Case Name: BANCO INVERSION, S.A. and Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereins Bank, AG, Appellants, v. CELTIC FINANCE CORPORATION, S.A., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-08-03
Citations: 907 So. 2d 704
Docket Number: No. 4D03-3382
Parties: BANCO INVERSION, S.A. and Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereins Bank, AG, Appellants, v. CELTIC FINANCE CORPORATION, S.A., Appellee.
Judges: MAY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 907
Pages: 704–721

Head Matter:
BANCO INVERSION, S.A. and Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereins Bank, AG, Appellants, v. CELTIC FINANCE CORPORATION, S.A., Appellee.
No. 4D03-3382.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 3, 2005.
Jack R. Reiter and Robin Corwin Campbell of Adorno & Yoss, LLP, Miami, for appellants.
Chris Keith, Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
On Motion For Rehearing
STONE, J.
Appellants' motion for rehearing is denied. However, we withdraw our opinion of March 9, 2005, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
Banco Inversion, S.A., a Spanish company (Banco), appeals a non-final order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of long-arm jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Celtic, is a Panamanian corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its place of business is in Broward County. The company has never done business out of any other location. Its principal, Henry Forero, is a Florida resident.
Banco asserts that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida, that Florida lacks venue over Celtic's claims, and that the court also erred in denying Ban-co's motion to dismiss on forum non conve-niens grounds.
Celtic's claims include breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, fraud, and interference with contract. Celtic contends that Banco, in June 1999, retained Celtic as a business consultant and to prepare for placing bonds to be issued by Banco and sold in Europe. According to Celtic, the parties entered into an oral agreement for services to be rendered by Celtic. Banco initially contacted Celtic by fax, and the agreement was later reached by telephone. Banco agreed to pay for consulting services at an hourly rate and to reimburse expenses. Celtic asserts that all payments were to be made to Celtic in Florida. The parties also initially agreed that Celtic would have exclusive rights to manage the offering.
From June through September 1999, Celtic provided more than 150 hours of consulting services at its Florida office, including holding extensive telephone conferences with Banco and received over 500 calls and faxes from Banco. It also consulted during two visits to Banco's offices in Europe. Celtic contacted and arranged for other U.S. financial service firms to participate with it, and also arranged for the bonds to be printed.
Subsequently, in October 1999, the parties executed a document referred to as a "letter agreement," signed in Spain, providing for Celtic's managing and coordinating bond dealers in a syndication to market the bonds. This brief letter agreement made no mention of the services rendered by Celtic pursuant to the initial oral contract.
In January of 2000, Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereins Bank, AG, a German company (HVB), purchased Banco, which resulted in its terminating the Celtic relationship. Celtic alleged that Banco fraudulently misrepresented to it that the forthcoming issuance of the bonds was certain. Celtic also alleged that HVB knew of, and tortiously interfered with, the Banco/Celtic agreements and that Banco intentionally withheld the fact that it was seeking to sell the company, which would obviate the need for the bond funding.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding Florida had personal jurisdiction over Banco, applying the two-step inquiry recognized in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). Pursuant to Venetian Salami, the court must determine .whether the complaint pleads jurisdictional facts in order to sufficiently "bring the action within the ambit of the [long-arm] statute." Id. If so, the court must then engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there exists minimum contacts between Florida and the non-resident or, essentially, whether the non-resident "should reasonably anticipate being haled into [Florida] court." Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). Where the defendant files affidavits in support of its position, the burden is on the plaintiff to show by affidavit the basis for jurisdiction. OSI Indus., Inc. v. Carter, 834 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). This court reviews the trial court's denial of Banco's motion to dismiss de novo. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla.2002).
It must be noted that neither party sought to schedule an evidentiary hearing in the trial court to resolve any conflicts in their respective affidavits. Banco also does not raise trial court's the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing as an issue on appeal, although it does request in its brief that if this court does not dismiss, that we remand for an evidentiary hearing. There was a hearing at which the court considered the representations of counsel together with affidavits. There was no objection to this procedure.
The record reflects that Banco contacted Celtic, in Florida, and Celtic agreed to provide its services to Banco. It is further uncontested that, while Celtic traveled to Spain and rendered consulting services at Banco's Spanish offices, Celtic also logged extensive hours of consulting and performed other services from its Florida offices. Banco does not deny that Celtic may be entitled to compensation for the services rendered in Florida.
Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a non-resident of the state submits to the jurisdiction of a Florida court for any cause of action arising from a variety of acts taken within the state. These acts include:
(a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state of having an office or agency in this state.
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
⅜ ‡ ⅜
(g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.
§ 48.193(l)(a)-(b), (g), Fla. Stat. (2003).
Celtic, by pleading and affidavit, asserts breach of an oral contract, an agreement to make payments (including an hourly rate for senior advisors), an agreement to reimburse expenses, and failure to pay. Celtic asserts that the agreement called on it to perform services which, as contemplated, it performed in Florida and elsewhere, involving numerous contacts by telephone and fax with Banco, meetings with third parties, and other preparations for the bond issue, as well as Banco's failure to pay. Payment of these services were to be made in Florida, and there is no indication that it was payable anywhere other than Florida. See, e.g., Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Pellerito Foods, Inc. v. Am. Conveyors Corp., 542 So.2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
We recognize that although the complaint alleges breach of contract, it does not explicitly reference section (l)(g). However, this is not significant where the complaint otherwise alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts. See Stewart v. Julana Dev. Corp., 678 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
It is clear that, although failure to make payment, alone, is not sufficient to bring a breach of contract claim within the ambit of section (l)(g), the failure to make payment, taken together with other facts, here, of services performed in the state and which could reasonably be anticipated to be performed in this state, is sufficient to prove that the defendant breached a contract in Florida by "failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Venetian Salami; Armaly v. Practice Mgmt. Assoc., 533 So.2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Unger.
The trial court also did not err in finding that Banco had the requisite minimum contacts with Florida.. Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides that "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity." In analyzing whether a nonresident has the requisite minimum contacts with a forum state to justify personal jurisdiction, courts should determine whether the non-resident's "conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 US. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559. In determining whether a nonresident satisfies the minimum contracts test, courts consider such factors as prior negotiations, expected future services, the contractual obligations of the parties, and the course of dealing between the parties. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).
In Ben M. Hogan Co. v. QDA Investment Corp., 570 So.2d 1349, 1350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), Hogan, an Arkansas corporation, contacted QDA, an investment banking firm doing business in Florida. The two agreed that QDA would assist Hogan in seeking financing to broker a two million dollar promissory note, possibly to foreign investors. Hogan maintained a relationship with the Florida firm through telephone calls, letters, and faxes. Id. The Third District affirmed the lower court's denial of Hogan's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1350-51. Further, notwithstanding that the two litigants had agreed that QDA would focus a substantial part of its search for investors outside of Florida, the court recognized that QDA still performed services on behalf of Hogan in Florida. Id. at 1351. Therefore, the facts indicated that Hogan "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Florida and must now answer for the consequences of that privilege in a Florida court." Id.
In Industrial Casualty Insurance Company. v. Consultant Assocs., Inc., 603 So.2d 1355, 1356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the appellant, a foreign corporation, contacted the appellee, a Florida corporation, for the purpose of obtaining its data conversion services. There, the appellant initially contacted the appellee at its Florida office and continued written communication with the appellee for the purpose of outlining and approving the agreement between the parties. Id. Since a substantial amount of services were performed in Florida, the court found the appellant had the requisite minimum contacts and purposely availed itself of the privilege to conduct business in Florida. Id. at 1357.
Here, Banco made the initial contact, and maintained the relationship with Celtic, through extensive letters and telephone calls. It is uncontested that, while Celtic traveled to Spain twice and rendered hundreds of hours of consulting services at Banco's Spanish offices, Celtic also logged hundreds of hours in consulting and other services from its Florida office.
Because we have confirmed jurisdiction under subsection (g), we do not reach whether Banco's oral contract with Celtic falls within the purview of section 48.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes.
We recognize that the October letter agreement included a forum selection clause, which stated:
This agreement-letter will be.governed by the laws of Spain and the parties submit irrevocably to the jurisdiction of the judges and courts of Madrid in everything concerning the compliance with the interpretation of the content thereof.
The trial court did not err in rejecting Banco's argument that the forum selection clause dictated that Spain was the required forum as to the issues raised in this complaint. The trial court reasoned that the short letter agreement contained no integration clause and dealt with only one, limited, aspect of the parties' relationship. The agreement covered only the subsequent management and coordination of the bond dealers, which is unrelated to the claims arising out of the prior oral contract for consulting work and printing of the bonds, or claim for quantum meruit compensation based on the same facts.
We also affirm the trial court's denial of Banco's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The record reflects that the trial court considered the factors set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.016(a). In its order, the court identified the application of the rule, determining that Florida had personal jurisdiction and that factors of both private and public interest did not favor a transfer of the case to Spain. Further, the transcript of the hearing on Banco's motion to dismiss reveals that both parties fully apprised the trial court of the facts in rule 1.061, each having the opportunity to make arguments as to the factors. Finally, at the hearing, the court expressed its consideration of the private interest factors, stating that "[f]o-rum non conveniens doesn't seem to be a factor. Seems like flying from Miami to Madrid or Fort Lauderdale to Madrid by either side imposed no hardship.... "
Generally, a presumption favors a plaintiffs choice of forum; however, the presumption may be overcome if the forum would disadvantage the defendant's private interests. Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 90 (Fla.1996). Here, the court could find that Banco did not overcome the presumption that the factors of private interest favored Florida. First, the affidavit submitted by Celtic stated that Celtic is a small corporation with "limited financial resources" and would suffer prejudice from the expensive travel to Spain. Further, Celtic's claims arose in Florida. The record shows that although Celtic traveled to Spain on two prior occasions, Banco agreed to reimburse all the expenses incurred in Celtic's rendering of consulting services to Banco, some of which occurred here and some in Spain. While Banco, in an affidavit, contended that six witnesses it intended to call were located in Spain, it also listed six other witnesses from various other European countries; Celtic named eight Florida-based witnesses that it intended to call, as well as two witnesses from New York and one witness from California. As the court expressly found, travel posed no more of a hardship on either party. Therefore, the conclusion that Banco did not overcome the presumption that private interest factors favored holding the trial in Florida is reasonable.
Unless a court finds that the private interest factors are overwhelming in one party's favor, a court must also consider public interest factors. Kinney, 674 So.2d at 91-92. Generally, when examining public interest factors, a court's inquiry should focus on "whether the case has a general nexus with the forum sufficient to justify the forum's commitment of judicial time and resources to it." Id. at 92. Here, there is a sufficient nexus between the cause of action on the oral contract and the state of Florida.
We dismiss HVB's appeal of the denial of its motion to dismiss Celtic's claim for tortious interference, as the order, as to the HVB claim, is not an appealable non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. Peavy v. Parrish, 385 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
HVB also asserts that the trial court should have stayed the claim for tortious interference against HVB. The trial court recognized that the parties had entered into two separate agreements; one, an oral agreement and the other, a written letter agreement. Because the court recognized Celtic's claim that the oral agreement was for a contract separate and distinct from the October 1999 letter agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the resolution on the issues involving the oral contract did not affect the resolution of separate issues arising from the 1999 letter agreement so as to require a stay of the proceedings. Further, Celtic has agreed to dismiss, with prejudice, all of its claims in this suit arising from the letter agreement.
Therefore, the order is affirmed as to venue on the Banco claims and dismissed, without prejudice, as to HVB.
MAY, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. The only record reference in the trial court to an evidentiary hearing is a comment in Banco's reply memorandum of law, served several months prior to the hearing held on its motion to dismiss, to the effect that Venetian Salami requires a jurisdictional hearing where the affidavits cannot be reconciled. At no time was the need for an additional hearing, beyond that scheduled and conducted on July 10, 2003, requested of the court, nor is there any indication that the trial court would have denied such a hearing.
. Although section 48.193(l)(g) is not stated in the order as a ground relied on by the trial court, Celtic also asserts jurisdiction under this subsection.