Case Name: Patrick Coyle vs. Succession of William Creevy
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1882-04
Citations: 34 La. 539
Docket Number: No. 8073
Parties: Patrick Coyle vs. Succession of William Creevy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 539–545

Head Matter:
No. 8073.
Patrick Coyle vs. Succession of William Creevy.
An appeal "bond is good though the name of the surety is not mitten in the body of that instrument, if it is signed at the bottom of it.
An executor may take a suspensive appeal on giving bond for costs only. Affirming previous decisions.
An opponent suing on a note indorsed by the deceased must show protest and notice before he can recover. Claims for money loaned are prescribed by three years. Neither can oral testimony he received or considered, nor can entries of the creditor, unsigned by the debtor, have effect to prove an interruption of prescription against a deceased person. The judgment obtained by a creditor against a succession representative is equivalent only to a recognition by the latter. Its effects are to interrupt prescription, to give the creditor the right of intervening in the succession, but it does not conclude the creditors of the succession. In a con curso in an insolvent succession, such judgment creditor is bound to prove his claim when assailed.
Rent of a house leased by the year to the deceased who, by contract with another person, saw hound to provide such, the latter paying housekeeping expenses, and supplying the wants of the family of both, is a debt chargeable to the succession from and after the death of th e lessee. Such rent is to he deducted from the $1,000 homestead allowed to the necessitous minors of the deceased, as they occupied the house. Relieving them from such deduction would he to give them the amount fixed by law for their relief. The law, being in derogation of common right, must he strictly construed. Such rent is not chargeable to the executor, on the ground that he should have rented said premises, and not permitted them to he occupied by the necessitous orphans of the deceased
APPEAL from tbe Civil District Court for tbe Parish of Orleans. Mghtor, J,
Beovy <£• KruttseJuiitl, W. S, Benedict, A, B. Tucker, for Opponents and Appellees.
Singleton c6 Browne and B. J?. Ohoate, for tbe Executor, Appellant.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
Tbe opinion of tbe Court was delivered by
Poché, J.
Among other reasons urged for tbe dismissal of this appeal, is tbe following.
That the appeal bond does not contain, in the body of the instrument, the namo of any party signing' the same as surety.
The bond reads that: "We, Richard Y. Hopkins, executor of Win. Creevy, as principal and as security, are firmly held and bound, etc.," and is signed by Hopkins and by R. Loeliger.
Nothing in the instrument indicates in what capacity or for what purpose Loeliger affixed his signature to the instrument, and wo cannot assume that he intended to bind himself as security on the bond.
The contract of suretyship cannot bo presumed, but must bo distinctly alleged and clearly proven, to justify judgment against any one held as security. As a man binds himself, so must he be bound, and this instrument, considered in all its parts, fails to inform us, whether, or in what manner and capacity, Loeligor undertook to bind himself. The bond is, therefore, before us without surety, and it cannot be maintained as legal. 30 A. 1127.
Counsel on both sides refer to the decision rendered in the succession of L. W. Lyons, not reportod, but to be found in Opinion Book SO, page S70, and appellant's attorneys urgently invoke that opinion as conclusive of the point, and as supporting their views of the legality and sufficiency of the bond in this case.
An inspection of that decision shows that the ground for the dismissal of the appeal was identical with the one now under consideration, but that the appeal was dismissed and not maintained, as suggested by appellant in his brief.
His counsel must, by inadvertance, have read the dissenting opinion of Judge DeBlane, and not that of the majority of the Court.
On the authority of that case, we conclude that the motion to dismiss must prevail.
It is, therefore, ordered that the appeal taken in this case be dismissed, at appellant's costs.