Case Name: SABAUGH v. CITY OF DEARBORN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-04-05
Citations: 384 Mich. 510
Docket Number: Docket No. 52,387
Parties: SABAUGH v. CITY OF DEARBORN
Judges: Black, T. E. Brennan, Swainson and Williams, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 384
Pages: 510–538

Head Matter:
SABAUGH v. CITY OF DEARBORN
Opinion op the Court
1. Constitutional Law — Municipal Corporations — Public Housing — Public Health.
Publie housing is a work involving the publie health or safety within the meaning of the constitutional provision allowing cities to acquire, own, establish, and maintain certain properties and facilities including “all works which involve the publie health or safety” (Const 1963, art 7, § 23).
2. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Revenue Bond Act.
Municipal corporations may exercise the powers granted them by the Revenue Bond Act of 1933 notwithstanding that no bonds are issued under the act in connection with the exercise of the power (MCLA § 141.104).
3. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Public Housing — Revenue Bond Act.
Acquiring and maintaining public housing for senior citizens is a publie work authorized by the section of the Revenue Bond Act of 1933 allowing cities to acquire public improvements including housing facilities (MCLA § 141.103).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4, 7-17, 20-28] 40 Am Jur 2d, Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment §§ 2, 3, 9-34.
[1, 7,10,11] 39 Am Jur 2d, Health § 5.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes or governmental housing projects for improvement of housing conditions. 172 ALR 966.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations §§ 111-138.
40 Am Jur 2d, Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment §§3,4,22.
43 Am Jur, Publie Securities and Obligations §§ 52-70.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations §§ 102-110.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations §§ 707, 708.
[18,19, 21-23] 38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 16.
49 Am Jur, States § § 8, 108.
4. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Public Improvements — Corporate Limits.
The Michigan Constitution and the Revenue Bond Act section implementing it authorizes a city to acquire public works within or without its corporate limits (Const 1963, art 6, § 23; MCLA § 141.104).
5. Constitutional Law — Municipal Corporations — Public Works —Territorial Limitations.
The constitutional and statutory provisions granting cities the power to acquire public improvements within or without the corporate limits was not intended to confine the scope of the power to places within the state (Const 1963, art 7, § 23; MCLA § 141.104).
6. Constitutional Law — States—Public Works — Territorial Limitations — Federal Question.
Ownership of land in one state by another state has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States and presents no Federal constitutional question.
Dissenting Opinion
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Adams and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ.
7. Constitutional Law — Municipal Corporations — Public Housing — Public Health.
Public housing involves public health and safety and is not to be excluded from the constitutional provision empowering cities to acquire and own all works which involve public health or safety although not expressly enumerated in that provision (Const 1963, art 7, § 33).
8. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Revenue Bond Act.
Bonds need not be issued before a city may proceed under the Bevelme Bond Act (MCLA § 141.101 et seq.).
9. Municipal Corporations — Revenue Bond Act — Public Housing —Public Works.
The Bevenue Bond Act authorizes acquisition of public improvements by cities and defines a public improvement to include “housing facilities’’; consequently, public housing is a public work with the expenditure therefor being for a public purpose (MCLA § 141.101 et seq.).
10. Constitutional Law — Construction—Municipal Corporations —Powers—Public Health or Safety.
The Michigan Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the provisions of the Constitution of 1908 authorizing any city or village to acquire, own, establish and maintain either within or without its corporate limits all works which involve the public health or safety were not self-executing and, because substantially the same language has been retained in the Constitution of 1963, the same construction of its provisions would be applicable (Const 1908, art 8, § 22; Const 1963, art 7, §23).
11. Constitutional Law — Municipal Corporations — Powers—Public Health — Corporate Limit.
The constitutional provisions that a city or village may acquire, own, establish and maintain, either within or without its corporate limits all works which involve the public health or safety conferred no new or additional municipal power (Const 1908, art 8, § 22; Const 1963, art 7, § 23).
12. Municipal Corporations — Home Rule — Public Character— Private Character — Necessities and Conveniences.
Some rule provisions of constitutions and statutes did not materially alter the concept of local government that municipal corporations are of a twofold character, the one public, as regards the state at large, insofar as they are its agents in government, the other private, insofar as they are to provide the local necessities and conveniences for the citizens.
13. Municipal Corporations — Powers.
The powers to be exercised by municipal corporations are: (1) those granted by express words, (2) those implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted, or (3) such powers as are essential to the declared objects or purposes of the corporation.
14. Municipal Corporations — Primary Purpose — Inhabitants— Nonresidents.
The primary purpose of a municipal corporation is to contribute toward the welfare, health, happiness and public interest of the inhabitants of such corporation, and not to further the interests of those residing outside its limits.
15. Municipal Corporations — Revenue Bond Act — Purpose—Public Works.
The Revenue Bond Act was passed during the great depression and its primary purpose was to provide a means for the construction of public works which, in turn, would provide employment for the unemployed of this state (MCLA § 141.101 et seq.).
16. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Private Capacity — Public Capacity — Revenue Bond Act.
The Revenue Bond Act, as its name implies, is an act as an aid to local improvements without the involvement of general fund debt limitations and is not a grant of power to a city to act in a private capacity but rather in a public one (MOLA § 141.101 et seq.).
17. Municipal Corporations — Powers—Revenue Bond Act — Public Improvements — Location.
The grant of power given to cities by the Revenue Bond Act should not be construed so broadly that public improvements, although designed to provide the local necessities and conveniences, could be built by a city anywhere in this state or, for that matter, anywhere in the world (MOLA § 141.101 et seq.).
18. States — Jurisdiction — Municipal Corporations — Powers — Territorial Limits.
The state cannot extend its sovereign jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits and what is beyond the power of the state is also beyond the power of one of its municipalities.
19. Municipal Corporations — Powers—State Boundaries.
The power of a city, acting in its local capacity or as an agent for the state, cannot extend beyond the boundaries of this state.
20. Municipal Corporations — Revenue Bond Act — Private Enterprise.
The broad grant of authority contained in the Revenue Bond Act does not permit a city to engage in private enterprise (MCLA § 141.101 et seq.).
21. Municipal Corporations — Municipal Purposes — Boundaries —Housing.
Municipalities can acquire lands and property rights beyond their boundaries for legitimate municipal purposes only.
22. Municipal Corporations — Boundaries—Housing.
Action of a city in attempting to move outside its boundaries to provide housing for its inhabitants can be upheld only under the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Municipal Corporations — Housing—Boundaries—Inhabitants op Municipality.
Bousing is unique among the proprietary enterprises a city may engage in; other facilities authorized by the Revenue Bond Act, built outside the municipality, are constructed in whole, or at least in major part, for the city’s inhabitants; but, when the city acquires housing outside its boundaries, by the very nature of such an action it divests itself of the right to act for those who occupy the housing, as they are then no longer inhabitants of the city.
24. States — Housing.
The public policy of this state as to housing may be summed up as twofold: (1) to reduce or eliminate slums and blighted areas; (2) to provide housing for certain residents of the state, primarily persons of low or moderate income.
25. Municipal Corporations — Public Policy — Housing Director.
The purchase by a city in this state of an apartment building in
Florida to meet the needs of the elderly of that city is completely beyond the public policy of this state and the attempt to place the management and operation of such a building in the hands of the housing director of that city is an impermissible exercise of governmental power.
26. Municipal Corporations —■ City — Primary Purpose — Local Needs — Home Rule — Constitutional Law — Statutes.
The primary purpose of a city is to serve local needs and constitutional and statutory provisions with regard to home rule are intended to allow cities to meet such local needs.
27. Municipal Corporations — Housing Project — Public Work— Proprietary Venture — Location—Public Use.
A housing project located in Florida cannot be a public work of a Michigan municipality because it is outside the state and, as a proprietary venture, since it does not serve local needs, it does not meet the test of public use which a city must meet when it ventures into such an activity.
28. Municipal Corporations — Public Housing Próject — Statutes —Public Policy.
A housing project located in Florida and owned by the City of Dearborn is not authorized by legislative enactment or by the public policy of Michigan.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, Lesinski, C. J., and J. H. Gillis and Beer, JJ., affirming Wayne, James N. Canham, J.
Submitted January 13, 1970.
(No. 10, January Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,387.)
Decided April 5,1971.
16 Mich App 182 affirmed.
Complaint by Samuel Sabaugh and Joseph L. Woloszynski, Jr., against the City of Dearborn and certain of its officials, to enjoin purchase and operation by defendants of an apartment building in Florida for the benefit of defendant city’s senior citizens, and for other relief. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment granted. Plaintiffs appealed to Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
James Thomson, for plaintiffs.
Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Special Counsel, Joseph J. Burtell, City Attorney, and Carl P. Garlow, Assistant City Attorney, for defendants.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The council of defendant City of Dearborn, proceeding under authority of the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, Act No 94, PA 1933, as amended (MCLA § 141.101 et seq.; Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.2731 et seq.), adopted a resolution for submission of a bid to the Federal Housing Administration on an 88-unit apartment in Clearwater, Florida. The bid was submitted and was successful. Thereafter, under direction of the council, the purchase was consummated and the city became owner of the apartment, intended to be used for rental to senior citizens of defendant city who could not endure the rigors of Michigan winters.
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers of the city, brought this action praying that the resolution of the city council be set aside and held illegal, that defendants' purchase of the property be restrained, and for a determination that the action of the city council is illegal, ultra vires, unconstitutional and void.
The trial court granted defendants' motion for accelerated or summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant city has the power to establish, own and operate public housing facilities outside this state. The matter is here on leave granted to plaintiffs to appeal.
Plaintiffs state the question involved in this appeal as follows:
"Can the defendant purchase, own and operate with tax funds an 88-unit apartment building in the State of Florida?"
Plaintiffs appear to advance as reasons for answering in the negative the following:
1. The grant of power to cities in the Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 7, § 23, to acquire, own, establish and maintain certain properties and facilities therein specified does not include in the list public housing. The answer to that is that it does expressly include "all works which involve the public health or safety". In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1966, No 346 (1968), 380 Mich 554, we held that the construction of housing is an enterprise affected with a public interest. In Thomson v. City of Dearborn (1957), 348 Mich 300, where counsel for plaintiffs here was the plaintiff, he urged this same argument against this same city's acquisition of off-street parking facilities. This Court upheld the right of the city to do so, stating that it was a work involving public health or safety. Public housing is no less so. Thomson v. City of Dearborn (1960), 362 Mich 1, tends to support this view. It is to be noted, also, that Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 7, § 22, provides:
"No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section."
This indicates that the grant of itemized powers contained in the subsequent § 23 is not to be deemed exclusive.
2. Plaintiffs say that the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, Act No 94, under which the city has presumed to act, is not applicable here because no bonds were involved in the transaction. This overlooks § 4 of the act, MCLA § 141.104 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.2734), which reads:
"The powers in this act granted may be exercised notwithstanding that no bonds are issued hereunder."
We are satisfied that the acquiring and maintaining of public housing for senior citizens of the city is a public work, involving public health, within the competence of the city. The Revenue Bond Act of 1933, authorizing acquisition of public improvements by cities, defines public improvements, in § 3 of the act, as including, at the head of the list, "housing facilities". Accordingly, public housing should be considered no less a public work, with expenditures therefor being for a public purpose, than we held a marina to be in Gregory Marina, Inc., v. City of Detroit (1966), 378 Mich 364.
Section 4 of the Revenue Bond Act authorizes the acquisition and operation of "public improvements within or without its corporate limits." This implements the provisions of Michi gan Constitution of 1963, art 7, § 23, authorizing a city to acquire public works "within or without its corporate limits." There can ,be no doubt, then, that a city may do that which defendant city has done here if on a location without its corporate limits but within the State of Michigan.
Was it the intent of the framers of the Michigan Constitution and of the electors in the adoption thereof, and of the legislature, that the noted language "within or without" in the Constitution and the statute might include places outside of this state? If such was the intent, would that be violative of the Constitution of the United States?
Nothing in the language of the Michigan Constitution or in the Revenue Bond Act granting the power in question to cities expresses an intent to limit the meaning of the term "within or without its corporate limits" so as to confine its scope to places within this state. We hold that such was not the intent. In 1968, House Bill No. 3595 was introduced in the legislature which proposed to amend the Revenue Bond Act to provide that no out-of-state acquisitions were permissible thereunder. The bill did not pass.
Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that the conferring by the Michigan Constitution or statute upon its cities of authority to acquire and operate public works in another state would be unconstitutional under the Constitutions of this state or of the United States and we find none.
As for the provision of Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 7, § 23, authorizing city acquisition of public works "within or without its corporate limits" and the like provision in § 4 of the Revenue Bond Act, a similar provision in a Tennessee statute (Williams Ann Code, § 2726.13) was construed in McLaughlin v. City of Chattanooga (1944), 180 Tenn 638 (177 SW2d 823), to mean that the City of Chattanooga had power to expend public funds in the purchase of lands for municipal airport purposes located outside of its corporate limits, lying partly in the State of Tennessee and extending over into the State of Georgia. The court observed that the words "within and without" embraced every place in the universe, including locations outside of the state. The Tennessee court went on to say:
"For more than one hundred years the State of Georgia has owned valuable property in Tennessee, located within the City of Chattanooga, with clearly implied, if not expressed, legislative, municipal and judicial recognition by this State, the City of Chattanooga, and the Courts. Twenty years ago the Supreme Court of the United States clearly recognized the right of ownership by Georgia of property in Tennessee. State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga [1924], 264 US 472, 480, 481, 44 S Ct 369, 370, 68 L Ed 796, 799."
An examination of the opinion in State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga (1924), 264 US 472 (44 S Ct 369, 68 L Ed 796), discloses a situation in which the State of Georgia owned property in Chattanooga, Tennessee, which the latter was seeking to condemn in part for street purposes. The United States Supreme Court held that Georgia's ownership of land in Tennessee was not in a sovereign capacity but a proprietary one, and, hence, the property was subject to condemnation by the city. The court took the right of Georgia to own property in its proprietary capacity in the State of Tennessee as a matter of course, with no suggestion of involvement of a Federal constitutional question in that regard. Had the court considered that there was such a question, this would have been the occasion to consider and decide it. Not having done so, we think it follows that no such question exists.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
Black, T. E. Brennan, Swainson and Williams, JJ., concurred.
This Opinion rendered in Per Curiam form was originally prepared by Justice John R. Dethmers prior to his retirement and is adopted verbatim.