Case Name: Emily Laverty, Respondent, v. The Interurban Street Railway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-02
Citations: 49 Misc. 510
Docket Number: 
Parties: Emily Laverty, Respondent, v. The Interurban Street Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 510–513

Head Matter:
Emily Laverty, Respondent, v. The Interurban Street Railway Company, Appellant.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
February, 1906.)
Carriers — Carriage of passengers — Liability for personal injuries to passengers — Duties with regard to setting down passengers — Starting car while passenger is alighting.
Where, in an action for personal injuries alleged to have been received by a passenger while alighting from a street car, it appears from plaintiff’s own testimony that she started to get off the. car without any signal to the conductor, that the car stopped and, as she was about to descend from the rear platform, the car suddenly started and she fell and was injured; and the uncontradicted evidence shows that the conductor at the time was in the car collecting fares, and there is nothing to indicate that either he or the motorman knew of plaintiff’s intention to get off the car, which hau not reached its regular stopping place; and it appears that, while the motorman was coming to a slow down, until a car standing in. front should start, the car in front started and he put on a little power to get to the stopping place; a quick start, under such circumstances, was not of itself negligence; and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the City Court of the city of Hew York in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial had at Trial Term before the court and a jury.
Henry A. Robinson (Bayard H. Ames of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas J. O’Heill, for respondent.

Opinion:
Giegerich, J.
The action is to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on the evening of the 13th day of April, 1903, while alighting from one of the defendant's cars.
According to the plaintiff's own testimony, she started to get off the car without any signal to the conductor. She claims the car stopped and as she was about to descend, or in the act of descending from the rear platform, the car started suddenly and she fell and was injured.
By other evidence, which is uncontradicted, it is shown that the conductor, at the time, was in the car collecting fares and transfers.
There is nothing to indicate that either he or the motorman knew of the plaintiff's intention to get off the car. At the close of the case the plaintiff testified: "There is the regular transfer station and I know that, and that car stopped without notice ". She docs not, however, state that the car had yet reached its regular stopping place. The contrary seems to have been the fact.
The witness Sinclair fairly well explained the situation, and his testimony shows not only that the car had not yet reached its regular stopping point, but why it slowed down, or, if we accept the testimony of the plaintiff and her witness, stopped, where it did. Sinclair testified: "I looked out to see if it was near the stopping place at Eighth Avenue Circle, and I saw a car standing in front, and the motorman slowed down until the car in front would have a chance to pull up; and, while coming to a slow down, the car in front started, and he put on a little increased power to get to the stopping place. While he was slowing down I heard a commotion," etc., the commotion referred to being caused by the fall of the plaintiff and the movement and outcry of her fellow passengers and of persons on the street.
Conceding the truth of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, namely, that the car came to a full stop and then started again suddenly, there is no proof of negligence on the part of the conductor or motorman. They were not aware of the plaintiff's purpose to descend and the car had not yet reached its regular stopping place. We are not prepared to hold that a quick start, under such circumstances, is of itself negligence.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to- abide the event.