Case Name: RAY L. INGALLS and CECIL R. HINES, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. KATHERINE T. BRADY, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of THOMAS A MANGAN, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1979-02-28
Citations: 180 Mont. 443
Docket Number: No. 13943
Parties: RAY L. INGALLS and CECIL R. HINES, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. KATHERINE T. BRADY, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of THOMAS A MANGAN, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: MR. JUSTICE HARRISON and SHEA concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 180
Pages: 443–453

Head Matter:
RAY L. INGALLS and CECIL R. HINES, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. KATHERINE T. BRADY, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of THOMAS A MANGAN, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 13943.
Submitted Nov. 20, 1978.
Decided Feb. 28, 1979.
591 P.2d 200.
Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula (Lonnie J. Dale, argued), for plaintiffs and appellants.
Garnaas, Hall & Riley & Pinsoneault, Harold J. Pinsoneault argued, Missoula, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of dismissal and judgment of the District Court, Missoula County, dismissing their complaint for specific performance of a contract for deed, and entering judgment in favor of defendant.
In October 1976 Katherine T. Brady inherited a parcel of real property located at 404 North Alder Street, Missoula, Montana. At that time, Mrs. Brady lived in New Mexico. Desiring to sell the inherited property, she entered into a listing contract with Dickson-Thomas Realty of Missoula, employing them to sell the property for her for $32,000. Dickson-Thomas began advertising the property for sale in the Missoula newspaper.
In response to the advertisements, Ray Ingalls and Cecil Hines contacted Dickson-Thomas on September 16, 1976 and the parties entered into an agreement to sell and purchase. Ingalls and Hines made an earnest money payment of $100.
The agreement to sell and purchase called for $7,000 down payment, with the remaining balance of $25,500 to be carried on a contract deed for over 20 years at 8% interest. These terms were conveyed to Mrs. Brady by Dickson-Thomas, and she accepted them by a telegram dated September 16, 1976 which read: "I, Katherine T. Brady accept the offer from Dickson-Thomas for $32,500 with $7,000 down for my property at 404 North Alder Street, Missoula, Montana."
Among the other provisions of the agreement to sell and purchase executed by Dickson-Thomas as agent for Mrs. Brady was a paragraph specifying that both seller and purchaser were authorized to enforce the remedy of specific performance, and a provision for a closing date of "on or before November 1, 1976."
At the time the agreement to sell and purchase was executed, Cecil Hines was not present. The agreement was signed by Ingalls on behalf of both purchasers as follows:
"Ray I. Ingalls
Cecil R. Hines by Ray Ingalls"
Subsequent to having entered into the agreement with Ingalls and Hines through Dickson-Thomas, Mrs. Brady became aware of at least one other offer by which she could have sold the property for a significantly higher price. It is her position, however, that this better offer had no influence on the events which occurred on the day scheduled for closing of the Ingalls-Hines deal, which events have culminated in this litigation.
At any rate, once the terms of the agreement to sell and purchase had been accepted by Mrs. Brady, Ingalls and Hines had their attorneys prepare a Contract for Deed, Notice of Purchaser's Interest, and Warranty Deed. These were sent to Mrs. Brady in New Mexico and executed there by her and her husband on October 9, 1976.
On October 11, 1976, Mrs. Brady came to Missoula. Wanda Young, an employer of American Land Title Co., who had furnished the preliminary title policy, was to handle the closing of the transaction. Closing was set for October 22. At eleven a.m. on that date, Mrs. Brady went to Wanda Young's office, expecting to have cash available to her then and there to close the deal. Ingalls and Hines, however, had arranged with Wanda Young to come in at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. Thus, there were no funds on deposit yet. Mrs. Brady, therefore, on the advice of her attorney, took the contract for deed, warranty deed, and notice of purchaser's interest (which she had previously signed and which had previously been given to Wanda Young in anticipation of the closing) and left. At 2:00 p.m. when Ingalls and Hines came in, Wanda Young informed them that Mrs. Brady had taken the documents they were to sign and that they would be unable to close. Subsequent efforts were made by Ingalls and Hines to bring about the closing on several occasions thereafter, but to no avail.
On November 18, 1976, Ingalls and Hines filed a complaint in the District Court, Missoula County, praying for specific performance of the agreement to sell and purchase. Trial was held before Judge E. Gardner Brownlee on June 27, 1977. The trial court concluded that because Hines had not signed the agreement to sell and purchase, but rather Ingalls had signed for him, there was no mutuality of remedy between Mrs. Brady and Hines. Since mutuality of remedy is a long recognized requirement for the enforcement of specific performance, Ingalls and Hines complaint would be dismissed. (Judge Brownlee did consider several other matters in reaching his decision, but it is clear from the record that his ruling was based primarily on the supposed flaw of lack of mutuality.) From the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment subsequently entered, Ingalls and Hines have brought this appeal.
Before turning to the issues we find dispositive here, we should point out that the fact scenario above is by no means exhaustive, but merely recites the uncontested points from a record that is otherwise characterized by confusion and disagreement. There is conflicting testimony whether Wanda Young expected Mrs. Brady to appear personally at the closing, or whether it had been anticipated that-Mrs. Brady would not be present and the closing would be completed through the mail. There is disagreement as to whether Ingalls and Hines knew Mrs. Brady expected the closing to be a cash transaction and would not go through with the sale otherwise. It is also unclear why the buyers and the seller did not meet at Wanda Young's office at the same time, rather than the seller arriving in the morning and the buyers not until afternoon.
Wanda Young did not appear in person at the trial of this cause; rather, her testimony was by deposition only. She did appear personally, however, at a subsequent hearing on plaintiff's motion to amend the findings and conclusions or for a new trial. At that hearing her testimony negated any inferences of fault on the part of In-galls and Hines for not appearing at 11:00 a.m. to meet with Mrs. Brady and for not having cash available. Nonetheless, the trial court refused to grant a new trail or to amend its findings and conclusions. The court stated that Mrs. Young's testimony did not render the judgment improper because the matters she addressed were "a very minor factor" therein. That being the case, the primary issue we must address can be stated as follows: Did the District Court err in holding that the fact that Ingalls signed the buy-sell agreement for Hines precluded the mutuality of remedy required for Ingalls and Hines to maintain a specific performance action against Mrs. Brady? We conclude that it did.
Specific performance of a contract for the sale of realty is not precluded because of either lack of mutuality as to obligation or remedy on the ground that only one of two purchasers signed the contract as purchaser, where the vendor knows that the signer is authorized by the other purchaser to act in making the purchase. Shreeve v. Greer (1946), 65 Ariz. 35, 173 P.2d 641. "Where there is an agreement to sell a certain piece of property and such agreement is signed by only one of the parties thereto, and therefore seemingly lacking in mutuality of remedy, the party who did not sign can bring a suit for specific performance and thereby make the remedy mutual." Jones v. Leland (1947), 77 Cal.App.2d 770, 176 P.2d 764, 768, disapproved on other grounds, Ellis v. Mihelis (1963), 60 Cal.2d 206, 32 Cal.Rptr. 415, 421, 384 P.2d 7.13. A plaintiff who has not signed a contract for the sale of realty to himself and another supplies the necessity mutuality of obligation by instituting an action for specific performance of the contract. Jones v. Elliot (1950), 123 Mont. 597, 218 P.2d 703. These cases state the general rule. 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 11. Further, even without the above authorities, the plain meaning of the controlling Montana statutes indicated there was no lack of mutuality here. Section 17-805, R.C.M.1947, now section 27-1-417 MCA, provides that a party who has not signed a contract may, by offering to perform, compel specific performance from the party who has signed. Section 17-802, R.C.M.1947, now section 27-1-414(1) MCA, provides that when either party to an obligation is entitled to specific performance, the other party is also entitled to it. Since Hines could have specific performance from Mrs. Brady •under the former section, she has the mutual right under the later.
Having concluded that Ingalls and Hines are not barred from obtaining specific performance because of lack of mutuality, we now turn to a discussion of the other factors the trial court considered persuasive. Mrs. Brady argued that her refusal to complete the agreement on October 22 was justified because cash money was not immediately available to her when she went to the closing agent's office, and because Ingalls and Hines did not appear at the 11:00 a.m. meeting. The findings of the trial court imply that Mrs. Brady's explanation, even aside from the lack of mutuality issue, was sufficient to allow her to avoid the agreement for failure of the plaintiffs to tender the purchase price. Although failure to tender the purchase price may be grounds for recission of a contract under some circumstances, we do not find that to be the case here.
The distinguishing feature present here in this regard is that the events at issue occurred on October 22, and the agreement itself specified only that closing was to take place on or before November 1. Time was not of the essence. Where time is not of the essence, a vendor is not entitled to rescind a contract without first tendering performance on his part as by tendering a deed and demanding performance by purchaser, and allowing a reasonable time to elapse thereafter. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 136. As to the need for cash to complete the transaction, there had appar ently been no prior discussion between the parties on the method of payment; it was merely Mrs. Brady's expectation that cash money would be available to her at the closing. Ingalls and Hines' attorney called Mrs. Brady's attorney the same day as the scheduled closing and offered to perform on whatever terms Mrs. Brady wanted. "A mere dispute as to the manner of performance resulting from a misunderstanding which is not persisted in . . . does not justify a recission" of a contract 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 422(1). A vendor cannot effectively declare a forfeiture of a contract for the sale of land because of a vendee's failure to pay promptly an installment of purchase money when the default in payment is caused or connived at by the vendor. Annot. 197 A.L.R. 345, § 8.
This entire dispute appears to have been precipitated by a failure of communication between the closing agent, the parties to the transaction, and their attorneys. Review of the complete record indicates that defendant is attempting to seize upon a minor failure on plaintiffs' part (which was occasioned as much by her own unreasonableness as.by any act or omission of plaintiffs) so that she can accept a better offer and avoid an otherwise valid contract. Plaintiffs should not be faulted for failure to tender the purchase price when they apparently made every good faith effort to comply with defendant's demands, but were refused even though the closing date specified in the agreement had not yet passed. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to order Mrs. Brady or her successors in interest (lis pendens has been timely filed) to specifically perform the buy-sell agreement by selling the real property described therein to Ingalls and Hines under the terms set forth in the agreement.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HARRISON and SHEA concur.