Case Name: 5500 NORTH CORPORATION d/b/a Days Inn, Oceanfront, Petitioner, v. Deborah WILLIS, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-04-09
Citations: 729 So. 2d 508
Docket Number: No. 98-2425
Parties: 5500 NORTH CORPORATION d/b/a Days Inn, Oceanfront, Petitioner, v. Deborah WILLIS, Respondent.
Judges: HARRIS, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 729
Pages: 508–517

Head Matter:
5500 NORTH CORPORATION d/b/a Days Inn, Oceanfront, Petitioner, v. Deborah WILLIS, Respondent.
No. 98-2425.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 9, 1999.
Richard E. Ramsey and Michael R. D’Lugo, of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioner.
Kevin Patrick Bailey, Orlando, for Respondent.

Opinion:
COBB, J.
The defendant/petitioner, 5500 North Corporation, petitions for a writ of certiorari asking this court to quash the trial judge's order which disqualified its trial counsel, the firm of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., (Wicker, Smith), from representing it because of the trial court's perception of an invasion of privileged material. This occurred when an associate from Wicker, Smith, one Kevin Mercer, deposed an investigator for the plaintiff and questioned him about matters involving the work product of plaintiffs attorney, one Kevin Bailey, and also about communications from the plaintiff herself.
The problem arose following an order by the trial court to the effect that all discovery "shall be completed prior to July 24, 1998 unless counsel have agreed to extend the time for said completion." Apparently the attorneys mutually agreed that discovery could extend through the date of July 24, which was a Friday. On the preceding Friday, July 17, 1998, Bailey served a notice by regular mail to add some twelve witnesses to the witness list, one of them being his own investigator, Pete Hildreth. On Tuesday, July 21, 1998, Mercer noticed his intent to depose these additional witnesses at various times throughout the days of July 23 and July 24, 1998. On Wednesday, July 22, Bailey filed a motion for protective order stating that he was unavailable; he further stated in the motion that it was his plan "to complete discovery of late added witnesses on July 28 and 29, as per the Court's instructions at the Pre-Trial Conference (i.e., if, as has happened, Defendant refused to produce any of its late added witnesses for deposition)."
On July 23 Mercer responded to the motion for protective order noting that the discovery cutoff date was July 24, 1998 — and that it had not been extended by the trial court. The response also noted that the trial court had stated at the pretrial conference that the plaintiff should subpoena her late added witnesses for deposition and the defense need not produce those witnesses. The witnesses in question, according to the response, were independent witnesses not under the control of the defense. The response further asserted that the defense was proceeding with the depositions it had set for July 24,1998, "as plaintiffs counsel has made no attempt to make himself available for depositions, nor has plaintiffs counsel attempted to have this Motion (for protective order) heard by the Court prior to the taking of the depositions as noticed."
Consequently, the Hildreth deposition proceeded on July 24. Bailey did not attend. Hildreth was questioned at the deposition by Mercer, who began preliminarily by stating that the deposition was scheduled on short notice because there was a discovery cutoff on July 24. Mercer further stated that Bailey had filed a protective motion regarding the deposition but did not get a court order thereon, nor did he contact Mercer's office to try to coordinate a hearing on the motion and apparently had elected not to attend the deposition.
Mercer thereafter asked Hildreth questions as to why he was named on the witness list. The investigator said he didn't know but it might have something to do "with the fellow over in Cocoa . who signed the statement that I took over for him, a former maintenance man." When asked why he was named with regard to that person, Hildreth said he thought he should not be answering something he would only be guessing about and also questioned whether he was being asked about matters which were work product. Mercer responded that any work product privilege "has been waived because Mr. Bailey listed you on his witness list. You are correct that typically what an investigator does is work product." Mercer thereafter asked Hildreth what he knew about various witnesses and as to various aspects of Bailey's trial preparation.
On August 3, 1998 (which was the trial date), Bailey filed a motion for sanctions against Mercer. The motion stated that Hil-dreth was "purposely misled" by Mercer's statement that the work product privilege was waived by Hildreth being listed as a witness. Bailey characterized this conduct as "Rambo litigation" and claimed the deposition was a "bad faith invasion" of the work product privilege to try and have Bailey's mental impressions and theories of the case exposed. The motion then recited the questions asked as to what the investigator knew about the testimony of various witnesses in the case and as to what he had been told by counsel about the incident at issue.
On that same day, the trial judge held a hearing on the motion for sanctions. Bailey argued that his case had been hurt because "we have effectively gained defense counsel as co-counsel. He has been inside our case, he's been inside our investigator's head...." The trial judge questioned Mercer as to why he thought it was proper for him to question the investigator, and was obviously upset with Mercer's conduct. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge entered an order with the following findings:
A. Counsel for the Defendant, in the course of deposing Plaintiffs private investigator on July 24, 1998, made a false statement of law in telling the witness that the work product privilege had been waived and, via that misrepresentation of the law, took full advantage of questioning the witness on privileged matters to such an extent that the concept of fundamental fairness was violated. Plaintiffs counsel, having filed a Motion for Protective Order on the basis of unavailability, was not present at the deposition.
B. As a result of defense counsel's violations of the work product privilege and the attorney-client privilege, on dozens of occasions in the course of the deposition, Plaintiff incurred undue prejudice as regards a fair trial.
C. Defense counsel's conduct evinced deliberate callousness for the privileges involved, and the essential aspects of fundamental fairness, and amounted to willful misconduct.
D. Defense counsel's conduct is governed by the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 4-4.1, that prohibits the making of a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in the course of representing a client. This surely encompasses defense counsel's major misrepresentation of law in advising an investigator/witness that the reluctant witness may proceed to answer questions because his concerns about the work product privilege were incorrect in that the privilege had been waived, as defense counsel incorrectly advised the witness and misled him into prejudicial disclosures.
E. In the subsequent deposition of the opposing party's private investigator in this premises liability matter, defense counsel learned which witnesses Plaintiff planned to call at trial, which witnesses Plaintiff did not plan to call, which witnesses Plaintiff considered important, and which were considered unimportant. Defense counsel discerned which witnesses Plaintiff planned to use on which issues and which witnesses would be used on other issues. Further questioning established which witnesses could be used without fear of impeachment or contradictory statement by Plaintiffs counsel and even which witnesses had been subjected to criminal background checks and which ones would be free of such concern if called by Defendant. Defense counsel learned Plaintiffs summary of certain witness testimony, and even the number of witnesses located by Plaintiff and whether certain witnesses were available for live trial testimony and which ones were safe from character evidence impeachment. All this and more amounted to a tremendous advantage to the Defendant and a tremendous amount of prejudice to the Plaintiff.
F. Defense counsel's questioning included inquiries as to the ability to get witnesses to Court, the identifying of witnesses who may be unavailable or out of town, and generally going through each of the parties' witness lists. He pressed the investigator witness for the result of any background checks Plaintiff may have obtained on each of them.
G. The violations of ethics that occurred here was egregious.
H. Defense counsel also invaded the attorney-client privilege. The private investigator was asked what he had talked to the Plaintiff about; what he had learned from the Plaintiff; whether the Plaintiff gave him a statement; and more specific questions about what the Plaintiff had told him about specific liability issues.
I. Because of the misrepresentation of law by defense counsel, the witness testified to many things he should not have testified to. As a result of the violations of the work product and attorney-client privileges, a tremendous advantage was obtained by the Defendant. Manifest prejudice obtained to Plaintiffs ability to present her case.
J. In the course of argument at the hearing in this matter, defense counsel was advised of the alternate possible remedies of disqualification of defense counsel and his firm, as opposed to the striking of Defendant's pleadings on liability and proceeding to trial on damages alone. Defense counsel informed the Court that their client elected to have defense counsel disqualified rather than to incur the striking of any pleadings.
Based upon his finding that a work product violation had occurred, the judge disqualified Wicker, Smith from the case and ordered them not to communicate any information they obtained from Hildreth. The trial judge also ordered Mercer and Wicker, Smith to pay attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff for the sanctions hearing and for filing the motion and also referred the matter to the Florida Bar for consideration of any ethical violation. The trial judge rejected Wicker, Smith's reliance upon United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), finding that Nobles held that when a party lists an investigator as a witness, the work product privilege is waived with respect to "matters covered in his testimony." The trial judge found that since the plaintiff had not presented any testimony at the time of the deposition, the privilege was not waived and therefore concluded that Bailey might have listed Hil-dreth to testify only as to nonprivileged matters.
In Nobles, defense counsel hired a private investigator after the crime, a bank robbery, had taken place. The investigator interviewed two witnesses, a bank teller and customer, both of whom were present during the robbery, and preserved the essence of those conversations in a written report. At trial, the witnesses testified for the prosecution. Defense counsel relied on the investigator's report during their cross-examinations. Both witnesses denied having made statements to the investigator that cast doubt on their trial testimony. The Supreme Court indicated that up to that point no waiver of the work-produet privilege was made. Nobles 95 S.Ct. 2160, 422 U.S. at 239. However, defense counsel then sought to put the investigator on the stand and contrast his recollection of the contested statements with the recollections of the two witnesses. The trial court ruled that a copy of the entire portion of the investigator's report dealing with the statements would have to be submitted to the prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigator's testimony. The defense chose not to disclose the report and suffered the consequence of not being allowed to have the investigator testify. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling. The Court indicated that defendant, "by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the [work-product] privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony." Id., 95 S.Ct. 2160, 422 U.S. at 239.
In American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So.2d 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1982), this court relied in part upon Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704 (Fla.1980), wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that the contents of surveillance films and materials are subject to discovery in every instance where they are intended to be presented at trial, either for substantive, corroborative, or impeachment purposes. Thus, if the materials are only to aid counsel in trying the case, they are "work product," but any "work product" privilege that existed ceases once the materials or testimony are intended for trial use. See also Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Loomis, 432 So.2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to produce the investigator's surveillance report, which defendant did not intend to use in evidence); Wackenkut Corp. v. Crant-Heisz Enters., Inc., 451 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (if an expert has been hired to conduct an investigation in anticipation of litigation, and is not going to testify at trial, his reports and memoranda constitute materials compiled in preparation for trial).
Since Bailey listed Hildreth as a witness, it was appropriate for Mercer to discover and inquire into his intended testimony. The Nobles opinion was not concerned with a pretrial waiver of privilege and prospective testimony as we are in the instant case. The trial judge was in error in reading Nobles as precluding pretrial discovery in regard to a listed witness's intended trial testimony, whether that testimony covers privileged or nonprivileged matter.
On the other hand, we conclude that the legal advice that Mercer gave Hil-dreth was misleading, whether or not so intended — at least in respect to absolutely privileged matters. The failure of the plaintiff below to make a timely objection or a motion to limit discovery in regard to Hil-dreth's testimony did not constitute a waiver of a work product privilege as to matters clearly outside the scope of permissible discovery. See Insurance Company of North America v. Noya, 398 So.2d 836 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). An attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning the client's case are opinion work product and are absolutely privileged. See State v. Rabin, 495 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). This absolute privilege is expressly recognized in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
We believe that Bailey substantially contributed to this problem by his contumacious conduct: although objecting to the scheduled discovery deposition of Hildreth, Bailey failed to obtain a protective order and failed to attend (or have some other attorney attend) the deposition; he did not reveal to Hildreth why the latter was listed as a witness nor did he instruct Hildreth as to any restrictions in regard to the latter's testimony at the imminent deposition; and he made no effort to cooperate with opposing counsel in scheduling the depositions precipitated by his own last minute motion to add additional witnesses. We therefore disagree with the award of any fees to Bailey.
The core question raised by the instant petition is whether the improper questioning of Hildreth by Mercer (i.e., that which was directed toward matters absolutely privileged) resulted in defense counsel gaining an unfair advantage over the plaintiff which could only be alleviated by removal of defense counsel from the case. See Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although the trial judge expounds at some length in his factual findings orí the improper questions propounded by Mercer, our reading of the deposition leads us to conclude that, given Hildreth's limited knowledge of the ease, Mercer acquired no useful information from him that constituted absolutely privileged matter— ie., the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of Bailey or confidential communications emanating from Willis. Indeed, at oral argument Bailey was unable to explain, at least to the satisfaction of the appellate panel, any disadvantage he suffered as a result of Mercer's improper questions in regard to absolutely privileged matter. Information that was entitled to be shielded as work product, but was not absolutely privileged, was waived by Bailey's failure to attend the deposition and his failure to instruct Hildreth in regard to the latter's scheduled testimony. None of the information Mercer actually acquired from Hildreth was information that Mercer was not entitled to acquire through other means.
Moreover, it is difficult to perceive what beneficial facts Mercer could have discovered from Hildreth. This is not a 'complex case. Even Bailey refers to this action as a simple premises liability case. That appears to be an apt description. Plaintiff jumped, or was pushed, into a motel swimming pool where she stepped on a Sprite bottle and fractured her foot. The asserted negligence was that the defendant's pool was unlighted at the time, thereby preventing the plaintiff from seeing the bottle. Mercer was able to determine from the investigator that the plaintiff had indicated that the pool was unlighted when she went into it,,and that she then stepped on the bottle. This information revealed nothing inconsistent with plaintiffs cause of action as set out in her complaint. How, then, was it prejudicial? What "tremendous advantage" did the defense gain?
We conclude, therefore, that defense counsel did not obtain such an unfair advantage in this case as to justify their removal from the case. It was sufficient in this unusual, not to say bizarre, factual scenario for the trial judge to refer this matter to the Florida Bar for consideration of any ethical violations, such referral being a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.
Finally, we observe that the circumstances of this case present a textbook example of lack of cooperation between opposing counsel. We would expect more civility from Beavis and Butthead than was displayed here by Attorneys Bailey and Mercer. We commend their attention to Judge Nesbitt's opinion in Sanchez v. Sanchez, 435 So.2d 347, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983):
[A] lawyer should be courteous to and accede to the reasonable requests of his opposing counsel regarding matters which will not prejudice the rights of his client. Fla. Bar Code Prof. Resp., E.C. 7-38. The proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will make the decisional process prompt and just without impinging upon the obligation of zealous representation. Fla. Bar Code Prof. Resp. E.C. 7-39.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for cer-tiorari and quash the trial court's order of disqualification and its fee award. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CERTIORARI GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; AND CAUSE REMANDED.
HARRIS, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
ANTOON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
. Although Bailey styled this notice as a motion, it effectively amended the witness list.
. There is nothing in the record before us to substantiate such instructions from the trial court, and the petitioner here denies there were any such instructions. Although certain depositions had been scheduled by agreement for the following week, the attorneys had no agreement concerning discovery in regard to the 12 additional witnesses, including Hildreth, who were listed in Bailey's notice.
. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(3) provides:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that party's representative, including that party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent, only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of the materials when the required showing had been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal the-oríes of any attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Without the required showing a party may obtain a copy of a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request without the required showing a person not a party may obtain a copy of a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for an order to obtain a copy. The provisions of rule 1.380(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred as a result of making the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or transcription of it that is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. (Emphasis added).
. See Frost, The Topic is Civility, 71 Fla. B.J. 6 (Jan. 1997); Davis, Thoughts on the "Emperor Complex," the "Scorched Earth Policy," and Lawyer Professionalism, 73 Fla. B.J. 30 (Feb. 1999).