Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sidney A. LITTMAN, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1970-01-21
Citations: 421 F.2d 981
Docket Number: No. 205, Docket 33682
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sidney A. LITTMAN, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 421
Pages: 981–985

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sidney A. LITTMAN, Appellant.
No. 205, Docket 33682.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 16, 1969.
Decided Jan. 21, 1970.
Alfred D. Lerner, Richmond Hill, for appellant.
James D. Zirin, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York, James Schreiber, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before FRIENDLY, HAYS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
HAYS, Circuit Judge:
Sidney A. Littman appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Littman was convicted, along with five co-defendants, of nine counts including wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964), use of interstate facilities to promote an unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Supp. IV 1965-68), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
Littman claims inter alia that the evidence introduced against him was insufficient to support his conviction; that the admission of certain testimony of a victim of the conspiracy requires this court to reverse under the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); and that the admission of a tape recording made by one of the victims of a conversation he had with appellant, and the subsequent failure to play this tape to the jury, constitute reversible error.
We find no merit in these or appellant's additional claims of error and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.
I.
The trial testimony proved the existence of an astonishing scheme involving Littman, who was a lawyer, and six others which eventually defrauded two groups of businessmen out of approximately 1.3 million dollars.
The scheme began with the false claim that the conspirators could obtain Cadillac agencies for the victims. To this end they were persuaded to deposit large amounts of money in escrow with Litt-man. It was represented that this money was to be used to bribe officials in the Cadillac organization. Later the victims were encouraged to participate in a gambling game with an entirely fictitious "eccentric millionaire." Finally the victims were told that they had suffered huge gambling losses, and threatened with bodily injury unless they paid these debts. The first group of victims paid by signing releases, prepared by appellant for the funds he supposedly held in escrow. The second group of victims was not so easily frightened and when pressed to pay, reported the swindle to the F.B.I.
Taking the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the government, see e. g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 50 (1964), we find that the jury had sufficient grounds upon which to reach its conclusion as to appellant's guilt.
That evidence can properly be viewed as establishing that Littman was present at meetings of the conspirators at the home of one Salvatore Marino when details of the fraudulent scheme were being planned, that he disbursed the proceeds of the fraud to Marino and Marino's creditors, then he went with Marino to the race track where Marino bet what the jury could have concluded was a part of the funds supposedly held by Littman in escrow, that he prepared and accepted delivery of releases from two of the victims when it was fair to assume he knew that they were acting under threat of physical injury, and that he accepted further payments from some of the victims when it was fair to assume he knew of the threats to others.
II.
At the trial, George Desser, one of the victims of the fraud, related the contents of a telephonic conversation between his wife and Salvatore Marino, one of the co-conspirators, which Desser overheard. The relevant portion of Des-ser's testimony is as follows:
Q. And on Saturday, May 25 about 9:30 in the evening, did there come a time when you received a call from Mr. Marino? A. Yes, I did and, as I say, I can't recall every one of these calls. I believe he said "You had some nerve talking that way. Blacky meant every word that he said that Saturday night and these union boys" —excuse me, just a minute, I am trying to see if I can remember.
"He meant every word that he said that Saturday night and your husband is in terrible danger and in terrible trouble and these union boys are real tough."
Q. Do you recall anything else that was said? A. Yes, he said, "We'll be over to get you and we'll put you through a torture the likes of which you have never seen."
Q. Do you remember anything else that was said? A. Yes, he said to my wife, "Mr. Littman is the only swindler in our gang"—
Mr. Wallach: Your Honor, I am going to object to this.
The Court: Yes, it is taken subject to connection as to Mr. Litt-man. You have to find that there was a conspiracy, that Mr. Littman was a part of it and that this was done in furtherance of the conspiracy during the life of the conspiracy before you may apply it to Mr. Litt-man.
What did he say ?
The Witness: Mr. Marino said that "Mr. Littman is the only swindler in our gang that has a law degree and I need him for the legal end of our scheme." (Emphasis added.)
Littman contends that the admission of the italicized comments require this court to reverse under Bruton v. United States, supra, despite the fact that the trial judge subsequently ruled the statement admissible only against Marino.
Bruton is inapposite. There the challenged statement was a co-defendant's confession made to a government agent after the confessing defendant's arrest. Bruton held that a trial judge's instruction to confine the effect of such evidence to the author of the confession was insufficient to protect a co-defendant from prejudicial effect.
The instant ease presents quite a different question. Here, since there was substantial independent evidence of Lift-man's participation in the conspiracy, testimony as to statements by a co-conspirator in the course of the conspiracy was properly admitted as a declaration made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
III.
It is argued that the admission of a tape recording made by one of the victims of the conspiracy of a telephone conversation he had with Littman constitutes reversible error. Reliance is placed primarily on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Katz held that evidence acquired by bugging of a telephone booth without a warrant was inadmissible when the evidence consisted of a conversation between two persons who were both unaware of the bugging. This court has held where one party to the conversation consents to its being monitored, Katz does not apply. United States v. Polansky, 418 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 1969); United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.), affirmed, 394 U.S. 458, 89 S.Ct. 1223, 22 L.Ed.2d 414 (1969), on the basis of Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969). Appellant's contention that 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV 1965-68) was violated by the recording and that his conviction must therefore be reversed is equally unpersuasive. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957); see Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 381, 88 S.Ct. 2096, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1968).
Having argued at the trial that the tape was inadmissible, appellant now contends that the tape was exculpatory and the failure of the trial court to have it played to the jury constitutes reversible error. If the tape was truly exculpatory appellant could have used it on cross-examination but chose not to do so. We have examined a transcript of the tape in question and conclude that the failure to have it played to the jury in no way prejudiced appellant.
Affirmed.
. The testimony shows, and Littman concedes, that he never respected his escrow obligations.
. Appellant's contention that there was no proof adduced to show that he knew interstate facilities were to be used is without merit. The jury was certainly entitled to find on the basis of the part he played in the scheme, that Littman was aware that these facilities would be used.
. In United States v. Marino, 421 F.2d 640, decided January 14, 1970, the conviction of Littman's co-conspirators on counts 5 and 6 was vacated on grounds not raised on Littman's appeal. The court in Marino found that the vacating of the conviction on counts 5 ancl 6 did not require remand for resentencing because of the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States ex rel. Weems v. Follette, 414 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).