Case Name: SCOTT v. FORD
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1904-12-12
Citations: 45 Or. 531
Docket Number: 
Parties: SCOTT v. FORD.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 531–553

Head Matter:
Argued 4 October,
decided 12 December, 1904;
rehearing denied 15 May, 1905.
SCOTT v. FORD.
[78 Pac. 742, 80 Pac. 899, 68 L. R. A. 469.]
Recovering Money Paid Under Mistake of Law or Error of Fact.
1. Money paid under a mistake of law, with knowledge of all the facts, no deceit or undue importunity intervening, cannot be recovered; but if paid under an error of fact, not arising from the intentional neglect of the party to inquire, even if accompanied by a mistake as to the law or ignorance of it, a recovery may be bad.
Idem. —In an action to recover money paid by executors to one whom they supposed entitled to receive it under the will, a finding that the money was paid to defendant under the belief that she was entitled to it as a child of her deceased father under the will, 4oes not sustain a j udgment of recovery, as it discloses only, a mistake of law unaifected by any act of the defendant.
Idem. —In such a case a finding that the evidence does not show whether plaintiffs had any belief or knowledge as to whether defendant’s father was alive at the time the will was executed or at the time of testator’s death, does not support a judgment for plaintiff on the ground of an error of fact, for it does not show that the plaintiffs were mistaken as to the truth.
Findings by Supreme Court in Law Actions.
4. Where different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the supreme court cannot make findings of fact on appeal in a law action, nor substitute one finding for another.
Assigning Error as to Ruling on Motion.
5. Error is not assignable on the ruling of the court ona motion for judgment dismissing an action based on the pleadings, evidence, and stipulations of fact.
Recovering Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact.
6. Money honestly paid in ignorance or forgetfulness of the facts, or under a clearly proven, genuine mistake as to the truth, may be recovered.
Right of Supreme Court to Enter Judgment on Findings.
7. Where the findings of fact by the trial court in a law action will not support a judgment for either party, the only course left for the supreme court is to send the case back.
Appeal — Making Findings on Conflicting Evidence.
8. Where the evidence in the record on appeal in a law action is such that different inferences and deductions may reasonably be drawn therefrom, the supreine court cannot 2’evise the findi22gs or make new ones.
Construction of Confused Conclusion.
9. A conclusion of law that “the sum so paid to defendant as a legatee under the will * * was erroneously paid,” is a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact.
From Lane: James W. Hamilton, Judge.
Action by George W. Scott and H. A. Hammond, as executors of the last will and testament and estate of Church Sturtevant, deceased, against Eva Ford, formerly Eva Stephens.
The complaint herein is,in substance, as follows: That on December 30, 1888, Church Sturtevant made his will; that on December 18, 1894, he made a codicil thereto, reciting that by said will he had bequeathed to his daughter, Mrs. Stephens, a certain share of his estate, and that, she now being dead, he therefore bequeathed to her five children equally the share set apart to her in the will; that at the time of the execution of said codicil, Mrs.. Stephens, whose given name was Mary Jane, was dead, and left surviving her five children, and no more; that Church Sturtevant subsequently died; that said will and codicil were duly admitted to probate in the county and probate court for Henry County, State of Illinois, and that plaintiffs were appointed executors; that the defendant, Eva Ford, is a grandchild of Mary Jane Stephens, being the daughter of Hosea Stephens, her son; that Hosea died in Lane County, Oregon, long prior to the death of Mary Jane, and prior to the time of the execution of the codicil; that at the time of their appointment and qualification as executors, and while plaintiffs were so acting, and at the times and dates that the money was paid to and received by defendant and her guardian, as hereinafter alleged, plaintiffs were informed and believed that said Hosea Stephens was one of the legatees named in said codicil, and was entitled to receive the legacy named in said codicil at the time of his death; that said Hosea was alive at the time said codicil and will were executed and at the time of the death of the testator, and that said Eva Ford, then Eva Stephens, was then entitled to receive the said money paid to her as daughter and heir of said Hosea; that plaintiffs did not know at the time that said money was paid that said Hosea Stephens was not living at the time said codicil and will were executed, and did not know that he was not living at the time of the death of the testator, and did not ascertain the fact that he was not named and referred to in said will and codicil as one of the legatees therein, and that he was not entitled to receive said legacy mentioned therein, and that the defendant was not entitled to receive the same until after said money was paid; that on and prior to the 1st day of January, 1900, plaintiffs were informed and believed that defendant was entitled to receive an equal one sixth of the bequest mentioned in the codicil; that plaintiffs paid to defendant, through her guardian, $600 on March 31, 1900, $600 on September 5,1900, and to the defendant in person $600 on March 27, 1901; that the said information and belief of said executors as to defendant’s being entitled to any portion of said bequest was and is erroneous, and that the money was paid to her through their mistake. Other formal allegations follow, with a prayer for the recovery of the amount so paid to defendant, with interest and costs.
The answer admits the allegations touching the execution of the will and codicil, their admission to probate, the appointment of plaintiffs as executors, the death of Mrs. Stephens at the time of the execution of the codicil, the subsequent death of Church Sturtevant; that Eva Ford is the grandchild of Mrs. Stephens, being the daughter of Hosea Stephens, her son; that Hosea died long prior to the death of Mrs. Stephens, and prior to the execution of the codicil and the payment of the money to Eva and her guardian ; but specifically denies all else.
Under these issues a trial was had before the court, a jury being waived, resulting in findings of fact and law as follows, omitting the first finding, which relates to the payment of the money by plaintiffs to defendant, which is admitted :
Second. “That the said payments were so made by plaintiffs to defendant under the belief that as a child of one Hosea Stephens said defendant would be entitled to said sums of money under and by the terms and provisions of the codicil to the will of Church Sturtevant, which terms are set forth in the amended complaint of plaintiff.
Third. “ That the Mary Jane Stephens referred to in the codicil of said will of Church Sturtevant as Mrs. Stephens died April 23, 1893.
Fourth. “That the children of the said Mary Jane Stephens living at the time of her death, and at the time of making the codicil to the will of Church Sturtevant, and at the time of the death of Church Sturtevant, are Lucy Stephens, Clark Stephens, Church Stephens, Joseph Stephens, and Lettie McCutcheon.
Fifth. “That Hosea A. Stephens was a child of said Mary J. Stephens ; that Hosea died December 13, 1882, leaving surviving him a daughter, who is the defendant herein.
Sixth. “ That it does not appear from the evidence that plaintiffs, or either of them, had any belief or knowledge as to whether the said Hosea was living at the time of the execution of said codicil to said will; nor that plaintiffs, or either of them, believed that said Hosea was living at the time of the death of said Church Sturtevant, the testator in said will.”
As conclusions of law, based on the foregoing findings of fact, I find as follows:
First. “The sum of eighteen hundred dollars so paid by plaintiffs to defendant as a legatee under the will herein-before referred to was erroneously paid to defendant.
Second. “That by the terms of the said codicil of said will defendant was not. entitled to said sum of money so paid her, nor any part thereof.
Third. “ That the withholding said moneys from plaintiffs by defendant is wrongful.
Fourth. “That plaintiffs are entitled to recover a judgment against the defendant for the sum of eighteen hundred dollars, with interest thereon from April 5, 1902, at the rate of six per cent per annum, amounting to ($1,995.90), and plaintiff’s costs herein incurred.”
Based upon these findings, a judgment was rendered for plaintiffs,.from which the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Tilmon Ford, William M. Kaiser,,and Woodson T. Slater, with an oral argument by Mr. Ford and Mr. Slater.
For respondent there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. L. Bilyeu and Mr. A. G. Woodcock.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Wolverton
delivered the opinion.
Plaintiffs base their action upon the principle that when one pays money which he is neither morally nor legally bound to pay, under a mistake as to his legal obligations and duty, and which the recipient has no right in good conscience to retain, the former may recover it back in an action of indebitatus assumpsit, whether his mistake be one of law or of fact. The trial court must have sustained this principle as sound, else its conclusion of law could not follow from the facts found. The defendant contends that the true principle is that money paid with knowledge of the facts, without fraud or deceit, under a mistake of law, cannot be recovered back, which principle she insists is.alone applicable in determining the controversy.
1. The question involved is an ancient one, and has provoked much disputation, but the trend of modern authority is strongly in one direction, favorable to the theory that a mistake of law, within proper limitations, does not excuse, and that money paid under such mistake cannot be recovered back. There are two legal maxims involved in the inquiry, namely, Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat (Ignorance of fact excuses, ignorance of the law does not excuse); and Volenti non fit injuria (that to which a person assents is not esteemed in law an injury): Broom, Legal Maxims (8 ed.), *253,268. As to the latter Mr. Broom says (*272): " There is also a large class of cases in which it has been held that money paid voluntarily cannot he.recovered, although the original payment was not required by any equitable consideration ; and these cases are very nearly allied in principle to those which have been considered in treating of a payment made in ignorance of the law." We will therefore turn our attention more directly to the common understanding in legal thought of the former maxim.
It is axiomatic, also, that "every man is presumed to know the law," and of this "ignorance of the law does not excuse" is but a sequence. From these, coupled with that as to ignorance of fact, Mr. Broom derives the two following propositions : "First, that money paid with full knowledge of the facts, but through ignorance of the law, is not recoverable, if there be nothing unconseientious- in the retaining of it; and, secondly, that money paid in ignorance of the facts is recoverable, provided there have been no laches in the party paying it, and there was no ground to claim it in conscience." The qualification of the principle involved by the first deduction, namely, "if there be nothing unconseientious in retaining it," is traceable to dicta of Lord Chief Justice De Grey in Farmer v. Arundel, 2 W. Bl. *824, and Lord Mansfield in Bize v. Dickason, 1 D. & E. 285. This has been shown by elaborate and well-considered cases, both in England and this country. The observation of Lord Chief Justice De Gr-ey was that, "When money is paid by one man to another as a mistake either of fact or of law, or by deceit, an action will certainly lie to recover it back." This is a positive affirmation, stripped of any qualification as to conscience, that money, though paid under mistake of law, may be recovered back. But it is said that in the case wherein the announcement was made the action was not sustained, although the money had been paid by the plaintiffs under a clear mistake of law. Lord Mansfield's proposition was I hat, "Where money is paid under a mistake, which there was no ground to claim in conscience, the party may recover it back again by this kind of action" (assumpsit.) We are left in doubt as to whether the great jurist meant mistake of law or of fact. Mr. Justice Gibbs, who wrote the prevailing opinion in Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144, infers with convincing force, from circumstances attending the utterance and others occurring later, that he meant the latter. See Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674, where this view was subsequently, maintained.
Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144, is one among the first cases bearing upon the question, and is most elaborately and learnedly considered. The case was this : The captain of a king's ship brought public treasure home in her, upon the public service, and treasure of individuals, for his own emolument. He received freight for both, and paid over one third of it, according to established usage in the navy, to the admiral under whose command he had sailed. Discovering, however, that the law did not compel captains to pay to admirals one third of the freight, he brought an action as for money had and received to recover it back from the admiral's executrix, and it was held that as to the public freight he could not recover the money back. Mr. Justice Gibbs, after stating the facts, makes use of this significant and unmistakable language: "We must take this payment to have been made under a demand of right, and I think that where a man demands money of another as a matter of right, and that other, with a full knowledge of the facts upon which the demand is founded, has paid a sum, he never can recover back the sum he has so voluntarily paid. It may be that upon a further review he may form a different opinion of the law, and it may he his subsequent opinion may be the correctone. If wb were to hold otherwise, I think many inconveniences may arise. There are many doubtful questions of law. When they arise the defendant has an option either to litigate the question, or to submit to the demand, and pay the money. I think that by submitting to the demand he that pays the money gives it to the person to whom he pays it, and makes it his, and closes the transaction between them, tie who receives it has a right to consider it as his without dispute, tie spends it in confidence that it is his; and it would be most mischievous and unjust if he who has acquiesced in the right • by such voluntary payment should be at liberty, at any time within the statute of limitations, to rip up the matter, and recover back the money. He who received it is not in the same condition. He has spent it in the confidence it was his, and perhaps has no means of repayment." Here are brought to the service of the jurist both of" the legal maxims first above alluded to, which seem to suggest a sound conclusion. Then he discusses the dicta of Lord Chief Justice De Grey and Lord Mansfield, and, as if not to have his meaning misunderstood, reiterates : "lam therefore, of the opinion this money cannot be recovered back. I think, on principle, that money which is paid to a man who claims it as his right, with a knowledge of all the facts, cannot be recovered back. I think it oh principle, and I think the weight of the authorities is so, and I think the dicta that go beyond it are not supported or called for by the facts of the cases."