Case Name: Daniel Lowell COLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-05-13
Citations: 418 So. 2d 238
Docket Number: No. 54250
Parties: Daniel Lowell COLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 238–244

Head Matter:
Daniel Lowell COLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 54250.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 13, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 1982.
Tyrie A. Boyer of Boyer, Tanzler, Blackburn & Boyer, Jacksonville, Margaret Good, Louis G. Carres and Thomas S. Keith, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Doris E. Jenkins, Gregory C. Smith and A. Sidney Johnston, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Coler was convicted and sentenced to death on three counts of rape of a child under eleven years and one count of sexual battery of a child eleven years or younger. Each count charged Coler with a separate episode of sexual battery on his daughter during the years 1972 through 1977. At the outset we vacate the death sentence since we have held in Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla.1981), that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and therefore forbidden by the eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. Further, although there is sufficient evidence in the record, if believed, to support a conviction, we find that Coler was convicted in part by the use of irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial testimony which deprived him of a fair trial. We therefore reverse his convictions and order a new trial.
After Coler and his wife were divorced early in 1972, the three Coler children lived half the time with each parent. In July 1972 Coler obtained exclusive custody of the children, and they lived with him until late in 1974 when their mother regained custody. Coler was granted weekend visitation privileges with the children. In March 1977 the children complained that they did not want to visit their father. When pressed by their mother for a reason, one of the children indicated that their father had been sexually abusing the daughter. Following an investigation by the Division of Family Services, including a gynecological examination, the state attorney's office sought and received an indictment.
In addition to the testimony of the children concerning the four specific incidents of sexual battery, the state introduced testimony from the children, over objection, of other examples of Coler's deviant sexual behavior. They testified that Coler had the children watch from the doorway as he fondled a woman, that he told them that they or the neighborhood children could use his bed for sexual intercourse, that he told one of his sons to have sex with three women he brought home, and that on a visit to Michigan he made the children eat a cucumber which, just prior thereto, he had inserted into the daughter's rectum. None of this testimony was relevant to prove a material issue of the indictment. It served only to prove the defendant's bad character and was obviously prejudicial.
For a discussion of evidence of a collateral nature we return to the fine opinion of Justice Thornal in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). That case states the general rule that similar fact evidence is admissible if relevant to a fact in issue even though it also points to the commission of a separate crime. Such evidence is inadmissible, however, if its sole relevancy is to establish bad character on the part of the accused. The prosecution is not permitted to present evidence simply to show a defendant's bad character or to show a disposition toward the commission of the crime charged. If relevant, the bad character exception may have to yield if incidental to a relevant issue, but, when there is no relevance except bad character, it is error to allow such evidence.
To be relevant, evidence must prove or tend to prove a fact in issue. The state argues that the objected-to evidence proves Coler's state of mind. Coler's state of mind, however, was not an issue. State of mind is not a material fact in a sexual battery charge, nor is intent an issue. Cf. Askew v. State, 118 So.2d 219 (Fla.1960) (specific intent is not the essence of the crime of rape). In this instance the state overstepped the threshold of responsible prosecution with the introduction of this loathsome and despicable testimony. We cannot say it did not affect the jury's verdict.
Coler raises other issues, but most of these alleged errors are unlikely to reoccur in a new trial, and we decline to address them. In any event we are unable to discern other clear reversible error on the issue of guilt.
The convictions and sentences are vacated, and Coler is granted a new trial.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion with which SUNDBERG, C. J., concurs.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion with which ADKINS, J., concurs.
. The first three counts were based on § 794.-01(1), Fla.Stat. (1971). The fourth count was based on § 794.011(2), Fla.Stat. (1975).
. We make no judgment as to whether the evidence actually tends to prove or disprove Coler's state of mind. Further, we do not comment on whether the introduction of such testimony should be excluded as a result of weighing its probative value against any unfair prejudice. See § 90.403, Fla.Stat. (1979) (not applicable to the trial of this cause).