Case Name: James Jacobs et al., Appellants, v. Elizabeth A. Brock, as Executrix, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1965-09-23
Citations: 66 Wash. 2d 878
Docket Number: No. 37320
Parties: James Jacobs et al., Appellants, v. Elizabeth A. Brock, as Executrix, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 878–899

Head Matter:
[No. 37320.
En Banc.
September 23, 1965.]
James Jacobs et al., Appellants, v. Elizabeth A. Brock, as Executrix, Respondent.
Greenwood, Shiers & Kruse, by Leonard W. Kruse, for appellants.
Conniff, Harper & Taylor, for respondent.
Reported in 406 P.2d 17.

Opinion:
Hunter, J.
This is an action on a claim against the estate of a decedent for the reasonable value of services rendered and expenses paid in his behalf during the last 3 years of his life. Plaintiffs (appellants) are James and Beatrice Jacobs, husband and wife. The defendant (respondent) is Elizabeth A. Brock, executrix of the estate of the decedent, Dr. Harry M. Brock, who was a retired Port Angeles dentist.
Mrs. Jacobs' acquaintanceship with Dr. Brock dates back to the depression year of the '30s, when her parents, the Rands, rented a house from him. The tenancy lasted 7 to 8 years, and the Rands paid a monthly rental of $12.50 in services, as follows: Mrs. Rand did the family washing for Dr. and Mrs. Brock, including the washing for Dr. Brock's dental office, which he operated in his home; her sons gathered wood for the Brocks' furnace, and Mrs. Jacobs, then a schoolgirl, kept house for the Brocks. The Rands moved during the late '30s, and for the next 20 years Mrs. Jacobs saw little of the Brocks. She made several visits to the Brock home and stopped to give Dr. Brock a ride whenever she saw him walking home from down town Port Angeles. Mrs. Brock died in the early '40s, and thereafter, Dr. Brock lived alone.
In November, 1958, during one of Mrs. Jacobs' infrequent visits, she found Dr. Brock recovering from pneumonia and quite ill. Thereafter, and until his death February 7, 1962, she cared for him an average of 4 hours a day. In those 3 years Dr. Brock was racked with illness. He was unable to control his bladder, and in late 1960 he suffered a stroke. In the last year of his life he suffered from diarrhea, and a month before his death he underwent a urinary operation, following which he was bedridden. Mrs. Jacobs provided Dr. Brock intensive care during this month-long period. Among her duties, she was required to give him daily enemas.
Mrs. Jacobs served as Dr. Brock's nurse, housekeeper, and, occasionally, his provider during the 3 years. She did his washing in her own home, a task both monumental and unpleasant considering his elimination difficulties. (He wore diaper-type pads which required frequent changing.) She on occasion purchased food and other items for him with her own funds, prepared his meals, canned food for him, started the furnace, cared for his six cats, kept house, took him on various automobile excursions, shaved him and trimmed his toenails. Dr. Brock requested services by telephone, as often as twice a day.
At Dr. Brock's request, Mr. Jacobs expended a minimum of 26 hours in performance of odd jobs for decedent during the 3 years preceding decedent's death. These tasks included furnace, electrical and plumbing repairs, and cutting and hauling of wood at Dr. Brock's nearby Lake Crescent cabin.
The only gratuity Dr. Brock bestowed upon the Jacobs was the use of his lake cabin. Most of the furnishings in the cabin belonged to the Jacobs, but they rarely used the cabin for their own purposes. Mrs. Jacobs took decedent there frequently. The Jacobs never used the cabin more than a week at a time, and even on those occasions, Mrs. Jacobs remained in town to care for decedent.
The Jacobs never submitted a bill for services to Dr. Brock, but Mrs. Jacobs did expect compensation. She testified that she and decedent had a mutual understanding that the lake cabin was to be hers in return for the services. However, by terms of decedent's will, executed in 1956, the lake cabin and the bulk of the estate went to a great, great niece, Harlene Brock. This eventuality precipitated this suit.
The plaintiffs alleged four claims in their complaint: (1) For specific performance of an express or implied contract in which decedent had promised to either make an inter vivos conveyance of his lake cabin to plaintiffs or devise it to them, in return for their services; (2), or, in the alternative, for $11,540.53, the reasonable value of services rendered and expenses paid by plaintiffs in decedent's behalf, and at his request, during the 3 years preceding his death (for which a claim had been filed in the estate, and rejected); (3) that defendant executrix be ordered to produce and carry out a will memorandum which Mrs. Jacobs alleged had devised to her the lake cabin; and (4) for the return of plaintiffs' personalty at the lake cabin.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, as to claims one through three. Defendant conceded the validity of the fourth claim and returned the lake cabin personalty to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs conceded a failure of proof on their first claim, for specific performance, and consented to its dismissal. Plaintiffs did not assign error to dismissal of their third claim. The will did incorporate a memorandum by reference, but the memorandum was never found.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing claim number two, for reasonable value of services rendered and expenses paid in decedent's behalf. It therefore becomes the sole claim before us on plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal. Plaintiffs urge that an implied contract in fact existed for payment of such services and expenses. It is plaintiffs' contention that their evidence proves such a contract.
In granting a dismissal at the close of a plaintiff's evidence, as in this case, the trial court is not required to consider the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, as in a jury case. The trial judge, as a trier of the facts, may or may not weigh the evidence. Before considering the testimony introduced we must then determine what the trial court did in this instance. In Richards v. Kuppinger, 46 Wn.2d 62, 278 P.2d 395 (1955), we laid down the rule for making this determination:
In determining whether the trial court has weighed the evidence or has treated plaintiff's evidence as true, and has given him the benefit of the most favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom, this court looks first to the trial court's oral or memorandum opinion. O'Brien v. Schultz, 45 Wn. (2d) 769, 278 P. (2d) 322, Grichuhin v. Grichuhin, 44 Wn. (2d) 914, 272 P. (2d) 141. If the trial court's opinion discloses that it treated plaintiff's evidence as true and held, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has not established a prima facie case, findings of fact are unnecessary. In such case, our review of the evidence is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to establish a prima facie case for plaintiff. (Italics ours.)
In examining the trial court's oral opinion we find nothing that indicates the testimony of the witnesses was disbelieved, or that the trial court weighed the evidence. To the contrary, it appears the motion for dismissal was granted on the ground that treating the plaintiffs' evidence as true it was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. We thus may review the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom to establish a prima facie case for plaintiffs. Richards v. Kuppinger, supra.
The trial court entered limited findings in its order of dismissal and concluded from the record that a reciprocal course of conduct of kindness and favors was extended between the decedent and the plaintiffs for many years and that the decedent, therefore, was not incurring a financial obligation by accepting the plaintiffs' services. If such a reciprocal course of conduct is supported in the record, then plaintiffs will be unable to prove an implied contract in fact. See Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wn.2d 87, 309 P.2d 380 (1957); Johnson v. Suddreth's Estate, 59 Wn.2d 517, 368 P.2d 907 (1962).
It is the plaintiffs' contention that the record does not support reciprocal conduct and that no services were furnished by the decedent to the plaintiffs which were of any substance in this case. We agree. We have heretofore detailed the facts as to the favors extended by the decedent. The only evidence showing a benefit running from the decedent to the plaintiffs was that the decedent had afforded the plaintiffs the use of his lake cabin, which was rarely visited by them. The defendant's answer affirmatively alleges reciprocal conduct on the part of the decedent, but there is no evidence in the record to support the allegation. The furnishing of the house to Mrs. Jacobs' parents in the '30s for a monthly rental of $12.50 was paid through the rendering of household services to the Brocks. Even if considered in the nature of a gratuity extended to the Rands, such did not run to the Jacobs. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding from the record that reciprocal benefits existed. The benefits flowed in one direction — from plaintiffs to decedent.
Having concluded that there were no reciprocal benefits, the issue remaining for our determination is whether the record will support plaintiffs' contention that an implied contract in fact existed to pay the reasonable value of plaintiffs' services and expenses. The guidelines for making this determination are well established in this state:
In Johnson v. Suddreth's Estate, supra, we stated:
The rule governing the disposition of this appeal is succinctly set forth in Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wn. (2d) 87, 91, 309 P. (2d) 380 (1957):
"A party seeking to establish a claim against an estate for services rendered to the decedent during his or her lifetime has the burden of proving a contract, express or implied, to pay for the services; and the evidence to support such claim must be clear, cogent, and convincing. Ross v. Raymer, supra [32 Wn. (2d) 128, 201 P. (2d) 129 (1948)].
"An implied contract is an agreement depending for its existence on some act or conduct of the party sought to be charged and arising by implication from circumstances which, according to common understanding, show a mutual intention on the part of the parties to contract with each other. The services must be rendered under such circumstances as to indicate that the person rendering them expected to be paid therefor, and that the recipient expected, or should have expected to pay for them (Italics ours.)
This court has adopted the following rule, as stated in 71 C.J., Work and Labor § 6, 41, 42 (98 C.J.S. Work and Labor § 8):
if the recipient of services should, as a reasonable man, have understood that the performer expected compensation, the actual belief of the recipient as to such matter is immaterial. (Italics ours.) Kellogg v. Gleeson, 27 Wn. (2d) 501, 178 P. (2d) 969 (1947); Ross v. Raymer, supra; Western Asphalt Co. v. Valle, 25 Wn. (2d) 428, 171 P. (2d) 159 (1946).
In Western Asphalt we quoted with approval the following language of Chief Justice Holmes in Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N.E. 947 (1902):
"Of course it does not matter whether the defendant expected to pay for the services or not, the question is as to the natural import of his overt acts. . . . Again, it is not necessary that the defendant should have believed that the plaintiff expected pay. If as a reasonable man he should have understood from what he knew that such was the expectation, he would be bound by accepting the services. . . . [Italics ours.]"
In Hardung v. Green, 40 Wn.2d 595, 244 P.2d 1163 (1952), we stated:
where there is a lack of mutuality in the benefits received, a promise to pay will be implied. Allerton v. Allerton, 133 Wash. 260, 266, 233 Pac. 632 (1925).
In Suddreth, supra, quoting from Hardung v. Green, supra, we stated:
"The general rule seems to be that, in the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests another to perform services of value for him thereby bargains and by implication agrees to pay for such services. Restatement, Restitution, § 107 (2); Cramer v. Clark, 121 Wash. 507, 209 Pac. 688, 24 A.L.R. 970."
In the instant case, there was a lack of mutuality of benefits. A promise to pay was therefore implied. Hardung v. Green, supra. The evidence in the record further shows that the services were requested, which also raised a promise to pay. Johnson v. Suddreth's Estate, supra.
In Suddreth, under similar facts, plaintiff proved an implied contract in fact existed to pay reasonable value of services. To substantiate the existence of mutual assent, we said:
The duties Mrs. Johnson performed during decedent's terminal illness were beyond the scope of neighborly concern and helpfulness.
The degree of services Mrs. Jacobs performed, considering the unpleasant nature involved, far outweighs those plaintiff performed in the Suddreth case. The statement in Suddreth that such services were beyond the scope of neighborly concern and helpfulness thus applies even more in the case at bar in establishing mutual assent. The evidence shows that plaintiff wife expected compensation for her services, and in view of the circumstances, decedent, as a reasonable man, should have viewed her conduct as an offer and by accepting her services should have expected to pay. Johnson v. Suddreth's Estate, Kellogg v. Gleeson, Ross v. Raymer, Western Asphalt Co. v. Valle, Spencer v. Spencer, supra. See Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 24, 28 (1959).
Under the facts of this case, it seems plain that the requirements for an implied contract in fact were established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
The defendant argues that the fact that no demand for payment for such services and expenses was made during the decedent's lifetime is fatal to plaintiffs' claim. This argument is answered in the record. There was no reason for the plaintiffs to request payment for their services and expenses during the decedent's lifetime, in view of Mrs. Jacobs' understanding with decedent that compensation was to be the lake property. Mrs. Jacobs testified on direct examination, without objection:
Q. Mrs. Jacobs, in rendering the services you did to Dr. Brock, I will ask you whether or not you did them with the expectation of being paid for them? . . . A. Yes, I did expect pay, in respect to the place at the lake. . . . Q. Why didn't you give him [Dr. Brock] any statement or billing? A. Our understanding was the place at the lake was to be mine.
Under such circumstances, where a contract for payment of the reasonable value of services may be implied, recovery for compensation may be had in an action at law where no provision is made for the expected legacy. The rule is correctly stated in 57 Am. Jur. § 179:
If services are rendered to a person at his request, made under such circumstances that a promise to compensate therefor may be implied, he is liable therefor, even though they were renderd in expectation of a legacy. (Italics ours.)
This statement is supported by In re Murphy's Estate, 110 Colo. 304, 134 P.2d 199 (1943); Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161, 169 (1872). See Giering v. Sauer, 120 Md. 295, 87 Atl. 774 (1913). Also see 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 370f, cited in Johnson v. Nasi, supra; Annot., 54 A.L.R. 548.
Therefore, on the evidence in the record, plaintiffs made out a prima facie case, and the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss their claim for reasonable value of services and expenses. The cause should be remanded for a new trial on this issue.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of one Juanita Jacobs (not related to plaintiffs), on the ground that she was not qualified as an expert witness. We agree. The trial court manifestly abused its discretion. The witness had operated nursing homes for more than 10 years and was well acquainted with the reasonable value of the nursing care tendered the dece dent by the plaintiff wife. She was therefore qualified to testify as an expert witness in regard to such services.
In view of the remand, our consideration of the remaining issues raised is unnecessary.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed as to claim number two, and the cause is remanded for a new trial thereon. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
Finley, Weaver, Hamilton and Hale, JJ., concur.