Case Name: GILBERT v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-06-04
Citations: 215 S.W. 106
Docket Number: No. 5109
Parties: GILBERT v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 215
Pages: 106–112

Head Matter:
GILBERT v. STATE.
(No. 5109.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 4, 1919.
On Motion for Rehearing,
1. Homicide i&wkey;>169(8) — Statement by defendant AS TO PRESENCE OF DECEASED AT CHURCH SHORTLY BEFORE KILLING ADMISSIBLE.
In a prosecution for a murder, committed soon after deceased and defendant left a church, evidence that while in the church defendant said to the witness, “He is here, isn’t he?” such statement, having reference to deceased, the witness having knowledge of a previous difficulty between them and having conversed subsequently with defendant upon that subject, was admissible as circumstantial evidence showing that defendant took notice of the presence of deceased.
2.,Criminal law &wkey;1169(2) — Admission of HEARSAY EVIDENCE HARMLESS WHERE SAME EVIDENCE CAME FROM OTHERS WITHOUT OBJECTION.
In a prosecution for murder, resulting from a blow with a club, the admission of evidence that an eyewitness was asked some five minutes later, and after the assailant had run away, if he knew who struck the blow, and he stated he did, if hearsay, was not reversible error, where the same evidence came without objection from other sources, and the appellant in developing the ease made it pertinent as bearing upon the credibility of witness by trying to show that the witness had stated that the assailant was one other than defendants a reversal not being authorized by the admission of competent and relevant evidence coming out of its order.
3. Homicide <©=3170 — Witnesses <@=3318 — Evidence not inadmissible as bolstering UP TESTIMONY OE UNIMPEACHED WITNESS.
Where -witness testified that he heard a party running through a 'field on the night of the murder, subsequent evidence showing there were tracks of a person running across the .field and also describing tracks corresponding to those which would have been made by the witness claimed to have been in the field, was admissible upon the question of the identity of the slayer, and not subject to the objection that it was to bolster up the testimony of an unim-peached witness.
4. Homicide <@=3268 — Identity op stick used QUESTION POR JUEY.
In a prosecution for murder committed by striking deceased with a stick, in which the indictment described the stick with unnecessary particularity, evidence held such that the identity of the stick and its dimensions as meeting those set out in the indictment were questions for the jury.
5. Homicide <&wkey;178(2) — Rejection op offer TO PROVE DECEASED’S DEPUTATION FOB VIOLENCE NOT ERROR.
Although, where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, testimony showing the opportunity and motive of persons in such proximity to the murder as to render the fact of weight in determining the identity of the slayer, or in excluding the accused, should be received, yet, where a witness positively identified defendant as the party who struck the fatal blow, it was not error to reject defendant’s offer to prove deceased’s reputation for violence in an attempt to show that one other than accused had opportunity and motive to commit the offense.
6. Criminal law <&wkey;413(l), 419, 420(8)— Hearsay and self-serving declarations INADMISSIBLE.
In a prosecution for murder, it was not error to refuse to receive appellant’s proof that on a different occasion, and some time subsequent to that on which defendant had uttered a threat against deceased, the defendant said to a third party deceased cursing him hurt the deceased worse than defendant; such evidence being hearsay and self-serving.
7. Criminal law &wkey;419, 420(10) — Witnesses <@=5383 — Impeachment of witness upon collateral issue properly denied..
The offer of defendant to prove that one witness had told another witness that defendant’s brother, who was under arrest, was not present at the time of the homicide, was properly rejected under the rule against hearsay and against impeachment of a witness upon a i collateral issue.
On Motion for Rehearing.
8. Homicide <&wkey;142(7) — Variance between indictment and proof as to identity of WEAPON IMMATERIAL.
In a trial for murder committed with* a stick, which the indictment described with unnecessary particularity, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it was sufficient if they believed the proof showed that the stick used was substantially the same as described in the indictment, in view of the rule that proof is sufficient, if it shows that the weapon charged in the indictment and the one proved to have been used are such that the nature and result of their use would be the same.
9. Criminal law <&wkey;1174(5) — Evidence from a juror received by jury after retirement GROUND FOR REVERSAL.
In view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proe. 1916, art. 837, providing that in a felony case a new trial shall be granted, “where the jury, after having retired to deliberate upon a ease, have received other testimony,” and it appears that an injury may have resulted, where a juror discussed facts known to him concerning the place where the murder was committed, the court will not speculate upon its effect upon the the jury, but will reverse the case.
10. Criminal law <&wkey;956(13) — Sufficiency OF EVIDENCE THAT JURY RECEIVED MATERIAL EVIDENCE AFTER RETIREMENT.
In a prosecution for murder, testimony of witnesses held to show that, after the jury had! retired to deliberate upon the case, a juror made statements to them of facts stated to be of his own knowledge, not irrelevant or immaterial, and such as were testimony within the meaning of Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proe. 1916, art. 837, requiring new trial.
Appeal from District Court, Franklin County; J. A. "Ward, Judge.
Ledger Gilbert was convicted of murder, and appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Beavers & Wilkinson, of Winnsboro, for appellant.
E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
The appeal is from a conviction for murder with a penalty of five years' confinement in the penitentiary.
The deceased, Arthur Greenlee, was struck on,the head with a stick' of timber one blow which resulted in his death. The assault occurred immediately after services at the church had ended and while deceased was starting away on foot. There was evidence of a difficulty between appellant and deceased about two weeks prior to the homicide in which the deceased used insulting language toward the appellant. Subsequently, according to state's witness, appellant expressed his intention to kill the deceased and later his intention to- whip him. A witness who was acquainted with neither of the parties testified that he saw the blow struck with a stick; that the assailant passed him and hit the deceased and ran. A witness by the name of Dickens was with the deceased at the time he was killed and in his testimony on the trial identified the appellant as the assailant. The appellant denied the assault and relied on proof of alibi.
A witness who was in the church with the appellant a short time before the homi cide testified that the deceased was also in the house just in front of the witness and appellant and in full view, and that the appellant while looking at deceased said to the witness, "He is here, isn't he?'' The witness was present at the previous difficulty and had conversed with appellant upon the subject subsequently, and said that shortly before the remark complained of was made appellant had said a word or two about the deceased, though the witness disclaimed recollecting the purport of the remarks. We perceive no error in the admission of the evidence. It circumstantially appeared that the reference was to the deceased and went to show, at least, that appellant took note of the presence of the deceased.
Some five minutes after the blow was struck, and after the assailant had run away, the eyewitness Dickens was asked if he knew who struck the blow, and he replied, "Yes." Granting this to have been hearsay, we think its admission was not reversible error. The same evidence came without objection from other sources than that complained of in the bill. Moreover, the appellant in the development of his ease made it pertinent as bearing upon the credibility of the witness Dickens, in that, by cross-examination and impeachment the appellant undertook to show that the witness Dickens had claimed that the assailant of the deceased was Loyal Gilbert, the brother of the appellant, and in supporting the witness the state proved by several witnesses that Dickens had claimed soon after the homicide that he knew the assailant to be the appellant. A reversal is not authorized for the admission of competent, relevant evidence though it comes out of its order. Moore v. State, 7 Tex. App. 14; Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 297, 34 Am. Rep. 746; Hartsfield v. State, 29 S. W. 777; Knight v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 541, 144 S. W. 967.
The state introduced evidence that, shortly after the homicide, a person ran across a certain field, and one witness who testified to this fact claimed that he had gone into the field on the night of the homicide for the purpose of responding to a call of nature, and that while there he heard a party running. Subsequently, evidence was introduced showing that there were tracks of a person running across the field, and the witness in testifying to the tracks also described tracks corresponding to those which would have been made by the witness last mentioned. The admissibility of the latter fact is challenged on the ground that its receipt is obnoxious to the rule which rejects testimony the sole purpose of which is to holster the testimony of an unimpeached witness; appellant referring to Taylor v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 274, 184 S. W. 224, and Holmes v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 353, 106 S. W. 1160. The rule mentioned does not exclude cumulative evidence of a relevant fact, and in cases of this character, where the identity
of the slayer'is the main controverted issue, it is the privilege of the state to put in evidence all surrounding facts and circumstances which may bear upon the subject of inquiry. Proof of footprints found at or near the scene of the homicide, as well as the presence of all persons, were admissible, and the fact that some or all of the footprints or other objects found could be accounted for by testimony of persons claiming to have been on the ground before or after the homicide would not be valid reasons for excluding evidénce that they were found. Ruling Case Law, vol. 13, p. 106; Wharton's Grim. Ev. vol. 2, p. 1681; Michie on Homicide, p. 829; Haley v. State, 209 S. W. 676.
The witness Alexander heard the lick and went immediately to the deceased, and while there picked up a stick which he hid in a fence corner, and subsequently the same night he _ went with the witness Salford and they got the stick. He said:
"I do not know who picked it up; I think Mr. Salford. I was with him' and saw him get it. Mr. Salford and I got it that same night."
Salford testified that he went with Alexander and got the stick from the corner of the fence and delivered it to Alvin Banks; that he subsequently saw it in the hands of Tibbs, a deputy sheriff. He said that the stick exhibited to him on the trial was, in his best judgment, the same. Tibbs testified he got the stick whiéh.was exhibited to the' jury, on the night of the homicide, from Alvin Banks. He had kept it and brought it to court. The witness Alexander was not able to identify the stick introduced in evidence as the one that he picked up. The indictment described the stick used with unnecessary particularity as 3 feet 8 inches long, 3 inches wide, and 1 inch thick. The record fails to disclose that any measurements of the stick introduced in evidence were given at the trial. Alexander made an estimate of it stating that he took it to be 3 or 3y2 feet long, 2% inches wide and an inch thick. The stick exhibited to the jury was also identified by the witness Stocks, who appears to have been with Alexander at the time it was picked up. We think there was no error in admitting the stick in evidence. Its identity and its dimensions as meeting those set out in the indictment were questions for the jury. Underhill on Evidence, § 314; Wharton's Grim. Ev. p. 276; Gipe v. State, 165 Ind. 433, 75 N. E. 881, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 419, 112 Am. St. Rep. 238.
Appellant contends that the court was in error in rejecting his offer to prove 'the reputation of the deceased for violence. We are aware of no issue upon which this testimony would have been relevant. Irwin v. State,. 43 Tex. 241; Branch's An. P. O. p. 1177, and cases cited. Appellant offered proof that some 30 days prior to the homicide the deceased, at a point some six miles from the homicide, cursed a man by the name of Wooten and told him "he would cut his head off and chunk his body with it." This, as well as the .reputation of the deceased mentioned, we understand the appellant deemed relevant as tending to show that another not acting with the accused had opportunity and motive to commit the of.fense. In a proper case testimony showing such opportunity and motive of persons in such proximity to the homicide as to render the facts of any weight in determining the identity of the slayer or in excluding the accused should be received. Taylor v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 195 S. W. 1149; Wallace v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 349, 81 S. W. 966; McCorquodale v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 344, 98 S. W. 879; Ogden v. State, 58 S. W. 1018. There was no suggestion in the evidence that Wooten was present.
The case was not one in which the state relied upon circumstantial evidence alone. Evidence of the witness Dickens was sufficient to take the case out of this rule, in that he was positive in his identification of the appellant as the assailant of the deceased. He said in his direct examination:
"I was with him when he was struck. Ledger Gilbert struck him. Ledger Gilbert came up from behind us. When the lick was struck I looked around."
On cross-examination, he said:
"It is not true that I did not see the party who struck him. I did see him. The first thing that attracted my attention was the lick. I then looked around and saw the party who struck the lick. He was turning the moment I got a glimpse of him. He ran off. I saw him until ho got up to the corner of-'the church. The stick fell down and struck my hand. I swear it was Ledger Gilbert. I swear it because I saw him and looked into his face. I saw his features. I could see him as he ,was turning, and I know it was him. There was light there. I think there was light shining on his head."
We think there was no error in excluding the testimony offered.
The court was not in error in refusing to permit the appellant to prove that on a different occasion, and some time subsequent to that on which 'the appellant had uttered a threat against the deceased, he said to a third party that deceased's cursing him hurt thg deceased worse than appellant. This was properly excluded as hearsay and self-serving. Branch's An. P. O. p. 58. The appellant having introduced evidence impeaching the witness Dickens by proof of statements contradictory of his evidence upon the trial, the state was within its rights in proving the prior consistent statements which are complained of. Branch's An. Texas P. C.' p. 110.
The offer to prove that the witness Campbell had told the witness Tibbs that Loyal Gilbert, brother of appellant, who was under arrest, was not present at the time of the homicide, was properly rejected under the rule against hearsay and against impeachment of a witness upon a collateral issue. Branch's An. Texas P. O. p. 108.
We think there was no error in excluding evidence of the conversation between appellant and his brother at the church, where the homicide took place, and a short time prior thereto. Especially is this true, as the substance of the conversation, showing that the brother stated he expected to be absent and requested appellant to do certain work for him at home, was developed.
The assignments of misconduct of the jury and the misconduct of the court by causing the arrest of a witness during the trial raised questions of fact upon which the court heard evidence which we have carefully examined and deem it unnecessary to detail. Suffice it to say that in our opinion it supports the conclusion reached by the trial court that there was no new evidence given the jury in its retirement, and that the arrest of the witness was not brought to their attention in a manner or time which was harmful to the appellant.
Discovering no errors which authorize us to reverse the judgment, its affirmance is ordered.
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