Case Name: COOK v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-12-08
Citations: 228 S.W. 213
Docket Number: No. 6012
Parties: COOK v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 228
Pages: 213–216

Head Matter:
COOK v. STATE.
(No. 6012.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 8, 1920.
Rehearing Denied March 16, 1921.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;l 169(12) — Testimony of flight harmless where defendant’s witness testified thereto.
In a criminal prosecution, the state’s evidence that defendant under bail to await the action of the grand jury did not appear for the return of , an indictment, but went to another state, if erroneously admitted, was harmless, where defendant’s witness testified to the same facts without objection.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 1661/2(8) — Overruling of challenge harmless where defendant did not exhaust peremptory challenges.
In a criminal prosecution where juror on his voir dire admitted that .if selected he would enter the jury box with “a feeling against the defendant” and the challenge for cause was overruled and the juror excused on peremptory challenge, a bill of exceptions objecting thereto is not available when qualified by a statement that defendant appellant failed to exhaust his challenges and no' improper or prejudiced juror was forced on him.
3. Witnesses <&wkey;405(!) — Impeaching testimony held properly admitted.
In a prosecution for statutory rape, where prosecutrix testified that defendant advised her to “go with some other boy and lay” the crime on him, and defendant’s witness testified that he had related prosecutrix’s accusation against another to the latter’s mother, the court did not err in admitting the mother’s testimony contradicting and thus impeaching defendant’s witness.
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Criminal law @^351(1), 1144(12) — Defendant’s failure to appear in accord with bail is admissible; and jury presumed to understand effect of evidence.
Proof that defendant failed to appear in accord with a bail bond or recognizance is admissible against the accused, and it will be X>resumed that a jury understood that bail is simply 'a means to assure accused’s presence and creates no presumption of guilt.
5. Rape ¿&wkey;52(l) — Evidence held sufficient to convict.
In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence held to show defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, so as not to warrant setting aside the verdict and remanding for new trial. Code Or. Proe. 1911, art. 939'.
6. Criminal law <&wkey;>742(l) — Rape c&wkey;>54(l)— Prosecutrix need not be corroborated; credibility of prosecutrix a question for the jury.
Corroboration of prosecutrix is not required by law to- support a conviction of statutory rape, and her credibility, like that of other witnesses, is a question for the jury in view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 786, making the jury the judge of facts and weight of evidence.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.
Leon Coot was convicted of statutory rape, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Mount & Newberry and Stroud & Dailey, all of Dallas, for appellant.
Alvin M. Owsley, Asst Atty. 'Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
The conviction is for rape, and punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of eight years. The prosecutrix was a girl .under 15 years of age. Her testimony, together with some corroborating circumstances, supports the state's case, and. constitutes sufficient evidence to justify the conviction. No complaint is made of the charge of the court.
In bills of exceptions Nos. 1 and 2, complaint is made of the action of the court in permitting proof'that at an examining trial the appellant was held under bail to await the action of the grand jury; that while there was no forfeiture of the bail bond, the appellant did not appear upon the return of an indictment against him, but went to a point in the state of Kansas, and was there arrested. The trial court regarded this evidence as admissible as tending to establish flight. The decided cases appear to support the court's ruling. Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 505, 169 S. W. 804; Hart v. State, 22 Tex. App. 567, 3 S. W. 741; Gent v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 414, 123 S. W. 594; Brown v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 570, 124 S. W. 101; Gilliland v. State, 24 Tex. App. 528, 7 S. W. 241. In Sorrell's Case it was held that the judgment of forfeiture would not have been admissible, but the fact of the absence of the accused, in disobedience of his bail bond, was held admissible. If the correctness of the ruling is questionable, it was harmless, for the reason that the appellant's witness Kennedy, on cross-examination, testified without objection:
"Mr. Cook made bond after the examining trial. He then skipped and went to Kansas. Mr. Seale brought him back to Dallas."
It is claimed that a juror, on his voir dire, admitted that if he was selected he would enter the jury box with "a feeling against the defendant." A challenge for cause was overruled, and the juror excused upon a peremptory challenge. The action of the court in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause is complained of in a bill which is qualified by the statement that the appellant failed to exhaust his challenges, and that no improper or prejudiced jurors were forced upon him. On the subject, Mr. Branch, in his Annotated Texas Penal Code (section 543), states the rule:
"The refusal to sustain a good challenge for cause is not reversible error if the jurors subject to such challenge did not sit on the trial of the case and no other objectionable juror was forced on the defendant."
See Loggins v. State, 12 Tex. App. 72; Kramer v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 84, 29 S. W. 157; Carter v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 433, 76 S. W. 437.
It has also been held that, unless the bill of exceptions shows that the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, the point is not available on appeal. Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713, and other cases cited in Mr. Branch's work, in the section mentioned. See, also, Mays v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 170, 96 S. W. 329.
The prosecutrix testified that, when she advised appellant of her pregnancy, he suggested that she "go with some other boy, and lay it on him." On the trial, he introduced the witness Maillot, a youth about 17 years of age, who testified that in conversation with the injured girl she "said something to me about being pregnant; said I had something to do about it." On cross-examination he said that he related this to the appellant on the next day, appellant being connected with a stepfather of the witness in business. He also testified that he never had anything to do with the girl. On the issue thus made, appellant introduced the witness Henry Cook, who said that he talked with the prosecutrix, Ruby Mayben, in the previous fall, at the home of Mrs. Nitsche; that she told him that she was in a family way, and that Charley Maillot was the cause of it. It appears from the bill that he testified that he had related the matter to Mrs. Nitsche, who was the mother of Charley Maillot. The state subsequently called Mrs. Nitsche, and she denied that Henry Cook had related the matter referred to to her. The action of the court in admitting this impeaching testimony is challenged upon the ground that it infringes the rule against impeaching a witness upon an immaterial matter. We are referred to no authorities supporting the view advanced by the appellant that the court's action was in violation of the rule stated. The witness having claimed that the admission by the state's witness was made to him at the house of Maillot's mother, and that he discussed the matter with the mother, we think the bill does not show that the court committed error in receiving the mother's testimony contradicting the appellant's witness.
Binding no error in the record justifying a reversal, the judgment is ordered affirmed.
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