Case Name: JOHNSON v. SMOCK
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1791-11
Citations: 1 N.J.L. 125
Docket Number: 
Parties: [106] JOHNSON v. SMOCK
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 125–129

Head Matter:
[106] JOHNSON v. SMOCK
A covenanted to convey to B a plantation, free of all encumbrances, for a sum of money, part of which was to be applied in discharge of a mortgage, and the residue paid to A before April, 1791; the deed was to be made to B before May, 1790. The deed was not tendered until after the time, and B waived the contract. Upon an action of debt being brought for the penalty, it was held that it is not necessary to perform a condition precedent, strictly with regard to lime, but that if a tender of a deed be made after the time, and no good reason shown for a refusal, evidence of such performance is sufficient, but the making a deed is not enough: a title msut be shown. A tender of a deed may be made by an attorney by parol.
This was an action of debt, for the penalty of certain articles of agreement, in which the plaintiff covenanted with the defendant to convey to him a plantation, free and clear of all encumbrances, in consideration of £700. Of this sum, £680 was to be paid to one Ludlum, in discharge of a mort gage, as was said, and the residue to the plaintiff, on or before April, 1791. The deed was to be made before the 1st May, 1790. The action was tried at bar.
Stockton, for the defendant, insisted—
1st. That the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to prove the offer of a deed after the 1st May, 1790; that the right to ask the money depended on tSe making a title as a condition precedent. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Salk. 171; Jones v. Barkly, Doug. 664; Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, 1 H. Blac. 270.
2d. That the tender and demand should be on the premises.
Boudinot, for plaintiff.
The defendant took possession of the premises at making of the contract, and is yet in possession.
2d. The plaintiff is prepared, to prove that it was understood between the parties, that Smoek was to pay the £680 to the mortgagee, before the 1st May, 1790, when the deed was to be made.
,3d. The deed was actually drawn on the day, and tendered to Smock in fifteen days after. On the second point he cited Powell on Contracts 380, to prove that dubious contracts may be explained.
To show that the words “ in considerations premissorum” did not make a condition precedent, he cited 1 Esp. 335; Smith v. Shelberry, 2 Mod. 35; Martindale v. Fisher, 1 Wils. 88.
Aaron Ogden, on same point,
cited Gilbert’s Evid. 197,198. He said the first thing -to be .done was the payment of the [107] money to Ludlum; for he was to pay what was “now due,” besides, a deed free of encumbrances could not be made until the mortgage was discharged. The intent of the parties is to be sought out. Gilb. Evid. 199, 200, and 1 Salk. 171,. show that these words are not conditional.

Opinion:
Kinsey, C. J.
The parol evidence is improper; the articles are explicit enough — -that is, they afford a construction ; and sio mistake or fraud is suggested. I think upon the construction of this instrument, the deed was to be made by the first of May, 1790, that time is fixed; but none is limited for taking up the mortgage, and I do not see how we can say that the time for making the deed was to depend on Smock's discharging the mortgage. It is true, Johnson was to convey it, free of encumbrance; be could do this by paying off the mortgage himself; besides, this mortgage was no encumbrance, because it was assumed by Smock, himself; lie knew it, and agreed to pay it. But another question arises. Is it necessary to perform a condition precedent strictly with respect to time? I think not. Gibson v. Patterson, 1 Atk. 12. If, therefore, a tender of a deed can be proved after the time, and no good reason for the refusal, it appears to me that evidence of such performance is sufficient.
Smith, J., agreed with the Chief Justice.