Case Name: PACEY v. STRANGE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1945-04-09
Citations: 311 Mich. 40
Docket Number: Docket No. 20, Calendar No. 42,900
Parties: PACEY v. STRANGE.
Judges: North, Butzel, Bushnell, Sharpe, and Boyles, JJ., concurred with Starr, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 311
Pages: 40–45

Head Matter:
PACEY v. STRANGE.
1. Automobiles — Reckless Driving — Arrest—-Evidence.
In pedestrian’s action against trucker for injuries claimed to have been sustained while plaintiff was crossing a street in a safety zone as defendant was allegedly operating his truck negligently and in violation of ordinance relating to reckless driving, where plaintiff does not claim defendant had been arrested or convicted, it was not prejudicial error to admit testimony to the effect that he had not been arrested or convicted of such offense (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15518).
2. Appeal and Error — Automobiles—Unanswered Question.
Whore one of a series of questions relating to whether or not defendant trucker had been given a ticket for violation of a traffic ordinance was not answered, it does not constitute a ground for reversal (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15518).
Appeal from "Wayne; Marschner (Adolph F.), J.
Submitted January 9, 1945.
(Docket No. 20, Calendar No. 42,900.)
Decided April 9, 1945.
Case by Valley T. Pacey against "Wilfred' J. Strange for personal injuries sustained when she was allegedly struck by defendant’s truck. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Henry G. L. Forler and Elmer H. Groefsema> for plaintiff.
Knight S Panzer, for defendant.

Opinion:
Starr, C. J.
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured in an automobile accident which occurred about 1 o 'clock in the afternoon of May 15, 1940, at or near the intersection of Grand Eiver avenue, Vinewood avenue and Grand boulevard in the city of Detroit. She began the present suit, alleging that while crossing Grand Eiver avenue on the green traffic signal and while in the safety zone, she was struck by defendant's Chevrolet truck, which was proceeding in a northwesterly direction on Grand Eiver. She further alleged that defendant was operating his truck in a negligent manner and in violation of certain ordinances of the city of Detroit, including section 38 of ordinance 115-b, which was set forth in her declaration and reads as follows:
"Any person who drives any vehicle or street car upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard1 of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of recldess driving and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in section three of this ordinance."
Defendant answered, denying the charge of negligence. He further denied that plaintiff was crossing Grand Eiver avenue on the green traffic signal and that his truck struck her. He alleged that she ran into the side of his truck. The case was tried before a jury, which returned á verdict for defendant on which judgment was entered. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied and she' appeals.
Over plaintiff's objection, defendant was permitted to testify that he was not arrested or convicted on a charge of reckless driving in connection with said accident or any other accident. Plaintiff's only contention on this appeal is that the admission of such testimony was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. On direct examination defendant testified in part:
"Q. Were you arrested or convicted of the charge of reckless driving?
"(Plaintiff's attorney): There is no claim to that, your honor. It is not proper, so there could be any favorable or unfavorable inference derived from that.
"The Court: You may take the answer.
"Q. (Defendant's attorney) # Were you arrested or convicted in connection with this accident?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Or any other accident?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Were you given a ticket?
"(Plaintiff's attorney): I object to that, your honor please, because Mrs. Pacey could not be bound in any way.
"The Court: It is conceded here that there were no proceedings.
" (Defendant's attorney): Yes.
"(Plaintiff's attorney): No, we don't claim there was any."
It should be noted that the question, "Were you given a ticket?" was not answered and, therefore, does not constitute ground for reversal. In view of the statement by plaintiff's attorney that she did not claim that defendant had been arrested or convicted, it was not reversible error to permit him to give the above-quoted testimony. In other words, it was not prejudicial to permit defendant to testify as to facts admitted by plaintiff.
We are satisfied that the jury reached a just conclusion and that there was no miscarriage of justice. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15518 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2618). The judgment for defendant is affirmed, with costs of both courts.
North, Butzel, Bushnell, Sharpe, and Boyles, JJ., concurred with Starr, C. J.