Case Name: William Matthews, as Executor, etc., of Caroline Silvernail, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. The American Central Insurance Company, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896
Citations: 9 A.D. 339
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Matthews, as Executor, etc., of Caroline Silvernail, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. The American Central Insurance Company, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 339–364

Head Matter:
William Matthews, as Executor, etc., of Caroline Silvernail, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. The American Central Insurance Company, Defendant.
Insurance—provision that an action must he brought within twelve months after the fire — delay not excused by the fact that the loss occurred after the death of the insured, and that her executor did not qualify within twelve months — Statute of Limitations— Code of Civil Procedure, § 414.
When the parties to a contract limit hy such contract the time in which an action must he brought thereon, their rights are to be determined by the contract, and the Statute of Limitations has no application to the case, nor do the provisions thereof which exclude certain cases from the operation of that statute.
In an action brought to recover the amount of a loss occasioned hy fire to property insured under a policy issued by the defendant, which provided that the ■ insured should give immediate notice of any loss, and within sixty days after the fire render a statement to the insurer, and, further, that no action on the policy could he sustained until after the insured had complied with these requirements, nor unless the action was commenced within twelve months next after the fire, it appeared that the policy was issued in August, 1889, and ran for three years; that the insured died December 2, 1891, and devised the premises in question to her executor' for five years, when they were to be sold and the proceeds divided among her children; that the fire occurred on April 20, 1892, and that a contest arose over the will of the insured, which consequently was not admitted to probate until May 15, 1894. The plaintiff, as executor, mailed proofs of loss to the insurer in July, 1894, and began this ■ action on October 29, 1894.
Held, that the action could not he maintained;
That, as the action had not been brought within the twelve months prescribed hy the contract of insurance, it was barred.
The questions by whom, under the circumstances of this case, proofs of loss could have been filed with the insurer considered by Follett and Green, JJ., and by whom an action might he brought considered' by Follett, J.
Ward and Adams, JJ., dissented.
Motion by the defendant, The American Central Insurance Company, for a new trial upon a case containing exceptions, ordered to be heard at the Appellate Division in the first instance, upon the verdict of a jury, rendered by direction of the court after a trial at 'a Trial Term of the Supreme Court, held in and for the county of " Steuben on the 6th day of January, 1896.
August 1, 1889, the defendant, by a New York standard policy, insured Caroline Silvernail for three years against damage by fire, to an amount not exceeding $1,050, on the following property: $400 on her frame dwelling house; $450 on her frame barn and sheds attached; $200 on her produce in the barn and sheds.
December .2, 1891, the insured died, leaving a last will and testament, by which she devised her farm, on which the insured buildings wére situated, to her executor for five years, then to be sold, and the avails, after the payment of debts, to be divided among her three children. '
April 20, 1892, the barn, sheds and their contents were destroyed by fire. It is conceded that the property destroyed was of the value of $612. Shortly after the death of the testatrix, the executor named in the will delivered it to the surrogate of the county and declined to take any steps in respect to probating it, but after-wards, and before the fire, he filed ”a petition asking that the will be admitted to probate. Some of the heirs contested the will; a litigation ensued, and May 15, 1894, the will was admitted to probate and letters issued to William Matthews, the executor nominated therein. July 11, 1894, the plaintiff verified the proofs of loss, which were mailed to and received by the defendant, July 23,1894,. at its principal office at St. Louis, Mo. October 29, Í894, this action was begun.
John F.. Parkhurst, for the plaintiff.
I. N. Ames,, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Follett, J. :
This action . is .defended on three grounds : (1) That it- was not begun within twelve months next after the fire; (2) that written notice of" the loss' was not immediately given; (3) that á verified statement of the loss was not furnished within sixty days after the fire.
The following are the provisions of the policy under which these defenses arise': .
" If fire occur the insured shall give immediate notice of any loss thereby in writing to this company, protect the property from further damage, forthwith" separate the damaged and undamaged . personal property, put it in the best possible order, make a complete inventory of the same, stating the quantity and cost of each article and the amount claimed thereon; and, within sixty days after the fire, unless such time is extended in writing by this company, shall render a statement to this company, signed and sworn to. by said insured.
" No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any. claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full, compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire."
It is settled in this State that, parties to contracts may prescribe the time within which either party must, if ever, bring actions to enforce the contracts, and that such stipulations are not against public policy, and are valid. This rule has often been applied in favor of insurers and against the insured (Wilkinson v. First National Fire Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 499), and it has also been applied against the insurer and in favor of the insured. (Wright v. Mutual Benefit. Life Association, 43 Hun, 61; affd., 118 N. Y. 237.).
The plaintiff seeks to evade the effect of this stipulation by .availing himself of the exceptions contained in chapter 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Limitations), but when the parties limit the time by contract in which an action must be brought thereon, their rights are to he determined by the contract, and the Statute of Limitations has no application. The statute so provides:
" Sec. 414. The provisions of this chapter apply and. constitute the only rules of limitation applicable to. a civil action or special proceeding, except in one of the following cases :
" 1. A case, where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law, or a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written contract of the parties."
In Wilkinson v. First National Fire Ins. Co. (suqpra) the plaintiff sought to escape the effect of the stipulation by reason of a provision in" the. Revised Statutes saving the rights of parties from the effects of those statutes when they were stayed by an injunction from bringing an action.- The court said: " This provision does not aid the plaintiff. The exception has no application where a limitation is prescribed by the contract of parties, but only applies to cases governed [by] the limitation in the general law."
In Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co. (7 Wall. 386) the plaintiff attempted to escape the effect of such a stipulation by invoking an exception contained in the Statute 'of Limitations of the State of Missouri, where the contract was made and sought to "be enforced. The court held that the statute had no application to the case, saying : " In the second place, the rights of the parties flow from the contract. That relieves them from the general limitations of the statute, and as a consequence from its exceptions also."
The section of the Code above quoted and the two cases cited, one in the Court of Appeals in this State, and the other in the Supreme Court of the United States, would seem to be sufficient authority on this proposition.
Again, the fire occurred April 20,4892, four months and eighteen days after the death of the insured (plaintiffs testatrix), and no cause of action accrued to her, and. this case does riot fall within any of the exceptions of chapter 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Limitations) extending the time in which actions may he brought by the representatives of decedents on causes of action accruing before death..
The delay in bringing this action was not induced by any act on the part of the defendant, but was due solely to the neglect of those who should have procured the appointment of a representative for the insured. No reason is given why a temporary administrator was not applied for and appointed, pending the contest over the will. Had tliis been done proof of loss might have been given and an action brought within the period prescribed by the policy.
The defendant's exceptions should be sustained, and as a new trial would be unavailing, the complaint should be dismissed, with costs.
Hardin, P. J., and Green, J., concurred;. Adams and Ward, J.J, dissented.