Case Name: PEOPLE v. BROWN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-09-06
Citations: 206 Mich. App. 535
Docket Number: Docket No. 139411
Parties: PEOPLE v BROWN
Judges: Before: Gribes, P.J., and Shepherd and P. E. Deegan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 206
Pages: 535–554

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v BROWN
Docket No. 139411.
Submitted November 2, 1993, at Detroit.
Decided September 6, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Kevin A. Brown was convicted following a joint bench trial in the Detroit Recorder’s Court, M. John Shamo, J., of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of assault with intent to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty to forty years for the murder and assault convictions, and to a consecutive term of two years for the felony-firearm conviction. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
The defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
P. E. Deegan, J., in an opinion with which Gribbs, P.J., concurred in the result only, stated: ■
1. The defendant’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination, as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and protected by the procedural safeguards in Miranda v Arizona, 348 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 76 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and the defendant’s right to counsel, as secured by Const 1963, art 1, § 20, were not violated during the defendant’s second interrogation while in police custody when the police officer conducting the interrogation failed to inform the defendant that an attorney retained by his mother was available and waiting to confer with him. The trial court correctly refused to suppress evidence of the defendant’s voluntary statement at the second interrogation session.
2. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a separate trial or in admitting evidence of the statements of the codefendants.
3. The defendant’s sentences do not violate the principle of proportionality.
Shepherd, J., dissenting, stated that the right to counsel under Const 1963, art 1, § 20 and the right against compelled self-incrimination under Const 1963, art 1, § 17 encompass the right to be informed about retained counsel’s attempts to contact the suspect. The case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial at which evidence of the defendant’s statement at the second interrogation session would be excluded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Nancy A. Neff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Cyril C. Pessina, for the defendant on appeal.
Before: Gribes, P.J., and Shepherd and P. E. Deegan, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
P. E. Deegan, J.
I agree with Judge Shepherd's recitation of the facts.
I also agree with Judge Shepherd that we should defer to the trial court with respect to its findings of fact regarding the police activity during the questioning of the defendant. Defendant alleged that the police engaged in a variety of improper behavior, including the misrepresentation of the defendant's whereabouts to an attorney. Judge Shepherd concluded, and I agree, that "there is no evidence that they deliberately tried to conceal [the] defendant's location." Post at 547.
I further agree that the most important issue regarding the defendant's second statement is "whether the officers' [failure] to inform defendant of [an] attorney's attempts to contact him," post at 547, violated the privilege against compelled self-incrimination as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and protected by the procedural safeguards in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 76 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), or the right to counsel as secured by Const 1963, art 1, § 20, or both.
However, I do not agree with Judge Shepherd that the facts of this case justify extending the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. I do not believe the police in this case were required to interrupt their interrogation of the defendant in order to inform him that an attorney, hired by a third party, was asking to talk with him. I find it significant that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, and that he never indicated to the police that he wanted an attorney.
The facts of this case differ in several important respects from those in People v Wright, 441 Mich 140; 490 NW2d 351 (1992). In Wright, the police did not advise the defendant of his constitutional rights until he had been in custody for over five hours. In the instant case, the police read the defendant his rights shortly after he voluntarily walked into the police station. The police in this case, in contrast to the police in Wright, reread to the defendant his rights before questioning him a second time. The defendant here, unlike the defendant in Wright, signed a standard constitutional rights notification form each time before he was questioned. The police stated that when they advised the defendant of his constitutional rights he declared that he understood those rights; he did not appear to be under the influence of any chemical substance, and he was cooperative. The defendant never asked to telephone a family member or a lawyer.
In Wright, the police engaged in coercive behavior. They deprived the defendant of food, and only gave him some water after nine hours in custody. They placed the defendant in a small room, four feet by five feet, in order to get him to confess. In addition, they threatened to charge the defendant with first-degree murder unless he confessed. Indeed, Justice Brickley, in his concurring opinion in Wright, makes it clear that Wright's statement should have been suppressed because "he was deprived of food, sleep, and contact with friendly outsiders, combined with the fact that he was not informed of available retained counsel." Id. at 172. Justice Brickley expressly relied on "[t]he sum of these circumstances" in his decision to concur in the result in Wright. Id.
The police in the present case provided breakfast for the defendant, and did not engage in any coercive behavior similar to that in Wright. The police treated the defendant justly. That is evidenced by the defendant's second statement, in which he wrote the word "fair" in response to how he had been treated.
Because the facts in this case are not egregious and are dissimilar to those in Wright, I adopt the rationale of Justice Riley, dissenting in Wright, supra at 172-180 (Boyle and Griffin JJ., concurring).
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Riley relied on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), which was written by Justice O'Connor for the six-member majority. Id. at 415-434. Judge Shepherd suggests that we adopt Justice Mallett's analysis in Wright, supra at 142-155. I am convinced that such a decision would establish a "rule that focuses on how the police treat an attorney — conduct that has no relevance at all to the degree of compulsion experienced by the defendant during interrogation — [and] would ignore both Miranda's mission and its only source of legitimacy." Moran, supra at 425.
Moreover, I believe that Judge Shepherd's suggestion would create a multiplicity of) needless and confusing legal questions for Michigan courts when applying Miranda, for example:
To what extent should the police be held ac countable for knowing that the accused has counsel? Is it enough that someone in the station house knows, or must the interrogating officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the suspect? Do counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal investigation trigger the obligation to inform the defendant before interrogation may proceed on a wholly separate matter? [Moran, supra at 425.]
In short, Judge Shepherd's suggestion would create in Michigan a Gordian knot concerning Miranda rights.
Because the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Wright and I am convinced that the reasoning in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Moran is superior, I find the decision of the police not to inform the defendant, while interrogating him, of an attorney's attempts to contact him did not violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and protected by the procedural safeguards in Miranda. Accordingly, I find no error in the trial court's decision not to suppress the defendant's second statement.
I am also convinced that the right to counsel as secured by Const 1963, art 1, § 20 does not include the right to be informed that counsel, retained by a third party, is attempting to contact the suspect.
The general rule [is] that a defendant has no right to counsel until the right attaches automatically after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings. . . . [An] exception [exists] for pretrial identification procedures . . . because of the unique elements of confrontation that these procedures present. . . . Normal custody interrogations have never been analyzed under the right to counsel simply because that right has not yet attached at this investigative stage. [Wright, supra at 173, n 4 (Justice Riley dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices Boyle and Griffin).]
Therefore, I do not find that the defendant's second statement was obtained in violation of the right to counsel as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Accordingly, I find no error in the trial court's refusal to suppress the defendant's second statement.
Notwithstanding established Michigan case law to the contrary, Judge Shepherd would extend the right to counsel to encompass a suspect's "right to be informed about [a] retained counsel's attempts to contact [him]." Post at 548. In support of his view, Judge Shepherd relies on the decisions of three foreign jurisdictions: People v West, 81 NY2d 370, 372-374; 599 NYS2d 484; 615 NE2d 968 (1993); State v Hattaway, 621 So 2d 796, 801 (La, 1993); and State v Lefthand, 488 NW2d 799, 801-802 (Minn, 1992). I believe that all of those cases are inapposite. In West, the defendant had an existing attorney-client relationship, and both Hattaway and Lefthand involved defendants who had court-appointed attorneys. In the present case, on the other hand, the defendant did not have an attorney, did not ask for an attorney, and did not retain an attorney on his own. Counsel was retained by a third party, not by the defendant. I find no reason to turn to foreign jurisdictions in light of our own established case law. The creation of such a novel extension would not advance the development of a sound Michigan constitutional right to counsel.
In summary, I conclude that defendant's second incriminating statement to the police, made while an attorney retained by a third party attempted to contact him, did not violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and protected by the procedural safeguards in Miranda or the right to counsel as guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to suppress the defendant's second statement should be affirmed.
Finally, I find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request for a separate trial or in admitting the codefendant's statements in a joint bench trial. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52-53; 492 NW2d 490 (1992); People v Butler, 193 Mich App 63, 66; 483 NW2d 430 (1992). I also conclude that the defendant's concurrent sentences of twenty to forty years' imprisonment for the murder and assault convictions do not violate the principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 659-660; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Affirmed.
Gribbs, P.J. I concur in the result only.