Case Name: Edward KILLEBREW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2010-04-06
Citations: 925 N.E.2d 399
Docket Number: No. 49A05-0905-CR-246
Parties: Edward KILLEBREW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Judges: BROWN, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 925
Pages: 399–405

Head Matter:
Edward KILLEBREW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 49A05-0905-CR-246.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
April 6, 2010.
Transfer Denied June 17, 2010.
John Pinnow, Greenwood, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BARNES, Judge.
Case Summary
Edward Killebrew appeals his convictions for Class B felony dealing in cocaine and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We reverse and remand.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying Killebrew's objection to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike all African-Americans from the jury venire.
Facts
On August 14, 2008, the State charged Killebrew, an African-American, with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class B felony possession of cocaine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Jury selection for Killebrew's trial in Marion County was held on March 10, 2009. Five African-Americans were called as part of the jury venire, and the State utilized peremptory challenges to strike all five of them. The State struck M.O. because a criminal background check revealed she had been the subject of five police reports, and it struck K.M. because he was a convicted felon. The State struck A.S. because she was a nurse, and the deputy prosecutor asserted he had a policy of always striking nurses because they were too compassionate. D.R. was stricken after he said his great-nephew had been convicted of drug dealing and he believed the police had acted unfairly in that case; by contrast, a white juror who was not stricken had asserted on his jury questionnaire that he thought his cousin had been unfairly convicted of a crime, and that he did not think he could be a fair and impartial juror. Finally, the State struck L.S., asserting that he had been too "emphatic" in agreeing with how defense counsel had described the State's burden of proof in criminal cases. 'I'r. p. 449. Kille-brew objected to these strikes, in particular those of D.R. and L.S., as being racially discriminatory in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court overruled the objection and proceeded to trial.
The jury found Killebrew guilty of Class B felony dealing in cocaine as a lesser-included offense of the A felony charge, Class B felony possession of cocaine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court did not enter judgment of conviction on the possession of cocaine guilty verdict and proceeded to sentence Killebrew for the other two charges. Killebrew now appeals.
Analysis
Killebrew's sole challenge to his convictions is that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson objection. The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Ind.2008), (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69), cert. denied.
The Batson Court developed a three-step test to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been used improperly to disqualify a potential juror on the basis of race. First, the party contesting the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of race. See-ond, after the contesting party makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the party exercising its peremptory challenge to present a race-neutral explanation for using the challenge. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is proffered, the trial court must then decide whether the challenger has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).
"Upon appellate review, a trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference, and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous." Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind.2001). The Supreme Court has made it clear in recent years, though, that this deference is not absolute. Rather, courts need not accept any facially neutral reason for striking a juror and should consider " 'all relevant cireumstances' in assessing Batson-challenged peremptory strikes. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).
The parties here appear to be in agreement that: (1) Killebrew made a pri-ma facie showing of discrimination in the State's exercise of peremptory challenges and (2) the State provided facially neutral reasons for those strikes. The issue here thus is whether Killebrew has established that those facially neutral reasons were merely pretextual and a mask for purposeful discrimination. Because the United States Constitution " 'forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose,' " we will focus our attention solely upon the striking of prospective ju ror L.S. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied).
The deputy prosecutor claimed to have used a peremptory strike on potential juror LS. because he was too "emphatic" in agreeing with defense counsel's description of the State's burden of proof, and because he was afraid L.S. would place too high of an evidentiary burden upon the State. Tr. p. 449. It is true that L.S. said the State had to prove its case "beyond a shadow of a doubt...." Id. at 388. However, one white juror who was selected, B.C., said that guilt would have to be proved so that "there is no other possible doubt." Id. at 382. Yet another white juror, B.B., was seated after indicating he "would have to be one hundred percent sure that they were guilty." Id. at 383A. These statements are virtually indistinguishable from L.S.'s, yet only L.S. was stricken from the jury venire.
We conclude this case is on all fours with Snyder. There, the Supreme Court found a Batson violation in the prosecution's striking of an African-American juror whom the prosecutor claimed had appeared "nervous," and who had expressed some concern about the disruption that jury service would have on a student teaching position he held. The Supreme Court placed no weight upon the prosecutor's claim that the prospective juror appeared "nervous," because the trial court made no express finding regarding the prospective juror's demeanor that would indicate whether it agreed with the prosecutor's assertion; rather, the trial court approved the peremptory strike without explanation. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479, 128 S.Ct. at 1209.
Similarly, the trial court here made no express finding whether it believed L.S. was "emphatic" in agreeing with defense counsel's description of the burden of proof. It simply approved the peremptory strike without explanation. As in Snyder and a claim of "nervousness," we will not place any weight on the prosecutor's claim here that LS. was too "emphatic" in agreeing with defense counsel.
The Supreme Court in Snyder also rejected the prosecution's second reason for striking the prospective juror, namely that he appeared concerned about missing student teaching time. The Court noted that other prospective jurors, who were white and not struck, expressed similar or even more pressing concerns about the toll jury service would have on their personal and/or professional lives. Id. at 484-85, 128 S.Ct. at 1211-12. See also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2325 ("If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step").
Here, there is no meaningful distinction between how L.S. described his concept of the State's burden of proof and how B.B. and B.C. described it. If anything, they, and especially B.B., would appear to place an even greater burden of proof upon the State than LS. Saying that one must be "one hundred percent" certain of guilt before convicting clearly is inconsistent with the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tr. p. 383A. Nonetheless, both B.B. and B.C. were seated on the jury and L.S. was not.
Batson violations, hopefully, are and should be rare. It should not be impossible, however, for a defendant to prove a Batson violation. Neither trial courts nor appellate courts should simply blithely accept a facially neutral reason for striking African-Americans from a jury panel, especially when all African-Americans have been struck. The possibility of purposeful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is very much alive and real, as demonstrated in an infamous video from Philadelphia, recorded after Batson was decided, in which a prosecutor was captured advising other prosecutors on the undesirability of having African-Americans on juries. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 657 (3rd Cir.2005). Although there is no indication that Marion County prosecutors systematically exelude minorities from juries, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the jury selection process in criminal cases is free from any hint of bias. Here, we conclude Killebrew has established that the peremptory strike of L.S. was the result of purposeful discrimination and a Batson violation, where there was no trial court finding regarding L.S.'s demeanor and the stated reason for striking him applied as much to B.B. and B.C. as it did to L.S.
Conclusion
The trial court clearly erred in concluding that the State's strike of L.S. from the jury venire was not discriminatory. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
BROWN, J., concurs.
MATHIAS, J., dissents with opinion.
. During questioning, however, this juror indicated that he could be fair and impartial after all.
. We find the striking of prospective juror D.R. to be troublesome as well, but we need not address those concerns in detail. Additionally, reasonable minds could differ on the desirability of having nurses serve as jurors. However, without evidence that the deputy prosecutor here was being untruthful with respect to having a policy of routinely striking nurses like A.S. in all cases, regardless of race, we cannot second guess that claim.
. Snyder was a death penalty case, but the Supreme Court's opinion gives no hint that it was applying a stricter Batson standard, or was being less deferential to the trial court, because of that fact.
. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented in Snyder, taking issue with the majority's placing no weight upon the "nervousness" claim. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 487-88, 128 S.Ct. at 1213-14. Be that as it may, Justice Alito's majority opinion, fully signed onto by the other six justices, is what constitutes the "law of the land." The analysis of the "nervousness" claim also clearly was not dicta, as the rejection of that claim was essential to the outcome of the case.