Case Name: Margaret Bohan, Resp't, v. The Port Jervis Gas Light Co., App'lt
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-10-07
Citations: 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 246
Docket Number: 
Parties: Margaret Bohan, Resp’t, v. The Port Jervis Gas Light Co., App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 33
Pages: 246–260

Head Matter:
Margaret Bohan, Resp’t, v. The Port Jervis Gas Light Co., App’lt.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed October 7, 1890.)
1. Nuisance—Naptha gas—Noxious smells.
The making of gas from naptha which gives off an odor polluting the air so as to substantially render plaintiff’s property unfit for comfortable enjoyment, constitutes a, nuisance; it is not necessary that she he driven from her dwelling.
2. Same—Seasonable use.
A reasonable use can never be construed to include those uses which produce destructive vapors and noxious smells, and that result in material injury to the property and to the comfort of the existence of those who dwell in the neighborhood.
S. Same.
A manufactory creating such odors need not be shown to the jury to be defective or out of repair or in charge of unskillful or incapable workmen to be pronounced a nuisance.
4. Same.
The defendant obtained no immunity from liability for consequential injuries sustained by property surrounding its works by reason of its incorporation, or the privileges conferred upon the business by the acts of the legislature.
(Follett, Oh. J., and Haight, J., dissent.)
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the supreme court, second department, affirming a judgment entered upon a verdict.
The amended complaint, after setting out the incorporation of the defendant, and that it was, and for several years prior to the commencement of the action had been engaged in the manufacture of gas, and that the plaintiff and defendant were owners of adjoining property, alleged that about the year 1880, the defendant erected a new tank for the purpose of its gas works on its said premises, the southern side of which stands within a few feet of plaintiff’s premises.
That about the year 1880, the defendant began and ever since has, and still does manufacture its gas at said works from naptha, and that said tank was and still is used to store said naptha for the purposes aforesaid; that naptha is an offensive, noxious, unhealthy and sickening mineral substance, destructive to the health and comfort of those required to be and remain in close proximity to it. That said tank was erected and is maintained in a negligent and unskillful manner, and by reason of the negligence and want of care upon the part of the defendant in the construction, use of and maintenance of said tank * * * and also by reason of the erection and use of said tank and said works, and the negligent and unskillful manufacture of gas from naptha, the defendant has since August, 1880, and still does maintain a nuisance injurious to the comfort and enjoyment of the plaintiff, and injurious to the rental value of the said premises. The defendant in its answer admitted the erection of the tank, and that it was engaged in manufacturing gas from naptha, and alleged that it used naptha because it was more economical than coal, and denied negligence in the erection of its works or in the conduct of its business.
It alleged that its business was carried on with all practicable care and skill, and by the use of the most approved machinery and the employment of skillful and competent persons. That it was engaged in a lawful business authorized by the statutes of the state, and that its gas was used in lighting the'streets and public places of the village of Port Jervis, and that the consequences to the plaintiff therefrom were such as necessarily arose from the prosecution of its business.
It appeared on the trial that defendant had been engaged in manufacturing gas on the premises in question since 1860. Prior to 1880 it manufactured gas from coal, but since August of that year all its gas was manufactured from naptha.
The plaintiff gave no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, either in the construction or maintenance of its works or the conduct of its business.
For the failure to give such proof, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, which was denied, and an exception was taken. Further facts appear in the opinion.
Lewis E. Carr, for app’lt; John W. Ljyon, for resp’t.
Affirming 10 N. Y. State Rep., 374.

Opinion:
Brown, J.
The plaintiff made no complaint of the existence of a nuisance upon defendant's property prior to 1880, when defendant first introduced the use of naptha in the manufacture of its gas, and it was a disputed question on the trial upon which there was a strong conflict of testimony whether the smells from the defendant's works, after it began to use naptha, were more offensive than when it used coal.
This question, it must be assumed, the jury determined in favor of the plaintiff's contention.
The court charged the jury that, to constitute a nuisance, it was essential that the smells and odors from the defendant's works should be sufficient "to contaminate and pollute the air and substantially interfere with the plaintiff's enjoyment of her property," and that the question for them to determine was " did the odor pollute the air so as to substantially render plaintiff's property unfit for comfortable enjoyment." An exception was taken by the defendant to this part of the charge.
The rule stated by the learned trial judge was in accordance with all the authorities. If one carry on a lawful trade or business in such a manner as to prove a nuisance to his neighbor, he must answer in damages, and it is not necessary to a right of action that the owner should be driven from his dwelling; it is enough that the enjoyment of life and property be rendered uncomfortable. Rex v. White, 1 Burr., 337; St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cases, 642; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Den., 311; Catlin v. Valentine, 9 Paige, 576; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y., 568 ; Cogswell v. N.Y.,N.H&H. R. R. Co., 103 id., 10; 3 N. Y. State Rep., 56; Wood's Law of Nuisance, § 497, and cases cited.
It was claimed by the defendant, and the court refused a request to charge, " that unless the jury should find that the works of the defendant were defective or that they were out of repair or that the persons in charge of manufacturing gas at these works were unskillful and incapable, their verdict should be for the defendant ; " and " that if the odors which affect the plaintiff are those that are inseparable from the manufacture of gas with the most approved apparatus and with the utmost skill and care, and do not result from any defects in the works, or from want of care in their management, the defendant is not liable." An exception to this ruling raises the principal question discussed in the case.
While every person has exclusive dominion over his own property and may subject it to such uses as will subserve his wishes and private interests, he is bound to have respect and regard for his neighbor's rights.
The maxim, " Sic utere iuo ut alienum non laedas," limits his powers. He must make a reasonable use of his property and a reasonable use can never be construed to include those uses which produce destructive vapors and noxious smells, and that result in material injury to the property and to the comfort of the existence of those who shall dwell in the neighborhood.
The reports are filled with cases'where this doctrine has been applied, and it may be confidently asserted that no authority can be produced holding that negligence is essential to establish a cause of action for injuries of such a character. A reference to a few authorities will sustain this assertion.
In Campbell v. Seaman, supra, there was no allegation of negligence in the complaint and there was an allegation of due care in the answer. There was no finding of negligence and this court affirmed a recovery.
In Heeg v. Licht, 80 N. Y., 579, an action for injuries arising from the explosion of fire works, the trial court charged the jury that they must find for the defendant, " unless they found that the defendant carelessly and negligently kept the gunpowder on his premises." And he refused to charge upon the plaintiff's request, "that the powder magazine was dangerous in itself to plaintiff and was a private nuisance and defendant was liable to the plaintiff whether it was carelessly kept or not."
There was a verdict for the defendant and this court reversed the judgment, holding that the charge was erroneous. In Cogs-well v. N.Y.,N. H. & H. R. R. Co., supra, the special term found as facts that in the construction of the engine house and coal bins, and in the use of its premises, the defendant exercised due care, so far as the same was practicable, and it refused to find, upon plaintiff's request, " that in the construction of the engine house, chimney, smoke-pipe and coal bins, it had not exercised, and does not now exercise, such reasonable and proper care as was necessary not to injure the plaintiff's property."
A judgment for the defendant was reversed, this court holding that the engine house, as used, was a nuisance, and that it was not an answer to the action that the defendant exercised all practicable care in its management. In Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. St., 257, the charge of the court and the refusals to charge were very similar to the charge in this case. The supreme court of Pennsylvania overruled the exceptions, holding that negligence was not essential to a right of recovery. To the same effect see Cleveland v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 20 N. J. Eq., 201; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill., 598; Wood's Law of Nuisance, 2d ed., § 553.
The principle that one cannot recover for injuries sustained from lawful acts done on one's own property without negligence and without malice is well founded in the law. Every one has the right to the reasonable enjoyment of his own property, and so long as the use to which he devotes it violates no rights of others there is no legal cause of action against him.
The wants of mankind demand that property be put to many and various uses and employments, and one may have upon his property any kind of lawful business, and so long as it is not a nuisance and is not managed so as to become such he is not responsible for any damage that his neighbor accidentally and unavoidably sustains. Such losses the law regards as damnum absque injuria. And under this principle if the steam boiler on the defendant's property, or the gas retort, or the naptha tanks, had exploded and injured the plaintiff's property, it would have been necessary for her to prove negligence on the defendant's part to entitle her to recover. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y., 476.
But where the damage is the necessary consequence of just what the defendant is doing, or is incident to the business itself, or the manner in which it is conducted, the law of negligence has no application and the law of nuisance applies. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 Comst., 159; McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y., 300.
The exception to the refusal to charge the first proposition above quoted was not, therefore, well taken.
It is contended, however, by the defendant, that the acts of the legislature relating to gas companies are a protection from liability for consequential injuries flowing from the manufacture of gas, or the prosecution of the business, when want of care forms no element of the cause of injury, and it is sought to apply to this case the broad principle that that which the law authorizes cannot be a nuisance, although it may occasion damages to individual rights and property.
The cases cited to sustain this proposition are ones where municipal corporations were engaged in grading and improving public streets and highways, Radcliff's ex'rs. v. Mayor etc. of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 195; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S., 635, or where the act causing the injury was done by corporations in the construction of works upon property acquired under the power of eminent domain. Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 23 N. Y., 42.
In these cases, in doing the acts complained of, the defendants acted in the performance of a public duty imposed upon them by the legislature or in the exercise of a right conferred by law, and it is well settled that persons appointed or authorized by law to perform a public duty, or to do acts of a public character, are not answerable for consequential damages if they act within their jurisdiction and with care and skill. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, supra, 641 and cases cited; Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y., 98; Conklin v. N. Y., O. & W. R. R. Co., 102 id., 107; 1 N. Y. State Rep., 677; Cooley's Constitutional Limitation, 5th ed., 671, et seq and cases cited in notes.
This principle cannot, however, be applied to cases like the one under consideration. The defendant is incorporated under chapter 37, Laws of 1848, which authorizes in general terms the creation of corporations for manufacturing and supplying illuminating gas. It acquired by that act its corporate life and character, and the power to purchase and hold such real and personal property as might be necessary to enable it to carry on its business.
By § 18 of the act named it is given the power to lay its conductors through the streets of the city, village or town in which it is located, with the consent of the municipal authorities of such city, etc., and by chapter 311 of the Laws of 1859 it is required to furnish gas to any applicant within one hundred feet of its mains.
It may be conceded that the business of manufacturing and distributing gas through the public streets for public and private use is a business of a public character, and the individual possessing such right has a franchise granted by the state for a public object, and that it meets a public necessity for which the state may make provision.
But the state has not seen fit to confer upon the corporations formed under the act cited the power of eminent domain, and they cannot, therefore, locate their works where they will
In their ability to acquire real estate upon which to establish their manufactory they have no greater power than any citizen of the state, and having acquired property they rest under the same obligation as other citizens to make a reasonable use of it and to respect and regard the rights of their neighbors.
The proposition contended for by the learned counsel for the defendant has in recent years received full consideration in the courts of England and of this country, and the rule is now established that the statutory authority which will justify an injury to private property, and afford immunity for acts which would otherwise be a nuisance, must be express, or must be a clear and unquestionable implication from powers expressly conferred, and it must appear that the legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which occasioned the injury. Cogswell v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 103 N.Y., 10; 3 N. Y. State Rep., 56; B.& P. R. R. Co. v. Fifth Bap. Ch., 108 U. S., 317; Hill v. Managers of Met. Asylum Dist., L. R., 4 Q. B. D., 433; S. C., on appeal, 6 App. Cas., 193; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa., 257; Eames v. N. E. Worsted Co., 11 Metc., 570; Commonwealth v. Kidder, 107 Mass., 188.
In Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy the supreme court of Pennsylvania said "the principle invoked applies when an incorporation, clothed with a portion of the state's right of eminent domain, takes private property for public use on making proper compensation, and when such damages are not a part of the compensation required."
In Eames v. N. E. Worsted Co. Chief Justice Shaw said: " The Mill act affords no warrant' or justification for erecting or maintaining a nuisance."
In Commonwealth v. Kidder, in considering the effect of a statute authorizing the storing and manufacturing of naptha and petroleum, the supreme court of Massachusetts said: " The reasonable, if not necessary, inference is, that it was not the intention of the legislature to establish a new rule in this regard, but to leave the question whether the manufacturing is carried on at such places, and in such a manner as to be unwholesome and offensive to the public, and on that account indictable as a nuisance, to be determined by the rules of the common law."
In B. & P. R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church it was said: " The authority of the company to construct such works as it might deem necessary and expedient for the completion and maintenance of its road, did not authorize it to place them where it may think proper, without reference to the property and rights of others. Grants of privileges or powér to corporate bodies like those in question confer no license to use them in disregard of the private rights of others and with immunity for their invasion."
And in Hill v. Managers of Met. Asylum Dist., Lord Watson said: "When the terms of the statute are not imperative but permissive, when it is left to the discretion of the persons empowered to determine whether the general powers committed to them shall be put in execution or not,T think the fair inference is that the legislature intended that discretion to be exercised in strict conformity with private rights, and did not intend to confer license to commit nuisance in any place which might be selected."
There is nothing in L., B. & S. C. R. Co. v. Truman, 11 Appeal Cases, 45, conflicting with this rule.
The House of Lords, in that case, recognized fully the role applied in Hill v. Managers of Met. Asylum Dist., and held that the purpose for which the land was acquired by the defendants being expressly authorized by act of parliament, and being incidental and necessary to the authorized use of the railway for cattle traffic, the company were authorized to do what they did.
The legislature may authorize acts which womd otherwise he a nuisance, when they affect or relate to matters in which the public have an interest, or over which the public have control, such as highways or public streams.
In such case the legislative authorization exempts from liability to suits, civil or criminal, at the instance of the state, but it docs not affect the claim of private citizens for damages for any special inconvenience or discomfort not experienced by the public at large. Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cowen, 165; Brown v. Cayuga R. R. Co., 12 N. Y., 486 ; Sinninickson v. Johnsons, 17 N. J. Law Rep., 151; B. & P. R. R. Co. v. Bap. Church, supra.
These views lead to the conclusion that the defendant obtained no immunity from liability for consequential injuries sustained by property surrounding its works by reason of its incorporation, ór the privileges conferred upon the business by the acts of the legislature, and that the facts of the case do not take it out of the operation of the rules of law applicable to ordinary common law nuisances.
The legislature has given to the corporations created to manu facture gas the right to lay down their conductors in the public streets, subject to the control and regulation of the municipal authorities, and for acts done in the execution of that privilege they are exempt from prosecution at the suit of the people.
The choice, however, of the place to locate their works, and the selection of materials from which to manufacture gas, has been left to the corporations, and those things must be performed with reference to the rights of others.
The fact appears in this case that for twenty years the defendant conducted its business without annoyance to any one. For the sake of economy (so it alleges) it adopted in 1880 a new process and new materials from which to make its gas. The result under the finding of the jury has been to impair the value of the plaintiff's property and substantially interfere with its comfortable enjoyment. If <the defendant's contention should prevail there would be no restraint upon the location of the business, and no limit to the offensive character of the 'materials it might use. It would thus have an immunity which the law denies to every other citizen.
We think the proof permitted the conclusion that the defendant had created a nuisance, and that there was no error in the charge of the court or the refusals to charge.
The judgment must be affirmed.