Case Name: Paul Herbert WEDIN v. Irene Anne WEDIN
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1997-05-07
Citations: 57 Ark. App. 203
Docket Number: CA 96-236
Parties: Paul Herbert WEDIN v. Irene Anne WEDIN
Judges: Robbins, C.J., Bird, and Roaf, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 203–215

Head Matter:
Paul Herbert WEDIN v. Irene Anne WEDIN
CA 96-236
944 S.W.2d 847
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions III and IV
Opinion delivered May 7, 1997
[P etition for rehearing denied June 18, 1997.]
Street, Seay & Caldwell, P.L.L.C., by: Theresa L. Caldwell, for appellant.
Deborah A. Knox, for appellee.

Opinion:
John E. Jennings, Judge.
Paul and Irene Wedin were married in 1963 and separated in July 1993. In September 1993 appellant filed suit for divorce in Baxter County Chancery Court. On October 14 the parties signed a property settlement agreement. The agreement provided: "Appellant will further divide with appellee any inheritance of personal property he may receive in the future from the Estate of Lucretta Wedin."
Lucretta Wedin, appellant's mother, died on October 25, 1993. On November 3, 1993, appellant was granted a divorce and the property settlement agreement signed by the parties was approved.
In January 1995 the appellee filed a petition in chancery to enforce the terms of the property settlement agreement and the trial court held a hearing focusing on the parties' differing interpretations of the clause at issue. It was shown that Lucretta Wedin had, on August 6, 1993, executed a trust agreement through which she placed virtually all her assets in an inter vivos trust. In the trust indenture she named herself as a trustee. Appellant and his sister, Jacqueline Cathers-Collision, were named co-trustees and were the sole beneficiaries of the trust. Lucretta Wedin's will, also dated August 6, 1993, left all her property to the trust. At her death the value of her property subject to probate was $600.00.
The appellee testified that during settlement discussions appellant told her that he was going to give her half of what he got from his mother. Appellant told her that the estate was valued at approximately $600,000.00 and that there would be about $190,000.00 in estate taxes payable. She testified that she had worked as a secretary in a law office but did not seek legal advice about the terms of the property setdement agreement. She testified that she was aware that some of Lucretta Wedin's property was in trust and understood that that property was included in appellant's inheritance.
Appellant testified that he did tell the appellee that he was going to split everything he got from his mother with her. He conceded that he told her that the total would be approximately $600,000.00 and that she would receive one-half of his one-half share. He received a little more than $200,000.00. He testified that appellee was aware that the trust existed.
He also testified however that he intended the clause to mean that appellee would receive only a share of the property he received through his mother's will. He further testified that he did not tell the appellee that the trust property would not be included and that if she had a misunderstanding about the agreement, he did nothing to correct it. At the time of the hearing appellant had paid appellee some $23,000.00 but took the position that this was a gift and that he was obligated to pay no more than half of the $600.00 he received through his mother's will.
The chancellor found that the phrase "The Estate of Lucretta Wedin" was ambiguous. The chancellor also found that appellant stood in a confidential relationship to the appellee. Relying on our decision in Undem v. First National Bank, 46 Ark. App. 158, 879 S.W.2d 451 (1994), the chancellor held that appellant was estopped to argue that the trust assets were not included in his agreement.
On appeal to this court appellant contends that the chancellor erred in holding that the language of the clause in question was ambiguous, erred in finding that appellant had a duty to advise the appellee as to the meaning of the clause, and erred in effectively granting reformation of the agreement. We find no error and affirm. Chancery cases are reviewed de novo on appeal. Lyons v. Lyons, 13 Ark. App. 63, 679 S.W.2d 811 (1984). We do not reverse the findings of the chancefior unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Kunz v. Jarnigan, 25 Ark. App. 221, 756 S.W.2d 913 (1988). If the chancellor reached the right result, we will affirm even if we disagree with the court's reasoning. Durham v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995).
Appellant contends that the clause in the property settlement agreement is unambiguous. While he does not argue that the word "estate" is unambiguous, he contends that the word "inheritance" is. He relies on Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "inheritance" as "property which descends to an heir on the intestate death of another."
The initial determination of the existence of an ambiguity rests with the court. C. & A. Constr. Co. v. Benning Constr. Co., 256 Ark. 621, 509 S.W.2d 302 (1974). If an ambiguity exists, then the true intention of the parties must be determined and the meaning of the term becomes a question of fact. See C. & A. Constr. Co., supra; Jones v. Jones, 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988). Black's Law Dictionary defines "estate" as "the degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a per son has in real and personal property." Black's Law Dictionary 490 (5th ed. 1979). The standard dictionary definitions are similar: "1. A landed property, usually of considerable size. 2. The whole of one's possessions, esp. all of the property and debts left by a dead person. 3. Law. The nature and extent of an owner's rights with respect to his property." American Heritage Dictionary 466 (2nd College ed. 1982). It has been said that "the word 'estate' does not impart a legal entity." Hansen v. Stanton, 177 Wash. 257, 31 P.2d 903 (1934).
Similarly, the word "inherit" is not unambiguous. While Black's gives as a definition, "to take by inheritance; to take as heir on death of an ancestor," it notes that the word is also used in its popular sense as the equivalent of to take or receive. Black's Law Dictionary 704 (5th ed. 1979). The American Heritage Dictionary defines inherit as: "1. To come into possession of; possess. 2. To receive (property) from an ancestor or another person by legal succession or will."
When we consider the prior discussions of the parties it is reasonably clear that they meant that appellant would share with the appellee that which he received from his mother's property after her death.
We would reach the same conclusion under section 201 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) That party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party.
Under our view of the case it is not necessary to consider the question of estoppel or the chancellor's application of the principles stated in our decision in Undem v. First National Bank, supra. Finally, we do not agree that either the chancellor's holding, or our own, amounts to a reformation of the parties' agreement. The chancellor's holding was that appellant was estopped from contesting the appellee's interpretation of their agreement. Our holding is that the appellee's interpretation conforms to the intention of the parties, as manifested by their words and actions.
For the reasons stated the decision of the chancellor is affirmed.
Robbins, C.J., Bird, and Roaf, JJ., agree.
Griffen and Neal, JJ., dissent.