Case Name: BURNETTE, Appellant, v. WAHL, Respondent; WAHL et al, Appellants, v. WAHL, Respondent; CHOCKTOOT, Appellant, v. KIRK, Respondent
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1978-12-29
Citations: 284 Or. 705
Docket Number: TC 75-2L, SC 25069; TC 75-1L, SC 25123; TC 75-16L, SC 25028
Parties: BURNETTE, Appellant, v. WAHL, Respondent. WAHL et al, Appellants, v. WAHL, Respondent. CHOCKTOOT, Appellant, v. KIRK, Respondent.
Judges: HOLMAN, J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 284
Pages: 705–731

Head Matter:
Argued September 8, 1977,
reargued December 5,
affirmed December 29, 1978
BURNETTE, Appellant, v. WAHL, Respondent. WAHL et al, Appellants, v. WAHL, Respondent. CHOCKTOOT, Appellant, v. KIRK, Respondent.
(TC 75-2L, SC 25069)
(TC 75-1L, SC 25123)
(TC 75-16L, SC 25028)
588 P2d 1105
David L. Slader, Metropolitan Public Defender, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.
Enver Bozgoz, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Wahl.
No appearance for respondent Kirk.
HOLMAN, J.
Tongue, J., concurred and filed opinion.
Lent, J., concurred in part, dissented in part and filed opinion.
Linde, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Lent, J., joined.

Opinion:
HOLMAN, J.
Three identical cases have been consolidated for appeal. Plaintiffs are five minor children aged two to eight who, through their guardian, are bringing actions against their mothers for emotional and psychological injury caused by failure of defendant-mothers to perform their parental duties to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal from orders of dismissal entered after demurrers were sustained to the complaints and plaintiffs refused to plead further.
The complaints allege that plaintiffs are in the custody of the Children's Services Division of the Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon and are wards of Klamath County Juvenile Court.
The complaints are substantially identical, each one being in three counts. Among these counts are strewn various allegations of parental failure upon which the causes of action rest. They are:
"1. Since [date], defendant intentionally, wilfully, maliciously and with cruel disregard of the consequences failed to provide plaintiff with care, custody, parental nurturance, affection, comfort, companionship, support, regular contact and visitation.
"2. She has failed in violation of ORS 109.010[ ] to maintain plaintiff, who, due to age and indigency, is poor and unable to work to maintain self.
"3. She has abandoned plaintiff by. deserting the child with intent to abandon and with intent to abdicate all responsibility for care and raising, in violation of ORS 163.535.[ ]
"4. She has neglected the plaintiff by negligently leaving unattended in or at a place for such period of time as would have been likely to endanger the health or welfare of the plaintiff, in violation of ORS 163.545.[ ]
"5. She has refused or neglected without lawful excuse to provide support for plaintiff, in violation of ORS 163.555.[ ]
"6. Defendant has maliciously, intentionally, and with cruel disregard of the consequences, deserted and abandoned her child.
"7. Defendant has alienated the affections of the plaintiff in that she has intentionally, wilfully and maliciously abandoned, deserted, neglected and failed to maintain regular contact or visitation, or to provide for the plaintiff and has deprived plaintiff of the love, care, affection and comfort to which plaintiff is entitled."
It is apparent that the first allegation is general in nature and is intended to be all-encompassing. The second, third, fourth and fifth allege violation of statutory duties in which abandonment and desertion comprise the central theme. The sixth allegation is one of abandonment and desertion purportedly based on common law. The seventh allegation is an attempt to allege alienation of affections. Although these allegations of parental failure allege lack of support and physical care along with affectional neglect, from the allegations of injury in the complaint and the statements made in plaintiffs' brief, it appears that the injuries claimed are solely emotional and psychological.
Preliminary to a more detailed discussion, it should be noted that these claims of parental failure are different from those tort claims usually made upon behalf of children against parents. The adjudicated cases concern physical or emotional injuries resulting from physical acts inflicted upon children such as beatings and rapes, and from automobile accidents. Plaintiffs admit they can cite no cases permitting them to recover from their parents for solely emotional or psychological damage resulting from failure to support, nurture and care for them.
The legislature, recognizing the necessity of parental nurture, support and physical care for children, has enacted a vast array of laws for the purpose of protecting or vindicating those rights. These are much more extensive and all-inclusive than are those statutes alleged to have been violated in plaintiffs' allegations of tortious conduct.
ORS ch 418 establishes extensive provisions for aid to dependent children, and it is under the provisions of this chapter and as wards of the juvenile court that plaintiffs are presently attempting to have their needs met. Most of the statutes cited in notes 1 through 5 deal with meeting children's physical needs, but plaintiffs' protection is not afforded solely by these laws. ORS 418.015 provides:
"(1) The Children's Services Division may, in its discretion, accept custody of children and may provide care, support and protective services for children who are dependent, neglected, mentally or physically disabled or who for other reasons are in need of public service.
"(2) The Children's Services Division shall accept any child placed in its custody by a court under, but not limited to ORS chapter 419, and shall provide such services for the child as the division finds to be necessary."
"Care," "protective services" and "such services for the child as the division finds to be necessary" are all terms which include emotional nurturing as well as physical care. This reading of the statute is reflected in the Children's Services Division's publication entitled, "Permanent Planning for Children in Substitute Care" (1977).
We recognize that this is not a proceeding to secure parental nurturing, support and physical care for plaintiffs, but rather an action for psychological injury claimed to have been caused by the absence of these services. However, the statutory enactments demonstrate that the legislature has put its mind to the deprivations of which plaintiff children are alleged to be victims and has attempted to remedy such situations by enacting a vast panoply of procedures, both civil and criminal, to insure that children receive proper nurturing, support and physical care. It has never undertaken to establish, however, a cause of action for damages for any emotional injury to the child which may have been caused by a parent's refusal to provide these services. This failure of the legislature to act is significant because this is not a field of recovery which has heretofore been recognized by courts, and it would therefore be natural for it to have provided such a remedy if it thought it was wise in view of the social problem it attempts to solve and the statutory provisions it has enacted for that purpose. It has had no difficulty in the past in creating new causes of action for persons aggrieved by conditions which it is attempting to rectify. Examples are the creation of causes of action, including punitive damages, in aid of enforcing ethics in the marketplace, ORS 646.638; actions for compensatory and punitive damages for unlawful discrimination by places of public accommodation, ORS 30.680, and by employers, ORS 659.030 and 659.121; and actions for double and triple damages for timber trespass, ORS 105.810 and 105.815.
The establishment by courts of a civil cause of action based on a criminal or regulatory statute is not premised upon legislative intent to create such an action. It is obvious that had the legislature intended a civil action it would have provided for one, as legislatures many times do. Therefore, the underlying assumption is that it was not intended that the statute create any civil obligation or afford civil protection against the injuries which it was designed to prevent. When neither the statute nor the common law authorizes an action and the statute does not expressly deny it, the court should recognize that it is being asked to bring into existence a new type of tort liability on the basis of its own appraisal of the policy considerations involved. If a court decides to create a cause of action for the act or omission which violates the statute, the interest which is invaded derives its protection solely from the court, although the legislative action in branding the act or omission as culpable is taken into consideration by the court in deciding whether a common law action should be established. If a civil cause of action based upon a statute is established by a court, it is because the court, not the legislature, believes it is necessary and desirable to further vindicate the right or to further enforce the duty created by statute.
Because it is plain to the legislature that it could have created the civil liability and it has not, courts must look carefully not only at the particular statute establishing the right or duty but at all statutes which might bear either directly or indirectly on the legislative purpose. If there is any chance that invasion into the field by the court's establishment of a civil cause of action might interfere with the total legislative scheme, courts should err on the side of non-intrusion because it is always possible for the legislature to establish such a civil cause of action if it desires. Courts have no omnipotence in the field of planning, particularly social planning of the kind involved here. Courts should exercise restraint in fields in which the legislature has attempted fairly comprehensive social regulations.
There is no doubt but that the statutory provisions previously cited show a strong state policy of requiring the kind of parental nurturing, support and physical care of children which the defendants here are alleged to have denied their children. As previously indicated, it does not follow as a matter of course that it would be wise or judicious to vindicate that policy by a tort action for damages by children against their mothers. The state also has other policies within its statutory plan of which such a cause of action might well be destructive, particularly the policy of reuniting abandoned children with their parents, if possible. This policy is demonstrated by ORS 418.485, which states that "it is the policy of the state of Oregon to strengthen family life and to insure the protection of all children either in their own homes or in other appropriate care This same policy is even evident in ORS 418.745, in such a serious matter as physical child abuse, which states it to be "facilitating the use of protective social services to prevent further abuse, safeguard and enhance the welfare of abused children, and preserve family life when consistent with the protection of the child by stabilizing the family and improving parental capacity, Also, as part of the Oregon Juvenile Code, we find ORS 419.474(2), which states that the provisions of the Act "shall be liberally construed to the end that a child coming within the jurisdiction of the court may receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will lead to the child's welfare
It is recognized by the statutory scheme that in some instances the reestablishment of a biological family is impossible and it therefore provides for a proceeding to terminate parental rights in order that a new family unit for the child may be formed. The section providing for parental termination, ORS 419.523, contains the following language in subsection (2) which demonstrates the importance which the legislature puts upon the establishment of the child in the home with its natural parents:
"The rights of the parent or parents may be terminated as provided in subsection (1) of this section if the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child and integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable in the foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely to change (Emphasis added.)
The statute further provides that the court shall, among other things, consider the following in determining whether to terminate the parents' rights:
"(e) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make the return of the child possible or failure of the parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected."
What emerges is a comprehensive plan to furnish children in the position of these plaintiffs with parental nurturing and physical care, preferably in family units with their parents. If this is not possible, it provides for means of divesting parental rights so that a new family unit may be created for the child.
It could be contended that the criminal statutes are inconsistent with such a plan. However, no plan established by the legislature over a period of years can ever have perfect symmetry. Also, the legislature is undoubtedly aware that, for obvious reasons, parents of dependent children are not prosecuted criminally if there is hope of establishing the family unit.
It is significant that plaintiffs' complaints do not allege that proceedings for the termination of the defendants' parental rights have taken place. In such circumstances, it would be exceedingly unwise for this court to step in and to initiate a new and heretofore unrecognized cause of action in a field of social planning to which the legislature has devoted a great deal of time and effort in evolving what appears to be an all-encompassing plan. Those persons designated by statute for aiding the plaintiffs in these cases have not yet taken the step for which the plan provides when there is no longer any hope of reestablishing these children in a family unit with their mothers. Tort actions such as the present ones might well be destructive of any plans the social agencies and the juvenile court might have for these children. It is inappropriate for this court to insert a new cause of action into the picture.
An exhaustive search of the legal literature finds only one article dealing with a right of action by children for emotional damage caused by ineffectual parents: The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 Fordham L Rev 669 (1978). It suggests an analogy to the broad equitable principles of trust law as a model for defining the rights and duties existing among the child, his parents and the state. Even such a radical departure from present views does not advocate an action for money damages such as the present one. After a discussion of rights of action against third parties for the benefit of children who have been deprived of the nurturing and physical care of a parent by the acts of such third parties, the authors say:
" Unlike the remedy of money damages sought as compensation for loss of parental care in actions for alienation of parental affections, remedies more appropriate to the character of the right could be fashioned in emotional nurturing actions, such as psychological care and follow-up to overcome an inadequate capacity for emotional parenting. While the state cannot enforce love, it can reinforce it by providing social services which encourage formation or maintenance of parent-child ties." Id. at 732.
This state has provided appropriate remedies, as suggested by the article. The article further says, at 739, "The possibility of a monetary recovery for lack of nurturing should be limited to adult plaintiffs." While our position does not purport to be one of approval or disapproval of the positions asserted by the authors, the article demonstrates that even those who advocate radical changes in our method of thinking concerning the rights of children do not endorse actions such as those asserted here. Plaintiffs are unable to point to any literature in the field of child care or family planning which advocates an action for money damages to vindicate a right of the kind asserted here.
In addition, there is a limitation to the extent to which use may be made of tort actions for the purpose of accomplishing social aims. If there is ever a field in which juries and general trial courts are ill equipped to do social engineering, it is in the realm of the emotional relationship between mother and child. It is best we leave such matters to other fields of endeavor. There are certain kinds of relationships which are not proper fodder for tort litigation, and we believe this to be one of them. There are probably as many children who have been damaged in some manner by their parents' failure to meet completely their physical, emotional and psychological needs as there are people. A tort action for damages by emotionally deprived persons against their parents is, in our opinion, not going to solve the social problem in the same manner in which the legislature is attempting to solve it.
In addition to the contention that defendants should be liable for civil damages because of their violation of criminal and regulatory statutes, plaintiffs also contend that defendants are responsible because of the infliction of severe emotional distress by intentional acts. Plaintiffs allege that defendants intentionally deserted and abandoned them; however, they do not contend that defendants deserted them for the purpose of inflicting emotional harm upon them. We recognize that this tort usually also encompasses the infliction of emotional harm under circumstances from which a reasonable person would conclude that harm was almost certain to result. We believe this latter rationale is inapplicable as between parents and children. If it were otherwise, the children of divorced parents would almost always have an action for emotional damage against their parents. Divorce has become a way of life with almost certain emotional trauma of a greater or lesser degree to the children , from the legal dissolution of the family and the resultant absence of at least one of the parents and sometimes of both.
In addition, plaintiffs contend that the common law tort of alienation of affections is applicable. They argue that because such a cause of action is intended to compensate one spouse for the intentional alienation of the other spouse's affections by a third party, and that because in one case, Daily v. Parker, 152 F2d 174 (7th Cir 1945), this cause of action has been extended to the children, it should exist against the parent himself. The statement of the argument is its refutation. Also, the tort of alienation of affections has recently been abolished by the legislature, Oregon Laws 1975, ch 562, § 1.
Plaintiffs generally contend that without respect to previously recognized theories of recovery, we should recognize a new tort of parental desertion. For all the reasons previously given in declining to use recognized theories of recovery, we also decline this invitation.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
"ORS 109.010 Duty of Support. Parents are bound to maintain their children who are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves; and children are bound to maintain their parents in like circumstances. "
"ORS 163.535 Abandonment of a Child. (1) A person commits the crime of abandonment of a child if, being a parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the care or custody of a child under 15 years of age, he deserts the child in any place with intent to abandon it.
"(2) Abandonment of a child is a Class C felony."
"ORS 163.545 Child Neglect. (1) A person having custody or control of a child under 10 years of age commits the crime of child neglect if, with criminal negligence, he leaves the child unattended in or at any place for such period of time as may be likely to endanger the health or welfare of such child.
"(2) Child neglect is a Class A misdemeanor."
"ORS 163.555 Criminal Nonsupport. (1) A person commits the crime of criminal nonsupport if, being the parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the support of a child under 18 years of age, bom in or out of wedlock, he refuses or neglects without lawful excuse to provide support for such child.

"(3) Criminal nonsupport is a Class C felony."
Among these laws are ORS 108.040, providing an action against both parents for family necessities; ORS 108.110 et seq., which allow a petition for the support of children to be brought against a parent by the other parent or a state agency for the support of the children; ORS ch 110, providing both criminal and civil means for reciprocal enforcement between states of the right of support for children; ORS 411.120(4), providing for assistance to dependent children; ORS ch 416, establishing the relative responsibility law (specifically see ORS 416.090, 416.100, and 416.220 for the means of enforcement); ORS ch 418, providing for child welfare services (specifically see ORS 418.135(1) and 418.460, concerning enforcement of parental duties); ORS ch 419, establishing juvenile courts (specifically see ORS 419.513, 419.515, and 419.517 concerning enforcement of support of children by parents).
See Prosser, The Law of Torts 191, § 36 (4th ed 1971), in which it is stated:
" Where the statute merely declares that conduct is a crime, and makes no mention of any civil remedy, justification becomes more difficult, since the court is then obviously under no compulsion to apply the statute. Many courts have, however, purported to 'find' in the statute a supposed 'implied', 'constructive', or 'presumed' intent to provide for tort liability. In the ordinary case this is pure fiction concocted for the purpose. The obvious conclusion can only be that when the legislators said nothing about it, they either did not have the civil suit in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide for it."
The dissenting opinions take this opinion to task because it is claimed the rationale is broad enough to encompass claims against parents for physical injuries. Because no physical injuries are involved, it is unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion to determine whether there are reasons why its rationale should or should not be applicable to physical injuries.