Case Name: SEARLES v. AULD
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-04-26
Citations: 118 S.C. 430
Docket Number: 10819
Parties: SEARLES v. AULD
Judges: Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Justices Fraser, Cothran, and Marion concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 118
Pages: 430–436

Head Matter:
10819
SEARLES v. AULD
(111 S. E. 785)
1. Vendor and Purchaser—Modification as to Consideration Mat be Made by Parol.—A contract providing- for delivery of shares of corporate stock in payment for land could be modified by parol so as to provide that a note be taken in lieu of the stock.
2. Vendor And Purchaser—Pleading Held Insufficient to Show Breach of Seller.—A complaint in an action by purchaser to recover damages for breach held insufficient on demurrer where it alleged a tender of corporate stock as a part of the purchase price, it appearing that the contract was modified so as to provide that a note delivered to defendant was taken in lieu of the stock, but it not appearing from the complaint that plaintiff was entitled to tender such shares and obtain a redelivery of the note, though there was an allegation that defendant informed plaintiff that he could not comply.
3. Vendor and Purchaser—Vendor Under Contract Need Not Have Title at Date of Execution; Title Sufficient if Good at Date of Performance.—A contract of sale of land is valid and binding on the purchaser, though the defendant at the time of making the contract does not have title; it being sufficient if, upon the date of compliance and upon a proper tender by the purchaser, the seller be ready to comply with the proper deed and a title free from the requisite incumbrances.
4. Appeal and Error—Plaintiff Held Entitled to Ask to Amend on Affirmance of Judgment Sustaining Demurrer.—On appeal in an action for damages for breach of contract to convey land, ■ where it appeared that defendant retained a note, held that plaintiff, on affirmance of a judgment sustaining a demurrer to his complaint, was entitled to ask for an order allowing him to amend his complaint if so advised.
Before WhaeEy, J., Richland County Court, April, 1921.
Affirmed and remanded to permit amendment of complaint.
Action by A. Sear les against F. G. Auld. From order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint the plaintiff appeals.
The order sustaining the demurrer was as follows:
A hearing was had with both parties present upon a demurrer in the above cause; the principal issue made therein being that in the modified agreement as set forth in the complaint it appeared on the face thereof that the plaintiff had no legal right when making a tender of the balance of the purchase price to demand back a certain note which, in accordance with such modification, had been executed and delivered by plaintiff to defendant, in lieu of certain shares of stock which by their original contract were to have been assigned as a part of the purchase price on the date set for compliance.
Such a modification can be made by parol. 39 Cyc., 1,2 1351. Plaintiff, the purchaser, must allege the terms of the contract and compliance on his part therewith before he can recover damages for an alleged breach, or for deceit, of the vendor, or he must show tender in accordance therewith and a readiness to perform. Id., 1558, 1561. In the instant case it was all right fór the plaintiff to have tendered something more than the modified agreement called for, to wit, the shares of stock, but, unless there was a provision in such agreement that on the date finally set for compliance he could tender such shares and obtain a redelivery of the note, which had been admittedly given in lieu of such shares, he could not demand such redelivery. His doing so excused defendant from complying. Baker v. Gasque, 3 Strob., 25.
The mere fact that he alleges in paragraph 7 that defendant informed him that he (defendant) could not comply is not sufficient, when taken in connection with the context, which shows that a tender was attempted, to show that defendant refused because of some impossibility to comply, which would have excused tender on part of plaintiff. It only shows that defendant could not comply because plaintiff had not made a proper tender.
The fact, as alleged, that defendant at time of mak-^ 3 ing the contract did not have title, is not sufficient to indicate an impossibility of compliance on his part at the date set for same. Such contracts are made under the same conditions every day. It is sufficient if, upon the date of compliance and upon a proper tender by the purchaser, the seller be ready to comply with the proper deed and a title free from the requisite incumbrances. Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. C., 282, 26 S. E., 657; Mobley v. Quattlebaum, 101 S. C, 221, 85 S. E., 585.
Mr. D. W. Galloway, for appellant,
cites: False statement by vendor as to estate he possesses concerns a material fact and avoids the contract: 39 Cyc., 1272. Pleadings should be liberally construed: Sec., 209, Code Proc. 1912,
Messrs. Moffatt & Marion, for respondent,
cite: Plaintiff must show full performance on his part before he can maintain action: 27 R. C. R., 456; 39 Cyc., 1551-. And he cannot complain of default by defendant until he has shozun full performance: 101 S. C., 221; 85 S. C.,585 ; 3 Strob., 25.
April 26, 1922.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.
For the reasons assigned by his Honor County Court Judge Whaley, it is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the County Court should be affirmed, but, however, it be remanded to the County Court in order that the appellant be allowed to ask for an order allowing him to amend his complaint if he be so advised.
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Justices Fraser, Cothran, and Marion concur.