Case Name: State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company vs. Circuit Court for Waushara County and another
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1917-04-24
Citations: 165 Wis. 387
Docket Number: 
Parties: State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company vs. Circuit Court for Waushara County and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 387–394

Head Matter:
State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company vs. Circuit Court for Waushara County and another.
March 16
April 24, 1917.
V&tftue: Action on life insurance policies: Where cause of action arose: Proofs of loss: Service: Appointment of administrator: Distinction between “arise” and “accrue.”
1. Life insurance policies were issued and were payable in M. county, in which the insurance company (a domestic corporation) had its principal office. The insured resided at the time, and until his death, in W. county. Notice and proofs of death were to he furnished to the company in M. county, and were in fact drawn in W. county and mailed there to the company in M. county. An administrator of the estate of the insured was appointed in W. county. Held, that an action upon the policies was properly triable in M. county, under sub. 5, sec. 2619, Stats., no part of the cause of action having arisen in W. county.
2. As to the proofs of death, the act essential to a recovery was not the drawing or mailing of them in W. county, but the service of them on the company, and this took place in M. county.
3. The appointment of the administrator was not an essential part of the cause of action; it merely designated the person who was to enforce it.
4. Although a cause of action does not “accrue” until there is a person in existence with a present right to sue upon it, a cause of action may logically be said to “arise” when the facts necessary to demonstrate the defendant’s breach of duty and liability to some person or group of persons or interests have all come into existence, even though the person or group be not at the time competent to sue.
Kisrwin, Siebecker, and Eschweilek, JJ„ dissent.
This is a mandamus action commenced in tbis court to compel tbe Circuit Court for Waushara County to change the venue of an action to Milwaukee county. The case is now before us on a motion to quash the alternative writ. The petition and writ show that the facts appearing on the hearing of the motion were substantially as follows: The plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of Melvin Plank, deceased, brought action in the Circuit Court for Waushara County against the defendant on two insurance policies on the life of said Melvin in favor of his estate. Melvin was a resident of Waushara county at the time of their issuance and remained such» until his death. He left his home May 29, 1908, went to Portage, Milwaukee, and Chicago, and was last heard from in Chicago, where it is alleged that he died on that day. Premiums were paid up to June 25, 1908. The policies were issued in Milwaukee and payable there. The premiums were to he paid in Milwaukee and were in fact paid at Stevens Point in Wood county. Notice and proofs of death were to he furnished to the company at Milwaukee and were in fact drawn in Waushara county and mailed to the company at Milwaukee. The plaintiff in that action resides in Wau-shara county and was appointed administratrix of the estate of Melvin Plank by the county court of that county in August, 1915, before the commencement of this action.
The petitioner in this action is a domestic corporation with its principal office at Milwaukee. Motion was made in the Circuit Court for Waushara County, based upon the complaint and certain affidavits showing the facts above set forth, to change the venue of the action to Milwaukee county under sub. 5, sec. 2619, Stats., which provides that the place of trial of an action against a domestic corporation shall be “the county in which it is situated or has its principal office or place of business, or in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose.” The trial court denied the motion on the ground that a part of the cause of action arose in Waushara county.
Eor the relator there was a brief by Jno. Barnes, J. B. Dyer, and II. N. Laflin, and oral argument by Sam T. Swan-sen, all of Milwaukee.
Eor the defendants there was a brief signed by Walter D. Corrigan of Milwaukee and Buchanan Johnson of Plain-field, and oral argument by Mr. Corrigan.

Opinion:
Winslow, C. J.
It is plain tliat the petitioner was entitled to have the action removed to Milwaukee county unless some part of the "cause of action" arose in Waushara county.
This court has held that the words "cause of action" as used "include the act or omission without which there would he no cause of action or right of recovery." Bruil v. Northwestern Mut. R. Asso. 12 Wis. 430, 39 N. W. 529; Hosley v. Wis. O. F. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 86 Wis. 463, 57 N. W. 48. Whether this proposition be entirely logical may perhaps be doubted, but we do not find it necessary to question it now. Applying it to the present case, we find no "acts or omissions" occurring in Waushara county except the drawing and mailing of the proofs of death and the appointment of the plaintiff as administratrix of the estate. Neither the drawing nor mailing of the proofs of death in Waushara county can be considered as an act essential to a recovery; it is the service of them on the company which is the sine qua non of a recovery, and this took place in Milwaukee county. As to the appointment of the administratrix the question is somewhat different. It is quite true that by the great current of authority a "cause of action" does not "accrue," within the meaning of statutes of limitation, until a person is in existence with a present right to sue upon it. 1 Wood, Lim. (4th ed.) § 117; 25 Cyc. 1067; American R. Co. v. Coronas, 230 Fed. 545. The ease last named contains an exhaustive review of the authorities on the question. This rule was recognized by this court in the case of Stehn v. Hayssen, 124 Wis. 583, 102 N. W. 1074.
There is, however, a substantial difference in meaning between the words "arise" and "accrue." A cause of 'action may logically be said to arise when the facts necessary to demonstrate the defendant's breach of duty and liability to some person or group of persons or interests have' all come into existence, even though the person or group be not at the time competent to sue, but must sue through a representative to be appointed later, while it cannot be said that a cause of action has "accrued" until there was a person in existence to whom it can accrue, for the very plain reason that a thing must accrue to somebody. Accrue means to increase, to augment, to add to something already existing by way of increase.
A complete cause of action certainly arises in favor of a man's estate when he meets death through the actionable negligence of another or if he dies owning a note which falls due immediately after the death; it is in abeyance; however, until the appointment of an administrator, when it "accrues" to such administrator.
The appointment of the administrator neither adds to nor takes from the essential parts of a cause of action; it simply designates the person who is to enforce it. If it were to be held to be an essential part of the cause of action, then it would necessarily follow that the cause of action would céase to exist in case of the administrator's death, resignation, or removal, and that a new and different cause of action would accrue to the next administrator. It is plain that this cannot be. There is but one cause of action, no matter how many administrators may in succession prosecute it.
It is to be remembered that under our statute (sec. 4251) the cause of action becomes barred if the appointment of an administrator be delayed until double the limitation period otherwise prescribed by law.
By the Court. — Adjudged that the motion to quash be overruled and that the peremptory writ of mandamus issue as prayed in the petition. Ho costs to be taxed.