Case Name: RECZNIK v. CITY OF LORAIN
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1968-11-18
Citations: 393 U.S. 166
Docket Number: No. 323
Parties: RECZNIK v. CITY OF LORAIN.
Judges: Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would deny the petition for certiorari.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 393
Pages: 166–174

Head Matter:
RECZNIK v. CITY OF LORAIN.
No. 323.
Decided November 18, 1968.
Meyer Gordon for petitioner.
Henry T. Webber for respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On the night of June 10, 1965, two police officers of the City of Lorain, Ohio, left their assigned cruising district and drove to the premises at 1420-1422 Broadway because they "suspected a crime was being committed" there. This suspicion was founded upon tips from persons who had stopped the officers on the street. Petitioner is the owner of the building at 1420-1422 Broadway, which contains two unconnected units. No. 1420 consists of the ground floor and basement and houses a cigar shop and storeroom. No. 1422 is a second story suite of rooms. When the officers arrived at the premises at approximately 1 a. m., they noticed an unusually large number of cars parked in the vicinity. According to their testimony they met the petitioner outside the rear entrance to the upstairs suite, warned him that there had better be nothing illegal going on inside, and said they would return in half an hour.
When they did return 20 minutes later, a large number of cars were still parked near the building, and the officers observed several men entering the upstairs apartment. The officers then climbed the stairs, listened to the sound of voices within, and tried to look through the window and door. Unable to see inside, they walked through the back doorway unannounced. As they headed for the front of the apartment, the petitioner emerged from a front room and told the officers they could not enter. Through the door opened by the petitioner, one of the officers saw a dice game in progress. The officers entered the room, placed everyone present under arrest, and seized the table, chips, dice, and money which were being used in the game. Those arrested, including the petitioner, were taken to the police station. The police continued to search the apartment, and came across some keys which they thought might open the store and basement downstairs. Apparently because the officers "had information that there were all sorts of gaming devices downstairs," the store and basement were also searched thoroughly, and various numbers game paraphernalia were discovered and seized.
Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Lorain of violating three ordinances which prohibit keeping a gambling place, exhibiting a gambling device, and possessing a numbers game. His motion to suppress all the evidence which had been seized at 1420-1422 Broadway was denied, the court ruling, upon the evidence above summarized, that the officers had "entered this public establishment and observed gambling being conducted openly and in full view." On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the conviction for possession of the numbers game paraphernalia found in the lower unit of the building was reversed. The court held that since the petitioner had already been taken to the police station and booked, "the search of the storeroom in this case was too remote in time to have been incidental to the arrest." The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on the two remaining counts, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed an appeal. Since we have concluded that the petitioner's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution were infringed by the entry of the police onto his premises, we grant certiorari and reverse. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643.
The finding of the Municipal Court that the petitioner's apartment was a "public establishment" has no support in the record. While the cigar store was usually open, to the public during business hours, it was closed and dark at the time of the arrest. The upstairs suite was an entirely separate unit, with a different address and different entrances. The respondent's suggestion that the officers were privileged to enter because the apartment "at that point had taken on, from the amount of people, a public appearance," is untenable. The congregation of a large number of persons in a private home does not transform it into a public place open to the police.
Respondent argues that the entry into the apartment was justified as incidental to the arrest of the petitioner, who the officers had probable cause to believe was conducting an illegal game. The senior arresting officer, however, did not so view the matter, for he conceded that when he entered the apartment, he "had no evidence to make an arrest." Nevertheless, it is argued, the officers could have entered to arrest the petitioner in view of the tips received from informers that evening and their own corroborating observations of the activities at the apartment. We cannot agree that the knowledge of the officers revealed by this record amounted to probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed. The testimony of one officer that the building was a "noted gambling joint" was stricken by the trial judge, and no further effort was made to show that either the petitioner or the apartment was at that time connected with illicit gambling operations. Nor did the respondent even attempt to establish that the informers were reliable. The officers identified these informers only as "people on the street" who were previously unknown to the officers and whose names they did not bother to ask because "there was no reason for it." They did not relate what information they received from these nameless individuals other than that there were "all sorts of gaming devices downstairs." (Emphasis supplied.)
We have held that the prosecution has not met its burden when an arresting officer "said no more than that someone (he did not say who) had told him something (he did not say what) about the petitioner." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97. Even where a search warrant is obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the mere fact of an assertion by an informer. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108. At least as much is required to support a search without a warrant. Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96. Since the respondent did not meet the burden of showing probable cause in this case, the motion to suppress should have been granted.
The conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would deny the petition for certiorari.