Case Name: JOHN MELICHAREK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HILL BUS COMPANY, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1962-06-25
Citations: 37 N.J. 549
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN MELICHAREK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HILL BUS COMPANY, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 549–551

Head Matter:
JOHN MELICHAREK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HILL BUS COMPANY, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Argued June 4, 1962
Decided June 25, 1962.
Mr. Harry 0. Chashin argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent (Messrs. Marcus & Levy, attorneys).
Mr. Edward J. O’Mara argued the cause for defendant-appellant (Mr. Daniel Gilady, attorney; Mr. James Dorment, Jr., on the brief).

Opinion:
Pee Curiam.
A group of teenagers was standing or playing near the public road over which defendant's bus passed in the ordinary course of travel. As the bus was passing, one of the youngsters threw a stone, which came into it and struck the plaintiff, a passenger, in his right eye. He sought damages from the bus company, alleging negligence in failing to anticipate that the incident might occur. The trial court dismissed the action at the close of plaintiff's proof, holding that no lack of due care on the part of defendant had been shown. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, taking the view that a jury question as to defendant's responsibility had been made out within the doctrine of Harpell v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 20 N. J. 309 (1956). See 70 N. J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 1961). We granted certification, 36 N. J. 297 (1962).
Our examination of the record fails to indicate that the proof adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether the defendant company knew of the existence of a danger of its passengers' being struck by stones or other objects thrown by children from the public sidewalk or adjacent areas in the vicinity of this accident. We are satisfied also, that the proof was inadequate to establish a jury question as to whether, on this particular occasion, defendant's driver knew or should have been aware that a stone was likely to be thrown at or into his vehicle. Absence of such knowledge on the part of the driver or the bus company suffices to distinguish the case from Harpell v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, supra.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was correct and that its order of dismissal should have been sustained in the Appellate Division.
Reversed.