Case Name: Washington LeGrand and Wife v. The Wilkes-Barre and Wyoming Valley Traction Company, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1899-03-23
Citations: 10 Pa. Super. 12
Docket Number: 
Parties: Washington LeGrand and Wife v. The Wilkes-Barre and Wyoming Valley Traction Company, Appellant.
Judges: Before Beaver, Orlady, Smith, W. W. Porter, W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 12–19

Head Matter:
Washington LeGrand and Wife v. The Wilkes-Barre and Wyoming Valley Traction Company, Appellant.
Picnic grounds — Maintenance of a pond, not negligence — Such pond not a pitfall.
The presence of a pond in a park used by a traction company for picnic purposes does not impose upon the proprietor the obligation to inform all comers by notice that they shall not bathe therein nor to post a guard to enforce an observance of such conduct. The absence of such guard or notice and the existence of the pond,are not negligence. It is not to be considered a pitfall. There can be therefore no recovery for the loss of life of a boy, one of a school picnic party, who entered the pond with some of his companions to bathe and getting into deep water was drowned.
Submitted Jan. 10,1899.
Appeal, No. 28, Jan. T., 1899, by lefendant, from judgment of C. P. Luzerne Co., Oct. T., 1894, No. 380, on verdict for plaintiffs.
Before Beaver, Orlady, Smith, W. W. Porter, W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ.
Reversed.
Orlady, J., dissents.
Trespass. Before Lynch, J.
It appears from the evidence that Frank LeGrand a boy thirteen years of age was one of a school picnic party at the Hanover Park picnic grounds where school picnics, among others, were permitted by the railroad-company, owners of the grounds. About a thousand feet from the picnic ground proper defendant .alcI recently made an artificial pond for boating purposes. Some twenty-eight boys including Frank LeGrand went to this pond, stripped and went in swimming at a place where the banks slope gently down to shallow water. About thirty-nine feet from the shore, as fixed by the actual measurement, the boy got beyond his depth and was drowned. This action was brought by the boy’s parents to recover for his death on the theory that the pond was a trap and pitfall, which it was negligence to leave unguarded and without warning.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs for $607.25. Defendant appealed.
jError assigned among others was refusal of binding instructions for defendant.
Henry A. Fuller and John T. Lenahan, for appellant.
There was no proof of extraordinary risk in the case at bar. The owner should not maintain a trap or pitfall, nor extend an invitation into danger, nor fail to guard against unusual risk, within the limits of the park. But none of these circumstances existed, and the court should not have submitted the question of their existence.
This pond was not a trap or pitfall. It was not a blind pool which demanded a railing or a notice of danger. It was not a raging torrent nor an unfathomable lake requiring watchmen to keep people away. . There was no abrupt bank, unprotected by a barrier, and even had there been, the boy did not come to his death from that cause. It was just a common little piece of water produced by the overflow of the creek, very shallow for some feet from shore and not deep at any point. So miich is certain whether one accepts the exact measurement of plaintiff’s witness and defendant’s engineer, or the uncertain guess of other witnesses. Plaintiff lays great stress upon the allegation that the boy stepped into a hole or excavation, but if this existed, it was at some distance from shore, thirty-nine feet by actual measurement, and at least fifteen feet by guess. True the water was deep enough to drown a boy. But likewise the trees on the place were high enough to cause his death if he had climbed and fallen.
James L. Lenahan, for appellees.
The defendant offered special inducements to school children to visit the park, to wit: half rates and no charge for the grounds ; it was therefore bound to take extra precautions for their safety.
The defendant knew, or ought to have known when it invited school children to this resort, that a large number would be under the supervision of each teacher, and some of them would surely stray to this pond and be tempted, boy like, to “go in swimming.”
Was there an absence of ordinary care under the circumstances ?
This defendant transformed a harmless creek into a dangerous pool. But, say counsel for the defendant, this body of water was for the sole purpose of boating; no one had ever bathed in it before. Let me ask, how was Frank LeGrand and his boy companions to know that the pond was not for bathing?
March 23, 1899:

Opinion:
Opinion by
William W. Portee, J.,
This is an action brought by parents for damages for the death of a son, alleged to be due to the defendant's negligence. The facts are peculiar. The defendant company on June 12, 1894, operated an electric street railway and owned picnic grounds which were used for the pleasure of the patrons of the road and other persons, to whom the grounds were at times rented. On the day above named, a number of children from the Hancock school, in Wilkes-Barre, arranged to hold a picnic. It was agreed with the defendant that the children should pay ten cents for car fare for the round trip and for the use of the picnic grounds.
Within an hour or more of the arrival of the party, the plaintiff's son was drowned in a pond or lake, which formed a part of the park. The pond was constructed by damming a small creek, and was intended for boating purposes. Part of the channel of the creek was deepened to adapt the pond to these purposes. The pond lay some distance below the main part of the picnic grounds. To it the plaintiff's son, with a number of boy companions, went, and, removing their clothing, proceeded "to go in swimming." At the point where they entered the water, the bottom descended gently for a number of feet. It then came to a place where the channel suddenly deepened to some six feet. The plaintiff's son went out to this point, got into the deep water and was drowned.
The case presents the question, Was the boy's death due to the defendant company's negligence ? There is no negligence in maintaining a pond in a public pleasure park. Its presence in such a place is not an invitation to adults or children to bathe therein. In the absence, then, of any invitation by sign, or by visible appliances or .preparations for bathing, the company might presume that no one would attempt to bathe in a place of such public character, notwithstanding the fact that the pond was more secluded than some other parts of the park. The mere presence of a pond in a public pleasure park does not necessarily impose upon the proprietor the obligation to inform all comers by notice that they shall not bathe, nor to post a guard to enforce an observance of such conduct. There may be circumstances when either or both of such courses may become desirable or even necessary, but no such circumstances are made to appear in this case.
If the presence of the pond was no invitation, its condition or construction only becomes important, in respect to negligence, if it put in peril those who were using it or were about it for a lawful or usual purpose. There was nothing in the condition of this pond, as disclosed by the testimony, which endangered those who were upon its banks or were encroaching upon its margin. This marks a clear distinction between the present case and that of Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109. This was not a pitfall which demanded protection or guard. It was not an improper construction.
To hold the conduct of the defendant in this case to be negligent, would, we believe, be a step in advance of any liability yet recognized by the law. The defendant's relation to its visitors imposes the exercise of care, but to sustain this judgment would be carrying the obligation too far. Thus finding that the defendant was not convicted of any negligence by the testimony presented, we enter upon no discussion of the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's son. We are of opinion that the defendant company was entitled to binding instructions, and that the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.