Case Name: The State, Respondent, v. McO'Blenis, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1857-03
Citations: 24 Mo. 402
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State, Respondent, v. McO’Blenis, Appellant.
Judges: Judge Scott concurring.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 402–437

Head Matter:
The State, Respondent, v. McO’Blenis, Appellant.
1. A deposition of a witness taken unon the preliminary examination Before a committing magistrate in the presence of the accused, may he received in evidence on the trial upon proof of the death of such witness. (Ryland, Judge, dissenting.)
2. The provision of the constitution of this State declaring “ that in all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face” does not render such evidence illegal. (Ryland, Judge, dissenting.)
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
Robert McO’Blenis was indicted at the April term of the St. Louis Criminal Court, in the yaar 1855, for the murder of Benjamin F. Brand. The indictment contained but one count, and that was for murder in the first degree. The cause was taken by change of yenue to the St. Louis Circuit Court.
Upon the trial, the State offered to read in evidence the deposition of Louis Nievergelder, a witness sworn and. examined on behalf of the State on the examination of the defendant before Mann Butler, the committing magistrate, on the charge of felo-niously shooting and killing Benjamin F. Brand, being the same charge for which the defendant was afterwards indicted and was then being tried. The said Nievergelder had departed this life since his examination before the committing magistrate. It was admitted by the defendant that the witness testified before the magistrate on oath, in the presence of the defendant, and was cross-examined by the defendant; that his testimony was reduced to writing by the magistrate, and that the witness signed the same; that the paper offered was the testimony of the witness, so reduced to writing and signed by him and returned by the magistrate, taking the same and committing the defendant to jail without bail, duly certified and delivered to the jailor, accompanying the warrant of commitment; and that the witness was dead since his examination as aforesaid; and all preliminary proof was waived by the defendant, the only objection made by the defendant being as to the competency of said testimony, the witness being since deceased. But the defen- slant -objected to the reading of the paper, because it was not legal evidence against him under the constitution -of this State. The court overruled the objection, and permitted the paper to be read in evidence. Exceptions were duly taken.
The jury rendered a -verdict in the following form t “ We of the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and assess punishment to imprisonment in penitentiary for ten years.5’
A motion for a new trial having been overruled, the'defendant appealed.
U. Wright, (with whom were E. Mates and Blenuerhas-isett,) for appellant.
I. The -introduction of Nievergelderfs deposition was a violation of the bill of rights of the people of Missouri in both the tetter and the spirit of that instrument. In our declaration of rights it is said, “ in all oriminal .prosecutions the accused has the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” .(Art. 18, sec. 9.) Now whatever these words may mean, it is at least certain that what they secure to the accused is beyond the control of any department of the government. The general assembly can not abrogate it by statute, nor -can the courts judicially legislate-it away. The thing secured is aboye all the “ discretion” of courts, sound or unsound — above all “ policy” •of legislatures, wise or foolish. Whatever maybe the right given by the words, it is a fixed right. It exists intact, or not at all. It-.can not be halved, quartered, or in less degree subdivided. It can not be made to yield to expediency or necessity. No court'has power to .eay of it “ we give the right in part; what is withheld^ is from necessity.” Within the .circle of expediency., policy and discretion, courts may hold such (language ; but it is not constitutional language touching a constitutional right. What is the right secured by the words ? I hold it to be nothing more, nothing less, nothing other, than the permanent establishment, by the fundamental law, of the status -ef every witness against .the .accused in a criminal prosecution.
It is a» transparent mistake to confound this right with any rule of evidence. No rule of evidence-is-established by it, nor is any such- object aimed at. The relative positiomof the “ witness” and the accused is established, but what the witness may lawfully swear from that position is not established. That is left to the courts, and is regulated by them under the systemu known as the rules of evidence. But whatever it may be lawful for the “ witness” to swear against the accused, under those-rules, must be heard from his position fixed by the constitution.. If the witness be not in that position assigned him- by the constitution, lie can not be heard at all. Nor does this provision; of the bill of rights decide whether the “ witness”' shall be-sworn nor how be shall be examined or cross-exemined ; nor whether there shall be- any cross-examination at aH. Such-questions must find their answers outside of the constitution,, or at least outside of this provision of it.
The “ accused” shall meet the “ witness face to faee” — lie-shall thus meet him in “ all criminal prosecutions —that is-the right. A meeting might involve only presence, contiguity but that is not enough. It shall be a meeting in the mode and-fullness in which man must meet his God in the day of final judgment, and1 that is “face to face.” The whole’purpose-of the provision is to thwart falsehood. If perjury were impossible, the provision would be without meaning. Two objects were secured by the words : first, the witness must look upon the-accused, the intended victim of a false oath, tha-the may see the-value of what he is about to destroy, and the accused shall look upon the witness as he swears ; second, th© triers shall look, upon the false witness and gather the perjury from his aspect. The means are simple,, but human experience has established their efficacy as tests of truth. They invoke only moral power,, but that after all is the highest power. It is hard to say which, of the two instrumentalities is the greater. “ And the Lord turned and looked upon Peter “ and Peter went out and wept bitterly.” (Luke, chap. 22..) When affidavits were read to> Mary of Scotland, in prison, imputing to her great crimes, the unhappy queen, said., “ who are the witnesses ? (for their names; were not given ;] bring them before me, and they will forswear their falsehoods when they meet me face to face.” The other instrumentality (the right of the triers to look upon the witness) is auxiliary to this. It brings knowledge of whatever is accomplished for innocence by the prior means home to the right quarter, and in the right way ; but its function does not stop there. It acts independently of the rules of evidence, by its own inherent power ; and sometimes renders a right derived from those rules unnecessary. Thus the inspection by the jury of a witness may dispense with a cross-examination ; but when this fails, it becomes auxiliary also to the rules of evidence, and gives to the right of cross-examination, derived from those rules (not from the constitution), a power which it could not have without it. It is thus sufficiently manifest that the status of the “ witness,” in a criminal prosecution, while it creates no rule of evidence, secures to every man accused of crime the largest amount of impunity from the operation of those rules which justice can allow.
When and where shall this meeting transpire ? Not in the secret chamber of the grand jury — not when complaint is made before a justice preliminary to a warrant; but whenever and wherever a “ criminal prosecution” has ceased to be a proceeding ex parte, and has taken the matured form of a legal accusation of crime, and the witness is brought to sustain it. In “ all criminal prosecutions” the right shall obtain, says the bill of rights. These words embrace, I think, every form of “ criminal prosecution” known to our laws. In prosecutions by presentment or indictment, the additional right of a speedy trial by a jury of the vicinage is given ; but I am not prepared to say that the right to meet the witness “ face to face” is confined to that tribunal. Doubtless this security was mainly intended for the hour and place of actual peril, when liberty and life should be in greatest jeopardy, when the accused should stand before a tribunal having power over either or both ; but the words are broad enough to cover the initiate prosecution, whenever and wherever it takes the matured form of a legal accusation of crime. And the same words, as well as the rea sons on which they rest, carry the right through every stage of the “ criminal prosecution,” so long as the “ witness” can by the mode of; procedure be brought “ against” the accused. While the “ witness” may swear, he shall swear “ face to face” with the accused. The security lasts as long as the peril, and the protection never ends until the peril is merged in judgment.
I deem it very fit to put a like question touching other and kindred rights secured by the same pregnant section of the bill of rights. How often shall the accused have counsel ? and where ? If he once have counsel, is the constitution satisfied ? If he have counsel before the examining court, may counsel be denied him before the jury ? If once before a jury he have counsel, may he be deprived of counsel on the second trial ? How often may the accused have the right of trial by jury? If once a jury be empanelled in his case, is the constitutional guaranty at an end ? May he be denied that tribunal afterwards ? If the jury bring no verdict and are discharged, or if the verdict be set aside, may that constitutional “ bulwark” be from that time abandoned as having done its office, and the State proceed to judgment by a simpler and more summary process? How often shall the accused have the right to compulsory process to force the attendance of his witness ? May the process be denied him if once it has been invoked ? These questions answer themselves. No power in the government can rob him of counsel in a “ criminal prosecution” at any one of a hundred trials of the same cause. The jury must come a hundred times, if there be as many trials; and in all of them the compulsory process must go for his witnesses; and at every trial the witnesses against him must meet him “ face to face,” that he may look for the hundredth time upon the witness white he swears, and every jury may see the manner of the swearing.
It is said the accused once met the witness Nievergelder face to face — met him in a “ criminal prosecution” — met him before justice Butler, and at that meeting looked, upon the witness and had there the right of cross examination. That is true. It might also be truly said that justice Butler had the opportunity of looking upon the witness, and of helping his judgment of tbe credibility of: the witness by an inspection of his manner. Now all that was, if not in obedience to the constitution, at least in harmony with it. The procedure was legal and appropriate ; but if it was a “-criminal prosecution” in the sense of the bill of rights, it did not end there. It was but preliminary to something that must follow ; and, touching what was to come, the bill of rights speaks its solicitude, and not only re-asserts, but multiplies its precautions. Before justice Butler the accused was not on trial. That functionary had no power over life or limb — not even for a moment. He was armed with no authority to acquit or condemn. He took the initiative in accusation, but his action could neither bind the State nor the accused. He could discharge the prisoner, but could not free him from indictment. He might lawfully suggest that an indictment would be proper, but the grand jury could ignore the bill. His action was not even necessary to the indictment; it might lawfully precede, but could not control it. He was acting within the scope of legal inquiry for crime, and incidental to this right was a temporary power over the liberty of the accused, by warrant and mittimus, for that space of time which lies between the accusation and “ the speedy trial by a jury of the vicinage.” I have said the constitution gives the accused a right to meet the witnesses against him face to face before the examining magistrate, but I am not clear in this. The question depends upon what is meant by “ criminal prosecution.” Is the defendant before the justice “the accused?” or does he only become “ the accused” when charged by presentment or indictment ? It is not necessary to decide the question upon this record. The constitution either did or did not secure to the accused the right of meeting the witness Nievergelder face to face before justice Butler. If it did not, then the right obtains only before the traverse jury on indictment. If it did, who will, who can maintain that the same provision which secures this right to the accused in a place and at a time when he is not in peril, denies it to him in the place and hour of his utmost need ?
I have said justice Butler could look upon tbe witness while be swore and be helped in judgment upon the credibility of the witness by the manner of his swearing ; but how could his convictions of the truth or falsity of the witness reach tliejury? There is no legal avenue open for the transmission of such convictions. They are reached only by sight, and they can. be made only upon the mind that sees. But if there were no such difficulty, the moral and legal responsibility of each juror is his own. It could in nowise be governed by the convictions of the justice. The justice might credit the witness, while the juror would disbelieve him, or vice versa. Besides, the fact that the witness had sworn before the justice in a particular way might be, as it often is, the conclusive reason for unbelief of his testimony before the jury. Perjuries are oftener unmasked by the antagonism of the past and present Swearings of the witness touching the same transaction than by any other single cause. Confronted with his contradictions he hesitates, stammers, chokes, and plunges by utterance into transparent falsehood, or proclaims the perjury in silence by the pantomime of the soul.
As to the right of cross-examination before the justice, the accused had it, but he did not get that from the constitution. He would have had it before the same justice, at the same time, if the suit had been on an account for twenty dollars, as he would have it in ejectment in other tribunals, or before arbitrators, or in the chamber of commerce, or in a church investigation, or before a committee of the General Assembly, or of the Congress of the United States. The right of cross-examination comes from the rules of evidence, a complex code enacted by expediency, policy, and necessity, and adapted by its flexibility to the exigencies of investigation. This code can not be found in the constitution of a state. I know of but one instance in our constitution in which a rule of evidence is established, and that is the provision touching prosecutions for libel, — “ that the truth thereof may be given in evidence.” But I have already shown that the largest exercise of the right of cross-ex amination before the justice could never fill the measure of the defendant’s constitutional right before the jury of the vicinage. It could not bring the witness face to face — it could not infornl the triers of his moral aspect while swearing — it could never abolish (for it is eternal) the distinction between a paper and a man. This right of cross-examination before a justice is in point of fact rarely exercised, and frequently for the obvious reason that the defendant is not prepared to exercise it. The proceeding is summary and hasty. When the prisoner is brought before the justice, he must “ as soon as may be proceed to examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution.” The defendant, suddenly arrested and borne “ forthwith” to the magistrate, meets for the first time the witnesses against him. He has had neither time nor opportunity to gather information of their character, their antecedents, or connection with the prosecution against him. The names of the witnesses are endorsed upon the indictment for the very purpose of enabling the accused to make such inquiries. And such knowledge is essential to the intelligent exercise of the right of cross-examination. Besides, he is not on trial, and should not be compelled to make defence; and cross-examination is defence. He may at his option, without the surrender of any the least of his legal rights, withhold all defence until he shall be brought on trial before his peers, who alone have power to decide his guilt or innocence. Every lawyer experienced in the defence of men accused of crime, knows the impolicy, as a general rule, of attempting before indictment the defence of the accused, whether he be innocent or guilty. If by the words “ the accused has the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face” the framers of the constitution intended to give the right of cross-examination, they failed to accomplish their design. The words do not convey the right. They do provide for a meeting of the “ witnesses” and the accused, but what shall be done when they meet is not provided. The manner of the meeting, face to face, and the place of meeting, establish a silent moral power in the accused and in the jury over the witness — the power of the eye instructed by the moral sense; but the power to put questions must be derived from some other source. The words establish the presence of the witness near the accused, and presence would be a very great facility to the right of cross-examination (though it is not essential to it) if such right belongs to the accused. The words are apt words, and prore that those who used them felt the importance of phraseology. Why, if their only purpose was to secure the right of cross-examination, did they not use words fitted to convey that idea ? Why not say, the accused in all criminal prosecutions shall have the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him ? But if the words do give the right of cross-examination, that is not the only right they give, and therefore the words can never be satisfied by a cross-examination.
This provision in the bill of rights is not to be found in magna diaria, and the decisions in England under it, as to examinations taken by virtue of the statutes of Philip and Mary, do not apply. Unfortunately they have been followed in some cases by judges of some of the states of our Union. But these decisions apply only to offences less than treason. The statute of Edward Sixth required (what magna charta did not), in a prosecution for treason, the production of the two witnesses in person at the trial, if living; and although, for one hundred years after the passage of this act, its provisions were shamefully violated in all prosecutions of the crown, within the last hundred years no deposition of a dead witness has been deemed competent by any English judge on a trial for high treason. (See Foster Crown Law, 234-5.) But the statute of Edward and magna charta stopped short of our declaration of rights. The latter provided for a conviction by “ due course of law',” and the former required the witnesses at the trial, if living, in treason only. The ninth section of our declaration of rights, in apter, clearer, stronger words, demands the witness at the trial in every grade and kind of criminal offence, and strikes out the words, “ if living.” It is said the object of the statute of Edward was to cut off hearsay evidence, and that that is the object of the ninth section of our bill of rights. The answer is twofold — neither the statute of Edward nor the ninth section has any such effect, for hearsay evidence is competent now in a criminal prosecution just as in a civil case ; and the object of both was to insure the presence of the witness at the trial by bringing him face to face with the accused. To demand his presence before the jury and the prisoner was said “to be hurtful to the crown,” and the crown therefore brought affidavits, not men. (See generally The State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 ; Finn v. The Commonwealth, 5 Rand. 701; Roscoe C. L. 50 ; Foster 0. L. 234, 237; 2 Russell on Crimes, 033, 893 ; 1 Hale P. C. 306 ; 2 Stark. Ev. 278-9 ; 13 Mo. 382 ; 6 Mo. 1.)
[It was further contended that the cases cited from sister states were ■ either not in point — the constitutions of a large number of those states not containing any provisions guarantying to the accused the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face, or provisions entirely different from that contained in our declarations of rights — or that they proceeded upon grounds entirely untenable and inadmissible.]
H. ¿3. Clover, (circuit attorney,) adduced the following authorities :
1 Ed. VI, c. 12, § 22; 5 & 6 Ed. VI, c. 11, § 13 ; 1 & 2 Phil. & Mary, c. 13, 2 Stat. at large, p. 484 ; 2 & 3 Phil. & Mary, c. —, 2 Stat. at large, p. 493 ; R. 0. 1845, Mo. p. 859, 860, 861; De Lolme on Eng. Const. ; Rex v. Smith, 1 Holt, 614; 2 Starkie R. 208 ; Woodcock’s case, 2 Leach, 565 ; Dingler’s case, 2 Leach, 639 ; Rex v. Redbourne, 2 Leach C. L. 512 ; Rex v. Inhabitants of Eriswell, 2 Durnf. & East, 387, 707 ; Thai-p v. The State, 15 Ala. 749 ; 17 Ala. 749; Davis v. The State, id. 354 ; Commonwealth v. Richards, 18 Pick. 436 ; The State v. Webb, 1 Hayw. 120; The State v. Moody, 2 Haw. 31 ; The State v. Hill, 2 Hill, S. C. 608 ; Bellinger v. The People, 8 Wend. 595; Bebee -v. The People, 5 Hill, 33 ; The People v. Restell, 3 Hill, 294 ; The People v. Moore, 15 Wend. 421 ; The State v. Hooker, 17 Verm. 669 ; Dunn v. The State, 2 Ark. 249 ; 9 Western Law Jour. 407; 8 id. 47B ; Johnston y. The State, 2 Yerg. 58 ; Bostick v. The State, 8 Humph. 345 ; Kendrick v. The State, 10 Humph. 485 ; United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440; Anthony y. The State, 1 Meigs, 265 ; Campbell y. The State, 11 Georg. 352 ; The State v. Tilghman, 11 Ired. 554; Collier y. The State, 13 Ark. 676.

Opinion:
Leoward, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The main question that has been discussed before us in this case is the competency of Nievergelder's deposition, which was regularly taken before the committing magistrate upon the preliminary examination in the presence of the accused, and read on the trial upon proof of the deponent's death. Before we dispose of it, however, we will remark that on a careful examination of the record and consideration of other points presented, we have not found any ground for reversing the judgment, in the empanelling of the jury, in the admission or exclusion of evidence, in the instructions under which the cause was tried, or in the verdict, either as to form or substance, and, dismissing with these remarks the minor points, we proceed at once to the question that was mainly relied upon in argument before us.
The proud answer of the Roman governor to the Jews, when they demanded of him the condemnation of Paul, was, " It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him." And De Lolme, a foreigner, born in Switzerland, and'educated under the civil law, impressed by the strong contrast in this respect between the mode of administering criminal justice in England and throughout the continent of Europe, (2 De Lolme, by Stephens, book 1, chap. 12 & 13,) says: " When at length the jury is formed, and they have taken their oath, the indictment is opened, and the prosecutor produces the proofs of his accusation ; bat, unti/ce the rules of the civil law, the witnesses deliver their evidence in the presence of the prisoner." And again : " It is an invariable rule that the trial be public ; the prisoner neither makes his appearance nor pleads but in places where every body may have free entrance ; and the witnesses, when they give their evidence — the judge, when he delivers his opinion — the jury, when they give their verdict, are all under the public eye." In a note, we are informed of the secrecy with which the proceedings in the administration of criminal justice are carried on according to the rules of the civil law, which, in that respect are adopted all over Europe. " As soon as the prisoner is committed, he is debarred of the sight of every body till he has gone through his several examinations. One or two judges are appointed to examine him, with a clerk to take his answers in writing, and he stands alone before them in some private room in the prison. The witnesses are to be examined apart, and he is not admitted to see them till their evidence is closed ; they are then confronted together before all the judges, to the end that the witnesses may see if the prisoner is really the man they meant in delivering their respective evidences, and that the prisoner may object to such of them as he shall think proper. This done, the depositions of those witnesses who are adjudged upon the trial to be exceptionable are set aside. The depositions of the others are to be laid before the judges, as well as the answers of the prisoner, who has been previously called upon to confirm or deny them in their presence: and a copy of the whole is delivered to him that he may prepare for his justification. The judges are to decide both upon the matter of law and the matter of fact, as well as upon all incidents that may arise during the course of the trial, such as admitting witnesses to be heard in behalf of the prisoner," &c.
This contrast between the common law and civil law mode of administering criminal justice, which prevailed over the whole continent ever since the latter age of the Roman law, impressed itself strongly upon the mind of the intelligent foreigner, and is forcibly presented in his book ; and these great principles of the common law to which he has referred — the accusation by a grand jury — the public trial by a petit jury of the neighborhood, instead of by a permanent body of men — the production of the witnesses before the court, and their public examination there in the presence of the accused — the right of the accused to compel the attendance of his own witnesses to be heard in his own defence — and his exemption from torture, or being otherwise required to testify against himself — have been deemed of so much importance on this side of the Atlantic, that they have been generally, in some shape or other, incorporated into most of the American constitutions, and in this way secured against legislative control. Our own bill of rights secures to the accused, among other things, the right "to be heard by himself and his counsel;" " to demand the nature and cause of accusation " to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his favor ;" ' ' to meet the witnesses against him face to face ;" and " to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage," and to an exemption from " being compelled to give evidence against himself;" and the admission upon the present trial of Nievergelder's deposition is supposed to have violated the clause which secures to the accused " in all criminal prosecutions the right to meet witnesses against him face to face." The great security of the accused however, after all, is in the fundamental principle of the common law, that legal evidence consists in facts testified to by some person who has personal knowledge of them; thus excluding all suspicions, public rumors, second-hand statements, and generally all mere hearsay testimony ; idhether oral or written, from the consideration of the jury — the usual test of this hearsay evidence being that it does not derive its value solely from the credit to be given to the witness who is before them, but partly from the veracity of some other individual. This great principle however, like all others, has its exceptions and limitations, which are as well settled as the rule itself, and among these exceptions, in its application to the administration of criminal justice, are, dying declarations in reference to the same homicide, and the deposition of a witness regularly taken in a judicial proceeding against tbe accused in respect to tbe same transaction and in Ms presence, when the subsequent death of the witness has rendered his production in court impossible; and the question now to be passed upon comes to this : whether the provision in our constitution is to be construed so as to abolish both or either of these exceptions, so that hereafter this species of evidence, which has heretofore, it is believed, always been received both in England and all over the United'States, must be excluded. The constitution, it is to» be observed, has not undertaken to define, by any direct pro-1 vision, what constitutes competent evidence in criminal cases, ' except in the single case of treason, but requires it to come ' from witnesses standing in the presence of the accused, and it may be in the tribunal where his guilt or innocence is to be finally passed upon. If the clause be understood literally, it provides for the production of the witness, but does not prescribe what he may communicate as evidence. It compels his presence in court, but leaves the evidence he may give to be regulated by law. The dying statement of the slain, and the deposition of the deceased witness, are both mere hearsay in the-legal sense of the term. The truth of the facts they relate do not depend upon the veracity of the witness who heard the oral statement in one case, or of the officer who heard the tes--timony of the deponent and .wrote it down and read it over to him in the other, but mainly upon the credit due to statements made under such circumstances. Even in the civil law mode, of procedure the witnesses, it seems, are ultimately confronted with the accused, and therefore it may be said literally even there that they " meet the accused face to face." But all such constructions would be quite too narrow, and altogether unworthy both of the instrument and of this tribunal. The people have incorporated into their frame of government a great living principle of the common law under which they and their ancestors have lived, and it is the duty of the court so to construe it as to make it effectual to answer the great purpose they had in view. And this principle, we think, is no other than the prin ciple of the common law in reference to criminal evidence, that it consists in facts within the personal knowledge of the witness, to be testified to in open court in the presence of the accused. This principle, however, was nowhere written down on parchment. It is not to be found in magna charta, or in the English bill of rights, but it existed in the living memory of men, and was always a part of the common law, although in bad times it was trodden under foot by bad men in high places. It is not, however, a stiff, unbending rule, extending to every case, without exception, falling within its letter, but is limited and controlled by subordinate rules, which render jfc safe and useful in the administration of public justice, and are as well established as the great principle itself, which, with all its exceptions and limitations, was taken from the existing law 'of the land and incorporated into the constitution. The purpose of the people was not, we think, to introduce any new principle into the law of criminal procedure, but to secure those 'that already existed as part of the law of the land from future 'change by elevating them into constitutional law. It may as well be the boast of an Englishman living under the common law, as of a citizen of this state living under our constitution, 'that in a criminal prosecution he has a right to meet the witnesses against him face to face ; and yet it was never supposed in England, at any time, that this privilege was violated by the admission of a dying declaration, or of the deposition of a de<ceased witness, under proper circumstances ; nor, indeed, by the reception of any other hearsay evidence established and re•cognized by law as an exception to the general rule. It is said by Lord Aukland, in reference to the conduct of the British courts in the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries— •" Depositions of witnesses forthcoming, if called, but not permitted to be confronted with the prisoner — written examinations >of accomplices living and amenable — confessions of convicts lately hanged for the same offence — hearsay of these convicts repeated at second-hand from others — all formed so many 'classes of competent evidence, and were received as such in the most solemn trials by learned judges." (Principles of Penal Law, 2d ed. 197) Rut no complaint of the character of the one now made was ever heard. This was not an evil to be provided for by any law, much less by a constitutional provision ; these exceptions to the general rule were never considered violations of the rule itself; they grew out of the necessity of the case, and are founded in practical wisdom. The facts thus communicated go to the jury, not as entitled to the full faith of the facts sworn to by a witness from his own personal knowledge, but yet as competent to be considered by the jury in forming their verdict. But whether these exceptions be wise or unwise, is not submitted to our judgment. They were well established at the time, and, we think, went into the constitution as part of the great principle of criminal evidence adopted by the clause now under consideration.
We refer, in conclusion, in confirmation of our views upon the subject, to the decisions of the other states ; but as they are cited in the briefs, we shall do so in a general manner, without calling attention to the particular cases. The privilege now under consideration exists in every state where the common law prevails, either as part of that law, or by a constitutional provision similar to our own, and yet evidence of this character, it appears, has never been excluded but in a single case, decided in early times in Tennessee, and which has since been expressly overruled. In some of the states it has been expressly recognized as competent by direct decisions to that effect, and in all of them the uniform current of judicial dicta, whenever the question has been a subject of discussion, is in favor of its competency. We are constrained, therefore, both on the score of reason and authority, to pronounce in favor of the legality of the evidence. The judgment must therefore be affirmed ;
Judge Scott concurring.