Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on Behalf of Delores C. HALL, Appellant, v. Albert HALL, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-10-03
Citations: 699 So. 2d 1036
Docket Number: No. 96-985
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on Behalf of Delores C. HALL, Appellant, v. Albert HALL, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 699
Pages: 1036–1040

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on Behalf of Delores C. HALL, Appellant, v. Albert HALL, Appellee.
No. 96-985.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 3, 1997.
Robert A. Butteiworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Barbara A: Ard and Jon Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, for appellant.
Stephen P. Sapienza, Bunnell, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
The Department of Revenue ("DOR"), on behalf of Delores C. Hall, appeals a final order modifying child support and fixing ar-rearages. We reverse in part.
On 8 March 1990, the mamage of appellee Albert Hall ("former husband") and Delores Hall was dissolved. At the time, the parties' four minor children were aged 17, 15, 13 and 9. The Final Order of Dissolution of Marriage ordered the former husband to pay $388 per month child support for all four children. The order provided that the support payments "shall continue until youngest of said minor children reaches age 18 years, mames, becomes self-supporting, dies, or until further order of the court." In a subsequent order, the trial court found the former husband in arrears under a New Jersey court order dated 22 May 1984 which instructed him to pay $50 weekly child support pending final judgment. The former husband was ordered to pay $10 per week toward the $9,600 arrearage.
As each of the three older children turned 18, the former husband reduced the monthly support payment by one-quarter. Then, on 1 December 1995, he filed a motion to modify child support. Therein, he sought an order terminating support for the three adult children retroactive to their respective 18th birthdays or graduation from high school, and reducing the support amount for the fourth child, who is still a minor. The trial court granted the motion, finding that:
[T]he previous Orders of support entered by this court automatically expired as to each child upon attaining age eighteen or graduating high school, but [the former husband] has mistakenly reduced his child support below the guidelines for the remaining children) and that the payments received from the [former husband] were deficient....
Accordingly, the court terminated the former husband's support obligation for the three adult children retroactive to their 18th birthdays or graduation from high school, whichever occurred later. In addition, the court fixed the arrearage at $6,194.75 and ordered the former husband to pay an additional $25 per month toward the arrearage. The court made no factual finding that the former husband is unable to pay a higher amount.
DOR argues that the trial court lacked authority to retroactively terminate child support beyond the date the former husband filed his motion for modification. We agree. Generally, a parent is not legally bound to support his or her children beyond the age of 18, unless the parent agrees to do so in a binding contract or unless one of the exceptions in section 743.07, Florida Statutes, applies. Madson v. Madson, 636 So.2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Carbonell v. Carbonell, 618 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). However, when the trial court, in its discretion, orders a lump sum support payment for more than one child, the obligor parent has the affirmative duty to seek a reduction as each child reaches majority. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Beckwith, 624 So.2d 395, 399 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Worthy v. Carwell, 524 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Hammond v. Hammond, 492 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The parent must continue to make full support payments until he or she successfully, obtains modification, and the payments vest when they are due. State, Dept. of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement v. Segrera, 661 So.2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
In the instant case the final order of dissolution provided for a lump sum support payment for the four children. The former husband therefore had the duty to petition the court for modification as each child reached majority and was required to make payments in full until the court granted his requests. Because the payments vested when they were due, the trial court could not retroactively terminate support to a date earlier than 1 December 1995 absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Segrera; Kutz v. Fankhanel, 608 So.2d 873. (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Atterberry, 578 So.2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). "The fact that one child has reached majority is not a sufficient compelling circumstance.... " Hammond, 492 So.2d at 839. Therefore, we reverse those portions of the modification order terminating support retroactive to the children's 18th birthdays and setting the arrearage amount. On remand, the court must recalculate the arrearage amount to include the vested but unpaid child support and should make specific findings to support its determination. See Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 669 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
DOR also challenges the portion of the order directing the former husband to pay $25 per month toward the arrearage without a factual finding as to his ability to pay. While the trial court has discretion in determining the manner in which arrearages will be repaid, it must consider the payor's ability to pay when fashioning a repayment schedule. State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alvarez, 629 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Because the order includes no findings on the subject, this court cannot determine whether the rate of repayment is reasonable or unconscionably low. Id. Therefore, on remand, the trial court must determine the amount the former husband is able to pay and include that finding in its order. Buttermore v. Meyer, 559 So.2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., dissents with opinion.
. 743.07 Rights, privileges, and obligations of persons 18 years of age or older—
(2) This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began pri- or to such person reaching majority or if the person is dependent in fact, is between the ages of 18 and 19, and is still in high school, performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduation before the age of 19.
§ 743.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1995).