Case Name: Allen GREEN, Appellant, v. SUN HARBOR HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-11-20
Citations: 685 So. 2d 23
Docket Number: No. 96-0158
Parties: Allen GREEN, Appellant, v. SUN HARBOR HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, J. concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 685
Pages: 23–27

Head Matter:
Allen GREEN, Appellant, v. SUN HARBOR HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
No. 96-0158.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 20, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1997.
Steven G. Glickstein, Davie, for appellant.
Monica I. Salis of Monica I. Salis, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
GROSS, Judge.
In January, 1994, Sun Harbor Homeowners' Association filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Allen Green, a townhome owner in the community. Green responded with a February motion to strike and dismiss the complaint and a March motion to compel discovery. Neither motion requested attorney's fees. In August, the trial court granted Sun Harbor's attorney's motion to withdraw. On October 31, while Sun Harbor was unrepresented, Green's attorney wrote the association urging them to dismiss the case. The letter threatened that if Green was "forced to continue with this law suit [he would] then be seeking damages and attorneys' fees and costs from the association."
In April, 1995, Green moved to dismiss Sun Harbor's action for failure to prosecute. The motion did not mention attorney's fees. The trial court entered an agreed order of dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b), which operated as an adjudication on the merits. The agreed order was silent as to attorney's fees. Two weeks later, Green moved for attorney's fees under the development's declaration of covenants -and restrictions. The trial court denied the motion citing Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835 (Fla.1991), and finding that Green did not "plead or otherwise raise on the record" the issue of attorney's fees until after the entry of the agreed order of dismissal. We affirm.
The general rule of Stockman is that a claim for attorney's fees must be pled. The rationale behind the rule is to notify the opposing party of all claims so as to prevent unfair surprise. Id. at 837; United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Martin County, 669 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). As the supreme court observed,
[t]he existence or nonexistence of a motion for attorney's fees may play an important role in decisions affecting a case. For example, the potential that one may be required to pay an opposing party's attorney's fees may often be determinative in a decision on whether to pursue a claim, dismiss it, or settle.
Stockman, 573 So.2d at 837. For these reasons, a party may not recover attorney's fees unless he has put the issue into play by filing a pleading or motion seeking fees. Id.; see Coffey v. Evans Properties, Inc., 585 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (failure to mention attorney's fees in motion to dismiss "fatal" to an award of fees). This notice requirement prevents a litigant from being blind-sided with a claim for fees after many litigation decisions have already been made, without factoring in the additional risk.
The primary focus of Stockman is actual notice of a claim for fees, not whether the notice had to take the form of a pleading, to the exclusion of a motion. Stockman's references to the requirement that a fee claim "must be pled" were not used in their most technical sense to narrowly limit the procedural method of giving notice. That the Supreme Court did not intend to foreclose the use of a motion to raise the issue of attorney's fees is evidenced by the following sentence from Stockman:
The existence or nonexistence of a motion for attorney's fees may play an important role in decisions affecting a case.
573 So .2d at 837.
The holding in this case is consistent with Chittenden v. Boyd, 669 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), cited by the dissent. Chittenden involved a Chapter 61 proceeding where an attorney's fee claim was orally raised at a deposition the day before trial. Such notice violated Stockman in two ways. Not only was the issue not raised in a motion or pleading, it was untimely. Our holding in Chittenden was that the oral notice was ineffective, not that it had to occur in a pleading and not in a motion.
In this case, Green filed neither a pleading nor a motion raising the issue of attorney's fees. Nor do any of the exceptions to Stockman apply. See Ganz v. HZJ, Inc., 605 So.2d 871 (Fla.1992) (section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1991)); Sandoval v. Banco de Comercio, S. A., 585 So.2d 934 (FIa.1991) (waiver by conduct). The October 31, 1994 settlement letter to the association fails to satisfy Stockman in two ways. First, it is an out of court communication, not a paper filed of record. Pleadings and motions distill the issues in litigation and are subject to the notice requirements of the rules of civil procedure. A letter between the parties has no such legal effect. Second, the letter's general reference to fees is merely posturing during negotiations, without setting forth the specific statutory or contractual basis for fees required under Stockman. See Dealers Ins. Co. v. Haidco Inv. Enter., Inc., 638 So.2d 127, 129-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Res Panel Refrigeration Corp. v. Bill Collins Refrigeration Sews., Inc., 636 So.2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Contrary to the dissent's concern, we do not see that the holding in this case will "create procedural confusion." The general rule is an easy one: to recover attorney's fees in a lawsuit, a party must timely request them in a pleading or motion. The dissent's approach engrafts exceptions onto the rule which can be a trap for the unwary. The goal of Stockman was to promote forthrightness in litigation and to eliminate "gotcha" tactics. Those values are best served by implementing a rule that requires timely notice of the intent to seek attorney's fees in a lawsuit, no matter whether it is in a pleading or a motion.
We certify conflict of this case with Bruce v. Barcomb, 675 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). See Fla.RApp.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, J. concurs.
HAUSER, JAMES C., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.