Case Name: Morris v. Edwards
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1823-12
Citations: 1 Ohio 189
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Morris v. Edwards.
Judges: Judge Sherman concurred.
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 1
Pages: 189–232

Head Matter:
*Morris v. Edwards.
Contract to pay two thousand dollars in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati is a contract to pay money, if the notes be neither paid nor tendered at the time.
Such contract, if made in writing, is not ambiguous, and can not be explained by parol testimony.
Eacts of recent occurrence, relating to a particular section of country only, can not be considered as in proof from general knowledge or recollection.
Morris brought an action in the supreme court of Hamilton county,, upon a note in writing, in the following words:
“ On the first day of February, in the year 1822,1 promise to pay James C. Morris, or order (in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati), two thousand dollars, with interest, for value received. December 25, 1819.”
This case was put to trial on the general issue. The defendant offered evidence, that at the time of making the contract, and executing the note, business was done in Cincinnati upon a depreciated circulating medium, consisting chiefly of the notes of the banks of Cincinnati and the vicinity — that the value of property was estimated by the numerical value of these notes, and that when payment was stipulated to be made in current bank notes, property was put at a higher price than it would have been if the contract was for specie — that the difference between the numerical value and the specie value of current bank notes, when this contract was made, was thirty-three and one-third per cent. — that at the time the note became payable, there was no depreciated bank paper in circulation in Cincinnati, nothing being current but specie, or bank notes of specie value. This evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff ought not to recover the full sum of two thousand dollars, but two-thirds of that sum, with interest. The question, as to the admissibility of this evidence for the purpose proposed, was reserved for the decision of this court.
Wade and Hayward, for plaintiff:
The principal question for the consideration of the court is, whether the sum of two thousand dollars, mentioned in said note, with the interest due thereon, shall be recovered in specie, out of which the following points have been.made:
1. Whether there is such an ambiguity in the language or terms made use of in this note, as to require parol or other evidence to explain or ascertain its true meaning, the rights of the parties, and the extent of the defendant’s liability ?
*2. Whether, by the terms of the contract, the defendant, after having failed to make the payment, in the manner and at the time stipulated, is liable for the full amount of the principal sum mentioned in the note, with the interest due thereon in specie ?
3. Whether it is competent for the defendant to offer testimony to prove a consideration less than that expressed in the note, or of a different character, with a view of reducing the amount of damages to be recovered ?
4. Whether it is competent for the defendant to offer evidence to prove the value of “ current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati,” at the time said note was given, or at the time the payment thereof became due?
1. What is, and what is not a latent ambiguity, is well known and understood by the court, and need not, in this enlightened age of legal science, be a subject of discussion. The note declared on is an entire contract, unequivocal in its terms, and clear and explicit in its legal import. Bank notes is a term long since known to the law, and has received a construction, by the highest judicial tribunals. 1 Burr. 457. But if it were now to be considered for the first time, the term current, a word, when applied to money or any other medium of mercantile exchange, of universal and unvarying import, would remove from the expression all doubt-and uncertainty, without the aid of external evidence. This note, therefore, must receive a construction from the language in which it is drawn, and not by parol proof; because the written terms of a contract, where there are no latent ambiguities, are better evidence of the intention of the parties than any parol explanation. As where, by the terms of a contract or agreement in writing, the court can give it such a construction as is known to the law, the intention of the parties and their respective rights and liabilities, are to be ascertained from the instrument itself, and no other evi denee will be admitted to change or vary its legal bearing and effect. “In a written simple contract, not within the statute of frauds, where the whole agreement is reduced to writing, and in which there is no latent ambiguity, parol evidence can not be admitted to explain such contract, the language used by the parties therein being the best evidence of their intent.” 6 Mass. 524; 2 Bos. & Pul. 555.
2. In the argument of the second point, it will be attempted to draw into the discussion, the peculiar circumstances of that portion or section of the state where this promissory note was executed, with a view of giving to this contract a different rule of construction *from that which has long and uniformly been adopted as the established principle of law. But it is confidently believed that neither a temporary state of commercial embarrassments, arising from an unprofitable course of trade and mercantile transactions, nor that unfortunate state of things which grows out of the insolvency of banking institutions, by which a fictitious and fluctuating medium of exchange is left upon the community to circulate at a depreciated value — can change or alter the law of contracts, or influence a legal decision. The fluctuations in trade and in the market value of private property, and the revolutions which take place in the circulating medium of a country, although in their consequences frequently injurious to some, while they advance the pecuniary ability of others, are the subjects of legislative investigation, and not of judicial inquiry. The property of individuals is always more or less affected by unexpected events and unforeseen embarrassments, while their rights, as ascertained and defined by the laws of society, remain unchanged and unimpaired. What bearing, then, can the failure of banking institutions, and the consequent evils which followed their inability to meet their engagements and sustain their credit, by which a partial circulation of their paper, at a depreciated value, was permitted for a time, have upon the rights of the present plaintiff, or upon the legal construction of this note and the liability of the defendant ? None is perceived, and it is suppposed to be difficult to imagine any.
It is not pretended that the whole agreement of these parties was not reduced to writing, or that there is any latent ambiguity in the note, requiring the aid of parol proof to ascertain its true meaning; and it surely can not be urged, in this suit, that there is a mistake in the terms of the note, or that it is contrary to the truth of the case, because such a defense is not permitted in a court of law; and the party can only obtain relief by a bill in equity, at the hands of another tribunal. 7 Johns. 342 ; 7 Bro. P. C. 70; 1 Johns. Ch. 707; 2 Johns. Ch. 274; 3 Cranch, 419.
The language made use of in this note can not be mistaken. The words “ in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati,” form a clear and unequivocal expression, and have a legal import and effect, which the court only can give; and if, in the mode and manner of their arrangement, any doubts should be entertained of their true meaning, or of the meaning of the whole expression, those doubts must be removed by a sound construction of the words themselves, and not by any parol explanation.
*Bank notes have long been considered as money, as cash, and have been so decided. “ They are not esteemed as goods, securities, nor documents of debt; but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary eoui’se and transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind ; which gives them the credit and currency of money to all intents and purposes.” “ They pass by a will, which bequeaths all the testator’s money or cash, and are never considered as securities for money, but as money itself.” No action will lie against the finder of a bank note, after it has been paid away in currency. 1 Burr. 457.
But, in the present case, the parties have gone further than the simple expression bank notes. They have said current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati. This, it is contended, is an expression too clear and definite to admit of any doubt. Current bank notes, if they have any meaning or legal effect, are the paper of such banks as pay their note.s in specie on demand, and not such as may obtain a circulation at a depreciated value; and if such had not been the meaning and intention of these parties, they would havo introduced some other term of qualification.
Again — here is an absolute promise to pay the sum of two thousand dollars, without any designation of the kind or quality of money. The words in the parenthesis must be construed as providing for the payment of that sum, at the time stated, in current bank notes, etc., without fixing upon any rate or value at which they should be received. If the promise had been to pay two thousand dollers of “ current bank notes,” etc., it is possible a different construction would have been given to the instrument. But, in this case, the consideration received and the promise to pay are two thousand dollars; and if it should be considered that current bank notes are not cash, not money, but merely articles of trade and speculation, as goods, wares, and merchandise, the rule of damages would still be the same,
Here the defendant has acknowledged that he has received the value of two thousand dollars, and has promised the plaintiff to pay him the same, at a certain time, with the interest, “ in current bank notes,” etc. He has failed to make the payment at the time and in the manner stipulated in the contract; and will the court say the measure of damages to be recovered shall be less than the consideration acknowledged to have been received ? If the contract should be construed as an obligation for the payment of specific articles, the parties have fixed their value by the very terms of the note itself. *The promise to pay the principal sum with interest, is the strongest, if not conclusive evidence, of the amount of the debt due, and of the right of the plaintiff to recover the same in specie.
There is a manifest distinction between a contract to pay or deliver a certain quantity of specific articles, and an obligation to pay the amount of a certain sum of money in specified articles. In the one case, on a failure to pay and suit brought, the measure of damages would be the value of the articles promised to be paid or delivered at the time when they were due. In the other, the sum of money mentioned in the obligation is the amount to be recovered, the value of the articles to be paid being fixed by the parties in the terms of the contract. If A., by his promissory note in writing, expressed for value received, promise to pay or deliver to B. one hundred bushels of corn in six months from the date thereof, and fails to comply with his engagement, in an action by B. against A. on sueh note, B. will be entitled to recover the value of the one hundred bushels of corn, at the time when, by the contract, it was to have been paid or delivered. And why f Because the real sum due has not been liquidated by the parties in the note, and there is no other rule of damages by which the plaintiff can obtain ample and complete justice for the injury he has sustained. But if A., by his promissory note in writing, expressed for a valuable consideration, promise to pay B. the sum of one hundred dollars, in corn, six months after the date thereof; .without stating the price at which the corn should be paid or re ceived, and fails to make the payment as stipulated, in an action on this last described note, B. would be entitled to recover the said sum of one hundred dollars, with interest thereon from the time the note became due. And why ? Because the real sum due has been ascertained and fixed by the parties in the note itself; and where, in the instrument declared on, the law has fixed the rights and liabilities of the parties, and the rule of damages to be recovered, no other rule is permitted to govern, nor is it competent for the defendant to introduce parol evidence to change or vary its legal operation. So, in the present case, the sum due on the maturity of the note has been fixed by the parties at two thousand dollars and the interest; and the provision that payment should be made in a particular, kind of money, or in certain specified articles at a particular time, does not affect the amount due for which the defendant is now liable, nor can it change or affect the measure of the damages to be recovered.
3. It is admitted, that notwithstanding a promissory note is expressed to be for value received, the promissor, in an action by the ^promisee, may prove there was no consideration, or that it was unlawful or against public policy; but the defendant is never permitted to give evidence of a consideration less than that he has acknowledged in the instrument. 1. Johns. 139; 5 Mass. 299.
Where A., by his promissory note in writing, for value received, promised to pay B. a certain sum of money in lands at a stipulated price per acre, and failed to make the payment according to his promise, in an action by B. on said note, the note itself was considered prima facie evidence of the value of the land, and the defendant was not permitted to show that the land was of less value than the consideration named in the note; and the note was considered competent evidence to support the money counts. 2 Johns. 235. “ It is a'settled rule that where the consideration is expressly stated in a deed, and it is not said also, and for other considerations, you can not enter into any other, for that would be contrary to the deed.” 7 Johns. 342. The same rule applies in parol contracts. 1 Johns. Ch. 370.
Whether there is or is not a lawful consideration to support a promise is a matter of fact, and parol evidence may be admitted to disprove it; but where in a written contract the promise is founded on a consideration expressed to be for value received, it is not corn- potent for the defendant to show, in point of pecuniary calculation, it was not equal to his obligation. Besides, although under the general issue, the defendant may give in evidence any matter which shows the plaintiff never had any cause of action, and also 'matter in discharge of the action, or which shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of the suit, had no subsisting cause of action ; yet by our practice act, and the construction which it has received, the defendant in this suit can not, under any circumstances, go into the amount of the consideration of this note, without pleading the same specially, or giving to the plaintiff notice, under the general issue, that he should offer testimony for such purpose.
4. This point, as stated, will not require any discussion. If the court should be of opinion that the amount of damages to be recovered shall be the value of the bank notes mentioned in the note declared on, at the time the said note was given, or when the payment thereof became due, to be ascertained by parol evidence, the plaintiff will be bound to prove the value of such bank notes before he can obtain his judgment.
Este, for defendant:
1. In every contract, the intention of the parties, if it can be ascertained, should prevail.
2. This intention, in the case under consideration, is to be known from the expression in the note, “ in current bank notes of,” etc., and evidence of what they and their value were.
Whenever the circulating medium of a people changes, or undergoes any alteration, contracts will be made accordingly. This may either be general or local.
Expressions will be inserted in contracts to meet the change.
It is a fact admitted, that at the time of the execution of the note, and before, and some time since, the common circulating medium in Cincinnati and its neighborhood was the notes of their banks, and of those contiguous. It is a fact, that for three or four years nearly the whole business of the place was transacted on this paper. It is unnecessary to mention other parts of the country.
During this period the terms “ current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati,” “bankable paper,” “ current bank notes or paper,” were inserted in contracts and had a meaning attached clearly and perfectly understood by the contracting parties and the corn munity. The prices of commodities were regulated by the change, also the real property of the town and country.
It will not be denied that, if tendered when due, the paper should have been received. It will be admitted that the paper was not equal to specie. If not paid, then, at the time, the real damage sustained was the value of the paper, and this should be the criterion of recovery.
The meaning attached to the terms above named was, that the payor was to pay the $2,000 in numero, according to the face of the bank notes — not to pay the sum of $2,000 in anything equivalent to specie. Thus a note of one of the banks for $10, was spoken of as a note for ten dollars, was treated as such, when the real value was only $6.66§-. A contract for the payment of ten dollars “in current paper,’ or “bankable paper," etc., was clearly understood for the nominal amount according to the face of the note. If this were the understanding and intention of the parties, it would be manifestly unjust that the payor should be compelled to pay a dollar in specie for what, in his contract, was treated as a dollar in paper, and of the real value of two-thirds of a dollar in specie.
The evidence will be received, because it shows what this paper was, and its value. Besides, when a phrase is inserted in a contract, *to adapt itself to the change in things, there is no [196 rule that a meaning should be affixed applicable to a different •state.
Hammond, on the same side:
The action is founded upon a promissory note, by which the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff, or order, in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati, two thousand dollars, at a future day. The amount was not paid or tendered at the day. The defendant contends that the contract was predicated upon a particular state of the business in the country where it was made, to which the terms of the note refer, and that the amount in coin that he is bound to pay must be determined by giving to the terms used in the note an interpretation connected with the history of the times in which it was made.
To this the plaintiff objects, in the first place, that it is an attempt to explain, by parol, a written contract, in which there is no ambiguity that requires or warrants such explanation.
This objection, I think, is founded upon a mistaken view of the point. The proposition is not an offer to prove an isolated fact, confined altogether to this individual and particular contract. It is to such cases that the reasonings and the authorities of the plaintiff apply. We maintain that certain terms used in the note are to be understood and interpreted by a reference to the general state of business at the place where the note was given, a matter of fact, applicable to all similar contracts, and to be ascertained by a knowledge of the general history of the country.
The case from 1 Burr. 457, cited by the plaintiff, is full in point to support our position. The character there given of bank notes is deduced from general facts connected with the business of the country. It is not pretended that they are in fact money, but that, by the general consent of mankind, they are treated as money in the transaction of business. For what purposes, to what extent, and in what sense they are treated as money, are matters of fact which do not depend upon the particulars of the contract between the parties, but upon the general course of trade and business at the time when, and in the place where the contract is made.
Upon the hypothesis and argument of the plaintiff, the terms “ in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati,” are rejected, in the construction of the note, as having neither meaning nor object; for if they import an agreement to pay two thousand dollars in money, the note would have imported the same thing had they been ^omitted altogether. It would be a perfect note for the payment of two thousand dollars in money without them. The rules of interpretation do not permit courts so to interpret a written agreement, as to reject any part of it, where it is manifest that the parties contemplated that some operative effect should be given to the terms they employed — and that such was the intention here can not be doubted.
The plaintiff’s argument is, that here is a promise to pay two thousand dollars — here is an acknowledgment of value received to that amount. You can neither controvert the amount nor the consideration. You may pay this sum in bank notes at the day, but these notes must be current, of the value of money or coin, and this because the general course of business has given to them the character of money. If this general course of business may be called in to aid the plaintiff in giving an interpretation to these terms, the defendant surely can not be precluded from resorting to it‘to fix and ascertain their interpretation on his part.
It is urged that the fact of a fictitious and fluctuating medium of exchange being thrown upon the community to circulate at a depreciated value, can not change or alter the law of contracts, or influence the decision of courts. And to this we agree, re markingj nevertheless, that a great deal of circumlocution is employed in the plaintiff’s argument to express what would have been-more easily, and full as clearly, expressed by the terms “■depreciated currency,” To make and to avoid definitions is one of the labors of a skillful controversialist. It suits the plaintiff’s argument much better to obtain a definition of the terms “current bank notes,” from Lord Mansfield, than from the mercantile and business vocabulary of Cincinnati, where the contract was made. But the rules of law require that the terms employed in a contract shall be interpreted in reference to the state of things prevalent in the country where the contract was made.
The fact that a depreciated currency is thrown upon the country, to circulate in the character of money, can not change the law of contracts, every man will admit. But it does not follow that this fact must be excluded from consideration in the interpretation of contracts. On the contrary, we maintain that if any reference be made to this fact in the contract, then it enters into and becomes a part of the contract itself, and must be kept steadily in view in enforcing the execution of the contract.
The promise of the defendant is to pay in current bank notes of *the city of Cincinnati. We maintain that this is an agreement to deliver two thousand dollars, numerically, of bank notes, passing current in trade and business as money. The plaintiff admits that if, on the day the note fell due, two thousand dollars, numerically, of notes of the Bank of Steubenville, had been tendered to him, he was bound to receive them. Such tender would have been a fair and legal offer to perform on the part of the defendant. But had the defendant tendered two thousand dollars, numerically, of the Bank of Cincinnati, the plaintiff would not admit that this tender was a fair offer to perform the contract. Why this distinction ? Because the right to make the tender depended upon the fact whether the bank notes tendered passed currently in Cincinnati. This view of the case demonstrates that it necessarily involves other considerations than an absolute prom» ise to pay money.
Another view of it may be presented, which places it in a still stronger light. Bank notes are intended to circulate as a fair, equal representative of coin. When they lose this character, they are said to depreciate. Their numerical value is the same, but their real value, in relation to coin or property, is different. This real value, most generally, is fluctuating; and when, in this situation, they constitute the medium of exchange upon which the business of a country is predicated, they still circulate numerically, and the price of property advances or decreases in proportion. In this case, had the notes of the banks of Cincinnati remained in circulation until the note became due, passing currently at their numerical value, while property had so appreciated as that their relative value was as one to four — that is, four numerical paper dollars would sell only for one dollar in coin — . would the plaintiff have been bound to accept two thousand numerical paper dollars of the banks of Cincinnati in payment of his debt ? His argument is that he would not, because none can be current bank notes but those the numerical and actual value of which are the same. This is the sole ground upon which he oan stand, and if it be not tenable — if the court adjudge that the terms “ current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati ” mean bank notes that pass current in business, without regard to their numerical or actual value — then the plaintiff would agree, and, had a tender been made, would insist that the rule did not operate justly.
This contract ought to receive the same interpretation that it would have received had the state of things here suggested actually occurred. The rule laid down for the interpretation of this contract *must apply to all contracts • made in similar circumstances, without reference to the time of performance. If the rule would be unjust that compelled the plaintiff to accept a numerical amount of bank notes, which was less than .one-fourth of the value contemplated by the parties, it would certainly be equally unjust to adopt a rule that would compel the defendant to pay double the value at which the subject of the contract was estimated by the parties when the contract was made.
In giving an interpretation to the terms “ current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati,” the court ought to contemplate the subject as they would do had a tender been made in certain bank notes claimed by the defendant to be current within the words of the note, and refused by the plaintiff upon the interpretation he now sets up. It ought not to affect the argument, that on the day this note fell due, no bank notes were current in business but such as were actually and numerically of the same value. The rights of the parties do not depend upon the state of things existing at the time the contract is to be performed, but must be governed and determined by the state of things as they stood at the time the contract was made. These rights ought not to be affected by the fluctuation of the circulating medium, nor by the appreciation or depreciation of property which takes place to meet this fluctuation. At the time the contract was made, the parties compared the property for which the note was given with the then circulation of bank notes current in Cincinnati. It was estimated as equal to two thousand dollars of the numerical amount of these notes, and the plaintiff agreed to receive that sum, numerically, of circulating current bank notes. While this circulation remained afloat and current in Cin■cinnati, the real relative value of the property and the notes must have remained about the same thing. But the numerical value of the notes, and the estimated value of the property, could not remain in the same proportion to each other. In reference to property, as the real value of the notes decreased, their numerical value increased, and property being estimated by the increased numerical value of the notes, appreciated also. The necessary and inevitable ■operation of this course of things was, that the notes, in process of time, must cease to have any actual value, and no longer serve as a standard by which to estimate the value of property. When this took place, the notes disappeared entirely, and the fictitious value or estimation which their circulation gave to property, disappeared also. Contracts made during the time when trade and business *were in this situation, ought not to be enforced without recurrence to the actual value of the subjects at the time the contracts were made — more especially where the parties themselves, as in this case, have predicated their contract upon the circumstances ■of the day, and have so written it down.
The relation which the actual value of current bank notes bore to their numerical value at the time this contract was made, is a matter of fact, which, if it can be ascertained, decides at once the real iust rights of the parties.
The state of business in Cincinnati in 1819, the place where and-the time when the contract was made, is a matter of which the court must take notice without requiring proof. It is a portion of the history of our state, not the less to be regarded because of very recent date. The contract of the parties contains upon its face intrinsic evidence that it was founded upon the condition and state of business then prevalent in that section of- the country. What, then, was this state of the country, known from its history, upon which the contract is founded and to which it refers? It was this: all business was transacted upon a circulating medium consisting of bank notes, the numerical value of which was greater than their real value, and that all contracts were based upon the numerical, not the real value of these notes; that there was from time to time a difference between their real and numerical value, which was regarded in the making of contracts, and which can be established by proof so as to be made applicable to contracts entered into at different periods of time.
The promise here being to pay in this description of banknotes, as we interpret it, and the very terms of the promise asserting the nature of the consideration, or rather its character, as being equivalent only to the numerical value of two thousand dollars of or in bank notes such as then constituted the money circulation of Cincinnati, we insist that the only standard by which the plaintiff can measure his damages is the actual value of the notes at the time the contract was made. This standard is fair and just for all parties. It relieves all from the uncertainty of what may be the numerical value of the notes at a future day, and gives to contracts made during these times a certainty and mutuality that no other rule can give.
Parol evidence to prove what was the real value of bank notes current in Cincinnati on the 25th December, 1819, is not offered to explain an ambiguity on the face of the note, nor to prove a consideration different from that expressed upon the face of it. But it *is offered to prove what is the real value of the consideration expressed. And its admission is founded upon the whll-known historical fact, that contracts which stipulate upon a value in bank notes are predicated upon a numerical, and not an actual value. Evidence to establish this actual value is received upon the same principle that evidence is admitted to prove the actual value of two thousand bushels of corn, were a contract made to deliver that •quantity of corn, and suit brought upon it.
In the case of the corn, the actual value, at the time it should have been delivered, must be the rule of damages. And the reason is, that the party purchasing must have made his purchase .with a view to the value of the article at the time of delivery. This is the general rule. But if the contract stipulated, that upon the delivery the payment should be made in current bank paper, at fifty cents per bushel, and upon the day of delivery the real value of corn was twenty-five cents per bushel, and the real value of current bank paper was fifty cents upon the dollar, a court of justice surely could not say that the paper price to be paid per bushel by the plaintiff, must be deemed the actual specie price against the defendant. And yet the argument of the plaintiff upon this point leads precisely to this conclusion.
The whole argument of the plaintiff proceeds upon the idea that legal and technical rules so operate as to compel the court to shut their eyes to the real facts of the case, and adjudicate in a blindfold state. Current bank notes are regarded in England, or rather were regarded in England seventy years ago, as money. Therefore, current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati, in Ohio, in 1819, are to be understood in all contracts as equivalent to money. The consideration of a promissory note can not be proved to be less than the amount expressed on the face of it (which, by the. by, .stands upon no principle). Therefore, you shall not ascertain the true value, where it is plain that a numerical, and not a real value is expressed. This appears to me the true state of the plaintiff’s argument; and if such be its character, it is surely clear that the •promises do not support the conclusions.
If this contract is really to be regarded as an agreement to pay two thousand dollars in money for a property fairly estimated to bo worth that in money,.by the parties, and the agreement to receive current bank notes, of specie value, instead of insisting upon specie, is inserted as a privilege to the defendant, in making payment, then the plaintiff’s argument is well founded. But if this .be not *the character of the transaction — if it be such as I insist it is, and that is a fact of which the court are bound to take notice in part, and to receive proof as to the remainder, then ■the plaintiff’s argument is misconceived, and can not avail him.
Wade and Hayward, in reply:
It is not contended that bank notes are money, but'that, in legal contemplation, they are to be considered and estimated of the same value. Lord Mansfield so considered them; and the reason was, be-cause they passed in currency, on a par with specie.
The resort to Lord Mansfield for a construction of the terms “ current bank notes,” arose from necessity, and not from a disposition to avoid any other definition which had been given to them by the general consent of mankind, or by the merchants and men of business at Cincinnati. The history of those times, when the paper of the insolvent banks of Cincinnati was permitted to circulate at a depreciated value, does not furnish any- definition to these terms. They were not then in general use. “Bankable money ” was a term in general use, and universally understood at that place,, during the whole of that period; and it is expressly denied that any particular definition has ever been given and generally understood, by the men of business and others at Cincinnati, to the terms “ current bank notes,” or “ current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati ; ” and they have no other meaning, at that place, than such as is given to them by a sound legal construction. And the plaintiff contends and insists, that this contract does not “ contain' upon its face intrinsic evidence that it was founded upon the condition and state of business then prevalent in that section of country.”
The defendant is mistaken, when he supposes “ the plaintiff’s argument proceeds upon the idea, that legal technical rules so operate as to compel the court to shut their eyes to the real facts in the case, and to adjudicate in a blindfold state.” The plaintiff contends,, his argument is founded upon the well-known and long-established principles of law, and the plainest dictates of reason and common sense; and he urges it upon the court, to prevent injustice and a. serious injury to himself.
With what reason can the defendant now insist, that his case is to be adjudicated by the same rules as it would have been had he made a lawful tender of the bank notes described in the note declared on ? He is now in a very different situation. Had he made the tender when the note had become due, the plaintiff would have *had an opportunity of obtaining the two thousand dollars, in specie, for the notes tendered, and the defendant could not have been charged with a violation of his contract. But the defendant has elected a different course. He retains the “ current bank notes in his own hands, or obtains the specie for them — suffers himself to' be sued on his note, and claims to be discharged on the payment of two-thirds of the sum due, and thereby speculate upon his own contract, and upon that, too, in which he has been guilty of a breach of good faith ! This might all be done, if the doctrine contended for by the defendant should be sanctioned by the court. Whereas, if the defendant had paid the note at the time and in the manner therein stipulated, the plaintiff might have long since realized his two thousand dollars in specie. And it is asked, who is entitled to the benefit of obtaining the sum of two thousand dollars in specie, for the pro ceeds of these “ current bank notes ?” The plaintiff, who has been kept out of his money, or the defendant, who has refused to comply with his engagements ? This question is asked, on the supposition that the consideration and promise are considered to be two thousand dollars of current bank notes,” and that these notes, at the time the payment became due, were circulating at a value below the par of specie. But a different construction must prevail. The contract is an obligation, on the part of the defendant, to pay the plaintiff the sum of two thousand dollars, in a particular kind of money, at a stated time. He has not done it, and the rule of damages has been fixed by the parties themselves, in the instrument itself. The sum due was liquidated at the time the contract was made, and makes a part of it. The plaintiff, therefore, insists that he is entitled to judgment for the sum of two thousand dollars, with the interest thereon from the first day of February, 1821.

Opinion:
Judge Hitchcock:
This case presents two questions to the consideration of the court:
1. Whether the sum of two thousand dollars, mentioned in the contract, with the interest due thereon, shall be recovered?
2. If, in the opinion of the court, this sum can not be recovered, whether the damages are to be ascertained by proof of the value of "current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati," on the day the contract was entered into, or on the day when the payment fell due?
That the first question may be correctly decided, it is necessary to ascertain what character is to be attached to bank notes. If they are considered as money, then this contract is a contract for money; *if not, it is a contract for the payment of a certain sum in specific articles. By the term money, we generally understand that which is the lawful currency of the country — that which may be tendered, and must be received in discharge of a subsisting debt. With this understanding of the term, it can not be contended- that bank notes are, ain themselves, considered money. They are not a lawful tender. No person is bound to receive them in discharge of a debt, unless in pursuance of a previous contract. But for certain purposes, and in fact for every purpose, in the ordinary transaction of business, bank notes, it is believed, ever have been and still are considered as money.' They do not come'under the denomination of goods, wares, and .merchandise. Evidence of the receipt of bank notes will support an action for money had and received. The delivery and receipt of them, in discharge of a debt, will be considered as payment of so much money, not as accord and satisfaction. By the .universal consent of mankind, when they pass from one to another, they pass as money. In the course of business, they are charged and credited as cash, as money. They have been estimated as money, not only by men of business, but by courts of justice. Lord Mansfield, in speaking of bank notes, says, " They are not esteemed as goods, securities, nor documents of debt; but are located as money, as cash in the ordinary course and transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and currency of money to all intents and purposes." "They pass by a will which bequeaths all the testator's money or cash, and are never considered as securities for money, but as money itself." 1 Bur. 457. The Supreme Court of the State of New York say that bank notes are considered as money — that a note for a certain sum payable in bank paper is a note for mon'ey, and of course a promissory note within their statute. 9 Johns. This court, in the case of Smith v. Houston, submitted in Licking county, in the year 1820, in giving a construction to the "act to prohibit the issuing and circulating of unauthorized bank paper," after a consultation of all the judges, decided that bank notes must be considered as money. 14 Stat. 10. The statute law of this state, entitled "an act making certain instruments of writing negotiable," provides, "that all bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange> foreign and inland, drawn for any sum or sums of money certain, and made payable to any person or order," etc., shall be negotiable by indorsement thereon, etc. Yol. 18, p. 163. In giving a construction to this statute, we hold that a note drawn for a sum certain, payable in bank paper, *is negotiable. This opinion can be justified upon no other ground than by considering bank notes .as money.
Apply these principles to the case under consideration, and what will be the result? Edwards, for a valuable consideration, promises to pay Morris or order, on a certain day, two thousand dollars, with interest annually. The payment is to be made " in current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati." Such are the terms of the contract. When the day of payment arrives, there is no offer to pay — there is no tender of bank notes. Had the note been •transferred, by indorsement, to a third jmrson, that third person, as indorsee, might have maintained an action against Edwards as maker of a promissory note. We should not have hesitated to •render a judgment in favor of the indorsee. And why? Because the note would have been considered as a note for money. If it be a note for money, as I think it must be considered both upon principle and authority, there can, I apprehend, be no doubt that the .plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the full amount of two thousand dollars, with the interest.
But suppose we take another view of the case, and consider bank notes, not as money, but as specific articles — will this lead to a different conclusion? Or will the plaintiff be compelled to receive a sum less than that named in the note? Where a contract is entered into for the payment of one hundred bushels of wheat, at a certain time, and the wheat is not delivered, the rule of damages will bo the value of the wheat when it should have been delivered. If, however, the contract be for the payment of one hundred dollars, in wheat, or of one hundred bushels of wheat at one dollar per bushel, and payment be not made, it will not be doubted but that a plaintiff, seeking to recover damages upon such contract for its violation, would be entitled to one hundred dollars. It would at once be said that the damages were liquidated or agreed upon by the parties. In the case under consideration, Edwards promises to pay two thousand dollars " in current banknotes of the city of Cincinnati." This promise is not performed — < the bank notes are not paid. What must be the rule of damages? I would suppose, if bank notes are considered in the same light, and as possessing the same character as other specific articles, wa must say at once, that the parties had fixed the rule of damages, and that the plaintiff must recover the amount named in the contract. I am sensible that it has been urged in argument, that in the contract under consideration, the word in must be interpreted to mean of, and that this contract should *be considered the same as if it had been for the payment of two thousand dollars of current bank notes. Is there anything, however, in the contract itself that would justify this interpretation, or justify the court in changing the meaning of words ? It appears to me that there is not, unless we attach a character to bank notes different, in some respects at least, from that which we attach to specific articles.
Counsel for the defendant insist, that whether we consider bank notes as money, and this contract a money contract, or whether we consider it as a contract for a certain sum payable in specific articles, injustice is done to him, inasmuch as such could not have been the intention of the contracting parties. In interpreting contracts, the great object always is to arrive at the intention ; and if in giving the construction to the contract, before the court, which I am disposed to give, injustice is done to either party, I sincerely regret it. The law, however, has fixed and established certain rules, by which all contracts are to be interpreted; and it would be dangerous to depart from these rules to accommodate a particular case or class of cases. No principle can be better settled than this, that- in the interpretation of contracts, the words or terms made use of, taken in connection with the subject matter, are the only things which can be looked to. You shall collect the meaning of parties by their words; every contract must be interpreted by itself. Resort can not be had to parol or extrinsic evidence, except where there is an ambiguity not apparent upon the face of the contract. If there is an apparent ambiguity, even this can not be explained. The contract before the court is very explicit. If the parties had intended this as a promise to pay two thousand dollars of bank notes numerically, it could have been easily exj>ressed. If they intended that, in the event of the failure-of the defendant to pay the bank notes, he should be discharged by the payment of a less sum in money or specie, this intention could with equal ease have been expressed. As neither is expressed, I must infer that such was not the intention, and am of opinion that parol evidence can not be received by way of explanation to lead to a different conclusion. In fact, the effect of such testimony, if received, would not be to explain this contract, but to prove one materially variant in its terms and conditions. Counsel for the defendant do not deny that it would be improper to receive this species of evidence.
It is contended, however, that this contract was predicated upon a particular state of business in the country where it was made, to-*which the terms of the note refer, and that the amount which the defendant is bound to pay must be determined by giving to the terms used in the note an interpretation connected with the history of the times in which it was made.
The contract was made in Cincinnati, and bears date in the year 1819. It is said, in substance, that in the course of that year the paper of the banks of that place had depreciated — that there was a difference between its real and numerical value — that this depreciated paper was the principal circulating medium of exchange — •that it was in common parlance denominated " currency," or " current bank paper," to distinguish it from that description of bank paper whose real and numerical value was the same — that the term "current," which, when applied to money, has been understood to mean that which is lawful, and when applied to bank paper that which is equal to specie, was here understood to mean paper which was depreciated — that contracts similar to this were made with the understanding that they should be discharged with this depreciated paper, which is denominated currency, or in specie of equivalent value, and in fact that the character of bank notes was changed; that they were no longer considered as money, but similar to any other specific article, and that a promise to pay two thousand dollars in this kind of property or paper, was understood to be a promise to pay that amount of it according to its numerical value. And it is further contended, that the court are bound to-know these facts as matters of public history, and apply them in the construction of the contract under consideration. The argument raised upon this state of facts is entitled to great consideration, and if the case was a new one would undoubtedly have much influence. But before we adopt the principle contended for, it may bo well to examine a little as to consequences. These facts can not be proved by parol, because they would lead to a construction of the contract different from what its terms justify; yet the court are bound to know them as matters of public history. Public history, not of the state at large, but of á particular town or -city. It is to bo recollected that contracts similar to the one before the court have been frequently made in this state, especially .since the year 1812. Makers of notes have promised to pay certain sums "-in-current bank notes," in "eastern or western bank notes or paper," in the notes of a particular bank or of the banks of a particular place. Almost every variety of expression has been •adopted that could be thought of. This mode of transacting business grew out of the state of the circulating medium, and was adopted ^sometimes for the accommodation of the creditor, but more generally for the accommodation of the debtor. These .promises have not always been complied with, and suits have been brought to compel judgment. Judgments have been recovered and enforced by execution. This court have in cases of default without hesitation assessed the damages without the intervention of a jury, and in every instance, previous to the year 1822 it is believed the rule of damages has been the sum named in the contract, together with the interest. This has been the practice, not in one particular county, but throughout the state. So far as a uniform .course of decisions, when any particular subject can settle the law upon that subject, it would seem that the rule of law, or the law itself, applicable to this subject, was well settled. It must be recollected, also, that this court, in giving construction to contracts, can not interpret the same terms, or words made use of in contracts, to mean one thing in one part of the state and a different thing in another. The rule of law must be uniform with the whole body of the people. The same words used in a grant would convey an estate- of inheritance in the county of Trumbull or Hamilton; and it will be contended that if by general consent the inhabitants of the county of T.rumbuli should attach a meaning to those terms which in a grant convey an estate of inheritance, different from that which the law attaches, that the court would be justified in changing the interpretation of those terms to meet the feelings, wishes, or general consent of the people in that particular section •of country. In interpreting contracts, the law of the place where the contract is made is to govern. But in what does the law of Cincinnati and its vicinity .differ from the law in Cleveland or Steubenville? Previous to the year 1819 it is not contended that there was any difference as to the ¡principles applicable to the cases similar to the one before the court. We are called upon, however, to know certain facts which have transpired since that period, as matters of public history which must go to change these principles in that particular section of country, so that a rule of law is to-prevail different from that which prevails in other parts of the-state. If this be correct, may not the same innovation be made by every town or village in the state; and may we not be left iu> this predicament, that agreements containing precisely the same terms, and relating to the same subject matter, must be construed to mean different things, according to the understanding of the people in the various counties, or even towns, in which they shall be executed ? It does appear to me that this is carrying the rule that *the lex loci must govern toan unreasonable length. True, the citizens of Cincinnati, as well as the citizens of any other incorporated town or village, may, according to their acts of incorporation, establish rules for their own internal regulations; but. can they contravene the general law of the land — can they change-the law of contracts?
As was before observed, if this were a new ease, and of the first, impression, the argument'of the defendant would undoubtedly have great weight. But I conceive that the law on the subject has been long settled ; that the rules for the interpretation of this species of contract were well understood previous to the year 1819;. and that the circumstance that a fictitious medium of exchange was then thrown upon a particular section of our country can not change these rules. It is better that a temporary or partial inconvenience should be sustained, than that the general and well-established principles of law should be violated or even changed.
But we may well inquire whether these facts constitute such matters of history that courts are bound to take notice of them*Certain facts, which are properly matters of history, have been long since transacted, and of which no person can give testimony, may be proved by ancient history of the times in which they were-transacted. Neale v. Fry, cited Salkeld, 281. But a particular custom can not be thus proved. The reason why public history is admitted as evidence seems to be, that the facts necessary to be-established are properly subjects of history, and because of the extreme difficulty or utter impossibility of establishing those facts by any other testimony. But the facts which the court are called upon to know in the present case are such as have recently transpired, and must be in the knowledge of those persons who were in* business at the time.
It is urged in argument, that if in the present ease we allow the plaintiff to recover any more than the specific value of two thousand dollars of depreciated bank paper, at the time the contract was made, injustice will be done, because he will receive a greater value than the consideration which he gave. This argument is raised upon the supposition that property at the time was estimated to be worth a greater nominal amount, in proportion as the paper of the banks had depreciated. But if this consideration is 'to influence the court, the argument may be urged with equal .force, in estimating the damages in another class of contracts. Property contracts are as well known and understood in different parts of the state as currency contracts can be in any particular section. The owner of any specific article of property is willing to sell that property for a certain *sum in money, or he will sell it for a sum twenty-five or thirty per cent, greater, and receive his pay in property of the same or a different description. The purchaser, •consulting what he conceives to be his interest, agrees to take the property offered for sale, at the advanced price, and pay in specific articles. The bargain is completed, and the vendee contracts to pay the vendor a certain sum in these specific articles. This contract is not complied with. The articles are not delivered, nor even tendered, at the time when due. Suit is commenced and judgment recovered. The damages uniformly assessed are the amount specified in the contract, without reference to the specific or money value of the property transferred, which was the consideration of the contract. The defendant is compelled to pay twenty-five or thirty per cent, more than the amount for which he could in the first instance have obtained the property which he purchased. Is not his case hard ? Yet he can obtain no relief. If he complains he will be told: " You might have contracted differently; if it was understood that in the event of your failure to deliver the specific articles you were to pay a less sum in money, it should have been so expressed; as it is not, you have by your contract agreed upon the amount you must pay. True, you had your election to pay this amount in property; but as you have not complied with your contract, you must pay it in money."
If these principles are correct when applied to property contracts, they must be equally so when applied to currency contracts. The loss which a defendant in either case sustains is not attributable to the plaintiff; it is not attributable to the law, but to his own neglect, to his carelessness in not performing, or perhaps, in some instances, to his misfortune in not being able to perform his engagements. Upon the whole, whether I consider the note in suit as a note for money, on the principle that bank notes have been and still are considered as money, or whether I consider it a note for a certain sum, payable in specific articles, I must come to this conclusion, that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount named in the note, together with the interest which remains unpaid.
Entertaining this opinion, it seems unnecessary to examine the second question raised in the case, that is, whether, admitting that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the full amount of two thousand dollars, but merely the specific value of two thousand dollars of " current bank paper of the city of Cincinnati," the damages shall be ascertained by proof of the value of that paper when the contract was made, or when the payment became due. If the same character *is attached to bank notes as is attached to other specific articles, the same rules of law must be applied in interpreting a contract which by its terms is to be discharged by the payment of this paper, as if it were to be discharged by the delivery of any other article of property. It will not do to treat it as money for one purpose and as property of a different description for another. In cases of contracts for the delivery of specific articles, one hundred bushels of wheat, for instance, to be delivered on a certain day, the law has said that the rule of damages shall be, not the value of the wheat on the day the contract was made, but on the day the wheat should have been delivered. If bank notes are considered as specific property, why should not the same rule be applied as to them ? I am aware that it is said, when property is sold and payment is to be made in' bank notes, either at the time of sale or at a future day, reference will be had to the value of those notes on the day of sale, and not to the value which may be attached to them at a future period. This is undoubtedly true, but the same reference is had to the value of wheat, or of any other specific article, at the time of contracting, provided the payment is to be made in wheat or such other specific articles. It is, however, to the contracting parties that the value of the article may be increased or diminished, and they contract possessing this knowledge. Still no change of value in the property can change the rule of damages, and if it were necessary in the present ease to express an opinion on this question, I should say that the value of the " current bank notes " named in the contract, or on the day of payment, must be the rule by which a court would be governed in assessing damages.