Case Name: PFENDER v. DEPEW et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-02-11
Citations: 121 N.Y.S. 285
Docket Number: 
Parties: PFENDER v. DEPEW et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 121
Pages: 285–290

Head Matter:
PFENDER v. DEPEW et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 11, 1910.)
1. Wills (§ 497 )—Construction—“Children.”
The rule that the words “child” or “children” when used in a will, or other document, will be taken to refer to “issue” or descendants of the first degree, and to exclude descendants of a more remote degree, is not inflexible, as the term will be given a wider signification and include issue, however remote, when reason demands it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1080-1086; Dec. Dig. § 497.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1115-1141; vol. 8, p. 7601.]
2. Wills (§ 634 )—Construction—Contingent Remainders—Vesting of Estate-Source of Title.
Testatrix bequeathed the residue of her property to trustees for the use of her two daughters in separate moieties during their lives, or so long as they remained unmarried, and directed that on the death or marriage of both of the daughters, or the survivor, the property should be divided among testatrix’s other children surviving at the time; the child or children of any son or daughter who may have died before such contingency taking the share to which the parent if living would have been entitled. Held, that the will created a contingent remainder to vest in possession at the end of the trust term, and that those designated to take the estate took directly under the will, and not by representation.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1488-1510; Dec. Dig. § 634. ]
3. Wills (§ 497 )—Construction—“Children.”
Testatrix bequeathed the residue of her estate in trust for the benefit of her two daughters in equal moieties so long as they lived and remained unmarried, with the right of survivorship, and provided that, on the death or marriage of both of the daughters, the trust fund should be equally divided among testatrix’s children who may be surviving at the time; the child or children of any son or daughter who may have died before such contingency taking the share to which the parent if living would have 'been entitled. Held, that testatrix thereby intended to provide for her unmarried daughters so long as they remained unmarried, and, when they should both have died or married, to distribute the estate among those who at that time were her heirs at law, and hence the word “children” should be construed to include testatrix’s great-grandchildren.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1081; Dec. Dig. § 497. ]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Judgment on Report of Referee.
Action by Eliza D. Pfender against Hannah L. Depew* and others. From an interlocutory judgment confirming a referee’s report, defendant Louise Patterson and others appeal.
Modified and affirmed.
■Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, SCOTT,' and MILLER, JJ.
Charles S. Guggenheimer, for appellants.
Walter Large, for respondent.
For other cases' see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
This appeal presents the question which often recurs, and is frequently difficult to answer, whether or not the words "children" when used in a will should be construed in its primary sense or in a more general and comprehensive sense as the equivalent of "issue" or "descendants." The question arises in an action for partition, arid relates to the will of one Hannah Depew.
Joseph Depew, husband of Hannah, died on or about August 26, 1856, seised of certain real property in the city of New York. He left surviving his widow, Hannah Depew, and sons and daughters. By his will he devised and bequeathed one-third of his estate to his widow, Hannah Depew, absolutely, and gave her the income of the remaining two-thirds for her life, with remainder over to his children and the issue of such as should have predeceased him. Hannah Depew died on or about July 20, 1876. She left one married daughter, the plaintiff herein, two unmarried daughters, Laura A. and Hannah L. Depew, and several sons. She had also several grandchildren of tender age living at the time of her decease. Her will was dated December 31, 1874, and, after providing for the payment of her debts, made the following disposition of her estate:
"Third. After the payment of my debts and liabilities I direct my executors of this will to hold and invest a different moiety, or one half part, of all the rest and residue of my estate for the benefit of each of my two daughters Laura A. Depew and Hannah L. Depew, and to pay the interest, rents and income of the property so held and invested to the person for whose benefit it shall be invested once in six months, or oftener, during the natural life of the person for whose benefit that property shall be invested, provided she shall remain so long unmarried; and on her death or marriage the principal of the money and property above directed to be held and invested for her benefit is to be held and invested for the benefit of my other daughter above mentioned, in case she is still living and unmarried.
"Fourth. Upon the occurrence of the death or marriage of both of my said daughters above mentioned, I then direct that the principal part of my said estate so directed to be invested for their benefit, or the survivor of them, be-divided equally among my other children who may be surviving at the time, the child or children of any son or daughter who may have died, before such contingency, taking the share to which the parent, if living, would have been entitled."
Laura A. Depew never married, and died April 30, 1903. Hannah L. Depew never married, and still survives. Since the death of Hanr nah Depew other grandchildren as well as great-grandchildren have come into being, and the question to be determined is whether these great-grandchildren are entitled to participate in the division of the estate when the trust estate shall terminate, and consequently whether their contingent interests must be provided for by the decree.
It is elementary law that, as a general rule, the words "child" or "children," when used in a will or other document, will be taken to refer to issue or descendant of the first degree, and to exclude descendants of a more remote degree. Low v. Harmony, 72 N. Y. 408; Palmer v. Horn, 84 N. Y. 516. The rule, however, is not inflexible,, and there are many cases in which the word will be given a wider signification, and read as standing in a collective .sense for grandchil dren or even more remote descendants. The subject was exhaustively-treated in Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N. Y. 42, wherein the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of many authorities, laid down the rule "that the term 'children' may include issue however remote, and will' be held so to include whenever the reason of the thing demands it."' In Matter of Brown, 93 N. Y. 295, the testator gave to each of Inis six daughters a life estate in one-tenth part of his estate, real and personal, with remainder over to their respective children, and the question presented was whether the remainder was intended to vest in all the children of each daughter, or whether it was contingent upon such children surviving their mother, so that issue of a son of one of testator's daughters who died before his mother was to be cut off from all participation in the remainder limited upon the life estate. The-court found enough in the language of the will to let in the grandchildren of the life tenant, saying, per Rapallo, J.:
"If, however, this language is capable of any construction which would permit the issue of the deceased son to participate in the remainder limited upon his mother's life estate, that construction should on well-settled principles be-adopted in preference to one which should exclude them."
In Matter of Paton, 111 N. Y. 480, 18 N. E. 625, the will submitted: for construction provided that, upon the happening of a certain event,, the property should be divided "equally among the children I may-then have, or those who may be legally entitled thereto." The court realized that this clause was susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would exclude, and the other include grandchildren, and found no difficulty in adopting the latter interpretation, quoting with approval Judge Story's remark in Parkham v. Bowdoin, 1 Sumn. 368, Fed. Cas. No. 10,763, that:
"Although in its primary sense the word 'children' is a descriptio personarunn who are to take, there is not the slightest difficulty in giving it the other sense,, when the structure of the devise requires it."
The Court of Appeals, quoting from Kent (volume 4, p. 419n) that "children, as well as issue, may stand, in a collective sense, for grandchildren where the justice or reason of the case requires it," cites a large number of well-known authorities for the proposition that:
"The word 'children' is a flexible expression, and we think that meaning-should be preferred, when the reason of the thing sustains it, which permits the children of a deceased child to inherit." •
Where two interpretations of the word "children" are possible, the-courts have been much disposed to adopt that one which will not serve-to disinherit the heirs of the testator. Scott v. Guerney, 48 N. Y. 106-120; Matter of Keogh, 126 App. Div. 285-289, 110 N. Y. Supp. 868. In the present case the gift over is to take effect at the end of' the trust term and is to the testatrix's other children, and to the child' or children of any son or daughter who may have died "before such contingency"; that is, before the death or marriage of the last surviv- or of the two daughters for whom the trust was created, It is clear that this created a contingent remainder to vest in possession at the end of the trust term, and that those designated then to take the estate will take it directly under the will, and not by representation. The testatrix was creating a trust which might run, as indeed it has, for a long time, and she clearly contemplated and undertook to provide for the probability that some of her own children might die before the expiration of the trust term, and that her married sons and daughters might have children, grandchildren to her, born after her death, but before the expiration of the trust, and it is clear that she intended to include among the ultimate beneficiaries such after-born grandchildren, if their parent, who was her son or daughter, should have died before the time for division and distribution arrived. She was careful to provide that the distribution should be made per stirpes, at least so far as concerned her own children and grandchildren, preserving so far as possible an equality between her own children who survived the trust and the families of those who did not survive. In all this we discern, without difficulty, a very simple testamentary design to provide for her unmarried daughters so long as-they remained unmarried, and, when they should both have died or married, to distribute the estate among those who at that time would answer to the description of her heir's at law. To give effect to this testamentary scheme, it is necessary to include among those who may become entitled to "share in the distribution of the estate, when the time comes to distribute it, the great-grandchildren of the testatrix. All the facts have been found by the referee in his report, and it will not therefore be necessary to send the case back for a new trial.
The interlocutory decree will 'therefore be modified in accordance with this opinion, with costs and disbursements to the guardian ad litem for the infant appellants.
Settle decree ón notice.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and CLARICE and MILLER, JJ., concur.