Case Name: Isaac Coombs & ux. versus Francis T. Purrington
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1856
Citations: 42 Me. 332
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isaac Coombs & ux. versus Francis T. Purrington.
Judges: Tenney, C. J./and Rice and May, J. J., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 332–338

Head Matter:
Isaac Coombs & ux. versus Francis T. Purrington.
The public, as foot passengers, have the right to use the carriage way as well as the sidewalk.
Walking in the carriage way is not of itself prima facie evidence of want of ordinary care ; nor from that fact alone will the law infer negligence.
When an injury is the result of negligence on botb sides, no action can be maintained.
Exceptions from Nisi Prius, Appleton, J., presiding.
This was an action of trespass, for alleged negligence of defendant’s minor son and servant, in driving against the female plaintiff, in Main street, Topsham.
The testimony was to the effect, that the accident happened while the female plaintiff was walking along in the carriage path, in the same direction in which the defendant’s horse and sleigh, driven by his minor son, were moving. It further appeared, that for some distance each side of the place where the accident happened, there was a plank sidewalk on one side of the street.
The evidence as to the precise manner in which the collision occurred was conflicting.
The defendant’s counsel requested the Court to instruct the jury, that if they found there was a safe and convenient sidewalk for foot passengers at the place where the accident happened, and the female plaintiff chose to walk in the carriage path, not for the purpose of merely crossing the street, but using the carriage path instead of the sidewalk, and the accident occurred in consequence, there would be such a want of care as would preclude the plaintiff from recovering.
This instruction was refused, and the jury were instructed that the plaintiff and defendant had an equal right to be in the street, and that they would determine whether there was a want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff; and if there was, that she would not be entitled to recover.
He further instructed, that the burthen of proof was on the plaintiffs to satisfy the jury that the accident happened by the negligence of the driver, without any want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff; that, if there was no negligence on the part of either party, and it was a pure accident, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover; or, if both parties were in fault, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
The plaintiffs’ counsel requested the Court to instruct the jury, that a person had a right to be in the street, whether there is a sidewalk or not, and that such fact is not evidence from which the jury can legally infer negligence; and the instruction was given.
To this instruction, and the refusal to give the instruction requested by the defendant, the verdict being against him, the defendant excepted.
W. G. Barrows, for defendant.
1. It is a want of ordinary care in a woman to use the carriage path, instead of the sidewalk, in a populous place, where carriages are frequently passing. Where suitable sidewalks are provided, indicating an appropriation by common consent of the community, of that portion of the way for the convenience of foot passengers, and to ensure their safety, it is their duty to yield the carriage-path to carriages, except when necessarily in it, as for the purpose of crossing and the like. They should present no unnecessary obstruction,to the free and convenient passage of vehicles; and ordinary care requires of them to avoid the danger of collision, by keeping off the carriage track, and upon that portion of the way especially assigned to them for their security when equally convenient. The ruling requested by the defendant would afford sufficient protection to all who were necessarily in the carriage path. Washburn v. Tracey, 2 Chip. 136; Starkie on Ev. part 4, title trespass, page 1458; Palmer v. Barker, 11 Maine, 339 ; Hall v. Bramley, 43 E. C. L. R., 1037; Rathhurn v. Payne, 19 Wend. 399; Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615; Cottrill v. Starkey, 34 E. C. L. R., 587; 55 O. & P. 379.
2. The instruction given, at the request of the plaintiffs’ counsel, withdrew from the consideration of the jury a circumstance which was properly in evidence before, them, and had a direct bearing upon the question, whether the female plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care at the time the accident occurred.
J. D. Simmons, for plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs contend that in this action the Court rightly refused to instruct the jury as requested by defendant’s counsel; for the law does not designate any particular portion of the road where the people may pass on foot and where not. Further, want of ordinary care is a question of fact for the jury, under the particular circumstances of the case. Cramp-ton S) al. v. Inhabitants of Solon, 11 Maine, 335.
The jury were instructed to determine whether there was want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiffs, and if there was, she could not recover. The jury found that she was in the use of ordinary care. As to what constitutes ordinary care, the law is silent; for no precise and distinct rule could be laid down so as to be applicable to all cases. Much must be left to the good sense, experience and discretion of the jury. 6 Cush. 530; 8 C. & P., 691; 5 C. & P., 407, 379.

Opinion:
Appleton, J.
The requested instructions amount to this; that being in the streets where there is a sidewalk, " would be such a want of care as would preclude the plaintiff from recovering." This request was properly refused. Whether there is negligence or not, must, in each case, be determined by the peculiar and attendant circumstances. Whether there was any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, was a fact for the consideration of the jury, and was submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Bigelow v. Rutland, 4 Cush. 247; Garmon v. Bangor, 38 Maine, 443.
The Court further instructed the jury, "that a person had a right to be in the street, whether there is a sidewalk or not, and that such fact is not evidence from which the jury can legally infer negligence." This instruction was given at the instance of the counsel for the plaintiff, and rests upon the isolated fact, of being in the street where there is likewise a sidewalk. But from that fact alone negligence could not be legally inferred. If such were the legal inference, then being in the streets must be regarded as a fact per se proving negligence. Now the public street is a place in which all have a right to be, for streets are for the purposes of public travel. It was held in Boss v. Litton, 5 C. & P., 379, that a foot passenger, though he may be infirm from disease, has a right to walk in the carriage-way, and is entitled to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of persons driving carriages along it. "A man," says Denman, C. J., "in that case, has a right to walk in the road, if he pleases. But he had better not, especially at night, when carriages are passing." The general right of foot passengers, in reference to carriages, to use the carriage-way, was fully recognized in Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 530. It would be a novel doctrine to hold that foot passengers have no right to walk in the street, or, that walking therein, was prima facie evidence of want of ordinary care, or that from that fact alone negligence might be inferred.
The jury were instructed, "that the plaintiff and the defendant had an equal right to bo in the street, and they would determine whether there was want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff; and if there was, she would not be cn titled to recover." The question of ordinary care was thus submitted to the jury, and it was for them to determine, from all the circumstances in the case, whether or not the female plaintiff was chargable with negligence in having left the sidewalk as she did; if not so chargable, whether the injury arose from the negligence of the defendant. The verdict has determined those facts, and they are not examinable here.
It is well settled, that when the injury is in consequence of negligence on both sides, that no action can be maintained. Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whar. 320; Williams v. Holland, 6 C. & P., 23; Parker v. Adams, 12 Met. 415.
Exceptions overruled. — Judgment on the verdict.
Tenney, C. J./and Rice and May, J. J., concurred.