Case Name: Peter Fitzpatrick, Appellant, v. Felix Boylan, impleaded, etc., Respondent
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-05
Citations: 57 N.Y. 433
Docket Number: 
Parties: Peter Fitzpatrick, Appellant, v. Felix Boylan, impleaded, etc., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 433–444

Head Matter:
Peter Fitzpatrick, Appellant, v. Felix Boylan, impleaded, etc., Respondent.
The mechanic’s lien law for the city of New York of 1863 (chap. 500, Laws of 1863) has no retroactive operation; it repealed the old act as to all liens subsequently created, but continued it in force as to existing liens. (Dwight and Gray, 00., dissenting.)
Accordingly held (Dwight and Gray, 00., dissenting), where a notice of lien was filed under and as required by the act of 1851 (chap., 51-3, Laws-. of 1851), and proceedings were commenced to enforce the lien prior to the act of 1868 taking effect, that the provision of the latter act (§ 11) that “ liens shall, in all cases, cease after one year, unless hy order of the court the lien is continued,” etc., did not apply; hut that the lien continued after the expiration of the year and until the rendition of judgment
(Argued January 15, 1874;
decided May term, 1874.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York, affirming a judgment entered upon an order upon trial at Special Term, dismissing the complaint as to defendant Boylan.
This was a proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien against premises known as No. 474 Third avenue, in the city of New York.
The original complaint, served under an order of the court made May 4th, 1863, alleged that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant O’Brien, to supply a quantity of brick and other .building materials, and to perform work and labor to the value of $868.45, which sum O’Brien promised to pay. There was a further allegation, that the goods were supplied and the work furnished, in pursuance of the agreement, between the 7tli day of November, 1862, and the 3d of February, 1863, and were used in the erection of buildings on the premises referred to. It was also set forth, that the defendant O’Brien had wholly failed to pay more than $200, so that there was still due $668.45, with interest from February 3, 1863. The complaint then stated that the other defendant, Boylan, was, prior to October 28th, 1862, and at the time of the complaint, owner in fee simple of the premises in question, and that O’Brien was the contractor with Boylan for the erection of the building aforesaid. It was added, that on February 7th, 1863, the plaintiff filed a lien against the defendants, O’Brien and Boylan, upon the premises already named, and that there was then due from Boylan to O’Brien, under the contract, more than sufficient money to discharge the lien, and that the object of the action was to foreclose the lien for the unpaid balance of claim. There was then a demand for judgment for the claim, interest and costs, with a sale of the interest of Boylan in the land, and a judgment for deficiency, if any. This complaint was verified May 5th, 1863. An answer was verified June 16, 1863, which denied the allegations in the complaint, except that there was an admission that Boylan was the owner of the premises 474 Third avenue, and that the defendant O’Brien was the contractor for the erection of a. building upon said premises at the time of the filing of the lien. No further proceedings appear to have been taken in the action until March 11th, 1870. At that time, an amended complaint was served, containing the following allegation, additional to what was set up in the original complaint: That the work and services were furnished under and lyy virtue of a contract therefor entered into between the defendant Boylan, as owner, and the defendant O’Brien, as contractor. The answer of March 31, 1871, denied all the material allegations of the amended complaint, except that it admitted that Boylan was owner of 474 Third avenue.
The case was brought on for a hearing at a Special Term of the court held November 3, 1870, when the judge found, as facts, that the proceeding was commenced to foreclose a mechanic’s "lien on the property, the notice of which was filed in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, on February 7th, 1863, and that no order of court"continuing this lien had been made, and that there was no new docket in the office of the clerk of the county, stating the fact that such order had been made.
He further found, as a conclusion of law, that the complaint should be dismissed, as to the defendant Boylan.
To these conclusions, both of law and of fact, the plaintiff excepted.
Amasa J. Parker for the appellant.
This action is in no wise affected by the act of 1863. (Calkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb., 306; Johnson v. Burrell, 2 Hill, 238; Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 188; Trist v. Cabenas, 19 Abb., 143; Fairbanks v. Wood, 17 Wend., 329.) A mechanic’s lien filed under the statute can only be discharged in one of the modes prescribed by the statute. (Fettrich v. Totten 2 Abb. Pr. [N. S.], 264; Poerschke v. Kedenburg, 6 id., 172; Paine v. Bonney, 4 E. D. S., 734.)
Charles F. Miller for the respondent.
In the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien the requirements of the statute must be strictly performed. (Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Mushlitt v. Silverman, 50 N. Y., 360.)

Opinion:
Earl, C.
I think it appears, clearly, that the plaintiff was defeated at the trial term, upon the- sole ground that no-order of court continuing his lien had been made, and no new docket made in the office of the county clerk stating the-tact that such order was made. Hence, the only question for pur consideration is, whether he was properly defeated upon that ground.
The plaintiff filed notice of his lien on the 7th day of February, 1863, as required by section 6 of chapter 573 of the Laws of 1851, and commenced proceedings to enforce his lien on the sixth of May thereafter; and hence, by section 12 of that chapter, the lien was continued until judgment was rendered, which superseded the lien and took its place. On the 5th day of May, 1863, was passed chapter 500, '¡An act to secure the payment of mechanics, laborers and persons furnishing materials toward the erection, altering or repairing of buildings in the city of Hew York." Section 11 of that act provides, that, " liens shall, in all eases, cease after one year, unless, by order of court, the lien is continued, and a new docket made stating such fact." It was under this section that the plaintiff was defeated; and whether he was-properly defeatéd or not, depends upon whether or not that act shall be construed as having retroactive as well as prospective operation. I think that act must have prospective operation only. Section 1 expressly provides that the liens to be created under that act are for work and materials thereafter to be done and furnished; and the entire proceeding prescribed by the act is to enforce the liens created under the act. The last section provides that the act shall take effect on the 1st day of July, 1863; and section 2 provides that all former acts giving liens, in the city of New York, are repealed, " except so far as may be necessary to carry into effect liens acquired before this act takes effect." The clear purpose of the act was to provide a new system as to these liens, and to repeal the old one as to all liens to be thereafter created, but to continue it in force as to all existing liens. This construction is sanctioned and required by the rule of law that every statute shall be construed as having prospective operation only, unless its express letter or clearly manifested intention requires that it should have retroactive effect; and that, if all the language .of the statute can be satisfied by giving it prospective operation it shall have such operation only. (Calkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb., 306; Johnson v. Burrell, 2 Hill, 238; Fairbanks v. Wood, 17 Wend., 329; Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 188; Trist v. Cobens, 19 Abb., 143; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John., 499; Jackson v. Van Zandt, 12 id., 168; Sayre v. Wisner, 8 Wend., 662; Palmer v. Conly, 4 Denio, 376; Hackley v. Sprague, 10 Wend., 114.)
The learned judge, therefore, erred, at the trial term, in defeating plaintiff, upon the ground specified by him, and the judgment must be reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event. v