Case Name: Elvin O. BENSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU, Defendant and Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1979-07-16
Citations: 283 N.W.2d 96
Docket Number: Civ. No. 9238-A
Parties: Elvin O. BENSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION BUREAU, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: ERICKSTAD, C. J., and HEEN, District Judge, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 283
Pages: 96–119

Head Matter:
Elvin O. BENSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION BUREAU, Defendant and Appellant.
Civ. No. 9238-A.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
July 16, 1979.
On Denial of Rehearing Aug. 28, 1979.
Dale W. Moench, Dickinson, for plaintiff and appellee.
Murray G. Sagsveen, Sol. Gen., Bismarck, and Richard J. Gross, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant.
Lisa Knazan and Arcelia Romo Perez, Migrant Legal Services, Fargo, amicus curiae, on briefs.

Opinion:
PEDERSON, Justice.
The district court of Stark County has twice held in this case that the statute which excludes agricultural service from the mandatory provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act violates both the Constitution of North Dakota and the Constitution of the United States. When the first holding was appealed to this court, we remanded because of procedural deficiencies and made suggestions as to procedure and issues. Benson v. N. D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 250 N.W.2d 249 (N.D.1977). On this appeal, we will address the merits of the constitutionality of the agricultural exclusion under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter 162, S.L. 1919 — now Title 65, NDCC).
There is no factual dispute. Although the trial subsequent to our previous holding in Benson v. N. D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, supra, developed the facts in much greater detail, the essential facts are the same as set forth in our previous opinion. The record reveals that Benson's scope of employment as an agricultural employee was extremely broad, and included: milking, livestock feeding, equipment operation, cleaning cattle, cleaning barn, hauling silage and grain, assisting in calving, repairing machinery, welding, tuning motors, changing oil and greasing machinery, repairing fences and corrals, operating augers, carpentry, driving tractors, trucks and swathers, chopping corn, operating a power saw, painting, and "about anything you could name."
Although North Dakota's Workmen's Compensation Act has been often amended, the stated purpose of the Act has remained essentially as enacted in 1919. The title to the Act clearly discloses that this is an act creating a fund for the benefit of employees injured, and the dependents of employees killed in hazardous employment. Section 1 of Chapter 162 (now § 65-01-01, NDCC), provides:
"The state of North Dakota, exercising its police and sovereign powers, declares that the prosperity of the state depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wage workers, and, hence, for workmen injured in hazardous employments, and for their families and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title, and to that end, all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are abolished except as is otherwise provided in this title."
Section 2 of Chapter 162 (now § 65-01-02, NDCC), provides in part:
"65-01-02. Definitions. — Whenever used in this title:
"3. 'Employment' shall mean . . . all private employments;
"4. a. 'Hazardous employment' shall mean any employment in which one or more employees are employed regularly in the same business or in or about the establishment except:
(1) Agricultural or domestic service; .
"5. 'Employee' shall mean every person engaged in a hazardous employment under any appointment,
"7. 'Employer' shall mean:
c. Every person, partnership, association, and private corporation,
The language chosen by the legislature when enacting Chapter 162 is, at best, uncertain and perplexing. In declaring the purpose of Chapter 162 and in defining its terms, the legislature resorted to a legal fiction. Apparently believing it necessary, in order to provide a benefit to workers who are injured, the legislature labeled certain employment as hazardous and then defined the term in such manner as to eliminate any concern as to whether or not a hazard existed. The exclusion of agricultural services was not based upon a conclusion that it was nonhazardous when compared to services that were not excluded. We will assume, as administrators and courts have for 60 years, that agricultural employment is excluded from mandatory workmen's compensation coverage without regard to its relative hazardousness.
There was no contention by anyone in this case that agricultural employment is not hazardous. By the very nature and scope of tasks required of a general agricultural service employee, such as Benson in the instant case, a jack-of-all-trades develops who may be the master-of-none. While operating a power saw a few minutes during a week, we would not expect Benson to be as proficient or careful as a carpenter helper who operates a power saw forty hours a week. The composite activities of a farmhand are obviously more hazardous than the total of the individual activities when performed full time.
Both parties agree that the issue for this court is whether the exclusion of agricultural employees from mandatory coverage under § 65-01-02(4)(a)(l), NDCC, violates the Constitutions of North Dakota and the United States. The thrust of the holding of the district court is that the statutory exclusion: (1) deprives Benson of equality as guaranteed by § 1 of Article I, North Dakota Constitution; (2) imposes upon him a non-uniform burden in violation of § 11, Article I, North Dakota Constitution; (3) violates his right to due process of law under § 13, Article I, North Dakota Constitution; (4) invidiously discriminates against him contrary to § 20, Article I, North Dakota Constitution; and (5) fails to provide him with due process and equal protection assured by § 1, Article XIV, United States Constitution.
Standards of Constitutional Review
Our court has reiterated the rule many times that an act of a legislature is presumed to be valid, and any doubt as to its constitutionality must, where possible, be resolved in favor of its validity. So. Valley Grain Dealers v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425, 434 (N.D.1977). See also, Caldis v. Board of County Commissioners, 279 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1979); Ralston Purina Company v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405 (N.D.1971); Souris River Telephone Mutual Aid Corp. v. State, 162 N.W.2d 685 (N.D.1968); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414 (N.D.1967).
In some of our recent decisions we have discussed the "three-standard of scrutiny" used to determine whether a statute is constitutionally valid. State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1979); Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.1978). All three of these cases refer us to Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974), where we identify the standards as: (1) the traditional rational-basis standard under which a statute is upheld if the classification is not patently arbitrary or if it bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest; (2) the strict judicial-scrutiny standard used when the classification is inherently suspect, or concerns a fundamental interest; and (3) an intermediate standard that has been difficult to label or define but which closely approximates the historical, substantive due-process test. This standard requires a close correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative goals. For interest, see Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 Minn.L.Rev. 91 (1950). Each of the first two standards is presumably applied in the federal court system and would have to be applied by this court here insofar as Benson argues that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated by our statute. The substantive due-process test would be inappropriate for that review. But see, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978).
In Herman v. Magnuson, supra, 277 N.W.2d at 451, our court discussed the three standards of scrutiny to determine which of the three was applicable to the circumstances of that case. One of the issues in Herman was whether the notice provisions of § 40-42-01 and 40-42-02, NDCC, requiring a claim to be filed prior to the commencement of a suit against a municipality, violated equal protection. We rejected the application of the traditional rational-basis standard used in Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974), because the right to recover from a municipality was severely limited by the notice provisions contained in Chapter 40 — 42, NDCC, and, hence, a stricter standard of review was appropriate. Because there was no "fundamental interest" or "suspect-classification" issue presented, the "strict-scrutiny" test was also inappropriate. State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.1977). Our court, in Herman v. Magnuson, supra, 277 N.W.2d at 451, concluded that the intermediate standard of review requiring a close correspondence between a statutory classification and legislative goals was the proper standard because the issue involved a limitation upon the authority of an injured party to bring an action against the tort-feasor.
Although we are not concerned in this case with a limitation on actions for common-law tort remedies, we are concerned with the complete exclusion of a legislatively created remedy for personal injury to one class of employees. Our concern here closely resembles those concerns addressed in cases using the intermediate close-correspondence test (Herman v. Magnuson, supra ; Arneson v. Olson, supra; Johnson v. Hassett, supra), rather than those cases in which we have applied the traditional rational-basis test. Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, supra. The complete exclusion of agricultural employees from workmen's compensation not only deprives the farm worker of a convenient remedy, it also limits his remedy to a common-law tort action in which the farm worker must prove all elements of a tort before he can recover. Employees covered by workmen's compensation in other similar occupations do not have to make this showing.
To determine whether the exclusion of agricultural employees from workmen's compensation violates equal protection considerations in this case, there must .be a close correspondence between the statutory exclusion and the legislative goals to be accomplished by that exclusion. Prior to developing this analysis, a discussion of the early precedents concerning the validity of the agricultural exclusion will be helpful.
Early Precedents
In early judicial decisions, comments concerning the agricultural exemption from state workmen's compensation acts inferred that the nexus between the classification and state objectives was obvious. In New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208, 37 S.Ct. 247, 254, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917), although it was not an issue, the United States Supreme Court offered the gratuitous advice that:
"The objection under the 'equal protection' clause is not pressed. The only apparent basis for it is in the exclusion of farm laborers and domestic servants from the scheme. But, manifestly, this cannot be judicially declared to be an arbitrary classification, since it reasonably may be considered that the risks inherent in these occupations are exceptionally patent, simple and familiar." [Emphasis supplied.]
Another of the early declarations, relying in great part upon New York Central R. Co. v. White, supra, also inferred that farm work is not hazardous and not likely to produce injuries. See Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157, 39 S.Ct. 227, 229, 63 L.Ed. 527 (1919), which stated:
"However, we are clear that the classification cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Texas in sustaining it said (108 Tex. 96, 110, 111, 185 S.W. 556):
'Employes of railroads, those of employers having less than five employes, domestic servants, farm laborers and gin laborers are excluded from the operation of the act, but this was doubtless for reasons that the Legislature deemed sufficient. The nature of these several employments, the existence of other laws governing liability for injuries to railroad employes, known experience as to the hazards and extent of accidental injuries to farm hands, gin hands and domestic servants, were all matters no doubt considered by the Legislature in exempting them from the operation of the act. Distinctions in these and other respects between them and employes engaged in other industrial pursuits may, we think, be readily suggested. We are not justified in saying that the classification was purely arbitrary.' " [Emphasis supplied.]
The North Dakota case of State v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372 (1919), has been interpreted as holding that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not violate the provisions of the Constitution involving due process or equal protection. In that opinion, as published, Syllabus ¶ 5 says, in part:
"It is held that these provisions in the act are not deemed so arbitrary and unreasonable as a matter of law as to be viola-tive of relator's constitutional rights, either under the due process clause, the equal privileges and immunities clause, or the clause concerning the impairment of the obligation of contracts of either the federal or state Constitution." [Emphasis in the original.]
Although two of the Justices, Bronson and Grace, said ". . . it is deemed proper to consider the merits of the issues raised concerning the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act, . . . ," the majority did not agree. Justice Birdzell said: ". . . a majority of the court does not adopt any opinion as expressing the views of the court . . . ." Chief Justice Christianson concurred specially in only a dismissal of the petition and Justice Robinson, in dissenting, expressed the view that the definition of hazardous employment, with the exceptions, is "absurd" and violates both Sections 61 and 11 of the North Dakota Constitution. It appears that the opinion of Justices Bronson and Grace rested, for the most part, on the question whether the classification of bookkeeper-clerk-typist was, "as a matter of law," nonhazardous. The proceedings were original in the Supreme Court and there was no testimony or affidavits supporting a conclusion on the hazardousness of that classification. The opinion, authored by Justice Bronson and concurred in by Justice Grace, at 175 N.W. at 379, stated:
"The fact that the act excludes from its operation domestic and agricultural employes, as well as railroad employes, does not give rise to the constitutional objection of unreasonable and arbitrary dis crimination as a matter of law. The fact that the entire field subject to regulation has not been covered is not fatal. What trades and occupations may be regulated is ordinarily á matter for the Legislature, in the absence of a distinctive showing of an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination or classification. Similar exclusions in other Compensation Acts have been upheld. [Cites omitted.]" [Emphasis supplied.]
We cannot escape the conclusion that this court, in Hagan, failed to decide the constitutionality of any part of the Workmen's Compensation Act and, specifically, failed to decide the validity of the agricultural exclusion. Even if it was contended that the constitutional issue was decided in State v. Hagan, supra, we would not be thereby prohibited from again examining the issue in this case. See Melland v. Johanneson, 160 N.W.2d 107,112 (N.D.1968). As we said in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 779 (N.D.1974):
"In constitutional law, as in other matters, times change and doctrines change with the times."
We also stated in that opinion, at 777:
"Even when a statute has been in effect for a long time, our duty to consider its constitutionality, when the matter comes before us, continues, and this duty has been performed even in the face of prior holdings of constitutionality."
Recent Montana and Michigan Cases
Courts from Montana and Michigan have been the most recent to have considered at least some of the aspects of an agricultural exclusion from workmen's compensation statutes. Both courts expressed some general principles with which we agree.
In State ex rel. Hammond v. Hager, 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52 (1972), the Montana Supreme Court was urged to ignore New York Central R. Co. v. White, supra, because there the issues were not considered head on, but only obliquely. The United States Supreme Court had used the terms "patent, simple and familiar" in describing agricultural employment, leaving the inference that that was the basis for justifying the agricultural exclusion. The majority of the Montana court did not indicate any disagreement with Hammond's criticism of White, nor with its contention that farming in Montana is not, in these days, patent, simple and familiar. The Montana court held that Hammond failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutional validity and that it failed to "negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Two of the Montana justices concurred specially, contending that there was no constitutional issue properly before the court. Because no state constitutional violation was asserted, there apparently was no reason for the court to discuss whether or not an intermediate standard of scrutiny is available in Montana. When the United States Supreme Court on appeal dismissed "for want of substantial federal question," without explanation, it missed an opportunity to clarify a confused legal problem. See Hammond v. Hager, 411 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 1548, 36 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973).
Holding that an agricultural exclusion in the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act was discriminatory to persons thereby excluded, the Michigan Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972), reversed a Michigan Court of Appeals' holding in Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Company, 34 Mich.App. 489, 192 N.W.2d 52 (1971). The Michigan Supreme Court made no comments upon its previous, contrary holding in Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N.W. 49 (1915), which, in upholding the exclusions from workmen's compensation coverage, stated:
"The law is unquestionable that it is within the power of the Legislature to classify both employers and employes, if the classification is not fanciful or arbitrary and for reasons of public policy, is based upon substantial distinctions, is germane to the object sought to be accomplished by the act, not limited to existing conditions only, and applies impartially and equally to each member of the class." Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., supra, 153 N.W. at 55.
In Gutierrez, out of the seven Michigan justices, four (Adams, T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., Black and Swainson) concluded that:
"There is no basis for distinguishing the work of a laborer who drives a truck at a factory from a laborer who drives one on the farm or for any one of numerous other labor activities 'on the farm' as distinguished from the same activity in industry, wholesaling, retailing, or building. . . .
"If the argument is that this creates special benefits for a class of agricultural workers . . . then it is clearly discriminatory as to all other employees If the argument is that the benefits are illusory since the class created is next to non-existent, then the exclusions . . . are all the more to be condemned.
"Finally, the argument that Section 115(e) is especially tailored to meet the problems of the small farmer and his occasional employees fails to account for the need for similar treatment as to the small businessman — grocer, clothier, butcher — or as to the small contractor— plumber, carpenter, roofer — or as to numerous other categories of small employers and their employees who are not accorded this treatment." Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 791.
These four justices were not only concerned about a subclassification of agricultural employees but found that the special benefit to agricultural employers was impermissible, clearly discriminatory, and unsupported by any rational basis.
Justice T. G. Kavanagh, when applying the rational-basis standard, concluded that there is a rational basis for distinguishing between agricultural and nonagricultural employees but, by applying a modified, substantive, due-process type of test, found the exclusion of a subclassification of agricultural workers invalid on the basis that "the existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect." See Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 793, and Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51 (1972).
Justice Williams agreed with Justice T. G. Kavanagh that the subclassification violated equal protection and found it "altogether unreasonable and lacking in rational basis." He further agreed with the principle that the effect of a statute in combination with other factors may be the basis for applying the same standard of close scrutiny ordinarily associated with suspect classification. Justice Williams asserted that there were not sufficient facts to establish a suspect classification.
Justice Brennan dissented, finding no discrimination. None of the justices concluded that there was an "inherently suspect" class even though the plaintiffs were Hispanic. None of the justices labeled it a "fundamental" right violated. In the light of these circumstances, Justice T. G. Kav-anagh's statement appears significant:
"A court is not confined to a sterile examination of the statute itself but must look to its effect. [Footnote omitted.] Such effect alone may dictate a finding that equal protection has been denied. This is true because when a classification is made by a statute we must look first to its reasonableness and then to its effect— direct and indirect. If the effect is direct we have little trouble in determining discrimination. If the direct effect is not constitutionally offensive however, we must look for any indirect effect. An indirect effect is no more legitimate than a direct effect, and we must assay the effect apart from the purpose. 'The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.' [Footnote omitted.]" Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 793.
We can only conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court has applied an intermediate standard of review which involves the rational basis to the extent applicable, and the strict-scrutiny standard where applicable.
Although this court desires to portray an image of intellectual vitality and to display its capacity to identify and evaluate each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests, we have a legacy of judicial restraint which we should not cavalierly abandon.
Use of judicial restraint, however, does not permit a court to ignore its responsibility. If taken too literally, the rule that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature could result in the abdication by the court of any authority to review the constitutionality of legislation. The ultimate result would be a destruction of the constitution as a limitation on legislative action. The pendulum could likewise swing too far the other way and the court could become so aggressively creative that the judge's notions as to what is good or bad or necessary or unnecessary could improperly restrict policy-making functions of the legislative branch.
The Stated Purpose of the Act
Government could not function without making classifications. The discriminatory effects of classification ordinarily do not violate equal protection as long as there is a basis for disparate treatment that naturally inheres in the subject matter. See Caldis v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, 279 N.W.2d at 670. Any classification can be challenged as denying equal protection; it then becomes the duty of the court to determine the statute's validity and to uphold the classification if it includes all, and only those, persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. See Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, 79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849, 864 (1953); Developments in the Law— Equal Protection, 82 Harvard L.Rev. 1065, 1076 (1969, Part 2).
Generally, when the legislature has expressed the purpose of the law, courts need only examine the statute itself in determining whether or not: (1) a particular classification bears some rational relationship to the expressed purpose; (2) the classification is based upon a permissible distinction (that is, are similar things treated similarly); and (3) the classification is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.
The North Dakota Legislature explicitly expressed the purpose of the Act but the exclusion of agricultural services has no correspondence to that expressed purpose. The legislature made no attempt to express any purpose for the exclusion. When the legislature fails to express a purpose for an enactment, the court will ordinarily attribute a purpose which is consistent with the provisions of the enactment and which is the most probable legislative purpose. See Development in the Law— Equal Protection, supra, 82 Harvard L.Rev. at 1077, which says: "To this end the court may properly consider not only the language of the statute but also general public knowledge . . . ."
The Purpose of the Agricultural Exclusion
The record in this case contains a considerable amount of material relating to the subject of the agricultural exclusion and, together with numerous writings (see e. g., IB Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Farm Labor, § 53), compels the conclusion that the purpose for the exclusion of agricultural services was not for the benefit of the employees but for the employers. This double-pronged exclusion, the agricultural employer and the agricultural employee, complicates analysis of the constitutional question. The exclusion of the agricultural employer appears to have been the focus of most of the cases that we have analyzed. North Dakota, being the most agricultural of all states, has never hesitated to grant to agriculture, as its most important industry, legislative preferences. A cursory analysis of one title of the North Dakota Century Code (Title 39) discloses seventeen readily identifiable exemptions for agriculture and a number which are not readily recognizable but are preferences in fact. This type of preference has been upheld whenever it has been challenged. See e. g., Figenskau v. McCoy, 66 N.D. 290, 265 N.W. 259 (1936). The agricultural exclusion violates none of the restrictions placed upon legislation by the constitution insofar as it results in a benefit to agricultural employers that are not enjoyed by other industries. A subsidized agriculture appears to have been accepted as inherent under our economic system.
The other prong of this exclusion requires that we focus upon the agricultural employee. There are four possible purposes for excluding agricultural employees from the benefits offered other employees by the Workmen's Compensation Act:
(1) The purpose of excluding agricultural employees was to overcome political opposition to passage of a workmen's compensation act by a farm-oriented legislature.
"Legislatures were quick to perceive that farmers would oppose such increased liability, and that they would not insure their hired help. . . . There were many individual and small farmers in the early twentieth century, not only on the farms, but as members of the legislatures in legislative halls, and it was feared that extension of the compensation acts to them would defeat the proposed bills. Exceptions were therefore made for farmers and farm laborers.
"One legislature followed the other in incorporating the exception, an exclusion with hollow but happy sound which echoed its way across the country, leaving in its wake only confusion and disaster for injured farm workers." Horovitz, Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, "Employees and Employers," pp. 214, 215 (1944), Wright & Potter Printing Co., Boston, Mass.
In the beginning of such legislation, political expedience may have justified the exclusion under the doctrine that reform may take one step at a time. But, in the light of the passage of time, changed conditions, and the expressed purpose of the Act, that cannot justify the exemption forever. See State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 760 (N.D.1966), quoting from Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). See also, City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.1970), and Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 46. Now that sixty years have passed and almost everything in life has changed, and farmers have experienced legal difficulties in the form of common-law tort claims, it appears that reconsideration of the agricultural exclusion is overdue. See Rosebear v. Anderson, 143 F.Supp. 721 (D.N.D.1956), 245 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1957), not as a decision supporting our reasoning in this case but as an indication that farmers may, and do, suffer common-law tort claims.
When we focus upon the employee, this purpose, if we can call it that, only supports a conclusion that agricultural employees had little influence in legislative matters, but supplies no justification for the exclusion in a constitutional sense.
(2) Farm employees should be excluded because their work is not as hazardous as other employment and compulsory coverage for them is not needed.
"Least convincing of all is the assertion that farm laborers do not need this kind of protection. Whatever the compensation acts may say, agriculture is one of the most hazardous of all occupations. In 1964, of 4,761,000 agricultural workers, 3,000 were fatally injured, while of 17,-259,000 manufacturing employees, the number of fatalities was 2,000." IB Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Farm Labor, § 53:20, p. 9-109.
With advanced technology and increasing mechanization, farming has become more dangerous. Of all occupations, only mining and construction are more hazardous than farming. Davis, Death of a Hired Man— Agricultural Employees and Workmen's Compensation in the North Central States, 13 S.D.L.Rev. 1 (1968); National Safety Council, Accident Facts, p. 85 (1965). See also, Medd, Legal Problems of Migrant Agricultural Workers, 50 N.D.L.Rev. 459 (1973-74).
The hazards inherent in farming have not escaped the notice of the judiciary and explain, in part, the reason for those cases in which we have been urged to declare some farm activities to be nonagricultural, i. e., beekeeping — Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584 (N.D.1975); and livestock feeding — Butts Feed Lots v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 261 N.W.2d 667 (N.D.1977). Some courts, even when faced with explicit statutory language, have resorted to fine-line distinctions to avoid unjust results. In upholding an agricultural exclusion in Roush v. Heffelbower, 226 Mich. 664, 196 N.W. 185, 186 (1923), the court said:
"In excluding farm laborers from the benefits granted to other classes, it was evidently the theory of the Legislature that the work of the farm laborer was not sufficiently hazardous to require the protection of the Compensation Law. As the danger incident to the operation of machinery used in threshing grain and husking corn is as great as that incident to the use of machinery in a factory or elsewhere, it was probably in the legislative mind that when a farmer was engaged in that business apart from his regular farming operations, he was not engaged in farming and his employees were not farm laborers. In no other way can the exclusion of farm laborers from the benefits of the statute be explained or justified."
A conclusion that modern-day farming is nonhazardous defies reality and provides no explanation for the exclusion of agricultural employees from coverage under the Act. It is readily acknowledged that driving cattle on horseback has not become more dangerous than it was in 1919, yet riders employed at sales rings and stockyards have always benefited from coverage while riders employed by farmers and ranchers have not.
(3) Farm employees should be excluded because the "family farm" is a closely knit community of relatives and friends who care for each other's needs and injuries and no other protection is needed.
The court, in Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 96 A. 340, 344 (1916), possibly had something like that in mind when it said:
"As to domestic and agricultural employes, if the Legislature deemed the nature of their employment with, as a general rule, its intimate personal relations between the employer and his employes, to be such that it would be proper to leave them both as to remedies for personal injuries arising from accidents in the course of their employment to the common-law action and its defenses, we cannot say that such classification is arbitrary and unreasonable, as there is a substantial difference between the condition of these employes and those where the obvious risks of the employment are greater and where the mere number of employes permits little opportunity for actual acquaintance."
In this case, Benson's employer, Decker, testified in effect that he thought that he had private insurance that would have taken care of any employee accident. He did carry farm liability coverage which included $2,000 no-fault medical benefits, and these were, in fact, paid to Benson. Decker asserted that he discovered, after the accident, that the coverage he thought he had is not even available from commercial insurance carriers and that it would be "too costly" to carry voluntary workmen's compensation coverage. There may be farmers even more beneficent than Decker but there undoubtedly are many migrant, temporary, part-time employees who have no reason whatsoever to expect to be cared for, if injured, out of any beneficence of their farmer-employer.
(4) Farm employees should be excluded because farm employers cannot afford to pay the premium.
We accord this justification considerable weight and perceive more than an element of truth in it. Any addition to the overhead costs of operating a farm threatens the chances of a profitable operation. The latest edition of IB Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 53:10, indicates that not more than seventeen states have mandatory workmen's compensation coverage for agricultural workers. All other things being equal, there is a recognizable, competitive edge for a farmer who is freed from any item of overhead cost.
There is also some validity in the argument that a great proportion of the North Dakota farmers who have family-size farms would be unduly burdened by the administrative inconvenience and expense of record keeping even though farmers are much more sophisticated now than in 1919. The Michigan court pointed out in Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 794:
"Defendant argues that the administrative burden placed upon the agricultural employer would be too great. However, such employer already must meet the requirements of withholding tax and social security to name just two."
If the legislature would base a classification on the record-keeping burden alone, it would be objectionable as underinclusive because there are family-size businesses that suffer the very same burden. Size of the operation is not a factor in the exemption any more than hazardousness of the activity.
Another of the economic factors that provides justification for a farm exemption is that, in our marketing system, a farmer, unlike a manufacturer, cannot add the costs of workmen's compensation premiums to the price for which he will sell his products. We acknowledged the validity of this factor in Figenskau v. McCoy, 66 N.D. 290, 265 N.W. 259, 263 (1936), where we said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that under the present transportation and marketing system the cost of transportation of agricultural products from the farm to the market or to the railway station usually falls upon the farmer. He has no way of including the cost of transportation in the price which he receives for his products and thus passing it on to the purchaser. The cost of transportation is one of the handicaps of the farming industry in this state. The Legislature may have reasonably decided that, since the fee here considered adds to the cost of transportation between farm and market or at least between the farm and the railroad station, it should not impose a further transportation burden upon agricultural products. When considered in this light, the exemption is based upon a reasonable and distinguishable classification, and is not in conflict with the provisions of either the state or federal Constitutions."
We note that the cost of premiums is not incurred solely for the benefit of the employee. An agricultural employer, if covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, would benefit by being relieved of the burden of defending possible common-law tort claims, especially in those cases where his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the employee.
We cannot ignore the effect of the exemption upon agricultural employees. We agree with that part of the Gutierrez opinion which said:
"A court is not confined to a sterile examination of the statute itself but must look to its effect." 202 N.W.2d at 793.
When we look at the effect of the agricultural service exclusion, we must focus upon both employer and employee and, although some inequality is permissible, we must balance the benefits against the burdens imposed on each class.
When a special benefit is granted by legislative enactment to a group and the resulting burden falls on the widest possible base, the balancing required is simple. Thus, for example, in situations wherein there is a claim that a tax benefit violates equal rights because those benefits are not available equally for all taxpayers, no balancing is required if the burden resulting from the special benefit falls on the public generally. See, e. g., Caldis v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, and Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973). These are simple situations similar to those involving the licensing of a profession, regulating of activities that have a "vested public interest," or involve economic or political policy. See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1979).
As the United States Supreme court said in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768, 777 (1972): "The essential inquiry . is . inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?"
We believe that the courts can assist in the preservation of the legitimate concerns of the legislature for the interests of agricultural wage earners and for the well-being of those engaged as agricultural employers, without imposing any extreme burden upon either.
When the nature of the discrimination appears evident on the face of the statute— the imposition of the burden upon the broadest basis rather than the narrowest — a judicial review in the nature of "strict scrutiny" may be appropriate. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, — U.S. —, —, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1737, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979), where the United States Supreme Court, in holding a statute of Oklahoma repugnant to the Commerce Clause, said:
"Section 4-115(B) is certainly not a 'last ditch' attempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory alternatives have proven unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's purported legitimate local purpose more effectively."
There would be no logic in concluding that rights of merchants to ship Oklahoma minnows in interstate commerce should be scrutinized differently from the right of an agricultural wage earner to be treated equally under the law. We find unacceptable the suggestion by the attorney general that by excluding farm workers from workmen's compensation coverage, the legislature has, in effect, spread the burden of injured farm workers to the widest possible base — to the taxpayers in general — because injured farm workers who are poor can receive welfare. The burden still rests entirely upon the injured farm employee, if not economically, surely in the loss of dignity-
Conclusions
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the exclusion of agricultural employees from the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act is unreasonable and contrary to the expressed purpose of the Act. Because of the exclusion, the Act withholds from agricultural employees the sure and certain relief awarded to other wage earners. There is no correspondence between the purpose of the Act and the agricultural classification. There are no proper and justifiable distinctions between agricultural employees and nonagricultural employees in relation to the risk of injury from employment.
Although the district court held that the statute here involved also violates Sections 1, 11, and 13 of Article I of the North Dakota Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is not necessary for the disposition of this case that we consider those matters. We hold that the agricultural exemption in the Workmen's Compensation Act violates § 20, Article I, North Dakota Constitution.
To the extent that State v. Hagan, supra, may be considered as upholding the validity of the agricultural service exemption, it is overruled.
Prospective Application
In Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795, 804 (N.D.1974), we said:
"Consistent with what has been termed the Sunburst Doctrine [footnote omitted], state courts have, in recent cases, recognized and utilized prospective application of decisions as a means of avoiding injustice in cases of this type. Decisions have been applied prospectively to be effective as to causes of action arising at varying future dates. The particular rule of law may or may not be applied to the parties to the appeal. This approach provides the judicial branch with some much needed flexibility in dealing with questions having widespread ramifications for persons not parties to the action."
Accord, Walker v. Omdahl, 242 N.W.2d 649 (N.D.1976).
Today's decision would undoubtedly have widespread and unknown ramifications for farmers in this State who have not voluntarily elected to secure coverage under the Act. Similarly, significant adjustments in the Workmen's Compensation Bureau's administration of the Act are required, likely involving additional personnel as well as funding authorization. To permit time for adjustments by all concerned and so that the legislature may study this field of law and possibly amend the Workmen's Compensation Act to meet the criticisms of this opinion, we hold that this decision shall be applicable to the claim of Benson and to future claims arising out of injuries occurring to agricultural employees on and after July 1, 1981.
The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for such further proceedings in the district court as may be necessary to facilitate the award of benefits to Elvin Benson by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau.
ERICKSTAD, C. J., and HEEN, District Judge, concur.
HEEN, District Judge, sitting in place of VANDE WALLE, J., disqualified.
ADDENDUM — Since the concurrence of four members of this Court is required to declare a statute unconstitutional (Section 88, North Dakota Constitution), and only three members of the Court concur in this opinion, the agricultural exclusion from the Workmen's Compensation coverage is not declared unconstitutional by a sufficient majority. See State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 629 (N.D.1977).