Case Name: LEONARD P. JONES et al., Cross-complainants and Appellants, v. CARL F. GREWE et al., Cross-defendants and Respondents
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1987-02-24
Citations: 189 Cal. App. 3d 950
Docket Number: No. B012541
Parties: LEONARD P. JONES et al., Cross-complainants and Appellants, v. CARL F. GREWE et al., Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 189
Pages: 950–960

Head Matter:
[No. B012541.
Second Dist., Div. Three.
Feb. 24, 1987.]
LEONARD P. JONES et al., Cross-complainants and Appellants, v. CARL F. GREWE et al., Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Counsel
Girardi, Keese & Crane and James B. Kropff for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Stockdale, Peckham & Werner and Richard W. McLain for Cross-defendants and Respondents.

Opinion:
Opinion
KENNARD, J.
—Cross-complainants Leonard and Mary Jones (appellants) appeal from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer of cross-defendants Carl F. Grewe, Grewe Agency, and Stelling and Grewe Insurance (respondents) to appellants' third amended cross-complaint. Affirmed.
Background
On September 28,1979, Linda Leriget, a minor, sustained serious injuries when she fell into the swimming pool of an apartment building in which her parents were tenants and which was owned by appellants. The Lerigets brought an action against appellants for negligence. Under a stipulated judgment entered on August 6, 1982, appellants agreed to settle the case for $1.5 million. The Lerigets agreed not to record, enter, or execute on the $1.5 million judgment provided appellants would (1) pay the Lerigets a total of $200,000, and (2) transfer to the Lerigets any legal rights appellants had against respondents, who were the insurance brokers who had sold appellants $300,000 in liability insurance for the apartment building in question.
Appellants filed a cross-complaint against respondents. In a cause of action for negligence, appellants' third amended cross-complaint alleged that respondents had a fiduciary duty towards appellants, and that respondents breached that duty when they failed to provide appellants with liability insurance sufficient to protect their personal assets and satisfy the $1.5 million judgment entered against them in August 1982. The complaint also alleged that respondents held themselves out as insurance consultants and experts; that respondents had taken care of appellants' insurance needs for 10 years, during which time appellants relied on respondents' expertise; and that respondents "expressly and impliedly" represented to appellants that their insurance protection was adequate. The complaint further alleged that on November 28, 1977, appellants bought a liability insurance policy through respondents covering appellants' apartment building for an amount up to $300,000. The policy was in effect on September 28, 1979, the date on which the young child of tenants in appellants' apartment building fell into the swimming pool.
Respondents demurred, arguing that they did not have a duty to provide appellants with liability insurance sufficient to "cover every conceivable eventuality," and therefore the complaint had failed to state a cause of action for negligence. The trial court agreed, and sustained the demurrer to the third amended cross complaint without leave to amend. This appeal by appellants followed.
Issue
In a case of first impression we are asked to decide whether respondents owed appellants a legal duty of care to provide them with a policy of liability insurance sufficient to protect their personal assets and to satisfy any judgment against appellants arising out of the latter's negligent acts.
Discussion
Because this appeal arises from a judgment entered after the sustaining of a demurrer, we must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of the complaint in evaluating the propriety of the trial court's action. (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330]; Baldwin v. Zoradi (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 275, 278 [176 Cal.Rptr. 809].) A pleading must allege facts and not mere conclusions. (Vilardo v. County of Sacramento (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 413, 418 [129 P.2d 165].) "The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading by raising questions of law." (Baldwin v. Zoradi, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 278.)
A complaint in an action for negligence must allege (1) the defendant's legal duty of care towards the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff as a proximate result of the breach, and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading § 527, p. 558.) A complaint which lacks facts to show that a duty of care was owed is fatally defective. (Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 820 [131 Cal.Rptr. 854].)
Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law for the court. (Wilson v. All Service Ins. Corp. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 793, 796 [153 Cal.Rptr. 121]; Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist. (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-9 [31 Cal.Rptr. 847].) Also, whether, and the extent to which, a new duty is recognized is ultimately a question of public policy. (Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., supra.)
Ordinarily, an insurance agent assumes only those duties normally found in any agency relationship. This includes the obligation to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured. (3 Couch on Insurance (2d ed. 1984) Duties and Liabilities of Agent, § 25:37, p. 336.) The mere existence of such a relationship imposes no duty on the agent to advise the insured on specific insurance matters. (Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. (Iowa 1984) 343 N.W.2d 457,464; 16A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 8836, pp. 64-66.) "An agent may point out to [the insured] the advantages of additional coverage and may ferret out additional facts from the insured applicable to such coverage, but he is under no obligation to do so; nor is the insured under an obligation to respond." (Hill v. Grandey (1974) 132 Vt. 460 [321 A.2d 28, 34].)
An agent may, however, assume additional duties by an express agreement or a holding out. (Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 343 N.W.2d 457, 464; 16A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra, § 8836, pp. 65-66.) Accordingly, the agent may be liable to the insured for losses which resulted as a breach of that special duty. (Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 464-465; 16A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra, § 8836, pp. 64-66.) The insured may sue for breach of the agreement, or he may sue in tort for negligent breach of the duty imposed by the agreement. (Haurat v. Superior Court (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 330, 334 [50 Cal.Rptr. 520]; Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 747.)
In arguing that appellants breached their duty in not providing respondents with adequate liability coverage, respondents rely on Greenfield v. Insurance Inc. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 803 [97 Cal.Rptr. 164] and Westrick v. State Farm Insurance (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 685 [187 Cal.Rptr. 214], Such reliance is misplaced. Neither case stands for the proposition that an insurance agent or broker has a duty to obtain liability coverage for an insured in an amount sufficient to satisfy any judgment arising out of an action for negligence brought against the insured by a third party.
Greenfield involved the negligent failure of an agent to obtain the coverage requested by his client. In the case before us, appellants sought liability insurance, and respondents did procure such coverage.
In Westrick, the insurance agent negligently failed to inform the insured that a welding truck which the insured sought to insure and which was later involved in an accident was not covered by the insured's existing policy. Unlike the situation in Westrick, the present case does not involve a failure by respondents to explain any exclusions in the policy.
Both Greenfield and Westrick involved a breach of the general duty owed by the agent to the insured. In Greenfield the court observed that an insurer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in seeking coverage as requested by the insured, and violates that duty by not obtaining the coverage. (19 Cal.App.3d at p. 811.) In Westrick, based on the insured's prior inquiries regarding coverage of a welding truck under his existing policy and the agent's superior knowledge of the scope of an automatic coverage clause under the policy, the court held the agent had a duty to explain the limiting provisions to the insured. (137 Cal.App.3d at p. 692.) Westrick's holding reiterates what California courts have recognized for some time, namely, that it is an insurer's duty to inform the insured of his rights and obligations under the policy, particularly when an insured's apparent lack of knowledge may result in a loss of benefits or a forfeiture of rights. (See, e.g., Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern California (1979) 25 Cal.3d 418, 428 [158 Cal.Rptr. 828,600 P.2d 1060]; Walker v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 518, 523-524 [63 Cal.Rptr. 45,432 P.2d 741]; Hawkinsw. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 116,125 [331 P.2d 742].) This obligation is included in the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which an insurer owes its insured. (Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern California, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 427-428.)
The general duty of reasonable care which an insurance agent owes his client does not include the obligation to procure a policy affording the client complete liability protection, as appellants seek to impose here.
The issue we must resolve is whether the complaint has alleged facts from which a special or greater duty could reasonably be inferred. The complaint did not allege the existence of an express agreement creating a broader agency relationship in which respondents were to advise, suggest and procure for appellants liability insurance in an amount sufficient to protect appellants' personal assets and satisfy any judgment against appellants arising out of the latter's negligent acts.
The mere allegation in a complaint, as in this case, that an insured has purchased insurance from an insurance agent for several years and followed his advice on certain insurance matters is insufficient to imply the existence of a greater duty. Such reliance is not at all uncommon when an insured has done business with an insurance agency over a period of time. (Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 343 N.W.2d 457, 465; Collegiate Mfg. Co. v. McDowell's Agency, Inc. (Iowa 1972) 200 N.W.2d 854, 856, 858.) Nor can the existence of a broader agency relationship warranting the imposition of a greater duty be reasonably inferred from the complaint's allegation that respondents had assured appellants of the adequacy of their liability coverage. As the court noted in Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 343 N.W.2d 457, an insured's request for "sufficient coverage" and an agent's assurance that the policy provided "adequate" coverage do not, in and by themselves, imply an "expanded principal-agent relationship." Such an exchange usually occurs within the context of the general principal-agent relationship. "Purchasers of insurance generally seek 'sufficient coverage.' " (Id. at p. 465.) To imply the existence of a broader agency agreement from such an exchange, the Sandbulte court said, would in effect make the agent "a blanket insurer for his principal." (Ibid.)
An insurance policy arises out of the insured's desire to be protected in a particular manner against a specific kind of obligation. It is the insured's responsibility to advise the agent of the insurance he wants, including the limits of the policy to be issued. (Manzer v. Pentico (1981) 209 Neb. 364 [307 N.W.2d 812, 813]; Hilly. Grandey, supra, 321 A.2d 28, 34.) Ordinarily, the person seeking liability insurance knows better than the insurance agent the extent of his personal assets, and the premium he can afford or is willing to pay. Here, the complaint did not allege that respondents knew the extent of appellants' personal assets. All we have is a vague and conclusionary allegation that "financial information" regarding appellants was made available to respondents. No facts were alleged from which it could be reasonably inferred that such information accurately reflected the extent of appellants' personal assets, and that respondents failed to consider the information in procuring a liability insurance policy with a $300,000 limit. Also, the complaint did not allege that liability coverage for $1.5 million (the amount of the judgment in the underlying negligence action) was available for the property in question, and if so, whether appellants would have been willing to pay the premium therefor. Nor did the complaint allege that appellants had delegated to respondents the burden of determining liability coverage in an amount which would have afforded appellants complete protection from any judgment arising out of a negligence action brought against appellants by a third party. Absent such allegations, appellants retained the responsibility of deciding how much liability insurance to carry and how much premium to pay.
Conclusion
We conclude that appellants' third amended cross-complaint has not alleged facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that respondents were under a duty to procure complete liability protection for appellants. To hold otherwise would, on the vague and conclusionary allegations contained in the complaint, drastically and unilaterally expand the principal-agent relationship. (See Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 343 N.W.2d 457, 465; Collegiate Mfg. Co. v. McDowell's Agency, Inc., supra, 200 N.W.2d 854, 858.) Neither an insurance agent nor anyone else has the ability to accurately forecast the upper limit of any damage award in a negligence action against the insured by a third party. To impose such a duty based on the pleadings in this case would in effect make the agent a blanket insurer for his principal. We fail to see where sound public policy would require the imposition of such a duty upon the agent, unless the latter has by an express agreement or a holding out undertaken that obligation.
Accordingly, we find that appellants' third amended cross-complaint has failed to state a cause of action for negligence, and the trial court therefore properly sustained respondents' demurrer to the cross-complaint.
Disposition
The judgment (order of dismissal) is affirmed.
Arabian, J., concurred.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.