Case Name: Sarah E. Mellen, Resp't, v. William C. Banning, Impl'd, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-05-15
Citations: 38 N.Y. St. Rep. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sarah E. Mellen, Resp’t, v. William C. Banning, Impl’d, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 38
Pages: 115–118

Head Matter:
Sarah E. Mellen, Resp’t, v. William C. Banning, Impl’d, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed May 15, 1891.)
1. Wills—Action to construe—Jurisdiction.
The jurisciction of a court of equity to construe wills is incidental only to that over trusts, and will not he exercised except in actions involving trusts.
2. Cloud on title.
Such action cannot he maintained as one to remove a cloud on title by restraining the execution of a power of sale contained in a will where such power of sale is null and void on its face.
(Lawrence, J., dissents.)
Appeal by the infant defendants Mellen, by Jane H. Pierce, their guardian ad litem, from an order overruling demurrer interposed by defendants to the complaint in this action, and also from the interlocutory judgment overruling said demurrer, with costs.
A. T. Ackert, for the guardian ad litem of the infant demurring def’ts ; H. Daily, Jr., for resp’t.

Opinion:
Van Brunt, P. J.
This action, according to the complaint, is brought to obtain a construction of the will of one Abner Mellen, deceased, and also to restrain his executors from executing a power of sale contained in that will, upon the ground that such power was inoperative, null and void, and never had any validity. To this complaint the infant defendants demurred upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
While concurring with the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice Lawrence, in his opinion thereon, although the point is not distinctly taken by the counsel for the infant defendants, I do not think that the court ought to entertain jurisdiction of this action, for the reason that it cannot be maintained as an action for the construction of the will, because the jurisdiction of courts of equity to pass upon the interpretation of a will is incidental to that over trusts, and there is no question of trust in the will mentioned.
This rule was distinctly enunciated in the case of Monarque v. Monarque, 80 N. Y., 320, in which, in speaking of a certain action which had been brought to construe a will, it was held that the case was not a proper one for the action for the construction of a wili, because there was no trust or other element to justify invoking the jurisdiction of the court for that purpose. Therefore it is clear that this action cannot be maintained as an action to construe a will.
But it is urged that the action may be maintained for the purpose of removing a cloud upon the title, and in support of that proposition the counsel for the respondents cite the case of Butler v. Johnson, 111 N. Y., 204; 19 N. Y. State Rep., 85, and De Witt v. Van Schoyk, 110 N. Y., 7 ; 16 N. Y. State Rep., 726.
An examination of these cases will show that they do not support the claim in this action. It is a well settled principle regulating the invocation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to remove a cloud upon a title that if the defect appears upon the face of the record or proceedings which are claimed to be invalid, the court will not entertain an action to declare such invalidity, and it is only where the claim of the adverse party to the land is valid upon the face of the instrument or proceeding sought to be set aside, and extrinsic facts are necessary to be proved in order to establish the invalidity or illegality, that a court of equity will intervene.
Now, in the case at bar, it is claimed that the power of sale contained in the will is null and void upon its face. If that is the fact, then there is no room for the intervention of a court of equity, because it does not- depend upon extrinsic evidence.
That is the allegation and the judgment that is asked for.
The two cases above cited in no way conflict with this rule. In Butter v. Johnson the fact that the debts were outlawed, for the payment of which the executor was about to exercise the power of sale, was a fact extrinsic of the instrument creating the power, and, therefore, brought the case within the rule above mentioned.
In the case of De Witt v. Van Schoyk, the intervention of a court of equity was sustained, because unless the action of the defendant was restrained its effect would be to change or confuse the boundary of two farms and render their location doubtful and open over the land of the plaintiff a right of way through which the public would be allowed to travel; facts showing that the action against which an injunction was sought would confuse the plaintiff's rights, which confusion would not necessarily appear of record.
It seems to me, therefore, that the court should not entertain jurisdiction of this action, and that the complaint does not state a cause of action within the rules limiting the invocation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
The judgment should be reversed and the demurrer sustained.
Daniels, J., concurs.