Case Name: VAN HEUSEN v. ARGENTEAU
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03-18
Citations: 109 N.Y.S. 238
Docket Number: 
Parties: VAN HEUSEN v. ARGENTEAU.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 109
Pages: 238–242

Head Matter:
VAN HEUSEN v. ARGENTEAU.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
March 18, 1908.)
1. Libel—Libelous Publication.
Defendant wrote a letter to a periodical relating to the disqualifications of a dog owned by defendant and entered at a competitive dog show, because his hair was found to have been dyed. After referring to a previous communication which exonerated defendant from guilty knowledge of the act, it was suggested that it was a subject for investigation by the Kennel Club, to inquire who dyed the dog—a question that could be answered by ascertaining who had an interest in having the dog dyed and disqualified. “Has, or is there any one who would profit by the disqualification of the dog Chin Chino? If so, whom? Who was it that discovered on the last day of the show, and three days after the judging of the Chow classes, that there was dye on the coat of the dog. And had the person who made this discovery an opportunity to put the dye on the dog? And was the dog’s disqualification in any way a benefit to the person? A crime was committed. The motive is plain. Who was it that had such a motive?” Held, that such article was libelous per se as against the person to whom reference was intended.
2. Same—Complaint—Identification of Person Libeled.
Where a publication was libelous per se, but did not identify the person libeled, it was unnecessary for a complaint for libel to allege any extrinsic fact to show application of the‘’defamatory matter to plaintiff, it being sufficient to allege that the article was published of, and concerning, the plaintiff, as expressly provided by Code Civ. Proc. § 535.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 32, Libel and Slander, $ 188.]
3. Pleading—Demurrer—Facts Admitted.
Where a libelous article did not identify the person libeled, and plaintiff alleged that the article was published of and concerning her, such fact was admitted by a demurrer to the complaint for want of facts.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 39, Pleading, §§ 525-527.]
Houghton, J„ dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Ada Olive Van Heusen against De Marcy Argenteau. From an interlocutory judgment overruling a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint' for want of facts, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ.
Robert Avery, for appellant.
Henry M. Ward, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
I think the article complained of is libelous per se. It tends to disgrace or bring into ridicule and contempt the person to whom it relates. Morey v. M. J. Ass'n, 123 N. Y. 207, 25 N. E. 161, 9 L. R. A. 621, 20 Am. St. Rep. 730; Stokes v. Stokes, 76 Hun, 314, 28 N. Y. Supp. 165. It does not identify the plaintiff as the person libeled, but the complaint alleges it was published of and concerning her. Being libelous per se and not identifying the person libeled, it was unnecessary to allege in the complaint "any extrinsic fact, for the purpose of showing the application to the plaintiff, of the defamatory matter," inasmuch as the allegation was that it was published of and concerning the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc. § 535), which is a fact admitted by the demurrer.
It appears on the face of the complaint that evidence may be given by the plaintiff which will show that she was the person referred to in the publication. As a pleading, this is all that is required, where it is charged that the matter was published of and concerning her. This was the rule laid down in Nunnally v. Tribune Ass'n, 111 App. Div. 485, 97 N. Y. Supp. 908, Mr. Justice Patterson, saying:
"But we conceive the rule to be, under the Code, that where it appears on the face of a complaint that evidence may be given by a plaintiff which will undoubtedly connect him with the alleged libelous matter, such a complaint is sufficient where it charges that the matter was published of and concerning him."
That case went to the Court of Appeals, and the judgment was affirmed on his opinion. 186 N. Y. 533, 78 N. E. 1108. The case has since been followed by the Fourth Department in Soper v. The Associated Press, 115 App. Div. 815, 101 N. Y. Supp. 342, affirmed 188 N. Y. 550, 80 N. E. 1120. The complaint should be liberally construed. Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366, 69 N. E. 725; Martin v. Press Pub. Co., 93 App. Div. 531, 87 N. Y. Supp. 859. At the trial the plaintiff may be able to prove that the article was published of and concerning her; that she had a dog at the show in the same class with the dog Chin Chino, and was the only other person who did have a dog in that class; that she was the person who discovered on the last day of the show that there was dye on the coat of the dog Chin Chino, and that she had an opportunity to put this dye on; and the disqualification of that dog was to her advantage because it enabled her dog to take the prize. If such proof be offered, can there be any question but that it would be admissible under the complaint, and, if admitted and not contradicted, would it not justify the jury in finding defendant liable? The plaintiff, as it seems to me, is entitled, by express provision of the section of the Code above cited, to prove the facts suggested and others if she can, without alleging them. Such facts simply show the application of the libelous matter to her; they identify the object of the libel by showing that she is the only person to whom the article could have referred. Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 184 N. Y. 479, 77 N. E. 660.
This complaint is not like those in Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231, and Corr v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 177 N. Y. 131, 69 N. E. 288. In the complaints in those cases there were allegations which showed that the libelous matter did not relate to the plaintiffs; in other words, in the complaint in each case facts were pleaded which showed that the plaintiff was not the person referred to in the article complained of. The pleading now before us is different. There are no allegations in the complaint which would exclude proof of any fact tending to identify the plaintiff as the person at whom the libelous article was directed.
I am of the opinion that the complaint states a good cause of action, that the demurrer was properly overruled, and the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs, with leave to the defendant to withdraw demurrer and to answer on payment of costs in this court and in the court below. All concur, except HOUGHTON, J., who dissents.