Case Name: Ruffin GEORGE et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ora BERTRAND et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1968-12-05
Citations: 217 So. 2d 47
Docket Number: No. 2510
Parties: Ruffin GEORGE et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ora BERTRAND et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, HOOD, and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 217
Pages: 47–52

Head Matter:
Ruffin GEORGE et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ora BERTRAND et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 2510.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Dec. 5, 1968.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1969.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 15, 1969.
Writ Refused Feb. 28, 1969.
Fusilier, Pucheu & Soileau, by A. Gaynor Soileau, Ville Platte, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, by Edward C. Abell, Jr., Lafayette, for in-tervenor-appellant.
Landry, Watkins, Cousin & Bonin, by William O. Bonin, New Iberia, for defendants-appellees.
Before FRUGÉ, HOOD, and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
FRUGÉ, Judge.
This is a death action arising out of the death of Vergie Lee George, brought by his alleged father, Ruffin George, appellant, and Velma Roxie Myles George. The plaintiffs in the court below filed an original and three supplemental and amending petitions, to which defendants filed various exceptions. In essence, and without going into detail regarding each petition and each exception thereto, all the defendants filed the exception of no cause of action in that the pleadings indicated that Velma Roxie Myles and one Willie Jackson, the latter not being a party to this action, were married on May 29, 1937, and that Vergie Lee George, the alleged acknowledged child of Ruffin George, was born to Velma Roxie Myles Jackson on August S, 1947, which was prior to her divorce from Willie Jackson on September 10, 1948.
Defendants' exception challenged the right of plaintiffs to recover for the death of Vergie Lee George under Louisiana C.C. Art. 2315 under the facts alleged. The district court maintained the exception as to Ruffin George and dismissed his suit, giving rise to this appeal. The exception was overruled as to Velma Roxie Myles George and the validity of this ruling is not before this court and will not be discussed further. Highlands Insurance Company, intervenor, seeking recovery for Workmen's compensation benefits paid, has filed a brief herein seeking reversal of the judgment against Ruffin George.
The essential question to be answered in this case is as follows: May the alleged, acknowledged father of a child born during the marriage of its mother and her legal husband have the right to maintain an action in wrongful death for the death of the alleged son?
There is no question that the child, Vergie Lee George, was conceived and born during the marriage of Velma Roxie Myles and Willie Jackson. It was established, however, that at the time of its conception and birth, Velma Roxie Myles was living with one Ruffin George, the plaintiff herein. Under these circumstances, the child, Vergie Lee George is the legitimate son of Velma Roxie Myles and Willie Jackson— the authority for this being the well-known presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the child. La.C.C. Art. 184.
The presumption referred to is so firmly fixed in our law that it requires no further citation. It has been referred to as "the strongest presumption known in law". Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952).
Plaintiffs admit in their brief that no action has been brought by Willie Jackson, the legal husband of Velma Roxie Myles, to disavow the paternity of Vergie Lee George, the deceased. Therefore, there is no reason that the presumption should not apply.
In the case of Succession of Barlow, 197 So.2d 682 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1967), writ refused, 1967, the court encountered a question as follows:
" Can a child who is presumed to be the legitimate child of the mother's husband under LSA-C.C. art. 184 also be the legitimated child under LSA-C.C. art. 198 of the actual father and mother by their subsequent marriage after removal of impediments?"
This quotation brings to light the basic issue in this case — that being whether Ruffin George, having acknowledged the child, legitimated him so as to be allowed the right of maintaining a wrongful death action at the son's death.
The court in the above-cited case, in a well-reasoned opinion, maintained that a child could not be both legitimate, in that he was born during the marriage of his mother and her husband, and legitimated in that his mother and her second husband, in their marriage, had attempted such legiti mation. The court reasoned that such could not be the case as is evidenced by the following language:
"We must reject appellant's argument that a child can be both legitimate of one father and legitimated as regards another father. If the argument were valid, what of her relationship in such a situation to her mother? Would she be both legitimate and legitimated? We think this would be a conflict of status not sanctioned by LSA-C.C. art. 178, which provides: 'Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated ' Note the 'either or' possibilities only."
Under the ruling of the Barlow case, supra, it is evident that Ruffin George, not being the legal father of Vergie Lee George, does not have a right of action for wrongful death under Louisiana C.C. Art. 2315.
Plaintiffs based strong argument upon the recent Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968) and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1512, 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968). In short, these cases hold that an illegitimate child, or the mother of an illegitimate child cannot be prevented from suing under La.C.C. Art. 2315 for the death of the other. The Supreme Court declared that the denial, to an illegitimate child or the mother of an illegitimate child, of the right to recover for the wrongful death of the other, on whom they were dependent, constituted invidious discrimination against them.
It is obvious from the wording of these cases that they have no application to the facts at hand. Vergie Lee George was not an illegitimate, but rather the legitimate child of Velma Roxie Myles and Willie Jackson. There is no discrimination against Ruffin George, he is simply not the legitimate father of the deceased.
If we were to allow Ruffin George to maintain this action, what of the rights of the legal father, Willie Jackson? Would both be able to maintain an action under La.C.C. Art. 2315 for the death of "their" son? We think the necessity of ruling for defendants is obvious.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court, in sustaining the no cause of action exception as against Ruffin George, is hereby affirmed. Costs to be paid by plaintiff-appellant.
Affirmed.
. We observe that this exception is sustained as to Ruffin George only. So far as the record shows, the intervention by Highlands Insurance Company, the workmen's compensation insuror, for recovery of benefits paid is still pending in the district court and is not before us. See C.C.P. Art. 1039, (1960); Thomas v. Matthews Lumber Co., La., 215 So.2d 832 (1968); Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313; LSA-R.S. 23:1101.