Case Name: Harry Sneck, Respondent, v. The Travellers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-10
Citations: 88 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 331
Docket Number: 
Parties: Harry Sneck, Respondent, v. The Travellers’ Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., Appellant.
Judges: Lewis and Haight, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 88
Pages: 331–335

Head Matter:
Harry Sneck, Respondent, v. The Travellers’ Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., Appellant.
Accident insurance policy — what is a “loss by severance of one entire hand”— erroneous submission of the question to the jury.
Upon the trial oí an action brought to recover the amount of an accident insurance policy it was shown that in the policy of insurance given by the defendant to the plaintiff was a clause as follows: “If loss by severance of one entire hand or foot results from such injuries” the defendant shall be paid one-third of the principal sum of $2,000 named in lieu of the weekly indemnity therein provided for.
The plaintiff’s hand was caught in the knives of a planing machine and was cut off three-quarters of an inch back of the knuckle joints and just back of the head of the first bone of the thumb. The severance was of the phalanges and the heads of the metacarpel bones, leaving the palm of the hand covering the carpal and metacarpal bones, except the heads of the latter, and the middle bone of the thumb except its head. He retained the joint at the wrist unimpaired with all the motions it ever had, in all directions. The surgeon who made the amputation testified on behalf of the plaintiff, that “ the portion of the hand which remains is more useful than if the amputation had been at the wrist.” The plaintiff himself testified that what remained of his hand was of considerable use to him.
Held, that to bring the case within the provision of such clause of the policy the loss must be substantially of the entire hand, both in respect to its structure and its use. (Bradley, J., dissenting.)
That under the evidence in the case it was manifestly erroneous to submit to the jury the question whether the plaintiff had sustained a loss within the provision of the policy in regard to-a “severance of one entire hand.” (Bradley, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendant, The Travellers’ Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Monroe on tlie 29th day of March, 1894, upon the verdict of a jury rendered after a tidal at the Monroe Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29th day of March, 1894, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes. ,
Satterlee dé Ta/ylor, for the appellant.
Howard W. Sneoh, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Dwight, P. J.:
The defendant insured the plaintiff, in the sum of ten dollars a week, against loss of time, not exceeding twenty-six weeks, i'esulting from bodily injuries received in a manner described and producing a degree of disability particularly defined; and further, by its policy, undertook that " if loss Toy severa/noe of one enim'e hand or foot " should result from such injuries, alone, within ninety days, it would pay him one-third the principal sum of $2,000, named in the policy, in lieu of such weekly indemnity.
By this action the plaintiff sought to recover under the 'second alternative of the above provision, and he was permitted to do so on the theory that he had suffered " the loss by severance of one entire hand." An exception taken by the defendant to the charge of the court raises the question whether that theory was supported by the evidence in the case, and the motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the verdict of the jury in that respect was contrary to the evidence.
The evidence is undisputed. The plaintiff's hand was caught in the knives of a planing machine and was cut off three-fourths of an inch back of the knuckle joints and just back of the head of the second bone of the thumb. Anatomically, the severance was of the phalanges and the heads of the metacarpal bones, leaving the palm and back of the hand covering the carpal and metacarpal bones, except the heads of the latter, and the middle bone of the thumb, except its head, lie retained the joint at the wrist unimpaired, with all the motions it ever had, in all directions. The surgeon who made the amputation, and who was called by the plaintiff, testified: " The fingers and the heads of all the metacarpal bones were cut off with a planer. ^ little over half of the hand, speaking anatomically, is gone. There are twenty-seven bones in the skeleton of the hand,' Thirteen bones are entirely gone and parts of five more. The parts of the five are simply the heads of the metacarpal bones and (the head of) the middle bone of the .thumb." The same surgeon testified that the portion of the hand which remains is more useful than if the amputation had been at the wrist, and he illustrated the statement by saying that the plaintiff might use it in pitching hay, grasping the handle of the fork with his right and lifting with his left. The plaintiff himself testified that his left hand is of considerable use to him. There is no evidence to the contrary of that above given.
Upon this evidence it was, we think, manifest error to submit to the jury the question whether the plaintiff had sustained the loss, by severance, of an entire hand. The loss which he sustained was unquestionably by severance, but it was not of the entire hand. He lost all of his fingers, but he retained part of his thumb and nearly the whole of the palm and back of the hand.
There seems to be no room for construction of the language of the contract. To bring the case within the provision in question the loss must be of the entire hand. Of course this means substantially the entire hand, both in respect to its structure and its use. In this case, upon undisputed evidence, there was not such a loss in either respect. Structurally, nearly half his hand was saved to the plaintiff, and the testimony, both of himself and his surgeon, is to the' effect that what he retains is of appreciable and substantial use.
The argument does not seem to admit of elaboration nor the citation of authorities. The case stands upon the unequivocal language of the contract and the undisputed evidence as to the extent of the injury.
We think the judgment and order appealed from must be reversed and a new trial granted.
So ordered, with costs to abide the event.
Lewis and Haight, JJ., concurred.