Case Name: Belgica Nubia CRUZ, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-08-16
Citations: 822 So. 2d 595
Docket Number: No. 3D02-2093
Parties: Belgica Nubia CRUZ, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: Before COPE, SORONDO and RAMIREZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 822
Pages: 595–597

Head Matter:
Belgica Nubia CRUZ, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 3D02-2093.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug. 16, 2002.
Fisher, Lawrence & Malove and Robert David Malove, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mark Rosenblatt, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Before COPE, SORONDO and RAMIREZ, JJ.

Opinion:
Confession of Error
COPE, J.
Bélgica Nubia Cruz petitions for a writ of mandamus. The State has properly confessed error.
Defendant-petitioner Cruz is charged with uttering a forged instrument and grand theft. ' She filed a written waiver of presence at pretrial conferences pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3) and 3.220(p)(l).
The trial court issued a Notice of Court Appearance for August 2, 2002 .for "Report Re:Plea." It appears this was a hearing scheduled by the trial court as a case management device to ascertain whether a plea had been offered and if so, whether it had been, or was likely to be, accepted. Defense counsel appeared at the scheduled time, but the defendant did not. The court ordered that "a no bond alias capias is entered as a result of the defendant's failure to appear in person today at the pretrial conference as otherwise directed by the Court."
The defendant filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus, asking this court to (1) direct the trial court to accept the written waiver of presence at pretrial conferences and (2) direct that the capias be quashed.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal explained in a similar case:
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3) and 3.220(p) provide that a defendant's presence at a pretrial conference may be waived in writing. On June 18, 1997, a waiver of appearance signed by petitioner was filed by her attorney. The Notice of Docket Sounding does not inform the petitioner that this pretrial proceeding requires her personal appearance, that her presence may not be waived and that she could not appear through counsel. Accordingly, there appears to be no legal basis for issuance of the capias and it is hereby quashed.
Reynolds v. State, 696 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (emphasis added); Stout v. State, 795 So.2d 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Lynch v. State, 736 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); see also Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1125 (Fla.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 1411, 149 L.Ed.2d 352 (2001).
As is implicit in the Reynolds decision, the trial court can require the personal presence of the defendant in court, notwithstanding the waiver, if there is a good reason to do so. But if that is what the court wants to accomplish, then defense counsel and the defendant must be clearly advised that the defendant's personal presence is required, notwithstanding the waiver of presence. Reynolds; see also Tellis v. State, 779 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Based on the cited authorities and the State's confession of error, we conclude that the defendant was not given a sufficiently clear notice that her personal appearance would be required in court, notwithstanding that she had executed a written waiver of appearance. This ruling is without prejudice to the trial court to reschedule the matter on clearer notice, if the court so desires.
We treat the petition for writ of mandamus as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and quash the capias.
Petition granted.
RAMIREZ, J., concurs.
. Rule 3.220(p)(l) states: "The trial court may hold 1 or more pretrial conferences, with trial counsel present, to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The defendant shall be present unless the defendant waives this in writing."
The order now under review characterizes the August 2 hearing as being a pretrial conference. For present purposes, we accept that characterization.
. In Stout and Lynch, the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require the trial court to accept the defendant's written waiver of presence. Stout, 795 So.2d at 228; Lynch, 736 -So.2d at 1222. In those cases no capias had been issued.
In the present case a capias has been issued, and the defendant seeks to quash it. We thus treat the petition as being for habeas corpus. See Amador v. State, 712 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).