Case Name: The State of Kansas, ex rel., J. C. Tarr, v. J. T. Haughey, Treasurer of Miami County, Respondent
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1870-04
Citations: 5 Kan. 625
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Kansas, ex rel., J. C. Tarr, v. J. T. Haughey, Treasurer of Miami County, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 625–643

Head Matter:
The State of Kansas, ex rel., J. C. Tarr, v. J. T. Haughey, Treasurer of Miami County, Respondent.
Application for a Writ of Mandamus.
Bedded at July Term, 1869.
Redemption Prom Taxes: — The land sought to be redeemed by this proceeding, was struck off to the county of Miami m September, 1862, for the taxes of 1860. No deed has boen made therefor, nor has the certificate of said sale been assigned. On the 15th day of September, 1868, the relator being the ownor of said land, tendered tho full amount of the taxes, interest and costs, then due on said land, to the county treasurer of Miami county, and demanded a certificate of redemption therefor. Held: That under this state of facts the relator was entitled to redeem, and it was the duty of the county treasurer to make out the certificate of redemption.
An original petition was filed in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, to be directed to J. T. Haugbey, as treasurer of Miami county, Kansas, to compel bim as such treasurer to execute and deliver to tbe relator certain certificates of redemption for lands' sold, for tbe non-payment of taxes. Tbe agreed statement of tbe facts contains a statement of tbe amounts of tbe taxes on tbe réspective pieces of land described in tbe affidavit — tbe foundation for tbe application — for tbe years respectively from A. D. 1860 to 1867 inclusive, and a statement that tbe taxes on one of said pieces were, on January lOtb, 1868, paid by A. for tbe year 1867, and on tbe other piece o,n January 5th, 1867, by B. for tbe year 1866, and that B. paid tbe taxes for tbe year 1867 on tbe last mentioned piece December 31st, 1867; “ that certificates of sale of .said land were duly-issued by tbe treasurer" of Miami county to that county September 2d, 1862; that since that time there has been no written assignment of said certificates to any person; that on September 26th, 1864, tax deeds were made for tbe land to Miami county, by tbe clerk-of that county, for tbe taxes on the land previous to that time, and upon said certificates; that on September 14th, 1866, A., and on October 1st, 1866, 33., tendered and paid to said treasurer a sum of money equal to the amount required at that time to redeem said tracts of land respectively, and that the moneys' were -accepted by. the treasurer; that the object of that payment was to purchase whatever interest the county'had in the lands at that time; that owing to a mutual mistake of law by A. and 33. and said county clerk, treasurer, and the board of commissioners of said county, in lieu of a written assignment of the certificates of sale to said A. and 33., and in lieu of a deed made by the county clerk to said A. and 33., a deed was made by the said board to said A. and 33. respectively; that the original certificates of sale, ev.er since September 2d, 1862, have remained in the custody of the proper officer, and have not been assigned to said A. of 33. or to any other person, and that at the time of the application of the relator to the respondent to redeem said land, no proof was made to the said respondent of the relator’s ownership of or title to said land, at the time of the tax sales or at any other time, and no such'proof was demanded by said respondent as treasurer; that no taxes • on said land subsequent to October 1st, 1864, were endorsed upon either of said sale certificates.
Henry Keeler, for relator.
Si?npson ‡ Stevens, for respondent.
Simpson df Stevens, for respondent, submitted:
1. The relator does not aver that title to the lands which he seeks to redeem, was vested in him at the time of the sale; nor that he proved or offered to prove to the defendant,at the time of the attempted reclemp tion that such title was so vested, or that he had any interest therein at any time whatever. The relator therefore is not entitled to the certificate oi redemption. Comp. L. § 7, 876; Blaekw. Tax Tit., 421, 402, 423.
2. This section Avas the law in force at the time of the sale, execution and delivery of certificate of sale, and under its pi ovisions alone the redemption must be made. And its subsequent repeal can not affect rights vested under it. Comp. L., §1, p. 837, Blaekw. Tax Tit., 298, 299, 432, 433, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479#and 480. Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wise., 341.
3. Under the provisions of this section, in force at the time of sale, a redemption from, sale could only be made by the person in whom the title to the land vested at the time of sale, and within two years therefrom. {Comp. A., § 7, p. 876.] This time had elapsed more than four years prior to the attempted redemption; hence such right had become extinct.
4. A certificate of sale of land for non-payment of taxes, is a contract in which it is stipulated that the holder is entitled to receive a deed of the> land at the expiration of the time prescribed by laAv foi redemption, unless the land is sooner redeemed.
And such certificate is by statute made assignable, the same as bonds for the conveyance of lands. Comp. L., §§ 43, 44; Robinson v. IToioe, 13 Wise., 341; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221; Blaekw. Tax Tit., 476.
5. The assignee of such certificates of sale can have no more rights by virtue of the assignment than the original holder. Judd v. Driver, 1 Kas. R., 455.
6. It is presumed that the relator claims the right of redemption notwithstanding the lapse of more than two years from the time of sale, because of Ihe provisions of section 111, chapter 107, General Statutes of 1868. Which, section provides, that any person, whose lands have heretofore been sold to any county, and remain in the hands of said county, may redeem the same by paying the principal, costs of sale and ten per cent interest. In fact, in the case at bar, the lands sought to be redeemed do not'remain in the hands of said county, having been purchased therefrom by individual purchasers. But grant, for the argument, that the lands in question were in the hands of the county on the 15th day o-f September, 1868, the time of the attempted redemption, would that fact change the proposition, that the certificate of sale, executed by the county treasurer to Miami county, September 2d, 1862, constituted a “contract” the “ obligations” of which could not be “impaired” by a subsequent act f the legislature enlarging the time of redemption, or the amount of money necessary to effect such redemption? We think not.
7. ' The section of the statute, last referred to, as in fact all other statutes, must be construed so as to harmonize, not only with the organic law of the land, but with other provisions of statutes, if such construction be possible.
8. The object of the section in question was the immediate acquisition of revenue, and which acquisition would be facilitated by discounting all interest above ten per cent.
9. If it be conceded that it was-the intent, and such intent was clearly expressed, that the owner of land sold to and still held by the county might redeem the same from such sale at any time, although the sale certificate and the law undor which the sale was made, both provided that such right of redemption should cease and become extinct at the termination of two years from the day of sale, then most clearly such enactment was pal pably in violation of the “obligations” of the “contract” of sale, destructive of vested rights, unconstitutional and void.
10. Can it be claimed-with any show of reason that the sale certificate is any less' a “contract,” around which the segis of the constitution is thrown, because of its being held and owned by the county? No statute now, or that ever has been in force • in this state, mates any distinction between the terms and legal effect- of certificates of sale executed to or held by a county and those executed to or held by individuals, so far as relates to the right of redemption. In either case it is stipulated when the right of redemption shall become extinct; and such agreement embodied into the certificate and in conformity to the letter of the statute becomes a part of its “obligations” that cannot be “impaired” by repeal of the law in force at the time of sale, or by subsequent enactment. Comp. L., §§ 43, 44, p. 867, § lj p. 837; Blackw. Tax Tit., 298, 299, 432, 433, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Oilman, 221; JRobinson v. Ilowe, 13 Wise., 341; Butler v. Chariton County Court, 13 Mo., 112.
The certificate of sale is none the less a “ contract ” because of its having been entered into by the state as one of the contracting parties. Fletcher v. Feck, 6 Oranch JR., 87.
11. There may be a permissive redemption after the period of the right of redemption has elapsed; and such kind of redemption may have been contemplated in the enactment of section 111, chapter 107, general statutes, 1868. Coxe v. Walcott, 3 Casey, 154.
12. But in fact the certificate of sale of the lands in question had been sold by the county prior to the 15th day of September, 1868, so that if such demand had been acceded to by the defendant, it would not only have been in disregard of the obligations and liabilities of the officers of the law to deed to the holders of such sale certificates- the land so sold, but also in like disregard of the vested rights of the' purchasers of these sale certificates ; and had the county treasurer refused, or should he hereafter refuse to assign said sale certificate to said purchasers, he could be compelled to do so by the writ of mandamus.' Com/p. L., § 43.
13. The relator is not entitled to the writ of mandamus in this ease, because he has a “plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” He might, if entitled to the certificate of redemption at all, enjoin the clerk from executing the tax deed to the land; or he might set up such tender for redemption to defeat a tax deed executed after such tender, in an ejectment suit brought by relator to recover, said land. \_Comp. A., § 681.] Our statute upon the subject of the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ of mandamus has not changed the common law rule established and recognized in the Court of King’s Bench. State of Kansas, ex rel., Price v. Carney, et al., 3 Kas. B., 93; 3 Blackst., 42; Moses on Mandamus, 16, 17, 18, 104, 105, 124; The People v. the Supervisors of Chenango County, 1 Kern., 573.
The right of relator must be clear. Moses on Mandamus, 124, 135. The issuance of the writ is discretionary. Moses on Mandamus, .18.
14. The relator is not entitled to the writ of mandamus to enforce the execution and delivery of the certificate of redemption, because the performance of that act, especially in this case, is not ministerial in its character, but requires the exercise of legal judgment and decision, as is obvious from the manifold questions presented to this court for its solution. Comp. A., § 580, Chap. 26; 2 Burrill’s Law Die., 177; Ross v. Robinson, et al., 1 Kas., 186; Moses on Mandamus, 78, 79, 80; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Bet., [_U. &,] 497; The United States, ex rel., Tocher v. Seaman, 17 How. R., 225.
Yat,entine, J., Dissenting:
1. Counties. — Counties are quasi corporations, possessing only the powers conferred by law.
2. Taxes: ‘Who may take Deeds. — Section 56, of tax law of 'GO, [Comp, L., 870,] and section 10, of amendment of '62 [Comp. L., 877] providing that the county clerk shall execute and deliver deeds to any lands sold for taxes unredeemed, within the time specified on presentation by tho purchaser of the certificate of sale. Held : To apply to counties as well as to other purchasers. G-uittard Township v. Marshall County, 4 Kas., 388, and State, ex rel., Brumbaugh v. Magill, id., 415 contra.
3. Certificates: Assignment of. — A county having bid off lands for taxes, by assigning a certificate of sale, can give no more tille or rights than it? holds.
4. Commissioners to take Deeds. — Semble, the county commissioners would be the proper officers to procure tax deeds for the county, if such power exists. ’
5. Purchasers at Sales. — A distinction is made in the statute between counties and individuals purchasing at tax sales, but not as to exclude the former from purchasing.
G. Statutory Construction, Sale Certificates. — It seems, section 9, [L. ’64, p. 42,] prohibiting the sale certificates from beiDg assigned to counties, is not retroactive, nor is it a legislative construction of former laws.

Opinion:
By the Court:
No opinion was filed other than that expressed in the syllabus heading the case, but after the disposal thereof, on December 29th, 1869, there was filed the following: