Case Name: CAMBLOS v. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. CO.; DINSMORE v. SAME
Court: United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1873-04-25
Citations: 4 F. Cas. 1089
Docket Number: 
Parties: CAMBLOS v. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. CO. DINSMORE v. SAME.
Judges: Before McKENNAN, Circuit Judge, and' CADWALADEB, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Cases
Volume: 4
Pages: 1089–1116

Head Matter:
Case No. 2,331.
CAMBLOS v. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. CO. DINSMORE v. SAME.
[30 Leg. Int. 149; 4 Brewst. 563 ; 9 Phila. 411.]
Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
April 25, 1873.
Railroads — Charges for Carriage — Powers — Competition — Monopoly—Express Company— Preferential Accommodation — Infraction of-Charter — Suit by Stockholder — Mandatory-Injunction — When Granted Interlocutohily' —Citizenship of Joint-Stock Company.
1. Of two hills in equity, filed at the same-time, one was at the suit of an express carrier against a railroad company to prevent the continuance by them of a competing business in which they were engaged, as he alleged, without authority in their charter; also to compel the allowance by them of certain disputed facilities and accommodations which he claimed in his own business upon their line, and also to prevent the continuance by them of certain alleged overcharges for transporting his ■ express freights. The other bill was against the-same company at the suit of one of their stockholders. It contained the same allegations and prayed like relief. He was a party in the interest of the express carrier, and, pending the disputes, had bought the stock in order to-promote that interest by thus bringing suit. A preliminary injunction asked under each- bill was refused under both, because if either complainant had an equitable right it was not, in such a case, enforceable until final hearing.
[See Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Virginia,’ etc., Water Co., CaBe No. 2,990.]
2. A mandatory _ order, as a method of enforcing the concession of a right, is generally inconsistent with the object and appropriate functions of a preliminary injunction; and unless; there is an extraordinary special exigency, will, not be made interloeutonly.
3. Under a bill against a corporation by a-stockholder, a preliminary injunction is not ordinarily grantable where the question is not that of preventing forfeiture of the charter from being incurred, hut only that of alleged' erroneous administration of corporate faculties.
4. Here, if the defendants had infringed their charter, the mischief was already done, and preliminary injunction could not avert a forfeiture. The value of their stock in other respects could not be impaired by their participation in the profits of a competing business. Their liability to an action at the suit of the express carrier was a risk which the stockholders had voluntarily sought. Therefore, if he were a complainant for his own interest, he could not ask preliminary injunction.
5. If any act of the defendants prejudicial to the express carrier was also an infraction off their charter, he was not, on the latter account, entitled to any redress. As to him. the only-questions were those of alleged injury to his. business of a freighter; and those questions, unless there had been a judgment at law, were not of such urgency as necessarily to require-interlocutory decision.
6. The charter of a railroad company authorized them to charge certain limited rates of toll to others for passage over the rails; but did not limit their charge for transportation by themselves. The absence of a limitation of the latter charge did not enable them, as common carriers, to make unreasonable charges.
7. A statutory limitation of a railroad company’s charges impliedly excludes, within the limit, and question of their unreasonableness, unless rebates from the maximum, or additions to, or rebates from any lower established rates, are systematically unequal. Here equality is understood in a relative sense, as importing that, under like circumstances, a like rate, according to weight or bulk, is charged to all persons for the carriage of goods which are of like descriptions for purposes of transportation. Occasional inequality, even though preferential, is not always necessarily unreasonable. But systematic relative inequality cannot be reasonable.
8. The absolute monopoly of .such a company, as owner of the road, includes only the profit from tolls properly so called.
9. Any further monopoly is founded only, in the groat relative necessity that, for the security of persons and property, a railroad company should have exclusive. control of the motive power and of the track.
10. The monopoly of the company, as a common carrier, depends wholly upon the relative necessity, and cannot be extended beyond its exigency.
11. But the company may, as a common carrier, exercise any accessorial functions profitable to themselves and useful to the public.
12. Freight which is transportable partly upon their own road, and partly beyond it, can be received by them as consigned for their ulterior destination.
18. They may. as common carriers, engage in the accessorial business, with horse power, of collecting freight which is to be transported upon their own railroad, and delivering freight at the places of destination.
14. But they cannot monopolize wholly or partly this accessorial business, or promote the monopoly of it by any one else, or appropriate preferential advantages for conducting it, to their own profit, or to .that of any one else.
15. Express carriers are not, through any present magnitude, or prospective expansion, of their business, entitled to any such preferential facilities or accommodations from a railroad company as would preclude or impede participation by the railroad company or by any of the public in conducting such business with equal advantage on any scale great or small.
16. The charges by a railroad company for such accessorial service with horse power cannot be imposed upon any of the public who decline to use it.
17. There is no difference between such a direct overcharge and an indirect one made by refusing abatement from a single aggregate charge which includes it.
IS. Quaere, whether a rebate of less than the whole, amount or value of the charge for the service dispensed with can be reasonable.
19. Quaere, whether an express carrier who does not himself encroach on rights of the public. and who submits to all necessary and proper regulations of the railroad company, cannot, without obtaining a judgment at law, have relief in equity against such an overcharge.
20. An express carrier who does not submit, or offer to submit, to such regulations, but insists on having preferential accommodations or facilities which could not be allowed without encroachment on rights of the railroad company and of the public, cannot be relieved before the final hearing.
21. Quaere, whether he can have relief at the final hearing. It seems that he may, in cases in which part of the decree relieving him may be an adjudication against his pretensions which are unfounded.
22. The charge of a railroad company for transporting packed parcels by rail, of the full sum which would be payable in the aggregate if they were not packed and were charged for severally, cannot be rightfully imposed upon the public generally, or upon express carriers, or other middlemen.
23. A court of law, and not a court of equity, has primary cognizance of the question of the right of the railroad company carrying packed parcels for a- middleman who does net own them ' to charge him with any addition," however small, to what would otherwise be. the regular charge for carrying the package in mass.
24. The legal right of the railroad company under the last head is not so clearly deniable as to warrant the summary decision of it against them by a court of equity.
25. A joint-stock company was organized under laws of a state, one of which provided that nothing contained in it should be construed to give to such company any rights and privileges as á corporation. The same law authorized such company to sue in the name of their president.
Quaere, whether such a company was a citizen of that state within the meaning of the 11th section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 [1 Stat. 73], defining the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Upon the application of the complainant in each case for a preliminary injunction, affidavits on his part, and on that of the defendants, were exhibited. The complainant in the first case — a citizen of the state of New York — had, on August 28, 1872, become the holder of one hundred shares of the stock of the defendants. The complainant in the other case — a citizen of the state of New York — is president of a joint-stock company associated and organized in pursuance of laws of that state, under the name of “The Adams Express Company,” with power to sue in the name of their president. These are chapter 258, of the Laws of 1849, and chapter 245, of those of 1854. The latter act provides, that nothing contained in it shall be construed to give to such a company any rights and privileges as a corporation. On the part of the defendants it was alleged that the shares of their stock held by the complainant Cambios were acquired by him on account and in the interest of the Adams Express Company, solely with a view to enable him to sue here ostensibly as a stockholder of the defendants, but really as an agent of the Adams Express Company, bjr whom the expenses of the suit in his name were to be borne. In the following statement of the case, the word “complainants,” unless otherwise distinctly applied, will be understood as designating the Adams Express Company:
The two bills were precisely alike in their allegations and prayers of relief. They stated that, from the limitation of the proper business of railroads and other improved highways under corporate authority, to the routes between their termini and intermediate stations, there has been established for many years past an extensive independent business known as the express business; that those who conduct it serve the public as common carriers, by gathering small parcels, money, and commercial securities, at local offices and the • consignors’ doors, and delivering them to the consignees’ doors, away from the stations on railroads or other great highways, as well as by collecting bills ■of exchange, notes, and commercial paper, and assuming responsibility for the risk of the loss thereof of their customers; and, where railroads exist, conveying the express packages thereon, and principally in the cars of the railroad companies; that, the business being principally valuable to the community from the speed with which the packages are forwarded, it has been principally -conducted in cars attached to, or forming part of, the passenger trains, as distinguish■ed from the ordinary freight trains of the railroad; that the express business is valuable from the responsibility with which it is conducted, and the facilities it affords; that it required from those establishing it a large outlay without immediate remuneration, in acquiring the confidence of the community, and the organization and requisite information of their agents; and that the •complainants for many years past have thus acquired “an enormously valuable express business extending throughout the country, to the great advantage of the public,” conducting it in their own name, and also in that of other private associations whose interests have been acquired, and some of whose names have been retained by the complainants for their own convenience.
The defendants were incorporated under an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania of April 4, 1833, with power to make a railroad from Philadelphia to Reading, and with all incidental privileges, franchises and immunities, but none other than such as might be necessary or incident to the making and maintaining of the road and the conveyance of passengers, and the transportation cf the mail and of goods, etc., thereon. The act gives to the defendants power from time to .time to establish and alter or amend rules and regulations for the due ordering of all travelling and transportation upon and for the preservation of the road, and to prescribe the kinds and descriptions of cars, etc., to be used on it, and to regulate speed and Transit; provided that the toll on any species of property should not exceed an average of four cents per ton per mile, nor upon each passenger an average of two cents per mile. It was enacted that after a certain time an annual report should be made by the company, under one head of which the amounts received for tolls and transportation, and the rates charged, were to be ■stated. By subsequent acts of the legislature passed in 1837 and 1838, the defendants were authorized to extend the railroad to Pottsville, with all the privileges granted, and subject to the same restrictions imposed by the above-mentioned act of April 4, 1833. An act of April 3, 1862 (P. L. p. 234), extended to the defendants the privileges which had been granted to a navigation com- i i i pany by the first section of an act of April 5, 1859 (P. L. 1859, 372), enabling them “to contract for the transportation of coal and other articles upon their navigation, and to and from points beyond the same, and to include the charge for such transportation in their charge for tolls.” The defendants were “operating” their railroad and certain connecting railroads of -great extension, when an agreement of August 1, 1860, was made between them and the complainants transacting the. express business under one of their own names. By this agreement, the complainants were, for the carriage of a safe not exceeding seven cubic feet in capacity, and other express freight, and the messenger or agent accompanying the same, to have the use on one of the defendants’ passenger trains of an eight-wheeled car, and on each of several others of their passenger trains of a certain fractional part of such a car. There were provisions for the retention by the defendants of the absolute control and regulation of the trains and lines. The weight of the express matter, including the safe and its contents, was not to exceed 12,000 pounds in any one eight-wheeled car, nor more than a proportional weight in any fractional part of such a car. There were various provisions for expediting and facilitating loading, unloading, and weighing. Payments were to be made monthly by the complainants of not less than $400 for .the transportation of their messengers and safes and other freights; and they were, in addition, to pay rates of transportation upon all freight other than the safes and their contents, greater by twenty-five per cent, than the rates charged from time to time by the defendants in their schedules or tariff of freights; provided that the monthly payments should never be less than $2,000, which amount, as a minimum, was to be payable to the defendants whether such rates in addition to the $400 should equal that sum or not. The complainants were to send a messenger and safe, and to furnish express facilities to the public to the extent to which they could, under this contract, be furnished, at least once a day each way, between designated points. If the defendants should thereafter transport any express matter for others doing an express business, at more favorable rates than those agreed on as above, there was to be a corresponding reduction of the amounts payable by the complainants. The 8th article of this agreement provided that the defendants should riot be, directly or indirectly, liable or responsible to any persons whomsoever-, for any loss, or damage, or injury, which may happen to any property of any kind, connected with, belonging to, cai-ried for, or offered to be carried for, the complainants under this contract, or otherwise howsoever, nor for any injury happening to or sustained by any employe, servant, or i agent of the complainants, or any persons in any manner connected with them, nor for the death of any such person while upon or about the railroad, or property of the defendants, while upon the business of the complainants, whether such loss or damage, damage to property, injury to or death of any such person, should have been occasioned by or through the negligence, or omission, or default of the defendants, their agents or employes, or other persons, or otherwise howsoever, but from all such loss, injury, or damage, should be by the complainants at all times indemnified; it being distinctly understood and agreed, as part of the consideration of the contract, that the complainants assumed and took upon themselves, and undertook to pay, and provide for, and indemnify the defendants against all and every claim and demand for loss and injury of every nature, to life, person, or property, arising from the performance of this contract, or any matter directly or indirectly connected therewith. And the complainants further agreed to indemnify the defendants from all loss or damage, to which they might be subjected, for or on account of any injury to persons or property caused by or resulting from any explosive, combustible, noxious or deleterious substance, transported or held by the defendants for the complainants. The contract was to continue in force until the expiration of sixty days from the date of the service of written notice by either of the parties, on the other, of their wish that it should terminate, and was then to become void, etc., except for the enforcement of claims then acquired and existing.
The defendants, in the latter part of 1870, became lessees for a long term of all the franchises, railroad, and property of the Philadelphia, Germantown, and Norristown Railroad Co. This company was incorporated by an act of February 17, 1831, with authority to make the latter road, and to charge and receive tolls, and for freights, in and for the transportation of goods, etc., and for the conveyance of passengers, at prescribed maximum rates; provided that all persons using the road for the transportation of persons or commodities should only use such cars, etc., adapted to the road as the company should prescribe. A supplementary act of April 7, 1832, enabled the latter company to own and place locomotive engines on the road and transport persons, merchandise, etc., for prices or compensation to be agreed upon. Since the lease of this road by the defendants, it has been called -the Germantown and Norristown branch of their railroad. Under the date of May 7, 1872, it was agreed between the defendants and the complainants, by another of their names, that the defendants should provide for the use of the complainants one eight-wheeled ear suitable for the business of an express company, and transport the same daily (Sundays excepted) between Philadelphia and Chestnut Hill, on the Germantown and Norristown branch of the railroad of the defendants, twice each way — attached to passenger trains; and also transport for the complainants one eight-wheeled car (to be provided by the complainants themselves), twice each way daily (Sunday excepted), between Philadelphia and Norristown, on the same branch — attached to passenger trains; and issue passes for the transportation, free of charge, of one employe of the complainants in each of the said cars, upon its two daily round trips. If the defendant should, during the continuance of the agreement, enter into an agreement with any person or persons, in an express business, for the transportation over the said Germantown and Norristown branch, of express matter, upon terms more favorable than, were therein contained, the complainants were to have their express matter transported upon .the same terms. In consideration whereof, the complainants agreed to pay to the defendants during the continuance of this agreement, three hundred dollars upon the first of each month; not to make any demand or bring any suit against the defendants, for any loss, injury, or damage, from any cause whatever, that might occur to the ear furnished by the complainants, or to the goods transported in either of the cars; and to indemnify the defendants from all such demands or suits by any person whatever, and from all demands or suits by reason of any injury to or death of any employe of the complainants, it being the intention and agreement of the parties that the car furnished by the complainants, and the goods contained in either of the cars, as well as the employes of the complainants, should be transported solely at their risk, and without any responsibility whatever on the part of the defendants. The contract was to continue in force until the expiration of sixty days from the service of written notice by either party, upon the other, of an intention to determine the same;, whereupon it should become void, except for the collection of any sum then due by the complainants to the defendants. This agreement contained a provision that it was to be deemed and taken to have been in force from April 1, 1871.
On June 10, 1S72, the defendants gave to the complainants, under each of the contracts of August 1, 18CG, and May 7, 1872, notice that it would become void upon the expiration of sixty days. The defendants allege that there was no more necessity for the intervention of the complainants in the transportation of express freight and small packages than there would have been for such intervention between the public and the defendants in the transportation of coal or passengers in the freight trains, and that it would not have been just to permit the complainants to continue to carry away a considerable profit which really belonged to the defendants’ stockholders. On August 21, 1872, the defendants gave pnblic notice that on and after September 2, they would take charge of the express business in all its details, on their road, and its branches, and would be fully prepared to accommodate the public in the rapid transmission of money and freight entrusted to their care; adding that direct connections would be made with the “Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Express-’ for New York city and state, the eastern states and Canadas, and all points on the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Lackawanna and Bloomsburg, and Morris and Essex Railroads, and at reduced rates; that particular attention would be given to the collection of cheeks, drafts, notes, bills, etc., and prompt returns made; that orders for articles to be returned by express would be carried free of charge, and delivered at ■once upon arrival of trains, and goods called for and returned by next train, if ready for shipment; and that telegrams ordering shipments of packages by express would be forwarded over the lines of the Philadelphia, Reading, and Pottsville Telegraph Company ■at half rates. “For further information” application was to be made at the “general office” of the “Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Express Department,” and at the “branch office” of the same department. The defendants explain their connection, mentioned in this notice, with the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Express, by stating that it was to facilitate the transportation of express freight to destinations beyond their own railroads on the customary terms, and that they had offered to transfer, on similar terms, the entire business of such ulterior transportation to the complainants, who had refused the offer. The complainants received from the defendants, in a letter of August 2G, 1S72, information that upon their regular freight trains they would carry freights for the complainants in the same manner as “for other shippers;” that the complainants could not be furnished with separate cars for their goods, nor could the defendants engage to forward them in any given time, but that they should be loaded and despatched in the same order as consignments to all other parties. “Respecting tlie running of a private car over the Norris-town branch,” the words of the defendants were: “We are very much cramped for room at our depot, on Ninth street, and we should on that account prefer handling the goods in our own cars. But, if you prefer to furnish a car, it can be done, although we shall not be able ‘to promise as good de-spatch as would be given to our own cars, from the fact that an extra shift will be required, and this could not always be insured in time to get the car out by any particular train.” The complainants inquired generally, and also under specific heads, what facilities would be afforded them for the transportation of their express matter on the passenger trains of the defendants over their several roads and the respective branches. The defendants, in two letters of August 30, 1872, answered that if the complainants desired to continue in the express business in the defendants’ region and to make use of the defendants’ express department for transportation, the defendants would at all times be glad to transport any of the express matter of the complainants upon the same terms paid by the public, and would endeavor to attend to the receipt and delivery with promptness, despatch, and in all cases, on terms as favorable as to “any other shipper.” The defendants added: “As we do not intend to set apart in our express cars any particular space for any one shipper, we cannot consent to do so for your company. Neither can we permit your messenger to occupy any space in our express cars. As we are obliged to keep up a sufficient equipment to receive from and deliver to the public all express matter transported over our lines, we cannot consent to make any abatement to you in consideration of your receiving and delivering goods.” The defendants stated further that it was not their intention to permit the cars of any express company to run with passenger trains.
On September 2, 1872, the defendants com-' menced, and they have since continued, the business of transporting express matter in cars of their own, run with their passenger trains, each express car being attended by their messenger in charge of the express matter. For the collection and delivery of such matter at the termini of its lines, the defendants employ horses and wagons. The defendants collect and transport bank notes or other moneys in payment of checks, drafts, and bills intrusted to them; and for so doing receive compensation. Their president’s affidavit states that “such money or other securities are transported as any other freight of similar character and value.” The defendants had “instituted” a tariff of charges to the public for the conveyance of express matter. They refused, as they say, to show this tariff to the complainants without refusing to make known to them the charge for any particular item of express matter offered for transportation. An interrogatory of the bill asks a disclosure of all the regulations adopted by the defendants for the management of the express business which they have undertaken. In September, 1872, the relations of the parties becoming practically controversial, several disputes occurred. In what follows, “express freights” will be understood as including all articles or parcels of such small weight and limited bulk that they are or may be conveniently transportable in fast passenger trains, and all orders and securities for money and other written or printed papers, of which transportation otherwise than by mail is not unlawful. The complainants demanded, as proportional to the magnitude and expansion of their express business, facilities and accommodations on the scale of those which they had conventionally received from the defendants until the annulment of the contracts of August, 1866, and Hay, 1872. The defendants objected that certain of the facilities and accommodations thus demanded would be preferential, and that the allowance of them would therefore be improper. The questions under this head were: Whether the complainants could insist on having, in a passenger train, a car for their exclusive use, furnished by themselves or provided by the defendants, or on having a sufficient space to set apart for such use in a car of the defendants; whether the complainants could rightfully insist upon loading and receiving their express freights upon platforms or landings of the railway depots or stations at places where the defendants had established offices or warerooms for the reception and delivery of the freights; whether the complainants could insist upon the booking or waybill-ing, etc., being done by themselves, instead of by the defendants-; or whether the complainants could require the admission of an agent or messenger in charge of their express freights to the ear containing such freights, and require his freedom from those restraints upon ordinary passengers which might hinder his personal • care of such freights during their transit by rail; and whether, if such an agent or messenger was admitted only as a passenger paying the ordinary fare, he should be allowed as baggage to be carried in the baggage car, a trunk containing express freight of the complainants, without being charged more than for its excess, if any, in weight above that allowed for an ordinary passenger’s baggage and at the same rate. The other disputes were upon alleged overcharges by the defendants for the carriage of express freights. Their charge for the accessorial service with horse power, in carrying freights to and from the railway, was included in a single aggregate sum, which included also the charge for transportation by rail with steam power, without any discrimination between the amounts or values of the two services. The complainants, themselves bringing the freights to, and receiving them at, the railway, and thus making no use whatever of the horse power of the defendants, objected to the charge for its use, offering to pay the amount which would have been chargeable l'or the transportation by rail, according to the rates which had been usual until the defendants engaged in the accessorial business. This the defendants refused to accept. They exacted the aggregate sum, without making any abatement whatever. The complainants paid the whole charge under protest. As to the excess, it was contended fon the defendants that no rebate whatever was requirable of them, and by the complainants that no rebate less than of the whole excess above the proper charge for transportation by steam upon the rails could be reasonable.
Another dispute arose thus: When several articles or parcels, all receivable at the same-place or destination by the complainants, but there deliverable by them to several persons unknown to the defendants, were so bound or inclosed as to form together a single package not of inconvenient bulk or weight for transportation, the complainants required the defendants to receive such package for transportation upon their road at a rate of charge no higher than if the whole contents were owned by the complainants, or were intended for ultimate delivery to a single person. The defendants refused to carry the package at this rate, exacting the full aggregate amount which would have been chargeable if the several parcels had not been packed together. The whole charge was paid by the complainants, under protest as to the excess. Between the two extremes of the question as to packed parcels, a point argued was whether, if the whole additional charge was excessive and unreasonable, a less addition might not be properly made in order to cover the contingent risk of the defendants’ liability to several actions at the suit of the unknown parties interested. The complainants do not appear to have brought any action at law to get back either of the two excesses in amount which they paid under protest. Besides the special contesta-tions which have been mentioned, the complainants contended generally that carriage without steam power to or from the railway is a business wholly distinct from that of carriage by rail; that the charter of the defendants does not authorize them to engage in any other business of carriage than upon the rails, and moreover does not authorize them to receive any freight which is transportable upon their own road and beyond it, as consigned for the ulterior destination.
The purposes of the bills were threefold: First, by injunction, to prevent the defendants from continuing the competing business-with horse power. Secondly, to compel, by mandatory injunction or decretal order, the allowance by the defendants to the complainants of the disputed facilities and accommodations. Thirdly, to prevent, by injunction, the continuance of the alleged overcharges.
The defendants, denying wholly that the complainant’s case had any merits, objected that the questions in dispute were primarily cognizable, not in equity, but at law, and if this were otherwise, could not be properly considered until the final hearing; that the complainants could not-sue as a citizen of the state of New York, under the 11th section-of the judiciary act of 24th September. 17S0 [1 Stat. 73], and could not sue in equity out of that state, in the name of their president.
Geo. L. Crawford and Benjamin Harris Brewster, for plaintiffs.
A. D. Campbell and James E. Gowen, for defendants.
[The plaintiffs presented the following points and authorities:
[A. As to the Remedy.
[I. The Shareholder’s Bill. When a corporation attempts to misapply its corporate powers, funds, or credits, in acts, ultra vires, violating its charter, or lessening the shareholder’s dividends and the value of his shares, it will be restrained upon the application of a single shareholder, by a bill on behalf of himself and the others in like interest. Dodge v¡ Woolsey, IS How. [59 U. S.] 331, 341-343; Sandford v. Catawissa, W. &. E. R. Co., 12 Harris [24 Pa. St.] 378; Colman v. Eastern C. R. Co., 10 Beav. 1; Cohen v. Wilkinson, 12 Beav. 125; Salomons v. Laing, Id. 377; Graham v. Birkenhead, etc., Ry. Co., Id. 460; Munt v. Shrewsbury, etc., R. Co., 13 Beav. 1; Logan v. Earl of Courtown, Id. 22; Gregory v. Patchett, 33 Beav. 595; Bagshaw v. Eastern U. R. Co., 7 Hare, 114; Simpson v. Denison, 10 Hare, 50; Maun-sell v. Midland G. W. R. Co., 1 Hem. & M. 130; Great Western R. Co. v. Rushout, 5 De Gex & L. 290, 293; Winch v. Birkenhead, etc., Ry. Co., Id. 562; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 550; Attorney General-v. Great Northern R. Co., 1 Drew& S. 154, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1006; Charlton v. Newcastle & C. R. Co., 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1096; Hare v. London & N. W. R. Co., 30 Law J. Ch. 820; Forrest v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co., 7 Jur. ,(N. S.) 887; Bioxam v. Metropolitan R. Co.,' 3 Ch. App. 337; Caledonian & D. J. R. Co. v. Magistrates, 2 Macq. 391; Dun. Nav. Co. v. North Midland R. Co., 1 Eng. Ry. & Canal Cas. 135; Kemp v. London & B. R. Co., Id. 495; Bell v. Hull & S. R. Co., Id. 636; March v. Eastern R. Co., 40 N. H. 548, 43 N. H. 515; Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn. 446; Gifford v. New Jersey R. & T. Co., 2 Stockt. [10 N. J. Eq.] 171; Stevens v. Rutland & B. R. Co. [29 Vt. 545]. Though the unauthorized works or business be beneficial to the corporation. Munt v. Shrewsbury & C. R. Co., 13 Beav. 1; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 550; • Cale-donian & D. J. R. Co. v. Magistrates, 2 Macq. 391. That the shareholder purchased his stock for the purpose of filing the bill, and sued at the instigation and request of a rival interest, and that his motives and feelings were adverse to the corporation, is no defense. Colman v. Eastern C. R. Co., 10 Beav. 1; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 550; Graham v. Birkenhead, etc., Ry. Co., 12 Beav. 400; Hare v. London & N. W. R. Co., 30 Law J. Ch. 820; Attorney General v. Great Northern R. Co., 1 Drew & S. 154, 0 Jur. (N. S.) 1006; Forrest v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co., 7 Jur. (N. S.) 8S7; Bioxam v. Metropolitan R. Co., 3 Ch. App. 337; Seaton v. Grant, 2 Ch. App. 459; Sandford v. Catawissa, W. 6 E. R. Co., 12 Harris [24 Pa. St.] 37S. That the bill was properly framed on behalf of those only in interest, who can take the benefit of the limited jurisdiction. Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 480. That the corporation was the proper defendant and it was not necessary to add the directors. Bagshaw v. Eastern U. R. Co., Winch v. Birkenhead, etc., Ry. Co., Beman v. Rufford, . Salomons v. Laing, Sandford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co., — all of which were before cited. See text-books: Drew. Inj. 194, 286; Waif. Rys. 153, 371, 404, 405; Hodges, Rys. 6S et seq.; 2 Shelf. Rys., 114, 125, 163-Godef. & S. Rys., 72 et seq.; 2 Redi. R. R. 327-336.
[II. The Express Company’s Bill. That a constitutional or statutory privilege was peculiarly the subject of equitable protection by injunction. Hil. Inj. c. 25, p. 389. That equity had undoubted jurisdiction to interfere by injunction, where public officers are proceeding illegally under a claim of right to the injury of the rights of others, where the acts are a breach of trust, or acts of irreparable mischief, or involving a multiplicity of suits, or otherwise invite equitable jurisdiction. Greene v. Mumford, 5 R. I. 475; Mohawk & H. R. Co. v. Arteher, 6 Paige, 83; Conover v. Mayor, etc., of New York. 25 Barb. 513; Frewin v. Lewis, 4 Mylne & C. 254; Hil. Inj. c. 24, p. 383; Manderson v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 379; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. [22 TJ. S.] 838-846; Boston W. P. Co. v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 16 Pick. 525. That the express company had a right to sue in the name of their president, and that their powers were given by the following statutes of New York:' Laws 1849, c. 52; 1851, c. 455; 1853, e. 153; 1854, c. 245; 1867, c. 289; 1868, c. 290; 1869, c. 157.
[B. As to the Right.
[I. That the defendants were bound to carry for all owners or express bailees of parcels, including said Adams Express Co., without partiality, preference, or advantage to the defendants themselves, or any one else. That railroad companies, though called private as contradistinguished from public, were not such private corporations as manufacturing companies, and were public as distinguished from them, their uses being all public. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. [17 TJ. S.] 668; Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal [Case No. 12,139]. That whenever the public, through its agents, deem the franchise of a railroad company injurious, they could, under the unlimited and discretionary clause in most charters, revoke it. Com. v. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Newbury - port Turnpike Corp. v. Eastern R. Co.,23 Pick. 326; Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. Corp., 4 Mete. [Mass.] 564; Enfield Toll-Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. Co., 14 Wend. 57; Beckman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, 43; Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., of Philadelphia, 9 Harris [21 Pa. St.] 149; Moers v. City of Reading, Id. 18S; Sandford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co., 12 Harris [24 fa. St.] 378; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, IS IU. 464; Galena & C. U. R. Co. y. Rae, Id. 490. By their obligations as common carriers. That the defendants, being empowered by their charter, with the eorela-tiye duty to become transporters upon, as well as to maintain their railway for tolls, and publicly professing to carry for others in respect to the matters complained of, were liable as common carriers. Johnson v. Midland Ry. Co., 4 Exch. 367; Fuller v. Nauga-tuck R. Co., 21 Conn. 559; Ang. Carr. p. 84, § 78; Thomas y. Boston & P. R. Co., 10 Mete. ¿Mass.] 475; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Thompson, 19 Ill. 5S4; Illinois Cent. R. Co. y. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 95. That “carriers regarded in law as if they were in the public service, and their obligations do not arise ex contractu.” Saltonstall y. Stockton [Case No. 12,271]; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 270. That it is the duty of a common carrier to receive and carry all goods offered, if he has requisite convenience, upon reasonable charge and conditions. 2 Show. 327; Story, Bailm. c. 6, § 508; 2 Kent, Comm. 599; Galena & C. U. R. Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 489, 490; Audenried y. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 18 P. F. Smith [68 Pa. St.] 380; Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke, 86; 3 Inst. 181; 4 Bl. Comm. 159; 4 Jac. Raw Diet. p. 307. That monopolies are void by the common law, being against the freedom of trade, discouraging labor and industry, and putting it in the power of particular persons to set what price they please on a commodity. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 79, § 2; Moore, 391; Mitchell v. Reynolds, 10 Mod. 130. As to instances of involuntary restraints by charter which are void, see 2 Rolle, Abr. 214; 3 Inst. 182; 11 Coke, 84; Moore, 671; 1 W. Jones, 321; 3 Mod. 73; Willes, 384; 1 Saund. 312c.; 1 Rolle, 364; Lutw. 562; 1 Comb. 269; 5 Mod. 104-106; Comb. 372; 1 Rolle, 4; 1 Ld. Raym. 113; Moore, 576; 1 Bulst. 11; Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich j City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; Ang. & A. Corp. | § 330; Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 i Cow. 462; Hayden v. Noyes. 5 Conn. 391; Í Grant, Corp. 80. In reference to charge for j parcels, see Crouch y. London & N. W. R. i Co. (1849) 2 Car. & K. 789; Parker v. Great Western R. Co. (1844) 7 Man. & G. 253; Edwards v. Great Western R. Co. (1851) 73 E. ■C. L. 588; Parker v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co. <1S51) 6 Exch. 702; Crouch v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1854) 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 2S7; Crouch y. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1854) Id. 449, 9 Exch. 530; Finnie v. Glasgow & S. W. Ry. Co. (1S35) 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 21; Crouch y. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1S50), 11 Exch. 742. In regard to undue preference, see Ransome v. Eastern C. Ry. Co. (1857) 1 J. Scott (X. S.) [1 C. B. N. S.] 437, 3S Eng. Law & Eq. 231; Oxlade v. Northeastern Ry. Co. (1S57) S7 E. C. L. 454, 1 J. Scott (N. S.) [1 C. B. N. S.] 434; Marriott v. London & S. W. Ry. Co. (1S37) 1 J. Scott (X. S.) n C. B. X. S.] 499; Baxendale v. North Devon Ry. Co. (1851) 3 J. Scott (N. S.) [3 C. B. N. S.] 324; Harris v. Coekermouth & W. Ry. Co. (1858) Id. 694; Piddington v. Southeastern Ry. Co. (1S58) 5 C. B. (N. S.) Ill, 94 E. C. L. Ill; Baxendale v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1858) 5 J. Scott (N. S.) [5 C. B. X. S.] 309, 336; Garton v. Great Western Ry. Co., Id. 669; Garton v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co. (1S59) 0 J. Scott (N. S.) [6 C. B. N. S.] 639; Id. (Exch. Ch.) 5 Jur. (N. S.l 1172; Id. (House of Lords) 7 Jur. (N. S.) 173; Id. (1801) 1 Best & S. 112; Baxendale v. Great Western Ry.‘Co. (1S63) 14 J. Scott (N. S.) [14 C. B. N. S.] 1; Sutton y. Great Western Ry. Co. (1863) 3 Hurl. & C. 800; Baxendale v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (Exchequer, 1866) 12 Jur. (N. S.) 274; Palmer y. London, B. & S. C. Ry. Co. (1871) 40 Law J. C. P. 133, L. R. 6 C. ' P. 194; Parkinson v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1871) 40 Law J. C. P. 222, L. R. 6 C. P. 554; Sand-ford y. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co., 12 Harris [24 Pa. St.] 378; New England Express Co. y. Maine Cent. R. Co., 57 Me. 188; 10 Mees. & W. 397; 3 Eng. Ry. & Canal Cas. 193; 49 E. C. L. 253; 73 E. C. L. 583; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 49 Ill. 37; Webber v. Gage, -39 N. H. 1S2; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 WaH. [72 U. S.] 74; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, 10 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 588. That a common carrier “exercises a public employment.” Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
[II. Thatthe defendants have no powers but those the strictest construction of their charters exhibits. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. [36 U. S.] 420-544; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. [54 U. S.] 71; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 10 How. [57 U. S.] 435; Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 1 Black [66 U. S.] 35S-380; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skel-ley, Id. 436-446; Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Ga. 517; Mayor, etc., v. Macon & W. R. Co., 7 Ga. 221; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; State y. Chase, 5 Ohio St. 52S. That their charters are to be construed by the laws of the states granting them. Smith v. Ivernochen, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 198. That Pennsylvania had .-judicially declared the rule of strictest construction. Packer v. Sunbury & E. R. Co., 19 Pa. St. 211-218; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Canal Com’rs, 21 Pa. St. 9, 22; Com. v. Franklin C. Co., Id. 117; Com. y. Erie & N. E. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339, 351; Com. y. Central P. R. Co., 52 Pa. St. 506. That the rule of strictest construction applies to the right to take toll, freight, or fares. Camden & A. R. & T. Co. v. Briggs, 2 Zabr. [22 N. J. Law] 023. That the rule applies to an alleged grant interfering with public trades, or commerce, or convenience. Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnpike Co., 13 Pa. St. 533; McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213; Justices y. Griffin, etc.. Road Co., Id. 475, etc. That the rule applies to railroad franchises. Hodg. Rys. 6S et scq., and cases cited; Godef. & S. Rys. 61; 2 Shelf. Rys. 2,114,126, et seq., and cases cited; 1 Redf. R. R., 50. 235, 7, 8; 405, 9, 28; 354, 4, 518, 614;' 2 Redf. R. R. 445; Colman v. Eastern C. R. Co., 10 Beav. 1; Munt v. Shrewsbury & C. R. Co., 13 Bear. 1; Simpson v. Denison, 10 Hare, 51; Maunsell v. Midland G. W. R. Co., 1 Hem. & M. 130; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 550; Forrest v. Manchester, S. &-L. R. Co., 30 Beav. 40. That an accident to be carried by a principal grant must be necessary and proper, and usually appurtenant. Sumner v. Marcy [Case No. 13,009]. That the defendants received their corporate franchises with the duty to exercise them (Cohen v. Wilkinson, 12 Beav. 125; Graham v. Birkenhead, etc., Ry. Co., Id. 460; Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 2 Eng. Ry. & Canal Cas. 599); and, having completed and operated their railroads for over a generation, never before exercised or claimed to exercise the franchise in question, and recognized the plaintiff’s right thereto. That the power to make a road and take tolls does not authorize establishing a line of stage coaches thereon. Downing v. Mount Washington Co., 40 N. H. 230; Wis-wall v. Greenville, etc., Road Co., 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 1S3. That the carriage of goods by an agent of a railroad company, from a point distant from the line of the road, to be transported on the line, was distinct from the general objects of the company. Missouri Coal & Oil Co. v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 35 Mo. 84. That the old rule that a carrier must deliver was not applicable to railroad companies, because they had fixed tracks and fixed points of termination. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 1 Gray, 203; People v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 55 Ill. 95; Mayor, etc., v. Macon & W. R. Co., 7 Ga. 221.
[III. That the duty of the defendants to permit the Adams Express Company’s express car to be drawn on any train whereon the defendants carry their own express car, and for charge not exceeding their statutory toll per ton i>er mile, with reasonable compensation for motive power and incideutal service, equally to such part of their charge to others for whom they perform the entire collection, carriage and delivery, as was fairly referable to the part of said entire services — followed from their statutory obligation, and that equal justice required by the nature of their franchise, their obligations as common carriers, and the principles of public policy. Hodg. Rys. 504, 539. That the equity jurisdiction, power, and practice of the circuit court of the United States, under the constitution, (article 3, § 2), the process acts of September 24, 1789 (section 11), May 8, 1792 (section 2), May 19, 182S (sections 1, 3), June 1, 1S72, and the rules of court, were in nature, extent, and forms of procedure as administered in the English court of chancery, and thus the same in all the circuits, and not as modified in the several states. 1 Rent, Comm. 342; Story, Eq. § 57; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat [16 U. S.] 221; U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat [17 U. S.) 115; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. [31 U. S.) 657, 658; Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. [34 U. S.] 633, 656; Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. [3S U. S.] 36S, 369; Ex parte Whitney, 13 Pet. [3S U. S.] 407, 408; Gaines v. Relf, 15 Pet. [40 U. S.] 14,17; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 13 How. [54 U. S.] 563, 564; Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. [58 U. S.] 3S4; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. [62 U. S.] 590-592; Thomson v. Central Ohio R. Co., 6 W'all. [73 U. S.) 137; Walker v. Dreville, 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 442; Mayer v. Foulkrod [.Case No. 9,341]; Gordon v. Hobart [Id. 5,609]; Fletcher v. Morey [Td. 4,864]; Cropper v. C.oburn [Id. 3,416]; Loring v. Marsh [Id. S,515]; Lorman v. Clarke [Id. 8,516]; Dow v. Chamberlain [Id. 4,037]; U. S. v. Parrott [Id. 15,999]. In regard to the protection of rights by injunction, they cited: Durell v. Pritchard, 1 Ch. App. 244-250; Great North, etc., R. Co., v. Clarence R. Co., 1 Colly. 507; Spencer v. London & B. R. Co., 8 Sim. 193; London & N. W. R. Co. v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co., 36 Law J. Ch. 479; Dew-hirst v. Wrigley, 1 Coop. Ch. Pr. 319; Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Browne, Ch. 588; Earl of Mexborough v. Bower, 7 Beav. 127;. Westminster, etc., Co. v. Clayton, 36 Law J. Ch. 476; Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim. 13; Martyr v. Lawrence, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 261; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 858; Hervey v. Smith, 1 Ivay & J. 389-394; Attorney General v. Borough of Birmingham, 4 Kay & J. 547; Goodale v. Goodale, 16 Sim. 316; "Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383-395; Greatrex v. Greatrex, 1 De Gex & S. 692, 11 Jur. 1032; Evitt v. Price, 1 Sim. 483; Sloo v. Law, [Case No. 12,957]; Manderson v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 379; Baxendale v. North pevon Ry. Co., 3 J. Scott (N. S.) [C. B.] 333; Ransome v. Eastern C. R. Co., 3S Eng. Law & Eq. 231-236; In re Oxlade, 87 E. C. L. 497; Harris v. Cockermoúth & W. Ry. Co., 91 E. C. L. 693; Baxendale v. Great Whstern Ry. Co., 94 E. C. L. 335; Garton v. Great Whstern Ry. Co., Id. 609; Same v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co., 93 E. C. L. 639; Palmer v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 40 L. J. C. P. 133; L. R. 6 C P. 194; In re Marriott, 87 E. C. L. 514; Parkinson v. Great Western R. Co., 40 L. J. C. P. 222, L. R. 6 C. P. 544.
The defendants presented the following points and authorities in regard to the plaintiff Cambios:
[I. That the court of equity could not be asked to interpose by a preliminary injunction to protect a suitor from risk incident to a position which he had voluntarily assumed for the purpose of incurring the risk which he complained of. Kenton v. Union Passenger Ry. Co., 4 P. F. Smith. [54 Pa. St.] 453, 454; Stuart, V. C., in Ffoolcs v. London & S. W7. Ry. Co., 19 Eng. Law & Eq., 14; Knight Bruce, L. J.. in Rogers v. Oxford, Wr. & Wr. R. Co., 2 De Gex & J. 662; Forrest v. Manchester S. & L. It. Co., 4 De 4ex, F. & J. 126, decided by Lord Westbury on appeal from M. R., 30 Beav. 40; Hare v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 30 Law 3. Ch. 280, 817, 2 Johns. & H. 80; Felder v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 1 Hem. & M. 4S9; Hattersley v. Earl of Shelburne, 31 Law J. Ch. 873; and Robson v. Dodds, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 301.
[II. That it was impossible to extend the principle on which a court of equity will, on proper occasions, enjoin a corporation at the ■suit of a single stockholder to a case like this. Ang. & A. Corp. (Ed. 1871) § 393; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. [59 ü. S.] 343; Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phil. Ch. 790; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare, 492; Lord v. Copper Miners’ Co., 2 Phil. Ch. 740; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. City of Wheeling, 13 Grat. 40.
[in. That the mere character of the relief sought (except so far as an injunction against carrying on “the independent express business,” or engaging in the business of collecting checks, drafts, etc., was asked for) showed that in no event could a preliminary injunction be granted. Audenried v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 18 P. F. Smith [68 Pa. St.] 370; Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Sim. 47; Mocanaqua Coal Co. v. Northern Cent. R. Co. [9 Phila. 250]; Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works v. Erie R. Co., 5 Green. Ch. [20 N. J. Eq.]; Sandford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co., 12 Harris [24 Pa. St.] 378.
[IV. That the inconvenience that would result from granting a preliminary injunction would be incalculably greater than that winch would result from refusing it; and even if the plaintiff’s right to relief on a final hearing appeared to be indisputable, the court would refuse to interfere. now.
[V. That the act incorporating the railroad company gave them such liberties, franchises, and privileges “as were necessary or incident to the making and maintaining of the railroad and the conveyance of passengers and the transportation of the mail and of goods, merchandise, and commodities thereon. Act April 4, 1833, § 2, proviso (P. L. p. 146). That the act of April 3, 1802 (P. L. p. 234), extended to the P. and R. R. R. Co. the privilege to “contract for the transportation of coal and other articles to and from points beyond their line, and to include the charge for such transportation in their charge for tolls.” (1) That the right of a railroad company to acquit itself of responsibility by unloading goods at its depot seems to have been established. Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co., 10 P. F. Smith [60 Pa. St.] 109; Morris & E. R. v. Ayres, 5 Dutch. [29 N. J. Law] 393; Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 1 Gray, 263; Tanner v. Oil Creek R. Co., 3 P. F. Smith [53 Pa. St.] 411; 2 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed. 1864), p. 189. (2) That under the English decisions the mere reception by a railroad company of goods destined and marked for a point beyond its line implied a contract to deliver at the destination. Mus-champ v.' Lancaster & P. R. Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421; Bristol & E. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 5-Hurl. & N. 969; 7 H. L. Cas. 194.; 2 Redf.. Ry. (3d Ed.) § 12; Id. pp. 109, 194, c. 23, § 13; 1 Pars. Cont. (3d Ed.) 687; Jenneson v.. Camden & A. R- & T. Cc., 4 Am. Law Reg. 234; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Forsyth, 11 P. F. Smith [61 Pa. St] 81; Pennsjdvania R. Co, v. Berry, 18 P. F. Smith [68 Pa. St.] 272. “In England and upon the continent it is the-practice for the companies themselves to-carry parcels by express, which is here done chiefly by others, under contract with the railroad companies.” 2 Redf. Ry. pp. 14, 15; South Wales Ry. Co. v. Redmond, 10-C. B. [N. S.] (100 E. C. L.) 675.
[VI. The defendants were common carriers, and as such were subject to no other rules or regulations than any other common carriers, incorporated or not. That every person had the right to place cars on their road, and to furnish the motive power required for their’ transportation. Boyle v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 4 P. F. Smith, [54 Pa. St] 810;. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sly, 15 P. F. Smith, [65 Pa. St.] 205. There is no rule of equality in regard to the charges of a common carrier. Fitchburg R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 893;. Baxendale v. Eastern .Counties Ry. Co., 4 C. B. [N. S.] (93 E. C. L.) 61; Branley v. South Eastern R. Co., 12 C. B. [N. S.] (104 E. C. L.) 63.
[The defendants argued in regard to the plaintiff Dinsmore, as follows:
[I. That the plaintiff’s case was not such as to entitle him to an injunction against the transgression of the defendants’ charter, alleged to have been involved in their engaging in what was described as the “express business.” That neither he nor the association he represented held a share of the defendants’ stock, hence no breach of the quasi trust relation between a stockholder and the corporation could be averred. That there was not even a contract relation between the plaintiff and the defendants, and, if there had been, such a relation would not of itself be a sufficient ground for interference of a court of equity. That no right of property claimed by the plaintiff was involved or imperilled; nor had the plaintiff established any right whatever which could be affected by the alleged usurpation of the defendants.
[H. That a court of equity could not grant the relief sought by the prayers in the plaintiff’s bill to compel the defendants to extend to the Adams Express Co. certain facilities, for the transportation of their freight. That the legal right, the infringement of which could be enjoined in equity, must be existing, continuing, and affecting property. Ges v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 414; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 239; Kerr, Inj. p. 1; Sutton v. Southeastern Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Exch. 32; Pickford v. Grand Junction Ry. Co.. 3 Eng. Ry. & Canal Cas. 53S. That the chancery jurisdiction of the federal courts was the same in all the states,- and the rule of decision was the same in all; its remedies were not regulated by the state practice. Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet [31 U. S.] 648; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 347; Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, [67 ,U. S.] 500; Gordon v. Hobart [Case No. 5,609]; Slayer r. Foulkrod [Case No. 9,341]; Dow v. Chamberlain [Id. 4,037]; 1 Brightly, Fed. Dig. 283.
[The English “Packed Parcels Cases”: Held: That the statute relating to the railroad company required the charges to be reasonable. Pickford y. Grand Junction K. Co., 10 Mees. & W. 399. Held: That the charges of a railroad should be equal and reasonable under the English act Parker v. Great "Western By. Co., 7 Man. & G. (49 E. C. L.) 253. Carriers were charged for packed parcels; the public were not. Held: A violation of equality clause in statute relating to the railroad company. Parker v. Great Western By. Co., 11 C. B. (73 E. C. L.) 545; Edwards v. Same, Id. 588. The following cases are to the same point as the above: Crouch v. London & N. W. B. Co., 14 C. B. (78 E. C. L.) 254; Crouch v. Great Northern By. Co., 9 Exch. Welsh. H. & G.) 556, 11 Exch. (Hurl. & G.) 740, *742. Held: That an action may be maintained by an express carrier’s customer, in his own name, against a railway company for the loss of, or injury to, a carrier’s packages. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. [47 U. S.] 344; Ang. & A. Carr. (4th Ed.) §§ 98, 466, 494; 2 Bedf. B.'B. (3d Ed.) pp. 13, 17. Held: That there was no rule of equality at common law. Baxendale v. Eastern C; By. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. (93 E. C. L.) 63. Held: That a railway company was justifiable in charging a carrier a separate rate on each separate parcel addressed to different ultimate consignees, although the parcels were delivered to the carrier’s agent, and were marked with the carrier’s address. Garton v. Bristol & E. By. Co., 1 Best & S. (101 E. C. L.) 112. Held: That double charge for parcels packed together was unequal and unreasonable under the statute. Piddington v. South Eastern By. Co., 5 C. B. [N. S.] (94 E. C. L.) 111. Held: That neither the statute nor the common law required equality of charges. Bran-ley v. South Eastern By. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. (104 E. C. L.) 63. Held: That the railway company must charge equal rates. Sutton v. Great Western By. Co., 3 Hurl. & C. (Exch. Ch.) 800, L. B. 4 H. L. 226; Parker v. Great Western By. Co., 6 El. & Bl. (88 E. C. L.) 77. Held: That a railway company cannot give undue preference to themselves in their separate capacity as carriers, other than on their line of railway. Baxendale v. Great Western By. Co., 5 C. B. N. S. (94 E. C. L.) 336. Held: That to constitute “an undue or un-. reasonable preference” within the act, by reason of an inequality of charge, it must be for travelling over the same line or the same portion of the line. Caterham By. Co. ■ v. London, B. & S. C. By. Co., 1 C. B. N. S. (87 E. C. L.) 410. Held: That an omnibus proprietor who carries passengers and their baggage for hire to and from a railway station, cannot maintain an action against the company for refusing to allow him to-drive his vehicle into the station yard.. Barker v. Midland By. Co., 18 C. B. (86 E. C. L.> 45. Held: That the granting of an exclusive privilege to one omnibus proprietor to enter the station yard was a breach of the statutory prohibition against the granting of undue and unreasonable preferences. In re Mariott, 1 C. B. N. S. (87 E. C. L.) 499. The contrary was held, on the ground of “no inconvenience to the public” having been shown. In re Beadell, 2 C. B. N. S. (89 E. C. L.) 509; In re Painter, Id. 701.
[Other illustrations relating to the exclusion of goods — vans—after a certain hour of the day, are found in Garton v. Bristol & E. By. Co., 6 C. B. N. S. (95 E. C. L.) 639, and Bax-endale v. London & S. W. By. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. (KM E. C. L.) 758; Palmer v. London & S. W. By. Co., L. B. 1 C. P. 588. In reference to charging for cartage, see Garton v. Bristol & E. By. Co., 6 C. B. N. S. (95 E. C. L.) 639; Baxendale v. Great Western By. Co., 14 C. B. N. S. (108 E. C. L.) 1; Baxendale v. London & S. W. By. Co., L. B. 1 Exch. 137; Cumberland Valley B. Co.’s Appeal, 12 P. F. Smith [62 Pa. St] 218; Boyle v. Philadelphia & B. B. Co., 4 P. F. Smith [54 Pa. St.] 310.]
Before McKENNAN, Circuit Judge, and' CADWALADEB, District Judge.
[Reprinted from 30 Leg. Int. 149, by permission.]
[From 4 Brewst. 503.]
[From 4 Brewst. 563.]

Opinion:
McKENNAN, Circuit Judge.
The prayers of these bills are the same. Although, in form, they invoke the preventive intervention of the court, they are founded upon the alleged denial of certain legal rights claimed by the Adams Express Company, and it is manifest that the only beneficial measure of' relief would be a mandatory order, constraining the defendant to concede to the express company the exercise and enjoyment of the rights claimed by it. This it may be within the range of the power of the court to decree, but it ought to be done only under-circumstances of special exigency, to avert the continuing injuriousness of clearly wrongful acts. As a method of enforcing the concession of a mere right, it is inconsistent with the object and appropriate functions of a preliminary injunction. In Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., referred to-in Audenried v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 18 P. F. Smith [68 Pa. St.] 376, Mr. Justice Strong said: "A preliminary injunction-ought never to be granted except in a clear ease, and then only to prevent a substantial injury. Its purpose is to keep things in their existing condition until the case can be finally heard. As it is the strong arm of the-law, it must be used only when necessity requires it And a preliminary injunction •can never be necessary when the thing sought to be restrained has been already done; for its province is not to undo, but to prevent and preserve." And in Farmers' R. Co. v. Reno, O. C. & P. Ry. Co., 3 P. F. Smith [53 Pa. St.] 224, the same learned judge said: "The sole object of such an order is to preserve the subject of the controversy in the •condition in which it is when the order is made. It cannot be used to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into possession of the other. That can be accomplished only by a final decree." It is true the allowance of mandatory interlocutory injunctions has, to some extent, the sanction of the modern English practice. It has grown up upon the supposed authority •of Lord Eldon, who made such an order, for the first time, in Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 193. But he evidently regarded it as exceptional, and while he considered the injury complained of as a dear invasion of the complainant's rights, demanding prompt rep.aration, he declined to decree a specific correction of it by the defendant^ but so avowedly framed his order as to "create the necessity" for the defendant doing what he was unwilling to order him directly to do. Such a case cannot be regarded as evidence of the existence of a uniform practice, or .as a warrant for the establishment of one. It has certainly not led to such a result in this country, for in Audenried v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., supra, Mr. Justice Sharswood says with great force: "There are some few instances in England in which a mandatory order has been made in an interlocutory application, but they have been very extreme case, and ought not to be followed as precedents."
Is there anything, then, in the circumstances of the present case to demand a resort to so questionable a mode of interposition? 'The Adams Express Company is entitled to protection only against such illegal acts of the defendant as are prejudicial to its rights and interests. If the railroad company has , assumed the exercise of any franchise not i •conferred by its charter, the express cornpa- ¡ uy is not authorized to call it to account. If, i without right, it seeks to appropriate the j profits of a business of which the express : company before had the monopoly, it does not thereby incur any liability to the express company. Their relations to each other grew out of the corporate duties of the defendant as a common carrier, and it is only for a failure or refusal to perform any of these duties to the express company as a shipper that the latter has a right to complain. The transportation of its freight over the defendants' road is not denied to the express company, nor can it be. The parties disagree as to the regulations imposed and the rates demanded by the defendant. The right to rebate from the charges of the defendant, equal to the cost of collecting, trans- i porting, and delivering parcels from and to the doors of the consignors and consignees, and the right to pay for transporting a package of parcels only the price charged for a separate one, are claimed by the plaintiff, and constitute the substantial subjects of the contention. Practically, only the profits to be derived from the express business on the Philadelphia and Eeading Eailroad are involved in it. Shall these profits accrue to the railroad company or to the express company? Are these questions of such urgent significance as to call for their decision before a final hearing? To decide them now, as must necessarily be done if the present motion is allowed, is, in effect, to decide them finally, because a final decree could not more fully secure to the plaintiff the enjoyment of what it claims than would an interlocutory injunction. Why should this be done in the absence of an answer and of the proofs necessary to a precise adjustment of the relative rights and duties of the parties, or without a trial at law? "To preserve the subject of the controversy in the condition in which it is" now, does not require it, but the effect would be to undo what has been done, to take away from the defendants the controverted rights now enjoyed by them and confer them upon the plaintiff. This can be accomplished appropriated only by a final decree. Nor has the complainant Cambios any better title to this summary relief than the express company. As a stockholder in the corporation defendant, his only interest is in being protected against the risk of loss. So long as those who manage the corporation keep within the limits of its charter, and commit, or propose to commit, no breach of their trust, he has no right to complain. In Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 341, the court says: "It is now no longer doubted, either in England or the United States, that courts of equity in both have jurisdiction over corporations, at the instance of one or more of their members, to apply preventive remedies by injunction to restrain those who administer them from doing acts which would amount to a violation of charter, or to prevent any misapplication of their capitals or profits, which might result in lessening- the dividends of stockholders, or the value of their shares, as either may be protected by the franchise if the acts intended to be done create what is, in the law, denominated a breach of trust." If the acts complained of are violations of the defendants' charter, as they are not, because concerning only the administration of its legal faculties, the mischief has been already done, —and a preliminary injunction could not avert their injurious consequences; and surely the value of the complainant's stock will not be impaired, or the dividends upon it lessened, by securing, its participation in the profits of a business which he seeks to divert into another channel. And then as to the apprehended liability of the defendants to the express company for damages, he has voluntarily sought the risk from which he asks to be protected. It is charged and not denied that he acquired his stock "on account and in the interest of the Adams Express Company, and solely with the view of giving himself a supposed status in court, to enable him to maintain the present suit ostensibly as a stockholder of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, but really as an agent of the Adams Express Company," and "that the expenses of the said suit, are to be borne by the said company." And these averments are corroborated by the fact that his bill is filed at the same time with and is an exact counterpart of the express company's bill. . He does not, therefore, come into court with a bona fide complaint as a stockholder really seeking protection, but as the auxiliary of another party whose proceeding is adverse to his, interest as a stockholder. It is not a question of his motives, but of the genuineness of the character in which he presents himself, and of the good faith of his appeal for summary relief. A court of equity is not the redresser of simulated wrongs, nor will it exert its strong arm to relieve a complainant in a position which he has voluntarily assumed, with a full knowledge of its perils. The motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore denied.