Case Name: In re G.O., et ux Applying for Adoption
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-05-25
Citations: 433 So. 2d 1115
Docket Number: No. 82-743
Parties: In re G.O., et ux Applying for Adoption.
Judges: Before GUIDRY, STOKER and KNOLL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 433
Pages: 1115–1122

Head Matter:
In re G.O., et ux Applying for Adoption.
No. 82-743.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 25, 1983.
Rehearing Denied July 14, 1983.
Russell T. Tritico, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.
Levingston, Tynes & Liles, Henry R. Liles, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellee.
Before GUIDRY, STOKER and KNOLL, JJ.

Opinion:
GUIDRY, Judge.
The plaintiffs in this adoption proceeding appeal the judgment of the trial court denying their petition for adoption on the ground that the natural mother's act of surrender is invalid. The names of the litigants have been omitted in the title and in this opinion in accordance with LSA-R.S. 9:437. The parties are referred to by their initials.
The child which the plaintiffs seek to adopt was born on May 14, 1982. On May 20, 1982, the natural mother executed a formal act of surrender, whereby she surrendered the child to the plaintiffs, G.O. and B.O., for the purpose of adoption. On June 4,1982, the natural mother executed a document styled "Declaration of Revocation of Adoption", wherein she stated her intention not to give the child up for adoption. The plaintiffs' petition for adoption was filed on June 8, 1982. The natural mother filed an exception of no cause of action, which was sustained by the trial court. The plaintiffs appeal.
The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether the formal act of surrender complied with the requirements of LSA-R.S. 9:422.6; (2) whether the act of surrender was executed subsequent to the period of delay provided by LSA-R.S. 9:422.7; and, (3) if the act of surrender is found to be valid whether adoption of the child by G.O. and B.O. would be in the best interest of the child.
FORMAL ACT OF SURRENDER
The trial court found that the formal act of surrender executed by the natural mother reserved a right to the surrendering parent which is not authorized by the adoption laws, i.e., the right to revoke the act of surrender itself and all its effects. He concluded that the reservation of such right in the act rendered the act invalid for failure to strictly comply with the adoption laws.
LSA-R.S. 9:422.8 provides for the effect to be given the formal act of surrender:
"The formal act of voluntary surrender grants the legal custody of the child identified in the act to the person or persons named or represented in the act. Further, the formal act of voluntary surrender grants the irrevocable consent, except as specifically provided in R.S. 9:422.10, of the surrendering parent or parents to the adoption of the child by the person or persons named or represented in the act. Should there be only one parent indicated on the birth certificate referenced in R.S. 9:422.4, the surrender by that parent alone terminates all parental rights whatsoever, except as provided in R.S. 9:422.-10."
LSA-R.S. 9:422.10 provides that the surrendering parent or parents may revoke the consent to adoption within thirty days after executing the formal act of surrender.
The formal act of surrender thus has the threefold effect of (1) transferring custody of the child to the person or persons named in the act; (2) granting the consent of the surrendering parent or parents to the adoption, subject to the right of the parent or parents to withdraw consent within thirty days; and, (3) termination of all parental rights. This right to revoke consent has the limited effect of giving the surrendering parent or parents standing to oppose the adoption. It has no effect on the transfer of custody effected by the formal act of surrender or the termination of parental rights.
The trial judge found that the act of surrender executed by the natural mother was invalid because of the inclusion of the following language in the act:
"E.S. also fully understands that this Act of Surrender is completely irrevocable, if no written opposition is served on G.O. and B.O., by certified or registered mail within thirty (30) days, after the execution of the Act of Surrender." (emphasis supplied)
The trial judge interpreted the foregoing language to mean that the act of surrender itself with all its attendant effects, i.e., the transfer of custody, the termination of parental rights and the consent to adoption, was revocable if an opposition was filed within 30 days. He found that such a provision, purporting to grant the surrendering parent the right to revoke the entire act of surrender, was in conflict with the adoption laws and rendered the act of surrender invalid. In his oral reasons for judgment, the learned trial judge opined:
"The instrument further states, 'E.S. also fully understands that this act of surrender is completely irrevocable.' If it went no further I'd have no question with it. However, the sentence goes on to say, 'if no written opposition is served on G.O. and B.O. by certified or registered mail within 30 days after the execution of this act of surrender.' This indicates clearly that the act of surrender can be revoked by her within 30 days. Of course, the statute has a 30-day provision for a surrendering parent to notify the adoptive parents that they are going to contest the adoption. In my opinion, this is limited to showing that the adoption will not be in the best interest of the child. But this document is written in terms which provide that the surrender, itself is revocable, if the surrendering parent serves a notice to this effect within the 30 days.
Under the circumstances the Court must necessarily conclude that the surrender document attached to the petition does not comply strictly with the terms of the law and therefore being without effect the peremptory exception of no cause of action is applicable."
The trial court's interpretation of the quoted phraseology in the act of surrender is not an unreasonable one. However, we choose to rely on other grounds in concluding that the act of surrender is invalid.
The formal act of surrender for purposes of private adoption is evidence of a legal and voluntary surrender only if it is executed in accordance with the requirements established by the legislature. LSA-R.S. 9:422.3. These requirements are listed in LSA-R.S. 9:422.6, which provides:
"The formal act of surrender shall identify the parents or parent of the child by name, parish of domicile, age, and marital status; shall identify the child and the parish of birth of the child; shall indicate the name and address of the person or persons to whom the surrender is made, or the name and address of the representative of that person or persons; and shall recite: (1) the date of birth of the child to be surrendered and that the act is not signed earlier than the fifth day following that date; (2) that the parent or parents freely and voluntarily surrender custody of the child for the purpose of private placement and adoption; (3) that the parent or parents consent to the adoption; (4) that the parent or parents have been informed and understand that their rights as parents of the child are to be terminated, and (5) that notice and service of any pleading of any sort in any subsequent adoption proceeding is waived. Should a surrendering parent of the child be under the age of eighteen at the time of signing, the formal act shall also recite that fact and shall state that the surrendering parent under the age of eighteen is joined in signing the formal act of surrender by those individuals indicated in R.S. 9:422.3. Each necessary party must sign in the presence of a notary and two witnesses, although it is not necessary that they sign the same instrument."
In the instant case, the formal act of surrender executed by the natural mother, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 1, fails to recite that the surrendering parent or parents consents to the adoption, as required by subsection (3). The appellants contend that the document, read as a whole, clearly indicates that the natural mother consented to the adoption. They emphasize the following language contained in the act:
"E.S., now freely, voluntarily, and irrevocably surrenders custody of W.C.S. for the purpose of adoption, to G.O. and B.O...."
The appellants urge that the foregoing language necessarily implies that E.S. consented to the adoption of her child, and that the requirement of subsection (3) has been fulfilled.
We agree that one could imply from a reading of the entire document that it was E.S.'s intention to consent to the adoption of her child by G.O. and B.O. However, in our view, the consent to adoption necessary to the validity of an act of surrender must be express. It may not be supplied by implication. This is made clear from a reading of LSA-R.S. 9:422.6, which specifically provides that the surrender document must recite: ". . (2) that the parent or parents freely and voluntarily surrender custody of the child for the purpose of private placement and adoption; (3) that the parent or parents consent to the adoption..." The legislature apparently felt that compliance with subsection (2) was inadequate to supply consent to the adoption, since they added the additional requirement, in subsection (3), that the act recite that the parent or parents consent to the adoption. We can conceive of no reason why the legislature would delineate these separate requirements if it did not intend each to be necessary to the validity of an act of surrender.
This interpretation is in accord with well settled jurisprudence regarding the construction of adoption laws. Adoption laws, being in derogation of natural rights, are strictly construed in favor of the natural parents. In re CDT, 415 So.2d 315 (La.App. 2d Cir.1982). We find no error in the judgment of the trial court finding the act of surrender invalid.
Two other issues are raised by this appeal. The first concerns the five-day waiting period provided for by LSA-R.S. 9:422.7 and whether LSA-C.C.P. Art. 5059 applies to the method of computation of such period. The other issue concerns whether adoption by the prospective parents would serve the best interest of the child. It is unnecessary to reach these issues since we find that the formal act of surrender executed by the natural mother is invalid.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiffs-appellants.
AFFIRMED.
KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
APPENDIX I
STATE OF LOUISIANA :
FORMAL ACT OF SURRENDER
PARISH OF CALCASIEU :
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, and in the presence of the undersigned competent witnesses, personally came and appeared:
E.S. and R.J.B., each of whom, after being duly sworn, did state:
E.S. is a single person having never been married, who resides in the Parish of Calca-sieu, State of Louisiana.
R.J.B. is the attorney for E.S.
E.S., age 19, is the mother of W.C.S., and her name appears on the Birth Certificate of W.C.S.; W.C.S. was born in the Parish of Calcasieu, Louisiana; on the 14th day of May, 1982. This Act of Surrender has been executed more than five (5) days from the date of the birth of W.C.S., on the 14th day of May, 1982.
E.S., now freely, voluntarily, and irrevocably surrenders custody of W.C.S. for the purpose of adoption, to G.O. and B.O., of Route 11, Box 257, Lake Charles, Louisiana.
The effect of this Act of Surrender has been fully explained to E.S. by R.J.B., Attorney at Law, and she fully understands that her rights as mother and parent of W.C.S. are to be terminated, including all rights of inheritance from her child.
E.S. also fully understands that this Act of Surrender is completely irrevocable, if no written opposition is served on G.O. and B.O., by certified or registered mail within thirty (30) days, after the execution of this Act of Surrender.
E.S. specifically waives notice and service of any pleadings of any sort, and any subsequent adoption proceedings, and she understands that she will not receive any notice of any adoption proceedings.
SWORN TO, SIGNED AND NOTARIZED in Lake Charles, Louisiana, after being carefully read and explained to E.S. by the undersigned Notary Public, and R.J.B., Attorney at Law and lawyer for E.S., and, in the presence of the undersigned competent witnesses on this 20th day of May, 1982.
WITNESSES:
s/D.T.
s/C.A.
s/E.S.
s/R.J.B., Attorney
s/C.P.
NOTARY PUBLIC
FILED June 8, 1982 s/Pam Fairchild Deputy Clerk of Court Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana
Before GUIDRY, STOKER, and KNOLL, JJ.