Case Name: TEAGUE et vir. v. BURK
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1929-04-24
Citations: 18 S.W.2d 690
Docket Number: No. 7358
Parties: TEAGUE et vir. v. BURK.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 18
Pages: 690–691

Head Matter:
TEAGUE et vir. v. BURK.
(No. 7358.)
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
April 24, 1929.
Rehearing Denied May 15, 1929.
Second Motion for Rehearing Denied May 22, 1929.
See, also, 3 S.W.(2d) 461.
E. A. Landman, of Athens, for appellants.
Bishop & Holland, of Athens, for appellee.

Opinion:
BLAIR, J.
Appellee recovered a judgment against appellants for $748.63, with foreclosure of a mortgage lien on personal property, which the sheriff sold for $250. Thereafter, under, execution issued on the judgment, the sheriff sold 150 acres of appellants' land for $200; appellee being the purchaser. Appellants then brought this suit to set aside both sales, alleging in reference to the personal property that appellee "chilled the sale" by fraudulently inducing one Jess Wofford to absent himself from the sale and to not bid, which caused the property to sell for a grossly inadequate price. The jury found that this allegation was not true and that Wofford was present at the sale. This finding is not attacked here and precludes that issue.
In reference to the sale of the land, appellants alleged that 43 of the 150 acres sold were a part of their 200-acre homestead, and not subject to forced sale; and further that the land sold at a grossly inadequate price under such circumstances as would" render the sale void. The jury found that the land was of the value of $3,000 at the time the sheriff sold it. On this finding and the undisputed evidence that the land was incumbered for more than its value when sold, the court denied appellants a recovery of the land, or a removal of cloud upon title by reason of the sheriff's sale and deed.
Appellants first contend that the court should have on their request instructed the jury to find that 43 of the 150 acres of land were their homestead, or should have submitted their requested issues as to whether 43 of the 150 acres were a part of their 200-acre homestead. The petition does not describe the 200 acres on which appellants alleged they were residing as a homestead ; nor. does it describe the 43 acres sought to be recovered, or from which they sought to remove cloud cast by the sheriff's deed. It merely alleged that appellants "are entitled to a homestead of 200 acres of land; that the tract upon which they reside is their homestead, and that it takes 43 acres of land which was sold under execution and sheriff's deed to aggregate the amount of 200 acres." The 150 acres are described elsewhere in the petition, but nowhere are the 43 acres alleged to be a part of the homestead described. The law is settled that a petition to recover land or to remove cloud from title must describe the land so as to enable the court to grant the relief sought; and that a petition to recover or to remove cloud from title to a certain number of acres of land out of a larger tract insufficiently describes the land and is subject to a general demurrer. Halley v. Fontaine (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 260; Cervenka v. Dyches (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. 316.
Neither do we sustain appellants' contention that the land sold for a grossly inadequate price. Appellants alleged, and the jury found, that the 150 acres were Of the value of $3,000 when sold. One of the appellants testified as follows: "There is something like $3400.00 or $3500.00 encumbrance on this 150 acres of land, the $1250.00 Federal Loan, $160.00 to Miller, some back taxes and deed of trust, making a total of about $3400.00 or $3500.00. Yes, sir, when Mr. Burk! purchased the land at the sheriff's sale he gave $200.00 additional."
The other appellant admitted in effect the same indebtedness against the land. So under the. undisputed evidence the land was incumbered at the time of sale for more than its value, as alleged by appellants and as found by the jury; and the plea of inadequacy of price must fall. Having reached this conclusion, we pretermit a discussion, as being immaterial, of the issue raised in the briefs as to whether gross inadequacy of price-alone is insufficient to invalidate a judicial sale; and whether appellants have alleged and proved sufficient facts and circumstances to render that general ipile inapplicable.
We find no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.