Case Name: Charles Edward BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-03-23
Citations: 172 So. 2d 857
Docket Number: No. E-463
Parties: Charles Edward BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 172
Pages: 857–866

Head Matter:
Charles Edward BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. E-463.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
March 23, 1965.
Rehearing Denied April 9,1965.
See also Fla.App., 161 So.2d 712.
Carl Gustave Swanson, Cocoa Beach, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Janies G. Mahorner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
STURGIS, Chief Judge.
The appellant, Charles Edward Barber, defendant below, was tried by jury and adjudged guilty of an attempt to commit grand larceny, hence this appeal. The judgment is affirmed.
The information charged, in substance, that Barber, by false and fraudulent representations and pretense, attempted to take, steal and carry away $2,500.00 in cash, with the intent to deprive the true owner, Mrs. Leroy Hartley, of her property.
The only question of law to be resolved here is whether the trial court erred in admitting in evidence, over Barber's objection, a tape recording, made without his knowledge, of a telephone conversation between him and Mrs. Hartley, the prosecuting witness, which' recording was procured before his arrest and with Mrs. Hartley's consent by means of wires that were attached by a deputy sheriff to the telephone receiver used by her in communicating with Barber.
Prior to such recording appellant Barber falsely represented to Mrs. Hartley, whose son was serving a two-year sentence of penal imprisonment, that for $2,500.00 in cash he could and would get the sentencing judge to substantially reduce said term of imprisonment. Mrs. Hartley, without Barber's knowledge, revealed his proposal to the local State Attorney who with her consent arranged for the recording to be made. The deputy sheriff, using a suction cup device, attached electronic equipment to the telephone receiver used by Mrs. Hartley at her end of the line, with wires leading to the instrument which' unknown to Barber recorded her conversation with him. The tape recording, admitted in evidence over his objection, was highly incriminating in character.
The trial judge heard extensive argument of counsel on the question of tire admissibility of the challenged evidence. He expressed a lack of intimate knowledge of the subject as compared to counsel, but in admitting the evidence succinctly observed:
" if you have properly represented to me what the law is, it would be my position in this case that if she had wanted to she could have turned the telephone over to Mr. Patrick, which is exactly what she did, and he could go ahead and record it with her permission."
Much of said argument was devoted to federal aspects of evidence obtained by wire tapping in cases where consent of a conversant was not involved as in this case. Other than academically, we are not concerned with the federal constitution or laws enacted pursuant thereto. We are confronted instead, as was the court below, solely with the Constitution of Florida and laws enacted pursuant thereto. From that approach, we hold on the authority of Griffith y. State, 111 So.2d 282 (Fla.App. 1959), and cases cited therein, that the trial judge did not err in admitting the tape recording in evidence.
The authorities are rife with philosophical dissertations having to do with the all-engrossing subject of rights, immunities and liberties of the individual that has intrigued mankind since time immemorial. The rule in Florida accords with the federal rule which, on the authority of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C.A. § 605), commonly known as the "Wire Tapping Statute," excludes such testimony unless obtained with the knowledge or consent of at least one of the conversants, and, as seen from the Griffith case, is predicated on Sections 12 and 22, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. Thus the rule of exclusion, as applied in the federal and state courts, respectively, depends upon independent statutory and constitutional provisions. The unauthorized procurement of evidence by aid of a mechanical device used to intercept a telephone or telegraph communication is commonly referred to as "wire tapping" and if objected to, is not admissible. However, it is consistently held to be admissible if procured with' the consent of one or more of the conversants, even though the person adversely affected had no knowledge of the interception.
'• In the Griffith case, supra, an investigator obtained the challenged evidence by listening in on one end of a party telephone line, located in his apartment, to conversations between Griffith and others. An electronic device was attached to the receiver in his apartment. This court held, in effect, that where the right exists to record the conversation, a person who is prosecuted on the basis of evidence thus acquired has no standing to complain. There, as in this case, Sections 12 and 22 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, and Section 822.10, Florida Statutes, F.S.A,, were involved. In that case this court, speaking through Carroll, J., quoted with approval from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, in which it was held that evidence of an interstate telephone communication, obtained with consent of a conversant, was admissible in a federal prosecution for crime, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, supra. In that case Rathbun communicated by telephone with one Sparks, who was in Pueblo, Colorado. Anticipating another call from the defendant, Sparks requested that members of the Pueblo Police Department overhear the conversation, and when the defendant again telephoned Sparks two police officers listened to the conversation on a telephone extension in another room of Sparks' home. The action of the trial court in permitting the police officers to testify over objection to the fact that Rathbun threatened Sparks' life was affirmed. We see no logical distinction between the facts in Rathbun and those involved in the case on review. The controlling consideration is that in each instance the party receiving the call consented that it be heard. The fact that in Rathbun the officers listened over a telephone extension in another room, whereas in the case on review the deputy sheriff used a mechanical device by which to more conveniently listen in and accurately preserve the conversation for future use, as was the ultimate objective in both instances, produces such kindred situations as to preclude any attempt to logically differentiate between them. Indeed, when it is remembered that the rule of exclusion was developed during an era when the mechanics of "wire tapping" had not progressed beyond the need to attach a device to telephone wires in order to intercept conversations conducted thereon, as compared to the present-day mechanical wizardry that enables an eavesdropper at substantial distance to accomplish that pur pose without any wire connection and with the use of minute electronic devices, the efficacy of the rule becomes submerged in the dilemma of Omar Khayyam's student who "Oft when young did frequent house of sinner and of saint, heard much about it and about, but always came out the door where in [he] went."
In Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla, 19SS), the Florida Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of a search warrant that was based on an affidavit by one whose information that a lottery was being conducted at the place to be searched was obtained by having seen a "confidential informant" dial the- number of a telephone listed under appellant's name and by having heard the voice of a woman who answered to the name of Teresa respond to the call, and by having heard the ensuing conversation in the course of which the informant bought from Teresa an interest in a lottery. The Florida Supreme Court rejected appellant's contention that the information was not usable because in violation of Section 822.10, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and held that the statute cannot be construed to mean that what was done by the affiant and the informant in Perez constituted a violation that would render the information thus procured illegal or useless as a basis for establishing probable cause.
Casual examination of Section 822.-10, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., reveals a purpose to define as a felony the unauthorised injuring or tapping of telegraph' or telephone lines and/or equipment. The statute was obviously designed to protect vested property rights against criminal trespass. It specifically excludes an authorized act of the nature performed by the deputy sheriff in this case who acted with Mrs. Hartley's consent. She had a proprietary interest in the subject telephone conversation of equal dignity to that of the appellant
We have considered the fact that the telephone conversation here involved was recorded with the aid of a mechanical device that was attached by means of a suction cup to the receiver of Mrs. Hart-ley's telephone. There seems to be no question but that the deputy sheriff would have been qualified to testify as to the conversation had he directly listened in with Mrs. Hartley. To exclude it on the ground that it was tape recorded would, under the circumstances of this case, amount to straining at a gnat while swallowing a camel.
Affirmed.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
RAWLS, J., dissents.
. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928).