Case Name: McKEONE v. McKEONE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-02-23
Citations: 38 Mich. App. 444
Docket Number: Docket No. 10541
Parties: McKEONE v McKEONE
Judges: Before: Danhof, P. J., and Bronson and Targonski, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 38
Pages: 444–450

Head Matter:
McKEONE v McKEONE
Opinion of the Court
1. Divorce — Grounds—Separation—Court-Ordered Separation.
Obedience to a court order which causes an enforced separation of the parties to a divorce action can hardly be considered justification for a judgment of divorce on the ground that the parties live apart.
2. Appeal and Error — -Divorce—De Novo Review.
An appellate court reviews the record de novo in a divorce action, but gives great weight to the findings of fact of the trial judge.
3. Div'orce — Extreme Cruelty.
The extreme cruelty necessary for a divorce judgment requires a showing of cruelty that is more than a display of temper, more than exasperating habits of conduct or expression; the cruelty must get into the realm of the evil and the wicked, of brutality, of malignancy, of indignities endangering mental or physical health.
References por Points in Headnotes
[1] 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 147-155.
[2] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 8.
[3] 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 32-66.
[4] 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation § § 44, 372, 397, 398.
Dissent by Bronson, J.
4. Divorce — Extreme Cruelty — Evidence.
Plaintiff wife was entitled to a judgment of divorce, even though she may have been unreasonable in some of her demands on the defendant’s time and money, where defendant, besides disagreeing with plaintiff’s financial philosophy, sometimes drank excessively which at times led to acts endangering plaintiff’s safety and humiliating her in front of friends; defendant twice left the plaintiff stranded after arguments away from home; the parties have lived apart for three years; the separation, although by court order, was the desire of both parties; the court order followed the defendant’s withdrawing all the parties’ savings and having all the utilities in the home turned off; and innocent children are involved.
Appeal from Clinton, Leo W. Corkin, J.
Submitted Division 3 November 3, 1971, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 10541.)
Decided February 23, 1972.
Complaint by Thea J. McKeone against James E. McKeone for absolute divorce. Complaint dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
James R. Giddings, for plaintiff.
Dunnings & Gibson, P. C., for defendant.
Before: Danhof, P. J., and Bronson and Targonski, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Targonski, J.
The parties were married June 15, 1957, and separated in May of 1969. On July 3, 1969, plaintiff wife filed a complaint for absolute divorce on the grounds of extreme and repeated cruelty, MCLA 552.7; MSA 25.87. At the outset, defendant husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the same statutory grounds. However, such counterclaim was withdrawn by defendant prior to trial and allegations of recrimination by plaintiff were filed by defendant.
After 1-1/2 days of testimony, the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiff had failed to prove by competent testimony the existence of the statutory ground to justify a grant of divorce. Our distinguished colleague, in writing for reversal, relies on the fact that presently the parties are living apart. However, he ignores the fact that this arrangement exists only because plaintiff, upon filing her appeal, applied for and received the assistance of the trial court in the enforcement of a restraining order entered by the trial court at the commencement of the action. Under the terms of the restraining order, defendant was required to vacate and stay away from the marital home pending disposition of the action. He had resumed his domicile in the marital home but respected the court order and vacated the premises in conformity with the terms of the court order, after this appeal was commenced. Obedience to a court order which causes an enforced separation of the parties can hardly be considered justification for a judgment of divorce on the ground that "the parties live apart".
While it is true that on appeal this Court reviews the record de novo, the Court generally gives great weight to the findings of fact of the trial judge. Hartka v Hartka, 346 Mich 453 (1956). The trial court is where truth is best tested as the contesting parties and their witnesses appear face to face in flesh and blood with weight and size and demeanor under the eyes of the trial judge. He has the opportunity to note the marks of hesitation, averted glances, and to detect the note of hysteria in the voice of the witness who seeks to deceive. Buettner v Buettner, 33 Mich App 448 (1971). We lose that advantage on appeal.
The trial judge, at the conclusion of the testimony, in a well-written and carefully-prepared opinion, cited the extreme cruelty test set forth in Tiffany v Tiffany, 370 Mich 370, 372 (1963), quoting Williams v Williams, 351 Mich 210, 213 (1958):
" '[T]he cruelty we demand is more than display of temper, more than exasperating habits of conduct or expression. We must get into the realm of the evil and the wicked, of brutality, of malignancy, of indignities endangering mental or physical health.' "
A careful reading and analysis of the transcript of testimony in the trial court leads us to concur with the trial judge that the test of Tiffany, supra, was not met here. Given the same facts and circumstances, we are not convinced that we would have reached a different conclusion than the trial court did. Riha v Riha, 30 Mich App 145 (1971).
For the reasons cited herein, we find that the lower court should he, and it hereby is, affirmed.
Danhof, P. J., concurred.