Case Name: W. W. Brown v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-04-11
Citations: 96 Tex. Crim. 409
Docket Number: No. 7147
Parties: W. W. Brown v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 409–415

Head Matter:
W. W. Brown v. The State.
No. 7147.
Decided April 11, 1923.
Rehearing denied October 3, 1923.
Rehearing denied January 23, 1924.
1. —Gaming—Indictment—Two Counts — Practice in Trial Court.
Where the indictment contained two counts and the Court sustained the motion to quash the first, but overruled it as to the second, which is an exact counterpart of one sustained by former precedent, there is no reversible error. Following Francis v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 67 and other cases.
2. —Same—Leading Questions.
Where the first ground of objection to the testimony was not tenable, but the question was leading, yet in the light of other evidence did not call for a reversal, there is no reversible error.
3. —Same—Verdict—Judgment.
Where a complaint was made that the jury having found defendant guilty as charged in the indictment no judgment could properly be entered thereon notwithstanding the Court submitted only one count, the same is property overruled. Distinguished Wood v. State, 84 S. W. Rep., 1058.
4. —Same—Evidence—Practice in Trial Court.
Where a complaint was made because the State was permitted to prove over defendant’s objection that he played and bet in a card game, he not being charged therewith, there was no error in overruling same. Following Sanchez v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 156.
5. —Same—Repeal—Vagrancy Statute — Statutes Construed.
The Vagrancy Statute, article 634 sub. K. C. C. P., Acts of the Legislature, 1909, page 111, did not repeal article 559 P. C., under which the prosecution in the present case proceeded. Following Fridge v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 76, and other cases.
6. —Same—Rehearing—Indictment.
The indictment was not fatally defective because it failed to negative the fact, that said room, premises, etc., was a private residence occupied by a family, in an indictment for keeping and permitting the keeping of a building and room for the purpose of being used as a place in which to gamble. Following Sanchez v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 156.
7. —Same—Indictment—Duplicity—Repugnancy.
While the indictment may have been duplicitous, the same could not be attacked successfully after verdict, and the same is not repugnant as it does not contain allegations inconsistent with each other, and there was, therefore, no reversible error in sustaining the indictment.
8. —Same—Negative Averments — Rule Stated.
The rule requiring that an indictment contain averments negativing all exceptions has application to instances in which the exception is em braced in the statutes defining the offense and forms a part of its definition. Following Slack v. State, 61 Texas crim. Rep., 406.
9. — Same—Statutes Construed — Private Residence — Second Motion.
In article 559 P. C. under which this prosecution is maintained there is found no exception exempting from its operation a private residence. Following Francis v. State, 233 S. W. Rep., 974, and other cases. A proper disposition of the case has therefore been made in the original opinion, and the filing of a second motion for rehearing is hereby declined.
Appeal from the District Court of Brazoria. Tried below before the Honorable M. S. Munson.
Appeal from a conviction of keeping and permitting the keeping of a room for the' purpose of being used as a place in which to gamble; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
E. T. Branch, for appellant. Cited cases in opinion.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, Judge.
Conviction is for keeping, and permitting the keeping, of building and room for the purpose of being used as a place in which to gamble. Punishment is assessed at two years in the penitentiary.
The evidence is amply sufficient to support the verdict and judgment, and will not be discussed unless necessary in considering some bill of exception.
The indictment contained two counts. The court sustained a motion to quash the first, but overruled it as to the second, and as to this ruling appellant's first complaint is urged. The second count is an exact counterpart of the one upheld in Harvey v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 645, 244 S. W. Rep., 1004; See also Francis v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 67, 233 S. W. Rep., 974: Deisher v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 467, 233 S. W. Rep., 978; Fridge v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 75, 233 S. W. Rep., 979.
State's counsel propounded to his witness Letz the following question: "This place here of Brown's (appellant), which he was running mighty near all the time, it was known as a gambling house wasn't it?" Objection was interposed because (a) there was no allegation in the indictment to that effect, .and, (b) because the question was leading. ' The objection being overruled the witness answered: "Well, if we wanted to play a little poker we would go up there. Some of them called it a bed room, and some of them called it a gambling room. Yes, sir, I have been in that room more than one time, several times." The first ground of objection was not tenable, .but the question was leading. The answer, however, in the light of the other evidence does not call for reversal.
Complaint is made that the jury having found appellant "guilty as charged in the indictment," no judgment could properly be entered thereon notwithstanding the court submitted only one count for the jury's consideration. Appellant bases this contention upon that part of the second count which alleges that appellant "did then and there knowingly permit said property 'and premises to be used as a place where people resorted to gamble, bet, and wager upon games then and there played with cards," his point being +hat although the court did not submit the first count, there is no wav to determine whether the verdict relates to the allegation in the second count which charges him with keeping a building and room for the purpose of being used for gambling or whether it relates to that portion of the second count above quoted. Again the similarity of the Harvey case (supra) appears. The part of the count quoted Avas not submitted to the jury either in that case or the instant one a^d it not being before the jury we could scarcely assume that the verdict had reference to it, but more logically conclude that the verdict referred to the charge in the indictment to which they were restricted by the instructions of the court. The case of Wood v. State, 84 S. W. Rep., 1058, to which we are cited by appellant is not in point. The decision there turned upon a duplicitous indictment. We have no duplicity here. The averments quoted charge neither a felony nor misdemeanor, as is apparent from the Harvey case (supra), and may be properly treated as surplusage.
Complaint is made because the State was permitted-to prove over his objection that he played and bet at a card game, he not being charged therewith. This exact point is decided adversely to the contention in Sanchez v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 156, 233 S. W. Rep., 983.
The vagrancy statute, Article 634, Sub. K of the Criminal Code, Acts of the Legislature, 1909, page 111, did not repeal Article 559, Renal Code, under which the prosecution in the present case proceeded. Harvey v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 645, 244 S. W. Rep., 1004; Fridge v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 76, 233 S. W. Rep., 979; Parshall v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 177; 138 S. W. Rep., 759; Ex Parte Oates, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 79, 238 S. W. Rep., 930.
Other questions are presented, all of which we have examined. We find no merit in them, and do not deem them of sufficient importance to discuss.
The judgment is affirmed.
'Affirmed.