Case Name: Mary N. RATLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lonnie Otis Ratley, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Robert Levon BATCHELOR, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-06-11
Citations: 599 So. 2d 1298
Docket Number: No. 90-2232
Parties: Mary N. RATLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lonnie Otis Ratley, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Robert Levon BATCHELOR, Appellee.
Judges: WOLF, J., specially concurs with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 599
Pages: 1298–1306

Head Matter:
Mary N. RATLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lonnie Otis Ratley, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Robert Levon BATCHELOR, Appellee.
No. 90-2232.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 11, 1991.
On Motion for Rehearing May 1, 1992.
Michael R. McCullough, Jacksonville, for appellant.
John M. Fite, Barron, Redding, Hughes, Fite, Bassett & Fensom, P.A., Panama City, for appellee.

Opinion:
ZEHMER, Judge.
Mary N. Ratley, the surviving wife and personal representative of the estate of Lonnie Ratley, Jr., deceased, appeals a final judgment entered in her action for the wrongful death of her husband. Mr. Rat-ley was killed in a head-on collision between the mini-van he was driving and a manufactured modular home being towed by the defendant, Robert Batchelor, on a two-lane state highway. The judgment, entered on a jury verdict that found Mr. Ratley 50% comparatively negligent, reduced the jury's damage award by that percentage. Mrs. Ratley's three points on appeal assert (1) error in failing to give an instruction on the prima facie effect of Mr. Batchelor's not having a valid wide-load permit to move the modular home on the highway; (2) error in failing to grant a mistrial following Mr. Batchelor's accident reconstruction expert testifying, in violation of a pretrial stipulation limiting the scope of his testimony, that his opinion on the cause of the accident was consistent with the cause stated in the Florida Highway Patrol homicide accident report; and (3) error in denying a new trial on damages because the low verdict was the result of a mistake on the jury's part or was inadequate as a matter of law. We reverse on the first two points and find it unnecessary to reach the third point because the case must be remanded for retrial on all issues.
Lonnie Ratley was killed on June 2, 1988, when the left front corner of the mini-van he was driving collided with the left front corner of the modular home being towed by Mr. Batchelor. The accident occurred on State Road 75, a two-lane, undivided roadway in Jackson County. During the collision, the side of the modular home tore through the mini-van and a two-by-four entered Mr. Ratley's midsection and exited out his back and through the seat. Despite being impaled by this two-by-four, Mr. Rat-ley remained conscious for some time after the accident, but ultimately died as a result of the massive internal injuries.
Mrs. Ratley, individually and as personal representative of her husband's estate, sued Mr. Batchelor for negligently causing the wrongful death of her husband. Evidence presented at trial showed that the lane widths in the vicinity of the accident were not uniform and varied between 11 to 12 feet, and that the modular home being transported by Mr. Batchelor was 13' 10" (166 inches) wide. Mr. Batchelor admitted that as he proceeded south on State Road 75 prior to the accident, the side of the modular home repeatedly jutted into oncoming traffic. Eyewitnesses testified that the side of the modular home was between 6 and 24 inches over the center line when the vehicles collided. Eyewitnesses also testified, however, that the mini-van had drifted toward the modular home seconds before the impact. These witnesses testified that the drift did not take the mini-van out of its lane of travel and that the impact occurred entirely within Mr. Ratley's lane of travel. Mr. Batchelor's expert witness opined, however, that the point of collision was in Mr. Batchelor's lane. The jury found Mr. Batchelor and Mr. Ratley equally negligent and the trial court entered a final judgment in accordance with that verdict.
As to Mrs. Ratley's first point on appeal, she requested and the trial court gave an instruction to the jury that violation of certain specific traffic regulations constituted evidence of negligence. The court instructed the jury on sections 316.-081, 316.185, and 316.1925, but denied her request for the following instruction based on section 316.515:
Florida Statute section 316.515 states that the total outside width of any vehicle or the load thereon may not exceed one hundred and two inches, exclusive of safety devices determined by the depart ment [of transportation] to be necessary for the safe and efficient operation of motor vehicles.
This instruction was requested on the theory that the modular home being towed exceeded the allowable width and that Mr. Batchelor did not at the time of the accident have a valid wide-load permit pursuant to section 316.550, Florida Statutes (1989), authorizing him to operate or move a load exceeding the width restriction in section 316.515. Prior to trial, Mrs. Rat-ley's counsel moved in limine to exclude any mention of the fact that Mr. Batchelor had in his possession a special permit authorizing him to transport the oversized load. This motion was grounded on the following facts stipulated to by the parties: the special permit Mr. Batchelor possessed at the time of the accident had been issued to NTC of America, Inc., the corporation that sold the modular home and hired Mr. Batchelor to deliver it to the buyer, and Mr. Batchelor was transporting the wide load as an independent contractor, not as an employee or agent of NTC of America, Inc. The court rejected Mrs. Ratley's argument that the permit was not transferable from NTC of America, Inc., to Mr. Batchelor, and allowed Mr. Batchelor to testify that he had a special permit authorizing him to transport the modular home at the time of the accident. The actual permit was never identified at trial or placed in evidence. Based on its ruling allowing the transfer of the permit, the trial court denied the requested instruction on section 316.515.
It is undisputed that the modular home being transported by Mr. Batchelor, which was 166 inches wide, exceeded the width limitation set out in section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Section 316.550, Florida Statutes (1989), provides the following exception to this width limitation where the vehicle operator applies for and receives a special permit authorizing the transport of the oversized load:
The Department of Transportation, with respect to highways under its jurisdiction, or a local authority, with respect to highways under its jurisdiction, may, in its discretion and upon application and good cause shown therefor that the same is not contrary to the public interest, issue a special permit in writing authorizing the applicant to operate or move a vehicle or combination of vehicles of a size or weight of vehicle or load exceeding the maximum specified in this chapter, or otherwise not in conformity with the provisions of this chapter, upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the authority issuing such permit and for the maintenance of which the authority is responsible. The permit shall describe the vehicle or vehicles and load to be operated or moved and the highways for which the permit is requested.
(Emphasis added). Section 316.003(25), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term "operator" as used in chapter 316 to mean, "Any person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highway, or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle." Section 316.003(29), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term "person" as, "Any natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation." Reading these provisions in pari materia, we construe section 316.550 as meaning the person who is the operator or one responsible for the actual operation of the vehicle upon the highway must be the applicant to whom the permit is issued.
Mr. Batchelor's operation of the towing vehicle for purposes of moving the modular home on State Road 75 violated section 316.515(1) unless he held a valid special permit that authorized him to transport this load. We conclude that the trial court erred in treating the NTC permit as transferable to Mr. Batchelor and finding that he had such a permit that validly covered his operation of the vehicle at the time and place of the accident. We have no doubt that had Mr. Batchelor been operating the vehicle towing the modular home as an employee or agent of NTC he would have been covered by the permit issued to NTC, because a corporation can only act through its employees and agents. However, there is no provision in chapter 316 that we know of that authorizes the transfer of such a permit from the original applicant who ob tained it to an independent contractor or operator not acting for the original applicant as an employee or agent subject to its control. Since the special permit Mr. Batchelor possessed authorized NTC of America, Inc., a corporation for whom he was not employed, to move the modular home, absent an express statutory provision authorizing such transfer, NTC of America, Inc., could not validly transfer this permit to Mr. Batchelor. See Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. King, 89 So.2d 246 (Fla.1956).
This interpretation of these statutes is consistent with Department of Transportation rule 14-26.007, Florida Administrative Code, which states that oversize permits are granted with the
specific understanding that the permittee shall be responsible and liable for accident, damage or injury to any person or property resulting from the operation of the equipment, covered by the permit, upon public streets and highways of the state....
Rule 14-26.0041 defines "permittee" as the "person to whom an oversize/overweight permit is issued." In this case, NTC of America, Inc., the "permittee," insulated itself from liability by using an independent contractor, rather than one of its employees or agents subject to its control, to transport the modular home.
Under the applicable ease law, the failure of an operator to have a valid wide load permit at the time of the accident is evidence of negligence. Smith v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 360 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Smith was a personal injury case resulting from a collision between an automobile and half of a double-wide portable classroom. The appellate court reversed a judgment entered for the plaintiff automobile driver pursuant to a jury verdict finding the plaintiff 90% negligent, which reduced the plaintiff's recoverable damages by that percentage. The basis for the reversal was the trial court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on section 316.196(1), Florida Statutes (1973) (now § 316.515(1)) in conjunction with Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.11 (violation of traffic regulation constitutes evidence of negligence). This court held that because there was substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's theory that the defendant driver had violated section 316.196(1) by not having the required permit, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury that if it found the defendant violated section 316.-196(1), such violation constituted evidence of negligence. See also Menard v. O'Malley, 327 So.2d 905 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). Here, the undisputed facts show that Mr. Batchelor violated section 316.515(1), in that the load he was transporting was wider than 102 inches and that Mr. Batche-lor did not have a special permit authorizing him to transport this oversized load on that highway. Thus, following Smith, we hold that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing Mr. Batchelor to testify that he had a special permit authorizing him to transport the modular home and in refusing to give the requested "violation of statute" jury instruction.
The second issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to' grant Mrs. Ratley's motion for mistrial following Mr. Batchelor's accident reconstruction expert's statement that his reconstruction of the accident was consistent with that made in the homicide accident report by the Florida Highway Patrol trooper who investigated the accident. Prior to trial, Mrs. Ratley's counsel filed a motion in li-mine that stated in pertinent part:
3. Similarly, plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order in limine prohibiting any other witness, especially the respective party's expert witnesses, from bolstering their testimony with statements that their conclusions coincide with those of the homicide investigator. Specifically, defense counsel's accident reconstruction expert stated several times during his deposition that his opinions as to certain facts were the same as those of the homicide investigator. These remarks insinuate that the Florida Highway Patrol homicide investigator concurs with the conclusions of the respective expert. However, the Florida Highway Patrol trooper's conclusions are otherwise inadmissible and thus should not be introduced by way of the respective party's accident reconstruction expert. Therefore, plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order specifically instructing counsel for the respective parties to instruct each and every witness that they are not to respond to a question, and that counsel is not to attempt to elicit a response, that indicates that the witness's testimony is in any way supported by the conclusions of the Florida Highway Patrol traffic investigator.
(Emphasis added). (R. 521-522). Mr. Batchelor's counsel stipulated to the limitations set out in paragraph 3 of the motion in limine. Mrs. Ratley's counsel reminded Mr. Batchelor's counsel of his agreement to paragraph 3 of the motion in limine shortly after Dr. Benedict, Mr. Batchelor's accident reconstruction expert, took the stand and Mrs. Ratley's counsel was assured that Dr. Benedict would comply with the stipulation. Despite these stipulations and assurances, Dr. Benedict testified that his opinion of how the accident occurred (his opinion was that a gouge mark in Mr. Batchelor's lane of travel was the point of impact) was the same as that contained in the homicide report. We specifically note that this statement of the witness was not called for by the question asked and was clearly volunteered by the witness.
Whether a trial court should grant a mistrial is within that court's discretion, and a mistrial should not be granted unless an absolute legal necessity to do so exists. Palmer v. State, 486 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Generally, both a motion to strike the allegedly improper testimony and a request for curative instruction are necessary prerequisites to a valid motion for mistrial. Id. In such circumstances, the trial court should not grant a mistrial unless the remarks are such that instructing the jury to disregard them could not cure the error; that is, the remarks constitute fundamental error. Id. In this case, Mrs. Ratley's counsel did not move to strike Dr. Benedict's testimony and did not request that the court instruct the jury to disregard this testimony. Thus, we cannot reverse the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial unless the remarks of Dr. Benedict constituted fundamental error.
This was a "close case" on the question of comparative negligence, as evidence was presented that Mr. Ratley drifted toward the modular home just prior to the collision. Some eye witnesses placed the point of impact in Mr. Ratley's lane. Mr. Batche-lor's expert, however, placed the point of impact in Mr. Batchelor's lane. Thus, the opinion testimony that the point of impact was in Mr. Batchelor's lane of travel was of critical importance to the relative negligence of the drivers. We conclude that Dr. Benedict's violation of the stipulation regarding the motion in limine was sufficiently prejudicial to plaintiff's case to constitute fundamental error and that the trial court erred in denying Mrs. Ratley's motion for mistrial based on this ground.
We do not reach Mrs. Ratley's final point on appeal as our resolution of the first two issues renders that point moot.
The judgment is reversed for the reasons stated and this cause is remanded for a new trial on all issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WOLF, J., specially concurs with opinion.
BOOTH, J., dissents.