Case Name: In the Matter of Michael Vetere, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Anita Vetere, an Infant, Appellant, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents; In the Matter of Lewis Hummel et al., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Sally A. Hummel and Another, Infants, Appellants, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, Respondent, and Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 12 of the Town of Hempstead, New York, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1965-03-18
Citations: 15 N.Y.2d 259
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Michael Vetere, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Anita Vetere, an Infant, Appellant, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Lewis Hummel et al., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Sally A. Hummel and Another, Infants, Appellants, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, Respondent, and Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 12 of the Town of Hempstead, New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 259–275

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Michael Vetere, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Anita Vetere, an Infant, Appellant, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Lewis Hummel et al., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Sally A. Hummel and Another, Infants, Appellants, v. James E. Allen, Jr., as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, Respondent, and Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 12 of the Town of Hempstead, New York, Appellant.
Argued November 16, 1964;
reargued February 11, 1965;
decided March 18, 1965.
Mason L. Hampton, Jr., C. William Gaylor and H. Paul King for petitioners-appellants.
I. The Commissioner exceeded his judicial powers in overruling the board’s pupil assignment plan, which he conceded was ‘ ‘ not arbitrary ’ ’ and an ‘‘ excellent example of administrative planning.” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1, Town of Ramapo, 65 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 106; Matter of Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1, Vil. of Hempstead, 70 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 108; Matter of Bell, 77 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 37; Matter of Dileo, 74 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 83; Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, N. Y., 226 F. Supp. 208.) II. The Commissioner was wholly arbitrary in acting upon the assumption, not supported by facts in the record before him, that racial “ imbalance ”, for whatever reason existing, must be eliminated. (Matter of Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein, 300 N. Y. 402; Matter of Stammer v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 287 N. Y. 359; Matter of Kilgus v. Board of Estimate of City of N. Y., 308 N. Y. 620; Matter of Macy & Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 192 Misc. 697, 275 App. Div. 665; Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 294 F. 2d 36, 368 U. S. 940; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339.) III. The Commissioner’s determination, which requires children in a certain neighborhood to leave their neighborhood school and transfer to a more distant school in order to achieve racial ‘ ‘ balance ’ ’, violates section 3201 of the Education Law. (Matter of Balaban v. Rubin, 20 A D 2d 438, 14 N Y 2d 193; Matter of Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc 2d 475, 21 A D 2d 365.) IV. The petitions state causes of action. (Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N. Y. 22; Matter of Fabricius v. Graves, 254 App. Div. 19, 913; Matter of Ross v. Wilson, 284 App. Div. 522, 308 N. Y. 605; Matter of Hiscox v. Levine, 31 Misc 2d 151; Bareham v. Rochester, 221 App. Div. 36, 246 N. Y. 140.) V. The Commissioner’s require ment that pupils be transferred away from their neighborhood because of racial considerations violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. (Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S. 483; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497; Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U. S. 683; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1; Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 294 F. 2d 36; Webb v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 466.) VI. Administrative power to define attendance area lines inheres in the local boards of education and has not been granted to the Commissioner. (People v. Dethloff, 283 N. Y. 309; Matter of De Angelis v. Laino, 235 App. Div. 390, 260 N. Y. 661; Lawrence Constr. Corp. v. State of New York, 293 N. Y. 634; Lantry v. Mede, 127 App. Div. 557, 194 N. Y. 544.) VII. Lacking administrative power to determine attendance area zones, the Commissioner may not usurp such power under the guise of quasi-judicial “ review ”. (Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127; People ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Graves, 243 N. Y. 204; Matter of La Fontaine Props. v. McGoldrick, 200 Misc. 518; Matter of Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 303 N. Y. 242, 343 U. S. 495; Matter of Lewisboro-Vista Civic Assn., 73 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 178; Matter of New York State Comm. Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., 10 Misc 2d 346; Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 213 F. Supp. 819, 324 F. 2d 209.) VIII. The power sought to be asserted by the Commissioner would necessitate the destruction of the private and religious school systems in the State of New York. IX. In the present case, the Commissioner failed to make factual inquiries or findings as to whether, in the present case, the so-called imbalance ” is the cause of any impairment of educational opportunity. Such conduct violates the fundamental rule that administrative determinations must be founded upon findings of fact. Otherwise they are capricious and arbitrary. (Matter of New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op. v. Noyes, 284 N. Y. 197; Matter of Land Purch. Corp. of America v. Grunewald, 20 Misc 2d 175.)
Thomas L. Driscoll for Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 12, Town of Hempstead, New York, appellant.
I. The Commissioner’s decision and order is illegal and therefore arbitrary, capricious, and in defiance of the constitutional rights of petitioners in this proceeding and their nh.il dren. (Matter of Balaban v. Rubin, 20 A D 2d 438, 14 N Y 2d 193.) II. The law of all of the cited cases and of all of the cases which have dealt with the question of imbalance is completely in accord with this appellant’s contention. (Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 324 F. 2d 209; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294; Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 139 F. Supp. 468; Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776; School Bd. of City of Charlottesville, Va., v. Allen, 240 F. 2d 59; Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, N. Y., 226 F. Supp. 208; Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181; Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87; Matter of Bell, 77 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 37; Matter of Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1, Vil. of Hempstead, 70 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 108.) III. The Commissioner’s fact-finding committee’s findings adopted by the Commissioner sustain the action and contention of this appellant. IV. The report and findings of the committee and the Commissioner clearly show that appellant Board of Education has acted reasonably and not in an arbitrary manner. V. The case of Matter of Balaban v. Rubin (20 A D 2d 438, 14 N Y 2d 193), cited by respondents, does not sustain the contentions of respondent Commissioner and others. VI. The Negro children attending the Woodfield Road School achieve just as well as those attending the other two grade schools in the district. VII. The recent Civil Rights Law provisions compel an annulment of the Commissioner’s decision and order. VIII. The power to control the assignment of pupils to the schools in the district and determine area zones lies wholly within the local board of education. IX. The amendment of 1956 to section 1709 of the Education Law by the addition of subdivision 33 puts the absolute power in the local board of education to have the management of the schools in the district. X. Section 310 of the Education Law would have no effect in the case at bar. (Matter of Bottenfield, 77 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 25.) XI. The right of appeal to the Commissioner of Education provided in section 310 of the Education Law is not exclusive and does not oust the courts of jurisdiction in cases calling for the interpretation of a statute affecting a valuable right. (Matter of McMaster v. Owens, 192 Misc. 687; Finley v. Spaulding, 192 Misc. 860; Matter of O’Connor v. Emerson, 196 App. Div. 807.)
Charles A. Brind, John P. Jehu, Elizabeth M. Eastman, George B. Farrington and Louis H. J. Welch for Commissioner of Education, respondent.
I. The decision of the Commissioner is not “purely arbitrary”. (Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S. 483; Matter of Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N Y 2d 193; Matter of Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc 2d 475, 21 A D 2d 365; Matter of Addabbo v. Donovan, 43 Misc 2d 621; Matter of Schnepp v. Donovan, 43 Misc 2d 917; Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, N. Y., 226 F. Supp. 208.) II. The decision of the Commissioner rendered under section 310 of the Education Law is final and conclusive and not subject to review in any court or place whatever. (Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127; Matter of Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 12 of Town of Virgil v. Allen, 14 A D 2d 429; Matter of Cochran v. Levy, 175 Misc. 666, 263 App. Div. 921; Matter of Board of Educ. of Bethlehem Union Free School Dist. v. Wilson, 196 Misc. 239, 277 App. Div. 809, 303 N. Y. 107; Matter of Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Neversink v. Wilson, 282 App. Div. 821, 847; Matter of Soergel v. Allen, 10 A D 2d 767, 9 N Y 2d 633; Matter of Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Allen, 6 A D 2d 316, 6 N Y 2d 871, 6 N Y 2d 983, 361 U. S. 535; Matter of Clark v. Allen, 7 A D 2d 144, 8 A D 2d 665; Gardner v. Ginther, 232 App. Div. 296; Lair v. Grant, 137 Misc. 470; Adriaansen v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Marion, 222 App. Div. 320; Matter of District No. 2 of Town of Marion, 31 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 426; Matter of Common School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Waverly, 33 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 53; Matter of District No. 9 of Town of Kent, 38 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 625; Matter of District No. 15, Town of Esopus, 71 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 139.) III. The statute itself authorizes and requires the Commissioner of Education to make such an order in a proper case. (Matter of Szkolnik v. Allen, 19 A D 2d 765; Matter of Bowen v. Allen, 1 Ed. Dept. Rep. 534, 29 Misc 2d 35, 14 A D 2d 716, 17 A D 2d 12, 13 N Y 2d 663; Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N. Y. 566; Barringer v. Powell, 230 N. Y. 37; People ex rel. Hylan v. Finegan, 227 N. Y. 219; People ex rel. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Finley, 211 N. Y. 51; Matter of Hirshfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297; People ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Graves, 243 N. Y. 204; Hutchinson v. Skinner, 21 Misc. 729.) IV. The history and purpose of the statute support the power of respondent to make the order. (Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N. Y. 566; Matter of Hirshfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297; Matter of Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1, Town of Ramapo, 65 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 106; Matter of Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1, Vil. of Hempstead, 70 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 108; Matter of Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 9, Town of Hempstead, 71 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 166; Matter of Davis, 75 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 57; Matter of Bell, 77 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 37; Matter of Taylor, 1 Ed. Dept. Rep. 501; Matter of Danker, 2 Ed. Dept. Rep. 513.) V. The power here involved derives not from constitutional rights or duties of the parties, but purely and solely from the need to solve an essentially educational problem. (Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 213 F. Supp. 819, 324 F. 2d 209, 377 U. S. 924; People ex rel. Yale v. Eckler, 19 Hun 609.)
Robert L. Carter, Joan Franklin and Louis Steel for remaining respondents.
I. Boards of education have a constitutional duty to eliminate racial imbalance. (Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, N. Y., 226 F. Supp. 208; Branche v. Board of Educ. of Town of Hempstead, 204 F. Supp. 150; Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N. J. 237; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S. 483; Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 294 F. 2d 36, 368 U. S. 940; Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U. S. 683; Holland v. Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County, Fla., 258 F. 2d 730; Matter of Balaban v. Rubin, 20 A D 2d 438, 14 N Y 2d 193; Matter of Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 A D 2d 365; Matter of Addabbo v. Donovan, 43 Misc 2d 621; Matter of Schnepp v. Donovan, 43 Misc 2d 917; Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339.) II. Independently of the constitutional obligation to eliminate racial imbalance, the 'Commissioner’s decision is reasonable and, therefore, final and conclusive. (Matter of Chapin v. Board of Educ. of City of Buffalo, 291 N. Y. 241; Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127.) III. The Commissioner’s plan to correct racial imbalance is legal and constitutional. (Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25; Board of Educ. of Waverly Community Unit School Dist. No. 6 v. Nickell, 410 Ill. 98.) IV. The Commissioner has power to direct a board of education to modify its pupil assign ment policy to correct racial imbalance. V. The Commissioner is empowered to hear petitions of persons conceiving themselves aggrieved by the refusal of a local board to act consistently with State educational policy. (Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N. Y. 566; Barringer v. Powell, 230 N. Y. 37; People ex rel. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Finley, 211 N. Y. 51; Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127; Matter of Nestler v. Board of Examiners of Bd. of Educ. of City of N. Y., 192 Misc. 663; Matter of Bomar v. Cole, 177 Misc. 740; Matter of Bowen v. Allen, 17 A D 2d 12, 13 N Y 2d 663; People ex rel. Hylan v. Finegan, 227 N. Y. 219; Matter of Delamater, 60 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 17; Matter of Beam v. Wilson, 200 Misc. 183, 279 App. Div. 277; Matter of Craig v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 173 Misc. 969, 262 App. Div. 706; Matter of Ross v. Wilson, 284 App. Div. 522; Matter of Board of Educ. of City of Oneida v. Tuttle, 125 Misc. 230; People ex rel. Yale v. Eckler, 19 Hun 609; Matter of Gable v. Gilbert, 126 Misc. 185; Matter of Belman, 78 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 10; Matter of Conlin, 75 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 60.) VI. Section 311 (subd. 4) explicitly authorizes the Commissioner to compel compliance with his determinations by adopting all necessary measures. VII. Assuming the power of the board of education to determine attendance areas, this in no way negates the Commissioner’s administrative control over boards in exercising such power or his authority to review and compel a variation in zoning practices.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The issue posed by the petition in terms of racial balance, which balance the Commissioner now avers is essential to a sound education, is not reviewable by this court as the following quotations from opinions show. The purpose of the grant of quasi-judicial powers under section 310 of the Education Law is "to make all matters pertaining to the general school system of the state within the authority and control of the department of education and to remove the same as far as practicable and possible from controversies in the courts " (Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N. Y. 566, 576-577 [1919]). "By our state system of education protected by the Constitution and developed by much study and experience, the commissioner of education is made the practical administrative head of the system, and in Ms exercise of sound wisdom, as we believe, the legislature deemed it best to make him the final authority in passing on many questions bound to arise in the admiMstration of the school system, and has provided an expeditious and simple method by which a disposition of such questions could be reached through appeal to him " (People ex rel. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Finley, 211 N. Y. 51, 57 [1914]). "In appraising the judicial nature of the act of the Commissioner of Education, it must be remembered that he combines both judicial and administrative functions. When he decides appeals where he has occasion to construe statutes, he undoubtedly acts in a judicial capacity. But in passing upon the propriety of educational policy by a particular school board or school district, he acts in a broader capacity than the courts, by reviewing at times administrative acts of discretion of which a court would refuse to take cognizance." (Matter of Craig v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 173 Misc. 969, 977, affd. 262 App. Div. 706 [1941]. See, also, Matter of Ross v. Wilson, 308 N. Y. 605, 617; State Commissioner's opinion of Feb. 15, 1965 in Matter of Dixon v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Buffalo; L. 1812, ch. 242; L. 1854, ch. 97; L. 1864, ch. 555.)
This is merely a reaffirmation of a principle contained in New York law for over 130 years.
In Easton v. Calendar (11 Wend. 91, 93-94 [1833]) the court stated:"The plaintiff below was not without his remedy, 1 R S. 487, § 110, 11; and the amendment of the law, 20th April, 1830, provides that any person conceiving Mm self aggrieved in consequence of any decision made by the trustees of any district in paying any teacher, or concerning any other matter under the present title, (which includes the whole of the school act,) may appeal to the superintendent of common schools, whose decision shall be final. This provision was intended for what it practically is, a cheap and expeditious mode of settling most, if not all of the difficulties and disputes arising in the course of the execution of the law. A common law certiorari would no doubt lie from this court to the trustees, to bring up and correct any erronéous proceeding not concluded by an adjudication of; the superintendent, or in a case where his powers were inadequate to give the relief to which the party was entitled."
A recent case illustrating the Commissioner's unusual authority to overturn a local hoard's orders solely from the standpoint of alleged sound education policy is Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127 [1959]. In that case a decision by the Commissioner that the local board's policy of requiring teachers who were former communists to identify , colleagues as party members was educationally unsound was not disturbed by this court on the ground that his decision was final. In arriving at this result, the court was fully cognizant of the fact that both the Feinberg Law (Education Law, § 3022) and section 20.1 of the Board of Regents Regulations (8 NYCRR 20.1) directed boards of education to take steps to eliminate subversive elements in their school system. Here the Board of Regents under authority of section 207 of the Education Law has declared racially imbalanced schools to be educationally inadequate. The Commissioner under sections 301 and 305 of the Education Law has implemented this policy by directing local boards to take steps to eliminate racial imbalance. These decisions are final absent a showing of pure arbitrariness.
The Commissioner's decision in this case rests squarely on his finding of the inadequacy of such schools from the viewpoint of educational soundness. Since this court had decided that the Commissioner, when a similar policy judgment was made, may substitute his judgment for that of the local board even where the action of the local board was not arbitrary (Matter of Board of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Allen, 6 N Y 2d 127 [1959], supra), the decision of the Commissioner in regard .to racial balance is conclusive.
Disagreement with the sociological, psychological and educational assumptions relied on by the Commissioner cannot be evaluated by this court. Such arguments can only be heard in the Legislature which has endowed the Commissioner with an all but absolute power, or by the Board of Regents, who are elected by the Legislature and make public policy in the field of education.
Since we find that the determination of the Commissioner of Education is not arbitrary or illegal, the order of the Appellate Division must be affirmed.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.