Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Windall HICKS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-01-14
Citations: 301 So. 2d 357
Docket Number: No. 53888
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Windall HICKS.
Judges: CALOGARO, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 301
Pages: 357–365

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Windall HICKS.
No. 53888.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 14, 1974.
On Rehearing Oct. 11, 1974.
Robert P. McLeod, Kirby & McLeod, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., Charles A. Traylor, II, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
This appeal by Windall Hicks is taken from his conviction for armed robbery committed on December 28, 1971 at the Globe Grocery Store located in the City of Monroe, Parish of Ouachita. Hicks was sentenced to serve a term of ten.years at hard labor.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 16 raise the issue of the legality of the search warrant which issued for the search of the residence of Bessie Lee Rollins, mother of Berlin Rollins. The contention is that the affidavit supporting the warrant is insufficient.
A consideration of this contention is not necessary under the particular facts of the case. The warrant issued was for the search of the premises at which Bessie Lee Rollins resided. Her son, Berlin Rollins, was arrested and, after trial, acquitted in the matter.
At the time of the search of the Rollins home, appellant Hicks was not present, nor was he living at this residence.
The State urges that Hicks has no standing to suppress the evidence seized under this search warrant, for he had no interest in the premises searched, claimed no interest in the things seized (a coat and a cap), and was not present when the search was, in fact, made.
We agree with the State. Appellant was not on the premises at the time of the search and seizure, had no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched, was not charged with an offense which included, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence (coat and cap) at the time of the search and seizure. Furthermore, appellant never alleged any legitimate interest in the coat and cap seized. Consequently, appellant is without standing to complain of the alleged illegal search and seizure herein. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); State v. Vassel, 285 So.2d 221, La.1973 (rehearing denied, 285 So.2d 221, La.1973); State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 236 So.2d 211 (1970); State v. Page, 251 La. 810, 206 So.2d 503 (1968).
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 16 are without merit.
Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the overruling of appellant's objection to the remark made by the Assistant District Attorney in his opening statement to the jury that the State would offer evidence showing that on December 30, 1971 at 4:00 a. m., less than thirty-six hours following the Globe Food Store robbery, the defendants carried out a certain course of conduct culminating in the robbery of a 7-11 food store.
Thereafter, during trial, objections were made when testimony relating to the robbery of this 7-11 store was introduced. These latter objections are the basis for Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8 through 15.
Appellant contends that the evidence introduced concerning the 7-11 store robbery for which he was not on trial can in no way be said to be admissible to prove system, knowledge or intent. He relies upon the holdings in State v. Jordan, 276 So.2d 277 (La.1973); State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973); State v. Moore, on rehearing, 278 So.2d 784 (La.1973).
The State asserts that the evidence of the 7-11 store robbery was introduced under the authority of R.S. 15:445 and 446. It points to the fact that this robbery was committed within two days after the one for which defendant was being tried. The record, it submits, shows the common system and scheme of the crimes and similarity of actions in the commission thereof. Thus, the State contends, State v. Prieur is not applicable on the facts of this case.
In order to determine the merits of the contention raised by appellant in these bills, we have reviewed the entire transcript of the trial which was made part of the record on appeal.
Appellant was prosecuted for the armed robbery of the Globe Food Store in Monroe. This store adjoins the Texas Street Housing Project. At about 9:00 p. m. on December 28, 1971, two black males robbed the assistant manager of the store, Larry Robertson, at gunpoint. There were two other employees in the store at the time, namely, Shirley Mitchell and David Corer-ro. The two robbers entered the store and proceeded to the glass-enclosed office where Robertson was located; thereafter, one of them, holding a .32 caliber blue steel revolver, informed Robertson that this was a holdup and ordered him to place all the money in a moneybag which was carried out of the store by the other robber. About $4,000.00 was taken in the robbery. The testimony was that the robbers left on foot in the direction of the housing project. A detailed description of the robbers was taken from the victim and two witnesses by the investigating police officer. Robertson was certain that the gun used in the robbery was a .32 caliber blue steel revolver, as he had one of his own. Shirley Mitchell had recognized Hicks as having been in the store before on several occasions. All witnesses identified Hicks as the gunman. The robbers were not apprehended.
On December 30, 1971, at about 3:15 a. m., some thirty-six hours after the above robbery, Jay Via, the night manager of the 7-11 food store located on Jackson and Plum Streets (about one mile from the Globe store, but in the same general area of town), noticed a yellow Mustang passing the store several times at a slow rate of speed. Via had been previously given a description of the Globe store robbers by his brother-in-law, who was a Monroe police officer. Subsequently, the car pulled up, and two black males came into the store. They inquired about the purchase of shotgun shells in order to go man hunting. Via testified that he immediately be came suspicious of the two men, since they fitted the description given to him by his brother-in-law of the Globe store robbers. Via told the men that he did not have the type of shells they needed and referred them to another 7-11 store about a mile away. He identified Hicks as the man with whom he had talked that night. Via further testified that they had inquired about the purchase of .32 caliber ammunition. Vic Barton, a friend of Via, was in the store at the time. He called the police on Via's instructions, advised them concerning the possible armed robbery of the other store, and gave them the license number of the yellow Mustang which Via had been able to secure.
Almost immediately after the two men left the 7-11 store on Jackson and Plum Streets, they arrived at the 7-11 store to which they had been sent by Via. This store was located at Jackson and Sandifer Streets. Mark Stehlick, the night manager, was alone in the store. He testified that two black males entered the store and inquired about the purchase of shotgun shells which they needed in order to kill a man. He was paid for the shells with a $20.00 bill, but was told at that time by one of the men who had pulled a gun that he wanted the $20.00 bill back, together with the rest of the money in the register. This amounted to about $135.00. Stehlick never saw a car either before or after the robbery. When asked to describe the weapon, he stated that he did not know anything about guns, but it was a small bluish gun.
The police, responding to Barton's call from the first 7-11 store, arrived on the scene of the second 7-11 store as the two robbers were pulling off. The police pursued the yellow Mustang, during which there was an exchange of gunfire. The robbers were followed into the Texas Street Housing Project where they abandoned their car and fled on foot into the project. The suspects were apprehended shortly thereafter, and the .32 caliber revolver was recovered the next day in the grass about three-quarters of a block from where the car had been abandoned.
The issue presented to us in these bills is whether the reference by the Assistant District Attorney in his opening statement to the 7-11 store robbery and the testimony of the witnesses concerning this robbery were admissible in evidence to prove system, knowledge or intent.
Evidence of similar acts is admissible to show system, knowledge or intent under R.S. 15:445 and 446. We explained in State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971) that crimes of "system" are those acts and offenses which are of like nature and exhibit like methods or plans of operation. Spencer was a prosecution for armed robbery, and we held that the evidence as to another armed robbery was admissible since it followed the same modus operandi as the armed robbery charged and was related in time and location.
Clearly, the armed robbery of the 7-11 store was similar to the Globe store robbery. Both were armed robberies involving food stores; both were committed during darkness; both were perpetrated by two black males of the same general description; both were in the same general area of Monroe; both involved the use of a .32 caliber blue steel revolver; the robbers in both cases fled either in the direction of or to the Texas Street Housing Project; in point of time, both robberies were within thirty-six hours of each other. Therefore, the evidence was admissible to show system.
Additionally, this Court has previously held that intent is an essential element of the crime of armed robbery, and evidence of similar offenses is admissible to show intent under R.S. 15:445 and 446. State v. Welch, 250 La. 719, 198 So.2d 902 (1967). See State v. Montegut, 257 La. 665, 243 So.2d 791 (1971). Hence, the evidence of the 7-11 store robbery was also admissible to show intent.
Furthermore, the evidence in regard to the 7-11 store robbery was relevant to issues involved in this case. First, the evidence was relevant as to the identification of Hicks. The manager of the first 7-11 store was able to identify Hicks based upon a description he had previously received of the men who had robbed the Globe store. This testimony was certainly relevant in corroborating the identity of Hicks by the victim and witnesses of the Globe store robbery. Second, the relevancy of the .32 caliber revolver in the Globe store robbery cannot be disputed. This gun was recovered only after a series of events involving the 7-11 store robbery. Accordingly, admission of evidence regarding these events constituted a necessary predicate to the introduction of the gun for identification by the victim of the Globe store robbery. Further, we have no difficulty in concluding that the probative value of this evidence outweighs any prejudicial effects thereof. Therefore, the evidence of these related matters was admissible.
Accordingly, there is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. 2 and Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8 through IS.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3 through 7 were reserved during trial when the State introduced testimony concerning lineup identifications as well as in-court identifications made by the witnesses of the Globe store robbery. The trial testimony revealed that photographs had first been submitted to these witnesses. Appellant alleges that the photographic identification procedure used by the State was so imper-missibly suggestive that not only did it violate his right to due process, but the procedure tainted subsequent lineup and in-court identifications so as to render them inadmissible.
The adverse rulings by the trial judge resulted in the reservation of these bills.
On December 29, 1971, the day after the Globe store robbery, the three witnesses to this crime were shown seventeen photographs by the police. The picture of appellant Hicks was not among them. No identification was then made by these witnesses. Subsequently, on December 30, 1971, after the arrest of appellant and Rollins in connection with the 7-11 store robbery, two of these witnesses (Robertson and Corerro) were shown a group of seven photographs. On January 4, 1972, the third witness (Mitchell) was shown the same set of seven photographs.
The tenor of the objection by appellant is that two of these seven photographs were of Hicks and Rollins, and the remaining were the same five photographs which were part of the seventeen first shown to the witnesses on December 29, 1971. In addition, appellant points out that at the time Mitchell and Corerro viewed the group of seven photographs, they were aware that Hicks and Rollins had been picked up in connection with the 7-11 store robbery.
It is thus argued that this procedure of photographic identification was "impermis-sibly suggestive" and in violation of the ruling in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).
As stated in State v. Franklin, 279 So.2d 163 (La.1973) : "The claim of unduly prejudicial identification in each instance has been held by this Court to be determined upon all the surrounding circumstances. State v. Junius, 257 La. 331, 242 So.2d 533 (1971)."
Larry Robertson had a clear view of Hicks on the night of the robbery when the money was taken from him at gunpoint in the well-lighted food store. He testified that when he was shown the photographs, no one in any way indicated, either by word, motion or by any inference, that any of the people in the pictures were suspect. All were pictures of members of the Negro race. Robertson stated that his identification in court was made upon a "flesh and blood" observation and was not based upon any other source.
Shirley Mitchell testified that she picked appellant's picture from the photographs. There was some interrogation concerning her being told by the police that one of the men was picked up after the 7-11 store robbery. However, she testified that this was not told to her until "after I had looked at the pictures." She also testified that Hicks had been in the store on several occasions prior to the robbery and that she recognized him on the night of the robbery.
David Corerro gave a description of the gunman. He, too, had a clear view of the events on the night of the robbery. , Cor-rerro viewed the photographs several times at the police station and once at the store. On the occasion of their being presented at the store, he recognized the man with the gun from his observation of him on the night of the robbery. Corerro stated that when he viewed the photographs, no statement was made to him by anyone; he was simply asked to look at the pictures to see if he recognized the robbers.
The record substantiates the position of the State that no suggestions were made by the police officers to these witnesses when they picked out the photographs. Furthermore, no attack is made upon the procedure employed in the lineups. The in-court identifications of Hicks were made from independent recollection of the gunman by the witnesses, not from photographs or suggestions at the lineup. No attempt was made to influence selection of a particular photograph by either word or action during their display.
Accordingly, we find that the contention of appellant that the photographic identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive is without foundation. Therefore, we conclude that the in-court identifications had a source independent of the photographic and lineup identifications and did not violate appellant's due process rights.
There is no merit to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8 through 15.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CALOGARO, J., concurs.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
TATE, J., dissents. The majority opinion is contrary to State v. Prieur and State v. Jordan.
DIXON, J., dissents.