Case Name: MILLER v. WEAVER
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1915-12-14
Citations: 78 Or. 594
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILLER v. WEAVER.
Judges: Mr. Justice Bean concurs.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 594–611

Head Matter:
Argued October 28,
affirmed December 14, 1915,
rehearing denied January 18, 1916.
MILLER v. WEAVER.
(153 Pac. 465.)
Brokers—Contract to Compensate Loan Brokers for Procuring Loan.
1. Plaintiffs and defendant executed an agreement in writing wherein plaintiffs were to procure a loan of $5,500 for term of 5 years, with an option of paying $1,000 per year, or the whole amount in 3 years, at 8 per cent secured by first mortgage on the farm owned by defendant, for which defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs $220, and further agreed that if for any reason defendant was unable or unwilling to close said loan, he agreed to pay the said $220 to plaintiffs for their services. Plaintiffs promptly procured the loan and performed all the conditions of such agreement, and defendant refused to execute tbe mortgage as agreed, aud plaintiffs thereupon brought this action to recover the $220 agreed on as their compensation. Defendant alleged in his answer that the contract was to- become void in case the mortgagee should refuse to cancel his mortgage, in order that a first lien could be given on the land; that said mortgagee refused to release his lien, and plaintiffs were promptly notified of such fact. In view of the record that no testimony was offered tending to show the legal delivery of sueh agreements to plaintiffs, or facts from which a valid possession of the contract could be inferred, held that the verdiet of the jury in favor of defendant and the judgment rendered thereon would not be disturbed. (Citing Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corporation, 75 Or. 588 [147 Pac. 756].)
[As to effect of retention by principal of benefit of loan procured by agent without authority, see note in Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1115.]
From Union: John W. Knowles, Judge.
In Banc.
Statement by Me. Chief Justice Mooee.
This is an action by Wm. Miller and A. C. Miller, doing business under tbe firm name and style of Wm. Miller & Bro., against J. R. Weaver to recover money. Tbe facts are that tbe defendant purchased from H. Towner a farm near Elgin, Oregon, tbe title to wbicb was encumbered by a mortgage of $2,000 in favor of tbe state land board. Weaver, to evidence a part of tbe purchase price, executed to tbe vendor a mortgage of tbe premises for $5,500, with interest, wbicb amount matured in the fall of 1911. Towner at that time demanded payment, whereupon Weaver applied to tbe plaintiffs, who represented a loan company, to obtain for him a loan, but they were then unable to secure any money, and tbe defendant was granted another year in wbicb to pay tbe debt. At tbe expiration of tbe extension Towner again required payment, whereupon Weaver once more applied to the plaintiffs to accommodate him, and subscribed bis name to a writing, which reads:
“This is to certify that I, J. R. Weaver, tbe undersigned, of Elgin, Union County, Oregon, do hereby appoint Wm. Miller & Bro., of La Grande, Oregon, my agents to procure for me a loan of fifty-five hundred dollars for the term of five years, with the privilege of paying $1,000 per year, or the whole amount in three years, at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, said interest to be paid annually; said loan to be secured by first mortgage upon the following described real estate: * * 198 acres. And I hereby agree to pay to said Wm. Miller & Bro. the sum of two hundred and twenty dollars for their services in procuring said loan, and for examining said described property and the title thereto, and for making out the necessary papers, documents, and mortgage; said two hundred and twenty dollars to be payable on demand, and when so paid by me to be payment in full for all services rendered to me in said matter by said Wm. Miller & Bro. And I hereby authorize the said Wm. Miller & Bro. to procure at my expense an abstract of title to said property, and have the same passed upon by their attorney at law, and if upon examination the title to said property is found to be unsatisfactory to said attorney at law, or for any other reason I am unable or unwilling to consummate said loan, I agree to pay to said Wm. Miller & Bro. the sum of two hundred and twenty dollars to compensate them for services rendered in said negotiations; the last-named amount to be paid by me in lieu of said first-named amount.
“Dated at La Grande, Oregon, this 1st day of November, 1912.
“J. R. Weaver.”
The defendant on December 19, 1912, executed to Mrs. Rachel C. McKinnis a mortgage of his farm, and obtained from her money with which the prior mortgages were discharged.
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the plaintiffs, William Miller and A. C. Miller, at all the times stated were and are partners as Wm. Miller & Bro.; that in consideration of the acceptance of such agency the defendant made, executed and delivered to them the writing mentioned; that they promptly procured for him the loan solicited, examined his farm, accepted the security offered as adequate for the money desired, and performed all the terms specified, except such as were excused by the defendant’s refusal to keep his engagement, and they have been at all times ready, able and willing to consummate the loan, but the defendant failed to perform his- part, whereby they are entitled to $220 for which sum judgment is demanded.
The answer admits the signing of the writing, but denies all other averments of the complaint. For a further defense it is alleged, in effect, that the defendant subscribed his name to the instrument pursuant to negotiations to obtain a loan upon his farm upon which H. Towner held a mortgage; that unless such encumbrance was canceled a first lien could not be given; that it was agreed the defendant should write Towner and ascertain if a release could be secured upon payment of a part of the mortgage debt, and the written instrument was to become effective only upon his consent to that proposition, without which assent it was agreed the writing was to be void; that defendant immediately wrote such mortgagee, who, replying, refused to release his lien, of which- fact the plaintiffs were promptly notified. A motion to make the answer more definite by averring whether or not the alleged agreement whereby the instrument remained inoperative was in writing was denied. A demurrer to the new matter in the answer on the ground that such averments did not constitute a defense was overruled, whereupon a reply was filed controverting the allegations of such new matter. Based on these issues, the cause was tried, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the defendant, and. the plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed. Rehearing Denied,
For appellant there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Charles A. Small.
There was no brief or appearance for the respondent in this court.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Moore.
It is contended that errors were committed in denying the motion and in overruling the demurrer. It is also insisted that the court erred in receiving, over objection and exception, certain testimony, and in giving and refusing instructions, to which rulings exceptions were taken. These alleged assignments may all be considered under some of the instructions referred to. Thus the plaintiffs' counsel requested the court to charge as follows:
"Gentlemen of the jury, I instruct you that, if you find that defendant delivered to plaintiffs the instrument signed by the defendant, a copy of which is annexed to plaintiffs' complaint, and refused to comply with the terms thereof, and if plaintiffs performed their part of the agreement, you will find for the plaintiffs."
This language was given, with the following addition :
"Unless you find that plaintiffs and defendant entered into the oral agreement hereafter referred to."
Without request the jury were further charged as follows:
"I instruct you that, if you believe there was a parol agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant that the written instrument introduced in evidence, signed by the defendant, was not to become effective as a contract between plaintiffs and defendant unless one H. Towner should give his consent to defendant giving first mortgage security to plaintiffs as security for a loan to be procured from plaintiffs, tbe said H. Towner agreeing to accept partial payment of tbe moneys due him, and take a second mortgage for tbe balance, and tbat Towner refused sucb consent, then you shall find for tbe defendant. ' '
No brief has been filed by tbe defendant, nor did be appear in any manner in tbis court. It appears from an examination of a transcript of tbe testimony tbat tbe cause was tried upon tbe issue as to whether or not tbe writing was delivered. Tbis theory is evidenced by tbe requested instruction hereinbefore quoted. Tbe plaintiffs' counsel, referring to tbe written instrument, inquired of bis chent, William Miller:
"Did Mr. Weaver band it over to you?"
Tbe witness answered:
"I don't know tbat be banded it to me; it was signed on tbe desk in my presence; was picked up off tbe desk by me and folded and put away."
No testimony was offered tending to show tbat tbe writing, after it was signed, was left upon tbe desk or elsewhere by tbe defendant with tbe intention tbat it should be taken by tbe plaintiffs, so as to have irrevocably passed beyond bis control: Allen v. Ayer, 26 Or. 589 (39 Pac. 1); Hoffmire v. Martin, 29 Or. 240 (45 Pac. 754); Payne v. Hallgarth, 33 Or. 430 (54 Pac. 162). Tbe plaintiffs' possession of tbe instrument would undoubtedly have raised a disputable presumption, in tbe absence of any other evidence, that tbe writing bad been duly delivered: Flint v. Phipps, 16 Or. 437 (19 Pac. 543); Swank v. Swank, 37 Or. 439 (61 Pac. 846); Pierson v. Fisher, 48 Or. 223 (85 Pac. 621); State v. Leonard, 73 Or. 451 (144 Pac. 113, 681).
Though tbe grantee's possession of a deed, duly executed, affords prima facie evidence of its delivery, thereby imposing upon the grantor the burden of disproving an intentional surrender of the sealed instrument, parol evidence is admissible to rebut such presumption by showing that the writing was never delivered: Devlin, Deeds, § 294, 295. Instead of relying upon the deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from the mere possession of the writing, the plaintiffs' counsel, as it will be remembered, undertook to supplement the presumption by interrogating his client in respect to the manner in which he secured custody of the instrument, without attempting to prove its legal delivery or to show any facts from which a valid possession of the writing could reasonably have been inferred. By this means the prima facie evidence of a delivery was overthrown, and, as there was no other testimony offered upon this subject, the material issue that the defendant "made, executed and delivered to said plaintiffs an instrument in writing.' ' as alleged in the complaint and denied by the answer was not established in the plaintiffs ' favor. If William Miller had testified that the defendant, after signing the writing, left it on the desk for the witness, delivery could have been inferred. In order to supplement the presumption adverted to, it must be inferred, from the testimony so quoted, that the writing was left on the desk for the witness, and from such deduction an intention to deliver must also be inferred. This would be founding an inference on an inference, which mode of proof is prohibited: Sections 794, 796, L. O. L.; State v. Hembree, 54 Or. 463 (103 Pac. 1008); State v. Lem Woon, 57 Or. 482 (107 Pac. 974, 112 Pac. 427); Lintner v. Wiles, 70 Or. 362 (141 Pac. 871). It will thus be seen that such presumption was destroyed by the additional testimony. The verdict and judgment may securely rest upon the plaintiffs' failure to prove a material averment, which disputed fact it was incumbent upon them to establish.
The requested instruction was predicated upon the hypothesis of a delivery of the writing, and the language so employed should have been given without the added clause mentioned. If it can be assumed from the part of the quoted charge given by the court of its own motion that the instrument was in fact delivered, it would necessarily follow that the written obligation became absolute. Such being the case, the extrinsic parol agreement alleged in the answer, providing for a qualification of the writing, was a condition subsequent which did not constitute a defense to the action, and errors were committed as alleged: Section 713, L. O. L.; Wigmore, Ev., § 2435, note 3. But, however this may be, as the certificate of the trial judge shows that there were attached and made a part of the bill of exceptions copies of the entire testimony, the instructions to the jury, exhibits and all other material matters, a careful consideration thereof leads to the conclusion that substantial justice has been administered, notwithstanding any supposed errors: Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 75 Or. 588 (147 Pac. 756).
It follows that the judgment should be affirmed; and it is so ordered.
Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.
Mr. Justice Bean concurs.
Mr. Justice Benson and Mr. Justice McBride concur in the result.