Case Name: Coolidge, Respondent, vs. La Crosse City Railway Company, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1908-09-29
Citations: 136 Wis. 356
Docket Number: 
Parties: Coolidge, Respondent, vs. La Crosse City Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 136
Pages: 356–360

Head Matter:
Coolidge, Respondent, vs. La Crosse City Railway Company, Appellant.
September 10
September 29, 1908.
Street railways: Injury to passenger: Negligent handling of trolley rope: Custom.
While on the rear platform of one of defendant’s street cars and about to descend the steps, plaintiff was struck in the eye by the end of the rope attached to the trolley pole, which the conductor had thrown with one hand from the center window of the vestibule around to the side entrance thereof, intending to catch it with his other hand as it swung around. Held that, notwithstanding any practice or custom in vogue among defendant’s employees, the jury were warranted in finding that there was a negligent handling of the rope, that the plaintiff’s injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, and that a person of ordinary care ought to have foreseen that some injury would be likely to result therefrom.
Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for La Crosse county: J. J. Fruit, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Tbis action is brought to recover damages for tbe loss of an eye, alleged to bave been caused by tbe actionable negligence'of defendant, wbicb operates a street railway in tbe city of La Crosse. Tbe plaintiff was a passenger on one of tbe defendant’s cars and desired to leave tbe same at tbe end of its journey. While plaintiff was on tbe rear platform and about to descend from tbe car be was struck in tbe eye by tbe end of tbe trolley rope, and it is claimed that tbe blow thus received resulted in tbe loss of bis right eye. It appeared that tbe car in question was of tbe ordinary kind with a vestibuled platform at each end. On arriving at tbe end of its route tbe direction of tbe car was reversed by releasing tbe trolley from tbe wire and swinging it around and bringing it in contact again with tbe wire above tbe other end of tbe car. Tbis was done by means of a rope, one end •of wbicb was fastened to tbe trolley pole. There was a loop bound with wire on tbe other end, wbicb was passed through tbe window in tbe center of tbe vestibule and bung on a book on tbe inside. In swinging tbe trolley it appeared that tbe defendant’s employees sometimes disengaged tbe rope from tbe book and dropped it through tbe vestibule window, so that they were obliged to leave the car in order to get bold of it to swing tbe pole. It also appeared that conductors were in tbe habit of catching tbe rope some distance from tbe loop, extending one band through tbe window of tbe vestibule, swinging tbe rope around tbe side of tbe vestibule, and catching it with tbe disengaged band. It seems to be conceded that tbe distance that tbe rope would bave to pass was so great that tbe conductor could not reach through tbe center vestibule window and pass tbe rope around so as to catch tbe other end without swinging or throwing it. At tbe time in question tbe conductor attempted to pass tbe looped end of tbe trolley pole rope through tbe window in tbe center of tbe vestibule around to tbe side entrance by swinging or throwing tbe rope with one band and catching tbe looped end with tbe other. As plaintiff was on tbe platform of tbe vestibule and about to descend from tbe car the looped end of tbe rope, thrown by tbe conductor, struck him in tbe eye. Tbe eye became swollen and inflamed and plaintiff has lost tbe use of tbe same. About two years prior to this time plaintiff lost bis other eye through an accident and be is now totally blind.
Tbe jury found: (1) That tbe defendant was guilty of negligence which caused tbe injury to and loss of tbe sight of the plaintiff’s right eye. (2) That tbe injury to tbe plaintiff was tbe natural and probable consequence of defendant’s negligence. (3) That in tbe light of attending circumstances a person of ordinary care ought to have foreseen that some injury would be likely to result from such negligence. (4) That tbe injury to tbe plaintiff was not tbe result of an accident without negligence'of either party. (5) That tbe plaintiff was entitled to recover damages to tbe amount of «$10,000. Judgment was rendered on this verdict for tbe plaintiff. From such judgment defendant brings this appeal.
For the appellant there was a brief by Woodward & Lees, and oral argument by Q. M. Woodward.
For tbe respondent there was a brief by Higbee & Higbee, and oral argument by LJ. G. Higbee.

Opinion:
BaR,Nes, J.
Defendant assigns as error: (1) Failure of tbe court to direct a verdict in its favor; (2, 3, 4) refusal to change tbe answers to tbe first, second, and third questions in tbe special verdict from "Yes" to "No," and (5) refusal to enter judgment for defendant on tbe verdict as so amended. Substantially tbe same reasons are urged in support of defendant's motion for a directed verdict as are urged for modifying tbe special verdict so as to entitle tbe defendant to judgment thereon.
Tbe defendant's contentions are: (1) Tbe trolley rope was not bandied in a negligent manner. (2) Tbe injury was not tbe natural and probable consequence of tbe act. (3) A person exercising ordinary care ought not to have foreseen tbat some injury would be likely to result from defendant's alleged negligent act, considered in tbe light of attending circumstances.
Tbe jury found all these disputed questions of fact in favor of tbe plaintiff, and we think it was fairly within its province, on the evidence before it, so to do. Tbe rope in question was about one quarter of an inch in diameter, or perhaps more. There was a loop on the end of it fastened by wire. To "swing," "pass," or "toss" this rope (using the words of-the conductor in describing what he did) in such a manner that the looped end of it was liable to come in contact with passengers' eyes as they were leaving cars seems to us to clearly warrant the jury in finding that there was a negligent handling of the rope, notwithstanding any practice or custom that was in vogue. If the employees of the defendant chose to take this method instead of the safe one of dropping the rope out of the vestibule window and then walking around the end of the car and securing it, it should not have been practiced while passengers were alighting from cars. It is true that the blow, if such it might be called, was not attended with any great degree of violence. It is none the less true that the eye is an extremely sensitive organ and that a comparatively slight blow upon the eyeball may produce serious consequences, and it would be rather hard to escape the conclusion that the swinging of the rope in such a manner that the looped end of it might well come in contact with the eyes of passengers was a negligent act on the part of the conductor.
So, too, we think it was for the jury to say, upon the testimony offered, whether or not the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligence. The evidence is ample to warrant the conclusion of the jury. The same may be said of tbe finding of tbe jury to tbe effect that, in tbe light of attending circumstances, a person of ordinary care should have foreseen that some injury would be likely to result from defendant's negligent act. Tbe case before us is very similar to that of McQuade v. The Golden Rule (Minn.) 117 N. W. 484, in which a judgment for tbe plaintiff was sustained. There is ño error in tbe record.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.