Case Name: STEVEN YOUNG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. RICHARD S. LATTA, D.O., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT, AND CARMEN ALAMENO, M.D., BURDETTE TOMLIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, JAMES MANLANDRO, D.O., AND ABC CORPORATION, SAID NAME ABC CORPORATION BEING FICTITIOUS, DEFENDANTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1989-06-07
Citations: 233 N.J. Super. 520
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEVEN YOUNG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. RICHARD S. LATTA, D.O., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT, AND CARMEN ALAMENO, M.D., BURDETTE TOMLIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, JAMES MANLANDRO, D.O., AND ABC CORPORATION, SAID NAME ABC CORPORATION BEING FICTITIOUS, DEFENDANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 233
Pages: 520–532

Head Matter:
STEVEN YOUNG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. RICHARD S. LATTA, D.O., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT, AND CARMEN ALAMENO, M.D., BURDETTE TOMLIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, JAMES MANLANDRO, D.O., AND ABC CORPORATION, SAID NAME ABC CORPORATION BEING FICTITIOUS, DEFENDANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued October 13, 1988
Decided June 7, 1989.
Before Judges GAULKIN, R.S. COHEN and ARNOLD M. STEIN.
Pellettieri, Rabstein and Altman, attorneys for appellant and cross-respondent (Richard M. Altman and E. Elizabeth Sweetser, of counsel; E. Elizabeth Sweetser on the brief and responding brief).
George & Korin, attorneys for respondent and cross-appellant (<Jay J. Blumberg, on the brief and reply brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ARNOLD M. STEIN, J.A.D.
The novel question presented by this appeal is whether the negligence of both a settling tortfeasor and a non-settling tortfeasor may be decided by the jury in the absence of a claim for contribution by the non-settler. We agree with the trial judge and answer in the affirmative.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On August 12, 1983, plaintiff fell from the boardwalk in Wildwood to the street below, injuring his head and face. He was taken to Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, where he was first attended in the emergency room by Dr. Latta. After an initial examination and review of X-rays, Dr. Latta called Dr. Alameno, the general staff surgeon then on call. Alameno authorized plaintiff's hospitalization. Plaintiff remained under Alameno's care until his discharge from Burdette Tomlin on August 14, 1983. On August 15, plaintiff was admitted to Princeton Medical Center, where a diagnosis was made of injury to the right optic nerve, resulting in permanent damage to and blindness in the right eye.
Plaintiff first sued Alameno and the hospital, claiming that their negligence caused the loss of vision in his right eye. Both defendants cross-claimed against each other, seéking contribution and indemnification.
By amended complaint, plaintiff then added as defendants Latta, Dr. Manlandro and the ABC Corporation, a fictitious entity.
Alameno cross-claimed for contribution and indemnification against Latta and Manlandro, who filed a joint answer to the amended complaint. They did not cross-claim against Alameno for contribution or indemnification.
Summary judgment was later entered in favor of Manlandro. Just before trial, plaintiff settled with Alameno for $20,000 and dismissed with prejudice his claim against the hospital. This left Latta as the only remaining defendant at' the time of trial.
Over objection of plaintiff's attorney, the trial judge instructed the jury to decide negligence and causal relationship as to both Alameno, the settling defendant, and Latta, the non-settler. Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury. The jury found both doctors at fault, fixed damages at $150,000, and assessed negligence at 80% for Alameno and 20% for Latta. The trial judge molded the verdict, awarding judgment against Latta in the amount of $30,000. The judge assessed prejudgment interest against Latta from May 10, 1984, the date that plaintiff filed the original complaint which did not name Latta as a party defendant.
Plaintiff appeals, contending that because of Latta's failure to cross-claim against Alameno for contribution, the jury should not have considered the negligence of Alameno, the settling co-defendant. Latta cross-appeals, arguing that prejudgment interest should have been assessed against him only from the date that he was made a party defendant in the amended complaint.
1.
If the trial judge was correct in instructing the jury to decide the negligence of both the settling and non-settling defendants, plaintiffs recovery, exclusive of interest, is $50,-000: $20,000 from the settler Alameno, and $30,000 from Latta, the non-settler (20% of $150,000).
Without Alameno's negligence submitted to the jury, plaintiffs recovery, exclusive of interest, is $170,000: $20,000 from Alameno, plus $150,000, the total verdict proceeds, from Latta. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that Latta should at most receive a credit for the $20,000 paid plaintiff from Alameno, leaving Latta to pay $130,000. Plaintiff would thus receive $150,000, the amount of the jury verdict.
We conclude that the trial judge was correct in submitting the negligence of the settling and non-settling defendants to the jury, and thereafter molding the verdict in accordance with the jury's allocation of fault between these two defendants.
The Comparative Negligence Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 et seq.) directs in N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2 "[i]n all negligence actions in which the question of liability is in dispute," the trier of fact shall determine "the full value of the injured party's damages" (subsection a) and also
The extent, in the form of a percentage, of each parties' negligence. The percentage of negligence of each party shall be based on 100% and the total of all percentages of negligence of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%. (subsection b).
The judge shall thereupon "mold the judgment from the finding of fact made by the trier of fact." (subsection c).
The essential question is whether Alameno is one of the "parties" to the litigation whose negligence is to be assessed by the fact finder and included in the judge's molding of the verdict. Both plaintiff and Latta agree, that, if Latta had cross-claimed against Alameno, Alameno would be such a "party." Rogers v. Spady, 147 N.J.Super. 274 (App.Div.1977) so held:
[W]hen a claimant settles with a codefendant, that percentage of negligence found attributable to the settling codefendant will be deducted from the verdict returned against the other codefendants found liable, i.e., the remaining joint tortfeasors will be liable for that percentage of negligence attributable to them, [at 277].
See also Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 81 N.J. 548, 569 (1980); Tefft v. Tefft, 192 N.J.Super. 561, 566 (App.Div.1983); Dimogerondakis v. Dimogerondakis, 197 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (Law Div.1984). That result occurs even though as a matter of law the settlement dismisses not only the plaintiff's claims but also all crossclaims against the settling defendant. Cartel Capital Corp., 81 N.J. at 569; cf. Theobald v. Angelos (Theobald II), 44 N.J. 228, 232, 241 (1965).
Plaintiff argues for a different result where the non-settling defendant has not cross-claimed against the settling defendant. He asserts that the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (N.J. S.A. 2A:53A-1 et seq.) permits contribution among joint tortfeasors only in "actions for contribution" (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-4) and that R. 4:7-5(b) also requires a defendant to "assert a claim for contribution." Plaintiff accordingly urges that Latta, as a non-settling defendant, is barred from contribution in the ab sence of pleading such a cross-claim. We find the contention unpersuasive because contribution is not in issue where one tortfeasor has settled and another has not.
A non-settling defendant can never seek contribution against a settling defendant. As we have already said, even if the non-settler has cross-claimed for contribution, that claim is dismissed as a matter of law upon the settlement. Tefft v. Tefft, supra, 192 N.J.Super. at 570. The right to contribution arises only when a party is "compelled to pay more than such party's percentage share." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3. What the non-settling defendant seeks is not contribution, but a molding of the verdict to reflect his or her own proportionate liability in keeping with the Comparative Negligence Act. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law is offended by thus giving effect to the Comparative Negligence Act. Both statutes are designed to provide for an equitable allocation of burden among tortfeasors. Both statutes would be pointlessly frustrated if such allocation were unavailable simply because a defendant failed to plead a cause of action which is barred to him in any event. Our pleading rules should not be read to yield such an unseemly result. Cf. Gottfried v. Temel's Restaurant, Inc., 69 N.J.Super. 163 (App.Div.1961) (pre-comparative negligence case holding that failure to assert a claim for contribution against a settling tortfeasor did not deprive the non-settling defendant of the right to a 50% pro rata credit).
Our ruling does not give license to a non-settling defendant to assert liability of a settling defendant without fair and timely notice. Where a defendant has not alleged liability of a co-defendant either by pleading or in discovery, he may well be foreclosed from presenting proofs or argument to implicate the co-defendant. See, e.g., R. 4:10-2; R. 4:17-4(c); R. 4:17-7. And, if no issue of fact is properly presented as to the liability of the settling defendant, the fact finder cannot be asked, under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2 or otherwise, to assess any proportionate liability against the settler.
2.
The trial judge incorrectly applied prejudgment interest against defendant Latta's share of the verdict from May 10, 1984, the date when the original complaint was filed, rather than August 12, 1985, when Latta was first joined by amended complaint as a party defendant. R. 4:42-ll(b) provides for the imposition of prejudgment interest in tort actions "from the date of the institution of the action or from a date six months after the cause of action arises____" The rule contemplates that prejudgment interest runs against a particular defendant from the date that the action is instituted against that particular defendant.
We reverse that portion of the judgment of the Law Division which awarded prejudgment interest against defendant Latta from the date of filing of the original complaint, rather than from the date that Latta was named as a party defendant. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. We remand the matter to the Law Division for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
We address here the applicable provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act in effect in August 1983, when plaintiffs cause of action arose. We note, however, recent amendments to this statute primarily involving liability of social hosts (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2) and sharply restricting joint and several liability under certain circumstances (N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3). See L.1987, c. 325, § 1 and 2, eff. December 18, 1987; L.1987, c. 404, § 4, eff. January 14, 1988.
Consider this scenario: when the plaintiff announces his settlement with the co-defendant, the non-settling defendant is granted leave to amend his pleadings to assert a cross-claim. The cross-claim is filed and immediately dismissed as barred by the settlement. Surely the rights and liabilities of plaintiff and the non-settling defendant should not turn on the performance of this little gavotte.