Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert RAMOIN (Romain)
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-09-28
Citations: 410 So. 2d 1010
Docket Number: No. 81-KA-0215
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert RAMOIN (Romain).
Judges: DIXON, C. J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 410
Pages: 1010–1014

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Robert RAMOIN (Romain).
No. 81-KA-0215.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 28, 1981.
On Rehearing March 1, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morgan J. Gou-deau, III, Dist. Atty., Donald Richard, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward James Lopez, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
COVINGTON, Justice Ad Hoc .
The principal issue in this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
Robert C. Ramoin (Romain) was charged by bill of information with the offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966 A(l). After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to serve five years at hard labor in the Department of Corrections, to run concurrently with a previous sentence. He appeals his conviction on the basis of one assignment of error.
The assignment of error by the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the evidence in that there was no evidence presented by the State to prove "intent to distribute", an essential element of the offense charged. He contends that there was a total lack of evidence to prove the crime charged in that the State proved only that he owned a cardboard box in which 12 grams (less than one-half ounce) of marijuana was found.
The evidence offered by the State disclosed that, based on information of a confidential informant, on March 27, 1980, St. Landry Parish deputies conducted a search of the cell in the St. Landry Parish jail which the defendant occupied as an inmate serving time under a sentence imposed for a previous conviction, and found 27 hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes (approximately 12 grams) in a cardboard box which belonged to him, located under his bunk, and in which the defendant normally kept his personal property. While the defendant was being taken to be booked on the charge, he attempted to escape. To this we point out that the evidence showed that only the defendant occupied the particular bunk in the cell, and that the defendant admitted that the cardboard box belonged to him. He also had a footlocker which could be locked and which was kept under his bunk. The defendant denied any knowledge or connection with the marijuana cigarettes, and denied smoking marijuana while in jail, stating that it had been a long time since he had smoked marijuana.
We believe that the issue concerning the essential element of "intent to distribute" marijuana is resolved by applying the standard used in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which standard is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212, 1215 (La.1980).
We find that there is ample evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to establish that the defendant possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute. There was sufficient evidence in the record to convince a rational jury of every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. See State v. Korman, 397 So.2d 1346 (La.1981).
For reversal, the defendant relies heavily upon several cases which held that quantity of the proscribed substance, standing alone, except in cases of sizeable amounts, is insufficient evidence to establish "intent to distribute."
In State v. House, 325 So.2d 222 (La.1975), the prosecution offered only evidence that the defendant was in possession of 21 marijuana cigarettes and some seeds and stems. No evidence was offered of any attempted distribution or any circumstances of the transaction tending to show that the defendant possessed with the intent to distribute. The court found that "mere possession" was not evidence of possession with intent to distribute.
In State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712 (La.1977), the State "simply proved that the defendant possessed less than Vioth of an ounce of a substance containing one percent of cocaine," or about 7/thousandths of an ounce of cocaine. The court found from the evidence that "the presence of this substance (containing only minute quantities of cocaine) is more consistent with possession for personal use in mixing or sniffing cocaine than with possession for distribution purposes". The court held that there was a "total lack of evidence" to prove possession with intent to distribute.
Parenthetically, in contrast to Ramoin, in neither case did defendant deny that he was a user.
The cited cases merely stand for the proposition that having possession of a small quantity of a dangerous controlled substance, standing alone, will not support an inference that the substance was intended for distribution. They do not support the defendant's contention.
It is, of course, accepted that the quantity of the substance involved (marijuana in this case) may be considered as a part of the "circumstances of the transaction." State v. House, supra at 224.
In the instant case, the quantity of the dangerous controlled substance did not stand alone. There was at issue the credibility of the defendant, who took the stand in his own defense; i.e., inter alia: there was his attempt to escape when he was confronted with imminent arrest; the freedom to come and go as an inmate on the "work-release program" (and thus have outside access to marijuana); the defendant's testimony that he did not smoke marijuana (so that the cigarettes could not have been for his own personal use); the possession of 27 hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes in a cardboard box along with defendant's personal belongings; he was seen to carry the box with him when he went to the shower area; and evidence that no other person had unobserved access to the box, which was found in the defendant's cell, under his bunk. Thus, we find there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute.
This assignment does not show reversible error.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence of Robert C. Ramoin (Romain) are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C. J., dissents.
LEMMON, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Judges Covington, Cole and Watkins of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon, and Associate Justices Marcus, Blanche and Lemmon.
. The defendant was an inmate in the St. Landry Parish jail serving time as a condition of probation under a previous conviction and sentence. He was permitted to serve his time during the seven days that he was off work from his off-shore job as a roughneck.
. The cell was occupied by six inmates, including the defendant.
. LSA-R.S. 15:445 provides:
"In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction." LSA-R.S. 15:446 provides:
"When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged."