Case Name: Raynolds v. Ray, Sheriff, et al.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1888-12
Citations: 12 Colo. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: Raynolds v. Ray, Sheriff, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 108–125

Head Matter:
Raynolds v. Ray, Sheriff, et al.
1. Attachment of Real Estate — Provisional Lien, how Acquired-Service of Writ Necessary to Preserve Lien.— Under sections 99 and 101, Civil Code (1883), a valid levy of a writ of attachment may be made on real estate and a valid lien acquired by indorsing thereon a description of the property attached and filing a copy of such writ, so indorsed, in the recorder’s office of the county wherein the real estate is situated. The levy of the writ creates a provisional lien; but before a valid judgment can be rendered which will preserve and make the lien effective, there must be service of the writ and summons'® the defendant.
2. Object of Personal Service of Attachment Writ,—The service of the attachment writ on the defendant is required by the statute to enable the defendant to deposit the money sued for, and thus prevent the lien from taking effect; or, if it already exists, to secure its dissolution; also to afford him ap. opportunity to traverse the matters stated in the affidavit for attachment.
3. Setting Aside Invalid Judgment — Entry of Valid Judgment after Service of Writ — Attachment Lien Preserved.— Where a writ of attachment was levied on real estate of a debtor and judgment entered without service of either the attachment writ or summons, but afterwards, on discovering the error, the judgment was set aside and a new judgment entered, after personal service of an alias summons and of a copy of the attachment writ, held, that the lien acquired at the commencement of the action by the levy of the writ was preserved and continued in force.
4. Enjoining Illegal Judgment — Subsequent Valid Judgment Not Apeeoted Thereby.— The fact that a sheriff had been perpetually enjoined from selling property on an execution issued upon the original judgment in a case, on the ground that it was entered without service of summons on the defendant, is not ah adjudication of the validity of a judgment subsequently entered therein after service of process, nor of the effect of an execution issued on the latter judgment and levied upon the property of the debtor.
5. Assignment for Benefit of Creditors — Valid without Schedule.— In the absence of a statute requiring a schedule, an assignment for benefit of creditors of “ all the estate of ” the assignor of every kind and description, a schedule of which property the assignor promises to make out and annex to the deed, is sufficient without a more particular description, and is not invalidated by a failure to make out such schedule.
Error to District Court of Chaffee County.
This was a suit instituted in the district court of Chaffee county by Frederick A. Raynolds, as assignee of Hartzell Bros., to enjoin Robert Ray, as sheriff of that county, together with E. B. Jones and J. T. Blake, judgment creditors of Hartzell Bros., from selling certain real estate of the assignors on executions issued on judgments obtained by said creditors in the county court.
Both parties claimed priority of lien upon the real estate in controversy, the plaintiff in error by virtue of the assignment, the defendants in error by virtue of the judgments, and the levy of executions issued thereon, claiming the judgments to have been secured by the levy of writs of attachment on the property before the articles of assignment were filed for record. The validity of the attachment liens was denied, but the district court held them to be valid.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (1883) involved are as follows:
“§ 9é. The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the sum mons in an action on contract, express or implied, or at any time afterwards before judgment, may have the property of the defendant not exempt from execution attached as security for any judgment that may be recovered in such action, in the manner prescribed in this chapter, unless the defendant shall give good and sufficient security to secure the payment of such judgment.”
“§ 99. The writ shall be directed to the sheriff of any county in which the property of such defendant may be, and require him to serve a copy of the writ on the defendant, and to attach and safely keep all the property of such defendant within his county, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, the amount of which shall be stated in conformity with the affidavit, and alias writs may issue at any time, unless the defendant deposit the amount or give him- security by the undertaking of at least two sufficient sureties, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in amount equal to the value of the property which has been or is about to be attached, in which case the sheriff shall take such undertaking. Several writs may be issued at the same time to the sheriffs of different counties.”
“ § 101. The sheriff to whom the writ is directed and delivered shall execute the same without delay, and if the undertaking mentioned in this chapter be not given by the defendant, then as follows:
“First. Real property standing upon the records of the county in the name of the defendant shall be attached by filing a copy of the writ, together with a description of the property attached, with the recorder of the county.” * * *
On and prior to the month of September, 1882, Frederick S. Hartzell and Wilbur J. Hartzell were engaged in a general banking business in the town of Silver Cliff, Ouster county, under the firm name of Hartzell Bros. They were likewise the owners of the real estate involved in. this action, situate at Salida, in Chaffee county. On September 4, 1882, they made an assignment of all their property, real and personal, to A. J. Rising, for the benefit of all their creditors. Mr. Rising accepted the trust, but on September 6th resigned the same, and Raynolds, the plaintiff in error, was on that day appointed assignee of the estate of said bankrupts by the judge of the district court of the sixth judicial district. He accepted the appointment, qualified, and proceeded to execute the trust.
The deed of assignment to Rising was recorded in the office of the clerk and recorder of Custer county on September 5th, at 11:47 A. M.; and it is alleged in the complaint filed by Raynolds in this action that it was also recorded in the office of the county clerk and recorder of Chaffee county on the same day. The defendants in error, E. B. Jones and J. T. Blake, being creditors of said Hartzell Bros., brought suit against them for the recovery of their respective demands in the county court of Chaffee county on September 5, 1882, at the same time causing writs of attachment to be issued and levied on certain real estate belonging to their debtors at Salida, in said Chaffee county. Copies of these writs of attachment, with the levies indorsed thereon, were filed for record in the recorder’s office in Chaffee county on the same day, September* 5, 18S2, the writ in the Jones Case being filed at 9:20 o’clock A. M., and the writ in the Blake Case being filed at 9:30 o’clock A. M. Judgments by default were rendered against the Hartzells, September 18,1882, and execution issued to the defendant in error, Robert Ray, as sheriff of Chaffee county, who levied the same upon the attached real estate and advertised it for sale thereunder. Raynolds, as assignee of the bankrupts, thereupon filed in the district court of Chaffee county a petition against said Robert Ray, sheriff, to enjoin the sale of the property, alleging, inter alia, that said judgments were entered up in the county court against the Hartzell Bros, by default and without service of summons. A temporary writ of injunction thereupon issued restraining the sales until the cause should be heard. Eay answered the petition January 18, 1883, admitting that he had advertised the property for sale by virtue of the two executions, but alleging that the county court had, on November 22, 1882, vacated the judgments and oi’dered the return of the executions, and that in compliance with said order he had returned the same, and prayed that the petition be dismissed. Thereupon Eaynolds moved for judgment on the pleadings in the district court; whereupon the sheriff and his successors in office were, by order of the court, perpetually enjoined from selling said real estate on the executions issued on the judgments entered by the county court on the 18th of September, 1882. The journal entries of the county court made in these cases recite that, it having been brought to the knowledge of the county court that the judgments were void because entered without service of process on the defendants, they were vacated, and alias writs of summons ordered to issue. Personal service of the alias writs of summons was had upon the Hartzell Bros, in Ohaffee county on January 11, 1883. Copies of the original attachment writs were delivered to them at the same time. On the 19th day of February following, judgments were again entered in the county court of Ohaffee county against them and in favor of said E. B. Jones and J. T. Blake respectively; the judgment in favor of Jones being for $1,500 and costs of suit, and the judgment in favor of Blake being for $510 and costs. On these judgments executions were issued February 6, 1883, which were by the defendant in error, Eobert Eay, as sheriff of said Ohaffee county, levied upon the attached real estate, and the same was again advertised for sale, the day of sale named being the 21th day of March, 1883.
This brings the history of the case up to the institution of the present action. On March 23, 1883, being the day preceding that on which the real estate levied on by virtue of the last-mentioned executions was advertised to be sold, the plaintiff in error again applied to the district court of Ohaffee county for an injunction to stay the sale thereof; alleging invalidity of the latter judgments of the county court, and the prior rights acquired by the plaintiff in error to the property levied on by virtue of the assignment of Hartzell Bros, for the benefit of their creditors. On presentation of that petition to the district judge the sale was again temporarily enjoined. Testimony was then taken under order of the court, and a hearing of the matters in issue had before the court at the January term thereof, 1884, when the court gave judgment for the defendants, Robert Ray et ail., dissolving the injunction previously granted, and dismissing the complaint at the costs of the plaintiffs.
Messrs. H. W. Hobson and A. Maoon, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. G-. K. Hartenstine, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Elliott
delivered the opinion of the court concerning the validity of the attachment liens.
The vital question in this action is, Who has the better claim to certain real property located in Ohaffee county, Colorado, belonging to Hartzell Bros., copartners, etc., the plaintiff, Raynolds, their assignee, or the defendant, the sheriff of Ohaffee county, who levied attachments thereon for certain creditors of said copartnership? The assignment was executed in Ouster county on September 4, 1882. The writs of attachment were issued out of the county court of Ohaffee county, and the sheriff made and recorded his levy in Ohaffee county on September 5, 1882, a few hours before the articles of assignment were recorded in Ohaffee county; and neither he nor the at tachment creditors had any notice of the assignment until after the recording of such levy. The judgments first rendered in these attachment cases were adjudged void for want of service of the writs of summons and attachment upon the defendants, and the sale of the property thereunder was perpetually enjoined by the district court of Chaffee county. Prior to this, however, these first judgments were vacated on motion of plaintiffs; and alias writs of summons and attachment were thereupon issued and duly served, January 17, 1883, and valid judgments were rendered thereon in February thereafter. To restrain the sale of the attached property under these latter judgments, the present action was brought by the assignee. These are the substantial facts. It is claimed in behalf of the assignee that the levy of the attachment writs on September o, 1882, was void for all purposes; and that, after vacating the first judgments, the defendant must not only be served with writs of summons and of attachment, but that there must be also a fresh levy of the attachment writs.
We cannot admit this claim of the plaintiff in error. "The requisites of an attachment of real estate are generally determined by statute." Drake, Attachm. § 236. We are of opinion that by filing a copy of the writ of attachment, together with a description of the property to be attached, with the recorder of the county, a valid levy was made, and that a valid lien upon the property was thereby created. Code 1883, § 101; Emory v. Yount, 7 Colo. 107; Brown v. Tucker, 7 Colo. 30. To conclude otherwise is to disregard the purpose and largely destroy the efficacy of the attachment act. The main purpose of attachment proceedings is to secure a lien upon the property of a failing or fraudulent debtor; and. to say that such a debtor must in all cases be notified of the service of the attachment writ before a lien can be created is to give him the opportunity of perpetrating the very wrong, which the attachment may be intended to prevent. By the levy under a writ of attachment before the service thereof, the plaintiff acquires a provisional lien upon the property levied on; but, before a valid judgment can be rendered by which the attachment lien is preserved and made effective, there must be proper service of the summons and the writ of attachment. Moore v. Thayer, 6 How. Pr. 47.
Sections 99 and 101 of the code, construed together, do not seem to be inconsistent with these views. Section 99 provides that alias writs may issue unless the defendant deposit the amount, or give security by an undertaking in an amount sufficient to satisfy the demand and costs, or in amount equal to the value of the property which has been or is about to be attached. Section 101 specifies how the sheriff shall proceed to execute the writ if the undertaking mentioned in section 99 be not given by the defendant. A fair construction of these provisions would seem to justify the conclusion that the service of the attachment writ is required for the purpose, of enabling the debtor to deposit the money sued for, and thus prevent the lien from taking effect; or, if the lien already exists, thus to secure its dissolution; and also to enable him, in case he shall see fit so to do, to traverse and put in issue the matters stated in the affidavit of attachment. In a majority of cases, the levy of the writ will either precede or be made simultaneously with the service thereof. In some cases, the officer may serve the writ before he makes the levy, and in such cases the statute provides that, if the amount of the claim be de-, posited, the levy shall not be made.
There was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiffs in the attachment suits indicating bad faith, or any intention on their part to waive or .abandon their lien, nor were they guilty of laches in any of the proceedings. They acted with reasonable dispatch. True, they made a mistake in causing judgments to be entered before the summons and writs of attachment had been served; but when such mistake was discovered they proceeded with diligence to rectify the error by recalling the executions, vacating the judgments, and by suing out and serving alias writs of summons and attachment; so that, in less than six months after the levy of their writs of attachment, judgments were entered which are conceded to be in all respects regular and valid. Upon these judgments executions were at once issued; and the defendant sheriff was proceeding to sell thereunder the property attached when enjoined by the present action. We think there was no unreasonable delay in obtaining service of summons or of the writs of attachment upon the defendants, nor was there any unreasonable delay in obtaining judgment and execution.
We have noticed in this opinion only what we regarded as the principal assignment of error, for the reason that the dissenting opinion of the chief justice, filed herewith, satisfactorily presents the views of the court upon other points of the case.
For the reasons announced in this opinion the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.