Case Name: Dunice P. BRASSEADX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray J. GIROUARD and Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1972-05-18
Citations: 269 So. 2d 590
Docket Number: No. 3804
Parties: Dunice P. BRASSEADX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray J. GIROUARD and Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before SAVOY, HOOD and MILLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 269
Pages: 590–605

Head Matter:
Dunice P. BRASSEADX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray J. GIROUARD and Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 3804.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 18, 1972.
On Rehearing Oct. 27, 1972.
Rehearings Denied Dec. 6, 1972.
Writs Refused Jan. 15, 1973.
Domengeaux & Wright by W. Paul Hawley, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. Minos Simon, and Ronald E. Dau-terive, Robert W. Mahoney and John Allen Bernard, Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, Lafayette, for defendants-appel-lees.
Before SAVOY, HOOD and MILLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Plaintiff Mr. Dunice P. Brasseaux appeals the jury determination that defendant Mr. Ray J. Girouard was justified in shooting him. We reverse and award damages.
Some issues relating to this case were decided in Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1968) and State ex rel. Brasseaux v. Spell, 238 So.2d 254 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970), writ refused on finding ". . .no error of law in the ruling complained of." 256 La. 855, 239 So.2d 359 (1970).
At about 7:30 p. m. on June 23, 1967, Girouard shot Brasseaux using his 16 gauge automatic shotgun. No witness suggested that visibility was obscured by darkness or obstructions. The incident occurred in open pasture. When shot, Bras-seaux was at least 35 feet north of Girou-ard (the investigating officer placed the parties more than 50' apart) and standing near to but on the far side of the east-west fence which Girouard had just constructed. There were at least two strands of barbed wire on the fence and there is no suggestion that Brasseaux was making a move to cross the fence.
Girouard's pickup truck was facing west and about 30 to 42 feet south of the fence. At the time of the shooting Girouard was behind the driver's side of the hood of his pickup truck or perhaps just in front of the left fender of his pickup truck. Seated in the passenger's seat of Girouard's pickup truck was his brother-in-law Mr. Jerome Judice. Girouard's son-in-law and two nephews (Judice's sons) were at the rear of the pickup truck or in the bed of the truck.
According to Girouard, at the time of the shooting, Brasseaux was some 100 feet from his own station wagon which had been parked heading east and located on the Brasseaux tract west of the scene of the incident. Seated in the right front seat of the Brasseaux station wagon was an employee (Mr. Wilmer Broussard) of a friend of Brasseaux.
Girouard admitted that he never saw that Brasseaux had a weapon either before or after the shooting. Vol. II, p. 13. But according to Girouard and his son-in-law and nephew, as Brasseaux walked from his station wagon to a point within two or three feet of the newly constructed fence, Brasseaux was shouting at Girouard and cursing Girouard. For the last 30 feet that Brasseaux walked toward Girouard, Brasseaux had his right hand concealed behind his back and was. shaking the fingers of his left hand at Girouard.
When Brasseaux started walking toward Girouard, Girouard was with hrs son-in-law and two nephews at the hack of his pickup truck loading tools. Girouard states that he became frightened because Brasseaux was hiding his right hand. While Bras-seaux walked toward the Girouard pickup truck (but on Brasseaux property), Girou-ard walked along the driver's side of his pickup truck (the truck was then between Brasseaux and Girouard) and picked up his shotgun together with two or four shells and loaded the gun (with one shell according to Girouard) as he walked to the hood of his truck. On reaching that point he aimed (Girouard says from the hip, but others said from the shoulder) and fired at Brasseaux's right shoulder. When Bras-seaux saw Girouard aiming at him, he tried to protect his face by putting both hands up. Brasseaux took the full load of number 7 shot in his empty right hand and his face, 'chest and left forearm. Brasseaux fell to the ground on his property some three feet from the fence. There he remained until sheriff's deputies and an ambulance arrived to take him to the hospital.
There was substantial hearsay testimony in the record to establish that Girouard had heard that Brasseaux was "a mean man, a drunkard and a trouble maker, a fighter, a bully." The evidence shows that Bras-seaux was guilty of the following offenses and received these sentences.
February 28, 1957 — Mayor's Court — Carenero— Fighting and Disturbing the Peace.
Fine $9.00 and costs.
March 5, 1957 — -Mayor's Court — Carenero—
Reckless Operation of an Automobile
Fine $9.00 and costs.
Disturbing the peace.
Fine $9.00 and costs.
April 6, 1957 — Mayor's Court — Carenero—
Reckless Driving of an Automobile
Fine $10.00 and costs.
Disturbing the peace.
Fine $10.00 and costs.
January 28, 1961 — Mayor's Court — Carenero— Disturbing the peace.
Fine $10.00 and costs.
October 7, 1961 — Mayor's Court — Carenero—
Fighting and Disturbing the peace.
Fine $9.00 and costs.
February 8, 1964 — -Mayor's Court — Carenero—
Drunk and Disturbing the Peace.
Fine $9.00 and costs.
October 30, 1964 — Mayor's Court — Carenero— Reckless Operation of an Automobile.
Fine $14.00 and costs.
October 1, 1964 — District Court — Lafayette— Resisting an Officer.
Sentence 60 days, suspended.
Disturbing the Peace.
Sentence 60 days concurrent, suspended
$150 peace bond provided for on his own recognizance.
There was no showing that Brasseaux was known to have carried a gun or to have had a reputation of having had or used a weapon.
Brasseaux's testimony was discredited by several witnesses called by Girouard. Brasseaux had testified that most of these witnesses were friendly to him.
During 1964 Girouard purchased the tract of land on which the fence was erected. Brasseaux bought the tract to the north in 1965. The neighbors were friendly until May of 1967 when two of Bras-seaux's pigs broke into Girouard's pig pen. Brasseaux obtained help from the Sheriff's office to help look for the two pigs. When they were found, Brasseaux indicated that he thought Girouard stole the pigs but the Sheriff's Deputy was convinced that Gir-ouard was innocent. No charges were filed but the neighbors were no longer friendly, each being satisfied that the other was at fault.
On or about June 9, Girouard started construction of the east-west fence to divide the two properties. The fence was being built along a previously surveyed line which had never been fenced. While Girouard was away, Brasseaux cut the wire from a portion of the fence and threw the wire in a nearby coulee. Girouard complained to a deputy sheriff and Brasseaux admitted to the deputy that he had cut the fence. No charges were filed. Girouard then employed the surveyor to resurvey the line and it was determined that the fence was being built about Jioths of a foot south of Girouard's north boundary.
About this time, Brasseaux was shopping at a neighborhood store and was overheard to say that he was going to ring Girouard's neck and throw him into the bayou. This conversation was reported to Girouard by another neighbor.
Some thirty minutes before the shooting, Brasseaux told another neighbor that he was going back in the woods where the property was located and if he met Girou-ard ". . . one of us is going to stay on the ground." This was not communicated to Girouard.
On this evidence defense counsel suggests that Girouard ". . . saw in (Brasseaux) a man of violence, a man given to action and imposing his will upon others threatening a man who was only trying to improve his own lot in life, moving toward him, hiding one arm behind his back all the while cursing and villifying him. Mr. Girouard was pushed to the wall. For him, there was no escape, there was no alternative. His only alternative was self-defense."
We do not agree. By his own testimony, Girouard was in a position behind his truck some 35 feet from Brasseaux. Brasseaux made no effort to cross the fence. Although Brasseaux was cursing and vilifying him and had his right arm behind his back, no weapon was observed. Girouard was armed with a 16 gauge automatic shotgun with two to four shells and ample time to load. Girouard had four relatives closeby while Brasseaux was standing alone.
In concluding that Girouard was justified in defending himself from what he reasonably believed to be imminent danger of great bodily injury, the jury was not instructed as to the applicable law. Since we review the facts as well as the law, we will not remand the case for another jury trial.
The privilege of self-defense in tort actions is well recognized by our jurisprudence. Where a person reasonably believes he is threatened with bodily harm, he may use whatever force appears to be reasonably necessary to protect against the threatened injury. Each case depends on its own facts, such as, for instance, the relative size, age and strength of the parties, their reputations for violence, who was the aggressor, the degree of physical harm reasonably feared and the presence or absence of weapons. Roberts v. American Employers Ins. Co., Boston, Mass., 221 So.2d 550 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1969), and authorities cited at 554.
The established rule is that a party who resorts to excessive violence and unnecessary force in repelling an assault, although initially acting in self-defense, becomes liable as an aggressor and is subject to an action for damages for assault and battery. Deville v. Wilks, 229 So.2d 128, 130 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1969). See also Tripoli v. Gurry, 253 La. 473, 218 So.2d 563 (1969).
A person is not justified in using a dangerous weapon in self-defense where the attacking party is not armed but commits the battery by means of his fists or in some other manner not essentially dangerous to life or limb. Bethley v. Cochrane, 77 So.2d 228, 231 (La.App.Orls.1955).
Brasseaux's bad reputation and his prior threats alone did not warrant the shooting. The force used by Girouard was excessive. Girouard's position behind the truck near four relatives and armed with an automatic shotgun was ample protection from Brasseaux who was at least 35 feet away, alone and not making an attempt to cross the fence. To the argument that Gi-rouard feared that Brasseaux's hidden hand concealed a weapon, we state that Girouard had the drop on Brasseaux and could have readily ascertained that Brasseaux was unarmed. We again note that no weapon was observed either before or after the shooting and that no evidence was offered to suggest that Brasseaux's bad reputation extended to carrying a weapon.
Having found that Girouard is liable for damages for shooting Brasseaux, we consider the defense raised by Girouard's liability insurer Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company. Insurer's alternative defense has been rejected for the reasons set forth hereinabove. The insurer's primary defense was that there was no coverage because Exclusion C excluded coverage where bodily injury or property damages were caused "intentionally by" the insured. Insurer argues that Girouard intentionally shot Brasseaux and the exclusion applies. They rely on Wigginton v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company, 169 So.2d 170 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1964); Areaux v. Maenza, 188 So.2d 633 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1966).
In Wigginton, the insured became impatient or angry because the driver of a vehicle parked behind him would not move to let the insured driver out of the parking place. The exclusion for "damage caused intentionally by the insured" was applied because the insured deliberately backed into the parked vehicle and caused plaintiff's injuries. In Areaux, the insured got the better of plaintiff in a fist fight. When plaintiff drove away insured followed in his car, overtook plaintiff and drove his car into the side of plaintiff's car knocking it into the ditch. The exclusion was again applied holding that "defendant deliberately and intentionally ran his car into plaintiff's."
We distinguish these cases. We find the language in the exclusion to be vague and uncertain. See Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal.Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966). The provision must therefore be construed against the insurer. Bowab v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 152 So.2d 66, writ denied 244 La. 664, 153 So.2d 881 (1963).
In the case before us, the fact that Girouard intended to shoot and hit plaintiff is not conclusive of the issue. His primary intent was not that of injury to plaintiff, but rather defense of himself. A person, in defending himself, may have an honest belief that he is faced with a situation calling for self-defense, when, in fact, a reasonable man would not so believe. Prosser, Law of Torts § 19 p. 110; Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1 § 311 p. 240. In such situations, he is in good faith. He is in the same good faith as when his belief is reasonable. But here, where his belief is unreasonable, or where he uses excessive force he is liable for damages. His intent never sways in either instance—it is always to protect himself.
Defendant insurer would have us place their insured in the predicament of forfeiting his liability insurance if he improperly gauges his situation and thereby becomes liable. If the insured acts reasonably his insurer is protected by the defense of justification. If he acts unreasonably his insurer is protected by his liability. We cannot condone such a result.
The crux of the reason why the insurer is held liable in this case is the reason why the insured is held liable. He is held liable not because his act is any less intentional than in a proper situation of self defense, but because his evaluation of the need for action was unreasonable. In both instances his acts are equally intentional and his motives the same—but in one he was reasonable, in the other negligent.
In Walters v. American Insurance Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 776, 8 Cal.Rptr. 665, 670, (Ct. of App., Div. 2, Calif.1960) the court interpreted part of a California Statute. We find the reasoning relevant to the case before us.
[2] Section 533 of the Insurance Code provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others." The meaning of "wilful act" as used in section 533, supra, was discussed in Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 164 Cal.App. 2d 83, 330 P.2d 432, 439, where the court states: "A 'wilful act' as used in this statute connotes something more blameworthy than the sort of misconduct involved in ordinary negligence, and something more than the mere intentional doing of an act constituting such negligence." A contention that it meant simply an act performed intentionally was rejected. If plaintiff acted in self-defense then although he "intended the act," plaintiff acted by chance and without a preconceived design to inflict injury just as though he were acting intentionally, although negligently, and injured someone. The Arenson case, supra, seems clearly to indicate that an element of wrongfulness or misconduct is connoted by an exclusion provision drafted as in the present case. Such a construction would also be consonant with the public policy provision in section 533 of the Insurance Code. (Emphasis added.)
Again in Davidson v. Welch, 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 75 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (Ct. of App., 1 Dist, Div. 1, 1969) the court had occasion to define the same statute with results also relevant. They distinguished an act done with malevolence, as distinguished from an act motivated by good intentions but founded in negligence.
The purpose behind the exclusionary clause in this case is to prevent extension to defendant of a license to commit whatever wanton and malicious acts he wished. However, where as here, an insured commits an act with a belief that he is properly defending himself, he is not excluded from coverage merely because he was negligent in reaching this assumption.
In this case, his liability revolves around negligence, not the intentional infliction of injuries. Therefore, his act falls more properly in the area of negligent torts rather than the intentional torts of assault of battery.
The exclusion does not apply. The policy limits on liability coverage are $25,000.-00.
QUANTUM
Brasseaux was hospitalized at the Lafayette Charity Hospital for 18 days, beginning at 2:40 a. m. on June 24, 1967. Thereafter, he was treated by the Veterans Administration Hospitals in Alexandria and New Orleans. He was hospitalized at Alexandria some 110 days during 1967 and 15 days in New Orleans during January 1968. Medical bills totaled some $6,000.00.
The undisputed testimony of Dr. James Gilly, orthopedic surgeon of Lafayette together with evidence in the hospital records proves that Brasseaux lost the use of his right hand as a result of the shooting. He had multiple shotgun pellet wounds, which caused damage to the median nerve at the right wrist and fractured bones in his right hand. The wounds became infected. The injuries led to a fibrosis of the muscles of his right thumb, a stiff thumb and great finger. He underwent several operations to restore the usefulness of his right hand and was fitted with two types of braces to prevent contraction of his fingers into a permanent fist. Brasseaux has a very sensitive area at the distal third of his index finger and on his thumb.
Brasseaux was regularly employed as an automobile mechanic at the time of the incident and had been so engaged for over twenty years. He earned $50 per week or $2,600.00 per year. He has been unable to work since the injury, and will be unable to return to full employment. He was 40 years of age at the time of the incident. His loss of income as of the trial date was approximately $9,000.
Brasseaux is entitled to an award of $40,-000.00.
The trial court judgment is reversed and set aside.
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that there he judgment in favor of plaintiff Dunice P. Brasseaux and against defendants Ray J. Girouard and Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company in the sum of $40,000.00 with legal interest thereon from judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of court both at trial and appeal. The judgment against Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company is limited to the limits of coverage set forth in its contract. (Exhibit P-8, Vol. S, page 205.)
Reversed and rendered.
HOOD, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.