Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v. Clarence J. Ressler, Jr., Respondent-Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1966-03-31
Citations: 17 N.Y.2d 174
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v. Clarence J. Ressler, Jr., Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 174–185

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v. Clarence J. Ressler, Jr., Respondent-Appellant.
Argued January 19, 1966;
decided March 31, 1966.
M. Andrew Dwyer, Jr., District Attorney (Donald J. Shanley of counsel), for appellant-respondent.
I. The Appellate Division erred in reversing the judgment of conviction since the grounds upon which said reversal was based had not been preserved for review by objection or exception in the trial court. (People v. Sanchez, 15 N Y 2d 387; People v. Donovan, 13 N Y 2d 148; People v. Failla, 14 N Y 2d 178; People v. Gunner, 15 N Y 2d 226; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368; People v. Huson, 187 N. Y. 97; People v. Sherlock, 166 N. Y. 180; People v. Steinmetz, 240 N. Y. 411; People v. Cohen, 5 N Y 2d 282; People v. Friola, 11 N Y 2d 157; People v. Rossi, 11 N Y 2d 379.) II. Inasmuch as Sacks was not an attorney, the alleged denial of access was at most an element bearing on the voluntariness of the confession. (People v. Hocking, 15 N Y 2d 973; People v. Huntley, 15 N Y 2d 72.) III. Even if Sacks be regarded as an attorney, still there was no denial of access herein so as to require a reversal of the judgment of conviction. IV. The indictment should not be dismissed. (People v. Howell, 3 A D 2d 153, 3 N Y 2d 672; People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395; People v. Eckert, 2 N Y 2d 126; People v. Melski, 10 N Y 2d 78; People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191; People v. Caminito, 3 N Y 2d 596; People v. Peetz, 7 N Y 2d 147.) V. The retrial of defendant would not constitute double jeopardy. (People v. Ercole, 4 N Y 2d 617.) VI. It cannot be said that as a matter of law the People failed to establish the guilt of defendant. (People v. Boas, 92 N. Y. 560 ; People v. Jelke, 1 N Y 2d 321.) VII. The issue of whether the death weapon can be admitted in evidence irpon the retrial of this action is not before this court. (People v. Failla, 14 N Y 2d 178.) VIII. The issue of whether or not the statement of defendant was exculpatory was for the jury to determine.
Henry Mark Holzer, Frank A. Tate, Jr., Franklin P. Gavin, Phyllis Tate Holzer and Albert L. Richter for respondent-appellant.
I. Under Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U. S. 478), and its counterpart New York cases, Bessler was denied the assistance of counsel who had been made available for him, and the flagrant deception by the police of such counsel in his efforts to represent Bessler constituted fundamental unfairness. Therefore, all statements thereafter made by Bessler were properly excluded by the Appellate Division. (People v. Di Biasi, 7 N Y 2d 544; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 314; People v. Waterman, 9 N Y 2d 561; People v. Noble, 9 N Y 2d 571; People v. Meyer, 11 N Y 2d 162; People v. Donovan, 13 N Y 2d 148; Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433; People v. Failla, 14 N Y 2d 178; People v. Stanley, 15 N Y 2d 30; People v. Gunner, 15 N Y 2d 226; People v. Sanchez, 15 N Y 2d 387; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1.) II. As soon as Bessler was cast in the role of an accused, and his lawyer had called on the telephone, the police had the duty to inform him of his absolute constitutional rights to remain silent and to obtain counsel. Since the police did neither, all statements thereafter made by Bessler were properly excluded by the Appellate Division. (Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437.) III. Contrary to the People’s assertion, the denial of counsel grounds upon'which the Appellate Division based its reversal was properly pre served for review. (People v. Huson, 187 N. Y. 97; People v. Sherlock, 166 N. Y. 180; People v. Steinmetz, 240 N. Y. 411; People v. Cohen, 5 N Y 2d 282; People v. Friola, 11 N Y 2d 157; People v. Rossi, 11 N Y 2d 379; People v. Boddie, 22 A D 2d 926; People v. Coffey, 11 N Y 2d 142; People v. Bradner, 107 N. Y. 1; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N. Y. 480; People v. McLucas, 15 N Y 2d 167; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; People v. Miles, 289 N. Y. 360; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1; People v. Laverne, 14 N Y 2d 304.) IV. If the Appellate Division is affirmed and Kessler’s confession remains inadmissible, instead of Kessler being tried again, the indictment should be dismissed. (People v. Peetz, 7 N Y 2d 147; People v. Howell, 3 N Y 2d 672; People v. Eckert, 2 N Y 2d 126; People v. Daghita, 299 N. Y. 194; People v. Melski, 10 N Y 2d 78; People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191; Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471; People v. Rodriguez, 11 N Y 2d 279; People v. Caminito, 3 N Y 2d 596, 357 U. S. 905.) V. A trial pursuant to the original indictment would subject Kessler to double jeopardy (and cruel and unusual punishment). (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660; United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844; Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71.) VI. As a matter of law, the People failed to prove defendant guilty of first degree manslaughter. (People v. D’Andrea, 26 Misc 2d 95; People v. Peetz, 7 N Y 2d 147; People v. Lewis, 282 App. Div. 267; People v. Nicoll, 3 A D 2d 64; People v. Heineman, 211 N. Y. 475; People v. Walker, 296 N. Y. 740; People v. Weiner, 211 N. Y. 469; People v. Patterson, 21 A D 2d 356; People v. Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10.) VII. If defendant’s confession remains inadmissible and a new trial is ordered instead of a dismissal of the indictment, the gun, all evidence by Mrs. Kessler concerning her conversations with her husband before she left for Slick’s apartment, and all occurrences with her husband after the shot was fired must be excluded from that new trial. VIII. Even if the Appellate Division is reversed and Kessler’s confession is admitted, the indictment should still be dismissed. (People v. Nitzberg, 289 N. Y. 523.) IX. Even if the Appellate Division is reversed and Kessler’s confession is admitted, but this court does not dismiss the indictment, Ressler is still entitled to a new trial. If the so-called ‘ ‘ confession ’ ’ was really an exculpatory statement, the trial court’s repeated references to it as a “confession” constituted reversible error. (People v. Bretagna, 298 N. Y. 323; People v. Harris, 306 N. Y. 345; People v. Kingston, 8 N Y 2d 384.) X. When the District Attorney asked one of the defense witnesses a question about Ressler’s prior criminal activities, reversible error-was committed. (People v. Jackson, 10 N Y 2d 510.) XI. When the District Attorney, in his summation, characterized one of the four defense witnesses as having told a “ contemptible ” story, reversible error was committed. (People v. Lombard, 4 A D 2d 666; People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542.) XII. Since Ressler’s written statement was in the form of an affidavit and sworn to, its use violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (People v. Foley, 8 N Y 2d 153; People v. Shenandoah, 9 N Y 2d 75; People v. Oakley, 9 N Y 2d 656; People v. Warner, 9 N Y 2d 670; People v. Randall, 9 N Y 2d 413.) XIII. Considered as a whole, the charge to the jury was confusing, contradictory, often incomprehensible, and therefore constituted reversible error. XIV. The trial court improperly charged the jury on the issue of self-defense. (People v. Giammatto, 273 App. Div. 1023; People v. Coleman, 7 A D 2d 155; People v. McCutcheon, 14 A D 2d 482.)

Opinion:
Van Voorhis, J.
The judgment of conviction was properly reversed and a new trial granted by the Appellate Division on account of the admission in evidence of the statement by defendant taken at the police station after his law firm had contacted the police (24 A D 2d 7). The misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives that there was nothing wrong and no need for a lawyer threw defense counsel off guard, and the consequence is the same as though the police had been instructed by an attorney for defendant that he was not to be interrogated in the absence of counsel (People v. Gunner, 15 N Y 2d 226; People v. Donovan, 13 N Y 2d 148; People v. Sanchez, 15 N Y 2d 387).
The defendant has appealed as well as the People, and some further comments are in order in respect of points raised by his counsel on appeal to serve as guidelines for the new trial.
Since the statement of defendant taken at the police station will have to be excluded upon the new trial, so, also, will the gun which was dredged from the river at the place where defendant in the statement said that he threw it (People v. Rodriguez, N Y 2d 279; Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392) unless its retrieval from the river can be traced to some other clue or lead than that which was furnished by the statement. Upon the other hand, the conversation between defendant and his wife in the presence of Maxwell Slick, before he was slain, is admissible over the objection that it was a privileged communication (People v. Daghita, 299 N. Y. 194) inasmuch as privilege does not attach while a third person is present (People v. Melski, 10 N Y 2d 78; People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, affd. 303 N. Y. 782).
Inasmuch as defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the second degree but was convicted of first degree manslaughter, we have concluded that he cannot again be tried on a more serious charge than manslaughter in the first degree based on the same incident. In 1881 the Legislature enacted sections 464 and 544 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide that granting a " new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had " and that the new trial " shall proceed in all respects as if no trial had been had." On the basis of these statutes it has heretofore been held by us that, if a defendant obtained a new trial on appeal from a conviction of a lesser degree of a crime stated in the indictment, he could still be convicted of the greater degree (People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413; People v. McGrath, 202 N. Y. 445; People v. Ercole, 4 N Y 2d 617; Matter of Fiorillo v. Farrell, 16 N Y 2d 678) although it has been the law of New York that if the conviction on the lesser charge was left standing, either because no appeal was taken or the appeal was not successful, the reprosecution for the greater charge would be impermissible. In that instance the jury's silence on the greater charge was held to be " equivalent to a verdict of not guilty ' ' of that charge (People v. McCarthy, 110 N. Y. 309, 314; Penal Law, § 32).
The Ercole and parallel decisions based on sections 464 and 544 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing that under the circumstances here presented the new trial shall proceed as if no previous trial had been had, became and remained the law of New York for so long as they were not held by the United States Supreme Court to have been overridden by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In Green v. United States (355 U. S. 184) the United States Supreme Court laid down a different rule for the Federal courts, holding that, under circumstances similar to those here presented, a second trial of an accused for first degree murder, after a previous jury had found him guilty of second degree murder only, placed him in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment. For so long as prevention of double jeopardy was not held to be mandated on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, our State rule could coexist with the Federal rule just as People v. Defore (242 N. Y. 13, cert. den. 270 U. S. 657) could coexist with Weeks v. United States (232 U. S. 383) until Wolf v. Colorado (338 U. S. 25) was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643) and Ker v. California (374 U. S. 23). After that we became obliged to follow the Federal rule on the theory that the Fourth Amendment had been mandated on the States.
Since our last decision upon this subject, in Matter of Fiorillo v. Farrell, supra), the United States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit has decided in United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins (348 F. 2d 844) that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes the rule of Green v. United States (supra) upon the States, and that, in effect, to reprosecute this defendant for second degree murder would place him in double jeopardy for the reason that on the former trial he was prosecuted for that crime but was found guilty only of the included crime of manslaughter in the first degree. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on application by the Warden (Mancusi v. Hetenyi, 383 U. S. 913). The holding is not necessarily that the entire Fifth Amendment is mandated on the States, but does extend to a determination that the situation here presented falls within the guarantee against double jeopardy which was held to be a fundamental right within the doctrine of selective incorporation, whereby certain guarantees of the Bill of Bights are absorbed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are thus made applicable to the States.
Denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in the Hetenyi case does not of itself indicate approval of that decision, but we are satisfied that decisions such as Malloy v. Hogan (378 U. S. 1), Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. (378 U. S. 52) and Pointer v. Texas (380 U. S. 400), as well as the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Hetenyi, go far toward demonstrating that the ruling on double jeopardy in Hetenyi is the law of the land. Defendant may be retried on homicide charges not greater than manslaughter in the first degree.
The order appealed from reversing the judgment of conviction and granting a new trial should be affirmed.