Case Name: Joshua BOYLE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2007-10-26
Citations: 245 S.W.3d 219
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-000761-DG
Parties: Joshua BOYLE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
Judges: Before LAMBERT, MOORE, and NICKELL, Judges.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 245
Pages: 219–222

Head Matter:
Joshua BOYLE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
No. 2006-CA-000761-DG.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Oct. 26, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 2008.
Jonathan R. Baker, Robert R. Baker, Stanford, KY, for appellant.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General of Kentucky, John E. Hackley, Special Assistant Attorney General, Stanford, KY, for appellee.
Before LAMBERT, MOORE, and NICKELL, Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION
LAMBERT, Judge.
Joshua Boyle appeals his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) charge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm his conviction.
Background
On August 25, 2005, at 12:41 a.m., in Stanford, Lincoln County, Kentucky, a peace officer pulled Boyle over because the officer suspected that the single orange road construction barrel in the bed of Boyle's truck was stolen government property. When the officer approached Boyle, he smelled alcohol. After Boyle failed several sobriety tests, the officer arrested Boyle for DUI. Boyle confessed his guilt to the DUI charge, but nevertheless asserts that the traffic stop leading to his arrest and conviction violated his constitutional rights.
Legal Standards
The law is well settled that an investigatory traffic stop is constitutionally justified if and only if the facts and totality of circumstances surrounding the stop indicate the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in unlawful activity. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky.1998). The reasonable and articu-lable suspicion standard is a significantly lower standard than the probable-cause standard. Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky.1999). Also, the subjective motivation of the investigating peace officer is immaterial as to whether the facts and circumstances surrounding a traffic stop are indicative of an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of crime. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
Analysis
The uncontroverted, material facts surrounding the investigatory stop in this case are that Boyle drove his unmarked pick-up truck after midnight with a single orange, road-construction barrel in its bed. Because we know "as a matter of ordinary human experience" that the increasingly ubiquitous orange, road-construction barrel is ordinarily transported during daylight hours, in bunches, and by marked construction or government vehicles, we find that, at the time of the investigatory stop leading to Boyle's arrest and guilty plea, there was indeed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Boyle was in possession of a stolen barrel. See, U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (requiring use of "common sense and ordinary human experience" to adjudicate investigatory traffic stops). Thus, even though the barrel was later shown to have been borrowed, not stolen, the arresting officer's investigatory stop was not unconstitutional or improper. Indeed, but for Boyle's palpable intoxication, the stop would have been momentary and therefore not a significant violation of Boyle's privacy interests when compared to the Commonwealth's significant interest in investigating possible criminal activity.
Conclusion
Because the foregoing analysis reveals that the undisputed facts support the lower court's legal conclusion that the traffic stop in this case was constitutional, we hold as a matter of law that the court below correctly overruled Boyle's motion to suppress. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App.2002) (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm Boyle's DUI conviction, which he entered on his conditional plea of guilty.
MOORE, Judge, concurs.
NICKELL, Judge, Dissents and Files Separate Opinion.