Case Name: Brooks Wimbey McADAM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-01-20
Citations: 648 So. 2d 1244
Docket Number: No. 94-02691
Parties: Brooks Wimbey McADAM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: QUINCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 648
Pages: 1244–1246

Head Matter:
Brooks Wimbey McADAM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 94-02691.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 20, 1995.
Michael J. Snure and David A. Henson of Kirkconnell, Lindsey and Snure, P.A., Winter Park, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Patricia E. Davenport, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

Opinion:
ALTENBERND, Judge.
Brooks McAdam seeks certiorari review of the circuit court order affirming his second conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. We deny the petition because Mr. McAdam's Colorado conviction for driving while ability impaired was sufficient for treatment as a prior similar alcohol-related conviction.
On September 25, 1992, Mr. McAdam was arrested for DUI in Polk County with a blood alcohol level of approximately .20%. He was convicted in county court. That conviction was affirmed by written opinion in the circuit court. Although he raises several arguments in this certiorari proceeding, only one warrants discussion.
In January 1991, Mr. McAdam was convicted in Colorado of "driving while ability impaired." Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-4-1202(l)(b) (1990). This statute makes it illegal to drive when affected "to the slightest degree so that he is less able than he ordinarily would have been . to exercise . due care in the safe operation of a vehicle." Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-4-1202(l)(g) (1990). In Colorado, there is a presumption that a driver whose blood alcohol level is over .05% and less than .10% commits this offense. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-4-1202(2)(b) (1990). Colorado has another offense of "driving under the influence" for a driver who is "substantially incapable" of safe operation of a vehicle. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 42-4-1202(l)(f) (1990). This offense is generally based on a blood alcohol level of .10% or greater.
Mr. McAdam argues that his Florida conviction should be sentenced as a first conviction because his prior offense in Colorado was the lesser of that state's alcohol-related offenses. In September 1992, section 316.193(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided, in part:
For the purposes of this section, . a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, shall also be considered a previous conviction for violation of this section.
(Emphasis supplied.) Given the great variety of ever-changing statutes in the fifty states governing the problem of driving under the effects of alcohol, it is clear that the legislature intends this statute to include a wide range of foreign offenses as prior offenses. We agree with both the trial court and the circuit court that a Colorado conviction for driving while impaired, even if it is based on a blood alcohol level greater than .05% and less than .10%, is sufficiently similar to a section 316.193 conviction to allow its use as a prior conviction.
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., concurs specially.