Case Name: State, ex rel. Cary D. Landis, as Attorney General, v. Raymond Harris and John S. Bond, Jr.
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1934-06-11
Citations: 120 Fla. 555
Docket Number: 
Parties: State, ex rel. Cary D. Landis, as Attorney General, v. Raymond Harris and John S. Bond, Jr.
Judges: Davis, C. J., and Terrell, J., concur in the opinion.
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 555–580

Head Matter:
State, ex rel. Cary D. Landis, as Attorney General, v. Raymond Harris and John S. Bond, Jr.
163 So. 237.
Opinion Filed June 11, 1934.
On Rehearing October 3, 1935.
Cary D. Landis, Attorney General, and Evan Evans and Will O. Murrell, for Relator;
Giles J. Patterson, Henry P. Adair, A. W. Cockrell, Jr., Francis P. Fleming, Francis M. Holt, Charles Cook Howell, W. D. Jones, Jr., and E. J. L’Engle, for Respondents.
Statement.
The Attorney-General filed in this court an information in the nature of quo warranto in which it is in substance alleged that respondents “for the space of, to-wit, six months next last past and upwards have used, enjoyed, exercised and performed and still do use, enjoy, exercise and perform, without warrant or authority of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the said State of Florida, the franchise, functions and powers of Jury Commissioners of Duval County, Florida * * * as- authorized or required by Chapter 16058, Laws of 1933,” which said law is in violation of stated sections of the Constitution of Florida, viz.: Sections 16, 20 and 21, Article III, Sections 1, and 3 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.
“The said Attorney General prays the advice of this Court in the premises and due process of law in this' behalf to the said Raymond Harris and John S. Bond, Jr., as alleged Jury Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, requiring them to answer the said State by what warrant or authority of law they claim to have and exercis'e jurisdiction and authority as Jury Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, and that this Honorable Court upon and after a hearing in due course as prescribed by law, shall enter its order ousting the said Respondents, from the said office.”
A writ was issued in due course. Respondents filed a demurrer to the information containing the following:
“1. Chapter 16058, Laws of Florida, approved June 3rd, 1933, is not obnoxious to the constitutional provisions set forth in said information.
“2. The information in the nature of quo warranto in this cause does not state any matters of fact or reasons in law why the respondents' should not continue to use, enjoy, exercise and perform the franchise, functions and powers of jury commissioners of Duval County, Florida.
“3. It appears on the face of the information in the nature of quo warranto herein that the respondents are lawfully and rightfully exercising the functions', powers and official duties of jury commissioners of Duval County, Florida.”
The Relator filecl a motion for judgment of duster:
“Comes now the Relator herein and moves the Court to enter a judgment of ouster against the respondents above named, as prayed for in the information filed herein, ousting the Respondents' from their pretended office of Jury Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, on the ground that no sufficient response has been made by the respondents to the information herein and the information herein being shown to be well founded, and the facts therein set forth being shown to be true.”
Chapter 16058, Acts of 1933, is as follows:
“An Act Providing For and Creating Jury Commissioners in all Counties of the State of Florida Having a Population Exceeding 155,000 by the Last Preceding Federal Census, and Prescribing Their Qualifications, Method of Appointment, Powers, Duties, Functions and Official Terms', and Providing for the Selection, Listing -and Procurement of Jurors in Such Counties.
“Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
“Section 1. That the Governor shall appoint in each County of the Staté of Florida having a population exceeding 155,‘000 inhabitants by the last preceding federal census two Jury Commissioners, each of whom shall be a resident of such county. As early as' practicable after this law becomes effective, one of said Jury Commissioners shall be appointed by the Governor to hold office for the term ending on the First Tuesday after the first Monday of January, A. D. 1935, and the other shall be appointed by the Governor to hold office for the terms ending on the First Tuesday after the first Monday of January, A. D. 1936. Their respective successors, who shall be appointed by the Governor, shall hold office for terms of two years each.
“Section 2. The Jury Commissioners in such counties shall select and list not less than 800 or more than 1500 in number of male inhabitants of such county known or believed to be qualified under the laws of Florida to be jurors, who even if exempt have not filed a written claim of exemption from jury duty as' hereinafter provided. In making the selections and the preparation of said lists', the Jury Commissioners may confer with the Judge or one or more of the Judges of the Circuit Court .of such county, and shall have -the power, without charge or cost, to examine at any reasonable time or times all documents and records' in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and of any other county officials as to persons who have'been listed, sumnroned, not- found, served or excused as jurors, arid all books, records and lists in the office of the Supervisor of Registration or other county official' containing the names of-.electors-of such county. . ;
“Section 3. Such list of jurors in each county shall be completed by the Jury Commissioners and certified by them during and before the end of January of each year, and at such other period or periods, during the year as may be ordered by a Judge of the Circuit Court of such county. Every such list shall be submitted to and approved by the Circuit Judge or one of said Circuit Judges, such approval to be evidenced by his signature thereon. When so certified and approved, such list of jurors shall be recorded by the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the minutes of such Court without charge therefor. Said List so.certified, approved and recorded, although it may be defective or irregular in form, certification, approval or other fojrmal requirement, or in the number of qualification of the persons so named, shall be the basis for copying the listed names on separate pieces of paper to be deposited and preserved in the box whence the names' of persons for jury duty are to be drawn as prescribed by law. It shall not affect the validity of such list or any listed or copied name if there should be any error or irregularity in either, each person so procured or listed as a juror being presumed to be the one intended to be listed as a juror. When the annual jury list or special jury list prepared pursuant to the order of a Circuit Judge is certified, approved and recorded, the box containing the name of jurors previously listed shall be emptied and all names removed therefrom before such newly listed names are placed in such jury box. If, notwithstanding this provision, some names or papers containing names remain in the jury box, such errors or irregularity shall not invalidate the contents of the box or the procurement of any jurors by drawing names therefrom or any subsequent proceeding or jury.
“Section 4. That every person, claiming to be exempt from jury duty in any such county shall annually, on or before the 31st day of December of each year, file with the Clerk of the Circuit Court an affidavit claiming exemption from jury duty and stating the grounds therefor, which affidavit shall be filed by the Clerk and transmitted promptly to said Jury Commissioners. If any person claiming any such exemption shall fail or refuse to file such affidavit of exemption from jury duty within the time above stated, he shall not be entitled to have the privilege of exemption from jury duty during the calendar year succeeding that during which he was required to file his affidavit of exemption as aforesaid. In preparing the jury list, the Jury Commissioners shall examine all written claims of exemption from jury duty which were filed on or before the preceding December 31st, and shall omit from such jury list the names' of all persons who shall be entitled to exemption from jury duty and who have filed such written claims of exemption within the time stated hereinabove. If any claim of exemption from jury duty shall be disallowed by the Jury Commissioners, the person claiming exemption, having-filed his written claim therefor as aforesaid, may renew his claim of exemption in any court in which he may be summoned as a juror.
“Section 5. Each Jury Commissioner shall be paid out of the General Fund of the County an annual salary of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and his actual expenses incurred or paid in the performance of his official duties, upon his requisition therefor containing an itemized statement of his expenses, which shall be approved by one of the Judges of the Circuit Court of such county before being entitled to payment.
“Section 6. If any part of this Act shall be unconstitutional, the remainder shall not be affected thereby; and all laws and parts thereof in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
“Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its' becoming a law.
“Approved June 7, 1933.

Opinion:
Whitfield, J.
Quo warranto proceedings were instituted in this Court by the Attorney General to have determined the constitutional validity of Chapter 16058, Acts of 1933, under which the respondents are performing the function of selecting and certifying names of persons qualified for jury duty, which duty had theretofore been performed by the county commissioners.
It is in substance contended that Chapter 16058 is a local and not a general law, and thereby violates the provisions of Section 20, Article III of the Constitution which forbid the passage of special or local laws "regulating the practice of courts of justice" and "summoning and empaneling grand and petit juries"; and that if a local law is permissible on the subject of the Act, a notice of intention to apply for its enactment was not published as required by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution, the Act is invalid.
It is argued that Chapter 16058 is a local law because it covers only one county and was treated by the Legislature as a local bill in passing it; that the classification as made of counties by population is arbitrary and without any reasonable basis; and that the classification is therefore illegal and fails, thereby making the Act in legal effect a local law.
The treatment of the bill as a local bill by placing it on the calendar of local bills in the process of its enactment does not make it a local law if in legal effect it is a general law and was enacted according to the essential requirements for enacting all statutes'. If a classification is legal to make a general law, the fact that it embraces only one county does not make it a local law. Givens v. County of Hillsborough, 46 Fla. 502, 33 So. 88, 110 Am. St. Rep. 104.
Different sections of the Constitution relate severally to (1) subjects upon which no special or local law shall be passed (Secs. 20 and 25, Art. Ill); (2) subjects which must be regulated by general laws (Sec. 22, Art. Ill, and Sec. 4, Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Art. XII, as amended in 1926; see also. Sec. 1, Art. IX, Sec. 1, Art XII): (3) subjects which may be regulated by general or by local laws (Secs. 21 and 24,, Art. Ill; Sec. 5, Art. IX). Except in cases covered by Section 8 of Article VIII (State v. Comrs. Duval Co., 23 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193; Middleton v. City of St. Augustine, 42 Fla. 287, 29 So. 421, 89 Am. St. Rep. 227) or by other express' or implied provisions of organic law (see State v. O'Neal, 100 Fla. 1277, 121 So. 165) ; "no local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published" and the publication shown as required by law. Sec. 21, Art. Ill, as amended in 1928. The proviso to Section 21, Article III, relating to notice of proposed local laws' was not complied with in enacting Chapter 16058, and if it is a local law, it is invalid.
Within the contemplation of the constitution, a special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things (Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Mabry, 102 Fla. 1084, 136 So. 714), or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal' (Knight v. Board Public Inst., 102 Fla. 922, 136 So. 631); a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a-specifically indicated part of the State (State ex rel. v. Crandon, 105 Fla. 309, 141 So. 177), or one-that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal (Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334).
A general law operates universally throughout the State, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the State, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a State function or instrumentality. See 59 C. J. 728, 732 et seq.; Lake v. Palmer, 18 Fla. 501.
If particular physical conditions exist in only a portion of the State, enactments with reference thereto may be general laws; e. g. laws regulating fishing in "the waters of the State of Florida," or in "the rivers, creeks, bays, bayous, or other such waters on the coast of the State of Florida," are general laws, though some waters do not exist universally in every part of the State. Carlton v. Johnson, 61 Fla. 15, 55 So. 975. See also Bloxham v. Florida Central and Peninsular Railroad Co., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902. But a statute regulating fishing in "the salt or fresh waters of" specified but not classified counties of the State when salt or fresh water fish exist in other sections of the State, is a local law. Stinson v. State, 63 Fla. 42, 58 So. 722. See also Southern Drainage District v. State, 93 Fla. 672, 112 So. 561.
Statutes operating upon proper classifications of the sub-r ject regulated may be general laws within the meaning of the Constitution. See Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280; McConihe, Mayor, ex rel. McMurray, 17 Fla. 238; Anderson v. Board, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 81; State, ex rel. v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 126 So. 374, headnote II. Givens v. Hillsborough Co., 46 Fla. 502, 35 So. 88; State, ex rel. Buford, v. Shepard, 84 Fla. 206, 93 So. 667; Whitaker v. Parsons, 80 Fla. 352, 86 So. 247; Collier v. Cassady, 63 Fla. 390, 57 So. 617; State v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 41 Fla, 363, 27 So. 221, headnote 1.
As to classifications, this court has announced the rule that:
"When a classification of counties for governmental purposes based upon population or otherwise is made by the Legislature in the enactment of general laws for governmental purposes in regard to the counties classified, if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that will sustain the classification attempted by the Legislature, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted, will be presumed by the courts, and the deference due to the legislative judgment in the matter will be observed in all cases where the court cannot say on its judicial knowledge that the Legislature could not have had any reasonable ground for believing that there were public considerations justifying the particular classification and distinction made." Anderson v. B. P. I., 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334. See also Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81.
The classification of the counties of the State into two classes, viz.; larger counties and smaller counties, for purposes of statutory regulation, appears to. be a legislative policy that has been sustained where classification is permissible and the classification made is appropriate to the subject regulated and to the particular regulation. Such for example as enactments regulating the registration of electors (Chap. 9295, Acts of 1925, Sec. 367, C. G. L. 1927); regulating fees of certain county officers (Chap. 15984, Acts of 1933, Sec. 4589 (1) 1934 Supp. to C. G. L" 1927, held invalid, not for the classification but for defective title, State, ex rel., v. Howell, 112 Fla. 852, 151 So. 299); regulating the business of making small loans in certain counties' (Chap. 10177, Acts of 1925, Secs. 3999, et seq., C. G. L., held valid in Beasley v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So. 288); and perhaps other enactments. See also State, ex rel., v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804; Sparkman v. Budget Com., 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809.
Under Sections 20 and 21 of Article III and the other sections of the Constitution, there are some subjects of legislative regulation as to which the counties of the State may reasonably be classified according to population in enacting statutes, thereby giving to' such statutes, a general operation ' within the classified counties, though not a universal operation throughout the State, as, for example, some matters of administrative or other governmental regulations and activities', State, ex rel. Buford, v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804; Beasley v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So. 288; Sparkman v. Budget Com., 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809.
But even where classification is permissible, if the classification made is not reasonable and practicable with reference to the subject regulated and the nature of the regulation, the enactment will not be a general law. Anderson v. B. P. I., 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334.
There are some subjects' of statutory regulation which, because of their inherent nature or because of some express or implied organic limitations, are required to be of universal operation throughout the State. Such, for example, as the disposition of State and county tax sale certificates'. State, ex rel., v. Quinn, decided here March 8, 1934. This rule of universality of operation throughout the State may well be applied in prescribing the qualifications of grand and petit jurors.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 16058, Acts of 1933, the duties involved in selecting and certifying jury lists were conferred by general laws upon the county commissioners in all of the several counties of the State (Chap. 4444 [2772] et seq., C. G. L.). Chapter 16058 in effect classified all the counties of the State into two classes viz.: all counties "having a population exceeding 135,000 inhabitants by the last preceding Federal census" are placed in one class wherein' the duties are conferred upon "two Jury Commissioners," while all the counties of the State having a population of 155,000 or less are left in another class wherein the'duties as theretofore are to be performed by the county commissioners of each county. Thus all the counties of the State are divided into two classes for statutory regulations as to the officers upon whom is conferred the duty of selecting and certifying the names' of persons who are qualified for jury service, the qualifications of the persons to be so selected and certified being the same in every county in the State as defined by general law. Secs. 4443 (2771) and 4444 (2772) C. G. L.
This differentiates the classification from that held invalid in Jordan v. State, ex rel., 100 Fla. 494, 129 So. 747, wherein fixing the number of names to be selected for jury duty in the County Judge's Court, the classification was of counties having a population between 40,000 and 43,000, leaving a small margin for other counties to -enter the class as formed by an increase or a decrease in their population respectively. In the latter case there was' an intermediate classification not appropriate to the subject regulated. See also Stripling v. Thomas, 101 Fla. 1015, 132 So. 824; Whitney v. Hillsborough Co., 99 Fla. 628, 127 So. 486; Anderson v. Board, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334; Knight v. Board, 102 Fla. 923, 136 So. 631.
In the larger counties of the State, the various and onerous duties of the county commissioners' or other considerations may in the judgment of the Legislature be suf ficient to justify the classification of the counties of the State into two classes, the larger counties' and the smaller counties, and to provide that in each of the larger counties so classified, the duties theretofore imposed upon the county commissioners with reference to selecting and certifying names of persons for jury duty, shall he conferred upon other officers; but a more extended classification of the counties of the state by population in conferring such duties upon different classes of officers may not be permissible in view of the inherent nature of the duty which the law contemplates shall be performed with uniformity throughout the State at least with reference to classifications of the larger and the smaller counties. There is only one county now in the class of larger counties under Chapter 16058, but two other counties have each nearly the required population to enter the present larger county class, and the Legislature may lower or, if advisable later, raise the population dividing line between the -two classes'.
• The principal provisions of Chapter 16058 relate (1) to the qualifications of the persons who may be selected for jury duty, and (2) to the officers who are to perform the statutory functions. The statute does not regulate "the practice of courts of justice" and does not regulate the "'summoning and .empaneling of grand and petit juries"; but the provisions of the statute do have some relation at least to "summoning annd empaneling grand and petit juries," and classifications for statutory enactments on such subjects should have relation to comprehensive uniformity of regulations to the end that essential provisions on such- subjects shall be as near uniform throughout the State as possible, consistent with efficient administration of • the law in the various counties of the State.
In substance, Chapter 16055 required the selection of "male inhabitants of the county known or believed to be qualified under the laws of Florida to be jurors."
Section 4443 (2771) Compiled General Laws, prescribes the qualifications and disqualifications of grand and petit jurors. Section 4444 (2772) requires the county commissioners to select "from the list of male persons who are qualified to serve as jurors under the provisions of Section 4443, and personally select and make out a list of persons qualified to serve as jurors, who, in addition to the qualifications above mentioned, shall be such persons only as the said commissioners know, or have good reason to believe, are law abiding citizens of approved integrity, good character, sound judgment and intelligence, and who are not physically or mentally infirm, which list shall be signed and verified by the said commissioners as having been personally selected, as aforesaid, and as possessing the prescribed qualifications according to their best information and belief."
In substance, Chapter 16058 requires the selection and listing of male inhabitants of the county known or believed to be qualified under the laws of Florida to be jurors; and requires such list to be certified by the commissioners. Such provisions in effect require the jury commissioners under the new Act to select and certify names of persons who are qualified for jury duty in accordance with existing general laws. Other provisions in Chapter 16058 not contained in the prior general law do not affect the qualifications' of those required to be selected for jury duty; and as the provisions prescribing qualifications of the persons to be selected for jury service are of uniform operation throughout the State under both the prior general law and the later Act, therev can be no question of classification as to such qualifications. The number of names to be selected and certified in larger counties and in smaller counties is a matter that should be regulated under proper classifications. There are existing statutes on that subject. Secs. 4445 (2773), et seq., C. G. L.; Secs. 4450 (1) et seq., 1934 Cum. Supp. to C. G. L. Classifications of counties by population for creating county officers are permissible even if only one county is in a class. State, ex rel. Buford, v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804. There is no organic right to have the names of persons who are qualified for jury duty selected by the_ county commissioners.
Chapter 16058 does not violate Section 16, Article III, relating to the title of the Act, or Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights of the State Constitution, relating to the right of trial by jury. Errors in numbering bills in process of enactment are not fatal to the bills. See Volusia County v. State, 98 Fla. 1166, 123 So. 375.
If any of the incidental regulations contained in Chapter 16058 are invalid, they may be disregarded without impairing the efficiency of the es'sential portions of the Act. See Section 6 of the Act. Courts determine the validity and interpretation of the statutes, not their policy.
The foregoing statement of the law of this case is concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Davis and Mr. Justice Terrell. It is not agreed to by Mr. "Justice Ellis, Mr. Justice Brown or by Mr. Justice Buford, whose views are severally stated in separate opinions filed herein as dissents from the views expressed in this opinion.
A concurrence of a majority of the members of this Court being necessary to declare Chapter 16058, Acts of 1933, unconstitutional and thereby enter a judgment ousting the respondents from the offices to which they have been appointed under the assailed Act, it follows that this quo warranto must fail, annd that the present proceeding must be dismissed without prejudice to the constitutional questions involved. And it is so ordered on the authority of State, ex rel. Landis, Atty. General, v. Williams, 112 Fla. 734, 151 Sou. Rep. 284.
Davis, C. J., and Terrell, J., concur in the opinion.
Ellis, Brown and Buford, J. J., dissent from the opinion.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Buford concur in the order entered.