Case Name: DE LOS SANTOS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-01-10
Citations: 146 S.W. 919
Docket Number: 
Parties: DE LOS SANTOS v. STATE.
Judges: PRENDERGAST, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 146
Pages: 919–927

Head Matter:
DE LOS SANTOS v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 10, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, March 6, 1912.)
1.Indictment and Information (§§ 86, 87 ) —Sufficiency—'“Then and Thebe.”
Where an indictment for permitting gambling on premises stated the date of the offense and laid the venue in a certain county of the state, it was sufficient to refer thereafter in the indictment to the time and place by using the words “then and there.”
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 230-243;. Dec. Dig. §§' 86, 87.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 6946-6948; vol. 8, p. 7815.]
2.Gaming (§ 87 ) — Indictment—Sufficiency.
An indictment for permitting premises to be used as a “place to keep and exhibit for the purposes of gaming a gaming table and bank,” in violation of article 388b, Pen. Code 1895, as added by Acts 30th Deg. c. 49, was not insufficient because it failed to describe the kinds of table or bank.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. §§235-240; Dec. Dig. § 87. ]
3.Gaming (§ 102 ) — Instructions.
In a trial of a tenant for knowingly permitting his subtenant to use the leased premises for gambling purposes, instructions were proper and sufficient which, taken in a whole, required the jury to find that the premises were used for gambling purposes with the defendant’s knowledge and permission before finding him guilty, and further required that they acquit the- defendant if they had a reasonable doubt upon the question of whether he rented the premises to be used as a barber shop, and did not know they were being used for gaming purposes.
[Ed. .Note. — For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. § 301; Dec. Dig. § 102. ]
On Motion for Behearing.
4. Cbiminal Daw (§ 1159 ) — Appeal and Ekbor — Vebdict.
A verdict of guilty will not be disturbed where -there is evidence to support it.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Dec. Dig. § 1159. ]
5. Criminal Daw (§ 1173 ) — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Instructions.
Where, in the trial of one for knowingly permitting gambling on premises under his control, all the evidence was positive except that upon the question of knowledge by the accused, and the court instructed that the accused was not guilty if he rented a room in the building to be used as a barber shop and it was used for gaming purposes without his knowledge, error, if any, in failing to instruct upon circumstantial evidence was harmless.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 3154 — 3163; Dec. Dig. § 1173. ]
6. Criminal Law (j[ 1162 ) — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.
A cause will not be reversed for error which is not calculated to injure the accused.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3085; Dec. Dig. § 1162. ]
7. Gamins (§ 76 ) —Instructions — “Control of Premises.”
There is no rule of law which makes the civil law of property rights inapplicable to criminal cases, and it was not improper to instruct in the trial of one for permitting gambling upon his premises that one who rents the whole of a building and uses a part of it and sublets other parts is in control of the whole building within the meaning of the gaming laws.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. §§ 202, 203; Dec. Dig. § 76.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1549-1552; vol. 8, p. 7617.]
8. Criminal Law (§ 1168 ) — Trial —Witnesses.
Failure to place under the rule two parties summoned as witnesses for the state was not error where neither was used as a witness.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3129-3136, 3144; Dec. Dig. § 116S. ]
9. Gaming (§ 98 ) — Evidence—Sufficiency.
Evidence in the trial of one for permitting gambling in a building under his control held sufficient to sustain a finding that the accused knew that there was gambling going on in the building.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Gaming, Cent. Dig. §§ 291-298; Dec. Dig. § 98. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Webb County.-; J. F. Mullally, Judge.
Jesus de los Santos was convicted of permitting gambling on premises under his control, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
H. G. Dickinson and Hicks & Hicks, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig.- & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was indicted by the grand jury, charged with permitting gambling on premises under his control. The indictment reads as follows: "The grand jurors for the county of Webb, state aforesaid, duly organized as such, at the April term, A. D. 1911, of the 'district court for said county upon their oaths in said court, present that Jesus de los Santos in the count and state aforesaid on or about the 20th day of March, A. D. 1911, did then and there knowingly permit premises then and there under his control to' be used as a place to bet and wager and to gamble with cards and as a place where people did resort to gamble, bet, and wager, and as a place to keep and exhibit for the purpose of gaming a gaming table and bank; and the said Jesus de los Santos, knowing that said games prohibited by law were being played on premises under his control, did then and there knowingly permit said promises to be used, against the peace and dignity of the state." Appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment, alleging that same "failed to allege the kind of gaming alleged to have been exhibited on the premises, and fails to allege the kind of bank alleged to have been exhibited for gaming, and fails to give any description of said alleged gaming table and bank." In the motion for a new trial it is also alleged that the indictment "fails to allege the venue of the offense."
Presiding Judge DAYIDSON has written an opinion in which he holds the indictment fatally defective, citing the cases of Eylar v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 257, 39 S. W. 665, and Mohan v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 410, 60 S. W. 552. By reading the above indictment and turning to these cases, it will be seen they are not in point. In this indictment, after laying the venue in Webb county, Tex., it is alleged, "did then and there knowingly permit premises then and there under his control to be used," etc. No such averments were used in the Eylar Case, or the Mohan Case, but for the lack of such averments the indictments were held defective. In the case of Smith v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 443, 37 S. W. 743, this court held, Presiding Judge DAVIDSON rendering the opinion: "Appellant moved to quash the indictment on the ground' that, after the charge of breaking, in the language introducing the charge as to the intent to commit theft, the phrase 'then and there' was not used. In the indictment the charging of breaking is coupled with the charge as to the intent' by the conjunction 'and.' Ordinarily, where the evidence consists of a series of connected acts, it is necessary, instead of repeating the time and place originally alleged, to use the phrase 'then and there.' See Bishop's Cr. Proc. § 412. In this case, the act was the breaking, and we' think that the use of the conjunction 'and,' coupling the intent with the breaking, was sufficient. It makes the indictment plain and intelligible, and sufficiently extends the original allegation of time and place to the succeeding averments in the indictment. See Harris v. State, 2 Tex. App. 102." And the same learned judge who rendered the opinions in the Mohan and Eylar Cases cited, in a later case, Butler v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 289, 81 S. W. 743, says: "Appellant questions the indiatiment on the ground that in the closing part of the indictment, to wit, the allegation, 'and the said L. A. Butler did unlawfully and fraudulently take, misapply and convert the same to his own use and benefit,' etc., that it fails to show such a connection with what precedes as to embrace a proper allegation of time and venue. We do not believe this contention is sound. The indictment pursues the ordinary form laid down in White's Annotated Penal Code, § 138, omitting, however, in said clause above referred to the allegation, 'then and there' after the word 'did.' However, the indictment after alleging that he was county treasurer, and said funds, being $3,000 current money of the United States of America of the value of $3,000, came into his possession by virtue of his said office, and was then and there the property of Ward county, Tex., and the said L. A. Butler did unlawfully as above stated, etc. We think the conjunction 'and' here sufficiently shows the connection, and carries forward with it the allegations 'then and there,' showing the act of conversion was committed at the time and place before alleged."
In the case of Baker v. State, 25 Tex. App. 1, 8 S. W. 23, 8 Am. St. Rep. 427, this court holds: "We are of opinion that the indictment is substantially sufficient in both its counts, and that the defendant's exceptions thereto and his motion in arrest of judgment were properly overruled. The locus in quo of the house burned is alleged sufficiently, the allegation being 'a certain house then and there occupied, owned, and controlled by him, the said- Baker'; the words 'then and there' referring to the time and county previously stated." In the case of State v. Slack, 30 Tex. 355, Judge Willie says: "The words 'then and there,' as used in an indictment, are words of reference, and, when time and place have once been named with certainty, it is sufficient to refer to them afterwards by these words, and it will have the same effect as if the time and place were actually repeated." See, also, Campbell v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 604, 68 S. W. 513, wherein Judge Davidson again renders the opinion. Not only is this the rule in Texas; but in Bishop's New Criminal Procedure it is stated: "When an indictment has stated one time and one place, whether in one count or more, each repetition thereof may, and in just propriety should, be laid as occurring 'then and there,' instead of by the longer form of expression." Section 407 Bouvier's Law Dictionary thus defines .the words: " 'Then and there,' words of reference, and, when the time and place have once been named with certainty, it is sufficient to refer to them afterwards by these words." Hughes' Criminal Law, § 2726, says: "If the words 'then and there' precede every material allegation (after the time and place have been stated at the beginning of the indictment), it is sufficient." See, also, 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 129; 10 Ency. of Pleading and Prae. p. 519; 22 Cyc. p. 321; 8 Words & Phrases, p. 6946. In these references there are numerous cases cited not only from this state, but almost every state in the Union. In this indictment it is •alleged that defendant in the county of Webb and state of Texas on or about the 20th day of March, 1911, did then and there knowingly permit premises then and there under his control to be used as a place to bet and wager and gamble with cards, etc.
This sufficiently alleges the venue of the offense, and it was unnecessary to describe the kind of table or bank, but the allegations in the indictment charge an offense under article 388b, Penal Code, as added chapter 49 of the Acts of the 30th Legislature, and the court did not .err in overruling the motion to quash the indictment.
Neither do we concur in the opinion of the presiding judge in holding that the case should be reversed on account of errors in the charge. The charge, taken as a whole, is not subject to the criticisms contained in the opinion. Under the evidence in this case, it is shown that appellant rented a building divided into four rooms. A diagram is as follows:
The gambling took place in the room marked "X."
The sheriff testified: "I am the sheriff in and for Webb county, Tex. On March 20, 1911, about 9 o'clock at night, I went to the saloon situated in the city of Laredo, Webb county, Tex., known as the Cantina Blanca. I had been informed that gambling was going on there. I took the deputy constable, Jacobo Salizar, with me. This saloon is on Victoria street in a house having four rooms. The two front rooms are of brick or stone, and the rear rooms are frame. The saloon is in a corner room which has a door opening on Victoria street and a door opening on a side street, one of the avenues. Next to. the saloon is another room of the house with a door opening into the saloon. This room was used at the time as a restaurant. To the rear of the restaurant was another room used as a kitchen for the restaurant. On one side of the kitchen was another room of the house with a door opening into the-kitchen. When I arrived at the house, I went to the rear of it, and through cracks in the rear wall X looked into the room on the side of the kitchen, and saw some men at a table, playing cards. X then went to-the front of the house and entered the front door of the restaurant opening on Victoria street. I passed through the restaurant, entered the kitchen, and from the kitchen X passed through a door into the room on the side of the kitchen. In this room I found a number of men, gambling. They were around a table upon which was a green cloth, and they were playing a game of cards called 'monte.' On the table there was also a box containing several packages of cards, and also on the table was a quantity of money and chips used in gambling. When I entered the room, I saw a man with cards in his hands. He was dealing monte and the other men were betting. I told the man with the cards that the outfit was mine. I took possession of the cards, the box, the chips, and the money that was on the table, which amounted to about $22 in Mexican money, and $30 or $40 in United States currency. There were about 10 men in the room when I went in. There is no door between the room where I found the gambling going on and the room where the saloon is located. I do not remember whether or not I saw the defendant at that house that night. I think I saw him there on the outside."
Jacobo Salizar, deputy, testified he went with the sheriff on the night in question, and stopped in the kitchen, and saw the defendant come out of the kitchen. He went out of the kitchen towards the saloon room; that he saw the barkeeper carry beer from the saloon to the room where the men were.
Avelino Pena testified he collected the rents on the building, and that defendant had the entire building rented; that he had collected the rent for this building from defendant every month for about a year; that defendant pays for the entire house, and owns the saloon.
J. M. Elores, deputy tax collector, testified that defendant was the owner of the saloon, and had a license to run a saloon in that building.
Inocente Hyme testified he was barkeeper for defendant, and that defendant had left Laredo about March 1st and gone to his ranch; that before defendant left for the ranch he rented the room in the rear of the saloon to Guillermo Cantu, and instructed him to collect the rent; that Cantu occupied the room until about the 20th or 22d of March, and then left; that defendant returned from the ranch about the 13th or 14th, but he had not noticed him around the saloon until the night and after the sheriff had made the arrests. Witness says he did not see any gambling in the house, and did not know gambling was going on there.
Defendant himself testified that he owns a ranch in Webb county of about 885 acres, and also the saloon in question, and employed Ino-cente Hyme to manage the saloon in order that he could attend to his ranch. He further testified: "The house in Laredo where my barroom is situated has four rooms. I rent this house from Mr. Hamilton. I rent two of the rooms in this house to a man by the name of Epifanio for restaurant purposes. About the 8th day of March, 1911, I rented the other rear room in the house to a man by the name of Cantu. I did not know this man Cantu, but I knew his brother, Jesus Cantu, who brought him to me, and asked me to rent the room to him. This man Cantu told me that he wanted to rent the room to use as a barber shop, and I rented it to him for that purpose. After I rented this room to Cantu, I left Laredo, and went to my ranch down the river. It was about March 10, 1911, I think, when I left Laredo to go to my ranch. I returned from my ranch to Laredo about March 20 or 21, 1911. I reached Laredo about dusk. My residence is about seven blocks from my saloon. I went to my saloon about 9 o'clock that night. I went into the yard in the rear of the saloon to urinate. There is no fence around the yard of the saloon. I then went into my barroom, passing through the kitchen of the restaurant and the restaurant. I do not recollect seeing Sheriff Sanóhez in my saloon that night. I never gave any one permission to gamble or run a gaming table or bank in any part of this house where my saloon is located. I give a saloon keeper's bond for $1,000, and I could not afford to do this. I had no/ idea that gaming was going on in that room I rented to Cantu. I would not have permitted gaming there if I had known it, because I am under bond. I did not know that Jesus Cantu, the brother of Guillermo Cantu, was running a monte game at the saloon of Narcisso Alanis. I did not know that Guillermo Cantu or Jesus Cantu were gamblers. I did not investigate whether the room was being used as a barber shop or not."
The state proved that Guillermo Cantu, the man to whom defendant claimed to have rented the room, had been convicted on a charge of vagrancy in the courts at Laredo; the charge being based on an allegation that he was a common gambler. This, in substance, is the testimony, and by presenting the testimony of the sheriff and the defendant almost in full the issues in the case are thus shown.
The court charged the jury: "You are instructed that it is provided by law that if any person shall knowingly permit property or premises under his control to be used as a place to bet or wager or to gamble with cards, or to keep or exhibit for the purpose of gaming any table or bank or as a place where people resort to gamble, bet, or wager, he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than four years. Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jesus de los Santos, on or about the 20th day of March, 1911, in the county of Webb and state of Texas, had under his control the building known as the Cantina Blanca or White Saloon, and that one Guillermo Cantu then and there used a room in said building as a place to bet and wager or to gamble with cards or to keep or exhibit for the purpose of gaming any table or bank, or as a place where people resorted to gamble, bet, or wager, and if you further believe from the evidence beyond a reason able doubt that the defendant knew that said Cantu was so using said room, and permitted said Cantu to so use it, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than four years. You are instructed that where a person rents the whole of a building from the owner, and uses a part of it for his own purposes, and sublets other parts of it to other persons, he is nevertheless in control of the whole building within the meaning of the gaming laws. If the defendant sublet or rented a room in the White Saloon building to Guillermo Cantu to be used by said Cantu as a barber shop, and defendant did not know that Cantu was using said room for gaming purposes (if he was so using it), then defendant is not guilty; and, in case you have a reasonable doubt as to this issue, you must give defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him. The defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and, in case you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you will acquit him, and say by your verdict 'not guilty.' " It is thus seen in the charge the court required the jury to affirmatively find that defendant knew that said Cantu was so using the room, and then permitted him to so use it before they would be authorized to find him guilty, and further instructed the jury that if he rented the room to Cantu to be used as a barber shop, and did not know that Cantu was using the room for gaming purposes (if he was so using it), to acquit defendant, and, if they had a reasonable doubt on this issue, to give the defendant the benefit of such doubt, and acquit him. Taking this charge as a whole, we do not think it subject to the criticisms contained in the opinion of the Presiding Judge, but that it fairly, fully, and clearly presented the issues in the case, and in a way the jury could not be misled. The jury had to affirmatively find that Cantu was using the room for gaming purposes, first; and, second, that defendant knew he was so using the room, or they would acquit defendant. Inasmuch as defendant had paid and continued to pay the rent on the entire building, and our statutes (R. S. art. 3250) provide that a person renting premises shall not sublet or lease same during the term of the rental contract to any other person without first obtaining consent of the landlord, and in this case no consent was asked or given by the landlord, we think the charge as written was as favorable as the facts called for, especially so taking into consideration that provision of the law which provides that the use of such premises by any tenant for any of the prohibited purposes shall terminate all the rights of the tenant in the premises. If defendant knew, as the charge required he should know before he could be convicted, that the premises were being so used, and he permitted such premises to be so used, he would be guilty under the law. The special charge requested is not the law, and the court did not err in refusing to give same.
This disposes of all the bills of exception in the record, and the other matters are not presented in a way we are authorized to consider same. The constitutionality of this law was passed on in Parshall v. State, 138 S. W. 759, and we adhere to the opinion in that case.
The judgment is affirmed.
PRENDERGAST, J., concurs.