Case Name: Iva H. LEONARD, Appellant, v. NAT HARRISON ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1960-08-10
Citations: 122 So. 2d 432
Docket Number: No. 1392
Parties: Iva H. LEONARD, Appellant, v. NAT HARRISON ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee.
Judges: ALLEN, C. J., and LOVE, WM. K., Associate Judge, concur in the order of reversal but do not concur in the opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 122
Pages: 432–445

Head Matter:
Iva H. LEONARD, Appellant, v. NAT HARRISON ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee.
No. 1392.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
Aug. 10, 1960.
Frederick E. Hollingsworth of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
W. C. Owen, Jr., of Miller, Cone, Owen, Wagner & Nugent, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHANNON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment consequent upon the granting of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff-appellant's amended complaint.
The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was a tenant in lawful possession of certain premises and that defendant wrongfully, unlawfully and without authority or the consent of the plaintiff drove a truck upon the premises of the plaintiff, and as a direct and proximate result of the wrongful breaking and entering by the defendant the steps of the plaintiff were damaged. Also in the same count of the amended complaint the plaintiff alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the wrongful breaking and entering by the defendant, plaintiff subsequently fell and sustained great bodily injury. This occurred when plaintiff attempted to use the steps some nine days after defendant's entry upon the land.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, saying in part:
" [N]ine days elapsed, within which the plaintiff could observe and could use the broken steps in question, and therefore the effect of the direct invasion was broken, and the cause of action is trespass on the case, to which the defense of contributory negligence is available.
The plaintiff has posed two questions as follows:
1. Does the amended complaint contain sufficient allegations to state a cause of action?
2. Could the plaintiff claim damages for personal injuries in an action for trespass or was she required to bring separate action of trespass on the case to recover for her personal injuries?
The defendant in its brief has conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages for the injury to the steps and also has conceded that if the personal injuries received by the plaintiff are a direct and immediate result of the trespass they can be brought in the same action of trespass. But, the defendant argues, notwithstanding this, the defense of contributory negligence is still available as to those injuries and resulting damages which lie outside of the classical common law definition of "trespass", namely, those that are indirect and consequential. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that this being an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the theory of negligence is not involved.
Historically the roots of trespass were criminal and punitive, rather than compensatory. As the law developed in time this became a sort of intentional tort — but intentional does not have its usual meaning here, as the intentional element can be implied. Thus, in reality, negligent acts of a defendant will support trespass, but the word, negligence, is not used. By avoiding use of the word, negligence, the doctrine of contributory negligence is similarly banned. As Justice Sebring stated for the Supreme Court in the case of Harris v. Baden, 1944, 154 Fla. 373, 17 So.2d 608, 612:
"At the common law, every entry upon another's land, except by consent, was deemed a trespass for which satisfaction would lie.
Thus, in an action for trespass, the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages on proof of entry without consent. Both parties agree to this point, and the issue here is the personal injuries which plaintiff alleges are immediate and direct. Whether on proof the plaintiff can sustain her allegations is a question that neither this court nor the trial court can determine at this time.
The case of St. Petersburg Coco-Cola Bottling Company v. Cuccinello, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 670, definitely determines that contributory negligence is not a proper defense to trespass. In that case recovery was allowed in a complaint of trespass quare clausum fregit for injuries to a child struck by the defendant's truck while trespassing on the premises owned by the plaintiff's father. The court had this to say, at page 672:
"The second plea alleges simple contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an action for trespass. H* ^ »
The amended complaint, here, alleges that the injury to the plaintiff was a direct and proximate result of the wrongful breaking and entering by the defendant. The truth of this allegation involves a factual determination, and depends upon the testimony. If the injury was, in fact, direct and immediate, it is a trespass; but on the other hand, if it is consequential or collateral it will be trespass on the case. While nine days may not seem, on its face, to be either direct or immediate, there is this question of proof, and we must conclude that the trial court was in error in sustaining the motion to dismiss.
Since the distinction between "immediate" and "consequential" will undoubtedly be important in further proceedings in this case, we may note in passing how this matter is treated in Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Grat. 151, 45 Va. 151, 154:
" 'The terms "immediate" and "consequential" should be understood, not in reference to the, time which the act occupies, or the space through which it passes, or the place from which it is begun, or the intention with which it is done, or the instrument or agent employed, or the lawfulness or unlawfulness of .the act; but in reference to the progress and termination of the act, to its being done on the one hand, and its having been done on the other. If the injury is inflicted by the act at any moment of its progress, from the commencement to the termination thereof, then the injury is direct or immediate; but if it arises after the act has been completed, though occasioned by the act, then it is consequential or collateral, or, more exactly, a collateral consequence.' "
Reversed.
ALLEN, C. J., and LOVE, WM. K., Associate Judge, concur in the order of reversal but do not concur in the opinion.