Case Name: ROGUE RIVER FRUIT & PRODUCE ASSN. v. GILLEN-CHAMBERS CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1915-09-28
Citations: 85 Or. 113
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROGUE RIVER FRUIT & PRODUCE ASSN. v. GILLEN-CHAMBERS CO.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice Harris concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 85
Pages: 113–124

Head Matter:
Motion to enjoin execution denied September 28, 1915.
Argued on the merits May 22, affirmed June 19, rehearing denied July 17, 1917.
ROGUE RIVER FRUIT & PRODUCE ASSN. v. GILLEN-CHAMBERS CO.
(151 Pac. 728; 165 Pac. 679.)
ON MOTION FOR INJUNCTION.
Appeal and Error — Stay of Proceedings — Counter Undertaking — “Suit on a Contract.”
1. An action for damages for breach of a contract is a suit on a contract, within Section 553, L. O. L., providing for the enforcement of judgments in such suits, notwithstanding an appeal and an undertaking for stay of proceedings upon the giving of a counter undertaking.
ON THE' MERITS.
Contracts — Construction—Arbitration.
2. A construction contract reserving to the owner’s engineer the right to inspect the building does not make him the arbiter of compliance with specifications so as to render his acceptance or failure to object binding upon the owner.
[As to conclusiveness of architect’s or engineer’s certificate, see note in 56 Am. St. Rep. 314.]
Contracts — Breach—W aiver.
3. To constitute acceptance of a building or approval of the work _ and material a waiver or estoppel, it must appear that the owner knew ;of the defects which he afterward complained of, sinee waiver cannot be imputed in the absence of knowledge.
Contracts — Breach—Waiver—Instructions.
4. In building owner’s action against the contractor for damages for defective work, a requested instruction that approval of the building bound the plaintiff after his examination was properly refused as omitting plaintiff’s knowledge of the defects, since mere examination does not always impute knowledge especially of latent defects.
Appeal and. Error — Scope of Review — Requests for Instructions.
5. In the absence of request for a proper instruction upon a proposition at issue, it will not be considered on appeal.
Contracts — Breach—Estoppel.
6. Mere inspection of work by the building owner or its agents does not so conclusively estop it as to prevent its recovering damages for hidden defects of construction or amount to a waiver of faults discovered after the completion of the work.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Trial — Instructions—Questions of Law and of Fact.
7. Tlie requested instruction desired by defendant was properly refused on account of tbe matter set forth being a question of fact for the jury to pass upon, and where the petition fails to distinguish between questions of fact and questions of law, a rehearing will be denied.
From Jackson: Frank M. Calkins, Judge.
In Banc. Statement by Mr. Justice Eakin.
This is an action by the Rogue River Fruit & Produce Association against the G-illen-Chambers Company upon a contract for the erection of a building.
The plaintiff alleged that by reason of the failure of the defendant to keep the terms of the contract it had been damaged in the sum of $2,000. On a trial it recovered judgment for $1,509.52. Defendant appealed, and gave a stay bond, as is provided by Section 551, subdivision 4, L. O. L. Within the time prescribed the plaintiff filed a counter-bond, as required by Section 553, L. O. L., and issued an execution to enforce the judgment notwithstanding the appeal. The defendant now moves this court for an order to enjoin any sale under this execution pending the appeal, upon the ground that this action is not within the purview of said Section 553.
Motion Denied.
Messrs. Neff & Mealey, for the motion.
Mr. O. C. Boggs and Messrs. Beach, Simon & Nelson, contra.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Eakin
delivered the opinion of the court.
The power of this court to issue an injunction in such a case, when the action is within the purview of Section 553, L. O. L., is upheld by this court in Kollock & Co. v. Leyde, 77 Or. 569 (143 Pac. 621); so the only question to be considered is as to whether this is an action upon a contract. This it clearly is.
Counsel for defendant contends that the section refers only to a contract for the direct payment of money — for example, a promissory note, when the promisee admits liability for a specific amount — and that it was not intended to cover an action for damages, although the right to recover such damages arises upon a contract. No authority is cited for such construction, and we doubt if any exists. There is an abundance of decisions holding that such an action as the one at bar is an action upon a contract: See 1 Words and Phrases, p. 145.
The injunction is denied. Denied.
Affirmed June 19, 1917.