Case Name: THE PEOPLE EX REL GEORGE W. PERKINS v. JOSEPH F. MOSS ET AL.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-05
Citations: 20 N.Y. Crim. 75
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE EX REL GEORGE W. PERKINS v. JOSEPH F. MOSS ET AL.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 75–100

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT—APP. DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT,
May 1906.
THE PEOPLE EX REL GEORGE W. PERKINS v. JOSEPH F. MOSS ET AL.
(113 App. Div. 329.)
(1) Grand Larceny—Contribution by Insurance Corporation to
Political Campaign—Penal Code § § 528, 530.
Although it may be ultra vires for an insurance corporation to contribute money to a political campaign, such contribution in the absence of a statute to the contrary, is not a crime unless made for the specific purposes stated in Section 41-n of the Penal Code.
<2). Same.
An officer of such insurance corporation, who, at the request of the president thereof, advances his own money for a political campaign upon a promise of reimbursement, and who pursuant to such promise is reimbuised out of the moneys of the corporation after the facts had been laid before the finance committee, with its consent though not expressed by formal resolution, is not guilty of grand larceny in the first degree.
(3) . Same—Penal Code § 528.
By receiving reimbursement under such circumstances the officer is not appropriating money of the corporation in his possession, custody or control as an officer or trustee, so as to be guilty of grand larceny under Section 528 of the Penal Code.
(4) . Same.—Penal Code § 548.
Even though the corporation may be entitled to recover the money paid to such officer to reimburse him, the fact that he received it openly and avowedly under a claim of title preferred in good faith is a defense to the charge of larceny under Section 548 of the Penal Code.
(5) . Same.
As such officer advanced the money for political purposes at the request of the president of the corporation, he has not aided or abetted the same so as to be a principal even if the contribution were considered to be a crime.
(6). Same—Habeas Corpus.
Under depositions showing only the facts aforesaid a magistrate has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant of arrest on a charge of grand larceny, and a person imprisoned on such warrant will be released on habeas corpus.
Appeal by the relator, George W. Perkins, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 19th day of April, 1906, dismissing a writ of habeascorpus.
William N. Cohen and Lewis L. Delafield, for the appellant.
William Travers Jerome and Samuel Untermyer, for the respondents.
Affirmed 187 N. Y. 410; Reversing 50 Misc. 198.

Opinion:
Ingraham, J. :
An information was laid before Joseph F. Moss, one of the city magistrates, who proceeded to take the depositions of the witnesses produced, from which the following facts appeared: That the New York Life Insurance Company is a domestic corporation of which John A. McCall was president and the relator, George W. Perkins, vice-president; that in November, 1904, there was an election for President- of the United States, and Mr. Cornelius N. Bliss was the treasurer of the Republican national committee; that Mr. Bliss came to the relator and informed him that Mr. McCall, the president of the New York Life Insurance Company, had promised him that the corporation would contribute the sum of $50,000 or so much thereof as might be necessary for the purpose of the national campaign,, and had requested Mr. Bliss to see the relator in reference thereto; that at a subsequent interview with Mr. McCall he informed the relator that demands were being made upon him for political contributions by the company which it did not seém to him it would he for the interest of the company to make; that it would make it easier for him to refuse such demands if the payment to the Republican national committee was not at that time made directly from the funds of the company; that Mr. McCall asked the relator to see Mr. Bliss and to make the payments personally, and said that he would see that the matter was taken care of later on; that in pursuance of this request the relator advanced to Mr. Bliss from his own resources various sums amounting to $48,500; that during the month of December, 1904, the subject of the relator's reimbursement for these advances was discussed between the relator and Mr. McCall, when it was concluded to take the matter up with the members of the finance committee, of which Mr. McCall and the relator were members; that subsequently, at a meeting of that, committee at which the relator and McCall were present, McCall stated to the committee that on behalf of the company he had promised Cornelius Y. Bliss that the Yew York Life Insurance Company would give to Mr. Bliss, in his capacity as treasurer of the Republican national committee, and for use in the presidential campaign then in progress, a sum not to exceed $50,000, and that the relator had advanced to Mr. Bliss pursuant to said agreement the sum of $48,500; that McCall did not ask that the committee, as a committee, take official action upon this statement, but desired to inform the committee of the facts; that the matter was then discussed by the committee, but no vote was formally taken and no entry made in the minutes of the committee of the transaction; but it was the expressed opinion of those present that Mr. McCall should cause Mr. Perkins (the relator) to be reimbursed for the sums advanced out of the funds of the Yew York Life Insurance Company; that some time after this meeting, and on the 30th of December, 1904, the treasurer of the Yew York Life Insurance Company drew a check payable to the order of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. for $48,102.50; that on that day there was a charge on the books of account of the company to the " Hanover office account charged—Treasury Department. Cheque to J. P. Morgan & Co.," and in the ledger, "By order of President, $48,702.50; " that these entries were made by the bookkeeper in the form usually employed in the books of the company where disbursements were made upon the order of the president and in the accustomed form of entering transactions by the company; that the relator had no control over the funds of the company, had no knowledge of its books and gave no order to the company in relation to this transaction; that this check was subsequently collected by J. P. Morgan & Co., and the proceeds placed to the credit of the relator.
Upon these depositions the magistrate issued a warrant for the arrest of the relator charging him with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree. Under that warrant the relator was arrested. He immediately sued out a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari, claiming that on these facts he was not guilty of a crime. The court at Special Term, upon the return to these writs, held that a crime was charged, dismissed the writs and remanded the relator to custody, and from the order entered thereupon the relator appeals to this court.
Upon this appeal the only question that has been argued is whether on these facts the relator was guilty of a crime. In the discussion of this question it must be understood that we are not now concerned' with the civil responsibility of the relator to the company. What is said relates solely to the question whether or not the relator is guilty of the crime of grand larceny, for which he was in custody when these writs were obtained.
Under sections 148 and 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when an information is laid before a magistrate, charging the commission of a crime, he must examine on oath the witnesses produced, whose depositions must set forth the facts stated by the prosecutor and his witnesses tending to establish the commission of the crime and the guilt, of the defendant, and section ISO provides that if the magistrate is satisfied therefrom that the crime complained of has been committed, and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, he must issue a warrant of arrest. If, upon the facts stated in the depositions, no crime has been committed, or there is not reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, the warrant is improperly issued and the defendant cannot be held under it. (Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538.)
The crime charged is grand larceny in the first degree, under-sections 528 and 530 of the Penal -Code. The former section provides: " A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof,, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, having in his possession, custody or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association or corporation, or as a public officer, or as a person authorized by agreement, or by competent authority, to hold or take such possession, custody or control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of' value of any nature, or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, steals such property and is guilty of larceny." And as bearing upon the construction to be given to section 528, section 548 provides that, " upon an indictment for larceny, it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable." Section 530 defines grand larceny in the-first degree.
It is evident that there are two essential elements which must appear to justify a conviction for this crime: First, it must appear that the person charged intended to deprive or defraud the-true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or- to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, and that the property was not appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title, preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable; and, second, it must appear that the person charged with the crime had in his possession, custody or control, as bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee or officer of a person, association or corporation, the money or property appropriated. Bearing in mind these two necessary elements, the question presented is, whether the deposition taken before the magistrate justified him in issuing a warrant against the relator.
The act of the president of this corporation in making a contribution to one of the political parties of the United States to aid in the election of its candidates for President, is the act which it is claimed was the misappropriation of this money of the corporation, which was the foundation of this charge. In considering the nature of this act, it must be borne in mind that such a contribution by a corporation was not prohibited by law. It is claimed, however, that the payment of money was ultra vires of the corporation, and, therefore, beyond its legitimate •or authorized power. We may assume the correctness of this •claim; but the money that was disposed of being the money of the corporation, if the contribution had been made by an order •of the corporation itself, or with the assent of those constituting the corporation, no officer of the corporation would have been liable for making the contribution. That principle is established in this State beyond controversey. (Bissell v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Cos., 22 N. Y. 258.) In that case it is said, in speaking of contracts of corporations ultra vires: " Undoubtedly such engagements may have the vices which sometimes infect the contracts of individuals. They may involve a malum in se or a malum prohibitum, and may be void for any cause which would avoid the contract of a natural person. But where no such vices exist, and the only defect is one of power, the con tract cannot be void because it is illegal or immoral." And the learned court then cites as an example the act of a bank making a contribution for charity, with no authority to engage in benevolent enterprises, and says: " A subscription made by authority of the board of directors and under the corporate seal for the building of a church or college or an almshouse would be clearly ultra vires, but it would not be illegal; " and after other illustrations of the same character, continues: " To apply the word ' illegality ' to such transactions, is to confound things of a totally different nature. It is only private interests which are affected by them; and there is no statute or rule of the common law by which they become public offences." This case has been followed by Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy (151 N. Y. 24) ; Moss v. Cohen (158 id. 240), and Holmes v. Willard, (125 id. 75).
There was no evidence before the magistrate that this corporation had not authorized the contribution. The only evidence on the subject was the deposition of the treasurer of the corporation that " for many years the president of the company had exercised the power of ordering disbursements out of the company's funds upon his sole personal authority, and, as far as I am aware, his right to do this had never been challenged; " and of one of the vice-presidents of the corporation that " said McCall, by virtue of his office, had power to make disbursements known as disbursements upon executive order." It cannot, I think, be disputed but that this act of making such a contribution to one of the political parties, not being prohibited by law, would have been perfectly lawful if made by an individual. Mo law and no declared public policy prohibits the making of contributions to political parties, except for certain specified purposes stated in section 41n of the Penal Code. That being so, it follows that if the corporation had made this contribution, the illustration of Chief Judge Comstock in Bissel v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Cos. (supra) would apply—that " to apply the word ' illegality ' to such transactions, is to confound things of a totally different nature. It is only private interests which are affected by them; and there is no statute or rule of the common law by which they become public offences." It would seem, therefore, to follow that, without some proof that the corporation itself did not authorize this transaction, or that the president had no authority to make such a contribution on behalf of the corporation, there was no evidence that a crime had been committed. When an unlawful and criminal intent is essential, it is necessary to aver the unlawful and criminal intent which constitutes the crime. (Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538; People v. Stevens, 109 id. 159.)
The relator, however, was not the officer who made the contribution. The president of the company having the power, according to the evidence, to order disbursements out of the company's funds, his right to do so never having been challenged, informed a subordinate officer of the company (the relator) that he had made an arrangement to make this contribution on behalf of the company, and requested the relator to make such a contribution out of his own funds, for which he was to be reimbursed by the company. Acting under this authority the relator paid the money to carry out the obligation assumed by the president on behalf of the company. There is no allegation that the relator had any knowledge that the president was not authorized by the corporation to make this contribution. There is no act proved to justify the inference that the relator had any knowledge that' the president of the company was acting without lawful authority to make the contribution; no allegation that the president of the company had any intent to deprive this corporation of its money for the use of the relator, or for any other purpose; and no allegation and no. fact alleged to justify an inference that in carrying out this, transaction at the request of the president of the corporation, the relator had any intent to defraud the company, or to deprive it of its property, or to violate the law.
To one of the depositions upon which this warrant was granted there is a letter of the relator to the district attorney, stating his connection with the transaction, in which he says: " When I made the advances above mentioned, and when I was reimbursed therefor, it never occurred to me that there could be any question as to the propriety of such expenditure, which I believed to be for the benefit of the company." This admission of the relator being used as an admission, there being no fact alleged to justify the inference that the relator had a criminal intent in carrying out, on behalf of the company, the obligation which had been entered into by its president, there was no charge of a criminal intent, the only evidence being that the relator acted in good faith. ISTor is there an allegation that the relator had the possession of or the control over the money of the corporation, or that the money he received was " in his possession, custody or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee or officer " of the corporation, or that he appropriated any money of the corporation which was in his possession or under his control. The president of the corporation having incurred on its behalf a liability to repay this money to the relator, at a meeting of the finance committee of which the relator and the president were members, stated the facts to the committee, informed them of his promise to Mr. Bliss and his arrangement with the relator by which the relator had advanced the money to carry out that promise, and expressed to the finance committee his opinion that the relator should be reimbursed from the funds of the company. There is no statement that the relator advocated such repayment or in any way used his position to obtain it. The matter was discussed with the finance committee. 2io formal action was taken by the committee, " but it was the expressed opinion of those present that Mr. McCall should cause Mr. Perkins to be reim bursed for the sums so advanced out of the funds of the Hew York Life Insurance Company." There was thus no secrecy about the transaction. Before the company had disbursed a dollar of its money the facts were stated to the finance committee, and all of those present acquiesced in the suggestion that the president should repay to the relator what he had advanced. Subsequent to this transaction the president of the company delivered to the firm of which the relator was a partner a check for the amount of the advance made, which was received by J. P. Morgan & Co., and by them credited to the relator.
Upon the argument it was claimed by the learned district attorney that the crime for which the relator was sought to be held was committed when he received from the corporation the money to reimburse him for the claim that he had against the corporation based upon the payment of his own money to fulfill an obligation incurred by the president of the corporation on its behalf. But the relator had paid his money on behalf of the obligation entered into by the president of the corporation on its behalf. He certainly was entitled to claim that he should he reimbursed this money, and the receipt of the money of the corporation in payment of this claim, whether well founded or not, is by the provision of section 548 of the Penal Code a sufficient defense to the charge. It is, however, I think a complete answer to this claim that the money which was received by the relator was not money that he had in his " possession, custody or control " as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee or officer of the corporation. At no time did this relator appropriate any money of the corporation which was in his possession, custody or control as its officer or trustee.
It is claimed, however, that, as this money was in the possession, custody or control of McCall as president of the company, and as McCall's intention was to make this political contribution, which was an appropriation of the property of the company for the use of a person other than the true owner, and as the relator aided and abetted in the appropriation of the money, he was a principal under section 29 of the Penal Code. That section provides that " A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids and abets in its commission, is a principal." But, as before stated, the evidence before the magistrate was not sufficient to prove that McCall had committed a crime. But assuming that McCall made this arrangement for the contribution without authority from the corporation, the evidence does not establish that the relator aided and abetted in the commission of the offense, if one was committed. He was not the moving party in making the contribution. It was not done by his command, inducement or procurement. His connection with it was in obeying a request of the president, so far as appears, in entire good faith and with no possibility of any personal advantage or benefit.
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Vol. 1 [Rawle's Rev.], p. 125), "Aiding and Abetting" is said to be "the offence committed by those persons who, although not the direct perpetrators of a crime, are yet present at its commission, doing some act to render aid to the actual perpetrator thereof.
A principal in the second degree is he who is present aiding and abetting the fact to he done. Actual presence is not necessary; it is sufficient to he so situated as to come readily to the assistance of his fellows." It is stated generally in the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law (Vol. 1 [2d ed.], p. 264), that "in order that a person may he guilty as an accessory before the fact, it is necessary, first, that he should have shared the criminal or mischievous design of the principal felon; and, second, that that design should have been substantially effected through his incitement thereto; " and, at page 265, " the guilt of an accessory before the fact consists in his having incited to a crime afterwards accomplished." As I understand it, the essential element in aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime is taking an active part with a criminal intent to commit the crime. Certainly the act of the officers and employees of this corporation in obeying the order of the president and preparing and delivering the check in repayment of money advanced by the relator, was not aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. In People v. Peckens (153 N. Y. 585), in speaking of section 29 of the Penal Code, it is said: " It is expressly provided by statute that a person who advises or procures the commission of a crime may be indicted and convicted thereof, although he was absent when it was committed. (Penal Code, § 29.) Indeed, such was the law as it previously existed, the general rule being that what one does or procures to be done through the agency of another is to be regarded as done by him." It was McCall who directed the payment of the money of the corporation; and the officers or employees of the company who obeyed his direction in making that payment, without intent to do more than carry out the instructions of the president of the corporation, were not, as I view it, responsible for the act.
I think, therefore, that it does not appear from these depositions before the magistrate that a crime had been committed, or that there was reasonable ground to believe that the defendant was guilty thereof; and the order appealed from should be reversed and the relator discharged.