Case Name: Brian C. CURTIS and Marsha Curtis, his wife, Appellants, v. Carol J. CICHON and Daniel MacIntyre, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-01-16
Citations: 462 So. 2d 104
Docket Number: No. 84-1017
Parties: Brian C. CURTIS and Marsha Curtis, his wife, Appellants, v. Carol J. CICHON and Daniel MacIntyre, Appellees.
Judges: RYDER, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 462
Pages: 104–107

Head Matter:
Brian C. CURTIS and Marsha Curtis, his wife, Appellants, v. Carol J. CICHON and Daniel MacIntyre, Appellees.
No. 84-1017.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 16, 1985.
Craig P. Moore, St. Petersburg, for appellants.
Joseph H. Chumbley, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

Opinion:
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellants seek review of the partial summary judgment limiting their recovery on a note to contribution from appellees according to appellees' percentage of stock ownership in the corporate obligee.
In January, 1982, Bos'n Yacht Brokers, Inc., executed a promissory note in favor of Landmark Union Trust Bank of St. Peters-burg, N.A. (Landmark Bank). Bos'n Yacht Brokers, Inc., is owned by the following persons in the percentages indicated:
Carol Cichon 10% (Appellee)
Daniel MacIntyre 10% (Appellee)
Bela Jenks 20%
Brian C. Curtis 60% (Appellant)
At the time the note was executed, appel-lees and appellant Brian C. Curtis, together with Bela Jenks, who is bankrupt and not a party to the suit, each executed personal guaranties in favor of Landmark Bank and its heirs and assigns.
On February 7, 1983, Landmark Bank, assigned to "Brian Curtis or Marsha Curtis, without recourse," the bank's interest in the promissory note. At the time of the assignment, the principal balance due on the note was $12,000, together with accumulated interest of $433.64. Bos'n Yacht Brokers, Inc. defaulted on the note and appellants accelerated payment on the note. Appellants thereafter brought suit against appellees seeking collection on the note, together with appellants' cost of collection.
Appellees answered and filed a motion for partial summary judgment which alleged that appellants were only entitled to obtain contribution for payment of the note from appellees in proportion to the benefits each party received. The trial court granted the motion and limited recovery to contribution in the amount of each parties' stock ownership. Appellees were each ordered to pay ten percent of the amount outstanding on the note.
Appellants first argue that the trial court erred by entering the partial summary judgment limiting their recovery to contribution rather than basing their recovery on their status as assignees of the note. We affirm the entry of the partial summary judgment which precluded one guarantor from collecting payment from his co-guarantors for the full amount of the debt owed on the note, thereby avoiding his own percentage of liability. See, e.g., Freed v. Giulani, 164 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
Appellants' second point is that the trial court erred in limiting the contribution by appellees to their percentage of stock ownership. We agree. Appellees' liability arises from the guaranty agreement, not from their status as stockholders. Guarantors are generally presumed to be equally liable for a proportion of the liability on the note guaranteed. See Hanrahan v. Barry, 363 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Here, the guarantees provide for joint and several liability; they do not indicate any intent to apportion the guarantors' liability according to their percentage of stock ownership. Therefore, we reverse on this point.
We also note that when one guarantor becomes insolvent, the remaining guarantors must divide that guarantor's percentage of liability among themselves. See Hanrahan v. Barry.
Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Absent any evidence of an agreement between the parties limiting their liability, on remand, the trial court should apportion liability equally among the three remaining solvent guarantors.
RYDER, C.J., concurs.
GRIMES, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.