Case Name: PEOPLE v. ROBERT G. THOMPSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-02-22
Citations: 81 Mich. App. 348
Docket Number: Docket No. 26215
Parties: PEOPLE v ROBERT G. THOMPSON
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P. J., and Bronson and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 81
Pages: 348–354

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ROBERT G. THOMPSON
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Felony Murder — Malice—Inference of Malice — Underlying Felony- — Jury Question— Instruction to Jury — Appeal and Error.
The presence or absence of malice in each first-degree murder case remains a question for jury determination, although malice may be inferred from the nature of an underlying felony in a felony-murder case and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the felony; therefore, a defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory should be reversed, and the matter remanded, where a trial judge, in his instructions to the jury, removed the essential element of malice from the jury’s consideration.
2. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Felony Murder — Underlying Felony — Prosecutor’s Option.
A prosecutor may choose on remand after a defendant’s conviction for felony murder has been reversed, where the defendant was convicted of both first-degree murder, under a felony-murder theory, and armed robbery, the underlying felony, either to have the defendant’s armed robbery conviction and sentence stand or to have it vacated and retry the defendant on armed robbery and first-degree murder charges.
Dissent by M. J. Kelly, J.
3. Homicide — Felony Murder — Underlying Felony — Armed Robbery — Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy.
Punishing a defendant for the greater offense of ñrst-degree felony murder and for the included offense of the underlying felony constitutes a violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution; therefore, a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery should he reversed where the armed robbery was the felony upon which the jury based the defendant’s conviction for felony murder (US Const, Am V, Am XIV, Const 1963, art 1, § 15).
References for Points in Headnotes
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 247, 498-500.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 190.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 194.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 500.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 525.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 91, 92.
4. Homicide — Felony Murder — Instructions to Jury — Malice— Underlying Felony — Preserving Issue — Manifest Injustice.
Failure of a defendant at his trial on a felony-murder charge to object to a trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of malice, and, in effect, letting the jury imply malice from the underlying felony to the killing precludes the Court of Appeals from reviewing the issue because there is no manifest injustice; whether the instruction uses the word murder or killing in connection with an underlying felony, an omission to instruct on malice should not be reversible error unless properly preserved for review by objection or by the trial court’s refusal to give a properly requested instruction.
5. Homicide — Felony Murder — Common-Law Felony Murder — Instructions to Jury — Malice—Underlying Felony — Statutes.
The common-law felony-murder rule does not require the giving of an instruction to the jury on malice because malice is imputed from a killing which takes place during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies (MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548).
6. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Allen Charge.
A charge to the jury which instructs them that they must examine the question submitted to them with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other, and that the verdict must be that of each juror, the result of his own convictions and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, and then urges them to reach a verdict if they can conscientiously do so, the so-called Allen charge, is not per se coercive; any claim of coercion must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Appeal from Saginaw, Eugene Snow Huff, J.
Submitted October 4, 1977, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 26215.)
Decided February 22, 1978.
Limited leave to appeal granted, 402 Mich 938.
Robert G. Thompson was convicted of armed robbery and first-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert L. Kaczmarek, Prosecuting Attorney, and Peter C. Jensen, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Daniel J. Wright, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P. J., and Bronson and M. J. Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, P. J.
For the reasons stated in People v Fountain, 71 Mich App 491; 248 NW2d 589 (1976), in People v Wright, 80 Mich App 172; 262 NW2d 917 (1977), and in Judge Riley's dissent in People v Till, 80 Mich App 16; 263 NW2d 586 (1977), we disagree with our brother's conclusion that reversible error did not result from the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the element of malice in the felony-murder charge. We join, however, in his disposition of the other issues raised.
For this reason, we would reverse the first-degree murder conviction and remand to the trial court. Upon remand, as we find no error relating to the armed robbery conviction, we would allow the prosecutor to choose either to have the armed robbery conviction and sentence stand or to have it vacated and to retry the defendant on armed robbery and first-degree murder.
Bronson, J., concurred.