Case Name: Richard C. HILL, Superintendent of Education; Fred Bagley, President of Forest Municipal Separate School District Board; and Burt Atkinson, Eddie Lee Johnson, Roland Harris, and Mrs. George Taylor, Jr., Members of the Forest Municipal Separate School District Board v. William C. THOMPSON
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1989-10-11
Citations: 564 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 07-58509
Parties: Richard C. HILL, Superintendent of Education; Fred Bagley, President of Forest Municipal Separate School District Board; and Burt Atkinson, Eddie Lee Johnson, Roland Harris, and Mrs. George Taylor, Jr., Members of the Forest Municipal Separate School District Board v. William C. THOMPSON.
Judges: En Banc.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 564
Pages: 1–30

Head Matter:
Richard C. HILL, Superintendent of Education; Fred Bagley, President of Forest Municipal Separate School District Board; and Burt Atkinson, Eddie Lee Johnson, Roland Harris, and Mrs. George Taylor, Jr., Members of the Forest Municipal Separate School District Board v. William C. THOMPSON.
No. 07-58509.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 11, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1990.
Mack Cameron, Jackson, for appellant.
Evan L. Thompson, Forest, for appellee.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Helen Wetherbee, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., James 0. Nelson, II, Kenneth A. Rutherford, Irene C. Howard, Thomas Price Firm, Jackson, for amicus curiae.
En Banc.

Opinion:
PRATHER, Justice,
for the Court:
This appeal challenges a Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust lease under the Mississippi Constitution which prohibits the donation of state lands to private individuals. The case concerns a commercial property in downtown Forest, Mississippi, that for years and until recently was used as a gasoline and motor vehicle service station. The lot was leased for a one-time payment of $7.50 for a ninety-nine year term and the assertion is made that this consideration is so grossly inadequate that it violates the donation clause of Article 4, Section 95, Mississippi Constitution. Additionally, issues relating to the applicability of 1978 Reform Act retrospectively, statutory requirements of appraisals of trust lands, and trial procedures are also presented for resolution.
The case began by William C. Thompson (Thompson) filing a complaint in the Chancery Court of Scott County for confirmation of his title to a leasehold interest of Sixteenth Section School Trust land. The suit named as defendants the State of Mississippi, a body politic, whose agent for process in this cause was: the Superintendent and the members of the Board of Trustees of the Forest Municipal Separate School District, the president and members of the Board of Supervisors of Scott County, and the Scott County Board of Education, all in their official capacities. The Chancery Court confirmed title of the lease in the complainant Thompson and imposed a sanction for recovery of attorney's fees in Thompson's favor against the Forest Municipal Separate School District for Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) and court costs. From this judgment, the School Board and Richard C. Hill, its Superintendent, appeal and present twelve assignments of error, not all of which need to be addressed, for reasons that will presently appear.
On this appeal, briefs were filed by Edwin Lloyd Pittman, then-Attomey General, on behalf of Dick Molpus, Secretary of State, and by Mississippi Valley Title Insurance Company, as Amici Curiae.
I.
The real estate involved in this lawsuit is described as Lot 6, Block 7 of Section 16, Township 6 North, Range 8 East, Scott County, Mississippi (hereinafter referred to as Lot 6). It measures forty (40) feet north and south and eighty-five (85) feet east and west and lies within the city limits of Forest, Mississippi and within the Forest Municipal Separate School District. By use and zoning, the lot has long been classified commercial.
The record of this case shows a partial history of the lot at issue. On May 9,1859, the Board of Police of Scott County, Mississippi leased the northeast quarter and east half of the northwest quarter of Section 16, Township 6, Range 8, Scott County, consisting of 240 acres, at a consideration of $88.00 for a period of 99 years. Per acre, per year, the consideration was about $0.0037037. Lot 6 is a part of that 1859 lease. The various subsequent lease transfers before 1943 are unimportant to the deposition of this case.
In January, 1943, in the case of Davenport Et al. v. All Persons, Etc., Cause No. 5,076, the Chancery Court of Scott County confirmed the unexpired 1859 leasehold interest in Lot 6 in Standard Oil Company against all persons claiming any legal or equitable title.
On March 21, 1955, with a little over four years remaining on the original 99 year lease, Standard Oil conveyed its interest in Lot 6 to H.L. Lackey, reserving all service station equipment to itself with removal rights to the same. Shortly thereafter on May 2, 1955, Lackey obtained a new Sixteenth Section Lease to the property from the Scott County Board of Supervisors, acting under the purported authority of 1948 Mississippi Laws, Chapter 497, again for 99 years. The consideration for this new lease was a one time payment of $7.50. On July 5, 1960, the transaction was repeated as another 99 year lease was issued to Lackey, again for a gross sum rental of $7.50, under the authority of the 1956 Mississippi Laws, Chapter 290. After H.L. Lackey's death his heirs conveyed his leasehold interest to Kenneth Haden, et ux., the purchase price of which was secured by a deed of trust in favor of Lackey's heirs. Apparently Haden defaulted, as the deed of trust was foreclosed by the trustee on January 25, 1985, and the leasehold interest was purchased by William C. Thompson, the plaintiff, for a consideration of $7,000.00. The Trustee's deed conveyed "Lot 6" and did not mention the leasehold interest nor the reservation of the service station equipment, except by reference to the Deed of Trust which is not a part of the record.
II.
Procedurally, this case comes to this Court in the following manner. On March 17, 1986, William C. Thompson filed his complaint for confirmation of his sixteenth section school trust lease for a 99 year period to run from July 5, 1960, the date of the last lease to H.L. Lackey.
The defendant School Board filed its answer denying that Thompson had good title. The basis for its position was that, because both the 1955 and 1960 leases were issued for a one-time payment of $7.50 for a ninety-nine (99) year period, the consideration was so grossly inadequate as to constitute a donation of public land in violation of the Mississippi Constitution and applicable statutes. The Board's counterclaim sought voiding of both 1955 and 1960 leases and confirmation of title, free of any lease, in the State of Mississippi in trust for the public schools.
On May 8, 1987 the Chancery Court entered final judgment which confirmed title in William C. Thompson to an unexpired ninety-nine (99) year Sixteenth Section Leasehold title in Lot 6 to terminate at midnight July 4, 2059. Further, the Chancery Court assessed sanctions in the form of attorney's fees against the Forest Municipal Separate School District, its Superintendent, Board of Trustees and their successors in office in the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with legal interest, on grounds that the School Board had filed a frivolous defense and counterclaim. Rule 11(b), M.R.C.P. The counterclaim of the defendant Board, which sought to confirm leasehold title in the State of Mississippi in trust for the public schools, was dismissed with prejudice.
III.
As this is another case involving Sixteenth Section School Trust lands, a reiteration of the historical facts will be helpful before analyzing their legal significance. Such a concise history can be found in the recent case of Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), which arises from a Mississippi controversy.
The history of public school lands in the United States stretches back over 200 years. Even before the ratification of the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation initiated a practice with regard to the Northwest Territory which was followed with most other public lands that eventually became States and were admitted to the Union. In particular, the Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for the survey and sale of the Northwest Territory, "reserved the lot No. 16, of every township, for the maintenance of public schools within the said township...." 1 Laws of the United States 565 (1815). In 1802, when the eastern portion of the Northwest Territory became what is now the State of Ohio, Congress granted Ohio the lands that had been previously reserved under the 1785 Ordinance for the use of public schools in the State. 2 Stat 175.
Following the Ohio example of reserving lands for the maintenance of public schools, " 'grants were made for common school purposes to each of the public land States admitted to the Union. Between the years of 1802 and 1846 the grants were of every section sixteen, and, thereafter, of sections sixteen and thirty-six. In some instances, additional sections have been granted.' " Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 506-507, n 7, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 100 S.Ct. 1803 [1806-07] (1980) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 240 U.S. 192, 198, 60 L.Ed. 599, 36 S.Ct. 326 [328] (1916) (footnotes omitted)). Thus, the basic Ohio example has been followed with respect to all but a few of the States admitted since then. 446 U.S. at 522-523, n 4, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 100 S.Ct. 1803 [1814-15] (Powell, J., dissenting). In addition to the school lands designated in this manner, Congress made provision for townships in which the pertinent section or sections were not available for one reason or another. Thus, Congress generally indemnified States for the missing designated sections, allowing the States to select lands in an amount equal to and in lieu of the designated but unavailable lands. See, e.g., Ch. 83, 4 Stat. 179 (1826). See generally Andrus v. Utah, supra, at 507-508, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 100 S.Ct. 1803 [1807]; Morrison, supra, [240 U.S.] at 200-202, 60 L.Ed. 599, 36 S.Ct. 326 [329],
Although the basic pattern of school lands grants was generally consistent from State to State in terms of the reservation and grant of the lands, the specific provisions of the grants varied by State and over time. See generally B. Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies 314-318 (1939). For example, in Indiana and Alabama, the school lands were expressly granted to the inhabitants of the townships directly. See 3 Stat. 290 (1816) (Indiana); 3 Stat. 491 (1819) (Alabama). In most of the other grants before 1845, the school lands were given instead to the States but were explicitly designated to be for the use of the townships in which they lay. See, e.g., 2 Stat. 233-234 (1803) (Mississippi); 3 Stat. 375 (1817) (same); 5 Stat. 58 (1836) (Arkansas). The Michigan grant in 1836, on the other hand, was simply "to the State for the use of schools." See 5 Stat. 59. After 1845, the type of grant used in Michigan, granting the lands to the State for the use of its schools generally became the norm. See, e.g., 9 Stat. 58 (1846) (Wisconsin); 11 Stat. 383 (1859) (Oregon). Finally, the most recent grants are phrased not as outright gifts to the States for a specific use but instead as express trusts. These grants also are stated to the States for the support of the schools in those States generally. In addition, though, under these grants the State is specifically designated a trustee, there are explicit restrictions on the management and disposition of the lands in trust, and the Federal Government expressly retains an ongoing oversight responsibility. See, e.g., 36 Stat. 574 (1910) (Arizona and New Mexico).
The history of the school lands grants in Mississippi generally follows the pattern thus described. In 1798, Congress created the Mississippi Territory, which included what is now about the southern third of the States of Mississippi and Alabama. 1 Stat. 549. In 1803, Congress provided for the sale and survey of all Mississippi Territory lands to which Indian title had been extinguished but excepted "the section number sixteen, which shall be reserved in each township for the support of schools within the same." Stat. 233-234. In 1804, the Mississippi Territory was extended northward to the southern boundary of Tennessee. 2 Stat. 305. Two years later Congress authorized the selection of lands in lieu of unavailable Sixteenth Sections in the Territory. 2 Stat. 401 (1806). Eventually, in 1817, Mississippi was admitted as a State, and a further Land Sales Act provided for the survey and sale of those lands in the northern part of the new State that had not been covered by the 1803 Act. The 1817 Act provided that these lands were to be "surveyed and divided in the manner provided by law for the surveying of the other public lands of the United States in the Mississippi territory;" thus, the Act required that "the section No. 16 in each township . shall be reserved for the support of schools therein." 3 Stat. 375 (1817). The Sixteenth Section lands and lands selected in lieu thereof were granted to the State of Mississippi. See Lambert v. State, 211 Miss. 129, 137, 51 So.2d 201, 203 (1951).
From these historical circumstances, the current practice in Mississippi with regard to Sixteenth Section lands has evolved directly. Under state law, these lands, which are still apparently held in large part by the State, "constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and must be treated as such." Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) (Supp.1985). In providing for the operation of these trusts, the legislature has retained the historical tie of these lands to particular townships in terms of both trust administration and beneficiary status. Thus, the State has delegated the management of this property to local school boards throughout the State:....
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 268-272, 106 S.Ct. at 2935-37, 92 L.Ed.2d at 220-23. Footnotes have been omitted from this quotation.
Thus the origin of the school lands trust for the support of public schools goes back to the beginning of our country and antedates the formation of the State of Mississippi. These lands throughout the United States, as well as within our State, have always been held to be trust lands for the benefit of public schools. Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) (Supp.1988), Turney v. Marion County Board of Education, 481 So.2d 770, (Miss.1985), Tally v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So.2d 547, 550 (Miss.1975), Keys v. Carter, 318 So.2d 862, 864 (Miss.1975), Washington County v. Riverside Drainage Dist., 159 Miss. 102, 131 So. 644, 645 (1931). The school lands trust was federally created and is federally enforceable. Papasan, supra, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2391, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 794 (1982), Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 460, 87 S.Ct. 584, 585, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967), 36 Stat. 574 (1910) (Arizona and New Mexico); Turney v. Marion County Board of Education, 481 So.2d 770, 776 (Miss.1985).
Title to all lands in the trust was granted to, and resides in, the State of Mississippi. Turney v. Marion County Board of Education, 481 So.2d 770, 776 (Miss.1985); Tally v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So.2d 547, 549-550 (Miss.1975); Lambert v. State, 211 Miss. 129, 137, 51 So.2d 201, 203 (1951); Pace v. State ex rel Rice, 191 Miss. 780, 798, 4 So.2d 270, 274 (1941); Jefferson Davis County v. James-Sumrall Lumber Co., 94 Miss. 530, 535-36, 49 So. 611, 612 (1909); Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss. 777, 800, 18 So. 87, 91 (1895). That title so resides has been affirmed in Papasan, 478 U.S. at 271, 106 S.Ct. at 2936, 92 L.Ed.2d at 222; See also Gaines v. Nicholson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 356, 364, 13 L.Ed. 172, 176 (1850).
The State of Mississippi has historically managed its sixteenth section lands through local authorities, originally through the respective boards of supervisors, and more recently through the school boards. This Court has described the duties of such managing agents in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State, 206 Miss. 847, 41 So.2d 26 (1949). "As such Trustees they were required, like all other fiduciaries, to exercise a higher degree of care with reference to the administration of their trust than in the management of their own individual personal business, and furthermore, even than in attending to the general run of the county's business." 206 Miss, at 854, 41 So.2d at 27. As record titleholder, the State of Mississippi, through its managing or supervising agent, the Board of Education, has standing to bring or defend actions in federal or state courts respecting these trust lands, the same as any common-law trustee.
Common-law rules enforceable in the case of private trusts are applied to the public school lands trust. Keys v. Carter, 318 So.2d 862, 864 (Miss.1975); Holmes v. Jones, 318 So.2d 865, 868 (Miss.1975); United States v. Swope, 16 F.2d 215, 217 (8th Cir.1926). Common law rules of trust law have been applied to federal lands trust in various contexts. See, County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nations, 470 U.S. 226, 233-37, 238, 246-48, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1250-52, 1253, 1257-58, 84 L.Ed.2d 169, 178-80, 181, 186-87 (1985) (applying common law remedies because federal act did not establish comprehensive remedial plan).
At common law, one who holds as trustee is prohibited from giving away, appropriating to his own use, or otherwise, disposing of the corpus of a trust in derogation of the rights of the beneficiaries. This rule applies to the school lands trust. Tally v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So.2d 547, 550 (Miss.1975); Holmes v. Jones, 318 So.2d 865, 868-69 (Miss.1975); See also, State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681, 683 (Alaska 1985) (relying on Restatement (2d) of Trusts 1959) (when protecting a federally created land trust); State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 813 (Alaska 1981) (relying on Scott, The Law of Trusts (3 ed. 1967), and Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, (Rev.Ed. 1978) when protecting a federally created land trust).
One important corollary of this rule is the continuing nature of the trustee's duty to manage the trust corpus so that the income therefrom is reasonably maximized. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 181 (1959). Indeed, where a reasonable yield is prevented by the trustee's wrongful conduct, this in no way serves to extinguish or ameliorate the trustee's continuing duty to produce a reasonable yield. Bogart, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §703 (2d rev. ed. 1982). The continuing duty of the trustee is enforceable at any time, 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1067, 1080 (5th ed. 1941); Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 74, Comment c (1959) and may not be avoided because of past defaults. 4 Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 392 (3d ed. 1967). Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So.2d 947, 955 (Miss.1988). (failure of enforcement in the past does not render a statute inoperative).
These common law duties have been made more concrete with respect to the school lands trust in Mississippi, first by the Mississippi Constitution and, second, by legislative enactment. Today's appellants have recognized their responsibilities as trustee and as trust supervisors or managers, and it is in that vein that they have defended the original action to confirm title, asserted their counterclaim, and prosecuted the present appeal. What is important is that these duties of the trustee and as well, the applicability and enforceability of the law of trusts to the school land trusts date back to the year 1817, the date of the creation of the trust. The subsequent constitutional and statutory enactments are but federally permissible supplements and refinements of the law regulating the school lands trust.
IV.
WERE THE 1955 AND THE 1960 SIXTEENTH SECTION LEASES VOID FOR INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION?
A.
Assignments of error No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 invoke Section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution and question the adequacy of consideration. Both leases were for a one time lump sum payment of $7.50 for a period of ninety-nine (99) years, or an annual payment of $.07575. The Plaintiff Thompson's position is that the statutory procedures were followed and that adequate consideration was paid; on the other hand, the School Board's contention is that the consideration is so grossly inadequate as to constitute a donation of public lands to private persons constitutionally prohibited, rendering the lease void from its inception. The Chancery Court found that in the post World War II period a depressed economy existed in Forest, Mississippi, with land values for the fee simple title extremely low and with land rental values even less. The court further found that, in light of the then existing economic conditions and land values and the condition of Lot 6, the consideration paid by Lackey was adequate under the applicable statutes and the state constitution. Thus the first issue to be analyzed is adequacy of consideration of the lease rental.
Two provisions of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution are applicable to our analysis. First is Section 95:
Lands belonging to, or under the control of the state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals_ Section 95, Mississippi Constitution.
Section 211 of the 1890 Constitution of the State of Mississippi states in part:
The Legislature . shall provide that the sixteenth section lands reserved for the support of township schools, except as herewith provided, shall not be sold nor shall they be leased for along term than ten (10) years for lands situated outside of municipalities and for lands situated within municipalities for a longer term than ninety-nine (99) years, for a gross sum....
Article 8, § 211 of the Constitution directs the legislature to enact statutory direction for the leasing of these public lands. This constitutional direction was amended in 1961 and in 1986.
The procedures for valuing and leasing at the time the leases were executed were provided by statute. In 1946 the Mississippi Legislature passed House Bill No. 63 which became Chapter 443 of the Laws of the 1946 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature. That statute provided, in Section 4, that three disinterested freeholders serving as appraisers would appraise the sixteenth section land to be leased and report to the Board of Supervisors. The Supervisors were then authorized to lease the land for seventy-five percent (75%) of the appraisal value thereof.
In 1948 the Mississippi Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 292 which became Chapter 497 of the Laws of the 1948 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature. That statute amended the 1946 law and required that leases be issued for a "reasonable amount." The 1948 law continued the requirement for an appraisal by three disinterested freeholders who would make their recommendations to the Board of Supervisors for a gross sum which the Board would then determine if it was a reasonable amount.
Within this tangled web is also the 1978 Reform Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-1 (Supp.1988), affecting the leasing of sixteenth section school lands, which sought to correct past abuses in rental determination. Changes of the Reform Act placed limits on lease terms, and included the payment of an annual rental with a rent adjustment clause every ten years on all leases except residential and farm-residential lands. This latter statute implements the trustee's continuing duties as described above. Not addressed by this opinion is the 1989 legislative enactment, Senate Bill 2780, the "Tidelands Act" passed since the filing of briefs by these litigants.
B.
Within this statutory framework in 1947 the Board of Supervisors of Scott County appointed three appraisers, T.G. McCormick, O.S. Redden, and V.R. Lackey, to make individual reports of appraisement upon several applications for Sixteenth Section Leases. That report stated that the three appraisers felt that it was necessary to "establish a basis upon which lands within the municipality should be valued to be released, or existing leases thereof extended 99 years." The conclusion of this report was that a fair market price for sixteenth section land was $10 per acre on undivided property and $10 per lot (less than one acre) on the subdivided property. This 1947 appraisal concludes with the statement that in the opinion of the three appraisers "there is no justification for other than a nominal value for even long term leases of sixteenth section lands in this city." (Emphasis added).
On April 4, 1955 H.L. Lackey applied to the Board of Supervisors of Scott County, Mississippi, for a 99 year lease of Lot 6. That application listed the total assessed value as fixed by the Board of Supervisors, in paragraph 4, at $3,200 with $3,000 being applied to improvements and $200 for the land. The assessed value of Lot 6 as fixed by the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, in paragraph 5, is for a total of $6,000 with the land being worth $2,000 of that total.
By order of the Board of Supervisors, O.S. Redden, T.G. McCormick and V.R. Lackey were appointed as appraisers, required by statute to be disinterested freeholders, to appraise the property and report to the Board of Supervisors. The statutory scheme of 1948 required that consideration be issued for a "reasonable" amount, rather than the former "fair market rental". These are the same three individuals that made the general appraisal in 1947 that all properties should be valued at $10 per acre and $10 per lot. These appraisers reported that Mr. Lackey should be charged a one-time payment of $7.50 as a fair gross sum rental for that property for a 99 year period or $.07575 per year. A lease was then issued by the Board of Supervisors to H.L. Lackey under the provisions of Chapter 497 of the Laws of the 1948 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature at a rate of $7.50 for 99 years.
The plaintiffs proof of adequate consideration was primarily directed toward the depressed economic conditions in Forest, as evidenced by the chancellor's finding, and of the intent of the legislature to promote industrial development. Plaintiff Thompson, as a former legislator, testified to this legislative intent. The proof showed without question that all Sixteenth Section Leases in Forest, regardless of size or location, were leased for a consideration of $7.50 for 99 years. Finding that citizens have a right to rely upon applicable statutory procedure for leasing Sixteenth Section land and be protected thereby, the Chancery Court confirmed the lease.
The Court's finding that the Plaintiff relied upon existing statutory leasing procedures overlooks controlling legal principles. At common law no trustee has authority to lease real property held in trust for substantially less than the fair value thereof. Tally v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So.2d 547, 550 (Miss.1975). The trustee certainly has no authority to enter a long term lease at a nominal one time rental, so that the lease is tantamount to a gift. This principle has been embodied in this state's constitution which prohibits donation of public land no matter what legislative procedure is mandated. Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 95 (1890). This Court knows of no rule of law whereby the substantive prohibition of Section 95 may be violated if only certain forms or procedures are met.
Section 95 and its non-donation principle have full force and effect in the case of lands held by the state in trust for the schools, for in a sense all lands held by the state are held in trust, only some such as these are dedicated to more specific purposes. This Court has in the past repeatedly held Section 95 applicable to assets a part of the school lands trust. In Keys v. Carter, 318 So.2d 862 (Miss.1975), for example, the Court stated:
The facts alleged in the bill, if supported by proof accepted by the chancellor as the trier of facts, would be capable of supporting a finding that the lease of this 320 acre tract for an annual rental of $170, although the fair value of the lease was $4,000 per year, amounted to an unconstitutional donation, as well as an appropriation of the property to "an object not authorized by law." In that event, the lease was and is void and may be attacked in this suit. See Saxon v. Harvey, 190 So.2d 901 (Miss.1966) and Coleman v. Shipp, 223 Miss. 516, 78 So.2d 778 (1955).
Keys, 318 So.2d at 864. Holmes v. Jones, 318 So.2d 865, 869 (Miss.1975) also held that leasing sixteenth section lands held by the state within the school lands trust for "a grossly inadequate consideration" was a violation of Section 95 of the Constitution. Edwards v. Harper, 321 So.2d 301, 303 (Miss.1975) is to like effect, viz school lands having a fair market value of $22,500 where leased for ninety-nine years for $400 are deemed donated when scrutinized under Section 95. In Talley v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, 323 So.2d 547, 550 (1975), this Court stated that "where the consideration paid for a lease [a rental of forty cents per acre] is so small as to amount to a donation of the property, the lease is void." See also Saxon v. Harvey, 190 So.2d 901 (Miss.1966); Coleman v. Shipp, 223 Miss. 516, 78 So.2d 778 (1955). Although the School Board contends that this lease in question was void from its inception, this position is not entirely correct. This Court construes our former decisions to mean that the lease for an inadequate consideration is voidable and may be attacked for that reason by a school board. Upon a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction of inadequate consideration, the lease may be declared void.
Long before Keys, Holmes, Edwards, and Talley, which were decided in 1975, this Court was saying the same thing, finding time and again that grossly inadequate considerations constituted an unconstitutional donation of sixteenth section trust lands. In Koonce v. Board of Supervisors of Grenada County, 202 Miss. 473, 477-78, 32 So.2d 264, 265 (1947) this Court held that supervisors had no authority to sell sixteenth section trust property at such a grossly inadequate price as to violate Section 95 of the Constitution. Likewise, in State ex rel Kyle, Attorney General v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 279, 46 So.2d 100, 104 (1950), this Court held that it was beyond the power of the Board of Supervisors to sell sixteenth section timber for a grossly inadequate price as to constitute donation. See also State v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 630-31, 55 So.2d 370 (1951) (sale of sixteenth section timber by County Board of Supervisors for $500.00 and which was resold for $4,000.00 held, prima facie, consideration was grossly inadequate). Likewise, this Court held that "value does not have to be proved with certainty as to the amount in order to show that the consideration is grossly inadequate." State v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 46 So.2d 100, 105 (Miss.1950).
When reviewing on appeal factual determinations made by a trial judge sitting without a jury, this Court employs the substantial evidence standard. UHS-Quali-care v. Gulf Coast Com. Hosp. 525 So.2d 746 (Miss.1987); Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d 683, 685 (Miss.1983). In the words of this Court in Tally v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, "We can take judicial notice that little, if any, land in the State of Mississippi could have been purchased on the open market for its reasonable value at such a low price in [1955 or I960]." 323 So.2d at 551. Even the assessed value of Lot 6 without improvements was $2,000.00, making clear that the $7.50 lease rental was but a miniscule fraction of fair market value. The Chancery Court's finding of fact that an adequate consideration was paid was clearly an erroneous finding and was manifestly in error. See also Estate of Robinson v. Gusta, 540 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss.1989); Matter of Estate of Varvaris, 528 So.2d 800, 802 (Miss.1988); State ex rel Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 633, 55 So.2d 370, 375 (1951).
On the authority of Section 95 and the many cases applying it to sixteenth section lands, the Court holds that the 1955 and 1960 leases were voidable, and at the election of the state as trustee, may be attacked. Keys, supra; Talley, supra. The School Board as managing agent has so elected and would clearly be entitled to judgment to that effect were Lot 6 still held by its original lessee. H.L. Lackey, however, is dead, and his heirs no longer hold the lease. The Court today is concerned with the rights of William C. Thompson, the current leaseholder.
It is the law in this state that ordinarily, one who acquires real property takes it subject to whatever claims lie against it and whatever defects there may be in the title. Hardy v. Wheaton, 374 So.2d 790, 791 (Miss.1979). The purchaser steps into the shoes of the seller. To the extent that one is a bona fide purchaser, however, an innocent purchaser without notice and who pays fair value, he takes free and clear*of hidden claims or title defects. Collier v. Shell Oil Co., 534 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Miss.1988).
In this case appellee Thompson bought the leasehold interest in 1985 at foreclosure sale for a consideration of $7,000.00; he asserts that the existing structure on the property was worthless and a liability for him. But to him it was worth $7,000.00 in 1985 for the balance of approximately seventy-five (75) years. The leasehold value placed on the property by the Board of Supervisors in 1955 and 1960 was a one time payment of $7.50 for ninety-nine (99) years. A comparison of these dates and values, although not an appraisal, speaks volumes to the point of adequacy or inadequacy. A consideration of $7.50 for ninety-nine (99) years is less than a dime a year in rental. Nothing in the record suggests that the economy in Forest and Scott County in 1955 and 1960 was that depressed! The City of Forest had assigned the lot an assessed value of $2,000.00 without considering the improvements. The lease rental paid by Lackey was a mere 0.375 per cent of assessed value! Moreover, the record is wholly devoid of evidence that non-sixteenth section real property of otherwise comparable kind and quality had a fair market value anything like so low.
The consideration Lackey paid for this lease is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience and to defeat any challenge even of one otherwise claiming the status of a bona fide purchaser. It is not a hidden title defect, but is and has been a matter of public record, so openly blatant as to put any purchaser on notice of a possible defect in the seller's (here the trustee's) title. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L & T Developers, 434 So.2d 699, 708 (Miss.1983); West Center Apartments, Ltd. v. Keyes, 371 So.2d 854, 856 (Miss.1979). The tax assessments of city and county gave notice of value that should have suggested a far higher rental was required to meet the constitutional mandate of non-donation. Even the appraiser's report stated that only a nominal value was used. Thompson was charged with all of this knowledge.
As was stated in Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578 (1913):
Inadequacy of consideration, whether in the deed to the purchaser or in the deed to his grantor, is material in ascertaining whether a purchaser shall be charged with constructive notice of defects in the title; and the fact that such consideration is grossly inadequate may under some circumstances alone be sufficient to charge a purchaser with notice of defects in the title. This land, according to the testimony of appellee, is worth $1,000; according to that of appellant $1,600. The consideration paid by Mrs. Glover was $10 cash, and the payment of the note due the Mortgage Company for $350, which note was not then due and would not become due for three and one-half years. Accepting as true the value placed on the land by appellee, the consideration agreed to be paid by Mrs. Glover therefor amounted to only one-third of its value. The sale of land for one-third of its value is, to say the least, unusual, and the recital of such a consideration in a deed, coupled with the fact that the consideration agreed to be paid was the payment of a note of the grant- or, which would not become due for three and one-half years, is sufficient to suggest to the mind of the average man that the entire consideration was not expressed in the deed, or that there was a defect in the title, and thus put him upon inquiry before purchasing the land.
*
A slight investigation would have conducted him to a knowledge of the true state of the title; consequently, he must be charged with knowledge thereof, for "whatever is enough to excite attention, or put a party on inquiry, is notice of everything to which such attention or inquiry might reasonably lead." Parker v. Foy, 43 Miss. 260, 5 Am.Rep. 484.
103 Miss. at 467-68, 60 So. at 580. See also, Annotation, 42 A.L.R.2d 1088, 1089-90 (1955); 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 696 (1975).
Caveat emptor still reigns at foreclosure sales. Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 20, 109 S.E.2d 379, 385-86 (1959); Ivrey v. Karr, 182 Md. 463, 473, 34 A.2d 847, 852 (Md.1943); Adams v. Boyd, 332 Mo. 484, 490, 58 S.W.2d 704, 707 (1933); American Law of Property, § 16.211. (1952). If Ha-den's signature had been forged to the deed of trust, Thompson would have taken nothing at the trustee's sale. Woodson v. Jones, 203 Miss. 152, 155, 33 So.2d 316 (1948). And if the Board of Supervisors had illegally leased the property to Lackey, the same conclusion would obtain. Thompson is not a bona fide purchaser. He was on actual or constructive notice that the $7.50 rental Lackey paid in 1955 and again in 1960 was grossly inadequate consideration. That he was willing to pay $7,000.00 for the property speaks volumes, particularly where, as Thompson testified, he considered the improvements on the lands a liability and not an asset. In State ex rel. McCullen v. Adams, 185 Miss. 606, 188 So. 551 (1939) the Court said, "since John Jordan was sufficiently familiar with the value of the land as to be willing to pay a cash consideration of $1,600 therefor" he was put on notice of the grossly inadequate price of $160 paid for the land by Adams in purchasing the same from the State Land Commissioner. Adams, 185 Miss. at 614, 188 So. at 553. And in State ex rel. Kyle v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 46 So.2d 100 (1950) the Court held that the purchaser was put on notice that $500 was a grossly inadequate consideration for sixteenth section timber "when the said defendant had determined that the timber was worth at least $4,000". Dear, 209 Miss. at 278, 46 So.2d at 104; see also, State ex rel. Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 631, 55 So.2d 370, 374 (1951).
In sum, this Court answers the issues posed by this assignment and holds that the Chancery Court manifestly erred when it found the consideration for the lease not grossly inadequate; further, this Court holds that, as a matter of law, a one time gross sum payment which amounts to $.07575 per year consideration is grossly inadequate and amounts to a donation of public lands prohibited by the constitution and trust law. Mere compliance with statutory formalities and procedures does not vitiate substantive violation of constitutional prohibitions. Ünder the authority of Mississippi Constitution Section 95, the common law of trusts regulating the duties of trustee, and prior decisions of this Court, this Court reverses the judgment below and voids the lease of appellee Thompson, but under the hereinafter stated conditions.
C.
In making this decision, the Court is aware of the proof that all sixteenth section leases in Scott County were for $7.50 for 99 years. Although the law has been clear for many years, the Court is cognizant of the fact that sixteenth section lands in many other counties have in the past been leased for nominal rentals. Indeed, there has been a century of disregard of this constitutional mandate and of widespread and long continued acceptance of this practice by former officials. Not unmindful of the impact of this decision, the Court considers it appropriate to repeat a remark made in Transamerica Co. v. Paine Supply Co., 194 So.2d 490, 491 (Miss.1967) that "we know of no way in which custom can change the law as written." Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So.2d 947, 955 (Miss.1988) and State Tax Commission v. Fondren, 387 So.2d 712 (Miss.1980), are to like effect.
However, our consideration does not end here. This case is to be remanded to the Board of Trustees of the Forest Municipal Separate School District Board for a new determination of the present rental value by a competent appraiser under Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-1 et seq., the 1978 Reform Act. Equity dictates, however, that while the appraisal process is in process that appellee shall have the use of the premises in question and the right of first refusal of the new lease and the right to meet the best bid when the rental value is determined. It must be remembered that this action is severe and that leaseholders, lien-holders, and title insurance companies must all be considered. Having rights and liabilities that flow from their past involvement in this unlawful practice of nominal rentals on sixteenth section trust lands, these third parties' positions must be taken into account. The right of a lienholder is not present in this case, but that equitable question will have to be addressed in another factual situation.
This Court favors the repose of title in real estate transactions and recognizes that this decision will involve an adjustment period. Section 95 has been in the Constitution since 1890. However, inadequacy of consideration may be challenged in the case of leases entered both before or after the Reform Act of 1978. Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-25. Nothing in this opinion shall be considered to indicate the present rental value, except as to the inadequacy of the present lease rental. However, as appellant Thompson has testified in this suit, the legislature in its 1940's enactments attempted to promote development of its sixteenth section lands. In fact, the policy of the State of Mississippi with its own lands was to make every effort to return forfeited tax lands to private ownership and considered economic development as a factor in sale pricing. This Court recognizes that a public policy of making all reasonable efforts to keep sixteenth section lands leased so that they might be developed and produce revenue from taxation is not an unworthy goal, and this policy may have influenced the past officials in this case, dealing with trust lands. Rental values are determined by a number of factors and the 1947 appraisers consideration of the economic development was warranted. Dodds v. Sixteenth Section Development Corp., 232 Miss. 524, 99 So.2d 897, 904 (1958). However, its emphasis must not overshadow constitutional mandates. Mississippi Constitution § 95. State ex rel Kyle v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 279, 46 So.2d 100, 104 (1950).
The case is remanded to the Board of Trustees of the Forest Municipal Separate School District for action consistent with 1978 Reform Act.
Y.
WERE LESSEES OF SIXTEENTH SECTION LEASES DISINTERESTED FREEHOLDERS WHO MAY APPRAISE SIXTEENTH SECTION LAND?
Assignments No. 3 and No. 5 raise the issue of whether the appraisement of 1955 and the 1947 general appraisal were performed by disinterested freeholders.
In 1955, the Board of Supervisors appointed as appraisers O.S. Redden, T.G. McCormick and V.R. Lackey, and stated, inter alia, that they were disinterested freeholders. V.R. Lackey and the original 1955 and 1960 leaseholder, Harold Lackey, were cousins.
The appellants offered evidence that the three appraisers were themselves holders of sixteenth section land leases at the times of the 1947 and 1955 appraisals, and that there was a renewal of their leases after the 1947 appraisal. Thompson objected to the materiality and relevancy of the evidence and pointed out that the appraisers only made recommendations to the Board of Supervisors, which Board then determined whether the recommendation was a reasonable gross sum, and that Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-7, the adverse possession statute, cures any problem. The trial court sustained the objection, but accepted the proffer by the School Board. The court noted that the acquisition of the leases by the appraisers was probably a result, rather than a cause of the 1947 appraisal amount. The trial court found them to be well qualified and would not assume that their leases affected their professional conduct. There is no allegation of fraud, their service was noteworthy and honorable. There is absolutely no challenge to their honesty or integrity.
The term "disinterested" has been defined as follows: "Not concerned, in respect to possible gain or loss, in the result of the pending proceedings or transactions; impartial, not biased or prejudiced." Black's Law Dictionary 421 (5th Ed.1979). This Court has defined the words "interested parties," in the context of a proceeding to contest the validity of a will, as "parties who have a pecuniary interest in the subject of the contest." Provenza v. Provenza, 201 Miss. 836, 29 So.2d 669, 670 (1947). This Court has also held that a mother-in-law is not a "disinterested person" within a court rule requiring a certificate to be made by a disinterested person. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First National Bank of Biloxi, 172 Miss. 284, 159 So. 656 (1935).
Other courts have held that members of a planning board should not sit in consideration of any matter in which they are personally interested. It has been held that self-interest of one member of a planning board infects the action of the other members, regardless of their disinterestedness. Hochberg v. Freehold, 40 N.J.Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46; Pratt v. Mayor & Council of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 89 A.2d 1, Zell v. Roseland, 42 N.J.Super. 75, 125 A.2d 890.
The defendant Board attempted to introduce the above evidence that the appraisers were not disinterested, and the proffer by the Board showed that the three appraisers held Sixteenth Section Leases. The exclusion of this testimony was preserved by the proffer. Murray v. Payne, 437 So.2d 47 (Miss.1983). This Court holds that the evidence was relevant and should have been admitted, and having reviewed that evidence which was proffered, holds that the appraisers were not disinterested freeholders since they held Sixteenth Section Leases. This is an additional ground for voidance of the leases in question.
VI.
DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE STATE, ACTING THROUGH ITS SCHOOL BOARD, WAS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED?
The chancellor held that under Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-7 and § 29-3-52, the School Board was equitably estopped from asserting inadequacy of consideration. The pertinent parts of those sections are:
§ 29-3-7 Adverse possession.
Adverse possession for a period of twenty-five years, under a claim of right or title, shall be prima facie evidence in such case that the law authorizing the disposition of the lands has been complied with and the lease or sale duly made. If the claim be under a lease, the time at which the lease expires shall be fixed by the court.
29-3-52 Prima facie validity of leases executed and recorded in substantial conformity with law.
Any lease of sixteenth section lands, or lands granted in lieu thereof, executed and recorded in substantial conformity with the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be prima facie valid, and defects in ministerial or procedural acts alone shall not affect the validity of any such lease, as far as a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value of any such lease is concerned. Any such purchaser or encumbrancer shall be entitled to rely upon the validity of any such lease insofar as the interest of the state or any political subdivision thereof, the public, or any school district is concerned.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit any party from challenging the validity of any lease on the grounds of inadequacy of consideration given for the lands involved in the lease. (Emphasis added).
Mississippi law is clear that the state is not subject to any statutes of limitations nor may the state lose property by adverse possession. Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 104 (1890); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508, 521 (Miss.1986); Board of Education of Itawamba County v. Loague, 405 So.2d 122, 124-25 (Miss.1981); Gibson v. State Land Commissioner, 374 So.2d 212, 217 (Miss.1979). The principle that a governmental entity is not chargeable with the laches of its officials is also well settled. Monroe County Board of Education v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908 (Miss.1988). Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 429 So.2d 574, 585 (Miss.1983); Alexander v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of City of Natchez, 219 Miss. 78, 94, 68 So.2d 434, 441 (1953); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 377, 94 So. 7, 10 (1922); City of Bay St. Louis v. Hancock County, 80 Miss. 364, 371-72, 32 So. 54 (1902); Josselyn v. Stone, 28 Miss. 753, 763 (1855).
On the other hand, the state and its political subdivisions "may be equitably estopped under the proper circumstances." Monroe County Board of Education v. Rye, 521 So.2d 900, 908-909 (Miss.1988); Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1985); Covington County v. Page, 456 So.2d 739 (Miss.1984); State v. Stockett, 249 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1971). But no estoppel may be enforced "against the state or its counties where the acts of their officers were unauthorized." Oktibbeha County Board of Education v. Town of Sturgis, 531 So.2d 585, 589 (Miss.1988). The Oktibbeha County case concerned an invalid sixteenth section lease and is controlling today.
The state is not bound by the action of the Board of Supervisors in 1955 and 1960. On at least two occasions, this Court has held:
Private individuals who negligently fail to ascertain the value of their own property may, in the absence of fraud, bind themselves by conveyances thereof for a grossly inadequate price, but this is not true of public officials dealing with property held by the state, either in fee simple or as trustee, and especially as trustee where the price is so grossly inadequate as to virtually amount to a donation, in violation of our State Constitution.
State ex rel Kyle v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 279, 46 So.2d 100, 104 (1950); Koonce v. Board of Supervisors of Grenada County, 202 Miss. 473, 478, 32 So.2d 264, 265-66 (1947); See also, State ex rel Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss 620, 632, 55 So.2d 370, 374 (1951).
In Pace v. State ex rel Rice, 191 Miss. 780, 4 So.2d 270 (1940), this Court held that:
The State cannot abdicate its duty as trustee of property in which the whole people are interested, such as sixteenth section land held by the state as trustee for schools, any more than the state can surrender its police power in the administration of government and in the preservation of peace and order.
Pace, 191 Miss. at 804, 4 So.2d at 277, citing an abundance of United States Supreme Court decisions. The point was repeated in State ex rel Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 630, 55 So.2d 370, 374 (1951). See also American Oil Co. v. Marion County, 187 Miss. 148, 192 So. 296 (1939); Gift v. Love, 164 Miss. 442, 144 So. 562, 86 A.L.R. 63 (1932); Eastman Oil Mills v. State, 130 Miss. 63, 93 So. 484 (1922). See also Lancaster v. City of Columbus, 333 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D.Miss.1971); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Barr, 245 Miss. 86, 146 So.2d 569 (1962); 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 127 (1966); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 142-43 (1964).
Having held herein that the consideration was grossly inadequate, this Court also holds that equitable estoppel cannot be applied against the State in this instance. The chancellor is reversed on this issue.
VII.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST THE SCHOOL BOARD?
On a finding of frivolousness, the chancellor found the School Board's defense to be totally without merit, and warranted an award of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) attorney's fees under M.R.C.P. Rule 11(b) as sanctions. Such sanctions may be imposed only where a claim or defense is frivolous or asserted for harassment or delay. Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 537 So.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Miss.1989); Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Development Corp., 511 So.2d 112, 118 (Miss.1987). The area of sixteenth section trust lands is one of the most litigated issues in the state for the past eight years, and it has received extensive media coverage for the same period. Past abuses in management of trust lands have given rise to this renewed interest to untangle a complex and involved public problem for the benefit of public schools. This public concern is meritorious; it is not an issue without merit.
Having found that the lease in question is void, this Court has held the School Board's position to be meritorious. The award of attorney's fee must be reversed and rendered.
VIII.
Finding that the amount of consideration was inadequate as a matter of law, the Court does not address the failure of the trial judge to permit the School Board's expert appraisal witness to testify. The proof that was introduced was sufficient to make this legal determination without further proof from appellant Board. Therefore, assignment No. 8 is not addressed. The Court upholds the chancellor's finding regarding the issue of waste. Assignments 9 and 11 are not addressed.
REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO INVALIDITY OF LEASE.
AFFIRMED ON THE ISSUE OF WASTE.
REVERSED AND REMANDED TO FOREST MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR APPRAISAL PROCEDURE.
REVERSED AND RENDERED AS TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST FOREST MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ" concur.
HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., dissent.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PITTMAN, J., not participating.
. Richard C. Hill is Superintendent of Forest Municipal Separate School District, who with Burt Atkinson, President, and Eddie Lee Johnson, Harold Windham, Mrs. George Taylor, Jr. and Fred Bagley, constitute the members of the Board of Education of Forest Municipal Separate School District. WJ. Measeis, Jr. is President of the Board of Supervisors of Scott County, and with Monzell Stowers, Powell Jones, Jack I. Miles and Isaac Weems, Jr. constitute the members of Board of Supervisors of Scott County, Mississippi. Albert Hollingsworth is Scott County Superintendent of Education and L.E. Gomillion is President of Scott County Board of Education together with Tommy Gilbert, W.R. Booth, A.G. Eason, Jr., and Roy Miles, members.
. This opinion does not include the discussion of the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek with the Choctaw Nation or the 1832 Treaty of Ponto-toc Creek with the Chickasaw Nation. Such a history is included in Papasan, supra, as that case specifically addresses alleged inequities in economic benefits of public school lands in the twenty-three (23) northern Mississippi counties within Chickasaw Cession. The County of Scott is included within the lands ceded under the Choctaw Cession, and is not involved in the funding inequity question.