Case Name: MAY v. WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-11-06
Citations: 180 Mich. App. 728
Docket Number: Docket No. 93511
Parties: MAY v WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Judges: Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Cynar and M. E. Kobza, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 180
Pages: 728–767

Head Matter:
MAY v WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Docket No. 93511.
Submitted December 21, 1988, at Detroit.
Decided November 6, 1989.
Alan A. May, conservator of the estate of Robert Kolosowski, a minor, Stanley Kolosowski, and Jadwiga Kolosowski, individually and as next friend of Robert Kolosowski, brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against William Beaumont Hospital and Christopher Marlowe, alleging malpractice in the prenatal treatment of Jadwiga Kolosowski resulting in injuries to the infant, Robert Kolosowski. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the infant in the amount of $5,000,000, in favor of Mrs. Kolosowski in the amount of $1,500,000 and in favor of Mr. Kolosowski in the amount of $500,000, and found Dr. Marlowe seventy percent responsible and the hospital thirty percent responsible for Robert Kolosowski’s injuries. The court, Alice L. Gilbert, J., granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Kolosowski and remitted the verdict of $5,000,000 to $106,696.01. Plaintiffs appealed and Dr. Marlowe cross appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The court did not err in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Mr. and Mrs. Kolosowski’s claims. A parent has no action for the loss of a child’s society and companionship. While there is a cause of action for a parent’s emotional distress sustained after witnessing a child’s injury, such an action requires proof of physical harm to the parent and plaintiffs presented no proof of physical harm to themselves. Last, plaintiffs’ theory that Mrs. Kolosowski was an independent victim of malpractice fails for lack of evidence of physical injury to her.
References
Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 110, 112, 939, 969; Damages §§945, 969-975, 1006-1008, 1021-1025; Evidence §268; Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance §§ 13 et seq., 36; Judgments §§ 106 et seq.; Parent and Child §§ 97-99; Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 200 et seq.; Summary Judgment §§ 6, 17, 27.
See the Index to Annotations under Additur and Remittitur; Appeal and Error; Children; Consortium; Emotional Injury; Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict; Malpractice by Medical or Health Professions; Summary Judgment.
2. The court erred in granting remittitur from $5,000,000 to $106,696.01. First, the court should have reduced the jury’s award of future damages to its present value, the court having failed to instruct the jury to make that calculation. The court further erred in determining future lost wages based on a salary of $3.35 an hour for life where the evidence indicated that, had he not been injured, Robert could have been employed at $14.80 per hour. Further, the court erred in reducing future lost wages by the amount of income taxes payable on the income. The court also erred in its assessment of the evidence of noneconomic damages. Thus, while remittitur was appropriate, the court abused its discretion in reducing the award to $106,696.01.
3. The evidence will support an award of $315,843.84 for Robert’s future economic losses and $950,000 for past and future noneconomic losses.
4. There was no error requiring reversal in plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony.
5. The arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel were not improper.
6. The court did not err in denying defendant Dr. Marlowe’s motions for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
7. The court did not abuse its discretion in giving plaintiffs’ requested jury instruction on mental anguish.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
Cynar, J., concurred in all respects but the determination of damages. He would hold that the evidence supported a judgment of $1,800,000, the present value of the $5,000,000 jury verdict.
1. Motions and Orders — Directed Verdict.
In deciding whether or not to grant a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must accord to the nonmoving party the benefit of viewing the testimony and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence, when viewed in this manner, establishes a prima facie case, the motion for a directed verdict must be denied.
2. Negligence — Parent and Child — Loss of Consortium.
A claim by a parent for the loss of a child’s society and companionship where the child has been negligently injured is not recognized under the common law of Michigan.
3. Motions and Orders — Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
The grant of a defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate only if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for the plaintiff; in reaching a decision, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence; if, after viewing the evidence in this manner, reasonable men could differ, the question is one for the jury and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper.
4. Torts — Emotional Distress — Parent and Child.
A parent who witnesses the negligent infliction of injury to his child and suffers emotional and mental distress as a consequence may have a cause of action based on negligence provided that: (1) the injury threatened or inflicted was serious and of a nature such that severe mental disturbance to the parent would have reasonably been foreseen to follow; (2) the shock resulted in actual physical harm; and (3) the parent was actually present at the time of the injury to the child or at least suffered shock fairly contemporaneous with the injury; the nature of the injury must be examined on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether it was foreseeable that emotional and mental distress to the parent was likely to result.
5. Damages — Remittitur — Verdicts — Court Rules.
Remittitur is justified where the amount awarded is greater than the highest amount the evidence will support; in deciding whether the jury award is supported by the proofs, a trial court may also inquire whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact, whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained, and whether the amount actually awarded is comparable to awards in similar cases within the state and other jurisdictions (MCR 2.611[E][1]).
6. Appeal — Remittitur.
In reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of remittitur, a reviewing court must afford due deference to the trial judge and may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge absent an abuse of discretion.
7. Damages — Future Damages — Present Value.
An award of future damages must be reduced to present value even in the absence of a request to do so; the trial court must instruct the jury on the reduction or must itself reduce the award to present value.
8. Damages — Lost Wages.
The proper factor in determining lost wages is what the injured person could have earned but for the injury.
9. Damages — Lost Future Wages — Income Taxes.
In the absence of a statutory provision, courts must disregard income tax consequences in fixing damages for lost future earning capacity in personal injury cases.
10. Damages — Future Damages — Present Value — Inflation — Jury Instructions.
In reducing future damages to present value, the effects of inflation may be taken into account (SJI2d 53.06).
11. Physicians and Surgeons — Medical Malpractice.
A treating physician is liable for damages when it is shown that he departed from the standard of care which is known as customary medical practice; the measuring standard of care is founded upon how other doctors in that field of medicine would act and not how any particular doctor would act.
12. Evidence — Written or Recorded Statements — Rules of Evidence.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it (MRE 106).
13. Appeal — Directed Verdict — Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
The standard of review applicable to a denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is that review by the Court of Appeals is limited to whether the party opposing the motion offered evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ; the test is whether, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable persons could reach a different conclusion and, if so, the case is properly one for the jury; the nonmoving party must be given the benefits of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.
Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David W. Christensen), and Gromek, Bendure & Thomas (by Mark R. Bendure), for plaintiff.
Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen, P.C. (by John P. Jacobs), for Dr. Christopher Marlowe.
Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler, Fiott & Asher, P.C. (by Michelle A. Thomas), for William Beaumont Hospital.
Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Cynar and M. E. Kobza, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
MacKenzie, P.J.
We agree with Judge Cynar's disposition of all claims raised on appeal, except the amount of remitted damages Robert Kolosowski should have been awarded.
As a general rule, awards for personal injury rest within the sound judgment of the trier of fact. If the amount awarded falls reasonably within the range of evidence and within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained, the verdict should not be disturbed. Precopio v Detroit, 415 Mich 457; 330 NW2d 802 (1982). However, where a jury's award is greater than the highest amount the evidence will support, remittitur is proper. See Palenkas v Beaumont Hospital, 432 Mich 527; 443 NW2d 354 (1989). This Court may only disturb a grant of remittitur if an abuse of discretion is shown. Palenkas, supra.
In this case, the trial court remitted the jury's $5,000,000 award to $106,696.01. As Judge Cynar's opinion details, the trial court in reaching this remitted amount committed a number of legal and factual errors. While we are cognizant of our duty to afford due deference to the decision of the trial judge, Palenkas, supra, in light of these errors we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its grant of remittitur. Based upon an objective review of the evidence, Palenkas, supra, we are of the opinion that the proofs reasonably support a remitted total award of $1,265,843.84.
As Precopio, supra, and Judge Cynar's opinion indicate, damages in personal injury cases may compensate the plaintiff for both economic losses (such as lost wages and expenses associated with the plaintiff's injury) and for noneconomic losses (including pain, disability, and lost enjoyment).
We agree with Judge Cynar's opinion that the remitted award for Robert Kolosowski's economic losses constituted an abuse of discretion. For the reasons stated in Judge Cynar's opinion, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case warranted an award to Robert Kolosowski of $315,843.84 for his future economic losses.
We also conclude that the trial court's remitted award to plaintiff for his noneconomic losses constituted an abuse of discretion. In assessing the appropriateness of an award for noneconomic losses, analogous cases provide a sense of a reasonable range of awards. Precopio, supra, pp 471-472. The awards in the analogous cases must be adjusted for the difference between purchasing power in the year of those judgments and the year of the judgment under consideration. Precopio, supra, p 474, n 26. The judgment in this case was rendered in 1985. Cases involving injuries analogous to those suffered by Robert Kolosowski demonstrate a range of awards from approximately $182,000 to approximately $1,111,500 in 1985 dollars. Only where the brain damage sustained by the plaintiff resulted in profound retardation, or was accompanied by disfigurement and emotional disorders, have courts exceeded the above range.
In Sewar v Gagliardi Bros Service, 69 AD2d 281; 418 NYS2d 704 (1979), a twelve-year-old struck by a bus suffered a fractured skull, brain damage, restricted sight and hearing, and some spasticity. The plaintiff's iq was measured at between fifty-seven and sixty-three, and she was deemed educable to the third-grade level, with an extremely limited social and occupational future. Remitted damages were $750,000 (approximately $1,111,500 in 1985 dollars) for pain and suffering and permanent disability. The remittitur was affirmed.
In Herman v Milwaukee Children's Hospital, 121 Wisc 2d 531; 361 NW2d 297 (1984), a ten-year-old suffered a reduced iq of eighty-five (dull normal range) as a result of medical malpractice. A jury awarded the plaintiff over $2,000,000 for past and future pain, suffering, and disability. On appeal, the award was reduced to $925,000 (approximately $958,300 in 1985 dollars), as that was the highest amount plaintiff's attorney requested the jury to award.
In Coastal States Gas Producing Co v Locker, 436 SW2d 592 (Tex Civ App, 1968), a five-year-old suffered permanent brain damage in an automobile accident. The boy was left with an iq of seventy-eight and he exhibited behavioral problems. A jury awarded him $400,000 for mental impairment, anguish, and lost earning capacity. On appeal, the court determined that this award should have been remitted to $300,000 (approximately $927,600 in 1985 dollars), including an award for lost earning capacity.
In Stanley v Ford Motor Co, 49 AD2d 979; 374 NYS2d 370 (1975), the plaintiff suffered permanent brain damage impairing his physical and mental coordination. Evidence established that his educational ability was severely limited and future employment would be confined to menial tasks. Additionally, there was a likelihood the plaintiff would develop seizure and emotional disorders. An award of $315,000 (approximately $687,000 in 1985 dollars), which included the present value of lost future earnings, was upheld as not excessive.
In Stanley v Wiley, 325 So 2d 661 (La App, 1975), the thirteen-year-old plaintiff suffered head injuries in a truck accident, resulting in intellectual impairment to the dull-normal range, physical impairment of skilled movement, impaired judgment, and impaired memory. Noting that the plaintiff's changed appearance would diminish her social life and that her vocational prospects were poor, the court upheld a general award of $275,000 (approximately $550,000 in 1985 dollars).
In Masters v Alexander, 424 Pa 65; 225 A2d 905 (1967), a twelve-year-old child was awarded $100,000 (approximately $359,600 in 1985 dollars) for disfigurement, permanent lessening of earning capacity, physical and mental pain and discomfort, and personality change. His injuries included a fractured skull, eye damage, and permanent brain damage leaving him unable to do or carry through anything but the most menial form of work. Additionally, the plaintiff sustained scarring of the face and head with a deformity and depression of the forehead.
In Watts v Town of Homer, 301 So 2d 729 (La App, 1974), a seventeen-month-old child was struck on the head with a metal pole, resulting in a fractured skull, swollen brain, and frequent convulsions. The child was unconscious for eight days, and holes had to be drilled in her skull. At the time of trial, left side paralysis was diminishing but affected her gait, her IQ was approximately fifty, and she was unable to attend school due to problems associated with convulsions. Because she required constant supervision and continual medication, she was deemed unable to work. The court remitted her general damages to $150,000 (approximately $327,000 in 1985 dollars).
Finally, in Smolinski v Taulli, 285 So 2d 577 (La App, 1973), a nineteen-month-old child fell, suffering a skull fracture. The child became hyperkinetic, exhibited slow motor development and slow toilet training, had difficulty with speech, and was in the dull or below normal intelligence range. A general award of $75,000 (approximately $182,000 in 1985 dollars) was held not excessive.
Based upon a review of the proofs and the above survey of analogous cases, we are persuaded that the highest award which can be justified for Robert Kolosowski's past and future noneconomic losses is $950,000. Plaintiffs neurological expert testified that Robert was mildly retarded. There is little likelihood that Robert will ever progress past the fourth grade level in school and his vocational opportunities will be limited. Children his age tease him, and he exhibits difficulties with speech. Robert will always require guidance and support, and his chances of engaging in "normal" social interactions and relationships are significantly reduced. Nevertheless, although intellectually impaired, Robert is far from being profoundly retarded. At the time of trial, he was attending school, was fully ambulatory, played with younger children, rode a tricycle, and enjoyed watching television and going places with his mother. There was no evidence of seizure disorders, hearing or visual problems, or disfigurement as in some of the analogous cases. Plaintiffs neurological expert found Robert's physical size and appearance, coordination, balance, posture, movement, and strength all totally normal. His physical pain and suffering seems to have been minimal, involving headaches approximately every three months which were controlled by baby aspirin. Plaintiffs neurological expert testified that Robert could live independently. Taking a view of Robert Kolosowski's loss most favorable to him, an award of $950,000 for noneconomic losses is both within the range of the proofs and the awards made in analogous cases.
On the basis of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that the evidence in this case warranted a total award to Robert Kolosowski of $1,265,843.84, plus statutory interest, for his economic and noneconomic losses. Because the trial court abused its discretion in remitting the verdict to $106,696.01, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and order the judgment remitted to $1,265,843.84 plus statutory interest. Plaintiff will have twenty-eight days from the date of this opinion to file an acceptance of this judgment with the trial court. Otherwise, this matter will be reversed for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
M.E. Kobza, J., concurred.
To adjust analogous judgments to 1985 dollars, we have used the following formula based on the Consumer Price Index (cpi):
(Average cpi 1985) — (Average cpi year of analogous judgment) ^ Average cpi year of analogous judgment
This formula yields the percentage by which the analogous judgment must be increased to reflect 1985 purchasing power.
See, e.g., Tinnerholm v Parke-Davis & Co, 411 F2d 48 (CA 2, 1969), and Northern Trust Co v Cook County, 135 Ill App 3d 329; 90 Ill Dec 157; 481 NE2d 957 (1985).
See, e.g., Frankel v United States, 321 F Supp 1331 (ED Pa, 1970).
Indeed, in instances where the plaintiff suffered profound retardation and could never master basic body functions or be trained in simple skills, courts have approved awards within the above range. See, e.g., Davis v Royal-Globe Ins Cos, 223 So 2d 912 (La App, 1969) (award of approximately $337,000 in 1985 dollars), Schnebly v Baker, 217 NW2d 708 (Ia, 1974) (award of approximately $654,300 in 1985 dollars), and Shaw v United States, 741 F2d 1202 (CA 9, 1984) (award of approximately $1,036,000 in 1985 dollars).
Under the analysis suggested by Precopio, no further calculation reducing plaintiffs future noneconomic losses to present value is required, the assumption apparently being that the triers of fact in the analogous cases already did so.