Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Irene SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-05-15
Citations: 604 F. App'x 57
Docket Number: No. 14-2735-cr
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Irene SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 604
Pages: 57–58

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Irene SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-2735-cr.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 15, 2015.
Michael J. Grudberg (Marjorie J. Peerce, on the brief), Ballard Spahr LLP, New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
Jonathan P. Lax, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Sarah Coyne, David C. •James, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief) for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Appellant.
PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the above.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
The Government appeals from a judgment of the District Court granting Irene Santiago's petition for a writ of error co-ram nobis. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to reverse.
In 2005 Santiago pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice for lying to investigators and perjuring herself before a grand jury investigating an alleged securities fraud scheme. She lied to conceal the scheme, which was operated, in part, by her superiors at work. There seems to be no dispute that Santiago lied "out of 'a misguided sense of loyalty to" her superiors rather than for personal gain or advantage. Nor is it disputed that she cooperated extensively with the Government. Santiago was sentenced to a fíne of $10 and a special assessment of $100.
Two of Santiago's superiors were convicted of witness tampering or conspiracy to commit witness tampering for their roles in suborning Santiago's perjury. One of these superiors and others were also convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud. Although these securities fraud convictions were later vacated due to the Government's failure to disclose Brady material, the witness tampering convictions remained intact. See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.2012). On remand, the Government declined to retry the securities fraud charges after the-defendants entered into deferred prosecution agreements.
Santiago petitioned the District Court for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that it was unfair for her to have a felony conviction, given the vacatur of the convictions of more culpable defendants. She also argued that the vacatur of the securities fraud convictions cast doubt on whether her perjury "was related to criminal activity." But she did not argue that she was factually innocent of the crime to which she pleaded guilty. Nor did she identify any legal error in the procedures by which she was convicted.
In granting Santiago's petition and issuing the writ, the District Court pointed to Santiago's relatively minimal culpability and the comparatively light punishment of her more culpable superiors. These facts did not justify the issuance of the writ. Relief under coram nobis "is strictly limited to those cases in which errors . of the most fundamental character have rendered the [challenged criminal] proceeding . irregular and invalid." Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir.1996) (quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original). Santiago concedes her guilt, and she points to no flaw in the proceedings that led to her conviction. There was neither error nor unfairness in her conviction, much less the kind of "extraordinary" circumstance, United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009), or "fundamental" error, Foont, 93 F.3d at 78, that might justify the issuance of the writ. We therefore are compelled to reverse the District Court's issuance of the writ.
We have considered all of Santiago's remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is REVERSED.