Case Name: Russell v. Russell et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1874-11
Citations: 48 Ind. 456
Docket Number: 
Parties: Russell v. Russell et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 456–459

Head Matter:
Russell v. Russell et al.
Descent.—Life Estate.—Second Wife.—A widow, who was a second wife, without a child by hex late husband, who died leaving children alive by a former wife, is entitled to a life estate only in the real estate of such husband.
Same.—A widow who is only entitled to a life estate in the lands of her deceased husband, if the lands are sold in proceedings for partition, can have of the x>roceeds only so much as her life interest was worth.
Beeading.—Practice.—Cross Complaint.—A plaintiff in a partition suit can not file a cross complaint; and if filed, it should be struck out on motion, hut sustaining a demurrer to it is not error.
Descent.—Life Estate.—If a widow, who is only entitled to a life estate in the real estate.of her late husband, in proceedings for partition, has set off to her one-third of the real estate, in value, for life, it is all she is entitled to.
Pbactice.—Supreme Court.—Technical Errors.—For technical errors, a judg meet will not be reversed, if on the examination of the whole case substantial right and justice have been observed and done.
Erom the Grant Circuit Court.
J. Brownlee -and U. Brownlee, for appellant.
A. Steele and B. T. St. John, for appellees.

Opinion:
Pettit, J.
This was a suit for the partition of real estate. 'The appellant was the second wife and widow of John Russell, and had no child by him, and she was the plaintiff or petitioner below; and the appellees were the defendants below, and were the children of John Russell by a former wife. There was a partition of the real estate, setting off to the appellant one-third of the same in value for her life. Questions are sought to be raised and presented to this court as to the proceedings, but it is not pretended that one-third of the real estate in value was not set off to the appellant for life; and the only question really presented to us (for all others resolve themselves into this) is, was the appellant, being the second wife and widow of John Russell, without a child by him, entitled to a life estate or a fee simple in his real estate ? In the well and thoroughly considered .case of Longlois v. Longlois, ante, p. 60, we held that the widow in such a case was only entitled to a life estate in the realty, and we adhere to that ruling. If that ruling is right, no wrong was done to the appellant, as she has got set.off to her one-third of the real estate for her life.
The judgment is affirmed, at the costs of the appellant.