Case Name: Michiah BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-12-22
Citations: 520 So. 2d 43
Docket Number: No. BP-378
Parties: Michiah BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BARFIELD, J., concurs, with an opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 520
Pages: 43–49

Head Matter:
Michiah BANKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. BP-378.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 22, 1987.
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1988.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Phil Patterson, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Gregory Costas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHIVERS, Judge.
The appellant, Michiah Banks, appeals the trial court's determination, after remand, to impose adult sanctions pursuant to section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes, and its decision to depart from the recommended guideline sentence. We reverse on both issues.
The record in this case indicates that on June 8, 1984, the state "direct filed" a four-count information against the appellant, pursuant to section 39.04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes, charging him with armed kidnapping, two counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and attempted first-degree murder. Appellant was 17 years old at the time of the charged offenses, and had no prior adjudications of delinquency. On November 19, 1984, appellant entered pleas of guilty to all counts, with the exception of one count of armed sexual battery, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 40, 40, and 30 years. The recommended guideline sentence was 17-22 years incarceration. The trial court (Judge Moran) entered a written order giving the following six reasons for departure:
1) The victim's testimony at the time of the defendant's sentencing, a copy of which is attached and made a part of these reasons.
2) The defendants had carefully planned this crime and had handcuffed this victim and forced her to participate in sexual activities.
3) The record reflects that after the sexual battery took place these defendants made a conscious decision to kill this victim. They attempted to strangle her and were unsuccessful. They attempted to stab her with a knife only to have the blade break off. They then beat the victim with a tire iron fifteen to twenty times in an effort to kill her. They also discussed, in her presence, tying her to two trees and running over her with an automobile. They further discussed put ting her in the trunk of an automobile and throwing her in the river.
4) From her testimony it is evident that the victim is still suffering psychological trauma from this episode.
5) The defendant's record reflects that society has worked with him previously in the Youth Mediation Program and has worked with him in a Community Control Program. Society has further worked with the defendant at University Hospital where he was to receive treatment in the Community Mental Health Center. None of these previous attempts have been successful at changing this defendant's violent behavior and antisocial demeanor.
6) The Presentence Investigation, under educational history, reflects that there were numerous altercations and disruptions of classes by this subject, and that many of these instances involved violence where the subject either struck another individual, or was involved in throwing chairs or other items around the room. The educational history further reflects that while enrolled at Florida Junior College, the defendant once again was involved in violent activity involving a fight in a stairwell and that, after being restrained by a recreational specialist at F.J.C., this defendant broke away and again attacked the other student.
In his first appeal to this court in 1985, appellant argued that the trial court had failed to comply with the requirements of section 39.111(6)(c), (d), Florida Statutes, in determining to impose adult sanctions. The state conceded that the requirements of the statute had not been followed, and this court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for resentencing as required by State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984). The trial court was specifically directed to "consider each of the criteria enumerated in Section 39.111(6)(c), conduct a disposition hearing consonant with the direction of Section 39.111(6)(a), and reduce to writing the findings of fact and the reasons for imposing adult sanctions." Banks v. State, 488 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
On September 19, 1986, the hearing on remand was conducted before Judge Parsons. After hearing argument from both counsel, the trial court entered a written sentence, finding adult sanctions to be suitable, and reimposing the original departure sentence imposed by Judge Moran. Judge Parsons adopted Judge Moran's statement of reasons for departure, and added the following statement: "If any one of the reasons for exceeding the guidelines are invalid, this court would have imposed the same sentence had the invalid reason(s) not been stated." We reverse both the trial court's finding of suitability of adult sanctions, and the sentence departing from the sentencing guidelines.
First, the finding of suitability of adult sanctions still fails to meet the requirements of section 39.111(6)(c), (d), Florida Statutes and, therefore, must be reversed and remanded again. Specifically, the trial court failed to .address all six of the criteria listed in subsection (6)(c), as required by this court's earlier opinion, Banks v. State, supra, by the language of section 39.111(6)(d), and by case law requiring consideration of all six criteria. See Christy v. State, 489 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Posey v. State, 501 So.2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Upshaw v. State, 464 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Further, the trial court's order failed to cite specific reasons for its decision to impose adult sanctions, as required by section 39.-111(6)(d), but instead merely restated four of the factors listed in subsection (6)(c). On remand, the trial court is instructed to consider each of the six factors listed in subsection (6)(c), and to "render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions," as required by subsection (6)(d).
Appellant's argument that the state lacked the authority to direct file an information in the instant case and, therefore, that the trial court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, is without merit. Appellant argued in his initial brief that the state had discretion to file an information in the adult division of the circuit court against a child who was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense, only if the child had also been previously found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult. In making this argument, appellant relied upon State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361, 1364-1365 (Fla.1980), which construed section 39.04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes. Although his argument would have been correct at the time the Cain decision was written, section 39.04(2)(e)4 was amended in 1981 to read as follows:
Upon motion of a child charged with a misdemeanor, the case shall be transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a felony.
(e.s.) Since appellant was not charged with á misdemeanor, the information was properly filed.
Second, we reverse the trial court's departure from the recommended guideline sentence, on the basis that five of the court's six reasons for departure were invalid. We find reason # 1 to be invalid as it is "ambiguous and lacking in clarity for failure to relate to any identified fact in the context of this case." Burch v. State, 462 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA), approved, 476 So.2d 663 (Fla.1985); Vanover v. State, 498 So.2d 899 (Fla.1986). Reason # 5 also suffers from ambiguity in that it fails to state a reason for departing from the recommended guideline sentence, but instead reflects the court's dissatisfaction with past attempts to rehabilitate the appellant. Reason # 6 is invalid as it relates to past behavior of the appellant which resulted in neither arrest nor conviction. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.701(d)(11).
Reason #2 refers to appellant's premeditation or calculation, which would constitute a valid reason for departure in a sexual battery case, since neither is an inherent component of the offense of sexual battery. Casteel v. State, 498 So.2d 1249 (Fla.1986). However, premeditation or calculation is an inherent component of attempted first-degree murder, and is thus an invalid basis for departure with regard " to that offense. Fryson v. State, 506 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Since the trial court's use of the words "this crime" make it impossible to determine whether the court was referring to sexual battery or attempted first-degree murder, and since the fact that the defendant "forced her [the victim] to participate in sexual acts" is an inherent component of the offense of sexual battery, reason # 2 is invalid. Although the first sentence of reason #3 is also improper under Fryson, supra (as it relates to premeditation of attempted first-degree murder), the remaining sentences are proper as they relate to the manner in which the crime was carried out, Lewis v. State, 496 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the circumstances surrounding the offense, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 b.3., and excessive use and threat of force, Mathis v. State, 498 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Last, reason # 4 is invalid on two bases. First, the evidence in the record fails to support a conclusion that the victim is "still" suffering psychological trauma, since the victim's testimony was taken 20 months prior to Judge Parsons' adoption of Judge Moran's reasons for departure. The record indicates that Judge Parsons did not hear testimony from the victim on rehearing. Second, psychological trauma is an inherent component of sexual battery and, therefore, may not be used as a basis for departure. Lerma v. State, 497 So.2d 736 (Fla.1986).
Even assuming that only reason # 3 constitutes a valid basis for departure, the state argues that Judge Parsons' use of "boilerplate" language satisfies the standard set forth in Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985), and mandates affirmance. We disagree, on the basis of the supreme court's recent decision in Griffis v. State, 509 So.2d 1104 (Fla.1987), in which the court stated:
We reiterate the principle of Albritton. Such a sentence can be affirmed only where the appellate court is satisfied by the entire record that the state has met • its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same without the impermissible reasons. A statement by the trial court that it would depart for any of the reasons given, standing alone, is not enough to satisfy that burden.
509 So.2d at 1105. Since the record does not indicate the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence, based on one valid reason for departure, as it imposed based on six reasons for departure, we find that the standard set forth in Albritton v. State has not been satisfied.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination of suitability of adult sanctions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In the event the trial court properly determines that adult sanctions are warranted, it is directed to reconsider the sentence imposed in light of our having found all except one reason for departure to be invalid. According to the supreme court's recent opinion in Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla.1987), the trial court may not enunciate new reasons to justify its departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed on appeal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BARFIELD, J., concurs, with an opinion.
NIMMONS, J., dissents, with an opinion.
. We note that the state conceded, in its answer brief, that reasons 1, 5, and 6 constituted invalid bases for departure.