Case Name: Gottfried August Schulze, Appellant, v. Rosa Schulze, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-05
Citations: 83 A.D. 375
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gottfried August Schulze, Appellant, v. Rosa Schulze, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 375–380

Head Matter:
Gottfried August Schulze, Appellant, v. Rosa Schulze, Respondent.
Action f oi' clivoi'ce — effect of the granting of a motion to dismiss the complaint—the rules applicable to a judgment of nonsuit on a jury trial a/i'e not applicable.
In an action brought to procure an absolute divorce, the plaintiff called two witnesses, who testified to facts which, if believed, established that the defendant was guilty of misconduct. The character of the plaintiff’s witnesses was such, however, that the court was not obliged to believe them. At the close of the plaintiff’s case the court granted a motion made by the defendant to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved any act of adultery.
Subsequently the court filed a decision which found as a fact “that the defendant did not commit any of the acts of adultery alleged or set up in the complaint herein,” and as a conclusion of law “that the plaintiff has not sufficiently proven the allegations of adultery set forth in the complaint, and that, therefore, the defendant is entitled to judgment against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint herein for failure to so prove the said acts of adultery.”
Held, that the granting of the motion to dismiss the complaint involved a determination by the court that the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses was. not credible and, therefore, not sufficient to justify a judgment for the-plaintiff;
That the rules applicable to an appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in a case-tried before a jury were not applicable to an appeal from the judgment, entered upon the decision, as, in the case at bar, it was for the court to-determine the facts.
Laughlin, J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Gottfried August Schulze, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 23d day of January,. 1903, upon the decision of the court, rendered after a trial at the New York Special Term, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.
Leon Sanders, for the appellant.
Max Steinert, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, J.:
The action was for a divorce, and at the end of the plaintiff's case counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved any act of adultery, which motion was granted, and the plaintiff excepted. Subsequently a. decision was filed which found as a fact " that the defendant did not, commit any of the acts of adultery alleged or set up in the complaint herein," and, as a conclusion of law, " that the plaintiff has not sufficiently proven the allegations of adultery set forth in the complaint, and that, therefore, the defendant is entitled to judgment against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint herein for failure to so-prove the said acts of adultery." The plaintiff claims that this is to be-treated as a nonsuit, and that the rules applicable to a nonsuit in an action triable before a jury should be applied. The evidence offered by the plaintiff was such as to require the court to consider it and determine whether it was sufficient to sustain the charge of adultery. The main witness called by the plaintiff was a private detective in the employ of what was' called a " detective bureau." He testified to facts which, if he was believed, would justify an inference that the defendant was guilty of adultery. His testimony was to some extent corroborated by a companion named Burke. Burke described himself as the manager of a furnished room house, and that he was also in the insurance business. He received one dollar for the services that he rendered. Considering the character of the witnesses, however, the court was not bound to believe their testimony. A j ndgment in an action for a divorce should not be granted unless the evidence, after a careful scrutiny, is such as to satisfy the court that the adultery has been committed. (Moller v. Moller, 115 N. Y. 466; Burch v. Burch, 80 App. Div. 57.) When the plaintiff rested the court was required to consider the testimony and whether, uncontradicted, it was sufficient to justify a judgment of divorce. If it was not sufficient, he was not required to take the testimony of the defendant. After the plaintiff's testimony was before the court, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the adultery was not proved; and it was this motion that was granted. This involved a determination by the court that the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses was not credible, and, therefore, not sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff; and this was followed by the decision which found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the adultery charged.
The record thus shows that the court did pass upon the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses, adverse to the plaintiff; and upon this record we are not justified in reversing the determination of the court.
The rules applicable to a nonsuit in a case tried before a jury, when the jury are to determine the facts, are not applicable; as here, it was for the court to determine the facts.
Judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., O'Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., dissented.