Case Name: Borg, Respondent, vs. Fain, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1951-12-04
Citations: 260 Wis. 190
Docket Number: 
Parties: Borg, Respondent, vs. Fain, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 260
Pages: 190–194b

Head Matter:
Borg, Respondent, vs. Fain, Appellant.
November 7
December 4, 1951.
For the appellant there was a brief by Lyman K. Arnold of Elkhorn, attorney, and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis and Georges Dapples, all of Chicago, Illinois, of counsel, and oral argument' by Mr. Dapples.
For the respondent there was a brief by Moran, O’Brien & Richardson of Delavan, and oral argument by J. Arthur Moran.
Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on February 5, 1952.

Opinion:
Gehl, J.
The plaintiff contends and the trial court agreed that, because the defense relied upon is based upon an inadmissible oral agreement, the prior and contemporaneous verbal agreements set forth in defendant's pleadings are merged in the written contract evidenced by the notes, and that parol evidence of such agreements is not admissible to vary or contradict its terms, he was entitled to summary judgment.
As appears from the foregoing statement of facts, the notes were simple in form without any reference to any collateral or extraneous agreement. Particularly, they do not on their face contain any reference to the alleged agreement that the stock of the Borg Company was to be held as security for their payment. To prove such agreement requires plaintiff to establish its existence by parol and thereby open the door to parol proof of the entire oral contemporaneous agreement.
"Where one party has been permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances leading up to, and connected with, the execution of a written contract, the other party may introduce evidence as to the same matters notwithstanding such evidence tends to vary or contradict the writing." 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, p. 1013, sec. 1159.
Plaintiff has no means of establishing that he has possession of the stock certificates under an agreement to hold them as collateral to the notes except by resorting to the oral agreement. It would be an unjust rule, contrary to all principles of equity, to permit plaintiff to take advantage of that part of the oral agreement under which, he alleges, he holds the certificates as collateral to the notes, and to repudiate those parts of the same agreement which, defendant alleges, define the circumstances under which the notes and the certificates are held by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that by admitting in his pleadings that the stock certificates were agreed to be held as collateral security for the notes defendant has waived his right to prove the rest of the oral agreement. That might be true if the admissions were inconsistent or conflicting with defendant's offer. They are not only consistent but are also in accord with, and a part of the defendant's, alleged defense.
Thus, it appears that there were factual issues presented by the pleadings. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should therefore have been denied. Prime Mfg. Co. v. A. F. Gallun & Sons Corp. 229 Wis. 348, 281 N. W. 697.
There is another reason why the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. The facts pleaded in the counterclaims and the plaintiff's reply thereto present substantial issues of fact. Plaintiff contends that defendant has not been prejudiced by the court's failure to try the issues raised by the counterclaims; that he can still pursue the remedy sought to be enforced thereby. It has been the general practice in the courts of this state to dispose at one trial of all of the issues made by the pleadings. There are many sound reasons for following the practice, reasons which concern the interests of both the public and the litigants.
". . . the piecemeal trial of separable issues of fact, so as to have separate trials and interlocutory adjudications as to such separable issues, even though there is thereby a substantial disposal of the merits, should be undertaken only with great caution, even when requested upon stipulations by the parties, so as to avoid complicating and delaying the disposition of litigation and unduly increasing the cost and expense thereof to all concerned." Cooper v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. 209 Wis. 314, 318, 245 N. W. 154.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.