Case Name: DUNNINGTON v. LOESER
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1915-06-01
Citations: 48 Okla. 636
Docket Number: No. 4290
Parties: DUNNINGTON v. LOESER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 636–647

Head Matter:
DUNNINGTON v. LOESER.
No. 4290.
Opinion Filed June 1, 1915.
(149 Pac. 1161.)
Opinion Denying Rehearing Filed July 6, 1915.
(150 Pac. 874.)
1. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION — Probable Cause — Question for Court — Instructions. In. an action for malicious prosecution, the question of what amounts to probable cause is one of law for the court. It is therefore the duty of the court, when evidence has been given to prove or disprove probable cause, to submit to the jury its credibility, with the instruction that certain facts amount to probable cause, or they do not, as the case may be.
2. SAME. In such cause, to leave to the jury the question of probable cause is error.
(Syllabus by Devereux, C.)
ON PETITION FOE EEHEAEING.
3. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION —Probable Cause — Instruction. Where, in an action for malicious prosecution, the question of whether or not the defendant believed the facts relied upon to prove probable cause arises, that only raises an additional' question for the jury to determine, but the court should still instruct the jury as to what facts do or do not amount to probable cause, and, in addition, instruct them that, even though the facts proved do constitute probable cause, if they further. find that the defendant did not believe them to be true at the time he instituted the prosecution, he would not be protected by the fact that they did exist.
4. APPEAL AND ERROR — Trial—Prejudicial Error — Instructions —Request. If the court correctly instructs the jury as to the law, if either party wants fuller- instructions upon the law given by the court, they should request the instructions they desire given. But, if the court undertakes to instruct the jury as to the law, and does so incorrectly, that is prejudicial error.
5. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION — Right of Action. To adopt a lax rule, favorable to actions for malicious prosecution, is to open the door in such actions, and to close the door to prosecutions, to turn society over to the lawless, and to create a dread on the part of any one who dares to prosecute.
(Syllabus by Brett, C.)
Error from District Court, Alfalfa County; Jas. W. Steen, Judge.
Action by Frank Loeser against C. S. Dunnington, administrator of the estate of Carl Loeser, deceased. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Rehearing denied.
During the pendency of this appeal the plaintiff in error, Carl Loeser, died, and by proper proceedings the case was revived in the name of his administrator.
The petition alleges in proper form a cause of action for malicious prosecution and alleges damages in the sum of $20,000. The answer is a general denial, and admits that a criminal prosecution was begun against the plaintiff by filing.an information in the county court of Alfalfa county, and that Carl Loeser, the defendant below, verified the same, and the plaintiff, Frank Loeser, was bound over for trial, and was subsequently tried and acquitted. The answer then pleads justification, as follows:
“Defendant further alleges that in verifying said information and preferring said charge against the plaintiff that he acted in good faith, and upon probable cause and without malice.”
A reply was filed to this answer, and on the issues thus made the cause was tried.
There was evidence introduced by the defendant tending to prove that he acted in good faith, and that there was probable cause for instituting the prosecution. On this part of the case the court charged the jury as follows:
“If you believe from the evidence that the defendant had probable cause to institute and carry on the criminal proceedings, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit; and ‘probable cause’ is defined to be reasonable ground for belief, .supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant an impartial and reasonably prudent man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. ‘Probable cause’ has been defined to be such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as will lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest opinion of guilt. Whether the facts known to the defendant were such as to lead him as a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe and entertain an honest opinion that the plaintiff was guilty, as charged in the criminal prosecution, is submitted to the jury to be decided as a question of fact.”
“If the defendant, in bringing and carrying on the criminal prosecution, did not use the means which an ordinarily careful and prudent man would exercise under like conditions to ascertain the facts connecting the plaintiff with the crime alleged to have been committed, and if you find from the facts and circumstances as they at that time were known or appeared to the defendant that he was not justified in believing that the plaintiff had committed the crime for which he was afterwards arrested and prosecuted, then such proceedings would have been commenced and carried on without probable cause.”
In the instructions given the court defined what was meant by “probable cause,” but nowhere charged the jury, as a matter of law, whether, if they believed the facts testified to, it was or was not probable cause. There was .a verdict for the plaintiff below for $2,000, motion for new trial duly filed and overruled, and exceptions saved, and the cause is now before us by petition in error and case-made.
Parker & Simons, A. J. Titus, and A. R. Carpenter, for plaintiff in error.
C. H. Mauntel and A. C. Beeman, •- for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Opinion by
DEVEREUX, C.
(after stating the facts as above). The question presented by the exceptions to the charge of the court above set out raises the question as to whether or not probable cause is a question for the jury or a question of law.
Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537, is a strong authority in the case at bar. The instruction objected to in that ease was as follows:
"You are instructed that, to constitute probable cause for criminal prosecution,, there must be such reasonable grounds of suspicion, , supported by circumstances suf ficiently strong to warrant an ordinarily cautious man in the belief that the person arrested is guilty of the offense charged, and, in this connection, you are further instructed that a mere belief that an innocent person is guilty of a crime is not alone sufficient to justify his- or her arrest. The facts must be such as would justify an ordinarily intelligent and reasonably prudent person in entertaining such belief. Whether in this case such facts had come to the knowledge of the defendant at the time he entered the complaint against the plaintiff is a question of fact for the jury to determine from a preponderance of the evidence."
In reversing the case on account of this instruction the court say:
"As it is not the province of the jury to determine what circumstances would induce a reasonably prudent man to believe another guilty of a crime, there seems to be no purpose in the giving of an abstract instruction on the subject. These abstract rules will guide the court in determining the question, but are apt to lead the jury away from their function of passing upon the evidence in support of the probative facts which the court may direct them to find in order to determine in which way their general verdict shall be rendered."
In Vickers v. Logan, 44 N. C. 393, it is held:
"Whether certain supposed facts constitute probable cause for a prosecution is a question of law, to be decided by the court, and not by the jury. It is the duty of the judge, leaving to the jury to ascertain the existence of the facts, to declare what inference as to probable cause results therefrom ,* to leave the inference to the discretion of the jury is error.".
In Stone v. Crocker, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 81, it is held:
"In an action for malicious prosecution, what facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a question of law; whether they exist in the particular case is a question of fact."
In Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 25 L. Ed. 116, it is held:
"The question as to what amounts to probable cause is one of law in a very important sense. It is therefore generally the duty of the court, when evidence has been given to prove or disprove the existence of probable cause, to submit to the jury its credibility, and what facts it proves, with instructions that the facts found amount to proof of probable cause, or that they do not."
In Lacey v. Porter, 103 Cal. 597, 37 Pac. 635, it is held:
"Actions for malicious prosecution are not favored in law, and will be sustained only when it is-shown that the prosecution was, in fact, actuated by malice, and that, the -party instigating it had no reasonable ground for causing the prosecution. Malice is a question of fact; but what facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law, though whether such facts and circumstances exist is a question of fact."
These authorities are directly in point that the instructions to the jury above set out, and which were duly excepted to, were erroneous.
We therefore recommend that the judgment be -reversed, and this cause remanded for a new trial.