Case Name: Wojciuk and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. United States Rubber Company, Defendant and Respondent: Stuewer, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1963-08-06
Citations: 19 Wis. 2d 224
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wojciuk and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. United States Rubber Company, Defendant and Respondent: Stuewer, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 19
Pages: 224–235g

Head Matter:
Wojciuk and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. United States Rubber Company, Defendant and Respondent: Stuewer, Defendant and Respondent.
February 4—March 5,
August 6, 1963.
For the appellants there was a brief by Foley, Sammond & Lardner and John R. Collins, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Collins.
For the respondents there was a brief by Arnold, Murray & O’Neill of Milwaukee, for Herbert Stuewer, and by Wickham, Borgelt, Skogstad & Powell of Milwaukee, for the United States Rubber Company and the Phillips Petroleum Company, and oral argument by Kurt H. Frauen and James T. Murray, both of Milwaukee.
Motion for rehearing granted, on April 30, 1963. For disposition on rehearing, see post, p. 235a.

Opinion:
Fairchild, J.
Two issues are presented on this appeal: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not allowing the plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Alfred Schmidt, to testify as an expert? (2) Did the trial court err in directing verdict in favor of the respective defendants?
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not allowing the plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Alfred Schmidt, to testify as an expert?
"The question of whether a witness possesses sufficient knowledge to qualify as an expert is generally one for the trial court, and unless it appears that in its determination the court is guilty of an abuse of discretion, the court's ruling will stand."
"The questions in that regard, however, relate to mere competency, and, therefore, the trial judge's determination thereof, within all reasonable limits is supreme."
Dr. Schmidt is a mechanical engineer, employed by Marquette University as research professor of engineering. He worked for a number of years as a mechanical engineer, mainly with optical industries, and received graduate degrees of Master and Doctor of Science in engineering at the University of Michigan. He had taught at other universities and had been employed at Kearney & Trecker as research engineer in charge of metal cutting and as chief research engineer. He was asked what experience he had in observing the mechanics of automobile tires. He answered that early in life he had worked for an organization that sold tractors, trucks, and automobiles, and often examined tires which customers brought back, claiming defects; he had his own bicycle, motorcycle, and car. When he studied at the University of Michigan they went around to various automobile factories and saw their testing procedures. He had recently spent a week at the General Motors test center and spent one day observing demonstrations and tests of tires. He testified that while at Kearney & Trecker he had studied adhesives, including rubber, and the bonding of rubber to other materials in connection with fastening components of machinery together, or insulating precision parts of a machine from vibration.
The offer of proof included testimony that there was a separation of plies in the vicinity of one of the breaks, and that the separation was caused by incomplete bonding in the vulcanizing process; that friction between the separated plies caused more heat than normal and weakened the material; that the deflation of the tire was caused by sudden loss of most of the air pressure due to the holes in the sidewall; that the lack of bonding caused the structure to lose full strength, and this condition caused the holes.
The learned circuit judge acknowledged Dr. Schmidt's standing as a mechanical engineer but ruled that he was not qualified to testify as an expert in rubber. He said:
"The mere fact that he has worked with rubber pads in heavy machine equipment at Kearney & Trecker certainly doesn't qualify him to testify as to what caused an alleged blowout or explosion of an automobile tire. His only affinity to tires is . . . owning a bicycle or being involved in the sale of automobiles where he examined the tires as to the amount of rubber left on them, and his trip over to General Motors."
Although the decision was based upon Dr. Schmidt's lack of experience with automobile tires, it was hot based upon a supposed rule that. practical experience is always an essential qualification of an expert witness. Such a rule would be erroneous.
In this case plaintiffs were attempting to establish, "from expert examination of the tire, that it had been defectively manufactured and that its failure resulted from such defect or at least had occurred in a manner which was a breach of alleged warranties. The ground which Dr. Schmidt's opinion was to cover was peculiar to the manufacture, structure, and behavior of rubber tires. We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to decide that Dr. Schmidt's knowledge of general scientific and mechanical engineering principles and his practical experience with materials and products other than tires did not qualify him to express opinions which would aid the jury in determining the facts of this case.
2. Direction of a verdict. The consideration of the propriety of directing a verdict can be readily divided into two parts: One relating to the causes of action for negligent manufacture and for breach of implied warranty, and the other relating to the causes of action for breach of express warranty and negligent representation.
Negligent manufacture and breach of implied warranty. In order to maintain their causes of action, plaintiffs must necessarily, in these circumstances, produce evidence that the failure of the tire resulted from a defect in its manufacture. Dr. Schmidt's opinion having been excluded, the record contained no such evidence unless the occurrence of the accident gave rise to a permissible inference of negligence.
Plaintiffs urge that an inference of negligent manufacture is permissible under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Con-cededly the tire which failed had been out of the possession of the manufacturer for more than two weeks before the accident, but plaintiffs rely on three cases where the doctrine has been applied even though the article causing the injury was no longer in the exclusive control of defendant at the time it caused injury.
In each of the situations considered in those decisions there was reason to say that there was much-greater probability that the defect causing injury existed when the article left defendant's possession than that it was created by subsequent occurrences. In Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at page 514, we said:
"It is not essential that the possibility of other causes of the accident be altogether eliminated, but only that their likelihood be so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant's door. The evidence must afford a rational basis for concluding that the cause of the accident was probably such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it. 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, p. 1086, sec. 19.7; Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed.), p. 205, sec. 42."
In the case before us the tire had been on the car for two weeks and been driven 3,100 miles. The exposure of automobile tires to possible injury and abuse while being used is common knowledge. There was a cut through which air could have leaked, and there were marks and breaks which indicated, according to Mr. Gray, that the tire had been used while not sufficiently inflated. As was said in Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., supra, at page 639:
"If the refrigerator were a machine or appliance, such as an automobile or sewing machine, the moving parts of which are capable of being operated by the user, defendant's point would be well taken. In case of injury resulting from the use of such a machine the inference would be just as strong that the defect causing the injury occurred as the result of the operator's use as would the inference that the same was due to some defect in manufacture, and therefore the principle of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable."
Breach of warranty and negligent representation. The complaint against Phillips seems to have been drawn upon the theory that by advertising practices Phillips made itself legally responsible for oral representations made by dealers handling its products, including Stuewer. At the trial, upon a different theory, Phillips was shown to have advertised its tires as "new, safer Phillips 66 tires, which are guaranteed for life against any defects." Plaintiffs testified they read these advertisements. Assuming that the quoted statement was a warranty upon which plaintiffs could maintain an action, if breached, plaintiffs, in our opinion, did not succeed in establishing a breach. The lack of sufficient proof that the failure of the tire resulted from any defect has already been discussed.
The Wojciuks had conversed with Stuewer about the purchase of new tires. Wojciuk had originally been interested in buying Lee-brand tube-type tires. Mr. Stuewer had previously stocked Lee tires, but was then selling Phillips tires, and recommended them. He explained the difference between tubeless and tube-type tires, pointing out that lower air pressures were required in the tubeless type.
If a warranty or representation material to this case was made, it must be spelled out of the statements as follows, testified to by the Wojciuks although denied in part by Stuewer: The low air pressure made the tubeless tire safer than the tube type. If anything punctured the tire on the road the air would not explode from the tire, but release slowly and allow a safe stop. The tire sealed itself to the rim and this was considered a safety factor. They are absolutely blowout proof because of the low pressure that is in the tire.
It would appear that most of what Stuewer said was intended as a comparison between tube-type and tubeless tires and to point out that the tubeless tire required less air pressure.
Nevertheless it is the rule that in deciding a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be regarded in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Although it is at least doubtful that there was a blowout of this tire in the ordinary meaning of the term, the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs does tend to show that the accident was precipitated by a sudden loss of whatever support the tire had been providing just before the accident and that the behavior of the tire did not completely fulfil the promises which Stuewer is claimed to have made.
We conclude, however, that plaintiffs' claim of express warranty must fail in any event because they did not prove that they gave a notice of breach of warranty as required by sec. 121.49, Stats. The giving of notice was alleged in the complaint but denied in the answers. Mr. Wojciuk testified that he telephoned Stuewer the day of the accident and said: "Herb, what kind of tires did you sell me? . . . We had a blowout and a terrible accident resulted from it." Although there was testimony that Wojciuk later showed Stuewer the damaged tire and presumably had conversations with him, the conversation just referred to is the one which comes the closest to constituting notice of breach of warranty.
The notice requirement is not satisfied by informing the seller of the facts concerning the breach, but the notice must inform the seller, either expressly or by implication, of the buyer's claim that a breach exists and that the buyer will look to the seller for damages. The conversation as described did not convey sufficient information to be a notice of breach of warranty although if it had contained the proper substance it was timely.
The evidence does not establish that Stuewer had either actual or apparent authority from Phillips to make the statements attributed to him. Moreover, the substance of any notice of breach of warranty to Phillips does not appear in the record.
With respect to the cause of action for negligent representation, the plaintiffs appear to be relying upon the rules for liability stated in Restatement, 2 Torts, pp. 1039, 1040, sec. 388, comment b. There is no evidence in the record tending to show that defendant Stuewer knew or should have known that the tire was dangerous for its obvious and intended use.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Drott Tractor Co. v. Kehrein (1957), 275 Wis. 320, 327, 81 N. W. (2d) 500, citing Morrill v. Komasinski (1950), 256 Wis. 417, 41 N. W. (2d) 620.
Northern Supply Co. v. Wangard (1904), 123 Wis. 1, 16, 100 N. W. 1066, quoted in Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1932), 207 Wis. 209, 240 N. W. 392. See Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber Co. (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 67, 80, 117 N. W. (2d) 646.
Bloch v. American Ins. Co. (1907), 132 Wis. 150, 154, 112 N. W. 45.
Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co. (1954), 266 Wis. 630, 64 N. W. (2d) 226 (electric shock from sealed unit of a refrigerator); Zarling v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1958), 2 Wis. (2d) 596, 87 N. W. (2d) 263; and Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. (1958), 5 Wis. (2d) 503, 93 N. W. (2d) 467, 94 N. W. (2d) 645 (bursting bottles).
Gilson v. Drees Brothers, post, p. 252, 120 N. W. (2d) 63.
Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co. (D. C. Colo. 1954), 127 Fed. Supp. 705.
Mack Trucks, Inc., v. Sunde, ante, p. 129, 119 N. W. (2d) 321. See Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 371, 384, 105 N. W. (2d) 748.