Case Name: Robert TRIPLETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-01-30
Citations: 709 So. 2d 107
Docket Number: No. 96-3467
Parties: Robert TRIPLETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 709
Pages: 107–112

Head Matter:
Robert TRIPLETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-3467.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 30, 1998.
Order Certifying Question on Rehearing May 8, 1998.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Stephanie H. Park, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David H. Foxman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, Robert Triplett ["Triplett"], seeks review of an order of restitution. We reverse.
Triplett pled nolo contendere to the charge of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries. After his truck struck the rear of a vehicle stopped at a traffic light, he made a U-turn and sped away. The occupants of the vehicle suffered injuries in the collision, as did the occupant of the vehicle struck by the ear struck by Triplett's vehicle. In sentencing Triplett for leaving the scene, the court imposed restitution for personal injury and property damages sustained in the collision.
In 1993, the legislature amended section 775.089(l)(a), Florida Statutes, to require restitution for: "1. Damages or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense; and 2. Damages or loss related to the defendant's criminal episode...." The state argues that, by applying subsection 2, the damages were "related" to Triplett's "criminal episode" within the meaning of subsection 2.
The precise question presented in this case is whether a person whose only criminal offense is the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury may be assessed restitution for damage caused by the preceding collision. It is clear that if the same driver had committed the same traffic infraction committed by Triplett and had caused an accident resulting in personal injury or property damage, but had not left the scene, he could not he assessed restitution. Moreover, in Longshore v. State, 655 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), a case also decided under the 1993 version of the statute, we held that a motorcyclist who fled the scene of an accident he caused was not liable to pay restitution to the person injured in the accident. "The fact that the accident that preceded the commission of the offense was Longshore's fault is not a legal basis to order restitution." Id. at 1139. The criminal episode in this case did not commence until Triplett elected an affirmative course of action in violation of the criminal laws of this state (leaving the scene) after he became aware that personal injury had occurred in the collision. State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223 (Fla.1997). If there were any evidence in this record that the victim's injuries or damages were exacerbated by the lack of immediate assistance due to Triplett's criminal violation of leaving the scene, there might be an argument for restitution- to that extent. But there is no such evidence.
The concurring opinion of Judge Harris suggests that the 1993 amendment must be construed to have superseded State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988). More likely, however, the true purpose of the amendment was to deal with the line of cases that limited restitution to the exact crime to which a criminal defendant actually pled, even though several crimes (or greater crimes) were committed as part of the criminal episode. See Hebert v. State, 600 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), approved, 614 So.2d 493 (Fla.1993); L.A.R. v. State, 563 So.2d 836 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The companion amendment adding subsection (b)2 to the same statute supports this interpretation.
The correct test for restitution is whether "but for" the criminal episode, the damages would have been incurred by the victim. Glaubius v. State, 688 So.2d 913, 915 (Fla.1997). Here, because the damages were already incurred before Triplett undertook to commit a criminal offense, no restitution is due.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. The record contains the restitution order but no amounts are contained in the record before this court.
. The state's theory of "relatedness" is that "if appellant had not caused the accident, there would not have been a scene for him to leave." This argument is only true in one sense. There could have been a scene for Triplett to leave even if he had not been at fault. For purposes of section 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), it did not matter if he caused the accident. Section 316.027(l)(a) prohibits the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident from leaving the scene. If the state's argument were correct that leaving the scene of an accident is enough to create the requisite "relation" to the accident for purposes of the restitution statute, restitution would be due even if the accident were not the fault of the person who leaves the scene. In any event, though "fault" was not a contested issue in this restitution proceeding, it is likely to be in others. The criminal courts are ill-equipped to litigate fault in automobile accident cases, especially in rear end collision cases. The place to determine the injured party's right to receive damages is in a civil action.
. One panel of this court has gone so far as to rule that damages resulting from an accident caused by a defendant charged with driving with a suspended license could not be assessed as restitution. Cheek v. State, 700 So.2d 731 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Either under the causation test or the criminal episode test, however, an argument can be made that driving without a legal right either caused the accident or began the criminal episode during which the accident occurred.