Case Name: PRATER v. THE STATE; THOMAS v. THE STATE; TOMLINSON v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2001-01-08
Citations: 273 Ga. 477
Docket Number: S00A1684; S00A1685; S00A1686
Parties: PRATER v. THE STATE. THOMAS v. THE STATE. TOMLINSON v. THE STATE.
Judges: Fletcher, P. J., Hunstein and Thompson, JJ., and Judge Herbert E. Phipps concur. Benham, C. J., and Carley, J., dissent. Hines, J., disqualified.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 273
Pages: 477–491

Head Matter:
S00A1684.
S00A1685.
S00A1686.
PRATER v. THE STATE. THOMAS v. THE STATE. TOMLINSON v. THE STATE.
(545 SE2d 864)

Opinion:
Sears, Justice.
After appellants were convicted of felony murder based upon armed robbery and also convicted of aggravated assault, the trial court held that they were entitled to a new trial due to: (1) insufficient evidence to support the felony murder convictions, and (2) an erroneous jury instruction. Thereafter, on the State's motion, the trial court vacated its findings that there was insufficient evidence to support the felony murder convictions, and amended the new trial > order to hold that appellants were entitled to a new trial due only to an erroneous jury instruction. The trial court then denied appellants' motions in autrefois acquit and pleas of double jeopardy. Appellants appeal from that ruling. We conclude that the evidence of record fails to support appellants' convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery, and that double jeopardy attaches to the State's announced effort to retry appellants for that crime and for felony murder based upon criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Therefore, we must reverse.
The evidence of record shows that appellants discussed robbing a Little Caesar's Pizza restaurant. Thereafter, appellants proceeded to the restaurant and knocked on the back door, carrying with them a 12-gauge shotgun and a red pizza delivery bag. Jonathan Tripp, an employee of the restaurant, responded to the knocks, believing them to be from a friend. When Tripp opened the door, the shotgun was discharged, killing Tripp and injuring restaurant employee Kyle Parenteau. Appellants then fled the scene. It is indisputable that there is no evidence of record to indicate that any money or valuables were taken from the restaurant, or that any of the appellants entered the restaurant premises after the fatal shot was fired.
Appellants were jointly indicted for one count of malice murder; two counts of felony murder — based upon armed robbery and aggravated assault, respectively; and aggravated assault. At appellants' trial, the court specifically asked the State if it wanted the jury to be given a charge on attempted armed robbery. At first, the State declined to have this charge given to the jury, but it later filed an amended request to add the charge. Eventually, though, the State announced that it was withdrawing its request to charge the jury on attempted armed robbery, and for that reason, the charge was not given by the trial court.
All three appellants were found guilty of felony murder, with armed robbery as the underlying felony. All three appellants were found not guilty of malice murder and felony murder based upon aggravated assault. Appellants Prater and Tomlinson were found guilty of aggravated assault. Appellant Thomas was found not guilty of aggravated assault.
On appellants' motion, the trial court granted a new trial on two grounds: (1) the evidence did not support the convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery; and (2) the jury did not receive correct instructions to establish felony murder convictions based upon a lesser included offense. The State sought reconsideration of the new trial ruling, and the trial court vacated its finding of insufficient evidence to support the felony murder convictions, but reaffirmed the granting of a new trial due to the inadequate jury instruction. Thereafter, appellants filed a motion in autrefois acquit and an accompanying plea of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion and the plea, and appellants now appeal to this Court.
1. As was initially found by the trial court, our review of the record requires us to conclude that there was insufficient evidence upon which to convict appellants of felony murder based upon armed robbery. Armed robbery is committed when, with the intent to commit theft, one takes property from another by the use of an offensive weapon. The distinguishing characteristic of an armed robbery is the taking of another's property by the use of force or intimidation. Because a taking or a theft is an essential element of armed robbery, it must be established in order to prove that an armed robbery occurred.
The evidence of record in this matter shows that there was no evidence that a taking or a theft occurred at the time of the murder. There is no evidence to show that the assailants took any money or items from the restaurant or its employees, or even that appellants entered the restaurant, after firing the fatal shot from the doorway threshold. Due to the complete absence of evidence to establish the essential element of a taking or a theft, the State failed to carry its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants committed the underlying felony of armed robbery.
Because armed robbery served as the sole predicate for appellants' felony murder convictions, the State's failure to prove armed robbery must necessarily result in the setting aside of appellants' felony murder convictions. Without sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellants committed armed robbery, the evidence also fails to support the convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery.
2. The State urges that appellants' felony murder convictions should be affirmed because under the facts of this case, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery may serve as the underlying felony. The State argues that the evidence of record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants committed the underlying offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Pretermitting whether the evidence of record would support a conclusion that appellants were attempting to commit armed robbery when Jonathan Tripp was killed, we must disagree with the State's assertion that appellants' felony murder convictions can be affirmed based upon attempted armed robbery.
As pointed out by the State, our case law provides that:
[A] felony which is an included offense of another felony which is charged in an indictment may constitute the underlying felony upon which conviction of felony murder may be grounded, given adequate proof and correct jury instructions. Correct jury instructions must identify the included offense as a felony, and must specify its essential elements, as well as the elements of felony murder.
This principle does not, however, support the State's argument that criminal attempt to commit armed robbery can support appellants' felony murder convictions. Contrary to the State's argument, the trial court's charge to the jury in this matter did not include a correct instruction on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. The State urges that the trial court's instruction to the jury that," [a] homicide is committed in the carrying out of a felony when it is committed by the accused while engaged in the performance of any act required for the full execution of the felony," was an adequate charge on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Quite to the contrary, this instruction is taken almost verbatim from the Suggested Pattern Jury Instruction concerning murders that are committed during the commission of a felony. Thus, it is simply not the case in this matter that the trial court's charge, while not expressly instructing on attempted armed robbery, otherwise included the principles that form the foundation of that particular crime. Because an adequate charge on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery was not given to the jury, that crime cannot serve as a basis for appellants' felony murder convictions.
3. The record shows that the trial court inquired whether the State wished the jury to be charged on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. After initially declining the charge, the State requested that the charge be given, and then changed its tactic and specifically asked that the trial court not charge the jury on attempted armed robbery. The transcript does not reveal the State's reason for withdrawing its request to charge. However, regardless of why the State elected not to have the jury charged on attempted armed robbery, our case law states that a party to a criminal prosecution will not be heard to complain about the failure to charge a lesser included offense that is not alleged in the bill of indictment unless a timely written request to make such a charge is submitted to the trial court. Thus, by failing to request an adequate instruction on attempted armed robbery from the trial court, the State has waived all claims on appeal relative to the instruction's omission from the trial court's overall charge.
4. Contrary to the position urged by Justice Carley^s dissent, the State is constitutionally estopped from retrying appellants for felony murder based upon attempted armed robbery. Because the Georgia Code "expand[s] the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions," all "questions of double jeopardy in Georgia must now be determined under [OCGA § 16-1-6, 16-1-8 and 16-1-7] "
Generally speaking, re-prosecution is not barred under the Georgia Code if an initial conviction is reversed on appeal, unless there is a finding on appeal that the evidence did not authorize the verdict. It is axiomatic that where an appellate court determines that the evidence at a first trial was insufficient to authorize a guilty verdict, a second prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy concerns expressed in our Georgia Code, as well as our State and Federal Constitutions. Thus, our reversal of appellants' convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery due to insufficient evidence raises a procedural double jeopardy bar to any re-prosecution for that particular crime.
Furthermore, under OCGA § 16-1-7, when several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the State at the time of trial, the crimes must all be prosecuted in a single action. Otherwise, the procedural double jeopardy protections of OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) forbid the State from prosecuting in a second action crimes that were omitted from the first prosecution. "Offenses arising from the same conduct, within the jurisdiction of a single court, must be prosecuted in a single action." Otherwise, successive prosecutions are barred by procedural double jeopardy.
Moreover, where a defendant is tried and convicted of a crime, and that conviction is reversed due to insufficient evidence, procedural double jeopardy bars re-prosecution for that same crime and any lesser included crime. A lesser or greater included offense is treated as the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Thus, in this matter, our reversal of appellants' convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery due to insufficient evidence not only raises a procedural double jeopardy bar for that particular crime, it also raises a procedural double jeopardy bar for the lesser-included offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery.
5. This Court may not order the trial court to enter judgments of conviction and sentence appellants for felony murder based upon attempted armed robbery without the benefit of retrial, as urged by Chief Justice Benham's dissent. Neither appellate precedent nor the Georgia Code authorizes this Court to order a trial court to enter judgments of conviction and sentences for a crime that was not indicted against an accused; that was not charged to the jury during trial; and for which an accused was not convicted at trial.
As explained in Division 4, supra, any attempt to retry appellants for felony murder based upon attempted armed robbery would violate the requirements of procedural double jeopardy. This Court may not avoid those constitutional requirements by ordering a trial court to dispense with a retrial and proceed directly to a second judgment and re-sentencing.
Finally, under this Court's own precedent, unless a jury is charged on a particular crime, no verdict may be rendered on that crime. When a verdict is rendered on a crime that was not charged to the jury, that verdict is illegal. Because in this matter the jury was not charged on felony murder based upon attempted armed robbery, a judgment of conviction and sentence for felony murder based upon attempted armed robbery would, under this Court's own precedent, be an illegal verdict.
6. For all of the reasons expressed above, the trial court's denial of appellants' motions in autrefois acquit and pleas of double jeopardy are reversed.
Judgments reversed.
Fletcher, P. J., Hunstein and Thompson, JJ., and Judge Herbert E. Phipps concur. Benham, C. J., and Carley, J., dissent. Hines, J., disqualified.
Only appellants Prater and Tomlinson were convicted of aggravated assault; appellant Thomas was found not guilty of that crime.
"A person . . . commits the offense of [felony] murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice." OCGA § 16-5-1 (c).
OCGA § 16-8-41 (a); State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 176 (476 SE2d 579) (1996).
Epps, supra.
OCGA § 16-8-41 (a); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 114-115 (303 SE2d 266) (1983).
Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 403 (207 SE2d 30) (1974); Kurtz, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia, p. 512 (3rd ed. 1991); 77 CJS Robbery 593, § 5.
Dillard v. State, 251 Ga. 858 (310 SE2d 518) (1984); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Dillard, supra.
"A person, commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." OCGA § 16-4-1.
(Emphasis supplied.) Dillard, 251 Ga. at 859.
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, Part 4 (B) (4) (2nd ed. 1991). The transcript includes a colloquy between the State and the trial court which indicates that the prosecutor may have believed that this instruction was sufficient to cover criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. However, we cannot conceive how this language can be construed to adequately instruct a jury on criminal attempt. Compare id., Part 4 (A) (1) (a proper instruction on criminal attempt states that: "A person commits criminal attempt to commit [a crime] when, with intent to commit [the crime], that person performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime [ ].").
Carter v. State, 263 Ga. 401, 403 (435 SE2d 42) (1993).
See State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1, 2 (222 SE2d 354) (1976); Williams v. State, 185 Ga. App. 633, 634 (365 SE2d 491) (1988).
State v. Warren, 133 Ga. App. 793 (213 SE2d 53) (1975).
Id.; Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596 (247 SE2d 92) (1978).
OCGA § 16-1-8 (d).
OCGA § 16-1-8; Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (219 SE2d 743) (1975). See 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII; United States Constitution, 5th and 14th Amendments.
OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) provides that: "If. . . several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution. . . ."
OCGA § 16-Í-8 (b) states that:
A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for a different crime, or for the same crime based upon different facts, if such former prosecution . . . [was] for a crime with which the accused should have been charged on the former prosecution (unless the court ordered a separate trial. . .), or is for a crime which involves the same conduct.
See Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 11 (98 SC 2141, 57 LE2d 1) (1978); Bethay v. State, supra.
Brock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 78, 80 (245 SE2d 442) (1978).
Id.; State v. McCrary, 253 Ga. 747, 748 (325 SE2d 151) (1985).
Stephens v. Zant, 631 F2d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1035 (102 SC 575, 70 LE2d 480) (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U. S. 862 (103 SC 2733, 77 LE2d 235) (1983) (applying Georgia law).
Id.; citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (97 SC 2221, 53 LE2d 187) (1977).
The dissent cites several Court of Appeals cases for the proposition that when there is evidence to establish the commission of a lesser included crime, conviction on that crime should be entered when a conviction for the greater crime is vacated, even if the jury was not charged on the lesser crime. The cases cited do not support this proposition. In the Interest of A. R, 236 Ga. App. 60 (510 SE2d 910) (1999), concerned an adjudication of delinquency and did not involve a jury trial or a jury charge. The available records in the other cases show that in those cases, the juries involved were charged on, and hence authorized to convict on, the lesser included offenses. See Donaldson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 532 (474 SE2d 722) (1996); Anderson v. State, 215 Ga. App. 426 (451 SE2d 103) (1994); Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 491 (420 SE2d 43) (1992); Platt v. State, 200 Ga. App. 784 (409 SE2d 878) (1991); Hogan v. State, 193 Ga. App. 543 (388 SE2d 532) (1989); Choate v. State, 158 Ga. App. 8 (279 SE2d 459) (1981). As stated above, no jury charge on the lesser offense was given in this case.
State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276 (444 SE2d 80) (1994). See Dillard, supra.
Id.