Case Name: PEOPLE v. HAMPTON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-04-04
Citations: 176 Mich. App. 383
Docket Number: Docket No. 104190
Parties: PEOPLE v HAMPTON
Judges: Before: Maher, P.J., and Cynar and Griffin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 176
Pages: 383–389

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HAMPTON
Docket No. 104190.
Submitted January 11, 1989, at Detroit.
Decided April 4, 1989.
Robert Hampton pled guilty to a charge of larceny from a person and was sentenced to three years of probation with the first six months in the county jail, Detroit Recorder’s Court, Leonard Townsend, J. Defendant was subsequently found to have violated a condition of probation following a hearing and was sentenced to six to ten years in prison. Defendant appealed, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the probation violation hearing and sentencing, and that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. Counsel is presumed to have afforded effective assistance. This presumption can only be overcome by a showing of counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty, which failure was prejudicial to the defendant. Under either one of two different standards of review laid put in Strickland v Washington, 446 US 668 (1984), and People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 (1976), defendant in this case has failed to prove that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
2. The trial court did not err in considering charges of armed robbery which were pending against defendant at the time of sentencing for the probation violation. A trial court has wide discretion in sentencing and may consider the defendant’s other criminal activities, including those that have not resulted in conviction, where, as here, defendant is allowed a chance to refute the information.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing to the extent that the sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. The sentence was within the limits prescribed by statute and it was proper for the trial court to consider defendant’s failure to abide by the terms of his probation and his lack of rehabilitative potential.
Affirmed.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 525 et seq., 985.
Court’s right, in imposing sentence to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by defendant. 96 ALR2d 768.
Griffin, J., concurred, but wrote separately to state that the state constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel is coextensive with the federal constitutional guarantee and that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based on the state constitution or the federal constitution, are more properly reviewed under the standard laid out in Strickland v Washington, supra, which superseded the standard on which People v Garcia, supra, was partly based.
1. Criminal Law — Attorney and Client — Assistance of Counsel.
A defendant’s trial counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance to the defendant; to overcome this presumption the defendant must show that there was a failure to perform an essential duty owed by counsel to the defendant and that this failure was prejudicial to the defense.
2. Criminal Law — Sentencing.
A trial court has wide discretion in sentencing and may consider a defendant’s other criminal activity that did not result in conviction if the defendant has a chance to refute the information.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Division, Research, Training and Appeals, and Olga Agnello, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carolyn A. Blanchard, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Maher, P.J., and Cynar and Griffin, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On February 24, 1984, defendant pled guilty to a charge of larceny from a person, MCL 750.357; MSA 28.589. On July 18, 1985, defendant was sentenced to three years probation with the first six months to be spent in the county jail. On January 5, 1987, a probation violation hearing was held and defendant was found guilty of violating a condition of his probation. On Janu ary 15, 1987, defendant was sentenced to six to ten years in prison. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the probation violation hearing and at sentencing. Defendant maintains that defense counsel failed to adequately prepare for the probation violation hearing and was ineffective in failing to review the presentence report with defendant before sentencing.
Trial counsel is presumed to have afforded effective assistance. People v Reinhardt, 167 Mich App 584, 591; 423 NW2d 275 (1988). This presumption can only be overcome by a showing of counsel's failure to perform an essential duty, which failure was prejudicial to the defendant. The burden of proof is on defendant. Id.
In the present case, defendant did not sustain his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our review of the record, whether we follow Strickland v Washington, 446 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569; 419 NW2d 609 (1988), lv den 430 Mich 880 (1988); or People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 264-266; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), reh den 399 Mich 1041 (1977), we conclude that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that the trial court impermissibly considered at sentencing the fact that defendant had two charges of armed robbery pending against him. The trial court has wide discretion in sentencing and may consider defendant's other criminal activity that did not result in conviction if defendant has a chance to refute the information. People v Johnson, 164 Mich App 634, 645; 418 NW2d 117 (1987). Defendant maintains that he was not given an opportunity to refute the charges at the time of sentencing. We disagree. Our review of the record reveals that defendant was afforded allocution prior to the imposition of sentence but that defendant did not refute the charges of armed robbery. Thus, we find no error.
Defendant lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing to the extent that it should shock the conscience of this Court. We disagree. In this case, the trial court properly considered defendant's failure to abide by the court's probation orders and defendant's lack of rehabilitative potential as factors in imposing sentence. Furthermore, defendant's sentence was within the limits prescribed by statute. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing to the extent that the sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550; 339 NW2d 440 (1983).
Affirmed.