Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Charles STEVENS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-06-21
Citations: 563 So. 2d 188
Docket Number: No. 89-2819
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Charles STEVENS, Appellee.
Judges: NIMMONS, J., and THOMPSON, FORD L. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 563
Pages: 188–191

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Charles STEVENS, Appellee.
No. 89-2819.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 21, 1990.
Rehearing Denied July 23, 1990.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst. Atty. Gen./ for appellant.
Alvin L. Peters of McCauley & Peters, Panama City, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORDER ON APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PER CURIAM.
Charles Stevens, appellee, was indicted for first-degree murder and robbery. Thereafter he filed a motion to suppress statements made to police on July 8 and 9, 1988. A hearing was held on the motions and testimony was presented. The trial court did not rule, however, until after the trial had commenced and further evidence presented. The motion to suppress was granted. The defense then moved for mistrial and, while the remarks of counsel are not entirely clear, the motion was apparently based on the fact that certain statements which were suppressed had already been heard by the jury in the testimony of an investigating officer. The prosecution expressed no objection to mistrial and the motion was granted. The state then timely filed a notice of appeal.
Stevens has moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction contending that this is not an order "[sjuppressing before trial confessions, admissions or evidence obtained by search' and seizure," see Rule 9.140(c)(1)(B), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellee's position, simply stated, is that the order was rendered during trial, not before it, and therefore the order is not one for which review is authorized. Appellant responds and relies on Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308 (Fla.1982). Although Savoie involved an appeal by a defendant of a denial of a motion to suppress made during trial, the court in discussing the proper procedures noted that a consideration for the trial court in deciding whether to entertain such a motion was the state's right to obtain review of a pre-trial suppression order. In a footnote it was stated "[t]he state could retain the right to appeal if the defendant consented, prior to the hearing on the motion, to a mistrial in the event trial court suppresses the evidence." Id. at 312 n. 1. Appellant acknowledges that this is dicta and that the facts here are somewhat distinguishable in that defendant did not consent to a mistrial prior to the ruling. Nevertheless, it argues that because Stevens now awaits trial, the order is, in effect, pre-trial for purposes of the rule under the rationale of Savoie.
We agree. We see no logical reason that the outcome should hinge on whether the defendant consents to a mistrial prior to the ruling or whether he moves for mistrial after the motion has been granted, and therefore we find the reasoning of Savoie controlling.
Although the issue is not squarely before us, this does not appear to be a case where the mistrial was the result of judicial or prosecutorial overreaching and thus a retrial is possible, see Bell v. State, 413 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Technically the ease below is in a pre-trial posture and we believe this to be the rationale of the footnote quoted above from Savoie. A fair reading of the footnote is that by obtaining the defendant's consent to a mistrial prior to ruling on the merits of the motion to suppress, the trial court could overcome the objections of the state regarding loss of right to appellate review resulting from the defense's waiting until trial to make the motion. Here the decision to delay a ruling was apparently made by the trial court, but the conclusion made in Savoie footnote, that the granting of a motion to suppress followed by mistrial results in an order appealable under Rule 9.140(c)(1)(B), would nevertheless apply. In reaching this conclusion, however, we caution prosecuting authorities to diligently seek pre-trial rulings on pre-trial motions to suppress, for in the absence of a mistrial the right to appellate review will most likely be lost where a ruling is deferred.
Because this appears to be a question of first impression and because our holding is based on language in a footnote that is clearly dicta, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida that the jurisdictional issue presented in this case is a question of great public importance.
NIMMONS, J., and THOMPSON, FORD L. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents.