Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. D. H. Ahrend Co., Inc., Defendant, and Herbert Ahrend, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1954-12-31
Citations: 308 N.Y. 112
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. D. H. Ahrend Co., Inc., Defendant, and Herbert Ahrend, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 308
Pages: 112–116

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. D. H. Ahrend Co., Inc., Defendant, and Herbert Ahrend, Appellant.
Argued December 2, 1954;
decided December 31, 1954.
Philip 1. Delfin for appellant.
I. The People have failed to establish the guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Grass, 257 App. Div. 1; People v. Rowan, 179 Misc. 225; People v. McHugh, 271 App. Div. 135; People v. Moore, 142 App. Div. 402; Matter of Avon Bar & Grill v. O’Connell, 276 App. Div. 517; People v. Liquorman, 171 Misc. 535; Houlihan v. Selengut, 175 Misc. 854; People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 180 App. Div. 615, 225 N. Y. 25; People v. Primrose Wet Wash Laundry Co., 256 App. Div. 1088; People v. Harrison, 183 App. Div. 812.) II. The imposition of a fine of $5,000 or one year in jail, with the alternative of paying $5,000 in certain. installments to the Department of Labor, was excessive under the circumstances. (People v. Abel, 279 App. Div. 623; People v. Buckner, 276 App. Div. 900; People v. Dudgeon, 270 App. Div. 1032; People v. Stein, 279 App. Div. 1048, 280 App. Div. 176.)
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Roy Wiedersum and Wendell P. Brown of counsel), for respondent.
I. Violations of the Labor Law are malum prohibitum and intent is not an element of the offense or a form of defense. (People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y. 25; People v. Taylor, 192 N. Y. 398; People v. Primrose Wet Wash Laundry Co., 256 App. Div. 1088; People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373; People v. Grass, 257 App. Div. 1; Matter of McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N. Y. 393.) II. The sentence was fair, moderate and in the interests of justice. (People v. Rytel, 284 N. Y. 242; People v. Collins, 271 App. Div. 511; People v. McDowell, 279 App. Div. 943; People v. Kienast, 279 App. Div. 943.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
If this appellant, who was not only an officer, but the sole active manager and actual owner of this corporation, did not " knowingly permit " his corporation to fail to pay its workmen's wages, then it is hard to see how anyone could, as an officer, violate section 1272 of the Penal Law. " Knowingly " (see Penal Law, § 3, subd. 4) means merely a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime. To " permit " means to allow to happen, to fail to prevent (see Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 464; People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 31). Certainly, defendant knew the workmen were not paid, and he permitted it in the sense that, knowing that fact, he did not prevent its occurrence. We think the true meaning of the statute is this: the corporation itself is, ipso facto, criminally liable for failure to pay, but of its officers, those only are punishable who stand in such a relation to the corporation's affairs that they actually know of the nonpayment. The purpose is to exculpate nominal officers or any others who are not actually in touch with the corporate financial affairs.
The judgment should be affirmed.