Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. James Craig MOORE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-10-19
Citations: 440 So. 2d 134
Docket Number: No. 82-KA-1788
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. James Craig MOORE.
Judges: DIXON, C.J., and DENNIS, J., dissent with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 440
Pages: 134–140

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. James Craig MOORE.
No. 82-KA-1788.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 19, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 1983.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., Don Landry, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Thomas E. Guilbeau, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
LEMMON, Justice.
In this appeal by defendant of his convictions for the attempted forcible rape and attempted second degree murder of a young woman, the principal issue involves the state's introduction of evidence of two unrelated attacks by defendant on other young women. Since the defense raised was clearly that of "mistaken identity", we must decide whether the evidence's relevance and probative value (the tendency to prove identity) was outweighed by the prejudicial effect (the tendency merely to prove "bad character"). See State v. Davis, 389 So.2d 71 (La.1980).
The victim's encounter with defendant occurred as she walked toward her home in Lafayette during the early morning hours of New Year's Day, 1981. She had been with her boyfriend (who at the time of trial was her husband) at a social gathering, but they became engaged in an argument, and she decided to walk home. She selected a well lighted route, walking through the area of Girouard Park near the university campus.
A rust colored Buick Riviera passed her and came to a stop. When the driver got out of the car and started to approach her, she announced that she did not want a ride. The man (whom she later identified in a lineup and at trial as defendant) moved quickly toward her, grabbed her, and smashed her on the head several times with a tire tool. The victim had the presence of mind to gasp and feign unconsciousness, and defendant discontinued the beating. He then pulled her off into some bushes adjacent to the roadway.
As the victim lay helplessly on the ground praying that someone would come upon the scene, defendant placed his hand between her legs and began to unbutton her skirt. She noticed that he had unzipped his trou sers and had exposed his penis. She described defendant as "grunting like an animal" while he crouched over her with his penis exposed, touching her perineal area and unbuttoning her dress.
Suddenly an automobile approached and slowed up, whereupon the victim sprang to her feet and ran toward the car, screaming for help. As a matter of fact, the driver had noticed her lying on the ground and had stopped to determine whether she needed assistance. Defendant ran to his car and drove off quickly. The victim asked her rescuer to follow defendant and attempt to determine the license number, but they were unsuccessful. The victim was then taken to the hospital, where she was treated in the emergency room and was interviewed by police.
The investigation eventually focused on defendant, and the police arrested him and searched his house pursuant to warrants. Although the police discovered a burgundy colored Buick Riviera (which had its tire tool missing and a small smudge of blood on the roof) and a white Ford Granada (the type of car used in another recent sexual attack in Girouard Park) at defendant's home, they did not find any other physical evidence linking defendant to the instant offense. Thus, the state's case rested almost entirely on the strength of the victim's identification.
At defendant's trial, defense counsel directed his efforts toward challenging and undermining her positive and unequivocal identification of defendant as her attacker. He focused his cross-examination of the victim on the lighting conditions at the scene and on her opportunity to view her assailant. He even concluded his closing argument by telling the jury that the "true culprit for [the victim's attack] is still somewhere outside. It is not Mr. Moore [defendant]".
It was in this context that the trial judge had to decide whether to permit the state to call two other young women who were assaulted in the early morning hours in the area of Girouard Park by a man whom they would positively identify as the defendant.
Before permitting the state to offer the testimony of the witnesses, the judge conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury and received evidence of the other incidents. Despite some differences, the other two attacks were essentially similar in most significant aspects. Both of the other attacks were made within a month of the present crime on pretty, young white women in the Girouard Park area in the early morning hours (between 2:00 and 5:00 a.m.). All three incidents displayed a pattern in which defendant prowled about in an automobile during the early morning hours in an area where one might expect to find pretty young "coed types". All three incidents involved the same bizarre behavior, in that defendant exposed his penis during the use of physical violence upon the female victim. All three involved a fondling of the intended victim's legs or thighs.
After deciding to permit the state to offer the testimony of the other two young women, the judge carefully instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of the evidence (to prove identity of defendant as the victim's assailant) before allowing the jury to hear the witnesses. Again, when the prosecutor in closing argument mentioned the other incidents, the judge gave the limiting instruction. The judge again repeated the instruction in charging the jury.
Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible when the only purpose of the evidence is to show the defendant's propensity to violate criminal laws, since the relevancy of such evidence for the purpose of showing that the defendant was the perpetrator is so marginal that its probative value is heavily outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The underlying purpose of a rule excluding such evidence (such as Fed.R.Evid. § 404[b]) is to protect the defendant from undue prejudice resulting from the use of evidence which has only marginal relevance to disputed issues. However, there are exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility.
The decision in State v. Hatcher, 372 So.2d 1024 (La.1979), sets forth guidelines for determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes. First, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other crimes. Second, the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show the defendant's general criminal character. Third, the other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue. Fourth, the method of commission of both the charged and the uncharged crime must be so distinctively similar that one may logically infer that the same person committed both crimes. Fifth, the probative value of the other crimes evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
In the present case, there was clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the other crimes. Moreover, the identity of the perpetrator was genuinely at issue, and the other crimes evidence had substantial independent relevance for the purpose of showing the probability that defendant was the perpetrator of the charged crime. Virtually the entire case was based on the victim's identification. The generally unsatisfactory nature of eyewitness identification uncorroborated by physical evidence and the intensity of defense counsel's challenge to the victim's identification revealed plainly that the proffered evidence was introduced for purposes of establishing identity, which was a genuine issue in this case, rather than to show merely that defendant had a "bad character". See State v. Hatcher, above; State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977).
The critical areas for determination are the comparison of the distinctive similarities between the crimes and the weighing of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the inherent prejudice. These determinations, which are closely related, must be made on a case by case basis.
Evidence of other crimes may be admitted when the prior crime by the particular defendant is so distinctively similar to the charged crime (especially in terms of time, place and manner of commission) that one may reasonably infer that the same person was the perpetrator. The determination of this standard is essentially a balancing process. The greater the degree of similarity of the offenses, the more the evidence enhances the probability that the same person was the perpetrator, and hence the greater the evidence's probative value, which is to be ultimately weighed against its prejudicial effect.
Thus, the positive identification of a defendant as the perpetrator of a distinctively similar previous crime is often permitted to enhance the otherwise uncorroborated identification of that person as the perpetrator of the charged crime. In such cases, the evidence of the uncharged crime has much higher relevance and far greater probative value than evidence which merely indicates that the defendant has a propensity to engage in all kinds of criminal activity.
The court in determining admissibility must also weigh the incremental probity of the evidence against its inherent prejudice. When "other crimes", evidence has only marginal relevance and therefore only slight probative value, the prejudicial effect is enormously disproportionate.
In this case, the other sexual assaults had significantly similar salient features which gave them the degree of distinctive similarity necessary to enhance the probability that defendant was the perpetrator of all three offenses. All three offenses involved a sex offender's December, 1980 prowling in an automobile in Girouard Park during the early morning hours in search of young white women and his attacking them violently with his penis exposed. The similarities in the method of commission and in the time, place and other circumstances of the crimes are so distinctive that the positive identification of defendant by the victims of the first two crimes greatly enhanced the uncorroborated identification by the victim of the charged crime, thereby giving the evidence extremely high probative value on the only disputed issue in the case. Moreover, the trial judge lessened the prejudicial effect and guarded against jury misuse of the evidence by giving cautionary instructions contemporaneously with the evidence and the closing argument, as well as in his jury charges.
Thus, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence on the basis that the crime had sufficient distinctive similarities and that the probative value of the challenged evidence's tendency to establish identity outweighed its tendency only to prove "bad character". See State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976).
Therefore, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
DIXON, C.J., and DENNIS, J., dissent with reasons.
Bailes, J. sitting for Marcus, Justice.
.Defendant also challenges the competency of trial counsel, citing counsel's failure to raise the "other crimes" issue by pretrial motion. This complaint is plainly without merit. The issue was properly raised at trial and was properly preserved for review on appeal.
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 821. He was sentenced to a total of 70 years imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant has four prior convictions and does not challenge the severity of his sentence.
. The injury was so severe as to require stitches and reconstructive surgery.
. The victim was a recent college graduate, majoring in psychology. She was in her early 20's at the time of the attack.
. Neither the rescuer nor his passenger saw the attacker well enough to identify him.
. During the defense case, an investigator was called to testify concerning the lighting conditions in the area in an effort to show that the light was poor and that the victim's opportunity to view her assailant was very limited.
. Prior to trial, the prosecutor provided defendant a "Prieur notice", alerting the defense of its intent to offer "other crimes evidence" and setting forth the purpose of offering such evidence. See State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973). Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the notice.
. There were some dissimilarities. The degree of force used against the victim of the charged offenses was greater than that used in the two earlier incidents. The other victims were handled violently, but defendant did not resort to armed violence.
In the first incident (December 6), defendant grabbed the sleeping victim from a parked car and was grabbing her thighs when her male companion (who had also been asleep) pulled defendant off, allowing her to run away. Defendant stole the female's purse as he fled in a white Ford Granada. (Other evidence showed that type of car at defendant's home.)
In the second incident (December 28), defendant got out of a red colored Riviera, grabbed the victim by the hair and arm, and pulled her down. He removed her underwear and attempted to have intercourse before she convinced him that her parents were home and would be checking on her. Upon her promise to meet him later, he fled, leaving her alone. (She had been trained at a rape seminar not to struggle with potential rapists and to talk to them in an effort to dissuade them from persisting in their attack.)
. In Louisiana, La.R.S. 15:481's prohibition against the use of evidence of the defendant's bad character effectively excludes the use of evidence of other crimes except as proof of some independently relevant and material issue other than the defendant's general criminal propensity. State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507 (La.1982).
.It has been suggested that the nature of the crime may affect the court's weighing process in determining the requisite relationship between the proffered evidence and a non-propensity issue (such as intent or identity) See 2 J. Weinstein, Evidence § 404[11] (1982). The suggested tendency is that courts admit other crimes more freely in narcotics and sex cases. That tendency in Louisiana in child abuse cases has also been noted. See State v. Germain, 433 So.2d 110 (La.1983).
Nevertheless, we agree with the court's statements in U.S. v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.1973), that "[s]imply fitting evidence of this nature into an exception heretofore recognized is, to our minds, too mechanistic an approach" and that "evidence of other offenses may be received, if relevant, for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime, provided that the trial judge may exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused." See State v. Humphrey, above.
. Another significant consideration in determining the degree of probative value (or the relevance based on similarity of the incidents) is the fact that the perpetrator in all three crimes used either a burgundy colored Buick Riviera or a white Ford Granada, both of which were found at defendant's home.
. It would perhaps have been preferable for the offenses to be joined for a single trial, rather than being offered as unjoined "other crimes evidence" to prove identity, in order to prevent the danger that the jury may convict the defendant of the offense charged merely because the jury is convinced that the defendant committed the uncharged crimes, without being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the charged offense. There is also a danger in some cases that the jury may convict a defendant to prevent his escaping punishment for the uncharged crimes. In this case, however, the trial judge's careful instructions eliminated any significant risk that the jury might misuse the "other crimes evidence" in that fashion.