Case Name: The State of Louisiana ex rel. W. E. Howell, District Attorney pro. tem. et al. vs. Arthur J. Echeveria, Sheriff, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1881-05
Citations: 33 La. Ann. 709
Docket Number: No. 8123
Parties: The State of Louisiana ex rel. W. E. Howell, District Attorney pro. tem. et al. vs. Arthur J. Echeveria, Sheriff, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 709–723

Head Matter:
No. 8123.
The State of Louisiana ex rel. W. E. Howell, District Attorney pro. tem. et al. vs. Arthur J. Echeveria, Sheriff, et al.
On the Motion/to Dismiss.
93io Intrusion into office Act is yet in force and linropealed or unaffected by any provision in the Constitution of 1879.
In proceedings under tliat Act, the failure of the State to appeal does not prevent any other party in interest from doing it.
Whilst this Court will not compel the Attorney General by Mandamus to tako and bring up an appeal in the name of the State, still that officer cannot bind the State by acquiescence in a judgment adverse to her.
A mere allegation of acquiescence, contained in a motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavit, does not justify tbo remanding of a cause for the purpose of having the question as to acquiescence tried in the lower court.
On the Merits.
The State has the undeniable power to prescribe qualifications as conditions precedent to the right to hold office, and, in ordaining such qualifications, the State Constitution could enact provisions with a retrospective effect, without violating the Federal Constitution.
Article 171 of the Constitution, providing for the ineligibility of public officers for certain causes, was intended to have a retroactive operation as well as to provide for the future.
The reason, object and means of enforcing said Article 171, fully considered.
In an issue as to the eligibility of a public officer under the, same Article, the discharge obtained by him from the competent authority cannot be attacked collaterally. It must be done directly, and the discharge must be averred to have been obtained by fraud or error.
The admission of Defendant, that he has made no settlement with the School Board of the Parish for school funds, though coupled with the allegation that he has disbursed more money than he received, on account of said Board, and that his vouchers have been filed with the State Auditor, — is a full solution of the question at bar. As he has not obtained his discharge from the proper authority, the School Board, he is not eligible under Article 171.
APPEAL from the Second Judicial District Court, parish of Assumption. Knobbloclc, J.
Pugh & Howell, for Plantiffs and Appellants :
On the Motion to Dismiss.
First — Bight to appeal must be tested by the state of facts existing at the time the appeal is taken. 20 An. 870, 112; 28 An. 231; 10 An. 324, 155; 14 An. 708; 14 An. 426 ; 32 An. 348 : 28 An. 562; 30 An. 131; 31 An. 121; 10 L. 252; 13 An. 417 ; 14 A. 708; 6 L. 586.
Second — When' motion for appeal is made in open court, jurisdiction of Supreme Court attaches on the signing of the order and filing .bond. The State of Louisiana being exempt from giving bond, tbe signing of the order of appeal vested the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Supreme Court jurisdiction having once attached, the court a qua has no longer authority to take any steps but such as may be necessary to transmit the record to the appellate court. C. P. 514; 28 An. 542; Hen. 73, Ho. 3; 20 An. 293,* 27 An. 431, 97, G84, 446; 24 An. 601, 599; 32 An. 816 ; 29 An. 350 ; 21 An. 154; 19 L. 173; 22 An. 518, 450; 21 An. 210, 213; 1 ®. 527; 2 An. 628; 32 An. 15; 23 An. 31; 22 An. 39, 589; 25 An. 623; 32 An. 551; 25 An. 666; 10®. 419; 30 An. 1016, 1028; 14 An. 157; 20 An. 236; 28 An. 568; 8 An. 434.
Third — The State of Louisiana, Police Jury and School Hoard of the parish of Assumption are co-plaintiffs and joint litigants. The police jury and School Hoard have the right and authority to employ associate counsel. On motion of District Attorney, the associate counsel in this case were placed as attorneys of record for the plaintiffs. The District Attorney is estopped by his judicial admission in the pleadings from denying authority of associate counsel. 5 An. 119, 710; 28 An. 163; 24 An. 136; Dillon, p. 389.
Eourth — Tbe right of appeal, the amount being sufficient, is guaranteed by the Constitution. 21 An. 114, 65; 28 An. 548, 881; 30 An. 71; Art. 81 Const. 1879.
Fifth — The District Attorney is not the State, but only the counsel for the State, and cannot acquiesce in a judgment under the intrusion in office act to the prejudice of the co-plaintiffs. 25 An. 434; 30 An. 70; 27 An. 320; 3 An. 292; 29 An. 147; 28 An. 344.
Sixth — The appeal bond being in favor of “ clerk of court,” are parties before the court. 23 An. 376; 30 An. 181; 24 An. 442; 25 An. 37-220; 26 An. 220, 312; 32 An. 30.
Seventh- — Under the intrusion in office act, the suit must be brought in the name of the State* on the relation of any person interested, the name of such person being joined with the State as plaintiff. The duties of District Attorney under this act are ministerial; can be forced by “mandamus ” to bring suit and to prosecute it. Secs. 2593, 2596 B. S.; 21 An. 655; 25 An. 15, 365; 24 An. 149; 31 An. 643; 23 An, 787.
Eighth — Ho inquiry can be made on a motion to dismiss, as to the interest of parties appealing. This comes up on the merits. 21 An. 670; 26 An. 43; 30 An. 70; 28 An. 548.
Hinth — Appeal bonds are for the amount fixed by the District Judge; this suffices. Hen. 51, Ho. 6; 26 An. 530; 31 An. 501; 27 An. 97; 21 An. 597; 20 An. 341; 24 An. 551, 475.
Tenth — The State of Louisiana is exempt from furnishing bond. She is sovereign, and in requiring other parties to give bonds, she is legislating for her citizens, and not imposing restrictions upon herself. 1 Kys. 262; Bex vs. Earl, Hun bury 33; Bex vs. Pickey, Id. 202; 3 McL. 483; 5 MoL. 133; 3 Pet. 12; 5 Pet. 293; 14 Pet. 315; 20 Wal. 255; Greinn vs. Pendergast, 2 B. 237. “From giving the surety no appellant hut the State can be dispensed.”
Oh the Merits, oh Applicatioh eor a Rehearihg.
First — What is the nature and true and only object of this action ? Hone other than to test the defendant’s eligibility to be elected to and hold office. B. p. Pet.; B. S. See. 2593.
Second — This is a statutory remedy, and can be applied only in the manner and only for the purpose expressly pointed out by the statute. B. S. Sec. 2593 et seq.
Third — Ho examination of accounts can be gone into, no moneyed judgment rendered either in favor of plaintiff or defendant.
Fourth — The judgment to be rendered here cannot be pleaded in bar against any suit brought, or to he brought, against this defendantfor a moneyed judgment. Hor can this action be pleaded asm judicata against the school board suit. The objects of the two suits are entirely distinct, and the issues in no manner connected. The one is for a moneyed judgment by a municipal corporation, the other a suit brought by the State of Louisiana to test the eligibility of one of her citizens to hold office. 29 An. 230; Hennen, vol. 1, p. 760, Ho. 3 et seq., Ho. 11. 1
Fifth — The intension into office act is not repealed by the Constitution of 1879, and' is the proper and only remedy to he applied in cases of this nature. Const. Arts. 258,152,196, 201; 32 An. 942.
Sixth — The only fact to be ascertained is, does defendant meet the requirements of Art. 17Í of the Constitution of 1879, viz., did h© possess, or had he obtained on the day he was voted for, proper discharge for all public funds to him entrusted. Const. Art. 171; B. S-Sec. -.
Walter Guión and B. N. Sims for Defendants and Appellees:
Oh Motioh to Dismiss.
First — In all intrusion suits the State is the only real party plaintiff, and all proceeding® therein must be originated and conducted by the District Attorney or Attorney General. 21 An. 655-710.
Second — Private individuals have no right to contest the title of a public officer or inquire into his right to hold office. 23 An. 25-784; 26 An. 272; 21 An. 655-710; 25 An. 364.
Third — Mandamus was the only remedy by which to force the bringing up of an appeal by the District Attorney. 23 An. 786; 24 An. 149.
Bourth — Ho appeal will lie where judgment has been acquiesced in, and this Court should re-t mand the case for the purpose of taking evidence on that issue. 23 An. 272; 3 An. 115; 23 An. 37; 20 An. 574; 29 An. 576; 22 An. 105; C. P. 567; 28 An. 743; 18 Ah. 59-264.
Bifth — Ho appeal bond has been prescribed by the State, the only party entitled to appeal, and the only appellant, if suoh there be, and the appeal should be dismissed.
On the Merits.
Birst — That defendant can be removed only by an address of tho Legislature, and not by a suit under che Intrusion Acts, which have been repealed by the adoption of the Constitution of 1879. See Arts. 152,196, 201 of the Constitution of 1879; 28 An. 445; 32 An. 941 et seq.
Second — That the defendant, although not in possession of a written or technical discharge from the school board, holds the discharge contemplated by article 171 of the Constitution of 1879, having shown that he had paid out for account of said board more than he had received, and that this fact of overpayment is admitted by counsel for plaintiff. Becord, pp.
Third — That tho school board, having made itself a voluntary party plaintiff with tho State, and having raised and tendered the issue of defendant’s liability for school funds and the amount thereof, is bound by the admissions made in this case and the evidence adduced therein, and is precluded from contradicting or denying said evidence and admissions, which operate as an estoppel and form res judicata in the school board suit. Hennen, pp. 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523; 8 An. 126; Hennen, p. 761, Ho. 11; 24 An. 3; 20 An. 293; 12 An. 197; Hennen, p. 520, Ho. 25; 26 An. 112; 28 An. 625.
Bourth — That by raising with and tendering to defendant in this suit the issue of liability and amount of his indebí edness to the school board, it has virtually abandoned its suit against defendant as a separate action, and consolidated it with this suit, and all the issues raised therein having been tried and determined in this suit, virtually puts an end to the suit of the school board, no objection having been made by any of the plaintiffs in this suit to all inquiry into defendant’s liability for school funds and the amount thereof. Hennen, vol. 1, p. 1142, III. Ho. 2; p. 520, Ho. 25; p. 766, Ho. 42; p. 145, Ho. 4; p. 1539, Ho. 4; 10 An. 7.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Levy, J.
Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss' this appeal on the following grounds:
1st. Because no appeal has been applied for by or granted to the State of Louisiana, the only party in interest, entitled, as plaintiff, to ask and apply for an appeal herein.
2d. That, even if any appeal has ever been applied for by plaintiff, the State of Louisiana (which, however, is denied), nevertheless the judgment of the Twentieth District Court herein in favor of defendant, has been acquiesced in by plaintiff and by the District Attorney representing plaintiff.
3d. That no appeal bond has ever been furnished by plaintiff, the only appeal bonds herein having been furnished by the Police Jury and by the School Board of the parish of Assumption, who have no right or interest to appeal from, the judgment herein; the only party in interest being the State, which has not appealed herein.
1st. The order of appeal was granted oh motion made by counsel of plaintiffs. The District Attorney, the official representative of the State in this suit, had joined with him on the relation the Police Jury and School Board of the parish. The associate counsel for the State as well as other plaintiffs, had been recognized as such by this officer and on his own motion they were placed as attorneys of record for plaintiffs. The failure of the State to appeal does not prevent any other party in interest from taking an appeal, as this Court has recently decided in the case of State ex rel. Eord vs. Attorney General (not yet reported).
2d. In the'case just cited, we distinctly held that, while this Court would not (under mandamus) compel the Attorney General to take and bring up an appeal in the name of the State, still such officer could not bind the State by acquiescence in a judgment adverse to her. And in this connection we may declare that a mere allegation of acquiescence contained in a motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavit, does not justify the remanding of a cause for the purpose of having the question as to acquiescence tried in the lower court. Such practice, if sanctioned, would open the door to tedious and injurious delay and dangerous postponement of the settlement of the rights of parties litigant, and might work great wrong and injustice. To remand causes on mere allegations of acquiescence, not sworn to and not suggested in the record, would place in the hands of one of the parties to the appeal a means of protracting litigation unfair and injurious.
3d. The State is not required to give bond and security for an ap- • peal in her own courts. 2 Rob. 237.
The motion to dismiss is denied.