Case Name: John JACKSON, Appellant, v. INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PALM BEACH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-03-27
Citations: 585 So. 2d 949
Docket Number: No. 89-0399
Parties: John JACKSON, Appellant, v. INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PALM BEACH, Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 949–952

Head Matter:
John JACKSON, Appellant, v. INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PALM BEACH, Appellee.
No. 89-0399.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 27, 1991.
On Motion for Rehearing Aug. 21, 1991.
Warner, J., filed specially concurring opinions on original submission and on motion for rehearing.
Hersey, C.J., filed dissenting opinion.
Larry Klein of Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Glantz & Glantz, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
William R.H. Broome of Broome, Kelley & Aldrich, P.A., West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, Judge.
Jackson appeals from a judgment entered upon an adverse jury verdict in his suit to recover from appellee the balance of an advertised jackpot at appellee's dog track.
The underlying factual scenario appears to be that Jackson read an ad in the Miami Herald which stated that the Pic-6 Jackpot for the last evening of the racing season would be $825,000. Jackson attended the track on that date and picked the winner in the six designated races and won the jackpot. The controversy arises because appel-lee intended the amount of the jackpot to be $25,000, but the advertisement in the Miami Herald stated $825,000. The mistake came about because the newspaper employee who prepared the final draft of the ad mistook appellee's draft thereof to state $825,000 instead of $25,000. Appellee had written on the face of a prior ad, "Guaranteed Jackpot $25,000 Must Go Tonight." The newspaper employee mistook the dollar sign with only one slash-mark to be the number 8 and thus, the eight hundred thousand dollar error! Appellee paid Jackson $25,000 on the night of the races but Jackson later claimed the balance, which led to this suit. At trial, the evidence made it apparent that appellee never intended to offer a jackpot of $825,000; it was clearly a mistake. While Jackson con tended that appellee was negligent in the draft preparation of the ad presented to the newspaper, his theory of recovery was that the advertisement constituted an offer, which he accepted, and thus he was entitled to recover. Appellee, on the other hand, contended that there was no valid offer because it never intended to make the offer included in the published ad. Furthermore, if the circumstances constituted an offer, appellee contended it revoked the offer prior to Jackson's acceptance. Finally, appel-lee argued that the facts did not give rise to a contract involving an offer and an acceptance. Rather, appellee argued, the ad constituted simply an "invitation to bargain," which does not give rise to a completed contract upon acceptance by the other party.
The sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as follows:
The issue for your determination is whether, as the Plaintiff claims, the Defendant Palm Beach Kennel Club intended by its advertisement in the Miami Herald to make an offer to make a guaranteed jackpot of $825,000 to whomever won the Pic-6 bet on April 25th, 1987. If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of John Jackson that the Palm Beach Kennel Club intended by its Miami Herald advertisement to make an offer to pay a guaranteed jackpot of $825,000 to the winner of the Pic-6 bet on April 25th, 1987, then your verdict on the claim of John Jackson for breach of contract should be for the Defendant Palm Beach Kennel Club.
Jackson argues that said instruction over his objection was tantamount to a directed verdict because there was no evidence adduced that appellee intended the jackpot to be $825,000. Jackson concedes that appel-lee never intended the jackpot to be the larger amount. The point is that appellee's subjective intent was not material in determining what the contract was between the parties. As the Florida Supreme Court said in Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla.1957), quoting from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
The making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. (Emphasis added.)
Professor Williston, in his work on Contracts, describes the test as:
[T]he test of the true interpretation of an offer or acceptance is not what the party making it thought it meant or intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant.
1 Williston on Contracts § 94, 339-340.
It appears to us that the law, applicable to offers of a reward, is also applicable to the type of advertisement involved in this case. The offer is a mere proposal or conditional promise which, if accepted before it is revoked, creates a binding contract. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73, 23 L.Ed. 697 (1876); 67 Am.Jur.2d, Rewards § 15. The evidence presented and the legal contentions asserted below created a question for the jury whereby they could have resolved the case had it not been for the preemptive instruction given relative to appellee's intent in publishing the advertisement in its existing form. See Restatement of Contracts 2d § 46 (1981), regarding revocation of a general offer.
We have given due consideration to appellee's argument regarding the advertisement as an "invitation to bargain," but find it inapposite here. The "invitation to bargain" rule appears to be applied in advertising wherein:
Neither the advertiser nor the reader of his notice understands that the latter is empowered to close the deal without further expression by the former. Such advertisements are understood to be mere requests to consider and examine and negotiate; and no one can reasonably regard them otherwise unless the circumstances are exceptional and the words used are very plain and clear.
1 Corbin on Contracts § 25 (1963) (footnote omitted). Here, there are no further negotiations indicated. If a member of the public buys a winning ticket on six races, he has accepted the offer and the parties have a contract.
We thus hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as it did regarding appellee's intentions and we reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the cause for a new trial.
WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.
HERSEY, C.J., dissents with opinion.