Case Name: Nathan SCHEKTER, Petitioner, v. I. MICHAEL, a/k/a Mickey Michael, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1966-03-09
Citations: 184 So. 2d 641
Docket Number: No. 34584
Parties: Nathan SCHEKTER, Petitioner, v. I. MICHAEL, a/k/a Mickey Michael, Respondent.
Judges: THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, O’CONNELL, CALDWELL and HOB-SON (Ret.), JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 184
Pages: 641–643

Head Matter:
Nathan SCHEKTER, Petitioner, v. I. MICHAEL, a/k/a Mickey Michael, Respondent.
No. 34584.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 9, 1966.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 1966.
Klein, Moore & Kline and Morton P. Brown, Miami Beach, for petitioner.
Ely R. Katz and Michael H. Salmon, Miami Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
This petition for certiorari, based on a question certified to us by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is directed to a decision of that court dated June 15, 1965 and reported as Michael v. Schekter in 176 So.2d 581.
The respondent executed a note for $8000.00 payable to Charles Donner but with the due date left blank. Thereafter the note was assigned to petitioner who made demand for payment This was refused and petitioner brought suit. Respondent interposed defenses based on an alleged parol agreement by which the note was not to mature until some indefinite time in the future determined by certain other ventures of the maker and payee. The petitioner moved for summary judgment which was granted. The respondent appealed to the District Court of Appeal which reversed the trial judge and certified the case to us as passing upon a question of great public interest.
The question posed is:
"Whether a promissory note which is blank as to due date becomes, by application of Sec. 674.09(2), F.S., a demand note thereby barring the admission into evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement which would vary the demand character of the instrument?"
The law is a part of every contract made in this State. Therefore, when this note was executed and delivered (April 19, 1960) the provisions of Section 674.09, Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., became as much a part of the note as if it had been written on the face of it. This was tantamount to stamping across the face of the note "No time for payment appearing hereon, this note is payable on demand."
It is said that this is a case of first impression in Florida. In view of the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, this is understandable. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Higgins, 89 N.H. 154, 195 A. 369 (1937), in construing this identical section taken from N.I.L., correctly disposed of the question in this terse observation:
"The statute states no exceptions or qualifications to the demandable character of such an instrument, and no policy is perceived by which any are implied by it. The law is intended to be a fully developed codification, of static fixation. It seeks definiteness and completeness, avoiding uncertainty and elasticity." (Emphasis supplied.)
If a person executes and delivers a promissory note in which no time for payment is expressed, he is charged with knowledge it is payable on demand.
The decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause is remanded to that court for entry of a judgment affirming the summary judgment of the trial court.
THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, O'CONNELL, CALDWELL and HOB-SON (Ret.), JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.