Case Name: Sandie EVANS v. Louis Phillip NOGUES, III, D.D.S. and Medical Protective Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-09-13
Citations: 775 So. 2d 471
Docket Number: No. 99-CA-2761
Parties: Sandie EVANS v. Louis Phillip NOGUES, III, D.D.S. and Medical Protective Company.
Judges: Court composed of Chief Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 775
Pages: 471–481

Head Matter:
Sandie EVANS v. Louis Phillip NOGUES, III, D.D.S. and Medical Protective Company.
No. 99-CA-2761.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 13, 2000.
Opinion Vacating Original Decision on Grant of Rehearing Nov. 29, 2000.
Writ Denied March 9, 2001.
Glenn E. Diaz, Carlos A. Zelaya, II, Chalmette, Louisiana, for plamtiff/appel-lee.
Peter E. Sperling, Mara P. Derme, Fri-lot, Partridge, Kohnke & Clements, L.C., New Orleans, Louisiana, for defendant/appellant (Louisiana’s Patients’ Compensation Fund).
Court composed of Chief Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY.

Opinion:
11 KIRBY, J.
The defendant, Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund ("PCF"), appeals the trial court's judgment awarding damages to plaintiff Sandie Evans in this dental malpractice case.
On March 13, 1992, plaintiffs dentist, Dr. Louis Nogues, III, extracted one of plaintiffs wisdom teeth. During this procedure, plaintiffs lingual nerve on the left side was severed. On April 19, 1993, plaintiff underwent surgery to relieve the pain she was experiencing. On May 4, 1994, she underwent another procedure to release the pressure surrounding the lingual nerve. This procedure was repeated again on August 7, 1996. According to plaintiffs oral surgeon, Dr. Michael Block, the plaintiff will probably require this outpatient procedure on the lingual nerve once a year for the rest of her life to relieve the pain caused by the severing of this nerve.
On March 22, 1995, plaintiff filed a dental malpractice suit against Dr. Nogues and his insurer. On March 30, 1995, the defendants filed their answer and a request for jury trial. Trial was set for April 21, 1997 and the defendants paid the ^required jury deposit on March 3, 1997. On April 11,1997, plaintiff and Dr. Nogues and his insurer entered into a settlement agreement in which plaintiff reserved her rights to pursue excess damages against the PCF.
On April 18, 1997, plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for continuance of the trial set for April 21, 1997. In that motion, plaintiff stated that opposing counsel had no objection to the continuance. The continuance was granted and the trial was reset for April 7,1998. PCF denied that it agreed to the continuance, disputing the plaintiffs assertion in the ex parte motion.
According to PCF, it then contacted, by telephone, the minute clerk for the trial court division where trial was scheduled in order to determine if the $1,000.00 jury deposit submitted on March 3, 1997 would be applied as a deposit toward the next trial or refunded. The clerk orally informed PCF that the $1,000.00 deposit would not be refunded because a portion of it had been spent to send notices to prospective jurors for the April 21, 1997 trial.
On April 22, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that reasonable minds could not differ that plaintiffs damages exceeded the medical malpractice limit of $500,000.00. The trial court granted the motion. On January 27, 1999, this Court reversed the trial court judgment and remanded the case for trial. Evans v. Nogues, 98-1827 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/27/99), 726 So.2d 1115, writ denied, 99-0579 (La.4/23/99), 742 So.2d 884.
On July 20, 1999, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the jury, arguing that PCF had failed to timely request a jury trial and post a jury bond or cash deposit. On 13July 30, 1999, the trial court granted the motion. PCF filed an emergency writ with this Court, seeking review of the trial court's judgment striking the jury. On August 2, 1999, this Court denied PCF's writ application, finding no error in the ruling of the trial court.
On August 3, 1999, a bench trial was held. Following trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against PCF. The trial court found that the plaintiffs damages exceeded $500,000 .00 and therefore plaintiff is entitled to the statutory malpractice limit of $500,000.00 in damages and recognition of entitlement to future medical care and related benefits. The trial court ordered the PCF to compensate plaintiff in the amount of $500,000.00 with legal interest from the date of filing the dental malpractice complaint subject to a credit of $100,000.00 for funds previously paid through settlement by Dr. Nogues and his insurer. In this judgment, the trial court also awarded plaintiff all medical expenses sustained from the date of the malpractice, in the amount of $12,001.52, as well as recognition of entitlement to all future medical expenses resulting from the malpractice at issue in this suit.
PCF now appeals the judgment rendered by the trial court on August 3, 1999. In this appeal, the PCF raises two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs motion to strike the jury and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding excessive damages.
PCF first argues that the timely request for jury trial and cash deposit made by Dr. Nogues and his insurer applied to the entire malpractice proceeding, | ¿including the trial on excess damages from the PCF. Therefore, according to PCF, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs motion to strike the jury.
Plaintiff argues that this Court's denial of PCF's application for an emergency writ from the trial court's granting of the motion to strike the jury is now the law of the case. This Court denied PCF's application, finding no error in the ruling of the trial court.
Under the "law of the case" doctrine, an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings of the law in the same case. Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So.2d 701, 705 (La.App. 1 Cir.), unit denied, 605 So.2d 1099, 1100 (La.1992). However, the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary guide and is not applicable in cases of palpable error or where, if the law of the case doctrine were applied, manifest injustice would occur. Id. at 705.
The right to a trial by jury is fundamental in character and courts should indulge in every presumption against waiver, loss, or'forfeiture of that right. Parker v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 628 So.2d 1108, 1110 (La.1991). Therefore, we will address the merits of this issue.
La.C.C.P. art. 1734. 1A states as follows:
When the case has been set for trial, the court may order, in lieu of the bond required in Article 1734, a deposit for costs, which shall be a specific cash amount, and the court shall fix the time for making the deposit, which shall be no later than thirty days prior to trial. The deposit shall include sufficient funds for payment of all costs associated with a jury trial, including juror fees and expenses and charges of the jury commission, clerk of court, and sheriff. The required deposit shall not exceed three hundred dollars per day for each day the court estimates the trial will last. Notice of the fixing of the deposit shall be served on all parties. If the deposit is not [stimely made, any other party shall have an additional ten days to make the required deposit. Failure to post the cash deposit shall constitute a waiver of a trial by jury. However, no cash deposit shall be required of an applicant for a jury trial under the provisions of this Article if waived or an order is rendered, pursuant to Chapter 5 of Title I of Book IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting the applicant to litigate or continue to litigate without payment of costs in advance or furnishing security therefor.
Included in the Rules of the 34th Judicial District Court for St. Bernard Parish is a rule regarding jury trials. Rule X(E) states, in pertinent part:
Upon the fixing of-a trial date for a jury trial by any of the Judges of this Court, the Clerk of Court will take the following action:
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2. Advise all counsel in writing at least sixty (60) days before the day of trial, that the party requesting the jury trial will be required to pay the costs of serving the jury venire prior to the issuance of the summons; that the payment must be made thirty (30) days prior to trial; and the amount of payment required. The notice to all counsel, particularly counsel for the parties requesting the jury, must advise them that they will lose the date, as the court will not summon the jury venire if the payment is not made within thirty (30) calendar days prior to the trial. This notice must be.in BOLD RED INK.
From the inception to the conclusion of a medical malpractice proceeding, the action is against only the health care provider, and not against the PCF. Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Kushner, 449 So.2d 455 (La.1984). The status of the PCF after a settlement between the plaintiff and the health care provider is more in the nature of a statutory interve-nor rather than a party defendant Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371 (La.1990), cert. denied, Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund v. Stuka, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 513, 112 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990).
As a general rule regarding jury trials, our case law states that when one party has properly demanded trial by jury, no other party need make such a request; the matter is then tried by jury as to all parties regarding whom a right to jury trial exists. Alger v. Continental Contractors, Inc., 378 So.2d 556 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1979). In a case involving the issue of how a previous jury trial request by a health care provider affects the PCF, the First Circuit held that once the health care provider settled with the plaintiff, the PCF had to take the proceedings as it found them, including, in that case, accepting the status of the jury trial at the time PCF was served with the settlement proposal. Dodson v. Community Blood Center of Louisiana, 633 So.2d 252, 256 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993), writ denied, 93-3158, 93-3174 (La.3/18/94), 634 So.2d 850, 851
It is undisputed that Dr. Nogues and his insurer timely requested a jury trial and timely paid the required cash deposit in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1734.1. PCF argues that because it is not the true party defendant in this proceeding, the plaintiffs settlement with Dr. Nogues and his insurer did not terminate the previous request for a jury trial. We agree.
Regarding the cash deposit for jury trial posted by Dr. Nogues and his insurer, counsel for PCF states that he learned through a telephone conversation with the trial courfls minute clerk on March 31, 1998 that a portion of these funds had been used to send notices to prospective jurors for the trial date of April 21, |71997. Counsel for PCF stated in the opposition to the motion to strike the jury that he never received any written notice from the Clerk of Court as to what, if any, additional funds were owed by PCF for jury costs for the August 3,1999 trial.
The record in this case does not include any written notice from the Clerk of Court for the 34th Judicial District Court to PCF regarding funds owed by PCF for the jury costs for the August 3,1999 trial. Without any such written notice in the record, we find that the Clerk of Court did not comply with Rule X(E) of the Rules of the 34th Judicial District Court. In his brief, counsel for PCF stated that at the hearing on the motion to strike the jury, the trial judge indicated his belief that there is a conflict between La.C.C.P. art. 1734.1 and Rule X(E) of the Rules of the 34th Judicial District Court, and that La.C.C.P. art. 1734.1 preempts Rule X(E). A reading of that code article and that local rule reveals that a conflict appears to exist between the two as to when a cash deposit for a jury trial must be made. However, there is nothing in La.C.C.P. art. 1734.1 that conflicts with the written notice requirements of Local Rule X(E).
In light of the written notice requirements of Local Rule X(E), the fact that counsel for PCF was told in a telephone conversation with the trial court's minute clerk that some of the previously paid jury deposit had been depleted is irrelevant. PCF was entitled to written notice as to what, if any, funds were required for a jury trial. Having received no such proper notice, we find that the granting of plaintiffs motion to strike the jury was erroneous.
Is As stated above, this Court denied PCF's application for emergency writs from the granting of the motion to strike the jury, finding no error in the ruling of the trial court. After a thorough review of the record, we find that strict application of the law of the case doctrine in this case is improper because the ruling on PCF's emergency writ application was palpably erroneous and manifest injustice will occur if the doctrine is applied. See Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., supra.
The trial court's erroneous granting of plaintiffs motion to strike the jury deprived PCF of its fundamental right to a trial by jury. In Gibbons v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 442 So.2d 833 (La.App. 4 Cir.1983), trial began before a jury, but the trial judge dismissed the jury on the second day of trial due to the failure of the defendant to pay a second day of jury costs. The trial was completed before the judge alone. The judge rendered his verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge should not have dismissed the jury. This Court agreed, finding that the trial judge did not have authority to dismiss the jury because of the defendant's failure to pay a second day of jury costs. This Court stated:
By dismissing the jury, without authority, the trial court improperly deprived defendant of its right to a trial by jury. La.C.C.P. art. 1731-1735. Preservation of defendant's right to a jury trial can be accomplished, at this stage, only by remanding the case to the trial court for the purposes of conducting a jury trial. Gibbons v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., supra at 836.
Similarly, in this case, the only way to preserve PCF's right to a jury trial is to remand this case to the trial court for the purposes of conducting a jury trial.
|c)Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is annulled and this case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to afford PCF a trial by jury after written notification to PCF of the amount owed for jury costs and the timely depositing of same by PCF.
ANNULLED AND REMANDED.
. We note that the transcript of the July 30, 1999 hearing on the motion to strike the jury is attached to PCF's brief, but it is not included in this appeal record. However, it is undisputed that the trial judge's opinion is that a conflict exists between La.C.C.P. art. 1734.1 and Local Rule X(E) and that the state law prevails.
. Because we are annulling the trial court's judgment and remanding this case for a jury trial, we need not address PCF's argument regarding excessive damages.