Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roy P. BALLARD, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-02-23
Citations: 956 So. 2d 470
Docket Number: No. 2D07-407
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roy P. BALLARD, Respondent.
Judges: CANADY, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 956
Pages: 470–476

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Roy P. BALLARD, Respondent.
No. 2D07-407.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 23, 2007.
Rehearing Denied May 18, 2007.
Jerry Hill, State Attorney, and Victoria J. Avalon, Assistant State Attorney, Bar-tow; and Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert J. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Petitioner.
Byron P. Hileman, Winter Haven, for Respondent.

Opinion:
WALLACE, Judge.
The State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from continuing to preside over a first-degree murder case that is pending in the Circuit Court for Polk County. Upon a careful review of the motion filed in the circuit court for disqualification of the judge, we conclude that the motion was legally sufficient. Accordingly, the circuit judge should have granted the motion and disqualified herself, and we grant the state attorney's petition.
Background
The defendant in the proceedings below is Roy P. Ballard, who is currently sixty-five years of age. The Grand Jury in and for Polk County indicted Mr. Ballard for first-degree murder, a capital felony, on October 19, 2006. The case was assigned to the Honorable Susan W. Roberts. The State promptly filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Mr. Ballard. The events pertinent to our consideration of the state attorney's petition occurred at a status conference in Mr. Ballard's case that was conducted by Judge Roberts on January 17, 2007.' The persons present at the status conference included Mr. Ballard; his attorney, Byron P. Hileman, Jr.; and an assistant state attorney, Victoria Avalon. An account of the events at the status conference follows. This account is based on the State's sworn motion for disqualification and on the court reporter's transcript of the proceedings.
The Events at the Status Conference
When the status conference was held, Mr. Ballard's case was scheduled for trial during a three-week trial block beginning March 19 and ending April 6, 2007. Mr. Hileman had only recently been appointed to represent Mr. Ballard after other counsel had withdrawn. After a discussion of unrelated matters, Mr. Hileman informed the court that the State was seeking the death penalty against Mr. Ballard. Mr. Hileman advised the court further that unless the State changed its position about seeking the imposition of the death penalty, he could not be ready to proceed with the penalty phase of the case in only two months when the case was then scheduled to go to trial. Ms. Avalon then confirmed to the court that the State was pursuing the death penalty against Mr. Ballard.
Immediately thereafter, Judge Roberts engaged Mr. Ballard in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: You're still 65. How old are you now?
THE DEFENDANT: I'll be 66 in May.
Judge Roberts then turned to Mr. Hile-man and said: "Could be . Well, you can imagine what I might be thinking." After receiving an affirmative response from Mr. Hileman, Judge Roberts turned to Ms. Avalon and addressed her as follows: "Okay. Is [sic] that might be a waste of the State's resources. You might want to reevaluate given his advanced age." Ms. Avalon made a noncommittal, but respectful, response: "I'll make a note of that, Your Honor."
After these remarks, the court and the attorneys had further discussions about scheduling the case for trial. Mr. Hileman emphasized the additional time and resources that he would need to prepare for trial if the State persisted in pursuing the death penalty against Mr. Ballard. Judge Roberts then turned to Ms. Avalon and engaged her in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Okay. What would be a reasonable time for the State to go get [the case] reevaluated?
MS. AVALON: With respect to whether or not we're seeking the death penalty?
THE COURT: Right.
MS. AVALON: As far as I'm concerned we're not going to abandon that position unless Mr. Hill [the State Attorney] himself says otherwise. However, I'll discuss that with him as soon as I can.
After further discussion, the court and the parties agreed to set another status conference in two weeks, on January 31, 2007.
As the January 17 status conference was drawing to a conclusion, Mr. Hileman announced that he would be filing a motion to continue the trial of the case. Judge Roberts then engaged Mr. Hileman in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to do that because there's a bunch of possi bilities here. You said that you could be prepared for it if all you had to prepare for is the guilt phase.
MR. HILEMAN: That's a possibility, Judge.
THE COURT: And there's a possibility, maybe not a probability, but a possibility that the State's not going to seek the death penalty. So, let's see how that plays out.
MR. HILEMAN: All right. We'll leave it on for now. And I'll file a motion later if I feel I need to.
THE COURT: All right.... And we'll see you on the 31st at 8:30.
MR. HILEMAN: Thank you, ma'am.
With that, the status conference was concluded.
The State's Motion for Disqualification
The next day, the State filed a motion to disqualify Judge Roberts in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330. In its motion, the State claimed that Judge Roberts' "comments regarding the suitability of the death penalty in [Mr. Ballard's] case show that the Court had prejudged the decision regarding the death penalty in this matter." In addition, the State asserted that the remarks that Judge Roberts directed to Ms. Avalon, "particularly [her] instruction . to have the State's intent to seek the death penalty reevaluated, create an appearance that [Judge Roberts] would disregard a death recommendation." The State concluded that Judge Roberts' statements at the status conference displayed a disposition to rule on a matter before hearing the evidence that raised "a reasonable fear of partiality."
On January 26, 2007, Judge Roberts entered an order that found the State's motion to be legally insufficient and denied it. The state attorney promptly filed his petition for writ of prohibition in this court. After a preliminary review of the petition and Mr. Ballard's response, this court entered an order staying further proceedings in the circuit court pending a ruling on the petition.
Discussion
Our review of the order denying the motion for disqualification is under a de novo standard. See Frengel v. Frengel, 880 So.2d 763, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In reviewing the circuit court's order, " '[o]ur task on appeal is to determine the legal sufficiency of the motion based on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hayes v. State, 686 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). If the motion was legally sufficient, then Judge Roberts was required to immediately enter an order granting disqualification and to proceed no further in the case. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f). The pertinent inquiry is not whether the judge perceives himself or herself as able to act fairly and impartially, but whether a party may reasonably question the judge's partiality. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla.1983).
With these principles in mind, we have carefully reviewed the State's petition, its motion to disqualify Judge Roberts, the transcript of the status conference, and the response filed by Mr. Hileman on Mr. Ballard's behalf. After completing this careful review, we have concluded that the challenged remarks made by Judge Roberts at the status conference may be reasonably interpreted in at least two different ways.
On the one hand, when the status conference was held, the trial of the first-degree murder case against Mr. Ballard was scheduled to begin in only two months. Mr. Hileman had only recently been appointed to the case, and he needed a reasonable amount of time to prepare for trial. With commendable candor, Mr. Hi-leman informed the court that he could probably be ready to proceed with the guilt phase of the trial on the scheduled date but that he did not have sufficient time or resources to prepare for the penalty phase if the State was actually going to seek the death penalty. Thus the question of whether the State would continue to pursue the death penalty against Mr. Ballard was critical to determining whether the case could proceed to trial as scheduled or if a continuance would be necessary. Judge Roberts' remarks appear to have been intended to encourage the State to make a realistic assessment of the case so that the court and the attorneys could intelligently address the scheduling issue. Viewed in the context of the scheduling problem that was the main subject of the status conference, one may reasonably interpret Judge Roberts' comments as intended to facilitate the fair and efficient administration of the case against Mr. Ballard, not as reflecting a prejudgment about whether life in prison without the possibility of parole — instead of death — would be the appropriate penalty if Mr. Ballard were convicted of first-degree murder.
On the other hand, we cannot overlook other implications that are inherent in Judge Roberts' remarks. After raising the issue of Mr. Ballard's age on her own, Judge Roberts invited the attorneys to "imagine" what she might be thinking. This invitation was followed immediately by Judge Roberts' observation directed to Ms. Avalon that pursuing the death penalty in Mr. Ballard's case "might be a waste of the State's resources." Judge Roberts continued this theme by instructing Ms. Avalon to have the case reevaluated "given [Mr. Ballard's] advanced age." Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the State could not reasonably conclude that Judge Roberts' remarks reflected a prejudgment on the issue of whether it would be appropriate to impose the death penalty in Mr. Ballard's case. The State's fear that Judge Roberts had prejudged the question of the appropriateness of the death penalty was thus a reasonable fear, and that fear was a legally sufficient reason for the judge's disqualification. See Konior v. State, 884 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Pierce v. State, 873 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Accordingly, Judge Roberts should have entered an order disqualifying herself in Mr. Ballard's case.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition, we vacate the stay of the circuit court proceedings that we previously imposed, and we direct the circuit judge to grant the motion for disqualification and to recuse herself from further proceedings in the case against Mr. Ballard.
Petition granted; stay vacated.
CANADY, J., Concurs.
VILLANTI, J., Concurs specially with opinion.