Case Name: Mitchell Lamar CHESNEY, Appellant, v. Cynthia Ann Howington CHESNEY, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-01-29
Citations: 828 So. 2d 219
Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-01948-COA
Parties: Mitchell Lamar CHESNEY, Appellant, v. Cynthia Ann Howington CHESNEY, Appellee.
Judges: Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, and CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 828
Pages: 219–223

Head Matter:
Mitchell Lamar CHESNEY, Appellant, v. Cynthia Ann Howington CHESNEY, Appellee.
No. 2000-CA-01948-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Jan. 29, 2002.
Rehearing Denied April 2, 2002.
Leslie R. Brown, Jackson, Attorney For Appellant.
Lawrence Primeaux, Meridian, Attorney For Appellee.
Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, and CHANDLER, JJ.

Opinion:
McMILLIN, C.J.,
For The Court.
¶ 1. Mitchell and Cindy Chesney were granted an irreconcilable differences divorce by the Chancery Court of Lauder-dale County. The parties were unable to agree on matters relating to post-divorce child support, the division of marital assets and possible alimony provisions for Mrs. Chesney. Pursuant to statute, the parties submitted these matters to the chancellor for decision. Mr. Chesney, finding himself dissatisfied with a substantial part of the chancellor's resolution of these matters, has appealed to this Court claiming that the chancellor abused her discretion in fashioning her judgment.
¶ 2. Mr. Chesney specifically claims that (a) the chancellor should not have required him to contribute to the youngest daughter's private school tuition and athletic fees and provide that child a car in addition to the monthly child support he was ordered to pay, (b) the chancellor did not equitably divide the marital estate, (c) it was an abuse of discretion to award periodic alimony, and (d) the award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Chesney was error. Finding some of the issues raised by Mr. Chesney to have merit, we reverse and remand as to child support, affirm the equitable division of marital assets, and reverse and render the award of periodic alimony and attorney's fees.
I.
Facts
¶ 3. Mitchell and Cindy Chesney were married in 1976 and resided as husband and wife in Lauderdale County until late 1999. There were three children born to their marriage, one of which was emancipated at the time of the divorce.
¶ 4. The chancellor found that the parties were of approximately the same age, both were in good physical and mental health, and both were gainfully employed earning roughly the same income. Both, according to the chancellor's findings, had contributed positively in various ways to the marriage; however, the chancellor further concluded that Mr. Chesney's romantic involvement with another woman had contributed substantially to the ultimate deterioration of the marital relationship.
II.
Standard of Review
¶ 5. The scope of our review of the chancellor's decisions in matters such as this is limited. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057, 1063 (¶ 21) (Miss.2000). The chancery court's determinations are afforded substantial deference so long as there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor's findings of fact. McEwen v. McEwen, 631 So.2d 821, 823 (Miss.1994). This Court will overturn the chancellor's determinations only if they are clearly erroneous. Hill v. Southeastern Floor Covering Co., 596 So.2d 874, 877 (Miss.1992).
III.
Child Support
¶ 6. The lower court required Mr. Chesney to pay child support in the amount of $530 per month, which was the amount determined by applying the appropriate percentage found in the statutory guidelines to Mr. Chesney's available income. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-101 (Rev. 2000). In setting child support in that amount, the chancellor specifically stated that the guidelines produced an appropriate amount of child support based on the facts presented to her. Despite that finding, the chancellor ordered Mr. Chesney to additionally pay one half of the youngest child's private school tuition and athletic fees. She also ordered Mr. Chesney to purchase that child a car comparable to that furnished for the two older children at such time as the youngest child reached driving age. Mr. Chesney complains that these additional expenses are a form child support, no matter how they are characterized by the chancellor. The order to pay these additional obligations, according to Mr. Chesney's argument, constitutes an abuse of discretion on the chancellor's part since they necessarily increase his periodic support obligation beyond that required under the statutory guidelines.
¶ 7. We agree that the additional costs are in the nature of child support. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the chancellor dictated a particular use for these additional sums. The statutes establishing child support guidelines permit the chancellor to vary from the presumptively-appropriate amounts dictated by Section 43-19-101 only upon a specific finding by the chancellor as to why the statutory guidelines are inappropriate. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-103 (Rev.2000). The Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically required the chancellor to make these statutorily-mandated findings as a prerequisite to entry of a support order deviating from the guidelines. Clausel v. Clausel, 714 So.2d 265, 267 (¶ 8) (Miss.1998). In the absence of any such findings suggesting the necessity to exceed the statutory guidelines, we find it necessary to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings to determine a proper level of child support to be substantiated by evidence in the record and necessary findings of fact supported by that evidence.
IV.
Equitable Distribution
¶8. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 927 (Miss.1994), holds that marital assets should be divided equitably. This does not necessarily mean an equal division. Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 863-64 (Miss.1994). Rather, the division must be made equitably after due consideration to a number of factors enumerated in the Ferguson decision. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. In the case now before us, the chancellor awarded approximately $187,000 of the marital property to Mrs. Chesney and $176,000 of the marital property to Mr. Chesney. In view of the fact that the chancellor found Mr. Chesney's improper behavior contributed to the demise of the marriage, which is a legitimate consideration in making the distribution, we do not find this disparity to be clearly erroneous, and thus we affirm the distribution of the marital property.
V.
Alimony
¶ 9. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in its decision in Johnson v. John son, 650 So.2d 1281 (Miss.1994), concluded that one legitimate aim of an equitable division of the marital assets is to provide for the post-divorce financial security of both parties and that only if a "deficit" as to one spouse remains after the equitable division, should the chancellor proceed to consider some form of alimony to properly provide for the less financially secure party. Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1287. In this case, the parties both received a fairly substantial amount of assets accumulated during the marriage. The evidence also showed that Mrs. Chesney was gainfully employed at an income level that met or exceeded that of Mr. Chesney. There was no evidence of any unusual aspect of Mrs. Chesney's financial position that would indicate any difficulty as to her ability to survive with assets and income substantially the same as Mr. Chesney. On those facts, we are of the view that the evidence does not establish the kind of "deficit" that must be established as a precursor to the award of periodic alimony. We, therefore, conclude that the chancellor abused her discretion in deciding to award periodic alimony to Mrs. Chesney in addition to the portion of marital assets set' apart to her in the equitable division of property.
VI.
Attorney's Fees
¶ 10. In order to award attorney's fees in a divorce action, the chancellor must find as fact that Mrs. Chesney did not have adequate financial resources to pay the costs of her representation. Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So.2d 513, 520 (Miss.1995). There was no such showing in this case. In fact, the chancellor specifically found that both parties had funds to pay their attorneys. The decision to award attorney's fees to Mrs. Chesney on these facts was error and must be set aside.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAUDER-DALE COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN REGARD TO ESTABLISHING A PROPER LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT, AFFIRMED AS TO THE EQUITABLE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS, AND REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO THE AWARD OF PERIODIC ALIMONY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLANT. THE COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED ONE HALF TO THE APPELLANT AND ONE HALF TO THE APPELLEE.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, and CHANDLER, JJ., concur. BRANTLEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by KING, P.J., and THOMAS, J.