Case Name: FISCHER v. BAYER et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1922-11-14
Citations: 108 Or. 311
Docket Number: 
Parties: FISCHER v. BAYER et al.
Judges: McBride, Harris and Rand, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 108
Pages: 311–336

Head Matter:
Argued October 4,
reversed and remanded November 14,
objections to cost bill sustained in part December 19, 1922, motion to recall mandate allowed, with directions, July 17, 1923.
FISCHER v. BAYER et al.
(210 Pac. 452; 211 Pac. 162; 216 Pac. 1028.)
Pleading — Complaint After Verdict Held Sufficient for Action on Quantum Meruit, Even Though Subject to Motion to Compel Election Between Quantum Meruit and Express Contract.
1. Complaint, which, is to be favorably construed after verdict, held sufficient to state a cause of action on quantum meruit for services rendered at defendants’ request, even though it would have been subject to motion to compel election between quantum meruit and express contract.
Work and Labor — Evidence of Express Contract Fixing Price Admissible.
2. In an action on quantum meruit, plaintiff may show an express contract fixing the price.
Evidence — In Action on Quantum Meruit, Evidence of Promise to Pay Fixed Price Construed as Admission That Sum was Reasonable.
3. Under an allegation of quantum meruit, evidence that defendant promised to pay a fixed price will be construed as an admission against interest that the sum mentioned is the reasonable value.
'Work and Labor — Contract Proved not One Alleged in Complaint.
4. Where a corporation’s board of directors directed that its trustee dispose of some of its machinery, and the trustee authorized the corporation’s president to dispose of it and turn the proceeds over to him to be disbursed, and in an action for labor and materials against the corporation, the trustee, and the president as an individual, the evidence showed that plaintiffs were working solely for the president as an individual, the contract proved was not the one alleged that the labor was furnished at the request of all defendants.
Judgment — Action on Quantum Meruit Held Within Code Permitting Judgment Against Only One of Several Defendants.
5. Where in an action against an individual, a corporation, and its trastee there were sufficient facts to take the ease to the jury only as against the individual, under Sections 180, 181, Or. L., providing that judgments may be given for or against one or more of several defendants, and that in actions against several defendants a court may render judgment against one or more of them whenever proper, leaving the action to proceed -against the others, a motion for nonsuit by the corporation and trustee should have been allowed.
ON OBJECTIONS TO COST BILL.
Costs — One Per Cent on Amount of Appeal Bond Recoverable by Appellant Who Prevails.
6. Under Section 6438, subdivision 5, Or. L., an appellant who prevailed on appeal, could recover as costs 1 per cent on amount of bond.
Costs — Prevailing Parties on Appeal can Recover for Transcript of Testimony at Rate of Fifteen Cents Per Folio.
7. Under Section 931, Or. L., the prevailing parties on appeal are entitled to recover for the transcript of testimony at the rate of fifteen cents per folio.
Costs — Where There are Several Appellants, the Prevailing Appellants can Recover Full Bill of Costs, Less Charges Relating Exclusively to Appellants Who Failed.
8. Where there are several appellants, some of whom are successful, the successful appellants are entitled to a full bill of costs, less such charges as relate exclusively to appellants who have failed.
Costs — Respondent may Recover Costs Against Unsuccessful Appellants, Where Some Appellants Prevail.
9. Where all except one of the appellants prevail on appeal, a respondent may recover his costs against the unsuccessful appellants.
ON MOTION TO CORRECT MANDATE.
Appeal and Error — Judgment Entered as Directed by Mandate is in Effect That of Supreme Court.
10. Where a judgment rendered jointly against three defendants was reversed by the Supreme Court, with directions to the lower court to render a judgment on the verdict against one defendant only, the judgment entered by the lower court in conformity to the mandate was in effect the judgment of the Supreme Court.
5. Whether judgment against two or more tort-feasors may be set aside as to some and allowed to stand as to rest, note, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209.
Judgment — Separate Recovery Allowable as to One and Dismissal as to Others, Notwithstanding Allegation of Joint Liability.
11. Under Sections 61, 180, 181, Or. L., the common-law rule that in an action brought against two or more defendants on an alleged joint demand judgment must be given against all of the defendants or none has been changed, and judgment in such action may he rendered against those liable, and the action dismissed as against those not liable, regardless of whether the liability is joint or several.
Appeal and Error — Stay of Execution is Consideration for Supersedeas Bond.
12. The suspension of plaintiff’s right to have a writ of execution running against all of the defendants issued for the enforcement of a judgment against all of them, pending the appeal by the defendants, is the consideration for the obligation of the defendants and the sureties on their supersedeas bond to pay whatever judgment may he rendered by the Supreme Court.
Appeal and Error — Separate Appeals may he Taken by Each Active Party.
13. There may he as many separate appeals from a judgment as there are different active parties to the action.
Appeal and Error — Decision Held in Effect Affirmance of Judgment as Against One of Three Defendants.
14. A decision on a joint appeal by three defendants from a judgment against all of them, reversing the judgment on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain it as against two defendants, hut with directions to render judgment upon the verdict against the third defendant, was in effect an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court against the third defendant.
Appeal and Error — Surety on Supersedeas Bond is Liable, if Judgment is Affirmed Against One of Three Joint Appellants.
15. Under Section 557, Or. L., authorizing the Supreme Court to affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment as to any or all of the parties joining in the appeal, and Section 559, providing that if judgment he given against the appellant it shall he entered against his sureties also, the surety on a supersedeas bond is liable for the amount of the judgment, where it was affirmed as against one of the three defendants who joined in the appeal, though it was reversed as against the other two.
From Wasco: Fred W. Wilson, Judge.
Department 1.
For appellants there was a brief over the name of Mr. G. A. Sheppard, with an oral argument by Mr. G. O. Fenlason.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. Harry G. Hoy and Mr. Paul W. Childers, with an oral argument by Mr. Hoy.

Opinion:
BURNETT, C. J.
In several causes of action, one in his own right and the remainder as assignee of other parties, the plaintiff joins as defendants the Eastern Irrigation, Power & Lumber Company, a corporation, J. C. Bayer, its trustee, and Joseph R. Keep, and as to the action in his own right alleges:
"That between the twenty-seventh day of April and the sixteenth day of August, 1918, this plaintiff, at the special instance and request of defendants, performed labor, advanced money, furnished goods, wares and merchandise, and furnished a gasoline motor-truck for defendants in hauling machinery, a large steam boiler, iron and other miscellaneous articles, which said labor and money, goods, wares and merchandise furnished by said plaintiff were of the reasonable and agreed value of $1,029.43; that defendants received the use and benefit of said labor, money, goods,, wares and merchandise, and gasoline motor-truck so furnished, and promised and agreed to pay the said sum above mentioned."
This form of averment is employed in all the other counts, the difference being only in dates and amounts and statement of the assignment of the account to the plaintiff.
The defendant Keep traversed all the allegations of the complaint except as stated in his further answer. In view of the grounds of our conclusion, it is not necessary to notice the further and separate answers of the defendant Keep more than to generalize that they aver payment to the plaintiff of enough money to cover the claims mentioned in the complaint, both his own and those of his assignors; and finally that "neither of the other defendants above named had anything to do with the employment of the parties alleged in plaintiff's complaint to have been employed."
The company and Bayer content themselves with a traverse of the allegations of the complaint.
The reply puts in issue the new matter in Keep's answer.
In various forms in the course of a trial by jury the defendants raised the question that the evidence to the effect that Keep promised to give a certain per diem wage to some of the employees mentioned in the pleadings was a variance from the allegations of the complaint and hence incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The averment in that respect is, that at the special instance and request of the defendants plaintiff performed labor "of the reasonable and agreed value" of the amount named in the complaint. The most that can be said of this allegation is, that it was duplicitous and if the court had been applied to in the proper manner, the plaintiff would have been compelled to elect whether he would proceed on the quantum meruit or reasonable value of the services, or upon the express contract to pay a certain amount: Harvey v. Southern Pac. Co., 46 Or. 505 (80 Pac. 1061); Whitten v. Griswold, 60 Or. 318, 324 (118 Pac. 1018).
Construing the complaint favorably after verdict, we have a pleading in which the plaintiff avers enough for an action on quantum meruit for services rendered at the special instance and request of the defendants. Under such circumstances he would have a right to offer evidence of an express con tract fixing the price. The authorities on this point are collated in Toy v. Gong, 87 Or. 454 (170 Pac. 936).
The principle is, that under an allegation on the quantum meruit, evidence that the defendant promised to pay a fixed price will be construed as an admission against his own interest that the sum mentioned is the reasonable value.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendants moved for a nonsuit on the ground, among others, that the contract proved is not the one alleged in the complaint. The evidence disclosed that at a meeting held in Portland, Oregon, on November 3, 1917, the board of directors of the defendant corporation after reciting that there was need to develop a fund for the benefit of the company for certain purposes, and that there was some extra machinery at the company's mill in Wasco County, passed a resolution as follows:
"Therefore be it resolved that the trustee, J. C. Bayer, be and he is hereby authorized and directed to dispose of such of the machinery belonging to this company as can be disposed of without injury or detriment to the machinery to be used at the mill now constructed, in such manner as deemed by said trustee to be for the best interests of this company, and that a copy of this resolution shall be sufficient authority for all the purposes herein contemplated."
The record of this meeting of the directors is signed by the defendant Keep as president and one Skinner as secretary.
There was also introduced in evidence a letter from Bayer, trustee, addressed to the defendant corporation and to Keep, its president, under date of November 6, 1917, reciting the passage of the resolution just mentioned and saying:
"I have authorized Joseph E. Keep, president of your company, to get together and dispose of the above mentioned machinery to the highest bidder. Money for same to be turned over to me as trustee, to be disbursed by authorization of your board."
It appears in evidence that the defendant corporation had issued bonds and given a mortgage to Bayer as trustee to secure the payment of those obligations, so that really he was the nominal mortgagee holding the encumbrance on the company's property. Under the circumstances detailed, the defendant Keep, as the testimony shows, took up not only the matter of disposing of the machinery mentioned, but also an enterprise of conducting water to the company's mill by means of a ditch, and employed the plaintiff Fischer and some of those named as his assignors. With one accord all of these parties testified that they were working for Keep. There is no testimony showing in any way that Keep mentioned the defendant corporation or assumed to act for it or in its name, or that he in any way disclosed the existence of the company. For instance, the witness William Engle testified, "I understood we were working for Mr. Keep." C. P. Doyle, another assignor, was asked, "By whom were you employed?" and answered, "By Mr. Keep." The result of the testimony is, that the defendant Keep contracted on his own responsibility. Under no view of the testimony can it be said that the defendants acted jointly, yet that is the averment of the complaint. It does not follow that because Keep happened to be president of the defendant corporation he was compelled to or did act as its agent. For aught that appears in evidence, he was acting as a contractor. Concede as we may, that he renders himself personally liable by contracting in his own name without dis closing Ms principal, under the authority of Frank v. Woodcock, 72 Or. 446 (143 Pac. 1105), yet there is another principle equally potent, wMeh is thus stated in 2 O. J. 843:
"While a person who has dealt with the agent of an undisclosed principal may elect to hold either the agent or, upon discovery, the principal, he cannot hold both, and, if with full knowledge of the facts material to his rights he elects to hold the agent, he thereby discharges the principal; and conversely, if he elects to hold the principal, he thereby discharges the agent. He must elect between the two, and when an election is once made he must abide by it, unless the principal and agent have by their acts waived the right to claim that an election to hold one releases the other."
The most that can be predicated of Bayer's connection with the matter is that as mortgagee he consented to the sale of some of the property of the mortgagor. All that the testimony shows respecting Keep is that he assumed to act independently in the matter without disclosing his connection with the corporation and employed the plaintiff and his assignors to perform certain services respecting the property of the defendant company, when in fact all that he was authorized to do was to dispose of machinery to the highest bidder. The plaintiff and his assignors do not claim in their testimony that they looked to or attempted to charge either the company or Bayer, but, as stated, all testified that they were employed by Keep. The effort to prove the allegation that the defendants were joint contractors utterly failed.
The motion for a nonsuit should have been allowed as to the defendants Bayer and the corporation. The case made by the testimony comes clearly within Sections 180 and 181, Or. L.:
§ 180. "Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between themselves."
§ 181. "In an action against several defendants, the court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, whenever a several judgment is proper, leaving the action to proceed against the others."
As to the performance of the services, the assignment of the claims to the plaintiff and their reasonable value, there was enough to take the case to the jury as against the defendant Keep. The judgment therefore will be reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to enter judgment against the defendant Keep on the verdict, and a judgment of nonsuit as to the other-two defendants.
Reversed and Remanded "With Directions.
McBride, Harris and Rand, JJ., concur.
Objections to cost bill sustained in part December 19, 1922.