Case Name: HIBERNIA SAVINGS AND LOAN SOCIETY v. WILLIAM HAYES
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1880
Citations: 56 Cal. 297
Docket Number: No. 6,215
Parties: HIBERNIA SAVINGS AND LOAN SOCIETY v. WILLIAM HAYES.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 297–307

Head Matter:
[No. 6,215.
In Bank.]
HIBERNIA SAVINGS AND LOAN SOCIETY v. WILLIAM HAYES.
Estates oe Deceased Persons—Foreclosure oe Mortgage — Presentation of Clam—Construction of Statute.—The amendments of 1874 to §§ 1403 and 1B00 of the Code of Civil Procedure, repealing the provision authorizing suits upon mortgages to be maintained against the property of the estate of a deceased person subject thereto, without presentation of the claim to the administrator or executor, are not retroactive, and do not give to a notice to creditors previously published, any effect which it did not have under the law under which it was published; and therefore held, where a notice to creditors had been published before the amendment, that a mortgage of the deceased falling due after the amendment was not barred by a failure to present the claim to the administrator.
Id. — Id. — Id. — Id. — Id. — Sharfstein, J., and McKee, J., dissenting. The right to a particular remedy is not a vested right, but depends upon the continuance of the law which creates it; and if the law be repealed, the right no longer exists, unless it has been expressly reserved by the repealing statute, or has been perfected by steps taken under the law while it existed. The repeal of the provision in § 1500 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which gives a remedy by action of foreclosure, took away that remedy, and left to the mortgagee only the remedy by presentation of the claim.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, in the Fourth District Court, City and County of San Francisco. Morrison, J.
George R. B. Hayes, for Appellant.
No claim having been presented on the note and mortgage sued upon within one month after it became due, it was barred forever. (Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1493,1500.) The provisions under consideration constitute a Statute of Limitations, and affect only a remedy. (Sichel v. Carrillo, 42 Cal. 498, 499.) Statutes affecting only the remedy do not become practically operative until the time arrives for the ascertainment and application of the remedy. Then, and not till then, the right accrues. The law as then exists furnishes the rule for all that concerns the remedy. (Tuolumne Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 522, 523; McMinn v. Bliss, 31 Cal. 122; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Supervisors v. Briggs, 3 Denio, 173; Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 517; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 322. The Statute of Limitations, which is to control, is that which is in force at the time and place when and where the remedy is brought. (Gilman v. Cutts, 23 N. H. 381.)
Tobin & Tobin, for Respondent.
We submit, that the amendment of 1874 has no application to this case, because no claim can be barred under it without a notice to creditors. The notice referred to is one to be given after the law was enacted, a future notice. The repealing clause of this act provides, that “ no s * * proceedings taken under the provisions repealed shall be * * * in any manner affected,” and the same Code (§ 3) also contains the provision, that “no part of it is retroactive unless expressly so declared.” (The United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399; Gates v. Salmon, 28 Cal. 320; Benner v. Phillips, 98 Watts & S. 13; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421; Dickson v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. 77 Ill. 331; King v. Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331, Hildreth v. Marshall, 7 id. 167; Bigelow v. Bemis, 2 Allen, 496.)

Opinion:
Ross, J.:
The mortgage for the foreclosure of which this action was brought was executed in March, 1872, and was made payable three years after its date. The mortgagor died in December, 1872. Administration upon his estate was had. Notice to creditors was published in February, 1873. The claim in suit was never presented to the representative of the estate for allowance; but the plaintiff, in 1877, commenced the present action, and in the complaint expressly waived all recourse against any other property of the estate than that embraced in the mortgage.
According to the law in force at the time the mortgage was executed, presentation of all claims to the representative of the estate for allowance was necessary; but in January, 1873, it was provided by statute that a mortgage claim need not be presented where all recourse against all other than the mortgaged property .is expressly waived in the complaint. Such was the law at the time the notice here in question was given, and such it remained until July, 1874. According to the law, therefore, under which the notice was given, the plaintiff was not required to present its claim for allowance within the time mentioned in the notice, or at all. In July, 1874, however, the law was again changed, and the statute then made to read as follows:
" Sec. 1493. If a claim arising upon a contract heretofore made be not presented within the time limited in the notice," it is barred forever, except as follows: If it be not then due, or if it be contingent, it may be presented within one month after it becomes due or absolute, if it be made to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the satisfaction of the executor or administrator and the Probate Judge, that the claimant had no notice, as provided in this chapter, by reason of being out of the State, it may be presented any time before a decree of distribution is entered. A claim for a deficiency remaining unpaid after a sale of property of the estate mortgaged or pledged, must be presented within one month after such deficiency is ascertained. All claims arising upon contracts hereafter made, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the time limited in the notice, and any claim not so presented is barred forever; provided, however, that when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the satisfaction of the executor or administrator and the Probate Judge, that the claimant had no notice, as provided in this chapter, by reason of being out of the State, it may be presented at any time before a decree of distribution is entered."
" Sec. 1500. No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon, unless the claim is first presented to the executor or administrator."
Unless these sections are made by construction to retroact, we do not see what application they can have to the plaintiff's case. Not only is there nothing in the sections themselves to indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to give them such effect, but section 3 of the same Code (Code Civ. Proe.) declares that "no part of it is retroactive unless expressly so declared."
To hold the plaintiff's claim barred by the statute would be to give an effect to the notice which it did not and could not have under the law under which it was published, and would require us to give to § 1493, above quoted, a retroactive effect when there is nothing in the section itself demanding such construction, and when there are other sections of the same Code indicating that it should not be given. In our opinion, the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
McKinstry, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.
Myrick, J., concurred in the judgment.
[Morrison, C. J., not having heard the argument, took no part in the decision of this case.]