Case Name: Samuel McChesney's Lessee v. William Wainwright
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1832-12
Citations: 5 Ohio 452
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Samuel McChesney’s Lessee v. William Wainwright.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 5
Pages: 412–415

Head Matter:
*Samuel McChesney’s Lessee v. William Wainwright.
Deed describing the land conveyed, as half the tract granted to M., January 9, 1804, prima facie a good description.
■ Grantee bound by recitals in the title of his grantor.
It is no defense in ejectment, that after the suit is commenced, the plaintiff takes possession of the premises in dispute.
Motion for a new trial reserved from the county of Clermont. At the trial in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff proved that his lessors were the widow and heirs of Samuel McChosney. He pro- ■ duced a deed from John McDowell'and wife to Samuel McChes,ney, dated October 16, 1818, a patent to McDowell, dated January .9, 1804, and a plat and survey from the county surveyor.
The defendant gave in evidence a deed from McChesney to-Joseph Kemp, and a deed from Kemp to him.
To rebut this title, the plaintiff produced a mortgage deed from Kemp to McChesney, given him before his conveyance to Wainwright, with proof that when Kemp purchased of McChesney, he-gave back a mortgage deed as security for the purchase money,., which is still unpaid. The mortgage conveys the land by the folio-wing description: “All the east half of a tract of land, granted' to John McDowell on January 9, 1804; beginning at a black oak and gum, standing in the northeast corner of said original sur-vey, aDd runs from thence west one hundred and forty-two poles to three white oak trees, standing in the middle of the north bounds of said tract; thence south four hundred and sixteen poles ■ to a hickory stump, standing in the south bounds of said tract; thence east one hundred and forty-two poles to a sugar tree, in the southeast corner of said tract; thence north to the place of beginning.”
The introduction of this deed was resisted by the defendant’s-counsel, because they alleged it contained no sufficient description to transfer any lands, but the objection was overruled.
The defendant then offered to prove as a defense, that the lessors of th'e plaintiff had taken possession of the land, which-proof was rejected, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff. This motion for a new trial is made for the two causes, the admission of the mortgage deed, and the rejection of the testimony offered by defendant. The decision of this motion is reserved for the-court in bank.
^Strait and Hawes, for plaintiff.
No counsel appeared for defendant.

Opinion:
Lane, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The mortgage from Kemp to McChesney professes to convey the east half of a tract granted to McDowell on January 9, 1804,. and proceeds to recite the specific abuttals. We are without the benefit of a brief from the defendant,-and are left to-gather the objection from the written motion. If we do not mistake the point intended to be raised, it is that this deed conveys no land,., from the generality of its description, especially in its omission to designate the county, township, or water-course on which it is situate.
We know no rule of law, which requires the insertion of these points in the description, provided it is sufficiently identified, If the description in a deed be so imperfect that it can not be known what land was intended to be conveyed, the deed is void. 4 Mass. 205. But although it is necessary to the validity of a grant, that the thing granted should be capable of being distinguished from other things of the same kind, it is not necessary that the description should be such as to identify the object without the aid of •extraneous testimony. 5 Wheat. 359. And if a deed refer to another deed for the description of the land conveyed, and the land •can be ascertained by such reference, the description is sufficiently certain. 6 Pick. 450.
The land which the parties attempted to transfer by this mortgage, consisted of one-half the tract granted to McDowell on January 9, 1804. This reference adopts the description in McDowell's grant; and if by combining them the jury can ascertain the land, the deed is effectual to transfer it. If it be said that the grant to McDowell is not sufficiently identified, that he might have had two grants of the same date, it is a sufficient answer that the two grants are not to be presumed, and that it will be early enough for the plaintiff to explain, when the testimony of the defendant shall render the intentions of the parties ambiguous.
Besides, Wainwright holds Kemp's title, and is bound by all that binds it. Kemp purchased of McChesney, by a *deed bearing the same date with his mortgage; so that he and all who hold his title are bound by its recitals and admissions. 5 Ohio, 194. This deed from McChesney, which identifies the land with the land mortgaged, by employing the same description, recites that it was purchased of McDowell,- and lies in the county of Glermont. The defendant, by his acceptance of Kemp's title, adopts this admission, and supplies that part of the description, which we understood him to allege is wanting in the mortgage. We are of opinion that the deed was properly submitted to the jury.
The second objection taken, arises from the rejection of proof, that the guardians of the plaintiff's lessees had taken possession of the land during the suit. Proof of this suit was properly excluded, unless it proves a defense.
The rights of the parties to a suit are generally to be acted •upon, as they existed at its commencement. In ejectment these rights are founded on a trespass and eviction. To redress these the plaintiff is entitled to recover a judgment for the land, for •damages and for costs ; and this judgment enables him to obtain the mesne profits in another suit. If circumstances, occur by which one object can not or ought not to-be obtained, the plaintiff is still entitled to pursue the other. An alienation during the suit furnishes the defendant with no defense. 2 Ohio, 293, 304. And where the estate of the plaintiff's lessee is for life only, and it expires during the suit, so that, there remains no right to possess the land, yet the plaintiff shall have judgment. 2 Str. 1056; 8 Johns. 507; 18 Johns. 302. The acquisition of the possession by the'plaintiff only accomplishes one object of the suit; he is entitled to judgment to recover his costs, and to aid in further .remedies.
The facts offered to be proved constituted no defense; but if they had been, they were not admissible under the general issue. There is no difference between actions of ejectment and other suits, in which matters of defense arising after issue joined must be brought forward by plea after the last continuance. 7 Johns. 194.
Judgment is entered on the verdict.