Case Name: HILL et al. v. REYNOLDS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-05-08
Citations: 104 N.Y.S. 303
Docket Number: 
Parties: HILL et al. v. REYNOLDS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 104
Pages: 303–307

Head Matter:
(119 App. Div. 689)
HILL et al. v. REYNOLDS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 8, 1907.)
Reference—Grounds for.
Where the primary purpose of an action is to obtain an accounting, and it appears that the trial will require examination of a long account as to several of the causes of action set forth in the complaint, the fact that one of the causes of action may be regarded as calling for a determination of the rights of the parties, independent of the state of their accounts, does not deprive the court of the power to refer.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 42, Reference, §§ 13, 21, 23.]
Smith, P. J., and Cochrane, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Schuyler County.
Action by George G. Hill and another against George G. Reynolds and others. From an order of reference made on plaintiffs’ application, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
The plaintiffs allege for a first cause of action that in December, 1902, they were and now are the owners of the lands described in the complaint; that December 15, 1902, they entered into a written agreement with the defendant George G. Reynolds, wherein they authorized him to drill a well for the purpose of obtaining natural gas, and he agreed to give to the plaintiff “one-tenth part of all moneys received from the sale of said gas which shall be taken from said well besides gas enough from said well to run and operate the sanitarium” ; that a well was drilled; that the contract was assigned to the defendant the Consumers’ Natural Gas Comapny; that a large amount of gas was obtained and sold, and that the defendants have neglected and refused to account for the same or the proceeds thereof or to pay the plaintiff therefor. It was further alleged that in February, 1905, the company executed to the defendant Samuel G. H. Turner, as trustee, a mortgage to secure the payment of bonds to the amount of $25,000, and that said mortgage purports to cover all its property rights and franchises.
The second cause of action alleges, among other things, that the agreement was without consideration, unreasonable, impossible of fulfillment and void, that the defendants entered upon plaintiff’s lands without any right or authority and took and appropriated the gas from plaintiff’s well, and that the amount so taken or the proceeds thereof cannot be ascertained without an accounting.
The third cause of action alleges another agreement by which the plaintiffs were to have the sole ownership, use, and benefit of the well in question and all the gas produced therefrom; that more than 100,009,000 cubic feet of gas have been obtained and appropriated to the use of the defendants, and they have refused to account to the plaintiffs therefor.
For a fourth cause of action the plaintiffs allege that they revoked and rescinded the original agreement on the 2d day of April, 1906, on account of the failure of the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs their portion of the money received from the sale of gas, and that, notwithstanding the revocation and rescission, the defendants have since taken and appropriated the gas from plaintiffs’ well without right or authority, and refused to account to the plaintiffs therefor.
The relief prayed for is that the defendants account to the plaintiffs for all the gas taken or received and for the proceeds of the sales, and that they be adjudged to pay such sum in the premises as may be just and proper. The answers admit the execution of the lease; that it was assigned to the defendant company, which assumed all the obligations of the lessee; that the bonds were issued, the well drilled, and natural gas obtained; and “that the said defendants on or about the 1st day of October, 1904, commenced and did operate said well and had control and possession thereof and took and received certain quantities of gas therefrom.”
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCH-RANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
George G. Reynolds, for appellants.
Irving W. Cole, for respondents.

Opinion:
SEWELL, J.
It is plain that the primary purpose of this action is to obtain an accounting, and that the trial will require the examination of a long account as to three of the causes of action set forth in the complaint. The fact that the second cause of action may be regarded as calling for a determination of the rights of the parties independent of the state of their accounts did not deprive the court of the power to refer.
It has been repeatedly held that, where one count or one cause of action requires the examination of a long account, the action is referable. Whitaker v. Desfosse, 7 Bosw. 678; Goodyear v. Brooks, 2 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 296; Batchelor v. Albany Ins. Co., 6 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 240; Place v. Chesebrough, 4 Hun, 577; Connor v. Jackson, 53 App. Div. 322, 65 N. Y. Supp. 693. The entire claim of the plaintiffs could have been properly stated as a single cause of action, and thus have avoided any objection on account of the division into different causes of action.
Hilton v. Hughes, 5 App. Div. 226, 39 N. Y. Supp. 204, and Jordan v. Underhill, 71 App. Div. 559, 76 N. Y. Supp. 95, differ materially from the case at bar. In each of these cases the right of the plaintiff to an accounting was denied, and depended upon the determination of other questions. Neither is the case of C. & C. Electric Company v. Walker Co., 35 App. Div. 426, 54 N. Y. Supp. 810, also relied upon by the defendants,' an authority upon this appeal. In that action the account was not the immediate object of the action or directly involved, and there was no trust or fiduciary relation between the parties. This case has all the referable qualities. The facts entitling the plaintiffs to an accounting are substantially conceded. The account is complicated. There is need of a discovery, and by force of the contract relations of a fiduciary nature existed between the parties.
I am of the opinion that the granting of the order of reference was a matter for the exercise of the discretion of the court, and that the order should be affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur except SMITH, P. J., and COCHRANE, J., who dissent.