Case Name: ANDREW HOJNOWSKI, A MINOR, THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM, JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, AND JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. VANS SKATE PARK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND MCCOWN DELEEUW COMPANY, DEFENDANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2005-03-10
Citations: 375 N.J. Super. 568
Docket Number: 
Parties: ANDREW HOJNOWSKI, A MINOR, THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM, JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, AND JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. VANS SKATE PARK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND MCCOWN DELEEUW COMPANY, DEFENDANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 568–612

Head Matter:
868 A.2d 1087
ANDREW HOJNOWSKI, A MINOR, THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM, JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, AND JERRY HOJNOWSKI AND ANASTASIA HOJNOWSKI, IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. VANS SKATE PARK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND MCCOWN DELEEUW COMPANY, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted October 20, 2004
Decided March 10, 2005.
Before Judges FALL, PAYNE and C.S. FISHER.
Bafundo, Porter, Borbi & Clancy, attorneys for appellant (Robert A. Porter, on the brief).
Reilly, Supple & Wischusen, attorneys for respondent (Alex W. Raybould, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAYNE, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs Andrew Hojnowski, a minor, and his parents, Jerry and Anastasia Hojnowski, appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing without prejudice the personal injury complaint filed by the parents on behalf of Andrew and themselves against Vans Skate Park (properly known as Vans, Inc.) to permit an arbitration to take place under rules established by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the pre-tort release signed by Anastasia Hojnowski on behalf of her son, which contains an arbitration provision as well as a limitation of liability, is not enforceable against the son. Its enforceability against the parents is not raised as an issue.
On January 3, 2003, Andrew Hojnowski, age twelve, fractured his femur while skateboarding at a skatepark facility operated by Vans. He has subsequently undergone two surgeries for the repair of the injury. In a complaint filed against Vans and its alleged corporate owner, plaintiffs claimed that Vans was liable for Andrew's injuries as the result of its negligent failure to supervise activities at the park, to control activities of aggressive skateboarders, to warn Andrew's parents that the activities of aggressive skateboarders would not be monitored, and to provide a safe place to skateboard.
Prior to Andrew's accident, on December 26, 2002, as a condition of use of the park, Andrew's mother executed on Andrew's behalf a document entitled "Release and Waiver of Liability and Jury Trial with Indemnity (For All Vans Skateparks, Stores and Facilities (Collectively, "Parks") in New Jersey)." The document commenced by stating:
Please read this document. It affects Your legal rights against Vans, Inc. if you are injured. Do not sign this document unless you understand it. If You are a minor, Your parent or guardian is required to sign this legal document.
Additionally, the document, at its conclusion, required a "yes" or "no" response to the following question: "Do You understand that You are giving up rights by signing this document if You are hurt?" Andrew's mother responded "yes" to this question.
The body of the document commenced with a description of the dangers of skateboarding, in-line skating and bicycle riding. It then set forth the following provisions of relevance to this litigation:
2. Can You Make A Claim For Money If You Are Injured?
If you are injured and want to make a claim, you must file a demand before the American Arbitration Association (the "AAA")____ You agree that any dispute between You and Vans will be decided by the AAA. Vans, Inc. will pay all costs of the arbitration for You____
3. Vans Is Asking You To Give Up Legal Rights in Order to Enter This Park.
Because using Vans' Park . may increase your risk of harm, Vans is asking you to give up certain valuable legal rights. Here are the rights you are giving up when you sign this document:
(a) You give up your right to sue Vans in a court of law.
(b) You give up your right to a trial by jury.
(c) You give up the right to claim money from Vans if you are injured unless Vans intentionally failed to prevent or correct a hazard caused by unsafe equipment or devices.
(d) You give up the right to claim money from Vans if you wait more than one year from the injury in order to make a claim.
(e) You give up the right to claim money from Vans, Inc. if you are injured by another person.
(f) You give up the right to recover damages to punish or make an example of Vans, Inc.
4. Rights You Do Not Give Up
You do not give up the right:
(a) To have safe equipment, structures and devices at the Park for Your intended use.
(b) To claim compensation for Your injury from Vans, Inc. if you are hurt because the equipment, structures and devices at the Park are not safe for Your intended use.
(e) To have a neutral arbitrator decide your rights fairly, quickly and completely.

5. Who is Bound By This Document?
You are bound by this document. Anyone who has or can obtain Your rights is also bound by this document, such as Your family, relatives, guardians, executors or anyone responsible for You____
6. Other Information Important For You To Know
You have the right to demand money if You believe Vans, Inc. intentionally caused You harm. If parts of this document are determined to be invalid, then that portion will be unenforceable and the remainder of the document will continue in full legal force and effect____
Following the institution of suit, Vans filed for commercial arbitration with the AAA. Plaintiffs then moved to enjoin the arbitration and to invalidate the pre-tort release signed by Andrew's mother. Vans cross-moved for summary judgment. The court granted Vans' motion, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice and ordering that the parties submit to arbitration. It made no ruling on the validity of the contract's limitation of liability, finding that the issue was within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
We are informed that the parties have selected as arbitrator a person with significant experience in tort law, thereby rendering irrelevant any argument by plaintiffs that the arbitration cannot proceed under the auspices of an organization whose focus is upon commercial matters — an argument that we find in any event to be factually unsupported.
I.
We construe the document executed by Anastasia Hojnowski on behalf of her son Andrew as bipartite, consisting of an agreement to arbitrate and a pre-tort liability waiver. We first address, as a matter entirely separate from the issue of the validity of the liability waiver, whether in the circumstances presented, a parent can enter into an enforceable contract, binding on the parent's minor child, that waives the right to trial by jury of the minor's bodily injury claims and requires submission of "any dispute" to arbitration. We hold that a parent has such power.
Public policy has long favored arbitration. See, e.g., Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76, 84-85, 800 A.2d 872, 876-77 (2002); Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, 168 N.J. 124, 131, 773 A.2d 665, 669-70 (2001); Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 186, 430 A.2d 214, 217 (1981) (discussing long history of arbitration); Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, 342 N.J.Super. 254, 257, 776 A.2d 816, 818 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001).
The ancient practice of arbitration "[i]n its broad sense, [ ] is a substitution, by consent of the parties, of another tribunal for the tribunal provided by the ordinary processes of law. The object of arbitration is the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditions and perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial differences between the parties."
[Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 131, 773 A.2d at 670 (quoting Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J.Super. 157, 162, 148 A.2d 497, 500 (App.Div.1959) (quoting Eastern Eng'g Co. v. City of Ocean City, 11 N.J. Misc. 508, 510-11, 167 A. 522, 523 (Sup.Ct. 1933))).]
We read an agreement relating to arbitration liberally to find arbitrability if that is reasonably possible. Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 132, 773 A.2d at 673; Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282, 633 A.2d 531, 535 (1993); Jansen, supra, 342 N.J.Super. at 257-58, 776 A.2d at 818-19.
In this ease, the agreement signed by Andrew's mother on his behalf provided that: "If you are injured and want to make a claim, you must file a demand before the American Arbitration Association." The agreement further eliminated the right to sue in a court of law. "A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy that may arise therefrom . shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract." N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1. The fact that the claim arises in tort, not contract, is immaterial. Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 137, 773 A.2d at 673; Jansen, supra, 342 N.J.Super. at 258, 776 A.2d at 819.
No New Jersey case has determined whether a parent, as a condition to her minor child's entry into a commercial recreational facility and participation in its activities, has the power to agree on behalf of that child that any claim for the minor's bodily injuries at the facility will be subject to arbitration. However the issue of the binding effect on non-parties of a contractual arbitration clause has been addressed. "[N]on-signatories of a contract . may . be subject to arbitration if the nonparty is an agent of a party or a third party beneficiary to the contract." Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 333 N.J.Super. 291, 308, 755 A.2d 626, 636 (App.Div.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 168 N.J. 124, 773 A.2d 665 (2001) (quoting Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 783 F.Supp. 853, 865 (D.N.J.), affd, 970 F.2d 899 (3d Cir.1992)). See also Jansen, supra, 342 N.J.Super. at 261, 776 A.2d at 820-21.
"The principle that determines the existence of a third party beneficiary status focuses on whether the parties to the contract intended others to benefit from the existence of the contract, or whether the benefit so derived arises merely as an unintended incident of the agreement." Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 90 N.J. 253, 259, 447 A.2d 906, 909 (1982). "[T]he real test is whether the contracting parties intended that a third party should receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts." Borough of Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp., 124 N.J.L. 73, 77, 11 A.2d 83, 85 (E. & A.1940). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979).
In this case, it is clear that Andrew's mother intended that Andrew benefit from the contract that she signed on his behalf. Indeed, her execution of the agreement had no purpose other than to gain for her son the benefit of entry into the skatepark. That the entry was conditioned upon a relinquishment of the right to trial and its replacement with the right to mandatory arbitration does not render the contract against public policy or otherwise avoidable.
The substitution of one forum for another, in and of itself, has never been declared against the public policy of this State. We recognize that commentators have found fault with the arbitration process, focusing on concerns such as its cost, limitations upon discovery, the absence of an adequate evidentiary record to support the arbitrator's decision, the elimination of the right to a jury trial, and severe restrictions upon appellate review. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornberg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 253 (Winter/Spring 2004). Nonetheless, those complaints have not gained a foothold in New Jersey's jurisprudence. A "State interest in favoring arbitration" has instead been recognized. Martindale, supra, 173 N.J. at 85, 800 A.2d at 877. We perceive no rational basis for according additional weight in this ease to the concerns enumerated by others, simply because the arbitration provision at issue governs the claims of a minor.
We derive support for our conclusion from Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J.Super. 254, 654 A.2d 1375 (App.Div.1995), although we recognize in that case that the benefit to the child was of greater significance than that accorded here, and the father's right to enter into a contract affecting the welfare of his son was concomitantly stronger. There, we found that a father's contractual agreement to submit underinsured motorist's (UIM) claims to arbitration bound his minor son, who sought UIM coverage as a family member, determining that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. We stated:
In this ease, the optional nature of UIM benefits under N.J.S.A. 17:28-l.lb, and the absence of a statute exempting minors from arbitration, requires plaintiffs rights to be analyzed under contract principles. The third-party nature of plaintiffs benefits and his father's attempt to provide for plaintiffs welfare fully warrant binding plaintiff to the arbitration provision.
[Id. at 263, 654 A.2d at 1380.]
See also, e.g., Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosp's, 71 Haw. 240, 788 P.2d 164, 169 (1990) (infant was bound by arbitration provision in contract for group medical services); Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal.2d 606, 43 Cal.Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (1965) (same).
In reaching the conclusion to enforce the arbitration provision of the Vans contract, we choose not to follow the decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc., 870 So.2d 20 (Fla.App.2003), review granted, 873 So.2d 1223 (Fla.2004), which held under Florida law that a contractual waiver by a mother of her son's right to sue a commercial safari operator for potential personal injury claims, and to subject them to arbitration, was contrary to public policy, but that a similar waiver relating to the activities of a non-profit entity would not be void. Id. at 25.
In Shea, as here, the waiver signed by the mother limited the liability of the safari company as well as subjected any claims against it to arbitration. The court's decision that the agreement was unenforceable was, in large measure, based upon the mother's waiver of remedies, not her choice of forum. The court never articulated why public policy disfavors arbitration, per se, in the context presented — a proposition for which we find no support in New Jersey precedent, which as we have recognized, strongly favors that form of alternative dispute resolution. We note addi tionally that the Shea court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of "whether a parent's agreement in a commercial travel contract to binding arbitration on behalf of a minor child with respect to prospective tort claims arising in the course of such travel is enforceable as to the minor." Because the Supreme Court has granted review and its decision remains pending, we cannot view the existing decision in Shea even as a dispositive statement of Florida law.
We recognize that a split of authority exists as to the resolution of cases such as these. See generally Douglas P. Gerber, Note, The Validity of Binding Arbitration Agreements and Children's Personal Injury Claims in Florida After Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc., 28 Nova L. Rev. 167, 170-77 (Fall 2003) (discussing reported and unreported decisions). An unreported decision in Troshak v. Terminix Internal. Co., 1998 WL 401693 (E.D.Pa. 1998) resembles Shea, in that it does not meaningfully distinguish between choice of forum and limitation of remedies in its holding that Pennsylvania courts, if they addressed the issue, would find that: "If a parent cannot prospectively release the potential claims of a minor child, then a parent does not have the authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to waive their right to have potential claims for personal injury filed in a court of law." Id. at *5. We decline to follow Troshak for the reasons that we have previously expressed. Additionally, we distinguish between the effect of a waiver of forum that preserves all remedies and a consent to settlement, which a court must review for improvidence.
A number of the decisions finding a minor's claim to be nonarbitrable depend solely upon a determination that the contractual language did not include the minor within the arbitration provisions at issue. They are thus of no particular precedential value here. See Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Serv's, Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 15 P.3d 1147, 1151 (2000) (arbitration provisions applied only to contracting parties); Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Serv's, Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 (2000) (same); Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 519 So.2d 799, 804 (La.Ct.App.1988) (mother had not signed arbitration agreement as representative of deceased children). Others decline to enforce contractual arbitration provisions against minors who are not third-party beneficiaries or do not seek to enforce the substantive provisions of the contract. See Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.2002) (children of mobile home buyers injured as the result of inhalation of formaldehyde were not bound by contract signed by parents that required arbitration of claims), op. supp. on denial of reh'g, 303 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.2002); Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 863 So.2d 557, 562-63 (La.Ct.App.2003) (parents of children suing as the result of the children's lead poisoning were not third-party beneficiaries of agreement to arbitrate between the City and its property management company), unit denied, 870 So.2d 303 (2004); Costanza v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2002 WL 31528447 at *6-7 (Dist.Ct.E.D.La.2002) (children injured by water leakage were not seeking to enforce their rights under warranty contract, nor were they third-party beneficiaries of contract).
We find persuasive the language of the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Cross v. Carnes, 132 Ohio App.3d 157, 724 N.E.2d 828 (1998). In that case, governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, the producers of the Sally Jessy Raphael Show successfully sought to stay a court action by a child participant who sued on grounds of fraud and defamation when the child was portrayed on the show as a bully. In granting a stay to permit arbitration to proceed under an agreement signed by the child's mother on the child's behalf the court stated:
we note that the parent's consent and release to arbitration only specifies the forum for resolution of the child's claim; it does not extinguish the claim. Logically, if a parent has the authority to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the child, he or she has the same authority to choose arbitration as the litigation forum.
[Id. at 836.]
Significantly, plaintiffs do not argue that Andrew's mother did not understand the agreement that she signed, that she was coerced into signing it, or that unequal bargaining power between her and Vans precludes its enforcement. As a consequence, we find the agreement to arbitrate to be valid and enforceable in connection with the bodily injury claims asserted on Andrew's behalf. Nothing has been brought to our attention that persuades us that arbitration of personal injury suits by minors against recreational facilities should essentially be barred because the parent, not the child (who is legally incapable of doing so), consents to the forum.
II.
The motion judge limited her decision to the issue that we have just discussed, holding: "There's no determination by this Court on the merits of the request to invalidate the liability waiver, and that's for the arbitrators to determine." We find that conclusion to have been in error.
As a general rule, the scope of an arbitrator's authority is set by the issues that he or she is called upon to decide. United Serv's. Auto. Ass'n v. Turck, 156 N.J. 480, 486, 721 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1998); Berger v. First Trenton Indem. Co., 339 N.J.Super. 402, 406, 772 A.2d 28, 30 (App.Div.2001). Further, "[arbitrators in the private sector have broad discretion in determining legal issues" so long as they fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. State of N.J., Dept. of Law and Pub. Safety, Div. of State Police v. STate Troopers Fraternal Ass'n of N.J., Inc., 91 N.J. 464, 469, 453 A.2d 176, 179 (1982). "The essence of arbitration is, of course, that the arbitrators decide both the facts and the law." Daly v. Komline-Sanderson Engineering Corp., 40 N.J. 175, 178, 191 A.2d 37, 38 (1963).
In the present case, the arbitration agreement pertained to "any dispute between You and Vans." The language was thus sufficiently broad to encompass any issue regarding the construction of the contract itself. However, we find that the issue of whether Anastasia Hojnowski had the power and authority to limit the liability of Vans to her son Andrew for its negligence to be a matter of public policy, not contract interpretation. Further, we hold that such power was lacking in this ease, and thus that Anastasia's waiver of liability was ineffective to limit the claims asserted on Andrew's behalf to anything less than the law would allow.
III.
We commence our analysis of the waiver of liability signed by Anastasia Hojnowski with its terms, which we find to be broad in scope, ambiguous and potentially misleading. First, it appears that liability of any nature is restricted by the release to that arising out of an unsafe condition of "equipment, structures and devices," thereby precluding claims of liability arising out of conduct, however negligent. Further paragraphs 3(c) and 4(b) of the waiver appear to be internally inconsistent, since paragraph 4(b) preserves the right to compensation for injuries caused by unsafe equipment, structures and devices, but paragraph 3(c) inferentially excepts from liability Vans' negligent failure to prevent or correct a hazard caused by unsafe equipment or devices. Paragraphs 3(c) and 6, viewed together, suggest that Vans sought to immunize itself from all liability except that caused by intentional conduct on its part that is related to equipment or devices, since each of the two paragraphs specifically preserves only those claims arising out of intentional harm in that regard. Even then, punitive damages are precluded by paragraph 3(f). Injuries caused by "another person," regardless of circumstances or the identity of the person, are precluded by paragraph 3(e). The release, however construed, is thus far-reaching in its impact, diminishing substantially or eliminating any right of recovery by Andrew arising from negligence and exemplary damages arising from intentional acts that might otherwise be available to him.
It has long been the law of New Jersey that without statutory authority or judicial authorization, a parent has no ability to release a claim properly belonging to a child. Moscatello ex rel Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 342 N.J.Super. 351, 360-61, 776 A.2d 874, 879-80 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 207, 785 A.2d 435 (2001); Riemer v. St. Clare's Riverside Med. Ctr., 300 N.J.Super. 101, 110-11, 691 A.2d 1384, 1389 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 188, 704 A.2d 18 (1997); Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 214 N.J.Super. 374, 377, 519 A.2d 893, 894 (App.Div.1986) (citing precedent). See also R. 4:44-1 to - 3; R. 4:48A. A purpose of this rule is to guard a minor against an improvident compromise of his rights, whether or not the claim has ripened or suit has been instituted. Colfer, supra, 214 N.J.Super. at 377, 519 A.2d at 894. See also Zukerman v. Piper Pools, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 74, 96, 556 A.2d 775, 786 (App.Div. 1989) (affirming the foregoing proposition). In Zukerman, we held that a parent may reject even a large settlement and proceed to a trial that may result in either a greater or lesser verdict, unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that a conflict exists between the parent's and the infant's positions or that the parent is otherwise incapable of effectively exercising judgment and discretion in the matter. Id. at 97, 556 A.2d at 786-87. However, that decision cannot be read to authorize a parent to forego any of the child's substantive rights to recovery. Simply put, no New Jersey statute, rule or decision authorized Andrew's mother to sign a pre-tort agreement limiting the liability of a tortfeasor to exclude negligent conduct in the circumstances of this case. In light of the protections afforded to the interests of minors in this State in connection with tort claims, family matters and otherwise, we will not here create the exception that the law has heretofore failed to recognize. Thus we declare that aspect of the agreement to have been void from its inception. The sever-ability clause of the agreement preserves the agreement in other respects.
Like agreements to arbitrate the claims of minors, agreements waiving a minor's substantive remedies have been treated in varying fasMons elsewhere. For decisions invalidating such waivers, see, e.g., Shea, supra, 870 So.2d at 25 (refusing to enforce parental waiver in commercial context); Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1233-35 (Colo.2002) (invalidating prospective exculpatory provision on public policy grounds); Scott v. Pacific West Mtn. Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 834 P.2d 6, 11-12 (1992) ("[T]o the extent a parent's release of a third party's liability for negligence purports to bar a child's own cause of action, it violates public policy and is unenforceable."); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1065-66 (Utah 2001) (voiding release in horseback riding context on public policy grounds); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 262 Ill.App.3d 141, 199 Ill.Dec. 572, 634 N.E.2d 411, 415 (1994) ("Since the parent's waiver of liability was not authorized by any statute or judicial approval, it had no effect to bar the minor child's (future) cause of action"); Munoz v. II Jaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex.Ct.App.1993) (the fact that the Texas Family Code empowers parents to make legal decisions concerning a child does not give them the right to waive a cause of action for personal injuries; such an interpretation would be against the State's public policy to protect minors); Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Tenn. Ct.App.1990) (a parent on behalf of a child cannot exculpate or indemnify an organization against liability); Simmons v. Parkette National Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F.Supp. 140, 144 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (it is immaterial under Pennsylvania law that the release is also signed by the minor); Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Jr. Coll., 630 F.Supp. 20, 24 (E.D.Pa.1985) ("Under Pennsylvania law, parents do not possess the authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child merely because of the parental relationship"); Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n. 3 (Me.1979) (dictum; a parent cannot release a child's cause of action). Contra, Sharon v. City of Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747 (2002) (validating release on basis of public policy favoring same, the fundamental liberty interest of parents in rearing their children, and the nonessential nature of the activity in which the child engaged); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d 201, 204-07 (1998) (finding no public policy violated by release, which was within parent's power to execute); Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist, 224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1564-65, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649 (1990) (a parent may contract on behalf of a child).
We find three arguments raised in the preceding cases to merit further discussion. First, we note the argument, expressed in decisions such as those in Sharon, supra, and Zivich, supra, that a parent can release the tort claims of a child as the result of the parent's fundamental right to make decisions that bear upon the care, custody and upbringing of their children. 769 N.E.2d at 746. Although we acknowledge that fundamental right to exist, as we must (see, e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56-57 (2000)), we do not read the precedent defining that right (as does our colleague) as encompassing a decision such as this to forego substantial tort remedies, a decision that we find to be different from such fundamental concerns as establishment of a home, upbringing and education, religion, or medical care. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2505, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 120 (1979)(mental hospital institutionalization); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935-36, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 537 (1977) (family living arrangements); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 24 (1972) (freedom of religion in light of compulsory education); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972) (termination of parental rights); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 1077-78 (1925) (private schooling); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct, 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923) (teaching of modern languages). Were it otherwise, existing restrictions on parental conduct in the context of litigation involving minors would long ago have been abrogated in New Jersey.
Our colleague would find a mother's decision to allow her son to skateboard at a Vans commercial facility "conditioned upon giving Vans a pre-tort release" to be constitutionally protected by the Due Process Clause as an aspect of the constitutional right of a parent to raise a child as the parent deems appropriate. We agree with our colleague that a parent has a constitutionally protected right to direct the activities in which a child may engage. Indeed, this is the thrust of the United States Supreme Court cases that we have cited and upon which our colleague relies, as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that he cites. However, we disagree that a parent's authority to relinquish a child's tort claims is similarly protected. No decision by the United States or New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that right. Our colleague's sole direct support is derived from the decisions by courts of other states in Sharon, supra, and Zivich, supra, which we choose not to follow, finding no support for their reasoning in authorities we regard as persuasive and controlling.
An additional argument is raised that a pre-tort release can be distinguished from a post-injury one, because the pressures on the parent, post-tort, to accept an inadequate settlement, the possibility of parental dishonesty, and the potential existence of indemnification agreements placing the burden of payment on the parent do not exist in a pre-tort context. Before the tort occurs, the argument continues, the parent's determination to sign a release is tempered by the knowledge that if injury takes place, medical expenses will become the parent's responsibility. See Angeline Purdy, Note, Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invalidating Parental Releases of a Minor's Future Claim, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 457, 472-75 (1993). Purdy has postulated that a parent is less vulnerable to coercion in a preinjury setting because the "parent has time to examine the release, consider its terms, and explore possible alternatives. A parent signing a future release is thus more able to reasonably assess the possible consequences of waiving the right to sue." Id. at 473-74.
We are unwilling to rest our decision on such prescience on the part of a parent, accompanied by an importunate child, finding no evidence that such a parent rationally calculates the risk of injury to the child or its economic cost before bowing to the child's request for entry into a craved pleasure ground and signing the release of liability upon which that entry is conditioned. The coercive pressures exerted by children in this context are ones that any parent has experienced.
We therefore find that although the forces influencing a parent's decision-making before and after a child has been injured differ, those forces remain in each setting. Thus, a public interest in judicial intervention remains.
Purdy's argument was met, we believe effectively, by the Court in Cooper, which stated:
We do not find these distinctions meaningful or persuasive, however. It may be true that parents in the pre-injury setting have less financial motivation to sign a release than a parent in the post-injury setting who needs money to care for an injured child. Nonetheless, the protections accorded minors in the post-injury setting illustrate Colorado's overarching policy to protect minors, regardless of parental motivation, against actions by parents that effectively foreclose a minor's right of recovery. Thus, while a parent's decision to sign a pre-injury release on his child's behalf may not be in "deliberate derogation of his child's best interests," Purdy, supra, at 474, the effeet of a release on the child in either the pre-injury context or the post-injury one is the same. If parents are unwilling or unable to care for an injured child, he may be left with "no recourse against a negligent party to acquire resources needed for care and this is true regardless of when relinquishment of the child's rights might occur." Scott, 834 P.2d at 12. In addition, while pre-injury releases might be less vulnerable to mismanagement, children still must be protected against parental actions — perhaps rash and imprudent ones — that foreclose all of the minor's potential claims for injuries caused by another's negligence.
[48 P.3d at 1234.]
A concern also exists that a decision precluding a pre-tort waiver of a minor's rights by a parent will unnecessarily interfere with beneficial school and recreational activities and with athletic events. See Sharon, supra, 769 N.E.2d at 747; Shea, supra, 870 So.2d at 25; Zivich, supra, 696 N.E.2d at 205; Simmons, 670 F.Supp. at 144-45. See also, e.g., Allison M. Foley, Note, We, the Parents and Participant, Promise Not to Sue . Until There is an Accident. The Ability of High School Students and Their Parents to Waive Liability for Participation in School-Sponsored Athletics, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 439 (2004); Richard B. Malamud and John E. Karayan, Contractual Waivers for Minors in Sports-Related Activities, 2 Marq. Sports L.J. 151 (1992). The concern is of course a legitimate one. Nonetheless, we find a significant measure of protection to exist in an noncommercial context as the result of statutes such as the Charitable Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 and the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 14-4, and the civil immunity provided to volunteer coaches, managers and officials for non-profit and county or municipal recreational sports teams by N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-6 to -6.2, and to trustees, directors, officer and voluntary members of non-profit organizations by N.J.S.A. 2A-.53A-7.1.
In a skateboard context, we do not find, as does our colleague, that the "law's solicitude for the rights of children" has been unjustifiably "exalted over the public's interest in the continued viability of businesses that make available places for such sporting activities." We view children to trump economic concerns such as these. We are aware of no public policy that requires the law to provide facilities such as that operated by Vans with an environment from which to operate a business apparently free from the risk of litigation except in the most egregious of cases.
Nor are we persuaded that, in the context of this litigation, we are equipped with the facts that would enable us to determine that skateboarding outside a facility such as Vans is so unsafe that the Vans of this country must be legally protected at the expense of a minor's tort rights in the manner that our colleague sets forth. The record contains nothing with respect to the comparative dangers of skateboarding in various venues. To be sure, reported eases can be utilized to create a parade of horribles. However, we lack any evidence by which we can compare the incidence, cireum- stance or severity of injuries in skateboard facilities of various types to injuries sustained elsewhere. If, as our colleague postulates, skateboarding is indeed more dangerous when conducted in the streets and a valuable resource providing a safe venue for the sport will be faced with economic extinction as the result of this decision, then the Legislature can be apprised of that fact and can act, as it has to protect other industries that it deemed to be both important and threatened.
We note in this context the protections against liability for dangers inherent in the sport that already have been afforded to certain other commercial enterprises by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to -11, governing skiing, tobogganing and sledding; the New Jersey Roller Skating Rink Safety and Fair Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 5:14-1 to -7 ; and N.J.S.A. 5:15-1 to -12, governing equestrian activities. If the Legislature regards our decision relating to child skateboarders as contrary to any manifestation by it of a willingness to render participants solely responsible for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of this or any other sport, the Legislature remains free to act.
We do not, as a matter of principle, reject the proposition that a parent should be empowered to permit a child to engage in activities that are accompanied by a degree of inherent risk. What we hold here is that the parent should not, at the same time, be able to waive the child's claim based on negligence. An issue arises in this context as to whether the parent should be permitted to waive liability for those injuries arising as the result of a danger inherent to the sport of skateboarding or any other sport. We see nothing to be gained by that process, so long as assumption of the risk remains as a defense to any claim of liability. We reach this conclusion, in part, because we find it impossible to define as a matter of law what constitutes a danger inherent to a sport that could definitively be encompassed in a waiver. Such a determina tion must be made on a case-by-case basis after full consideration of the factual circumstances giving rise to the injury. As a consequence, the existence of a waiver by a parent of this type of liability will not serve to lessen litigation. A determination will still be required by a judge or arbitrator whether the facts support the imposition of liability.
Moreover, we regard utilization of the doctrine of assumption of the risk to provide a better means for sorting out the liability of the parties than waiver, since a negligence-based defense has a greater potential for nuanced application and, when appropriate, utilization of concepts of comparative negligence. It further holds the potential for influencing the conduct of Vans and other skateboard facilities in a manner designed to minimize the risk of injury to skateboarders such as Andrew, while protecting it from liability for self-induced injury.
We thus return, as the bedrock of our decision, to the principle that the judiciary must stand as guardians of the State's children in the context of this ease. As the Court stated in Cooper, supra,
To allow a parent or guardian to execute exculpatory provisions on his minor child's behalf would render meaningless for all practical purposes the special protections historically accorded minors. In the tort context especially, a minor should be afforded protection not only from his own improvident decision to release his possible prospective claims for injury based on another's negligence, but also from unwise decisions made on his behalf by parents who are routinely asked to release their child's claims for liability.
[48 P.3d at 1234.]
Were we to decide otherwise, we would be relieving an alleged wrongdoer from its traditional legal responsibility to provide compensation for injuries caused by its negligence and shifting the economic burden to families, public welfare agencies and private charities without any concomitant benefit to either an injured child or his parents. Cf. Gershon v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J.Super. 237, 249, 845 A.2d 720, 727-28 (App.Div.2004).
We therefore void the release at issue because it limits the tort remedies available to Andrew to less than the law, if unfettered, would otherwise allow. We do not, however, foreclose to Vans any defenses available to it under the facts and the common law, including assumption of the risk. See Del Tufo v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 147 N.J. 90, 112-13, 685 A.2d 1267, 1278-79 (1996).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. The matter is referred to the arbitrator for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The case properly should have been stayed pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. See N.J.S.A. 2A:24 — 4 (prior Arbitration Act); N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(£) and (g) (new Act). See also Ravin, Sarasohn, Cook Baumgarten, Fisch & Rosen, P.C. v. Lowenstein Sandler, P.C., 365 N.J.Super. 241, 247, 839 A.2d 52, 55 (App.Div.2003).
The provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11 were superseded by N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, effective January 1, 2003. Andrew's accident occurred four days later. Plowever, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-31 provides that "an arbitration agree ment made before the effective date of this act is governed by N.J.S. 2A:24-1 et seq." The execution of the agreement at issue occurred prior to the new Act's effective date.
We lack sufficient information to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1-16, is applicable to this case. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1.
We reject plaintiffs' argument that the choice of an arbitration forum will subject them to additional and unaffordable litigation expenses. Those expenses (including any expense incident to an increase in the limit of recovery) must be paid by Vans under the terms of the contract at issue, and it acknowledges that obligation.
This entire volume is devoted to issues that relate to mandatory arbitration.
We thus do not employ the rules of contract interpretation expressed in such cases as McBride v. Minstar, Inc., 283 N.J.Super. 471, 486, 662 A.2d 592, 600-01 (Law Div.1994), aff'd sub nom, McBride v. Raichle Molitor, U.S.A., 283 N.J.Super. 422, 662 A.2d 567 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 319, 670 A.2d 1061 (1995).
In this context, see Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 111 N.J.Super. 104, 107-08, 267 A.2d 557, 558-59 (Law Div.1970) (invalidating a pre-tort parental release and indemnification agreement that required the parent to save the Ledger harmless from all claims by the son, holding that it created a disincentive to the institution of an action by the parent on the child's behalf).
There is no claim in this case to the protections of this Act, which appears inapplicable as the result of its definitional section.
Although the release in this case is not clear, it appears to release Vans from actions based upon the negligence of it and its employees.