Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jimmie L. SIMPSON, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Melvin BENJAMIN, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joel R. HANUKAH, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-06-02
Citations: 347 So. 2d 414
Docket Number: Nos. 48426, 48595 and 48596
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jimmie L. SIMPSON, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Melvin BENJAMIN, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joel R. HANUKAH, Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 347
Pages: 414–418

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jimmie L. SIMPSON, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Melvin BENJAMIN, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joel R. HANUKAH, Appellee.
Nos. 48426, 48595 and 48596.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 2, 1977.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Philip J. Padovano of Ruiz, Padovano & Schrader, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Chief Justice.
We review these consolidated cases on direct appeal from the Pinellas County Court. In each case the trial court dismissed informations filed against defendants, declaring Florida's statute on unlawful assembly, Section 870.02, to be unconstitutional because it abridged defendants' First Amendment right to freedom of assembly. We have jurisdiction.
Section 870.02 makes it unlawful for three or more persons to meet in order "to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any other unlawful act." The trial court found the statute neither vague nor overbroad, construing "unlawful act" to mean unlawful criminal act. Nevertheless, it held that:
". . . [T]he Statute in question violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it attempts to regulate conduct which is protected by the Freedom of Assembly Clause contained in the First Amendment; in that it seeks to make criminal the coming together without requiring affirmative action in furtherance of the breach of peace or other unlawful act . ."
We disagree.
In State v. Beasley, 317 So.2d 750 (Fla.1976), we upheld the related riot statute, Section 870.01, Florida Statutes, and held the term riot must be defined as it was understood at common law since it was not expressly defined in the statute. We further required that each of the common law elements of the offense must be established by the circumstances of the incident and the charging document must include the, ". . . facts which establish that
three or more persons acted with a common intent to mutually assist each other in a violent manner to the terror of the people and a breach of the peace."
We have similar situations in the instant cases. The term unlawful assembly as used in the statute may be defined in accordance with the common law definition. State v. Beasley, 317 So.2d 750 (Fla.l975); Fields v. State, 85 So.2d 609 (Fla.1956); Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315, 85 So. 911 (1920).
The common law had both narrow and broad definitions for unlawful assembly. The narrow view regarded unlawful assembly merely as a lesser included offense to riot, i. e., assembly of three or more persons with the common intent to riot, but without actually executing the violent action necessary to riot. Supra note 5.
The broad view required only a common purpose among the members of the assembly, and assembly in a manner which caused apprehension in the neighborhood of a breach of the peace. It did not necessarily require there be a purpose to riot or even any unlawful purpose. The broad definition resulted from expansion of the original narrow view. See 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 516 (8th ed. 1824); 8 W. Holds-worth, A History of the English Law 324-26 (2d ed. 1937).
The statutory provision for unlawful assembly is obviously designed to make unlawful an assembly in which those assembled have the intent to do an unlawful act which threatens a breach of the peace. The basic common law elements apply. Accordingly, we construe Section 870.02 to prohibit (1) an assembly of three or more persons who, (2) having a common unlawful purpose, (3) assemble in such a manner as to give rational, firm, and courageous persons in the neighborhood of the assembly a well-grounded fear of a breach of the peace.
It is no abridgement of free speech or assembly to make criminal an assembly which has as its purpose the breach of the peace. We hold Section 870.-02, Florida Statutes (1975), which establishes the offense of "unlawful assembly," to be constitutional subject to the following restrictive limitations: The term "unlawful assembly" as used in the statute is defined in accordance with the definition as set forth in this opinion; each of the itemized elements of the offense must be established by the circumstances of the incident; and the charging document must articulate the facts which establish each of those elements.
With reference to the specific facts in the instant cases we find that the infor-mations in each instance charge that each of the individual appellees on a specific date and place,
"did then and there meet together with two or more persons to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any other unlawful act . . . ."
The facts are not sufficiently before us, and the informations as drawn are clearly inadequate. Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.140(b) and 3.140(d)(1); State v. Beasley, supra.
We reverse the holding of the trial judge that the statute is unconstitutional, but affirm the dismissal of the informations on grounds that they fail to properly state an offense under the statute, without prejudice to the State to file amended informa-tions.
These causes are remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
SUNDBERG, J., concurs with an opinion.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.
HATCHETT, J., dissents.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.
. § 870.02, Fla.Stat. (1975), reads:
"Unlawful assemblies. — If three or more persons meet together to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any other unlawful act, each of them shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083."
. § 870.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1975), which reads in its entirety:
"All persons guilty of a riot, or of inciting or encouraging a riot, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084."
. State v. Beasley, 317 So.2d at 753.
. Compare, e. g., 6 Coke's Third Institutes ¶ 79, at 175 (1809) with Reg. v. Vincent, 9 Car. & P. 91, 173 Eng.Rep. 754 (1839).
. Reg. v. Vincent, supra note 5 at 756, 62; Reg. v. Graham, 16 Cox C.C. 420 (1888).
. We do not read Callender v. Florida, 383 U.S. 270, 86 S.Ct. 924, 15 L.Ed.2d 749 (1966), to declare the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The restrictive construction we now make saves the statute from similar future dispositions.