Case Name: Sheila M. KING-COLEMAN, Appellant, v. Larry J. GEATHERS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-04-02
Citations: 841 So. 2d 593
Docket Number: No. 4D02-3194
Parties: Sheila M. KING-COLEMAN, Appellant, v. Larry J. GEATHERS, Appellee.
Judges: FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 841
Pages: 593–597

Head Matter:
Sheila M. KING-COLEMAN, Appellant, v. Larry J. GEATHERS, Appellee.
No. 4D02-3194.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 2, 2003.
Jack A. Fleischman of Fleischman & Fleischman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
R. Stephen Ottewell of Law Office of R. Stephen Ottewell, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee.

Opinion:
OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., Senior Judge.
Appellant, the former wife, seeks review of a non-final order denying her motion to vacate a post-dissolution monetary judgment entered in favor of appellee, the former husband. We affirm.
Previously, appellee had obtained a substantially identical judgment against appellant but, on appeal, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. See King-Coleman v. Geathers, 795 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Upon remand, a non-jury trial was scheduled for March 28, 2002, with due notice to appellant's attorney. The trial, which appellant did not attend, again resulted in a monetary judgment in favor of appellee. Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that her failure to appear at the trial was due to excusable neglect, inadvertence and surprise, in that she did not receive notice. Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which appellant appeared and testified, the court denied her motion to vacate. That order is the subject of this non-final appeal.
The relevant facts are neither complex nor in material dispute. Appellant, a Lt. Colonel in the United States Air Force, was stationed in Europe in December 1999. After she had been served with her former husband's petition, she retained Steven Cripps, Esq., to represent her in that matter. She remained in contact with Mr. Cripps until she returned to the United States in September 2000. For whatever reason, from that time on she never again contacted Mr. Cripps, either to ascertain the status of the pending appeal or to advise him of how or where he could contact her.
The mandate in the prior appeal was issued in October 2001, nearly thirteen months after appellant had returned to the States. At that time the only addresses for appellant which Mr. Cripps had were her previous military address while she was stationed in Europe and the Maryland residence of her former baby-sitter where she visited from time to time and occasionally stayed while on leave. At the court's request, Mr. Cripps then obtained, through military channels, appellant's mailing address at the Pentagon. Notices of the March 28, 2002 trial date were mailed to appellant at both the Pentagon and the address of the baby-sitter; however, she denied receiving either.
The trial court found that although it could not conclude whether appellant received actual notice of the trial date, a finding on that issue was not necessary to its decision on the motion. Appellant's attorney had notice and if, as appellant testified, she did not receive actual notice, it was due entirely to her own fault, i.e., her failure, during the eighteen months between September 2000 and March 2002, to advise her attorney, Mr. Cripps, of how or where to contact her. Consequently, the court found that appellant had not shown that any lack of notice of the hearing was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect as contemplated by rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate. This case does not involve lack of notice of trial. Appellant's counsel had notice of the trial date and, as agent of the client, any notice by or to the attorney in the proceeding is notice to the client. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.060(m) ("In all matters concerning the prosecution or defense of any proceeding in the court, the attorney of record shall be the agent of the client, and any notice by or to the attorney or act by the attorney in the proceeding shall be accepted as the act of or notice to the client."). Furthermore, the court found that Mr. Cripps diligently exerted every effort to convey that notice to appellant. The fact that he was unsuccessful was due entirely to appellant's own fault and her inattention to her duty as a litigant to keep counsel informed of her current address. See W.K v. Dept. of Children & Families, 832 So.2d 229, 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); M.E. v. Florida Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs., 728 So.2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Accordingly, the order denying appellant's motion to vacate is affirmed.
FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
. At that point in time, the prior judgment had been entered and the appeal, filed on appellant's behalf by Mr. Cripps, was pending.
. In fact, it was on the occasion of one such visit to the baby-sitter's residence the latter part of April 2002 that the appellant received a copy of the April 9, 2002 Final Judgment which had been mailed to that address by the court.