Case Name: OLIVER PORTER, Appellant, v. AUGUSTUS W. KINGSBURY and CHARLES O. NEWTON, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1878-01
Citations: 20 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 33
Docket Number: 
Parties: OLIVER PORTER, Appellant, v. AUGUSTUS W. KINGSBURY and CHARLES O. NEWTON, Respondents.
Judges: Present — Learned, P. L, Boardman and Sawyer, JJ.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 20
Pages: 33–38

Head Matter:
OLIVER PORTER, Appellant, v. AUGUSTUS W. KINGSBURY and CHARLES O. NEWTON, Respondents.
Pendency of formes' action — -plea of — relates to time of commencement of suit in which it is interposed,.
On July 7,1875, the plaintiff herein commenced an action against the defendants upon an undertaking given by them. A demurrer interposed by them was overruled at the Special Term, but sustained upon an appeal to the General Term; and on January 3, 1876, judgment was entered therein dismissing the complaint with costs. On February 17, 1876, this action was commenced by the same plaintiff against the same defendants upon the same cause of action. March 11, 1876, the plaintiff appealed, in the first action, from the decision of the General Term to the Court of Appeals, March seventeenth the defendants served an answer in this action, setting up as a defense that another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.’'
Held, that the plea referred to the time of the commencement of the action; that, at that time, the former action had been terminated by a final judgment upon the demurrer, and was no longer pending, and that the plea should, therefore, be overruled. (Boardman, J, dissenting.)
Semble, that the defendant’s remedy was to apply for a stay of proceedings in this action, during the pendency of the appeal in the first.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, entered upon the trial of this action by the court, without a jury.
On the 7th of July, 1875, plaintiff Porter commenced an action upon an undertaking executed by the defendants Kingsbury and Newton, to recover the amount alleged to be due thereon. To that complaint defendants demurred on the grounds:
I. That the complaint does not state facts .sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
II. That the court has no jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants or the subject of the action.
The issue of law, thus joined, was tried at the Cortland Special Term, September, 1875. The demurrer was overruled and defendants given leave to answer. Defendants appealed to the General Term from the order overruling the demurrer. At November term, 1875, the order of the Special Term overruling the demurrer was reversed, and the demurrer sustained, and the complaint dismissed with costs. (5 Hun, 597.) Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint with costs, January 8, 1876.
February 17, 1876, this present action was commenced upon the same undertaking set forth in the complaint in the action commenced July 7, 1875. After the commencement of this present action, viz., March 11, 1876, Porter appealed to the Court of Appeals, in the first action, from the judgment entered January 3, 1876, dismissing the complaint with costs, and gave the undertaking provided for by section 334 of the Code. March 17, 1876, the defendants answered, in this present action, setting up: “ That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action as that stated in the complaint in this action” and that an appeal had been taken by the plaintiff therein.
Upon the trial the court found among other things, as follows, viz: “ the subject-matter sought to be litigated in this action is the identical subject-matter being litigated in the aforesaid action between the same parties, commenced July 7, 1875, and now pending and undetermined in the Court of Appeals.”
O. Porter, for the' appellant.
The appeal brought March 11, 1876, is not good as a plea in abatement. An appeal from a final judgment at common law is the commencement of a new- suit and not the continuation of an old one. It. is so held in the following cases: Corml/y v. McIntosh (22 Barb., 271), Bice v. Floyd (1 Comst., 608), Enos v. Thomas (5 How., 361-366), Pratt v. Allen 19 How., 450-456). The appeal may be brought and prosecuted by a new attorney without substitution. (Pratt v. Allen, 19 How., 450-456; McLaren v. Charrier, 5 Paige, 530; Fernno v. Dickinson, 4 Henio, 84.) At the time this present action was commenced, a right of action had accrued against the defendants upon the undertaking, and that right of action is not divested by the appeal, taken after the commencement of this action, from the final judgment dismissing the complaint in a prior action, upon the ground that it did not state facts constituting a cause of action. (Bwrall v. Yanderbilt, 6 Abb., 70, 73; Bowman v. Cornell, 39 Barb., 69.) This defense arose after the action was commenced. (Curtis v. Cobb, 8 Johns., 470, 471; Lowry v. Lcmrence, 1 Caines R., 69-71; Jenkins v. Pepoon, 2 Johns. Cases, 312.)
Waters & Knox, for the respondents.
The subject-matter is identical, as both actions are founded upon the same undertaking to recover the same amount upon the same promise and against the same parties. The former action is pending while the appeal is pending. (4 Denio, 84; 7 Wend., 434; 21 id., 270; 25 N. Y., 485; 8 How., 140; 12 Abb., 247; 2 Duer, 611.) The pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is a defense, and the objection may be taken by demurrer if it appear on the face of the complaint (Code, § 144), and by answer if it do not appear on the face of the complaint. (Code, § 147; 16 Barb., 461; Gould’s PL, chap. 5, § 122, p. 283; 14 Ább. Pr. R., 206 ; 9 How., 228; 2 Duer, 611; 9 Paige, 296; 13 Barb., 183 ; 17 How., 69.)

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
The plea of. another action pending, was an allegation that such other action was pending at the time when the action was commenced in which the plea was put in. So distinctly did the plea have reference to the time of the commencement of the action in which it was pleaded, that it was not nece'ssary to aver, that the former action was still pending at the time when the plea was pleaded, although it was customary to aver this. (1 Chitt. Pl., 454, note 2.) This matter was discussed at some length in Commonwealth v. Churchill (5 Mass., 174), where an old case is cited at length from the year books. And in the Massachusetts case it was held that where a defendant pleaded the pendency of a former action, and there was a replication that since the plea pleaded the plaintiff in the former action had become nonsuit, the replication was bad. The court say that it must appear that the first writ was pending when the second was purchased.
Now when this present action was commenced the former action had been terminated by a judgment for the defendant upon the demurrer. This was a final judgment, and the action was no longer pending. "When, therefore, this present action was commenced there was no other pending for the same cause.
It is true that after this action had been commenced the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals from the judgment in the former action. And it may be asked, what was the remedy of the defendant ? It seems to me that he should have applied for a stay of proceedings in this action during the appeal in the former. In that case, if the former judgment should be affirmed (as we were informed on the argument that it had been), the present action could have proceeded. If it had been reversed, the court could have perpetually stayed proceedings in this present action.
But now the defendant has pleaded in bar the pendency of the former action, which was not pending when this action was commenced, and which (as above stated) is now finally disposed of, and the plaintiff is defeated both in this and in the former action, without having been heard on the merits.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.