Case Name: Smith v. Bank of Marianna
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1928-04-23
Citations: 176 Ark. 1146
Docket Number: 
Parties: Smith v. Bank of Marianna.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 176
Pages: 1146–1149

Head Matter:
Smith v. Bank of Marianna.
Opinion delivered April 23, 1928.
Griffin Smith, for appellant.

Opinion:
Hart, C. J.,
(after stating the facts). The sole reliance of the plaintiff for a reversal of the judgment is that the court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce evidence to show that the salesman of the plaintiff represented, at the time the contract was executed, that the reading material would "tie-in" with the cuts. No such provision was inserted in the contract. On the contrary, in plain terms the contract recites that it is the sale of "seventy-eight Who's Who advertising engravings with ads and lobby cards, bulletin, and copy of monthly letter. ' ' The contract provides that all promises and agreements are 'Stated therein, and that verbal agreements with salesmen are not authorized.
We are of the opinion that the court erred in allowing the testimony of the cashier of the bank to be introduced before the jury. His testimony to the effect that the salesman told him that the advertising material would "tie-in" with the cuts was plainly contradictory of the terms of the written contract. This court has uniformly enforced the general rule that a written contract cannot be contradicted or varied by evidence of an oral agreement between the parties before or at the time of the execution of .such contract. Federal Lumber Co. v. Harris, 152 Ark. 448, 238 S.. W. 611; Delaney v. Jackson, 95 Ark. 135, 128 S. W. 859; and Pictorial Review Co. v. Rosen, 171 Ark. 719, 285 S. W. 385.
In the last case cited the court upheld a ruling of the trial court to the effect that parol evidence would be admitted to show that a traveling salesman had induced a customer to sign a printed form of contract in blank because he was in a hurry to catch a train, and promised to fill in the terms of the contract in accordance with the terms of their agreement. The purchaser had confidence in him, and relied upon his representation. The salesman filled out a contract different from the one the purchaser made, and, as soon as the purchaser found it out, he countermanded the order and notified the company not to ship the goods. The court held that the evidence of the purchaser was not a contradiction of the writing, but showed what was the real agreement between the parties.
No such condition exists in the case at bar. The evidence for the bank, which was admitted over the objections of tbe plaintiff, was to the effect that the salesman of the plaintiff had represented that the advertising material bought would "tie-in" with the cuts. As we have already seen, this was contradictory of the terms of the written contract which was signed by the parties after being written. Therefore tbe court erred in admitting it over the objections of the plaintiff, and for that error the judgment must be reversed.
Inasmuch as the case seems to have been fully developed, no'useful purpose could be served by remanding it for a new trial. The undisputed evidence shows that the sum of $130 is due the plaintiff by the defendant on the contract, and that the whole of this amount is due. This amount should bear interest under the contract as follows: $52 from February 1, 1927, and $78 from August 1, 1927. It is ordered that judgment be entered here in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant for said sum.