Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Frederick SMITH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-02-25
Citations: 632 So. 2d 1086
Docket Number: No. 92-1097
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Frederick SMITH, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, PETERSON, DIAMANTIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 632
Pages: 1086–1090

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Frederick SMITH, Appellee.
No. 92-1097.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 25, 1994.
Griffin, J., concurred and concurred specially and filed opinion in which Dauksch, J., concurred.
Harris, C.J., dissented and filed opinion in which Cobb and W. Sharp, JJ., concurred.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and John W. Foster, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Anne Moorman Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
GOSHORN, Judge.
We grant en banc review, withdraw our opinion filed September 17, 1993, and substitute the following in its stead.
The State of Florida appeals the order of the trial court granting appellee's motion to suppress. At issue is the correctness, vel non, of the trial court's determination that the search of appellee's wallet exceeded the scope of his consent to search. In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249-50, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the Supreme Court, citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), held:
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?
The Court explained that the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
According to the uncontroverted testimony of the appellee, the officer's stated reason for requesting the consent to search was that one of the officers had seen the passenger move as if he were putting something under the seat of the car. The officers similarly testified at the suppression hearing that they were concerned the passenger had placed something under the seat. However, the wallet in question was not found under the car seat. The appellee testified that despite his consent to search the car and its contents, he did not consider that in agreeing to permit a search of the car and its contents he gave the officers permission to search his wallet because that was "his personal belongings." The trial judge, as the finder of fact, obviously found this testimony credible.
Utilizing the Jimeno "objective reasonableness" standard, the trial court held that the search of the contents of the appellee's wallet exceeded the scope of the appellee's consent. The trial judge's ruling comes to us clothed with the presumption of correctness. Smith v. State, 378 So.2d 281 (Fla. 979); State v. Hardy, 610 So.2d 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), review denied, 621 So.2d 433 (Fla.1993). We should not reweigh the evidence and substitute our factual findings for that of the trial judge. We must affirm unless it can be concluded that the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous under the totality of the facts in this ease. See Davis v. State, 594 So.2d 264 (Fla.1992). The totality of the facts in this case do not support such a conclusion. The order of the trial court granting the appellee's motion to suppress is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, PETERSON, DIAMANTIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion in which DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
HARRIS, C.J., dissents, with opinion in which COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.