Case Name: Thomas Anderson vs. John W. Baker, George Ernest and Julian Magruder
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1865-11-02
Citations: 23 Md. 531
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas Anderson vs. John W. Baker, George Ernest and Julian Magruder.
Judges: The cause was argued before Eowie, O. J., and Bautol, GoldsboROUGH, CochRan and Weisel, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 531–629

Head Matter:
Thomas Anderson vs. John W. Baker, George Ernest and Julian Magruder.
The Powebs of a Convention of the People of a State, assembled to frame a form of Government, are no where defined. It is the right of the people to alter or abolish, or institute a new Government, “ laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”
The Convention is the depository of the residuary or reserved sovereignty of the people, unlimited except so far as restrained by the Constitution of the United Stales, and the moral law. Whether their action is dependent upon the subsequent ratification of the people or not, is not clearly established; but when ratified and adopted, or acquiesced in, their acts are unquestionable within the limits prescribed.
The Regulation of the Elective Fbanchise, an Unqualified Right of the States. — Among the absolute, unqualified rights of the States, is that of regulating the elective franchise, ft is the foundation of State authority. The most important political function exercised hy the people in their sovereign capacity. Whilst “the right of the people to participate in the Legislature, is the best security of liberty and foundation of all free Government,” yet it is subordinate to the higher power of regulating the qualifications of the electors and the elected.
Citizenship and Right of Suffbage not Insepabable. — Citizenship and suífraee, are hy no means inseparable; the latter is not one of the universal, inalienable rights, with which men are endowed by their Creator, but is altogether conventional.
Suffbage not a Right of Pbopekty, ob Absolute Pebsonal Right.— None of the elementary writers include the right of suffrage among the rights of property or person. It is not an absolute, unqualified, personal right.
The Improper Withholding op the Right op Suffrage by Judges of Election, or Registrars, is damnum absque injuria. — In one sense, if the citizen is a legal yoter, he has the right to Tote, and is injured if deprived of it; but the lawhas appointed a means, whereby his right to vote is decided, and for that purpose has provided judges to determine that questionj and has also provided the most careful guarantees for a proper discharge of duty by the judges, by the mode of their selection and their oaths of office, and if the citizen has had a fair and honest exercise of judgment by a judicial officer in his case, it is all the law entitles him to, “ and although the judgment may be erroneous, and the party injured, it is damnum absque injuria, for which no action lies.”
-Disqualificatonof Voters. — The appellant’s position that the right-of suffrage is an inalienable right of property, if tenable, would render the amendment of the Constitution of 1801, and all subsequent, excluding that class, inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and void. The same power which disqualified free colored men in 1801, enabled the Convention of 1864 to disqualify “ all who had been in armed hostility to the United States.”
Art. 1, sec. 2, and Art. 3, sec. 41 of the Const, of Md., and the Act of 1865, ch. 174, passed in pursuance of its provisions, are not in violation of Art. 1, sec. 10 of the Const, of the U. S., declaring that “no State shall pass any hill of attainder or ex post facto law.”
Powers of Registrars a Police or Political Power. — The power . conferred on the registrars by the Act of Assembly, carrying into execution the provisions of the Constitution, is a policeor political power, closely analagous to that previously committed to the judges of election; a power, on the due exercise of which, the inauguration and succession of the several departments of the Government depend.
The Registration Law (Act of 1865, ch. 174,) not Restrained by the Declaration of Rights. — The Declaration of Rights is a guide to the several departments of Government, in questions of doubt as to the meaning of the Constitution, and “a guard against any'extravagant or undue extension of power,” but dogs not control the Constitution itself, when it is clear and unambiguous. As far then as the Registration Law is a legislative enactment of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th sections of Article 1 of the Constitution, it is not restrained by the Declaration of Rights, because it proceeds from the same authority, that of the Convention.
Bills of Attainder, as they are technically called, are such special acts of legislation, as inflict capital punishments, ( or pains or penalties,) upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.
Ex-Post Facto Laws: Retrospective Laws, when not within the Prohibition of the Const, of the U. S. — “ Ex post facto laws are technical expressions, which include every law which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed. They relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose punishments and forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings which effect private rights retrospectively. Reirospective laws, divesting vested rights, unless “ ex post facto,” do not fall within the prohibition contained in the Constitution of the United States, however repugnant they may be to the principles of sound legislation.
Const, of U. S., 9th and 10th Amendments. Prohibitions 'on the States, are not to be enlarged by Construction; — to do so, would violate the spirit and object of the 9th and 10th amendments to the Constitution of the United Stales, viz: “The enumeration by the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
Ex Post Facto Laws, Further Defined. — The distinctive and obnoxious feature of “ ex post facto” laws, is the exercise of a judicial function by the Legislature, punishing thereby as crimes, acts not before forbidden, or aggravating their punishment.
'The Disqualification of Voters by Art. 1, Const, of 1864, and the Act of 1865, ch. 174, not a Punishment for Crime. — The right of suffrage being the creature of the organic law, may be modified or withdrawn by the sovereign authority which conferred it, without inflicting aiiy punishment on those who are disqualified.
The 4th section of Art. 1 of the Constitution of Maryland, does not declare any act criminal which was not previously so, or add to, alter or change the Criminal Code of the State.
Acts of Assembly not to be pronounced Unconstitutional, except '{.X clear Cases. — To declare an Act of a co-ordinate department of the Government, an unwarrantable assumption, or usurpation of power, because it is a violation of a constitutional prohibition, is an exercise of the judicial oifice of a grave and delicate nature, which never can be warranted but in a clear case. 12 G. ⅜ X, 438.
The presumption must always he in favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated: “it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, — not a doubtful and argumentative implication.” 15 Md. Hep., 476, 477.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery county.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery county, dismissing the petition of the appellant for the writ of mandamus to ’he directed to the appel-lees, officers of registration, commanding them to register his name on the list of registered voters for said county and district wherein he resided. The facts of this case are fully stated in the several opinions filed by the Justices of this Court.
The cause was argued before Eowie, O. J., and Bautol, GoldsboROUGH, CochRan and Weisel, J.
Robert J. Brent and Thos. G. Pratt, for the appellant:
I. The petitioner is entitled to the summary relief of the writ of mandamus.
II. That all those provisions of the registry law, which provide the mode of appointment of the officers of registration, and -which authorize them to determine the qualification of voters, under section 4th of Article 1st of the Constitution, including the test oath, are null and void, and contrary to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of Maryland.
III. That the disqualifying clauses and the test oath of the 4th section of Article 1st of the present Constitution, and the registry law of March 12th, 1865, so far as the latter undertakes to carry out the disqualifications declared by said section 4, are null and void, by- reason of the prohibitions of the Constitution of the United States.
IY. The disqualifying clauses and test oath of section 4th of Article 1st of the Constitution of Maryland, and so much of the registry law of March-24th, 1865, as undertakes to carry the same into effect, are null and void, as being contrary to the fundamental principles of justice and reason, and of American Republican Government.
I. The writ of mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. 3 Blach. Oom., 110. Tapp, on Mand., 64, and cases cited. Runlcel vs. Winemiller, 4 H. & MeH., 429. State, relator McGlellan vs. Graves, 19 Md. Rep., 314. See, also, cases cited in the appellants' argument in Hardesty, et al., vs. Taft, et al., 23 Md. Rep., 512. The petitioner has no means of obtaining his elective franchise except in a proceeding of this character. If he recover damages, that would not give him the franchise; and if the Courts do not sustain proceedings of this character, the elective franchise of the citizens of Maryland will he subject to the uncontrolled caprice of the Executive appointees.
' II. Tlie registry law is in contravention of the Constitution of Maryland.
Sec. 1 of the registry law, authorizes the Governor of the State to appoint “from among the citizens of the State most known for loyalty, firmness and uprightness, three persons for each ward in the city of Baltimore, and for each election district in the several counties of the State, who shall, he styled officers of registration.”
The power to appoint is given to the Governor. It is submitted that this is subject to section 13 of Article 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the Goveinor “shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all civil and military officers of the State, whose appointment or election is not otherwise herein provided for, unless a different mode of appointment be prescribed by the law creating the office.”
The Legislature has not selected “a different mode of appointment,” for it has selected the Governor to appoint, but it has not changed the condition under which the Constitution says the Governor only shall exercise the power of appointment. It follows that the Governor should have nominated these officers to the Senate, which was in session at the passage of the law.
The intent of the Legislature to aggrandize the power of the Governor and his agent, and to make him and them the sole despotic dispensers of the elective franchise, in exclusion of the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Judiciary, and in violation of the Constitutional rights of the citizen, is manifested:
1. By withdrawing from the local constituencies the usual privileges of selecting officers whose functions relate entirely and exclusively to the electoral matters in the respective districts and wards of those constituencies.
2. By conferring on the Governor, for the first time in the history of the State, the unusual power of appointing officers for the wards of the city of Baltimore and the election districts'of the various counties.
3. By removing froto the G-overnor the ordinary restraint of the approval of his appointments by the Senate.
4. By dispensing with the usual and ordinary qualifications, which provides that the residence of every officer shall be in the district, ward or county in which he exercises his functions.
5. By creating, for the first time in the history of Maryland, a new set of officers, called officers of registration, and vesting them with the most despotic powers, including not only the ordinary judicial powers, which belong to officers of election, of determining the usual qualifications of age, color, residence, alienage, &c., but the unusual functions of trying citizens judicially for disloyalty, and if in their judgment the guilt of the citizen be established, then to forfeit his franchise of voting.
The intent thus manifested, is carried out by the registration law, which is claimed to be contrary to the Constitution of Maryland.
It will be seen that the Legislature has conferred on these Executive agents, called “officers of registration,” the power “to enquire into and ascertain if any person has not done any of the acts which are declared in the 3rd, 4th and 5th sections of Article 1, as causes of disqualification; and if the evidence brought to their knowledge shall satisfy them that he is disqualified,” they shall “carefully exclude him, even if he have taken the test oath prescribed by section 4 of Article 1.”
Erom this it appears that the test oath is not intended as a proof of qualification, but is only to be regarded as some-evidence “brought to the knowledge” of the registrars, and is to be passed on by them as other testimony.
The “careful exclusion” from the list of qualified voters, is based upon the conclusion or judgment arrived at by the-registrars, on the evidence “brought to their knowledge after diligent inquiry.” To prosecute this inquiry or trial,, they are invested with the power to attach, arrest and commit citizens of the State, in the same manner as a Judge of a Circuit Court, with this difference, nevertheless, that the registrars, or Executive agents, are not to be troubled with the necessity of informing the citizen of the nature of the charge against, or of confronting him with the witnesses against him, or giving notice of the time of trial, or of making any written record of the trial, or even of the “acts" for which he has been tried; but they must enter in the “seventh column of the books of registration" their judgment, by simply writing, according to section five of the registration Act, the word “disqualified for disloyalty, under the 4th section of Article 1st of the Constitution.”
The registry Act in no manner undertakes to designate what species of evidence shall be had by the registrars in the examination of cases; it only says, “if the evidence brought to their knowledge shall satisfy them," they shall disfranchise the citizen.
When the vast importance of this delegation of disfranchising powers to tiro registrars is considered, it is vital to determine upon wliat evidence they are to proceed.
If “letters, goods, money or information he unlawfully sent within the lines of the enemies of the United States," it is declared, in the 5th exception, to be “an adherence to said enemies,” punishable with disfranchisement. Row as the registrars are required hy the registry law to determine the guilt of the citizen in a case like this, many questions necessarily arise, which must he disposed of before their judgment can be properly rendered. It must be determined “where the lines of the enemy” were at the time of the alleged act. Section 4th of Article 1 does not provide that the “unlawful sending of the money, goods, letters or information" should bo from within the State of Maryland to within the enemy’s lines: on the contrary, such general, terms are used relative to this class'of acts, as well as to all others, except that contained in the 3rd exception, as to preclude the idea that it is or was necessary that any of these acts should have been committed within the jurisdiction of Maryland.
Under the registry law, the registrars are authorized to try the applicant for registration for any acts or words of disloyalty, even if committed in the State of Louisiana; now we know, historically, that the military lines of the opposing armies in the State of Louisiana, changed repeatedly. And as no prolusion is made in the law for, and no general practice has obtained before the registrars of, informing citizens of the nature of any charge against them, nor of the evidence brought against them, the vast range of facts to prove these extra-territorial acts must be gone over ex parte, and if the registrars are “satisfied,” the brief judgment of “disqualified for disloyalty” entered in the seventh column of the “books of registration,” disfranchises forever the citizen, without any information of the nature of the crime of which he has been convicted.
The respondents claim that the State, in its Constitution, has declared the qualifications of voters, excluding disloyal persons, and that the power to exclude the parties falling under the disqualifying clause in the Constitution, is legally vested in the officers of registration.
It has been shown by the Registry Act :
1. That the registrars are mere Executive officers or agents.
2. That they have the power of summoning witnesses to prove the qualification of voters, and they are invested with judicial functions, the same as a Judge of the Circuit Court, for the purpose of issuing summons, attachments and commitments.
3. That they are authorized to pronounce judgment against any citizen, for acts committed within or without the jurisdiction of Maryland, which amounts to a forfeiture of his right to vote.
4. That they are not required to give any notice of the charges to the accused party, or to confront him with witnesses, nor to try him by jury, nor to keep any written record of the trial.
5. That they are only required to record his conviction in these words, “disqualified for disloyalty, under Article 1 of the Constitution.”
6. That the ordinary rules of evidence are disregarded; that the guilt of parties accused of treason and felonies, is permitted to he proved previous to trial and conviction by a competent Court; that a party is required to testify against himself, particularly by section five, wherein the registrars are directed to exact an oath from the citizen to answer any questions touching his right to voting, and this even when his oath may be discredited.
1. That this judgment of the registrars disfranchises the citizen forever, unless discharged by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly.
We now contend, that the Constitution of Maryland has not authorized the Legislature to confer on the registrars these extraordinary judicial functions.
■ Previous to and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1864, there were no such persons as officers of registration known to our laws, and unless the Constitution expressly authorizes the Legislature to confer on officers of registration, the extensive powers granted them in the Registry Act, it cannot be even claimed that the grant is constitutional. Nor can it be claimed that they have the powers of judges of elections, because these offices still exist.
The franchise of voting is property. The right of voting is recognized by law as an inalienable right of property sui generis, and cannot be impugned without injury, for which an action may be brought against the judges of election where no special malice or corruption is shown. Lincoln vs. Ilapgood, 11 Mass., 35. Parlcer vs. Anlteny, el al., 11 Ohio, 312. Ashby vs, While, 2 Ijd. Paym., 953, 956, and 958.
The right of property, in the elective franchise, is also affirmed in the following cases, but it is considered that special malice or corruption should be alleged before exemplary damages are recovered. Wheeler vs. Patterson, 1 N. PL. Pep., 88. Jenkins vs. Waldron, 11 Johns., 114. Bevardvs. Hoffman, 18 Md. Pep., 480.
In addition to this, most of the States, including Maryland, have declared the inviolability of the right of suffrage. It is the badge and symbol of freedom; it is essential to the protection of the citizen, and it belongs of right to every free white male citizen of Maryland, having the required residence and age. Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights. The qualifications which entitle every free white male citizen to vote, are found in Article 1 of the Constitution of 1864. At the time the Convention framed this Article, there was an organized Government in Maryland, formed by citizens, who had rights of property in the elective franchise, in lands, and in other property; and the decisions already quoted, show that the elective franchise is even better protected than ordinary rights of property. The ownership of land and of the elective franchise, stand on precisely the same footing, with the exceptions hereafter explained; even the franchises and privileges of mere corporations were fully protected and secured, and could not be forfeited, except “by due course of law.”
The right of voting and holding office was not a privilege, held at the will of the majority, but was, by the law of the land, an inalienable right of property in him who had the necessary qualifications; and in defence of which, he could maintain an action for damages against any one who obstructed or hindered him, in the same manner that he could maintain an action for injury to his freehold of personal property.
Now, the Constitution of 1804, adopted for the qualifications of voters, the identical qualifications existing at the date of its enactment.
The Legislature, in the Registry Act, have fallen into the grave error of considering the act or crime for which, after convicition, a forfeiture of the elective franchise might be decreed, as constituting the disqualification of a voter, while in fact, it is only the judicial conviction which so operates, Article 1, sec. 1 of the Constitution, clearly recognizes this distinction,
The absolute qualifications imposed upon the citizen of the United States, as essential for the exercise of the right of suffrage, were:
1st. The present and existing qualifications or conditions of color, sex, age, and residence.
2nd. The future and contingent qualification or condition subsequent, contained in the expression, relating entirely to the future, “shall comply with the provisions of the 1st Article of the Constitution.”
Upon the possession of these qualifications, the citizen becomes an absolute owner of the elective franchise, subject to the condition of forfeiture, just as any other right or property can he forfeited. Forfeiture is the enforcement of a condition annexed to every class or description of rights or property which a citizen can own. Life, lands, liberty, the right of voting and of holding office, are all subject to forfeiture, but this forfeiture, in this country, can only he enforced in due course of law, after trial and rendition of judgment. This elective franchise cannot ho lost, except by due course of law. Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill, 140, et seq., Bbonsox, J., 146, and reaffirmed in 24 How. Pr. Hep., 152. See, also, Harris vs. Harcleman, 14 How., 334. Slarbuck vs. Murray, 5 Wend., 151. Jackson vs, Golden, 4 Goto., 281.
It is alleged that the Legislature derived its power from the Constitution.
In order that the Courts may construe the Constitution, as authorizing the violation of almost every right secured to the citizen, it is necessary that the words of the Constitution he clear and unequivocal.
If the powers granted to the registrars by the Legislature can stand, the great sub-division of the State Government into Legislative, Judicial and Executive Departments, is broken down; and Articles 4, 1, 8, 19, 20, 21 and 22, and particularly Art. 23 of the Bill of Rights of 1864, and sec. 1 of Art. 4 of tbo Constitution, clash with and are virtually repealed by sec. 4 of Art. 1.
A different construction would assiime that the Constitution intended to disfranchise the citizens of the State before trial and conviction; for it must he home in mind, that all these provisions in sec. 4, relative to “disloyalty,” are intended solely to apply to citizens, who have the constitutional qualification of voters; for if they he aliens, they would he already disqualified; and hence, all these provisions of sec. 4, deprive of or forfeit an acknowledged and pre-existing right of ^suffrage. • Now this right of suffrage cannot he lost unless the party he guilty of disloyalty; and the only proof of the guilt of the party is conviction and judgment rendered in due course of law. A citizen cannot he punished, unless found guilty of some act forbidden "by law, and no tribunal,on the earth, can declare otherwise. It would he a hill of attainder, or of pains and penalties, which latter is included under the description of the bill ■of attainder, as used in the Federal Constitution, (see Smith’s Commentaries on Statute and Constitutional Law, sec. 230,) and it would possess features more obnoxious than a hill of attainder by the English Parliament, which always includes the names of the parties attainted, who are thus presumed in law to have had a species of trial before the Parliament. But the hill of attainder, which would result from the construction the Legislature has placed on the Constitution, is of this nature, that it attaints citizens in blank, and then institutes an executive commission to fill the blank with names, and thus to enforce its jjains and penalties, without the intervention of any judicial authority.
“In the due course of law,” no punishment or forfeiture can he enforced against a party until after the judgment of the Court. A conviction does not work any disability. 4 Blade’s Com., 381, 382. 3 Kent’s Com., 12, 13.
Section 4 of Article 1, after declaring that no persons, who'have done the enumerated disloyal acts, shall ever vote— meaning, as we contend, after conviction, — goes on to say, “and it shall he the duty of all officers of registration and judges of election, carefully to exclude from yoting or being registered, all persons so, as above disqualified. * * * * And it shall be the duty of the proper officers of registration to allow no person to be registered until he shall have taken the oath or affirmation above set out. ’ ’ This is the first and only mention of “the officers of registration" in the Constitution. Section 41 of Article 3, confers on the Legislature the power “to make effective the provisions of the Constitution, disfranchising certain persons, or disqualifying them from holding office." This last section confers; no additional power on the Legislature, as without it, it could have passed laws to make effective any constitutional provision. Hence, the whole claim to the vast power which has just established an oligarchy in the State, rests upon the constitutional provision, that the “officer of registration and judges of election, shall carefully exclude from voting.or being registered, all persons so'as above disqualified." Under this clause, two-thirds of the citizens of the State have been disqualified.
A careful examination of section 4, shows that the officers of registration have no power to take any testimony, except to ascertain the forfeiture of the elective franchise by conviction of some crime or treason, or by reason of insanity; and if they do not find that the citizen is so disqualified by conviction, he is required to register him upon taking the test oath; and the section of the Registry Act, which authorizes the registrars to administer an additional oath to answer all questions, is clearly unconstitutional.
• Nor can it be claimed that the trial by the registrars is a trial by a competent tribunal; for it had been decided in New York, that the dué course of the law means a trial by a Court of Justice, known to the common law, and having a jury; and that where the Legislature provided a different tribunal, and authorized it to try, that it was a mockery of the constitutional provisions, and its action null and void. See the case of Wynehamer vs. People, 3 Kenan, 378.
In conclusion of this branch of the subject, it is asserted broadly, that it is not in the power of the Constitution to divest a citizen of his right of voting for alleged crime, without ascertaining the criminality by means of a trial in due course of law, and that, where the State of Massachusetts, undertook to do this in 1*7’79, in the midst of the Revolution, and when the Legislature represented the entire sovereignty of tho people, unrestrained by State or Federal Constitution, its highest Courts have decided that it was not competent to commit so great a wrong. The particular principle desired at present to be drawn from the following case, is, that no Court will, if possible to avoid it, so construe the Constitution of Maryland, as undertaking to violate the first principles of justice, or to do a vain thing. Kilham vs. Wood, et al., 2 Mass., 236.
The change in Government cannot divest rights. Bodge vs. Woolsey, 18 Sow., 360. The test oath must be declared void. Either Arts. 7, 17, 19, 22 and 23, of the Bill of Rights of 1864, and the great constitutional guaranties of personal security, dependent on them, must be disregarded as nullities, or the test oath of section 4 of Art. 1 must be declared void.
The clash and conflict is obvious, and one or the other must be overthrown. The oath violates the great provision that no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case. ■ To concede a man a right, and then say he shall not enjoy it, unless he yields up his constitutional rights, is equivalent to destroying it. Bespub-lica vs. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, 429. Winehamer vs. People, S Kernan, 378, et seq. Green vs.. Briggs, 1 Curtis, 411.
These cases fully establish that the test oath of section 4, applicable to voters, is in opposition to the great and cardinal principles of Constitutional Government; and in order to sustain the oath, the Court must be prepared to admit:
1st. That it is constitutional to make a citizen of Maryland bear testimony against himself.
2nd. That if he refuses so to do, then his refusal will, ipso facto, confiscate his elective franchise.
3rd. That the retroactive portions of the oath áre good, notwithstanding Article 17 of the Bill of Rights, and kindred principles.
The Act of 1865, ch. 174, for the registration of voters, is a nullity to all intents and purposes. In making this objection, we rely on the Constitution of Maryland of 1864, Article 3, section 28.
In the Act of 1865, ch. 174, for the registration of voters, we find no reference to the Code, hy articles and sections, either in the title or the hody of the Act, hut it stands on its face precisely in all respects like an Act passed before the adoption of the Code. This important Act is therefore unsupported even hy precedents, while it ignores the stringent requirements of both the Constitutions of 1851 and 1864. That these requirements are vital and touch the validity of the Act, is clearly shown hy the case of Davis vs. State, 7 Md. Rep., 159.
III. The disqualifications, including the test oath, declared hy section 4 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Mary-t land, adopted in 1864, and the provisions of the registration Act of March 24, 1865, enforcing such disqualification and test oath, are violations of section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, declaring that “no State shall pass any hill of attainder or ex post facto law.” The United States’ Constitution is supreme where it applies. Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 How., 347.
What is an ex post facto law ? In Colder vs. Bull, 3 Dali., 386, Mr. Justice Chase treats this question of constitutional law at length, and defines ex post facto laws as follows:
“I will state what laws. I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and intent of the prohibition, (of the Constitution of the United States.)
1. “Every law that makes an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2. ‘ ‘Every law that aggravates a crime, and mates it greater than when committed.
3. “Every law that changes a punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime.
4. “Every law that alters the rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.”
■ This case has been the basis and foundation of the construction of ex post facto laws, and has been followed in all the States, and is reaffirmed in Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Granch, 8T; Watson vs. Mercer, 8 Pet., 88; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 421; Carpenter, et al., vs. Commonwealth, &c., IT How., 463.
In Watson vs. Mercer, 8 Pet., 110, the Supreme Court of the United States declares that to he an ex post facto law “which punishes a party for acts antecedently done, which were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the extent or in the manner prescribed.”
What is an ex post facto law is shown in 3 Mad. Papers, 1399, 1450,15T9, by which Blacestone’s definition is adopted and approved, as stated in Hill vs. Tucker, 13 How., 463. Blackstom, in enumerating the punishment in criminal cases, speaks of forfeiture of property, or personal disabilities to hold office, &c., as part of the punishment, hut remarks, it is the glory of the English law that all these punishments are prefixed by law. 4 Blackstone, 3TT. See, also, 4 Kent, 451.
Section IT of the present Bill of Rights of 'Maryland, which is copied from the first Bill of Rights, is in the same terms. See, also, 3 Story on Const., sec. 1339. ,
The disqualifying acts and words mentioned in the Constitution, of 1864, are all, by the force of the language used, retrospective, and so are the acts and words enumerated in the test oath. In fact the Constitutional Convention voted down, by twelve yeas to forty-eight noes, a proposition to make the disqualification prospective, beginning on the 1st day of January 1865.
We contend that the Constitution of 1864, by its disqualifying clauses and test oath, makes acts done and words uttered before their enforcement, and which were not punishable when done or uttered, criminal, and punishes such acts and words. What law of Maryland forbade or punished treason against the United States? No such law was in existence at that time; nor is there such a law in existence now; nor is it competent for the State to enact such a law.
The Government of the United States has passed statutes punishing the crimes of treason, misprision of treason, sedition, conspiracy, .correspondence with foreign or rebel Governments, or their agents, and enlisting soldiers against the United States. U. S. Statutes, 30th April 1700; 30th June 1799; 31st July 1861; 6th August 1861; 17th July 1862; 25th February 1863. These statutes cover all the offences and-provide all the punishments which the United States has deemed proper to declare, and no such punishment as the forfeiture of the elective franchise is declared.
The Constitution of Maryland has undertaken to assist the United States in the punishment of offenders against its' laws, and have added ex post facto disfranchisement to all the offences punished by those statutes; and has even gone-beyond them, and declared acts, and even words, offences against the United States, which that sovereign and paramount Government has never undertaken to punish. The State of Maryland has no statute providing for offences against the United States; its only law on the subject is the Statute of 1862, ch. 235, which provides for the punishment of treason against the State, and disloyal offences. Hence we claim that the disfranchisement of citizens and the exaction of the test oath are ex post facto laws, and as such null and void.
As to the oath, see the cases above quoted, in 3 Teates and 3 Kernan. In addition, we claim that the disfranchising clauses and test oath are necessarily nullities, because the State of Maryland has nothing to do with treason against the United States, the exclusive power and control over ■which is vested in the United States. The People vs. Lynch, 11 Johns., 549. Rawle on Const., 140, 141. Sergeant on Const., 371, 372. 3 Story on Const., sec. 1296.
Section 4 of Art. 1 of the Constitution and the registry law, are in the nature of a hill of attainder, which includes also hills of pains and penalties. Smith’s Com. on Statute Laws, sec. 230. And see on this point, 16 How., 385, which calls the Federal Constitution a Bill of Rights to the people of the States. Also see No. 44 of Federalist.
In forbidding hills of attainders and of pains and penalties, it was the intention of the Federal Constitution to carefully guard the citizen from the loss of any right or property, except by and through the judgment of the ordinary judicial tribunals; hut this intention will he defeated, if the Constitution of Maryland he held valid to declare that, without trial and conviction, certain classes of persons he disfranchised and disqualified, and then to provide a special tribunal, not exercising the usual judicial functions, for ascertaining the names of the parties.
One of the qualities of attainder is to deprive the party of the functions of other citizens. ■ 4 BlacJcstone, 38. We claim that disfranchisement of the majority of the citizens of Maryland, by the Registry Act, without the agency of the Judicial Department, is an enormous and oppressive hill of attainder, and of pains and penalties, and is .therefore inconsistent and void.
IY. The retroactive disfranchising clauses and test oath of section 4, Article 1, of the Maryland Constitution of 1864, and the Registry A.ct of Márclr 24th, 1865, are null and void, as contrary to the principles of common and fundamental right, and Constitutional law.
It is well known that, in the theory of the English Government, the Parliament is supreme and imperial, exercising every power of Government absolutely and without restraint. Yet the Judiciary of England never has permitted the enforcement of any law of Parliament, contrary to the fundamental principles of English justice.' Bonham’s ease, 8 Colee, 118. Day vs. Savage, Hob. Rep., 87. London vs. Wood, 12 Mod. Rep., 687. 1 Rl. Corn., 91.
“It is against the principles of liberty and common right to deprive a man of his property or franchise, while he is within the pale of the Constitution, with his hand on the altar, without a hearing and trial by due course of law.” Brown vs. Hummel, 6 Barr, 86.
The power of the Courts to declare laws void, when against common reason, has been much discussed. Can the Legislature give the property of A. to B., or make a man a judge in his own case, or make criminal an act lawful when done?
Whatever may be the decisions of other States, on the powers of the Courts to nullify legislative Acts, because they are contrary to common right and natural justice, in Maryland the question is not open, and the power of the Court is affirmed in the broadest terms. The Regents, &e., vs. Williams, 9 Q. & J., 408. Harris vs. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. Dec., 61. Wright vs. Wright’s Lessee, 2 Md. Rep., 452. The same principles are declared in Smith’s Com. on Stat. & Const. Law, sec. 149, dec.- Colder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas, 388. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 135. Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns., 5013. Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill, 147. Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters, 657. Wynehamer vs. People, dec., 3 Hernán, 378. Borman vs. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252.
The principle of evidence has been changed by the provisions of the law which permit the registrars to be satisfied with the guilt of a party without proof of his conviction. The identical question is presented, when the competency of a witness is to be settled. His infamy must be proved by the record; and even his admission, under oath, of his conviction, does not disqualify him; for the only proof of a man’s guilt, is the production of the record of conviction. The People, &c., vs. Herrick, 13 Johns., 84. Hilton vs. Colson, 13 Johns., 182. Cushman vs. Loker, 2 Mass., 108. 1 Greenlf. on Evidence, sec. 372.
As to the judgment to be rendered, we do not seek in this case to control the discretion of a judicial officer, this cannot he done. The pleadings show that the respondents rely, as the basis of action, on their right “then and there to decide upon the claims of the.relator to vote,” because of his refusal to take the test oath. This shows that they considered they had the right to require the oath, and to decide in the manner provided by the Registry Act, the validity of which they avow. We insist that no such powers are possessed by them, that they have the power to register a free white male citizen, with the constitutional residence, that this is their only power, and we ask that they he ordered to proceed and act upon his application for registry, without requiring the test oath to he taken, and without proceeding to “inquire into and ascertain, as provided by the Registry Act, whether he has committed any act stated in sections 3, 4 and 5, of Article 1, as a cause of disqualification, unless there has been a previous trial and conviction in a Court of competent jurisdiction. If, in the judgment of the respondents, he he not a free white male citizen and resident, as required by law, or if he he disfranchised by reason of a conviction in due course of law, then he is not entitled to registry; but we ask the Court to instruct the registrars that the registry law, in certain of its provisions, is a nullity,.and that they must proceed to investigate and decide upon the right of the petitioner to he registered, without enforcing these null and void provisions. We do not ask that they be required to register the petitioner, but that, disregarding the excuses and pleas they set up, derived from a law void in most of its provisions, they proceed to act upon the application for registry, confining themselves to the legal provisions and features of the Act. It is a ministerial duty to proceed and investigate the case, and it is this ministerial duty we ask this Court to instruct the respondents to proceed to execute, disregarding the invalid oath and other conditions insisted on in their answer, affirming the validity of the Registry Law of 1865. If the officer to be coerced has any discretion, he is not to be affected or controlled by mandamus, which only goes to ministerial officers to do a plain duty. Green vs. Purnell, 12 Md. Rep., 329.
But even when it is held that the officer has a discretion, and refuses to exercise it, the mandamus will go to put his discretion in motion. The Court lias a right, by mandamus, to compel the exercise of a lawful discretion, and to set it in motion. See 19 Johns., 261.
The comprehensive and efficacious nature of the writ of mandamus, and its applicability to a case like the present, is fully shown in Kunkel vs. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH., 429. Harwood vs. Marshall, 9 Md. Rep., 91, &c. Hull vs. Supervisor of Oneida, 19 Johns., 261. The King vs. Justices of Kent, 14 East., 395. The People, &c.} vs. Supervisors of New YorJc, 21 Koto., 321. The People, dec., vs. Supervisors of Goriland, 24 How., 120. Bacon Abr., Mandamus, 491, 501, 503.
When there is no other legal remedy, mandamus will lie. This,.Court may either quash the return at once, or have the cause set down for argument. The King vs. St. Katharine Dock Go., 4 Barn. & Adol., 363.
The case of Bevardvs. Hoffman, 18 Md. Rep., 419, shows that the petitioner lias no right of action against the respondents, because he alleges no special malice or corruption, and hence, unless the writ of mandamus lies, he has no remedy. ' See case in 4 Barn. & Adol., 363. The People vs. Supervisors, 10 Wend., 316.
The other remedy must be a legal and not an equitable remedy, nor does the fact that the party refusing is liable to criminal prosecution, destroy the remedy by mandamus. The People, éc., vs. Mayor of New York, 10 Wend., 398.
A. Randall, Atty. Geni., andi?. M. Williams, for the ap-pellees :
The appellees will contend, that the Court below correctly refused to quash and set aside the answers and returns of the defendants, aud dismissed the petition of the petitioner, for the following reasons assigned therein :
I. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this petition.
1st. The political department of the Government of the State of Maryland, having determined that the Constitution was ratified by the people of this State, that decision cannot he inquired into by any judicial proceedings in this State; the judicial power of the State adopts and follows the decisions of the political department on that subject. Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard’s Bep., 37 to 40, (N. /S'.) Miles vs. Bradford, 22 Md. Bep., 170.
2nd. Because the Courts of this State, having necessarily by their organization, and by the execution of the powers conferred on them by the State Constitution, assumed its validity and obligation upon themselves and the people of this State, the 'Courts of the United States will adopt and follow these decisions of the Courts of the State in-questions concerning the Constitution and Laws of the State, and refuse to entertain any proceeding calling them in question. Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard’s Bep., 40, 54. (N. 8.) Miles vs, Bradford, 22 Md, Bep., 170.
3rd. Because the right of suffrage in the States belongs exclusively to themselves, and is restricted and regulated as the people thereof may therein prescribe, with which the Courts of 'the United States have nothing to do; and so •far as the Constitution of the United States has provided for any emergency of this hind, and authorized the General Government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, it has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department, and not in the Courts. Spragins vs. Houghton, 2 Scammon (III.,) 395. 2 Story on Const., 59, 61, 62, 66, secs. 58Í, 582, 583, 585. As to “ JEx post facto laws, see, Mayor & C. C. of Balto., vs. Police Commrs., 15 Md. Bep., 459. Smith’s Com. on Stat., 366, sec. 231, page 370, sec. 234. Marshall on Const., 147, 512. 1 Kent’s Com., 408# 409. Bawleon Const., 146. 3 Story’s Com., 212, seo. 1339. Baugher vs. Nelson, 9 Gill, 306. As to bills of attainder, see, Smith’s Oom., 365, sec. 230. 3 Story’s Com., 210, sec. 1338. As to guarantee of Republican form of Government, see, 3 Story’s Oom., 679, sec. 1807, &c. 7 Howard, 1. 2 Gurtis’ Hist, of Const, of U. S., 471, 472. Davis vs. State, 7 Md. Rep., 158. Keller vs. State, 11 Md. Rep., 525. ParJcinson vs. State, 14 Md. Rep., 184.
4th. Because the Constitution and Laws of the State of Maryland, have conferred upon these respondents and their colleagues, special powers and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of the registration of voters as aforesaid, and no Court of this State has any jurisdiction by mandamus, to control or direct these respondents in the discharge of their official duties. Luther vs. Borden, 7 Hoto., 45. Savage Man. Go., vs. Owens, 3 Gill, 497. Thomas, vs. Owings, 4 Md. Rep., 189.
5th. Because, by the eighth Article of the Declaration of Rights, it is declared that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government, ought to be for ever separate and distmet from each other, and no person exercising the functions of one of the said departments, shall assume or discharge the duties of any other,' — and the issuing of this nandamus, according to the prayer of the petitioner, would unite and combine powers so declared to be forever separate md distinct; and in fact, make this Court the sole officer of registration, and the exclusive judge of elections. Miles vs. Bradford, 22 Md. Rep., 170.
II. According to the settled authorities in this State and the United States, if this Court had jurisdiction, the petitioner has not made out such a case as will authorize this Court to grant him the mandamus prayed for in his petition.
1st. Because by law, there is a specific and adequate remedy for the supposed grievance of the petitioner; and he is not without redress in the premises, if he have any legal cause of complaint. 4th sec. of 1st Art. .of Md. Const, of 1864. Act 1865, ch. 174, sec. 20. 76 Law Lib., 25. Tapping, 10. Rex vs. BJc. of England,, 2 Doug., 526.
2nd. Because this Court cannot act by mandamus, directly upon these respondents and their colleague, requiring them to do any official act, -which by the Constitution and Law is submitted to their judgment and discretion, as officers of the registration of voters, or in any manner control or guide their judgment and discretion, in the ordinary discharge of their official duty. Watldns vs. Watldns, 2 Md. Rep., 356. Thomas vs. Owens, 4 Md. Rep., 189. Green vs. Purnell, 12 Md. Rep., 329. State vs. Graves, 19 Md. Rep., 352. Evan’s Prac., 510, 511, note. Braslders vs. Mason, 6 Sow., 102. Luther vs. Borden, 7 Sow., 44. Tapping on Mand., 13. Evan’s Prac:, 410. Act of 1837, ch. 333.
3rd. Because the issuing of a mandamus by the Court, is a summary exercise of high judicial discretion, even where the power so to do is conceded; and will be exercised only in cases of necessity, and with caution and prudent reluctance; and when a case is of doubtful necessity, or its probable effects upon the community of a questionable character, the case does not present those'conditions prescribed by the authorities, to entitle it to this writ. Rut when, as in the present case, to grant this writ would be assuming a power never before exercised on a subject of vital constitutional interest to the people of the entire State, and at a time of great public excitement, by which writ the sworn officers of the State, may be required to violate their oaths if they obey its command, — this Court will not hesitate to exercise that discretion it always has in such cases, to refuse to grant the mandamus, and to leave the petitioner to his remedy, with which the law has provided him. Tapping on Mand., 5, 13, 15 and 1 'l, margin. State vs. Graves, 19 Md. Rep., 374. Tapping on Mand., 13 and 15. Evan’s Prac.-, 410.
4th. Because the petitioner predicates his right to this writ of mandamus, upon the ground, that the first Article of the Constitution of Maryland, and the Act of 1865, ch. 174, are nullities, and of no binding effect in the Courts of 'Law or elsewhere; and yet, hy the prayer of the petition, he prays that this Court,, hy mandamus, to he directed to these respondents, will command these respondents to execute these nullities and law of no binding effect; and that too, in violation of their provisions. Tapping on, Mand., 189, Id., 15.
III. The petitioner having alleged various facts on which he places his right to citizenship, and to he registered as a legal voter, and the two respondents, Baher and Ernest, having denied any knowledge of these lacts, and of the petitioner’s right to citizenship, and to be registered, and requiring the petitioner to prove the same, and the caso being submitted without replication or proof, there is an entire absence of any evidence in the record of the petitioner’s right to he registered as a legal voter, and therefore, under no circumstances could the prayer of his petition to he registered he granted by the Court. I Hoio., 44.
Severdy Johnson, for the appellant in reply :
The importance of the questions 1 am about to discuss, cannot he overstated. They admit of no exaggeration. They involve the validity of the Constitution of the State in certain particulars, and the validity of the Act of 1865, professedly passed in pursuance of that Constitution. I shall endeavor to satisfy your Honors, that they are both invalid. I deny their constitutionality, because of the Constitution of the United States, which limits the powers of the States, and, because of their inconsistence with the rest of the Constitution of the State, and the fundamental principles upon which political liberty rests.
The tenth section of the first Article of the Constitution of the United States, contains a limitation upon the power of the States in the particulars stated in that section, or rather, to speak more correctly, not only contains a limitation, hut an actual prohibition upon powers which were before vested in the people of Maryland, as well as the people of the other States. When that Consti tution was adopted, Maryland was one of the States connected in a Union, such as it was, hy force of the Articles of Confederation. Experience had demonstrated that they were inadequate to achieve the powers which an enlightened and free people should he anxious to achieve — prosperity and national renown, the security of private property, and the security of political rights. And when she became a member of the Union, her people in Convention adopting the Constitution of the United States, they are not to he considered only as delegating to the Government formed hy that Constitution, the powers which that Government was authorized to exercise, hut they are supposed. to have consented to abandon, during all future time, the rights which they' had antecedently to pass ex post facto laws, to pass hills of attainder, to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, to emit hills of credit, to coin money, or to make anything that they- might think proper, a tender in payment of debts.
And now, I suppose, my brothers will hardly deny that if Maryland, with a Constitution formed, a Government organized, as it existed in 1789, would have no authority to legislate at all, to interfere in any way whatever, so as to bring about any of the acts against which the section of the Constitution of the United States, to which I have alluded, was aimed; that she can get no such right hy resolving herself into her original elements, destroying the Constitution which she had in 1789, and forming another. If that could he done, one of two things would either he the result — that she would he out of the Union, and, of course, not responsible to the Constitution, or in the Union, and equally without responsibility to the section in question. The prohibition, on the contrary, was a prohibition upon the people of the States as they then existed, to remain forever as a restraint vital to the interests of all as well as of each, as long as the Union of States shall endure. Whether, therefore, State legislation against the prohibitions of that Article was attempted by a Legislature organized under the form of Government existing in Mary land in 3 789, or attempted nnder any other form, that Maryland might think proper thereafter to adopt — it falls equally within the prohibition, and, if within the prohibition, it was void — not voidable, but void. I had occasion a few days since, to refer your Honors to the 44th No. of the Federalist, written by Mr. Madison, in which he tells us that, although such legislation is void by the Article prohibitory on the powers of the States, and should be considered as void upon principle in every Republican Government, as inconsistent with its objects, because incompatible with the continued existence of political freedom, and it was deemed necessary to adopt that section as a part of the Constitution, that it might remain through all time as a bulwark, around which the people of each State could gather, and hold up any one of them which might he injured — that bulwark as a defence against any attempt to interfere with rights secured as against such legislation by the section. ■ And how was it to be restrained practically? Who was to decide conclusively that a State had passed, in Convention or by Legislature, an ex post facto law — a hill of attainder, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts? Hot the State. Hot the people constituting the-State. The great men of 1789, in the first session of Congress after the Constitution was adopted, passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, in which to make that protection secure as against all hazard, they provided that when, in any State Court, the existing law shall he assailed upon the ground that it conflicted with the Constitution of the Hnited States, and such Court decided that it did not, the party against whom the decision was pronounced, was to have a right to take it to the Supreme Court of the United States, and their decision, once pronounced, was to be conclusive. As these questions, in the first instance, might frequently be brought in the State Courts, they directed that each Judge of every State Tribunal should take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and each judiciary therefore became as much hound to regard the prohibitions upon State power, found in the Constitution, as the Supreme Court itself was hound to see that such prohibitions were not set aside by such State power/
.If, then, the people of Maryland in 1864, when this Constitution was adopted, were subject to that restraint, can it be denied that they were equally subject to it when the Constitution was adopted — that they are subject to it now, and must remain subject to it as long as they constitute a State of the Union, and the Constitution of the United States exists ? The question therefore is: Has or has not Maryland, in the provisions of her present Constitution, violated the Constitution of the United. States? Has she entered upon a sphere of legislation denied to her by her own consent, and denied because, in the judgment of the men of that day, such denial was absolutely necessary to make them what they should desire to be — not only prosperous, but a prosperous because a free people.
The States being antecedently sovereign, and the question being, how far that sovereignty was affected by the Constitution of the United States, and that question depending upon the manner in which the Constitution of the United States had been'adopted, whether by the people, in one sense, in the aggregate, or by the. States individually, making it a contract as contradistinguished from a government ; whether they had a right, when they thought proper to exert it, to abandon the compact — to retire from the league and to stand upon that antecedent, absolute sovereignty — was a question about which, although there were differences of opinion in the States that did attempt to exert it, the prevailing opinion was that the right existed. The men who have grown ujd since 1789, and who now, for the most part, constitute the people of the South, if not entirely, who were those engaged in the war, had grown up under the teachings of Jefferson — recognized the world over as the apostle of human freedom — and they had considered those teachings to mean that each State had a right to decide for herself, and conclusively, whether she should or should not remain in the Union. They had received the doctrine from their fathers, and, above all, they considered it as conclusively established, by the authority of the man to -whom the people of the United States and the world are indebted for the Declaration of Rights of 1 *1*16, (erroneously as I think,) and now as is almost universally admitted,' — a blessed result, which in some measure atones for the misery which the war has brought upon us, South and North, — to have been erroneous.
Let me ask the Court’s attention to what the Constitution is, taken by itself, and what the Act of 1865 is, as compared with the authority conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution. It was adopted at a period of political excitement, not calculated at any time, whatever may be its course, to give reason fair play, and make the obligations imposed by fundamental principles of civil liberty and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States have their proper influence, and still less calculated because of the cause of the excitement. I am willing to concede that that Convention was governed by what they considered patriotic motives, but it had become embittered against those who held opinions contrary to their own in relation to the rebellion, and were rendered more or less incompetent to submit to the restraints which the Constitution of the United States imposed upon them. They desired, and are entitled to credit for so desiring, to maintain the Government of the United States. They thought it was in imminent peril, and they endeavored, as they thought successfully, to obviate that peril by including certain classes of people, not from participation in the government then of the State, but from participation at any time thereafter. They were not willing to trust to the oath of allegiance — dealing with the present and the future. They sought to exclude all men who at, any time, from the beginning of the world to the present day, had spoken or written or acted in any of the particulars found in the clause in the Constitution in question. Had they the authority to do it? Certainly not, if they Rave, in doing it, violated the Constitution of the United States. We say they have violated it in two particulars: that the provision is virtually a hill of attainder and an ex post facto, law. If any one of the voters whose name has been rejected hy the registrars, because of his having done any of the prohibited acts in that clause of the Constitution, had been indicted and tried, he could not have been convicted. Is it not, in point of fact, punishment? If the right to participate in the government of the State is vital to the continuance of liberty — if the right to hold office under the State is a valuable right — to be deprived of either, no matter how accomplished, is to be punished.
What is an ex post facto law ? As simply defined by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Fletcher vs. Peclc, 6 Granch, it is any law that mates that punishable which was not punishable before, or which enhances the punishment when a milder punishment existed alone before, or which materially changes the evidence by which the party is to be tried for the crime. The object is to deny to the Legislature the authority at all to interfere in any case which has already existed, to confine them prospectively to the punishment of crimes and their definitions.
In the Act of 1865, the first section provides that the Grov-ernor shall appoint, from the citizens of the State, men known for loyalty, firmness and uprightness, to carry out the provisions of the law. I suppose he has done so, but from the manner in which I have heard the duties aré discharged by a great many of them, I should hope that he had been able to appoint men of more firmness, more loyalty, and more uprightness.
I don’t know that your Honors have been subjected to the moral torture of answering the questions that the registrars are authorized to ask, and been asked whether you had served a term in' the penitentiary or not, (I was;) whether you had been convicted of bribery; any and every question these inquisitors might think proper, in the exercise of their inquisitorial power, to propound to the applicant for regis tration. Suppose the applicant refuses to answer, our own Constitution says: “No man shall he permitted to crimi-nate himself.” The law says, standing upon principles more elevated than any constitutional provision: “No man shall he called upon to degrade himself,” Yet if he fails to answer whether he has been convicted or not of any infamous crime; whether, if he has been convicted, his term of punishment has expired or not, or whether he has been pardoned, he cannot vote. If this is not an infliction of punishment, I am at a loss to imagine what punishment is. Is the petitioner entitled to redress ? It is denied — first, upon the ground that what has been done was the legitimate act, as far as power was concerned, of the political department of the Government; second, that whether so or not, the law reposes a discretion in these registrars which cannot he interfered with by mandamus. What did Luther vs. Borden decide? At that time there were two parties in Rhode Island, each the friends of a different Constitution. There were two Constitutions. Which was the legitimate one? The Court said that was not a judicial question, as it clearly was not. As Rhode Island had decided for herself which was the G overnment, and Congress had accepted her Senators and Representatives, that was conclusive upon the judicial department of the Government. But that is not this question. We are not denying that the Constitution of 1864 is now the Constitution of Maryland. But we do deny that these particular provisions in the Constitution, as well as the particular provisions in the Act of 1865, are provisions which constitute any part of .the Constitution and the law, because when each was adopted there stood, and now stands, in the Constitution of the United States, a positive prohibition against the exercise of any such power, whether by the people in Convention or by Legislature, under any Constitution which that people may have adopted. The question before your Honors is one purely of constitutional law. Does the Constitution of the United States prohibit the enactment by the Legislature of the Act of 1865? If it does, then there was no power at all. Nor do we question the right of Maryland to call for a registration of voters. My brother seems to suppose the case before you falls within the decision pronounced upon the Act of 1837, a registry law peculiar to the city of Baltimore. But there was nothing in that law which it was not within the power of the Legislature to legislate upon. The only doubt about the validity of that law was that it was local in its operation. It placed the voter in Baltimore upon a different footing from the voter in the rest of the State, and was therefore supposed to be obnoxious to some particular principle in the State Constitution.
If the registrars have no discretion because they have no authority to impose this oath, because of the' restraints of the Constitution of the United States, their obligation is to register, notwithstanding the failure to take the oath. Wherever there is a right for which there is no specific legal remedy except by mandamus, then that remedy is open to the party.

Opinion:
Bartol, J.,
dissented, and filed the following opinion:
The first question presented by the record in this case is, whether the provisions contained in the fourth section of the first Article of our State Constitution are in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States ?
Before proceeding to examine that question, it is necessary to determine whether it is one which this Court has the jurisdiction and power to decide. Looking to the structure and organization of our Government, and to the whole current of authorities, this point seems to me to be free from all possible doubt or difficulty.
The cases that have heretofore arisen, involving the constitutionality of Acts of Congress, or laws of a State, have been decided upon principles and reasons too firmly established to be now disturbed, and are plainly applicable.. See Kent's Commentaries, vol. 1, 449 to 454, where the cases are collected. On page 453, the author says: "In Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, the subject was brought under the consideration of the Supreme Court of the United States, and received a clear and elaborate discussion'. The power and duty of the judiciary to disregard an unconstitutional Act of Congress, or of any State Legislature, were declared in an argument approaching to the precision and certainty of a mathematical demonstration."
The principles established by that groat case, have been ever since universally recognized and adopted.
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule; if two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each; so if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the Constitution and the law apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 1 Cranch, 177.
How it requires no argument to show that the same principle must govern Courts of Justice, when they are compelled to decide whether anj*- provision in a State Constitution is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. This last being the paramount law, if they are repugnant to each other, must prevail. This, in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, is "emphatically a judicial question," to be decided by the Courtsit cannot in any sense be called a political question, to be finally determined by the Legislative or Executive Department. Uor is it concluded by the adoption of the Constitution, and the organization under it of the State Gfovernment. So to maintain would render nugatory and worthless the limitations upon the powers of the States found in the Constitution of the United States. Those limitations are imposed, not only upon the State Legislatures, but upon the States themselves, and can no more be transcended or violated by tbe organic law of a State, tban by a law enacted by tbe Legislature.
To illustrate this, let us suppose that a State were to adopt a Constitution, containing a clause repealing a private charter, or impairing tbe obligation of any other valid and subsisting contract made either by tbe State, or between its citizens; would it be for a moment contended, that such a provision would be valid, in the face of tbe express prohibition contained in tbe Constitution of tbe United States, declaring that no State shall pass any law impairing tbe obligation of a contract. Tbis point was expressly decided by the Supreme Court in Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 Sow., 331. Tbe same principle must apply'where tbe case is within any of tbe other inhibitions upon State legislation, contained in the Constitution of the. United States. That Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 10, declares that "no State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." The only part of this section which can apply to the present •case, is that which inhibits the passage'of any ex post fac-to law. Are the provisions of the 4th section of the 1st Article of the State Constitution ex post facto, in the sense in which those words are used in the Constitution of the United States ?
This is a most grave and important question, none more so, has ever been presented to the Appellate Court of our State for decision. I have given it as full and careful examination as it has been in my power, and shall proceed to express my opinion upon it, adopting as my guide, the language of Chief Justice Buchanan, when dealing with a kindred subject: "It has been said, that a legislative Act should not be pronounced unconstitutional or invalid in a doubtful case; nor should it, where the doubt is bona fide and well founded, and not the result of a disinclination to deny the authority of the Legislature, which all must feel, but none should yield to, in violation of a solemn duty. But where a Judge is satisfied, upon full consideration, that an Act of the Legislature is contrary to the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law, which he is hound to ohoy, and which must prevail over any Act that -comes in conflict, and cannot stand with it, or is for any other reason invalid, he has no choice; and all that is left him, is honestly and fearlessly to do his duty; from the faithful discharge of which, however unpleasant the task, no upright Judge can shrink if he would. On the other hand, a Judge should not suffer himself to he betrayed to pronounce an Act unconstitutional or invalid on insufficient grounds by a morbid apprehension that a contrary decision might be ascribed to the want of a proper sense of judicial duty." Regent's case, 9 Gill, 383.
It was suggested in the argument, that the Court ought to construe the 4th section, Art. 1 of our Constitution, as operating prospectively from the time of its adoption, and thus avoid the difficulty. Such, no doubt, is the general rule of construction.
In Baugher vs. Nelson, 9 Gill, 303, which was a case involving the construction of the Act of 1845, ch. 352, the Court, after stating the general rule, said : "But this general principle, salutary and well established as it is, as an element of jurisprudence, can have no application to a case, when the Legislature have declared in language too express and plain to be mistaken, that they designed to give to the Statute in question, a retroactive operation." Here, as in that case, the words are "too plain for dispute, there is no room for construction." It is impossible, therefore, to adopt the construction of this section, suggested in argument, and declare that it is not retroactive in its operation.
But all retroactive laws are not ex post facto, in the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Those words have been declared to have a technical meaning more restricted than their ordinary and common signification. This leads me to inquire what is the true meaning of the term ex post facto law, in the Constitution of the United States ?
The cases in the Supreme Court, in;which they have come under consideration, are : Calder & Wife, vs. Bull, 3 Dall., 386. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87. Satterlee vs. Matthews, 2 Peters, 413. Watson vs. Mercer, 8 Id., 88. Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Id., 423. Carpenter vs. Com. of Pa., 17 How., 456. They have also been considered in many cases arising in the Courts of the different States; among those I have examined are: Strong vs. Nash, 1 Blackf. Ind. Rep., 193. Lock vs. Dane, 9 Mass. Rep., 362. Ross's case, 2 Pick., 169. Baugher vs. Nelson, 9 Gill, 229.
These cases do not appear to be in conflict, although different Judges have used different language, in defining the terms ex post facto, as used in the Constitution. In Calder vs. Bull, Judge Chase defined an ex post facto law to be;
1st. "Every law that mates an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done criminal; aud punishes such action."
2nd. "Every law that aggravates a crime, or mates it greater than it was when committed."
3rd. "Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed."
4th. " Every l.aw that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender; all these and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive."
The other Judges who delivered separate opinions, concurred substantially in the same views; and the subsequent cases have affirmed the same rule of interpretation.
In Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138, Chief Justice MARSHALL, defined an ex post facto law, as one "which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed." He adds, "Such a law may inflict penalties on the person, or may inflict pecuniary penalties which swell the public Treasury." ,
Chancellor Kent, 1 Com., 409, after giving Chief Justice MARSHALL'S definition, says : This definition is distinguished for its comprehensive brevity and precision, and extends to laws passed after the act, and affecting the person by way of punishment of that act, either in his person, or estate. Ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose punishment' or forfeiture, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private rights retrospectively. Retrospective laws and State' laws, divesting vested rights, unless ex post facto, or impairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within the prohibition contained in the Constitution of tlxe United States, however repugnant they may be to the principles of sound legislation. I have quoted thus at length from Chancellor Kent, because I believe he states correctly the result of the various decisions upon this subject.
The same construction is adopted by Judge Stoet, 3 Com. on Const., sec. 1339.
It is argued that the provision of our State Constitution under consideration, cannot fall within the definition of an ex post facto law, because it relates to the elective franchise, and is intended to fix the qualification of voters; and that being a subject belonging exclusively to the people of the State; the Courts of the United States, have nothing to do with it." There can be no doubt of the soundness of the position, that the States have the sole and exclusive power of regulating the right of suffrage, and of fixing the qualification of voters, and that the Federal Government cannot constitutionally control or interfere with the State in the legitimate exercise of that power; but it by no means follows that the State can, in the exercise of that power, or of any other of her reserved powers, so legislate as to inflict upon the citizen by way of punishment, pains, penalties or forfeiture by law enacted, ex post facto, within the prohibition of the 10th section, Art. 1st, of the Constitution of the United States. As well might it be said that, her-. cause the State has exclusive jurisdiction over contracts, between her citizens and the remedies for their enforcement,, that she can by iaw or Constitution, deprive the citizen of the protection thrown over him by the Constitution of the United States, which maintains the obligation of thé contract inviolate and beyond the power of the States to impair it.
The provision which protects his person and his property from the unjust operation of ex post facto laws, is equally comprehensive, and, where it applies, is alike inviolate by the State, no matter by what form of legislation.
By this construction alone, will those provisions in the Constitution of the United States prove, as they were designed, ' a bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights ?" If then, the provisions of the 4th section, are within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, an ex post facto law, they are not protected from its operation; because they form part of the organic law relating -to the right of suffrage. Are they ex post facto in the sense and meaning of the Constitution of the United States ? They are retroactive, and relate, to acts done and words spoken antecedently, before the adoption of the Constitution, and declare that no person who has at any time done the acts or made the declarations therein enumerated,, "shall ever be entitled to vote at any election to be held in this State, or to hold any office of honor, profit or trust under the laws of this State, unless, since such unlawful acts, he shall have voluntarily entered into the military service of the United States, and been honorably discharged therefrom, or shall be on the day of election, actually and voluntarily in such service, or unless he shall be restored to his full rights of citizenship by an Act of the General Assembly, passed by two-thirds of all the members elected to each house."
To ascertain the true construction and effect of these provisions, it is necessary to examine the first, third and fifth sections of the same Article, and the seventh Article of the Declaration of Rights, which must be construed with them.
This Article declares, "that the right of the people to participate in the Legislature, is the host security of liberty, and the foundation of all free Government; for this purpose elections ought to he free and frequent, and every free white male citizen having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right of suffrage."
The qualifications of a voter are prescribed in the first section, they are: "Every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall have resided in the State one year next preceding the election, and six months in any county or legislative district of Baltimore city, and who shall comply with the provisions of this Article of the Constitution, shall be entitled to vote at all elections hereafter held in this State."
The 3rd, 4th and 5th sections, declare the causes of disqualification, or causes for which the citizen forfeits the right of suffrage. With the exception of lunatics, or persons noli compos mentis, who are incapable of doing any valid civil Act, and are therefore excluded, all the causes of disqualification named in the 3rd, 4th and 5th sections, are either for offences before known to the law, or so declared by the Constitution.
By the 3rd section, persons convicted of larceny or other infamous crime, unless pardoned by the Governor, are disqualified. Here, disfranchisement is a punishment consequent upon conviction; this provision is prospective only in its operation.
By the 5th section, persons convicted of bribery at elections and other offences therein enumerated, are in addition to the penalties imposed by law, disqualified from voting of holding office.
By the 4th section, persons who have at any time done the acts, or made the declarations therein enumerated,— some of them being offences against the United States, and some of them, to wit: words spoken and desires expressed,— not offences known to the law before the adoption of the Constitution, and which are therein for the first time, declared to be unlawful, are punished with disfranchisement. It is said, that disfranchisement, under the 4th section, is not intended as punishment. But in the Constitution itself, in the 5th section, disfranchisement is expressly declared to he punishment. How then, can it he said, that in the 4th section, where the same consequence is denounced against the persons who have committed the unlawful acts therein enumerated, can the disfranchisement he construed, not to be punishment.
This, then, is in the nature of a criminal enactment, for it declares certain acts to he unla-wful, and provides, as a consequence of their commission, that the offender shall he disfranchised. The criminal character . of the provision would scarcely he disputed, if the Constitution provided in terms that the offence should he evidenced as the case of larceny and bribery, by conviction in a Court of justice. But it cannot change the penal character of the enactment, if the law-making power fails to secure to the accused the safeguard and protection of a trial according to the law of the land.
If I am right in this construction, then the 4th section is an ex post facto law, within the strictest definition of those terms; and therefore within the inhibition of the Constitution of the United States.
The next question to he examined is, whether the provisions of the Act of 1865, ch. 174, entitled, an Act for the registration of the voters of the State, are in conformity with the Bill of Rights and Constitution of Maryland? This question will he considered apart from any objections to the provisions of the Constitution, and assuming them to he in all respects valid.
It is contended that the Act is null and void, because it is not ' Enacted in articles and sections, in the same manner as the Code is arranged," as directed by section 28 of Art. 3 of the Constitution. It is plain, upon an inspection of the Act, that this direction has not been complied with; it is passed in the ancient form used and practiced before the Code was adopted. The 28th section of the 3rd Article contemplates and directs that the law, in its body and form, shall he codified by the Legislature in passing it; such has been the uniform construction of that section, and the practice under it since the Code was adopted. The provision is the same as was contained in the Constitution of 1851. In this respect the Legislature have failed to observe the directions of the Constitution.
The Act passed at the same session, ch. 159, does not, in my opinion, remove the objection. That Act does no more than declare the purpose of the Legislature with regard to laws thereafter to be enacted on the subject of registration, but does not in fact codify them. I do not think, however, that this omission renders the Act void. The provision of the Constitution, in this respect, is-directory merely; and although a compliance with it would promote the public convenience, and carry out the policy of the State, by maintaining uniformity in the Code embodying the general statute law; yet, looking upon the words of the Constitution as directory only, and relating to form rather than substance, a failure to comply with the form prescribed, would not, either upon reason or authority, render the Act null.
Ear more grave and serious, and, in my opinion, fatal objections to the Registration Act now under consideration, present themselves when its several provisions are examined and brought to the test of those vital and fundamental principles embodied in our Declaration of Rights, which form part of our organic law, and are designed as restraints upon the powers of the Legislature, as well as of the other departments of the Government, and which are, in the language of Chancellor Kent, "part of the muniments of freemen, showing their title to protection." 2 Kent, 8.
The provisions of the Registration Law are, in my opinion, repugnant to the Declaration of Eights of 1864, aiid are not authorized or sanctioned by the Constitution of Maryland. The Bill of Rights and the Constitution form one instrument, and are to be construed together. So far as this question is concerned, they are not in conflict.
The plain, construction of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th sections of the 1st Article of the Constitution, and the tth Article of the Bill of Rights, is, that the right of suffrage is secured to every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, and having the requisite residence, unless for some of the causes enumerated in the 3rd, 4th or 5th sections, he is disqualified, or that right has been forfeited. Of course I do not hold that the right of suffrage is a natural or inherent right, existing independently of the organic law. Eor the purposes of this question, I treat it as a right to he exercised only in conformity with the organic law ; but where it exists, it is a most valuable right, entitled to the same protection as the right to any property or franchise. Where the qualifications enumerated in the 1st section, exist, the right of suffrage is conferred upon the citizen, and to deprive him of that right, the cause of disqualification must be shown.
By the 2nd section of the 1st Article, and the 41st section of the 3rd Article, it is made the duty of the Legislature to pass laws for the registration of voters. How is that power to be exeroisod? The Constitution does not prescribe the mode, further than to require that it shall be done by law. Here the subject is left to be dealt with by the Legislature in the same manner as they may deal with any other subjeot confided by the Constitution to their authority, and to be regulated by law, passed, in subordination to the restraints upon the legislative will, imposed by the Declaration of Rights, and in suoh manner as that the citizen shall not be deprived of those securities for his protection, guaranteed to him by the organic law, and of which the Legislature cannot constitutionally deprive him.
By the Registration Act, the Legislature has conferred upon the officers of registration the most extraordinary and despotic powers, which are thus briefly but oorreotly stated in the appellant's brief:
1. They have the power of summoning witnesses to prove the qualification of voters, and are invested with judicial functions, the same as a Judge of a Circuit Court, for the purpose of issuing summons, attachments and commitments.
2. They are authorized to pronounce judgment against any citizen for acts committed within or without the jurisdiction of Maryland, which amounts to a forfeiture of his right to vote.
3. They are not required to give any notice of the charges to tho accused party, or to confront him with witnesses, or to try him hy jury, or to keep any written record of the trial.
4. They are only required to record his conviction in these words, "disqualified for disloyalty under Article 1 of the Constitution."
5. The ordinary rules of evidence are disregarded; tho guilt of parties accused of treason and bribery, is permitted to he proved without trial or conviction by a competent Court; a party is required to testify against himself, particularly hy section five, wherein the registrars are directed to exact an oath from the citizen to answer any questions touching his right of voting, and this even when his oath may be discredited.
6. The judgment of the registrars disfranchises tho citizen forever, unless discharged by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly.
It seems to me that the Act is in plain conflict with the 2nd Article of the Bill of Rights, by depriving tho citizen of the benefit of "the common law, and tho trial by jury, according to the course of that law." 2nd, With Article 20, which declares that the trial of facts when they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the people. And especially with Article 23, which declares "that no man ought to be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, hut by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
These words, "law of the land," first used in Magna Charta, have been universally interpreted to mean "law in its regular course of administration through Courts of Justice." See Coke's Inst., 45, 50. 2 Kent, 13. Story on Const., 661.
In 9 G. & J., 412, Chief Justice Buchanan said these provisions in the Bill of Rights "were intended as restraints upon the legislative power, by means of Courts of Justice, in which the laws were to he administered, and where all would be entitled to he heard, and have an opportunity afforded them of asserting and defending their rights against any attempted invasion." See 2 Md. .Rep., 452. 1 Md. Ch. Dec., 252. 3 Kern., (N. Y.,) 394, &c.
In 4 Hill, 145, Chief Justice Bhonson, speaking of the provision in the Constitution of New York, said: "The words law of the land, as here used, do not mean a statute passed'for the purpose of working the wrong;" and again, "the meaning of the section then seems to he, that no member of the State shall he disfranchised of any of his rights and privileges, unless the matter he adjudged agamst him upon trial had according to the course of the common' law."
The Registration Act, by making the decision of the registrars final, and failing to provide any appeal or other mode by which the right of the citizen to his franchise might he tried and determined in due course of law, deprives him of the protection of this great provision in our Bill of Rights. The powers conferred by this Act upon the registrars, are wholly dissimilar from those heretofore held and exercised by judges of election in this State, and no analogy can properly he drawn between them; nor, does it seem to me, is any precedent furnished by our past legislation for conferring upon subordinate tribunals, created by the Legislature, such extraordinary and absolute judicial powers. The provisions of the Constitution do not, in express terms, authorize the Legislature to confer such powers on the registrars, and such authority cannot be implied in the face of the express prohibitions of the Declaration of Rights.
Believing the provisions of the Registration Act to he plainly repugnant to the Declaration of Rights, I thinh it ought to be declared inoperative, and that the writ of mandamus prayed for by the appellant ought, for that reason, to ho refused.
Goldsborough, J.
Without expressing my views seriatim upon the important questions involved in this case, I am content to unite with the majority of the Court in affirming the order of the Court below, for the reasons assigned by my brothers, Bowie, Cocheas and Weisel, in their respective opinions.