Case Name: Harold W. BUSCHING v. Margree GRIFFIN
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1989-01-04
Citations: 542 So. 2d 860
Docket Number: No. 57965
Parties: Harold W. BUSCHING v. Margree GRIFFIN.
Judges: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 542
Pages: 860–870

Head Matter:
Harold W. BUSCHING v. Margree GRIFFIN.
No. 57965.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 4, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1989.
David L. Reynolds, Reynolds & Kilpa-trick, Jackson, for appellant.
Steve H. Smith, Smith & Case, Ridge-land, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTSON, Justice,
for the Court:
I.
Without hint of fraud or suggestion of incompetence, a Madison County woman has granted to another a written option to purchase her family's land in Ridgeland, Mississippi. Second thoughts suggested that the $50,000.00 purchase price was too low, and, when optionee gave notice of his intent to exercise the option, the woman said she thought the option fee was a loan to pay her taxes and, in any event, that the written option agreement was too vague to enforce. The court below accepted the woman's view and let her off the hook. We reverse and render, for otherwise the integrity and enforceability of written contracts would be greatly in doubt.
II.
A.
On July 27, 1981, Margree Griffin executed an instrument labeled Option to Purchase. Her acknowledgment was taken by a Madison County notary public. Griffin then delivered the option to Harold Busch-ing. The instrument recited that until December 15,1981, Busching had an option to purchase for $50,000.00 a tract of land in Ridgeland, Mississippi, a description of the property being attached as an exhibit. Busching paid $500.00 for the option.
The property is said to consist of "five (5) acres, more or less, more particularly described" as
All that tract of land lying and being in Section 24, Township 7 North, Range 1 East, and being that portion of Lot 3, Block 16, Highland Colony Sudivision, lying north of Old Agency Road and west of Interstate Highway 55, as said highways are presently constituted, and being in Madison County, Mississippi.
In relevant part, the option agreement provides:
4. Purchase Price. The total purchase price for the property described shall be $50,000 to be paid by Busching if this option is exercised, the terms of such sale will be provided in an agreement to be exercised between Griffin and Busching. The sum paid for this option shall be credited on account of the cash payment to be made on the closing as will be provided in the agreement.
Paragraph 6 of the option states:
6. Exercise Option. If this option is exercised as herein provided, Griffin and Busching will respectively, as Seller and Purchaser, perform the obligations in the form of agreement to be made between them.
The option was signed by Griffin and recorded by Busching in the land records of Madison County.
On January 26, 1982, and on March 4, 1982, for valuable cash considerations, Griffin granted extensions of Busching's option until January 22, 1984. It seems that Griffin had a problem with family members about title. These extensions were likewise recorded in the Madison County land records.
On July 8, 1983, Busching, through his attorneys, wrote Griffin saying he understood that she had received clear title and notifying her that he intended to exercise the option. He requested that closing take place within ten days. Nothing happened. Busching then wrote Griffin directly on August 10, 1983, and told her that he intended to exercise the option to purchase. Again Busching requested that the closing take place within ten days. Griffin refused to perform.
B.
Busching formally commenced this civil action on September 2, 1983, when he filed his complaint in the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi. Busching asked that the Court order Griffin to perform her obligations under the option. Griffin moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Miss.R.Civ.P., on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Chancery Court granted her motion.
Busching appealed and we reversed, holding that Busching was entitled to proceed further under his complaint. See Busching v. Griffin, 465 So.2d 1037 (Miss.1985) (Bunching I). En route we stated
We therefore reverse and remand this case for additional proof upon the intent of the parties and the ability of Busching to meet whatever terms of payment Griffin may lawfully require.
Busching I, 465 So.2d at 1042-43.
Pursuant to our remand, a hearing on the merits was held on December 2, 1985. Griffin not only sought to vary the terms of the option agreement she had signed and acknowledged; she denied it entirely, though without claiming any species of fraud. Griffin said Busching did nothing but loan her some money to pay her taxes. When questioned as to how she expected to be paid the $50,000.00 under the agreement, Griffin stated that she "did not expect this money to be paid at all" since the land belonged to "all twelve of us" and "the money I had got from him [Busching] was a loan."
In support of his suit for specific performance, Busching testified that, when he contracted with Griffin, she indicated she needed some money to pay taxes on the land. Griffin told Busching she wanted to sell the land but didn't know if she could since there was a problem with the title.
I suggested to her that until we could clarify what the situation was with the land, that I advance her the money and we take some sort of an option on the land until such time as the land — the title could be cleared up on the land — which she agreed to. She indicated the amount of money that she wanted for the property and the amount of money that she needed then and I made a basic agreement with her over the phone and we proceeded in that fashion.
Busching repeated that he wished to exercise the option according to its terms and that he stood ready, willing and able to pay Griffin $50,000.00 in cash at the time of closing, or that he would pay for the property via any reasonable terms proposed by Griffin. He admitted that they never discussed surveying the property, the type of deed being considered, taxes, or easements on the property.
On April 1, 1986, the Chancery Court issued a ruling denying Busching's claim for specific performance. The Court held that the Option to Purchase was too vague and uncertain and "was simply an agreement to enter into a contract at some future date." Final judgment was entered May 23, 1986.
Busching's second appeal is now before us.
III.
Two preliminary words need be said.
A.
While Busching I carefully considered many of the problems lurking in this case, the bottom line was a holding that the Chancery Court had erred when it granted Griffin's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Miss.R.Civ.P. Busching's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. It was certainly within this Court's power to have limited the issues that could be heard upon remand— and this would have been done had we felt the motion in part had been correctly granted and in part erroneously granted. Notwithstanding, we imposed no such limitation in Busching I. Upon remand the case assumed exactly that status it would have had if the Chancery Court had denied Griffin's motion to dismiss. Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 226 (Miss.1988); Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Publishing Co., Inc., 487 So.2d 843, 846 (Miss.1986).
Busching I should not be read for more than what it is: a careful and methodical explanation of why the Chancery Court had erred in dismissing Busching's complaint. No law of the case principles set in, except of course on the proposition that Busch- ing's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. When Busching I observes that there are ambiguities in the option agreement, this is for the purpose of explaining why the motion to dismiss should have been denied. Busching I announces no holding on this point which Griffin can subsequently turn into a sword.
B.
The second word concerns our scope of review. We are presented what is essentially a question of law: whether the option agreement is sufficiently clear that it may undergird a decree for specific performance. The judicial task is to view the terms of the document, find their legal meaning, and adjudge their enforceability vel non. The familiar manifest error/substantial evidence rules have no application to our appellate review of such questions. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So.2d 1202, 1206 (Miss.1979); S & A Realty Co. v. Hilburn, 249 So.2d 379, 382 (Miss.1971). Cf. UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital, Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss.1987).
Griffin makes much of the notion that she never understood she was giving Busching an option, rather that she was merely borrowing money with which to pay her taxes. Indeed, Griffin makes a series of factual allegations designed to avoid her obligations under the option. She stops short, however, of claiming fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching or any other , unconscionable conduct. She in no way denies her competence to grant the option. Taking Griffin's factual defenses as true, they fail as a matter of law. As we say, the manifest error/substantial evidence rule offers no aid on this appeal.
IV.
A.
The outcome determinative issue is Busching's attack upon the Chancery Court's holding that the option was no binding contract at all, only an "agreement to agree." Our policy regarding such matters was established in Jones v. McGahey, 187 So.2d 579 (Miss.1966) wherein we stated:
Determination that an agreement is sufficiently definite is favored in the courts, so as to carry out the reasonable intention of the parties if it can be ascertained. A contract is sufficiently definite if it contains matter which would enable the court under proper rules of construction to ascertain its terms, including consideration of the general circumstances of the parties and if necessary relevant extrinsic evidence. Having found a contract to have been made, an agreement should not be frustrated where it is possible to reach a reasonable and fair result. [citations omitted]
187 So.2d at 584. We have approved these views in Etheridge v. Ramzy, 276 So.2d 451, 455 (Miss.1973); McGee v. Clark, 343 So.2d 486, 489 (Miss.1977)—and in Busching I, 465 So.2d at 1040.
The point is not new. In Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. J.M. Guffee Petroleum Co., 86 Miss. 60, 38 So. 302 (1905), we said:
A stipulation to reduce a valid written contract to some other form does not affect its validity, and the stipulation may not be used by either of the parties for the purpose of . evading performance of any of the provisions of the contract.
86 Miss. at 66, 38 So. at 304.
Others outside our borders appear of like mind. The late Prof. Corbin has written:
Two persons may fully agree upon the terms of a contract knowing that there are other matters on which they have not agreed and on which they expect further negotiation. Such an expectation does not prevent the agreement already made from being an enforceable contract.
1 Corbin, The Law Of Contracts 94-95 (1963). See also Volk v. Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co., 139 N.J.Eq. 171, 50 A.2d 488 (N.J.Ch.1947) (specific performance decreed of option to purchase at stated price even though the option contained the following: "The terms of the said sale to be determined and settled by the parties hereto at the time of the exercise of the option.")
The holder of an option is entitled to specific performance of the optionor's duty to convey, so long as the holder is willing to pay the option price. Clinton Service Co. v. Thornton, 233 Miss. 1, 10, 100 So.2d 863, 867 (Miss.1958). Harold Busching testified that he stands ready, willing and able to deliver $50,000.00 cash to Griffin — and that he has been so since July of 1983. This suggests strongly that he is entitled to a decree that Griffin execute and deliver a proper instrument of conveyance.
McGee v. Clark concerns, with one exception, an identical situation. The option in McGee provided for a downpayment of a portion of the total purchase price, with the balance to be financed and secured by a deed of trust, with payments annually in specified installments at a specific rate of interest. McGee held that option contract specifically enforceable, rejecting a charge of vagueness and ambiguity. We find nothing in McGee that would lead us to think that the Court would have decided the question otherwise had the option provision on the matter of purchase price been worded as is the case of the one here. The key term whose specificity must appear is the purchase price — here $50,000.00. That this sum may be paid according to different terms ranging from lump sum to a complete installment arrangement are but differing mechanisms for accomplishing the same economic event. And when Busching states under oath that he is willing to pay' the $50,000.00 in cash or according to such installment terms as may be reasonable and lawful, he eliminates any possible claim of ambiguity for the obvious reason that there is no longer any way the provision may be construed to Griffin's detriment.
All of this is quite consistent with the careful discussion in Busching I to the effect that, where an option fixes the purchase price but does not specifically fix the time for payment of the purchase price, the law construes the offer to be for cash on delivery and before title passes. Busching I, 465 So.2d at 1041.
B.
Two further points. First, we have considered the adequacy of the description of the property. That description appears on Exhibit "A" to the Option to Purchase and is recited verbatim at the outset of Part 11(A) above. The suggestion is that there are more than five acres in the disputed tract. Neither law nor language leave doubt how we should read an instrument respecting an interest in land when it uses words such as "five (5) acres, more or less" followed by "more particularly described" or the like. The "more particular" description controls, modifying, if not replacing, the "more or less" language. As to the legal adequacy of the "more particular" description, we must keep separate (1) "adequacy" for purposes of giving notice to third parties and perfecting interests against lien creditors and (2) "adequacy" between the parties. Nothing said here passes upon the adequacy of the description here vis-a-vis third parties or lien creditors. Suffice it to say that Griffin offers no suggestion that she is in doubt on the description and identity of the land she is to convey.
Second, we have considered whether Busching's exercise of the option is effective in view of the fact that he never placed a $50,000.00 check on the table and said to Griffin, "I tender the purchase price called for in the Option to Purchase". To be sure, that would have been one means by which Busching may have exercised the option, but not the only means. The notices Busching gave Griffin, personally and through counsel, were within the option period as extended. As such, they had the effect of an acceptance, converting the option into an enforceable bilateral contract. See Holifield v. Veterans' Farm & Home Board, 218 Miss. 446, 450-52, 67 So.2d 456, 457-58 (1953); Hollingsworth v. Bilbo, 211 Miss. 155, 158, 51 So.2d 229 (1951). Of course, Griffin has no obligation to tender a deed until Busching is prepared simultaneously to deliver in exchange his check for the purchase price.
V.
The Chancery Court took a very different — and quite erroneous — view of the case. First, the. Court found the Option to Purchase "vague and uncertain and ambiguous . simply an agreement to enter into a contract at some future date...." Griffin tries to bolster this conclusion in her brief, noting a variety of details upon which the parties had made no specific agreement. All of Griffin's talk about what the parties had not agreed on cannot obscure what they did agree on: that, if Busching exercised the option, Griffin would sell him the property for $50,000.00. In any event, McGee v. Clark and the discussion in Part IV above unmask the error of this portion of the opinion below.
Second, the Chancery Court credited— but in a curious way — Griffin's testimony that she never intended to give Busching an option, that all she wanted was loans to pay her taxes. Griffin had said she never thought of the $500.00 Busching paid her in July of 1981 and the $400.00 paid in March of 1982 as anything but loans that had to be repaid. She didn't remember what the $25.00 Busching paid her in January of 1982 was for. What is of note is the Court's failure to predicate its judgment on this view. Careful reading of the opinion below reveals the ambiguity point as the sole predicate of the judgment for Griffin. Yet en route the Court said it
believes the "Option to Purchase" . was nothing more in the eyes of the Defendant [Griffin] than something to secure the money she received, to pay the taxes until the title was cleared, from the Plaintiff [Busching]; ."
The point implicates our parol evidence rule. That rule provides that where a document is incomplete parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms but, in no event, to contradict them. Carter v. Collins, 151 Miss. 1, 8, 117 So. 336, 338 (1928); what happened below is that Griffin attempted, and the court permitted her, to destroy the written contract. In Alliance Trust Co., Ltd. v. Armstrong, 185 Miss. 148, 186 So. 633 (1939), the Court employed language and reasoning equally applicable here:
To permit a party when sued on a written contract, to admit that he signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.
Alliance Trust, 185 Miss. at 163-64, 186 So. at 635.
Undaunted, Griffin seeks to deny the express provisions of the agreement she signed. She argues that the rule offers no bar to her testimony of her understanding where the writing is incomplete, ambiguous or where the evidence is not offered to vary the terms of the written agreement. See, e.g., Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 462 So.2d 719, 725 (Miss.1985). But at most this means that parol evidence is admissible on those points where there is ambiguity. Such evidence may not be received to contradict parts of the option that are not ambiguous. The least ambiguous part of the option is that, if it were exercised, Griffin would sell Busching the property for $50,000.00.
We noted above that Griffin makes no claim Busching practiced any fraud upon her. A review of the writings Griffin signed makes clear just how legally innocent Busching is.
On July 27, 1981, Griffin signed the option agreement at issue in the presence of a notary public. On January 22, 1982, Griffin signed an Extension of Option to Purchase, again in the presence of a notary public. On the same day she signed a typed Receipt which recited that she had been paid $25.00 of the option extension.
Then, on March 4, 1982, Griffin executed an Agreement which extended until January 22, 1984, the date by which Busching had to exercise his option. This Agreement was also signed before a notary public. On the same day, Griffin signed a Receipt. That writing recited Griffin's acknowledgment that she had been paid $400.00 "being the consideration for the Extension of Option to Purchase granted by me to Harold Busching."
The record contains not so much as a hint that Griffin was incompetent. That she was inexperienced in buying and selling property is legally irrelevant, absent some suggestion that Griffin has been defrauded, subjected to undue influence or overreaching or something of that sort. If we were to allow Griffin to escape her obligations under this option, the precedent would imperil all contracts where, before performance, one party smelled a sweeter deal. We have established in our law that
the mere fact that the defendant [Griffin here] made a bad trade or bargain is not sufficient to defeat an obligation for specific performance.
Clinton Service Company v. Thornton, 233 Miss. 1, 11, 100 So.2d 863, 867 (1958); see also Pickett v. Boutwell, 240 Miss. 18, 22, 125 So.2d 822, 824 (1961).
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.
DAN M. LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, J., dissent by separate written opinion.
. Innuendos appear in the papers before us that Griffin may not after all possess fee simple title to the property. That is a matter not formally before us and upon which we express no opinion, except to observe the obvious: that Griffin has no power to convey interests she does not have.