Case Name: Wirt Franklin, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
Court: United States Board of Tax Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1927-10-24
Citations: 8 B.T.A. 977
Docket Number: Docket No. 9267
Parties: Wirt Franklin, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
Judges: Considered by Moekis, Muedock, and Siefkin.
Reporter: Reports of the United States Board of Tax Appeals
Volume: 8
Pages: 977–979

Head Matter:
Wirt Franklin, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
Docket No. 9267.
Promulgated October 24, 1927.
F. H. Bryan, Esq., for the petitioner.
Orris Bennett, Esq., for the respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION.
Trammell:
The question presented for determination is whether the collection of the alleged deficiency of $21,459.08 is barred by the statute of limitations.
The assessment of the alleged deficiency herein was made in April, 1920. Thereafter, the (Revenue Act of 1921 was passed, November 23, 1921, which contains in section 250 (d) the following provisions:
The amount of any such taxes due under any return made under prior income, excess-profits or war-profits tax Acts shall be determined and assessed within five years after the return was filed, unless both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to a later determination, assessment and collection of the tax; and no suit or proceeding for the collection of any such taxes due under prior income, excess-profits or war-profits tax Acts shall be begun, after the expiration of five years after the date when such return was filed .
The above section was construed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S. 346. The question in that case was whether the distraint was a proceeding within the purview of that section. The court held that distraint was a proceeding within the meaning of the Act and was barred by the section five years after the date the return was filed, even though the taxes were duly assessed within the five-year period provided by that section. The court in that case said:
Tbe purpose of the enactment was to fix a time beyond which steps to enforce collection might not be initiated. The repose intended would not be attained if suits only were barred, leaving the collector free at any time to proceed by distraint. In fact, distraint is much more frequently resorted to than is suit for the collection of taxes. The mischiefs to be remedied by setting a time limit against distraint are the same as those eliminated by bar against suit.
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That it was the intention of Congress by the clause here in question to protect taxpayers against any proceeding whatsoever for the collection of tax claims not made and pressed within five years.
The only exceptions to the running of the statute of limitations provided in the above quoted section of the statute are (1) when both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to a later determination, assessment and collection of the tax, (2) in the case of false or fraudulent returns with intent to evade taxes, (3) failure to file the required return, (4) cases coming within the scope of paragraph (9) of subdivision (a) of section 214 or paragraph (8) of subdivision (a) of section 234, or (5) cases of final settlement of losses contingently allowed by the Commissioner pending a determination of the exact amount deductible.
None of the exceptions are applicable to this case. There was no consent in writing to a later determination, assessment or collection, nor is there any question presented as to a false or fraudulent return, nor does the case come within the scope of the other exceptions.
The respondent contended that the statute of limitations in this case was suspended or started to run anew by the filing of the claim for abatement, by the giving of the bond and the letter of the petitioner to the chief clerk in the office of the collector of internal revenue. That is, to our minds not sufficient to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations. They do not come within any of the exceptions to the statute. We see nothing in any of the instruments referred to or the procedure followed, which would be a basis for the application of the doctrine of estoppel. The letter of December 22, 1926, clearly set forth the position of the petitioner that he refused to sign the waiver. The bond that was given was in connection with the appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals and by its terms was conditioned upon a decision of the Board that the tax was lawfully due. Otherwise, it was to become null and void.
In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the collection of the tax involved is barred by the statute of limitations. There is therefore no deficiency in respect of the tax involved.
Judgment will be entered for the fetitioner.
Considered by Moekis, Muedock, and Siefkin.