Case Name: In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
Court: United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1968-12-05
Citations: 56 C.C.P.A. 769
Docket Number: No. 8021
Parties: In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
Judges: Before Worley, Chief Judge, Rich, Smith, Almond and Baldwin, Associate Judges.
Reporter: Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 769–772

Head Matter:
403 F. 2d 752; 159 USPQ 721
In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
(No. 8021)
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
December 5, 1968
Wenderoth, Lmd, & Ponaelc, attorneys of record, for appellant. Ernest F. Wendei'oth, Vincent M. Creedon, of counsel.
Joseph Sehimmel for the Commissioner of Patents. Q-eorge Roeming, of counsel.
[Oral argument November 5, 1968 by Mr. Creedon and Mr. Schimmel]
Before Worley, Chief Judge, Rich, Smith, Almond and Baldwin, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
Almond, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., appeals from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refusing registration of the mark shown in appellant's application for iron, namely pig iron, sponge iron, cast iron, and ferro alloy; steel, namely ordinary steel and special steel; semi-finished steel, namely blooms, billets, slabs, sheet bars and tin bars; and finished steel products, namely rails and accessories, bars and shapes, sheet piling, wire products, wire rods, plates, sheets, high tensile strength steels, hot extruded steels, stainless steels, and clad steels. Ownership of a Japanese registration is asserted. The mark described in the application and for which registration is sought on the Principal Eegister is reproduced below:
Kefusal of registration was predicated on the ground that appellant's mark so resembles the design mark comprising the letter "S" within a circle (shown below) previously registered for carbon steel, alloy steel, semi-steel, and malleable and grey iron castings as to be likely, when applied to appellant's goods, to cause confusion or mistake or deception.
There is no issue here as to priority of use or as to the identity of the competing goods of the respective parties. The sole issue is likelihood of confusion within the purview of section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 USC 1052(d).
Appellant has cited numerous third-party registrations of marks with the letter "S" as a dominant characteristic surrounded by a design and used in conjunction with metal products. Appellant contends that inasmuch as these marks were permitted registration "one over the other," appellant's mark should also be allowed over the registration cited by the board. Appellant's reliance on third-party registrations of somewhat similar marks is, as the board said, not conclusive on the issue here involved. Those registrations, as appellant admits are distinguished one from the other. The most they can establish is that the use of the letter "S" as a mark or part of a mark is not particularly distinctive in the metal field. This does not answer the question of likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.
After comment on the third-party registrations, the board stated:
In the final analysis, we must look at the marks to determine whether there does in fact exist such similarity therebetween as would be likely to cause confusion or mistake or deception.
There are of course differences between the marks but when the marks are applied to the goods, these differences are apparently minimized. As cast on pig iron, the distinctive points of applicant's mark are not readily discernible and as stenciled on packages of hot strip coil the impression of applicant's mark is of an "S" within a circle. As we view the marks, as illustrated above, the impact of each is substantially identical — an "S" within a circle.
We conclude that in view of the substantial similarities between the marks and in view of the identity of the involved goods, confusion or mistake or deception is likely.
Appellant argues that inasmuch as the goods involved are not "over the counter" wares and are bought only by discriminating purchasers, likelihood of confusion is thereby minimized. Here, as noted, we have legally identical goods, hence the same class of purchasers, and marks which are quite similar in their essential features, as well as the fact that the goods as identified in the application are not restricted to any particular channel of distribution.
We are not persuaded of error in the decision of the board, which decision is accordingly affirmed.
Judge Smith participated in the hearing of this case but died before a decision was reached.
Board opinion abstracted, 150 USPQ 833.
Serial No. 188,404 filed March 10, 1964.
Registration. No. 397,914 issued September 29,1942.