Case Name: PAN AMERICAN BANK OF MIAMI and Pan American Bancshares, Inc., etc., Appellants, v. Richard OSGOOD, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-04-22
Citations: 383 So. 2d 1095
Docket Number: No. 78-2276
Parties: PAN AMERICAN BANK OF MIAMI and Pan American Bancshares, Inc., etc., Appellants, v. Richard OSGOOD, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 1095–1100

Head Matter:
PAN AMERICAN BANK OF MIAMI and Pan American Bancshares, Inc., etc., Appellants, v. Richard OSGOOD, Appellee.
No. 78-2276.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 22, 1980.
Rehearing Denied June 18, 1980.
Smathers & Thompson, Shepherd D. Johnston, Miami, for appellants.
Greene & Cooper, Robyn Greene, Joan M. Bolotin, William Huggett, Miami, for appel-lee.
Before HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding appellee $6,000 in compensatory damages and $25,-000 in punitive damages on a complaint alleging negligent injury to appellee's credit reputation.
For a convenient reference, the appellant will be referred to as "Bank" and appellee as "Osgood."
The plethora of points on appeal are more readily disposed of after a recitation of the salient facts which follow:
Osgood became the assignee of a promissory note and a chattel mortgage on a motor home which the Bank had financed on behalf of the original owner. Osgood assumed payment of the monthly installments due on the note. The Bank also held power of attorney which authorized it alone to convey or transfer title.
Approximately seven months later, Osgood drove the motor home to Texas where he found a purchaser. He telephoned the Bank's loan officer and inquired as to whether the Bank would accept $9,500 as payment for the motor home. The loan officer later, advised him that the Bank would accept the sum of $10,500. That sum was remitted to the Bank, $9,500 from the acquiring purchaser and $1,000 from Osgood. The Bank accepted the payments and transferred title to the acquiring pur chaser. Osgood testified that it was his understanding with the loan officer that the remittance of $10,500 was in complete discharge of his obligation to the Bank. The Bank had no further communication with Osgood.
Pursuant to its contract with a credit reporting agency, the Bank assigned this transaction an "1-9" rating-and so reported it. "I" stands for chargé-off and "9" indicates the worst possible credit rating. The "charge-off" indicates that the Bank removed the balance from its list of assets and charged the balance against its loan loss reserve. A "charge-off" occurs when the Bank suffers a loss irrespective of whether the debtor still owes anything. While it is somewhat inconsistent, the Bank also rebated interest under the transaction under the applicable regulations and arrived at a deficiency of approximately $1,700.
Six months after the foregoing transaction, Osgood applied for a loan through another bank in order to finance a new business venture. The loan application was denied due to the poor credit rating he received from the foregoing transaction. The loan officer at that bank indicated he would have denied Osgood's loan regardless of whether it had been reported as a "charge-off" or a deficiency. This was Osgood's first knowledge of an unfavorable credit rating.
Osgood returned to the Bank to talk with the loan officer with whom he had formerly discussed the sale. There, he spoke with a new loan officer who told him that it appeared a settlement had been made and there would be no problem in clearing up the matter. The loan officer advised Osgood that he would consult with his superiors and advise him. He later told Osgood the Bank's attorney advised that the Bank should assume the position that the monies were still owed to it. The successor loan officer disavowed the action of the loan officer with whom Osgood had previously conducted business. Osgood testified that the loan officer advised him that only ten per cent of those who threaten to bring legal action against the Bank do so, and then, only one per cent are successful. After this conversation, he received a letter from the Bank that he had a deficiency balance on the note of $1,729.56, representing a charge-off and unless the matter was settled the Bank would place it in the hands of attorneys for collection.
Osgood, having been unsuccessful in obtaining a loan, invested his own savings into a new business venture which failed for lack of sufficient capital, He then commenced this action against Pan American Bank of Miami and its holding company, Pan American Bancshares, Inc. The holding company was eventually dismissed from the suit with prejudice. The Bank answered the complaint and filed a counter-claim to collect the deficiency claimed on the promissory note to which Osgood interposed affirmative defenses of waiver and settlement. After trial by jury, a verdict in favor of Osgood and against the Bank was returned. Judgment was entered and this appeal ensued.
At trial, the Bank requested that the jury be instructed that a new and independent consideration was necessary in order to satisfy the outstanding balance due on the note and obligation. The trial court properly refused to so instruct the jury. In transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 673.408, Florida Statutes (1977), "no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation . . . given in payment . . .for an antecedent obligation of any kind." Holm v. Woodworth, 271 So.2d 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). See Newbern v. Pan American Bank of Orlando, N. A., 368 So.2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
The Bank contends that Osgood's cause of action is contained in the common law counts of libel and slander to which it would have the affirmative defense of "good motive." It further contends that Osgood should not be permitted to characterize his action as negligence in order to avoid the affirmative defense and requirements of a defamation action. A party has the right to choose its remedy and may pursue any theory provided that a cause of action has been stated. Hines v. Trager Construction Co., 188 So.2d 826, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). See 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions, § 31, 145 (1962); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110.
The Bank also contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict on the plaintiff's claim because the evidence did not establish the Bank's negligence. This argument focuses upon the fact that the Bank was under a contractual' obligation with the credit bureau to report the credit standing of its customers, which the credit bureau disseminates to other parties to the agreement. The Bank points to the fact that it actually suffered a loss from the deficiency on a promissory note in an amount claimed by its counterclaim and having truthfully and correctly reported it did not breach any duty to Osgood. The fact that actual loss was suffered or that such loss was truthfully and. correctly reported is simply irrelevant in that the obligation between Osgood and the Bank had been extinguished by payment. Osgood set forth a cause of action under the theory that the Bank was negligent in handling his account. He argued that under the circumstances of this case the Bank had the duty to either give notice of the charge-off of his loan, attempt to collect the deficiency balance of the loan from him or notify him of the report sent to the credit bureau. He alleged that the Bank breached that duty and that the breach was a proximate cause of the damages he sustained. The jury was properly charged as to the cause of action for negligence and, after weighing all the evidence presented, found that a duty existed and the Bank's breach of that duty was the cause of the damages suffered by Osgood.
The Bank further contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for leave to file an amended answer to the plaintiff's claim. The Bank wanted to add, by the amendment, the defense of qualified privilege accorded under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C., § 1681h(e) (1970). This request, which was presented late in the trial, attempted to inject somewhat complicated issues into the case. The trial court was in the best position to assess the timeliness and possible disruption and prejudice resulting from the injection of a new issue at that state of the proceedings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Whitehall Realty Corporation v. Manufacturers Trust Company, 100 So.2d 617 (Fla.1958); Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Finally, the Bank contends that the evidence was insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. We are required to review the evidence adduced in the view most favorable to the prevailing party. In this posture, there was an abundance of evidence to support a punitive damage award. See Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Civ.) 6.12; Doral Country Club, Inc. v. Lindgren Plumbing Company, 175 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) [gross negligence as to indicate the wanton disregard of rights of others;] Lan-Chile Air Lines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So.2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) [reckless indifference to the rights of others].
Although not raised, we note that the judgment appealed from has been entered jointly against the Bank and its holding company, Pan American Bancshares, Inc., which had been dismissed as a party prior to trial. It is fundamental error to enter a judgment against an entity not a party to the action. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Feller, 219 So.2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). We therefore delete Pan American Bancshares, Inc. from the judgment appealed from.
We have reviewed the various other contentions which the Bank raises and find them to be without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment, as modified, is affirmed.