Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL RAMSEY, Appellant
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2000-08-10
Citations: 192 Ill. 2d 154
Docket Number: No. 83987
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL RAMSEY, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 192
Pages: 154–188

Head Matter:
(No. 83987.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL RAMSEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
BILANDIC, J., specially concurring.
FREEMAN, J., joined by McMORROW, J., also specially concurring.
Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Lawrence Bapst, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield and Karen Andrews, State’s Attorney, of Carthage (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Jay Paul Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Hancock County, defendant, Daniel Ramsey, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count each of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion and residential burglary. In finding defendant guilty of these offenses, the jury rejected defendant's claim that he was insane under section 6 — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended by section 15 of Public Act 89 — 404 (720 ILCS 5/6 — 2 (West 1996)). The jury also determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty based on the cold, calculated and premeditated manner of the crimes. 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(b)(ll) (West 1996).
After a sentencing hearing, the jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. The trial court then sentenced defendant to death. In addition, the court sentenced defendant to terms of imprisonment on his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and residential burglary. Defendant's death sentence has now been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we reverse defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.
At issue in this appeal is the law governing defen dant's insanity defense. The trial proceedings utilized the version of the insanity defense statute as amended by section 15 of Public Act 89 — 404 because that was the version of the law in effect when the crimes were allegedly committed. The amended version of the law was significant because it altered the definition of insanity. Under the amendment, a defendant could no longer raise an insanity defense based on his inability "to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." In addition, the amendment increased a defendant's burden of proof for an insanity defense from "a preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence." See Pub. Act 89 — 404, § 15 (eff. August 20, 1995), codified at 720 ILCS 5/6 — 2(a), (e) (West 1996).
When defendant's insanity defense failed, he argued in his post-trial motion that the amended version of the insanity defense statute was unconstitutional and should not have been followed because Public Act 89 — 404 violated the single subject rule in article ry section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy § 8(d)). Defendant asserted that because of Public Act 89 — 404's constitutional infirmities, he should have been tried under the former version of the law with its broader definition of insanity and its less stringent burden of proof.
Although the trial court rejected defendant's constitutional challenge, its ruling came before our opinion in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), which was filed while this appeal was pending. In Reedy our court held that Public Act 89 — 404 does violate the single subject rule and is unconstitutional in its entirety. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12. As a result, the law is void ab initio-, " '[i]t is * as though no such law had ever been passed.' " People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990), quoting People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394 (1932). Section 6 — 2 of the Criminal Code therefore remained as it was before the adoption of Public Act 89 — 404's amendments (Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 390), and those amendments should not have been applied at defendant's trial. The judgment of the circuit court must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with the version of the law in effect prior to Public Act 89 — 404.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the General Assembly has now enacted new legislation containing the same revisions to the insanity defense statute originally included in Public Act 89 — 404. The new legislation, set forth in Public Act 90 — 593, section 15, is not claimed to suffer from the same single subject rule problems that rendered Public Act 89 — 404 invalid, and we must presume ij; to be constitutional (see People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 257 (1994)). The new law, however, cannot be applied on retrial.
Application of criminal or penal measures to events occurring before their enactment is restricted by article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall * pass any * ex post facto Law" (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10) and by article I, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16), which contains similar language. Our court has held that a "law is ex post facto if it makes criminal an act that was innocent when done, if it increases the punishment for a previously committed offense, or if it alters the legal rules of evidence to make conviction easier." People v. Shumpert, 126 Ill. 2d 344, 351 (1989); accord People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 107 (1990); see Brewer v. Peters, 262 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613 (1994). A law which abolishes an affirmative defense of justification or excuse constitutes an ex post facto law because "it expands the scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is done." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 49, Ill L. Ed. 2d 30, 43, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723 (1990); see also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169, 70 L. Ed. 216, 217, 46 S. Ct. 68, 68 (1925) (a law is ex post facto if it "deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed").
Under these standards, application of Public Act 90— 593 to defendant's case would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for two reasons. First, it would deprive defendant of an affirmative defense he possessed under the former version of the statute, namely, that he is not guilty because he lacked the capacity " 'to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.' " See United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052, 1054 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding ex post facto clause precludes retroactive application of amendment to federal insanity defense statute eliminating identical prong of insanity, defense), quoting United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kowal, 596 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Conn. 1984) (same); United States v. Lakey, 610 F. Supp. 210, 212-13 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (same). Second, by increasing the burden of proof a defendant must meet in order to establish that he was insane at the time of the offense, the amendment makes it easier for the State to secure a conviction. See, e.g., People v. Eckhardt, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1080 (1987) (holding that shift in burden of proof relating to insanity defense would be improper ex post facto application of statute if applied to a trial for an offense committed prior to the amendment to the law); People v. Ahmad, 206 Ill. App. 3d 927, 937 (1990) (same).
In a supplemental brief ordered by our court, the State agrees with this conclusion and concedes that an application of Public Act 90 — 593's provisions at defendant's retrial would violate ex post facto principles.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions and sentences are reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial. On retrial, defendant shall be allowed to assert an insanity defense in accordance with section 6 — 2 of the Criminal Code as it existed prior to the amendments contained in Public Acts 89 — 404 and 90— 593. Specifically, defendant shall be allowed to present an insanity defense based on his inability to conform his conduct to the law. In addition, he shall only be required to prove his insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Public Act 89 — 404 did not change the other prong of the definition of insanity, which permits a defendant to argue that he is not guilty because he "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct." 720 ILCS 5/6 — 2(a) (West 1996).