Case Name: MARGARET PUTMAN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-02
Citations: 54 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 439
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARGARET PUTMAN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Parker, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 54
Pages: 439–445

Head Matter:
MARGARET PUTMAN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Action to recover damages alleged to home been caused Try the negligence of the defendant — when the defendant is liable therefor, although another cause concwrredin producing them.
Upon the trial of this action, brought by the plaintiff to recover, damages to her horse, wagon and harness, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, it appeared that the plaintiff’s husband was driving the horse from the west, towards the defendant’s crossing, upon a public street, where the defendant had in use, upon each side of the crossing, a gate suspended by, and in part formed of, wires extending over and across the street, which gates were raised and lowered by one operation of a crank at the south-east gate post. The plaintiff’s husband drove under the westerly gate and started to cross the track, which occupied a space of about eighty feet, but had not reached the easterly gate when the gateman, seeing an engine approaching from the south, began to lower the gates, then stopped and raised them a little, thereby making some noise by which the horse, which was already somewhat restless, was frightened, but passed under the easterly gate and attempted to run away. Witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the easterly gate in descending struck the horse upon the head. The plaintiff’s husband tried to hold the horse, but when about ninety feet easterly from the easterly gate the left rein broke. The horse, being pulled suddenly to the right, turned completely around, upsetting and breaking the wagon and running away.
The court refused to charge “ that if the proximate cause of the injury to the horse and other property was the breaking of a defective rein the plaintiff could not recover, even though the horse was previously frightened at the railroad crossing,” and charged that if the defendant, by the use of the gates above mentioned, “ caused the horse to be frightened, and that fright caused the horse to run away, and the rein broke while endeavoring to control the horse, the jury may find that the proximate cause of the injury was the frightening of the horse and not the breaking of the rein.”
Held, that, as it was to be assumed that the court had already charged the jury that it was necessary to the plaintiff’s recovery to show that the fright of the horse was caused by the defendant’s negligence, without fault on the part of plaintiff’s husband, the case presented by the request was the case of two concurring causes, both equally proximate, for one of which the defendant was to blame and in respect to the other of which the plaintiff was unfortunate but not negligent, and that the request was properly denied. (Fish, J., dissenting.)
Bing v. Gity of Oohoes (77 N. Y., 83) followed.
That if the negligence of the defendant was one of the concurring causes, without which the injury would not have happened, then, however bad the condition of the plaintiff’s harness, and however much it promoted the injury, it would not defeat the plaintiff’s recovery unless it amounted to negligence. (Fish, J., dissenting.)
. Aureal from a judgment in favor of tlie plaintiff, entered upon a verdict of a jury rendered upon a trial in the Schenectady County Court.
The action was brought to recover for damages to the plaintiff’s horse, wagon and harness, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff’s husband, while driving the horse which was harnessed to the wagon in which he was seated, approached from the west the railroad crossing on State street, Schenectady. The defendant had in use upon each side of such crossing a gate, suspended by and in part formed of wires, extending over and across the street, to which gate was attached a board, with letters painted on it: “ Railroad crossing, lookout for the cars.” Both gates were raised and lowered by one operation of a crank at the south-east gate post. When the gates were raised the crossing was understood to be safe; when lowered the crossing was closed to vehicles upon the street. Plaintiff’s husband drove under the westerly gate. The tracks occupied about eighty feet spáce. Before he reached the easterly gate the gateman, seeing an engine approaching from the south, began to lower the gates, then stopped and raised them a little. This operation made some noise. The horse, which was already somewhat restless, became frightened, but passed under the easterly gate and attempted to run. Witnesses on the part of the plaintiff testified that the easteriy gate in descending struck the horse upon the head. Defendant’s witnesses denied this. Plaintiff’s husband tried to hold the horse, but when about ninety rods easterly of the easterly gate the left 1-ein broke; the horse was thus suddenly pulled to the right, it-turned completely around,, upsetting and breaking the wagon and harness; the horse becoming detached from the wagon ran back to the crossing, plunged through the easterly gate, over the crossing and into a basement opening, and was injured. The court charged the jury that there was no evidence that the gate system of signals was not right and proper.
The defendant’s counsel requested the comt to charge the jury that if the proximate cause of the injury to the horse and other property of the plaintiff was the breaking of a defective rein, the plaintiff cannot recover even though the horse was previously frightened at the railroad crossing. The comt declined to so charge, and further stated: I did not say anything to the jury about that rein. I think if the defendant, by the use of this applicance, caused the horse to be frightened, and that fright caused the horse to run away, and the rein broke while endeavoring to control the horse, the jury may find that the proximate cause of the injury was the frightening of the horse and not the breaking of the rein. The counsel for the defendant excepted to the refusal to charge as so requested.
S. W. Jackson, for the appellant.
D. M. Chadsey, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Landon, P. J.:
The case does not contam the charge of the court, and we therefore assume that before his refusal to charge as requested and his explanation of that refusal, the judge had instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover unless her property was injured by the negligent acts of the defendant in managing the gate, and without any concurring or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff's husband. In view of the previous proper instructions to the jury we are not at liberty to construe the request as presenting the proposition that the breaking of the rein was the sole proximate cause of the injury, for it is qualified by the condition "even though the horse was previously frightened at the railroad crossing." The fright of the horse must be considered such a fright, as the judge had already instructed the jury was necessary to the plaintiff's recovery, namely— a fright caused by the negligence of the defendant. The case presented by the request was therefore the case of two concurring causes, both equally proximate, for one of which the defendant was to blame, and for the other the plaintiff, unfortunate but not negligent. In such casé the request was properly refused because the defendant would be liable. (Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y., 83.) If the request had been understood as meaning the case in which the breaking of the rein was due to the negligence of the plaintiff, the court would no doubt have promptly charged as requested.
The remarks of the judge in addition to his refusal to charge, must also be construed in the light of his previous proper instructions, and therefore must be understood as meaning the ease of the horse frightened by the negligent use of the appliance. If that negligence was the causa causans of all the difficulty immediately following it, the breaking of the rein would be but one of its consequences. Under the evidence the jury might have found that the horse although frightened by the negligence of the defendant, was so far manageable that no injury would have happened but for the breaking of the rein. The jury might have found that the rein was weak or rotten, although no external appearances indicated any defect. The learned counsel probably desired to present such a case by his request. He cites cases from Maine, in which it is held, where injuries of a similar character were occasioned jointly by a defect in a highway for which the defendant was chargeable, and by a defect in the plaintiffs harness, the plaintiff cannot recover notwithstanding he had no knowledge of such defect and was not in fault for not knowing it. (Moore v. Abbot, 32 Maine, 46 ; Coombs v. Topsham, 38 id., 204; Farrar v. Greene, 32 id., 574.) Such is not the law in this State. If the negligence of the defendant is one of the concurring causes without which the injury would not have happened, then however bad the condition of the plaintiffs harness, and however much it promoted the injiu'y, we do not understand that it defeats her recovery, unless it amounts to negligence. And a party whose harness is defective but of which defect he has no knowledge and is not in fault. for not knowing it, is not legally negligent; for he has neither done a careless act nor omitted to do what reasonable care requires.
The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
Parker, J., concurred.