Case Name: Curtis Anthony MAYES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-04-02
Citations: 831 S.W.2d 5
Docket Number: No. 01-90-00579-CR
Parties: Curtis Anthony MAYES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before O’CONNOR, DUGGAN, and DUNN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 831
Pages: 5–10

Head Matter:
Curtis Anthony MAYES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-90-00579-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
April 2, 1992.
Opinions on Motion for Rehearing July 2, and Aug. 31, 1992.
Jules L. Laird, Jr., Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Kimberly Aperauch Stelter, Scott Durfee, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, for appellee.
Before O’CONNOR, DUGGAN, and DUNN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
DUNN, Justice.
After finding appellant, Curtis Anthony Mayes, guilty of possession of a controlled substance and the enhancement allegations to be true, the jury assessed punishment at 55-years confinement.
While responding to a disturbance call, Houston Police Officer Richard Pederson saw appellant walk from behind a small business strip center. Appellant was carrying a beer can in his hand. Pederson testified that he watched appellant walk across the street to a vacant house, where he fell backwards onto a discarded couch on the front porch. Based on appellant's behavior, Pederson believed he was intoxicated. After questioning appellant, Peder-son arrested him for public intoxication.
During a brief pat down for weapons, Pederson discovered a long, glass crack pipe in appellant's front pants pocket. Pederson testified that appellant's condition was consistent with one who was coming "off" a cocaine high and that cocaine residue was visible from the outside of the pipe. Residue inside the glass pipe tested positive in a field test for cocaine.
The remaining residue was later chemically analyzed. The State's chemist testified that cocaine residue was visible and that he was able to collect .2 milligrams pure cocaine from the residue inside the pipe by using a solvent.
In his first point of error, appellant asserts the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly possessed the cocaine in question. Appellant contends that due to the trace amount of residue obtained, the testimony of the peace officer and the chemist is insufficient to show he knowingly possessed cocaine. We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1974); Manuel v. State, 782 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet.ref'd). To prove the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) the accused exercised care, custody, control, and management over the contraband; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Manuel, 782 S.W.2d at 336.
This Court has recently held that if the controlled substance can be seen and measured, the amount is sufficient to establish that the appellant knew it was a controlled substance. Thomas v. State, 807 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. granted).
Both Pederson and the chemist testified that residue was visible and that .2 milligrams of pure cocaine was recovered.
Therefore, appellant's first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient because the cocaine was not introduced into evidence and the court's charge authorized a conviction that was not supported by the evidence.
The relevant portion of the charge reads as follows:
Before you would be warranted in convicting the defendant you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance alleged to have been found by the State is cocaine and you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily had the same in his possession and that he knew the substance was cocaine.
Based upon this charge, appellant makes two contentions. First, relying on Arceneaux v. State, 803 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), he contends the State was required to introduce the cocaine itself into evidence. We disagree.
Arceneaux is distinguishable from the case at bar. The Arceneaux jury charge contained the following:
Before you would be warranted in convicting the defendant you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the exhibit introduced in evidence by the State is cocaine.
Arceneaux v. State, 803 S.W.2d at 268 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that once a phrase is incorporated into the jury instruction in such a way that the jury must find it before a verdict of guilt is authorized, it must be proved or the verdict will be deemed contrary to the law and evidence. Id. at 270.
In the present charge, the language is critically different from the Arceneaux charge. Here, the State need only prove that "the substance alleged to have been found by the State is cocaine." The testimony of the officer and the chemist was sufficient to meet this burden.
Second, appellant contends the State increased its burden by requiring a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that he voluntarily had cocaine on his possession and that the evidence was insufficient to meet this burden. We disagree.
Possession must be voluntary. Section 6.01 of the Texas Penal Code provides:
(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.
(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.
Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 6.01(a) and (b) (Vernon 1974).
The State did not increase its burden of proof. The charge simply required the State to show the substance was cocaine and, as required by the Penal Code, possession was voluntary.
Here, Pederson testified that due to its shape and its location in appellant's front pants pocket, it would have been impossible for appellant not to have felt the crack pipe when he sat down. Appellant was aware of his control and, thus, the State has met the requisite burden of proof.
Appellant's second point of error is overruled.
In his third point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred when it refused to include his requested jury charge. At the conclusion of the guilt or innocence phase, appellant objected to the trial court's jury charge and requested a charge for the possession of drug paraphernalia as a lesser included offense. Appellant argues possession of drug paraphernalia is a lesser included offense of possession of cocaine.
Before a charge on a lesser included offense can be given, two requirements must be met. Lincecum v. State, 736 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Johnson v. State, 773 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd). First, the lesser included offense must be included within the proof necessary to establish the offense charged. Lincecum, 736 S.W.2d at 678. Second, there must be some evidence in the record that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty of only the lesser offense. Id.
Here, the second requirement is clearly not met. The cocaine was recovered from the pipe. Thus, there is no evidence in the record that the appellant is guilty of only the lesser offense. Thus, a lesser included offense charge would not have been appropriate.
Appellant's third point of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., dissents.
. See also Lavigne v. State, 782 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) aff'd, 803 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (possession of a minute amount of cocaine is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the amount possessed is capable of being measured).