Case Name: SAMUEL L. ALLEN and Wife, LAURA V. ALLEN, v. A. SHIFFMAN
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1916-11-22
Citations: 172 N.C. 578
Docket Number: 
Parties: SAMUEL L. ALLEN and Wife, LAURA V. ALLEN, v. A. SHIFFMAN.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 578–579

Head Matter:
SAMUEL L. ALLEN and Wife, LAURA V. ALLEN, v. A. SHIFFMAN.
(Filed 22 November, 1916.)
Attorney and Client — (Evidence—Confidential Communications.
Communications which, an attorney may not testify to against the interest of his client are those of a confidential nature in relation to his employment, and not such as the attorney knows independently from transacting his client’s affairs,” as in effecting a compromise of a former action in which attorneys for both sides and the parties were present; and in order to give such testimony the attorney may withdraw from a pending trial, upon considering that his client’s testimony as to such compromise reflected upon his integrity.
Civil action- tried before Cline, J., and a jury, at February Term, 1916, of Guilford.
Tbe áction was to recover tbe penalty for taking and receiving usurious interest in transactions bad between male plaintiff and defendant. On denial of liability and issues submitted, tbe jury rendered tbe following verdict:
1. Did tbe defendant knowingly take from tbe plaintiff, and did tbe plaintiffs pay to tbe defendant, any amount in excess of tbe interest allowed by law, as alleged in tbe complaint, and if so, wbat amount? Answer: “No.”
2. Did tbe defendant pay to tbe plaintiffs, and did tbey accept tbe sum of $100 and release tbe defendant from liability on account of tbe usurious transaction, as alleged in tbe answer? Answer: (Not answered by tbe jury.)
Judgment on tbe verdict, and plaintiff excepted and appealed.
W. J. Sherrod and B. C. Strudwiclc for plaintiff.
Stern & Swift and Wilson & Ferguson for defendant.

Opinion:
Hoke, J.
Tbe only objection insisted on to tbe validity of tbe trial was -tbe reception of tbe testimony of O. C. Frazier, Esq., appearing in tbe present case as attorney for tbe defendant.
.Tbe usury alleged as tbe basis of tbe present suit was to some extent involved in a former case between these same parties wbicb bad been settled by compromise at August Term, 1912, of said court, in wbicb transaction tbe witness bad appeared as attorney for tbe plaintiff. In tbe present trial tbe attorney, considering tbat bis position wa's to some extent reflected on in tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff, was allowed to withdraw from tbe case as attorney and become a witness for defendant. Plaintiff objected to certain portions of tbe witness's testimony, on tbe ground tbat it was in violation of tbe accepted principle wbicb forbids disclosure of "confidential communications between tbe attorney and client." Tbe position is fully recognized, but it only extends to communications in tbe course of tbe attorney's employment and wbicb may properly be regarded as confidential in tbeir nature, and, so far as we can see, on careful perusal of tbe record, tbe only facts spoken to, baying any significance on tbe issue, were concerning a compromise in adjustment of a former suit between these parties wbicb. was effected between tbe witness, wbo was then appearing as attorney for tbe present plaintiff, and David Stem, Esq., now deceased, wbo tben represented tbe defendant, at wbicb both of tbe parties litigant were apparently present and of wbicb all of them were fully cognizant. Tbe facts of such an occurrence could, in no sense, be considered confidential communications within tbe meaning of tbe principle, and tbe exception, therefore, must be overruled. An objection very similar was disallowed in R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., pp. 368-388, and, speaking to tbe position, tbe Court said: "Tbe objection to tbe testimony of one whp bad been of counsel for Howland, tbe original lessee, as to tbe fact that tbe Ives contract was mentioned and referred to at tbe time of taking tbe lease is without merit. This was a fact necessarily known to both parties, brought out during tbeir negotiations concerning tbe lease, and could in no sense be considered a confidential communication. Weeks on Attorneys, 289; Wigmore Evidence, 2311, 2312; 23 A. and E., 67; Elliott v. Elliott, 92 N. W., 1008, citing with approval Hills v. State, 61 Neb., 598, reported in 57 L. R. A., 155." And, in Dearsier v. Walkup, 43 Mo. App., 625, it was held: "Professional communications between attorney and client. are protected from motives of public policy, but tbe rule will not apply where tbe transaction shows tbe matter was not private, and could not in any sense be termed tbe subject of a confidential disclosure, as when, like this case, tbe disclosure was made in tbe presence of tbe opposite party."
There is no error, and tbe judgment for tbe defendant is affirmed.
No error.