Case Name: William G. Wallace v. Thomas Freeman & Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 91
Docket Number: 
Parties: William G. Wallace v. Thomas Freeman & Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 91–93

Head Matter:
William G. Wallace v. Thomas Freeman & Co.
Where H. & R. purchased goods of F., which they put into their stock in trade, and afterwards W. took the place of R. in the firm, and the new firm agreed to pay the debt to F., which promise F. accepted and released R., W. could not plead the statute of frauds, that his promise was not in writing.
The new promise was an original undertaking. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3875.)
[Note.—For the authorities on this Article, see Paschal’s Dig., Note 903.]
Appeal from Travis. The case was tried before the Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
Freeman & Co. sued Heffington and Wallace, alleging that they sold Heffington & Randolph, merchants and partners, a quantity of brandy, and that afterwards Randolph sold his interest in the stock in trade to the defendant, Wallace, in consideration of which Wallace bound himself to relieve Randolph from all the outstanding liabilities against Heffington & Randolph, and specially agreed to pay the debt of Heffington & Randolph to Freeman & Co., and that Wallace afterwards paid Freeman & Co. a part of the debt, leaving a balance due of $159, for which suit was brought. The defendant, Wallace, demurred, and plead the general issue, and that he did not make such promise in writing as is required by the statute of frauds. Randolph was released by the plaintiffs. Randolph was introduced as a witness. He swore that Heffington & Randolph purchased the goods of Freeman & Co.; that after-wards the witness sold his interest in the firm to the defendant, Wallace, and that Wallace agreed to become responsible and pay the debt to the plaintiff, to which they assented; that he paid $50, and promised to pay the balance as soon as he got the money. The court charged the jury that if Wallace assumed to pay the debt of Heffington & Randolph, and that Freeman & Co. accepted this promise of the new firm, in lieu of the old firm of Heffington & Randolph, and released Randolph on account of further liability, then they would find for the defendant. And the court refused to charge that no suit can be maintained, whereby to charge the defendant upon a special promise to answer for the debt of another person, unless the promise or some memorandum thereof was in writing. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the balance of the debt for which there was judgment.
Flournoy Carter, for appellant,
relied upon the second clause of the statute of frauds. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3875.) And they cited Lemmon v. Box, 20 Tex., 330, and Rollins v. Hope, 18 Tex., 450.
Shelley £ Carrington, for appellees,
denied that the case came within the statute of frauds, and relied upon the same authorities; and they insisted that, as it was agreed that Randolph should be discharged, and he actually was discharged, the new firm became liable for the debt, for which they cited Corbet v. Cochran, Riley, 44; same case, 3 Hill, S. C., 41; McKenzie v. Jackson, 4 Ala., 230; Kershaw v. Whitaker, 1 Brev., 9; Creel v. Bell, 2 J. J. Marsh, 309; Smith v. Finch, 2 Scam., 321; Stanley v. Hendricks, 13 Iredell, 86.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—The promise of the defendant, Wallace, to pay the debt due from Randolph to the plaintiffs was an original and not a collateral promise, and therefore was not within the statute of frauds. It was an original undertaking upon a new and distinct consideration, whereby the defendant became substituted in the place of Randolph, and the debt became his own debt. The defendant undertook to pay, in consideration of the transfer to him of Randolph's interest in the stock in trade, and the plaintiffs, upon being informed of it, agreed to accept and look to him, and released Randolph. The statute does not apply to such a case. (2 Parsons on Con., 304; 2 Kent's Comm., 123; Lemmon v. Box, 20 Tex., 329.) There is no error in the judgment; and it is
Affirmed.