Case Name: PEOPLE v. MACK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-09-15
Citations: 100 Mich. App. 45
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-3703
Parties: PEOPLE v MACK
Judges: Before: Bashara, P.J., and D. C. Riley and E. A. Quinnell, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 100
Pages: 45–51

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MACK
Docket No. 78-3703.
Submitted June 12, 1980, at Detroit.
Decided September 15, 1980.
Leave to appeal denied, 410 Mich 875.
George E. Mack was convicted of first-degree felony murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Keith J. Leenhouts, J. He appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of the home in which he was staying. Held:
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched and, thus, has standing to challenge the search. The trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of the premises.
Reversed and remanded.
Bashara, P.J., dissented. He would hold that the trial court’s ruling that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place of the search was not clearly erroneous. The defendant failed to establish that he had a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises in that he had no property rights in them, did not exercise exclusive control over them, and did not take normal precautions to maintain his privacy. He would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Searches and Seizures — Standing to Challenge Searches — Legitimate Expectation of Privacy — Criminal Law.
A defendant in a criminal case may challenge a search only if he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area.
Dissent by Bashara, P.J.
2. Privacy — Legitimate Expectation — Source of Expectation — Criminal Law.
A legitimate expectation of privacy by definition means more iban a subjective expectation of not being discovered and must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment for legitima tion, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society, such as the right to exclude others; but such an interest may be insufficient to establish the expectation with respect to particular items located on or activity conducted upon a premises.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 2, 4,16 et seq.
3. Privacy — Legitimate Expectation — Criminal Law.
The reasonableness of an asserted expectation of privacy in challenging a search should be determined by considering whether the person invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment took normal precautions to maintain his privacy, the way in which he used the location, including whether he exercised exclusive control over the searched premises, whether the framers of the Fourth Amendment considered such a search an unjustifiable intrusion, and whether his property rights, as recognized generally in society, give him the right to act as he wishes in certain premises.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Dianne M. Odrobina, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John C. Mouradian, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bashara, P.J., and D. C. Riley and E. A. Quinnell, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. C. Riley, J.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Defendant appeals as of right, alleging two errors, one of which we hold requires reversal.
Defendant correctly argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of the home where he was staying. Although the search was conceded to be improper, the trial court ruled that defendant was without sufficient proprietary or possessory interest in the home to have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule.
At the evidentiary hearing, testimony revealed that the house belonged to defendant's mother and was occupied by his cousin. Defendant was not present when the search took place, but he had been living there for approximately two weeks. Although defendant maintained another address where he received his mail, he had some of his clothing at his mother's home and was free to come and go as he pleased.
In Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128; 99 S Ct 421; 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court established a test for determining standing to dispute a search and seizure. A defendant may challenge a search only if he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area.
In the instant case, defendant had an expectation of privacy in his mother's house. We believe that this expectation was reasonable, based on his having lived there for approximately two weeks, his keeping some clothes there, and his cousin's full acceptance of his freedom to come and go at will.
In People v Mason, 22 Mich App 595; 178 NW2d 181 (1970), this Court found, on nearly identical facts, that the defendant had standing to dispute the contested search. Although that case was de cided under the "legitimately on the premises" test of Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960), repudiated by United States v Salvucci, — US —; 100 S Ct 2547; 65 L Ed 2d 619 (1980), we believe that it, like this case, would have the identical result under the Rakas "legitimate expectation of privacy test". The instant court erred, therefore, in its denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.
E. A. Quinnell, J., concurred.
This new concept of standing has been explained further in United States v Salvucci, — US —; 100 S Ct 2547; 65 L Ed 2d 619 (1980), Rawlings v Kentucky, — US —; 100 S Ct 2556; 65 L Ed 2d 633 (1980). It replaces the earlier standard enunciated in Jones v United States, 362 US 257, 267; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960), "that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him".