Case Name: George E. Austin v. James B. Ewell et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 403
Docket Number: 
Parties: George E. Austin v. James B. Ewell et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 403–408

Head Matter:
George E. Austin v. James B. Ewell et al.
Where a vendor sold land and received a part of the purchase-money, and afterwards found there was a mistake as to the boundaries, which entitled the vendee to a reduction, he had no right to forfeit the contract, and to declare the property his own, and re-enter or resell it.
If the vendee discover that there has been a mistake as to the boundaries, whereby he has been injured, he is entitled to a specific performance, and to have the court settle what amount of diminution ho shall be allowed.
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of the district judges.
Austin sued Ewell for specific performance of a title bond to convey land, and made Robert C. Edmondson, a subsequent purchaser of the legal title, a party. The bond hears the date of the 13th December, 1852, is in the penal sum of §4,000, conditioned for the conveyance of the tract of land therein described, and concludes: “How, if the said George E. Austin and Joseph Weatherby shall well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto the said J. B. Ewell, two certain promissory notes, bearing even date with this obligation, one for $1,000, payable at sixty days’ sight, in the city of Baltimore, Maryland, and the other for $1,000, payable on the 1st day of January, A. D. 1854; and, if the said J. B. Ewell shall execute and deliver unto the said Austin and Weatherby a good and sufficient deed, with the customary covenants of warranty, then this obligation to be void; otherwise, to remain in full force and virtue.”
The notes which thus became part of the contract are well described in the consideration clause.
The statement of facts shows, that at the -time of the execution of the bond the legal title to the land was in William Reynolds; that the first note was paid to him upon his giving a guaranty to make title when the. other should be paid.
Before the maturity, of the second note, Austin and Weatherby learned that the house which they supposed they had bought was not upon the land described in the bond, and hence they refused to pay, unless allowance was made for the mistake. This Ewell refused, and commenced suit in Maryland for the recovery of the note. Several months after this time, at the request of Ewell, Reynolds conveyed to him the legal title which he held as security for $500. On the 20th January, A. D. 1855, Ewell commenced suit on the same note in Bexar. The defendants, Austin and Weatherby, answered, by setting up the mistake as to the boundaries and about the house not being upon the land, as represented. They laid their damages at $800, and prayed that defalcation from the note. But, on 29th August, 1855, Ewell sold to Edmond-son, who had full notice of the bond and suit, actual and constructive; and afterwards, on 7th September, 1857, Ewell dismissed his suit upon the note. Before and preceding the suit in Bexar, Ewell offered a defalcation of $100, which was declined. It was proved that the house was worth that. But, although the lines differed, there was no deficiency in the quantity of the land, and the record is silent as to any difference of value.
Austin commenced his suit for specific performance 10th September, 1856.
• Ho other notice of the pleadings is necessary, except to say, that the plaintiff" claiméd a defalcation for the mistake about the house and lines, and states, as an additional reason for not paying the note, that he discovered the legal title was not in Ewell, but in Reynolds; that Ewell never acquired the title until 3d March, 1855, and then Austin was kept in ignorance of the facts.
Hotice upon Edmondson is charged; a specific performance was prayed, both against Edmondson and Ewell, upon the payment of the note, less the reasonable deduction; damages of $1,000 were prayed; also general relief.
The answer of Ewell admits the main facts, and sets up that, before the payment of the first note, “But he refused to do so until the said William Reynolds executed and delivered to them a bond to make title when the second note was paid.” He also sets up, that Ewell ordered the suit in Maryland to be dismissed; but whether it was ever done neither appears in the pleadings nor statement of facts. They brought in the bond and second note, and prayed for defalcation, without offering to refund the $1,000 paid.
A jury was waived, and the court simply gave judgment for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause. Thus, in fact, holding that he had forfeited the $1,000 already paid, and was not entitled to specific performance of the contract upon the payment of the $1,000, less the $100 defalcation.
I. A. Geo. W. Paschal, for appellant.
—The facts present Mr. Ewell in this unenviable light:
1. He sells a tract of land and misrepresents the course of the lines and the ownership of the house, innocently, we may allow.
2. He does not himself disclose the fact, that the legal title is in himself, subject to an incumbrance of $600. He thereby compels the vendees to go to the expense of taking a non-resident’s covenant for title.
3. Before the second note matures, the vendees discover that the house and the valley, which formed an inducement to the sale, is not included within the lines, and they ask a corresponding deduction. This he refuses, and without commencing a suit for the specific performance of the contract, in which the exact equities might be tried, he commences ' a personal action, in a distant State, for money, which, for aught that appears in the record, is still pending.
4. He commences another vexatious personal action in Bexar, without praying specific performance, or asserting the right to sell the same for the balance.
5. When the vendees set up an equitable defense, instead of allowing it, and demanding the balance, he stealthily sells, and, without communicating the fact of the sale or the assertion of the claim of forfeiture, dismisses the suit.
Wm. B. Leigh, for appellees,
relied upon Browning v. Estes, 3 Tex., 462, and Estes v. Browning, 11 Tex., 237.

Opinion:
Bell, J.
—We are of opinion that there is error in the judgment, for which it must be reversed. The evidence shows that, at the time of the contract for the sale of the land by Ewell to Austin and Weatherby all the contracting parties supposed that the house in which Ewell lived was on the land sold to Austin and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that Austin and Weatherby refused to pay the second note given by them for the land, unless a deduction was made from the note equal to the value of the house, which, it had been ascertained, was not on the land sold to them. This deduction Ewell refused to make, and directed the institution of suit on the note, in the State of Maryland. It is true, that the evidence shows, also, that before the institution of the suit in Bexar county by Ewell, and during the pendency of that suit, Ewell offered to make a deduction of $100 from the note, as the value of the house, and Austin and Weatherby refused to settle on those terms. These facts, taken together, do not present a case in which the vendor of land is permitted to put an end to the contract of sale, to retain the part of the price which has been paid, and to resell the land. The case here presented is one in which the vendor is the party who first places himself in the wrong. When it was ascertained that the house, which was supposed to he on the land conveyed, was not in fact on the land, it was the duty of the vendor to have allowed the proper deduction from the purchase-money which remained to be paid. His refusal to do this placed him in the wrong. Hor did his subsequent offer to allow a deduction from the note of $100 on account of the house, and the refusal of Austin and Weatherby to settle on those terms, authorize Ewell to dismiss his suit, declare a forfeiture of the contract, and resell the land; because Austin and Weatherby were entitled to the judgment of the proper court, upon the question of the amount of the deduction from the note which they had a right to claim.
It is shown that Edmondson, the last purchaser from Ewell, had a full knowledge of all the facts of the case when he purchased. He is not, therefore, in a position to claim the protection of the court; nor does his connection with the matters involved in the suit affect in any manner the rights- of the appellant.
We are of opinion that,- upon the facts presented in the record, the appellant,- Austin, was entitled to the relief claimed in his petition. The original contract of sale by Ewell to Austin and Weatherby ought to have been enforced, the proper deduction being made from tbe purchase-money on account of the house in which Ewell lived at the time of the sale.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.