Case Name: Lorenzo PEREZ, etc.; Alphonso Joa and Stonewall Insurance Company, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-04-21
Citations: 414 So. 2d 544
Docket Number: No. AC-6
Parties: Lorenzo PEREZ, etc.; Alphonso Joa and Stonewall Insurance Company, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 544–550

Head Matter:
Lorenzo PEREZ, etc.; Alphonso Joa and Stonewall Insurance Company, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
No. AC-6.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 21, 1982.
Rehearing Denied June 15, 1982.
Arnold R. Ginsberg of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, and Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, Miami Beach, for appellant Perez.
R. Benjamine Reid of Kimbrell, Hamann, Jennings, Womack, Carlson & Kniskern, Miami, for appellants Joa & Stonewall.
Jay 0. Barber and Alan E. DeSerio, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment entered in favor of the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT) on complaints filed by Perez and Joa. We affirm.
Jose Perez was a passenger in a vehicle driven by appellant Joa on the McArthur Causeway. The Joa vehicle was traveling on a wet roadway in excess of the speed limit. Upon reaching the steel grating on the draw portion of the bridge, the vehicle suddenly made an abrupt right hand turn of nearly 90 degrees, crossed three lanes of traffic, struck the restraining curb and vaulted through the pedestrian handrail into Biscayne Bay. Perez was thrown from the car and drowned. Perez' parents sued Joa and DOT. Joa filed a third party complaint against the DOT. Based upon depositions and on the affidavits of DOT personnel in evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DOT on the ground that the alleged acts fell within the "planning" exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 768.28, Fla.Stat. (1975).
In their complaints, Perez and Joa alleged negligent design of the bridge, negligent maintenance of the bridge, and failure to warn of a dangerous condition.
The uncontroverted evidence in the record shows that the DOT adopted the American Association of State Highway Officials' (AASHO) standards for bridge design which included the specifications for the metal grating, and the curb-rail system. After reciting the four-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979), the trial judge found that the design of the bridge fell within the planning exception to § 768.28, Fla.Stat. Although the appellants submitted some evidence that a better standard could have been adopted, the trial court found that this was "second guessing" of a governmental decision which Commercial Carrier intended to prevent. We agree.
The appellants have relied on a number of cases, particularly Ferla v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So.2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 759 (Fla.1980), as authority for the proposition that the design of a bridge is not an act of planning but is an operational act and that the DOT is therefore not immune from liability. However, these cases merely hold that the facility in question cannot be negligently designed or negligently constructed. The steel grating lift span met AASHO requirements and the decision to use it was a design decision that met accepted standards existing at the time it was constructed. Unlike Feria, there is no evidence in this record of negligent design of the bridge or any of its components. In the instant case, the design and construction of the bridge in accordance with the accepted standards promulgated by AASHO was an immune planning decision.
Appellants contend that the continued maintenance of the curb-rail system and the metal grating on the bridge was an operational activity so as to be actionable. Negligent maintenance is an actionable operational level activity. However, there is no evidence of negligent maintenance in this case. Appellants make it clear that they are not speaking of maintenance as the term is normally used but are speaking of maintenance in the sense of allowing a condition to exist.
It is contended that the DOT is guilty of negligent maintenance for failing to replace or modify the curb-rail system and the steel grating. A similar contention was made in Feria where it was alleged that the traffic lanes on the causeway were too narrow. The Feria court recognized that it was difficult to distinguish the question of the median strip design, which it had already decided was operational, and the fixing of the size of the roadway in question. The Feria court took judicial notice that the solution to this problem could involve only the consolidation of the two heavily traveled traffic lanes into one or the construction of a new or additional bridge. Feria held that this determination was a basic policy decision which would be the exercise of a planning level function from which the county was immune.
The upgrading or modification of structures to meet current standards is often of such magnitude as to constitute replacement or reconstruction. There are many roads and bridges in the State of Florida that were adequate for the amount of traffic and the size and speed of vehicles traveling on them when designed but which are not up to present standards. The modification or replacement of all of these roads and bridges involves the spending of many times the money available annually to the DOT for that purpose.
As was the case in Feria it would require a major expenditure of funds to replace or modify the bridge as appellants contend should have been done. The evidence in this record shows that the bridge handled an average traffic flow of approximately 12 million vehicles per year and there had been apparently no prior accidents attributable to the steel grating. There was further evidence that there were numerous intersections and highways within the Dade County area that were more dangerous to the traveling public. It is the responsibility of DOT to expend the funds available for updating, improving or modifying existing facilities in a manner that is of the most benefit to the public. Their decision as to where and on which facilities these available funds are to be spent is a planning decision. If the appellants are correct in their contention, the state could easily be liable for more than 90% of the accidents occurring between Miami and Key West and yet it would probably require the entire budget of the DOT for several years to reconstruct the roads and bridges on that route to meet modern standards.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the alleged negligent maintenance caused the accident. On the contrary, the only evidence as to causation is that the steel grating probably would not cause a vehicle to suddenly cross from the median to the outside curb at approximately a 90 degree angle. There is no evidence that a curb or handrail constructed to even higher than modem day standards would have prevented the vehicle from going off the bridge into the water. The DOT is not required to place impenetrable barriers along the sides of a bridge.
The DOT's alleged negligence in failing to warn does not warrant further discussion in view of the numerous decisions holding that the selection and placement of traffic control devices are discretionary governmental planning functions and are therefore exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 768.28, Fla.Stat. See Feria.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., dissents.