Case Name: Douglas Ray MEEKS, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-04-11
Citations: 576 So. 2d 713
Docket Number: No. 71947
Parties: Douglas Ray MEEKS, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 576
Pages: 713–721

Head Matter:
Douglas Ray MEEKS, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent.
No. 71947.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 11, 1991.
Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative and Billy H. Ñolas, Chief Asst. CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard E. Doran, Director, Criminal Appeals, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Douglas Ray Meeks, a Florida prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Meeks seeks relief from two death sentences arising from two separate convenience store murders. He alleges that available non-statutory mitigating evidence was excluded from his sentencing hearings, and he is therefore entitled to new sentencing proceedings pursuant to Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
Meeks was indicted for two first-degree murders occurring in separate mini-market robberies in Perry, Florida. The first indictment alleged that Meeks entered a Ma-jic Market convenience store on October 24, 1974, and, while engaged in committing a robbery, mortally stabbed the store clerk, Chevis Thompson. The second indictment alleged that two weeks later, on November 6, 1974, Meeks and Homer Hardwick entered a convenience store and committed an armed robbery in which the store clerk and a customer, Lloyd Walker, were shot. Walker later died of his wounds. The state elected to try Meeks separately for each indictment.
At the penalty phase of both trials, the jurors were instructed to consider only those mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975). The jury recommended death in both instances, and the trial court imposed the recommended sentences, referring only to the statutory mitigating circumstances in its orders.
In the Walker case, the trial judge found four aggravating factors, specifically: (1) the murder was committed during the commission of a violent felony; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and, (4) the murder was committed to hinder the enforcement of laws. The court also found two mitigating circumstances: (1) lack of significant criminal history and (2) Meeks' youthful age and low intelligence. In the Thompson case, the trial judge found the same four aggravating circumstances plus the circumstance that Meeks had been convicted previously of a capital felony (the Walker murder). One mitigating circumstance was found (Meeks' youthful age and low intelligence). Meeks' convictions and sentences of death were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. Meeks v. State, 336 So.2d 1142 (Fla.1976), and Meeks v. State, 339 So.2d 186 (Fla.1976).
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), we ordered the sentencing court to conduct a Gardner inquiry to determine whether Meeks' death sentence for the murder of Lloyd Walker was based upon consideration of evidence which was not known to Meeks or which he had no opportunity to explain or deny. The trial judge subsequently stated that his decision was based solely on information known to Meeks, and this Court found no violation of the Gardner principle. Meeks v. State, 364 So.2d 461 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S.Ct. 592, 58 L.Ed.2d 666 (1978).
In 1980, Meeks sought postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 after a death warrant had been signed by the governor. The trial court denied relief, but we stayed Meeks' execution and remanded the cause for an eviden-tiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the sentencing phase of the trial. Meeks v. State, 382 So.2d 673 (Fla.1980). After denial of his rule 3.850 motion on remand, Meeks again appealed and this Court affirmed. The Court found that neither trial counsel's alleged failure to ask for additional peremptory challenges during jury selection nor counsel's introduction of evidence during the penalty phase in which he attempted to demonstrate that Meek's codefendant was the more dominant participant constituted ineffectiveness. Meeks v. State, 418 So.2d 987 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155, 103 S.Ct. 799, 74 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1983).
Meeks then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court, and relief was denied in 1985. He appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which stayed his second scheduled execution pending its review of his claim on the merits. In 1987, while Meeks' appeal was still pending, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger. Consequently, Meeks moved for leave from the Eleventh Circuit to present his Hitchcock claim to this Court. The motion was granted. Meeks v. Dugger, No. 87-3281 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 1987) (order granting leave to present Hitchcock claim).
In Hitchcock, the United States Supreme Court found it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury to consider only statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances and for the court to sentence a defendant to death if the trial judge only considered those same statutory mitigating circumstances. We have previously recognized that the recent Hitchcock decision represents a sufficient change in the law to defeat a claim that the issue is procedurally barred. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 173 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960, 108 S.Ct. 1224, 99 L.Ed.2d 424 (1988); Demps v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1092 (Fla.1987); Delap v. Dugger, 513 So.2d 659 (Fla.1987). In prior cases involving Hitchcock claims, we have recognized that errors may require a new sentencing hearing while in others we have applied the harmless error rule. See, e.g., Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So.2d 656 (Fla.1987); Thompson v. Dugger; Morgan v. State, 515 So.2d 975 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 2024, 100 L.Ed.2d 610 (1988). But see Delap v. Dugger; Demps v. Dugger; Tafero v. Dugger, 520 So.2d 287 (Fla.1988).
Meeks' Hitchcock claim asserts: (a) that the record clearly establishes that the sentencing judge believed he could consider only statutory mitigating circumstances; (b) that the sentencing judge instructed the jurors accordingly and, in doing so, excluded available nonstatutory mitigating evidence; and, (c) that Meeks' defense counsel was also restricted by the then-prevailing statutory construction and thus failed to investigate, develop, and present available nonstatutory mitigating evidence regarding Meeks' character and background, and his emotional, intellectual, and psychological deficiencies. In support of his position, Meeks presented the affidavit of his trial attorney, wherein the attorney stated that he felt constrained by the language of the statute and did not investigate any other possible mitigating circumstances. Meeks also offered the report of a psychologist prepared January 25, 1988. The results in the report suggest several mitigating circumstances: that Meeks is easily led, suffers from a plethora of mental problems, has difficulty with abstraction and concept formulation, comes from a background of poverty and depravation, has abused alcohol and drugs from an early age, and was in fact under the influence at the time of the offense. Further, Meeks submitted the affidavits of two of his sisters and his mother, chronicling his underprivileged childhood.
Because of the erroneous jury instruction, the state concedes that the record establishes a Hitchcock violation but maintains the error is harmless. It argues that the record establishes "beyond a reasonable doubt that, after weighing the aggravating factors against the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors, the judge would have properly imposed death, regardless of a life recommendation.'' Demps, 514 So.2d at 1094. We might accept this proposition if we look only at the face of the record. However, according to the affidavits filed with this motion, Meeks' counsel did not seek to develop nonstat-utory mitigating evidence because he was constrained by the then-prevailing statutory construction. These affidavits assert that substantial nonstatutory mitigating evidence could have been presented, including the fact that Meeks had been a patient in a state mental hospital, that he had received subsequent treatment with psychotropic medication, that he had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and that he suffered from severe emotional problems as a result of his deprived childhood. On their face, the contents of these affidavits are sufficient to negate the conclusion that the Hitchcock error was harmless. The merits of the claims can only be determined by an evidentiary hearing.
Pursuant to our decision in Hall v. State, 541 So.2d 1125 (Fla.1989), Hitchcock claims should now be raised by motion for postconviction relief. However, Meeks' petition for habeas corpus was filed before our decision in Hall. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing directed to the Hitchcock allegations of this petition as if they had been filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The issue to be decided will be whether the Hitchcock error was harmless. In the event the court decides that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentences of death should be set aside and new sentencing proceedings conducted before separate juries.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which BARKETT, J., concurs.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Because this petition was filed prior to our disposition of Hall v. State, 541 So.2d 1125 (Fla.1989), in which we held that all Hitchcock claims should be raised pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, we will allow the instant claim to be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
. The trial judge instructed the jury in the Lloyd Walker murder case as follows:
Members of the jury, upon conviction of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, as authorized by Florida Statute section 775.02. The proceedings shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the sentence and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in that particular section of the law. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value with respect to the sentencing may be received regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements and further provided that particular portion of the law shall not be construed to authorize introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of Florida. The state and the defendant, or his counsel, shall be permitted to present arguments for or against sentence of death. After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory opinion to the court based upon the following matters: (A) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection 6 and (B) whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection 7 which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist, and (C) based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes the sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based. Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (A) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment. (B) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use of or threat of violence to the person. (C) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. (D) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. (E) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (F) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (G) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (H) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile. Cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to or even enjoyment of the sufferings of others. Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: (A) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (B) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (C) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. (D) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. (E) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (F) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (G) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. These are your instructions with respect to your deliberation concerning your recommendation to the court as to whether the court should impose a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death upon the defendant, Douglas Ray Meeks.
The instruction given the jury in the Chevis Thompson murder case was substantially the same as the above.
. We deny the claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We deny as procedurally barred Meeks' remaining claims, to wit: (1) improper doubling of aggravating factors; (2) improper use of psychiatric reports in penalty-phase proceedings; (3) erroneous jury instruction on weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (4) erroneous jury instruction on vote necessary to recommend life imprisonment; (5) failure to instruct on underlying felony in felony-murder instruction; (6) insufficient Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), remand; (7) jurors' sense of responsibility was diminished as in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).