Case Name: UNITED STATES v. PERRY; SAME v. LELAND
Court: United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1904-10-27
Citations: 133 F. 841
Docket Number: Nos. 3,505, 3,507
Parties: UNITED STATES v. PERRY. SAME v. LELAND.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 133
Pages: 841–842

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES v. PERRY. SAME v. LELAND.
(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.
October 27, 1904.)
Nos. 3,505, 3,507.
1. Customs Duties — CiíAssieication—Statuary.—Statutes in Pieces.
The provision in paragraph 454, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule N, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1678], for statuary produced from “a solid block or mass of marble,” etc., is not limited to statuary made from single blocks, and is held to include certain statues, each carved from three solid blocks of marble.
On Application for Review of Decisions of the Board of General Appraisers.
The decisions in question reversed the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York on merchandise imported by Perry, Ryer & Co. and Wirt Leland. The following is the opinion of the board in one of the decisions in question (G. A. 5,571, T. D. 25,986):
WAITE, General Appraiser. The articles subject of this protest are two marble statues or caryatids from 150 to 200 years old, representing a faun and Flora, the net value of the two pieces being 3,000 francs. It is not disputed that the articles are of Italian production. The goods were assessed for duty at 50 per cent, ad valorem as manufactures of marble under paragraph 115 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule B, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1636], and are claimed to be dutiable at 15 per cent, ad valorem as “statuary,” within the meaning of paragraph 454 of said act, Schedule N, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1678], and the reciprocal commercial agreement with Italy, July 18, 1900, 31 Stat. 1979, made pursuant to Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 203 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1690],
We find from the evidence, including verified photographs of the statues in question, that they are the professional productions of a sculptor, within the meaning of paragraph 454 of the act, as construed by the courts and the board. In re Vandegrift, G. A. 5,501, T. D. 24,822; In re Bing, G. A. 5,196, T. D. 23,955; Townsend v. United States (C. C.) 108 Fed. 801, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 113 Fed. 442, 51 C. C. A. 276.
A further question arises from the fact that the statues are each of three pieces, and were in all probability each sculptured from three separate blocks of marble for convenience in handling, the figures being about eight feet in height. It is necessary to determine whether these works are made from “a solid block” of marble, within the meaning of the clause in paragraph 454 defining the term “statuary” wherever used in the act, which reads as follows :
“454. * * * The term' ‘statuary’ as used in this act shall be understood to include only such statuary as is cut, carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from a solid block or mass of marble, stone, or alabaster, or from metal, and as is the professional production of a statuary or sculptor only.”
Many of the best statues, especially those of heroic size, are executed from more than one piece of marble, and a construction which produces the inequitable result of excluding such productions from the comparatively low rate of duty on statuary is to be avoided if possible. It is very probable that the purpose of the qualifying expression, “cut, carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from a solid block or mass of marble, stone,” etc., was to restrict paragraph 454 to statuary made from solid marble, stone, etc., as distinguished from' statuary made from composition stone or similar materials by molding. To admit under its provisions statuary made from more than one solid block of marble would not defeat this object. Such an interpretation is, we think, rather in harmony with the spirit of the law, and accords with the elementary principle of statutory construction that singular expressions in a statute may include the plural, and vice versa. Endlieh on Interp. of Stats. § 388. We believe it should be adopted as the more reasonable construction. The board is now of opinion that its decision in Re Joseph, G. A. 1,191, T. D. 12,453, where the contrary view was taken, is erroneous, and should be overruled.
The protest is accordingly sustained, and the collector’s decision reversed, with instructions to reliquidate the entry accordingly.
Henry A. Wise, Asst. U. S. Atty.
Frederick W. Brooks, for the importers.

Opinion:
HAZEL, District Judge.
Judgment affirmed on the decisions of the Board of General Appraisers.