Case Name: Jerry Wayne EANES v. STATE of Maryland
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1990-02-08
Citations: 318 Md. 436
Docket Number: No. 1
Parties: Jerry Wayne EANES v. STATE of Maryland.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 318
Pages: 436–500

Head Matter:
569 A.2d 604
Jerry Wayne EANES v. STATE of Maryland.
No. 1,
Sept. Term, 1989.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 8, 1990.
David A. French (The Rutherford Institute of Manassas, Virginia, Craig L. Silver, Campen & Silver, P.C., Gaithersburg), on brief, for petitioner.
Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued Before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.
Blackwell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Judge.
Section 121 of Article 27 (1987 Repl.Vol.) makes it unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb any neighborhood in [any Maryland] city, town or county by loud and unseemly noises----" In the case before us, we must decide whether this proscription is constitutional when used by the State to limit the volume level of speech protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Before addressing this issue, however, we set out the facts in some detail.
I.
This case arises in the context of an anti-abortion demonstration which took place in front of the Hagerstown Reproductive Clinic (Clinic) on 18 May 1988. The Clinic is located on West Washington Street, a congested, one-way, two-lane thoroughfare in Hagerstown. The building which houses the Clinic also houses two other businesses and at least one residential apartment. Across the street from the Clinic is a residential apartment building.
On the morning of 18 May, petitioner Jerry Wayne Eanes (Eanes) was part of a small group that had gathered in front of the Clinic to, in Eanes's words, "assemble [,] to speak out against abortion, to pass out gospel tracts [and] to try and talk to girls that are walking by [in order to explain the evils of abortion]." Eanes's primary method of opposing abortion, however, was "to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ." Indeed, he asserted that his purpose was to preach to the entire neighborhood.
Eanes and another man, Timothy Schuller, preached that morning between approximately 10:80 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. Each spoke for short periods of time at varying intervals. Each spoke unaided by any artificial amplification. People employed in the vicinity and local residents complained to the Hagerstown Police Department (Department) that they were being disturbed by the loudness of the preaching. At least one resident left her home and complained to the demonstrators. She requested that the noise level be reduced. The administrator of the Clinic left her office and complained directly to Eanes. She indicated to him that the noise was disrupting her work and requested that he quiet down. Police Officer Feigly, who had responded to complaints received at the Department, also spoke with Eanes and with Schuller. He explained that a number of noise complaints had been received and requested that the volume level of the speech be reduced.
After warning Eanes, Officer Feigly left the scene, although it appears from the record that other police officers remained in the area. He returned approximately forty minutes later in response to further noise complaints received by the Department. At that time he observed Eanes shouting in a loud voice. He then placed Eanes under arrest for disturbing the peace in violation of § 121.
On 2 August 1988, the District Court of Maryland sitting in Washington County (Glaser, J.) found Eanes guilty of disturbing the peace in violation of § 121. On 15 December 1988, Eanes obtained de novo review of his conviction before Judge Frederick C. Wright, III, of the Circuit Court for Washington County.
At that trial the State presented eleven witnesses who testified as to Eanes's conduct on 18 May: three residents, three local business people, one pedestrian, one police cadet, and three police officers. All generally characterized Eanes's preaching as very or extremely loud. His conduct was more specifically described as "screaming without screeching," "shouting and screaming," "yelling and screaming at the top of his voice." Each of the first six witnesses listed above testified that they were disturbed in their homes or places of business and that it was the loudness and tone they found objectionable, not the message Eanes conveyed. One resident, unable to put her son down for his nap, testified that she and her child were forced to leave their apartment due to the noise. Another resident, in an apartment in the back of the building across the street from the Clinic, testified that her husband's sleep (he worked the night shift) was disrupted. Each of the three State's witnesses who were employed in the area testified that the volume level of Eanes's speech was so great that it interfered in some manner with their work.
Although there was some conflicting testimony, several of the witnesses agreed that Eanes could readily be heard above the traffic noise. One witness testified that Eanes was "far louder than the vehicle noises," while others testified that he "overpowered" or "overtook" the sounds from the street. It also was said that Eanes could be heard as far away as "the square," a location stated to be a block and a half from where Eanes was preaching.
Eanes, testifying in his own defense, did not, for the most part, dispute this evidence. He testified that in preaching in front of the Clinic, he raised his voice. When asked why he raised his voice, he replied:
Because I'm speaking not just to the people in that buildingf.] I was speaking to the general people that were in that area, the bystanders, the people driving by, the people that I knew were going to be coming in. Based on the evidence presented, Judge Wright found Eanes "guilty of willfully disturbing the peace and tranquility of that particular neighborhood during the morning of May the 18th . by making loud and otherwise unacceptable^] improper under the circumstances noises."
II.
Eanes raises several constitutional challenges to his conviction. He insists that in Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 363 (1983), this Court definitively limited application of the statutory prohibition against "loud and unseemly noises" to speech that falls outside the protective reach of the first amendment; speech, for example, that advocates imminent, lawless action. Bereft of such a limitation, he argues, the statute is left unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He concludes that even if § 121 is found to overcome those hurdles, it cannot, consonant with the first amendment, be enforced to limit the volume level of speech that is not artificially amplified.
The State, for its part, disputes each of these contentions. It takes the position that the provision at issue is a content- neutral regulation of the manner of protected speech, one that is neither vague nor overbroad, and one that was properly applied in the case at bar. Noting the substantial disparity between the parties' understanding of the constitutionally permissible scope of § 121, we granted Eanes's petition for writ of certiorari, 315 Md. 223, 554 A.2d 351 (1989), in order to consider if and in what manner § 121 may be applied as a limitation on protected speech.
III.
A.
We begin by disagreeing with Eanes's evaluation of Diehl. He reads that opinion much too broadly. We dealt there not with a conviction based on objectionablé loudness, but with one based on allegedly objectionable content. As we shall explain, the Diehl limitation on which Eanes relies is only applicable when the prohibition against "loud and unseemly noise" seeks to regulate the content of speech.
Diehl involved a police officer, Gavin, who stopped an automobile for a traffic violation. Diehl, a passenger, left the vehicle but was ordered by Gavin to return to the car. Diehl responded by screaming, " 'Fuck you Gavin;' 'I know my rights;' you can't tell me what to do____'" 294 Md. at 468, 451 A.2d at 116. A crowd gathered. After Diehl refused a second time to get back in the car, Gavin arrested him for " 'screaming obscenities and . drawing a crowd.' " Id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 117 [ellipsis in Diehl].
The State sought to uphold Diehl's subsequent conviction under § 121 in part on the ground that Diehl violated the statute "by making loud and unseemly noises in refusing 'to obey Gavin's proper order.' " Id. at 470, 451 A.2d at 118. At no time did the State argue that the loudness of Diehl's protestations violated § 121. Rather, it was the State's position that the statements "attracted a crowd and enhanced the possibility of chaos." Appellee's Brief in Diehl v. State at 6; see 294 Md. at 480-481, 487-488, 451 A.2d at 123, 126-127 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). Since the State's argument addressed the content of Diehl's speech (and not its loudness), we determined that in order to qualify as "loud and unseemly noise," under the circumstances, "Diehl's conduct must have advocated imminent lawless action and been likely to incite a breach of the peace____" Diehl, 294 Md. at 472, 451 A.2d at 119 [emphasis in original]. In this manner we limited the provision's ability to regulate the content of speech. We did not in that case, however, consider the argument the State at present raises before us: that the statute serves as a constitutionally valid content-neutral regulation of the volume level of protected speech. We now address that question.
B.
The command of the first amendment, that "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom of speech .," is directed with equal force, by way of the fourteenth amendment, to state and local governments. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780 n. 8, 96 L.Ed. 1098, 1105 n. 8 (1952) (collecting cases); Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 124, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965). This "constitutional right of free expression" puts "the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1787-1788, 29 L.Ed.2d 284, 293 (1971). The "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think" is a "means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and is essential both to "stable government" and to "political change." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648-649, 71 L.Ed. 1095, 1105-1106 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). It has been described as "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee____" L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-1 at 785 (2d ed. 1988).
Yet "the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. at 1785, 29 L.Ed.2d at 290. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86, 69 S.Ct. 448, 453, 93 L.Ed. 513, 521 (1949) (sound trucks); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942) ("fighting words"); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470, 473-474 (1919) (clear and present danger of imminent unlawful conduct). "Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3447, 87 L.Ed.2d 567, 578 (1985) (nonpublic forum); see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,-, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2499, 101 L.Ed.2d 420, 428 (1988) (picketing of single residence); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (1965) (obstructing sidewalk). The fundamental importance of free speech in our constitutional scheme requires, however, that restrictions on its exercise be subjected to searching scrutiny. Frisby, 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2499, 101 L.Ed.2d at 428.
Constitutional analysis begins by looking at the type of forum the speaker seeks to employ. Id. We deal here with the public streets and sidewalks which have been repeatedly recognized as "archetype[s] of . traditional public forum[s]." Id. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 343 (1988); Cornelius, supra, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. at 3448-3449, 87 L.Ed.2d at 580; Perry Education Assn v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794, 804 (1983). " '[S]treets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.' " Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 47 L.Ed.2d 196, 204 (1976) (quoting Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1606, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 610 (1968)).
When a court reviews restrictions on speech in traditional public forums, "the appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content." Frisby, 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d at 429. A content-based restriction is constitutionally hale only if it can be shown that the challenged " 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end____'" Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955, 74 L.Ed.2d at 804) [ellipsis in Frisby]. See Sable Communications of Calif. v. FCC, — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2837, 106 L.Ed.2d 93,106 (1989) (content-based regulation of telephonic commercial communication); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 65 L.Ed.2d 263, 270 (1980) (content-based regulation of residential picketing). On the other hand, a state " 'may . enforce regulations of the time, place and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' " Frisby, 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d at 429 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955, 74 L.Ed.2d at 804). See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675 (1989) (content-neutral regulation of sound volume); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1984) (content-neutral ban on overnight sleeping and camping in certain parks).
In this case even Eanes does not question that as applied to protected speech § 121 can be read as content neutral. Indeed, because we are working in the area of protected speech, the statutory phrase "loud and unseemly noise" should be construed in a content-neutral fashion in order to remain in conformity with first amendment jurisprudence. "[I]f one of the proposed interpretations would render an enactment valid, while another would render it invalid or ineffective, the court will construe the enactment to be valid whenever feasible." City of College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 589, 525 A.2d 1059, 1067 (1987); see Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 566, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (1989).
In Matter of Nawrocki, 15 Md.App. 252, 289 A.2d 846 (1972), Judge Orth, then of the Court of Special Appeals, faced with construction of the phrase "loud and unseemly" as it appears in § 121, gave the words their common meaning.
'Loud' is 'characterized by high volume and intensity of sound . clamorous and insistent.' 'Unseemly' and its synonyms such as 'improper', 'indecorous', 'indelicate' mean 'in violation of accepted standards of what is right or proper.'
Id. at 256, 289 A.2d at 849 [ellipsis in opinion]. "Unseemly" has also been defined as "analogous to the oft-used term 'unreasonable.' " Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F.Supp. 720, 741 (E.D.Pa.1968), aff'd, 392 U.S. 646, 88 S.Ct. 2307, 20 L.Ed.2d 1358. We interpret the word "unseemly" as directly modifying the volume level of "loud." It requires the meaning of "loud" to be informed by the circumstances. It does not act as a blanket proscription against loud speech. If the other statutory elements are met, § 121 can be enforced only if the speech is unreasonably loud under the circumstances. Construed in this manner the phrase "loud and unseemly noise" is clearly content-neutral.
This content-neutral law is not a regulation of time or place. Under the statute individuals may speak in any traditional public forum at any time. The elements of time and place operate, in the context of the statute, to inform; they are not themselves the subject of regulation. As the State correctly contends, § 121 is a regulation on the manner of expression. It serves to limit, under proper circumstances, the loudness of the delivery of the communication.
As a regulation on the manner of expression, § 121 must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The Supreme Court recently pointed out that "it can no longer be doubted that government 'ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.' " Ward, — U.S. at —, 109 S.Ct. at 2756, 105 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2129, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1984), citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949)) [brackets in Ward]. See also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1150, 92 L.Ed. 1574, 1578 (1948); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir.1980).
What is more
[t]his interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect " 'the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home.' " Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at [-], [108 S.Ct. at 2502, 101 L.Ed.2d at 431] (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. [at] 471 [100 S.Ct. at 2296, 65 L.Ed.2d at 276] (1980)), but it is by no means limited to that context, for the government may act to protect even such traditional forums as city streets and parks from excessive noise, [citations omitted]
Ward, — U.S. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 2756, 105 L.Ed.2d at 678-679. In Ward, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation which gave New York City broad authority to control the volume level of concerts and other performances (recognized as protected speech) at a Central Park bandshell, on the justification that the City sought "to avoid undue [noise] intrusion into residential and other areas of the park." Id. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d at 676.
In Kovacs, supra, a much earlier antinoise case relied on in Ward, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance which prohibited the use of sound trucks which emitted "loud and raucous" noise. As in Ward, the concern in Kovacs was on protecting the "unwilling listener" both on the street and in the privacy of his or her home. 336 U.S. at 86-87, 69 S.Ct. at 453, 93 L.Ed. at 522. Without such regulation, the court remarked, "in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would . be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions." Id. at 87, 69 S.Ct. at 453, 93 L.Ed. at 522.
Ward and Kovacs, as well as numerous other Supreme Court cases, reflect judicial concern with balancing the right of free speech with the individual's right to be free from unwanted communication. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2502, 101 L.Ed.2d at 431; Carey, 447 U.S. at 470-471, 100 S.Ct. at 2295, 65 L.Ed.2d at 276; F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3040, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073, 1093 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-211, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2272-2274, 45 L.Ed.2d 125, 130-132 (1975); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2717, 41 L.Ed.2d 770, 776-777 (1974); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 291-292 (1971); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). This has often been expressed in terms of the "captive audience."
The notion of "captive audience" involves the problem of the unwilling listener or viewer who cannot readily escape from the undesired communication, or whose own rights are such that he or she should not be required to do so. See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To? 67 Nw.U.L.Rev. 153, 195-197 (1972). The pedestrian or motorist on a public street may simply walk or drive past the unwelcome speaker or detour around the picketers or demonstrators. As in Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 291-292, those who do not care to read or hear certain messages are, in these circumstances, free to turn away. But the Cohen Court pointed out that the people passing through a courthouse corridor, who could look the other way if they did not like the anti-draft message on the back of Cohen's jacket, "were in a quite different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences." 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 292. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, explained:
[Tjhis Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue____ The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Id. [citations omitted]. See also Carey, 447 U.S. at 471, 100 S.Ct. at 2295, 65 L.Ed.2d at 276 (1980) (preserving sanctity of the home from tribulations of daily pursuits is an important value).
Thus, while door-to-door residential canvassing cannot be subject to blanket prohibition, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), a householder who does not wish to be canvassed may be permitted to prevent unwelcome visits by invoking trespass laws. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-148, 63 S.Ct. 862, 865-866, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 1319 (1943). Within the home, "the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3040, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1093. For even if "the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in public before they turn away, . a different order of values obtains in the home." Id. at 759, 98 S.Ct. at 3045-3046, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1100 (Powell, J., concurring) [citations omitted]. See also Frisby, 487 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2503, 101 L.Ed.2d at 432 (unwilling listeners may be protected within their own houses); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. at 736, 90 S.Ct. at 1490, 25 L.Ed.2d at 742-743 (householder may act to preclude receipt of unwanted mail).
Moreover, a captive audience that is entitled to protection may exist outside the home. Because riders on public rapid transit vehicles are captive audiences, a municipality may decline to accept political advertising on these vehicles. Lehman, supra. See also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting disturbance of school).
The principle is grounded on the concept of privacy. "The Supreme Court permits the state to protect listeners who are 'captive' to unwanted speech — when speech invades their privacy interest in an essentially intolerable manner." Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Faculties, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1856,1863 (1988) [footnote omitted]. Although that protection is most often extended to those within their homes, it may be extended to any situation in which "privacy interests [are] substantially threatened" because "individuals cannot escape 'bombardment of [their] sensibilities.' " Id. at 1864 (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211, 95 S.Ct. at 2278, 45 L.Ed.2d at 132, quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1286, 29 L.Ed.2d at 292). See also Comment, 'I'll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It . But Not to Me' — The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983 S.Ill.U.L.J. 211, 215-216.
Sound is one of the most intrusive means of communication. "The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it." Kovacs, 386 U.S. at 86-87, 69 S.Ct. at 453, 93 L.Ed. at 522 [footnote omitted]. The cases support the view that content-neutral regulations controlling its loudness are permissible. See, e.g., Ward, (volume may be controlled to protect area of park and nearby residences); Grayned, (ordinance prohibiting disturbance of good order of a school valid); Kovacs (municipality may control volume of sound trucks); Reeves (city may protect citizens from unreasonable or disruptive levels of noise in streets). It may be otherwise outside the home or office, where the audience is ordinarily not captive, see Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 749 n. 27, 98 S.Ct. at 3040 n. 27, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1098 n. 27; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209-211, 95 S.Ct. at 2272-2273, 45 L.Ed.2d at 130-132; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 292. But § 121 prohibits only that volume level of communication that unreasonably disturbs individuals whose rights to be free from aural abuse override the right of a speaker to address them by direct or incidental oral communication. This is the type of balance of conflicting interests contemplated by first amendment jurisprudence.
We read the statute as going no further than to afford content-neutral protection to the captive auditor (on the facts before us, auditors in homes or in private offices) who cannot avoid continuing, unreasonably loud and disruptive communications emanating from the street. So read, the statute serves a substantial interest and is narrowly tailored to serve those ends.
When the State seeks to correct a particular evil by way of time, place, or manner restrictions, it need not employ the least restrictive or least intrusive means. Ward, — U.S. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d at 680. "Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S; 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2906, 86 L.Ed.2d 536, 548 (1985) [ellipsis in Ward], Since the character of open public places may differ widely, one from another, only a flexible approach to volume control can adequately serve the myriad circumstances which the State can legitimately regulate. As we have pointed out, it is the particular circumstances that render a loud communication unseemly or unreasonable, and hence subject to time, place, and manner regulations.
Consider apartment dwellers and workers in private offices along West Washington Street. The record in this case makes clear that during business hours the street is heavily travelled by motor vehicles, including large trucks. This traffic produces a high noise level, and one who wishes to communicate by voice with people in the street must make his or her voice heard over the sound of traffic. But when the volume of the speaker's voice not only reaches passersby in the street — the public forum — but also awakens adults sleeping in their homes, prevents children from taking their naps, and makes it impossible for workers to concentrate on their work, the volume's effect on the captive audience reaches a point at which that volume may be controlled.
One speaking on West Washington Street at midnight, with traffic levels much reduced, could run afoul of § 121 at a lower level of voice volume. In this quieter environment, a less loud oral presentation could unreasonably disturb what might well be a larger captive audience, at least from the viewpoint of apartment dwellers. See People v. Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 419, 573 P.2d 100, 103 (1978) (proscribed conduct "necessarily varies according to the time, location and decibel level of such conduct"); Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 735, 359 N.E.2d 310, 312 (1977) (same). And if we move the scene to an area of Hagerstown that is solely residential, still different levels of speech might suffice to violate the statute. Reeves, 631 F.2d at 385 n. 10 (threshold level of prohibited disruptive noise may be substantially lower in areas primarily residential). We deal with a balancing that involves the time and place where speech occurs as well as the nature of the places where auditors are — the street itself; stores; schools; hospitals; private offices; homes. A sound level that a pedestrian on the sidewalk could not constitutionally object to might be impermissible with respect to a patient in an intensive care ward.
Another factor that enters the balancing is that of alternative means. We shall have more to say about this topic shortly in a somewhat different context. Whether there is some other way of achieving the actor's goal is to be considered in the determination of whether a loud sound is unreasonably loud. Road construction equipment, for example, may make a great deal of noise and may seriously disturb people in homes, hospitals, schools, and offices. But broken water mains must be repaired and streets must be maintained, and it is often the case that noisy machines are the only practicable means of achieving these objectives. Thus, the sound created by that sort of activity is not necessarily unseemly or unreasonably loud. But a speaker will usually have a number of less noisy ways of presenting his or her message: speaking at lower volume; individual contact; use of placards or leaflets! So the balance of reasonableness may rest differently depending on the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Greene, 410 Pa. 111, 115-116, 189 A.2d 141, 144 (1963).
Another weight in the balance may be the mechanical or electronic amplification of sound. It is no doubt easier to find that an antinoise law is constitutional when it deals with that sort of amplification, as did the ordinance in Kovacs, supra. See also, e.g., Ward, Saia and Reeves, all supra. But even though cases like Kovacs emphasize the sound-truck feature of the law, we reject Eanes's argument that amplification is a constitutional sine qua non. Eanes would have it that a speaker could stand in front of a residence at two o'clock in the morning and shout at top volume as long as he or "she pleased provided a message was being conveyed. We disagree. If the State is able to prove that, under the circumstances, the human voice is so unreasonably loud as to be unreasonably intrusive on a captive audience, that is enough. See, e.g., Grayned, supra. Captive auditors in their homes and places of business need not become an unwilling congregation for Eanes's street-preaching.
Eanes suggests that only a statute which sets a specific decibel level would be constitutional. Yet even with respect to a particular public forum, such as Hagerstown's West Washington Street, a decibel level that would permit communication with passersby and not disturb residents in their homes may vary with the time of day, air temperature, air currents, and background noise present. A standard which more specifically defined acceptable decibel levels at varying times and places would be likely both underinclusive and overbroad. See Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass, at 735, 359 N.E.2d at 312 (addressing the statutory standard "disturbers of the peace"). See also Mann v. Mack, 155 Cal.App.3d 666, 674, 202 Cal.Rptr. 296, 301-302 (1984) ("A determination as to what constitutes a 'loud, unnecessary and unusual noise' requires common sense not a decibel meter"). Because § 121 is tailored to respond to the individual circumstances and, as it is here construed, to regulate only that conduct which on balance can appropriately be limited consistent with the first amendment, we conclude it is sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Bolstering our determination that § 121 is narrowly tailored is the fact that the statute allows for ample alternative avenues of communication. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2132-2133, 80 L.Ed.2d at 792. See also J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law (3d.,ed. 1986) § 16.47 at 971. Nothing in § 121 prevents a spealcer from orally addressing passersby, or from distributing literature or carrying a sign which expresses his or her viewpoint. Nor, if the intent of the speaker is to reach area residents or merchants, is an individual prohibited by § 121 from communicating with willing recipients by telephone, postal service, or in person. That a speaker's potential aural audience may be limited by the inability to stand outside a residence or business and scream a message to the unwilling listener therein is of little consequence when there are ample alternative channels of conveying that communication which have not been shown to be inadequate. Ward, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 2759, 105 L.Ed.2d at 682.
In summary, we hold that § 121, as we have construed it, is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant State interest, and does not inhibit the use of various alternative channels of communication. It does not violate the first amendment unless the words "loud and unseemly noise" in § 121 render the statute vague or overbroad. We next consider those concerns.
IV.
A.
A penal statute is vague if it violates "[t]he cardinal requirement . that [it] 'be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' " Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 120, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978) (quoting Connolly v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). In Bowers, we described this "as the fair notice principle [which] is grounded on the assumption that one should be free to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct." Id. at 121, 389 A.2d at 345. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d at 227. A statute also may be void for vagueness if it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Id. at 108-109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d at 228. Both of these tests of vagueness are based on fourteenth amendment due process or fairness concerns. Tribe, supra, § 12-31. We first address the issue of notice.
A law is not vague simply because it requires conformity to an imprecise normative standard.
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584, 590 (1972). The touchstone is whether persons of " 'common intelligence' " need reasonably " 'guess at its meaning.' " Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 837 (1973) (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. at 391, 46 S.Ct. at 127, 70 L.Ed. at 328).
Bowers involved a vagueness challenge to a then-existing child abuse statute which made it unlawful to injure a child by "cruel or inhumane treatment." 283 Md. at 119, 389 A.2d at 344. The statute was attacked, in part, for failing to delineate, with any specificity, between legitimate corporal punishment and illegitimate child abuse. We determined that
[a] statute is not vague when the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.
Id. at 125, 389 A.2d at 347. Using a variety of the sources listed above to define the phrase "cruel or inhumane," the statute was determined to be "sufficiently explicit____" Id. at 127, 389 A.2d at 349. We explained that
[pjarents of ordinary intelligence are made aware that they do not subject themselves to the statute by merely engaging in corporal discipline for the purpose of punishment or correction. Only when the line is crossed and physical injury is intentionally and maliciously or cruelly inflicted does criminal responsibility attach.
Id. at 128, 389 A.2d at 349.
Other courts have applied these principles in responding to vagueness attacks on antinoise laws. For example, in Kovacs, supra, the Supreme Court confronted a vagueness challenge to the not-too-dissimilar statutory phrase "loud and raucous." 336 U.S. at 79, 69 S.Ct. at 449, 93 L.Ed. at 518. Remarking that the claim deserved only passing mention, the Court stated that "[wjhile these are abstract words, they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys to any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden." Id. at 79, 69 S.Ct. at 449-450, 93 L.Ed. at 518.
The method of analysis is further demonstrated in Grayned, supra. That case involved a Rockford, Illinois, ordinance that made it a crime for anyone willfully to make a noise or diversion which disturbed or tended to disturb the peace or good order of any school in session. 408 U.S. at 107-108, 92 S.Ct. at 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d at 227. The Supreme Court held the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. The words "tending to disturb," in a Chicago ordinance, had previously been construed by the Supreme Court of Illinois to refer only to an imminent threat of violence. Id. at 110-112, 92 S.Ct. at 2299-2301, 33 L.Ed.2d at 228-230. The Rockford ordinance did not define the requisite quantum of disturbance, but the United States Supreme Court found that this question was measured by the impact of the disturbance on school activity. Given the requirements of (1) willful conduct, (2) that the noise or diversion be actually incompatible with normal school activity, and (3) a demonstrated causal relationship between "noise or diversion" and disruption, the ordinance withstood constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 113-114, 92 S.Ct. at 2301-2302, 33 L.Ed.2d at 230-231.
In similar fashion, we here apply normal meanings to words of common understanding and conclude that speech that is so unreasonably loud as to unreasonably intrude on the privacy of a captive audience may be punished. We hold that the words "loud and unseemly," so construed, give sufficient notice of what conduct is penalized. "Unseemly" modifies "loud" and means "unreasonably loud in the circumstances." That is clear enough. The objective "reasonable" test is used in many areas of the law as an appropriate determinant of liability and thus a guide to conduct.
An exhaustive listing of words or phrases deemed not unduly vague would unduly prolong this opinion. We note a few examples in addition to those we have already discussed: Reeves, 631 F.2d at 386 (prohibition of sound that is "jarring" or "a nuisance" not unconstitutionally vague; words do not provide mathematical certainty, but have acquired sufficiently definite content through daily use); State v. Johnson, 112 Ariz. 383, 542 P.2d 808 (1975) (statute that made it a misdemeanor to "maliciously and wilfully disturb[ ] the peace or quiet of a neighborhood . by loud or unusual noises" is valid); Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 269 N.E.2d 657 (1971) ("disturbers of the peace" not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Smith, 46 N.J. 510, 518, 218 A.2d 147, 151, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838, 87 S.Ct. 85, 17 L.Ed.2d 71 (1966) (statute proscribing "noisy or disorderly conduct" which "disturbs or interferes with the quiet or good order" of certain places of assembly is valid; "if there is a public interest in need of protection, due process does not stand in the way merely because the subject defies minute prescription"); State v. Holland, 132 NJ.Super. 17, 23, 331 A.2d 626, 629 (1975) (prohibition of "unreasonably loud and unnecessary noise" valid because "[wjhether a given noise disturbs the public peace depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and it is impractical to spell out rigid legislative criteria"); Commonwealth v. Weiner, 230 Pa.Super. 245, 326 A.2d 896 (1974) ("loud" and "unseemly" not unconstitutionally vague); Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 759 P.2d 366 (1988) ("loud or raucous behavior" which "unreasonably disturbs others" not unconstitutionally vague).
The words "loud and unseemly noise" as used in § 121 are no more vague than the words considered in the preceding cases. As we have construed it, the phrase "loud and unseemly noise" reasonably conveys what is forbidden. Nevertheless, a speaker exercising the legitimate rights of free speech may be unaware that his or her volume has reached a prohibitive level and has become unlawfully disruptive. In order, then, to provide fair notice in a case such as this, we believe that the application of § 121 ordinarily requires prior warning by police authority, so that the speaker is made aware that further communication at the offensive volume level may subject the individual to prosecution. See Bacheller v. State, 3 Md.App. 626, 634-635, 240 A.2d 623, 628 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 564, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1968) (Art. 27, § 123, prohibiting disorderly conduct, gives reasonable notice through its language, at least when demonstrators are notified, before arrest, that they are in violation of statute); Occhino, 629 F.2d at 563 (conduct held to be "unreasonable" where disruptive behavior continued after individual was warned that disturbance was being created); Weiner, 230 Pa.Super. at 250, 326 A.2d at 898 (statute prohibiting "loud and unseemly noise" violated when Weiner continued to use loudspeaker in residential area after police had warned him that residents had been disturbed).
As to the matter of enforcement standards, we also addressed this issue in Bowers, wherein we concluded that a statute is not vague
merely because it allows for the exercise of some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials. It is only where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement that it will be held unconstitutional under this second arm of the vagueness principle.
283 Md. at 122, 389 A.2d at 346.
Section 121, properly construed, does not invite arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. It can be enforced to limit protected speech only to the extent the speaker's actions are willful, the volume clearly exceeds what is necessary to address passersby, and the noise is actually disruptive to the "captive" audience in the neighborhood. Moreover, we hold that police may act under this statute only upon receipt of a complaint from an affected citizen upon the basis of which the officer reasonably believes that the statute has been violated. See Weiner, supra. This requirement guards against oppressive action initiated solely by government opposition to unwelcome speech. Circumscribed in this manner § 121 does not permit a subjective determination of what is "loud and unseemly noise." The inquiry is limited to relatively objective criteria and does not confer "impermissible discretion" on police officers, prosecutors, judges, or juries. Bowers, 283 Md. at 128, 389 A.2d at 349.
B.
We need not dwell long on Eanes's claim that § 121 is overbroad. "The crucial question . is whether the [statute] sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth amendments." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114-115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d at 231. The concern is that an overbroad statute may, by that very fact, have a chilling effect on free expression. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796-798, 104 S.Ct. at 2124-2125, 80 L.Ed.2d at 781-782. That is, if a statute is to be struck down as overbroad, it must appear that the statute's very existence will inhibit free expression. Id. at 799, 104 S.Ct. at 2125, 80 L.Ed.2d at 782. The doctrine is "strong medicine" and should be applied sparingly. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841. It should not be invoked when a limiting construction can be placed on the statute. Id. Because the overbreadth doctrine involves a challenge to the facial validity of a statute, a court should not resort to it unless there is a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protection of parties not before the court. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801, 104 S.Ct. at 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d at 784.
Eanes argues that § 121 is overbroad because "it delegates standardless discretionary power to local authorities to permit or deny first amendment activity" and "because its prohibition against 'unseemly' conduct can readily ban speech on the basis of its content." Petitioner's Brief at 21-22. We have already rejected these arguments at various points in this opinion and need not repeat our reasoning.
As we have concluded, § 121 is neither without applicable enforcement standards nor can it be permissibly applied when the objection to speech is solely based on its content. What is more § 121, properly applied, reaches only that conduct which can be regulated consistent with the rights of free speech and does not reach beyond. The instant case is not unlike Boos v. Barry, supra. There, a provision of the District of Columbia Code was attacked as overbroad. The provision penalized any congregation of three or more persons within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, if the persons failed to disperse when ordered to do so. The Supreme Court construed the law to prohibit only "congregations" directed at an embassy and to permit the police to order dispersal only when they reasonably believed that a threat to the security or peace of the embassy was present. 485 U.S. at 331, 108 S.Ct. at 1169, 99 L.Ed.2d at 350-351. As so construed, the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad because it was site specific and limited to groups presenting security threats. Id. As a consequence, it did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Id. It did not have the chilling effect that is the concern of overbreadth analysis. This is also true of § 121 as we have construed it. It is not overbroad.
y.
We now consider the final issues of whether § 121 was properly applied to the specific facts of this case and whether that application was constitutional.
The record demonstrates that Judge Wright construed § 121 in a manner consistent with this opinion. In denying Eanes's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, Judge Wright rejected Eanes's notion that Diehl, supra, limited application of § 121's prohibition against "loud and unseemly noises" to speech which advocated imminent lawlessness. After reviewing the words "loud" and "unseemly," as they were defined by Judge Orth in Nawrocki, supra, Judge Wright concluded:
Courts may differ. Judges will differ. Whether they are trial judges or whether they are appellate judges in the areas of speech and protection of speech. But I think that the evidence that I've heard which indicates basically that Mr. Eanes during this morning in question was extremely loud, louder than normal, ["]one of the two loudest persons I've ever heard in my life,["] [at a] volume above the traffic____ But that the entire commotion then caused sufficient complaints to bring the police and the police officer asking Mr. Eanes to lower his voice and lower therefore the intensity and not withstanding that Mr. Eanes shouted about money for drugs, etc. at a very high voice, could well lead to the conclusion that his actions on this morning were to willfully disturb the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood. Not caring about whom he did disturb whether it be those that may have been targets of the language or those of [the] general public____
It was not the content. The content of his language really was not that which was disturbing. It is interesting that the people . some of the people who were disturbed . indicated that they agreed with his purposes. And I think that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that on this occasion . Mr. Eanes was using his right to communicate ideas to not only communicate but to willfully disturb. And I think that that kind of activity is proscribed by Section 121.
After Eanes presented his defense and closing arguments were made, Judge Wright, in his ruling from the bench, explained how the statute was to be applied.
The statute . talks about willful disturbance of any neighborhood by means of loud and unseemly noises. Now the loudness of Mr. Eanes' expressions . may well be a matter of how one views it, how one hears obviously. What is loud to one person may not be loud to another _
But the Legislature said loud. So that has to be a fact that's found. And I would find from the evidence that Mr. Eanes' method and manner of expression was on this day in May of May 18, [1988] loud.
Now the Legislature also said and unseemly noises. And we know that the Court, the trier of fact is to give that adjective its common meaning, improper. And improper of course means under the circumstances. What is proper in one situation or under one set of circumstances may be improper in another set of circumstances.
Because it also means in violation of accepted standards of what is right or proper. So the noises have to be loud and in violation of accepted standards of what is right or proper. Loud and improper noises, that can mean speech. Because there has to be a balancing of one's right to express himself and other's right to be free from disruption.
Now the method here is what is being tested not the words. We do know that and there's no reason to keep on it. But it is not the content of Mr. Eanes' speech. There can be no chilling of that right to express what one believes. So it's not the content that is being judged or can be judged by any governmental agency. The manner, however, can be subject to restriction. And the statute here is a method of governmental . restriction of the manner in which somebody expresses his views. Because it cannot be loud and unseemly. That is the manner, loud and unseemly, [emphasis supplied]
Having found Eanes to be loud, Judge Wright went on to find specifically that Eanes actually disturbed both residents and area business people and that he was aware that his manner of communication was disruptive to the neighborhood. He then concluded that Eanes was "guilty of willfully disturbing the peace and tranquility of that particular neighborhood during the morning of May the 18th, [1988], by making loud and otherwise unacceptable improper under the circumstances noises."
We hold, in view of Judge Wright's exposition of § 121, that he properly construed "loud and unseemly noise" to apply only to an improper volume level of speech and not to its content. He further correctly concluded that noise that was "loud and unseemly" was noise that was unreasonably loud under the circumstances — among those circumstances being the fact that the noise produced by Eanes unreasonably disturbed members of a captive audience who were entitled to be free of that sort of disturbance. In other words, Judge Wright properly balanced Eanes's first amendment rights against a substantial public interest protected by a narrowly drawn, content-neutral regulation. Eanes was warned to lower his voice by a police officer whose action was based on complaints from members of the captive audience. Eanes chose not to comply. Under these circumstances, he was properly convicted of a violation of the statute.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
. "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom of speech----" This command is directed to state and local government by the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925). As petitioner's contentions are based solely on the guarantee of freedom of speech under the first amendment, we do not deal with the similar guarantee under Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 4, 310 A.2d 156, 158 (1973).
. Preaching on the public street was Eanes's only activity on West Washington Street on 18 May 1988. There is no suggestion that he made any effort to restrain physically anyone who attempted to enter the Clinic or that he tried to block access to the Clinic (see Ch. 807, Acts of 1989). Nor does the State contend that he threatened anyone with physical violence or that he trespassed on private property. Nor did he attempt to incite his listeners to violence, use profanity or obscenity, or hurl "fighting words" at his listeners.
. Indeed, we determined that the decibel level of Diehl's communication was not unexpected under the circumstances. Diehl, 294 Md. at 471-472, 451 A.2d at 118.
. Although Whitney was overruled by Brandenburg, the words of Justice Brandéis remain a meaningful exposition on the singular importance of free speech to the maintenance of our democratic ideals.
. The nature of the street in question (*.&, rural, residential, commercial, or some variant thereof) is not important at this stage of analysis since "all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora." Frisby, 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d at 429.
. In a similar fashion, a federal regulation which prohibited disruption of the official duties of government employees by " 'loud or unusual noise' " was held to "include speech . only where the manner of expression is in itself unreasonable." United States v. Occhino, 629 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 1487, 67 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981).
. We reject the argument that a statute of this nature may survive first amendment scrutiny only if it is limited to a communication that is both loud and either presents a clear and present danger of violence or is not intended as a communication but "is merely a guise to disturb persons." See In re Brown, 9 Cal.3d 612, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 469, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 950, 94 S.Ct. 1959, 40 L.Ed.2d 300 (1974). See also People v. Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 420, 573 P.2d 100, 104 (1978); State v. Marker, 21 Or.App. 671, 678, 536 P.2d 1273, 1277 (1975). We have already held that Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), requires no such construction. Neither do the United States Supreme Court decisions. Our construction of § 121 is not inconsistent with decisions that hold antinoise statutes do not apply to speech protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 894, 101 S.Ct. 259, 66 L.Ed.2d 124 (1980). Cases of this type are concerned with possible regulation of content. We have already held that § 121 is content-neutral.
. In the context of common law nuisance, this Court has stated that:
"It can scarcely be argued that any habitual noise . which is so loud, continuous, insistent, not inherent to the character of the neighborhood, and unusual therein, that normal men, women, and children, when occupying their own homes, however distant, are so seriously incommoded that they cannot sleep, study, read, converse, or concentrate until it stops, is not an unreasonable unlawful, invasion of their rights."
Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 647, 197 A. 146, 148-149 (1938) (quoting the chancellor's decision in that case). The criteria for disturbance of the peace by noise are sometimes equated with those for nuisance. See, a.g., State v. Holland, 132 N.J.Super. 17, 27, 331 A.2d 626, 631 (1975); State v. New York Central Railroad Co., 37 N.J.Super. 42, 49, 116 A.2d 800, 804 (1955).
. Eanes asserts that Cohen prohibits the regulation of speech that does not invade "substantial privacy interests in an intolerable manner." Petitioner's Brief at 27-28 [emphasis supplied]. By this Eanes means, we take it, "in a manner that is physically or psychologically unbearable." The cases do not require sound to rise to ear-drum breaking level before government can regulate. It is the invasion of privacy that is intolerable, not the sound level that produces it. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), in which the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of sound volume without requiring that the noise be "intolerable" before regulation could be affected. In any event, Cohen dealt with the content of speech, not its volume. 403 U.S. at 20-22, 91 S.Ct. at 1785-1787, 29 L.Ed.2d at 291-292. What is more, the passage from Cohen, on which Eanes relies, addresses "[t]he ability of the government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse____" Id. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 291 [emphasis supplied]. We are dealing here with a statute that does not "shut off discourse" but simply limits its volume.
. For some problems that may arise from "regulation by decibel," see U.S. Labor Party v. Pomerleau, 557 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.1977). See also Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386 (5th Cir.1980) (enforcement of decibel-based regulation is a highly complex issue).
. The objective, content-neutral perspective of § 121 is quite unlike that of an ordinance recently found unconstitutionally vague in Fratiello v. Mancuso, 653 F.Supp. 775 (D.R.I.1987). One of the problematic provisions of the ordinance addressed in that case prohibited " 'unnecessary noises or sounds . which are physically annoying to persons____Id. at 791. The court construed the ordinance as a content-based restriction on a selected category of speech which the listener subjectively finds annoying. Id. It acknowledged that in limited circumstances selective restrictions on speech have been upheld, such as '"when the speaker intrudes upon the privacy of the home . or the degree of captivity make it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.' ' Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209, 95 S.Ct 2268, 2272, 45 L.Ed.2d 125, 131 (1975)) [ellipsis in Fratiello ]. But, unlike the case at bar, the court found that protection of the captive auditor was neither alleged nor demonstrated as a basis for the restriction. Id.
. For examples primarily in the area of criminal law, see Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 40, 542 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1988) (imperfect self-defense; subjective belief that force was necessary unreasonable under the circumstances); State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 696, 521 A.2d 1193, 1199 (1987) (reasonable apprehension of imminent danger element of defense to unlawful possession of handgun); Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 459, 488 A.2d 962, 967 (1985) (element of assault: any action or conduct reasonably tending to create apprehension); Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 709, 436 A.2d 906, 910-911 (1981) (element of common law indecent exposure: reasonable knowledge, actual or constructive, that act is open to observation by others); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 718, 415 A.2d 830, 842 (1980) (claim of self-defense requires defendant have a reasonable belief of immediate or imminent death or serious bodily harm); Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 441, 408 A.2d 711, 718 (1979) (quoting Wharton's Criminal Law § 68 (Anderson, 1957)) (criminal liability may arise where " 'the ultimate harm is one which a reasonable man would foresee as being reasonably related to the acts of the defendant' "); Mangum v. Md. St. Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 185, 328 A.2d 283, 288 (1974) ("obscenity" to be tested by average person applying contemporary community standards).