Case Name: Mrs. Bessie HENNEBERGER et al., Appellants, v. Deborah M. SHEAHAN, Guardian, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1955-03-04
Citations: 278 S.W.2d 497
Docket Number: No. 14908
Parties: Mrs. Bessie HENNEBERGER et al., Appellants, v. Deborah M. SHEAHAN, Guardian, Appellee.
Judges: CRAMER, J., dissents.-
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 278
Pages: 497–503

Head Matter:
Mrs. Bessie HENNEBERGER et al., Appellants, v. Deborah M. SHEAHAN, Guardian, Appellee.
No. 14908.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
March 4, 1955.
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1955.
Allen Melton and James R. Ellis, Dallas, for appellants.
Golden, Croley, Howell, Johnson & Mi-zell, and John L. Roach, Dallas, for appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Chief Justice.
This suit was originally filed by Mrs. Sarah Henneberger in her own behalf for title and possession of bonds of a face value of $50,000 and a ring valued at $350. The defendants, appellants here, were the nieces and nephews of Edward Henneber-ger, of whom Mrs. Henneberger is the surviving widow.
Mrs. Henneberger an elderly person alleged ownership and sought recovery of the personal property upon three theories: (1) That it was unlawfully converted by appellants; (2) that if appellants claimed the property by virtue of transactions with Mrs. Sarah Henneberger, she was lacking in mental capacity to understand the effect and consequences of her acts; and (3) that she was unduly influenced by the words and acts of certain of appellants. In their answers appellants alleged ownership of the properties by virtue of gifts made to them by Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger.
While suit was pending Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger, on Oct. 15, 1952 in the Probate Court of St. Louis, Missouri was adjudged to be of unsound mind, and her sister, Mrs. Deborah M. Sheahan was appointed guardian of her person and estate. Thereafter on Nov. 21, 1952 Deborah M. Sheahan, as guardian, was substituted as plaintiff in the case.
The cause came on for trial March 15, 1954 before a jury, which returned a verdict to the effect that Mrs. Henneberger did make the gifts in question, that she was not unduly influenced to do so, but that at the time of making said gifts she did not possess mental capacity sufficient to understand the nature and effect of her acts, or the business she was transacting. Based on the jury's verdict, judgment was rendered for appellee as guardian.
Appellants first two points of error urge that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the jury's answer to issue No. 1, that "She did make a gift" and their answer to issue No. 2, that "She did not have mental capacity." These two issues had reference to the transactions involving the bonds. The same conflict was alleged to exist between similar answers to issues Nos. 4 and 5, which had to do with the ring.
The court defined gift as follows: "A 'gift' as that word is used in these issues, means a voluntary transfer of property from one person to another person without any consideration or compensation therefor, coupled with the intention of the donor to divest herself of the title, dominion and control of the property at the very time of the gift and the delivery of the possession of the property to the donee so that the donor can exercise no further act of dominion or control over it."
Mental capacity was defined as follows: " 'Mental capacity' as that term is used in these issues, means the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which a person is engaged, and the business she is transacting."
Appellants contend that the inclusion in the court's definition of gift, of the words "voluntary transfer of property with the intention to divest herself of title, dominion and control of the property " (emphasis supplied), necessarily includes the idea of mental capacity, so that an answer of "Yes" to issue No. 1 is equivalent to saying that the donor had mental capacity to make the gift. If such contention were correct there would indeed be a conflict in the jury's answers as asserted by appellants.
But in the light of the court's definition of mental capacity we do not see any such conflict. The court defined mental capacity as " the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which a person is engaged, and the business she is transacting."
Are the words intention and understanding as used in the court's definitions in this case so near the same in meaning that the jury's answers to the issues in question are inconsistent and conflicting? We do not believe so. They seem to us to convey different concepts. Understanding includes a realization in every direction of the practical effects and consequences of a proposed act. On the other hand intent looks merely to the accomplishment of an act without necessarily understanding its effect and consequences.
We believe that this material difference in the meaning of the two words is recognized by both lay and legal authorities. In Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1941) we find the following definitions:
"intention. 1. a settled direction of the mind toward the accomplishment of a particular act; 2. anything intended to be done."
"understand. I 1. receive or appreciate the significance of; apprehend; 3. to have full and clear knowledge or mastery of. II 2. To comprehend the relation of things."
The above definitions of intention are substantially the same in some particulars as that given by the court in the cases of In re McCafferty's Will, 142 Misc. 371, 254 N.Y.S. 789; In re Ambrose's Will, Sur., 58 N.Y.S.2d 614, at page 617, and State ex rel. Verbon v. County of St. Louis, 216 Minn. 140, 12 N.W.2d 193, at page 196. The above definitions of understand are similar in some respects to the definition of understand as given in Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 41 A.2d 46, at page 49, 157 A.L.R. 132 (" ' the realization of the practical effects and consequences in every direction of the proposed act .' "), and White v. White, 60 N.J. Eq. 104, 45 A. 767, at page 771.
As we understand the meaning of the two words a child of tender years may have the intention to do a thing, but not understand the effect and consequences of doing it. An insane person may also intend to commit an act, but we say that he lacks criminal intent because he does not understand the effect and consequences of his act. Of course in the case at bar the question of criminal intent is not involved. Here Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger, in her confused state of mind may have had the intention to give away her property, but her mental capacity was such that she was incapable of realizing the practical effect and consequences of so doing, to appreciate the significance of her act, or to comprehend the relation of things.
There are other authorities which, though not altogether in point, seem to us to bear on the subject. Western Indemnity Co. v. MacKechnie, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 456, an opinion by this Court; International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Pence, Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 206; Fischer v. Gorman, 65 S.D. 453, 274 N.W. 866; Hochstetler v. Graber, 78 N.D. 90, 48 N.W.2d 15; People v. Henry, 23 Cal.App.2d 155, 72 P.2d 915. We hold that the issues in question do not present conflicting findings. Appellants' first, second, seventh, and eighth points are overruled.
Appellants also say that there was no evidence, or at least not sufficient evidence to support the submission of issues Nos. 2 and 5, which inquired about the mental capacity of Mrs. Sarah Henneberger. The record discloses that numerous lay and medical witnesses testified concerning her lack of mental capacity. For example, Dr. James F. McFadden, a psychiatrist, testified that he had examined and treated Mrs. Henneberger many times beginning Oct. 1, 1952; that she had a mental condition known as schizophrenia of the paranoid type and suffered from delusions and hallucinations, a derangement she had had before going to a hospital in Wisconsin, which derangement she still has; and it is incurable; that she is of unsound mind and does not possess mental capacity to under stand the' nature and consequences of her acts; and that her acts are influenced by her delusions and hallucinations. Other doctors also testified' that she was of unsound mind. There is testimony from other witnesses of her hallucinations concerning 'voices', noises, ideas of persecution, chairs wired, etc., and her belief that' there was :a live rat in her stomach.' The question of the mental capacity of Mrs. SarahM. Henneberger was for the jury, which based its verdict' on substantial evidence. We overrule appellants' third, fourth, fifth,- and sixth points. • •
Appellants' ninth point asserts- er- ror because the trial court's de'finition does not include these words "And a mere mental weakness is not of itself sufficient to incapacitate a person." . A .definition somewhat similar to 'the one' given in This case, without including the above quoted instruction, has been approved by our Supreme Court. Rutherford v. Robbins, Tex.Com.App., 298 S.W. 549. See, also Nass v. Nass, Tex.Civ.App., 224 S.W.2d, 280. We overrule appellants' ninth point.
-Appellants further complain because -the court overruled their motion to restrict the testimony' of certain witnesses under 1 art. 3716, Vernon's Anri.Giv.St., the "Dead Man's Statute." The witnesses were Elizabeth Page, Charles Arthur Page, Martha Proctor, Mary Pf enninghausen;-- Deborah Jane Sheahan, Deborah: M. Sheahan, and Dr. Edwin- L.- Sheahan. S
We find nó téstimony in the record of Martha Proctor, Mary.' Pfenning-hausen, or Deborah M: Sheahan. Portions of the deposition of Elizabeth Page were first introduced by appellants; in rebuttal appellee offered only one question and answer from said deposition.' Moreover Elizabeth Page is not a party to the suit and though -a niece of Mrs. Sarah M. Henne-berger, is not shown- to be an heir. Nor are Charles Arthur Page, Deborah Jane Sheahan or Dr. Edwin L. Sheahan parties to the suit, or shown to have an interest in the estate within the terms of art. 3716, V.A.C.S. The fact that they are relatives of parties to the suit is not'sufficient of itself -to restrict their testimony under the statute. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291, at page 294, Moreover the record shows that appellants thoroughly cross-examined the last three named witnesses respecting the matters they had testified about on direct examination. By so doing appellants waived the prohibition declared by the statute. Garza v. De Leon, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W.2d 844; Walkup v. Stone, Tex.Civ.App., 73 S.W.2d 912; Hearori v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 230. We overrule appellants' tenth point.
In their last point appellants say that the court erred in sustaining appellee's motion to restrict tl.e testimony of certain witnesses under'art. 3716, V.A.GS.: The record contains no bills of exception showing what would have been the testimony of the-witness.- Since we- do not-know what the testimony would have been, we are unable to pass on the question whether it was error to restrict or exclude it. J. Weingarten, Inc., v. Brockman, 134 Tex. 451, 135 S.W.2d 698 (opinion adopted by S. C.); Cushenberry v. Profit, Tex.Civ.App., 153 S.W.2d 291 (writ ref. w. m.) ; Texas Lloyds v. Laird, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W.2d 937; 3-A Tex.Jur. 534. Appellants' eleventh point is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.