Case Name: Deborah TEMPLE, Appellant, v. Narinder S. AUJLA, M.D., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-10-25
Citations: 681 So. 2d 1198
Docket Number: No. 95-2316
Parties: Deborah TEMPLE, Appellant, v. Narinder S. AUJLA, M.D., Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 681
Pages: 1198–1200

Head Matter:
Deborah TEMPLE, Appellant, v. Narinder S. AUJLA, M.D., Appellee.
No. 95-2316.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 25, 1996.
David W. Glasser of Glasser and Handel, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Stephen T. Ball of Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Deborah Temple appeals the summary final judgment entered in favor of Narinder Aujla, M.D. arising out of a lawsuit Temple filed against Aujla alleging retaliatory termination. The trial court dismissed Temple's suit on the ground that the legislature had specifically provided a criminal remedy for retaliatory discharge without enumerating a civil cause of action, and therefore, none exists. We affirm.
Aujla fired Temple from her employment at his medical office after Temple informed Aujla that she had taken her sick daughter to another doctor for treatment. Temple brought suit pursuant to section 448.03, Florida Statutes (1995) alleging retaliatory termination. The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of Aujla.
On appeal, Temple asserts that the trial court should not have entered summary judgment even though section 448.03 does not expressly provide a civil cause of action for retaliatory termination. She contends that the fact that the legislature provided a criminal penalty evidences its intent that a civil cause of action exists. To support her argument, Temple relies primarily on Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983). In Smith, among other things, the Florida Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an employee who allegedly had been retaliatorily discharged for pursuing a workers' compensation claim had a cognizable cause of action under section 440.205, Florida Statutes. The Smith eourt recognized that the legislature had proscribed what action was impermissible without enumerating the consequences of disobedience. The supreme eourt therefore determined that a cause of action existed. The eourt based its holding on the proposition that a court is authorized to grant a remedy where the legislature has given a right "although in express terms it has not given a remedy...." Id. at 184 (quoting Girard Trust Co., v. Tampashores Dev. Co., 95 Fla. 1010, 1015-16, 117 So. 786, 788 (1928)).
Smith is materially distinguishable from the present case because the legislature failed to create any remedy whatsoever for a violation of section 440.205. In contrast, the legislature did afford a remedy, albeit a criminal one, for one found to have violated section 448.03.
In Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), the Second District Court of Appeal faced a situation similar to ours and elected to show deference to the legislature. In that ease, a bartender brought suit against his employer for retaliatory discharge, alleging that the employer fired him for refusing to sell alcohol to an intoxicated patron. The bartender claimed that such action violated section 562.50, Florida Statutes (1985), which states in relevant part:
Any person who shall sell . any alcohol beverage . to any person habitually addicted to . such intoxicating liquors . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree as punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
§ 562.50, Fla. Stat. (1985). The bartender urged the eourt to create a civil cause of action on the basis that the criminal statute demonstrated a legislative intent to do so. The court refused, stating:
While the legislature has provided criminal penalties for violation of that statute, it has not provided civil remedies. We decline to act where the legislature has chosen not to....
Id. at 764.
Sub judice, like the plaintiff in Ochab, Temple has asked that the court to create a civil remedy where the legislature has already created a criminal one. However, as the Second District correctly noted, where the legislature has spoken by delineating a specific remedy, it is not the judicial branch's role to overstep the legislature's authority and create an additional remedy. If this court were to accept Temple's argument, it would be impermissibly legislating from the bench. We believe that Ochab states the correct policy, and accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Section 448.03 states:
Any person . either as owner or lessee, having persons in their service as employees, who shall discharge any employee or threaten to discharge any employee in their service for trading or dealing, or for not trading or dealing as a customer or patron with any particular merchant or other person or class of persons in any business calling, or shall notify any employee either by general or special notice, directly or indirectly, secretly or openly given, not to trade or deal as a customer or patron with any particular merchant or person or class of persons in any business or calling, under penalty of being discharged from the service of such person . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
§ 448.03, Fla. Stat. (1995).
. We note that, in enacting section 448.103, Florida Statutes (1995), the legislature expressly provided for a civil remedy. It enacted no similar provision in section 448.03.