Case Name: Guillermo MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-08-06
Citations: 851 So. 2d 832
Docket Number: No. 1D02-1817
Parties: Guillermo MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WOLF, C.J., CONCURS; BENTON, J., CONCURS in affirmance but dissents from remand.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 851
Pages: 832–837

Head Matter:
Guillermo MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D02-1817.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 6, 2003.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Ed Harvey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, J.
In this direct criminal appeal, appellant, Guillermo Martinez, contends the trial court erred in failing to enter a written order finding him competent to proceed. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c)(7)(2002) ("If, at any time after such commitment, the court decides, after hearing, that the defendant is competent to proceed, it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed."). The record shows that appellant was adjudicated incompetent, placed in a mental institution, and subsequently released therefrom based on staffs opinion that he no longer met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. After his counsel represented to the court that appellant was competent to proceed, the judge responded, "All right, sir." The judge then accepted appellant's plea and sentenced him. We affirm appellant's conviction and sentence, but "we find it necessary to remand for entry of a nunc pro tunc order finding appellant competent to stand trial." White v. State, 548 So.2d 765, 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
In reaching our decision, we have not overlooked the dissent's assertion that the sentence should be affirmed summarily without remand for a written order, because appellant had entered a guilty plea without expressly reserving a legally dis-positive issue, as required by section 924.051(4), Florida Statutes (2000), enacted as part of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996. Chapter 96-248, § 4, at 954-55, Laws of Fla. In the case at bar, appellant did not preserve the issue, nor did he move to withdraw the plea. Nevertheless, we do not understand that the pertinent provisions of the Act dispossess this court from jurisdiction to remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of memorializing in writing an oral finding made by the court. The judgment and sentence remain intact. The command of the law is honored requiring that no defendant, previously adjudicated incompetent, shall thereafter be forced to stand trial unless he or she is adjudged competent to proceed.
Appellant's failure to reserve the right to appeal does not divest this court of jurisdiction over the appeal. In State v. Jefferson, 758 So.2d 661, 664 (Fla.2000), the court explained:
We find it is clear from the language of section 924.051(8) that the Legislature intended to condition reversal of a conviction on the existence of either an error that was preserved and prejudicial or an unpreserved error that constitutes fundamental error. However, we do not find from the statutory language utilized that the Legislature clearly intended to limit the appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction in the area of criminal appeals.
As Jefferson and Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89 (Fla.2000), make clear, the provisions of section 924.051 were designed with the object of limiting appeals relating to potentially reversible errors in convictions that had not been timely preserved. In fact, the stated goal of the statute was "to ensure that all claims of error are raised and resolved at the first opportunity." § 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. (2000). We are simply not confronted with the type of error contemplated by the Criminal Appeal Reform Act, because, as stated, the judgment and sentence are unaffected by our remand for the purpose only of clarifying the court's adjudication of competency, which it should have determined before it accepted the plea, entered judgment, and pronounced sentence.
If we understand the dissent correctly, it appears to say that because no competency hearing was held, the lower court's statement, "All right, sir," after defense counsel informed the court that two doctors had concluded that appellant was competent to proceed, should not be construed as an oral determination of competency; hence, there was no need to formalize that statement in writing. Neither the defendant nor the state has contended on appeal that such statement was anything less than a finding of competency. Indeed, we will not presume that the court acted contrary to the dictates of the law by declining to make such finding once it was aware of the prior adjudication of incompetency.
AFFIRMED, but REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.
WOLF, C.J., CONCURS; BENTON, J., CONCURS in affirmance but dissents from remand.
. Section 924.051(4) provides:
If a defendant pleads nolo contendere without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, or if a defendant pleads guilty without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, the defendant may not appeal the judgment and sentence.