Case Name: JORDAN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1927-03-09
Citations: 296 S.W. 585
Docket Number: No. 10372
Parties: JORDAN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 296
Pages: 585–588

Head Matter:
JORDAN v. STATE.
(No. 10372.)
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 9, 1927.
Rehearing Granted ¿Tune 24, 1927.
Seale & Denman, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.
Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
The conviction is for misdemeanor theft; punishment fixed at a fine of $10 and confinement in the county jail for a period of 10 days.
The motion to quash the indictment is founded upon the theory that the facts averred bring it within the terms of article 1346, P. C. 1925, a malicious mischief statute, and exempts it from the operation of article 1410, P. C. 1925, a theft statute. Article 1346 does not repeal article 1410. Under article 1410, supra, the fraudulent taking without the owner's consent, with the intent to deprive him of its value and to appropriate it to the use of the taker, constitute the elements of the offense. In article 1346, the offense is committed by the malicious or willful taking or removing without authority of certain parts or equipment of an automobile. This statute denounces such taking or removing as a misdemeanor, although there was no attempt to appropriate the property to the benefit of the taker or to deprive the owner of its value. In the present case, the state having charged the fraudulent taking with the intent to deprive the owner of the value thereof, thereby bringing the complaint and information under the terms of article 1410, supra, it is obligated to prove the facts establishing the offense of theft.
Emery Sutphen was the owner of a Ford automobile. According to his testimony, about the last of November, it was burned and left along the road side, where it remained for about 15 days. It was left there in order that an insurance adjuster might examine it.
According to the witness Chandler, a garage man, about the first of December, appellant brought to his place of business a radiator, generator, and self-starter, and offered them for sale. They were worth about $20. Appellant at first asked $25 and finally $18, and the witness agreed to buy them at the price last mentioned.
The testimony of the witnesses introduced by the appellant 'indicated that before the parts were finally removed the car had remained on the road side for about a month. Appellant testified in his own behalf that he was about 30 years of age; that he observed an automobile standing by the road side; that it had been there for about two weeks; that it was stripped of its casings and some other parts; about 3 days later, he returned and noticed that the cylinder head was gone, and, thinking that the car was junk, removed the radiator, generator, and self-starter, and took them to his home; this occurred in the daytime; he had no intention of stealing them and believed that the car had been thrown away; he later tried to sell the parts to Chandler.
Appellant takes the position that the court was in error in failing to instruct the jury that, if the appellant believed the car to have been abandoned by the owner, he would not be guilty.
"Property which has been thrown away and abandoned becomes no man's property. The former owner loses his title and all claim to it, and one who finds it can claim it as his own. Hence property which has been abandoned is not the subject of larceny." 17 Ruling Case Law, p. 36.
"Abandonment" means an absolute relinquishment; a giving up; a total desertion. 1 Corpus Juris, p. 5. See Dikes v. Miller, 24 Tex. 417; Worsham v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 253, 120 S. W. 439, 18 Ann. Cas. 134; Sikes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 28 S. W. 688. Abandonment includes both the intention to abandon and the external act by which the intention is carried into effect. See 1 Corpus Juris, p. 7. • When the evidence is such as to raise the issue, abandonment becomes a question ior the jury. See 1 Corpus Juris, p. 12, and cases collated in note 76.
Touching the circumstances from which the jury would he authorized to infer an abandonment, there are many illustrative cases collated in 1 Corpus Juris, p. 9, note 55; also page 7, notes '37 and 38. Many of these are civil cases involving the title to property. In the reports of the decisions of this court, we find but two in point. One of these is Sikes v. State, 28 S. W. 688, in which the opinion was written by Judge Hurt. The evidence showed that two turbine water wheels had lain upon the railway right of way without use or interference for 9 years. They belonged to one Beveridge, to whom they had been shipped from Arkansas. After remaining upon the platform of the depot for awhile, .the wheels were removed by Bev-eridge to the right of way. He had no intention of parting with the title to them. The station agent at Round Rock, at the request of the appellant, shipped the wheels to him at Houston. Beveridge had not taken the wheels away from the depot because his mill had been washed away and he had no immediate use for them. On this state of facts, Sikes was held guilty of theft.
In Worsham's Case, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 253, 120 S. W. 439, 18 Ann. Cas. 134, the opinion was written by Judge Ramsey ana the judgment was affirmed. One of the points of attack upon the conviction was the failure of the court to charge the jury upon the issue of abandonment. The facts were these: While engaged in a game of cards with the appellant and another, one Logan executed his check in favor of the appellant for $75. Appellant lost in the game and delivered the check to one Perkins. Logan gave Perkins his check for $125, thereby redeeming the $75 check and getting $50 in money. Logan then wadded up the $75 check which he had thus redeemed and threw it on the floor. Wor-sham afterwards found it on the floor and attempted to have it cashed. The court held that there was no error in refusing to charge on the issue of abandonment.
There is no great similarity in the facts in either of these cases with those in the instant case. The principles that control are not dissimilar. Sutphen's ear was disabled so that it could not be rejnoved on its own power. He left it beside the road intending to have it inspected by an insurance agent. Some of its parts were usable and valuable and were, after the car had remained beside the road but a comparatively short time, removed by the appellant with the purpose of selling them and realizing on their value, thereby depriving the owner thereof. We fail to perceive any fact which would warrant the inference or belief on the part of the appellant that the owner of the car had parted with the title to it. He was not standing guard over it. It was not a thing that he could carry about his person. The parts which the appellant removed from it were attached to it. He had to use a monkey-wrench in detaching them. We are, therefore of the opinion that the court was not in error in refusing to read to the jury the charge requested.
The judgment is affirmed.