Case Name: ROWLAND L. HAZARD, et al., Respondents, v. JOHN R. CASWELL, et al., Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1881-04-04
Citations: 15 Jones & S. 537
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROWLAND L. HAZARD, et al., Respondents, v JOHN R. CASWELL, et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 47
Pages: 537–538

Head Matter:
ROWLAND L. HAZARD, et al., Respondents, v JOHN R. CASWELL, et al., Appellants.
Before. Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Tbit ax, JJ.
Decided April 4, 1881.
Trade-mark—successorship in business, and right to me trade-mack.— Huwer v. Dannenhofer (Ct. App.) distinguished.
Motion for a reargument of an appeal decided by the general term of this court, March, 1880 (46 Super. Ct. 559).
The court, at General Term, said: “ The reargument is asked for on the sole ground that the court of appeals in Huwer n. Dannenhofer, which has been decided since the decison of this case, substantially overrules the decision in this case. The judge who tried this action found, among other things, that the plaintiffs are the sole successors of the firm and to the business of the former copartnership of Caswell, Hazard & Co. (of which the defendant Caswell was a member), with the right to trade under that name, and that as such successors, and by virtue of the instruments executed and acts done by the defendant Caswell, the plaintiffs have acquired exclusive property rights in the trade-mark and label in suit and are the sole proprietors thereof. These findings have been sustained by the general term of this court, on the ground that they are warranted by the evidence.
“It was found in Huwer v. Dannenhofer that nothing was said at the time of the sale to the plaintiff (in that case) about the good-will of the business, or about the trade-mark, and that there was no reference. to the trade mark in the bill of sale. In these respects the cases differ.
“The court of appeals say, however, that the defendants could by agreement vest the exclusive right to use the trade-mark in the plaintiff. This court has found, in this case, that the defendant Caswell has vested the plaintiffs with this right.”

Opinion:
Opinion by Text ax, J.; Sedgwick, Ch. J., and Feeedman, J., concurred.
Motion denied, with costs.