Case Name: In re Charles A. Thatcher
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1909-06-25
Citations: 80 Ohio St. 492
Docket Number: No. 11650
Parties: In re Charles A. Thatcher.
Judges: Crew, C. J., Summers, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 80
Pages: 492–675

Head Matter:
In re Charles A. Thatcher.
Disbarment proceedings — Supreme Court of Ohio has inherent jurisdiction in Section '563, Revised Statutes — Suspension or removal of an attorney — Right of attorney to criticise in respectful manner conduct of judges — But not to degrade or intimidate public officer — Article I, Section 11, Ohio Constitution — Abuse of right of free speech — Nature of offense constituting contempt of court.
1. The Supreme Court of Ohio has inherent jurisdiction of proceedings to disbar an attorney, resulting as an incident of its organization as a court, as well as from its power, to admit to the bar.
2. The provisions of Section 563, Revised Statutes, are not an at- ■ tempted enlargement of the jurisdiction of the several courts therein named, in contravention to the constitution, but are regulative provisions recognizing already existing powers of the courts.
3. An elector who is an attorney has the right to criticise the judgments and conduct of judges in a decent and respectful manner ; but no man has a right to degrade and intimidate a public officer and bring his office into contempt by the publication of libelous matter at any time, and the fact that such officer is a candidate for re-election will not excuse such conduct. One who claims the protection of the constitution, Article I, Section 11, must also and at all times be held responsible for abuse of the privilege.
4. The real question in cases of this kind is whether under the facts admitted and proved the respondent appears to be a fit person to be longer allowed the privilege of an attorney; whether he has shown himself, by lack of appreciation of ethical standards and by unworthy conduct, to be no longer worthy of being recognized as an officer of the courts.
5. In order to justify a court in disbarring an attorney, it is not necessary that his offense should constitute a contempt or a crime; or that he should be convicted of the crime or contempt before the disbarment.
6 While the power of disbarment should be exercised with great caution, yet where the respondent has been found guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude and of misconduct affecting his character and standing as an attorney, and especially where he has manifested no signs of regret and retracted nothing, the courts will not hesitate, through sympathy for the individual, to protect themselves from scandal and contempt and the public from prejudice, by striking such person from the roll of attorneys.
(No. 11650
Decided June 25, 1909.)
Original Proceeding for Disbarment of an Attorney.
Upon representations made in open court, alleged to be on behalf of the bar of Lucas county, that one Charles A. Thatcher, a member of the bar of this state, residing in Lucas county and practicing in this court, had probably been guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude, it was ordered that Clayton W. Everett, Emery D. Potter, John W. Schaufelberger, Julian H. Tyler, Frank M. Sala and James S. Martin, members of the bar of this state, resident in Lucas county, prepare and file in this court written charges and specifications against the said Charles A. Thatcher, whichjiharges and specifications were filed, as follows- •
Charge No'. 1. That the said Charles A. Thatcher now is and was at the times hereinafter set forth, an attorney at law dulv admitted to practice as such in all the courts of this state, and practicing in this court: and that, as such attorney at law, he was, at the times and in the manner herein after set forth and specified, guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude.
Charge No. 2. That the said Charles A. Thatcher now is, and was at the times hereinafter set forth, an attorney at law duly admitted to practice as such in all the courts of this state, and practicing in this court; and that, as such attorney at law, he was at the times and in the manner hereinafter set forth and specified, guilty of misconduct in office.
Each of the foregoing charges contained eighteen separate specifications, which are substantially the same in each charge, and are as follows:
SPECIFICATION NO._ 1.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit A,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the' court house in said Lucas county and to be placed in the hands of, and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in said counties adjoining.
That at the time said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the said Fourth Common Pleas Judicial District óf Ohio, and sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That said printed pamphlet was, as to each and every one of the matters and things therein contained, a false and malicious libel of and concerning said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and that all of 'said matters and things therein contained were known by said Thatcher to be false, malicious and untrue at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated the same.
That the said matters and things contained in said pamphlet tended to defame, disgrace and degrade the said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, and of all the persons having litigation before him, as said judge; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to believe that said Morris was, in his official capacity as such judge, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before him in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in his court; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris in his capacity as said judge, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris as judge had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and that said Morris as judge decided cases being litigated in his court from a corrupt and im proper motive and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in his court, and further tended to destroy the power and influence of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided.
That the matters and things in said pamphlet contained imputed to said Morris in his official action as judg'e as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before him as such judg'e and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of his official position as such judge.
That said Thatcher well knew at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet, that the matters and things therein contained would tend to have the effect and produce the belief herein set forth; and in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the said court -over which he presided, said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters therein contained should vilify, defame and degrade said Morris as judg'e and the said court over which he presided and destroy its power and influence; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should disgrace said Morris as judge, in the minds of the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining and of all persons having litigation before him as such judge, and should cause the people of said Lucas county and of the said counties adjoining, to believe that said Morris was, in his official capacity as such judge, corrupt and hostile to the interests of the individual engaged before him in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in his court; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should cause the people of said Lucas county and of the counties adjoining to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris in his capacity as said judge, and to believe that trials as being conducted' by said Morris as judge had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and to believe that said Morris as judge decided causes being litigated in his court from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in his court; and with the further design and intent that the matters therein contained should impute to said Morris in his official action as judge as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before him as such judge, and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of his official position as such jtidge.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit A” and made part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet td be freely circulated and dis tributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher-prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the cause of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Raikuays & Light Co., No. 53885 upon the appearance docket of said court; the cause of Coombs v. Coombs, No. 57569 on the appearance docket of said court, and the cause of The Franklin Printing and Engraving Company v. The Typographical Union No. 63, et al, No. 54237 upon the appearance docket of said court,* and that said causes are the same causes referred to in the printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher then was and now is the attorney of record in said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein; all of which foregoing statements of fact were well known to said Thatcher at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directly charged and tended to show and to cause it to be believed that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions, and further tended to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said pending actions; tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and to destroy the efficiency .of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and tended to impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That all of the matters and things contained in said pamphlet, relating to the official action of said Morris as judge, were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter. disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said Morris as judge, and of the said court over which he presided, prepared, wrote, printed, published, dis tributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and. intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge, and tend to show, and to cause it to be believed generally, that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said pending actions, and impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, and insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties eng'ag'ed in litigation in said causes and subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 3.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which certain pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit A,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining. That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county, and said common pleas court in said county was presided over by four judges, to-wit: John F. Kumler, Lindley W. Morris, Bernard F. Brough and George A. Bassett
That said Morris was then a candidate before the people of said judicial district for re-election to his said office as judge, and was as such candidate upon the official ballot presented to the voters of said district at the official election held in said judicial district on the third day of November, 1908.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county, and undisposed of, the cause of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railzvays & Light Company, No. 53885, upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said cause is the same cause referred to in said printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher was then and now is the attorney of record in said cause for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein.
That said Thatcher then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, and now is, engaged in his office as attorney at law in prosecuting actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries; that the larger part of said Thatcher’s business as attorney was then, and now is the prosecution of said class of actions, and that a very large number of said causes then and now being prosecuted by said Thatcher were and are against corporations.
That there then was and now is pending in said court a very large number of causes, to-wit: Over fifty, in which said causes, said Thatcher is the attorney for the plaintiff therein, and in which said causes the relief prayed for by said plaintiffs is damages for personal injuries sustained either by said plaintiffs or by those represented by said plaintiffs; and that the defendants in all of said causes are corporations, and that all of said causes belong to the same class of causes as the cause herein mentioned, to-wit: No. 53885, Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, and that all of the foregoing statements of fact are now well known to said Thatcher and were well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directed, charged and tended to show, and to cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and the said matters and things tended further to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes Over which said Morris as judge had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and tended to impair the capacity of said court and of all the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein. And the said matters and things further tended to procure and bring about the defeat of said Morris as judge at the said oncoming election, and to thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the said judges of said court and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all of the said judges of said court in all of the said matters and causes then pending in said court and in all of the said causes then pending in said court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to; and to thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said matters and causes, and to impair the capacity of said court and all the said judges thereof to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That each and every one of the matters and thing's contained in said pamphlet relating' to the official action of said Morris as judge were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said court, and of all the said judges thereof, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show and cause it to be believed generalfy that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge and of the court over which he presided, in the administration. of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes over which said Morris as judge had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should procure the defeat of said Morris as judge at the oncoming election, and thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the judges of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all the judges of said court in the said causes herein mentioned and then pending in court, and in all of said causes then pending in court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to; and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said causes then pending in said court of the class and character of said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, and to impair the capacity of said court and all of the said judges thereof to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes and to subvert the ends of justice therein.'
SPECIFICATION NO. 4.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a • certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said cer tain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit B,” and made a part hereof, as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county, and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons- in said Lucas county and in said counties adjoining.
That at the time said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris and one John F. Kumler, citizens of. Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, were judges of the court of common pleas of the said Fourth Common Pleas Judicial District of Ohio, and sitting as such judges in the court house in said Lucas county.
That said printed pamphlet was, as to each and every one of the matters and things therein contained, a false and malicious libel of and concerning said Morris and said Kumler as judges aforesaid, and all of the said matters and things therein contained were known by said Thatcher to be false, malicious and untrue at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published and circulated the same.
That the said matters and things contained in said pamphlet tended to defame, disgrace and degrade the said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and the court over which they presided, in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of the said counties adjoining, and of all the persons having litigation before them as said judges, and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county, and of the said counties adjoining to believe that said Morris and said Kumler were, in their official capacity as such judges, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before .them in litigation against corporations' and biased .and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in their court; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris and said Kumler in their capacity as said judges, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris and said Kumler as judges had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and that said Morris and said Kumler as judges, decided cases being litigated in their courts, from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in their court; and tended to destroy the power and influence of said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and of the court over which they presided.
That the matters and things in said pamphlet contained, imputed to said Morris and said Kumler in their official actions as judges as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before them as such judges, - and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of their official position as such judges.
That said Thatcher well knew at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet that the matters and things therein contained would tend to have the effect and produce the belief herein set forth; and, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of said Morris and said Kumler as judges aforesaid, and of the couht over which they presided, said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should vilify, defame and degrade said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and the said court over which they presided, and destroy its power and influence; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should disgrace said Morris and said Kumler as judges in the minds of the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining, and of all persons having litigation before them as such judges, and should cause the people of said Lucas county and of the said counties adjoining to believe that said Morris and said Kumler were, in their official capacity as such judges, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before them in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in their court; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris and said Kumler in their capacity as said judges, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris and said Kumler as judges had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and to believe that said Morris and said Kumler, as judges, decided causes being liti gated in their court from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in their court; and with the further design and intent that the matters and thing's therein contained should impute to said Morris and said Kumler in their official actions as judges as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before them as such judges and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of their official position as such judges.
SPECIFICATION NO. 5.
That on or about the 24th day of Octobbr, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit B,” and made a part hereof, as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of, and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the cause of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, No. 53885, upon the appearance docket of said court; the cause of Coombs v. Coombs, No. 57569, on the appearance docket of said court, and the cause of The Franklin Printing and Engraving Company v. The Typographical Union No. 63, et al., No. 54237, upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said causes are the same causes referred to in said printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher was then and now is the attorney of record in said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways and Light Company for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein; all of which foreg'oing statements of fact were well known to said Thatcher at the time that he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directly charged and tended to show and to cause it to be believed that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions, and further tended to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said pending actions; and tended directly to impair the respect due to the au- - thority of said' Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to de grade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and to destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of" justice, and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and tended to impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said causes and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That all of the matters and things contained in said pamphlet, relating to the official action of said Morris as judge, were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said Morris as judge, and of the said court over which he presided, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet, with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show, and to cause, it to be believed generally, that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions;, and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Mor ris as judge in said pending actions, and impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties eng'aged in litigation in said causes and subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 6.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit B” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining', comprising' the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of- and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county, and said common pleas court in said county was presided over by four judges, to-wit: John F. Kumler, Lindley W. Morris, Bernard F. Brough and George A. Bassett.,
That said Morris was then a candidate before the people of said judicial district for re-election to his said office as judge, and was as such candidate upon the official ballot presented to the voters of said district at the official election held in said judicial district on the 3d day of November, 1908. That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county, and undisposed of, the case of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, No. 53885, upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said cause is the same cause referred to in said printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher was then and now is the attorney of record in said cause for Gravell, the plaintiff therein.
That said Thatcher was then, and for a- long time prior thereto had been, and now is, engaged in his office as attorney at law in prosecuting actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries ; that the larger part of said Thatcher’s business as attorney was then and now is the prosecution of said class of actions, and that a very large number of said causes then and now being prosecuted by said Thatcher were and are against corporations.
That there was and now is pending in said court a very large number of causes, to-wit: over fifty, in which said causes said Thatcher is the attorney for the plaintiff therein, and in which said causes the relief prayed for by said plaintiffs is damages for personal injuries sustained either by said plaintiffs or by those represented by said plaintiffs, and that the defendants in all óf said causes are corporations, and that all of said causes belong to the same class of causes as the 'cause herein mentioned, to-wit: No. 53885, Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, and that all of the foregoing statements of fact are now well known to said Thatcher and were well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directly charged and intended to show and to cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action. in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and the said matters and things tended further to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes; and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes over which said Morris as judge had jurisdiction,, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and tended to impair the capacity of said court and of all the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein. And said matters and things further tended to procure and bring about the defeat of said Morris as judge at the said oncoming' election, and to thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the said judges of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all of the said judges of said court in all of said matters and causes then pending in said court, and in all of the said causes then pending' in said court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to; and to thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said matters and causes, and to impair the capacity of said court, and all of said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in . all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That each and every one of the matters and thing's contained in said pamphlet relating to the official action of said Morris as judge, were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of said court, and of all the said judges thereof, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show, and cause it to be believed generally, that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes then pending in said court, and impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should procure the defeat of said Morris as judge at the oncoming election, and thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the judges of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all the judges of said court in the said causes herein mentioned and then pending in court, and in all of said causes then pending in court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said causes then pending in said court of the class and character of said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, and to impair the capacity of said court and all of the said judges thereof to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 7.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed paper, a correct copy of which said certain ■printed paper is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit <C” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed paper to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county, and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in said counties adjoining.
That at the time said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris and one .John F. Kumler, citizens of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, were judges of the court of common pleas of the said Fourth Common Pleas Judicial District of Ohio, and sitting as such judge in the court house, in said Lucas county.
That said printed paper was, as to each and every one of the matters and things therein contained, a false and malicious libel of and concerning said Morris and said Kumler as judges as aforesaid, and all of the said matters therein contained were known by said Thatcher to be false, .malicious and untrue at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated the same.
That the said matters and things contained in said paper tended to defame, disgrace and dégrade the said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and the court over which they presided, in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, and of all the persons having litigation before them as said judges; and tended to cause the people of said'Lucas county and of said counties adjoining, to believe that said Morris and said Kumler were in their official capacity as judges, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before them in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of-corporate interests engaged in litigation in their court; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris and said Kumler in their capacity as said judges, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris and said Kumler as judges, had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and that said Morris and said Kumler as judges, decided cases being litigated in their courts from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in their courts, and further tended to destroy the power and influence of said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and of the court over which they presided.
That the matters and things in said paper contained imputed to said Morris and said Kumler in their official actions as judges ás aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before them as such judges, and an utter lack of the appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of their official positions ’as such judges. ■
That said Thatcher well knew at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper that the matters and things therein contained would tend to have the effect and produce the belief herein set forth; and, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of said Morris and said Kumler as judges as aforesaid, and of the court over which they presided, said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper, with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should vilify, defame and degrade said Morris and said Kumler as judges, and the said court over which they presided, and destroy its power and influence; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should disgrace said Morris and said Kumler as judges in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, and all persons having litigation before them as such judges, and should cause the people of said Lucas county and of said counties adjoining to believe that said Morris and said Kumler were, in their official capacity as such judges, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before them in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in their court; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and thing's therein contained should cause the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris and Kumler in their capacity as said judges, and to belieA^e that trials as being conducted by said Morris and said Kumler as judges, had their foundation in fraud and wi;ong, and to believe that said Morris and said Kumler as judges, decided causes being litigated in their court from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in their court; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should impute to said Morris and said Kumler, in their official actions as judges as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before them as such judges, and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of their official positions as such judges.
' SPECIFICATION NO. 8.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed paper, a correct copy of which said certain printed paper is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit C,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed paper to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the cause of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railivays & Light Company, No. 53885 upon the appearance docket of said court; the cause of Coombs v. Coombs, No. 57569 on the appearance docket of said court, and the cause of The Franklin Printing & Engraving Company v. The Typographical Union No. 63, et' al., No. 54237 upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said causes are the same causes referred to in said printed paper; that said Thatcher then was md now is the attorney of record in said cause of Graven v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company for said Graved, the plaintiff therein ; all of which foregoing statements of fact were well known to said Thatcher at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper.
That the matters and things contained in said printed paper directly charge and tended to show and to cause it to be believed that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions, and further tended to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said pending actions; and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and to destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and tended to impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said causes, and to subvert the ends óf justice therein.
That all of the matters and things contained in said paper, relating to the official action of said Morris as judge, were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said Morris as judg-e, and of the said court over which he presided, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show, and cause to be believed generally, that said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said causes then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said actions; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said paper should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said pending actions, and impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said causes then pending in said court and herein referred to, and impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said causes and subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 9.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed paper, a correct copy of which said certain printed paper is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit C,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed paper to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in sai'd Lucas county, and said common pleas court in said county was presided over by four judges, to-wit: Jqhn F. Kumler, Lindley W. Morris, Bernard F. Brough and George A. Bassett.
That said Morris was then a candidate before the people of said judicial district for re-election to his said office as judge, and was as such candidate upon the official ballot presented to the voters of said district, at the official election held in said judicial district on the 3d day of November, 1908.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the case of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, No. 53885 upon the appearance docket of said court; and that said cause is the same cause referred to in said printed paper; that said Thatcher was then and now is the attorney of record in said cause for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein.
That said Thatcher then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, and now is engaged in his office as attorney at law in prosecuting actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries; that the larger part of said Thatcher’s business as attorney was then, and now is, the prosecution of said class of actions, and that a very large number of said causes then and now being prosecuted by said Thatcher were and are against corporations.
That there then was and now is pending in said court a very large number of causes, to-wit: over fifty, in which said causes, said Thatcher is the attorney for the plaintiff therein, and in which said causes the relief prayed for by said plaintiffs is damages for personal injuries sustained either by said plaintiffs or by those represented by said plaintiffs; and that the defendants in all of said causes are corporations, and that all of said causes belong to the same class of causes as the cause herein mentioned, to-wit: No. 53885, Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company; and that all of the foregoing statements of fact are now well known to said Thatcher, and were well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper.
That the matters and things contained in said printed paper directly charged arid tended to show .and to cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by im-. proper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and the said matters and things tended further to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes; and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of the said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all matters and causes over which said Morris, judge,-had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and tended to impair the capacity of said court and of all the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said' matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein. And the said matters and things further tended to procure and bring about the defeat of said Morris as judge at the said oncoming election; and to thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the said judges of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all of the said judges of said court in all of the said matters and causes then pending in said court, and in all of the said causes then pending in said court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to; and to thereby . obstruct the administration of justice in all of said matters and causes, and to impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That each and every one of the matters and things contained in said paper relating to the official- action of said Morris as judge were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher and was well known to him at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said court, and of all the said judges thereof, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said paper with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show and cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which .he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for' personal and friendly considerations, in all said matters and causes; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said paper contained should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes over which said Morris as judge had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said paper contained should procure the defeat of said Mofris as judge at the oncoming election, and thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the judges, of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all the judges of said court in the said causes herein mentioned and then pending in court, and in all of said causes then, pending in court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said causes then pending in said court of the class and character of said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, and to-impair the capacity of said court and all of the said judges thereof to act impartially between the par ties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 10.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit D,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining*, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of- persons in said Lucas county, and in said counties adjoining.
That at the time said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the said Fourth Common Pleas Judicial District of Ohio, and sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That said printed pamphlet was, as to each and every one of the matters and things therein contained, a false and malicious libel of and concerning said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and all of the said matters and things therein contained were known by said Thatcher to be false, malicious and untrue at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated the same.
That the said matters and things contained in said pamphlet tended to defame, disgrace and degrade the said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, and of all the persons having- litigation before him as said judge; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, to believe that said Morris was, in his official capacity as such judge, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before him in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in his court; and tended to cause the people of said Lucas county and of the said counties adjoining- to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris in his capacity as said judge, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris as judge had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and that said Morris as judge decided causes being-litigated in his court from a corrupt and improper motive, and that fair and impartial trials were impossible in his court, and further tended to destroy the power and influence of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided.
That the matters and things in said pamphlet contained, imputed to said Morris in his official action as judge as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before him as such judge, and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of his official position as such judge.
That said Thatcher well knew at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet that the matters and things therein contained would tend to have the effect and produce the belief herein set forth, and in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of- said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the said court over which he presided, said Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should vilify, defame and degrade said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy its power and influence; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should disgrace said Morris as judge in the minds of the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, and of all persons having litigation before him as such judge, and should cause the people of said Lucas county and of the said counties adjoining to believe that said Morris was, in his official capacity as such judge, corrupt and hostile to the interests of individuals engaged before him in litigation against corporations, and biased and prejudiced in favor of corporate interests engaged in litigation in his court; and with the further design and intent that the said matters and things therein contained should cause the people of said Lucas county, and of said counties adjoining, to be inflamed with prejudice against said Morris in his capacity as said judge, and to believe that trials as being conducted by said Morris as judge had their foundation in fraud and wrong, and to be-believe that said Morris as judge decided causes being litigated in his court from a corrupt and improper motive, and that “fair and impartial trials were impossible in his court; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should impute to said Morris in his official action as judge as aforesaid, a vicious and criminal disregard generally of the rights of litigants appearing before him as such judge, and an utter lack of appreciation of the honor, the decency and the dignity of his official position as such judge.
SPECIFICATION NO. 11.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit D,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in the hands of and brought to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in the said counties adjoining.
That at the time the said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lucas county.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the cause of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company, No. 53885, upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said cause is the same cause referred to in said printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher then was and now is the attorney of record in said cause for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein; all of which foregoing statements of fact were well known to said Thatcher at the time that he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directly charged and tended to show and to cause it to be believed that the said Morris as judge was partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in -said cause then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said cause; and further tended to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in said cause, and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge and the court over which he presided, and to destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice; and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said cause then pending in said court, and herein referred to, and tended to impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said cause, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
That all of the matters and -things contained in said pamphlet, relating to the official action of said Morris as judge, were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, • and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said Morris as judge, and of the said court over which he presided, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show, and to cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge was partial, and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in said cause then pending, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in said cause; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things contained in said pamphlet should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge, in said cause, and impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he pre sided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to the said cause then pending in said court, and herein referred to, and impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in said cause, and subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 12.
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1908, said Charles A. Thatchér prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated a certain printed pamphlet, a correct copy of which said certain printed pamphlet is hereto attached, marked-“Exhibit D,” and made a part hereof as fully and completely as if rewritten herein.
That said Charles A. Thatcher caused said printed pamphlet to be freely circulated and distributed in said Lucas county and the counties of the state of Ohio adjoining, comprising the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, and in and about and near to the court house in said Lucas county, and to be placed in-the hands and brouglit to the notice and attention of a large number of persons in said Lucas county and in said counties adjoining.
That at the time that said Charles A. Thatcher prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid, one Lindley W. Morris, a citizen of Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, was one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting as such judge in the court house in said Lu- ' cas county, and said common pleas court in Lucas county was presided over by four judges, to-wit: John F. Kumler, Lindley W.. Morris, Bernard F. Brough and George A. Bassett.
That said Morris was then a candidate before the people of said judicial district for re-election to his said office as judge, and was as such candidate upon the official ballot presented to the voters of said district at the official election held in said judicial district on the 3rd day of November, 1908.
That there was then and is now pending in said court of common pleas in said Lucas county and undisposed of, the case of Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Raihvays & Light Company, No. 53885 upon the appearance docket of said court, and that said cause is the same cause referred to in said printed pamphlet; that said Thatcher was then and now is the attorney of record in said cause for said Gravell, the plaintiff therein.
That said Thatcher then was. and for a long time prior thereto had been, and now is, engaged in his office as attorney at law in prosecuting actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries; that the larger part of said Thatcher’s business as attorney was then, and now is, the prosecution of said class of actions, and that a very large number of said causes then and now being prosecuted by said Thatcher were and are ag'ainst corporations.
That there then was and now is pending in said court a very large number of causes, to-wit: over fifty, in which said causes said Thatcher is the attorney for the plaintiff therein, and in which said causes the relief prayed for by said plaintiffs is damages for personal injuries sustained either by said plaintiffs, or by those represented by said plain tiffs; and that the defendants in all of* said causes are corporations, and that all of said causes belong to the same class of causes as the cause herein mentioned, to-wit: No. 53885, Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company; and that all of the. foregoing statements of fact are now well known to said Thatcher, and were well known to him at the time he prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet.
That the matters and things contained in said printed pamphlet directly charged and tended to show and to cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly consideration in all said matters and causes; and the said matters and things tended further to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, and tended directly to impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby tended to obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes over which said Morris, as judge, had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and tended to impair the capacity of said court, and of all the said judges thereof, to act impartially between thé parties engaged in litiga tion in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein. And the said matters and things further tended to procure and bring about the defeat of said Morris as judge at the said oncoming election, and to thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the said judges of sáid court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all of the said judges of said court in all of the said matters and causes then pending in said court, and in all of said causes then pending in said court in which said Thatcher was interested as. an attorney at law, and herein referred to, and to thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said matters and causes, and to impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the end of justice therein.
That each and every one of' the matters and things contained in said pamphlet relating to the official action of said Morris as judge were and are malicious, false and untrue, which fact is now well known to said Thatcher, and was well known to him at the time he so prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet as aforesaid.
That said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due the authority of said court, and of all the said judges thereof, prepared, wrote, printed, published, distributed and circulated said pamphlet with the design and intent that the matters and things therein contained should directly charge and tend to show and cause it to be believed generally that the said Morris as judge then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, partial and actuated by improper motives in his judicial action in all matters and causes over which he had jurisdiction, and warped the law for personal and friendly considerations in all said matters and causes; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should directly tend to disparage the judicial conduct of said Morris as judge in all said matters and causes, and impair the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge as aforesaid, and of the court over which he presided, and to degrade, insult and bring into disrepute said Morris as judge, and the court over which he presided, and destroy the efficiency of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, in the administration of justice, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to all said matters and causes over which said Morris as judge had jurisdiction, and all the matters and causes then pending in said court, and impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all said matters and causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein; and with the further design and intent that the matters and things in said pamphlet contained should procure the defeat of said Morris as judge at the oncoming' election, and thereby intimidate and improperly influence all of the judges of said court, and improperly and wrongfully control the judicial action of all the jtxdges of said court in the said causes herein mentioned and then pending in court, and in all of said causes then pending in court in which said Thatcher was interested as an attorney at law, and herein referred to, and thereby obstruct the administration of justice in all of said causes then pending in said court of the class and character of said cause of Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company; and to impair the capacity of said court, and all of the said judges thereof, to act impartially between the parties engaged in litigation in all of said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 13.
That on the 6th day of July, 1905, whilst taking the deposition of sundry witnesses in the law office of said Thatcher, in Toledo, Lucas county, Ohio, before one A. W. French, a notary public, in a cause then pending in the court of common pleas of Lucas county, Ohio, to-wit: cause No.' 53801, wherein Harry G. Huss was plaintiff, and Julius Strauss and others were defendants, said Charles A. Thatcher, in behalf of his client, the plaintiff therein, with menaces and threats of violence, and against the wishes and protests of said Julius Strauss, and of said Julius Strauss’ attorney, one Harry E. King, and in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of law, ordered and compelled said Julius Strauss to leave the said office during the examination and the taking of the deposition of one James B. Clinton. That said depositions were then being taken under a lawful and proper notice, and said Julius Strauss, as one of the parties to said action, had a right in law to be present during the taking of said depositions; all of which foregoing statements of fact were well known to said Thatcher at the time he so ordered and compelled said Strauss to leave said office.
SPECIFICATION NO. 14.
That on or about the 5th day of October, 1906, said Charles A. Thatcher caused to be prepared and delivered to Albert W. Payne, deputy clerk of the court of common pleas of Lucas county, Ohio, eleven affidavits of prejudice, properly signed and verified, in which said affidavits said Thatcher stated under oath that as to the following causes then pending in said court said Thatcher was interested as an attorney, and that one Lindley W. Morris, one of the judges of the said court of common pleas, had a bias and prejudice against said Thatcher therein, to-wit:
Cause No. 52058. Broder, Admr., v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co.
Cause No. 52951. Delander v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co.
Cause’ No. 52606. Graham, Admr., v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co.
Cause No. 53357. Crockery Co. Latig Jilin v. Daiidt Glass &
Cause No. 53257. Light Co. Wackerlin v. Toledo Rys. &
Cause No. 54873. Thatcher v. Richt.
Cause No. 54727. Gas Co. Ingram v. New Ohio Nat.
Cause No. 55114. Con. Co. Gilchrist v. U. S. Coaster
Cause No. 55099. Con. Co. Bergman v. U. S. Coaster
Cause No. 55411. Connor v. U. S. Coaster Con. Co.
Cause No. 55291. French, Admr., v. C. H. & D. Ry. Co.
That said Thatcher requested said deputy clerk upon receipt of said affidavits to show the same to said Morris, and to say to said Morris that if he (meaning said Morris) would transfer said causes to some other judge or judges of said court, said affidavits would not be filed, and to say further that unless said Morris did consent to so transfer said causes, said affidavits would be filed in said causes. That thereby said Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of said Morris as judge, and of the court over which he presided, designed and intended to intimidate and improperly influence said Morris as judge, and to improperly and wrongfully control his judicial action in said causes herein mentioned, and then pending in said court, and further designed and intended to thereby obstruct the administration of justice in regard to said causes and to destroy the efficiency of said court in the administration of justice in regard to said causes, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
SPECIFICATION NO. 15
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1907, said Charles A. Thatcher, whilst arguing a motion for a new trial before the Honorable John F. Kumler, one of the judges of the court of common pleas of Lucas county, Ohio, and sitting as such judge, without justification or provocation or excuse therefor, and whilst addressing the court in behalf of his client, the plaintiff, in the case of Orleano G. Barnes v. The Toledo Urban & Interurban Railway Company, and in open court and to the court, and in the presence of the husband of plaintiff and of opposing counsel, one Harold Fraser, and of many other persons, in substance did use the following language:
“The attorney for the defendant [meaning thereby Mr. Harold Fraser] ought to be shot. He deserves it.” That the court thereupon interrupted said Thatcher by asking: “What, here in court?” and that said Thatcher replied: “No, not here in court, but he [meaning Fraser] should be taken out of the court house and led a block away and then shot.”
That the said Flarold Fraser, of whom said Thatcher used the foregoing language, was an attorney at law, duly admitted to practice as such in the said court, and then present in court in behalf of said railway company in the hearing of said motion.
That said Thatcher in the use of the foregoing language thereby threatened the said Fraser with murder and assumed to himself the commission of said crime of murder, and by his said language suggested, incited and urged upon the husband of the said plaintiff, the commission of said offense of murder.
That the said Thatcher' used said language in . utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the law of the land, and" in disregard of the respect due to the said court and said opposing counsel.
SPECIFICATION NO. 16.
That said Charles A. Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the respect due to the authority of law, did, on or about the 3d day of August, 1903, in a matter growing out of and relating to his duties as an attorney for one Harley Mattison, secure • from the said Mattison the sum of seven hundred dollars ($700.00) upon the false representation of him, the said Thatcher, made to said . Mattison, that he, the said Thatcher, wanted said sum of money placed in his, said Thatcher’s hands, for the sole and only purpose of counting the same; whereas in truth and in fact said Thatcher secured said sum of money from said Mattison with the design and intent to appropriate the same to his, said Thatcher’s use, and in pursuance of said design and intent, said Thatcher put said sum of money in his, said Thatcher’s pocket, and thereafter returned the same to said Mattison only when the same was demanded of him with menaces and threats by the said Mattison.
SPECIFICATION NO. 17.
On a?nd for some time prior to the 1st day of February, 1908, the said Charles A. Thatcher was the custodian of a certain promissory note, duly executed on the 7th day of January, 1896, by one Charles F. Milburn and one George R. Hudson, wherein and whereby the said Charles F. Milburn and the said George R. Fludson, for value received, promised to pay to the order of one Albert Reiter, one year after date thereof, the sum of One Thousand and Eleven Dollars and Twenty-four Cents ($1,011.24), at the office of The Milburn Wagon Company, Toledo, Ohio, together with interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum. Said promissory note is in the words and figures following, to-wit:
“$1,011.24-100
“'Toledo, O., January 7th, 1896.
“One year after date we promise to pay to the order of Albert Reiter Ten Hundred and Eleven and 24-100 Dollars at office of Milburn Wagon Co., Toledo, Ohio, with interest at 6%. Value received.
(Signed) “C. F. Milburn,
“G. R. Hudson.
(Endorsed:) “Without recourse.
“Albert Reiter.”
On and for some time prior to the 1st day of February, 1908, the said Charles A. Thatcher was the custodian of a certain promissory note, duly executed on the 18th day of January, 1896, by one Charles F. Milburn and George R. Hudson, wherein and whereby the said Charles F. Milburn and the said George R. Hudson, for value received, promised to pay to the order of one Albert Reiter, one year after date thereof, the sum of Twelve Hundred and Seventy-six Dollars and Eighty-four Cents -($1,276.84) at the office of The Milburn Wagon Company, Toledo, Ohio, together with in-* terest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum. Said promissory note is in the words and figures following, to-wit:
“$1,276.84-100
“Toledo, O., January 18th, 1896.
“One year after date we promise to pay to the order of Mr. Albert Reiter Twelve Hundred and Seventy-six and 84-100 Dollars, at office of Milburn Wagon Co., Toledo, Ohio, with interest at 6%. “Value received.
(Signed) “C. F. Milburn,
“G. R. Hudson.
(Endorsed:) “Without recourse, Albert Reiter.”
On and for some time prior to the 1st day of February, 1908, said Charles A. Thatcher was the custodian of a certain promissory note executed on the 25th day of November, 1895, by Toledo Road Cart Company, wherein and whereby, for value received, said Toledo Road Cart Company promised to pay to the order of the First National Bank of South Bend, Ind., four months after the date thereof, the sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500), together with interest thereon at the rate of eight per centum per annum. Said promissory note was endorsed by the said George R. Hudson, and by the said Charles F. Milburn, and said persons were liable jointly and co-equally for the payment of said note. Said promissory note is in the words and figures following, to-wit:
“$2,500.00
“South Bend, Ind., Nov. 25, 1895.
“Four months after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of the First National Bank, of South Bend, Indiana, Twenty-five Hundred and no-100 Dollars, in the First National Bank of South Bend, Indiana, with interest from' maturity at eight per cent., waiving all benefit of valuation or appraisement laws, with five per cent, attorney fees.
“The drawers and endorsers severally waive presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest, and non-payment of this note.
.(Signed) “Toledo Road Cart Co.,
“C. F. Milburn, Manager.
“No. 14900. Due Mar. 28-96.
(Endorsed:)
“G. R. Hudson.
“C. F. Milburn.
“Without recourse.
“First National Bank, South Bend, Ind.,
“C. A. Kimball, Cash.”
Each and every of said promissory notes aforesaid were and had been paid and fully satisfied by the said Charles F. Milburn, long prior to the said 1st day of February, 1908, and had been surrendered to said Milburn by the holders thereof, all of which was well known to said Thatcher, on and long prior to said 1st day of February, 1908.
On said 1st day of February, 1908, the said Charles F. Milburn was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, a' citizen and resident of the city of Chattanooga in the state of Tennessee, as the said Charles A. Thatcher well knew.
That on or about said 1st day of February, 1908, the said Charles A. Thatcher, in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the authority of the law, and with the design and intent to deceive the court in which the action hereinafter mentioned was begun, and for the purpose and with the intent of deceiving and defrauding said George R. Hudson and of obtaining a judgment on each and every of said promissory notes against the said George R. Hudson, and of procuring for him, the said Charles A. Thatcher, a large portion of the moneys to be realized therefrom, and with the fraudulent intent and purpose of concealing from the said George R. Hudson the fact that each and every of said promissory notes aforesaid had been paid and fully satisfied by the said C. F. Milburn, as hereinbefore alleged, and the connection of him, the said C. A. Thatcher, therewith, delivered each and every of said promissory notes to Alonzo G. Duer, Esq., an attorney at law admitted to practice in this state and practicing his profession in the city of Toledo, county of Lucas, said state, and instructed and directed the said Alonzo G. Duer, Esq., to forthwith commence in the court of common pleas within and for said county of Lucas, a civil action in the name of the said Albert Reiter against the said Charles F. Mil-burn and the said George R. Hudson, upon each and every of said promissory notes aforesaid, and to cause service of summons to be forthwith made on the said George R. Fludson.
That on the said 1st day of February, 1908, the said Alonzo G. Duer, Esq., being ignorant of the fact that any of said promissory notes aforesaid had been paid and fully satisfied by the said Charles F. Milburn, and acting upon the instructions and at the direction of the said Charles A. Thatcher, commenced a civil action in said court of common pleas, being cause No. 58238 on the docket of said court, in the name of the said Albert Reiter as plaintiff, and against the said Charles F. Milburn and George R. Hudson, to recover a judgment on each and every of said promissory notes aforesaid, and caused a summons to be issued therein and served upon the said George R. Hudson, which said cause is still pending in said court.
SPECIFICATION NO. 18.
That the said Charles A. Thatcher as such attorney at law is now making and for many years last past has made, a specialty of the procurement and prosecution of a class of cases known as personal injury cases, and as such attorney has, for the purpose of obtaining, controlling, bringing and prosecuting such cases in the several courts of this state having jurisdiction thereof, solicited such cases personally by personal communications and interviews not warranted by personal relations, and has therein and thereby obtained, brought and prosecuted a very large number of such cases; that the said Thatcher has also procured and brought a great many of said personal injury cases by indirection through touters whom he has employed and paid to procure such cases for him to prosecute; that the said Thatcher has been and is a breeder and inciter to litigation by seeking out himself personally, and by employing agents and runners to seek out, those having claims for personal injuries in order to secure them as his clients, and the said Thatcher, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice has, by himself and by agents, obtained admission to homes and hospitals where sick and injured have been placed and confined, and by his representations and promises has influenced them to seek his professional services and to sign unconscionable contracts as to his oay for such services; all of which course of conduct upon the part of said Thatcher has been and is in utter disregard and violation of his professional duties as such attorney at law and of his oath of office, and of the respect due to the authority of law, and in utter and flagrant disregard of his high calling as attorney and practitioner, and he has thereby and therein defied the traditions and lowered the tone of his high calling as attorney and practitioner. And, instead of striving at all times by example and precept to uphold the honor and maintain the dignity of his calling as attorney and practitioner, he has therein and thereby become defiant, bold and impudent, made himself conspicuous, set a bold and bad example, and brought upon himself and his profession public ridicule and contempt, and has therein and thereby impaired the usefulness and efficiency of the court and of the legal administration of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) Clayton W. Everett, Chairman,
Emery D. Potter,
J. W. S CITAUFELBERGER,
Frank M. Sala, .
James S. Martin,
Julian H. Tyler,
Committee.
'(Filed Jan. 27, 1909, Supreme Court of Ohio.)
EXHIBIT “A.”
The suppressed record of Judge L. W. Morris.
(Cut omitted Harry Gravell.)
Judge Morris threw this cripple out of court;
The upper court could not stand for it!
Will you? See inside.
The facts in the following pages have been suppressed by the newspaper corporations owned by Judge Morris’ friends. But they are proved by the records. The people have a right to know.
Copies of this circular may be got of Harry Gravell, 1944 Seaman St., Toledo, Ohio.
JURY TRIALS REFUSED.
53885. Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
We give Harry Gravell’s signed statement of his own case:
“Toledo, Ohio, Sept. 16, 1908.
“At 6 o’clock a. m. April 1, 1905, I was working as a motorman for The Toledo Railways & Light Company on an Ironville car. The brakes of the car were defective so that I could not control it while going to Ironville with a large load of workmen. I stuck to my post to protect the lives of these men.
“The car crashed into another car and my legs were crushed so that both were cut off, leaving me a helpless cripple. My case came to trial before Judge Morris, February 27, 1906. He denied me the right to a trial by jury and ordered the jury to return a verdict for the Rail-Light Company. I borrowed money to pay the expense of the stenographer and took my case to the circuit court. That court, Pctober 8, 1906, immediately reversed Judge Morris and held that I had a right to let a jury of my fellow-men decide it.
“The ‘Big Con’ carried the case to the supreme court. That court in January, 1908, also decided that Judge. Morris had no right to deny me the right to trial by jury and to himself decide for the corporation. After more than three years’ delay because of Judge Morris’ action, I can now try my case before a jury.
“My family and I have nearly starved and would have done so if collections had not been taken up for our support and but for the aid of the infirmary.
“Judge Morris during this time, and is now, living' in a mansion on Colling'wood avenue.
“I want to save other poor cripples from his power. He has been drawing salary for fifteen years and wants us to give him six years more at more than $5,400 per year, or more than $32,000 for the term; in all nearly $100,000.
“I appeal to you, fellowmen, who want justice done, in the name of many helpless cripples who have been treated by him as I was, not to keep Judge Morris in power, although he may now pretend to have reformed — just to get our votes.
“The records prove all I have said.
“Truly yours,
“Harry Gravell.”
Mr. Gravell published his statement a month ago over his own name and personally distributed it at the Independent Judicial Convention, which refused to indorse Judge Morris. Neither Judge Morris nor his supporters have ventured to speak on this subject. They have all kept strict silence, lest the facts should become known.
Trial by jury is a constitutional right of every free citizen. We ordinary Americans are proud of our jury system. Judges once respected that institution. Of late many have tried in various ways to undermine it. One plan is to take cases away from the jury and direct verdicts for the corporations and trusts. This has been a favorite practice of Judge Morris.
He has not directed any verdicts for those maimed, widowed and orphaned by corporate recklessness and indifference. But numberless times has he thrust juries to one side and decided in favor of railroads, traction companies and other corporations, which are so careful of dollars, and so careless of life and limb.
From the public records of a hundred of such cases we cite a few at random:
54580. Jas. Addison v. The Toledo Railway & Terminad Co., Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Company and The Toledo & Ann Arbor R. R. Co.
Addison was a baggage man on a train and was injured in a collision. Clarence Brown and Alexander Smith (attorneys for the ice trust)' defended the various railroads. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the companies.
55385. Emil Eichelman v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was a passenger on a Rail-Light car. He had dismounted and started to cross the street when he was struck down without any warning by a fast car from the opposite direction. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the Rail-Light Co.
54970. Hila Leiter v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was crossing the street. A street car came almost to a stop on the opposite side to take on passengers. It suddenly-started up and without warning ran her down inflicting serious injuries. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
41297. Jacob Uhlrich v. Toledo Consolidated Street Ry. Co.
Plaintiff and his wife, while driving were run down by a car. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
Julius ■Schulz, Administrator of the Estate of George J. Schwarts v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company.
Schwartz was killed by injuries received while working for the company. Pie left a wife and children. Doyle & Lewis, Standard Oil attorneys, represented the defendant. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
57069. William E. Shields v. The Toledo Home Telephone Co.
Plaintiff, a new man at the business, was hurt for life by a shock from a live wire. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
45512. Herman Keiper v. The Toledo & Wabash Elevator Co.
While plaintiff was busy pinching a car another car was backed against it and he was badly hurt. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
36632. Jos. Petrowski v. The Hocking Coal, Ore & Transportation Company.
Plaintiff was injured for life by defective appliances furnished by the company. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
33792. Stephen Boyer v. The C., H. V. '& T. Ry. Co.
A defective coal bucket provided by the company struck and injured plaintiff. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
37447. Hugh L. Decker v. Toledo Machine & Tool Company.
An infant had three fingers crushed by the company’s defective punch press. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
NO TRIAL BY JURY FOR THEM.
(Cut omitted.)
Widow and children of George Schwartz who appeal to the Jury of the Whole People.
(See opposite page.)
THE LAW AGAINST THE UNFORTUNATE.
It is said the “ambulance chasers” are down on Morris.
This is intended to mean the attorneys who stand for the rights of those killed and injured.
But the only real “ambulance chasers” that we know are the corporation claim agents and attorneys like Ed. Eckert, who chase the ambulances with a dollar in one hand and a release of the company in the other hand to get the victim to sign before he comes to himself. They are not down on Morris. But the attorneys who try the suits against big corporations are against Morris to a man. It isn’t sentiment or politics with them. It is business. They never would be against Morris if he really were a “people’s judge.”
Possibly some of the people thus thrown out of court did not have good cases. The corporation lawyers so argued. But that is not the question. The question is, what right the judge had in so many cases to decide instead of leaving it to the jury to decide. What is a jury for? Either we might as well get rid of juries altogether or else we had better get rid of judges who have so little use for juries.
INNOCENCE NOT PROTECTED.
Judges have great and exclusive power in divorce cases, which they are expected to use for the benefit of the defenseless children of unhappy marriages. Judge Morris has disregarded the sanctity of the home relation and exposed youthful innocents to improper surroundings. In the divorce case of Coombs v. Coombs (No. 57569) it was undisputed that the mother of two girls 10 and 12 years of age, was entertaining a strange man and had done so for weeks. Judge Morris refused the father’s prayer to take the children from under such influences and instead required him to make monthly payments to the mother for their support and education by her.
LAW IS AGAINST TPIE UNFORTUNATE.
“The law is against the unfortunate,” said Judge Morris in one case where he directed a verdict. Why is the law against the unfortunate? Because judges' make it so. In Judge Morris’ court the law is against the unfortunate only because Judge Morris considers and declares it against the unfortunate. What good is a law or a judge that does not protect the unfortunate?.
DOWN WITI-I INJUNCTION JUDGE.
Another way by which corporation judges try to destroy the right of trial by jury is the injunction. The judge, rising above the legislature, makes a law, which he calls an order; he construes it, he executes it and without a jury trial he punishes any violation of it according to his own will. Hostile to juries, Judge Morris became an Injunction Judge. He made that process an effective weapon against the workers. Typographical Union No. 63 had a disagreement with a newspaper corporation and printing company and the corporation attorney applied to Judge Morris to make his petition stronger. The court and-the judge went so far as to suggest to the attorney how to make his petition stronger. The court and the court officers waited for the corrected petition and later in the evening without any hearing, Judge Morris issued an injunction, thus, saying in effect, “Now get rid of it.”
ATTORNEYS DRAW ORDER.
He did not even draw his own order, but simply wrote down “Injunction allowed as prayed for.” The corporation attorneys say they drew the order as strong and as broad as possible. The judge permitted the newspaper corporation to have an order against hundreds of defendants and “all other persons, union or non-union.” All the people in Toledo, so far as it might “hurt business” were restrained from free and peaceable speech, from printing or publishing their side of the controversy, from peaceably assembling, from soliciting the support of 'the employes, subscribers and advertisers of the newspaper, as well as from unlawful' acts that could have been prosecuted as provided by the laws of the state or prevented by peace proceedings which the legislature has directed for such cases.
BARELY THE RIGHT TO BREATHE.
The printers said they were barely left the right to breathe.
The printers brought clear evidence to show that they were right and had not violated and did not intend to violate the law. Even then he refused to raise the injunction, which was in force against the printers “and all -other” people of. Toledo from October, 1905, until July, 1906, when the newspaper corporation had won its victory. The case is now in the circuit court. This litigation cost the workers over $1,200, which meant more to them than the $29,000,000 fine meant to the Standard Oil Company, as they had to pay it out of their own pockets.
In another case brought, for a printing corporation by the same attorneys, Judge Morris did the same thing, but in that case the injunction is still in force so that if the workers should publish a circular or try to peaceably persuade one of the employes of this company to join their union they would be held guilty of .contempt if such an act “hurt business.” The numbers of these cases are 54191 and 54237.
Charles E. Chittenden now a candidate for common pleas judge, nominated by the Independent and Democratic voters, was one of the attorneys who stood for the rights of the workers in these cases.
Summary of proceedings in The Express Publishing Co., Plaintiff, v. Typographical Union No. 63, Typographical Union No. 24, The Central Labor Union, and seventy-five workingmen sued by name:
Oct. 10, 1905. Petition filed. Same day injunction granted by Judge Morris, “as prayed for,” without hearing. (137 Journal, 452.) The petition prayed, among other things, for an injunction against:
Prevailing upon advertisers to withdraw advertisements ;
Soliciting those advertising in plaintiffs newspaper to withdraw their advertisements;
Congregating about the plaintiffs place of business for the purpose of inducing employes to quit;
Distributing circulars which stated the facts about plaintiff and said, “We respectfully request all our friends to put their printing in union shops and thus assist the printers in their struggle against the open shop.” '•
Distributing circulars that one of the patrons of plaintiff “refused to- place his printing in a union office, left it with a non-union firm and thereby is assisting to defeat the printers in their struggle for the eight-hour day.”
“Unlawful persuasion” (the judge to decide when persuasion is lawful and when it is unlawful, according to his own notion).
Picketing.
Boycotting the business of plaintiff (although the plaintiff might blacklist them if he chose).
Distributing and circulating circulars “that plaintiff is unfair to organized labor, or intended or calculated to injure his business, or to induce the public to withdraw its patronage from plaintiff” (although plaintiff might print and publish that the workingmen were unfair and that he was perfectlv fair, whether he was or noth
Soliciting subscribers to and advertisers in plaintiffs newspapers for the purpose of inducing them to withdraw their subscriptions and advertisements.
Threatening or coercing subscribers and advertisers to withdraw. (Although plaintiff might threaten and coerce his employes by the loss of their livelihood.)
And (as if this were not enough), “for all other and further relief.”
Judge refused to require plaintiff to tell any names of persons, or acts committed, or other definite facts which plaintiff charged in general terms.
Nov. 4, 1905.. Motion to dissolve injunction overruled. (137 Journal, 540.)
April 24, 1906. Rule granted to show cause why certain defendants should not be punished for contempt. (138 Journal, 514.)
. May 12. Motions to quash and dismiss the rule overruled. (138 Journal, 573.)
July 2. Motion for new trial.
See Case No. 2106 in circuit court, which is the number of the case in that court where it is now pending.
Summary of proceedings in the case of The Franklin Printing and Engraving Company, Plaintiff, v. Same Defendants:
October 21, 1905. Order of L. W. Morris issuing an injunction like that in the other case. (137 Journal, 480.)
October 23. Motion by defendants to dissolve injunction.
November 3. Motion overruled. (137 Journal, 538.)
April 19, 1906. Motion overruled for the defendants to show cause why they should not be punished. (138 Journal, 492.)
May 14. Motion to quash and dismiss rule overruled. (-148 Journal, 574.)
May 14. Motion to strike irrelevant matter from petition overruled.
No further proceedings have been had and the case is still pending in the common pleas court.
This circular is published ten days before election. Let Judge Morris or his friends answer. They have the newspapers.
EXHIBIT “B.”
The suppressed record of Judge L. W. Morris.
Judge Morris threw this legless cripple out of court.
The upper courts could not stand for it! Will you? (Cut omitted.) See inside.
The facts in the following pages have been suppressed by the newspaper corporations owned by Judge Morris’ friends. But they are proved by the records. The people have a right to know.
Copies of this circular may be got of Harry Gravell, 1944 Seaman St., Toledo, Ohio. (Tear off here.)
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republican; put your X before the name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent voters, Democrats and Independence party.
Take this slip with you to remind you.
THE DEADLY PARALLEL.
Human beings deprived of jury trial by Judge Morris.
Harry Gravell’s case and the other cases are only a few among many. Some of the others are as follows:
56982. Lucas Co. Appearance Docket.
52685. 53885. 52264. 51882. 50313. 46222. 44058.
37998. 40452. 36227. 55138. 54011. 50979. 47392.
46359. 47262. 44268. 39726. 38241. 36439. 55341.*
54093. 50234. 48509. 45958. 42908. 39837. 39655.
36998. 56593. 52063. 52316. 50692. 48751. 47470.
39905. 39879. 37852. 37580. 55499. 52587. 52463.
51342. 48774. 42904. 42711. 41515. 37863. 36594.
55191. 53109. 53186. 51351. 48792. 44615. 41539.
37156. 37947. 36885. 52407. 50089. 53223. 51359.
49437. 45068. 37153. 38227. 38062. 47037. 52385.
Corporations deprived of jury trial by Judge Morris.
JURY TRIALS REFUSED.
Trial by jury is a constitutional right of every free citzen. We ordinary Americans are proud of our jury system. Judges once respected that institution. Of late many have tried in various ways to undermine it. One plan is to take cases away from the jury and direct verdicts for the corporations and trusts. This has been a favorite practice of Judge Morris.
He has not directed any verdicts for those maimed, widowed and orphaned by corporate recklessness and indifference. But numberless times has he thrust juries to one side and decided in favor of railroads, traction companies and other corporations, which are so careful of dollars and so carele'ss of life and limb.
From the public records of a hundred of such cases, we cite a few at random:
53885. Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
We give Harry Gravell’s signed statement of his own case:
“Toledo, Ohio, Sept. 16, 1908.
“At 6 o’clock a. m., April 1, 1905, I was working as a motorman for The Toledo Railways & Light Company on an Ironville car. The brakes of the car were defective, so that I could not control it while going to Ironville with a large load of workmen. I stuck to my post to protect the lives of these men.
“The car crashed into another car and my legs were crushed so that both wereyrut off, leaving me a helpless cripple. ■ My case came to trial before Judge Morris, February 27, 1906. He denied me the right to a trial by jury and ordered the jury to return a verdict for the Rail-Light Company. I borrowed money to pay the expense of the stenographer and took my case to the circuit court. That court, October 8, 1906, immediately reversed Judge Morris and held that I had a right to let a jury of my fellowmen decide it.
■ “The ‘Big Con’ carried the case to the supreme court. That court in January, 1908, also decided that Judge Morris had no right to deny me the right to trial by jury and to himself decide for the corporation. After more than three years’ delay, because of Judge Morris’ action, I can now try my case before a jury.
“My family and I have nearly starved and would have done so if collection's had not been taken up for our support and but for the aid of the infirmary.
“Judge Morris during this time was, and is now, living in a mansion on Collingwood avenue.
“I want to save other poor cripples from his power. He has been drawing salary for fifteen years and wants us to give him six years more at more than $5,400 per year, or more than $32,000 for the term; in all nearly $100,000.
“I appeal to you, fellowmen, who want justice done in the name of many helpless cripples who have been treated by him as I was, not to keep Judge Morris in power, although he may now pretend to have reformed — just to get our votes.
“The records prove all I have said.
“Truly yours,
“Harry GravellA
Mr. Gravell published his statement a month ago over his own name and personally distributed it at the Independent Judicial Convention, which refused to indorse Judge Morris. Neither Judge Morris nor his supporters have ventured to speak on this subject. They have all kept strict silence, lest the facts should become known.
54580. las. Addison v. The Toledo Railway & Terminal Co., Detroit and Toledo Shore Line Company and The Toledo & Ann Arbor R. R. Co.
Addison was a baggage man on a train and was injured in a collision. Clarence Brown and Alexander Smith (attorneys for the ice trust) defended the various railroads. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the companies.
55385. Emil Eichelman v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was a passenger on a Rail-Light car. He had dismounted and started to cross the street when he was struck down without any warning by a fast car from the opposite direction. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the Rail-Light Co.
54970. Hila Leiter v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was crossing the street. A street car came almost to a stop on the opposite side to take on passengers. It suddenly started up and without warning ran her down, inflicting serious injuries. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendants.
41297. Jacob Ulrich v. Toledo Consolidated Street Ry. Co.
Plaintiff and his wife, while driving, were run down by a car. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
Julius Schultz, Administrator of the Estate of George J. Sclnvarts, v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company.
Schwartz was killed by injuries received while working for the company. He left a wife and children. Doyle & Lewis, Standard Oil attorneys, represented the defendant. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
57069. William E. Shields v. The Toledo Home Telephone Co.
Plaintiff, a new man at the business, was hurt for life by a shock from a live wire. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
45512. Herman Keiper v. The Toledo & Wabash Elevator Co.
While plaintiff was busy pinching a car another car was backed against it and he was badly hurt. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
36632. Jos. Petrowski v. The Hocking Coal, Ore & Transportation Company.
Plaintiff was injured for life by defective appli anees furnished by the company. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
33792. Stephen Boyer v. The C., H. V. & T. Railway Co.
A defective coal bucket provided by the company struck and injured plaintiff. Judge Morris directed a verdict for defendant.
37447. Hugh L. Decker v. Toledo Machine & Tool Company.
An infant had three fingers crushed by the company’s defective punch press. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republican, put your X before the name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent voters, Democrats and Independence party.
No trial by jury for them. (Cut omitted.)
Widow and children of George Schwarz who appeal to the Jury of the Whole People. (See opposite page.)
THE LAW IS AGAINST THE UNFORTUNATE.
It is said the “ambulance chasers” are down on Morris.
This is intended to mean the attornejrs who stand for the rights of those killed and injured.
But the only real “ambulance chasers” that we know are the corporation claim agents and attorneys like Ed. Eckert, who chase the ambulances with a dollar in one hand and a release of the company in the other hand to get the victim to sign before he comes to himself. They are not down on Morris. But the attorneys who try the suits against big corporations are against Morris to a man. It isn’t sentiment or politics with them. It is business. They never would be against' Morris if he really were “a people’s judge.”
Possibly some of the people thus thrown out of court did not have good cases. The corporation lawyers so argued. But that is not the question. The question is, what right the judge had in so many cases to decide instead of leaving it to the jury to decide? What is a jury for? Either we might as well get rid of juries altogether or else we had better get rid of judges who have so little use for juries.
INNOCENCE NOT PROTECTED.
Judges have great and exclusive power in divorce cases, which they are expected to use for the benefit of the defenseless children of unhappy marriages. Judge Morris has disregarded the sanctity of the home relation and exposed youthful innocents to improper surroundings. In the divorce case of Coombs v. Coombs (No. 57569) it was undisputed that the mother of two girls, 10.and 12 years of age, was entertaining a strange man and had done so for weeks. Judge Morris refused the father’s prayer to take the children from under such influences and instead required him to make monthly payments to the mother for their support and education by her.
LAW IS AGAINST TITE UNFORTUNATE.
“The law is against the unfortunate,” .said Judge Morris in one case where he directed a verdict. Why is the law against the unfortunate? Because judges make it so. In Judge Morris’ court the law is against the unfortunate, only because Judge Morris considers and declares it against the unfortunate. What good is a law or a judge that does not protect the unfortunate?
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republican, put your X before the name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent -voters, Democrats and Independence party.
Take this circular with you to remind you.
Residence and stable of Judge L. W. Morris, 3264 Collingwood avenue. ( Cuts of same omitted.)
Cottage rented by Harry Gravell, who lost both legs by negligence of “Big Con.” Judge Morris directed verdict for “Big Con,” and was overruled. (Cut of same omitted.)
Cottage of laboring man, overtaxed to build mansion and stable.
(Cut omitted.)
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republican, put your X before the name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent voters, Democrats and Independence party.
PURIFY TI-IE BENCH-BACKED BY THE BROWN MACHINE.
Judge Morris has been on the bench for fourteen years, so that the people in deciding his appeal for a fourth term of six years, have before them a- long record o’f many cases 'which he has acted upon.
Previous to his elevation to the bench, Mr. Morris was a lawyer of limited practice. He went into partnership with Judge Kumler. The latter was attorney for David Robison, now president of a trust company then a traction promoter. A fran chise war was on in Toledo between the Robison interests, who wanted franchises for three lines of street railway, and the Consolidated Traction Company which held the existing lines.
Mr. Morris became a member of the Toledo common council, and afterward its president, with the support of the Robison-Kumler faction, which finally got the necessary franchises.
taxpayers’ money wrongfully taken.
Councilman Morris was promoted in 1894 and became Judge Morris. His first “judicial” act, as has been frequently asserted, and" is not denied, was to go to Columbus and lobby for an unconstitutional special law allowing" the county commissioners to pay him $1,500 per year in addition to the lawful salary he was elected to receive. This act was against the taxpayers, and necessarily affiliated the judge with other politicians in office, who were grabbing illegal fees and salaries right and left.
If a sheriff, clerk, auditor or probate judge takes illegal fees, the people call it graft. .The grafter must disgorge and retire from public life. In Lucas county former incumbents of these offices have been compelled to refund thousands of dollars to the taxpayers and have been retired.
Judge Morris and Judge Kumler were nominated at the same primary, backed by the machine. Each now supports the other for election. Both are opposed to the re-election of prosecutor Wachenheimer, from whom Judge Morris borrows a temporary popularity.
WITAT ABOUT THE UNEMPLOYED.
The News-Bee recently announced that the infirmary directors must raise $150,000 to'feed and clothe our poor this winter. If Judge Morris would make restitution, as other county officers have done, it would lighten the burdens of the taxpayers and lessen the suffering of those who will be cold and hungry.
Every Monday morning three hundred to four hundred men gather at the Toledo street commissioner’s office begging for work. He tells them he has plenty of work but no money to pay for the work. Taxes are high. Who has got the taxpayers’ money? Ask Judge Morris and others who have taken unlawful salaries.
In 1906 Prosecutor Lyman W. Wachenheimer, rather than touch an illegal penny, worked without pay for three months, and made test cases, which rooted out the iniquitous fee system and illegal salary grabbing.
The political machines that thrive on such wrong-doing could not tie this prosecutor’s hands.
Judge Morris however, lobbied for a share of the millions illegally extorted from the taxpayers. He took and has kept over $15,000 above his lawful salary. Suit has been brought to recover this money for the county. Judge Morris’ answer is long overdue, but he as yet offers no defense. A judgment on default would be entered against an ordinary man.
Is a judge so sacred that, like a king, he can do no wrong? Because he can declare the law, is it right for him to countenance illegal taxes on the owners and renters of cottages and farms in order that out of a portion of such taxes he may build him a mansion on an aristocratic avenue?
STANDARD OIL INFLUENCE.
When Judge Morris wanted re-election five years ago friends of Captain Clayton W. Everett a one-armed veteran’, and an honored member of the Toledo bar, called on Walter Brown and asked his support to nominate Everett in place of Morris. Brown at first promised his support for Everett.
Soon after, he repudiated the promise and said to Captain Everett’s supporters, “John H. Doyle and John Kumler have been raising trouble and want to know why I am going back on their friend Morris. Now this won’t* do. We get our subscriptions for campaigns from these fellows and must support Morris.” Morris was re-nominated and re-elected. Doyle was and is attorney for The Standard Oil Company and Kumler was attorney for the Robison Trust Company and other interests. This shows where the wheels of the Brown machine are greased.
INJUNCTION JUDGES AND FRANCHISES.
“Big Con” Franchise.
The franchises for the use of our streets held by the “Big Con” commence to expire next year. The scheme for control and loading the people down with a new franchise has just become known.
It is the intention of the “Big Con” to lie quiet until the Dorr street and other franchises expire. It will then ask the council to renew the franchises. If they are not renewed on the “Big Con’s” own terms, it will then do as the same syndicate did in Cleveland, stop running cars. The people dependent upon the line will insist on service. The city, if the law will permit, will attempt to take possession itself and operate the cars or let the right to some one else.
The “Big Con” will then want an injunction to restrain the city from taking possession of its own streets and removing the “Big Con’s” tracks, or allowing any one else to operate the car lines. It will want a judge experienced in issuing injunctions and familiar with franchises. The “Big Con” knows that Judge Morris is a first-rate injunction judge. See his record in the German Express and Franklin printing cases.
The “Big Con” knows that Morris, as president of the council, helped David Robison get his franchises. The “Big Con” knows that David Robison, James Robison, Will Robison, Clarence Brown, King & Tracy, and many other corporation magnates and trust lawyers traded their holdings in the Yaryan Heating Co. for stock of the “Big Con.” Barton Smith now sleeps with them in the same bed.
So the “Big Con” knows that by electing Judge Morris they will have a friendly judge, ready to issue the injunction, and tie the city’s hands. They will then have a judge who will put every city official in jail who pretends to violate his judge-made, jury-denied injunction. By tying up one or more of the streets occupied by car lines,, such hardships will be worked that the city will then be forced to accept whatever terms the “Big Con” offers, as the public will be dependent upon the cars for transportation.
If you don’t believe this, then give us some other reasons why the “Big Con” five years ago sent its men into every ward in the city to spend money and work for Morris’ election.
If you don’t believe this, then tell us why the “Big Con” is now straining every effort to re-elect Morris.
If you don’t believe this, inquire why King & Tracy, Clarence Brown and the Robisons are working for his re-election.
PEOPLE WANT INDEPENDENT JUDGES NOT PARTISAN POLITICIANS.
Man v. $$$$
The political judge, corporation judge and injunction judge cannot be a humane judge. Property rights rather than human rights, liberty and happiness are first with him.
Judge Morris is merciless with petty offenders for “Law is against the unfortunate.” The fortunate are able to go to Columbus and get laws that make them still more fortunate or to the courts and get disagreeable laws nullified by judges. The unfortunate must be ground down under the law and suffer at the hands of judges who construe the law against them.
Judge Morris has for 14 years held for the defendant in the case of Man v. $$$$$. He is making his campaign on one single act which is expected to cover up all the rest of his record.
a 4-flush bluff.
His term was about to expire when, through the diligence of Prosecutor Wachenheimer, the Toledo lumber and brick men pleaded guilty and were brought up for sentence. Judge Morris wanted to renew his lease on his job. He wanted something in his favor to make the run on. His ear was at the ground. He listened. He heard Judge Kinkade’s name on every-lip. Judge Kinkade two years ago broke all precedents and sentenced the ice men to the workhouse. It was not hard for Judge Morris to decide what to do. If he imposed a fine he could never be re-elected. If he followed Judge Kinkade’s example he would share in the popularity of both Kinkade and Wachenheimer. So while he fined the brick men he gave a workhouse sentence to the Toledo lumber men. They never went to prison. They afterward appeared before Judge Kumler. Judge Kumler conferred with his former law partner, Judge Morris, and changed the sentence to a fine.
A PARTISAN JUDGE.
Some may think that Morris was not a party to this miscarriage of justice but it is not denied that Judge Morris and Judge Kumler have been affiliated together during- their careers, professionally and politically. Both opposed Wachenheimer as an Independent three years ago and both opposed Kinkade as an Independent two years ago. Last summer Judge Morris at the State Bar association did nothing to help in the fight for a non-partisan judiciary because he is a partisan and only a partisan all the time.
POLITICAL JURORS.
The enemies of jury trial say that we do not get the right kind of jurymen. Most jurymen are fair and just, but it is necessary for the corpora tions to have one or two on each jury to hang the jury. If some jurors are not all right it is the fault of the judges, for they have the exclusive power of appointing jury commissioners who pick out the jurors, and when there is a special call, for a jury, the judge or his bailiff picks out the jurymen and the judge appoints the bailiff.
In Lucas county for years past there has no been a year in which one or more of the jury commissioners have not been well known machine politicians. Is it any wonder, then, that this kind of jury commissioners appointed by this kind of judges should first prefer this kind of jurors? Is it any wonder that even when a judge lets a case go to the jury, there may be found some to hang the jury and make a mis-trial or to deceive their fellow-jurors? The only remedy is to have non-partisan judges who will appoint jury commissioners, not because they are politicians, but because they are straight, honorable men and will give every competent citizen an equal opportunity for jury service without regard to whether he has a political pull or not. Judge Morris is a rabid partisan politician. If continued in office, we shall undoubtedly have political jury commissioners' and a good sprinkling of political jurors.
FRIEND OF THE “BIG CON.”
It has become a matter of common knowledge and is undisputed that the so-called “Big Con” is again supporting Judge Morris this year. Frank Geer, an attorney for the ice trust, and opponent of Kinkade with big business attempted to bring about Morris’ endorsement by the Independent voters. They failed. They bolted and tried by petition to get Morris on to a so-called Independent ticket. Among their signers, were ex-Councilman George C. Bittner, whom the News-Bee last year accused of intimacy with traction interests; James W. Caldwell, city council watchman for the “Big Con,” and their friends and the friends 'of Sam Cohn, of Walter Brown’s cabinet. So many of them were struck off because they helped nominate Morris in the Republican primary that the petition. fell short of necessary signers. The News-Bee says that John O’Dwyer is a boss. - As a member of the board of elections O’Dwyer voted to strike Kinkade’s name off the “phony” petition, but to keep on the name of Morris. This was done.
Former employes of the traction company say that they received money from Ed. Eckert in 1898 and 1903 with orders to carry their precincts for Morris. King & Tracy, Clarence Brown and. other trust and corporation lawyers are now stockholders in the Rail-Light company. This year, just as in 1898 and 1903, during Judge Morris’ campaigns, they have loaned their aid to him.
Have you heard Judge Morris criticise Judge Kumler, his running mate? No. Have you heard him praise Wachenheimer ? No. Have you heard him raise his voice for Kinkade two years ago? No.
DEATH BED REPENTANCE TOO LATE.
Judge Morris’ act in the lumber cases will not fool the people. It will not cover up the long record of the corporation judge. The death bed repentance came too late. The people wanted righteous judges. Measured by this standard and in the light of a record which is open for all to read, Judge Morris falls so far short that it would be dangerous for the people to put themselves, their juries and their fellowmen under him for six years longer, in addition to the fifteen years he has already had.
KNOW THEIR FRIEND.
The millionaire Scripps-McRae syndicate, owning the News-Bee and other newspaper corporations, are anxious to re-elect Morris regardless of all other candidates. Why? A newspaper may be for the people where it has no ax to grind but the corporations that own the papers are just like other corporations when their own interests are at stake. If they should ever have trouble with the people that do their work, they know that Judge Morris would issue and maintain an injunction for them; just the kind of an injunction that their attorneys might ask and they would have reason to expect that if their attorneys did not make it strong-enough Judge Morris would suggest the necessary corrections. They know this because-this is just what he has done for other newspaper corporations.
TI-IE NEWSPAPER BOSS.
Cochran threatened the Independent voters that if they did not nominate Morris he would bolt. The convention refused to .nominate Morris, even at Cochran’s dictation. He bolted. He advertises that majority of the Lucas county members- voted for Morris, .but that .the outside counties -belonging to the district had enough votes to nominate- Johnson over Morris.
Tt is true that Morris in the convention had 51 votes out of Lucas county while Johnson had 50. This 51st vote for Morris was cast by Frank Geer, attorney for the ice trust. And now Cochran is seeking to deceive the readers of his newspaper by saying that Morris is an anti-trust judge, knowing as he does, that his record for 14 years has been universally in favor of the railroads, street car companies and other corporations.
Voter, don’t be fooled by a newspaper that wants an injunction, trust and corporation judge kept on the bench and is trying to throw dust in your eyes by calling him an anti-trust judge. Don’t be fooled by an editor, who for years represented the Standard Oil Company that was then the owner of the paper now run by Cochran. Lie has been and is now serving the Standard Oil Company and other corporate interests and attempts to fool the people.
Political bosses are bad enough. A newspaper and political boss combined is worst of all. No one can deny the power of the press. If dishonestly exercised it can do great injustice. There was a time when the News-Bee stood for principle. It stands for principle now in Colorado, or Idaho, or New- Jersey — but not in Toledo and Lucas county. In this campaign right here it is disregarding principle and is seeking to make its editor, Mr. Cochran, a newspaper and political boss. He can be seen at the Boody House billiard room and bar in Walter Brown’s company when Walter is in town. His paper, the News-Bee, helped him through with his slate at the Republican primary. It has praised him as a “leader.” ■ Brown and Cochran laugh at the sham fight between them, and then take a drink.
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republicán, put your X before the* name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent voters, Democrats and Independence party.
WHAT DID MORRIS DO TO THE WORKERS?
DOWN WITH THE INJUNCTION JUDGE.
Another way by which corporation judges try to destroy the right of trial by jury is the injunction. The judge, rising above the legislature, makes a law, which he calls an order; he construes it, he executes it and without a jury trial he punishes any violation of it according to his own will. Hostile to juries, Judge Morris became an injunction judge. He made that process an effective weapon against the workers. Typographical Union No. 63 had a disagreement with a newspaper corporation and printing company, and the corporation attorney applied to Judge Morris for an injunction. Union officials say that the judge went so far as to suggest to the attorney how to make his petition stronger. The court and the court officers waited for the corrected petition, and later in the evening, without any hearing, Judge Morris issued an injunction, thus saying in effect “Now get rid of it.”
ATTORNEYS DRAW ORDER.
He did not even draw his own order, but simply wrote down “Injunction allowed as prayed for.” The corporation attorneys say they drew the order as strong and as broad as possible. The judge permitted the newspaper corporation to have an order against hundreds of defendants and “all other persons, unions or non-unions.” All the people in Toledo, so far as it might “hurt business” were restrained from free and peaceable speech, from printing or publishing their side of the controversy, from peaceably assembling, from soliciting the support of the employes, subscribers and advertisers of the newspaper, as well as from unlawful acts that could have been prosecuted as provided by the laws of the state or prevented by peace proceedings which the legislature has direct- ' ed for such cases.
BARELY TI-IE RIGHT TO BREATHE.
The printers said they were barely left the right to breathe.
The printers brought clear evidence to show that they were right and had not violated and did not intend to violate the law. Even then he refused to raise the injunction, which was in force against the printers “and all other” people of Toledo from October, 1905, until July, 1906, when the newspaper corporation had won its victory. The case is now in the circuit court. This litigation cost the workers over $1,200, which meant more to them than the $29,000,000 fine meant to the Standard Oil Company, as they had to pay it out of their own pockets.
In another case brought for a printing corporation by the same attorneys, Judge Morris did the same thing but in 'that case the injunction is still in force so that if the workers should - publish a circular or try to peaceably pursuade one' of the employes of this company to join their union, they would be held guilty of contempt if such an act "hurt business.” The numbers of .these cases are 54191 and 54237.
The records prove Judge Morris a foe of labor, of independence, of tax payers, of human rights, of jury trial.
A friend of labor crusher, of partisanship, of fee and salary grabbers, of corporate interests, of judicial tyranny.
• This circular was published ten days before election. Let Judge Morris or his friends answer. They have the newspapers.
To vote against Lindley W. Morris, Republican, put your X before the name of Curtis T. Johnson, nominated by Independent voters, Democrats' and Independence party.
EXHIBIT "C.”
JUDICIAL REFORM BULLETIN.
The people of Ohio are entitled to and demand information as to the records of judges who seek re-election. The facts set forth in the Judicial Reform Bulletin are taken from official public records. They have been published and have been in circulation for weeks and are undisputed. (Union Label.)
SUPREME JUDGES SHAUCK AND PRICE-REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FOR RE-ELECTION-TI-IEIR RECORDS — OFFICIAL REPORT OF OHIO FEDERATION OF LABOR AND BROTPIERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN.
ON TRIAL.
IN THE COURT OF THE COMMON PEOPLE.
No. 1,000,200.
20o,ooo Shop and Factory Employees, Coal Miners, and 110,000 Railway Employees, in Ohio.
Plaintiffs,
v.
Candidates for Judge of Supreme Court, State of Ohio,
Defendants.
This case is for trial on the 3d day of November (election day) in every voting booth in Ohio.
The jury is composed of 1,000,200 voters/
Published under the direction of the: Ohio Federation of Labor and State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
Cleveland, O., October 8, 1908.
TO THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE OHIO FEDERATION OF LABOR AND THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, STATE OF OHIO.
Sirs and Brothers:. In compliance with action taken at meeting of the Executive Board of the Ohio Federation of-Labor, held at' Cleveland, Ohio, June 6, 1908, and the biennial meeting of the legislative representatives of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, held at Columbus, Ohio, January 5, 1908, instructing us to compile and submit for your information a statement of the records of the candidates for the office of judge of supreme court, state of Ohio, we beg to submit the following:
JUDGE OF SUPREME COURT.
Candidates — Republican Ticket: John A. Shauck, Montgomery county. James L. Price, Allen county.
Candidates — Democratic Ticket: H. T. Mathers, Shelby county. Geo. B. Okey, Franklin county.
Judge John A. Shauck. Term of service as judge of supreme court about thirteen (13) years, during which time the following cases relating to master and servant have been tried in the lower courts and judgment in each case • rendered in favor of the original plaintiff, then carried to the supreme court, the result of Judge Shauck’s vote in each case being as follows:
Volume 58, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Lersch, page 639. Shauck voted in favor of the company.
Hesse v. Railway Co., page 167. Neil Hesse was a fireman and was killed by reason of being furnished a defective locomotive which exploded. Shauck voted for .the company.
Railway Co. v. Andrevus, page 426. A brakeman was killed through the negligence of company. Shauck voted for the company and wrote opinion in the supreme court.
Volume 60, Ohio State supreme court reports: Schzveinfurth v. Railway Co., page 215. Company recklessly ran down R. J. Blum at a public crossing and killed him. Shauck voted in favor of the company.
Volume 63, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Ehlert, page 320. Christian Holz was fatally injured at street crossing. Shauck voted for the company and wrote opinion in the case.
Volume 64, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Skiles, page 458. Skiles had his right leg cut off through the company’s misconduct. Shauck voted for the company.
Volume 65, Ohio State supreme court reports: Coal Co. v. Smith, page 70. The company carelessly furnished Smith with an unsafe place to work. Shauck voted in favor of the company.
Volume 65, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Cox, Admr., page 267. Cox was killed as a result of the company’s negligence. Shauck voted for the company and wrote opinion in the case.
Railway Co. v. Workman, Admr., page 509. In this case a sixteen-year-old boy, employed as lamplighter, was killed through the fault of the company. Shauck voted for the company.
Volume 67, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railzvay Co. v. Holmes, page 153. Shauck voted for the company.
Volume 69, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. McCormick, Admr., page 45. Railway company wrongfully caused the death of James McCormick, a track walker. Shauck voted for the company and wrote the opinion in the case.
Railway Co. v. Rigby, page 184. Shauck voted for the company.
Transport Co. v. Pachuta, page 462. Pachuta was killed as a result of negligence by the company. Shauck voted for the company.
Volume 70, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Shanhower, page 166. Due to company’s negligence, Shanhower’s leg was crushed off. Shauck voted for the company.
In addition to these Judge Shauclc has passed upon ten (10) other similar reported and eighty-seven (87) unreported cases, and with but few exceptions voted in favor of the company or corporation. He also voted to declare the eight hour law unconstitutional. He also held that a member of the so-called voluntary relief association was not entitled to any damage for injury received through the negligence of railroad companies in case he accepted any of the benefits of such association, notwithstanding the fact that the employees are compelled to become members of this association and contribute largely to its maintenance.
Judge James L. Price. Term of service as judge of supreme court about six (6) years, during which time the following cases relative to master and servant have been tried in the lower courts and judgment in each case rendered in favor of the original plaintiff, then carried to the supreme court, the result of Judg'e Price’s vote in each case being as follows:
Volume 66, Ohio State supreme court reports: Raihvay Co. v. Cox, Admr., page 276. Cox was killed as a result of the company’s negligence. Price voted for the company.
Raihvay Co. v. Workman, Admr., page 509. In this case a sixteen-year-old boy, employed as lamplig'hter, was killed through the fault of the company. Price voted for the company.
Volume 66, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway v. Holmes, page 153. Price voted for the company.
Volume 69, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. McCormick, Admr., page 45. Rail way company wrongfully caused the death of Jariies McCormick, a track walker. Price vote! for the company.
Railway Co. v. Rigby, page 184. Price v>ted for the company.
Transport Co. v. Pachnta, page 462. Pachuta •was killed as a result of negligence by the company. Price voted for the company.
Volume 70, Ohio State supreme court reports: Railway Co. v. Shanhower, page 166. Due to the company’s negligence Shanhower’s leg was crushed off. Price voted for the company.
In addition to these Judge Price has passed upon four (4) other similar reported and fifty-five (55) unreported cases, and with but few exceptions voted in favor of the company or corporation.
Judge PI. T. Mathers. Has been on the common pleas bench in Western Ohio for the past six (6) years and 'has only passed upon about fifteen (15) cases, but two of which were master and servant, as follows:
Allen county: Plarry Frye v. C. IT. & D. Ry. Co.
Auglaize county: Sarah Immel, Admx., v. The Wapakoneta Wheel Co., both of which were decided in favor the plaintiff. In nearly all of the negligence cases handled the decisions were in favor of the plaintiff.
Geo. B. Okey. Was formerly supreme cotirt reporter, but never held an elective public office; thereforé, has no judicial record. He is reported as an able lawyer and has practiced law in Franklin county for many vears.
During recent sessions of the legislature we have succeeded in securing the passage of the following labor bills:
Metzger’s Employer’s Liability Assumed Risk Law.
O’Rourke Voluntary Relief Law.
Reynolds Child Labor Law.
Reynolds Law providing relief for children to attend school.
Four laws for the protection of miners against explosives and incompetent labor.
Contract Prison Labor Law.
Amendment to the Union Label Law.
Ohio Automatic Coupler and Power Brake Law.
It should 'be remembered that the judges of the supreme court for the state are elected for a term of six (6) years and it lies within the power of these judges to declare all or part of these laws unconstitutional, or place such construction upon them as will make them useless, The various decisions of the supreme court have caused the judges of the lower courts within the state to hesitate in rendering decisions favorable to the common people, feeling that their decisions will be reversed when reaching the supreme court of the state.
It now behooves you, as members of organized labor, within the state of Ohio, to carefully study the records of the candidates for the high -office of judge of supreme court, and use your influence in favor of only those who are readv and willing to interpret the laws and render a decision in favor of all classes alike, and as the facts presented in each case may warrant.
We do not expect, nor do we request special privileges, but we believe that the time has come when we should demand justice. You can and should decide this matter on November 3.
(Seal.) Fraternally,
Llewellyn Lewis, President,
Harry D. Ti-iomas, Secretary,
Ohio Federation of Labor.
(Seal.)
M. J. Murpi-iy, Chairman,
J. H. Thompson, Secretary,
State Legislative Board.
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen.
Approved by the Ohio State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
J. A. Lati-irop, Chairman,
F. L. Osgood, Secretary.
Harry Gravell’s statement. Lost both legs by corporate carelessness. Judge Morris threw him out of court — was overruled — what will the people do ? ( Cut omitted.)
Trial by jury is a constitutional right of every free citizen. We ordinary Americans are proud of our jury system. Judges once respected that institution. Of late many have tried in various ways to mdermine it. One plan is take cases away from the jury and direct verdicts for the corporations and trusts. This has been a favorite practice of Judge Morris.
He has not directed any verdicts for those maimed, widowed and orphaned by corporate recklessness and indifference. But numberless times has he thrust juries to one side and decided in favor of railroads, traction companies and other corpora tions, which are so careful of dollars and so careless of life and limb.
From the public records of a hundred such cases, we
(Pending Case.)
53885. Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
We give Harry Gravell’s signed statement of his own case:
“At 6 o’clock a. m., April 1, 1905, I was working as a motorman for The Toledo Railways & Light Company on an Ironville car. The brakes on the car were defective, so that I could not control it while going to Ironville with a large load of workmen. I stuck to my post to protect the lives of these men.
“The car crashed into another car and my legs were crushed so that both were cut off, leaving me a helpless cripple. My case came to trial before Judge Morris February 27, 1906. He denied me the right to a trial by jury and ordered the jury to return a verdict for the Rail-Light Company. I borrowed money to pay the expense of the stenographer and took my case to the circuit court. That court, October 8, 1906, immediately reversed Judge Morris and held that I had a right to let a jury of my fellowmen decide it.
“The ‘Big Con’ carried the case to the supreme court. That court in January, 1908, also decided that Judge Morris had no right to deny me the right to trial by jury and to himself decide for the corporation. After more than three years’ delay, because of Judge Morris’ action I can now try my case before a jury.
“My family and I have nearly starved and would have done so if collections had not been taken up for our support and but for the aid of the infirmary.
“Judge Morris during this time was, and is now, living in a mansion on Collingwood avenue.
“I want to save other poor cripples from his power. He has been drawing salary for fifteen years and wants us to give him six years more at more than $5,400 per year, or more than $32,000 for the term; in all nearly $100,000.
“I appeal to you, fellowmen, who want justice done, in t.he name of many helpless cripples who have been treated by him as I was, not to keep Judge Morris in power, although he may now pretend to have reformed — just to get our votes.
“The records prove all I have said.
“Truly yours,
“Harry Gravell.”
Mr. Gravell published his statement a month ago over his own name and personally distributed it at the Independent Judicial Convention, which refused to indorse Judge Morris. Neither Judge Morris nor his supporters have ventured to speak on this subject. They have all kept strict silence, lest the facts should become known.
CRIPPLE FOR LIFE.
EMIL EPSTEIN.
(Cut omitted.)
A "Miedo street car crushed his leg, Sunday, Oct. 25, ’08, and crippled him for life.
LAW IS AGAINST THE UNFORTUNATE.
“The law is against the unfortunate,” said Judge Morris in one case where he directed a verdict. Why is the law against the unfortunate? Because judges make it so. In Judge Morris’ court the law is against the unfortunate, only because Judge Morris considers and declares it against the unfortunate. What, good is a law or a judge that does not protect the unfortunate?
RECORD OF LINDLEY W. MORRIS, REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR RE-ELECTION TO THE COMMON PLEAS BENCH OF LUCAS, OTTAWA, ERIE, SANDUSKY AND HURON COUNTIES.
Judge Morris has been on the bench for 14 years, so that the people in deciding his appeal for a fourth term of six years, have before them a long record of many cases which he has acted upon.
Previous to his elevation to the bench, Mr. Morris was a lawyer of limited practice. He went into partnership with Judge Kumler. The latter was attorney for David Robison, now president of a trust company, then a traction.promoter. A franchise war was on in Toledo between the Robison interests, who wanted franchises for three lines of street railway, and the Consolidated Traction Company, which held the existing lines.
Mr. Morris became a member of the Toledo common council, and afterward its president, with the support of the Robison-Kumler faction, which finally got the necessary franchises.
BACKED BY TI-IE BROWN MACHINE.
Judge Morris and Judge Kumler were nominated at the same primary backed by the machine. Each now supports the other for election. Both are opposed to the re-election of prosecutor Wachenheimer, from whom Judge Morris borrows a temporary popularity. It is rumored that the machine politicians are going to compel Morris to bolt his party colleague and supporter, Holland Webster. If they do, it will only be another campaign dodge and will deceive no one.
T/A PAYERS' MONEY WRONGFULLY TAKEN.
Councilman Morris was promoted in 1894 and became Judge Morris. His first “judicial” act, as has been frequently asserted, and is not denied was to go to Columbus and lobby for an unconstitutional special law allowing the county commissioners to pay him $1,500 per year in addition to the lawful salary he was elected to receive. This act was against the taxpayers, and necessarily affiliated the judge with other politicians in office, who. were grabbing illegal fees and salaries right and left.
If a sheriff, clerk, auditor or probate judge takes illegal fees the people call it graft. The grafter must disgorge and retire from public life. In Lucas county former incumbents of these offices have been compelled to refund thousands of dollars to the taxpayers and have been retired.
The News-Bee recently announced that the infirmary directors must raise $150,000 to feed and clothe our poor this winter. If Judge Morris, would make restitution, as other county officers have done, it would both lighten the burden of the taxpayers and lessen the suffering of those who will be cold and hungry.
WHAT ABOUT THE UNEMPLOYED ?
Every Monday morning 300 to 400 men gather at the Toledo street commissioner’s office. begging for work. Ele tells them he has plenty of work but no money to pay for the work. Taxes are high. Who has got the taxpayers’ money? Ask Judge Morris and others who have taken unlawful salaries.
In 1906, Prosecutor- Lyman W. Wachenheimer, rather than touch an illegal penny, worked without pay for three months, and made test cases, which rooted out the iniquitous fee system and illegal salary grabbing.
The political machines that thrive on such wrong-doing could not tie this prosecutor’s hands.
Judge Morris, however, lobbied for a share of the millions, illegally extorted from the taxpayers. He took and has kept over $15,000 above his lawful salary. Suit has been brought to recover this money for the county. Judge Morris’ answer is long overdue, but he as yet offers no defense. A judgment on default would be entered against an ordinary man.
Is a judge so sacred that, like a king, he can do no wrong? Because he can declare the law, is it right for him to countenance illegal taxes on the owners and renters of cottag'es and farms in order that out of a portion of such taxes he may build him a mansion on an aristocratic avenue?
STANDARD OIL INFLUENCE.
When Judge Morris wanted re-election five years ago friends of Captain Clayton W. Everett, a one-armed veteran, and an honored member of the Toledo bar, called on Walter Brown and asked his support to. nominate Everett in place of Morris. Brown at first promised his support for Everett.
Soon after, he repudiated the promise and said to Captain Everett’s supporters, “John H. Doyle and John Kumler have been raising trouble and want to know why I am going back on their friend Morris. Now this won’t do. We get our subscriptions for campaigns. from these fellows and must support Morris.” Morris was re-nominated and re-elected. Doyle was and is attorney for The Standard Oil Company and Kumler "was attorney for the Robison Trust Company and other interests. This shows where the wheels of the Brown machine are greased.
INJUNCTION JUDGES AND FRANCHISES. “BIG CON” FRANCHISE.
The franchise for the use of our streets held by the “Big Con” commence to expire next year. The scheme for control and loading the people down with a new franchise has just become known.
It is the intention of the “Big Con” to lie quiet until the Dorr street and other franchises expire. It will then ask the council to renew the franchises. If they are not renewed on the “Big Con’s” own terms, it will then do as the same syndicate did in Cleveland, stop running cars. The people dependent upon the line will insist on service. The city, if the laws will permit, will attempt to take pos session itself and operate the cars or let the right to someone else.
The “Big Con” will then want an injunction to restrain the city from taking possession of its own streets and removing the “Big Con’s” tracks, or allowing anyone else to operate the car lines. It will want a judge experienced in issuing injunctions and familiar with franchises. The “Big Con” knows that Judge Morris is a first-rate injunction judge. See his record in the German Express and Franklin printing cases.
The “Big Con” knows that Morris, as-president of the council, helped David Robison get the franchise. The “Big Con” knows that David Robison, James Robison, Will Robison, Clarence Brown, King & Tracy and many other corporation magnates and trust lawyers traded their holdings in the Yaryan Heating Co. for stock of the “Big Con.” Barton Smith now sleeps with them in the same bed.
So the “Big Con” knows that by electing Judge Morris they will have a friendly judge, ready to issue the injunction and tie city’s hands. They will then have a judge who will put every city official in jail who pretends to violate his judge-made, jury-denied injunction. By tying up one or more of the streets occupied by car lines, such hardships will be worked that the city will Ihen be forced to accept whatever terms the “Big Con” offers, as the public will be dependent upon the cars for transportation.
If you don’t believe this, then give us some other reason why the “Big Con” five years ago sent its men into everv ward in the city to spend money and work for Morris’ election.
If you don’t believe this, then tell us why the “Big Con” is now straining every effort to re-elect Morris.
If you don’t believe this, inquire why King & Tracy, Clarence Brown and the Robisons are working for his re-election.
PEOPLE WANT INDEPENDENT JUDGES.
NOT PARTISAN POLITICIANS.
Man v. $$$$
The political judge, corporation judge and injunction judge cannot be a humane judge. Property rights rather than human rights, liberty and happiness are first with him.
Judge Morris is. merciless with petty offenders for “Law is against the unfortunate.” The fortunate are able, to go to Columbus and get laws that make them still more fortunate or to the courts and get disagreeable laws nullified by judges. The unfortunate must be ground down under the law and suffer at. the hands of judges who construe the law against them.
Judge Morris has for 14 years held for the defendant in the case of Man v. $$$. He is making his campaign on one single act which is expected to cover up all the rest of his record.
a 4-flush bluff.
His term was about to expire when, through the diligence of Prosecutor Wachenheimer, the Toledo lumber and brick men pleaded guilty and were brought up for sentence. Judge Morris wanted to renew his lease on his job. Pie wanted something in his favor to make the run on. His ear was at the ground. He listened. He heard Judge Kinkade’s name on every lip. Judge Kinkade two years ago broke all precedents and sentenced the ice men to the workhouse. It was not hard for Judge Morris to decide what to do. If he imposed a fine he could never be re-elected. If he followed Judge Kinkade’s example he would share in the popularity of both Kinkade and Wachenheimer. So while he fined the brick men he gave a workhouse sentence' to the Toledo lumber men. They never went to prison. They afterward appeared before Judge Kumler. Judge Kumler conferred with his former law partner, Judge Morris, and changed the sentence to a fine.
A PARTISAN JUDGE.
Some may think that Morris was not a party to this miscarriage of justice, but it is not denied that Judge Morris and Judge Kumler have been affiliated together during their careers, professionally and politically. Both opposed Wachenheimer as an Independent three years ago, and both Kinkade as an Independent two years ago. Last summer Judge Morris at the state bar association did nothing to help in the fight for a non-partisan judiciary because he is a partisan and only a partisan all the time.
FRIEND OF THE "BIG CON.”
It has become a matter of common knowledge and is undisputed that the so-called “Big Con” is again supporting Judge Morris this year. Frank Geer, an attorney for the ice trust, and opponent of Kinkade with big business attempted to bring about Morris’ endorsement by- the Independent voters. They failed. They bolted and tried by petition to get Morris on to a so-called Independent ticket. Among their signers, were ex-Councilman George C. Bittner, whom the News-Bee last year, accused of intimacy with traction interests, James W. Caldwell, city council watchman for the “Big Con” and their friends and the friends of Sam Cohn, of Walter Brown’s cabinet. So many of them were struck off because they helped nominate Morris in the Republican primary that the petition fell short of necessary signers. The News-Bee says that John O’Dwyer is a boss. As a member of the board of elections O’Dwyer voted to strike Kinkade’s name off the “phony” petition, but to keep on the name of Morris. This was done.
Former employes of the traction company say that they received money from Ed. Eckert in 1898 and 1903, with orders to carry their precincts for Morris. King & Tracy, Clarence • Brown and other trust and corporation lawyers are now stockhold-ers in the Rail-Light Company. This year, just as in 1898 and 1903, during Judge Morris’ campaigns, they have loaned their aid to him.
Have you heard Judge Morris criticise Judge Kumler, his running mate? No. Have you heard him praise Wachenheimer ? No. Have you heard him raise his voice for Kinkade two years ago? No.
DEATH BED REPENTANCE TOO LATE.
Judge Morris’ act in the lumber cases will not fool the people. It will not cover up the long record of the corporation judge. ' The death bed repentance comes too late. The people want righteous judges. Measured by this standard and in the light of a record which is open for all to read, Judge Morris falls so# far short that it would be dangerous for the people to put themselves, their juries and their fellowmen under him for six years longer, in addition to the 15 years he has already had.
“the law is against the unfortunate.”
WHAT DID JtFDGE MORRIS DO TO THE WORKERS ?
Down with injunction judge.
Another way by which corporation judges try to destroy the right of trial by jury is the injunction. The judge, rising above the legislature, makes a law, which he calls an order; he construes it, he executes it and without a jury trial he punishes any violation of it according to his own will. Hostile to juries, Judge Morris became an injunction judge. He made that process an effective weapon against the workers. Typographical Union No. 63 had a disagreement with a newspaper corporation and printing company and the corporation attorney applied to Judge Morris for an injunction. Union officials say that the judge went so far as to suggest to the attorney how to make his petition stronger. The court and the court officers waited for the corrected petition, and later in the evening, without any hearing, Judge Morris issued an injunction, thus saying in effect “Now get rid of it.”
ATTORNEYS DRAW ORDER.
He did not even draw his own order, but simply wrote down “Injunction allowed as prayed for.” The corporation attorneys say they drew the order as strong and as broad as possible. The judge permitted the newspaper corporation to have an order against hundreds of defendants and “all other persons, union or non-union.”. All the people in Toledo, so far as it might “hurt business” were restrained from free and peaceable speech, from printing or publishing their side of the controversy, from peaceably assembling, from soliciting the support of the employes, subscribers and advertisers of the newspaper, as well as from unlawful acts that could have been prosecuted as provided by the laws of the state or prevented by peace proceedings which the legislature has directed for such cases.
BARELY THE RIGHT TO BREATHE.
The printers said they were barely left the right to breathe.
The printers brought clear evidence to show that they were right and had not violated and did not intend to violate the law. Even then he refused to raise the injunction, which was in force against the printers “and all other” people of Toledo from October, 1905, until July, 1906, when the newspaper corporation had won its victory. The case is now in the circuit court. This litigation cost the workers over $1,200, which meant more to them than the $29,000,000 fine meant to the Standard Oil Company, as they had to pay it out of their own pockets.
In another case brought for a printing corporation by the same attorneys, Judge Morris did the Same thing but in that case the injunction is still in force so that if the workers should publish a circular or try to peaceably persuade one of the employes of this company to join their union, they would 'be held guilty of contempt if such an act “hurt business.” The numbers of these cases are 54191 and 54237.
POLITICAL JURORS.
The enemies of jury trial say that we do not get the right kind of jurymen. Most jurymen are fair and just but it is necessary for the corporations to have one or two on each jury to hang the jury. If some jurors are not all right it is the fault of the judges, for they have the exclusive power of appointing jury commissioners who pick out .the jurors, and' when there is a special call for a jury, the judge or his bailiff picks out the jurymen and the judge appoints the bailiff.
In Lucas county for years past there has not been a year in which one or more of the jury commissioners have not been well-known machine politicians. Is it any wonder, then, that this kind of jury commissioners appointed by this kind of judges should first prefer this kind of jurors? Is it any wonder that even when a judge lets a case go to the, jury, there may be found some to hang the jury and make a mis-trial or to deceive their fellow-jurors? The only remedy is to have nonpartisan judges who will appoint jury commissioners, not because they are politicians, but because they are straight, honorable men and will give every compétent citizen an equal opportunity for jury service without regard to whether he has a political pull or' not. Judge Morris is a rabid partisan politician. If continued in office, we shall undoubtedly have political jury commissioners and a good sprinkling of political jurors.
Mansion and stable of L. W. Morris, 3264 Collingwood avenue.
(Cut omitted.)
Cottage of laboring man, over-taxed to build mansion and stable.
(Cut omitted.)
Cottage rented by Harry Gravell, who lost both legs by negligence of “Big Con.” Judge Morris directed verdict for “Big Con.” and was overruled.
(Cut omitted.)
THE DEADLY PARALLEL.
HUMAN BEING DEPRIVED OF JURY TRIAL.
TUDGE MORRIS.
Harry Gravell’s case and the other cases are only a few among many. Some of the others are as follows:
56982. Lucas county. Appearance Docket.
52685. 53885. 52264. 51882. 50313. 46222. 44058.
37998. 40452. 36227. 55138. 54011. 50979. 47392.
46359. 47262. 44268. 39726. 38241. 36439. 55341.
54093. 52385. 50234. 48509. 45958. 42908. 39837.
39655. 36998. 56593. 52063. 52316. 50692. 48751.
47470. 39905. 39279. 37852. 37580. 55499. 52587.
52463. 51342. 48774. 42904. 42711. 41515. 37863. 36594. 55191. 53109. 53186. 51351. 48792. 44615.
41539. 37156. 37947. 36885. 52407. 50089. 53223.
51359. 49437. 45068. 37153. 38227. 38062. 47037.
Corporations deprived of jury trial by Judge Morris.
NO TRIAL BY JURY FOR THEM.
(Cut omitted.)
Widow and children of George Schwartz who appeal to the jury of the Whole People.
mr. voter:
If you want to aid in putting unbossed, unbiased and fair judges on the bench for the next six years, we urge you to mark your ballots as follows:
For judges of the supreme court:
| X Hugh T. Mathers.
| X George B. Okey.
For judges of common pleas court:
Full term, beginning January, 1909.
| X | John P. Mantón.
Full term, beginning October, 1909.
| X | Curtis Tr Johnson.
extra!!!
The Metal Trades Association is trying to reelect Morris.
The Toledo Blade announced, October 27, that Frank M. Sala was trying to learn who was publishing the above facts.
Sala is attorney for the Metal Trades Association and recently put some striking working-men in jail.'
Want an injunction judge?
' THE CORPORATION FARED WELL IN THESE CASES.
Julius Schulz, Admr. of the Estate of George J. Schwartz, v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company.
Schwartz was killed by injuries received while working for the company. He left a wife and children. Doyle & Lewis, Standard Oil attorneys, represented the defendant. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
57069. William E. Shields v. The Toledo Home Telephone Co.
Plaintiff, a new man at the business, was hurt for life by a shock from a live wire. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
45512. Herman Keiper v. The Toledo & Wabash Elevator Co.
While plaintiff was busy pinching a car another car was backed against it and he was badly hurt. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
36632. Jos. Petrowski v. The Blocking Coal, Ore & Transportation Company.
Plaintiff was injured for life by defective appliances furnished by the company. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
33792. Stephen Boyer v. The C., IT. V. & T. Railway Co.
A defective coal bucket provided by the company struck and injured plaintiff. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
33147. Hugh L. Decker v. Toledo Machine & Tool Company.
An infant had three fingers crushed by the company’s defective punch press. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
54580. Jas. Addison v. The Toledo Railway & Terminal Co., Detroit and Toledo Shore Line Company and The Toledo■ & Ann Arbor R. R. Co.
Addison was a baggage man on a train and was injured in a collision. Clarence Brown and Alex ander Smith (attorneys for the ice trust) defended the various railroads. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the companies.
55385. Emil Eichelman v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was a passenger on a Rail-Light car. He had dismounted and started to cross the street when he was struck down without any warning by a fast car from the opposite direction. Judge Morris directed a verdict in favor of the Rail-Light Co.
54970. Hila Leiter v. The Toledo Railways & Light Co.
Plaintiff was crossing the street. A street car came almost to a stop on the opposite side to take on passengers. It suddenly started up and without warning ran her down, inflicting serious injuries. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
41297. Jacob Uhlrich v. Toledo Consolidated Street Ry. Co.
Plaintiff and his wife, while driving, were run down by a car. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
It is said the “ambulance chasers” are' down on Morris.
This is intended to mean the attorneys who stand for the rights of those killed and injured.
But the only real “ambulance chasers” that we know are the corporation claim agents and attorneys like Ed. Eckert, who chase the ambulances with a dollar in one hand and a release of the company in the other hand to get the victim to sign before he comes to himself. They are not down on Morris. But the attorneys who try the suits against big corporations are against Morris to a man. It isn’t sentiment or politics with them. It is business. They never would be against Morris if he were “a people’s judge.”
Possibly some of the people thus thrown out of court did not have good cases. The corporation lawyers' so argued. But that is not the question. The question is, what right the judge had in so many cases to decide instead of leaving it to the jury to decide. What is a jury for? Either we might as well get rid of juries altogether or else we had better get rid of judges who have so little use for juries.
JUDGE KUMLER.
HIS HISTORY.
INNOCENCE NOT PROTECTED.
Judges have great and exclusive power in divorce cases, which they are expected to use for the benefit of the defenseless children of unhappy marriages. Judge Morris has disregarded the sanctity of the home relation and exposed youthful innocents' to improper surroundings. In the divorce case of Coombs v. Coombs (No. 57569) it was undisputed that the mother of two girls, 10 and 12 years of age, was entertaining a strange man and had done so for weeks. Judge Morris refused the father’s, prayer to take the children from under such influences and instead required him to make monthly payments to the mother for their support and education by her.
KNOW THEIR FRIEND.
The millionaire Scripps-McRae syndicate, owning the News-Bee and other newspaper corporations, are. anxious to re-elect Morris regardless of all other candidates. Why ? A newspaper may be for the people where it has no ax to grind but the corporations that own the papers are just like other corporations when their own interests are at stake. If they should ever have trouble with the people that do their work, they know that Judge Morris would issue and maintain an injunction that their attorneys might ask and they would have reason to expect that if their attorneys did not make it strong enough, Judge Morris would suggest the necessary corrections. They know this because this is just what he has done for other newspaper corporations.
THE NEWSPAPER BOSS.
Cochran threatened the Independent voters that if they did not nominate Morris he would bolt. The convention refused to nominate Morris even at Cochran’s dictation. He bolted He advertises that a majority of the Lucas county members voted for Morris, but that the outside counties belonging to the district had enough votes to nominate Johnson over Morris.
It is true that Morris in the convention had 51 votes^ out of Lucas county while Johnson had 50. This 51st vote .for Morris was cast by Frank Geer, attorney for the ice trust. And now Cochran is seeking to deceive the readers of his newspaper by saying that Morris is an anti-trust judge, knowing as he does, that his record for 14 years has been universally in favor of railroads, street car companies and other corporations.
Voter, don’t be fooled by a newspaper that wants an injunction, trust and corporation judge kept on the bench and is trying to throw dust in your eyes by calling him an anti-trust judge. Don’t be fooled by an editor, who for years represented Standard Oil Company that was then the owner of the paper now run by Cochran. He has been and is now serving the Standard Oil Company and other corporate interests and attempts to fool the people.
Political bosses are bad enough. A newspaper and political boss combined is worst of all. No one can deny the power of the press. If dishonestly exercised it can do great injustice. There was a time when the News-Bee stood for principle. It stands for principle now: — in Colorado, or Idaho, or New Jersey — but not in Toledo and Lucas county. In this campaign right here it is disregarding principle and is seeking to make its editor, Mr. Cochran, a newspaper and political boss. He can be seen at the Boody House billiard room and bar in Walter Brown’s company when Walter is in town. His paper, the News-Bee, helped him through with his slate at the Republican primary. It has praised him as a “leader.” Brown and Cochran laugh at the sham fight between them, and then take a drink.
The late Dennis Coghlin once employed Judge Kumler in a business deal. Mr. Coghlin was then asked what he thought of Kumler’s ability as a lawyer. He answered:
“Well, John is not much of a lawyer, but he has peculiar methods.”
As John F. Kumler, the lawyer, he has done the following for the dear public:
(1) He' helped secure a franchise for The Toledo Natural Gas Company; sold it out to The Northwestern Natural Co., a branch of The Standard Oil Company, at a good profit.
Then boomed the city pipe line, leaving a debt of $1,250,000 for the taxpayers to meet.
(2) The city borrowed money to buy park property. It paid John B. Ketcham $100,000 for what was cow pasture, now Ottawa Park. Mr. Ketcham afterwards told his friends that he received but $60,000, and John K. Kumler and associates who worked the deal through the park board, got the remaining $40,000. .
(3) At the time of the park property deal Mr. Kumler took advantage of his knowledge of what the board would do, bought a farm opposite the park, had the park board build a boulevard in front of it. He then grabbed a street car franchise on Bancroft street from the county commissioners in a star chamber session, and turned it over to the “Big Con.”
(4) A.s attorney for David, Willard and James Robison, he put his law partner Lindley W. Morris in the city council; made him president of the council; got Morris to help through the street railroad franchises for the Robisons; then made Morris judge of common pleas court and re-elected him with the aid of the “Big Con,” agents and attorneys of The Standard Oil Co., the Robisons, and allied corporations.
'(5) Although but a short time on the bench he has verified the opinion of Dennis Coghlin.
(6) When Prosecutor Wachenheimer brought Ed. Eckert, agent of the “Big Con,” to trial, Judge Kumler personally selected eight special jurors, most of whom were known to be friendly to Eckert or hostile to Wachenheimer.
He practically charged the jury to find Eckert not guilty, although Eckert 'admitted the transaction, but said it was a “joke.”
(7) Prosecutor Wachenheimer secured the conviction of the lumber trust men.
They came for re-sentence before Judge Kumler, who after conferring with Judge Morris, broke the wholesome precedent set by Judge Kinkade, and changed the sentence to a fine.
Judges Shauck and Price on the supreme court, Morris and Kumler of the common jileas court, are examples of the system of allowing political bosses and corporations to name and elect our judges.
The names of Mathers and Okey, to succeed Shauck and Price, will be found on the ballot as follows: Democratic ticket, third column, and Independent ticket, sixth column.
The names of John P. Mantón and Curtis T. Johnson, to succeed Kumler and Morris, will be found on Democratic ticket, third column; Independent ticket, sixth column, and Independent Voter’s ticket: ninth column, of ballot.
EXHIBIT “D.”
A FEW SKELETONS IN THE POLITICAL CLOSET OF JUDGE MORRIS.
Mr. Voter: — Are you interested in electing as judges of the common pleas court men who are possessed of the qualifications necessary to faithfully, fearlessly and honestly administer the laws of the state?
The very name of these courts designates them as the courts for the relief of the wrongs common to every day life. Have you ever realized how im portant these courts are to you? If you were to be killed'or injured through the negligence of a corporation tomorrow and your family sought recompense for the grief, trials and financial burden placed upon them, you or your family would realize the vital importance of having your case tried before just and impartial judges.
Do you desire judges who will administer the .laws equally and not dismiss without trial by jury, personal injury cases, in order to please and serve railroad and other corporations? Do you notice that the newspapers do not call attention to this most important question? It is very much to their interest to control judges, as the more -power they exert over elective officials the more political and • financial success comes to the proprietors. Do not allow newspapers to sway your political opinions; newspapers are after'the money the sanie as other corporations, and it is to their interest to be able to dictate to our judges.
Do you realize that we 'have at present and who seeks re-election, a judge who is noted for his prejudice in damage suits against corporations? Mr. Voter, we never can tell when we will present ourselves before a court asking relief from injuries, over which he had no control, and surely when that time comes we want absolute fairness. In these days when we read of the duplicity of prominent lawyers holding important offices and how they seek and take bribes, it behooves us to be exceptionally careful of the men we elect to the bench:
In substance the issue is this: If you were to be injured by a street car or railroad train you would want fair treatment and justice at the hands of our courts. The Employers’ Liability Act, which required years of hard work and expense before it became a law, is greatly nullified by “friendly” judges, who dismiss suits on any and every pretext, thus discouraging the plaintiff and necessitating great expense to carry his case to a higher court, and it is our aim and duty to stop such practices and protect this great law enacted for the benefit of the workers.
Morris is an injunction judge, having squeezed $1,200 from the printers’ union and caused it to lose the Franklin strike. Morris is a salary grabber, going to Columbus in 1893 and obtaining a special allowance of $1,500 yearly from the county over his salary and drew this for ten years, in all $15,000 illegal salary. Morris is friendly to railroads and other corporations, as is proven by the number of personal injury cases he has dismissed from the' court without trial.
A vote against Morris is a vote to expel a friend of corporations from the court house and place in his stead an attorney who is competent, upright, honest and capable in every respect. Extracts from the records of Judge Morris in personal injury cases are herein printed. Please read carefully and ask yourself if you would want a case of yours treated in a similar manner.
45512. Herman Keiper v. The Toledo & Wabash Elevator Company.
While plaintiff was busy pinching a car another car was backed against it and he was badly hurt. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
36632. Jos. Petrowski v. The Hocking Coal, Ore & Transportation Company.
Plaintiff was injured for life by defective appliances furnished by the company. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
37447. ’ Hugh L. Decker v. Toledo Machine & Tool Company.
An infant had three fingers crushed by the company’s defective punch press. Judge Morris directed a verdict for the defendant.
53885. Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Railways & Light Company.
We give Harry Gravell’s signed statement of his own case:
“Toledo, Ohio, September 16, 1908.
“At 6 o’clock a. m., April 1, 1905, I was working as a motorman for The Toledo Railways & Light Company on an Ironville car. The brakes of the car were defective so that I could not control it while going to Ironville with a large load of workmen. I stuck to my post to protect the lives of these men.
“The car crashed into another car and my legs were crushed so that both were cut off, leaving me a helpless cripple. My case came to trial before Judge Morris, February 27, 1906. He denied me the right to a trial by jury and ordered the jury to return a verdict for the Rail-Light Company. I borrowed money to pay the expense of the stenographer and took my case to the circuit court. That court, October 8, 1906, immediately reversed Judge Morris’ decision and held that I had a right to let a jury of my fellowmen decide it.
“The ‘Big Con’ carried the case to the supreme court. That court in January, 1908, also decided that Judge Morris had no right to deny me the right to trial by jury and to himself decide for the corporation. After more than three years’ delay, because of Judge Morris’ action I can now try my case before a jury.
“My family and I have nearly starved and would have done so if collections had not been taken up for our support and but for the aid of the infirmary.
“Judge Morris during this time was, and is now, living in a mansion on Collingwood avenue.
“I want to save other poor cripples from his power. He has been drawing salary for fifteen years and wants us to give him six years more at more than $5,400 per year, or more than $32,000 for the term; in all nearly $100,000.
“I appeal to you, fellow-men, who want justice done, in the name of many helpless cripples who have been treated by him as I was, not to keep Judge Morris in power, although he may now pretend to have reformed — just to get our votes.
“The records prove all I have said. ■
“Yours truly,
“Harry Grávele.”
Mr. Gravell published his statement a month ago over his own name and personally distributed it at the Independent Judicial Convention, which refused to indorse Judge Morris. Neither Judge Morris nor his supporters have ventured to speak on this subject. They have all kept strict silence, lest the facts should become known.
To these charges and specifications the said Charles A. Thatcher interposed, a motion to strike the same from the files, as follows:
“Now comes the above named Charles A. Thatcher and moves the court as follows, to-wit:
I.
“(1) That said charges and specifications be stricken from the files for the reason that the same are unverified.
“(2) Said Charles A. Thatcher respectfully represents to the court that records and papers are in the custody of residents of Lucas County, Ohio, and various witnesses whom it will be necessary for him to call in his defense in this proceeding reside in Lucas county, Ohio, or in one of the counties comprising the first subdivision of the common pleas judicial district, designated in said-charges and specifications. That he requests a hearing of these proceedings in open court, in whatever court the same may be heard, where all the witnesses for or against him may appear in the presence of the court and of all of the judges who may participate in the trial or decision.
“He therefore moves that the charges and specifications heretofore filed in this proceeding be dismissed for the reason that this court is without power or jurisdiction to compel the attendance before it of necessary witnesses so residing in said counties, and that without the compulsory attendance of said witnesses whose evidence is material to him he will be deprived of his right to produce them in open court.
“(3) That said charges and specifications be dismissed for the reason that the supreme court of Ohio has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter .of said charges and specifications.
“(4) That said charges and specifications be dismissed for the reason that Section 563 of the' Revised Statutes of Ohio, which purports to confer such jurisdiction upon the supreme court of Ohio in the above proceeding, contravenes Section 2 of Article IV of the constitution of the state of Ohio.
“(5) That said charges and specifications be dismissed for the reason that any trial, action, proceeding or procedure thereunder which will deprive him, said Charles A. Thatcher, of his right to meet the witnesses against him in open court, or of his right to produce witnesses in his behalf in open court, or which will deprive him of compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, or which will deny to him the right to have said charges and specifications heard before a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, will be a denial of that due process of law to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment of •the Constitution of the United States and Section 10 of Article 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Ohio.
II.
“Said Charles A. Thatcher further represents to the court that the several matters and things set forth in the charges and specifications heretofore filed herein against him, relate to events occurring in Lucas county, Ohio, or in the counties of which said Lucas county is a common pleas judicial subdivision; that for the proper defense of this proceeding it will be necessary for him to call in his behalf about seventy-five to one hundred witnesses, residents of said counties, and it will probably be necessary for him to procure transcripts of various records in said Lucas county; that he will be unable to anticipate what records or papers may be needed in advance of the hearing of the evidence on behalf of the prosecution; that there is no provision of law by which he can require the attendance of witnesses from said counties, and that he desires to procure the attendance of certain witnesses who will .not voluntarily appear; that he desires and hereby requests the hearing of any proceeding growing out of the matters and things set forth in said charges and specifications, in open court; that at least thirty days will probably be required for said hearing; that to require him to appear in Columbus, Ohio, about one hundred and twenty-three miles from his residence which is in Lucas county, Ohio, and attempt to procure the attendance of his witnesses at Columbus, Ohio, will work a great and unnecessary hardship and burden upon him; that he is informed and believes, and therefore states, that it has been thfe uniform practice and custom of the supreme court of Ohio not to entertain original jurisdiction of proceedings of this character, but to refer all such matters to the county in which the same arose.
“Said Charles A. Thatcher therefore moves the court as follows:
“(6) Should the court decline to dismiss this proceeding as herein above requested, that the committee heretofore appointed by the court be directed to make and file such charges and specifications as said committee may deem it advisable to make and file, in some court of competent jurisdiction sitting in Lucas county, Ohio, the county in which said Charles A. Thatcher resides in which he has practiced law for more than twenty years, and in which the witnesses reside whose testimony will be required upon the hearing of said charges, and in which county the various court records, files and papers necessary in said hearing, are kept,” which motion was overruled by the court, and said Thatcher also demurred to each of said charges and specifications, as follows:
“Now comes Charles A. Thatcher and demurs to each and every of the charges and specifications heretofore made and filed in this proceeding, for the reasons and upon the grounds following, to-wit:
• “First. That the supreme court of Ohio has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of said charges and specifications.
“Second. That the statute pretending to confer such jurisdiction contravenes Section 2. of Article IV of the constitution of the state of Ohio.
“Third. That this court has no power or jurisdiction to compel the attendance of witnesses from any of tlfe counties designated in said charges and specifications, ■ and without the compulsory attendance of witnesses said Charles A. Thatcher will be deprived of his right to produce his witnesses in open court and present his defense in open court before all the judges who participate in the trial or decision.
“Fourth. That any trial, proceeding or procedure which deprives him, said Charles A. Thatcher, of his right to meet the witnesses against him in open court, or which compels him to take witnesses beyond the county of his residence, or which deprives him of compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, will be a denial of that due process of law to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Sections 1 and 10 of Article 1 of the Bill of Rights of. the Constitution of Ohio,” which demurrer was over ruled. Whereupon the defendant answered, as follows:
Now comes the -above named Charles A. Thatcher, and for answer to the charges and specifications filed herein, says:
(1) He admits that he now is, and for a number of years last past has been, an attorney at law duly admitted to practice as such in all of the courts of the state of Ohio. He avers that he now has, and for a number of years last past, and at the time of the filing' of these proceedings, had a profitable practice as such attorney at law, and appeared as counsel for a large number of clients. That his business as such attorney and his right to exercise .his office as an attorney, is now and at the time of the commencement of this proceeding, was a property right of great value to him. He avers that he is a citizen of the United States and a citizen and resident of the state of Ohio.
(2) ' This defendant avers that this court is wholly without jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, for the reason that the jurisdiction of this court is limited by Section 2 of Article IV, of the constitution of the state of Ohio, to actions arising in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus and procedendo. That these proceedings did not arise under any of said four grounds of original jurisdiction conferred upon this court.
(3) Defendant further says that this court is without jurNrb'cL'on to entertain these proceedings, for the reason that the same have been instituted under'Section 563 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which section is in contravention of and in direct conflict with, Section 2 of Article IV of the constitution of the state of Ohio. That this court is without jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, and has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this proceeding, and has no jurisdiction over the person of this defendant.
(4) This defendant further avers that this court is wholly without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of these proceedings and over the person of this defendant, and that should this court entertain these proceedings, and attempt by any order, judgment or decree to suspend or remove this defendant from his office as an attorney at law, such action would be in contravention of Article V of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, and especially to that part of said Article V, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. That this defendant has a property right in the said profession and office, and as such citizen of the United States and of the state of Ohio, is entitled to have the same protected and cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law.
(5) That this court is wholly without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of these proceedings and over the person of this defendant, and that should this court entertain these proceedings, and attempt by any order, judgment or decree, to suspend or remove this defendant from his office as an attorney at law, such action would be in contravention of Section 1 of Article NIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, and especially to that part of said section which provides:
“No state shall enforce or make any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi zens of' the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
This defendant further avers that this court being without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this proceeding and over the person of this defendant, would, by any order, judgment or decree which it might make, purporting to suspend or remove this defendant from his office as an attorney at law, deprive him of his property without due process of law and deny him the equal protection of the laws.
That it will be necessary for this defendant to call as witnesses, various persons residing in Lucas county, Ohio, in any trial of this case, and that Franklin county, Ohio, is not adjacent to Lucas county, and that there is no provision by which compulsory attendance of such witnesses can be procured. That many of said witnesses wiill not appear voluntarily. That this defendant demands a trial of these proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction where witnesses can be required to attend, and the judges who try these proceedings may see said witnesses face to face and have full opportunity to pass upon the credibility of all the witnesses who may testify.
(6) That this court is without jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings and enter any judgment, decree or order, suspending or removing the defendant from his office as attorney at law, under any of specifications numbers 1 to 12 inclusive, of charges 1 and 2, for the reason that any such judgment, decree, or order, would be in contravention of Article I of the amendments to the Constitu tion of the United States, which provides that states shall make no law respecting religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
(7) That this court is without jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings and enter any judgment, decree, or order, suspending or removing defendant from his office as attorney at law, upon any of the charges and specifications filed herein, for the reason that such action of the court would be in contravention of Sections 1 and 10 of Article I of the Bill of Rights of the constitution of the state of Ohio.
(8) That this court is without jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings and to enter any judgment, decree or order, suspending or removing defendant from his office as an attorney at law, under any of the. specifications Nos. 1 to 12, inclusive, charges 1 and 2, for the reason that any such judgment, decree or order, would be in contravention of Section 11, Article I, of the Bill of Rights of the constitution of the state of Ohio, which provides among other things as follows:
“Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”
(9) This defendant further answering says that he admits that Lindley W. Morris, John F. Kumler, Bernard F. Brough and George A. Bassett, were, on October 24, 1908, judges of the court of common pleas of the First Subdivision of the Fourth Judicial District of Ohio, sitting in Lucas county, and that said Morris and Kumler were at said time, candidates before the electors-of said district, for re-election as judges of said court, at the election to be held November 3, 1908.
He further admits that at said time there was on the docket of the court of common pleas of Lucas county, Ohio, a case entitled "Harry Gravell v. The Toledo Raihvays & Light Company Defendant says that said case had theretofore been tried in the court of the said Lindley W. Morris, at which time the said judge directed a verdict against the said Gravell, and in favor of the said The Toledo Railways & Light Co. That at said time this defendant was riot the attorney for said Gravell. That thereafter he was employed as the attorney for the said Gravell and prosecuted error in his behalf to the circuit court of Lucas county, Ohio, which court reversed the decision of the said Lindley W. Morris. That the said' company then prosecuted error to this court, • and that this court affirmed the decision of the said circuit court, so reversing the decision of the said Lindley W. Morris, and remanded said case to said Lucas county common pleas court for a riew trial.
Defendant says that on and for a long time prior to the said 24th day of October, 1908, there had been a custom and practice in the common pleas court of said Lucas county, that no judge who had once tried a case would thereafter try the same, provided there were other judges of said court who had not at any time tried such case. Defendant says that said case had been' once before tried by said Morris, and that three judges of said court were qualified to try the same, and that the said Morris was disqualified from trying the same. That said case on the said 24th day of October, was not upon the docket of the said Morris, but was on the docket of another member of said court. That said Morris could not and would not, on the said 24th day of October, or at any time thereafter, have been called upon to try said case. That this defendant for more than a year prior to said 24th day of October, 1908, because of the prejudice which the said Morris had toward him, had, under the statutes of the state of Ohio, removed all cases in which he was interested as counsel, from the docket of said Morris, and refrained from trying any of said cases before said Morris. That he could and would have removed said case of Gravell versus said company from the docket of said Morris, had the same been assigned upon his docket. That nothing which was said or published -during said campaign referring to said case of Gravell versus said company, could or would have directly or indirectly affected any court or jury that would have been called upon to sit in said case. That the substance of all that was said or published during said campaign' on the subject of said ease, was that the said Morris had denied the plaintiff the right to trial by jury, and had been reversed by the higher courts.
Defendant says that said matters were of public record and that any court that might thereafter be called upon to try said case, would be governed solely bv the record in said case,, and not influ enced in any manner by any campaign literature that may have been published concerning the same.
Defendant says that the fact is, and that he knew on the said 24th day of October, that the supreme court of Ohio and the circuit court of Lucas county had determined the law in said case, and that said Gravell on said record had the right to have the case submitted to a jury-.
That the defendant knew that any court that might thereafter be called upon to try said case would be bound by the rules so established by said courts in that respect.
Defendant further says that he had no intent in anything that he aided in publishing concerning said Gravell* case, to influence said Morris or any other judge that might be called upon to sit in said case.
Defendant denies that the publication of the facts concerning said Gravell case was calculated to or tended to impair the capacity of said court to act impartially between the parties in said case, and to subvert the ends of justice therein.
Defendant further says that all that was said concerning said Gravell case was uttered by him' as an elector and citizen touching the qualifications of one seeking election to a judicial position and was not uttered for any other purpose. The intent and purpose being more fully set forth herein in answer to specifications Nos. 1 to 12, inclusive, charges 1 and 2.
Defendant denies that any other of the cases named in the exhibits filed herein, were pending in ■.arw court, and denies that any literature published during said campaign would or could have in any way affected the administration of justice in any of the cases referred to in said literature.
(10) For answer to specification No. 13, charges 1 and 2, this defendant says that he admits that on the 6th day of July, 1903, he was engaged in taking the depositions of sundry witnesses in his office, before A. W. French, a notary, in the case of Harry G. Huss v. Julius Strauss et al.
Defendant says that in said case the facts, showed that the said Julius Strauss and others had entered into a plan to defraud the said Flarry G. FIuss, who was á stockholder in the sum of $10,000 in a company in which the said Strauss held a majority of the capital stock.
Defendant says that he requested the notary to cause the witnesses to be separated in said - case, for the reason that various of said witnesses were charged with fraud, and it was desired that said witnesses should be examined separately and apart, for the purpose of preventing one witness from hearing what another had said, and for the further purpose of avoiding the influence which the said Julius Strauss was liable to exercise over various witnesses. That said notary did order the said Julius Strauss to remain in a room adjacent to the one in which the said evidence was taken, and that said Strauss, under the orders of said notary, did retire into the adjacent room.
Defendant says that it is not true that any menaces or threats were made by him toward the said Strauss, and it is not true that the attorney of the said Strauss, Harry E. King, protested against the said Strauss being excluded from said room. That on the other hand, said Harry E. King made no objection to said Strauss being required by the notary to retire from said room.
(11) For answer to specification 14, charges 1 and 2, defendant says that he admits that he was attorney for the plaintiff in the cases named in said specification, and admits that he prepared and signed affidavits showing prejudice on the part of one Lindley W. Morris toward affiant, and that he caused the same to be filed in the office of the clerk of Lucas county.
Defendant says that for several months prior to the date of the filing of said affidavits., this defendant had removed all cases in which he was counsel, from the docket of said Morris, because of the bias and prejudice which the said Morris entertained toward this defendant. That on the 5th day of October, 1906, for the purpose of avoiding the publicity which would follow if said affidavits were filed, this defendant, with a view of saving any embarrassment which might come to said Morris, by reason of the filing of said affidavits, endeavored to have said several cases changed from the docket of said Morris, but that said Morris refused to relinquish said cases and thereby made it necessary that said affidavits should be filed.
This defendant says that it is not true that he sought or intended to intimidate or improperly influence said Morris or to improperly and wrongfully control his judicial action, or to obstruct the administration of justice, or destroy the efficiency of said court, or to subvert the ends of justice, but on the other hand, this defendant sought to preserve the ends of justice and to avoid all publicity or odium, which mL'M attach to said court, by reason of exercising a statutory right in filing-said affidavits.
(12) For answer to specification No. 15, charges 1 and 2, defendant admits that he participated in the argument of the motion for a new trial in the case of Orle ano G. Barnes v. The Toledo Urban & Interurban Ry. Co., in the Lucas county pleas court, and that Harold Fraser was was one of the attorneys for the defendant in said case.
Defendant says that said case occupied about three weeks in its trial, and that in his argument to the jury, the said Fraser told the jury that he did not question the sincerity or truthfulness of the plaintiff in said action. That thereafter, upon the argument of said motion for a new trial, the said Fraser stated to the presiding judge, in substance and effect, that the plaintiff in said action was a perjurer and a fraud, and used other abusive and discourteous language of and concerning the plaintiff. Defendant says that at said time the plaintiff was, and for nearly a year prior thereto had been, confined to her bed in the Toledo hospital, by reason of injuries which she had received while a passenger upon the railroad of the defendant, and through its negligence. That this defendant, in reply to the said abuse of the said Fraser, stated, in substance, that the attack so made upon the plaintiff by said Fraser, was cowardly and used other language showing disapproval of the conduct of the said Fraser in so abusing a helnless woman, who was unable to defend herself against malicious and cowardly attacks.
Defendant says that it is untrue that he said the said Fraser ought to be shot. That it is untrue that he suggested or incited or urged the husband of the plaintiff to cause said Fraser to be murdered. That it is untrue that the defendant used any language whatsoever except that which was becoming a lawyer, and except that which was proper, to resent the unwarranted attack so made upon a defenseless woman.
(13) For answer to specifications Nos. 16 and 18, charges 1 and 2, defendant says that each of said specifications is false and absolutely unwarranted.
(14) For answer to specification No. 17, charges 1 and 2, defendant says that he admits that on January 7, 1908, he had in his possession the several promissory notes described therein, and that he requested one Alonzo G. Duer, an attorney at law, to commence action thereon against one George R. . Hudson, and that an action was brought against the said Hudson and summons served upon him. Defendant denies that he requested that such action be brought against Charles F. Milburn.
Defendant further says that Albert Reiter, for a period of 27 years prior to January 7, 1896, had been in the employ of The Milburn Wagon Co., a manufacturing corporation in the city of Toledo, as a blacksmith. That during all or a greater part of said time C. F. Milburn and G. R. Hudson had been the officials in charge of the conduct of the business of the said The Milburn Wagon Company. That said Albert Reiter was subordinate to the said Milburn and Hudson, and was ignorant of business and business methods and- finance, and had the utmost confidence in the integrity of the said Milburn and Hudson. That by hard labor and self-denial, the said Albert Reiter, working as a blacksmith over an anvil in the shop of said company, had saved his earnings which he was induced by the said Milburn and Hudson to loan to them as follows: on January 7, 1896, the sum of $1,011.24, and on January 18, 1896, the sum of $1276.84. That said Milburn and Hudson procured said money from the said Reiter upon their personal notes, and without -giving any security whatever therefor. That at said time the said Milburn and Hudson were in failing circumstances, and knew that they were in such circumstances, and did directly thereafter transfer all, or a greater part of the property which they had, to other persons, and placed the same beyond the reach of the said Reiter, and their other creditors. That at the time of borrowing said- money from said Reiter, said Hudson and Milburn knew that they were in failing circumstances, and that they would probably be unable to repav the sum so borrowed, to said Reiter.
Defendant says that neither said Hudson nor said Milburn paid any sum whatever upon the interest or principal of said notes. That in the year 1900 said Milburn induced said Reiter to exchange said notes so held by him for four notes belonging to said Milburn, signed by one James W. Murray and secured by collateral stock of The Tubular Axle Company. That at said time said Milburn represented to said Reiter that he would be able to realize out of said Murray notes, all or a greater part of the 'amount due him from said Milburn and Hudson. That if he did not do so, that he (said Milburn) would, if ever able to do so, pay said Reiter any sum that might remain unpaid on the notes so held by him. That thereafter said Reiter succeeded in collecting on said collateral the sum of $245.76, but no further sum. That said Murray is insolvent. . That thereafter, said Milburn for a valuable consideration, assigned all his interest in said two notes which he and said Hudson had executed and delivered to said Reiter, together with a third note for the sum of $2500, which had been executed by the Toledo Road Cart Co. on November 25, 1895, and delivered to the First National Bank of South Bend, Indiana, and endorsed by said Hudson and Milburn, which note said Milburn had acquired from said bank. That said Milburn authorized, directed and empowered said Reiter to begin action against the said Hudson for the recovery of the amount which might be due from said Hudson upon said several notes, and assigned to said Reiter all his interest in said notes. That said Milburn requested this defendant to cause suit to be brought upon said notes, for the purpose of recovering all that could be recovered thereon from the said Hudson.
This defendant says that he caused said suit to be brought under said instructions from said Milburn and at the request of the said Reiter, and for the use and benefit of said Reiter. That this defendant repeatedly requested the committee appointed by this court at the time it was making its investigations regarding this transaction, to permit, him to place before said committee all of the facts concerning said notes, but that said com mittee refused to. permit said facts to be placed before it. Defendant says that said suit was so brought with the best intention on the part of this defendant, and for the purpose of securing to said Reiter what was justly due him, and without any agreement or expectation of profit in behalf of this defendant, except such reasonable fee as might be due him for services rendered. That he secured the collection of said sum of $245.76 for said Reiter, and has made him no charge whatever for the same, and has at no time received any compensation whatever' for his services in connection with said notes. That each and every allegation in said specification No. 17 not herein admitted, is absolutely and unqualifiedly false.
(15) ANSWER TO SPECIFICATIONS 1 TO 12, INCLUSIVE, CHARGES 1 AND 2.
Defendant further says that in the fall of 1908, one Lindley W. Morris was a candidate for reelection for a fourth term, as judge of the court of common pleas in the judicial subdivision of which Lucas county, Ohio, is a part.
That said Morris was the nominee of the Republican-party and that his opponent as a candidate for said office was one Curtis T. Johnson, a lawyer of ability and integrity, who was the nominee of the Democratic party and the Independent voters.
That a vigorous and heated campaign was being conducted by said Morris and in his behalf, through the newspapers, on the stump and otherwise, throughout said judicial district. .
That said campaign was being so conducted upon the following among other issues:
That he was “Neither controlled by political bosses nor awed by the wealth and social prestige of high-toned violators of the law.”
That as a judge he, “Belonged to the whole people, and no individual or interest had any private pull with him.”
That he as a judge, “Made himself so popular with the people that the bosses didn’t dare deny him a renomination.”
That: “Judge Morris was nominated at a Republican primary election; and in spite of the many trust enemies he made, including trust lawyers, when he treated the high-toned lumber barons as he would treat any other violators of the law and gave them a prison sentence.”
That: “Judge Morris was proof against all the wiles and powerful influence of the criminal trusts and’ sentenced the big men in the lumber trust to prison.”
That: “The ice trust, the bridge trust,' the lumber trust, the brick trust and the other trusts don’t want Judge Morris elected.”
That: “He braved the powerful political influences of the corporations and their lawyers and used the law to protect the rights of every citizen of Toledo.”
That it was further claimed in support of said Judge Morris that “corporation legal bosses” were attempting to “pack the people’s courts,” and a call was made to the “people” to prevent this by re-electing Judge Morris.
That: “The criminal trusts and their cunning lawyers want to drive Judge Morris off the bench.”
That: “Every man who wants one law for the poor and another for the rich,” was fighting Judge Morris during “this campaign.”
An appeal was also made to the voters to support Judge Morris for re-election to the bench by print'ng, publishing and widely circulating throughout said judicial district, a paper containing the following language: “If the people rise in their might and re-elect Judge Morris, trusts won’t DARE COMBINE TO ROB THE PEOPLE of Lucas county or other counties where such judges can get at them. But if the criminal trusts and their hired lawyers and machine bosses can defeat Judge Morris, every other judge will be afraid to send rich trust criminals to prison. And every judge who wants to protect the public will be discouraged.
“If the criminal trusts can defeat Judge Morris TPIEY WILL FRIGHTEN EVERY JUDGE IN OHIO. If the people won’t stand by judges who stand by the people, and use the laws to protect the people, what incentive is there for judges to incur the enmity of the-rich and powerful trusts by making them fear the law?”
Defendant further says that the foregoing, among other, claims on behalf of said Morris were freely and extensively printed, published and circulated throughout said judicial district for several weeks before Oct. 24, 1908, and up to Nov. 3, 1908.
That the same were also stated upon the stump by various camraipm speakers.
That by reason of the frequent and continuous repetition of said claims in behalf of said Judge Morris, the. electors of said district were being affected thereby, and influenced in favor of said Morris.'
Defendant further says that a number of electors, including defendant, did not believe that the claims so made and published on behalf of and in laudation of said Morris, were true.
That for a long time, said electors, including defendant, refrained from making. any denial of said claims, expecting and hoping that said Morris who was then occupying said bench, would prevent the-further repetition of said claims.
That said claims were repeated with greater vigor, as the day of said election approached.
That one newspaper having a daily circulation of about .50,000 copies, published said claims in favor of said Morris to'such an extent that about one million copies of said newspaper were circulated throughout said district containing a publication of said matter.
That a number of electors, including defendant, thereupon sought to correct the ’ unwarranted impression made upon the electors of said district, because of the claims so made on behalf of said Morris, and for no other purpose whatsoever did publish to said electors the facts contained in Exhibits “A,” “B” and “C,” heretofore filed in this court.
That defendant wrote a part only of the facts contained in said exhibits, concerning said Morris.
That all ‘the facts that were so written and published concerning said Morris, were collected with great care from the court records of Lucas, county, and other reliable sources, and the same were, and believed by defendant to be, true.
That the same was written and published without malice and for the purpose of correcting the various misleading and unfounded claims made on behalf of said Morris, and for the further purpose of persuading the voters of said district to elect to said office the opponent of said Morris.
That defendant believed that said Johnson was better fitted to fill said office than was said Morris.
That the defendant therefore felt that he was warranted in, and that it was his duty to, make known to the electors of said judicial district, the views entertained by him concerning the fitness of said Morris for re-election to the bench.
That this defendant in each and every act performed by him in the premises, was acting as a citizen and elector, entitled under the constitutions of the United States, and of the state of Ohio, to express his views on the fitness and qualifications of a candidate who was soliciting the suffrages of the people.
That defendant did not appear, or any time perform any act, in the premises, in the capacity as an attorney at law.
That he did not intend to and did not in fact do any act in the premises which tended to retard, obstruct or in any manner interfere with the administration of justice.
That the defendant had nothing whatever to do with the preparation of that part of Exhibit “C,” containing a report issued by the Ohio Federation of Labor, and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. That the same had been published and freely circulated throughout the state of Ohio a long time prior to Oct. 24, 1908.
That each and every act performed by the defendant in the premises was done by him in good faith and without malice, and as defendant believed, for the public good.
That the said Morris learned of the printing of said Exhibits “A,” “B” and “C,” before either of them was distributed to any extent. That at said time he was a member of said common pleas court, with full authority to stop any act which might tend to interefere with the administration of justice.
That he at no time made any complaint whatever to defendant because of the publication and circulation of said exhibits.
That he at no time admonished this defendant, or any other person to this defendant’s knowledge, that he considered the publication of said exhibits as tending to retard the administration of justice.
That at no time was any complaint whatever made by him to this defendant’s knowledge, concerning said exhibits, until after said election was over.
(16) Defendant admits that he is attorney for the plaintiffs in a large number of cases now pending in Lucas county against various railroad corporations. He avers that in said cases plaintiffs are claiming damages for personal injuries suffered by them, by reason of the negligence of said companies. That many of said cases were brought to recover damages because of death inflicted upon persons through the negligence of said companies. That he has faithfully labored to protect the rights of his said clients, many of whom were in reduced circumstances, and unable to prosecute their rights without assistance. That with great and continuous labor, defendant has been reasonably successful procuring for various persons that to which they were justly entitled from said defendants.
That by reason thereof, defendant has incurred the enmity, ill-will and hatred of various attorneys representing said railroads, which attorneys have suffered in their professional standing, and have been injured in their pride, by reason of their being unable to successfully defend all of said suits so brought.
That said attorneys, and as defendant verily believes, said railroads and other corporate interests- that they represent, have entered into a conspiracy, and caused complaint to be lodged with this court against this defendant. That they thereby caused these proceedings to be brought, for the purpose of harassing, annoying and compelling defendant to cease the practice of law.
That their purpose was to prevent defendant from appearing and prosecuting the several cases, exceeding fifty, referred to in the charges filed herein.
That their further purpose was to prevent the defendant from instituting new cases against said railroads and other corporations that might hereafter become necessary to be instituted.
That these proceedings are wholly unwarranted, and that each of said attorneys, railroads and other corporate interests, who were guilty of instituting the same, know such to be the fact. That the said persons, in- the month of December, 1899, instituted a similar proceeding against this defendant based upon false and perjured testimony.
That upon investigation, the same was dismissed and abandoned by said conspirators, and defendant is informed and believes, have continued said conspiracy up to the present time, with the purpose and intent of causing the disbarment of this defendant, so that he would be unable to prosecute further actions against said railroad and other corporate interests.
That many of the charges filed herein were so filed upon the testimony given by said conspirators.
That defendant, during its investigations by the committee appointed by this court, repeatedly requested said committee for permission to appear before it and submit to cross-examination and to offer proof showing the falsity of the evidence, which had been placed before it.
That said committee, one of whom was a member of said conspiracy, refused to permit defendant to appear before it and offer any testimony whatever to refute the false and malicious evidence which was being so adduced against him.
(17) Defendant denies each and every allegation in the specifications and charges filed herein, except such matters as are hereinabove admitted to be true.
(18) Defendant says that he is ready, able, anxious and willing to prove' the truth of each and all of the allegations contained in this, his answer, in a court of competent jurisdiction.
That the several acts of which complaint is made in this proceeding, occurred in Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Erie or Huron counties, Ohio. That he can not, without great hardship, burden and sacrifice, defend these proceedings at a place remote from said Lucas county, to-wit, in Franklin county, which is 123 miles from Lucas county.
That the intent and purpose of said various attorneys and corporate interests, which have entered into said conspiracy, in instituting these proceedings, at Columbus, Ohio, was to further harass, annoy and burden, and if possible, prevent this defendant from making a complete defense herein.
That there are now, and were at the time these proceedings were instituted, courts of competent jurisdiction in Lucas county, to entertain these proceedings.
Defendant further says that he is informed and believes and therefore avers, that for more than ten years last past said conspirators have maligned and slandered this defendant in the presence of various persons, including judges of various courts, with the intent and purpose of creating a sentiment and feeling against this defendant, and for the purpose of carrying out their said plot to cause the disbarment of this defendant.
That the proof of many of the specifications filed herein against this defendant, will require the prosecution to call as witnesses, a large number of said conspirators.
That the defendant will call a large number of witnesses to make proof of said conspiracy, and for the purpose of reflecting upon the credibility of said conspirators so called against him.
That it will be necessary for the defendant to, and he will, call a large number of witnesses from Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Erie and Huron coun ties, Ohio, to show the nature and character of the campaign conducted on behalf of said Morris.
That he desires to, and will, call various witnesses to show the claims made by various speakers on behalf of said Morris and the circulation of literature throughout said judicial district, in behalf of said Morris.
That many of the thirty-six specifications filed herein involve disputed allegations of fact. That they involve not less than eight separate and distinct issues of fact, which will require the attendance of many witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and defense.
That the defendant will call a large number of witnesses to show that he has practiced law in Lucas county for more than twenty years. That he has always shown due respect to all courts, has been faithful to his clients, and has aimed to promote the administration of justice in every respect.
That he will require in his defense not less than seventy-five witnesses, some of whom will not come without compulsory process. That all of said witnesses reside in Lucas, Ottawa, San-dusky, Erie and Huron counties, Ohio.
That he will require. access to various court records and files in sa.id Lucas county, and to various letter-books and papers. That he can not anticipate in advance of the Tearing of the evidence against him, what records, letter-books, papers and files he may require.
That the necessary expense, including railroad fare, hotel bills and other incidental expenses to táking witnesses to Columbus, Ohio, from this judicial district, will average at least twenty- dollars for each witness. That this will require an expenditure of not less than $1500.00 on the part of this defendant to procure tne attendance of witnesses, and probably a like sum from the state.
That many of the witnesses whom defendant will call, are lawyers and business men, whose time is of value, and who cannot, without serious loss, attend as witnesses outside of Lucas county.
That the defendant will be required to employ additional counsel to defend these proceedings outside of Lucas county.
That the trial of this proceeding at Columbus will involve an expense on the part of defendant of more than $5,000. That a great part of said expense would not be necessary if this proceeding was tried in a Lucas county court.
That the trial of this proceeding, defendant verily believes, will require at least thirty days. That to be required to submit to such a trial' at Columbus, Ohio, will necessitate the absence of defendant from his office during said time without any opportunity to attend to such matters as could be cared for out of court hours, provided said trial took place in Lucas county.
That defendant has already suffered great loss and inconvenience by reason of the pendency of this proceeding at a distance from his residence.
That he is informed and believes, and ther fore avers, that it has been the uniform practice of this court for more than fifty years, to refuse to entertain proceedings of this character, but at all times to require persons making complaint to institute the same in the county where the person against whom complaint is made, resides.
Defendant avers that no occasion now exists to depart from the practice so established by this court.
That this defendant objects to and protests against these proceedings being referred to a master or referee, for the reason that the same would deprive defendant of the opportunity of having the trial court see the various witnesses face to face, and be able to judge of their credibility.
That a reference would also incur an unwarranted and unnecessary . expense and vexatious delays, and be a hardship, not only upon this defendant, but also upon the prosecuting committee appointed herein.
That the same will cause an unwarranted and unnecessary expense on behalf of the state and this defendant.
Defendant further represents that he is reliably informed and upon such information avers, that when one F. M. Sala presented complaint to this court and requested the appointmerit of a committee to prosecute the same, that' he represented to this court that this defendant had been guily of unprofessional conduct in the campaign of the fall of 1908. That thereupon this court appointed a committee to prepare and file charges and specifications upon the complaint, so made to said court and- touching said matters so brought to the knowledge of said court.
He further represents that the committee appointed herein sat for a period of nearly six weeks and entertained various other alleged acts committed by defendant, all of which were brought before said committee by said conspirators herein-above referred to, and are specifications Nos. 13-18, inclusive, charges 1 and 2. That each of said acts are claimed to have been committed in Lucas county, and each will require evidence in behalf of the committee and this defendant.
That the same cannot be tried outside of Lucas county without serious inconvenience, hardship and loss to this defendant, as well as great expense to the state.
That specification 17, charges 1 and 2, involves a case still pending wherein Albert Reiter is plaintiff and George R. Hudson is defendant.
That to now hear and determine the complaint so made against this defendant based on said specification, is liable to work great prejudice to the cause of the said Reiter and be a great injustice to him.
Defendant avers that as to each and every specification filed herein, no reason exists why the same should not be heard in the county where the acts of which complaint is made arose, and where this defendant resides, and where the witnesses and necessary evidence can be conveniently produced.
That there are twenty-two common pleas judges sitting in said judicial district, twenty of whom are in no way involved, either directly or indirectly, and in no way disqualified from sitting in this proceeding'.
That there are three judges of the circuit court of Lucas county who are in no way disqualified from sitting in this proceeding, provided said court has jurisdiction.
Wherefore defendant prays:
(1) That this proceeding may be dismissed, and that he may have and recover his costs herein incurred.
(2) That should this court refuse to dismiss this proceeding, then this defendant prays that it may stay all proceedings herein and authorize and direct the committee heretofore appointed by it to file like charges in a court of competent jurisdiction in Lucas county; Ohio, in which court this defendant now offers to enter his appearance and proceed to trial within any reasonable time to be determined by this court.
(3) Should the court refuse the foregoing request, then defendant further prays that this court will dismiss from this proceeding each and every specification and charge filed herein, except such as are based upon the information originally submitted to this court by the said F. M. Sala, being specifications Nos. 1 to 12, inclusive, charges 1 and 2.
(4) Defendant prays for all other relief to which he may be entitled.
And thereupon, this matter came on for hearing in open court, the said Charles A. Thatcher being present in person and by counsel, on the first day of June, 1909, and was fully heard on the evidence, oral and documentary, was argued by counsel and submitted to the court on the eleventh day of June, 1909. On consideration whereof the court found the said Thatcher guilty as charged, ánd upon all the specifications except Numbers 13, 15, 16 and 18.
Mr. Clayton W. Everett; Mr. Emery D. Potter; Mr. John W. Schatifelberger;. Mr. Julian JJ. Tyler; Mr. Frank M. Sala and Mr. James S. Martin, for the prosecution:
All courts having the power to license, possess the inherent power to disbar. Ex parte Secombe, 19th Howard, p. 9, 15 L. Ed., 565; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wallace, 505, 22 L. Ed., 205; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wallace, 335, L. Ed., 20, p. 647; In re Cole, V McCrary, 405; In re Wall, 107 U. S., 265, L. Ed., 27, p. 552; In re Woolley, 11 Bush., ICy,, 95; Manning v. French, 149 Mass., 391; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St., 116; Rice v. Com., 18 B. Monroe (Ky.), 472; State v. Harber, 129 Mo., 271; People v. Goodrich, 79 111., 148; In re Mills, 1 Mich., 392; Weeks on Attorneys, 2nd Ed., p. 153 to 158; 3 Am. 7 Eng. Ency. Law, 2nd Ed., 300.
The courts having power to admit attorneys to the bar «possess, as a necessary and inherent incident of such power, the right to disbar them for unworthy behavior, independent of any authority conferred by statute. State, ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Harber et al., 129 Mo., 271; Beene v. State, 22 Ark., 149; State v. Chapman, 11 Ohio, 430; People, ex rcl. Elliott v. Green, 7 Colo., 237; People, ex rel. Rogers v. Green, 9 Colo., 506; Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me., 140; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S.), 335; Scouten’s Appeal, 186 Pa., 270; Smith’s-Appeal, 179 Pa., 14; People, ex rel. Moses v. Goodrich, 79 111., 148; People, ex rel. Morris v. Moutray, 166 111., 630; Morrison v. Snow,-26 Utah, 247; State, ex rel. McCormick v. Winton, 11 Ore., 456; In re Percy, 36 N. Y. Ren., 651; State of Florida, ex rcl. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla., 278; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. (U. S.), 9; United States v. Parks, 93 Fed. Rep., 414; In re Adriaans, 17 App. Cas. Dist. of Columbia, 39; Bar Assn. City of Boston v. Greenhood, 168 Mass., 169; Delano’s Case, 58 N. H., 5; State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va., 250; In re Palmer, 8 O. Cir. Dec., 508, affirmed 62 Ohio St., 643; In re Swadencr, 5 O. Dec., 598; In re Disbarment of I. A. Smith, 73 Kan., 743; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. Rep., 265; Proceedings to Disbar P. E. Dellenbaugh and Vernon H. Burke, 9 O. Cir. Dec., 325.
Criticism of the decision of the court or opinion after a case has been determined as contempt or ground for disbarment. In re Peter Breen (Nevada), 17 Law Rep., An., N. S., 572; State, ex rel. Crow, A tty. Gen., v. Shepherd, 177 Mo., 205; lohnson v. State Supreme Court of Alabama, 44 S. Rep., 671; Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va., 838; In re Chadwick, 109 Mich., 588; In re Mains, 121 Mich., 603; State v. Rott, 5 N. Dak., 487-489; In re Philbrook, 105 Cal., 471; Ex parte Cole, 1 Mc-Crary’s Rep., 405; United States, ex rel. Hallett v. Green, 85 Fed. Rep., 857; Ex parte Mason, 29 Oregon, 18; In re Snozv, 27 Utah, 265; Maires’s Disbarment, 189 Pa., 99; State, ex rel. v. Finn, 32 Oregon, 519.
Under the cloak of citizenship or right of free speech Mr. Thatcher ought not to be permitted to claim immunity from the penalty which the court is authorized to impose, if justified, by reason of his misconduct as an officer of this court, or for unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude in the practice of his profession, under the license from the court to practice as one of its attorneys.
The license to practice the profession of the law is as an officer of this court, and is coupled with the condition that the power of control and authority which grants the license is a continuing one, and may be exercised by this court in canceling the license whenever, in its judgment, the right as an officer of this court to practice law has been forfeited by misconduct in office, or for unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude. People, ex rel. v. Goodrich, 79 111.-, 148; People, ex rel. v. Salomon, 184 111., 490; People, ex rel. v. George, 196 111., 122.
An attorney does not hold an office of public trust, in the constitutional or statutory sense of that term, but as an officer of the court exercising a privilege or franchise. Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal., 241; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; In re Thomas, 16 .Col., 441; Robinson Case, 131 Mass., 376; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y., 67; Byrne v. Stezvart, 3 Desauss. (S. C.), 466; Heffren v. layne, 39 Ind., 463; Bauer v. Betz, 99 N. Y., 672; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.), 333; Ex parte Wall, 13 Fed., 814; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; Bradzvell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 130; In re Lockwood, 154 U. S., 117; Holden V. Hardy, 169 C. S., 383; Maxzvell v. Dozv, 176 U. S., 592.; In re Macanley, 5 Ohio L. Rep., 569; In re Rockmore, 6 Ohio L. Rep., 339.
Liberty of free speech and press, and liability for its abuse. Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio St., 555; Cooley’s Const. Lim. (6th Eel.), 518; King & Verplanck v. Root, 4 Wendell, 114; Root v. King, 7 Cowan, 613; Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 111., 77; Wheaton v. Beecher, 66 Mich., 307; Riley v. Lee, 88 Ky., 603.
Liability of lawyers for libels on -the court. In re Chadzvick, 109 Mich. 588; People ex rel, v. News Times Pub. Co., 35 Colo., 253; In re Collins, 147 Cal., 9; State ex Inf. v. Shepherd,' 177(Mo., 205; Washington (State) v. Tugwell, 19 Wash., 238; Co'oper v. People ex rel., 13 Colo., 337; In re Mur ray, 11 N. Y. Supp., 336; Ex parte Cole, 1 Mc-Crary (U. S. C. C. R.), 405; People v. Green, 9 Colo., 506; Myers v. State, 46 Ohio St., 473.
Mr. E. B. King; Mr. J. J. Sullivan; Mr. E. C. Morton; Mr. Janies H. Southard and Mr. Rhea P. Carey, for Thatcher.
The question now before this court is as to whether one who takes part in a campaign is guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude, in his professional capacity, should he happen to be a lawyer, doctor or member of any other profession.
A mere statement of -the question suggests the answer. In what respect did the attorney’s conduct have anything to do with the profession of the law ? Suppose he had been a doctor or preacher and had taken the same part in the campaign. Would any .one have dreamed that his action had the slightest bearing upon the practice of medicine of upon the ministry? Does one who happens to be a lawyer lose his right to express an opinion as to the fitness of a candidate for office?
It may not be amiss to refer to the speeches of Abraham Lincoln, criticising the supreme court of the United States, on the Dred Scott decision, in which he proclaimed from the stump, in effect, that the court held up its decision for political reasons because of the fact that a presidential election was soon to take place. The remarks of our citizens during the last campaign do not approach the severity of criticism used by Mr. Lincoln. Neither do we ask that the letters and speeches of President Roosevelt, in which he uses severe denunciation of Judge Humphrey, who sat in. the-Beef Trust cases, and of Judg'e Grosscup in the Standard Oil cases, be used as guide. Perhaps no better authority for the right to freely and publicly criticise and discuss judicial conduct can be found than in the address of Judge William I-I. Taft, delivered before the American Bar Association, at Detroit, August 28, 1895.
When a lawyer is charged with commission of a crime he must be indicted and convicted before he can be put on.trial for disbarment. The commencement of disbarment proceedings is therefore premature in so far as this branch of the charges is concerned. This appears from the following: State v. Byrkctt, 4 O. D., 95; 4 Cyc., 906 (111) and cases cited; In re Delmas, 72 Pac., 402; Stephens Case, 102 Cal., 264; 36 Pac., 586; State v. Goode, 44 Pac., 640; Walker v. Commonwealth, 71 Ky., 86; People v. Treadwell, 66 Cal., 400; 5 Pac., 686; 36 Pac., 586; In re Lozventhal, 37 Pac., 526; In re Tipton, 42 Pac., 504; In re. Tilden, 25 Pac., 687; Beene v. State, 22 Ark., 149; People v. Com-stock, 176 Til., 192; 52 N. E. 67; Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C., 1.
At the threshold, it is apparent that the word “unprofessional,” as defined by Section 563, Revised Statutes, implies that the conduct must relate to the profession of the attorney who is so charged. The courts are uniform in holding that the conduct of which complaint is made must relate to the conduct of an attorney in his professional capacity as an attorney and not as a private citizen.
In the case at bar the printed matter referred to was campaign documents claimed to have been issued. It is therefore apparent that if the intent and purpose of these documents were to defeat a candidate for office and not to influence the administration of justice in the court in which the candidate might sit,That the action of the attorney in issuing it was not in his professional capacity as an attorney, but in his right as an American citizen to indulge in free speech or in the freedom of the press. State ex rel. v. Byrkett, 4 O. D., 89; 3 N. P., 28; Ex parte Wall, 1Ó7 U. S., 306; In re Bickley, 4 N. P. (N. S.), 129; Neff v. Kohler, 90 Mo. App., 296; Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St., 222; 40 Am. Rep., 637; State v. Bee Pub. Co., 50 L. R. A., 195; State Bd. of Examiners in Law v. Hart, (Minn.) 116 N. W., 212; Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 245; State v. Kaiser, 20 Ore., 50; 23 Pac., 964.
There must be a motive to obstruct the administration of justice and there must also be an actual obstruction of the administration of justice to render a lawyer guilty of either contempt or misconduct in referring to pending suits. Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St., 222; State v. Finley, 30 Fla., 326; 18 L. R. A., 401; State v. Young, 30 Fla., 85; In re Manheim, 99 N. Y. Supp., 87; Zachary v. State, 43 Southern, 925; People v. Flarvey, 41 111., 277; Roscivater v. State, 47 Neb., 630.
The record of a candidate running for re-election as judge is open for public discussion by members of the bar and the public at-large. State ex rel. v. Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, 97 Wis., 1; Flerringcr v. 'Ingbcrg, (Minn/), 97 N. W., 460; Crane v. Waters, Í0 Fed. Rep., 619; Gott v. Pulsifcr, 122 Mass., 235; Myers v. The State, 46 Ohio St., 473.
Though an attorney is guilty of contempt of court, the same is. not sufficient to disbar him. Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind., 47; Ex parte Green, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 576; Cuyler v. Atlantic, etc., 131 Fed. Rep., 95; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C, 202.
The right to practice law not a mere indulgence. Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 333; 6 Encv. of PI. & Prac., 709, note 1; Ex parte Wall, 107 XJ. S., 306.
The right to discuss pending cases. Post Pub. Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St., 71; In re Press-Post, 6 O. D., 10; Myers v. State, 46 Ohio St, 491; Crane v. Waters, 10 Fed, Rep., 620; Cuyler v. Atlantic, etc., 131 Fed. Rep., 95-98-99; People v. Green, 7 Colo., 237; Rosezvater v. Slate, 47 Neb., 630; Story v. People, 79 111., 45; State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis., 1.
Grounds warranting disbarment must clearly appear. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S., 335; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; Ex parte Eastham, 80 Pac. Rep., 1057; In re Palmer, 15 C. C., 94; Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheaton, 529; Mills case, 1 Mann., 393; Randall Case, 11 Allen, 473; Kilbourn v. Hand, 9 Ohio, 42.

Opinion:
Davis, J.
All along the way through this proceeding the respondent has challenged the jurisdiction of this court to try. him upon the alleged offenses. By motion, demurrer and answer he has asserted the lack of jurisdiction. His theory is, as disclosed .by the brief filed in support of the motion and demurrer, that the supreme court has and can have no original jurisdiction except such as is conferred in the constitution, Article IV, Section 2; and that, for that reason, Section 563, Revised Statutes, which expressly recognizes the original jurisdiction of the supreme court in disbarment proceedings, is unconstitutional and void. It is evident that this reasoning, if valid, would disqualify the supreme court and effectually prevent both it and the circuit court (constitution, Article IV, Section 6). from protecting themselves, the bar,, or the public, except by appellate jurisdiction. It is not surprising that such logic should appeal to one who is charged with transgression. • •
Numerous authorities, English, Federal and State, assert such jurisdiction as inherent in every court of record as a necessary incident of its organization as a court; and that it especially, although not- exclusively, results from the power to admit to the bar; and that such original jurisdiction exists even in courts of appellate jurisdiction. We cite some of the cases in point. In re Durant, 80 Conn., 140; points held are more fully stated in the syllabus of the same case, 67 Atl. Rep., 497; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St., 116; People v. Goodrich, 79 Ill., 148; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S.), 335; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; In re Duncan, 64 S. Car., 461; Fields v. State, 18 Tenn., 168; Brooks v. Fleming, 65 Tenn., 331, 337; In re Whitehead, 28 Ch. Div., 614; People v. Green, 7 Colo., 237; Ex parte Brown, 1 How. (Miss.), 303.
The power of any court to protect itself from contempts is generally conceded. At least it was held by this court in Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St., 210, that such power is inherent and necessary to the exercise of judicial functions; and that it is not within the authority of the general assembly to abridge such power as to a court created by the constitution. The power to punish for contempt is not more completely involvedjn the constitution of the courts, nor is it more necessary in the due administration of justice than is the power to see that none but persons of legal learning, integrity and respectful demeanor, and, generally speaking, of good moral character, shall be permitted to assume the functions of an attorney at law, and thereby, as officers of the court, assist in dispensing justice. By such sanction of the court, an attorney is held out to the public as worthy of their confidence and respect. Hence, whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the court which made him one of its officers and gave him .the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and the disbarment of attorneys-are judicial acts; and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own good behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion by the court. In re Durant, 80 Conn., 140; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 130; In re Day, 181 Ill., 73.
The provisions of Section 563, Revised Statutes, are not an attempted enlargement of the jurisdiction of the several courts named, in contravention of the constitution; but are regulative provHons recognizing already existing powers of those courts. State, ex rel., v. Harber, 129 Mo., 271; In re Breen, Sup. Ct. of Nevada, 1908, 93 Pac. Rep., 997; Cooper v. People, 13 Colo., 337; In matter of Mills, 1 Mich., 392; In matter of Goodell, 39 Wis., 232, 240; Nelson v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1908), 109 S. W. Rep., 337; In re Smith, 73 Kans., 743, 748-749. A very instructive case is In re Simpson, 9 N. Dak., 379, from which we quote the follow ing: "A preliminary motion was made to quash this proceeding upon the ground that this court is denied original jurisdiction to entertain it under Sections 86 and 87 of the state constitution. We are entirely clear that a disbarment proceeding is not within the spirit and meaning of the constitutional inhibition contained in the sections referred to. The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice, and in this state that power is vested in this court, has the inherent right in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to exclude them from practice. The statutory provision found in Section 432, Revised Codes, authorizing this court to suspend or disbar an attorney for unprofessional conduct is merely a legislative affirmance of a power which already existed. In support of the foregoing see Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; In re Mills, 1 Mich., 392; People v. Ford, 54 Ill., 520; In re Secombe, 19 How. (U. S.), 9; In re Garland, 4 Wall., 333, and numerous cases cited in 6 Enc. Pl. & Pr., on pages 711 and 712.
"It is also well settled that an appellate court possesses the power by an original proceeding to suspend or disbar an attorney for unprofessional conduct in a lower court. So also a state court may discipline counsel for unprofessional acts committed in the federal courts". On this point see cases cited in 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2 ed.), pages 300 and 301, and note, and this inherent power in the judiciary cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive departments."
Counsel for respondent place considerable emphasis on In re Waugh, 32 Wash., 50; but this case is practically overruled' in In re Robinson, decided by the same court December 26, 1907, and reported 92 Pac. Rep., 929.
We do not think it necessary to say more, or to cite further authority on the matter of jurisdiction. We think, for the reasons stated, that "we have full original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding; and that considering the unsettled state of the law in this state and the peculiar circumstances of this case we are entirely warranted in exercising jurisdiction without being in any way under obligation to do so in every case which may be brought to our notice.' We have entertained the present case with the intention to be absolutely fair to the judiciary and the public interest on the one side and the respondent on the other, and we believe that we have not failed in that reg'ard.
We come now to the consideration of the merits of the charges preferred against the respondent. We are unanimous in our findings of fact upon the several specifications and it will serve no good purpose to discuss the evidence in detail. What we do say is with reference. to the bearing of the facts' as found upon the proper judgment to be rendered. In not entertaining Specification 15 we do not wish to be understood as holding that the facts therein stated show nothing that is reprehensible, but that it discloses a want of decorum which could have been adequately taken care of at the time by the court in whose presence the conduct of the respondent occurred. In regard to Specification 13, the whole matter appearing upon the face of the depositions, the trial court might have properly disposed of it by striking the depositions from the files, without resort to anything more severe. As to Specification 16, the evidence of Mattison and the respondent discloses a conflict as to the understanding of the parties in regard to the contract, or as to whether there was any contract at all; but it does not show that the respondent was not acting in good faith, under the belief that Mattison was trying to cheat him out of his just rights. There was some testimony tending to sustain Specification 18, but the evidence did not sustain the specification as a whole. Specifications numbers 17, 14, and 1 to 12, inclusive, are found to be sustained and we will consider them in the order in which we have mentioned them.
Specification No. 17 in substance recites that the respondent, Thatcher, for the purpose of procuring for himself a large sum of money caused an'action to be begun in the name of Albert Reiter against George R. Hudson when the notes had long-before been paid by Milburn and the respondent knew they had been paid; and that the respondent thereby attempted to impose upon the court and practice fraud upon Hudson. The evidence would indicate that Milburn and Hudson were co-sureties of the note to the First National Bank of South Bend and joint makers on the Reiter notes. Consequently if they were paid by Milburn as alleged the only right of action which would remain would be an action by Milburn against Hudson for contribution. .This right of action Milburn did not see fit for various reasons to exercise. The bank note was paid on or before March 29, 1900, by the bank accepting as payment certain life insurance policies which Milburn had theretofore deposited as collateral. Later, in May, 1900, Milburn obtained the Reiter notes by giving for them certain notes signed by one Murray, amounting to two thousand dollars and secured by eighty shares of the capital stock of The Toledo Tubrtlar Axle Company, par value four thousand dollars. At this time the Murray notes were past due and The Tubular Axle Company was in the hands of a receiver. Thatcher conducted the negotiations by which these transactions were consummated and he thereby came into possession of the original notes. The right of action upon those notes in favor of Reiter and the bank was extinguished. Reiter never sued upon the Murray notes, but received a dividend of $245.76 upon the stock which he held as collateral. On July 1, 1902, Thatcher wrote to Milburn ánd called his attention to the contract by which Milburn was to receive one-third of the amount of claims placed in Thatcher's hands for collection, up to $2,250, and two-thirds of that sum was to be retained by Thatcher, together with any balance over $2,250. Lie then continues as follows: "I believe with a considerable effort something can be realized on the Reiter notes and on the note given to the South Bend bank. More can be done if the notes are sued upon in the name of Reiter and the bank. In order to get Reiter and the bank to allow the suits to be brought in their names, they will no doubt rec[uire a portion of the amount recovered to be paid to them. I am willing to give a portion of the amount to which I will be entitled, provided you are also willing to do the same. I consider our agreement of March 9th still in force; but desire to co-operate as to the manner in which it will be carried out."
Passing over a number of letters which passed between Milburn and Thatcher, we come to one dated February 7, 1903, in which occurs the following: "Mr. Reiter called a few days ago to learn whether there was a prospect of his getting anything more on his notes. I asked him if he would allow the use of his name providing he got fifteen or twenty per cent, of the amount realized. Pie seemed willing to do this, although it was hard for me to make him thoroughly understand what I desired to know but I trust he did understand me. I think it will be much better to have the suit brought on the First National Bank note in the name of the bank if you can make satisfactory arrangements." Then follows, under date of February 13, 1903, the following letter from Milburn: "I enclose herewith an assignment for the Reiter notes. The First National Bank of South Bend-would not bring suit, consequently I make no assignment of that." On the following day Thatcher answered Milburn as follows: "Yours of the 13th containing an assignment of notes to Albert Reiter, received. The assignment recites the fact that you have paid Reiter in full for the two notes and assign your right to sue Hudson as a signer of the note and assign anything he may collect. I fear that this will cause complications, so that it would be claimed by Pludson that if you have paid Reiter for the notes his (Reiter'sI interest in them has ceased. Hudson w-11 then claim that anything to which you are entitled is off set by claims which he has against you, and therefore your assignment to Reiter of the right to sue on the notes will allow Hudson to bring in his set-offs. In other words, Hudson will have the same defense against Reiter that he would have if you brought the suit. Would not a better way be for you to sign a statement to the effect that whereas you have made an exchange of certain notes given to you by one Murray for the notes held by Reiter and at the time of the exchange it was represented to Reiter that a considerable sum could be collected on said note, but that it had afterwards been found that such was a mistake, and it being the desire of both parties to cancel such agreement of exchange, you therefore do by the instrument named re-convey to said Reiter all rights which you acquired by reason of such transfer and he in turn conveys to you the Murray notes." Milburn answered, under date of February 18, 1903 : "Answering your favor of the 14th, will say that I am willing to sign any paper that will enable Reiter to get any amount of money •he can out of Hudson, but I am not willing to sign any paper that will make me liable again for notes that I have paid him for." Thatcher writes to Milburn April 4, 1903: "I feel that something should be done in the Reiter matter and explained to you in a former letter that it will be impossible for Reiter to sign the papers stating that he has been paid the note in question and at the same time commence an action to enforce payment ag'ainst one of the makers," etc. On September 21, 1903, Thatcher writes to Milburn: "Enclosed I send you a new draft of agreement, which, if satisfactory you might send to Mr. Knapp for his signature. It will become necessary for me to employ associate counsel and I can see a disagreeable fight ahead before anything can be recovered." The Mr. Knapp referred to in this letter is the father-in-law of Milburn. September 23, 1903, Milburn wrote to Thatcher: "Answering your favor of the 21st, will say that I am not willing in any way to have Mr. Knapp mixed up in a law suit, conser quently I do not send paper on for his signature; neither am I willing to be mixed up in a law suit, preferring to attend to my own business, and let whatever I might be able to get as my share even though it amounted to over $2,000 go with the balance. I should like very much indeed to know that Albert Reiter had been paid in full, and would be willing to sign a paper assigning thesé claims to him, if the assignment could and would be worded in such a way that I would not be again held*liable to Reiter or any one else in case of failure to be satisfied with whatever was collected. If you will draw up such an assignment and send to me I will sign it with this provision, and that is that Reiter is to receive ten per cent, in the collection indicated in the assignment that you have sent me, and the fort3>--five per cent, that I was to receive, making his share fi^-five per cent, and your share forty-five per cent. In sending this to me, enclose the three notes with it." March 22, 1904, Milburn wrote to Thatcher as follows: "You can readily understand that I will not sign any papers which can in any way make either Mr. Knapp or myself liable in the future, and unless papers can be drawn fully protecting both of us I will not sign any, neither will I ask him to. And in drawing up a contract, make it explicit that forty-five per cent, of the collection is yours and that you are to pay every expense of whatever nature connected with the collection." And again, on September 9, 1904, Thatcher writes to Milburn: "I think it best that you have your own attorney draft such papers as are necessary to be signed by Mr. Knapp transferring the Hudson notes to Reiter. In fact, I think those notes are already indorsed without recourse, and can be transferred by delivery. If you will consent to my proceeding in Reiter's name I will do so, and not ask for any paper at all."
We cannot undertake to analyze thoroughly all the evidence upon this subject, but we think that this correspondence, with other testimony, conclusively shows that Milburn, the bank and Reiter regarded ' the original notes as paid; and that Thatcher knew that they were paid and that a suit by Milburn against Hudson for contribution would probably be fruitless. But as against the bank and Reiter, Hudson would have no defense if he were deceived into believing that the notes had never been extinguished by payment. Thatcher failed in his scheme to induce the bank to sue, but by promising to pay a poor and ignorant German blacksmith ten per cent, of the amount to be recovered he prevailed upon him to ignore the payment of the notes and to appear as the real party in interest. And concealing his own interest in the matter, he induced a reputable attorney to institute the action and verify the pleadings. "The lawyer's duty is of a double character. He owes to his client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession. He is an officer of the court — a minister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. lie violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception or permits his clients to do so. He is under no obligation to seek to obtain for those whom he represents that which is forbidden by the law." People v. Beattie, 137 Ill., 553. In short, we are of the opinion that the evidence submitted under specification No. 17 fully sustains the charges. The whole affair is a striking' example of the peril to his integrity which a lawyer invites when he speculates in a law suit upon a large contingent fee and of the strain which, under the circumstances, he puts upon himself while struggling with his honor upon the one side and cupidity upon the other. We have here a vivid illustration of the proverb of Solomon:, "He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be innocent."
The facts stated in specifications Nos. 1-12, inclusive, and No. 14, are in no material part disputed; but, on the contrary, are admitted in the answer. Some additional facts are brought out in the evidence and these will be referred to hereafter. The facts stated in Specification No. 14 standing alone would probably not have been regarded as sufficient to sustain the charges; but the respondent's own testimony, in the opinion of a majority of the court, adds materially to the gravity of the specification. From that it appears that some personal feeling was engendered beween the respondent and Judge Morris some time before the date mentioned in Specification No. 14. It occurred in this way: The respondent had a client who was plaintiff against a railroad company. This client was not a resident of this state and is not to be presumed to have knowledge of the laws of Ohio, Judge Morris never had seen him and knew nothing of him; but from seeing the judge while trying a personal injury case against a railroad company respondent's client did not want his case tried before Judge Morris. At that time the statute did not permit counsel to swear to affidavits of prejudice. Respondent seems to have advised his client to swear to an affidavit of prejudice and took it upon himself to interview the judge at his residence. Naturally the judge was indignant at the suggestion that he could entertain a bias against a man whom he did not know and never had seen. Respondent then criticised the judge's conduct in some other case and they separated. Afterward, it would seem, when the statute had been changed so as to permit attorneys to swear to affidavits of prejudice, the respondent habitually filed affidavits of prejudice for the removal of his cases from Judge Morris' docket. We gather from the whole testimony that this course resulted more from prejudice of the respondent against the judge than from any bias of the judge against respondent's clients or any conduct of the judge which justified the inference of any bias against the attorney which seriously affected his cases. So that when we come to look at the option suggested to the judge through the deputy clerk, as alleged in the specification, in the light of the facts detailed by both parties, it does not appear to be so innocent and considerate as it might be regarded on the face of it. We are, therefore, inclined to take this transaction, as well as those detailed in Specifications 1 to 12, inclusive, as showing that the respondent was acting throughout in a vengeful spirit and with .a determination to defy Judge Morris and through him to serve notice on other judges that they would have to reckon with him if they exercised their own judgment instead of adopting his notions of what would be proper and right. It is true that he alleges in his answer, and re-asserts it in his testimony, that he was acting throughout as a disinterested citizen, pro bono publico; but it would require further proof to establish this, in view of his own statement in Exhibit "C," viz.: "'But the attorneys who try the suits against the big corporations are against Morris to a man. It isn't sentiment or politics with them. It .is business. They never would be against Morris if he were 'a people's judge.' " Whether he wrote these words or not, he made himself responsible for them by distributing these circulars; and the peculiar methods of publishing them and the time at which it, was done made them all the more inflammatory and dangerous. With a trumpeter and an automobile and the crippled Gravell, he went about gathering curious crowds and giving out harrowing stories of corruption, oppression and injustice wrought in the name of law. Some of them were not even half truths. For instance, "The deadly parallel" of seventy-one cases, of which fifteen were personal injury cases, all of which were reviewed and but two. reversed, and the attacks on Judge Kumler in exhibits "B" and "C," as to which there is not even an attempt at explanation, excuse or defense.
The chief stress of the defense has been upon the claim that what the respondent did, and he denies very little, he did as a citizen and not as an attorney; and that as a citizen and an attorney he had the right, and it was his duty, to oppose a candidate whom he believed unfit for office. We concede that it is the duty of the bar to aid the public in the selection of proper persons for the bench; but that duty should be exercised in subordination to another duty, which is -thus expressed in the code of ethics adopted by the American Bar Association : "It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free tq defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust' criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise^ such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected." This obligation is usually understood to be implied in the attorney's oath and therefore he cannot assail the judge in the violent and disrespectful manner which is admitted here without a breach of his oath. If the judg'es who were attacked in these circulars were believed by the respondent to be guilty as he charges and insinuates it was his privilege and duty to do what he could to have them impeached so that they might be deposed from office, when found guilty. As an attorney, or as a citizen, he had the right to criticise the judgments and conduct of the judges in a decent and respectful manner ; but no man has a right at any time to degrade and intimidate a public officer and bring his office into contempt by the publication of libelous matter imputing to him impeachable offenses, and the fact that the officer is a candidate for re-election does not remove the ban.
Whether an attorney can divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen elector at another, is not the important question here. The real question is whether under the facts admitted'and proved the respondent appears to be a fit person to be longer allowed the privileges of an attorney. In re Durant, 80 Conn., 140, 67 Atl. Rep., 497; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark., 384. The question is not whether' his offense might be punished as a contempt or by prosecution for libel, nor in what capacity he was acting. It is whether he has shown himself, by lack of appreciation of ethical standards and by unworthy conduct, to be no longer worthy of being recognized as an officer of the courts.
The rancor of personal feeling appears in almost every line of the publications issued by the respondent. The views of this c'ourt as to the effect of such publications is very well indicated in the following extract from a per curiam opinion in Myers v. State, 46 Ohio St., 489: "The article was a libel upon the presiding judge, but that alone did not form the basis of the information. The intention of the publication was to insult and intimidate the judge, degrade the court, destroy its power and influence, and thus to bring it into contempt; to inflame the prejudices of the people against it; to lead them to believe that the trial then being conducted was a farce and wrong on the part of the judge and other officers of the court, and, if communicated to the jury, to prejudice their minds, and thus prevent a fair and impartial trial. Besides, the tendency was, when read by the judge, to produce irritation and to a greater or less extent, render him less capable of exercising a clear and impartial judgment. It therefore tended directly to obstruct the administration of justice in reference to the case on trial and its publication was a contempt of court." Much of this language is just as pertinent to libelous publications relating to matters no longer pending in the courts as to those still pending.
In'this connection it is proper to say that in order to justify a court in disbarring an attorney it is not necessary that his offense should constitute a contempt or a crime; or that he should be con-, victed of the crime or contempt before disbarment. "The obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the bar, is not merely to be obedient to the constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their judicial acts. Whatever may be thought, in such a case, of the power to punish for contempt, there can be no doubt of the existence of a power to strike the offending attorney from the roll," Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., 335, by Mr. Justice Field. "No question can be made of the power of a court to strike a member of the bar from the roll for official misconduct in or out of court," Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St., 220, by Chief Justice Sharswood. "The power of the court to punish for contempt by fine and imprisonment is one thing, and its power to strike an attorney from the roll is another and distinct thing, although the misconduct for which an attorney may be disbarred may in some instances involve a contempt of court," Beene v. The State, 22 Ark., 151, by Chief Justice English. "Where the crime, the commission of which is charged, is unconnected with the professional conduct of the attorney, a previous indictment and conviction are in general necessary to warrant disbarment; but this requirement is not inflexible, and the courts will sometimes proceed without conviction." 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2 ed.), 304.
Nor can the respondent be justified on the ground of guaranteed liberty of speech. When a man enters upon a campaign of vilification he takes his fate into his own hands and must expect to be held to answer for the abuse of the privilege extended to him by the constitution. An attorney of more than twenty years' standing at the bar must be presumed to know the difference "between respectful, fair and candid criticism, and scandalous abuse of the courts which gave him the high privilege, not as a matter of right, to be a priest at the altar of justice.
The respondent has admitted no fault. He has insisted upon his right to say and do that which he did say and do. He has -assumed an attitude of defiance even in the face of this court. He has expressed no regret and made not even a suggestion of an apology. In view of all this and the facts as they appear to us we feel compelled to' go to the logical result.
In Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. St., 270, Mr. Justice Mitchell said: "The bar have great liberty and high privileges in the assertion of their clients' rights as they view them, but, on the other hand, they have equal obligations as officers in the administration of justice, and no duty is more fundamental, more unremitting or more imperative than that of respectful subordination to the court. The foundation of liberty under our system of government is respect for the law as officially pronounced. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and his temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-restraint are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times, be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." In Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265, it was said in the opinion that: "The provisions of the constitution, which declare that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, have no relation to the subject in hand. As held by the supreme court of Tennessee in Fields v. The State (and the same view is .expressed in other cases), the constitutional privilege of trial by jury for crimes does not apply to prevent the courts. from punishing its officers for contempt, or from removing them in proper cases. Removal from office for an indictable offense is no bar to an indictment. The proceeding is in its nature civil, and collateral to my criminal prosecution by indictment. The proceeding is not for the purpose of punishment, but for the purpose of preserving the courts of jus tice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. Undoubtedly, the power is one that ought always to be exercised with great caution; and ought never to be exercised except in clear cases of misconduct, which affect the standing' and character of the party as an attorney. But when such a case is shown to exist, the courts ought not to hesitate, from sympathy for the individual, to protect themselves from scandal and contempt, and the public from prejudice, by removing grossly improper persons from participation in the administration of the laws. The power to do this is a rightful one; and, when exercised in proper cases, is no violation of any constitutional provision." In People v. Green, 7 Colo., 237, the court said: "But courts ought not to forget, in their anxiety to shield the attorney, the duty they owe themselves, to the legal profession in general, and to that portion of society with whom they directly deal. This case cannot be determined as a single controversy between two individuals; the questions are of general importance and application. Every other judge and every other lawyer is almost as much interested as are relator and respondent. Individuals are lost sight of; the issue tried bears directly upon the relations existing between the bench and bar of the entire state." In In re Murray, 11 N. Y. Supp., 336, the supreme court of New York in general term, in a case in which the respondent charged the court with corrupt practices, in an affidavit, used the following language, which appears to us to be just as applicable, for our present purpose, to the case at bar: "The charges are most serious in character and would be attended with the gravest results if established. They should not, therefore, be entertained for a moment, except upon the most impressive evidence at least, and then only in the manner provided by law for the investigation of kindred accusations against judicial officers. These results impose the greatest and most scrupulous care even in an attempted impeachment of a judical officer, and if a counselor of this court, disregarding that mode ' of procedure, makes the charge, of corruption against an officer in his own court, while sitting in a case which he is investigating, his conduct is in the highest degree unprofessional and improper. If such a performance should be tolerated, when every presumption of law is ag'ainst the truth of the accusation, the honor of judicial officers would be exposed to the malice or rage of disappointed attorneys whose evil inclinations, anger, or passion, would thus seek its gratification. Unfortunately, perhaps, there are in our profession a few who chafe under an adverse decision, and indulge in utterances which they are only too happy to retract in cooler moments; and this class are unfortunate, it may be, in having adopted a profession which has its successes and failures, the latter arising doubtless more from the infirmities of human evidence than the uncertainty or variability of legal principles. Here the respondent for the oral declaration against the surrogate was given the opportunity to apologize, which he failed to do, and in this proceeding has given neither signs of regret at his conduct nor retracted, apologized, nor stated anything in extenuation or in mitigation. We think it our duty to grant the motion made herein forever disbarring the respondent as an attorney or counselor of this court."
The counsel for the respondent say that, "Many would say that a humble citizen might safely follow the leadership of such distinguished men as President Lincoln and the opinion of former judge now President Taft"; and they quote at large from the address of the latter before the American Bar Association, August 28, 1895, and from speeches of Mr. Lincoln severely criticising the Dred Scott decision. Again we say that there is a broad distinction between fair and temperate criticism and abuse or slander of the courts or judges constituting them. Mr. Lincoln was not guilty of the latter offense nor did Judge Taft approve it. And nobody knows better than a lawyer, that while judicious criticism is a necessary and effective means when used to keep the judges mindful of their duties and to prevent the selection of inefficient judges when judges are chosen by the people; yet when carried beyond the limit of truth and fairness nothing is more certain to destroy the judicial balance of timid judges and to effectually impair the impartial administration of justice.
The judgment of the court is that the respondent be
Disbarred.
Crew, C. J., Summers, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
Spear, J.
At the inception of this inquiry I was of opinion, which has not been changed, that the matter could be tried by one of the courts of Lucas county with less expense than in this court, and, considering that error would lie to a judgment so obtained, with equally conclusive results. That course would have proved a material saving of the time of this court, for, while we have spent practically a week in the trial, an error case from a court of Lucas county, embodying the same record, could have been heard in a few hours at most, and the week spent on this trial could have been profitably given to the hearing of pressing cases on the docket having precedence. Not that I had or have doubts as to the legal right of this court, whether called the exercise of jurisdiction or of inherent power, to entertain and act upon the charges, but it seemed to me that this would be better practice and would avoid any possible claim that this court had, by entertaining this case de novo, established a burdensome precedent. For these reasons I favored sustaining the motion of the defendant to commit the controversy to one or the other of the Lucas county courts, the power of the circuit court to act upon such complaints, having been twice affirmed by this court, once as far back as the year 1893 (Palmer v. The State, from Fayette county), and again some years later in a similar case from Cuyahoga county. But a majority, for reasons by them deemed sufficient, thought that the motion should be overruled. I am aware that this question of practice does not affect the merits of the case, but I regard the point as of sufficient importance to justify this statement of my position upon it; and I am authorized to say that Crew, C. J., was of the same opinion with respect to the granting of the motion, and concurs in the foregoing.
It results that we have the case and it is to be determined, as other controversies in the courts are determined, upon the law and the evidence. At the opening of the trial specification No. 15 was dismissed by order of the court. In my judgment specifications numbered 13, 14, 16 and 18 are not sufficiently supported by evidence and proper conclusions to be drawn therefrom to warrant any action by this court, and may properly be ignored. As to the other specifications I am satisfied that they are sufficiently sustained, and do sufficiently establish the charge of misconduct in office to make it the duty of the court -to take action thereon. I do not, however, feel that the proper discharge of that duty requires a judgment of disbarment. I am disposed to somewhat temper justice with mercy, to make some allowance for the frailties of our nature, to which we are all more or less subject, and to give opportunity for reflection and correction, and for that reason, and taking into account all the circumstances presented by the evidence, am of opinion that a suspension from practice for a reasonable time, definite as to date, would, so far as that feature of the case is concerned, sufficiently vindicate the majesty of the law, .and serve as a warning to others. I therefore do not concur in the judgment as rendered. I do concur in the syllabus except as to the sixth paragraph as applied to this case.