Case Name: Clyde Timothy BUNKLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-05-27
Citations: 882 So. 2d 890
Docket Number: No. SC01-297
Parties: Clyde Timothy BUNKLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, LEWIS, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 882
Pages: 890–927

Head Matter:
Clyde Timothy BUNKLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC01-297.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 27, 2004.
R. John Cole, II, Sarasota, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Katherine V. Blanco, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
ON REMAND
BELL, J.
This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration of our decision in Bunkley v. State, 833 So.2d 739 (Fla.2002), vacated, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution and reaffirm our decision in Bunkley.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts are set out fully in this Court's initial opinion on review. Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 740-41. In 1986, Bunkley burglarized a closed, unoccupied restaurant. When he was arrested, he had in his pocket a folding knife with a blade shorter than four inches. The knife had been folded in his pocket at all times during the burglary. Bunkley was charged with armed burglary. To prove the offense under section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), the State had to prove that Bunkley was armed with a "dangerous weapon." The applicable statutory definition of a "weapon" in section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1985), excluded a "common pocketknife." Specifically, this statute defined a "weapon" as "any dirk, metallic knuckles, slung-shot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife." The term "common pocketknife" is not statutorily defined.
That Bunkley's knife was a "dangerous weapon" and not an excepted "common pocketknife" was a basic element of the offense the State had to prove to the jury. To establish this element at trial, the arresting officer told the jury that Bunkley had "a good-sized buck knife." The officer said that the blade, which folded into the handle, was about two-and-one-half to three inches long. The officer testified further that Bunkley's knife blade locked in the open position. The officer explained how this feature distinguished it from a common pocketknife:
It's a locked blade, which makes it a dangerous weapon for the simple fact that an average pocketknife, if you stick something with it and you're not very good at what you do, the blade will close. The pocketknife has that safety feature, that it will close. This blade will not close unless you push down very hard on this spring.
On cross-examination, Bunkley acknowledged that the knife could cut a throat and could be considered a dangerous weapon. In closing argument, the prosecutor described the blade as thick and capable of being locked in an open position, unlike a common pocketknife. Because the knife was admitted into evidence, the jurors could examine it for themselves.
The jury, having heard the evidence, considered the arguments of counsel, and received from the trial judge the proper instruction on the law applicable to the charged offense, concluded Bunkley's knife was a dangerous weapon, not a common pocketknife, and convicted him of armed burglary, possession of burglary tools, and resisting arrest without violence. The court entered judgment in April 1987. On the armed burglary conviction, the court sentenced Bunkley to life imprisonment in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. The sentence was based in part on Bunkley's fifteen prior convictions, fourteen of which were related to burglary. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Bunkley's conviction without opinion. Bunkley v. State, 539 So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (table).
Bunkley filed two motions for postcon-viction relief, challenging the jury's finding that he was armed with a dangerous weapon. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of one of Bunkley's motions, Bunkley v. State, 569 So.2d 447 (table) (No. 90-02681), and struck the appeal from the denial of the other motion. Bunkley v. State, 569 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (table) (No. 90-02568). Bunkley also filed two federal habeas petitions in which he argued that he could not be convicted of armed burglary because his knife was a common pocketknife excluded from the section 790.001(13) definition of a weapon. The federal district court denied Bunkley relief. Bunkley v. Singletary, No. 96-405-CIV-T-24C (M.D.Fla. Feb. 26, 1999); Bunkley v. Dugger, No. 91—113—CIV-T-99B (M.D. Fla. June 1, 1993). Bunkley also filed a petition to invoke all writs in this Court, which we denied without opinion in July 1995. Bunkley v. State, 660 So.2d 712 (Fla.1995) (table).
In 1997, eight years after Bunkley's conviction and sentence became final, we decided L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997), in which we interpreted the "common pocketknife" exception to the section 790.001(13) definition of a "weapon." We held in L.B. that the petitioner's knife, which had a three-and-three-quarter-inch blade, fell within the "common pocketknife" exception. Id. at 373. In reaching that conclusion, we cited a 1951 Florida Attorney. General's opinion which stated that a pocketknife with a blade of four inches or less is a common pocketknife. Id. (citing Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 51-358 (1951)). Based on the L.B. decision, Bunkley applied for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Bunkley argued that under the L.B. definition of a "common pocketknife," his knife with its three-inch blade was excluded from the statutory definition of a "weapon," so that he could not be convicted of armed burglary.
The circuit court dismissed Bunkley's rule 3.850 motion, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, but certified to us the question of whether L.B. was to be applied retroactively. Bunkley v. State, 768 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In answering the Second District's certified question, we determined that L.B. constituted a "change" not a "clarification" in the law. We expressly looked at the decision in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001), but rejected its applicability to Bunkley. We determined that, "as opposed to 'changes' in the law, an entirely separate body of precedent, i.e. 'clarifications' in the law, has no application under Florida law in the context of retroactivity." Bunkley 833 So.2d at 744. Applying our well-established law on retroactivity, we held that L.B. did not apply retroactively to Bunkley's case and approved the Second District's decision. Bunkley v. State, 833 So.2d 739, 746 (Fla.2002). We explained that only a "jurisprudential upheaval," defined as a "major constitutional change of law," justified retroactive application. Id. at 744 (citing Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929-30 (Fla.1980)). We concluded that L.B. was, instead, a mere "evolutionary refinement" in the law, and thus would not be applied retroactively. Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 745.
Justice Pariente, in a dissent'joined by Chief Justice Anstead, argued that Bunk-ley's conviction violated the due process principles of Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001). Fiore held that due process is violated by a conviction based on conduct that a "criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not prohibit." Id. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 712. The Bunkley dissent argued that L.B. did not change or refine the law but merely clarified the existing interpretation of a "common pocketknife" under the statute. Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 747 (Pariente, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, L.B. "correctly stated the law at the time Bunkley's conviction became final." Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 747 (Pariente, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent stated that under 1989 law (as clarified by L.B. in 1997), Bunkley carried a "common pocketknife" excepted from the statutory definition of a "weapon," so he could not be convicted of armed burglary. Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 747. Bunkley then filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari from and vacated this Court's decision. Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003). The Supreme Court remanded the casé with instructions to consider whether, in light of Fiore and L.B., Bunkley was convicted without proof of one of the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court accepted, this Court's conclusion that L.B. changed the law. Bunkley, 123 S.Ct. at 2023. However, the Supreme Court noted that this Court said L.B. culminated a "century-long evolutionary process" in the law on the "common pocketknife" exception. Id. The Supreme Court could not determine whether L.B. changed the law from 1989 when Bunkley's conviction became final or whether L.B. merely clarified the law as it had existed in 1989. Id.
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court said that the question under Fiore, left unanswered by our decision in Bunkley, was whether a two-and-one-half-to three-inch pocketknife was a "weapon" under the statute in 1989. Bunkley, 123 S.Ct. at 2024. If Bunkley's pocketknife was not a "weapon" under the statute when his conviction became final in 1989, then his conviction violated Fiore's due process principles. On the other hand, if Bunkley's knife could have been a "weapon" under the statute in 1989, then Bunk-ley's conviction stands.
FLORIDA LAW IN 1989
In answer to the United States Supreme Court's question, we clarify that Bunkley's conviction was proper under Florida law in 1989. Basically, in light of both Fiore and L.B., Bunkley was not convicted without proof of one of the elements of his crime. Bunkley's knife could have been a "dangerous weapon" under both the statute and the decisional law at that time. In 1989, whether Bunkley's knife was a weapon was properly a factual determination for his jury. Having heard the evidence and having received proper instructions on the law, Bunkley's jury unanimously determined that his knife was a dangerous weapon, not a common pocketknife. The evolutionary refinement in our decisional law made eight years later in L.B. has no retroactive application under either Florida's well-established law on retroactivity or Fiore. The support for this conclusion is found in our prior decision, the prior federal habeas petition decisions, and the discussion below.
Bunkley was convicted of armed burglary under a statute defining the offense as simple burglary while the defendant is armed with a "dangerous weapon." § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). At the time of Bunkley's trial in 1987, whether or not a particular knife was a "dangerous weapon" under the statute was determined by. juries based on the. facts of each case after receiving proper instructions on the law. In Bunkley's case, the jury determined that Bunkley's knife was a "dangerous weapon," not a common pocketknife. And, because he was armed with a dangerous weapon, he was guilty of armed burglary.
The decisional law of Florida was clear in 1989 that the determination of whether Bunkley's knife was a dangerous weapon or an exempted common pocketknife was ordinarily a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, not a pure question of law. Of particular importance, this position is confirmed by State v. Ortiz, 504 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Ortiz was charged with possession of a concealed weapon, not armed burglary, but he relied on the same statutory exception on which Bunkley relies. He filed a motion to dismiss because the charge was based on his pocketknife, and the definition of a "weapon" under section 790.001(13) excludes a "common pocketknife." Ortiz, 504 So.2d at 40. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. Although there was no factual dispute about the characteristics of the knife, the Second District held that "whether a knife is a 'common pocketknife' ordinarily involves a factual determination which may not be made by a trial court" on a motion to dismiss. Id.
While Ortiz was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss, the Second District has repeatedly affirmed that the Ortiz decision rested on the rule that "whether the knife was a' common pocketknife was a question of fact , that must be resolved by a jury." Baldwin v. State, 857 So.2d 249, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Ortiz, 504 So.2d at 40), review dismissed, 865 So.2d 479 (Fla.2003); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Ortiz for the rule that "whether a pocketknife is a weapon is a factual question for the jury"), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997); Bell v. State, 673 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (affirming a defendant's- convictions for concealed weapons offenses and citing Ortiz for the rule that whether a knife qualified as a "weap on" under section 790.001(13) is a jury question).
Ortiz was decided on March 13, 1987, one month before Bunkley's trial began on April 13, 1987. Ortiz remained the law beyond 1989 when Bunkley's conviction became final. Indeed, the Second District's decision in L.B. confirms the rule that whether a knife fell within the "common pocketknife" exception was a jury question. In L.B., the Second District rested upon this fact when it held that the "common pocketknife" exception to the statutory definition of weapon was void for vagueness. L.B. v. State, 681 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996), rev'd, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997). In support of its conclusion, the Second District observed that "the statute impermissibly leaves the question of whether a specific pocketknife is or is not a weapon to the 'whim of a jury.' " Id. at 1180. The Second District also cited with approval the trial court's conclusion that "no per se test could be applied to determine whether the [defendant's] knife, as a matter of law, fell within the exception."' Id.
This Court reversed the Second District's decision. We expressly held that the statute was not void for vagueness. See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1997). Indeed, this Court in L.B. recognized the rule that whether a knife is a "common pocketknife" is a jury question, and stated that in most cases the answer will be obvious to fact-finders. L.B., 700 So.2d at 372. Even though juries might reach inconsistent results based on similar facts, L.B. stated that this is an acceptable consequence of our jury system. Id. at 373. Thus, Florida law at the time of Bunkley's conviction unquestionably approved the referral to a jury of the question of whether a specific pocketknife qualified as a "weapon" under the section 790.001(13) definition, or, specifically to Bunkley, as a "dangerous weapon" under section 810.02(2)(b).
In sum, at the time of Bunkley's conviction juries were given the instructions previously noted and it was up to them to determine unanimously as a question of fact whether or not a particular pocketknife was a "dangerous weapon" or a "common pocketknife." Thus, as a matter of statutory and decisional law in 1989, Bunkley's jury could permissibly conclude that a folding knife with a three-inch blade carried closed in a burglar's pocket was a "dangerous weapon." And as the federal district court observed in rejecting Bunk-ley's claim in his first habeas petition, the evidence presented at trial regarding Bunkley's buck knife "clearly provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the petitioner was armed with a dangerous weapon." Bunkley v. Dugger, No. 91-113-CIV-T-99B, order at 6 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 1993). Bunkley's jury found that he was armed with a "dangerous weapon" while he committed the burglary. This was proper under the law at the time of Bunk-ley's trial in 1987 and at the time his conviction became final in 1989.
Bunkley argues that L.B. stated a bright-line rule that a pocketknife with a blade shorter than four inches is a "common pocketknife" excluded from the section 790.001(13) definition of a "weapon," unless other characteristics of the knife, how it is carried, or how it is used establish the weapon-like qualities of the knife. As does the dissent, Bunkley further argues that the L.B. rule existed as a matter of Florida law at the time of his conviction. Bunkley cites several cases to support his argument. See, e.g., Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450, 452-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (stating that a key-chain knife would fall within the "common pocketknife" exception to the statutory definition of "weapon"); Arroyo v. State, 564 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (reversing a defendant's conviction for attempted armed burglary and holding that a pocketknife is not a "dangerous weapon" with regard to attempted armed burglary unless it was used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm); McCoy v. State, 493 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (stating that a "small" pocketknife is not a "weapon," but affirming a defendant's conviction because the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the way the defendant used the knife constituted assault with a deadly weapon).
However, these cases do not support Bunkley's or the dissent's position. These cases do not define the scope of the "common pocketknife" exception at the time of Bunkley's conviction with respect to the length of knife blade that qualifies as a "common pocketknife." Further, only McCoy was decided before Bunkley's conviction became final, and McCoy was a Fourth District case. The precedent of the Second District, cited above, was the uncontradicted law in Florida in 1989 and establishes that the question of whether a particular knife was a "common pocketknife" or a "dangerous weapon" was a fact question for the jury. A trial court within the Second District conducted Bunkley's trial. In light of the Second District's precedent, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether Bunkley's pocketknife was a weapon.
Bunkley also relies on the Attorney General's 1951 opinion to support his argument that his knife was a "common pocketknife" at the time of his conviction. The Florida Attorney General in 1951 opined that "a pocket knife . with blade approx imately four inches long is a 'common pocket knife' within the meaning of the [statutory] exception." Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 51-358 (1951). However, Bunkley's reliance on the Attorney General's opinion as a statement of 1989 law is misplaced because opinions of the Attorney General are not statements of law. See Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Beverly v. Division of Beverage of the Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 282 So.2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (holding that opinions of the Attorney General are entitled to great weight in construing state law but are not binding on courts). Further, notwithstanding the Attorney General's statement that a pocketknife with a four-inch blade fits within the statutory "common pocketknife" exception, the Attorney General expressly qualified his opinion by stating that "the concealed carrying of' the weapons enumerated in this statute must, to a large extent, be governed by the particular and peculiar facts surrounding each casé." Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 51-358 (1951).
In sum, neither Bunkley nor the dissent cites any law of Florida at the time of Bunkley's conviction to suggest that the court should not have allowed the jury to decide whether Bunkley's particular knife was a dangerous weapon. In Bunkley's case, consistent with the Attorney General's recognition of the factual nature of the issue and as prescribed by applicable Florida law, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether Bunk-ley was armed with a "dangerous weapon" or merely carried a "common pocketknife" while he committed a burglary.
CONCLUSION
In answer to the United States Supreme Court's question, we clarify that at the time Bunkley's conviction became final, the question of whether Bunkley's knife fit within the "common pocketknife" exception in section 790.001(13) was a fact question' properly answered by a jury instructed on the law. Bunkley was lawfully convicted by the unanimous decision of a jury of his peers properly instructed with the unambiguous law applicable at the time of his offense. He was also sentenced according to that law. Therefore, Bunkley's conviction does not violate the federal due process requirements stated in Fiore. L.B.'s subsequent, conventional change in our decisional law has no retroactive application and thus does not negate Bunkley's lawful conviction.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, LEWIS, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., recused.
. The dissent asserts that the instructions given to Bunkley's jury were erroneous in light of L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997). However, the jury instructions correctly stated the law at the time of Bunkley's trial. The trial court, without objection, instructed Bunkley's jury that a "dangerous weapon" is "any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm." No additional or special instructions were requested by the defendant. When the jury itself requested further instructions concerning the use of the weapon, the trial court instructed the jury: "The fact that the defendant does not actually employ the weapon is not the gravamen of this enhanced offense. There is no requirement that the State must show the person charged intended or was willing to use such weapon in the furtherance of the crime being committed." Bunkley's counsel objected to this additional instruction solely on the ground that the standard jury instructions were adequate. The court overruled the objection based on State v. Rodriguez, 402 So.2d 86, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the burglary statute authorizes an increased penalty where the burglar is armed, and the fact that the defendant does not actually use the weapon is "not the gravamen of this" enhanced offense"). Bunkley offered no case law to contradict Rodriguez. In fact, Bunkley had no legal ground on which to challenge the supplemental jury instruction. The holding of Rodriguez is consistent with the armed burglary statute, which provides a maximum penally of life in prison where a burglar either commits an assault or battery, or where a burglar commits a burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon. See 810.02(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1985). For a conviction of armed burglary, there is no statutory requirement that an armed burglar use the weapon. Thus, Bunkley's jury was properly instructed. In any case, in, Bunkley's petition to this Court, Bunkley did not renew his objection to the jury instructions. Therefore, the correctness of the jury instructions is not an issue before this Court.
. At this point, Bunkley's conviction and sentence became final. The Florida Supreme Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over such decisions because such an affirmance without opinion by a district court in Florida constitutes a "decision of the highest state court empowered to hear the cause." Florida Starv. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla.1988).
. The juvenile in L.B. was charged with possession of a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Unlike Bunkley's crime, there was no underlying offense to which the possession of a weapon was an enhancement. However, the same definition of "weapon" which excluded a "common pocketknife" was at issue.
. The dissent erroneously characterizes this Court's decision in L.B. as having clarified the definition of a "common pocketknife" in order to save the term from constitutional vagueness, and thus argues that our decision in L.B., although it came seven years after Bunkley's conviction became final, must apply to Bunkley's case. If L.B. had declared the weapons statute unconstitutional but for a saving construction, we would have evaluated the statute's application to Bunkley on that basis. However, that is not what L.B. held. To the contrary, a review of L.B. reveals that this Court upheld the statutory term "common pocketknife" as sufficiently clear to "provide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair notice as to what constitutes forbidden conduct," and therefore not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 371-72.
In determining that the "common pocketknife" exception is facially constitutional, we stated in L.B. that "in the vast majority of cases, it will be evident to citizens and fact-finders whether one's pocketknife is a 'common' pocketknife under any intended definition of that term." Id. at 372. We assumed for the sake of argument that "in some peripheral cases it may not be clear whether a particular pocketknife is a 'common' pocketknife." Id. However, we said "that reason alone is insufficient to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague." Id. We emphasized that ,;even if judges and juries were prone to reach inconsistent conclusions as to which knives are 'common pocket knives' under section 790.001(13), the statute still would not be rendered unconstitutional." Id. We cited for support the United States Supreme Court's statement in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 n. 30, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957):
It is argued that because juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material, the statutes must be held to be insufficiently precise to satisfy due process requirements. But, it is common experience that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.
700 So.2d at 373 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 492 n. 30, 77 S.Ct. 1304). Finally, we concluded in L.B. that "in the vast majority of cases it will be evident whether one's particular knife is a 'common pocketknife' therefore, we held that "section 790.001(13) is not void for vagueness." Id. Thus, without resort to a saving definition, this Court in L.B. held that the statutory "common pocketknife" exception at issue in Bunkley's case was not unconstitutionally vague.
. The dissent asserts that Fiore mandates the relief Bunkley seeks because "the constitutional principles are identical." We disagree. This case is fundamentally different from Fiore. In Fiore, the State failed to present any evidence on a basic element of the crime. Fiore was convicted under a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited operating a "hazardous waste facility without a permit." Fiore, 531 U.S. at 226, 121 S.Ct. 712. The United States Supreme Court in Fiore noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ultimate determination that the Commonwealth presented no evidence to prove a basic element of the crime for which Fiore was convicted, i.e., the failure to possess a permit; instead, the Commonwealth conceded that Fiore did possess a permit. Fiore, 531 U.S. at 229, 121 S.Ct. 712. Unlike Fiore, sufficient evidence was adduced at Bunkley's trial on every element of his crime, including the dangerousness of his weapon, for his jury to find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the State presented evidence and proved to a jury that he not only possessed a knife, but that this knife was a dangerous weapon and not a common pocketknife. Therefore, this case is distinct from Fiore because there was no failure of proof under the applicable procedural or substantive law of 1989 as to any element of Bunkley's offense. Consequently, Bunk-ley's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were not violated.