Case Name: PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., and Miami Herald Publishing Company, et al., Petitioners, v. The Honorable Richard Bryan BURK, Linda Aurilio and State of Florida, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-11
Citations: 471 So. 2d 571
Docket Number: No. 83-422
Parties: PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., and Miami Herald Publishing Company, et al., Petitioners, v. The Honorable Richard Bryan BURK, Linda Aurilio and State of Florida, Respondents.
Judges: DOWNEY, HERSEY, DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 471
Pages: 571–585

Head Matter:
PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., and Miami Herald Publishing Company, et al., Petitioners, v. The Honorable Richard Bryan BURK, Linda Aurilio and State of Florida, Respondents.
No. 83-422.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 11, 1985.
Talbot D’Alemberte and L. Martin Reed-er, Jr., of Steel, Hector, Davis, Burns & Middleton, Palm Beach, for petitioner/Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc.
Richard J. Ovelmen, Miami, for petitioner/Miami Herald Pub. Co.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent/Richard Bryan Burk.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent/Linda Aurilio.

Opinion:
UPON PETITION FOR REVIEW EN BANC
Palm Beach Newspapers, joined by other newspapers (all referred to as the Press), are here under the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100.
There was pending an attempted murder case in West Palm Beach entitled State of Florida v. Linda J. Aurilio, Case No. 82-5858-CF-T. Being interested, the Press sought access, as hereinafter particularized, to pretrial discovery depositions in this criminal case. The effort was unsuccessful. The respondent trial judge basically ruled that such depositions are not judicial proceedings, and that such depositions are not court records until such time as they are transcribed and filed with the Clerk. The Press, being thereby disaccom-modated, filed this proceeding.
The questions to be resolved, as we understand them, are (1) Is the Press entitled to notice and an opportunity to attend pretrial discovery depositions in a criminal case? and (2) Is the Press entitled to access to pretrial discovery depositions taken but not filed with the Clerk?
Upon consideration of the excellent advice of counsel, we answer the questions in the negative. We approve and affirm the order under review.
To more exactly reflect the position and demands of the Press, we quote from the Press' Petition:
Respondent's ruling that the petitioner may not attend depositions in this case should be reversed and the case should be remanded to determine whether closure of any particular deposition is appropriate under the three-part test of Lewis. The trial court must consider the facts which relate to a particular deposition before ordering that particular deposition closed.
This Court also should direct the trial court to require the release or filing of any existing deposition transcripts and any deposition transcripts ordered in the future by the parties or the petitioner unless a motion to seal the transcripts is filed, and evidence produced at a hearing shows a compelling need to seal.
Finally, the lower court should be directed to require the filing of all original notices of taking depositions in accordance with the rules of civil and criminal procedure. If a party believes that public or press access to any future depositions will infringe on the fair trial rights of the accused or will unreasonably endanger the defendant or a witness or any other person, that party should file an appropriate motion seeking to restrict access and notice the media of the hearing thereon. At the hearing, the movant must be required to present evidence sufficient to overcome his burden of meeting each prong of the three-part test established in Miami Herald v. Lewis [426 So.2d I (Fla. 1982)] and Miami Herald v. State [363 So.2d 603 (Fla.App. 1978) ].
The Press tells us that, "No Florida appellate court has addressed directly the issue here presented: whether depositions taken in the course of a criminal proceedings are pretrial judicial proceedings to which the right of access applies." We are then referred to a number of cases that, according to the Press, support their position by inference, deduction, or otherwise. Having reviewed such cases, we are not persuaded and see no gain to be accomplished by engaging in a disputation on a case by case basis. Perhaps the largest distinction to be found is that many of the cited cases deal with access to trial or proceedings actually conducted before the court (judge) in the courthouse while here the judge is not present at the taking of the depositions, which events may take place outside the courthouse. We found not a single case, statute or rule that we think precedentially commands the result contended for by the Press. The survey, though educational, did indeed reveal the success of the press generally in gaining access to proceedings theretofore thought private or subject to court discretion.
We support our decision that the Press has no constitutional right to access to pretrial depositions in a criminal case, as defined in the questions before us, by referring to the following cases:
GANNETT CO., INC. v. DePASQUALE
443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979)
While this case is not on point in that it deals primarily with press access to a pretrial hearing (before the judge in court) on a motion to suppress allegedly involuntary confessions and physical evidence in a criminal case, we think portions of the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger are illuminating:
Even though the draftsmen of the Constitution could not anticipate the 20th-century pretrial proceedings to suppress evidence, pretrial proceedings were not wholly unknown in that day. Written interrogatories were used pretrial in 18th-century litigation, especially in admiralty cases. Thus, it is safe to assume that those lawyers who drafted the Sixth Amendment were not unaware that some testimony was likely to be recorded before trials took place. Yet, no one ever suggested that there was any "right" of the public to be present at such pretrial proceedings as were available in that time; until the trial it could not be known whether and to what extent the pretrial evidence would be offered or received. Similarly, during the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a "trial" until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evidence. Pretrial depositions are not uncommon to take the testimony of a witness, either for the defense or for the prosecution. In the entire pretrial period, there is no certainty that a trial will take place. Something in the neighborhood of 85 percent of all criminal charges are resolved by guilty pleas, frequently after pretrial depositions have been taken or motions to suppress evidence have been ruled upon. For me, the essence of all of this is that by definition "pretrial proceedings" are exactly that.
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 396, 99 S.Ct. at 2914, 61 L.Ed.2d at 631.
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, INC. v. WILLIS
370 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
This case deals with Press access to written depositions filed with the Clerk. It held, among other things, "In sum, we conclude that the rules of procedure contemplate that upon filing, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a deposition becomes a part of the 'court file' (Rule 1.400, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure). According to this view, in the absence of a court order sealing the deposition, or some provision of law requiring the same to remain confidential, the Press may not be excluded from reading, copying and reporting the contents of a deposition." Tallahassee, 370 So.2d 870-871. We agree with this holding. See also Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. Sturgis, 388 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We note that the trigger device is the act of "filing." Thus, conversely, we hold that no right of access accrues until there is a "filing." As all know, our rules of procedure do not blanket mandate the filing of depositions and other discovery documents. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.310(f) 3, 1.340, and 1.350. Moreover, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.075(a)(1) defines court records as "the contents of the court file, depositions filed with the clerk_" Thus, non-filed depositions are not court records available to the Press. Also, we know of no requirement for counsel to require transcription and to file a discovery deposition or statement when, for example, it was non-productive, hurtful to his cause, or where it will be of no use to him at trial.
Finally, we note with approval this statement and footnote because it partially cap-sulates a basis for our holding:
Petitioners argue with great insistence the applicability of the notice and hearing procedures set forth in State ex. rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh [340 So.2d 904 (Fla.1977)], supra. However, we perceive a distinction between press rights of access to court hearings or trials, and access to portions of the court file or records which may or may not be subject to public and press inspection, i.e., specifically, depositions.
Tallahassee, 370 So.2d at 871-72.
UNITED STATES v. GURNEY
558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir.1977), rehearing denied 562 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 1606, 56 L.Ed.2d 59 (1978)
This was a criminal case, courthouse trial, which is a step closer than our case where the trial has yet to commence and where the proceedings were not conducted at the courthouse. In Gurney, the trial judge denied the Press access at trial to (1) the exhibits proferred but not yet admitted into evidence; (2) transcripts of bench conferences held in camera where exhibits and testimony were proffered; (3) written communication between the jury and judge; and (4) Gurney's grand jury testimony which had not been read to the jury. It also appears that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing on Press requests but merely entered oral orders denying access, which orders were subsequently confirmed in writing with reasons. These rulings and actions were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, and certio-rari was denied by the Supreme Court.
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART
— U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984)
While this is a civil case which approved limitation upon use of pretrial discovery, we think some of its pronouncements are inferentially significant:
As in all civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.") Thus, continued court control over, the discovered information does not raise the same spectre of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dissenting).
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2910, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. See id., at 396, 99 S.Ct., at 2913-2914 (BURGER, C.J., concurring); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during pre-trial discovery may be unrelated or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S., at 399, 99 S.Ct., at 2915 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context.
Seattle Times Co., 104 S.Ct. at 2207-2208 (footnotes omitted).
3c ⅜ Sjc ⅜£
. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain — incidentally or purposefully — information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1648-1649, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-146, 8 S.Ct. 379, 384-385, 31 L.Ed. 374 (1888). As stated by Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), "[wjhether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particu lar protective order] . we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.' " (citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a- state's discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders.
Seattle Times Co., 104 S.Ct. at 2208-2209 (footnotes omitted).
FORT MYERS BROADCASTING COMPANY v. NELSON
460 So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
We deny the petition for a writ of certio-rari from the trial court's order closing to the public all discovery depositions in this libel lawsuit. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.280(c).
We shortly address the term, "pretrial discovery depositions." The word pretrial needs no elaboration. Discovery is partially defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, "In a general sense, the ascertainment of that which was previously unknown; the disclosure or coming to light of what was previously hidden." Discovery in criminal cases is provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 and discovery depositions are specifically provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(d) where it is said,
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the defendant may take the deposition upon oral examination of any person who may have information relevant to the offense charged. The deposition shall be taken in'a building where the trial may be held, such other place agreed upon by the parties or where the trial court may designate by special or general order.
It is further provided, "Any deposition taken pursuant hereto may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness." Finally, the matter of notice and subpoenas is treated. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(a) discusses in detail the prosecutor's many obligations with reference to discovery. We think it is significant that these important functions shall, according to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(a)(3), be performed in any manner mutually agreeable to the prosecutor and defense counsel or as ordered by the court. In other words, court supervision of the discovery process is not required so long as counsel can agree. Finally, the term "deposition" means the testimony of a witness given in advance of the trial upon oral examination or written questions where there is an opportunity for cross-examination. See generally 19 Fla.Jur.2d Discovery and Depositions § 59.
The Press urges that it should have access to pretrial discovery depositions as here contended unless someone moves for a protective order and successfully meets the three-pronged test promulgated in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. State, 363 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Lewis, 426 So.2d 1 (Fla.1982). The test is that movants seeking closure or protection must establish:
1. Closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice;
2. No alternatives are available other than a change of venue, which would protect a defendant's right to a fair trial; and
3. Closure would be effective in protecting the rights of the accused, without being broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose.
In Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Lewis, closure was sought as to a hearing on a motion to suppress the defendants' confessions in a homicide case. Different from the instant ease, the suppression hearing was to be conducted before the judge in court. Moreover, different from the matter of pretrial discovery, the dimension of the problem in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Lewis, was quite apparent. There had been extensive pretrial media coverage of the murder of a four-year-old child and the public, thanks to the media, was aware that the defendant had confessed. So the important but simple question there projected was: Should the media have the right to attend the suppression hearing and to publish its happenings and the content of the confession?
We hold that the three-pronged test is not applicable to pretrial discovery proceedings such as discovery depositions because, among other things, the taking of such depositions is not a judicial proceeding since the judge is not in attendance and since the deposition cannot be received in evidence. More importantly, if such test were to be considered as applicable, it would be impossible to apply because of the inherent nature of such depositions. Counsel cannot know in advance what testimony will be adduced at discovery depositions.
Usually and for obvious reasons such discovery depositions are aimed at hostile witnesses, witnesses that refuse to communicate or give statements and witnesses that refuse to cooperate with counsel or his investigator seeking information. The reasons why counsel may seek to depose a witness in a criminal case defy being cat-alogued. Perhaps based on hunch or hearsay it is thought that the witness may have some knowledge of some kind about some facet of the alleged crime. The witness upon being deposed may reveal that he or she was an eye-witness or a participant or that the witness knows nothing. It may uncover incriminating or exculpatory information of large or small magnitude about all or some of the events. Again, the point is that counsel cannot know in advance, except by way of possible speculation and conjecture, what the witness knows and the scope of the testimony. Under these circumstances counsel cannot apply in advance for protection and, if he did do so, he would have no way of satisfying the three-pronged test. Repetitively, how can he protect his client's right to a fair trial when he does not know if the witness's unrevealed and undiscovered testimony, if released to the media, would prejudice and place the defendant in jeopardy?
All who have taken discovery depositions know that it entails fishing on a dangerous and uncharted sea. However, they are very valuable tools and, in our opinion, a lawyer would be remiss in not making pretrial inquiry of witnesses where he has reason to think they may have knowledge of some kind concerning the alleged crime. If the witness incriminates the defendant when the indicated areas are plumbed, counsel will at least know what he may be faced with at trial and undertake to mount a defense. Counsel can undertake to elicit impeachment testimony and other matters that might impair the credibility of the witness. If the witness has friendly testimony then, of course, counsel will add the witness to his trial witness list.
Practical considerations militate against press access, although it is agreed that such considerations could not prevail if access was constitutionally mandated. As before mentioned, discovery depositions are not subject to admission into evidence. Jackson v. State, 453 So.2d 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) Terrell v. State, 407 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Moreover, as a general rule, there are many questions and answers that are proper as a matter of discovery which would not be allowable even if produced live at trial. Thus, if the Press is present at deposition time it is fair to say that such presence would severely chill or inhibit the discovery process. The questioner is not likely to explore or pursue needed subjects and areas as he normally would if he learns that the answers may prejudice or damage his client or others if the answers are published before trial as indicative of the facts of the case.
Such depositions are often arranged orally without formal notice for the convenience of counsel. Sometimes they are arranged on short notice and in such case it could be awkward to be required to give the Press reasonable notice. In addition, depositions are most often scheduled for a lawyer's or court reporter's office where space is limited. Without laboring it, most such places simply will not have sufficient accommodations to allow the presence of the media, especially in cases that the media would deem sensational or specially newsworthy. Moreover, it should be recognized that the right of access for the press is no greater than that of the general public. Pell v. Procunier and Howchins v. KQED, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). In other words, if the press can attend pretrial discovery depositions, so can the general public and this would only exacerbate the mentioned problem.
Finally, if media access should be required, it is reasonably predictable there will be collisions out of the presence of the court between counsel and the media as to access and the terms of it. These collisions will in many instances, we feel, require resolution by the court. This will require hearings, notice, counsel, orders, and the whole panoply. This will impose an additional work load on the judges and delay the prosecution.
We feel in sum that pretrial discovery depositions are but a part of pretrial preparation and as such are not a proper subject for press intrusion.
Finally, it seems to us that if those in higher authority believe in their wisdom that the Press should properly have the access for which they contend, we suggest that it should be accomplished by Supreme Court amendments to our rules of procedure, a matter within that court's purview and jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. See dissent in State ex rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So.2d 777 at 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), overruled on other grounds, English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293 (Fla.1977). We presume to say this based on our holding here to the effect that there is now no constitutional, procedural, or substantive mandate for such access.
We, on our own motion, hereby certify to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(v), that the following questions are of great public importance:
1. IS THE PRESS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND THE OPPORTUNITY AND RIGHT TO ATTEND PRETRIAL DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE?
2. IS THE PRESS ENTITLED TO ACCESS TO PRETRIAL DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSCRIBED BUT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FILED WITH THE CLERK OF COURT OR THE JUDGE?
AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY, HERSEY, DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
LETTS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., with whom HURLEY and BARKETT, JJ., join, dissents with opinion.
HURLEY, J., with whom GLICKSTEIN and BARKETT, JJ., join, dissents with opinion.
GLICKSTEIN, J., with whom HURLEY, J., joins, dissents with opinion.
. So that there may be no misunderstanding, we acknowledge the right of the Press to have access to the following:
A. Filed depositions because they then become part of the official court records. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Willis, 370 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
B. The trial plus pretrial and posttrial proceedings conducted by or before the judge. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979).
. Following the preparation of this opinion, the case of Short v. Gaylord, 462 So.2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), came to our attention. There, a trial court ruling which refused to exclude the press from attendance at pretrial discovery depositions in a criminal case was reviewed via certiorari proceedings. The Second District Court of Appeal held that such ruling was not a departure from the essential requirements of the law and it, therefore, denied certiorari. Accepting that the Short case and some of its pronouncements may conflict with our instant opinion, we do respectfully decline to accept or follow the precedent of the Short case.
. We agree with respondent's observation (response by letter dated April 16, 1979) that depositions are "tools of discovery and preserving evidence", but we would add further qualifications and observations. A deposition does not become evidence in a case unless and until admitted by ruling of the court at a trial or hearing; that depositions very often contain matters that are not and can never be considered as evidence, since the scope of inquiry 6n depositions is not limited as in examination of a witness in a judicial proceeding; that persons not even parties to the case are often compelled under process of law to divulge information that is not intended for use as evidence, but merely to elicit or lead to information that might explain other evidence or become admissible as evidence; and the taking of a deposition itself can hardly be categorized as a "judicial proceeding" for the simple reason that there is no judge present and no rulings nor adjudications of any sort are made by any judicial authority. Further, in criminal cases, discovery depositions taken under Rule 3.220(d), Fla.R.Cr.P. may be used only "for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching testimony of the deponent as a witness"; and deposition testimony may be used as evidence at the trial only if taken to perpetuate testimony under Rule 3.190© requiring a court order, notice to defendant, and, if defendant is in custody, his presence at the deposition, and a showing that attendance of the witness cannot be pro-curred at the trial. State v. Basiliere, 353 So.2d 820 (Fla.1978).
. Of course, depositions taken to perpetuate testimony, different from discovery depositions, would be admissible. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190®.
. Having been afforded the privilege of reviewing the dissents filed by our colleagues prior to publication, we wish, not seeking the last word but in the interest of completeness, to offer a few additional comments so that the distinctions between our viewpoints may be finely drawn.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971, 99 S.Ct. 1533, 59 L.Ed.2d 787 (1979). is cited for the proposition that pre-trial discovery depositions are open to the public. An examination of that case reveals that it does so state. However, we dare to question the worth of that precedent inasmuch as such statement is, in our opinion, a pure ipse dixit in that it cites no authority for such conclusion. It has been tracked and cited by several trial court federal cases which, likewise, cite no authority or compelling reason for the stance, being content to simply cite American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Grady, supra.
Indeed, not all federal cases support open depositions. See Times Mews Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F.Supp. 189 (1974), which held that depositions, as opposed to trials, are not open to public or press, and that neither the public or press has a right to be present.
The common thread which we divine from the dissenting opinions is that somehow the Florida Rules of Procedure as written command that public and press are entitled, as a matter of right to attend pretrial discovery depositions. It is here that we also part company.
Hoping not to be merely argumentative, we have searched the Rules and not found a mention of public and press or that they are entitled to notice and attendance at such depositions. We have dissected Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 and do not reach a conclusion that it serves that purpose. It is true that section (c) of that Rule provides for protective orders for many purposes, one of which is "(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court." We construe its application to be limited to instances where the parties do not agree and there is controversy between them as to who may be present. For example, this might be applicable where trade secrets or sensitive matters will be pursued or where one of the parties or his or her friends insist on being present and are disruptive. We do not read it that everybody, public and press, are entitled ipso facto to attend unless the court orders otherwise. To repeat, if the Rules are to be the avenue so opening up depositions, then the Rules in our opinion must be amended to specifically so state.
Finally, and hoping not to unduly labor the matter, we reject the suggestion that in this area the federal and Florida rules of procedure are so similar that the federal decisions as to federal rules necessarily bind Florida courts. Without comparing them rule by rule, we believe that there are significant differences. For instance, Rule 30(f)(1) of the Federal Rules pertains to the court reporter. It requires, with reference to depositions, that he or she shall certify it, securely seal it, and promptly file it with the court. Differently, our Florida Rule 1.310(f) does not require that a deposition be filed or even transcribed. See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), and particularly footnotes 12 and 14.