Case Name: Lauren Moore DELEHANT, Appellant, v. Dorothea Margaret DELEHANT, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-03-07
Citations: 383 So. 2d 231
Docket Number: No. 78-364
Parties: Lauren Moore DELEHANT, Appellant, v. Dorothea Margaret DELEHANT, Appellee.
Judges: LETTS and MOORE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 231–233

Head Matter:
Lauren Moore DELEHANT, Appellant, v. Dorothea Margaret DELEHANT, Appellee.
No. 78-364.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 7, 1979.
Rehearing Denied May 2, 1979.
On Rehearing May 28, 1980.
Richard D. Sneed, Jr., Fort Pierce, for appellant.
Russell J. Ferraro, Jr., of McManus, Stewart & Ferraro, P.A., Stuart, Vincent A. Lloyd, of Lloyd & Brown, Fort Pierce, and R. Patrick Beatty, of Saylor & Beatty, Stuart, for appellee.

Opinion:
BERANEK, Judge.
This is an appeal by the husband from the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The case suffers from numerous procedural irregularities. Notice of appeal was filed on February 17, 1978. Designations to the court reporter filed by appellant included only limited portions of the transcript of all the evidence. Ap-pellee/wife did not file cross designations to the court reporter. No portion of the tran script of actual testimony was ever filed with this court. The parties have engaged in numerous motions whereby appellant originally sought to substantially extend the time for the filing of the complete transcript as designated. Appellee has continually argued appellant only designated a small portion of. the evidence and that the portion designated would be insufficient to sustain the appeal. Appellee argues that she must have the transcript of the entire trial in order to refute the allegations made in the brief which appellant has filed and which makes no reference to any transcript. The time for the filing of appellee's brief was extended until after appellee received portions of the transcript designated by appellant. The transcript as designated has never been filed in complete form and ap-pellee has never filed a brief. Appellant has filed a document waiving the right to be heard with regard to any argument made which is not supported by a transcript.
Under all of these circumstances the Court on November 8, 1978, ordered appel-lee to file whatever brief deemed advisable within thirty days. No brief was ever filed. The matter has thus been considered and disposed of upon such record and briefs as have been filed.
We find that the final judgment discloses error on its face and reverse.
The trial court found that the husband was unemployable but that he would be receiving certain sums of money in the future due to the sale of a jointly owned business. The parties owned two assets jointly. One was a home and the other was Seymour's Inn, a restaurant and bar.' The court found that there were no special equities in either one.
•The court ordered child support to the wife based upon the husband's "net worth." This 'net worth was based on the husband's interest in the bar. The court ordered the bar be sold and the proceeds be used to pay off various designated bills and debts growing out of the marriage. The court then stated that anything left over was to be split equally between the parties.
As to the jointly owned home, the court ordered that the wife be awarded the husband's interest as lump sum alimony. The judgment then went on to condition this award of lump sum alimony by reciting that if the sale of the bar did not result in the husband's getting a substantial sum of money, then wife would not get the house as lump sum alimony but instead would receive the house for an estate of ten years during which time husband and wife would pay half of all expenses.
This final judgment is reversible on its face. An award of lump sum alimony creates a vested right that survives the death of the wife and is neither modifiable nor terminable upon remarriage. Gordon v. Gordon, 335 So.2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 324; and Cann v. Cann, 334 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Lump sum alimony should not be ordered unless the spouse being required to pay it is financially in a position to do so without impairing his or her economic status. Bradley v. Bradley, 327 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Here, the Court could not award the home to the wife as lump sum alimony and then condition this award of lump sum alimony on the husband's making money out of the sale of the jointly owned business. Further, the Court could not assume a positive net worth on the part of the husband in one part of the final judgment and then recognize the very real possibility that he might make no money out of the sale of the business in another portion of the judgment. The judgment, on its face, is inconsistent and is erroneous as it affects the rights of both parties.
The final judgment is reversed in its entirety and the matter remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS and MOORE, JJ., concur.