Case Name: Milo Hine, Resp't, v. Nathan Cushing, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-07-09
Citations: 24 N.Y. St. Rep. 778
Docket Number: 
Parties: Milo Hine, Resp’t, v. Nathan Cushing, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 24
Pages: 778–787

Head Matter:
Milo Hine, Resp’t, v. Nathan Cushing, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed July 9, 1889.)
1. Negligence—Action fob damages fob fibe communicated to adjoining building—Liability of owneb.
In an action for loss sustained by plaintiff in the burning of a building, the fifth story of which was occupied by him, it appeared that the defendant was its owner, and in possession, by his agent, at the time. The construction of a new pier becoming necessary for the support of one of the main girders, it was made under the direction and authority of the agent. Jack-screws had been placed under the ends of the girder which sustained the floor, without the aid of the pier, and posts between that floor and the one above, sustained the upper part of the building. When the screws were removed and the building allowed to settle upon the pier,it gave way and precipitated the fall of the upper floors. In the business carried on in the building fifes were used, and by the falling of the floors these were commi.nicated to the building and the adjoining one occupied by plaintiff. Both buildings were communicating, were used as a single building, having a common stairway and elevator. There was evidence tending to show that the pier was insufficient for the purpose designed, and the consequence of its fall was the firing of the building. Held, that the Are was caused by the negligence of defendant’s agent, and that defendant is liable for the loss sustained thereby.
2. Same—When pbofits allowed as damages.
Where loss of profits is reasonably well maintained by the evidence, such profits may be allowed as part of the damages.
3. Same—Evidence—Competency of — Ceoss-examination— How fob WITNESS MAY BE QUESTIONED AS TO TESTIMONY ON ANOTHEB TBIAL.
Where a witness was produced and sworn on behalf of defendant, his counsel considering the testimony of this witness not as favorable to him as it should be, called his attention to what was stated to be his evidence given upon another trial. After this evidence was read to the witness, he was asked whether he remembered giving that testimony. This was objected to on the part of plaintiff as irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial; the objection was sustained and the answer excluded. Similar inquiries were made of the witness as to other portions of his evidence, and he was not permitted to answer those inquiries. Hid, that while a party calling a witness, who is surprised by testimony contrary to his expectations, is permitted to interrogate the witness as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony “for the purpose of probing his recollection, recalling to his mind the statements he has previously made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent inconsistency, " the rule does not extend to such surprises of cross-examination, nor to declarations inconsistent with affidavits used to weaken perfectly consistent, direct testimony. Held, also, that defendant was deprived of no legal right by the exclusion of these declarations. Held, also, that the admission of the whole affidavit was unobjectionable, as the referee limited its use to its proper functions, namely, the showing of statements inconsistent with the Witness’ present testimony. Daniels, J., dissenting.
4. Same—Competency of building laws oe city op New York.
Upon cross-examination of another witness, the building laws applicable to the city of New York (the premises being situated in Brooklyn) were admitted in evidence. Held, that this was immaterial, and could not possibly have prejudiced the defendant. It was also superfluous, as the laws of the state could be referred to without being put in evidence. Daniels, J., dissenting.
5. Same—Hypothetical question.
Where hypothetical questions are put to a witness, and the evidence elicited thereby is both useless and harmless, a new trial should not be granted merely because the questions were intricate and prolix, nor because of the manner in which such useless and harmless testimony was taken. Daniels, J., dissenting.
Appeal from a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.
Albert Stickney and Samuel H. Ordesay, for app’lt; John E. Parsons, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Barrett, J.
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Daniels upon the general merits of this controversy. But I am unable to agree with him that the judgment must, nevertheless, be reversed because of errors in the admission and exclusion of testimony.
First. With regard to the witness Miller. The defendant was not surprised by the testimony of this witness, nor does he seem to have been a hostile witness. The excluded questions were not necessitated by anything which transpired upon the direct examination. Upon that examination there was neither inconsistency nor want of recollection. The excluded questions were put upon the re-direct, after the witness, upon cross-examination, had admitted making an affidavit, somewhat modifying his direct testimony. The rule laid down in Bullard v. Pearsall (53 N. Y., 230), which is evidently the case referred to by Justice Daniels, does not apply to such a situation.
The defendant had a right, upon the re direct, to inquire into the circumstances attending the making of the affidavit. He could also ask the witness whether he still adhered unqualifiedly to his direct testimony. If he did, the defendant could not add to that adherence, or corroborate the witness, by asking him whether he had not previously testified, even more strongly, to the same effect. If, however, upon being confronted with the affidavit, the witness receded from the direct testimony, the defendant could probably refresh his recollection, and bring him back to his original statement, by recalling the previous testimony. But where the witness was not asked whether he reaffirmed or receded from his direct testimony, the latter simply stood, subject to the legitimate effect of the cross-examination.
The defendant could not, under such circumstances, and under the guise of a cross-examination of his own witness upon the affidavit, make direct testimony of the previous declarations.
It was not a complete lapse or change of memory with which the party here calling the witness had to contend, but merely the weakening of his direct testimony by cross-examination. That did not justify an inquiry into the witness' testimony in other cases. A party calling a witness, who is surprised by testimony contrary to his expectations, is permitted to interrogate the witness as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony "for the purpose of probing his recollection, recalling to his mind the statements he has previously made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent inconsistency." Rapallo, J., in Bullard v. Pearsall (supra). Here, however, there was no inconsistency between the testimony given and the previous declarations. The direct testimony was not, perhaps, quite so strong as the previous testimony, but it was substantially the same. At all events, the previous testimony was not admissible, nor could the witness be interrogated with regard to it, merely for the purpose of giving color and strength to the present direct testimony, there being no inconsistency between the latter and the former. The inconsistency, if any, was in the affidavit, to which the witness' attention was called upon cross-examination. But the rule does not extend to such surprises of cross-examination, nor to declarations inconsistent with affidavits used to weaken perfectly consistent direct testimony.
My conclusion is that the defendant was deprived of no legal right, by the exclusion of these declarations.
Second, as to the admission of the entire affidavit. This was 'unobjectionable, as the referee expressly limited its use to its proper function, namely, the showing of statements inconsistent with the witness' present testimony. The referee then added: "The statements in the affidavit are not admissible as evidence for any other purpose." And when the defendant's counsel repeated his objection in another form, the referee again said:
"I overrule the request, on the ground that the whole of the affidavit must be admitted in evidence, but holding, at the same time, that the affidavit constitutes no proof of the facts in the portion of the affidavit which has been read."
Third, as to the admission, upon Hatfield's cross-examinatian, of the building law applicable to the city of Few York. This was immaterial, and could not possibly have prejudiced the defendant. It was also superfluous, as the laws of the state can be referred to without being put in evidence.
Fourth, as to the hypothetical questions put to the witness, Robertson. Justice Daniels concedes that this evidence was both useless and harmless. For that very reason I cannot assent to the granting of a new trial merely because the questions put to this witness were intricate and prolix, nor because of the manner in which this useless and harmless testimony was taken.
In my judgment, substantial justice was done in this case, and whatever errors may have been committed in the course of a long and earnestly contested trial, were trivial and unimportant. They were not, at all events, sufficiently grave to affect the result, or to warrant the disturbance of the judgment.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.