Case Name: I. A. Huey v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-04-18
Citations: 81 Tex. Crim. 554
Docket Number: No. 4429
Parties: I. A. Huey v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 554–565

Head Matter:
I. A. Huey v. The State.
No. 4429.
Decided April 18, 1917.
Rehearing denied June 27, 1917.
1. —murder—Clothes of Deceased — Evidence.
Where, upon trial of murder, the introduction in evidence of the bloody clothes of deceased did not tend to solve any disputed fact, or explain issues about which there was doubt, the same was reversible error. Following Christian v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 47, and other cases. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same—Evidence—Declaration of Third Parties — Hearsay.
Where, upon trial of murder, the State was permitted to introduce testimony concerning matters and things that were said by the witness to other State witnesses in a conversation between said witness and the other witnesses, as to what occurred at the time of the homicide, and which declarations were made by said witness in the absence of the defendant, the same was reversible error. Following Gonzales v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 152, and other cases. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
3. —Same—Rehearing—Facts Stated in Opinion.
Where the facts stated in the original opinion are correct, except appellant was made to testify to things that another witness testified to, hut the matter was of not sufficient moment to affect the court’s ruling, there was no reversible error.
4. —Same—Stating Eacts in Opinion — Rehearing.
Where, upon motion for rehearing, it was contended that the statément in the original opinion, with reference to defendant’s carrying Ms gun to shoot squirrels and rabbits just before the homicide, was incorrect, but the court’s statement was borne out by the record, there' was not reversible error.
5. — Same—Evidence—Bloody Clothes — Buie Stated.
Bloody clothing may or may not be admissible in evidence, and this depends upon, whether they serve some useful purpose in the elucidation of some issue in the case, or tend to solve some question about which there may be some issue, but where the contention of the State was that the clothes were admitted in evidence to contradict appellant’s testimony as to the location of the wound was untenable, in as much as there was no issue about this point, the introduction of bloody clothes of deceased in evidence was reversible error. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
8. — Same—Evidence—Buie Stated — Opinion, of Witness.
While the physical facts surrounding the scene of the homicide may be admissible in evidence, yet a conversation between parties with reference to incidents and matters which are in controversy is not admissible in evidence, in the absence of the defendant, after the homicide. This .would be but an opinion of the witness. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
7. —Same—Evidence—Tracks—Declaration of Third Parties.
W’here, upon trial of murder, an issue arose as to where the gun was located with which .defendant killed the deceased, and certain tracksi were upon the ground, an eyewitness could testify that the gun was located at a certain point, and that he saw the actions of defendant in going to and coming from the gun and the use of it. But these facts could not be testified to by another to whom the first State witness related them, after the homicide and in the absence of the defendant. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
8. —Same—Evidence—Habits of Deceased.
Where, upon trial of murder, defendant testified that deceased cursed him at the time of the homicide, the State should not have been permitted to show that about a year before the homicide the deceased had joined the church and could not therefore be guilty of swearing.
Appeal from the District Court of Cooke. Tried below before the Hon. 0.- F. Spencer.
Appeal from a conviction of murder; penalty, ninety-nine years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Culp, Culp & Culp, for appellant.
Upon question of declarations of third parties: Holt v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 432, 125 S. W. Rep., 43; Seymour v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 76, 158 S. W. Rep., 304, and cases cited in opinion.
E. B. Hendricks, Assistant Attorney General, and Garnett & Garnett, for the State.
Upon question of bloody clothes: Cole v. State, 75 S. W. Rep., 527; Crenshaw v. State, 85 S. W. Rep., 1147; Hart v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 202.
On question of malice: Marta v. State, 193 S. W. Rep., 523.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of murder, his punishment being assessed at ninety-nine years confinement in the penitentiary.
It is unnecessary, we think, to give anything like a statement of the facts. The State relied lárgely upon the testimony of Williams to the effect that when he walked to where the parties were engaged, in the difficulty he heard them talking. His testimony and that of defendant is-at variance as to who began the conversation that finally led 'to the trouble. The great preponderance of the testimony shows that the parties were friendly up to the time of the killing, and that appellant was a renter of the deceased. One of the witnesses testified to the effect that appellant expressed some dissatisfaction because deceased did not accompany him to the town of St. Jo on Saturday to assist him in raising some money previous to the homicide on Monday. Deceased was building a fence separating the pasture from the farm land. Appellant and other hands had been assisting him. It is in evidence that deceased, the landlord, was to pasture the stock of his tenants free, among others the stock of appellant. Appellant was asked if he would further assist in building the fence on Monday, to which lie assented, and went to the place of the homicide for that purpose, taking a single barrel shotgun. He accounts for taking the shotgun by stating that he would find squirrels and rabbits in passing through some timbered land and would use the gun for the purpose of killing these. When he reached the place of the homicide he laid it down a few steps from the fence in some young corn in which was also growing some Johnson grass. This was about eight to twelve steps from the fence on the south side. Deceased drove up in his wagon on the north side of the fence. A conversation occurred in which deceased informed appellant that he would have to pay fifty cents a month pasturage on his stock or keep them out of the pasture. Appellant reminded him of the fact that the contract was that he was to have pasturage free. A wordy altercation became a little incisive. Deceased jumped out of his wagon with a double-edged ax. Appellant says he got- the ax out of the wagon, while Williams' says he picked- it up from the ground. He drew the ax in a striking attitude, and appellant stepped back and got his gun and approached within a few steps of deceased. Williams says at this time deceased had his ax handle in his hand with the ax part of it down by his leg or side, while appellant says he had it drawn back over his shoulder in a striking attitude. He fired the gun from down by his side without raising' it to his shoulder, the load of shot taking effect in appellant's abdomen about two or two and one-half inches to the right of the middle line of the stomach, which resulted fatally. The ax was found about two or three feet from deceased's body, some of the testimony showing it was near his feet. Appellant and Williams both left. Appellant surrendered to the officers, and Williams went around and secured some nearby neighbors and returned to the scene of the tragedy. It seems that the son of deceased had been to the body before these parties arrived. Two other young men •were also present. The wound was described as having entered, as before stated, going straight in and about an inch to an inch and a half in diameter. The gun was loaded with Ho. 6 shot. This would indicate that the muzzle of the gun was not very far distant from deceased when it was fired. There was no controversy or question as to the wound and that it entered from the front and at the point designated. This did not become an issue and there was no other evidence as to the place of the wound. Appellant made no contention that the wound entered otherwise than in the front, and his contention was further that deceased was facing him at the time with an ax drawn back above and over his shoulder. The testimony describing the wounds is stated because of a bill of exceptions reserved to the action of the court permitting the exhibition of the bloody shirt and pants to the jury while the widow of the deceased was on the witness stand. The bill shows that she was very much affected when the clothes were shown her and while describing them was crying. Exception was reserved to this, and, we think, correctly. Where the production of the bloody clothes tends to solve any disputed fact or explain issues about which there was doubt, they should go to the jury, otherwise they should be excluded. Under these decisions we are of opinion that the court was in error with reference to this testimony, and it comes within the rule laid down in Cole v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 225, followed in Christian v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 47; Crenshaw v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 77; Lucas v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 219. These are a sufficient number of cases to show the rule as applicable to this bill of exceptions and the action of the court.
There are two other bills practically to the same effect reserved to the introduction of the testimony of the two witnesses who went to the scene of the homicide with Williams. They cover each about a couple of pages of the transcript, setting out conversations and acts occurring between the parties at the scene of the tragedy some time after the shooting but during the same day. These matters were things that were said by Williams and the conversation between himself and these witnesses as to what occurred at the time of the homicide, the location of the parties and various things that he says he saw at the time, to all of which exceptions were reserved for various and sundry reasons. We are of opinion this testimony was not admissible. These were acts, conversations and declarations made in the absence of the defendant among third parties, and in no way binding upon appellant. It is useless, we think, to go into a discussion of this matter. There are quite a number of cases we might cite, among others, Gonzales v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 152; Felder v. State, 23 Texas Crim. App., 477; Liner v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 75; Straight v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 453; Holt v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 295, 125 S. W. Rep., 45. The rule is so well recognized it is unnecessary to cite authorities. This illegal testimony may have had and doubtless did have material effect upon the minds of the jury in their finding the amount of punishment.
The court charged upon the issue of manslaughter. There was a sudden quarrel, starting about not very important matters. The parties became angered and minds inflamed. The deceased made the first demonstration with the ax. The testimony in any event was illegal and improper. The assessment of ninety-nine years in the penitentiary may have been induced by this testimony by giving it undue prominence and weight.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
PRENDERGAST, Judge, dissenting.