Case Name: Billy Roy MORACE v. Josephine Louise MORACE
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-03-10
Citations: 220 So. 2d 775
Docket Number: No. 7600
Parties: Billy Roy MORACE v. Josephine Louise MORACE.
Judges: Before LANDRY, SARTAIN, and MARCUS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 220
Pages: 775–781

Head Matter:
Billy Roy MORACE v. Josephine Louise MORACE.
No. 7600.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
March 10, 1969.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1969.
Walton J. Barnes, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Joseph A. Gladney, Baton Rouge, for ap-pellee.
Before LANDRY, SARTAIN, and MARCUS, JJ.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Judge.
Appellee, Billy Roy Morace, was granted a divorce from the appellant, Josephine Louise Morace, by judgment dated June 2, 1965 of the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, wherein Billy Roy Morace was ordered to pay Josephine Louise Morace the sum of $45.00 per week as alimony and support for herself and the four minor children of the marriage, of which amount $20.00 per month was decreed to be alimony for appellant. This was the same amount which had been originally fixed by judgment of the Family Court on October 15, 1963.
Upon discovering that appellant had remarried, appellee moved the court to amend its judgment of June 2, 1965 by reducing the alimony to $36.00 per week and in effect ceasing the payment of alimony for support of the appellant Josephine Louise Morace.
The appellant filed a cross rule asking that the alimony for the maintenance and support of the four minor children be increased to $350.00 per month and that alimony in arrears in the amount of $234.00 be made executory and that the appellee be found in contempt.
The Trial Judge amended and modified the previous judgment by a judgment signed on April 9, 1968 and fixed the amount of support at $40.00 per week thereby stopping the payment of alimony for support of appellant herself, and made executory the alimony in arrears in the amount of $234.00. No disposition was made as to the contempt portion of the rule as this had been abandoned during the course of the hearing on the rule.
The appellant, Josephine Louise Morace, has perfected a devolutive appeal contend ing that the amount of alimony awarded to her for the support of the four minor children is insufficient in light of appellee's ability to pay and the needs of the minor children of the marriage.
The evidence reveals that both appellee and appellant have remarried since the judgment of divorce. Josephine Louise Morace and her four children are living with her husband in Jackson, Mississippi whereas Billy Roy Morace resides with his wife and her children in Baton Rouge.
Josephine Louise Morace testified to items needed by the children which totalled an amount equal to $435.75 per month. She further testified that her income amounted to $65.00 per week gross pay or about $56.33 per week take-home pay.
Billy Roy Morace on the other hand testified as to items of expenses to-talling $584.62 but upon cross examination it was evident that many of the enumerated items included expenses for his second wife and her children. He further admitted that his expenses ran around $400.00 per month. He further testified that his gross pay was $116.65 per week while his net take-home pay was $102.00 per week. While there was some evidence that he had received larger take-home checks in the past when he had worked overtime, the evidence did not indicate that such overtime was regular or consistent and therefore was properly disregarded.
The record further reveals that in addition to appellee and appellant working, the wife of appellee and the husband of appellant were also gainfully employed. The trial court refused to allow into evidence the expenses of Billy Roy Morace's second marriage as well as the income of his present wife. He further refused to allow into evidence the income of Josephine Louise Morace's present husband.
By the very act of marrying, fathers and mothers contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their minor children. (LSA-C.C. Art. 227). This support, commonly denominated "alimony" is understood to be what is necessary for the nourishment, lodging, and support of the person who claims it, and includes the expense of education when the person to whom it is due is a minor (LSA-C.C. Art. 230), and is granted in proportion to the wants of the person requiring it and the circumstance of those who are to pay it. (LSA-C.C. Art. 231).
The jurisprudence is well settled that the primary obligation of the father is to support, maintain, and educate his children from his first marriage, and, although he has the right to remarry, he may not be allowed to assert the second marriage as a basis for relief of the obligation he owes to the children of the first marriage. See Newton v. Newton, 196 So.2d 575 (La.App. 1st Cir.1967); Meyers v. Bohrer, 176 So.2d 3 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1965); and Laiche v. Laiche, 237 La. 298, 111 So.2d 120 (1959). Nevertheless, the necessary living expenses of the remarried father may be taken into consideration as one of the items in fixing alimony to children of the first marriage.
It is also well settled that a judgment awarding alimony is subject to change at any time when the circumstances of the parties justify the change or modification. Anderson v. Anderson, 158 So.2d 303 (La.App. 1st Cir.1963); Rabun v. Rabun, 232 La. 1004, 95 So.2d 635; Brown v. Harris, 225 La. 320, 72 So.2d 746; Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32; Comstock v. Bourge, 210 La. 20, 26 So.2d 220. However, it is elementary that the person who seeks to change or modify the support award has the burden of proof to show that there has been a change in the needs of the person requiring it as compared to the circumstances of the person obligated to pay, before the original award may be changed or modified.
There seems no question but that the needs of the four children have increased since the award was originally fixed on October 15, 1963. In regard to the question of the increased ability of ap-pellee to pay, the trial court erred in excluding- from consideration one-half of ap-pellee's present wife's income in a determination of his ability to pay. It is a well settled and established point of law in this State that the earnings of the wife fall within the community of acquets and gains. This particular point was discussed and settled by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.2d 925, 926 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962) wherein the court held that:
"The question, however, is whether or not the second wife's income should he considered in a determination of defendant's ability to pay. A wife's earnings, under LSA-C.C. Art. 2334, whether from a separate trade or business, as a public merchant or otherwise, fall within the community, if she is living in community with her husband at the time such business is carried on. Succession of Howell, 177 La. 276, 148 So. 48; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37; King v. Dearman, La.App. 1st Cir., 1958, 105 So.2d 293. Thus, the husband's interest therein, an undivided one-half, may be taken into consideration in fixing the amount awarded for the maintenance and support of his children by a former marriage. Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713."
While the Trial Judge erred in excluding one-half of appellee's present wife's income in the determination of his ability to pay as aforesaid under Lytell v. Lytell, supra, and Fazzio v. Krieger, supra, he did not err in excluding from consideration the income of appellant's husband. In the Lytell and the Fazzio cases, the courts reasoned that the husband's interest in the community earnings of his second wife must be considered in determining his ability to pay child support on behalf of the children of his first marriage. In Zara v. Zara, 204 So.2d 76 (La.App. 4th Cir.1967) defendant wife had remarried and since she had a community interest in the income of her second husband, the court concluded that her second husband's income must also be considered in evaluating her ability to contribute to the support of the minor children born of her first marriage. However, in the case at bar, appellant lives with her husband in Jackson, Mississippi. While there is no evidence in the record as to the law of the State of Mississippi, the court under Article 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure takes judicial notice of the fact that Mississippi is not a community property State and that the wife has no interest in the income of her husband. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in not allowing testimony as to appellant's husband's income.
After carefully reviewing the record, we find no error in the determinations of the trial judge except for his failure to take into consideration one-half of appellee's wife's income as an element in determining appellee's ability to pay. According to a proffer made over an objection which was sustained as to the testimony regarding appellee's wife's income, the record indicates that appellee's wife's income is $70.00 per week, one-half of, which would be $35.00 per week. The trial court set the alimony for the support of the minor children at $40.00 per week. Taking into consideration one-half of appellee's wife's income as aforesaid, we feel constrained to increase the judgment of the trial court from $40.00 to $50.00 per week. In all other respects the judgment of the lower court is affirmed and appellee is cast for such costs as permitted by law.
Amended and affirmed.