Case Name: STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, v. Jose SARMIENTO, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-08-06
Citations: 989 So. 2d 692
Docket Number: No. 4D08-1632
Parties: STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, v. Jose SARMIENTO, Respondent.
Judges: HAZOURI, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 989
Pages: 692–696

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, v. Jose SARMIENTO, Respondent.
No. 4D08-1632.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 6, 2008.
Robin F. Lotane, General Counsel, and Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel, Lake Worth, for petitioner.
John H. Lipinski, Pembroke Pines, for respondent.

Opinion:
STEVENSON, J.
We deny this second-tier certiorari petition filed by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). DHSMV challenges a final circuit court order granting certiorari in favor of respondent, Jose Sarmiento, and quashing the order of the DHSMV that had affirmed the suspension of Sarmiento's driver's license for refusal to submit to a breath test. We find that the circuit court correctly applied the competent substantial evidence standard of review when it held that the evidence at the hearing was "undisputed" that Sarmiento's vehicle was inoperable.
A circuit court order on review of an administrative action is reviewable in the district court by certiorari. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(B); Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 720 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla.1998). "As a case travels up the judicial ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader." Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995). The standard of review applicable to circuit court review of an administrative decision is: "(1) whether procedural due process is accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of law have been observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence." Id. The standard of review for certiorari in the district court eliminates the competent substantial evidence component and is "limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law." Id. A district court should grant second-tier certiorari review of an appellate circuit court decision only when there has been " 'a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.' " Id. at 529 (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983)). Certiorari review of a circuit court appellate decision is narrow and must not be utilized as a means for obtaining a second appeal. Id.; City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982).
In a per curiam decision issued by a panel of three judges, the circuit court determined that it was improper for the DHSMV to suspend Sarmiento's license for failing to take a breath test. After quoting section 316.1932(l)(a), Florida Statutes, the circuit court wrote:
It is clear that the statute implies consent to a breath test when any person accepts the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Florida. However, the statutorily created implied consent only applies if the person is arrested while driving or while in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.
To be in control of a motor vehicle, the vehicle must be operable. Jones v. State, 510 So.2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (finding a lack of actual physical control where vehicle was found to be inoperable so that it could not be moved except by an outside agency). The record establishes that the vehicle at issue was inoperable. Therefore, the statutory implied consent contained in Florida Statute § 316.1932(l)(a) does not apply and the suspension of the petitioner's license must be set aside.
We hold that the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. Moreover, a miscarriage of justice has not occurred. In considering section 316.1932(l)(a) and Jones v. State, the circuit court applied the correct substantive law pertaining to the underlying issues. Furthermore, we do not conclude that the circuit court failed to apply the "competent substantial" evidence standard when it held that the evidence was "undisputed at the hearing that the vehicle was, in fact, inoperable." This is equivalent to holding that no competent substantial evidence was present to support a finding that the vehicle was operable.
The circuit court, in its written opinion, did not expressly address the hearing officer's alternate finding that the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that Sarmiento had been driving. We will not presume that the circuit court failed to apply the competent substantial evidence standard when, by its holding, it resolved that issue adversely to the DHSMV. While the DHSMV argues that circumstantial evidence supports a finding that Sarmiento drove the car while it was operable, second-tier certiorari review does not empower this court to determine if competent substantial evidence was presented at the agency level. That is unquestionably the function of the circuit court's initial certiorari review.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is denied.
HAZOURI, J., concurs.
WARNER,' J., dissents with opinion.
. Whether there was competent substantial evidence to support the DHSMV's finding that probable cause existed to believe that Sar-miento drove the car was debatable. Sar-miento's vehicle was legally parked in a parking lot with its two left tires blown out and its axle hanging down. Although the engine was running, the automotive service advisor testified that the vehicle could not have been moved an inch. Despite the presence of lubricants in the power train, neither the police officers nor the automotive service advisor was able to offer an opinion as to when or how the car may have gotten to the parking lot or how long it had been there.