Case Name: William W. KELLY, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of A. Wilkes Knight, Appellant v. Rodney A. PEEPLES as Executor of the Estate of Pauline H. Knight and Elroy B. Dantzler, her Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1987-11-23
Citations: 294 S.C. 63
Docket Number: 22804
Parties: William W. KELLY, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of A. Wilkes Knight, Appellant v. Rodney A. PEEPLES as Executor of the Estate of Pauline H. Knight and Elroy B. Dantzler, her Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
Judges: Harwell, J., dissenting.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 294
Pages: 63–68

Head Matter:
22804
William W. KELLY, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of A. Wilkes Knight, Appellant v. Rodney A. PEEPLES as Executor of the Estate of Pauline H. Knight and Elroy B. Dantzler, her Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
(362 S. E. (2d) 636)
Supreme Court
Thomas B. Bryant, III, of Bryant, Fanning & Yarborough, Orangeburg, for appellant.
Richard B. Ness, of Early, Kemp & Ness, Bamberg, for respondents.
Heard May 18, 1987.
Decided Nov. 23, 1987.

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
This appeal is from an order determining the validity of a 1972 written agreement and ordering its enforcement. We reverse.
In 1970, appellant began leasing laundromat equipment from his stepfather for $300 per month. On April 28, 1972, the stepfather signed a bill of sale purporting to "bargain, sell, and deliver" to appellant the laundromat equipment and his interest in the leases of the two buildings where the equipment was located. On August 29, 1972, appellant, his stepfather, and his stepfather's wife signed a purchase agreement providing that appellant pay the $300 per month to the stepfather until the stepfather's death and then to the stepfather's wife until her death. This agreement was signed, witnessed, notarized, and filed in the Orangeburg County Courthouse.
In October 1973, some 14 months after the agreement was signed, the stepfather wrote a will. One clause provided: "I hereby will and bequeath unto my son, William W. Kelly, all of the business interests, leases, and other interests referred to in the agreement between William W. Kelly and A. W. Knight dated August 29, 1972, upon condition that for and during the term of the life of my widow, Pauline Knight, William W. Kelly pay unto her monthly, the sum of Three Hundred ($300.00) Dollars as specified in said agreement." In August 1983, a few weeks before his death, the stepfather updated his will but left this provision unchanged.
Appellant commenced this action seeking to declare the 1972 agreement invalid on the ground it was mutually rescinded. Appellant claimed after the agreement was signed, his stepfather learned that for tax purposes it would be more advantageous for him to continue to lease the equipment rather than sell it. Appellant and his stepfather orally rescinded the agreement and appellant continued to lease the equipment through 1979. At the end of 1979, his stepfather gave him the equipment as a gift.
Respondent counterclaimed for enforcement of the 1972 agreement. They contended its validity was proven by the reference to it in the stepfather's will. After a non-jury trial, the circuit court found the agreement valid. It held appellant was indebted to his stepfather's wife in the amount of $24,516.45 and ordered that he continue to pay her $300 per month for her lifetime under the agreement.
This case was tried as an action in equity. Under our scope of review, we will find facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S. C. 81, 221 S. E. (2d) 773 (1976).
Appellant first contends the trial court erred in finding his testimony regarding rescission of the agreement violated the Dead Man's Statute, S. C. Code Ann. § 19-11-20 (1976). Clearly, appellant was a party to this action and the testimony he sought to introduce: 1) dealt with a transaction or communication between appellant and the deceased; 2) was against a party prosecuting or defending the action as executor, heir-at-law, legatee, devisee, or survivor of such deceased person; and 3) affected a present interest of the appellant. Appellant's testimony, therefore, fell squarely within the Dead Man's Statute and the trial judge properly refused to consider it. See Long v. Conroy, 246 S. C. 225, 142 S. E. (2d) 459 (1965).
We find, even without appellant's testimony, the preponderance of the evidence indicates the 1972 agreement was rescinded. The stepfather's tax returns and testimony of the accountant who prepared them overwhelmingly support this conclusion. These tax records do not reflect a sale of the equipment, nor a recapture of any investment tax credit, but do reflect depreciation and rental income from the equipment through 1979. The 1980 tax return includes a handwritten notation by the accountant that the stepfather made a gift of the equipment to appellant. Based on this evidence, we hold the record establishes rescission of the 1972 agreement. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 386 & 388 (oral rescission may be shown by surrounding circumstances).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court is
Reversed.
Harwell, J., dissenting.