Case Name: Clarence Dias vs. Charles F. Chickering, and George H. Chickering, trading as Chickering & Sons
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1885-12-04
Citations: 64 Md. 348
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clarence Dias vs. Charles F. Chickering, and George H. Chickering, trading as Chickering & Sons.
Judges: The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Stone, Miller, Robinson, Ritchie, and Bryan, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 348–359

Head Matter:
Clarence Dias vs. Charles F. Chickering, and George H. Chickering, trading as Chickering & Sons.
Replevin of Piano — Bona fide Purchaser without Rotice.
C. consigned a piano to B. & E., a firm, who were authorized to sell it for cash. 'This piano with the assent of E. was removed to the residence of B. for private use, and after remaining there for nine or ten months, was sold by B. as belonging either to himself or to his wife, to D. for two hundred and fifty dollars, a fair price at the time. D. paid the money to B., taking a receipt therefor. D. was a bona fide purchaser, without notice of the relations between the firm of B. & E. and the consignor 0., and unaware that either B. or the firm was in any financial trouble. In an action of replevin brought by G. against D. to recover the piano, it was Held :
That the defendant being an innocent purchaser for value, took a good title to the piano; and the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
Appeal from tbe Superior Court of Baltimore City.
This was an action of replevin brought by the appellees to recover a piano from the appellant. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Exception. — The plaintiffs offered three prayers which were rejected. The defendant offered the following prayers:
1. That in order to enable the plaintiffs to recover, it is incumhent upon them to prove, either that the title to the piano in controversy, or the right to the possession thereof, is in them, the plaintiffs, and there is no evidence of either of these facts.
2. That if the jury, find from the evidence before them, that the plaintiffs consigned the piano in controversy to the firm of Buckland and Ebeling for sale, and that Buck- land, one of the members of said firm, and while a member of said firm, sold said piano to the defendant Dias, and that the said Dias purchased the same in good faith and for a valuable consideration, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
3. That if the jury find from the evidence before them, that the plaintiffs consigned the piano in controversy to the firm of Buckland and Ebeling, as their agents, fox-sale, and that by an arrangement between said Buck-land and Ebeling, the said Buckland purchased said piano from said firm of which he was a member, and that in pursuance of said purchase the said piano was sent, on or about the 28th of June, 1882, from the warerooms of the said Buckland and Ebeling to the private residence of the said Buckland, where it remained for a period of about ten months, and was then purchased by the defendant Dias, who in good faith paid a valuable consideration therefor, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
4. That the Court instruct the jury to exclude from their consideration the entries in the books of the firm of Buckland and Ebeling, which were made and written by Ebeling, and which were offered in evidence by the plaintiffs subject to the exception of the defendant.
The defendant moved the Court to exclude from the consideration of the jury the evidence of the entries made by the witness Daniel in the books of Buckland and Ebeling, the said evidence being admitted subject to exception on the part of the defendant.
The Court (Brown, C. J.,) rejected the prayers and overruled the motion of the defendant, and gave an instruction of its own, as follows:
According to the undisputed evidence in this case, the plaintiffs consigned the piano in question to the firm of Buckland, Ebeling & Co., as their agents, for sale, and the defendant has failed to show that Charles O. Buckland, who was a member of said firm, and who claimed to be the purchaser of said piano from said firm, and who sold the same to the defendant, acquired any title thereto under said pretended sale, and said Bucldand therefore conveyed no title to the defendant; and the defendant has also failed to show that the title of the plaintiffs to said piano has in any way been divested, and the Court therefore instructs the jury that on the undisputed evidence in the case the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
The defendant excepted to the rejection of his prayers, and the verdict and judgment being against him he took this appeal.
The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Stone, Miller, Robinson, Ritchie, and Bryan, J.
Isidor Raynor, for the appellant.
A trustee purchasing from his cestui que trust; an agent from his principal; a fraudulent vendee, all take titles that can be avoided in equity, but the purchaser from them in good faith for value and without notice of the trust, or the fraud, takes an unimpeachable title. Benjamin, Story, and, in fact, all the text writers, are of one accord upon this elementary principle, and this Court has sanctioned it in a manner which withdraws it from the pale of controversy in this State. Hall vs. Hinks, et al., 21 Md., 417; Hoffman Steam Coal Co. vs. Cumberland Coal and Iron Co., 16 Md., 511; Williams’ Ex’rs vs. Marshall, 4 G. & J., 380; Story on Agency, (8th Ed.,) ch. VII, page 261, sec. 211, note 1, and cases referred to in note ; Perry on Trusts, (2c? Ed.,) ch. VI, sec. 218; ch. XXVII, sec. 828; Benjamin on Sales, (Is? Am. Ed.,) booh 3c?, part 2d, sections 2 and 433, and note 1; Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, (12th Ed.,) secs. 381, 434; Wharton’s Commentaries on Agencies and Agents, ch. 3c?, sec. 201.
If the sale to Bucldand was void, then the’ title of the piano remained in Buckland, Ebeling & Co., as the agents of the appellees, and Bucldand being a member of the firm, had obviously the right to sell the piano. It is difficult’to see any escape from this proposition. Dias had a right to purchase pianos, the whole stock if he wanted to, from either member of the firm; that was the business of the firm. If Bucldand, as the Court seemed to think, could not pass title to Dias through the medium of the sale to him, Bucldand, he certainly could pass title as one of the members of the firm of Bucldand, Ebeling & Co.? the piano having been consigned to them for sale. Now the view that the Court took upon the question, was, that the sale, having been made at Bucldand’s residence, and not at the place of business of the firm, it did not pass title. If an agent has the right to sell, he has the right to sell anywhere. The power of sale being admitted, the place of sale cannot affect the title.
The Court seemed to consider that under the provisions of what is known as the factor’s Act, Article 3, section 4, of the Code, the sale was inoperative, unless made at the place of business of the firm. This Act, which is substantially the English Act of 4 Geo. 4, ch. 83, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 94, and 5th and 6th Viet., ch. 39, does not bear upon this question. That Act was passed to enlarge and not to restrict, the powers of an agent at common law. Its objects was to protect purchasers from parties who had no power of sale, but were only entrusted with the property, and had the indicia of ownership. In this case there was a poioer of sale, and a right to receive the money. If the appellant, in good faith, for value, had bought this piano at any place whatever from any member of the firm, his title would be indefeasible. Levi vs. Booth, 58 Md., 306.
The Court was in error in permitting the entries in the books of the firm of Buckland, Ebeling & Co., which were made and written by Ebeling, to go to the jury, and in rejecting appellant’s fourth prayer, which asked that these entries should be excluded. An entry made by a party himself in his shop books is not evidence in Maryland. Romer vs. Jaecksch, 39 Md., 585; Owings & Piet vs. Low, 5 G. & J., 145; Atwell vs. Miller & Mayhew, 6 Md., 10; Whiteford vs. Buckmeyer & Adams, 1 Gill, 140; Hagan vs. Hendry, 18 Md., 190.
B. Howard Haman, for the appellees.
As between the plaintiffs and their agents, Buckland, Ebeling & Co., the title to the piano in question was in the former. 1 Benjamin on Sales, (Am. Ed.,) 8; Bayliss vs. Davis, 47 Ia., 340, same report, page 363; Cole vs. Mann, 62 N. Y., 1.
The Judge below instructed the jury that there was no evidence in the case tending to show that the plaintiffs’ title had been divested. This instruction was correct, for the plain reason that Mrs. Buckland, the defendant’s vendor, had herself no title to the piano in controversy, and consequently could give none to the defendant.
There is a sharp distinction between the legal effect of a sale of goods where the title of the vendor to the thing sold is void, and where it is voidable only. Though A’s title be defective through fraud of his, and therefore voidable by his vendor, he still has enough title in himself to pass to an innocent purchaser for value an indefeasible interest in the thing sold. Hall vs. Hinks, 21 Md., 406. If on the other hand, A’s title is void, he can give no title to the most innocent purchaser. Ramazotti vs. Bowring, 7 C. B. N. S., 851; Sheridan vs. The New Quay Company, 4 Com. Bench, (N. S.,) 617.
Mrs. Buckland’s title to the piano in controversy was absolutely void. There is no question but that Chickering & Sons might have replevied the piano from .her at any time. Admitting that her husband’s title was defeasible merely, and not void, she could take no title from him, since she paid nothing for the piano. It toas a present, and she has no equity, as a purchaser has. Neither an execution creditor of a fraudulent vendee, (Buffington vs. Gerrish, 15 Mass. R., 156,) nor a purchaser from a fraudulent vendee who gives a past debt, (Radcliff vs. Sangston, 18 Md., 383,) gets a good title.
Mrs. Buckland’s title to the piano was void, for the further reason that the transfer to her by her husband, was inoperative, as in fraud of his creditors, and the appellant was put upon notice of that fact. Green vs. Early, 39 Md., 223.
All the prayers of the defendant were defective in not leaving the question to the jury, whether the sale was made in the due course of trade. Higgons vs. Burton, 26 L. J. Exch., 342; Baines vs. Swainson, 32 L. J. Q. B., 281; Booth vs. Levi, 58 Md., 325.
Bare possession of goods by an agent is not enough to enable him to divest the title of his principal by a fraudulent sale, even to an innocent purchaser. Andrew vs. Dietrich, 14 Wendell, 41; Leigh Bros. vs. R. R. Co., 58 Ala., 179; McNeill vs. The Bank, 46 N. Y., 330.

Opinion:
Ritchie, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. *
The uncontroverted testimony in this case shows that Buekland & Ebeling were a firm engaged in selling pianos of their own, and also on consignment from other parties, among whom were the appellees; that the piano replevied in this case was one they had received from the appellees, and that they were authorized to sell it for cash, and when sold their duty whs to transmit the proceeds to the appellees; that this piano was, with the assent of Ebeling, removed to the residence of Buekland for private use, and after remaining there for nine or ten months was sold by Buekland, as belonging either to himself or wife, to the appellant, whose business was that of a dealer in furniture, for two hundred and fifty dollars, a fair price at the time; that appellant paid the money to Buekland, taking his personal receipt, and was a bona fide purchaser, without notice of the relations between the firm of Buckland and Ebeling and the appellees, and unaware that either Buck-land or the firm was in any financial trouble ; a fact which he learned through the newspapers several days after the purchase.
The controverted evidence was on the point of whether Buckland, when the piano was removed to his home, nine or ten months before the sale, had bought it, or merely borrowed it; Buckland testifying that he had bought it, directing it to be charged to his account, and Ebeling that it was merely lent to him.
In our view of the effect of the undisputed evidence, it is immaterial in this case whether Buckland had bought the piano from the firm, or only borrowed it. The question is not whether Buckland had actually acquired title to the piano in himself as between him and the Chickerings; but whether under all the facts and circumstances' disclosed in the undisputed proof, Dias is to be protected, as an innocent purchaser for value, against the principals of Buckland and Ebeling. In our opinion he is clearly so-entitled.
Assuming that Buckland had not purchased the piano himself in fact, or that having undertaken to buy it, his-character as agent rendered such a purchase voidable in law ; he was, nevertheless, as one of the firm of Buckland and Ebeling, put in possession of the piano and specifically clothed with the power' to sell it for cash to any outside party. Such a sale he actually did make; he sold the piano for cash and received the money; and assuming the ownership of the property not to be in him, he should have transmitted the proceeds to the Chickerings to whom it was due, and who are legally entitled to recover it from him. But so far as the purchaser is concerned, his obligation ended with his payment. The private instructions from the principal to their agent, he is not a party to nor bound by. ' Buckland being clothed, not only with pos session of the piano but the right to sell it also, and, moreover, having been allowed to treat it as his own property, and so use it in his private family, without objection or interference by the Chickerings for nine or ten months, we think, under the common law, without pausing to consider the factor's Act, the Chickerings are now estopped from making any demand upon Bias, and that the latter took a good title to the piano.
(Decided 4th December, 1885.)
The facts in this case bring it within the principle, that "when one of two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud of a third, the loss shall fall upon him who has enabled such third person to do the wrong." It also comes within the general rules as laid down in Wharton on Agency, sec. 200: "At common law, an agent with prima facie right to sell may convey title to bona fide purchaser without notice;" and in sec. 201: "Where property is unlawfully sold by an agent, it, or its proceeds, may be followed by the principal until he meet with a bona fide purchaser without notice."
The case of Hall vs. Hinks, 21 Md., 406, in which there is a full discussion of the principles involved, fully covers the one before us. The doctrine there expressed, as applicable to a case like this, is also recognized in Levi vs. Booth, 58 Md., on pages 311, 312.
It follows, therefore, from our conclusions, that we regard the rulings and instructions of the Court below as erroneous; and as the evidence below would have justified an instruction to the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, we shall reverse the' judgment without awarding a new trial.
Judgment reversed.