Case Name: Lonnie GARRETT, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1972-06-14
Citations: 481 S.W.2d 225
Docket Number: No. 57680
Parties: Lonnie GARRETT, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
Judges: SEILER, MORGAN, HOLMAN, BARDGETT and HENLEY, JJ., concur; FINCH, C. J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 481
Pages: 225–229

Head Matter:
Lonnie GARRETT, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. 57680.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
June 14, 1972.
Edward F. O’Herin, New Madrid, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O’Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Neil MacFarlane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Opinion:
DONNELLY, Judge.
Appellant, Lonnie Garrett, on June 9, 1959, entered a plea of guilty in Mississippi County, Missouri, to a charge of burglary and larceny.
Thereafter, appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court of New Madrid County, Missouri, of robbery in the first degree (V.A.M.S.Sec. 560.120), and his punishment was assessed under the Habitual Criminal Act (V.A.M.S. Sec. 556.280) at imprisonment for a term of thirty years (V.A.M.S. Sec. 560.135). On his direct appeal, this Court held that the findings of the trial court as to the prior conviction were insufficient under V.A.M.S. Sec. 556.280, supra, and remanded the case for new findings and resentence (State v. Garrett, Mo.Sup., 416 S.W.2d 116).
Thereafter, the trial court made findings under the Habitual Criminal Act and sentenced appellant to imprisonment for a term of twenty years. Appellant again appealed to this Court and his judgment of conviction was affirmed (State v. Garrett, Mo.Sup., 435 S.W.2d 662).
In 1969, appellant filed a motion to vacate sentence under Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., relying upon Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319, and challenging the invocation of the Habitual Criminal Act on the assertion that he was without counsel when he entered a plea of guilty in Mississippi County in 1959. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, and on appeal this Court reversed and remanded the case for a hearing and finding in compliance with the law set forth in Losieau v. Sigler, 8 Cir., 406 F.2d 795 (Garrett v. State, Mo.Sup., 459 S.W.2d 378).
On October 28, 1971, a hearing was held in New Madrid County, and, on January 4, 1972, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, and denied the motion to vacate sentence. On January 13, 1972, appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court and to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District. A transcript on appeal was filed in this Court on March 22, 1972.
We must determine whether appellate jurisdiction is in this Court or in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District. Article V, Sec. 3, Const, of Missouri (as amended at special election August 4, 1970, effective date January 1, 1972) V.A. M.S., reads as follows:
"The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this state, the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, or any authority exercised under the laws of the United States, the construction of the revenue laws of this state, the title to any office under this state, in all appeals involving offenses punishable by a sentence of death or life imprisonment, and except as provided in this section, in other classes of cases provided by supreme court rule unless otherwise changed by law. The court of appeals shall have general appellate jurisdiction in all cases except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court."
We reach the following preliminary conclusions :
(1) Appellant's challenge to invocation of the Habitual Criminal Act, on the assertion that he was without counsel when he entered a plea of guilty in Mississippi County in 1959, raises issues which are governed by well-established principles and do not involve " the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this state State v. Kiplinger, Mo.Sup., 414 S.W.2d 547; State v. Jones, Mo.Sup., 466 S.W.2d 688.
(2) The "offense" involved in this case is robbery in the first degree because appellant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The offense of which appellant was convicted, and not the offense charged, is determinative on the question of jurisdiction. State v. Greenspan, 137 Mo. 149, 38 S.W. 582; State v. Woodson, 248 Mo. 705, 154 S.W. 705; State v. Supinski, Mo.App., 378 S.W.2d 602.
(3) If robbery in the first degree is an offense "punishable by a sentence of death or life imprisonment," this appeal from a ruling under S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., is an appeal "involving" such offense, and jurisdiction is in this Court.
(4) The offense of robbery in the first degree (not by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon) is punishable by a sentence of five years as a minimum and life imprisonment as a maximum. V.A.M.S. Secs. 560.135 and 546.490; State v. De Shon, 334 Mo. 862, 68 S.W.2d 805.
(5) The essential question then is: what is meant by the phrase "punishable by a sentence of death or life imprisonment" ?
We have concluded that the phrase "punishable by a sentence of death or life imprisonment" embraces "only those offenses having as alternative punishments life imprisonment or death," and "does not embrace offenses which have a sentence of less than life imprisonment as a minimum and a maximum of either life imprisonment or death." Jaramillo v. District Court, Colo., 480 P.2d 841, 842, 843 (1971). In Missouri, for example, murder in the first degree has alternative punishments of death or life imprisonment. V.A.M.S. Secs. 559.010 and 559.030.
The amendment of August 4, 1970, reaffirms the duty of this Court to exercise "general superintending control over all inferior courts and tribunals" in Missouri (Art. V, Sec. 4). This Court now has authority to perform this function, generally under Art. V, Sec. 4, and specifically under Art. V, Sec. 10. For example, we have entered an order, effective this date, directing all districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals, until further order of this Court, to transfer to this Court, before opinion (Art. V, Sec. 10), all appeals (direct or under Rule 27.26) involving convictions wherein the death penalty is imposed.
We believe this authority to transfer cases .before opinion, under Art. V, Sec. 10 supra, obviates the necessity, at least for the present, to provide by rule of this Court for an enlargement of our mandatory jurisdiction under Art. V, Sec. 3, supra.
The Missouri Court of Appeals is a court of general appellate jurisdiction. This Court "only has such appellate jurisdiction as has been specifically conferred upon it by the Missouri Constitution." Ward v. Consolidated School District, 320 Mo. 385, 389, 7 S.W.2d 689, 690.
Appellant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Robbery in the first degree is not an offense "punishable by a sentence of death or life imprisonment." This Court does not have jurisdiction of this appeal.
The cause is ordered transferred to the Springfield District of the Missouri Court of Appeals.
SEILER, MORGAN, HOLMAN, BARDGETT and HENLEY, JJ., concur; FINCH, C. J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed.