Case Name: Pearson and others against Morrison
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1815-09-09
Citations: 2 Serg. & Rawle 20
Docket Number: 
Parties: Pearson and others against Morrison.
Judges: Yeates J. absent.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 2
Pages: 20–22

Head Matter:
Pearson and others against Morrison.
In Error.
ERROR to the Common Pleas of Westmoreland county, To reverse the proceedings on an execution.
Morrison, the plaintiff below, obtained judgment against Pearson, Pleacher, and Kerns. A Ji. fa. issued to June, 1807, on which á levy was made on a tract of land belonging to Pearson. An inquisition was held, and the land condemned and sold to Joseph Weigly, esq. (who was attorney for plaintiff,) on St venditioni exponas returnable to September, 1807. In June, 1808, the court set aside the levy, execution, and sale, on motion of the plaintiff’s attorney; it having been suggested, that no money had been paid to the sheriff, and that the defendants had personal property sufficient to satisfy the judgment. An alias fi. fa. issued to September, 1808, under.which a tract of land belonging to Kerns was levied on and condemned, and a vend. expo, having issued to- December, 1808, this tract was sold to George Edgar.
Foster, for the plaintiff in error,
now contended, that the reason assigned .in the suggestion in the court below for setting. aside the levy, execution, and sale, to the plaintiff’s attorney, was not sufficient. The money was in fact paid, because the purchase was made by the plaintiff’s attorney. Had »o reason been given, it might have been difficult to reverse the court’s proceeding: but it appears by the reason given, that their decision was made on erroneous grounds. It is a case of great hardship on Kerns who was only security for Pearson.
On judgment against three the land of one was Sold byfi.'fa. to the plaintiff's attorney. The court on liis motion and suggestion of default, in payment, set aside the sale, and on an alias the land of another of the defendant? was sold. Meld to be regular.
The purchase of lands is not within the trust confided to the plaintiff’s attorney: nor is a sale to him the same as a sale to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s attorney who purchases at sheriff’s sale is not entitled to a deed, without paying the the money or giving a receipt on behalf of his principal.
Forward, contra.
If this execution is set aside it will not restore the first levy. The court below had a discretionary power over the sale: and the money not being paid is a sufficient reason for setting aside a sale. This matter has slept from 1808 to 1814, without any complaint, and the land has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser.
Reply. .The delay may be accounted for by Kerné being-suffered to remain in possession of his land. Hé brought the writ of error as soon as he knew that the sheriff’s sale would be insisted on.

Opinion:
Tilghman C. J.
(After stating the case.) Kerns now contends, that the first levy and sale of the land belonging to Pearson ought to have stood. It is not denied that the Court of Common Pleas had power to set aside the first execution, if good cause had been shewn. ' But it is said, that the suggestion appearing on-the record was not good cause: because a sale to the plaintiff's attorney was the same as A sale to the plaintiff himself, and therefore, in fact, the money was paid. This mode of reasoning does not- appear to me to be correct. The plaintiff is bound by the act of his attorney, provided he acts within the sphere -of his authority. If the attorney receives the debt, the plaintiff is bound although the money never comes tó his hands. But the purchase of lands is not within the trust confided to an attorney. He would not be entitled to a deed from the sheriff without paying the purchase money, or giving a receipt on behalf of his principal. A receipt, provided there were no collusion, would justify the sheriff in giving a deed. But if the plaintiff himself should apply to the court, before the deed was acknowledged, and insist on payment of the money, there can be no doubt but the court would suspend the acknowledgment, until the money was paid, or set aside the sale, if it was not paid in a short time. It is confessed, that the Court of Common Pleas has a discretionary power oyer its own process, and we know, that it is not usual to insert, in the record the facts, on which the court proceeds to exercise its power.' We are not to take for granted,' that the court proceeded solely on the suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel which appears on the record. The setting aside of the first inquisition could have been no injury to the defendants. Or if it injured any one of them eventually, it would be for the benefit of another of them.. This is a singular case. The three. defendants are plaintiffs in error" and yet the caus'e assigned for error is, that the land of Pearson, one of the defendants,"ought to have been sold, and the land'of Kerns ought not to have been sold". So that one has losts||id the other gained by setting aside the first execution. This is said by Kerns to be a hardship, because he' was'originally but security for Pearson. 'But"the plaintiff knows no difference between principal and security, and may levy on the estate of either at his pleasure. '• It was the business of the security to insist on an indemnification from the principal before he entered into an obligation on his account j and if he failed to do it he must abide l.'v the consequences. It is nearly seven years since the sheriff made the sale which it is now endeavoured to avoid. The length of time affords a strong presumption in favour of the proceedings. For if there was' any "thing wrong in them, why was-not application made-to-'the Court of Common Pleas for redress ? On good cause shewn, relief would have been given in "a summary way. The probability, therefore* is, that there was no objection to setting aside the-first; execution on the part of the defendants, or either of them. But be that as it may, there is nothing in the record;which would justify this court in saying, that the Common Pleas had exceeded their authority or abused their discretion. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the execution should be affirmed.
Yeates J. absent.
Brackenridge J; concurred.
Execution affirmed.--