Case Name: Caroline Davidson, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-06-04
Citations: 133 A.D. 352
Docket Number: 
Parties: Caroline Davidson, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 133
Pages: 352–355

Head Matter:
Caroline Davidson, Respondent, v. The City of New York, Appellant.
Second Department,
June 4, 1909.
Municipal corporations — negligence — streets — fall on sidewalk — injury to. pedestrian.
'That it is possible .for some one.person out of many to trip on a defect in the pavement of a street does not render it "obviously dangerous.”
'Where in an action against a city it appears that plaintiff tripped upon' a flagstone in a. sidewalk,, shown, by actual measurement to. have been raised only two and one-half inches above the adjoining one, and that the elevation gradually decreased to' nothing at the outside of the six-foot walk, it is error to' refuse to charge on defendant’s ■ request that, if the jury found that the elevation was only two and one-half inches at the highest point, which evidence it had already charged that they must accept, and ran from that down to nothing, and that the plaintiff simply tripped and fell, the defendant was not liable, and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff will be reversed and a new trial granted, for it is impossible to free a city from such slight defects and unreasonable to permit a jury to say they are obviously dangerous.
Woodward, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, The City of New York, .from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 30tli day of October, 1908, upon the verdict of a jury for $1,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
James D. Bell [Francis K. Pendleton, Corporation Counsel, with him on the brief], for the appellant.
Henry E. Heistad, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Gaynor, J.:
This case did not go to the jury on the theory that oneflag might be above the other as much as 5 inches at the outside by the tree — the highest point. On the contrary, there was the testimony of an engineer that by actual measurement by him the elevation at such highest point was only 2J inches (and it gradually decreased to nothing at the outside of the flag walk, the width of which was 6 feet); and the learned trial Judge charged the jury that they had to accept that evidence as against the loose estimates which had been testified to. Moreover, the learned trial Judge refused to charge the request of the defendant that if the jury found that the elevation was only inches at the highest point, and ran from that down .to nothing, and that the plaintiff simply tripped and fell, the defendant was not liable; so that this is the precise point of the case. It is impos-sible to free a city from such slight defects, and unreasonable to say, or permit a jury to say, that they are " obviously dangerous", which is the test of the city's liability.-. We know that they are not, If they were, thousands and thousands would be hurt by them hourly. That it is " possible " for some one out of many, out of . millions, it may be, to trip on such a defect, does not make it dangerous. Probability, not possibility, governs (Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 N. Y. 444; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 id. 15).
The judgment should he reversed.
Jenks, Burr and.Miller, J.T., concurred; Woodward, J., read for affirmance. -