Case Name: UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. W. A. (Tony) BOYLE et al. Appeal of Louis A. ANTAL; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. Richard WEAVER et al. and W. A. (Tony) Boyle et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1977-09-01
Citations: 567 F.2d 112
Docket Number: Nos. 76-1871 and 76-1872
Parties: UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. W. A. (Tony) BOYLE et al. Appeal of Louis A. ANTAL. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. Richard WEAVER et al. and W. A. (Tony) Boyle et al.
Judges: Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 567
Pages: 112–119

Head Matter:
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. W. A. (Tony) BOYLE et al. Appeal of Louis A. ANTAL. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. Richard WEAVER et al. and W. A. (Tony) Boyle et al.
Nos. 76-1871 and 76-1872.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued 1 June 1977.
Decided 1 Sept. 1977.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 1977.
Steven Jacobson, Washington, D. C., for appellants in No. 76-1872. ' Richard L. Trumka, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant in No. 76-1872. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellant in No. 76-1871.
Robert Cadeaux, Washington, D. C., for appellee, W. A. Boyle, also argued for ap-pellee Owens.
Jo V. Morgan, Jr. and William E. Rollow, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee, The National Bank of Washington, Trustee.
J. Gordon Forester, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, John Owens.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion for the Court PER CURIAM.
Dissenting opinion filed by BAZELON, Chief Judge.
PER CURIAM:
We affirm the District Court on the basis of the opinion of Judge Corcoran, 418 F.Supp. 406 (D.D.C.1976), to which reference is made for the statement of facts and the discussion of the legal issues involved. We find it necessary to write only on the point raised by the dissent, which was not discussed in Judge Corcoran's opinion, that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(a), represents a statement of public policy which would bar the application of the Spendthrift Trust provision of the UMWA pension fund.
We cannot interpret this provision of the statute in the same way as our dissenting colleague. The portion of section 501(a) relied on in the dissent states: "A general exculpatory provision in the Constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for the breach of the duties declared by the section shall be void as against public policy." (emphasis added).
We start and end by looking at the plain language of the statute. It is obvious that the spendthrift provisions of the pension trust were neither general, nor were they in the Constitution and bylaws, nor were they in the resolution of a governing body, nor were they exculpatory.
It is undeniable that the pension trust was a provision neither of the union's constitution or of its bylaws, nor was it a general resolution of the union's governing body. The pension trust is an independent entity, not part of the UMWA, whose only connection now is the continuing funding of the trust. While not bearing upon the interpretation of the statute, it may be noted that defendant Boyle at no time was a trustee of the trust itself, and that the wrongful acts committed by Boyle had no connection with the pension trust itself.
The spendthrift provisions of the pension trust are in plain language and are neither general nor exculpatory. Spendthrift provisions in pension trusts or trusts established by personal settlors are a common financial device used to ensure that the settlors' funds go where and are used for the benefit of the beneficiary he or it intends. Such a commonly used spendthrift provision is a very limited provision, and is hardly embraced within the phraseology "a general exculpatory provision". The position of our dissenting colleague might be stronger, but only slightly stronger, if the phraseology of section 501(a) had read "any exculpatory provision," or "any provision having an exculpatory effect," but no such language was used.
We say that the position of our dissenting colleague might be only slightly stronger if such language were used, because the spendthrift provision is not only special and limited rather that "general," but in the first place it is not even "exculpatory." The American Heritage Dictionary defines "exculpatory" as "proving or tending to prove guiltless; exculpating." The basic verb "exculpate" is defined as "to clear of a charge; prove guiltless or blameless; exonerate." The meaning is traced back to the Medieval Latin "ex" (removal away from) plus culpa (guilt or blame).
Thus to come within the language of the statute here, the spendthrift provision must purport to relieve Boyle of guilt, fault, blame, or liability. The spendthrift provision does not purport to do so, and our dissenting colleague does not claim that it does. Boyle has not been exculpated in any way by the spendthrift provision. He remains guilty, at fault, blameworthy, and liable to the UMWA for the full amount of the judgment rendered against him. Where there is guilt, fault, blame, or liability, then various remedies arise. All that the spendthrift provision of the pension trust does is void the particular remedy of attachment. Boyle's liability remains, for which various remedies may be invoked. Boyle remains liable, and owes the UMWA the full judgment rendered; the spendthrift provision of the trust was not designed to "exculpate" him within the plain meaning of the statute.
The English language is marvelously flexible, yet precise. Had the Congress — or the settlors of the trust — at any time desired to provide for an offset of the pension ordinarily to be paid to any beneficiary of the trust by reason of any liability, specific or general, flowing from a beneficiary to the trust, either could have said so. This they did not do, and the language employed by Congress regarding "a general exculpatory provision," specifically to be found in the constitution or bylaws or resolution of the Union, plainly does not cover the spendthrift provision of the Pension Trust. That being so, we find no public policy, implicit or explicit, in section 501(a) which should cause this court to create another exception to the usual rule on spendthrift provisions.
Affirmed.