Case Name: WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Luann Nixon and Mary Lou Powell, Appellant, v. BEST PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC., and Sanyei Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-04-12
Citations: 541 So. 2d 1302
Docket Number: No. 87-2674
Parties: WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Luann Nixon and Mary Lou Powell, Appellant, v. BEST PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC., and Sanyei Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd., Appellees.
Judges: WALDEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 541
Pages: 1302–1307

Head Matter:
WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Luann Nixon and Mary Lou Powell, Appellant, v. BEST PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC., and Sanyei Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd., Appellees.
No. 87-2674.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 12, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1989.
Sam Daniels of Daniels & Hicks, P.A., Miami, and Ricci & Roberts, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
J. Terence McManus of Ingalsbe Mc-Manus Wiitala & Contole, North Palm Beach, for appellee-Best Products Co., Inc.
Joseph H. Lowe of Marlowe, Shofi, Con-nell, Valerious, Abrams, Lowe & Adler, Miami, for appellee-Sanyei Corp. (Taiwan) Ltd.

Opinion:
STONE, Judge.
The issue on appeal is whether the appellant-insurance company's right to seek contribution from the defendants, alleged to be joint tortfeasors with West American's insureds, is time barred.
In May, 1985, an injured party recovered a judgment against the insureds, Powell and Nixon. Hie appellees, Best and Sa-nyei, were not parties to that suit. That case terminated, following dismissal of an appeal, in March of 1986. The judgment was then satisfied by West American, the insurer of the judgment debtor. However, this action by the insurance company, for contribution against the joint tortfeasors, was not instituted for more than a year after the original judgment became final.
It is undisputed that any contribution claims by the insureds, Powell and Nixon, against Best and Sanyei, would be barred, because no attempt was made to enforce a contribution claim within one year from finality of the judgment, as required by section 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes:
If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.
Neither the judgment debtor nor the insurer, claiming by virtue of subrogation to the rights of its tortfeasor-insureds, has a right of action against a joint tortfeasor for pro rata contribution independent of the right bestowed by section 768.31. Cf. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 535 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
Subsection (2)(e) of the statute recognizes the right of an insurer, as subrogee of its insured, to seek contribution from joint tortfeasors:
A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
The appellant asserts several arguments why an insurer is not included within the one year limitation restrictions of subsection (4)(c). Appellant argues that the limitations period does not commence as to an insurer until payment, notwithstanding that it runs, as to an insured-tortfeasor, from the date of finality of a judgment. Appellant argues that an insurance company is not a "tortfeasor" within the provisions of subsection (4)(c), and that the judgment is against the insured not the insur- anee company. Therefore, there is no judgment against it to commence the running of the statute. Additionally, appellant distinguishes the subrogation rights arising where there is a settlement with a third party claimant from those arising upon a payment to an insured.
We reject these arguments because a cause of action by an insurer for contribution from a joint tortfeasor exists only by virtue of the right and remedy created by the statute. Therefore, the insurance company, in pursuing a contribution claim under section 768.31, stands in the shoes of its insured. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 535 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Also cf. Allstate Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Dade County, 436 So.2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 885 (Fla.1984).
We are not unmindful of the reasoning in the dissenting opinion that the decision in Employers Fire Insurance Company v. Continental Insurance Co., 326 So.2d 177 (Fla.1976), sets the course for us to follow. However, we consider that case to be inap-posite. It involved a dispute between two insurance companies over payment of a claim for their mutual insured. It did not involve a claim under section 768.31. In Employers, the supreme court did recognize that claims for indemnity and contribution do not arise until the payment of a debt or judgment. However, the claim in this case is purely statutory, and the issue is simply one of legislative intent. We note that the record clearly reflects that the insurer is not seeking damages as the sub-rogee of the initial plaintiffs. Rather, the insurance company sought to enforce the contribution rights of its insured, which do not exist independent of the statute. This is not an action for equitable subrogation or indemnity. There is no reason to con-elude that the legislature intended to confer any greater contribution rights on an insurer than on its insured. Certainly the legislature would normally anticipate that contribution actions against joint tort-feasors will generally be brought by an insurance company following payment. There is also no reason for a legislative policy that would primarily reward insurers for intentional delays, and possible bad faith, by extending the limitations period for the insurance company alone so that they may litigate with their insureds.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by ruling that the one year limitations term of Florida Statute 768.31(4)(c) applies to insurers and by dismissing the complaint accordingly. We also reject appellants' additional argument that the trial court erred by deciding the statute of limitations issue on a motion to dismiss, where the facts constituting the defense appear in the pleadings. See Lago West 84, Inc. v. Homac Barnes, Inc., 486 So.2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
WALDEN, J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.
. We note that the settlement with the third party was for over $7,000,000 on an $11,000,000 judgment, although the policy limits were only $100,000. Apparently, this occurred as a result of bad faith claims and separate actions for declaratory relief following appellant's denial of coverage on the initial claim. But we do not consider these factors to be determinative on the issue presented to us. We also note that there is no contention that the insurance company did not have due notice and an opportunity to assert its rights at all times.