Case Name: Clarendon Land Investment Agency Company v. McClelland Bros.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1893-11-23
Citations: 86 Tex. 179
Docket Number: No. 47
Parties: Clarendon Land Investment Agency Company v. McClelland Bros.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 179–192

Head Matter:
Clarendon Land Investment Agency Company v. McClelland Bros.
No. 47.
1. Cattle May Bun at Large—Duty of Owner of Land. Neither the courts nor the Legislature of this State have ever recognized the rule of the common law which requires every man to restrain his cattle, either by tethering or by enclosure. If cattle of one person wander upon the unenclosed lands of another, or upon his lands imperfectly enclosed, they are not trespassers, and the owner is not liable for any damage that they may inflict. It follows, that one who desires to secure his lands against the encroachments of livestock running at large, either upon the open range or in adjoining fields or pastures, must throw around it an enclosure sufficient to prevent the entry of all ordinary animals of the class intended to be excluded. A charge in conflict with this rule held reversible error...............185
2. Kind of Fence. It may be admitted, that if the owner’s enclosure be sufficient to exclude all cattle of an ordinary disposition, he would have the right to recover for the trespass of such as are peculiarly vicious and prone to break fences........................................................ 186
3. Bight of Owners of Livestock. It is the right of every owner of domestic animals in this State, not known to be diseased, vicious, or breachy, to allow them to run at large, and this without reference to the "size or class of such animals kept by others in the same neighborhood; e. g., a stock owner may turn his calves and yearlings out, although adjoining a pasture built to secure older and larger kinds..................................... 186
4. Statutes Defining Lawful Fences, etc. Title 43; title 93, chapter 5, and act amendatory, March 26, 1887, apply to lands in cultivation, and not to pasture lands...................... 186
5. Diseased Cattle. An owner of diseased cattle would be liable in damages caused by placing them in his pasture adjoining another into which it was probable the diseased cattle might intrude.................................... 187
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
6. Conclusiveness of the Findings of Fact by Courts of Civil Appeals. It is prescribed that “ the judgments of the Courts of Civil Appeals shall be conclusive upon the facts of a case.” By this is meant that the decision of that tribunal upon questions of fact—that is to say, questions upon which there may be a conflict in the evidence—shall be final, and not the subject of review in this court .............................. 187
7. Same. In accordance with the statute, Acts of 1892, page 22, this court adopted rule 5 (of Rules, etc.), directing that the transcript shall be transmitted to this court in every case in which a writ of error shall have been granted. This is to enable this court to decide all issues presented for its determination in the light of the pleadings, and of every fact established by undisputed evidence, or the conclusions of the Court of Civil Appeals upon the conflicting evidence................ 188
8. Same. Where the testimony in the record is undisputed, it will be considered by this court, although it conflict with a finding by the Court of Civil Appeals. See example............................................. 188
9. Rules. Rules 24, 25, and 26, on assignments of error, discussed and construed.. 190
10. Assignments of Error. When an assignment of error is sufficiently specific to enable the court t to see that a particular ruling is complained of, it should be held good. ; The reasons by which allegations of error are sustained find their proper place in the propositions, statements, and authorities required to be set forth in the brief, under and in support of the respective assignments .......................................................... 101
11. Same. An assignment of error, that 11 the court erred in the fifth paragraph of his charge to the jury, which is as follows” (setting it out), is sufficient, without allegation wherein is the error complained of..... 189,1^2
12. Same. An assignment, that “ the court erred in overruling the defendant’s general demurrer to plaintiffs’ petition,” should be held good, and should be considered on appeal............................................. 192
13. Cause of Action. ! Allegation that plaintiffs’ land was securely fenced and that defendant permitted its cattle to break through their enclosure, states cause of action on general demurrer......................................... 192
Error to Court of Civil Appeals for Second District, in an appeal from Donley County.
Matlock & Peacock and W. R. Butler, for plaintiff in error.
1. Ttie court erred in overruling the defendant’s general demurrer to plaintiffs’ original petition. The allegation of the scienter is not only a material allegation, but is a necessary allegation, and must be proved. Gibbs v. Coykendall, 39 Hun, 140; Cook v. Waring, H. & C., 2 Exch., 331-338; Fisher v. Clark, 41 Barb., 329; Week’s Dam. Ab. Inj., sec. 118, note 1; Hale v. Blanford, 45 Ill., 9; Fultz v. Wyckoff, 25 Ind., 324; Kerschacke v. Ludwig, 25 Wis., 430; Wormley v. Gregg, 56 Ill., 251; Lyke v. Van Leuven, 4 Denio, 127; 17 N. Y., 520; Tift v. Tift, 17 N. Y., 538; Sedg. on Meas. of Dam., 722, 723; 1 Thomp. on Neg., 186, 189, 205, 206; Cool. on Torts, 343, and note 2, 344, and note 102; Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S., 645; Moss v. Partridge, 9 Ill. App., 490; Twigg v.Ryland, 24 Am. Law Reg., 191; Whit. Smith on Neg., 101, 102.
2. Simply turning one’s cattle, having an infectious disease, into his own pasture, adjoining the pasture of another, occupied by cattle, is not unlawful, nor such an act or wrong or negligence as will give to the owner of the adjoining premises a cause of action for damages sustained in consequence of the disease being communicated to his cattle. Fisher v. Clark, 41 Barb., 329; Mills v. Railway, 41 N. Y., 619; Walker v. Her ron, 22 Texas, 55; Scott v. Groves, 46 Am. Rep., 814; Gibbs v. Coykendall, 39 Hun, 141.
3. Plaintiffs can not recover in this case, even if defendant had known when it placed the cattle in its pasture in Donley County that the same were liable to communicate disease to plaintiffs’ cattle, unless the evidence shows that defendant was guilty of culpable negligence and willfulness in the care and custody, management, and handling of their cattle, and as a result of such culpable negligence and willfulness plaintiffs’ cattle contracted the disease and died therefrom. And it must further appear that the plaintiffs have not been guilty of any culpable negligence or willfulness or contributory negligence in handling, managing, and caring for their own cattle. Walker v. Herron, 22 Texas, 60; Wolf v. Iron Works Co., 10 Cal., 544; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., secs. 5, 12; Hoffman v. Water Co., 10 Cal., 413; 1 Hill, on Torts, 67; Sedg. on Dam., 7 ed., 362.
4. If it appears from the evidence that plaintiffs were guilty of culpable negligence, or that their negligence contributed to the injury they suffered, whatever may be the degree of their negligence, notwithstanding the defendant may have been guilty of negligence, yet plaintiffs can not recover. Walker v. Herron, 22 Texas, 59, 60; Telfer v. Railway, 3 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 665; Wild v. Feairrie, 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 242; Zoebisch v. Tarbell, 5 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 572; Waters v. Wing, 8 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 738; Canal Co. v. Bentley, 10 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 746; Jacob v. Duke, 3 Am. Law Reg., O. S., 443; O’Brien v. Railway, 6 Am. Law Reg., O. S., 361; Freer v. Cameron, 55 Am. Dec., 670, and note; 2 Sedg. on Dam., 347-349, note 1, 349, 350, note A, and 358; 1 Sedg. on Dam., 164, 165, note A; Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow., 78.
Counsel cited additional authorities in petition for writ of error: Salinas v. Wright, 11 Texas, 577; Lipscomb v. Bryan, 22 Texas, 609; Sneed v. Moodie, 24 Texas, 160; Whitlock v. Castro, 22 Texas, 111; Ramsay v. McCauley, 2 Texas, 189; Morrison v. Ins. Co., 69 Texas, 359; Railway v. Hennessy, 75 Texas, 157; Ford v. Taggart, 4 Texas, 492; Champion v. Vincent, 20 Texas, 812; Hilliard v. Railway, 37 Iowa, 445; Syford v. Shryford, 61 Iowa, 155; Clark v. Phelps, 4 Cow., 190; Johnson v. Presby, 2 N. H., 56.
Browning & Madden, for defendants in error, in original brief, cited:
Davis v. Davis, 70 Texas, 123; Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis., 536; Zacharie v. Bryan, 2 Texas, 274; Prewett v. Farris, 5 Texas, 370; Warner v. Bailey, 7 Texas, 517; Deys v. Stewart, 4 Denio, 101; Hamburg v. Wood, 66 Texas, 168; Walker v. Herron, 22 Texas, 55; Gallaher v. Bowie, 66 Texas, 70; Hays v. Hays, 66 Texas, 606; Shumard v. Johnson, 66 Texas, 70; Randall v. Carlisle, 59 Texas, 69; Powell v. Haley, 28 Texas, 53; Briscoe v. Bronough, 1 Texas, 326; Chevallier v. Denson, 8 Texas, 439; Alley v. Booth, 16 Texas, 94; Ward v. Bledsoe, 32 Texas, 251; 1 Thomp. on Neg., 206, 209; 6 Wait’s Act. and Def., 72; 1 Suth. on Dam., 24.
And in supplemental brief contended: 1. That said petition is good
on general demurrer. Dist. Ct. Rule 17, 47 Texas, 619; Frosh v. Sweet, 2 Texas, 485; Williams v. Warnell, 28 Texas, 610. The plaintiffs’ petition alleged that their land was “securely fenced and enclosed,” and that averment is good against a general exception. ;
2. Under the second proposition submitted in the petition in error, it is contended, that the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals does not correctly declare the law of this case, and in support of their position they cite a number of authorities which were never referred to in their brief before the Court of Civil Appeals.
It will be seen upon examination that these cases are not applicable to the case at bar.
Cole v. Tucker, 6 Texas, 270, was an action in trespass against the defendant for killing a mule belonging to plaintiff, while it was depredating upon defendant’s crop. The defendant, in his answer, admitted that he had an insufficient fence, but justified himself by a tender of money for the damages done, and thus-tried to evade the plaintiff’s right to vindictive or exemplary damages. The decision turned upon the point whether the defendant was liable for exemplary damages.
Ford v. Taggart, 4 Texas, 492, is a similar case, and the court says that the defendant has no right to destroy plaintiff’s property, even if his fence was lawful.
Champion v. Vincent, 20 Texas, 811, was an action against defendant for shooting three of plaintiff’s hogs while they were rooting up potatoes in defendant’s potato patch.
All three of these cases turned upon the question of the right in the plaintiffs to recover exemplary damages for the destruction of their stock by the willful acts of defendant. Therefore we contend that they aré not applicable to this case.
Webster defines-a “gardener” to be “ one who makes and tends a garden; horticulturist.” He defines a “farmer” tobe “ one who farms; as one who hires and cultivates a farm; a cultivator of leased ground; a tenant; an agriculturist; ahusbandman.” He also defines a “planter” to be “one who plants, sets, introduces, or establishes; as a planter of maize; a planter of vines; one who owns a plantation.” (
From these definitions, we can not see how article 2431 of the Revised Statutes can be construed into the meaning insisted upon by counsel for plaintiff in error. And further, the said article provides for the fence to be “about his cleared land in cultivation.” Why not have said: “about his land” if the intention was that contended for by opposing counsel ?
Take into further consideration the time when this act was originally passed (1840), and the meaning of the law is clear. This court held in Davis v. Davis, 70 Texas, 123, that “ Every owner of land in this State is entitled to its exclusive enjoyment. If he take no steps to guard against the intrusions of his neighbor’s cattle, he can not complain if they roam over and graze upon it. If he enclose it, his enclosure must be respected, although it may not be a statutory fence.” The opinion further says: “The object of the statute was to afford an easy remedy for trespasses by livestock to such land owners as complied with its provisions, and was not to throw open to the use of the public the lands of all proprietors who did not observe the statutory requirements in making or maintaining these enclosures. We are not prepared to say that the Legislature had the power to make the private lands in the State, when not enclosed in a particular manner, a common grazing ground, if it so desired.” 70 Texas, 125.
Again, this court, in Worthington v. Wade, 82 Texas, 26, said: “It seems to be insisted that because the fence is not such as is prescribed by the Act of April 18, 1879, it was unlawful to construct it. But the object of that act was merely to prescribe such a fence as would enable land owners to enforce certain remedies against the owners of trespassing animals, and not to prohibit any other kind of fence.” 82 Texas, 28, 29. And the court in said case again confirms the doctrine laid down in Davis v. Davis, 70 Texas, 123.
There is nothing in chapter 4, title 93, of Sayles’ Civil Statutes, or in title 43 of said statutes, that conflicts in any manner with the principle enunciated by the two last decisions above cited, nor with those cited by plaintiff in error. If the plaintiff in error is bound to have some statutory rule to govern a recovery in this case, it would seem that article 4609 ought to satisfy it.
The Court of Appeals, in the case of Wool Growing Company v. Bogel, 3 Willson’s Civil Cases, section 273, held that an action would lie against defendant for entering upon the plaintiff’s unenclosed lands with 5000 sheep, and herding same upon said land, over the protests of the plaintiff.
The criminal laws of this State also indicate clearly the intention of the law making power to protect a land owner in his possessions, whenever he evinces a desire to maintain exclusive control over his land by placing a fence around it. That policy is shown particularly in Penal Code, articles 665, 675a, 684, 684a, and 631a. Also, Laws 23rd Leg., ch. 67, pp. 87, 88.
The policy of this State in reference to this question seems to be so clearly settled that the Court of Civil Appeals very properly made use of the following language in rendering the opinion in this case when before that court: “It must be considered as settled in this State, that the failure of the owner of land to construct around it the exact kind of fence prescribed by the statute does not throw it open to whomsoever sees proper to drive his cattle thereon; these statutes being regarded as intended to prescribe an easy remedy for those who so enclose their land, leaving those who do not to settle their rights independent of' the statute.” • >
To change this settled policy now would confuse and embarrass almost every settler in the entire west and northwest portion of the State, constituting more than one-half of the area of Texas. It is almost impossible to find, in the entire Panhandle country, such a fence as the counsel for plaintiff in error insists that the defendants in error should have had around their land to entitle them to recover their damages so clearly and indisputably shown in this case.

Opinion:
GAINES, Associate Justice.
This suit was brought in the District Court of Donley County, by the defendants in error, to recover of plaintiff in error damages for an alleged trespass of the latter's cattle upon the pasture of the former. It was claimed in the petition that the plaintiffs' cattle had died by reason of a disease communicated to them by those of the defendant. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs, which, upon appeal by the defendant, was affirmed in the Court of Civil Appeals.
It was shown upon the trial, that the plaintiffs were the owners of a pasture embracing 2000 acres, which was enclosed by a wire fence, and upon which they held about 100 head of cattle. This pasture was entirely surrounded by a much larger one, which was owned by the defendant corporation, and which was also enclosed by a fence of the same general character. The fence of plaintiffs, as they testified, was constructed of "posts about 30 feet apart, with four barbed wires, and three or four stays between each post." In 1889 the defendant company placed in its pasture a large number of East Texas cattle, which were less in size than the cattle of the Panhandle section. Some of these cattle passed through! the plaintiffs' fence and into their pasture, and there was evidence sufficient to justify a finding that they communicated a disease to some of plaintiffs' cattle, from which they died. The fence appears to have been passed through by the young cattle, presumably the calves and yearlings: One of the plaintiffs testified that " they (meaning the cattle) would crawl through the fence." The other also testified as follows: " They were small, and just walked through our fence."
The court charged the jury as follows: " Every entry of one's own! cattle upon the lands or premises of another is a trespass, and the owner of such cattle will be liable for any damages sustained by the owner of such premises, if any, provided such lands or premises were at the time of such entry enclosed by a fence sufficient to exclude therefrom such; cattle or animals as were accustomed to be used in the country or the range around and about such enclosed premises, and provided further that such trespass is effected by a forcible entry through such fence or enclosure."
This charge was assigned as error upon the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, and the assignment is insisted upon in this court.
Neither the courts nor the Legislature of this State have ever recognized the rule of the common law of England which requires every man to restrain his cattle either by tethering or by enclosure. Davis v. Davis, 70 Texas, 123. Hence if the cattle of one person wander upon the unenclosed lands of another, or upon his lands imperfectly enclosed, they are not trespassers, and the owner is not liable for any damage that they may inflict. It follows that one who desires to secure his lands against the encroachments of livestock running at large, either upon the open range or in an adjoining field or pasture, must throw around it an enclosure sufficient to prevent the entry of all ordinary animals of the class intended to be excluded. If he does not, the owner of animals that may encroach upon it will not be held liable for any damage that may result from such encroachment. This is the necessary result of the right of the owner of domestic animals to permit them to run at large, as recognized by the laws of this State. Since he does not owe the duty of confining his cattle, he is guilty of no negligence, and he does no wrong by allowing them to go unconfined, and is not responsible for their acts if, by reason of an insecure fence, they inflict damages upon the lands of a neighbor. In other words, their encroachment upon another's lands is not a trespass. If, however, he drives his cattle upon the enclosed land of another, however imperfectly enclosed, he is guilty of a trespass, for which he is liable to answer in damages. Davis v. Davis, supra.
Tested by the rule we have announced, the charge under consideration can not be sustained. Abstractly considered, it admits of a holding, that if only sheep ' ' were accustomed to be used in the country or in the range around and about the enclosed premises," and the owner of the land had a fence sufficient to exclude such animals, one who should bring in neat cattle, and leave them unconfined upon adjacent lands, would be held to respond in damages for any loss that might ensue by reason of their encroaching upon the enclosed premises. It is clear that such is not the law. It is but just, however, to the learned judge who tried the case to say, that it is apparent from the entire charge, in the light of the testimony, that he did not intend to lay down so broad a doctrine. He referred solely to neat cattle. But the possible construction we have suggested serves to illustrate what we conceive to be an error in the instruction, when applied, as doubtless intended, to the latter class of animals only.
We do not hold that for no breach of his fence and invasion of his pasture by domestic animals could a land owner recover under our laws. It may be admitted, that if his enclosure be sufficient to exclude all cat- tie of an ordinary disposition, he would have the right to recover for the trespass of such as were peculiarly vicious and prone to break fences. The owner of a dog may, as a general rule, permit him with impunity to run at large, but if he knows him to be vicious and does not restrain him, he is liable for any injury he may inflict upon person or property; and,it would seem that the same principle should apply to the owner of any domestic animal known to him as being accustomed to break through an ordinarily good and sufficient fence.
But upon what principle are we to draw a distinction between small cattle and large ? If the fact that all the cattle in the neighborhood of his pasture were of large breeds when his fence was constructed would relieve the owner of the necessity of making his fence sufficiently close to keep out small cattle that might be brought into the country, why should he be not relieved against the necessity of fencing against hogs, provided there were no hogs within reach when he made his enclosuré ? The owner of the little " dogies" (as the witnesses call them), such as crawled or walked so freely under the wires of plaintiffs' fence, had precisely the same right to permit them to go at large as his neighbors had who owned Herefords or shorthorns; and it could make no difference who came first with his cattle to the neighborhood. It is equally unimportant whether others in the same section or neighborhood kept the same kind of cattle or not.
It is the right of every owner of domestic animals in this State, not known to be diseased, vicious, or "breachy," to allow them to run át large, and this without reference to the size or class of such animals kept by others in the same neighborhood. For these reasons we think there was error in the charge complained of, for which the judgment must be reversed.
We are of the opinion that the Act of March 26, 1879 (2 Sayles' Civil Statutes, article 4609a), applies only to counties and subdivisions of counties in which the provisions of chapter 4 of title 93 of the Revised Statutes have been put in force by an election. So also title 43, in relation to fences, applies only to lands in cultivation, and not to pasture lands. They have no bearing upon the case, except in so far as they evince a recognition by the Legislature of the general rule, that owners of domestic animals have the right in this State to permit them to run at large. ,
In order to obviate any misconception in the scope of this opinion, we call attention to the radical distinction between this case and that of Davis v. Davis, supra. In that case the defendant drove his cattle upon the plaintiff's enclosed land. That made him a willful trespasser. In this the defendant corporation merely put its cattle upon its own pasture, and they passed the plaintiffs' fence of their own volition.
If the agents of the defendant corporation knew that their calves could pass through the plaintiffs' enclosure, and that they were likely to com municate disease to the latter's cattle, it was negligence on its part not to confine them, and for the consequences of that negligence it would be liable.
The judgments of the District Court and of the Court of Civil Appeals are reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.