Case Name: BOOTY et al. v. O'CONNOR et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1926-02-26
Citations: 287 S.W. 282
Docket Number: No. 8743
Parties: BOOTY et al. v. O’CONNOR et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 287
Pages: 282–291

Head Matter:
BOOTY et al. v. O’CONNOR et al.
(No. 8743.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
Feb. 26, 1926.
On Motion for Rehearing June 24, 1926.
Motion for Further Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1926.)
Proctor, Vandenberge,’Crain, and Mitchell, of Victoria, and Woods, King & John, of Houston, for appellant Brooks.
John T. Vance and Rose & Sample, all of Edna, fot appellants, Gertrude V. Booty, Mary Virginia Booty, and Pew Booty.
J. T. Linebaugh, of Victoria, and H. W. Wallace, of Cuero, for appellees.
Writ of error ref used-December 1, 1926.

Opinion:
GRAVES, J.
This suit was in regular form of trespass to try title to 160 acres of land in Jackson county, known as the J. M. Rosbor-ough subdivision No. 31 of the Valentine Garcia grant, Wm. J. O'Connor, managing executor of Thomas M. O'Connor, and others, being plaintiffs, and R. E. Brooks, Gertrude V. Booty, administratrix of E. P. Booty, and others, being defendants; these named defendants— -Gertrude V. Booty answering individually and as guardian of her minor children, as well as in her capacity as such administra-trix-after general denials and pleas of not guilty, each separately filed limitation pleas to this effect:
"Defendant says that more than twelve months have elapsed since the amendment of article 56-95, Revised Statutes, by the Act of 1913 before this suit was brought by plaintiffs; and further says that more than four years have elapsed since the due date of any vendor's lien note payable or assigned to plaintiffs, or either of them, as part of the original purchase price of the lands described in plaintiffs' petition, before the bringing of this suit; and defendant expressly pleads the one and the four-year statute of limitation against any effort of plaintiffs, or either of them, to recover the lands above described by reason of plaintiffs, or either of them, being the vendor, or assignee of the vendor of said lands."
Mrs. Booty then added averments, the purport of which may be stated in this way; That her deceased husband, E. P. Booty, bought the land in 1913, paying a large part of the consideration in cash, afterwards improving it at heavy expense from time to time until his death, not only making further payments on both principal and interest of unpaid purchase money to plaintiffs, but also renewing such indebtedness with them at higher interest rates than were stipulated in the original deed of conveyance to him; that plaintiffs, although at all times knowing of such payments, expenses, and outlay, never before this suit claimed any title to the land, but recognized E. P. Booty and herself, as succeeding to his rights, as the owners thereof, and at all times merely demanded of them the payment of such debts against it, wherefore they were now estopped to assert any claimed superior title to the land as against them, etc.
The defendant Brooks also further pleaded as follows:
"Specially answering herein, this defendant says that the claim of plaintiffs on which their asserted cause of action is based, if they have any such claim, which is not admitted, but expressly denied, is nothing more than the superior title of the vendor, and the plaintiffs are without any title to the lands described in their petition other than, if any, the title remaining in the vendor to secure the payment of the original purchase price, and in this connection defendant represents;
"That heretofore, to wit, on or about the 28th day of March, 1914, Wm. J. O'Con-nor, managing executor under the will of Thomas M. O'Connor, deceased, at that time claiming to hold the vendor's lien to secure four notes for .$1,050 each, of date February 20, 1913, and due oh or before one, two, three, and four years from, date, respectively, bearing interest at 7 per cent, per annum from date until paid, accepted from E. P. Booty and wife, Gertrude Booty, a deed of trust to Jas. McDonald, trustee, for the use of said Wm. J. O'Connor, executor, wherein it was agreed that the asserted vendor's lien indebtedness should be reformed and extended so that it should take the form of a note in the principal sum of $4,528.03, dated March 28, 1014, becoming due March 28, 1919, and bearing interest from date until paid at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum, payable annually.
"That thereafter, on or about the 5th day of October, 1918, the said Wm. J. O'Connor took from the said E. E. Booty and wife a deed of trust on the premises described in plaintiff's petition, wherein it was agreed that there should be given, in lieu of the note last above described, a note in the principal sum of $4,-890.27 of date October 5, 1918, becoming due October 5, 1923, the said reformed note and deed of trust being accepted wherein the said E. E. Booty and wife, Gertrude Booty, conveyed the lands described in plaintiffs' petition to L. W. O'Connor, trustee, for the use of Wm. J. O'Connor, executor, and the said deed of trust providing that all liens of the former deed of trust should remain in full force and effect to secure the note last above described.
"That thereafter, on or about the 20th day of January, 1920, the said Wm. J. O'Connor, executor as aforesaid, loaned E. E. Booty and wife, Gertrude Booty, the sum of $4,500 in addition to the moneys represented by the notes above described, for the purpose of enabling the said E. F. Booty and wife, Gertrude Booty, to pay $800 as taxes against the lands in this subparagraph hereafter described, and $650 for material to be used in the construction of improvements on said lands, and approximately $3,000 further, for which the said Wm. J. O'Connor took and accepted a note in the principal sum of $4,500, and to secure which the said Wm. J. O'Connor took from the said E. E. Booty and wife a deed of trust to B. W. O'Connor, trustee, for the use of Wm. J. O'Connor, executor, of date January 20, 1920, conveying to the said trustee the properties in Jackson, county, Tex., described as follows, to wit: [Among other property the following:] Subdivisions in the Valentine Garcia four league grant as said subdivisions are shown upon a map and plat made by L. A. Guerin'ger of certain lands formerly owned by J. M. R.osborough in said Valentine Garcia grant, said map and plat being of record in volume 10, page 268, Deed Records of Jackson county, Tex., and here referred to for a more particular description and a better identification of said subdivisions in this paragraph enumerated:
"(A) The entirety of subdivision No. 1, containing 21S1/io acres of land.
"(B) The entirety of subdivision No. 10, containing 160 acres of land.
"(C) The entirety of subdivision No. 18, containing ICO acres.
"(D) The entirety of subdivision No. 26, containing 1273/10 acres.
"(E) The entirety of subdivision No. 31, containing 160 acres.
"(E) The entirety of subdivision No. 32, containing 187s/10 acres, and 279% acres out of R. Musquiz 5%-league grant — the said deed of trust further providing: 'The lien fixed and created by this deed of trust is a second lien upon all of the hereinabove conveyed property, there being at the time of the execution of this deed of trust existing deed of trust on the several tracts of land securing the payee in 'the hereinabove described note in the payment of indebtedness secured against the several tracts hereinabove conveyed in trust.'
"That thereafter, on or about the 21st day of September, 1921, after default in interest due the said Wm. J. O'Connor, executor on each and all of the notes above described, this defendant, for the purpose of enabling E. E. Booty to pay the taxes due against the mortgaged land, to take up the $4,500 second lien note in full, and to pay all past-due interest on the notes, on all of the above-described lands, and all held by the said Wm. J. O'Con-nor, executor, and to avoid a foreclosure, which was threatened by the said executor, in accordance with an agreement between the said Wm. J. O'Connor, executor, R. E. Brooks, ana E. E. Booty, and relying on the agreement and extension hereinafter set out, loaned the said E. E. Booty sufficient money to pay the past-due interest on all of the notes against the above-described lands, including the notes above described, and to pay all taxes due against the said land, and further paid the said Wm. J. O'Connor the sum of $4,509 for transfer without recourse of the second lien note above described, and the said E. F. Booty, with the moneys so loaned to him by this defendant, paid all amounts of interest due against all of the above-described lands to the said Wm. J. O'Connor, executor, and all of the taxes due against all of the above-described lands; and, in consideration of said payments, and of the payment to said. Win. J. O'Connor of the said sum of $4,509 by this defendant, the said Wm. J. O'Connor sold and assigned to this defendant the note for $4,500' above described, and the deed of trust to secure the same; said assignment among other things providing:
'That said deed of trust hereinabove referred to and herein assigned creates a blanket lien upon some eight parcels of land in Jackson county, Tex., one parcel of land in Victoria county, Tex., and, in making this transfer and assignment of the lien created by the deed of trust aforesaid, the lien of said deed of trust is here declared to be secondary to, and inferior to, the liens described and defined and fixed by nine deeds of trust executed to B. W. O'Connor, trustee, to secure Wm. J. O'Con-nor, managing executor under the will of Thos. M. O'Connor, deceased, in the payment of nine several notes, and in making this transfer and assignment grantor distinctly limits the lien of said deed of trust here assigned so that said lien is a lien secondary to the lien of said nine deeds of trust on said nine several parcels of land to the extent of the principal of said nine notes and the interest to accrue on said nine notes from the 1929 maturities of said interest on the principal of said notes and any and all future interest to accrue on said nine notes and all interest on past-due interest on said nine notes, and reserves the right to extend the time of payment of any interest that is now due or may become due on said nine notes, or any of them, and to enter into agreement with the said E. E. Booty and his wife, or E E. Booty alone,- to receive from the said E. E. Booty interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest that may accrue on said nine notes, or any of them, and to-grant such extension and to charge interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest and to become due on said nine notes, or any of them, without consulting the said R. E. Brooks; and any extension of the indebtedness represented by the note here now assigned shall contain a provision recognizing the right of grantor herein to extend the payment of interest, and to charge interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest on said nine notes or any of them'; that E. E. Booty is dead, and his estate is insolvent.
"Wherefore, by reason of the premises, this defendant says that plaintiffs affirmed the sale and waived their right to rescind for breach, and elected to rely solely on their liens, and are estopped to recover the lands above described, and are estopped to assert as against this defendant their supposed vendor's superior title to the lands above described."
On conclusion of the evidence, both sides requested peremptory instructions, that of plaintiffs being granted, and judgment in their favor for the land followed. The defendants have appealed.
The controlling question presented by the cause is whether or not the plaintiffs below, in bringing their suit, were at the time in position as against the appealing defendants to assert a superior title to the land by virtue of being the holders of the original and outstanding vendor's lien against it. A statement of what are deemed the material facts involved will aid in its solution.
With only one interpolation by ourselves reciting the giving of the second mortgage deed of trust by Booty and wife on January 20, 1920, this much is quoted from the brief of appellees in this court as correctly reflecting the facts so far:
"The land in controversy was conveyed by J. M. Rosborough to E. F. Booty by deed expressly retaining a vendor's lien to secure purchase money notes, the deed bearing date of February 20, 1913. Booty gave to Rosbor-ough four vendor's lien notes for $1,050 each, due on or before February 20, 1914, 1915, 1910 and 1917, respectively, which notes were indorsed to plaintiffs, and Rosborough conveyed his superior title reserved in said deed to plaintiffs (appellees) March 28, 1914. On the same day Booty and wife executed a deed of trust on the same land in favor of plaintiffs to secure the payment of the amount due on those four vendor's lien notes, which was by the deed of trust extended to mature March 28, 1919, and consolidated into one new note for the sum of $4,528.03, maturing on the date last named; the new note reciting that it was given as a substitute for, and in lieu of, the four original vendor's lien notes, the new note being copied in the deed of trust. The deed of trust further recited that the original vendor's lien retained in the above-mentioned deed was acknowledged 'to exist in full force and unimpaired to secure the $4,528.03 note described in this deed of trust, and this deed o.f trust and the remedies herein given are cumulative and additional -to the rights and remedies incident to the securing of said four original notes. Said four $1,050 notes, and the lien securing the same, have been taken over by Wm. J. O'Connor, managing executor as aforesaid, in his representative capacity, at our special instance and request, and with the distinct understanding that he be given the note described in this deed of trust and this deed of trust, and that he be subrogated to all of the rights of the original holder of said four $1,050 notes.'
"On, October 5, 1918, Booty and wife gave a new deed of trust to plaintiffs (appellees) of that date on the same land securing a note executed by them to plaintiffs for $4,890.27, due October 5, 1923, with interest at 7 per centum per annum. This note recited that it ivas given in lieu of, in substitution for, and in extension of, the above-mentioned note for $4,528.03, and that the maker acknowledged that the lien defined and fixed in the deed of trust of March 28, 1914, remains in full force and effect, and the deed of trust contained recitals to the same effect, and a provision that 'a release of this deed of trust shall be construed to be a release of said former deed of trust and of all liens acknowledged to be kept alive and in force and effect to secure the payment of' said hereinabove described note.' At the time of suit and of trial the principal of this last-mentioned note was wholly unpaid, but it was credited with interest paid to October 5, 1920, and interest on interest paid to September 19, 1921. This note was offered in evidence by plaintiffs at the trial. Plaintiffs also offered in evidence the four original vendor's lien notes for $1,050, each given by Booty to Rosborough, which were indorsed by the latter to plaintiffs.
"On January 20, 1920, E. F. Booty and wife executed a second mortgage deed of trust covering the premises covered by the deed of trust described in the preceding paragraph and other premises to secure a note of even date in the principal sum of $4,500, given for taxes and other purposes, bearing 8 per cent, interest from date, the said deed of trust, among other things, providing:
" 'The lien fixed and created by this deed of trust is a second lien upon all of the herein-above conveyed property, there being, at the time of the execution of this deed of trust existing deed of trust on the several tracts of land securing the payee in the hereinabove described note in the payment of indebtedness secured against the several tracts hereinabove conveyed in trust.' "
On September 17,1921, after some previous communication between the parties, defendant R. E. Brooks sent to plaintiffs, by letter, of that date, cashier's cheek for $9,316.77, and in this letter instructed plaintiffs where to apply that payment, and stated that the following week he would be in Victoria and pay the balance due, and, when that was done, he wanted plaintiffs to assign and transfer to him (defendant) the note for $4,-500, dated January 20, 1920, executed by Booty and wife, and then held by plaintiffs. Later Brooks went to Victoria and paid the balance, but he did not get the $4,500 note on that occasion.
Thereafter, on September 21, 1921, the plaintiffs transferred and assigned without recourse to R. E. Brooks the $4,600 note referred to and the second lien deed of trust so securing the same; the assignment containing among others these recitals:
"The said deed of trust hereinabove referred to and herein assigned creates a blanket lien upon some eight parcels of land in Jackson county, Tex., and one parcel of land in Victoria county, Tex., and in making this transfer and assignment of the lien created by the deed of trust aforesaid the lien of said deed of trust is here declared to be secondary to, and" inferior to, the liens described and defined and fixed by nine deeds of trust executed to L. W. O'Connor, trustee, to secure Wm. J. O'Con-nor, managing executor under the will of Thos. M. O'Connor, deceased, in the payment of nine several notes; and in making this transfer and assignment grantor distinctly limits the lien of said deed of trust here assigned so that said lien is a lien secondary to the lien of said nine deeds of trust on said nine several parcels of land to the extent of the principal of said nine notes ana the interest to accrue on said nine notes from the 1920 maturities of said interest on the principal of said notes and any and all future interest to accrue on said nine notes, and all interest on past-due interest on said nine notes, and reserves the right to extend the time of payment of any interest that is now due, or may become due, on said nine notes, or any of them, and to enter into agreement with the said E. E. Booty and his wife, or E. P. Booty alone, to receive from the said E. E. Booty interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest that may accrue on said nine notes or any of them, and to grant such extension, and to charge interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest due and to become due on said nine notes -or any of them without consulting the said R. E. Brooks; and any extension of the indebtedness represented by the note here now assigned shall contain a provision recognizing the right of grantor herein to extend the payment of interest, and to charge interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum on all past-due interest on said nine notes or any of them.
"At the time of executing this assignment the interest on all of said nine notes had been paid to the 1920 interest maturity dates thereon and interest on interest on sums accruing as interest to 1920 interest maturity dates, leaving due upon the notes held by grantor herein the principal of said nine notes and interest, and interest upon interest, accruing from 1920 interest maturity dates on said nine notes."
At the time this second lien trust deed was executed by Booty and wife, January 20, 1920, the plaintiffs had .already both purchased the Rosborough original vendor's lien notes, and extended them for the Bootys. The negotiations through which defendant Brooks became the owner of this trust deed and of the $4,500 note it secured took place during August and September of 1921 mainly between himself and McDonald for plaintiffs. During that period the Bootys were in arrears for over two years' interest on the last renewal of these Rosborough notes, evidenced by the above-described note for $4,890.27, and the plaintiffs finally, on'August 29, 1921, demanded that they pay off all interest and taxes due up to September 1, 1921, as well as the second lien note in full for $4,500, but they did not declare the vendor's lien indebtedness standing back of these accumulations they thus required paid due on account of the nonpayment of interest thereon. On the contrary, when defendant Brooks, on September 21, 1921, came to Mr. Booty's aid, and met their demands by paying the amounts so required, they extended the interest on this prior vendor's lien debt, which did not mature until October 5, 1921, to October 5, 1923.
The original Rosborough vendor's lien-notes and all extensions of and substitutes for them thereafter given, provided that default in the payment of any interest installment when due should, at the election of the holder, mature the whole of the indebtedness, thus giving the holders the unexercised option just referred to.
In-these circumstances R. E. Brooks became the owner of the $4,500 note and its accompanying second lien on the land, which the quoted assignment thereof from the O'Connors placed in him. At that time the original purchase-money indebtedness, for which the latter held the superior title, was not "due, nor was it to become so for more than two years, having been previously extended of record to mature October 5, 1923, by the above-mentioned renewal trust deed of October 5, 1918. Nothing that passed concerning this second lien between the parties here litigant, by their correspondence or otherwise, unless that be the import of this assignment thereof to Brooks when construed in relation to the other written instruments catalogued, evidenced any intention or understanding between them that any right or remedies of the O'Connors under their then outstanding vendor's lien — which was first in time and first in right — were being thereby affected, waived, or impaired. On the contrary, both seem to have plainly understood otherwise; that is, that, in consideration of the payments then made by R. E'. Brooks for Mr. Booty and his purchase of the $4,500 note, the O'Connors were foregoing their then existing right to declare their vendor's lien indebtedness against Mr. Booty due for unpaid interest by extending the interest for another year, and that Brooks was getting in unconditional subordination thereto a straight second lien on the land; their testimony on this trial so indicates, being as follows:
That of Judge Brooks:
"At the time I took this transfer of second lien from W. J. O'Connor I believed and relied on the fact that I was procuring a second lien subordinate only to the first lien in favor of O'Connor. At the time Mr. Booty came to me to help him out on this it would require about §15,000 to be paid to them in order to meet Mr. O'Connor's demands, and that Mr. Booty had nothing except these lands, and O'Connor had a first and second lien on them. The second lien was for only §4,500, but under the terms of the deed of trust it authorized the owner of it to pay taxes on all of the land, and would be secured by the same deed of trust, so I felt that by taking over the second lien I would be secure so far as the §4,500 was concerned, and as far as taxes were concerned that I paid. The balance of it, that went to pay his interest, I would not be secured on, but to save Mr. Booty's land I was going to do that. So I took a transfer-, which has already been offered in evidence. I did not examine the title at all. They had an abstract of' title, and I relied upon them. I relied upon a good and valid second lien and claim, and I bought it and paid every dollar for it, principal and interest, and some §7,000 or §8,000 besides."
Mr. O'Connor's:
"I claim to have a valid first lien on this land. I have never claimed to have anything but a lien on this land. As to whether I ever intended to or did assert a right to rescind the contract and claim the land, will say I took that matter up with my attorney, and left it to his discretion. I do not remember the date when I first learned I had any such right as that, but it has been some time ago — along in January of this yéar, I think it was. ' Up until that time X did not know I had the right to rescind. After I learned that I had the right to rescind, I did not notify Mrs.- Booty or Judge Brooks or any one connected with the case of my intention to rescind.
"The note referred to, for §4,890 I believe it was, which I testified had not been paid, and no interest paid on it since September 19, 1921, purports to become due on October 5, 1923. That note has not been extended at any time since then. To be candid about'it, I really did not know I had the right to rescind. I am not a lawyer, and I did not know for some time that I had that right."
At the time this suit was filed the purchase-money vendor's lien notes as last extended had matured, there had been default in the payment thereof, and neither of the defendants either tendered the same or offered to do equity in relation thereto.
As appellants here, the defendants below make these contentions: (1) That the O'Connors, in the circumstances shown to have attended the transaction, not having expressly in the assignment of the second lien to Brooks reserved the right to rely upon their superior title as holders of the vendor's lien, thereby irrevocably affirmed as to such as-signee the sales contract thereon with Booty, and could not thereafter, in reliance upon such superior title, rescind the sale and recover the land; (2) that the vendor's superior title retained in the deed to Booty was barred by B.. S. arts. 5694, 5695, since the deed and accompanying notes on which it rested bore date of February 20, 1913, the last of the notes maturing on February 20, 1917, more than four years before the filing of this suit on September 3, 1924; (3) that it was inequitable for appellees to recover the land, and they should have been restricted to a foreclosure of their lien, since Booty originally paid a considerable portion of the purchase price in cash, and thereafter made valuable improvements, the appellees having subsequently not only so extended their vendor's lien indebtedness (once at an increased interest rate), but also sold the second mortgage thereon; (4) "evidence of valuable improvements made on the land by the purchaser is material on the question of whether it is just and equitable to permit a rescission of the sale contract and recovery of the land by virtue of the superior title, instead of compelling the owner of such purchase-money indebtedness to resort to foreclosure."
None of these positions are sustainable under the record, we think. The first one rests upon the assumption that at the time appellant Brooks purchased the second lien deed of trust note the appellees had elected to treat the vendee, Booty, as in default upon the pre-existing vendor's lien indebtedness for failure to pay the interest thereon; but, under the foregoing findings of fact, there had been no such election; hence the contention falls with the unsupported assumption. It was not an "election between two legal situations," with the consequence of destroying their outstanding superior title, for the appellees Jo merely agree in the way they did with appellant Brooks not to accelerate the maturity of the purchase-money indebtedness and to transfer to him, without recourse on them, the second lien note, nor did they thereby as to the former relegate themselves to the position of a mere lienholder or mortgagee. Not having declared the debt to Which the superior title was an incident due, the bridge of a waiver of it was not crossed because never reached. They had -the undoubted right to excuse the failure to pay any particular installments of interest without affecting their right as to subsequent defaults. Herman v. Gieseke (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. at page 1009.
If an affirmative assertion of title in the vendee and of a lien on the land to secure the purchase money, made in a suit to foreclose that remained many years on the court docket, did not constitute such irrevocable waiver of the superior title as to prevent the vendor from dismissing the action and still asserting the superior title, as was held in Walls v. Cruse (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 199, surely the mere choice in this instance of not exercising the option of declaring all the purchase money due in September of 1921, but, instead, of agreeing not to under the circumstances given, should not be given that effect.
In effect, appellants' sole argument is that the terms of the assignment to Brooks,- in the circumstances, amounted to a contract with him on their part that the appellees would waive tile superior title they held down under Rosborough, and thereafter consider themselves on a parity with him as being lien-holders only, theirs being first and his second, but an examination of the instrument itself repels that construction, and so clearly tends the other way, we think,-that there can be no substantial doubt about it. It expressly recites that the lien it transfers "is here declared to be secondary to, and inferior to, the liens described and defined and fixed by nine deeds of trust executed to L. W. O'Con-nor, trustee, to secure Wm. J. O'Connor, managing executor under the will of Thos. M. O'Connor, deceased, in the payment of nine several notes." When reference is made back to those former deeds of trust, which include all the several renewals of the original vendor's lien indebtedness, they each in substance specifically describe, define, and ' fix that lien as still remaining in full force and unimpaired, and as being thereby brought forward in its original position of primacy.
Instead of constituting the concession claimed, this instrument seems to us to clearly safeguard every right, privilege, and remedy respecting the ever subsisting vendor's lien that appellees had so particularly "described, defined, and fixed" in all their preceding deeds of trust. The matter being thus a plain one of express contract, there is little or no need for the mention of supporting authority, but the case of Trust Co. v. Willis, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 128, 47 S. W. 889, writ of error denied, applies the principle here involved. There, as we haye determined was the situation here, the vendor had done nothing amounting to an affirmance of the contract of sale, and the trust company, to which the vendor's lien had been conveyed, recovered the land by virtue of the superior title incident thereto.
We do not think the circumstance that this assignment employs the word "lien" rather than "superior title" or "vendor's lien" has any contrary significance, because it refers back to the former deeds of trust, where the kind of lien it was so carefully giving continuing precedence to was described and defined as the original vendor's lien retained in the deed to the land from Rosborough to Booty. Furthermore, our Supreme Court, in embedding the doctrine in our Jurisprudence that an express lien, reserved in a conveyance of land to secure the purchase money, constituted the dominating title over that going to the vendee and his privies, interchangeably used the words "lien," "vendor's lien," and "express lien," as creating the superior title in the vendor. Baker v. Ramey, 27 Tex. 52; Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 115; Masterson v. Cohen, 46 Tex. 520; Roosevelt v. Davis, 49 Tex. 463; Baker v. Compton, 52 Tex. 252; Russell v. Kirkbride, 62 Tex. 455; Foster v. Powers, 64 Tex. 247.
The claim for the bar of four-year limitation under R. S. arts. 5694, 5695, being the second of these presentments here, has, under the facts already stated, been ruled adversely to appellants in'the cases of Wier v. Yates (Tex. Civ. App.) 237 S. W. 623, and Templeman v. Kempner (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 293, in both of which writs of error were denied. The vendor's lien in this instance was renewed and extended each time before the expiration of four years by the deeds of trust referred to, which this court in the Kempner Case held was a proper method of extending the lien, and the Yates Case determined that the superior title was not barred until the lien was.
The appellees, after, pointing out that this suit was filed less than ten years after the first maturity of the last three of the original vendor's lien notes here involved, further answer these limitation pleas by questioning the constitutionality of these statutes as affecting contracts made prior "to the amendment thereof by the Legislature in 1913, as was this one, citing the fact that the preceding article relating to the time within which the power of sale in deeds of trust might be exercised, article 5693, was held unconstitutional by the Commission of Appeals as to deeds of trust executed prior to the enactment of that amendment in the cases of Frank v. Bank, and Insurance Co. v. Wol-ters (Tex. Com. App.) 263 S. W. pages 255 and 259, respectively; the Supreme Court, however, in both cases since granted motions for rehearing, set aside all previous orders, withdrew them from the Commission of Appeals, and holds them now pending undetermined upon its docket. That article, 5693, is section 1 of the Acts of 1913, page 250, while those here under consideration are sections 2 and 3 of the same enactment, and, while we deem it unnecessary to decide the matter one way or the other, like considerations as to fundamental validity would seem equally applicable to them all. Of course, if -invalid as to vendor's liens and superior titles outstanding at the time of their passage, they could in this instance furnish appellants no comfort of any sort.
The third and fourth propositions contending that equities arose in favor of appellants out of improvements made upon the land, and that the proffered testimony of Mrs. Booty as to the cost and value thereof should have been admitted, when applied to the issues actually made by the pleadings and evidence, raise inconclusive and immaterial questions. Appellant Brooks pleaded no such matters, wherefore was in no position to invoke them, and neither he nor Mrs. Booty, while both admitted that the original purchase money had never been paid to the appellees, offered in any way to do equity with reference to it. In such circumstances the making of improvements on the property, although valuable, is not sufficient to defeat the right of the holders of the vendor's lien to recover the. land. Efron v. Burgower (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S. W. 306, and cases there cited.
It follows from these conclusions that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. That order has heretofore been entered.
Affirmed.