Case Name: Leslee SCALLON, a California resident individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc. and Jay Gairson, a Washington resident, individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SCOTT HENRY'S WINERY CORP.; et al., Defendants, and Henry Enterprises, Inc., Nominal Defendant, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-04-11
Citations: 686 F. App'x 495
Docket Number: No. 15-35952
Parties: Leslee SCALLON, a California resident individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc. and Jay Gairson, a Washington resident, individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SCOTT HENRY’S WINERY CORP.; et al., Defendants, and Henry Enterprises, Inc., Nominal Defendant, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 686
Pages: 495–496

Head Matter:
Leslee SCALLON, a California resident individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc. and Jay Gairson, a Washington resident, individually and derivatively on behalf of Henry Enterprises Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SCOTT HENRY’S WINERY CORP.; et al., Defendants, and Henry Enterprises, Inc., Nominal Defendant, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-35952
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2017 Portland, Oregon
Filed April 11, 2017
Aaron James Noteboom, Arnold Gallagher P.C., Eugene, OR, Rohn M. Roberts, Attorney, Arnold Gallagher Percell Roberts <& Potter PC, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Paul S. Bierly, Attorney, Kerry J. Shepherd, Markowitz Herbold PC, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellant
Before: LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District Judge.
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge.for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Henry Enterprises, Inc. ("HEI") appeals from the district court's ruling that Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952(6), a share buyout provision applicable to close corporation disputes, does not apply to derivative shareholder actions, like the one Plaintiffs brought here. Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952(6) permits a defendant to shortcut litigation by purchasing the plaintiffs shares for fair value. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. To determine whether the statute applies to derivative actions, we examine the statute's text and context and, to the extent it appears useful, the legislative history. State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050 (2009) (en banc). Applying this methodology, we hold that the buyout provision applies to derivative proceedings and reverse.
First, the plain meaning of the statute's text indicates that the buyout provision applies to derivative actions. The relevant text provides that "the corporation or one or more shareholders may elect" to exercise the buyout option "after the filing of a proceeding under subsection (1)." Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952(6). A "proceeding under subsection (1)" is a "proceeding by a shareholder" alleging certain types of claims. Or. Rev, Stat. § 60.952(1). A "proceeding by a shareholder" includes both direct and derivative actions. See In re Conduct of Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660, 666 (1983) (per curiam) (explaining that a derivative action is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder to enforce a corporate right); Lee v. Mitchell, 152 Or. App. 159, 953 P.2d 414, 423-24 (1998) (explaining that a direct shareholder action is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder to enforce rights owed to the plaintiff as an individual). In fact, Oregon law requires the person bringing a derivative proceeding to be a shareholder. Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.261.
Furthermore, the types of claims set forth in subsection (1) include claims traditionally brought derivatively. For instance, the statute applies to proceedings where "[t]he corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted." Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952(l)(d). Waste or misapplication of corporate assets is a corporate injury. See, e.g., North v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Or. 483, 117 P. 822, 825 (1911); Noakes v. Schoenborn, 116 Or.App. 464, 841 P.2d 682, 686 (1992), Because subsection (1) describes claims generally brought derivatively, the statute must apply to derivative proceedings.
Second, Oregon courts applied similar predecessor statutes in derivative actions. See, e.g., Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or.App. 604, 767 P.2d 903 (1989); Serbick v. Timpte-Pac., Inc., 88 Or.App. 633, 746 P.2d 1167 (1987); cf. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). Importantly, the Oregon legislature enacted Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952 to reflect this prior judicial practice. Hickey v. Hickey, 269 Or.App. 258, 344 P.3d 512, 520 (2015). Therefore, Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952 should be applied in the same way.
Third, the legislative history supports applying the buyout provision in derivative proceedings. The legislature wanted the provision to be used to end costly litigation early. See Tape Recording, Oregon Senate Committee on Business, Labor and Economic Development, SB 116, Jan. 15, 2001, (later incorporated into SB 118), Tape 2, Side A (statement of Robert Art); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.952(6) (stating that buyout right must be invoked within 90 days after the filing of a proceeding). A holding that the statute does not apply to derivative proceedings would undermine that statutory purpose.
In conclusion, the text, context, and legislative history of Or. Rev. Stat, § 60.952 demonstrate that the statute applies to derivative proceedings.
REVERSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.