Case Name: CONNECTICUT v. BARRETT
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1987-01-27
Citations: 479 U.S. 523
Docket Number: No. 85-899
Parties: CONNECTICUT v. BARRETT
Judges: Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 530. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 536.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 479
Pages: 523–537

Head Matter:
CONNECTICUT v. BARRETT
No. 85-899.
Argued December 9, 1986
Decided January 27, 1987
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 530. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 536.
Julia DiCocco Dewey, Assistant State’s Attorney of Connecticut, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Trott, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.
Robert L. Genuario argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John F. Kavanewsky, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by David Crump and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Harold M. Brown of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, John K. Van de Kamp of California, Duane Woodard of Colorado, James T. Jones of Idaho, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, David L. Armstrong of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, HubeR H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Edwin L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin; and for the National District Attorneys Association by Robert S. Marsel, Jack E. Yelverton, and James P. Manak.

Opinion:
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent William Barrett was convicted after a jury trial of sexual assault, unlawful restraint, and possession of a controlled substance. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions. It held that incriminating statements made by Barrett should have been suppressed under our decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), because Barrett, though stating his willingness to speak to police, had indicated that he would not make a written statement outside the presence of counsel. 197 Conn. 50, 495 A. 2d 1044 (1985). We granted certiorari to consider the federal constitutional issues presented by this holding. 476 U. S. 1114 (1986). We reverse.
In the early morning of October 24, 1980, Barrett was transported from New Haven, Connecticut, to Wallingford, where he was a suspect in a sexual assault that had occurred the previous evening. Upon arrival at the Wallingford police station, Officer Peter Cameron advised Barrett of his rights, and Barrett signed and dated an acknowledgment that he had received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Barrett stated that "he would not give the police any written statements but he had no problem in talking about the incident." App. 12A.
Approximately 30 minutes later, Barrett was questioned by Officer Cameron and Officer John Genovese. Before this questioning, he was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a card acknowledging that he had been read the rights. Respondent stated that he understood his rights, and told the officers that he would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present but had "no problem" talking about the incident. Id., at 21 A. Barrett then gave an oral statement admitting his involvement in the sexual assault.
After discovering that a tape recorder used to preserve the statement had malfunctioned, the police conducted a second interview. For the third time, Barrett was advised of his Miranda rights by the Wallingford police, and once again stated that "he was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came." Id., at 44A. He then repeated to the police his confession regarding the previous evening's events.
When the officers discovered that their tape recorder had again failed to record the statement, Officer Cameron reduced to writing his recollection of respondent's statement.
The trial court, after a suppression hearing, held that the confession was admissible. It found that respondent not only indicated that he understood the warnings, but also "offered the statements that he did not need anything explained to him because he understood. So it was not merely a passive acquiescence . . . ." Id., at 70A. Barrett's decision to make no written statement without his attorney "indicate[d] to the Court that he certainly understood from having his rights read to him that... he was under no obligation to give any statement." Ibid. The court held that Barrett had voluntarily waived his right to counsel and thus allowed testimony at trial as to the content of Barrett's statement. Barrett took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had understood his rights as they were read to him. Id., at 130A. He was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 9 to 18 years.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that respondent had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to make written statements without the presence of his attorney. In the court's view, Barrett's expressed desire for counsel before making a written statement served as an invocation of the right for all purposes:
"The fact that the defendant attached his request for counsel to the making of a written statement does not affect the outcome of. . . our inquiry. No particular form of words has ever been required to trigger an individual's fifth amendment protections; nor have requests for counsel been narrowly construed. The defendant's refusal to give a written statement without his attorney present was a clear request for the assistance of counsel to protect his rights in his dealings with the police. Such a request continues to be constitutionally effective despite the defendant's willingness to make oral statements. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant did invoke his right to counsel under the fifth and fourteenth amendments." 197 Conn., at 57, 495 A. 2d, at 1049 (citations omitted).
This invocation, the court believed, brought the case within what it called the "bright-line rule for establishing a waiver of this right." Id., at 58, 495 A. 2d, at 1049. That rule requires a finding that the suspect "(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam). See also Edwards, supra, at 485, 486, n. 9. Because Barrett had not initiated further discussions with police, the court found his statement improperly admitted.
We think that the Connecticut Supreme Court erred in holding that the United States Constitution required suppression of Barrett's statement. Barrett made clear to police his willingness to talk about the crime for which he was a suspect. The trial court found that this decision was a voluntary waiver of his rights, and there is no evidence that Barrett was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into this waiver. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 476. The Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless held as a matter of law that respond ent's limited invocation of his right to counsel prohibited all interrogation absent initiation of further discussion by Barrett. Nothing in our decisions, however, or in the rationale of Miranda, requires authorities to ignore the tenor or sense of a defendant's response to these warnings.
The fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in Miranda was "to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process." Id., at 469 (emphasis added). See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 426 (1986) ("Miranda attempted to reconcile [competing] concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation") (emphasis in original); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 308 (1985) ("Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities") (emphasis added). To this end, the Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights from the government "compulsion, subtle or otherwise," that "operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." Miranda, supra, at 474. See also Smith, supra, at 98; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983). One such rule requires that, once the accused "states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Miranda, supra, at 474. See also Edwards, 451 U. S., at 484. It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further questioning — like other aspects of Miranda — is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654 (1984). By prohibiting further interrogation after the invocation of these rights, we erect an auxiliary barrier against police coercion.
But we know of no constitutional objective that would be served by suppression in this case. It is undisputed that Barrett desired the presence of counsel before making a written statement. Had the police obtained such a statement without meeting the waiver standards of Edwards, it would clearly be inadmissible. Barrett's limited requests for counsel, however, were accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities. The fact that officials took the opportunity provided by Barrett to obtain an oral confession is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose between speech and silence, and Barrett chose to speak.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision to the contrary rested on the view that requests for counsel are not to be narrowly construed. 197 Conn., at 57, 495 A. 2d, at 1049. In support of this premise, respondent observes that our prior decisions have given broad effect to requests for counsel that were less than all-inclusive. See Bradshaw, supra, at 1041-1042 ("I do want an attorney before it goes very much farther"); Edwards, supra, at 479 ("I want an attorney before making a deal"). We do not denigrate the "settled approach to questions of waiver [that] requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel," Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 633 (1986), when we observe that this approach does little to aid respondent's cause. Interpretation is only required where the defendant's words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambiguous. Here, however, Barrett made clear his intentions, and they were honored by police. To conclude that respondent invoked his right to counsel for all purposes requires not a broad interpretation of an ambiguous statement, but a disregard of the ordinary-meaning of respondent's statement.
We also reject the contention that the distinction drawn by Barrett between oral and written statements indicates an understanding of the consequences so incomplete that we should deem his limited invocation of the right to counsel effective for all purposes. This suggestion ignores Barrett's testimony— and the finding of the trial court not questioned by the Connecticut Supreme Court — that respondent fully understood the Miranda warnings. These warnings, of course, made clear to Barrett that "[i]f you talk to any police officers, anything you say can and will be used against you in court." App. at 48A. The fact that some might find Barrett's decision illogical is irrelevant, for we have never "embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness." Elstad, supra, at 316; Colorado v. Spring, post, p. 564.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Connecticut Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the trial court "impliedly found that the defendant had requested counsel." 197 Conn. 50, 56, 495 A. 2d 1044, 1048 (1985). This statement does not suggest, however, that the request for counsel was in fact all-inclusive, and the Supreme Court expressly noted the trial court's finding that defendant had refused to give a written statement without his attorney present. Id., at 56, n. 6, 495 A. 2d, at 1048, n. 6. The holding that Barrett had invoked his right to counsel, then, rests on a legal conclusion about the effect of his limited invocation rather than on a factual finding.
Because the attempts to record Barrett's statements were unsuccessful, we have no occasion to consider whether the result would be different if police had taped the statements and used the recording against Barrett.
Since we reject the claim that Barrett's statements represent an ambiguous or equivocal response to the Miranda warnings, there is no need for us to address the question left open in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 96, n. 3 (1984) (per curiam).
We do not suggest that the distinction drawn by Barrett is in fact illogical, for there may be several strategic reasons why a defendant willing to speak to the police would still refuse to write out his answers to questions, or to sign a transcript of his answers prepared by the police, a statement that may be used against him.