Case Name: Heber LADNER, Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, and Jesse L. White, Jr., Secretary of the Mississippi State Senate, Respondents/Appellants, v. DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK et al., Petitioners/Appellees
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1973-12-10
Citations: 290 So. 2d 263
Docket Number: No. 47290
Parties: Heber LADNER, Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, and Jesse L. White, Jr., Secretary of the Mississippi State Senate, Respondents/Appellants, v. DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK et al., Petitioners/Appellees.
Judges: All Justices concur except SUGG, J., GILLESPIE, C. J., and ROBERTSON, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 263–270

Head Matter:
Heber LADNER, Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, and Jesse L. White, Jr., Secretary of the Mississippi State Senate, Respondents/Appellants, v. DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK et al., Petitioners/Appellees.
No. 47290.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 10, 1973.
Petition for Rehearing Reconsidered and Denied Feb. 25, 1974.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Maurice R. Black and George M. Swindoll, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for respondents-appellants.
Watkins & Eager, Cox & Dunn, Wells, Gerald, Brand, Watters & Cox, Jackson, Burgin, Gholson, Hicks & Nichols; Columbus, for petitioners-appellees.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, Justice:
This is an appeal by Heber Ladner, Secretary of State, and Jesse L. White, Jr., Secretary of the Mississippi State Senate, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. The judgment directed writs to mandamus to issue with a copy of the order attached. They are:
TO: JESSE L. WHITE, JR. Secretary of the Senate State of Mississippi
You are directed, within fifteen (15) days from and after July 12, 1972, to transmit to the Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, Senate Bill No. 1535 as enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, 1972 Session, as a bill which became a law of the State of Mississippi.
TO: HEBER LADNER Secretary of State State of Mississippi
You are directed, within fifteen (15) days from and after July 12, 1972 to take possession of and to file, preserve, and otherwise deal with said Senate Bill 1535 as a valid and subsisting- law of the State of Mississippi, as in the case of other valid and subsisting laws duly enacted.
Aggrieved, both Ladner and White appeal and assign as error, among other things, the failure of the trial court to sustain the demurrers interposed to the petition.
The demurrer of Ladner challenges the legal sufficiency of the petition upon the premises that the relief requested emanates from a legal conclusion that Senate Bill 1535 became the law of the state without the approval of the governor and as secretary of state he had no legal authority or duty to perform that requested of him by petitioners at the time requested since the validity vel non of Senate Bill 1535 remains to be determined.
White's demurrer raises, in addition to that above, the premise that he is an employee of the Mississippi State Senate and that body, not he, is alone empowered to comply with the mandamus and moreover, mandamus lies only for the performance of a ministerial duty by an inferior tribunal, officer or person, and since the state senate is not inferior to the other departments of government, mandamus does not lie.
We are of the opinion the petition did not state a cause of action and the trial court erred in failing to sustain the demurrers. The decision is therefore limited to this issue.
The petition alleges, in addition to the necessary formalities, that Senate Bill 1535 was duly passed by both houses and enrolled in the senate, was signed by the lieutenant governor and the speaker of the house and was presented to the governor for his approval on May 2, 1972; that he did not return the bill to the secretary of the senate until 9:00 a. m., Tuesday, May 9, 1972, the date the 1972 Session of the Mississippi State Legislature adjourned at 6:00 p. m. The petition then sets forth:
The Governor did not return Senate Bill 1535 within five days as required by Section 72 of the Mississippi Constitution (1970) [sic], therefore, Senate Bill 1535 became law without the approval of the Governor, and Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 3977 (1956) requires the same to be deposited in the office of the Secretary of State; that upon the return of said Bill to the Secretary of the Senate on May 9, 1972, same was accompanied by a document bearing date of May 8, 1972, setting forth objections of the Governor of the State of Mississippi to said Bill which is being held by the Secretary of the Senate as a part of the official records of the Senate pertaining to said Bill; that said document containing said obj ec-tions is null and void, and, as a legal nullity, should be expunged from the records of the Mississippi State Senate by the Secretary of the Mississippi State Senate.
Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated Section 3339 (1956) requires that the Secretary of the Senate keep "a correct journal of the proceedings" of the Senate, "carefully engross and enroll all bills . that may be ordered to be engrossed or enrolled," and "promptly and faithfully discharge all the duties incident" to his office.
Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated Section 4194 (1956) requires that the Secretary of State receive from the Secretary of the Senate, "keep and preserve in his office, the journals, papers and proceeding of the Senate and all enrolled act." (sic) Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated Section 4197 (1956) requires that the Secretary of State shall deliver to the authorized printer attested copies of all acts passed at each session of the legislature. (Emphasis added.)
It is then alleged that each of the petitioners has a substantial interest in the status of the bill as the law of the state and that demands have been made upon the secretaries of state and senate to perform the statutory duties imposed upon them and that they have failed and refused to do so. Petitioners then charge that if they are not directed to perform the ministerial acts required of them, the petitioners will be deprived of their property without due process of law and denied the equal protection thereof in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of Sections 14 and 72 of the Mississippi Constitution (1890). They therefore requested the issuance of the writ of mandamus to force compliance.
We think it sufficient to state without elaboration that the test of law presented by a demurrer is that it admits all material facts well pleaded in the declaration, bill of complaint or petition. It does not admit, however, the conclusions arising from the admitted facts, but rather denies them. In Tennent v. Barksdale, 3 So. 80 (Miss.1887), we stated:
By their demurrer the defendants admitted the truth of the relevant facts as stated by complainants, but they did not admit as correct the legal conclusions deduced from these facts by the pleader. The office of a demurrer is to submit to the court the sufficiency of the facts charged to support the legal conclusions essential to the plaintiff's right of action; it does not admit, but denies the conclusion of law to be such as plaintiff contends. .
[2, 3] The legal conclusion contended for by the petitioners is that Senate Bill 1535 became law without the approval of the governor by reason of the fact it was not returned to the senate within five days as required by Section 72 of the Mississippi Constitution (1890). The correctness of this conclusion, though it may be well reasoned from the facts admitted by demurrer, is not before the Court for judicial determination since, being a mere conclusion, it is not well pleaded. It is apparent, however, that the trial court accepted the conclusion as a correct legal premise since its acceptance was a prerequisite to the existence of duties flowing from Senate Bill 1535 to the respondents, the duties now sought to be enforced by mandamus. We adjudicate nothing with regard to the propriety of the trial court's reliance upon the conclusion as a valid expression of the law since we are of the opinion that an adjudication would be advisory and as such beyond our authority. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Marler, 206 So.2d 628 (Miss.1968); Insured Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State, 242 Miss. 547, 135 So.2d 703 (1961); Gipson v. State, 203 Miss. 434, 35 So.2d 327, 36 So.2d 154 (1948); and In Re Opinion of the Justices, 148 Miss. 427, 114 So. 887 (1927), wherein we stated:
Section 1 of the Constitution, which divides the powers of government into three departments, impliedly prohibits the giving of advisory opinions by one department to another, except in so far as another section of the Constitution may provide therefor. 15 C.J. 785, and authorities there cited. Moreover, and aside from this prohibition, the giving by judges of opinions on questions that may thereafter be submitted for decision to the courts of which they are members is highly improper unless they are constitutionally authorized so to do. (148 Miss, at 430-431, 114 So. at 888)
Turning now to the other aspects of the petition which are well pleaded as they relate to the secretary of the senate, we note that his secretarial duties are stated in Section 3339, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) [paragraph 2 of the petition above quoted]. It is apparent from the statute that if the secretary of the senate had a duty of delivering a senate bill, with a veto message attached, to the secretary of state, it arose as a duty incident to the office and not by the terms of the statute. Moreover, to be subject to mandamus the action requested must be either an official duty of the respondent or a mere ministerial act not involving discretion for its performance. The rule, in brief, is that if an administrative officer has discretion in a matter, mandamus may compel the officer to act, but may not control or dictate his discretion for a desired result. Hinds County Democratic Executive Committee v. Muirhead, 259 So.2d 692 (Miss.1972); and Gill v. Woods, 226 So.2d 912 (Miss.1969).
Did the secretary of the senate have an official or ministerial duty to return the senate bill with the governor's veto message to the secretary of state ?
This question must be answered by the facts stated in the petition, including the senate bill exhibited to it and the veto message. In answering we observe that the veto message with the senate bill is addressed to the Mississippi State Senate and was delivered to the secretary of that body by an aide of the governor. Under these circumstances we are unable to categorize the diversion of these documents from their addressee to the secretary of state, an official of another governmental department for publication as a law contrary to the veto message, to be a mere ministerial act subject to mandamus. The resolution by the secretary of the senate that the bill became the law, thereby imposing upon him the incidental duty of delivery to the secretary of state, would obviously require the exercise of great discretion. It is our opinion that this determination is much more than a ministerial act incident to the faithful discharge of the duties of the office which are subject to mandamus. We therefore conclude the demurrer of the secretary of the senate should have been sustained.
The petition sets forth the duties of the secretary of state (paragraph 3 of the petition above quoted) and that demand has been made upon him for the performance of these duties, but that he refuses. It additionally states, however, that Senate Bill 1535 has not been delivered to him. It is therefore obvious that opportunity was not afforded to the secretary of state for his performance of the duty now sought to be enforced by mandamus. In Wood v. State, 169 Miss. 790, 142 So. 747 (1932), a mandamus proceeding, we held the opportunity to perform to be vital:
It appears to be quite well settled that mandamus will not lie when the act is only to be done in case another party approves thereof. See Merrill on Mandamus, p. 66, § 58. It being perfectly obvious that the secretary of state has not in any way failed to discharge any duty, nor has he had the opportunity to fail, nor can it be presumed that he will fail to discharge any duty enjoined upon him by the law, how, then, can it be said that a suit may be instituted against him and a judgment entered that he shall perform a duty long prior to the time when he is called upon to act? The cause of action must exist at the date of the filing of a petition for mandamus; that is elementary with reference to mandamus and all other suits, except perhaps injunction suits against threatened invasion of the complaining party's rights. (169 Miss, at 796, 142 So. at 749).
We conclude that no cause of action was stated against the secretary of state and that the lower court erred in not sustaining his demurrer as well as that of the secretary of the senate.
Reversed and rendered.
All Justices concur except SUGG, J., GILLESPIE, C. J., and ROBERTSON, J., who dissent.
. Section 72. Every Bill which shall pass both Houses shall be presented to the Governor of the state. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if he does not approve, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it originated, which shall enter the objections at large upon its Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If any Bill shall not be returned by the Governor within five (5) days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature, by adjournment, prevented its return, in which case such Bill shall be a law unless the Governor shall veto it within fifteen (15) days (Sundays excepted) after it is presented to him, and such Bill shall be returned to the Legislature, with his objections, within three (3) days after the beginning of the next session of the Legislature.