Case Name: William Lee v. The State of Ohio
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1871-12
Citations: 21 Ohio St. 151
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Lee v. The State of Ohio.
Judges: Scott, C. J., and Welch, White and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 21
Pages: 151–154

Head Matter:
William Lee v. The State of Ohio.
1. Where an accomplice testifies as a witness, a liberal and full cross-examination, for the purpose of testing the truth of his statements, should be permitted ; and it is error to restrict such cross-examination within unreasonable limits.
2. Where an accomplice testified in chief, that, in Gallia county about a week before the 14th of November, he saw a letter from the accused, which was a material fact on the part of the prosecution, it was error in the court not to allow the accused to show, on cross-examination, that the witness was absent from that county from the 5th to the 12th of the same month.
Error to the court of common pleas of Vinton county.
At the February term, 1871, of the court of common pleas of Vinton county, William Lee, George Rimmey and Matthias Mitcbel were indicted, with Rudolph Coughenour, for aiding, abetting and procuring Coughenour to commit a burglary in the dwelling house of one F. M. Bay, and steal ing therefrom a sum of money. Separate trials were granted. Cougkenour and Eimmey resided in the same neighborhood, in Gallia county. Lee lived in Vinton county, about forty-five miles from Coughenour’s residence. Bay’s residence was in Vinton county, about thirty five mile;; from Coughenour. The burglary and larceny was committed by Coughenour alone, on the 18th of November, 1870. On the trial of Lee, Coughenour was offered by the State as a witness. The question made on his testimony arose on the objection of the State to certain questions asked on the cross-examination, which objections were sustained by the court, and the defendant excepted.
The case on the point decided is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
After a verdict of guilty against Lee, his counsel moved for a new trial on the grounds, among others, that the court erred in excluding testimony, and that the verdict was against the law and the evidence. The court overruled the motion, and defendant excepted. He now prosecutes his writ of error in this court to reverse the judgment rendered against him by the common pleas, and assigns for error, among other grounds, the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
H. G. Jones for plaintiff in error:
The court erred, to the prejudice of the defendant below, in refusing to allow the defendant’s attorneys, on cross-examination of Coughnenour, to inquire of him as to his whereabouts from the 5th to the 12th November, 1870, and of the time he 'was at Portsmouth prior to the commission of the burglary. This testimony was relevant and competent. 1 G. & W. on New Trials, 251, 254, 255 ; Hilliard on New Trials, 310; Edwards v. Evans, 3 East. 455 ; 5 Mass. 391.
J. M. MeQillivray, prosecuting attorney, for the State :
As to the Portsmouth matter, it was immaterial, being no part of the case or of the defense. And with regard to the time of the transactions before the 14th of November, the testimony of Coughenour was too indefinite to admit of impeachment, so that the question saved by the exception could not have affected the issues or prejudiced the defendant; at least the record fails to show that it would.
F. B. Pond, attorney general, also for the State.

Opinion:
Day, J.
The view we take of this case renders it only necessary for us to determine whether the court erred in excluding the testimony proposed to be elicited, on cross-examination of the witness Coughenour, that he was not in Gallia county on or between the 5th and the 12th days of November, 1870.
The defendant Lee was indicted, with others, for aiding and abetting Coughenour, the witness, in the commission of the crime charged. His conviction was sought chiefly on the testimony of this witness, an admitted accomplice. It became material to show a conspiracy between the defendant and the witness to commit the crime. For this purpose the witness had testified in substance that he and Rimrney, (another defendant) lived in the same neighborhood in Gallia county ; that in October he saw Lee there, who told him to come up to Yin ton county (where Lee lived,) and steal money that he knew of there ; that he would let Rimrney know when he should come ; that about a week afterward Rimrney showed him a letter from Lee, directing him to meet Lee on the 14th of November at the foot of a certain hill ; that about a week after seeing the letter, he met Lee at the time and place mentioned therein, when the arrangement to perpetrate the burglary charged was completed.
The testimony of the witness tended to show that the original conspiracy was entered into in October, or the first of November, in Gallia county, and that the letter from Lee was shown to him in that county, on or about the seventh day of November in pursuance of that arrangement. It was clearly competent for the defendant, on cross-examination, to show that the witness was not in Gallia county at or about the time he had testified in chief to seeing the letter in that county. We think the court erred in excluding that testimony. If the testimony about the letter was competent and material on the part of the State, it was equally competent and material for the defendant on cross-examination, pertinent to the testimony in chief, to test the recollection and veracity of the witness: to this end, the testimony excluded directly tended. The value of the evidence, moreover, when admitted, might, as in this case, be enhanced by other circumstances developed in the progress of the case; although no considerations of this kind, in the form in which they appear in this record, can affect the question of the competency of the evidence at the time and in the manner it was made. The only question we can consider, as the case stands, is, were the questions asked and the evidence sought to be elicited admissible as cross-examination ? In deciding that they Avere, we are influenced somewhat by the consideration, that in the cross-examination of an alleged accomplice, especially Avhere, as shown in this case, the witness testifies under strong circumstances of discredit, the accused should have a full and ample opportunity, by pertinent questions, to test his veracity, and should not be confined Avithin unreasonable limits.
The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Eor this reason it is not necessary to determine the other questions presented on the record and in argument, for they will probably be wholly immaterial in the further progress of the case.
Scott, C. J., and Welch, White and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.