Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Fletcher WILLIAMS, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1980-06-23
Citations: 631 F.2d 198
Docket Number: No. 79-2237
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Fletcher WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Judges: Before ADAMS, GARTH and VAN DU-SEN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 631
Pages: 198–214

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Fletcher WILLIAMS, Appellant.
No. 79-2237.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 12, 1980.
Decided June 23, 1980.
Sandra D. Jordan (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert J. Cindrich, U. S. Atty., Frederick W. Thieman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Paul R. Gettlemen (argued), Zelienople, Pa., for appellant.
Before ADAMS, GARTH and VAN DU-SEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
Fletcher Williams appeals his conviction for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (distribution of heroin) and 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (misuse of communication facilities in distribution of heroin). The sole ground for reversal urged on appeal is ineffective assistance of counsel. In a prior proceeding we remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. United States v. Williams, 588 F.2d 825 (1978) (mem.). Having reviewed the record of that hearing and the district court's opinion, which held that Williams had exemplary trial representation rather than inadequate counseling, we too are satisfied that Williams was not denied effective assistance of counsel and that thus his sixth amendment right to counsel was not violated. We accordingly affirm Williams' convictions.
I.
The controversy in this case centers around two affidavits. The two key wit nesses against Williams were Pearl and Barron Kelly Brooks (Kelly), husband and wife, who testified to narcotics transactions between Williams and themselves. Some months prior to trial, Williams came into possession of signed affidavits of Pearl and Kelly Brooks in which they denied that there ever were any such transactions. Williams gave one or both of these affidavits to his counsel and demanded that they be used to impeach the credibility of Pearl and Kelly Brooks should they testify at trial against Williams.
Defense counsel, however, did not use the affidavits to impeach the Brookses. He stated that he had been informed by the Government that it was prepared to prove that the affidavits had been executed under duress, including threats of harm to the Brookses' children. See Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 34-35. Such evidence, he believed, would seriously harm Williams both with respect to the jury's determination of guilt or innocence, and in regard to sentencing. See id. at 35. Moreover, he reasoned, the only way to try to rebut the Government's claim that the affidavits were coerced would have been to have Williams testify, thus opening Williams to damaging cross-examination on all aspects of the case, including tape-recorded conversations between Williams and Pearl Brooks. See id. at 37; app. to dissenting op. infra (typescript of conversation). Defense counsel therefore determined not to introduce the affidavits, and Williams was ultimately convicted by the jury of four out of the five counts charged. He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of eight and fifteen years, to be followed by three years special parole.
II.
The testimony of Pearl and Kelly Brooks was central to the Government's case, and it is not seriously contended that Williams could have been convicted without it. Thus, if indeed Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel by virtue of the failure of counsel to use the affidavits to discredit the Brookses, we could not characterize that action as harmless error.
In this Circuit, the standard for effective assistance of counsel is "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970). We are therefore confronted with the question whether defense counsel's decision not to use the affidavits and the reasons leading to that decision fell within the range of behavior properly to be expected of defense counsel.
Following our remand for an eviden-tiary hearing, the district court heard testimony of Williams and his various counsel in its consideration of the merits of Williams' claim:
Trial counsel testified at the evidentia-ry hearing that he did not use the affidavits because, inter alia, the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney had advised him that the government was prepared to prove that the affidavits were executed under duress, possibly including threats of harm to the children of Pearl and Kelly Brooks. Not only would testimony that the affidavits had been obtained through threat of bodily harm be severely detrimental to prospects of acquittal but could, also in counsel's opinion, adversely affect sentencing considerations should conviction follow. Bearing in mind the foregoing pitfalls, trial counsel decided during the trial that use of the contradictory affidavits would not be in the best interest of his client, notwithstanding their obvious contribution to the ongoing battle of credibility.
Williams insists, however, that while trial counsel may have chosen the proper strategy had the affidavits in fact been obtained under duress, no effort was made to independently determine whether they might have been made voluntarily. To the contrary, trial counsel indicated that he relied on several factors before concluding the statements were probably given under duress. According to his testimony, trial counsel relied upon the government's representation, photographic evidence, surveillance by Allegheny County Police Officers and Drug Enforcement Agents, and tape recordings for his opinion that the affidavits did not have the ring of truth. Trial counsel diligently analyzed a multiple of factors before reaching a judgment.
In any event, the actual voluntariness of the affidavits was not of critical importance. Trial counsel again testified that as long as he was convinced that Pearl and Kelly Brooks would testify that threats were made, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to rebut such testimony except by tendering Williams as a witness subject to potentially fatal cross examination. Carefully weighing these considerations, utilization of the affidavits, even if voluntarily given, would have been fraught with danger once Pearl and Kelly Brooks testified they were obtained under duress.
Even a cursory review of either the trial transcript or the hearing testimony reveals that trial counsel far surpasses customary skill and knowledge. At trial he aggressively and intelligently represented Williams. His reasons for failing to use the affidavits at trial indicate a thoughtful and well-considered decision. That Williams was convicted in spite of exemplary trial representation is testimony to his actual guilt of the crimes charged. Trial counsel in the case sub judice exercised exceptional skill and knowledge far above that which normally prevails. Accordingly, Williams was not denied effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment when trial counsel chose not to use the affidavits of Pearl and Kelly Brooks.
United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 77-110, Slip op. at 3-5 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 15,1979). After consideration of the record, it is clear that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous.
III.
Williams has argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney relied on the Government's representation that it could prove duress, without fully investigating or preparing the case himself. See Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). In Gaines, defense counsel failed even to consider as plausible the defendant's version of the facts and limited his investigation to discussions with the prosecutor and police officers. Defense counsel had a total lack of knowledge of the defendant's position. In the present case, while defense counsel failed to interview the Brookses and never ascertained the nature of the Government's proof of duress, he was nevertheless fully aware of Williams' position and had before him all of Williams' evidence, the two affidavits. He could reasonably have concluded from the tenor of the affidavits and from the other overwhelming corroborating proof of the crimes that the affidavits were false and must have been the product of coercion, despite some evidence of their voluntariness, such as the fact that the Brookses had sought out Williams to give him the affidavits, Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 100.
However, as the trial court recognized, more important than whether the affidavits were in fact coerced is counsel's evaluation of the potentially devastating effect of their introduction. There would at least have been a question as to the voluntariness of the affidavits, and counsel determined that shifting the focus of the trial to this issue would have harmed Williams more than using the affidavits to discredit the Brookses would have helped him. Of particular significance is counsel's response at the evidentiary hearing to one question:
Q. [Williams' attorney on appeal]. Okay. I only have one final question. If you had attempted an independent investigation and you would have been satisfied at least at the time when the affidavits were made that they were made voluntarily, and subsequent to that the Brookses might have changed their mind and might even have. been coerced to testify, would you at that point have used them on behalf of Mr. Williams?
A.- [Williams' trial counsel]. No. Because as long as I was convinced that the Brookses would so testify that there were threats, it would be up to the jury to decide whether threats had been made or had not been made. But it would have certainly opened the door to a whole set of circumstances that in my opinion could do no good for Fletcher Williams and might have put him in a worse position on the downside after conviction than he faces today. So I wouldn't have used it once the Brookses, as Mr. Panneton advised me, would have indicated that the statements were given under duress.
The fact that the notary who took the statement would have indicated that they seemed calm and relaxed would not have prevented the Brookses from doing as Mr. Panneton [Assistant U.S. Attorney] indicated would be the likely result of the rebuttal testimony. And I would not have been in a position unless I submitted Fletcher Williams as a witness to the trial jury and to Mr. Panneton on cross examination on the whole of the case to rebut the open season that the Brookses would have had on Williams with respect to threats. So I chose not to use the statements and wouldn't have used the statements.
Id. at 51-52. We cannot say that this was an unreasonable decision, much less an error in advocacy of sufficient magnitude to depart from the Moore standard.
Williams' reliance on United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976), is misplaced. Dingle stated in dictum that "[i]t is error not to call a witness when that witness would present the only defense available," id. at 1385 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The present case is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the affidavits do not present a defense but merely could have affected—positively or negatively—Williams' contention that the Brookses were not telling the truth. Second, another defense was available and was asserted: the defense that Pearl Brooks had not been sufficiently searched to make sure she was not carrying the narcotics into Williams' apartment before meeting him, so as to frame him. See Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 32-33, 49 (discussion at evidentiary hearing of defense strategy); Trial Transcript, Dec. 1-6, 1977, at 60-61, 69-70, 118-123, 127, 137-38, 275-76, 286-87, 296-98, 303, 306, 309, 321-22 (questioning of witnesses with regard to searches conducted).
IV.
Buttressing the trial court's conclusion that Williams was not denied effective assistance of counsel is the plain fact that Williams himself never attempted to have the affidavits introduced and did not object until his appeal to counsel's failure to utilize or introduce them. A fair reading of the record reveals that Williams was apprised in advance of trial of counsel's skepticism and reluctance to use the affidavits. Counsel testified:
Q. When you had this conversation with Mr. Panneton did you come back and discuss this with Mr. Williams?
A. I did.
Q. Did you tell him that the government was going to introduce threats?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anybody else present when this conversation took place?
A. I think I told him that in the bathroom at the Hilton Hotel. Because I wanted him to feel free without anyone being present to tell me whether threats were used or not.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. He told me no threats were used and he wanted me to use the statement.
*
Q. This discussion that you had in the bathroom with Mr. Williams, did you ever indicate—or you gave him back the affidavit at that point, didn't you?
A. I gave him back what, sir?
Q. An affidavit.
A. Exhibit A [Kelly Brooks' affidavit], I don't recall seeing Exhibit B [affidavit of Pearl and Kelly Brooks].
Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 45, 47. Counsel testified as well:
Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Williams these threats?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he still say that he wanted to use these affidavits?
A. He denied at all times any threats and said that he wanted the statements used.
*
I applied my knowledge of the case in totality, considering the photographic evidence, the surveillance by a team of Allegheny County Police Officers and DEA agents, the tape recordings, and then matched the sum of all these things against a document that I felt did not have the ring of truth, but I withheld judgment on whether I would use the document indicating to Mr. Williams that the execution of these documents was important to me only to the extent that they may indicate that perhaps the Brookses wouldn't testify for the government
Id. at 39 (emphasis supplied). Williams thus knew that his counsel would not seek to impeach the Brookses with the affidavits once they did testify for the Government, despite Williams' testimony that he was never definitively told before trial that the affidavits would not be used, see id. at 6,13.
This record also supports the conclusion that Williams was not surprised by counsel's actions in not employing the affidavits. Williams had already discharged a number of attorneys when he first consulted with this trial counsel. When Williams explained his version of the case at his initial consultation with this counsel, he was told in unequivocal terms "that a judge would bury [him]" if the affidavits were used. See id. at 5. Despite this, Williams still retained this counsel to represent him at trial and never attempted to discharge him. Moreover, at the conclusion of the trial, Williams kissed his attorney on the cheek and told him he had done a wonderful job. Id. at 44. Finally, Williams never indicated to the trial judge, either during or after trial, that he himself wanted the affidavits used or introduced. See id. at 8-9, 13. Of even greater significance, the record reveals that at no time after Williams' counsel had rested Williams' defense, did Williams question his forbearance in using the affidavits.
It is thus clearly apparent that Williams ultimately concurred in his counsel's tactical decision not to use the affidavits to impeach the Brookses. Hence, there is no merit to Williams' intimation on appeal that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because he was never explicitly told that the affidavits would not be introduced.
V.
Our examination of this record satisfies us that Williams was not denied effective assistance of counsel. We will therefore affirm the judgment of sentence imposed on Williams on January 11, 1978.
. One affidavit executed by Pearl and Kelly Brooks (Exhibit B) reads in part:
Mr. Fletcher Williams did not at anytime sell us any drug of any kind . . . there has
[sic] not been any threats of any kind mad to me or my family[.] The dates I was sup posed to have bought drugs were Oct[.] 6, 1976 & Nov[.] 6, 1976.
Statement given is of our own free will and true and correct to the best of our knowledge.
Another affidavit of Kelly Brooks (Exhibit A) reads in relevant part:
This is not only a confession of a true fact. But it is the truth in writing to free not only my soul and mind, I want to be released from the dishonor of a lie. I Kelly Brooks am swearing this true statement of my own free will[.] I am under no herastment [sic] of any kind neither is any one in my family or even close to me in any danger from Mr. Williams[.]
My true statement is true. Mr[.] Fletcher Williams has never sold me or my wife any narcotics, pill or any other unlawful subtance [sic] not at anytime or place in Oct[.] or Nov[.] 1976 or any other time in my life, on or about Oct[.] or Nov[.] 1976 and at other times I lied about sales and other things in regard to Mr. Williams in order not to be incorsorated [sic], or for my wife not to in corsorated [sic], as a resualt [sic] of my lies, Mr[.] William [sic] was arrested and is now I[']m sure wondering why I would just lie for no reason. I want this sworn statement of the true fact to also note, I was giving [sic] by verious [sic] law inforcement [sic] officers (a choise [sic]) some more time on this street, which I thought ment [sic] real freedom, in exchange [for] lies about Mr[.] Williams. My God forgive me and have mercy on my soul because everything I singed [sic ] or stated about Mr[.] Williams at that time or any other time about narcotic [sic] in any way any style or manner is a lie.
February 27, 1979 Hearing Tr., p. 34-35.
February 27, 1979 Hearing Tr., p. 39.
February 27, 1979 Hearing Tr., p. 51-52.
It would be illogical to assume that Pearl and Kelly Brooks would testify to the voluntar-iness of the affidavits after having previously contradicted the contents of the affidavits in their trial testimony.
. Trial counsel's fear that Williams might have been given enhanced or consecutive sentences had testimony of threats to the Brookses and their children been introduced and believed, instead of the concurrent sentences ultimately imposed was a reasonable concern. Cf. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (trial judge may consider in fixing sentence defendant's false testimony at trial).
. Williams employed a total of seven attorneys on this case, five before and through trial, and two more afterwards. See Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 12.
. Williams undoubtediy trusted counsel's judgment, based on counsel's experience and qualifications. Counsel explained to the court:
I'm a graduate of the Harvard Law School in 1957. I served as Assistant District Attorney under Frank S. Hogan. I was appointed as Special Attorney to the United States Department of Justice before the strike forces were formed by Attorney General Kennedy. And I served here in Pittsburgh as a special prosecutor under the United States Attorney, then Joseph Ammerman.
I have taught trial advocacy at Harvard Law School, Hofstra Law School, New York School, at a course given by United States Attorney Robert Fisk[e] and District Attorney Robert Morgantha[u] for newly appointed prosecutors, and I have lectured at the Practicing Law Institute on trial advocacy.
Trial Transcript, Feb. 27, 1979, at 36. Counsel further testified that he tries about ten federal cases a year, primarily as criminal defense counsel. See id. at 52--53.
. The dissent argues that counsel usurped Williams' prerogative to decide the scope and extent of the cross-examination of the Brookses and misled Williams as to whether or not the affidavits would be used. These issues implicit in the dissent's argument simply are not raised on the record of this case or as questions for consideration in Williams' brief on appeal. As we have noted, Williams, with full knowledge of his counsel's strategy, took no steps to discharge counsel or object to the court, or for that matter to raise this issue with his counsel at any time prior to the jury's verdict.