Case Name: Andrew ELLIS, petitioner, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Appellant (50168), and Raymond Smith, complainant, Respondent (50168), Appellant (50182)
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1980-06-20
Citations: 295 N.W.2d 523
Docket Number: Nos. 50168, 50182
Parties: Andrew ELLIS, petitioner, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Appellant (50168), and Raymond Smith, complainant, Respondent (50168), Appellant (50182).
Judges: 
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 295
Pages: 523–527

Head Matter:
Andrew ELLIS, petitioner, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Appellant (50168), and Raymond Smith, complainant, Respondent (50168), Appellant (50182).
Nos. 50168, 50182.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
June 20, 1980.
Robert J. Alfton, City Atty., and Allen B. Hyatt, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights (50168).
Thomas Vasaly, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, Inc., Minneapolis, for Smith (50182).
Blake & Phillips and Seth R. Phillips, St. Paul, for Ellis.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Raymond Smith, complainant, and the Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights appeal from an order of the district court reversing an order of the commission which concluded that Andrew Ellis, Smith's landlord, violated Minneapolis, Minn., Code § 945.040(e)(3) and (k)(2) (1960) by discriminating against Smith on the basis of Smith's American Indian heritage. The issues raised are whether the filing of an affidavit of prejudice in an action to review an agency decision requires that the case be reassigned, whether the decision of the commission was supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted, and whether proceedings by the commission were barred by an adverse jury verdict on the defense of discrimination in an unlawful detainer proceeding. We conclude that the affidavit of prejudice should have been honored and that the remedy afforded in civil cases, reversal and a new trial, should be applied. We therefore find it unnecessary to reach the other issues raised.
Minn.Stat. § 15.0424, subd. 6 (1978), governing judicial review of administrative agency decisions states that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided all proceedings shall be conducted according to the rules of civil procedure." R.Civ.P. 63.03 provides:
Any party or his attorney may make and serve on the opposing party and file with the clerk an affidavit stating that, on account of prejudice or bias on the part of the judge who is to preside at the trial or at the hearing of any motion, he has good reason to believe and does believe that he cannot have a fair trial or hearing before such judge. The affidavit shall be served and filed not less than 10 days prior to the first day of a general term, or 5 days prior to a special term or a day fixed by notice of motion, at which the trial or hearing is to be had, or, in any district having two or more judges, within one day after it is ascertained which judge is to preside at the trial or hearing. Upon the filing of such affidavit, with proof of service, the clerk shall forthwith assign the cause to another judge of the same district, and if there be no other judge of the district who is qualified, or if there be only one judge of the district, he shall forthwith notify the chief justice of the supreme court.
It is undisputed that Smith complied with the rule but that the chief judge of the district determined that it was inapplicable on the theory that review is in the nature of an appeal rather than a trial.
We have often stated that the right to peremptorily challenge a judge is to be liberally construed to safeguard in both fact and appearance the constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. Jones v. Jones, 242 Minn. 251, 64 N.W.2d 508 (1954); Wiedemann v. Wiedemann, 228 Minn. 174, 36 N.W.2d 810 (1949); Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259 (1946). In State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn.1977), however, we refused to permit peremptory challenges of appellate judges, adopting the rationale expressed in ABA Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.42 (Approved Draft 1977) and its commentary:
In the collegial decision-making of an appellate court an individual judge's purely personal views are of less significance than they would be in a trial court and he is subject to collegial restraint should he be inclined to act on them; an appellate judge has few occasions for exercising the broad discretion reposing in a trial judge; and in appellate litigation there is no occasion for the intense personal interaction between the judge arid the lawyers and litigants that may occur in a trial court.
257 N.W.2d at 363-64.
We believe that the role of a district judge in reviewing an administrative decision is more akin to that of a trial judge than an appellate judge. First, there is no collegial restraint since the reviewing judge makes his decision without consulting others. Second, § 15.0424, subd. 6, provides that testimony may be taken in court concerning alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency and § 15.0424, subd. 5, confers discretion on the reviewing court to grant a party leave to present additional evidence before the agency. Third, a litigant or his attorney is likely to have interacted personally with the judge conducting the review. In our view, the situation is substantially the same as arguing a motion before the district court, and we find no special consideration of administrative law requiring that the rule riot be applied.
Often the principal issue raised in review proceedings is whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency decision. In such cases, the strictures of judicial review require that the reviewing court refrain from substituting its judgment concerning inferences to be drawn from the evidence for that of the agency. Unless there is manifest injustice, the limitation applies even though it may appear that contrary inferences would be better supported or that the reviewing court would be inclined to reach a different result were it the trier of fact. Gibson v. Civil Service Board, 285 Minn. 123, 171 N.W.2d 712 (1969). Given this narrow scope of review, which the record indicates may have been exceeded in the present case, we believe that preservation of fairness in fact and appearance requires that a review proceeding be reassigned when a party complies with Rule 63.03.
We have consistently held that failure to honor a proper affidavit of prejudice is reversible error requiring a new trial. Jones v. Jones, 242 Minn. 251, 64 N.W.2d 508 (1954); Wiedemann v. Wiedemann, 228 Minn. 174, 36 N.W.2d 810 (1949). While our role in reviewing district court rulings on petitions for review of agency decisions is not the same as our role in reviewing civil actions generally, we believe that the differences do not warrant the conclusion that the error was without prejudice. The statutorily established review by the district court is an important step in administrative procedure, and we believe that proper review should be conducted before we reach the merits of a claim. Under these circumstances, we do not address the question of the substantiality of the evidence. Furthermore, the question whether the unlawful detainer proceeding has res judicata effect on subsequent proceedings before the commission cannot be adequately determined upon the record submitted.
Reversed and remanded.
. These sections are currently found at Minneapolis, Minn., Code § 139.40(e)(3) and (k)(2) (1977).