Case Name: Succession of Joseph MENDOZA
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-03-13
Citations: 288 So. 2d 673
Docket Number: No. 4804
Parties: Succession of Joseph MENDOZA.
Judges: Before LEMMON, STOULIG, and SCHOTT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 288
Pages: 673–676

Head Matter:
Succession of Joseph MENDOZA.
No. 4804.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 13, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1974.
Racivitch & Wegmann (William J. Weg-mann), New Orleans, for appellant.
Before LEMMON, STOULIG, and SCHOTT, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHOTT, Judge.
This is an appeal by the surviving spouse of the decedent from a judgment which classified the only asset of the Succession as separate property of the decedent. The item in question is the sum of $3500 representing death benefits payable to the estate of the decedent under the Seafarers' Union Welfare Plan, hereinafter referred to as the Plan.
The decedent and his widow were married on August 11, 1962. He had become a participant in the Plan before his marriage. The Plan was established pursuant to tripartite agreements between the Union, the employer and a trustee under the terms of which the employer makes a contribution to the trustee at a fixed rate per day for each day the employee works, regardless of the number of hours the employee may work on a given day. To be eligible for the death benefit the employee must have worked a minimum of 90 days during each year, including the last year before his death and at least one day in the last 90 days prior to his death. The employee makes no direct contribution to the Plan and has no individual control over the amount of the employer's contribution to the Plan. That amount is established by the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Union. If the employee terminates his employment or has not worked at least one day during the 90 days preceding the date of his death, and a minimum of 90 days during the year preceding the date of his death, he is entitled to no benefits from the Plan whatsoever.
An employee has the right to designate a beneficiary prior to his death, but in the instant case the decedent did not designate a beneficiary so that the death benefit was paid to the administrator of his Succession.
This case is similar to Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So.2d 438, in which this Court held that a lump sum death benefit resulting from a retirement system instituted by the decedent's employer and joined by the decedent prior to the date of his marriage did not form a part of the community between the decedent and his surviving spouse and was therefore the separate property of the decedent. Under that combined plan the employee made voluntary contributions to a fund for the purpose of retirement benefits but the employer made fixed contributions to the fund for death benefits. In holding that the death benefit was the separate property of the decedent, this Court analogized the plan to a contract of life insurance since there-was an agreement to pay a specified sum on the death of the member and since the proceeds did not come into existence during the lifetime of the member and consequently did not belong to him or form a part of his estate.
In the instant case appellant relies on the case of Laffitte v. Laffitte, La.App., 232 So.2d 92, where it was held that an employee's interest in a profit sharing trust Plan was community property. There the trust fund consisted entirely of contributions made by the employer as in the instant case, but under the Plan the employee had a vested interest which he would forfeit only if his employment were terminated by the employer for dishonesty or for conviction of a crime. As of the date of the dissolution of the community the employee would have been entitled to 100% of the funds credited to his account if his employment were voluntarily terminated. The Court held:
"In this case defendant has the sole control of the event, the voluntary termination of his employment, that may now cause the payment of 100% of the sum credited to his account."
Appellant contends that the two cited cases are in conflict but there is a fundamental difference between the two, namely, that in Rockvoan the employee had no interest in the fund during his lifetime and while the community was viable, but in Laffitte the employee had a vested interest of which he could voluntarily avail himself during the existence of the community. As in the Rockvoan case, the decedent in the instant case had no vested interest whatsoever in the death benefit and could realize no part of it as long as he lived.
Nevertheless, appellant contends that the payments made to the Fund by the employer are a part of the compensation to the employee for his services during his marriage and consequently the benefits should be treated as community property. But the same argument can be advanced in connection with an insurance contract which is entered into before the marriage but which is maintained during the marriage by payment of premiums out of community funds. In Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So.2d 12, the Supreme Court held:
"An analysis of the jurisprudence reveals that, where life insurance is taken out in favor of the insured's estate, or of his executors, administrators or assigns, the status of the proceeds of such life insurance, i. e., whether separate or community property, depends upon whether the contract of insurance was made dur ing the existence of the marital community."
Again as in the Rockvoan case, this Plan is analogous to an insurance contract in that the decedent's eligibility, acquired before his marriage, was maintained by his maintaining the minimum employment required of him during his marriage. He was free to name a designated beneficiary which would have had the effect of taking the proceeds out of his Succession entirely. Since the proceeds were, in effect, payable to his estate and since he became a participant in the Plan before his marriage, the proceeds in the hands of the administrator were properly classified as his separate property.
As an alternative plea, the appellant has claimed the marital portion under LSA-C.C. Art. 2382. Our examination of the record convinces us that this article does not apply to the facts of this case. At the time of the decedent's death the surviving spouse had equity in her home which she valued at $6,000 as well as a half interest in a savings account containing $750. The only asset of the decedent was the $3500 death benefit. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the husband died "rich" leaving his survivor "in necessitous circumstances" so as to afford to the appellant the right to take out of the succession the "marital portion."
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LEMMON, J., concurs with written reasons to follow.