Case Name: JENKINS, Chief of Police, etc. v. JONES
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1953-04-13
Citations: 209 Ga. 758
Docket Number: No. 18150
Parties: JENKINS, Chief of Police, etc. v. JONES.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Candler, J., who• dissents, and Atkinson, P. J., not participating.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 209
Pages: 758–769

Head Matter:
JENKINS, Chief of Police, etc. v. JONES.
No. 18150.
Argued March 10, 1953
Decided April 13, 1953—
Rehearing denied May 13, 1953.
J, C. Savage, J. C. Murphy, J. M. B. Bloodworth, John E. Feagin and Henry L. Bowden, for plaintiff in error.
G. Fred Kelley, Frank Grizzard, Frank A. Bowers, Paul Webb, Solicitor-General, and Norman H. Fudge, contra.

Opinion:
Almand, Justice.
Code § 68-307, which makes it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of Georgia while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs, has been a law of general operation since 1910. Ga. L. 1910, pp. 90, 93; Id. 1927, pp. 226, 238; 1947, p. 230. The municipal ordinance here under consideration deals with the same subject matter, viz., operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets in the City of Atlanta while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs, and does not introduce any ingredient or concomitant essential to the preservation of the city's peace, health, or good order which is not included in Code § 68-307. Where a municipal ordinance and a public criminal statute operate upon the same state of physical acts, the ordinance is invalid unless the offense created thereby contains some characterizing ingredient not contained in the State offense. Aycock v. Town of Rutledge, 104 Ga. 533 (1) (30 S. E. 815); Papworth v. City of Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 378 (32 S. E. 363). A municipal ordinance punishing an act made penal by a State law then existing, covering the same subject matter, must yield to the State law. Lanford v. Alfriend, 147 Ga. 799 (1) (95 S. E. 688). "Where both the ordinance and the State law exist, covering the same act and same offense, the offender can not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense under the ordinance and under the State law. In such case he could only be punished for a violation of the State law." Mayo v. Williams, 146 Ga. 650, 652 (92 S. E. 59).
The respondent contends that the power of the City of Atlanta to enact the ordinance here involved is specifically authorized by Code § 68-312, a general law, and that, under the rulings of this court in Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405 (1) (14 S. E. 564), Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. 427 (1) (51 S. E. 390), and Lanford v. Alfriend, 147 Ga. 799 (supra), the city, by virtue of Code § 68-312, had authority to enact this ordinance, though the identical offense is penalized under a general law of this State. The cases cited in substance hold that the General Assembly may by express enactment authorize a municipality to provide by ordinance for the punishment of an act which in its nature affects the health, peace, and good order of the community, notwithstanding such an act has already been made penal under a general law of the State. Whether these rulings are sound, or in conflict with other decisions of this court — such as Aycock v. Town of Rutledge, Papworth v. Fitzgerald, and Mayo v. Williams, all supra, and Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Hussey, 21 Ga. 80 (68 Am. D. 452), Snipe v. Dixon, 147 Ga. 285 (93 S. E. 399), Smith v. Chapman, 166 Ga. 479 (143 S. E. 422), and Marshall v. City of Griffin, 173 Ga. 782 (161 S. E. 622), which hold that a municipal corporation has no power to enact an ordinance providing for the punishment of an offense made penal by the laws of the State — need not be passed upon in this case, for the reason that Code § 68-312 does not grant express authority to enact the ordinance under review; and even if it be conceded that the rulings in the cases relied upon are correct, the respondent can derive no benefit from these deci sions. Code § 68-312 is a codification of section 19 of the act of 1927 (Ga. L. 1927, pp. 226, 240). Section 68-307, which penalizes operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquors or drugs, is a codification of section 13 of the same act. The first part of § 68-312 purports in general terms to grant authority to a municipality to regulate the running and operation of motor vehicles therein, and then, as a part of the same sentence, states that nothing in these motor vehicle statutes shall prevent a municipality from regulating, by reasonable ordinance, speed, cut-outs, and headlights, or requiring owners of motor vehicles to register the numbers of the State licenses with designated city officers. There is no reference in this section to operating motor vehicles while under the influence of liquors or drugs, nor is any authority therein granted to make penal the running and operation of a motor vehicle also made penal by a State statute. Ejusdem generis is a rule of construction to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Where general words are followed by a description of specified subjects, the meaning of the general words ordinarily will be presumed to be limited to the enumerated special subjects, and to include only those things of the same nature as those specially enumerated, unless a clear manifestation of a contrary intent appears from the statute. Beavers v. LeSueur, 188 Ga. 393, 403 (3 S. E. 2d, 667); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 201 Ga. 770, 777 (41 S. E. 2d, 229); 14 Words & Phrases (Perm, ed.), 197, 212. In our opinion, it was not the intent of the General Assembly to confer upon the municipalities of this State the authority to enact ordinances making it a penal offense to operate a motor vehicle on the streets of the municipalities while under the influence of liquors or drugs, there being a general law of force in the State making such operation a penal offense. If a municipality, under the general terms of Code § 68-312, has authority to enact the ordinance in question, then, under a general law authorizing it to enact ordinances concerning the misappropriation of personal property, illicit relations between the sexes, and injury to property, a municipality could enact penal ordinances as to simple larceny, fornication and adultery, or assault and battery and malicious mischief, all of which are misdemeanor offenses under the general laws of the State. Surely, the General Assembly did not intend to authorize the City of Atlanta to enact an ordinance that would lead to unjust and unequal enforcement of the law. With both a State statute and a municipal ordinance making driving a motor vehicle on a public road while intoxicated a penal offense, A, while driving a motor vehicle within the limits of the City of Atlanta, could be arrested by an officer, tried before the city recorder without a jury, and be fined a sum not exceeding $500 and sentenced to work on the streets or public works of the city for not exceeding sixty days. If A had been arrested by the officer while driving outside the city limits, in Fulton County, he could be charged with violating the State statute and tried before a court having jurisdiction to try the State offense, with the right of trial by a jury, and upon his conviction, be subject to punishment by a sentence to twelve months on the public works, six months imprisonment in jail, and a fine not exceeding $1000. Code, § 27-2506. Clearly, the General Assembly did not intend such an incongruous result from the enactment of what is now § 68-312 of the Code. The amount of punishment for a violation of the criminal law should not depend upon the place where the law was violated. Where A and B are charged with the same criminal offense, but A) because of the place of his arrest, is subject to a greater punishment than B, this result does not conform to the principle of equal justice under the law.
In Moran v. City of Atlanta, 102 Ga. 840 (30 S. E. 298), the defendant was charged with selling liquor without a license, in violation of a city ordinance. At that time there was a State statute in force making the selling of liquor without a license a misdemeanor. Though the legislature had granted authority to regulate the sale of ardent spirits within the corporate limits of the city, and in its discretion to issue a license or withhold the same, this court held that such provision in the charter did not expressly confer upon the corporate authorities the power to enact an ordinance prohibiting and making penal the retailing of spirituous liquors without a license. It was there said: "The power to legislate concerning an offense which is fully covered by the penal laws of the State does not exist in a municipal corporation, unless it has a clear and well defined grant of such authority from the legislature." P. 844.
Counsel for the respondent, however, contend that the words, "laws of a general nature," used in the uniformity clause of the Constitution refer to State statutes, and that a municipal ordinance is not a special law within the meaning of said clause of the Constitution. In support of this contention, they cite such cases as Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 176 Ga. 489 (168 S. E. 312), and Maner v. Dykes, 183 Ga. 118 (187 S. E. 699). These cases simply rule that a municipal ordinance is not a "State statute" within the meaning of art. 6, sec. 2, par. 5 of the Constitution of 1877 as amended (sec. 2, par. 4 of the same article of the Constitution of 1945, Code, Ann., § 2-3704), which paragraph confers exclusive jurisdiction on this court to review cases in which the constitutionality of "any law of the State of Georgia or of the United States is drawn in question," and these cases hold that a municipal ordinance is not a law or statute of the State, and that consequently the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review cases involving the constitutionality of municipal ordinances. Municipal ordinances, though laws of a municipality, are the result of legislative action of a corporate body created by the General Assembly of the State. Under art. 1, sec. 4, par. 2 of the Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-402), it is the duty of the courts to declare invalid all legislative acts which violate the Constitution, and this court has repeatedly held invalid municipal ordinances which deal with matters covered by the general law. Barlow v. City of Americus, 146 Ga. 805 (92 S. E. 643); Snipe v. Dixon, 147 Ga. 285 (supra); Marshall v. City of Griffin, 173 Ga. 782 (supra). See also Carey v. City of Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192 (84 S. E. 456, L. R. A. 1915D 684, Ann. Cas. 1916E 1151); Chaires v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755 (139 S. E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 230). Generally, a municipal ordinance passed in pursuance of express legislative authority is a law within the meaning of the Constitution, and has the same effect as a local law duly enacted by the State legislature. Herman v. City of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191 (55 Atl. 2d, 491, 173 A. L. R. 1310). The authority of the creature is not greater than the authority of the creator. If the General Assembly cannot enact a special law as to matters covered by a general law, it follows that a municipal ordinance which deals with matters covered by a general law is a special law within the meaning of the uniformity clause of the Constitution. Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850 (69 S. E. 2d, 774), and citations.
The ordinance under an attack in this case is violative of art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1 of the Constitution of Georgia (Code, Ann., § 2-401). The detention of the prisoner by the respondent, being by virtue of a void ordinance, was illegal, and the trial judge properly made the writ of habeas corpus absolute and discharged the petitioner from the custody of the respondent.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Candler, J., who• dissents, and Atkinson, P. J., not participating.