Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard Lee HEINZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1993-01-26
Citations: 983 F.2d 609
Docket Number: No. 92-8165
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard Lee HEINZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 983
Pages: 609–620

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard Lee HEINZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 92-8165.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 26, 1993.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 10, 1993.
Richard L. Durbin, Jr., Mark R. Stel-mach, Ronald F. Ederer, U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Asst. U.S. Attys., for plaintiff-appellant.
Nate Rhodes, Corpus Christi, Tex., for R. Heinz.
Nancy M. Simonson, A.J. “Tony” Ca-nales, Corpus Christi, Tex., for M. Wilshu-sen.
Charles 0. Grigson (Court Appointed), Austin, Tex., for J. Carsrud.
Richard Shreves (Court Appointed), Austin, Tex., for B. Thomas.
Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District Judge.
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
The question presented by this appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that the government's prosecutorial and investigatory conduct toward defendant-appellees was so improper as to render taped telephone conversations between Heinz and the government's agent subject to suppression. The question must be analyzed by the light of the Sixth Amendment. Upon such analysis, we hold that the government's conduct did not violate Heinz's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
I
Ted Mitchell is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. The district court found that Mitchell had on occasions in the past given legal advice in certain civil matters to Charles Patillo and to defendants-appellees: Richard Lee Heinz, Michael Scott Wilshursen, and Jack Delano Carsrud. However, the communications between Ted Mitchell and the defendants that the defendants seek to suppress were communications allegedly in furtherance of criminal activity — namely, avoiding prosecution for bank fraud and money laundering.
On December 13,1989, a series of eviden-tiary search warrants were executed on premises controlled by various defendants. No charges were filed against any of the defendants. The defendants, however, received grand jury subpoenas requiring them to appear and testify in January before the grand jury in Austin, Texas.
One of these search warrants was executed in the Corpus Christi office of Heinz and Wilshursen. At that time, Heinz was read his "Miranda rights," and he invoked his right to counsel and right to remain silent — affirmatively refusing to speak with the investigating agents without the presence of his attorney.
Another of the search warrants was executed the next day directed to Ted Mitchell's briefcase, in which agents apparently found evidence of money laundering. That same day, Mitchell entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors, in which he agreed to cooperate in the investigation of the other defendants.
The government admits that the defendants were targets of a criminal investigation at the time, and even before the execution of the search warrants on December 13, 1989. On December 22, Corpus Christi IRS Agent Wentrcek was contacted by Attorney Rich Rogers, who informed the agent that he was representing Heinz regarding the matters before the grand jury. Wentrcek informed Rogers that he was a special agent in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service working under the direction of Assistant United States Attorney Blankinship.
On December 26, 1989, Mitchell called IRS Agent Abel Trevino in Austin, Texas, and told him defendants were planning to commit perjury before the Austin Grand Jury. (Trevino and Wentrcek operated as co-"Case agents" on the money laundering and fraud cases.) Mitchell told Trevino that the defendants knew they were under investigation by federal agents and "wanted to get their story straight."
Between December 27 and 28, 1989, Mitchell — while in the company of Agent Trevino — had three telephone conversations with Heinz. Trevino "consensually monitored" these conversations, in which Mitchell acquired testimonial evidence apparently incriminating to Heinz and Heinz's fellow defendants. Carsrud was with Heinz during at least one of the conversations, but did not talk to Mitchell. During another of the conversations, Heinz was apparently speaking from the office of Wil-shursen.
Trevino testified that he was personally unaware that Heinz was represented by counsel at the time he taped these conversations between Mitchell and Heinz. He admits that his co-"Case agent" Wentrcek knew as of December 22, 1989, that Heinz was represented by counsel in the grand jury matters, but stated that he himself "probably didn't know" this—that he did not know this "until just recently." But during the third tape-recorded conversation, Mitchell asked Heinz about what "Rogers" has told Heinz, an apparent reference to Rick Rogers, Heinz's attorney.
In January of 1990, the Austin Grand Jury was convened; defendants Carsrud and Byron Lewis Thomas testified before the Grand Jury about the case. On May 10, 1990, the defendants were indicted for money laundering and bank fraud, perjury and conspiracy to commit perjury.
On March 13, 1992, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendants' suppression motion. At this hearing, Trevino admitted that the documents he and his teammates discovered in Mitchell's briefcase on December 13, 1989, reflected Mitchell's previous representation of Heinz and Patillo.
On March 27, 1992, the district court granted defendants' motion to suppress from evidence the tape-recorded conversations between Mitchell and Heinz; the district court concluded that the government had violated Heinz's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The district court held that, even though Heinz had not been indicted, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached before the December 27 and 28 tape-recorded telephone calls—because the case had reached a "critical state." Examining the facts of the case, the district court concluded that at the time of the taping, the government and Heinz had become "adversaries." The district court relied on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 484, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). In Moulton, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to counsel is shaped by the need for counsel, and noted that the right attaches at "critical" stages in the criminal justice process before trial. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170, 106 S.Ct. at 484. Accordingly, the Court held that pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, "a person is entitled to the help of an attorney at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated." Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). In Es-cobedo, the accused had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police had not effectively warned him of his right to remain silent. The Supreme Court held that the police had violated Escobedo's right to counsel when the investigation was "no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but ha[d] begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect ha[d] been taken into police custody; [and] the police carried] out a process of interrogations lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements." Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-491, 84 S.Ct. at 1765.
II
We reverse the district court on its Sixth Amendment ruling. Current law teaches that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until or after the time formal adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-190, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297-2299, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.), and authorities cited therein; McNeil v. Wisconsin, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207-2211, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (Scalia, J.). See also United States v. Johnson, 954 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. McClure, 786 F.2d 1286, 1290-1291 (5th Cir.1986). This is so despite the fact that some earlier Supreme Court cases seem to imply that a more functional test for the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is appropriate. Compare e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 483-484, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until such time as the " 'government has committed itself to prosecute, and . the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified' ") (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when "the state [becomes] aligned against the accused."). Compare also United States Ex Rel. Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir.1986) ("The right to counsel attaches only when a defendant proves that, at the time of the procedure in question, the government had crossed the constitutionally-significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.") (Citing DeAngelo v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1519-1520 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953, 107 S.Ct. 444, 93 L.Ed.2d 392 (1986)).
Ill
Before concluding, we think we have a responsibility to address the arguments raised in the dissent. The dissent argues that we should suppress the conversations between Mitchell and Heinz because the prosecution team violated the canons of ethics. The dissent is ill-advised for several reasons. In the first place, Heinz did not make this argument below, the district court did not consider it, and Heinz has not seriously made this argument on appeal. In essence, the point has been raised sua sponte by the dissenting judge.
Furthermore, our research shows that no court has ever suppressed evidence in a criminal case because a prosecutor on the prosecutorial team — much less an investigator or an informant — violated DR 7-104(A)(1) in the course of an investigation and before the grand jury indicted the defendant. Indeed, the great weight of the authority is to the contrary: several courts have held that DR 7-104(A)(l) does not apply "during the investigative process before the initiation of criminal proceedings." United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.1981). In short, Judge Parker's conclusion that DR 7-104(A)(l) applies to the facts like those before us has been explicitly rejected by almost every court that has considered the issue.
Even assuming, however, that the ethical canons apply to the period during investigation and before indictment, they are not applicable in this case. The canons of ethics — unlike constitutional principles — apply to and control only the attorney's conduct and not the investigator's or informant's independent conduct. United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.1982); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645-646 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C.Cir.1973). Thus, DR 7-104(A)(l) would only apply to Agent Trevino if he was acting as Blankinship's alter ego, i.e., Blankinship was directing his actions. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.1962). Because Blankinship did not direct Trevino— indeed, he did not even know what Trevino was doing — the ethical canons did not restrict Trevino's investigation of Heinz.
Moreover, it is absolutely irrelevant that Mitchell is an attorney. Mitchell was not Heinz's lawyer. ' Heinz had not retained Mitchell in any capacity, and Mitchell certainly did not represent Heinz in this case. Indeed, Mitchell had only advised Heinz on one or two occasions about totally unrelated civil matters. As far as this ease is concerned, Mitchell was a co-defendant, pure and simple. The dissent refers to Mitchell as a "covert prosecutor" and an "alter ego" of the prosecutor. Nothing in the record supports this unwarranted characterization of Mitchell's role.
The dissent decries that Mitchell "traded on" Heinz's trust. Unfortunately — or indeed fortunately for the public in many cases — all co-defendants who turn state's evidence and cooperate with the government, "trade on," or have traded on, their fellow co-defendant's "trust." This method is the way a lot of criminals get convicted — legally and properly so. Nor is it exceptional that using Mitchell to garner information from Heinz was "inherently deceptive"; little information is acquired by "forthright" dealings of informers. Mitchell was simply a co-defendant-informant occupying the quite ordinary role of this breed of folks: providing incriminating evi dence against their co-defendant to save their own hides.
Even if we could join in with the dissent's conclusion that the canons of ethics applied in this case, we could find no basis to suppress the evidence. The purpose of suppressing evidence is, primarily, to deter police and other government misconduct. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In this case, there has been no wilful misconduct by law enforcement officials. Trevino did not know that Heinz was represented by counsel; even if he had known Heinz was represented, allowing Mitchell to telephone Heinz would not have violated any obligation the law imposes on Trevino because the Sixth Amendment does not apply. Furthermore, Assistant United States Attorney Blankinship did not know that Heinz had retained an attorney or that Mitchell was making the phone calls to Heinz. In other words, even if a violation of the canon of ethics occurred here pursuant to the "prosecutor team" theory of the dissent, the law enforcement officials did not engage in a wilful and knowing violation of the canon of ethics. Consequently, under the good faith exception, the facts in this case do not justify our suppression of the evidence.
Finally, we think the position the dissent advances is unwise because of its consequences. The dullest imagination can comprehend the devastating effect that such a rule would have on undercover operations. Any potential defendant with an attorney would be insulated from any undercover operation; any potential defendant without an attorney would hire an attorney (if he could afford to do so) in order to build a wall between himself and the government's investigators. It's effect would not be limited to undercover operations of course, but would impede, obstruct, and even eliminate many continuing investigations of organized crime, racketeering, and drug dealing. The impact of such a rule would severely alter investigative operations in all criminal cases, except those investigations focused on run-of-the-mill criminals who cannot afford lawyers to serve as a wall between them and law enforcement.
This point raises a second and anomalous consequence of adopting this rule: The beneficiaries of Judge Parker's proposed holding would be the big time criminals with lawyers at their elbows to protect their rights, while such protection as the rule may provide against an overreaching government would not trickle down to those who cannot afford lawyers.
For these reasons, we respectfully reject the dissent.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's suppression order is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
.For example, Mitchell was retained as a lawyer for Texas Southern Exploration Company, in which company Heinz is a partner and part owner. See Exhibit "A" to Heinz's Notice of Intent to Claim Attorney-Client Privilege and Prevent Use of Tapes 96, 97, and 98 by the Government. Moreover, Heinz consulted with Mitchell as a lawyer regarding a monetary transaction involving Charles Patillo's cashing of Heinz's checks in a fraudulent manner at the NCNB Bank in Austin, Texas. Exhibit "B" to Heinz's Notice of Intent to Claim Attorney-Client Privilege and Prevent Use of Tapes 96, 97, and 98 by the Government. Other defendants appear to have sought legal advice from Mitchell. See e.g., Transcript of March 13, 1992 Hearing on Motions, at 88-92 (testimony of Ted Mitchell regarding his law-oriented dealings with Carsrud).
. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Charles Patillo also pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government.
. The taped conversations between Heinz and Mitchell focus on facts underlying the government's money laundering and bank fraud allegations against defendants.
. This point too was made in the Appellees' Appellate Brief, at p. 16 ("In Hammad, the court declined to establish a bright line rule for determining whether suppression would be appropriate. Instead, Hammad utilized a case by case analysis.").