Case Name: Herla Jill HOSKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Damon HOSKINS, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-04-05
Citations: 814 So. 2d 773
Docket Number: No. 36,031-CA
Parties: Herla Jill HOSKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Damon HOSKINS, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before BROWN, GASKINS and PEATROSS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 814
Pages: 773–783

Head Matter:
Herla Jill HOSKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Damon HOSKINS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 36,031-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 5, 2002.
Albert E. Loomis, III, Monroe, for Appellant.
Kenneth L. Harper, Jonesboro, for Ap-pellee.
Before BROWN, GASKINS and PEATROSS, JJ.

Opinion:
I t GASKINS, Judge.
Hería Jill Hoskins Mauldin, the mother of nine-year-old Ashley Hoskins, appeals from a trial court judgment which denied her motion to modify a joint custody plan and which continued the child's father, John Damon Hoskins, as the domiciliary parent. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties were married in August 1990. Of this marriage, one daughter, Ashley, was born (DOB 6/14/92). The parties separated in April 1997. The mother filed for divorce in May 1997, requesting joint custody of the child with herself as domiciliary parent. In June 1997, the father answered and reconvened, asking that he be named domiciliary parent. In July 1997, the father petitioned for divorce based upon the mother's adultery with Bobby Mauldin in April and June 1997.
In August 1997, the parties entered into a consent judgment whereby the father was named domiciliary parent during the school year. The mother was ordered to pay $150 in monthly child support, as well as 30 percent of the child's uncovered major medical expenses. In January 1998, the father filed a motion for judgment of divorce. The judgment was signed in February 1998. In addition to terminating the marriage, the judgment also incorporated by reference the terms of the consent judgment setting child custody and support. In April 1998, the father married his current wife, Karen. In May 1998, the mother married Mr. Mauldin.
In June 2000, the father filed a rule to modify custody to require that the mother's visitation be supervised. He alleged that the mother's living arrangements were unstable; that there was no room for the child at the bplace where the mother was then residing; that the mother had allowed the stepfather to take the child with him on sales calls and that he would leave the child in the car unattended for excessive periods of time; and that the mother allowed the child to go days without bathing, resulting in urine burns on the child's buttocks which required medical attention. The father further alleged that the mother had violated the joint custody plan by telling the child lies and derogatory comments about the father; he requested that the mother be held in contempt for these violations. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on June 13, 2000, preventing the mother from exercising physical custody of the child pending a hearing.
In July 2000, the mother filed an answer and her own rule to change custody. She claimed that she and the stepfather were living in a three-bedroom house where the child had a room of her own. She denied that the stepfather left the child unattended or in the car for more than five or ten minutes. She claimed that the urine burns were actually chlorine irritation from a swimming pool. She alleged that the father was physically abusive to her and the child and that he was financially unstable. The mother also asserted that the stepmother was raising the child and insisted that the child call her "mother."
On July 28, 2000, the court dissolved the prior TRO against the mother, restored the joint custody plan and granted the mother exclusive custody from the date of the hearing until three days before school resumed. The court further ordered that the parties ensure that the child exercise | ¡proper hygiene and that they refrain from making derogatory remarks about each other in the child's presence.
In October 2000, the mother filed a rule for contempt, alleging that the father was persistently tardy in providing the child to her for weekend visitation.
In November 2000, the father filed a motion for contempt, protective order and an increase in child support. He asserted that the mother had not paid child support in September, October and November and was in arrears of $450. He also contended that she had failed to pay her 30 percent of the child's uncovered medical expenses. He requested that the child support be increased. Additionally, the father assert ed that the stepfather had a history of sexually abusing children and that he believed that the child had been sexually abused by the stepfather. An order prohibiting contact between the child and the stepfather was issued on November 27, 2000.
Evidence was adduced on December 18, 2000 and August 8, 2001. On August 10, 2001, the trial court gave oral reasons for judgment. It denied the mother's request to transfer custody, instead ordering that the child remain with her father. However, to allow the mother more time with the child, the court granted the mother custody for four weeks beginning at noon the Saturday after school recessed for the summer. At the end of the four-week period, the father would have custody for two weeks. Then the mother would have the child until the Saturday before school resumed. The |4father would have weekend visitation two weeks into each of the mother's two periods of summer custody. The court also awarded spring break visitation to the mother. The court denied the father's contempt request, finding that the mother was not in arrears as alleged by the father. The court did find that she owed $150 for July 2000; however, it did not find her in contempt because she had good reason to believe it was not owed due to the parties' agreement the previous year that she not pay in July. Child support was increased to $490 per month, retroactive to July 2001, although the mother was not required to pay child support the month of June each year. Judgment was signed September 20, 2001.
The mother appeals.
LAW
The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731.
In cases where the original custody decree is a stipulated judgment and the rule of Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986), is inapplicable, the party seeking modification must prove (1) that there has been a material change of circumstances since the original custody decree was entered, and (2) that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Evans v. Lungrin, supra.
In determining the best interest of a child in custody cases, there must be a weighing and balancing of factors favoring or opposing custody in respective competing parents on the basis of evidence presented in each | .^particular case. Cooper v. Cooper, 579 So.2d 1159 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991); McKinley v. McKinley, 25,365 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/19/94), 631 So.2d 45; Hill v. Hill, 34,104 (La.App.2d Cir.1/24/01), 777 So.2d 1263.
According to La. C.C. art. 134, the relevant factors to be considered in determining the best interest of the child may include the following:
(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
(7) The mental and physical health of each party.
(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
(11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.
The court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all of the statutory factors fisted in La. C.C. art. 134, but should decide each case on its own facts in fight of those factors. The court is not bound to give more weight to one factor over another, and when determining the best interest of the child, the factors must be weighed and balanced in view of the evidence presented. Rogers v. Stockmon, 34,327 (La.App.2d Cir.11/1/00), 780 So.2d 386. Moreover, the factors are not exclusive, but are provided as a guide |fito the court, and the relative weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. McIntosh v. McIntosh, 33,908 (La.App.2d Cir.8/31/00), 768 So.2d 219.
Continuity and stability of environment are important factors to consider in determining what is in the child's best interest. Ezell v. Kelley, 535 So.2d 969 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Roberie v. Roberie, 33,168 (La.App.2d Cir.12/8/99), 749 So.2d 849; Washkow v. Washkow, 33,965 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/00), 765 So.2d 1210. A change from a stable environment should not be made absent a compelling reason. Day v. Day, 97-1994 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/8/98), 711 So.2d 793; Roberie, supra.
The separation of children of a family, though sometimes necessary, is a custodial disposition that courts seek to avoid. Howze v. Howze, 99-0852 (La.5/26/99), 735 So.2d 619. Normally, the welfare of children is best served by leaving them together, so they can have the full benefit of companionship and affection. When feasible, a court should shape its orders to maintain family solidarity. Roberie v. Roberie, supra.
Underlying the trial court's great discretion in child custody cases is its opportunity to better evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, the trial court's determination of custody issues is afforded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Hill v. Hill, supra.
DISCUSSION
We note at the outset that the mother complains that the trial court's oral reasons focused on its reluctance to separate siblings. However, we preview judgments and not reasons for judgment. Rogers v. Stockmon, supra.
Ashley's parents separated in April 1997 when she was four years old. Within four months, her mother relinquished physical custody of Ashley to her father in August 1997. Since then, Ashley has been in the primary custody of her father. Under the care of her father and stepmother, she has flourished academically. In first grade, she made straight A's. In second grade, she made four A's and a high B and was an honor roll student. Although she encountered some difficulties early in third grade, she rebounded and was again an honor roll student.
Both parents have suitable homes where Ashley has her own bedroom. Both are gainfully employed. The stepfather is also employed; the stepmother is a housewife. (The trial court specifically found that neither stepparent was detrimental to Ashley.) The household of the father includes Ashley's half-sister, now age three, as well as a nine-year-old stepsister who had been adopted by the father.
The mother argues that she is the better moral influence for Ashley because she regularly attends church and the father does not. However, the record indicates that the mother's regular church attendance is a relatively recent occurrence. Also, her alleged adherence to her religious faith — which disapproves of gambling — has not prevented her or the stepfather from spending considerable time and money at casinos.
The most compelling factor in the instant case is the stability of Ashley's home environment. The record demonstrates that the father has |Rbeen the main source of consistency and stability in Ashley's young life. This child, who is almost 10 years old, has lived with her father and stepmother since she was barely five years old. Under their supervision — and with minimal involvement by her mother — Ashley has excelled at school, making above average grades. Following the parents' separation, the mother lived in eight different places and had four different jobs. Until recently, she has shown little interest in Ashley's schooling.
Although there have been some occasional disharmony between Ashley and her adopted sister, that is not uncommon behavior between children. (We note that the age difference between them is only two weeks.) Additionally, the record strongly suggests that many of the problems between these little girls have been instigated by the mother. In fact, the record also indicates that certain problems between the father and stepmother were likewise related to the friction caused between the children by Ashley's mother. Although the father and stepmother considered a separation, the fact remains that they stayed together and their family is intact.
The trial court saw no reason to remove Ashley from a household in which she has thrived for almost half of her life under her father's care and where she has the companionship of her sisters, both adopted and biological. We agree with the trial court that the record demonstrates that it is in Ashley's best interest to remain in the primary custody of her father.
| CONCLUSION
The trial court judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Hería Jill Hoskins Mauldin.
AFFIRMED.
PEATROSS, J., dissents with written reasons.
. The trial court rendered oral reasons on the Friday after the Wednesday when the taking of evidence concluded. Since the new school year began in the parish where the mother lived on the coming Monday, the court felt an immediate decision was necessary and there was insufficient time to prepare written reasons.
. Were the father and the stepmother to divorce, the mother might then be in a position to prove that the advantages to the child substantially outweighed the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment. Bergeron, supra.