Case Name: Paul Allen MARR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-01-29
Citations: 470 So. 2d 703
Docket Number: No. AU-499
Parties: Paul Allen MARR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 470
Pages: 703–717

Head Matter:
Paul Allen MARR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AU-499.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 29, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 1985.
On Rehearing En Banc June 14, 1985.
Silas R. Eubanks and T. Whitney Strickland, Jr., Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Gregory G. Costas and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. At-tys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Chief Judge.
Marr appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed for the. offense of sexual battery. He raises several issues on appeal, only two require discussion. First, that the trial court erred in holding Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes, constitutional in that it denied appellant his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by a full and fair cross-examination. Second, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction, asking that the testimony of the prosecutrix be rigidly scrutinized, in that the prosecutrix was the sole witness to the alleged act. We affirm as to the constitutional point raised, but reverse and remand as to the second issue.
On March 11, 1982, appellant was charged with the December 25, 1981 sexual battery of K.R. by oral penetration under Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The prosecutrix, a 36-year-old cerebral palsy victim and mother of three children, testified that on December 25, 1981, between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., while she was at the home of an elderly friend for the purpose of taking her to a Christmas dinner, appellant came from a neighboring house, which he was renting from the elderly friend, and told the prosecutrix that her friend' was then in his house having a cup of coffee. The victim related that after she had gone inside the house, appellant grabbed her and stated, "Merry Christmas. Santa Claus didn't come to my house last night, so you are going to be my Christmas present." Appellant and the victim struggled for a while but appellant, brandishing a knife, was able to force her to undress. The victim recounted that she told appellant she did not want to engage in sexual intercourse because she was then having her menstrual period. Appellant replied, "Well, there are other ways .", and then forced her to perform oral sex with him. After a short while, the victim bit appellant's penis, grabbed his testicles and was able to make her escape, proceeding immediately to her church where she met her boyfriend. The victim told him that the elderly friend was not at home, but did not then advise him about the incident which occurred at appellant's house. She testified that she had not planned to report the incident, but, during the days that followed, she received several threatening telephone calls from an unidentified person who reported to her details concerning the sexual battery. Finally, on January 2, 1982, an unidentified person assaulted and threatened her outside of her home. After the last incident, the victim notified the police of the sexual battery.
Appellant admitted at trial that he had seen the victim at his home on December 25, 1981, but denied sexually battering her, as well as the subsequent assault and harassing telephone calls. The defense also presented several witnesses, including appellant's wife, who stated that nothing unusual occurred at appellant's home on the day in question. The prosecution introduced no physical evidence, such as laboratory tests or fingerprints which would have established the contrary. In fact, there was no other evidence corroborating the victim's account of the incident.
Appellant first contends that the trial judge erred in holding constitutional section 794.022(2), because it denied appellant his constitutional right of a full and fair cross-examination of the prosecutrix, as guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 794.022(2) provides in part that specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender is afforded admissibility: (1) when such evidence may prove that the defendant was not the source of semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease; or (2) when such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim and only when it is relevant to the issue of consent. These two exceptions to the inadmissibility of prior consensual sexual acts of the victim are clearly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Appellant, in an effort to establish that the victim had fabricated the sexual assault, proffered evidence outside the presence of the jury relating to sexual intimacy between the victim and her boyfriend. The purpose of the proposed line of questioning was to demonstrate bias on the part of the state's only key witness. Although the trial judge ruled that this line of questioning was inadmissible, because it was barred by section 794.022(2), he permitted appellant to inquire generally about the victim and her loved one's close relationship, barring, however, references to specific sexual acts. Upon cross-examination in the presence of the jury, the victim admitted that her relationship with her companion was very close; that she was very much in love and respected his judgment. The friend in turn testified that he knew the appellant, and also knew that appellant had contacted the state attorney, and had reported information regarding the commission by him of an alleged criminal offense, which had precipitated an investigation. Even so, he stated that he did not harbor any animosity towards appellant.
We disagree that appellant was prejudiced by the limited inquiry. The general rule of law regarding cross-examination of witnesses is as follows:
All witnesses are subject to cross examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice or interest, and this is particularly so where a key witness is being cross-examined_
The sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses requires that a defendant in a state criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination to show bias. Denial of effective cross-examination in such circumstances is constitutional error.
Hannah v. State, 432 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (e.s.). See also Watts v. State, 450 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Our research in this area has revealed only one Florida case directly interpreting the interrelationship between the Florida rape shield statute — restricting the admissibility of prior consensual sexual acts of the victim — with the defendant's right to a full and fair cross-examination, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment for the purpose of establishing bias on the part of a key witness. In Kaplan v. State, 451 So.2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the court cautioned: "We recognize, however, that the defendant's right to full and fair cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, may limit the statute's application when evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is relevant to show bias or motive to lie."
A review of recent Massachusetts case law, interpreting a similar rape-shield statute, is instructive. In Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1981), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
We do not believe that the prohibition in the rape-shield statute sweeps so broadly as to render inadmissible evidence of specific instances of a complainant's sexual conduct in situations when that evidence is relevant to show the complainant's bias.
(e.s.) In Joyce, the defendant, as here, had claimed that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual acts, which was relevant to the issue of bias, thereby denying him his right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, although avoiding the defendant's constitutional contention by holding that the judge misapplied the Massachusetts rape-shield statute, conceded that serious constitutional doubts are raised when such a statute is construed as excluding any evidence relevant to a rape complainant's bias.
Our case is analogous to a later Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Elder, 389 Mass. 743, 452 N.E.2d 1104 (1983), in which the court, while recognizing the broad scope of examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, concluded that the trial judge had properly excluded evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim and her boyfriend, offered for the purpose of establishing an escalating hostility towards the defendant. There the defendant sought to introduce evidence disclosing that the complainant had fabricated rape charges against him in order to prevent him from interfering with her intimate relations with her boyfriend. "At trial, the judge permitted the defendant to introduce [some] evidence of hostility between the complainant and the defendant", without introducing complainant's prior sexual history. Commonwealth v. Elder, 452 N.E.2d at 1109. The reviewing court concluded that "[s]ince the defendant was able to establish bias without the proffered evidence, . [t]he judge properly limited the scope of the evidence after adequate exposure on the issue of bias, and he gave proper attention to 'the important policies underlying the rape-shield statute' as well as the confrontation clause." 452 N.E.2d at 1109, 1110.
In the case at bar, the trial judge allowed testimony relating to the facts that the prosecutrix and her friend were in love, as well as the closeness of their relationship. We consider that under the circumstances he struck a proper balance between the policies undergirding the statute, and those of the confrontation clause, by allowing evidence as to the bias of the prosecu-trix, without permitting specific references to sexual intimacies. In so doing, the lower court did not completely foreclose the defendant's right to conduct an effective cross-examination for the purpose of exposing any lurking bias of the key witness. "Where evidence of bias is available by other means," the exclusion of prior consensual sexual acts relevant to a showing of the prosecutrix's bias does not raise serious constitutional problems. Commonwealth v. Elder, 452 N.E.2d at 1110. Similarly, we find that section 794.022(2) is constitutional as applied to the facts before us.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's requested jury instructions, asking that the testimony of the prosecutrix be rigidly scrutinized, since she was the sole witness to the alleged act. We agree. Appellant's requested jury instruction was couched in the following language:
In a case where no other person was an immediate witness to the alleged act, the testimony of the prosecutrix should be rigidly scrutinized.
The trial judge denied the request and gave the standard jury instruction on judging the credibility of witnesses.
In determining whether the standard jury instructions generally cover the scope of a requested instruction, our sister court in Moody v. State, 359 So.2d 557, 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), has offered the following comments: "A trial judge should generally adhere to the Standard Jury Instructions; however, he is not relieved from his obligation to determine whether the standard instructions accurately and adequately state the relevant law." (e.s.) Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court itself authorizes a departure from the standard form in the event the form is deemed "erroneous or inadequate." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.985.
We consider that the standard instruction, given in the case at bar, set out in n. 4, supra, did not adequately apprise the jury of the law relevant to a situation in which the victim is herself the only witness to the crime, and her bias is placed in issue. Although the law is well established that a rape victim's testimony requires no corroboration, such " 'testimony must be carefully scrutinized so as to avoid an unmerited conviction.' " Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla.1976) (e.s.) (quoting from Thomas v. State, 167 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla.1964)). We therefore conclude that, because of the unique circumstances present in a close case such as this, in which the harmless error rule obviously cannot be applied, the lower court's refusal to give the requested instruction must be deemed an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal.
We recognize that there is contrary authority on this point. In Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in using the standard jury instruction, rather than a special instruction involving a sexual battery under section 794.011. Accord, Hicks v. State, 388 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Williamson v. State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We consider, however, that each case must rest on its own particular facts in gauging the propriety of giving a requested instruction. In the case at bar, not only did the prosecution rely completely on the testimony of the alleged victim, it failed to perform any laboratory tests or doctor's examinations of her, due to her week-long delay in reporting the incident.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.
MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Before ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, BOOTH, SMITH, SHIVERS, WENT-WORTH, JOANOS, THOMPSON, WIG-GINTON, NIMMONS, ZEHMER and BAR-FIELD, JJ.
. Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1983), states:
A person who commits sexual battery upon a person over the age of 11 years, without that person's consent, and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
. The Massachusetts rape-shield statute provides:
Evidence of the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in any investigation or proceeding before a grand jury or any court of the commonwealth for a violation of sections twenty-two, twenty-two A, twenty-three, twenty-four and twenty-four B of chapter two hundred and sixty-five. Evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct in such an investigation or proceeding shall not be admissible except evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of recent conduct of the victim alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition of the victim; provided, however, that such evidence shall be admissible only after an in camera hearing on a written motion for admission of same and an offer of proof. If, after said hearing, the court finds that the weight and relevancy of said evidence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim, the evidence shall be admitted; otherwise not. If the proceeding is a trial with jury, said hearing shall be held in the absence of the jury. The finding of the court shall be in writing and filed but shall not be made available to the jury. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 233, § 21B, inserted by ch. 110, Statutes (1977).
. We caution that if, in a particular case, there is a complete foreclosure of cross-examination sought to disclose bias on the part of a key witness, serious constitutional problems might arise.
. The jury instruction, which followed almost verbatim that provided in section 204, Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, was as follows:
It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable. You should use your common sense in deciding which is the best evidence, and which evidence should not be relied upon in considering your verdict. You may find some of the evidence not reliable, or less reliable than other evidence.
You should consider how the witnesses acted, as well as what they said. Some things you should consider are:
1. Did the witness seem to have an opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified?
2. Did the witness seem to have an accurate memory?
3. Was the witness honest and straight-forward in answering the attorneys' questions?
4. Did the witness have some interest in how the case should be decided?
5. Does the witness' testimony agree with the other testimony and other evidence in the case?
1't
You may rely upon your own conclusion about the witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testimony of any witness.
.We are not unaware that the Tibbs decision, which reversed the defendant's conviction due to the lack of evidentiary weight, was later disapproved by the same court. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1126 (Fla.1981). The later opinion, however, did not address the impropriety of refusing to give a requested instruction similar to that before us.