Case Name: Carrie M. TEDDER, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-07-16
Citations: 697 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: No. 96-01096
Parties: Carrie M. TEDDER, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: FULMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 697
Pages: 900–903

Head Matter:
Carrie M. TEDDER, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellees.
No. 96-01096.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 16, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 13, 1997.
James Garrity of Garrity & Fulford, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
David J. Stefany and Maria N. Sorolis of Hogg, Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Barnett Banks, Inc.
No appearance for Appellee Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission.

Opinion:
BLUE, Judge.
Carrie M. Tedder appeals the order of the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) reversing the appeals referee and denying her unemployment compensation claim. Because the UAC improperly substituted its factual findings for that of the appeals referee, we reverse.
Tedder worked for Barnett Bank for nine years. At the time of her discharge from employment, she worked as a customer service representative in the telebanking department. Tedder's job included crediting customers' accounts for certain previously assessed service charges, including automatic teller machine (ATM) charges. Barnett policy prohibited customer service representatives from making credits to their own accounts. Over a period of six months in 1995, Tedder removed fifteen dollars of service charges, including four ATM charges, from her own account. Tedder's entitlement to the credits was not questioned. When a supervisor discovered the credits, Tedder was fired.
Barnett challenged Tedder's claim for unemployment compensation benefits. At the hearing before the appeals referee, Ted-der denied that she was aware of the Barnett policy at the times she personally adjusted her account. The appeals referee accepted Tedder's testimony and made the factual finding that Tedder was unaware of the Barnett policy. There was competent, substantial evidence to support this finding. Accordingly, the appeals referee found that Tedder's conduct was not "misconduct connected with work" and therefore did not disqualify her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.
Barnett appealed to the UAC which reached the "legal conclusion" that Tedder "... knew, or should have known, that she was prohibited from performing transactions on her own account...." This ruling is not a "legal conclusion," but simply and plainly a reweighing of the facts. Where there is competent, substantial evidence to support the appeals referee's factual determinations, the UAC cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its findings of fact for those of the referee. See Georgia v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 647 So.2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Studor, Inc. v. Duren, 635 So.2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The UAC's conclusion that Tedder knew of Barnett's policy constitutes a reweighing of the evidence, even though clothed as a legal conclusion. What Tedder "should have known" is a factual finding as well.
Moreover, a factual finding that Ted-der "should have known" of Barnett's policy would not rise to the level of misconduct connected with work. Section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1995), defines misconduct connected with work as:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer.
If Tedder "knew" of the policy, there would be evidence to meet the willful disregard or wrongful intent tests as set forth above; but this would require a factual finding that directly conflicts with the appeals referee's finding., Even assuming the UAC could properly find that Tedder "should have known" of the, Barnett policy, we conclude Tedder's conduct would not rise to the level of misconduct connected with work. It is obvious that misconduct connected with work requires some degree of intent. We hold that the intent necessary to constitute misconduct connected with work as set forth in section 443.036(26) could not be based on what Tedder "should have known." See Doyle v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 635 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Accordingly, we reverse the UAC's order and remand for reinstatement of the appeals referee's decision.
FULMER, J., concurs.
DANAHY, A.C.J., concurs specially.