Case Name: Gerard AUGUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-12-27
Citations: 666 So. 2d 218
Docket Number: No. 94-03458
Parties: Gerard AUGUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 666
Pages: 218–221

Head Matter:
Gerard AUGUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-03458.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 27, 1995.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Michael J.P. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Gerard Augustin, challenges the trial court's denial of motions to suppress evidence in two separate cases. He also contends that the trial court erred in assessing the amount of public defender fees, in imposing certain conditions of probation, and in assessing certain court costs. We affirm the trial court's rulings regarding the motions to suppress. We agree, however, with appellant's other contentions and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
First, the trial court erred in assessing $300 in attorney's fees pursuant to section 27.56(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993) without affording appellant the opportunity to object to the amount of the assessment. Bourque v. State, 595 So.2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Accordingly, on remand, appellant shall have thirty days from the date of our mandate within which to file a written objection to the amount of the fees. If such an objection is filed, the trial court shall strike the assessment and a new assessment shall not be imposed until appellant is afforded notice and hearing in compliance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). Trice v. State, 655 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We also conclude that the trial court erred in imposing written conditions of probation requiring appellant to pay for the cost of a drug and alcohol evaluation, as well as the cost of any needed treatment (condition 20), and prohibiting him from using intoxicants to excess (condition 5). We have held that these are special conditions of probation which must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Nank v. State, 646 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In this case, these conditions were not orally pronounced, and they must be stricken on remand by the trial court. Id.
Finally, with regard to the issue of costs, we reverse the "cost/fine" of $33 because no statutory authority was cited to support its assessment. Sutton v. State, 635 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We also reverse the $100 assessment for the FDLE lab fee since the trial court failed to determine the appellant's ability to pay this fee. Callaway v. State, 658 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Lastly, we reverse the $2 cost item imposed under section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993). This cost is discretion ary, and the trial court failed to give appellant notice of its imposition. Williams v. State, 655 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). On remand, however, the state may seek to reimpose these costs in accord with the law. Callaway, 658 So.2d 593; Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. Case Nos. 94-1052 and 94-1331.
. The remainder of condition 20 requiring appellant to undergo an evaluation and to successfully complete any recommended treatment program is valid because it was orally pronounced at sentencing and not objected to. Franklin v. State, 658 So.2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Olvey v. State, 609 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (en banc).
.The trial court only imposed costs in case no. 94-1052.