Case Name: Thomas H. Donaghy, defendant below appellant, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Delaware, plaintiff below respondent, defendant in error
Court: Delaware Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1917-02-28
Citations: 6 Boyce 467
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas H. Donaghy, defendant below appellant, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Delaware, plaintiff below respondent, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 29
Pages: 467–544

Head Matter:
Thomas H. Donaghy, defendant below appellant, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Delaware, plaintiff below respondent, defendant in error.
1. Statutes—Construction—Ejusdem Generis.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction that, where general words follow the enumeration of partciular classes of persons ■or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.
2. Criminal Law—Jurisdiction—Construction of Constitutional Provision.
Const. Art. 4, § 30, provides that the General Assembly may by law give to any inferior courts by it established or to be established, or to one or more justices of the peace, jurisdiction of assaults and batteries, keeping without a license a public house of entertainment, etc., retailing or selling without license or on Sunday, or to minors, intoxicants contrary to law, the carrying of a concealed deadly weapon, disturbing meetings held for the purpose of religious worship, nuisances, and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, prescribe, and that the General Assembly may by law regulate the jurisdiction and provide that the proceedings shall be with or without indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury, and may grant or deny the privilege of appeal to the Court of General Sessions, but that there shall be an appeal to such court in all cases in which the sentence shall be imprisonment exceeding a month or fine not exceeding one hundred dollars. Held, that there was no similarity between the specific crimes mentioned, arid thatithe doctrine of ejusdem generis did not apply in the construction of the section, the phrase “such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may prescribe” meaning “other misdemeanors such as the General Assembly may_ prescribe,” since the doctrine does not apply where the specific words signify subjects greatly different from one another.
3. Criminal Law—Appeal—Amount in Controversy.
In prosecutions in the Municipal Court of Wilmington under the Nonsupport Act {Rev. Code 1915, §§ 3034, 3035, 3037) for nonsupport of a minor child, in every case where the payments imposed upon accused would, during the continuance of his bond, amount to at least one hundred dollars, he is entitled to an appeal, under Const. Art. 4, § 30.
4. Criminal Law—Jurisdiction—Municipal Courts—Constitution.
The holding that Const. Art. 4, § 30, providing that the General Assembly may give to inferior courts jurisdiction of assaults and batteries, etc., and other misdemeanors, was not a limitation on the power of the General Assemebly to give to the Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington jurisdiction of the criminal matters contained in the Nonsupport Act, does not violate Article 4, § 20, giving the Legislature power to change the subject-matter to be adjudicated in the courts of the state of superior jurisdiction, since Section 20 does not limit the power of the Legislature to alter the jurisdiction of any existing inferior court by giving it jurisdiction of other misdemeanors than those enumerated in Section 30.
5. Criminal Law—Jurisdiction—Municipal Courts.
The Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington has jurisdiction of the criminal matters contain in Nonsupport Act.
6. Criminal Law—Appeal and Error—Character of Appeal.
An appeal effects a removal of the cause to another tribunal, and involves a hearing de novo on both facts and law, as distinguished from a writ of error, or certiorari, whereby only questions of law are subject to re-examination.
7. Parent and Child—Procedure on Appeal in Nonsupport Prosecutions.
By Nonsupport Act, giving the Municipal Court of Wilmington jurisdiction of the criminal matters involved, subject to the right of accused to appeal as provided by law in other cases, the duly established procedure of the Mtinicipal Court was adopted for the trial of cases arising under the Nonsupport Act, including an information there filed in place of an indictment, and the method of taking appeals from the judgments of the 'Municipal Court in cases which such court has jurisdiction to hear and determine.
8. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Appeal—Statutes.
17 Del. Laws, c. 207, § 21, providing that, if in a prosecution in the Municipal Court of Wilmington for a nuisance affecting the public streets the defend ant by affidavit claims a right of property in the street, further proceedings are stayed in the Municipal Court, and the clerk must transmit to the Court of General Sessions a copy of the record, and thereafter the case shall proceed in such court, does not provide a procedure for hearing appeals to the Court of General Sessions from the Municipal Court of Wilmington in cases arising under the Nonsupport Act.
9. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Appeal—Statutes.
17 Del. Laws, c. 207, § 23, providing that a person against whom a judgment has been entered in the Municipal Court of Wilmington for violation of a city ordinance, and who has been committed for failure to satisfy the judgment, may appeal to the Superior Court, and that the filing of a transcript, modes of trial, and forms of proceeding shall be as in cases of appeal from the judgments of justices of the peace, provides a procedure for hearing appeals to the Court of General Sessions from the Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington in cases arising under the Nonsupport_ Act, and on appeal by a father convicted of nonsupport of his minor child in the Municipal Court, the Attorney; General had a right to file in the Court of General Sessions a new information against the father.
10. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Appeal—Variation—“Without Just Cause”—“Without Lawful Excuse.”
In connection with nonsupport of a minor child, the statutory^ expression “without lawful excuse” is synonymous with the expression “without just cause,” and in a prosecution in the Municipal Court of Wilmington for violation of Nonsupport Act by failing to support a minor child, it is not a variation that the information filed by the Attorney General on appeal in the Court of General Sessions used the expression “without lawful excuse," whereas the information in the Municipal Court used the expression “without just cause.”
11. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Information— Particularity in Alleging Offense.
An information in the Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington charging nonsupport of a minor child, in violation of the Nonsupport Act_, must have the same degree of particularity in alleging the offense as is required of an indictment, for -which it is a substitute.
12. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Appeal—Varia-' tion—Specification of Offense.
In a prosecution for nonsupport of defendant’s minor child in violation of the Nonsupport Act, where the information in the Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington omitted the name of the child, the new information filed by the Attorney General in the Court of General Sessions on appeal was not demurrable because supplying the name of the child.
13. Parent and Child—Failure to Support—Statute—“Lawful Excuse.”
Where a wife, because of physical violence shown her by her husband, was afraid to come with her child to live with her husband in a place to which he invited her to come, and refused to do so, her refusal was no “lawful excuse ” for her husband’s failure to support the child, within the Nonsupport Act; the financial inability of the father to support his child being a lawful excuse for failure to support.
14. Husband and Wife—Husband’s Right to Establish Domicile.
A husband has a right to establish the family domicile, and in general it is the duty of the wife to live in that domicile, and she loses some of her rights to support in case she unreasonably refuses to do so, but there are reasons which may justify her in living elsewhere, of which fear of personal violence is one.
15. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Statute—“Destitute or Necessitous Circumstances.”
A child of three years, without property, is in “destitute or necessitous circumstances ” within the Nonsupport Act when the father can, but does not, and the mother cannot, provide for the child’s support, though both mother and child are in fact supported by the child’s maternal grandfather, who is under no legal obligation to furnish such support.
Boyce, J., dissenting.
On Reargument.
16. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Evidence—Relevancy.
In a prosecution of a father for nonsupport of his minor child, in violation of the Nonsupport Act, testimony relating to the marital relations between defendant and his wife was immaterial and irrelevant, though the defense was that his wife refused to live with defendant, and she set up that it was on account of her fear of personal violence.
17. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Evidence.
In a prosecution of a father for failure to support his three-year-old child, in violation of the Nonsupport Act, the refusal to permit defendant’s wife to answer the question, “Are you willing to take your child to your husband and live with him in a home provided for by him? ” was proper, the only bearing the answer could have had being on the future support of the child, which was not the issue.
18. Parent and Child—Nonsupport—Prosecution—Appeal.
In a prosecution for nonsupport of defendant’s minor child, in violation of the Nonsupport Act, where, on appeal from the Municipal Court of Wilmington to the Court of General Sessions, the case was heard de novo, the judgment on appeal was a new one, not limited to an affirmance or reversal, but the Court of General Sessions had a right to enter a different judgment, including changes in the sentence and provisions for enforcing support of the child, and could rightly require the father to provide such support from a period anterior to the entry of its judgment, viz., from the time of the judgment in the Municipal Court.
19. Criminal Law—Certiorari—Character of Procedure.
On certiorari the Supreme Court finds whether the record does or does not contain error, and, if it does, grants new trial, or orders correction of the judgment, and, if it does not, simply affirms, and by mandate remits the case to the Court of General Sessions for such further proceedings as would have been proper had there been no writ of error.
20. Criminal Law—Certiorari—Questions Reviewable.
On certiorari, questions of law and not of fact are reviewable; evidence being gotten into the record by a bill of exceptions, which is inappropriate to a writ of certiorari; but where the record, including the testimony taken below, as well as the parties, is before the Supreme Court, it has power to and should determine the questions raised by the assignments as if there had been a writ of error.
Boyce, J., dissenting. Pennewill, C. J., dissenting in part.
(February 28, 1917.)
Curtis, Chancellor, Pennewill, Chief Justice, and Boyce, Associate Judge, sitting.
James I. Boyce for plaintiff in error.
Josiah O. Wolcott, Attorney General, and Armon D. Chaytor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for defendant.
Supreme Court, No. 2,
June Term, 1916.
Certiorari to the Court of General Sessions, New Castle County. y
Thomas H. Donaghy was tried on an information, in the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington, for non-support of his minor child. Adjudged guilty, sentenced to pay a fine, and ordered to pay a certain sum by monthly installments for the support of the child. He appealed to the Court of General Sessions.
The Attorney General filed a new information on appeal.in the Court of General Sessions, No. 49, March term, 1915. The accused was tried, convicted and ordered to pay a smaller sum for support of the child and costs of prosecution. He brings certiorari. Judgment affirmed with directions. Boyce, J., dissenting. Pennewill, C. J., dissenting in part.
Same case on demurrer to the information in the Court of General Sessions. Boyce , 99 Atl. 720.
The statute under which the accused was prosecuted is contained in the Revised, Code 1915, and the pertinent sections are:
“Sec. 3034. That any husband who shall, without just cause, desert or wilfully neglect or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or any parent who shall, without lawful excuse, desert or wilfully neglect or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her legitimate ór illegitimate child or children, under the age of sixteen years, in destitute or necessitous circumstances, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment with hard labor in such penal or reformatory institution of this state as may be determined upon by the court, for a period not exceeding one year, or both. And it is hereby made the duty of the parent of any illegitimate child or children, under the age of sixteen years, to provide for the support and maintenance of such illegitimate child or children.
“Sec. 3035. Proceedings under this act may be instituted upon complaint made'under oath or affirmation by the wife or child or' children, or by any other person, against any person guilty of either of the above-named oSenses. The Court of General Sessions, and the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under this act, and unless the accused shall demand a trial by jury the trial shall in each case be by the Court without a jury, subject to the right of the accused to appeal as provided by law in other cases: Provided, however, that the proceedings, under this act, in the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington shall be without indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury. * * *
“Sec. 3037. Before the trial, with the consent of the defendant, or at the trial, on entry of a plea of guilty, or after conviction, instead of imposing the penalty hereinbefore provided, or in addition thereto, the court in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances, and to the financial ability or earning capacity of the defendant, shall have the power, to make an order, which shall be subject to change by the court from time to time, as circumstances may require, directing the defendant to pay a certain sum periodically to the wife, or the guardian, or custodian of the said minor child or children, or to an organization or individual approved by the court as trustee, and to release the defendant, from custody on probation, upon his or her entering into a recognizance, with or without surety, in such sum as the court or a judge thereof in vacation may order and approve. The condition of the recognizance shall be stich that if the defendant shall make his or her personal appearance in court whenever ordered to do so, and shall further comply with the terms of such support, or of any subsequent modification thereof, then such recognizance shall be void, otherwise in full force and effect.”
The information filed against the accused in the Municipal Court charged that he ‘ ‘did unlawfully without just cause, wilfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his minor child under sixteen years of age, in destitute and necessitous circumstances, against,” etc.
Counsel for the accused moved to quash the information, which motion was denied. Thereupon, after hearing the evidence, the Municipal Court adjudged the accused guilty and did order him to pay or cause to be paid to Frank Stout, trustee, of whom the court approved, the sum of six dollars per week for the support and maintenance of his minor child under sixteen years of age; and also, to appear personally in the said court whenever thereafter ordered to do so; and also, to comply with the terms of the order of support, or of any subsequent modification thereof; and also, that he be released from custody on probation upon entering into recognizance with surety to the State of Delaware, in the sum of five hundred dollars for compliance by him with the said order of support; and in addition to the foregoing order, did sentence him to pay a fine of two hundred dollars and costs of prosecution amounting to the sum of one hundred and eighteen and 84/ioo dollars.
On appeal to the Court of General Sessions, the information filed by the Attorney General, set forth the judgment of the Municipal Court, and charged the accused in six counts with various violations of the statute. The first charged that the accused ‘ ‘unlawfully and without lawful excuse did wilfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his child, to wit, one Henry Donaghy, he, the said Thomas H. Donaghy being then and there a parent of the said Henry Donaghy, and the said Henry Donaghy being then and there the legitimate child of the said Thomas H. Donaghy, and being then and there a minor under sixteen years of age, and being then and there in destitute circumstances, against,” etc.
The second was like the first, except that the child was alleged to be in ‘ ‘necessitous circumstances.” The third charged that the accused “unlawfully and without lawful excuse did desert his child. * * * ” The fourth charged that the accused “unlawfully and without lawful excuse, did refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his child. * * * ’ ’ The fifth was like the third, and the sixth was like the fourth, except that the child was alleged to be in “destitute circumstances.”
Counsel for the accused moved to quash the information, and each count thereof, on the grounds that it failed to correspond with the record of the prosecution below in the cause of action. Motion refused.
Thereupon the accused demurred to the information and each of the counts thereof, which demurrer was overruled as to the first and second counts and sustained as to the third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts. To the two counts sustained the accused pleaded not guilty and put himself upon the court for trial.
The prosecution on appeal came on for hearing before the Court of General Sessions. At the close of the testimony, the court was requested on behalf of the accused, to find as matters of fact, in substance: That at the time the wife of the accused separated from him taking Henry Donaghy, the child, with her, and going home to her parents, he (the accused) was a resident of the city of Wilmington, Delaware; that from that date he moved to Atlantic City, New Jersey, with the intention of making that his legal residence and that his wife was requested to come there with him; that his wife has since refused to live with him at Atlantic City; that from and since the time of the separation, his wife has retained and enjoyed the custody and society of their minor child; that he has from and since that time been ready, willing and desirous to support his child, if he might have and enjoy its custody and society; that the child was not at that time and is not now in want of food, clothing or lodging, and is not likely to become a burden upon the State of Delaware.
The accused also prayed the court to find as matters of law, in substance:
That it was incumbent upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any neglect, on the part of the accused, to provide for the support of Henry Donaghy, the child, was without lawful excuse; that the word “wilful” in the statute means with evil intent or legal malice or without reasonable ground for believing the act to be lawful; that likewise it is incumbent upon the state to show that the accused has means or property with which to support the child, or that he is in health with ability to earn money for the support of the child; that the accused may not be convicted under the statute when the child is fully provided for by others; that the statute must be strictly construed, and if the child is receiving necessary food, clothing and lodging, there is no occasion for the state to enforce the statute in this case; that the-child is improperly detained from the father, and that the improper detainment is a defense to the prosecution; and that, it being-shown that the legal residence of the accused is in an adjoining state, he has committed no offense against the statute, if the child was detained in this state by the mother.
The court adjudged the accused guilty and made an order, similar to that made in the Municipal Court, that he pay the sum of four dollars instead of six dollars per week for the support and maintenance of his minor child, and that he pay the costs of prosecution amounting to the sum of twelve dollars and thirty-eight cents, the fine imposed below being omitted. The order so made was made retroactive and dates back, with respect to the weekly payments, to the date of the judgment of the Municipal Court.
Certiorari was sued out of the Supreme Court to the Court of - General Sessions.
The exceptions taken to the record by the plaintiff in error are-numerous, but they involve in general only three questions, stated in the majority opinion of the court.
Argument op Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.
The Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington has no jurisdiction in cases arising under Chaper 262, Vol. 27, Laws of Delaware.
Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware (1897) is recited.
Attention is directed to the scope and character of Sections 1, 2 and 4 of the statute in question.
The misdemeanor defined in the above sections of the statute is not one of ‘ ‘such other misdemeanors’ ’ as the General Assembly may by law give to any inferior court by it established, or to be established. The obvious basis of this contention is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which is stated in 36 Cyc. 1119, 1120, and cases cited.
In the present instance it cannot be seriously contended that the framers of the Constitution meant to include any or all mis- ■ demeanors, for not only did they specify certain species of the genus which they had in mind, but they also qualified “other misdemeanors’ ’ not by the word ‘ ‘any’ ’ but by the word ‘ ‘such.” The first or primary definition of the word ‘ ‘such’ ’ in the Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia is “of that kind”; “of like kind or degree”; “like”; “similar”. A secondary meaning of the word is given as ‘ ‘the same as previously mentioned or specified”; ‘ ‘not other or different”. In re Hull, 18 Idaho, 475, 110 Pac. 256, 257, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465.
Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, §§ 405—407, gives numerous illustrations of the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The only question is whether the misdemeanor defined by the statute in question is of the same genus as the misdemeanors specifically enumerated in Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution.
The misdemeanors therein enumerated are somewhat fewer than those enumerated in Section 15 of Article 6 of the Constitution of 1832. Such summary trials are in derogation of the common law and not only must the proceedings be in strict conformity to the statute which authorizes them, but also must the jurisdiction over the subject matter be plainly and fully conferred. 12 Cyc. 321
The genus of which assaults and batteries, keeping without license a public house of entertainment, the unlawful selling of liquors, carrying concealed a deadly weapon, and nuisances are the species, may not be capable of precise limitation, but it cannot be held to include a misdemeanor such as is defined in Section 1, c. 262, Vol. 27,' Laws of Delaware. The latter offense is distinguished from those enumerated in the Constitution: First, in that it is not of itself a breach of the peace and does not naturally or directly tend thereto; second, in that the penalty prescribed, including as it does a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and imprisonment with hard labor for a period not exceeding one year, or both, makes the offense practically a felony in spite of its name; and third, in that the court has the power to make an order, in lieu of the above penalty or in addition thereto, directing the payment of unlimited sums of money for an unlimited period of time.
Assuming that the General Assembly, prior to the passage of the statute, had never exceeded its constitutional authority and that all of the criminal matters theretofore placed under the jurisdiction of inferior courts were within the meaning of Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution; nevertheless, the whole category of such criminal matters does not contain a single misdemeanor less calculated to affect the public peace and good order or more severe in its effect and penalty than that with which the plaintiff in error is charged. It is inconceivable that the framers of the Constitution intended to give to the General Assembly power to confer upon a mere magistrate, jurisdiction over a matter often involving thousands of dollars.
"Upon an appeal to the Court of General Sessions from inferior courts under Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware, the Attorney General may not file a new information, or if he may, the new information must correspond with the original information in all matters of substance.
The Attorney General, as previously stated, filed in the Court of General Sessions a new and different information which the plaintiff in error first moved to set aside for irregularity. This motion was based on the assumption that the Attorney General had a right to file a new information just as the plaintiff below, in civil cases appealed from a justice of the peace to the Superior Court, has a right to, and must file a pro-narr. The objection to the information as filed by the Attorney General was that it did not correspond with the record of the prosecution below in the cause of action. In other words, disregarding the four counts to which a demurrer was later sustained by the Court of General Sessions, the new information differed from the information filed in the Municipal Court in two most important particulars:
The information filed in the Municipal Court charged the plaintiff in error with having committed a certain offense ‘ ‘without just cause,” whereas the information filed by the Attorney General charged that he had committed the offense “without lawful excuse.”
The information filed in the Municipal Court failed to describe or identify the person alleged to have been injured by the offense charged, whereas the information filed by the Attorney General identified the person injured as one Henry Donaghy, and alleged him to be the legitimate child of the plaintiff in error.
The ruling of the learned Court of General Sessions dismissing the motion seemed to make an appeal capable of such hardship and injustice to an appellant, that comisel for the plaintiff in error demurred to the information filed by the Attorney General upon the grounds:
That upon an appeal to the Court of General Sessions from inferior courts under Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution, no new information may be filed by the Attorney General, but the case must be proceeded with upon the record of the court below.
An appeal is a method for the removal of a cause from a court of inferior to one of superior jurisdiction, unknown to the common law. It is a civil law process, originally confined to causes of equity, ecclesiastical and admiralty matters to subject the fact as well as the law to review. In this, it is distinguished from a writ of error or a writ of certiorari, which are both processes of common law origin and which remove nothing for re-examination but the law. 1 Woolley, 46; 1 Bouv. Law Diet. tit. Appeal; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U. S. 321, 1 L. Ed. 619.
There have been in this state so few appeals in criminal cases from inferior courts to the Court of General Sessions that the question of what constitutes the lawful procedure has not come before the courts. It is admitted that in the few cases which do exist the Attorney General has filed a new information based on the information filed below. This practice has had for its supposed authority the case of Pratesi v. the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 4 Pennewill, 258, 54 Atl. 694, but an examination of that supposed authority shows that the case was an appeal to the Superior Court from a judgment of the Municipal Court for the violation of a city ordinance and as such was expressly provided for by Section 23, c. 207, Vol. 17, Laws of Delaware.
A further examination shows that the nearest approach of any statutory provision governing the mode of procedure upon an appeal to the Court of General Sessions in criminal matters is upon an information in the Municipal Court for a nuisance affecting the public streets, lanes or alleys of the city where the party against whom the same is filed claims a right of property. Section 21, c. 207, Vol. 17, Laws of Delaware.
The method and nature of an appeal from summary convictions before justices of the peace in England are described in Chapter 4, Vol. 2, of the first American edition in Chitty’s Practice. The1 ‘conviction,” which is the record sent to the Sessions, contains the original complaint or information, the appearance, the arraignment, the evidence by which the justice- arrives at his verdict, and the sentence imposed by the court. This ‘ ‘conviction’ ’ is open to quashal for errors either in law or in fact and it is clear that an appeal gives the appellant any advantage which he might have had by certiorari and in addition thereto the added advantage of having the appellate court determine whether there are grounds for error in connection with the testimony. The sole difference between an appeal and a certiorari is that the former constitutes a broader remed;”- provided only in certain cases.
So far'ás counsel for the plaintiff in error has been able to ascertain this is the first case appealed to the Court of General Sessions in which the definition or the description of the offense, as charged before the magistrate, ha,s been substantially modified or amended by the Attorney General. In the case of Bradfield v. State, 5 Boyce, 262, 92 Atl. 988, which was an appeal from the Municipal Court to the Court of General Sessions involving the same offense chárged in this case, the new information filed by the Attorney General followed the exact wording of the original information in the statement of the offense. The state can scarcely rely upon practice to support its new information and then disregard the practice as established in the Bradfield and other cases. There is no authority either at common law or under our statutes for the filing of a new information.
That the information filed by the Attorney General failed to correspond with the record of the prosecution below in the cause of action and raised issues which were not the issues before the Municipal Court.
Assuming for a moment that the case on appeal is properly de nemo as to the pleadings, it is nevertheless trae that the case is the same as the one upon which the judgment was entered below. Even in civil appeals where the procedure is naturally relaxed, the pro-narr. must conform to the transcript. If it should appear that the pro-narr. failed to correspond with the record of the case below in the cause of action, it would be struck out on application. 2 Woolley, § 1438; Townsend v. Steward, 4 Harr. 94; Norton v. Janvier, 5 Harr. 346; McDowell v. Simpson, 1 Houst. 467.
In those states in which appeals in criminal matters vacate the judgment of the magistrate and open the whole case for trial de novo in accordance with a statute to that effect, an objection to the, sufficiency of the complaint may be made for the first time on appeal Steuer v. State, 59 Wis. 472, 18 N. W. 433; People v. Belcher, 58 Mich. 325, 25 N. W. 303; State v. Howie, 130 N, C. 677, 41 S. E. 291.
That an appellant is to be tried for one and the same offense in both the inferior and the appellate courts is obvious in principle and well settled. 12 Cyc. 342; 1 A. & E. Enc. of Law, 627; Com. v. Blood, 4 Gray (Mass.) 31; Com. v. Phelps, 11 Gray (Mass.) 72.
What were the changes made by the Attorney General and what was the effect of them? With regard to the substitution of the phrase “without lawful excuse’’ as used in the information filed in the Court of General Sessions for the phase ‘ ‘without just cause’ ’ as used in the 'original information, it might reasonably be urged that the two phrases are synonymous and that the issues raised thereunder would be identical, if the General Assembly had not seen fit to differentiate between these two phrases, and to use them in contradistihction to each other.
Under the strict rulings properly applicable to criminal pleading, it might well be held that no offense was charged in the information filed in the Municipal Court, by reason of the failure to use proper words to negative the exception contained in the statute.
The insertion in the new information filed by the Attorney General of the name of the person alleged to be injured was held by the learned Court of General Sessions not to change the offense charged, but to set it out more specifically. The court said:
‘ ‘If it could have any effect it would be to limit the scope of the evidence necessary to be met by the appellant and would be to his advantage rather than to his disadvantage."
It is respectively submitted that the appellant was unmistakably entitled to this advantage before any judgment of the Municipal Court could have been legally rendered against him. • It was not to acquire advantages of which he had been deprived that the appellant went into the Court of General Sessions, but to seek a reversal of the judgment of the Municipal Court because he had been deprived of advantages secured to him by the fundamental principles of criminal law. Persons other than the defendant and particularly the persons injured are universally required to be alleged in criminal proceedings for the identification as well as the material description of the offense. State v. Walker, 3 Harr. 547; State v. Pollock, 105 Mo. App. 273, 79 S. W. 980; State v. Irvin, 5 Blackf. (Ind) 343; Butler v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 280; 1 Chitty, Cr. Law, *213; 3 Whart. Cr. Law, §2445; Bac. Abr. Indict. G. 2; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25, §71; 10 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 505, 506.
Brown v. Mayor of Mobile, 23 Ala. 722, and State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa, 485, are exactly in point and state the unquestioned law. See, also, Irving v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep. 615, 166 S. W. 1166.
The reason for this and other similar rules of pleading in criminal matters is stated in 1 Bishop’s Crim. Pro. §517 et seq.
What constitute ‘ ‘without lawful excuse’ ’ and ‘ ‘in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ ’ under the statute?
Assuming that said Municipal Court had jurisdiction in this case and that the information filed by the Attorney General was properly and regularly filed, nevertheless the Court of General Sessions erred when it refused to enter a judgment of not guilty on the grounds that the state had failed to show that the minor child of the plaintiff in error was “in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ ’ or that the plaintiff in error had neglected to support his child “without lawful excuse.” Taking the latter phrase first, it is obvious that “without lawful excuse’ ’ means something. State v. Langley, 248 Mo. 545, 154 S. W. 713.
The state did not prove that the neglect of the plaintiff in error was ‘ ‘without lawful excuse.”
The testimony of the plaintiff in error contradicts much of the testimony of Mrs. Donaghy; but assuming the testimony of the latter to be entirely true in every particular, it is nevertheless submitted: First, that the plaintiff in error had a right to establish the domicile of the family; and second, that it was the duty of the wife to live in the domicile established by him. It is well settled that where a husband is ready and willing to take care of his wife and children, but the wife refuses to live with him and retains the custody of the children, the husband cannot be subsequently convicted of failing to support the children. People ex. rel. Mueller v. Mueller, 164 App. Div. 386, 150 N. Y. Supp. 204; People v. Rubens, 92 N. Y. Supp. 121. The state can cite no authority under the so-called Uniform Non-Support Act or under the general poor laws, where it has been held that a father, who is willing, ready and desirous of supporting his child, is guilty of neglect to support that child by reason of the fact that he fails to support it, so so long as it is kept out of his custody.
A still more important question is the meaning of the phrase, “in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ ’ as used in the act. There are two lines of cases: the one holding that the father is guilty of a misdemeanor even though the wants of the child be amply supplied by relatives or friends; the other holding that the father cannot be convicted unless it be shown that the child is actually in destitute or necessitous circumstances. It is respectfully submitted that the latter line of cases is founded in good reason and justice and that the learned court below erred in holding the contrary. See State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S. W. 519, 32 L.R. A. (N. S.) 841; Dalton v. State, 118 Ga. 196, 44 S. E. 977; Baldwin v. State, 118 Ga. 328, 45 S. E. 399; Williams v. State, 121 Ga. 195, 48 S. E. 938; Mays v. State, 123 Ga. 507, 51 S. E. 503; Williams v. State, 126 Ga. 637, 55 S. E. 480; Richie v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1237, 64 S. W. 979.
In the case before the court, the testimony shows that since the separation of the husband and wife, the child and its mother have lived with the mother’s father, Charles G. Guyer, and that the child has not been in want of necessary food, clothing or lodging while under its grandfather’s roof.
- The other line of cases are: State v. Stouffer, 65 Ohio St. 47, 60 N. E. 985; State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 126 Pac. 215; 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588.
Although the statute is the same, there is a marked distinction between the Kansas case and the case before the court, in that the husband in the former case did not offer his wife a home or ask her to come to any other place where he would support her. In the Kansas case the court held that the statute in question was not a penal statute but remedial in its purpose, although it provided for the infliction of a severe penalty, and that the rule that penal ■statutes must be strictly construed was not applicable, but that the statue must be liberally construed in order that the legislative intent might be accomplished.
It may be noted that the court went so far as to hold that, even if the necessaries of life were amply supplied by -the wife’s own labor, the husband would still be guilty of a crime. Under such reasoning what meaning can the phrase “in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ ’■ possibly have?
■ The whole theory of punishment for crimes is based upon the injury done to society and not the individual.
The judgment of the Court of General Sessions should be reversed:
First. Because the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington was without jurisdiction in the cause.
Second. Because it appears by the record that the Attorney General filed in the Court of General Sessions an information denovo.
Third. Because it appears by the said record that the information so filed by the Attorney General failed to correspond with the record of the prosecution below in the cause of action.
Fourth. Because it does not appear by the said record that the plaintiff in error wilfully neglected to provide for the support and maintenance of his minor child ‘ ‘without lawful excuse.”
.• . Fifth. Because it does not appear by .the said record that the minor child of the plaintiff in error was on May 1st, A. D. 1913, or has been at any time since then “in destitute or necessitous circumstances.” •
Argument for the State.
’• The first proposition of the plaintiff in error is: The Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington has no jurisdiction in the cases arising under Chapter 262, Vol. 27, Laws of Delaware.
The argument in support of this proposition is founded entirely upon the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
It is submitted that the doctrine invoked does not apply:
(a) Because the specific words assumed to limit and confine the general phrase “and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time * * * prescribe’ ’ have no common analogy to each other.
(b) Because from the whole constitution the intention appears that it was not intended to limit the legislative power of the General Assembly in the manner suggested.
The specific words assumed to limit and confine the general phrase "and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time * * * prescribe’’ have no common analogy to each other. State v. Eckhardt, 232 Mo. 49, 133 S. W. 321; Jones v. State, 104 Ark. 261, 149 S. W. 56, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 302; Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508, 42 N. W. 481; McReynolds v. People, 230 Ill. 623, 82 N. E. 945.
The only relation which the specific words bear to each other is that they are within that class of crimes known as misdemeanors. Within the class to which they all belong, they are of entirely different nature, and the punishments imposed respectively are to correct entirely different kinds of public wrongs, having entirely different characteristics.
Some of the offences specified are mala prohibita and some are mala per se. In this respect they are dissimilar. Some are common law crimes and others are purely statutory.
To be sure the specified offenses, were at the time the Constitution was promulgated, well known and recognized, but if that should be a classification which would prevent the General Assembly from extending or conferring jurisdiction upon inferior courts of all new misdemeanors which might be created because of the growing complexity of society or because of the ingenuity of criminals then the jurisdiction of all new misdemeanors would, regardless of their nature, have to be conferred upon the Court of General Sessions.
Nor can the enumerated offenses be classified as "petty misdemeanors.” There are only two classes of crime known to the. law of England or Delaware and they are felonies or misdemeanors.
Nor can the offenses specified fairly be called, as a class, “petty misdemeanors,” even if there was such a classification because some are inherently serious.
It is argued that the word ‘ ‘such’ ’ in the clause ‘ ‘and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly from time to time * * * prescribe’’is used to qualify the word “misdemeanors.” The word ‘ ‘such’ ’ is both an adjective and a pronoun. If it had been the intention of the convention to qualify the word ‘ ‘misdemeanors’ ’ with the word ‘ ‘such”, they could and probably would have used it in such juxtaposition as to indicate that intention, and. would probably have written the clause ‘ ‘and other such misdemeanors.” Century Dictionary also defines ‘ ‘such’ ’ as:
“II. Pronoun. Such a person or thing; more commonly with a plural reference, such persons or things; by ellipsis of the noun. ‘Such as sit in darkness and in the shadow of death. ’ ”
The word ‘ ‘such’ ’ is such in conjunction with the word ‘ ‘as” in lieu of the word ‘ ‘that’ ’ and the clause might as readily have been written and as easily - read “and other misdemeanors that the. General Assembly may * * * prescribe.”
Within the rule laid down above there is lacking in the, specified offenses that similarity which makes them of such a class having such a common analogy as to persuade that it was the, intention to limit the natural significance and meaning of the, general words ‘ ‘such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time * * * prescribe’ ’ or confine such phrase beyond, its natural and usual meaning.
From the whole Constitution it is apparent that the general legislative power with respect to the jurisdiction of inferior courts was not intended to be limited as suggested by the plaintiff in error. In addition to the case of State v. Eckhardt, supra, 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 437, announces the qualifications of the doctrine ejusdem generis:
The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘ ‘and such other misdemeanors :as the General Assembly may from time to time * * * .prescribe” is broad and unlimited except in three particulars: (1) That jurisdiction can never be conferred on inferior courts except by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly; (2) Jurisdiction can never be conferred upon an inferior court of a crime deemed a felony; and (3) The General Assembly cannot prohibit or prevent an appeal in any case where the punishment exceeds one month’s imprisonment or one hundred dollars fine.
From an examination of the whole constitution it is evident that the Constitutional Convention intended to give to the General Assembly very broad powers with respect to the jurisdiction of '■courts. Section 1, Article 2, and Section 20, Article 4.
The convention was not satisfied with expressly vesting the general legislative power in the General Assembly (Section 1, Article 2) but to emphasize the extent of that power over the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts, expressed itself as in Section 20, Article 4. It will be borne in mind that the clause ‘ ‘and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time * * * prescribe’ ’ and the proviso that there should be an appeal to the Court of General Sessions when the punishment exceeds one month imprisonment or one hundred dollars fine, are new to the Constitution of 1897.
The general words which give the General Assembly power to invest inferior courts with jurisdiction in any misdemeanor are a "corollary to the express power of the General Assembly to repeal or alter the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts. The three ■qualifications of the general power mentioned are indicative that they were the only limitations intended to be placed upon the General Assembly. It can hardly be urged that while the General Assembly had power, with a concurrence of two-thirds of its members, to create any inferior court {Section 1, Article 4) and had full power to repeal or alter any law giving jurisdiction to the Court of General Sessions and though it could divest, under the last mentioned power, the Court of General Sessions of jurisdiction in all misdemeanors, it could not invest one of the inferior courts created by it with jurisdiction of such offenses.
‘ ‘The people in framing the Constitution committed to the Legislature the whole law-making power of the state which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold. Plenary power in the Legislature, for all purposes of civil government, is the rule.” State v. Fountain, 6 Pennewill, 520, 529, 69, Atl. 926, 930; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.
An appeal is not a common law remedy, but must look to some enactment for its existence. In this particular case it exists by reason of the provision of Section 30, Article 4, of the Constitution.
The foregoing provision of the Constitution was not contained in that of 1832, and makes its appearance first in the Constitution of 1897, and consequently there was no law or no practice established in this state with direct reference to this provision. Since the Constitution of 1897 the General Assembly has provided no law governing the practice or procedure in the event of appeals under the foregoing provision, and that practice has arisen from analogy to the practice on appeals from the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington upon convictions for violation of a city ordinance. Pratesi v. the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 4 Pennewill, 258, 54 Atl. 694.
The analogy between the practice under appeals taken by virtue of the constitutional provision with that of appeals to the Superior Court from a Municipal Court is the closest for which any provision for procedure is made and was the more readily followed because, due to the activity and importance of the Municipal Court and the frequency with which appeals had been previously taken from that court to the Superior Court, a practice was established which could be easily followed and which has been, consistently followed in the Court of General Sessions in all cases upon appeal under the Constitution.
Practice in appeals provided for by statute and which was followed in the Pratesi case can only arise after an actual trial and judgment in the Municipal Court involving a sentence of imprisonment.
An examination of the records of the Court of General Sessions since 1897 shows the following appeals to have been taken: * * * (Twenty).
Except in the three appeals where a nolle prosequi was entered and another which was dismissed, there have been new informations filed in every appeal to the Court of General Sessions.
An appeal in a criminal case is different from atopeals in civil litigation. It differs in these respects: (a) No evidence comes up; (b) new testimony is taken; (c) an independent judgment is rendered in the appellate court; (d) no mandate is sent back to the lower court.
The information below sets out an offense. Assume it was not set out with sufficient particularity yet it unquestionably described an offense. The information above described a similar offense with greater particularity. There was no apparent inconsistency between the two informations; they were in harmony. If there was no conviction in the lower court in an appeal case, or if the conviction was for an offense different from that tried in the appellate court, it is submitted the defendant should be required to set the fact up by way of plea and if the case goes to trial on the merits it is to be assumed that he waives the objection.
In criminal matters of this kind two remedies are open to the defendant:
Appeal where the upper court hears anew all evidence, not confining itself solely to the evidence below, and renders a judgment of its own.
Certiorari, which brings up the record in the lower court for review for sufficiency in law. By analogy to the rule applicable to civil appeals from justices of the peace, the defendant should be required to elect which remedy he desires.
No prejudice has been done to the defendant in this case. If he had pleaded that the offense in the upper court was different from the offense in the lower court and had won on that plea, after hearing, he would have gone free. If on the other hand he had lost on that plea he would not have been prejudiced because then the fact' would have been determined against him. Instead of taking his appeal, the defendant could have taken a writ of certiorari and attacked the judgment below because of defect in the information. If he had won on this his rights would have been secured, if he had lost, there would have been a judgment affirming the judgment below.
The General Assembly had already provided a procedure in a statutory appeal in criminal cases where defendants had been imprisoned, and the Pratesi case established and defined that procedure. As has been shown that procedure was adopted and has been consistently adhered to in every appeal in the Court of General Sessions since the new Constitution. Until changed by the General Assembly, this practice should have all the force of statutory law of this state.
The Court of General Sessions and the Municipal Court have concurrent jurisdiction of the offenses in the non-support act. If a defendant should be brought before a justice of the peace he would be held to bail or committed to appear in either of said courts. If the defendant is held for the Court of General Sessions, he is indicted by the grand jury. If he is held for the Municipal Court and there convicted he takes his appeal to the Court of General Sessions and there an information is filed. By whichever route he may travel, he comes to the Court of General Sessions and the only difference in the procedure is in the fact that when his case comes directly from a justice of the peace he is indicted, when it comes by way of the Municipal Court he is informed against. '
If we are right in maintaining the practice established, then the information in the Municipal Court had no place or part in the Court of General Sessions for the one statute which defines method of procedure on appeal from an inferior court, provides that the ‘ ‘filing of transcript, modes of trial and forms of proceeding shall be as in cases of appeal from the judgments of justices of the peace,” upon which the transcript of the record only is filed.
The Constitutional Convention was perfectly cognizant of the fact that testimony is not preserved or taken in the inferior courts and when it provided for an appeal it meant an entirely different thing than that which is known to equity and admiralty jurisprudence where the whole record, pleadings and evidence, are taken to the appellate tribunal.
r,"? There is no warrant at the common law for trial upon a record, in criminal cases, but there is and the courts are familiar with proceeding initiated by indictment or information.
The plaintiff in error, having elected to have his case heard upon the merits, complains because the information is more specific and certain than that in the court below, but the proceeding being de now as to pleading, not only upon practice but upon the reasons therefor, there is properly in the appellate court no information with which the comparison can be made.
The right of the accused to appeal as provided by law in other •cases is preserved in the Non-Support Act. Section 2, c. 262, Vol. 27, Laws of Delaware. The General Assembly could not have meant the constitutional appeal already secured by the Constitution to defendants. At the time of the enactment of the statute, the right of appeal from the Municipal Court in criminal cases was provided for by Section 23, of Chapter 207, Vol. 17, Laws of Delaware, in which the procedure was specified. The law and practice being in this state it is respectfully submitted that the General Assembly knew of that law as to- appeal and the established practice and by the provision in the Non-Support Act adopted the appeal and procedure thereon set out in said section 23.
Upon appeal to the Court of General Sessions the whole procedure, is de novo, pleading as well as evidence, for the purpose of trying the case upon its merits solely and not for the purpose of raising questions that could be more appropriately raised by certiorari.
The third proposition of the plaintiff in error is expressed in his question:
‘ ‘What constitutes ‘without lawful excuse’ and ‘in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ under Section 1, Ch. 262, Vol. 27, Laws of Delaware?”
Under the authority of State v. Quinn, 2 Penn. 339, 45 Atl. 544, the phrase in the statute ‘ ‘without lawful excuse’ ’ need not have been alleged. But assuming for the sake of argument that the Quinn case is not applicable and the allegation is not surplusage it is submitted that the state showed that the failure of the plaintiff in error to support his child was ‘ ‘without just cause.”
It is hardly necessary to point out the distinction between these cases, viz.: State v. Langley, 248 Mo. 545, 154 S. W. 713, and Mueller v. Mueller, 164 App. Div. 386, 150 N. Y. Supp. 204, and the one at bar. In both cases the father endeavored to take care of his children even to the. point of bringing proceeding for their custody and in neither case does it appear that the father was to blame for his wife’s absenting herself. In the case at bar Donaghy inflicted physical abuse upon his wife so as to make her afraid of him and then would do nothing for his child, apparently using the child’s dependent condition as a lever to compel his wife to return ' to him. We have not had access to People v. Rubens, 92 N. Y. Supp. 121.
Coming to the question of what is meant by the phrase ‘ ‘in destitute or necessitous circumstances’ ’ there are two lines of cases, upon which the plaintiff in error relies and those upon which the state relies.
The former arise under statutes, or constructions of statutes, distinctly different from ours whereas the latter cases construe and apply statutes precisely like ours except as to the term of imprisonment.
State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S. W. 519, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 841, is founded upon a statute which is dissimilar to ours and which requires the neglect of the child to be such that ‘ ‘his life shall be endangered or his health shall have been or shall be likely to be permanently injured.”
The Georgia cases are considered in the case of State v. Bess, 44 Utah, 39, 137 Pac. 829.
As to Richie v. Comm., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1237, 64 S. W. 979, it will hardly be contended that to make a father a violator of our statute that he must leave a child to ‘ ‘starve or freeze.”
There are two decisions in particular upon statutes precisely like our own to which we desire to call particular attention. State v. Waller, 90 Kan, 829, 136 Pac. 215, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588; State v. Bess, 44 Utah, 39, 137 Pac. 829; also Brandel v. State, 161 Wis. 532, 154 N. W. 997.
To the same effect are the cases cited in State v. Bess, supra, and also State v. English, 101 S. Car. 304, 85 S. E. 721, L. R. A. 1915F, 977.
It was not only shown,that the plaintiff in error -was without excuse for his neglect to support his child but, while possessing ample ability from an independent income and ability to work to support him, used the justifiable separation of his wife as a mere excuse and pretext, leaving his child dependent for the necessaries of life upon the generosity of its grandfather, and the judgment of the court of General Sessions should be affirmed.

Opinion:
Curtis, Ch.:
Numerous exceptions to the record were taken by the plaintiff in error, but as stated by his counsel in his brief they involve in general only three questions, which were there succinctly stated thus:
"1. Has the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington jurisdiction macases arising under Chapter 262, Vol, 27, Laws of Delaware?
' '2. Upon an appeal to the Court of General Sessions from inferior courts under Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware,, may the Attorney General file a new information; and if so, in what respects may the new information differ from the information filed in the inferior court?
' '3. What constitute 'without lawful excuse' and 'in destitute or necessitous circumstances' under Section 1, Ch. 262, Vol. 27, Laws of Delaware?"
This last point raises the question as to the sufficiency of the proof made in the trial of the information in the Court of General Sessions. The question of jurisdiction depends upon whether under the Constitution the Municipal Court could be given power to hear causes wherein a husband is charged with desertion and non-support of his wife and children. Article 4, § 30, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware provides:
"The General Assembly may by law give to any inferior courts by it established or to be established, or to one or more justices of the peace, jurisdiction of the criminal matters following, that is to say: assaults and batteries, keeping without license a public house of entertainment, tavern, inn, ale house, ordinary or victualing house, retailing or selling without license, or on Sunday, or to minors, wine, rum, brandy, gin, whiskey, or spirituous or mixed liquors, contrary to law, carrying concealed a deadly weapon, disturbing meetings held for the purpose of religious worship, nuisances, and such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may from time to time, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House prescribe.
' 'The General Assembly may by law regulate this jurisdiction, and provide that the proceedings shall be with or without indictment by grand jury, or trial by petit jury, and may grant or deny the privilege of appeal to the Court of General Sessions; provided, however, that there shall be an appeal to the Court of General Sessions in all cases in which the sentence shall be imprisonment exceeding one month, or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars."
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, invoked by the defendant, is a rule of statutory construction to the effect that where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. As has been said, such a rule is based on the obvious reason that if it was intended that the general words should be used in their unrestricted sense, no mention would have been made of the particular classes. The particular application of the rule made by the defendant to the constitutional provision in question is that the word "such" is taken to mean "like," or "of the kind," and that the legislature can give to the Municipal Court, or any other inferior court jurisdiction of misdemeanors of the same kind or like those enumerated in the constitution, and the particular misdemeanor of failing to support a wife or child is not like any other misdemeanors so enumerated. The case of Hull, 18 Idaho, 475, 110 Pac. 256, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, does not sustain the position taken by the defendant, because the general phrase there construed was ' 'or any such," which is quite different from ' 'and such other."
But there is an important modification of the rule as to ejusdem generis very pertinent in this case. Obviously the doctrine does not apply where the specific words signify subjects greatly different from one another. See State v. Eckhardt, 232 Mo. 49, 133 S. W. 321, quoting a fair definition of the doctrine contained in 36 Cyc. 1119, 1120, also cited in the defendant's brief. See, also, McReynolds v. People, 230 Ill. 623, 82 N. E. 945; Jones v. State, 104 Ark. 261, 149 S. W. 56, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 302; Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508, 42 N. W. 481. Is there such a similarity or relationship between the several criminal matters mentioned in the constitutional provision under consideration? Clearly they are all crimes of the grade of misdemeanors, as distinguished from felonies. In other respects they are public wrongs, having no characteristics common to all of them. Some are breaches of the peace, viz., assaults and batteries, and perhaps disturbing religious meetings, while none of the others are. Others relate to the enforcement of laws for collection of revenue, with only a remote bearing on peace and good order, viz., keeping without license a tavern, and selling intoxicating liquors without license, or on Sunday, or to minors. Incidently this class of criminal matters relate to the promotion and enforcement of morality. Disturbances of religious meetings probably involve a breach of the peace, but a broader pur pose may be to secure to the individual freedom in his right- to worship without annoyance. Nuisances are of many kinds, and do not necessarily involve a breach of the yeace, and rarely do. Chiefly they relate to acts or conduct affecting injuriously the public health or morals. They differ in almost every way from, every other criminal matter stated in the clause mentioned. It is clear, then, that there is no such general similarity between crimes that are distinctly breaches of the peace, those relating entirely to enforcement of revenue measures and those relating to the public health and morals, and so the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply here. The constitutional question as to jurisdiction is disposed of by the above consideration relating to the character of the above criminal matters without considering the punishments affixed thereto by the General Assembly.
It is not claimed that the Non-Support Act violates in any other way the constitutional provision above quoted, for it was enacted by a vote of two-thirds of the legislature, the offense created is not a felony, and an appeal was provided. As has been pointed out, the constitutional phrase ' 'such other misdemeanors as the General Assembly may prescribe' ' means naturally
and according to the usual meaning, as well as from the context "other misdemeanors such as the General Assembly may prescribe," and if it had been intended to qualify the word ' 'misdemeanors' ' to mean demeanors like those mentioned, the phrase used would naturally and properly have been "and other such misdemeanors."
It is argued that the Constitutional Convention could not have intended to confer upon the Municipal Court for the City of Wilmington jurisdiction of offenses like the one before the court, because the accused would have no right of appeal in cases where neither imprisonment for a month nor a fine of one hundred dollars is imposed. We are of the opinion that in every case where the payments imposed upon the accused would, during the continuance of his bond, amount to at least one hundred dollars he would be entitled to an appeal. That would cover practically every case, and be in harmony with the spirit of the law.
In holding that there was not in the section of the Constitution referred to a limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to give to the Municipal Court jurisdiction of the criminal matters contained in the Non-Support Act, no violence is done to the provisions of Section 20 of Article 4 of the Constitution, whereby a broad power is given to the legislature to change the subject matter to be adjudicated in the cotuts of the state of superior jurisdiction. B y the last mentioned section, after defining, by general words the jurisdiction of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Supérior Court, Court of General Sessions, Orphans' Court and Court of Chancery, power was given to the General Assembly to repeal or alter the several jurisdictions in any matter, or giving any power to either of said courts. This provision in terms relates only to those of the superior courts there named, and theretofore established and then existing, and not to the then existing inferior courts, none of which was named, or to any such inferior courts as may hereinafter be created. Neither does it inferentially limit the power of the legislature to alter the jurisdiction of any existing inferior court, such as the Municipal Court of Wilmington, by giving to it jurisdiction of other misdemeanors than those enumerated in Section 30 of Article 4 of the Constitution, as herein above quoted, for obviously there is no relation between the two kinds of courts, and besides (which must be conclusive on the point) in another section of the same Constitution the power to alter the jurisdiction of such inferior courts was expressly given to the General Assembly. The conclusion is, then, that the Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington had jurisdiction of the criminal matters contained in the Non-Support Act.
The next question relates to the procedure on appeal and the filing of a new information in the appellate court. An appeal to the Court of General Sessions from the Municipal Court having been taken by the defendant, the Attorney General filed in the appellate court a new information differing in some respects from that in the lower court, and it is claimed that this was error, and that the case must be proceeded with upon the record of the court below. The constitutional provision above quoted respecting the jurisdiction of inferior courts simply provides that there shall be an appeal to the Court of General Sessions, and there is not there any procedure provided as to the mode of taking or hearing the appeal, nor does any statute do so in explicit terms, but if at all only inferentially. Speaking generally an appeal effects a removal of the cause to another tribunal and involves a hearing de novo on both facts and law, as distinguished from a writ of error or certiorari, by the use of which questions of law only are subject to re-examination. By the constitutional provision as to inferior courts the General Assembly may by law regulate the jurisdiction to be conferred on such inferior courts, and the General Assembly gave this jurisdiction to the Court of General Sessions and Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington, ' 'subject to the right of the accused to appeal as provided by law in other cases." (See Section 2 of the Non-Support Act.) The legislature having given to the Municipal Court of Wilmington, an inferior court of the state, existing in 1897, the time when the Constitution was adopted, jurisdiction of the Non-Support Act, the duly established procedure of that court was naturally and properly adopted for the trial of cases arising under that law, including an information there filed in place of an indictment. With equal appropriateness the method of taking appeals from the judgments of the Municipal Court should be adopted, as the most natural meaning of the statute giving to the defendant convicted under the Non-Support Act an appeal "as provided by law in other cases," viz., in other cases which the Municipal Court had theretofore been given jurisdiction to hear and determine, and with respect to which the judge of that court was not sitting merely as a committing magistrate, but to adjudicate a cause. In the statute respecting the Municipal Court of Wilmington there are two sections to be considered, viz. Section 23 and Section 21 of Volunte 17, Laws of Delaware, c. 207. By Section 23 a person against whom a judgment has been entered in that court for violation of a city ordinance, and who has been committed for failing to satisfy the judgment, may appeal to the Superior Court, and as to procedure the act provided thus:
' 'The filing of a transcript, modes of trial and forms of proceeding shall be as in cases of appeal from the judgments of justices of the peace. ' '
In Section 21 of the same act, it is enacted that, if in a prose cution in the Municipal Court for a nuisance affecting the public-streets the defendant by affidavit claims a right of property in the street, further proceedings are stayed in the Municipal Court and the clerk thereof is required to transmit to the Court of General Sessions a copy of the record, ' 'and thereupon the case shall be proceeded in at the next term of said court upon the information set forth in the copy of the said record, in like manner and with like effect as upon an indictment for the like offense."
Do either of these sections, both of which were in force when the Non-Support Act was passed, provide a procedure for hearing appeals in cases arising under the Non-Support Act? Clearly the latter does not, for it is in no sense an appeal, but is a, change of venue, or transfer of the cause, in advance of a trial thereof. It is equally clear to us that the former section (Section-23) does furnish a theory of procedure, though the appellate tribunal therein mentioned be a civil and not a criminal court, and though a transcript refers naturally to the record of a civil and not of a criminal suit, and though the judgment of a justice of the peace in a civil cause is not analogous to a judgment in the Municipal Court upon conviction of a violation of the Non-Support Act. On appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court under that act the case is heard de novo in the Court of General Sessions as appeals to the Superior Court from a justice of the peace are heard, including a new information in the appellate tribunal correspond-, ing to the narr. in.the Superior Court. The case of Pratesi v. The Mayor and Counsel of Wilmington, 4 Pennewill, 258, 54 Atl. 694, confirms this view, and is pertinent here, for the offense of which the defendant in that case was convicted below, viz., maintaining a nuisance by obstructing a public street, though it was a violation of the ordinance of the City of Wilmington, was none the less criminal in its nature. The Attorney General had a right therefore to file in the Court of General Sessions a new information against the defendant, Donaghy, and the established practice to such effect is approved.
The next question relates to the variations of the new information from that filed in the court of original jurisdiction. The information filed in the Court of General Sessions differed from that in the Municipal Court in two respects, and they will be considered separately: (1) In the latter the defendant was charged with having committed a certain offense "without just cause," and in the former ' 'without lawful excuse." It was urged that by the act there were two kinds of offenses, one by a husband who ' 'without just cause' ' refuses to support his wife, and the other by a parent who ' 'without lawful excuse' ' refuses to support his or her children. There is so little real difference of meaning between the two phrases above quoted, even in the connection in which they are used, that they must be deemed to be synonymous, and, so far as those quoted words were concerned, not only was there a statutory offense charged in the information below, but there was also no real variation therefrom in the information filed in the appellate court. (2) The other variation between the two informations consisted in the omission from that in the Municipal Court of the name of the defendant's child, with the non-support of whom the defendant was charged, while in the information filed in the Court of General Sessions the name of the child was stated to be Henry Donaghy.
By the Constitution one accused of a crime is secured in his right ' 'to be plainly and fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." Article 1, § 7. Accordingly, it has been held that in an indictment for selling liquor by the small measure ' 'to one-," the name of the person to whom it was sold must be specified if known, in order to give the accused certain knowledge of the specific offense with which he was charged, though it would have been held differently if he had been charged with a course of conduct or habit, arising from a continuance of acts of the same nature. State v. Walker, 3 Harr. 547. Obviously a charge of an assault must contain the name of the person assaulted for the identification of the person injured, as well as being a material description of the offense. There is no doubt as to the general principle. The wise and wholesome language in Bishop on Criminal Procedure, §517 et seq., quoted by counsel for the defendant in his brief, must ever be had in mind. Without making a full quotation, the author says:
" Every fact which is an element in a prima facie case of guilt must be stated; otherwise there will be at least one thing which the accused person is entitled to know, whereof he is not informed. And that he may be certain what each thing is, each must be charged expressly and nothing left to intendment. All that is to be proved must be alleged."
But it does not follow that the information in the Municipal Court was defective in that in charging the defendant with neglect to support "his minor child under sixteen years of age," it did not state the name of the child. Undoubtedly the information in the Municipal Court must have the same degree of particularity in alleging the offense as is required of an indictment, for which it is a substitute. One important reason for such particularity is the protection of the accused if he be convicted from a second charge for the same offense. -
We cannot agree with the decision of the Texas court in Irving v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep. 615, 166 S. W. 1166, cited by the defendant, where an information which charged the defendant with desertion of his wife, without giving her name, was held defective on that account. Presumably a man has but one wife, and her name is known to him, and to say that he was charged with desertion of an unknown and uncertain person occupying the legal status of a wife. is unfeasonably captious. But the case of State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa, 485, cited by the defendant, is more reasonable. There the defendant was charged with cruelly and inhumanely whipping and beating "his. own child, being about three years old," without naming the child. A demurrer was filed in the lower court based on this objection and it being overruled and the defendant having been convicted, an appeal having been taken, the appellate court held the information defective by reason of the omission of the name of the child. Theoretically the court in the case cited was right, for there is no presumption that the accused has but one child about three 3'ears old, and he may have others within that description. But practically the omission is not a limitation on his right to be informed of the name of the person with respect to whom the offense was committed. If as is the fact in this case he has but one child, he knows to whom the charge refers. This principle must not be extended beyond the relationship .of parent and child, or husband and wife, for it is based on the peculiar features' of that relationship. It'-follbws that the -new information in the áppellaté court was not-demurrable- there if -the objection: be1 based on the-addition of- the'name1 of the child of the accused,1 and the 'reason of thetebtír'rib'eloXV 'is1 sensible''and; therefore',1 abtind: There-was ho efrór ih overruling thé'demtirrer based-on this'point; and the objections-to-the new information!are not sustained.'' As pointed-out bythe'brief of'thC'Attorñey'Géneral; -the!-facts of'the' cas'eS cited by the deféfídatit on this point ÉhOvf that théy áte'hot helpful. f. ' •" ' V'.-
The solution Of--two-questions which' temáiti to'be considered.-' depends largely upon questions of fact. It was shown as a4 Tact that- the-defehdanbdid notprovidefdrthe support and'iñáintenance of the child. - - It was- contended, -however; that1 it was not shdwn that 11 'without lawful excuse' ' he deserted or failed'tb support the' child or that the child was ' 'in destitute and necessitous circumstances.'' Was there ' 'lawful excuse' ' for the-failureOf-the accused-to-support1 his child? '"v
The excuse given was that his wife Xvould not come with the child to live with him in a place to which he invited her to come. But it sufficiently appears from the evidence, that because of physical violence shown to her by him she was afraid to do so. Under the circumstances, even if the mother did refuse to bring the child to live with his father, there was no legal excuse for the failure of the father to support his child. Undoubtedly a husband has a right to establish the family domicile and in general it is the duty of his wife to live in that domicile, and she loses some of her rights to support in case she unreasonably refuses to do her duty; but there are reasons which may justify her in living elsewhere and fear of personal violence from her husband surely is a proper one.
After a careful consideration of the facts, we believe the court below was right in finding there was no lawful excuse for the failure of the defendant to provide for his child, without more fully stating the reasons therefor.
Was the child in destitute and necessitous circumstances within the intendment, purpose and scope of the statute? A -child three years old, having no property, is in ' 'destitute or neces sitous circumstances' ' when the father can but does not, and the mother cannot, provide for the support of the child, though both mother and child be in fact supported by the child's maternal grandfather, who was under no legal obligation to furnish such support. This view of the statute, which has been called the humane construction thereof, is based on sound reason, as well as the great weight of authority of courts elsewhere, which have considered statutes almost precisely like that of Delaware. State v. Waller 90 Kan. 829, 136 Pac. 215, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588; State v. Bess, 44 Utah, 39, 137 Pac. 827; Brandel v. State, 161 Wis. 532, 154 N. W. 997.
In Brandel v. State, cited above, the court there announced its view, calling it the ' 'humane' ' construction of a statute precisely like that in Delaware:
"A wife is in necessitous circumstances when she does not have property or money available for such necessities or ordinary comforts of life as her husband can reasonably furnish, even though she has the clothing, furniture, and ornaments usually owned by a woman in her station in life or receives aid from others."
In State v. Waller, cited above, the court said of a similar act:
' 'The essence of the act is that a man shall not be allowed to_ shift the-burden of supporting his wife and children upon others under no obligation tofo ear it, and possibly upon the state itself. Therefore, whenever a husband, without just cause, neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife and thereby places her in such a situation that she stands, in need of the necessaries of life, it is not material that they are supplied by her own labor or by sympathizing relatives, friends, or strangers, so that she .does not infact suffer from privation. He is guilty if he leaves her in such dr-, cumstances that, without her own efforts or outside help, she would lack the-, necessaries of life."
In State v. Bess, cited above, the court said:
' 'The fact that the destitution and suffering of the children were relieved by the acts of kind and charitable friends does not, as counsel seem to contend, exculpate the defendant for his dereliction, if he were wilfully derelict in failing to relieve the wants and suffering of the children by providing them with the-' common necessaries of life."
In this case the court viewed the statute as not only providing a punishment for dereliction of duty of a parent, but also a means of enforcing the continuing liability to provide support. Its. object is not only to protect the state against the effects of pauperism, but also to actually secure to the wife or child money for food, raiment and shelter. This double purpose is evident in the Delaware act, for it provides not only punishment, but also enforces payment of money for wife or child by requiring the parent to give a bond or recognizance for the purpose with surety. Such an act is not made ineffective in cases where other persons provide the support for a wife or child who would be hungry, or naked or unsheltered, unless provided for by the state or by friends, relatives or charitable persons, for the person who ought to pay therefor has not been made to do so. We cannot consent to an interpretation of the act which would relieve a parent from all liability under the act to support his infant child until it was actually starving, naked or homeless. The parent's liability exists under it when, so far as anything he has done, the child would have starved, become naked or homeless, for in such case the child is in destitute and necessitous circumstances.
The conclusion is, that there is no error in the record and none of the assignments of error are sustained.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Pennewill, C. J., concurred.