Case Name: Planned Parenthood of Vermont, Inc. v. City of Burlington
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1985-11-01
Citations: 146 Vt. 348
Docket Number: No. 83-037
Parties: Planned Parenthood of Vermont, Inc. v. City of Burlington
Judges: Present: Hill, Underwood, Peck and Gibson, JJ., and Daley, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 146
Pages: 348–356

Head Matter:
Planned Parenthood of Vermont, Inc. v. City of Burlington
[503 A.2d 545]
No. 83-037
Present: Hill, Underwood, Peck and Gibson, JJ., and Daley, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
Opinion Filed November 1, 1985
Spencer R. Knapp of Dinse, Allen & Erdmann, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Richard C. Whittlesey, Assistant City Attorney, of McNeil, Murray & Sorrell, Inc., and Gretchen S. Bailey, Assistant City Attorney, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion:
Underwood, J.
Planned Parenthood of Vermont (taxpayer) filed an action in Chittenden Superior Court seeking a declaratory ruling that its real estate is exempt, pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), from taxation by the City of Burlington (City). The trial court determined first, that taxpayer's property was tax exempt under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), and second, that the statutory exception to tax exempt status, applicable to health care facilities under 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7), did not apply to the taxpayer's property. The City appealed that declaratory ruling. We affirm.
Taxpayer is the owner of a three-story building located at 23 Mansfield Street in the City of Burlington. In 1980, the City notified the taxpayer of its intent to assess property taxes on taxpayer's real and personal property. The City subsequently billed the taxpayer in the amount of $11,413.92 for the tax year ending June 30, 1981, and $12,064.00 for the tax year ending June 30, 1982, which assessments the taxpayer paid under protest.
In this appeal, the parties now agree that the taxpayer's property comes within the exemption provisions of 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4). The remaining issue before this Court, therefore, is whether taxpayer's property is excepted from that exempt status by virtue of 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7). That latter statute would act to except or preclude taxpayer's property from qualifying for the ex emption provisions of 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), if the property is used "primarily for health . . . purposes," unless such an exemption were specifically approved by the voters of the City at a duly warned meeting for that purpose. Thus the threshold question for the trial court was to determine the primary use being made of taxpayer's property during the tax years 1981 and 1982.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact on this issue and concluded that taxpayer's property was exempt from taxation under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4). It determined that the property was used for a public purpose and its primary use was not for health purposes. Therefore, the property's tax exempt status, under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), did not fall within the exception set forth in 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7). The trial court also found that taxpayer's primary use of the property was for family planning, specifically for the provision of contraceptive devices. The trial court then went on to remark that contraceptives are for the prevention of conception and not to enhance or safeguard one's health. The performing of vasectomies or abortions, on taxpayer's property, was found by the trial court to be only incidental to taxpayer's primary purpose of family planning and the provision of birth control devices. This Court recently stated:
A party who, on appeal, challenges the findings and conclusions of a court below has a difficult burden to overcome. This is because we accord great deference to the judgment of the court and will not set aside the court's findings unless, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and excluding the effects of modifying evidence, they are clearly erroneous. V.R.C.P. 52(a). Even when there is substantial evidence to the contrary, the findings must stand if supported by credible evidence.
Vieweger v. Clark, 144 Vt. 630, 632, 481 A.2d 1268, 1270 (1984) (citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we turn to the findings of the trial court.
The trial court addressed the threshold question of determining the primary use of taxpayer's property in two ways. First, it considered the percentage of the total floor space of taxpayer's property which was used for various purposes. The trial court found that only the first floor, which housed taxpayer's Burlington clinic, was used for the provision of medical, surgical, diagnostic or therapeutic services.
Second, the trial court considered the proportion of total client visits to taxpayer's property which were allocated to the various services provided by the taxpayer at its Burlington site. It found that 4.1% of client visits involved abortions or vasectomies (no figure was given for female sterilizations), and 6.0% involved colposcopy services for the purpose of cervical cancer diagnosis; both of these uses come within the meaning of health purposes. The trial court found that 0.9% of client visits were related to an infertility program. Finally, the trial court found that 95% of client visits were related to receiving information, counseling and devices related to birth control. Although the trial court found that client visits related to birth control activities may include physical examination and diagnosis, that a physician must supervise and direct the prescription of all oral contraceptive pills, and that intrauterine devices and diaphragms are fitted by medical personnel, it did not make a finding concerning the percentage of client visits related to birth control which utilized such medical services.
Under either of the above-described methods utilized by the trial court to determine the primary use of taxpayer's property, it is clear that if, as the City contends, the term "health . . . purposes," as used in 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7), includes all services related to family planning, then the taxpayer's property is used primarily for health purposes, the statutory exception to its tax-exempt status, pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), is applicable, and the trial court's decision must be reversed. We therefore now turn to the statutory meaning of the term "health . . . purposes" as used in 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7).
This Court has recently reiterated:
that the primary method of interpreting the meaning of a statute is through the "plain meaning rule": "The most elemental rule of statutory construction is that the plain meaning of the statute controls. If confusion or ambiguity does not appear, then the statute is not construed but rather is enforced in accordance with its express terms."
Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516, 529, 496 A.2d 154, 162 (1985) (quoting Heisse v. State, 143 Vt. 87, 89, 460 A.2d 444, 445 (1983)).
Taxpayer contends that the plain meaning of the word "health" as used in the statute refers principally to a condition of being free from disease or injury. Under this approach, activities related to the prevention of pregnancy would not be considered health activities as they are not directed primarily at preventing or curing a disease or physical injury. The City, however, contends that the word "health" as used in the statute incorporates all activities related to the "maintenance of health, i.e., the prevention of disease and other conditions threatening a sound body, mind, and spirit." We cannot agree with the City that a definition of "health" should be given such a broad meaning in construing 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7).
Such a broad definition is not required by the language of the statute. Furthermore, the definition suggested by the City is so broad as to include virtually any activity which an individual might undertake for his or her own benefit, including, inter alia, athletic pursuits (physical well-being), religious activities (spiritual well-being) and social functions (emotional well-being). Such an expansive definition could lead to the incorporation of virtually any public activity within the scope of health-related activities under 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7). Such a result would be absurd and irrational, and we therefore decline to accept such a definition of the statutory term. Heisse, supra, 143 Vt. at 90, 460 A.2d at 446.
The interpretation set forth by the taxpayer, and accepted by the trial court, is both reasonable and consistent with the meaning of the statute as a whole. Therefore, taxpayer's property is tax exempt.
Judgment affirmed.
Title 32 V.S.A. § 3802 provides in part:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(4) Real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or charitable uses .
Title 32 V.S.A. § 3832 provides in part:
The exemption from taxation of real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or charitable uses shall not be construed as exempting:
(7) Real and personal property of an organization when the property is used primarily for health or recreational purposes, unless the town or municipality in which the property is located so votes at any regular or special meeting duly warned therefor.
The trial court, in its conclusions of law, could not "conclude that the mere provision of contraceptives in and of itself [was] a 'health' purpose. Health is an aspect of safe and effective contraception, but, as the word implies, most contraceptives are used to prevent contraception and not to enhance or safeguard one's health."
The percentages cited herein total more than 100% because client visits may be for more than a single purpose.