Case Name: RIVER ROAD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CANAL INDEMNITY COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-11-07
Citations: 538 So. 2d 625
Docket Number: No. CA 87 0443
Parties: RIVER ROAD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CANAL INDEMNITY COMPANY.
Judges: Before COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN, ALFORD, LeBLANC and FOIL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 538
Pages: 625–632

Head Matter:
RIVER ROAD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CANAL INDEMNITY COMPANY.
No. CA 87 0443.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1988.
Rainer Lorenz, Hammond, for plaintiff, appellee.
Gary M. Zwain, New Orleans, for defendant, appellant.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN, ALFORD, LeBLANC and FOIL, JJ.

Opinion:
FOIL, Judge.
This appeal involves a question of coverage under an "all risk" contractors equipment policy. Plaintiff River Road Construction Company, Inc., brought this action against its insurer, defendant Canal Indemnity Company, alleging coverage of damage to an insured Link Belt 108-B crane. At trial, the parties stipulated to the facts and the court entered judgment for the insured in the amount of $28,522.60 with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand. The insurer has appealed from this judgment, assigning the following as error:
(1) The trial court went beyond the evidence in reaching the factual conclusions that operator error caused the damage to the crane and that the crane's overturn caused the damage to the boom.
(2) The trial court erred in awarding interest from date of judicial demand.
The statements of three employees of the insured (the operator of the crane and two witnesses to the accident) were stipulated to and submitted into evidence. This evidence reveals the following facts: The crane was engaged in performing sheet pile driving operations at the time the damage was sustained. In the course of this operation, a sheet had been hooked up to the crane and was being lifted when it began to swing back and forth. In order to stop this, the operator set the sheet down, causing the boom to come backwards through the boomstops, and up and over the cab of the crane. The crane tilted and turned over, and the boom landed on the ground behind the crane. The damage to the crane and the damage to the boom are the subject matter of the claims filed by the insured.
The insurer rejected the insured's claims on the grounds that the damage to the crane was not covered because the loss did not result from an external cause, and that the damage to the boom was not covered because it was not incurred by one of the specific perils listed in the policy. The coverage clause of the policy involved in this case reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
3. THIS POLICY INSURES (Except as hereinafter excluded)
Against all risks of direct physical loss of or damage to the property insured from any external cause ., except as respects boom(s) in excess of 25 feet in length, which are insured hereunder only against loss or damage directly caused by fire, lightning, . or overturning of the unit of which it is a part . [Emphasis added]
The relevant inquiry in assignment of error number one is whether or not the losses sustained by the insured were covered under the provisions of the foregoing policy clause. The trial court reviewed the evidence and reached the following factual conclusions in its written reasons for judgment:
"... [T]he written statements of the three River Road employees and common sense lead the Court to the conclusion that it is more probable than not that the accident and corresponding damage to the equipment was the result of the circumstances of the incident and the actions of the crane operator rather than an internal defect of the crane . In addition, the policy limitation for booms over 25 feet is also fulfilled, so as to permit recovery for the boom damage. It is clear from the pictures . that the crane and boom were overturned by the accident, thus meeting that policy condition of coverage ."
Canal Indemnity Company argues that no evidence was presented showing that the damage incurred by the crane resulted from operator error as opposed to a malfunction. Defendant further contends that there was no evidence suggesting that the boom damage was caused by the crane's overturn. Defendant claims that, instead, the boom was damaged when it struck the crane's cab and that this caused the crane's overturn.
After a thorough examination of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court's factual conclusions are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and are not manifestly erroneous. We agree that it was the actions of the crane operator in suddenly relieving the boom of its heavy load which caused the boom to exceed its normal vertical orientation. This clearly constitutes an "external cause" within the ordinary meaning of those words. Moreover, we also agree that the fact that the crane and boom were overturned in this accident constitutes a named peril for which the policy specifically provides coverage. After the crane tilted and overturned, the boom landed on the ground behind it. It is immaterial whether or not the boom was the cause of the crane's overturn, only that the boom was damaged as a result thereof.
Courts must give legal effect to the provisions of an insurance policy according to the true intent of the parties, which is determined by the wording of the policy when its provisions are clear and unambiguous and do not lead to absurd consequences. If there is doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of a provision in an insurance policy, the policy must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Lacoste v. Price, 453 So.2d 986 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984).
We feel that the trial court's findings are in accord with the above. Thus, assignment of error number one is meritless.
By means of assignment of error number two, Canal Indemnity Company contends that the trial court erred in awarding legal interest from date of judicial demand. Rather, it claims that interest is owed from the time the debt becomes due, which in this case would be from the date of judgment. We disagree.
In the recent case of Mini Togs Products, Inc. v. Wallace, 513 So.2d 867 (La.App.2d Cir.), writs denied, 515 So.2d 447, 451 (La.1987), the court stated as follows:
Although the issue as presented to us in this case is whether legal interest should run from date of judicial demand or from date of judgment, neither of those dates are specifically mentioned' in the codal articles providing for legal interest on debts or claims arising out of contracts. Cases involving disputes over the time of commencement of legal interest have often been resolved by reference to the time the debt was due, or when the obli-gor was put in default, or when the claim became liquidated or ascertainable. Often the dispute has been whether legal interest commenced to accrue upon judicial demand or at an earlier date.
The most recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court dealing with legal interest on a claim arising out of a contractual relationship is Alexander v. Burroughs Corporation, [359 So.2d 607 (La.1978) ] . We read the decision in that case as holding that a claim arising out of a contract, whether liquidated or not, bears legal interest from judicial demand or from such earlier date when the claim became ascertainable and due.
In using the term "ascertainable" the court did not mean that the precise amount of the claim need be liquidated or established without dispute in order for legal interest to commence in a contract claim . What was meant was that a debt or claim for the payment of money or damages under a contract is ascertainable and becomes due on the date an active violation occurred or the obligor was put in default, which can be earlier but never later than judicial demand, and legal interest runs from that date. [Citation added]
The judgment in this case awarding legal interest from date of judicial demand is correct.
In brief on appeal, plaintiff-appellee River Road Construction Company, Inc. specifies as error the trial court's failure to find the defendant's conduct arbitrary and capricious and to award penalties and attorney's fees. The plaintiff has not appealed the decision below, nor answered defendant's appeal. As such, plaintiff's arguments contained in brief will not be considered. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133; See Mackie v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 444 So.2d 166 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to appellant.
AFFIRMED.
CARTER and LeBLANC, JJ., concur.
WATKINS, J., concurs for the reasons assigned.
LANIER, J., agrees with the disposition of assignment of error number one, but only concurs in the result of assignment of error number two and will assign reasons.
SAVOIE, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by LANIER, J.