Case Name: Speer versus The School Directors, Burgess and Town Council of the Borough of Blairsville
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1865-06-19
Citations: 50 Pa. 150
Docket Number: 
Parties: Speer versus The School Directors, Burgess and Town Council of the Borough of Blairsville.
Judges: This opinion was concurred in by Strong, J., and Read, J., being a majority of the court in bane.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 150–180

Head Matter:
Speer versus The School Directors, Burgess and Town Council of the Borough of Blairsville.
Constitutionality of Act 2bth March 1864, for payment of bounties to volunteers.
1. An Act of Assembly is to be presumed constitutional, until shown to be unconstitutional by the party who alleges that it is so. 2. l’he courts will not declare an Act of Assembly void unless it violates the constitution, clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such a manner as to preclude doubt or hesitation.
3. A tax law is to be considered valid', unless it be for a purpose in which the community taxed has palpably no interest; and when it is apparent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others than the public, and for another than the public interest.
4. It is a matter involving the public welfare and interest, that the quota of troops called for, from a municipal district, under an impending and unexecuted draft, should be filled by volunteers.
5. Hence the payment of bounties to volunteers to enable a borough to fill its quota under a call for troops, and an anticipated draft, is a legal payment as for a purpose of a municipal and public nature: and an Act of Assembly authorizing the borough authorities to raise money for such purpose by loans and taxation is constitutional.
6. Such a law is not within the constitutional amendment of 1857, prohibiting the legislature from authorizing municipalities to obtain money for or loan credit to any corporation, institution, or party.
Appeal from the Common Pleas of Indiana county.
This was an appeal by William R. Speer, John Devinny, C. C. Davis, and others, from the decree of the court below dismissing a bill in equity filed by them against the school directors, burgess, and town council of Blairsyille.
The prayer in the bill was to restrain them from borrowing money under the Act of March 25th 1864, which authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of $800 “ to each non-commissioned officer and private” who might thereafter “ volunteer and enter the service of the United States from such county, and be credited to the quota thereof;” and the object of the bill was to test the constitutionality of all acts called Bounty Laws. The injunction was at first granted, but was subsequently dissolved. The complainants then appealed from the decree of the court below to the Supreme Court. The cause was argued at Philadelphia, March 10th 1865, before three of the justices of the court, and a re-argument before the full bench was ordered. Leave was subsequently granted to the city of Philadelphia to be heard by her solicitor on the constitutional question.
Walter H. Lowrie and Jeremiah S. Black, for appellants,
argued that whenever there was any doubt as to the constitutionality of a law, it should be resolved in favour of the great charter itself. There was a prohibition in the law rendering it void. The legislature cannot enter a judgment, or a decree.
I. The law is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
II. It is an order, or decree.
III. It is in conflict with the amendments '-to the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Ko man could serve two masters at one and the same time. Congress has power to declare war, to suppress insurrections, to raise and support armies, to pass all laws needful to carry these powers into effect, and has occupied the whole ground — has fixed the amount of bounties, has distributed the burdens of war amongst those who had remained at home. A uniform tax has been laid — a full system established. That did not satisfy the legislature and a different system was enacted. Even the governor was not authorized to appoint the officers. The supervisors of townships, the school directors, the town councils, the overseers of the poor, were to suspend their ordinary duties and to assume those prescribed by the law in question. If the legislature should levy a tax to pay an additional sum to those in the civil service of the government, it would be clearly unconstitutional.
It is conceded that the animus of those enacting the law was not unfriendly to the Federal government. But if the legislature had any jurisdiction, they could exercise it as they pleased. They might • abrogate an Act of Congress. Once the right to interfere at all shall be admitted, nothing can prevent their going the downhill path to nullification and secession.
The law was also most malignant in its operation. The conduct of those acting under it, in the way authorized by it, had called forth the reprobation of all those who were really interested in upholding the government. A new profession had been created who cheated their victims, stole and kidnapped men and put them on the auction-block and sold them, in shameless defiance of all decency.
Both governments can undoubtedly tax; but not for the same purpose.
The law in question promoted the good of certain individuals only. The conscription of a man was his own personal debt, or burden; exactly as if his barn had been struck by lightning. He could not'then go to the legislature and have them authorize the levying of a tax on his neighbours, not for the purpose of enabling Mm to perform his duty, but to evade it. The legislature had been operated upon by politicians. These latter had called meetings all over the state, and declared they would “ subscribe their last dollar.” Then they went to the legislature and said they had contracted great debts for bounties — that they had subscribed heavily and were bound to pay. The legislature had consequently.passed a law compelling others to pay these very debts contracted as* described. They might just as well have asked that some other political corporation should pay this debt.
Howard and Childs, for the appellees.
The law in question is opposed on two grounds:
1st. Because it was an exercise of power which did not belong to the state, but to Congress, exclusively, by the express terms of the Constitution of the United States; and
2d. Because the law under which the defendants propose to act was in violation of the Constitution of the state, and. therefore inoperative and void.
It is clearly deducible, from all the authorities, that an exclusive jurisdiction in Congress, or an entire alienation of state authority, can exist only in the following cases :—
1st. Where the Constitution in express terms grants an exclusive authority to the Union.
2d. Where it grants an authority to the Union, and at the same time prohibits the states from exercising the like authority.
8d, Where it grants an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the states is absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. See Weaver v. Fegley & Brother, 5 Casey 29.
Our citizens undoubtedly have a status as state militia, and in this character the general government has no power to govern them. In that character they are entirely under the state jurisdiction.
I. The power of the Union to “ raise and support armies,” is a distinct grant of power from that relating to the power to “ provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection,” &c.
The former relates to what we call the regular army; the latter to the militia. And these forces have always been separate and distinct in this country. Congress may prescribe rules for organizing and disciplining the militia, but the state governs them until called into the actual service of the Union; and then the state appoints the officers, and that has been the practice during the present war. The great body of the forces used in fighting the rebellion were the militia, called into service “ to execute the laws of the Union,” and “ suppress insurrection:” Federalist, p. 131, and Nos. 24, 25.
The Constitution of the United States provides “ that the President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.” And this clause furnishes another argument for the position that the militiaman is not under the the governing control of the United States until he is mustered into <£ the actual service.”
' The first section of the Act of July 17th 1862 authorizes the President to call out the militia of the states into the United States service, and it provides that if, by reason of defects in the state laws, or the execution of them, it shall be found necessary, for the enrolling of the militia, the President may make such rule in regard to the same as he may think proper.
By this section authority is conferred on the President to cause the enrolment, when there shall exist defects in the state laws or in their execution. Congress, by this section, clearly contemplated the friendly co-operation of the states, and .clearly recognised the state enactments as valid. By the third section, a bounty is given to volunteers, but there is to be no pay until the volunteer is mustered into the service of the United States, so that the relation of the United States with the volunteer does not commence until he is mustered into the United States service, and his relation to the state, as one of her militia, continues until the moment of mustering in.
Upon the point that this legislation was to aid a class of men, and tax others to aid them in the discharge of a duty imposed by the United States, it is proper to understand that all citizens of every age are liable to military duty, and because Congress had only called for men of certain ages, it does not follow that Congress may not call the whole male population into the field. The duty to be performed is the true test by which to determine the right of taxation for its compensation. The soldier does not go to the field for his own individual benefit. It is not long since it was strenuously argued that it was unconstitutional for the United States to draft men; that volunteering was the only mode contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.
II. In order to a correct interpretation of laws, we are to look into the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. We shall have little trouble in applying the rule in the present case.
The mischief that gave rise to the seventh section of the eleventh article of the Constitution, was legislation authorizing counties to contract debts, borrow money, &c., for building railroads.
The real question now, is whether the legislature may authorize taxes to be levied to pay military bounties. The fact that a loan of money is authorized, in anticipation of the receipt of taxes, is not material. It was not the design of the amendment to the state constitution so to bind the legislature that taxes could not be imposed for the support and defence of the government, and the preservation of its very existence. The national government had imposed a national tax upon the borough of Blairsville. Taxes may be in money, kind, or services. This was a tax for services ; a tax falling upon the whole community. It was not a tax or burden upon individuals, for no one was named; nor could it be known upon whom the draft might fall, if the borough failed to fill its quota. The entire community were deeply interested in the services to be performed. Eor taxes, the government gives security to life, liberty, and property. Prohibiting the loaning of credit to a “ party” never contemplated that the legislature and local communities were fettered in the discharge of those great and paramount duties that every people owe to their government in time of war. Our government may, in its necessity, call for our lives and all our property, and we owe both to our country. And shall it be said that a people may not voluntarily tax themselves for a tithe of this property, in time of war, to support their government ? Had the draft taken place, and some, after being drafted had been excused, others had not reported, the community would have been compelled to make good all deficiencies, and the draft would have proceeded until the last man was taken, unless sooner satisfied. How can it be said, then, that the money was raised for a u party ?” The money was raised for the sole and exclusive benefit of the borough of Blairsville, to aid in the discharge of a great public duty, that the laws of the land imposed upon every citizen, without regard to age or condition.
F. Carroll Brewster, for the city of Philadelphia,
argued: Whilst millions have been poured out like water ; whilst serving men and women have literally flocked to place their offerings of money upon the altar of their country, to the amount of millions a day, thirty-five appellants come into court complainants against a loan of $5000, incurred by their entire borough for the defence of the nation. If these parties composed the entire borough, their burden would be only $142.85 apiece. They have come as appellants in equity. They must first and principally establish that they are entitled to come into a court of equity; secondly, that the thing they asked is equitable.
How are the complainants entitled to come into, court? The law complained of was enacted March 25th 1864. The town council acted speedily. They authorized the county commissioners to levy the tax March 28th 1864. The commissioners refused to do this, and referred the question to the boroughs on the same day. The bonds were then issued and negotiated, but this bill was not filed until August 11th 1864. Should the court declare these bounty laws void, what is to become of the innocent holders of the bonds ? What fate awaits the holders of the thirty millions issued in other counties, cities, and boroughs, upon the faith of similar laws ?
No debt has been ever more fairly contracted or more solemnly entered into. The people of the Commonwealth have authorized it in every mode imaginable. By counties — by cities — by townships — by boroughs — by school districts — by conventions of citizens called for the very purpose of imposing it. They have issued bonds for it; they have issued certificates of indebtedness; they have borrowed and used money in its creation ; they have authorized the levy of taxes to pay it. The consideration for this debt, too, has been given; the duty contracted for in its creation has been fully performed ; and nothing remains but the discharge of its obligations by the contracting parties, who have enjoyed the full consideration. Of the large amount due in Pennsylvania, the city of Philadelphia owes about one-third. This sum she has actually received from her citizens, and she feels that it would be a lasting reproach to her credit if these obligations should be repudiated.
Who raises this question? No department of the United States. How is the government benefited by declaring this act unconstitutional ? The appellants argue that “ Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.” And the argument built upon that was that Congress alone can raise and support armies ; and, further, that to assist her purpose is unconstitutional. They rested the objection rather on the refinement in advance of all past rulings, that wherever Congress can legislate, and does legislate, the states cannot even assist its action. This argument, if carried to the extreme, would nullify all laws allowing to the United States the use of our state jails, and many other acts, the validity of which has never been doubted.
Writers on the subject of constitutional law have adopted certain canons of construction as our guides here:
1st. Where the states have ceded an exclusive authority to Congress, the legislatures of the states are powerless to act.
The second general exception to the sovereignty of the state legislature, is where there is a power granted to Congress, and it was exercised, and from its very nature it excludes state action.
There is still another exception to the authority of the states, and that is where they are actually prohibited, as in case of impairing the obligation of contracts.
In all of these exceptional cases the state legislatures cannot act; in all others it is believed their power cannot be disputed under the Constitution of the United States.
The constitution tells us that a state can “ engage in war” when “ actually invaded,” or in such “ imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”
Beyond this, in times of peace, we enact militia laws, and thus raise armies ; and in times of war we enact pension laws, and thus encourage enlistments.
We have a law establishing' a state guard. Congress can tax; we tax also. Congress can enact bankrupt laws; we pass insolvent laws. Congress can regulate weights and measures ; we do so also. Congress can borrow money ; we certainly do that.
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
There is no prohibition upon the states as to raising armies for their own use, while the fostering of a military spirit among the people, and the encouragement of the school for the soldier, is made the subject of especial provision and regard.
The Federal Government often relies exclusively upon the volunteers of the states, and the national armies should be made up of the people themselves.
The state and local authorities stand between the Federal Government and the people, who are the source of all power, and out of whose individual persons soldiers are to be made.
In the war of 1812 the states raised, trained, and punished soldiers ; our Pennsylvania statute of 1814 did all these things, and yet its constitutionality was expressly affirmed by the Supreme Court. If we did not violate the Constitution of the United States when we actually raised and punished soldiers, how can it be safely argued that we transgressed our authority when we simply offered a bounty to a soldier ? See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; 4 Curtis 535.
It is said, “ The law provides a way of escape, and annuls the Act of Congress.” The answer is plain, the law neither annuls nor attempts to annul the Act of Congress.
The appellants insist that the Act of Assembly authorizing these bounties is in violation of the following amendment of 1857 to our state constitution.
“ Sect. 7. The legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township, or incorporated district, by virtue of a vote of its citizens, or otherwise,- to become a.stockholder in any company, association, or corporation; or to obtain money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution, or party.”
This is a question of interpretation, and the rules which obtain in cases arising upon our state constitutions are much more liberal than those relating to the Federal charter.
“ The first and fundamental rule is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties:” 1 Story on the Const. 283; Vattel, B. 2, ch. 17, p. 262, et seq.; Bacon’s Abr. tit. Stat. I.; 1 Story on Const. 284.
It is well known that the evils pointed out by our Supreme Court in the leading case of Sharpless v. The Mayor, 9 Harris 147, as necessary to be remedied only by constitutional law, led to the amendment of 1857.
The money raised by bounty laws was not obtained for a a corporation, association, institution, or party.” Because it is paid to the soldier, it does not follow that it was “ obtained for a party.” Such a construction of the clause would defeat all loans, for all money borrowed was paid to some person.
This money is raised to buy no stock, nor for any use save that of the borrowers; they expended it for their. preservation, to repel invasion, to suppress insurrection, to save their towns from the torch which destroyed Chambersburg, to protect their property from the guerrilla; and for the higher, because the holier, purpose of preserving their liberties and the Union.
June 19th 1865,

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
Agnew, J.
Perhaps it would be quite as just to say of this case, as Chief Justice Black said of Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia, 9 Harris 158, " This is beyond comparison the most important cause that has ever been in this court since the formation of the government." The millions of money at stake are greater, and the purpose of their expenditure even more important. That related to subscriptions for mere public convenience — this concerns the lives and welfare of our citizens.
That much of this money has been squandered we must deplore, and that the laws themselves were loosely penned denotes a want of legislative wisdom. They were therefore proper subjects of an executive message to the legislature. " But (as remarked by the same judge) all these considerations are entitled to no consideration here. We are to deal with this strictly as a judicial question. However clear our convictions may be, that the system is pernicious and dangerous, we cannot put it down by usurping authority which does not belong to us. That would be to commit a greater wrong than any which we could possibly repair by it 9 Harris 159.
The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a law ; but the request by the concluding counsel, made slightly imperative by its emphasis, that we should furnish satisfactory reasons for the constitutionality of the law, seemed to invoke a contrary presumption. But in Erie and N. E. Railroad Company v. Casey, 2 Casey 300, the same learned judge states the rule thus: " The party who wishes us to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes upon himself the burthgn of proving beyond all doubt that it is so." We have'not only the authority of Marshall, C. J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, but that of the distinguished judge just referred to for saying, " There is another rule which must govern us in cases like this, namely, that we can declare an Act of Assembly void only when it violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds:" 9 Harris 164.
The question before us relates to certain provisions of the Act of 25th March 1864, for the payment of bounties to volunteers : P. L. 88. It is proper to notice the precise portion to be brought within the scope of our decision, as no opinion should be ventured beyond it. The plaintiff's bill avers that the defendants are about to contract for and to borrow $5000 in the name and on behalf of the borough of Blairsville, to procure volunteer enlistments by paying to each volunteer a bounty of $300, to fill the quota assigned to the said borough by the last requisition of the president calling for six hundred thousand men, to enter the military service of the United States, and thus to avoid the draft ordered to take place on the 5th of September 1864, and to make payment therefor by the issue of the bonds of the said borough. The plaintiffs suggest their interest as tax-payers, that- the debt of the borough will be greatly increased by the loan, and their taxes largely augmented. The only question before us is, therefore, upon the power of the legislature to authorize the municipality of Blairsville to borrow money and levy taxes for its payment, for the purpose of paying bounties to those who would volunteer to perform the military service due from the citizens of that municipality under an impending but as yet unexecuted draft.
The bill was filed on the 11th of August, and the draft was not to take effect until the 5th of the following September. The case, therefore, involves no assumption of past debts, or payments to persons already in service, but presents the single question of the power to borrow money and levy taxes to pay volunteers to avoid the injury of a public indiscriminate draft.
Beyond all doubt it is competent for the legislature to confer upon counties, townships, cities, and boroughs the power to borrow money, issue bonds as the evidence of the debt, and levy taxes to pay the same. These are ordinary municipal powers of daily use, and when conferred the only test of their validity is, that the object must be public in its nature. Before the amend ment of the Constitution in 1857 this power was unlimited. Its limitation I shall notice hereafter. Nor is it doubtful in the least degree that this limitation is not a general prohibition to borrow money and levy taxes to pay the same. It would be a startling fact if the people were now to learn from us that a bridge or poorhouse, or a jail or court-house, cannot be built until the taxes have been first laid and collected to pay for it.
The power to create a public debt and liquidate it by taxation is too clear for dispute. The question is therefore narrowed to a single point: is the purpose, in this instance, a public one ? Does it concern the common welfare and interest of the municipality ? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided in the second section of the Act of 24th February 1864, that the quota of troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c., should be as nearly as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render military service. Section 3 provided that all volunteers who may enlist after a draft shall be ordered, shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted in such ward, town, &c. Volunteers are therefore, by law, to be accepted in relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or chance. Does this relief involve the public welfare or interest ? The answer rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in a community liable to the military burthen. It is given not by the voice of him alone who owes the service, but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military service is the highest duty and burthen the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater ££ burthen" than the taxation of property. The loss or the injury is not confined to the individual himself, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him in the ties of consanguinity, friendship, and interest; to the community, which must furnish support to his family, if he cannot; and which loses in him a member whose labour, industry, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources ; who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit contribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public welfare by their industry, skill, property, and good conduct, is a common loss, and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is therefore clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing, whose loss will sever the fewest ties, and produce the least injury.
The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is benefited. . It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who ¡Day it. The community is subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burthen of war. It is not a- mere gift or reward, but a consideration for service. It is, therefore, not a confiscation of one man's property for another's use, but it is a contribution from the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare. This is the design of the law, and it is no answer to say that bad men have abused it. The argument which rises, in its conception, no higher than the relief of the drafted man, and asserts that our money should not be taken to pay his debt, if not already answered by the magnitude of the public interest involved, has its reply in the fact that our question presents no such case. In our case it is yet a matter of public concern, the die has not been thrown, the draft is yet impending, and no one knows who will be torn from the community. The case so stood when this bill was filed.
It is not the individual payment which tests the public character of the appropriation. Individuals are always the recipients of public funds. It is paid to salaries, to pensions, to bounties, for the scalps of panthers, wolves, foxes, crows, and blackbirds, to the poor, to the education of the young, as rewards for the apprehension of horse thieves and felons, to the families of soldiers in service, to aid hospitals, colleges, agricultural societies, and to other useful objects. In all these the recipient is directly benefited, while the public interest in many, is not half so imperious or acute as the relief of a community from an impending draft. The pursuit of happiness is our acknowledged fundamental right, and that, therefore, which makes a whole community unhappy, is certainly a social evil to be avoided if it can be. The support of the poor affords one among the best illustrations of what is á municipal or public appropriation of money. The pauper is the party directly and solely benefited, while his pauperism is a public evil, and often is the result of crime. The pauper has not the merit of the volunteer, while the community is injured, not benefited, by his support. There is nothing but a naked public duty performed in his relief. The same may be said of all expenditures of public money in the punishment of crime.
There is also an illustration to be drawn from those cases (and they are numerous) sustaining the constitutional authority to impose unequal burthens, such as the opening, paving, and grading of streets, the building of sewers, &c., where the owners of adjoining lo'ts are compelled to bear the expenses : McMasters v. Commonwealth, 2 Watts 292 ; Fenelon's Petition, 7 Barr 175; Kirby v. Shaw, 7 Harris 258; Schenly v. City of Allegheny, 1 Casey 130. Kirby v. Shaw was peculiar, sustaining an act imposing a special tax of $500 annually for nine years, upon the borough of Towanda, for the building of a court-house and jail. In delivering the opinion, Gibson, C. J., said: "But it is a postulate of the state constitution, which distinguishes it from the Federal, that all the power of the people is delegated by it, except such parts of it as are specifically reserved; and the whole of it is, without exception, vested in the constitutional dispensers of the people's money. As regards taxation there is no limitation of it. Equality of contribution is not enjoined by the bill of rights, and probably because it was known to be impracticable." "If equality were practicable, in what branch of the government would power to enforce it reside ? — not in the judiciary, unless it were competent to set aside a law free from collision with the constitution, because it seemed to be unjust."
In Schenly and Wife v. The City of Allegheny, the question arose upon a law to levy a special tax on the owners of lots proportioned to the number of feet fronting on the streel, to pay for grading and paving. The opinion delivered by the present chief justice sustained its constitutionality in forcible terms. After citing the cases I have referred to, he says: " From the principles recognised in these cases it must be apparent that the exercise of the taxing power by the legislature must become wanton and unjust — be so grossly perverted as to lose the character of a legislative function, before the judiciary will feel themselves entitled to interpose on constitutional grounds. To arrest the .legislation of a free people, especially in reference to burthens self-imposed for the common good, is to restrain the popular sovereignty, and should have clear warrant in the letter of the fundamental law."
The extent of the taxing power entered largely into the discussions in Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia. Black, C. J., said: "I use the language of Marshall, C. J. (4 Wheat. 816), when I say that it may be exercised to any extent to which the government may choose to carry it, and that no limit has been assigned to it, because the exigency of the government cannot be limited." And again: "lam of opinion that a tax law must be considered valid unless it be for a purpose in which the community taxed has palpably no interest; when it is apparent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and where it would be so pronounced at the first blush." In the same case, after stating the high grounds required to justify the judiciary in declaring a law unconstitutional, the present chief justice said with his usual emphasis: " But on lower ground than this, and especially on ground so low as the equivocal and undefined purposes of municipal corporations, Acts of Assembly have never been declared unconstitutional. ' '
These strictly legal views have even been embodied into a sentiment by the late Chief Justice Lowrie, in a case of municipal subscriptions. His language deserves translation into this case: " When people," says he, " shall have discovered the exact boundary between engagements that are peculiarly social, and those which are peculiarly individual, then possibly they may be morally entitled to declare that they and their governor and legislature and judiciary have violated their constitution in making such contracts. But even then they cannot honestly retrace their steps without making restitution to those whom they have misled:" Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny, 8 Casey 238.
Municipal subscriptions to corporation stocks are no longer authorized ; but Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia, and cases following in its wake, continue to be authoritative expositions of the nature and extent of the taxing power, and the scope of its purposes. It was there held that taxation is not an infringement' of the rights of property, is not a taking within the constitutional prohibition," nor such an injury as can invoke the constitutional right to judicial remedy.
If then it be within the scope of a municipal purpose to grant pensions, pay bounties, give rewards for the destruction of noxious animals, and the arrest of felons, employ watchmen, support paupers, build alms-houses, bridges, and markets, aid charitable institutions, make roads, and grade and pave streets at private expense, how much more is that a public affair which has for its object to preyent the forcible and blind extradition of a valuable part of the population into a service dangerous to the lives and limbs of those who go, and destructive of the welfare and happiness of those who remain! Nor can the dilemma be avoided. It is imposed by the exigency of war and the duty of public defence.
The purpose being clearly municipal, because of its public nature, and therefore within the authority to tax, the power to borrow money in anticipation of the levy is ancillary, following as of course unless within the amendment to the Constitution of 1857. This then is the next question. The amendment provides that " The legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township, or incorporated district, by virtue of a vote of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corporation; or to obtain money for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, association, institution, or party." Granting, for the purpose of the argument, that party here means person or individual, the only part of the amendment to be considered is the clause," " or to obtain money for any party." We have before us no subscription to stock or mere loan of credit.
The prohibition of the clause is clearly not against obtaining money for individuals in the sense of those appropriations which involve the public interest; otherwise this would overthrow the whole power to borrow money to perform ordinary municipal functions. It certainly does not prohibit the obtaining of money to pay contractors for bridges, paving, market-houses, &c., or to pay labourers, artisans, or material-men engaged upon a public work. In every such case where money is borrowed to pay individuals, it is in a broad sense obtaining money for a party. But the sense of the amendment is evidently a restricted one. Its leading thought is the loan of the public money or credit tp private parties corporated or unincorporated. It is not payment in its proper sense which is prohibited, but the private use or control of the public funds. Payment implies a previous debt or consideration, but here advances or loans, which import no obligation or consideration, are the objects of prohibition. There is not a word in the amendment which interdicts the borrowing of money merely, or the pledging of the public credit for a municipal purpose, to be laid out by authorized public officers or agents. The purpose was to prevent the money of the people from passing into the control of private irresponsible associations or parties, and from being squandered in undertakings of doubtful propriety, or being liable to be lost through the want of integrity of those engaged in its disbursement. It intended to confine the municipal expenditures not only to public objects, but to public officers or agents under their direct responsibility to the municipality. This is seen in the whole section. Therefore the municipality shall not become a stockholder in a corporation or association, for this would be to make it a corporator or partner in the company, and place its funds under -the control of its associates. Nor shall it obtain money for these private parties. If I obtain money for another, I do not mean that I am paying him my own debt. Then I should obtain the money for myself, not for him. If I borrow to pay what I am bound to pay, I borrow for myself. But the expression " obtain money for" is immediately followed and explained by its adjunct, " or to loan its credit to," both being linked together in the same sentence before the object or party, common to both expressions, is reached. The history of the amendment also informs us that subscriptions to stock, and lending the credit of the municipalities to private corporations and associations, were the evils to be remedied. But individuals are always in some capacity the recipients of the public money. It makes no difference, therefore, whether a party paid is a volunteer or a witness, viewer, juror, labourer, pauper, or pensioner. The true question is, whether the money is borrowed for a public purpose, and paid bond fide to a proper person for this purpose, or whether it is money obtained as a loan or advance to the use in all respects of private parties.
In the case before us the object is not to obtain money for the volunteer, but for the community, which is to be relieved by the volunteer. In proper contemplation, the obtaining of the money precedes any knowledge of the volunteer, who only becomes known as he steps forward to close with the public offer, and accept the proffered bounty, as the consideration of his service. The consideration given on his side is most valuable; he enlists into a dangerous service, running the risk of life and limb ; and take upon himself the burthen resting upon the whole community subject to the lot. The public welfare, as I have already shown, is most intimately involved in the draft; which enters directly within the field of municipal affairs. The die is not cast, and the lot is yet uncertain. All are liable within the ages of the greatest capability for usefulness. The chosen may be the most valuable, useful, and needed members of society, whose extradition may produce the greatest injury and the most distress. The public interest is more involved in the ills of a draft, than in many evils recognised as public in their nature. An obstruction to a highway, and a disorderly house, perhaps hurtful to but few, are punished as public nuisances. Even sounds and smells claim public attention. An impending draft is an evil certainly more to be dreaded than the odour of a pig-sty, or the clatter of horns. Can it be that citizens may be torn- from the community, and social ties ruptured, to drag them into a dangerous public service, and yet community cannot interfere to save them on the ground that it is only a private affair ? Their property may be protected from the storage of powder, by municipal regulations; but their bodies cannot be saved from being made food for powder in the public defence. It is possible to hold the disc of the dollar so closely to our eyes, it excludes from sight every object of public interest, and blinds us to every sentiment of humanity. I hold, therefore, that money paid to save a community from a draft is not obtained for a party or individual, but is a direct appropriation to a public purpose, and that raising money by the ordinary powers of borrowing and taxation for a common purpose affecting the interests, happiness, and welfare of a community, is not obtaining money or loaning credit to any party, within the terms of the amendment.
But if this case fall within the letter of the clause, it is within the spirit and demands of all the exceptions, in the amendments of 1857, when taken together as a whole. The first section limits the state debt to $750,000 ; yet the second gives unlimited power to contract debts, to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, and defend the state in war. Two invasions of our state, and the character of the war, attest the necessity of this provision. But it is said that protection against invasion and insurrection is a Eederal duty. True, it is so by an express grant of power. But, by the same constitution, every right not delegated is reserved to the states or people; and I find no clause in the constitution by which the right of self-protection is taken away from the states, in all respects. On the contrary, I find that in time of war, or when actually invaded, or in imminent danger not admitting of delay, the right of the state to keep troops or ships of war is reserved by express exception. The kind of war is not defined, foreign or civil; nor is the duty or mode of self-protection prescribed or limited. To say, therefore, in the face of a civil war raging from Pennsylvania to the Gulf, and of invasions far within her borders, bringing ruin on thousands of her citizens, who are now knocking at the doors of the legislature for public compensation, that there is no power in the state to preserve her territory from irruption, and the lives and property of her people, is to outrage the first law of nature and of government, and to bring unmerited reproach upon the wisdom of the founders of our institutions. Why shall not the state offer inducements to her citizens to go into the Federal service to assist in preserving us from the ravages of war ? What clause of Federal or State Constitution forbids it ?
By the sixth section of the amendments, the Commonwealth is forbidden to assume the debt, or any part of it, of any county, city, borough, or township; but the exception immediately follows : unless such debt shall have been contracted to enable the state to repel invasion, suppress domestic insurrection, or defend itself in time of war. Now, the exception here implies two things: first, that a municipality may be authorized to contract a debt for defence in time of war or of invasion; and next, that such a debt may be assumed by the state. If we suppose a literal difference in the fact that the volunteer goes directly into the service of the United States, yet the motive is state defence; and the means .thus employed not only actually contribute to this purpose, but experience has shown to be most effective to the desired end. In such a war as this has been, wherein is the difference between the strong Federal arm, outstretched for our protection under the injunction of the Federal Constitution, and the feebler hands of the state militia, that we should declare authoritatively that the former cannot be aided by the state while the latter only can be used ? Who has forgotten the mighty shock of arms at Gettysburg, when the whole power of the nation was held in doubtful Conflict by a giant and determined foe; and when, for three anxious days, prayers ascended to the God of battles, and loyal men held their breaths, uncertain upon which side the victory had settled ? It therefore becomes us well to pause before we stand on such narrow ground. Bather should we become humble pupils in that great school of experience which has taught us how near we were to total defeat. In view of these grave realities of war, and of the necessities of defence, how can it be supposed that a free and intelligent people, in avoiding the evils of municipal subscriptions, ran so far into the opposite extreme that they have stripped themselves of the power of incurring a debt in defence of their lives and property at a time of great public exigency ? On the contrary, every line and clause of the exceptions bristle, as it were with steel, against this artificial, feeble, and unfriendly interpretation.
If we refer to the Federal Constitution we find the war powers wholly conferred upon the Federal Government, including the duty of protection to the states ; while the states are prohibited from " engaging in war unless when actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." In returning to the state constitution we discover that the exception in the sixth section of the amendment does not stop with a debt contracted to enable the state to repel invasion and suppress domestic insurrection, but includes also debts contracted to enable the state to defend itself in time of war. Clearly this is not mere tautology, and something was meant by defence in time of war beyond invasion, or imminent danger of it. Then how defend itself ? What provision in the constitution confines state defence to calling out the militia merely ? What is there to forbid the encouragement of, or procuring volunteers to enter into the Federal service, when it is manifest it directly promotes the defence of the state ? In spirit, purpose, and language, therefore, such a debt is clearly within the exception to the amendment.
There is nothing, in my judgment, in the argument founded upon the alleged repugnance of the law to the Federal power to raise and support armies. There is no conflict of jurisdiction, or of power. Admitting to the fullest extent the incompatibility of any state law assuming to regulate or to interfere with the raising and supporting of a Federal army, there is here no interference, no regulation, and no repugnance. Congress purposely refrained from occupying the whole field of power, and expressly provided for the acceptance of volunteers in discharge of the draft. The Act of February 24th 1864, after providing for the distribution of military service by quotas among the municipalities of each state, declared that " all volunteers who may enlist after the draft shall be ordered, and before it shall actually be made, shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted in such ward, town, township, precinct, election district, or county." This portion of the field, as to procuring volunteers, was therefore left open to the exercise of any means to induce persons to enlist in relief of the-municipality from the pending, but as yet unexecuted draft. That this was intentional is recognised by the terms of the law. The third proviso of the seventh section, which provides for transfers into the naval service, declares that the bounty money -received from the state, by any mariner or seaman enlisting from that state, shall be deducted from his prize-money. The proviso in the 20th section, authorizing the discharge of minors entering the service without consent of their parents or guardians, expressly requires such persons, their parents or guardians, first to repay to the government and to the state and local authorities all bounties and advance pay which may have been paid to them. The Federal law, therefore, does not assume to control or direct the procuring of volunteers. It simply suffers or permits the citizens to come forward voluntarily, and accept the service of the men to be drafted, and contemplates that inducements in the shape of bounties will be hel.d out to volunteers by the states and municipalities from which they come.
The argument, therefore, that the act of the legislature providing for the payment of bounties to volunteers, comes into conflict with the Federal law for drafting men into the service, has not a single foot to stand upon. There is not a single point of conflict. The state bounty operates only upon the will of the citizen to induce him to volunteer, and ends with his acceptance into service. It does not even undertake to determine his fitness to serve, but leaves this to the operation of the Federal law; and this is a decisive answer to the argument that the state bounty throws upon the service unfit persons, while it saves the young and vigorous. If the fact be so, it is an argument to be addressed to Congress to amend its law, or punish the Federal agents. It is a most singular conception that the malpractice of the Federal officials in this respect proves the uneonstitutionality of the state law ; and if it were not uttered with great gravity by counsel of commanding position, I should suspect it of irony.
In view of the perfect line of demarcation which separates the state and Federal laws in this instance, it is unnecessary to treat the case upon authority. But I may refer to the single case of Weaver v. Fegely et al., 5 Casey 27, where the rules governing questions of conflict between Federal and state legislation are stated, and the authorities collected. The rule applied to such a case as this is, that the implication against the power of the state can only arise where the state authority is absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
This opinion was concurred in by Strong, J., and Read, J., being a majority of the court in bane.