Case Name: KINCH v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-04-02
Citations: 156 S.W. 649
Docket Number: 
Parties: KINCH v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 156
Pages: 649–651

Head Matter:
KINCH v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeal of Texas.
April 2, 1913.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 7, 1913.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 1036 ) — Competency ox Witnesses — Rulings—Review.
Where prosecutrix was tested as to her competency, and the court decided that she was competent, and her testimony went before the jury, accused, reserving no exception, could not complain of the ruling.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1631-1640, 2634-2641; Dec. Dig. § 1036. ]
2. Jury (§ 110 ) — Selection—Objections.
Where accused tried at one term accepted, without objection, the jury selected at the prior term, he could not after trial complain of the time of the selection of the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 502-513, 515-523; Dec. Dig. § 110. ]
3. Rape (§ 6 ) — Elements oe Offense — Force.
Force is not an element of rape on a female under the age of consent.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Rape, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 6. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Criminal Law (§ 951 ) — Motion eor New Trial — Time oe Filing.
A motion for new trial filed after the term at which the conviction occurred comes too late.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2349-2358; Dec. Dig. § 951. ]
5. Criminal Law (§ 1099 ) — Statement oe Facts — Time oe Filing.
A statement of facts filed after sentence, entered nunc pro tunc at a term subsequent to that at which conviction was had, cannot be considered on appeal; for a statement of facts must be filed at the term at which the jury returned the verdict and judgment entered.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2866-2880; Dec. Dig. § 1099. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 1172 ) — Harmless Error-Erroneous Instructions.
Where, on a trial for rape on a female under the age of consent, prosecutrix testified that accused had intercourse with her, and physicians examining her declared that she had been penetrated, an instruction that it was necessary that the evidence showed penetration, but beyond that the jury need not go, though erroneous, was not ground for reversal; the indictment not alleging that the offense was accomplished by force, threats, or fraud.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154-3157, 3159-3163, 3169; Dec. Dig. § 1172; Rape, Cent. Dig. § 104.)
Appeal from District Court, Harrison County; H. T. Lyttleton, Judge.
Russell Kinch was convicted of rape on a female under the age of consent, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 150 S. W. 610.
Beard & Davidson, of Marshall, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
This is a conviction for rape; the punishment being assessed at 10 years.
1. There are no bills of exceptions incorporated in the record. Appellant urges two grounds for reversal, which cannot be considered in the absence of bills of exceptions. The first is to the competency of the witness Emma Grandberry, the prosecutrix, and the second is to the fact that the petit jury who tried appellant had been drawn at the May term for the November term of the court. With reference to the competency of the testimony of the girl, it is sufficient to say that she was tested as to her competency, and the court decided adversely to appellant, and her testimony went before the jury. Appellant reserved no exception, and therefore cannot be heard to complain. In regard to the second question, the record shows an agreement in the statement of facts that the jurors who tried appellant were selected at the May term of the court, and that he was tried at the following November term. Appellant went to trial without objection, accepted the jury, reserving no exception. There was no challenge to the array; nor was there an exception reserved to any juror who sat upon the trial. This does not come within the rule laid down in the case of Woolen v. State, 150 S. W. 1165, and Mayfield v. State, 151 S. W. 303, and Whiten v. State, 151 S. W. 1182, three cases decided at the present term of court. The three cases mentioned were from Harrison county, as is this case. Those cases discussed the legality of the indictment, because it was returned by grand jurors selected as the petit jurors were selected in this case, but timely objection was urged, and the indictment was held vicious under the authorities and line of reasoning set forth in those cases, Under the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion those cases are not applicable. If appellant had objected to these jurors, or to the array, before the selection of the jury, his. case would have presented a very different proposition. We therefore hold that, even had the matter been presented by bill of exception, we could not reverse, inasmuch as appellant accepted the jury without objection and only suggests it, after trial, in the agreed statement in the statement of facts.
2. The court gave the following charge: "Penetration only is necessary to be proved by the state upon a trial for rápe, but it is necessary that the evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt that there was penetration; that is to say, that the private parts, the female organ of the female alleged to have been raped, was penetrated or entered into by the male member or organ of the accused. Beyond the mere fact of penetration you are not required to go, as to ascertain how deep or how far the penetration- or entry extended," or whether or not there was emission of semen." This charge trenches closely upon forbidden ground, and had the indictment alleged either force, threats, or fraud it would have been fatal to this conviction. The indictment, however, alleges the rape upon a girl under 15 years of age, and does not allege that this was accomplished by either force, threats, or fraud. Therefore the case does not come within the rule laid down in the McAvoy Case, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 56, 51 S. W. 928, and cited by appellant, nor within the rule laid down in the Cromeans Case, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 129 S. W. 1129. These cases are cited in support of this proposition. In this case the evidence is clear on the part of the prosecu-trix that appellant had actual intercourse with her and penetrated her, she says, a distance the length of her finger. Two physicians examined her and declared that she had been penetrated. We are of opinion that this charge, while erroneous; is not sufficiently so in this ease to require a reversal of the judgment.
3. It is contended that the court erred in presenting the issue of rape to the jury, and that he nowhere defined and told the jury the meaning of the term "assault," and did not define and give the meaning of the word "force" in connection with rape. The court did give the definition of assault, but did not define force. It is contended that the court erred in not defining force. This is not correct in this character of ease. The girl was under 15 years of age, and the element of force does not enter into the case. We are cited to the McAdoo Case, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 603, 34 S. W. 955, 60 Am. St. Rep. 61. In the McAdoo Case it was necessary to give the definition of force. That was under a' different article and alleged an attempt to commit rape. All of the decisions, as well as the statutes, recognize and keep separate a distinction between assault to rape and an attempt to rape.
4. In the other questions suggested we find nothing of sufficient importance to discuss. The judgment is affirmed.