Case Name: McLEOD v. TARRANT
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1893-05-23
Citations: 39 S.C. 271
Docket Number: 
Parties: McLEOD v. TARRANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 271–558

Head Matter:
McLEOD v. TARRANT.
1. Deeds — Habendum.—Where a deed, in its premises, grants land to A, habendum to A and B, their heirs and assigns forever, followed by a general warranty to A and B, their heirs and assigns, the intention to grant the estate to A and B is manifested, and the courts will effectuate such intention.
2. Estates by Entirety — Circuit Decree. — And A and B being husband and wife, they took as tenants by entireties, and the land vested in fee in the surviving wife on the death of the husband. The Circuit Judge erred in failing so to decide.
Mr. Justice McGowan concurred in the result and Mr. Chief Justice
McIver dissented.
Before Hudson, J., Greenville, April, 1892.
This was an action for partition by the heirs at law of A. B. McGilvary, who died in 1863, against the devisees of Nancy McGilvary, who died in 1891. The Circuit decree was as follows:
This cause came to trial before me upon exceptions to the master’s report. The facts are as follows: Stephen Holloway, late of the county and State aforesaid, departed this life in 1844, leaving a will by which he devised the land, sought in this action to be partitioned, to his wife, Nancy Holloway, for life; remainder, one-half in fee to said wife, and the other one-half to his daughter, Mary Mariah; in the event that the said Mary Mariah should die, leaving no bodily heirs, then over to testator’s surviving child or children; but in the event there should be none such, then over to Stephen H. Wood. Testator left surviving him his widow and the said only child, the latter dying in 1849, unmarried. There being thus no bodily heirs of her, or other surviving children of testator, the said Stephen H. Wood became entitled to the one-half devised to the said Mary Mariah.
In the winter of 1849, the widow, Nancy Holloway, intermarried with one A. B. McGilvary. Subsequently, in 1850, Stephen H. Wood conveyed by deed his interest in the land referred to to the said A. B. McGilvary. The point at issue in this case is the construction of that deed. The original deed is in evidence before me. By the premises thereof the grant is to A. B. Mc-Gilvary, and the consideration, is stated to be “one hundred dollars, paid by A. B. McGilvary.” The habendum and the warranty clauses of the deed are peculiar, however, and are in these words: “To have and to hold, all and singular the premises before mentioned unto the said A. B. McGilvary and Nancy McGilvary (late Nancy Holloway), their heirs and assigns forever. And I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said premises unto the said A. B. McGilvary and Nancy McGilvary (late Nancy Holloway), their heii’s and assigns, against me and my heirs and against any person whomsoever lawfully claiming the same or any part thereof.” The said Nancy McGilvary died in June, 1891, leaving a will, wherein she devised all her interest in the land referred to to the defendant.
It is claimed by the defendant that the said deed created an estate by entirety, and that, the wife having survived, the whole estate became vested in her. In that event, the plaintiffs, as heirs at law of A. B. McGilvary, who became deceased as far back as 1865, would have no interest in this land. Such were the conclusions of the master, but I cannot concur therein. I agree with the master that there is no repugnancy between the premises and the habendum of the deed such as to render void the habendum. The effect of the habendum, however, would be to vest the fee in A. B. McGilvary. In so far only as that clause would give any estate to Nancy McGilvary, is it invalid? See Mart. Conv., 92; 3 Wash. Real Prop., 468; 3 Cruise Real Prop.,432, and cases therein cited. I, therefore, must reverse the master in his conclusion that there was an estate by entirety, and must sustain the plaintiffs’ exceptions upon this point. The fact that it appears, from the evidence taken before the master, that the purchase money for this land was probably procured by A. B. McGilvary from the sale of certain personalty belonging to his wife, cannot, in my opinion, affect the construction I have given to this deed. This act on the part of the husband would be only a reduction to possession of his wife’s personalty, and I find, as a matter of fact, that it was such. The defendant must also account for the rent and profits of this tract, since he has been in possession of the same, subsequent to the death of Nancy McGilvary. * * * The master’s repoi't is, therefore, reversed to the extent rendered necessary by this decree; otherwise confirmed. It is ordered, that a writ of partition be issued, &c.
Messrs. Cothran, Wells, Ansel & Cothran, for appellants.
Messrs. Benet, McCullough & Parker, contra.
May 23, 1893.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Pore.
There are only two questions raised by this appeal. First: Whether the habendum in a deed, whereby an estate in land is provided for a man and his wife and their heirs and assigns, can be so construed to enlarge the premises in such deed, wherein the husband alone is granted an estate in such land, as that the estate in such land is vested in both husband and wife. Second: If so, and the wife survive the husband, whether she becomes seized of such land as an estate in entirety. The Circuit Judge, by his decree, answered the first question in the negative, thus rendering it unnecessary, in his judgment, to answer the second question.
We are not satisfied with that conclusion for the following reasons: The technical meaning of the premises in a deed is that part of the deed that sets forth the number and names of the parties; recitals necessary to explain the transaction, the consideration; and the certainty of the grantor, grantee, and thing granted. 2 Bl. Com., 241. This is the object of the premises. In the case at bar, the premises provide an estate for life to the husband (Varn v. Varn, 32 S. C., 77), the reason being that no words of inheritance are coupled with the estate vested in the grantee thereby. However, in the case at bar, in the habendum of the deed, the grantor uses words of inheritance whereby the estate for life, set out in the premises, is enlarged to an estate in fee in the husband. Why is this allowed? Is it not because the intention of the grantor is thus made clear to vest an estate in fee rather than a life estate? Thus the cardinal principle governing the construction of deeds is made to appear, viz: that the intention of the grantor, if consistent with law, must govern. This principle is recognized and enforced by this court. Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich., 161; McCown v. King, 26 S. C., 233; Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C., 125; Fuller v. Missroon, 35 S. C., 314.
But, it may be said, granted that the estate in land of the grantee in the premises of a deed may be enlarged by the habendum, it does not follow that a person named for the first time in the habendum, and not so named in the premises, can be admitted to be a grantee under such deed. Why should this be so? If no name at all appears in the premises as the grantee, but such name first appears in the habendum, the courts effectuate the intention of the grantor by making the grantee named in the habendum the true grantee under the deed. 3 Wash. R. P., 319; Perry v. Bellinger, 44 Maine, 416. All these matters are governed by the ascertainment of the intention of the grantor. This court, in the case of Kibler v. Luther, 18 S. C., 606, held, in effect, that when the concluding parts of a warranty in a deed for land imposed a duty, or a condition, for the first time expressed in the whole deed, it wms incumbent upon the court to give effect to such stipulations by the grantor. Why? Because thereby the grantor evinced his intention for his conveyance to so operate. "The office of the habendum in a deed is properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed." 2 Blackstone, 241. Applying these well established and-just principles to the case at bar, and we fail to see why the intention of the grantor that the wife should be a grantee, along with the husband, of the estate in fee he had conveyed by his deed, should not be enforced. How else can the words of this deed in the habendum — "To have and to hold all and singular the said premises before mentioned unto the said A. B. McGilvary and Nancy McGilvary (late Nancy Holloway), their heirs and assigns forever. And I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said premises unto the said A. B. McGilvary and Nancy McGilvary (late Nancy Holloway), their heirs and assigns," &c. — be construed.
[filed June 5, 1893].
The second question has been already decided by our courts. In a deed whereby lands are conveyed to husband and wife and their heirs and assigns forever, the survivor of such husband and wife is seized of such in entirety. Bomar v. Mullins, 4 Rich. Eq., 80; also, Georgia, &c., Railway Company v. Scott, by Judge McGowan, 38 S. C., 34. It follows, therefore, that the Circuit Judge, as before remarked, was in error in his decision of the first question, and was also in error in refusing to decide the second question in the affirmative.
It is the judgment of this court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the complaint be dismissed.