Case Name: The Lottawanna
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1874-10
Citations: 21 Wall. 558
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Lottawanna.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 558–609

Head Matter:
The Lottawanna.
1. Whilst the general maritime law is the basis of the maritime law of the United States, as well as of other countries, it is only so far operative in this, or any country, as it is adopted by the laws and usages thereof. It has no inherent force of its own.
2. In particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character, the received maritime law may differ in different countries without affecting the general integrity of the system as a harmonious whole.
3. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers ' and statesmen of this country when the Constitution was adopted, was-intended, and referred to, when it was declared in that instrument, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend “ to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Thus adopted, it became the maritime law of the United States, operating uniformly in the whole country.
4. The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively a judicial question, and no State law or act of Congress can make it broader or narrower than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent to affect it.
6. The decisions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to the laws and Constitution, are especially to be considered; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they have been governed.
6. It is settled, by repeated adjudications of this court, that material-men furnishing repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port do not acquire thereby any lien upon the vessel by the general maritime law as received in the United States
7. Whilst it cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that the maritime law should remain unchanged, the courts cannot change it; they can only declare it. If within its proper scope, any change is desired in its rules, other than those of procedure, it must be made by the legislative department.
8. Semble, that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, has authority to establish a lien on vessels of the United States in favor of material-men, uniform throughout the whole country.
9. In particular cases, in which Congress has not exorcised the power of regulating commerce, with which it is invested by the Constitution, and where the subject does not in its nature require the exclusive exercise of that power, the States, until Congress acts, may continue to legislate.
10. Hence, liens granted by the laws of a State in favor of material-men for furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port in said State are valid, though the contract to furnish the same is a maritime contract, and can only be enforced by proceedings in rem in the District Courts of the United States.
11. Any person having a specific lien on, or a vested right in, a surplus fund in court, may apply by petition for the protection of his interest under the forty-third admiralty rule.
12. Separate libels were filed in 1871, against a steamboat, for wages for salvage, for supplies furnished at her home port, and for the amount due on a mortgage. Held, on the evidence, that the lien for supplies had not been perfected under the State law; and, if it had been, that the libels for such supplies could not be sustained prior to the recent change in the twelfth admiralty rule. Held, also, that the libel upon the mortgage could not be sustained as an original proceeding, but that the mortgagees, having petitioned for the surplus proceeds of the vessel, were entitled to have the same applied to their mortgage.
Appeal in admiralty from the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana.
The case was thus:
In the year 1819 this court, in The General Smith decided (as the profession has generally understood), that in respect to repairs or necessaries furnished to a ship in the port or State to which she belongs, no lien is implied unless it is recognized by the municipal law of the State; declaring the rule herein to be different from that where the repairs or necessaries are furnished to a foreign ship; in which case it was admitted that the maritime law of the United States gives the party a lien on the ship itself for his security.
In view of this decision most or all of the States enacted laws giving a lien for the protection of material-men in such cases.
In the year 1833, in the case of The Planter, the converse of the rule in The General Smith was laid down, aud process against a vessel in her home port was used and supported, the State law giving a lien in the case.
In 1844, this court, acting in pursuance of acts of Congress which authorized it to adopt rules of practice in the courts of the United States in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (and. adhering to the practice declared as proper in the cases mentioned), adopted the following rule of practice:
“Rule XII.
“In all suits by material-men for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, or against the master and owner alone in personam; and the like proceeding in rem shall apply to cases of domestic ships, where by the local law a lien is given to material-men for supplies, repairs, and other necessaries.”
On the 1st of May, 1859, a new twelfth rule was adopted, as a substitute for the one above given. It was thus:
“Rule XII.
“ In all suits by material-men, for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship or freight in ~em, or against the master or owner alone in personam. And the like proceedings in personam, but not in rem, shall apply in cases of domestic ships for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries.”
The reasons for the substitution of this latter rule for the former one are stated by Taney, O. J., in the case of The Steamer St. Lawrence, to have been that in some eases the State laws giving liens, and the constructions put on them, by State courts, were found not to harmonize with the principles and rules of the maritime code, and embarrassed the Federal courts in applying them.
In this state of things, William Doyle and another filed a libel in the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, abovementioned, on the 10th day of June, 1871, against the steamer Lottawana, of New Orleans, for mariners’ wages. The vessel being seized, libels of intervention were afterwards filed by various parties, some for mariners’ wages, some for salvage services, some for supplies, materials, and repairs furnished in the port of New Orleans, for the use of the steamer. On the 20th day of June, 1871, Catharine Rodd, administratrix, together with several commercial firms of the city of New Orleans, filed a libel of intervention by which they set up a mortgage on the vessel, given to them by the owner, on the 20th of May, 1871, and duly recorded in the custom-house on the 22d of May, to secure the payment of various promissory notes of the same date, given to said libellants by the said owner, and amounting to more than $14,000.
The steamer, up to the 16th of May, had been engaged in the river trade oil the Mississippi and Red Rivers, between New Orleans and Jefferson, in Texas, and was laid up for repairs at New Orleans on that day. Most of the claims for wages and supplies arose before the date of the mortgage, although some arose afterwards. The steamer was sold for $7500, and, after deducting expenses of sale, costs, salvage and wages of mariners (which were admitted tO' have preference), there remained a surplus of $4644.42, which the District Court, by a decree rendered February 26th, 1872, and signed on the 1st of March following, decreed to be paid pro rata to the mortgage creditors, t'o the exclusion of the claims for repairs and supplies.
On the 6th of May, 1872, about two months after the decree was finally rendered, this court promulgated yet a third twelfth rule in admiralty. It was in these words:
“In all suits by material-men for supplies or repairs or other necessaries, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam.”
In this state of things, on the 3d of June, 1872, the above-mentioned decree of the District Court was reversed by the Circuit Court, on appeal, and the surplus ivas decreed to be paid pro rata to the claimants for repairs and supplies, to the exclusion of the mortgage creditors; the amount not being ■sufficient to pay either class of creditors in full. From the latter decree an appeal w7as taken to this court.
The principal question presented by the appeal, therefore, was whether the furnishing to a vessel on her credit, at her home port, needful repairs and supplies created a maritime lien. If it did, such lien would take precedence of a mortgage given for the payment, of money generally, and the decree must be affirmed. If it. did not, the decree was to be reversed; unless the appellees could sustain themselves on ■some other ground.
Such other grounds they asserted existed in what they alleged to be a fact, to wit, that by the law of Louisiana they had a “privilege” for their claims giving them a lien on ■the vessel and her proceeds, which lieu, though not strictly a maritime one, the court was bound to enforce.
[On that part of the subject the case was said by the appellant’s counsel to be thus:
The constitution of Louisiana of 1869, ordains :
■ “No mortgage or privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unless recorded in the parish where the property to be affected is situated.”
The Revised Civil Code of Louisiana says:
“Article 3237. The following debts are privileges on the price of ships and other vessels:
“ Sums due to sellers: to those who have furnished materials, and to workmen employed in the construction, if the vessel has never made a voyage, and those due to creditors for supplies, labor, repairing, victuals, armament, and equipment.’
“ Article 3273. Privileges are valid against third persons from the date of the recording of the act or evidence of indebtedness, as provided by law.
“ Article 3274. No privilege shall have effect against third persons unless recorded, in the manner required by law, in the parish where the property to be affected is situated.
“Article 3093. If the mortgage or privilege be a notarial or public act, the same shall be recorded. . . . If the same be not in writing, the person claiming the mortgage or privilege, his agent, or some person having knowledge of the fact, must make affidavit of all the facts on which it is based, stating the amount and all the necessary facts, which affidavit shall be recorded iii the mortgage-book as other acts of mortgage or privilege.”]
No record of mortgage was shown in the transcript.
The case was twice argued, once at December Term, 1873, by Mr. T. J. Semmes, for the appellant, and Messrs. J. A. Grow and Jj. M. Day, for the appellees; and now, at this term, by Mr. B,. Mott, for the appellant, and Mr. J. A. Groio,> for the appellees, and by Mr. W. W. Goodrich, in favor of the lien for supplies furnished a vessel in her home port, and by Mr. William Allan Butler and Mr. Andrew Boardman, in opposition to such lien.
It was thus contended in favor of such lien, or in support of the ruling below :
I. As to the principal question.
The General Smith is. the case always relied on against the lien.
1. That ease was wrongly deckled.
In determining a question of admiralty lieu, a court of admiralty must resort for tbe principles upon which to base its conclusion neither to the rules and decisions of courts of common law nor to the statutory regulations of the different States of the United States, but to the general maritime law which, according to the comity of nations, is administered by all courts of admiralty. Says Marshall, C. J.:
“ In admiralty eases the law, admiralty an,d' maritime, as it. has existed for ages, is applied by our courts to the cases as-they arise.”
Says Nelson, J.:
“The admiralty is a maritime court, instituted for the purpose of administering the law of the sea.”
In harmony with these authorities, and with the object of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction contained in the Constitution of tbe United States, and following also the example set by this court, we turn to the general maritime law for the law of this case. In that ancient body of law there is found imbedded the general rule that necessaries furnished to a ship bind the ship herself as a contracting party. From this rule, as it exists in the general maritime law, a domestic ship is not excepted. Says Benedict:
“The civil law, the general maritime law, and.the particular maritime codes, extend this lien or privilege to all ships and vessels, without any distinction between foreign and domestic vessels.”
No sound reason exists why our country should depart from this rule of the admiralty. The foundation of the rule lies in the necessities of navigation. These maintain from age to age the same general characteristics. The vicissitudes to which all vessels engaged in navigation are necessarily exposed, compels some method by which the wants of a ship may be promptly supplied. That result has been found to be best obtained by making the whole value of the ship an available security for any debt lawfully contracted to relieve her wants. It is a mistake to suppose that the principal object of the lien of the maritime law is to protect the interest of those dealing with ships. Its real object is to enable the ship in any place and at any time to obtain relief in case of necessity, and thus to get on, to the end that the venture of the merchant be not jeoparded, and that commerce may thrive. The benefit sought to be secured is benefit to the ship, not to the material-man. In the absence of such a rule it is manifest that the material-man could resort to the common-law lieu acquired by retaining the possession of the ship, whence disastrous results must often follow. A rule resting upon such ground was of course made applicable to the demand of the material-man, the necessity for whose services is in most cases as cogent as the need of a crew, or a pilot-, or a wharf. Therefore, it came to be understood to be general law, that the material-man acquired a lieu by the furnishing of necessaries to a ship, whether domestic or foreign. Such was the declaration of the civil law, which in Roman ports furnished the rule as well for the Roman ship as for the ship of the barbarian. Sucb was the declaration of the maritime codes, and such the rule declared in the ordinance. And when those great systems of law are referred to, the reference is in no proper sense to local law, but to general law as known throughout the civilized world, including, for a long period, England.
No sufficient reason, then, as wo have said, can be given for making domestic vessels an exception to this rule in the United States. Some considerations press strongly the other way. To admit such an exception is to give to the admiralty courts of the United States a law different from the general maritime law, whereas the provision in the Constitution, by-virtue of which the admiralty courts were created, was intended to provide courts for the sole purpose of administer ing the general maritime law. The maritime law is part of the law of nations, one of the great beauties of which is its universality. Uniformity has been declared to be its essence. The worst maritime code would bo one which should be dictated by the separate interest and influenced by the peculiar manner of only one people.
Further. The peculiar character of the commerce which engages the ships and vessels of the United States — there is no such thing as a vessel of a State — affords additional reason why the law respecting supplies to ships and vessels should be uniform throughout the United States, and at the same time in harmony with the general maritime law. For in our country we have great inland seas, bordering on different States of the Union, with different laws, and also on foreign territory, which are navigable by vessels owned by residents of different States, and also by foreign vessels proper. ¥e also have long navigable rivers whose waters are vexed by the keels of foreign as well as domestic vessels, engaged for the most part on routes from State to State, but not infrequently on voyages which extend beyond the mouths of rivers to the open sea, and thence to all the corners of the earth. In such a navigation no harmony in the laws governing the vessel, during the course of a single voyage even, can be secured by resort to State laws or to the-decisions of the State tribunals. For such a country, a maritime law— the same in all the States — rendered uniform by the decisions of one high appellate court of admiralty — and in harmony with the general maritime law of the world — a law not rigid by reason of statutory provisions, but broad, flexible, and just — a common law of the seas, becomes of the first importance ; and the necessity for such a system of law becomes imperious, when we approach the subject of supplies and repairs, which any vessel, at any moment, and at auy place, may be compelled to procure forthwith, or perish where she lies.
That serious difficulty did, not long ago, arise from the want of such a law for the ships and vessels of the United States, is in a great measure owing to the decision that all vessels of the United States are foreign vessels when'without the limits of the State wherein the residence of the owner happens to be.
These views derive support from the well-known fact that the announcement of the doctrine of The General Smith was followed by statutes of the States which, as far as rt was possible for the States to do, reinstated the rule of the general maritime law. In more than twenty States of the Union a lien upon domestic vessels for repairs and supplies was attempted to be created by local laws; and this, too, with full knowledge that the courts of admiralty could be resorted to for the enforcement of the lien so created, as indeed they were, almost to the exclusion of the State tribunals in some places. The reports of the State of New York prior to the change of the twelfth rule, show but very few adjudications — some ten or twelve perhaps — upon this subject by the State courts, while, as is notorious, the District Court of the United States in the port of New York was crowded with actions by material-men seeking there to secure the benefits of a maritime lien by enforcing the lien law of the State. These statutes, so used in many States, were not only maintained upon the statute-books, but they were from time to time rendered more nearly analogous to the maritime law, until the ship-owning State of New York, by the act of 1862, not only extended a lien to the builders of ships and to stevedores, but in effect created a State admiralty for the plain purpose of securing to the vessels owned by citizens of the State the benefits of the rule of the general maritime law. The absence of any repugnance to the rule of the maritime law is thus clearly shown, and it is believed that no objection exists anywhere to surrendering to the admiralty courts of the United States the whole subject of liens upon domestic vessels.
2. Aside from the twelfth ride of 1872, to be spoken of directly, there are decisions of the Supreme Court which, in effect, overthrow the authority of The General Smith.
The reason relied on in that case, as the foundation for the distinction between domestic aud foreign vessels, was that the law of England recognized such a distinction.* It may be remarked in passing that in England the distinction was forced upon the courts of admiralty by the prohibition of the courts of common law, issued upon considerations as to the policy of England, and that it has not been often that the circumstance that a particular- rule of law would advance the interests of England, has beeu held to be a reason for the adoption of the rule by the courts of the United States. Waiving,-however, such considerations, we submit that since The General Smith this court has on more than one occasion declared that the doctrines of England, in respect to the admiralty, do not furnish authority for the determinations of the admiralty courts of this country. The reason for the decision in the case of The General Smith having been thus repudiated by late decisions, the authority of the case is gone.
Further. This court has expressly declared that the grant of the Constitution “ must be held to mean all such cases of a maritime character as were cognizable in the admiralty courts of the States at the time the Constitution was adopted.” Now, since the argument of Mr. F. C. Loring, in Insurance Company v. Dunham, and what he there showed, it is beyond dispute that the admiralty courts of the Colonies did entertain actions to enforce liens for supplies furnished to domestic vessels.
But more than this. In this very ease of The Lottawanna, and so lately as at the last term, Clifford, J., delivering the opinion of the court says — and this ivilhout any reference to the new'twelfth rule of 1872 — as follows:
“ Much embarrassment has existed ever since the old twelfth admiralty rule was repealed, as the new rule makes no pro vision to enforce the payment of contracts for repairs and supplies furnished to domestic ships, except by a libel in personam. Repeated judicial attempts have been made to overcome the difficulty, none of which have proved satisfactory, because they failed to provide a remedy in the admiralty by a proceeding in rem. Inconveniences of the kind have been felt for a long time, until the bench and the bar have come to doubt whether the decision that a maritime lien does not arise in a contract for repairs and supplies furnished to a domestic ship is correct, as it is clear that the contract is a maritime contract, just as plainly as the contract to furnish such repairs and supplies to a foreign ship or to a domestic ship in the port of a State other than that to which the ship belongs. Such a remedy is not given even in the latter case, unless the repairs and supplies were furnished on the credit of the ship, and it is difficult to see why the same remedy may not be given in the former case if the repairs and supplies were obtained by the master on the same terms. These and many other considerations have had the effect to create serious doubts as to the correctness of the decision made more than fifty years ago, in The General Smith that a maritime lien does not arise in such a case.”
3. The modification in 1872 of ike twelfth admiralty rule has greatly changed the position of the question.
Originally the twelfth rule recognized the law declared in the ease of The General Smith. It was based upon two propositions: 1st. That by the maritime law of the United States no lien upon a domestic vessel existed in favor of a material-man; 2d. That a local law could give the material-man a lien upon a domestic vessel, which might be enforced by the courts of admiralty.
In 1858 the second of these propositions wps withdrawn from the rule, and by the amendment of 1872 the first was made to disappear. As the rule now stands, it authorizes a material-man to institute an action in rem against a domestic and a foreign ship alike.
The rule, as thus amended, overrules the decision in the ease of The General Smith, and is in itself an authoritative declaration that the distinction heretofore made between foreign and domestic ships does not exist. It can hardly be supposed that the Supreme Court intended to declare by rule, that a material-man could proceed against the domestic ship in rem, and at the same time leave it open to be decided that such proceeding must of course be futile. Nor can it be supposed that the Supreme Court intended to give by rule a right not before existing by law. Any lien thus created would be a new right arising out of the process, and subject, of course, to all rights previously acquired. Such a lien would be very different indeed from a maritime lien, which does not arise out of the process, but out of the contract. And as by the rule the right is made the same in the case of a foreign as of a domestic vessel, such an understanding of the rule would seem to sweep from the law of the United States the whole doctrine of maritime liens, so far as regards material men. But how can an authorization of a proceeding in rem be simply a rule of process, if, as says Curtis, J., “ a proceeding in rem is to give effect to a maritime lien arising either ex contractu or quasi ex contractu, or ex delicto or quasi ex delicto ?” If “ the lien and the proceeding in rem are correlative, where one exists the other may be taken.”
II. [As to the special or subsidiary question — that of the privilege under the law of Louisiana — it was argued as the reporter understood it, — notwithstanding what was said in the constitution and code of Louisiana, that hypothecations of ships and other vessels were made according to the laws and usages of commerce, and that in whatever cases those usages and laws would recognize the validity of a hypothecation of a vessel, the code of Louisiana also recognized it, and in none other. This special question, however, was less insisted on than the principal one.]
4 Wheaton, 443.
Reported under the name of Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters, 324.
Acts of Hay 8th, 1792 (1 Stat. at Large, 275), and of August 23d, 1842 (5 Id. 516).
1 Black, 529.
Article 123.
With the brief of the appellee was submitted an opinion of Benedict, J., of the New York District, in the case of The Crescent, sustaining a lien for materials against a domestic ship. Much of the argument now given is from that document.
The Patriot, 1 A. M. L., p. 77.
Norwich Company v. Wright, 13 Wallace, 116.
Admiralty, § 272.
The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wallace, 452; Dupont v. Vance, 19 Howard, 168; The Seneca, Washington, J., 3d Wallace, Jr.
See remarks of New York Court of Appeals, in Brookman v. Hamill, 42 New York, 562.
See what is said by Woodbury, J., in Waring v. Clark, 5 Howard, 451.
Waring v. Clark, 5 Howard, 451; The Magnolia, 20 Id. 299, 341; The Genesee Chief, 12 Id. 451; The China, 7 Wallace, 69.
The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 636; Waring v. Clark, 5 Howard, 451.
11 Wallace, 1.
20 Id. 219.
Abbott on Shipping, 143, 148.
5 American Law Review, 612; 7 Id.; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 529; The Harrison, 2 Abbott, United States Reports, 78; The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 645, 646.
4 Wheaton, 443.
The Mayurka, 2 Curtis, 77.
The Rook Island Bridge, 6 Wallace, 215.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice BRADLEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal questions raised in this case were decided by this court adversely to the lien more than fifty years ago in the case of The General Smith, reported in 4 Wheaton, 488, and that decision has ever since been adhered to, except occasionally in some of the District Courts. A solemn judgment relied on so long by the commercial community as a rule of property and the law of the land, ought not to be overruled except for very cogent reasous. If, however, in the progress of investigation, and with the new lights that have been thrown upon the whole subject of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, a more ratioual view of the question demands an adverse ruling in order to preserve harmony and logical consistencj7 in the general system, the court might, perhaps, if no evil consequences of a glaring character were likely to ensue, feel constrained to adopt it. But if no such necessity exists, we ought not to-permit any consideration of mere expediency or love of scientific completeness, to draw us into a substantial change of the received law. The additional security which has been extended to bills of sale and mortgages on ships and vessels since the passage of the act for recording them in the custom-house; and the confidence with which purchasers and mortgagees have invested money therein under the existing course of decisions on this subject, have placed a large amount of property at undue hazard, if those decisions may lightly, or without grave cause, be disturbed.
The ground on which we are asked to overrule the judgment in the case of The General Smith is, that by the general maritime law, those who furnish necessary materials, repairs, and supplies to a vessel, upon her credit, have a lien on such a vessel therefor, as well when furnished in her home port as when furnished in if*foreign port, and that the courts of admiralty are bound to give effect to that lien.
The proposition assumes that the general maritime law governs this case, and is binding on the courts of the United States.
But it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country. In this respect it is like international law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such; or, like the ease of the civil law, which forms the basis of most European laws, but which has the force of law in each state only so far as it is adopted therein, and with such modifications as are deemed expedient. The adoption of the common law by the several States of this Union also presents ah analogous case. It is the basis of all the State laws; but is modified as each sees fit. Perhaps the maritime law is more uniformly followed by commercial nations than the civil and common laws are by those who use them. But, like those laws, however fixed, definite, and beneficial the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far.the effect of law in any country as it is permitted to have. But the actual maritime law can hardly be said to have a fixed and definite form as to all the subjects which may be' embraced within its scope. Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the saíne in all commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities exist either as to some of the rules, or in the mode of enforcing them. Especially is this the case on the-outside boundaries of the law, where it comes in contact with, or shades off into the local or municipal law of the* particular country and affects only its own merchants or people in their relations to each other. Whereas, in matters affecting the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is more assiduously observed — as, in justice, it should be. No one doubts that .every nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may adopt one; England another; the United States a third; still, the convenience of the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse, demands that, in all essential things wherein those relations bring them in contact, there should be a uniform law founded on natural reason and justice. Hence the adoption by all commercial nations (our own included) of the general maritime law-as the basis and groundwork of all their maritime regulations. But no nation regards.itself as precluded from making occasional modifications suited to its locality and the genius of its own people and institutions, especially in matters that are of merely local and municipal consequence and do not affect other nations. It will be found, therefore, that the maritime codes of France, England, Sweden, and other countries, are not one and the same in every particular; but that whilst there is a general correspondence between them arising from the fact that each adopts the essential principles, and the great mass of the general maritime law, as the basis of its system, there are varying shades of difi'erence corresponding to the respective territories, climate, and genius of the people of each country respectively. Each state adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, proprio vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. Thus adopted and thus qualified in each case, it becomes the maritime law of the particular nation that adopts it. And without such voluntary adoption it would not be law. And thus it happens, that, from the general practice of commercial nations in making the same general law the basis and groundwork of their respective maritime systems, the great mass of maritime law which is thus received by these nations in common, comes to be the common maritime law of the world.
This account of the maritime law, if correct, plainly shows that in particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character, the received maritime law .may differ in different countries without affecting the general integrity of the system as a harmonious whole. The government of one country may be willing, to give to its citizens, who supply a ship with provisions at her home port where the owner himself resides, a lien on the ship; whilst that of another country may take a contrary view as to the expediency of such a rule. The difference between them in a matter that concerns only their own citizens, in each case, cannot seriously affect the harmony and consistency of the common maritime law which each adopts and observes.
This view of the subject does not in the slightest degree detract from the proper authority and respect due to that venerable law of the sea, which has been the subject of such high encomiums from the ablest jurists of all countries; it merely places it upon the just and logical grounds upon which it is accepted, and with proper qualifications, received with the binding force of law in all countries.
The proposition, therefore, that by the general maritime law a lien is given in cases of the kind now under consideration, does not advance the argument a single step, unless it be shown to be in accordance with the maritime law as accepted and received in the United States. It certainly has not been the maritime law of England for more than two centuries past; and whether it is the maritime law of this country depends upon questions which are not answered by simply turning to the ordinary European treatises on maritime law, or the codes or ordinances of any particular country.
That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to when it wfjs declaimed in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." But by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the law thus adopted ? The Constitution does not define it. It does not declare whether it w7as intended to embrace the entire maritime .law as expounded in the treatises, or only the limited and restricted system which was received in England, or lastly, such modification of both of these as was accepted and recognized as law in this country. Nor does the Constitution attempt to draw the boundary line between maritime law and local law; nor does it lay down any criterion for ascertaining that boundary. It assumes that the mean ing of the phrase " admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of " cases in law and equity," or of " suits at common law," without defining those terms, assuming them to be known and understood.
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states.
The question is discussed with great felicity and judgment by Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court in the case of The St. Lawrence, where he says: "Judicial power, in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government in general terms, and courts of this character had then been established in all commercial and maritime nations, differing, however, materially in different countries in the powers and duties confided to them; the extent of the jurisdiction conferred depending very much upon the character of the government in which they were created; and this circumstance, with the general terms of the grant, rendered it difficult to define the exact limits of its power in the United States. This difficulty was increased by the complex character of our government, where separate and distinct specified powers of sovereignty are exercised by the United States aud a State independently of each other within the same territorial limits. Aud the reports of the decisions of the court will show that the subject has often been before it, and carefully considered, without being able to fix with precision its definite boundaries; but certainly no State law can enlarge it, uor can an act of Congress or rule of court make it broader thau the judicial power may determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in the Constitution, taken in connection with the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was granted to the Federal government."
Guided by these sound principles, this court has felt itself at liberty to recognize the admiralty jurisdiction as extending to localities and subjects which, by the jealousy of the common law, were prohibited to it in England, but which fairly belong to it on every ground of reason when applied' to the peculiar circumstances of this country, with its extended territories, its inland seas, and its navigable rivers, especially as the narrow restrictions of the English law had never prevailed on this side of the Atlantic, even in colonial times.
The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is undoubtedly, as Chief Justice Taney intimates, exclusively a judicial question, and no State law or act of Congress can make it broader, or (it may be added) narrower, than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the basis of the sy.stem, depends- on what has been received as law in the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent to affect it. .
To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of this country is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian, and other foreign works on the subject, or the codes which they have framed; but we must have regard to our own legal history, constitution, legislation; usages, and adjudications as well. The decisions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to the. laws and Constitution are especially to be considered; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they have been governed.
But. we must always remember that the court cannot make the Ituv, it can only declare it. If, within its proper scope, any change is desired in its rules, other than those of procedure, it must be made by the legislative department. It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that the law should forever remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed. The scope of the maritime law, and that of commercial regulation are not coterminous, it is true, but the latter embraces much the largest portion of ground covered by the former. Under it Congress has regulated the registry, enrolment, license, and nationality of ships and vessels; the method of recording bills of sale and mortgages thereon; the rights and duties of seamen; the limitations of the responsibility of shipowners for the negligence and misconduct of their captains and crews; and many other things of a character truly maritime. And with, regard to the question now under consideration, namely, the rights of material-men in reference to supplies and repairs furnished to a vessel in her home port, there does not seem to be any great reason to doubt that Congress might adopt a uniform rule for the whole country, though, of course, this will be a matter for consideration should the question ever be directly presented for adjudication.
On this subject the remarks of Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the court in White's Bank v. Smith (which established the validity and effect of the act respecting the recording of mortgages on vessels in the customhouse), are pertinent. He says: "Ships or vessels of the United States are creatures of the legislation of Congress. None can be denominated such, or be entitled to the benefits or privileges thereof, except those registered or enrolled according to the act of September 1st, 1789; and those which, after the last day of March, 1793, shall be registered or enrolled in pursuance of the act of 31st December, 1792, and must be wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, and to be commanded by a citizen of the same." . . . " Congress having created, as it were, this species of property, and conferred upon it its chief value under the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, we perceive no reason for entertaining any serious doubt but that this power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights aud title of all persons dealing therein. The judicial mind seems to have generally taken this direction." This case was subsequently affirmed by Aldrich v. Ætna Company.
Be this, however, as it may, and whether the power of Congress is or is not sufficient to amend the law on this subject (if amendment is desirable), this court is bound to declare the law as it now stauds. Aud according to the maritime law as accepted and received in this country, we feel bound to declare that no such lien exists as is claimed by the'appellees in this case. The adjudications in this court before referred to, which it is unnecessary to review, are conclusive on the Subject; aud we see no sufficient ground for disturbing theni.
This disposes of the principal question in the case.
But it is alleged by the appellees that by the law of Louisiana they have a privilege for their claims, giving them a lien on the vessel and her proceeds; and that the court was bound to. enforce this lien in their behalf, though not strictly a maritime lien.
On examining the record, however, it appears that the appellees never caused their lien (if they had one) to be recorded according to the requirements of the State law. By the.one hundred and twenty-third article of the constitution of Louisiana, adopted in 1869, it is declared that no " mortgage or privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unless recorded in the parish where the property to be affected is situated." And an act of the legislature, passed since that time, adopts the very terms of the Constitutional provision. And a further act provides that if the privilege be not in writing, the facts on which it is based must be stated in an affidavit, which must be recorded. None of these requisites having been performed, no lien can be claimed under the State law.
But if there were any doubt on this subject, the case of the appellees is met by another difficulty. The admiralty rule of 1859, which precluded the District Courts from entertaining proceedings in rem against domestic ships for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries, was in force until May 6tb, 1872, when the new rule was promulgated. Now, this case was commenced in the District Court a year previous to this, and final judgment in the District Court was rendered two months previous. It is true that the judgment of the Circuit Court, on appeal, was not rendered until the 3d day of June, 1872; but if the new rule had at that time been brought to the attention of the court, it could hardly have been applied to the case in its then position. All the proceedings had been based and shaped upon other grounds and theories, and not upon the existence of that rule. It would not have been just to the other parties to apply to them a rule which was not iu existence when they were carrying on the litigation.
As to the recent change in the admiralty rule referred to, it is sufficient to say, that it was simply intended to remove all obstructions and embarrassments in the way of instituting proceedings in rem iu all cases where liens exist by law, and not to create any new lien, which, of course, this court could not do in any event, since a lien is a right of property, and not a mere matter of procedure.
Had the lien been perfected, and had the rule not stood in the way, the principles that have heretofore governed the practice of the District Courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, and which have been repeatedly sanctioned by this court, would undoubtedly have authorized the material-men to file a libel against the vessel or its proceeds. It seems tó be settled in our jurisprudence that so long as Congress does not interpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material-men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her homo port may be regulated in each State by State legislation. State laws, it is true, cannot exclude tho contract for furnishing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits of that jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the State courts so as to enable them to proceed in rent for the enforcement of liens created by such State laws, for it is exclusively conferred upon the District Courts of the United States. They can only authorize the enforcement thereof by common-law remedies, or such remedies as are equivalent thereto. But the District Courts of the United States having jurisdiction of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for its security, even when created by tlie State laws. The practice may be somewhat anomalous, bntit has existed from the origin of the government,- and, perhaps, was originally superinduced by the fact that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, liens of this sort Created by State laws had been enforced by the State courts of admiralty; and as those courts were immediately succeeded by the District Courts of the United States, and in several instances the judge of the State court was transferred to the District Court, it was. natural, in the infancy of Federal legislation on commercial subjects, for the latter courts to entertain jurisdiction over the same classes of eases, in ¿Very respect as the State courts had done, without due regard to the new relations which tho States had assumed towards the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. For example, in 1784, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a law allowing persons concerned in building, repairing, fitting Out, and furnishing vessels for a voyage, to sue in admiralty, as mariners sue for wages. Two cases, those of The Collier, and The Enterprise, arising under this law, and coming before the admiralty court of Pennsylvania, are reported in Judge Ilopkinson's works. No doubt other cases of the same kind occurred in the courts of other States.
But, whatever may have been the origin of the practice, and whether or not it was based on the soundest principles,' ]t became firmly settled, and it is now too late to question its Validity.
- It is true that the inconveniences arising from the often intricate and conflicting State laws creating such liens, induced this court in December Terrh, 1858, to abrogate that portion of the twelfth admiralty rule of 1844 which allowed' proceedings' in rem agaiust domestic ships for repairs and supplies furnished in the home port, and to allow proceedings in- personam only in such cases. But we have liow restored the rule of 1844, or, rather, we have made it general in its terms, giving to material-men iii all eases their optioh to proceed either in rem or in personam. Of course this modification of the rule cannot avail where no lien exists; but whore one does exist, no matter by what law, it removes all obstacles to a proceeding in rem, if credit is given to the Vessel.
It would undoubtedly he far more satisfactory to have a uniform law regulating such liens, but until sueh a law bé adopted (supposing Cotigress to have the power) the authority of the States to legislate on the subject seenis to he conceded by the uniform course of decisions.
Indeed, there is quite an extensive field of border legisla-t tion on commercial subjects (generally local in character) which nitty be regulated by State laws until Congress interposes, and thereby excludes further State legislation. . Pilotitgc is one of the subjects in this category. So far as Congress has interposed, its authority is supreme and exclusive) but where it has not dono so, the matter is'still left to the regulation of State laws. And yet this exercise by the States of the power to regulate pilotage has not withdrawn the subject, and, indeed, cannot withdraw it from thé adiiii rally jurisdiction of the District Courts. And, of course, as before intimated, this jurisdiction of the State legislatures in such cases is subject to be terminated at any time by Congress assuming the control. In some cases this is not so desirable as in others, but in the one under consideration, if Congress has the power to intervene, it is greatly tó be; desired that it should.do so. It would be better to have the subject regulated by the general maritime law of the country than by differing State laws. .The evils arising from conflicting lien laws passed by the several States are forcibly set forth by Chief Justice Taney in the ease of The St. Lawrence, before cited. It may be added that the existence of secret liens is not in accord with the spirit of our commercial usages, and a uniform law by which the liens in question should be required within a reasonable time to be placed on record in the custom-house like mortgages, and otherwise properly regulated, would be of great advantage to the business community.
But there is another mode in which the appellees, if they had a valid lien, could come into the District Court and claim the benefit thereof, namely, by a petition for the application of the surplus proceeds of the vessel to the payment of their debts, under the forty-third admiralty rule. The couTt has power to distribute surplus proceeds to all those who can show a vested interest therein, in the order of their several priorities, no matter how their claims originated. The propriety of such a distribution in the admiralty has been questioned on the ground that the court would thereby draw to itself equity jurisdiction. But it is a wholesome jurisdiction very commonly exercised by nearly all superior courts, to distribute a fund rightfully in its possession to those who are legally entitled to it; and there is no sound reason why admiralty courts should not do the same. If a .ease should be so complicated as to require the interposition of a court of equity, the District Court could refuse to act, and refer the parties to a more competent tribunal.
In this case the appellants themselves have no maritime lien, but'merely a mortgage to secure an ordinary debt not founded on a maritime contract. They, therefore, have no standing in court, except under the forty-third admiralty rule, and in the manner above indicated. Their libel was inadmissible, even under the admiralty rule as recently modilied.f But before the final decree they filed a petition for the surplus proceeds, and, as there is no question in the case about fraudulent preference under the Bankrupt law, they are entitled to those proceeds towards satisfaction of their mortgage.
Decree reversed, and the record remanded, with instructions to enter a decree in favor of the appellants,
In conformity with this opinion.
1 Black, 526, 527.
7 Wallace, 655, 656.
8 Wallace, 491.
Revised Civil Code, Articles 3273, 3274, 3093.
The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 438; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters, 324; The Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Id. 175; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522.
Cases supra.
Volume 3, pp. 131, 171.
Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 Howard, 299; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wallace, 236.
Schuchardt v. Babbidge, 19 Howard, 239.
The Neptune, 3 Knapp's Privy Council, 111.
See cases reviewed in 1 Conklin's Admiralty, pp. 48-66, 2d ed.
The John Jay, 17 Howard, 399.