Case Name: Harry Swisher v. The Illinois Central Railroad Company
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1899-10-16
Citations: 182 Ill. 533
Docket Number: 
Parties: Harry Swisher v. The Illinois Central Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 182
Pages: 533–549

Head Matter:
Harry Swisher v. The Illinois Central Railroad Company.
Opinion filed October 16, 1899
Rehearing denied December 14, 1899.
1. Appeals and errors—when Supreme Court is precluded from a consideration of the case. The recital in the judgment of the Appellate Court, reversing without remanding, of ultimate facts covering the entire right of recovery as made by the pleadings in an action for negligence, precludes, under the statute, further consideration of the case by the Supreme Court, in the absence of errors of law.
2. Same—when Appellate Court’s recital of facts precludes a recovery. In an action for injuries to a fireman by collision occasioned by a misplaced switch, which, it is alleged, had no light thereon to indicate the way it was turned, a finding by the Appellate Court that the injury was the result of a risk incident to the plaintiff’s employment, that it occurred in the day time when lamps were not needed, and that it was occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff, precludes a recovery under such facts.
Magruder, J., dissenting.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Swisher, 74 Ill. App. 164, affirmed.
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee county; the Hon. John C. Carver, Judge, presiding.
This is an action by appellant, against appellee, to recover damages for personal injury.
The original declaration was amended, andas amended contained two counts, which, in effect, aver the plaintiff, while in the service of the defendant, was a locomotive fireman, and while he and his engineer were in the exercise of reasonable care and caution he was injured at the station of Sublette on the third day of May, 1892, by a collision between a passenger engine which he was firing, going south, and a switch engine of the defendant heading north and standing on the east side-track at that place. Each count alleges that there were standard or rotary switches at that station, with targ'ets painted white and targets painted red, the former, when facing an approaching engine, indicating the main track was safe, and the latter, when so placed, indicating it was not safe for a train to pass over that track. In- each count it is averred that the targets were only for use in the day time, and when completed the switches had lamps on them to be used in the night time, and that the defendant negligently failed to put lamps on them, by reason of which the plaintiff was injured in the night time, when it was dark.
On May 4, 1896, two additional counts were filed, the first of which alleges that it was the duty of the defendant, through its servants, to use reasonable care and diligence to keep the switch in question closed, so the train could pass along the main track without going upon the side-track, but the defendant, through its servants, did not keep said switch closed, and did not, through its servants, exercise reasonable care or diligence to keep the same closed, and that by reason of said neglig'ence of defendant, through its servants, about seven o’clock in the afternoon of May 3, 1892, the Dubuque and LaSalle passenger train, on which plaintiff was a fireman, and while he and his fellow-servants were in the exercise of reasonable care, was diverted from the main track onto the side track at the station of Sublette, and collided with the engine of a freight train standing on the side-track, thereby greatly injuring the plaintiff, and that said switch was not permitted to remain open by any of the fellow-servants of the plaintiff.
The second count avers that it was the duty of the defendant, by its servants, to use reasonable care to keep the switch in question closed until the engine and train had passed by it, but that the defendant, by its servants, did not keep said switch closed, and that while said train was being run along said main track approaching said switch, at about seven o’clock in the evening of May 3, 1892, defendant, by its servants, carelessly opened said switch before said locomotive reached it, and negligently, by its servants, permitted it to be and remain open until said engine reached it', and in consequence of said negligence said engine and train were diverted from said main track onto said side-track and came in collision with the engine on the side-track which was there, without fault of the plaintiff or his fellow-servants, and that by reason of said collision the plaintiff was greatly injured without his fault or the fault of any of his fellow-servants, and that the switch was not opened through the fault of the plaintiff or any of his fellow-servants.
On trial in the circuit court of Lee county a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff, which, on appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District, were reversed and the cause was not remanded.
The Appellate Court, in its judgment, made a finding of facts, which was recited in the final order of that court, as follows: “And the court finds as facts, from the evidence in the case, that the injury to appellee, under the original declaration as amended, was the result of the risks incident to his employment, and occurred in the day time, when lamps were not required on the switch of the appellant, and the injuries resulting to him by reason of the negligence averred in the additional counts of the declaration were occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant of appellee directly co-operating with him in the particular business in hand and in the same line of employment in which the injuries were sustained.”
Morrison & Bethea, S. B. Pool, and Henry S. Dixon, for appellant.
William Barge, H. A. Brooks, and C. LeRoy Brown, for appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Phillips
delivered the opinion of the court:
By the final order of the Appellate Court for the Second District the ultimate facts found were that the injury was the result of the risks incident to plaintiff's employment; that the accident occurred in the day time, when lamps were not required on the switch of defendant, and that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant of plaintiff directly co-operating with him and in the same line of employment. These finding's are all as to ultimate facts and not as to evidentiary facts, and hence are conclusive on this court. (Caywood v. Farrell, 175 Ill. 480, and authorities there cited.) The ultimate facts as found by the Appellate Court, covering the entire right of recovery, as averred in the pleadings in this case, having been by the Appellate Court adjudicated adversely to the plaintiff, the appellant here, and being all with reference to facts the determination of which is conclusive of the action, we are precluded by the statute from a further consideration of the case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Juagment affirmed.