Case Name: Thomas S. BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-05-07
Citations: 622 So. 2d 1333
Docket Number: No. 91-1498
Parties: Thomas S. BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WOLF, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 622
Pages: 1333–1339

Head Matter:
Thomas S. BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 91-1498.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 7, 1993.
Order Certifying Question Sept. 14, 1993.
Louis 0. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, James T. Miller, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Marilyn McFadden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
MINER, Judge.
Urging that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his out-of-court and in-court identification by state's witnesses and his motion for judgment of acquittal based' on insufficient evidence, appellant, Thomas Baker, challenges his conviction and sentence for burglary of a dwelling. We affirm.
With respect to the identification issue, on the record before us, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress and affirm on this point without further com ment. Whether the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction for burglary of a dwelling warrants more extended analysis.
By a third amended information, appellant was charged with burglary of a dwelling. Specifically, the information alleged that on October 15,1990, Thomas unlawfully entered or remained in Robert Wilson's dwelling with the intent to commit an unspecified offense.
Deposition and trial testimony disclosed that on the day in question, Joy Ellis, Wilson's next-door neighbor, was sitting in her living room around the noon hour when she heard a burglar alarm sound at the Wilson residence. Within three or four seconds after hearing the alarm she looked out a window and observed the appellant come around the far side of the Wilson house riding a bicycle. Mrs. Ellis testified that the Wilson house was hidden from the road located in front by trees and shrubs. A six-foot privacy fence separated the Ellis and Wilson residences and Mrs. Ellis described the area where she had seen appellant as containing shrubbery and a small pathway. She related further that appellant proceeded around the front of the Wilson home and down the driveway to the street.
Joy Ellis' testimony was corroborated by that of her 20-year-old daughter, Angela, who also heard the alarm and went to the window in time to see appellant emerge from the far side of the Wilson home on a bicycle. Like her mother, Angela Ellis did not see appellant jump the fence or enter Wilson's house.
After hearing the burglar alarm and seeing appellant departing the Wilson premises, Joy Ellis called the Neptune Beach Police Department to report the matter and give a description of the person she saw hurrying away. Officer William Jones responded to the call and preliminary investigation at the scene revealed that a window had been broken. Another officer, Richard Pike, was also dispatched to investigate and within two or three minutes of receiving the dispatch describing appellant, Pike stopped Thomas and returned him to the scene where he was identified by Joy Ellis as the man she had seen a few minutes earlier riding a bicycle away from the Wilson home moments after the burglar alarm sounded. Further investigation at the scene by Officer Pike revealed that the lower panel of a window in the back of Wilson's house had been smashed. Next to the broken window lay a window screen and a piece of wood two inches thick, 10 inches in width and 14 inches long. On this piece of board were glass fragments. Similar pieces of wood were found under a plastic tarp at the front of the house. Officer Pike also noted a chain-link fence surrounding the backyard of the Wilson residence.
At the conclusion of the state's case at trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the following grounds:
(1) The state failed to prove the house allegedly burgled was owned by Robert Wilson;
(2) The state failed to prove appellant's intent to commit an offense and there was no proof of stealthy entry; and
(3) There was insufficient proof of burglary because there was no showing that appellant entered the dwelling.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal. As to the first basis for acquittal, the court concluded that the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the state, was sufficient to establish ownership. Similarly interpreted, the court found the evidence sufficient to establish stealthy entry:
This did occur around the side towards the back of the house in an area that was secluded not only by fences, but by shrubs as well. I looked at the photographs in evidence and [I am] relying on them. Also you can tell that's an area that would be secluded, someone trying to sneak in would pick an area like that. It is pretty apparent as to the location of the window in relation to the surrounding area. Also the fact that the man who has been identified as this defendant did flee the scene as soon as the alarm went on, the alarm that the neighbors heard. That also is going to stealthy entry. Fleeing the scene on the bicycle when the alarm went off, the fact the window was broken out with a piece of wood, all of those facts and the rest of the circumstances on the record add up to the stealthy entry in this court's opinion in the light most favorable to the state.
As to the third basis of acquittal, the trial court found that there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant entered the house when breaking the windowpane with the block of wood found beside the broken window.
The defense called no witnesses and the case was argued to the jury. The state argued that entry was made by appellant using the block of wood; it was up to the jury to decide whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove completed entry or only attempted burglary. After argument, the trial court instructed the jury, including in such instructions the standard jury instruction defining "structure" as "any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure." (Emphasis added).
Appellant was found guilty of burglary as charged in the information. Thereafter he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial. At the hearing on these motions, the state argued for the first time that appellant could be convicted of burglary for entry into the curtilage. The trial court denied the motions and appellant was subsequently sentenced to 30 years in prison as an habitual felony offender. This appeal followed thereafter.
Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), defines burglary as "entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.... " In making its initial ruling on appellant's motion for acquittal, the trial court apparently concluded that appellant's "entry" was based upon his use of the block of wood which shattered the windowpane and thereby protruded inside the structure or dwelling. However, such an "entry by instrument" is not sufficient in Florida or at common law unless the instrument inserted into the structure is actually used to commit the contemplated crime; where the instrument is merely inserted in the course of the break, or to facilitate subsequent entry, its presence inside the structure does not constitute an entry by the defendant. Foster v. State, 220 So.2d 406 (Fla.3rd DCA), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 913 (Fla.1969); W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13(b) (1986); C.E. Torcia, 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 333 (1978); see State v. Spearman, 366 So.2d 775 (Fla.2nd DCA 1978).
Despite this apparent misconception, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that a "structure" could include the enclosed grounds immediately surrounding the building. Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 136; see § 810.011(1) and (2), Fla.Stat. (1989) (definitions of "structure" and "dwelling" include the curtilage); J.E.S. v. State, 453 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (the driveway of a home is part of the curtilage so that theft of a bicycle from the driveway constitutes burglary); Tobler v. State, 371 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA) (the fenced area surrounding a warehouse is part of the curtilage so that entry onto the grounds to accomplish a theft constitutes burglary), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979). In the case at bar, there was competent evidence establishing appellant's entry into the fenced yard. He was seen coming from the yard only seconds after the alarm had sounded, which alarm appeared to have been triggered by the breaking of a window with a block of wood. Appellant's suggestion that the block was thrown from outside the curtilage is unreasonable given the size of the block (9" x 14" x I-V2"), the fact that the gate was left open, and the presence of a window screen left lying next to the broken window. Additionally, in view of Officer Pike's testimony that the piece of wood found beside the broken window was similar to blocks of wood found under the tarp at the front of the house, we are of the view that it could not be reasonably inferred that appellant entered the curtilage to take the block of wood from under the tarp and then left the curtilage to throw the wood at the window.
Appellant's intent to commit an offense, which is an essential element of burglary, may be inferred from his stealthy entry. Thus, section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that "proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense." The trial court correctly instructed the jury that intent could be inferred from stealthy entry. See Fla. Std. Jury Inste. (Crim.) 135. There was ample evidence of appellant's stealthy entry onto the curtilage which, by definition, was part of the "structure" or "dwelling." Appellant entered a fenced yard and sought entry into the house through a rear window. Testimony established that the front of the house was hidden from the road by trees and shrubbery. The yard was secluded due to the presence of fencing and shrubs. Choosing a secluded location calculated to avoid discovery may constitute stealth. See Irvin v. State, 590 So.2d 9 (Fla.3rd DCA 1991) (in prosecution for attempted burglary of a conveyance, stealth instruction was proper under § 810.07(2) where the defendant selected a van parked next to a wall in a deserted parking lot).
Accordingly, appellant's conviction and sentence are herewith affirmed.
WOLF, J., concurs.
ERVIN J., dissents with opinion.