Case Name: Elder, v. McIntosh
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1911-04-01
Citations: 88 S.C. 286
Docket Number: 7846
Parties: Elder, v. McIntosh.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 286–296

Head Matter:
7846
Elder, v. McIntosh.
Dower — Homestead.—The alienee of the husband cannot claim homestead in the land aliened, against a judgment in favor of alienor’s widow for a sum of money assessed in lieu of her dower in the land.
Mr. Justice Woods dissenis.
Before Klugi-i, J., Fairfield, July, 1909.
Affirmed.
Action by Elizabeth Elder against Simon McIntosh, Patsy McIntosh et ah, in probate court for dower. So much of the circuit decree oni the exceptions to the report of commissioners to set aside homestead as' is necessary to show the issues, and this adjudication is:
“The plaintiff, Elizabeth Elder, who brings this action for dower, was lawfully married to Francis Elder in 1873, and subsequently, in the same year, he was seized of a lot of five acres of land in the town of Winnsboro, on which was his dwelling house. In 1882, he executed to J. E. McDonald, Esq., as assignee, for the benefit of his creditors, an assignment of his property, including -said -house and lot, and thereafter said lot was subdivided into a number of smaller lots, which were sold in December, 1882, by the assignee. Two of said smaller lots lying contiguous to one another, on one of which was said dwelling house, known as lots D and M, were purchased by Mrs. C. D. Ellison, and she- held them until the year 1890'. While she so held -them’ the dwelling house was destroyed by fire, and a policy of insurance of the same was paid to her.
“In 1890, Mrs. Ellison conveyed the said two lots to T. H. Ketchin and T. K. Elliott, by a deed with general warranty, and on the same day that the conveyance was made to them, said Ketchin and Elliott.conveyed said two1 lots to Amelia McIntosh, and she held the same until she died, intestate, in 1905, whereupon said land descended to her husband and children — all of whom are parties defendant herein — as her heirs at law, and her said husband and two of her children,both adults, are now in possession thereof.
“Francis Elder, the husband of plaintiff, died July 17, 1906, and the plaintiff’s right of dower, theretofore inchoate, then- accrued to her. Thereafter, she brought this action in1 the probate court again-st the defendants, as the parties in possession of the land to recover her dower, and, after due proceedings, the said Court found that she was entitled to dower in said land, arid decreed accordingly. A writ in dower was duly issued, and the commissioners named ini the writ made return thereof, certifying that, in their judgment, the said lots of land cann-ot be equally and fairly divided without manifest disadvantage, and they assessed and valued said two lots at the timé of the alienation thereof -by the husband, at $1,655, and assessed -one-sixth of said valuation, to wit, $275.83, with- interest from- July 17, 1906, the date of the death- of Francis- Elder, aggregating $299.53, as the sum of money to be paid the plaintiff by the defendants, in lieu of her dower in- said two lots.
“Upon hearing said return and exceptions thereto on-behalf of the defendants, the probate court confirmed the return and adjudged that the defendants pay to the plaintiff the sum so assessed, together with interest and costs. The defendants appealed from the judgment of the probate court to the Court of Common Pleas, but subsequently abandoned the appeal, and thereupon, the judgment confirming the return of the commissioners and requiring the payment by the defendants of the sum assessed in lieu of dower, became final and -conclusive upon all parties.
“The said judgment was duly enrolled in the probate court and a transcript of the same, as prescribed by law, was filed and entered in the office of the clerk of court of Fair-field county. Execution was duly issued for the enforcement of said judgment, directed to the sheriff of said county, and reciting the proceedings for the recovery of the plaintiff’s dower, and requiring said sheriff to satisfy said decree out of the personal property of the said defendants, or, if sufficient personal property cannot be found, then out of the real property belonging to said defendants. A certificate was endorsed on said execution to the effect that the same was issued for the enforcement of the decree for the value of the plaintiff’s dower, duly assessed and ordered to be paid by the defendants, in the two lots E and M, and said execution, so endorsed, was lodged in. the office of the sheriff of Fairfield county on April 10, 1908.
“Thereafter, the defendants served upon the sheriff a notice demanding that a homestead be set off to them before making any levy or sale under said execution. In pursuance of said demand, appraisers were appointed, who duly made their return, ini which the said lots E and M, together with another parcel of land, known as lot S, were set off as the homestead of the defendants, and the appraised value of said three lots was fixed at $850. Exceptions to said return were duly served on behalf of the plaintiff, and argument thereon was heard by me at the Spring term of the Court in February last. I reserved the case for further consideration, and it is proper to state here that my time has been so continuously occupied in holding the Courts of the Sixth and Fifth Circuits, that I have had no opportunity to give the matter the attention it required until now.
“It was admitted at the hearing that the land mentioned in the proceedings belonged to Amelia McIntosh, the wife of Simon, and mother of the other defendants; that the defendants have no interest in any other lands, and owned no- land in the lifetime of Amelia; that Simon and his. two. adult unmarried daughters are in actual possession of said lots, and have no personal property subject to execution.
“Dower is an interest in land of which the 'husband is seized during coverture, which arises- in favor of the wife immediately upon the concurrence of the fact of marriage, and the fact of seisin of the husband. It has been frequently held by our Courts to be independent of the control of the •husband and paramount to any interest that any one thereafter claiming under him can have. Cunningham v. Shannon, 4 Rich. Eq. 140. Accordingly, the inchoate right of •dower is superior to, or rather independent of, even the lien for taxes that are assessed after its inception against the lands of the husband in which the dower interest exists, and that, too, although a sale under the tax lien extinguishes the right of homestead. Shell v. Duncan, 31 S. C. 56.6.
“The contention in the present case, however, is not that the defendants’ claim of homestead excludes the plaintiff’s right to have her dower assigned in the land. As I understand the argument, it is conceded that the widow’s dower, if set off to her in kind in the two lots, L and M, cannot be defeated by the claim of homestead; but the defendants contend that when a sum of money is assessed to her in lieu o'f dower, and a judgment for said sum is -entered up against the defendants as the parties in possession of said land and execution issued thereon, said judgment is on the same footing which the judgment of any ordinary creditor of the defendants would have, and that the execution for its enforcement is process against which the' defendants- may claim homestead. Such a contention makes it necessary, to consider the nature of the assessment that is made as' a. substitute for dower. The statute, Civil. Code, section 2404, provides for such assessment," and not only authorizes, but ■requires, it -to be made in cases where the commissioners find- the facts to warrant it. That the present is such a'case is conclusively established by the judgment of the probate court. By the terms of the statute, the assessment provided for is said to be ‘in lieu of dower,’ that is to say, it stands in the place of, and as a substitute for the accrued right of dower. It is only allowed in cases where the land cannot be fairly and equally divided, so as to assign dower in kind — • where it would be to the manifest disadvantage not less- of the tenant or purchaser in possession than -o-f.the widow demandant to assign the proper proportion -of the land as dower.' Standing in lieu of, and being substituted for the dower estate, because of the necessity of the case, the assessment must retain the nature and incidents of the dower estate. Stock v. Parker,-2 McC. Ch. 382. It adheres to the land and is an> incumbrance or charg-e upon the land which, if not paid by the party against whom it is assessed, must be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the land. Williamson v. Gasque, 2é S. C. 100; Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S. C. 396. If is not a specific lien so as that, when reduced to judgment, such judgment takes rank because of its being- based upon the right of dower over other judgments, which would otherwise rank equally with or superior to it. But neither does a purchase money judgment have such prior rank; yet a purchase money judgment, by the terms of the 'Constitution and statute, is superior to- the right of homestead. The assessment in lieu of dower represents the value of the dower estate, and may fairly be said to be the purchase money of the estate. The law furnishes a close analogy to the assessment in lieu of dower in the case of a partition where the land cannot be fairly and equally divided in kind, and is set over to one of the cotenants upon the payment by him to each of the others of a sum of money assessed by commissioners equivalent to the value and in lieu of their respective shares. Manifestly, the cotenant thus taking the whole of the land cannot, by claiming the same as his homestead, and procuring it to be set off to him as such, defeat the right of his cotenants to have the lands subjected to the payment of their shares. The value of the shares so assessed represents the purchase money of the ■same against which there can be no claim of homestead in the common property by the one cotenant against the other. Of course, the right of homestead would be an effectual shield of other property than that in which the dower estate exists, as against the judgment for dower.”
From this decree the defendants appeal.
Messrs. Ragsdále & Dixon and J. B. McDonald, for appellants. Mr. McDonald
cites: Descent of homestead: 20 S. C. 248; 45 S. C. 64. Conditions must exist at time of attempted sale: 21 S. C. 11; 23 S. C. 327. Homestead cannot he sold: 24 S. C. 424; 26 S. C. 1; 39 S. C. 237; 45 S. C. 61; 51 'S. C. 493; 54 S. C. 208; 73 S. C. 329. Obligations homestead is liable for: 19 S. C. 242; 21 S. C. 136>; 22 S. C. 312; 35 S. C. 54; 45 S. C. 64; 25 S. C. 98; 54 S. C. 313. Right to assess money in lieu of dower: 24 S. C. 100, 359. Judgment thereon cannot be a lien except on dower interest: 2 Rich. 164; 24 S. C. 100. And cannot defeat homestead: 8 S. C. 87; 15 S. C. 36; 30 S. C. 459; 59 S. C. 70; 64 S. C. 82.
Messrs. A. S. & W. D. Douglass, contra. Mr. A. S. Douglass
cites: Rule of valuation: 4 McC. 352; 12 S. C. 39; 35 S. C. 613; 24 S. C. 355. Vested right of dower is an encumbrance on the land: 2 Strob. 81; 9 Rich. 374; 27 S- C. 193; 31 S. C. 566. A sum assessed for equality of partition is free from homestead: 30 S. C. 464; 14 S. C. 11; 33 S. C. 229; 47 S. C. 453; 52 S. C. 221. Judgment in dower is breach of warranty: 5 S. C. 405; 9 Rich. 374; 1 N. and McC. 104. Dower judgment is not on a debt due by defendants: 25 S. C. 572. Homestead cannot be assigned in undivided interest in land: 26 S. C. 227; 28 S. C. 133.
April 1, 1911.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Hydrick.
The facts out of which this appeal arises are fully stated in the opinion of the Circuit Court. The sole question is whether an alienee of the husband can claim homestead in the land aliened against a judgment in favor of alienor's widow for a sum of money assessed in lieu of her dower in the land.
The provision of the Constitution exempting to the head of any family a homestead in lands was not intended, nor can it be construed, to shield the homestead against a right, title or encumbrance which is paramount to the right of homestead. When the right of dower attaches to land, it is paramount to the right of any other person claiming the land, or any interest therein under the husband by any subsequent act of his. Tibbetts v. Langley Mfg. Co., 12 S. C. 465; Shell v. Duncan, 31 S. C. 566, 10 S. E. 330. It was unnecessary to rest the circuit decision, to any extent, upon the ground that the value of the dower estate may be said to be pro tanto the purchase money of the land, SO' as to bring the case within the exception in the 'Constitution of obligations contracted for the purchase money of the homestead. In other respects, the opinion of the Circuit Court, as reported, is satisfactory, and for the reasons therein stated, the judgment is affirmed.