Case Name: SWEET v. PERKINS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-11-14
Citations: 101 N.Y.S. 163
Docket Number: 
Parties: SWEET v. PERKINS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 101
Pages: 163–167

Head Matter:
SWEET v. PERKINS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
November 14, 1906.)
Highways—Obstructions—Adjoining Owners—Rights.
Defendants, who owned a farm adjoining a highway contiguous to the place of the accident, had drawn a pile of compost onto the highway, about 170 feet long, 14 to 15 feet wide, and from 2 to 4 feet high, extending to within 4 feet of the beaten track, and occupying nearly one-third of the highway. The pile had remained there for four months, when, as plaintiff was driving along the highway at night, his horse became frightened at an automobile, so that he suddenly veered to one side, running the vehicle onto the pile of manure, overturning the vehicle, and permanently injuring plaintiff. Held, that the manure pile constituted an unlawful obstruction of the highway, rendering defendants liable for the injury sustained.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 25, Highways, § 509.]
Spring and Kruse, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by Oscar H. Sweet against Charles H Perkins and others. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, NASH, and KRUSE, JJ.
Horace Maguire and S. K. Williams, for appellants.
Durfee & Lines, for respondent.

Opinion:
NASH, J.
The law with respect to public highways and to freshwater rivers is the same, and the analogy perfect, as concerns the right of soil. The presumption is that the owners of the land on each side go to the center of the road, and they have the exclusive right to the soil, subject to the right of passage in the public. Being owners of the soil, they have the right to all ordinary remedies for the freehold. They may maintain an action for ejectment for encroachments upon the road, or an assize, if disseised of it, or trespass against any person who digs up the soil of it, or cuts down any trees growing on the side of fhe road and left there for shade or ornament. The freehold and all profits belong to the owners of the adjoining lands. 3 Kent, 432. A man shall be deemed in actual possession of a highway passing through his lands, and may maintain trespass against another for any use of the road, except for the purposes of traveling, as for cutting timber, digging in the soil, piling boards, or any other exclusive appropriation of the soil. By laying out a road the public acquire a mere right of traveling, and every other right belongs to the owner as exclusively, and he has the same remedy for enforcing it as if the highway had never existed. 1 Cow. Treatise, 371.
For an appropriation of the soil of a road trespass lies by the owner of the land through which the road passes. Gidney v. Earl, 12 Wend. 98. By the court (Nelson, J.) :
"The public highways in this state were generally laid out and opened according to the provisions of some statute law existing at the time. Prescription, or use of 20 years or more of a road, gives to the public a right to the enjoyment of it for that purpose in some cases. The right of way, public or private, is but an incorporeal hereditament, an easement which, per se, does not divest the owner of the fee of the land; and for every other purpose, except the use or servitude as a public highway, the soil belongs to him, and he is entitled to the same remedies for an injury to this residuary interest that he would be entitled to if it was entire and absolute. When, therefore, a road runs through a man's close, prima facie the fee of the land over which the road passes belongs to him as much as it does in any other part of the lot or tract. The law will not presume a grant of a greater interest or estate than is essential to the enjoyment of the public easement. The rest is parcel of the close. The fact that the highway is fenced on each side is for the convenience of the owner, and has no necessary connection with the road. It follows from the above view that the person in possession of the farm or lot through which the highway passes is in contemplation of law, in possession of the highway, subject to the public easement; for, being in possession of the lot, he is prima facie in possession of every parcel of it."
A highway, though common to all people, is said to be nothing but an easement on the lands over which it passes. The public have no other right in it than the right of passage, with the powers and privileges incident to that right, such as digging the soil and using the timber and other materials found within the space of the road, in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of making and repairing the road and its bridges. The owner of the soil still retains his exclusive right in all the mines, quarries, springs of water, timber and earth, for every purpose not incompatible with the public right of way. While this rule as to the extent of interest which the public acquires in highways is strictly true as to highways in the country, it must be taken with some limitation as to the streets of a city or large village. There are certain uses, such as the construction of sewers and the laying of gas and water pipes, to which the latter are generally applied. These—called "urban servitudes"—are the necessary incidents of streets in large cities, and are paramount to the rights of the owner of the fee. Thompson on Highways, pp. 25, 26. The ownership of the fee and right of possession necessarily carries with it the full use and enjoyment of the soil for every purpose not incompatible with the public use. The abutting owner may, therefore, use the portion of the highway not required for public travel, cultivate the soil, store upon it crops, and, as was done by the defendants, store compost or manure for use upon the adjoining land.
This is the view taken of the rights of the public in highways in Massachusetts. In Howard v. Inhabitants of North Bridgwater, 16 Pick. 189, the plaintiff was driving on the highway, when, by accident, the bolt by which the whippletree was fastened to the cross-piece came out, and the whippletree fell suddenly upon the horse's legs, whereupon he was frightened and broke from the harness, and ran with great violence upon large loose stones which lay in the road, and broke his leg. The stones were seven feet, eight inches from the cart rut. Per curiam:
"From the facts in the case it appears that no negligence is imputable to the plaintiffs, that the injury to their horse was occasioned by the stones in the highway as alleged in the declaration, and that the defendants had notice of the obstruction; and the only question is whether these stones constituted such an obstruction as renders the defendants liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiffs. If it was such an obstruction as they were bound to remove, they are answerable. It is necessary that we should consider what is required of towns. The statute provides that highways shall be kept in repair and amended from time to time, that the same may be safe and convenient for travelers, with their horses, etc. Of course, travelers are to use due diligence to avoid accidents, and towns are to keep the highways in such condition that travelers using such care may go safe. We think it clear that this provision does not mean that the whole of the road, from one boundary to the other, shall be made smooth. But there may be such obstructions out of the beaten path as will render the road unsafe, such, for instance as would frighten horses. We think the obstruction complained of was not a defect for which the defendants are liable."
In Hoffart v. Town of West Turin, 90 App. Div. 345, 85 N. Y. Supp. 471, the right of the pile of wood to be or be placed upon the side of the highway was not questioned.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted upon questions of law only.
McLENNAN, P. J., concurs. WILLIAMS, J., votes for reversal on the ground that the verdict is excessive.
Judgment and order denying motion for new trial on the minutes reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.