Case Name: CYDNEE C. SIMS v. DAN GERNANDT, DAN GERNANDT d/b/a/ DAN'S FOREIGN CAR REPAIR
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1995-07-28
Citations: 341 N.C. 162
Docket Number: No. 514A94
Parties: CYDNEE C. SIMS v. DAN GERNANDT, DAN GERNANDT d/b/a/ DAN’S FOREIGN CAR REPAIR
Judges: Justice PARKER concurs in the result.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 341
Pages: 162–167

Head Matter:
CYDNEE C. SIMS v. DAN GERNANDT, DAN GERNANDT d/b/a/ DAN’S FOREIGN CAR REPAIR
No. 514A94
(Filed 28 July 1995)
Torts § 31 (NCI4th)— release signed by plaintiff — claim in existence at time of signing — release as bar to action
A release signed by plaintiff effectively barred her claim that defendant fraudulently concealed damages to her car where plaintiff took her car to defendant for repairs to the clutch; when she picked it up, she noticed a peculiar odor and a stain on the carpet near the gas pedal; defendant refunded the $30 fee paid by plaintiff; plaintiff signed a document whereby she agreed to “relinquish [defendant] of any responsibility whatsoever, of any kind for my [car]”; and any responsibility of defendant to plaintiff was already in existence at the time plaintiff signed the document and was, therefore, released by that document.
Am Jur 2d, Release §§ 29 et seq.
Justice Parker concurs in the result.
Justice Frye dissenting.
Justices Lake and Orr join in this dissenting opinion.
Appeal by plaintiff pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) of the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 116 N.C. App. 299, 447 S.E.2d 455 (1994), affirming an order allowing defendant’s motion for summary judgment entered by Manson, J., on 21 June 1993 in District Court, Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court 10 May 1995.
McGill & Noble, by Christa A. McGill, for plaintiff-appellant. .
Browne, Flebotte, Wilson & Horn, P.L.L.C., by Daniel R. Flebotte, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
Plaintiff's complaint and forecast of evidence indicate that she took her car to defendant's repair shop to have the clutch cable tightened. When she returned for her car, she noticed a peculiar odor and a stain on the carpet near the gas pedal. Defendant agreed to refund the $30.00 fee paid by plaintiff. Defendant then presented plaintiff with a one-sentence release, which plaintiff signed.
Plaintiff alleges she later discovered that her gas line had been damaged while her car was being worked on by defendant, and the damage caused a gasoline leak that resulted in the carpet stain and odor. Plaintiff then brought this action against defendant claiming that defendant fraudulently concealed the damage to her car. Plaintiff admits that she did not read the document that defendant gave her to sign, but she contends that she did not know she was signing a "release." The document signed by plaintiff was as follows: "I Cydnee C. Sims [plaintiff's signature] agree to relinquish Dan Gernandt of any responsibility whatsoever, of any kind for my 85 Honda-Civic & hereby receive a refund in full of $30.00 for welding of vehicle pedal." Plaintiff states in her affidavit that she believed she was signing a receipt for the $30.00 refund.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on the release. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, with Judge Wynn dissenting, affirmed the order of the trial court. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court from Judge Wynn's dissent below.
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the plaintiff's release effectively bars her claim. Plaintiff argues that the basis of her claim arose subsequent to her signing of the release and is therefore not barred by the release. Plaintiff relies on Travis v. Knob Creek, Inc., 321 N.C. 279, 362 S.E.2d 277 (1987), reh'g denied, 321 N.C. 481, 364 S.E.2d 672 (1988), where this Court stated:
"A release ordinarily operates on the matters expressed therein which are already in existence at the time of the giving of the release. Accordingly, demands originating at the time a release is given or subsequently, and demands subsequently maturing or accruing, are not as a rule discharged by the release unless expressly embraced therein or falling within the fair import of the terms employed."
Id. at 282, 362 S.E.2d at 279 (quoting 76 C.J.S. Release § 53 (1952)) (alteration in original).
In Travis, the plaintiff was employed by defendant Knob Creek from 1977 until the company was bought by defendant Ethan Allen in 1979. When plaintiff learned that the company was going to be sold, he negotiated and signed a ten-year employment contract with Knob Creek to ensure his continued employment by Ethan Allen. Shortly thereafter, Ethan Allen asked the plaintiff to sign a release which released and discharged Knob Creek "from all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, on account of, connected with, or growing out of any matter or thing whatsoever." Id. at 281, 362 S.E.2d at 278 (emphasis added). Five years later, Ethan Allen fired the plaintiff, and he sued for breach of his employment contract. Defendants argued that the release barred the plaintiff's claim. This Court stated that because "[t]he release did not specifically include future claims or existing non-asserted rights" and "did not contain any language implying that such claims or rights were being released," the release did not bar plaintiffs claim. Id. at 283, 362 S.E.2d at 279.
This case is distinguishable from Travis. In Travis, plaintiff had an ongoing relationship with Knob Creek. He signed the release prior to the expiration of his ten-year employment contract. Moreover, at the time plaintiff signed the release, he did not have a claim for relief and had not asserted a legal right to continue working for Knob Creek. Knob Creek's obligations had not yet fully matured or accrued. Here, by contrast, when plaintiff smelled the odor and saw the stain on the carpet of her car, she was aware that something was wrong with the car. Her claim against defendant had accrued. After some discussion, the parties agreed that defendant would refund the $30.00 fee plaintiff had paid, and plaintiff signed a release. At the time of signing the release, there was no continuing relationship between the parties, and any obligation of defendant to plaintiff had matured.
We conclude that the document in this case is effective as a release of plaintiffs claim against defendant. The document clearly and unambiguously informs the reader that it is a release by the signatory of "any responsibility [of defendant] whatsoever, of any kind for my 85 Honda-Civic." Any responsibility of defendant to plaintiff was already in existence at the time plaintiff signed the document and was therefore released by that document.
Summary judgment for defendant was properly granted by the trial court, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Justice PARKER concurs in the result.