Case Name: THE STATE v. WILLIAM SWARENS, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1922-05-22
Citations: 294 Mo. 139
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE v. WILLIAM SWARENS, Appellant.
Judges: James T. Blair, C. J., concurs in separate opinion in which Woodson, Graves, David E.~ Blair and Elder, JJ., concur; Graves, J., concurs in separate opinion in which Woodso~ and David E. Blair, JJ., concur; I avid F. Blair, J., concurs in separate opinion in the second paragraph, of which James T. Blair, C. J., concurs; Walker, J., dissents in separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 294
Pages: 139–170

Head Matter:
THE STATE v. WILLIAM SWARENS, Appellant.
In Banc,
May 22, 1922.
1. LARCENY: Recent Possession of Stolen Goods: Presumptions: Instructions. In a prosecution for grand larceny, it was error for the trial court to give an instruction to the jury to the effect that if they found that the property was stolen and that recently thereafter it was found in the exclusive possession of the defendant then he was presumed to be the thief and the burden was on him to overcome such presumption, and, unless such possession was satisfactorily accounted for in a manner consistent with the innocence of defendant by evidence in the case or the circumstances attending.such possession, or by the habits and manner of life of defendant, or unless such presumption was rebutted by evidence showing the good character of defendant or by evidence that he was at some other place when said property was stolen or by the . weight of all the evidence, they should find -defendant guilty as charged in the information, inasmuch as such recent possession of stolen property, even if not satisfactorily explained, was only a circumstance to be taken into consideration and weighed by the jury, together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining defendant's guilt or innocence, and hence did not create a presumption of law, as announced in said instruction, but merely gave rise to an inference of fact which the jury might draw. In addition thereto, said instruction erroneously shifted the burden of. proof upon the defendant in violation of the rule of law that, in a criminal case where- the general issue is pleaded, the burden always rests upon the State to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and was also erroneous as a comment on the evidence. [State v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608, overruled; WALKER, J., dissenting in toto.]
2. -: ---: Circumstantial Evidence: Instructing on Whole Case. In this case' it was error for the trial cour,t not to instruct the jury upon circumstantial evidence, since it was required by Section 4025, Revised Statutes 1919, whether requested or not, to instruct the jury upon all' questions of law arising in the case which were necessary for their information in giving their verdict and the evidence was circumstantial in that there was no direct evidence of defendant’s having stolen the property, although it was found in his possession and he gave an explanation of how ' it came into h’s possession but denied taking it from its owner and denied knowledge of its ownership. [WALKER, J., dissenting in toto.]
Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court. — Hon. B. 0. Thurman, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Howell H. Heck and Charles E. Gilbert for appellant.
(1) Where the prosecution relies solely on circumstantial evidence, to convict, an instruction defining it should be given. State v. Emmons, 225 S. W. 895; State v. Stegner, 276 Mo. 440; State v. Massey, 274 Mo. 588; State v. Nerzinger, 220 Mo. 47; State v. Smith, 190 S. W. 288; State v. Bobbitt, 215 Mo. 43; State' v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642; State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137; State v. Robinson, 117 Mo. 663; 8 R, C. L. p ,180, sec. 172. (2) Tlie trial court must give all necessary instructions, whether asked or not, and it is error to fail to instruct on circumstantial evidence when a conviction is sought on such evidence. Sec. 4025, R. S. 1919; State v. Gault-ney, 242 Mo. 391; State v. Lackey, 230 Mo. 707. (3) The court should not deprive the jury of the right to deduce from the facts proved the conclusion that the crime committed, if any, is of a lower grade' than that charged in the information. State v. Wienhardt, 253 Mo. 636; State v. Hoag, 232 Mo. 316; State v. Banks, 73 Mo. 597; State v. Branstetter, 65 Mo. 155; Carter v. Comm., 5 ¿y. Op. 776; 16 C. J. 946. (4) If the relevancy of testimony is not apparent it should not be admitted on the promise of the prosecution to make it relevant. State v. Clayton, 100 Mo. 520; State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235; State v. Rothschild, 68 Mo. 52. (5) The court did not instruct on good character. Sec. 4025, R. S. 1919. (6) Manifestations of impatience by the court at the request of counsel are not only in bad taste, but may also constitute error. State v. Teeter, 239 Mo. 483; State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 87; State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 273. (7.) Where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon an instruction defining it should be given. State-v. Maggard, 250 Mo. 335; State v. Douglas, 258 Mo. 294; State v. O’Brien, 265 Mo. 612; State v. Lewkowitz, 265 Mo. 636. (8) The trial court should not deprive the jury of the right to deduce from the facts proved the conclusion that the crime committed, if any, is of a lower grade than that charged in the information. State v. Wienhardt, 253 Mo. 636; State v. Hoag, 232 Mo. 316; State v. Banks, 73 Mo. 597; 16 C. J. 946.
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Albert Miller and R. W. Otto, Assistant A.ttorneys-General, for respondent.
The trial court, did not err in refusing an instruction on circumstantial evidence, (a) When an appellant testifies and admits the possession of stolen property but claims that his possession thereof was obtained in such manner as not to constitute theft, the case is not one of circumstantial evidence. Willard v. State, 26 Tex. App. 126; Worsham v. State, 56 Tex. Grim. 253; State v. Overson, 30 Utah, 22; Everett v. State, 15 G-a. App. 390; State v. Francis, 58 Mont. 659; Reddick v. State, 11 Ga. App. 150; Jourdan v. State, 9 Ga. 5,78; Love v. State, 9 Ga App. 874; 17 R. C. L. p. 79, sec. 85. (b) It is only when a conviction is sought on circumstantial evidence alone, that it is necessary to give an instruction on the weight of circumstantial evidence. State v. Hubbard, 223 Mo. 84; State v. Nerzinger, 220 Mo. 47; State v. Bobbitt, 215 Mo. 43; State v. Crone, 209 Mo. 331; State v. Massey, 274 Mo. 588; State v. Stegner, 276 Mo. 440; State v. Emmons, 225 S. W. 895; State v. Baird, 231 S. W. 626; State v. Steinkraus, 244 Mo. 152. (e) The presumption of guilt growing out of the recent possession of stolen property is a presumption of law and, in the absence of other rebutting evidence, must be met by proof on tbe part of the accused, explaining this possession, in a manner consistent with his innocence, or it will become conclusive against him. It is not a mere presumption of fact to be weighed with other evidence in the case. State v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608; State v. Jenkins, 213 S. W. 799; State v. Weiss, 219 S. W. 370 et seq.; State v. Court, 225 Mo. 614 et seq.; State v. Wright, 199 Mó. 166; State v. Walker, 194 Mo. 263. (d) Defendant, having failed to ask any specific instruction relating to circumstantial evidence, and having failed to request the court to instruct on that subject; and having failed to except to the failure of the trial court to so instruct on circumstantial evidence is in no position to complain of the non-action of the court in respect to its failure to instruct on circumstantial evidence. State v. Lee,' 231 S. W. 621; State v. Rowe, 271 Mo. 88; State v. Selleck, 199 S. W, 129; State v. Pfeifer, 267 Mo. 29; State v. Wansong, 271 Mo. 58; State v. Smith, 190 S. W. 288.

Opinion:
HIGBEE, J.
The defendant was convicted of grand 'larceny and sentenced for two years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, and appealed. The charge is that he stole a tarpaulin, of the value of fifty dollars, the property of J. 0. Williamson.
Williamson testified that he lived in Vernon County, near the north line of the county; that he used the tarpaulin in the year 1919, put it in his machine shed on January 15, 1920, and on January 28, it was gone; that it had a mouse hole in it; two or three holes in it at the time of the trial; that defendant lived across the line in Bates County; that he saw him on witness's premises several times trapping and hunting; that he was told on February 22, 1920, that the tarpaulin was in defendant's house; sued out a search warrant and found it there on that day; that it was reasonably worth $50 at the time it was stolen. When the constable read the warrant to the defendant, Swarens said, "I have something of that kind here. I don't know whose it is." He further said he had found it on his place ten or twelve days before that.
The defendant testified that about February 12, 1920, he went to the south part of his farm to get a load of fodder and found the tarpaulin behind a bunch of brush in the corner of his pasture, it having been thrown over the fence ten to twenty feet; that he .put it in his wagon, took it home and put it in the front room to take care of it and keep it safe from mice; that he was taken sick the next day and was confined to the house about ten days; that his family was also taken sick, and that he had no telephone in the house. Two of his neighbors called on him on Sunday, February 22. They saw the tarpaulin, but nothing was said about it. They had heard that Williamson had lost, his tarpaulin and reported they had seen it in defendant's house, and no time was lost in procuring the warrant.
The defendant denied taking the tarpaulin from Williamson's shed and denied knowing it belonged to him.
The court, in an instruction not numbered, instructed the jury, in substance, that if they found the defendant feloniously took, stole and carried away the tarpaulin from the possession of Williamson, with intent, etc., that it was his property and of the value of $30 or more, then they should find the defendant guilty of grand larceny and assess his. punishment at, etc.
By Instruction 1 they were told that if they found the tarpaulin was the property of Williamson and that it was stolen in Vernon County on or about the -day of January, 1920, and that recently after it was stolen it was found in the exclusive possession of the defendant, then he is presumed to be the thief, and the burden is on him to overcome such presumption, and unless such possession is satisfactorily accounted for in a manner consistent with the innocence of the defendant by evidence in the case or the circumstances attending such possession, or by the habits and manner of life of the defendant, or unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence showing the good character of the defendant or by evidence that he was at some other place when said property was stolen, of by the weight of all the evidence, they should find the defendant guilty as charged in the information.
I. Instruction 1, in the use of the words we have italicized, assumes that the property was stolen. A finding that the tarpaulin was stolen was necessary to conviction, for it is possession of stolen property that raises the presumption of guilt. [State v. Sasseen, 75 Mo. App. 197, 203; 25 Cyc. 132.]
II. This instruction reads, in part: "or unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence showing the good character of the defendant or by evidence that he was at some other place when said property was stolen, or by the weight of all the evidence," etc. The w~rds we have italicized put an undue burden on tbc fendant. Where there is no evidence of the defendant's good character, the rule ~n this State is that the defendant's explanation of his possession should be such as reasonably to satisfy the jury that it was innocently or honestly acquired. [State v. Moore, 101 Mo. 316, 330.] The general rule elsewhere is that the presumption is removed if the explanation leaves the matter in doubt. "In other words, ~vhen such a reasonable explanation of the possession is given, the prosecution must establish the falsity of it beyond a reasonabiQ doubt." [25 Cyc. 137.]
III. Another vice in this instruction is that it purports to cover the whole case and authorizes a conviction of grand larceny without a finding that the tarpaulin was of the value of thirty dollars or more. That was an issue in the case. The two instructions are there-f ore in conflict, a'nd the jury would `not know which to ado~3t as their guide in arriving at their verdiet. [State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 110; Wojtylak v. K. & T. Coal Co., 188 Mo. 260, 282; Rissmiller v. Ry. Co., 187 S. W. 573; State v. Harris, 232 Mo. 317, 321; Hall v. Coal & Coke Co., 260 Mo. 351, 369; Johnson v. Building Co., 171 Mo. App. 543, 560; Traylor v. White, 185 Mo. App. 325, 331; 38 Cyc. 1604.]
There are other interesting questions discussed in the briefs of learned counsel, which need not be considered. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
James T. Blair, C. J., concurs in separate opinion in which Woodson, Graves, David E.~ Blair and Elder, JJ., concur; Graves, J., concurs in separate opinion in which Woodso~ and David E. Blair, JJ., concur; I avid F. Blair, J., concurs in separate opinion in the second paragraph, of which James T. Blair, C. J., concurs; Walker, J., dissents in separate opinion.