Case Name: WILLIAM A. WHEELOCK, Respondent, v. MICHAEL NOONAN, Appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-05-06
Citations: 21 Jones & S. 286
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM A. WHEELOCK, Respondent, v. MICHAEL NOONAN, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 53
Pages: 286–298

Head Matter:
WILLIAM A. WHEELOCK, Respondent, v. MICHAEL NOONAN, Appellant.
Mandatory injunction may go to compel performance of a duty—also to abate continuing trespass by compelling removal of that which constitutes it—Continuing trespass.—The allowing ponderous articles, placed on land under a ¡permission to do so, to remain there after revocation of the permission and demand for removal, constitutes a continuing trespass.—Mandate, possibility of inability to comply with, within time required, as found by findings, not cause for reversal.
Defendant obtained permission from plaintiff to pile a small quantity of ' rock on certain vacant lots of his, upon the representation that he desired it to remain there but a short time only, and a promise that he would soon remove it ; under this permission, he, in the winter of 1879 and 1880, piled large boulders on the lots, covering almost their entire surface to the height of twenty or thirty feet. In the spring of 1880, plaintiff revoked his permission and required defendant to remove the rock. Since that time he has neglected and refused to remove it, although often requested so to do. By reason of the rock the property was unsalable, and plaintiff deprived of its use and enjoyment.
Held, 1. That permitting the rock to remain after the revocation of the permission and the demand for its removal constituted a continuing trespass, and as its removal involved great and peculiar difficulties, and as the duty of removal rested on the defendant, and as it would be extremely difficult to establish loss of rental value, and as plaintiff had a right to have his lots in a condition which permitted use and enjoyment and rendered them salable, and as compensation for the continuing injury could be obtained at law only by successive actions (Uline v. N. Y. O. & H. R. R. R. Co., 101 JT. 7. 98),—a judgment for a mandatory injunction, compelling the removal of the rock, was proper.
2. The case at bar does not fall within the principles of the case of Beck v. Allison (56 M. T. 366).
The findings found that unless the rock was used for paving Eleventh avenue it could not be removed in less than two years, and that the Eleventh avenue was not ready to be paved ; the judgment was entered January 7, 1886, and required the rock to be removed on or before the fifteenth of the following March.
Held, not cause for reversal, as the time might be extended.
Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Ingraham, JJ.
Decided May 6, 1886.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered against him upon the decision of a judge at special term.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
L. Laflin Kellogg, attorney, and of counsel for appellant,
on the questions considered in the opinion, argued : —I. Conceding all the facts to be true as the plaintiff has stated them, a court of equity has no power to grant an injunction in this case, for the reason that the damages suffered by the plaintiff can be adequately measured at law (High on Injunction, ed. 1880, 228 ; Coe v. Columbus, P. & I. R Co., 10 Ohio, 372; Coughran v. Swift, 18 Ill. 414 ; Winkler v. Winkler, 40 Ib.. 179 ; Paige v. Bell, 3 Band. 586 ; Akrell v. Selden, 1 Barb. 316 ; Sherman v. Clark, 4 Nev. 138 ; Mullen v. Jenning, 1 Stock. 192 ; Wooden v. Wooden, 2 Green. Ch. 429 ; Richard v. Kirkpatrick, 52 Cal. 433 ; Frasier v. White, 49 Md. 1 ; City of Council Bluffs v. Stewart, 51 Iowa, 385 ; Willard Eq. Juris. 276 ; Penn. Coal Co. v. Delaware, etc., 31 N. Y. 91; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315). The complaint sets up a contract to use lots of land for a short time for the purpose of storage, upon the condition that the defendant remove the stone placed there within a short time. The only damage the plaintiff can suffer would be from the want of use of these lots. If the defendant has violated his contract by reason of failure to remove, the plaintiff upon this breach would have a right to remove the stone from the lot. His damage would be simply the cost of removal, which, in a proper case, he could recover from the defendant. This remedy is simple and plain. It is hard to see how a multiplicity of actions, as claimed by the plaintiff could arise ; but if they could, they would arise simply from the fault and neglect of' the plaintiff in removing these stones upon the breach of defendant’s contract.
II. It is submitted that, as the stones are on the land by permission, there can be no trespass. If placed without permission, and the defendant was guilty of trespass, an injunction could not be granted (Troy & Boston Railroad Co. v. Boston, Housatonic, etc. R. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 107; New York Printing Establishing Co. v. Pitch, 1 Paige, 97 ; Hart v. Mayor, 3 Ib. 214 ; City of New York v. Mapes, 6 Johns. Ch. 46 ; Murray v. Knapp, 62 Barb. 566 ; Deklyn v. Davis, Hopk. Ch. 135 ; Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige, 607; Akrill v. Selden, 1 Barb. 316). In a case exactly similar to the one at bar, in Pennsylvania, it was held “that an injunction would not be granted against a party for placing earth or other materials on another man’s land. The proper remedy in such a case is an action for trespass” (Mulvaney v. Kennedy, 26 Penn. 44). Equity will not interfere to restrain a trespasser simply because he is a trespasser, but only because the injury threatened is ruinous to the property and will permanently impair its future enjoyment (High on Injunctions, § 701; Echlehart v. Schader, 45 Md. 505 ; Mayer v. Groschen, 30 Ib. 436). What future enjoyment will be impaired after the stone are removed ?
Counsel here commented on and sought to distinguish Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory (40 N. Y. 206) ; Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (16 Ib. 111); Taylor v. Christopher & Tenth Street R. R. Co. (1 Abb. N. C. 75); Calkins v. Bloomfield R. R. Co. (1 T. & C. 541); Delano v. Blizzard (7 Hun, 66); Engle v. Owen (3 Duer, 15). In Auburn, etc. Co. v. Douglas (12 Barb. 553), the judgment was reversed in 9 N. Y. 444.
III. An injunction should not be granted for fear of a multiplicity of actions. Such a claim in this case, it seems, is idle. There can be one action at law, to wit: damages estimated at the cost of the removal of the stone. After the removal what other damages could accrue? The plaintiff would have his land. The stone would not be there. No further injury could accrue. In any event, the general rule requires that an action at law should first be brought. This was established in Livingston v. Livingston (6 Johns. 497). The court of appeals affirmed the rule in Troy & Boston R. R. v. Boston & Housatonic R. R. Co. (86 N. Y. 107). But to warrant the interference in such cases (for multiplicity of suits) there must be different persons assailing the same, and the particulars upon which the relief is granted have no application to a repetition of the same trespass by one and the same person, the case being susceptible of compensation and damages (High on Injunctions, § 700 ; Hatcher v. Hampton, 7 Georgia, 30). In this case it is seen that not only could there be no multiplicity of action, 1st., because the damage could not be continuing ; 2d., that no suit had previously been brought; 3d., that there could be but one person to sue, to wit, the plaintiff.
IV. A court of equity would have no power to enforce a contract for personal services, and this is just the contract that the plaintiff asks to have enforced (Willard's Equity, 277 ; Haight v. Bedgely, 11 Barb. 501; Hamblin v. Dunnefred, 2 Ed. Ch. 522; Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 ; Kemball v. Dean, 6 Sim. 333 ; Flint v. Brandon, 8 Ves. 163; South Wales Railway Co. v. Wythes, 5 De G., M. & G. 880 ; Fallon v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill. [C. C.] 121; Booth v. Pollard, 4 Y. & C. 61; High on Injunctions, § 728 p. 79 ; Collins v. Plum, 16 Vesey, 454 ; Pollard v. Clinton, 1 K. & J. 462; Wheatley v. Westminster, etc. Coal Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 538 ; Heathcote v. North Stafford Railway Co., 20 L. J. [N. S.] 82, and cases there cited ; Ford v. Jermon, 6 Ohio [.Venn.] 6 ; 5 Wait's Actions & Defenses, 768 ; Pickering v. Bishop of Ely, 2 Y. & Col. 249 ; Stoker v. Brocklebank, 3 Mac. & G. 250 ; Hair v. Himalaya Tea Co., 1 Eq. 411; Richmond v. Dubuque, etc. R. R. Co., 33 Iowa, 480; Chinnock v. Sainsbury, 30 L. J. [N. S.] Ch. 409 ; Acker v. Phœnix, 4 Paige, 305). A court of equity will not enforce the specific performance of an agreement contained in a lease upon the part of a lessor to repair damages caused by fire (Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 367 ; 15 Am. Rep. 430).
V. If on no other ground, this appeal should be successful in this court, in modifying the decree.
Martin & Smith, attorneys, and George A. Strong, of counsel for respondent,
on the questions considered in the opinion, argued :—I. If defendant abused the permission given to him, exceeding it both as to the quantity of rock placed on the land and the length of time they remained, he made himself a trespasser. Still further, if he has kept this mass of rock on the lots after the plaintiff demanded its removal, then he has become a wrongdoer, even though it should be held that up to that time his conduct had been lawful. That was long since decided by this court, and the decision was expressly approved and followed by the court of appeals (Jamieson v. Milleman, 3 Duer, 255 ; Babcock v. Utter, 1 Keyes, 403).
II. The cases are numerous which hold that a mandatory injunction will issue to redress such a wrong. The trespass is a continuing one, and where a defendant has •committed an unlawful act, and the nature of the injury .requires such relief, the courts have not hesitated to command him to take affirmative measures to undo the "wrong which he has done (Corning v. Troy Factory, 40 N. Y. 191; Eagle v. Owen, 3 Duer, 15 ; Prime v. 23d St. R. R. Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 63; Calkins v. Bloomfield, &c. Co., 1 T. & C. 541; Delany v. Blizzard, 7 Hun, 66; Auburn, &c. Co. v. Douglass, 12 Barb. 553 ; Martyr v. Lawrence, 2 DeG., J. & S. 266 ; Bankin v. Huskisson, 4 Simons, 13 ; 6 E. Ch. Rep. 7 ; Spencer v. London, &c. Ry. Co., 8 Simons, 193; Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 588). It.is clear “that injunctions in substance mandatory, though in form merely prohibitory, have been and may be granted by the court” (Junction Ry. Co. v. Clarence Ry. Co., 1 Coll. 521). Defendant’s counsel urged in his brief at special term that equitable relief could not be granted, because plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. This claim was based on the proposition that plaintiff was bound to remove the stone and sue the defendant for the cost of removal, and his omission to adopt this course was actually termed a “fault and neglect” on his part. The only case in which this argument seems ever to have been advanced is an old one, but this fact is perhaps accounted for by the disfavor with which the argument was then received (Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y. 97). Certainly it is a novel idea that when defendant disregarded his duty to take these rocks away, it then became plaintiff’s duty, for defendant’s benefit, to undertake the task. On the contrary, the foregoing authorities show that it was a continuing trespass for defendant to leave the rock there, that a continuing trespass necessitates a multiplicity of actions at law, and that the necessity for a multiplicity of actions furnishes one of the strongest grounds for the interposition of equity. Defendant’s argument that plaintiff could remove the rock and then sue defendant for the expense of removal would have applied with precisely the same force to every one of the above cases, where a mandatory injunction was actually granted. It cannot, therefore, be any answer to the prayer for such an injunction. The distinction is very clear between a single trespass, with which equity will not interfere, and a continuing trespass, or repeated trespasses, which bring a case within equitable jurisdiction (Story’s Eq. Jur. [10th ed.] vol. 2, § 928 ; Meyer v. Phillips, 97 N. Y. 491). We may instance, while upon this point, the elevated railroad cases. They occasioned, the court of appeals said, “a permanent and continuing injury ” to property, and an injunction is therefore the proper remedy (Story v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 179). This rule was laid down in a case where the damages could be ascertained, and the issue of the injunction was by the direction of the court to be suspended, to allow these damages to be ascertained and paid.
III. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance. We submit that a court of equity may properly decree the specific performance of the agreement to remove (Jones v. Seligman, 81 N. Y. 190 ; Countryman v. Deck, 13 Abb. N. C. 110 ; McLallan v. Jones, 20 N. Y. 166 ; Malins v. Brown, 4 Ib. 403 ; Bennett v. Abrams, 41 Barb. 619 ; Story Eq. Jur. [10th ed.] § 146). Great stress was laid by defendant’s counsel upon the case of Beck v. Allison (56 N. Y. 366). But that case is explicitly based upon the ground that a court of equity has no proper machinery for supervising so complicated a matter as specific performance of an agreement to rebuild. It could not' enter into the question of the proper extent and quality of repairs. It was the same court which after-wards compelled specific performance of the duty of building the fence, seeing that there could be no difficulty in supervising the execution of such a decree.
IV. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, because there is no way of measuring the damages sustained by reason of the presence of the rock on his land. Defendant’s ' whole contention rests on the proposition, that plaintiff had “an appropriate and adequate ” remedy at law. And this proposition depends upon another, viz.: that it was plaintiff’s “duty” first to remove this rock himself and then sue defendant at law for the expense of so doing. The reverse of this has been reached (Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y. 91). A moment’s thought also will show that the doctrine contended for by defendant cannot coexist with one as old as the law itself, viz.: that of continuing trespass. Throwing a heap of stones on the land of another person is given in a leading text book as an instance of a continuing trespass, which gives a right to' sue de die in diem (Addison on torts [Banks’ Ed.], vol. 1, 332).

Opinion:
Freedman, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment enjoining him from keeping or maintaining any rock which he had placed there, upon the plaintiff's premises and directing him to remove said rock by a time specified.
The complaint alleges that in or about the year 1880, the defendant, who then held a contract with the city of New York to open Eleventh avenue, applied to the plaintiff, the owner of eight vacant lots bounded on one side by Eleventh avenue, for permission to pile a small quantity of rock temporarily upon said lots ; that in the course of such application he represented that he desired to place only a small quantity thereon and for a short time only, and promised that he would soon remove it again, as he expected to sell it for macadamizing purposes; that upon the faith of such representations and such promises the plaintiff gave the permission requested; that thereupon the defendant, without plaintiff's knowledge, piled rock, consisting largely of huge boulders, on said land to the height of twenty or thirty feet and so as to cover almost the entire surface of the eight lots ; that since that time the defendant, though often requested to remove said rock, has neglected and refused to move the same, and that by reason of the aforesaid premises the lots have become utterly unsalable and the plaintiff has been deprived of their use and enjoyment. The prayer is for judgment enjoining and restraining the defendant from keeping said rock any longer upon the lots described, and directing and requiring him, within such time as shall be fixed by the court, to remove all of the said rock from the said lots.
The evidence leaves no doubt that the defendant greatly abused the permission given to him, and that the plaintiff substantially established all the material allegations of his complaint.
It is claimed, however, and this is really the only point presented by defendant's appeal which requires serious consideration, that conceding all the facts to be true as above stated, a court of equity will not grant a manda tory injunction because the plaintiff has a remedy at law.
The question therefore arises, what remedy the plaintiff would have in an action at law.
The defendant claims that his omission and refusal to remove the rock, although wrongful, constitute but a mere breach of contract, and that the measure of damages is the cost of the removal of the rock.
The answer to that is that the duty of removing the rock does no more rest upon the plaintiff, than the duty of rebuilding or replacing the gate rested upon Crain in the case of Beach v. Crain (2 N. Y. 86, 97).
Moreover the evidence shows that there are great and peculiar difficulties to be overcome in the removal of the particular rock complained of, unless an immediate use or market for it can be found for account of contractors in the vicinity.
And, finally, it is to be considered that defendant's abuse of the permission granted to him, and his subsequent refusal to remove the rock when requested, and keeping it there after that, amount to a continuing trespass upon plaintiff's land. In this aspect of the case, the plaintiff can only bring successive actions for the loss of the rental value of his lots, but he cannot, in a common law action, recover once for all time, the total diminution of the fee value of the lots, because the trespass is capable of being discontinued, and the law will not presume that it will always continue. This has been expressly decided in Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (101 N. Y. 98).
These considerations show sufficiently that the plaintiff, upon the peculiar circumstances of this case, has no adequate remedy at law. A further consideration is that it would be extremely difficult to establish loss of rental value in vacant losts situated as plaintiff's lots are, and that the plaintiff has a right to have his lots in a condition which permits use and improvement and renders them salable.
For the reasons stated, and the additional reason that equity will, interpose to prevent a multiplicity of suits for damages, the case is brought directly within the decision of Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory (40 N. Y. 191).
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.