Case Name: H. L. Shornweber v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-04-16
Citations: 70 Tex. Crim. 389
Docket Number: No. 2404
Parties: H. L. Shornweber v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 389–393

Head Matter:
H. L. Shornweber v. The State.
No. 2404.
Decided April 16, 1913.
Rehearing denied May 7, 1913.
1. —Burglary—Argument of Counsel.
In the absence of a bill of exceptions, an objection to the argument of counsel can not be considered.
2. —Same—¡Private ¡Residence—Indictment.
Where the indictment charged burglary in two counts in the ordinary form alleging burglary at night-time and in daytime, and the evidence showed that the alleged injured party did not sleep or live in that part of the building which was in fact burglarized, but slept in another part of it on a little gallery between the lower floor and the roof elevated about ten feet from the floor, this would not constitute the store which was burglarized, a private residence within the meaning of the statute. Following Alinis v. State, 63 Texas Crim. Rep., 272.
3. —Same—Practice on Appeal.
In the absence of a bill of exceptions or motion for new trial, matters suggested for the first time in the brief can not be reviewed on appeal.
4. —Same—Stating Facts in Opinion—Practice on Appeal.
Where this court found from the record that the indictment did not allege that the house burglarized was a private residence and the record supported this finding, this will control the statement in attorney’s briefs and motion for rehearing.
5. —Same—Private Residence.
Where the indictment did not allege that the house burglarized was a private residence, and the evidence showed that it was a store and that the party injured slept in another portion of the building used as a sleeping gallery and was not a part of the store, the contention that the evidence showed that the house burglarized was a private residence is untenable and there was no error. Following James v. State, 63 Texas Crim. Rep., 559, and other cases.
6. —Same—Separate Offense.
Ordinary burglary is a different offense from that of breaking into a private residence and requires different allegations and different proof, but this issue is not raised in the instant case.
7. —Same—Breaking—Daytime Burglary—Charge of Court.
Where the court did not submit directly a daytime burglary, but charged the jury that if defendant broke and entered the alleged house by force, he would be guilty, which charge was supported by the indictment and the evidence, which did. not support a- daytime breaking, there was no error in the court’s failure in submitting a daytime burglary.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Harris. Tried below before the Hon. C. W. Robinson.
Appeal from a conviction of burglary; penalty, twelve years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Gibson & Wander, for appellant.
On question of private residence: Jones v. State, 47 Texas Crim. Rep., 126; Martinus v. State, 47 id., 528; Mays v. State, 50 id., 391; Fonville v. State, 62 S. W. Rep., 573; Rodgers v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 146, 127 S. W. Rep., 834; Reyes v. State, 51 Texas Crim. Rep., 420, 102 S. W. Rep., 421; Martinez v. State, 51 Texas Crim. Rep., 584, 103 S. W. Rep., 930; Lewis v. State, 54 Texas Crim. Rep., 636, 114 S. W. Rep., 818; Sedgwick v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 420, 123 S. W. Rep., 702; Malley v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 425, 126 S. W. Rep., 598; Hopkins v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Rep., 590, 135 S. W. Rep., 553.
C. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
Cited cases in opinion.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of burglary, his punishment being assessed at twelve years confinement in the penitentiary.
There are two propositions in the motion for new trial, first, the undisputed evidence shows that the house burglarized was a private residence, and, second, the district attorney used remarks during his argument which were objectionable and injurious. To the second ground it may be stated that these matters are not verified in any manner or perpetuated'by bill of exceptions, and, therefore, can not be considered. To the first ground it may be replied we are of opinion that the evidence does not show burglary of a private residence. The indictment contains two counts, in the ordinary form, charging burglary at night and in daytime. Nowhere in either of these counts is it undertaken to charge that the house burglarized was a private residence. The theory upon which this contention is made is that in one part of the house the alleged owner had a room in which he slept. The burglarized house was a jewelry establishment, one of the front windows being broken by a rock and the jewelry taken through this aperture. The alleged owner slept in a different part of the house from that occupied as the jewelry establishment. The alleged injured party slept in another part of it on a little gallery between the lower floor and the roof, elevated about ten feet from the floor. This will not constitute the store a private residence within the meaning of the statute. This matter was discussed in Alinis v. State, 63 Texas Crim. Rep., 272, and same style of case, page 371 of same volume.
There are other questions suggested in the brief, but are not presented by bill or motion in the record. They are suggested here for the first time. Under the ruling of this court these matters can not be reviewed.
As the record is presented the judgment is ordered to be affirmed.
Affirmed.