Case Name: James R. WOOLERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.J. ARAVE, Warden, Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1993-10-26
Citations: 8 F.3d 1325
Docket Number: No. 91-36029
Parties: James R. WOOLERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.J. ARAVE, Warden, Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: WRIGHT, CANBY, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 8
Pages: 1325–1333

Head Matter:
James R. WOOLERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.J. ARAVE, Warden, Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-36029.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 1, 1993.
Decided Oct. 26, 1993.
Gar Hackney, Lynn, Scott, Hackney & Jackson, Boise, ID, for plaintiff-appellee.
Myrna A.I. Stahman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, ID, for defendant-appellant.
Before: WRIGHT, CANBY, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Idaho appeals the district court's grant of James Woolery's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Woolery's petition alleged that he was entitled to relief because evidence of a blood alcohol test introduced at his trial in state court was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In its response to Woolery's petition in district court, the State of Idaho neglected to assert that the claim was barred by the rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). The magistrate judge and the district court consequently reached the merits of Woolery's Fourth Amendment claim. On appeal from the district court's grant of Woolery's petition, Idaho argues that it was not required to raise the Stone rule as an affirmative defense, and that, in light of Stone, Woolery's petition should be denied.
The question before us is whether, absent a showing that the state denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim, the rule of Stone v. Powell precludes the federal court from enforcing the exclusionary rule through the writ of habeas corpus even though the state has failed to raise the Stone issue. We conclude that Stone has that effect. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
In Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494, 96 S.Ct. at 3052. The holding is grounded in the Court's conclusion that in cases where a petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim has been adequately litigated in state court, enforcing the exclusionary rule through writs of habeas corpus would not further the deterrent and educative purposes of the rule to an extent sufficient to counter the negative effect such a policy would have on the interests of judicial efficiency, comity and federalism. Id. at 493-494, 96 S.Ct. at 3051-52; see also id. Withrow v. Williams, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1750, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ("[W]e simply concluded in Stone that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on collateral review outweighed any potential advantage to be gained by applying it there.").
There is no indication in the language of the opinion that the Court intended for the Stone rule to apply only when the state raised it in timely fashion. On the contrary, the Court made clear that the rule is a categorical limitation on the scope of the exclusionary rule:
Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is limited to cases in which there has [sic] been both . a showing [that the state court did not provide the petitioner with an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his Fourth Amendment claims] and a Fourth Amendment violation.
Id. 428 U.S. at 495 n. 37, 96 S.Ct. at 3053 n. 37 (emphasis added).
The exclusionary rule is a creation of the judiciary. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 376, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has given the rule shape and definition. 428 U.S. at 485, 96 S.Ct. at 3048. In Stone v. Powell, the Court limited the occasions on which petitioners in habeas proceedings could challenge a state court's failure to exclude evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds; the claim could.be entertained only when the petitioner had not had an adequate opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court. See id. at 488, 96 S.Ct. at 3049 (stating that negligible benefits derived through enforcing exclusionary rule through habeas corpus proceedings would be outweighed by resultant intrusion on federalism and comity). Accordingly, we conclude that absent a showing by Woolery that the state court did not afford him an adequate hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim, the federal court may not award relief for the claim through enforcement of the exclusionary rule.
Our reading of Stone is consistent with our decision in Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 n. 3 (9th Cir.1980), in which we held that a "fourth amendment claim is not cognizable as a basis for federal habeas relief, where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim" (emphasis added). This language indicates that unless the district court finds that the petitioner has made the requisite showing, the court may not grant relief on the petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims. While this requirement may be prudential rather than jurisdictional, it is founded in policy considerations that oblige the court to raise the issue sua sponte if the state neglects to assert it. Accord Davis v. Blackburn, 803 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (5th Cir.1986).
We are mindful that in our recent decision in Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1534-37 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992), we ruled that when a state has failed to raise in district court the Teague "new rule" defense, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the appeals court retains discretion to refuse to recognize the defense. Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1537. Boardman is different from our case. At the core of the holding in Boardman is the courts recognition that there are some circumstances under which an appeals court's refusal to entertain a state's untimely new rule defense will not intrude on the principles of comity and federalism. Id. at 1536-37. In such cases, the appellate court is not required to raise the Teague rule sua sponte. Id. at 1536; see also Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (appeals court retains qualified discretion to address merits of habeas corpus petitioner's claims when state fails to assert in district court proceedings that petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies).
The language and reasoning of the Stone decision compel a different conclusion in the present case. In part, Stone is based on the same considerations of judicial efficiency, finality, and federalism that underlie other procedural requirements surrounding federal habeas. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n. 31, 96 S.Ct. at 3051 n. 31; Withrow v. Williams, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1750. But the remaining considerations in Stone were the limitations inherent in the exclusionary rule itself; it excluded "the most probative" evidence, and the deterrent value that supported its application in direct proceedings was not materially enhanced by applying it on collateral review. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90, 493-94, 96 S.Ct. at 3050, 3051-52. "In this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist with special force." Id. at 494-95, 96 S.Ct. at 3052-53 (footnote omitted). The Court couched its ruling in terms of a requirement: To be eligible for habeas relief on Fourth Amendment claims, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court has not afforded him a full and fair hearing on those claims. Id. at 494 n. 37, 96 S.Ct. at 3052 n. 37. We read Stone as a categorical limitation on the applicability of fourth amendment exclusionary rules in habeas corpus proceedings.' See id. at 495, 96 S.Ct. at 3053; Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 376, 106 S.Ct. at 2583.
It is true, as the dissent argues, that when other types of claims are urged on habeas, we will often consider a procedural barrier to be waived if the state does not assert it. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127 n. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (default in failing to raise self-incrimination claim in state trial waived by state's failure to assert it); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir.1993) (failure to object to instruction that violated due process no bar when state has not asserted default). In those cases, however, there was nothing inappropriate about entertaining the constitutional claim for relief in federal court; if no procedural defaults had occurred, the federal court would have reviewed the claims in ha-beas proceedings as a matter of course. In Stone, the Supreme Court made it clear that, if all procedural requirements are scrupulously followed, a fourth amendment claim for exclusion of evidence is not to be enforced in habeas proceedings.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's decision granting Woolery habeas relief without consideration of Stone v. Powell. We remand for further proceedings to afford Woolery the opportunity to show that the state court did not offer him a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. If he fails to make such a showing, his Fourth Amendment claim must be dismissed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. We are not dealing with a case where a federal court determined not to invoke Stone v. Powell because the Fourth Amendment claim being asserted was patently without merit. See Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490, 497 n. 6 (1st Cir.1991). We express no opinion on the propriety of that procedure.
. The dissent takes issue with our requirement that the district court invoke Stone sua sponte, and states that Davis only provides for a permissive invocation of Stone sua sponte by the appellate court. We see little distinction in the effect of our ruling and that in Davis. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit stated: "we are obliged to apply Stone as a prudential limitation on the exercise of our jurisdiction here, even if it must be raised sua sponte." Davis, 803 F.2d at 1372-73. If the appellate court is obliged to apply Stone sua sponte, then the district courts must, as a practical matter, do so as well.
The other two circuit court decisions cited by the dissent offer but weak support for overlooking the Stone rule when the state fails to raise it in timely fashion. In Wallace v. Duckworth, 778 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir.1985), the court held that the prisoner's petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust, and that it was therefore not necessary to deal with the Stone question. It also added that the state had not raised the Stone argument, and that, as a non-jurisdictional rule, the court need not raise it sua sponte. Id. at 1219-20 n. 1. Judge Posner would not have considered the exhaustion issue "since the petition for habeas corpus is in any event frivolous in light of Stone v. Powell." Id. at 1226.
In Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir.1991), the court stated: "As a preliminary matter, neither Tart nor the Commonwealth raised the issue in the district court as to whether Tart was afforded a 'full and fair opportunity' to present his fourth amendment claim in state court. Absent such a showing by the petitioner, principles of comity require that federal habeas review of fourth amendment claims be refused." Id. at 497 n. 6. The court also noted that the petitioner was at peril relying on the state's failure to raise the issue, in light of decisions in the Fifth Circuit recognizing discretionary authority of the appellate court to raise Stone sua sponte. Id. The Tart court then stated that it would not need to rely on the default because it was in full agreement with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on the Fourth Amendment issue. Id.
. The dissent seems to suggest that, because Woolery argued in his trial brief that he had not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, and the state did not argue to the contrary, that the magistrate judge or the district court were justified in concluding that he had not been afforded that opportunity. That is not the manner in which the magistrate judge and district judge proceeded. The magistrate judge ruled that, because the State had not raised the "affirmative defense" of Stone, he would not apply it. No ruling was made on the full and fair opportunity to litigate. The district judge simply reviewed the fourth amendment merits de novo, and reached a conclusion contrary to the magistrate judge and in favor of Woolery.
We agree with the dissent that Woolery's failure to assert in his petition that he had not had a full and' fair opportunity to litigate his claim is not fatal in light of his trial brief. All that this leniency means, however, is that Woolery is now entitled to make his case on that issue; he has not waived it.