Case Name: COVINGTON PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC TRUCKS, INC. and Eddie Pablovich v. AAA SEWER & WATER FABRICATION & SERVICE, LLC, David Guidry, Abe Insurance Company and Xyz Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2004-02-13
Citations: 873 So. 2d 56
Docket Number: No. 2002 CA 2676
Parties: COVINGTON PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC TRUCKS, INC. and Eddie Pablovich v. AAA SEWER & WATER FABRICATION & SERVICE, LLC, David Guidry, Abe Insurance Company and Xyz Insurance Company.
Judges: Before: WHIPPLE, KUHN and McDonald, jj.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 873
Pages: 56–65

Head Matter:
COVINGTON PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC TRUCKS, INC. and Eddie Pablovich v. AAA SEWER & WATER FABRICATION & SERVICE, LLC, David Guidry, Abe Insurance Company and Xyz Insurance Company.
No. 2002 CA 2676.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Feb. 13, 2004.
Writ Denied May 7, 2004.
Robert C. Lowther, Jr., Covington, for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Covington Pontiac-Buick-GMC Trucks, Inc. and Eddie Pablo-vich.
Julian J. Rodrigue, Jr., Covington, for Defendant/Appellee, St. Tammany Parish Clerk of Court.
Before: WHIPPLE, KUHN and McDonald, jj.

Opinion:
I i>KUHN, J.
Plaintiffs-appellants, Covington Pontiac-Buick-GMC Trucks, Inc. and Eddie Pablo-vich (collectively Covington Pontiac), appeal the trial court's dismissal of their rule to traverse answers filed by Malise Prieto, the St. Tammany Parish Clerk of Court (the clerk of court), in response to the garnishment interrogatories with which she was served. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Covington Pontiac is the judgment creditor of defendants, AAA Sewerage and Water Fabrication and Service, LLC (AAA) and David Guidry. In an attempt to execute a judgment, Covington Pontiac conducted a judgment debtor examination, which revealed that funds in a community property proceeding between David Gui-dry and his former wife, Cynthia, were held in the registry of the Twenty-second Judicial District Court.
On October 15, 2001, Covington Pontiac filed a petition for garnishment under a writ of fieri facias, naming the clerk of court as garnishee. Averring that the clerk of court was in possession of the money held in the court registry in the matter entitled, Guidry v. Guidry, docket number 98-13642, (the Guidry community property proceeding) in which David Gui-dry had an undivided interest, Covington Pontiac alleged that the clerk of court was indebted to its judgment debtor. On October 19, 2001, a judgment was signed naming the clerk of court as a garnishee and ordering her to answer the garnishment interrogatories. The clerk of court was served the petition, citation, and interrogatories on October 29, 2001.
The clerk of court subsequently filed sworn answers to the garnishment interrogatories. Urging the clerk of court's responses were erroneous, Coving-ton Pontiac filed a rule to traverse. After a hearing, in which testimonial and documentary evidence was adduced, the trial court found that the clerk of court's |3answers to the garnishment interrogatories were not erroneous and rendered a judgment, dismissing Covington Pontiac's rule to traverse. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A garnishment proceeding is a separate and distinct proceeding from the original suit and is between different par ties. La. C.C.P. arts. 2411-2417; Ransome v. Ransome, 2001-2361, p. 8 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/02), 822 So.2d 746, 754. It is nothing more than a streamlined legal process for obtaining the seizure of property of a judgment debtor in the hands of a third party. All Star Floor Covering, Inc. v. Stitt, 2000-2049, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/14/01), 804 So.2d 705, 708, writs denied, 2002-0406, 2002-0421 (La.4/19/02), 813 So.2d 1085, 1088.
After the issuance of a writ of fieri facias, a judgment creditor may, through a petition for garnishment naming a third person as garnishee, require the garnishee to declare under oath what property he has "in his possession or under his control" belonging to a judgment creditor. La. C.C.P. art. 2411A; Rapier v. Harris, 614 So.2d 301 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). The garnishment seizure is effective upon service of the petition, citation, and interrogatories. La. C.C.P. art. 2411B. Other than as is statutorily applicable to garnishments of wages, a garnishment shall not be continuing in nature, and the garnishee need only respond as to property of the judgment debtor that the garnishee has in his possession or under his control at the time the garnishment interrogatories are served on him. La. C.C.P. art. 2411C.
Where the garnishee's answers admit that he does indeed hold something belonging to the debtor, a garnishment judgment is then entered, ordering the | ¿garnishee to deliver the thing to the sheriff. La. C.C.P. art. 2415; All Star Floor Covering, Inc., 2000-2049 at pp. 4-5, 804 So.2d at 708. If, on the other hand, the garnishee denies possession of any of the judgment debtor's property, the judgment creditor may file a contradictory motion traversing the answer. La. C.C.P. art. 2414; Ransome, 2001-2361 at p. 8, 822 So.2d at 754.
On appeal, Covington Pontiac suggests the trial court erred in dismissing its rule to traverse because the evidence at the hearing showed the clerk of court's answers to its interrogatories were erroneous and misleading.
The seminal facts show the following. The money held in the court registry in the Guidry community property proceeding was the subject of competing claims. On June 20, 2001, the Division G trial judge signed an order in the Guidry community property proceeding, directing the sum of $88,683.74 be placed in the court registry. That same day, the Division G trial judge also signed a consent judgment, ordering $44,683.74 of the deposited money disbursed to Cynthia Guidry and the remaining $44,000.00 to David Guidry.
Nine days prior to rendition of the Division G consent judgment between the Gui-drys, on June 11, 2001, Unicorn Nursery Inc. (Unicorn), had filed a petition in Division B of the Twenty-second Judicial District Court, averring that Cynthia Guidry d/b/a AAA was its judgment debtor, naming the clerk of court as garnishee, ordering an answer to a single garnishment interrogatory, and requesting a writ of attachment on the deposited money. The writ subsequently issued on June 11, 2001, which expressly included "one half of those funds presently on deposit with [the clerk of court]" held in the court registry in conjunction with the Guidry community property proceeding.
On June 20, 2001, after the Division G trial judge had signed the consent judgment addressing the disbursal of the money held in the court registry, Cynthia Guidry apparently learned of the pending Division B garnishment proceeding, and | Kfiled a motion in the community property proceeding, requesting that the Division G trial court "freeze" the money held in the court registry. This motion was granted by the Division G trial judge. Thus, the last order of Division G on June 20, 2001, stayed the consent judgment of disbursal signed earlier that day; and ordered a "freeze" on the money held in the court registry. The contradictory hearing, which followed on August 9, 2001, resulted in the Division G trial judge's express order stating that the money held in the court registry was not to be disbursed until further order of the court.
Unaware of the Division G order of August 9, 2001, precluding disbursal of the money in the court registry, on September 25, 2001, on a joint motion of Unicorn and David Guidry, the Division B trial judge signed an order, which directed disbursal of a portion of the money in satisfaction of Cynthia Guidry d/b/a AAA's debt to Unicorn. But on September 26, 2001, the Division B trial judge, having learned of the August 9, 2001, Division G order, issued another order, which vacated her September 25, 2001 order of disbursal to Unicorn and ordered that the money in the court registry be "frozen" until further order of the court.
On October 23, 2001, eight days after Covington Buick filed its petition for garnishment but six days before service of the interrogatories was made on the clerk of court, the Division G trial court addressed the merits of David Guidry's interest in the money on deposit in the court registry. In its written reasons, after noting that the prior, June 20, 2001, consent judgment between the Guidrys had settled all issues between them, the Division G trial judge concluded that it lacked authority to maintain Cynthia Guidry's request for a stay and signed a judgment | fidisbursing $46,500.00 of the money held in the court registry to David Guidry. The October 23, 2001 judgment specifically ordered that the clerk of court "disburse the sum of $46,500.00 . to David C. Guidry."
It is axiomatic that a district court clerk of court deposits and withdraws sums into the court's registry in accordance with orders issued by the district court. See La. R.S. 13:760 (providing immunity from liability to clerks of court who perform any act or issue any order in conformity with the written order or judgment of any judge of a court); see also La. R.S. 13:476 (providing that specified deposits made into the court registry shall be made and withdrawn by the clerk of court only in accordance with the provisions of the order or judgment of the court having jurisdiction).
In her sworn answers to Covington Pontiac's garnishment interrogatories filed on November 6, 2001, the clerk of court denied that she had in her possession or under her control any property or funds belonging to David Guidry, while noting that the sum of $93,749.04 had previously been on deposit in the court registry in the Guidry community property proceeding. The clerk of court's answers expressly stated that pursuant to a court order of disbursement, signed by the trial judge of Division G on October 23, 2001, $46,500.00 of the $93,749.04 previously on deposit in the court registry had been released to David Guidry. The record clearly establishes that on October 23, 2001, when the Division G trial court ordered disbursal of $46,500.00 to David Guidry, the clerk of court had not 17yet been served Covington Pontiac's petition, citation, and interrogatories. Under La. C.C.P. art. 2411B, the garnishment seizure was not effective until October 29, 2001, which is the date the clerk of court was served with Covington Pontiac's petition, citation, and interrogatories. Because La. C.C.P. art. 2411C imposes no duty of a continuing nature on the garnishee, requiring only that she respond "as to the property . in [her] possession or control at the time the garnishment interrogatories were served on [her]," mindful that the clerk of court acted pursuant to a court order of disbursement which was issued before the garnishment seizure was effectuated, the record duly establishes that the clerk of court's answers were not erroneous. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the answers provided by the clerk of court were correct.
Moreover we note, under the facts presented in this case, the clerk of court could not be liable to Covington Pontiac. According to the provisions of La. R.S. 13:760:
No clerk of court and no deputy of such officer who performs any act or issues any order in conformity with the written order or judgment of any judge of a court in this state shall be liable in either his individual or official capacity to any person, firm, or corporation for any damage as the result of such action.
See also La. R.S. 13:476.
| sIt is abundantly clear that the clerk of court disbursed the money to David Gui- dry "in conformity with the written order . of [a] judge of [the Twenty-second Judicial District Cjourt," and so advised Covington Pontiac in her sworn answers. Thus, under La. R.S. 13:760 the clerk of court cannot be held hable to Covington Pontiac, in either her individual or official capacity, for any damage the judgment creditor allegedly may have sustained as the result of the clerk of court's disbursal of $46,500.00 from the court registry withdrawn in accordance with the October 23, 2001 order of the Division G trial court.
In the trial court, and on appeal, the parties assert the issue before the court is who is the proper party to make garnishee when a judgment creditor seeks to seize money deposited in the court registry in which the judgment debtor has an interest. Although Covington Pontiac named her as garnishee, citing La. R.S. 13:474, the clerk of court contends that hers is merely a ministerial, administrative position — akin to a bookkeeper — and that it is either Hibernia National Bank (as the fiscal agent appointed by the district court judges, see La. R.S. 13:475), who has actual possession over the money or the district court judges, who have control over the property on deposit in the court registry, that is properly made garnishee when a judgment creditor seeks to seize money held in the court registry. Because on the effective date of Covington Pontiac's seizure, the deposited money was duly subject to the trial court's order of disbursal, we find it unnecessary to address this, and we pre-termit such a discussion.
For these reasons, we find that Coving-ton Pontiac's rule to traverse was correctly dismissed.
DECREE
The trial court's judgment, dismissing Covington Pontiac's rule to traverse the answers to garnishment interrogatories provided by the clerk of court, is ^affirmed. Appeal costs are assessed against Covington Pontiac-Buick-GMC Trucks, Inc. and Eddie Pablovich.
AFFIRMED.
WHIPPLE, J., dissents with reasons.
. The judgment in a traversal of answers to interrogatories dismissing the rule is a final disposition of the controversy between the plaintiff and the garnishee. The judgment is conclusive as to those parties, leaving no other remedy or proceeding in the lower court against that particular garnishee. Carroll v. Wallace, 1 McGl. 9 (La.App.1881). As such, it is a judgment subject to immediate appeal, see Carroll, 1 McGl. at 9; see Rapier v. Harris, 614 So.2d 301 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993); see also Elizey Marine Supplies, Inc. v. Taylor, 237 So.2d 706, 707 (La.App. 4th Cir.1970), and, therefore, properly before this court.
. According to Cynthia Guidry, Unicorn is a corporation owned and operated by her ex-husband's business partner. Noting that only her interest in the money held in the court registry was at issue, Cynthia Guidry averred that it was merely one day before the Guidrys appeared in court in the proceeding that resulted in the consent judgment in which they agreed to the distribution of their former community property that Unicorn chose to file its petition naming the clerk of court a garnishee and seeking to attach the money in the court registry.
. Between June 20, 2001, when the Division G trial court initially ordered $88,638.74 be placed in the registry and (by consent of the parties) $44,000.00 be disbursed to David Guidry, and October 23, 2001, when it ultimately ruled on the merits of David Guidry's interest in that money, a $5,000.00 deposit belonging to the Guidrys' former community was made into the court registry. Thus, the amount disbursed to David Guidry in accordance with the October 23, 2001 order reflects his one-half interest in the deposit and is, therefore, $2,500.00 greater than the disbursed amount ordered in the June 20, 2001, consent judgment.
. Apparently accounting for interest which accrued on the money while it was in the court registry, see La. R.S. 39:1231B, the clerk of court's sworn answer notes $46,874.52 as the exact amount disbursed pursuant to the October 23, 2001.
. Covington Pontiac's reliance on Whitney Central Trust & Svgs. Bank v. Norton, 157 La. 199, 102 So. 306 (1924), is misplaced. In Norton, the civil district court rendered a judgment dismissing the rule to quash a writ of attachment and garnishment against the criminal clerk of court "without prejudice to the right of the clerk of the criminal court to retain the money attached until final disposition of the criminal proceedings . at which time, upon proper order, the clerk of said court will deliver the money in controversy to the civil sheriff to await final disposition of this case." 157 La. at 202-03, 102 So. at 307. When the clerk of the criminal court thereafter delivered the money to the criminal defendant/civil debtor via an ex parte order, it was "in utter disregard of the seizure of the money under the attachment proceedings." 157 La. at 203, 102 So. at 308. But the order that the criminal clerk violated was one of a district court judge which specifically directed that, upon proper order, the money held in the registry (for use as evidence in the criminal proceeding) he delivered to the civil district court for final disposition. Thus, in failing to conform to the previous order of the district court, the clerk of court acted at his peril. 157 La. at 207, 102 So. at 309. In this case, the "orders" addressing the money in the registry that Covington Pontiac suggests the clerk "ignored" were a judgment that did not in any manner address money that may have been held in the court registry and a writ of seizure and sale issued by a deputy of the clerk of court; a district court judgment pronouncing a ruling that addressed the money in the court registry was not among those orders. Thus, Norton is distinguishable from the facts presently before us.