Case Name: Succession of RUSHA
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1925-03-02
Citations: 158 La. 74
Docket Number: No. 20278
Parties: Succession of RUSHA.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 73–79

Head Matter:
(103 So. 515)
No. 20278.
Succession of RUSHA.
(On Motion to Dismiss, April 7, 1924.
On the Merits, March 2, 1925.
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1925.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. Appeal and error <&wkey; 150 (3) — Executor has interest to appeal from judgment directing him to place claimant and her children on his account for legacy.
An executor has an interest authorizing an appeal by him from a judgment directing him to place claimant and her children on his account for a legacy.
2. Appeal and error t&wkey;>395 — That amount of appeal bond was not fixed by trial judge held not ground for dismissal of appeal.
That the amount of an appeal bond was not fixed by the trial judge held not ground for dismissal of the appeal, where the trial judge allowed the appeal on condition that appellant furnish bond according to law, and the appeal bond given was more than 1% times the amount involved, in view of Code Prac. art. 575.
On the Merits.
3. Wills <&wkey;94 — Testamentary dispositions can be made only in writing in form and manner prescribed.
Testamentary dispositions can be made only in writing, in the form and manner prescribed by law.
4. Wills &wkey;>297(l) — Parol evidence as to verbally declared intentions of deceased held not admissible to establish testamentary disposition.
Parol evidence, as to'verbally declared intentions of the deceased, held not admissible to establish testamentary dispositions in view of Civ. Code, arts. 1712, 1714, 1715.
5. Wills <&wkey;>!84(4) — Codicil held to revoke legacy and not ambiguous so as to admit parol evidence.
Where a codicil provided “part of E. revoke [d], on account of his education at Holy Cross College,” held) that the legacy was revoked and not merely reduced, by amount of college expenses, and codicil was not ambiguous, so as to admit parol evidence of testator’s verbal declarations as to her testamentary intentions towards F.
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Mark M. Boatner, Judge.
In the succession of Miss Ida Rusha. From a judgment directing him to place a certain claimant and her children on his account for a legacy, the executor, Charles H. Haight, appeals,
Judgment reversed, oppositions rejected, and account approved.
Louis R. Alba, 'of New Orleans (D. V. Doussan, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellant.
J. H. Pugh, of Donaldsonville, for E. & J. Kinberger.
J. E. Pierson, C. I. Denechaud, and Claude L. Johnson, all of New Orleans, for appellees Heirs of Charles Eessler.
By Division C, composed of OVERTON,' ST. PAUL, and THOMPSON, JJ.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
ST. PAUL, J.
The executor appeals from a judgment directing him to place the appellee and' her children on his account for a legacy of $7,000 (net).
The trial judge did not fix the amount of the appeal bond, but allowed the appeal conditioned on the appellant furnishing bond "according to law."
The appeal bond given was for $12,000 which is more than one and a half times the amount involved (C. P. art. 575).
The appellee moves to dismiss on two grounds: (1) That the executor is without right or interest to appeal; and (2) that the amount of the appeal bond was not fixed by the judge.
If
The first ground is without merit. In Succession of Cassidy, 40 La. Ann. 827, 5 So. 292, this court said:
"An executor lias an interest to appeal [and it is his duty to do so] whenever it is sought to wrest from him property belonging to the succession, or to impose a debt upon it which will diminish its assets in the fund to be distributed among the heirs or creditors," citing Succession of McKenna, 23 La. Ann. 370; Succ. of Charmbury, 34 La. Ann. 25; Coyle v. Succ. of Creevy, 34 La. Ann. 541.
"The cases referred to in support of the motion [to dismiss] only apply to the case of a contest of creditors over a fund in the hands of an executor or administrator for distribution, and the determination of which cannot add to or diminish the assets of tlie succession; as where the litigation only concerns the rights of opposing creditors to a certain fund or the right to be paid by preference out of it. In such case it is a matter of indifference to the executor which creditor succeeds, and he has no interest whatever in the judgment determining the question."
II.
As to the second ground urged for dismissal, this court said in Succession of Huxen, 149 La. 61, 88 So. 687:
"The next ground relied on [for dismissing the appeal taken by the administratrix] is that the (amount of the appeal) bond should have been fixed by the judge, and was not so fixed. The judgment recognizes plaintiff as a preferred creditor of the succession for $219, with interest from May 29, 1915, and orders that the administratrix amend her account accordingly. She gave bond for a suspensive appeal in the sum of $400. This court has, no doubt, held that, where in such case an administratrix gives a bond for costs in an amount fixed by the judge, it will suffice for the purposes of the appeal, but it seems safe to say that no ease can be found in which the appeal has been dismissed because an administrator gave bond in an amount exceeding by one-half the amount of the judgment, where the judgment was for a specific sum; nor do we see any reason, from any point of view, why such an appeal should be dismissed, since Act 45 of 1890, p. 38, amending and re-enacting article 575 of the Code of Practice, declares that, where the judgment is for a specific sum (and other conditions are complied with), its execution may be stayed, 'provided the appellant gives his obligation with good and solvent surety,' etc., 'in a sum exceeding by one-half the amount for which the judgment was given,' and, where, as in this case, the judge orders that the appeal be granted upon the appellant's furnishing bond, with good and solvent surety according to law, he thereby fixes the amount of the bond. If, however, he do'es not, and there is error in the amount of the bond for that or any other reason, the case falls under the dominion of Act 112 of 1916, and, in the absence of any attempt on tbe part of the appellee to have the error corrected, ¡(tie bond, as given, must stand. [Citing] White v. Maison Blanche Co. et al., 142 La. 265, 76 South. 708.
Decree.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.