Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John M. Schuyler, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-06-28
Citations: 106 N.Y. 298
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John M. Schuyler, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 298–320

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John M. Schuyler, Appellant.
Where a party seeks to exclude the testimony of a physician under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 834), forbidding a physician from disclosing information he “acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity,’- the burden is upon such party to bring the case within the provision, he must make it appear not only that the information which he seeks to exclude was acquired by the witness in attending the patient in a professional capacity, but also that it was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.
Upon the trial of an indictment for murder, where the defense was insanity, the prosecution called as a witness, B., who was a physician of the jail where defendant was confined for six months prior to the trial. B. testified that he was employed bylthe board of supervisors, and as such had medical charge of all prisoners in the jail; that he examined defendant at the request of both parties and “ kept an eye on the case; ” that he saw to the defendant, as he did to others, when he needed it. There was no proof that defendant was at any time sick during the six months, or that the witness was ever called to attend upon or prescribe for him as a physician. A hypothetical question was then put to the witness, from which was excluded all personal knowledge he had of the defendant, but which was based entirely on facts which occurred before defendant came to the jail, and the witness was requested to answer, without any reference to anything, except to the facts stated as to whether the defendant was sane or insane when he committed the act. The witness stated that it was very questionable whether in answering he could, and he was unwilling to say that he could, exclude the knowledge he had obtained while defendant was in jail The question was objected to as incompetent under said provision and the witness allowed to answer. He answered “ sane.” Meld (Rapallo and Andrews, JJ_, dissenting), that the evidence was competent; that ■ even if the witness was influenced by the knowledge he acquired by seeing the defendant in jail, this did render his testimony incompetent.
On cross-examination the witness stated he thought it was a practical impossibility to eliminate from his own mind the convictions formed as the physician of the prisoner and thus answer the question. On being reminded that he had answered, he stated that he withdrew the answer and did not wish it to be treated as an answer. The district attorney objected, the court held it had hot the power to strike out the answer and refused so to do. Meld (Rapallo and Andrews, JJ., dissenting) that as the witness was not bound to eliminate the knowledge he acquired as jail physician, if he could not, it did not render the answer incompetent; and so it was not error to refuse to strike it out.
After the statements of the witness as to his knowledge of the prisoner and before the hypothetical question was put, the court stated that the witness could not give any testimony based upon any fact that he learned either from or in regard to defendant at any time when the relation of patient and physician existed. Held, that the erroneous assumption by the court that the mere fact that the witness was the jail physician created the relation of patient and physician between him and defendant, did not render the question incompetent; that an erroneous ruling in defendant’s favor could not render incompetent evidence which, in its nature, was competent.
As to whether the said provision renders a physician incompetent to testify that his patient was free from disease of any kind, qucere.
Also, qumre, as to whether, when the patient calls witnesses to testify as to his mental condition, he does not waive his privilege under the provision and throw open the inquiry.
Defendant’s wife was called as a witness in his behalf, and testified among other things, that the night before the commission of the crime defendant came home at nine o’clock sick at his stomach and with a severe h'eadache; that he went to bed and she put a board at his feet so that by pressing against it he could press his head against the headboard, and that he lay there for hours. On cross-examination her attention was called to an occasion, the day after the homicide, when the district attorney and certain other persons specified were present, and she was asked if she did not say to the district attorney on that occasion that she had never seen anything strange or unusual in the conduct of her husband. Also; if she did not say “ that he went to bed as usual the night before,” or “ that he went to bed and slept as usual.” She denied having said anything of the kind. Subsequently one of the persons named was called as a witness by the prosecution, and his attention having been called by the district attorney to the occasion referred to, he was asked; 11 Did she then say to us that Mr. Schuyler went to bed about nine p. m. the preceding evening in his usually healthy condition and slept all night as far as she knew? ” This was objected to, the objection overruled and witness answered, “ she did.” Held, that the evidence was properly received to contradict and discredit the defendant’s witness; and that the evidence went no further than her examination fairly justified.
(Argued May 11, 1887;
decided June 28, 1887.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, in the fourth judicial department, entered upon an order made January 11,1887, which affirmed a judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Otsego county, entered upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree. (Reported below, 43 Hun, 88.)
The indictment charged the prisoner with having on the 2d of July, 1885, at the town of Morris, Otsego county, with a deliberate and premeditated design to effect her death, killed Amy Schuyler, by violently hurling her head against a wooden block, thereby crashing in a portion of her skull and thus causing her death. The defense was insanity.
The evidence, so far as material, is stated in the opinions.
Nathaniel C. Moah for appellant.
When cross-examination shows evidence to be improper, it should be promptly stricken out and the wrong, as far as possible, repaired. (Dunn v. Hewitt, 2 Den. 637, 638; Stebbins v. Cooper, 4 id. 191, 192; Hatch v. Pryor, 3 Keyes, 441, 443; Jennings v. Osborne, 1 N. Y. 267, 269, 270; Crane v. Crane, 5 id. 423, 424, 425; Barnett v. Williams, 7 Kan. 339, 343.) A party is not bound to interrupt the examination of a witness called by his adversary in respect to a material matter, on a mere suspicion that the witness may be debarred by his position from testifying ; he may await the cross-examination to bring out the facts, and if it appears thereby that the witness is incompetent, make his motion to have the testimony struck out. (Loveridge v. Hill, 96 N. Y. 222, 226, 227.) Under the circumstances to allow the jail, physician to give an opinion, based even in part, on what he had learned from communications to and from defendant, or from observations made while acting as a physician to defendant, was illegal and improper. (Code of Civ. Pro., §§ 834, 836; Code of Crim. Pro., § 392; People v. Murphy, 101 N. Y. 126; Renihan v. Dennin, 103 id. 573; Westover v. Ætna, 99 id. 56; Grattan v. Metropolitan, 92 id. 274, 286, 287; 28 Hun, 430; Edington v. Mutual, 67 N. Y. 185; Storrs v. Scongale, 48 Mich. 395, 396; 12 N. West. R., 505.) Prior conversations between the defendant and his wife were not admissible in this case. (People v. Lamb, 2 Keyes, 371.) A layman when examined as to facts within his own knowledge bearing on the question of sanity, may be permitted to characterize the acts to which he testifies as rational or irrational. He may testify to the impression produced by what he witnessed. (O’Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 282; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 id. 195.)
Charles T. Brewer for respondent.
The relation of physician and patient does not exist unless illness has been proved to exist at some time in the alleged patient. (Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573; Westover v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 99 id. 57; Grattan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 80 id. 286, 295; Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 id. 189; Dilleber v. Home Ins. Co., 69 id. 260; People v. Murphy, 101 id. 126; People v. Stout, 3 Park. 670.) The burden was upon the defendant to show, and that in the first instance, that the technical relation of physician and patient existed between these parties. (Cary v. White, 59 N. Y. 339; Steele v. Ward, 30 Hun, 560; Edington v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 571.) The hypothetical questions propounded to Dr. Babbitt were properly allowed. All the facts assumed having occurred before the witness ever saw the prisoner. (Edington v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564; Grattan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 80 id. 281; Staunton v. Parker, 19 Hun, 57; Steele v. Ward, 30 Hun, 555; Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 433, 434.) The testimony of the prisoner’s wife that after he got up from the table he took “ this same child by the heels and threatened ox attempted to strike it on the stove ” was competent as part of the res gestae at the time of the killing, and as showing the animus of the prisoner toward the person killed. (People v. Jones, 99 N. Y. 668, 669; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Thorp v. State, 15 Ala. 749; Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. [7th ed.] 92; 3 Russ on Cr. [9th ed.] 228; People v. Kern, 61 Cal. 244; People v. Shulman, 80 N. Y. 373, n; People v. Wood, 3 Park. 684; People v. Thompson, 97 N. Y. 319; Hope v. People, 83 id. 418; State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 156; Hopkins v. Comm. 50 Penn. St. 15; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 396.) The fact of murder being established, the inability to discover the motive does not disprove the crime. (Lake v. People, 1 Park. Cr. R. 539-541; McLain v. Comm. 99 Penn. St. 99; Goodwin v. State, 4 Cr. Law Mag. 579; State v. Green, 92 N. C. 779; Clifton v. State, 73 Ala. 478.) The people were entitled to show the history of the defendant. (1 Wharton’s Law of Ev. § 175; Lake v. People, 1 Park. 556, 557; Hochrieter v. People, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 363.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The able and satisfactory opinion pronounced in the court below, renders it unnecessary that much should be written now. A brief presentation of our views will be sufficient to justify the conclusion we have reached.
The killing by the defendant of his child was, upon the trial, undisputed, and his sole defense was insanity. The crime was committed on the second day of July, 1885, and the defendant was then twenty-seven years old. It does not appear that before that date he said or did anything indicating unsoundness, of mind, nor does it appear that, at any subsequent time, he gave any sign whatever, by word or deed, of insanity. From the moment of the commission of the crime, all his acts and conversations were perfectly sane and rational. He at once recognized the moral quality of his act, and was perfectly aware that he had violated the law and was liable to be punished. Down to the trial of this action, it does not appear that he ever claimed that he killed his' child while unconscious or irrational, or laboring under any delusion; but his avowal was that he had done it in a passion. Four physicians were called on the part of the defense, who testified that they had examined the defendant, and in answer to a hypothetical question, assuming such facts justified by the evidence as his counsel saw fit to insert therein, stated that he was insane at the date of the crime. Four physicians were called upon the part of the people, who, in answer to a hypothetical question put by the district attorney, which contained such facts justified by the evidence as he saw fit to insert therein, testified that he was sane. There was thus ai question of fact as to the defendant's sanity for the jury; and with their determination thereof, based, as we believe, upon a preponderance of the evidence, we have no occasion or power to interfere.
It appeared that the crime was committed when the defendant was in a great passion. Upon the evidence there was ground for claiming that' there was the absence of that deliberation and premeditation which are the necessary elements of the crime of murder in the first degree. But it was not claimed upon the trial that there was not sufficient evidence of the presence of these elements for the consideration of the jury, and their determination, justified by the evidence, also concludes us.
During the progress of the trial numerous exceptions to the rulings of the court were taken on behalf of the defendant. We have carefully examined and considered them all, and we agree that all but two are unfounded; and as to the two only, there is difference of opinion among the members of this court. To them, therefore, we will briefly direct attention. Among the expert witnesses called on behalf of the people, to give evidence as to the condition of the defendant's mind at the time of the crime, was Dr. Bassett. He testified that for six months preceding the trial he was the jail physician, employed by the board of supervisors; that as such he had medical charge of all the prisoners in the jail; that during that time he examined the defendant at the request of both parties, and " kept an eye on the case " and had him under his observation; that he assumed the obligation of attending the prisoners in the jail and " saw to the defendant as he did to the others, when he needed it." After these statements, the court remarked to the district attorney : "You cannot give any testimony based upon any fact that he learned either from the defendant or in regard to the defendant at any time when the relation of patient and physician existed." A hypothetical question was then stated to the witness, from which was excluded all knowledge which he had of the defendant personally, and which was based entirely upon facts which occurred before the defendant came to the jail, concluding as follows : " Assuming those facts to be proved, and without any reference to anything except those stated, was this man, if he did the act, sane or insane at the time he committed that act?" This question was objected to on the part of the defendant "because the witness held the confidential relation of physician and patient; that it is practically impossible to eliminate the position in which he stands and decide upon a question, in this case, and the question put is in this case, as they claim upon the facts in this case, and therefore that the testimony of this witness, was incompetent and improper." The objection was overruled, and the witness answered, " Sane." It is claimed that this question and answer were incompetent under section 834 of the Code, which provides as follows: " A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." When a party seeks to exclude evidence under this section the burden is upon him to bring the case within its purview. He must make it appear, if it does not otherwise appear, that the information which he seeks to exclude was such as the witness acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity not only, but he must also show that it was such as was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. (Eddington v. Ætna, Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564.) Here there was no proof that the defendant was at any time sick during the six months in which the witness was the jail physician, or that the witness ever attended or prescribed for him as a physician, or that he derived any of the information upon which the question or answer thereto could be based while attending Mm as a physician. It was assumed by the defendant's counsel, and by the court, that the mere fact that the witness was the jail physician created the relation of patient and physician between Mm and the defendant, and that the mere existence of that relation was sufficient to exclude evidence. But the assumption by the court was beneficial rather than harmful to the defendant. It restricted the examination of the witness, and embarrassed .him in giving his evidence. An erroneous ruling in defendant's favor could not render incompetent evidence which in its nature was competent, and the case is like that of a correct decision made by a judge under a misconception of the law. It does not appear and cannot be inferred that the defendant, in consequence of this erroneous assumption, omitted to prove anything which he otherwise could or would have proved. The inquiry related to the condition of the defendant's mind at the time of the commission of the crime, about eleven months before the trial, and not to anything which occurred or appeared during the time he was confined in the jail; and the witness was not asked to testify as to the mental condition of the defendant while in the jail, or to disclose any information he acquired while he was there. He did not, in fact, disclose any such information, and it is utterly impossible for us to perceive how the evidence of the witness could have been excluded under that section., It is true he said it waá very questionable whether he could exclude, in answering the hypothetical question, the knowledge which he had obtained of the defendant while in the jail, and that he was unwilling to say, in giving his opinion as to the condition of the defendant's mind at the time of the commission of the crime, .that he could eliminate from his mind such knowledge. But he nowhere in his evidence intimated that he had any knowledge which he had obtained from the prisoner while attending him in a professional capacity, or that he had received any information whatever from him which was necessary to enable him to attend him as a physician, or that he ever prescribed for him as a physician.
The hypothetical question was, therefore, in any view of the case, a competent question to put. It does not appear that, in answering it, the witness took into consideration any improper elements, and if he was influenced by the knowledge he acquired of the defendant by •seeing him in jail, that circumstance did not render the evidence incompetent. He was not bound to eliminate from his -mind that knowledge in answering the question, and even if "he could not, that did not render his answer incompetent. A proper question having been put and answered, the court waá not, upon anything appearing in the record, bound to strike it -out. The objection, therefore, to the evidence given by Dr. Bassett and the rulings of the court in reference thereto, present no error requiring the reversal of this judgment.
The object of the section referred to was to prevent the dis«closure by a physician of his patient's ailments and infirmities, •and it may he queried whether it makes him incompetent to «testify that his patient was free from disease oí any kind; and was not Dr. Bassett, therefore, competent under any view •of the case, to testify that the defendant was not insane, but -•sane Í And when thej defendant called experts, who had «examined him, to testify as to his mental condition and to show that he was insane, did he not waive his privilege undefi the •.section referred to and throw open the inquiry as to his mental condition ? In other words, can a party himself upon a trial «expose his ailments and make them the subject of inquiry, and then object that his physician shall tell anything he knows about them?" We do not deeni it important to answer these questions at this time, and leave them to be solved when the •exigencies of some future case may require it.
The defendant's wife was called as a witness in his behalf and testified, among other' things,- that the night before the commission of the crime the defendant came home at nine •o'clock, sick at his stomach, and with a severe headache; that •he undressed and went to bed and that she put a board at the foot of the bed so that he could press his feet against it while his head would be against the headboard, and that he lay there for hours. On her cross-examination her attention was called to a time when the district attorney and one Merrills were present with her at the court house, and she recollected having -a conversation there. She was then asked questions and gave answers as follows : " Did you say to Mr. Barber (the district attorney), in the presence of Mr. Merrills that you had never seen anything strange or unusual in John's conduct ? " A. " I don't remember of saying so." Q. "And that he was not affected by the ball play ? " A. "I never said so." Q. "And that he went to sleep as usual the night before the homicide, and ate as usual? " A. "No, sir, I did not say that as I remember, because it is not true; I don't remember of saying it." Her attention was then called to another occasion, the day after the commission of the crime, when the district attorney, Mr. Fairchild and Mr. Sweet were present, and she was asked questions and gave answers as follows : Q. " Did you say then to the district attorney in the presence of Mr. Fairchild and Mr. Sweet that yon had never seen anything strange or unusual in John's conduct? " A. " I do not think I said so." Q. " That he went to bed as usual the night before?" A. "I did not say so, for it was not true." Q. "You deny now that you said to Mr. Barber that he went to bed the night before and slept as usual ? " A. " I don't remember talking to Mr. Barber the next day; I remember talking to him in his office in January." Q. "Did you say that to him there?" A. "No, I don't believe I did." Q. " You didn't say anything of the kind?" A. "1 don't believe I said so at all." Mr. Sweet was subsequently called and testified that on the occasion' referred to on the cross-examination of Mrs. Schuyler, when he, Fairchild and the district attorney were present, the day after the commission of the crime, she stated that she never saw anything peculiar in her husband before that time, and he was asked this: Q. " Did she say that the evening before he came home, he went to bed as usual, and slept all night, so far as she knew?" And he answered, "yes, sir; she did." This question and answer were not objected to. Subsequently Fairchild was called as a witness, and his attention being called to the interview with Mrs. Schuyler, the day after the homicide, he was asked this question by the district attorney: " Did she there say to us that Mr. Schuyler went to bed about nine p. m. the preceding evening in his usually halthy condition and slept all night, so far as she knew % " This was objected to by the defendant as-improper and incompetent, and that there was no ground laid for the contradiction of Mrs. Schuyler, and any statements-she then made could not be binding upon or used against the defendant. The objection was overruled, and the witness-answered " She did." Merrills was called as a witness and his attention being directed to the interview with Mrs. Schuyler when the district attorney was present, was asked this question : " Did she say to me (the district attorney), in your presence on that day that she had never seen anything strange or unusual in John's conduct ? " This'was objected to by the defendant's counsel as incompetent and improper. The objection was overruled and the witness answered : " I think she said she had not, more than he had headaches once in a while, she spoke about that." He was then asked this ques - tion: " Did she say that he went to bed and slept as usual the night before the homicide," and he answered, " I think she did." In the examination of these witnesses, Sweet, Fairchild and Merrills, no error was committed. The evidence was given merely for the purpose of .contradicting and discrediting Mrs. Schuyler. She had testified on her direct-examination that the defendant came home the night before the crime,, sick; that he undressed and went to bed and that she put a. board at the foot of the bed so that he could press his feet against it with his head against the head-board, and that he lay there for hours. The purpose of the district attorney was to-show that she had made statements out of court at variance with this evidence, and the object of her cross-examination was to show that she had stated out of court that, instead of' going to bed in that unusual manner, he went to bed as-usual the night before and slept as usual. After she had substantially denied making such statements or any statements of that kind, these witnesses were called for the purpose of contradicting her, and we think no error was committed in receiving their evidence. That evidence went no further than her examination fairly justified, and it was a proper contradiction of what she had testified to.
Upon the whole case we do not believe that any error was committed upon the trial prejudicial to the defendant, and the judgment should be affirmed.