Case Name: Suckley v. Tunno & Cox
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1803-05
Citations: 1 Brev. 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: Suckley v. Tunno & Cox.
Judges: (Bay, Trezevant, and Brevard, Just ces, in the absence of the other judges.)
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 257–260

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
CHARLESTON,
MAY, 1803.
Suckley v. Tunno & Cox.
An authority to an agent abroad to purchase goods, and draw bills for the amount, will not bind the principal to the acceptance of a bill drawn by the agent for payment of a demand against himself, not within the scope of his authority: and, in an action against the principal, for refusing to accept such a bill, the agent is a competent witness, for the principal, to prove the consideration. Vide 2 Bay, 505 S. C.
Motion for a new trial in behalf of the defendant. The verdict was giveti for the plaintiff, in an action tried at Charleston, before Trezevant, J. The action was to recover the amount of a bill of exchange, drawn by one Joseph Doane, as the agent of the defendants. To prove that Donne was an authorized agent, plaintiff produced a letter of defendants, addressed to Doane, of the following tenor : “ Charleston, 10th June, lbOl. Captain Joseph Doane : Your favor of 21st last month came to hand the 31st, with enclo» sures, and charter of thu Charlotte, which we are happy to inform you got in yesterday vwthout an insurance. We are likewise fortunate in s.-iving yours. You did well in shipping us sugars. If good, they will answer better than coffee. We approve of your remaining with the schooner; and when we have your prospects, and opinion ot such articles as you think will answer, we will endeavor to meet your wishes. Meanwhile, if you can purchase good sugtrs, you may do so and ship ; keeping in view to make us as many charters as you can upon the same terms as the Charlotte. Coffee, prime, you must not exceed 16 to 17 cents; and cotton, 28 to HO. For other articles that may fall in your way, exercise your judgment, valuing upon us at as favorable sights and dates as possible. . Our market remains as noted for your information, &c.” The prices current, at the end of this letter, mentioned cotton, coffee, sugar, dye woods, rice, flour, and tobacco. It appeared, that Doane had been regarded, generally, as the agent of defendants at Cape Francois, and had gained credit as such, on the strength of the above written letter, and had made ihem sundry shipments, and that they were considered as pledged to answer his bills. That he entered into business for himself, and had at one time a partner, from whom he after some time separated, and took another person into partnership. That he received and sold consignments on his own account, as well-as on account of defendants ; and that he was in the habit ol drawing bills on defendants, which were honored. The testimony of Doane was objected to, but overruled by the court. His evidence was offered on behalf of the defendants ; and it went to shew that the bill was drawn in consideration of his having become security for one Dupont to plaintiffs, at the Cape, for goods sold and delivered to Dupont. This was before he rece \e 1 ti e letter of defendants above recited. That Dupont paid for the goods, and obtained credit on his own account for more. Afterwards, the plaintiff’ applied to Doane for the balance of the whole account between Dupont and him, Dupont having absconded. Doane refused to pay ; whereupon, plaintiff sued -him before a judge of the place, who gave judgn e.it in favor of Doane. Afterwards, great confusion arose in the government of the cotin try, and plaintiff* had Doane arrested again, and he was confined until he drew the bill in question. Plaintiff was heard to say, by a witness who gave evidence on the trial, that he would keep Doane confined forever, unless he would agree to pay Dupont’s , debt; and alter Doane had agreed to accept an order from him in favor of one Taylor, he cried out, “ now I have taken him in for Dupont’s debt, and will make him pay it.”
For the delendants, it was insisted that Doane had no authority to draw the bi 11 in question, as he was a special agent, and the draft was not within the scope of his authority. The defendants never accepted the bill. The question is, whether by the terms of their letter constituting Doane their agent, for particular purposes, they were bound to accept this draft. It so, it would be equivalent to an actual acceptance. Doug. 299. Kyd on Bills, 74. The evidence was before the court, and was to be judged of by the settled usages and customs among merchants. .The law of merchants was apart of the law of the land, known to the courts, uniform and stable, not fluctuating and uncertain. The construction of mercantile instruments should not depend on the various opinions of mercantile men, but must be governed by the rules and principles of law. Bills of exchange may be taken upon conditions, 3 T. R. 757. 1 Esp. Hep. 111. This was a limited agency. Suppose the letter had been addressed to the plaintiff, would it have authorized him to charge the defendants on such an account? The power was general, as regarded business of a certain description, but it was particular as to the nature of the business.
For the plaintiff. An agreement to accept, will bind to pay, as much as an actual acceptance. Kyd 72, 74. Lex Mercat. 446. An agent may hind his employer, where accustomed to draw, and his drafts accepted. Doug. 290, 590. 3 T. R. 759. A man shall not be allowed to invalidate his own security, as it was con. ¿ended that Doane was allowed in this case to do. 1 T. R. 296.

Opinion:
The court,
(Bay, Trezevant, and Brevard, Just ces, in the absence of the other judges.)
it does not appear, from the evidence stated, that the letter of the defendants authorized the draft in question. Agents may be clothed with either general or special powers. Their acts, as agents, must be confined within the sphere of the authority delegated. Here the power given was special and circumscribed, as to the nature and objects of it; although general, as it regarded those objects. The bill in question appears to be on account of a subject matter entirely foreign to the nature of the agency, and not by any means within the scope of the au* thority delegated. The defendants, therefore, cannot, by any principle, or fair rule of construction, be considered as having ever agreed to a bill drawn upon them on any such con-i teration. The verdict was, therefore, ordered to be set aside, and a new trial granted. It was also decided, that Doatie was a competent witness.
Pringle, for defendants. Cheves, for plaintiff.