Case Name: MARVIN LAWRENCE and LORD BARONOFF APARTMENTS, INC., Appellants, v. SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION, LAWYERS TITLE OF LAS VEGAS, INC., UTILITY FINANCIAL CORP., McKELLAR AND ASSOCIATES, and CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Jurisdiction: Nevada
Decision Date: 1973-10-11
Citations: 89 Nev. 433
Docket Number: No. 7143
Parties: MARVIN LAWRENCE and LORD BARONOFF APARTMENTS, INC., Appellants, v. SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION, LAWYERS TITLE OF LAS VEGAS, INC., UTILITY FINANCIAL CORP., McKELLAR AND ASSOCIATES, and CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Nevada Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 433–434

Head Matter:
MARVIN LAWRENCE and LORD BARONOFF APARTMENTS, INC., Appellants, v. SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION, LAWYERS TITLE OF LAS VEGAS, INC., UTILITY FINANCIAL CORP., McKELLAR AND ASSOCIATES, and CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents.
No. 7143
October 11, 1973
514 P.2d 868
[Rehearing denied November 1, 1973]
Charles L. Kellar, of Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Darrell Lincoln Clark, of Las Vegas, for Respondents Southwest Gas Corporation and Utility Financial Corp.
Dickerson, Miles & Pico, of Las Vegas, for Respondent Lawyers Title of Las Vegas, Inc.
George L. Albright, of Las Vegas, for Respondents McKellar and Associates and Chicago Title Insurance Company.

Opinion:
OPINION
Per Curiam:
Pursuant to NRCP 36(a), appellants (plaintiffs below) were served a formal request to admit certain facts. Appellants served neither timely answers nor timely objections, and thus they admitted facts that negatived the existence of the claims alleged in their Amended Complaint. Thereafter, without moving for permission to withdraw or amend these admissions, appellants filed a belated "Answer to Demand for Admissions," purporting to deny the matters already admitted by operation of NRCP 36. On motion, the district court granted summary judgment, from which appellants have appealed, contending that the district court "abused its discretion."
Assuming the district court had discretion to relieve appellants of their admissions, on its own motion, our review of the record satisfies us that in this case the court was justified in not doing so.
Affirmed.
As with analogous federal provisions, NRCP 36(a) expressly declares that each matter of which an admission is requested "is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom a request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter," and NRCP 36(b) states that "[ajny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."