Case Name: John William BUTLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZAPATA HAYNIE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-02-23
Citations: 633 So. 2d 1274
Docket Number: No. 92-71
Parties: John William BUTLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZAPATA HAYNIE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., and STOKER, THIBODEAUX, COOKS and SAUNDERS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 633
Pages: 1274–1295

Head Matter:
John William BUTLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZAPATA HAYNIE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 92-71.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1994.
Rehearing Denied April 6, 1994.
Raleigh Newman, Lake Charles, for John William Butler.
James Buckner Doyle, Lake Charles, for Zapata Haynie Corp.
Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., and STOKER, THIBODEAUX, COOKS and SAUNDERS, JJ.

Opinion:
THIBODEAUX, Judge.
In this action brought under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.CApp. § 688, for negligence, the general maritime law for unseaworthiness of the vessel, and for punitive damages, attorney fees, and penalties for failure to provide maintenance and cure, the plaintiff, John Butler, appeals a judgment in favor of Zapata Haynie Corporation, defendant and owner of the fishing vessel, M/V Oyster Bayou, on which plaintiff claims he was injured on April 24, 1989.
After the presentation of plaintiff's case in this non-jury trial, the trial court granted Zapata's motion for involuntary dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim. At the completion of the trial, the court concluded that an accident had not occurred and dismissed plaintiffs remaining claims.
John Butler filed this appeal from the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment as it relates to the dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim, and reverse and render on the Jones Act negligence claim and the refusal to award maintenance and cure benefits. We decline to award punitive damages and attorney fees.
FACTS
Butler was a member of the crew of the M/V Oyster Bayou wMch was engaged in catcMng menhaden, or "pogy," fish in the Gulf of Mexico. His job was that of a cork puller in the mate boat, one of two purse boats which is a powered launch carried by the main vessel, or "steamer." The purse boats encircle the schools of menhaden with a large drawn net. Each purse boat has a power block mounted on a large swivel boom. TMs power block weighs approximately 300 pounds and is used to lift the net after the fish are caught. It is hydraulically powered from the engine on the purse boat.
Butler claims he was struck on the left side of Ms head by the power block wMch was being operated by Aldoise "Cookie" Hampton whose regular job was that of a cook or ring setter. This blow caused a hermated cervical disc at the C5-6 level of the neck as the principal injury wMch left him disabled.
John Butler, the plaintiff, testified that he was working in the mate purse boat with, among others, Frank Robinson and Aldoise "CooMe" Hampton, the block operator. The block was located behind him as he was working with the net near the time the accident occurred. George Lemelle, a crew member, yelled at him to "watch out." At about that time, he saw Hampton "fighting" with the control levers. As he turned to determine what danger was involved, he was almost immediately struck by the block. He recalls waMng up later in his bunk in the "hold" of the boat.
When his captain, Bruce Mason, visited him in the hold, he advised Mason of pain in his head, chest and left arm areas. Shortly thereafter, Mason brought him ashore and instructed him to report the incident to Ms pilot because of Mason's inability to write a report. As he, Butler, was giving a narrative to the pilot, Mason interrupted them and accused Butler of "making a case." Butler testified that Mason then escorted him off of the premises. He ultimately went home after returmng to Zapata's plant to request that an accident report be made.
According to Butler, a friend offered to transport him to a doctor on April 25th, the day after the accident. Instead, he was brought to Attorney Gano Lemoine's office who arranged an appointment with Dr. Frank Robbins, a specialist in industrial medicine and Board certified in surgery and emergency medicine. Butler was examined by Dr. Robbins on April 26, 1989. Dr. Robbins referred him to Dr. William Foster, a neurosurgeon, who recommended physical therapy. Dr. Robbins also recommended an MRI diagnostic procedure, but Butler had to forgo this testing because no one would pay for it, including Zapata.
Butler's testimony was corroborated by Oscar Dudley, a cousin by marriage. Because of a malfunction in the netting process, the fish could not be lifted and pumped into the steamer. Consequently, the fish had to be released. A crewman yelled for the ring setter to operate the block for the purpose of swinging it over. Apparently, according to Dudley, the incorrect lever was used by the operator which caused the block to swing around and strike Butler. Dudley further testified that the block had been functioning improperly and the crew had knowledge of this. Specifically, he stated that it was difficult for an operator to control the direction of the block swing once it began moving. He assisted the plaintiff in getting to the steamer after the occurrence. Butler advised him that his hand, arm and back areas were in pain.
In his initial statement given to Joanna "Jody" Olsen, the claims representative for Zapata, two days following the accident, Dudley stated that he heard someone yelling to move the power block and heard the power block striking Butler's helmet on the left side, but Butler continued to work. Butler later told him that his arm was bothering him and he had a headache. Dudley's deposition testimony contradicted his initial statement in that it substantially tracked his trial testimony. His deposition and trial testimony emphatically stated that Butler was hit in the head and bent over, but not to the floor level after being hit. When confronted with the disparities in his various statements, Dudley explained that he was less than truthful in his statement to the claims representative because he wanted to preserve his bonus of $500.00 which each crew member received for an accident-free season.
George Lemelle, another crew member of the M/V Oyster Bayou, testified that he saw the block strike Butler on the left side of the head. After the blow, Butler was taken down to his bunk area of the steamer.
In support of its position that an accident did not occur, Zapata's captain, Bruce Mason, testified that he witnessed an occasion on April 24th when Butler's hat brim was hit by the power block. Butler, however, continued working and the fishing operation was not interrupted. Mason felt that Butler was uninjured by the minor impact. When he later checked on Butler in the bunk area of the steamer, Butler was experiencing difficulty in "catching his breath," although Mason admitted that Butler was also complaining about pain in his head area for which he supplied some aspirin. Mason subsequently filed an accident report and described the accident as "minor."
On cross-examination, Mason indicated that he had heard crew members talking about Butler being hit by the power block. He further admitted that it was possible for Butler to become injured by an event which he did not witness. Butler initially voiced a desire for medical treatment but, according to Mason, changed his mind after they engaged in an argument.
Mason's testimony also verified that the company had problems with the controls on the power block "for a period of time" before the accident, but he was uncertain if the problem was corrected before leaving on the date of the accident.
The other primary defense witness on the issue of liability was Aldoise "Cookie" Hampton, the power block operator on the day of the accident whose regular job was that of a cook and ring setter on the boat. Hampton said that nothing was wrong with the power block. The block, however, could have struck Butler without his (Hampton's) knowledge. He admitted moving the block because it appeared as though a collision between the purse boat and the steamer was imminent. He admonished the crewmen to "look out" when the block began moving. Hampton did not see Butler being hit; he only heard about it from crew members. However, he went into Butler's bunk area to inquire about his condition because he knew that Butler had "got hurt." He testified that he observed a "nail scratch" on Butler.
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
The ultimate conclusion of the trial court was that Butler failed to prove an accident. It reached this determination by judging the plaintiffs case solely on the credibility of John Butler, the plaintiff, and two of his witnesses, Oscar Dudley and George Le-melle, who was mistakenly identified as "Philip Lemelle" in the trial court opinion. It identified their credibility as "nonexistent" while apparently giving credence to the testimony of the two main witnesses for Zapata on the issue of liability.
For the reasons expressed below, the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its findings.
ISSUES
The issues are:
(1) Whether the trial court committed manifest error in failing to find that an accident occurred;
(2) Whether the trial court committed manifest error in failing to find negligence on the part of Zapata Haynie Corporation;
(3) Whether the trial court committed manifest error in granting a directed verdict on the issue of unseaworthiness and in failing to find that the WV Oyster Bayou was unseaworthy;
(4) Whether the trial court committed manifest error in failing to make an award for maintenance and cure; and,
(5) Whether the trial court committed manifest error in failing to find the actions of Zapata Haynie to be arbitrary and capricious for their failure to pay maintenance and cure, in failing to award penalties, punitive damages, and attorney fees against Zapata on the issue of maintenance and cure.
DISCUSSION
An appellate court in Louisiana is constitutionally authorized to review both law and facts. La. Const, art. V, § 10(B). This court is acutely aware of the oft-quoted rules of appellate review. Just recently in Stobart v. State of Louisiana, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993), our supreme court instructed us that:
(1) A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of 'manifest error' or unless it is 'clearly wrong.' Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). This court has announced a two-part test for reversal of a factfinder's determinations:
1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and
2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).
See Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987).
This test dictates that a reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or controverts the trial court's finding. Id. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844-45. (Emphasis supplied).
Balanced against these directives is the idea that:
"[t]he principles of appellate review do not require an appellate court to affirm the trier of fact's refusal to accept as credible uncontradicted testimony or greatly preponderant objectively-corroborated testimony where the record indicates no sound reason for its rejection and where the factual finding itself has been reached by overlooking applicable legal principles. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987)."
Dugas v. Fontenot Motors, 510 So.2d 1374, 1376 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987). In other words, an intermediate appellate court is not required to follow blindly the factual determinations of a trial court without discerning whether that court's discretion in evaluating facts and credibility has been abused. Certainly, the fact finder should be accorded great latitude and discretion, but discretion must always be buttressed by sound judgment. It is not immutable. To extend the quality of immutability to a fact finder's determinations simply because it articulates the magical word, "credibility" effectively limits and circumvents an appellate court's constitutionally given power to review facts.
Against this background, then, what documents, objective evidence, objectively-corroborated testimony, or uncontradicted testimony exist which militate in favor of rejecting the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations?
The trial court specifically found that "[pjlaintiff s version of events rest [sic] solely upon his testimony and that of two other crew members of the M/V Oyster Bayou, namely Oscar Dudley and George Lemelle." (Emphasis supplied). The record does not support this finding. Zapata's claims representative took recorded statements from each crew member on April 26, 1989. The statements were later transcribed and entered into evidence. Frank Robinson, for example, saw Butler being struck by the rear of the block. Robinson declared that if Butler had been hit with the "front" portion of the mechanism, he would have been killed. This obviously demonstrates the intensity of the force by which the 300 pound block is propelled by hydraulic power. The force, according to Robinson, knocked Butler off the rail — he was "bent over" and "went down." This statement corroborates what Dudley observed, that Butler was hit in the head and "bent over." Butler did not appear to be hurt, although he was definitely hit. Nonetheless, Butler complained to Robinson about chest pains, a headache, and pain from his head to his arm. Because Captain Mason was busy, he did not witness the incident, Robinson's statement indicated.
The trial court observed that the Butler— Lemelle — Dudley versions of the accident were "directly contradicted by Bruce Mason . and Aldoise Hampton." This observation again is not supported by the record. Mason admitted witnessing an incident of. the power block striking the brim of Butler's hat. Mason testified that "7 seen when he got hit the time I seen him get hit" and "[w]e wasn't up against the steamer. That's the reason I say I don't know when this fellow got hit. I seen him get hit ." On cross-examination, Mason simply denied that Butler was injured by what he claimed to be a minor accident, but did not repudiate the fact of some contact of the 300 pound block with Butler's hat. Thus, Captain Mason's version does not contradict Butler's; in fact, it corroborates it. The only divergence concerns the seventy of the impact which is an issue for resolution by the medical providers.
Hampton admitted that he may not have been able to see everything from his position as operator of the block. He simply stated that he did not see anyone being hit by the block and did not notice any work interruption. In fact, Hampton's testimony corroborates to a certain extent the plaintiffs version. The block could have struck Butler without Hampton's knowledge, according to Hampton. Moreover, Hampton hollered "look out" when the block started to move, and he also heard someone yell to "watch the block," just as Butler testified to. Although Hampton stated he did not strike Butler with the block, he knew that Butler "got hurt," prompting him to check on Butler's condition.
Because it was faced with such "contradictory testimony," the court felt that it had to decide whether plaintiffs version was trustworthy. The only plausibly contradictory testimony was Hampton's and even his version of the event was equivocal.
The trial court found it "important to note that the plaintiff did not connect [his] condition to any incident on the purse boat or to any accident." (Emphasis supplied). The record again does not substantiate this "important" finding:
THE COURT: It (the power block) swings pretty violently when .
THE WITNESS (MASON): Yeah, at times or, you know, when it's rough if you've got any slack in it, it will, yeah.
THE COURT: When you got word that Mr. Butler was in the hold of the boat, was that after the set was complete?
THE WITNESS: After the set was complete, yeah.
THE COURT: And you visited with him down in the hold?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Did he say he had gotten hit in the head by the block?
THE WITNESS: He told me he got hit.
THE COURT: By the block? I mean
THE WITNESS: Yeah, block.
Captain Mason filed an accident report, as the trial court found. Yet, Leonard Nunez, the insurance claims specialist for Zapata, and Richard Brunner, its corporate risk manager, denied that any such report had been filed or that an accident of any sort had occurred.
The lower court found Butler's credibility to be lacking because he: (1) admitted making false statements in his job application relating to previous loss time accidents; (2) intentionally failed to mention an automobile accident; (3) does not file income tax returns; (4) went to an attorney first, rather than a doctor; and, (5) failed to disclose significant events in his past which would impact upon his current medical condition. These bases for a complete obliteration of plaintiffs credibility are overemphasized and unrelated to the events surrounding the accident, especially when the record is viewed in its entirety.
The record contains additional ample objective and documentary evidence to sufficiently overcome the trial court's lack of credibility findings and to support a reversal.
Dr. Frank Robbins was plaintiffs treating physician who examined Butler two days after the occurrence. Butler had a 50% decreased range of motion in his neck. An x-ray of the cervical area revealed an angulation at the C5-C6 disc level. An angulation, explained Dr. Robbins, is a break in the normal curvature of the vertebrae and is evidence of trauma. It does not occur naturally. Furthermore, the plaintiffs injury was recent. Dr. Robbins opined that Butler could not have worked on the M/V Oyster Bayou with his injury, i.e., a herniated inter-vertebral disc.
Butler received therapy treatments on April 27, 28 and May 1 and 2, 1989. Dr. Robbins saw Butler on a regular basis through at least January 3, 1990 at which time, he felt, Butler was still unable to work. In August, 1989, Butler continued to complain of pain in his leg. Because of the pain and plaintiffs failure to respond to conservative treatment, Dr. Robbins felt an MRI was essential. An MRI was finally done on August 21, 1990. It revealed what is commonly known as a "slipped disc" which causes a compression of the spinal cord. This compression can cause symptoms in the lower extremities similar to those experienced by Butler.
Dr. Ariel Bar-Sela of the Houston Pain Center corroborated Dr. Robbins's diagnosis of a C-6 radiculopathy caused by a disc injury.
Moreover, Dr. Robbins examined x-rays of Butler's cervical area in 1987 taken as a result of an automobile accident and compared them to x-rays taken after this accident. The 1987 x-rays were normal along with a cat scan of the C-5 and C-6 areas. However, there were identifiable differences between the 1987 and 1989 post-accident x-rays.
Dr. Robbins concluded that based on Butler's history and having examined him two days post-accident, the impact of the power block was the cause of Butler's condition. He further felt that Butler was not malingering. The clinical examinations, x-rays, and MRI results were all consistent with the trauma described by Butler.
Dr. Dale Bernauer, an orthopedist, who treated Butler for a 1987 cervical injury confirmed Dr. Robbins's analysis of Butler's 1987 injury. The neurological examinations in 1987 were normal, the cervical strain sustained in 1987 was self-limiting in nature, and the CT scans of the cervical areas near C-6 and C-7 were essentially normal. Furthermore, the disc herniation in 1989 at C-5 and C-6 would not be a natural progression from the 1987 injury and would necessarily result from an intervening cause.
Dr. Cecil Clark performed a pre-em-ployment physical examination on Butler on behalf of Zapata on February 23, 1989. No problems were noted. The report indicated a "normal spine." The record lacks any evidence to show an injury between February 23, 1989 and the date of the accident. We have to assume that Butler, therefore, was in good health on April 24, 1989. If, after the incident, Butler had a disabling injury and there is a reasonable possibility that the incident caused the disabling injury, as we so find, then there is a legal presumption that the incident caused the injury. Lucas v. Insurance Company of North America, 342 So.2d 591 (La.1977); Heath v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 398 So.2d 132, 134 (La.App. 3d Cir.1981). That legal presumption exists in the case sub judice. The defendant presented no evidence to rebut this legal presumption. The trial judge's failure to recognize and apply this presumption is an error of law.
Dr. William Foster, a neurosurgeon, examined Butler on May 4, 1989, one week after the accident. Butler had "marked paraspi-nous muscle spasm in the neck." He felt that the spasm was related to the recent injury of Butler. He exhibited a past concussion syndrome, cerebral concussion, and a severe cervical straining injury. Dr. Foster could not completely exclude a herniated cervical disc. He recommended one month of therapy and testified that his findings were consistent with involvement in some type of recent trauma.
At the request of Zapata, Butler was examined on July 23, 1990 by Dr. Gerald Litel, a neurosurgeon. His deposition testimony indicated that Butler's disc herniation occurred between December 16, 1987 and August 21, 1990 and that a blow to the head by a power block can cause a herniated disc. In his report to the attorney for Zapata, Dr. Litel specifically noted the appearance of a cervical strain and "complaints suggestive of a radiculopathy" which is a pinched nerve. Interestingly enough, Dr. Litel's observations mirrored those of Dr. Robbins, plaintiffs treating physician, and Dr. Bar-Sela. Dr. Litel went on to say "I do believe this man sustained a significant blow to his head and has had a post-eoneussive syndrome."
Zapata's approach and responses to the plaintiffs allegations of injury were not models of consistency. In fact, their justifications and arguments were often disingenuous. Leonard Nunez, for example, testified that he received the first notice of an accident and injury on May 11, 1989 when an attorney for Butler wrote to him. He then assigned Jody Olsen to begin an investigation. Richard Brunner, Zapata's risk manager, testified that statements of potential witnesses and crewmen were taken after Butler spoke with a Zapata official in May, 1989. However, the record is clear that fourteen statements were taken by Ms. Olsen on April 26,1989, two days after the incident which is the subject of this lawsuit. The testimony of Zapata officials has to be viewed with great suspicion under these circumstances. It borders on the incredulous to assume a position of ignorance with respect to an incident on which an investigation was ordered and conducted two days following the incident and then state that knowledge of the occurrence was first acquired some two weeks after the accident and investigation.
Although it is uncontroverted that Zapata was busy conducting an investigation two days following the accident and was placed on notice of an accident through numerous letters and medical reports received from Butler's attorneys, Zapata asserted in its answers to certain interrogatories on February 1, 1990 that it had no reason to believe Butler was injured, except for his own asser tions, had no knowledge of Butler's injuries, and did not have an accident report. Of course, Zapata's own captain testified that he submitted a report on Butler's accident.
Given the circumstances enumerated above, this court is left with the unmistakable belief that an accident occurred on April 24, 1989 which injured John Butler. The trial court was manifestly erroneous to find otherwise.
NEGLIGENCE OF ZAPATA
Our jurisprudence holds that a seaman such as John Butler has a "featherlight" burden of proof in a civil action, Osorio v. Waterman Steamship Corporation, 557 So.2d 999 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 561 So.2d 99 (La.1990), and that the "slightest negligence" is sufficient to sustain Jones Act liability. Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 458 So.2d 971 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984). The record amply establishes that Zapata was negligent in allowing Butler to be struck with a power block being operated by a crewman, Aldoise "Cookie" Hampton, who was inexperienced in the operation of this hydraulically powered equipment. As noted elsewhere in this opinion, Hampton was a cook who was assigned to operate the power block which, according to Captain Mason, was difficult to control.
Because the trial court exonerated Zapata from all liability and this court has imposed liability because of Zapata's negligence, we shall next consider the award of damages after disposing of the issue of the propriety of granting Zapata's motion for involuntary dismissal on the unseaworthiness claim.
UNSEAWORTHINESS
The trial court was correct in dismissing Butler's claim of the unseaworthiness of the M/V Oyster Bayou. We, therefore, affirm.
Article 1672(B) of the Code of Civil Procedure states that:

(B) In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
The trial court is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It may weigh and evaluate all the evidence presented up to that point and order a dismissal if the plaintiff has failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Shafer v. State of Louisiana, Through DOTD, 590 So.2d 639 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991).
The power block operator, Hampton, testified that the block was operating normally and was not malfunctioning. The fact that Captain Mason testified about the difficulty of controlling it is not synonymous with a malfunction which would make it unseawor-thy. There is nothing in the record which suggests that the vessel and its gear and appurtenances were unsafe or unfit for their intended uses, nor is there any indication that a defective power block was the proximate cause of the accident. See, e.g., Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra.
MAINTENANCE AND CURE
It is well established that:
When a seaman becomes ill or injured while in the service of his ship, the ship owner must pay him maintenance and cure, whether or not the ship owner was at fault or the ship unseaworthy . this obligation includes paying a subsistence allowance, reimbursing medical expenses actually incurred, and taking all reasonable steps to insure that the seaman receives proper care and treatment. (Citation omitted).
Maintenance and cure is designed to provide a seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick or injured in the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do a seaman's work and continues until he reaches maximum medical recovery. (Citation omitted). A ship owner who arbitrarily and capriciously denies maintenance and cure to an injured seaman is liable to him for punitive damages and attorney's fees. (Citation omitted).
Porche v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, 550 So.2d 278, 280 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989).
We have previously determined that an accident occurred and Zapata Haynie Corporation was negligent in causing the accident and resultant injuries. Zapata, therefore, had an obligation to provide maintenance and cure to Butler. Maintenance and cure extends to the time an injured seaman reaches maximum medical recovery. Maximum medical recovery
. is achieved when it appears probable that further treatment will result in no betterment of the seaman's condition . Thus, where it appears that the seaman's condition is incurable, or that future medical treatment will merely relieve pain and suffering but not otherwise improve the seaman's physical condition, it is proper to declare that the point of maximum cure has been achieved.
Pelotto v. L & N Towing Company, 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir.1979). (Emphasis in original). Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra at 978.
The plaintiffs exhibit on medical bills in the record reflects total medical bills through trial of $2,890.00. Plaintiff, John Butler, is entitled to recover this amount from Zapata, his former employer.
The record is unclear on when the plaintiff will reach maximum medical recovery. Dr. Robbins testified that Butler will need disc surgery. This procedure has not been accomplished so it is impossible to predict when maximum medical recovery will be reached. Nonetheless, "ambiguities or doubts in the application of the law of maintenance and cure are resolved in favor of the seaman." Porche v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, supra at 280. Zapata paid maintenance benefits to Butler beginning in December 1990 after the medical depositions were taken at the rate of $15.00 per day from December 3, 1990 to December 23, 1990. The benefits were terminated after this date. Dr. Charles Bettinger, the economist employed by the plaintiff, testified that $25.00 per day for room and board was a reasonable estimation for maintenance. This evidence went unrebutted. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to the sum of $25.00 per day for maintenance from the date of the accident, April 24, 1989, until he reaches maximum medical recovery. Zapata is to be given credit for the maintenance it paid in the sum of $315.00.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES
The court is aware of Gray v. Texaco, Inc., 610 So.2d 1090 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So.2d 686 (La.1993) in which a different panel of this court held that punitive damages were not available on a maintenance and cure claim following Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). This panel respectfully disagrees with Gray v. Texaco to the extent it declined to award punitive damages on a maintenance and cure claim.
Miles v. Apex dealt with non-compensatory damages to an injured claimant. Punitive damages are also non-compensatory but serve a completely different purpose. As opposed to making a claimant whole, punitive damages are meant to penalize a recalcitrant employer for its egregious conduct and deter that employer from future illicit behavior. Its purposes, therefore, are wholly different from the non-compensatory damages to which Miles v. Apex referred. While we respect the position of our colleagues in Gray v. Texaco, we think the better position is that which is taken in Ortega v. Oceantrawl, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 621 (D.Alaska 1992); Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So.2d 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992), writ denied, 613 So.2d 996 (La.1993); Thurman v. Patton-Tully Transportation Company, 619 So.2d 879 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993); Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F.Supp. 787 (E.D.La.1991); Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra. Punitive damages are available under a Jones Act claim for negligence and a claim for the arbitrary denial of maintenance and cure to an injured seaman.
When is a defendant's conduct willful, arbitrary, and capricious so that punitive damages may be awarded? Punitive damages are merited for: 1) laxness in investigating a claim that would have been found to have merit; 2) failure to reinstate benefits after diagnosis of an ailment previously not determined medically; 3) reckless indifference; and, 4) willful, wanton, persistent, callous, or recalcitrant conduct. Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra; Porche v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, supra; Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Company, Inc., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir.1984).
While we find Zapata's conduct to be repugnant and reprehensible in many instances, the record overall reflects Zapata's arguably reasonable, albeit incorrect, belief that an injury-causing accident had not occurred. Its erroneous evaluation of the factual circumstances does not elevate its conduct to the wantonness, recklessness, laxness, or callousness which would merit the imposition of punitive damages and attorney fees. We, therefore, decline to award these damages.
QUANTUM
Butler was examined by several physicians whose cumulative opinions indicate a herniation at the C-5 and C-6 cervical areas. Since he is of limited financial resources and because Zapata refused to pay for the medical expenses, he has been unable to receive extended medical care. Dr. Robbins unequivocally testified that disc surgery is necessary. This court will now proceed to consider various items of damages in its assessment.
A. Special Damages
Dr. Robbins testified that the cost of hospitalization for disc surgery will approximate $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 along with a surgical fee of $4,000.00 to $5,000.00. The court will, therefore, award $17,000.00 for future medical expenses.
Based on a future work expectancy of 11.7 years, Dr. Charles Bettinger, plaintiffs economist, tabulated Butler's loss of future earning capacity at $217,008.00 discounted to present value. Butler's loss of past earning capacity was tabulated at $39,460.00. His total past and present loss of earning capacity is, therefore, $256,468.00 based on 11.7 years of work expectancy with earnings tabulated at $13,000.00 per year as a fisherman for six months and $6.25 per hour for the remainder of that year. Added to this figure is a minimum wage benefit package calculated at 15% or $38,202.00. His loss of past and future earning capacity totals $294,-670.00. Dr. Bettinger's calculations are further supported by Dr. Robbins's testimony that the prognosis for Butler returning to any kind of manual labor is poor.
The court has considered Dr. Bettinger's calculation of $25.00 per day for room and board from the date of the accident to the date of trial and the future loss of room and board. However, we decline to award this amount as it has already been awarded as a maintenance benefit and since it is impossible to determine when Butler will achieve maximum recovery.
Furthermore, past medical bills of $2,390.00 will not be awarded as this amount has already been awarded in cure. Because cure is plaintiffs recovery of medical expenses, this amount will not be awarded as past medical expenses. To do so would amount to double recovery. See, Reed v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra.
B. General Damages
Butler testified that since the accident, he has had to undergo the embarrassment of receiving state welfare assistance to support his family. It is impossible, he testified, to perform some of the odd jobs he was accustomed to performing such as painting his house, picking up the garbage, or even cutting his yard. Moreover, he cannot attend social functions such as french dances with his wife. He cannot afford medical treatment. He is unable to have the surgery performed as recommended by Dr. Robbins and is unable to see Dr. Moore, a neurosurgeon, as he wishes because of his financial inability. As previously noted, Dr. Robbins testified that the prognosis of Butler returning to any kind of manual labor is poor.
Considering all of these factors, we award Butler $100,000.00 for past pain and suffering and $150,000.00 for future pain and suffering for a total of $250,000.00 in general damages.
SUMMARY OF DAMAGES
Maintenance - $25.00 per day from the date of the accident to plaintiffs maximum medical recovery.
Cure. $ 2,390.00
Future Medical Expenses. $ 17,000.00
Loss of past and future earning capacity $294,670.00
Past pain and suffering. $100,000.00
Future pain and suffering. $150,000.00
TOTAL (Excluding Maintenance) $564,060.00
Pre-judgment interest is awarded on all items of damages except future non-economic general damage of $150,000.00. McFarland v. Justiss Oil Co., 526 So.2d 1206 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988); Gray v. Texaco, Inc., supra.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with respect to its dismissal of the plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim, but reversed with respect to its dismissal of plaintiffs Jones Act claim of negligence.
Judgment is hereby rendered awarding maintenance at the rate of $25.00 per day from the date of the accident, April 24, 1989, until plaintiff reaches the point of maximum medical benefit. Additionally, judgment is awarded to plaintiff in the following amounts: cure — $2,390.00; future medical expenses— $17,000.00; loss of past and future earning capacity — $294,670.00; past pain and suffering — $100,000.00; future pain and suffering — $150,000.00.
Legal interest is awarded on $150,000.00 from the date of this judgment and on $414,-060.00 from the date of the accident, April 24, 1989, until paid.
All costs of the trial court and this appeal are assessed against defendant-appellee, Zapata Haynie Corporation,
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED.
STOKER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
DOMENGEAUX, C.J., dissents for the written reasons assigned by Stoker, J.
SAUNDERS, J., dissents in part, concurs in part and assigns reasons.
. Aldoise Hampton testified that, on the average, a fisherman would earn $13,000.00 for a six month fishing season. Butler testified that he would earn $6.25 per hour "fairly regularly" working as a house painter, and Charles Stevens, for whom Butler worked as a handyman for twelve to thirteen years, stated that Butler would earn $100.00 per day when he worked. Since the accident, he could no longer perform those duties for Stevens.