Case Name: Den on the dem. of JOHN H. JOHNSON v. JOHN F. PENDERGRASS
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1857-08
Citations: 4 Jones 479
Docket Number: 
Parties: Den on the dem. of JOHN H. JOHNSON v. JOHN F. PENDERGRASS.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 479–481

Head Matter:
Den on the dem. of JOHN H. JOHNSON v. JOHN F. PENDERGRASS.
The certificate of a clerk, endorsed upon a deed, or attached to it, showing that it was proven before him, in his county, followed by an order for registration, is sufficient, without showing that it was taken in his office and a record made of such probate.
ActioN of bjectMent, tried before Ellis, Judge, at the Fall Term, 1856, of Cherokee Superior Court.
A deed to tbe lessor of tbe plaintiff, for tbe land in controversy, was offered in evidence, and objected to by tbe defendant’s counsel, upon tbe ground, that it had not been duly proved and registered. Tbe certificate of probate, entered on tbe deed, is as follows :
■c< State of North Carolina, Cherokee county, September 9th, 1854. The execution of the within deed was, this day, duly proven before me, by the oath of W. C. Walker, the subscribing- witness thereto, for the purposes therein contained. Therefore ,let it be registered. Certified by me.
Signed, Deukt Weeks, Clk.”
The certificate of the register, in proper form, was entered ' below the above, and was objected to, only upon the ground, that the clerk’s certificate was not sufficient to authorise it.
His Honor held that the certificate was sufficient, and admitted the deed to be read; whereupon, the defendant excepted.
Yerdict for the plaintiff. Judgment; and appeal by the defendant.
J. W. Woodfin, for plaintiff.
W. L. Tate, and Baxter, for defendant.

Opinion:
Battle, J.
The only question made on the trial was, whether the deed, under which the lessor of the plaintiff claimed, had been duly proved and registered. The act of 1852, ch. 133, (Rev. Code, ch. 37, sec. 2,) authorises the clerks of the county courts to take and certify the probate of deeds, &c., in their respective counties, and the objection to the certificate of probate in the present case is, that it does not state that the probate was taken by the clerk in his office, and that a record thereof was made by him. There is certainly nothing of the kind expressl,y required of him by the •act, and we cannot discover any thing in its policy which would justify us in making such a requisition by construction. The terms of the law seem to be fully complied with, when the certificate of the clerk, followed by an order of registration, is endorsed upon, or annexed to the deed, and shows that the probate was duly made before him, in his proper county. That is a sufficient authority for the registration of the instrument by the register, and is all that has ever been deemed necessary in the certificate and fiat of a Judge. In the Revised Code, the authority to take the probate of deeds and other instruments, is conferred upon both officers in the same terms, and we cannot perceive any good reason why more should appear in the certificate of the one, than in that of the other, except in the particular, that the clerk's certificate must show that he is acting within his own county. The certificate and order, in the present case, were amply sufficient to authorise the registration, which the certificate of the register shows, was duly made, and the deed was, therefore, properly admitted in evidence. There is no error.
Pee CueiaM. Judgment affirmed.