Case Name: McCORD v. THOMPSON-STARRETT CO. et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-12-11
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 385
Docket Number: 
Parties: McCORD v. THOMPSON-STARRETT CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 385–392

Head Matter:
McCORD v. THOMPSON-STARRETT CO. et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 11, 1908.)
1. Associations (§ 13 )—Rules—Validity.
An order of a Building Trades Employers’ Association embracing nearly every prominent building contractor of the borough of Manhattan, organized to regulate industrial disputes between its members and their employés, which instructs the members that no men may be set to work or retained at work who do not join a particular labor union, is void as against public policy, since it affects practically the whole building trade in such borough, and a bond given by a member to secure penalties for noncompliance with orders of the association is not breached by a violation thereof.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Associations, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]
2. Associations (§ 13*)—Rules—Adoption.
The constitution of the Building Trades Employers’ Association, organized to regulate industrial disputes between its members and their employés, provided for a board of governors with authority to decide disputes and regulate the conduct of its members. A letter instructing the members that no men might be set to work or retained at work who did not join a particular labor union was sent to a member by the board of governors, certified by the secretary. The letter spoke of the emergency committee as making the order, but it did not appear who constituted the committee or what power it possessed. The same letter contained another injunction not purporting to emanate from the committee. Held, that the board of governors adopted the orders in the letter, and the association thereby undertook to impose on a member a void obligation.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Associations, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. $ 13.*]
3. Associations (§ 13*)—Rules—Violation—Effect.
An association of employers, organized to regulate industrial disputes between its members and their employés, cannot collect the penalty imposed on a member for violating an order of the association, unless the order is one within the power of the association to give.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Associations, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. § 13.*]
4. Contracts (§ 108*)—Employment of Union Labor—Validity.
While an individual employer may lawfully agree with a labor union to employ only its members, yet such an agreement when participated in by a large proportion of employers in any community is contrary to public policy, because it operates generally on the craftsmen in the trade and imposes on them, as a penalty for refusing to join the union, the practical impossibility of obtaining employment at their trade.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Dec. Dig. § 108.*]
Ingraham and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by William H. McCord, as president of the Building Trades Employers’ Association, against the Thompson-Starrett Company and another. From a judgment of the Trial Term (113 N. Y. Supp. 903) for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, LAUGH-FIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Morgan J. O’Brien, for appellants.
Frederick Hulse, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
We find no difficulty in affirming this judgment if the Buildings Trades Employers' Association had gone no further than to order a general "lookout" of the members of the Brotherhood of Carpenters. The communication of September 22, 1904, however, does go further, and instructs the members of the association that no men may be set to work, or retained at work, who do not at once-join a particular labor union, the Greater New York Carpenters' Union.
This requirement, if it is to be considered as the act of the association, was against public policy, illegal, and void (Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297, 37 L. R. A. 802, 57 Am. St. Rep. 496; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5, 3 L. R. A. [N. S.] 293, 111 Am. St. Rep. 730). I see no reason why we are not bound to regard this requirement as the act of the association. By its constitution the board of governors is designated as the body which is authorized to act for the association, and to issue orders to the members. The complaint alleges and the court has found that the letter containing the objectionable order was "sent to said defendant by the said board of governors and certified by its secretary." It is true that the letter speaks of the emergency committee as directing that all carpenters then in the employ of a member, who are competent, shall become members, at once, of the Greater New York Carpenters' Union, and it does not appear who constitute the emergency committee or what power it possessed. But the same letter also contains the injunction, not purporting to emanate from the emergency committee, that no brotherhood carpenter, although willing to sign the arbitration plan, may be set to work unless he at once joins the designated union. Whether these instructions originated with the emergency committee or any one else, the board of governors 'by causing them to be subscribed by their secretary, and by sending them to the members of the association, adopted them, and made them their own. In so doing, as it seems to us, they exceeded their lawful authority, and undertook to impose upon the Thompson-Starrett Company an obligation which it was not required to assume. The bonds sued upon, although purporting to be given to secure liquidated damages, are in fact given to secure penalties for noncompliance with the order of the association, for it is apparent that the association, as such, could suffer no actual pecuniary damage from the disobedience of an order.
- To collect a penalty for the, disobedience of an order, it must appear that the order was one which was rightfully and lawfully given, and, as it appears that the association exceeded its authority in requiring that no carpenter should be employed unless he joined a particular union, it follows that the penalty cannot be collected. I do not understand that there is any serious difference of opinion between us as to the illegality of the directions to employ only members of one particular union. This seems to be established by the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Galen-v. Curran, supra, reaffirmed and explained in Jacobs v. Cohen, supra. In the latter case Judge Gray, writing for the court, makes it quite clear that while an individual employer may lawfully agree with a labor union to employ only its members, because such an agreement is not of an oppressive nature operating generally throughout the community to prevent craftsmen in the trade from obtaining employment and earning their livelihood, yet that such an agreement when participated in by all or by a large proportion of employers in any community becomes oppressive and contrary to public policy, because it operates generally upon the craftsmen in the trade, and imposes upon them, as a penalty for refusing to join the favored union, the practical impossibility of obtaining employment at their trade and thereby gaining a livelihood. The evidence makes it quite clear that the objectionable order of September 22, 1904, was of the latter class, for it is in evidence that the Employers' Association embraced nearly every prominent building contractor, and that the "lockout" affected practically the whole building trade in the borough of Manhattan. It is suggested, however, that even if the order to employ only members of the Greater New York Carpenters' Union was beyond the authority of the board of governors of the Employers' Association, still that the earlier orders which merely forbade the employment of members of the Brotherhood of Carpenters were authorized and lawful, and that the disobedience of these by defendants constituted a breach of the conditions of their bonds. Hence it is argued that the illegal order may be ignored and the forfeiture upheld by reason of the disobedience of the earlier orders, which are assumed to have been lawful. The difficulty with this argument is that the defendants did obey the earlier orders, and did lay off their employés in obedience to them. Indeed, for a long time after the issuance of the obnoxious order, they continued to lock out the members of the Brotherhood of Carpentérs, and made efforts to obtain a sufficient number of carpenters from outside the membership of that organization. There certainly is no reason to suppose that, if defendants had filled up their working force with carpenters unaffiliated with any labor organization, the Employers' Association would have accepted their action as a compliance with its orders, for the violation of the illegal order of September 22, 1904, is expressly included in the bill of complaint as a reason for forfeiting the bonds sued upon.
The judgment appealed from, must therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
PATTERSON, P. J., and EAUGHEIN, J., concur.