Case Name: STEWART v. TROUTT
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-01-17
Citations: 73 Mich. App. 378
Docket Number: Docket No. 26246
Parties: STEWART v TROUTT
Judges: Before: Bashara, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 73
Pages: 378–394

Head Matter:
STEWART v TROUTT
Opinion op the Court
1. Motions — Hybrid Motions — Accelerated and/or Summary Judgment.
A hybrid motion for accelerated and/or summary judgment is looked upon with disfavor.
2. Judgment — -Accelerated Judgment — Absolute Privilege— Court Rules.
The language "or other disability of the moving party” contained in the court rule regarding accelerated judgments is not intended to include the defense of absolute privilege (GCR 1963, 116.1[5]).
3. Motions — Summary Judgment — Assumption of Truth — Court Rules.
A motion for summary judgment on the ground that the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim as determined from the pleadings alone; for the purposes of such a motion, both at the trial and appellate levels, every well-pled allegation in the complaint is'assumed to be true (GCR 1963, 117.2[1]).
4. Motions — Summary Judgment — Tests-—Court Rules.
The test for a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is whether the plaintiffs claim, on the plead ings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery (GCR 1963, 117.2[1]).
References for Points in Headnotes
47 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 1158.
73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment § 26.
50 Am Jur 2d, Libel and Slander § 125 et seq.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal School, State, and Tort Liability § 246.
Libel and slander: actionability of statement imputing incapacity, inefficiency, misconduct, fraud, dishonesty, or the like to public officer or employee. 53 ALR2d 8.
Constitutional aspects of libel or slander of public officials. 95 ALR2d 1450.
50 Am Jur 2d, Libel and Slander §§ 195-198.
50 Am Jur 2d, Libel and Slander §§ 192-194.
5. Libel and Slander — Municipal Employees — Governmental Immunity — Official Duties — Absolute Privilege.
A municipal employee is entitled to an absolute privilege in a defamation action only where the alleged defamatory statements were made in the course of carrying out an official duty.
6. Libel and Slander — Absolute Privilege — Accelerated Judgment — Official Duties.
An accelerated judgment in an action for defamation granted on the basis of absolute privilege should be reversed and remanded to give the appellant an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege facts disclosing that the appellee was not acting in the course of carrying out an official duty when the alleged defamatory remarks were made where the appellee’s motion for accelerated judgment did not attack the failure of the appellant to allege such facts.
Concurrence by D. E. Holbrook, J.
7. Libel and Slander — Public Officials — Absolute Privilege— Qualified Privilege.
The privilege afforded to public officials in a slander action varies with the situation, therefore, there may be an absolute privilege, a qualified privilege, or no privilege at all.
8. Libel and Slander — Privileged Communications — Absolute Privilege — Qualified Privilege — Loose Gossip.
A communication absolutely privileged is not actionable even though false and maliciously published; a qualified privilege may be overcome by proof of actual malice; whereas loose gossip, thoughtless or malevolent, qualiffes for no privilege at all.
9. Libel and Slander — Public Officials — Tests—Privileged Communications — Essential Functions — Official Positions.
The test as to the nature of a privilege in a defamation action against a public official is whether the making of the statement that contained the allegedly defamatory remarks was an essential function of the official position held by the defendant.
10. Libel and Slander — Public Officials — Absolute Privilege— Qualified Privilege.
Alleged slanderous statements by a mayor regarding an investí gation into possible unethical conduct by a city councilman: (a) are absolutely privileged if made during an exercise of any essential function of the mayor’s office; (b) are qualiffedly privileged where the publication of the statements is not closely related to the mayor’s official duties; and (c) are not privileged if the mayor has no powers or duties which would justify such investigation and statements.
11. Libel and Slander — Public Officials — Absolute Privilege— Qualified Privilege.
A trial court must look at all the facts, the city’s charter, and the entire context of the alleged slanderous statement by a mayor to determine whether the statement is subject to either an absolute or a qualified privilege.
12. Libel and Slander — Absolute Privilege — Limited Circumstances.
The doctrine of absolute privilege as a defense in a defamation action exists in Michigan under certain limited circumstances.
13. Libel and Slander — Absolute Privilege — Fact Disputes— Qualified Privilege — Factfinding—Legal Analysis.
An accelerated judgment based on absolute privilege was improperly granted in a defamation action where there were many factual disputes still existing regarding whether an absolute or a qualified privilege applied to the fact situation, since the determination of the nature of a privilege requires extensive factfindings and legal analysis.
Appeal from Wayne, Thomas J. Foley, J.
Submitted November 3, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 26246.)
Decided January 17, 1977.
Complaint by James Stewart against Terry Troutt and William S. Munger seeking damages for defamation. Accelerated judgments for both defendants. Plaintiff appeals as to defendant Troutt only.
Reversed and remanded.
Eugene S. Hoiby, for plaintiff.
Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker (by Stephen E. Glazek and Louis J. Burnett), for defendant.
Before: Bashara, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, P. J.
The appellant, a Romulus city councilman, brought this action for defamation against the appellee, the mayor of Romulus. The complaint alleged that the appellee made a number of defamatory statements at a city council meeting, regarding the appellant's failure to pay property taxes on certain property.
The appellee moved for "accelerated and/or summary judgment" pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(3) and (5) and 117.2(1). The motion alleged a number of grounds, including the assertion that the appellee was addressing a meeting of a municipal legislative body and was absolutely privileged. The trial judge, without enumerating the specific ground of GCR 1963, 116.1(5), granted appellee's motion for accelerated judgment on the basis of absolute privilege.
A hybrid motion for "accelerated and/or summary judgment" is looked upon with disfavor. Knapp v Dearborn, 60 Mich App 18, 26; 230 NW2d 293 (1975), Hobbs v Michigan State Highway Department, 58 Mich App 189, 190, n 1; 227 NW2d 286 (1975), lv granted, 394 Mich 837 (1975).
Appellee premised his motion for accelerated judgment on two grounds. The first ground was GCR 1963, 116.1(3), "the party asserting the claim lacks legal capacity to sue". Nowhere in the motion is appellant's capacity to bring this action challenged. We, therefore, conclude that this ground is inapplicable.
The other ground upon which appellee brings his motion for accelerated judgment is GCR 1963, 116.1(5). It states:
"(5) the claim is barred because of release, payment, prior judgment, statute of limitations, statute of frauds, infancy, or other disability of the moving party, or assignment or other disposition of the claim before commencement of the action."
By process of elimination the only ground that could conceivably apply to absolute privilege is "other disability of the moving party".
The Committee Notes reveal that GCR 1963, 116.1 was drafted from the substance of Court Rule No. 18 (1945). 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Committee Notes, p 324. The language of GCR 1963, 116.1(5) represents (with one addition, payment) the grouping of the defenses listed in subsections (e) through (j) of Court Rule No. 18 (1945). Subsection (i) provided:
"(i) That the cause of action did not accrue against defendant because of his infancy or other disability."
See Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 72 Mich App 670, 681, n 8; 250 NW2d 759 (1976) (Peterson, J., concurring).
It was not the intention of the drafters in drafting GCR 1963, 116.1 to "enlarge or diminish" the defenses available under Court Rule No. 18 (1945). 1 Honigman & Hawkins, supra. Motions brought pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1 were intended to be restricted to the specific claims set forth in the rule. 1 Gilmore, Michigan Civil Procedure Before Trial (1964), § 12.500, p 565. Subsection (i) of Court Rule No. 18, § 1 (1945), was specifically aimed at such disabilities as infancy, insanity, or incompetency. See generally 1 Searl, Michigan Pleading and Practice (1934), § 121, p 183. See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, supra.
Court Rule No. 18, § l(i) was based on Rules 106-110 promulgated under the New York Civil Practice Act of 1921. Court Rule No. 18 (1931), notes p 34. Reference to New York decisions discloses that "other disability" has been applied to competency situations. See Anonymous v Anonymous, 166 Misc 861; 2 NYS2d 663 (1938).
For the above stated reasons, we do not believe that the language of "other disability of the moving party" contained in GCR 1963, 116.1(5), was intended to include the defense of absolute privilege.
The remaining ground asserted by appellee was that the appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. GCR 1963, 117.2(1). Although the trial judge granted the motion on the basis of accelerated judgment, we may still consider whether summary judgment would be appropriate based on absolute privilege, since there is no prejudice to the appellant. Cf. Unger v Forest Home Twp, 65 Mich App 614, 616-617, n 1; 237 NW2d 582 (1975), Birch Run Nursery v Jemal, 52 Mich App 23, 24, n 1; 216 NW2d 488 (1974), modified on other grounds, 393 Mich 775; 224 NW2d 282 (1974). The appellant was permitted to argue against the application of absolute privilege.
A motion for summary judgment brought under GCR 1963, 117.2(1), merely tests the legal sufficiency of the claim as determined from the pleadings alone. Todd v Biglow, 51 Mich App 346, 349; 214 NW2d 733 (1974), lv den, 391 Mich 816 (1974), 1 Honigman & Hawkins, supra, Committee Notes to GCR 1963, 117, pp 353-355. For the purposes of that motion, both at the trial and appellate levels, every well-pled allegation in the complaint is assumed to be true. Bielski v Wolverine Insurance Co, 379 Mich 280, 283; 150 NW2d 788 (1967). The test is whether the plaintiffs claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. Crowther v Ross Chemical & Mfg Co, 42 Mich App 426, 431; 202 NW2d 577 (1972).
The motion asserts that the alleged defamatory statements were made by a municipal officer addressing a municipal legislative body and were absolutely privileged. The time, place, and attending circumstances surrounding the defamation are an important consideration, but not dispositive. Bolton v Walker, 197 Mich 699, 705; 164 NW 420 (1917). A municipal employee is only entitled to an absolute privilege if the alleged defamatory statements were made in the course of carrying out an official duty. See Brunn v Weiss, 32 Mich App 428, 430-431; 188 NW2d 904 (1971), and cases cited therein.
Appellant's nearest allegation to whether the appellee was carrying out an official duty, is that the appellee "failed to act timely to direct the matter to the proper authorities pursuant to" MCLA 211.150; MSA 7.208, and MCLA 211.152; MSA 7.210. These statutes provide procedures whereby the state tax commission may assess property tax deficiencies. However, this cannot be taken as an allegation that the appellee was not acting in the course of carrying out an official duty when the alleged defamations arose.
Since the appellant's complaint does not allege that the appellee was acting outside the course of carrying out an official duty, and appellee's motion does not attack this failure, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand. The appellant should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege facts that disclose the appellee was not acting in the course of carrying out an official duty. If appellant is unable to so allege, summary judgment for failure to state a claim, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), should be entered in favor of appellee.
Reversed and remanded in accordance with this opinion. Costs to abide the outcome.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.
It should be noted that the present complaint cites a number of conclusions of law, rather than statements of fact. If, on remand, plaintiff is only able to cite conclusions, summary judgment is proper.