Case Name: PEOPLE v. WORRELL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-11-21
Citations: 417 Mich. 617
Docket Number: Docket No. 68630
Parties: PEOPLE v WORRELL
Judges: Levin, Ryan, Brickley, and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 417
Pages: 617–637

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WORRELL
Docket No. 68630.
Argued June 7, 1983
(Calendar No. 11).
Decided November 21, 1983.
Jack Worrell was convicted by a jury in the Monroe Circuit Court, William,J. Weipert, Jr., J., of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration on a 13-year-old girl, and he pled guilty of being an habitual offender. The Court of Appeals, V. J. Brennan, P. J., and T. M. Burns and Pannucci, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 53944). The defendant appeals, asserting that some force or violence is an essential element of the offense of which he was convicted, and that the jury should have been so instructed.
In an opinion by Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Ryan, Brickley, and Cavanagh, the Supreme Court held:
A conviction of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration in a case in which the victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years requires that an assault on the victim be proved. While consent of such a victim is no defense to charges of criminal sexual conduct or attempt, it is a defense to a charge of assault. Assault and consent are mutually exclusive concepts. There can be no assault without proof of force or a threat of force.
The Legislature has protected children of tender years by providing that the consent of persons under the age of 16 to sexual intercourse is legally ineffective, and that the consent of persons under the age of 13 to any sexual contact is equally ineffective, but persons of all ages are equally protected under the assault laws.
Because the sexual activity in this case is not claimed to have been other than consensual and there was no evidence of assault, the jury should not have been instructed on assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape §§ 15, 21-23.
[2, 3] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape § 3.
[4] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape § 4.
[5] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape §§ 108, 110.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 876.
Reversed.
Justice Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Williams, dissenting, would hold that the crime of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration in a case in which the victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years is made out by evidence sufficient to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had the specific intent to commit sexual penetration. The criminal nature of the touching does not depend on the victim’s ability to consent to some sexual contact, but on the defendant’s intent, and therefore a showing of force or coercion is not necessary where the victim is under the age of 16.
1. The criminal sexual conduct statute protects persons under 13 years of age from both sexual contact and sexual penetration. Where a person is at least 13 years of age, but less than 16, consent can be given to sexual contact, but not to penetration. Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration consists of the specific intent to achieve sexual penetration in addition to some physical manifestation of the intent. Where a victim is between the ages of 13 and 16, acts from which a specific intent to achieve sexual penetration can be inferred are not permissible merely because some touching of the victim' for sexual gratification would otherwise be permissible where consent was given. The criminal nature of the touching does not depend on the victim’s ability to consent to some sexual contact, but rather on the defendant’s intent. The determination of intent is for the trier of fact. In this case, a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended sexual penetration of the victim.
2. It is not necessary to show force or coercion to make out a case which would permit the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant intended to commit sexual penetration during an assault where the victim is under the age of consent for sexual penetration. If force or coercion were necessary elements of the offense where an underage victim is involved, underaged victims would have no greater protection from sexual assaults than adults, a result inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statutes proscribing criminal sexual conduct. Rather, the Legislature intended to make a defendant strictly liable for his intent and conduct in sexually assaulting a person under the age of consent. This does not mean that any overt act will be conclusively presumed to include an intent to penetrate the victim. An assault, i.e., an overt act, and the intent to commit sexual penetration must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration.
3. In this case, the defendant was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, i.e., sexual penetration of a person between 13 and 16 years of age. Because force and violence are not necessary elements of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration with a person who is under 16 years of age, the jury could properly be instructed that the assault was a necessarily lesser included offense of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. For the same reasons, the information did not fail to give the defendant adequate notice that he would be required to defend against the assault charge.
4. Before sentencing the defendant, the trial court reviewed his previous criminal record, noting both the frequency and the nature of his crimes. The court also noted that many of the crimes involved excessive consumption of alcohol and that there was some indication that the defendant’s excessive consumption problem was not under control. The record shows that the court recognized its discretion in imposing a sentence, but determined that the greatest possible sentence was appropriate as the maximum sentence.
Ill Mich App 27; 314 NW2d 516 (1981) reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Rape — Assault With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct — Infants ■— Defenses — Consent.
Proof of an assault on the victim, creating a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury, is required for a conviction of the crime of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration in a case in which the victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years; while consent of such a victim is no defense to charges of criminal sexual conduct or attempt, it is a defense to a charge of assault (MCL 750.520g[l]; MSA 28.788[7][1]).
Dissenting Opinion by Boyle, J.
2. Rape — Assault With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct — Infants — Elements — Force.
The crime of assault with intent to commit third-degree criminal sexual conduct in a case in which the victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years is made out by evidence sufficient to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had the specific intent to commit sexual penetration; a showing of force or coercion is not necessary where the victim is under the age of 16 (MCL 750.520g[l]; MSA 28.788[7][1]).
3. Rape — Assault With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct — Infants — Consent.
A person between the ages of 13 and 16 years may consent to sexual contact, but not to sexual penetration; however, where a defendant assaults such a person with the intent to commit sexual penetration, any touching to which the victim may otherwise consent and from which an intent to commit sexual penetration may be inferred is not permissible and is the crime of assault with intent to commit third-degree criminal sexual conduct (MCL 750.520g[l]; MSA 28.788[7][1]).
4. Rape — Assault With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct — Infants — Force.
ft is not necessary to show force or coercion to make out a case that the defendant intended to commit sexual penetration during an assault where the victim is under the age of consent for sexual penetration; the prosecutor need only show beyond a reasonable doubt an overt act and an intent to commit sexual penetration (MCL 750.520g[l]; MSA 28.788[7][1]).
5. Rape — Third-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct — Assault • With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct — Instructions to Jury — Lesser Included Offenses.
Because force and violence are not necessary elements of the crime of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration with a person under 16 years of age, the jury in a prosecution for third-degree criminal sexual conduct could properly be instructed that the assault offense was a lesser included offense of the crime charged and the information charging the defendant provided sufficient notice to the defendant that he would be required to defend against the assault offense (MCL 750.520d[l][a], 750.520g[l]; MSA 28.788[4][1][a], 28.788[7][1]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Michael W. LaBeau, Prosecuting Attorney, William D. Bond, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Kim Robert Fawcett) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
The dissent in this case, as the decision of the Court of Appeals, is based on the premise that a charge of statutory rape or criminal sexual conduct is made out by evidence of penetration of a female under the statutory age without regard to her consent. This is not disputed. The law traditionally has held that the consent of a person of such tender years to such acts will not be recognized and accordingly that consent is no defense to such a charge.
Likewise, consent is no defense to a charge of attempt to effect such sexual penetration.
However, proof of penetration or attempt to penetrate will support conviction of the crime of assault with intent to effect such connection only if the assault be made out.
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals and the dissent, by and large, posit assault and hence do not address the question presented here. People v McDonald, 9 Mich 150 (1861), is the only case brought to our attention which involves consensual sexual activity and a charge Of assault with intent to commit statutory rape. The Court said that since consent is no defense to the crime of statutory rape, neither is it a defense to a charge of assault with intent to commit the crime. While it is true that the consent of the minor is irrelevant to a charge of statutory rape or attempt to commit statutory rape, it is relevant to a charge of assault with intent to commit statutory rape._
" 'An assault is any attempt or offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness, with such circumstances as denote, at the time, an intention to do it, coupled with a present ability to carry such intention into effect.' 3 Cyc, p 1020.
" 'An assault is any unlawful physical force, partly or fully put in motion, creating a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury to a human being.' 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (7th ed), § 23." People v Carlson, 160 Mich 426; 125 NW 361 (1910).
If the other person is a willing partner to the physical act, there can be no assault because there is no reasonable apprehension of immediate injury. The McDonald Court apparently viewed the offense there charged as an attempted statutory rape. Yet no reason is given for ignoring the ordinary meaning of the word assault. We are not persuaded by the reasoning of McDonald. Instead, we feel constrained to accord the word assault in our present statute, MCL 750.520g; MSA 28.788(7), its commonly understood meaning, for to define assault as does the dissent makes the offense identical to attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. This would make MCL 750.520g(l); MSA 28.788(7)(1) and MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287 redundant, and their provisions for penalties of ten years and five years, respectively, equally applicable with no principled basis for distinction. We will not ascribe such an intention to the Legislature.
Assault and consent are mutually exclusive. There can be no assault without proof of force or threat thereof. Accordingly, while consent will not amount to a defense to the charge of criminal sexual conduct or attempt to commit it, it is a defense to every charge of assault.
The suggestion that to require proof of force or offer of force in every charge of assault somehow reduces the protection of children of tender years intended by this legislation is chimerical. Persons of all ages are equally protected under our assault laws. The consent of persons under 16 years to sexual intercourse is legally ineffective. The consent of persons under 13 years to any sexual contact is equally ineffective legally.
This is the protection the Legislature ordained. We are not free to enforce our own values in the name of construction even to provide some perceived greater protection.
Because the sexual activity here is not claimed to be other than consensual, there is no evidence to support a verdict of assault, and hence it was error to instruct on it.
This conviction is set aside, and the defendant discharged because the refusal of the jury to find the defendant guilty of criminal sexual conduct or attempted criminal sexual conduct precludes his retrial on those charges.
Levin, Ryan, Brickley, and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
People v Courier, 79 Mich 366, 368; 44 NW 571 (1890). "Sexual intercourse is sufficient, and if an assault is made, with the design of sexual intercourse with a child under the statutory age, the crime of an assault with intent to carnally know and abuse the child is committed." (Emphasis supplied.) People v Carlson, 160 Mich 426; 125 NW 361 (1910).