Case Name: HAHN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-03-04
Citations: 165 S.W. 218
Docket Number: 
Parties: HAHN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 165
Pages: 218–223

Head Matter:
HAHN v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 4, 1914.
On Motion for Rehearing, April 8, 1914.)
1. Criminal Law (§§ 665, 1144 ) — Appeal— Presumptions.
The placing of witnesses under the rule being in the sound discretion of the trial court, it will, until the contrary is shown, be presumed that such discretion was correctly exercised.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1549-1566%, 2736-2764, 2766-2771, 277L-2781, 2901, 3016-3037; Dec. Dig. §§ 665, 1144. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 1166% ) — Teial—Abuse of Discretion.
Where the sheriff was a witness, the refusal of the court to place him under the rule with the other witnesses was not an abuse of discretion, where accused made no showing of prejudice, and the court qualified the bill of exceptions by a statement that, knowing the high character of the witness, he was of the opinion that no harm was done to accused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. § 1166%. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 393 ) — Evidence — Admissibility.
Where the sheriff compelled accused to make tracks so that they could be compared with the tracks made by the guilty party, evidence of the comparison of the tracks is admissible.
[Ed. 'Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law,. Cent. Dig. §§ 871-874; Dec. Dig. § 393. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 811 ) — Trial—Instructions.
Where there was other evidence connecting accused with the offense, besides the comparison of the tracks made by him and his confederate and by the horse they drove, the refusal of a special charge that evidence of footprints is not sufficient to support a conviction was proper because singling out a particular circumstance in the evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1787, 1969-1972; Dee. Dig. § 811. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Criminal Law ■(§ 665 ) — Trial—Conduct —Placing of Witnesses Under the Rule.
Code Or. Proc. 1911, art. 296, provides that the examining magistrate “shall,” if requested, place the witnesses under the rule, while article 719, referring to the trial court, provides that at the request of either party the witnesses on both sides “may” be removed from the court room to some place where they cannot hear the testimony. Held, that in view of article 58 and article 10, Pen. Code 1911, and providing that words and phrases are to be taken in their usual acceptation, the placing of witnesses under the rule rests in the discretion of the trial court; the word “may” being used in contradistinction to “shall.”
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1549-156614 > Dec. Dig. § 665. ]
6. Burglary (§ 41 ) — Prosecution — Evidence-Sufficiency.
The evidence in a prosecution for burglary held sufficient to support conviction.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 94-103, 109; Dec. Dig. § 41. ]
Appeal from District Court, Jones County; Jno. B. Thomas, Judge.
Roy Hahn was convicted of burglary, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
W. J. Arrington and J. M. Carter, both of Aspermont, Chapman & Coombes, of Anson, and W. F. Ramsey and C. L. Black, both of Austin, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Inheres

Opinion:
'PRENDERGAST, P. J.
From a conviction - of burglary with the lowest penalty assessed, appellant prosecutes an appeal.
There are but few questions raised. One of these is appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. We have carefully read and studied the evidence. It is circumstantial. We are not only thoroughly convinced from a study of it that it is sufficient to sustain the conviction, but from it no other reasonable conclusion could be reached than of the appellant's guilt. We think it is unnecessary to recite the evidence. It is quite lengthy. The statement of facts is more than 100 typewritten pages.
The state invoked the enforcement of the rule. The witnesses were thereupon duly sworn and properly instructed by the court. One of the material witnesses for the state was Fred Senter, the sheriff of Stonewall county in which county the burglary is alleged to have been committed and from which county to Jones county the venue had been changed. The state requested that said witness be permitted to remain in court. The defendant objected to this. The witness remained in the courtroom and heard the testimony of the other witnesses who testified before he did. The court, in qualifying the bill, stated, in effect, that the rule always obtained in the courts and it was the custom to permit the sheriff to remain in the courtroom, not to be required to go out under the rule, and he followed this custom, stating further: "The court, knowing the high character of the witness, was of the opinion that no injury would be done appellant thereby and that none was done." This court, in a uniform line of decisions, has always held that such matters are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that such discretion will be presumed to have been correctly exercised until the contrary is shown. The court did not abuse its discretion in this case. White's Ann. O. G. P. § 7-67, and cases collated thereunder.-
About the night of December 13, 1912, the depot building of the Wichita Valley Railroad at Aspermont in Stonewall county was burglarized and certain express articles stolen therefrom. The next day after the discovery of the burglary, said sheriff, Senter, with Mr. Bingham, suspected appellant and Don Brewster, who was with him, of the burglary. They found where a buggy and double team had been hitched at a rather secluded place some 100 or more yards from the depot. They tracked two persons from the buggy towards the depot and back to the buggy. One of the horses made a peculiar track which was readily identified. They also found the tracks of these same two parties and said horse and the buggy tracks at a place where a fire had been the night before about a mile and a half from the town of Aspermont, where appellant and said Brewster and this team of horses were seen at this fire early the night of December 13th. They also found these same tracks — all, vehicle, horse's and persons' — at an old rock house about four miles from Aspermont Both these places where the appellant and Brewster were seen at this fire, and the old house were near the road. They suspected appellant and Brewster and watched them the next day. After appellant and Brewster left town, the sheriff and Bingham followed them. They left Aspermont after appellant and Brewster had already gone about one mile. The sheriff and Bingham were on horseback. They rode rapidly until they got in sight of appellant and Brewster. Appellant and Brewster .drove rapidly until they got near said old rock house. As they did so, they drove slowly, in a walk, looking back, and evidently discovered the sheriff and Bingham following them. After passing the old house, they drove rapidly for some short distance. They were overtaken by the sheriff and Bingham and their buggy searched, but the stolen goods were not found therein. They were then discharged, and the sheriff and Bingham went back to this old rock house and searched it, finding therein three of the stolen articles. They also discovered the tracks of two persons to and from this old house and the tracks of the. buggy and team where they had been hitched in the lane near thereto. Appellant and Brewster, after being turned loose at first by the sheriff, got on an elevation where they could see what the sheriff and Bingham did, and stopped and watched them. As soon as the sheriff and Bingham found the goods in this old house, they went to and arrested appellant and Brewster and brought them back and stopped them opposite this old house. The sheriff then went back to the house and fur ther searched for tracks. Upon discovering them, he called to Bingham, who was with appellant and Brewster, and told him to bring the two men to the house, which was done. The sheriff thereupon had both of them to make tracks so that they could be measured. The sheriff then measured their tracks then made, accurately with the tracks he had already found, going to and from this house, and they corresponded exactly. He also measured the horse's track at this house where it had been evidently the night before and at the said fire and where the team had been hitched near the depot, and they corresponded exactly. He also measured the hoof of the horse itself, and it corresponded exactly with these tracks and was the horse that made them.
Appellant has several bills of exceptions to the testimony of Bingham and the sheriff, Senter, as to these tracks, both of the horse and men, and objected for various reasons, among others, claiming that by the sheriff forcing appellant and Brewster to make their tracks at the old house, while under arrest, it was inadmissible, as it was thereby forcing them to give testimony against themselves while under arrest. All this testimony was clearly admissible and has many times been so held in a uniform line of decisions by this court. Pitts v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 527, 132 S. W. 801; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 32 Am. Rep. 595; Meyers v. State, 14 Tex. App. 35; Bruce v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 21 S. W. 681; and section 1074d, White's Ann. O. O. P.
The court gave a correct, and full charge submitting everything aptly that was proper and necessary to be submitted to the jury. Appellant makes no complaint of the court's charge in any respect. He requested, and the court refused to give his special charge to this effect: "That character footprints, measurement of tracks and tracks are not of themselves sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. Therefore you are charged that the evidence of tracking, measuring, and comparing the tracks introduced by the witnesses Senter and Bingham and Whitaker would not of themselves warrant a conviction for the offense charged in the indictment against the defendant." There was much other evidence tending to connect appellant with the burglary in addition to the tracks of himself and Brewster, the horse and the vehicle. It would have been improper for the court, therefore, to have singled out a part of his testimony and given appellant's special charge on the subject. This can no more be done against the state than against appellant. As stated above, the court correctly, aptly, and fully submitted a charge to the jury. See White's Ann. O. O. P. § 810, and cases there cited.
No other questions are raised to be passed upon.
The judgment will be affirmed.