Case Name: Deborah McFARLAND v. ENTERGY MISSISSIPPI, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2005-10-06
Citations: 919 So. 2d 894
Docket Number: No. 2003-CT-00538-SCT
Parties: Deborah McFARLAND v. ENTERGY MISSISSIPPI, INC.
Judges: EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, P.J. WALLER, P.J. AND DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 919
Pages: 894–912

Head Matter:
Deborah McFARLAND v. ENTERGY MISSISSIPPI, INC.
No. 2003-CT-00538-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 6, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 2006.
Robert W. Sneed, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
John H. Dunbar, Walter Alan Davis, Oxford, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SMITH, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Thomas R. McFarland sued Enter-gy Mississippi, Inc. in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, for injuries McFarland received while driving a track which collided with a sagging transmission line maintained by Entergy, in Leland, Mississippi. A motion for directed verdict by Entergy was denied, and the jury returned a verdict for the McFarland in the amount of $300,000.00.
¶ 2. Entergy filed post trial motions, including a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") and in the Alternative, for New Trial. The trial court then granted Entergy's Motion for JNOV, and held that the motion for new trial was granted in the event that the JNOV was overturned on appeal.
¶ 3. McFarland appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of the JNOV and remanded for a new trial. McFarland v. Entergy, 918 So.2d 697, 705 (Miss.App.2004). McFarland filed a petition for certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision not to review the trial court's conditional grant of a new trial, as provided in Rule 50 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Entergy also filed a petition for certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the JNOV. Both petitions for certiorari were granted.
¶ 4. After thorough review, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held Entergy to a higher standard of care. The jury, however, was instructed that only a degree of ordinary care was required under these facts. We also hold that the trial judge was correct in granting Entergy's Motion for a JNOV and the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of the JNOV and remanded the case for a new trial. Finally, we hold that McFarland waived the remaining issues concerning the conditional grant of a new trial.
FACTS
¶ 5. On February 9, 1994, a severe ice storm struck the Mississippi Delta causing extensive damage. The ice storm caused trees to fall and limbs to snap, as well as downing power lines throughout the area. The area involved was roughly one hundred fifty miles long and fifty miles wide, stretching from DeSoto County to the Sharkey County line and eastward through Leflore County. In total, the storm affected an area of approximately 5,200 square miles.
¶ 6. There were hundreds of miles of downed power lines including over 25,000 poles and hundreds of miles of downed transmission lines. Numerous towns, cities, and untold thousands of individuals throughout the area went without power for weeks. Even on the date of the accident, five days after the storm commenced, there remained nineteen cities and towns without power and 45,000 Entergy customers in Washington County alone without power. Approximately 2,500 additional electrical power workers from other corn- panies and surrounding sister states were sent in to help with this disaster. Additionally, thousands of volunteers were involved in helping with cleanup and repair in the various affected communities. For the first time ever, Entergy lost steel structure transmission poles. Over 100 transmission line structures alone had to be repaired by specialized crews. A priority system was initiated for restoring power: hospitals, water systems, municipal services, sheriffs and police offices, sewer systems, then all others. Helicopter surveys conducted by Entergy revealed that approximately 80% of a twenty mile stretch of transmission lines, running from Indianola to Greenville, were flattened to the ground. The same survey, however, did not reveal any problem with the site at issue because, as the testimony revealed, a sagging line could not be detected from the air as easy as a flattened line lying on the ground.
¶ 7. Before the accident occurred on February 14, 1994, at approximately 3:30 p.m. former Deputy Sheriff Tony Sullivan testified that he observed a sagging transmission line over North Main Street in Leland, Mississippi. Sullivan also testified that he informed a man about the sagging line who was sitting in a truck with the MP & L (Entergy's predecessor) logo on its side.
¶ 8. Public travel advisories existed throughout the area warning drivers of downed power lines and other open and obvious hazards. Ignoring those warnings, McFarland drove his employer's eighteen-wheeler into the Mississippi Delta during the night time. At approximately 7:00 p.m. as McFarland traveled at a speed of no more than 15 miles per hour in the severely devastated area, he struck the dead transmission line which sagged approximately eight feet above the roadway.
¶ 9. The following issues are before us:
I. Did the Court of Appeals Err When it Applied a High Standard of Care to Entergy?
II. Did the Trial Court Err by Granting Entergy's Motion for Jnov?
III. Do the Appellate Courts Have Jurisdiction to Determine Whether a Trial Court's Grant of a New Trial Is Appropriate When a Trial Court Concurrently Enters a Jnov and a Conditional Grant of a New Trial, and the JNOV Is Reversed on Appeal?
IV. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Granting, in the Alternative, Enter-gy's Motion for New Trial.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶ 10. The Court of Appeals decision stated that "[t]he public policy of this State requires 'utilities to exercise a very high degree of care in protecting the public from the dangers of electricity' " McFarland, at ¶ 11 (citations omitted). McFarland argues that the Court of Appeals was correct to impose this higher standard of care upon Entergy, but also argues that at trial Entergy was only held to a reasonable care standard, and therefore this issue is irrelevant. Entergy argues that when the property or activity of the utility does not involve the risk of electrocution, they should only be held to the duty of reasonable care. We agree.
¶ 11. Since 1907, this Court has held utility companies to a high standard of care. "[CJorporations handling the dangerous agency of electricity are bound, and justly bound, to the very highest measure of skill and care in dealing with these deadly agencies." (emphasis added). Temple v. McComb City Elec. Light & Power Co., 89 Miss. 1, 42 So. 874 (1907). This Court has also stated, "The degree of dili gence which a distributor of electricity must observe in the distribution of the dangerous agency of electricity is a very high degree of care." MP & L v. Shepard, 285 So.2d 725, 729 (Miss.1973) (emphasis added).
¶ 12. This high standard of care was imposed because of the life threatening dangers of electricity. In Shepard, this Court quoted 26 Am.Jur.2d Electricity, Gas and Steam § 42, at 248-49 (1966), which stated:
The degree of care required to be used in the production, distribution, and use of electricity is stated in various terms which, perhaps, convey merely one idea. To declare that the utmost care must be used to prevent injury sound different in statement than to say that ordinary care must be used in view of all the circumstances; but when analyzed, the meaning is not far different, for the ordinary care required under the cimmstances is, in its practical application and in vieiv of the highly dangerous character of electricity, a relatively high degree of care.
285 So.2d at 729. (emphasis added). Therefore, the degree of ordinary care required under the circumstances, i.e. when dealing with the dangerous nature electricity, is a high degree of care. "Moreover, the degree of care increases as the danger increases." Id. The danger of a live wire, is no doubt more dangerous than a wire without electricity; thus the high degree of care should not be utilized unless such is required under the circumstances. In Spears v. Miss. Power & Light, 562 So.2d 107 (Miss.1990), this Court utilized the reasonable care standard when determining whether or not a power company had negligently placed a power pole in the middle of a heavily traveled parking lot. Id. at 108. This Court also stated in Spears that, "Reasonable care is the care a reasonable person would exercise under like circumstances." Id.
¶ 13. We find that utility companies should be held to a reasonable standard, i.e. they should exercise the care that is reasonable in like circumstances. The degree of care that is reasonable will either increase or decrease based upon various circumstances. When circumstances involve live wires, we hold that the reasonable standard of care is elevated to one of a high degree. However, if electricity is not present, the utility company should exercise "reasonable care."
¶ 14. After an examination of the record, it is apparent that the jury was instructed that Entergy was to be held to a reasonable standard of care. In fact, both attorneys for McFarland and Entergy referred to this standard of reasonableness in their closing arguments. Furthermore, the jury instructions only referred to a reasonable standard of care. While the Court of Appeals erroneously imposed this higher standard, this standard had no impact at trial because the jury was properly instructed that Entergy was to be held to a reasonable care standard. Except for clarifications of the proper standard, the issue is irrelevant and therefore Entergy's appeal on this issue is without merit.
II.
¶ 15. The standard of review for a grant of a JNOV verdict is well settled:
A motion for a JNOV tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict, not the weight of the evidence. Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20, 23 (Miss.1994). It asks the court to hold, as a matter of law, that the verdict may not stand. Goodwin v. Derryberry Co., 553 So.2d 40, 42 (Miss.1989) (citing Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss.1984)). When a motion for JNOV is made, the trial court must con sider all of the evidence — not just evidence which supports the non-movant's case — in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, granting the motion is required. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 54 (Miss.2004).
White v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 905 So.2d 506, 510 (Miss.2004).
a.
NOTICE
¶ 16. McFarland argues the facts in this case are sufficient to impose a duty upon Entergy. However, utility companies only have a duty to "eliminate foreseeable danger." Miss. Power & Light v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721, 728-29 (Miss. 1998). While Entergy knew the ice storm had created problems with many of their lines, they did not have knowledge that this particular line was sagging and caused a potential hazard to drivers. This Court has stated that "Time, place and circumstances must be taken into account." Roberts v. Miss. Power & Light, 193 Miss. 627, 10 So.2d 542, 543 (1942). Whether Enter-gy owed a duty to McFarland turns on the question of whether Entergy had notice of the dangerous condition.
¶ 17. The Court of Appeals relied heavily upon the allegation of "the fact that this transmission line had been down for 5 days." McFarland v. Entergy, 918 So.2d at 708. We note, however, that the record reveals that the line was not down, but rather was sagging approximately 8 feet above the road. The record also reflects that it was a physical impossibility for Entergy to have known where each and every downed power line was located just days after this ice storm. This is true even though the record reveals that Enter-gy conducted a helicopter flyover survey of the disaster area which failed to reveal the sagging line in question. This storm brought down transmission lines and poles, a first time event in Mississippi. Even more critically, the ice storm came in "waves," commencing on Feb. 9 and continuing on the 10th and 11th. In fact, looking solely to the record, we do not know whether the line was even sagging for five days. What we do know, according to Sullivan, is that someone apparently had placed barricades at the scene two days prior to the accident, but the barricades were not there when Sullivan drove by the scene three to three and a half hours prior to the accident. Thus, the record reflects that the line was sagging at most two days prior to the accident; any additional time is mere speculation.
¶ 18. Former Deputy Tony Sullivan claims to have reported the sagging line to a man sitting in a truck with an MP & L logo on it while parked on the side of North Main Street. If this testimony of Tony Sullivan is taken as true, we must consider the rest of the material facts. For example, Sullivan could not identify the individual or even recall what he said. In fact, the individual easily could have been one of the many volunteers riding with and assisting these crews. Although the record reflects that Sullivan had the "impression" that they "would take care of it," the record reflects that the trial judge excluded Sullivan's understanding of the conversation.
¶ 19. We find that these facts fail to satisfy the condition precedent of notice to Entergy. Entergy has consistently denied any notice whatsoever in this case. The learned trial judge held the only evidence McFarland provided indicating any notice was the testimony of Sullivan concerning an unidentified person sitting in a truck having an MP & L logo and parked on the side of the roadway near a substation. There is no proof that this person was an Entergy employee, a service man, or that he was even the driver of the truck. We do not know from this record anything about the individual, as the record was insufficient and poorly developed on this issue. No proof was offered as to this person's direct or apparent authority; therefore, the judge correctly held the evidence was insufficient to establish notice to Entergy.
¶ 20. This Court has dealt with a "sagging line" case previously. In Delta Elec. Power Assoc. v. Burton, 240 Miss. 209, 217-19, 126 So.2d 258, 260-61, suggestion of error overruled, 240 Miss. 209, 223, 126 So.2d 866 (1961), this Court held an electric company was on notice when the electric company's service men, who were clearly identified, actually saw the dangerous condition. However, the facts in the case at bar differ in that not only was the individual in the truck not positively identified as an Entergy service man, but also there is no proof that any service man actually saw the dangerous condition. Furthermore, the facts in the case at bar are unlike those where this Court found evidence that an electrical wire was in a dangerously low position over a street and that "the dangerous condition had existed for ten days or two weeks." Miss. Power Co. v. Thomas, 162 Miss. 734, 140 So. 227 (1932). This Court went on to say:
Taking, however, the shorter period of time first mentioned, that is to say, one week, we do not hesitate to say that, as a matter of law, this was a period of time sufficient to charge the company with constructive knowledge. To hold otherwise would be either to deny the duty of inspection, or else to say that the periods thereof could be so far apart as to be of little practical value.
Id.
¶ 21. In Thomas, this Court was faced with a single sagging line which had existed 7, or 10 to 14 days, where as a matter of law, this Court could find constructive notice applied. Id. The lone sagging line in that case should have been discovered within that time frame. However, in the case at bar, with miles of downed power lines and poles, we know that Entergy conducted a line inspection via a helicopter flyover survey and was attempting to find all of its downed or damaged lines. Further language in Thomas is also instructive as the Court noted "it follows that there is a duty on these electric companies to make inspections of their wires and equipment. We do not hold that this obligation requires a constant inspection, nor do ive attempt to say how often such an inspection shall he made." Id. (emphasis added). Here, subsequent to a major disaster, Entergy was doing all that it could to discover and repair its downed power lines and poles. We find that there was insufficient proof of actual notice to Entergy. Also, under the facts of this case, "taking the shorter period of time we do not hesitate to say that as a matter of law," this two day delay was not a sufficient period of time to charge Entergy with constructive notice of the sagging line. Id. We also look to our sister states for guidance. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held "[i]f the electric company has not received actual notice that its lines are down, the utility must still discover the danger and cut the power within a reasonable time." Grattan v. Union Elec. Com., 151 S.W.3d 59 (Mo.2004). "Notice or a lack thereof, of course, affects the amount of time allowed as a "reasonable opportunity" to remedy the problem." Id. See Thomas, 140 So. 227.
¶ 22. Also, it is noteworthy that the Court of Appeals' majority decision states "[ojther evidence offered at trial was sufficient to prove that Entergy either knew or should have known of the low hanging power line." (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals decision does not tell this Court what that proof consists of, let alone who testified about it or where it is located in the record. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and we find nothing but the limited testimony of Tony Sullivan.
¶ 23. In the case at bar, first we note that the line was not energized. Second, the amount of time this line was sagging during a major disaster is far short of what this Court in Thomas considered as sufficient constructive knowledge. Notice only becomes a factual jury question when there is sufficient evidence presented for a reasonable juror to find in the plaintiffs favor. We hold that Entergy did not receive notice of the sagging line.
b.
¶ 24. This Court requires proof of "conduct on the part of the principal indicating the agent's authority." See Am. Income Life Ins. Co. v. Hollins, 830 So.2d 1230, 1237 (Miss.2002) (citing Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1180 (Miss.1990)). The unidentified person could have been one of the thousands of volunteers, an off-duty meter reader, or any one else involved in the massive clean up and repair operations. There is no proof that the individual in the truck was an employee of Enter-gy, much less one possessing either direct or apparent authority. Thus, McFarland's evidence adduced is insufficient to create notice to Entergy.
¶ 25. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of express ("direct") authority on the part of the individual in the MP & L truck as this person cannot be specifically identified by either Deputy Sullivan or Entergy. An express agent is one who is "in fact authorized by the principal to act on their behalf." Cooley v. Brawner, 881 So.2d 300, 302 (Miss.App.2004). McFarland never submitted sufficient proof that the individual was an employee of Entergy. This Court has stated that "[t]he burden of proving an agency relationship rests squarely upon the party asserting it." Highlands Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 387 So.2d 118, 120 (Miss.1980). McFarland failed to meet this burden and since Enter-gy has no knowledge of this person's identity, there is no proof of any express authorization. We find that express or direct authority is also required to be proven for Entergy to be liable.
¶ 26. Nor is there sufficient evidence of apparent authority. Apparent authority of an agent only binds the principal when the plaintiff can show "acts or conduct of principal indicating agent's authority, reasonable reliance upon those acts by third person, and detrimental change in position by third person as result of that reliance." Eaton v. Porter, 645 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Miss.1994) (emphasis added). One can argue that Entergy gave this individual apparent authority by putting that person in their company vehicle. However, Deputy Sullivan admitted in testimony that he was aware of the presence of numerous volunteers in the area who were assisting the electrical crews. Under these specific and unusual factual circumstances, it was not reasonable for him to assume some individual sitting alone in an MP & L truck had the necessary authority to correct the transmission line problem in this particular situation. We find that McFarland failed to prove apparent authority.
c.
¶ 27. The ultimate question before us is whether Entergy is negligent under these facts. We fail to see any negligence under the meager proof submitted by McFarland. McFarland has failed to prove a breach, let alone the duty itself. Brown v. J.J. Ferguson Sand & Gravel Co., 858 So.2d 129, 131 (Miss.2003). The effect of a finding in favor of McFarland would be to place an extremely high burden of care on Entergy and similarly situated electric companies when major disasters such as this one strike our state. The Court of Appeals' finding that Entergy exercised no care whatsoever for the public users of highways absolutely ignores and distorts the overwhelming evidence. The fact of the matter is that Entergy did amazingly well in response time and exhibited great skill, care and diligence in attempting to restore power to a vast area of the state which suffered a very rare and unusual major disaster.
¶ 28. Unquestionably, the ice storm of 1994 can best be characterized as an "Act of God," of which Entergy had no control. Nor could Entergy have done anything to prevent or lessen the end result. All Entergy could hope to accomplish under these circumstances was a quick mobilization of all its available workers, equipment and resources; to call for extra support from surrounding companies in sister states; to seek volunteers to assist; and to use reasonable ordinary due care in restoring power lines, poles, and electricity as soon as possible. Entergy performed each of the tasks extraordinarily well according to this record. In MP & L v. Shepard, 285 So.2d 725, 741 (Miss.1973), this Court stated "[ajlthough the [p]ower [c]ompany is required to do all things necessary in maintaining its lines as a reasonable person would do under like circumstances for protection of public, it is not required to maintain its lines in such a perfect condition as to prevent any and all accidents." Thus, Entergy was required to act only "to the extent of exercising reasonable care to correct or remove the cause of danger if reasonably foreseeable and known to power company." Id. at 729. The United States Supreme Court has defined "Act of God" as a "loss happening in spite of all human effort and sagacity." The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 386, 17 S.Ct. 597, 602, 41 L.Ed. 1039 (1897). This defense has been widely defined as "any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected could have been prevented." See Skandia Ins. Co., v. Star Shipping, 173 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1239 (S.D.Ala.2001). However, the "Act of God" defense "applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them." Id. (citing) Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir.1989) (citing to Bradford v. Stanley, 355 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1978)) (citing Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Walker, 132 Ala. 553, 31 So. 374 (1902)). "[A]n Act of God' is not only one which causes damage, but one as to which reasonable precautions and/or the exercise of reasonable care by the defendant, could not have prevented the damage from the natural event." Skandia, 173 F.Supp.2d at 1240. "Act of God" does not apply if there is an intervening circumstance attributed to the defendants. See Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sonagerra, 208 Okla. 95, 98, 253 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla.Sup.Ct.1953). Here, Entergy exercised reasonable due care and precautions. Based on the evidence set forth in the record, McFarland did not provide sufficient evidence to prove duty, breach, or causation all of which are required in a negligence claim. Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So.2d 258, 262 (Miss.2003).
¶29. We also find that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that there was enough evidence to support a jury verdict for either party. When considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to McFarland, there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in his favor for the reason previously discussed. Therefore, the trial court's grant of the JNOV must stand. In this instance the jury verdict was incorrect. It was not based upon legally sufficient evidence. The trial judge, who repeatedly expressed concerns about the plaintiffs proof of notice and lack of negligence by Entergy, ultimately rectified the situation by awarding a JNOV or new trial in the alternative. Entergy is entitled to its JNOV.
III. & IV.
¶ 30. Initially, McFarland neither raised, addressed, nor briefed the issue of whether the trial judge erred in the conditional grant of a new trial. The Court of Appeals- handed down its first version of its opinion on October 12, 2004. McFarland raised the issue before the Court of Appeals for the first time on rehearing. As such, he waived these issues and is not now permitted to raise them on certiorari during this appeal. Brewer v. State, 819 So.2d 1169, 1175 (Miss.2002); Irving v. State, 441 So.2d 846, 854 (Miss.1983) ("The issue may not now be raised for the first time on a petition for rehearing and it is procedurally barred.") (citing Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So.2d 906 (Miss.1983)); Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So.2d 486 (Miss.1983). Accordingly, we apply the procedural bar.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31. Although the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied a higher standard of care to Entergy, the jury was instructed to apply the standard of ordinary care. We also hold that because the trial judge was correct in granting Entergy's motion for a JNOV, the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of the JNOV. Furthermore, McFarland waived the issues regarding the conditional grant of a new trial. This Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstates and affirms the trial judge's judgment granting Entergy's JNOV motion.
¶ 32. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, P.J. WALLER, P.J. AND DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. During the appeal of this case, Deborah McFarland was substituted as plaintiff, due to the death of Thomas R. McFarland. McFarland's death was the result of circumstances unrelated to this case.