Case Name: Clark W. JENNINGS, Appellant, v. CITY OF WINTER PARK and Insurance Company of North America, a corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1971-08-02
Citations: 250 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: No. 70-309
Parties: Clark W. JENNINGS, Appellant, v. CITY OF WINTER PARK and Insurance Company of North America, a corporation, Appellees.
Judges: REED, C. J., and OWEN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 250
Pages: 900–907

Head Matter:
Clark W. JENNINGS, Appellant, v. CITY OF WINTER PARK and Insurance Company of North America, a corporation, Appellees.
No. 70-309.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 2, 1971.
S. Victor Tipton, Orlando, for appellant.
Monroe E. McDonald, of Sanders, Mc-Ewan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
On 20 January 1969, the plaintiff, Clark W. Jennings, a sixty-eight-year-old Winter Park lawyer, filed a complaint against the City of Winter Park in which he alleged that the City was liable to him on several theories including assault and battery by use of excessive force in effecting his arrest, negligence, and false imprisonment. The City's answer denied the material allegations, the cause went to trial, and a jury verdict was returned for the defendant City. Final judgment was entered on 28 January 1970; motion for new trial was filed on 30 January 1970; an amendment to the motion for new trial was filed on 22 February 1970, andean order denying the motion for new trial was entered on 10 March 1970. The plaintiff appeals from the final judgment.
Mr. Jennings' version of the arrest is as follows: On 3 April 1968, Officer Bris-coe of the Winter Park Police Department drove up behind the plaintiff after he allegedly made an improper left turn. Bris-coe started to give plaintiff a lecture, but plaintiff told Briscoe he did not want a lecture and to either give him a ticket or allow him to go about his business. At this point Briscoe wrote a ticket and rammed it, along with a machine which contained the ticket, into the plaintiff's ribs and instructed the plaintiff to sign the ticket. The plaintiff refused to sign the ticket, whereupon Briscoe threw the machine down and grabbed plaintiff from the back and pulled up on his trousers. Briscoe then hit the plaintiff in the back of the head twelve times with his fist. The plaintiff jerked away from the officer and turned around. As plaintiff turned, the officer squirted four blasts of mace in plaintiff's face at a distance of three to six inches. The officer then grabbed the plaintiff, threw him in the back of the police car, and drove to the station. When the plaintiff and Briscoe arrived at the police station another officer came up to the plaintiff and grabbed him by the belt and coat collar and hit him again in the back of the head and continued to hit him in the back of the head all the way into the police station.
The arresting officer gives the following version of what occurred. He attempted to give the plaintiff a verbal warning with respect to his traffic violation. As the officer attempted to give the warning, the plaintiff said:
" 'Now, you listen. I am sick and I am tired and I don't need a lecture from the likes of you. If you are going to write me a ticket, write me one; if not, shut up and let me get out of here.' "
The officer then wrote the ticket out and asked the plaintiff to sign it. The plaintiff refused to sign the ticket and started to walk away. The police officer then advised the plaintiff that he was under arrest and put his arm on Jennings' arm and said, " 'You will have to come with me.' " At this point Mr. Jennings jerked away and said, " 'You are not placing me under arrest. Take your dirty hands off me.' " The plaintiff then said he was going to his office and started across the street. At this point the police officer ran to catch up with the plaintiff and shot him with one three-second blast of mace from a distance of about three feet. The officer then took the plaintiff by the arm and guided him to the patrol car. The officer denied grabbing the plaintiff by the collar and belt and denied using any more force than was necessary to effect the arrest.
The plaintiff's first point is stated in his brief as follows:
"The trial judge erred in not granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the law or the evidence or the manifest weight of the evidence."
The argument under Point I proceeds on three theories. First plaintiff says that there was no legal justification for using mace because of its painful and disabling effects. We take this to be a contention that the use of mace was, as a matter of law, excessive force.
Our review of the record indicates that the only pertinent testimony before us is that of Officer Briscoe (summarized above), the plaintiff, and his doctor, one George O. Emerson. Dr. Emerson testified that the plaintiff first came to see him in September 1968. (The arrest occurred in April of 1968.) The doctor stated that Mr. Jennings had excessive watering in one eye, a sticky substance in his eyes, and cloudiness on the cornea. He related the watering and the cloudiness on the cornea to mace. On the other hand, the doctor testified that Mr. Jennings' vision was 20-20. The doctor's testimony revealed that he had had no personal experience with mace, but had read some literature on it the exact nature of which is not revealed by the record. The doctor testified that the watering and discharge from the eyes may continue for some time, but he did not know how long. No other medical testimony was included in the record on appeal, although the transcript reveals that other doctors did testify.
Mr. Jennings testified that the immediate result of the mace was painful and that he had subsequently had trouble focusing his eyes and difficulty with his eyes watering. However he continues to drive an automobile and fly his own personal aircraft.
It appears to us, notwithstanding the apparent effect of the mace, that the jury reasonably might have concluded from all the evidence — including that of plaintiff's age and apparent belligerence — that the force employed in effecting the arrest was not unreasonable. In fact, the jury may reasonably have concluded that had mace not been used, a more dangerous force might have been required to bring about the arrest.
The second contention under Point I is that the City was negligent as a matter of law because neither Briscoe nor any other officer advised Mr. Jennings that he should wash his eyes out after the exposure to mace. Briscoe's testimony indicates that he did not advise Mr. Jennings to wash his eyes out. Briscoe stated that he had no instructions with respect to washing one's eyes out after the use of mace. Officer Joel (another of defendant's officers) testified that he did not tell the plaintiff to flush his eyes out, although he (Joel) knew that this was a proper treatment and should be done as soon as possible. However, insofar as the record on appeal is concerned, whatever consequences might have resulted from the macing are not shown to have been avoidable by an immediate eye wash. Furthermore, Mr. Jennings' own testimony indicates that he washed his eyes out after he left the police station. It, therefore, appears that the jury reasonably could have found either (a) the plaintiff's knowledge was such he did not need the warning or (b) the policemen's failure to warn Jennings to wash his eyes out was not causally related to his alleged injury.
Finally under Point I the appellant argues that there was no legal excuse for holding him in the city jail for the period which he was detained. The plaintiff states in his brief that the records of the City reflect that he was held for one hour and five minutes. The plaintiff testified that he was held for a longer period of time — from two to two and one-half hours. Accepting the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the question becomes whether or not a detention of one hour and five minutes is such that the City was liable as a matter of law for false imprisonment. Civil liability for false imprisonment, where one's initial arrest was lawful, depends on a showing that the detention was unreasonable and unwarranted by the circumstances. City of Miami v. Albro, Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 23, 26, and Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 1936, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214, 218. It would appear, that the jury reasonably could have reached the conclusion that a restraint for a period of one hour and five minutes was not unreasonable for the purpose of "booking" the plaintiff.
We understand it to be the duty of an appellate court to exercise considerable caution and restraint in reversing an order of the trial judge which denies a motion for new trial where the motion is addressed essentially to the evidentiary basis for a jury verdict. This is merely a recognition that the trial judge is in an eminently better position than an appellate court to pass on such matters. See Wolkowsky v. Good-kind, 1943, 153 Fla. 267, 14 So.2d 398. Where as here, the evidence and inferences therefrom were conflicting on material issues, the jury verdict was not shown to have been the result of improper influence, and there appears to be a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the verdict, there is no reason for an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's denial of such a motion. See Clark v. Ocala Gas Company, Fla.App.1960, 123 So.2d 391, 392. For the foregoing reasons we hold that Point I is without merit.
The plaintiff's second point on appeal is that the trial judge erred in refusing to give the plaintiff's requested instruction number 6. This instruction in substance states that the City had the duty of giving its officers proper instructions in the use of mace. In our opinion this point does not demonstrate error. The substance of the requested instruction was covered by Standard Jury Instruction 4.1 defining negligence. Under this general instruction given by the trial judge, the plaintiff could have argued to the jury that the City was negligent in failing to give proper instructions to Briscoe with respect to the use of mace.
Under plaintiff's third point the contention is made that the trial court should have given the plaintiff's requested instruction reading as follows:
"Even a person under arrest has certain liberties that cannot be taken from him, including the liberty to be free from imlawful attacks on his physical being. It has always been the policy of the law to protect the physical integrity of every person from unauthorized violation or interference. So this plaintiff, while under arrest, had the right under both the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitution not to be deprived of this remaining liberty without due process of law.
"Due process of law means, among other things, that no one can be punished until he has been convicted and sentenced by a court with authority to act in his case. In other words, a police officer does not have the authority to punish a person in the process of arresting him for commission of a crime, even if he observed the person committing the crime. Punishment can only be lawful if it is based on the sentence of a court following a judgment of guilty."
We are unable to see how this instruction relates to the issues in the case. In our opinion it would merely have obfuscated the issues.
Under his Point 4 the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a requested instruction which reads as follows :
"When a citizen is being arrested on the ground that he has committed only a minor offense or a misdemeanor and the citizen is merely moving away from or not cooperating with the officer and is not attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the officer, the officer is not privi-ledged to use such force or methods to effect the arrest as may produce serious bodily harm to the citizen, since the law considers it better to allow a petty offender to escape altogether than to do him great bodily harm."
In our opinion this instruction was properly refused because it does not appear to be in accordance with Florida law. The standard of care the law imposes on municipal officers in effecting an arrest has been discussed in numerous opinions. In City of Miami v. Albro, Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 23, the Court held that a police officer may use such force as reasonably appears necessary under all circumstances to effect a lawful arrest. The court stated that if an officer uses more force than he is privileged to use he is liable only for the excess. See also City of Miami v. Simpson, Fla.1965, 172 So.2d 435 and City of Ft. Pierce v. Cooper, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 12.
In Hutchinson v. Lott, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 442, cited by the plaintiff in support of the proposed instruction, the opinion indicated that the defendant fired a shot at plaintiff's outboard motor in an effort to stop the plaintiff's boat and to arrest the plaintiff for a misdemeanor. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a cause of action for assault and battery. The principle announced in the decision was that the measure of force which a police officer may use in effecting an arrest is that which an ordinary and prudent person would have used in the same circumstances. The court did say that an officer in attempting to effect an arrest for a misdemeanor is not justified in shooting or killing the misdemeanant unless such is necessary in self-defense. Obviously, this dictum is not pertinent to the facts of our case. The plaintiff also cites State v. Dunning, 1919, 177 N.C. 559, 98 S.E. 530. There it was held on evidence showing that the defendant police officer shot a person to arrest him, that it was error to direct a verdict against the police officer where it appeared from the record that such force was necessary in view of violence threatened by the person sought to be arrested. Reference was made in the opinion to the principle that a police officer cannot kill or shed blood to effect the arrest of a fleeing misdemeanant, but again this proposition clearly does not apply to the facts of our case.
We conclude that there was no error in refusing to give the requested instruction— particularly in view of the fact that a full and complete instruction was given with respect to the duty of a police officer in effecting arrest and the limit on his right to use force.
Under his fifth point the plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred in not granting a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff's motion for new trial was filed on 30 January 1970. Thereafter, on 24 February 1970 the plaintiff filed what he entitled "Amendment To Motion For a New Trial". The amendment alleged that the plaintiff's attorney had a conversation subsequent to the trial with the sheriff of Seminole County and was furnished by the sheriff with a booklet giving instructions on the use of mace. The booklet stated that mace is irritating to eyes and that the antidote is to flush the contaminated areas with cold water and baking soda. It does not say how soon this should be done.
In Springer v. Morris, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 781, the Supreme Court indicated that application for new trial should be granted on the ground of newly discovered evi dence only where the evidence is such as ought to produce a different result and is not merely cumulative. Assuming that the booklet had been introduced in evidence, it is rather difficult for us to say at this juncture that it would likely have produced a different result. Recall the testimony of Officer Joel who admitted that he knew at the time Mr. Jennings was arrested that proper treatment was to wash the eyes out as soon as possible. The jury knew that the City's agents were aware that this was a treatment that should have been administered to the eyes and still chose to find that the City was not guilty of negligence in failing to warn the 'plaintiff of this treatment. We conclude that the "newly discovered evidence" did not require the granting of a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
REED, C. J., and OWEN, J., concur.
WALDEN, J., dissents, with opinion.