Case Name: PARISH v. HEDGES. (1)
Court: Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1909-10-15
Citations: 34 App. D.C. 20
Docket Number: No. 2050
Parties: PARISH v. HEDGES. (1)
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Volume: 34
Pages: 20–21

Head Matter:
PARISH v. HEDGES. (1)
Appeals; Citation; Waives.
1. Qucere,—whether the rule of court requiring the issuance and service upon the successful party of a citation on an appeal to this court applies to an interlocutory order from which an appeal has been specially allowed by this court, as well as to final judgments and decrees.
2. The acceptance of service by the appellee of the designation by the appellant of the parts of the record to be included in the transcript of the record on appeal is a waiver by the appellee of citation. (Following Leonard v. Rodda, 5 App. D. C. 256, and Dowling v. Buclcey, 26 App. D. C. 266.)
No. 2050.
Submitted October 15, 1909.
Decided October 15, 1909.
Hearing on a motion by the appellee to dismiss an appeal.
Denied.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry E. Davis and Mr. John E. Laskey for the motion.
Mr. Holmes Conrad and Mr. Leigh Robinson opposed.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Shepard
delivered the opinion of the Court:
Appellee, Henry C. Hedges, has moved to dismiss this appeal because of the failure to issue and serve a citation upon the allowance of the same. It is a special appeal from an interlocutory order entered in a probate proceeding, that was allowed by order of this court in the exercise of the discretion committed to it by law in such cases. It has been argued by appellant, Emily E. Parish, that the rule requiring citation in case of appeals applies only to final judgments and decrees, and not to appeals from interlocutory orders in a pending cause, because tbe parties are in court, and bound to take notice of all proceedings until tbe final termination of tbe suit. Certainly, the reason for requiring notice in tbe latter class of appeals is not so strong as in the first, but we deem it unnecessary to determine tbe question raised. Assuming tbe rule applies equally to both,, tbe motion, we think, is not well taken.
The object of tbe citation on appeal is to give notice to tbe appellee that an appeal has been taken. This notice be received when be accepted the service of the designation of tbe parts of the record to be included in tbe transcript. This acceptance of notice was bad without condition or objection, and therefore amounted to a waiver of tbe regular citation. Dowling v. Buckey, 26 App. D. C. 266; Leonard v. Rodda, 5 App. D. C. 256, 262.
The motion is denied.