Case Name: PEOPLE v. SMITH
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2000-07-28
Citations: 463 Mich. 199
Docket Number: Docket No. 114785
Parties: PEOPLE v SMITH
Judges: Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Corrigan, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 463
Pages: 199–230

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SMITH
Docket No. 114785.
Argued April 5, 2000
(Calendar No. 1).
Decided July 28, 2000.
Diapolis Smith was convicted by a jury in the Kent Circuit Court, Michael R. Smolensk!, J., of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The Court of Appeals, Markey, P.J., and Hoekstra and J. C. Kingsley, JJ, denied the defendant’s request for a remand for a new trial on the ground that he was denied his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. After argument, however, the Court, sua sponte, remanded the case in an unpublished order for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s allegations of impropriety in the selection of the jury venire (Docket No. 172558). Thereafter, the trial court, Paul J. Sullivan, J., concluded that the defendant had not shown that he was denied his right to an impartial jury. The Court of Appeals, Markey, and J. C. Kingsley, JJ. (Hoekstra, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), remanded for a new trial in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The people appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Corrigan, joined by Chief Justice Weaver, and Justices Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held:
The defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. To establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, a defendant must show that a distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury pool, and that the under-representation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection process.
1. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment guarantee for criminal defendants of a trial by an impartial jury requires that the jury be drawn from a fair cross section of the community, i.e., a source fairly representative of the community. The fair cross-section requirement, however, does not guarantee that any particular jury actually chosen must mirror the community. Rather, for the fair cross-section requirement to be satisfied, venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative of them.
2. A criminal defendant who claims that the fair cross-section requirement has not been satisfied must prove three elements, as set forth in Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357 (1979), that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community, that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. In this case, the defendant easily satisfies the first prong of the Duren analysis. Black Americans are a constitutionally cognizable group because they are capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment and have been held to be a distinctive group for jury composition challenges.
3. The United States Supreme Court has not specified the preferred method for measuring whether representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool is fair and reasonable, although, since Duren, courts have applied three different methods of measuring fair and reasonable representation: the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity test, and the standard deviation test. Because each test has been criticized, no individual method should be used exclusive of the others. Rather, a case-by-case approach is to be employed. Provided that the parties proffer sufficient evidence, courts should consider the results of all the tests in determining whether representation was fair and reasonable. In this case, the defendant presented some evidence of a disparity between the African-Americans eligible for jury duty and the actual number of African-American prospective jurors selected for the Kent Circuit Court jury pool list. However, the defendant’s statistical evidence failed to establish a legally significant disparity under either the absolute or comparative disparity tests. Nevertheless, rather than leaving the possibility of systematic exclusion unreviewed solely on the basis of the defendant’s failure to establish underrepresentation, and giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt on under-representation, under Duren, as a final step in establishing a fair cross-section violation, the defendant must show that the under-representation of black jurors was systematic, i.e., inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized. The defendant has not carried his burden on this step. Further, the influence of social and economic factors on juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. The Sixth Amendment does not require Kent County to counteract these factors. Finally, even presuming that the defendant can rely exclusively on statistics, he has not made the requisite showing.
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, concurring, stated that the defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, because, assuming unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation, he has not shown systematic exclusion. To establish that this right was denied, a criminal defendant must show that a distinctive group was underrepresented in his jury venire, and that the under-representation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection process. The defendant did not make the requisite showing under Duren.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment guarantee for criminal defendants of a trial by an impartial jury requires that the jury be drawn from a fair cross section of the community, i.e., a source fairly representative of the community. The fair cross-section requirement, however, does not guarantee that any particular jury actually chosen must mirror the community. Rather, for the fair cross-section requirement to be satisfied, venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative of them.
A criminal defendant who claims that the fair cross-section requirement has not been satisfied must prove that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community, that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
In this case, the defendant easily satisfies the first prong of the analysis. Black Americans are a constitutionally cognizable group because they are capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment and have been held to be a distinctive group for jury composition challenges. To satisfy the second prong of Duren, the defendant must prove that the number of prospective black jurors in the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation to the black population in Kent County.
Courts have applied three different methods of measuring fair and reasonable representation: the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity test, and the standard deviation test. In addition, in People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459 (1996), the Court of Appeals adopted a different approach, under which a court may glance ahead at the evidence of systematic exclusion when deciding whether representation of the distinctive group is fair and reasonable. When the showing of underrepresentation is close, or none of the methods of analysis are particularly well suited to a case, a court can consider the defendant’s evidence of systematic exclusion. If a jury selection process appears ex ante likely to systematically exclude a distinctive group, that is, the system contains “non-benign” factors, a court may essentially give a defendant the benefit of the doubt on underrepresentation, even if the system ex post proves to work no systematic exclusion.
In this case, the defendant has not shown underrepresentation under either the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity test, or standard deviation analysis. Under each approach, the underrepresentation was below levels that have been held unfair and unreasonable. However, because the jury-eligible black population of Kent County is small, and the sample of the overall population represented by the jury pools is also small, none of the analytical methods are particularly well suited to the defendant’s case. Further, the facial similarity between the jury selection system and the system held constitutionally impermissible in Hubbard is a thumb on the scale when weighing underrepresentation. Thus, although the defendant has not shown unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation under the disparity analyses, the jury selection process bears the mark of a “non-benign” influence. Leaving this possibility of systematic exclusion unreviewed because the disparities in this case were not large creates the possibility that a systematic exclusion could be acceptable if only its effects were small enough. To prevent this, under the approach taken in Hubbard, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt on under-representation, and the Court should glance ahead to the third prong of the Duren analysis.
Reversed and remanded.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, William A. Forsyth, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
James Sterling Lawrence for the defendant.

Opinion:
Corrigan, J.
The question presented in this case is whether Kent County's former system of selecting jurors denied defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show that a distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury pool, and that the under-representation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection process. Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979). We hold that defendant was not denied this right because, although we grant him the benefit of the doubt on unfair and unreasonable under-representation, he has not shown systematic exclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining issues.
i
We join parts I through n(A) and part n(c)(2) of the concurring opinion, but part company with our concurring colleague on the analysis of the second prong of Duren.
The United States Supreme Court has not specified the preferred method for measuring whether representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool is fair and reasonable. See Detre, note, A proposal for measuring underrepresentation in the composition of the jury wheel, 103 Yale L J 1913, 1918-1920 (1994). Since Duren, the lower federal courts have applied three different methods of measuring fair and reasonable representation, known as the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity test, and the standard deviation test. Ramseur v Beyer, 983 F2d 1215, 1231 (CA 3, 1992). Each of these tests, however, has been criticized. For example, in cases where the members of the distinctive group comprise a small percentage of those eligible for jury service, the absolute disparity test produces questionable results. See United States v Jackman, 46 F3d 1240, 1247 (CA 2, 1995). Likewise, most courts have rejected the comparative disparity analysis because when the distinctive group's population is small, a small change in the jury pool distorts the proportional representation. See United States v Royal, 174 F3d 1, 8 (CA 1, 1999). Finally, courts have applied a standard deviation analysis in Fourteenth Amendment cases, but not typically in Sixth Amendment cases. Detre, supra at 1922-1926. Some courts have used standard deviation anal-yses, see Jackman, supra; Ramseur, supra, but "no court in the country has accepted [a standard deviation analysis] alone as determinative in Sixth Amendment challenges to jury selection systems." United States v Rioux, 97 F3d 648, 655 (CA 2, 1996).
We thus consider all these approaches to measuring whether representation was fair and reasonable, and conclude that no individual method should be used exclusive of the others. Accordingly, we adopt a case-by-case approach. Provided that the parties proffer sufficient evidence, courts should consider the results of all the tests in determining whether representation was fair and reasonable.
In this case, defendant presented some evidence of a disparity between the number of jury-eligible African-Americans and the actual number of African-American prospective jurors selected to the Kent County Circuit Court jury pool list. However, defendant's statistical evidence failed to establish a legally significant disparity under either the absolute or com parative disparity tests. Nevertheless, rather than leaving the possibility of systematic exclusion unreviewed solely on the basis of defendant's failure to establish underrepresentation, we give the defendant the benefit of the doubt on underrepresentation and proceed to the third prong of the Duren analysis.
n
Assuming defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of the Duren analysis, defendant must still show that the underrepresentation of African-American jurors was systematic, "that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized." Duren, supra at 366. We agree with our concurring colleague that defendant has not shown a systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the Kent County Circuit Court jury pool.
We further agree with our concurring colleague that defendant has not shown how the alleged siphoning of African-American jurors to district courts affected the circuit court jury pool. The record does not disclose whether the district court jury pools contained more, fewer, or approximately the same percentage of minority jurors as the circuit court jury pool. Defendant has simply failed to carry his burden of proof in this regard.
We also agree with our concurring colleague that the influence of social and economic factors on juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. The Sixth Amendment does not require Kent County to counteract these factors. United States v Purdy, 946 F Supp 1094, 1104 (D Conn, 1996).
Finally, even presuming that defendant can rely exclusively on statistics, he has not made the requisite showing in this case. In Duren, the Court noted that the defendant proved that a large discrepancy occurred in every weekly venire for approximately one year. Duren, supra at 366. Here, while defendant's proof may satisfy any duration requirement, the disparities over that time fell far short of those in Duren. Defendant did not demonstrate unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation under the disparity analyses. We therefore conclude that defendant has not shown a systematic exclusion of African-Americans for the Kent County Circuit Court jury pool.
m
We conclude that defendant has not established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining issues.
Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Corrigan, J.
We note that neither defendant nor the prosecution presented expert testimony regarding application of the standard deviation test. We do not endorse our concurring colleague's efforts to craft his own standard deviation analysis from the available data. Nor do we approve the concurring opinion's endorsement of People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). The constitutional conclusion Hubbard reached has not been adequately briefed, and we need not reach that question to resolve this case.
Although the constitution does not concern itself with problems not inherent in a jury selection process that nevertheless may adversely affect jury participation, this Court, through the State Court Administrative Office, has been studying ways to increase jury participation. We have undertaken several initiatives in recent years to address concerns about juries and jury service. For example, in 1998, the State Court Administrative Office began reviewing the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management with an eye to producing Michigan standards. Similarly, this Court retained the National Center for State Courts Center for Jury Management to address the jury selection and management procedures in trial courts where jury concerns had been raised, and to make recommendations for improvement in those courts. Finally, this Court has worked with the State Bar of Michigan Open Justice Commission to improve citizen participation in jury service, focusing on improving the representativeness of juries.
In Duren, the Court specifically concluded that the petitioner had demonstrated that the underrepresentation was due to the operation of the exemption criteria. Duren, supra at 367. Therefore, Duren did not hold that the third prong was established solely on the basis of statistical proof; there was also proof of the cause of the underrepresentation.