Case Name: STATE of Maine v. Ronald PINKHAM
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1989-10-24
Citations: 565 A.2d 318
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE of Maine v. Ronald PINKHAM.
Judges: Before McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 565
Pages: 318–321

Head Matter:
STATE of Maine v. Ronald PINKHAM.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Argued June 8, 1989.
Decided Oct. 24, 1989.
David W. Crook, Dist. Atty., Evert Fowle (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Skowhegan, for the State.
John Alsop, Andrew Ketterer (orally), Ketterer and Alsop, Skowhegan, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

Opinion:
HORNBY, Justice.
The question in this case is whether a police officer has "specific and articulable facts" to justify stopping and warning a driver when he observes improper driving behavior not worthy of a citation for a traffic infraction. Concluding that a civil or criminal infraction is not always essential and that safety reasons alone could justify such a stop, we vacate the judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, MacNi-chol, J.) that granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence and remand for further proceedings.
At about 2:00 A.M. on a summer Sunday morning a police officer in the town of Skowhegan observed the defendant drive down Russell Street to its intersection with Madison Avenue. Weather conditions were clear and there were no other vehicles around. At the Russell-Madison intersection, Russell Street is a one-way street divided into three lanes. Well-marked and clearly visible directional arrows painted on the pavement indicate that the right lane is to be used for turning right onto Madison Avenue, the middle lane is to be used for proceeding ahead through the intersection onto Elm Street and the left lane is to be used for turning left onto Madison Avenue. There are yield signs but no traffic lights at the intersection.
The defendant entered the right lane, slowed down, then instead of turning right as the lane markings directed, and without making any signals, passed straight through the intersection and quickly proceeded up Elm Street. The police officer pulled the defendant over "merely for safety reasons," as he testified, and "to inquire about the improper lane usage and to inform him that in the future, should he use the lanes, to be sure to advise other drivers of his intentions . " — "performing an informational function" in the District Court's words. As a result of the stop, however, the police officer observed circumstances that led to a preliminary breath test and an ultimate arrest for operating under the influence.
On the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the stop, the District Court reasoned that the grounds identified by the police officer did not justify the stop. It interpreted State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978 (Me.1987), as requiring more —specifically, grounds for believing that a violation of law had occurred. The District Court found that here the defendant had committed no infraction of state law in ignoring the directional arrow on the pavement and that the reason for the stop was only to convey information or a warning. The District Court therefore granted the defendant's motion to suppress.
Caron involved a one-time straddling of the center line for 25 to 50 yards with no oncoming traffic on an early morning. Id. at 978-79. In Caron, this Court held that the single incident of lane-straddling "did not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was involved." Id. In Caron we had no occasion to focus upon the adequacy of a safety justification.
This record presents only the safety issue. The Skowhegan police officer had no suspicion of criminal activity, but simply observed improper lane usage and pulled the driver over to warn him about improper driving behavior. Thus, we must decide whether safety reasons alone can ever justify a stop.
The Fourth Amendment standard is clear: "[i]n order to initiate an investigation involving brief detention short of a formal arrest, a law enforcement officer must act on the basis of 'specific and artic-ulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' " State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; 1879-1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires that the "specific and articulable facts" relate to suspected criminal activity, although that was the factual context of both Terry and Griffin. If we were to insist upon suspicion of activity amounting to a criminal or civil infraction to meet the Terry/Griffin standard, we would be overlooking the police officer's legitimate role as a public servant to assist those in distress and to maintain and foster public safety. "Local police officers . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (upholding, for public safety reasons, search of out-of-state police officer's abandoned vehicle before leaving it unattended, on the belief that it might contain his service revolver). Police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they stop a vehicle when they have adequate grounds to believe the driver is ill or falling asleep, cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.4(f), at 123-24 and cases cited at n. 114 (1987 & Supp.1989). Safety reasons alone can be sufficient if they are based upon "specific and articulable facts." For example, we have recently upheld a stop when blinking headlights led an officer to halt a vehicle for safety reasons. State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224 (Me.1989); accord, State v. Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn signals justifies stop); State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 533 P.2d 1143 (1975) (bouncing left rear tire justifies stop). In such instances, the "specific and articulable facts" are not related to suspected infractions of the law, yet the intrusion is warranted.
The stop here was not a random stop like that condemned in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and there is no suggestion that the safety justification was only a pretext. Here the officer's observation of the defendant's misuse of the marked lanes could furnish "specific and articulable facts" to justify pulling him over for safety purposes to advise him of his improper use of the intersection. It could provide an affirmative answer to Terry's question: "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). But we do not decide this issue as an appellate court; it is a judgment for the District Court to make in the first instance now that we have made clear that a civil or criminal violation is not always prerequisite to a stop. We therefore remand for reconsideration.
Because the District Court granted the motion to suppress evidence resulting from the vehicle stop, thus effectively terminating the action, the defendant never had the opportunity to conduct cross-examination on his other motions, an issue he preserved by cross-appeal as the State concedes. Depending upon the outcome of the District Court's reconsideration of the motion to suppress on remand, it may also be necessary for the District Court to take further testimony on the remaining motions.
The entry is:
Order on motion to suppress evidence vacated;
Order denying motion to suppress statements, confessions or admissions vacated;
Order denying motion to suppress evidence of test refusal vacated;
Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, CLIFFORD and COLLINS, JJ., concurring.
. There was substantial discussion in the District Court whether markings painted on a road surface are "placed or erected" within the meaning of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1(17-B) (1978) so as to create a violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 941-A (Pamph.1988) out of the driving behavior and whether a municipal ordinance could have any effect. Because the police officer did not testify that any infraction prompted him to pull the defendant over, we do not decide whether a violation in fact occurred.