Case Name: WARREN H. MACE v. EDWARD MERRILL
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1880
Citations: 56 Cal. 554
Docket Number: No. 6,442
Parties: WARREN H. MACE v. EDWARD MERRILL.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 554–558

Head Matter:
[No. 6,442.
In Bank.]
WARREN H. MACE v. EDWARD MERRILL.
State Lands—Jurisdiction of Land Officers—Estoppel.—In a contest before the land, department of the United States, involving the land in controversy—the plaintiff claiming as a pre-emptor, and the defendant claiming the right to purchase under the Act of Congress of July 23rd, 1866, “to quiet land titles in California,” by virtue of the location of a school-land warrant on the land prior to survey—the decision was adverse to the plaintiff, and the land was listed to the State. Pending the decision of the contest before the Secretary of the Interior, and before the listing, the plaintiff made application to purchase the land from the State, and the contest arising was referred by the Surveyor-General to the District Court. In an action to determine the same, held (affirming Wilkinson v. Merrill, 62 Cal. 424), that the decision of the land department of the United States, to which “ all the questions of law and fact pertaining to the proceeding were especially " confided,” is conclusive against the United States and against the plaintiff, in subsequently attempting to acquire the title from the State.
Appeal from a judgment for the defendant, and from an order denying a new trial, in the Seventeenth District Court, Los Angeles County. Sepulveda, J.
Brunson & Wells, and S. Haley, Attorneys, and W. Mace, in per, for Appellant.
After a party is deprived of his right of pre-emption, otherwise perfect, by a mistaken construction of the Act of Congress by the land department, equity will relieve. (Sampson v. Smiley, 13 Wall. 91; Johnson v. Tousley, id. 86.)
Henry Hancock, for Respondent.
The land, having been listed-to the State in satisfaction of Merrill’s school-land-warrant location, under the provisions of the Act of July 23rd, 1866, is now held by the State in trust for Merrill. (14 U. S. Stats, at Large, 218.)

Opinion:
Sharpstein, J.:
On the 22nd day of June, 1857, J. C. Merrill, attorney in fact of Edward Merrill, located a "school-land warrant on the south-east quarter of section 21, township 2 south, range 13 west, S. B. M., which was then unsurveyed land of the United States. On the 30th of April, 1858, Merrill applied to the Surveyor-General to relocate the warrant upon the same land, and on the llth of August, 1868, the location was made by the State locating agent. On the 27th of July, 1872, Merrill filed in the United States land office an application to purchase said land under the provisions of § 1 and 3 of an Act of Congress " quieting land titles in California," approved July 23rd, 1866. Merrill's right to purchase was contested by Mace, the appellant herein, and denied by the local land officers. An appeal was taken to thé commissioner of the general land office, and from thence to the Secretary of the Interior. Both the commissioner and Secretary were of the opinion that the location by Merrill was valid; and in pursuance thereof, the land was duly certified over to the State, in satisfaction of said selection and location.
In Wilkinson v. Merrill, 52 Cal. 424, it was held, that the decision of the land department of the United States, to which " all the questions of law and fact pertaining to the proceeding were especially confided," was conclusive as against the United States, and against the plaintiff in that action, who subsequently attempted to acquire the title from the State.
As before stated, the appellant herein was a party to the contest before the land department, to which the Court refers in the case above cited, and the decision of the department, if conclusive as against Wilkinson, is equally so as against appellant. The latter claims to have alleged and proved some facts which were not alleged and proved in Wilkinson v. Merrill, supra; but we are unable to discover that he has presented anything which takes his case out of the doctrine of that case. If the principle upon which that decision is based be sound, and we think that it is, it seems to us to be decisive of this case. And the grounds of that decision are so plainly and succinctly stated, as to render a restatement of them wholly unnecessary.
Judgment and order affirmed.
McKinstry, J., McKee, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.