Case Name: Marlene WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1991-05-30
Citations: 934 F.2d 221
Docket Number: Nos. 89-55595, 89-55856
Parties: Marlene WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before BOOCHEVER, HALL and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 934
Pages: 221–225

Head Matter:
Marlene WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 89-55595, 89-55856.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 8, 1991.
Decided May 30, 1991.
John Ohanian, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael R. Power, Asst. Regional Counsel, Dept, of Health and Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER, HALL and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

Opinion:
RYMER, Circuit Judge:
Marlene Williams appeals the district court's denial of her motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). She filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits in April 1982, claiming that she had been unable to work since March 18, 1982 due to high blood pressure, heart trouble, poor vision, and a past history of mental breakdowns. The Secretary denied her applications. Williams appealed and we remanded in light of Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.1985), which invalidated the severity regulations upon which the Secretary had relied. On remand, the Secretary again denied benefits and the district court remanded again because the Secretary had not properly considered Williams's mental condition in evaluating whether she could resume work, improperly weighed medical evidence and selectively disregarded her testimony without adequate credibility findings. After considering additional evidence, the Secretary granted benefits for the closed period for which Williams had applied. The district court found that her case should be analyzed in two phases: the first, covering the period through the Ninth Circuit remand and the second, the period thereafter. We affirm.
We review the district court's decision that the government's position was substantially justified for abuse of discretion. Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.1989). The district court abuses its discretion when its "decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when the record contains no evidence on which [it] rationally could have based that decision." Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Petition of Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.1985)). Review is limited to "assuring that the district court's determination has a basis in reason." Pirus, 869 F.2d at 540.
We cannot say that there was no basis in reason for the district court's decision. On appeal from the Secretary's original determination, the district court had ruled that that determination was supported by substantial evidence; the appeal concerned only the applicability of the severe impairment regulation. Although there was evidence of mental impairment, one of Williams's physicians, Dr. Baron, found that Williams's flattened affect was not grossly out of the range of normality and diagnosed her schizophrenic reaction as in remission, noting that Williams had been symptom-free for the past three years due to medication. Given the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision remanding the first time, the district court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in concluding that the remand is not a basis for awarding fees.
When Williams appealed the Secretary's second determination, made after the Ninth Circuit remand, the case was again remanded by the district court, but for failure properly to weigh conflicting evidence and make credibility findings. As before, some evidence supported the Secretary's position. While there was clear evidence of a serious mental condition in the past, and the psychiatric evidence showed a serious mental impairment, the evidence was conflicting with respect to its current impact on Williams's inability to work. It cannot be said that the district court lacked any basis for concluding that the Secretary's position was reasonable: Williams's psychiatric evidence, even though not challenged, was somewhat ambiguous; the focus of the proceedings was not entirely on mental condition, rather it was also on physical disabilities as to which the medical testimony was not dispositive. At the last supplemental hearing, additional testimony was taken and the claimant submitted additional evidence. More lenient mental impairment criteria which became effective October 9, 1984 changed the Secretary's evaluation of Williams's principal impairment, chronic schizophrenia. The district court therefore did not lack any basis for concluding that the Secretary's new determination of disability, based in part on new evidence and in consideration of new criteria, was not reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
. This court's decision in Yuckert was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987).
. See Pagan v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 340, 342-43 (D.C.Cir.1988).