Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melvin Dean MAJOR, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1983-06-17
Citations: 105 Idaho 4
Docket Number: No. 13950
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melvin Dean MAJOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 4–18

Head Matter:
665 P.2d 703
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melvin Dean MAJOR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13950.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 17, 1983.
Gar Hackney, of Lynn, Scott & Hackney, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Neil Tillquist, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
BAKES, Justice.
Defendant appellant Melvin Major was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a fixed term of life in prison. He appeals both the conviction and the sentence, asserting numerous errors which denied him a fair trial. We find that none of these errors require reversal of defendant's conviction or reduction of his sentence; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
During December of 1979, the defendant, his wife and two children were living in Nampa. The victim, Tony Mesa, was living approximately three miles away. The defendant and Mesa had known each other about three years. On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1979, the defendant and his wife went to a bar in Nampa. Mesa was at the bar, a place he frequented. Mesa and the defendant played pool and drank beer the rest of the evening, until the closing of the bar. At one point the owner of the bar asked the defendant to remove a large butcher knife from his right back pocket. The defendant left for five minutes, then returned without the knife. The owner also noticed that, when the bar was closing, the defendant indicated to Mesa that he wanted to accompany him, but Mesa told him to come over the next day instead.
After the bar closed, the defendant went to Mesa's house while his wife went to pick up their child. (Both were on foot, as their car was disabled.) From this point on, there are two versions of what happened. The state's witness, Kerry Buell, a neighbor to Mesa, testified that he saw Mesa come home, with a man following about 8 to 10 feet behind. Mesa stopped at his mailbox, but the man, later identified as the defendant, was encouraging him to hurry up and open the door. Mesa went into his house, but left the defendant outside on the walk. Buell testified that the defendant seemed nervous and edgy. Mesa meanwhile was apparently fiddling with some clear plastic baggies on his kitchen table. Buell quit watching for a time, and when he next glanced over, the defendant was in the house with Mesa. Buell saw Mesa fall down (either fell or was pushed). Buell then left, but when he returned all the lights at Mesa's were off.
The defendant's version is different. He testified that Mesa invited him over, they went to his house together (no stop at the mailbox); they sat and chatted while drinking a few beers. The defendant denied waiting out on the porch at all. According to him, a car with two men in it pulled up to Mesa's house, and Mesa went out to talk to them. The defendant then decided to find his wife and go home. He walked out of Mesa's house, said goodby to Mesa, who was still chatting, and left. The defendant could not describe the car or the two men.
On January 2, 1980, the defendant and his wife, after having retrieved their car from a garage, packed as many of their belongings as they could, and left for California, where her parents lived. They left many belongings behind, including children's clothing, toys, food, kitchen utensils, etc. The defendant testified that they left because he was unemployed, his wife was pregnant, and she wanted to be near her family. He claimed they had been planning the move for two weeks. When they left Nampa, some of their rent remained unpaid because, according to the defendant, they could not have gone to California on their existing funds if they had paid their rent. They left January 2, at approximately midnight. The landlord was unaware they were gone until police went to the defendant's residence to find him.
The body of Tony Mesa was found on January 3, 1980, at 9:00 p.m. No one had seen him since New Year's Eve. His papers had not been picked up since December 31. He had not kept an appointment to eat a turkey dinner and watch football on New Year's Day.
Mesa's body was found in the hallway of his home, with numerous stab wounds. He had been stabbed once in each knee, once in the buttocks, once in the scalp, once in the hand (possibly a defensive wound), twice under the arm, and three times in the chest. Death, however, was caused by numerous slashes to the throat, during which Mesa's left ear was partially severed, and an artery was fully severed.
Evidence gathered at the scene included two bloody towels, numerous strands of hair, cigarette butts, and a crumpled cigarette pack.
The defendant was arrested in California on January 9, and waived extradition to return to Idaho. His car was searched with his consent and police recovered a shirt and a pair of pants, each with a minute spot of blood on them.
Witnesses testified that the defendant owned a single-edged butcher knife, with a wide but tapered 8-inch blade. Witnesses also testified that the defendant had that knife in his possession on the night of the murder. The doctor who performed an autopsy on the victim testified that the knife that inflicted all the wounds was single-edged and tapered.
An FBI agent testified that some of the hairs found on the bloody towel and on the victim's body matched hair of the defendant. (A match is defined as similarity in more than fifteen characteristics; this hair matched defendant's in twenty characteristics.) Testimony also indicated that this hair had been forcefully removed from the head and had not merely fallen out. Another FBI agent testified that the spot on defendant's pants was human blood, but could not be identified as to type. The spot on defendant's shirt was not identified as human blood.
Defendant was observed, while in custody, smoking the same brand of cigarettes as those found at the scene. He also had a distinct way of smoking those cigarettes, so as to leave only an unusually small butt. The cigarette butts found at the scene were in a similar, unusually small, condition.
Testimony by an undercover narcotics agent, Max MeEvers, indicated that the defendant was a heroin user. MeEvers drove around with the defendant looking for heroin to buy, and on at least one occasion went to Mesa's house. MeEvers also testified that defendant was suffering from withdrawal from heroin on December 31. He testified that defendant seemed to be having some sort of trouble with his supplier, referred to as "his boy," and that defendant stated that "he was bummed out or something, really mad about his — his boy wouldn't come across with the heroin, and if he didn't start coming across with some dope, that he was going to kill him."
Several of the errors alleged by the defendant can be disposed of quickly. First, the defendant alleges error in the failure of the trial court to grant a challenge for cause to a juror. Defendant alleges that, because of the juror's position in the county (county treasurer), she stood in an attorney/client relationship with the county prosecutor, and thus should have been excused for cause. We dealt with a similar situation in State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159, 438 P.2d 904 (1968), where the juror challenged for cause was a janitor in the prosecutor's office. In that case, in looking at I.C. § 19-2020, which allows for challenges for implied bias, we ruled that the "proscribed relationship [here attor ney/client relationship] between a prospective juror and an attorney in the case is not a ground for challenge for implied bias. Such relationship must be shown to exist between the juror and accused or the person allegedly injured by the offense charged." Id. at 167, 438 P.2d 904. There was no error in the refusal of a challenge for cause in the present case.
The defendant also claims error in the admission of certain testimony. First, he claims he was denied due process and a fair trial by the trial judge's failure to exclude the jury while James Woolery claimed his fifth amendment privilege because of threats of prosecution for perjury. After Woolery was called to the stand he said, "I can't be sworn in, I have been threatened on the grounds of perjury by the prosecuting attorney." Defendant's counsel did not object to this alleged error at trial. There have been cases where a witness, having been called to the stand by the prosecutor, claimed his fifth amendment privilege, and this was held to be reversible error. However, those cases usually involve a situation where the witness was an accomplice of the defendant, this fact was known to the jury, the prosecutor knew the witness would claim his fifth amendment right, and the prosecutor persisted in asking questions concerning the crime with which the defendant was charged. See, e.g., Robbins v. Small, 371 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.1967), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1033, 87 S.Ct. 1483, 18 L.Ed.2d 594; United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53 (8th Cir.1972); Shockley v. State, 335 So.2d 659 (Ala.Cr.App.1975), aff'd 335 So.2d 663 (Ala.1976); People v. Giacalone, 399 Mich. 642, 250 N.W.2d 492 (Mich.1977). See also, Annot., Prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense with which accused is charged. 86 A.L.R.2d 1443 (1962). Thus, in most of the cases where this was held to be reversible error, there existed both prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice to the defendant. In the present case, defendant has shown neither. The defendant has not shown that the prosecutor called this witness for the purpose of eliciting a prejudicial inference. He also has not shown that the claim of privilege by this witness in any way prejudiced his case. There is no indication in the record that Woolery was any sort of accomplice. There is also no indication in the record of what his testimony would have been. The state did make an offer of proof, outside the presence of the jury, but the only thing apparent from this offer of proof is that there was a possible attempt to influence Woolery not to testify. There is no indication of what connection Woolery had with the crime charged by the prosecutor. Thus, the jury could not have drawn an unfavorable inference from Woolery's fifth amendment claim, because his connection with the case is itself unclear. Woolery's claim of privilege during defendant's trial was not reversible error. See State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 448 P.2d 243 (1968). We rejected a similar claim of error for similar reasons in State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 448 P.2d 229 (1968), cert. den., 395 U.S. 977, 89 S.Ct. 2129, 23 L.Ed.2d 765.
Defendant also claims that the testimony of Max McEvers, an undercover informant, should have been suppressed. He argues that his statements to McEvers were involuntary because they were made under conditions of "stealth, deceit, false pretenses, and entrapment," without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The law is well settled that Miranda safeguards attach only after a suspect has been taken into custody. Miranda was not intended "to prohibit the voluntary and spontaneous statements of persons who have not been taken into custody, detained in some manner," etc., from being used against them. State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 489 P.2d 1310 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has considered, and rejected, claims that the use of statements made to undercover informants violates a defendant's fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). Since defendant presented no proof that his statements were involuntary, there was no error in failing to suppress these statements.
Defendant also asserts that the admission of unresponsive answers from two witnesses denied him a fair trial. During the trial, the defendant's counsel, on cross examination of Deputy Glenn Slocum, asked, "Did you determine why he was there?" Instead of answering yes or no, the deputy answered, "She told us that he was there purchasing narcotics." A non-responsive answer to such a question often poses a special problem for an attorney. The proper procedure for an attorney to follow in such a situation is to object after the answer, ask that it be stricken from the record, and that the jury be instructed to disregard it. State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 531 P.2d 1193 (1975). That is exactly what occurred here. Defendant's attorney objected to the unresponsive answer, and it was stricken from the record and the jury instructed to disregard it. There is nothing to suggest that the defendant was prejudiced or denied a fair trial.
The second statement that defendant complains of as unresponsive is one made by Max McEvers. While relating the statements defendant made concerning "his boy," McEvers mentioned "Tony," in reference to the "boy." That statement was not unresponsive, and additionally no objection was made by defense counsel. It is well settled that errors not objected to at trial will not be considered on appeal. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 594 P.2d 146 (1979).
Defendant also claims he was denied a fair trial by several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he claims the prosecutor overstepped the bounds of proper cross examination by asking questions that assumed facts not proven. We have examined the record, and it appears that the prosecutor was attempting to establish a possible scenario of occurrences at the murder scene by asking the defendant if that was what really happened. All of the prosecutor's questions were based on possible inferences which might be drawn from facts already in evidence. We find no error in that type of cross examination of a defendant who chooses to testify about his version of events.
The defendant also claims that the prosecutor injected his own personal opinion into his argument. While it is error for a prosecutor to make personal representations or express personal opinions to the jury during his closing argument, State v. Garcia, supra, a prosecuting attorney can express an opinion based on the evidence, and when a prosecutor does this it will not be considered reversible error. State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967). After examining the prosecutor's closing argument, it is apparent that he did not overstep the boundary as defined in State v. McKeehan, supra, by expressing a personal opinion not based on the evidence.
Appellant asserts two additional alleged errors committed on behalf of the prosecuting attorney in his conduct of the cross examination of appellant. The first asserted error contained in appellant's opening brief relates to certain cross examination of defendant concerning a statement made by him on direct examination explaining why he waived extradition in California, in which the defendant stated as follows:
"Q. Well, did you come right back up here?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And why did you come right back up here?
"A. Oh, I wanted to get it straightened out. I didn't have nothing to hide. I wanted to get it straightened out."
On cross examination, the defendant appellant was asked, "Did you ever do anything to straighten this matter out after your— you came to the State of Idaho?" After an objection by his counsel was overruled, the defendant answered, "I did what I was told by my attorney."
"Q. Did you ever do anything to solve the murder of Manuel Antonio Mesa?
"A. (No response.)
"Q. Did you ever do anything?
"A. Well, how could I?"
At this point, appellant's counsel interposed an objection which was sustained by the court, and no further questions were asked along that line. Appellant asserts that the foregoing line of questions was error because it inferred that the defendant had some duty to help the police solve the crime. However, the first questions were not objected to, and therefore will not be considered on appeal. State v. Garcia, supra. The court sustained the defendant's objection to further questions along that line, and therefore no reversible error was committed in that exchange of questions.
Although not raised in his Issues Presented on Appeal, set out in his appellate brief, I.A.R. 35(a)(3), appellant in his reply brief asserts an additional error committed by the prosecutor on cross examination. The defendant was asked if, when he was arrested, he had refused to give his name to the officers when they asked for it. Again, the cross examination was related to his direct testimony in which he testified that he had waived extradition in California and came right back to Idaho because "I wanted to get it straightened out. I didn't have nothing to hide. I wanted to get it straightened out." On cross examination he was asked:
"Q. Isn't it true that when you were arrested by Officer Elliot, and guns were drawn, he informed you that you were under arrest for murder, and he asked you your name, and you wouldn't respond with your name?
"A. I guess, I don't know. I don't remember."
Since the foregoing question was not objected to at trial it would ordinarily not be considered on appeal. State v. Garcia, supra. However, since, as the appellant points out, his Miranda rights are implicated by the question, we must consider whether the asking of that question, even though unobjected to, could constitute such a violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda so as to warrant our review under our fundamental error rule, as announced in State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971). We conclude that even if the question was erroneous in that regard, the error was not fundamental. The asserted violation is less serious than that asserted in State v. Swenor, 96 Idaho 327, 528 P.2d 671 (1974), in which we found no fundamental error. Nor does the extent of inquiry into silence in this case come near to the intrusion found in State v. Haggard, supra, or State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976), cert. den., 429 U.S. 842, 97 S.Ct. 118, 50 L.Ed.2d 111. Therefore, we conclude that, no contemporaneous objection having been raised to the question, no fundamental error was committed under these circumstances with regard to the foregoing cross examination.
Defendant alleges that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of the crime charged, particularly asserting that there was no evidence of pre meditation. However, a review of the record indicates very substantial evidence, direct and circumstantial, pointing to the defendant's guilt of the crime of premeditated first degree murder, and thus defendant's allegations of error are unfounded. State v. Ponthier, 92 Idaho 704, 449 P.2d 364 (1969); State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 592 P.2d 836 (1979); State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 313 P.2d 706 (1957).
Finally, defendant alleges error in the length of the sentence assessed by the trial judge. The length of sentence to be given to a defendant upon conviction of a crime is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 602 P.2d 71 (1979); State v. O'Bryan, supra. The crime of first degree murder is punishable by death or by imprisonment for life. I.C. § 18-4004. Appellant's sentence of a fixed life term for the crime of first degree murder is well within the limits defined by statute. The record discloses a rather heinous murder, and we see no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Affirmed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
. "19-2020. GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE FOR IMPLIED BIAS. — A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes and for no other:
"2. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and servant, or landlord and tenant, or being a member of the family or boarder or lodger of the defendant, or of the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or in his employment on wages.
. In Hoffa, the government was allowed to use the statements made to an undercover informant during the course of defendant's commission of a crime, jury tampering. The defendant contended that allowing the use of such testimony violated his fourth amendment right to be free from illegal searches. He argued that the informant's failure to disclose his role as a government agent vitiated any consent that the defendant had given to the informant to enter his private hotel room. The court saw no violation of the fourth amendment, saying, "The risk of being . betrayed by an informer . is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak." Id at 303, 87 S.Ct. at 414, quoting from Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 at 465, 83 S.Ct. 1381 at 1402, 10 L.Ed.2d 462. The court went on to reject sixth amendment claims by the defendant. They also held that the use of an informer is not a per se violation of due process, rather the credibility of the informer himself is to be tested by the jury. The court also rejected defendant's fifth amendment claim, saying that the right to be free from self-incrimination applies only when an element of coercion is present, i.e., the fifth amendment protects only against compulsory self-incrimination. The statements made to the informer by Hoffa were found to be completely voluntary.
. We would also note that the witness himself expressly told the jury that the defendant had never mentioned the name Tony in connection with their conversations about "the boy."