Case Name: Edward C. TIETIG, Petitioner, v. Colleen H. BOGGS, etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-06-11
Citations: 602 So. 2d 1250
Docket Number: No. 78013
Parties: Edward C. TIETIG, Petitioner, v. Colleen H. BOGGS, etc., Respondent.
Judges: BARKETT, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 602
Pages: 1250–1252

Head Matter:
Edward C. TIETIG, Petitioner, v. Colleen H. BOGGS, etc., Respondent.
No. 78013.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1992.
Edward C. Tietig, pro se.
William M. Tuttle, II and Stephen J. Kol-ski, Jr., Catlin, Saxon, Tuttle & Evans, P.A., Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
GRIMES, Justice.
We review Tietig v. Boggs, 578 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), because of its conflict with Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a judgment incorporating a property settlement agreement which called for the payment of child support by the husband. Several years later, the former husband filed a motion to reduce his child support obligations, alleging a change in his ability to meet the payments. The former wife responded by moving to enforce the payment of child support arrearages and seeking attorney's fees. The trial of the issues was referred to a general master. Pursuant to the general master's report, the trial judge denied the former hus band's motion to modify his child support requirements, granted the former wife's motion to enforce arrearages, and awarded her attorney's fees.
In affirming the judgment in all respects, the district court of appeal stated:
First, the general master did not, as urged, employ an erroneous burden of proof on the former husband's motion to modify. To the contrary, the master followed the established law in this district [and the majority rule among the other districts] that where, as here, the amount of child support is based on an agreement between the parties as incorporated into a final judgment of marriage dissolution, a heavier burden rests upon the party seeking a modification of such child support than would otherwise be required in the absence of such an agreement. Fritz v. Fritz, 485 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Lacy v. Lacy, 413 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Bish v. Bish, 404 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Deatherage v. Deatherage, 395 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 5th DCA), dismissed, 402 So.2d 609 (Fla.1981). Contra Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Tietig v. Boggs, 578 So.2d at 839.
Bernstein involved an appeal from the denial of a former wife's petition for upward modification of child support. In denying the petition, the trial judge had stated that because the judgment for child support was based upon an agreement by the parties, a heavier burden rested upon the party seeking a modification than would otherwise be required. The district court of appeal reviewed the cases that have required a heavier burden to modify support obligations in dissolution judgments which incorporated settlement agreements between the parties. The court pointed out that the heavy burden rule was first applied to persons seeking modification of alimony and reasoned that the rule was inappropriately transferred to child support cases. The court stated that public policy did not permit the terms of a contract between parents to impinge upon the best interests of their children and held that the heavy burden rule did not apply in cases involving modification of child support.
We are sensitive to the concern expressed in Bernstein. It is at least possible that the parties might place their own interests ahead of those of their children in crafting a settlement agreement. Thus, we agree that the party seeking an increase in child support need only prove a substantial change in circumstances similar to that required in the modification of dissolution judgments which do not incorporate a settlement agreement. However, in the instant case, the former husband was seeking to reduce his child support obligations. Under these circumstances, the best interests of the children could not be jeopardized, and we see no reason to depart from the application of the heavy burden rule in such a case.
Thus, it appears that both the instant case and Bernstein were correctly decided. However, the rationale of those cases is hereby modified to the extent that in cases where judgments for child support are based on settlement agreements, the heavy burden rule is inapplicable only when an increase in child support is sought. We do not address the other issues raised by the parties. Subject to the explanation above, we approve the decision below.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, C.J., concurs.