Case Name: The State of New Hampshire v. Melvin E. Akers and Marshal H. Fox
Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Hampshire
Decision Date: 1979-03-23
Citations: 119 N.H. 161
Docket Number: No. 78-170
Parties: The State of New Hampshire v. Melvin E. Akers and Marshal H. Fox
Judges: LAMPRON, C.J., and BOIS, J., dissented; the others concurred.
Reporter: New Hampshire Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 161–165

Head Matter:
Ossipee District Court
No. 78-170
The State of New Hampshire v. Melvin E. Akers and Marshal H. Fox
March 23, 1979
Thomas D. Rath, attorney general (Edward N. Damon, assistant attorney general, orally), for the State.
Randall F. Cooper, of North Conway, by brief and orally, for the defendants.

Opinion:
GRIMES, J.
The case before us presents anissueoffirstimpression. We are called upon to determine whether, under New Hampshire's Constitution and Criminal Code, parents of minors can be held criminally responsible for their children's offenses solely on the basis of their parental status. We hold that parents cannot be held criminally responsible vicariously for the offenses of the child. N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15; RSA 626:1 I.
The defendants are fathers whose minor sons were found guilty of driving snowmobiles in violation of RSA 269-C:6-a II (Supp. 1977) (operating on public way) and III (Supp. 1977) (reasonable speed).
RSA 269-C:24 IV, which pertains to the operation and licensing of Off Highway Recreational Vehicles (OHRV), provides that "[t]he parents' or guardians or persons assuming responsibility will be responsible for any damage incurred or for any violations of this chapter by any person under the age of 18." Following a verdict of guilty for violating RSA 269-0:24 IV, the two defendants waived all right to an appeal de novo to the superior court and all questions of law were reserved and transferred by the District Court (Schroeder, J.). The defendants argue that (1) RSA 269-C:24 IV, the statute under which they were convicted, was not intended by the legislature to impose criminal responsibility, and (2) if in fact the legislative intention was to impose criminal responsibility, then the statute would violate N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 15 and U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
We first address the defendants' claim that the legislature's intention in enacting RSA 269-C:24 IV did not encompass the imposition of criminal sanctions on parents whose minor children have committed violations under chapter 269-C. In considering this claim, we are guided by the legislature's own mandate that in interpreting its enactments, we must construe "[wjords and phrases . . . according to the common and approved usage of the language." RSA 21:2. Town of Greenland v. Bunker, 118 N.H. 783, 394 A.2d 321 (1978). "Our task is to construe the criminal code provisions according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice." State v. Doe, 117 N.H. 259, 261, 372 A.2d 279,280 (1977), quoting State v. Partlow, 117 N.H. 78, 81, 369 A.2d 221, 223 (1977).
The language of RSA 269-C:24 IV, "parents . . . will be responsible . for any violations of this chapter by any person under the age of 18," clearly indicates the legislature's intention to hold the parents criminally responsible for the OHRV violations of their minor children.
It is a general principle of this State's Criminal Code that "[a] person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." RSA 626:1 I. (Emphasis added.) State v. Adelson, 118 N.H. 484, 389 A.2d 1382 (1978). See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). RSA 269-C:24 IV seeks to impose criminal liability on parents for the acts of their children without basing liability on any voluntary act or omission on the part of the parents. Because the statute makes no reference at all to parental conduct or acts, it seeks to impose criminal responsibility solely because of their parental status contrary to the provisions of RSA 626:1 I.
The legislature has not specified any voluntary acts or omissions for which parents are sought to be made criminally responsible and it is not a judicial function to supply them. It is fundamental to the rule of law and due process that acts or omissions which are to be the basis of criminal liability must be specified in advance and not ex post facto. N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 23;see State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 320 A.2d 646 (1974).
It is argued that liability may be imposed on parents under the provisions of RSA 626:8 11(b), which authorizes imposing criminal liability for conduct of another when "he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense." This provision comes from the Model Penal Code § 2.04(2)(b). The illustrations of this type of liability in the comments to the Code all relate to situations involving employees and agents, and no suggestion is made that it was intended to authorize imposing vicarious criminal liability on one merely because of his status as a parent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2)(b), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1956); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 32 (1972).
Without passing upon the validity of statutes that might seek to impose vicarious criminal liability on the part of an employer for acts of his employees, see Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); and Opinion of the Justices, 25 N.H. 537 (1852), we have no hesitancy in holding that any attempt to impose such liability on parents simply because they occupy the status of parents, without more offends the due process clause of our State constitution. N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15.
Parenthood lies at the very foundation of our civilization. The continuance of the human race is entirely dependent upon it. It was firmly entrenched in the Judaeo-Christian ethic when "in the beginning" man was commanded to "be fruitful and multiply." Genesis I. Considering the nature of parenthood, we are convinced that the status of parenthood cannot be made a crime. This, however, is the effect of RSA 269-C:24 IV. Even if the parent has been as careful as anyone could be, even if the parent has forbidden the conduct, and even if the parent is justifiably unaware of the activities of the child, criminal liability is still imposed under the wording of the present statute. There is no other basis for criminal responsibility other than the fact that a person is the parent of one who violates the law.
One hundred and twenty-seven years ago the justices of this court in giving their opinions regarding a proposed law that would have imposed vicarious criminal liability on an employer for acts of his employee stated, "[b]ut this does not seem to be in accordance with the spirit of our Constitution . . . ." Opinion of the Justices, 25 N.H. 537, 542 (1852). Because the net effect of the statute is to punish parenthood, the result is forbidden by substantive due process requirements of N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 15.
Exceptions sustained.
LAMPRON, C.J., and BOIS, J., dissented; the others concurred.