Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clyde McCULLY, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-03-31
Citations: 310 So. 2d 833
Docket Number: No. 55571
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clyde McCULLY, Appellant.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 310
Pages: 833–836

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clyde McCULLY, Appellant.
No. 55571.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
March 31, 1975.
Gordon Hackman, Boutte, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Melvin P. Barre, Dist. Atty., Norman J. Pitre, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Director, Research and Appeals Div., Gretna, for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant McCully was convicted of possession of marijuana, La.R.S. 40:971 (c), and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fined. Numerous bills of exceptions were reserved during the trial and are argued on appeal. However, we need discuss only Bill No. 34, which presents reversible error.
After the case was submitted to the jury, it returned and requested that the testimony of Agent Louque, a principal State's witness, be repeated to it. The defendant objected, urging undue emphasis on the agent's testimony would thus result. Alternatively, the defendant wanted the other evidence read also.
Despite the defendant's repeated objection, the trial court permitted the tape containing this agent's testimony to be repeated to the jury.
A clear violation of an express statutory prohibition occurred when the trial court permitted, over defense objection, the testimony of the witness to be repeated to the jury after it had retired to the jury room. Article 793 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "A juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written evidence. Testimony shall not he repeated to the jury.
The explicit prohibition against re-reading of recorded testimony was added by the 1966 code. Official Revision Comment (a). The earlier prohibitions against access to any written evidence or to any notes of testimony were retained, as was the legislative requirement that jurors should rely upon their memories. The general policy behind all these prohibitions is a fear that the jurors might give undue weight to the limited portion of the verbal testimony thus emphasized. State v. Freetime, 303 So.2d 487 (La.1974).
We are mindful that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions permit testimony to be re-read to the jury upon its request, and that there are sound reasons why such jurisdictions regard the practice as salutatory. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury, Standard 5.2 (1968) and commentary thereto; 5 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, Section 2110 (Anderson ed., 1957). Nevertheless, Louisiana is not one of these jurisdictions.
The Louisiana legislature has recently re-enforced a traditional prohibition against jury re-examination of trial evidence by the additional express prohibition of Article 793 against re-reading testimony to jurors. We cannot ignore this deliberate policy choice and this express enactment by our legislative branch. It is for the legislature to repeal or modify this prohibition, not for us to refuse to enforce it.
Nor can we characterize this erroneous violation of a specific statutory prohibition as harmless. For one thing, as "a substantial violation of a . . . statutory right", it cannot under Article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be regarded as harmless. For another, the jury's re-hearing of the testimony solely of the chief prosecution witness (see Footnote 1) can only be regarded as prejudicial to the accused, accepting the legislative policy which prohibited doing so as overemphasizing such testimony in preference to other testimony in the record.
To characterize as harmless this express and prejudicial violation of a statutory right is to ignore the legislative mandate and, in effect, to repeal the legislative prohibition. This, we cannot do.
Decree
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are annulled, and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with law.
Reversed and remanded.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
. The testimony is to the effect that in his presence a marijuana cigarette was passed around and smoked by all nine guests at the Dufrene home, one of whom was the defendant. Mrs. Dufrene was also an undercover agent. This hostess preserved the cigarette so smoked for Louque, and the cigarette and the testimony of the two undercover agents is the principal evidence of possession presented against the defendant. Louque also identified the cigarette and was the chief evidence of its chain of custody.
. La.R.S. 15:395 (1950), re-enacting a similar provision in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, Act 2 of 1928.
. The defendant MeCully took the stand and denied smoking any cigarettes, although he saw others doing so at the wine party and assumed some of them were smoking marijuana. He had been invited by a friend of Mr. Dufrene, the host, who was married to the undercover agent. Dufrene, now estranged from his wife, also testified that Mc-Cully did not participate in the smoking. Louque only generally testified that all those present passed around the cigarette, although he also testified that other cigarettes were also lighted. His testimony does not expressly identify the defendant MeCully as one of the smokers.