Case Name: Daniel E. OLVEDA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1983-03-16
Citations: 650 S.W.2d 408
Docket Number: No. 015-81
Parties: Daniel E. OLVEDA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: MILLER, J., joins.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 650
Pages: 408–412

Head Matter:
Daniel E. OLVEDA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 015-81.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 16, 1983.
Antonio G. Cantu, court appointed, David K. Chapman, San Antonio, Janet S. Morrow, Houston, for appellant.
Bill M. White, Dist. Atty., E. Dickenson Ryman, Anton Paul Hajek, III and Alan E. Battaglia, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., and Alfred Walker, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ODOM, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of robbery and punishment was assessed at ten years. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in published opinion, 625 S.W.2d 13, that sustained appellant's only ground of error. The court held fundamental error was presented because the jury charge failed to include the statutory definition of the phrase "in the course of committing theft." V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 29.01(1).
The Court of Appeals relied on Rohlfing v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598, in reaching its decision. In that case a panel of this Court held that omission of a definition of "in the course of committing theft" did not constitute fundamental error. The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish Rohlfing on the theory that the assaultive conduct there was made during the commission of theft, while the conduct here was committed in immediate flight from the theft. We find the distinction unpersuasive.
As noted in Rohlfing, when the statutory definition is not included in the charge, it is assumed the jury would consider the commonly understood meaning in its deliberations. Although error could result where the common meaning is more expansive than the statutory definition, such is not the case with the phrase "in the course of committing theft." Any possible misunderstanding of the phrase would have been more restrictive than the statutory definition, and could only have been to appellant's benefit. No reversible error is shown.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.