Case Name: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Petitioner-Appellee, and Satterfield Legal, PLLC, Substitute Trustee; Sarah Banks, Substitute Trustee, Attorney in Fact, Plaintiffs, v. Lynton Yates BALLENTINE, Jr.; LB International Express Trust, Non Corporate Entity (Rela Party in Interest, Tertius Intervenie), Defendants-Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-03-07
Citations: 714 F. App'x 254
Docket Number: No. 17-2187
Parties: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Petitioner-Appellee, and Satterfield Legal, PLLC, Substitute Trustee; Sarah Banks, Substitute Trustee, Attorney in Fact, Plaintiffs, v. Lynton Yates BALLENTINE, Jr.; LB International Express Trust, Non Corporate Entity (Rela Party in Interest, Tertius Intervenie), Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 714
Pages: 254–255

Head Matter:
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Petitioner-Appellee, and Satterfield Legal, PLLC, Substitute Trustee; Sarah Banks, Substitute Trustee, Attorney in Fact, Plaintiffs, v. Lynton Yates BALLENTINE, Jr.; LB International Express Trust, Non Corporate Entity (Rela Party in Interest, Tertius Intervenie), Defendants-Appellants.
No. 17-2187
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: February 26, 2018
Decided: March 7, 2018
Lynton Ballentine, Appellant Pro Se. Aleksandra Elzbieta Anderson, John T. Benjamin, Jr., William Earle Hubbard, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN T. BENJAMIN, JR., PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants appeal from the district court's order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and remanding the foreclosure action filed against Appellants back to state court. We dismiss the appeal.
Remand orders are generally "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Supreme Court has explained that the appellate restrictions of "§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) [i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction and defects in removal procedures] are immune from review under § 1447(d)." Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127, 116 S.Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995). Whether a remand order is reviewable is not based on a district court's explicit citation to § 1447(c); "[t]he bar of § 1447(d) applies to any order invoking substantively one of the grounds specified in § 1447(c)." Bomeman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 824-25 (4th Cir. 2000).
Here, the district court explicitly noted that there was no subject matter jurisdiction and cited § 1447(c). Because the basis for remand fell within the ambit of § 1447(c), we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court's order. Thus, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED