Case Name: BURTON v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.; HEEREN v. SAME
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-12-15
Citations: 132 N.Y.S. 628
Docket Number: 
Parties: BURTON v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO. HEEREN v. SAME.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 132
Pages: 628–639

Head Matter:
BURTON v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO. HEEREN v. SAME.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
December 15, 1911.)
1. Extradition (§ 37 ) — Constitutional Daw (§ 207*) — Foreign Citizen-Power to Abbesiy-PRivileges and Immunities of Citizens.
Since, by the direct provisions of Code Or. Proc. § 167, to “arrest” is to take a person into custody that he may be held to answer for a crime, the arrest in this state of a citizen of another state believed to be guilty of the commission of a crime in such other state is governed by the same rules applicable to the arrest of citizens of New York, in view of the provision of Const. U. S. art. 4, § 2, subd. 1, that the" citizens of each state shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immuni ties of the citizens of the several states, and it is not essential that all of the steps for his rendition have been taken at the time of the arrest.’
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Extradition, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. § 37 ; Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 625-648; Dec. Dig. § 207. ]
2. Arrest (§ G8 ) — Arrest Without Warrant — Felony Charge.
Code Cr. Proc. § 170, provides that an arrest may be made for a felony o"n any day or at any time of the day or night. Section 177 permits a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant for a crime committed in his presence, or in case of felony, when not committed in his presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed the felony which was in fact committed. Section 17-9 provides that a peace officer may at night without warrant arrest one whom he has reasonable cause to believe committed a felony, though it appear that the person arrested did not commit it, and section 178 provides that to make an arrest, as provided in section 177, the officer may break open an outer or inner door of a building, if refused admittance. Held, that peace officers who were informed by telegraph from the police department of another city that a person answering the ’ description of one suspected of the crime of murder was upon a railroad train could, under the statutes, as well as at common law, enter the train at night, and force their way into the berth of such person, and arrest and remove her.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Arrest, Dec. Dig. § 68. ]
8. Carriers (§ 284 ) — Passengers — Protection from Arrest.
A railroad company would not be liable for damages for the arrest of a passenger, a resident in another state, and her removal from the train by peace officers under the belief that she was a criminal wanted for murders committed in another state, if the officers were, under the circumstances, authorized to make the arrest, as it would have been illegal for the company’s employes to have refused to permit the arrest.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Carriers, Dec. Dig. § 284. ]
4. Evidence (§ 80 ) — Presumptions — Common Law.
It is presumed that the common law exists in each of the states.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 101; Dec. Dig. § 80; Common Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 14-16.]
5. Criminal Law (§ 27 ) — “Felony.”
At common law, a felony was an offense, a conviction for which caused forfeiture of lands or goods, or both, and was also subject to punishment by death, or otherwise.
[Ed. Note. — For. other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 29-31;. Dec. Dig. § 27.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2736-2744;; vol. 8, p. 7662.]
6. Homicide (§ 7 ) — Murder.
Both at common law and under Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) § 2, a murder is a felony.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. § 7. ]
Thomas, J., dissenting.
Actions by Lucinda Burton and by Cora B. Heeren against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. Upon exceptions to be heard in the first instance upon denial of plaintiffs’ motions to go to the jury upon the issues, and upon denial of their motions for a new trial. Judgment directed for defendant.
Argued before JENKS, P. J„ and THOMAS, CARR, WOODWARD, and RICH, JJ.
William F. Connell, for plaintiffs.
Robert A. Kutschbach, for defendant.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & RepY indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
The facts in the above cases are practically identical, and they were tried together. There is no dispute about the material facts. The plaintiffs, mother and daughter, residents of Franklin, Pa., purchased tickets from the defendant at that point, entitling them to passage from Franklin to New York City, by way of Ashtabula, on the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern and the New York Central" & Hudson River Railroads, on the 8th day of May, 1908. While passengers upon the defendant's train, and at or near Erie, Pa., the plaintiffs purchased sleeping car berth No. 1, and, when the train reached Erie at about 10 o'clock, they retired to their compartment, disrobed, and went to sleep. The train reached Syracuse at midnight, and during the 10 minutes that the train remained at the station two police officers entered the car, demanding of the conductor that they be directed to berth No. 1 for the purpose of interviewing the two women who were occupying the berth, alleging that one of them was believed to be Mrs. Guinness of Eaporte, Ind., who was at that time alleged to have been implicated in a series of atrocious murders. The defendant's conductor asked for the authority of these officers, and was told that they were police officers, they at the same time displaying their badges, and upon this assurance the officers were conducted to the compartment where the plaintiffs were sleeping. The officers opened the curtains, and had some conversation with the plaintiffs, the latter demanding to know why they were thus disturbed, and the officers told them that they were wanted and commanding them to get up and leave the train, threatening to take them out without an opportunity for dressing. The plaintiffs got up, and, after putting on a portion of their clothes, were permitted by the defendant's conductor to go into the stateroom, where they finished dressing in the presence of one of the officers, the train in the meantime having left the Syracuse station on time. The officers paid their fare to Utica, and defendant's conductor gave the plaintiffs a receipt entitling them to recover the amount of the unused portion of their tickets, and advised the plaintiffs to leave the train with the officers without trouble, and this they did at Utica, from whence they returned to Syracuse upon a later train, the officers paying'the return fares. At Syracuse the plaintiffs were taken to police headquarters, where they were given over to the matron, and by her stripped and searched, and finally at about 4 o'clock of the following day they were permitted to resume their journey to New York; it being ascertained that they were not the persons whom the" officers were looking for.
This action is brought, not against the officers, but .against the defendant railroad company, upon the theory that it was the duty of the defendant to perform its contract of carriage, and to protect the .plaintiffs against the indignities and the humiliations to which they were subjected by the officers. The case is peculiarly aggravating. From the evidence it appears that these women, having no connection with the Indiana or any other crime, were treated with great brutality by the officers, who apparently felt that they had a license to forget all that belongs to their office as peace conservers, and to bully these two defenseless women, whom they had been told by telegraph from Rochester were identified with the Indiana crimes, and it would be worth while to deal with them as the facts seem to warrant, but that case is not here for determination. The question here is as to the duty of the defendant in the premises.
The plaintiffs urge that the right to arrest in this state the citizens of another state for a crime committed against the laws of that other state is wholly regulated by the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress of 1793, and that this state has no authority to cause the arrest of such citizen without first complying with the' requirements of the United States Constitution, for this state does not possess by comity, or otherwise, the right to detain or arrest the citizen of another state. The plaintiff cites many authorities for this proposition, but none of them, we apprehend, goes to the extent of holding that a citizen of a sister state may not be arrested in this state for a crime committed in such sister state until all of the steps have been taken which would justify the rendition of such person. As well say that a man might not be arrested in this state for murder until he has been formally charged with crime by a grand jury. The definition of "arrest," as given by the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 167), "is the taking of a person into custody that he may be held to answer for a crime," and as it is made the duty, of the executive authority of the state, under given conditions, to surrender persons charged with crime in sister states, we apprehend that the arrest of persons believed to have been guilty of crimes in other states, that they "may be held to answer for a crime," is governed by the same rules which apply to citizens of this state within our own jurisdiction. This is in harmony with that provision of the Constitution of the United States (article 4, § 2, subd. 1) which provides, that the "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," as construed by the court in Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 222, 9 Sup. Ct. 277, 279 (32 R. Ed. 695), where the court say that:
"The clause o£ the Constitution declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states does not give nonresident citizens of Iowa any greater privileges and immunities in that state than her own citizens there enjoy."
If we are right in this proposition, we are to view the acts of the defendant in the present cases in exactly the same light that we would view the question if the plaintiffs had been citizens of the state of New York and residing here. That is all that can be fairly asked, that citizens of other states, within our jurisdiction, be treated in the same manner that we treat our own citizens. Section 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if "the crime charged be a felony, the arrest may be made on any day, and -at any time of the day or during any night," and in the case now under consideration the crime was murder, so that the particular time of the arrest is of no consequence. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a&emdash;
"peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, (1) for a crime, committed or attempted in his presence; (2) when the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence; (3) when a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it."
Section 179 further provides that a peace officer&emdash;
"may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person whom he has reasonable cause for believing to have committed a felony, and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appear that a felony had been committed, but that the person arrested did not commit it."
Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure likewise provides that:
"To make an arrest, as provided in the last section, the officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance."
It thus appears that, in so far at least as citizens of this state are concerned in the commission of a crime within this jurisdiction, the peace officers of the city of Syracuse would have been justified in making the arrest which was made upon the information by telegraph from the police department of the city of Rochester that a felony had been committed, and that a person answering the description of the person suspected of the crime was upon the defendant's train in a particular berth, and this was the rule of the common law. Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463, 466, and authorities there cited; Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 504, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. Ed. 458, and authorities there cited.
Being authorized to make the arrest, the peace officers would have been justified in using any force necessary to this end, and the agents and servants of the defendant would have been acting contrary to. law if they had refused to permit the arrest to be made. The peace officers, acting within their authority, superseded the authority ,of the conductor and servants of the defendant in charge of the train, the plaintiffs, by operation of law, were transferred to the custody of the policemen, and the train officials ceased to have any control over them, and the defendant could not, therefore, be held liable for any of the indignities suffered by the plaintiffs. This was practically decided in the case of Newman v. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co., 54 Hun, 335, 7 N. Y. Supp. 560, where a railroad detective arrested a suspicious character who had purchased a ticket, and was waiting for the'departure of a train. The prisoner was taken before a police magistrate and' held, and the court held that the arrest might be justified under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and that the detention by the police magistraté could not involve the defendant in damages, even though the peace officer making the arrest was in its employ, so long as it was not shown that the prisoner was detained at the instance of the officer.
The presumption prevails that the common law exists in each one of the states (Newman v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R R. Co, supra), and at common law a felony has a well-known and definitive meaning. It is an offense which occasions a total forfeiture of lands or goods or both, to which capital or other punishment might be super-added (Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252, 257), and it cannot be doubted that murder is a felony both under our own statutes and at common law. See People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 210, 216, 1 N. E. 673; section 2, Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40). Our statute does not require that the felony shall have been committed within this state, nor does the common law. The authority to arrest without a warrant is general in a peace officer "when a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it" (section 177, Code of Criminal Procedure), and people coming within this state have no right to complain if they are treated in the same manner that our own people are treated under the law.
In the case now before us the defendant railroad company took on passengers and undertook to carry them, subject to the laws of this state, to their destination. At Syracuse peace officers, acting under the law, came on board and interrupted the defendant in the performance of its contract, and it cannot, we believe, be held answerable to the plaintiffs in this action. It is not material even that there may have been no felony. The peace officers had apparent authority to make the arrest. It was a matter of common notoriety that a series of murders had been committed in the state of Indiana, and the perpetrator of these crimes was believed to be Mrs. Guinness. These peace officers told the defendant's conductor that they were after Mrs. Guinness, who was believed to be on car 1 and in berth 1, according to information received from the police department of Rochester, and the conduct of the conductor and other members of the train crew was in accordance with law, and involved no liability to the plaintiffs. This view is supported by Owens v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R. Co. 126 N. C. 139, 35 S. E. 259, 78 Am. St. Rep. 642, Brunswick & Western R. R. Co. v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 63, 43 S. E. 430, 60 L. R. A. 713, 97 Am. St. Rep. 152, Texas Midland R. R. v. D. Dean, 98 Tex. 517, 85 S. W. 1135, Bowden v, Atlantic Coast Line, 144 N. C. 28, 56 S. E. 558, and by reason and sound public policy.
Judgment for the defendant should be entered.
Exceptions overruled, and judgment directed for defendant, with costs.
JENKS, P. J, and RICH, J, concur. CARR, J, concurs in result in separate memorandum. THOMAS, J, reads for plaintiff.