Case Name: Southern Lime & Stone Co. to use v. Baker, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1924-12-01
Citations: 281 Pa. 587
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 82
Parties: Southern Lime & Stone Co. to use v. Baker. Appellant.
Judges: Before Moschzisker, C. J., Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler and Schaerer, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 281
Pages: 587–598

Head Matter:
Southern Lime & Stone Co. to use v. Baker. Appellant.
Judgment — Warrant to confess — Promissory note — Strihing off judgment — Opening judgment.
1. Where a corporation makes and signs a promissory note to the order of themselves, and endorses and signs on the back of it a printed form of assignment, guaranty and authorization of entry of judgment, constituting a single, connected sentence, the note as a whole, is a complete, nonseverable, indivisible contract Worded in such manner that no one could properly execute it save the maker-payee, as no one else could assign or negotiate the obligation.
2. If an individual signs after the endorsement of the corporation, his signature can have no relation to the assignment of tha note, as he had no interest to assign, and if judgment is entered upon the note under the warrant, it will be stricken off as to such individual.
3. In such case, the mere fact that the assignor was the same as the maker, resulting under the printed form in the assignor’s assuming to guarantee its own payment is not sufficient to force the conclusion that one signing after the signature of the company, must of necessity have been a party to it in order to give effect to all its terms.
Chief Justice Moschzisker, and Justices Frazer and Kephart dissent on the ground that the only relief which could properly be granted would be to open the judgment.
Argued October 7, 1924.
Appeal, No. 82, Oct. T., 1924, by defendant, O. L. Baker, from order of O. P. Cambria Co., Sept. T., 1923, B. S. B. No. 103, discharging rule to strike off judgment, in case of Southern Lime & Stone Co. to use oí Union National Bank of Johnstown v. Southern Lime & Stone Co., J. C. Ogden, C. L. Baker and J. R. Bockel.
Before Moschzisker, C. J., Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler and Schaerer, JJ.
Reversed.
Rule to strike off judgment as to C. L. Baker. Before Evans, P. J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
The note, which appears on the following pages, was as follows, the signatures of the vice-president being not legible in the fac simile here printed:
Rule discharged. C. L. Baker appealed.
Error assigned was order, quoting record.
H. S. Endsley, with him Walter W. Krebs, for appellant. —
The contract on the back of the note is purely and simply an indivisible contract of assignment and guaranty of payment by the payee in the note.
Appellant’s signature on back of note was not an execution of the assignment, guaranty and power to confess judgment.
A defendant’s liability on a guaranty of another’s indebtedness cannot be established partly by parol and partly by written evidence. The whole agreement or memorandum thereof must be in writing: Morris v. Eisaman, 201 Pa. 190.
D. P. Weimer, for appellee. —
Appellant’s signature is not that of endorsement: Shaffstall v. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598; Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. 468.
The placing of appellant’s signature on the note must be construed as an execution of the printed form of assignment, guarantee and authorization to confess judgment : Consolidated Ice Mfg. Co. v. Bloomer, 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 451; Dodge v. Chessman, 10 Pa. Superior Ct. 604; Steininger v. Hoch, 39 Pa. 263; Bickford v. Cooper Co., 41 Pa. 142; Vulcanite Paving Co. v. Phila., 239 Pa. 524.
December 1, 1924:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Schaffer,
Defendant appeals from the refusal of the court below to strike from the record a judgment entered against him in pursuance of a warrant of attorney appearing on the back of a note.
From the fac simile of the note and endorsement set forth in the report, it will be seen that it was made by the Southern Lime & Stone Company to the order of themselves. So drawn, it was not an obligation to pay any one, as maker and payee were the same. To complete the instrument, the maker-payee executed the assignment, guaranty and authorization of entry of judgment on the back of it. This is a complete, non severable, indivisible contract, worded in such manner that no one could properly execute it save the payee, as no one else could assign or negotiate the obligation. It is all embraced in a single connected sentence and when signed, as it was by the payee, was complete. The signatures of appellant and the two others who signed with him, as appears by the paper itself, had and could have had no relation to the assignment of the note, as they had no interest in it to assign.
It is argued by appellee that appellant and the others who signed with him must be deemed parties to the assignment, and that this, at least so far as the undertaking of guaranty is concerned, is conclusively shown, that it would be meaningless, or at least ineffective, if executed only by the Southern Lime & Stone Company, who in that event would be guaranteeing its own payment. It should be remembered, however, that the note is on a printed form, prepared for the usual situation where maker and payee are different persons. The printed endorsement or assignment was intended to cause the assignor-payee to guarantee payment. Merely because there is a different situation in that the assignor is the same as the maker, resulting under the printed form in the assignor's assuming to guarantee its own payment, is not sufficient to force the conclusion that the three others whose names appear below the assignment must, of necessity, be parties to it, in order to give effect to all its terms. We are of opinion that the instrument shows there was no warrant authorizing the entry of judgment against appellant; his motion to strike it off should, therefore, have prevailed: Stewart v. Lawson, 181 Pa. 549; Saupp v. Streit, 258 Pa. 211; Ahern v. Standard Realty Co., 267 Pa. 404. We do not at this time pass upon the question whether the body of the note and the assignment taken together make it a negotiable instrument.
The decree of the court below is reversed and it is directed to strike the judgment against appellant, C. L. Baker, from the record, the costs to abide any future proceedings.