Case Name: BITTNER v. CROSSTOWN ST. RY. CO.
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-05-15
Citations: 33 N.Y.S. 672
Docket Number: 
Parties: BITTNER v. CROSSTOWN ST. RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 33
Pages: 672–676

Head Matter:
(12 Misc. Rep. 514.)
BITTNER v. CROSSTOWN ST. RY. CO.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term.
May 15, 1895.)
Negligence—Error in Judgment.
There being evidence from which the jury could find that a motorman was solely at fault for running over a boy in the first instance, it was proper to refuse to charge that the company was not responsible for error of judgment of the motorman in the management of the car after it struck the boy, he having by reversing, in attempting to avoid the accident, again run over him. Hatch, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term.
Action by Frank Bittner, as administrator, against the Crosstown Street-Railway Company, to recover damages for negligence of defendant causing the death of plaintiff’s intestate. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial on the minutes, defendant appeals.
Affirmed by divided count.
Argued before WHITE and HATCH, JJ.
Porter Horton, for appellant.
Emory P. Close, for respondent.

Opinion:
WHITE, J.
I am of the opinion that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed. The controversy as to whether they should or not depends substantially upon the correctness of the ruling by the trial court upon the defendant's request Ho. á, as it appears in the appeal book. As I construe the language of the request, the refusal was right, and the exception is not well taken. As the evidence then stood, the jury would have been justified in finding either way upon the question as to whether or not the emergency which the motorman was called upon to meet after he had run over the body of the deceased in the first instance was attributable solely to his own negligence. If it was, then his efforts to extricate the boy from peril, however praiseworthy, would not relieve the defendant from the consequences of an error in judgment in making those efforts. Error in judgment on the part of one who negligently injures another cannot be invoked as a defense in behalf of him who causes the injury. With equal propriety might a cause of action in favor of the one injured be predicated upon his error in judgment in erroneously deciding that he could do with safety the act which resulted in his injury. Judgment and order appealed from affirmed.