Case Name: Alfred Eldridge, Resp't, v. The Atlas Steamship Co., App'lt
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-10-01
Citations: 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: Alfred Eldridge, Resp’t, v. The Atlas Steamship Co., App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 48
Pages: 257–263

Head Matter:
Alfred Eldridge, Resp’t, v. The Atlas Steamship Co., App’lt.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed October 1, 1892.)
Master and Servant—Negligence—Seamen.
Plaintiff, a seaman on shipboard, was ordered to operate a diagonal old' fashioned steam winch which he did not observe before the vessel sailed, the wheels of which were uncovered, and in obeying orders crushed his hand. The noise caused by the machine was so great that orders could not be heard, and plaintiff was obliged to take Ms orders from motions of the officer's hand. There were two other winches of improved pattern, and with the wheels covered. Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that he had to reach over the wheels to take hold of the lever; while defendant’s-testimony was that he might have reached around. Held, that while plaintiff knew that the winch could not be operated without risk of danger to himself, he was constrained to obey the order given him by his-superior, because he knew that disobedience would result in his punishment, and the question as to whether he was guilty of negligence was for' the jury.
(Pollett, Oh. J., Haight and Parker, JJ., dissent.)
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the supreme-court, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $3,700.
Action, negligence, in that plaintiff, a sailor in the employ of defendant upon its ship, while in obedience to orders he was operating its winch, an alleged unsafe machine, had his hand caught, in the cog wheels thereof and the ends of four fingers taken off.
November 9, 1886, plaintiff at New York engaged as an able-bodied seaman to serve on board defendant’s ship, the Alvena. The defendant is a British corporation, but it was not shown under what flag the ship sailed. The plaintiff had not served upon that ship before. The ship had three winches, two horizontal, one-No. 3, diagonal. The cog wheels of the horizontal winches were covered, those of the diagonal, No. 3, were without cover. No. 3-was an old fashioned winch ; the other two of modern construc tian. Plaintiff did not observe No. 3 before he went to duty November 10th, on which day the ship sailed from New York for Kingston, Jamaica. At Kingston the ship proceeded to Aspinwall, and there was hauled alongside defendant’s ship Athos; some >of the cargo of the Athos was then transferred to the Alvena. Plaintiff was ordered to operate winch No. 3„ in transfening the ■cargo. He had to stand between the winch and the house of the ship, a space eighteen inches wide.'' He, bad to operate a valve with his right hand so as to let the steam on or shut it off as ordered by his superior, and to operate a lever with his left hand so .as to revolve the drum forward, or backward as ordered. There was so much noise that these orders were given by signals by the ■officer. Thus, the officer raised his hand as the order to go forward, moved it down to go backward, opened it wide to stop, and twirled it round fast, to go fast, etc. The officer was on the right of the front of the plaintiff. The valve to be moved by plaintiff’s left hand was about as high as his knee, and was at the end of the winch near its middle. The lever to be moved by his left hand was on the outside of the side of the winch. The plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that he had to reach over the big .and small cog wheels to take hold of the lever. The defendant’s ■testimony was to the effect that he might have reached around the winch and seized the lever without passing his hand over the cog ^wheels. The size of the winch is not given.
While watching for orders and at the same time obeying them, the plaintiff’s fingers, in grasping for the lever, came in contact with the cog wheels and were crushed. His contention is, if these wheels had been covered as the wheels of the other winches were, Iris fingers would have been protected. Defendant gave testimony fending to show that the winch was safe enough if plaintiff had been reasonably careful. The trial court charged the jury that if plaintiff entered defendant’s service knowing that this winch had no cover he could not recover upon that ground, and if his own negligence in any way contributed to bis injury he could not recover.
The court also charged that plaintiff was bound to obey all lawful orders of the defendant’s officers and for a refusal would have forfeited his wages or been punished. Testimony was given to this effect.
The court also charged that if this accident had happened on land, plaintiff not working as a sailor, he could not recover, but left it for the jury to say whether in view of the plaintiff’s duty .as a sailor he was guilty of negligence.
E. P. Wheeler, for app’lt; Jacob Fromme, for resp’t.
Affirming 33 St. Rep., Í016.

Opinion:
Landon, J.
In view of the verdict and the instructions of the -trial court, we assume that the plaintiff knew that the winch could not be operated without risk of danger to himself, but was •constrained to obey the order given him by his superior to operate it, because he knew that disobedience would result-in his punishment ; that he therefore did operate it andDbecause of its known defects of construction was injured notwithstanding his exercise of reasonable care to avoid injury.
The defendant insists that the command to operate this dangerous winch was not lawful, and therefore plaintiff might rightfully have refused obedience. If it be conceded that the command was unlawful it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff's obedience was negligence. For whether the command was lawful or unlawful,, the evidence is to the effect that his disobedience would have resulted in his punishment.
The boatswain, under whose orders plaintiff was operating the winch, testified that the plaintiff " was bound to obey the order that I gave him; if he did not obey the order he would have been put in irons and fined." Grant that the plaintiff had been so learned in the law as to know that the courts would ultimately decide that the command was unlawful, and disobedience to it lawful, he could'know no way of escape from the ship's punishment of his disobedience, for there was none. The jury found, in effect, that he was coerced through fear of punishment into obedience. If the command was unlawful the- defendant's case is not improved by the fact that the punishment it would visit upon disobedience was also unlawful. In any event the plaintiff was in a dilemma. He had to choose between present punishment with a possible hope of remote justification, and customary obedience to orders with the hope that by care he would escape injury. Grant that he made a mistake in judgment under these difficult conditions, the law does not adjudge it to be negligence,, and the jury, upon consideration, have refused to dó so. We cannot hold that their refusal was error.
Except as the case is affected by the dangerous condition of the winch the order to operate it was lawful, and the plaintiff's obedience was the duty of his service. Whatever may be the practical administration of law or of arbitrary power on shipboard, the plaintiff, if amenable to- the law of the United States, was also punishable by our courts for wilful disobedience to any lawful command. Section 4596, U. S. R. S., provides: " Whenever any seaman who has been lawfully engaged commits-any of the following offences, be shall be punishable as follows: Fourth. For wilful disobedience to any lawful command, by imprisonment for not more than two months, and, also, at the discretion of the court, by forfeiture out of his wages of not more than-four days pay."
Thus, the plaintiff had to choose whether he would obey the order, or take the hazard of liability under the statute. Whatever may have been the law of the flag of the ship, or of the-United States of Colombia, in whose port the injury was received, it was not shown, and hence the parties in our forum must accept the law as we administer it. The Scotland, 105 U. S., 24.
In this view of the case, if the plaintiff made a mistake in judgment, the defendant could rightfully ask no more than that the jury should pass upon the facts.
We find no error of law requiring a reversal
Judgment affirmed, with costs.