Case Name: Erich DIENER and ERPE, Inc. v. John RATTERREE
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1997-05-28
Citations: 57 Ark. App. 314
Docket Number: CA 96-476
Parties: Erich DIENER and ERPE, Inc. v. John RATTERREE
Judges: Rogers and Meads, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 314–321

Head Matter:
Erich DIENER and ERPE, Inc. v. John RATTERREE
CA 96-476
945 S.W.2d 406
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I and II
Opinion delivered May 28, 1997
[P etition for rehearing denied July 2, 1997.]
Michael E. Stubblefield, P.A., for appellant.
Andrew A. Flake and Rex W. Chronister, P.A., for appellee.

Opinion:
John F. Stroud, Jr., Judge.
This case involves a dispute between adjacent landowners concerning a septic system. The appellants are Erich Diener and ERPE, Inc., Diener's wholly owned corporation. The appellee is John Ratterree. The properties purchased by these parties were originally owned by one person, Bobby Taylor. When Taylor owned all of the property, he constructed a commercial building with restrooms served by an underground septic system. The commercial building was located on the portion of the property subsequently purchased by appel-lee. The lateral leach lines extending from the septic system ran under a portion of the property that was subsequendy purchased by appellants.
Appellants purchased their parcel in 1982. The warranty-deed to appellant Diener stated that the conveyance was subject to existing easements, but appellant was not told about the location of the leach lines nor did he inquire. Appellee purchased his adjoining property approximately one year later, in 1983. Problems did not arise until 1993, when appellee opened a catfish restaurant in the commercial building on his property. Appellants maintained that the increased usage of the public restrooms on appellee's property caused sewage to rise to the surface of appellants' property from the leach lines running underneath, and appellant Diener severed the lateral, fines located on his property. The parties eventually filed actions against each other, and those actions were consolidated for trial. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a permanent servitude had been created on appellants' property during Taylor's prior ownership when there was unity of tide. The court awarded appellee $1,000 in damages, representing the cost of repairing the lateral fines that were severed four times by appellant. The court also permanendy enjoined appellants from interfering with those fines. The court denied appellee's request for damages based on trespass. This appeal followed. We affirm.
Appellants argue in the first point of appeal that the "trial court erred in finding that the existence of a septic system during unity of title created a permanent servitude on the appellants' property in favor of the appellee, and in awarding damages to the appellee." We find no error.
Under this point, appellants use the terms "prescriptive easement" and "implied easement" as if they were interchangeable. They are not. Here, we are dealing with a type of "implied easement." Our supreme court has defined an "implied easement" as follows:
Where, during unity of tide, a landowner imposes an apparendy permanent and obvious servitude on part of his property in favor of another part, and where at the time of a later severance of ownership the servitude is in use and is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of that part of the property favored by the servitude, then the servitude survives the severance and becomes an easement by implication. In order for such an easement to be estab lished it must appear not only that the easement was obvious and apparently permanent but also that it is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property, the term "necesssary" meaning that there could be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant tenement without the easement. An easement by implication does not arise merely because its use is convenient to the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant portion of the property.
Kennedy v. Papp, 294 Ark. 88, 741 S.W.2d 625 (1987) (emphasis added).
In making their argument under this first point, appellants argue that the use of the claimed "prescriptive easement" was not apparent and that it was not necessary. Whether an easement is apparent and necessary is ordinarily a question of fact. Greasy Slough Outing Club, Inc. v. Amick, 224 Ark. 330, 274 S.W.2d 63 (1954). While we review chancery cases de novo, we do not reverse the chancellor's findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, or clearly erroneous. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Carver v. Jones, 28 Ark. App. 288, 773 S.W.2d 842 (1989).
Apparentness of use does not necessarily "mean actual visibility, but rather susceptibility of ascertainment on reasonable inspection by persons ordinarily conversant with the subject." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses § 30 (1966). Each case must necessarily depend upon its particular facts. Here, the chancellor found that the septic system was reasonably necessary to appellee's use of the property and that the "test of apparent and obvious" had been satisfied. Those findings are not clearly erroneous. Appellant Diener had owned land adjacent to the property in question, and he knew that the property had to be served by septic systems because there were no sewer lines in the area.
We announced the rule in this language in Waller v. Dansby, 145 Ark. 306, 224 S.W. 615: "The general rule is, that whatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty as in the case of vendor and purchaser, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite fact, by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. Or, as the rule has been expressed more briefly, where a man has suffi cient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed cognizant of it."
Hannah v. Daniel, 221 Ark. 105, 252 S.W.2d 548 (1952). We cannot say that the chancellor's finding that appellant Diener possessed sufficient information to make apparent the existence and location of lateral leach lines extending from the adjoining property's septic system was clearly erroneous.
Neither can we say that the trial court's finding that the septic system is reasonably necessary to appellee's use of his property was clearly erroneous. It is the necessity at the time of the conveyance that governs. Greasy Slough, 224 Ark. at 338. The commercial building, with its restrooms and septic system, was in existence at the time of the conveyance in 1983. Because there are no sewer lines in the area, a septic system is reasonably necessary to the property owner's use of the property.
In the second point of appeal, appellants argue that the "trial court erred in finding that the appellants' imputed awareness of the need for septic systems in the general area met the legal requirement that a prescriptive easement be apparent and obvious." This argument was addressed under Point I and needs no further discussion.
Affirmed.
Rogers and Meads, JJ., agree.
Robbins, C.J., Crabtree, J., and Hays, S.J., dissent.