Case Name: The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Grimes, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 2017-05-24
Citations: 151 Ohio St. 3d 19
Docket Number: No. 2016-0215
Parties: The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Grimes, Appellee.
Judges: O’Donnell, O’Neill, and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 151
Pages: 19–35

Head Matter:
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Grimes, Appellee.
2017-Ohio-2927.]
(No. 2016-0215
Submitted February 9, 2017
Decided May 24, 2017.)

Opinion:
O'Connor, C.J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider what information a trial court must include in a sentencing entry to validly impose a postrelease-control sanction on an offender when the court orally provides all the required advisements to the offender at the sentencing hearing. We hold that to validly impose postrelease control when the court orally provides all the required advisements at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing entry must contain the following information: (1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the Adult Parole Authority ("APA") will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute. Because the sentencing entry in this case included all the required information, we reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} The Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas first imposed postre-lease control on defendant-appellee, Bradley E. Grimes, in August 2011 as part of his sentence for convictions for robbery and vandalism. It is undisputed that the trial court properly advised Grimes at the sentencing hearing of his postrelease-control obligations and the consequences of violating a condition of postrelease control. The sentencing entry included the following statement:
The Court further notified the Defendant that "Post Release Control" is mandatory in this case for three (03) years as well as the consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by Parole Board under Revised Code § 2967.28. The Defendant is ordered to serve as part of this sentence any term for violation of that post release control.
(Boldface and underlining sic.) Grimes served his prison term in that case, was released from prison on December 30, 2012, and began serving the three-year period of postrelease control under supervision of the APA.
{¶ 3} On September 4, 2013, while Grimes was still under postrelease control, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted him on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, both fourth-degree felonies. Grimes pled guilty to the first count, and the state dismissed the second.
{¶ 4} On January 7, 2014, the trial court sentenced Grimes to a one-year prison term, classified him as a Tier II sex offender, and imposed a judicial-sanction sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.141 in which the court converted the remainder of the postrelease-control term imposed for his 2011 convictions into prison time and ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to his one-year prison sentence for the 2013 unlawful-sexual-conduct conviction.
{¶ 5} On April 16, 2015, having completed his prison term for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Grimes moved the trial court to vacate his judicial-sanction sentence and order his immediate release from prison. He argued that the court did not validly impose postrelease control when it sentenced him for his 2011 convictions. The trial court denied Grimes's motion without opinion.
{¶ 6} Grimes appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment. The Fifth District held that the trial court's August 2011 sentencing entry "is silent as to the consequences of violating post-release control" and that therefore, the court "failed to inform [Grimes] if he violated his supervision or a condition of post-release control, the parole board could impose a maximum prison term of up to one-half of the prison term originally imposed." 2015-Ohio-3497, 2015 WL 5050650, ¶ 12.
{¶ 7} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal to address the following proposition of law:
To impose valid post release control, the language in the sentencing entry may incorporate the advisements given during the sentencing hearing by referencing the post release control sections of the Ohio Revised Code and do not need to repeat what was said during the sentencing hearing.
See 145 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2016-Ohio-899, 46 N.E.3d 702.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 8} It is settled that "a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing" and that "any sentence imposed without such notification is contrary to law." State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23. Concomitantly, because a court is generally said to speak only through its journal, id. at ¶ 6, the trial court is "required to incorporate that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence," id. at ¶ 17. In this case, the state asks us to identify what information the sentencing entry must contain to validly impose postrelease control.
{¶ 9} We begin by reciting the statutory requirements for notice at the sentencing hearing. The court at a sentencing hearing must notify the offender that he or she "will" or "may" "be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for" a felony. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and (d). The offender "will" be supervised if the offender has been convicted of a felony subject to mandatory postrelease control. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and 2967.28(B). The offender "may" be supervised if the offender has been convicted of a less serious felony for which the APA has discretion to impose postrelease control. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and 2967.28(C). The postrelease-control law also designates the term of supervision for each degree of felony. R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C). Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, the court must notify the offender that if he or she "violates that supervision , the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of np to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender." R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e).
{¶ 10} We have interpreted these statutory provisions on a number of occasions when examining claims that a trial court's imposition of postrelease control was invalid. In a long line of cases, including those summarized in State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 12-20 (lead opinion), we explained in more detail how a trial court can fail to validly impose postrelease control.
{¶ 11} We held that a trial court imposing postrelease control "is duty-bound to notify [the] offender at the sentencing hearing about postrelease control and to incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry." Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 22. After Singleton, we made clear that "statutorily compliant notification" includes "notifying the defendant of the details of the postrelease control and the consequences of violating postre-lease control," State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 967 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 18, including whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, Jordan at ¶ 22-23, and the term of supervision, State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 12. Although we have held that in order to validly impose postrelease control the notice given at the sentencing hearing must be incorporated into the sentencing entry, Jordan at ¶ 17, we have not decided whether—and if so, how—notice of the consequences of violating a condition of postrelease control must also be incorporated into the sentencing entry.
{¶ 12} Grimes argues, and the court of appeals held, that the judicial-sanction portion of his 2014 sentence was void because the trial court had failed to validly impose postrelease control for his 2011 robbery and vandalism convictions. According to the appellate court, the 2011 sentencing entry did not properly incorporate the notification that violation of postrelease control may result in an APA-imposed prison term of up to one-half of the defendant's original sentence. 2015-Ohio-3497, 2015 WL 5050650, at ¶ 12. The state counters that the entry's reference to R.C. 2967.28 was sufficient to incorporate the advisements orally made to Grimes at the sentencing hearing and that duplicating or repeating those advisements in the entry was unnecessary.
{¶ 13} We agree with the state that in order to validly impose postrelease control, the trial court must incorporate into its sentencing entry the notifications it provides to the offender relating to postrelease control at the sentencing hearing but that it need not repeat those notifications verbatim in the entry. We conclude that to validly impose postrelease control, a minimally compliant entry must provide the APA the information it needs to execute the postrelease-control portion of the sentence. This conclusion reconciles the statutory requirements for imposition of postrelease control with our analyses in our postrelease-control decisions preceding this one.
{¶ 14} We are guided by our decision in Qualls, in which we considered a sentencing entry that did not mention postrelease control even though the trial court properly notified the offender about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 967 N.E.2d 718. We recognized in that case that "our main focus in interpreting the sentencing statutes regarding postrelease control has always been on the notification itself and not on the sentencing entry." Id. at ¶ 19. Indeed, we have deemed the "preeminent purpose" of R.C. 2967.28 to be that "offenders subject to postrelease control know at sentencing that their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their initial sentences." (Emphasis added.) Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 52. In this case, as in Qualls, Grimes does not dispute that he was notified at the sentencing hearing that he would be subject to postrelease control, see Qualls at ¶ 6-7, so we conclude that the court accomplished the primary purpose of notice.
{¶ 15} A sentencing entry's silence on postrelease control, however, is impermissible because it is the sentencing entry that "empowers the executive branch of government to exercise its discretion," Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 22, citing Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512-513, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000) (plurality opinion). In Qualls, we held that the trial court could correct the deficient entry by issuing a nunc pro tunc entry and that the offender was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Qualls at ¶ 30. We observed that correction through issuance of a nunc pro tunc entry is appropriate "as long as the correction is accomplished prior to the defendant's completion of his prison term." Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 16} This case is different from Qualls because the sentencing entry here provided adequate notice as to postrelease control. Contrary to Grimes's representation of the sentencing entry as making "a passing reference to postrelease control," it clearly states that Grimes was subject to mandatory postrelease control for three years, informs the APA that the trial court notified Grimes that he would be subject to "the consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by Parole Board under Revised Code § 2967.28," and ordered him to "serve as part of this sentence any term for violation of that post release control." Among numerous other instructions and consequences, R.C. 2967.28 states that "the maximum cumulative prison term for all violations under [the postrelease control] division shall not exceed one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender as part of this sentence." R.C. 2967.28(F)(3).
{¶ 17} Grimes argues that a judgment entry must " ' "so dispose of the matters at issue between the parties that they and such other persons as may be affected, will be able to determine with reasonable certainty the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined." ' " Grimes's brief at 19, quoting Licht v. Woertz, 32 Ohio App. 111, 115, 167 N.E. 614 (8th Dist.1929), quoting 1 Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments 126 (5th Ed.1925). But the trial court's sentencing entry in this case did that and incorporated ail the notifications necessary for the APA to perform its job. By specifying that Grimes was subject to mandatory supervision for three years, the entry informed the APA that it lacked discretion as to both whether to impose postrelease control and the length of the postrelease control period.
{¶ 18} The entry also informed the APA that Grimes had been advised that if he violated any of the conditions of postrelease control there would be consequences, up to and including prison time, as described in R.C. 2967.28(D)(1). And the APA could review R.C. 2967.28 for necessary information about its authority to impose postrelease control and to punish Grimes for any violations.
{¶ 19} We agree that articulating in the sentencing entry the specific information set forth in R.C. 2929.19—including that "the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender," R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e)—would be more thorough. Although the trial court in this case could have been more comprehensive in its sentencing entry, the entry nevertheless satisfies the requirement that the trial court incorporate the advisements it provided at the sentencing hearing. By referring to R.C. 2967.28, the trial court's entry empowered Grimes and other readers to consult the statute and determine what consequences the APA could impose for any violation of the conditions of postrelease control. The entry thus met the statutory threshold for imposing a valid postrelease-control sentence.
{¶ 20} Notably, we caution that this appeal presents a case in which it is undisputed that the trial court provided all the required advisements regarding postrelease control to Grimes at the sentencing hearing. Grimes did not introduce a transcript of the hearing into the record, so we must assume the regularity of the sentencing hearing. Natl. City Bank v. Beyer, 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 160, 729 N.E.2d 711 (2000). Our holding is limited to those cases in which the trial court makes the proper advisements to the offender at the sentencing hearing. We reach no conclusion as to the requirements for sentencing entries in eases in which notice at the sentencing hearing was deficient.
{¶ 21} Regardless of the facts of a given case, the bench and bar must understand and be guided by the separate but related responsibilities of the trial courts and the APA with respect to postrelease control. It is the trial judge's responsibility to impose postrelease control, including the responsibility to interpret the law to determine in each case whether postrelease control is mandatory or discretionary and to determine the term of supervision as well as to advise the offender of those determinations and the consequences that the APA may impose for any postrelease-control violations. It is the responsibility of the APA to carry out the sentence after the court imposes it, not to interpret the law and facts and impose its own sentence based on information in the sentencing entry.
{¶ 22} Grimes's argument that State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, controls this case is unpersuasive. Ketterer involved an offender facing the death penalty in a case with numerous procedural errors that necessitated both resentencing on his noncapital offenses and a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the resentencing entry. Ketterer challenged the nunc pro tunc entry on appeal to this court from his resentencing. We determined that the resentencing hearing and the nunc pro tunc entry were both defective. At the sentencing hearing, the court informed Ketterer that he was subject to postre-lease control on counts two and five when he was actually subject to postrelease control on counts two and three. Id. at ¶ 78. In addition, the nunc pro tunc entry incorrectly stated that Ketterer was advised at the resentencing hearing that he was subject to postrelease control as to four counts, and the trial court never held the hearing required before a nunc pro tunc entry is journalized. Id., citing R.C. 2929.191.
{¶ 23} Grimes relies on our determination that the trial court erred by failing to include in the nunc pro tunc entry the maximum term that the APA could impose if Ketterer violated a condition of his postrelease control, see id. at ¶ 77. While we did determine that the nunc pro tunc entry should be amended to include this information, given the substantial deficiencies of the resentencing hearing and the nunc pro tunc entry—and our observation that "trial courts in capital cases must scrupulously comply with the applicable statutes and rules, even those involving postrelease control," id. at ¶ 78—we decline to extend this determination beyond the facts and circumstances of Ketterer.
{¶ 24} We also find little merit in Grimes's warning that a failure to affirm the Fifth District's judgment "would transfer the judiciary's authority to determine and impose criminal sentences to the executive branch." First, as already described, the trial court's sentencing entry did give proper notice as to postre- lease control. Second, even if the entry had not explicitly referred to the APA's authority to impose a prison term for violations of postrelease control, there would be no breach of the separation of powers because the APA did not impose the prison term at issue in this case—the court did. For the same reason, Grimes would not have been prejudiced if the trial court had failed to advise him in its entry that the APA had authority to impose a prison term as a consequence of violating postrelease control.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 25} The trial court validly imposed postrelease control by advising Grimes at the sentencing hearing of the term of supervision, that it was mandatory, and that the APA would administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28, including subjecting him to consequences up to and including prison time for violating postrelease control, and then incorporating those advisements into the sentencing entry. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas denying Grimes's motion to vacate his judicial-sanction sentence, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, trial court judgment reinstated, and cause remanded.
O'Donnell, O'Neill, and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Kennedy, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
French, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
DeWine, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
. We need not address the arguments raised solely by amici curiae, including the attorney general's invitation that we conclude that sentencing entries that improperly attempt to impose postrelease control are voidable, not void. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 19, citing Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 53 (an argument not raised by the parties will not be considered).