Case Name: CITY OF BOISE, a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, Petitioner-Respondent, v. David FRAZIER, an interested party, Respondent-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 2006-04-13
Citations: 143 Idaho 1
Docket Number: No. 30944
Parties: CITY OF BOISE, a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, Petitioner-Respondent, v. David FRAZIER, an interested party, Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 143
Pages: 1–10

Head Matter:
137 P.3d 388
CITY OF BOISE, a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, Petitioner-Respondent, v. David FRAZIER, an interested party, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 30944.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise,
May 2005 Term.
April 13, 2006.
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox,- Boise, for appellant. Heather A. Cunningham argued.
Boise City Attorney’s Office, Boise, for respondent. Matthew K. Wilde argued.
Skinner, Fawcett & Mauk, Boise, for respondent. Dennis Gíbala appeared.

Opinion:
BURDICK, Justice.
David Frazier (Frazier) appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from a district court decision authorizing the City of Boise (the City) to incur a public liability in order to expand the parking facilities at the Boise Airport. Frazier argues the agreement entered into by the City is in violation of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution requiring a public vote before incurring a debt or liability unless the proposed undertaking is "ordinary and necessary." Additionally, Frazier contends the parking expansion violates the prohibition on public loans or gifts of credit to private entities found in Article VIII, § 4 of the Idaho Constitution because portions of the expanded parking facilities will be leased by private rental car companies. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for a determination of Frazier's costs and attorney fees.
I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The City has owned and operated an airport since 1926, and the Boise Airport has been at its current location since 1939. The Boise Airport serves as the principal airport for southwestern Idaho and eastern Oregon. The number of travelers passing through the airport is expected to grow substantially in the coming years.
The City sought judicial confirmation in district court to allow the City to enter into an agreement for the expansion of the airport's parking facilities. The proposed agreement involved the City incurring long term indebtedness to finance the project. Frazier filed a notice of appearance and opposed the City's petition for judicial eonfirmation. After the parties conducted discovery and a hearing was held, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the City's petition.
The district court found parking capacity to be an integral part of the operation of a regional airport and the parking facilities at the Boise Airport to be inadequate to meet current or future needs. The district court additionally found that the proposed five level parking facility was not new construction, but instead was an expansion of the existing facility. As a result, the district court determined the expansion project was an "ordinary and necessary" expense that did not require a public vote for its approval, and that leasing parking space to rental car companies would not be an impermissible gift of the City's credit because such leases were consistent with public use of the facility.
Frazier filed a timely appeal that is now before this Court.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court defers to the factual findings of the district court unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999). This Court exercises free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782, 784 (1999). Constitutional issues are questions of law over which we also exercise free review. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314, 316 (2004).
III.ANALYSIS
Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars cities from incurring debts or liabilities without first conducting an election to secure voter approval for the proposed expenditure. The section, however, contains a notable exception. No public vote is required if the expenditure is for an "ordinary and necessary" expense "authorized by the general laws of the state____" This exception is referred to as the "proviso clause." City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 778, 473 P.2d 644, 648 (1970).
In the present case, the district court ruled that the parking expansion was an ordinary and necessary expense within the meaning of the constitution. Consequently, the district court concluded the City was lawfully authorized to incur liabilities in order to finance its completion. Frazier argues the expansion is not an "ordinary and necessary" undertaking and therefore the City must obtain the consent of the voting public before entering into the proposed financing agreement.
A. The Development of Article VIII, § 3
Article VIII, § 3 has been part of Idaho's Constitution since the beginning of statehood. The draft version of Article VIII, § 3 that was submitted to the 1889 Idaho Constitutional Convention was modeled after and nearly identical to Article XI, § 18 of the California Constitution of 1879. See 1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889, 589 (1912) (henceforth 1 Proceedings); Cal. Const. of 1879, Art. XI, § 18. The intention was to prevent local government entities from incurring debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan to retire those debts. Donald Crowley & Florence Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution 170 (1994).
Broadly speaking, Article VIII, § 3 imposes two requirements to be met by local governments before incurring indebtedness. The first requirement is a public election securing two-thirds of the vote, and the second is the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the debt within thirty years. The remainder of the section consists of exceptions to those requirements, beginning with the previously mentioned proviso clause and continuing with language added in a series of subsequent amendments not applicable to our analysis.
When the draft version of Article VIII, § 3 was presented to the constitutional convention, it was amended by the delegates to add the words "provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state." See Idaho Const. art VIII, § 3; 1 Proceedings at 584-94. Delegate William Claggett offered the original proviso clause. See 1 Proceedings at 586. Claggett explained Ms intent to the other delegates, stating: "[w]e all know that in the practical administration of county government, that there sometimes will be extraordinary expenses, I mean extraordinary expenses in the ordmary administration of affairs." Id. at 588. By way of example, Claggett mentioned the payment of witness fees. Id. Other delegates mentioned juror fees and criminal court expenses, id. at 590, the expense of controlling streams and ditches, id. at 592, and "any emergency" id. at 587.
B. The Proposed Parking Expansion Is Not An "Ordinary And Necessary" Expense Under Article VIII, § 3
In determining whether the proposed parking expansion is ordinary and necessary, we turn first to the question of whether it is "ordinary." This Court has previously held an expense to be ordinary "if in the ordinary course of municipal business, or the maintenance of mumcipal property, it may be and is likely to become necessary." Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968).
Idaho law provides for local governments to maintain and operate airports. I.C. § 50-321. The City's proposal to expand the Boise airport's parking facilities to keep pace with rising demand is entirely consistent with "the ordinary course of municipal business" in operating City property and is a type of expense that "may be and is likely to become necessary." See Hanson, 92 Idaho at 514, 446 P.2d at 636 (defining "ordinary" in the context of the proviso clause). As a result, the City's proposed project is an "ordinary" expense under the circumstances before us.
The phrase "ordinary and necessary," however, is read in the conjunctive. See Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 443, 670 P.2d 839, 850 (1983). Therefore, in order for the expenditure at issue to be "ordinary and necessary" it must also qualify as "necessary." See id. The proper definition of "necessary" as it is used in the proviso clause merits especially close scrutiny in this case. We have articulated two definitions of the term as it appears in the clause. Most recently, this Court quoted Black's Law Dictionary for the proposition that " '[n]ecessary' means 'indispensible'" [sic]. Peterson, 93 Idaho at 778, 473 P.2d at 648. The difficulty with defining "necessary" as "indispensable" is that the definition is circular and provides little guidance. In particular, such a definition does not assist a court in distingmshing truly necessary expenditures from those that are merely desirable or convenient.
Earlier, in Dunbar v. Board of Commissioners of Canyon County, 5 Idaho 407, 412, 49 P. 409, 411 (1897), we wrote that in order for an expense to qualify as necessary under the proviso clause "there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or divnng such year." (Emphasis added). The meaning of "necessary" in the proviso clause takes on added clarity under the Dunbar test because expenditures qualify as "necessary" only if they are truly urgent. The Dunbar test has the additional benefit of matching closely with the types of expenditures the delegates at the Idaho Constitutional Convention discussed when they debated Article VIII, § 3 of our state constitution. Those expenditures included unavoidable expenses, such as carrying on criminal trials and abating flood damage, that could not be delayed. See 1 Proceedings at 590-2. We observe that the expenditures contemplated by the delegates involved immediate or emergency expenses, such as those involving public safety, or expenses the government entity in question was legally obligated to perform promptly.
Although our decisions in the years since Dunbar was handed down have been broadly consistent with the Dunbar test, we have not employed that test expressly. See e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Idaho Health Fac. Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 510, 531 P.2d 588, 600 (1975) (expanding a hospital); Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (replacing unsafe airport terminal); Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) (creating a police retirement fund); Corum v. Common Sch. Dist. No. 21, 55 Idaho 725, 47 P.2d 889 (1935) (paying teacher salaries); Lloyd Corp. v. Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217 (1933) (providing relief for the unemployed); Thomas v. Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921) (providing for police and fire protection services); Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 35 (1915) (paying organizational expenses for a new county); Hickey v. City of Nampa, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912) (rebuilding the city's destroyed water system for fire protection and domestic water supply); Butler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234 (1905) (satisfying a tort judgment and paying the salaries of city officers and employees). Here, we return to the test stated in Dunbar and hold that in order for an expenditure to qualify as "necessary" under the proviso clause of Article VIII, § 3 there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such year.
In Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Idaho 156, 167, 37 P. 277, 280 (1894), this Court wrote that an expenditure to provide for a temporary jail was an ordinary and necessary expense for Bannock County. Such an expense, we observed, "might very properly be expended, when necessary, for repairing a jail already built; and as it was paid for a temporary jail" it was an ordinary and necessary expense. Id. In the same case, this Court determined a debt to purchase land on which to build a permanent courthouse was not ordinary and necessary. We wrote that "[i]t is, of course, the duty of the commissioners to provide a suitable place for holding of the courts and public offices, jails, etc.; but such rooms must be temporarily provided, at as little expense as is consistent with providing suitable quarters, until the question can be submitted to the people." Id. at 168, 37 P. at 281.
Discussing Article VIII, § 3 of our state constitution, we observed in Williams v. City of Emmett that
[t]he Idaho Constitution is imbued with the spirit of economy, and in so far as possible it imposes upon the political subdivisions of the state a pay-as-you-go system of finance. The rule is that, without the express assent of the qualified electors, municipal officers are not to incur debts for which they have not the funds to pay. Such policy entails a measure of crudity and inefficiency in local government, but doubtless the men who drafted the Constitution, having in mind disastrous examples of optimism and extravagance on the part of public officials, thought best to sacrifice a measure of efficiency for a degree of safety. The careful, thrifty citizen sometimes gets along with a crude instrumentality until he is able to purchase and pay for something better. And likewise, under the Constitution, county officers must use the means they have for making fair and equitable assessments until they are able to pay for something more efficient or obtain the consent of those in whose interests they are supposed to act.
51 Idaho 500, 505, 6 P.2d 475, 476 (1931) (quoting Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank v. Clearwater County, 235 F. 743, 754 (D.Idaho 1916)).
Applying our interpretation of the phrase "ordinary and necessary" in this instance, we observe that the parking expansion proposed by the City falls outside the proviso clause. We do not doubt the City's contention that parking facilities are an important part of a well functioning airport. Nor do we question the important role the Boise airport plays in our transportation infrastructure and regional economy. However, regardless of the importance of public airport parking, circumstances do not require the erection of a permanent parking structure on an immediate or emergency basis. The volume of traffic passing through the Boise airport has been growing for some time, and the airport itself has been improved to meet this rising demand. Rather than being a sudden emergency thrust upon the City, the need for expanded parking facilities is an expected expense for which the City has been able to plan. In the short term, the City has been shuttling travelers unable to secure onsite airport parking back and forth from parking areas located offsite. As with the courthouse and jail in Bannock County, we see that here the City is in a position to provide a temporary substitute to a permanent structure. Our state constitution requires the City to make do with such measures until sufficient normal revenue becomes available or the question of whether to enter into debt to build the desired permanent structure can be submitted to the people in accordance with Article VUI, § 3.
In its ruling in this case, the district court determined the proposed parking expansion was an ordinary and necessary expense because it found adequate parking facilities to be "critical" to the operation of the Boise Airport. However, that parking facilities are important, or even critical to the operation of the airport is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article VIII, § 3. Instead, we have held that there must exist a necessity not simply for the expenditure, but also for making the proposed expenditure at or during such year. Dunbar, 5 Idaho at 412, 49 P. at 411.
Additionally, the district court ruled the proposed expenditure was ordinary and necessary because the City's plan called for the expansion of an existing parking facility rather than new construction. Specifically, the City intended to build a multiple floor parking garage on land already being used as surface parking, and the parking garage thus created would be connected to an existing multiple floor parking structure. The district court accurately cited to our decisions in Board of County Commissioners, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588, and Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644, for the proposition that expenses incurred in the repair and improvement of existing facilities can qualify as ordinary and necessary under the proviso clause.
Both Board of County Commissioners and Peterson, however, are distinguishable from this case. First, in both cases we noted the important safety implications of the proposed expenditures. In Board of County Commissioners we stressed the impact of public health in relation to the proposed hospital expansion. 96 Idaho at 510, 531 P.2d at 600. In Peterson we noted the safety threat posed to passengers by an unsound airport passenger terminal and other facilities the City of Pocatello sought to replace. 93 Idaho at 778-79, 473 P.2d at 648-49. The impact on public safety found in both decisions provided the requisite urgency missing from the present case.
Second, the logic holding that repair and improvement of existing facilities can qualify as an ordinary and necessary expense, while sound, simply cannot be extended so far as to cover the circumstances of this case. Converting a flat parking lot into a five floor parking garage is not a repair, nor any recognizable form of maintenance. Likewise, while it is an "improvement" of the existing surface parking, the expansion is so profound as to constitute an entirely new construction in every meaningful sense. Accordingly, we hold that the proposed expenditure is not "necessary" within the meaning of the proviso clause in Article VIII, § 3 and therefore the City must obtain the consent of the voting public before entering into the proposed financing agreement.
As a result of our holding, there is no need for this Court to reach the remaining questions presented by the Appellant.
C. Attorney Fees
Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. The City requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines the ease was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 139, 983 P.2d 208, 212 (1999). The City is not the prevailing party on appeal, and therefore no award of attorney fees is warranted. Frazier argues he is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 7-1313, which provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees for a party who has appeared and prevailed against a political subdivision's petition for judicial confirmation. We agree, and grant Frazier an award for both the costs and attorney fees he incurred in this action.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for an expenditure to qualify as "necessary" as the word is used in the proviso clause to Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution, there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such year. Dunbar, 5 Idaho at 412, 49 P. at 411. The required urgency can result from a number of possible causes, such as threats to public safety, Board of County Comm'rs, 96 Idaho at 510, 531 P.2d at 600, the need for repairs, maintenance, or preservation of existing property, Asson, 105 Idaho at 441-42, 670 P.2d at 848-49, or a legal obligation to make the expenditure without delay, see Butler, 11 Idaho at 404, 83 P. at 238. Whether a proposed expenditure is ordinary and necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Asson, 105 Idaho at 442, 670 P.2d at 849; Board of County Com'rs, 96 Idaho at 510, 531 P.2d at 600; Peterson, 93 Idaho at 776, 473 P.2d at 646. Here, the circumstances of this ease do not require an immediate or emergency expenditure exempting the City from the election requirement of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's confirmation of the City's authority to enter into the proposed lease and trust agreement for the expansion of airport parking facilities. Costs and attorney fees are granted to the Appellant, and we remand to the district court pursuant to I.C. § 7-1313 and I.R.C.P. 54 for a determination of costs and a reasonable sum of attorney fees below and on appeal.
Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS concur.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting without opinion.
. The full text of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution, entitled "Limitations on county and municipal indebtedness," provides:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof, within thirty (30) years from the time of contracting the same. Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be void: Provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state and provided further that any city may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of such city, off street parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and air navigations facilities, and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof may, without regard to any limitation herein imposed, with the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors voting at an election to be held for that purpose, issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the use of, and the service rendered by, such facilities as may be prescribed by law, and provided further, that any city or other political subdivision of the state may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of such city or political subdivision, water systems, sewage collection systems, water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, and may rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities, and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof, may, without regard to any limitation herein imposed, with the assent of a majority of the qualified electors voting at an election to be held for that purpose, issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the use of, and the service rendered by such systems, plants and facilities, as may be prescribed by law; and provided further that any port district, for the purpose of carrying into effect all or any of the powers now or hereafter granted to port districts by the laws of this state, may contract indebtedness and issue revenue bonds evidencing such indebtedness, without the necessity of the voters of the port district authorizing the same, such revenue bonds to be payable solely from all or such part of the revenues of the port district derived from any source whatsoever excepting only those revenues derived from ad valorem taxes, as the port commission thereof may determine, and such revenue bonds not to be in any manner or to any extent a general obligation of the port district issuing the same, nor a charge upon the ad valorem tax revenue of such port district.
(Emphasis added).