Case Name: WILDER et al. v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1906-02-06
Citations: 143 F. 433
Docket Number: No. 559
Parties: WILDER et al. v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: Before GOFF, Circuit Judge, and BOYD and McDOWELL, District Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 143
Pages: 433–451

Head Matter:
WILDER et al. v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
February 6, 1906.)
No. 559.
1. Criminal Law—Wp.it of Error—Mattebs Reviewable.
An appellate court cannot review the ruling of a trial court in refusing to entertain a plea in abatement tendered by a defendant in a criminal case after a demurrer had been overruled and at a term succeeding the one at which defendant had entered a plea of not guilty; there being nothing in the record to excuse the delay or to show that the court abused its discretion.
2. Conspieacy—Offense against United States—Obstructing Due Administration of Justice.
A conspiracy to corruptly obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in a court of the United States in a civil action between private parties, in violation of Rev. St. § 5399 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3656], is a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States within the meaning of Rev. St. § 5440 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676), and is indictable thereunder.
3. Obstructing Justice—Elements of Offense—Federal Statute.
In Rev. St § 5399 [U. S. Comp. St 1901, p. 3656], making it a criminal offense, inter alia, to corruptly or by threats or force “obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice” in any court of the United States, the words “due administration of justice” import a free and fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending cause in a federal court to learn what he may learn (if not obstructed or impeded) concerning material facts, and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony as to such facts, and an offense is committed under such statute if a person corruptly endeavors to induce other persons who have knowledge of facts which may be material to a party to a pending cause to conceal or deny their knowledge, so as to prevent such party from obtaining knowledge or procuring evidence of such facts.
4. Conspieacy—Sufficiency of Indictment.
An indictment under Rev. St. § 5440 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States by obstructing the due administration of justice in a court of the United States, in violation of Rev. St. § 5399 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3656], considered, and held good.
Boyd, District Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
The first count of the indictment in this case reads as follows:
“Indictment.
“United States of America, Southern District of West Virginia—ss.:
“In the District Court of the United States in and for the Southern District aforesaid at the April term thereof, A. D. 1903, at the city of Huntington, West Virginia.
“The grand jurors of the United States, impaneled, sworn, and charged at the term aforesaid of the court aforesaid on their oaths, do present, charge, and say:
“That heretofore, to wit, on the 21st day of April, 1902, one V. A. Wilder, whose name is unknown to the grand jurors aforesaid otherwise ♦•han V. A. Wilder and one Daniel Justus did, in the county of Kanawha, in the Southern District of West Virginia, and within the jurisdiction of said court, unlawfully, knowingly, corruptly, fraudulently and feloniously con spire, combine, confederate and agree together to commit an offense against the United States, in this, to wit:
“That on said last-named day, and for a long time prior thereto, and ever since there was and has been pending and undetermined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of the state of Virginia, in the Fourth judicial circuit, a certain action at law in ejectment in which the matter in dispute exceeds, and has always exceeded, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum and value of two thousand dollars, and which the said Circuit Court then and there and during the times aforesaid had and still has the lawful and proper jurisdiction to hear and determine, and which action in ejectment one Henry C. Iving, a citizen of the state of New York, instituted in said court against Henry C. Stuart, a citizen of the said state of Virginia, for the recovery of an estate in fee simple and the possession of certain land lying in. the county of Buchanan, in said state of Virginia, which said county of Buchanan, before and at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment, and ever since was, has been and now is within and a part of the said Western District of the state of Virginia, and which land so sought to be recovered by said King in said action in ejectment was, at the time of the institution of said action and ever since has been claimed by said King to be a part of the land granted to-one Robert Morris by the commonwealth of Virginia by patent dated the 23rd day of June, 1795, being as so claimed by said King that part thereof which lies in the said county of Buchanan. That at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment the said Stuart claimed, and has ever since claimed, an estate in freehold in and to certain lands in said county of Buchanan, which the said King at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment claimed, and has ever since claimed to be partly within the boundaries of the land set out and described in the said patent from the commonwealth of Virginia to the said Robert Morris, but how much of the land so claimed by the said Stuart is within the boundaries of the land set out and described in said patent and the true location of the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent were, at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment and ever since have been matters in dispute and controversy of more than two thousand dollars in value, exclusive of interest and costs in said action in ejectment between the said King and said Stuart.
“That in the declaration filed by said King in said action of ejectment is set out the location as claimed by him of the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent which includes a large part of the land so claimed by said Stuart, and the said Stuart has always, since the institution of said action in ejectment, claimed and still claims, that the location of the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent as set out by the said King in his said declaration is not the true location and that the true location of the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent would include a much smaller quantity of the land so claimed by said Stuart than is embraced by the location thereof claimed as aforesaid by the said King in his said declaration. That the said action in ejectment was so instituted by the said King against the said Stuart for the purpose of establishing title in fee in said King to the land embraced in said patent which lay in the said county of Buchanan, and to recover from the said Stuart that part of the land so claimed by him, which the said King claimed as aforesaid to be within the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent, and that at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment and ever since the said King claimed and has claimed to be the owner in fee-simple estate and entitled to the possession of that part of the land embraced in said patent which lies in the said county of Buchanan and according to the location thereof as set forth in his said declaration. That shortly after the institution of said action in ejectment, and long prior to the 21st day of April, 1902, to wit, at rules held in the clerk’s office of said court on the first Monday in January, 1898, the said Stuart appeared to said action in ejectment, and the said Stuart shortly after the institution of said action of ejectment and long prior to the 21st day of April, 1902, to wit, at rules held in the said clerk’s office as aforesaid and at the June term, 1S98, of the said court by proper plea interposed in his behalf put in issue the right of the said King to recover in said action in ejectment the land so sought to be recovered by him therein, and said issue has ever since remained between the said King and the said Stuart as a matter in controversy between them to be tried and determined in and by the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of the state of Virginia, and said issue now remains pending and undetermined in said court, and that ever since said action in ejectment was instituted in said court, the said Stuart has controverted and denied and still controverts and denies the right of the said King to recover therein the land so sought to be recovered by him therein as set out in his said declaration, and that said action in ejectment is still pending and undetermined in said court, and that at the time of the institution of said action of ejectment the said King was a citizen of the state of New York and the said Stuart a citizen of the state of Virginia, and they have ever since been citizens of different states, and that at the time of the institution of said action in ejectment and ever since the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of the state of Virginia has had the due and lawful jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters in controversy in said action in ejectment between the said King and the said Stuart and still has such jurisdiction. That the said patent dated the 23rd day of June, 1795, from the commonwealth of Virginia to Robert Morris in describing the land granted thereby designates one of the corners of the said land as, and states the name to be ‘three poplars and a sugar tree by a small branch of Knox creek.’ That ever since said action of ejectment was instituted it has been and now is material and important to said Stuart and of great value to him in defending said action in ejectment, and in contesting the location of the boundaries of the land embraced in said patent as claimed by said King, and set forth in his said declaration, and to show that of the land so claimed by said Stuart a much less quantity is within the boundaries of the land embraced by said patent than is claimed by said King in said declaration and to establish the true location of said boundaries, to show and prove in any trial in said action that said corner so designated as ‘three poplars and a sugar tree by a small branch of Knox creek’ was located near what is known as the Race Fork of Knox Creek in said Buchanan county, the said Race Fork being a small branch of Knox Creek, and that ever since the institution of said action of ejectment it has been and now is material and important and of great value to the said King in order to recover in said action the lands sought to be recovered therein by him as aforesaid, to show and prove in any trial in said action that said corner so designated as aforesaid was not located on or near said Race Fork of Knox Creek. That certain persons residing in said county of Buchanan, to wit’: Riley Lester, William A. Lester, Miles Lester, Andrew Baker, George Childers, Jacob Lester, John Charles, Hiram Smith, Calvin Lester, and the said Daniel Justus had many years prior to the 21st day of April, 1902, to wit: seven years prior thereto seen certain marked poplar trees not over three in number, and a marked sugar tree, standing near together, and near said Race Fork of Knox Creek, in said Buchanan county, and within a short distance, to wit: 400 feet of the house where the said Daniel Justus resided on said 21st day of April, 1902, and were so marked as seen by said persons as to indicate that they were corner trees and might be corner trees of the land embraced in said patent. That said marked trees had long prior to said 21st day of April, 1902, to wit: six years prior thereto, been cut down and destroyed. That the evidence and testimony which said persons who saw said marked trees could give in relation thereto would be material and important, and of great value to said Stuart in any trial of said action of ejectment to show and prove that said marked trees were the corner in whole, or in part, which was described in said patent as aforesaid as ‘three poplars and a sugar tree by a small branch of Knox creek,’ and to show and prove that the corner so designated in said patent was located near said Race Fork of Knox Creek, ana would be damaging and prejudicial to said King in at tempting to show and prove in any such trial that the land embraced in said patent was located as claimed in his said declaration.
“That heretofore, to wit: on the 21st day of April, 1902, in the county of Kanawha, and in the Southern District of the state of West Virginia, and within the jurisdiction of this court, and after the said Stuart in said action of ejectment had, as hereinbefore set out, put in issue the right of the said King to recover therein the lands sought to be recovered by him therein as aforesaid, and while the said matters in controversy in said action of ejectment between the said King and the said Stuart were, as hereinbefore set out, existing and pending, the said V. A. Wilder and the said Daniel Justus for the unlawful, fraudulent and felonious purpose of corruptly obstructing and impeding and with the unlawful, fraudulent, and felonious intent to obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia in the said action in ejectment then and there pending and undetermined in said court as aforesaid, between the said Henry C. King and the said Henry C. Stuart, and with full knowledge and notice that said action in ejectment was so peñding and undetermined, did unlawfully, knowingly, corruptly, fraudulently, and feloniously conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together to prevent, obstruct, impede, hinder, embarrass, and defeat the said Henry C. Stuart, from proving in any trial of said action in ejectment that said marked trees had existed and were located as aforesaid, and from proving in any such trial that the corner in said patent described ■ as aforesaid was located near said Race Fork of Knox Creek and at the place above described, in this, to wit, that it was then and there unlawfully, knowingly, corruptly, fraudulently, and feloniously conspired, confederated and agreed by and between the said Wilder and the said Justus that the said Justus should endeavor to procure the said Riley Lester, William A. Lester, John H. Lester, Miles Lester, Andrew Baker, George Childers, Jacob Lester, John Charles, Hiram Smith, and Calvin Lester to make false and corrupt statements in writing under oath which should be inconsistent with, and contradictory of, the true facts which they knew in regard to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and that said Justus should endeavor to induce and persuade said last-named persons from ever testifying in any trial which might he had of said action in ejection as to the facts within their knowledge which might prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and that the said Justus should endeavor to procure said last-named persons to make false declarations and statements contradictory of, and inconsistent with the facts within the knowledge of said persons which would tend to prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and to which they would testify if examined as witnesses by said Stuart in any trial of said action of ejectment, and that the said Justus should endeavor to make said last-named persons unfriendly and hostile to the interests of the said Stuart which were involved in said action of ejectment and that the said Justus should endeavor to persuade and get said persons to agree not to tell the truth if they were called or examined as witnesses in behalf of said Stuart in any trial of said action of ejectment, and that the said Justus should endeavor to get said persons to conceal and secrete the facts within their knowledge which would tend to prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and that the said Justus should endeavor to get the said persons to make false statements which would indicate that they could give no evidence tending to prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, in order that said persons would not be examined as witnesses in behalf of said Stuart in any trial of said action of ejectment and that the said Justus should endeavor to prevent, obstruct, impede, hinder, embarrass, and defeat the said Henry O. Stuart from securing and producing upon any trial of said action of ejectment the evidence which existed in relation to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees through the knowledge of the said parties who had seen the' same as aforesaid, or through the knowledge of any other persons who had seen said trees, or any of them, marked and located as aforesaid, and that the said Justus should refuse to testify in any such trial as to the facts within his knowledge which might prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and that the sale! Justus should endeavor to find witnesses who, upon any such trial of said action of ejectment, would testify and give evidence against the existence and location as aforesaid of the said marked trees, and evidence to contradict, impair, weaken and destroy the evidence which might be given in any such trial by any of the said persons last named without regard to the fact whether the witnesses so to be found by said Justus would testify honestly and truthfully or falsely and corruptly, and that the said Justus should' himself make a false and corrupt affidavit in writing contradictory of, and inconsistent with, the real facts within the knowledge of said Justus as to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees. That thereafter, to wit, on said 21st day of April, 1902, in the said county of Kanawha and at the city of Charleston, and in pursuance of and for the purpose of effecting and carrying into execution the said unlawful, fraudulent, corrupt, and felonious conspiracy, combination, confederacy, and agreement between the said V. A. Wilder and Daniel Justus, and to effect the object thereof, the said Wilder paid to the said Justus the sum of one hundred dollars in lawful money of the United States as a reward and consideration for what the said Justus was to do and perform as aforesaid in pursuance of said combination, confederation, conspiracy, and agreement and the said Justus did, then and there to effect the object of said unlawful, fraudulent, corrupt and felonious conspiracy, combination, confederacy and agreement between him and the said Wilder, make the false and corrupt affidavit which he had agreed to make as aforesaid, and thereafter, to wit, on the 24th day of April, 1902, and on divers other days, in the said county of Buchanan, the said Justus in pursuance of, and for the purpose of carrying out and to effect the object of the said unlawful, fraudulent, corrupt, and felonious conspiracy, combination, confederacy, and agreement between himself and the said Wilder, did unlawfully and corruptly solicit and endeavor to procure certain parties, to wit, the said Riley Lester, William A. Lester, and John H. Lester and divers other parties to the grand jurors aforesaid unknown to make corrupt and false statements contradictory of, and inconsistent with, the real facts, as the said Justus then and there well knew, within the knowledge of said parties last above named and said unknown parties as to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and then and there unlawfully and corruptly offer to pay and give, and to procure to be paid and given, money and other things of valué to said parties last above named and to said unknown parties in order to obtain such statements, and then and there corruptly and fraudulently solicited the said Riley Lester, William A. Lester, and John H. Lester and said unknown parties to conceal the real facts, as the said Justus then and there well knew, within the knowledge of the said parties last above named and said unknown parties as to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, and then and there corruptly and fraudulently solicited said parties last above named and said unknown parties to pretend and represent that they knew nothing as to the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees, although the said Justus then and there well knew that said last-named parties and said' unknown parties had seen some of said marked trees at the location aforesaid and were lawful and competent witnesses to testify in any trial of said action in ejectment to prove the existence and location as aforesaid of said marked trees.
“And so the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do present, charge and say that the said V. A. Wilder and Daniel Justus, in the said county of Kanawha, in the state of West Virginia, and in the Southern-District of said state, heretofore, to wit: on the 21st day of April, 1902, did, in violation of section 5440, Revised Statutes of the United States [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], unlawfully, knowingly, corruptly, fraudulently, and feloniously conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together to commit an offense against the United States, to wit: to corruptly obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, as hereinbefore set out, and to effect the object and to carry out the said unlawful, fraudulent, corrupt, and felonious conspiracy, combination, and confederacy, did the acts and things hereinbefore set out; all of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute of the United States in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States.”
Maynard F. Stiles, for plaintiffs in error.
Geo. W. Atkinson, Dist. Atty., and Malcolm Jackson, Special U. S. Atty., for the United States.
Before GOFF, Circuit Judge, and BOYD and McDOWELL, District Judges.

Opinion:
McDOWELL, District Judge
(after stating the facts). The defendants were indicted April 9, 1903, under section 5440 U. S. Rev. St. as amended by act May 17, 1879, c. 8, 21 Stat. 4, 3 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676. On the next day the defendant Wilder appeared in open court, moved to quash the indictment, and demurred to the indictment and to each count thereof. The trial court took time to consider the motion and demurrer, and thereupon said defendant was" arraigned and pleaded not guilty. At the next term, on September 22, 1903, both defendants appeared, moved for a change of venue, which was denied, and moved to quash the indictment, presumably only for objections such as could be made on demurrer. The argument not being completed, the court adjourned until the next day, and on September 23d the court overruled the motion to quash and the demurrer. And thereupon "the defendants by their attorneys tendered a special plea in writing, to the filing of which the government objected, and the court having seen and inspected said special plea, and having heard fully the arguments of counsel thereon, the court doth sustain said objection, and thereupon refuse to permit said special plea to be filed, to which action of the court the defendants by their attorneys object and except,' and tender their bill of exceptions marked 'Defendants' Bill of Exceptions No. 1,' which is accordingly signed, sealed, and made a part of the record herein." No bill of exceptions appears in the record, no suggestion of diminution of record has been made, and it is understood to be a fact that no bill was ever prepared or submitted to the trial judge. A plea in abatement (endorsed: "Tendered and objection by Gov. and objection sustained, by the Court and plea rejected. Sept. 23d, 1903. Edwin M. Keatley, Clerk.") is copied as a part of the record. The cause was tried at the April term, 1904, and resulted in a general verdict of guilty against both defendants, and a judgment sentencing them to pay a fine and the costs.
The assignments of error are based on the action of the trial court in overruling the motion to quash and the demurrer and in refusing to allow to be filed the plea in abatement. If the motion to quash the indictment was based on matter not presented by the demurrer, such matter does not appear in the record. The plea in abatement sets up alleged improper influences brought to bear on the grand jury which returned the indictment. Quite aside from the technical rule which forbids us to consider the matter presented by the plea, because it has not been made a part of the record by bill of exception, is the fact that the plea was tendered after the trial court had ruled on the demurrer to the indictment and at a term following that at which the defendant Wilder (in whose behalf alone the plea on its face appears to have been offered) had pleaded not guilty. If any reason in excuse of this delay existed, it does not appear from the record. In order to obviate this insuperable objection to considering the plea itself, this court must assume, in the absence of any evidence to such effect, that the trial court erred. So far as we can know, the trial court may have rejected the plea on the ground that the facts set up therein were not recently discovered by the defendants, and that therefore the tender of the plea had been unduly delayed. Nothing in the plea alleges'excuse for the delay in tendering it. It is with the strictest propriety that appellate courts refuse to presume that error was committed. Not only is the discretion of the trial courts very great in ruling as to the merits of such pleas (Radford v. U. S., 129 Fed. 49, 63 C. C. A. 491; McGregor v. U. S. [C. C. A.] 134 Fed. 187), but there is also a discretion vested in such courts as to allowing such pleas to be filed after the regular time therefor has passed. We cannot possibly say from this record that the trial court abused this latter discretion. And, unless we can properly so decide, we cannot in any event reach a consideration of the merits of the plea. For these reasons, we do not express any opinion whatever as to the matters set up in the plea.
The assignments of error based on the action of the trial court in overruling the demurrer and motions to quash, based on objections such as can be presented by demurrer, alone remain for our consideration. Attention needs to be given only to the first count of the indictment. As the second count differs from the first only in that the second is more generally expressed, the second count is invalid if the first count is. If the first count is valid, we need not concern ourselves as to the second count.
The indictment is founded on section 5440, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], as amended, and the offense conspired to be committed was (section 5399 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3656]) corruptly obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a certain action of ejectment pending in the federal Circuit Court for the Western District of Virginia, styled "King v. Stuart." Section 5399 reads, so far as now material, as follows:
"Every person who corruptly obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or Impede tbe due administration of justice therein [a court of the United States] shall be punished," etc.
Subject to the conclusion to be hereinafter reached as to some important questions, this indictment seems to be well drawn under the rulings in U. S. v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 2 Sup. Ct. 531, 27 L. Ed. 698, and Pettibone v. U. S. 148 U. S. 197, 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 37 L. Ed. 419.
Section 5440, Rev. St. as amended by Act May 17, 1879, c. 8, 21 Stat. 4 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], so far as now material, reads:
"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense against the United States and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all of the parties shall be liable. "
The contention that a violation of section 5399, consisting of obstructing the administration of justice in a civil litigation, between private citizens in a federal court, is not an offense against the United States, need not be discussed at any length. One of the sovereign powers of the United States is to administer justice in its courts between private citizens. Obstructing such administration is an offense against the United States, in that it prevents or tends to prevent the execution of one of the powers of the government. See U. S. v. Sanche (C. C.) 7 Fed. 715; U. S. v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 2 Sup. Ct. 531, 27 L. Ed. 698; Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S. 197, 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 37 L. Ed. 419. The agreement must be to commit an offense against the United States; but the act done to effect the object of the conspiracy need not, as we think, be itself a crime or an offense against the United States. U. S. v. Sanche (C. C.) 7 Fed. 715; U. S. v. Newton (D. C.) 52 Fed. 275; U. S. v. Donau, 11 Blatchf. 168, Fed Cas. No. 14,983; U. S. v. Cassidy, (D. C.) 67 Fed. 698, 705; U. S. v. Thompson (C. C.) 29 Fed. 86, 89; Curley v. U. S., 130 Fed. 1, 3, 64 C. C. A. 369. However, this point is not of importance in the case at bar. Here the acts alleged to have been done to effect the object of the conspiracy and those alleged to have been agreed to be done are in the same category. If the act agreed to be done would, upon consummation, violate section 5399, the acts done equally violate that statute. If the acts agreed to be done would, if successful, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice, the acts done were certainly endeavors to obstruct or impede. In its final, analysis, therefore, the question now for consideration is the true intent shown by the latter clause of section 5399.
If the strictest and narrowest possible meaning were given the word "administration," as used in this statute, the interferences forbidden would be confined to those which obstruct or impede the judge, the jurors, counsel, the marshal, and possibly witnesses. But such obstructions are provided for in the first part of the statute, and in using the different and broader language employed in expressing the latter clause of the statute it seems clear that the intent was to embrace obstructions other than those which were dealt with in the first clause. Perjury, subornation of perjury, and obstructing officers in the service of process are dealt with in sections 5392, 5393, and 5398 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3653-3655], The first clause of section 5399 sufficiently provides for influencing, intimidating, or impeding witnesses (who have been summoned or otherwise designated as such) and officers of the court while actually in the discharge of their official duties. If those acts which may obstruct or impede the administration of justice, and which are not embraced within the previously used language, are held not to be embraced within the meaning of the latter clause of section 5399, Congress has wholly failed to forbid such acts, and has uselessly and confusingly twice expressed the same intent in different language.
The argument is made that the conspiracy was not to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice, in that prejudice to Stuart can only be predicated on a double contingency: (1) That, if there had been no act done to carry out the object of the conspiracy, Stuart would in due time discover the facts as to the marked trees; and (2) that, after learning these facts, he would agree with the grand jury in the opinion that evidence of such facts is valuable to-him. But the words "due administration of justice" import a free and fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending cause in a federal court to learn what he may learn (if not impeded or obstructed) concerning material facts and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony of such faces. The violation of the law may consist in preventing a litigant from learning facts which he might otherwise learn, and in thus preventing him from deciding for himself whether or not to make use of such facts. The latter clause of section 5399 seems to us to be too broad in its scope to be confined to-cases where the suppression of knowledge of material facts merely might not prejudice the litigant. On the other hand, it is, as we think, sufficient if the litigant might be prejudiced by the success of the conspiracy. The acts intended to be made criminal by the latter clause of the section are, as we think, not forbidden merely on the ground that such acts will of necessity prevent a fair trial, but on the ground that such acts may prevent such trial. We need give no weight to-the conclusions of the grand jury that the facts sought to be suppressed are "material" in the ejectment cause, and that to prove them would be "valuable to 'Stuart." The facts alleged in the indictment are such that this court must for itself of necessity draw the conclusion that the facts as to the marked trees are material. Whether or not it will be of value to Stuart to prove these facts when the ejectment cause comes on to be tried is now a mere matter of opinion. And even after a trial of the ejectment cause shall have taken place, if Stuart should introduce the evidence sought by the defendants here to be suppressed, it is conceivable that it would still be a matter of opinion as to whether or not such course was a wise one. When a conspiracy, such as the one here, is discovered and the indictment is-returned in advance of the trial of the case of the litigant against whose interest knowledge of material facts has been attempted to be suppressed, it must, at the date of the indictment, be a mere matter of opinion whether or not the litigant will seek to use the facts, and equally a mere matter of opinion whether or not he would, if there had been no interference, have discovered the facts; but, if the conspiracy be successful, it is manifest that the litigant cannot have favorable occasion for preparing for trial. This imports a fair opportunity to learn what may be of value concerning material facts and a consequent fair opportunity to decide intelligently whether or not to use such facts when the case comes on to be tried.
In the brief of the learned counsel for defendants it is said:
"I apprehend that one party to a lawsuit would have a legal right to-mate it as difficult as possible for his opponent to prove his case, and consequently to 'conspire' with some one else to do so. Of course, he would have no right to commit or procure perjury, or prevent execution of, or obedience to, process, nor tamper with a 'witness'; but none of these things is charged in this indictment."
If section 5399 did not contain the language used in its last clause, this argument might be sound. But this argument shows the vital need for a federal statute such as we deem the clause mentioned to be. In the absence of a federal statute of the scope of this clause, a party to a pending civil suit in a federal court, so long as process for persons intended to be used as witnesses by his adversary had not been issued, could legally induce all such persons to conceal themselves or otherwise evade service* of process. But that such acts, if successful, would impede and obstruct the administration of justice, is quite apparent.
It is further contended as follows: The indictment does not allege that the marked trees were in fact corner trees of the Morris tract. They may not have been, and, if not, the "conspiracy" was merely an agreement to prevent a perversion of justice. This argument assumes a right in the defendants here to decide a question which under our theory of law should be left, at Stuart's option, to the decision of the tribunal which is to try_ the ejectment cause. As we cannot here and now assume the, truth' of the hypothesis on which this argument is founded, it follows that the sufficiency of the indictment must be determined on the only permissible hypothesis, to wit, that the trees in question may have been corner trees of the Morris tract. The facts as to these trees (that there were some poplar trees, not over three in number, and one sugar tree standing near together, standing near a branch of Knox creek, so marked as to indicate that they were corner trees and might be corner trees of the Morris tract) are sufficient, read in connection with the other facts alleged in the indictment, especially the quotation from the grant, "three poplars and a sugar tree by a small branch of Knox creek," to make it necessary for the court to draw the conclusion that these trees may have been corner trees of the Morris tract. The possibility that these trees may not have been corner trees of the Morris tract does not affect the validity of the indictment, and does not prevent the charge of suppressing the information concerning these trees from being a sufficient charge of an impeding or obstructing the due administration of justice. The fallacy underlying the argument now under discussion is the same as that discussed above. It was wholly unnecessary for the pleader to allege in the indictment that the trees were in truth corner trees, and under the present indictment evidence tending to" show that the defendants believed they were not corner trees of the Morris tract would not have been admissible in behalf of the defendants. After verdict of guilty such evidence might well be offered to the trial judge in mitigation of punishment. It might reduce the culpability of the defendants, if they believed and had reason to believe at the time of the agreement that these trees were not corner trees; but such belief would not prevent the agreement from being a conspiracy to violate section 5399, Rev. St. A belief on the part of the defendants that the trees in question were not in truth corner trees of the Morris tract, and that the "testimony" sought to be suppressed was false, would lessen the moral wrong involved, but would not excuse the commission of the acts alleged in the indictment. Such argument is not even based on the ancient fallacy that a good end justifies the use of improper means. It is based on the assumption that a supposed good end justifies the use of improper means. As hereinbefore stated, the allegations of the indictment are such that we cannot assume that the trees were in fact not corner trees of the Morris tract. The utmost length that we can go in this case in making assumptions favorable to the defendants is that they believed that the trees were not in fact corner trees. Hence the argument above referred to is based on the theory that forbidden and illegal means may properly and legally be used if the ultimately intended result is morally justifiable. It could be equally well argued that intimidating a witness is not a violation of the first clause of section 5399, if the person so doing believes that such witness will testify falsely.
As we have under consideration only the questions -raised by demurrer to the indictment, we do not express any opinion as to the admissibility or effect, on trial, of evidence proving or tending to prove that the trees here in question were not in fact corner trees of the Morris tract.
We are of opinion to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.