Case Name: MARIE DUTCHER v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1912-03-01
Citations: 241 Mo. 137
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARIE DUTCHER v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: The premises all considered, the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. Yalliant, G. J., and Ferriss, Kennish and Broion, JJ., concur; Woodson and Graves, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 241
Pages: 137–231

Head Matter:
MARIE DUTCHER v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
In Banc,
March 1, 1912.
1 NEGLIGENCE: Humanitarian Rule: Settled Law. Although plaintiff was a trespasser and, in full possession of all her faculties, walked for a quarter of a mile on defendant’s track without looking behind her for a train, it will not be held she was guilty of such palpable contributory negligence as defeats her recovery as a matter of law, regardless of defendant’s own negligence. Even under such circumstances, if those in charge of the locomotive saw her and realized her danger, it became their duty to do what they could, with the means at hand, to avoid injuring her. That is the humanity doctrine, which has become a fixed principle in the law of negligence. That rule is: When one is negligently upon a railroad track, unconscious of his immediate peril, and that peril is timely discovered by''those in charge of the engine, they may not punish him for his negligence by knocking him off, but must use due care to avoid injuring him.
2 -: -: Due Care. The gauge of due care arises precisely with the obvious danger and the circumstances of the individual case. In one case the monotonous stroke of the bell might be the due care which those in charge of the engine must use to avoid injuring a trespasser on the track;in other cases the alarm whistle timely given might be due care; in an extreme case nothing short of stopping the train would be due care.
3. -: -: -: Trespassers: Duty to When Seen. Those in charge of the engine are under no duty to lookout for a trespasser on the railroad track in the country away ' from congested populations and between public crossings, absent a known and permitted public user; but excepting the duty not to look out for trespassers, the duty to use due care not to kill or maim them if they are seen in time, is precisely the duty owed to those not trespassers.
4. -: -: Alarm Signals: Intervening Confusion. When a condition intervenes to confuse or, prevent a trespasser on the track from hearing an alarm signal, or where the conduct and actions of the trespasser walking on the track with his back to an oncoming locomotive should cause an engineer of ordinary prudence to conclude that such party does not or cannot hear alarm signals, and he continues to ■ walk on the track, the right of the engineer to act upon the presumption that the trespasser will leave the track before being struck eeases.
5. -: -: Duty to See: Applicable to Defendant. He who shuts his eyes when to open them and look is to see, is presumed to see. And this truism applies to defendant as well as to plaintiff, when due care requires defendant to see.
6. -: -: Duty to Woman on Track. The engineer of a train is chargeable with the duty to know and realize that the actions of a young woman walking on a railroad track, with her back to him, in the open country between public crossings, her hat in her hand, never looking back and apparently oblivious to danger, unmistakably indicate that she has not heard the crossing signals behind her. It is not natural for a woman to trifle with death by remaining on the track after hearing the alarm signals behind her; and natural instincts constitute evidence to men of sense.
7. -: -: -; Noise from Train on Near-by Track. On parallel railroads, 100 feet apart, two freight trains . were moving in opposite directions. The one on defendant’s road was running extra, was 510 feet long, made up of twelve loaded freight cars, the rear four of which were non-air cars, ■■ but the other eight and the engine well equipped with air, and the train was running from' twenty-five to thirty miles an hour, on an upgrade of twenty-seven feet to the mile, on a track that lay on a fill. The other train consisted of twenty-five freight cars, was over 1000 feet long, running about twenty miles an hour on a slightly down grade, and made a great deal of noise. Plaintiff, a school teacher, nineteen years of age, in full possession of all her faculties, about 4:30 in the afternoon of September 6th, accompanied by a girl of ten years, left the public road at a crossing and walked north on defendant’s track, and at about one-quarter of a mile from the crossing was struck by defendant’s train which approached from the south. The afternoon was clear, bright and warm, and plaintiff, bareheaded and carrying a lunch satchel and a box of wild haws, faced steadily to the north, and neither she nor the child at any time looked back or in any wise indicated a knowledge that a train was approaching from behind. At the time the defendant’s train struck her the caboose of the other train was just opposite or had passed her 100 feet or so. The tracks were straight, unobstructed, and when defendant’s train was a mile or a mile and a half from plaintiff and the child, the engineer saw them going north on the track, with their backs to him, and thereafter kept them under his eye, and also saw the train on the opposite track coming to meet his and that the trains would meet each other just about the time his train would overtake her. He sounded the signal at the crossing, which she did not seem to hear. According to his testimony when he was 600 or 700 feet from her, and according to other testimony when he was 180 to 200 feet behind her, he simultaneously began to sound the alarm signals and turned on the full force of the emergency air, but she at no time heard the train and did not know until after she had regained consciousness what had struck her. The train stopped after striking her, and its south end was sixty-eight feet north of the point of the accident, that is, the train ran 578 feet beyond that point, though some witnesses say the distance was eleven or twelve hundred feet. There was testimony that it could have been stopped in 300 or 400 feet, if it was then running at the rate the defendant’s witnesses testified it was. The men on the train on the parallel road saw plaintiff’s peril and did their best to draw her attention, by shouting and motioning, to the defendant’s train bearing down upon her; but she supposed they were flirting with her, and at no time turned her head to look back. It is ad mitted that the train could not have been stopped after the ' alarm signals were first given before striking her. Held, first,, that á demurrer to the evidence should not have been sustained; second, whether or not the act of the engineer, with everything to be seen lying right under his eye, in allowing the situation to drift and delaying to attempt to stop ■ the train until the near approach and noise of the train on the other track made it a matter of doubt whether or not the alarm signals would reach her and be effective, was the exercise of due care to avoid striking her, was a question for the jury, and their verdict holding his act to be negligent cannot be disturbed by the appellate court; and, third, there being a conflict in the testimony as to whether the train was 700 or 180 feet from her when the alarm signals were first sounded • and the air brakes applied, that testimony also raised a question of diligence and care as to the time of giving the signals, which was for the jury.
Held, by WOODSON, J., dissenting, first, that there was no substantial testimony to contradict that of numerous witnesses that the danger signals were repeatedly given in ample time for plaintiff to have stepped from the track before being struck; second, that plaintiff unquestionably heard the danger signals, and that the engineer had the right to presume that plaintiff heard the signals and would step out of the danger line until he had reasonable ground to apprehend that she was ignorant of the train’s approach and had not heard the signals; third, that plaintiff was guilty of the grossest negligence, which continued down to the place and instant of her injury, and therefore the humanitarian doctrine does not apply to the case, since the rule is that, if the negligence of plaintiff continues down to the time of the accident that doctrine has no application; fourth, since the engineer had a right to presume that plaintiff would heed the alarm signals which she heard or could have heard had she not been negligent in not trying to hear, and since it was impossible to have stopped the train before striking her after the signals were given, defendant is not to be held to have failed to exercise ordinary care in not sooner attempting to stop the train; and, fifth, even though it be conceded that defendant was guilty of negligence in not sooner stopping the train, yet as her own negligence continued down to the very instant she was struck, the concurrent negligence of both should bar her recovery.
8. APPELLATE PRACTICE: Weight of Testimony: Matter for Jury. The Supreme Court has nothing to do with the weight of testimony in a law case. Its function is to say whether there was any substantial testimony. It will not uphold a verdict supported by only a mere glimmer or spark, a mere scintilla, of testimony;s but if there is .substantial testimony, however small as compared with the great body of proof, the appellate court has no right to meddle with the weight of it, or ignore it because negative in character. "
D. -: -: -: Negative Testimony: New Trial. Nor can the Supreme Court reverse a verdict for plaintiff though it rest alone upon testimony negative in character, if that testimony is substantial. Where the nineteen-year-old plaintiff was bareheaded and had good ears, yet neither she nor the ten-year-old child with her heard any alarm signal from the train approaching from behind, the appellate court will not say that the signals were sounded though several other witnesses, both interested and disinterested, positively testify they were sounded. The trial court, under such circumstances, might properly grant a new trial to defendant on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the credible testimony; but that negative testimony was substantial, and in the face of it the appellate court has no right to reverse a verdict for plaintiff, even if the failure to sound the alarm signals were the only issue of negligence in the case.
10. NEGLIGENCE: Pedestrian on Track: Failure to Stop Train: Depending on Alarm Signals: Confusion of Noises. A railroad engineer does not use due diligence in applying the emergency brakes, if a large train is passing on a near-by parallel track, making so much noise that the sounding of the alarm signals is drowned in its volume, and, depending on those signals to draw the attention of a trespasser on the track, he waits to apply the emergency brakes until it becomes impossible with the means at hand to stop the train before striking her. His duty, under such circumstances, is to stop before hitting her. And under the circumstances of this case the engineer knew or was bound to know, which amounts to the’ same thing, that he could not stop his train after he first applied his brakes before striking plaintiff.
11. -: -: Instruction: Reliance on Rumbling of Train to Give Notice. An instruction telling the jury that no warning signals were necessary until the engineer discovered that the trespasser on the track, within the sound zone of a much greater train on a near-by track, did not hear the rumbling of his train, was properly refused.
12. -: -: -: Not Looking. An instruction which precludes a recovery by the trespasser because she walked leisurely down the track without turning her head, and this although the jury believe “no signal was given nor effort made to stop the train,” should be refused. It Is not the law of a case falling within the humanitarian doctrine.
13. -: -: -: Due Care: What is Stopping and Signal Distance. An instruction declaring that an alarm signal at 600 feet from the pedestrian on the track was due care, and that the engineer was not required to stop the train when he came in stopping distance’ of her, was, under the circumstances of this case, properly refused. And so also was another instruction declaring as 'a matter of law that if the alarm signals and attempts to stop the train began 600 feet from plaintiff and continued until she was struck she could not recover, properly refused, for it invaded the right of the jury to determine what was due care under the peculiar circumstances of this case.
14. -: -: -: Noise of Another Train: Not Looking Behind. An instruction telling the jury that it was the imperative duty of the pedestrian on the track, because of the great noise made by a train passing in the opposite direction on a near-by track, to look behind to see if the train that struck her was approaching, and if she failed in that duty she could not recover, was properly refused. In effect, it was a mandatory instruction for defendant..
15. -: -: -: Wantonness: Humanity Rule. The court should not tell the jury in a case resting on the humanitarian rule that the railroad company owed no duty to a pedestrian walking on its track except to not willfully or wantonly injure her. The willfulness and wantonness doctrine is exploded. The touchstone of duty in the law of negligence is due care, not a shade less or more.
16. -: -: -: Alarm Signals Not Heard for Noises. An instruction based on the theory that if the alarm signals were timely given but could not be heard because of the noises made by a train on another near-by track, the pedestrian could not recover for injuries received by being run down by the train, is not the law of a case resting on the humanitarian doctrine. Due care does not, because of the noises’, exclude the duty to stop the train in time to avoid the injury.
17. -: -: -: Limiting Distance for Signals. An instruction declaring the law to be that if the whistle was blown from three to six hundred feet from plaintiff as she walked on the defendant’s railroad track with her back to the approaching train, and afterwards until she was struck, and the engineer did all in his power to save her after discovering she did not get off the track to avoid her own injury, then the verdict must be for defendant, under the circumstances of this case invaded the province of the jury, by limiting the distance in which the engineer was obliged to begin an effort to warn and save plaintiff to within three to six hundred feet, and therefore was properly refused.
IS. -: Pleading: Noises of Another Train: Proof. The noises of a train on another near-by track, and the fact that any experienced person observing that train going in one direction and the one which struck defendant going in the other could see that the two would pass about the place plaintiff was struck, are evidential matters, and proof of them may be made under a charge of a failure to use due care, without pleading them as specifications of negligence.
19. -: Trespasser: Instruction: No Duty Except to Sound Alarm. An instruction which excludes any duty of the engineer to a trespasser to stop the train under any circumstances is bad; and k modification by inserting the words “in the first instance” in the clause declaring that “the defendant owed to her no duty, in the first instance except to warn her by the usual signals of the approach of the train in time for her to step off the track and avoid being struck,” was more favorable to defendant than it was entitled to, since under the testimony the situation demanded the instantaneous application of the air brakes with the blowing of the whistle.
20. -: Excessive Verdict: $10,000. Plaintiff, nineteen years old, a school teacher, while walking on a railroad track, was struck by a train. She was taken up unconscious, remained unconscious for days, was injured on her head, an arm and leg were broken; she was disfigured, one of her feet and the toes of that foot are drawn out of place, making her clubfooted and lame, one arm is crooked and there is a catch in the elbow of it, and she is a cripple for life. Held, that a verdict for $10,000 is not excessive.
21. REMARKS OF COUNSEL: Reasonable Verdict, etc. The straying -by plaintiffs counsel in the heat of argument a little out of the record, for which he was admonished by the court, in a case which is not a close one, in which the size of the verdict does not show inflamed minds in the jurors, will not justify a reversal or a new trial.
Appeal from Adair Circuit Court. — Hon. Nat M. Shelton, Judge.
Arrirmed,
James L. Minnis and Eigbee £ Mills for appellant.
1. The court erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer at the close of all the evidence, a. It was admitted hy plaintiff’s counsel on the trial that defendant’s track was inclosed by lawful fences and cattle-guards; there was no evidence tending to prove that the track was used by pedestrians as a public high-' way; or that defendant acquiesced in occasional use of it by pedestrians; the court so found and declared by defendant’s instruction 13, and that plaintiff was a trespasser by defendant’s instruction 14. No exceptions were saved thereto; plaintiff agreed to the correctness of both instructions. Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 720 ; Frye v. Railroad, 200 Mo. 402; Hyde v. Railroad, 110 Mo. 272; 2 Thomp. Neg., sec. 1705. b. The petition charges that defendant’s servants in charge of the train negligently failed to warn plaintiff of the approach of the engine, or to sound the whistle o.r ring the bell at any time within one-fourth mile of her, or to use ordinary care to stop the train. These are the specific allegations of negligence, and are alleged to have been the cause of plaintiff’s injury. There was a total failure of proof of these allegations, and the case should have been withdrawn from the jury. McManamee v. Railroad, 135 Mo 440. Collins, the peddler, plaintiff’s witness, testified danger signals were given until plaintiff was struck, .but he did not know which engine gave them; the Katy train passed between him and the Wabash train, and he had no opportunity to observe when the train began checking its speed; his evidence on that point was without probative value. Bennett v. Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 703. c. The evidence was conclusive that plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence continuing down to the time of the accident; that she knew she was walking on defendant’s main track; that it was broad day light, the view unobstructed, and she at no time looked behind her or listened for the approach of a train. She was not only apparently, but in fact, in possession of all her faculties. The engineer had no reason to believe she would not hear the alarms and was not bound to anticipate she would not step aside. Her negligence, according to her own testimony, was unaccountably gross; was subsequent to the alleged negligence of defendant’s engineer, continued down to the time of the accident, and was the proximate cause thereof. She had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. 23 Am. & Eng. Eney. Law (2 Ed.), 761, 765'; 1 Tliomp. Neg. 235-241; Bogan v. Railroad, 129 N. C. 154; 3 Elliott on Railroads, secs. 1253,1254,1257a; Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546 ; Drown v. Traction Co. (Ohio), 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 421; Dyerson v. Railroad (Kan.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132, and annotations; Modiwell v. Railroad, 151 Fed. 421; Neal v. Railroad, 49 L. R. A. 684; Hoffard v. Railroad, 110 N. W. 446; Copp v. Railroad, 100 Me. 568; Williams v. Railroad, 40 So. (Ga.) 143; Finlayson v. Railroad, 1 Dill. 578; Holmes v. Railroad, 97 Cal. 161; Railroad v. Graham, 46 Ind. 239; Railroad v. McClaren, 62 Ind. 566; Railroad v. Walker, 113 Ind. 196; Campbell v. Railroad, 55 Kan. 536; Syme v. Railroad, 113 N. C. 558; Railroad v. Cook, 42 Neb. 905; Herring v. Railroad, 32 N. C. 402; McAdoo v. Railroad, 105 N. C. 140; Daily v. Railroad, 106 N. C. 301; Norwood v. Railroad, 111 N. C. 236; Cogswell v. Railroad, 6 Ore. 417; Tyler v. Sites, 90 Ya. 539; Railroad v. Judd, 10 Ind. App. 213: (d)' It was plaintiff’s duty to have given attention, heard the signals and left the track. . It was her misfortune if she was so absorbed she failed to take notice of the repeated warnings. By subsequently continuing to walk on the track until she was struck she was guilty of such contributory negligence as to defeat her re- . covery in this cause. Her negligence was the proxi mate cause of her injury, although the engineer might have been negligent in not stopping the train in time to avoid the collision. Yarnall v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 575; Sinclair v. Railroad, 133 Mo. 233; Prewitt v. Eddy, 115 Mo. 283; Woods v. Railroad, 188 Mo. 229; Candee v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 142; Bell v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 50; Maloy v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 275; Sharp v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 214; Tanner v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 497; Barker v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 50; Powell v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 80; Everett v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 54; Dlauhi v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 645; McGauley v. Railroad, 179 Mo. 583; Brockschmidt v. Railroad, 205 Mo. 435'; Cahill v. Railroad, 205 Mo. 393; Laun v. Railroad, 216 Mo. 563; Zumault v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 288; Ross v. Railroad, 132 Mo. App. 472; Sims v. Railroad, 116 Mo. App. 572; Bennett v. Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 703; Reyburn v. Railroad, 187 Mo. 565; Engelking A Railroad, 187 Mo. 158; Schmidt v. Railroad, 191 Mo. 215; Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 720; Stotler v. Railroad, 204 Mo. 619; Sissell v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 515; Holland v. Railroad, 210 Mo. 338; Davies.v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 1; McGee v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 530; Kinlen v. Railroad, 216 Mo. 145; Felver v. Railroad, 216 Mo. 195. (2) The doctrine of the last clear chance means a clear opportunity, and not a mere possibility. The court submitted the case upon mere estimates or guesses of distances, speed of the train, formed under the excitement of the impending catastrophe, and of the distance within which the train could have been stopped. The fact remains that danger signals were given, the full force of the brake power applied, the track sanded, and the bell rung continually for a distance of near ‘600 feet before plaintiff was struck, and the train did not stop in time to save plaintiff, and every one but herself was exhausting his utmost efforts to avoid the collision. It cannot be said there is any evidence of such gross negligence or reckless or wanton conduct as justified the court in submitting to the. jury to say whether or not the plaintiff ought to recover in spite of her own negligence. It requires more than a show: ing of a mere possibility that the accident might have been avoided in order to bring a case within the hur manitarian doctrine. Markowitz v. Railroad, 186 Mo. 350'; Boring v. Railroad, 194 Mo. 541; Neal v. Rail.' road, 126 N. C. 634.
Sanford B. Ladd, F. M. Harrington and Campbell & Ellison for respondent.
(!) Although plaintiff was negligent and a trespasser, this fact will not bar her recovery, because.-it stands admitted defendant’s operatives saw her in ample time to stop the train. Morgan v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 262; Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 720. In fact in cases based on the humanitarian rule the negligence of the plaintiff is confessed. Hall v. Railroad, 219 Mo. 553; Everett v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 54. (2) Defendant presents a demurrer at the close of plaintiff’s case and again at the close of all the evidence. The whole evidence is before the court. “It is elementary in this State that a demurrer admits every fact to be true which the evidence in the case tends to prove, whether by direct testimony or by reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Von Trebra v. Railroad, 209 Mo. 658. (3) It is claimed by appellant that plaintiff’s evidence that she did not hear alarms is of no probative force, and does not tend to prove alarms were not sounded. There might be force in this contention if alarm signals were ordinary noises and if other circumstances existing in this case were not also proven. But alarm signals from an engine are startling noises and are heard for miles. It is impossible for us to conceive of persons being so absorbed they would not hear such signals sounded within a few hundred feet of them. Plaintiff is not the only-one who did not hear. The little, timid, nine-year-o.ld child that walked on the ends of the ties and who escaped so narrowly that even the fireman and brakeman on the Wabash train told the conductor that she, too, had been struck, evidently did not hear any alarms. Her conduct in remaining on the track is a mute but convincing witness that she did not hear. That little girl had not reached the age to be “mentally absorbed.” The passing train on the M., K. & T. track was only sufficient to prevent her hearing the ordinary noises of the approaching Wabash train. If alarm signals had been sounded continuously for six hundred feet before it reached her, as appellant contends, she, as well- as plaintiff, would undoubtedly have heard. There would have been near fifty short, sharp, startling shrieks in that six hundred feet and almost one-half minute would have been required by the train in traveling the distance. That they did not hear such extraordinary noises is strong evidence there were no such noises. Even plaintiff’s evidence that she did not hear is of itself sufficient to submit the question of alarms or no alarms to the jury. Murray v. Company, 101 Mo. 242; Hanlon v. Company, 104 Mo. 388; State v. Company, 70 Mo. App. 641. (4) The defendant’s answer avers that defendant failed to stop, look or listen for the approach of defendant’s said cars; that as soon as her presence on said track was discovered by defendant’s employees so managing and operating said train, she was duly warned of the approach by said train by blowing the whistle and ringing the bell. Said averment is, as a matter of law, a confession on the part of defendant that plaintiff was in peril at all times while on said track. Lynch v. Railroad, 208 Mo. 24. There is no claim in the answer that any efforts whatever were made by said operatives to stop or check the train; on the contrary, it proceeds upon the theory that the only duty defendants operatives ever owed plaintiff was to sound the whistle. The question as to when the defendant did or ought to have discovered plaintiff’s peril is well stated in Becker v. Company, 53 L. R. A. 270.

Opinion:
LAMM, J.
— Negligence. Defendant in apt time and due form appeals from a judgment in the Adair Circuit Court entered on a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $10,000.
The pleadings. As we construe the petition it counts on the three specifications .of negligence following :
First, that plaintiff was walking on defendant's track in Randolph county south of the city of Moberly at a point where said track (with the knowledge of defendant and its officers, servants and employees) was for a long time treated as a thorougfare by people not connected with the railroad service and by them was traveled as a public highway of said county. That such public user cast the duty upon defendant's employees running its trains to keep a sharp lookout for persons on the track in front of them and exposed to danger. That on the occasion in hand defendant's employees running a certain locomotive and train of cars failed to perform this duty, when by ordinary care in looking out they would have discovered plaintiff's peril in time to have saved her. (Nota bene: This specification was not submitted to the jury.)
Second, complaint is made in the petition of a negligent-rate of speed of forty miles an hour in violation of defendant's alleged duty to run its trains at the locus in quo at such speed as permitted the engineer to have his train "constantly under control." (Nota bene-. This specification also was not submitted to the jury.)
Third, finally the petition counts on another theory, viz., that, plaintiff being on the track and unconscious of the train's approach, defendant's servants in immediate charge of its locomotive and train saw her danger in ample time to have warned her and to have stopped the train before running her down and negligently failed to do either, whereby she was run down, struck and injured. (Note. This was the issue put to the jury upon which to predicate a recovery.)
The answer admits defendant was a railroad corporation owning and operating the line of railroad mentioned, but denies all other allegations. Following that denial is a plea of contributory negligence— in that, the place of the accident was in the country among farms, where defendant's track was inclosed by' side fences and cattle-guards and was not at the crossing at any public road; that plaintiff, without the knowledge or consent of defendant or its employees managing its train, negligently got upon its track as a trespasser and, walking thereon, negligently failed to stop, look or listen for the train. That as soon as she was seen on the track by defendant's said servants. she was duly warned by both whistle and bell, notwithstanding which warnings she failed to leave the track as she had plenty of time to do. That if she had stopped, looked or listened she would have seen and heard the train in ample time to leave the track and avoid her own injury; wherefore, defendant avers that plaintiff's hurts were caused by her own negligent, unlawful and careless conduct. While, as said, defendant, in its answer pleaded affirmatively that due care was exercised in giving warnings by signals, there is no affirmative plea of any attempt to stop before hitting plaintiff. The issue in that behalf was raised by the general denial.
The cause was argued twice at our bar — once in Division and once in Banc. The force of the oral arguments by learned counsel on both sides was spent on the alleged error of the ruling nisi disallowing a de.murrer to the evidence at the close of the whole case. So, error in that ruling is pressed with vigor as the main assignment' in defendant's brief.
There are other assignments, viz.:
The court erred (1) in giving plaintiff's first and second instructions; (2) in refusing eleven instructions prayed by defendant; (3) in permitting evidence tending to prove that plaintiff's attention was attracted by the noise of an M. K. & T. train running nearby on a parallel track; (4) in modifying defendant's 15th instruction; (5) in overruling defendant's timely objection to the inflammatory argument of plaintiff's counsel and in failing to rebuke counsel; and (6) finally that the verdict was against the instructions, was excessive and the product of sympathy, prejudice and passion.
Attending to those assignments, the main one seeks the facts, which are, to-wit: .
It is not amiss to cull, as near as may be, the undisputed from the disputed facts. Those undisputed follow, viz.: The scene of the accident was a mile or so south of the town of Moberly. Close by its south corporation line the Missouri, Kansas and Texas crosses the Wabash. Thence south for two or three miles the tracks of both run on a tangent and parallel 100 feet apart, the Wabash to the east, and the rights of way of both are inclosed by the same side fences and cut off by cattle-guards at public crossings.
Going north into Moberly there is an up grade of twenty-seven feet to the mile at the place of the accident, but the view on and of each track is quite unobstructed for a mile and a half or more either way from that place. At that point the Wabash track lay on a fill.
Some two or three hundred feet north of that place an east-and-west public road cuts both railroad tracks at a right angle, making what is called the Headinghouse crossing. About one-half mile south of the Headinghouse crossing there was another east- and west public road making what is called the Terrill crossing.
There was a school house at a cross-road corner west of the Terrill crossing. Miss Butcher began teaching school in that country schoolhouse four days before she was injured, to-wit, on the 6th day of September, 1906'. She boarded with her brother, who lived on a farm northeast of the Headinghouse crossing on a north-and-south public road. She could go home from school by public roads in two ways. First, she could turn north at the corner at the schoolhouse on a public road and after aways turn east and go on over the Headinghouse crossing, and thence on east until she came to the north-and-south road on which her brother lived, and thence north on that road home; or she could go straight east from her schoolhouse on the Terrill road, cross both tracks at the Terrill crossing, thence on east till she came to the road on which her brother lived, thence turn north home, missing the Headinghouse crossing altogether.
She took neither of these ways home on the day she was hurt, nor had she taken either in the four days of her school term. She went (as she always had gone) east on the Terrill road until she came to or close to the Terrill crossing and then she turned north taking the M. K. & T. track for it. Presently, for personal reasons immaterial here, she changed over from the M. K. & T. to the Wabash and traveled north on the latter's track for, say, a quarter of a mile, heading toward the Headinghouse crossing, where she planned to turn east until she came to the road on which her brother lived. It was about 4:3G of a clear, warm, bright summer afternoon. Taking with her a pupil, a little girl of ten years, she (herself aged nineteen) walked north in the middle of the track, bareheaded, carrying a lunch satchel and a box of wild haws, and being at the time in full possession of perfect natural senses. It seems the child walked a trifle ahead and to one side outside the rail on the ties, but within the danger line. The testimony is that after starting north neither of them turned their heads to look for a train from the south, hut faced steadily to the north. However, when Miss Dutcher first got upon the Wabash track she looked to the south, hut no train was then in sight.
A few minutes before the accident, a train on one track was approaching one running on the other. On the M. K. & T. track there was a heavy freight train of 1000 or more feet in length, made up of twenty-five loaded cars, running down grade to the south at, say, 20 miles per hour and making a great .deal of noise. On the Wabash track there was a train of, say, 510 feet in length, made up of twelve loaded freight cars, running extra, approaching her from the south at a speed of from twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. The eight forward cars of this train and the engine were well equipped with air — the last four, including the caboose, were non-air cars.
When a mile or a mile and a half away (and constantly thereafter until he struck her) the engineer of the Wabash train saw the school mistress and little child going north on the track ahead of him, with their backs to him, and kept them under his eye. He also saw the M. K. & T. train coming to meet his. A man of experience, such as the Wabash, engineer was, could well conclude, as appears from the testimony, that at the rate the two trains were running the Wabash train would catch up with the school mistress at the very time the M. K. & T. train would pass her only 100 feet to her left. This would become more and more obvious as the trains covered the distance between them. That was precisely what happened. At two or three hundred feet south of the Headinghouse crossing, when the caboose of the M. K. & T. train was passing her or had got by her a hundred feet or so, the locomotive of the Wabash train struck.ber and tossed her many feet up and to one side off the track. The child was not injured — the record being dark on the reason why.
It does not appear which way the wind, if any, blew and train sounds carried. Although bareheaded and in possession of all her natural senses, as said, Miss Dutcher did not hear the train that struck her nor did she know what struck her, and the evidence of the several eye witnesses is to the effect that as that train approached her from behind she walked straight on in the middle of the track, giving not the least sign she was aware of its approach, but to the contrary showing by her carriage and conduct that she was. entirely oblivious to its presence.
She was taken up unconscious,, remained unconscious for days, was injured on her head, an arm and leg were broken and possibly both arms, she was disfigured, one of her feet and the toes of that foot are drawn out of place, making her clubfooted and lame, one arm is crooked, there is a catch in the elbow of it, and there are other serious injuries — in short she is a cripple for life.
The M. K. & T. train was, as said, over 1000 feet long. As the men on the engine of that train approached her they saw her and apprehended her ignorance of danger and imminent peril and did their best to attract her attention to the Wabash train bearing-down upon her from behind by shouting and motioning. At the same time at the rear of the M. K. & T. train the men on the caboose also saw her peril and that she was unaware of it and also tried to warn her by shouting and gesticulating until they passed her. She saw this train and the motions of these men but, misapprehending their meaning, she thought they were trying to flirt with her and went her way in the middle of the track with her face, as always before, set to the north.
There was a whistling post eighty rods south of the Heading-house crossing. All sides agree that the Wabash engine gave the usual crossing signal at that post. I ana of opinion that the fact, or if not the fact, at least the time and extent of the alarm signals, if any, belong in the list of disputed or uncertain facts to be stated later on.
We shall assume it proved beyond question that at the instant the school mistress was struck the Wabash engine had slowed down some — the extent thereof and the time and character of attempts to stop belong also in the category of disputed or uncertain facts to be noticed later on. After she was struck the Wabash train stopped, but before stopping it ran so far that its caboose stood about two carlengths (s'ay sixty-eight feet) north of where her body lay in the ditch. That is, it ran its own length (about five hundred and ten feet) plus sixty-eight feet. She was struck about 300 feet south of the Headinghouse crossing. The day was warm, as said, and the windows of the Wabash caboose and of its cupola were open. A brakeman, in order to make a quick switch at Moberly, had gone forward over the Wabash engine to the cowcatcher. He shouted to the school mistress as the engine caiiie on, and, seeing she was unconscious of the warning and that the engine was bound to strike her, he left-his post and came back over the engine before that event. . -
All the testimony tends to show that plaintiff was a trespasser on the Wabash track and that the sporadic occasional use of the track by footmen did not establish any public right by custom, acquiesced in, to such user at the time and place.
It maybe taken as established, also, that when the air brakes were once applied the jar of the air going on would be felt immediately in the non-air cars at the tail of the train. Moreover that, speed and track both considered, it was impossible to stop after the air was actually applied before hitting plaintiff, leaving the question open for the nonce whether the application of the air was negligently delayed.
We now come to a set of facts which are uncertain or disputed, or from which different- inferences are drawn by counsel. As the summary we are making relates to defendant's demurrer to the evidence, we shall deal with the disputed and uncertain facts in a , way as favorable to plaintiff as the record will allow —laying to one side, as within the province of the jury, both self-contradictions of, and disagreements between, witnesses; and giving our impressions of the tendency of the proof based on a critical study of the record, rather than swell the statement by profusion of detail.
There is some evidence to the effect that a rain had lately fallen and the public roads were heavy, and much that there was a dry spell and those roads were dusty; but, as this testimony connects itself merely with the use of the track by pedestrians, we lay it out of view on the same shelf with the user itself.
By far the greater weight of the testimony tends to* show that alarm signals were given by the Wabash engineer before the school mistress was struck. Some of it indicates they commenced at once after the crossing signal at the whistling post, say, 800 or more feet away from plaintiff. Some of it is to the effect that these signals commenced subsequently when the Wabash engine was 600 feet south of plaintiff. The engineer so testified. His account is that, noticing that the school mistress and the little girl did not look around when he gave the crossing signal, he drove ahead until within about 600 feet of where plaintiff was struck, when he began giving danger signals and continued them until she was struck. She was, as already said, always under his eye and he saw she gave no indications that she heard the signals or the train but just walked on in a leisurely sort of gait. But there was other testimony from some of defendant's witnesses who were watching the train, the school mistress and little girl, which is fairly susceptible to the construction that the alarm signals were first given when the engine was about one hundred and eighty or two hundred feet from the school mistress. There was an eye witness (Collins) on the M. K. & T. track 175 feet north of the Headinghouse crossing who left the track to let that train pass. There is some uncertainty whether he left to the east or to the west. If to the west, then the M. K. & T. train passed between him and the scene of the accident and shut off his view for the time. If to the east, then he was in plain view all the time. However, when the M. K. & T. passed him he could see what happened. He testified that the sharp alarm blasts were given after the M. 3L & T train passed him (but by which train he did not know) and he must have stood about four hundred feet from the point where she was struck.
There was negative evidence of some appreciable value. For instance, as pointed out, the school mistress was bareheaded and had good ears and she heard no alarm signals at all from the Wabash train. A silent fact of some value is that the child seems to have heard no alarm signals either. So, the Wabash conductor who was 510 feet from the nose of the engine of his train and was in a caboose with open windows, says he heard no alarm whistling until a while after he felt the jar and jam of his train from the air going on. A brakesman, in the cupola and similarly situated, gave evidence to the same effect. There was some testimony that the alarm signals continued after she was struck and one witness who was watching (Collins) says he saw no steam escape from the Wabash whistle.
Another witness testified the alarm signals were given after the M. K. & T. train passed south over the Headinghouse crossing. On that hypothesis they were given much less than 600 feet from her. So much for the fact of alarm signals and the time they were given.
What of attempts, if any, to stop the train and when were they made ? The engineer says that, simultaneously with giving the alarm signals when 600 feet away from the plaintiff, he turned on the full force of his air and that his efforts to stop resulted in lowering his speed to about sixteen or eighteen miles per hour. Other testimony cuts the speed down to from ten to fifteen miles per hour at the moment of impact. Some of the testimony tended to show that the emergency air was turned on before and some of it after the alarm signals were first given, and some of it, not •agreeing to the distance mentioned by the engineer, tended to show (as he testified) that the air went on at the same time the alarm signals were given. There; was also testimony tending to show that the train ran after the emergency was applied eleven or twelve hundred feet and that the stop was a good one (this from the engineer and others), but there was other testimony tending to show that the train only ran from 600 to 800 feet after the emergency air went on. Assuming the train was running at the time it struck her at twelve to sixteen miles per hour, there was testimony tending to show that at twelve miles per hour, it could stop in 300 feet and at sixteen miles in 400' feet. In point of fact it ran after the blow about 600 feet. The witness Collins testified there was no slacking of speed at all until after Miss Dutcher was struck.
If necessity arises other facts will be stated in connection with the disposition of the assignments of error seriatim.
I. When this case was aigued in Bivision, the three sitting brethren were at first of opinion the demurrer to the evidence was improvidently ruled. But a restudy of the record, aided by arguments in Banc and new briefs, warrants a holding that the demurrer was well ruled. This because:
(a) Defendant's counsel industriously (and ex industria) have marshaled a great array of authority which we take as intended to explode the humanity rule as broadly expounded and adhered to in this jurisdiction. Thus, based on the theory that plaintiff was a trespasser and walked for a quarter of a mile oh defendant's track without' looking behind her for a train, it is contended she was guilty of such palpable contributory negligence as defeats recovery as a matter of law, regardless of defendant's own negligence. But we will not be drawn into an extended exposition of the philosophy of the humanity rule nor into a fresh defence of it.
In Reyburn v. Railroad, 187 Mo. l. c. 574, we said: "If what this court has said in former cases has failed to reconcile appellant to the justness of this doctrine probably nothing we could now say would be more persuasive." That language was addressed to an attack made upon the humanity rule as laid down in the same case in these words (pp. 573-4): "It has long been the doctrine of this court that though a man voluntarily adopts the dangerous track of a railroad for his footpath and walks in it apparently heedless of the danger entailed, yet if the servants in charge of the locomotive see him and realize his danger, . . . it then becomes their duty to exercise ordinary care to do what they can with the means then at hand to avoid injuring him, and if they fail in that duty the railroad company is liable, notwithstanding the negligence of the injured man."
In the Murphy case (228 Mo. 56) an elaborate and animated assault — one of many before — was delivered in Banc on the rule. In response we said, inter alia (p. 80'): "In the light of our later decisions, holding a single and no uncertain voice in that behalf, to defend the rule by marshaling anew the reasons underlying it, is but to admit it needs defense, and we leave it with some observations, viz.: (1) It is too firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of this State to be overturned by anything short of an act of the law-making power."
In Banc in the Eppstein case, 197 Mo. 1. c. 733, certain propositions pertaining to the humanity doctrine were formulated. Two of them are: "(a) Where one (at least one sui juris) is in a place of safety and therefrom negligently moves to a place of danger, so immediately before that danger that it may not be averted by the use of ordinary care by those controlling the dangerous instrumentality, and is killed, his death is not actionable, (b) Where one, unconscious of his peril, has negligently placed himself in a position of danger so far away from that danger that his death may be averted by the use of ordinary care by those who see him and who control the dangerous instrumentality, his death is actionable."
In peril oft may be, yet so stands today the rule of law administered by appellate courts of Missouri in negligence cases coming within the range of the rule. Stare decisis. Quieta non movere. Accordingly the demurrer to the evidence cannot stand on the unsoundness of the humanitarian doctrine.
(b) A locomotive engine is equipped with whistle, bell and ability to stop its train. When one is negligently upon a railroad track unconscious of his immediate peril and that peril is timely discovered by those in charge of the engine they may not punish him for his negligence by knocking him off and thereby killing him, o,r breaking his bones or mauling and smashing his body. Out of tenderness to life and limb they must do what every man must do for every other man. in times of peace, viz., use due care to preserve life and limb. Due care is care according to circumstance. Due care calls for the use of the means at hand to prevent one's injury to the person timely seen exposed to danger. The means at hand in this instance were bell, whistle and ability to stop. In some cases, the mpnoto nous stroke of the bell might be due care. In others, easily put, the alarm whistle timely used might be dne care. And (the gauge of duty arising precisely with the obvious danger and the circumstances attending the individual case, under the axiom "the greater the hazard the greater the care"- — per Yalliant, J., in Woods v. Railroad, 188 Mo. 229) in some extreme cases nothing short of stopping would be due care. Because plaintiff was a trespasser those of defendant's servants in charge of its locomotive were under no duty to look out for her in the country away from congested populations and between public crossings, absent a known and permitted public user, as here. But in this case they saw her a great ways off and saw her peril. Barring the duty to look for trespassers, the duty to use due care not to. kill or maim them if they are seen in time, is precisely the duty owed to those not trespassers.
In Lynch v. Railroad, 208 Mo. l. c. 34, it was ruled: "But even if he (deceased) had been guilty of contributory negligence, running as he was for a half mile ox two-thirds of a mile in plain view of the engineer and fireman on this engine and having indicated in no way to them his knowledge of their approach, it was their plain and obvious duty to exercise reasonable care for his safety and not run over him. Prom the time they saw him and observed, as alleged in the defendant's answer, that he was not looking back and was ignorant of their approach, it was their duty to warn him and to slow down the train and stop if necessary in order to save Ms life."
The Chamberlain case was in Banc (133 Mo. 587). In discussing the Sinclair case (133 Mo. 233) and the Reardon case (114 Mo. 405) we considered an instruction in the Chamberlain case, which, among other things, told the jury that, if Chamberlain (quoting) "while walking upon defendant's track, became in imminent peril of being struck by defendant's train, arid defendant's employees in charge of said train became aware of his peril of being struck in time to have enabled them, by the exercise of ordinary care, to have stopped said train, and to have averted the injury to said deceased, . . . and that they failed to exercise such care and stop said train, and that by reason of such failure to exercise such ordinary care, the said train was not stopped and said Chamberlain was struck and killed, then the jury must find for the plaintiff, though the jury may find that the deceased, Godfrey Chamberlain, was guilty of negligence in walking on defendant's track." In speaking to that instruction and approving it we said (p. 605): "But the instruction would not be proper in all cases, as the signal if given in time would be all that was required to apprise a trespasser, until it is seen he apparently does not hear it. The engineer is not required to stop his train if the trespasser is far enough away to warn him, and a timely- warning is sufficient until it is seen that for some ,cause it is not heeded; then it is his duty to avoid hilling, even a trespasser, if by .the exercise of ordinary care it can be done."
The sound general doctrine is thus summarized and formulated in an excellent treatise (2 Shear, and Red. on Neg., sections 483-4): "The rule stated in section 99, that the plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding his contributory negligence, if the defendant, after becoming chargeable with notice of the plaintiff's danger failed to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him, has been enforced in'many railroad cases. It is universally agreed that this rule applies to all cases in which the defendant or his agent is actually aware 'of the plaintiff's danger. Thus, a locomotive engineer or motorman, after becoming aware of the presence of any person on, or dangerously near the track, however imprudently or wrongfully, is bound to use as much care to avoid injury to him as he ought to use in favor of one lawfully and properly upon the track, that is to say, ordinary care with respect to anticipating injury, before it becomes imminent, and the utmost care and diligence of which he is personally capable, after he knows that it is imminent. He must' promptly use all the usual signals to warn the trespasser of danger, and he mnst also check the speed of his train, and even bring it to full stop, if necessary, unless the circumstances are such as to justify him, acting prudently, in believing that the traveler sees or hears the train and will step off the track in ample time to avoid all danger, without any diminution of the speed of the train. . In general, an engineer has the right to assume that a person walking upon the track is free to act, and is in-possession of all ordinary faculties, and will therefore act with ordinary prudence; but when the conduct of the traveler is such as to excite a doubt of this, the engineer is bound to use greater caution, and to check or even stop the train, as may be necessary. So, where he sees a little child upon the track, he has no right to assume that the child will use the same discretion for its own protection as an older person would; and he must bring the speed of the train under control as quickly as possible, so as to be able to stop it altogether, if the child does not appreciate its danger. . . ; The rule stated in the last secton, however, does not cover the whole ground. The defendant is responsible, not only for what he actually knows, but for that which he is bound to know. It is clear that the frequent statements that contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery, except where the defendant's conduct has been 'reckless,' 'willful' or 'wanton,' or even grossly negligent, are not sound. No courts have in actual practice adhered to this imaginary rule; it has been explicitly overruled, and, indeed, it has been explained away or disavowed by courts which have previously stated it. Nothing more is really meant by tbe courts using these phrases than a want of ordinary care, after becoming actually aware of the plaintiff's peril."
Assuming that due care may embrace the duty to give alarm signals in some cases, and the further duty, when those alarm signals fail (or apparently will fail) of their purpose, to stop the train, it remains to inquire: "When does either duty arise? Attend to what we have ruled on that score: "It may be safely said as a general rule, that the duty of care arises in all cases as soon as the perilous situation of the trespasser is discovered" — per Maceaklane, E., speaking for the whole court, in the Sinclair case supra. Still further speaking to the point, he said (p. 242): "Prom these cases, and many others that might be cited, it seems to be well settled that it'here no conditions intervene to confuse, or to prevent hearing a signal, and knowing its object, it will be sufficient if given in time for the trespasser to leave the track safely." Speaking to the duty to stop the train we in that case further ruled that "this duty of the engineer arose as soon as he knew, or by proper care ought to have known, that deceased did not regard the warning signal. ' '
And in a late case in Banc, Degonia v. Railroad, 224 Mo. l. c. 595, there is guarded general language by our Brother G-raves apposite here, viz.: "Plaintiff's case therefore must proceed upon the theory that defendant's servants saw the perilous position of the deceased, and saw such things as would lead prudent persons to believe that deceased was oblivious to such perilous position, and after so seeing had time to obviate and avoid the accident by ordinary care and caution upon their part. It devolved upon the plaintiff to show these facts."
Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give to every one his due, says Coke. It is not strange, then, that in a court of justice the just rule should be (as it is in eases of this character) that when conditions intervene to confuse or prevent hearing an alarm signal or knowing its object, or where the conduct and actions of a party walking on a track with his back to a coming locomotive and a train of cars, should cause an" engineer of ordinary prudence to conclude that such party did not or could not hear alarm signals and was continuing his walk on the track, the right of the engineer to act upon the presumption that he would leave the track before being hit ceases. Take an example by way of illustration. There is a working presumption indulged that a party approaching a street car track will stop and not step upon it in front of a going car, but that presumption ceases when by the actions and conduct of the traveler it would be apparent, to a prndent motorman that he does intend to go upon the track (Ellis v. Railway, 234 Mo. l. c. 680-1 and cases cited). We can see no difference in principle between the two propositions. Both of them run on the theory that the party in charge of the car or locomotive should act on reasonable appearances and exercise due care in giving signals or in stopping.
Care to be due requires that alarm signals be given when they would be effective. And due care required that the attempt to stop should be made, as a last resort, when it would be effective; for if defendant owed any duty to stop at all that duty must begin when it amounts to something worth while. It must not be pretermitted until it amounts to nothing whatever. Any other view is hollow mummery — mere "words, words" that "lose the name of action." Again, speaking of due diligence or care, it is axiomatic that he who has at his disposal the means of knowing, is held to know; that he who shuts his eyes when to open them and look is to see, is held to see; that where there is a duty to use diligence, those facts which diligence will discover are presumed to be known under the law of notice; and that what one knows and what he ought to know is regarded in law as equivalent. These trueisms are more often invoked in negligence cases against a plaintiff, but where the boot is on the other foot and defendant is charged with a "duty to use due care, as here, they fill a very useful office in determining the scope and discerning the elements of defendant's duty.
We come now to apply more closely the general principles announced to the facts of the case at bar.
The engineer of the Wabash train gave his alarm signals, under some of the evidence, at about the time the M. K. & T. engine was opposite or nearly opposite the school mistress and child, to their left 100' feet. He continued them while that engine and long', heavy train thundered past her. We think he is charged with the duty to see and know that intervening conditions had arisen likely to confuse and prevent her hearing those signals. At least that was' a question for the jury. He was charged with the duty to know and realize further that her actions unmistakably indicated she had not heard the crossing signals behind her. Whatever a man who knew of an approaching train might do in remaining dangerously long on the track, this engineer had no right to assume that the young school mistress and little girl, both presumably armed with the quick ear of youth, timid and shrinking from danger, were trifling with death by remaining on the track after they heard the crossing signals behind them. It is not natural for a woman and child to act that way. Natural instincts are allowed to have their weight and constitute evidence to men of sense. [Stotler v. Railroad, 200 Mo. l. c. 146.] Moreover, the situation, before a finger was lifted, had been allowed to drift and become so crying that the engineer concluded the emergency air should go on simultaneously with his giving the alarm signals. Is that the usual-course1? According to his theory, with everything to be seen lying right under his eye, he drove ahead for' 600 or 700 feet after giving the crossing before giving the alarm signals. In other words he waited until the deafening noise from the near approach and passage of the M. K. & T. train would naturally, according to the physics of the matter, make it a matter of doubt whether the alarm signals would reach her and be effective. At least there was a question for the jury on that point and they were entitled to take that view of it. Moreover, there was testimony strongly tending to show that the engineer was mistaken about the distance. There is testimony that it was less than 600 feet, and some of it indicated he was as close to her as 180 or 200 feet. Such testimony raised an issue for the jury on the question of diligence and care in the time of giving the signals. Again, while the broad current of the testimony ran the other way, yet there was testimony of some value, negative in character, from which the jury might infer no alarm signals were given at all. There were silent facts, of which it may be said, though silent, they cry out (dum tacent, clamant), squinting the same way. We lay little stress on this feature of the case. We think if that had been the sole issue and the jury had found fox plaintiff the duty of the trial court would have been to set the verdict aside as against the very great weight of the credible testimony. But when a case at law comes by appeal to this court, we have nothing to do with the weight of the testimony. The appellate function is to say whether there is any substantial testimony. A mere glimmer or spark, a mere scintilla will not do, but if there is substantial testimony, however small as compared to the great body of the proof, we have no right to meddle with the weight of it, or ignore it because negative in character. We deem it not space misused to reproduce some excerpts from a case in the House of Lords (Railroad Co. v. Slattery, L. R. 3 App. Cas., pp. 1155, 1164-5, 1167, 1181, 1182-3).
The Lord Chancellor said: "There is thus opposed to the evidence of two persons who say they did not hear, which may mean they did not observe, the whistle, and of one who says he did not hear it, but will not swear it did not take place, a body of witnesses, ten in number, including every person whose evidence could be supposed to be material, all of whom seemed to me to be entirely unimpeaehed and unimpeachable, who state in the most positive way that the whistling did take place.
"My Lords, I have already said that your Lordships have not now before you the question of whether the verdict was against evidence, or against the weight of evidence. But I feel bound to say that if that question were now open, I should, without hesitation, be of opinion that a verdict more directly against evidence I have seldom seen. It is stated that the learned judge before whom the case was tried was not dissatisfied with the verdict. I can only express my surprise that this should have been the case. As it is, it appears to me that the jury, actuated perhaps by feelings of compassion for a plaintiff who is no doubt much to be pitied, and willing to gratify those feelings at the expense of the appellants, have found the 'first issue, that of negligence on the part of the appellants, for the respondent, when it ought to have been found for the appellants. This, however, as I have already said, is not a reason for entering the verdict for the defendant. It is only a ground for a new trial. . I certainly cannot look on the result of this litigation as satisfactory. The appellants will, I fear, have to pay a sum for which I cannot think they ought to have been made liable, and the respondent and her children will recover money to which I do not think that their legal right is established. But I cannot seek to prevent this by proposing to your Lordships, on the only part of the case which is brought for your deter- ruination, to do what it appears to me would seriously encroach upon the legitimate province of a jury."
And. Lord 0 'Hagan, in the same case, said: ' ' My Lords, the principle on which, I think, this case ought to be decided appears, to me to be well expressed in the trite maxim, 'Ad quaestionem juris respondent judices; Ad quaestionem facti respondent juratores.' That maxim is old but cannot be obsolete whilst trial by jury subsists among us. . .' . As to the first question, whether the defendants were guilty of negligence, I cannot see how, possibly, it could have been taken from the jury. I shall not occupy the time of the house by any repetition of the narrative which has been lucidly given to it by my noble and learned friend on the woolsack. I shall only remind your Lordships that the learned Lord Chief Baron Palles rightly confined the attention of the jury to the consideration of the alleged want of whistling, as the one instance of negligence with which they had to do; and that with reference to it there was a large body of testimony and clearly conflicting testimony. Ten witnesses for the defendants swore that the whistling occurred at the proper time and in the usual way; three witnesses for the plaintiff swore that, being in a position in which, if it so occurred, the sound should have reached their ears, they-did not hear it. It is impossible not to be struck by the apparent weight of the defendants' proof. But, as was observed in the Irish Court of Common Pleas, the jury saw the witnesses, and the judge did not condemn the verdict. And, whether it was right or wrong, the jurors along were competent, legally and constitutionally, to decide between the ten who testified on the one side and the three who testified on the other. It was urged, and the authority of an eminent judge was vouched to sustain the suggestion, that proof of the want of hearing was no material proof at all. But this seems to me untenable. Assuming that a man stands jn a certain position, and has possession of his faculties, the fact that he does not hear what would ordinarily reach the ears of a person so placed, and with such opportunities, seems to me manifestly legal evidence, which may vary in its value and persuasiveness — which may in some instances he of small account, and in others be the strongest and the only evidence possible to be offered; but at all events cannot be withheld from the jury. And if this be so, there was here a conflict of testimony on which the jurymen, and they alone, were competent to pronownce."-
The doctrine thus announced finds support in cases cited from our own reports in the briefs of counsel for respondent.
Again, taking the plainly confused situation, a situation so open and unusual as to be properly designated extraordinary — a situation in which a prudent engineer could see that there was a probability of alarm signals being drowned in the great volume of noise made by the heavy M. K. & T. freight train thundering past and near her — did the engineer use due diligence in applying his emergency brake? Did he not wait until he must have seen and known that the use of the brake was bound to be an idle formula? Mark, he could not possibly stop, after he began to stop, in time to save her at the rate he was going. He knew that or was bound to know it, which is the same thing. If the emergency was turned on precisely when the alarm signals began then there is some testimony tending to show that the air went on not 600' feet away, as the engineer says, but a great deal closer than that. Their spontaneous and instinctive judgment, born of facts that lay before the eyes of the railroad employees on the M. K. & T. train, showed them during the time their train was 'approaching and running for twelve or fifteen hundred feet, as we figure it, that this woman and child were in deadly peril and were unconscious of it. What they saw the Wabash engineer must also be held to see.
We are not dealing with a case where a person attempts to cross a track so closely before a locomotive that the engineer has no time to save life, nor with a case where the peril of a trespasser is not seen in time to save him, nor with a case where there is nothing to prevent the alarm signals being effective. We are cited to many cases of that sort, but they are not in point under the record in the instant ease.
Our conclusion is there was a case for the jury, hence the demurrer was well ruled.
II. While the main proposition for reversal (on which the whole force of the oral argument and marked labdr in collecting authority in briefs were spent) is the demurrer to the evidence, yet, as said at the outset, there are subsidiary assignments of error, viz.-: Defendant's counsel lodge sundry objections against two instructions. One is that without any evidence to support them the court submitted issues whether signals or warnings were given, whether any efforts were made to prevent injuring plaintiff, and authorized a recovery without a finding that the engineer realized plaintiff did not hear the signals. Another is that it was erroneously assumed that plaintiff would have heard a whistle if one had been sounded, and erroneously assumed that the engineer discovered plaintiff's peril in time to save her by the exercise of ordinary care. Another is that the same instruction' authorized a verdict if she did not hear the signals although the engineer may have had every reason to believe she did hear them, and in that particular there was a conflict with four of defendant's instructions — that the instruction did not require the jury to find from the evidence that given signals were not heard, or that the engineer had good reason to believe they were not heard and after he discovered her peril could by ordinary care save her. Another is the alleged assumption that the engineer could have-stopped the train after discovering plaintiff's peril, and that it required more than the exercise of ordinary care. Another to both instructions is that they submitted to the jury the question whether plaintiff was a trespasser and was guilty of contributory negligence when that fact should have been declared as a matter of law by the court.
Acquiescing in the controlling prominence given to it by counsel, we considered the main proposition so fully that we feel justified in not disposing of those objections seriatim on full discussion, as we would have done if a suitable length to this opinion permitted. Counsel must rest content with the general ruling, to-wit, that we have not been able to find re-versible error in instructions.
We make these general observations and let it go at that, to-wit:
The ruling on the demurrer disposes of some of them.
Some of them are refined and technical to a degree reflecting no little credit on the acumen of learned counsel, but in no way, that we can see, affecting the merits or tending to mislead the hard-headed men in the box.
In some of them, suggested doubts and uncertainties are cleared away under the doctrine of aider by one or the other of the twelve instructions given for defendant.
Some of them are answered by a reference to the testimony of the witness Collins who was watching the train and testified, in effect, that it did not slacken its speed until after plaintiff was struck (that testimony may have been untrue, but its falsity is not for our determination. Plaintiff was entitled to reckon with it as one hypothesis).
Some of them are answered by a reference to the negative testimony which, as heretofore pointed ont, tended to show no alarm signals were given np to the time Miss Dutcher was struck. (However, liability was not alone predicated on that fact, but the matter was woven into an instruction and coupled with other facts put to the jury by the conjunction "and.")
Taking the whole body of the instructions (defendant's with plaintiff's) and reading them together, as we must, the ease was fairly put to the jury.
The point is disallowed to defendant.
III. The court refused twelve of defendant's twenty-four instructions. Error is assigned on that score — the demurrer was one and is already decided.
One of those remaining told the jury that no warning signals were necessary until after the engineer discovered the teacher did not hear the rumbling of his train. It was well refused. When a twist of the wrist will sound a warning signal, why should an engineer dally and twiddle by speculating on the effect the rumbling of his own train had on a woman who was within the sound zone of a much nearer and much greater train? There is no testimony this engineer relied on rumbling. '
Another was refused which practically declared, upon facts admitted, that plaintiff was precluded of recovery beause she walked leisurely down the track without turning her head, and this although the jury believe "that no signal was given nor effort made to stop the train." That instruction was not the law of a case falling within the humanity rule. The demurrer disposed of it.
Another was refused declaring, in effect, that an alarm signal at 600 feet was due care and that the engineer was not required to stop the train when he came in stopping distance of plaintiff. That might be good law in a proper case, but not under the cir cumstances we are dealing* with. The disposition made of the demurrer disposes of it precisely as the trial court did.
Another was refused calling the jury's attention to the noise of the M. K. & T. train and declaring as a matter of law that because of that noise it was plaintiff's imperative duty to look behind to see if a train was approaching, and if she failed in that she could not recover. In effect, that was mandatory instruction for defendant, therefore is covered by the demurrer and must be similarly ruled.
Another was refused declaring "as a matter of law that if the alarm signals and attempts to stop began GOO feet from plaintiff and continued until she was struck she could not recover. That instruction invaded the province of the jury in determining what was due care under the particular circumstances of this case. Assuming our ruling on the demurrer is sound, the instruction was not the law of this case.
Another was refused declaring as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as precluded recovery. That instruction was' in the very teeth of the humanity rule as expounded in the first paragraph of this opinion.
Another was refused telling the jury that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff except to not willfully and wantonly run upon her without warning. The willfulness and wantonness doctrine is exploded. The touchstone of duty in the law of negligence is due care, not a shade less or more. Due care under the circumstances of this case does not exclude the duty to stop, as the instruction does.
Another was refused taking from the jury the right, to consider the noise made by the M. K. & T. train. That instruction eliminated the most pregnant fact in this case with one stroke of the pen. Defendant would hardly admit that it employed engineers' who did not know that M. K. & T. trains made noises the same as Wabash trains, or who are ignorant of the immutable law of physics that the proximity of a g'reater noise has a tendency to drown out more distant noise. Any boy who ev.er worked around a threshing machine when the dinner horn blew knows that. The evidence relating to this noise was admitted over objection. We shall recur to the matter- when that ruling is considered. Some of defendant's suggestions anent the instruction may be better disposed of then.
Another refused instruction was predicated of the theory that if a whistle was sounded and if it could not be heard because of the noise of the M. K. & T, train then in that event plaintiff should be cast. That was not the law of this case either.
Another declared it to be the law that if the whistle was blown from three to six hundred feet from plaintiff and afterwards until she was struck and the engineer did all in his power to save her after discovering she did not get off the track to avoid her own injury, then the verdict must be for the defendant. That instruction under the circumstances of the case invaded the province of the jury by limiting the distance in which the engineer was obliged to begin an effort to warn and save plaintiff to within three to six hundred feet. It was well refused.
Another told the jury there was no evidence that plaintiff's position was one of peril from which she could not easily extricate herself (quoting) "until the train got so close to had no time to step off her that she the track." We are not quite sure we understand the whole of this instruction. The part we do understand was wrong, the part we don't understand we express no opinion upon. If there was any substance in the quoted part, as originally drawn, it is likely counsel would have seen to it that it was brought here in proper form.
There was no error in refusing instructions for defendant.
TV. Error is predicated of a ruling of the court permitting plaintiff to show the noise of the M. K. & T. train, and further that any experienced person observing the trains could see that the two would pass at about the place she was struck. It is argued these were specifications of negligence not pleaded in the petition. But these facts were evidential. They related to the charge of a failure to use due care in warning and stopping. We think the point without substance.
V. The court modified and gave for defendant instruction 15, reading: "The court instructs the jury that under the evidence in this case the plaintiff was a trespasser on defendant's railroad track and the defendant owed her no duty in the first instmce except to warn her by the usual signals of the approach of the train in time for her to step off the track and avoid being struck." (Note: the italicized clause was written in by the court). As originally written the instruction was bad in excluding any duty to stop under any circumstances. . Even as modified and given it is not in accord with the bulk of defendant's testimony which pointed to a situation at the time apparently demanding the instantaneous application of the air with the blowing of the whistle. If it did any harm it did harm to plaintiff, not defendant.
VI. It is next argued that the inflammatory argument, of plaintiff's counsel was grossly prejudicial and that the court erred in overruling defendant's objections thereto and in failing to rebuke counsel: and next that the verdict is excessive. We do not think the verdict excessive. Plaintiff is confessedly a permanent cripple, her chances to get on in life are lessened, her injuries are extremely grave and her sufferings pro longed, aconte and not over. There is no evidence of simulation or hysteria. She asked $40,000 and got one-fourth of it. Compared with many judgments we meet with here, it was sober and modest, reflecting credit on the management of defendant's counsel.
We have examined with pains the colloquies between court and counsel during the jury argument of Mr. Harrington on behalf of plaintiff. In some of them there was no ruling by the court and no exceptions saved for a failure to rule. In some of them the court on request did admonish and rebuke him. In others objections were made and sustained and no request was made to rebuke counsel. , In still others the objections were without vitality.
We do not feel justified in reversing the judgment because counsel by inadvertence was betrayed during the hot foot of the argument into straying a little outside the record, for which he was admonished by the court. To my mind the ease is not a close one, and sure it is that the size of the verdict does not show that the inflamation, if any, arguendo, bred unseemly infla-mation in the mind of the jury.
The premises all considered, the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. Yalliant, G. J., and Ferriss, Kennish and Broion, JJ., concur; Woodson and Graves, JJ., dissent.