Case Name: W. B. Burditt v. George J. Glasscock
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 45
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. B. Burditt v. George J. Glasscock.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 45–49

Head Matter:
W. B. Burditt v. George J. Glasscock.
Where there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and an intervenor in the suit, and the matter of complaint or cause of action sought to be enforced by the latter against the defendant is a contract between such intervenor and the defendant, distinct from that which is the subject of litigation between the plaintiff and defendant, the petition of the intervenor „■ cannot be maintained, and exceptions thereto by the plaintiff on those grounds will be sustained.
Where, in an application for a continuance, it did not appear that the witnesses who had been subpoenaed, and on account of whose absence the continuance was sought, were citizens of the county or State, it was not error in the court to refuse to grant the same. (See Paschal’s Annotated Digest, Art. 1509, note 595.)
Appeal from Travis. Tried below before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
This was a suit brought by Glasscock against Burditt for $251 67, the balance claimed by him to be due for 788 bushels of corn, sold and delivered to the defendant.
The defendant answered, and pleaded in reconvention that he contracted with the plaintiff, in the month of June, A. D. 1856, for 1,200 bushels of corn, at 50 cents per bushel, to be delivered at the plaintiff’s crib, in Travis county, as soon thereafter as it could be shelled; and that, by the terms of said contract, the defendant was not to pay for the same until he could deliver it at Fredericksburg, in the county of Gillespie, to one John M. Hunter, to whom defendant had contracted to deliver that amount of corn. Defendant admitted the delivery by plaintiff of 788- bushels of corn, in pursuance of the contract, and alleged that afterwards, when defendant demanded the balance, to wit, 412 bushels, the plaintiff refused to deliver the same, for no other reason than that corn had advanced in price. Defendant claimed a judgment in reconvention against the plaintiff for the sum of $254.
John M. Hunter filed his petition of intervention, and for causes therefor, averred that the defendant had contracted to deliver to him, in the county of Travis, 1,200 bushels of corn, at the price of 50 cents per bushel. That, in pursuance thereof, he sent from the county of Gillespie to the residence of the plaintiff", and received of the said 1,200 bushels about 788. That afterwards he sent six other wagons and teams for the remaining 412 bushels of corn, which defendant' failed to deliver, or cause to he delivered, at the residence of the plaintiff, as he had contracted to do. He averred general and special damage, and that, in consequence of defendant’s failure aforesaid, he had paid to him for the corn delivered to him as aforesaid only the sum of $142 75, and has refused to make any" further payment on account of the damage sustained from the failure of said Burditt or of said Glasscock to comply with said contract. “ To the end, therefore, that said intervenor may not be compelled hereafter to litigate with said Burditt,” he prayed “to be permitted now to intervene, or in some other form known to the equitable rules of court to make himself a party to this suit, so that all the parties in interest, touching the matters complained of by the parties respectively, may he inquired into, and finally adjusted between them by the decree of this court.”
The defendant filed an answer to the petition of Hunter, substantially admitting the contract stated, and alleging that said Hunter had agreed to pay him 5 cents per bushel, if the corn should he by him (defendant) purchased at the price of 50 cents per bushel. He alleged that if he had made default in his contract with said intervenor, the same was occasioned by the failure and refusal of the plaintiff to comply with his contract. The answer prayed “ that if said defendant be held liable in damages to said Hunter, that he may recover like damages against said plaintiff, so far as the damages of said Hunter shall have resulted from said plaintiff’s failure to comply with his said contract.”
The plaintiff excepted, and moved to strike out the petition of intervention. The motion and exceptions were by the court sustained.
When the cause was called for trial, the defendant, on his first application for a continuance, offered his affidavit, to the effect following:
“ That he cannot safely go to trial in the above cause, at this term of the court, on account of the absence of Henry Kirchner and George Bowers, who are material witnesses for defendant in defense of his cause; that affiant has used due diligence to procure the attendance of said witnesses at this term of the court, by causing them to be duly subpoenaed, and by further tendering to said Kirchner his reasonable expenses and fees in money. Affiant expects to have said witnesses at the next term of this court. This application is not made for delay, but that justice may be done.”
The defendant, in further support of his motion to continue, before the ruling of the court thereupon, exhibited a subpoena, amongst the papers of the cause, directed to the sheriff of Travis county, commanding him to summon George T. Bowers and E. P. Hill, to appear at the term of court then in session, (begun on the 6th day of December, 1858,) in behalf of the defendant, to testify in this cause. Subpoena was returned served upon each of the witnesses on the 6th day of November, 1858, the day on which it was issued. The court overruled the application, “ because it did not appear that the witnesses, on account of whose absence the said continuance is sought, were citizens of -. this county or State; and it cannot, therefore, appear from said affidavit whether or not the defendant has used due diligence.” To which ruling the defendant excepted.
Verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of $254 37.
The appellant assigned as error the overruling of his motion to continue, the dismissal of the petition of intervention, and the refusal to grant to him a new trial.
Hamilton $ Sublett, for the appellant.
Flournoy Garter and JRóbards ¿f* Robarás, for the appellee.

Opinion:
Wheeler, 0. J.
—We are of opinion that the court did not _ err in sustaining the exceptions to the petition of the interven or. The intervenorwas not a party to the contract between the plaintiff and defendant. There was no privity between him and the plaintiff. His right of action against the defendant, if he have one, is upon an independent contract between himself and the defendant, distinct from that between the plaintiff and defendant on which the suit was brought. That cannot give him a right to intervene between the parties to this suit.
The ground mainly relied on for a reversal of the judgment, is the ruling of the court refusing a continuance. The application was held insufficient, because " it did not appear that the witnesses, on account of whose absence the continuance was sought, were citizens of the county or State." The residence of the witnesses was not stated. And it has been held, in repeated decisions, that this was necessary, to enable the court to determine whether proper diligence had been used to obtain their testimony. (11 Tex., 85; 17 Tex., 157.)
A witness, whose residence is not within the county or State, might be temporarily in the county where a cause is pending, and might be served with a subpoena while there, when it would not be his duty to obey the subpoena, and the party would have no right to expect his attendance at the trial.
There is no hardship in the requirement, that the party making the application shall state the residence of the witness. The rule, as we have seen, was long since announced, and there can be no reason why it should not be complied with by the party seeking a continuance on account of the absence of witnesses. It was not complied with in this case, and we are of opinion that the court did not err in refusing the application.
The judgment is aepirmed.