Case Name: Henry Kramer v. The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1855-12
Citations: 5 Ohio St. 140
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Kramer v. The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 5
Pages: 140–169

Head Matter:
Henry Kramer v. The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company.
In proceedings for the appropriation of private property to public uses, arising under the constitution of 1802, the construction put upon that instrument by the Supreme Court, that it allowed the benefits conferred to be deducted from the value of the property appropriated, and that it did not require the assessment to be made in a court, or by a jury, will be adhered to by this court.
Three disinterested freeholders of the county where the property is situated, appointed by a judge of a court of record, was a competent tribunal to make the assessment.
Where notice was actually given, and the owner appeared before the appraisers, the proceeding cannot be invalidated, for the reason that the law provided for no such notice.
In Case. Reserved in the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
The defendant entered upon and dug down the lands of the plaintiff, and carried away gravel and sand therefrom; and constructed its railroad through and over said lands, and caused said lands to be appropriated to the uses of such railroad.
The plaintiff sued the defendant in the court below for damages for so doing.
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The defendant claims to be justified in its acts, by virtue of the provisions of the 8th section of the act of Feb. 16, 1849, (47 O. L. 149,) “ authorizing the city of Cleveland to subscribe to the capital stock of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company, and for other purposes.” The section is in the following words:
“ Sec. 8. That the president and directors of said company, or a majority of them, or any person authorized by them, or a majority of them, may agree with the owner or owners of any land, earth, timber, gravel or stone, or other materials, or any implements which may be wanted for the construction or repair of said road, or any of their works, for the purchase, or use, or occupation of the same; and if they cannot agree, or if the owner or owners, or any of them, be a married woman, infant, insane person, or idiot, or out of the county in which the property wanted may lie, when such land or materials may be wanted, application may be made to the court of common pleas, or other court of record of the county where the land lies, or any judge thereof in vacation, by either party, and said court or judge shall appoint by warrant, three disinterested freeholders of such county, to appraise the damages which the owner of the land may sustain by such appropriation. Such appraisers shall be duly sworn ; they shall consider the benefit as well as the injury’which such owner shall sustain by reason of said railroad, and shall forthwith return their assessment of damages to the clerk of said court, setting forth the value of the property taken, or damage done to the property ; the amount of benefit conferred, and the difference between the value of, or the damage done to, the property taken, which they assess to such owner or owners separately, to be by him filed and recorded ; and thereupon said railroad company shall pay to said clerk the amount thus assessed, or secure the payment to the satisfaction of said court, or the judge issuing the warrant. And on making payment or tender thereof to said clerk, or on giving such security as may be required, it shall be lawful for said company to hold their interests in such lands or materials thus appropriated, and the privilege of using any material on said road-way within fifty feet on each side of the center of such road-way for the uses aforesaid; the costs of such award to be paid by said company, and on motion of any party interested.”
The special plea of justification sets up proceedings in conformity with this section of the statute, alleging, in substance, that the plaintiff had notice of the appointment of the appraisers, and that he appeared before them at the time and place the appraisement was made; that in the return of their assessment of damages to the clerk of the court, they estimated the value of, or damages done to, the property, taken at six hundred and fifty dollars, and the amount of benefit conferred at four hundred dollars, and the difference at two hundred and fifty dollars; and that the amount thus assessed, to wit: two hundred and fifty dollars, was paid to the clerk by the defendant, for the use of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the questions thus raised were reserved for decision by this court.
Bolton, Kelley & Griswold, for plaintiff:
The plaintiff claims that the 8th section of the statute under which the defendant justifies was unconstitutional and void, and therefore furnishes no justification to the defendant.
1. It is unconstitutional, because it allows benefits conferred to be set off against the value of the land appropriated by the defendant, in making compensation to the owner thereof, — not only “ accidental ” benefits which happen by reason of the public work to the balance of the land remaining unappropriated, but also “ general benefits,” or those which the owner of the land appropriated receives in common with others. See Cooper v. Williams, 4 Ohio Rep. 253. The case of Symonds v. The City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio Rep. 147, allows “ accidental benefits ” only; but the principle established in that case does not cover and embrace the section under which the defendant justifies, because that section includes both “ general and accidental benefits,” as well as benefits which might arise or occur to his peculiar business or employment — indeed any benefits which the vivid imagination of the appraiser might suggest.
2. This 8th section of said act is unconstitutional, because it fails to afford just compensation to the owner of land appropriated,, in not providing a proper tribunal to assess the damages sustained. It is well settled, unless compensation is made to the owner of private property which is taken for public use, any act authorizing such appropriation is void. It seems equally clear that, although compensation is proposed, yet if by design or accident, the legislature fails to provide just compensation, such act is also void. Gardner v. The City of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 162 ; Kent Com., vol. 2, 5th ed., sec. 339, notes.
This 8th section, under which the defendant justifies, is entirely wanting in those requisites which justify the appropriation of private property to public use.
The appraisers provided in this section are in no sense a “ tribunal before whom each party may meet and discuss their claims on equal terms.” They are appointed at the instance of the corporation. No notice is required to be given, either of their appointment, or of the time when the assessment shall be made. The owner of the land cannot appear before them to discuss or prefer his claims. He has no opportunity to offer testimony; nor are they required to hear him or his counsel, should he be so lucky as to hear of their appointment. No appeal can be taken from their decision. There is no correction for their errors, and no punishment for their corruption.
This board of appraisers possesses no attribute whatever of a fair and equitable tribunal. They may be appointed in vacation, on the same day view the land appropriated, adjudge the “ benefits ” equal to the damage done, and the same day make return to the clerk of the court appointing them, and, without notice, the property of the unfortunate owner is divested from him, and vested in the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Rail Road Company. The allegation in the plea, that the plaintiff had notice of the assessment by the committee, and met with them, does not aid the act. The notice was of no avail to the plaintiff. This board of appraisers were under no obligations to hear him, nor were they required or directed to give him a hearing. This notice was only an aggravation to the injury that was done to him. This law, under which the defendant justifies, is opposed to the whole current of Ohio legislation. Besides this, and two other acts, we believe the General Assembly have never granted to any company or corporation such absolute power.
No decision of the Supreme Court has ever gone so far as to sustain such an ex parte proceeding as this 8th section provides for. On the other hand, our judges have uniformly sustained and been governed by the rule laid down by Chancellor Kent.
Cooper et al. v. Bates, 4 Ohio 284; Bates v. Cooper, 5 Ohio 115 ; McArthur v. Kelly, 5 Ohio 139 ; Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio, 2d Pt., 111; Foote v. The City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408 ; Symmonds & Symmonds v. Same, 14 Ohio 147.
In all these cases, the court has justified the taking of private property for public use, in addition to the necessities of the public welfare, on the ground that an adequate compensation was paid to the owner, and that a fair and equitable tribunal was furnished him to assess that compensation.
Foote & Newton, and Williams & Gary, for defendant.
The Reporter finds no brief on behalf of defendant.

Opinion:
Ranney, J.
The defendant justifies.under the provisions of the 8th section of the act of February 16, 1849, to authorize the city of Cleveland to subscribe to the capital .stock of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company, and for other purposes. 47 O. L. 149. That section empowered the company to agree with the owners of land, etc., needed for the construction or repair of their road, for the purchase, or use, or occupation of the same; or, if they could not agree, or if any of the owners were married women, infants, or insane persons, or out of the county in which' the land, etc., was situated, either party might apply to any court of record of the county in which the land lay, or to any judge thereof in vacation, whose duty it was to appoint by warrant three disinterested freeholders of the county, to appraise the damages which the owner of the land might sustain by the appropriation ; who, upon oath, were required to consider the benefit as well as the injury which such owner would sustain by reason of said railroad, and forthwith return their assessment of damages to the clerk of the court, setting forth the value of the property taken, or damage done to the property, the amount of benefit conferred, and the difference assessed to the owner. This award the clerk was required to file and record ; and the company, on paying or tendering the amount, or securing the payment to the satisfaction of the court or judge issuing the warrant, was authorized to hold the property for the uses and purposes for which the same was appropriated.
The special plea of the defendant sets up regular proceedings instituted by the company under this section, alleging notice to the plaintiff of the appointment of appraisers, and his appearance before them, and full payment of the damages awarded.
The demurrer to this plea draws in question the constitutionality of the section referred to ; and, in the argument, it is claimed to be repugnant to the constitution of 1802, under which it was enacted, and under which these proceedings were had, because, 1st, It allows benefits conferred to be set off against the value of the land appropriated, in making compensation to the owner; and because, 2d, It fails to afford just compensation to the owner of land appropriated, in not providing a proper tribunal to assess the damages sustained.
In both these particulars, which are pressed upon our attention with earnestness and ability, it is said to violate the 4th section of the 8th article of that instrument, which provided that " Private property ought and shall ever be held inviolate, but always subservient to the public welfare, provided a compensation be made in money to the owner."
So far as this argument proceeds upon general principles, it is impossible not to see, that it involves a repudiation of repeated decisions made by the court of last resort, sitting under that constitution, and treats as open, questions which those decisions were intended to settle and close. In the case of Symonds v. The City of Cincinnati, 14 O. R. 147, which was very fully argued and maturely considered, the direct question was presented, " whether the defendants could set off against the value of the plaintiff's property, appropriated for public uses, any increased benefit, arising from the improvements made by the city to the balance of the lot ?" And it was held, that such deduction could properly be allowed. The opinion proceeds upon the ground, that the constitution only requires compensation to be made, and that it is made when the party receives in money the difference between the value of his property before, and what remains after, the work is constructed.
In Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 O. R. 111, pt. 2d, the position was taken, that the owner was entitled to have the value of his property fixed by a jury, and that the. legislature could not compel its assessment by commissioners. But the court were of a different opinion, and very conclusively show that the proceeding neither belonged to a court of justice, nor was it one of the cases in which a jury trial was guaranteed by the constitution. Whatever of doubt there might have been about these questions orig inally, we are not disposed, at this late day, and after that constitution has ceased to exist, to depart from a construction which was universally acted upon by the legislative and judicial departments of the government, while it was in force. For myself, I am free to acknowledge, that I should have adopted a different rule of compensation, and should have held the owner entitled to the fair cash value of the property taken, without any regard to the effect of the improvement upon his other property. But I am bound to admit, that some strong reasons may be given for the rule adopted, and it certainly has much of judicial support in other States; while I do not consider it my duty to interpose my individual opinion against ¡such a weight of authority, when it is certain to open up a multitude of controversies, not only where lands have been appropriated by corporations for turnpikes, railroads, etc., but in respect to all the public roads and canals of the State. It seems much more in accordance with a sound public policy, to adopt the construction uniformly acted upon by those who lived under and administered that instrument; especially in view of the fact, that all cause of complaint has been removed by the present constitution.
Upon the questions presented in the other case, I do not see much room for doubt. Whatever may be the theoretical foundation of the right of eminent domain, it is certain that it attaches as an incident to every sovereignty, and constitutes a condition upon which all property is holden. When the public necessity requires it, private rights to property must yield to this paramount right of the sovereign power. We have repeatedly held that the character of the work for which the property is taken, and not the means or agencies employed for its construction, determines the question of power in the exercise of this right. It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public uses. Like the power to tax, it resides with the legislative department, to whom the delegation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body; and it can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its authority has been abused or perverted. But the constitution has fixed an indispensable condition to its exercise. Full compensation must be made to tbe owner, before the property-can be taken. A fair and equitable mode for ascertaining the amount of this compensation, and an undoubted fund from which to pay it, must in all cases be, provided, as a necessary part of the proceeding to appropriate. Foote v. City of Cincinnati, 11 O. R. 408.
We see nothing in the law notv drawn in question to distinguish it from those already sustained, so far as the rule of compensation is concerned. An impartial tribunal is certainly provided for ascertaining it. It must consist of three disinterested freeholders of the county, selected by an impartial judicial tribunal, at the instance of either of the parties. They must act under oath, and upon actual view of the property appropriated. If any of these are wanting, their action is unavailing. It might have been more judicious to have provided for reviewing their determination. But this was a matter of legislative discretion, not to be revised by the judiciary.
It was certainly important that the adverse party should have notice of the action of the appraisers, in order that he might point out to them such circumstances as were calculated to enhance the value of the property, or the damages sustained. But, allowing this to have been indispensable, it is averred that he had such notice, and did actually appear before the appraisers. Where this is done, we do not think the omission in the act to require it, can be made use of ,to invalidate the proceeding. It is no part of the duty of the appraisers to hear evidence or arguments. This has never been required in any of our laws, prior to the adoption of the present constitution. They'proceed upon actual view of the property taken or injured, and from the information thus derived, make the appraisal or assessment. We think the plea sufficient; and the demurrer must therefore be overruled, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.