Case Name: DUMAS v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1974-03-01
Citations: 131 Ga. App. 79
Docket Number: 48657
Parties: DUMAS v. THE STATE.
Judges: Hall, P. J., concurs. Evans, J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 131
Pages: 79–86

Head Matter:
48657.
DUMAS v. THE STATE.

Opinion:
Clark, Judge.
This is an appeal by a department store owner from a conviction for the violation of the provisions of Code Ann. § 26-2101 prohibiting the distribution of obscene materials. The materials charged as being obscene were necklaces with medallions attached.
This case had its inception as a result of the seizure by school officials at the LaGrange Boys Junior High School of two medallions which in the opinion of the principal, assistant principal, athletic coach and police detective captain were such that they were obscene within the meaning of our statute. Although these exhibits were not transmitted to this court, our consideration of the enumerations of error did not require this court to examine any exhibits as a new trial will be required.
1. On March 6, 1973, when the trial took place in the State Court of Troup County the U. S. Supreme Court had not yet released its decision of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (93 SC 2607, 37 LE2d 419), which attempted a clarification of the applicable community standards on obscenity. Thus, court and counsel were in disagreement as to whether the term "prevailing community standards" should be based upon the nationwide community or otherwise. The trial judge ruled the applicable standards to be those of the local community, namely the City of LaGrange. This has since been determined to be erroneous. After the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Miller v. California, supra, defined the term community standards by indicating the measuring rod to be that of the State rather than a smaller geographical segment, our Georgia Supreme Court ruled specifically on the question in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312 (201 SE2d 456). Here the court's opinion followed the U. S. Supreme Court and ruled the geographical area to be that of the State of Georgia. We quote from the opinion: "In Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 [93 SC 2607, 37 LE2d 419], the Supreme Court clarified the 'community standards' to which the obscenity guidelines were to apply, disavowing that of the nationwide community in favor of that of the state. In view of Miller and of the constitutional responsibility placed upon this court to conduct independent appellate determinations of the issue of obscenity vel non, we hold the 'community' by which the standards for obscenity are gauged is that community or polity which is the State of Georgia." Accordingly, the case must be reversed and a new trial granted.
2. Enumerations 4, 5, 6 and 7 dealt with alleged evidentiary errors in permitting the school principal, assistant principal, coach and police detective to state their opinions as to whether the State's exhibits predominately appealed to a prurient interest, portrayed a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and was utterly without any redeeming social values. Although each of these individuals also added that their opinions were those prevailing in the City of LaGrange it is noted that the school witnesses based their views upon school policies as to what should be available to teenagers. Although our views may be considered obiter dictum we deem it incumbent to state that determination of "community standards" are not based upon what is appropriate for children. We have in Code Ann. § 26-9901a through 26-9907a statutes permitting prosecution for distribution of obscene material where children are involved.
In the case at bar there was no foundation to show knowledge of the community standards as a whole and therefore personal opinions of the three school officials were erroneously admitted into evidence. Similarly, a review of the detective captain's testimony showed his opinions were to be limited to those of a law enforcement officer rather than a knowledge of community standards. These four enumerations of error are meritorious.
3. As a new trial is being granted it should be noted that our Supreme Court in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, supra, has pointed out (p. 317) that "it is also no longer necessary in cases where the materials themselves are available for inspection by the finder of fact that expert testimony be produced on behalf of the prosecution. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 [93 SC 2628, 37 LE2d 446]. See, also, United States v. Groner, 479 F2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973)." See also Fishman v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 509 (197 SE2d 467).
4. There is no merit to the eighth enumeration of error complaining of the court's ruling which sustained the district attorney's objection to the introduction of thirteen magazines and publications containing written and pictorial material depicting nudity and sex in various degrees of explicitness which had been purchased by defense counsel in LaGrange stores. Code § 38-201 provides that "The evidence must relate to the questions being tried by the jury and bear upon them either directly or indirectly." "Questions as to the relevancy and admissibility of the testimony, are properly for the court." Hotchkiss v. Newton, 10 Ga. 560 (5). "No precise and universal test of the relevancy of testimony is furnished by the law. The question must be determined in each case according to the facts of that particular case and in accordance with the teachings of reason and judicial experience. [Cits.]" Alexander v. State, 7 Ga. App. 88, 89 (66 SE 274).
5. The ninth and tenth enumerations of error were to questions submitted in cross examination to witnesses who had limited their direct testimony to the good character of the defendant. (T. 61). On cross examination the district attorney asked "When they [your four children] were in Junior High School, would you have wanted them to purchase materials such as this in the stores?" (T. 63). The court overruled defense objection that this "was irrelevant and immaterial and did not pertain to this case." Such ruling was error. While considerable latitude exists in cross examination personal questions having no relevancy are not permitted even as a part of a thorough and sifting interrogation. Code § 38-1704 provides "It shall be the right of a witness to be examined only as to relevant matter; and to be protected from improper questions and from harsh or insulting demeanor." See also Edwards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 187 (3) (189 SE 678).
In regard to a question of this type being inappropriate, note the comment in United States v. Klaw, 350 F2d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1965): "Unless there be this protection, a witch hunt might well come to pass which would make the Salem tragedy fade into obscurity . .Otherwise it would be altogether too easy for any prosecutor to stand before a jury, display the exhibits involved, and merely ask in summation: 'Would you want your son or daughter to see or read this stuff?' A conviction in every instance would be virtually assured." See also United States v. Groner, 475 F2d 550, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
6. The eleventh and twelfth enumerations of error are intertwined. The eleventh enumeration reads: "Because the court, over the objection of the defendant, illegally permitted the solicitor, Mr. Ketzky, to make highly prejudicial and inflammatory statements during his closing argument to the jury concerning whether or not the jurors personally approved of or liked the allegedly obscene material in question and whether the jurors would want their children to see or be exposed to such material or similar materials." The twelfth enumeration reads: "Because the court illegally refused to permit closing arguments of counsel to be recorded despite the fact that the court reporter was available and present during said argument." We are unable to pass on the eleventh enumeration of error because the allegedly improper arguments were not preserved in the record by means of a transcript. Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398 (8) (154 SE2d 803); Steverson v. Hosp. Auth. of Ware County, 129 Ga. App. 510 (4) (199 SE2d 881). Such lack was due to the ruling by the trial judge stated in these words: "Let the record show that I didn't permit the oral argument to be reported." (T. 99). Undoubtedly the trial judge had in mind the provisions of subparagraph (b) of Code Ann. § 6-805, which states that "In all misdemeanor cases, the trial judge may in his discretion require the reporting and transcribing of the evidence and proceedings on terms prescribed by him." The meaning of "discretion" herein placed in the trial court is to be obtained from the provisions of subparagraph (j) of that same section. This states that "In all cases, civil or criminal, any party may as a matter of right have the case reported at his own expense." Accordingly, the provision "in his discretion" clearly refers to the terms which the judge may require for the reporting and transcribing but not to the mandatory right to have the proceedings reported. In short, the proper interpretation is that, in all cases, including misdemeanors, any party has the absolute right to have the case reported at his own expense. Therefore, in the instant case, the proper procedure was to have sustained the motion by defense counsel to direct the court reporter already in court to record the oral arguments to the jury on such terms as the judge in his legal discretion might prescribe. Thus the ruling which denied the defense the right to have the oral arguments recorded was error.
Submitted October 3, 1973
Decided March 1, 1974.
Wyatt, Wyatt & Solomon, Charles Solomon, Jr., Allen B. Keeble, for appellant.
Loeb C. Ketzky, Solicitor, for appellee.
Judgment reversed.
Hall, P. J., concurs. Evans, J., concurs specially.
Months after this U. S. Supreme Court decision a United Press International survey resulted in a newspaper article headlined "Guidelines on Porno Confusing; Court Rulings Not Understood."
He testified that the famed statue of Venus de Milo would be obscene, explaining "The naked body would be obscene as far as I am concerned." (T. 47).