Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellant, v. J.J.E., Father of J.E., A Child, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-03-30
Citations: 953 So. 2d 659
Docket Number: No. 5D06-1797
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellant, v. J.J.E., Father of J.E., A Child, Appellee.
Judges: PALMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 953
Pages: 659–666

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellant, v. J.J.E., Father of J.E., A Child, Appellee.
No. 5D06-1797.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 30, 2007.
Ralph J. McMurphy, of Department of Children and Families, Wildwood, for Appellant.
Gary R. Gossett, Jr., and Christopher D. Cloud, of Gossett Law Offices, P.A., Sebr-ing, for Appellee.

Opinion:
MONACO, J.
The Department of Children and Families appeals the order of the trial court finding that the service of process by publication in which the Department sought to obtain jurisdiction over the appellee, the father of the child that was the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding, was invalid, and that the subsequent order terminating the father's rights was void. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
In 2002, the father's parental rights to his child, J.E., were terminated based upon service of process by publication. The order terminating the father's rights indicated that the father's location was unknown and that he could not be found. J.E. was placed in a foster home along with his half-sister. Two years later the father learned through the media that J.E.'s half-sister had been abused. The father became concerned with the welfare of his son and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. His petition, which was assigned to a judge not involved in the original proceeding, alleged that J.E. was being wrongfully restrained in the custody of the Department because jurisdiction had never been obtained over the father. When the court, considering the petition, determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the Department sought a writ of prohibition from this court. We granted the petition and ordered the trial court either to dismiss the father's petition for habeas corpus or "to transfer the proceedings to the court that ordered the termination of parental rights which continues to have jurisdiction over J.E." See Dep't of Children & Families v. J.J.E, 901 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 911 So.2d 98 (Fla.2005). We directed that the issue of whether jurisdiction had been obtained over the father be considered by the dependency court employing the procedure found in Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.270(b)(4), which governs relief from an order or judgment because the order or judgment is void. Cf, Paladin Props, v. Family Inv. Enters., 952 So.2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
In accordance with that order the case was transferred to the dependency court, which then proceeded to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider whether process had been properly served in the original proceeding so that personal jurisdiction had been obtained over the father. More specifically, the trial court set out to determine whether the Department had performed the statutorily required diligent search prior to using publication as a means to serve process on and gain jurisdiction over the father.
Procedural due process requires "that a defendant in a termination proceeding will be given fair notice and afforded a real opportunity to be heard and defend in an orderly procedure." M.J.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So.2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Section 39.801, Florida Statutes (2006), and Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.505 govern the procedure for giving notice and serving process with respect to a petition to terminate parental rights. Section 39.801(3)(a)l. and rule 8.505(a)(1) provide that before a court can terminate parental rights, notice must be personally served on any parent who is the subject of the termination. If a party to a proceeding for termination of parental rights is known but his or her whereabouts are not, section 39.803(5) Florida Statutes (2006), requires a court to direct the petitioner to conduct a diligent search to locate the party, unless it would be in the best interest of the child to proceed without actual notice. If a party entitled to personal service cannot be so served, section 39.801(3)(b) thereafter compels notice to be given as required by the rules of civil procedure. Accordingly, when personal service cannot be made on an affected parent, service by publication may be made on any known party for proceedings to terminate parental rights. Sections 49.011(13), 49.021(1), Florida Statutes (2006); rule 8.505(c). If constructive service is utilized, however, there must be strict statutory compliance. See, e.g., Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 922 So.2d 340, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Floyd v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 704 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
As a prerequisite to service of process by publication, the party seeking to obtain service must file a sworn statement with the court demonstrating that a diligent search has been made in an effort to obtain the defendant's residence and establishing that personal service could not be obtained. Section 49.031(1) Florida Statutes (2006); Floyd. The sworn statement must show that a diligent search has been conducted to discover the name and address of the person sought to be served, whether the person sought is over 18, and that the person's address is unknown or known, and if known, is included in the affidavit. Section 49.041, Florida Statutes (2006). Section 39.803(6), Florida Statutes (2006), lists the minimum requirements for a diligent search:
The diligent search required by subsection (5) must include, at a minimum, inquiries of all known relatives of the parent or prospective parent, inquiries of all offices of program areas of the department likely to have information about the parent or prospective parent, inquiries of other state and federal agencies likely to have information about the parent or prospective parent, inquiries of appropriate utility and postal providers, and inquiries of appropriate law enforcement agencies.
Even though the affidavit must allege that a diligent search and inquiry was made, it does not have to include specific supporting facts. Floyd, 704 So.2d at 1112. This provision, nevertheless, does not relieve the party of establishing that a diligent search has actually been made:
The underlying facts, however, must show that the complainant reasonably employed the knowledge at his command, made diligent inquiry and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstance to acquire the information necessary to enable him to effect personal service of the defendant.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Shepheard. Failure to comply strictly with the constructive service statutes renders a subsequent judgment voidable or even void if service of process is so defective that it essentially amounts to no service. Floyd, 704 So.2d at 1112.
In the present case, the trial court found that the Department represented in the earlier proceeding that it had performed a diligent search for and was unable to locate the father. It thereafter served process by publication in a local newspaper. The evidence received revealed that the Department had contacted the mother of J.E., whose rights were also being terminated, and were told by her that she had no knowledge of the father's location. The Department stated in documentation brought to the trial court's attention that "the mother had reasons for not being forthcoming as to her knowledge of the Father's whereabouts." The record does seem to indicate that the Department's personnel did at least check the phone book and drivers' license records, but because the father had a common name, it went no further. It did not bother to seek to learn which of the seven persons with similar names was the father whose parental rights it sought to terminate. Because it was not given a social security number or the birth date of the father, the Department considered itself unable to search further, and argued that its inquiry, meager as it was, satisfied the requirements of diligent search. It did not try to contact any other governmental agencies and did not check the county public records because, according to the Department's witness, "it would have been a waste of time."
The evidence further revealed, however, that the Department of Revenue (Child Support Office), was located in the very same building that housed the Department, yet incredibly no one from the Department ever consulted this agency, even though the Department of Revenue had issued an Order Suspending Child Support Payments that contained the father's correct mailing address. The Clerk of the Circuit Court testified, as well, that a motion to suspend the father's child support payments was filed in the public records of that court. The Clerk likewise had records showing that child support payments were being received. In fact, the Clerk had a letter from the father with his address on it.
The trial court found it "unfathomable" that a more diligent search was not performed, and noted that "throwing up one's hand due to a common name and a lack of detail when the outcome involves the termination of parental rights . strains the conscience." The trial court found that the dependency court never obtained jurisdiction over the father prior to terminating his parental rights because no diligent search had been completed. Having found that the termination order was void, the trial court then gave the Department leave to give proper notice to the father and to commence a new termination proceeding against him. The Department appeals.
This case is largely controlled by our recent decision in J.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 938 So.2d 620 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Here, as in J.M., the Department failed to demonstrate that it conducted a diligent search and inquiry. The burden of demonstrating that constructive service was proper fell squarely on the shoulders of the Department. See J.M.; Shepheard. The trial court found that the Department did not come close to the mark. Inasmuch as we review such a determination on an abuse of discretion basis, we find no error. See Snipes v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 885 So.2d 899, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), review dismissed, 902 So.2d 792 (Fla.2005). We write only to reconfirm that because parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, termination of those rights may not be accomplished in a perfunctory fashion. See In re K.M., 946 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The Constitution requires and we fully expect those seeking to terminate parental rights to comply rigorously with the applicable laws, including very importantly the laws governing service of process.
AFFIRMED.
PALMER, J., concurs.
TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.