Case Name: Roy Edward DELOACH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-11-09
Citations: 338 So. 2d 1141
Docket Number: No. AA-335
Parties: Roy Edward DELOACH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOYER, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 338
Pages: 1141–1143

Head Matter:
Roy Edward DELOACH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AA-335.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 9, 1976.
Alan R. Parlapiano, Public Defender, Gainesville, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
Charged with manslaughter in operating an automobile while intoxicated, appellant Deloach moved unsuccessfully for discharge under Rule 3.191, R.Cr.P., then pleaded nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the speedy trial issue. The trial court held that the Rule's 180-day period for trial did not begin to run until July 28, 1975, when Deloach was arrested on a capias issued upon filing of the information. The determinative issue is whether, as Deloach contends, he was arrested or taken into custody on the night of the incident, March 30,1975.
Following a collision in which a passenger was killed, Deloach was taken to a hospital for observation and treatment for broken ribs and lacerations. The investigating officer asked a doctor to administer a blood alcohol test. The doctor stated that De-loach would first have to be arrested. The officer thereupon advised Deloach that he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated and he advised Deloach of his rights to remain silent and to consult counsel. At the officer's request, Deloach then acquiesced in the blood alcohol test. The officer did not touch Deloach or make any effort to remove him to jail. Deloach was discharged from the hospital only after hospital authorities sought and obtained permission from the police to release him.
Florida's speedy trial rule establishes time periods for trial which "commence when . . . [the accused] is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged." Rule 3.191(a)(1), R.Cr.P. The State does not contend that Deloach's alleged driving while intoxicated was independent of the "criminal episode" in which the manslaughter is said to have been committed. See Crain v. State, 302 So.2d 433 (Fla.App.2d, 1974); State ex rel. Meyer v. Keough, 325 So.2d 75 (Fla.App.2d, 1976). The State asserts only that Deloach was not "taken into custody" on the night of the incident.
Although the officer disclaimed any intention to take the injured Deloach into actual custody on the night of the incident, he admittedly "placed him under arrest for driving while under the influence to get his permission" for the blood alcohol test. The officer advised Deloach he was arrested. Deloach plainly understood he was arrested and subject to the officer's direction. Even the hospital authorities considered Deloach not subject to discharge without police approval. The arrest therefore met the classic test of Melton v. State, 75 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1954), including the element of "[a]n actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested . . . ." The Supreme Court held that an arrest and constructive detention had occurred, so justifying a search incident to a lawful arrest, notwithstanding that the person arrested in her home was not physically restrained or removed. State v. Parnell, 221 So.2d 129 (Fla.1969). The principle of that case controls this one. The judgment of conviction must be reversed and Deloach discharged.
REVERSED.
BOYER, C. J., concurs.
MILLS, J., dissents.