Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Marshal CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-04-19
Citations: 428 F. App'x 712
Docket Number: No. 09-50231
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Marshal CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 428
Pages: 712–713

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Marshal CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-50231.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 15, 2011.
Filed April 19, 2011.
Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Joseph B. Widman, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Riverside, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Robert Stephen Hanna, Law Office of Michael Berger, Santa Barbara, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
The district court expressly determined that "[t]he defendant's criminal history places him in criminal history category 5." In doing so, the court necessarily rejected Clarke's requests for downward departures and therefore complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. See United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1384-85 (9th Cir.1997) (finding that a district court complied with Rule 32 by implicitly resolving an objection to the PSR).
Clarke's challenges to two conditions of supervised release similarly fail. First, the condition requiring Clarke to "notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer" is not unconstitutionally vague because "men of common intelligence" needn't "guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762, 768 (9th Cir.2004). Second, the condition requiring Clarke to "permit a probation officer to visit him . at any time at home or elsewhere" is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), nor is it constitutionally overbroad or vague, or statutorily a "greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary," see United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 865-67 (9th Cir. 2007).
In his plea agreement, Clarke waived his "right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, and the manner in which the sentence is determined" so long as he received a within or below Guidelines sentence. Because Clarke's 96-month sentence falls within the relevant Guidelines range, we don't consider his remaining arguments. See United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.2005).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.