Case Name: ANDREW G. WASHBON and Another, Appellants, v. NANCY COPE and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-02
Citations: 74 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: ANDREW G. WASHBON and Another, Appellants, v. NANCY COPE and Others, Respondents.
Judges: IVÍARTiN, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 74
Pages: 272–281

Head Matter:
ANDREW G. WASHBON and Another, Appellants, v. NANCY COPE and Others, Respondents.
Will— bequest with remainder over on the death of the first taker without children— construed, as relating to a death, after as well as before the death of the testator,
A will, among other provisions, contained a bequest to the testator’s daughter Nancy of $10,000, and hy a subsequent clause bequeathed and devised the residue of the testator’s property, real and personal, to his children, Robert, Nancy and Henry, to be divided equally between them; the next clause being as follows: “I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion, herein given to her shall be given to my sons, John G-., Robert and Henry R., or their heirs, share and share alike.”
The daughter Nancy, who survived the testator, had been married some ten years before the execution of the will, and was, at the time of its execution, and continued to be, childless.
In an action brought by certain of the heirs-at-law and next of kin of the testator to compel the daughter Nancy to give security for the legacies received by her, on the theory that upon her death without children the principal of the legacies to her would belong to the plaintiffs:
Held, that it appeared from the whole context of the will, and the circumstances surrounding the testator, that the words of contingency, in the event my daughter “shall die without children,” did not refer only to death within the lifetime of the testator, but referred to the death of the daughter after as well as before the death of the testator; that, consequently, in case she died childless her interest in the legacy was only the use thereof for her life, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief asked for. (Merwin, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the plaintiffs, Andrew G. Washbon and Anne W. Lee, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of Otsego county on the 12th day of October, 1891, upon a decision rendered at the Otsego Special Term dismissing the complaint, with costs.
The action was brought by Andrew G. Washbon and Anne W. Lee, sole heirs-at-law and next of kin of John G. Washbon, deceased, who was a son of Andrew G. Washbon, deceased, to compel the defendant, Nancy Cope, a daughter of said Andrew G. Washbon, deceased, to give security for the ultimate disposition of certain legacies received by her under the will of her father, or that a trus> tee be appointed; upon the theory that upon the death of Nancy Cope without children the principal of the legacies will belong to other parties, two of whom are the plaintiffs and the others are parties defendant.
The action was commenced in May, 1890. Before that date, and on July 26,1889, the surrogate of Otsego county had made a decree upon the judicial settlement of the accounts of Robert Washbon and John Cope, Jr., as surviving executors of the last will and testa^ ment of Andrew G-. Washbon, late of the town of Morris, in said county, deceased, which decree adjudged, among other things, as follows: “ It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bequests to Nancy Cope by the fourth and- seventh clauses of the will are not absolute, but her interest therein is reduced to a life estate by the eighth clause of the will in the event of her dying without children, and that that contingency relates to her death without children after as well as before the death of the testator, and that said Nancy Cope is entitled to a life use only of the bequests to her in case she shall die without children.”
Andrew G. Washbon died March 1, 1867, leaving a last will and testament bearing date the 31st day of January, 1866. He was in his seventy-seventh year when the will was executed. The first clause of the will provided an annuity for his wife. The second clause devised a farm in trust for his son, John Gr., with the remainder over to the descendants of John “ who shall be living at his deeasel to whom I devise and bequeath the same so that the descendants of each deceased child, if any, of my said son, John Gr. Washbon, shall take together and per stirpes, one share as said deceased child, their parents would have takeii if living, and for the benefit of said déscendants of said son, John G. Washbon.” The third clause devised a farm to his son, Henry R., containing 188 acres. The fourth provision was as follows: “ I give and bequeath to my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.” The fifth clause gave a legacy of $2,000 to John Cope, Jr., husband of Nancy. The sixth clause contained a bequest to his second son, Robert, of $12,000. The seventh clause was as follows: “ I give and bequeath and devise all rest, residue and remainder of my property, real and personal, to my three children, Robert Washbon, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., and Henry R. Washbon, to be divided equally between them.” “Eighthly. I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons John Gr., Robert and Henry R., or their heirs, share and share alike.” In the ninth clause there was a provision for his sister and the tenth clause was as follows: “ I furthermore direct and authorize my executors hereinafter named, to sell all real estate which I may have, except such as I have otherwise given and devised in this my last will and testament for the benefit of my heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best.” “ Eleventhly. I do hereby nominate and appoint my sons Robert Washbon and Henry R. Washbon and my son-in-law John Cope, Jr., to be the executors of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made.”
The Special Term held that the surrogate’s decree was not binding upon Nancy Cope ; and, secondly, that she took under the provisions of her father’s will absolutely under the provisions made in her behalf.
Carver, Deyo c& Jenkins, for the appellants.
Bwr Mattice, for the respondents.

Opinion:
HaediN, P. J.:
(1.) If Nancy Cope only took a life estate or was " entitled to the use of the legacy during her life and nothing more," then this action was properly brought and the plaintiffs were entitled to some relief. (Tyson v. Blake, 22 N. Y., 558; Livingston v. Murray, 68 id., 485.) Plaintiffs alleged and sought to establish by evidence that their interests would be imperiled without some security required, and to bring their case within the qualified rule stated in Graham v. New York Life Insurance and Trust Company (46 Hun, 267), and Matter of Fernbacher (17 Abb. N. C., 389).
(2.) When the will was made Nancy Cope was about forty-four years of age, having been married ten years, and was then and still is childless. It is suggested " the words of contingency refer only to a death in the lifetime of a testator." In the tenth clause of the will the testator directs and authorizes his executors " to sell all real estate " wbicb be bad, except sucb as be bad " given and devised for the benefit of my (bis) heirs at sncb times as said executors shall deem best; " and in the eighth clause be provides as follows: " I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons, John G-., Robert and Henry R., or their heirs, share and share alike." The language used indicates an intent on the part of the testator that the portion given to her, in the event she shall die without children, "shall be given" either to his sons John G-., Robert and Henry R. "or their heirs, share and share alike;" thus a provision is made for the giving of her share upon her death without children to his sons John, Robert and Henry, and, not being content to provide for their reception of it only, he provides still further for the portion being given " to their heirs, share and share alike," using words apt to control the estate at a time so far in the future as might be subsequent to the death of John G.> Robert and Henry R., or either of them. Considering the language just referred to, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of his execution of the will and the whole language of the instrument, and observing the rule "that all the parts of an instrument are to be taken together in ascertaining its meaning and that no part of it should be rejected as inoperative if the whole can reasonably stand together" (Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y., 283), the conclusion is reached that it was the intention of the testator to provide that the portion of his estate given to Nancy, in the event of her death without issue, should pass to those of the blood of the testator. And that the " words of contingency " used by the testator do not refer to a death in the lifetime of the testator. (Executors of Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns., 12 ; Greyston v. Clark,( 41 Hun, 125; Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N. Y., 513 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 id., 56; Buel v. Southwick, 70 id., 581; Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S., 526, and the opinion of Learned, P. J., in Mead v. Maben, 60 Hun, 268; S. C., on appeal to Ct. of Appeals, 131 N. Y., 255.)
In speaking of the rule referring to death without issue to a time prior to the death of a testator, Andrews, J., in Vanderzee v. Slingerland (supra), says: "But the rule established by the courts applies only where the context of the will is silent, and affords no indication of intention other than that disclosed by words of absolute gift, followed by a gift over in case of death, or of death without issue or other specific event. Indeed, the tendency is to lay hold of slight circumstances of the will to vary the construction and to give effect to the language according to its natural import." See, also, his opinion in Soper v. Brown (32 N. E. Rep., 768).
In Mulla/rhy v. Sullivan (49 State Rep., 333), O'BbieN, J"., in giving construction to a will, says : " It is perfectly true that in determining what the testator meant, every part of the will must be considered, and that the natural and ordinary'meaning of the words of a particular clause may be modified by other provisions."
( 3.) As the foregoing views, if adopted, would lead to a reversal, it is not important to consider the effect of the surrogate's decree declaring a construction of the will in accordance with the views already expressed.
There should be a reversal and a new trial.
IVÍARTiN, J., concurred.