Case Name: DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-08-27
Citations: 385 Mich. 519
Docket Number: No. 18; Docket No. 52,678
Parties: DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DETROIT
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, T. E. Brennan, and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 385
Pages: 519–536

Head Matter:
DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DETROIT
Opinion of the Court
1. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances—Employees—Residence.
The Detroit Common Council had the power to pass an ordinance requiring most of its employees to reside therein (Detroit Ordinance 327-G).
2. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Classifications — Statutes — Ordinances.
Constitutional provisions relating to equal protection of the laws permit classification in statutes and ordinances based on natural distinguishing characteristics bearing a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation (US Const, Am 14; Const 1963, art 1).
3. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances—Employees—Residence —Police Officers.
An ordinance requiring police officers and most other employees of the city to reside therein but permitting waiver of this requirement for employees in the classified service is valid in its totality because a policeman’s job has “natural distinguishing characteristics” from all other city employees as the police force is a semi-military organization subject at all times to immediate mobilization, which distinguishes this type of employment from every other in the classified service (Detroit Ordinance 327-G).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 247.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 488, 494.
[4, 7, 8] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 488, 494; 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 247.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 98 et seq.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations §§ 247, 343, 346.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 372.
Concurring Opinion
T. E. Brennan and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ.
4. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances — Police Officers — Residence — Employees — Classifications — Legislative Determination.
There is nothing invidious about- the classification in an ordinance which requires police officers to be residents of the city but permitting waiver of this requirement for employees in the classified service as the classification amounts to nothing more than a legislative determination that the nature of a police officer’s work is such that he ought to be a resident of the city; the residency requirement is not designed solely to assure that the officer has a greater stake in the city but is also intended to bring about a more cooperative attitude among the citizenry with whom the police are in daily contact; the constabulary is unique among the municipal departments; and special treatment of police residency puts them in the category of judges and other elected city officials.
Opinion Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part.
Adams and Williams, JJ.
5. Municipal Corporations — Charters — Ordinances — Police Commissioner.
No intent to except the police commissioner of the City of Detroit from the operation of validly enacted city ordinances can be gleaned from the language of that city’s charter.
6. Municipal Corporations — Charters — Legislative Power — Common Council —■ Ordinances — Employees — Residence — Equal Protection.
The legislative power of the City of Detroit is vested exclusively in the common council by the city charter under which, subject to equal protection limitations, the council’s determination that an ordinance enacted by it to require most of the employees of the city to reside therein would promote the general health, safety, welfare and good government of the city was a policy decision within the bounds of legislative discretion (Detroit Charter, Title 3, Ch 1, § 1; Detroit Ordinance 327-G).
7. Municipal Corporations — Employees — Residence — Police Officers — Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Classifications.
A classification in an ordinance allowing a waiver of residence in the city to employees in the classified service when it “would serve the best interest of the city” but denying it categorically to police officers, in order to be upheld under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions, must be based upon a real and substantial difference having reasonable relation to the object of the legislation (US Const, Am 14; Const 1968, art 1; Detroit Ordinance 387-G).
8. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances — Police Officers — Residence — Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Classification.
A classification in an ordinance allowing a waiver of residence in the city to employees in the classified service when it “would serve the best interest of the city” but denying it categorically to police officers is devoid of rationality by denying that which is in the best interest of the city to police officers, the classification foregoes any claim it might have to a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose and denies to police officers the equal protection of the law (US Const, Am 14; Const 1968, art 1; Detroit Ordinance SS7-C).
9. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances — Police Officers — Residence — Constitutional Law — Constitutional Portions.
The words “police officers” in the second section of an ordinance providing that all police officers, appointees in the unclassified service, with certain exceptions, and all persons in the classified service of the City of Detroit shall reside therein are unconstitutional, void and of no effect; the remainder of the ordinance is left intact under a provision of an ordinance of that city that when a portion of an ordinance is declared unconstitutional, those portions not declared unconstitutional are to be unaffected (Detroit Ordinances § 1-1-6, 8S7-U).
Appeal from Wayne, Thomas Roumell, J., and from Court of Appeals prior to decision.
Submitted May 5, 1971.
(No. 18
April Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,678.)
Decided August 27, 1971.
Rehearing denied September 28, 1971. Appeal dismissed by the United States Supreme Court February 28,1972 for want of a substantial Federal question.
Complaint by the Detroit Police Officers Association and others against the City of Detroit for a declaratory judgment that a Detroit ordinance and a rule of the police department are unconstitutional and invalid and for an induction restraining the enforcement of that ordinance and rule. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals and applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. Leave granted.
Reversed.
Livingston, Gregory, Van Lopik & Higle, for plaintiffs.
Michael M. Glusac, Corporation Counsel, and John B. McKinlay, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
Swainson, J.
I agree with the opinion of Justice Williams that the trial court erred in holding that the Detroit Common Council did not have the power to pass Ordinance 327-G.
I dissent from Part IV of my Brother's opinion which holds that Ordinance 327-G violates the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and of the Michigan constitution.
The test for validity under the equal protection clauses, as noted by Justice Williams, is stated in Tracer v. Bushre (1968), 381 Mich 282, 286, 287:
" 'These constitutional provisions [the Federal and state equal protection clauses] do not mean that there can be no classification in the application of statutes and ordinances, but only that the classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.' Cook Coffee Co. v. Village of Flushing (1934), 267 Mich 131, p 134."
The job of a policeman does have "natural distinguishing characteristics" from all other city employees. There is a special relationship between the community policed and a policeman. A policeman's very presence, whether actually performing a specified duty during assigned hours, or engaged in any other activity during off-duty hours, provides a trained person immediately available for enforcement purposes.
Policemen are required by department order to be armed at all times, and why is this ? Simply because by such requirement they are, no matter where they are or what they are doing, immediately prepared to perform their duties. They are charged with law enforcement in the City of Detroit, and obviously must be physically present to perform their duties. The police force is a semi-military organization subject at all times to immediate mobilization, which distinguishes this type of employment from every other in the classified service.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that Ordinance 327-Gr is valid in its totality.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, T. E. Brennan, and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.