Case Name: BARBER v. GLADDEN
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1958-12-03
Citations: 215 Or. 129
Docket Number: 
Parties: BARBER v. GLADDEN
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 215
Pages: 129–144

Head Matter:
Submitted on briefs September 17,
affirmed December 3,
petition for rehearing denied December 31, 1958
BARBER v. GLADDEN
332 P.2d 641
Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General for Oregon, and Peter S. Herman, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem, Attorneys for respondent.

Opinion:
O'CONNELL, J.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding initiated by George R. Barber on November 5, 1957 against Clarence T. Gladden, Warden of the Oregon State Penitentiary. The plaintiff appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Marion County dismissing the action. The plaintiff was sentenced on November 20, 1953 for a term of 25 years in the State Penitentiary after a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary with explosives, in violation of ORS 164.260. He was represented by counsel at that time. No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction. On December 1955 the plaintiff commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in which he attacked the conviction on five grounds. He appealed from an order dismissing his action in that case. The order of dismissal was affirmed in Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 298 P2d 986, 309 P2d 192 (1957).
In the action which is now before v. the plaintiff contends that his imprisonment was invalid on five grounds enumerated in his replication in the following order:
(1) The committing magistrate acted without legal authority for the reason that ORS 51.220 is void. This section provides as follows:
"A justice of the peace in a justice district abolished by ORS 51.030 shall be the judge of the district court created by ORS 46.020 or 46.025 during the remainder of his elective term, or until his successor is elected and qualified."
The plaintiff argues that ORS 51.220 violates the Oregon Constitution in that it is "an unlawful and unauthorized delegation of Legislative power" for the reason that it purports to create a district judgeship without election or appointment. He contends that since the section is void he was not legally committed by a magistrate and that therefore his conviction was void. He also contends that as a result of this alleged illegal procedure he was denied due process of law and equal protection of the laws under the Constitution of the United States.
(2) Oregon Laws 1949, Chapter 258 (which was applicable at the time plaintiff was prosecuted) was unconstitutional because the statute required the county court to prepare a jury list of "qualified jurors in the county, as far as it may be able to ascertain the same from the latest tax roll and/or registration books of the county" and that this permitted "the systematic and intentional exclusion of a class of persons" by the county officials. He also charges that the method actually used in selecting the jurors who sat on the grand jury in his case was illegal and therefore he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
(3) The indictment under which he was convicted was fatally defective because it failed to allege the ownership of the building in which the crime was committed.
(4) The plaintiff's plea of guilty was the result of coercion and duress.
(5) The plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial court's action "in sentencing plaintiff on the basis of his [the judge's] recital that safecrackers once shot at his father."
The defendant demurred to allegations (1), (2), (3), and (5) contained in the plaintiff's replication on the ground that these allegations failed to set forth facts or grounds sufficient to entitle plaintiff to relief. The demurrer was sustained. Thereafter the defendant filed its answer to the remaining allegation, and after a hearing was held the court found that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made by the plaintiff. The court then entered an order dismissing the proceedings.
This is the second habeas corpus proceeding brought by the plaintiff to test the validity of his incarceration resulting from the judgment of conviction on November 20,1953. There is nothing in the record to show that the issues presented on this appeal could not have been presented in the first habeas corpus proceeding brought by the plaintiff in December 1955. In fact some of the grounds urged as a basis for the writ in the present case are essentially the same as those presented in the first petition. See Barber v. Gladden, snpra.
OES 34.710 provides, in part, as follows:
" No question once finally determined upon a proceeding by habeas corpus shall be reexamined upon another proceeding of the same kind."
This statute is a legislative declaration that the principle of res judicata is applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. That principle precludes the relitigation not only of matters actually determined in a prior proceeding but also matters which could properly have been determined in such earlier proceeding. Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690, 277 P2d 767 (1954); Yuen Suey v. Fleshman, 65 Or 606, 133 P 803 (1913). Frequently res judicata is defined simply in terms of matters previously litigated as distinct from matters which could have been but were not litigated in the prior proceeding. See, for example, Black's Law Dictionary, page 1470. However, this manner of stating the principle is not regarded as a limitation upon the principle so as to exclude its operation in those situations in which the question was not raised in the prior proceeding but could have been raised and determined. And so also where a statute speaks only in terms of questions actually determined it may be construed more broadly to cover the principle of res judicata in its broader meaning. The Florida statute, FSA 79-10 which is similar to ORS 34.710 was so construed. Eeferring to the Florida statute, the court in Durley v. Mayo, 351 US 277, 283, said:
"In its more recent cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that, on an original application for habeas corpus, the petitioner may not raise issues that have been raised in prior proceedings whatever those may have been. Also, that unless he can show good reason for his failure to do so, he is precluded from raising issues which he could have raised in any such prior proceedings. Washington v. Mayo, 77 So.2d 620; Irvin v. Chapman, 75 So.2d 591; Florida ex rel. Johnson v. Mayo, 69 So.2d 307. "
We interpret our own statute, OES 34.710, to mean that a denial of the writ of habeas corpus is res judicata on a subsequent application for the writ, not only upon grounds which were alleged, but also upon grounds which could have teen alleged in the prior habeas corpus proceeding.
At common law the principle of res judicata had no application to habeas corpus proceedings, and the decision on one writ was not a bar to a subsequent proceeding. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Section 55; Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or 283, 330, 251 P2d 87, 253 P2d 289. The explanation for the rule at common law is well stated in Salinger v. Loisel, 265 US 224, 230 (1924) as follows:
In early times when a refusal to discharge was not open to appellate review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number. But when a right to an appellate review was given the reason for that practice ceased and the practice came to be materially changed,—just as when a right to a comprehensive review in criminal cases was given the scope of inquiry deemed admissible on habeas corpus came to be relatively narrowed."
Probably no court today would accept the common-law rule in its pristine form. Cf. Ex Parte Reinhardt, 88 Mont 282, 292 P 582 (1930). However, the extent to which the courts have qualified the common-law rule differs in the various jurisdictions. Since the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus resulting from the decision in Johnson v. Verbst, 304 US 458 (1937) both the courts and legislatures have sought measures to deal more effectively with the increasing number of petitions for the writ. There has been a noticeable tendency to adopt more stringent rules with respect to the filing of successive applications for the writ. Even prior to the expansion of the writ alluded to above, departures were made from the common-law rule excepting habeas corpus proceedings- from the principle of res judicata. Thus in Salinger v. Loisel, supra, after noting the common-law rule, the court said:
"But it does not follow that a refusal to discharge on one application is without bearing and weight when a later application is being considered. °
" each application is to be disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought. Among the matters which may be considered, and even given controlling weight, are (b) a prior refusal to discharge on a like application. " 265 US 224 at 230.
A similar position has been taken by a number of state courts. See, e.g., Nicolay v. Kill, 161 Kan 667, 170 P2d 823 (1946); Fisher v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 195 Md 705, 71 A2d 871 (1950); Labelle v. Hancock, 99 NH 254, 108 A2d 545 (1954); State v. Ingenito, 16 NJ 36, 106 A2d 3 (1954). Some states have applied the rule that only issues actually determined in the prior proceeding are barred thereafter. Gusick v. Eyman, 81 Ariz 206, 303 P2d 531 (1956), cert. den., 353 US 913 (1957); Guy v. Foster, 160 Tenn 285, 24 SW2d 897 (1930); Bravata v. Morhous, 273 App Div 929, 77 NYS2d 451 (1948); Du Fault v. Utecht, 220 Minn 431, 19 NW2d 706 (1945).
In still other states the principle of res judicata is applied in its broadest sense to habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Horowitz, 33 Cal2d 534, 203 P2d 513 (1949); Woodruff v. Balkon, 205 Ga 445, 53 SE2d 680 (1949); Tilghman v. McLeod (Okla Crim App), 306 P2d 732 (1957); De Simone v. Cavell, 185 Pa Super 131, 138 A2d 688 (1958). But c.f., Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 391 Pa 265, 137 A2d 468 (1958); McMahon v. Mead, 30 SD 515, 139 NW 122 (1912).
We believe that the principle of res judicata should be fully applicable to habeas corpus proceedings; we do not think that this position is inconsistent with OES 34.710.
If a petitioner establishes that the grounds asserted in his petition could not reasonably have been presented in the prior proceeding he will not be precluded from asserting them. The rule we recognize may be stated in the same terms as Section 8 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which has been recommended for adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Annual Conference Meeting in its 64th Year, Philadelphia, Pa., August, 1955). It provides as follows:
"All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under this Act must be raised in his original or amended petition, and any grounds not so raised are waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition."
The comment appended to this section explains its purpose:
"Many petitions for habeas corpus or other post-conviction relief are repetitious; others often are specious. This places an unnecessary burden upon the courts. It is highly desirable that a petitioner be required to assert all of his claims in one petition. His failure to assert them constitutes a waiver. The way is left open, however, for a subsequent petition if the court finds grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original petition. "
The application of OBS 34.710 to plaintiff's petition in the present case precludes him from reasserting each of the five grounds upon which he bases his petition. If he can establish that any of these grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the prior petition the principle we have announced in this case does not preclude him from taking appropriate action to protect his rights.
The judgment is affirmed.