Case Name: CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KOOL RADIATORS INCORPORATED, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-04-25
Citations: 689 F. App'x 877
Docket Number: No. 15-16023
Parties: CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KOOL RADIATORS INCORPORATED, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: BEA and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and CHHABRIA, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 689
Pages: 877–878

Head Matter:
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KOOL RADIATORS INCORPORATED, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-16023
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 3, 2017 Pasadena, California
Filed April 25, 2017
Leland Howard Jones, IV, Richard A. Simpson, Attorney, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, Kurt M. Zitzer, Esquire, Attorney, Meagher & Geer PLLP, Scottsdale, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Colin F. Campbell, Esquire, Brian. K. Mosley, Esquire, Osborn Maledon, PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant
Before: BEA and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and CHHABRIA, District Judge.
The Honorable Vince Chhabria, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental Casualty.
Stephen Evans asked Kool Radiators to invest in Aegis Jet, a company that Evans partially owned. Kool Radiators later sued Evans in connection with this transaction and won. As a judgment creditor, Kool Radiators stands in the shoes of Evans in this case. See Carpenter v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 565, 422 P.2d 129, 131 (1966).
To be covered by the Continental Casualty professional liability insurance policy, Evans's conduct must have met the policy's definition of "professional services." The policy specified that "professional services" are either work performed for remuneration for HarnerEvans or approved pro bono work:
Professional services mean those services:
A. performed in the practice of public accountancy by you for others for remuneration that inures to the benefit of the Named Insured [that is, HarnerEvans], including but not limited to consulting services and investment advisory services;
B. pro bono services ., if at the time such services were undertaken, a partner, officer or director of the Named Insured approved the rendering of such services without compensation... -
There is no evidence in the district court record that the investment solicitation by Evans was for remuneration inuring to the benefit of HarnerEvans. Nor is there any evidence that the investment solicitation constituted pro bono work. Pro bono services are unpaid, with the possible exception of court-ordered fees at the end of some lawsuits. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (quoting Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978)); Pro Bono, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "pro bono" as "[ujncompensated, esp. regarding free legal services performed for the indigent or for a public cause"). Evans stood to benefit from the investment in Aegis Jet because he had a financial stake in the company as a partner. And Evans paid himself $32,000 from the Aegis Jet bank account holding the Kool Radiators investment, just one day after Kool Radiators made the investment. Soliciting an investment in a company in which Evans had a financial stake, and then taking some of that money for himself, was not pro bono investment advice.
Because the investment solicitation by Evans fell outside the policy's definition of covered "professional services," we decline to address Continental's arguments that coverage was separately foreclosed by the fraud exclusion or by the "prior knowledge" provision in the policy.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. The policy places defined terms in bold font.