Case Name: Stanley Bicknell, Respondent and Cross-appellant, v. Clarence Guenther, as Administrator, Appellant
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1965-02-25
Citations: 65 Wash. 2d 749
Docket Number: No. 36917
Parties: Stanley Bicknell, Respondent and Cross-appellant, v. Clarence Guenther, as Administrator, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 65
Pages: 749–771

Head Matter:
[No. 36917.
En Banc.
February 25, 1965.]
Stanley Bicknell, Respondent and Cross-appellant, v. Clarence Guenther, as Administrator, Appellant.
J. D. Searle and Hull, Armstrong & Vander Stoep, for appellant.
Donal D. Sherfy, for respondent and cross-appellant.
Reported in 399 P. (2d) 598.

Opinion:
Donworth, J.
This action was brought for specific performance of an alleged oral contract wherein plaintiff would perform work and services on decedent's farm and she, in turn, would devise all of her property to him. The defendant is the administrator of her estate. Both parties are appealing and will be designated by their titles in the original action.
The evidence shows that plaintiff had worked as a logger from 1930 to 1937. He had known the decedent and her husband for several years and owned a 40-acre tract adjoining theirs. The husband of decedent died in March, 1937. The plaintiff went to work for her on April 9, 1937, and worked regularly on her farm until June, 1961, when she died.
Nine witnesses all testified that they had known the decedent from 8 to 50 years. They had lived as neighbors and had had many conversations with her about her property and her relations with plaintiff. Their testimony was undisputed.
In 1949 and 1958, respectively, plaintiff built a machine shop and a lower barn on decedent's property. These were substantial permanent buildings with concrete foundations, sheet metal roofs, and frames of rough boards sawed in plaintiff's own mill. The testimony was that when these were being erected, decedent had stated:
" '. . . What is the use of having it down there? [Meaning on decedent's farm] . he is putting it there because it [the farm] will be his when I am through with the place. He is going to have all of this anyway, and he wants all of these buildings together. . He has worked and stood by me all these years, and more than earned anything that I could leave him on this property . . . This farm, the property, is his when I pass on. He has earned it three times over. . . . ' "
Plaintiff testified that, for 7 years prior to 1937, he had worked as a logger for $5.60 a day. When he went to work for decedent, he received $45 a month and room and board for 3 months. His wages were then reduced to $15 a month until October, 1942, when mortgages on the property were paid off. Thereafter, he received $45 a month until 1961, when he received one half of the net income from the farm until she died in June, 1961.
The testimony concerning these mortgages was that decedent had stated that the only'one who helped her was Stanley (plaintiff) and that he worked with her until they got out of debt; if it hadn't been for him she never would have maintained the farm, and that is why she wanted to leave it to him. " 'It is his. I am giving it to him. . . . He has earned it, the long hours he has put in.'"
There was testimony that plaintiff's relationship with decedent was much more than the usual employer-employee relation. He was treated as one of the family, and performed many more duties than those normally required of a farm laborer. Several witnesses testified that plaintiff had worked on the farm from early morning until late at night, week ends included, and, with minor exceptions, had taken no vacations. He furnished his own automobiles for transportation for decedent and her family from 1937 to 1944, and again from August, 1960, until the time of her death.
Plaintiff offered in evidence an unsigned will form in which decedent, in her own handwriting, had first made nominal bequests to relatives (several of whom predeceased her), and then provided:
"Fifth, to Stanley Bicknell, Executor for faithful services, since 1937 All other Personal Property and Realestate, Stocks and Money inherited or otherwise.
"Should said, Executor be deceased at my death, his said inheritance shall go to The Children's Orthopedic Hospital, Seattle, Washington."
This had been discovered in a bedroom in her house a few months after her death.
There was also testimony that a "Memo" in decedent's handwriting was found a few days after her funeral. It stated:
"Stanley shall have the use of my property and the proceeds thereof until his death, after which it will go to the Orthopedic Hospital."
Defendant's wife found this memorandum in the presence of both plaintiff and defendant. However, it was not introduced into evidence and no one testified as to what became of it. Defendant testified that it had been shown and delivered to plaintiff soon after it was found.
The testimony offered by the defendant was rather brief and did not conflict with that of plaintiff's witnesses.
After the trial, the court decreed specific performance of the alleged oral contract whereby plaintiff received the real property and personal property appurtenant to the farm, but denied specific performance as to the remainder of the estate, consisting of bank accounts and shares of dairy stock.
Defendant appealed from the award of any property to plaintiff. Plaintiff has cross-appealed, assigning error to the court's award of the bank accounts and stock to defendant and in refusing to permit plaintiff to testify concerning certain matters which are discussed fully below in connection with the cross-appeal.
The defendant's first 10 assignments of error are based upon the findings of the trial court that an implied contract was entered into whereby the decedent agreed to devise and bequeath certain property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be performed by him as agreed.
The trial court's findings of fact relative to the alleged oral contract and decedent's breach thereof are as follows:
"III. Plaintiff, Stanley Bicknell and Sarah Ann Guenther, during the lifetime of Sarah Ann Guenther, entered into a contract and agreement, express or implied, in which it was agreed that Stanley Bicknell would perform many and varied services for Sarah Ann Guenther; and Sarah Ann Guenther promised and agreed to devise and bequeath certain of her property to Stanley Bicknell in consideration of the performance of said contract by Stanley Bicknell. This contract was accepted by the plaintiff and Sarah Ann Guenther.
"IV. Pursuant to and in reliance on said contract and by virtue of the terms thereof and in performance thereof, Stanley Bicknell did remain on said farm (the real estate referred to herein) and belonging to Sarah Ann Guenther and performed his obligations as required in said contract, since April 1937, and Stanley Bicknell did remain on said farm until after June 4, 1961.
"V. Since 1937, and pursuant to the terms of said contract, the income from the labors and services of Stanley Bicknell were used to pay off the encumbrance on said farm and to generally improve said farm, buy equipment, livestock and generally contribute to the expenses of the operation of said farm. Plaintiff accepted a diminished wage during the later months of 1937 and until the mortgage on the farm referred to herein was paid off in 1942.
"VI. Plaintiff performed many and varied services including but not limited to furnishing transportation to and for Sarah Ann Guenther, and nursing care and personal services for Sarah Ann Guenther's father, Abe Amstutz; plaintiff worked steadily long hours and worked exceptionally hard; plaintiff took one vacation that amounted to anything, from 1937 to 1941[ ]; all of this conduct by the plaintiff was not the normal conduct of a person working for wages only.
"VII. Sarah Ann Guenther induced plaintiff to build a machine shop and another building referred to as the 'lower barn' on plaintiff's [sic] [decedent's] property. These buildings were of substantial size and value. Sarah Ann Guenther dissuaded plaintiff from building these buildings on plaintiff's own real estate which was located adjacent to the farm referred to herein.
"VIII. The deceased Sarah Ann Guenther had no obligation to support any of her relatives referred to in this matter.
"IX. No Will has been admitted to probate and plaintiff and defendant have been unable to locate any Last Will and Testament of Sarah Ann Guenther, although the parties hereto have made diligent search for said Will. By reason of no Will having been made, Sarah Ann Guenther broke, breached and failed to perform the terms and conditions and duties imposed upon her by said contract and agreement referred to herein."
Defendant has argued these assignments together under these headings: (A) Was there a contract? (B) Which property did it cover? (C) Does the evidence justify specific performance?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, we need not consider the other two questions.
Assignments of error No. 11 and No. 12 deal with the admission of the evidence of the two mortgages and their satisfactions and testimony concerning wages paid by decedent to the plaintiff.
The trial court, in its oral decision, said:
"There seems to be júst one question in this case, and that is whether there was a contract or not, and there certainly is no proof of an express contract. That is, no one heard the parties actually make an agreement, and, therefore, the problem is whether the evidence clearly shows that such a contract existed, express or implied.
"I feel that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the Plaintiff's contention that there is a contract to convey or will the tangible assets, real property, farm equipment, farm machinery, any hay crop that was present, farm animals, the personal and real property."
It is apparent, from reading the trial court's findings in the light of the above-quoted portions of its oral opinion at the close of the trial, that the court found that there was no express contract between plaintiff and the decedent relative to devising and bequeathing to him her farm and the personal property situated thereon at the time of her death. Therefore, the first question to be decided is whether, under the rule laid down by this court in Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 25 Wn. (2d) 702, 172 P. (2d) 189 (1946), plaintiff has sustained the burden of proving an implied contract by evidence that was conclusive, definite, certain, and beyond all legitimate controversy.
We have set forth rather fully the substance of the evidence produced by plaintiff. As stated above, there was no conflict in the testimony presented by the parties as to the material facts.
In the usual case tried to the court, we accept the findings of fact as verities if there is substantial evidence (as compared to a mere scintilla) to support them. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn. (2d) 570, 343 P. (2d) 183 (1959). In the case at bar, and in similar cases involving an oral contract to devise or bequeath the property, under the rule of the Jennings case, we have a duty to determine whether the existence of such alleged contract has been proven definitely, certainly, conclusively, and beyond all legitimate controversy. We are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to sustain this burden of proof, which is heavier because of the nature of the contract and of this court's skeptical view of such agreements. In Jennings v. D'Hooghe, supra, we stated the applicable rule, at p. 704:
"Cases of this kind are not favored and, when the promise rests in parol, are even regarded with suspicion, and will not be enforced except upon the strongest evidence that it was founded upon a valuable consideration and deliberately entered into by the deceased. Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572."
Contrary to the trial court's statement in its oral decision that the evidence "overwhelmingly supports" the plaintiff's contention "that such a contract existed," we are of the opinion that the proof of the existence of such contract failed to meet the test adopted in the Jennings case for the following reasons:
In the first place, there was no evidence as to when this alleged contract was entered into. Finding No. 3 recites that it was made between the parties "during the lifetime of" the decedent. Did the parties make the contract in April, 1937, when plaintiff started to work on the farm? It might be reasonably inferred that it was made later, although, in finding No. 4, it is stated that, in reliance on the contract, and in performance thereof, plaintiff did "remain" on the farm and performed his obligations thereunder from April, 1937, until after June 4, 1961 (the date of decedent's death). The findings fail to state what compensation plaintiff received for his services during the 24 years he worked on the farm, other than the decedent's promise to devise the farm to him. The undisputed evidence is that he received $45 per month plus board and room, except for a 5-year period beginning about July, 1937, during which his wages were reduced to $15 per month. Finding No. 5 states that, pursuant to the contract, the income from the labor and services of plaintiff was used to pay off the encumbrances on the farm and to generally improve the farm, buy equipment and livestock, and contribute to the expenses of the operation thereof. This finding can refer only to the 5-year period above mentioned.
The evidence of the decedent's promise to will the farm to plaintiff consists of the testimony of several witnesses as to conversations with the decedent in which she made statements such as, "I have turned everything over to Stanley"; "It is all his anyway"; "This farm, the property, is his when I pass on." Also, she made other similar statements.
Concerning such statements, we said, in the Jennings case, at p. 724:
"The evidence to support alleged contracts in the second class of cases is like that in the case at bar. That evidence consisted for the main part of testimony of witnesses as to statements made by deceased that he expected to leave his property to another. Expressions, '-has been good to me, and I will leave my property to him. When I die he will receive everything. If anything happens to me-will receive everything,' do not prove the making of a contract, nor does it indicate any of the terms of a contract."
After the death of the decedent, plaintiff filed a claim against her estate for services rendered in the amount of $304.35. This was paid.
July 12, 1962, the present action was commenced. This was more than a year after the decedent's death.
The law applicable to this case is discussed exhaustively in the Jennings case, supra, where this court, in an en banc decision, reviewed its prior decisions and stated, at p. 708:
"The pertinent part of Mr. Ellison's testimony with reference to what Mr. Tonjum would do is summed up in the quoted portion of his testimony:
" ' If Mr. Jennings would take care of his home, take care of the grounds, and wash his clothes, and take care of the property, and look after him while he was sick, that he wanted him to have everything that he owned, that he did not want his relatives to have anything.'
"This court has decided thirty-seven cases relative to oral contracts to make mutual wills, or wills in consideration of services to be rendered. In twelve cases we have held the contracts to be valid and in twenty-five cases enforcement of the alleged contracts has been denied. In order to show that the facts in the instant case are alike to those in the last-mentioned cases and dissimilar to those in the first class of cases, we set out the principal facts in all of them."
The record shows that plaintiff worked long hours daily on the decedent's farm for 24 years prior to her death for $45 per month plus board and room (except for a period of 5 years when his salary was reduced to $15 per month). It further shows that the decedent was pleased with his services, and, on several occasions, stated to her neighbors her intention to leave him the farm upon her death. There is some disparity in the evidence as to whether this intention was to leave him a life estate or the fee interest therein.
Whatever her intention was in this regard, plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proving the existence of any contract (express or implied) to devise the farm to him by evidence that was conclusive, definite, certain, and beyond all legitimate controversy. Our decision in the Jennings case is still the law as to the quantum of proof required in such cases and should control.
Referring to the trial court's finding No. 6 (above quoted), in which additional services performed by plaintiff are described such as nursing care and personal services for decedent's sick father, and occasionally furnishing her transportation, in our opinion, there is not even a scintilla of evidence that these services were performed under a contract. Plaintiff was employed as a farm hand at $45 per month plus room and board. Any nursing care performed by plaintiff for either decedent's father or her two daughters (one of whom had a heart condition) was performed as a volunteer.
This case does not involve quantum meruit or a quasi-contract. Whether, as a farm hand, plaintiff was overworked or underpaid during the 24 years he worked on decedent's farm is immaterial. He performed valuable services and received the compensation agreed upon by the parties. In the absence of the requisite proof of the existence of a contract to devise the farm to him, neither law nor equity-can now make such a contract for the parties, no matter how strongly the court may feel that as an abstract concept of natural justice he should have been given the farm and contents.
What this court said in Blodgett v. Lowe, 24 Wn. (2d) 931, 167 P. (2d) 997 (1946), in which the claimant had lived in the decedent's home for 23 years prior to her death, and, during that time, had cooked, washed, ironed, driven her car, and taken care of her yard, is applicable to this case. The claimant sought specific performance of an alleged agreement by decedent to give him all her property at her death. We there said, at p. 938:
"We are unable to see how a trial court could pass upon whether or not certain acts of one asserting such a contract were relevant or material, unless and until it was shown by competent evidence that there was such a contract, and the terms and conditions of such contract disclosed.
"We are of the opinion the instant case is typical of the situation last above referred to. While we are of the opinion the services performed by appellant in and around the home of Mrs. Buroker might have afforded ample consideration for an agreement, how was it possible for the trial court to say that the services performed by appellant were the services contemplated by the agreement, until an agreement was shown to have been made?
"We are clearly of the opinion that the evidence in this case wholly fails to show that deceased ever made or entered into a contract with appellant, such as alleged. This being true, it follows that the evidence wholly fails to show that the services performed by appellant were so performed in reliance upon the alleged contract.
"All the testimony of the several witnesses who testified in this case shows, is that Mrs. Buroker indicated that she intended to make some provision for appellant upon her death, because he had been good to her, but no witness testified that deceased made any statement directly or to the effect that any provision to be made by her for appellant was based upon any agreement, or the terms of any agreement, or specifically, because appellant was to take care of her for the balance of her life."
Plaintiff relies on Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wn. (2d) 941, 182 P. (2d) 49 (1947), and contends that this decision is in some respects inconsistent with our en banc decision in the Jennings case. In Ellis, it was established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there was a contract between the decedent and her sister (the plaintiff) at the time the latter came at the decedent's invitation and insistance from Rochester, New York, to decedent's home in Puyallup to live with her and care for her. The sister remained there for 16 years and performed the duties requested by decedent. This court held that the terms of the contract had been proven with reasonable certainty. The existence of the contract, while denied in the answer, was practically conceded on the appeal. We find no distinction between the Ellis and Jennings cases as to the quantum of proof required to establish the existence of a contract to devise or bequeath property.
In the case at bar there is no evidence to support the finding that a contract to devise or bequeath property existed. At most, it shows that plaintiff worked long hours as a farm hand and also performed nursing services and other such work not ordinarily performed by a farm hand during a period of 24 years. He received $45 per month plus room and board (except for the 5-year period previously mentioned). There is no evidence that his acceptance of this compensation was predicated on a contract that his employer would leave him the farm and other property on her death. In fact, he did not ever assert the existence of such a contract until 13 months after his employer's death. In the meantime, he had filed his claim with the administrator for $304.35 as being the balance due him for services rendered prior to her death.
The evidence shows that his employer was highly pleased with his services and that she expressed to her neighbors an intention to give him the farm and other property when she died.
In his brief, plaintiff asks the rhetorical question, "Is it probable or credible that Respondent or any person would work for these sums without a contract or agreement to receive some other compensation?"
As pointed, out above, it is immaterial whether the compensation received by plaintiff for his services were above, below, or equal to the going wage for farm hands in the community at that time. The argument that nobody would have worked so hard for that compensation without a contract with his employer to leave him the farm and other property is a pure non sequitur as proof of the existence of such a contract.
Such reasoning, if accepted by the courts, would place every employer's estate in jeopardy. Any employee of long standing could claim, upon his employer's death, that he had not been paid enough and that he had accepted less than the going scale of wages because he had relied upon a contract with his employer to leave him the business upon his death. In deciding the factual issue as to the existence of such a contract (which must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence beyond all legitimate controversy), the court cannot consider whether an adequate wage was paid to the employee, and then, if found to be too small, enter a decree of specific performance directing that he receive the business upon the employer's death.
The fallacy of such reasoning is illustrated in Sweetser v. Palmer, 147 Wash. 686, 267 Pac. 432 (1928), where a farm hand, who had resided on a 40-acre dairy farm belonging to the decedent and had worked there for 26 years prior to her death, during which period he had received room, board, and expense money (but no salary), instituted an action against her estate. He alleged two alternative causes of action: (1) a contract wherein he was to perform services for decedent during her lifetime in consideration of her leaving him her entire estate upon her death, and (2) for the reasonable value of his services for 26 years, being approximately $14,800. After a trial, the court denied recovery on both causes of action. On appeal, the employee practically abandoned his first basis of recovery and relied on an implied agreement with the decedent that he was to be paid the reasonable value of his services. In affirming the dismissal, of the action,, this court said, at p. 688:
"There is evidence, also, that the appellant performed work, during the period of his service, inconsistent with his duties as a farm-hand. He served on state election boards, acted as school clerk, and performed other services for which he received a consideration. He also, of course, received his board and lodging, money to procure his clothing and money to meet such personal expenditures as every one in his situation necessarily requires. It was shown, further, that Mrs. Hamilton bought Liberty bonds during the war period which she divided with him, and that, at a time shortly prior to her death, she had $1,200 in money, one-half of which she deposited in a local bank to the appellant's credit. She at one time consulted with her banker about making a will, and he caused a draft of one to be prepared in accordance with the directions she gave him, and delivered it to her. In this draft she named the appellant as a beneficiary to the extent of $2,000. The will, however, seems not to have been executed by her.
"The foregoing considerations seem to us to lead to the conclusion that the actual agreement was something different than the appellant contends it to be; that it is more probable the contract was one of joint adventure than a contract of hire, in which the parties agreed to work the farm together and divide the net earnings between them. But, be this as it may, the evidence, in our opinion, does not justify the conclusion that the appellant is entitled to any form of wage for the services he performed.
"Claims of the nature of the one here in question are not looked upon by the courts with favor, and are never sustained, except upon clear and convincing testimony. What we have heretofore said upon the subject we need not here repeat. ."
Since we are of the opinion that the evidence in this case does not establish the existence of the alleged contract conclusively, definitely, certainly, and beyond all legitimate controversy, we do not reach the other questions discussed in the briefs relative to defendant's appeal.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the judgment and decree entered by the trial court must be reversed with directions to dismiss plaintiff's action.
With respect to plaintiff's cross-appeal, his assignments of error raise two questions which are stated in his brief as follows:
"A. Should, the trial court have awarded all of the property belonging to Sarah Guenther at the time of her death to Respondent instead of only a portion of it?
"B. Did Appellant waive the provisions of R.C.W. 5.60.030 (Deadman's Statute) to the extent and to the effect that Respondent should be allowed to testify with reference to a contract and to transactions had with person since deceased?"
The first question must be answered in the negative. Since we hold that the existence of the alleged contract has not been legally established, there is no occasion for us to consider what property it covered. Hence, the trial court did not err in excluding from its judgment and decree the bank account and shares of stock owned by decedent at the time of her death.
The second question is whether the trial court erred in failing to hold that defendant had waived the provisions of RCW 5.60.030 (the so-called Dead Man's Statute) in regard to the alleged contract and his transactions with the decedent.
This assertion is based on two acts of defendant: (1) by failure to object to certain questions asked of plaintiff at the taking of his pretrial discovery deposition, and (2) by asking defendant certain questions at the trial relative to the memorandum found in decedent's house after her death but not offered in evidence. It was contended that, since defendant was permitted to testify as to his wife's finding this memorandum and showing it to him, defendant thereby waived the protection of the Dead Man's Statute. Incidentally, defendant also testified as to the contents of the memorandum and said that he had handed it to plaintiff.
As to the deposition (which was published in open court but never read in evidence at the trial), it contains, at the beginning, a stipulation of counsel that plaintiff waived no right to make objections to the testimony either at that time ór at the trial. Therefore, regardless of the scope of the testimony elicited at the time of taking of plaintiff's deposition for discovery purposes, the parties agreed that there would be no waiver of any objections as to the admissibility of testimony at the trial.
The trial court did not err in ruling that the scope of the questions asked at the discovery deposition (which the court stated was similar to the former practice of demanding a bill of particulars) did not constitute a waiver of the Dead Man's Statute because the questions asked did not concern a transaction with the decedent, but related only to the contentions alleged in the complaint.
Neither did the trial court err in holding, upon plaintiff's objection, that the testimony given by defendant relative to the memorandum was admissible. It is clear to us that there was no waiver of the Dead Man's Statute because defendant's testimony was not related to any transaction between plaintiff and the decedent.
Since we find no merit in either of plaintiff's two assignments, the judgment and decree is affirmed on his cross-appeal.
As pointed out above, on defendant's appeal, the judgment and decree is reversed with directions to dismiss plaintiff's action.
Defendant shall recover his costs in this court.
It is so ordered.
Rosellini, C. J., Hill, Weaver, Ott, and Hale, JJ., concur.
Apparently the figure "1941" resulted, from a typographical error and should be read as "1961."