Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Arnold OLINEY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-04-05
Citations: 430 So. 2d 1294
Docket Number: No. 82 KA 0866
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Arnold OLINEY.
Judges: Before LOTTINGER, COLE and CARTER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 430
Pages: 1294–1298

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Arnold OLINEY.
No. 82 KA 0866.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
April 5, 1983.
Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee by Glen Petersen, Asst. Dist. Atty.
Georgia Wilemon, Asst. Public Defender, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Before LOTTINGER, COLE and CARTER, JJ.

Opinion:
CARTER, Judge.
The defendant, Arnold Oliney, was convicted by a six-person jury with having committed simple burglary of a residence in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. He was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals assigning as error the acceptance by the trial court of a jury verdict based on insufficient evidence.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it accepted a verdict based on insufficient evidence. This argument has no merit since a trial judge is not empowered with the discretion to accept or reject a verdict of the jury, unless the verdict does not comply with the form and/or procedural requirements. See Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Article 1 § 17 and Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 809-820.
Defendant next argues that the evidence offered by the prosecution was not sufficient to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime of simple burglary viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
In State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979), a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the United States Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) required that the standard of review when considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated that this appellate review of the evidence by a state court is required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982). When reviewing a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, it must be determined that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been excluded. La.R.S. 15:438; State v. Ennis, 414 So.2d 661 (La.1982); State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981).
The crime of simple burglary is defined in La.R.S. 14:62, as follows:
§ 62. Simple burglary
Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, other than as set forth in Section 60.
Whoever commits the crime of simple burglary shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than twelve years, or both.
The elements to be proved by the State are: (1) unauthorized entry into a dwelling in question, and (2) that defendant had the requisite specific intent to commit a theft or felony therein. See State v. Tennant, 352 So.2d 629 (La.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 945, 98 S.Ct. 1529, 55 L.Ed.2d 543.
In State v. Dickerson, 353 So.2d 262 (La.1977), overruled on other grounds in State v. Cox, 369 So.2d 118 (La.1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court, discussing specific intent relative to a burglary prosecution, determined that intent, being subjective in character, need not be proven as a fact in a burglary prosecution and may be inferred from circumstances of the transaction. LSA-R.S. 14:62; LSA-R.S. 15:445; see also, State v. Moore, 302 So.2d 284 (La.1974); State v. Kado, 300 So.2d 461 (La.1974).
Defendant argues that evidence of "specific intent to commit a theft or felony therein" as offered by the prosecution was insufficient because of defendant's testimony that he had no knowledge that the entry was not authorized and further that he should not be charged with knowledge of lack of valid permission to remove the air conditioning unit from the dwelling. However, the defense offered absolutely no evidence to corroborate the appellant's testimony. The appellant and his co-defendant both admitted to entering the screened porch of the unoccupied dwelling without permission of the owner of the dwelling and both admitted they removed one air conditioning unit and placed it in the car with intent to keep it. The owner of the unoccupied house testified that one and possibly two air conditioning window units were removed from the house without authoriza tion of the owner and that one of these units was found in the car in the possession of the appellant and his co-defendant. The owner of the house further testified that she had not given permission to anyone to enter the unoccupied premises, had not given permission to anyone to remove the air conditioning units, and that she had never seen either of the defendants before. The testimony of one of the arresting officers established that the physical condition of the window from which an air conditioning unit had been removed was such that the dust had been freshly disturbed, that there were finger prints and black finger marks around the window, that there was dirt collected on the floor below the window, all evidencing the apparently recent removal of a window air conditioning unit.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence in the record before us on appeal is clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant made an unauthorized entry into another's dwelling with the specific intent to commit a theft.
This assignment of error is clearly without merit.
DECREE
The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LOTTINGER, COLE and CARTER, Judges, specially concurring.
. Cf. State v. Ruple, 426 So.2d 249 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). See also, our Specially Concurring opinion in the instant case.