Case Name: HENDERSON SIGN SERVICE, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee; ARROWHEAD CAMPSITES, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-11-19
Citations: 390 So. 2d 159
Docket Number: Nos. NN-112, NN-113
Parties: HENDERSON SIGN SERVICE, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee. ARROWHEAD CAMPSITES, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 390
Pages: 159–165

Head Matter:
HENDERSON SIGN SERVICE, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee. ARROWHEAD CAMPSITES, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. NN-112, NN-113.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 19, 1980.
James P. Appleman, Marianna, for appellants.
H. Reynolds Sampson and Margaret-Ray Kemper, Tallahassee, for appellee.
. Section 479.16(12) excepts signs from the provisions of Ch. 479 which are within the corporate limits of cities or towns, and adjacent to highways other than interstate and federal-aid primary systems.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals Henderson Sign Service and Arrowhead Campsites appeal from Department of Transportation orders adopting the proposed order of a hearing officer finding that appellants' signs adjacent to an interstate highway are in violation of Section 479.17, Florida Statutes (1977).
The evidence as to the location of all three signs was essentially the same: All were well within the area prohibited by the 660-foot setback provisions of Section 479.-11, Florida Statutes (1977), and none displayed permit tags. Appellants offered no evidence. They now argue the Department did not establish by substantial and competent evidence that the signs were outside or within an incorporated city or town; that the signs were in fact signs as defined by Chapter 479. We reject these contentions. The structures were clearly visible as signs from the highway by DOT's outdoor advertising inspector. While the Department offered no specific proof that Interstate 10 had been designated as part of the national system of interstate and defense highways by the Department of Transportation, we conclude that we may take judicial notice that Interstate 10 was and is part of the federal highway system. The highway adjacent to the signs was referred to by the Department's witness as Interstate 10. Matters relating to transportation and roads have been judicially noticed on numerous occasions. E. g, State Road Department v. Lewis, 170 So.2d 817 (Fla.1964); Welker v. State, 93 So.2d 591 (Fla.1957). Moreover, the burden of proving entitlement to any exceptions of the chapter's advertising requirements is upon appellants, not the Department. Walker v. State, Dept. of Transp., 352 So.2d 126, 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Appellants' primary contention is that since the Department failed to establish the date of the erection of the signs, or the date when the Department designated the highway as part of the national system of interstate and defense highways, one could conclude that the signs were lawfully erected or were lawfully in existence prior to the official designation of the highway as an interstate highway. And in the absence of such proof, they argue, there is no authority for the Department to remove nonconforming signs until the end of the fifth year after they have become nonconforming, relying upon Section 479.23, Florida Statutes (1977). The problem with appellants' argument is that none of the signs displayed the permit tag required by Section 479.07(1), and appellants offered no explanation for their failure to affix a tag upon their signs. Section 479.07(4) states:
The construction, erection, use or maintenance of any advertising structure, advertising sign or advertisement which is required by this chapter to be permitted, without having affixed thereto a currently valid permanent permit tag shall be prima facie evidence that the same has been constructed or erected and is being operated, used or maintained in violation of the provisions of this chapter, and shall be subject to removal by legal representation of the department.
The effect of a statute which declares that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of other facts is to relieve the party in whose favor they operate of the necessity of producing evidence on the issue, and to cast on the other party the burden of going forward with the evidence. Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.2d 551 (Fla.1954). When the Department presented evidence showing that no permit tags were affixed to the signs, a statutory presumption arose that the signs were illegally erected, which remained until the signowners presented testimony to rebut the presumption. None was presented. The Department established its case.
Alternatively the signowners contend that if their signs are found to be illegally erected and maintained, and therefore subject to removal, compensation must nevertheless be paid for the actual replacement value of the materials in those signs pursuant to Section 479.24(1), which provides:
(1) Compensation shall be paid upon the removal of all signs lawfully in existence on December 8,1971 or signs lawfully erected which later become nonconforming. Compensation for any sign erected or completed after December 8, 1971 shall be limited to the actual replacement value of the materials in such signs. It is the legislative intent that any person erecting or completing such a sign after December 8, 1971 shall be fully compensated by the method herein provided.
Construing Section 479.24(1), this court in Brazil v. Div. of Admin., Dept. of Transportation, 347 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), ordered a signowner compensated for the replacement value of materials in his sign which was found to have been erected and maintained adjacent to an interstate highway in violation of the spacing requirements of Chapter 479. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, placed a different interpretation of Section 479.24(1) in LaPointe Outdoor Advertising v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 382 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
As appears from his separate opinion in this case, Judge Ervin would recede from Brazil and deny compensation to the appellant signowners whose signs are now subject to removal. Judges Booth and Robert Smith, for different reasons, choose not to reach the question of compensation. Judge Booth considers that because appellant has not yet raised the question of compensation before the agency we should not reach that question now. While Judge Robert Smith conceives that any legal question inhering in the case and raised in this court can and ordinarily should be decided, if it can fairly be decided on the existing record, Rice v. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Services, 386 So.2d 844, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), he thinks it undesirable for a panel of this court to reconsider a prior decision of this court, perhaps leading to en banc proceedings, when the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has attached because of that prior decision and that Court may reasonably be expected soon to make the law uniform on an important subject.
For the reasons stated, then, we decline to consider appellants' claims for compensation based on Brazil and Section 479.24(1), and in affirming the Department's order for removal of appellants' offending signs we remit the question of compensation to the Department to abide the Supreme Court's decision in LaPointe.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., specially concurs, with opinion.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents, with opinion.
. Section 479.01(13) defines interstate highway as "any highway officially designated as part of the national system of interstate . highways by the Department of Transportation and approved by the appropriate authority of the Federal Government."
.If the sign was lawfully in existence prior to the effective date of December 8, 1971, it thereafter became nonconforming and not subject to removal until after the fifth year from its nonconformity and then only upon the payment of compensation. Sections 479.23 and .24.