Case Name: PARKER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-06-29
Citations: 200 S.W. 1083
Docket Number: No. 4564
Parties: PARKER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 200
Pages: 1083–1085

Head Matter:
PARKER v. STATE.
(No. 4564.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 29, 1917.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 20, 1918.)
1.Criminal Law <@=>1092 (7) — Bill of Exceptions — Time of Piling.
At a term beginning January 1st and ending March 30th defendant was convicted, his motion for new trial being overruled on March 12th, at which time he was accorded 60 days within which to file bills of exception. On May 11th an additional extension of 10 days was granted, a*nd on May 26th defendant obtained an additional extension of 7 days. Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proe. 1916, art. 744, declares that on trial of any criminal action the defendant may tender his bill of exceptions, and the judge shall sign such bill of exceptions under the rules prescribed in civil suits, while article 845 declares that, when an appeal is taken from the judgment rendered in any cause in any district or county court, the parties shall be entitled to 30 days after the date of adjournment of court in which to prepare, or cause to be prepared, and to file a statement of facts and bills of exception, and upon good cause shown the judge trying the cause may extend the time, provided that, if the term of court may by law continue more than 8 weeks, such statement of facts and bills of exception shall be filed within 30 days after final judgment shall be rendered, unless the court shall by order entered of record extend the time for filing such statement of facts and bills of exception. Held, that bills of exception which were filed on June 1st cannot be considered, the time for filing the same having expired before the entry of the order of May 26th granting 7 days’ additional time for extension.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Prostitution <@=34 — Evidence.
While the right of one accused of crime to make bond is guaranteed, evidence in a prosecution for pandering in violation of Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a, that accused agreed to obtain bond for a prostitute and urged her to continue to ply her vocation, is admissible.
3. Prostitution <§=>4 — Evidence — Admissibility.
In a prosecution under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a, for pandering, evidence that accused whipped a prostitute and required her to remain at home for the purpose of plying her vocation is admissible.
4. Prostitution <@=4 — Evidence — Admissibility.
In a prosecution under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a, for pandering, evidence that accused made inquiries of officers who were watching the house in which a prostitute in whom he was interested lived was admissible.
5. Prostitution <@=>4 —Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for pandering in violation of Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Í916, art. 506a, evidence that accused caressed a prostitute and received money from her while she was living in a disorderly house is admissible.
6. Prostitution <@=34^-Evidence — Admissibility.
In a prosecution for pandering under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 506a, denouncing the offense of persuading or coercing an inmate of a house of prostitution to remain therein as an inmate, evidence that accused while a prostitute was living at another house struck her because he did not receive money enough from her is admissible, though the charge submitted the question whether accused induced the prostitute to remain in a house of prostitution at a different address; for accused’s control over the prostitute was material, and evidence of his striking her part of the res gestee.
7. Criminal Law <@=829(1) — Trial—Instructions.
The refusal of special charges covered by the charge given is not error.
8. Prostitution <@=j4 — Evidence —Sufficiency.
In a prosecution under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art 506a, for pandering, evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction.
9. Criminal Law <@=>555 — Weight of Evidence. ■
In a criminal prosecution, conflicts in the testimony of the prosecuting witness go to its weight, but not its sufficiency to sustain a conviction.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.
Pay Parker was convicted of pandering, and be appeals.
Affirmed.
A. S. Baskett, of Dallas, for appellant. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
Appellant was convicted of pandering, and his punishment assessed at five years' confinement in the state penitentiary.
The prosecution is under the pandering statute (article 506a, Vernon's P. C.). No defects are pointed out and none discovered. The evidence which is disclosed by the state ment of facts is sufficient to support the finding of the jury. The court gaye a written charge to which it appears there was some exceptions filed. It is also apparent that there are exceptions taken to matters of procedure occurring in the course of the trial. These, as well as the exceptions to the charge, appellant undertook to bring before the court by bills of exceptions. It appears, however, that owing to the delay in filing these bills we are precluded by the law from considering them. The term of court at which appellant's trial took place began January 1 and ended March 30, 1917. His motion for a new trial was overruled March 12th, at which time he was accorded 60 days within which to file bills of exceptions. On May 11th an additional extension of 10 days was granted and on May 26th he, by motion, sought and obtained an additional extension of 7 days.
The state, through the Assistant Attorney General, in a motion filed, brings to the attention of the court the facts recited above with reference to the several dates mentioned, and calls attention to the fact that the bills of exceptions were filed on the 1st day of June, 1917, and insists that the court is required by law to ignore them. The particular contention made by the state was that the order of the court made May 26th allowing 7 additional days was not effective because on May 21st prior to the date of the order named the time for filing the bills of exceptions allowed in previous orders had expired, and that after its expiration the court lost control of the matter. Supporting this contention, the state's counsel cites decisions of this court in Armstrong Case, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 59, 130 S. W. 1011, and Presley v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 102, 131 S. W. 332. These decisions, in construing the statutes with reference to the extension of time for filing bills of exceptions (article 845, C. Cr. P.), have construed them in accord with the state's contention, and this construction makes it necessary for us to sustain the state's motion.
Having examined the statement of facts and such matters in the record as, under the rules, we are privileged to pass upon, and being precluded from passing upon the questions raised by the bills of exceptions (see Vernon's C. C. P. art. 744, and notes), and there having been brought to our attention no reversible error, and no fundamental error discovered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
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