Case Name: Celester BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-10-07
Citations: 226 So. 2d 870
Docket Number: No. 69-174
Parties: Celester BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before CHARLES CARROLL, and BARICDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 226
Pages: 870–871

Head Matter:
Celester BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 69-174.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
Oct. 7, 1969.
Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Gregory B. Hoppenstand, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before CHARLES CARROLL, and BARICDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The appellant was informed against by a two-count information. Count I alleged breaking and entering of a dwelling house and assault on persons lawfully therein. Count II alleged a lewd and lascivious or indecent assault upon male minors under the age of fourteen years. The appellant was found guilty as to the first count on the lesser included offense of entering without breaking, and guilty of Count II although the evidence indicated the assault was singular rather than plural. However, the written judgment indicated a conviction on both counts as alleged.
We affirm the convictions as orally stated by the court upon, the following au thorities: Peters v. State, Fla.1954, 76 So.2d 147; Hall v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So.2d 202; Dobry v. State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 603; State v. Wright, Fla.1969, 224 So.2d 300; People v. Keene, 391 Ill. 305, 63 N.E.2d 509; State v. Boone, Mo.1926, 289 S.W. 575; State v. Culbertson, Mo.App.1934, 74 S.W.2d 375; 17 Fla.Jur., Indictments and Informations, § 96; 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 168a, 264. However, we return the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a correct written judgment in accordance with the oral pronouncement at the conclusion of the trial as to Count I. See: Hart v. State, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 489; Matera v. State, Fla.App.1969, 218 So.2d 180. We also vacate the sentence as to Count I in the event the trial judge should desire to reconsider this matter. It is, however, noted that the sentence imposed was not beyond the limits set in § 810.03, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
Affirmed as modified, with directions.