Case Name: RUBY DODSON v. CITY OF BEND
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1926-01-26
Citations: 117 Or. 231
Docket Number: 
Parties: RUBY DODSON v. CITY OF BEND.
Judges: Burnett, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 231–238

Head Matter:
Motion to dismiss overruled September 15, 1925, submitted on briefs January 12,
affirmed January 26,
costs retaxed February 9, 1926.
RUBY DODSON v. CITY OF BEND.
(242 Pac. 821; 243 Pac. 76.)
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Mr. G. 8. Benson.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Mr. E. 0. Stadter.

Opinion:
COSHOW, J.
Dillon (5 ed.) on Municipal Corporations, Sections 3011-3013, states the law of a municipality's liability for a defective highway thus:
"Where the duty to keep its streets in safe condition rests upon the corporation, it is liable for injuries caused by its neglect or omission to keep the streets in repair, as well as for those caused by defects occasioned by the wrongful acts of others, but, as the basis of the action is negligence, notice to the corporation of the defect which caused the injury, or of facts from which notice thereof may reasonably be inferred, or proof of circumstances from which it appears that the defect ought to have been known and remedied by it, is essential to liability." Mack v. The City of Salem, 6 Or. 275, 278; Heilner & Co. v. Union County, 7 Or. 83, 85 (33 Am. Rep. 703); Rice v. Wallowa County, 46 Or. 574, 576 (81 Pac. 358).
But notice to the City is not necessary wJtiere the defect was directly caused by the municipality, or its officers, whose duty it was to keep the sidewalk in repair: 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (4 ed.), §3016, note 2, under §1718; 6 McQuillin, 5720, § 2808; 13 Ruling Case Law, 319, § 264.
The complaint was not tested by demurrer. It will be construed, therefore, favorably for the plaintiff. The complaint will not only be construed liberally but also every reasonable inference drawn from the allegations will be indulged in order to sustain the complaint when it was called in question for the first time upon a motion for a directed verdict in the trial court. A motion for a directed verdict calls in question the evidence and not the pleading: Carty v. McMenamin & Ward, 90 Or. 490 (216 Pac. 228); Ridley v. Portland Taxicab Co., 90 Or. 529, 533, 534 (177 Pac. 429).
It is very doubtful that the complaint is fatally defective after verdict. It is rather in our opinion a defective statement of a good cause of action: Heilner v. Union County, 7 Or. 83, 86. The use of the word "left" would indicate that the city through its officers had been at work upon the sidewalk and left it in an unsafe condition. If the complaint had been tested by demurrer, it might properly have been held insufficient. The plaintiff then could have amended her complaint and framed it so as to overcome this defect.
However that may be, an examination of the record discloses that the defendant did not object to the testimony offered for the purpose of showing the circumstances that either brought knowledge to the defendant or ought to have done so. The testimony of a witness was adduced showing that the hole in the sidewalk had existed in the place where plaintiff had received her injury for a month before the accident. It was in the discretion of the court to allow the plaintiff to reopen her case for the purpose of introducing additional testimony. It was likewise within the discretion of the court to permit the plaintiff to amend her complaint: Or. L., § 102; Ridley v. Portland Taxicab Co., above; Bishop v. Baisley, 28 Or. 128 (41 Pac. 937); Cook v. Croisan, 25 Or. 477 (36 Pac. 532); York v. Nash, 42 Or. 321, 326 (71 Pac. 59); Farmers' Bank v. Saling, 33 Or. 394, 404, 405 (54 Pac. 190); Koshland v. Fire Association, 31 Or. 362, 365 (49 Pac. 865).
The defendant does not claim to have been surjjrised and the court granted the defendant every opportunity to combat the evidence adduced and complained of here: Caples v. Morgan, 81 Or. 692 (160 Pac. 1154, L. R. A. 1917B, 760); Ridings v. Marion County, 50 Or. 30, 32 (91 Pac. 22); Wild v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 21 Or. 168 (27 Pac. 954).
For the objections, Mr. C. 8. Benson.
Contra, Mr. E. 0. Stadter.
The amendment was in furtherance of justice and was properly allowed. The right of amendment should he liberally applied: Hillsboro Nat. Bank v. Garbarino, 82 Or. 405 (161 Pac. 703); Pacific Co. v. Cronan, 82 Or. 388 (161 Pac. 692); Or. L., § 107. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Burnett, J., concurs in the result.
Cosfs retaxed February 9, 1926.
On Objections to Cost Bill.
(243 Pac. 76.)
COSHOW, J.
This cause has come on to be heard on objections to the cost bill filed by the respondent. The only item objected to in the cost bill is, "printing brief 12 pages $29.00." Appellant admits that respondent is entitled to $15 but objects to any greater sum. Buie 29 limits the amount of recovery to the maximum sum of $1.25 per page, unless for special reasons apparent in the record it shall be otherwise ordered. No reason appears in the record for allowing a greater sum than $1.25 per page. The fact that respondent was charged more by the printer is not sufficient reason. The costs are re- taxed allowing the respondent the smn of $15 for printing his brief and the total sum of $40 as costs in this court.