Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, v. Labrone GRIPPON, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1997-07-21
Citations: 327 S.C. 79
Docket Number: No. 24645
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Labrone GRIPPON, Appellant.
Judges: MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 327
Pages: 79–89

Head Matter:
489 S.E.2d 462
The STATE, Respondent, v. Labrone GRIPPON, Appellant.
No. 24645.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard Nov. 21, 1996.
Decided July 21, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 21, 1997.
Assistant Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliot, Senior Assistant Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, Columbia; and Solicitor David P. Schwacke, Charleston, for respondent.

Opinion:
BURNETT, Justice:
Appellant challenges his voluntary manslaughter conviction on the ground the trial judge's charge on circumstantial evidence erroneously diluted the State's burden of proof. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Around 6:30 a.m. on December 4, 1996, appellant stabbed Harold Singleton. According to appellant, he awoke at his home to find Singleton standing over him. Singleton tried to rape him. The two men fought, and appellant stabbed Singleton in the leg with a knife he kept near his bed. The fight moved into the kitchen where appellant then stabbed Singleton in the back causing his death. Appellant dragged Singleton outside and then called for help. Appellant was indicted for murder.
At the trial, the State introduced appellant's confession as direct evidence of the cause of Singleton's death. The State relied on circumstantial evidence to prove malice. The defense did not present any evidence, and appellant did not testify.
On appellant's request, the trial judge instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence. The trial judge omitted from appellant's requested instruction the phrase "to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis" ("reasonable hypothesis" phrase) because he interpreted this phrase as shifting the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. The trial judge defined reasonable doubt and repeated throughout his instructions reasonable doubt was the required standard of proof.
ISSUE
Did the trial judge err by omitting the phrase "to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis" from the circumstantial evidence charge?
DISCUSSION
Appellant requested the trial court charge the following:
Crimes may be proven by circumstantial evidence, provided that it meets the necessary legal tests. To the extent that the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence it must prove all the circumstances relied on beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be wholly and, in every particular, perfectly consistent with one another; and the circumstances must point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. That is, to be considered as evidence of guilt the circumstances must be absolutely inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.
I charge you further that the mere fact that the circumstances are strongly suspicious and the defendant's guilt probable, it is not sufficient to sustain a conviction because the proof offered by the State must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, and must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
(emphasis added). The trial judge, relying on State v. Raffaldt, 318 S.C. 110, 456 S.E.2d 390 (1995), refused to include the "reasonable hypothesis" language. The trial judge incorrectly read Raffaldt as a rejection of the "reasonable hypothesis" phrase. However, except for the omission of that phrase, the trial judge fully instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence.
Appellant argues the instruction given on circumstantial evidence was incomplete because the level of proof required to find him guilty was lowered without the omitted phrase. We disagree.
The instruction requested by appellant initially received approval by this Court in State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955). See State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 246, 107 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989) (stating the appropriate circumstantial evidence charge). Our recent cases addressing the circumstantial evidence charge modified this charge by deleting language requiring the jury to "seek" another explanation. State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); Raffaldt, supra. However, we never rejected the "reasonable hypothesis" phrase or found this phrase shifted the burden of proof. In fact, use of a similar phrase was recently approved. State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 468 S.E.2d 76 (Ct.App.1996) (approving use of reasonable explanation phrase). Therefore, the trial judge was not required to delete the "reasonable hypothesis" phrase from the requested charge.
However, the instruction actually given by the trial judge, as a whole, adequately conveyed the level of proof required to find appellant guilty. See State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 446 S.E.2d 411 (1994) (jury instructions should be considered as a whole, and if as a whole they are free from error, any isolated portions which may be misleading do not constitute reversible error); State v. Burton, 302 S.C. 494, 397 S.E.2d 90 (1990) (jury instruction is sufficient if, when considered as a whole, it covers the law applicable to case).
The trial court repeatedly charged the State had the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and reasonable doubt was correctly defined. State v. Darby, 324 S.C. 114, 477 S.E.2d 710 (1996). Therefore, the jury was adequately apprised of the proper legal standard, and the omission of this "reasonable hypothesis" phrase from the circumstantial evidence charge did not affect the burden of proof. Accordingly, we find no error.
Nonetheless, although neither the requested charge nor the charge actually given by the trial court in this case lowered or shifted the burden of proof, we think the better rule is posited in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). In Holland, the Court held, if a proper reasonable doubt instruction is given, a jury need not be instructed that circumstantial evidence must be so strong as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Several jurisdictions have adopted this rule. See United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1066, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (no special circumstantial evidence instruction is needed); State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970) (eliminating the "reasonable hypothesis" charge so long as a correct reasonable doubt charge is given); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) (overruling prior cases requiring a special circumstantial evidence charge); State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1984) (no reasonable hypothesis instruction required when a correct instruction on reasonable doubt is given).
Therefore, in a criminal case relying in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence, once a proper reasonable doubt instruction is given, we recommend the jury be instructed as follows:
There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial — direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact. The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence. You should weigh all the evidence in the case. After weighing all the evidence, if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find [the defendant] not guilty.
1 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 12.04 (4th ed.1992).
For reasons stated, we AFFIRM.
MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur.
TOAL, J., and FINNEY, C.J., concur in separate opinion.