Case Name: In re the Marriage of Dennis TOKASH, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Tamara TOKASH, Appellee (Petitioner Below)
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1984-01-03
Citations: 458 N.E.2d 270
Docket Number: No. 3-183A1
Parties: In re the Marriage of Dennis TOKASH, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Tamara TOKASH, Appellee (Petitioner Below).
Judges: GARRARD, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 458
Pages: 270–274

Head Matter:
In re the Marriage of Dennis TOKASH, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. Tamara TOKASH, Appellee (Petitioner Below).
No. 3-183A1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
Jan. 3, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1984.
Transfer Denied April 28, 1984.
Timothy M. Bemis, Griffith, for appel lant.
Lowell E. Enslen, Gary K. Matthews, Hammond, for appellee.

Opinion:
HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge.
The marriage of Tamara and Dennis To-kash was dissolved by the trial court on July 11, 1980. In dividing the marital property of the parties, the trial court ordered Dennis to pay Tamara $4,000 or transfer a Ford Bronco in question to her and to hola her harmless from certain debts owed jointly to the Hammond National Company. On November 5, 1980, Dennis filed a voluntary bankruptey petition. When Dennis failed to comply with certain portions of the dissolution decree, Tamara sought to enforce the decree through contempt proceedings. On appeal, Dennis contends that the discharge in bankruptcy allows him to avoid these obligations and that the trial court erred in determining that his obligations to Tamara were enforceable.
The $822.50 debt to Hammond National Company and the $4,090 debt to Tamara were discharged in bankruptey pursuant to Dennis' petition, because the debts were not support, alimony, or maintenance. However, transfer of the Bronco and Dennis' obligation to hold Tamara harmless on the Hammond National Company debt were not discharged.
The trial court at the time of the dissolution ordered Dennis to surrender the possession of the title to the Ford Bronco within 80 days or pay Tamara the sum of $4,000 in lieu of said vehicle within the same period of time. He did neither. Instead, approximately 45 days later, he filed bankruptcy, listing Tamara as an unsecured creditor for the $4,000 amount. Tamara is not entitled to the $4,000 but she is still entitled to receipt of the Bronco. This was a conveyance Dennis was ordered to make, and the trial court has the authority to enforce its orders by means of contempt proceedings. In re Perrello, (1973) 260 Ind. 26, 291 N.E.2d 698; Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., (1963) 243 Ind. 521, 188 N.E.2d 274. The bankruptcy court had no authority over and did not address the conveyance of the Bronco. It is a valid order which still stands and which may be enforced via contempt proceedings.
Dennis claims he does not own the Bronco and that he did not own the Bronco at the time of the dissolution decree, but rather, that he transferred ownership of the vehicle to his father. Obviously, Dennis did not meet his burden of proof on lack of ownership because the trial court ordered Dennis to convey the vehicle to Tamara. Dennis did not appeal that original order, and thus he cannot argue on appeal now that he does not own the Bronco.
Dennis fails to comprehend that he is bound by the law of the case, i.e., for the purpose of determining whether he is in contempt of court it has already been determined that he is the owner of the Bronco. Even if the trial court's original judgment was erroneous, it nevertheless becomes the law of the case and thereafter binds the parties unless it is successfully challenged on appeal. Cunningham v. Hiles, (1982) Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 669.
Much the same is true with respect to Dennis' obligation to hold Tamara harmless on the Hammond National Company debt. In Marburger v. Marburger, (1978) 175 Ind.App. 612, at 615-616, 372 N.E.2d 1250, at 1252, this Court held:
"Jimmie contends that his discharge in bankruptcy on those debts which he had assumed in the court approved property settlement agreement precluded the trial court from enforcing the property settlement agreement. We do not agree.
"It is correct that Jimmie's obligation to his and Shirley's ereditors was discharged in bankruptcy. However, because of Jimmie's failure to list on the schedules accompanying his bankrupt, cy petition his obligation to hold Shirley harmless on the joint debts of the parties which were incurred during their marriage, he was not discharged as to that obligation. Therefore, Jimmie's obligation to hold Shirley harmless on those debts survived the bankruptcy and was still enforceable. See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8).
"If Shirley as a co-obligor, had paid the debts of the marriage instead of petitioning for bankruptcy, then Jimmie would have been obligated to reimburse her because of the obligation imposed upon him by the court approved property settlement agreement, and the court could have used its contempt powers to enforce its prior order." (Emphasis added.)
The record in this case discloses that Dennis listed Tamara as an unsecured creditor for $4,090 in his bankruptcy petition, but failed to list on the accompanying schedules his obligation to hold Tamara harmless. Therefore, that obligation is still enforceable. Tamara paid the debt to Hammond National Company and therefore, pursuant to Marburger, Dennis is obligated to reimburse her, and the trial court may use its contempt power to enforce its prior order.
The discharge of Dennis' debts by the bankruptcy court did not affect Dennis' obligation to convey the Bronco to Tamara and to hold her harmless on the debt to Hammond National Company. The trial court has the power to enforce its prior order, and therefore the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.
. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(3) which is referred to in the quotation cited is now found at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).
. It is also within the authority of the federal courts involved in bankruptcy proceedings to provide relief in a situation such as this as exemplified in the case of In re: Peters, No. H79-205 (N.D.I. Sept. 5, 1980).