Case Name: George A. Hunt et al. vs. Franklin S. Brewer et al.
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1878-06-08
Citations: 68 Me. 262
Docket Number: 
Parties: George A. Hunt et al. vs. Franklin S. Brewer et al.
Judges: WaltoN, BARROWS, Daneorth and Vergin', JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 262–266

Head Matter:
George A. Hunt et al. vs. Franklin S. Brewer et al.
Androscoggin.
Decided June 8, 1878.
Evidence. Payment.
The defendant was indebted to the plaintiffs, first as he was member of a firm and afterwards individually, and gave his note in payment, taking back this receipt: “Received from P. S. Brewer his 90 day note for $300, to be paid at either bank in Portland.” There was a contention as to whether there was an actual appropriation, by the parties, of the note on the joint account of the defendants or on the several account of Brewer. Held, that upon this issue, it was not error to instruct the jury that the receipt was silent and could have no legitimate bearing one way or the other.
On exceptions.
Assumpsit, on account annexed.
The defendants dissolved as copartners in the grocery business, September 27, 1875, when there was a balance due from them to the plaintiffs. Subsequently to the dissolution the defendant Brewer continued to purchase of the plaintiffs, and October 22, 1875, gave their agent his personal note, taking back the receipt in the head note stated, of the same date and signed “ George A. Hunt & Co. Starbird.” The defendants claimed, and introduced evidence to show, an appropriation of the note by Brewer to the copartnership debt. The plaintiffs claimed that no appropriation was in fact made by Brewer, and that they made the appropriation to Brewer’s account, and introduced the original entry on their day book, under date of October 22, 1875, thus: “Notes Keceivable, Dr. to F. S. Brewer, 90 day note for $300.00, $300.00.”
The presiding justice instructed the jury that on the question, on which of the two accounts the note was to be applied, the receipt was silent and could have no legitimate bearing, as in the opinion more fully appears ; and the plaintiffs alleged exceptions.
S. M. Carter, with whom were Frye, Cotton dc White, for the plaintiffs.
I. II. Hutchinson, A. II. Savage efe W. W. Sanborn, for the defendants.

Opinion:
Libbev, J.
Prior to September 27, 1875, the defendants were copartners, and on that day they dissolved their copartnership. Prior to the dissolution the defendants had traded with the plaintiffs, and there was an admitted balance due the plaintiffs unless it had been paid. Subsequent to the dissolution, Brewer bad traded with plaintiffs and was indebted to them individually. On the 22nd of October, 1875, Brewer gave to the plaintiffs his personal note for $300 on ninety days, and took their receipt therefor, which did not specify for what it was received. The question of fact was presented to the jury whether there was an actual appropriation, by the parties, of the note on the joint account of defendants, or on the several account of Brewer. There was evidence both ways. In presenting the case to the jury, the judge instructed them upon this point as follows: " There is only one piece of evidence to which I feel it my duty to call your attention bearing upon that point, and that is the receipt which was given at the time the note was delivered, which is before you and has been the subject of comment by counsel. With respect to that receipt, I deem it my duty to give you a specific instruction, and that is that the receipt for the note does not show, upon the face of it, whether the note was or was not given in discharge of the joint indebtedness of Brewer and Lothrop, or the individual indebtedness of Brewer alone. It shows from whom it was received, but not upon which of the two accounts it was to be applied. Upon the latter point it is silent and can have no legitimate bearing one way or the other." To this instruction exception is taken. The exceptions do not show what instruction was given as to the legal rule of appropriation, in case no actual appropriation of the payment was made by the parties. In such case the law would appropriate the payment in discharge of the several debt of Brewer. We must assume that this rule was given.
From the statement in the exceptions, of the issue presented to the jury and the language used by the judge, we must assume that the portion of the charge excepted to related to the issue of fact upon which the jury was to pass, whether there was an actual appropriation by the parties of the three hundred dollar note in payment of the joint indebtedness, or the several indebtedness of Brewer. Upon this issue the instruction was correct, for the receipt is entirely silent as to what the note was received for, and hence contained no evidence upon the issue of actual appropriation.
Exceptions overruled.
WaltoN, BARROWS, Daneorth and Vergin', JJ., concurred.