Case Name: Burrell Oates v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1907-05-15
Citations: 51 Tex. Crim. 449
Docket Number: No. 3564
Parties: Burrell Oates v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 449–455

Head Matter:
Burrell Oates v. The State.
No. 3564.
Decided May 15, 1907.
1. —Murder in First Degree—Indictment—Bobbery.
In a prosecution for murder in the perpetration of robbery, it is not necessary that the indictment charge who was robbed or how or what he was being robbed of.
2. —Same—Evidence—Appearance of Prosecutrix—Identification—Opinion of Witness.
Where upon trial for murder a witness for the defense testified that the prosecutrix and principal State’s witness failed to identify the defendant as being one of the parties at the killing of her husband the day following the homicide, the State should not have been permitted on cross-examination to show that the prosecutrix at this time was nervous, weak and crying, and had to be assisted up and down the stairs by officers at the jail.
3. —Same—Declaration of Third Parties—Immaterial Testimony.
Upon trial for murder, the acts and declarations of other parties in the presence of defendant with reference to one of them shooting a pistol sometime before the homicide, and which had no direct connection with the same were inadmissible in evidence.
i.—Same—Charge of Court—Accomplice—Corroboration—Beasonable Doubt.
Upon trial for murder, a charge of the court that a conviction could not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the jury first believed the accomplice’s evidence was true, and that it showed or tended to show that the defendant was guilty; and that then the jury could not convict unless the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, etc., was reversible error. The facts must do more than tend to show guilt; they must be cogent enough to overcome the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt.
5. —Same—Murder Committed in Perpretation of Bobbery—Malice.
Upon trial for murder, it was reversible error to charge the jury that if any person in the perpetration or in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery upon another shall take the life of such other he shall be deemed guilty of. murder, and murder committed under such circumstances is murder in the first degree, as it authorized a conviction in the absence of malice.
6. —Same—Charge of Court—Principal—Erroneous Theory.
Where upon trial for murder, the evidence showed that another fired the fatal shot that killed deceased and that the defendant was present, a charge which instructed the jury that if the defendant alone or acting with another, while engaged in the perpetration of robbery did with malice aforethought kill deceased, to convict him of murder in the first degree was reversible error, and did not correctly apply the law of principals to the facts in the case.
7. —Same—Form of Verdict—Practice.
Upon trial for murder, where the evidence showed that the defendant did not fire the fatal shot and there was evidence that the prosecutrix or a codefendant fired the same, and the court undertook in his instructions to the jury to prescribe a form of verdict for murder in the first degree only, and omitted to give any form of verdict for a minor offense or that of acquittal, there was reversible error.
8.—Same—Charge of Court—Robbery—Harmless Error.
See opinion for charge of court defining the penalty for robbery by the use of fire arms which was held to be harmless error.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Dallas. Tried below before the Hon. E. B. Muse.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree; penalty, death. .
The -opinion states the ease.
A. 8. Baslcett, for appellant.
On question of indictment: Wilkins v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 525; Crews v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 533; Hedrick v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 532. On question of charge of murder in perpetration of robbery: Small v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa., 304; Mann v. State, 11 Law Rep., Ann., 656; Lane v. State, 85 Ala., 11; Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S., 396; Wharton on Homicide, 3rd ed., sec. 103, p. 142. On question of charge on principals: Red v. State, 47 S. W. Rep., 1003; Leslie v. State, 57 S. W. Rep., 659. On question of form of verdict: Williams v. State, 7 S. W. Rep., 333.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attornej'-Oeneral, for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted for murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death.
This is the third appeal of this case, the former appeals being reported in 12 Texas Ct. Rep., 921, and 16 Texas Ct. Rep., 493.
Appellant's first bill of exceptions is to the refusal of the court to quash the indictment. There are two counts in same, one charging murder by express malice, and the other in the perpetration of rob-. bery. The case was submitted to the jury upon the second count. Appellant's objection is that it does not charge who was robbed, or how or what he was being robbed of. The indictment is in the form laid down by White in his Annotated Penal Code. See section 1254; and said form is supported by all" the authorities of this court. See Wilkins v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 525; Crews v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 533, and Hedrick v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 532. In the latter case the question is reviewed at some length, and all of appellant's insistences discussed.
Appellant's second bill of exceptions is to the action of the court in permitting the State, over appellant's objection, to prove that Mrs. Aronoff was excited when appellant was brought before her. In the trial of the ease appellant took the position that when defendant was first presented to her she did not recognize him. The State to account for her conduct offered proof to show her weak and prostrated condition, and that she was not able to stand up and had to 'be assisted by others. The testimony of the State was a rebuttal of the proper deduction to be drawn by appellant from a failure to recognize the defendant in the first instance.
Appellant objected to the following charge of the court: "If any person in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery upon another shall take the life of such other, he shall be deemed guilty of murder, and murder committed under such circumstances is murder in the first degree," the objection to said charge being that the same was not the law, because it makes all killing under such circumstances murder without regard to whether such killing was upon malice or not. This proposition has been settled against appellant by a long line of authorities above cited, and also by the following authorities: Walker v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 245; Lucas v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 79; Smith v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 14; King v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 228, and numerous other authorities. The charge of the court defines malice, malice aforethought and murder in the first degree.
Appellant further complains that the court erred in telling the jury the penalty for robbery by the use of firearms. It was not necessary for the court to do this in his charge, but it certainly could not be any reversible error to do so since appellant was not being tried for robbery but for murder in the perpetration of robbery. The evidence in this case conclusively establishes appellant's guilt. For collation of same see previous opinions of this court on this case above cited. It shows a cruel, wanton and reckless killing and a dastardly effort to rob a helpless man who was pursuing the peaceful vocation of running a store in the City of Dallas.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.