Case Name: SICKLICK v. INTERURBAN HOME CO. (two cases)
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-04-29
Citations: 116 N.Y.S. 553
Docket Number: 
Parties: SICKLICK v. INTERURBAN HOME CO. (two cases).
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 116
Pages: 553–556

Head Matter:
SICKLICK v. INTERURBAN HOME CO. (two cases).
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
April 29, 1909.)
Fraud (§ 12 )—Fraudulent Representations—Liability.
False representations, by the agent of a vendor of lots several miles from a city and two miles from a railroad station, to a prospective purchaser, that the vendor was building cars and laying tracks, that he was building a station on the premises, that he had contracts to build a large number of houses, and that the vendor had employed one to lay sewers and erect lamps, though followed by promissory statements to the effect that the vendor would run a train between designated points in a short time, etc., were material representations of matters of fact on which the prospective purchaser could rely, and the latter, induced thereby to purchase the property, could recover any damages sustained.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 12.*] Lehman, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.
Actions by Lizzie Sicklick and by Anna Sicklick against the Interurban Home Company. From judgments for the respective plaintiffs, defendant in each case appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before GILDERSLEEVE, P. J., and SEABURY and LEHMAN, JJ.
J. Leon Brandmarker, for appellant.
Bogart & Bogart, for respondents.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SEABURY, J.
These actions were brought to recover money paid under contracts of sale of certain lots at Mt. Pleasant Heights, Westchester county. The plaintiffs' claims are based upon certain misrepresentations of existing facts which induced them to buy the lots owned by the defendant. The lots purchased were several miles from the city of New York and two miles from a railroad station. The statements made by the defendant, through its agents, and upon which the plaintiffs relied when they purchased the lots, were made with reference to the particular lots sold and the property immediately surrounding them.
The alleged false representations made to the plaintiffs when they purchased the property are as follows: That the agents of the defendant stated that "they were building the cars and laying the tracks"; that "they are widening the street already for the tracks"; that "they were tearing down a barn to build the station"; that "they are building a station right on the premises"; that "they showed a pack of papers; they got a hundred contracts in their pockets to build houses"; that "they had employed a man to lay sewers and erect lamps." These representations were made as to matters of fact, upon which the plaintiffs had a right to rely. That they were false the jury have found, with ample evidence to sustain the finding. That they were material, and greatly enhanced the value of the property in the eyes of a prospective purchaser, the recital of them, when considered in connection with the location of the property, shows. That they constituted the inducing cause, without which the contract of purchase would never have been made, I think the evidence clearly established.
The mere fact that the statements above set forth were reinforced by other statements promissory in their nature in no way weakens the plaintiffs' case. It was but natural for the defendant to promise that 100 houses would be built, after stating that it had given contracts to erect the houses; that a train "will run from the Battery to Mt. Pleasant Heights in a short time," after stating that a station was in the course of erection on the premises and that they were building the cars and laying the tracks; that there would be sewerage provided and lamps erected, after stating they had engaged a man to perform that work. As between the statement of existing facts and those which were promissory merely, it is clear that the plaintiffs relied upon the former, rather than upon those statements which were promissory in their nature.
The representations as to the facts were definite and certain, and were of such a character as to justify the plaintiffs in relying upon them. That the plaintiffs did rely upon them, and that they were false, and that the plaintiffs in consequence sustained damage, was established by the evidence and found by the verdict of the jury.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
GILDERSLEEVE, P. J" concurs.'