Case Name: Domenic GROSSO a/k/a Domenic L. Grosso, Appellant, v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE on Behalf OF ACE SECURITIES CORP., Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2019-05-08
Citations: 275 So. 3d 642
Docket Number: No. 4D17-2874
Parties: Domenic GROSSO a/k/a Domenic L. Grosso, Appellant,
v.
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE on Behalf OF ACE SECURITIES CORP., Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 275
Pages: 642–648

Head Matter:
Domenic GROSSO a/k/a Domenic L. Grosso, Appellant,
v.
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., AS TRUSTEE on Behalf OF ACE SECURITIES CORP., Appellee.
No. 4D17-2874
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
[May 8, 2019]
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We deny the bank's motion for rehearing, but withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place.
The homeowner appeals an order denying his motion for attorney's fees following the bank's voluntary dismissal of its foreclosure action. We reverse because the voluntary dismissal rendered the homeowner the prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees.
HSBC Bank filed a foreclosure complaint against the homeowner, alleging it was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage. HSBC further alleged it was entitled to attorney's fees under the contract. A copy of the note attached to the complaint listed DB Home Lending LLC as the lender and the homeowner as the borrower. The note contained a specific endorsement by DB Home Lending to HSBC.
The homeowner filed an answer and affirmative defenses. In his affirmative defenses, the homeowner stated that the bank lacked standing, the bank did not have legal rights to enforce the note and mortgage, and the endorsement on the note was not valid and authentic. The homeowner also requested attorney's fees.
A year after filing the complaint, HSBC voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. The homeowner moved for prevailing party attorney's fees under the contract. Specifically, the homeowner alleged in the motion for attorney's fees that "[t]he Mortgage that was the subject matter of this lawsuit provided for costs and expenses if the Note holder was to enforce the Note" and that section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, made this provision applicable to the homeowner. HSBC opposed the motion, arguing that the homeowner's lack of standing defense precluded him from recovering fees. After a hearing, the trial court denied the homeowner's motion, finding that he failed to prove that he and HSBC were parties to the contract.
A trial court's determination of whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees based on a fee provision in the mortgage is reviewed de novo. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A. v. Fitzgerald , 215 So.3d 116, 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, operates to make a unilateral attorney's fees provision in a mortgage contract reciprocal. In order for a prevailing party to avail itself of section 57.105(7), both the movant and the opponent must be parties to the contract containing the fee provision. Madl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 244 So.3d 1134, 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
In denying the motion for fees, the trial court relied on Florida Community Bank, N.A. v. Red Road Residential, LLC , 197 So.3d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). In Red Road Residential , the borrower maintained throughout the litigation, including in sworn discovery, that she never signed the mortgage. Id. at 1114. Rather than litigating its claim against the borrower, the bank ultimately dismissed her from the lawsuit with prejudice. Id. Unlike Red Road Residential , the instant case did not involve any sworn discovery and the dismissal was without prejudice.
We find instructive Rodriguez v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust A , No. 4D18-310, 270 So.3d 367, 2018 WL 6528491 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 12, 2018). In that case, a borrower was found to be entitled to prevailing party fees after the bank's voluntary dismissal even though she had challenged the bank's standing throughout the lawsuit. This court found that "the parties never litigated the merits of [the bank's] standing below, and the trial court never made a finding that the Borrower was not a party to the note or mortgage." Id. at *2. Because the bank voluntarily dismissed the action without the trial court resolving the standing issue on the merits, the borrower was entitled to fees. Id. See also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Elkind , 254 So.3d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (finding borrower who raised lack of standing as affirmative defense was entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees following the bank's voluntary dismissal because the parties never litigated standing and "the trial court never made a finding that the bank or the borrower were not parties to the contract"); Harris v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , No. 2D17-2555, - So.3d -, -, 2018 WL 6816177, at *4 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 28, 2018) ("[P]roof of standing is not required to establish a contractual relationship between the parties.").
In this case, HSBC voluntarily dismissed its complaint, thus rendering the homeowner the prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees. Notably, the trial court never made a judicial determination that HSBC or the homeowner was not a party to the contract. Additionally, HSBC
maintained in its complaint a right to enforce the contract. Significantly, the copy of the note attached to the complaint contained a specific endorsement by the original lender to HSBC and listed the homeowner as the borrower. This should be sufficient record evidence to demonstrate that HSBC and the homeowner were parties to the underlying contract so as to justify attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(7). See Mihalyi v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. , 162 So.3d 113, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (implying that an evidentiary hearing is required for determining the amount of fees, not for determining entitlement to fees); Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ("A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation.").
The cases the dissent relies on are distinguishable, as none involve a voluntary dismissal without prejudice like the instant case. The dissent attempts to distinguish Rodriguez and Elkind by stating that those cases dealt with judicial estoppel or prevailing parties, and not with the burden for attorney's fees. But cases with the same facts should get the same result. A voluntary dismissal, without a judicial determination, should allow reliance on the reciprocal attorney's fees provision of section 57.105(7).
Based on the foregoing authority, the homeowner was entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees. We reverse and remand for the trial court to grant attorney's fees and determine the reasonableness of the amount sought.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Levine and Forst, JJ., concur.
Conner, J., dissents with opinion.