Case Name: In the Matter of Christy C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2016-01-12
Citations: 135 A.D.3d 468
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Christy C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 135
Pages: 468–477

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Christy C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.
[25 NYS3d 8]

Opinion:
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Mary E. Bednar, J., at suppression hearing; Susan R. Larabee, J., at fact-finding and disposition), entered on or about May 31, 2013, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that she committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of false personation, and placed her on probation for a period of 13 months, affirmed, without costs.
At the time of her arrest, appellant, then 14 years of age, gave a false name, age and address to the police. A police officer had approached appellant at the Exchange Place Path station in Jersey City, New Jersey, as a possible abandoned child. Appellant, who was a runaway child from Harlem, New York, continued her false assertions after being warned by a police officer that providing false information subjected her to criminal liability. On appeal, appellant challenges the denial of the motion to suppress her statements to the police, the finding that she committed false personation, and her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent in need of treatment and supervision.
The court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress her statement to the police, in which she gave a false name and date of birth, resulting in the false personation charge (Penal Law § 190.23). The police had probable cause to believe appellant was a runaway (see Matter of Marrhonda G., 81 NY2d 942 [1993]). The then 14-year-old appellant, who appeared to be as young as 13, was alone in a PATH station in New Jersey, but she vaguely claimed to live in "upstate" New York. In addition, she had a bruised eye and was wearing provocative clothing, suggesting the possibility of some kind of sexual exploitation. The police were entitled to ask pedigree questions without Miranda warnings, even though an officer warned appellant, as required by the false personation statute, that providing false information would result in an additional charge (see People v Ligon, 66 AD3d 516 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 889 [2010]). We have considered and rejected appellant's remaining suppression claims. In light of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to reach the presentment agency's argument that a misrepresentation of identity made in violation of Penal Law § 190.23 is not a statement subject to suppression.
The finding that appellant committed false personation was supported by legally sufficient evidence, and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations. The dissent argues that, "[b]ut for [the police officer's] warning, there would have been no . . . crime." There was, however, nothing nefarious about the police officer's conduct. The officer properly warned appellant in accordance with Penal Law § 190.23 of the consequences of providing false pedigree information. Further, the evidence supports the inference that appellant acted with the requisite knowledge and intent.
Upon disposition, the court properly exercised its discretion when it denied appellant's request for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, and instead appropriately adjudicated her a juvenile delinquent and placed her on a 13-month period of probation. This was the least restrictive alternative consistent with appellant's needs and the community's need for protection (see Matter of Katherine W., 62 NY2d 947 [1984]). Appellant's history, which included violent behavior, toward her family, in placement, in school, and in the streets, aggressive behavior toward facility staff, a threat to kill a fellow student, truancy, promiscuity, and drug and alcohol abuse, warranted a 13-month period of supervision.
Appellant's record of violent behavior, truancy, promiscuity, and drug and alcohol abuse establishes that the court had ample reason to reject the Department of Probation's recommendations, and demonstrates that an adjudication of supervised adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), as the dissent posits, would have been unsuitable and inappropriate. We reject the dissent's suggestion that appellant's "past behavioral, disciplinary and psychiatric problems" raised herein, and taken into account by the court, should have been ignored because of improvements made by appellant after being returned home. While appellant did not run away from home again, took her medications and was enrolled in school, it is significant and cannot be ignored, that appellant missed well over half of the school days in March and April 2013; she was suspended for not attending classes; and, again tested positive for marijuana. The dissent takes at face value that appellant's poor school attendance record in 2013 must be attributed to allegations of "peer bullying." Appellant's 2013 truancy, however, was not aberrant; it was consistent with her history, as she also had only a 50% school attendance rate for the spring 2011 and fall 2012 terms.
In addition, the dissent also fails to consider that the psychologist who prepared the Mental Health Studies, at the behest of the court, disagreed with the Department of Proba tion's recommendation of an ACD. In his final dispositional report, the psychologist opined that, while there were "some improvements at home," appellant was still at a significant increased risk of future aggression and substance abuse. Given this genuine concern, the evaluating psychologist's final recommendation was a disposition of probation. These facts and circumstances outweighed appellant's lack of prior record and other mitigating factors that appellant cites. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Renwick and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
The record indeed establishes that the psychologist's concern proved to be a prescient risk assessment because a few months after being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, appellant violated the terms of her probation by failing to obey the lawful commands of her mother. As a result, appellant was placed with ACS in a Close to Home Facility for six months, with no credit for time served. Appellant took no appeal from the second order. Of course, such outcome was not known hy the Family Court at the time of the adjudication nor should it be considered in the disposition of this appeal.