Case Name: Miner Spicer, for the use of Frederick A. Nash, vs. John Giselman and others
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 15 Ohio 338
Docket Number: 
Parties: Miner Spicer, for the use of Frederick A. Nash, vs. John Giselman and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 15
Pages: 338–344

Head Matter:
Miner Spicer, for the use of Frederick A. Nash, vs. John Giselman and others.
It is error to sustain a general demurrer to an entire declaration, containing one good count. ‘
A joint action, under the 43d section of the act of 1831, “ defining the duties of executors and administrators," (29 Ohio Laws, 229,) cannot be sustained against several heirs or devisees, where there is no joint contract, either express or implied.
This is a Writ or Error directed to the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County.
The original action was in assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts. The first count averred, that on the 29th day of December, 1835, Frederick Giselman, deceased, executed to the plaintiff his promissory note for $46, payable January 1, 1839, with interest; that said Giselman, on the first of September, 1839, died, without having paid the note; that on the 9th of September, 1839, administration upon his estate was granted to John Giselman, one of the defendants, by the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County; that on the 6th of September, 1842, said John Giselman filed his final account in the office of the clerk of said court; that at the April term thereof, 1843, he, in due form of law, settled with said court, when there was found in his hands, as administrator, the sum of $469.51, which he was ordered to distribute according to law. It further averred, that after the granting of letters of administration, and before the filing of said final account, the said note was not presented to the said administrator for allowance and payment, and, therefore, was not paid, nor any part thereof; that more than five years had elapsed since the death of the intestate; that the defendants were the heir's at law and distributees of the intestate, and having received assets of the estate of said Frederick, had, by force of the statute in such case made and provided, become liable to pay the plaintiff the amount of money in the note specified, according to the tenor and effect thereof, and being so liable, promised, &c.
In Bank.
Dec. Term, 1846.
The second count was the same in substance as the first, and the third was the usual common count for money had and received, &c.
The defendant demurred to the whole declaration, and the Court of Common Pleas sustained the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendants; to reverse which judgment, this writ of error was sued out.
Hand Nash, and Z. Snow, for Plaintiff in Error.
Belden &f Schaefer, for Defendants.

Opinion:
Birchard, J.
This suit was instituted under the 43d section of the act of 1831, (3 Chase's Stat. 1784,) and the question is, can a joint action be sustained against all of the defendants ? It is a general rule, that where there is no joint liability, there can be no joint action.
At common law, this action could not be prosecuted with effect. If it can be done under the statute, it must be because the statute will bear no other construction; for it is manifest that to make one of several heirs liable to an amount equal to an that had descended from his ancestor to a number óf heirs, simply because he had received a sniaH'portion of that anees-' tor's estate, would be unjust. The proposition is one at which-the mind instinctively revolts. ' _ - .
In a case where a prudent child, after the, settlement of the, estate, takes asmall legacy, say of one hdndred .dollars, and the bulk of the estate is distributed to other- legatees, to a large-amount, who squander it, it would be.hard indeed if a-creditor, who has slept on his right for five years, could afterwards come into-Court with- a, debt sufficient to -sweép.'the-whole estate of. the decedent, and-make .the-prudent legatee''responsible for moneys which have bee'n-squandered by the'improvident, and over which he had no control, A-majority of .the Court held, that the Legislature never Intended stich a result;, and,-if. it were necessary, would, unhesitatingly declare that; .if they did intend it, they.,had-not- the capacity of Accomplishing such intention. . The .constitution of, the .State,=as well as- principles-of' natural justice, have interposed insurmountable obstacles.,
These several'; defendants, each in'his- own right, and in severalty, as- heir,'-took whateverwas paid to 'them' by tli'e ;administrador, on the settlement of their ancestor's estate. Haying so taken,, they canñót be subjected to respond to-any-.creditor of the.'deceased ancestor,, in any form'of a'ction, to an amount beyond what each received.. The 43d section of the statute, by implication, makes that the. extent of the- liability.. But if. this form of action can be resorted to; and a' joint action -can be.máintained.against all the heirs of an estate, or all'the legatees of a- testator; a-joint judgment must bind'all, and each must become-subject to, the' entire payment... T hesitate not-to sav, that the doctrine which will produce'-such a. result is. so monstrous, that it is impossible tó suppose that it lurks' among the enactments of the statute.
Tt is. claimed that it is to be- found in these'words:" "But ' Such heirs -or. devisees'shall remain liable to the full extent'of' c the assets, by .them received from the estafe of their ancestor-. 1 or devisor, for the payment of all claims.against.the'estate of--. £ such ancestor or devisor; and any writ which could .be brought £ and sustained against such ancestor or devisor, were he alive, ° . / '£ may be brought and sustained against such heirs and devisees, ' after, the executor or administrator of the ancestor or devisor ' shall' have made final settlement with the Court, until the asaseis so received by such heirs or devise'es shall be exhausted."
The first and all important rule to be regarded in construing", a statute, is to have respect to its spirit rather than its letter. Manifestly the framer's of this section ,did not contemplate a violation of the plain rules-of natural justice.' They did not design to give to creditors the right to subject an heir, in any case, to an amount beyond the value ,of the (assets which that heir had received.. , The intent must be borne in mind in giving a construction to'their language; and if, literally ta^en that intent will be defeated, the words of the section must.be departed from., -We have before seen that a joint liability can. not arise from a separate receipt of property, and that a joint action cannot' be permitted when there1 is no joint liability; without subjecting the solvent to the payment of the debts of the improvidént, and that this, cannot be consistently with justice. The very right of the wholé matter would be., to subject each heir to the payment of the ancestor's debts to the amount of the assets that may have come to his hands; This was. all that the statuté.'meant. Tins could be dope by a separate suit against each; and therefore separate suits; are the- only suits provided for. where there has been no joint reception of the assets. The demurrer was, therefore, well taken .to the first and second counts of'the declaration; and had it been limited to those counts,'there would have been no error,in sustaining it. .The third count is the usual common count for money had and received, &c. To this count the demurrer was not well taken. It furnished no defence. Assuming to answer the whole declaration, and being insufficient'as to a part, it should have been overruled. The Court of Common Pleas in not over- . ruling it erred, and for that error their judgment' must be .reversed, » . •