Case Name: Geoffrey R. PAYNE, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2003-09-22
Citations: 355 S.C. 642
Docket Number: No. 25719
Parties: Geoffrey R. PAYNE, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Judges: MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 355
Pages: 642–649

Head Matter:
586 S.E.2d 857
Geoffrey R. PAYNE, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
No. 25719.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted March 19, 2003.
Decided Sept. 22, 2003.
Assistant Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Chief, Capital & Collateral Litigation Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Allen Bullard, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion:
Chief Justice TOAL:
Petitioner, Geoffrey Payne ("Payne") asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to counsel for co-defendant's comment on Payne's right not to testify.
Factual/Procedural History
Geoffrey Payne ("Payne") was convicted of murder and criminal conspiracy, and this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Payne, Op. No. 98-MO-008 (S.C. Sup.Ct. filed January 26, 1998). Payne applied for post-conviction ("PCR") relief, which was dismissed. Payne's counsel petitioned for a writ of certiorari requesting to be relieved as counsel. Johnson v. State, 294 S.C. 310, 364 S.E.2d 201 (1988). The petition was denied, and the Court ordered rebriefing, and later granted certiorari on the following issue:
Was Payne's counsel ineffective for failing to object to counsel for the co-defendant's comment on Payne's right to remain silent during the closing argument?
Law/Analysis
Payne asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his co-defendant's counsel's statement about his right to remain silent. We disagree.
In his closing argument, Kelsey's attorney, Douglas S. Strickler ("Strickler"), stated to the jury,
So I will talk with you a little about what I had to say at the start; and that's that he would go ahead and confess to what he is guilty of, what he has done. What did Mr. Breibart tell you at the start? That's [Payne's] attorney.
I've got to bring that up because yesterday you heard nothing but Joe Kelsey because Joe wanted and was willing to sit right there and look y'all in your eyes and tell you the answer to the only questions that matter, not whether he remembered seeing blood when he talked about it at one point and didn't remember it another time or whether, you know, there is a two-inch difference in the size of the pipe bomb.
He talked with you about the only questions that matter in this case, and there has never been anything to say from the moment he sat down and gave his statement to the police — which he brought to your attention and which he testified to and which the State makes no claim that he testified inconsistently with.
He has said consistently that she was killed in the back seat by [Payne]....
(emphasis added). Payne alleges that Strickler's statement concerning Kelsey's willingness to testify, and his indirect reference to the fact that Payne did not testify, infringed on his constitutional right to remain silent. Thus, he alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the comment.
In order to prove ineffectiveness of counsel, Payne must prove that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273, 414 S.E.2d 780 (1992).
The state may not directly or indirectly comment on the defendant's right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987). Further, a co-defendant's counsel is held to the same standard because the importance of this protection is the effect an indirect reference may have upon the jury regardless of whose counsel made the reference. State v. Green, 269 S.C. 623, 239 S.E.2d 646 (1977).
The PCR judge found that Strickler's comment did not indirectly reflect on Payne's right not to testify. We disagree. In our view, Strickler's comment, "you heard nothing but Joe Kelsey because Joe wanted and was willing to sit right up there and look y'all in your eyes and tell you the answer to the only questions that matter," does indirectly refer to the fact that Payne elected to remain silent. Accordingly, we believe that Strickler inappropriately commented on Payne's constitutional right not to testify, and counsel for Payne's failure to object satisfies the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
But Strickland's prejudice prong is not satisfied because there was overwhelming evidence that Payne murdered the victim. Id.; See also Gill v. State, 346 S.C. 209, 552 S.E.2d 26 (2001) ("improper comments on a defendant's failure to testify do not automatically require reversal if they are not prejudicial to the defendant.")
Both Kelsey and co-defendant Jammie Lee ("Lee") testified that Payne strangled the victim. Lee testified that Payne hit the victim twice on the head with a wrench. After Payne strangled the victim, Lee testified that the victim was still alive, and Kelsey testified that the victim was dead. Both Lee and Kelsey testified that Payne had sexual intercourse with the victim, attempted to remove the victim from the vehicle and take her into the woods. Lee and Kelsey helped take the victim into the woods. Kelsey testified that he placed the pipe bomb in the victim's mouth and that Payne lit the fuse with a lighter. Lee testified that Payne threw the lighter on the dashboard of his car. Whether the victim died by Payne strangling her to death, or by Payne lighting the fuse of the pipe bomb that exploded in her mouth, the testimony overwhelmingly proves that Payne murdered her. Therefore, we hold that Payne was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to Strickler's reference to Payne's refusal to testify.
Conclusion
Based on the reasoning above, we AFFIRM the PCR judge's determination that Payne's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Strickler's comment on Payne's right to remain silent.
MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur.
PLEICONES, J., concurring in result in a separate opinion in which BURNETT, J., concurs.
. Payne's co-defendant, Joseph Kelsey ("Kelsey"), was also convicted of murder and criminal conspiracy.