Case Name: Gracette WILKINS, Appellant, v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-01-27
Citations: 754 So. 2d 50
Docket Number: No. 1D98-3901
Parties: Gracette WILKINS, Appellant, v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: JOANOS, J., concurs; ALLEN, J., dissenting with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 754
Pages: 50–53

Head Matter:
Gracette WILKINS, Appellant, v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees.
No. 1D98-3901.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 27, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 29, 2000.
L. Barry Keyfetz, of Keyfetz, Asnis & Srebnick, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
John M. Kelley, of Kelley, Kronenberg, Kelley, Gilmartin, Fichtel & Wander, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellees.

Opinion:
KAHN, J.
In this workers' compensation case, the claimant, Gracette Wilkins, appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) awarding attorney's fees and costs. Wilkins argues that, in determining the amount of fees due, the JCC erred in excluding supplemental benefits after age 65. We affirm.
During the attorneys' fee hearing before the JCC, a dispute arose regarding the calculation of benefits and the applicability of this court's statements in Burger King Corp. v. Moreno, 689 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), concerning section 440.15(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes. Section 440.15(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes (1993), provides that entitlement to permanent total disability (PTD) supplemental benefits "shall cease at age 62 if the employee is eligible for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423, whether or not the employee has applied for such benefits." In Moreno, the court concluded that this statute did not preclude an award of PTD supplemental benefits to a 6.9-year-old claimant who was receiving social security retirement benefits (under 42 U.S.C. section 402), but not social security disability benefits (under 42 U.S.C. section 423). See Moreno, 689 So.2d at 289.
At the fee hearing, the E/C argued that the Moreno case did not apply here because Wilkins was younger than 62 at the time of her accident and PTD designation, whereas Moreno was 69 at the time of her accident and never would have been eligible for or qualified for social security disability. According to the E/C's argument, in calculating the benefits secured for Wilkins, supplemental benefits should not be included after age 65.
Wilkins' attorney argued, however, that Wilkins would be entitled to supplemental benefits after age 65. He argued that, in finding Moreno entitled to supplemental benefits, the court indicated that such benefits cease only during the time when a claimant is eligible for both social security retirement and social security disability. Thus, because eligibility for social security disability benefits terminates after age 65, Wilkins would be entitled to supplemental benefits at that point. Wilkins' attorney also pointed out the Legislature considered changing the statute after the Moreno decision, but chose not to do so. Therefore, according to this argument, in calculating the amount of benefits secured for Wilkins, supplemental benefits should be excluded only between ages 62 and 65.
In the order on appeal, the JCC accepted the E/C's argument and distinguished Moreno "because of the age difference of the parties at the time of the award." The JCC thus found that the value of supplemental benefits after age 65 should not be included in the calculation of benefits secured and awarded fees accordingly. We agree.
As noted above, section 440.15(l)(e)l. provides that entitlement to supplemental benefits "shall cease at age 62 if the employee is eligible for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402 and 423, whether or not the employee has applied for such benefits." Although this court has considered several eases involving this statute, no case has involved a claimant injured and found PTD before age 62. See Orlando Regional Healthcare System v. Owens, 731 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (claimant injured at age 62 and found PTD at age 63); Dixon v. Pasadena Yacht & Country Club, 731 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (claimant injured at age 61 and found PTD at age 63); Scott v. Mohawk Canoes, 730 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (claimant injured at age 61 and found PTD at age 64); Moreno, 689 So.2d at 289 (claimant injured and found PTD at age 69).
We hold that in cases such as this, where a claimant is injured and reaches PTD prior to age 62, the claimant is not entitled to supplemental benefits after age 65. The Legislature could have legitimately assumed that in these cases a claimant would not continue to work after a traditional retirement age. Indeed, in these cases, the "shall cease" language of the statute means just that. In Moreno the language could never have been triggered. To the extent that statements in our opinion in Moreno may indicate otherwise, such statements constitute dicta. Under Moreno where a claimant reaches PTD after age 62, the claimant is entitled to supplemental benefits after age 65.
AFFIRMED.
JOANOS, J., concurs; ALLEN, J., dissenting with written opinion.