Case Name: Kathleen WRIGHT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Millard B. WRIGHT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-05-19
Citations: 509 So. 2d 329
Docket Number: No. 86-22
Parties: Kathleen WRIGHT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Millard B. WRIGHT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL, HENDRY, HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 509
Pages: 329–333

Head Matter:
Kathleen WRIGHT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Millard B. WRIGHT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 86-22.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 19, 1987.
Mark E. Pollack, Miami, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Fred E. Glickman, Miami, for appel-lee/cross-appellant.
Elizabeth S. Baker, South Miami, for National Organization for Women, as amicus curiae.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL, HENDRY, HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM.
The appellee moved for rehearing en banc asserting that the panel opinion, re ported at 509 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), is in conflict with this court's opinion in Duttenhofer v. Duttenhofer, 474 So.2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Despite the efforts of the panel to distinguish this case from Dut-tenhofer, we agree that the two cases are irreconcilable and that our en banc jurisdiction is, therefore, properly invoked. Having now reheard the matter en banc, six members of the en banc court are of the view that the panel opinion should be vacated and the trial court's judgment affirmed in its entirety.
In the present case, Mrs. Wright claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her alimony and certain medical expenses. Given that the parties separated after a mere eleven months and given the trial court's amply supported findings that Mrs. Wright had made no substantial contribution to the marriage, was unwilling to curtail her unexplained spending habits, and was capable of becoming gainfully employed — in essence, that she had been on an eleven-month joy ride— we quite obviously cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her relief.
Mrs. Wright says, however, that the trial court erred by refusing to take into account, when considering if and how much alimony Mr. Wright should pay, that her marriage to him resulted in the termination of $1,000 per month alimony she had been receiving from a former husband. Contrary to Mrs. Wright's position, we conclude that the trial court was entirely correct in disregarding her "lost alimony" in deciding Mr. Wright's responsibility, if any, to pay alimony to her. As was said in Duttenhofer, 474 So.2d at 253, "the power of a court to 'consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties' was not intended to encompass the consideration of premarital sacrifices." So even as the court in Duttenhofer held that the forfeiture of widow's benefits was such a non-compensable premarital sacrifice, so, too, the termination of the wife's entitlement to alimony from an ex-husband is a mere consequence of the event of the remarriage which is not to be considered in fixing the next husband's alimony obligation.
We thus adopt Duttenhofer and its reasoning, find it to be dispositive of the present case, and specifically reject the panel's view in Wright that "the forfeiture of alimony on remarriage . is an equitable factor for the court to consider in awarding alimony." Wright v. Wright, 509 So.2d at 328.
Affirmed.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL, HUBBART, NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ., concur.
. Mrs. Wright had been married to this former husband for twenty-three years. Under their property settlement agreement, the former husband's obligation to pay her $2,000 per month in non-modifiable alimony survived her remarriage to and divorce from Wright.