Case Name: MAKOS et al. v. PRINCE et al.
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1953-04-24
Citations: 64 So. 2d 670
Docket Number: 
Parties: MAKOS et al. v. PRINCE et al.
Judges: TERRELL, SEBRING, HOBSON and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 64
Pages: 670–677

Head Matter:
MAKOS et al. v. PRINCE et al.
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
April 24, 1953.
Hal S. Ives and Russell H. McIntosh, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Harry A. Johnston and Henry F. Lilien-thal, West Palm- Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
SEBRING, Justice.
Acting under the authority supposedly conferred by the provisions of section 562.14(4), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County adopted the following resolution:
"Whereas, by resolution the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County has heretofore fixed the hours of sale of alcoholic beverages within the territory of Palm Beach County not included within any municipality, and
"Whereas, officials of the cities of Belle Glade, Pahokee and South Bay have appeared before the Board and have requested the Board of County Commissioners to fix the hours of sale in the western part of the county to conform to the hours of sale fixed by the municipalities in that area,
"Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, Florida, in regular session assembled May 26, 1952, that in the previous resolution of this Board fixing the hours of sale of alcoholic beverages be and the same is hereby amended so that in that part of Palm Beach County, Florida, lying west of the range line between Ranges 39 and 40 and not included within the boundaries of any municipality the Board hereby fixes and declares the hours of sale of alcoholic beverages, where alcoholic beverages may be sold, consumed or served in any place holding a license under the State Beverage Department of Florida, whether bars, package stores or a combination of both, to be as follows: 8:00 o'clock a. m. until 12:00 o'clock midnight, Mondays through . Fridays; 8:00 o'clock a. m. Saturdays ' until 1:00 o'clock a. m. Sundays.
"Be it further resolved, that except as. herein amended, the previous applicable resolutions of this Board with respect to hours of' sale of alcoholic beverages remain in full force and effect."
The appellants, who were liquor dealers in the rural area of the west zone fixed by the resolution, filed their bill of complaint to enjoin the Board from enforcing the resolution, on the ground that as to them the resolution was arbitrary, discriminatory and invalid.
When the cause was heard by the court on an application for the entry of a temporary injunction, the trial judge entered an order denying the application and, sua sponte, dismissed the bill of complaint without leave to amend, giving as his reasons for his decision the following:
"The court will take judicial notice of the fact that the area affected by the resolution in question is that part of Palm Beach County known as the 'Everglades Section.' The area is adjacent to the towns of Port Mayaca, Canal Point, Pahokee, Belle Glade, South Bay and Lake Harbor.
"It is likewise a matter of common knowledge, of course, that such section of Palm Beach County is devoted almost entirely to the growing of sugar cane, winter vegetable crops and the raising of cattle. In this work, great hordes of migrant laborers, some of whom are brought from the islands of the West Indies, are used, and live in that area. It seems entirely reasonable and proper that different hours-of selling intoxicating beverages be established. for that area than in the metropolitan 'areas making up the eastern section of the comity..
"Considering at this time those things of, which the court must take judicial notice, leads to the conclusion that the regulation in question is entirely propei;, and that the bill of complaint is without equity." -(Emphasis supplied.) "
In due course the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing arid a motion for leave to amend, tendering with' the motion a proposed amended bill of complaint. In this amended-bill the plaintiffs alleged a. state of facts which were sufficient, if true, to establish an- entirely different condition existing in Palm Beach County than the condition reflected by the state of facts recited in the order of the trial judge, of which he -had "taken "judicial--notice,"- and, which, if, true, tended to show that in the adoption of the resolution - the Board of County Commissioners had acted in. an arbitrary and capricious manner, to the injui-y of the plaintiffs.
The petition for rehearing was denied and the .plaintiffs were refused" permission to .file their- amended bill,-of, complaint. Thereupon, this appeal was taken., '
Subsections 1 and 4 of section 562.14, Florida Statutes 1951,-F.S.A., provide that "No alcoholic beverages may be sold, consumed of served or permitted to be served or consumed, in any place holding a license under the state beverage department, of Florida, between the hours of midnight and-seven o'clock a. m. of the following day . * [except that] the board of cpunty commissioners of any county of the State of Florida may, by resolution, independently regulate-.the hours of sale of alcoholic beverages within the territory of such county not included within any municipality notwithstanding the provisions of this section." -
The first question for consideration is whether the quoted provision of the statute empowering counties to "regulate the hours of sale" of alcoholic beverages should be construed to permit a resolution establishing different hours.in certain áreas of a.county, on the basis' of reasonable grounds for classification; or whether the commissioners, in their "independent regulation," must fix hours absolutely uniform throughout the territory not included within any municipality. •"
The County of Palm Beach exercises no general zoning powers, although both counties and cities, under section 561.44(2) of the beverage law, may determine in what zones within -their jurisdiction licenses shall or shall not be issued; and zoning regulations under the. latter provision, are independent of general zoning procedures. Ellis v. City of Winter Haven, Fla., 60 So.2d 620. Thus by one provision of the law a county would be authorized to prohibit the sale of liquor within certain zones) and by another would be authorized to prohibit sales within ' certain hours. Though not determinative of the specific question at hand, it would seem illogical to presuppose a legislative:-intent that licensees may be •prohibited from operating in certain areas of -the county but may not be,subjected to varying regulations as to hours of sale.
The use of the term "independently regulate" imports, of course, the meaning that a county's regulation of hours of sale may be. independent of hours set by the general law for the state''at large." The argument of appellants' is that even though the gránt of power 'to regulate this' particular matter is not in any way restricted, the county must nevertheless fix' one schedule of -hours for:its-entire .territory without regard for any. differences between areas which might warrant different regulations. We think this contention is unsound, in view of the- liberal construction given the word "regulate" in our law: .
"The power to" regulate carries full power 'over -the thing subject to. regulation, and * .*. ‡,..» the absence of restrictive, words, the-power must be regarded as plenary over the entire' sttbj ect. The power to regulate may include the power to confine a business, with reference to place,. or time (Emphasis supplied.) State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club v. Stein, 133 Fla. 530, 182 So. 863, 868.
In further definition, the word "regulate" has been said to mean to adjust, order or govern by rule, method, or established mode; direct or manage according to certain standards or rules. Van Ingen v. Hudson Realty Co., 106 App.Div. 444, 94 N.Y.S. 645, quoting Stand.Dict.; Weadock v. Judge of Recorder's Court of Detroit, 156 Mich. 376, 120 N.W. 991; State ex rel. Wagner v. Fields, 218 Mo.App. 155, 263 S.W. 853. It would seem that the process of regulation, like legislation, is in a sense almost always a matter of classification. Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 1156.
In spite of the conclusion that the quoted provision of the statute is broad enough to empower a county in the regulation of the liquor traffic to establish separate zones in a county and not to require that regulations of hours be uniform throughout the county as a whole, the law is plain that where the county may lawfully adopt su.ch a method of regulation the power may not be exercised in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner but must be grounded upon some reasonable basis of classification with reference to the subject sought to be regulated. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 126; King Lbr. & Mfg. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 58 Fla. 292, 50 So. 509; Di Lustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898. Also see State ex rel. Helseth County Com'rs, v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4.
From an inspection of the record it appears that the county commissioners adopted the challenged resolution at the request of town officials in the west zone of the county so as to make the closing hours in the rural area of that zone conform with the hours fixed by separate ordinances in each of the municipalities situated in the western portion of the county. The circuit judge found the reason given by the Board for the adoption of the resolution to be legally sufficient, because of certain social and economic differences, of which he -took "judicial notice," which existed between the rural areas in the eastern and the western portions of the county. The amended bill which was tendered by the plaintiffs sought to controvert the facts which in the opinion of the trial judge gave rise to these supposed social and economic differences of which he had taken judicial.notice, by alleging a state of facts designed to show that in truth such differences were nonexistent.
The established rule in respect to judicial notice is that it should be exercised with great caution. The matter judicially noticed must be of common and general knowledge. Moreover, it must be authoritatively settled and free from doubt o.r uncertainty. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L.R.A.1918C, 482; State ex rel. Libtz v. Coleman, 149 Fla. 28, 5 So.2d 60, and authorities therein cited.
The allegations of the amended bill are sufficient, in our opinion, to raise considerable doubt that the matters and things of which the trial judge took judicial notice have been "authoritatively settled" or that in fact they are as he 'judicially noticed" them to be. However that may be, as to those matters of which the court may take judicial notice because they are matters of common knowledge, as distinguished from certain official records cf. State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 164 So. 192; and Schriver v. Tucker, Fla., 42 So.2d 707, the rule is that the fact that a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the necessity of .offering evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that the matter will not be disputed. But the rule does not prevent an opponent's disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable. Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Section 2567, p. 535.
We conclude that under the doctrine of liberal amendments obtaining in this state the plaintiffs should have -been allowed to file their amended bill and that thereupon the cause should have proceeded in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the decree appealed from is reversed with directions that the amended bill be filed and that thereafter the cause proceed in accordance with law, in the light of the principles herein stated.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, SEBRING, HOBSON and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C. J., THOMAS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.