Case Name: Carlos VILLALTA; Anthony Padilla; Gilbert Guerra; Daniel Perez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-08-23
Citations: 448 F. App'x 697
Docket Number: No. 10-16006
Parties: Carlos VILLALTA; Anthony Padilla; Gilbert Guerra; Daniel Perez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 448
Pages: 697–699

Head Matter:
Carlos VILLALTA; Anthony Padilla; Gilbert Guerra; Daniel Perez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-16006.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 9, 2011.
Filed Aug. 23, 2011.
Julio Joaquin Ramos, Jr., Esquire, Law Offices of Julio Ramos, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Rafal Ofierski, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Gilberto Guerra, Daniel Perez, Anthony Padilla, and Carlos Villalta appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the City and County of San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency ("MTA") on their Title VII disparate treatment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir.2010), we affirm.
Guerra failed to establish a prima facie case of workplace discrimination or retaliation because restricting his access to a computer database and to a photocopier did not "materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2008) (discussing the third element of disparate impact claims) (internal alterations omitted); see Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to retaliation).
Even assuming Perez made out a prima facie case of discrimination, his work-related misconduct constituted a "legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason" for his dismissal. Cornwell v. Electro, Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perez adduced no evidence that the employer's reason was pretextual.
Padilla and Villalta each made out prima facie cases of disparate treatment by showing that each was passed over for a promotion for which he was qualified in favor of a Caucasian employee. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). But MTA brought forward admissible evidence that it promoted individuals who were rated as more highly qualified than either Padilla or Villalta during the interview process. And unlike the plaintiffs, neither had disciplinary records. Neither Padilla nor Villalta has brought forth evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to whether MTA's explanation was "unworthy of credence." Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir.2005) (applying the standard enunciated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's summary judgment in favor of MTA is AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.