Case Name: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jody Jurl Darden, Petitioner
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1983-06-02
Citations: 99 Wash. 2d 675
Docket Number: No. 48284-5
Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jody Jurl Darden, Petitioner.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 99
Pages: 675–684

Head Matter:
[No. 48284-5.
En Banc.
June 2, 1983.]
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jody Jurl Darden, Petitioner.
A. J. Meyers (of Kane & Meyers), for petitioner.
Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Deputy, for respondent.
David R. Wohl and Raymond H. Thoenig on behalf of Washington Appellate Defender Association, amici curiae for petitioner.

Opinion:
Stafford, J.
Petitioner Jody Darden appeals convictions on three counts of first degree robbery. In so doing petitioner urges the application of former CrR 3.3 as interpreted by State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980).
Petitioner was arrested after an investigation of a num ber of armed robberies. He gave a statement to police and was held by the Department of Youth Services in Seattle for 4 days. During that time he was required to appear in a lineup and his automobile was searched. He was released from custody on October 2, 1979.
On December 28, 1979, 92 days after petitioner's arrest, the prosecutor filed a complaint against him in King County District Court. Arraignment occurred January 25, 1980, 120 days after arrest. On February 4, 1980, 130 days after his arrest, a preliminary hearing in district court resulted in an order binding petitioner over to superior court on robbery charges.
In superior court, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for violation of former CrR 3.3(b). The trial court found no violation of CrR 3.3(b) because a superior court trial date had been set within 60 days after the bindover. Subsequently, petitioner stipulated to the truth of police reports and was found guilty on three counts of first degree robbery.
Six months later, this court decided State v. Edwards, supra, in which we concluded that a preliminary hearing held pursuant to JCrR 2.03 must occur within 100 days of arrest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment holding that Edwards should not be applied retroactively. We reverse the Court of Appeals and set aside petitioner's convictions.
The Court of Appeals first recognized, in State v. Scha- piro, 28 Wn. App. 860, 626 P.2d 546 (1981), that "the rule announced in [Edwards] seems to be nothing more than an interpretation of an existing rule, the former CrR 3.3." Schapiro, at 864. Six months later, the Court of Appeals abandoned its holding in Schapiro, labeling it as mere dictum. See State v. Darden, 30 Wn. App. 460, 635 P.2d 760 (1981) ; State v. Schmidt, 30 Wn. App. 887, 639 P.2d 754 (1982) ; State v. Kray, 31 Wn. App. 388, 641 P.2d 1210 (1982).
Beginning with its opinion in Darden, the Court of Appeals adhered to the mistaken belief that our decision in Edwards announced a new, unanticipated procedural rule which, under traditional principles of retroactivity, could only be applied prospectively. Over the vigorous dissents of Judge Ringold in Darden and Schmidt and Judge James in Kray, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Edwards could not have been foreseen and that as a "complete break" with previous law, it would be manifestly unfair to apply the "new" Edwards rule to cases tried before the rule was adopted. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969); State v. Barton, 93 Wn.2d 615, 611 P.2d 789 (1980).
Had our decision in Edwards been the equivalent of a "new" procedural rule, a traditional retroactivity analysis might be appropriate; however, the Court of Appeals in Darden misconstrued Edwards. State v. Edwards, supra, is nothing more than the interpretation of an existing rule. We did not announce a new rule; we merely put an end to a prosecutorial practice which had evolved into an abuse of the existing rule.
Moreover, our decision in Edwards cannot be said to have been unforeseeable. The State knew the rule protecting an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial must be strictly enforced. State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 600 P.2d 1009 (1979).
All we did in Edwards was to declare the meaning of former CrR 3.3(b). "Judicial declaration of the meaning of an existing court rule is not promulgation of a new procedural rule. It is judicial clarification of what the rule has meant since its enactment." State v. Kray, supra at 392 (James, J., dissenting).
We have long adhered to the principle that when the highest appellate court construes a statute, that construction must be read into the statute as if it had been enacted that way originally.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that once a statute has been construed by the highest court of the state, that construction operates as if it were originally written into it. In other words, there is no "retroactive" effect of the court's construction of a statute; rather, once the court has determined the meaning, that is what the statute has meant since its enactment.
(Citations omitted.) Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 922, 927-28, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976). Rules of court should generally be construed in the same manner. State v. McIntyre, supra.
As a result of our decision in Edwards, former CrR 3.3(b) means the State was not permitted to delay a trial by using the preliminary hearing as the "triggering event." The trial must have taken place within 100 days of arrest or the preliminary hearing, but the preliminary hearing cannot be used as the "triggering event" unless it is held within that 100 days. Since no trial or preliminary hearing occurred within 100 days of Darden's arrest, the State violated former CrR 3.3(b).
We are not unaware of the possible harsh result wrought by this analysis. Nevertheless, former CrR 3.3(b) means just what Edwards says it means. Since the speedy trial objection, based on former CrR 3.3(b), was actually raised before trial and was renewed on appeal, the Edwards interpretation should relate back to the original adoption of former CrR 3.3(b). The conviction should be reversed and the charges against Darden dismissed.
It should be noted that appellant Darden raised the issue herein prior to trial, on appeal and again in his petition for review filed with this court. Since these were the limited procedural facts before us on review and because former CrR 3.3(b) is not a rule of constitutional magnitude, State v. White, 94 Wn.2d 498, 501, 617 P.2d 998 (1980), several questions must be left open for future consideration. Although Edwards clearly applies within the factual parameters of the instant case, we reserve judgment at this time as to whether Edwards will be applicable if the issue was not raised before the trial court, if the issue although raised was not perfected on appeal, if an appeal raising the issue was unsuccessful and a petition for review was not filed in this court and finally whether a personal restraint petition will be considered in light of the nonconstitutional magnitude of CrR 3.3. See In re James, 96 Wn.2d 847, 854-57, 640 P.2d 18 (1982); In re Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 204-05, 622 P.2d 360 (1980). See also In re Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 826-27, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982).
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
Williams, C.J., and Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, and Pearson, JJ., concur.
The applicable version of CrR 3.3(b), in effect from November 1978 to August 1,1980, read in pertinent part:
"(1) The time limits set forth in subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) shall commence to run from the date: (a) of the order binding the defendant over to the superior court following a preliminary hearing pursuant to JCrR 2.03 or (b) of the tenth day following the defendant's arrest in the event a preliminary hearing is not held or the charge is initially filed in the superior court.
"(2) A defendant unable to obtain pretrial release from custody shall be brought to trial within 60 days of the applicable event set forth in subsection (b)(1).
" (3) A defendant who is released from custody shall be brought to trial within 90 days of the applicable event set forth in subsection (b)(1)."
It appears the Court of Appeals has now recognized its error. In the most recent decision to address the applicability of State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980), the Court of Appeals reverted to the position originally taken in State v. Schapiro, 28 Wn. App. 860, 626 P.2d 546 (1981). State v. Jordan, 32 Wn. App. 215, 646 P.2d 781 (1982).
The Court of Appeals was correct in stating that a newly adopted procedural rule has prospective application only. State v. Barton, 93 Wn.2d 615, 611 P.2d 789 (1980). The Court of Appeals erred, however, in characterizing the Edwards decision as a new procedural rule.
It should be noted, however, that while former CrR 3.3(b) is based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the rule itself is not of constitutional magnitude. See State v. White, 94 Wn.2d 498, 617 P.2d 998 (1980).