Case Name: J.E. "Buster" BROWN, Petitioner, v. Fred MEYER and Patricia A. Hill, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1990-02-07
Citations: 787 S.W.2d 42
Docket Number: No. C-9396
Parties: J.E. “Buster” BROWN, Petitioner, v. Fred MEYER and Patricia A. Hill, Respondents.
Judges: DOGGETT, J., not sitting.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 787
Pages: 42–50

Head Matter:
J.E. “Buster” BROWN, Petitioner, v. Fred MEYER and Patricia A. Hill, Respondents.
No. C-9396.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Feb. 7, 1990.
Rehearing Overruled Feb. 7, 1990.
Jerry S. Payne and Lee N. Joseph, Houston, for petitioner and J.E. “Buster” Brown, Lake Jackson, petitioner, pro se.
P. Michael Jung, Jay A. Brandt, and Peter A. Warrick, Dallas, for respondents.

Opinion:
OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution disqualifies a mid-term legislator from running for the office of Attorney General because of legislation which has the effect of increasing retirement benefits for certain elected state employees. The trial court rendered judgment declaring that Senator J. E. "Buster" Brown is eligible to be a candidate for Attorney General in the Republican primary. With one justice dissenting, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment declaring Brown disqualified. 782 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989). On December 29, 1989, on a joint motion of the parties for an expedited decision, we granted the writ of error of petitioner Brown, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and rendered judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court.
The issue at hand was raised in a declaratory judgment action by Brown against Fred Meyer, chairman of the Republican Party of Texas. Patricia A. Hill, a Republican candidate for the Office of Attorney General, intervened as a defendant and counterclaimed for judgment against Brown declaring his ineligibility to run for Attorney General.
The parties stipulated to the operative facts at trial. Brown meets the qualifications to be a candidate for Attorney General in the 1990 Republican primary unless article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution makes him ineligible. He is a midterm state senator and acted in that capacity in the 71st Legislature.
House Bill 101, enacted by the 71st Legislature, raised the salary of district judges. Compare Act of June 16,1989, ch. 1258, § 1, 3, 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 5073, 5074, with Act of August 6, 1987, ch. 78, art. IV, § 1, 1987 Tex.Sess.Laws 751, 755. The retirement benefits paid to qualified elected officials are indexed to the salary of state district judges. Holders of state wide offices, as well as legislators, are classified as "elected officials" under the retirement system, and their participation in the system is optional. Tex. Gov't Code § 812.002 (Vernon Supp.1990). Thus, by raising district judges' salaries, House Bill 101 has the net effect of increasing the amount of benefits paid out to retired state officials and employees.
Article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution provides in relevant part:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be eligible to (1) any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which may have been increased, during such term....
Based on our holding in Strake v. First Court of Appeals, 704 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.1986), the court of appeals held that article III, section 18 of the constitution disqualified Senator Brown from seeking statewide office.
In Strake, the chairman of the Republican Party of Texas refused to accept Senator Brown's application to be a candidate in the primary race for Attorney General in 1986 because he had held legislative office when an across-the-board salary increase for all state employees was enacted. We observed that the word "emolument" was defined in Webster's World Dictionary (1982) as "the result of exertion; gain or profit; gain from employment or position; payment received for work; salary; wages; fees." Strake, 704 S.W.2d at 748. The issue in Strake was not what constitutes an emolument; there can be no question that a salary is an emolument. Rather, the issue that we decided was whether a three percent raise, which was less than the increase in the cost of living, was an "increase" in emoluments as that term is used in the constitution. Id. Our court held that it was.
As we noted in Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W.2d 921, 923 n. 1 (Tex.1966), this provision of article III predates statehood, and was obviously influenced by the Constitution of the United States. Approximately 38 other states have similar constraints. 1 G. Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 133 (1977).
A leading case deciding the scope of "emoluments" is State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 82 P.2d 173 (Wash.1938). See 63A Am.Jur.2d Public Officers & Employees § 76, at 725 (1984); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 24, at 274 (1979). In that case a senator's qualifications to run for the Washington Supreme Court were challenged because he was a member of the legislature that enacted a retirement system for the judiciary. The court defined "emolument" as "profit from office, employment, or labor; compensation; fees or salary". State ex rel. Todd, 82 P.2d at 175. The court held:
This definition is substantially the same as that found in the decisions of the courts. That the word was employed in the constitution in its ordinary sense, as implying actual pecuniary gain, rather than some imponderable and contingent benefit, can hardly be questioned . [emphasis added].
Id. See also State v. Dubuque, 68 Wash.2d 553, 413 P.2d 972, 980-81 (1966) (salary increase which will not be received unless reelected does not disqualify from running for office, reaffirming Reeves).
This construction of emoluments as including actual pecuniary gain rather than contingent benefit has been followed by many of the courts that have considered the question. See, e.g., Bulgo v. Enomoto, 430 P.2d 327 (Haw.1967) (disability compensation benefits are too contingent or remote to constitute an increase in emoluments); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (N.D.1961) (contribution towards social security withholding is not increase in emoluments because the benefits are remote and contingent); Campbell v. Kelly, 157 W.Va. 453, 202 S.E.2d 369, 376 (1973) (pension plan for legislators does not violate constitutional provision setting salary but prohibiting other "emoluments"); State ex rel. Johnson v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 135 N.W. 126 (1912) (constitutional disqualification based on increase of emoluments cannot be based on conjecture or speculation). But see State v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d 463 (1987) (retirement plan is encompassed in constitutional prohibition of additional "pay" or "perquisites"); Chamber of Commerce of E. Union City v. Leone, 357 A.2d 311 (N.J.1976) (pension plan is "compensation"); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 (1975).
Although the decisions of other states construing their constitutions are persuasive authority, our holding rests upon the language and prior construction of our own constitution. When determining the purpose of a provision, we will consider the evil to be remedied and the good to be accomplished by that provision. Markowsky v. Newman, 134 Tex. 440, 136 S.W.2d 808, 813 (1940). The purpose of article III, section 18 is to keep improper motivations of personal gain from influencing lawmakers when they establish the rewards of elective office. Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex.1970). Our recognition of this purpose is tempered, however, by the principle that constitutional provisions which restrict the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility. Id., at 702.
Applying this rule of construction, we conclude that an increase in "emoluments" as contemplated in article III, section 18 means only actual pecuniary gain and not contingent and remote benefit. Whether a party will actually receive a retirement benefit is dependent on numerous variables. An employee must agree to participate in the program, requiring withholding of salary. The record here is silent about whether Senator Brown is a participating member in the retirement system. Also, the employee must accumulate the requisite number of years "service credit" before any benefit can vest. In the case of an elected official, this will generally require not only serving a full term, but also reelection to office. And the official must remain alive until the earliest time that benefits may vest.
We hold, therefore, that the retirement benefits for legislators and other elected officials are not embraced within the term "emoluments" as used in article III, section 18 of our Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and affirm that of the trial court.
DOGGETT, J., not sitting.
RAY, J., dissents with opinion joined by MAUZY, J.
. The court acted prior to the January 2, 1990 deadline for filing for candidacy in order to avoid any question of mootness, and to avoid the delay of a possible subsequent mandamus raising the very same issues.
On January 3, 1990, the full court met and reviewed the action taken on December 29th. No member of the court requested that the action taken on December 29 be set aside or that the cause be set for oral argument.
On January 15, 1990, Respondent Patricia A. Hill filed a motion for rehearing and reply brief. In the motion, Respondent Hill informed the court for the first time that the parties considered January 7th to be the first critical date because Respondent Meyer could tentatively accept the filing and defer his decision until that date and January 15th to be the final possible date for our decision. (January 15th is the last date for certification of candidates to the county chairpersons).
Finally, the merits of this cause have been fully considered and deliberated by the court.
. The annual retirement benefit is two percent of current district judges' salaries, "as adjusted from time to time", for each year of participation in the retirement system as an elected official, up to a maximum of 60 percent for those whose classification as an elected official ended before September 1, 1983, and 80 percent for those whose membership continued beyond that date. Tex. Gov't Code § 814.103(b)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp.1990). An elected official may retire and receive benefits at age 60 with 10 years of service, or at age 55 with 30 years of service. Id. at § 814.104. Those members who qualified as an elected official on August 31, 1983, including Senator Brown, may receive retirement benefits at age 60 with 8 years participation in the program, or at age 55 with 12 years of participation. Id. at § 814.102. Participants may take early retirement, with reduced benefits, as early as age 50 with 12 years of participation in the system. Id. at § 814.102(b).
. Tex. Const, art. XVI, § 67 was adopted in 1975 and empowers the legislature to establish retirement programs for "officers and employees of the state." Id at § 67(b). The system enacted provides for benefits of the class of elected officials to increase as salaries of district judges are increased. Tex. Gov't Code § 814.103.
. Article 1, § 6, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution disqualifies legislators from appointment to civil offices:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time....
According to the Federalist Papers, the purpose was to prevent bartering with the executive branch for appointments. The Federalist No. 76, at 483, 484 (A. Hamilton) (B. Fletcher ed. 1972).
.In some states a legislator is prohibited from holding state office before his legislative term expires, whether the office was obtained by election or appointment. See e.g., Alaska Const, art. II, § 5; Fla. Const, art. II, § 5; Haw. Const, art. III, § 8; Md. Const, art. Ill, § 17; N.J. Const, art. IV, § V, ¶ 1; N.D. Const, art. IV, § 17; Ohio Const, art. II, § 4; S.D. Const, art. Ill, § 12; Utah Constitution art. VI, § 7; Wash. Const, art. II, § 13; W.Va. Const, art. VI, § 15; Wis. Const, art. IV, § 12.
Many of the states follow the lead of the United States Constitution, however, and only prohibit legislators from receiving appointed office. See e.g., Ala. Const, art. IV, § 59; Del. Const, art. II, § 14; Ind. Const, art. IV, § 30; Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 21; Ky. Const. § 44; Me. Const, art. IV, pt. 3, § 10; Mass. Const.Amend. art. LXV; Miss. Const, art. IV, § 45; Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 12; Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 16; N.M. Const, art. IV, § 28; N.Y. Const, art. Ill, § 7; Nev. Const, art. IV, § 8; Or. Const, art. IV, § 30.