Case Name: L. W. ARMWOOD and Mary K. Armwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William A. FRANCIS, d/b/a Uncle Bill's Dinner Bell Motel and Cafe, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1959-06-08
Citations: 9 Utah 2d 147
Docket Number: No. 9002
Parties: L. W. ARMWOOD and Mary K. Armwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William A. FRANCIS, d/b/a Uncle Bill’s Dinner Bell Motel and Cafe, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., and TUCKETT, District Judge, concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 9
Pages: 147–152

Head Matter:
340 P.2d 88
L. W. ARMWOOD and Mary K. Armwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William A. FRANCIS, d/b/a Uncle Bill’s Dinner Bell Motel and Cafe, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 9002.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 8, 1959.
Concurring Opinion June 12, 1959.
D. H. Oliver, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Moreton, Christensen & Christensen, E. R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
HENRIOD, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. Affirmed, with costs to respondent.
This case was decided upon the pleadings and upon answers to interrogatories under the rules relating to discovery, when a motion to dismiss was granted after a pretrial hearing. At the pre-trial, an order was entered, conceded to be accurate by counsel for both' sides, as to the admitted facts stated therein and as to the respective contentions of the litigants. The order set out generally the contentions of the parties, plaintiffs' being that a meal was sought at defendant's cafe, where plaintiffs were denied service in violation of Title 76-31-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and defendant's being that plaintiffs came to the cafe, but not to his motel or any other part of his property that could be classified as an inn under the statute, defendant denying that he refused the service mentioned or that he requested them to leave, countering that he invited them to stay and eat gratis.
The remaining portion of the pre-trial order set out what the parties conceded were undenied evidence, which stated:
"The uncontroverted facts in the case are: that the plaintiffs, on the 1st day of September, 1957, went to defendant's place of business at about 861 No. Second West, and served themselves to certain food items at which is called the Smorgasboard, and then seated themselves at a table; the plaintiffs were colored people; later the police arrived, and after the police arrived, the defendant offered to serve the plaintiffs a meal at the defendant's expense. The plaintiffs did not make any request for lodging."
Plaintiffs urge three points on appeal: 1) that an inn is a place where travelers or sojourners are provided with the accommodation of lodging, food and drink, 2) that plaintiffs became defendant's guests, and 3) that whether or not defendant's cafe was a part of his motel business was a question of fact for the jury.
We do not disagree with point 1) since it is but a definition of the word "inn." As to point 2), it appears obvious that the word "guest" is used as it might relate to innkeepers, which we will discuss later. As to point 3), that whether the cafe was a part of the motel was a question of fact for the jury, apparently the matter was left to the trial court, on defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs having invited the trial court to determine the matter by motion for summary judgment "determining liability of the defendant" and the defendant likewise having made such an invitation by motion to dismiss "because the complaint and pleadings and pre-trial order fail to state a claim," there being no other request or demand for further proceedings shown in the record, plaintiffs merely appealing from the judgment dismissing the complaint.
Up to the time these motions were interposed, both parties had employed the discovery procedure and the motions were based on the pleadings and the facts adduced by such discovery procedure. Defendants asked 21 questions of plaintiffs, and they asked 4 of him, with the following results:
Of the 21 interrogatories put to plaintiffs, 7 were answered, which pointed up the facts that they had gone to- the cafe, entered what they described as "main entrance of office and cafe," spoke to defendant's employees when they were at the smorgasbord table to make a selection of salad and meat; that they selected the salad, and ate the food but "did not complete the salad"; that they did not return to the cafe, but waited in their car "until the police officer arrived."
Plaintiffs wholly failed to answer interrogatories put to them calling for information as to who was present and what was said; whether anyone prevented them from obtaining food; where they went and what they did after obtaining food; whether they ate the food; who the person was whom they alleged denied them service; such person's description with respect to sex, age, physical characteristics and dress; where any conversation took place; what the employees were doing; what was actually said; what they did after the alleged conversation; where they went thereafter; and as to whether or not they had been offered a meal by defendant gratis.
On the other hand, defendant answered all of plaintiffs' interrogatories, which answers evidenced the facts that "a license was issued" by the city, "for 861 No. 2nd West," and one for the motel; however, that the motel units were separate and apart from 861 No. 2nd West and "had no physical connection therewith" and that "reservations for the motel could be obtained from the cashier at 861 No. 2nd West," which was a restaurant; and that actually no office was maintained there for the motel.
Counsel for plaintiffs, in moving for summary judgment, stated in a supporting affi davit that he had seen a sign at the motel reading "Motel Office in Cafe, 861 North Second West."
The motion to dismiss that was granted, was based "on the complaint, pleadings and pre-trial order," but the dismissal did not specify whether it was made because 1) there was no innkeeper-guest relationship as contemplated under the statute, or 2) whether there simply was no refusal to serve and therefore no violation of the statute, irrespective of any innkeeper-guest relationship.
From an examination of the pretrial order and the answers to the interrogatories it appears that as a matter of law the defendant did not violate the statute since there appears to be no evidence to the effect that the plaintiffs were refused service. This, although the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to answer pertinent interrogatories calling for the facts with respect to any such refusal. The trial court, therefore, was not in error in granting the motion to dismiss.
As to the innkeeper-guest relationship aspect of this case, which we really need not decide, it would appear that about the only evidence pointing at all to any such relationship was the affidavit of counsel with respect to the sign reading "Motel Office in Cafe," which falls far short of establishing any such relationship. Absent any further evidence, the trial court well might have concluded specifically that as a matter of law also, there was no such relationship in this case.
Each case involving the existence or non-existence of this relationship must be determined on its own particular facts-Parenthetically, however, we might suggest that the world has come a long way since necessity created the innkeeper-guest relation as known at common law, with its. own distinct liability. We think courts may be prone to take a second look at that relationship before applying it to the hostelries of the space age in a case where, for example, a, traveler aboard a covered wagon might, arrive at a skyscraper hotel, demanding not only food and refreshment, but art attendant to tether, groom and hay his horses, and barn his wagon.
We have held that a restaurant in and of itself is not an inn either in the common law or modern sense. Plaintiffs' authorities generally have to do with controversies involving those who have sought, claimed and/or obtained lodging, as was not the case here, and which otherwise are factually different than the instant case-As to the whole relationship, in its modern aspect, we are somewhat impressed by the logic and reasoning of much of the language in Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 1946, 184 Va. 943, 36 S.E.2d 906, cited by defendant, -which more nearly approaches the situation we have, and to which language, without repetition here, reference is made for the interested reader.
WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., and TUCKETT, District Judge, concur.
. Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
. "Every person and every agent or officer of any corporation carrying on business as an innkeeper -who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to receive and entertain, any guest is guilty of a misdemeanor."
. Under Rule 56.
. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 1944, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773.