Case Name: GENERAL INDUSTRIES CO. v. 20 WACKER DRIVE BLDG. CORPORATION et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1946-07-16
Citations: 156 F.2d 474
Docket Number: No. 8777
Parties: GENERAL INDUSTRIES CO. v. 20 WACKER DRIVE BLDG. CORPORATION et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 156
Pages: 474–480

Head Matter:
GENERAL INDUSTRIES CO. v. 20 WACKER DRIVE BLDG. CORPORATION et al.
No. 8777.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
July 16, 1946.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1946.
LINDLEY, District Judge, dissenting in part.
Robert E. Barrett, John Costello, and Wendell H. Shanner, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
Ralph M. Snyder, of Chicago, Ill., and King Fauver, of Elyria, Ohio, for appellee.
Before EVANS and MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

Opinion:
MINTON, Circuit Judge.
The defendants appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff which enjoined them from adopting and using the name General Industries Corporation.
The plaintiff, incorporated in Ohio in 1914, first adopted the name, The General Industries Company, in 1925. During World War II it manufactured largely military equipment. Before the war it had made and sold plastic parts, spring motors, electric motors, phonograph record changers, sound recording units, typewriters, heat regulators, road 'markers, automobile horns, movie projectors, massage machines, plumbing supplies, telephone switchboards, and other devices. At the present time, it operates a plastic division and a mechanical division. It is licensed to transact business only in the State of Ohio but sells generally all over the country, maintaining one of its soliciting offices under its own name in Chicago. It accepts transmitted orders at its home office in Ohio and then ships the goods to various States.
The trial court found that the plaintiff's products have been long and favorably known, but there was no finding that they were known by its corporate name. The court further found that plaintiff advertises extensively in trade papers, where its name is actively featured; that its annual business by 1943 exceeded $10,000,000 in volume; and that by fair dealing, integrity, prompt deliveries, and excellence of its product, plaintiff has during twenty years built up a valuable good will in its corporate and trade name.
The defendant General Finance Corporation was previously engaged only in the general finance business. When the war interrupted its ordinary operations, it purchased several subsidiary manufacturing corporations. It also controls a building corporation which owns the Civic Opera Building in Chicago. All three defendants, 20 Wacker Drive Building Corporation, LaSalle Industrial Finance Corporation, and General Finance Corporation, proposed to merge in one corporation to be known as General Industries Corporation. When the plaintiff learned of this plan, it brought the present suit.
Upon the trial the court found the foregoing facts and additionally that a likelihood of confusion would arise from the defendants' use of a name practically identical with that of the plaintiff and that the nearly exact identity of the two names would be very confusing to any person dealing in the stock of either corporation and in identifying products produced or to be produced by the two companies.
The court concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to be protected from confusion arising from the practical identity of the names, from confusion as to identity of the corporations, and from probable damage to its credit or to its reputation for fair dealing and responsibility. There is no finding to support this latter conclusion. The court further concluded that the public is likewise entitled to be protected from the effects of such confusion, and that under the laws of Illinois it is not necessary to establish direct competition but that it is sufficient to show that confusion in the trade and on the part of the public is likely to result and that the plaintiff has a property right in its nationally known corporate and trade name and is entitled to be protected against its appropriation by a later comer in the same general field. The court then enjoined the defendants from using or causing to be used the name General Industries Corporation or any name similar thereto.
Two questions are presented. First, may the plaintiff, a foreign corporation that has not received a license to do business in the State of Illinois, maintain this suit in a Federal court in Illinois ? Second, if it has the right to maintain the suit, is the finding of fact that there is likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public sufficient to support an injunction?
As to the first question, we think it clear that the State of Illinois may deny to a foreign corporation the right to sue in its courts to enjoin a domestic corporation from using a name similar to that of the foreign corporation where such foreign corporation has not complied with the statute of Illinois which permits such corporation to do business in the State. Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339. Neither can a foreign corporation with a name "deceptively similar" to that of a domestic corporation in Illinois mandate the Secretary of State to admit such foreign corporation to do business under such "deceptively similar'* name. Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754. In that case the court held that the Secretary of State, who had found that the Investors Syndicate of America, the name of the plaintiff Minnesota corporation, was in the words of the statute "deceptively similar" to Investors Syndicate, the name of the existing Illinois corporation, had not abused his administrative discretion in refusing to license the Minnesota corporation in Illinois. This was a case where the legislature had acted to protect the public from confusion that might arise from the use of "deceptively similar" names. The standard was set by the legislature and the discretion was placed in the Secretary of State to apply that standard. It did not involve the law of unfair competition and the standards of confusion pertinent thereto where the suits are brought by private parties.
While these two cases seem to effectively foreclose the plaintiff from any remedy in the courts of Illinois, it does not follow that the Federal courts are also closed to the plaintiff. We think the plaintiff has a right to sue the defendants in the Federal courts on a cause in which the courts of Illinois may be closed to it. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489, 500, 32 S.Ct. 711, 56 L.Ed. 1177, Ann.Cas.1914A, 699; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Kane, 7 Cir., 117 F.2d 398, 133 A.L.R. 1163; Peck Bros. & Co. v. Peck Bros. Co., 7 Cir., 113 Fed. 291, 62 L.R.A. 81.
Having brought the suit in the Federal court because of a likelihood of confusion in names, the law of Illinois as to the right of the plaintiff to any equitable relief must control. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487.
We must now answer the second question : Is the finding of fact that there is likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public sufficient to support an injunction?
The plaintiff's name is composed of generic words incapable of exclusive appropriation by the plaintiff. They are 'words publici juris. There is no finding of fraud by the defendants in the proposed use of the similar name. The parties are not found to be or likely to be in competition with each other. There is no -finding that the defendants now do business outside the State of Illinois or that they intend to do so in the future under the name General Industries Corporation. The court found that the plaintiff sells mostly to manufacturers, to a lesser extent to jobbers and dealers, and occasionally to individuals. There is no finding that the goods of the plaintiff aré sold to or are known to the trade by the plaintiff's name. In other words, there is no finding of a secondary meaning attaching to the plaintiff's name in relation to the sale of its products. We have the bare naked question of whether the plaintiff can enjoin the defendants from the use of a similar corporate name, the mere use of which is likely to lead to confusion. The authority in Illinois would seem to indicate that the plaintiff is not entitled to such equitable relief.
The case of Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., supra, is attempted to be distinguished on the ground that the court there held that its courts were not open to a foreign corporation that had not complied with the Foreign Corporation Act of Illinois. This Act provided that a foreign corporation must be licensed to do business in Illinois before it is entitled to sue in the State courts to enjoin a domestic corporation of Illinois from using a similar corporate name. While the court did decide this point quite clearly, it went further and said:
"If any confusion has occurred, it has arisen from the similarity of the two corporate names, and not from any attempts on the part of the defendant to deceive. But, as we have already held, the similarity of names is a circumstance of which the complainant has no right to complain, the defendant having at least as good a right to the use of its corporate name in the transaction of its business as the complainant has to use its name. If injury results to the complainant from such cause, it is damnum absque injuria." 142 Ill. at page 509, 30 N.E. at page 345.
The case of Lady Esther, Ltd., v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill.App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165, 148 A.L.R. 6, has been cited. In this case both corporations were using somewhat similar names in Illinois. They were not in competition nor was there any fraud or palming off found, but it did appear clearly that the plaintiff, who had made and sold cosmetics for over thirty years, had acquired a secondary meaning to its name. Its goods were sold to and identified by the trade as "Lady Esther cosmetics." This case cannot be controlling in the present situation where the plaintiff has acquired no secondary meaning to its name. The Lady Esther case did not turn upon the use of similar names alone. It was a case of similar names plus a secondary meaning attaching to one of them.
The law as laid down in the Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., supra, from which we have heretofore quoted, is amply supported by the United States Supreme Court in Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, 198 U.S. 118, 25 S.Ct. 609, 49 L.Ed. 972. In that case the court stated the question as follows (198 U.S. at page 134, 25 S.Ct. at page 611) :
"Referring to the Remington-Sholes Company, it was unanimously held by the Circuit Court of Appeals: 'We do not find in this voluminous record sufficient evidence that defendant has itself done anything to promote confusion in the minds of the public, except to use the name "Remington" on its machines and in its literature.' Accepting that conclusion, it follows that complainant's case must stand or fall on the possession of the exclusive right to the use of the name 'Remington.' "
After holding that the plaintiff had no exclusive right to the name Remington, the Supreme Court said at pages 137 and 140 of 198 U.S., at page 613 of 25 S.Ct.:
"The principle that one corporation is not entitled to restrain another from using in its corporate title a name to which others have a common right, is sustained by the discussion in Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 14 S.Ct. 151, 37 L.Ed. 1144, and is, we think, necessarily applicable to all names publici juris. Having the right to that use, courts will not interfere where the only confusion, if any, results from a similarity of the names, and not from the manner of the use $ if. # t*
It is not the use of similar names that might lead to confusion, it is the abuse of such similar names injurious to the plaintiff that may be enjoined. Mere confusion of the public in the use of similar names that are publici juris cannot be enjoined by the plaintiff or by any other private individual. For a private party to succeed in a court of equity in enjoining the use of similar names because of confusion to the public, such party would have to show it had suffered some injury not suffered by the public generally. Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 67 U. S. 485, 492, 17 L.Ed. 311; Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10, 50 U.S. 10, 27, 13 L.Ed. 25; The Mayor v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91, 37 U.S. 91, 9 L.Ed. 1012. Public agencies protect the public interest. To entitle a private party to equitable relief, there must be wrong added to incidental confusion in the use of similar names, such as fraud, deception, or palming off, or the name which it has sought to protect must have acquired a secondary meaning. A court of equity will not enjoin the use of a similar name because of the incidental confusion in the use of that name. The plaintiff, a foreign corporation, may not succeed in the Federal courts in preventing the State of Illinois from giving to its domestic corporations such names as it pleases simply because the names are similar and there is a likelihood of confusion. The State of Illinois cannot close the Federal courts to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may not succeed in the Federal courts on a complaint for unfair competition when the defendants have done only what they had a legal right to do, to wit, indicate their intention to use a name that was public property in Illinois.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.