Case Name: THE FREDERICK-TOWN SAVINGS INSTITUTION vs. JOHN L. MICHAEL
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1895-06-19
Citations: 81 Md. 487
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE FREDERICK-TOWN SAVINGS INSTITUTION vs. JOHN L. MICHAEL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 487–512

Head Matter:
THE FREDERICK-TOWN SAVINGS INSTITUTION vs. JOHN L. MICHAEL.
Insolvency — Discharge of Surety on Note by Acceptance of Mortgage and New Note — Preferences—Liability of Married Woman Signing Point Note with her Husband.
The plaintiff bank was the holder of promissory notes for money loaned to W. upon which the defendant was liable as surety. In response to plaintiff’s demand for the renewal, with additional security, of the notes, some of which, including the one sued on in this case, were overdue, W. gave to the plaintiff bank the joint note of himself and wife for the principal sum of his entire indebtedness, and executed a mortgage to the bank of his real estate to secure the payment thereof, in which his wife united; and thereupon the former notes were delivered by the plaintiff to W. The bank knew at the time that W. had failed to pay his debts at maturity. Within four months after this transaction W. applied for the benefit of the insolvent law, and upon a bill filed by his trustee in insolvency, the mortgage from W. and wife to the plaintiff was vacated and annulled, as being a preference under the insolvent law, and it was decreed that the original promissory notes should ’be returned to the plaintiff bank. This action was instituted on one of them against W. and the defendant, and the latter pleaded payment and satisfaction. Held,
i st. That since the plaintiff had voluntarily accepted the note and mortgage of W. and his wife in lieu of the note sued on, and with knowledge of W’s. precarious financial condition, the liability of the defendant as surety was extinguished.
2nd. That although the mortgage was vacated as a fraudulent preference under the insolvent law, yet the note secured by it remained valid, and the liability of W’s. wife as joint maker thereof was unaffected.
A married woman may become surety on a note executed by her jointly with her husband, and in such case it is not necessary, in order to hold her liable, that the consideration of the contract should enure to her benefit.
Appeal from a pro forma judgment of the Circuit Court for Frederick County. This was an action of assumpsit by the appellant against the appellee and Wm. Wilcoxon, sur viving makers of the following promissory note: “ Frederick, Md., Aug. 4, ’92. Six months after date, we jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of the Frederick-Town Savings Institution, five thousand dollars, for value received, negotiable and payable at the Frederick-Town Savings Institution.” (Signed), Wm. Wilcoxon, Andrew J. Wilcoxon, Jno. L. Michael. The defendant, Michael, filed the general issue plea and a special plea, “that before this action Wm. Wilcoxon, who was the principal maker of said note, satisfied and discharged the plaintiff’s .claim by payment.” This plea was traversed by the plaintiff and issue joined. Judgment by default was entered against Wilcoxon, subject to his discharge in insolvency.
The evidence showed that in March, 1893, W. Wilcoxon, a merchant and trader, was indebted to the appellant bank in the sum of $11,300, upon four promissory notes, two of which were not then due, and the other two, including the note sued on in this case, were overdue. On March 16, 1893, he was notified by the bank that the overdue notes must be renewed with additional security before the 23rd of that month, this notice being a repetition of a previous demand for renewal with additional security. On March 21, 1893, Wilcoxon gave to the bank the joint note of himself and wife for the said sum of $11,300, payable, six months after date, and executed a mortgage to the bank of certain real estate owned by him to secure the payment of the same. At the same time Wilcoxon was credited in his account with the plaintiff bank with $ 11,300, the face of the new note, and with a check for $227.64, drawn on another bank. The sum of $115.86 was on that day the balance to the credit of Wilcoxon on the books of the plaintiff. He at once gave his check, payable to the plaintiff, against these credits, for $11,643.50, which sum represehted the aggregate amount .of the four promissory notes, both due and unmatured, six months interest in advance, at five per cent., on the mortgage debt, and accrued interest on the overdue notes. This check closed and exactly balanced his account current with the plaintiff
The old notes thus taken up, including the one which is the cause of action in this case, were then delivered to Wilcoxon. At the time of this transaction it was agreed between Wilcoxon and the bank that the money loaned on said mortgage note was to be applied solely to the payment of his indebtedness to the bank.
On May 6, 1893, within four months after the execution of said mortgage, Wilcoxon applied for the benefit of the insolvent law of the State of Maryland. On the 24th of the same month his trustees in insolvency filed a bill in equity against the Savings Institution and Wilcoxon and his wife, setting forth the above transaction and alleging that at the time of the execution of the said note and mortgage for $ 11,300, and for a long period prior thereto, the said Wilcoxon was a merchant, manufacturer and trader, and was insolvent, and so continued up to the time of filing his application for the benefit of the insolvent laws of Maryland; that at the time of the execution of the said note and mortgage no money was bona fide loaned or paid by the Savings Institution to Wilcoxon, but the consideration of the same was wholly debts before that time owing to the Savings Institution, and said note, and mortgage which was given to secure said note, were intended for no other purpose than to pay and secure to be paid the said four notes ; that accordingly, immediately upon the execution and delivery of said note and mortgage for $11,300, and upon the receipt of the cash paid by said Wilcoxon, the Savings Institution delivered up to Wilcoxon the said four notes, which were then in the possession of the trustees in insolvency; that the mortgage given to secure the payment of said note for $11,300 and the lien thereby created was a preference in favor of said Savings Institution over other creditors of Wilcoxon, and that the same was void under the laws of Maryland. (Code, Art. 47, sec. 14, as amended by the Act of 1890, ch. 364.)
Upon this bill the Circuit Court for Frederick County, in Equity, decreed that the said mortgage executed by Wilcoxon and wife to the Savings Institution be set aside and declared null by reason of its being a preference prohibited by the insolvent laws of Maryland; that the said Savings Institution should pay to the trustees in insolvency the sum of $343.50, less the sum of $115.86, and that the Clerk of the Court should deliver to the Savings Institution the four promissory notes above mentioned. It was subsequently decreed in another equity case, between the same parties, that the dower interest of the wife of Wilcoxon in the land mortgaged by him and her to the Savings Institution did not pass to the mortgagee, but remained in' her. No appeal was taken from the decrees, and on September 20, 1894, 'this action was institued.
At the trial the first exception was taken to the refusal of the Court, pro fo7'i7ta, to admit in evidence the bill in equity filed by the trustees .in insolvency, the answer of the Savings Institution, and the opinion and decree of the Court thereon. ‘The second exception was taken to a similar ruling of the Court, refusing to admit evidence by the plaintiff showing that in obedience to the decree in said cause in equity, the said note for $5,000, the cause of action in this case, was delivered back to the plaintiff, and that plaintiff paid to the trustees in insolvency of Wilcoxon the sum of $227.64. The third exception was taken to'th& pro fo7'77ia ruling of the Court, that under the pleadings and evidence the verdict must be for the defendant.
The cause was argued at January Term, 1895, before Robinson, C. J., Bryan, McSherry, Briscoe, Page and Roberts, JJ., and was subsequently, under ah order of the Court, re-argued at April Term, 1895, on notes filed by counsel.
Charles W. Ross and John S. Newman for the appellant.
If the contention of the appellee is correct, that is, if the contract in this case is valid so as to release the sureties on the original notes, and is such simply because the note* of Wilcoxon and wife has not been declared void, then the dtp pellant will be adjudged to have accepted said note in payment when the same does not bear interest, and no interest has been paid on it; for the very money which was paid as interest, in the shape of discount, has been recovered back by the trustees of Wilcoxon, in insolvency.
This we consider a very important circumstance in this case. Surely the appellant never agreed to accept a note for the sum of eleven thousand three hundred dollars, payable six months after date, in payment of the original indebtedness, and make the principal a present of the interest. Is it not, therefore, true that when the appellant was decreed to refund the interest, that avoided that portion of the contract, the same as setting aside the mortgage avoided the other portion ? Is not the appellant, the bank, therefore entitled to be restored to its former position.
So strongly did this transaction impress the Circuit Court for Frederick County, that in its opinion indicating the'equity case, it said : “ Those original notes uncancelled and unpaid are here in Court. The sureties on them have not been prejudiced or injzired (as far as the record discloses) by the execution and delivery of the mortgage, as the mortgage must fall by reason of the inexorable mandate of the statute ; though there is no taint or suggestion of fraud in the conduct of the bank, it is only-just and equitable that the bank should be restored to the position which it held when the mortgage was given, March, 1893. This will injure no one. Should the sureties be obliged to pay the notes they will merely discharge the obligation they voluntarily assumed when they signed them. Whatever loss may fall upon them will be a loss resulting from their own contract and not from any conduct of the bank.”
But is the note for the sum of eleven thousand three hundred dollars, executed by William Wilcoxon, with Elizabeth Wilcoxon as surety, according to the contention of appellee, a valid note or contract? For to constitute a novation, the new contract must be a valid one. In every novation there are four essential requisites : First, a previous valid obligation ; second, the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; third, the extinguishment of the old contract ; fourth, the validity of the new one. Clark v. Billings, 59 Ind. 508 ; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 16 (Novation), pg. 864, and cases there cited. Where there is a substitution of a new contract for an old one, the new contract must be a valid one, upon which the creditor can have his remedy. Guichard v. Brande, 57 Wis. 534; Sprycher v. Werner, 74 Wis. 456.
In addition, then, to the matters hereinbefore referred to, in considering the validity of the note for $11,300 made by Wilcoxon and wife, it becomes necessary to consider the validity of the undertaking of Elizabeth Wilcoxon, for if she is not bound under her contract as surety, the note is not “ one upon which the creditor can have his remedy.” What then was her contract ? Was it not that she signed the note as surety on the condition that the same would be secured by a conveyance to the appellant of certain property by way of mortgage? This, we submit, was her undertaking, an undertaking of which the payee and appellant at the time had knowledge.
A surety who has contracted to become so on the understanding that he is to be co-surety with another, is wholly released if the intended co-surety does not execute., Evans v. Blenridge, 8 DeG. M. & G. 100. If, then, the liability of Elizabeth Wilcoxon was assumed with the full knowledge and understanding on the part of the payee (the appellant bank) and of Wilcoxon, the principal maker, that the said note of William Wilcoxon for the sum of eleven thousand three hundred dollars would be secured by a mortgage conveying certain property, which conveyance would result to her benefit as surety on said note (because it is a well settled principle of law, that any security taken by the principal would revert or belong to the surety on payment of the debt thereby secured by the surety), and this very conveyance of property, which was given to secure this debt, was rendered null and void by operation of law and such security thereby lost, would not Elizabeth Wilcoxon, under such circumstances, be discharged from liability, and could the bank maintain an action against her as surety ? The inducement for her to become surety on said note having been rendered utterly null and void, how can it be said that she is still liable on the note ? If, then, no action can be maintained against her upon the ground that her contract of suretyship has been violated, how can it be successfully maintained that the said note is a novation of the original indebtedness. The appellant therefore insists that Elizabeth Wilcoxon is not bound by her contract of suretyship on the said note.
J. C. Motter and William P. Maulsby, Jr., for the appellee.
At the time the transaction occurred, who doubted but. that the note had been fully paid and satisfied, absolutely and unqualifiedly extinguished without further life or vitality. If Michael, the appellee, had gone to the appellant after the 2ist day of March, 1893, and asked for the note in question, it would have been promptly explained to him that the note had been paid and delivered up to Wilcoxon ; that he was no longer responsible to the appellant on said note, and he would have gone thence with the comforting assurance that he was forever relieved of that heavy financial responsibility. Our brothers contend that it would have been a mere delusion, however. If the new note, as an actual fact, was discounted (the appellant says it was), and a part of the proceeds of that note were applied to the payment of the note in question, and the old note was delivered up as paid (which is admitted by the appellant), it is fully discharged and forever extinguished as against the appellee, and the plea of payment is sustained. Bank of New Windsor v. Ecker, Executor, 59 Md. 304 — 5 ; U. S. v. Thompson, 33 Md. 575 ; Compton v. Patterson, 28 South Carolina, 115.
If there was a valid binding contract made between appellant and Wilcoxon or his wife on March 21st, 1893, the day of extension of note and mortgage for $11,300, then the surety, Michael, appellee, was discharged, and the judgment must be affirmed, because such a contract was a variance from the contract appellee made with appellant when he became surety on $5,000 note, and a variance made without appellee’s consent. Appellee had a right to have the letter of his contract with appellant as surety on $5,000 note observed ; a departure from this contract discharged him. 31 Md. 131 ; 47 Md. 190; 9 Wheaton, 680.
The appellant knew that Wilcoxon was a trader and merchant; he kept his account as such with appellant; the proceeds of this $5,000 note, when originally discounted for him, had gone into this very account, as also the other notes, the sum of whi.ch made up the indebtedness of $11,300 — besides which he carried on business openly and publicly as a merchant and trader in the very town of appellant, having a store within two blocks of' appellant’s bank. We submit that it knew Wilcoxon was insolvent at date of mortgage, by its own dealings with him. Knew it, not suspected or had good reason to believe, but knew it.
Now, with this knowledge of law and fact, what was the contract made March 21st, 1893 ? " We, appellant, will loan you $11,300, the exact amount owing us by you, upon your giving us two securities, the one your wife as a security on the note ; we know you are a trader, that you are insolvent, that the mortgage creates a preference, that this preference is in fraud of insolvent law, that if insolvent proceedings are had in four months, this preference will be set aside, but we equally know, that if no proceedings are had within four months, it will remain good. It is perfectly valid and binding now, and we will take the risk of it remaining good. We get a present lien, we get the chance ■of it remaining unassailed. This chance we take, this con tingency we accept. We submit that this is the fair statement of the contract with the conditions expressed in language which were in law and fact necessarily implied in the contract of March 21st. The mortgage was then made valid and binding. It would remain so, unless a contingency happened, viz., unless proceedings in insolvency were had within four months. Whether this contingency would or would not happen, was the risk or chance the appellant took — the chance that it would not happen. “ If parties make contracts upon contingencies equally uncertain to both of them, or with equal means of information, upon what grounds can Courts undertake to set them aside ? ”
But in another view, independently of the foregoing, the contract of March 21st, 1893, extended the time for the payment of the $5,000 note, superseded the contract made by appellee as surety on this note, by the mortgage of March 21st, and thus discharged the surety. Any extension of time of payment by creditor by valid contract with principal debtor, by which the rights of 'surety during the time thus extended are suspended, discharges the surety. 64 New York, 457. Of course the reason is plain; anything which prevents the right of surety to protect himself, done by creditor, violates the contract made between creditor and surety and discharges surety. “ Any dealings with the principal debtor by the creditor, which amount to a departure from the contract by which the surety is to be bound and which by possibility might materially vary or enlarge the latter’s liability without his assent, discharges the surety.” Mayhew v. Boyd, 5 Md. 102.
And if we are wrong in this contention that the mortgage conveyed the potential dower right of Mrs. Wilcoxon, which was a sufficient consideration for the contract for the 6 months extension given in mortgage, if we are wrong in all this, we submit that, besides and outside the mortgage the appellant received in the contract of March 21st full consideration to support the contract; that the same was a valid and binding one ; and if so, that the surety, appellee, was discharged. What did appellant receive ? He got two securities for his debt; the one the liability of Mrs. Wilcoxon, the other the mortgage. These were the very securities he asked, with the taking of which appellee had nothing to do ; one of the securities, the mortgage, upon the hypothesis of this view, fails, is void .from the beginning, but the other one, Mrs. Wilcoxon, is not void. She remains liable; the appellant has a note for $11,3000 with one security who is bound. Can this be denied ? Surely the note is not a preference ; the note is but the sum of the old debt. So far as the creditors of insolvent are concerned, they are no worse off for the $ 11,300 note than before it was made, the preference has been avoided, viz., the mortgage, but the note is in full force. Mrs. Wilcoxon is not asking to be relieved from the note ; the appellant, who took her as the surety, asks it; but why ? upon what ground ? She was not a necessary party to the note, even though a desirable one to the mortgage, yet they took her. She was and is for any reason that we have heard suggested bound by her position as surety on the note. There has been no bill filed by the trustees in insolvency asking to have note declared null. So far as the' law goes, we.submit the note is in full force and vigor, a legal, binding obligation.

Opinion:
Roberts, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.''
The record of this appeal contains three exceptions, two of which relate to the admissibility of the proof offered, and one to the rulings of the Court below in rejecting the prayers of the plaintiff, and granting that of the defendant. The questions are interesting and important, not only on account of the large sum involved, as of the principles of law invoked, and which we are now called upon to consider and apply. This is an action brought upon a promissory note in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. The note sued upon is as follows:
$5,000.00. " Frederick, Md., Aug. 4th, 1892.
Six months after date we jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of the Frederick-Town Savings Institution, five thousand dollars for value received, negotiable and payable at the Frederick-Town Savings Institution. Wm. Wilcoxon, Andrew J. Wilcoxon, John L. Michael."
The principal question in the case arises on the issue taken on the replication to the second plea. The plea states that William Wilcoxon, the principal in said note, satisfied and discharged the same by payment before suit brought thereon. It is not, however, a technical question of pleading which we are called upon to decide. The material inquiry is, did said Wilcoxon satisfy and discharge said note by payment in such manner as to relieve the appellee, Michael, from further liability as surety thereon. This is the plain issue presented and which we are now to determine. The facts show;n by the record, touching the question of payment pleaded by the appellee, are that the appellant bank was, on the 21st of March, 1893, the holder of four notes of said Wilcoxon and sureties variously dated, and for various sums, and which together aggregated the sum of $11,300. The note sued on was one of the four making up said last mentioned sum. Being thus indebted and repeatedly pressed by the appellant for additional security to that then held by it, Wilcoxon and wife agreed to give to the. appellant their note for the sum of $11,300.00, secured by mortgage on his real estate. This offer was accepted by the appellant without qualification or condition. The mortgage was thereupon executed and delivered to the appellant, and the new note then discounted by it. From the proceeds of the said new note the indebtedness of said Wilcoxon, evidenced by said four notes, was paid and the same were then delivered by the appellant to said Wilcoxon. Within four months after the execution of said mortgage Wilcoxon applied for the benefit of the insolvent law of the State of Maryland, and was adjudged to be insolvent. Trustees having been selected, under the provisions of the law, they filed, with the sanction of the Court, a bill in equity, to set aside said mortgage, as giving to the appellant a fraudulent preference under the provisions of the insolvent laws. Wilcoxon being a merchant or trader, and found to be insolvent at the time of the execution and delivery of the mortgage, the Court decreed it to be an unlawful pref erence and struck down the same. An important question arises here as to the effect resulting from depriving said mortgage of its character as a legal preference. It is contended by the appellant that the action of the Court in the insolvency proceedings not only deprived said mortgage of its quality as a lien or- preference in the distribution of the assets of the insolvent estate of Wilcoxon, but that such action extinguished the liability of the surety in said note, for the payment of which the mortgage was given to secure. We have been referred to many cases touching the liability of sureties as to what constitutes payment and what does not, and we fully concur in the doctrine announced thereon. This, however, is not a case where in the renewal of a note the signature of the surety has been subsequently ascertained to be a forgery. In such a case, the renewal is invalid, and does not operate as a payment of the original note; nor does it effect an extinguishment of the right of action thereon. This is the almost universal concession of the declared doctrine of the Courts in England and in this country. There is, however, but small analogy between the case of a forged signature to a note and the case now under consideration. In the one instance, as far as the surety is concerned, the note is a nullity; in the other, which is the case now before us, we have a mortgage given to secure a perfectly valid note, but in consequence of the provisions of the insolvent law, the mortgage is not allowed to stand as a legal preference in the appellant's favor in the distribution of the assets of the insolvent estate, only, however, because it has been executed and recorded within the inhibited period contained in the statute. This view of the law in no sense contravenes the doctrine of the cases of Goodrich v. Trucy, 43 Vt. 314; Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455 ; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5 Conn. 71.
This case was, by agreement of counsel, tried before the Court below without the intervention of a jury. The facts contained in the record are fully and satisfactorily stated by the reporter in his notes placed at the head of this case. The first exception taken by the appellant relates to the admissibility in evidence of the record of proceedings in equity cause No. 6128, on the docket of the Circuit Court for Frederick County, to which the appellee was not a party, and in no wise concluded from making in this action any defense which he had the legal right to interpose. This exception brings up for consideration the primary and leading question on this appeal: Has the appellee, by the action of Wilcoxon, been discharged of liability as surety on the note sued upon?
It will be necessary to consider, in the first place, the legal attributes of the joint note of Wilcoxon and wife for the sum of $ 11,300, which the appellant discounted for the purpose of paying the four notes of Wilcoxon and sureties,! at the time held by the appellant, and which were delivered to Wilcoxon when the note of himself and wife had passed to the possession of the appellant. We may have occasion later on to examine some of the consequences attending the execution of the mortgage. But let us inquire as to the legal status of the note of Wilcoxon and wife, after the mortgage had been declared an illegal and fraudulent preference. It was not a necessary incident to the execution of a valid mortgage, that a note of any kind should have been given. The mortgage would have been equally valid without it, and if given, it was only collateral to the note; and the wife was in no sense a necessary party to the note. The almost universal practice in this State has been for the wife to join with her husband in the execution of the mortgage, for the sole purpose of releasing and conveying her potential right of dower; but to the accomplishment of this purpose it was in no respect essential that she should join in the making of the note. Since the passage of the Act of 1872, ch. 270, (Code, Art. 45, sec. 2), by which the wife is authorized jointly with her husband to contract in writing on any note, bill of exchange, &c., there is a manifest object to be obtained in having the wife join in the note as well as the mortgage, especially if she be seized or possessed of property.
As already stated, the appellant was urging upon Wilcoxon to give additional security for the notes which were already in the possession of the bank, and yet, as soon as the new. note and mortgage were delivered to the bank, it voluntarily surrendered to Wilcoxon the. four notes on which he was originally indebted.
Is it not a reasonable inference that the appellant was sufficiently well satisfied with the character of the new security which it had taken in payment of the original indebtedness of Wilcoxon on said four notes as to cause it, of its own motion, and not otherwise, to part with the possession of the four notes by delivering up the same to Wilcoxon, so that the new note and mortgage were in no just sense additional security? But there is another suggestive fact in the record which the testimony makes clear, and that is, the appellant cannot, under the circumstances of the case, justly-claim to have been without notice of the financial status of Wilcoxon, and his liability to be declared an insolvent within four months of the execution of the mortgage. The appellant had in its possession at that time, four notes, covering an indebtedness of $i 1,300, and each of. said notes was for money'borrowed by Wilcoxon during the year 1892. These notes, or most of them, had been renewed from time to time and were long past due, yet Wilcoxon had not, to the 21st of March, 1893, the date of said mortgage, paid one farthing in discharge of the principal sums constituting his indebtedness on said notes. The doctrine is well recognized that insolvency may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a transaction. If the appellant knew that Wilcoxon was a trader and indebted to it in the .sum of $11,300, and that he had for nearly two years failed to pay his notes at maturity, in the ordinary course of business, and further knew that he had, within four months -of the execution of the mortgage, suspended payment of his negotiable paper, and had failed to resume payment thereof within twenty days thereafter, did not these circumstances constitute reasonable cause from which the bank was justi fied in believing that Wilcoxon's business credit and pecuniary standing were bad, and such as would warrant the belief on the part of the bank that if it accepted a mortgage from him to secure itself, he would be liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of the insolvent laws ? If with knowledge of the facts recited, and we cannot escape the conviction based upon the testimony in the record, that the appellant had such knowledge, it then delivered up the four original notes to Wilcoxon, the appellant has taken a venture, the consequences of which it must accept. We are, after careful consideration, unable to lend our sanction to the theory advanced, that in striking down the mortgage as a fraudulent preference under our insolvent laws, the note, which the mortgage was given to-secure, must also abide the same result. We do not think, upon principle or authority, that any such conclusion follows'frbm the premises stated. In Allers v. Forbes, 59 Md. 376, which was an action brought by Forbes against Allers. and wife to recover on three promisory notes signed by them as joint makers, the husband pleaded in his own behalf, that he had been discharged under the insolvent laws, and for a further plea the defendant and wife pleaded " that by the discharge of the husband, they were jointly and severally discharged from all liability on account of said notes." Judge Miller, delivering the opinion of this Court, said: " We can discover no possible reason why the discharge of her husband under the insolvent laws should release her and her property. Her property does not pass to his trustee, nor are her rights therein in any way affected by his insolvency. The statute makes her stand, with respect to the obligations so signed by her, in the same position as any other party so signing them would stand." The same conclusion was reached by Vice Chancellor Hall on a similar state of facts in' construing the English married woman's property Act of 1870, in the case of Davies v. Jenkins, L. R., 6 Chancery Division, 728. We have referred o these cases with but one purpose in view, and that is to ascertain the legal status of the wife, as affected by her husband's insolvency, in a case like the present, where she has jointly with her husband executed a note.
There is nothing in the record to show whether Mrs. Wilcoxon is possessed of property or not, and there can be no just reason assigned why the appellant should be deprived of its indisputable right to proceed against her. If it had been the intention of the parties to controvert the responsibility of Mrs. Wilcoxon as surety on said note, it was their privilege to have done so at the trial below. But this they did not do, and without indulging in speculation as to her financial ability or looking to the consequences, as they may affect either party to this cause, we must apply the law as we find it. It is well-established law in this State, that a married woman is competent to become surety on'a note which she has signed jointly with her husband, and it is wholly immaterial whether she has separate property or not. In some of the States where the laws relating to married women have undergone changes of like character with our own, there have been well-considered decisions of the Courts of those States holding femmes covert liable to the same extent announced by this Court. It has been argued that the note is void as against the wife, because there is no consideration to bind. her. A different view is, however, taken by Chief Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion of the Court in Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108. He says : " Before the statute of 1874, ch. 184, the female defendant would not have been liable in either of those cases, because contracts could only be made by a married woman in reference to her separate property, business or earnings. But this statute has removed that restriction and in the broadest terms enables a married woman to make contracts, oral and written, sealed and unsealed, in the same manner as if she were sole, and does not require that the consideration of her contracts should enure to her own benefit." We have given careful examination and consideration to the questions presented by this appeal, and finding no error in the rulings of the Court below, we must affirm the same.
(Decided June 19th, 1895.)
Judgment affirmed with costs.