Case Name: Jay Myoung YOON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Sunsook YOON, Appellee-Petitioner
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1997-10-21
Citations: 687 N.E.2d 201
Docket Number: No. 49A02-9611-CV-733
Parties: Jay Myoung YOON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Sunsook YOON, Appellee-Petitioner.
Judges: KIRSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 687
Pages: 201–209

Head Matter:
Jay Myoung YOON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Sunsook YOON, Appellee-Petitioner.
No. 49A02-9611-CV-733.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Oct. 21, 1997.
David A. Clase, Harper, Clase & Grim-mett, P.C., Indianapolis, Karen A. Wyle, Bloomington, for Appellant-Respondent.
J. Gregory Garrison, Michael A. Kiefer, Martha J. Mondou, Garrison & Kiefer, P.C., Indianapolis, Scott Richardson, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Petitioner.

Opinion:
OPINION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge.
Jay Myoung Yoon appeals the judgment in his marital dissolution action instituted by Sunsook Yoon. Jay presents the following restated issues for review:
1. Did the trial court err in computing the child support payment?
2. Did the trial court err in determining the value of Jay's medical practice?
3. Did the trial court err in dividing the marital assets of the parties?
4. Did the trial court err in prohibiting Jay from testifying as an expert medical witness?
5. Did the trial court err in denying Jay's motion for change of judge?
Sunsook, on cross-appeal, presents the following restated issue for review:
6. Did the trial court err in determining that Jay had not dissipated the marital assets?
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
The parties' twenty-three-year marriage was dissolved by an August 15, 1996 decree of dissolution. At the time of the dissolution, there were two minor children of the marriage and one child over the age of majority. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 52(A) regarding payment of child support and division of marital property. Additional facts will be provided where relevant.
1.
The trial court ordered Jay to pay $698.00 per week for support of the minor children and 50% of their college expenses. Neither party challenges the court's order, however, Jay contends that the court committed an abuse of discretion by failing to abate his child support obligation to the extent it duplicates the contribution for the children's room, board, and other living expenses while at college.
Post-secondary education expenses incurred on behalf of children may be added to a basic child support obligation. Ind.Child Support Guideline 3(E). Commentary 3(b) to this guideline provides that, if college expenses are provided separate from child support, "support paid to the custodial parent should be reduced or eliminated, at least while the student is away from the household and at school." Therefore, when a parent is ordered to pay child support and a portion of the child's college expense, the trial court must consider full or partial abatement of the basic child support obligation. Such a system avoids the duplication of payment for a single expense, which would result in a windfall to the custodial parent. Stover v. Stover, 645 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
Sunsook, the custodial parent, does not argue, and the record fails to demonstrate, that the trial court abated Jay's child support obligation for the time during which the minor children were at school. This was error. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court and instruct the court to recompute Jay's child support obligation for those time periods when the minor children are actually away attending college on campus, and to include either a full or partial abatement of child support during such times.
Jay asserts that the trial court erred in determining his child support obligation because the court failed to take into account evidence submitted after January 1995, such as Jay's health difficulties and changes in the medical industry, which all indicated a reduction in his level of income.
The trial court entered findings of fact relevant to the issue of child support. Therefore, , we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. The findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, i.e., if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Reversal of a finding is only appropriate if the finding was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts, or reasonable probable deductions to be drawn therefrom. Nat'l. Advertising Co. v. Wilson Auto Parts, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 997 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).
The trial court found that Jay had and continues to have the ability to earn $18,-888.98 per week and based his child support obligation upon this amount. Further, the trial court found that Jay "has the ability to determine and set his own income level and has attempted to reduce it during the pen-dency of this action, not because of the condition of his health, but by failing and refusing to submit prompt and timely bills to his patients and hospitals." Appellant's Appendix at 15.
In January 1995, Jay's gross income was $18,888.98 per week. However, at trial Jay presented evidence that his income level had been reduced substantially during 1995 and the first eight months of 1996 because his health was declining and industry trends were making it difficult for his solo practice to compete. Cameron McQuay, a certified public accountant appeared on Sunsook's behalf and testified that he visited Jay's office in October 1995 and, at that time, Jay was operating an ongoing medical practice and had scheduled patients through March 1996.
The level of income attributed to Jay is supported by the evidence. The trial court did not err in using this amount to calculate the child support obligation.
2.
Jay argues that the trial court erred in determining the value of his medical practice because the court considered the intangible asset of goodwill in its valuation and accepted a valuation which failed to take account of his deteriorating health and specific industry trends. Before discussing this contention, we address Sunsook's assertion that the doctrine of waiver precludes Jay from raising this issue.
During cross-examination of R. James Ald-ering, Jr., there was a substantial discussion by the court and the parties' counsel of the application of the case law from Porter v. Porter, 526 N.E.2d 219 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied, regarding the inclusion of goodwill in valuation. The issue was not waived.
Jay asserts that goodwill should not be treated as a divisible marital asset because, inter alia, such a practice represents the minority viewpoint among other states, will encourage a "battle of the experts", and goodwill is "future earnings by another name." Appellant's Brief at 17.
We established in Porter, 526 N.E.2d 219, that the goodwill of a professional practice may be included in the marital estate for purposes of property distribution pursuant to a dissolution decree. We decline Jay's invitation to revisit the question even though numerous jurisdictions have refused to consider goodwill in evaluating a professional practice.
In Porter, 526 N.E.2d 219, 224, (citing In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash.App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279 (1976)), we acknowledged the conceivable difficulties with valuing professional goodwill:
The fact that professional goodwill may be elusive, intangible, and difficult to evaluate is not a proper reason to ignore its existence.
Here, again, we recognize the possibility that experts will disagree on the value of a professional practice, but refuse to alter our valuation system due to such potential difficulties.
The accepted definition of goodwill is the expectation of continued public patronage. Porter, 526 N.E.2d at 219 (citing Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979)). In order to determine the value of goodwill, the present , value of that expectation is considered. In contrast, a valuation concerning future earnings does not focus on the present value of expected public patronage. Goodwill and future earnings are distinguishable from each other.
For the reasons aforementioned, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering goodwill in evaluating Jay's medical practice.
Next, we address Jay's argument that the trial court improperly failed to consider his deteriorating health and certain industry trends.
The trial court found:
[Jay] has the ability to determine and set his own income level and has attempted to reduce it during the pendency of this action, not because of the condition of his health, but by failing and refusing to submit prompt and timely bills to his patients and to hospitals.
Appellant's Appendix at 15.
Jay's earning level declined substantially from 1994 to 1995. According to Jay, the decline resulted from his deteriorating health and certain industry trends which made it more difficult for solo practitioners to compete. Sunsook presented evidence that the reduction was attributable to Jay's failure to appropriately bill for his services. The trial court weighed the evidence presented and agreed with Sunsook. Jay has not demonstrated that the trial court did not consider the evidence he offered. Instead, Jay asks us, in effect, to reweigh the evidence but this is a task we are ill-equipped to perform.
The evidence supports the finding and, therefore, the trial court's acceptance of the valuation figure was not error.
3.
Jay contends that the trial court erred in dividing the marital property of the parties because it took into account his future earning capacity when determining the value of the medical practice. Specifically, Jay asserts that goodwill and future earnings are indistinguishable and that consideration of his future earning capacity resulted in a windfall for Sunsook. However, as previously discussed, goodwill and future earnings are different elements. Therefore, Jay's assertion is restated as whether the trial court's division constituted error.
The trial court has discretion to divide the marital property unequally, but when it makes such a division, Ind.Code Ann. § 31-l-11.5-ll(c) (West Supp.1996) requires the court to set forth a basis for its decision. In re Marriage of Snemis, 575 N.E.2d 650 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). For example, disparate earning abilities of the parties would permit an unequal division. IC § 31-1-11.5-11(c)(5).
The court determined that Sunsook should receive 55.4% of the marital assets. In support of the decision, the court found:
(105) . that the present and future earning ability of the parties is disparate in that [Jay's] present ability and future ability to earn through his medical practice is greater.
Appellant's Appendix at 19. The evidence at trial supports the finding and, therefore, the trial court did not err in employing Jay's present and future earning ability as the basis for the unequal distribution of marital property.
4.
Jay claims that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing him to testify as an expert witness regarding his medical condition.
The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the propriety of expert testimony and will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. During direct examination, if the trial court determines that a witness may not testify, the proponent of the excluded testimony must make an offer of proof to preserve the ruling for appellate review. The offer must show the substance, relevancy, materiality, and purpose of the excluded evidence in order to enable the reviewing court to determine whether exclusion was proper. Donaldson v. Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp., 632 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).
During Jay's direct examination, his counsel raised the matter of Jay's medical condition. Sunsook objected on the ground that Jay was not qualified to provide expert testimony and the trial court sustained the objection. Although wé can speculate that Jay would have testified that the condition of his health was deteriorating and that such a condition was relevant 'and material to the case, Jay bore the burden of providing such information. Here, Jay failed to make an offer of proof. Therefore, we cannot determine whether Jay was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding Jay's expert testimony.
5.
Jay asserts'that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for change of judge.
Ind.Trial Rule 76(C) governs applications for change of judge and imposes specific time limits for filing such motions. However, the rule permits a party to file an application subsequent to expiration of the time limits in certain situations and requires verification of the application "personally by the party himself...." T.R. 76(C)(6).
On the first day of trial, Jay made an oral, unverified motion for change of judge based upon bias and prejudice. This motion did not comply with the requirements of T.R. 76(C)(6) and, therefore, the trial court's denial did not constitute reversible error.
6.
Sunsook argues that the trial court erred by failing to find that Jay had dissipated certain marital assets after' the parties separated. Specifically, Sunsook asserts that Jay expended approximately $1,177,000 from the parties' bank accounts and that Jay's distributive share should have been reduced by that amoünt. The trial court found that Jay did not dissipate assets during the marriage. Therefore, the standard of review under T.R. 52(A) is applicable.
At trial, substantial evidence was presented concerning authority over, and deposit and withdrawal activity from, the parties' bank accounts. For example, Jay testified that approximately sixty to seventy percent of the gross receipts from the medical practice, which he deposited into a certain account, was spent on overhead expenses for the practice.
There was evidence to support the finding that Jay did not dissipate the marital assets and the finding supports the conclusion that the distributive share awarded to Jay is the appropriate amount.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
KIRSCH, J., concurs.
BARTEAU, J., concurs with separate opinion.
. Aldering, a certified public accountant with experience in valuing businesses, testified on Sunsook's behalf.
. Jay aptly labels this potential difficulty as "battle of the experts".
. Jay offers Quillen v. Quillen, 659 N.E.2d 566, 572-73 (Ind.App.1995), as guidance for his argument. In Quillen, the court stated that it "has never upheld an asset valuation that completely ignores factors which, as admitted by the supporting valuation expert, would have a negative effect on the asset's value." Jay's reliance is misplaced because his premise, i.e. that the trial court completely ignored the evidence of industry trends and Jay's health, is not applicable.
. Jay's oral'motion falls under the exception provided by T.R. 76(C)(6).
. We decline Jay's invitation, to consider the affidavit which was submitted for the first time on appeal.