Case Name: David S. ALCOTT and A. J. Richter & Company, a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. WAGNER & BECKER, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-03-12
Citations: 328 So. 2d 549
Docket Number: No. 74-1166
Parties: David S. ALCOTT and A. J. Richter & Company, a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. WAGNER & BECKER, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Appellees.
Judges: WALDEN, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 328
Pages: 549–554

Head Matter:
David S. ALCOTT and A. J. Richter & Company, a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. WAGNER & BECKER, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Appellees.
No. 74-1166.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 12, 1976.
Charles A. Goff, of Law Offices of Carl W. Turner, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Peter A. Portley and William F. Sullivan, of Zimmerman, Haywood & Portley, Pompano Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
OWEN, Judge.
Appellants, real estate broker and salesman, brought this suit to recover a commission from the sellers of certain business property. Upon non jury trial, plaintiffs/appellants suffered an involuntary dismissal at the close of their case, precipitating this appeal.
Count III of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged a breach of an exclusive listing agreement executed by the parties. The plaintiffs' evidence in support of this count, when viewing all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the plaintiffs, established the following: (1) plaintiffs were to be compensated in a fixed amount if they secured a purchaser for defendants' business property; (2) plaintiffs' advertisement of the property brought an inquiry from one Joseph Gubman; (3) Gubman, upon learning that the property belonged to the defendants with whom he was personally acquainted, thereafter contacted and dealt directly with them; (4) at all times Gub-man was acting as the agent of the ultimate purchaser, one Navel, Inc.; and (5) the sale was consummated as a result of continuous negotiations between Gubman and defendants, from which negotiations the plaintiffs were purposely excluded.
This made out a prima facie case, for as we said in First Realty Corporation of Boca Raton v. Standard Steel Treating Company, 268 So.2d 410, at 413 (Fla.App. 4th 1972):
"When the broker has brought the prospective parties together, they cannot complain that the broker did not participate in negotiations when they have purposely excluded the broker from these negotiations by dealing with one another directly and in secret. National Airlines, Inc. v. Oscar E. Dooly Associates, Inc., Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 53; Moylan v. Estes, Fla.App.1958, 102 So.2d 855; Mead Corporation v. Mason, Fla.App. 1966, 191 So.2d 592."
It may well be that had the same evidence been presented to the trial judge as the trier of fact, he might have, in weighing the evidence, found for the defendants. However, it is not the privilege of the trial court to weigh the evidence when ruling on a defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's case. Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So.2d 509, 55 A.L.R.3d 267 (Fla.1972).
The judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WALDEN, C. J., concurs.
KAPNER, LEWIS, Associate Judge, concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.