Case Name: DEVON-AIRE VILLAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NO. 4, INC., a not-for-profit Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AMERICABLE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, and Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-12-17
Citations: 490 So. 2d 60
Docket Number: No. 84-675
Parties: DEVON-AIRE VILLAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NO. 4, INC., a not-for-profit Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AMERICABLE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, and Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 60–69

Head Matter:
DEVON-AIRE VILLAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NO. 4, INC., a not-for-profit Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AMERICABLE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, and Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.
No. 84-675.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 17, 1985.
Motions to Appear as Amicus Curiae and Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1986.
Keith, Mack, Lewis & Allison and Robert A. Cohen, Miami, for appellant.
Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England and Gary S. Brooks, Robert A. Ginsburg, Co. Atty., and Stephen P. Lee, Asst. Co. Atty., Miami, for appellees.
Frates, Bienstock & Sheehe and Terry S. Bienstock, Miami, and Alan D. Lash, for movants Storer Communications, Inc., Dade Cable Television of Florida, Inc. and Storer Cable TV of Florida, Inc.
Robert D. Zahner, City Atty., Coral Gables, for movant City of Coral Gables.
Catlin, Saxon, Tuttle and Evans and H. James Catlin, Jr., Miami, for movant Dynamic Cablevision of Florida, Inc.
Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
The appellant, Devon-Aire Villas Homeowners Association No. 4, Inc., (Homeowners), is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of holding and operating certain lands as set forth in a recorded plat. Without the consent of Homeowners, and ostensibly pursuant to certain Dade County ordinances, the appel-lee, Americable Associates, Ltd. (America-ble), entered upon Homeowners' lands and utilized certain easements dedicated on the plat for public utilities to install underground cable television equipment.
Homeowners sued Americable and the County for trespass. Homeowners asked that the court declare that (1) Americable is not a public utility and thus not entitled to use easements dedicated for the use of "public utilities," and (2) Section 8A-127 of the Dade County Code (pursuant to which Americable, a private entity, is licensed to use easements) is unconstitutional as depriving Homeowners of property without just compensation. Homeowners also requested that a mandatory injunction be entered requiring the removal of the cables. The trial court entered a summary judgment for Americable and the County, and Homeowners appeals.
Since the appellees concede that Section 8A-127 of the so-called Cable TV Ordinance authorizes cable television companies to use only those streets, rights-of-way and easements in which Dade County has an interest or which have already been dedicated to public use, and since it is undisputed that Americable used only platted public utility easements to install its cable television facilities, we need not concern ourselves with Homeowners' argument that the ordinance unconstitutionally gives to Americable rights to use the property of Homeowners without just compensation. , If cable television is, as Americable and the County urge, a public utility, then the cable television company may use the easement dedicated for the use of public utilities without any unlawful taking occurring; however, if cable television is not a public utility, then its use of this easement and entry upon Homeowners' land is a trespass which should have been declared and enjoined.
As will be seen, the phrase "public utility" eludes precise definition. Nonetheless, an examination of various statutory provisions and decisional law persuades us that a public utility is typically a creature of statute which is impressed with a public use, provides services generally considered essential to the society, and enjoys certain powers usually reserved to the sovereign. With these indicia in mind, we conclude that cable television is not a public utility and reverse the contrary judgment of the trial court.
I.
A.
We note at the outset that the Public Service Commission does not have jurisdiction to regulate cable television. Teleprompter v. Hawkins, 384 So.2d 648 (Fla.1980). Because, however, a public utility need not necessarily be under the auspices of the Public Service Commission, see Radio Telephone Communications v. Southeastern Telephone Company, 170 So.2d 577, 581 (Fla.1964) ("[T]he Legislature of Florida has never conferred upon the Florida [Public Service] Commission any general authority to regulate 'public utilities' "), the fact that it is not is con-cededly not dispositive of the question whether cable television is a public utility. But the fact that the Legislature, which traditionally has subjected public utilities to the jurisdiction of the Commission, has not seen fit to similarly subject cable television, strongly suggests that cable television should not be considered a public utility. As the court in Teleprompter noted:
"Community antenna television systems have never been defined as 'public utilities' by the legislature, nor is there anything in this record which would justify the conclusion that such systems are vested with the public interest; in actual fact, they may be of such character as to justify public regulation and control. That, however, is a matter for determination by the state legislature." 384 So.2d at 650.
B.
Apart from the various Florida Statutes which define certain entities as "public utilities" in the context of defining the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, the term "public utility" is also found in statutes granting public utilities the right of eminent domain — that is, statutes permitting the taking of private property for the public good. - Cable television is not given the right of eminent domain in any of these statutes.
Under the Florida Constitution, eminent domain is "an inherent attribute of sovereignty to be exercised in case of pub- lie exigency or for the public good." Daniels v. State Road Department, 170 So.2d 846, 848 (Fla.1964). See Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. A public utility granted the right of eminent domain may not exercise it absent a showing of "public use." See Clark v. Gulf Power Company, 198 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). A public use, in turn, is "one which is fixed and definite, in which the public has an interest, and the terms and manner of its enjoyment must be within the control of the state." Id. at 371. A public use must be available to all people equally, although it is not essential that the benefits of the public use be received by the whole public or even a large part of it. Higgs v. City of Fort Pierce, 118 So.2d 582 (Fla.2d DCA 1960). That the Legislature has not granted the right of eminent domain to cable television companies as it has granted that right to specified public utilities, although again not dispositive of the question whether cable television is or is not a public utility, surely suggests that it is not.
Clearly the Legislature of this State has not as of this time seen fit to declare cable television a public utility. This legislative silence speaks eloquently that cable television is, in the eyes of the Legislature, not so necessary to the functioning of a modern society and not imbued with such pub-licness that it must be regulated by a public service commission, or invested with the power of eminent domain.
II.
We turn now to the question whether cable television should be considered a public utility as that term has been defined by the courts.
In Higgs v. City of Fort Pierce, 118 So.2d 582, the court held that the defendant-city did not have to submit a proposed gas utility to a referendum vote under a charter provision that required a vote if such a public utility already existed in private hands, since the local private gas dealers did not come within the court's definition of public utility:
"To constitute a 'public utility,' the devotion to public use must be of such character that the product and service is available to the public generally and indiscriminately, or there must be the acceptance by the utility of public franchises or calling to its aid the police power of the state....
"Aside from the statutory definition, the term 'public utility' implies a public use, carrying with it the duty to serve the public and treat all persons alike, without discrimination, and it precludes the idea of service which is private in its nature, whether for the benefit and advantage of a few or of many...."
Id. at 585 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Village of Virginia Gardens v. City of Miami Springs, 171 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), this court, holding that the City of Miami Springs was not acting as a public utility when supplying water to the Village of Virginia Gardens for distribution to the village residents, and was thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, discussed the nature of a "public utility":
"[T]o fall into the class of a public utility, a business or enterprise must be impressed with a public interest and . those engaged in the conduct thereof must hold themselves out as serving or ready to serve all members of the public, who may require it, to the extent of their capacity. The nature of the service must be such that all members of the public have an enforceable right to demand it." Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
See also Department of Revenue v. Merritt Square Corporation, 334 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (citing Section 366.02, Florida Statutes, and holding that under that statute a privately owned utility supplying electricity or gas and holding itself out to serve the general public is a public utility).
While an argument might be made that cable television should "be available to the public generally," 118 So.2d at 585, and is "impressed with a public interest," 171 So.2d at 201, we do not believe that the value and necessity of cable television is so self-evident that this court should arrogantly declare this newest rage of the media world to be the equivalent of, for example, electricity and water. As the court in Teleprompter v. Hawkins observed in a different context, if cable television is so vested with the public interest as to justify public regulation and control, that "is a matter for determination by the state legislature." 384 So.2d at 650. Similarly, it seems to us that if cable television is so vested with the public interest as to give it the right to use easements on private land dedicated for public use only, the Legislature, rather than this court, should say so.
The County calls our attention to some cases in other jurisdictions wherein the courts have concluded that cable television is a public utility. However, as these cases reveal, this conclusion was reached either because the term "public utility" in the particular state statute or constitutional provision under consideration was susceptible to a construction that included cable television, see, e.g., White v. City of Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 572, 281 N.W.2d 283, 289 (1979) (where public utility defined in statute as an entity "providing gas, electricity, water, steam, telephone, sewer, or other services of a similar nature," the "informative and communicative aspects and potential" of cable television made it of a similar nature to telephone services and thus a public utility (emphasis supplied)) , ; City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp., 93 Wash.2d 567, 611 P.2d 741 (1980) (en banc) (notwithstanding that statute dealing with the conversion of electric and communication facilities to underground facilities expressly included cable television within the definition of "communication utility," cable television held not to be a public utility for purpose of statute proscribing municipality from operating a public utility without authorization), or because existing legislative pronouncements pointed decisively to the proposition that cable television was so vested with the public interest as to require a holding that it was a public utility, see Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision System, Inc., 52 A.D.2d 313, 317-18, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678 (1976) (legislative finding in enacting Article 28 of the executive law regulating and controlling cable television "that while . [cable television] operations must be subject to state oversight, they also must be protected from undue restraint and regulation so as to assure cable systems with optimum technology and maximum penetration in this state as rapidly as economically and technically feasible; that municipalities and the state would benefit from valuable educational and public services through cable television systems," leads to conclusion that cable television is public utility for purpose of using existing utility easements (brackets in original)); Crowley v. New York Telephone Co., 80 Misc.2d 570, 571, 363 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293-4 (1975) ("Article 28 of the Executive Law of the State of New York has, to all intents and purposes, established a new form of utility presided over by a commission on cable television").
Thus, the cases relied on by the County are not only distinguishable, but, more important, support our announced view that elevating cable television to the preferred status enjoyed by public utilities is a matter for the Legislature. We think it far from obvious that cable television is, at this point in time, so impressed with the public interest, or so essential to the functioning of our society, that we, as a court, should judicially declare it to be a public utility.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
BARKDULL, J., concurs.
. According to Homeowners' complaint, the corporation operates Devon-Aire Villas Section Eight, which contains 104 villas and appurtenant common elements and open spaces.
. Section 8A-127 provides in pertinent part:
"A license may be issued to a licensee, . granting the non-exclusive right, privilege and permit . to install, maintain and operate transmission and distribution' facilities and additions thereto in, under, over, along, across and upon the present and future highways, streets, alleys, rights-of-way, easements and public property in . Dade County for the purpose of transmission and distribution by cable of audio and video signals by means of electrical impulses for sale to inhabitants of said county_"
. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Storer Cable T.V. v. Summerwinds Apartments, 451 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
. We also do not concern ourselves with, and find totally without merit, Americable's argument in defense of the judgment in its favor that Homeowners is precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from bringing this action against Americable.
. E.g., Section 366.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985), defines "public utility" as an entity supplying electricity or gas to the public, and Section 366.04, Florida Statutes (1985), gives the Commission jurisdiction over such entity. Section 367.021(3), Florida Statutes (1985), defines "utility" as an entity supplying "water or sewer services to the public for compensation," and Section 367.121, Florida Statutes (1985), gives the Commission jurisdiction of this utility. Section 365.01(3) defines "public utility" as an entity "owning or operating . equipment or facilities for conveying or transmitting messages or communications by telephone or telegraph to the public for compensation." Because Chapter 365 elsewhere specifically defines "private wire" as including the "medium of . television or any other means by which the voice or electrical impulses are sent over a wire" (presumably, cable television), the omission of cable television from the definition of public utility must be taken as intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (where statute includes particular language but another does not, it is generally presumed that the disparate inclusion or exclusion is intentional). Cf. Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla.1976) (under doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where statute enumerates the thing or things on which it is to operate, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from this operation all those things not expressly mentioned); Rebich v. Burdine's and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 417 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied 424 So.2d 762 (Fla.1982) (since physicians not specifically mentioned in two-year workers' compensation statute of limitations, their payment claims not governed by that statute).
. The power of eminent domain is granted to railroad companies, see § 361.025, Fla.Stat. (1985); water works companies, see § 361.04, Fla.Stat. (1985); petroleum companies, see § 361.06, Fla.Stat. (1985); telegraph and telephone companies, see § 362.02, Fla.Stat. (1985). The power of eminent domain has also been granted to government to erect public buildings; further public education; conserve the public health, promote morals and safety of the state; aid in slum clearance projects; aid in drainage; aid in flood control; establish airports; establish parking facilities; establish public highways and bridges; preserve areas of historic interest; preserve primitive areas, parks and recreational facilities; and establish dams. See generally 21 FlaJur.2d Eminent Domain § 35-53 (1980).
. The term "public utility" is also found in a statute empowering municipalities to make expenditures for certain things considered as public utilities. Section 180.07, Florida Statutes (1985), provides:
"Public Uitilities; combination of plants or systems; pledge of revenues.—
"(1) AH such reservoirs, sewerage systems, trunk sewers, intercepting sewers, pumping stations, wells, intakes, pipelines, distribution systems, purification works, collecting systems, treatment and disposal works, airports, hospitals, jails and golf courses, and gas plants and distribution systems, whether heretofore or hereafter constructed or operated, are considered a public utility within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision for the purpose of acquiring, purchasing, owning, operating, constructing, equipping and maintaining such works."
. The White court was apparently influenced to bring cable television within the statutory definition by factual considerations unique to the case and not present here. The court noted that using the old poles of the electric company rather than building new ones "provides for an orderly layout of the required facilities in . areas so as not to require the utilization of unneeded and sometimes unsightly, poles, cables and wires." 406 Mich, at 574, 281 N.W.2d at 289-90.
. The White court held that where a constitutional amendment which made "any public utility furnishing light, heat or power" revocable at will unless approved by the voters, cable television was not a public utility under the amendment. The court also noted that it declined to expand the definition of public utility to include cable television for purposes of the revocable at will amendment, since were a cable television franchise revocable at will, Michigan might have problems attracting cable television companies, since such companies might fear the uncertainty of having their right to broadcast revoked based merely on public sentiment due to a controversial production or editorial comment. The court likewise noted the First Amendment problems that could be involved in making cable television companies subject to such a provision. The State of Florida has no such provision, and thus, this section of White has no application in the instant case.