Case Name: TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY et al., Petitioners, v. Ellis CARP et al., Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1967-02-08
Citations: 412 S.W.2d 307
Docket Number: No. A-11478
Parties: TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY et al., Petitioners, v. Ellis CARP et al., Respondents.
Judges: SMITH, J., dissenting.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 412
Pages: 307–319

Head Matter:
TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY et al., Petitioners, v. Ellis CARP et al., Respondents.
No. A-11478.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Feb. 8, 1967.
Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen., Hawthorne Phillips and John Reeves, Asst. Attys. Gen., Will Garwood and Tom Gee, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Niemann & Babb, Charles N. Babb, Austin, Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Miller & Martin, Mark Martin, Dallas, for petitioners.
Price Daniel, Austin, Douglas E. Bergman, Dallas, Keith, Mehaffy & Weber, Quentin Keith, Beaumont, for respondents.

Opinion:
POPE, Justice.
Doctors Ellis Carp, S. J. Rogers, and N. Jay Rogers sued The Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry and sought a declaratory judgment that the Professional Responsibility Rule adopted on December 21, 1959 by the Board was void. They also asked for a permanent injunction against the Board's enforcement of the rule. The trial court denied the relief prayed for and sustained the validity of the rule. The court of civil appeals held that although there was substantial evidence which supported the rule, the Board exceeded its delegated powers in promulgating it and therefore, the rule was invalid. 401 S.W.2d 639. In our opinion the Board did not exceed its statutory powers in promulgating the rule. We reverse the judgment of the intermediate court and affirm that of the trial court.
The court of civil appeals held that the rule was not arbitrary or capricious and that there was substantial evidence of the relationship between the rule and the general welfare of the citizens of Texas. We too find that the rule is grounded upon substantial evidence. The necessity for such a rule was demonstrated by the general support it received from the members of the optometry profession and professional so cieties and the record which abounds with evidence of the specific evils the rule was designed to correct. Some portions of the record will he mentioned and commented on in our analysis of the specific provisions of the rule.
The central question presented by the points before us is whether the Board exceeded its delegated powers in promulgating the Professional Responsibility Rule. In determining this issue, we must examine the general purposes of the Optometry Act as well as certain specific provisions of the act. The Legislature's primary purpose in passing the act was to assure and protect the personal and professional relationship between an optometrist and his patient. To make certain that this purpose was carried out, the act requires an optometrist to be licensed before he may practice within the state. The optometrist must evidence his identity and professional qualifications by registering and recording his license in any county in which he practices. Articles 4561-4562 ; article 735 Vernon's Ann. Penal Code. He must also display his license in his office, and when he practices away from his office, he must identify himself by affixing to each bill for glasses his signature, address and the number of his license. Article 736, Vernon's Penal Code. Personal identification by those practicing any of the healing arts is of such significance that the Legislature requires a licensee to identify the particular system which his license permits him to practice. Article 4556. It is in this statutory context of fixing professional identification and personal responsibility that we now examine the powers delegated to the State Board of Examiners in Optometry and the provisions of the particular statutes and the rule which the Board promulgated. Article 4556 is the source of the Board's rule-making authority. It provides:
" The Board shall have the power to make such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this law as may be necessary for the performance of its duties, the regulation of the practice of optometry and the enforcement of this Act. »
Article 4563 provides that the Board of Examiners may refuse to issue a license to an applicant and may cancel, revoke or suspend any license it has granted for any of the following reasons:
"(a) That said applicant or licensee is guilty of gross immorality;
"(b) That said applicant or licensee is guilty of any fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the practice of optometry or in his seeking admission to such practice;
"(c) That said applicant or licensee is unfit or incompetent by reason of negligence ;
"(d) That said applicant or licensee has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor which involves moral turpitude;
"(e) That said applicant or licensee is an habitual drunkard or is addicted to the use of morphine, cocaine or other drugs having similar effect or has become insane or has been adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind;
"(f) That said licensee has directly or indirectly employed, hired, procured, or induced a person, not licensed to practice optometry in this State, to so practice;
"(g) That said licensee directly or indirectly aids or abets in the practice of optometry any person not duly licensed to practice under this Act;
"(h) That said licensee directly or indirectly employs solicitors, canvassers or agents for the purpose of obtaining patronage ;
"(i) That said licensee lends, leases, rents or in any other manner places his license at the disposal or in the service of any person not licensed to practice optometry in this State;
"(j) That said applicant or licensee has wilfully or repeatedly violated any of the provisions of this Act."
The questioned Professional Responsibility Rule, except for its severability clause, is copied in the footnote to Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.2d 409, 411-412 (Tex.1965). The footnote to the opinion of the court of civil appeals, 401 S.W.2d 639, 640-641, is a good summary of section 1 of the rule, which we adopt. Section 1 provides that no optometrist shall:
"(a) Divide, share or split fees with any lay person, firm or corporation. However, it shall not be construed a violation of the Rule if an optometrist (1) pays an employee in the regular course of employment, or (2) leases space on a percentage or gross receipts basis; and (3) he may sell or assign accounts receivable.
"(b) Divide, share or split fees with another optometrist or physician except (1) on a division of services and (2) then only with the knowledge of the patient, but (3) the Rule will not be interpreted to prevent partnerships.
"(c) Practice under or use an assumed name in connection with his practice. However (1) partners may practice under their full or last names, and (2) optometrists employed by other optometrists may practice under their own names in an office listed in the names of their employers.
"(d) Use or allow his name or professional identity to be used on the door, window, wall or sign of any office or location where optometry is practiced unless said optometrist is actually present and practicing therein during office hours.
"(e) Practice in any office or location where any name or professional identification on any sign shall indicate that such office or location is owned, operated or supervised by any person not actually present and practicing therein during office hours.
"(f) Requirements (d) and (e) above shall be deemed satisfied if the optometrist is (1) physically present more than half the total hours the office is open for at least nine months of the year; or (2) physically present in such office at least one-half the time such person conducts, directs or supervises any practice of optometry; or (3) regularly makes personal examinations of eyes at such location or regularly directs or supervises such examinations."
Section 2 of the rule provides that the wilful or repeated failure of an optometrist to comply with any provision of section 1 shall be considered prima facie evidence that such optometrist is guilty of a violation of law, and shall be grounds for filing charges to cancel, revoke, or suspend his license or to enjoin him from continuing such violation. Section 3 of the rule provides that if any part of the rule be held invalid, the intent of the Board was to promulgate the remainder of the rule.
The court of civil appeals in striking down the rule in its entirety, held that article 4563 and other statutes stated specific grounds for refusing or cancelling a license, that the statement of specific grounds was an exclusion of all others, and that the Legislature intended that the Board should not add new or inconsistent grounds. The authorities in support of the legal principles applied by the court of civil appeals are listed in the court's opinion. Our opinion is, however, that each provision of the rule must be separately examined to determine whether it is related to and consistent with the grounds for cancellation or refusal that the Legislature listed. In other words, the real question presented is whether the rule states new or inconsistent grounds as held by the intermediate court.
In Kee v. Baber, 157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957), this court sustained the validity of three rules that the Board of Optometry promulgated. These rules regulated "bait" advertising, basic competence, and corporate practice of optometry. The court held that article 4556 was a broad delegation of regulatory powers to the Board since it authorized the Board to adopt such rules as are necessary for "the regulation of the practice of optometry." The court also held that each of the rules was consistent with, related to, and an implementation of one or more of the prohibited categories set out in article 4563. The Professional Responsibility Rule which is under attack prohibits five forms of practice by those licensed as optometrists, and as in Kee v. Baber, we shall examine each of the prohibited practices with reference to article 4563 and other optometry regulations.
Section 1(a) of the rule prohibits fee-splitting by a licensed optometrist with an unlicensed person. Since the Optometry Act forbids an unlicensed person to directly charge fees for optometric services, such a person cannot undermine the act by indirectly charging and collecting fees through the device of fee-splitting. The prohibition of fee-splitting with laymen is generally related to the personal and professional relationship between optometrist and patient which is requisite to the practice of optometry and is specifically related to article 4563(b) which prohibits a "deceit or misrepresentation in the practice of optometry ." It is related to article 4563(h) which authorizes revocation of a license when the "licensee directly or indirectly employs solicitors, canvassers, or agents for the purpose of obtaining patronage," and article 773, Vernon's Penal Code, which provides that no optometrist may "employ or agree to employ, pay or promise to pay, or reward or promise to reward any person, firm, for securing, soliciting or drumming patients or patronage." It is related also to article 4563 (i) since a licensee who shares his professional fees with an unlicensed person "places his license at the disposal or in the service of a[ny] person not licensed to practice optometry in this State."
Section 1(b) of the rule prohibits a division of fees by a treating optometrist with another optometrist. This section is subject to some exceptions but even then the fee-splitting is permissible only with the knowledge of the patient. This section is relevant to the same provisions of the Optometry Act as section 1(a). Section 1(b) protects the same personal and professional relationship between the optometrist and his patient and that purpose runs through the whole act. The section is relevant to article 4563(b) because the treating optometrist holds himself out to his patient as the one who is performing the services and is to be paid upon the basis of those services. A patient who ignorantly pays optometric fees based upon elements other than service alone and which fees are paid to absentee optometrists is misled.
Section 1 (c) of the rule prohibits the practice of optometry under assumed or trade names. The reason for this section is that the trade or assumed name practice, like fee-splitting, disrupts the optometrist-patient relationship by concealing the identity and burying the responsibility of the licensed optometrist. The need for section 1 (c) is clearly supported by substantial evidence some of which we shall now summarize since it demonstrates the relevance of this section to the provisions of article 4563. Dr. Carp operates seventy-one offices in Texas. He advertises them under the following trade names: Luck Optical, Luck One Price Optical, Mast Optical, Mesa Optical, Mack Optical, Plains Optical, Amarillo Optical, Lubbock Optical, Panhandle Optical, and Mission Optical. From time to time he adds, drops, or changes the trade name at a particular office although the licensed optometrists employed in that office remain the same. He has purchased the practices of licensed optometrists and practices under their name although they are no longer associated with the respective offices in any manner. Illustrative of Dr. Carp's trade or assumed name practice is the situation that exists in Wichita Falls. Within a two-block area in that city, Dr. Carp maintains offices operated under the names of Mast Optical, Luck Optical, and Lee Optical. The same supervisor oversees these three offices. Each office dispenses the same optical goods and services and uses the same kind of equipment. Optometrists are shifted from one location to the other. Dr. Carp's advertising represents to the public that these three offices are in competition with each other thereby creating the false impression that they are each independently owned and operated. Similar situations exist in Dallas and El Paso. On the other hand, Texas State Optical, owned by the Doctors Rogers, operates eighty-two offices in Texas and advertises only under the one trade name. Although no trade name can be licensed to practice optometry, Texas State Optical advertises by the use of such, statements as "a scientific TSO eye examination."
The practice of optometry under a trade name is a holding out to the public that the trade name is licensed. The result is that the identity of the licensed practicing optometrists is hidden behind the unlicensed trade name. Prescriptions belong to those operating the trade name business rather than the prescribing optometrist. The practice is confusing and misleading to the public. In Kee v. Baber, supra, this court upheld a Board rule which required an optometrist to separate his practice from the business operations of mercantile establishments, and did so on the grounds that it was a safeguard for the optometrist-patient relationship and would avoid confusion on the part of the public. The court there held that the rule which prohibited corporate practice of optometry was reasonably referable to article 4563 (i), which prohibits placing an optometrist's license "in the service or at the disposal of unlicensed persons." Practice under a trade name is similar to practice under a corporate name which was denounced in Kee. Section 1(c) is also reasonably referable to article 4563 (b) which prohibits "deceit or misrepresentation in the practice of optometry." See also article 738a, Vernon's Penal Code.
The practice of a profession under a trade name has often been regulated and prohibited by rules. Fisher v. Schumacher, 72 So.2d 804 (Fla.1954); Pearle Optical of Monroeville Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 So.2d 374 (1963); State Board of Dental Examiners v. Bohl, 162 Kan. 156, 174 P.2d 998 (1946); Silverman v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 344 Mass. 129, 181 N.E.2d 540 (1962); Toole v. Michigan State Board of Dentistry, 306 Mich. 527, 11 N.W.2d 229 (1943); State Board of Optometry v. Orkin, 249 Miss. 430, 162 So.2d 883 (1964) ; Strauss v. Univ. of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 464, 161 N.Y.S.2d 97, 141 N.E.2d 595 (1957) ; Strauss v. Univ. of New York, 282 App.Div. 593, 125 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1953); Straus Inc. v. Univ. of State of New York, 186 Misc. 242, 59 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup.Ct.1945); 41 Am Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 52 (1942); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 31, 33 (1951).
Sections 1(d), 1(e), and 1(f) of the rule require and assure the presence of an optometrist at the offices with which his name is identified and at which he holds himself out as a practitioner. Substantial evidence was presented to prove that such rules were needed to correct the evil of misleading representations to the public. Named optometrists have been identified with scores of widely separated offices in Texas, notwithstanding the fact that they have neither practiced at nor been inside many of the places with which their names are associated. Dr. Carp has advertised and practiced under the names of Douglas Optical, Shannon Optical, Pearl Optical, Lee Optical, Lee Optical Company and Dr. L. H. Luck. Those are the names of licensed optometrists who sold Dr. Carp their locations and the use of their names but continued their practice independently of Dr. Carp.
Texas State Optical's advertising leaves the impression that one of the Doctors Rogers is present at a particular office. Actually they have neither been inside nor seen some of their eighty-two offices distributed generally over Texas. They list their names in phone books in cities where they do not purport to practice optometry and on plaques showing the names of the optometrists who serve particular offices though they do not in fact practice at such offices. Since such practices are deceptive and misleading, sections 1(d), 1(e), and 1(f) are relevant to article 4563(b). Toole v. Michigan State Board of Dentistry, supra, and Campbell v. State, 12 Wash.2d 459, 122 P.2d 458 (Wash.1942).
We conclude that the court of civil appeals erred in its holding that the Professional Responsibility Rule added new and inconsistent provisions to the Optometry Act. To the contrary, our opinion is that the rule's provisions are in harmony with the general objectives of the act and referable to and consistent with one or more of its specific proscriptions. We believe that the Legislature, by investing the Board with broad rule-making powers "[for] the enforcement of this Act" and "[for] the regulation of the practice of optometry," contemplated that the Board would use these powers to correct the evils generally classified in article 4563, or some other provision of the Optometry Act. If these rule-making powers did not authorize the Board to regulate evils not encompassed in the specific wording of the act, they would be nothing more than meaningless excess.
Respondents urge two additional reasons in support of the judgment of the court of civil appeals — the case of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Texas State Optical, 253 S.W.2d 877, (Tex.Civ.App.1952, no writ) and the legislative history of the Optometry Act. In the Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. case the Doctors Rogers brought an injunction suit and compelled the telephone company to list Texas State Optical, the trade name, in the yellow pages of the Port Arthur telephone directory. At that time the Board had not yet undertaken to implement the act. The case did not come to this court, and the opinion contains a number of holdings that are inconsistent with our views expressed above. The court held that "[t]he fact that no license to practice optometry has been issued to 'Texas State Optical' is not material." The decision reflects an absence of factual background about the evils of the trade name practice of optometry as evidenced by its holding that such practice is not against the public interest so long as the public by making a search can discover the persons using the name. We disapprove these holdings. Whether the telephone company should list an optometrist's trade name is not the same issue as that of the Board's power to make rules prohibiting practice under a trade name.
Respondents urge that the Legislature did not enact proposed legislation which would have prohibited trade name practice of optometry and fee-splitting. The argument is that the original Optometry Act, as introduced, had a provision which prohibited the practice of optometry under any name other than a licensee's own proper name and also had a provision which would have made it a penal offense to falsely impersonate any person licensed as an optometrist. Acts 46th Leg.R.S.1939, ch. 4, pp. 360-368. Before passing the bill, the Legislature deleted the sections which prohibited trade name practice, Vol. II House Journal, 46th Leg. 1939, pp. 2529-2534, and fee-splitting, Senate Journal, 46th Leg.1939, pp. 1958-1968. Respondents urge that the Legislature by deleting the prohibitions against the practices from the bill, implied an intent that such practices should be permitted. Respondents' reasoning is that "[n]o court should read into a statute by implication that which both Houses of the Legislature have expressly rejected Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482 (1935).
The Legislature did not adopt specific prohibitions of trade name practice and fee-splitting; however, any implications which might be derived from that action are overcome by the Legislature's express grant of broad rule-making powers to the Board. Kee v. Baber, supra. The Legislature expressly empowered the Board to make rules to regulate the practice of optometry and enforce the act. Rather than an implied limitation of Board powers, the act extended the powers of the Board. Instead of an implied grant of permission to practice under a trade name, the act's rule-making provision empowered the Board to make appropriate rules grounded upon substantial evidence of the evils against which the public should be protected. Gibbs v. United States Guarantee Co., 218 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Civ.App.1949, writ ref.). In Kee v. Baber, supra, this court so treated the grant of rule-making powers and we sustained the rule which prohibited corporate practice of optometry on the reasoning that it implemented the Legislature's prohibition against placing an optometrist's license "in the service or at the disposal of unlicensed persons." On similar reasoning, the Board had the power to prohibit the same result under a different scheme. The trade name entity is no more a licensee than a corporate entity. The Board passed its rule after substantial evidence showed that a widespread practice existed in Texas which undermined sections (b), (h), and (i) of article 4563 and the general purpose of the act to identify and establish personal responsibility of the licensee. It is our opinion that the Legislature in failing to enact the specific provisions, intended instead to provide a better method for the Board to regulate the profession, and that it did this by an express authorization for the Board to tailor and make its rules for the particular needs of the profession and the public so long as they are relevant to the statutory proscriptions.
We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SMITH, J., dissenting.
. Unless indicated otherwise, all articles cited Statutes. in this opinion are contained in Vernon's Civil