Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. David M. FINKLEA
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-24
Citations: 313 So. 2d 224
Docket Number: No. 55723
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. David M. FINKLEA.
Judges: TATE, J., also assigns additional concurring reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 313
Pages: 224–227

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. David M. FINKLEA.
No. 55723.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 24, 1975.
Rehearing Denied May 30, 1975.
William G. Kelly, Jr., Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., Brian E. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence of eighteen months for second offense possession of marijuana. R.S. 40:966. The sole question on appeal is the correctness of the overruling of a motion to suppress.
Marijuana seeds (estimated at from eight to twelve) were found by deputies after they had stopped and searched a car driven by defendant's brother and occupied by defendant and a girl friend. The evidence is conflicting in many respects.
The State argues that the police had probable cause to search without a warrant, and, in the alternative, the contraband was in plain view.
The "plain view" argument is not supported by the evidence. The seeds were described as being the size of the letter "c" on a typewriter; one officer said they were found between the seat and the seat back of the rear seat of the automobile, in the crack where they joined, and on the rug on the floor and in the ashtray; the other officer said the seeds were on the front seat; neither testified that any contraband was visible from outside the car.
The State argues that: "The defendants fled from the officers upon their approach and after the collision; the driver was placed under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated, prior to the search of the interi- or of the vehicle. Additionally, the officers smelled what they believed to be marijuana at the time the defendants opened the door and removed themselves from the vehicle. The totality of facts gave the officers reasonable grounds to search the vehicle without a warrant."
The officers testified that they first observed the old Cadillac automobile occupied by the defendant's party about 10:30 in the evening. There had been a complaint about a half hour earlier that a light colored Cadillac with a loud muffler was acting "suspiciously" on a country road.
The officers saw such a Cadillac drive up to the gas pumps at a country store, followed by a Javelin. The officers intended to question the occupants of the Cadillac, but both cars started to leave the station, one heading north and the other headed south. The officers put the police vehicle in reverse, attempting to block the Cadillac, and then there was a slight collision between the rear of the police car and the side of the Cadillac. The deputies turned on their car's flashing red light at about the time they tried to stop the cars.
The deputies said they then turned their car around and pursued the Cadillac, which, they said, left at a high speed. The deputies said they reached a speed of about 60 mph and caught up with the Cadillac, which stopped about 54 °r Vi mile away, in front of the deputies. It was at this point that the arrest and search was made.
The deputies ordered the occupants out of the Cadillac, searched them, handcuffed the two boys and placed the girl between the two automobiles. During this procedure the deputies said they smelled marijuana smoke and smelled alcohol on the breath of the driver (not the defendant). They asked the driver if they could search the car, and the driver said yes, provided he be allowed to watch the search. This the deputies did not permit him to do, but searched, nevertheless. The State does not contend that the search was with the consent of the possessor of the automobile.
The occupants of the Cadillac denied that there was a chase. They said they had driven to the store for gasoline, found it closed, and were leaving when the deputies collided with their car, which was partly on the road at the time of the collision. The car was then brought to a halt on the road near the store, according to the boys.
The police had determined to question the occupants of the Cadillac when they first saw it. The officers said they could tell "they were going to run" as soon as the officers pulled into the grocery parking lot. Then the "chase" began, and whether it was for 50 yards or a Yz mile is immaterial.
The police had no right to arrest the defendant or his companions when they drove into the station. The police did have a right to make a "non-custodial investigation ;" that is, they could look and see, and question if those interrogated wished to be questioned. They had no right, however, to stop them or chase them or arrest them. The police had no information of any crime — only that a light colored Cadillac with loud mufflers had acted suspicious on a country road.
When there is no warrant, police may arrest only when the one arrested has committed a felony, or has committed a misdemeanor in his presence, or at least "has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense." C.Cr.P. 213.
The reasonable cause must exist before the arrest, not after. After the defendant and his companions were removed from the car and handcuffed, the deputies, having smelled alcohol, arrested defendant's brother for driving while intoxicated. Having smelled marijuana, they searched, found seeds, and announced that defendant and the others were under arrest for possession of marijuana. The only incident noted by the State and the trial judge which occurred before the defendant was stopped and handcuffed (arrested) was the "flight." Flight alone, under these circumstances, cannot justify an arrest. See State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869 (La.1974).
The motion to quash should have been, and is now, sustained. The conviction and sentence are reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
TATE, J., also assigns additional concurring reasons.
SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent and assign written reasons.