Case Name: WOOLCOTT v. SHUBERT et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-07-09
Citations: 154 N.Y.S. 643
Docket Number: 
Parties: WOOLCOTT v. SHUBERT et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 154
Pages: 643–649

Head Matter:
WOOLCOTT v. SHUBERT et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 9, 1915.)
1. Injunction @=94—Gbounds—Existence oe Statutoby Remedy.
Civil Rights Law (Laws 1895, c. 1042; Consol. Laws, e. 6, as amended by Laws 1913, e. 265) § 40, declares that all persons are entitled to full and equal accommodations and privileges of any place of public amusement, including theaters, and that no proprietor, etc., of any such place shall deny such accommodations and privileges, and section 41 provides a penalty for violation of section 40, recoverable by the person aggrieved thereby, and declares the offense a misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment, or both. Plaintiff, a newspaper writer and dramatic critic, was excluded from theaters controlled by defendants, who also threatened his future exclusion. Held, that whatever rights plaintiff had were based on the statute, there being no such right at common law, and that, assuming that the statute expressly secured to all full and equal accommodations and privileges at theaters, and that the exclusion of plaintiff violated the statute, the statutory remedy was exclusive, so that injunction would not lie.
<g=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered- Digests & Indexes
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 165; Dec. Dig. <&=94.]
2. Injunction <§=94—Grounds—Multiplicity op Suits.
Nor would injunction lie on the ground that it would prevent a multi- . plicity of suits, where it was not alleged that even one action for a penalty had been tried or commenced.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 165; Dec. Dig. <§=94.]
3. Injunction <§=94—Grounds—Inadequacy oe Remedy at Law.
Nor would injunction lie on the ground that the exclusive remedy provided by statutes was inadequate, since such remedy was entirely adequate.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 165; Dec. Dig. <§=94.]
Dowling, J., dissenting.
<gzs?For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Aciion by Alexander Woolcott against Lee Shubert and others. From an order granting an injunction pendente lite, defendants appeal. Order (90 Misc. Rep. 474, 154 N. Y. Supp. 754) reversed and motion denied.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and CLARKE, SCOTT, DOWLING, and HOTCHKISS, JJ.
Charles H. Tuttle, of New York City (William Klein, of New York City, on the brief), for appellants.
Alfred A. Cook, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The plaintiff is a newspaper writer and dramatic critic. The defendants are engaged in the business of conducting theaters and other places of amusement in the city of New York and elsewhere. Owing to the unfavorable character of some of the criticisms written and printed by plaintiff concerning certain plays produced by defendants, the latter have refused to permit him to enter any theater controlled by them, and threaten so- to prevent him in the future. The reason given by defendants for so excluding plaintiff is that, as they consider, his articles were not fair reviews or criticisms of the plays produced or of the productions or of the acting, but were biased and improper and inaccurate. Plaintiff denies bias, and asserts in effect that his criticisms expressed his honest opinions and were fair and impartial. Much of the voluminous appeal book is taken up with matter designed to bear upon this issue, but, in the view we take of the case, the question thus raised is immaterial.
Whatever rights the plaintiff has for redress against defendants' acts must rest upon sections 40 and 41 of the Civil Rights Law. Section 40 of that law as it stands at present (chapter 265, Laws 1913) differs widely in phraseology, and perhaps in effect and intent, from the section which preceded it (chapter 1042, Laws 1895) and under which nearly all of the so-called civil rights cases in this state have been decided. Sections 40 and 41 of the present act read as follows:
"Sec. 40. Equal Rights in Places of Public Accommodation, Resort or Amusement.—All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be enti tied to the full and equal accommodations, advantages and privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employé of any such place, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages or privileges thereof, or directly or indirectly publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed or color, or that the patronage or custom thereat, of any person belonging to or purporting to be of any particular race, creed or color is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. The production of any such written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, purporting to relate to any such place and to be made by any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, superintendent or manager thereof, shall be presumptive evidence in any civil or criminal action that the same was authorized by such person. A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning of this article, shall be deemed to include any inn, tavern or hotel, whether conducted for the entertainment of transient guests, or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, any restaurant, eating house, public conveyance on land or water, bathhouse, barber shop, theater and music hall. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the mailing of a private communication in writing sent in response to a specific written inquiry.
"Sec. 41. Penalty for Violation.—Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby or by any resident of this state, to whom such person shall assign his cause of action, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the plaintiff or the defendant shall reside; and shall, also, for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor. more than five hundred" dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment."
The former act was generally construed as forbidding only discrimination founded on racial considerations. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the present act is much wider in its scope and purport, and forbids all discrimination by those controlling places of public resort, confining the prohibition or discrimination as to race, creed, or color to the communications, notices, and advertisements mentioned in section 40. Without passing at present upon this contention we shall assume for the purpose of this appeal, but without deciding, that the act now in force expressly secures to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state the full and equal accommodations, advantages, and privileges of theaters, as well as other places of resort and amusement, and that in discriminating against plaintiff the defendants violated the statute.
The question remains whether, admitting all that plaintiff claims as to the scope and effect of the statute, he is entitled to resort to equity for relief by way of injunction. Whatever right plaintiff has to claim admittance to defendants' theaters against their will must be based upon the statute, for at common law he would have had no such right. Collister v. Hayman, 183 N. Y. 250, 76 N. E. 20, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188, 111 Am. St. Rep. 740, 5 Ann. Cas. 344; People ex rel. Burnham v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 82 N. E. 169, 12 Ann. Cas. 420; Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351-355, 96 N. E. 736, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204. Section 41 of the act above referred to imposes severe punishment upon any person who may violate it, both by way of penalty to be recovered by the person aggrieved in a civil action, as well as by conviction for a misdemeanor. The general rule is that where a statute creates a right and prescribes a remedy for its violation, that remedy is exclusive, and neither an action for damages nor for an injunction can be maintained. In Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns. 175, Harris sued Almy in the court below for damages for disturbing him in the enjoyment of a ferry, and had judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, because whatever right Harris had to be left undisturbed was derived from a statute which also provided a penalty. The court said:
"If Harris had possessed a right, at the common law, to the exclusive enjoyment of this ferry, then the statute giving a remedy in. the affirmative, without a negative expressed or implied, for a matter authorized by the common law, he might, notwithstanding the statute, have his remedy by action at the common law. 1 Comyns' Dig. Action on Statute C. But Harris had no exclusive right at the common law, nor any right but what he derived from the statute; consequently he can have no right, since the statute, but those it gives; and his remedy therefore must be under the statute, and the penalty only can be recovered."
The same rule thus applied to an action for damages on the case must equally apply to an action for an injunction, for the right to an injunction depends upon the necessity for preventing a legal injury from which damages may result, and if plaintiff can establish no case for claiming damages, he can show no ground for an injunction. "In such a situation it goes without saying that a court of equity cannot be invoked to aid a plaintiff unless some other ground for its interference be shown." Marlin Firearms Co. v. Schields, 171 N. Y. 384-391, 64 N. E. 163, 165 (59 L. R. A. 310).
The plaintiff, while not disputing the general rule above stated, insists that this case is outside the rule for two reasons. The first is that equity will interfere by injunction to- prevent a multiplicity of suits. By this we understand to be meant a multiplicity of suits for the penalties prescribed by the statute. The difficulty with that suggestion is that it is not alleged that even one action for a penalty has been tried or even begun. In Troy & Boston R. R. Co. v. Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & Western Railway Co., 86 N. Y. 107-128, the Court of Appeals said:
"The complaint and proof is of a trespass, but there is neither allegation nor proof showing the injury to be irreparable. There is no allegation showing multiplicity of suits pending or expected; and, while there is a finding by the court that a remedy can only be partially obtained by a great multiplicity of actions at law, there is no evidence that any such action has been tried or even brought. This the general rule requires, and we find nothing in the case to make it an exception. Against whom will the suits be required? If against the defendant, it will be time enough to urge that plea when by one action the plaintiff's legal right shall have been established, and its adversary still offends. For aught that now appears, one action at law will suffice."
The second reason urged by plaintiff why he should be awarded equitable relief is that the remedy provided by the statute is inade quate, and he cites to us several well-known, cases to the effect that the general rule that the remedy provided by statute is exclusive is only applicable when the remedy so provided is adequate. Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 150, 14 Am. Rep. 202: People ex rel. Hatzel v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; McLean y. Myers, 134 N. Y. 480, 32 N. E. 63. The answer to this objection is that, in our opinion, the statutory remedy is entirely adequate. Our conclusion is that the order appealed from must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion for an injunction pendente lite denied, with $10 costs.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and CLARKE and HOTCHKISS, JJ., concur.