Case Name: NOVA UNIVERSITY, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Josephine C. WAGNER, Etc., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-07-17
Citations: 491 So. 2d 1116
Docket Number: No. 67160
Parties: NOVA UNIVERSITY, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Josephine C. WAGNER, Etc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: ADKINS, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 491
Pages: 1116–1120

Head Matter:
NOVA UNIVERSITY, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Josephine C. WAGNER, Etc., et al., Respondents.
No. 67160.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 17, 1986.
John P. Kelly of Fleming, O’Bryan & Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, for Nova University, Inc. and Ins. Co. of North America.
Joseph H. Lowe of Marlow, Shofi, Conell, DeMahy, Valerius, Abrams, Lowe & Adler, Miami, for Janet Stevens, Charles Stevens and Chicago Ins. Co.
G. William Bissett of Preddy, Kutner & Hardy, Miami, for Dr. John Flynn.
Allan M. Rubin, P.A., Hollywood, Harry A. Gaines, P.A., and Joel D. Eaton of Pod-hurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Easton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., Miami, for respondents.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us pursuant to the certification by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a question it deemed to be of great public importance. Wagner v. Nova University, Inc., 473 So.2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution.
The facts in this case as alleged in the complaints are as follows: Nova University [hereinafter Nova] operates a residential rehabilitation program, Living and Learning Center [hereinafter Center], that accepts children whose continued residence with parents, foster parents or legal guardians has been determined to be against the best interests of the general public because of behavior problems. The children attend local public schools but are not otherwise allowed to leave the premises without permission. No security measures are maintained to enforce this policy, however. During the time material to this action defendant John M. Flynn was the executive director of the Center, responsible for policy and its implementation.
Two Center residents, Roland Menzies and Dana Williamson, were accepted as residents in 1974 and lived in a house with several other minors under the supervision of defendants Mr. and Mrs. Stevens, employees of Nova. Roland was accepted as an ungovernable child and Dana as an emotionally disturbed and delinquent child. Both, on numerous occasions while at the Center, exhibited a propensity toward physical violence, on occasion injuring younger children. They also frequently ran away from the Center. The defendants allegedly observed the boys' violent propensities and knew or should have known they had a propensity to commit acts which could normally be expected to cause harm to others.
The boys ran away from the Center on February 16, 1975, and remained at large for several days. On February 17, at approximately 6 p.m., they encountered Peter Wagner, 4, and Christy Wagner, 6, and beat them, killing Peter and leaving Christy with serious permanent injuries. The complaints allege that the defendants were negligent in failing to supervise and control Roland and Dana.
The childrens' mother brought wrongful death and personal injury actions. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that as a matter of law they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. On appeal the district court reversed, finding that the Center stood in loco parentis to its residents and that the proper application of that theory precluded summary judgment for the defendants. The district court certified the following question:
DOES KNOWLEDGE OF A CHILD'S VIOLENCE REQUIRE A PARENT TO EXERCISE CONTROL TO AVOID INJURY TO ANOTHER CAUSED BY SUBSEQUENT VIOLENCE WHICH IS MORE SEVERE?
Wagner, 473 So.2d at 734. We restate the question as follows:
Does a child care institution that accepts as residents delinquent, emotionally disturbed and/or ungovernable children have a duty to exercise reasonable care in its operation to avoid harm to the general public?
We answer the restated question in the affirmative. We do not believe that the question of the defendants' duty in this instance need rest on the presumed existence of an in loco parentis relationship. The Nova Living and Learning Center, for a fee, undertakes to rehabilitate children with emotional and behavior problems. We do not think it too onerous a burden to place upon it the duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out its efforts. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319 (1965), provides:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
We find section 319, a statement of traditional tort principles, applicable. See Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886, 895-98; 904-05 (1934).
We assume for purposes of this opinion that the Center is a socially desirable enterprise, and we express no view as to whether it was negligent. Neither do we pass judgment on the issue of proximate causation. We merely hold that a facility in the business of taking charge of persons likely to harm others has an ordinary duty to exercise reasonable care in its operation to avoid foreseeable attacks by its charges upon third persons. If reasonable care is exercised, there can be no liability. The alternative, the exercise of no care or unreasonable lack of care, subjects the facility to liability. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court for the reasons stated in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, CJ., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs.
. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, Nova admitted in its memorandum to all of the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaints save use of the word "escape." The other defendants made a similar admission in their memorandum, arguing that assuming all of the plaintiffs' allegations can be proved, the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs. We will paraphrase selected allegations from the complaints. John Flynn is a defendant in the personal injury action only.
. "[A] person in loco parentis is one who intentionally accepts the rights and duties of natural parenthood with respect to a child not his own." In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 794-95, 424 A.2d 178, 180 (N.H.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 3116, 69 L.Ed.2d 976 (1981). Whether the parental relationship has been assumed is normally a question of fact suitable for resolution at trial. See 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, § 88 (1971). Key factors that are hallmarks of the in loco parentis relationship are the intentional assumption of obligations incidental to the parental relationship, especially support and maintenance, State v. Pittard, 45 N.C.App. 701, 263 S.E.2d 809 (Ct.App.), review denied, 300 N.C. 378, 267 S.E.2d 682 (1980), and psychological bonding, In re Diana P. . Plaintiffs alleged a parental relationship in their complaints against the Stevens and Nova but not in their complaint against Dr. Flynn. In view of our holding in this case, the establishment of an in loco parentis relationship is not a necessary element of the plaintiffs cause of action.