Case Name: Clark against Beach
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1826-06
Citations: 6 Conn. 142
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clark against Beach :
Judges: Peters, Brainard and Lanman, Js. were of the same opinion.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 142–165

Head Matter:
Clark against Beach :
IN ERROR.
An action of trespass quare clausum fregit, demanding not more than seven dollars damages, returnable to a justice of the peace, and thence removed, on a plea of title, to the county court, is appealable from the latter court to the superior court.
But the right of appeal, in such case, does not deprive the party of his remedy by writ of error.
Where the defendant, in support of a plea of title, offered in evidence certain declarations of a former grantor of the land in question, as to its boundaries, which, in opposition to the plaintiff’s objection, were admitted ; the plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions, and thereupon brought a writ of error; but the bill of exceptions did not shew when the declarations were made, or that they were relevant to the point in issue; it was held, that they were inadmissible.
Where the defendant, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, justified under the licence and authority of A., who was alleged to be “the true and lawful owner of the land, and was lawfully seised and possessed thereof :" and in support of such plea, the defendant offered in evidence a mortgage deed from B. to A., the law-day having expired, and the mortgagee being in possession ; it was held, that such evidence was admissible.
This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought originally by Simeon Beach against Elisha Clark, before William Kellogg, Esq. a justice of the peace, alleging, that the plaintiff, on the 1st of May, 1823, was well seised and possessed of a certain tract of land, upon which the defendant entered, trode down and destroyed the grass, &c. demanding seven dollars damages. The defendant pleaded as follows: “ That at the time of doing the acts and committing the supposed trespasses in the plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, one Abby Betsey Mills was the true and legal owner of the land on which &c. and was then and there lawfully seised and possessed of the same ; and the defendant, as the servant of the said Abby Betsey Mills, and by her direction and command, entered upon said land, and did the acts complained of, as well he might.” The cause was thereupon removed to the county court, on the recognizance of the defendant to prosecute his plea before that court. Issue being joined to the court on this plea, the cause was tried on such issue, at the December term, 1824.
Litchfield,
June, 1826.
On the trial, the defendant, for the purpose of establishing a title in Abby Betsey Mills offered in evidence a mortgage deed, dated the 5th of February, 1821, from Lydia Mills to her, of the land on which the alleged trespasses were committed. It appeared, that the mortgage had been forfeited, and the possession of the land surrendered, by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, before the acts complained of were done ; and that, at that time, the mortgagee was in possession. The equity of redemption, however, remained in the mortgagor, not having been foreclosed. To the admission of this deed, for the purpose for which it was offered, the defendant objected ; but the court admitted it.
To establish the title of Lydia Mills, the defendant then offered in evidence an absolute deed of the land to her from her father, Benjamin Beach, dated the 5th of February, 1821 ; he being, at that time, the undisputed owner, and in possession. One of the bounds mentioned in the deed, was " a heap of stones on or near Goshen line, which is the South corner of Simeon Beach’s land.” The plaintiff claimed, that this was a heap of stones near a certain hemlock tree in Goshen line, about 1G rods South of the point claimed by the defendant; and offered a witness to testify, that Benjamin Beach, since deceased, declared, in his life-time, that “ the heap of stones near said hemlock tree, was the true boundary." The defendant then offered witnesses to testify, that said Benjamin Beach, in his life-time, declared, that “ a certain stake, shewn to the witnesses, standing in the ground at or near the North-West corner of the plaintiff’s land, was the North-East corner of the land conveyed to Lydia Mills, and that the North-West comer of said land was a number of links North of a certain brook; which stake was some rods North of the North line of said land, as claimed by the plaintiff.” To the admission of the testimony thus offered by the defendant, the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted it.
The issue being found and judgment rendered for the defendant, the plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions ; and thereupon brought a writ of error in the superior court.
The defendant pleaded in abatement of the writ of error, that the original action was appealable by the plaintiff from the judgment of the county court to the superior court then next to be holden in Litchfield county; and that if the plaintiff had so appealed said action, he might have tried it before the latter court. On a demurrer to this plea, it was adjudged insufficient. The defendant then pleaded in nullo est erratum ; and the superior court reversed the judgment of the county court. The present writ of error was thereupon brought.
Bacon and P. Miner, for the plaintiff in error,
contended, 1. That the plea in abatement of the writ of error, was sufficient ; inasmuch as the cause was appealable; and it is a general rule, that where an appeal is given by statute from the judgment of any court, the remedy of the party aggrieved by the judgment, is exclusively by appeal, on which the whole merits of the cause may be examined, and errors in law, as well as mistakes of fact, may be corrected. First, the cause was ap-pealable from the county court. The statute gives an appeal “ in any action brought to, and tried by the county court, wherein the title of land is drawn in question and determined.” Slat. 51. tit. 2. s. 62. In this case, it will not be denied that the title of land was in question, and that it was tried and determined by the county court. Is it not equally clear, that the cause was brought to the county court ? It was literally brought there. Was it not brought there, also, within the meaning of the statute ? The writ was made returnable to a justice of the peace; but the cause was not tried by him, and could not be, after the plea of title was given. It was removed to the county court, without any judgment rendered. It was, in that court, an original action. Secondly, if the action was appealable to the superior court, there is no need of a writ of error; as the party may have every advantage on an appeal, which he could have, on a writ of error. The remedy by appeal, where it can be had, is more direct, is less expensive, and admits of further relief. Besides, on an appeal, the very ground of error may he removed, by amendment, or by presenting a different state of facts. It is, therefore, a reasonable implication from the statute, that in giving an appeal, it has taken away the remedy by error. This has been decided repeatedly in Massachusetts. Savage v. Gulliver, 4 Mass. Rep. 171. Putnam v. Churchill, 4 Mass. Rep. 516 Jarvis v. Blanchard, 6 Mass. Rep. 4. Champion v. Brooks, 9 Mass. Rep. 228. The general rule is recognized, also, in Valier & al. v. Hart & al. 11 Mass. Rep. 300. and in Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. Rep. 507. 512. The reasons on which these decisions are founded, are equally applicable in this state.
2. That the declarations of Benjamin Beach, regarding the bounds of the land, were admissible. First, he was the person under whom the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, claimed title by deed ; and what a grantor has said against his interest, is good evidence against those who claim under him. Jackson d. Gris-wold & al. v. Bard, 4 Johns. Rep. 230. Jackson d. McDonald v. McCall, 10 Johns. Rep. 377. Beers & al. v. Hawley & al. 2 Conn. Rep. 467. 470. Walker v. Broadstock, 1 Esp. Rep. 453. Davies v. Pierce & al. 2 Term Rep. 53. Secondly, these declarations were admissible, on the ground that what a deceased person, though not the grantor of the adverse party, has said against his interest, is good evidence. Roe d. Brune v. Rawlings, 7 East 279. 290, 1. Barry v. Bebbingion, 4 Term Rep. 514. Stead & al. v. Heaton & al. 4 Term Rep. 669. Higham & ux. v. Ridgway, 10 East 109. Doe v. Robson & al. 15 East 33. Doe d. Baggalley v. Jones, 1 Campb. 367. Thirdly, if these declarations are to be regarded as mere hearsay, yet as they related to ancient boundaries of land, they are admissible. Swift’s Evid. 121. Fourthly, Benjamin Beach, being in possession of the adjoining land, and occupying up to a certain place, his declarations accompanying his acts, are admissible as part of the res gesta-shewing what and where the occupation was. Williams v. Ensign, 4 Conn. Rep. 456. Davies v. Pierce & al. 2 Term Rep. 53. Holloway v. Rakes, cited 2 Term Rep. 55. Doe d. Foster v. Williams, Cowp. 621.
If this evidence might have been received, consistently with the rules of law, and there were any special circumstances in the case, which rendered it improper, it was incumbent on the plaintiff, when he took the exception, to shew them. Had he done so, they would have appeared upon the bill of exceptions; and he might have insisted on them here. As they do not appear, this Court will say they do not exist.
3. That the mortgage deed from Lydia Mills to Abby Betsey Mills, was proper evidence in support of the defendant’s plea. It proved a title in A. B. Mills paramount to the plantiff’s title; he being a mere tort-feasor. The mortgagee, on the execution of the mortgage deed, is vested with the fee of the land, and is entitled to immediate possession. Rockwell & al. v. Bradley, 2 Conn. Rep. 1. 4. Roath & al v. Smith & al. 5 Conn. Rep. 133. 137. Phelps v. Sage, 2 Day 151. Recognized in Groton v. Boxborough, 6 Mass. Rep. 50. 52, 3. When it is said in the books, that the morgator remains the real owner of the land,proposition, which, in its proper sense, is perfectly correct,it is not intended to deny the legal title of the mortgagee; this being expressly saved, in some instances, and by implication, in all. Willington v. Gale, 7 Mass. Rep. 138, 9. Groton v. Box-borough, before cited. Wakeman & al. v. Banks, 2 Conn. Rep. 445. 446, 7.
But whether the mortgagee is seised in fee, or not, is, in this case, an immaterial enquiry. He has, incontrovertibly, a right of possession : if so, he has a right to defend it: and if so, he has a right to plead his title, whatever it may be ; and if it is better than that of the plaintiff, he must prevail. A right of possession, with the actual possession, is clearly a title paramount to no title at all. Stat. 53. tit. 2. s. 65. This is sufficient for the defendant’s purpose. This supports enough of the plea to constitute a good defence ; and what relates to a seisin in fee, may be treated as surplusage. Hitchcock v. Hotchkiss, 1 Conn. Rep. 470.
J. W. Huntington and D. C. Sanford, for the defendant in error,
contended, 1. That the plea in abatement, filed to the writ of error in the superior court, was insufficient. First, the cause was not appealable; as the action was originally returnable, riot to the county court, but to a justice of the peace. A cause is made appealable from the county court, only where it is brought to and tried by that court. Secondly, if the cause was appealable, still error lies. A court of error is created to correct all the erroneous proceedings of inferior tribunals appearing on their records. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the nature and constitution of such a court, to suppose, that its jurisdiction ceases, whenever another mode of relief may be had. A writ of error is a writ of right-ex debito justiciæ : of course, it cannot be refused, because there may be another remedy. The only discretion in its allowance, exists in determining whether there is a reasonable ground of error apparent on the record. This being determined in the affirmative, the allowance of the writ becomes a matter of right. Stat. 54. tit. 2. s. 69. In a great proportion of the cases in which writs of error are brought, another remedy might be had.
2. That the declarations of Benjamin Beach, on the trial in the county court, were inadmissible. First, it does not appear from the bill of exceptions, when the declarations were made ; whether while he was the owner and in the possession of the land, or after he had conveyed the property and surrendered the possession. And here it is to be remarked, that in the case of a bill of exceptions, nothing is to be presumed. In this respect, it is like a special verdict. It is also well settled, that if the testimony offered, is, on general principles, admissible, but is claimed to be inadmissible, by reason of the existence of particular facts, and it is admitted, the bill of exceptions must state those facts ; otherwise, there is no error. On the other hand, if on general principles the testimony offered is inadmissible, but is claimed to be admissible, by way of exception, and it is. admitted, the bill of exceptions must set forth the facts, which constitute the exception ; otherwise, there is error. The evidence admitted in this case, is hearsay, and, on general principles, inadmissible; and no facts are stated in the bill of exceptions to bring the case within any exception to this general rule. It does not shew, that the declarations of Benjamin Beach were made when he had any interest to be affected by them. For aught that appears to the contrary, they may have been made before he owned the land, or post litem motam. Secondly, it does not appear, that these declarations were relevant to any point in issue. The court do not know, and cannot ascertain from the record, where the locus in quo was. But if they could, these declarations would throw no light on the question of title. There is not enough shewn to make out any connexion between them and any boundary line in controversy. Now, it is a settled rule, that if evidence was admitted on the trial, the relevancy of which does not appear from the bill of exceptions, the judgment will be deemed erroneous; because the court of revision cannot know what influence it had on the verdict.
3. That the mortgage deed offered in evidence to support the defendant’s plea, ought to have been rejected; it being irrelevant, not conducing to prove the averments in the plea. The plea avers, that A. B. Mills “ was the true and lawful owner, and lawfully seised and possessed.” Did this mortgage deed constitute her such ? The mortgagor is the owner of the property in fee-simple. He is "the true and lawful owner, and lawfully seised and possessed.” The interest of the mortgagee is a mere chose in action. The execution of the deed vests no jet, nor any title, in him; but confers a right to the possession merely ; and operates as a licence to the mortgagee to enter. The King v. St. Michael’s, Doug. 632. Huntington v. Smith, 4 Conn. Rep. 235. Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn. Rep. 421. Roath v. Smith, 5 Conn. Rep. 133 139. Wake-man v. Banks, 2 Conn. Rep 445. 446. Fish v. Fish, 1 Conn. Rep. 559 560. 563. Barkhamsted v. Farmington, 2 Conn. Rep. 600. Reeve's Dom. Rel. 53. Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. Rep. 534. Bradford v. Bradford, 5 Conn. Rep. 132. The terms used in the plea, imply, that the individual has an absolute estate in fee simple in the property. Is the man, who has the mere right to obtain, to use and occupy, a farm, without the power of alienating or encumbering it, “ the true and lawful owner ?” Is such a man “lawfully seised and possessed?”
If these observations are well founded, they furnish a satisfactory answer to an enquiry made with some degree of confidence.-If a mortgagee, by the deed, has a right to acquire the possession, may he not use it to retain that possession, and especially, against a wrong-doer ? Admitting this might be done, in a proper case, where the declaration or plea was framed for that purpose, there is, in the present case, no room for the exercise of that right. First, because in this plea, the allegation is of an ownership in fee ; whereas the deed offered in evidence shews no such title. It neither proves, nor conduces to prove, that the defendant was the true and lawful owner ; or that, in legal contemplation, he was legally seised and possessed. Secondly, the argument alluded to is founded on an inadmissible supposition, viz. that our statute allowing a plea of title, and thus taking away the jurisdiction of a justice, contemplates the trial of a mere question of possession, as well as that of a right of property ; whereas it is apparent, that the statute has no such object in view ; for it speaks of a justification, by a plea of title to the land, and of the payment of treble damages, if he fail to make out a title paramount to the title of the plaintiff leaving the question as to the mere right of possession, as distinct from a right of property, to be tried and finally determined, like all other causes where not more than seven dollars dam ages are demanded, by a single minister of justice. Besides, if under such a plea as the present, a mere right to the possession could be tried, a judgment against the plaintiff would be an es-toppel in any future suit between the same parties or privies, even though the mortgage debt were paid ; for, as the plea alleges a title in fee, on which precise point issue is joined, a verdict for the defendant would find the title to be in him, and would be forever conclusive. Outram v. Morewood, 3 East 346. Smith v. Sherwood, 4 Conn. Rep. 284, 5. per Bristol, J. Swift’s Evid. 22.

Opinion:
Daggett, J.
Several objections are made against the judgment of the superior court.
1. It is said, that as the cause might have been appealed from the county court, to the superior court, no writ of error will lie. It is true, an appeal might have been taken from the judgment of the county court. The statute entitled " an act for the regulation of civil actions," sect. 62. allows an appeal from the judgment of the county court to the superior court, "in any action brought to, and tried by the county court, wherein the title of land is drawn in question, and determined," &c. This action was " brought to" the county court from a justice of the peace, under the 65th sect, of the act, in conformity with the prescription of the act, the defendant having justified under a plea of title. The words comprehend the case ; analogy justifies the practice; and, it is believed, such has been the uniform construction of the statute. It is, however, urged, that no writ of error will lie. The 69th sect, of the act declares, " that writs of error may be brought to the superior court, from the judgments of the county and city courts, and of justices of the peace, for any error in the same, to be proceeded with according to the course of the common law," &c. This writ of error is brought to the superior court from a judgment of the county court. It is embraced by the words of the act; and 1 have no doubt that it will lie.
2. Another question is, were the declarations of Benjamin Beach in relation to the bounds, admissible ? The bill of exceptions does not allege when the declarations were made, nor show their relevancy to the point in issue. This court cannot see, if it could conjecture, that they could bear on the issue; and this is necessary to justify their admission. If they were made before B. Beach was the owner of the land, they ought not to have been received. Equally uncertain is it, from inspecting the bill of exceptions, whether the bounds being at one place or the other, could affect the question, whether a trespass had been done. In Vernon v. East-Hartford, 3 Conn. Rep. 482, the principle is recognized, that the motion or bill of exceptions must show that the testimony objected to was relevant, otherwise the court of revision will not sanction its admission.
3. The only point on which I think the decision of the superior court incorrect, is, in deciding, in opposition to the opinion of the county court, that the mortgage deed from Lydia Mills to Abby Betsey Mills, was not proper evidence in support of the plea of title pleaded by the defendant. In this plea of title, it was alleged, that "Abby Betsey Mills was the true and legal owner of the land on which, &c., and was then and there lawfully seised and possessed of the same." As the defendant Clark justified under the licence and authority of Abby Betsey Mills, the deed was good evidence, as was supposed, in his defence.
Sinzeon Beach contends, that the deed being a mortgage, though the law-day had expired, and though th~ mortgagee had gone into possession, by an agreement with the mortgagor, as the bill of exceptions finds; yet it did not prove, that Abby B. Mills was the true and legal owner, and was seised and possessed of the land, &c. in support of this position, The King v. St. Michaels, Doug. 632. is cited. There, Lord Mansfield said. on a question whether a mortgagor gained a settlement, "It is an affront to common sense, to say the mortgagor is not the real owner." Numerous decisions of the supreme court of New-York and Massachusetts, are in accordance with this doctrine. In Connecticut, the same general principle has been repeatedly recognized. In Barkhamsted v. Farmington, 2 Conn. Rep. 600, it was decided, that the mortgagor was to be regarded as the owner of the land to every purpose, except the right of possession; and in Fish v. Fish, 1 Conn. Rep. 559. a widow of a deceased mortgagor was adjudged to be entitled to dower in an equity of redemption. In Huntington v. Smith, 4 Conn. Rep. 235., it was holden. that the interest of the mortgagee in mortgaged premises could not be taken in execution, after the expiration of the law-day; and in Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn. Rep. 426. a mortgage was decided to be not an alienation within the statute against selling pretended titles.
I am not disposed to question or impair the authority of these cases; nor does the point in examination require it. But we will look at some other decisions bearing directly on the point in discussion. In Keech v. Hall, Doug. 21. Lord Mansfield decided, that a mortgagee might recover in ejectment without notice to quit. In Jackson v. Dubois, 4 Johns. Rep. 216. it was holden, that the mortgagee might maintain ejectment against the mortgagor and those that claim under him. In Rockwell & al. v. Bradley, 2 Conn. Rep. 1. the doctrine in Keech v. Hall, was directly sanctioned, as also in Wakeman v. Banks, 2 Conn. Rep. 445. In Newall & al. v. Wright, 3 Mass. Rep. 138. 152. Chief Justice Parsons laid down the law as follows : " It is very clear, that when a man seised of lands in fee, shall mortgage them in fee, if there be no agreement that the mortgagor shall retain the possession, the mortgagee may enter immediately, put the mortgagor out of possession, and receive the profits ; and if the mortgagor refuses to quit the possession, the mortgagee may consider him as a trespasser, and may maintain an action of trespass against him, or he may, in a writ of entry, recover against him as a disseisor." I am satisfied, that this opinion is consistent with the contract of the parties to the mortgage, and that there is no established doctrine opposed to it. The mortgagee is well seised against the mortgagor, and certainly against all strangers, so as to enable him to maintain trespass or ejectment. This right of the mortgagee appears essential to the protection of the pledge; and without it, he would be without security-his pledge would be useless.
But without the aid of these principles, so reasonable and just, the deed in question, was undoubtedly admissible. The issue was joined on the plea of the defendant, founded upon the 65th sect. of the statute above quoted. The last clause of that sect, is as follows : " and if on trial, before such court, (that is, the county court to which it has been removed, by previous provision,) he shall fail to make out a title paramount to the title of the plaintiff, he shall pay treble damages and cost." The defendant, then, under this statute, is bound to make out a title paramount to that of the plaintiff. With this object in view, he offers a mortgage deed to the person by whom he was authorized to enter, and who had gained a possession by the agreement of the mortgagor. As yet, no title, of any description, is shewn to exist in Simeon Beach, the plaintiff. It does not appear, whether he claims under any title, or whether he is a mere stranger. Why, then, may not Clark show a title by mortgage in A. B. Mills, under whom he has entered, and by whom he has been put in possession, to justify, in this action of trespass ? Whether this title will appear to be paramount to that the plaintiff, cannot as yet be ascertained. If the mortgagee has any interest in the pledge, it is superior to that of a mere stranger, upon the view of the case as presented when the deed was offered. It should, therefore, have been admitted ; and the county court was correct in receiving it in evidence.
It is again said, that upon the authorities above cited, the deed did not prove the averment of seisin, in the technical sense of the term. Be it so, for the sake of argument, but for no other purpose; what then ? It proved some degree or kind of title, if the mortgagee gets any title by the mortgage, and that he does, is not denied. This Court decided, in the case of Hitchcock v. Hotchkiss, 1 Conn. Rep. 470. that " where land, in which the debtor had an estate for life only, is levied upon, appraised and set off as an estate in fee simple, the creditor acquires a title to the estate, which the debtor had." In an action of ejectment, the plaintiff may recover, if he proves a right to the possession, though he alleges his quantity of interest to be greater than it is proved to be. A declaration in ejectment counting on a seisin in fee, would be sustained, by proof of an estate for life.
In every view of this case, I am satisfied, that the opinion expressed at the circuit, that the deed from Lydia Mills to A. B. Mills was not admissible, was incorrect; but as the judgment of the county court was erroneous in the admission of the declarations of Benjamin Beach, the superior court was correct in reversing it; and, of course, the judgment of the superior court must be affirmed.
Peters, Brainard and Lanman, Js. were of the same opinion.