Case Name: J. W. Turner v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-10-03
Citations: 95 Tex. Crim. 593
Docket Number: No. 7076
Parties: J. W. Turner v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 593–596

Head Matter:
J. W. Turner v. The State.
No. 7076.
Decided October 3, 1923.
Rehearing denied November 7, 1923.
1. —Transporting Intoxicating Liquor — Sufficiency of the Evidence.
The contention that it was incumbent upon the State to prove that the liquor was transported for sale is unsound, and the evidence being sufficient to support the conviction, there is no reversible error.
2. —Same—Per Cent of Alcohol — Indictment.
Where the indictment contained an averment that the liquor was whisky and intoxicating it was not necessary to allege that it contained more thane one per cent of alcohol. Following Estell v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 481.
3. —Same—Search and Seizure — Evidence.
The fact that a search of appellant’s automobile was made without a search warrant was not an impediment to prove by the officer that he found the whisky in the car. Fallowing Welchek v. State, 93 Texas Crim. Rep., 271.
4. —Same—Evidence—Transporting Whisky — Harmless Error.
The fact that defendant had stated that he had sold corn whisky was admissible under the charge of transporting whisky, there being no defensive matter introduced, and the minimum punishment assessed, the same was at the most harmless error.
5. —Same—Conduct of Defendant — Practice in Trial Court.
Where defendant made threatening gestures towards the State’s witness, while the latter was testifying, there was no error on the part of the court to reprimand the witness.
6; — Same—Charge of Court — Words and Phrases — Weight of Evidence.
Where the court instructed the jury that the burden was on the State to prove that defendant unlawfully and knowingly transported intoxicating liquor, and the jury called upon the court in writing for an explanation of the word knowingly, it not having been used in the indictment, and the court instructed them that they must decide it as any other issue in the ease, etc., there is no reversible error, and the same was not on the weight of the evidence.
7. — Same—Rehearing—Rule Stated — No Injury to Defendant.
Even if an error is committed during the trial of a case, it does not and should not call for a reversal unless it was such that the court may say from the record it injured accused, or was of such character that it may have done so, and the question raised may he justly disposed of under this rule, and the fact, that defendant declared that he did sell corn whisky, etc., when he was charged with transporting it, could not possibly have injured him in the instant case.
Appeal from tbe District Court of Randall. Tried below before tbe Honorable Henry S. Bisbop.
Appeal from a conviction of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor; penalty, one year imprisonment in tbe penitentiary.
Tbe opinion states tbe case.
E. T. Miller and Stone & Guleke for appellant.
On question of reprimanding counsel, Venable v. State, 207 S. W. Rep., 530.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, Presiding Judge.
— Conviction is for tbe unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in tbe penitentiary for one year.
Tbe evidence reveals tbe fact that appellant was carrying in bis automobile a gallon of corn whisky. No evidence was introduced on behalf of tbe appellant.
Tbe contention that it was incumbent upon the State to prove that tbe liquor was transported for sale is unsound. See Stringer v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 46, 241 S. W. Rep., 159; Crowley v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 103, 242 S. W. Rep., 472.
Tbe indictment contained an averment that tbe liquor was whisky and that it was intoxicating. An .additional averment that it contained more than one per cent of alcohol was unnecessary. See Estell v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 481, 240 S. W. Rep., 913.
Tbe fact that a search of appellant's automobile was made without a search-warrant was not an impediment to proof by the officer who made tbe search that he found tbe whisky in the car. See Welchek v. State, 93 Texas Crim. Rep., 271, 247 S. W. Rep., 524.
Complaint is made of the receipt of testimony to tbe effect that appellant bad stated that be bad sold corn whisky. Tbe proof being conclusive and uncontroverted that be transported a gallon of corn whisky, and there being no defensive matter introduced and tbe minimum punishment having been assessed, tbe admission of the evidence was apparently harmless.
While a State witness was testifying, appellant made threatening gestures towards him, and the judge admonished appellant to keep his hand down and cease making demonstrations. There is some conflict between the bill and the qualification, .but the latter prevails. Under the facts, the reprimand seems to have been justified. Cyc. of Law & Proc., Vol. 12, p. 538; Corpus Juris, Vol. 16, p. 829, Secs. 2095-2100.
The court,' in the second paragraph of his main charge, instructed the jury that the burden was upon the State to prove by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant ' ' did unlawfully and knowingly transport intoxicating liquors. ' '
After retirement, the jury submitted to the court, in writing, the following question:
•"The word 'knowingly' in the second part of the Court's charge is causing much dispute and disagreement in the jury room. We note that this word does not appear in the indictment.
"Must we give this word serious consideration and look for real evidence to support this particular portion of the Court's charge?
"Perhaps you cannot, or dare not answer, however, we would appreciate what explanation you may be permitted to give us on Clause II of the Court's charge."
The Court made the following reply:
"In determining whether or not an act was knowingly done, the jury may, in their discretion, as in determining any other issue in the case, consider all the facts and circumstances, if any, in evidence. ' '
This is criticized as fieing upon the weight of the evidence. We think the complaint is without merit. See Code of Crim. Proc., Art. 754, Vernon's Tex. Crim. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 567;; Benavides v. State, 31 Texas Crim. App., 173; 37 Amer. Dec., 799.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.