Case Name: STORY v. NEW YORK ELEVATED RAILROAD CO.
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1882-10
Citations: 11 Abb. N. Cas. 236
Docket Number: 
Parties: STORY v. NEW YORK ELEVATED RAILROAD CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's New Cases
Volume: 11
Pages: 236–298

Head Matter:
STORY v. NEW YORK ELEVATED RAILROAD CO.
N. Y. Court of Appeals ;
October, 1882.
[Reversing 3 Abb. N. C. 478.]
Action fob Injunction Against Construction of Elevated Railroad.—Deed with Stipulation as to Use of Streets.— Dedication to Public Use.—Municipal Corporations.— Ownership of Streets.—Covenant not to Build.— Easement of Abutting Owners.—Constitutional Law of compensation for Private Property. —Elevated Railroad an Obstruction. —Eminent Domain Exercised by taking Land in Trust.—Railroads in Highways.
In a deed by a municipal corporation to an individual, of land under water embracing the bed of a projected street, the grantee agreed to build, erect and make, or “ cause to be built, erected and made, the street now known as Front street,” and then followed this clause : “Which said streets shall forever thereafter continue and be, for the free and common passage of, and as public streets and ways for, the inhabitants of the said city, and all others passing and returning through or by the same, in such manner as the other streets of the same city now are or lawfully ought to be.”
Reid, that this was a covenant on the part of the city, the grantor, and not merely of the grantee, for it must be assumed to be made by the party who held the title to the bed of the street, and if the bed of the street was included in the grant, it must be deemed the covenant of the city, because in that case the land could not become a street except by proceedings taken for the purpose, or by a dedication to and acceptance by the public.
The construction of the street pursuant to the covenant would amount to a dedication, and the covenant would amount to an acceptance on the part of the city.
The rule, that where an individual conveys village or city lots, designated upon a map as abutting upon a public street, the map being referred to in the deed, the grantee acquires, as against the grantor, a right of way over the strip of land referred to as a street, although the same may not, in fact, be a public street, not having been accepted by the public as such ; yet, as between the parties to the grant, the land is deemed to have been dedicated to- the public by the grantor, and he cannot thereafter appropriate said lands to any use inconsistent with their use as a public street,—applied.
The city of New York, having power to lay out and open streets and to acquire land for such purposes, had power to dedicate its own land to such uses, and to bind itself by a covenant with its grantees of abutting lands that a particular street should forever be kept as a public street.
Such a covenant in a deed is a covenant running with the land, and passes to a subsequent grantee of the estate without any special assignment of the covenant.
The servitude created by it constitutes a private easement in the bed of the street, attached to the lands abutting thereon and passing with the title to those lots.
Such easement is properly within the constitutional provision requiring compensation for the taking of private property.
The erection of an elevated railroad which, as a fact, will to some extent obscure the light of the abutting premises and impair their general usefulness and depreciate their value, is a taking of the property of the owner of the premises and such easement, which requires compensation.
A covenant to keep a strip of land open as a public street forever is a covenant not to build thereon.
The cases of People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 ; and Kellinger v. Forty-Second Street R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206,—explained and limited.
Where, by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the public acquire, not the property itself, but the mere right to use it for a particular purpose, the title of the former owner is not extinguished, but is so qualified that it can only be enjoyed subject to the easement. In such case the title of the public is limited to the particular use, with the powers and privileges incident thereto.
Although the construction of a surface railroad without a change of grade is a legitimate exercise of the power regulating the use of public streets for public purposes, it seems, that the taking of permanent and exclusive possession for sidings and the permanent occupation with rows of standing cars, or the erection of permanent depot buildings would not be within the power.
The trust created by the act of 1813, under which the city of New York takes land for streets, is one for the benefit of abutting owners as well as for that of the public.
The legislature is not authorized in its discretion to appropriate the public streets of cities to railroad corporations, without reference to the form of their structure or the extent of the injury wrought upon abutting property, without compensation.
The erection of an elevated railroad,—such as that described in the evidence in this case,—is inconsistent with the use of a street as a public street, and is a taking and appropriation of the property of abutting owners for public use.
The rapid transit act authorizes the corporation to acquire the property that may be necessary for its uses, including such easements, upon making compensation therefor.
In this case, in view of the serious consequences to the railroad company of an immediate injunction,—Held, that an injunction should not be issued until after a reasonable time" had been afforded to acquire the property by agreement, or by proceedings to fix compensation.
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the court of common pleas in the city of New York affirming a judgment of the special term dismissing plaintiffs complaint on the merits.
This action was brought by Bui us Story against the New York Elevated Bailroad Company to enjoin them from constructing their elevated railroad in Front street, in the city of New York, in front of the plaintiffs premises. [The decision of the special term is fully reported in 3 Abb. N. C. 478.]
Plaintiff sought this relief upon the ground (in addition to. the objections that the structure was unauthorized, that it was a common nuisance especially injurious to the plaintiff, and that compensation had not been awarded him) that his title to his property was held under a deed from the city which secured the use of the street. His title was derived through two water grants from the city corporation, one dated May 26, 1773, to Thomas Allison, and the other dated December 2, 1737, to Isaac De Peyster, both of which embraced the entire bed of the street.
By each grant the grantee agreed to “build, erect, and make, or cause to be built, erected, and made, one other good and sufficient firm wharf or street of forty-five feet English measure in breadth . . . which said street shall also be built, erected and made in such manner upon a straight or right line, . . . which said several streets shall forever thereafter continue
and be for the full and common passage of, and as public streets and ways for, the inhabitants of said city, and all others passing and returning through or by the same, in such manner as the other streets of the same city now are or lawfully ought to be.”
The court below dismissed the complaint on the merits, holding that this stipulation bound the grantee but was not to be deemed the covenant of the city, and held that an abutting owner is not entitled to compensation for an authorized use of the street in front of his premises for an elevated railway, which in no way interferes with its use as a highway, other than to such extent as the columns upon which it is erected may incommode and interfere with the right of the public, in passing along the street; and that he is not entitled to damages for any annoyance'occasioned to his premises by the construction of the railway and its use of the street as authorized by the legislature. (Reported in 3 Abb. N. C. 478.)
This decision, in connection with those which have preceded it, indicates the general rights of abutting owners as affected by railroads, &c., in highways, to be as follows :
If the public have only acquired an easement or right of way the construction of a steam railroad even on the surface of the street is not authorized, without compensation for the additional burdens. Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 107.
If the public have acquired the fee of the land, but in trust for use as a highway only, the right will depend upon the terms of the trust, and if those declare the street shall be kept open for free and common passage, structures which obstruct that passage are an injury which may entitle an abutting owner intended to be benefited by the trust to compensation. Story v. Elevated R. R. Co., above.
If the public are the owners of an absolute and unqualified fee in the lau,d used as a street, the question will depend upon general principles, of which the chief are the maxim, sie Utere tuo ut non alienum laidas, and the rule that that which is expressly sanctioned by the legislature is not actionable as a nuisance. See Caro v. Metropolitan R. Co., 46 Super. Ct. (J. & S.) 138.
I am indebted to Robert E. Devo, Esq., for the very complete collection of papers in this litigation, from which this report has been prepared.
On the right to compensation in these cases, see also, beside the cases cited in the report, Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; and an article by Arthur G. Sedgwick on the constitutional protection of property rights, in North American Review, September, 1882, and by A. Knauth, 26 Alb. L. J. 336.
The injurious effect on the human system, of the noises of cities, railroads, machinery, &c., are discussed by James Sully, in a paper on “Civilization and Noise,” in the Popular’ Science Monthly, Supp., December, 1878, p. 111.
In City of Brooklyn v. N. Y. Ferry Co., 87 N. Y. 204, it was held that the city’s authority to regulate its wharves and piers did not imply power to deprive owners of uplands and water front of the enjoyment and improvement of their own premises without compensation.
As to further extensions of new made land, see also, Matter of City of Brooklyn, 73 N. Y. 179.
In this connection are there reported the other elevated railroad cases of which a full account is given there p. 301, namely : Patten v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., p. 306 [appeal from the injunction was dismissed, 67 N. Y. 484] ; Ninth Avenue R. R. Co. v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., p. 347 ; Sixth Avenue R. R. Co. v. Gilbert Elevated R. R. Co., p. 372 ; reversing 41 Super. Ct. (J. & S.) 489 ; Matter of N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., p. 401 ; S. C, 70 N. Y. 327 ; affirming 7 Hun, 239 ; Gilbert Elevated Ry. Co., v. Anderson, p. 434 ; S. C., less fully, as Matter of Gilbert Elevated Ry. Co. v. Kobbe, 70 N. Y. 361 ; affirming 9 Hun, 303 ; and Spader v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., p. 467.

Opinion:
On appeal to the general term, this judgment was affirmed, the following opinions being delivered by the court:
Beach, J.
The opinion of the lamented judge before whom this case was tried at special term is very learned and elaborate. It contains a careful examination of the various points presented, and I coincide with its conclusions without a ttempting to reproduce the arguments and the authorities by which they are maintained. I am of the opinion that the original grant, under which the plaintiff claims, did not convey a fee to any part of the street upon which the railway of the defendant is located. It seems plain to me, that it is held by the city in trust for the general public.
Doubtless the plaintiff is entitled to the use of the street in common with others, and may complain, if unlawfully subjected to special damages. The case, of People v. Kerr, 26 N. Y. 188 ; sustained by Kellinger v. Second St. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206, seems conclusive upon the proposition that plaintiff, as abutting owner, having no freehold interest in the street, is not entitled to compensation on account of its appropriation to public use, because of resulting inconvenience to the enjoyment of his property.
If this position be maintainable, that the fee of Front street remains in the city, as I conclude it does, I am unable to see any ground or principle upon which the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief he demands.
The judgment should be affirmed upon the opinion given by the court below.
Larremore, J., concurred in result.