Case Name: Buford A. GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-06-14
Citations: 450 So. 2d 1275
Docket Number: No. 83-1228
Parties: Buford A. GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 450
Pages: 1275–1279

Head Matter:
Buford A. GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1228.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 14, 1984.
Buford A. Green, pro se.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The defendant, Buford A. Green, filed a pro se motion dated July 13, 1983, with the trial court "pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) and/or 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure," asking that his credit for 407 days served be applied to two concurrent sentences rather than merely one. He asserted this failure by the trial court rendered the sentence illegal. This motion was denied by an order dated July 19, 1983, with the trial court expressly finding that the 407 days were credited to the sentence in a companion case.
The state does not challenge the timeliness of this appeal; however, the dissent does. The certificate of service on the July 19, 1983, order is undated. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge mailed the order to the defendant on the same day, said defendant had through August 6, 1983, to move for a rehearing — fifteen days under Rule 3.850, which expressly provides for rehearing of denial of a motion thereunder, and three more days under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.070, or a total of eighteen days.
On August 5, 1983, the defendant filed with the trial court a "Motion for Clarification of Sentence," setting forth an elaboration of the original motion. A fair reading of this pro se motion requires that it be construed as a motion for rehearing. The motion for rehearing, therefore, was timely and tolled the rendition date of the order of July 19, 1983. The trial court, by order rendered on August 10, 1983,' denied the "Motion for Clarification of Sentence" and the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this court on August 19, 1983. We, therefore, consider the appeal on the merits.
In the recent case of Martin v. State, 452 So.2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), it was held that where a defendant receives jail time credit on one concurrent sentence, he must receive it on the other. The authority cited in Martin for that proposition is Bevins v. State, 412 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), which dealt merely with the miscalculation of credit time in a case where the trial court clearly intended dual credit time.
We covered this point in our en banc opinion in Amlotte v. State, 435 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), wherein we said:
We cannot agree with the appellant that concurrent sentences for identical terms of years compel presentence jail time credit on each sentence. Nothing in section 921.161, Florida Statutes (1981), requires, or even suggests, this construction. We held in Fenn v. State, 418 So.2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), that where there are two sentences for two crimes, the credit for presentence jail time need not be allocated to both of those sentences. We made no attempt in Fenn to distinguish between consecutive and concurrent sentences.
The appellant's reliance on the Florida Supreme Court case of Jenkins v. Wainwright, 285 So.2d 5 (Fla.1973), is misplaced. The sentence in that case, which was imposed at a time when the granting of credit for time served was discretionary with the trial judge, was ambiguous, and the Supreme Court's opinion merely dealt with the reasonable interpretation of the intent of the sentencing judge. In the instant case, the intent is unambigu-ous_
435 So.2d at 252. See also Miller v. State, 297 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
AFFIRMED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. By prior order of this court, requested by appellant, we treated this appeal as one from the summary denial of a 3.850 motion. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(g). We know of no reason why an illegal sentence violative of section 921.-161(1), Florida Statutes (1983), could not be attacked at the trial level by either a 3.850 motion or a 3.800(a) motion.
. Rule 3.850 provides in pertinent part:
The prisoner may file a motion for rehearing of an order denying a motion under this rule within fifteen days of the date of service of the order. The clerk of the court shall promptly serve upon the prisoner a copy of any order denying a motion for post-conviction relief or denying a motion for rehearing noting thereon the date of service by an appropriate certificate of service.
See Williams v. State, 392 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), petition for review dismissed, 399 So.2d 1147 (Fla.1981).
. Rule 3.070 states:
Additional Time after Service by Mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.020.