Case Name: Ex parte MUNCY
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-11-05
Citations: 163 S.W. 29
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ex parte MUNCY.
Judges: DAVIDSON, J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 163
Pages: 29–58

Head Matter:
Ex parte MUNCY.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 5, 1913.
On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 21, 1914.)
1. Witnesses (§ 297*) — Peivilege eeom Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Provision.
Under Bill of Rights, § 10, providing that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a person cannot be compelled to testify in a criminal case pending against him, nor give testimony on the trial of another on which a prosecution may or can be founded against him.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1011, 1026-1037; Dec. Dig. § 297. ]
2. Witnesses (§ 304 ) — Privilege from Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Provision.
Where the law of a state absolutely protects one from all punishment for the offense about which he is called to testify, he does not give evidence against himself, and Bill of Rights, § 10, providing that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, has no application.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1051, 1052; Dec. Dig. § 304. ]
3. Witnesses (§ 303 ) — Privilege from Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Provision.
The district attorney, with the knowledge and consent of the district judge, has power to guarantee a witness immunity from prosecution and punishment for any matter about which he may be called to testify in regard to a homicide; and hence, where immunity was tendered by the district judge, a witness could be imprisoned for his refusal to testify.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1049, 1050; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
4.Witnesses (§ 303 ) — Privilege from SELF-iNCRIMINATION — CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.
That a person who declined to testify concerning a homicide on the ground that his testimony would incriminate himself, and who was thereupon tendered immunity from prosecution and punishment by the district attorney and district judge, might testify falsely, and thereby become subject to a prosecution for perjury did not entitle him to insist upon his right to refrain from testifying, notwithstanding the tendered immunity.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1049, 1050; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Witnesses (§ 303 ) — Privilege erom Self-INCRIMINATION — CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.
An offer of immunity to a witness, concerning a homicide, from prosecution for the offense of murder, embraced immunity from punishment for any connected offense which his testimony might disclose.
[Ed. Noto. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1049, 1050; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
6. Witnesses (§ 303 ) — Privilege erom Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Provision.
To compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him, the immunity from prosecution given him must be complete and absolute as to the transaction under investigation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1049, 1050 ; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
7. Witnesses (§ 303 ) — Privilege from Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Provision.
That immunity given a witness from punishment for any offense about which he may testify by the district attorney and district judge does not bar an indictment, but only a conviction, does not justify the refusal of the witness to testify on the ground that his testimony will incriminate himself.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1049, 1050; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
8. Constitutional Daw (§ 74 ) — Witnesses (§ 293*) — Judicial Power — Encroachment on Executive — Pardoning Power.
The statutes, under which the district attorney and district judge may grant immunity to a witness from prosecution for any offense about which he may testify, do not violate the constitutional provision conferring upon the Governor the sole power of granting pardons, as the pardoning power is not inherent in the executive department of the government, but is inherent in sovereignty, and the people, having-given the Governor power to pardon only after conviction could, through the Legislature, confer power to reprieve or pardon before conviction on the courts, or any other agency of government.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 124; Dec. Dig. § 74; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1009-1014; Dec. Dig. § 293. ]
9.Constitutional Law (§ 61 ) — Judicial Power — Suspension of Laws — Privilege from Self-Incrimination.
The statutes under which the district attorney and district judge may grant immunity to a witness in respect to matters about which he may testify do not give the courts power to suspend a law of the state.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 103-107; Dec. Dig. § 61. ]
Davidson, J., dissenting.
Original habeas corpus proceeding by Elbert Muncy.
Relator remanded.
The following is the substance of the briefs on rehearing, referred to in the dissenting opinion:
First. The following statement in said opinion is erroneous and in the face of the record, to wit: “The district attorney in open court stated he would agree that the relator should not be prosecuted for my offense growing out of the Mlling of J. M. Muncy;, and L. S. Kinder, Judge of the Sixty-Fourth judicial district, acquiesced in and approved said offer of immunity from prosecution, and informed relator he would not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of the killing of his father.” There was no agreement that relator should not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of the killing of J. M. Muncy, and the immunity tendered him was expressly limited to the offense of murdering J. M. Muncy, and any and all other offenses were, by the expressed terms of the language used, excluded.
Granting that the placing of the witness upon the stand, under a general promise of immunity, would protect him for all offenses about which he might testify, it certainly could not be said to be true of immunity tendered a witness that was expressly limited to one offense only, and is referred to throughout the judgment of contempt as said offense, referring only to the offense of killing J. M. Muncy. Article 1433, P. C. 1911, defines a conspiracy as an agreement entered into between two or more persons to commit any one of the offenses hereinafter named in this chapter. Article 1434 provides that the offense of conspiracy is complete, although the parties conspiring do not proceed to effect the object for which they have unlawfully combined. Article 1437, said Code, provides the agreement, to come within the definition of conspiracy, must be to commit one or more of the following offenses, to wit: Murder, robbery, arson, burglary, or any other offense of the great felony.
The theory of the state is, and the judgment of contempt affirmatively shows, in part at least, that a conspiracy, which is punishable under our statute as a felony, was entered into the day preceding the killing by relator and his mother, Bertie Muncy. The offense of conspiracy is expressly excluded from the immunity offered, and this relator has no protection whatever as to said offense.
In Ex parte Park, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 599, 40 S. W. 301, 66 Am. St. Rep. 835, the relator was discharged because it appeared that he might have to give testimony of another offense, for which immunity had not been offered him, and which might be brought out on cross-examination by the defendant. While the direct question and answer might not have incriminated the relator of the offense of conspiracy, it has been the uniform holding of the courts of this and every other state that, if a legitimate cross-examination would elicit any information connecting the witness with any other offenses, he need not answer unless absolutely protected. Certainly the defendant would have a right to bring out on cross-examination all the connection the relator had with this offense, if for no other reason than to connect him with same as an accomplice and discredit his testimony.
Second. The court erred in the following paragraph of said, opinion: “It is thus seen that when relator was called before the grand jury, he was promised immunity and accepted same, and gave testimony before the grand jury, a sworn statement of such testimony being incorporated in the record, and is as follows,” etc. We cannot understand how the court made this mistake, as the record not only fails to show that he was granted immunity before the grand jury, but affirmatively shows that he was not; and the statement referred to in said -opinion was not the grand jury statement, but was a statement secured at the ex parte hearing or inquest proceedings in the town of Lockney on the day of the killing.
The following -facts are deducible from the above: First. That the statement incorporated in the opinion of the court as the grand jury statement was not the grand jury statement, but the statement taken at Lockney, where the killing occurred, not the county seat of Floyd, and could not therefore have been the grand jury statement. Second. That the state, through its officers, was so positive that this relator was connected with this offense in some way that he was warned before the grand jury that he did not have to testify at all, and need not make any statement. Third. That he was denied the privilege of consulting with counsel. Fourth. That he was not granted immunity at all.
Third. The court erred in said opinion in the following statement: “That there was no case pending against him was an admitted fact; that he had testified in regard to the same matter before the grand jury, under promise of immunity, is an admitted fact.”
We most earnestly deny both propositions, and do not admit either; and, if there is a single line of testimony in the record showing either of said facts, we have failed to find it, and cannot understand where the court discovered it. There is no such admission in either the judgment of contempt or the statement of facts on file, and we presume the court feels itself bound by such record.
Fourth. The following statement in said opinion is erroneous, to wit: “In the Greenhaw and Camron Cases, supra, this case is discussed at length, and it is held that the courts in this state, under our Code have authority to give and guarantee absolute immunity to a person who may be called to testify in regard to the transaction.” Previous to the Camron Case referred to, the power of the district court to even make a contract of immunity had been expressly denied. In the Holmes Case, 20 Tex. App. 517, because such power belonged to the executive department of the government, and such had always been the rule in England, and after discussing the rules obtaining under different jurisdictions, Justice Simkins, in the Camron Case, finally rests his opinion of the right of a court to make such a contract upon grounds of expediency and public policy, as shown by the following statement from said opinion: “But it would seem that the power of dealing with such agreements lies primarily with the prosecuting officer, and in Texas he may act with the consent of the court, and we can see no good reason why, when a defendant has in good faith carried out his agreement, the labor and expense to the state of a solemn trial should be incurred for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which it is admitted he is entitled as a matter of right.”
The Camron Case was again before the appellate court, and Justice Simkins further amplified the reason upon which said opinion rested for its basis, and settled the matter beyond cavil. The following excerpt from the Camron Case, reported in 25 S. W. 288, shows that Justice Simkins did not admit that the courts of Texas had the inherent right, under the Constitution and statutes, to grant immunity, but that same was a right he had by applying to executive clemency, and it was a useless expense to put the state and defendant to a trial for the purpose of remitting him to this remedy. His statement is as follows: “In the former appeal we examined this question, and reached the conclusion, there announced, that a plea of the character here interposed is peculiarly within the province of the judge to decide, because the contract, when carried out in good faith, is the ground of obtaining a pardon after conviction, on the recommendation of the judge; and we here reach the same result by dismissing the prosecution, entering of record the reasons therefor, and thereby avoiding useless trouble and expense to the state, witnesses, and jurors.”
There is not a line, word, or syllable in the Camron Case that shows, directly or inferentially, that it was based upon any provision of our Code, as stated in said opinion, but Justice Simkins, as if to settle the matter for all time to come, specifically states his reasons in the second appeal of the Camron Case, supra. The Greenhaw Case cited by the court is even stronger against the court’s position. In this case, Justice Henderson, who wrote the opinion in the Park Case, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 40 S. W. 301, 66 Am. St. Rep. 835, which we will hereafter refer to, wrote an opinion in the Greenhaw Case, concurred in by the entire court, in which he stated that a witness who had been promised immunity from prosecution, might “at any time before the final trial, refuse to testify against his codefendant, or testify falsely; and, under all the authorities, when he makes a breach of the contract, he is no longer entitled to immunity from punishment under it. If the rule were otherwise in a capital case such as this, applicant might contract for bail_, or even for the dismissal of the case against him, to be extended before the final trial of his codefend-ant; and he might abscond, or he might attend, and refuse to testify, or testify falsely, and, in either event, he would have the state at a disadvantage.” .
. Fifth. The court erred in the following statement in said opinion, to wit: “This court held that the dismissal of the cases for burglary and theft, in consideration of Young testifying, carried with it complete immunity for any matter growing out of the transaction, and he could not thereafter be prosecuted for the theft in Brazos county hereinbefore stated, reversing and dismissing the cases against Young. Thus it will be seen that our courts have construed the law to carry complete immunity from prosecution for any matter growing out of the transaction, and will not countenance or permit the prosecution of a person under such circumstances.”
An examination of the Young Case, reported in 45 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 75 S. W. 23, will show that the court’s statement that a dismissal of the cases for burglary and theft carries complete immunity for any matter growing out of the ■transaction is entirely too broad a statement, and is not justified by the facts. The court simply decided, and this was the only matter before the court, that the dismissal by the prosecuting attorney of the eases of theft and burglary in Grimes county, under promise of immunity, would bar prosecution for theft in Brazos county. Nor do the other cases cited, beginning with Stanford v. State and ending with Elliott v. State, sustain the proposition of the court. The Stanford Case is an incest case, and Judge Davidson expressly held in that case that the court was without power to grant immunity to a witness and force his testimony, and we will refer to this case hereafter, as it is directly against the majority opinion in this case and the first expression of the courts of Texas directly upon this subject. The Griffin, Taylor, Kain, and Elliott Cases are each and all gaming cases, and it was very properly held by the court that article 391, P. C. 1895, amply protected them and granted complete immunity for anj; offense about which they might testify in gaming cases, and have no application whatever to a case where the court itself has attempted to exercise the power which we claim belongs only to the executive and legislative departments of the government.
Further on in the opinion, it is asserted that Judge Davidson’s dissenting opinion in the Napoleon Case was the first opinion rendered questioning the soundness of the law in the Floyd Case.
Sixth. The court erred in the following statement of its opinion: “So it may be said to be an unbroken rule of decisions, both in this court and the Supreme Court, from 1855 down to the present time, that a witness may be compelled to testify, when under the law he is given complete immunity from punishment for the transaction about which he is called to testify, and the dissenting opinion in the Napoleon Case is the first time that any judge of either this court or the Supreme Court has announced the rule that the consent of the witness must first be obtained. This would render ineffective our laws in regard to immunity from punishment, and place a barrier to the enforcement of the law in many instances.”
Our view of the earlier Texas authorities and what they intended to decide is precisely the opposite from the above, as we think the following will show: In the Bowden Case referred to by the court, and which is the first and one of the best-considered cases in Texas, we find the following statement made by the court in that case: “It seems to have become a practice recognized as correct in our courts, for the district attorney, with a concurrence of the court, to enter a nolle prosequi in cases where it was deemed essential to the ends of justice that one or more of the defendants, by Ms consent, or at Ms instance, should turn state’s evidence against his codefendants.”
So the very first case cited by the court lays down the proposition that the testimony of the witness can be used only by his consent. All other cases cited by the court, including the Cam-ron Case, which is the leading authority in Texas holding that the courts have authority to contract immunity, it will be observed that the courts were construing onlj; a contract by the courts, and were not deciding whether or not the courts had the inherent right, vested in them by the Constitution and laws, to thrust immunity upon a witness and compel his testimony. A contract presupposes consent. There could be no valid contract without the consent of the contracting parties. Then how could it be said that the Barrara Case, the Camron Case, and the Hardin Case, cited by the court as sustaining its contention, were decisive of the issue presented in this case, when in each and all of these cases the question was one of contract, carrying with it the idea of consent, and supporting Judge Davidson in his view? The court further says in its opinion, that the right of the court to grant immunity never has been seriously, questioned in Texas. It has not only been seriously questioned, but denied by no less an eminent jurist than Judge Wilson in Holmes v. State, 20 Tex. App. 509. Judge Wilson in that case expresses the opinion that the granting of immunity is a right belonging to the pardoning power only, and Judge Simkins in the Camron Case, as reported in 22 S. W. and 25 S. W., supra, does not deny the correctness of this principle of law, but finally rests the rule laid down therein, as heretofore stated, upon grounds of expediency and public policy, without holding that the courts have the inherent right or power to even contract for immunity, much less force immunity upon a witness, which is an entirely different matter.
Briefly reviewing the authorities showing it has never been the recognized rule that immunity can be thrust upon a witness, except with his consent, we note the following: The Barrara Case, supra, was the case of a contract presupposing consent. The Bowden Case was likewise a contract, in which the proposition was laid down that a case could be dismissed and the defendant’s testimony used with Ms consent, and the further expression therein made that the effect of the nolle prosequi would be different without it, and that he is amenable to any indictment in any court having jurisdiction of the offense. The next case is the Hardin Case, in which Judge Hurt expresses the opinion that the great weight of authority was to the effect that “immunity could be granted only by the pardoning powerand rests his opinion upon the doctrine of estoppel against the state, and not upon the court’s right to give immunity. The next is the Holmes Case, supra, in which Judge Wilson denied the right of the court to even contract immunity. The next case is the Cam-ron Case, by Simkins, who impliedly admits the correctness of the Holmes Case, but says there is no use to put the defendant to the trouble and the state to the expense of a trial merely for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which he is always ■ entitled, and this was a case of a contract which he agrees carried with it the idea of consent. About the next case is the Park Case, in an opinion by Judge Henderson, where the relator was discharged because it appeared that upon cross-examination the witness might have to incriminate himself. The next case is the Stanford Case by Judge Davidson, in which the right of the court to force a witness to testify upon granting him immunity was expressly denied, and which opinion was concurred in by Henderson and Brooks. This case was decided many years before the Hughes or Napoleon Case, and to our mind follows the principles announced in the Bowden and Camron Oases, supra. We do not think the court has grasped the distinction which we have attempted to draw between the right of the court to make a contract with the consent of the witness, and their inherent right under the Constitution and laws to force testimony by the use of the dungeon or jail. In the former there would not be necessity for positive statutory law, because the defendant could naturally do away with or waive his right; in the latter, the courts are attempting to take away a right guaranteed him by the state and federal Constitution, and this naturally presupposes an absolute right in the court to perform that identical act derived from the organic law of the state.
All the authorities hold that a contract for immunity by the court merely suspends the offense; that he can be thereafter prosecuted; that the offense is alive all the time; that it has never been obliterated, else, how could he thereafter be prosecuted, as stated in the Neeley and Green-haw Cases? This amounts in effect to a suspension of the laws of the state, which might be done with the consent of the defendant, but certainly could not be done against his consent, without violating section 28 of the Bill of Rights, providing that no law should be suspended, and which was applied in the Smythe Case, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 375, 120 S. W. 200, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 854, 133 Am. St. Rep. 976. For this very reason, the defendant can at any time withdraw from the contract, and the only remedy of the state is to prosecute. The promise operates against the state by way of estoppel, but the court has not the inherent right to hold a case over a defendant year in and year out and deny him a speedy public trial against his consent.
This is the severest blow civil liberty has received at the hands of any court in the last 200 years. We cannot believe this court will allow, upon mature consideration, the principles enunciated in the majority opinion to stand as a guidepost for the generations that are and that are yet to come. The wise and salutary provisions of the state and federal Constitutions sprang from the necessity of protecting the liberty of the citizens from the judicial tyranny of the courts, as exemplified in the whipping post, the rack, and the inquisition. If the majority opinion be the law, we are 'returning again to that condition, and vesting the courts of Texas with a right no less severe probably, when abused, than the pillory and the rack, and in our judgment it turns back the pages of history and progress for more than 100 years.
It surely ought not to be justified, as intimated in the opinion, upon the grouud that to hold otherwise might prove a barrier to the en- foreement of the law. For we do not understand that government has been instituted among men for the sole purpose of enforcing law, but for the purpose of protecting individual rights. So every right that a defendant possesses, and which has been bought by the privation, suffering, and blood of those who preceded us, and transmitted as a priceless heritage to the present generation, might also be taken from them.
We most earnestly ask that this case be'given further attention believing that upon mature deliberation this court will discharge the relator.
Amended Argument for Relator on Motion for Rehearing.
The majority opinion holds, in substance, that the courts of Texas have been vested with the right and authority under the laws to thrust immunity from prosecution upon a witness implicated in a crime and compel his testimony against his confederate, and that complete immunity having been given relator by the proper officers in this case, relator was thereafter in contempt of court in refusing to answer the questions propounded. The relator maintains that there is neither constitutional provision, statutory enactment, or judicial decision in this state previous to the Hughes opinion by Judge Harper, which itself was dicta, that vests in the judicial department of the government the power and right to wipe out and obliterate an offense against a witness so as to compel his testimony. Unless such power exists in the district courts, it is conceded that relator must be discharged, so that the determining question is the inherent power of the courts derived from the organic law of the state to use the jails of the country to unseal the lips of a witness, and compel his testimony where such testimony would implicate him in a crime.
Justice Harper quotes with approval the proposition laid down in Oyc. “that a witness’ constitutional privilege of refusing to answer cannot be taken away by the state unless absolute indemnity is provided, and that nothing short of complete immunity to the witness, and absolute wiping out of the offense as to him, so that he can no longer be prosecuted for it, will furnish that indemnity,” etc. To the same effect is the case of Cullen v. Cam, 24 Grat. (Ya.) 624;. Ex parte Carter, 166 Mo. 604, 66 S. W. 540, 57 L. R. A. 654; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171 — all holding in substance that there must be a wiping out and obliteration of the offense before testimony can be forced from a person implicated in or charged with such offense. To wipe out an offense by granting immunity is only another way of granting a pardon, and if so we are immediately confronted with a constitutional provision prohibiting the exercise of such power by the judicial department of the government, which provision is supported and buttressed by numerous decisions, ■chief among which is the case of Snodgrass v. State, 150 S. W. 162, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1144, by Judge Harper, who, in one of the most exhaustive and luminous decisions ever rendered in Texas, declared the old suspended sentence law unconstitutional because it attempted to vest pardoning power in the courts, which he very properly held belongs only to the executive department of the government. He states that no intelligent lawyer could deny that a legislative enactment, purporting to give the courts authority to grant a pardon, was unconstitutional. Therefore, if the act of the court in the instant case amounted in effect to granting a pardon, it would not be worth while to search for or cite legislative authority for such action, as we have Judge Harper for it that no such power can be given or granted to the courts, and no provision of our Code could therefore be authority, and it would be useless to discuss any such provision, if one existed, which we emphatically assert does not.
The Constitution of Texas vests the power to grant pardons only in the executive department of the government, and if the Legislature cannot delegate this power to the courts, which to our minds is self-evident, from whence do the courts of Texas derive their power to force a pardon upon a witness implicated in a crime, in order to compel him to testify without infringing upon his constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination? It is hardly worth while to state that no constitutional provision exists in Texas applicable to this character of cases, and the only statutory provision which could in any manner apply is the following provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The attorney representing the state may at any time, under the rules provided in article 37, dismiss a prosecution as to one or more defendants jointly indicted with others, and the person so discharged may be introduced as a witness by either party. This article upon its face shows that it was not intended to take away the witness’ constitutional guaranty of silence, which*we contend can only be done by a statutory enactment, clearly intended to have that effect, and which in itself wipes out the offense, or by a pardon. It only remains to examine the judicial decisions of Texas upon the subject, for it is clear from the above that they alone must furnish authority for the court’s action in this case, if any exists.
An examination of the authorities cited in the majority opinion will show them to belong to either one of two classes, viz., • to that class where there has been a contract entered into between the state and the witness, express or implied, under which the witness was to testify in consideration of immunity granted him by the court, which of course necessarily implies consent, and could not be authority in the instant case, where the state is attempting to thrust immunity upon a witness against Ms consent, and use the jail to compel him to testify. Nor do any of these cases base the court’s right to grant immunity upon any provision of our Code. To this class of cases belong the Bar-rara, Bowden, Hardin, Holmes, Oamron, and Greenhaw Oases, cited by the majority as sustaining its view that the courts have the inherent right to thrust immunity upon a person implicated in crime against his consent and force his testimony. Every one of these will be found to be cases where the witness agreed to testify. The second class of cases cited by the court are those where there has been some statutory enactment which wiped out the offense about which the witness was called to testify, and the witness stood in the same position as he would if no offense had ever been defined or denounced. The Legislature only has power to define offenses, to suspend law with reference to punishment for crime, and to make such provisions as they deem necessary for the enforcement of the law, and certainly a case falling under this class would furnish no authority for the judicial department of the government exercising a right clearly belonging under our Constitution to another department. To this last class belongs the Eloyd Case, 7 Tex. 215, so much relied upon by the majority, which lays the obviously correct rule that where an acquittal is had, or the offense barred by the statute of limitation (both statutory modes for the obliteration of offenses), the witness cannot claim his constitutional privileges of silence. To this class also belong the Griffin, Taylor, Kain, and Elliott Oases, cited by Judge Harper; they being all gaming cases, where the immunity statute' protects the witness. The cases cited from • other states and from the Supreme Court of the United States, in the latter part of the majority opinion, are, without exception, cases arising under immunity statutes, mostly anti-trust, where the courts hold, as do the Texas courts, that the witness is amply protected. We concede the correctness of all these decisions. The Legislature may provide for the immunity of a witness because it has the sole right to define crime, and the very fact that every state in the Union from which the majority cites cases has seen fit to pass general immunity statutes p'ertaining to certain offenses argues very strongly that none of these states recognize the courts as having the inherent power to grant immunity, else why such statute.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, held, in substance, that the witness must be protected absolutely against prosecution before he could be required to testify, discharging the relator. The subsequent case of Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 593, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819, neither overrules this case nor denies the correctness of the principles enunciated therein, the witness in this case being required to answer because there had been, since the Counselman Case, an immunity statute passed by Congress. The majority have cited no case, nor quoted from any, where the court, without the consent of the witness and in the absence of legislative action wiping out the offense, has ever been held to have the inherent right to grant immunity against the witness’ consent and compel his testimony. All the authorities in and out of Texas hold precisely to the contrary.
In the Bowden Case we find the following language: “And it seems to have become a practice, recognized as correct in our own courts, for the district attorney, with the concurrence of the court, to enter a nolle prosequi in cases where it was deemed essential to the ends of justice that one or more of the defendants, by his consent or at Ms instance, should turn state’s evidence against his codefendant.”
It will be observed that Justice Wilson was discussing a contract, under the terms of which the defendant’s case was to be dismissed, in consideration of his testifying against his co-defendant, and the rule is laid down by him that it can be done by the consent, or at the instance of such witness. Oertainly a very different proposition from the case at bar, where the court is attempting to force the witness to accept immunity against his consent.
Justice Wilson observes further: “There is no doubt of the correctness of the rule ‘that the effect of the nolle prosequi is to put the defendant without day upon that indictment,’ and that ordinarily ‘he becomes, while he is so, amenable to another indictment in any court having jurisdiction of the offense.’ ” There might have been no impropriety, while it was evident that the Arnold Case (his codefendant) could not be tried, to procure the finding of another indictment against Bowden.”
It is remarkably strange, if the court in this case recognized the district court as having inherent power to wipe out and obliterate an offense against a witness, that he lays down the proposition that he could be indicted in any court having jurisdiction upon such obliterated offense. In the Greenhaw Case the question at issue was thoroughly considered; and, as it has been quoted by the court by Justice Harper as sustaining his view, and, as it is so overwhelmingly in our judgment against his position, we will quote from it without stint:
“Appellant was indicted for three several murders in Henderson county. He sued out an application for habeas corpus before Hon. A. £>. Lipscomb, judge of the district court of said county, and upon the hearing thereof was remanded to the custody of the sheriff. Appellant’s first assignment of error is ‘that the court erred in refusing reasonable bail to applicant, the evidence showing he is only held as a witness against his codefendants, and that he had been promised, under a valid contract with the proper officers of the state, immunity from prosecution and punishment for his connection with the crime charged against him.’ ”
In discussing the principles of law involved, Judge Brooks uses the following language:
“Here two parties are indicted for murder, one of whom turns state’s evidence; this forms and constitutes, under our law, a continuous contract, the good faith of which must be carried out by both parties. Being a continuous contract, the terms and conditions are not consummated until the final, trial of the party or parties accused against whom the accomplice agrees to testify. After he has testified against the parties, and they have been convicted, and if appeals are prosecuted, and these appeals have been affirmed by this court, then the accomplice is entitled to his release under the terms of the contract, but not until then. * * *
“We have been cited to no authority which holds that, where a party turns state’s evidence, he is entitled to bail. But on this subject we find the following laid down in Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, paragraph 1168: ‘Before testifying, an accomplice has acquired no special privileges. He is not consequently entitled to have bail.’ * * * There is no authority 'in Texas for a county or district attorney, or other party acting for them, to agree that an accomplice turning state’s evidence shall have bail, in a capital case. * ⅜ s
“So, where the district attorney enters into such an agreement, and the party turning state’s evidence carries out in good faith his part of the contract, it would seem to terminate his prosecution. But¡ in order to entitle the defendant to such dismissal, he must in good faith carry out Ms agreement.”
From the above we see that where a witness has been guaranteed immunity and promised bail, it avails him nothing at all until the final disposition of the case, and that he can be kept in jail until he testifies against the other party, and will remain under indictment all the while. A rather strange and novel procedure to go through, if the granting of immunity by the court has “obliterated and wiped out the offense.”
But Judge Henderson, who also wrote an opinion in this case, and upon whose opinion in the Park Case the majority partly relies, stated the position of the court very much stronger than the above, as shown by the following quotation from his opinion:
“I think, however, it can be fairly deduced from the authorities that the state or sovereign can contract with the accomplice upon the following terms only. In consideration that he-shall testify fully and fairly as to all he knows-in regard to the guilt of his associates in the particular case in which the contract is made, that he will receive immunity from punishment as to such case. * * * Again it is agreed that there must be a compliance with the terms of the contract on the part of the accomplice before he can claim immunity. ⅜ * * This would appear to be in harmony with the proposition that this immunity from punishment is not to be entended until after the accomplice has testified. * * *
“Here, as we have seen, an accomplice is not driven to an executive pardon, but is protected by the court itself, which authorizes the dismissal or nolle prosequi of the case. This dismissal is after such accomplice has fully and fairly testified against his codefendants, and he cannot be said to have fully performed his contract until the final disposition of the case against his-codefendant. His contract is a continuous one, and he has no right under it until he has finally testified in the case. So the question of applicant’s reasonable compliance with his contract cannot arise until the final trial of his code-fendants, as it cannot be known until then whether or not he will fulfill his obligation to testify. He may, at any time before the final trial, refuse to testify against his codefendant.. or testify falsely. * * * If the rule were otherwise in a capital case such as this, applicant might contract for hail, or even for the dismissal of the case against him, to be extended before the final trial of his codefendant; and he might abscond, or he might attend and refuse to testify. ⅜ * * Viewing the question from every standpoint, it occurs to me that a rule which confines a contract between the state and an accomplice to the simple proposition that the state will accord the accomplice immunity from punishment after he has fully and truly testified in the final trial is a safe and sound one."
From the above it is clear that a district court can only contract for immunity upon the condition of a witness giving his testimony, which contract he might thereafter violate by refusing to testify, and that immunity is only an inchoate and imperfect right which may ultimately ripen into a vested one, as the state can only extend immunity upon the condition, as Judge Henderson states, of the witness testifying, and the witness cannot claim immunity so as to be discharged from bail until after he has testified fully and fairly. Under this authority, which Justice Harper has quoted with approval, the relator can be remanded to jail and kept there, an indictment can ■ be held against him, and he would all the while be utterly helpless, because without his consent and over his protest he has had immunity thrust upon him by the court.
Judge Simkins in the Camron Case, which was twice before the appellate court, did not deny the principle of law enunciated above by Justice Wilson, but rested his decision that the courts could contract for immunity in consideration of a witness testifying truly upon grounds of expediency and public policy, as is conclusively shown by quotations from the Cam-ron Case: “But it would seem that the power of dealing with such agreements lies primarily with the prosecuting officer, and in Texas he may act with the consent of the court; and we can see no good reason why, when a defendant has in good faith carried out his agreement, the labor and expense to the state of a solemn trial should be incurred for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which, it is admitted, he is entitled as a matter of right.” 32 Tex. Cr. R. 180, 22 S. W. 682, 40 Am. St. Rep. 763.
This same case was again before the court, and Judge Simkins, as if to dispose of the reason for his decision beyond cavil, uses the following unmistakable language: “In the former appeal we examined this question, and reached the conclusion, there announced, that a plea of the character here interposed is peculiarly within the province of the judge to decide, because the contract, when carried out in good faith, is the ground of obtaining a pardon after conviction, on recommendation of the Judge; and we here reach the same result by dismissing the prosecution, entering of record the reason therefor, and thereby avoiding the useless trouble and expense to the state, witness, and jurors.” 25 S. W. 288.
After collecting the authorities and discussing the principles involved therein, the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Ford, 99 U. S. 594, 25 L. Ed. 399, expressly decided that the power to grant immunity was lodged in the pardoning power only, and such is the rule recognized by the overwhelming weight of authorities, and which was changed in this jurisdiction, as stated by Judge Simkins, to avoid useless expense and trouble. These quotations are given to show that it has never been recognized that the judicial department of the government had the inherent right to grant immunity, for such a right belonged only to the executive department of the government, by the exercise of its pardoning power, or to the legislative department by providing that upon the happening of certain contingencies no offense existed, as in our gaming statute.
The principles of law announced in the Green-haw Case, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 53. S. W. 1024, have been many times reaffirmed by. this court.
Again, such a power, vested in our courts to thrust immunity upon a witness and hold him under indictment pending the giving of his testimony, would deprive a citizen of his constitutional right to a speedy public trial. This exact question has also been recently before the court, and in the case of Waldon v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 512, 98 S. W. 848, 14 Ann. Cas. 342, it was held that the Acts of the Twenty-Eighth Legislature, suspending prosecution in seduction case for two years upon certain conditions, was unconstitutional, because it deprived the defendant of a speedy public trial.
If the principles of the Greenhaw Case are inapplicable to this case, then the majority opinion as shown above is absolutely without any authority whatever to sustain its view, and if this case is applicable and justifies the opinion of the majority, it removes the very foundation stone upon which the civil liberty of the citizens of Texas now rests. The majority concede that, unless relator is protected from prosecution, he must be discharged, yet they cite a decision as sustaining them which expressly holds that the granting of immunity by the court does not protect the relator from indictment nor imprisonment. To our minds the distinction between this case and some cases cited in the majority opinion upon this phase of the question is obvious. In this case there can be a valid indictment and legal imprisonment. In the cases under the immunity statute there could be neither, as a defendant could resort to the method of habeas corpus for his release if he were protected by the immunity statute which had obliterated the offense as to him before he had testified; but in this case he is absolutely without any remedy to obtain a speedy public trial, or to obtain his discharge in case of arrest, or even bail if it were a capital offense. This exact question has been before the courts of other states, and it has been uniformly held, so far as a most painstaking investigation by us has shown, that the power to thrust immunity upon a witness against his consent, and compel his testimony where such testimony implicates him in a crime, had never been lodged or vested in the judicial department of the government.
The question of the right of the court to grant immunity came up for consideration by a Virginia court, in the case of Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, and their right in that case was absolutely denied. The court, in disposing of the matter, uses in part the following language: “No implied suggestion by the court, nor any implied or positive promise by the commonwealth’s attorney, could operate as an indemnity to the witness that he would not be further prosecuted. He had a right to stand upon his constitutional privilege, and not to trust to the chances of a further prosecution. The court, of course, could offer Mm no indemnity. * * ⅜ He has a right to stand upon his constitutional privilege, and to remain silent whenever any question is asked him the answer to which may tend to incriminate himself.” This case was cited with approval by the federal Circuit Court in the case of Foot v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. 161, where this exact question came up for consideration, and the court uses the following language: “It is set up in the answer filed by the district attorney that the petitioner, when carried before the court, upon his failure to answer questions before the grand jury, was assured by the court that no information given by him in his answers to the questions would or could be used against him in any prosecution in any court of the United States. The petitioner could not be required to waive his constitutional privilege upon such an assurance by the court. He has a right to stand upon his constitutional privilege, notwithstanding such assurance, and to remain silent whenever any question is asked, the answer to which might incriminate him.”
What we conceive to be the precise question involved in this case came up for adjudication before the Sixth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals from the Ohio District, and in disposing of same Judge Wm. H. Taft, afterwards President of the United States, uses the following language: “It is argued for the respondent, represented by the attorneys for the United States that the witness is given, by virtue of the action of-the government, entire and absolute immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the alleged criminating question relates, by the long-approved practice of recommending to the pardon of the executive accomplices and codefendants whom the government calls to establish its case against the principals and other defendants. The cases of Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cow. 331; People v. Whipple, 9 C.ow. 707, and Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 492, 20 Am. Dec. 534, are relied upon to show the extent and the binding effect of such a rule. These cases show that there is an equitable right to a pardon where an accomplice is called upon by the government to give testimony against those with whom he was engaged in violating the law; but we do not find any authority, and none is cited to us, in which such an equitable right to executive pardon, if the witness states fully and fairly the truth, has ever been held to do away with the constitutional privilege not to give evidence against himself, if he chooses to claim, it. See Whisky Cases, 99 U. S. 594, 25 L. Ed. 399. It is a mere equity after all, not dependent upon a positive statute, and commensurate only with full and fair revelation by the witness of the entire truth.” Ex parte Irvine (C. C.) 74 Fed. 954.
It will be noticed that he quotes the same authorities as does Judge White in the Bowden Case, supra,. and his reasoning and that of Judge Henderson in the Greenhaw Case, supra, is strikingly similar. It will be noted that he rests it upon the proposition that his right to pardon or immunity is an equity dependent upon his giving testimony in the future, as was the Greenhaw Case, and that therefore he cannot be forced to testify. The right of a court to imprison a witness for contempt because he refuses to testify, after having been granted immunity by the judge and district attorney, necessarily implies that such officers have been vested with the power and authority by the organic law of the state to wipe out such offense and place the witness in the same attitude, in order to make his protection as broad as his constitutional guaranty, as if no offense had ever been defined. That the district attorney and district judge have not been vested with powers so broad and liberal, and that such powers belonged to different departments of the government, to our minds is so obvious as to not even be debatable.
Cyc. defines the prosecution in a criminal case as a criminal action, the institution or commencement or continuance of a criminal suit, the whole or any part of the procedure which the law provides for bringing the offenders to justice. Ufider this definition and the principles of law enunciated in the Greenshaw Case, supra, relator is as unprotected from prosecution to-day as he was before the action of the court in attempting to thrust immunity upon him. It seems to us that the authority of the judicial department of the government to extend a pardon to a witness implicated in a crime, in consideration of his testimony and upon this condition alone, and ,by his consent, is the only authority that has ever been vested in the judicial department of the government, is so conclusively established in the authorities cited by majority opinion as not to admit of argument.
This exact question was decided by the court in the case of Stanford v. State, 42 Tex. Or. R. 345, 60 S. W. 253, and which was concurred in both by Judges Brooks and Henderson, so that it may be said to be the unbroken line of decisions in and out of Texas prior to the recent Hughes Case by Judge Harper; that no inherent right existed in the district courts of Texas to force immunity upon a witness implicated in a crime and compel his testimony, and if any exist in any English-speaking country having a constitution similar to our own, the majority fails to cite them.
Again, the immunity offered relator was for one offense only, to wit, that of murdering J. M. Muncy, and was expressly, limited to this. We concede that without this limitation the immunity would have been general enough to include any offense growing out of the transaction as stated in the majority opinion, but this certainly could not be true when the state expressly put a limitation upon such immunity. The record suggests that the relator was guilty of the offense of conspiracy, which, under our Penal Code, is punishable as a felony. We contend that he is unprotected by the courts’ promise as to this offense, conceding the right of the court to grant immunity.
In conclusion, our position, in brief, is that article 2, § 1, of our state Constitution provides, in substance, for three departments of government, to wit, legislative, executive, and judicial, and that neither of these shall transgress upon any power properly attached to either of the others, and that, as the executive department has been vested by the Constitution with the right to grant pardons, and the legislative with the right to define and obliterate offenses by repeal or the alteration of conditions, the action of the court in this ease is a clear transgression upon these departments of the government. The courts can contract immunity only on the condition that the witness testifies fully and fairly,- which protects such party against a trial on the merits as decided in the Nicks and Neeley Cases cited in majority opinion, but not against indictment and imprisonment, as decided in the Greenhaw Case; that therefore relator is unprotected from prosecution, and that, as it is conceded in the majority opinion that he must be protected before being required to testify, he is therefore entitled to be discharged.
D. C. Penry, of Plainview, Martin & Zim-mermann, of Tulia, and A. D. Love, of Austin, for relatbr. Crudgington & Works, of Amarillo, and C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
Nor other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Relator was called as a witness before the grand jury of Floyd county, Tex., when said body was examining witnesses in regard to the killing of J. M. Mun-cy. The relator is a boy 12 years of age, and is the son of J. M. Muncy, deceased, and Mrs. Bertie Muncy, and on his testimony and the testimony of other witnesses Mrs. Bertie Muncy and Horace Peters were indicted charged with the murder of J. M. Muncy.
Mrs. Muncy and Horace Peters sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and on this hearing relator was offered as a witness by the state, and refused to testify on the ground that any testimony he might give might incriminate him. The district attorney in open court stated that he would agree that relator should not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of tlie killing of J. M. Muncy, and L. S. Kinder, Judge of the Sixty-Fourth Judicial District Court, acquiesced and approved said offer of immunity from prosecution, and informed relator that he would not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of the killing of his father, but the witness still refused to testify, when the court entered an order adjudging relator guilty of contempt, the order being as follows: "And the said witness refused to answer any and all questions, and gave, while on the stand and in open court, his reason for his refusal to answer said question that it would incriminate him, and the state by its counsel in open court promised the said witness immunity from prosecution and punishment for said offense, and said promise was acquiesced in by the court, and the said witness was assured of immunity from prosecution for said offense, and, it appearing to the court that there is no indictment or complaint or prosecution of any kind pending against said witness, and the court thereupon being of the opinion that the questions propounded would not incriminate the witness, and the said witness having been promised immunity from prosecution, and he having agreed with the district attorney to testify herein, upon said promise of immunity, it is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that said witness is in contempt of court for his refusal to answer said questions, and it is further the order, judgment, and decree of the court that he, the said Elbert Muncy, be confined in jail of Floyd county, Tex-., until he shall answer said questions, and it is therefore ordered by the court that the said witness, Elbert Muncy, be and he is hereby remanded to the custody of the sheriff of said Floyd county, Tex., until he shall answer said questions and testify as a witness in said causes." It is thus seen that when relator was called before the grand jury he was offered immunity, and accepted same, and did testify before the grand jury, a sworn statement of such testimony being incorporated in the record, and is as follows: "About a week ago, I heard Horace Peters tell mama she ought to kill my papa. Yesterday evening mama said, Would I kill papa? I told her I would kill him if I could, but I was too nervous. While papa was gone to town, mama said she might kill papa if she could. Yesterday evening I told mama X would say I shot papa. I got up this morning and went out to the closet and told them the horse was out in the yard. Papa said, 'Let him go.' As I came in, mama stepped out on the floor. I lay down on the bed. I then heard the pistol shot or fire. I then heard it fall on the floor. I went out and told 'Judge Stalbird I did it, and when I told you all I killed him X did it to save my mama."
After being remanded to jail for refusing to testify on the habeas corpus trial, relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was granted by Judge Davidson, and the cause set for hearing on the 8 th day of October, it being the first day set for hearing of causes at this term of court. At the hearing of the case the testimony offered was substantially as above; the relator claiming that .he could not be forced to testify, as section 10 of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. There is and can be no question that no person can be compelled to testify in a criminal ease pending against him, nor give testimony on the trial of another on which a prosecution may or can be founded against him. To this expression of the law we give our full assent and approve what is said in the case of Ex parte Wilson, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 630, 47 S. W. 996, cited by relator, but in that case no immunity was tendered, offered, nor accepted. A different question arises here, and that is, after giving the witness immunity for prosecution, was the court attempting to force the witness to testify in regard to any matter upon which a prosecution might or could be founded against the witness? That there was no case pending against him is an admitted fact; that he had testified in regard to the same matter before the grand jury under promise of immunity is an admitted fact, but for some reason on the habeas corpus trial he declines to testify, giving as his reason that his answers might incriminate him. The district judge and district attorney again pledged him immunity from prosecution, but he declines to testify.
Relator's able attorney argues and earnestly insists that, although relator had testified before the grand jury, under an agreement that he would not be prosecuted, that relator had the right to withdraw from such an agreement, and the state could not enforce it, but all the state could do would be to prosecute relator if it desired to do so. There is no doubt the state could proceed in that manner if it desired to do so, but if the state elected not to do so, and again assured relator he would not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of this matter, why could he not be compelled to testify? In an unbroken line of decisions in this court, and the courts of other states, it is held that if a person has been tried and acquitted, he can then be compelled to testify against another, although his testimony might show a criminal connection with the offense; that if the statute of limitation furnishes a complete bar to him being prosecuted for the offense, he can be compelled to testify, on the ground that in either of these events, he would not be giving evidence against himself, for no criminal prosecution against him would lie. In an unbroken line of decisions this court has held, where the statutes of the state furnish complete immunity from prosecution for an offense, about which the witness is called to testify, lie may be compelled to testify. The first case we find on tliis question, wherein our court passed on that question, is that of Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215, rendered in 1855. Judge Wheeler, in rendering the opinion, held that where a statute prescribes that a witness shall be exempt from liability for any offense of which he is compelled to give evidence, he cannot claim the privilege of not answering, but he may be compelled to testify. This has been the unbroken rule of decision by our Supreme Court and this court from'that day to this, and the law as thus announced is supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the great weight of authority, both in this country and in England.
And while relator does not seriously contest this rule of law, yet he says the Legislature of this state by no statutory enactment has declared such to be the rule in cases of murder, and similar cases. Upon what ground is it the courts hold that the witness is compelled to testify? It is that, either by an acquittal, by limitation, or by statutory enactment, no prosecution will lie against the witness about which he may be called to testify, and we might here say that we agree to the rule that the exemption from prosecution must be so broad as to absolutely prohibit his prosecution and conviction for any offense about which he may be called to testify, otherwise he will be within the protection of the Constitution, and he cannot be compelled to testify. But if the immunity given him by the law of the state is such as to absolutely protect him from all punishment for the offense about which he is called to testify, then under such circumstances he could not be said to be giving evidence against himself, and the constitutional inhibition has no application any more than if he has been tried and acquitted, or the offense was barred by the statute of limitation, for in any and all of said events he is' protected against the evidence he may give being used agmnst Mm, and this is what the Constitution guarantees him — nothing more and nothing less.
The question then would be, Do the laws of this state furnish relator full and ample immunity from punishment, if he should be compelled to testify? If so, he should be remanded to undergo the punishment assessed by the trial judge for contempt; if the law does not guarantee him absolute immunity from punishment in regard to the matters about which he would be compelled to testify, he is entitled to be discharged. The record, as hereinbefore recited, discloses that under an agreement of immunity from prosecution he did testify before the grand jury; that when called to testify on the habeas corpus trial of his mother, and Peters, he refused to testify, when he was again guaranteed immunity from prosecution by the district attorney, in open court, with the knowledge, sanction, and approval of the district judge, and he was so informed. So the sole question is, Did the district judge and district attorney have the authority and power under our law to guarantee and give this immunity from prosecution, and would our law and the courts enforce that immunity and protect relator from prosecution and punishment for any matter about which he might be called to testify in regard to the killing of his father? The right under our law of the district attorney, with the knowledge and consent of the district judge, to guarantee immunity from prosecution and punishment has never been seriously questioned in this state. In the case of Barrara v. State, 42 Tex. 263, and other cases, when our Supreme Court had criminal jurisdiction, it was recognized that they had this authority and power under our laws.
When this court was created in 1876, in the first volume of its reports, in the case of Bowden v. State, 1 Tex. App. 145, it recognized and enforced the rule. In that case the district attorney, with the approval of the district judge, agreed with Bowden that he would dismiss the case against him if he would testify against Arnold, who was also indicted for the offense. The case was dismissed, but subsequently Bowden was rein-dicted, tried, and convicted, although he had regularly attended court, and stood ready to testify at any and all times should Arnold be tried. In passing on that case, this court said: "There has been no default on his (Bowden's) part, and, until there is, the plighted faith of the state should have been kept inviolate in his immunity from further prosecution and punishment" — and the conviction was reversed on this sole ground. And this rule of law has been reaffirmed by this court in the cases of Holmes v. State, 20 Tex. App. 517; Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 53 S. W. 1056; Hardin v. State, 12 Tex. App. 190; Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 182, 22 S. W. 682, 40 Am. St. Rep. 763. In the Greenhaw and Camron Cases, supra, this question is discussed at length, and it is held that the courts of this state, under our Code, have authority to give and guarantee absolute immunity to a person who may be called to testify in regard to the transaction. If the rule of law was otherwise, and there was any question that the immunity given and tendered by the court was not an absolute immunity from punishment for the matters about which he is called to testify, then we think relator's contention would be sound. In the case of Young v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 75 S. W. 23, it was held that a dismissal of a case in one court, in consideration of the appellant's testifying, was binding upon all the courts of the state, and the defendant could not be prosecuted for any matter growing out of the transaction in another, and upon appeal the case was reversed and dismissed. In that ease the trial judge testified that there were two cases pending in Grimes county against the appellant, and up •on the district attorney making a motion to dismiss to obtain the testimony of Young against Dunlap, he permitted the cases, one charging burglary and the one charging theft, against Young to he dismissed, but says he at the time remanded Young to the custody of the sheriff of Brazos county, where an indictment for theft growing out of the same transaction was pending; the stolen property having been carried into that county. This court held that the dismissal of the cases for burglary and theft, in consideration of Young testifying, carried with it complete immunity for any matter growing out of the transaction, and he could not thereafter be prosecuted for the theft in Brazos county, as hereinbefore stated, reversing and dismissing the case against Young. Thus it is seen that our courts have construed the law to carry complete immunity from prosecution for any matter growing out of the transaction, and will not countenance nor permit the prosecution of a person under such circumstances. See, also, Stanford v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 34S, 60 S. W. 253; Griffin v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 428, 66 S. W. 782; Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 184, 95 S. W. 119; Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App. 311; Elliott v. State, 19 S. W. 249, and other cases.
Shortly after the writer's accession to this court the case of Hughes v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 288, 136 S. W. 1068, was decided, and we therein held, in accordance with the authorities above cited as we understood them, that if complete immunity from prosecution for the transaction was tendered the witness, he could be compelled to testify. There was no dissent filed in that case, but in the later case of Ex parte Napoleon, 144 S. W. 269, where we announced the same rule, Judge Davidson filed a vigorous dissent. At the time the opinion was handed down Judge Davidson stated that he would file a dissenting opinion, but the dissent was not prepared at the time, and the writer did not see it until it was published in the Southwestern Reporter. In this dissenting opinion Judge Davidson does not deny that the courts of this state, under our laws, have the authority to give and guarantee immunity from prosecution, but his dissent is based upon the proposition that he cannot he compelled to testify against others in matters vn, which he is criminally liable, without his consent, citing section 10 of the Bill of Rights, and cases cited, which we do not think sustain his proposition, and later we will take up each of these cases and discuss them. He says; "An inspection of the cases cited in the Park Case shows that in each case there was an agreement with the witness to testify upon guaranteed immunity from prosecution. No case has been cited, and I believe none can be found in Texas, holding that a witness can be forced to testify against his confederates in a criminal prosecution, unless he has agreed so to do. He cannot even then be forced to testify. If he agrees to do so upon promise of immunity, and fails or refuses to carry out his agreement, he may be prosecuted in the ease in which he made the agreement. Neeley v. State, 27 Tex. App. 327, 11 S. W. 376; Nicks v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 48 S. W. 186; Ex parte Park, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 594, 40 S. W. 300, 66 Am. St. Rep. 835; Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 171, 59 S. W. 545. The state may hold the indictment against him until he has complied with the agreement. Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 281, 53 S. W. 1024, and other cases cited, supra. In the Camron Case, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 180, 22 S. W. 682, 40 Am. St. Rep. 763, an agreement made with the prosecution was required to be fulfilled. It was further held that, where the state has made such agreement, and the witness has complied with its terms, he is entitled to immunity. But in no case has it been held that the witness can be compelled to testify to any fact which would incriminate him. He may agree to do so; and, if he fails or refuses, he may be prosecuted as if he had not entered into such agreement. With the constitutional inhibition and guaranty that he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, it is not readily to be comprehended how it is to be held that the state can force the witness to testify against himself, even by agreeing not to prosecute. The witness may testify if he chooses; but it is a matter within his discretion, to be controlled by him, and not by the prosecuting officers."
Thus it is seen he admits the witness can contract for immunity from prosecution, and then the immunity given is binding on the state and all its officers, and Judge Davidson, in an opinion by him, specifically so held in the case of Young v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 302, 59 S. W. 890, to which opinion we refer to show what authority the district court has in the premises, and how complete immunity it can and does give, even by agreeing to a dismissal of a case, when the case is dismissed in consideration of. the witness testifying. So the question resolves itself down to the proposition, Gan the witness he compelled to testify, when immunity from prosecution is given him, if he does not desire to do so? There is and can be no question that if the witness has been tried and acquitted he can be compelled to testify; if limitation bars a prosecution against him he can be compelled to testify. All the decisions so hold, and what reason can be given, if he can be compelled to testify in those instances, that if immunity from prosecution is absolutely given him, under the laws of a state he cannot then be compelled to testify? No legal prosecution can be instituted against him in regard to the matters about which he may be called to testify in that instance, any more than in the other two instances, and, as hereinbefore stated, in the case of Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215, our Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Wheeler, held that: "If a prosecution ⅝ }s barred by the statute of limitations, he was bound to answer the question; for then he would not be liable to punishment. The same principle applies if the witness is exempted, by statute, from punishment, in consequence of his being made a witness. And though the-answer of a witness, called to testify respecting the offense to which the exemption relates, would tend to inculpate him as a participant i/n the crime, he could not refuse to answer; for his participation in the offense could not subject him to punishment." In that case the question before the court was, Gould the witness be compelled to testify when he did not desire to accept the immunity? and Judge Wheeler held he could. In fact in that case the witness was fined for contempt for refusing to answer the .questions as in this case, and the court held he was entitled to no relief, he being guaranteed immunity from prosecution, and should have answered the question. 'As hereinbefore stated, this opinion was handed down by our Supreme Court in 1855, when it had jurisdiction in criminal matters, and we know of no opinion even questioning the soundness of the law there announced, until the dissenting opinion in the Napoleon Case, supra, was filed. Certainly the case of Ex parte Park, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 40 S. W. 300, 66 Am. St. Rep. 835, cited by Judge Davidson as sustaining his dissent, does not question the soundness of the rule of law announced in the Ployd Case, supra, but on the other hand in the Park Case, that case is cited approvingly, and the relator was discharged solely upon the ground that immunity was not given appellant from prosecution for such offenses as his testimony might and probably would necessarily be disclosed on his examination, and in the case it is held: "Article 709 further provides: 'The attorney representing the state may at any time, under the rules provided in article 37, dismiss a prosecution as to one or more defendants jointly indicted with others, and the person so discharged may be introduced as a witness by either party.' This would seem to imply the power on the part of the state to dismiss a case against a defendant, and require his testimony. Of course, such dismissal must be with the guaranty to the witness on the part of the court against any other or further prosecution for the same offense; and this statute has been so construed. See Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 180 [22 S. W. 682, 40 Am. St. Rep. 763]; Neeley v. State, 27 Tex. App. 327 [11 S. W. 376]; Fleming v. State, 28 Tex. App. 234 [12 S. W. 605]."
If the immunity offered would not absolutely protect the witness against prosecution for matters about which he was called to testify, then we would not question his right to refuse to answer the questions, but if complete and absolute immunity is offered, the Park Case, in the excerpt above quoted, holds with the Floyd Case that he may be compelled to testify, and the Floyd Case is cited as authority in the Park Case that the immunity must absolutely protect the witness from prosecution. In the Wilson Case cited by Judge Davidson no immunity from prosecution was offered or tendered the witness, and the question of whether the witness can be compelled to testify when given absolute immunity is not even discussed nor questioned, but the relator was discharged because the testimony could be used in a criminal prosecution against Mm. In the other cases cited by Judge Davidson in his dissent the question of whether a witness can be compelled to answer when given immunity from prosecution is not mentioned nor discussed, and has no bearing on that question.
In the case of Griffin v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 428, 66 S. W. 782, article 391 of the Penal Code is quoted, this court saying: "This article provides: 'Any court, officer or tribunal having jurisdiction of the offenses enumerated in this chapter or any district or county attorney may subprana persons and compel their attendance as witnesses to testify as to violations of any of the provisions of the foregoing articles. Any person so summoned and examined shall not be liable to prosecution for any violation of said articles about which he may testify and for any offenses enumerated in this chapter a conviction may be had upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice or participant.' Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App. 282; Day v. State, 27 Tex. App. 143, 11 S. W. 36; Wright v. State, 23 Tex. App. 313, 5 S. W. 117. And it would make no difference whether the grand jury had returned a bill or was simply examining into the transaction. If the testimony of one of the participants is used by any of these tribunals, courts, or officers in behalf of the state, it exonerates the witness whose testimony is used by virtue of the terms of the statute. Nor does it make any difference at what stage of the investigation or trial the evidence of the participant is used. The grand jury may not have been satisfied that the evidence upon which the bill was returned was sufficient to justify a conviction, but, if they had been, still, under the terms of the law, the use of the testimony of one of the participants exonerates him from prosecution. In cases where indictments have been returned, and one of the indicted parties was used as a witness for the state, this would exonerate, even though he be one of the indicted parties. Article 391, supra, was enacted for the purpose of forcing witnesses to testify in behalf of the state. He cannot plead that rule of evidence which does not permit a witness to incriminate himself, because when he testifies he is exonerated from punishment, and the incriminating testimony can never be used against him. The mere fact that the participant is required to testify for the state exonerates him from punishment." This opinion was written by Judge Davidson and concurred in by the entire court, and in it is seen this expression is used: "This article was enacted for the purpose of forcing witnesses to testify, and that when a witness is exonerated, from punishment he cannot plead the rule of evidence which does not permit a witness to incriminate himself." No more terse and forcible expression of the law could be made. See, also, Elliott v. State, 19 S. W. 249; Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 183, 95 S. W. 119, and cases therein cited.
So it may be said to be an unbroken rule of decisions, both in this court and in the Supreme Court from 1855 down to the present time, that a witness may be compelled, to testify when under the law he is given complete immunity from punishment for the transaction about which he is called to testify, and the dissenting opinion in the Napoleon Case is the first time that any judge of either this court or the Supreme Court has announced the rule that the consent of the witness must first be obtained. This would render ineffective our laws in regard to immunity from punishment, and place a barrier to the enforcement of the law in many instances. The sovereignty of this country rests in the individuals composing it, and we believe as firmly as any in protecting the individual in all his rights, and believe the declaration in our Constitution that "no citizen shall be compelled to give evidence against himself" a wise provision, and that the history of the times past when inquisitorial methods were adopted, and the citizen punished for matters thus disclosed by himself, proves the wisdom of the fathers in first placing it in the Constitution of 1776, and in ingrafting it in every state Constitution since that time. 1⅛ is right the individual should thus be protected; but, when the law im-munes him from punishment, and he seeks to use this provision, not as a shield to himself, but as a shield to others, the reason for this rule of law no longer prevails, and he will not be permitted to protect others from punishment. He is and must be protected before he can be compelled to testify, but when afforded ample and full protection from punishment, then the interest of the state, the interest of society, and the law requires that he shall give such testimony within his knowledge as will aid in bringing criminals to justice and mete out to them their merited punishment.
Not only is this the rule of law in this state; but, owing to the importance of this question, we have studied the law as applied in other jurisdictions, and the great weight of authority is that the witness may be compelled to testify when he has been granted immunity, and is no longer subject to punishment in regard to the matters inquired about. Relator in his brief cites us to the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 586, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110, in which case Counselman was adjudged guilty of contempt for refusing to answer certain questions propounded to him by the grand jury, on the ground that to answer such questions might tend to criminate him. The court held that, as the law then in force did not give Counselman complete immunity from punishment, he was not compelled to answer the questions, and discharged him. In that case it was held: "We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating questions put to him can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. Section 860 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 661] does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." To this statement of the true rule of law we give our hearty assent. The "law must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates," or the witness cannot be compelled to testify.
After the rendition of the above opinion, Congress amended section 860, referred to, so as to give complete immunity from punishment, and the question again came before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 593, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. In this case Brown had been summoned before the grand jury and refused to answer questions propounded to him, on the ground that to do so would tend to incriminate him. The court holds, speaking through Justice Brown: "(1) The act of Congress of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 443, c. 83 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3173]), exempting a witness from any prosecution on account of any transaction to which he may testify, sufficiently satisfies the constitutional guaranty of protection against being compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. (2) Where one state adopts the laws of another, it is also presumed to adopt the known and settled construction of those laws by -the courts of the state from which they are taken. (3) The fact that a witness cannot be shielded by statute from the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime does not render a statute exempting him from prosecution therefor insufficient to satisfy the constitutional guaranty of protection against being compelled to be a witness against himself." The law furnishing Brown complete immunity, he was remanded to custody, and he was compelled, to answer the questions propounded. The opinion in that case discusses the reasons for the rule at length, and it is referred to for a learned discussion of the question.
This question was again before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird et al" 194 U. S. 25, 24 Sup. Ct. 563, 48 L. Ed. 860, and it was again held that, where the law furnishes complete immunity from prosecution, a witness may be compelled to testify. For other eases so holding, see Ex parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 38 Pac. 364, 26 L. R. A. 423, 43 Am. St. Rep. 127; People ex rel. Aiken v. Butler, 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349; State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314; People v Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319, 1 Am. St. Rep. 851; State v. Morgan, 133 N. C. 743, 45 S. E. 1033; Kendrick v. Com., 78 Va. 493; Ex parte Buskett, 106 Mo. 602, 17 S. W. 753, 14 L. R. A. 407, 27 Am. St. Rep. 378; State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307; Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255; Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153; Hirsch v. State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 89; Frazee v. State, 58 Ind. 8; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171; People ex rel. Lewisohn, 96 App. Div. 201, 89 N. Y. Supp. 364; Id., 179 N. Y. 594, 72 N. E. 1148; Re Briggs, 135 N. C. 118, 47 S. E. 403. Many other cases could he cited; and we quote as stated in Cyc. yol. 30, p. 1161: "In a number of the states having constitutional provisions similar to that contained in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, it has been held that statutes which provide that a witness may be compelled to give self-criminating evidence, but that his answers shall not thereafter be used as evidence against him, fully preserve the constitutional privilege. It is the better opinion, however, that the constitutional privilege of refusing to answer cannot be taken away by statute, unless absolute indemnity is provided, and that nothing short of complete immunity to the witness, an absolute wiping out of the offense as to him, so that he can no longer be prosecuted for it, will furnish that indemnity, and that statutes, aiming to take away the constitutional privilege without providing complete immunity, are unconstitutional. If, however, he is thus fully protected by statute, he may be compelled to answer, though his testimony may show that he has committed a crime."
Under these texts are cited cases from almost every state in the Union, and we adhere to the rule that "nothing short of complete immunity to the witness" will justify a court in compelling a witness to testify, and if the Codes of our state, as construed in an unbroken line of decisions, had not held that, when the district attorney tenders immunity from punishment, and such offer receives the sanction and approval of the district judge, this furnished absolute and complete immunity from punishment for offenses about which he might be questioned and called to testify, we would hold that relator was within the protection of section 10 of the Bill of Rights, and he could not be compelled to testify. But, as the proof in this case shows that relator was extended and accepted immunity and testified before the grand jury; that that body returned no bill against him, and he has never been charged, by complaint or otherwise, with this offense; that when the habeas corpus trial was called, and he refused to testify, he was again tendered complete immunity from punishment by the district attorney and the district judge, which gave him absolute immunity from punishment, and he was only committed to jail for contempt after a refusal to testify under such circumstances — it is our opinion that he should be remanded to custody; and it is so ordered.
The fact that on the trial the relator may not testify truthfully, and thereby become subject to a prosecution for perjury, need not be considered. The immunity given relator was immunity from punishment for any connection he may have had with the killing of his father, and if he thereafter commits perjury, or is connected with the killing of another, or thereafter commits any other offense, the immunity given for this offense would be no bar to a prosecution for an offense of any character thereafter committed.
The relator is remanded.
DAVIDSON, J., dissents.