Case Name: CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, et al. v. IACOBUCCI, dba TALK OF THE TOWN, et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-11-17
Citations: 479 U.S. 92
Docket Number: No. 86-139
Parties: CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, et al. v. IACOBUCCI, dba TALK OF THE TOWN, et al.
Judges: Justice Scalia would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 479
Pages: 92–103

Head Matter:
CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, et al. v. IACOBUCCI, dba TALK OF THE TOWN, et al.
No. 86-139.
Decided November 17, 1986

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
In 1982, the City Commission of Newport, Ky., enacted Ordinance No. 0-82-85. This ordinance prohibited nude or nearly nude dancing in local establishments licensed to sell liquor for consumption on the premises. A state law imposing an almost identical prohibition on nude dancing was upheld by this Court in New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U. S. 714 (1981) (per curiam), as being within the State's broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the sale of liquor within its boundaries.
Respondents, proprietors of Newport liquor establishments that offered nude or nearly nude entertainment, challenged the ordinance in federal court. They contended that the ordinance deprived them of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against its enforcement. The District Court ruled that the ordinance was constitutional, stating that it "is squarely within the doc trine of Bellanca . . . and must be upheld on that basis." App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed that judgment. 785 F. 2d 1354 (1986). It found the decision in Bellanca inapplicable because in Kentucky local voters, rather than the city or the Commonwealth, determine whether alcohol may be sold. Pursuant to the authority granted by the Commonwealth's Constitution, Kentucky expressly authorizes a city to conduct a popular election on a question of local prohibition when a specified proportion of qualified voters petition for such an election. See Ky. Rev. Stat. §242.010-242.990 (1981 and Supp. 1986). Noting this Court's statement in Bellanca that "[t]he State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs," 452 U. S., at 717, the Court of Appeals' majority nevertheless concluded that the ordinance could not be justified under the broad authority bestowed by the Twenty-first Amendment. It stated that this case does not fall within the Bellanca "doctrine" or "rationale" because the city "cannot exercise in part a power it does not hold in full." 785 F. 2d, at 1358. The court remanded the case for a determination, among other things, of the city's authority to enact the ordinance under its police power. The dissenting judge argued that the majority read Bellanca too narrowly, and he contended that the city is not restricted solely to the exercise of the police power to regulate the liquor industry.
We agree with the dissent's conclusion that this case is controlled by Bellanca, and we therefore reverse. The reach of the Twenty-first Amendment is certainly not without limit, but previous decisions of this Court have established that, in the context of liquor licensing, the Amendment confers broad regulatory powers on the States.
"While the States, vested as they are with general police power, require no specific grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to matters traditionally within the scope of the police power, the broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 114 (1972).
This regulatory authority includes the power to ban nude dancing as part of a liquor license control program. "In LaRue . we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing and that a State could therefore ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license program." Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 932-933 (1975). In Bellanca, the Court upheld a state statute imposing just such a ban.
The Court of Appeals misperceived this broad base for the ruling in Bellanca and seized upon a single sentence, characterizing it as the "doctrine" or "rationale" of Bellanca. Because a Kentucky city cannot ban the sale of alcohol without election approval, the court concluded that it similarly cannot regulate nude dancing in bars. In holding that a State "has broad power . to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under which liquor may be sold," Bellanca, 452 U. S., at 715, this Court has never attached any constitutional significance to a State's division of its authority over alcohol. The Twenty-first Amendment has given broad power to the States and generally they may delegate this power as they see fit.
There is certainly no constitutional requirement that the same governmental unit must grant liquor licenses, revoke licenses, and regulate the circumstances under which liquor may be sold. Indeed, while Kentucky provides that the question of local prohibition is to be decided by popular election, the parties are in agreement that the city is vested with the power to revoke a liquor license upon a finding of a violation of state law, a state liquor regulation, or a city ordinance. See Brief in Opposition 7. Yet, the rationale of the opinion of the Court of Appeals implies that, because of the Kentucky Constitution, neither the State nor the city may revoke a liquor license under the authority of the Twenty-first Amendment. Only a strained reading of Bellanca would require each licensing decision to be made by plebiscite. Moreover, there is no statutory provision that gives the voters direct authority, once the sale of alcohol is permitted, to determine the manner of regulation. Thus, if respondents were to prevail in their argument that only voters can ban nudity because only voters have the authority to ban the sale of alcohol, it is possible that nude dancing in bars would be immune from any regulation.
The Newport City Commission, in the preamble to the ordinance, determined that nude dancing in establishments serving liquor was "injurious to the citizens" of the city. It found the ordinance necessary to a range of purposes, including "preventing] blight and the deterioration of the City's neigh borhoods" and "decreasing] the incidence of crime, disorderly conduct and juvenile delinquency." See 785 F. 2d, at 1360. "Given the added presumption in favor of the validity of the . . . regulation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment requires," California v. LaRue, 409 U. S., at 118-119, it is plain that, as in Bellanca, the interest in maintaining order outweighs the interest in free expression by dancing nude. The fact that the Commonwealth of Kentucky has delegated one portion of its power under the Twenty-first Amendment to the electorate — the power to decide if liquor may be served in local establishments — does not differentiate this case from Bellanca.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
Newport Ordinance No. 0-82-85, §11, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for and a person is guilty of performing nude or nearly nude activity when that person appears on a business establishment's premises in such a manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of the pubic area, anus, vulva or genitals, or any simulation thereof, or when any female appears on a business establishment's premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view portion of the breast referred to as the areola, nipple, or simulation thereof."
Sections IV and V specify criminal and civil penalties for any violation of the ordinance. A proprietor who knowingly permits the proscribed activity on his premises may have his occupational license and liquor license revoked.
Ordinance No. 0-82-85 is set forth in its entirety in the appendix to the Court of Appeals' opinion. See 785 F. 2d 1354, 1360-1362 (CA6 1986).
The Twenty-first Amendment provides in relevant part: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
Respondents also challenged a second Newport ordinance, see 785 F. 2d, at 1362-1363, requiring employees of establishments that sell liquor by the drink to register with the Police Department and be fingerprinted. The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of this second ordinance as a valid implementation of the city's police power. Id., at 1355-1358. That ordinance is not at issue here.
The Kentucky Constitution, §61, provides:
"The General Assembly shall, by general law, provide a means whereby the sense of the people of any county, city, town, district or precinct may be taken, as to whether or not spirituous, vinous or malt liquors shall be sold, bartered or loaned therein, or the sale thereof regulated. But nothing herein shall be construed to interfere with or to repeal any law in force relating to the sale or gift of such liquors. All elections on this question may be held on a day other than the regular election days."
See, e. g., California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 120, n. (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring):
"This is not to say that the Twenty-first Amendment empowers a State to act with total irrationality or invidious discrimination in controlling the distribution and dispensation of liquor within its borders. And it most assuredly is not to say that the Twenty-first Amendment necessarily overrides in its allotted area any other relevant provision of the Constitution. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433; Hostetter v. Idlewild, Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 329-334; Dept. of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341."
Because it found Bellanca inapplicable, the Court of Appeals did not reach the state-law question of delegation of authority by the Commonwealth to the city of Newport. We express no opinion on this issue.