Case Name: Grace Fisher BROWN, Appellant, v. John F. KEAVENY, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1963-12-12
Citations: 326 F.2d 660
Docket Number: No. 17490
Parties: Grace Fisher BROWN, Appellant, v. John F. KEAVENY, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 326
Pages: 660–663

Head Matter:
Grace Fisher BROWN, Appellant, v. John F. KEAVENY, Appellee.
No. 17490.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 17, 1963.
Decided Dec. 12, 1963.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Denied Jan. 15, 1964.
J. Skelly Wright, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. Earl H. Davis, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. H. Mason Welch, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. J. Harry Welch, J. Joseph Barse, Walter J. Murphy, Jr., and James A. Welch, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Washington, Danaher and Wright, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is a malpractice case, in which the complaint alleged that the defendant oral surgeon had negligently performed an operation for the removal of diseased and impacted teeth, during which plaintiff's jaw was broken. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant, at the close of plaintiff's case, on the issues of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. It left with the jury the issue of warranty; this was ultimately decided in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.
We find no error affecting substantial rights. Plaintiff offered no evi dence of specific negligence, or evidence that defendant did not exercise " 'that •degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by the profession in his own or similar localities'." Rodgers v. Lawson, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 282, 170 F.2d 157, 158 (1948). As to res ipsa loquitur, that doctrine applies only "where the occurrence complained of ordinarily would not happen in the absence of negligence." Quick v. Thurston, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 17-2, 290 F.2d 360, 363, 88 A.L.R.2d 299 (1961). "The thing does not speak for itself" unless a layman can say as a matter of common knowledge that the consequences of the professional treatment are not those which ordinarily occur if due care has been exercised. The plaintiff may not rest his case on the mere fact of his injury or rely upon the jury's untutored sympathies. In short, where the question turns on the merits and the performance of scientific treatment, the issue may not be resolved by the jury without the aid of expert opinion. Here the plaintiff offered no such evidence. Rodgers v. Lawson, supra, 83 U.S.App. D.C. at 285, 170 F.2d at 161; Hohenthal v. Smith, 72 App.D.C. 343, 346, 114 F.2d 494, 497 (1940).
Affirmed.