Case Name: L. Cook & Co. vs. James H. Corthell
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1877-03-03
Citations: 11 R.I. 482
Docket Number: 
Parties: L. Cook & Co. vs. James H. Corthell.
Judges: 
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 482–495

Head Matter:
L. Cook & Co. vs. James H. Corthell.
Although a mortgage of personal property to he subsequently acquired is in itself ineffectual to vest in the mortgagee a legal title to the property, yet if after acquisition by the mortgagor the mortgagee by delivery from, or by consent of, the mortgagor, takes possession of the property under the mortgage conveyance, the title to the property both in law and equity vests in the mortgagee without further conveyance or bill of sale.
Plaintiees’ petition for a new trial.
Assumpsit. The plaintiffs’ writ was served by attaching certain personal property covered by a mortgage executed by the defendant to one Darwin Almy. The defendant pleaded, in abatement, no service of writ, whiBh plea the plaintiff traversed. Gen. Stat. of R. I. cap. 197, § 4, provides that “ Personal estate, when mortgaged and in the possession of the mortgagor, and while the same is redeemable at law or in equity, may be attached on mesne process against the mortgagor, in the same manner as his other personal estate.”
The case was submitted to a jury to determine the defendant’s title to the mortgaged property, and the jury found “ that at the time of the service of the plaintiffs’ writ the property of the goods and chattels attached by virtue of said writ was not in the defendant, but in one Darwin Almy, mortgagee.” The charge of the court, and the evidence, are stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Potter.
Nicholas Van Slych $ Lorin M. Cook, for the plaintiffs.
A mortgage of personal property, such as stock in trade, with a proviso that such mortgage should cover “ All additions or renewals of said stock in trade hereafter made from time to time,” is simply an executory agreement as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, and cannot defeat the rights of creditors on property acquired subsequent to the mortgage, even if possession be taken of such after-acquired property by the mortgagee, under the mortgage. Jones v. Richardson, 10 Met. 481; Barnard v. Baton, 2 Cush. 303; Codman et al. v. Freeman, 3 Cush. 306; Bdgell v. Bart, 9 N. Y. 217.
B. N. 3. 3. Lapham, for the defendant,
cited Oliver v. Towne, 28 Wis. 328; Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81; Rowly v. Rice, 11 Met. 333.
March 3, 1877.

Opinion:
Durfee, O. J.
We think it is well settled that, though a conveyance of personal property, to be subsequently acquired, is per se ineffectual to transfer the legal title to the grantee, yet, if the grantor delivers the property when acquired to the grantee in fulfilment of the conveyance, or allows him to take possession under the conveyance, the property thereupon passes and vests according to the terms of the conveyance both at law and in equity. There is no need of any new conveyance or bill of sale ; for the property, being personal, passes by delivery. And there is no need of the intervention of a court of equity to treat the conveyance as an executory contract and decree its specific performance ; for, looking at it in that light, the contract is specifically performed by the parties themselves. The cases which recognize or sustain this view are numerous. The most prominent of them are cited in Williams v. Briggs. See ante, p. 476. There was, therefore, no error in the ruling mainly relied on as a ground for new trial. And in regard to the other rulings alleged to be erroneous, we do not think the petition discloses any sufficient reason for a new trial.
The petition assigns as a final ground that the verdict is against the evidence. The brief makes no point under this head, and no point was made at the hearing. We therefore presume that the petitioner did not expect to have the ground considered.
A majority of the court thinks a new trial should be denied.-