Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph RICO, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1998-04-27
Citations: 551 Pa. 526
Docket Number: No. 12 E.D. Appeal Docket 1996
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph RICO, Appellee.
Judges: Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 551
Pages: 526–552

Head Matter:
711 A.2d 990
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph RICO, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Oct. 18, 1996.
Decided April 27, 1998.
Reargument Denied June 24, 1998.
Catherine Marshall, Marilyn F. Murray, Philadelphia, for Com.
Jack M. Myers, Philadelphia, for Joseph Rico.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
This is a discretionary appeal from an order of the Superior Court vacating the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and remanding for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Rico, 443 Pa.Super. 507, 662 A.2d 1076 (1995). We reverse and remand.
Appellee, Joseph Rico, was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder of Robert Hornickle and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hornickle was lolled in January, 1983, after he tried to recover $14,000 he had given to Ronald DeCaprio and appellee in an unsuccessful attempt to buy marijuana. On appeal, Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to strike the jury panel as a result of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of Italian descent because such use violated appellee's rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Allocatur was granted on the issue of whether Batson applies where the prosecutor, in a case allegedly involving organized crime, has exercised peremptory challenges to disqualify prospective jurors of Italian descent.
Appellant, the Commonwealth, contends that the Superior Court incorrectly assumed Batson applies to Italian-Americans and, further, improperly disregarded the trial court's factual findings regarding the Batson claim. The following first addresses Batson and its progeny, then focuses on this court's jurisprudence, and finally addresses the issues before us.
The court in Batson held that a black state criminal defendant can raise an equal protection challenge by showing that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding from the jury members of the defendant's race. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. The court explained that although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise peremptory challenges for any reason related to his or her view concerning the outcome of the case, the equal protection clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the state's case against the black defendant. Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718, 90 L.Ed.2d at 81. Racial discrimination in selection of jurors, the court said, harms not only the accused and the potential jurors and but also the public's confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Id.
The Batson Court then stated that a defendant demonstrates a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. at 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d at 86. A prima facie case of a prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges can be demonstrated by showing the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87. In proving discrimination, the "defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' " Id. These facts and any other relevant circumstances "raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88.
Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. The prosecutor's explana tion, however, need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Id.
The trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful discrimination. Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. The trial judge has before him or her the entire venire and is well situated to detect whether a challenge to the seating of one juror is part of a pattern of singling out members of a single race for peremptory challenges. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89. Thus, deference to the trial court's finding on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular sense because the finding largely will turn on an evaluation of credibility. Id. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89 n. 21.
The Court extended Batson to other types of criminal cases, to civil cases and to cases alleging gender discrimination. Batson was held to apply in opposite race cases and to defendants. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (white state criminal defendant can object on equal protection grounds to the exclusion of black venirepersons through prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (Batson prohibits a white criminal defendant from using peremptory strikes to exclude black members from defendant's jury on account of their race)., Batson was applied in a case involving the use of challenges on the basis of racial and ethnic classifications. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (use of peremptory challenges to exclude two Latin-American, Spanish-speaking jurors did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights where jurors appeared to refuse to accept the official court interpreter's English translation). Batson was extended to civil cases. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (Batson applies in civil case with respect to classifications based on ancestry or skin color). And, Batson was further extended to gender cases in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (in a paternity and child support suit, equal protection clause prohibits gender discrimination in jury selection.)
This court has likewise held that the intentional, discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to exclude from the jury members of the defendant's race or gender violates the equal protection clause. Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988) (race-based peremptory challenges); Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 668 A.2d 491 (1995) (gender-based peremptory challenges).
In Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, supra, this court stated, as was articulated in Batson, that a criminal defendant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that:
1. the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race;
2. the peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate; and
3. facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the venire persons from the petit jury on account of the race of those persons.
Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, supra, 519 Pa. at 243, 546 A.2d at 1104. It is the combination of these factors in the selection of the jury that raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. Commonwealth v. Dinwiddle, 529 Pa. 66, 70-71, 601 A.2d 1216, 1218 (1992). The striking of a number of individuals belonging to some cognizable minority group, however, is not dispositive that a violation of Batson, has occurred. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 197, 555 A.2d 846, 850 (1989).
This court requires the defendant in his or her prima facie case to make a record concerning peremptory challenges specifically identifying:
1. the race or gender of all the venirepersons in the jury pools;
2. the race or gender of all venirepersons remaining after challenges for cause;
3. the race or gender of those removed by the prosecutor; and
4. the race or gender of the jurors who served and the gender of jurors acceptable by the Commonwealth who were stricken by the defense.
Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 246, 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (1993); Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, 542 Pa. at 519, 668 A.2d at 518.
After such a record is established, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether challenges were used to exclude venirepersons on account of race or gender. Id. If the court finds in the affirmative, the prosecutor is to offer neutral reasons for each of its strikes. Racially neutral uses of strikes were found in: Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 243, 546 A.2d 1101, 1104 (1988) (one juror was young and unemployed and another juror had a relative who had been lolled in a violent crime); Commonwealth v. Bond, 539 Pa. 299, 310, 652 A.2d 308, 313 (1995) (jurors equivocated on the death penalty or had a relative who had been convicted of murder); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 459, 644 A.2d 1167, 1173 (1994) (jurors were reluctant to impose the death penalty or had a short employment record). But see, Commonwealth v. Horne, 535 Pa. 406, 635 A.2d 1033 (1994) (prosecutor's reason for exclusion, that prospective juror lived in "high crime" area and was therefore desensitized to crime, was not race-neutral as applied to individual juror excluded (equally divided court)). The reasons for the challenge need not rise to the level of a "for cause" challenge. Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. at 520 n. 31, 668 A.2d at 519 n. 31. The findings of the trial court are to be given great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed absent a determination that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 69-71, 637 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1993).
The Commonwealth first argues that appellee failed to establish a prima facie case because Italian-American are not a cognizable group warranting protection from discrimination under Batson. The question of whether Batson extends to the ethnic classification of Italian-Americans has not been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court or this court.
The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, however, leads to a conclusion that Batson can apply to purposeful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges in jury selection based solely on ethnicity. The Court in Batson cited Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (Mexican-Americans are a cognizable group under the equal protection clause). Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87. See, Hernandez v. New York, supra (court examined peremptory challenges to members of ethnic group (Spanish-speaking Latin Americans) in the context of race discrimination).
The circuits that have looked at this issue have assumed, or have sidestepped the issue of whether, Batson applies generally to peremptory challenges on the basis of ethnicity. The circuits have usually decided that defendants presented no prima facie showing that, under Batson, Italian-Americans (or persons with Italian surnames) are a cognizable group that has been or is currently subjected to discriminatory treatment. United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 432-33 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844, 109 S.Ct. 117, 102 L.Ed.2d 91; United States v. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 276 (3rd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3216, 106 L.Ed.2d 566 (1989); United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S.Ct. 314, 102 L.Ed.2d 332 (1988); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063, 108 S.Ct. 1021, 98 L.Ed.2d 986 (1988). See also, Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828, 112 S.Ct. 99, 116 L.Ed.2d 70. (Americans of Irish ancestry were not a cognizable group for purpose of Batson claim that a prosecutor's use of peremptories to exclude jurors with Irish sur names violated equal protection). But see, United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678-79 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991) (Italian-American are cognizable group but prosecutor's explanations were neutral and not pretextual).
Cognizability, according to some circuits, is demonstrated by defendant's showing that an ethnic group is singled out for discrimination by the community and, thus, needs to be protected from community prejudices. A defendant must show the ethnic group: (1) is defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor or factors; (2) possesses a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences; (3) shares a community of interests such that the group's interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process; and, (4) has experienced or is experiencing discriminatory treatment and is in need of protection from community prejudices. United States v. Di Pasquale, supra, 864 F.2d at 277; United States v. Bucci, supra, 839 F.2d at 833 n. 11; United States v. Sgro, supra, 816 F.2d at 33.
We conclude that whether Italian-Amerieans comprise a cognizable group needing protection from community prejudices for purposes of Batson is a question of fact within the sound discretion of the trial court. In order to demonstrate cognizability, a defendant must show the ethnic group: (1) is defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor or factors; (2) possesses a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences; (3) shares a community of interests such that the group's interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process; and, (4) has experienced or is experiencing discriminatory treatment and is in need of protection from community prejudices. The mere spelling of a person's surname is insufficient to show that he or she belongs to a particular ethnic group. And, a conclusory statement that "Italian-Amerieans comprise a recognizable ethnic group," without more, does not constitute the requisite showing that Italian-Amerieans are a cognizable group for purposes of a Batson challenge.
The Superior Court suggests that the eognizability test be discarded because the focus of Batson is on the "discriminatory pattern allegedly employed." The court suggests that our Batson jurisprudence be replaced with a test probing whether the three purposes of Batson are served, i.e., a litigant's right to a jury selection process free of discrimination; a prospective juror's right to participate in a civic duty with confidence that he or she was evaluated by virtue of ability to serve, regardless of race or ethnic heritage; and, the community's right to an unquestioned belief that our system of justice operates without discrimination at every level. Commonwealth v. Rico, supra, 443 Pa.Super. at 514, 662 A.2d at 1080.
The Superior Court's position fails to recognize that Batson jurisprudence is grounded on the equal protection clause which prohibits the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on the basis of classification, i.e., membership in a cognizable group that has been singled out for discrimination by the community. Racial and gender groups have been singled out for discrimination to such an extent in communities of this nation that eognizability for these groups is generally recognized by the courts. The eognizability test, though, remains as the first inquiry in a Batson challenge and the evolution of Batson leads to no other conclusion. Thus, where the prosecutor, in a case allegedly involving organized crime, has exercised peremptory challenges to disqualify prospective jurors of Italian descent, the person challenging such use must first establish that Italian-Americans are a "cognizable group" before proceeding with the remaining steps of the Batson analysis.
Here, assuming the eognizability test was met in this case, no error on the part of the trial court has been demonstrated. The record reflects the following. Voir dire of prospective venirepersons for appellee's trial consumed four days. Prior to swearing in the first panel of prospective jurors, the trial court and counsel agreed to the questions the court would direct members of the panel to answer. They included inquiries with respect to a juror's age, occupation, place and length of residence, as well as a specific question, composed by the trial court, regarding a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial in light of "evidence in this case that might tend to connect the defendant and/or one or more of the witnesses with organized crime." According to the trial court, the question was designed to benefit the prosecution as well as the defense, since it would elicit "whether they would have a prejudice."
Batson challenges began with the prosecutor's third peremptory challenge. When appellee raised a Batson objection to the Commonwealth's use of its third and sixth peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors, Enrico Salvator and Linda Giordano, the trial court overruled the objections because appellee failed to establish that the venirepersons were of Italian descent. The following day, the court, after hearing argument, ruled that while the application of Batson to persons of Italian descent was unprecedented, she would, "in an abundance of caution," request the prosecutor to state his reason for further peremptory challenges of jurors who, by virtue of their current surnames, appeared to be of Italian descent. The trial court noted that "the record shows a purposeful exclusion or pattern of exclusion on the part of [the] Commonwealth on anybody who appears to be of Italian descent."
When the Commonwealth exercised its ninth peremptory challenge against venireperson Mary Tucci, whom the Commonwealth conceded was of Italian descent, the trial court asked for the reason for the strike. The court accepted as ethnically neutral the prosecutor's response that he believed the witness would not comprehend the facts of the case. When the Commonwealth's eleventh peremptory challenge was used against prospective juror Vincent Giorgi, who was of Italian descent, the trial court asked for the reason for the strike. The prosecutor said he thought he saw "fear in [Giorgi's] demeanor and his voice when organized crime was mentioned and that in conjunction with his Italian background led me to believe he would not be a juror suitable with this case." Further voir dire by the court reflected that the witness equivocated about whether the organized crime connections of the case would affect his ability to serve. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation for the strike.
The prosecutor's thirteenth peremptory challenge against potential juror Susan Bratrolla, whom the Commonwealth conceded was of Italian descent, was explained by the fact that she lived "in South Philadelphia in an area over which the mob will speak and I think she's subject to intimidation in an abundance of caution I'm striking her." The trial court found the reason was ethnically neutral.
The twentieth peremptory challenge was against potential alternate juror John Taconelli whom the prosecutor struck because he thought Taconelli was a "very strange person" and hesitated when asked by the trial court if the fact the case involved organized crime would affect his ability to be fair and impartial. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation for the strike.
Assuming Batson was triggered here, the Superior Court erred in rejecting the trial court's factual finding of no purposeful discrimination. The Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth had discriminatorily used peremptory challenges based on the court's own subjective assessment that the prosecutor had failed to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for his peremptory challenges of Mr. Giorgi and Ms. Bratolla. The appropriate review is whether the trial court's findings were clearly in error. Here, the trial court found that the prosecutor's reasons were ethnically neutral based on the testimony and its observations of the two individuals. Giving deference to the trial court's findings grounded on credibility determinations, we find no clear error that would warrant a disturbance of the trial court's conclusions.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a concurring opinion.
CASTILLE, J., files a concurring opinion in which NEWMAN, J., joins.
CAPPY, J., concurs in the result.
NIGRO, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The court recently explained that the burden is to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, even if the reason arguably makes no sense. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
. The court stated:
If any identifiable group is excluded on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, or other reason not related to a perception that the individual member would be unable to adequately perform the functions and duties required of a juror in the case presented, impermissible discrimination has occurred.
Commonwealth v. Rico, supra, 443 Pa.Super. at 513, 662 A.2d at 1079.
. On appeal, appellee asserted that the Commonwealth exercised its second peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner to strike Cathy Roba. The record reflects, however, that appellee did not object to the striking of Ms. Roba and did not establish that she was of Italian descent.
. The Superior Court did conclude that the prosecutor's reasons for striking Ms. Tucci and Mr. Taconelli were ethnically neutral. Commonwealth v. Rico, 443 Pa.Super. at 518, 662 A.2d at 1081 (1995).
. The Superior Court did not reach the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. See Commonwealth v. Rico, supra, 443 Pa.Super. at 512 n. 1, 662 A.2d at 1078 n. 1 (1995).