Case Name: Cecil F. TAYLOR v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1974-12-23
Citations: 306 So. 2d 638
Docket Number: No. 47743
Parties: Cecil F. TAYLOR v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: GILLESPIE, C. J., and PATTERSON, SMITH and BROOM, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 306
Pages: 638–656

Head Matter:
Cecil F. TAYLOR v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 47743.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 23, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1975.
Davey L. Tucker, Jackson, for appellant.
Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTSON, Justice:
Cecil F. Taylor brought suit against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, to recover $10,000, the full amount of the coverage on a house that had burned. Taylor claimed that he was the sole owner of the house, that it was a total loss, and that in addition to the $10,000 coverage he was entitled to recover $390 loss of rent and $5,000 punitive damages.
Fireman's Fund pleaded as an affirmative defense the failure of Mr. Taylor to comply with these provisions of the insurance policy:
"This entire policy shall he void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in the case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
"[W]ithin sixty days after the loss, unless such time is extended in writing by this Company, the insured shall render to this Company a proof of loss, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the knowledge and belief of the insured as to the following: the time and origin of the loss, the interest of the insured and of all others in the property, the actual cash value of each item thereof and the amount of loss thereto, all encumbrances thereon, all other contracts of insurance, whether valid or not, covering any of said property, any changes in the title, use, occupation, location, possession or exposures of said property since the issuing of this policy, by whom and for what purpose any building herein described and the several' parts thereof were occupied at the time of loss The insured, as often as may he reasonably required, shall exhibit to any person designated by this Company all that remains of any property herein described, ' and submit .to examinations under oath by any person named by this Company, and subscribe the same; . " (Emphasis added).
When both sides rested, the defendant moved for a peremptory instruction, and the court sustained defendant's motion.
Appellant assigns as error:
1. The granting of the peremptory instruction.
2. The failure of the trial court to find that appellee was estopped by its conduct from denying liability.
3. The use of the examination under oath to void the policy.
4. The admitting into evidence of Ap-pellee's answers to appellant's interrogatories.
Cecil F. Taylor testified that on April 25, 1972, he called Matthew W. Thomas, Jr., of the Statewide General Insurance Agency, and said:
"Well, I told Mr. Thomas — I called him and told him I'd just bought a house on Barrett Street, 1840 Barrett, and I would like to get some insurance on it. And he asked me how much did I want on it, and I told him $10,000 because that's what I'd paid for it, you know, and I wanted something to cover the amount I'd paid for it. So I give him' the address and he said he would check it and get back with me. So then he called me and told me what the insurance would be, and I paid him the premium, or part of the premium, and he sent me the policy." (Emphasis added).
The policy issued in accordance with Taylor's request shows "Mr. Cecil Taylor, 1840 Barrett Street, Jackson, Mississippi" as the sole insured. The amount of insurance against fire shown in the policy was $10,000.
The Warranty Deed dated May 6, 1972, and recorded on May 10, 1972, recited that the property was conveyed to "MAUDE L. TAYLOR, A SINGLE WOMAN, AND CECIL F. TAYLOR, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common,".
Cecil Taylor testified at the trial that he went all through the house on May 13, 1972. The house was completely destroyed by fire about 3:00 A.M. May IS, 1972. Taylor testified at the trial that he contacted his insurance agent, Thomas, and Thomas had R. L. Hewitt of the General Adjustment Bureau get in touch with appellant. Taylor testified that after the fire he went through the house and that the kitchen was almost burned off from the rest of the house.
Taylor, on May 23, 1972, signed a Non-Waiver Agreement, which recited:
"IT IS AGREED that any action taken by the insurance company, or companies, signing this agreement in ascertaining the amount of the actual cash value; and the amount of the loss and damage which occurred May 14, 1972, to Dwelling located at 1840 Barrett Street, Jackson, Mississippi and in investigating the cause thereof, shall not waive or invalidate any of the conditions of the policies of insurance, and shall not waive or invalidate any rights whatever of any party to this agreement.
"NOTICE, is hereby given and accepted, and it is hereby mutually understood and agreed, that no representative of any insurance company signing this agreement has poiver or authority to waive any of the conditions of their respective policies, itnless such waiver he specifically made in writing.
"THE SOLE OBJECT AND INTENT of this agreement is to provide for the determination of the amount of the actual case value and the amount of the loss and damage, and an investigation of the cause thereof, without regard to the liability of said insurance companies, and to preserve all the rights of the insurance company, or companies, and the insured." (Emphasis added).
Taylor testified that Hewitt advised him that he had found from the Land Records that Cecil Taylor only owned a 1/2 interest in the property at 1840 Barrett Street, and that Fireman's Fund could not pay him over $5,000 as a part owner. Taylor testified that he refused to accept that amount and demanded $10,000, the full amount of the policy.
Appellant testified that the appellee gave him notice of a hearing to be held in accordance with the terms of the policy, and that such hearing was held on August 18 and 21, 1972. Taylor was placed under oath and questions and answers were reduced to writing and subscribed to by Taylor before his attorney, Davey L. Tucker, on August 28, 1972.
At the close of the direct examination of Taylor at the trial in lieu of cross-examination, appellee offered as an exhibit the written transcript of the hearings on August 18 and 21, 1972, and the entire transcript was admitted into evidence.
The transcript recites in part:
Q Who is Maude L. Taylor?
A That's my aunt.
Q Why was she named as one of the grantees in this deed ?
A Well, the reason why is we do a lot
BY MR. TUCKER: Joint venture.
A —of joint venture and—
(Discussion off the record)
Q Now, why was she named as one of the grantees?
A Well, as I stated, we do joint venturing on various pieces of property. We buy and trade, you know, together sometime, property.
Q How much did she pay on the purchase price?
A How much did she pay on the purchase price?
Q Uh huh.
A Not anything at all.
Q I understand you to say that she advanced the $9,500.00 that you sent to Mr. Jefferson?
A Yeah, I said I borrowed it from her.
Q Then she paid nothing on the purchase price?-
A No. I just — This is a transaction that — In other words, well, maybe I can explain it to you better. On various pieces of property if I think she can transact it for me a little better than I can then I use her, you know. And if 1 can transact some better for her, then she uses me. So that's the way we do.
Q Well, on this deed you put both names on the deed.
A Right, because I had her transacting the property with me, also.
Q Have you repaid her the $9,500.00 you borrowed?
BY THE WITNESS: Should I answer that?
BY MR. TUCKER: Yeah.
A No, I haven't paid her all of it.
Q Have you paid her any of it?
A Yes.
Q How much?
A $4,000.00 on it, I believe.
Q Did you sign a note to her for the $9,500.00?
A Yes. I signed a check.
Q A check ?
A Right.
Q On what Bank?
A On the First National Bank.
Q In Jackson?
A Right.
Q And she holds that check ?
A That's correct.
Q Has she deposited that check ?
A No.
Q Did you have an account in the First National Bank in Jackson when you signed that check?
A Yes.
Q Did you havé that much money in it?
A At the time I signed the check ?
Q Yes.
A No.
Q Have you had that much in it since ?
BY MR. TUCKER: Don't answer.
A I refuse to answer.
Q Do you have that much in it now?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that, also.
Q How did you pay the $4,000.00 thfit you say you have repaid Maude L. Taylor?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that.
Q Now, the property in question was damaged by fire May 14, 1972, is that correct ?
A I believe so, right.
Q On or about May 25, 1972, Mr. R. L. Hewitt of General Adjustment Bureau discussed this fire loss with you, did he not?
A That's correct.
Q At that time you told him that Maude L. Taylor was your aunt and that she then owned a fifty-fifty interest in the house, did you not ?
A I believe I might have made the statement to him that way.
Q Well, don't you know that you did?
A I don't recall. It has been such a pretty good while since we've been prolonging with this situation, I don't recall exactly whether I made the statement to him.
Q Do you deny making that statement to him?
A I don't deny it. I don't recall exactly how I made it.
Q Again on July 7, 1972, Mr. Hewitt came and talked to you about this thing again, didn't he?
A I don't remember the exact date but he came back and talked to me.
Q In July?
A I don't recall the date. I don't.
Q About a month ago ?
A That I talked to him ?
Q Yes.
A I tried to correspond with him on the telephone several times back at the office, but I don't recall what date it was and I don't recall what date it was I talked to him on the phone.
Q Well, on or about July 7, I want to ask you if you didn't tell Mr. Hewitt, again, that you and Maude L. Taylor owned the property fifty-fifty?
A I don't recall telling him that. I might have. As I've stated my deeds will show that when I told you there was a lot of transaction that we do, and if there was a question about why was her name on there, then I might have said it. I'm not sure, you know, the way I said it to him.
Q On neither of those occasions did you tell Mr. Hewitt anything about a deed from Maude L. Taylor to you, did you?
A No, he didn't ask me.
Q He was asking you who owned the property and on both of those occasions you told him you and Maude L. Taylor owned it fifty-fifty; didn't you?
BY MR. TUCKER: Don't answer, Cecil.
A I refuse to answer that. I don't remember telling him that.
Q Do you have a deed from Maude L. Taylor covering this property ?
A Yes.
Q May I see that deed ?
(Mr. Tucker hands Mr. Watkins deed.)
Q Your Attorney has handed me what's entitled a "Quitclaim Deed" which purports to be dated May 8, 1972, and which purports to have been executed by Maude L. Taylor. Is this the deed from Maude L. Taylor to you?
A That is it, right.
Q Why was this deed executed P A Why was the deed executed ?
Q Uh huh.
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that question.
Q When was it executed ?
A On the date that is showed on there. Q On May 8th, 1972?
A Right.
Q Were you present?
A Yes, I was.
Q Who else was present ?
A Before my attorney and Maude L. Taylor.
Q You and Mr. Tucker and Maude L. Taylor were present?
A Right.
Q It purports to have been acknowledged by your attorney, Mr. Davey L. Tucker, on May 8, 1972. Was it acknowledged on that date ?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that.
Q What was the consideration for this quitclaim deed?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer.
Q When was this deed delivered to you, executed and acknowledged?
BY MR. TUCKER: The same date.
A The same date.
Q On May 8, 1972?
A That's right.
Q Who recorded in the office of the Chancery Clerk the Warranty Deed dated May 6, executed by James Jefferson and Sarah Jefferson?
A My attorney handles all of that for me.
Q Mr. -Tucker recorded it ?
A Right.
Q I note that the deed from James Jefferson was recorded on May 10, 1972, are you familiar with that fact ?
BY MR. TUCKER: No. You don't know the answer.
A Right.
Q Why wasn't the quitclaim deed from Maude L. Taylor recorded at the same time?
A I don't know. I leave that in my attorney's hands, you know.
Q Did you instruct your attorney to record both deeds?
A No. I didn't instruct him to do it. I'm sure that he knows what's his job to do so I didn't have to instruct him.
Q Why hasn't the quitclaim deed from Maude L. Taylor ever, been recorded?
A I don't know.
Q The truth is that it wasn't executed until July, long after the fire of May 14, 1972, isn't it?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that.
Q Will you submit you aunt, Maude L. Taylor, for examination under oath on your behalf on this matter?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that, also.
Q When were you last in the house before the fire of May 14, 1972 ?
A What date ? Let me see. I had checked by and they had moved and I'm trying to think what date was that. I don't recall what day it was. It was the day I had checked by and they had moved.
Q Was that the day before the fire ?
A No.
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer what day.
Q Was there any inflammable in the house on May 14, 1972?
A I don't recall. Not that I recall.
Q What was the cause of the fire ?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I don't know. I refuse to answer.
Q Do you know that there was evidence of an inflammable in the kitchen at the time of the fire ?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer.
Q What was your financial condition on May 14, 1972?
BY MR. TUCKER: No answer.
A I refuse to answer that.
Q May I see a copy of your 1971 income tax return?
A No.
Q You refuse to furnish that ?
(Witness nods head affirmatively.)
Q You did file a return?
A I refuse to furnish it and refuse to' answer that.
BY MR. WATKINS: I believe that's all.
The questions asked were about these material and important matters:
1. The title to the property.
2. The amount paid for the property.
3. The source of the funds used to purchase the property.
4. The consideration for the quitclaim deed.
5. The validity of the quitclaim deed.
6. The circumstances surrounding the fire which occurred twenty days after the effective date of the policy and five days after the recording of the warranty deed to Taylor and his aunt.
The insured was required to answer these questions fully and completely, to give the best information he had about these matters.
In Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Dean, 252 Miss. 69, 172 So.2d 553 (1965), the insurance policy involved contained the exact same provisions for a sworn examination of the insured before trial. In Southern, the trial court held that the policy had not been voided by the actions of the insured. This Court, in reversing, said:
"We hold that insured failed and refused to answer questions in the examination under oath on matters which were material and relevant to the insurance and the loss, and failed and refused to produce for examination written documents which were pertinent and material to the insurance and loss. Failure of insured to comply in material respects with these contractual clauses bars her recovery under the policies. Hence the decree of the chancery court is reversed, and judgment is rendered here for appellants." 252 Miss, at 72, 172 So.2d at 554.
"It is well established that such clauses in fire insurance policies are reasonable and valid, and are to be given a reasonable interpretation. If breached, the insurer would be deprived of a valuable right for which it contracted. Moreover, in an examination of the insured, all of those matters are material which have a hearing on the insurance and the loss. The insured is required to give the best information obtainable. 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 3549, 3552 (1941); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 1023, 1024 (1946)." 252 Miss, at 76, 172 So.2d at 556. (Emphasis added).
The definitive case in Mississippi on this subject is Standard Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 227 Miss. 397, 86 So.2d 298 (1956). In Anderson this Court quoted with approval from Claflin v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 110 U.S. 81, 3 S.Ct. 507, 28 L.Ed. 76 (1883):
"The object of the provisions in the policies of insurance, requiring the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the Company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to its rights, to enable it to decide upon its obligations, and to protect it against false claims. And every interrogatory that was relevant and pertinent in such an examination was material, in the sense that a true answer to it was of the substance of the obligation of the assured. . . . By that contract the companies were entitled to know from him all the circumstances of his purchase of the property insured, inchiding the amount of the price paid and in what manner payment was made; and false statements, willfully made under oath intended to conceal the truth on these points, constituted an attempted fraud by false swearing which was a breach of the conditions of the policy, and constituted a bar to the recovery of the insurance." 227 Miss. 407-408, 86 So.2d at 301-302. (Emphasis added).
"In the Claflin and Claxton cases, supra, the policyholders made false statements in the examination under oath. In the case here, Anderson deliberately revised to answer questions on matters which were material, and thus willfully concealed su,ch material facts and circumstances. The policy prohibited both concealment and misrepresentation. Consequently his concealment operated, under the provisions of the policy, to deny and defeat his right to recover under them." 227 Miss, at 409, 86 So.2d at 302. (Emphasis added).
To the same effect is Anderson v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 227 Miss. 324, 86 So.2d 303 (1956), a companion case.
In Boston Insurance Co. v. Mars, 246 Miss. 36, 148 So.2d 718 (1963), we closed our opinion with these words:
"We think that the refusal of the insureds to submit to the examination under oath was a violation of the express provisions of the insurance policy, and resulted in a forfeiture of their right to recover under the policy; and that, therefore, the appellant was entitled to the requested peremptory instruction in its favor." 246 Miss, at 43, 148 So.2d at 720.
The circuit court was correct in peremptorily instructing the jury to find for the defendant.
The appellant next contends that the appellee was estopped by its conduct from denying liability on appellant's claim. There is no merit to this contention. Also we note from the record that the appellant signed a non-waiver agreement on May 23, 1972, and this Court upheld the validity of similar non-waiver agreements in Standard Insurance Co. v. Anderson, supra, and Anderson v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., supra.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence appellee's answers to appellant's interrogatories, and by admitting into evidence the transcript of the pre-trial contractual examination under oath. Appellee's answers were properly admitted under the authority of Maness v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 271 So.2d 418 (Miss.1972) and Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company v. Tinney, 73 Miss. 726, 19 So. 662 (1896).
When the transcript of appellant's examination under oath was offered into evidence, the appellant identified the transcript and the only comment made by appellant's counsel was "No objection, Your Honor". In addition, this Court held these examinations admissible for- examination by the trial court and by this Court on appeal in Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Dean, supra; Boston Insurance Co. v. Mars, supra; Anderson v. American & Foreign Insurance Co., supra; Standard Insurance Co. v. Anderson, supra, and Claxton v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., 179 Miss. 556, 175 So. 210 (1937).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GILLESPIE, C. J., and PATTERSON, SMITH and BROOM, JJ., concur.
RODGERS, P. J., and INZER, SUGG and WALKER, JJ., dissent.