Case Name: Louanne PARKER v. John Matthew PARKER
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2007-01-31
Citations: 97 Ark. App. 298
Docket Number: CA 06-111
Parties: Louanne PARKER v. John Matthew PARKER
Judges: Pittman, C.J., agrees.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 298–310

Head Matter:
Louanne PARKER v. John Matthew PARKER
CA 06-111
248 S.W.3d 523
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 31, 2007
[Rehearing denied March 7,2007J
Rieves, Rubens, & Mayton, by: KentJ. Rubens and Lawrence W. Jackson, for appellant.
Mooney Law Firm, P.A., by: Clarke Mixon; and Barrett & Deacon, A Professional Association, by: D.P. MarshallJr., BrandonJ. Harrison, and Andrew H. Dallas, for appellee.

Opinion:
D. Vaught, Larry D.Judge.
Appellant Louanne Parker appeals from an order modifying the amount of child support and alimony to be paid by her former husband, appellee John Matthew (Matt) Parker. We affirm.
In a 1999 divorce decree, Louanne was awarded custody of the parties' three children, and Matt was ordered to pay $2026 per month child support and $1600 per month alimony. During the proceedings, Louanne asked that she be allowed to relocate with the children to Little Rock, but her request was denied. Louanne continued to reside in the marital home, and, under the terms of the decree, the house was to be sold and the proceeds to be divided equally upon her vacating it. The remaining assets were divided equally for the most part, although a business venture that Matt had entered into with his brothers, Jonesboro Investment Company, LLC, was declared to be his non-marital property.
Louanne appealed from the decree, challenging the denial of her request to relocate, the division of marital property, and the calculation of Matt's income for support purposes. In Parker v. Parker, 75 Ark. App. 90, 55 S.W.3d 773 (2001) (Parker I), we affirmed the property division and support awards but reversed the prohibition on her relocation and declared that she was free to move to Little Rock.
Soon after Parker I was handed down, Louanne petitioned the trial court for permission to move to Texas rather than Little Rock. Matt initially opposed the petition, but the matter was settled, with Louanne and the couple's daughters relocating to Texas and the couple's son remaining in Jonesboro with Matt. The parties agreed that neither of them would seek modification of child support or alimony before February 28, 2003. Additionally, Matt agreed to pay Louanne $107,500 for her interest in the marital home.
Upon moving to Texas in 2002, Louanne purchased a home for $185,000. Even though she had recently obtained a postgraduate degree as a specialist in education from Arkansas State University in Jonesboro, she planned to pursue a PhD from the University of North Texas. When she learned that there had been changes in the department at North Texas and that the particular degree .she sought was no longer being offered, she transferred after one semester to Texas Women's University to pursue her PhD in psychology, with a minor in pediatric neuropsychology. She hoped to complete this degree by 2006. While in school, she obtained her Texas license as a specialist in school psychology. She did freelance work in 2003 and 2004, for which she received a small income.
On May 21, 2004, Matt filed a motion to modify his child-support and alimony payments. He asserted, as changed circumstances, that the couple's oldest daughter would graduate from high school on May 29, 2004, resulting in each party having custody of one minor child; that Louanne had completed her education specialist degree and had received assets in the post-decree division of marital property; and that Louanne, despite having obtained her degree, "continues to be enrolled in postgraduate education as a lifestyle choice." Louanne opposed the motion and denied that any downward adjustments in child support or alimony were warranted.
Hearings were held in September and October 2004 to determine both parties' incomes for child-support purposes and Louanne's continuing need for alimony. Particularly at issue was whether Matt's income should include a one-time, $200,000 distribution that he received from Jonesboro Investment Company, LLC, in 2004. In addition, there was evidence that, in September 2004, Louanne obtained two contracts as a licensed specialist in school psychology, which would pay her a total of $52,000 per year.
After the hearings, the trial court issued letter opinions with the following relevant rulings: 1) a change of circumstances warranted modification of child support and alimony; 2) Louanne's net income, as per her new contracts, was $809.73 per week; 3) Matt's net income was $2539.77 per week; 4) based on the parties' incomes and the chart amounts attributable to each of them having custody of one minor child, Matt's net child-support obligation was modified to $244.96 per week; 5) the $200,000 distribution to Matt from the LLC would not be included in calculating Matt's income; 6) even if the $200,000 were included, a deviation from the chart attributable to that amount was justified; 7) Louanne would receive alimony at the reduced rate of $1000 per month from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2006, when it would cease entirely. These rulings were incorporated into an order entered July 11, 2005, from which Louanne filed a timely notice of appeal. She now argues that the trial court erred in calculating hers and Matt's incomes for purposes of child support and that the trial court erred in reducing the amount of alimony she was to receive.
Calculation of Income for Child-Support Purposes
We review traditional cases of equity, such as domestic-relations proceedings, de novo. Hurtt v. Hurtt, 93 Ark. App. 37, 216 S.W.3d 604 (2005). It is the ultimate task of the trial judge to determine the expendable income of a child-support payor. Cole v. Cole, 89 Ark. App. 134, 201 S.W.3d 21 (2005). As a rule, when the amount of child support is at issue, we will not reverse the trial judge absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
Under this heading, Louanne makes several sub-arguments, which we will address individually. We first consider her claim that the trial court's temporary child-support order entered in August 2004 incorrectly established the parties' incomes. At the hearing that preceded that order, the trial judge received evidence so that child support could be temporarily adjusted pending completion of trial. At the close of the hearing, the judge declared Matt's yearly income to be $163,448.50, based on an exhibit prepared by Louanne's expert witness, and declared Louanne's yearly income to be $19,423, based on her adjusted gross income from her 2003 tax return. Louanne now states that the trial court erred in "calculating appellant's obligation for the temporary order on her adjusted gross income as opposed to appellee's after-tax income."
Louanne's assertion on this point is made without a developed argument and without a convincing explanation as to how or why a legal error occurred. It is the appellant's burden to demonstrate reversible error. See Arrow Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 81 Ark. App. 42, 98 S.W.3d 48 (2003). Moreover, no authority, other than a general citation to Administrative Order No. 10, is cited. Points asserted without citation to authority or convincing argument should not be considered. West v. West, 364 Ark. 73, 216 S.W.3d 557 (2005). In any event, Matt's income at the temporary hearing was calculated by reference to an exhibit offered by Louanne, and Louanne's income was taken from her 2003 tax return, which she agreed could be used for that purpose. An appellant may not complain on appeal that the trial court erred if she induced, consented to, or acquiesced in the trial court's position. Keathley v. Keathley, 76 Ark. App. 150, 61 S.W.3d 219 (2001). We therefore find no reversible error on this point.
We next address Louanne's statement that "the court used the projected weekly wages that Ms. Parker did not begin receiving until September 30, 2004, and applied them retroactively." By "retroactively," she means, as best we can tell, that the court calculated the income that she was to receive from her September 2004 contracts "as though [she] had received that additional income throughout 2004." Again, Louanne does little more than make an assertion of this point, unsupported by convincing argument or authority. See West, supra. Moreover, we do not believe that the trial court's ruling bears out her argument. The final order enteredjuly 11, 2005, retroactively modified Louanne's support payments as of September 2004, which was the month that she began earning money on her contracts. We therefore see no basis for reversal.
Next, in a similarly undeveloped and unsupported argument, Louanne contends that "it was error under Administrative Order No. 10 to fail to calculate Ms. Parker's income by looking at her 2002 and 2003 tax returns." She is apparently contending that she was a self-employed person and that, under Administrative Order No. 10, her child-support obligation should have been calculated based on her prior two years' tax returns and her current year's quarterly estimates. See In re Administrative Order No. 10: Arkansas Child Support Guidelines, § III(c) 347 Ark. App'x 1064, 1068 (2002) (per curiam). However, at the beginning of the final hearing in this matter, Louanne's counsel seemingly invited the court to look to her 2004 contracts in determining her income, stating:
[W]e have provided and the Court will see that a contract that was not available was signed ultimately on September 2nd or 3rd. And I may be off a day. And there are actually two of them. They're for ten months each, and there's a right of renewal in favor of the employer. They each pay 26,000 dollars for ten months. And so she has income and she can — the Court can clearly look to that in terms of the youngest child, the daughter that is in Texas with Mrs. Parker.
This, therefore, seems to be a case in which the trial court did what it was asked to do. An appellant may not complain of an alleged erroneous action of the trial court if she has consented to or acquiesced in that action. See Keathley, supra; Harness v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 60 Ark. App. 265, 962 S.W.2d 374 (1998).
We turn now to Louanne's assertion that, in calculating Matt's income, the trial court failed to consider certain matters, including interest-free loans that Matt received from the LLC and five-percent fees or commissions that he was to receive as part of his LLC income. We find no error here. There was evidence that the amount that Matt stood to gain from the fees and commissions was de minimis. As for the interest-free loans, they were, in part, a device for protection of the LLC's money. Matt (and his brothers, who also received such loans) used approximately $355,000 in loan proceeds to buy individual CDs in smaller amounts in order to obtain the FDIC's $100,000 limit; then, when the CDs matured, they placed the interest back into the LLC account — a practice that even Louanne's counsel called "good business." Other loans at issue were obtained by Matt in 2002 and 2003 for the purpose of paying off the mortgage and buying out Louanne's interest in the marital home and for the purpose of buying some stock. However, Louanne makes no convincing argument nor does she cite any authority for the proposition that the interest that Matt saved as a result of these loans should be considered income for child-support purposes. Therefore, her burden of demonstrating reversible error has not been met.
Finally, we address Louanne's argument that Matt's income should have included a $200,000 distribution from the LLC that was reported and taxed as income in 2000 but was not actually distributed until 2004. We conclude that Louanne is procedurally barred from raising this issue. The trial court gave two alternative bases for its ruling on this point: 1) the $200,000 distribution should not be included in Matt's 2004 income because it was reported and taxed in 2000, and, alternatively 2) if it were included, a deviation from the chart for the amount of support attributable to the $200,000 would be justified. On appeal, Louanne attacks the trial court's refusal to consider the $200,000 as part of Matt's income but not the trial court's alternative ruling that a deviation from the support chart was justified. Thus, even if we were to agree that the $200,000 should have been included in calculating Matt's income, we still would not reverse in light of the failure to attack the trial court's independent, alternative basis for its ruling. See Morehouse v. Lawson, 90 Ark. App. 379, 206 S.W.3d 295 (2005); Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002); Pearrow v. Feagin, 300 Ark. 274, 778 S.W.2d 941 (1989); Camp v. State, 66 Ark. App. 134, 991 S.W.2d 611 (1999).
To conclude on this point, we affirm the trial court's calculation of the parties' incomes for child-support purposes.
Modification of Alimony
The primary factors to be considered in changing an award of alimony are the needs of one party and the ability of the other party to pay. Bracken v. Bracken, 302 Ark. 103, 787 S.W.2d 678 (1990). Each case is to be judged upon its own facts. Id. Discretion is vested in the trial judge, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
From 1999 through 2004, Matt paid Louanne $1600 per month as alimony. Under the trial court's current order, that amount was modified to $1000 per month from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2006. Thereafter, the alimony obligation ceased. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making this modification.
Louanne argues that Matt's income increased following entry of the 1999 decree; however, there was evidence that her income increased as well. The court found in 1999 that Louanne earned a salary of $700 per month, but by the time the 2005 order was entered in the present case, the court found her income to be $809.73 per week. Further, Louanne earned one post-graduate degree after the 1999 alimony was established and was expected to earn a doctoral degree by the time the alimony obligation ceased in 2006. Additionally, there was evidence that Louanne was able to afford a nice residence and new automobiles and that she received at least $400,000 in assets from the property division following entry of the 1999 decree. Moreover, she is currently supporting one minor child rather than three.
While Louanne mentions other matters to support her claim for continued, unmodified alimony, we conclude, based on the above factors and our de novo review, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the alimony as it did. We therefore affirm on this point.
Affirmed.
Pittman, C.J., agrees.
Griffen, J., concurs.
Louanne also mentions, in cataloguing the matters that the trial court did not consider, Matt's failure to list any liabilities owed to the LLC on his affidavit offinancial means and the LLC's failure to keep records of its investors' capital accounts. It is not explained how the trial court's failure to consider these matters impacted the calculation of Matt's income.