Case Name: Stanley VASKA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent
Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 2006-05-15
Citations: 135 P.3d 1011
Docket Number: No. S-11171
Parties: Stanley VASKA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
Judges: Before: BRYNER, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, FABE, and CARPENETI, Justices.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 135
Pages: 1011–1036

Head Matter:
Stanley VASKA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
No. S-11171.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
May 15, 2006.
Margi Mock, Assistant Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Petitioner.
Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Respondent.
Before: BRYNER, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, FABE, and CARPENETI, Justices.

Opinion:
OPINION
BRYNER, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found Stanley Yaska guilty of sexually abusing T.E., a minor. The evidence identifying Vaska as the young child's abuser included testimony of T.E.'s mother describing statements T.E. had made after the alleged abuse. Because T.E. said at trial that she had no memory of the period in her childhood when the abuse occurred, the trial court admitted her mother's testimony under the "catchall" exception to Alaska's hearsay rule. On appeal, Vaska argued that the trial court erred in applying the catchall exception. In response, the state urged the court of appeals to affirm on the alternative ground that T.E.'s statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements. The court of appeals accepted this argument and affirmed Vaska's conviction, ruling that T.E.'s statements were admissible under this new theory. We granted Vaska's petition for hearing and now reverse. Because Vaska's decision not to cross-examine T.E. at trial may have been influenced by the state's exclusive reliance on the catchall exception and by its failure to lay any foundation to admit T.E.'s statements as prior inconsistent statements, we hold that it was error to apply the prior-inconsistent-statement provision for the first time on appeal, and we remand to allow the court of appeals to consider other potential grounds for affirming.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Three-year-old T.E. began having mood swings in the spring of 1994. She eventually disclosed to her mother, Olga E., that "her girl" (T.E.'s term for her genital area) hurt. T.E. later told her mother that a "ga-ga" (the family term for "monster") had hurt her. Olga reported the abuse and took T.E. to a hospital in Bethel for examination by Dr. Donald Burgess. Dr. Burgess asked T.E. to show the area of her pain on an anatomically correct doll, and T.E. responded by pointing to the doll's genital area and to its mouth. Dr. Burgess asked T.E. who had hurt her, and T.E. answered, "Ga-ga." T.E. then referred to M.V.'s "daddy's ga-ga." She placed her finger in the doll's vagina when asked how the "ga-ga" hurt her. Dr. Burgess conducted a pelvic examination and found an opening in T.E.'s hymen that was larger than any he previously observed in a girl her age. The doctor concluded that T.E. had been penetrated by a large object. Sometime after this examination, Olga and T.E. were walking in their home community of Russian Mission and encountered Vaska. According to Olga, T.E. said, " 'There's the ga-ga — he's the ga-ga' and then she pointed at Stan [Vaska]."
Vaska was later indicted and convicted on one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, T.E., and one count of second-degree sexual abuse of another minor, M.V. Vaska appealed the convictions to the court of appeals, which reversed and ordered new trials.
At Vaska's retrial on the count relating to T.E., the state called T.E. as a witness and questioned her briefly, but ended its examination after T.E. said that she could not remember anything before the third grade. T.E.'s complete testimony was as follows:
Q:_How old are you [T.E.]?
A: Ten.
Q: And do you know what your birthday is?
A: March 5.
Q: Do you know what year you were born in?
A: 1991.
Q: And you're going to school now?
A: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q: What grade? What grade did you just finish?
A: Fourth.
Q: Did you like school?
A: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q: What was your teacher's name?
A: Theresa Vaska.
Q: Now, do you know what it means to tell the truth?
A: (Inaudible reply).
Q: Yon don't know what it means to tell the truth? Do you know the differ — well, what if I told you it's snowing in the room her [sic] today? What am I doing?
A: Lying.
Q: Is that good?
A: Unh-unh (negative).
Q: Now, [T.E.], do you remember back to when you were a little tiny girl?
A: Unh-unh (negative).
Q: What's the — what—think—what I'd like you to do is think back in your mind and what's the first thing you can think of as a little girl?
(Pause)
Q: Do you remember being in kindergarten?
A: (Inaudible reply).
Q: No? Do you remember being in first grade?
A: (Inaudible reply).
A: No.
Q: What grade do you remember?
A: Third.
Q: Third grade? Okay. Do you — what's your mom's name?
A: Olga [E.].
Q: What's your daddy's name?
A: Larry [E.].
Q: So do you remember anything before the third grade?
A: No.
Q: Okay.
[Prosecutor]: I don't have any other questions, Your Honor.
Defense counsel did not cross-examine T.E. The court then told T.E., "You can leave now, that's the end of your testimony ma'am." The trial transcript states: "(Witness excused)."
After T.E. left the stand, the prosecutor asked the superior court to find, under Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3), that T.E. was unavailable as a witness because she lacked all memory of her out-of-court statements. The prosecutor then moved to have T.E.'s statements to her mother admitted under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), the catchall exception to the hearsay rule.
The superior court stated that it "would allow the mother to testify as to the statements [T.E.] made concerning identification of the defendant...." The court also stated that "there's no reason to believe . that these statements are so unreliable as to be inadmissible." The court concluded that, given the "broad general exceptions under 804(b)(5), . given the evidence presented to date and the review of the court file . the court believes that testimony by the mother of statements made . by her daughter, concerning this incident will be admissible."
The prosecutor then called T.E.'s mother to the witness stand. She described the statements T.E. made to her about "her girl" hurting and the "ga-ga"; she also testified that on one occasion, when she and T.E. encountered Vaska while walking together in Russian Mission, T.E. said, "There's the gaga — he's the ga-ga" and "then she pointed at Stan [Vaska]." The state never sought to recall T.E. to the witness stand after she was excused. Nor did it ever ask the trial court to admit T.E.'s prior statements as prior inconsistent statements under Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
The jury found Vaska guilty of sexual abuse of T.E. in the first degree. Vaska appealed, arguing that the admission of T.E.'s hearsay statements to her mother under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5)'s catchall exception violated the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In response, the state urged the court of appeals to hold, as an alternative ground for affirming, that the statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements under Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) — a theory that the state had never previously asserted. The court of appeals adopted this new theory and affirmed Vaska's conviction without deciding whether T.E.'s statements were admissible under the catchall exception.
Vaska petitioned for hearing to this court, challenging the court of appeals's ruling that T.E.'s statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements. We granted the petition to consider that issue.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We apply de novo review in determining whether an intermediate appellate court has erroneously applied new legal grounds to affirm a trial court's ruling.
B. The State Failed To Establish a Foundation for Admitting T.E.'s Prior Statements Under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
Vaska challenges the court of appeals's ruling that T.E.'s prior statements implicating Vaska were properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements. The superior court did not rely on this theory; instead, it ruled the statements admissible under Alaska's catchall exception, Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5). Not until Vaska appealed did the state first argue that the statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements. The court of appeals accepted the state's argument and admitted the disputed evidence on this new theory. Vaska argues that the court of appeals erred in so ruling.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) allows prior statements of a witness to be admitted if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, the prior statement shall be excluded unless (i) the witness was so examined while testifying as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement or (ii) the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action.
The party offering a statement under this rule must satisfy two foundational conditions. First, the offering party must show that the prior statement is indeed inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. "Inconsistency" does not necessarily require textual conflict; other circumstances, including lack of memory at trial, may suffice. Because the question whether a declarant's alleged lack of memory establishes inconsistency often becomes a disputed issue, a claim of inconsistency based on faulty memory normally must be raised by the offering party at the trial court level. The trial court is best situated to resolve testimonial disputes of this kind, and raising the issue in the trial court ensures that the party against whom the prior statement is offered will have ample notice that inconsistency has been asserted and a fair opportunity to contest this foundational point.
The second foundational condition for admitting a prior inconsistent statement requires that the witness who made the prior statement be given an opportunity to explain or deny it. Under Evidence Rule 801(d)(l)(A)(i), the offering party usually must meet this requirement by ensuring that the witness is "so examined while testifying as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the statement." Alternatively, Evidence Rule 801(d)(1) (A)(ii) sometimes allows trial courts to admit a prior inconsistent statement before the declarant can explain or deny it—but only if "the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action." As the commentary to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) makes clear, however, this option applies only in exceptional situations: "Except in special cases, counsel should lay the foundation for an inconsistent statement while the witness who made the statement is testifying...."
Ordinarily, then, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) contemplates that both of the foundational conditions it describes should be met before the prior statement is admitted, and while the declaring witness is still on the stand. And at a minimum, the rule directs that the full foundation must be laid before the de-clarant has been excused from testifying. The text of Evidence Rule 801(d)(l)(A)(i) makes these expectations clear by requiring that the declarant be "so examined while testifying as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement." It follows that when the state fails to make a prima facie showing of compliance with the rule's foundational conditions, the defendant has no duty to cross-examine the declarant in order to negate the existence of a proper foundation. Indeed, to shift the foundational burden in this way would leave a defendant like Vaska with an untenable choice: "[Forcing a defendant to call a child complainant to testify in order to cross-examine that individual . unfairly requires a defendant to choose between his right to cross-examine a complaining witness and his right to rely on the State's burden of proof in a criminal case."
Although we have long recognized that the foundational conditions for admitting a prior inconsistent statement "should not be mechanically applied in every instance," our adherence to this principle assumes a corresponding showing of circumstances establishing good cause to relax the rule's clear commands; we have never suggested that the principle of flexibility should routinely excuse offering parties from complying with Rule 801(d)(l)(A)'s foundational prerequisites. As already indicated, the commentary to the rule precludes such an interpretation by emphasizing that the rule's foundational conditions should be enforced "except in special cases." This emphasis on the need for compliance as a general rule is justified because the foundational conditions serve the vital purpose of protecting the rights to effective confrontation and cross-examination. They do this by sparing the party against whom a prior inconsistent statement is offered from the unfair burden of having to directly examine a witness about a prior statement that has not yet been shown to be admissible under Rule 801, while at the same time preserving that party's right to fully cross-examine the declarant about the statement if it passes muster and is properly admitted.
Moreover, when Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is invoked for the first time on appeal, as the state invoked it here, the need to enforce its foundational conditions takes on added importance because those conditions serve the additional purpose of protecting the accused from being unfairly surprised by the rule's late invocation. In this procedural setting, because compliance with the rule's foundational conditions would provide actual notice at trial that the statement in question met the prerequisites for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the existence of a proper foundation would at a minimum ensure that the accused received fair and timely warning that the rule might be invoked.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. Here, the trial court excused T.E. and declared her unavailable as a witness immediately after the prosecution's preliminary questioning caused her to claim that she could not recall anything that had happened to her before she entered third grade. Because the state did not offer to admit T.E.'s statements as prior inconsistent statements during the trial, the adequacy of the state's foundation for admission under this theory necessarily depends on whether the state's brief examination of T.E. established inconsistency between her trial testimony and her prior statements and resulted in her being "so examined" as to give her "an opportunity to explain or deny the [prior inconsistent] statement^]." T.E.'s abbreviated testimony failed to satisfy, or even address, either foundational condition for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The court of appeals nevertheless excused these foundational flaws, primarily relying on two previous cases in which it had considered foundational challenges to prior inconsistent statements: Bodine v. State and Wassilie v. State.
In Bodine, a child declarant made statements to social workers and the police, alleging fellatio with her father. At trial, she repeatedly denied that her father had ever put anything in her mouth and also denied ever telling anybody that he had done so. The trial court admitted into evidence her statements to the social workers and police. The prosecutor had not specifically asked the witness questions about when she made the prior statements, to whom they were made, or their exact contents, but when Bodine appealed, the court of appeals held that for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the prosecutor's questions sufficiently alluded to the subject matter of the child's statements to the social worker and the police. The court of appeals concluded that, given the child's age and the subject matter of the interrogation, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Wassilie v. State. There, an elderly witness at trial could not remember a statement he had made to police after he and his wife were assaulted. The prosecutor did not directly confront the witness with his prior statement or ask him to explain or deny it, but did ask him whether he recalled talking to the police or the police coming to his home. Even though he could not recall any details, the witness was able to testify that his wife had in fact been injured. Analogizing the witness's limited ability to testify to that of a child, the court of appeals recognized that foundational requirements "should not be mechanically applied in every instance" and concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the prior statement despite the minimal foundation presented.
Here, unlike Bodine and Wassilie, where the prosecutors conducted at least a minimal inquiry into the prior statements, none of the questions the state posed to T.E. remotely touched upon or even suggested the subject matter of her prior statements. The state's brief examination of T.E. consisted entirely of preliminary, background questions covering topics such as what it means to tell the truth, how far back in elementary school T.E.'s memory extended, and the names of her parents. None of these questions gave T.E. an opportunity to explain or deny any prior statements T.E. made to her mother regarding sexual abuse by Vaska. The prosecutor failed to ask about the subject matter of T.E.'s prior statements; he likewise failed to ask about the surrounding circumstances in which T.E. made those statements. Nor did the state otherwise attempt to test T.E.'s lack of memory; it simply accepted at face value her general assertion that she remembered nothing that happened before she entered third grade.
In short, the state abandoned its examination of T.E., asked for her to be declared unavailable, and allowed her to be excused without complying with either foundational prerequisite for admitting prior inconsistent statements-indeed, without eliciting any germane testimony whatsoever. To be sure, as we noted above, a declarant need not directly deny or contradict a prior statement to establish inconsistency. But in our view the duty to establish inconsistency under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requires something more concrete and specific than an unexplained statement asserting a general memory loss of everything before third grade. By the same token, while it seems safe to assume that the state's duty to give T.E. a chance to explain or deny her prior statements might be minimal under the circumstances presented here, the state offers no persuasive justification for ignoring this condition completely. The state's near-total failure to lay a foundation provides a strong factual ground distinguishing this case from Bodine and Wassilie.
The dissent tries to dismiss Rule 801(d)(l)(A)'s opportunity-to-explain requirement as merely a dispensable frill. Citing McMaster v. State, it suggests that this requirement is "distinctly optional where the witness is a young child." But McMaster is readily distinguishable from this ease, as are other cases that have condoned relaxing the rule's foundational conditions — such as Bodine and Wassilie — because they all involved situations in which the disputed witnesses had been available to testify, had actually given meaningful testimony about the offenses at issue, and had subjected themselves to cross-examination on their testimony. Here, by contrast, the witness was excused and declared unavailable without offering any relevant testimony — and, as we discuss further below, this occurred under circumstances in which Vas-ka's counsel had no reason to believe that the state might later claim that her brief appearance on the stand had testimonial significance under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
Another important procedural distinction exists here as well. Our opinion in McMas-ter and the court of appeals's opinions in Bodine and Wassilie reviewed and affirmed decisions in which trial judges exercised their broad powers of discretion to admit evidence that was expressly offered at trial under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). As the court of appeals itself emphasized in deciding Bodine, "In determining the sufficiency of the foundation for admission of prior inconsistent statements, the trial court is allowed considerable latitude, particularly where the witness is a young child." By sharp contrast, in Vas-ka's ease, the state raised Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as a theory for admission for the first time on appeal; and the court of appeals declared the disputed evidence admissible not out of deference to trial court discretion exercised in applying this rule, but rather by independently ruling as a matter of law that, despite the lack of a proper foundation, T.E.'s statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
This ruling is problematic for several reasons. When an offer of evidence presented at trial fails to comply with formal requirements set out in our evidence rules, trial judges commonly exercise broad discretion in deciding whether the offered evidence should be admitted despite its formal lack of compliance, usually basing their decisions in large part on a careful consideration of the precise facts at issue in the case at hand. Because such decisions rely heavily on case-specific factual considerations, they fall squarely within the domain of trial courts, not appellate tribunals, as demonstrated by the fact that appellate review in such cases is typically deferential. After all, an appellate court lacks the trial court's ability to observe witnesses, assess credibility, weigh competing evidence, and resolve disputed facts — all essential tools for fact-based discretion. Accordingly, when foundational facts have not been established and the trial court has never been asked to consider a theory of admissibility freshly raised on appeal, it would seem problematic for an appellate tribunal to resolve the disputed issue by exercising fact-based discretion; yet it seems equally problematic to decide the controversy as if it presented a pure issue of law.
We recognize of course that an appellate court ordinarily has broad authority to affirm a trial court's ruling on any legal theory established in the appellate record. But this rule is not absolute. By its own terms, it applies only to issues of law that find support in settled facts. It does not extend to new theories that would normally be resolved by discretionary powers traditionally reserved for trial courts — powers relying on case-specific consideration of disputed or disputable issues of fact.
The rule allowing appellate courts to affirm on any legal theory also must be tempered by the need for procedural fairness. As we have previously indicated, invoking Rule 801(d)(1)(A) for the first time on appeal raises unique concerns relating to fair* notice. Specifically, it would seem fundamentally unfair to apply a legal theory raised for the first time on- appeal if a different theory asserted by the prosecution at trial encouraged the defendant to chart a procedural course that might not have been taken if the prosecution's new legal theory had been timely asserted. The circumstances of Yas-ka's case suggest the potential for this kind of unfairness.
The prosecution ended T.E.'s direct examination and asked to have her declared unavailable without any inquiry into the alleged offense or any effort to lay a proper foundation for admitting her prior statements as prior inconsistent statements under Rule 801(d). Because T.E. had said nothing relevant and the prosecution offered no clue that it might later use her limited direct examination as a foundation to introduce her earlier out-of-court statements, Vaska unsurprisingly declined to cross-examine. The prosecution immediately moved to excuse T.E. as a witness, and the trial court formally excused her. The state then asked the superior court to declare T.E. unavailable under Rule 804(a)(3) because she lacked any relevant memory; at the same time, it asked to admit T.E.'s prior statements under the catchall exception. Despite strenuous objections by Vaska, the superior court granted the state's motions and admitted T.E.'s prior statements under the catchall exception.
On appeal, the state opted to advance a new legal theory, urging the court of appeals to hold that T.E.'s statements would have been admissible as prior inconsistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) — -a ground that the state never mentioned at trial. In accepting this theory, the court of appeals expressed the view that T.E.'s lack of memory did not deprive Vaska of a fair opportunity for cross-examination; the court then ruled that T.E.'s declarations were admissible as prior inconsistent statements.
Yet given the totality of these circumstances, it seems to us that invoking the state's new legal theory for the first time on appeal potentially exposed Vaska to unfair prejudice by undercutting tactical choices he might have made in reliance on the theory of admissibility invoked by the state at trial— the catchall exception. As set out in Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), the catchall exception applies only when (a) the declarant is unable to testify — in other words, is "unavailable" as a witness; (b) no other hearsay exception "specifically cover[s]" the proposed out-of-court statements; and (c) the statements are shown to have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" in comparison to specifically covered exceptions — in other words, trustworthiness so strong that adversarial testing through cross-examination would not benefit the defendant. In light of the catchall rule's requirements, when the superior court found T.E.'s statements admissible under this rule, it effectively determined that T.E. had shown herself to be incapable of providing any useful testimony, that her prior statements were not "specifically covered" by any other exception, and that they were so reliable that Vaska had no need to cross-examine her. In short, by accepting the state's theory of admissibility at trial and applying the catchall exception, the superior court effectively told Vaska that there was no real reason to cross-examine T.E.
By contrast, the rule applied on appeal, Evidence Rule 801(d)(l)(A)'s prior-inconsistent-statement provision, requires the declar-ant to testify and be available for meaningful cross-examination. When realistically viewed, the findings required under the state's newly raised theory flatly conflict with the superior court's express finding that T.E. was in fact not available to testify — a finding specifically requested by the state and authorized under Rule 804(a)(3). The court of appeals's conclusion that T.E. was available for meaningful cross-examination also conflicts with the trial court's finding that T.E.'s statements met the guarantee of trustworthiness required under Rule 804(b)(5) — a finding implicitly determining that cross-examination would not provide any meaningful benefit to Vaska.
To be sure, as the state now points out, a finding of unavailability under Rule 804(a)(3) does not necessarily equate to a legal determination that the witness could not have been meaningfully cross-examined in a way that would satisfy the accused's constitutional right of confrontation. But this abstract constitutional distinction begs the practical question at issue here: whether the particular manner in which the state chose to present its case at trial could have influenced Vaska's tactical choices. Here, as already mentioned, the state terminated T.E.'s direct examination at the earliest opportunity, without questioning her about any circumstances relevant to the case at hand and without making any attempt to lay a foundation for introducing her earlier declarations as prior inconsistent statements. The state then immediately asked to have T.E. declared unavailable and simultaneously asked the court to admit her out-of-court statements under the catchall exception.
At no time during the trial did the state do or say anything to suggest that it might later seek to introduce T.E.'s out-of-court statements on a basis that would authorize their admission only if T.E. actually testified and could be meaningfully cross-examined. Given that the state's chosen theory of admissibility at trial did not require T.E. to testify and, indeed, assumed that cross-examination would be unhelpful, the totality of the circumstances could easily have led Vaska's trial counsel to conclude — quite reasonably— that cross-examining her would be pointless, even though under different circumstances asserting that procedural right might have been crucial.
As the state itself recognizes, Vaska's decision to waive cross-examination at trial reflects a tactical choice. Yet despite this recognition, the state ignores the most likely tactical explanation for Vaska's choice: the state's own strategic decision to cut short T.E.'s testimony, have her declared unavailable, and ask that her earlier statements be admitted on grounds wholly unrelated to her ability to appear as a witness at trial or to be meaningfully cross-examined. Theoretically, of course, Vaska remained free to cross-examine T.E.; but as a practical matter, the state's tactical choice gave Vaska no immediate reason to conduct cross-examination, and it suggested no foreseeable reason. Indeed, it appears that the state's most likely purpose in deciding to seek admission at trial under the catchall exception, instead of on alternative grounds that would have required T.E.'s presence, was to spare T.E. from having to face the emotional trauma of cross-examination. From the state's perspective at trial, T.E. had no meaningful testimony to offer, so there was no point in initiating an ongoing dispute over her present ability to testify and be meaningfully cross-examined— a dispute that the state was bound to invite unless it relied on the catchall provision.
Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to suggest, as the dissent does, that Yaska's trial counsel had a duty to cross-examine T.E. about her prior statements to her mother, or to call her back for cross-examination, if he wanted to avoid losing Vaska's right to challenge the state's future (but then-unforeseeable) efforts to have T.E.'s statements declared admissible on new grounds. While it might be correct as an abstract legal proposition to say that T.E. was always available and could have been cross-examined, by any practical measure the proposition is hardly convincing.
In summary, when the state chooses not to offer evidence under the prior-inconsistent-statement theory at trial, fails to lay a proper foundation for admission under this theory, and relies instead on the catchall exception, its tactical choices could easily lead the accused to reasonably believe that the declarant's testimony and testimonial credibility are not at issue and that no question of inconsistency has been raised; these beliefs may in turn shape the accused's conduct at trial by persuading him that, under the circumstances, the inherent risks of cross-examining the declarant outweigh the potential benefit. If the state later invokes Rule 801(d)(1)(A) on appeal in a situation like this, we think that the foundational conditions of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) should generally be enforced because of the crucial role they can play in avoiding surprise and unfair prejudice. Considering the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we are unable to conclude that the state laid an adequate foundation for admitting T.E.'s prior statements to her mother under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
The dissenting opinion nonetheless reasons that T.E.'s out-of-court statements were alternatively admissible — and may actually have been admitted — as prior identifications under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). Some comments are in order to explain why we are unpersuaded by the dissent's thoughtful discussion of this theory.
Initially, we note that our own review of the trial transcript leaves us unconvinced that the superior court actually admitted, or even considered admitting, T.E.'s statements as evidence of prior identification. As we read the record, it seems as likely that the trial court admitted them only under the catchall exception, Rule 801(d)(1)(A). But even if we assumed that Judge Funk found T.E.'s statements admissible on this other alternative ground, his ruling would provide no occasion for this court to affirm the court of appeals's decision.
The alternative theories discussed by the dissents have never been raised by the state, addressed by Vaska's counsel, or considered by the court of appeals; they have been proposed only by the dissents. Because adversary briefing serves as the foundation of due process in an appellate forum, it would hardly seem right for this court to rely on yet another set of alternative legal grounds— grounds that the court of appeals never had an opportunity to consider and that neither party has ever recognized, let alone briefed. Absent briefing on the issue, we are in no position to decide whether T.E.'s statements were inevitably admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as prior identifications.
We granted Vaska's petition to decide whether the court of appeals correctly af firmed on the newly raised legal theory that T.E.'s statements were admissible under the prior inconsistent statement provision, and we have resolved that issue. Our decision on that narrow point does not suggest that the disputed evidence was inadmissible on other legal grounds. To the contrary, it leaves the court of appeals ample room to consider on remand any other alternative legal ground for affirming, including harmless error, so long as both parties have fair notice of the ground and an opportunity to address it, and provided that the ground finds support in the record and can be applied without unfairly altering procedural expectations formed during the trial court proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the evi-dentiary ruling of the court of appeals on the limited ground that the rationale adopted by that court was unsound. We REMAND to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including further consideration to determine whether T.E.'s statements were admissible on other legal grounds and whether improper admission of the statements would have amounted to harmless error.
CARPENETI, J., dissenting in part.
MATTHEWS, J., with whom CARPENETI, J., joins in part, dissenting.
. Vaska v. State, 74 P.3d 225, 228-30 (Alaska App.2003).
. M.V. is Vaska's daughter and T.E.'s cousin.
. Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska App.1998).
. Vaska v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 4326 (Alaska App., January 10, 2001), 2001 WL 21196, at *3-4. The court of appeals remanded for determination whether the superior court's law clerk was biased against Vaska. Vaska, 955 P.2d at 947. On remand, the superior court decided to sever the two counts. Vaska v. State, 2001 WL 21196, at *1. The petition now before us concerns only Vaska's conviction on the count charging him with abusing T.E.
. Alaska Evidence Rule 804(a)(3) defines unavailability to include "situations in which the declar-ant . establishes a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement."
. Under Alaska Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), if a declarant is unavailable as a witness, the hearsay rule does not exclude:
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Alaska appellate decisions have variously referred to this provision as the "residual exception" and "catch-all exception" to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., In re T.P., 838 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1992); In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801, 802, 804 (Alaska 1992); Cleveland v. State, 91 P.3d 965, 971 (Alaska App.2004); Hughes v. State, 56 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Alaska App.2002). We refer to it here as the catchall exception.
. Vaska, 74 P.3d at 226.
. An appellate court can affirm a correct ruling of law by a trial court, regardless of the grounds relied upon by the trial court, "if there exist independent grounds which, as a matter of law, support the trial court's conclusion." McGee v. State, 614 P.2d 800, 805-06 n. 10 (Alaska 1980).
. Vaska, 74 P.3d at 227.
. See generally Vaska, 74 P.3d 225.
. McGee, 614 P.2d at 805-06 n. 10; Stordahl v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 67 n. 16 (Alaska 1977).
. Vaska, 74 P.3d at 227.
. Id. The state's brief in the court of appeals candidly stated that "neither the state nor the trial court relied on [Rule 801(d)(1)(A)] as a basis for admitting T.E.'s out-of-court statement...."
. Cf. Dobos v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Alaska 2000) (stating that, for admission of hearsay statement under Evidence Rule 803(1), "[t]he burden is on the proponent of the evidence to establish the foundational facts necessary for the hearsay exception").
. "[Ijnconsistency is not limited to diametrically opposed answers but may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position." United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795 (8th Cir.1980) (interpreting Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A)) (citing United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 495-96 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2182, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977)); see also Richards v. State, 616 P.2d 870, 871 (Alaska 1980) ("When [the declarant] testified at trial that he had forgotten much of what he had seen that night, the tape was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.").
. See, e.g., Wassilie v. State, 57 P.3d 719, 722 (Alaska App.2002) (affirming admission under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) where elderly witness could not recall at trial statements he made to police investigating assault); Brandon v. State, 839 P.2d 400, 411-12 (Alaska App.1992) (upholding admission where witness had no memory at trial of prior statements); Van Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047, 1049-51 (Alaska App.1983) (holding feigned memory loss inconsistent with prior statement).
. A.R.E. 801 (d)( 1 )(A)(ii).
. Commentary, A.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A). The commentary for Rule 801(d)(1)(A) refers to the foundation requirement for Alaska Evidence Rule 613, which "generally requires asking the testifying witness to identify the statement after being reminded of its substance and to whom it was made, and either to admit having made the statement and explain the circumstances, or to deny it." Commentary, A.R.E. 613(b). Rule 613(b) addresses use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach the declarant.
. Id.
. If admission is sought under the alternative provided in Evidence Rule 80 l(d)(l)(A)(ii), the declarant cannot have been excused as a witness; this implies that inconsistency must be demonstrated while there is still an opportunity for the declarant to testify.
. Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 771 (5th Cir.1993).
. McMaster v. State, 512 P.2d 879, 882 (Alaska 1973).
. Commentary, A.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A).
. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988).
. A.R.E. 801 (d)(l)(A)(i). Although Rule 801 (d)(l)(A)(ii) provides an alternative route for admission in exceptional cases when an "opportunity" to deny or explain can be established because a declarant "has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action," this provision has no conceivable application here. As already mentioned, T.E. was excused and declared unavailable immediately after the state's preliminary questioning concluded. Even assuming that both parties might have remained free to recall her for purposes of laying the required foundation during the remainder of the trial, neither party had occasion to do so, because the State failed to invoke the prior inconsistent statement rule until the trial was over and Vaska filed his appeal. By then, of course, no possibility of recalling T.E. existed.
. Bodine v. State, 737 P.2d 1072 (Alaska App.1987).
. Wassilie v. State, 57 P.3d 719 (Alaska App.2002).
. Bodine, 737 P.2d at 1073.
. Id. at 1074.
. Id.
. Id.
. Wassilie, 57 P.3d at 721.
. Id. at 720.
. Id. at 721-22 (quoting McMaster, 512 P.2d at 882).
. Dissent at 1030-31.
. 512 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1973).
. Dissent at 1030-31.
. Bodine, 737 P.2d at 1074.
. Crook v. Mortenson-Neal, 727 P.2d 297, 302 (Alaska 1986) ("On appeal, we defer to [the superior court's] ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor. ."); McMaster, 512 P.2d at 882-83 ("The trial judge should exercise his discretion to see that the testimony is fairly presented to the jury.").
.McGee, 614 P.2d at 805-06 n. 10; Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 67 n. 16. The first case to follow this rule was Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 285 (Alaska 1961) (citing treatise on federal practice).
. Vaska v. State, 74 P.3d 225, 227 (Alaska App.2003).
. Id. at 229.
. Id. at 228.
. A.R.E. 804(b) (requiring unavailability under A.R.E. 804(a) for hearsay exceptions set out in A.R.E. 804(b)).
. A.R.E. 804(b)(5) (defining catchall provision to apply to "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions").
. Id.; see also Ryan v. State, 899 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska App.1995) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), for the proposition that evidence admitted under catchall exceptions must possess "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" and be "so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability").
. Evidence Rule 804(a) provides: "Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant . (3) establishes a lack of memory of the subject matter of [his] statement[.]"
. See Ryan, 899 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21, 110 S.Ct. 3139).
. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 563-64, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988).
. Notably, at Vaska's original trial, T.E. was so terrified of appearing as a witness that she hid under a table in the court building's law library and could not be convinced to come out, or even to communicate, despite repeated entreaties by the prosecuting attorney. After T.E. was unable to testify, the trial court evidently admitted her out-of-court statements under this court's opinion in In re T.P., 838 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Alaska 1992), which affirmed a trial court decision applying Rule 804(b)(5)'s catchall exception under similar circumstances.
.As the trial prosecutor acknowledged in asking the superior court to declare T.E. unavailable and admit her testimony under the catchall provision, "[W]hat I am asking to do, rather than having to — number 1, so we can determine the issue, but number 2, so it doesn't have to come up every time as — potentially as an objection is to have [T.E.] declared unavailable under [Rule] 804(a)(3)." (Emphasis added.)
.In this regard, the dissent suggests that, since Vaska never contested T.E.'s lack of memory and now characterizes T.E.'s memory loss as "virtual amnesia," there is no reason to suppose that he would have wanted to cross-examine T.E. Dissent at 1029. But this argument overlooks that Vaska's reason for not contesting T.E.'s lack of memory may well have been precisely the same as his reason for not seeking to cross-examine T.E.: given the prosecutor's reliance on the catchall exception, Vaska's counsel may simply have seen no reason to think that the state would seek to admit Olga E.'s testimony concerning T.E.'s statements on a theory of admissibility that would view T.E.'s pro forma appearance on the stand as a proper foundation for admitting her prior statements as prior inconsistent statements. The dissent further maintains that Vaska's counsel must have been aware that T.E. had "testified," because Judge Funk treated her brief appearance as testimony for purposes of admitting Dr. Burgess's report as identification evidence under A.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C). Dissent at 1026, 1032-33. But this argument assumes that Judge Funk's comments in the colloquy transcribed in the dissent's Appendix meant what the dissent says they meant and that Vaska's counsel necessarily would have understood them to have that meaning when they were made. As we explain more fully in note 54 below, neither assumption seems warranted. Moreover, even assuming that the dissent's interpretations of the colloquy in the Appendix were clearly correct, we fail to see how Vaska's counsel's willingness to forgo cross-examining T.E. about statements attributed to her and to her mother in Dr. Burgess's report shows that Vaska's counsel necessarily would have forgone the opportunity for cross-examination had the state tried to lay a timely foundation for admitting Olga E.'s testimony about what T.E. had said on the distinctly different theory that T.E.'s prior statements were prior inconsistent statements.
. Dissent at 1026-27.
. In our view, the record provides ample reason to question the dissent's reading of the superior court's ruling. First, the state never asked to admit T.E.'s prior statements to her mother under Rule 801(d)(l)(C)'s identification provision, or on any other ground besides the catchall exception — the provision that Judge Funk eventually expressly adopted.
Second, the catchall provision applies by its own terms only when an out-of-court statement is "not specifically covered" by another provision. A.R.E. 804(b)(5). It thus seems unlikely that Judge Funk would have ruled the statements admissible under both Rule 804(b)(5) and Rule 801(d)(1)(C) — at least not without clearly indicating that his ruling on the catchall exception was a backup rationale.
Third, by requiring circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those required under the specific exceptions listed in Rule 804(b)(l)-(4), the catchall provision, Rule 804(b)(5), invites courts faced with motions to admit evidence under that provision to consider the issue of trustworthiness by comparing the circumstances surrounding the statement at issue with similar circumstances specifically covered under hearsay provisions that might not strictly apply to the case at hand. Here, Judge Funk's colloquy with trial counsel addressing analogous circumstances covered by other hearsay provisions might simply reflect his understanding that Rule 804(b)(5) required him to find equivalent guarantees of reliability. This would certainly explain why Judge Funk repeatedly discussed the reliability of T.E.'s statements (see, e.g., Dissent, Appendix at 1034: "[T]here's no reason to believe any particular reasons to find that these statements are so unreliable as to be inadmissible."). Such discussion would not have been necessary if the judge had simply meant to rule that T.E.'s statements were specifically covered by the identification provision, since, unlike Rule 804(b)(5)'s provisions governing the catchall exception, Rule 801(d)(l)(C)'s provisions do not make the admission of identification evidence contingent on a finding of circumstantial reliability.
Fourth, Judge Funk had good reason to believe that Rule 801(d)(l)(C)'s identification provision might not specifically cover T.E.'s statements. The identification provision only extends to those narrow portions of a statement comprising the identification itself — it does not allow admission of accompanying statements describing the offense. See Commentary to A.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C). Furthermore, as noted by the court of appeals in Bell v. State, 716 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Alaska App.1986), a case that Judge Funk discussed in his colloquy with counsel, the identification provision could be read as being applicable only if "the declarant herself . testifies to the prior identification" — a condition that was not met here.
Fifth, it may not be textually accurate to characterize Judge Funk's statements regarding Bell and "prior identifications" as a ruling that admitted T.E.'s prior statements to her mother as identification evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(C). What Judge Funk said was that he would allow "the mother to testify as to the statements that [T.E.] made concerning identification of the defendant and/or concerning the sexual abuse." Dissent Appendix at 1034-35 (emphasis added). This merely describes what evidence Judge Funk meant to admit; it- does not say what legal ground he relied on in deciding to admit it. To view this as a ruling that admitted the disputed evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) overlooks the judge's conspicuous failure to specify that provision as the ground for his ruling. It also overlooks the judge's simultaneous reference to admitting testimony "concerning the sexual abuse"' — evidence that could not have been covered by Rule 801(d)(l)(C)'s identification provision.
Finally, the catchall exception was the only exception Judge Funk was ever asked to apply as a basis for admitting the disputed evidence. Immediately after the judge ruled that he would admit evidence of T.E.'s statements concerning identification and sexual abuse, Vaska's counsel asked to complete his argument on the point, and Judge Funk invited him to "[mjake an offer." Vaska's counsel proceeded to complete his argument, and Judge Funk returned to the one subject he had not yet addressed: the legal ground for his initial decision to admit this evidence. The judge then explicitly stated that he based his ruling on the "broad general exceptions under 804(b)(5)," the catchall provision.
In sum, we think that, when viewed as a whole, the record leaves the dissent's reading of Judge Funk's ruling arguable at best; the ruling is also amenable to an alternative reading: After thoroughly considering the catchall exception's prerequisite of circumstantial trustworthiness in light of other hearsay rules that concerned similar evidence but did not "specifically cover" Vas-ka's case, Judge Funk found that T.E.'s statements had equivalent trustworthiness to similar evidence routinely admitted under those exceptions, so he admitted her statements under the catchall exception.
. The dissent criticizes the "bottom line" of our opinion for "contemplating the possibility of a third trial in this case." Dissent at 1033. But our decision under the prior inconsistent statement rule finds support in decisions from other states reversing convictions in analogous situations. See State v. Daniels, 210 Mont. 1, 682 P.2d 173 (1984); Felix v. State, 109 Nev. 151, 849 P.2d 220 (1993), superseded on other grounds by tule as stated in Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 28 P.3d 498 (2001); State v. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d 472, 939 P.2d 697 (1997). Furthermore, the dissent's concern that our decision "contemplates" a new trial is unfounded. If the court of appeals confirms on remand that the disputed evidence was admissible as identification evidence (as the dissent contends that it is), then no new trial will be needed; the same will be true if it turns out on remand that the evidence was admissible under the catchall exception or some other alternative theory; or that its erroneous admission amounted to harmless error. And of course, if it turns out that the evidence was admitted in error and that the error was not harmless, then it is completely beside the point to consider how many prior trials Vaska has had.