Case Name: GILBERT JONES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1973-02-21
Citations: 17 Md. App. 130
Docket Number: No. 242
Parties: GILBERT JONES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Appellate Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 130–156

Head Matter:
GILBERT JONES v. STATE OF MARYLAND
[No. 242,
September Term, 1972.]
Decided February 21, 1973.
The cause was argued before Thompson, Moylan, Carter and Davidson, JJ.
Chester Cohen for appellant.
James G. Klair, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Milton B. Allen, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Rodney M. Watts, Assistant State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.

Opinion:
Thompson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Moylan, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 135 infra.
Gilbert Jones, the appellant, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of robbery with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to a term of 12 years. The sole question raised on appeal is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in denying his request to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial. In view of the contention it will be unnecessary to recite the facts of the crime. We will set out the dates of various occurrences in the court below because the time element is of significance in our decision.
On March 30, 1971, Jones was re-arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and elected a jury trial. There was an agreement between counsel that the jury was to be selected that day but the actual trial was not to commence until April 5, 1971 because in the interim, the trial judge would be required to attend a conference of all of the judges of the State. The jury was selected, excused and left the court room. Jones requested and was granted permission to personally address the court. He advised he thought the jury selection process unfair because he had used up his 20 strikes before he understood that would be all that he would be permitted. He argued that although his counsel had told him he was limited to 20 strikes he did not fully understand what he was being told and he requested another panel of veniremen because "I want to strike another jury out of the characteristic way that appears to be and by me challenging I never get a chance to get down to the ones I want to judge this case." The trial judge explained, "The law gives you the right as a Defendant to exercise twenty pre-emptory strikes, which you and your attorney used up. I can't give you under the law more strikes than that . I am bound by the law the same as you are."
On Monday, April 5, 1971 before the jury was sworn, the defendant requested that he be granted a court trial instead of a jury trial. The court thoroughly explained the procedure for the jury trial and explained that by giving up the jury trial that if he changed his mind again and wanted a jury trial later on, he would be unable to have a jury trial because he had waived his right. Thereafter a continuance was granted to permit counsel to interview and arrange for the summons of a prospective witness, Shirley Johnson. The case was reset for April 20. The record does not indicate why the case was not tried on April 20.
On May 20, 1971, the defendant appeared in court and requested that his counsel be dismissed claiming he was incompetent and proved to be negligent in selecting the jury in that he did not make Jones aware of the selection procedure and that he, Jones, had used up his twenty strikes before he was aware he was so limited. The trial judge stated that although he had found appellant's counsel to be a competent lawyer, he preferred that an accused have counsel with which he be satisfied and that he would permit trial counsel to withdraw. For the record, trial counsel stated as follows:
"In reference to what Mr. Jones just said about not advising him of his strikes at the time we were selecting the jury, I did advise. I want the record to indicate I did tell Mr. Jones he had twenty strikes, now don't use them all up at the time. Maybe Mr. Jones did not understand what I had said at the time and we proceeded to use those challenges rather freely. Also, I want to indicate for the record I advised him in the middle of using these twenty strikes, we have, Mr. Jones, we only have a few more. I think I said, 'You have about half of your strikes already gone. Take it easy.' Maybe he didn't understand but I did advise him he had twenty strikes."
The Court: "Are you saying Mr. Jones was exercising his own discretion in making strikes and not you?"
Mr. Nelson: "I'm saying that exactly. And if you recall, Mr. Jones was the one telling me who to challenge."
The Court: "The Court did note Mr. Jones was telling you whether to challenge or not challenge prospective jurors. Both of you were in animated discussion on each and every prospective juror."
The appearance of other trial counsel was entered by appointment of the court on July 15, 1971.
The case was called for trial before a second judge on December 6, 1971. At that time Jones requested that his case be tried before the jury but the trial judge called his attention to the fact that Jones had changed his mind after the jury had been selected and that in view of the previous trial judge's admonition that he would not be permitted to change his mind again, refused the request. Jones's new counsel claimed that Jones thought his challenges were unlimited and that the last eight jurors had been selected after he had run out of challenges. The trial judge had only a partial record of the prior proceedings before him. He asserted that this was a new argument not presented before the prior judge. He denied Jones's motion, at least in part, because "there's not a single word to that effect in this transcript."
It appears from the record that a jury was available on December 6, 1971 and neither the State nor the court would have been inconvenienced if Jones had been permitted to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial made eight months prior. We note that due to the original trial judge's granting of the postponement, appellant would have been tried before a different jury anyway.
Maryland Rule 741, as amended, makes clear that an accused has the right to elect whether his case shall be tried before a court or a jury. Our cases, Staten v. State, 13 Md. App. 425, 283 A. 2d 644; Cole v. State, 12 Md. App. 379, 277 A. 2d 248 and Walter v. State, 4 Md. App. 373, 243 A. 2d 626, hold that for good cause a previous election may be withdrawn up until the actual commencement of the trial unless there is a showing that the granting of the motion would unduly delay the trial or otherwise impede justice. There is nothing in the change of language in the rule which would affect the efficacy of those cases.
In the instant case the. record shows that a jury was immediately available for trial on December 6, 1971. We think the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit appellant to withdraw his prior election of a court trial. Although an accused obviously cannot be permitted to change his election as a dilatory tactic, we note that here, from the complete record, there was at least a modicum of doubt that the accused fully understood the method by which a jury was selected at the time he participated with his counsel in selection of the jury. We think it of significance that several months had elapsed since the accused had made his election for a court trial, that a different judge was presiding at the trial than at the time the original election was made and that different trial counsel had been provided in the interim. Under all of these circumstances we think the withdrawal of the election should have been permitted and that he should be granted his constitutional right to have his case tried before a jury.
The State argues that State v. Gerardi, 6 Conn. Cir. 218, 269 A. 2d 641, stands for the proposition that an accused cannot elect a jury trial, withdraw the election and repeat this at will so as to postpone the case indefinitely. In that case the accused had previously elected a jury trial; on the date of trial the accused withdrew his election but before evidence was received, he sought to change his election and have a jury trial. The judge refused to grant a jury trial and the case proceeded on the same day. We do not think the case is apposite here where there was a substantial time lapse between the election and the attempted withdrawal of that election, as well as a change in the trial judge and in defense counsel.
Judgment reversed.
Case remanded for a new trial.
. Md. Rule 741, effective September 1, 1971 and at the time of trial provided as follows:
"An accused may elect to be tried by jury or by the court. Such election shall be made by the accused in open court when first called upon to plead after he is represented by counsel of record or has waived counsel. If an accused elects to be tried by the court, the State may not elect a jury trial. The court may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, at any time prior to the trial permit the accused to change his election."
The rule in effect at the time of the original election was as follows:
"An accused may waive a jury trial and elect to be tried by the court. If an accused elects to be tried by the court the State may not elect a jury trial. An election to be tried by the court must be made before any evidence in the trial on the merits is taken unless otherwise provided by local rule of court."