Case Name: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue, Appellant, v. Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc., Appellee
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1974-03-12
Citations: 12 Pa. Commw. 388
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 581 C.D. 1973
Parties: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue, Appellant, v. Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc., Appellee.
Judges: before President Judge Bowman and Judges Grumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 388–399

Head Matter:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue, Appellant, v. Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc., Appellee.
Argued January 9, 1974,
before President Judge Bowman and Judges Grumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt.
Guy J. DePasquale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
March 12, 1974:
Barton F. Wiemeyer, President, Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc., for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Judge Mencer,
Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc. (Niemeyer) is a Pennsylvania corporation and operates an automobile dealership near Elizabeth, Pennsylvania. Niemeyer was issued license number 02-35146 by the Department of Revenue for the purpose of collecting and remitting Pennsylvania sales and use taxes.
Pursuant to Section 230 of the Tax Reform Code of 1971, Act of March 4, 1971, P. L. 6 (Code), 72 P.S. §7230, the Bureau of Taxes for Education, Department of Revenue, conducted an audit of Niemeyer's books and records for the period of January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1972. As a result of that audit, a sales and use tax assessment in the amount of fl,655.92 was imposed on Niemeyer.
Niemeyer petitioned the Department of Revenue for a reassessment. On September 29, 1972, the Department of Revenue made, and mailed to Niemeyer, a reassessment which concluded that the net amount due by Niemeyer was fl,627.02. On November 27, 1972, Niemeyer mailed to the Department of Revenue, Bureau of Taxes for Education, Board of Finance and Revenue, 1846 Brookwood Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a petition for review of assessment. This petition was received by the Bureau of Taxes for Education on November 29, 1972 and was then forwarded to the Board of Finance and Revenue where it was received on December 1, 1972. The Board of Finance and Revenue, two members dissenting, entertained the petition and considered it on its merits and reduced the assessment to a net amount due of $1,009.13, plus appropriate interest.
The Department of Revenue, contending that the Board of Finance and Revenue committed an error of law in accepting jurisdiction of Niemeyer's petition for review, filed this appeal. We must sustain the appeal and reverse.
Section 234 of the Code, 72 P.S. §7234, reads in pertinent part: "Within sixty days after the date of mailing of notice by the department of the decision on any petition for reassessment filed with it, the person against whom such assessment was made may, by petition, request the Board of Finance and Revenue to review such decision. . . . Every petition for review filed hereunder shall state specifically the reasons on which the petitioner relies. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Commonwealth v. Lukens Steel Company, 402 Pa. 304, 308, 167 A. 2d 142, 144 (1961), the Supreme Court quoted, with approval, Mr. Justice Keptrart in East Lake Road and Payne Ave., 309 Pa. 327, 163 A. 683 (1932), as follows: " We have held as a general rule that where an act of assembly commands an act to be performed within a certain time the words employed are mandatory. It is not within the power of courts to waive or dispense with such legislation [citations omitted].' "
Here a single and narrow issue is raised by Niemeyer. It contends only that the mailing of the petition for review of assessment within the sixty-day period provided by the Code for filing of such a petition is the equivalent of filing and therefore was a timely and allowable petition, even where admittedly it was not received by the Board of Finance and Revenue until after the sixty-day period had expired. We simply cannot agree that mailing is the equivalent of or constitutes filing. We need only repeat what we recently stated in Walsh v. Tucker, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 181, 187-88, 302 A. 2d 522, 525-26 (1973):
"We do decide that a judge intending to seek retention election has the responsibility to file or cause to be filed the requisite declaration of intent in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, a responsibility which is not met by depositing a letter in the mail directed to the Secretary whether or not properly addressed and regardless of any presumption of law otherwise relating to the mail. See Twibill v. Woods, 20 Dauph. 266 (1917); Hulings v. Woods, 20 Dauph. 260 (1917).
"A substantial amount of federal case law has dealt with the issue of what constitutes a filing. In a variety of statutory contexts, it has been held that a document is filed when the proper official acquires custody. In United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76-77 (1916), the Supreme Court said, Tiling . is not complete until the document is delivered and received. "Shall file" means to deliver to the office and not send through the United States mails. A paper is filed when it is delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed.' [Citations omitted.] As was said in Twibill, supra at 270, Tiling involves the presentation of the [document] to [the proper official] or to his representative and the receipt into his custody or the recognition that they are in his possession.' Accord, Kahler-Ellis Company v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 225 F. 2d 922 (6th Cir. 1955). Following the Lombardo rule, Phinney v. Bank of Southwest National Association, Houston, 335 F. 2d 266 (5th Cir. 1964), focused on the problem at issue in the instant case: 'The filing of a paper takes place upon the delivery of it to the officer at his office. Mailing is not filing. When the mails are utilized for the purpose of filing an instrument, the filing takes place upon delivery at the office of the official required to receive it.' 355 F. 2d at 268 [citations omitted; emphasis added]. In Park Management v. Porter, 157 F. 2d 688 (U. S. Emergency Court of Appeals, 1946), the issue was whether a landlord had properly filed a document pursuant to rent regulations of the Office of Price Administration. The court held, citing Lombardo, 'If a landlord chooses to use the mails, the risk that papers required to be filed may not reach their destination lies with him. He takes the chance. The situation is distinguishable from the mailing of an acceptance of an offer which has been made by mail under the law of contracts.' 157 F. 2d at 689. There is apparently no question that dropping the paper in a mailbox will not constitute the filing of that paper. 'The act of depositing the [document] in the mail is not a filing. A filing takes place only when the Clerk acquires custody. [Citation omitted.]' United States v. Easement and Right-of-Way, 386 F. 2d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968)."
We are compelled to conclude, under the facts of this case and the issue raised in this appeal, that Niemeyer did not timely file a petition for review of assessment and that the Board of Finance and Revenue committed an error of law in entertaining and acting upon the petition. Accordingly, we enter the following
Order
Now, March 12, 1974, the appeal of the Department of Revenue is hereby sustained, and the order of the Board of Finance and Revenue of March 30, 1973, reducing the sales and use tax assessment imposed on Niemeyer Oldsmobile, Inc., is hereby reversed and set aside.
Section 232 of the Code, 72 P.S. §7232.
Section 234 of the Code, 72 P.S. §7234.
Section 235 of the Code, 72 P.S. §7235.