Case Name: BERRY v. MARION COUNTY LUMBER CORPORATION
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1924-03-14
Citations: 128 S.C. 300
Docket Number: 11447
Parties: BERRY v. MARION COUNTY LUMBER CORPORATION
Judges: Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 300–310

Head Matter:
11447
BERRY v. MARION COUNTY LUMBER CORPORATION
(121 S. E., 794)
Logs and Logging — Reasonable Time Within Which Purchaser Must Commence Cutting not Extended by Payment of Interest.— Under a deed conveying the timber on lands and providing that . purchaser has 10 years from the date it commences cutting to cut 'and remove the timber, and, if at the end of that time purchaser has not removed it, by payment of 6 per cent of the purchase price, purchaser can have 10 years longer to remove the timber, held that the right to cut the timber is forfeited unless purchaser or its assigns begin to cut the timber within a reasonable time, and the payment of interest will not extend the time within which cutting must commence.
Before Shipp, J., Dillon, January, 1923.
Affirmed.
Action by Tommie M. Berry against the Marion County Lumber Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Messrs. M. C. Woods and Henry B. Davis, for appellant
cite: Forfeiture: 89 S. C., 328; 114 S. C., 501; 102 S.C., '289; Minshew’s Case 89 S. C.; McSwain’s Case 96 S. C. Avoidance of forfeiture by payment of interest: 107 S. C. 147. Period of extension: 97 S. C., 247.
Messrs. N. B. Hargrove and Henry Buck, for respondent,
cite: Notice not necessary: 108 S. C., 108. Grantee’s option to extend contract without authority: 102 S. C., 289; 258 Fed., 990; 235 U. S., 685. Circuit Judge’s findng of fact will be sustained on appeal if not manifestly wrong: 114 S. C., 186; 116 S. C., 1; 115 S. C., 452.
Note — On effect of expiration of time for removal of timber, see note in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.), 882.
On construction and effect of provision for extension of time fixed by lease or sale as extending time for removal of standing timber, see note in 84 L. R. A. (N. S.). 615.
On rights of partis to a timber contract upon failure of purchaser to remove timber within the time fixed or within a reasonable time, see note in 15 A. L. R., 41.
March 14, 1924.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The appellant states its case as follows:
"On the-day of January, 1899, Elisha Bethea, who then owned in fee the premises on which the timber involved in this litigation is located, conveyed to Cape Fear Lumber Company the timber in question, together with the usual licenses and easements necessary for removal. By successive conveyances, title to the fee became vested in the plaintiff; by like conveyances, the title to the timber became vested in the defendant.
"The deed whereunder Cape Fear Lumber Company acquired title to the timber from Elisha Bethea contained the following time clause for the cutting and the removal of the timber, to wit: 'The said Cape Fear Lumber Company to have 10 years from time they commence cutting our timber to cut and remove said timber, and if at the end of that time they haven't removed said timber, then by payment of 6 per cent. Upon the purchase price they can have 10 years longer time to remove same.'
"Alleging that defendant did not commence 'to cut and remove the said timber, until, on or about the-day of December, 1915,' and that 'a reasonable time for the commencement of the cutting and removing of said timber has since expired, and had expired long before the entry of the defendants,' and that the defendants 'have forfeited and lost all right, title and interest, etc.,' and 'that the same by operation of law reverted to the plaintiff,' the plaintiff came into court and sought to permanently enjoin the defendant from exercising any Of the rights under the Elisha Bethea conveyance. In short, plaintiff seeks a forfeiture of the timber under what is now well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction of failure to commence to cut within a reasonable time."
D The point in this case is in exception 2:
"(2) Because his Honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in holding that the tender of interest under the extension clause of the contract, within a reasonable time from the date of the contract, will not dispense with the necessity, of commencing to cut and avoid a forfeiture, in that in so doing his Honor, of necessity, eliminated from the contract a covenant entered into between the parties and substituted a new contract, a creation of the court, in lieu thereof."
This court has held in many cases that the vendee and its assigns must begin to cut in a reasonable time from the date of the deed. The right to cut is forfeited by a failure to commence to cut within a reasonable time. There is no provision for an extension of the time to commence to cut by the payment of interest. The tender of interest does not extend the time to commence to cut. The tender of interest before commencing to> cut did not avoid the forfeiture.
'II. The second question does not arise. The tender of interest was definitely provided for, and the reasonable time does not apply.
.The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.