Case Name: Leon E. SUPAL and Cynthia Supal, Appellants, v. John Franklin PELOT and Richard E. Tuman, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-05-30
Citations: 469 So. 2d 949
Docket Number: No. 84-1566
Parties: Leon E. SUPAL and Cynthia Supal, Appellants, v. John Franklin PELOT and Richard E. Tuman, Appellees.
Judges: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, JR., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 469
Pages: 949–951

Head Matter:
Leon E. SUPAL and Cynthia Supal, Appellants, v. John Franklin PELOT and Richard E. Tuman, Appellees.
No. 84-1566.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 30, 1985.
H.B. Gedzinski, Ocala, for appellants.
John B. Walkup, Jr., of Walkup, Rowe & Cooper, Ocala, for appellees.

Opinion:
COBB, Chief Judge.
The plaintiffs below, John Franklin Pelot and Richard E. Turnan, sought to establish a public road by prescription upon land owned by the defendants, Leon and Cynthia Supal. The complaint alleged that a public road belonging to the Supals and adversely used by the general public for more than twenty years had been blocked by the Supals, and therefore plaintiffs no longer had access to "homes and people residing therein which front on said road." The plaintiffs owned no property accessible via said road.
The defendants moved to dismiss and the plaintiffs sought a temporary mandatory injunction directing the Supals to remove obstructions from the road. At hearing on these motions the Supals argue that only a political entity could bring a suit for a public prescriptive easement and thus the plaintiffs lacked standing. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on the temporary injunction. At the conclusion, the trial court granted a temporary mandatory injunction directing the Supals to remove certain obstructions from the road.
The Supals appeal, and posit one point on appeal:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs, as private individuals, had standing to bring this action to enforce their right to use a controversial public road without further finding that the plaintiffs' right to use the road is based on a special and particular injury, differing not only in degree, but also in kind, from that sustained by the community at large.
The argument on appeal is directed to the alleged error of the trial court in not dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to sufficiently allege standing. See Brooks-Garrison Hotel Corp. v. Sara Inv. Co., 61 So.2d 913 (Fla.1952). This is not an appeal to review a nonfinal order granting an injunction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B). The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a reviewable nonfinal order under 9.130, even though entered as part of the same court order granting the temporary mandatory injunction. See Chesler v. Hendler, 428 So.2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla.1983).
Accordingly, this appeal is
DISMISSED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, JR., J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.