Case Name: JOHNSON TIMBER CORPORATION v. Norma Jean STURDIVANT, Administratrix, et al.
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1988-06-06
Citations: 295 Ark. 622
Docket Number: 87-163
Parties: JOHNSON TIMBER CORPORATION v. Norma Jean STURDIVANT, Administratrix, et al.
Judges: Hickman, J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 295
Pages: 622–663-F

Head Matter:
JOHNSON TIMBER CORPORATION v. Norma Jean STURDIVANT, Administratrix, et al.
87-163
752 S.W.2d 241
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered June 6, 1988
[Interim Opinion delivered July 11, 1988. ]
[Opinion of June 6, 1988 Set Aside on Rehearing October 17, 1988.]
Griffin, Rainwater & Draper, by: Richard E. Griffin, for appellant Georgia-Pacific Corporation.
Laser, Sharp & Mayes, P.A., for appellant Johnson Timber Corporation.
McKenzie, McRae & Vasser, for appellant Lemmie Smith and J & N Logging Company, Inc.
Rose Law Firm, A Professional Association, for amicus curiae American Forestry Association.
Boswell, Tucker & Brewster, and Bramblett & Pratt, for appellee Norma Jean Sturdivant, Administratrix, etc.; Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, P.A., for appellees Catherine M. Vestal, Executrix, etc., and James C. and Linda Meshell; Shackleford, Shackleford & Phillips, P.A., for appellee Nelda C. Meshell, Administratrix, etc.
Gipson, Sp.J., joins in the order; Glaze, J., not participating.

Opinion:
John I. Purtle, Justice.
A Union County Circuit Court jury awarded more than $5,000,000 to the various appellees for three wrongful deaths and a personal injury, all arising out of a motor vehicle collision. The appellants' common arguments for reversal are that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial, and that the court erred in refusing to give or in giving certain jury instructions. Numerous other arguments are presented by the several appellants and will be considered later herein. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the action of the trial court in entering judgments in accordance with the jury verdicts.
A truck loaded with pulpwood and driven by Joe Thrower was traveling east on U.S. Highway #82 in Union County shortly before daylight on March 1,1985, when the vehicle developed an electrical fire and Thrower stopped it in the eastbound traffic lane of the highway. The stalled truck had neither lights nor reflectors to warn other drivers as they approached. Thrower did manage to flag down a westbound log truck, driven by Lemmie Smith, who was employed by J&N Logging Company, Inc. Smith stopped his truck in the westbound traffic lane alongside Thrower's stalled vehicle. Smith told Thrower that he could not help him but would report the situation and send help when he reached the nearby city of Strong.
At the time of the occurrence Thrower was hauling a load of pulpwood for Charles G. Johnson d/b/a Johnson Timber Company to the Georgia-Pacific plant in Crossett. The pulpwood had been cut from land that did not belong to Georgia-Pacific. Thrower owned the truck he was driving. Smith was hauling a load of logs in a truck owned by J&N Logging to a Georgia-Pacific sawmill. These logs had been harvested from Georgia-Pacific land. It is undisputed that Smith was an employee of J&N and was in the course of his employment at the time of the accident.
As Smith drove away from Thrower's truck toward Strong, he met an eastbound automobile driven by Frank Sturdivant, Jr., in which Donald Vestal, Lloyd Meshell and James Meshell were passengers. The automobile crashed into the rear of the Thrower truck resulting in the injury of James Meshell and the death of the other three occupants.
Georgia-Pacific (GP) contracted with Johnson to cut and haul pulpwood from land owned by GP as well as from land owned by others. (The pulpwood being hauled by Thrower was cut from land owned by one Tatum.) Johnson, in turn, had an oral agreement with Thrower to do the actual cutting and hauling. All of the pulpwood being cut and hauled by Thrower during this period was delivered to Georgia-Pacific and was credited to the GP-Johnson contract. J&N contracted to cut and haul timber solely for Georgia-Pacific from Georgia-Pacific land during the period of time in question. The terms of the contracts and the relationship among these parties will be treated in detail later in this opinion.
Separate suits on behalf of the injured party and the various survivors were filed and were consolidated for trial. The issues of comparative fault, agency and damages were submitted to the jury on interrogatories. The jury answered the interrogatories that the agency relationship existed between Thrower and Johnson, between Johnson and GP, and between J&N and GP, and that Thrower was 85 % at fault and Smith 15%. The jury also found Sturdivant was not at fault.
The critical issues in this appeal concern the question of agency between and among the various defendants. The contracts were written by Georgia-Pacific and by their terms obviously intended to create the status of independent contractors, thereby limiting GP's exposure to liability in occurrences such as this. It is therefore necessary to examine in detail the contracts which were in effect at the time.
The cutting and hauling contracts which Johnson & J&N entered into with Georgia-Pacific were essentially the same. The contracts repeatedly stated that Johnson and J&N were independent contractors. The contracts incorporated by reference schedules which were considerably more specific and detailed than the contracts themselves. If a party followed all the specific details and requirements in the contracts there would be no need for any supervision. By complying with the details in the contracts, the "contractors" and their employees were under the direct control of GP as to the details of the performance of the contracts.
Some of the specifics of the contracts were: Georgia-Pacific determined trees to be cut by spotting them with paint; GP dictated the beginning and ending of cutting periods; Georgia-Pacific had the right to speed up, slow down or even stop the harvesting of timber on tracts of land covered by the contract, whether owned by Georgia-Pacific or not; each contract contained provisions requiring the contractors to provide worker's compensation and liability insurance; GP set the minimum limits of coverage and was listed on the policies as a "certificate holder"; the insuring agencies were required to report any changes in coverage or cancellations, etc., direct to Georgia-Pacific; worker's compensation insurance premiums were withheld by Georgia-Pacific from the proceeds due the contractors for the pulp and logs delivered.
The contracts required Johnson Timber Company and J&N to meet the requirements of the law, including the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); provided that accidents be reported to GP's legal department; required that the contractors' records be available for inspection by GP at any time and provided that the records would be inspected at least monthly; gave Georgia-Pacific the right to refuse to unload trucks which were not in compliance with the loading specifications of Georgia-Pacific; required large loads to be separated to allow Georgia-Pacific to unload with their equipment; set detailed specifications for wood which would be delivered including the size, species and general appearance of the wood; and set the destination or delivery point. The specifications set out in the incorporated schedules for "pulpwood contractors," e.g., included:
Contractor agrees to cut from standing timber only marked trees and to fell said trees free of unmarked trees. (By marked trees are meant only such trees as are marked with paint in a conspicuous manner). All wood must be green and sound, with knots and branches trimmed flush with the body of tree.
All truck delivered wood must be cut in lengths not less than 4', or greater than 6'-6" in length. Rail wood must be cut in lengths not less than 5', and not more than 5'-6" in lengths.
No axe-cut or wood with splintered ends will be acceptable.
Georgia-Pacific furnished trained foresters to assist the contractors; prepared the contracts and filled in the blanks before presenting them to the contractors for their signatures; and retained the right to terminate the contracts at any time.
The contracts repeatedly declared that Johnson and J&N were independent contractors and that Georgia-Pacific would not exercise any physical control over the contractors or their employees or equipment and operations. The contracts also contained "hold harmless" provisions which, when coupled with the requirements and prohibitions, were intended to shield Georgia-Pacific from all angles. Between the contract and the attached specifications there was indeed very little ground not covered.
Due to the multiple briefs and points argued on appeal we consolidate the discussion of the arguments whenever possible.
The central issues which we must decide are whether J &N Logging Company was the agent, servant or employee of Georgia-Pacific; whether Thrower was the agent of Johnson Timber; and, if Thrower was indeed an agent, whether Johnson Timber was the agent of Georgia-Pacific. On appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must determine whether the verdict is supported by any substantial evidence. See, e.g., Grendell v. Kiehl, 291 Ark. 228, 723 S.W.2d 830 (1987); and Arkansas Power and Light v. Adcock, 281 Ark. 104, 661 S.W.2d 392 (1983). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will compel a conclusion one way or another. Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 671 S.W.2d 178 (1984). Such proof, with all reasonable inferences, is examined in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is sought, and if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict we affirm the trial court.
We have repeatedly held that the two essential elements of agency are authorization and right to control. The relation of agency is created as the result of conduct by two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for the other to act for him subject to his control, and that the other consents to so act. Evans v. White, 284 Ark. 376, 682 S.W.2d 733 (1985). Ordinarily the question of agency is one of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. However, if only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the proof presented, then it becomes a question of law. Evans v. White, supra, citing Campbell v. Bastian, 236 Ark. 205, 365 S.W.2d 249 (1963).
When it is demonstrated that the person causing an injury was at the time rendering service for another and being paid for that service, "and the facts presented are as consistent with the master-servant relationship as with the independent contractor relationship, then the burden is on the one asserting the independence of the contractor to show the true relationship of the parties." Schuster's Inc. v. Whitehead, 291 Ark. 180, 722 S.W.2d 862 (1987), citing Phillips Cooperative Gin Co. v. Toll, 228 Ark. 891, 311 S. W.2d 171 (1958). "It is generally held by the courts, including our own, that if the employer claims that an employee is an independent contractor for whose acts he is not responsible, the burden is upon him to show that fact." Phillips.
The appellants in the present case entered into written agreements. In Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 214 Ark. 657, 217 S.W.2d 341 (1949), we stated:
Although a written contract creates the relation of employer and independent contractor, such relation may be destroyed by conduct of the employer through direction of means and methods of producing physical results, and it becomes a question of fact for the jury if there is any substantial evidence to show that such conduct became operative.
Similarly, where the nature of the relation between employer and employee depends upon the meaning of a written instrument collaterally introduced in evidence, and the effect of such instrument depends, not only upon its construction, but also upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, the inferences pf fact to be drawn from the instrument must be left to the jury.
The appellants rely rather heavily on Moore and Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Phillips, 197 Ark. 131, 120 S.W.2d 722 (1938), in which this court held that Moore was an independent contractor of Chicago Mill and Lumber. The facts of that case and of the present appeal are superficially similar in that Chicago Mill and Lumber contracted with Moore for the delivery of timber according to specific and definite contractual directions that were to be observed by the contractor in the cutting of the timber, especially as to location and dimension. However, "[tjhere [was] nothing in the contract showing an intent upon the part of the company to retain control or direction of Moore in the exercise of the means or method by which he should perform the contract." Chief Justice Griffin Smith, speaking for the court, observed:
The governing distinction is that if control of the work reserved by the employer is control not only of the result, but also of the means and manner of the performance, then the relation of master and servant necessarily follows. On the other hand, if control of the means be lacking, and the owner does not undertake to direct the manner in which the employee shall work in the discharge of his duties, then the relation of independent contractor exists.
Moore defined an independent contractor as one who contracts to do a job according to his own method without being subject to the control of the other party except as to the result of the work. That statement is still the law. Indeed, Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 707, which was given to the jury over the appellants' objection that it is an "inaccurate" or "incomplete" statement of the law, provides in part:
An independent contractor is one who, in the course of his independent occupation, is responsible for the performance of certain work, uses his own methods to accomplish it, and is subject to the control of the employer only as to the result of his work.
The appellants also rely upon the case of Newton & Fitzgeralds. Clark, 266 Ark. 237, 582 S.W.2d 955 (1979). True, Newton had many facts in common with the present case, but the issue in that case was whether Newton was an independent contractor of Fitzgerald or whether he was merely a supplier of logs to Fitzgerald. The present case is clearly distinguishable from Newton. There, the record demonstrated "that Moses Newton does not cut logs from lands marked and designated by Fitzgerald or any of the other contractor dealers. Newton makes his own arrangements with a landowner to cut logs and when he gets a load ready to go, he hauls the logs to Georgia-Pacific's mill."
Both Thrower and Smith were hauling wood to Georgia-Pacific at the time of the occurrence giving rise to this litigation. Smith was hauling logs which had been cut from Georgia-Pacific land and Thrower was hauling pulpwood which had been contracted for delivery to Georgia-Pacific's Crossett Plant. We held in Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, supra, that after the plaintiffs introduce testimony showing that the driver of a log truck is hauling for a lumber company at the time of the injuries complained of, the burden then rests with the lumber company to establish the relationship of independent contractor. Ozan Lumber also stated that evidence that the company was carrying liability insurance covering the truck driver and evidence that the company paid workers' compensation insurance on the workers are both relevant factors to be considered in determining the issue of employee versus independent contractor.
In Ozan we quoted from Delamar & Allison v. Ward, 174 Ark. 82, 41 S.W.2d 760 (1931), as follows: "Evidence that defendants were carrying liability insurance covering the negligence of a truck driver hauling gravel was a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the truck driver was employed by defendants or was an independent contractor." In the instant case Georgia-Pacific did not carry liability insurance covering the drivers, but by the terms of the contracts Johnson and J&N were required to have such insurance in an amount set by GP and with a company acceptable to GP. GP was listed as a "certificate holder" on these insurance policies and received notice of all endorsements, changes and cancellations.
Workers' compensation insurance covering the drivers is required by the terms of the contracts. In fact, Georgia-Pacific withholds the workers' compensation premiums from the payments made to the contractors for the delivery of wood products by Thrower and Smith. The premiums were based on the quantity of wood delivered rather than the payrolls. By collecting the premiums in this manner it was about as accurate as if the premium had been based upon payroll records. Payment of workers' compensation insurance premiums is evidence relating to the status as employer-employee or independent contractor. Ozan Lumber.
Their contracts also required Johnson and J&N to follow the federal laws relating to safety (OSHA) and the FLSA. The guarantee of minimum wages is evidence that an individual is an employee and not an independent contractor. In Irvan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S.W.2d 674 (1943), we stated that compliance with the federal wage and hour law "indicates that Irvan considered Bounds to be an employee, because, if Bounds was an independent contractor, and not an employee, it was not necessary, in order to comply with the federal law, to guarantee him any minimum wage."
There is no hard and fast rule whereby we are always able to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. Each case must stand upon its own facts as developed at the trial. All of the parties generally state the correct law applicable to this case. However, as usual, the emphasis and interpretation to be applied to the facts are where the parties disagree.
The following are but a few of the factors considered in reaching our conclusion that the issue was properly a fact question for the jury: GP prepared the contracts and filled in the blanks before presenting them to the "contractors"; required liability insurance with a company acceptable to GP; withheld workers' compensation premiums; could terminate the contract at will; required that the wood be loaded in a manner compatible with GP's unloading equipment; required each worker not only to abide by OSHA standards but also GP's local safety rules; controlled the size and shape of logs and the delivery rate; furnished foresters to assist in locating boundaries, surveying and spotting trees; maintained the right to refuse to accept timber which was not loaded properly, contained culls, or was too small or too large; and maintained the right to refuse to accept timber if the employees were not wearing proper safety equipment.
We cannot point to any specific fact which establishes the employer-employee relationship. However, we conclude that all the facts and circumstances established by the proof, when considered together, are sufficient to present questions of fact to be decided by the jury. See Phillips Cooperative Gin Co. v. Toll, supra. The employer-employee relationship between J&N and Smith is not in dispute. The facts are clearly sufficient to present the question to the jury concerning the relationships between Johnson and Thrower, between Johnson and GP, and between J&N and GP. We hold that there was substantial evidence to support all findings relating to the issue of agency.
Johnson argues that the trial court should have granted it a directed verdict because, as a matter of law, Thrower was an independent contractor. In Ozan Lumber Co. v. Tidwell, 210 Ark. 942, 198 S.W.2d 182 (1946), we considered the nature of an oral agreement for the cutting and hauling of timber. We stated: "If the contract is oral, and if more than one inference can fairly be drawn from the evidence, the question should go to the jury whether the relation is that of employer and independent contractor or that of master and servant." In the present case, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that both Johnson and GP retained a degree of control over the work of Thrower consistent with his status as an employee. The resolution of this issue was therefor properly submitted to the jury.
The contracts and incorporated schedules were so detailed and complete that there was little room for an independent contractor to function. Practically all decisions relating to the performance of the contracts had already been determined by the terms of the contracts. Georgia-Pacific dominated every phase of the work to such an extent that the relationship between and among the defendants was a question of fact for the jury.
All appellants argue the court erroneously gave instructions to the jury or failed to give proper instructions. The rule concerning instructions is stated in our Per Curiam of April 19, 1965:
If Arkansas Model Jury Instructions (AMI) contains an instruction applicable to a civil case, and the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the AMI instruction shall be used unless the trial judge finds that it does not accurately state the law. In that event he will state his reasons for refusing the AMI instruction. Whenever AMI does not contain an instruction on a subject upon which the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed, or when an AMI instruction cannot be modified to submit the issue, the instruction on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.
Appellants argue that the court erred in giving AMI 707 and refusing three instructions on the issue of agency which were requested by the appellants. The notes following AMI 707 provide that this instruction should be given "when there is an issue whether a person is an agent or an independent contractor." The instructions requested by the appellants apparently were taken from Moore and Chicago Mill & Lumber v. Phillips, supra, and basically are accurate statements of the law. However, as noted earlier in this opinion, AMI 707 is an accurate statement of the law. Indeed, the definition of an independent contractor found in AMI 707 is nearly identical to the definition found in Moore and Chicago Mill. Even if a non-AMI instruction correctly states the law, it is not error to refuse it when an AMI instruction covering the same subject matter is appropriate. Wharton v. Bray, 250 Ark. 127, 464 S.W.2d 554 (1971). The trial court therefor did not err in giving AMI 707 and refusing the three requested instructions.
The defendants requested that the court give an instruction which included the bracketed portion of AMI 901(B):
When the driver sees danger ahead, or it is reasonably apparent if he is keeping a proper lookout (or if he is warned of approaching imminent danger) then he is required to use ordinary care to have his vehicle under such control as to be able to check its speed or stop it, if necessary, to avoid danger to himself or others.
The trial court instructed the jury according to AMI 901 (A), (B) and (C) — that it is the duty of a driver to keep a proper lookout, to keep his vehicle under control, and to drive at a reasonable speed.
The requested portion of 901(B) is properly refused when, e.g., the driver of an automobile is faced with an unexpected emergency which he could not have reasonably anticipated. Home Insurance Co. v. Harwell, 263 Ark. 884, 568 S.W.2d 17 (1978). On the other hand, in East Texas Motor Freight v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d 456 (1986), we held that it was not error to have given the bracketed part of 901 (B), where drivers could see smoke crossing the highway from some distance away. We are of the opinion, in the present case, that the trial court correctly refused the bracketed portion of 901(B). While there was evidence that both Thrower and Smith attempted to warn the approaching automobile of the stalled truck, there was no evidence that the driver of the automobile saw, or reasonably should have seen, the danger.
The defendants also requested that the court instruct the jury according to AMI 910. This instruction simply states that a passenger in an automobile is required to use ordinary care for his own safety. We have held this instruction to be proper only when there is evidence that the passenger's conduct was a negligent act or omission which operated as a proximate cause of the injury. Reed v. McGibboney, 243 Ark. 789, 422 S.W.2d 115 (1967). There was no such evidence in the present case. Under the circumstances of this case, it would have been pure speculation for the jury to have found that the passengers' failure to warn the driver was a proximate cause of the injuries. See also Curbo v. Harlan, 253 Ark. 816, 490 S.W.2d 467 (1973); and Kyser v. Porter, 261 Ark. 351, 548 S.W.2d 128 (1977). Moreover, the court did instruct the jury according to AMI 305(B) — that it was the duty of all persons involved in the occurrence to use ordinary care for their own safety and the safety of others.
Appellant J&N Logging Company also requested that the court give AMI 616, the model instruction based on the "rescue doctrine." J&N argues that Smith was attempting to rescue Thrower, and therefore it was error to refuse the requested instruction. This instruction applies when a person "acting under stress in response to humanitarian impulses" is "attempting to rescue another who reasonably appears to be in danger of substantial injury or loss of life." The court correctly refused this instruction because there was no evidence that Thrower reasonably appeared to be in danger of substantial injury. See Price v. Watkins, 283 Ark. 502, 678 S.W.2d 762 (1984); and Woodruff Electric Co-op v. Weis Butane, 225 Ark. 114, 279 S.W.2d 564 (1955).
The appellants objected to the jury being instructed concerning Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-1303 (1987). This statute concerns stopping, standing, or parking other than in a business or residential district. The statute specifically provides:
(a)(1) Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district, no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main-traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park, or leave the vehicle off such part of the highway. In any event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles, and a clear view of the stopped vehicles shall be available from a distance of two hundred feet (200') in each direction upon the highway.
(b) This shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or main-traveled portion of the highway in a manner and to an extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the disabled vehicle in that position.
The statute does not prohibit any person from leaving a vehicle on the main-traveled portion of a highway when it is impossible to stop, park or leave the vehicle off such portion of the highway. However, the statute requires that "in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles."
In American Bus Lines, Inc. v. Merritt, 221 Ark. 596, 254 S.W.2d 963 (1953), a passenger bus stopped on the main-traveled part of a highway to discharge passengers. An automobile attempted to go around the stopped bus and collided with an opposite-bound vehicle. The opinion discussed this statute in detail but summed up in the following words:
Every case must be decided on its own facts; and in some cases, as here, it becomes a question for the jury as to whether it is practical to stop the vehicle off the highway . . . But here, where reasonable minds may differ as to whether it is practical to remove the vehicle from the pavement before stopping, it becomes a question for the jury, and the statute may be taken into consideration in determining whether there was negligence in stopping the bus on the pavement.
It is a question of fact for the jury whether it was practical for both Thrower and Smith to have stopped their vehicles on the shoulder of the highway. It is undisputed that Smith stopped his vehicle alongside the Thrower vehicle in violation of this statute. There was evidence that the nearby shoulders of the highway were sufficiently broad to have allowed the trucks to have stopped off the highway.
Appellant J &N Logging also argues that there is no substantial evidence that Smith was negligent. For reasons stated immediately above, we hold that there is evidence from which the jury could have found that Smith was negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries.
Appellants argue that a mistrial should have been granted or that the jury panel should have been quashed due to allegedly improper remarks by counsel for appellees during the voir dire of the jury. The incident complained of was counsel's response to the question of a member of the jury panel concerning a situation where both parties were negligent but the negligence of one outweighed the negligence of the other. The attorney's response. was: "Til give you an example to answer your question. We have in Arkansas comparative negligence law, so if you found the one party 60 % at fault and the other one 40 % at fault, then a million dollars in damages would be reduced down to $600,000 by the percentage of their negligence."
Although this exact situation has not been previously considered by the court, we have on numerous occasions considered statements by counsel during closing arguments concerning answers to interrogatories. The general rule when submitting a case to the jury on interrogatories, is that the jury may not be informed by counsel or by the court of the effect that their answers may have upon the ultimate liability of the parties. Wright v. Covey, 233 Ark. 798, 349 S.W.2d 344 (1961). In the case of International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901 (1971), counsel told the jury in his closing argument: "If the jury finds that Earl Pike assumed the risk of his own injury, he will not receive a nickel." We held that this statement violated the rule against informing the jury of the effect of their answers to interrogatories. See also Stull, Administratrix v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264 (1981).
In Buckeye Cellulose v. Vandament, 256 Ark. 434, 508 S.W.2d 49 (1974), plaintiffs counsel in closing argument stated: "[I]f there's some argument about how much, we ask you to decide the larger amount because his Honor, there, if you give [the plaintiff] too much, can cut it down, but if you give him too little, he can't increase it." Objection was made and the court stated: "I suppose it is improper argument, it is the law but probably is not a proper argument to present to the jury. In any event you are instructed to disregard it." In Buckeye, we stated that a trial court is accorded great latitude in correcting any prejudicial effect of argument by counsel and that we do not reverse unless such prejudice appears manifest and the court's admonition is not sufficient to eliminate that prejudice from the jurors' minds. We held that the "admonition" given by the court was insufficient to remove the prejudicial error of the remarks of counsel.
A well reasoned analysis of this subj ect can be found in Wright v. Covey, supra. Wright held that it is not error, in submitting a case on interrogatories, for the court to instruct the jury that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery if it is of less degree than the defendant's negligence and that the award of damages is diminished in proportion to the contributory negligence. This statement of the law is remarkably similar to the comments objected to in this appeal. We stated in Wright that we did not think this instruction "had the'effect of telling the jurors anything which they as intelligent men might not have deduced from the wording of the special interrogatories." We went on to remark: "It is a matter of common knowledge to the bench and bar that counsel may argue long and loud to the jury that a certain issue should be answered in a particular way."
Counsel's comments during voir dire explaining comparative negligence law are similar to these statements made in closing argument or in the court's instructions. The general rule appears to be that while an attorney may specifically argue what the answer to an interrogatory should be, he may not comment on the effect the answers will have on the outcome of the trial. In this case we believe the trial court cured the error, if there was any, by admonishing the jury to disregard the explanation of the law given by plaintiff's counsel. The failure of the trial court to grant a mistrial will not be reversed unless the court clearly abused its discretion.
Appellants also claim prejudicial error when counsel for one of the plaintiffs during opening argument displayed the interrogatories before the jury and argued for appropriate an swers. A motion for mistrial was denied. Such conduct amounts to no more than suggesting the answers to interrogatories.
The appellants strenuously argue that the various insurance policies should not have been admitted into evidence. They argue that the policies were not relevant to the issue of agency, or, if relevant, the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The various insurance contracts were entered into the record with the limits of coverage deleted. Appellant Johnson specifically argues that his liability insurance policies had no relevance because they did not include coverage for Thrower or Thrower's vehicle. Appellant J&N concedes its policies covered Smith but argues they were not relevant.
There was much discussion among the attorneys and between the attorneys and the trial court concerning the introduction of the various insurance policies and the cautionary instruction to be given to the jury. Before the trial commenced there was a lengthy discussion in chambers concerning the admission of the policies, including an exchange among the attorneys for the defendants concerning the frequency that the admonition should be given. After considerable discussion about the admonition to be given limiting the purpose for which the policies had been introduced, the court stated: "I'd ask you to write out, I'd ask both of you to write out that admonition that you feel that the court should make to the jury and let me consider both, then I'll make that and I'll read it to the jury . . .You write it out, let me see it and I will admonish the jury in that regard." The instruction agreed upon by counsel at that time is as follows: "The question of insurance is only to be considered by you, the jury, in determining the relationships between the parties and should not in any way be considered by you for any other purpose." The court, after reading this instruction to counsel, then stated: "I'll give that when you desire it."
After the trial was in progress there was another discussion in chambers concerning the introduction of the insurance policies. This discussion focused on the deletion of the coverage limits from the policies and the instruction to be given concerning the deletions. The trial then continued in open court, and the policies, with the coverage limits "whited out," were introduced into evidence. Before their introduction the court gave a limiting instruction which included the following statement:
So those are additional items or exhibits which are in evidence which you are entitled to see and to examine. I do have an admonition with respect to both exhibits. Exhibits introduced into evidence relating to certificates of insurance have been altered by Order of the Court in order to eliminate or eradicate the limits or the amounts of the insurance, and such should not be considered by you. Such eliminated or eradicated portions of the contract, that's not made to deceive or in any [way] mislead you. Merely by Order of the Court as this particular item of. insurance relates to the evidence. Is that an acceptable admonition by all parties?
One of the defense attorneys replied: "Yes, your Honor."
From the record it is obvious that the litigants had an agreement as to the exact wording of the limiting instruction, but that the court slightly misstated it when he cautioned the jury. However, defense counsel then agreed that the instruction given by the court was satisfactory.
It is fundamental that evidence relating to the existence of liability insurance is not ordinarily admissible because of its lack of relevance and its inherently prejudicial nature. Ben M. Hogan, Inc. v. Nichols, 254 Ark. 771, 496 S.W.2d 404 (1973). Such evidence should be admitted only when it is relevant to the issues. In Hogan, we stated:
Evidence along these lines has been admitted when it tended to show facts or circumstances having a bearing upon an issue. This policy or its content could be admitted only to the extent it tends to show that Cumbie and Steele were employees of Hogan.
In Brown v. Keaton, 232 Ark. 12, 334 S.W.2d 676 (1960), we stated that contractual provisions for liability insurance, though not admissible for all purposes, were relevant matters to be considered by the jury on the issue of a party's status as an employee or independent contractor. See also Ozan Lumber v. McNeely, supra; and Phillips Cooperative Gin Co. v. Toll, supra. Brown emphasized, however, that the jury should be instructed to consider such evidence only with respect to the issue upon which it is admitted. Brown further emphasized that it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs, when offering proof not admissible for all purposes, to request that the court admit it for the limited purpose only.
An early case involving this question is Delamar and Allison v. Ward, supra. There evidence of liability insurance was submitted to the jury with the instruction that "This testimony is submitted to you as a circumstance only for you to consider in determining whether or not Delamar and Allison, the defendants, had any control or dominion over the truck which figured in the case you are now trying, and you will not consider that testimony, gentlemen, for any other purpose . . ." This court held that the fact that the defendants were insured against liability for injuries occasioned by the truck drivers was a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.
Johnson argues rather strenuously that his insurance policies were not relevant and that their admission was highly prejudicial. The record reveals that the policies named Georgia-Pacific as a "certificate holder" on both the general liability and vehicular liability policies. The general liability policy covered, among other things, "hired and non-owned" vehicles. Other liability policies covered several log trucks, tractors and trailers. Johnson testified that he did not own any such equipment. It is clear that these policies were relevant to the determination of the relationship among the defendants, GP, Johnson and Thrower.
The trial court did not err in allowing the policies to be introduced into evidence. As stated in Brown v. Keaton, Hogan v. Nichols, and Delamar and Allison v. Ward, liability insurance is relevant to the determination of the issue of employee or independent contractor. Such evidence is, of course, subject to a limiting instruction. Although the exact instruction agreed upon before the trial commenced was not given, the defendants not only did not object to the instruction given by the court, they expressly agreed that the instruction was satisfactory.
We lastly consider the argument that the award to Linda Meshell in the amount of $750,000 for loss of consortium is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. We have many times considered the argument that an award of damages for loss of consortium was excessive. We review each case upon its own merits and reduce the award only if it is shown to have been influenced by prejudice or is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981). Consortium is not easily defined. From our prior cases we conclude that consortium may be generally defined as the comfort, society, affection, services, and other indefinable elements reasonably expected from the injured person. Damages for loss of consortium do not include the personal inconvenience of the claimant. Nor do they include matters such as pain and suffering, loss of wages, medical expenses and other damages personal to the injured party. In the present case, Mr. Meshell has received a judgment covering these elements of damages. Ms. Meshell's claim for loss of consortium must stand or fall on its independent merit.
The excessiveness of a verdict must be considered on a case by case basis and each must be examined on its own facts. Breitenberg v. Parker, 237 Ark. 261, 372 S.W.2d 828 (1963). Although loss of consortium is most difficult to measure in dollars and cents, recovery for such loss should be dictated by reason and justice. Whiter. Mitchell, 263 Ark. 787, 568 S.W.2d 216 (1978). We considered the propriety of an award for loss of consortium in Morrison v. Lowe, supra, where the trial court had reduced the jury verdict from $ 100,000 to $30,000. In affirming the reduction of the award we pointed out that we review the record de novo on appeal to determine whether the amount of the judgment shocks the conscience of this court. We have often reduced consortium awards because the jury considered matters included in the spouse's recovery. See, e.g., Scheptmann v. Thorn, 272 Ark. 70, 612 S.W.2d 291 (1981).
Factually no two cases are exactly alike. Therefore, in reaching our decision on this award for loss of consortium, we are compelled to review the facts. The husband's injuries in this case were severe. He is generally confined to a wheelchair, wears diapers, is fed through a funnel in an opening in his stomach, is incapable of a conjugal relationship, and will probably never regain bowel and bladder control. He has severe speech impairment and considerable brain damage. All the testimony relating to the husband's injuries was before the jury at the same time that it was considering the wife's claim for damages. Ms. Meshell's damages and the damages of her husband are interwoven and difficult to distinguish. The wife told how she sat by her husband's bed at night and cried until she couldn't cry anymore. Much of her testimony concerned the care and services she rendered to her husband.
After reviewing the evidence presented to the j ury, we are confident that the award for loss of consortium was based partly upon matters included in the husband's recovery and not properly embraced within the concept of consortium. We conclude that the amount of the award was influenced by passion and is therefore excessive. Much of the wife's testimony related to her husband's pain and suffering and his horrible injuries and permanent disabilities as well as the services she rendered in caring for him. These items constitute elements of the husband's recovery. The judgment for Linda Meshell in the amount of $750,000 is excessive and should be reduced to $250,000.
The issue as to employee or independent contractor was in sharp dispute. Unquestionably there was substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury on the issue of agency. Had the decision been for the appellants there would have been substantial evidence to support that verdict. The facts presented clearly establish that the issue was one properly presented to the jury for resolution. We conclude therefore that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in refusing to direct a verdict, or grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. As discussed above we do not find any of the other arguments sufficient to reverse the decision of the trial court except with respect to the award of damages to Linda Meshell. If within seventeen days she will enter a remittitur of $500,000, the judgment will be affirmed. Otherwise, the case will be remanded for a new trial on the question of damages for her loss of consortium. As to all other parties the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed upon condition.
Hickman, J., concurs.
Glaze, J., not participating.
Mike Gibson, Special Justice, dissents.