Case Name: NORWOOD, ordinary, v. PEEPLES
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1924-04-21
Citations: 158 Ga. 162
Docket Number: No. 4223
Parties: NORWOOD, ordinary, v. PEEPLES.
Judges: All the Justices concur, esccept Gilbert, J., dissenting.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 162–171

Head Matter:
NORWOOD, ordinary, v. PEEPLES.

Opinion:
Hines, J.
1. The contest of a mayor's election must "be filed with, heard, and determined by the ordinary of the county wherein such contest may arise, under the same rules and regulations as to the mode of procedure as prescribed in contests where commission is issued by the Governor." Civil Code (1910), § 125.
2. Under said rules and regulations, " such contest shall be begun by giving the adverse party five days' notice in writing, stating the grounds of contest, the time and place where the contestant intends to take testimony, and the judicial officer before whom the testimony will be taken." Civil Code (1910), § 121(2).
3. Procedure by petition addressed to the ordinary, with prayer that notice of the contest be served instanter upon the adverse party, that the latter show cause at the office of the ordinary on a named day, if any he could, why the prayers of the petition should not be granted, and why the votes east by certain named parties should not be excluded from the ballot-box, a recount be had, and the lawful result of the election declared, was not in accordance with the above rules and regulations, and was not such a contest of the election as is provided and required by these rules and regulations.
4. If such petition could be treated as a substantial compliance with such rules and regulations, allegations therein, that the election was illegal and void for the reason that 35 named women voting in said election for mayor were not legal and qualified voters, because they had not paid their poll-taxes for the year 1922, for which reason said votes should be excluded from the ballot-box, and the legal votes remaining therein be recounted so as to actually declare the result, and wherein the contestant alleges upon information and belief that when said illegal votes have been removed from the ballot-box, and the true and correct result of the election declared, he will be the person duly elected and entitled to hold the office of mayor for the ensuing year, are too loose and general to bring into question the legality and fairness of the election. Collins v. Huff, 63 Ga. 207; Jossey v. Speer, 107 Ga. 828 (33 S. E. 718); Paulk v. Lee, 117 Ga. 6 (43 S. E. 368).
No. 4223.
April 21, 1924.
Mandamus. Before Judge Dickerson. Berrien superior court. February 1, 1924.
On December 14, 1923, T. M. Peeples filed his petition addressed to Joel I. Norwood, ordinary of Berrien County, in tyhich he alleged the following facts: On December 11, 1923, an election was held in the City of Nashville, said county, for the purpose of electing a mayor, three councilmen, and other officers. Petitioner and J. Y. Talley were the respective candidates for the office of mayor of said city for year 1924. At said election 152 votes were cast, petitioner receiving 70 and Talley receiving 82, which would entitle Talley to serve as mayor for said year. Said election, in so far as the contest'for the office of mayor of said city is concerned, is illegal and void, for the reason that 35 named women voting in said election for mayor were not legal and qualified voters, because they had not paid their poll-taxes for the year 1922, as required by the laws of the State and said city; for which reason said votes should be expunged from the ballot-box and the true and legal votes remaining therein recounted, so as to actually declare the result, so that the person entitled to hold the office of mayor should be legally declared as such officer. Contestant alleges upon information and belief that when said illegal votes have been removed from the ballot-box, and the true and correct result of the election declared, he will be the person duly elected and entitled to hold said office for the year 1924. He prays that the clerk of the council of said city, if he has not done so, deliver instanter to said ordinary one tally-sheet, one list of voters, and all the ballots cast in said election, that a recount of the votes be made, that all the illegal votes cast in said election be excluded from the ballot-box, that only the legal votes be counted, and that the lawful result of said election be declared, so that the person receiving the highest number of votes in said election be declared mayor of said city for 1924. He further prays that notice of this contest be served instanter upon Talley, and that the latter show cause at the office of said ordinary on December 21, 1923, if any he can, why the prayers of the petition should not be granted, and why the votes cast by the above parties should not be excluded from the ballot-box, a recount had, and the lawful result of said election declared. Thereupon the ordinary passed an order, reciting the filing of the above petition, and requiring said Talley to show cause before him, "at ten.o'clock a. m., at the office of. the ordinary in the court-house in Berrien County, Georgia, why the contest should not be held and why a recount of the votes should not be made as prescribed and provided by law, and, after the recount has been made, why the result of the election shall' not be declared and the persons receiving the number of votes after1 the illegal votes have been excluded from the ballot-box should not be declared as the person elected for mayor to serve for the ensuing year of 1924 for the City of Nashville, Georgia." The order further provided: "beginning at the time and place herein named for this contest, that the contestant will then and there take testimony and offer' testimony in support of the allegations of the petition and this notice, for the purpose of showing, that the names of each and all of the persons set out in the petition and notice were illegal voters, and because of this to have their votes . . excluded from the ballot-box, . . and thereafter to declare the result of said election."
5. Where in response to the order of the ordinary, issued upon the presentation of said petition, the contestee appeared and made a motion to strike said petition on the ground that it set forth no valid and legal grounds for contesting the election, the ordinary did not exceed his jurisdiction in entertaining said motion, in sustaining the same, and in dismissing the petition. Paulk v. Lee, supra. Nothing to the contrary of this ruling is to be found in Simpson v. Rimes, 141 Ga. 822 (82 S. E. 291), in which this court held that in such a contest the ordinary had no authority to consider the right of a person to vote who did not vote, and, upon concluding that he was illegally deprived of voting, to render a judgment deciding that the contestant was duly elected, based on a count of such assumed vote; nor in Walton v. Booth, 151 Ga. 452 (107 S. E. 63), in which this court held that in such a contest the ordinary had no jurisdiction to entertain a question as to whether the election itself, out of which the contest grew, was void. In those cases the ordinary exceeded his jurisdiction; but in the insi.ant case he had the power and authority to determine whether, under the facts embraced in this petition, the contestant made a case which authorized a contest of the election.
6. Where the ordinary rendered judgment sustaining the motion of the contestee to dismiss the petition, on the ground that it set out no ground of contest, and where such judgment was correct, the judge of the superior court, on application by contestant for mandamus, erred in granting a mandamus absolute, requiring the ordinary to hear the contest.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, esccept Gilbert, J., dissenting.
The contestee, Talley, in answer to the rule nisi issued upon said petition, appearing, solely for that purpose, filed a motion to strike the contestant's petition, upon the ground that it set forth no valid and legal ground for contesting said election, and prayed that it be dismissed. After hearing argument the ordinary "adjudged that all legal requirements do not affirmatively appear in said petition," and dismissed the same. Thereupon Peeples filed his petition for mandamus against Norwood as ordinary, and alleged the following facts: (1) On December 11, 1923, the regular election for mayor for the City of Nashville was held; and petitioner and J. Y. Talley were candidates for said office. '(2) On the face of the returns of the election petitioner received 70 votes and Talley 82 votes, giving Talley, on the face of the returns, a majority of 12 votes. Of the 82 votes counted by the election manager for Talley, 35 were votés of women who were not registered and who had not paid their poll-tax for 1922, for which reason they were not entitled to vote. Two votes cast for petitioner were by women, and illegal; and when all of said illegal votes are excluded, petitioner will have a majority of 22 votes, and for this reason is duly entitled to said office. (3) Within the time prescribed by law petitioner filed with the ordinary his contest of election; and 'after due service on Talley, the contest came on to be heard at the time and place set as prescribed by law, and the ordinary refused to hear said contest as he is required to do by law, and passed an order dismissing the contest proceedings solely upon the ground that the mayor and council of the City of Nashville had not been served with notice of petitioner's intention to contest said election. (4) Said order is illegal and void, for the reason that the ordinary had no power or authority to pass it, the only power vested in him being to hoar the petition and contest upon its merits, canvass and count the votes cast in the election, excluding all illegal votes, and declare the result of the election. (5) The mayor and council had notice of the filing and pendency of the election contest; and although this fact was made known to the ordinary when the motion to dismiss was argued before him, he disregarded this fact and refused to hear the contest upon its merits. (6) Before the ordinary passed his order dismissing the contest proceedings, petitioner asked leave to amend by setting up a written waiver from the mayor of the City of Nashville, all of which the ordinary refused, and denied to petitioner each and every right to contest said election. Petitioner prayed for a rule nisi directing Norwood, ordinary, to show cause, if any he could, why mandamus absolute should not issue requiring him to hold said election contest as provided by law; and,for such further relief as petitioner might be entitled to.
In response to the mandamus nisi Norwood, appearing solely for that purpose, made his written motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition for mandamus, because: (1) No cause for mandamus appears from the allegations therein. (2) It affirmatively appears from the petition that the defendant had already assumed jurisdiction of the subject-matter, had heard and acted upon the same, and determined same adversely to plaintiff; and such matter is fully and completely res adjudicata. The defendant, answering the petition for mandamus, admitted paragraph 1 thereof, and denied paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. He alleged that he had already assumed jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved, had already heard and determined the same, and the decision rendered had already been made a part of the record of the contest proceedings of file. The general demurrer filed by defendant to the petition for mandamus was heard by the judge, who took the same under advisement, and, on February 1, 1924, passed an order- making the mandamus absolute as prayed, and ordering the ordinary to hear said election contest and determine same as provided by law. The judge made no ruling on "said general demurrer. To this judgment defendant excepted on the grounds that it was contrary to law and without evidence to support it; that the court should have sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition for mandamus, and should have refrained from passing an order upon the merits of the case after an answer had been filed by defendant making an issue of fact, there having been no agreement between the parties that the judge could determine the issues of fact involved in vacation.
W. B. Smith and John P. & Dewey Knight, for plaintiff in error.
B. A. Hendricks, Jeff S. Story, and Elsie Higgs Griner, contra.