Case Name: FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GIDDINGS, TEXAS, Appellant, v. Dorothy BIRNBAUM, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-02-19
Citations: 826 S.W.2d 189
Docket Number: No. 3-91-350-CV
Parties: FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GIDDINGS, TEXAS, Appellant, v. Dorothy BIRNBAUM, Appellee.
Judges: Before POWERS, JONES and KIDD, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 826
Pages: 189–191

Head Matter:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GIDDINGS, TEXAS, Appellant, v. Dorothy BIRNBAUM, Appellee.
No. 3-91-350-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.
Feb. 19, 1992.
On Motion for Rehearing April 1, 1992.
Pamela K. Giese, Giddings, for appellant.
Steven W. Keng, Giddings, for appellee.
Before POWERS, JONES and KIDD, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a postjudgment award of sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 13 (Pamph.1991). Appellant First National Bank of Giddings received a money judgment against appellee Dorothy Bimbaum and Ryan Bimbaum in December 1990. The bank filed a postjudgment application for turnover relief to enforce the judgment, and Dorothy Bimbaum responded to the application and filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 13. In four points of error the bank contends the district court erred in imposing sanctions because: (1) the evidence was insufficient to show the turnover application was groundless; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that allegations in the turnover application were groundless and brought in bad faith; (3) there was insuffi cient evidence to show that the bank had knowledge of or authorized the filing of the turnover application; and (4) in the order for sanctions there was no finding that the turnover application was groundless and brought in bad faith. We will dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
The order for sanctions under Rule 13 was rendered in connection with the application for turnover relief. The record before us does not indicate that the district court has acted on the merits of the application for turnover relief. The sanctions order, therefore, does not dispose of all parties and issues. It is neither an appeal-able final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. See North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.1966); In re Breckeisen, 665 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.App.1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.012 (1986).
The cause is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
. Although the order for sanctions utilizes the word "contempt," we will liberally construe the order as a potentially appealable order for sanctions. The validity of a civil contempt order in which there is no order of confinement may be attacked only by mandamus. See Deramus v. Thornton, 160 Tex. 494, 333 S.W.2d 824, 827 (1960); Wagner v. Wamasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956).