Case Name: Sterling J. PLANCK, Sr., and Southport Boat Storage and Sales, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. TRADERS DIVERSIFIED, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-08-13
Citations: 387 So. 2d 440
Docket Number: No. 77-1132
Parties: Sterling J. PLANCK, Sr., and Southport Boat Storage and Sales, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. TRADERS DIVERSIFIED, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
Judges: ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion .only.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 387
Pages: 440–444

Head Matter:
Sterling J. PLANCK, Sr., and Southport Boat Storage and Sales, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. TRADERS DIVERSIFIED, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
No. 77-1132.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 13, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1980.
Wilton L. Strickland and Carey M. Fischer of Ferrero, Middlebrooks & Strickland, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Richard W. Wasserman, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAUKSCH, JAMES C" Jr., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of a broker and against a seller of real estate. The question on appeal is whether the broker had an exclusive listing agreement entitling him to a commission no matter who sold the property to whom dúr-ing the time period of the listing agreement.
The listing agreement gave the broker one month from this date (and thereafter until this agreement is revoked by ten days' written notice delivered to you), the sole right and authority to find a purchaser for the above described property at the following price and terms, or at any other price and terms acceptable to me:
Price: $895.000.00c Terms: $295.000.-_00c cash, and Purchase money Mort. of _$600.000.00(t or all cash. Mort. will _be held at a rate of 9%. pavmt. of _$6000.00 per, mo._
# # # This Listing Agreement pertains only _to the above named property to be of-_fered for sale to Mr. Phillip Slack of Chicago Ill.
The portion of the agreement which says "# # # This Listing Agreement pertains only to the above named property to be offered for sale to Mr. Phillip Slack of Chicago, Ill." is typed in, as are some other portions of this apparently rather standard printed agreement. This typed part of the agreement limits the right of the broker to negotiate a sale to Phillip Slack. However, in the first part of the agreement, which is part of the printed form, the agreement does not limit the broker's authority and would give the broker the right to collect a commission no matter who sold the property to whom. Thus there is a conflict in the agreement as to the extent of the broker's right. It has been generally held that typed portions of a contract which are at variance or in conflict with printed provisions take precedence and are controlling. MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Service, Inc., 347 So.2d 1081 (Fla.3d DCA 1977).
The dispute arose in the case because the seller, Planck, sold the property to someone other than Slack during the thirty day period of the listing agreement. Ap-pellee filed suit for a commission on account of that sale. The issue went to trial and a jury returned a verdict for the broker which verdict was reduced to judgment. Appellant urges the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and erred in entering the judgment. We agree and reverse. In interpreting the agreement, we have applied the standard relating to typed versus printed provisions in a con tract. MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Service, Inc., 347 So.2d 1081 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). We have also considered the law which says ambiguities in a contract are more strictly construed against the drafter. MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Service, Inc., 347 So.2d 1081 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); American Agronomics Corporation v. Ross, 309 So.2d 582 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). This rule is especially true when the drafter stands in a position of trust, or greater professional or business knowledge, such as a real estate broker. Falovitch v. Adrienne Realty, Inc., 345 So.2d 839 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). The broker in this case drafted the listing agreement so we interpret it in favor of the client/appellant. This leads us to the decision that the agreement limited the broker to the right to collect a commission only if he secured the offer to purchase from Slack within the thirty days and before the appellant sold the property to anyone else. The evidence is clear the broker did not secure the ultimate purchaser, did not produce a contract offer from Slack before the sale to the ultimate purchaser and is entitled to no commission. See also Wilkins.v. W. B. Tilton Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., 257 So.2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
REVERSED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion .only.
DOWNEY, J., dissents with opinion.