Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEPHAN HEDDINS, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1977-04-05
Citations: 66 Ill. 2d 404
Docket Number: No. 48220
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEPHAN HEDDINS, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 66
Pages: 404–411

Head Matter:
(No. 48220
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEPHAN HEDDINS, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 5, 1977.
Rehearing denied May 26, 1977.
DOOLEY, J., specially concurring.
Martin Rudman, State’s Attorney, of Joliet, for the People.
Cirricione, Block & Krockey, of Joliet (V. James Cerri, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH
delivered the opinion of the court:
In a complaint filed in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Stephan Heddins, was charged with armed robbery. As the result of plea bargaining, it was agreed that he would waive indictment, preliminary hearing and presentence report and plead guilty to robbery. The People agreed to dismiss the armed robbery charge and recommend a sentence of 2 to 10 years.
Upon being advised of the plea bargain, the circuit court stated that without receiving a presentence report, it would not be bound by the terms of the agreement. The People, taking the position that the offer "was conditioned on the court concurring in all of the terms of said agreement," terminated negotiations. Defendant was indicted for armed robbery and thereafter moved to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court then held that, by earlier insisting that the plea agreement be accepted without the presentence report, the People were attempting to encroach upon the court's sentencing powers, and dismissed the indictment. The order of dismissal provided:
"The defendant's motion to dismiss the Indictment is granted and the Indictment is dismissed. The defendant is ordered to be held to his original obligation and bond in this cause pending further proceedings in this cause and until such time as either an appeal is taken or other proceedings. Defendant's bond is to stand as previously set in the sum of $15,000.00 with the 10% deposit having been made. People have 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal."
The People appealed and the cause is here on direct appeal. Rule 302(b).
The parties have briefed and argued several issues, none of which need be reached. Supreme Court Rule 604 provides:
"(a)
(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any grounds enumerated in section 114 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963;'arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.
(3) Release of Defendant Pending Appeal. A defendant shall not be held in jail or to bail during the pendency of an appeal by the State, or of a petition or appeal by the State under Rule 315(a), unless there are compelling reasons for his continued detention or being held to bail." 58 Ill. 2d R. 604.
It is obvious that the order from which the People seek to appeal does not fall within the ambit of Rule 604(a). It is equally obvious that the order which held defendant to bail and comtemplated "further proceedings in this cause" did not effect the dismissal of the charge. The order clearly lacks finality, we perceive no basis on which to hold it appealable-, and the appeal is therefore dismissed. An order, however, need not be final and appealable in order that this court exercise its supervisory authority. People v. Breen, 62 Ill. 2d 323.
The order entered was clearly erroneous. Rule 402(d) governs the taking of negotiated pleas of guilty and does not authorize the action taken here. Furthermore, unlike the order in People v. Scholin, 62 Ill. 2d 372, which would have effected the dismissal of the charge and become final upon the expiration of 5 days, the effect of the order entered here was to place the cause in a state of suspense not provided for in either the Code of Criminal Procedure or the rules of this court. It should be noted that although in Scholin we affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of the People's appeal, our failure to enter a supervisory order is not to be interpreted as approval of the order entered by the circuit court in that case. In the exercise of our supervisory authority the circuit court of Will County is directed to vacate its order and reinstate the cause for further proceedings.
Appeal dismissed; supervisory order entered.