Case Name: Henry L. Gladding, App'lt, v. Alice S. Gladding, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-02-04
Citations: 29 N.Y. St. Rep. 485
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry L. Gladding, App’lt, v. Alice S. Gladding, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 29
Pages: 485–490

Head Matter:
Henry L. Gladding, App’lt, v. Alice S. Gladding, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
Filed February 4, 1890.)
Benefit societies—Beneficiabies.
By § 18 of chap. 175 of Laws of 1883, membership in an association engaged in the business of life insurance on the co-operative or assessment plan, gives the member the right, with the consent of the corporation, to change his beneficiary. In an action between rival claimants to a fund due upon the death of a member in such an association, Held, that the consent of the corporation to such change was essential, and that the fund be paid to that person who could show recognition by the corporation of himself as the beneficiary.
(Fish, J., dissents.)
George W. Gladding was in Ms lifetime and at the time of Ms death a member of a domestic corporation known as the Odd Fellows Belief Association, and entitled to the benefits of the association. He died at Albany, May 29, 1887, whereupon an. assessment was made by the corporation, upon which was paid in for the benefit of the beneficiary in his certificate of membership the sum of §700.61, which sum belongs to whomsoever is entitled according to his direction 'as a member. The association, offers no defence, but is indifferent as to who shall receive the money, and has, in pursuance of an order of the court, paid the sum named into court, subject to the order of the court. The plaintiff is a brother of the deceased. He is the person named by the deceased as the beneficiary in his application for membersMp and in the certificate of membership. He claims to be entitled to the fund by virtue of such designation, and by virtue of a subsequent written direction of the deceased.
The defendant, Alice S. Gladding, was the wife of George W. Gladding, and she claims it in virtue of a change of beneficiary, which she alleges was made by her husband some time before his death. The special term decided that the defendant was entitled to the money, and judgment has been entered, from which plaintiff has appealed.
P. M Du Bois, for app’lt; Jerome W. Eclcer and Henry C. Nevitt, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.
By the original application of the deceased he directed the benefits to be paid to Henry L. Gladding, his brother. By an endorsement on the back of the certificate, signed by the secretary of the company, dated October 15, 1886, and stated therein to be at the written request of the member, George W. Gladding, the beneficiary was changed to Alice S. Gladding, his wife. Although such written request was not produced on the trial, still this endorsement made on the certificate, which must then have been in the possession of George W., is sufficient evidence that from that time forward the benefits were to be paid to Alice S. unless some subsequent legal change should be made.
The recital in this endorsement is sufficient evidence of a proper written request. The endorsement was upon the certificate itself, and that was a' paper belonging to George W., and originally in his possession. Unless the beneficiary originally named had some vested rights it would seem, on general principles, that the parties to the agreement might modify it by mutual consent.
Section 12 of the laws and regulations requires the payment to be made to wife, children, .father, mother, sister or brother of the deceased member in the order above named, unless otherwise ordered in writing by the deceased member, such order to be signed in presence of two witnesses.
Chapter 175, Laws of 1883, by its fifth section makes all companies like the one here in question subject only to the provisions of the act, and describes such companies as " engaged in the business of life insurance on the co-operative or assessment plan." Section 18 of the act says that membership in any association transacting such business shall give the member the right, with the consent of the corporation, to change his beneficiary.
The question then must be, did the deceased make a valid change of his beneficiary ? On the 20th of May, 1887, he signed a paper directing " the association " (not naming any) to pay the amount of benefits to his brother, Henry L. This he acknowledged on the same day before a commissioner of deeds. There is no witness to the paper. This paper was never brought to the notice of the association until after the death of George W. Such is the finding of the court, on a conflict of evidence. Of course, therefore, there was no consent of the association to the proposed change.
In the case of Hannigan v. Ingraham, 28 N. Y. State Rep., 530, - recently decided in this court, there was no beneficiary named, and no restriction upon the assigning of the benefit. But the present case is different. There is a beneficiary agreed upon between the assured and the association, and there is a restriction upon the assigning o'f the benefit. The assured then did not make a valid transfer of the benefit
It is urged that, at the time of the attempted transfer, the certificate was in the possession of Alice S., and therefore an endorsement could not be made thereon. But it would have been possible for the association to consent to the transfer, if it had chosen to do so, before the death of George W.
The plaintiff urges that the secretary of the association testified that he would have consented if the original certificate had been produced. But his testimony as to what he would have done under other circumstances, does not show that the association did consent. It was certainly prudent to decline to consent unless the original certificate should be produced, so that the change could be stated thereon.
There was then no change of the beneficiary made with the consent of the association, and the association was not, under this contract, liable to one who was not substituted as beneficiary with its consent.
"We do not think it necessary to decide whether or not Henry L. was within the class of persons who might be beneficiaries.
Hor is it important to consider the fact that, during some part of their married life, the deceased and Alice S. lived apart. Of the grounds of the separation we know nothing; nor would they be material. For about a year prior to his death they were living together. And they were so living when he was taken ill of his last sickness. That they were not together at his death was owing to the fact that Henry L. had taken to his own house the deceased at the beginning of his illness, and had prevented the wife from seeing him there. An attempted substitution of the brother as beneficiary under these circumstances does not commend itself to any special favor.
We think that the view of the law stated in Story v. Williamsburgh M. M. B. Ass'n, 95 N. Y., 474, and in Ireland v. Ireland, 43 Hun, 212; 5 N. Y. State Rep., 89, and other cases cited by counsel, sustain the view of the learned justice who tried the case. And we have seen nothing which as we think militates against them.
In the latter case it was held, and correctly, that on a controversy between two claimants the question was to which of the two the association was legally liable. If the consent of the association was needed to give Henry L. the right to recover against it, then Alice S. may show that want of consent in this controversy. The case of Luhrs v. Sup. Lodge, 27 N. Y. State Rep., 89, is not in conflict with this.
Judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Landon, J., concurs.