Case Name: THE STATE v. HUNTER
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2007-05-14
Citations: 282 Ga. 278
Docket Number: S07A0139
Parties: THE STATE v. HUNTER.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Benham and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 282
Pages: 278–284

Head Matter:
S07A0139.
THE STATE v. HUNTER.
(646 SE2d 465)

Opinion:
Melton, Justice.
The State appeals from the grant of defendant Michael Hunter's motion to suppress, contending that the trial court erred in concluding that the police provided insufficient information to the magistrate to support a showing of probable cause to search Hunter's suspected residence. Because we agree with the State that the police officer's affidavit at issue here provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to determine that probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant, we reverse.
The magistrate's task in determining if probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Our duty in reviewing the magistrate's decision in this case is to determine if the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrants. A magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 787 (7) (493 SE2d 157) (1997). The test for probable cause is not a hypertechnical one to be employed by legal technicians, but is based on the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men . . . act." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215, 217 (1) (336 SE2d 762) (1985). Moreover, even doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding a warrant. See Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212, 213 (465 SE2d 438) (1996).
With these principles in mind, the record reveals that on October 27, 2004, Ronnie Davis was shot and killed outside of his apartment. As outlined in an affidavit provided to the issuing magistrate by Detective Mark Smith, the police interviewed witnesses who connected Hunter and two other men to the shooting. The witnesses stated that Hunter and the other men fled the scene after the shooting. The investigation also revealed that Hunter, the suspected leader of a narcotics ring in north Fulton County, had no recent job history; no vehicles registered to him; no home or apartment in his own name; and no utilities or phone listed in his name. Hunter's last known address was a residence that he shared with Chequanda Milteer. Witnesses identified Hunter as a person who had frequent contact with Milteer, and a person who had been seen driving Milteer's vehicles. Milteer had also listed Hunter as her "employer" for purposes of obtaining her current apartment. At the time that police arrested Hunter, he was driving a car that was registered to Milteer. Before he was arrested, however, Hunter attempted to flee in the direction of Milteer's apartment. Based on this information from Detective Smith's affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant allowing the police to search Milteer's residence for, among other things, firearms, ammunition, and narcotics. It was later revealed at the motion to suppress hearing that, at the time that the magistrate issued the warrant, Detective Smith had not informed the magistrate that Hunter had not been seen at Milteer's current apartment despite six weeks of police surveillance there, and that Hunter was half a mile away from Milteer's apartment at the time that he allegedly attempted to flee in the direction of the apartment when he was arrested.
Without considering the additional information that Detective Smith failed to include in his affidavit, the affidavit on its face provided the magistrate with enough information to come to the "practical, common-sense" conclusion that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime could be found at Milteer's residence. Specifically, Hunter lived with Milteer in at least one of her previous apartments; Hunter had no current address under his own name; Milteer listed Hunter as her "employer" for purposes of obtaining her new apartment (even though Hunter had no recent job history); a witness connected Hunter to a murder and to an illegal narcotics operation in north Fulton County; witnesses saw Hunter driving vehicles registered to Milteer; police found Hunter driving a car registered to Milteer and Hunter had no car in his own name; and Hunter ran in the direction of Milteer's apartment when police attempted to arrest him. Based on the information contained in the affidavit, the magistrate was able to come to the common-sense conclusion that Hunter, having lived with Milteer in the past, having no independent address of his own, and having been found driving Milteer's car, might have been currently residing with Milteer, and that evidence of criminal activity could be found at Milteer's residence. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 217 Ga. App. 45, 48 (456 SE2d 693) (1995) (probable cause existed to search defendant's girlfriend's apartment based on anonymous tip and defendant's criminal history, even though apartment utilities were in another person's name).
Even after excising the inaccurate information from the affidavit and inserting the more accurate information derived from Detective Smith's testimony at the motion to suppress hearing (see Moss v. State, 275 Ga. 96, 102 (13) (561 SE2d 382) (2002)), the magistrate still had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant. Assuming that the detective deliberately withheld from the magistrate (1) the fact that Hunter was half a mile away from Milteer's apartment when he allegedly ran in the direction of the apartment, and (2) the fact that the police had not seen Hunter at Milteer's apartment during their six weeks of surveillance, this omitted information would not invalidate the finding of probable cause. Regardless of whether or not Hunter ran in the direction of Milteer's apartment when police attempted to arrest him, Hunter had already been connected to Milteer through their prior co-habitation; being listed as Milteer's "employer" on her apartment records (despite having no recent employment history or home in his own name); and being seen driving Milteer's vehicles both before and when he was arrested. Moreover, the police did not have to observe Hunter living with Milteer to reach the logical conclusion based on the information provided to them that the pair could still be living together. Stewart, supra, 217 Ga. App. at 48.
In light of the substantial deference that we must give to a magistrate's finding of probable cause, and in light of the evidence supporting the issuance of the search warrant here, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Hunter's motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.
Hunter was indicted for, among other things, murder in connection with the shooting death of Ronnie Davis.
Even though the residence that was searched was not in Hunter's name, the State does not challenge the trial court's finding that Hunter has standing to challenge the warrant that was issued here.
This Court in no way condones Detective Smith's decision to conceal relevant information from the magistrate in seeking the search warrant. Nor can this Court make any assumptions as to why the issuing magistrate did not place Detective Smith under oath and ask him additional questions before agreeing to issue the search warrant. Nonetheless, our role under the governing legal standard is to determine whether, while giving substantial deference to the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. DeYoung, supra, 268 Ga. at 787 (7). Where, as here, the circumstances reveal that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause, even when considered in light of Detective Smith's omissions, the evidence seized in connection with the warrant should not be suppressed. Stewart, supra, 217 Ga. App. at 48.