Case Name: STATE of North Dakota ex rel. Herschel LASHKOWITZ, John A. Oakey, and John W. Markey, Petitioners and Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CASS COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation; P. M. Paulsen, Cass County Judge, Rhoda Lee, Cass County Auditor, and C. A. Baumgartner, Cass County Treasurer, Constituting the County Redistricting Board of Cass County, North Dakota; Rhoda Lee, County Auditor; and H. L. Bohnet, Kenneth A. McKinnon, Ingolf Sandbeck, Lewis Sutton, and Ray Kasowski, Individually and as Commissioners of Cass County, North Dakota, Respondents and Defendants and Appellants
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1968-04-05
Citations: 158 N.W.2d 687
Docket Number: Civ. 8347
Parties: STATE of North Dakota ex rel. Herschel LASHKOWITZ, John A. Oakey, and John W. Markey, Petitioners and Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CASS COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation; P. M. Paulsen, Cass County Judge, Rhoda Lee, Cass County Auditor, and C. A. Baumgartner, Cass County Treasurer, Constituting the County Redistricting Board of Cass County, North Dakota; Rhoda Lee, County Auditor; and H. L. Bohnet, Kenneth A. McKinnon, Ingolf Sandbeck, Lewis Sutton, and Ray Kasowski, Individually and as Commissioners of Cass County, North Dakota, Respondents and Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: ERICKSTAD and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 158
Pages: 687–694

Head Matter:
STATE of North Dakota ex rel. Herschel LASHKOWITZ, John A. Oakey, and John W. Markey, Petitioners and Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CASS COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation; P. M. Paulsen, Cass County Judge, Rhoda Lee, Cass County Auditor, and C. A. Baumgartner, Cass County Treasurer, Constituting the County Redistricting Board of Cass County, North Dakota; Rhoda Lee, County Auditor; and H. L. Bohnet, Kenneth A. McKinnon, Ingolf Sandbeck, Lewis Sutton, and Ray Kasowski, Individually and as Commissioners of Cass County, North Dakota, Respondents and Defendants and Appellants.
Civ. 8347.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
April 5, 1968.
Rehearing Denied May 28, 1968.
Eugene A. Kruger, State’s Atty., Fargo, for appellants.
Conmy, Conmy & Feste, Fargo, for respondents.

Opinion:
STRUTZ, Judge
(on reassignment).
This appeal from the judgment of the district court of Cass County involves the validity of Chapter 11-07, North Dakota Century Code, which provides for redistricting of counties of the State. The trial court held that the entire statute was invalid.
Chapter 11-07 provides:
"11-07-01. County redistricting board —Membership—Powers.—The county judge, the auditor, and the treasurer of each county shall constitute a redistricting board, and such board may change the boundaries of the commissioners' districts of the county in accordance with the provisions of this chapter upon the filing with it of a petition as provided in this chapter.
"11-07-02. Petitions — Signers required — Filing.—A petition asking that the boundaries of the commissioners' districts in the county be changed must be signed by at least twenty-five per cent of the qualified electors of the county as determined by the number of votes cast for the office of governor at the preceding general election. The petition shall be filed in the office of the county auditor.
"11-07-03. Board determines if districts should be changed — Auditor calls meeting of the board. — Within twenty days after the petition is filed, the county auditor shall call a meeting of the redistricting board to consider the petition. If it appears that the commissioners' districts of the county are not reasonably equal in population or extent of territory, the board shall proceed at once to redistrict the county into commissioners' districts.
"11-07-04. How county redistricted. —In redistricting a county, the redistricting board shall make the districts as regular and compact in form as practicable, and as nearly equal in population as possible. The equality of population in the districts shall be determined by the vote cast at the last preceding general election. No new district shall be so formed that any two of the then acting commissioners shall reside in the same district, nor shall any county be so redistricted that any municipality therein shall form any part of a majority of the commissioner districts in such county."
The facts are not in dispute, the parties having stipulated necessary facts for the record. The record discloses that the 1960 population of Cass County was 66,947. Of this total population, 46,662 persons resided in the city of Fargo and 20,285 were living in the balance of the county. The county is divided into five commissioner districts, the city of Fargo and five adjacent rural townships comprising the first and second districts, while the balance of the county is divided into the remaining three commissioner districts. The present districts and their population, as determined by the 1960 census, are as follows:
The first district, with a population of 28,530; the second district, with a population of 24,954; the third district, with a population of 4,940; the fourth district, with a population of 4,872; and the fifth district, with a population of 3,651.
From these figures, it will be noted that the vote of persons living in the first and second commissioner districts of Cass County is not nearly so effective as the vote of persons residing in the balance of the county outside of these two districts.
It is undisputed that the county is an important unit of local government. It exercises general governmental powers which directly affect all of the citizens living in the county, such as administration of welfare services, levying of taxes, construction of bridges and highways, erection and maintenance of the courthouse, hospital, and jail; that these and other duties have an immediate and personal impact upon all of the citizens of the county.
Until recently, there has been doubt whether the principle of "one person, one vote" would be applied to local units of government which do not have express legislative powers. The members of this court have been hopelessly divided on this issue. However, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45, which was decided on April 1, 1968, now has settled this question. The law of the land, as interpreted by that decision, now holds that the Equal Protection Clause as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in determining districts for units of local government which have general governmental powers over the area which they serve. The Avery decision specifically provides that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that units of local government having general powers over an entire geographic area may not be apportioned among single-member districts which have substantially unequal populations.
The Avery decision thus would render unconstitutional that portion of Section 11-07-04, North Dakota Century Code, which provides that no county shall be so redistricted that any municipality therein shall form any part of the majority of the commissioner districts in the county, regardless of population. Whether county commissioners have any legislative powers no longer is material. They do have general governmental powers over the counties and thus they come within the purview of that decision. We therefore hold that that portion of Section 11-07-04 of Chapter 11-07 is unconstitutional.
Having found that the portion of Section 11-07-04 which prohibits any municipality from forming a majority of the commissioner districts of a county invalid, are the remaining portions of the chapter valid ? We think not. Section 11-07-03 provides that if the board set up by law to redistrict the county finds that the districts of the county are not reasonably equal in population or in extent of territory, it must redistrict.
This means that if one or the other basis for redistricting- — -reasonably equal population or reasonably equal extent of territory —is not present, the board must act. The fact that the board may refuse to act when the extent of territory is reasonably equal permits apportionment on a basis other than population and thus violates the "one person, one vote" principle.
On the other hand, if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 11-07-03 means that the board must act unless it finds that the districts were reasonably equal, both in population and in extent of territory, we would be construing the section to produce a ludicrous result. Under that construction, a group of citizens might petition for redistricting because the districts are not reasonably equal in population, and the board would proceed to redistrict the county on a population basis. Another group could then contend that the districts, having been made equal in population, have been made grossly unequal in extent of territory because of the presence of urban areas in the county, and such group could demand a redistricting because the districts are not reasonably equal in extent of territory. Both demands could not be complied with. In the construction of a statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Bronson v. Johnson, 76 N.D. 122, 33 N.W. 2d 819.
We therefore find that Section 11-07-03 is invalid in that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution.
But it is contended that even though a portion of Section 11-07-04 and all of 11-07-03 are invalid, the balance of the statute still must be upheld. The remaining sections of the law do provide for a redistricting board and for the securing and filing of petitions to bring about a redistricting of the county. Under Section 11-07-02, if a petition for redistricting of a county is presented which is signed by at least twenty-five per cent of the qualified electors of the county, the board shall proceed to redistrict, if the conditions which require redistricting are found to exist.
We believe Section 11-07-02 also is invalid in that it violates the Due Process Clause of Article XIV of the United States Constitution. Article XIV provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." The right of franchise is one of the greatest privileges of an American, and that right clearly is infringed by Chapter 11-07, North Dakota Century Code. In order to secure redress for the infringement of his rights, however, Section 11-07-02 requires an elector to secure the signatures of at least twenty-five per cent of the qualified electors of the county. Those electors living in the three favored commissioner districts would, of course, refuse to sign such petitions since they have a favored position under the present law. So the statute actually requires an aggrieved person to obtain the signatures of a greater percentage of the electors of the remaining districts in order to secure redress of his rights.
Section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that "All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law."
Section 11-07-02 would compel a person to go to the expense of obtaining a large number of signatures to petitions in order to secure his sacred rights as an American citizen. For reasons stated herein, we believe that Section 11-07-02, North Dakota Century Code, is invalid.
This leaves Section 11-07-01 of the Act remaining. That section merely provides for a county redistricting board. Standing alone, it is absolutely meaningless. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, Sec. 186, p. 414. We therefore hold the entire chapter to be invalid.
We are aware of the difficult problems which will face the next Legislature as a result of this decision. In order that the continuity of county government shall not be interrupted, we hold that corrective relief required by this decision shall be deferred to give the Legislature an opportunity to enact a valid districting law, which should contain a provision for the orderly transition of the governmental powers to the commissioners elected thereunder. Until that time, present boards of county commissioners shall continue to function. The commissioners whose terms will expire in January 1969, or others seeking the same office, shall be nominated and elected for the interim in accordance with present statutes.
This court will retain jurisdiction in this case, and if for any reason a valid system of districting in county government is not provided for by the next Legislative Assembly, the respondents may apply to this court for further relief.
ERICKSTAD and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.
PAULSON, J., participating on the briefs.