Case Name: PEOPLE v. MASK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-03-23
Citations: 68 Mich. App. 104
Docket Number: Docket No. 22355
Parties: PEOPLE v MASK
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 68
Pages: 104–112

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MASK
Opinion of the Court
1. Forgery — Uttering and Publishing — Elements of Offense.
The crime of uttering and publishing an instrument cannot be established without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the accused knew that the instrument was false, and (2) the accused had an intent to defraud.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Elements of Crime — Circumstantial Evidence — Sufficiency of Evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to establish an element of a crime where the evidence is not inconsistent with any other reasonable hypotheses upon which the defendant’s innocence may be maintained.
3. Forgery — Uttering and Publishing — Evidence—Hypotheses of Innocence — Sufficiency of Evidence.
The evidence in a trial for uttering and publishing a forged instrument was not inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of the defendant’s innocence (that someone other than defendant stole a check, forged the endorsement, and passed it to defendant) where (1) the defendant sought without identification to cash a prior-endorsed check, (2) the check had a forged endorsement in the name of a payee other than the defendant, (3) there was no evidence that the check was stolen or endorsed by the defendant, and (4) the defendant never represented himself as being the payee.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Circumstantial Evidence — Forgery —Elements.
Evidence of such elements of the crime of forgery as knowledge of falsity and intent to defraud is rarely clear and convincing and often can only be proven with circumstantial evidence.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 36 Am Jur 2d, Forgery §§ 44-46, 48.
[2, 4, 7, 8] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1091, 1125, 1126.
[5] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1172.
[6] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 489.
[9] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 304.
5. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Burden — Elements of Crime — Probative Evidence — Reasonable Doubt.
The prosecutor’s burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has not been met when there is almost a total lack of probative evidence as to the commission of an element of the crime charged.
6. Criminal Law — Evidence—Directed Verdict — Insufficient Evidence — Matter of Law.
Denial of a motion for a directed verdict was reversible error where the evidence produced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to convict the defendant of the crime charged.
Dissent by V. J. Brennan, J.
7. Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Reasonable Inferences — Sufficiency of Evidence.
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom can be sufficient to uphold a conviction.
3. Criminal Law — Evidence—Sufficiency of Evidence — Appeal and Error.
A verdict is final and will not be disturbed on appeal where there is sufficient evidence presented at trial to justify the jury’s verdict.
9. Criminal Law — Question of Fact — Jury Questions — Intent to' Defraud — Knowledge of Forgery.
Evidence showing that a defendant presented a prior-endorsed check to be cashed, did not explain to the cashier that he was not the payee, and carried no identification was sufficient, in a trial for uttering and publishing a forged instrument, to present a question of fact for the jury as to whether the defendant had the requisite criminal intent to defraud and knowledge that the instrument was forged.
Appeal from Eaton, Richard Robinson, J.
Submitted November 6, 1975, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 22355.)
Decided March 23, 1976.
Robert L. Mask was convicted of uttering and publishing a forged instrument. Defendant appeals as of right.
Reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, David L. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service, Edward R. Wilson, Director, by Dennis M. Powers, Special Assistant Attorney General), for the people.
Stuart M. Israel, Assistant Defender, for defendant.
Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, P. J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of uttering and publishing a forged instrument. MCLA 750.249; MSA 28.446. He was sentenced to 2-1/2 to 14 years in prison and appeals as of right.
At trial, James Cooper testified that while he was working as a cashier at Don's Truck Stop on May 2, 1974, defendant entered the truck stop and placed a check before him. Mr. Cooper's relevant testimony was as follows:
"Q. Did he say anything to you, when he came into the station, sir?
"A. Not anything what he said. He was mumbling, and he just laid the check up there and said he wanted to cash it.
"Q. What did you do when Mr. Mask put the check up on the counter?
'A. I asked for identification.
"Q. Did you look at the check, at all?
'A. Yes, I looked at it.
"Q. Did you see that endorsement at that time?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. And what was Mr. Mask's action, response when you asked for identification?
'A. He told me he didn't have any.
"Q. What did you do at that point, sir?
'A. I couldn't take the check.
r,Q. Now after that time, did anyone else enter the station?
'A. After that time, Mr. Lonnie entered."
Mr. Lonnie, who apparently accompanied defendant to the truck stop, stated to the cashier that he would endorse the check. He endorsed his name and added his driver's license number and address. The cashier agreed to cash the check, stating that he would have to go and get the money. Leaving defendant and Lonnie standing at the counter, Cooper called the police. After 15 minutes, the police arrived with the defendant and Lonnie still standing at the counter. It was later determined that the check had been stolen and that the payee's name (Stephen W. Wood) had been forged thereon. Of the issues raised on appeal, one merits discussion and mandates reversal.
Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence produced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to convict defendant of the crime charged?
Two of the elements of the crime of uttering and publishing which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt are knowledge of the falsity of the instrument and intent to defraud. People v Kimble, 60 Mich App 690, 694; 233 NW2d 26 (1975). There was insufficient evidence produced by the prosecutor to prove these elements.
Defendant's "knowledge" of the falsity of the check was proven by the weakest of circumstantial evidence. The evidence produced at trial was not sufficient as it was clearly not inconsistent with other reasonable hypotheses upon which defendant's innocence might be maintained. People v Wingfield, 62 Mich App 161; 233 NW2d 220 (1975).
The evidence indicated that defendant sought to cash a U.S. Treasury check payable to a Stephen Wood. The check was endorsed in the name of the payee. When asked for identification, defendant responded that he had none. Defendant did not represent himself as Stephen Wood. Mr. Wood testified that he never received the check, that the endorsement was not his signature, and that he had not authorized the endorsement. There was no evidence that the check had been stolen or endorsed by the defendant.
The prosecutor argues that defendant tacitly put himself forward as Stephen Wood by presenting the check and by not stating that he was not the payee. It is also urged that proof of the mental elements of the crime can be based upon the fact that Stephen Wood neither endorsed the check nor authorized another to do so. These facts are equally probative of the argument that someone other than defendant stole the check, forged the endorsement and passed it to the defendant.
Evidence of such elements as knowledge of falsity and intent to defraud is rarely clear and convincing and often can only be proven with circumstantial evidence. In the instant case, however, there is an almost total lack of probative evidence of these elements. We can only conclude that the prosecutor's burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not met. Cf. People v Gadson, 348 Mich 307; 83 NW2d 227 (1957).
Reversed.
M. F. Cavanagh, J., concurred.