Case Name: MARYLAND COMMITTEE FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION et al. v. TAWES, GOVERNOR et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1962-07-23
Citations: 229 Md. 406
Docket Number: No. 140, Adv.
Parties: MARYLAND COMMITTEE FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION et al. v. TAWES, GOVERNOR et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 229
Pages: 406–432

Head Matter:
MARYLAND COMMITTEE FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION et al. v. TAWES, GOVERNOR et al.
[No. 140, Adv.,
September Term, 1962.]
Decided per curiam, July 23, 1962.
Motion for rehearing, filed August 2, 1962, denied September 11, 1962.
Opinions filed September 25, 1962.
The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Horney, Marbury and Macgiee, Associate Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, specially assigned, JJ.
Alfred D. Scanlon, with whom were Shea & Gardner, John B. Wright and Johnson Bowie, on the brief, for appellants.
Thomas B. Binan, Attorney General, and Joseph S. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General, with whom were Morris Turk, Attorney for Board of Election Supervisors for Anne Arundel County, on the brief, for appellees.
Brief Amicus Curiae filed by Montgomery County, Maryland. Alfred H. Carter, County Attorney for Montgomery County, and Richard J. Sincoff, Assistant County Attorney, on the brief.

Opinion:
Henderson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 23, 1962, we filed a per curiam order affirming a declaratory decree of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County that Article III, sec. 2 of the Maryland Constitution is valid and constitutional. We now state the reasons for our order.
This is the third time this case has been before this Court. On April 24, 1962, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, and its per curiam order in Scholle v. Hare, 369 U. S. 429, we reversed a decision of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County which had sustained the appellees' demurrers to the bill of complaint. We held, by a divided court, that the bill, alleging that the apportionment prescribed by the Maryland Constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, stated a justiciable cause of action cognizable in the State courts, and remanded the case in order that the chancellor might determine "whether or not an invidious discrimination does exist with respect to representation in either or both houses." Md. Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 436. We also said that "inquiry into the rational basis for such apportionment seems to be called for."
On May 28, 1962, the chancellor, after argument but without hearing testimony, held on motion for summary judgment that the composition of the House of Delegates, prescribed by Article III, sec. 5 of the Maryland Constitution, violated the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the distribution of numerical voting strength in voting for members of the House of Delegates, accorded to voters in the four suburban and more populous counties, was arbitrary and unreasonable. He reserved decision as to the Senate.
The Governor promptly convened a special session of the General Assembly, which for the first time in the history of this State added nineteen Delegates to the House of Delegates, to be voted for in the 1962 elections, by "stop-gap" legislation rather than by proposing a constitutional amendment. A proposed constitutional amendment failed of passage. The apellants entered an appeal from the chancellor's order reserving decision as to the Senate and we remanded the case with di rections that the chancellor decide the point. The present appeal is from that decision. No question is presented as to the validity of the "stop-gap" legislation or the reapportionment of the House of Delegates.
Article III, section 1 of the Maryland Constitution provides: "The Legislature shall consist of two distinct branches; a Senate, and a House of Delegates, and shall be styled the General Assembly of Maryland."
Art. Ill, sec. 2 provides: "The City of Baltimore shall be divided into six legislative districts as near as may be of equal population and of contiguous territory, and each of said legislative districts of Baltimore City, as they may from time to time be laid out, in accordance with the provisions hereof, and each county in the State, shall be entitled to one Senator, who shall be elected by the qualified voters of the said legislative districts of Baltimore City and of the counties of the State, respectively, and shall serve for four years from the date of his election."
Throughout the colonial period the upper house consisted of the Governor and Council, appointed by the proprietor, and modeled after the English House of Lords. They also sat as a provincial court and court of appeals from the county courts. See Bond, Court of Appeals of Maryland, p. 4 et seq. See also 1 McMahon, Historical View of the Government of Maryland (1831), p. 148. That they had a certain sectional distribution was fortuitous. While the House of Delegates was selected on a county basis (four from each) the councilors were selected from among the most eminent landowners and office holders, serving at the will of the Governor. In the Constitution of 1776, Art. XV provided for a Senate to be elected by the vote of Delegates elected two from each county and one each from the City of Annapolis and Baltimore Town. At that time there were eight counties on the eastern shore and ten counties on the western shore. These electors were directed to elect six senators from residents of the eastern shore and nine senators from residents of the western shore, "men of the most wisdom, experience and virtue, above twenty-five years of age, residents of the state above three whole years next preceding the election, and having therein real and personal property above the value of one thousand pounds current money." See Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law, p. 5. By the amendment proposed by Chapter 197, Acts of 1836, and ratified in 1837, the Senate was reconstituted to consist of one senator from each county (of which there were then twenty by reason of the establishment of Allegany and Carroll Counties) and one from Baltimore City. The method of indirect election by an electoral college was abandoned. This distribution was continued in the Constitution of 1851, and so far as the counties are concerned, was continued in the Constitutions of 1864 and 1867, and in subsequent amendments. The last county to be formed, Garrett, was erected in 1872. See 3 Scharf, History of Maryland, p. 778. From that date the counties have numbered twenty-three.
However, Baltimore City, which had achieved the status of a political subdivision independent of Baltimore County in 1851, was allotted three senators, one from each legislative district, in 1864 and this provision was continued in 1867. It received an additional legislative district and senator in 1900 and two more in 1922, subsequent to the annexation of portions of Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County by Chapter 82 of the Acts of 1918.
The counties of Maryland have always been an integral part of the state government. St. Mary's County was established in 1634 contemporaneous with the establishment of the proprietary government, probably on the model of the English shire, associated with the important office of sheriff. 1 Scharf, supra, p. 124 et seq. Indeed, Kent County had been established by Claiborne before the landing of the Marylanders and he established New Kent County in Virginia after he was ousted from Maryland vi et armis by the Calverts. We have noted that there were eighteen counties at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1776. They have always possessed and retained distinct individualities, possibly because of the diversity of terrain and occupation. Baltimore County, the most populous in the State, still has no incorporated towns, and until the recent adoption of a charter form of government, was governed by-three elected commissioners who exercised the executive functions, while most of the legislative functions were exercised by its representatives in the General Assembly. Baltimore City,, having acquired the unique status of an independent political subdivision, has maintained its own local government, subject to control by the General Assembly, since 1867. Only two counties, Montgomery and Baltimore have adopted the charter form of government under Art. XI of the State Constitution. While it is true that the counties are not sovereign bodies, having only the status of municipal corporations, Howard County v. Matthews, 146 Md. 553, 561, they have traditionally exercised wide governmental powers in the fields of education, welfare, police, taxation, roads, sanitation, health and the administration of justice, with a minimum of supervision by the State. In the diversity of their interests and their local autonomy, they are quite analogous to the states, in relation to the United States.
It is an interesting historical fact that the mode of selecting the members of the United States Senate adopted in 1789 was modeled, to a considerable extent, upon the Maryland Senate of 1776. In addressing the Constitutional Convention on August 14, 1787, Madison opposed a proposal that senators be paid by the states on the ground that it would tend to impair the stability and independence of the Senate, which, he remarked, "was formed on the model of that of Maryland." 4 The Writings of James Madison, edited by Gaillard Hunt, G. B. Putnam's Sons (1903) p. 202. Again, in No. 63 of The Federalist Papers, Madison in answering a contention that a Senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for a term of six years, would acquire a dangerous preeminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy, stated that "the constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The senate of that State is elected, as the Federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people; and for a term less by one year only, . If the Federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the senate of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary the Maryland constitution is daily deriving from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union". The members of the Federal Senate continued to be elected by the state legislatures until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. It is also interesting to note that when Maryland abandoned the selection of state senators by an electoral college in 1837, it adopted a provision for one senator from each county and from Baltimore City, following the federal pattern of geographical representation in the upper house.
The question before us is not whether such a provision is wise or unwise but simply whether, as alleged in the bill, membership in both houses of a bicameral legislature must "be based on, or reasonably related to, the present population" of the various political subdivisions of the State. Since the provision of one senator from each county has been repeatedly approved and incorporated in the Maryland Constitution by the people of Maryland, it cannot conceivably offend the Maryland Constitution. The sole claim is that it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Equal protection has been judicially equated to a prohibition against invidious discrimination. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489. Not every discrimination is invidious, nor will it be set aside "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 and cases cited. We think a complete justification for the election of state senators on a county basis is to be found in the historical precedents cited above. The idea of a bicameral legislature, with the upper branch selected on a territorial rather than a popular basis, was a familiar one in 1837 and it is familiar today. The very purpose of having two houses was that each would be a check upon the other, and prevent the passage of hasty and ill-conceived legislation. A different method of selection was essential to the bicameral plan. No more natural or logical basis could be suggested than that the viable and long established political subdivisions be accorded representation, as they had been in election of electors under the Constitution of 1776.
The bicameral concept is not one that has become obsolete with the passage of the years. It has been repeatedly recognized by Congress and the President, subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in approving the constitutions of states seeking admission to the Union. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559. In the most recent cases, Alaska and Hawaii, their Constitutions each contain provisions for senatorial districts of marked inequality in popular representation. In Alaska one of the senators represents more than fifteen times as many voters as the other. Moreover, the constitutions of a majority of the states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contained provisions for an upper house based on a geographical distribution of senators, without reference to population. It can hardly be maintained that in voting for ratification they were, in effect, voting to invalidate their own state constitutions.
The appellants argue that the Federal Constitution furnishes neither analogy nor precedent for the composition of the Maryland Senate, on the ground that the states which adopted the Federal Constitution were sovereign bodies. The argument overlooks the fact that thirty-seven states were admitted to the Union after 1789, which were not and had never been sovereign bodies, with the possible exception of Texas. It also overlooks the fact that it was never suggested that senators vote by states. They were clearly members of a national congress,, designed for the very purpose of achieving a greater stability and a stronger central government than under the Articles of Confederation. In any event, the consequence and effect upon voting rights are the same, whether the voter be voting for United States senator or state senator. We think it is hardly conceivable that a different principle would apply in the one case than in the other.
We are of course aware that the government of the United States, within its delegated powers, may possess rights not retained by the states. But where civil rights are concerned there is still truth in the ancient adage that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. When the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, that the equal protection clause prohibited the states from maintaining racially segregated schools, it also held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, decided the same day, that the Federal Government was likewise barred by the Fifth Amendment. The relation between the two amendments seems sufficiently close to negative a conclusion that a provision like that for the Federal Senate, U. S. Const., Art. I, sec. 3, would be offensive to either.
The appellants argue, however, that the federal plan has not been followed in Maryland, since an exception has been made in the case of Baltimore City, which has been subdivided into six election districts and now has six senators. The argument proves too much. The fact that the original plan has been modified in one instance does not require that it be totally abandoned. There are reasons for a distinction. In 1864, when Baltimore City acquired three senators, the State was in the control of the Union Army and many of the southern sympathizers in southern Maryland and the eastern shore had been disfranchised. There were special reasons for the continuance of extra representation in 1867, in 1900, and again in 1920, when the population of Baltimore comprised fifty-one per cent of the population of the State. Baltimore, even prior to the Civil War, was a great seaport, an industrial center and the hub of commerce and communication. Despite the distrust for city governments, dominated around the turn of the century by "rings" and "bossism", it mustered enough political power to enlarge its representation. Until quite recently it has been underrepresented in the House of Delegates as well as in the Senate, although the picture has changed with the population explosion in the suburban counties, and it is not far out of line. The instant case is a contest for political power between the larger and the smaller counties, and Baltimore City is not concerned. It may also be noted that there is no constitutional requirement of territorial uniformity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91.
We find nothing in the Supreme Court cases to support the appellants' claim of invalidity in the apportionment of the Maryland Senate. Baker v. Carr, supra, merely decided that a justiciable question was presented. The remand in Scholle v. Hare, supra, was for the express purpose of allowing the Michigan Court to give further consideration to the question presented in the light of Baker v. Carr. We do not read into that remand any intimation as to how the case should be decided on the merits. Nor do we attach any significance to the similar remand in the New York case of W. M. C. A., Inc. v. Simon, 370 U. S. 190. Upon remand,.the Michigan Court, by a vote of four to three, held that in "[t]he absence of any semblance of design or plan in the present senatorial districts," the state constitutional provision approved by the voters in 1952, was invalid. But Mr. Justice Stewart stayed the order for reapportionment, stating: "It is very clear the issues decided by the Michigan Supreme Court are new issues; ones that were not decided in Baker v. Carr." We think it is significant that Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the Baker case, said: "The Court does not say or imply that there is anything in the Federal Constitution 'to prevent a State, acting not irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people.'
"In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not 'deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.' We find no intimation in later Supreme Court cases that this is not still the law.
We think there is little to be gained from a review of cases in other states and in the lower federal courts. A typical statement is that of the Tennessee Court upon remand of Baker v. Carr. 31 L.W. 2003 (June 22, 1962) : "[Ejqual protection requires that apportionment in at least one house shall be based, fully and in good faith, on numbers of qualified voters without regard to any other factor." See also Sims v. Frink, 30 L.W. 2512 (Ala.), Toombs v. Fortson, 30 L.W. 2605 (Ga.) (May 25, 1962) and Caesar v. Williams, 371 P. 2d 241 (Ida.) rehearing denied May 8, 1962. In reading some of the decisions attention must be paid to whether the particular constitution requires representation based on population in both houses, as some do. The action taken by state or lower federal courts, once the question of justiciability is conceded, may turn on the construction of the state constitution and not present a federal question at all. Such cases are readily distinguishable. In any event, there is no unanimity of opinion to be drawn from the cases, and the final determination must await further light from the Supreme Court of the United States.
. The last colonial legislature convened on March 33, 1774, and the twelve councilors present were: Benedict Calvert, John Rid-out, John Beale Bordley, George Stewart, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Benjamin Ogle, Philip Thomas Lee, Richard Lee, William Hayward, Daniel Dulany (the Younger), William Fitzhugh and George Plater. Archives of Md. LXIV.