Case Name: Dewey RICHARDSON v. Pam RICHARDSON
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-07-09
Citations: 859 So. 2d 81
Docket Number: No. 2002 CA 2415
Parties: Dewey RICHARDSON v. Pam RICHARDSON
Judges: Before: KUHN, DOWNING and GAIDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 859
Pages: 81–93

Head Matter:
Dewey RICHARDSON v. Pam RICHARDSON
No. 2002 CA 2415.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
July 9, 2003.
Marcus T. Foote, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Dewey Richardson.
Karen D. Downs, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Pamela Perkins Richardson.
Before: KUHN, DOWNING and GAIDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
UKUHN, J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Rodney Dewey Richardson, appeals a judgment dismissing his rule for modification of child support on the trial court's motion raising the peremptory exception of no cause of action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2000, appellant was divorced from appellee, Pam Richardson. On that same date, the parties entered into a consent judgment and joint implementation plan, which purported to resolve all the parties' disputes. Among thé express provisions the parties agreed to were the following stipulations addressing appellant's obligation of child support for the parties' only child, Joshua:
[Appellant] shall pay unto [appellee] the sum of [$1,000.00] per month as child support for the minor child, said sum due and payable in semi-monthly installments of [$500.00] on the first and fifteenth of each month[.]
Further, [appellant] shall establish an IRA for' the minor child and deposit [$100.00] per month into the minor child's IRA.
The foregoing sums shall not be subject to a reduction and the foregoing obligations will terminate when the minor child reaches the age of [18] or no later than [19] if the minor child is still in secondary education. (Emphasis added.)
On April 10, 2002, appellant filed a rule to modify child support. His allegations include:
There have been significant changes in circumstances between the time of the previous [October 23, 2000 consent] judgment and the time this motion for increase is being filed, more particularly detailed as follows:
a. Mover has changed jobs and no longer makes the income he made in Year 2000.
b. Mover was self employed and now is seeking employment through other means.
|3c. The judgment of October 23, 2000, was not based on guideline calculations and needs to be modified due to mover's inability to maintain such payments.
Appellee filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata to appellant's rule for modification. A hearing on both appellant's rule for modification and appellee's exception of res judica-ta was held, and on its own motion, the trial court concluded that appellant's pleading failed to state a cause of action. Subsequently, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action and dismissing appellant's rule to modify child support from which appellant appeals.
On appeal, appellant maintains the trial court erred in dismissing his rule to modify child support, challenging the propriety of an implicit application of the doctrine of res judicata. He also asserts that the trial court's action in sustaining an objection of no cause of action was erroneous.
APPLICATION OP RES JUDICATA
At the hearing, in support of her exception raising the objection of res judicata, appellee directed the trial court to the October 23, 2000, consent judgment noting appellant's stipulation of child support in the sums of $1,000.00 per month and an additional $100.00 monthly deposit into Joshua's IRA account. Appellee maintained to the trial court — and now on appeal — that the stipulated sums of child support coupled with appellant's express agreement that "[t]he foregoing sums shall not be subject to a reduction" until Joshua attained the age of 18 (or in the event of continued secondary education, the age of 19) constituted a valid transaction and compromise. Thus, appellee reasons that the terms of the consent judgment [ constitute res judicata on the issue of appellant's entitlement to a reduction of child support and urges application of the doctrine of res judicata is warranted.
A "consent judgment" is, in effect, a bilateral contract between the parties which gets its binding force from the consent the parties gave, rather than from adjudication by the courts. Palgrave v. Gros, 2002-249, p. 5 (La.App. 5th Cir.9/30/02), 829 So.2d 579, 582. Interpretation of a consent judgment, i.e., a con tract between parties, is a determination of the common intent of the parties; each provision in the contract is interpreted in light of other provisions so that each is given meaning suggested by the contract as a whole, and when the words of the contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, the intent of the parties is to be determined by the words of the contract. Nungesser v. Nungesser, 95-2298, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/28/96), 694 So.2d 312, 314. A valid compromise agreement can form the basis of a plea of res judicata. Atwell v. National Safety Consultants, Inc., 97-1561, p. 4 (La.App. 3d Cir.4/1/98), 713 So.2d 495, 497, writ denied, 98-1866 (La.10/30/98), 727 So.2d 1164. And while a plea of a valid compromise or transaction is technically an affirmative defense under La. C.C.P. art. 1005, generally the proper procedural mechanism for interposing this defense is the peremptory exception of res judicata. See Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019, p. 6 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741, 747.
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4232, however, sets forth exceptions to general rules of res judicata. In particular, La. R.S. 13:4232 provides that in actions for matters incidental to divorce, the judgment has the effect of res judicata "only as to causes of action actually adjudicated." (Emphasis added.) Because child support is a matter incidental to divorce, see La. C.C. art. RIOS, when a party raises new allegations pertaining to changes in circumstances affecting a child's best interest, the La. R.S. 134232B limitation to the general res judicata rules applies. See La. C.C. art. 142 and La. R.S. 9:311.
DEFERENCE TO STIPULATED JUDGMENTS
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.1D provides a two-step process for the trial court to follow in initially approving stipulated child support judgments. First, upon presentation, it may review and approve or categorically reject stipulated provisions relating to child support. Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 8 (La.1999), 739 So.2d 762, 767. Second, if it does not reject the stipulation in favor of the child support guidelines, the trial court must " 'consider the guidelines . to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount.' " Id.
Notwithstanding the freedom of the parties to enter into stipulations relating to child support, parties must remember that their agreements may not "derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest." La. C.C. art. 7. It is clear that the stipulated child support recognized in the judgment must conform to the public policy codified in the child support guidelines with its concomitant best interest presumption and mandated adequacy review provisions. Stogner, 98-3044 at p. 10, 739 So.2d at 768.
Thus, enforcement of the obligor-par-ent's waiver of a reduction of a stipulated child support obligation may at times not conform to public policy or be in the best interest of the child. As a graphic example involving private education, this court warned: "[Jjustice would not be served by requiring a disabled father to go 'on the dole,' or grandparents to overextend their retirement benefits, to underwrite a private school education." Sobers v. Sobers, 98-0006, p. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/98), 724 So.2d 278, 279. |fiAnd it can be seen that a parent's bankruptcy or disability may make enforcement of a stipulated support amount contrary to a child's best interest. See La. C.C. art. 7.
Because appellant did not introduce any evidence at the hearing, reviewing only the allegations of the rule to modify, he should be permitted an opportunity to attempt to establish, by competent evidence, that enforcement of the October 23, 2000, consent judgment's waiver of the right to seek a reduction (of the $1,000.00 per month and the additional $100.00 monthly deposit into his son's IRA account) to which he agreed would not be in the best interest of Joshua. At that hearing, the evidence appellant submits must demonstrate that enforcement of the waiver is in derogation of public order before a stipulated waiver of reduction in child support, which has been accepted by the trial court, will not be enforced.
NO CAUSE OF ACTION
The trial court did not expressly rule on appellee's exception of res judicata; instead the trial court converted the exception to an objection of no cause of action, which it sustained.
The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to question whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the motion. Industrial Companies, Inc. v. Durbin, 02-0665, p. 6 (La.1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207, 1213. The peremptory exception of no cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the particular plaintiff is afforded a remedy in law based on the facts alleged in the pleading. Id. The exception is triable on the face of the pleading and, for the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the pleading must be accepted as true. Id. In reviewing a trial court's ruling sustaining anj 7 exception of no cause of action, the court of appeal should subject the case to de novo review because the exception raises a question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Id., 2002-0665 at p. 7, 837 So.2d at 1213. Simply stated, a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language of the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial. Id.
An award of child support may be modified if the circumstances of the child or of either parent materially change and shall be terminated upon proof that it has become unnecessary. La. C.C. art. 142. See also La. R.S. 9:311.
Thus, assuming as true those facts appellant averred in his motion: that he has changed jobs, no longer makes the same income, is no longer self-employed, and has not had a support determination within the ambit of the Child Support Guidelines, the allegations of appellant's rule to modify clearly state a cause of action. And the trial court erred in sustaining an objection based on the failure of appellant's motion to state a cause of action and in dismissing appellant's rule to modify on that basis.
It is obvious that the trial court attempted to address the issue appellee raised in her exception of res judicata, i.e., whether enforcement of a waiver by the obligor-parent of his right to seek reduction of the amount of child support in a consent judgment is in derogation of public order under La. C.C. art. 7, when the allegations of his rule to modify fail to allege that such an enforcement is not in the best interest of the child. But in its attempt to dispose of the matter via an exception of no cause of action, the trial court |Rconsidered evidence, which it is not permitted to do. Therefore, because the trial court erroneously considered evidence in its determination of whether the rule to modify child support stated a cause of action, that portion of the judgment which sustains the objection of no cause of action is reversed.
DECREE
Having concluded that neither the exception of res judicata raised by appellee nor the objection of no cause of action, raised on the trial court's own motion, warrants dismissal of appellant's rule to modify at this stage of the proceedings, we reverse that portion of the judgment that dismisses appellant's rule to modify. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appeal costs are assessed equally between the parties/parents.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GAIDRY, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
. Despite the express request for an increase and, more generally, for a modification (as otherwise set forth in his pleading), by this rule appellant in fact seeks a reduction of the amount of child support he agreed to pay to his former wife for Joshua in the October 23, 2000, consent judgment.
. See generally La. R.S. 13:4231.