Case Name: Taylor v. Bay St. Francis Drainage District
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1926-05-31
Citations: 171 Ark. 285
Docket Number: 
Parties: Taylor v. Bay St. Francis Drainage District.
Judges: Mr. Justice Smith entertains the same views • as herein, expressed.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 171
Pages: 285–296

Head Matter:
Taylor v. Bay St. Francis Drainage District.
Opinion delivered May 31, 1926.
Eugene Sloan and Qautney S Dudley, for appellant.
Basil Baker and Chas. D. Frierson, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, J.,
(after stating the facts). The original order, of the county court establishing the drainage district was made on the 11th day of October, 1924. A. F. Taylor and other landowners prosecuted an appeal from this order to the circuit court. The cause or proceeding was heard in the circuit court on the 25th day of. March, 1925, and' the judgment of the county • court establishing the district was affirmed. The landowners then prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court, and the commissioners of the drainage district made a motion to dismiss the appeal. It was then discovered that the original order of the county court establishing the district was void because of the misdescription of an 80-acre tract of land, which was wholly at variance with the description of the same tract in the notice required under the statute as a prerequisite to the establishment of the district. It was conceded that this rendered the order establishing the district void, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment expressly on the ground that this tract of land was misdescribed in the notice, and it was therefore ordered that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to set aside its order and to certify its judgment-down to the county court.
During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, counsel for the drainage district treated the original order establishing the district as void, and obtained another order of the county court on May 29, 1925,- establishing the district. The provisions of the statute were in all respects complied with in obtaining this order, and the order is valid on its face, unless it can be said that it is void because rendered during the pendency of a former appeal in this court.
In Bailey v. Gibson, 29 Ark. 472, the court said that it is well settled that chancery causes will be reviewed on appeal, whether the court below had jurisdiction or not. In that case, and in Brumley v. State, 20 Ark. 77, it was said that no appeal will lie from a void judgment at law, and the proper remedy would be to dismiss the appeal. It will be observed, however, that on the first appeal in this case the court refused to dismiss the appeal, but reversed the judgment. It is now well settled that a void judgment or order is appealable. In Alexander v. Crollott, 199 U. S. 580, it was said that the fact that the judgment may have been void will not prevent its reversal upon appeal. In a case-note to 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 733, it is said that the prevailing opinion, as attested by tlie collated cases, is clearly to the effect that the appellate court will so far take cognizance of the void entry as to reverse it and restore the parties to the position they originally occupied.
To the same effect see note to 20 Ann. Cas., p. 277, Hayne on New Trial and Appeal, vol. 2, pp. 950, 979, and 1069, and Elliott on Appellate Procedure, § 110. On this question Elliott says:
" There is solid reason for this rule, inasmuch as it enables a party injured by such a judgment to remove it from the record without injury to the rights of adverse parties, for they can have no rights under a judgment which has no force. It is a sacrifice of substance to a barren technicality to hold, as some of the courts do, that no relief can be had against a void judgment."
It is true that, in the theory of law, a void .judgment is no judgment at all and can therefore have no effect. In this view of the matter the landowners would have had a right to treat the original order of establishing the drainage ditch as a nullity; but if they did so it would have been at their peril. The better practice and a juster rule seems to be that the parties affected should have the right to have the matter judicially determined on appeal. Of course, in theory of law, a void judgment is harmless because it is a nullity; but,as a practical fact a void judgment, especially where it creates a lien on land, or is used as a basis for the creation of a lien on land, is not harmless. To illustrate: in a proceeding like this, the commissioners of the district, representing a majority of the landowners, were contending that the judgment was valid. As a practical matter, this fact and the fact that the judgment had been entered of record would serve to create a cloud on the title of the landowners. The judgment would have a tendency to affect a sale of the property, and, even if the landowners had assured prospective purchasers that the judgment was' void, they might be reluctant to purchase the land at its full value. The fact that the commissioners were proceeding under the judgment as if it were valid would tend to create a cloud on the title of the lands. It has been well said that a judgment unreversed, thoug'h void upon its face, may seriously embarrass the person against whom it is in form rendered, though it can of course be of no benefit to the person who has secured it. Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341, 25 Pac. 457, 22 Am. St. Rep. 150.
It is said that, as appellate courts have the power to clear their own records of objectionable entries, even though as standing thereon they are absolutely void, they have like power to set aside void entries in the inferior courts when the forms of reviewing such void entries to such appellate courts have been complied with.
This court has held that, where an appeal is granted and an authenticated copy of the record is filed in the appellate court, the court or action is thereby removed to the appellate court. Robinson v. Arkansas Loan & Trust Co., 72 Ark. 475, 81 S. W. 609.
In McKenzie v. Engelhard Co., 266 U. S. 131, it is said that an appeal is a proceeding in the original cause, and that the suit is pending until the appeal is disposed of.
In this view of the matter, the county court would have no right to make another order establishing the drainage district while the appeal from the original order creating the district was still pending on appeal. If the appeal is a proceeding in the original cause, until the appeal is disposed of the county court .would have no jurisdiction to make an order after the cause had been removed to another court by appeal. The better procedure, and the ordinary procedure in such cases, is that the suit should be treated as pending in the appellate court until, by appropriate orders, it is again sent down to the county court.
But it is insisted that a statutory proceeding for the establishment of a drainage district is a proceeding in rem, and that the ordinary rules of practice relative to adversary causes should not be applied.
A majority of the court fails to see any distinction in the matter. Our statute expressly provides that the landowners in a proposed drainage district may become parties to the proceeding and file a remonstrance to the petition asking for the establishment of the district. The statute also provides that the landowners may appeal, if their remonstrance is overruled and the drainage district is established. The statute also expressly provides that, where an appeal is taken to the circuit court, the original papers in the case shall be deposited there, together with a transcript of the record in the county court. Presumably these original papers would remain in the circuit court until the case was finally disposed of. The record in this case shows that the order attacked was made by the county court while the case was pending on appeal. If, under the express provisions of the statute, the proceeding may become an adversary one by the landowners filing a remonstrance to the petition seeking the establishment of the drainage district, and if they are allowed to appeal from an adverse judgment, it would seem that the better practice would be that the incidents and methods of procedure usual in cases where there are adversary parties should obtain. This course would prevent confusion and might prevent fraud. To illustrate: Take a case like the present one, where the .judgment is void. As we have already seen, it is now settled that an appeal from a void judgment will not be dismissed, but the judgment will be reversed. The landowners feeling-aggrieved and appealing from an order of the court establishing a drainage district are required to follow the case through the appellate court and take notice of the proceedings there. They should not be required, however, to watch the proceedings in the county court, to see if that court was taking jurisdiction of the case while it was pending on appeal to this court, or in the circuit court. Suppose the circuit court should be trying the appeal and using the original papers in some- stage of the trial; or suppose, for good reasons, upon appeal to this court we should permit one of the original papers to be sent here for our inspection, then suppose, while the papers were here or in the circuit court, the county court should undertake to exercise jurisdiction in the premises, this would bring about a conflict of jurisdiction as to which court would be entitled to the original papers. It is no answer to say that the presumption is that the county court would not undertake to act unless it could in some way get the original papers. The test of jurisdiction would not be what it would do, but what it could do. .
If, as we have already seen, the appeal is a continuation of the action and not a new action, it seems to a majority of us that the better practice is to hold that the county court had no jurisdiction to establish the drainage district during the pendency of an appeal from its original order establishing the district, even though the original judgment was void.
Moreover, it is claimed that the landowners should have appealed from the judgment of the county court of May 29,1925, instead of applying for a writ of certiorari to quash it.
In Browning v. Waldrip, 169 Ark. 261, it was held that certiorari lies to quash a judgment of the county court which was void because that court had no jurisdiction, even though such void judgment might have been vacated and set aside on appeal.
But it is insisted that the judgment of the county court of May 29, 1925, establishing the district, is valid on its face. The records of the county court show that an appeal had been granted from the original judgment of the county court establishing the district, and that the original cause was pending on appeal. "When an appeal is taken from an order of the county court establishing or refusing to establish a drainage district, the statute requires the original papers to be sent to the circuit court. If the appeal is a continuation of the original cause or proceeding, the case would remain in the appellate court until it had been sent back to the county court by some appropriate order in the regular course of procedure. To illustrate, when the judgment in the cause was reversed in this court, it was ordered that the cause be remanded to the. circuit court with directions to set aside its order and certify its .judgment down to the county court. When this was done, the county court would again acquire jurisdiction of the cause, and the certification of the circuit court would be notice to the county court, as well as all interested parties, that the cause had' been sent back to the county court for further proceedings in accordance with the statute. . Until this certification was made, the records of the county court would show that the cause was pending* on appeal, and consequently the county court has no- jurisdiction to make any order whatever while the cause or proceeding is pending on appeal.
The result of our views is that the judgment of the county court was void; and the landowner might have ignored it or he might have gotten rid of it by appeal. The reason is that it was in form a judgment entered upon the records of the -county court, which, although void, might through judicial process cast a cloud upon the title of the landowners in the district. All the circuit court could have done on certiorari was to have quashed the judgment of the county court and thereby have eliminated it from the record. Because the circuit court erred in not following this course, its judgment is reversed, and, inasmuch as no further proceedings in the matter can be taken in the circuit court, it is not necessary to remand the case.
The reversal of the judgment of the circuit court in effect declares the judgment of the county court to be void. This leaves the proceedings in the county court, and it may take such further steps as it deems to be advisable in the establishment of the drainage district which are according to law.