Case Name: BULMAN v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHATTOOGA COUNTY
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1983-02-03
Citations: 165 Ga. App. 843
Docket Number: 65381
Parties: BULMAN v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHATTOOGA COUNTY.
Judges: Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 843–847

Head Matter:
65381.
BULMAN v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHATTOOGA COUNTY.

Opinion:
Quillian, Presiding Judge.
The defendant appeals from the grant of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. On September 7, 1978 the defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note secured by a deed to secure debt, which note provided for payment in the principal amount of $63,132.00, together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from date until paid in full, together with all costs of collection including 15% as attorney's fees if collected by law or through an attorney at law. The defendant failed to make any payments on the note and on January 7,1980 the plaintiff notified the defendant by letter that defendant was in default and the plaintiff intended to enforce the provisions of the note with respect to attorney's fees as provided in Code Ann. § 20-506 (OCGA § 13-1-11) and further to foreclose the deed to secure debt and obtain a confirmation of the foreclosure in order to pursue the deficiency judgment if necessary. The foreclosure sale was had but confirmation of the sale was denied and the property ordered to be resold. Thereafter, on June 3,1980 the plaintiff again notified the defendant that because of defendant's default the plaintiff demanded the principal plus the interest on the note and the defendant was further notified that unless the principal sum due as well as the interest was paid not later than ten days from receipt of this letter that the plaintiff intended to foreclose on the property and if necessary seek confirmation of the sale and to recover attorney's fees and court costs in addition to the principal and interest. The defendant failed to make payment on the note within the time prescribed and on July 1,1980 foreclosure sale was had on the property. This sale was subsequently confirmed by the trial court. The property brought $58,200.00 on the sale and the total indebtedness including principal, interest, attorney's fees and costs of foreclosure as $84,565.28. Thus, the present suit was brought by the plaintiff to recover the deficiency.
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment and after a hearing at which pleadings and affidavits were considered by the trial judge the following judgment in favor of the plaintiff was entered. The sums involved were as follows: The principal due on the note was $63,132.00, the interest which had accrued up to that time was in the amount of $8,433.52, giving a balance owed on the note of $71,565.52. Fifteen percent of the amount owed as attorney's fees equaled $10,734.82. This gave a total of $82,300.34. The trial judge in his order deducted the amount of the sale, to wit, $58,200.00 from that sum to reach a principal amount of $24,100.34. He then computed interest on the principal amount at the rate of 9% per annum from July 1, 1980 (the date of the sale) through June 21, 1982 (the date the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was entered). This resulted in a sum of $4,282.74 which when added to the principal equaled $28,383.08. From this sum the trial judge deducted a setoff, which the plaintiff conceded, in the sum of $1,750.00 and added to this sum interest at the rate of 7 % per annum from March 3,1980 (the date of the first foreclosure sale which was not confirmed) through June 21,1982 and arrived at a total of $2,035.94 which was subtracted from the $28,383.08 to reach a total amount owed by the defendant to the plaintiff in the sum of $26,347.14.
The defendant appeals from that judgment and enumerates as error the trial judge's imposition of interest on the 15 % attorney's fees which were included in the principal balance owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant contends that interest could not be charged on attorney's fees and that such sum should be deducted from the judgment and the recomputed amount would be the proper amount owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Held:
One of the early Supreme Court decisions dealing with the imposition of attorney's fees for failure to timely pay a note stated that such attorney's fees became a part of the principal and that interest could be charged upon attorney's fees. Baxter v. Bates, 69 Ga. 587. That case was decided in 1882 and since that time the law regarding the inclusion of a provision imposing attorney's fees in a note has undergone considerable metamorphosis. For a thorough discussion of the history of the notice provision see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Brooks, 242 Ga. 109 (249 SE2d 596). See also DeLamater v. Martin, 117 Ga. 139 (43 SE 459). Our present law regarding attorney's fees was enacted in 1953 and reads as follows: "Obligations to pay attorney's fees upon any note or other evidence of indebtedness, in addition to the rate of interest specified therein, shall be valid and enforceable, and collectible as a part of such debt, if such note or other evidence of indebtedness be collected by or through an attorney after maturity, subject to the following provisions: (a) If such note or other evidence of indebtedness provides for attorney's fees in some specific per cent, of the principal and interest owing thereon, such provision and obligation shall be valid and enforceable up to but not in excess of 15 per cent, of the principal and interest owing on said note or other evidence of indebtedness." Code Ann. § 20-506 (OCGA § 13-1-11). In Woods v. State, 109 Ga. App. 225, 227-28 (136 SE2d 18) this court considered Code Ann. § 20-506 and determined that the obligation regarding attorney's fees was perfected at the expiration of ten days from service of the notice under Code Ann. § 20-506.
Decided February 3, 1983 —
Rehearing denied March 18, 1983.
William J. Westbrook, for appellant.
William U. Hyden, Jr., for appellee.
Code Ann. § 57-110 (OCGA § 7-4-15) provides: "All liquidated demands, whereby agreement or otherwise the sum to be paid is fixed or certain, bear interest from the time the party shall become liable and bound to pay them...." Certainly, at the time of the sale of the property the obligation to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff had become fixed and certain. Therefore, from that time forward interest on such sum began to run. However, there was no provision in the contract nor in our law that the interest rate would be 9% per year. Instead, since there was no provision as to the percentum per annum, the interest on the liquidated sum would be the legal rate as provided in Code Ann. § 57-101 (now OCGA § 7-4-2), which as of 1980 would have been 7% per annum.
Hence, it was the error of the trial court to impose the interest rate of 9 % per annum on the unpaid attorney's fees. Instead the trial court should have separated the unpaid attorney's fees from the other amount and computed interest on the unpaid attorney's fees at the rate of 7% per annum from July 1, 1980 to June 21, 1982.
The case must therefore be reversed with the direction that the trial court vacate the judgment and recompute the interest on attorney's fees in conformity with the dictates of this opinion.
Judgment reversed with direction.
Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur.