Case Name: SHANDOULIA WALLACE, Indiv. and as Adm'r of the Estate of Waketta Roy Wallace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN P. SMYTH et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1998-10-21
Citations: 301 Ill. App. 3d 75
Docket Number: No. 1—97—0467
Parties: SHANDOULIA WALLACE, Indiv. and as Adm’r of the Estate of Waketta Roy Wallace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN P. SMYTH et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 301
Pages: 75–86

Head Matter:
SHANDOULIA WALLACE, Indiv. and as Adm’r of the Estate of Waketta Roy Wallace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN P. SMYTH et al., Defendants-Appellees.
First District (3rd Division)
No. 1—97—0467
Opinion filed October 21, 1998.
Rehearing denied December 4, 1998.
BURKE, J., dissenting.
Stanley L. Hill & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.
Robert C. Yelton III and Jeffrey Edward Kehl, both of Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE LEAVITT
delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 16, 1996, Shandoulia Wallace filed her second amended complaint alleging the defendants acted negligently, willfully, and wantonly with regard to Waketta Wallace (Waketta). The judge subsequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the negligence claims. She held Illinois' parental immunity doctrine shielded the defendants from liability for negligence because they stood in loco parentis to Waketta. We reverse and remand.
Twelve-year-old Waketta, a ward of Illinois, was, on July 11, 1989, temporarily residing at Maryville Academy (Maryville) for a 90-day diagnostic assessment that would yield recommendations for his future placement. Maryville was an independent contractor providing services to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for money. DCFS at all times remained the legal guardian of the children it placed at Maryville, including Waketta, and Maryville was required to consult DCFS staff members regarding important decisions affecting the children DCFS placed there. For instance, on June 13, 1989, Maryville obtained permission from Waketta's guardian at DCFS to administer psychotropic medications to Waketta. Also, on July 5, 1989, assistant Maryville program director Laura Angelucci obtained permission from Waketta's guardian at DCFS to take Wa ketta on a field trip to Wisconsin.
While at Maryville, Waketta stayed in the home of Paul Voltz, who was the Maryville program manager. Waketta typically left the Voltz home to attend school for eight hours per day, then returned to the Voltz home. On July 11, 1989, at approximately 12:50 p.m., Waketta returned from school early. He reported to Voltz's office and showed Voltz and Angelucci a note from his teacher stating Waketta had a "good day" at school.
At around 1:45 p.m., Jill Jacobe, a family educator at Maryville, came to Voltz's office and told him Waketta was in study hall, where he was supposed to be reading, but he had instead closed his eyes and pretended to sleep. Angelucci called nurse Dee Le Bel and inquired whether Waketta's sleep could have resulted from his medication. Le Bel said she believed Waketta was feigning sleep, although she never personally saw Waketta. Voltz told Jacobe to send Waketta to his office.
Waketta reported to Voltz's office, where Voltz confronted Waketta about his behavior. Waketta threatened to leave the home, then Voltz followed Waketta out of his office to the back door of the Voltz home. Voltz told Waketta because of his bad behavior he could not leave the home. The two returned to Voltz's office.
In Voltz's office, Waketta took a pick out of his pocket and began to pick his hair. Voltz asked him to put the pick away. After asking Waketta to put the pick down, Voltz said Waketta made threatening gestures toward him but never touched Voltz or even stood up. Voltz walked over to Waketta and held Waketta's hands at the wrists crossed on Waketta's lap. According to Angelucci, who witnessed these events, Voltz had an awkward position with regard to Waketta and asked Waketta to stand up, which he did, and the two walked to the hallway.
Once they reached the hallway, Voltz called for assistance. Angelucci responded. When Angelucci reached the hallway, Waketta was on the floor, on his back with his arms crossed in front of him. Voltz held Waketta's wrists. Angelucci testified she "laid across [Waketta's legs] and he began to struggle." Angelucci called for Jacobe to help her. Jacobe held Waketta's ankles while Angelucci remained on his legs. Waketta struggled, and the three counselors switched positions.
At some point before 3 p.m., the counselors flipped Waketta onto his stomach. Jim Geidner, another family counselor, said when he arrived sometime before 3 p.m., Waketta was on his stomach in a baskethold with his arms crossed at the abdomen and his wrists held firmly to the floor. Voltz was straddling Waketta's lower back and Angelucci was lying on Waketta's legs. Geidner replaced Angelucci on Waketta's legs. At 3 p.m., Xavier Collier came on duty and aided in the restraint.
This continued for approximately four hours in the middle of the hallway floor while other children walked past. Waketta struggled mainly when other children were present. In the course of his restraint, Waketta warned the counselors he had to urinate and that he might urinate upon himself. They continued to restrain him. Even after Waketta urinated upon himself, the counselors continued to restrain him.
According to Angelucci, after Waketta was flipped to his stomach, "he began to calm down again and was lying quietly." At approximately 6 p.m., Voltz instructed Angelucci to "get off [Waketta's] legs." Angelucci said she did so and immediately noticed Voltz checking Waketta's pulse and breathing. The counselors flipped Waketta onto his back and Voltz unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Waketta. Angelucci called an ambulance. Waketta was dead.
Dr. Robert J. Stein, chief forensic pathologist at the Cook County medical examiner's office, performed Waketta's autopsy. He testified the cause of Waketta's death was asphyxia, a lack of oxygen. According to Dr. Stein, that finding is consistent with the scenario of Waketta lying facedown with his arms crossed in front of his neck and a 120-pound man on his back. Also, the autopsy revealed an abrasion on Waketta's elbow consistent with the scenario of Waketta lying facedown struggling with his arms crossed at his chest.
Dr. Stein said that, with Waketta's arms crossed in front of his chest and one person holding each arm, there was compression of Waketta's carotid, his vagus nerve, and internal jugular. Dr. Stein also found evidence of petechial hemorrhages, a larger hemorrhage, pulmonary edema, and pulmonary congestion. He explained petechial hemorrhages are small hemorrhages of capillaries almost always caused by strangulation. However, he noted no evidence of intentional strangulation existed here.
Waketta's death certificate indicated the cause of his death was positional asphyxiation and stress due to restraint. Dr. Kirschner, another doctor at the Cook County medical examiner's office, testified positional asphyxiation "is a condition where an individual requires a large intake of air usually because they are excited or in an emotional state, and they are breathing rapidly, and they are in a position that does not allow them to breathe rapidly or deeply enough to get sufficient air into their lungs to maintain respirations."
Denise Kane, Inspector General for DCFS, testified she preliminarily investigated Waketta's death. She learned Waketta was diagnosed as hyperactive, emotionally disturbed, and possibly suffering from attention deficit disorder while at the Old Orchard Hospital just prior to his arrival at Maryville. These psychological problems left Waketta un able to stay on task for very long and made him easily distractible. Ms. Kane also testified Waketta was going through a tremendous growth spurt at the time of his death, causing him to tire easily. This resulted from his internal organs, including his heart, growing rapidly, which caused him to expend massive amounts of energy. Ms. Kane said this certainly should have been considered by nurse Le Bel and the other counselors who assessed Waketta's condition on July 11. 1989.
Finally, Ms. Kane said, in her expert opinion, the situation was not an emergency and the restraint used on Waketta was not effective, was not proportionate to his behavior, was not temporary, and was inappropriate because it occurred in a public hallway with other children watching. She further said alternatives to physical restraint were never explored by the counselors.
After hearing this testimony, the jury found for the defendants on the willful and wanton counts. The only issue Ms. Wallace raises for our review is whether the judge erred as a matter of law in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss her negligence counts pursuant to section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 1996)).
A cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 72 Ill. 2d 179, 187, 380 N.E.2d 790 (1978). We review orders granting motions to dismiss de novo. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 662 N.E.2d 1377 (1996). Because we find Ms. Wallace's complaint alleged facts that tended to establish Maryville was not in loco parentis regarding Waketta, we reverse the judge's order dismissing Ms. Wallace's negligence counts, and remand.
The term in loco parentis implies "a standing in the place of a parent; one charged fictitiously with parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities." Bland v. Department of Children & Family Services, 141 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822, 490 N.E.2d 1327 (1986). At common law, in loco parentis status belonged to persons who put themselves in a parent's shoes by assuming all parental obligations toward a child without going through the formalities of legal adoption. See Hawkey v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 941, 943 (E.D. Ill. 1952). We have held that parties must assume the usual financial burdens of parenthood before they can be considered in loco parentis, and such status is granted sparingly. Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 682, 684, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); see also Lawber v. Doil, 191 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326, 547 N.E.2d 752 (1989) (holding in loco parentis status was proper where child's stepfather was unemployed and thus did not financially support the child, but acted as a parent in all other respects, because he assumed the financial burden of parenthood but was simply, temporarily, unable to satisfy it).
In this case, Ms. Wallace alleged in her second amended complaint:
"4. That at all times relevant herein, MARYVILLE ACADEMY was a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois and was licensed by the State of Illinois to house, care for and educate children, including those committed to the custody of the State of Illinois, or its agency Illinois DCFS. MARYVILLE ACADEMY acts as a contractual agent of the State of Illinois in caring for these children.
5. That at all times relevant herein, the plaintiffs decedent, WAKETTA, was a ward of the State of Illinois who was committed to the custody of DCFS." (Emphasis added.)
For purposes of a section 2 — 615 motion, the judge was required to accept the preceding allegations and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom as true. Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 130 Ill. App. 3d 173, 176, 474 N.E.2d 397 (1985).
The defendants claim Ms. Wallace conceded Maryville stood in loco parentis regarding Waketta when she pled Maryville "was licensed by the State of Illinois to house, care for and educate children [including Waketta]." We disagree. While Ms. Wallace alleged Maryville "was licensed" to do those acts, housing, caring for and educating a child do not alone confer in loco parentis status. Examples of situations where housing, care and education are provided children by persons we have not generally held in loco parentis to those children include: summer camps, day-care centers, medical and psychological treatment facilities, and grandparents, for example. See Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 99, 619 N.E.2d 715 (1993) (holding parental immunity from negligence liability will not be invoked unless a case involves "conduct intimately associated with the parent-child relationship," because "the immunity exists only to further the parent-child relationship, and where that relationship is not impacted, the policies supporting the doctrine lose their persuasive strength").
In certain circumstances teachers are in loco parentis with regard to students, but that is by legislative enactment, not judicial fiat. 105 ILCS 5/24 — 24 (West 1996). Additionally, as our supreme court explained in Cates, a teacher, whose in loco parentis status is legislatively defined is immune based on his special status "only to the extent he acts within the confines of his duties in loco parentis." Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 100. No statutory equivalent insulating corporations, like Maryville, from liability for negligently supervising or disciplining children exists. The relevant legislation here is the Illinois Administrative Code, which states DCFS has legal and financial responsibility for children of whom it is guardian, regardless of their momentary location. That obligation entails providing for such children's clothing, mental health care, camp fees and supplies, cultural enrichment, educational expenses, and medical care. 89 Ill. Adm. Code § 359.7, 359.9 (1996).
Ms. Wallace alleged Waketta was at Maryville temporarily for a diagnostic evaluation but remained a ward of Illinois. She further alleged DCFS retained control over important decisions affecting Waketta as well as financial responsibility for Waketta during his interim stay at Maryville. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed Ms. Wallace's negligence claims, stating:
"I am convinced from the cases that the defendants have tendered to me, and from the arguments made, and everything that I know about the case that Maryville was acting de facto as loco parentis for this child. Therefore, the motion to strike Counts I and III for ordinary negligence — that are based on ordinary negligence, that motion will be granted. I do not believe that Maryville can be sued under theories of ordinary negligence."
Because the preceding allegations made by Ms. Wallace do not in any way establish as an inevitable conclusion that Maryville stood in loco parentis with regard to Waketta but, rather, that in conjunction with Illinois' statutory scheme they intone that DCFS bore ultimate responsibility for traditional parental functions with regard to Waketta, we find the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
For all of these reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing Ms. Wallace's negligence counts is reversed, and this cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
CAHILL, J., concurs.