Case Name: MURPHY v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-08-31
Citations: 447 Mich. 93
Docket Number: Docket No. 96265
Parties: MURPHY v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Judges: Boyle, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 447
Pages: 93–129

Head Matter:
MURPHY v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Docket No. 96265.
Argued January 11, 1994
(Calendar No. 5).
Decided August 31, 1994.
Following the death of Dennis Wainman in 1972 in the course of his employment with Michigan Bell Telephone Company, worker’s compensation death benefits were paid to his widow, Candace, and his two children. When she remarried in 1973, to Charles Murphy, Michigan Bell ceased payment of benefits to her pursuant to MCL 418.335; MSA 17.237(335), but voluntarily continued to pay benefits for the two children until the expiration of the 500-week period required by MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321). Thereafter, Candace Murphy sought benefits beyond the 500-week period for her children, aged thirteen and nine, on the basis of the provisions of §§ 321 and 335 of the worker’s compensation act permitting payments for dependent children. Michigan Bell argued that, although the children were under sixteen years of age at the end of the 500-week period, they no longer were dependent on their deceased father because they had been adopted by Charles Murphy and there was no factual showing of continued dependency on their deceased father. A hearing referee ordered the continuation of benefits until the children were sixteen. The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Shepherd and Doctoroff, JJ., remanded for clarification (Docket No. 128256). On remand, the wcab ruled that Michigan Bell was obligated under §§ 331, 335, and 353 to pay benefits until the children were eighteen. After remand, the Court of Appeals, Sullivan, P.J., and Mackenzie and I. B. Torres, JJ., reversed in an opinion per curiam, holding that the basis for the permissive ordering of continued weekly benefits is the recipient’s continued dependency. It concluded, on the basis of Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152 (1976), that a child who is adopted ceases to be factually dependent on the deceased father, and that in this case the adoption destroyed the rationale for the conclusive presumption of the children’s dependency on their deceased father and created a legal relationship in which the adoptive father assumed the legal obligation to provide for the children, thereby supplanting the legal relationship that gave rise to the statutory presumption (Docket No. 128256). The plaintiff appeals.
In separate opinions, the Supreme Court held:
The statutory conclusive presumption of dependency continues until the age of sixteen. After the expiration of the 500-week benefit period, benefits may continue to be paid to dependents under age sixteen, without a factual determination of dependency, at the discretion of the hearing referee.
Justice Riley, joined by Justice Boyle, stated that the conclusive presumption of dependency automatically terminates at the end of the statutorily mandated 500-week period. Thereafter, the continuation of benefits to dependents under a certain age is a discretionary decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission, requiring a factual finding of continued dependency. A finding to the contrary is outside the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act and constitutes the sanction of economic waste.
Section 341 clearly indicates the legislative intent to maintain the conclusive presumption of dependency except as stated otherwise in the act. The use of the term "may” instead of "shall” in § 321 indicates discretionary, rather than mandatory, action. Section 335 specifically requires the termination of benefits to a dependent wife upon remarriage and a reassessment of benefits payable to dependent children. Section 331(l)(b) does not require the continued presumption of dependency for children under the age of sixteen in cases of remarriage of the surviving spouse or the end of the 500-week benefit period. Instead it defines who is entitled to the conclusive presumption of total dependency, i.e., children under the age of sixteen, rather than how long the conclusive presumption remains in effect.
In this case, the presumption of dependency was terminated at the end of the 500-week period under the terms of § 321, and it was incumbent upon the claimants to establish a continued factual dependency in order to justify further benefits.
Justice Brickley, joined by Justice Griffin, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that there is a conclusive presumption of dependency until age sixteen, but despite its existence benefits are not automatically continued until age sixteen. Rather, continuing benefits may be awarded at the discretion of the magistrate.
While the conclusive presumption of dependency dispels the need for a factual determination of dependency and renders the dependent eligible for further benefits, it does not guarantee that such benefits will be awarded. Dependency was intended as a prerequisite to, but not a guarantee of continuing benefits. Benefits are not to be awarded automatically at the end of the statutory 500-week period; rather the magistrate has discretion to award continuing benefits, and may deny continuing benefits to wholly dependent persons.
Justice Levin, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh, and Justice Mallett, stated that a referee may order the payment of worker’s compensation death benefits beyond the expiration of the 500-week statutory limitation period for a child who was adopted by another person after the parent’s death.
The worker’s compensation act provides that if death results from an injury, benefits are payable for 500 weeks from the date of death, and that if, at the expiration of the 500-week period, a dependent is less than twenty-one years of age, a hearing referee may order the employer to continue to pay benefits until the person reaches the age of twenty-one. The act further explicitly provides that a child under the age of sixteen is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support on a deceased employee. Merely because the provisions of the act for the continuation of death benefits beyond 500 weeks to underage dependents are stated in permissive terms, it does not follow that the conclusive presumption of dependency does not continue until the age of sixteen. Reading the act in its entirety, it is consistent with the concept of permissiveness to find that a referee has no discretion but to order the continuation of benefits until a dependent is sixteen.
Section 341 of the act provides that questions regarding who is a dependent and the extent of the dependency are to be determined as of the date of the injury of an employee, and that the right to any death benefits becomes fixed at that time, irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions, except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 321, 331, and 335. Neither §§ 321, 331, or 335 nor the permissive "referee may order” language of §§ 321 and 335 specifically otherwise provides. Thus, in this case, the questions concerning the extent of the children’s dependency must be determined as of the date of injury of their father, and their right to any death benefit became fixed as of the date of his death, irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions including their adoption by Charles Murphy, and without regard to whether after they were adopted they continued to be factually dependent on their deceased father.
Vacated and remanded.
200 Mich App 422; 505 NW2d 3 (1993) vacated.
Rapaport, Pollok, Farrell & Waldron, PC. (by Steven J. Pollok and Kassia L. Snyder), for the plaintiff.
Lacey & Jones (by Michael T. Reinholm) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Riley, J.
Today we are called upon to consider the duration of the total dependency presumption in cases involving minors entitled to death benefits under § 321 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The language of the statutes at issue makes clear that the conclusive presumption of dependency automatically terminates at the end of the statutorily mandated 500-week period. Thereafter, the continuation of benefits to dependents under a certain age is a discretionary decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. A discretionary decision to continue benefits requires a factual finding of continued dependency in order to conform with the statutory mandates of the wdca. Finally, the logic behind this mode of procedure is elementary: employers obligated to pay death benefits under the wdca should not be required to pay death benefits after the period of statutory presumption has expired or has otherwise been terminated by statute without a showing of continued need. A finding to the contrary is outside the scope of the wdca and constitutes the sanction of economic waste.
i
Dennis Wainman was killed while driving a truck in the course of his employment with Michi gan Bell Telephone Company in February, 1972. Worker's compensation death benefits were paid to his widow, Candace, and his two children. In June 1973, she was remarried to Charles Murphy. Michigan Bell thereafter ceased payment of benefits to her pursuant to MCL 418.335; MSA 17.237(335), but voluntarily continued to pay benefits for the two children until the expiration of the 500-week period required by MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321).
Thereafter, Candace Murphy petitioned for a hearing of her claim that the children aged thirteen and nine, were entitled to benefits beyond the 500-week period, on the basis of § 321 and 335 of the worker's compensation act, as dependent children. Michigan Bell argued that, although the children were under sixteen years of age at the end of the 500-week period, they no longer were dependent on their deceased father because they had been adopted by Charles Murphy and there was no factual showing of continued dependency on their deceased father.
A hearing referee ordered the continuation of benefits until the children were sixteen, and the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals remanded for clarification. On remand, the wcab ruled that Michigan Bell was obligated under § 331, 335, and 353 to pay benefits until the children were eighteen. After remand, the Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion per curiam, holding that the basis for the permissive ordering of continued weekly benefits is the recipient's continued dependency, concluding, on the basis of Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152; 240 NW 2d 255 (1976), that a child who is adopted ceases to be factually dependent on the deceased father. It stated further that in this case the adoption destroyed the rationale for the conclusive presumption of the children's depen dency and created a legal relationship in which the adoptive father assumed the legal obligation to provide for the children, thereby supplanting the legal relationship that gave rise to the statutory presumption.
We granted leave to appeal. 444 Mich 866 (1993).
ii
The starting point of this Court's inquiry is to consider how to interpret the statutes involved. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary. Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 650; 375 NW2d 715 (1985); Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 249; 191 NW2d 307 (1971). When different statutes address the same subject, courts must endeavor to read them harmoniously and give them reasonable effect. House Speaker v State Administration Bd, 441 Mich 547, 568; 495 NW2d 539 (1993); Huron Twp v City Disposal Systems, Inc, 201 Mich App 210, 212; 505 NW2d 897 (1993).
hi
A
The specific question we are asked to answer is whether the conclusive presumption of dependency terminates at the end of the 500-week period. Accordingly, it is appropriate to focus our inquiry on certain provisions of the wdca. We are aided by a particular statutory provision in our search to determine the existence and extent of dependency for death benefits recipients. MCL 418.341; MSA 17.237(341) provides:
Questions as to who constitutes dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of the injury to the employee, and their right to any death benefit shall become fixed as of such time, irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions except as otherwise speciñcally provided in sections 321, 331 and 335. [Emphasis added.][ ]
This language, which clearly indicates the legislative intent to maintain the conclusive presumption except as stated otherwise, requires no interpretation regarding the point that the conclusive presumption is erased under prescribed circumstances. See Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra. Creative construction that disregards the removal of the conclusive presumption under appropriate circumstances would therefore violate the legislative intent. With this in mind, we now turn to consideration of the statutes wherein one may find the circumstances removing the conclusive presumption._
B
First, MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321) provided, in relevant part, for death benefits as follows at the time of the decedent's injury and death:
[F]or a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. If at the expiration of the 500-week period any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee . . . may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation or some portion thereof until such . . . person reaches the age of 21. [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized language indicates the discretionary nature of a hearing referee's ruling on the payment of continued benefits following the expiration of the 500-week period. In fact, use of the term "may" instead of the term "shall" indicates discretionary, rather than mandatory, action. It would be anomalous to hold that the hearing referee must order the continuance of death benefits after the 500-week period as a matter of law. To do so would nullify the quoted language of § 341 in violation of established precedent, would violate the clear legislative intent in § 321 of preserving discretion in hearing referees, see Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra, and would lead to forcing an employer to pay continued death benefits even in cases where the presumption has terminated and the legal and economic status of the claimant would make any further payments an absurdity.
Second, the wdca also specifically provides for the termination of benefits payable to a dependent wife upon remarriage and a reassessment of benefits payable to dependent children. At the time of Dennis Wainman's death, MCL 418.335; MSA 17.237(335) provided:
Upon the remarriage of a dependant wife receiving compensation, such payments shall cease upon the payment to her of the balance of the compensation to which she would otherwise have been entitled but in no event to exceed the sum of $500.00 . Where, at the expiration of the 500-week period, any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation, or some portion thereof, until such wholly or partially dependent person reaches the age of 21. [Emphasis added.]
In short, hearing referees are ordered to reassess the dependency of children at the end of the 500-week period in case of remarriage as well as to terminate an award to formerly dependent wives. There is no indication of any intent on the part of the Legislature to continue the conclusive presumption of total dependency after the statutory period in the case of children whose living parent remarries. Worthy of note is the emphasized lan guage that again calls for a hearing referee to exercise discretion regarding whether the facts support a continued award. Thus, hearing referees may order continued benefits for the children of deceased employees as an exercise of the discretion granted in § 335 as well as in § 321. To remove this discretion by judicial fiat certainly violates the clear intent of the Legislature for a factual inquiry into the nature of any continued dependency on the part of a child in cases of remarriage even without consideration of the added concerns surrounding legal adoption. See Farrington, Franks, and Dussia, supra.
Third, MCL 418.331(l)(b); MSA 17.237(331)(l)(b) does not require the continued presumption of dependency in cases of remarriage of the surviving spouse or the end of the 500-week benefits period. Rather, the provision calls for the conclusive presumption of complete dependency for "[a] child under the age of 16 years, or over if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning . . . ." It is clear from the language of § 331 that individuals having prescribed relationships with a deceased employee and who are under the age of sixteen are to be treated as wholly dependent. What is not particularly clear is whether the Legislature intended for the age of sixteen years, as found in § 331(l)(b), to represent a termination date for the conclusive presumption. Keeping in mind that we are required to provide an harmonious reading and a reasonable effect to ambiguous language, see House Speaker, supra, we conclude that § 331(l)(b) defines only the status of dependency and not its length. In other words, §331(l)(b) controls the question who is entitled to the conclusive presumption of complete dependency and not how long the conclusive presumption remains.
In addition, both § 321 and 335 target 500 weeks from the date of death as a critical period in cases of death benefits. Any attempt to disregard this commonality would negate a concept that the Legislature considered important enough to mention twice.
Indeed, it is the conclusive presumption provided in § 331(l)(b) that best supports the dissent. However, and as noted above, it is inappropriate to extend this presumption to the statute involving remarriage. We conclude that the presumption in § 331 does not nullify the termination of benefits following the conclusion of the statutory 500-week period provided in § 321 because it would violate the clear legislative intent previously described. Moreover, we are constrained to give an harmonious reading and reasonable effect to different statutes that arguably address the same subject, see House Speaker and Huron Twp, supra, without creating absurd results. The legislative intent for termination of the conclusive presumption on the happening of certain events, together with the discretion afforded hearing referees to order continued benefits after these events occur, requires the conclusion that § 331(l)(b) relates to the qualification of an individual as a dependent and not how long the conclusive presumption of dependency lasts.
In sum, it is beyond doubt that the Legislature intended the termination of the conclusive presumption of dependency under certain circumstances. These circumstances are the end of the statutory 500-week period and remarriage. See MCL 418.321, 418.335; MSA 17.237(321), 17.237(335).
iv
While it is clear that the conclusive presumption contained in § 331(l)(b) is not absolute, it is more problematic to discern which of the circumstances contained in § 341, i.e., remarriage (§ 335) or the conclusion of the 500-week period (§ 321), is operative under these facts. Moreover, the inquiry is further complicated by the legal adoption of the dependents involved. However, it is unnecessary to resolve this question at this time because defendant continued to pay death benefits to the two children after their adoption and their mother's remarriage and up to the end of the 500-week period. Accordingly, we conclude that the presumption of dependency was terminated at the end of the 500-week period under the terms of § 321 and that it was incumbent upon the claimants to establish a continued factual dependency in order to justify further benefits. This holding ensures the continuation of benefits in appropriate cases, while providing hearing referees with the opportunity to exercise the discretion that is so clearly part of the statutory scheme. It also avoids the absurd result of forcing employers to pay continued benefits where there is no further need.
In conclusion, it is not argued that qualified dependents are entitled to enjoy the conclusive presumption of dependency. Disagreement arises regarding whether this presumption may be terminated before a dependent's reaching a certain age on thé happening of specifically delineated events. It must be emphasized that there is no prohibition against a continuation of benefits following the occurrence of one or more of these events as long as hearing referees, within their statutorily authorized discretion, conclude that continued benefits are required. However, the burden of establishing a continued need of benefits rests with the same party who must establish the initial entitlement, i.e., the claimant.
Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the wcac for further proceedings regarding whether claimants are entitled to a continuation of death benefits.
Boyle, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Cf. Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 532; 33 NW2d 69 (1948) (the failure of the worker's compensation commission to lower an award after a spouse's remarriage constituted "the imposition of a penalty upon employers" and required reversal of an award).
The language of this statute has remained unchanged since before Dennis Wainman's death to the present day, despite sweeping changes made in the wdca in the last decade.
Furthermore, this Court's inquiry into the issue involved in this case properly begins with consideration of § 341. Its title and its import evidence the fact that its specific purpose is to govern the existence and extent of any presumptions of dependency, while the other statutes define situations best described as categories of entitlement. See 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 51.05, p 174 ("Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail"). Accordingly, we are required to treat the mandates of § 341 as paramount to sentences in other statutes that appear to be facially inconsistent when taken out of context.
See Lake Angelus v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 194 Mich App 220, 224; 486 NW2d 64 (1992) ("The use of the term 'shall' in a statute indicates mandatory, rather than discretionary, action"); Mollett v City of Taylor, 197 Mich App 328, 339; 494 NW2d 832 (1992).
See, e.g., Feld v Robert & Charles Beauty Salon, 435 Mich 352, 364; 459 NW2d 279 (1990) ("every word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible").
See, e.g., Reisman v Wayne State Univ Regents, 188 Mich App 526, 536; 470 NW2d 678 (1991) ("Statutes are to be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable consequences"); Webster, n 1 supra at 531. As stated earlier, there is no need to engage in judicial construction of the statutes because of their clarity on this point.
Review of this statute's legislative history reveals that it continues to provide for remarriage of a "dependent wife" rather than a dependent "spouse." However, this Court has already concluded that the terms of this subsection are gender-neutral. See Day v Foote Memorial Hosp, Inc, 412 Mich 698; 316 NW2d 712 (1982).
See n 3 and accompanying text.
See n 4.
See n 5.
As previously noted, § 341 calls for the termination of a presumption of dependency under circumstances set forth in § 321, 331 and 335. However, § 331 does not contain the type of termination language found in §321 and 335. On the other hand, the negative implication of § 331(l)(b) is that children over the age of sixteen are not entitled to the conclusive presumption of total dependency. Thought of in this light, § 331 does contain an exception, which in turn leads to an harmonious reading of these statutes in concert. See House Speaker and Huron Twp, supra.
Mention of the 500-week period in § 335 on remarriage strongly suggests a common factor between § 321 and 335 regarding the date after which the conclusive presumption of dependency, as provided in § 331(l)(b), expires. However, resolution of this issue is not required under the facts of this case.
In the absence of this presumption, one must resort to the underlying rule that it is a claimant's burden to establish factual dependency. See, e.g., Runnion v Speidel, 270 Mich 18, 24; 257 NW 926 (1934).