Case Name: Benjamin C. Adams v. James W. George
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 374
Docket Number: 
Parties: Benjamin C. Adams v. James W. George.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 374–377

Head Matter:
Benjamin C. Adams v. James W. George.
Where there is a conflict in the evidence,, and the jury might well have found a verdict either way, this court will not disturb the judgment because the court below refused a motion for a new trial.
A court declares its determination upon a question properly submitted through its recorded judgment, and not through the' reasons, either relevant or irrelevant, that may be assigned for such judgment. Such judgment only is a proper subject of revision in this court.
Error from Guadeloupe. The case was tried before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
Adams sued George on a note, which purports to have been made by one Harrison to George, and, indorsed by George, passed into Harrison’s hands, and then put into market by the maker. After the lapse of nearly four years George was sued as assignor. There was no allegation that Harrison was insolvent when suit should have been brought. George plead, under oath, in defense, that he never indorsed or assigned the note; that his name written across it was a forgery; and that suit was not brought to the first term of the court, &c.
The want of the use of diligence was made the subject of special exceptions to the petition. The’se were overruled, and the cause went to a jury, and, on the plea of non est factum, they returned a verdict for defendant.
The liability, was fixed by protest. The maker of the note swore to its being an accommodation note, and swore positively that he saw George make the indorsement; and swore that he, the maker, was insolvent when it matured, and for eighteen months afterwards.
The preponderance of the evidence is against the note being in the handwriting of George, though many witnesses on both sides express doubt. One witness swore that George was in Shelbyville, Kentucky, at the date of the note.
The court submitted to the jury the issue'of the indorsement tel non.
W. E. Goodrich, for plaintiff in error.
—As to the liability of George, as indorser, our statute law does not apply, but lex loci contractus. (Raymond v. Holmes, 11 Tex., 54; Story on Bills, § 176.)
Allegation of presentment, demand, refusal of payment, protest', and notice to indorser, are sufficient, without alie gation of suit at first term. (Fisher v. Phelps, Dodge & Co., 21 Tex., 551.)
Reid v. Reid, 11 Tex., 581, for presumption that draft sued on was mercantile paper, and as to burden of proof to show the contrary.
In Cunningham v. The State, 5 Tex., 440, it was held, “That one positive witness, whose testimony is not impeached, is worth more than half a dozen who are not certain as to a given fact.” The first portion of the 3d instruction is not so strong as it should have been, and even its force was very much weakened by the subsequent part. “But it is the- peculiar province of the jury to determine on the weight of testimony, and to render their verdict in favor of that party in whose favor the facts and circumstances prep on derate. ”
John Ireland, for defendant in error.
—The exceptions to the petition should have been sustained. The note was hot between merchant and merchant. (Oliphant v. Dallas, 15 Tex., 140, 141; Locke v. Huling, 24 Tex., 312, 313.)
The liability of an indorser can only be fixed by protest, in cases between merchant and merchant. - (Patrick v. Payne, 21 Tex., 680.)
The reason given by the court for overruling the motion for a new trial amounts to nothing. If a ruling be correct, it matters nothing that the court assigns a wrong reason.

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—There is no error in the charge of the court. The statement of facts shows a conflict in the evidence upon the main point at issue, to wit, the execution of the indorsement of the note, which was denied under oath. The facts in proof upon that point seem to preponderate against the verdict, supposing equal credit due to all the witnesses. Still, there is no deficiency in the evidence on the side of the verdict. The jury might have found cither way, and there would have heen evidence sufficient to sustain their verdict. Under the facts thus presented, we do not feel warranted in interrupting the verdict.
It is contended that the judgment should be reversed, because the court below overruled the motion for a new trial, and assigned as the reason for it; " that the defendant's demurrer and special exceptions to the petition ought to have been sustained." This reason is entirely irrelevant to the motion, and it is hardly to be supposed that the district judge would have acted on that alone, had he believed it to have been proper to grant a new trial. Had he believed that the new trial should have been granted, it would surely have occurred to him, as the proper course, to set aside the verdict, and then, if the petition were not amended so as to make it good, dismiss the cause by sustaining the exceptions to the petition.
But, suppose the reason assigned were the only one upon which the court acted; it simply amounts to the fact, that the grounds set forth in the motion for a new trial were not considered by the court when it was being acted on. The only effect which that could have would be, to remove the presumption in favor of a verdict arising from its being sustained by the court upon a motion for a new trial. The action of the court in overruling the motion would none the less be the judgment of the court upon the motion. A court declares its determination upon a question properly submitted through its recorded judgment, and not through the reasons, either relevant or irrelevant, that may be assigned for such judgment. Such judgment only is a proper subject of revision in this court.
The judgment is therefore
Affirmed.