Case Name: ELIZABETH V. COLLINS, GENERAL ADMINISTRATRIX AND ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF MARTIN L. COLLINS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. UNIROYAL, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1974-02-04
Citations: 64 N.J. 260
Docket Number: 
Parties: ELIZABETH V. COLLINS, GENERAL ADMINISTRATRIX AND ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF MARTIN L. COLLINS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. UNIROYAL, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 260–275

Head Matter:
ELIZABETH V. COLLINS, GENERAL ADMINISTRATRIX AND ADMINISTRATRIX AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF MARTIN L. COLLINS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. UNIROYAL, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Argued December 3, 1973
Decided February 4, 1974.
Mr. Burtis W. Horner argued the cause for defendant-appellant (Messrs. Stryker, Tams and Dill, attorneys).
Mr. Michael H. Hochman argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent (Messrs. Miller, Hochman, Meyerson & Miller, attorneys).

Opinion:
Pee Cueiam.
We affirm essentially for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Appellate Division, 126 N. J. Super. 401 (1973). However, we add the following to address the concept of our dissenting colleague that the adverse verdict on the strict liability count implies there was no defect in the tire and that where a tire is without defect it is not prima facie unconscionable for the manufacturer to limit his damages for breach of express warranty against a blowout to a replacement of the tire even where personal injuries or death ensue as a result of the breach.
1. The dissent does not dispute that N. J. S. A. 12A: 2-719(3) is applicable to claims for breach of express warranty. On the face of the statute, that section renders prima facie unconscionable a contractual limitation of damages in the case of consumer goods where the claim of damages per tains to injury to the person, as here. A cause of action for breach of express warranty, as the Legislature of course knew, does not depend upon a defect in the goods. Indeed, the affirmative establishment by the defendant of freedom from defect would be irrelevant in such an action. It therefore appears highly unlikely that the legislative declaration of prima facie uneonscionability in the instance of contractual limitation of damages for personal injury was intended to be negated in a case of breach of express warranty merely because a defect in the product could not be established. We are clear that an issue of freedom from.defect could not be injected by a defendant into an action for breach of express warranty for any purpose at all.
2. If the foregoing proposition is sound, and the question of defect consequently irrelevant on the issue of damages as well as that of liability in- an -action solely for breach of express warranty, it should be immaterial in this case that the plaintiff joined a count on strict tort liability in her complaint and that the jury found against her on that count (assuming, arguendo, that such a finding establishes freedom from defect in the product, as the dissent posits, rather than mere failure of plaintiff to carry her burden of persuasion on the strict liability count). Clearly the plaintiff should not stand in a worse posture for having joined a claim in strict liability than had she sued only on the express warranty.
3. Part of the rationale by which the dissent concludes that "the prima facie uneonscionability' contemplated by the Code has been overcome," and that uneonscionability does not otherwise appear, is the thesis that defendant by its warranty, even as limited, gave plaintiff's decedent more than he was otherwise entitled to by law and that it would foster such offers by businessmen in the future to permit them to restrict consequential damages as in this case. We deem this position not consonant with the commercial and human realities.
A tire manufacturer warrants against blowouts in order to increase tire sales. Public advertising by defendant rela tive to these tires stated: "If it only saves yonr life once, it's a bargain." The seller should be held to realize that the purchaser of a tire buying it because so warranted is far more likely to have made the purchase decision in order to protect himself and the passengers in his car from death or personal injury in a blowout accident than to assure himself of a refund of the price of the tire in such an event. That being the natural reliance and the reasonable expectation of the purchaser flowing from the warranty, it appears to us patently unconscionable for the manufacturer to be permitted to limit his damages for a breach of warranty proximately resulting in the purchaser's death to a price refund or replacement of the tire. We consequently agree with the determination of the Appellate Division that the statutory presumption of unconscionability was not here overcome and that the trial court ruled correctly on the issue.
Judgment affirmed.