Case Name: SHEWELL v. KEEN et al., executors of FORDE
Court: Philadelphia District Court
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1836-04-09
Citations: 1 Miles 186
Docket Number: 
Parties: SHEWELL v. KEEN et al., executors of FORDE.
Judges: Pettit, President, was absent at the argument of this case, in consequence of indisposition.
Reporter: Reports of cases determined in the district court for the city and county of Philadelphia
Volume: 1
Pages: 186–203

Head Matter:
SHEWELL v. KEEN et al., executors of FORDE.
April 9, 1836.
Case stated,
A legacy in the hands of executors is not the subject of foreign attachment for a debt due by the legatee, unless the executors have assented to the legacy, or where suificient assets being admitted to be in the hands of the executors to pay him, the legatee, prior to the attachment, has tendered an adequate refunding bond.
It $rcw,s that under the act of the 21st of March 1772, the refunding bond can be provided by the legatee only, and not by a creditor of the legatee ; and by the act of the 24th of February 1834, the security must be given in the orphan's court, and there only.
THIS was a case stated for the opinion of the court in the nature of a special verdict, in the words following, to wit:
“ Sarah Forde, late of the city of Philadelphia, widow, died, having made her last will and testament, date;! the 10th of July 1830, and which was proven September 14th, 1834, whereof ¡-he constituted the defendants, Charles Keen and Aaron Kille executors {prout copy of said wall).
“ Plaintiff issued a writ of foreign attachment against John B. Forde and Standish Forde, October 1st, 1832. December 1832, No. 207 (prout record of attachment and return).
“ Scire facias issued September 26th, 1833, against the defendants, as garnishees, (prout the writ, return thereto and record) and interrogatories were filed and the defendants’ answers made (prout the same).
“The administration account of the defendants was filed October 18th, 1833; referred to auditors, and subsequently settled {prout the same in the answers of the defendants).
“Aaron Kille, one the defendants, died on the day of 1834.
“ The question submitted for the opinion of the court is, whether the estate, goods, rights, chattels, credits and effects, or any of them, in the hands of said defendants, under the said will of Sarah Forde, were, at the time of issuing the attachment, properly attachable. Judgment to be given accordingly.”
The following is a copy of the will referred to in the case stated, viz.:
“ Be it remembered that I, Sarah Forde, of the city of Philadelphia, widow, &c. hereby make my last will and testament in the manner following ; that is to say,
“ First, I will that all my just debts and funeral expenses be duly paid and satisfied.
“ Item, I give and bequeath to my daughter, Ann Forde, a legacy or sum of 3000 dollars.
“ Item, all the rest, residue, reversion and remainder of my estate, real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever, I give, devise and bequeath in the manner following, that is to say : one full, equal, undivided sixth part thereof unto my daughter Eleanor Hansell, her heirs, executors and administrators for ever. One other sixth part thereof to my son Standish Forde, Ms heirs, executors and administrators for ever. One other sixth part thereof to my daughter Margaret Smith, her heirs, executors and administrators for ever. One other sixth part thereof to my son John Forde, his heirs, executors and administrators for ever. One oilier sixth part thereof to my daughter Ann Forde, her heirs, executors and administrators for ever; and the remaining one-sixth part thereof to my executors hereinafter named, in trust, for the use of my daughter Mary Poor and her heirs,
“Item, I nominate and appoint my friends Charles Keen, of the county of Philadelphia, and Aaron Kille, of the city of Philadelphia, executors of this my last will and testament; and for the better division of my estate among my residuary devisees and legatees, I authorize and empower them, my said executors, to sell and dispose of my real estate, and to grant and convey the same to the purchaser or purchasers thereof, his, her or their heirs and assigns for ever, any thing hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding.
“ Provided always, and it is my mind and will, that in the distribution of my estate my son Standish Forde shall be charged with a note given to the Insurance company of indorsed and
paid by rnc for 616 dollars, with interest from the 26th day of May 1827, and with another note given to me for 755 dollars, with interest from ilie'-date of this my will, and deducted from his part and share of and in my said estate.
“Lastly. [A revocation of all former wills.]”
“ (Dated July 10th, 1830. Proved September 14th, 1832. Same day executors qualified.)”
The writ of attachment -was,
“Thomas Shewell a. Standish Forde and John B. Forde, To December term 1832, No. 207. Foreign attachment case. Bail 19,000 dollars. Exit 1st of October.”
Writ indorsed — “Attach all and singular the messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments, goods, chattels, rights, credits, effects, and estate real and personal, whatsoever, and wheresoever lying, and being in your bailiwick, of the defendants, and especially those which are devised to the said defendants by Sarah Forde, late of the city of Philadelphia deceased, widow, as appears by her last will and testament, dated July 10th, 1832, duly proved on the 14th of September, A. D. 1832, and remaining on file in the office of the register of wills at Philadelphia; and summon as garnishees Charles Keen and Aaron Kille, executors of said last will and testament, or any other person or persons in whose hands the same you shall find.”
Return of sheriff to this writ. “'October 1st, 1832, Attached as within commanded all and singular the lands, messuages and tenements of the defendants in the county of Philadelphia, and left a copy of attachment at the office of the recorder of deeds for the city and county of Philadelphia, and further attached all the goods, chattels, rights, estate, credits and efleets of the defendants in the hands of Charles Keen and Aaron Idle, executors of the last will and testament of Sarah Forde deceased, and summoned them as garnishees.”
June 22d, 1833, narr. filed; and same day, on motion of J. Miles, for plaintiff, judgment for the plaintiff sec. reg.
Same v. Same. To September term 1833, No. 203. Writ of inquiry of damages. Return by sheriff that inquest, &c., assessed the damages of plaintiff at 11,573 dollars 39 cents.
The scire facias against the garnishees was,
“Shewell v. Keen and Kille, executors of Sarah Forde deceased, garnishees of Standish Forde and John B. Forde. To December term 1833, No. 116. Scire facias against garnishees. Return of sheriff — ! made known”
March , 1834, plaintiff files “interrogatories to be put to the defendants, garnishees, &c.
“1. Do you know the aboye named John lftR|j^?£<Jj£jSfcl¡sh Forde! How long have you known of thenvf f
“'2. Had you, or either of you, on the 1 si day of D. 1832, the date of the service of the foreign ajtfigkSent m this cafe; or have you or either of you since that time |atl, in vmji^pp^ssipn, keeping, care, control, management or direcytoi^étfy^goocls, wrtres, merchandize, moneys, property, credits, rights oteeii&e^^f'any kind or description, or any legacies, moneys, property or things devised, belonging, coming or appertaining to the said John B. Forde and Standish Forde, or either of them, or to which they are or were in any manner entitled, and which of them 1 If yea, state how much. Annex a proper account or exhibit to your answer hereto, and answer fully and at large.
“3. Had you, or either of you, on the said 1st of October, A. D. 1832, or have you or either of you since, as executors of Sarah Forde deceased, received or had possession of any property, moneys, effects or things, or had any control over the same, which, by virtue of the last will and testament of said Sarah Forde deceased, belonged to the said John B. Forde and Standish Forde, or either of them, and which of them, or to which they were in any manner entitled, or had any interest therein 1 Answer fully, and at large; and if affirmatively, annex statements or exhibits of amounts and facts in full.
“4. Are all the debts due by the estate of Sarah Forde deceased, of whose last will and testament you are the executors, fully paid and discharged'? Has the general account of your administration of said estate been duly settled and confirmed 1 Annex copies of the same, and answer fully and at large.
“ 5. Do you know of any other matter or thing material to the plaintiff in this case 1 Answer fully.”
April 7th, 1834. The defendants’ answers to the interrogatories filed in the above case by the plaintiff:
“ 1. That they have been partially acquainted with John B. Forde and Standish Forde for several years, but the precise period they are unable to state.
“2. That in their individual capacities they had not, nor had either of them, any, either on the 1st of October or since.
“3. Yea, that they, as executors of Sarah Forde deceased, had, on the 1st day of October 1832, and since, the possession and control of the property and effects left by her, in which the said John B. Forde and Standish Forde were interested, they being each entitled under the will to one-sixth part of the residue and remainder of the estate, after the payment of debts and funeral expenses and certain legacies, two notes due by Standish Forde to the estate, amounting to 1406 dollars and 23 cents, with interest on them, to be deducted from Standish Forde’s share. The statement annexed, marked A, shows the property belonging to said estate on hand on the 1st of January 1834, when distribution was made to the other legatees ; and the following property and effects were retained in their hands as executors as and for the shares of the said John B. Forde and Standish Forde, viz., a bond and mortgage given by Samuel Stevenson to the said executors for 1000 dollars, a bond and mortgage given by Adam Hoffman to the said executors for 400 dollars, seven shares of Commercial Bank stock, four shares of Farmers and Mechanics Bank stock, two shares of Mechanics Bank stock, and 1165 dollars 62 cents in money.
“ 4. Yea, that all the debts due by the estate, so far as they have come to their knowledge, are paid and discharged. That their accounts as executors of said estate have been duly settled, and confirmed copies of said accounts are annexed, marked B.
“5. That they know nothing further material to the plaintiff in this cause, except that in December 1832 they received from F. W. Hubbell, Esq., as attorney of Robert Sihreshley, a notice that the said John B. Forde did, on the 12th day of December 1832, assign
all his interest in the estate of the said Sarah Forde to Robert B. Sthreshley.”
“ Exhibits referred to in the Answers.
A.
Property on hand January 1st, 1834, belonging to the estate of Sarah Forde, attached, viz.
October 18th, 1833, Orphan’s Court of Philadelphia. The account of C. Keen and A. Kille, executors of Sarah Forde deceased, was presented, and referred to auditors. The accountants charge themselves, inter alia, with the following items :
April 12th, 1833, sale of real estate by Wolbert:
A. Hoffman, ------ $1,200 00
Samuel Stevenson, - 1,750 00
The following personal estate on hand : Seventy-five shares of Commercial Bank stock at $70, 5,250 00
Forty-one shares of Farmers and Mechanics Bank at $71, ......... 2,911 00
Fourteen shares of Mechanics Bank at $59, - - 826 00
G. K. Budd’s bond and mortgage, principal and interest, ......... 2,516 67
Baptist, Church, do.. 709 22
S. Stevenson, do. 1,023 67
A. Hoffman, do. - - - - - 613 70
The auditors reported the balance for distribution (including the above items) to be 18,801 dollars and 31 cents, which report was confirmed.”
It appeared by this account that the executors, under the power in the will, had sold the real estate of the decedent, and had brought it into general account.
This case was argued at length by
C. fngersoll and Miles, for the plaintiffs,
and
G. AL IVhartón and F. W, Iluhhell, for defendants,
Cited during the argument: nets of 1705, 28th of September 1789, 2d of March 1723, Purd. Dig., tit. Attachment; act of 21st of March 1772, Purd. Dig., tit. Legacies; Petersd. Ab., tit. For. Attachment, and notes; Sergeant on Attachment 86, 193 ; Pris. Lond. 267; M’Comb is. Duueh, 2 Dali. 73 ; Pringle «. Black’s Executors, 2 Dali. 97; Bank of North America v. M’Call, 4 Binn. 372 ; Ross v. M’Kinsey, 2 Ratele 227; Wike v. Lightner, I Rawle 289; Rev. Laws JV. Jersey 50, sect. 3; Barnes v. Treat, 7 Mass. 271 ; Picquet v. Twan, 4 Mason 443, 463; Taylor». Woodward, 4 Hoisted 115; Thorn is. Wright, Ibid., note; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 1 Ca. in Chan, 256 ; Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. 33 ; 2 Watts 61 to 65 ; Act of 22d of May 1722 ; 1 Co wen’s Rep. 32 ; 2 Bac. Ab. 259; 1 Rolle’s Ab. 551.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Stroud, J.
It, not being stated that the executors assented at any time to the legacies bequeathed to the defendants in the foreign attachment, or that refunding bonds, in conformity with the requisitions of the act of assembly of the 21st of March 1772 "for the more easy recovery of legacies," have been tendered the executors, the broad question is presented, whether without such assent, and without the tender of a refunding bond, a legacy in the hands of executors is the subject of a foreign attachment under our laws.
It has long been settled that under the custom of London a legacy cannot be attached. Several reasons have been assigned for this exemption, the most prominent of which is, that a legacy cannot be recovered in a suit at law. This, of itself, is a sufficient answer there. With us this reason does not exist; and it is supposed, moreover, that our acts of assembly authorizing foreign attachment are of wider scope in respect to the subjects of attachment than the custom of London. Whether or not this supposition be well founded, it is needless to inquire, since it is obvious that our decision must be governed by the acts of assembly, and not by the custom of London.
The acts of assembly of 1705 and 1789 extend in express terms " to goods and chattels, moneys, credits and effects" of the defendant in the attachment; and lands, having always been regarded in this state liable for the payment of debt in the same manner as chattels are in England, have been deemed within the equity of these statutes.
Had the executor assented to the legacies, or, sufficient assets being admitted to be in his hands to pay them, had the legatees, prior to the issuing of the attachment, tendered adequate refunding bonds, I should have inclined to the opinion that the attachments were well laid. In either of these cases the legatee would have had a legal right to the recovery of his legacy, in the first case, on the authority of Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. 33, and in the second, by force of the act of assembly of 1772. " Goods, chattels, credits and effects" are words of large import according to numerous authorities, the chief of which are collected in Dowdel v. Hamm, 2 Watts 61 to 65. But at common law without the assent of the executor, and by our acts of assembly without the tender of a refunding bond, the legatee has clearly no right which he can enforce, and I am unable to see how his creditor can be in a better situation. The exaction of a refunding bond is for the protection of creditors of the testator, whose rights are altogether superior to any claim which the creditors of the legatee may be supposed to have. Take the case at common law, without regard to our act of assembly, and in what light is a legatee to be viewed, having respect to his legal rights under the will? Upon the death of -the testator, the whole of his personal estate, the proper fund for the payment of legacies is, eo instante, by act of late, transferred to his executor. He takes it in trust, primarily for the payment of the testator's debts. Until these are wholly discharged, it would be a violation of duty in the executor to make the slightest application of the funds of the estate to a legatee as such, or to suffer him to appropriate to his own use any portion of the goods left by the testator, although the subject of a specific bequest to him. Even a debt due to the testator at his death, but released or forgiven by his will, is still looked upon as assets in the event of a deficiency of other estate of the testator to satisfy his debts. Sibthorp v. Morton, 1 Ves. Sen. 50. And the assent of the executor is necessary to consummate the intention of the testator, however fully declared in this respect. 1 Roper 565, 566. This doctrine, in its whole scope, rests upon the sound principle that a debt due by the testator is a right in his creditor of the highest legal efficacy; while a legacy is a mere benevolence in its creation, and can never attain, comparatively, a more obligatory character. This is the very reason assigned by lord keeper Finch in Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 1 Cha. Cas. 256, why a legacy is not the subject of foreign attachment by the custom of London. " The legacies," he says, " are not due till the debts be paid, and a legacy being paid, remains as a legacy in the hands of a legatee after payment, and hence it is that a legacy is not attachable by foreign attachment, as it may work a wrong to the creditors, who are third persons, ant! have no day in court in that suit to interplead." In Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Jersey, concurrent decisions have taken place on laws, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, precisely like our attachment acts, negativing the right to attach a legacy in the hands of the executor. Wincheil v. Allen, 1 Conn. Rep. 385; Barnes v. Treat, 7 Mass. Rep. 271 ; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason's Rep. 443, 463; Taylor and others, Executors v. Woodward, 4 Halsted's Rep. 115, and Thorn v. Wright, Ibid., note.
The decision in New Jersey is entitled to great respect, from the character of the court by which it was pronounced ; especially so, as the law of that state for the recovery of legacies is almost literally identical with our act. It bears date about two years later, and its very title, as well as the whole of its provisions, show that if not borrowed from ours, both must have had a common original. See Revised Laws of Jfew Jersey of 1821, page 50. The same point has been decided there twice. On the first occasion, Ewing, G. J., was not present, and the opinion was delivered by Ford, J., who disposed of the question in this manner. " A legacy is not aright at common law. It may be reduced to a right by the legatee, if he pursue the provisions of the statute. Revised Laws 50, sect. 3. The right does not vest until the bond has been offered or filed. There is no provision in the attachment act requiring the attaching creditor to give such bond. How then is the executor to obtain the indemnity the refunding bond was intended to afford 1" Thorn v. Wright, 4 Hals. Rep. 115, note. This reasoning applies with precisely the same force in regard to our laws; for the attachment law of New Jersey is, to say the least, as comprehensive in its terms as our acts of 1705 and 1789 combined.
In Barnes v. Treat, the supreme court of Massachusetts denied the right to attach a pecuniary legacy, on the ground that in the hands of the executor it could not be regarded as " goods, credits or effects." " Pecuniary legacies," it was said, " in the bands of the executor, are not e goods or effects,' and it is equally clear that in no proper sense can they be denominated credits. Without the relation of a creditor and a debtor, there can be no such thing as a credit; but a legatee can, in no proper sense, be said to be the creditor of a testator ; nor a testator, merely as such, the debtor of a legatee." Judge Story gives bis full sanction to this doctrine in Picquet v. Swan, before cited. The language of the Massachusetts decision is, that " a testator is not the debtor of a legateeIt is scarcely necessary to add, that the executor, although he may have sufficient assets in his hands to pay legacies, is not, in legal contemplation, the debtor of the legatee, before assent given to the legacy, or a refunding bond tendered. If he were, indebitatus assumpsit would lie against him, which cannot be pretended without a total disregard of the settled doctrine on the subject, both in England and in this country.
The views of the supreme court of Connecticut accord generally with those expressed in the Massachusetts reports, with the further suggestion of a conflict of jurisdiction with the court of probate — the proper tribunal for the settlement of executors' accounts.
The obstacle from the leant of a refunding bond, is attempted to be surmounted by the suggestion that this court may, before execution is awarded against the garnishee, coerce the plaintiff to give security to him, similar in character to that which is directed by the act of 1772 to be provided by the legatee. It is a sufficient answer to this, that the executor has assumed his office in reference to a state of the law not merely not identical with this proposition, but which he has a right to say is wiser and better. He has a right to say that a reasonable demand of payment of the legacy, and a convenient opportunity of ascertaining the value of the surety that is offered for a return of the legacy, if circumstances should render that necessary, formed part of the terms on which he assumed his office, and that he ought not to be deprived of these because a stranger has chosen to intermeddle in his affairs. And should it be replied, that the decree of the court will constitute a protection to him from the claims of creditors, whether the security be adequate or not, the objection to the course proposed is rather strengthened that weakened, because the substantial ground for requiring the refunding bond is the security of creditors of the testator, and they are not before the court. Courts, without doubt, interpose occasionally, and exact indemnification before they enforce a proceeding, in itself proper, but which in its operation may prejudice the interests of third persons. But this interference takes place only in cases manifestly beneficial to the party for whom it is exercised, and never in derogation of the rights of individuals not before the court, and otherwise amply protected.
It would have been much more advantageous to the parties, and more satisfactory to us, if the investigation of this question had devolved upon the court of the last resort. It appears to have been incidentally before it on several occasions, but not being the very point in the cause, no decision has taken place. I speak of reported decisions, for I can scarcely doubt, that in the long tract of time which has elapsed since the passing of the first attachment law, some pointed intimation in denial of the pretension upon which this attachment is founded, has been given from the bench. Certain it is, that until Boss v. M'Kinney, 2 Rawle 227, the sentiment of the profession in this city, was as settled on this point as on any acknowledged principle of the common law.
This case having been commenced in October 1832, is to be determined by the laws then in force. Looking at the provisions of the " act relating to executors and administrators," passed the 24th of February 1834, which must govern all future cases, no room for conjecture or experiment is left. Security is there directed to be given in the orphan's court, and there only; and therefore the injunction of the 13th section of " the act to regulate arbitrations," of the 21st of March 1806, will apply with despotic effect. Wike v. Lightner, 1 Rawle 289, 290. In coming to the conclusion that this attachment cannot be supported, I have not lost sight of the admitted principle of our jurisprudence, wh ich sustains actions founded on rights purely equitable and without the pale of a mere common law forum. This doctrine rests on necessity, to prevent the reproach and injustice of an existing right without a corresponding remedy. The present application is not of this description. The creditor has all the usual remedies against his debtor; and they are ample. If more is desired, let the legislature be applied to, according to the suggestion of the court, in Ammant v. The New Alexandria Turnpike Company, 13 Serg. & Rawle 210. With equal propriety might a sequestration of tolls have been awarded there, as the attachment here be enforced.