Case Name: Agnes P. SNEDEKER et al., as and constituting the Florida Board of Massage, Appellants, v. VERNMAR, LTD., a limited partnership under the laws of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1963-02-20
Citations: 151 So. 2d 439
Docket Number: No. 31412
Parties: Agnes P. SNEDEKER et al., as and constituting the Florida Board of Massage, Appellants, v. VERNMAR, LTD., a limited partnership under the laws of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
Judges: ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, J,, •concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 151
Pages: 439–446

Head Matter:
Agnes P. SNEDEKER et al., as and constituting the Florida Board of Massage, Appellants, v. VERNMAR, LTD., a limited partnership under the laws of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
No. 31412.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 20, 1963.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1963.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and David U. Tumin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Simmonite, Budd & Walsh and Garland M. Budd, Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
The complaint initiating this litigation was filed in July, 1958, by appellees, operators of Stauffer System reducing establishments, seeking a declaratory decree and injunction to prevent enforcement of the law regulating masseurs in this state, Chapter 480, F.S.1957, F.S.A., against them by the appellant Florida Board of Massage.
Among the express statutory definitions of persons covered by the law in question, Section 480.01(1), are those who administer "treatments with any mechanical or electrical apparatus for the purpose of body slenderizing, body reducing or body contouring," or who administer "body massage either by hand or by any mechanical or electrical apparatus or device applying such movements as stroking, friction, rolling, vibration, kneading, cupping, pettrasage, rubbing, efHeurage, tapotement." Related provisions require registration of all such persons and establish prerequisites including a diploma or credentials from an accredited massage school or proof of like experience or education, together with examination in specified subjects. Section 480.09 required for such schools in 1957 not less than 600 hours of instruction in physiology, anatomy, massage, hydrotherapy and other techniques of the trade, since increased to 950 hours minimum.
The complaint described at length the system by which plaintiffs operated, by franchise, certain electrically powered mechanical tables allegedly providing "passive exercise" for muscle relaxation, stimulation of circulation, and reduction of fatty tissue. The plaintiffs set forth their inability to comply with the educational requirements of Chapter 480, asserted that its provisions had no reasonable relation to their occupation, and claimed that its enforcement would deprive them of property and liberty without due process of law and would deny to them the equal protection of the laws, contrary to state and federal constitutional provisions.
This appeal under Article V, Section 4 (2), Florida Constitution, directly to this Court from the decree enjoining the enforcement of the controverted portions of the statute against the plaintiffs, presents initially the jurisdictional issue of whether the decree is a "decision directly passing upon the validity of a statute" so as to-authorize original review here under the cited section. The equitable relief granted by the decree must, of course, be predicated' on a decision either that the statute did not in terms apply to plaintiffs, or that insofar as it did so apply it was unconstitutional and invalid. In the face of the plain words of the law which involve no ambiguity susceptible of construction, and the recognition of same by the parties implicit in their exclusive reliance on constitutional infirmities, the decision cannot be regarded as one construing the statute to be inapplicable. Nor does the record indicate, as it has in previous cases, alternative theories upon which the decision might rest so as to warrant remand for clarification. The decree in a situation such as that at bar is, therefore, necessarily one directly passing upon the validity of a statute for the purposes of direct appeal to this Court under Article V, without regard to any debate over alleged ambiguities or confusion in its language, and, in fact, without reference to any specific expression by the court as to the intended effect of its decree for plaintiffs.
The real confusion in this jurisdictional area has arisen from the attempt to distinguish the legal effect of a decision holding a statute unconstitutional as applied to specific facts from that of a decision "that the law itself was constitutional •or unconstitutional irrespective of its application to pertinent facts." Stein v. Darby, Fla.1961, 134 So.2d 232, 236. To whatever extent the opinion in the cited •case excludes decisions in the first category (i. e. those finding a statute invalid as applied to specific facts) from the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article V, Section 4, supra, we must recede from such cons'ruction of the provision for appeal here from any "decision directly passing upon" the pertinent issues of statutory validity or constitutionality. Our conclusion is dictated by a consideration of historical limitations on judicial power to nullify legislative acts for constitutional transgression, under which a decision upon statutory validity cannot normally be rendered in the abstract or upon any consideration other than its application in a certain case. The traditional statement is that courts can pass on the constitutionality of a statue "only as it applies and is sought to be enforced in the determination of a particular case before the court, for the power to revoke or repeal a statute is not judicial in its character." A decision that a statute in particular circumstances collides with constitutional inhibitions may, as in this case, deprive it of only part instead of all of its effect, depending on issues of separability and intent, and the collision or violation may be plain from the terms of the law in controversy or from such terms only as they operate or apply in the particular case. The adjudication, how ever, of validity. or invalidity in every such case is a decision passing upon the validity of the statute as applied to the facts at bar, unless, of course, the court ultimately concludes that the terms of the law can be construed as inapplicable to such facts, in which event the constitutional issue is not decided. The decision here, as already noted, enjoins enforcement of a statute which patently includes the plaintiffs within its terms and is therefore not susceptible of construction on this point.
The Constitution vests in litigants the right to take "appeals directly to the supreme court, as a matter of right from final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity of a state statute." Art. V, Sec. 4. The test of the effect of the trial court's decree or disposition of the cause, and its effect with respect to the pertinent issue of statutory validity or constitutionality must be determined by reference to record issues, and decided by this Court upon that record in conjunction with but not subject to opinions of the trial forum upon the point. The jurisdictional issue we have accordingly disposed of in favor of the appeal in this case.
Upon voluminous and conflicting testimony of medical and lay witnesses the court below concluded ultimately that there was not in this case any reasonable relationship between the statutory requirements and the public safety or welfare because the course of technical training detailed in Section 480.09 would not make the appellees more competent in their particular occupation or enable them to perform those limited functions with any significantly greater protection of the public interests in behalf of which police power may be exercised. We concur in this coni-clusion.
While the evidence is to the effect that operators of the apparatus in question are: not confined strictly to mechanical activation of the tables, and that use by patrons, with pre-existing abnormalities might involve risk of injury, there is nevertheless-substantial uniformity of opinion in the-record that the required courses would not in any event enable an operator to diagnose-such conditions or eliminate that risk.. Many of the statutory prescriptions are obviously unrelated to competent performance of the limited activities involved in-appellees' operations, and the evidence amply sustains the court's findings in this-respect. Occupational regulations of some-nature might conceivably be lawfully imposed, but the problem presented in judicial review of legislation under constitutional attack is limited to determination of the propriety of the requirements as framed rather than definition of the permissible limits of regulation in the premises.
Upon the pivotal point we are of the view that the subject legislation sought to be enforced lacks in these circumstances the essential relationship to the public interests which may be protected by exercise of police power and that, therefore, as to the activities of the appellees, the trial court was correct in holding the act unconstitutional. The decision in sum is that the definition of applicability contained in Sec. 480.01(1) (a) is stated in terms not susceptible of lawful limitation and is therefore void and unenforceable. To whatever extent Sec. 480.01(1) (b) purports to make the chapter applicable to activity such as that here involved then its operable effect must also be limited, leaving otherwise •effective a statute which with those provisions would be invalid.
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, J,, •concur.
HOBSON, J. (Ret.), concurs specially.
THOMAS, THORNAL and O'CON-NELL, J J., dissent.
. Amendments since enacted do not affect the issues presented in this suit.
. Cf. Florida Board of Massage v. Underwood, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 184, 17 A.L.R.2d 1181, construing Chapter 4S0, prior to the addition of the language now in issue.
. In State v. Bruno, Fla.1958, 104 So. 2d 588, there was a motion to quash an information on five grounds, only one of which asserted the unconstitutionality of a pertinent statute. The trial court sustained the motion to quash but gave no reasons for doing so. Under these circumstances, it could not be determined whether the trial court had directly passed upon the validity of the questioned statute. This Court commented upon the firmly imbedded principle that a court should not pass upon the validity of a statute if the case could be deter mined on any other grounds and then stated: "This leads to the conclusion that we cannot and must not assume that the trial court, in this case, directly passed upon the validity of [the questioned statute.]" Under such circumstances this Court then ordered the case returned to the trial court "for the sole and only purpose of having the trial court enter an order seting forth therein the grounds upon which it granted the motion to quash the information."
.The distinction is drawn as a basis for concluding in that case that the district court had jurisdiction of an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint under F.S. Sec. 704.01(2), F.S.A., when the decree expressed the trial court's opinion that the application of the statute in the circumstances "would constitute the exercise of a power in contravention" of state and federal constitutional provisions. Since the trial court's decree was equivocal in its disposition of this issue, it was at least arguable that it merely construed the terms of the law to be inapplicable to the facts of that case because of the chancellor's conviction that a broader construction of its terms would render the law unconstitutional. The point of applicability as well as validity was decided to the contrary by the district court, but upon certiorari here the only issue properly presented for adjudication was the district court's jurisdiction to decide the appeal, rather than the status of its decision as an initial determination of the constitutional issue in the litigation.
. 11 Am.Jur. 753, Const.Law, Sec. 111, citing Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136, 78 A.L.R. 826; White v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 51 S.Ct. 115, 75 L.Ed. 388; People ex rel. Rusch v. White, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N.E. 100, 64 A.L.R. 1006; Boyd v. Johnson, 212 Iowa 1201, 238 N.W. 61; State ex rel. Linde v. Packard, 35 N.D. 298, 160 N.W. 150, L.R.A.1917B, 710; Insurance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okl. 620, 154 P. 48, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 471; In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797, 63 A.L.R. 1086; State v. Heffernan, 40 R.I. 121, 100 A. 55, citing R.C.L.; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. State, 113 Tex. 570, 261 S.W. 996, 33 A.L.R. 367. Accord State ex rel. Crim v. Juvenal (1935), 118 Fla. 487, 159 So. 663.
. Florida cases collected 6 Fla.Jur. 330, Const.Law Sec. 72.
. Oooley, Constiimitations, 2nd ed., Yol. 1, 366, 383.
. In Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, Fla. 1959, 111 So.2d 439, this Court said: "this fact [that the trial court did not expressly rule on the validity of the act] does not alter the effect of the decree as a negative disposition of all pertinent questions properly raised." To the same effect see Evans v. Carroll, Fla.1958, 104 So.2d 375.
. Cf. Eelbeck Milling Co. v. Mayo, Fla. 1956, 86 So.2d 438; Florida Accountants Association v. Dandelake, Fla.1957, 98 So.2d 323, 70 A.L.R.2d 425.