Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward Oliver MORNINGSTAR, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1973-05-23
Citations: 207 N.W.2d 772
Docket Number: No. 54718
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward Oliver MORNINGSTAR, Appellant.
Judges: All Justices concur except REES, MASON and RAWLINGS, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 207
Pages: 772–777

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward Oliver MORNINGSTAR, Appellant.
No. 54718.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
May 23, 1973.
J. R. McManus, and N. B. Wilson, Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Raymond W. Sullins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stanley R. Simpson, Boone County Atty., for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
UHLENHOPP, Justice.
The main question in this criminal appeal is whether the charge was filed in time.
The chronology of events relative to the claimed errors which were preserved is this. On February 6, 1970, an officer arrested and incarcerated defendant Edward Oliver Morningstar for allegedly operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. On February 7, 1970, the officer took defendant before a magistrate and defendant posted bail. The magistrate did not hold a preliminary examination nor did defendant waive one.
On April 7, 1970, the prosecutor charged defendant by county attorney's information with driving while intoxicated. On May 13, 1970, defendant pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it was filed too late. Subse quently defendant's motion to dismiss was overruled, the case was tried, defendant was convicted and sentenced, and he appealed.
In this court defendant advances two main propositions which were preserved in the trial court: first, the offense of driving while intoxicated under § 321.281 of the Code of 1966 was repealed prior to this incident by chapter 205 of the Acts of the 63rd General Assembly, and second, the trial court should have sustained defendant's motion to dismiss the county attorney's information as untimely filed.
I. Offense of Driving While Intoxicated. Defendant is correct that the offense of operating a motor vehicle "while in an intoxicated condition" in § 321.281 of the Code of 1966 was changed by the legislature in 1969 to operating a motor vehicle "while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." 63 G.A. ch. 205, § 1. We have held, however, that the two quoted expressions mean the same thing and constitute the same offense. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa). Defendant's first proposition is therefore without merit.
II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant predicated his motion to dismiss the county attorney's information on § 795.1 of the Code. In that connection he also urged the invalidity of the demand-waiver rule and asserted constitutional doctrines.
Section 795.1 deals with speedy indictment. Defendant's difficulty relates to applicability of that section to the facts here. The section provides in part:
When a person is held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment be not found against him within thirty days, the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. (Italics added.)
See also § 769.13 (provisions relating to indictments apply to county attorney infor-mations) .
The words "held to answer" in § 795.1 are not used by the legislature in that section only; they are also used in the following regular progression of steps in our criminal procedure from the commencement of the prosecution down to § 795.1 itself :
1. After preliminary examination showing sufficient reason to commit the accused, or on waiver by the accused, the magistrate orders that the accused be "held to answer." § 761.18.
2. The magistrate thereupon sets bail for defendant "to answer." § 761.19.
3. The magistrate then issues a warrant reciting that the accused is "held to answer." § 761.20.
4. The magistrate next transmits the papers to district court relating to an accused when the magistrate has "held him to answer." § 761.25.
5. In district court, the accused may challenge the jury if he has been "held to answer." § 770.3, 770.4.
6. Also in district court, the clerk lays the papers before the grand jury relating to an accused who has been "held to answer." § 771.18.
7. Finally, the prosecution must be dismissed if the grand jury does not indict an accused who has been "held to answer." § 795.1.
These steps involving the expression "held to answer" were not enacted in separate statutes or at different times but rather in one act. See Code 1851, p. 1 and § 2872, 2874, 2875, 2880, 2882, 2890, 3248. "In the construction of a statute, it is ordinarily regarded as reasonable to assume, or presume, or conclude prima facie, that words used in one place in a legislative enactment has the same meaning in every other place in the statute, — especially where the word or phrase is repeatedly used therein." 50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 271 at 259. See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 348 at 728.
In view of these considerations, we recently held that the expression "held to answer" in § 795.1 means held to answer by a magistrate after a preliminary examination or waiver of same under preceding § 761.1 and 761.18. State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa). We adhere to that decision. In New York, from which we borrowed the statute, the same result was reached. People v. Gearns, 14 Misc.2d 1010, 180 N.Y.S.2d 875. This defendant was not held to answer, and we hold that § 795.1 is not applicable.
Since § 795.1 is inapplicable, we need not consider defendant's attack upon our former rule that a person who is held to answer must demand speedy trial or he waives the benefit of that section. However, were § 795.1 applicable, failure to make a demand would not have prevented operation of that section, for we have recently eliminated demand as a prerequisite to operation of the section. State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa).
The constitutional doctrines defendant urged in his motion to dismiss the county attorney's information were apparently part of his attack upon the demand-waiver rule under § 795.1. Since demand is no longer a prerequisite, we need not consider the constitutional doctrines. Defendant cannot successfully contend that the hiatus here between the arrest and the filing of the county attorney's information —from February 6, 1970, to April 7, 1970— rose to the level of unconstitutional delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa).
The verdict and sentence must stand.
Affirmed.
All Justices concur except REES, MASON and RAWLINGS, JJ., who dissent.