Case Name: RODEWAY INNS OF AMERICA, an Arizona Corporation, Rodeway Inns of America, a Nevada Corporation; and Rodeway Inn-Clearwater, Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership, Appellants, v. Robert E. ALPAUGH and Kathleen P. Alpaugh, his wife; Charles W. Birdsong, Sr., and Dorothy Birdsong, his wife; and E. Eugene Sitton and Donna L. Sitton, his wife; and ABS, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-10-10
Citations: 390 So. 2d 370
Docket Number: No. 79-1452
Parties: RODEWAY INNS OF AMERICA, an Arizona Corporation, Rodeway Inns of America, a Nevada Corporation; and Rodeway Inn-Clearwater, Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership, Appellants, v. Robert E. ALPAUGH and Kathleen P. Alpaugh, his wife; Charles W. Birdsong, Sr., and Dorothy Birdsong, his wife; and E. Eugene Sitton and Donna L. Sitton, his wife; and ABS, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: SCHEB, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 390
Pages: 370–379

Head Matter:
RODEWAY INNS OF AMERICA, an Arizona Corporation, Rodeway Inns of America, a Nevada Corporation; and Rodeway Inn-Clearwater, Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership, Appellants, v. Robert E. ALPAUGH and Kathleen P. Alpaugh, his wife; Charles W. Birdsong, Sr., and Dorothy Birdsong, his wife; and E. Eugene Sitton and Donna L. Sitton, his wife; and ABS, Inc., Appellees.
No. 79-1452.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 10, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1980.
J. Philip Plyler of Hill, Hill & Dickenson, Tampa, for appellants.
Milton D. Jones of Wightman, Weidemeyer, Jones & Turnbull, Clearwater, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
OTT, Judge.
The judgment below holds appellant liable on a mortgage which it had placed on the premises in order to obtain financing to construct a motel thereon, even though ap-pellee owners had evicted appellant and taken possession. We affirm the judgment, but deem it worthwhile to explain why that result was proper.
The pertinent facts are quite simple. Rodeway leased appellees' land for 55 years for the purpose of constructing and operating a motel thereon. In order for Rodeway to obtain construction financing, appellees agreed to become signatories to a mortgage on the premises, which provided in pertinent part:
20. The undersigned by their joinder in this mortgage do hereby subordinate and make inferior any and all rights they have or in the future may have by virtue of any lease agreement by or between them on above described property and covenant that no parties are in possession other then mortgagors.
21. The Owner joins in the execution of this mortgage solely for the purpose of constituting this mortgage a first lien upon the fee simple title to the premises herein described and the Owner shall have no personal liability for the payment of any sums secured by this Mortgage and no personal liability or personal judgment may ever be taken against the Owner by reason of its execution hereof.
Pursuant to and consonant with that concession by appellees, Rodeway agreed in the lease (as amended) that:
Article X
Remedies
Section 1. Defaults. The LESSOR may terminate this lease or may evict the LESSEE from the premises and re-let the same for the account of the LESSEE upon the happening of any one of the following events: (a) failure of the LESSEE to pay the rent . .; (b) failure to pay real estate taxes . .; (c) failure to pay the monthly mortgage installment
Section 2. Re-entry. Upon the occurrence of any defaults hereinabove provided for or otherwise provided by law, whether the LESSOR elects to terminate this lease or evict the LESSEE and retake the premises for the account of the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to re-enter the premises . Upon and after such re-entry by the LESSOR the LESSEE shall remain liable to pay the mortgage .
Due to various local and national problems in the economy, the motel was not a success. Rodeway defaulted in payment to suppliers, to appellees for rent, and on the mortgage to the construction financier. Appellees terminated the lease, regained possession of the premises with Rodeway's acquiescence, paid the delinquent operating expenses and brought the mortgage current. They then brought this action and obtained judgment for reimbursement of all such payments, and for collection of the rent accruing prior to the termination of the lease.
This appeal by Rodeway attacks only the portion of the judgment granting reimbursement for the mortgage payments which fell due after the termination of the lease. What Rodeway does not contend on this appeal is as revealing and significant as what it does contend. First, it makes no contention at any time that the provisions of the lease are in any way ambiguous. Moreover, although it advances many reasons for avoiding its obligation to satisfy the mortgage regardless of appellees' termination of the lease and repossession of the premises, Rodeway never once denies that the literal language of the lease requires it to do so. Equally significant is the fact that Rodeway has never claimed that its officers who negotiated and signed the lease were in any way misinformed or otherwise laboring under a mistaken impression of the effect of such language. More over, Rodeway has never denied that the lease was terminated. In fact, that was expressly asserted to be so in the affirmative defenses Rodeway attempted to raise in the trial court.
In the absence of contrary agreement, a landlord whose tenant has defaulted in payment of rent can re-enter and dispossess the tenant. § 83.05 et seq., Fla.Stat. If there is a lease, however, its provisions are conclusively controlling, and a court will not substitute its .judgment for that of the parties by rewriting that lease. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Desser & Garfield, Inc., 193 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Although the Florida Residential Landlord & Tenant Act (§§ 83.40 et seq., Fla. Stat.) permits courts to override the terms and conditions- of residential leases if they are deemed inequitable, there is no such control over business leases. As to those, the rule governing contracts in general is applicable-a party will not be relieved of obligations deliberately undertaken merely because they prove burdensome or otherwise improvident. Nussey v. Caufield, 146 So.2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
To counteract that general rule, Rodeway relies almost exclusively on Mandell v. Fortenberry, 290 So.2d 3 (Fla.1974) for the proposition that the claims of a landlord who retakes possession of premises which have been improved by the defaulting tenant are subject to setoff, under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, for the net value added to the repossessed premises by the improvements. There is dictum in Mandell to that effect, but it must be noted that (1) the landlord did win that lawsuit and (2) the landlord's theory of recovery was predicated on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which explains the inapplicability of the normal rule that equitable defenses are not cognizable in actions at law unless they would suffice to avoid the judgment if one were obtained. Klein v. G. F. C. Corp., 103 So.2d 120 (Fla.1958).
A shorter answer to any reliance on Man-dell, however, is that the contract there did not specifically grant the relief sought, as does the one here. Rodeway agreed to pay the mortgage even though appellees terminated the lease and regained possession. The lease in Mandell contained no such provision. It is hardly surprising, under those circumstances, that the landlord found his equitable action met by the equitable defense of unjust enrichment-the inequity of allowing enforcement of the tenant's continuing obligation on the mortgage with no offsetting credit for improvements which might have enhanced the value of the premises. There is no reasonable predicate for concluding that such a defense has validity where, as here, the agreement of the parties specifically and unequivocally dictates precisely that result.
The lease before us provided appellees with two alternative remedies when Rode-way breached the lease-terminate and reenter for their own benefit, or evict Rode-way and relet for Rodeway's account. In either event, (1) appellees had a right to re-enter and (2) Rodeway remained obligated to pay the mortgage. Those provisions are in no way inconsistent or ambiguous-or in any way contrary to Florida law or public policy. We agree with the able trial judge, who ruled that the language in question was "as clear as spring water", and it is significant that Rodeway itself has never professed to find any ambiguity in that language.
The applicability of Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. DeLoach, 362 So.2d 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), on which Rodeway relies, is flawed by the fact that there the landlord sought two remedies that are patently incompatible, i. e., repossession for his own account and continued liability of the tenant for the accruing rent. There is no such inconsistency here-appellees terminated the lease and made no claim against Rodeway for further rent. They merely sought to enforce Rodeway's explicit promise to satisfy the mortgage even if the lease were terminated and appellees took over the facilities constructed with the proceeds of the loan for which the mortgage was given.
For reasons which the parties deemed compelling at the time, they agreed that appellees would not be responsible for the improvements Rodeway planned to construct. The lease clearly reveals Rodeway's awareness that such provision could result in an ordinarily anomalous situation-loss of the improvements without release from the obligation to pay for them. Rodeway was under no compulsion to proceed with the project under those conditions. It chose to do so of its own free will and volition, and it would be naive to think that it had no pecuniary motive or incentive for doing so. The trial court properly refused to tamper with the solemn commitments of astute business men.
In our opinion the terms of the lease, negotiated by the parties in good faith and with full awareness of the legal consequences, fully support the conclusion reached by the trial court. The judgment is affirmed.
SCHEB, C. J., concurs.
CAMPBELL, J., dissents with opinion.
. We are not unmindful that Rodeway claims that the parties themselves, in effect, rewrote the lease by an oral novation at the time appel-lees re-entered the premises. In our opinion the trial court properly struck that affirmative defense. The release, surrender or rescission of a lease for a term in excess of one year must be in writing signed before witnesses. § 689.-01, Fla.Stat.; 11 Fla.Jur.2d 469, Contracts § 162.
. The actual basis of the denial of certiorari was lack of jurisdiction.