Case Name: FT. WORTH & R. G. RY. CO. v. NEAL
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-05-17
Citations: 140 S.W. 398
Docket Number: 
Parties: FT. WORTH & R. G. RY. CO. v. NEAL.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 140
Pages: 398–400

Head Matter:
FT. WORTH & R. G. RY. CO. v. NEAL.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
May 17, 1911.
On Rehearing, June 15, 1911.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 18, 1911.)
1. Damages (§ 166 ) — Evidence—Relevancy —Personal Conditions.
A question, asking a medical witness for plaintiff, in an action against a railroad for personal injuries, as to whether it was not a fact that people who had damage suits against railroads, and other causes for simulating injury, could and did fool physicians to a great extent about what was the matter with them when it was an internal injury, is inadmissible, as being irrelevant and immaterial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Dee. Dig. § 166. ]
2. Trial (§ 192 ) — Instructions — Conformity to Evidence.
Where the uncontroverted evidence showed that plaintiff was thrown from the caboose in which he was riding by a collision, an instruction assuming such fact is not erroneous.
■ [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 432-434; Dec. Dig. § 192. ]
3. Appeal and Error (§ 1004 ) — Yerdict — Amount of Recovery.
The amount of a verdict for damages in a personal injury case being for the jury, unless there is good reason to believe that they were influenced by bias or prejudice, the court will not say that it is excessive.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error. Cent. Dig. §§ 3944-3947; Dec. Dig. § 1004. ]
On Rehearing.
4. Carriers (§§ 315, 316 ) — Action for Injuries — Presumption and Burden of Proof —Res Ipsa Loquitur.
Where the petition, in an action against a railroad for personal injuries to a passenger, alleges that he was injured while riding in a caboose of defendant’s train by another of defendant’s freight trains running into the caboose by reason of the negligent acts of the employés in charge of each of defendant’s trains, the 'plaintiff, having limited his allegations of negligence to certain employés of defendant, cannot recover upon proof of facts which indicate negligence of some character, on the part of defendant, but does not show negligence on the part of those whom he had specifically charged with negligence causing his injury, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1281, 1283-1294; Dec. Dig. §§ 315, 316. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. CARRIERS (§ 318 )—Action for Injuries —Sufficiency of Evidence—Negligence Causing Collision.
Evidence, in an action against a railroad company for personal injuries from a collision of freight trains, in the caboose of one of which plaintiff was riding, submitted by a charge which limited plaintiff’s right to recover to proof of negligence on the part of defendant’s employ^ in charge of' the train, held sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1307-1314; Dec. Dig. § 318. ]
Appeal from District Court, McCulloch County; John W. Goodwin, Judge.
Action by W. P. Neal against the Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Andrews, Ball & Streetman and F. M. Newman, for appellant. Joe Adkins and Woodward & Baker, for appellee.
writ oí error denied by Supreme Court December 13, 1911.
For other oases see same topic ana section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes-

Opinion:
JENKINS, J.
Appellee was a passenger in a caboose on appellant's road. While said caboose was standing on the track at one of appellant's stations, it was run into and wrecked by an engine hauling a train on said track. Appellee received injuries in said wreck for which he recovered judgment herein in the sum of $4,000, from which judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.
1. Appellant assigns error on the refusal of the court to allow it to ask Dr. Long, a witness for appellee, the following question, "Is it not a fact that people who have damage suits against railroads, and other causes for simulating injury, can and do fool physicians to a great extent about what is the matter with them when it is an internal injury?" As to whether this appellee was probably or possibly deceiving this witness was a proper subject of inquiry, and appellant was permitted to pursue such inquiry to the fullest extent. It was proper for appellant to show, if it could, that ap-pellee was probably malingering; but that others had done so would not tend to prove this fact. It was permissible to show that the alleged injuries of appellee were of such a nature that a physician could not determine with certainty their existence or nonexistence; but that other persons had been able to deceive other physicians as to other alleged injuries was irrelevant and immaterial as to any legitimate inquiry in this case.
2. The appellant assigns error on the charge of the court in submitting the general issue of negligence in the operation of appellant's train as the cause of the appellee's injury, upon the ground that appellee specifically alleged the negligence complained of, and therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Appellant is in error as to the nature of appellee's allegations. He does, in a separate count of his petition, wherein he claims exemplary damages, allege that appellant's train crew were incompetent, and were retained by appellant in its service after such incompetency was known to it. But no evidence was offered to sustain this allegation; appellee did not request that it be submitted to the jury, and it was not submitted, for which reasons it must be treated as having been abandoned. As to actual damages, appellee alleged in general terms that the collision occurred by reason of the negligence of appellant's servants in operating its said trains, and each of them, for which reason the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
3. The uncontroverted evidence shows that appellee was thrown from the caboose in the collision, for which reason the court did not err in assuming such fact in its charge.
4. We cannot, under the evidence in this case, say that the judgment is excessive. This being a matter for the jury, we will not invade their province, unless there is good reason to believe that they were influenced by bias or prejudice.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment herein is affirmed.
Affirmed.