Case Name: PEOPLE v. KOAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-07-20
Citations: 70 Mich. App. 214
Docket Number: Docket No. 24114
Parties: PEOPLE v KOAN
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 70
Pages: 214–217

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v KOAN
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Right to Counsel — Sentencing — Court Rules.
It is not necessary at the time of sentencing following a probation revocation hearing to advise a defendant that she has the right to counsel, where the defendant has already intelligently waived her right to counsel at the revocation hearing; the court rule regulating sentencing procedures in regular criminal actions does not apply to probation revocation proceedings (GCR 1963, 785.8).
Dissent by Beasley, J.
2. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Right to Counsel — Sentencing — Waiver—Court Rules.
The court rule which entitles a defendant to be represented by counsel at sentencing unless she affirmatively waives that right is mandatory even where she has previously during the course of proceedings waived assistance of counsel; a waiver of counsel by a defendant at a probation revocation hearing was not sufficient to constitute a similar waiver at the subsequent sentencing where she was given no hint at the hearing that she would also be entitled to counsel at the time of sentence (GCR 1963, 785.4[1]).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 567, 568.
Right to notice and hearing before revocation of suspension of sentence, parole, conditional pardon, or probation. 29 ALR2d 1074.
Appeal from Barry, Richard Robinson, J.
Submitted May 5, 1976, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 24114.)
Decided July 20, 1976.
Janet L. Koan was convicted of knowingly issu ing a check without sufficient funds with intent to defraud, and placed on probation. Probation revoked. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and David A. Dimmers, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Reid & Reid, P. C, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Quinn, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, P. J.
Defendant appeals from her sentence following the revocation of her probation on the following allegations of error: defendant was denied counsel at her probation revocation hearing; defendant was denied counsel at sentencing; defendant's uncounseled plea of guilty to the probation violation was invalid.
Defendant was not denied counsel at her revocation hearing. The record establishes that she intelligently waived counsel at that time.
Defendant's argument that she was denied counsel at time of sentencing is based on the premise that counsel must be present at the time of sentencing, or that she must again be advised of her right to counsel at time of sentencing and again intelligently waive that right.
Neither the decided cases nor GCR 1963, 785.8(1) cited in support of defendant's basic premise apply to a sentencing following revocation of probation where defendant intelligently waived her right to counsel prior to the revocation hearing. The cases are factually inapposite and GCR 1963, 785.8(1) must be read in context with the total rule. When this is done, it is apparent that 785.8(1) has no application to probation revocation proceedings. They are fully covered by statute, MCLA 771.4; MSA 28.1134, except for the right to counsel requirement or intelligent waiver thereof.
The third allegation of error merits no discussion.
Affirmed.
D. E. Holbrook, J., concurred.