Case Name: Daniel Hernandez et al., Appellants, v. Victor L. Robles, as City Clerk of the City of New York, Respondent; Sylvia Samuels et al., Appellants, v. New York State Department of Health et al., Respondents; In the Matter of Elissa Kane et al., Appellants, v. John Marsolais, as Albany City Clerk, et al., Respondents; Jason Seymour et al., Appellants, v. Julie Holcomb, as City Clerk of the City of Ithaca, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2006-07-06
Citations: 7 N.Y.3d 338
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel Hernandez et al., Appellants, v Victor L. Robles, as City Clerk of the City of New York, Respondent. Sylvia Samuels et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Health et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Elissa Kane et al., Appellants, v John Marsolais, as Albany City Clerk, et al., Respondents. Jason Seymour et al., Appellants, v Julie Holcomb, as City Clerk of the City of Ithaca, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 338–397

Head Matter:
[855 NE2d 1, 821 NYS2d 770]
Daniel Hernandez et al., Appellants, v Victor L. Robles, as City Clerk of the City of New York, Respondent. Sylvia Samuels et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Health et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Elissa Kane et al., Appellants, v John Marsolais, as Albany City Clerk, et al., Respondents. Jason Seymour et al., Appellants, v Julie Holcomb, as City Clerk of the City of Ithaca, et al., Respondents.
Argued May 31, 2006;
decided July 6, 2006
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York City (Susan L. Sommer, David S. Bucket and Alphonso David of counsel), and Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP {Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Norman C. Simon and Darren Cohen of counsel), for appellants in the first above-entitled action.
I. The marriage ban violates plaintiffs’ due process rights under the New York Constitution by denying them, without a compelling justification, the fundamental right to marry the person of their choice. (Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485; Matter of Aliessa v Novello, 96 NY2d 418; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474; People v P.J. Video, 68 NY2d 296; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88; Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810; Wynehamer v People, 13 NY 378; Matter of Jacobs, 98 NY 98; Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48.) II. The marriage exclusion fails equal protection scrutiny under the elevated standards applicable to denials of fundamental rights and to classifications based on sexual orientation or sex. (Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 NY2d 326; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Brown v State of New York, 9 AD3d 23; People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474; Under 21 v City of New York, 108 AD2d 250, 65 NY2d 344; Padula v Webster, 822 F2d 97; Ben-Shalom v Marsh, 881 F2d 454; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38.) III. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage does not rationally serve any legitimate government interest. (Seymour v Holcomb, 7 Misc 3d 530; Matter of Shields v Madigan, 5 Misc 3d 901; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; People v Abrahams, 40 NY2d 277; Heller v Doe, 509 US 312.) IV The only proper constitutional remedy is judicial construction of the Domestic Relations Law to grant same-sex couples full marriage rights. (People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76; Matter of Lisa M. UU. v Mario D. VV., 78 AD2d 711; Goodell v Goodell, 77 AD2d 684; Childs v Childs, 69 AD2d 406; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v Barnette, 319 US 624; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88.)
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City {Leonard Koerner, Marilyn Richter and Ronald E. Sternberg of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
I. The Domestic Relations Law’s limitation of marriage to one male and one female does not contravene the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution. (Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 339 US 981; Matter of Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306; Washington v Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 US 463; Hicks v Miranda, 422 US 332; Brady v State of New York, 80 NY2d 596, 509 US 905; Mandel v Bradley, 432 US 173; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128, 82 NY2d 801; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Raum v Restaurant Assoc., 252 AD2d 369.) II. The Domestic Relations Law’s limitation of marriage to one male and one female does not violate plaintiffs’ rights to due process of law. (Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810.) III. If this Court concludes that the Domestic Relations Law is unconstitutional, the Court should stay entry of judgment in order to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate. (Washington v Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 US 463.)
Richard E. Barnes, Albany, and Paul Benjamin Linton, North- brook, Illinois, for New York State Catholic Conference, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.
I. New York law does not authorize same-sex marriage. (Matter of Storar, 52 NY2d 363, 454 US 858; Storrs v Holcomb, 168 Misc 2d 898, 88 NY2d 1063, 245 AD2d 943; Anonymous v Anonymous, 67 Misc 2d 982; Matter of Jenkins, 133 Misc 2d 420; Frances B. v Mark B., 78 Misc 2d 112; Matter of Shields v Madigan, 5 Misc 3d 901; Seymour v Holcomb, 7 MisC 3d 530; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128, 82 NY2d 801; Raum v Restaurant Assoc., 252 AD2d 369; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38.) II. Reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples does not violate the due process guarantee of article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution. (Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48; Crosby v State of N.Y., Workers’ Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; People v Shepard, 50 NY2d 640; Delan v CBS, Inc., 91 AD2d 255; Matter of Berger v Adornato, 76 Misc 2d 122; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69; Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484; People v De Stefano, 121 Misc 2d 113; Cherry v Koch, 129 Misc 2d 346; Matter of Mary of Oakknoll v Coughlin, 101 AD2d 931.) III. Reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples does not violate the equal protection guarantee of article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution. (Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810; Hicks v Miranda, 422 US 332; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Matter of Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306; Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 339 US 981; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 454 US 803; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Washington v Davis, 426 US 229.) IV Reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to multiple legitimate state purposes. (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Sweinhart v Bamberger, 166 Misc 256, 254 App Div 665; Morris v Morris, 31 Misc 2d 548; Smelt v County of Orange, 374 F Supp 2d 861; Adams v Howerton, 486 F Supp 1119; Lofton v Kearney, 157 F Supp 2d 1372, affd sub nom. Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804; Wilson v Ake, 354 F Supp 2d 1298; FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307; Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1.)
Roger B. Adler, PC., New York City (Roger Bennet Adler of counsel), for New York State Conservative Party, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.
I. The Domestic Relations Law’s restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples is not unconstitutional. (Matter of Klein [Hartnett], 78 NY2d 662, 504 US 912; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; Courtroom Tel. Network LLC v State of New York, 5 NY3d 222; Fearon v Treanor, 272 NY 268; Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618; D’Amico v Crosson, 226 AD2d 34, 93 NY2d 29; Reno v Flores, 507 US 292; Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810.)
American Center for Law & Justice Northeast, Inc., New Milford, Connecticut (Vincent B McCarthy and Kristina J. Wenberg of counsel), admitted pro hac vice, for City Action Coalition, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.
I. Supreme Court decisions establishing marriage as a fundamental right are premised on the inextricable link between marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and the procreation that typically results from that union. (Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479.) II. Lawrence v Texas (539 US 558 [2003]) established homosexuals’ right to be free from government intrusion into their relationships, not a right to government endorsement of their relationships. (Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186; Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804; Wilson v Ake, 354 F Supp 2d 1298.) III. Marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman for the purpose of securing the well-being of children that typically result from the couple’s union. IV Redefining marriage to include same-sex couples will eventually diminish marriage and endanger the well-being of children. (Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Ballard v United States, 329 US 187.) V Once marriage is redefined to include same-sex unions, there is no principled basis upon which to exclude any two or more people who have a close interpersonal relationship.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York City {Roberta A. Kaplan and Andrew J. Ehrlich of counsel), American Civil Liberties Union Foundation {James D. Esseks and Sharon M. McGowan of counsel) and New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation {Donna Lieberman and Arthur Eisenberg of counsel), for appellants in the second above-entitled action.
I. New York’s marriage law denies gay and lesbian people the fundamental right to marry the person they love. (Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69; People ex rel. Portnoy v Strasser, 303 NY 539; People v De Stefano, 121 Misc 2d 113; Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371.) II. New York’s marriage law violates the New York Constitution because it fails even rational basis review. (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48; Abberbock v County of Nassau, 213 AD2d 691; Lovelace v Gross, 80 NY2d 419; Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713; Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284; Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243; Crosby v State of N.Y., Workers’ Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152.) III. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage fails heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. (People v P.J. Video, 68 NY2d 296; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128; Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558.)
Brian M. DeLaurentis, PC., New York City (Brian M. DeLaurentis of counsel), for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Law Association of Greater New York, Inc., amicus curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. Protecting your loved ones and your committed relationship with the rights accorded through marriage is the deeply rooted fundamental right at issue. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 US 833; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Bennett v Bennett, 116 NY 584; Fearon v Treanor, 272 NY 268, 301 US 667; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Millington v Southeastern El. Co., 22 NY2d 498; Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702.) II. The purported purposes of marriage asserted by the Appellate Division Departments fail to pass constitutional muster. (Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479; Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 NY2d 387; Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1; People v Marx, 99 NY 377; People v Gillson, 109 NY 389; People ex rel. Duryea v Wilber, 198 NY 1.) III. The daily experiences of this amicus amply demonstrate the due process inequities gay and lesbian citizens regularly endure because the presently existing system of separate but less than equal is a failure. (O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576; Dallas v Stanglin, 490 US 19; Correa v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 165 Misc 2d 614; Langan v St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 25 AD3d 90; Silver v Starred, 176 Misc 2d 511; Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M., 77 NY2d 651; Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186.) IV The sensible conclusion is to permit same-sex couples to marry each other.
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York City (Martin Klotz, Joanna Rotgers and Jeffrey S. Siegel of counsel), for Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The state law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying is gender-based discrimination that does not withstand scrutiny. (Reed v Reed, 404 US 71; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76; Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US 199; McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184; Bob Jones Univ. v United States, 461 US 574; J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 US 127; People v Blunt, 162 AD2d 86; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Matter of Carolyn B., 6 AD3d 67.) II. The state law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying is gender stereotype discrimination that does not withstand judicial scrutiny. (Orr v Orr, 440 US 268; Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718; Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677; People ex rel. Watts v Watts, 77 Misc 2d 178; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201; Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76.)
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York City {Bonnie Steingart, Jonathan F. Lewis, Jennifer L. Colyer, Edward J. Jacobs and Tico A. Almeida of counsel), for Academy for Jewish Religion and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. Although marriage has both a religious and a civil meaning, the Domestic Relations Law defines and governs only the institution of civil marriage. (Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, 464 US 817.) II. Allowing same-sex couples to participate in civil marriage will not impinge on the free exercise rights of religious groups. (Williams v Bright, 230 AD2d 548; Grumet v Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist., 81 NY2d 518, 512 US 687.) III. The issue of civil marriage between same-sex couples must be decided as a matter of civil law, without reference to any particular religious tradition. (Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494.) IV In addition to supporting full civil marriage equality, many religious traditions already celebrate the marriages of same-sex couples in their religious communities.
Ross D. Levi, Albany, and Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York City (Gary A. Bornstein of counsel), for Empire State Pride Agenda and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. Whether New York State’s same-sex couples may marry is in the first instance a question of New York State law. (Mansell v Mansell, 490 US 581; Moore v Sims, 442 US 415; Ex parte Burrus, 136 US 586; Lehman v Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 US 502; United States v Yazell, 382 US 341; Minnesota v National Tea Co., 309 US 551; People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638; People v Barber, 289 NY 378; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474.) II. New York State has in many contexts respected relationships of committed same-sex couples. (Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; DiStefano v DiStefano, 60 AD2d 976; Matter of Carolyn B., 6 AD3d 67; Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201; East 10th St. Assoc. v Estate of Goldstein, 154 AD2d 142; Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484; Slattery v City of New York, 266 AD2d 24; Stewart v Schwartz Bros. Jeffer Mem. Chapel, 159 Misc 2d 884.)
Jay Weiser, New York City, Lia Brooks, Robert H. Cohen, Allen Drexel, Bruce Wagner, Albany, William D. Frumkin, New York City, and Mark B. Wheeler, Ithaca, for Association of the Bar of the City of New York and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
Same-sex couples, who are unable to legally marry in New York, are treated unequally with opposite-sex married couples under New York law. In the absence of equal marriage rights in New York, same-sex couples are unable to fashion alternatives that make up for the unequal rights. (Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Matter of Carolyn B., 6 AD3d 67; Matter of Thomas S. v Robin Y., 209 AD2d 298; Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I., 24 AD3d 451; Matter of C.M. v C.H., 6 Misc 3d 361; Matter of Janis C. v Christine T., 294 AD2d 496; Matter of Multari v Sorrell, 287 AD2d 764; Matter of Gilbert A. v Laura A., 261 AD2d 886; Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., 246 AD2d 282; Anonymous v Anonymous, 20 AD3d 333.)
Norman L. Reimer, New York City, Ivan J. Dominguez, Kathryn Shreeves, Jean M. Swieca and H. Alexander Robinson, Washington, D.C., for New York County Lawyers’ Association and another, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
Respondents’ arguments attempting to circumscribe the fundamental right to marry do not withstand scrutiny. (Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 US 833; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476, 451 US 987; People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434; Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390; Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510; Turner v Safley, 482 US 78; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48; People v Shepard, 50 NY2d 640.)
Ropes & Gray LLP, New York City (Douglas H. Meal of counsel), and Mary L. Bonauto, Boston, Massachusetts, admitted pro hac vice, for Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, amicus curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
Delaying the remedy would be unnecessary and counterproductive if this Court rules in favor of the couples. (Romer v Evans, 517 US 620.) II. The Massachusetts cultural and political landscapes increasingly favor marriage equality.
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York City {Joseph F. Tringali, Robert J. Pfister and Paul A. Saso of counsel), for Anti-Defamation League and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The constitutional violation is the denial of the right to marry — not only the denial of the incidents of marriage. (Fearon v Treanor, 272 NY 268; Morris v Morris, 31 Misc 2d 548; Haas v Haas, 271 App Div 107; Di Lorenzo v Di Lorenzo, 174 NY 467; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Crosby v State of N.Y., Workers’ Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305; Turner v Safley, 482 US 78; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438.) II. As a matter of remedies, granting civil marriages to same-sex couples is the only measure that can redress the violation of appellants’ rights. (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v Barnette, 319 US 624; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d 893; Matter of Cynthia M. v Elton M., 69 Misc 2d 653; Duncan v Laury, 249 App Div 314; Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 US 1; Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356; Slattery v City of New York, 266 AD2d 24; Sweinhart v Bamberger, 166 Misc 256.)
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae LLP, New York City {Vivian L. Polak, Jonathan A. Damon, Paul H. Cohen, Kathryn S. Catenacci, Desiree A. DiCorcia, Angela M. Papalaskaris and Colin G. Stewart of counsel), for Association to Benefit Children and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The institution of marriage provides tangible and material benefits and protections to children who are part of a married family. (Mutter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Matter of Landon v Motorola, Inc., 38 AD2d 18; Matter of Mazzeo, 95 AD2d 91; Matter of Karin T. v Michael T., 127 Misc 2d 14; Matter of C.M. v C.H., 6 Misc 3d 361.) II. Marriage for same-sex couples may benefit children by increasing the durability and stability of their parents’ relationship. (Mirizio v Mirizio, 242 NY 74; Diemer v Diemer, 8 NY2d 206; Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Matter of Carolyn B., 6 AD3d 67; Slattery v City of New York, 179 Misc 2d 740; Langan v St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 25 AD3d 90; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38; Lennon v Charney, 8 Misc 3d 846; Funderburke v Uniondale Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 172 Misc 2d 963.) III. The leading experts— child welfare and mental health professionals — agree that lesbian and gay parents are as capable and successful at raising well-adjusted children as are heterosexual parents. IV Recognizing marriage for same-sex couples would be a logical extension of this Court’s decision in Matter of Jacob (86 NY2d 651 [1995]).
Norman J. Chachkin, New York City, and Victor A. Bolden for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., amicus curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples. (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677.) II. New York’s prohibition on marriage for same-sex couples discriminates on the basis of gender. (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1.)
Suzanne B. Goldberg, New York City, Arnold & Porter LLP, New York City and Washington, D.C. (Robert C. Mason, Dorothy N. Giobbe, Joshua A. Brook, Jennifer L. Hogan, Helene B. Madonick, Christopher S. Rhee and Joshua I. Kaplan of counsel), and Costello Cooney & Fearon, PLLC, Syracuse {Samuel C. Young of counsel), for Suzanne B. Goldberg and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The legal definition of marriage in New York has never been static; features of marriage once thought essential have been revisited and rejected consistently over time. (Bertles v Nunan, 92 NY 152; Winter v Winter, 191 NY 462; Quilty v Battie, 135 NY 201; Bennett v Bennett, 116 NY 584; Oppenheim v Kridel, 236 NY 156; People v Morton, 284 App Div 413; Schultz v Schultz, 89 NY 644; Abbe v Abbe, 22 App Div 483; Caplan v Caplan, 268 NY 445; Allen v Allen, 246 NY 571.) II. Courts have been at the forefront of invalidating long-standing marriage rules that conflict with constitutional rights. (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; People v Morton, 308 NY 96; Orr v Orr, 440 US 268; Childs v Childs, 69 AD2d 406; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; Matter of Patricia A., 31 NY2d 83.) III. Spousal interdependence comprises the essential element of marriage today in New York. Alleged state interests in the sex of marriage partners and in procreation do not justify the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. (Holterman v Holterman, 3 NY3d 1; DeLuca v DeLuca, 97 NY2d 139; DeJesus v DeJesus, 90 NY2d 643; Koehler v Koehler, 182 Misc 2d 436; Matter of Lindgren, 181 Misc 166; Gleason v Gleason, 26 NY2d 28; Halsey v Halsey, 296 AD2d 28; Linda R. v Richard E., 162 AD2d 48; Osterhoudt v Osterhoudt, 28 Misc 285; Matter of Fountain v Fountain, 83 AD2d 694.) IV New York historically has not maintained uniformity with other states in its definition of marriage. (Matter of May, 305 NY 486; Matter of Mott v Duncan Petroleum Trans., 51 NY2d 289; Van Voorhis v Brintnall, 86 NY 18; Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden, 15 NY2d 9; S.C. v A.C., 4 Misc 3d 1014[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50884.)
Genant Law Offices, Mexico (Robert Genant of counsel), and Liberty Counsel, Lynchburg, Virginia (Rena M. Lindevaldsen of counsel), for Concerned Women for America and another, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. The Domestic Relations Law does not violate plaintiffs’ equal protection guarantees. (Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Matter of Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Langan v St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 25 AD3d 90; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587; Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474; Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162.) II. There is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. (Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702; Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535; Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804.)
Whiteman, Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (Michael White-man, Heather D. Diddel and Andrew M. Johnson of counsel), Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C. (Paul M. Smith, William M. Hohengarten and Eric Berger of counsel), and Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle for American Psychological Association and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
There is no scientific basis for distinguishing between same-sex couples and heterosexual couples with respect to the legal rights, obligations, benefits and burdens conferred by civil marriage.
Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, Arizona (Byron J. Babione, Benjamin W. Bull, Glen Lavy and Christopher R. Stovall of counsel), for Family Research Council, amicus curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.
I. Constitutional analysis of the marriage laws is incoherent absent recognition of the meaning of “marriage.” (People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152, 471 US 1020; Millington v Southeastern El. Co., 22 NY2d 498; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 US 833; Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810; Fearon v Treanor, 272 NY 268, 301 US 667; Matter of Shields v Madigan, 5 Misc 3d 901; Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506; Storrs v Holcomb, 168 Misc 2d 898; Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702.) II. Appellants’ circular assumptions regarding marriage’s meaning and purpose evade their threshold burden under equal protection analysis. (Langan v St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 25 AD3d 90; Gruen v County of Suffolk, 187 AD2d 560; Margolis v New York City Tr. Auth., 157 AD2d 238; Matter of Cooke v Board of Educ. of Lawrence School Dist., 140 AD2d 439; Matter of Abrams v Bronstein, 33 NY2d 488; Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713; Trump v Chu, 65 NY2d 20; Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190; Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390; Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535.) III. The lack of a federal constitutional basis to compel New York to grant marriage to same-sex couples undermines plaintiffs’ state constitutional arguments. (McConnell v Nooner, 547 F2d 54; Wilson v Ake, 354 F Supp 2d 1298; Adams v Howerton, 486 F Supp 1119, 673 F2d 1036; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Ballard v United States, 329 US 187.)
Kindlon and Shanks, PC., Albany (Terence L. Kindlon and Kathy Manley of counsel), for appellants in the third above-entitled action.
I. Because there is a fundamental right to marry, the denial of that right to same-sex couples violates the due process provision of the New York State Constitution. (People v Shepard, 50 NY2d 640; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485; People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Matter of Lindgren, 181 Misc 166; Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432.) II. Denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples is a violation of the equal protection guarantee of the New York State Constitution. (Brown v State of New York, 9 AD3d 23; People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339; People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474; Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201; Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484; People v Santorelli, 80 NY2d 875; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Weissman v Evans, 82 AD2d 441; Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483.) III. Because Domestic Relations Law § 25 provides that couples who undergo the solemnization ceremony without a license are legally married, the Court should hold that appellants, who have done so, are legally married. (Persad v Balram, 187 Misc 2d 711; Amsellem v Amsellem, 189 Misc 2d 27; Berenson v Berenson, 198 Misc 398.)
John J. Reilly, Corporation Counsel, Albany (Patrick K. Jordan of counsel), for John Marsolais, respondent in the third above-entitled action.
I. The Domestic Relations Law should be presumed valid as written by the New York State Legislature in that it does not provide for the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. (Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 71 NY2d 313; Matter of Travis S., 96 NY2d 818; People v Foley, 94 NY2d 668; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128; Anonymous v Anonymous, 67 Misc 2d 982; Morris v Morris, 31 Misc 2d 548; Hernandez v Robles, 7 Misc 3d 459; Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190; People v Allen, 27 NY2d 108.) II. The Domestic Relations Law does not violate any fundamental right and does not violate the Due Process Clause. (Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702; Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374.) III. The Equal Protection Clause does not provide same-sex couples with a guaranteed right to a marriage license. (Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900; Matter of Klein [Hartnett], 78 NY2d 662; Matter of Lloyd v Grella, 83 NY2d 537; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Matter of Valentine v American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38; Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1; Matter of Excellus Health Plan v Serio, 2 NY3d 166.)
Bixler & Stumbar, Ithaca (L. Richard Stumbar and Elizabeth J. Bixler of counsel), and LoPinto, Schlather, Geldenhuys & Salk (Mariette Geldenhuys and Diane V. Bruns of counsel), for appellants in the fourth above-entitled action.
I. Denying same-sex couples the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution. (Carey v Population Services Int’l, 431 US 678; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88; Turner v Safley, 482 US 78; Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620.) II. The denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples by the State of New York is a denial of equal protection of the law because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation and on the basis of gender. (Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 339 US 981; Seaman v Fedourich, 16 NY2d 94; Matter of Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 NY2d 152; People ex rel. Arcara v Cloud Books, 68 NY2d 553; People v Barber, 289 NY 378; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Liberta v Kelly, 839 F2d 77; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638.) III. It is the role of the Court to overturn unconstitutional legislation. (People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88.)
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Peter H. Schiff, Andrea Oser and Julie M. Sheridan of counsel), for Attorney General, intervener in the first above-entitled action, and for New York State Department of Health and another, respondents in the second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
Plaintiffs have not established beyond a reasonable doubt that granting marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples violates the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the New York State Constitution. (Matter of Klein [Hartnett], 78 NY2d 662, 504 US 912; Dunlea v Anderson, 66 NY2d 265; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41; Schulz v State of New York, 84 NY2d 231, 513 US 1127; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563; Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618; Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702; People v Isaacson, 44 NY2d 511; Matter of Shields v Madigan, 5 Misc 3d 901; Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128, 82 NY2d 801.)
Barth, Sullivan & Behr, Buffalo (.Laurence D. Behr of counsel), and Marriage Law Foundation, Orem, Utah (Monte N. Stewart of counsel), for United Families International, amicus curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. Marriage is a vital social institution. (Williams v North Carolina, 317 US 287; People ex rel. Troare v McClelland, 146 Misc 545; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617.) II. The courts that have redefined marriage have elided the social institutional realities of marriage. (People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23.) III. The other efforts to harmonize genderless marriage with social institutional realities also fail. (United, States v Lopez, 514 US 549; Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432.)
Shapiro Forman Allen Sava & McPherson LLP, New York City {Laurie McPherson and Jason Vigna of counsel), Alicia Ouellette, Albany, and Stephen Clark for Alicia Ouellette and others, amici curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. Before addressing the constitutional issues presented in this case, the Court should decide whether New York’s Domestic Relations Law already permits same-sex couples to marry. (Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201; People v Barber, 289 NY 378; Wait v Wait, 4 NY 95; Medical Bus. Assoc. v Steiner, 183 AD2d 86; Goodell v Goodell, 77 AD2d 684; Matter of Rachelle L. v Bruce M., 89 AD2d 765; People v Pickett, 19 NY2d 170; Matter of New York Post Corp. v Leibowitz, 2 NY2d 677; Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 US 568; United States v X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 US 64.) II. If New York’s Domestic Relations Law denies same-sex couples the right to marry, that denial is unconstitutional. (Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429; Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380; Orr v Orr, 440 US 268; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v Manhart, 435 US 702; Carey v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 46 NY2d 1068; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Oneida County Sheriff’s Dept., 70 NY2d 974; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 US 127.) III. It is the role of this Court to remedy any constitutional defect in New York’s marriage statutes. (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d 893; Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch [5 US] 137; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88; Benson Realty Corp. v Beame, 50 NY2d 994; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v Barnette, 319 US 624; Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Raum v Restaurant Assoc., 252 AD2d 369; Greenwald v H & P 29th St. Assoc., 241 AD2d 307.) TV The Court should remedy the constitutional defects by extending New York’s marriage statutes to same-sex couples. (Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76; Welsh v United States, 398 US 333; Orr v Orr, 440 US 268; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Matter of Jessie C., 164 AD2d 731; Childs v Childs, 69 AD2d 406; Soto-Lopez v New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 755 F2d 266; Thaler v Tha ler, 89 Misc 2d 315, 58 AD2d 890; Tuan Anh Nguyen v INS, 533 US 53.) V Nothing less than immediate access to civil marriage will suffice to remedy the constitutional defects presented by any exclusion of same-sex couples read into the Domestic Relations Law. (Sweatt v Painter, 339 US 629; Langan v St. Vincent’s Hosp., 25 AD3d 90; New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297; Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247; Heckler v Mathews, 465 US 728; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537; Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3; Watson v Memphis, 373 US 526.)
Stephen P. Hayford, Albany, and Joshua K. Baker, Manassas, Virginia, for James Q. Wilson and others, amici curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. Marriage has a unique and indispensable social purpose: creating family unions where children can be known and loved by their own mother and father. (Matter of Shields v Madigan, 5 Misc 3d 901; Laudo v Laudo, 188 App Div 699; Landwehr v Barbas, 241 App Div 769; Frost v Frost, 15 Misc 2d 104; Schumer v Schumer, 205 Misc 235; Matter of Cooper, 149 Misc 2d 282, 187 AD2d 128; Chavias v Chavias, 194 App Div 904; Maher v Maher, 172 Misc 276; Lapides v Lapides, 254 NY 73; Roger v Roger, 24 Misc 2d 566.) II. The State of New York’s declared interest in marriage is not only legitimate, it is compelling. (Adams v Howerton, 486 F Supp 1119, 673 F2d 1036; People ex rel. Sibley v Sheppard, 54 NY2d 320.) III. Marriage as the union of husband and wife is rationally related to furthering procreation (including uniting children to their mothers and fathers). IV Marriage is not gender discrimination.
Coti & Sugrue, New York City (Ralph Coti of counsel), for Alliance for Marriage, amicus curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
Social science data confirms the State of New York’s interest in defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman to promote the optimal setting for raising children. (Wilson v Ake, 354 F Supp 2d 1298; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804; Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587; Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429; Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645; Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 520 US 180.)
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York City {Kristin D. Kiehn, Eliza M. Sporn, Sally S. Pritchard and Jennifer E. Spain of counsel), for Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Inc. and others, amici curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. Courts apply heightened scrutiny to government actions that rely on suspect classifications. (Heller v Doe, 509 US 312; D’Amico v Crosson, 93 NY2d 29; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 NY2d 326; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495; People v Rambersed, 170 Misc 2d 923.) II. New York courts may treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification. (Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620; Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186; Lofton v Secretary of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F3d 804, 543 US 1081; Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v City of Cincinnati, 128 F3d 289; Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618; Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714; Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist, 83 AD2d 217, 57 NY2d 27, 459 US 1138; Brown v State of New York, 9 AD3d 23; People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375.) III. The lack of a relationship between sexual orientation and ability justifies application of heightened scrutiny. (Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 US 127; Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677; Watkins v United States Army, 875 F2d 699; Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651; Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201.) IV The history of discrimination against lesbians and gay men requires application of heightened scrutiny. (Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677; Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721; Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558; Under 21 v City of New York, 108 AD2d 250, 65 NY2d 344; Rowland v Mad River Local School Dist., 470 US 1009.) V Although they are neither necessary nor sufficient, additional factors enhance the justification for heightened scrutiny. (Watkins v United States Army, 875 F2d 699; Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677; Weber v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 US 164; Nyquist v Mauclet, 432 US 1; Parham v Hughes, 441 US 347; United States v Virginia, 518 US 515; Foley v Connelie, 435 US 291.) VI. Governmental actions that classify on the basis of sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny.
Ruta & Soulios, LLP, New York City (Steven Soulios of counsel), for Pastor Gregory L. Wilk and others, amici curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. Changing the definition of marriage would pose serious threats to religious liberty. (Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535; Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374; Mirizio v Mirizio, 242 NY 74; Funderburke v Uniondale Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 251 AD2d 622, 92 NY2d 813; Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyt. Church v Florio, 40 F3d 1454; Bruff v North Mississippi Health Servs., Inc., 244 F3d 495; Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484; Bob Jones Univ. v United States, 461 US 574; Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v United States, 136 US 1.) II. The civil and religious components of marriage cannot be segregated. (Diemer v Diemer, 6 AD2d 822; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, 464 US 817; Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v Hogan, 5 F Supp 598; United States v Francioso, 164 F2d 163; Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145; Davis v Beason, 133 US 333; Murphy v Ramsey, 114 US 15; Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470; Turner v Safley, 482 US 78.)
Law Offices of Brian W Raum, PC., New York City {Brian W. Raum of counsel), for Dr. Paul McHugh, M.D., and another, amici curiae in the first, second, third and fourth above-entitled actions.
I. There is no scientific agreement on the definition of homosexuality. II. Emerging evidence suggests that homosexuality is not an innate characteristic like race or sex.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
R.S. Smith, J.
We hold that the New York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex. Whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the Legislature.
Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs and petitioners (hereafter plaintiffs) are the members of 44 same-sex couples. Each couple tried unsuccessfully to obtain a marriage license. Plaintiffs then began these four lawsuits, seeking declaratory judgments that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is invalid under the State Constitution. Defendants and respondents (hereafter defendants) are the license-issuing authorities of New York City, Albany and Ithaca; the State Department of Health, which instructs local authorities about the issuance of marriage licenses; and the State itself. In Hernandez v Robles, Supreme Court granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor; the Appellate Division reversed. In Samuels v New York State Department of Health, Matter of Kane v Marsolais and Seymour v Holcomb, Supreme Court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We now affirm the orders of the Appellate Division.
Discussion
I
All the parties to these cases now acknowledge, implicitly or explicitly, that the Domestic Relations Law limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. Some amici, however, suggest that the statute can be read to permit same-sex marriage, thus mooting the constitutional issues. We find this suggestion untenable.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Domestic Relations Law, which govern marriage, nowhere say in so many words that only people of different sexes may marry each other, but that was the universal understanding when articles 2 and 3 were adopted in 1909, an understanding reflected in several statutes. Domestic Relations Law § 12 provides that "the parties must solemnly declare . . . that they take each other as husband and wife." Domestic Relations Law § 15 (1) (a) requires town and city clerks to obtain specified information from "the groom" and "the bride." Domestic Relations Law § 5 prohibits certain marriages as incestuous, specifying opposite-sex combinations (brother and sister, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew), but not same-sex combinations. Domestic Relations Law § 50 says that the property of "a married woman . . . shall not be subject to her husband's control."
New York's statutory law clearly limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. The more serious question is whether that limitation is consistent with the New York Constitution.
II
New York is one of many states in which supporters of same-sex marriage have asserted it as a state constitutional right. Several other state courts have decided such cases, under various state constitutional provisions and with divergent results (e.g., Goodridge v Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass 309, 798 NE2d 941 [2003] [excluding same-sex couples from mar riage violates Massachusetts Constitution]; Standhardt v Superior Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 206 Ariz 276, 77 P3d 451 [Ct App 2004] [constitutional right to marry under Arizona Constitution does not encompass marriage to same-sex partner]; Morrison v Sadler, 821 NE2d 15 [Ind 2005] [Indiana Constitution does not require judicial recognition of same-sex marriage]; Lewis v Harris, 378 NJ Super 168, 875 A2d 259 [2005] [limitation of marriage to members of opposite sex does not violate New Jersey Constitution]; Baehr v Lewin, 74 Haw 530, 852 P2d 44 [1993] [refusal of marriage licenses to couples of the same sex subject to strict scrutiny under Hawaii Constitution]; Baker v State, 170 Vt 194, 744 A2d 864 [1999] [denial to same-sex couples of benefits and protections afforded to married people violates Vermont Constitution]). Here, plaintiffs claim that, by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, the New York Domestic Relations Law violates two provisions of the State Constitution: the Due Process Clause (art I, § 6 ["No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law"]) and the Equal Protection Clause (art I, § 11 ["No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof']).
We approach plaintiffs' claims by first considering, in section III below, whether the challenged limitation can be defended as a rational legislative decision. The answer to this question, as we show in section IV below, is critical at every stage of the due process and equal protection analysis.
Ill
It is undisputed that the benefits of marriage are many. The diligence of counsel has identified 316 such benefits in New York law, of which it is enough to summarize some of the most important: Married people receive significant tax advantages, rights in probate and intestacy proceedings, rights to support from their spouses both during the marriage and after it is dissolved, and rights to be treated as family members in obtaining insurance coverage and making health care decisions. Beyond this, they receive the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships recognized by the State.
The critical question is whether a rational legislature could decide that these benefits should be given to members of opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex couples. The question is not, we emphasize, whether the Legislature must or should continue to limit marriage in this way; of course the Legislature may (subject to the effect of the federal Defense of Marriage Act [Pub L 104-199, 110 US Stat 2419]) extend marriage or some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples. We conclude, however, that there are at least two grounds that rationally support the limitation on marriage that the Legislature has enacted. Others have been advanced, but we will discuss only these two, both of which are derived from the undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children.
First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the advances of science, it remains true that the vast majority of children are born as a result of a sexual relationship between a man and a woman, and the Legislature could find that this will continue to be true. The Legislature could also find that such relationships are all too often casual or temporary. It could find that an important function of marriage is to create more stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be born. It thus could choose to offer an inducement — in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits — to opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.
The Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not apply with comparable force to same-sex couples. These couples can become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels, but they do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse. The Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more. This is one reason why the Legislature could rationally offer the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples only.
There is a second reason: The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father. Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a woman are like. It is obvious that there are exceptions to this general rule — some children who never know their fathers, or their mothers, do far better than some who grow up with parents of both sexes — but the Legislature could find that the general rule will usually hold.
Plaintiffs, and amici supporting them, argue that the proposition asserted is simply untrue: that a home with two parents of different sexes has no advantage, from the point of view of raising children, over a home with two parents of the same sex. Perhaps they are right, but the Legislature could rationally think otherwise.
To support their argument, plaintiffs and amici supporting them refer to social science literature reporting studies of same-sex parents and their children. Some opponents of same-sex marriage criticize these studies, but we need not consider the criticism, for the studies on their face do not establish beyond doubt that children fare equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households. What they show, at most, is that rather limited observation has detected no marked differences. More definitive results could hardly be expected, for until recently few children have been raised in same-sex households, and there has not been enough time to study the long-term results of such child-rearing.
Plaintiffs seem to assume that they have demonstrated the irrationality of the view that opposite-sex marriages offer advantages to children by showing there is no scientific evidence to support it. Even assuming no such evidence exists, this reasoning is flawed. In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in the home. (See Goodridge, 440 Mass at 358-359, 798 NE2d at 979-980 [Sosman, J., dissenting].) And a legislature proceeding on that premise could rationally decide to offer a special inducement, the legal recognition of marriage, to encourage the formation of opposite-sex households.
In sum, there are rational grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of opposite sex. Plaintiffs have not persuaded us that this long-accepted restriction is a wholly irrational one, based solely on ignorance and prejudice against homosexuals. This is the question on which these cases turn. If we were convinced that the restriction plaintiffs attack were founded on nothing but prejudice — if we agreed with plaintiffs that it is comparable to the restriction in Loving v Virginia (388 US 1 [1967]), a prohibition on inter racial marriage that was plainly "designed to maintain White Supremacy" (id. at 11) — we would hold it invalid, no matter how long its history. As the dissent points out, a long and shameful history of racism lay behind the kind of statute invalidated in Loving.
But the historical background of Loving is different from the history underlying this case. Racism has been recognized for centuries — at first by a few people, and later by many more — as a revolting moral evil. This country fought a civil war to eliminate racism's worst manifestation, slavery, and passed three constitutional amendments to eliminate that curse and its vestiges. Loving was part of the civil rights revolution of the 1950's and 1960's, the triumph of a cause for which many heroes and many ordinary people had struggled since our nation began.
It is true that there has been serious injustice in the treatment of homosexuals also, a wrong that has been widely recognized only in the relatively recent past, and one our Legislature tried to address when it enacted the Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act four years ago (L 2002, ch 2). But the traditional definition of marriage is not merely a by-product of historical injustice. Its history is of a different kind.
The idea that same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively new one. Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there could be marriages only between participants of different sex. A court should not lightly conclude that everyone who held this belief was irrational, ignorant or bigoted. We do not so conclude.
IV
Our conclusion that there is a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples leads us to hold that that limitation is valid under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, and that any expansion of the traditional definition of marriage should come from the Legislature.
This Court is the final authority as to the meaning of the New York Constitution. This does not mean, of course, that we ignore the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of similarly worded clauses of the Federal Constitution. The governing principle is that our Constitution cannot afford less protection to our citizens than the Federal Constitution does, but it can give more (People v P.J. Video, 68 NY2d 296, 302 [1986]). We have at times found our Due Process Clause to be more protective of rights than its federal counterpart, usually in cases involving the rights of criminal defendants (e.g., People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88 [2004]) or prisoners (e.g., Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69 [1979]). In general, we have used the same analytical framework as the Supreme Court in considering due process cases, though our analysis may lead to different results. By contrast, we have held that our Equal Protection Clause "is no broader in coverage than the Federal provision" (Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344, 360 n 6 [1985]).
We find no inconsistency that is significant in this case between our due process and equal protection decisions and the Supreme Court's. No precedent answers for us the question we face today; we reject defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's ruling without opinion in Baker v Nelson (409 US 810 [1972]) bars us from considering plaintiffs' equal protection claims. But both New York and federal decisions guide us in applying the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.
A. Due Process
In deciding the validity of legislation under the Due Process Clause, courts first inquire whether the legislation restricts the exercise of a fundamental right, one that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 [1997], quoting Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 [1977] [plurality op]; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563, 575 [1994]). In this case, whether the right in question is "fundamental" depends on how it is defined. The right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental right (Loving, 388 US at 12; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 [1978]; Cooper, 49 NY2d at 79). The right to marry someone of the same sex, however, is not "deeply rooted"; it has not even been asserted until relatively recent times. The issue then becomes whether the right to marry must be defined to include a right to same-sex marriage.
Recent Supreme Court decisions show that the definition of a fundamental right for due process purposes may be either too narrow or too broad. In Lawrence v Texas (539 US 558, 566 [2003]), the Supreme Court criticized its own prior decision in Bowers v Hardwick (478 US 186, 190 [1986]) for defining the right at issue as the right of "homosexuals to engage in sodomy." The Lawrence court plainly thought the right should have been defined more broadly, as a right to privacy in intimate relationships. On the other hand, in Washington v Glucksberg (521 US at 722, 723), the Court criticized a lower federal court for defining the right at issue too broadly as a "right to die"; the right at issue in Glucksberg, the Court said, was really the "right to commit suicide" and to have assistance in doing so.
The difference between Lawrence and Glucksberg is that in Glucksberg the relatively narrow definition of the right at issue was based on rational line-drawing. In Lawrence, by contrast, the court found the distinction between homosexual sodomy and intimate relations generally to be essentially arbitrary. Here, there are, as we have explained, rational grounds for limiting the definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples. This case is therefore, in the relevant way, like Glucksberg and not at all like Lawrence. Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Lawrence did, seek protection against state intrusion on intimate, private activity. They seek from the courts access to a state-conferred benefit that the Legislature has rationally limited to opposite-sex couples. We conclude that, by defining marriage as it has, the New York Legislature has not restricted the exercise of a fundamental right (see also concurring op of Judge Graffeo at 368-374).
Where no fundamental right is at issue, legislation is valid under the Due Process Clause if it is rationally related to legitimate government interests (Glucksberg, 521 US at 728; Hope, 83 NY2d at 577). Again, our earlier discussion answers this question. Protecting the welfare of children is a legitimate governmental interest, and we have shown above that there is a rational relationship between that interest and the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. That limitation therefore does not deprive plaintiffs of due process of law.
B. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs claim that the distinction made by the Domestic Relations Law between opposite-sex and same-sex couples deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. This claim raises, first, the issue of what level of scrutiny should be applied to the legislative classification. The plaintiffs argue for strict scrutiny, on the ground that the legislation affects their fundamental right to marry (see Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 NY2d 326, 332 [1976]) — a contention we rejected above. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue for so-called intermediate or heightened scrutiny on two grounds. They say that the legisla tion discriminates on the basis of sex, a kind of discrimination that has been held to trigger heightened scrutiny (e.g., United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 532-533 [1996]). They also say that discrimination on the basis of sexual preference should trigger heightened scrutiny, a possibility we left open in Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York (65 NY2d at 364). We reject both of these arguments, and hold that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, New York is not engaging in sex discrimination. The limitation does not put men and women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other. Women and men are treated alike — they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex. This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black legislation. Plaintiffs do not argue here that the legislation they challenge is designed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class.
However, the legislation does confer advantages on the basis of sexual preference. Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits associated with marriage. This case thus presents the question of what level of scrutiny is to be applied to legislation that classifies people on this basis. We held in Under 21 that "classifications based on sexual orientation" would not be subject to strict scrutiny, but left open the question of "whether some level of 'heightened scrutiny' would be applied" in such cases (id. at 364).
We resolve this question in this case on the basis of the Supreme Court's observation that no more than rational basis scrutiny is generally appropriate "where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement" (Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 441 [1985]). Perhaps that principle would lead us to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual preference discrimination in some cases, but not where we review legislation governing marriage and family relationships. A person's preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State's interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best. In this area, therefore, we conclude that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate.
Where rational basis scrutiny applies, "[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest" (id. at 440). Plaintiffs argue that a classification distinguishing between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples cannot pass rational basis scrutiny, because if the relevant state interest is the protection of children, the category of those permitted to marry — opposite-sex couples — is both underinclusive and overinclusive. We disagree.
Plaintiffs argue that the category is underinclusive because, as we recognized above, same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples, may have children. That is indeed a reason why the Legislature might rationally choose to extend marriage or its benefits to same-sex couples; but it could also, for the reasons we have explained, rationally make another choice, based on the different characteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex relationships. Our earlier discussion demonstrates that the definition of marriage to include only opposite-sex couples is not irrationally underinclusive.
In arguing that the definition is overinclusive, plaintiffs point out that many opposite-sex couples cannot have or do not want to have children. How can it be rational, they ask, to permit these couples, but not same-sex couples, to marry? The question is not a difficult one to answer. While same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are easily distinguished, fimiting marriage to opposite-sex couples likely to have children would require grossly intrusive inquiries, and arbitrary and unreliable line-drawing. A legislature that regarded marriage primarily or solely as an institution for the benefit of children could rationally find that an attempt to exclude childless opposite-sex couples from the institution would be a very bad idea.
Rational basis scrutiny is highly indulgent towards the State's classifications (see Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320-321 [1993]). Indeed, it is "a paradigm of judicial restraint" (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied sub nom. Affronti v Lippman, 534 US 826 [2001]). We conclude that permitting marriage by all opposite-sex couples does not create an irrationally overnarrow or overbroad classification. The distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex couples enacted by the Legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
V
We hold, in sum, that the Domestic Relations Law's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not unconstitutional. We emphasize once again that we are deciding only this constitutional question. It is not for us to say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong. We have presented some (though not all) of the arguments against same-sex marriage because our duty to defer to the Legislature requires us to do so. We do not imply that there are no persuasive arguments on the other side — and we know, of course, that there are very powerful emotions on both sides of the question.
The dissenters assert confidently that "future generations" will agree with their view of this case (dissenting op at 396). We do not predict what people will think generations from now, but we believe the present generation should have a chance to decide the issue through its elected representatives. We therefore express our hope that the participants in the controversy over same-sex marriage will address their arguments to the Legislature; that the Legislature will listen and decide as wisely as it can; and that those unhappy with the result — as many undoubtedly will be — will respect it as people in a democratic state should respect choices democratically made.
Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division in each case should be affirmed without costs.