Case Name: PEOPLE v. NICHOLS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-04-26
Citations: 33 Mich. App. 63
Docket Number: Docket No. 8066
Parties: PEOPLE v. NICHOLS
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and T. M. Burns, and J. E. Hughes, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 33
Pages: 63–73

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. NICHOLS
Original Opinion
1. Criminal Law — Evidence — Other Crimes — Admissibility — Motive — Intent.
Evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissible to show knowledge or intent when they are elements of the offense charged (MCLA § 768.27).
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Inferences—Multiple Inferences.
A jury may draw more than one inference from the same evidence if the inferences drawn are reasonable; the essential issue is whether the multiple inferences are reasonable, not whether arguably one inference is based on another.
3. Criminal Law — Possessing a Stolen Vehicle — Evidence—Inferences
Inference that the defendants were in possession of a stolen automobile, knowing the car to be stolen or having reason to believe the car had been stolen, was reasonable where there was evidence that one of the defendants was seated in the stolen automobile and that the other defendant was standing near the car, parked in a deserted side street in a non-residential area late at night, that a truck, with a window forced and “hot wired”, was 60 feet from the car, that similar scraps of insulation were found on the wire used to hot-wire the truck and in the automobile, that the defendants had been at the scene for a considerable time, and that several flashlights with their ends taped to provide narrow beams were found near the car (MCLA § 257.254).
Beferences for Points in Headnotes
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 323, 324.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 166.
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 341,
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 229.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1129.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 320.
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303, 308.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545.
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303, 308, 321, 340.
4. Criminal Law — Possessing a Stolen Vehicle — Non-Innocent Possession — Evidence—Other Crimes.
Evidence that one of the defendants was seated in a stolen car, parked in a deserted side street in a nonresidential area late at night, and that the other defendant was standing near the car, that a truck, parked 60 feet from the car, had had a window forced and had been hot-wired, that scraps of insulation similar to the insulation used to cover the wire used in hot-wiring the truck were found in the stolen car, that defendants had been at the scene a considerable time, and that flashlights, taped so as to give narrow beams, were found near the ear was admissible in defendants’ trial for possessing a motor vehicle knowing or having reason to believe that it had been stolen, because an element of • the crime charged is that the possession was not innocent and there was unity of time, place, and nature between the crime charged and the attempted theft of the truck (MCLA § 257.254).
5. Criminal Law — Evidence—Appeal and Error — Preserving Questions.
Policeman’s testimony that a gasoline credit card, found in the police car used to transport the defendants to the police station after their arrest, had a name on it other than the names of the defendants, charged with possessing a stolen automobile, knowing it to be stolen or having reason to believe the car had been stolen, did not constitute reversible error where the prosecutor dropped the line of questioning when defense counsel objected, the defense had been forewarned at the preliminary examination of the prosecutor’s intended line of questioning and, thus, defense counsel could have objected before the question was asked, the defendants did not ask that the evidence be stricken nor request a cautionary instruction to the jury, and where, after the prosecutor, in summation, mentioned that the credit card had a name different from the defendants on it, defense counsel did not object.
6. Criminal Law — Other Criminal Acts — Evidence.
Prosecutor’s asking the defendant questions concerning the defendant’s commission of other crimes for which defendant was not convicted was not reversible error where defendant’s trial was prior to the decision holding such questions reversible error, the prosecutor was not trying to place before the jury evidence he knew was inadmissible or facts he was not prepared to prove, there was a factual basis for the questions, and where when defendants objected, the court directed the prosecutor to confine his questions to possible convictions.
Our Rehearing
7. Criminal Law — Automobiles—Stolen Automobiles — Possession — Intent—Statutes.
The section of the Michigan Vehicle Code punishing possession of a stolen automobile is restricted to situations where possession is coupled with intent to fraudulently transfer title (MCLA § 257.25).
8. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Rule of Law — Preserving Question.
A defendant in a criminal case is entitled on direct appeal of his conviction to the benefit of a new rule of law declared after his trial even though he did not preserve the issue by timely raising the question at the trial level.
9. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Stolen Automobiles— Possession — Intent—Evidence—Sufficiency.
Defendants convicted of possession of a stolen automobile are entitled to the benefit of a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, announced after their trial, that the possession must be coupled with intent to transfer title fraudulently, even though they did not raise the issue in the trial court; hence, where the people concede that there was no attempt or intent to pass title, they are entitled to reversal of conviction and discharge on appeal (MCLA § 257.254).
Appeal from Oakland, Clark J. Adams, J.
Submitted Division 2 October 7, 1970, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 8066.)
Decided April 26, 1971.
Opinion on rehearing released August 23, 1971.
George W. Nichols and Barry Lee Scott were convicted of possessing a stolen motor vehicle. Defendants appeal.
Reversed on rehearing.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Thomas G. Plunkett, Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank R. Knox, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James D. O’Connell, for defendants on appeal.
Before: Levin, P. J., and T. M. Burns, and J. E. Hughes, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Original Opinion; see Opinion on Rehearing IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING