Case Name: In the Matter of Mary Jane LEE, individually and doing business as "The Breakers." O. W. IRWIN, Trustee in Bankruptcy, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1972-08-28
Citations: 468 F.2d 1249
Docket Number: No. 25063
Parties: In the Matter of Mary Jane LEE, individually and doing business as “The Breakers.” O. W. IRWIN, Trustee in Bankruptcy, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 468
Pages: 1249–1252

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Mary Jane LEE, individually and doing business as “The Breakers.” O. W. IRWIN, Trustee in Bankruptcy, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 25063.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 28, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1972.
Vernon D. Stokes (argued), James M. Conners, San Francisco, Cal., Harold C. Kruse, Monterey, Cal., Donald G. Hubbard, of Thompson & Hubbard, Monterey, Cal., for appellant.
John M. Youngquist, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., Lee A. Jackson, Crombie J. D. Garrett, Attys., Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, District Judge.
The Honorable William J. Jameson, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge:
We have here a contest over the proceeds ($14,093.37) of the sale of a California liquor license used at a restaurant operated by Mary Jane Lee and her sister Betty Jean Parker in Monterey, California, known as "The Breakers."
The government has a claim for estate taxes due from the estate of Donald Roy Bailey. For this, Mrs. Lee and her sister as co-administratrices are personally liable. Bailey was the father of Mrs. Lee and Mrs. Parker.
In 1961 Bailey owned a motel in Pacific Grove. He transferred it to Mrs. Lee subject to a first trust deed held by a third party. The sole consideration was a purchase money second trust deed in the amount of $25,500. (That is, this was the balance due at the time of his death in 1962.)
Soon after the father's death, the sisters began their restaurant business, unconnected with the motel. A liquor license was needed. This required money. To raise the money, Mrs. Lee obtained a loan in the amount of $29,000 on her equity in the motel by giving a third trust deed as security. At the time she obtained this loan, the entire amount of the note secured by the second deed of trust in favor of Bailey's estate was due and payable.
Out of the proceeds of this loan, a liquor license was purchased for "The Breakers" for $12,000. The balance was used up in operating the restaurant.
Needing still more money, Mrs. Lee, in her capacity as administratrix of her father's estate, demanded that the trustee under the second deed of trust reconvey his title to Mrs. Lee as owner of the motel. This he did. She had represented to the trustee that the debt which she and her sister owed had been paid. Others were now willing to make loans against the motel subject to the two trust deeds now appearing on the record to be outstanding. Two further loans were obtained and the proceeds were consumed in the operation of "The Breakers." Of course, Mrs. Lee did have a duty with the proceeds of any such loans, or with any other property she had, to pay off the note secured by the original second trust deed. Estate of Walker, 125 Cal. 242, 57 P. 991 (1899).
The government contends for a lien for its death duties against the liquor license and against the proceeds of the sale of the license by the trustee in bankruptcy for Mrs. Lee. If there was a lien against the license, the proceeds would naturally go to the government. The government asserts a trust ex maleficio — a constructive trust. The referee in bankruptcy held that there was no lien, but the district court reversed.
We are not satisfied there was a constructive trust. Of course, Mrs. Lee has no right to the money, but we hold that the United States is only entitled to its ordinary fourth priority.
If the administrators had sold the second note and trust deed which represented their debt to their father's estate and had used the proceeds to buy a liquor license for themselves, we would have no trouble affixing a lien on the liquor license and on the proceeds. But here, with a mere failure to pay a debt owed, we have a gap in any "tracing of a res." When one initially qualifies as an administrator, one's personal assets are not subjected to a lien for all estate debts, and thereafter are not so subjected automatically.
Probably the "lien" of the original second trust deed remained on the motel after the fraudulent reconveyance, at least as between Lee as owner of the motel and Lee and Parker as administrators, but that lien has undoubtedly been lost by a bona fide purchase. It lasted through, we would say, until the sale of the motel. We do not see how we can say a lien arose on the proceeds of the first loan which Mrs. Lee herself obtained. We do not think the lien could have been imposed if the debtors and administrators had not been identical. We are not persuaded that a different rule should apply here.
Allowing a constructive trust here would give the government a first priority. It in effect would amount to a state created priority. This is not a proper use for the remedy of constructive trust. United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 91 S.Ct. 991, 28 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971); Lusk Corporation, et al. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 462 F.2d 187, (9th Cir. 1972).
We do not reach the question of what the rule would be if we had a simultaneous transaction of "releasing" the estate's second deed of trust and putting on a new deed of trust, the proceeds of which were used to purchase a liquor license.
The order of the district court is reversed.