Case Name: PEOPLE v. STEVENSON
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-05-02
Citations: 399 Mich. 656
Docket Number: Docket No. 56236
Parties: PEOPLE v STEVENSON
Judges: Williams, Levin, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 656–663

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v STEVENSON
Docket No. 56236.
Submitted February 4, 1976
(Calendar No. 1).
Decided May 2, 1977.
George Stevenson was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of assault with a dangerous weapon by Muskegon Circuit Court, John H. Piercey, J. The defendant had been convicted of armed robbery in a different action while five other charges, including the assault charge, were pending against him. The defendant appealed the robbery charge, and then under an agreement with the prosecutor the defendant dismissed that appeal (Court of Appeals Docket No. 13620), and the prosecutor obtained orders of nolle prosequi on the other pending charges. More than 180 days after sentencing on the armed robbery conviction, the defendant applied for leave to appeal, which was denied. The prosecutor reinstated the assault charge and the defendant entered a plea of guilty. The Court of Appeals, McGregor, P. J., and R. B. Burns, J. (O’Hara, J., dissenting), reversed the assault conviction and discharged the defendant (Docket No. 16870). The people appeal. Held:
It is unnecessary in this case to address the question whether the court lacked jurisdiction because more than 180 days had elapsed between the date of the defendant’s incarceration and the reinstitution of the assault charge. The defendant has kept his bargain, although not willingly, because his application for leave to appeal the armed robbery conviction was denied, and he should receive the benefits of the agreement. The conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon is reversed and the dismissed charges may not be reinstated.
Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Coleman, concurred in reversal, but on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept the plea of guilty of felonious assault because there was no good-faith effort to bring the charge of assault with intent to murder to trial within the 180-day period re quired by statute. The practice of plea bargaining has become so pervasive that the trial judge and the majority of two appellate courts ignore the plain mandate of the 180-day statute and instead decree specific performance of a plea bargain which the defendant did not keep. The Supreme Court ought to apply a clear and unequivocal enactment of the Legislature rather than enforce a private and questionably valid plea bargain.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 512, 513.
Indictment or information which has been dismissed by prosecuting attorney as susceptible of reinstatement. 112 ALR 386.
[2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 492-494.
Affirmed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Plea Bargaining — Nolle Prosequi — Reinstatement of Charges.
A defendant who waived his right to appeal a conviction of armed robbery pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor who obtained an order of nolle prosequi in other pending charges, kept his bargain, although unwillingly, where his subsequent application for leave to appeal the conviction of armed robbery was denied by the Court of Appeals; the defendant should receive the benefits of the agreement and the dismissed charges may not be reinstated.
Concurring Opinion
Coleman and Ryan, JJ.
2. Criminal Law — Inmates—Untried Charges — 180-Day Statute.
A circuit court was without jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty of felonious assault in a pending case for assault with intent to commit murder where the defendant was an inmate of a state penal institution, and there was no good-faith effort to bring the assault case to trial within the statutory 180-day period after he was delivered to the Department of Corrections on a sentence for a different crime (MCL 780.138; MSA 28.969[3j).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Richard Pasarela, Prosecuting Attorney, and David F Folkert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Brian K. Walsworth, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, C. J.
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals order reversing defendant's plea-based conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon;
We affirm.
Defendant was jury convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to serve 8 to 40 years. He filed a claim of appeal of this conviction. At the time of sentence five other charges, including assault with intent to commit murder, which was the basis for the instant plea to the included offense, were pending.
The prosecutor agreed to nolle prosequi these charges if defendant waived his right to appeal the armed robbery conviction. Defendant withdrew his claim of appeal and an order nolle prosequi was entered.
One hundred and eighty-one days after sentence on the armed robbery charge defendant notified his lawyer that he wished to pursue his appeal of that conviction.
Subsequently an application for delayed appeal was filed and leave was denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 27, 1972, the prosecutor moved to reinstate the formerly dismissed charges, and the motion was granted. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied, and on September 14, 1972 he proceeded to trial on the charge of assault with intent to commit murder. During the trial, defendant pled guilty to the lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon in return for another nolle prosequi order on the remaining charges.
Defendant appealed the assault conviction alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because more than 180 days had elapsed between the date of his initial incarceration and "the re-institution of the assault with intent to commit murder charge. MCLA 780.131; MCLA 780.133; MSA 28.969(1); MSA 28.969(3). The Court of Appeals reversed.
On appeal to this Court, the prosecutor argues that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the armed robbery conviction as a quid pro quo for dismissal of the five pending charges. When the claim of appeal was withdrawn the prosecutor, in good faith, dismissed these charges. They were reinstated only after defendant again pursued his appellate remedies. Citing cases which hold that if the prosecutor acts in good faith to bring cases to trial within the 180-day period the statute is complied with, the prosecutor contends that the nolle prosequi orders indicated a good faith effort.
Defendant argues that the prosecution acted improperly in conditioning the dismissal of the pending charges on waiver of the right to appeal, citing People v Harrison, 386 Mich 269; 191 NW2d 371 (1971); People v Ledrow, 53 Mich App 511; 220 NW2d 336 (1974); People v Clark, 43 Mich App 476; 204 NW2d 332 (1972). Because the prosecutor acted improperly, bad faith should be presumed, and a violation of the 180-day rule established.
We find it unnecessary to address the 180-day rule question in this case. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that because defendant's application for leave to appeal the armed robbery conviction was denied by the Court of Appeals, "[although not willingly, defendant has kept his bargain and should receive his benefits of the agreement". Accordingly, the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon is reversed and the charges dismissed pursuant to the negotiations of February 2, 1972 may not be reinstated.
Affirmed.
Williams, Levin, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, C. J.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., took no part in the decision of this case.