Case Name: CANTON (City) v. Walter Pryke
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1916-12-05
Citations: 27 Ohio C.C. Dec. 536
Docket Number: 
Parties: CANTON (City) v. Walter Pryke.
Judges: Houck, J., concurs.
Reporter: Ohio Circuit Court Decisions
Volume: 27
Pages: 536–546

Head Matter:
MOTIONS — TRIAL—VERDICT.
[Stark (5th) Court of Appeals,
December 5, 1916.]
Shields, Powell and Houck, JJ.
CANTON (City) v. Walter Pryke.
1. Motion by Defendant at Close of Plaintiff’s Evidence to Direct Verdict net Submission of Defendant’s Case.
A motion made by the defendant, at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant is not a submission of the defendant’s case and cannot be made so by the plaintiff’s joining in such motion. Such a motion by the defendant tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case, and is in no wise a submission of defendant’s case.
2. Motion to direct Verdict Equivalent to Demurrer to Plaintiff1» Evidence and if Overruled Defendant May Submit Case to Jury.
A motion by defendant to direct a verdict in his favor made at the close of the evidence of plaintiff is equivalent to a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence and under the code practice if overruled, the defendant has a right to introduce his testimony and have the cause submitted to the jury on the facts; and the nature of such a motion by defendant is not changed by plaintiff joining in such motion.
3. Motions by Both Defendant and Plaintiff at Close of Plaintiff'» Evidence, not Waiver of Right by Defendant to Introduce Evidence and Submit Cause to Jury on Facts.
Where it appears that at the close of the testimony offered by the plaintiff, a motion was made by the defendant to direct a verdict in its favor, and a motion was also made by the plaintiff to direct a verdict in his favor and the motion of the defendant was overruled, the defendant then had the right to go forward and offer his evidence and have the whole cause submitted to the jury on the facts; and when the motion of plaintiff was sustained and a verdict for plaintiff was directed by the court, such action on the part of the court deprived the defendant of its constitutional right to a trial by jury.
4. Waiver of Jury Trial must be Shown In Record by Unequivocal T erms.
The right of trial by jury should ever be held inviolate, and if a party who is entitled to such trial waives such right, the record must disclose such waiver in unequivocal terms.
Error.
Walter S. Buff and Clarence A. Fisher, for plaintiff in error.
Webber & Turner, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
POWELL, J.
The defendant in error, Walter Pryke, recovered a judgment against the city of Canton, for damages arising from the loss of the personal services of his wife, by reason of the negligence of said city in the maintenance of its streets and street crossings. Said judgment is brought into this court by petition in error for review'. The question presented to us for adjudication is one of procedure and not one arising out of the merits of the case.
The record shows that when the case was on trial in the court of common pleas the plaintiff, Pryke, offered his testimony and rested his case. The defendant, the city of Canton, then moved for a directed verdict in its favor, whereupon the plaintiff joined in said motion, asking a directed verdict in favor of the said plaintiff. The court overruled the motion of defendant and sustained the motion of plaintiff, directing a verdict in his favor in the sum of $2500, which verdict was returned by the jury and. the judgment thereupon was entered. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and a bill of exceptions was taken, containing the entire record and the same was filed in this court with the petition in error.
Did the court eiT in its action on said two motions for a directed verdict? We are of the opinion that it did.
The conduct of the trial of a cause in the court of common pleas is provided for by Secs. 11447 and 11448 G. C. By Subd. 3 of Sec. 11447 it is provided as follows:
"3. The party who would be defeated, if no evidence were offered on either side, first, must produce his evidence, and the adverse party must then produce his evidence."
Pursuant to this direction plaintiff offered all his evidence and rested. Defendant then by his motion for a directed verdict, submitted for the consideration of the court, the evidence offered by the plaintiff, with the claim that even if its truth were admitted it would not make a ease that would entitle the plaintiff to a judgment in his favor. The action of the defendant was equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence, the only difference being in the legal effect of an order sustaining the same. Formerly on an order sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, a nonsuit was entered, which did not bar a second suit on the same cause of action, but now a judgment entered on an order sustaining a motion to direct a verdict is res judicata and no second suit can be maintained, otherwise a motion to direct a verdict and a demurrer to the evidence are one and the same thing. A motion by the defendant to direct a verdict at the close of plaintiff's case is not a submission of the defendant's case and cannot be made so by the plaintiff's joining in such motion. He had nothing to submit that was not already submitted when he had offered his evidence and rested his case. His joining in defendant's motion does not change the nature of it. It is still a motion testing the sufficiency of th,e plaintiff's evidence, and is in no wise a submission of defendant's ease. It is said, how ever, that the record does not show a prejudicial error in the action of the court; that the defendant should have stated what he intended to prove by the evidence to be offered. We do not subscribe to this view. The statute above cited prescribes what the record should show. It should show that the plaintiff offered his testimony and rested; that a motion to direct a verdict was filed by the defendant and overruled; that the defendant then offered its evidence, or refused to offer any, as the case might be and rested. If its motion to direct a verdict was then renewed as required by law, the whole case would be before the court and jury, and a motion by the plaintiff for judgment on the whole case would be a submission of the whole ease to the court, as a matter of law and without the intervention of the jury.
A case cannot be submitted and adjudicated on the submission of one side only. If it is submitted on the evidence it must be submitted on the whole evidence, and the record must so show. If on a motion for judgment on the pleadings it must be on all the pleadings in the case and not on any one of them. It is not necessary in this ease to show what the evidence to be offered tended to prove. It is only necessary to show that the defendant had evidence to offer, or if it had none to offer that it rested ffs case. This it does not show and the court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff and in entering judgment thereon without such evidence having been offered.
It is strongly contended in argument that the defendant waived its right to have its ease submitted to a jury, and that it consented to have its case passed on by the court, or that the court should direct such verdict to be returned as the pleadings and the evidence would warrant.
The right of trial by jury should ever be held inviólate, and if a party who is entitled to a trial of his cause waives such right, the record ought to disclose such waiver in unequivocal terms. What does this record disclose that can be construed as a waiver of a jury trial, and submission of the same to the court without the intervention of a jury ?
The record shows that the court overruled the motion of defendant for a directed verdict and sustained the motion of plaintiff for such verdict. After this had been done, counsel for the plaintiff said: "We now ask that the case go to the jury on the facts." Counsel for the defendant then said: "We object and insist that it is not the correct procedure." The court then submitted the ease to the jury, by directing it to return a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2500, which it did.
A majority of the court do not think that this constitutes a waiver of any of its rights on the part of the defendant. It was and is more of a protest to the action of the court in sustaining plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, the motion for which had already been sustained. There remained nothing to submit except a direction by the court to the jury to retire and return a verdict in an amount fixed by the court.
"The right of trial by jury being guaranteed to all our citizens by the constitution of the state, cannot be waived or violated by either legislative act or judicial order or decree." Gibbs v. Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34. [102 N. E. Rep. 299],
In the able opinion in this case, at page 47, the court says:
"So long as the trial by jury is a part of our system of jurisprudence its constitutional integrity and importance should be jealously safeguarded. The right of trial by jury should be as inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our constitution. '
A majority of the court think there was no waiver of any rights on the part of the defendant; that the court erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, and in directing the jury to return the verdict that was returned.
Said judgment will, therefore, be reversed and the cause will be remanded to the court of common pleas for a new trial, and for such other proceedings as are authorized by law. Judgment reversed.
Houck, J., concurs.