Case Name: SAN JUAN URANIUM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Thomas G. WOLFE and Virginia E. Wolfe, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1957-01-02
Citations: 241 F.2d 121
Docket Number: No. 5429
Parties: SAN JUAN URANIUM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Thomas G. WOLFE and Virginia E. Wolfe, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 241
Pages: 121–125

Head Matter:
SAN JUAN URANIUM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Thomas G. WOLFE and Virginia E. Wolfe, Appellees.
No. 5429.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Jan. 2, 1957.
Rehearing Denied March 14, 1957.
Phillips, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Thomas S. Williams, for appellant.
A. Francis Porta, El Reno, Okl., and Mather M. Eakes, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, MURRAH and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The complaint, as amended, alleged in substance and effect that the appellee, Thomas G. Wolfe and one Deardorf caused the appellant corporation to be organized for the purpose of exploring tor and mining uranium and associated minerals; that after organization of the company and the installation of dummy officers and directors, the corporation represented to prospective purchasers of its stock that certain mining claims, its only asset, had been acquired from William M. Smallwood and his wife for a cash consideration of $25,000, evidenced by a note payable in six months, and certain stock; that out of the proceeds of the sale of the stock, the corporation issued its check to Smallwood in the sum of $25,000; that the cheek was delivered to appellee, Wolfe; Smallwoods' endorsement was forged thereon; Wolfe endorsed it, cashed it, and loaned the proceeds to his partner, Deardorf, who invested it in a home to which Wolfe now holds the legal title.
It is alleged that the mining leases purportedly sold to the corporation by Smallwood for $25,000 were in fact owned by Rollie B. Walter, who acquired them from their owners without money consideration and transferred them to Smallwood, who in turn transferred them to the corporation for the^ $25,000 note; that this transaction was in furtherance of a scheme and device between Dear-dorf, Smallwood and Wolfe to fraudulently extract money and stock from the plaintiff. ^ The prayer was for judgment against the defendants, Wolfe and Smallwood, and^ a lien against the real property in which the money had been invested.
Under the allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true, there can be no doubt of the scheme on the part of the promoters of the corporation to defraud it of the $25,000. The only question is whether the corporation has standing to complain of the fraud.
The trial court gave no reasons for its dismissal, but the judgment is defended here on the theory that while, as promoters of the corporation, Wolfe and his associates stood in a fiducial relation to it, they were under no duty to account to the corporation for the $25,000 since all of the parties interested in the corporation at the time of the transaction had full knowledge of it and could not therefore complain,
This theory does indeed find venerable support in Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 28 S.Ct. 634, 636, 52 L.Ed. 1025. in that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous court, held that a corporation had no right of action against its promoters whose entire stock was issued to them at the time of ineor-poration, although the corporation later issued additional stock and disposed of it to stockholders who were ignorant of fictitious profits to the promoters. This is so, said Mr. Justice Holmes, because af the time of the ¡transaction, the pro-motors "were on both sides of the bargain, and they might issue to themselves as much stock in their corporation as they liked in exchange for their conveyance of their land."
Contemporaneously with this litigafi0I1) another suit involving the same transactions reached the Supreme Court 0f Massachusetts., In the face of the Holmes decision, that Court reached a diametrically opposite conclusion, saying, j-eview of the authorities seems to demonstrate that there is a liability of promoter to the corporation when further original subscribers to capital stock contemplated as an essential part 0f the scheme of promotion came in after the transaction complained of, even though that transaction is known to all the then stockholders, that is to say, to the promoters and their representatives." Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193, 202, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 314, affirmed 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, 56 L.Ed. 1009.
The contrariety of views expressed in the two cases has been the subject of much comment. See Annotation, 85 A.L.R. 1262; Vol. 1, Fletcher Cyc.Corp., Perm.Ed., § 194, p. 627; § 196, p. 641; see also Cumm.Supp. § 194-5-6; XLV Yale L.J. No. 3, Jan. 1936, p. 511. The Lewisohn case was qualified or explained by a closely divided court in McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140, 56 S.Ct. 41, 80 L.Ed. 121, the dissenters taking the view that it was repudiated.
The weight of authority supports the Massachusetts rule. See Jeffs v. Utah Power & Light Co., 136 Me. 454, 12 A.2d 592. And, while Oklahoma has not taken sides, it has embraced the universally accepted view that the promoters of a corporation occupy a fiducial relationship to it which requires them to make full disclosure to their immediate associates in the promotional enterprise. See Jarvis v. Great Bend Oil Co., 66 Okl. 179, 168 P. 450. In Arn v. Dunnett, 10 Cir., 93 F.2d 634, 637, we held, following the Lewisohn case, that while the promoters of a corporation occupied a trust relationship to it, a profit to them from the sale of property to the corporation for stock was not secret or unlawful where the stockholders of the corporation, having a present interest in the corporation and the transaction, knew and gave assent to the sale. "The effect of the transaction" said the court "was that the corporation acquired and became owner of the property free of obligation, and the promoters owned the stock; there were no other stockholders; there was no secrecy; The corporation was not injured through fraud, secrecy, or otherwise;
Not so in our case. The stockholders who became interested in the corporation subsequent to the transaction complained of were original stockholders. Their investments paid the $25,000 for which it is alleged none of the faithless promoters gave any value whatsoever. Here, unlike the Arn case, the deceptive representations were made to prospective stockholders to induce them to purchase stock, the proceeds of which were to be paid to the promoters in furtherance of a fictitious scheme. This, we think, constituted a flagrant breach of a trust obligation imposed upon the promoters to those whom they induced to invest in the corporation. See Annotation, 85 A.L.R. at page 1276.
We hold that the technical assent of the corporation through its promoters to the deceptive transaction is no defense to an action by the corporation when freed of its bonds. We think the complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The judgment is reversed.
. Hereinafter called San Juan.