Case Name: John Chaffe & Sons vs. Ernest Heyner
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1879-05
Citations: 31 La. 594
Docket Number: No. 6700
Parties: John Chaffe & Sons vs. Ernest Heyner.
Judges: The opinion of the court on the motion to dismiss was delivered by Manning, C. J. • On the merits the opinion on the original hearing was ■delivered by Spencer, J., and on the rehearing by White, J.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 594–627

Head Matter:
No. 6700.
John Chaffe & Sons vs. Ernest Heyner.
An order of appeal on motion in open court which Axes the return day on a day this court is not in session is not ground for dismissing the appeal. Such an order, although made in compliance with the motion of appellant’s attorney, is the act of the court, and lienee the error of it is not imputable to the appellant.
A charge by a factor “ for advancing” money, over and above oight per cent per annum interest, can not, under the general issue, bo recovered.
Where cotton, which had been transferred by a planter in a neighboring State, under the form of conveyance of the common law chattel-mortgage, to secure a certain creditor, is afterwards shipped by a common carrier for the account of the creditor, the delivery of the cotton to the carrier, is a transfer of the legal title to the creditor, who thereby becomes in effect the consignor, and whose rights of ownership of the cotton can not be affected by an attachment levied by any other creditor of the shipper.
The action of a consignee in accepting or refusing a consignment can not affect the consignor’s title to the goods consigned.
Where two lots of goods are consigned by one single bill of lading, for account of two different persons, the consignee can not accept the consignment as to one lot, and refuse it as to the other. If he accepts as to one, he thereby accepts as to both.
A PPEAL from the Fourth District Court, parish of Orleans. Houston, J.
Bayne & Benshaw for plaintiffs and appellees.
E. Evariste Moise and Hornor & Benedict for intervenors and defendants, appellants.
The opinion of the court on the motion to dismiss was delivered by Manning, C. J. • On the merits the opinion on the original hearing was ■delivered by Spencer, J., and on the rehearing by White, J.

Opinion:
On motion to dismiss.
Manning, 0. J.
This appeal was taken by motion, and is returnable on first day of November 1877, instead of the first Monday of November, which is the opening day of the term. The motion to dismiss is based upon the ground that no appeal can be made returnable on the first day of November, the court not being in session then. The ruling in Rains v. Kemp is cited by the appellee as conclusive upon the question, it being said there that an order of appeal, returnable on a day on which the court does not sit is equivalent to an order allowing the appeal to be returned on any day, or not to be returned at all, and may be treated as a nullity. 4 La. 318.
But that ease was decided in 1832, and the statute of 1839 operated a great and necessary change in the mode or causes for which appeals were dismissable. The rankest injustice had been so often done by the dismissal of appeals for all' manner of technicalities and informalities, that provision was then made, saving parties appellant from dismissal for defects or irregularities not imputable to them. Rev. Stats. 1870, sec. 36.
It is alleged however here that the defect is imputable to the appellant, because the motion is written by his attorney and the day is fixed therein, and the judge merely adopted the day thus fixed.
An order of court, whether written by the attorney of one of the litigants or by the clerk, is the act of the judge. In the country parishes, the habit of lawyers is to Write the judgments for the judge who signs them, and such judgments thus signed are no more the acts of the attorney than is an order of appeal, such as that made in this case, and which is written by the attorney, as is the habit of practitioners here. It was the judge who made the order of appeal, and who named an improper day for its return, and the appellant cannot be prejudiced by his act.
It was lately held that where an application for appeal was made in writing, and the time for its return made by the judge was the same as that asked by the appellants, the error was their own and they must bear its consequences. Citizens Bank v. Ruty, 26 Annual, 747. It would seem that the appeal in that case was made by petition in which the appellant formally and expressly mentioned the return day. Perhaps we should not have ruled as the court then did, but in the present instance we hold that the order of appeal is the act of the judge and a mistake of a return day made by him cannot be visited upon the appellant.
The motion to dismiss is denied.