Case Name: Isaias Lorenzo LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2019-05-22
Citations: 925 F.3d 396
Docket Number: No. 15-72406
Parties: Isaias Lorenzo LOPEZ, Petitioner,
v.
William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 925
Pages: 396–410

Head Matter:
Isaias Lorenzo LOPEZ, Petitioner,
v.
William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 15-72406
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted February 12, 2019 Pasadena, California
Filed May 22, 2019

Opinion:
KORMAN, District Judge:
Isaias Lorenzo Lopez was born in Oaxaca, Mexico in 1984. In September 1998, when he was fourteen years old, he arrived in the United States to be with his father, a lawful permanent resident ("LPR"). Lorenzo was paroled into the United States and, two years later, on February 12, 2002, he became an LPR. While in the United States, Lorenzo graduated from high school, receiving good grades while working to support his family. After graduating, he continued to work six days a week on a farm to support his two U.S. citizen children and their mother.
But his record, which includes two misdemeanor convictions for which he served a total of 10 days in jail, is not unblemished. This case arises out of a separate incident that occurred on March 14, 2008: Lorenzo agreed to help Adriana Lopez Estevez enter the United States illegally by furnishing her with a U.S. citizen's birth certificate and driving to Tijuana to pick her up. When they attempted to return to the United States through the San Ysidro port of entry, border agents discovered that Adriana was not actually a U.S. citizen and had no documents authorizing her entry into the country. The agents arrested Lorenzo, and he confessed to attempting to assist Adriana to enter the United States because he felt pity for her. Immediately following his arrest, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") commenced removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear and serving it on Lorenzo.
At his removal proceeding, Lorenzo sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) based on his LPR status. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an LPR must, among other requirements, "reside[ ] in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). The IJ concluded that Lorenzo was admitted in February 2002 when he became an LPR and that the March 2008 Notice to Appear terminated his residence period. Because Lorenzo had resided in the United States for only six years and one month, he was deemed ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the IJ's decision. Lorenzo appealed.
While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions , - U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018). Pereira held that, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), a Notice to Appear must contain "[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held," and that such definition applies wherever the term is used. Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2116. Because an alien's residence is terminated by service of a "notice to appear under section 1229(a)," 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), absent time and place information, a purported Notice to Appear may not trigger the "stop-time" provision. Id. at 2110. Because the Notice to Appear issued to Lorenzo did not contain that information, it was defective and did not trigger the stop-time provision. Nevertheless, in April 2008, the Immigration Court advised Lorenzo of the time, date, and location of his proceeding by issuing a separate document labeled "Notice of Hearing." In light of Pereira , we ordered supplemental briefing on "[w]hether a Notice of Hearing that contains the time and place at which an alien must appear cures a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira v. Sessions , - U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018), such that the 'stop-time' rule is triggered upon receipt of the Notice of Hearing."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review questions of law, such as "the interpretation and construction of statutes," de novo, Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. , 258 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2001), "except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA's determination of the governing statutes and regulations." Aragon-Salazar v. Holder , 769 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 2014). "Questions of law that can be answered with 'traditional tools of statutory construction' are within the special expertise of courts, not agencies, and are therefore answered by the court de novo." Ayala-Chavez v. INS , 945 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) ), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Urbina-Mauricio v. INS , 989 F.2d 1085, 1088 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). If "the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
DISCUSSION
Section 1229b(a) provides for "[c]ancellation of removal for certain permanent residents" who satisfy three prerequisites: "the alien (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). As to the second requirement, two events may terminate an alien's residence, even if he still lives in the country: service of a Notice to Appear under Section 1229(a), or commission of "an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . that renders the alien inadmissible . or removable." Id. § 1229b(d)(1) (the "stop-time" rule); see also Nguyen v. Sessions , 901 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2018). Only the former is relevant here.
To trigger the stop-time rule, a Notice to Appear must contain all items listed in Section 1229(a)(1), including the date, time, and place of the removal proceeding. Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2113-14. Although "much of the information Section 1229(a)(1) calls for does not change and is therefore included in standardized language on the I-862 notice-to-appear form," "time-and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from case to case." Id. at 2113 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Pereira focused its analysis on the omission of that information, ultimately holding that "[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings is not a 'notice to appear under section 1229(a),' and so does not trigger the stop-time rule." Id. at 2113-14 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) ). Under Pereira , the Notice to Appear Lorenzo received in March 2008 did not terminate his residence. The Notice of Hearing he subsequently received in April 2008 contained the time and place of his removal proceeding but did not contain many of the other requirements of a Notice to Appear. Nevertheless, relying on our holding in Popa v. Holder , 571 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2009), the Attorney General argues that this Notice of Hearing cured the defective Notice to Appear and triggered the stop-time provision.
The plain language of the statute forecloses such a result. Popa 's holding that "a Notice to Appear that fails to include the date and time of an alien's deportation hearing, but that states that a date and time will be set later, is not defective so long as a notice of the hearing is in fact later sent to the alien" rested on three grounds. Popa , 571 F.3d at 896. These grounds have been "undercut" by Pereira such that "the cases are clearly irreconcilable." Miller v. Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Thus, we reject Popa "as having been effectively overruled." Id.
First, Popa explained that we "silently . adopted the rule that the time and date of a removal proceeding can be sent after the first notice to appear" because we "never held that the [Notice to Appear] cannot state that the time and place of the proceedings will be set at a future time." 571 F.3d at 895 (emphasis added). Putting aside the propriety of adopting rules through judicial silence, Pereira resoundingly rejected what Popa deemed "silently adopted." Pereira , like Popa , involved a Notice to Appear ordering the alien to appear at a time and date "to be set." 138 S. Ct. at 2112 (emphasis omitted). But the Supreme Court held that a notice lacking specific time and date information is "not a notice to appear." Id. at 2118 (quotation marks omitted).
More precisely-indeed, more compellingly-the Supreme Court held that "when the term 'notice to appear' is used elsewhere in the statutory section, including as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it the substantive time-and-place criteria required by § 1229(a)." Id. at 2116. Unlike Popa , this holding relies on unambiguous statutory language. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) provides that "any period of continuous residence . shall be deemed to end . when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)," incorporating the definition of a Notice to Appear found in Section 1229(a), which includes information regarding the "time and place" of the hearing. Id. § 1229(a). In other words, any document containing less than the full set of requirements listed in Section 1229(a)(1) is not a Notice to Appear within the meaning of the statute-regardless of how it is labeled by DHS-and does not terminate an alien's residence. While Popa held that a Notice to Appear that states "the time and place of the proceedings will be set at a future time," is "not statutorily defective," 571 F.3d at 894-96, Pereira makes clear that it is.
Second, Popa relied on now-outmoded out-of-circuit case law in adopting a "two-step notice procedure." See id. at 895-96 (citing Gomez-Palacios v. Holder , 560 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2009) ; Dababneh v. Gonzales , 471 F.3d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2006) ; Haider v. Gonzales , 438 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) ). Each of the three decisions upon which Popa relied were issued before Pereira , and none binds us today. More importantly, none of these cases comports with the unambiguous statutory text. Haider held that the law "simply requires that an alien be provided written notice of his hearing; it does not require that the [Notice to Appear] served on Haider satisfy all of § 1229(a)(1)'s notice requirements." 438 F.3d at 907. This is flatly wrong. As Pereira explained, the term "Notice to Appear" carries with it all of Section 1229(a)(1)'s notice requirements wherever it appears. Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2116. Dababneh , in turn, relied on Haider and certain inapposite regulations, discussed below, rather than the statute. 471 F.3d at 809. And Gomez-Palacios merely concluded "that information may be provided in a subsequent [ Notice of Hearing]," primarily relying on Haider and Dababneh . 560 F.3d at 359. Popa likewise hung its hat on Haider 's faulty premise. See Popa , 571 F.3d at 895-96.
Third, the final ground undergirding Popa was a regulation-namely, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18. That provision requires that DHS
provide in the Notice to Appear, the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing, where practicable . If that information is not contained in the Notice to Appear, the Immigration Court shall be responsible for scheduling the initial removal hearing and providing notice . of the time, place, and date of hearing.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) (emphasis added). We reasoned that such a regulation is necessary "[b]ecause circumstances may arise in which it is not feasible . to state the date, time, and place of a removal hearing at the time the [Notice to Appear] is sent." Popa , 571 F.3d at 896. Pereira rejected this rationale, see 138 S. Ct. at 2118-19, and we have acknowledged that " Pereira appears to discount the relevance of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 in the . context of eligibility for cancellation of removal." Karingithi v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 1158, 1160 n.1 (9th Cir. 2019).
In any event, the regulation rewrites the statute. As an initial matter, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 does not, on its face, relate to the stop-time rule. It pertains to scheduling cases and providing notice, implicating the stop-time rule only to the extent it purports to alter the requirements of a Notice to Appear. But the statute already enumerates what a Notice to Appear must contain. Even if we agreed with DHS that it makes sense to only issue time and place information "where practicable," neither we nor DHS can override the clear statutory command that time and place information be included in all Notices to Appear. Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2118-19 ; see also Comm'r v. Asphalt Prods. Co. , 482 U.S. 117, 121, 107 S.Ct. 2275, 96 L.Ed.2d 97 (1987) (per curiam) ("Judicial perception that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided.").
Moreover, the Supreme Court scrapped the notion that "practical considerations"-namely, that DHS may not be able to access the Immigration Court's calendar and properly schedule proceedings when it issues a Notice to Appear-excuse the failure to provide "specific time, date, and place" information. Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2118-19. Such "considerations . do not justify departing from the statute's clear text." Id . at 2118. Yet Popa did just that. We cannot now rely on those same considerations to advance a policy other than what Congress passed and the President signed. See Xi v. INS , 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] decision to [rearrange] or rewrite the statute falls within the legislative, not the judicial, prerogative."). Nor may DHS displace legislation with regulation. See League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren , 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) ("An agency simply may not interpret a regulation in a way that contravenes a statute.").
The Attorney General charts his course around the statute by arguing that a Notice of Hearing may cure a defective Notice to Appear. The phrase "notice of hearing"-or anything resembling it-does not appear in the law. Rather, the statute refers to a "notice to appear" and a "notice of change in time or place of proceedings" and delineates when each document may be issued and what it must contain. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) ; see also Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2114. Nevertheless, the Attorney General counters that the law is silent on whether the required notice must consist of one document or if it may consist of multiple documents that collectively contain the necessary information.
Far from silent, the statute speaks clearly: residence is terminated "when the alien is served a notice to appear." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (emphasis added). The use of the singular indicates that service of a single document-not multiple-triggers the stop-time rule. Cf. United States v. Hayes , 555 U.S. 415, 421, 129 S.Ct. 1079, 172 L.Ed.2d 816 (2009) ("We note as an initial matter that [the statute] uses the word 'element' in the singular, which suggests that Congress intended to describe only one required element."); Delgado v. Holder , 648 F.3d 1095, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("The singular article 'a' could not make any clearer the singular nature of 'a particularly serious crime': the agency must identify one offense of conviction .").
Rather than contending, as the Attorney General does, that the statute is silent, the dissent argues that the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, requires all references to "a notice" or "the notice" in the statute be read as referring to both the singular and the plural, thus permitting multiple documents to collectively satisfy the requirements of a Notice to Appear. We reject this position for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has held that reliance on the Dictionary Act's rule regarding "words importing the singular," 1 U.S.C. § 1, is appropriate only "[o]n the rare occasions when . doing so [is] 'necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute.' " Hayes , 555 U.S. at 422 n.5, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (quoting First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri , 263 U.S. 640, 657, 44 S.Ct. 213, 68 L.Ed. 486 (1924) ). The "essential function of a notice to appear" is to "[c]onvey[ ] . time-and-place information to a noncitizen" and "facilitate appearance at [the] proceedings." Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2115. A single, complete Notice to Appear achieves that aim, so resort to the Dictionary Act's singular/plural rule and attendant context-driven guidance is unnecessary. Second, reading Section 1229b as the dissent does, the stop-time provision would be triggered "when the alien is served notices to appear under section 1229(a)." Nevertheless, no matter how many documents are sent, none qualifies as a "notice to appear" unless it contains the information Section 1229(a) prescribes. See Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2110.
The BIA has reached a conclusion contrary to our holding. Over a vigorous dissent, a closely divided BIA held that "where a notice to appear does not specify the time or place of an alien's initial removal hearing, the subsequent service of a notice of hearing containing that information perfects the deficient notice to appear, triggers the 'stop-time' rule, and ends the alien's period of continuous residence or physical presence in the United States." Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez , 27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (BIA 2019) (en banc). We do not defer to this conclusion for three reasons.
First, the threshold issue addressed by the BIA was whether Pereira definitively resolved whether "subsequent service of a notice of hearing containing [time and place] information perfects the deficient notice to appear, trigger[ing] the 'stop-time' rule." Id. The BIA acknowledged that " Pereira can be . read in a literal sense to reach a different result," i.e. , a result contrary to the BIA's ultimate holding. Id. Nevertheless, the BIA rejected such a "literal reading" and now the Attorney General invites us to defer to the BIA's conclusion. But "a reviewing court should defer to an administrative agency only in those areas where that agency has particular expertise." Ayala-Chavez , 945 F.2d at 294. "There is therefore no reason for courts-the supposed experts in analyzing judicial decisions-to defer to agency interpretations of the Court's opinions." Akins v. FEC , 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated on other grounds by FEC v. Akins , 524 U.S. 11, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998). Accordingly, we do not accord Chevron deference to the BIA's reading of Pereira .
Second, the BIA's analysis is disingenuous. Pereira did not merely "include[ ] language stating that a notice lacking the specific time and place of the removal proceeding does not equate to a notice to appear under [ Section 1229(a)(1) ]." Mendoza-Hernandez , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 529-30. Rather, the Supreme Court held that Section 1229(a)(1)defines what a notice to appear is, and that the definition is imported every time the term "notice to appear" is used in the statute-especially when it is used in the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), which refers to "a notice to appear under section 1229(a)." Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2116. The BIA ignored the plain text of the statute, violating a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation: "The inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. , 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). More than that, the BIA disregarded the Supreme Court's holding construing the statute in accordance with its plain language.
As the dissenting opinion in Mendoza-Hernandez explained:
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pereira . leaves little room for doubt that the Court's decision requires us to follow the plain language of the Act that the DHS must serve a [ 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) ] "notice to appear" that includes the date, time, and place of hearing in order to trigger the "stop-time" rule. The Court in Pereira repeatedly emphasized the "plain text" of the "stop-time" rule and left no room for agency gap-filling as to whether an Immigration Court can "complete" or "cure" a putative "notice to appear" by subsequent issuance of a "notice of hearing" that would trigger the "stop-time" rule on the date of that event. Quite simply, . a "notice of hearing" is not a "notice to appear" and, therefore, it does not satisfy the requirement that the DHS serve a [ Section 1229(a)(1) ] "notice to appear" that specifies the date and time of hearing, in order to trigger the "stop-time" rule.
27 I. & N. Dec. at 540-41 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). This rationale accords with our holding above and the plain language of the statute. The lack of ambiguity in the statutory language provides us with yet another reason to "not resort to Chevron deference," Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2113, and to not accord any deference to the BIA's contrary holding, as it was unmoored from the text, see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. , 545 U.S. 967, 982-83, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005). In so holding, we follow the lead of the Supreme Court's recent decision in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos , - U.S. -, 139 S. Ct. 893, 899, 203 L.Ed.2d 160 (2019), which interpreted a statute as we do here-relying on cross-references to similar terms across provisions-without any reference to the agency's interpretation of the same provision.
Third, to the extent the BIA relied upon the Third Circuit's holding in Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General , 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2016), or other similar holdings such as Popa , those cases cannot be reconciled with Pereira . The BIA cannot rely on abrogated decisions in hopes of securing deference from the very courts that issued the now-defunct precedent. Such an approach would be hopelessly circular. Moreover, the BIA presumes that because the issue of whether a " 'perfected' notice to appear" may stop time "was not before the Court," prior decisions interpreting the stop-time rule were unaffected by Pereira . Mendoza-Hernandez , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 530. The BIA reads too much into the Court's judicial restraint and fails to recognize that none of these pre- Pereira decisions "take into account the Supreme Court's determination that the 'stop-time' rule contains plain and unambiguous language" that the " 'stop-time' rule is triggered by service of a . 'notice to appear' that specifies the time and place of a hearing as an essential part of the charging document." Id. at 541-43 (dissenting opinion). Thus, we agree with the dissenters in Mendoza-Hernandez and accord no deference to the BIA's flawed analysis.
Skirting the statutory text, the Attorney General points to purportedly analogous areas of law where an initial defect may be cured by a litigant's subsequent acts. For instance, Becker v. Montgomery held that an unsigned notice of appeal is timely if signed after the time to appeal has expired. 532 U.S. 757, 760, 121 S.Ct. 1801, 149 L.Ed.2d 983 (2001). But Pereira distinguished Becker , explaining that "omission of time-and-place information is not . some trivial, ministerial defect, akin to an unsigned notice of appeal. Failing to specify integral information like the time and place of removal proceedings unquestionably would deprive the notice to appear of its essential character." Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2116-17 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Similarly, in Scarborough v. Principi , the Supreme Court held that amendment of a timely application that failed to include a necessary allegation was permissible because the rule requiring specific allegations was aimed, like the signature requirement in Becker , "at stemming the urge to litigate irresponsibly." 541 U.S. 401, 416, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004) (quoting Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll. , 535 U.S. 106, 116, 122 S.Ct. 1145, 152 L.Ed.2d 188 (2002) ). The Scarborough Court went on to explain that "the allegation does not serve an essential notice-giving function," and so curative amendment was appropriate. Id. at 416-17, 124 S.Ct. 1856.
Conversely, the primary function of a Notice to Appear is to give notice, which is essential to the removal proceeding, Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2114-15, so the Attorney General's reliance on Becker , Scarborough , and Edelman is misplaced. Each of those cases allowed litigants to correct trivial or ministerial errors. The requirements of a Notice to Appear, however, are "substantive." Id. at 2116. Substantive defects may not be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing that likewise fails to conform with the substantive requirements of Section 1229(a)(1). As nothing precludes DHS from issuing a Notice to Appear that conforms to the statutory definition, that is the appropriate course of action for the agency to follow in such situations.
DHS's ability to issue a Notice that complies with the statute limits the set of cases affected by our holding. Retrospectively, although nearly all Notices to Appear issued between 2015 and 2018 lacked time and date information, see Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2111, the Attorney General conceded at oral argument that DHS can reissue complete Notices to Appear to those who have been served defective ones. The cases most affected by our holding will be those where a defective Notice to Appear issued so near to when an alien attained the requisite years of residence that DHS cannot reissue a complete Notice to Appear before the statutory period elapses. Prospectively, the Supreme Court noted that software exists that would enable DHS and the Immigration Court to "schedule hearings before sending notices to appear." Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2119.
In a final attempt to salvage his argument, the Attorney General suggests that Karingithi should inform our decision. But Karingithi addressed whether a defective Notice to Appear vests the Immigration Court with jurisdiction. Karingithi , 913 F.3d at 1160-61. It did not address whether a Notice of Hearing can cure a defective Notice to Appear. Instead, we held that because a regulation properly governs what a notice must contain to vest jurisdiction, the statutory definition of a Notice to Appear did not control. Id. at 1161. As we explained, " Pereira simply has no application [to the Immigration Court's jurisdiction]. . [T]he only question [in Pereira ] was whether the petitioner was eligible for cancellation of removal." Id . But our decision here is based on the statute's text, not a regulation, and we are assessing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Finally, the dicta from the Eleventh Circuit's unpublished non-precedential opinion in Molina-Guillen v. U.S. Attorney General , 758 Fed.Appx. 893 (11th Cir. 2019), does not alter our conclusion. Not only had the petitioner abandoned the argument that a Notice of Hearing cannot cure a defective Notice to Appear, but Molina-Guillen does not engage the statutory text. Id. at 898. It merely notes that a subsequent "Notice of Hearing, which contained the date and time of the removal hearing, was served on Molina-Guillen . Together, the December 2005 Notice to Appear and the March 2006 Notice of Hearing fulfilled the notice requirements in § 1229(a)(1)." Id. We are unpersuaded by this cursory analysis.
CONCLUSION
We hold that a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira cannot be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing. The law does not permit multiple documents to collectively satisfy the requirements of a Notice to Appear. Thus, Lorenzo never received a valid Notice to Appear and his residency continued beyond 2008. Accordingly, he has resided in the United States for over seven years and is eligible for cancellation of removal.
Because we hold that Lorenzo's residence was not terminated, there is no need to opine on his other arguments. Moreover, the question presented here is purely legal, so remand to consider the impact of Pereira is unwarranted. See Ceguerra v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[A] purely legal inquiry . does not require remand."); see also Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey , 542 F.3d 653, 658 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to remand where "no additional information would be available that previously was not" and the panel "can resolve the legal question on the basis of available evidence"). Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review.