Case Name: Lindsey J. AUCOIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert C. HANSON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1968-02-28
Citations: 207 So. 2d 834
Docket Number: No. 2255
Parties: Lindsey J. AUCOIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert C. HANSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, HOOD, and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 207
Pages: 834–841

Head Matter:
Lindsey J. AUCOIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert C. HANSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2255.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Feb. 28, 1968.
Rehearing Denied March 25, 1968.
Kenneth Boagni, Jr., Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.
Kearney Tate, Eunice, for plaintiff-appel-lee.
Before FRUGÉ, HOOD, and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
FRUGÉ, Judge.
This is an action in redhibition in which the plaintiff, Lindsey Aucoin, seeks the recovery of the purchase price of a thoroughbred mare, which was sold to him by the defendant, Herbert Hanson. The defendant was a resident of Mississippi whose only relevant transactions and contacts with this state were his horse dealings.
Defendant was served with process via certified mail in Mississippi. He then made a special appearance for the purpose of excepting to the court's jurisdiction "ratione materiae" and "ratione personae". The trial judge received evidence on this issue and subsequently overruled the objections filed by the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant answered the plaintiff's petition, a trial was had on the merits, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $499.99.
A suspensive appeal was sought by the defendant, limited to the question of personal jurisdiction over him; and therefore, our further discussions will be limited to the facts and issues relevant only to the question of jurisdiction.
The determination of this case rests upon the interpretation of the Louisiana "long-arm" statute, R.S. 13:3201 and 3202, which read in part:
§ 3201: PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to cause of action arising from the nonresident's
(a) transacting any business in this state;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
§ 3202:
"When personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is based solely upon R.S. 13:3201, only a cause of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated therein may be asserted against him."
The design of the Louisiana long-arm statute was to reap the fullest benefits from United States Supreme Court cases in which the due process requirements under the Federal Constitution have been relaxed, as such pertain to personal jurisdiction in civil suits. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The intent of the long-arm statute was to provide the Louisiana resident with maximum protection of Louisiana courts from injury occasioned him through the acts or omissions of a non-resident when that non-resident has "minimal contacts" with this state. As stated by the late Henry G. McMahon in his article, Louisiana Legislation Of 1964 — Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 25 La.L. Rev. 28, 32 (1965):
"With the adoption of the Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Statute, it is believed that the courts of Louisiana now possess all of the jurisdiction in personam over all types of non-residents permitted by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."
The question of the applicability of R.S. 13:3201 is basically an issue of fact, the determination of which must rest upon the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. See Home Gas and Fuel Company v. Mississippi Tank Company, 143 So.2d 641 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1962).
The revelant facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
The defendant, Mr. Hanson, raised and raced horses. He is a resident of Mississippi and has no horses or other property in Louisiana. He has been a member of the Louisiana Thoroughbred Breeders Association. He has purchased horses from Louisiana on prior occasions; in fact, the thoroughbred mare in consideration was originally purchased by him from a Louisiana owner. He was issued an owners' license by the Louisiana State Racing Commission. He has been consistently racing his horses in Louisiana at the Fair Grounds in New Orleans and at Evengeline Downs in Lafayette.
Plaintiff was in the market for a thoroughbred mare for breeding purposes. In Eunice he met a Mr. Lee Guillory, who represented himself as being a horse trainer and who further stated that he had trained horses for the defendant, Mr. Hanson. During their conversation Mr. Guillory volunteered the information that Mr. Hanson had some mares and that he wanted to sell a particular one. Mr. Guillory quoted plaintiff a price which plaintiff felt was too high and then Mr. Guillory returned to Eunice about a week later and told plaintiff that defendant had another mare which he would sell for $500.00.
As a result of these transactions through Mr. Guillory, from his home in Eunice, plaintiff telephoned defendant and talked with him concerning the purchase of this particular mare. Plaintiff did not recall whether he had one or two long distance conversations with Mr. Hanson. But he did testify that all the particulars of the agreement with Mr. Hanson were agreed upon over the telephone. The only reservation made by the plaintiff from the conversations with defendant was that he would have no obligation to purchase the horse if it was not in good physical condition and as represented by defendant in his telephone conversation with plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed that he would pick up the horse himself; and so he drove to Mississippi with a trailer, looked at the mare, tendered a check for $400.00, and brought the horse back to Eunice. The agreement as to the price of the mare was that were the mare with colt at the time of purchase, the price was to be $500.00, and should the mare not be with colt at the time of the purchase, the price of the mare would be $400.00. Plaintiff paid $400.00 in Mississippi, and brought the mare back to Eunice. Upon returning to Eunice, plaintiff was to have the mare inspected to determine whether or not she was with colt. This the plaintiff did with a preliminary inspection by a veterinarian, the result of which indicated that the mare was with colt. Therefore, plaintiff sent the defendant a check for $100.00 pursuant to their agreement. Subsequently, it was determined that the mare was without colt at the time, which discovery resulted in a thorough examination of the mare. From this examination it not only appeared that the mare was without colt, but that the mare was incapable of bearing, due to injuries to her reproductive organs. Plaintiff then notified defendant of the fact that he intended to return the horse and requested recision of the sale and return of the $500.00 he had paid for that mare. Upon receiving no reply from the defendant, plaintiff filed this suit for recision of the sale in the city court of Eunice.
The trial court found that defendant had sufficient business contacts with this State to render him subject to R.S. 13:3201 (a). This was based upon the fact that defendant conducted substantial horse dealings in Louisiana and upon the trial court's finding that Mr. Guillory was a horse trainer for the defendant and that Mr. Guillory conducted preliminary negotiations with plaintiff in defendant's behalf in Louisiana.
The defendant-appellant strongly urges that this latter finding was error on the part of the trial court because the records disclosed that Mr. Guillory was not working for the plaintiff at the time of the transactions in question here. But it is not essential to the existence of an agency relation pertaining to a particular object for the agent to be an employee of the principal or for the agent to receive compensation for his services.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Guillory was acting in behalf of or as an agent of defendant pertaining to this particular transaction as evidenced from the facts given above. Thus, we are unable to say that the trial court's conclusion was manifestly erroneous, notwithstanding that defendant denied even knowing Mr. Guillory in his answers to written interrogatories submitted to him.
Defendant-appellant urges that because the contract in question here was perfected in Mississippi, and because plaintiff brought the horse into Louisiana himself, Louisiana could not acquire personal jurisdiction over him.
The record supports the proposition that the agreement here in question was perfected in all significant regards in a telephone conversation between Mr. Hanson in Mississippi, and Mr. Aucoin in Louisiana. It is impossible to determine which party made the final acceptance of the terms of the other; nor do we feel that determination to be essential. The contract appears to be as much a "Louisiana contract" as it is a "Mississippi contract". The initial preliminary negotiations occurred in this state and the final payment on the contract was mailed from this state. Further, the object of the contract was intended for use in Louisiana. Concededly, the state of Mississippi also has substantial contacts with the transactions; but this is not the question before us.
This argument appears to have more significance in determining if § 3201 (b) can apply, which section gives this state jurisdiction as a result of defendant's "contracting to supply services or things in this state." But since we have found § 3201(a) to apply, it is unnecessary for us to decide if § 3201(b) might also apply so as to give our courts jurisdiction.
Appellant further argues that this sale was but an isolated transaction and did not relate to defendant's prior dealings with horses in Louisiana. We find it unnecessary, however, under the long-arm statute, for the particular transaction creating the cause of action in favor of plaintiff to be a direct and immediate result of defendant's business transactions in this state, so long as his prior business activities are related to and are of the same general nature as the one out of which plaintiff's claim arises. In Home Gas and Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 143 So.2d 641 (La.App. 3rd Cir,, 1962), we found jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation, based upon prior solicitation in this state, as to a contract which did not directly arise out of that corporation's solicitations or activities in this state. Also appropriate to the instant case is language quoted in that case at page 645:
"The evidence makes it clear that the Mississippi Tank Company, Inc., has on occasion, and through its agents and representatives, transacted business in the State of Louisiana. However, it is also established by the evidence that the tank involved in this suit was ordered, manufactured, and delivered as set forth in the allegations of the exception, that is to say, without any contract whatever with the State of Louisiana beyond the fact that it was ordered in a telephone call from Louisiana to Hattiesburg, Mississippi."
Compare Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Company, 170 So.2d 518 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1965) and cases discussed therein.
For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that the defendant was engaged in transacting some business in the State of Louisiana relating to the dealings of horses and, specifically, preliminary transactions pertaining to the sale of the mare involved in this case. Therefore, we find that jurisdiction in personam was properly obtained under the provision R.S. 13:3201 (a).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at the defendant-appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
. Although appeal bond was for the purpose of a suspensive appeal and although a suspensive appeal was granted by the trial judge, the amount of the appeal bond was only $500.00. The amount of the judgment had not been deposited into the registry of the court, and therefore, under C.C.P. Art. 2124 the bond for a sus-pensive appeal must be in the amount of one and one-half times the award made by the trial court in its judgment. The trial court has no discretion in such matters, and therefore, had the defendant desired a suspensive appeal, it would have been necessary for him to supply bond in the sum of $750.00, rather than $500.00, as was done here. Although the appeal cannot be deemed as a suspensive appeal, it remains valid as a devolutive appeal, and will be treated as such.
. In order for § 3201(a) to apply it is probably necessary that defendant or his agent be present in Louisiana while transacting that business relative. to which the cause of action arises. For § 3201(b) to apply, the contract may be perfected outside this state, but the object of the contract must be one which somehow acquires situs in Louisiana — i. e., sent into this state, or supplied within this state. See generally Comment, Jurisdiction In Personam over Contracts With Nonresidents, 26 La.L.Rev. 372 (1966); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents—The Louisiana "Long-Arm" Statute, 40 Tu.L.Rev. 366 (1966).