Case Name: Peter P. Lowe, Administrator of Sophia Lowry, deceased, v. Fielding Lowry, James Steele, and others
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1829-12
Citations: 4 Ohio 69
Docket Number: 
Parties: Peter P. Lowe, Administrator of Sophia Lowry, deceased, v. Fielding Lowry, James Steele, and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 4
Pages: 69–71

Head Matter:
Peter P. Lowe, Administrator of Sophia Lowry, deceased, v. Fielding Lowry, James Steele, and others.
Bill of peace can not be sustained with respect to personals, where no title is established at law, and it is not necessary to prevenía multiplicity of suits.
Party prosecuting at law, a groundless action of replevin, can not be relieved in equity against the legal consequences.
This was a bill in chancery, which was adjourned here for decision from Montgomery county, in connection with the preceding cause, between the same parties. Tho facts necessary to state, for a clear understanding of the decision of the court, are these:
In the month of January, 1822, Sophia Cooper, widow and relict of Daniel C. Cooper, deceased being possessed of considerable personal property, and some real estate, both in her own right, and as dower in her late husband’s estate, being also the mother of two children, sons of herself and D. C. Cooper, deceased, in contemplation' of a marriage with the defendant, Fielding Lowry, made a conveyance in trust, of her principal property, real and personal, to the defendant Steele, to hold the same for her own use, during her ^contemplated coverture, and for any issue that might spring from it, reserving a power in herself, at any time, to direct the trustee in making certain dispositions of the property, The marriage took place, and there was issue of it, one son, thfi defendant, Fielding Lowry, jr. The property remained in. the possession of Mr. and Mrs. Lowry, and was considered subject to the trust, until her death in 1825. She had contracted some debts during her widowhood, which remained unpaid. Some debts arose during her marriage with Lowry, in improving hec real estate, and the expenses of her last sickness and funeral were to be paid. The plaintiff Lowe, at the request of the defendant Lowry, took letters of administration to Mrs. Lowry, and under these, he claimed from Lowry, in whose possession they remained, the personalties included in the deed of trust. Lowry refused tv) deliver them, upon which Lowe, having had them appraised, brought a replevin against Lowry, and thus obtained the possession. On the trial of the replevin, a verdict was rendered against Lowe, and damages given in favor of Lowry for twelve hundred and fifty dollars seventeen cents, as the value of the -goods, one hundred and twelve dollars eighty-seven cents, as interest, and sixty-nine dollars twenty cents as costs.
The bill sets out these proceedings, and also sets out the debts due from Mrs. Lowry, and the means within the reach of the administrator to pay them. It prays'a decree, charging the estate of Mi's. Lowry with these debts, and requests that some order be made for the legal disposition of the balance, asks an injunction against the judgment obtained by Lowry in the replevin suit, and prays for general relief.
The defendant Steele admitted the facts stated in the bill; Lowry demurred.
Lowe, for complainant.
Bacon, for defendant.

Opinion:
By the Court:
There is no equity in the bill upon which the complainant can be relieved. Its chief object, though somewhat dimly *prosented, is that of a bill of peace. But the subject matter does not relate to real estate, and as to the personal, the complainant has established no right at law. This is deemed indispensable to sustain a bill of peace, unless an issue is,necessary to bring in different interested parties, and thus prevent litigation, and a multiplicity of suits. 2 Johns. Ch. 281.
There seems to be no ground for relieving the complainant against the judgment at law, in the action of replevin. There is no allegation that the complainant was ignorant of any material fact since discovered; no suggestion of fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake. No circumstance is charged in the bill to warrant a conclusion that the judgment at law is not according to the right of the case. On the contrary, we are satisfied, from another case which has been before us in connection with this, that the judgment against the complainant in replevin is unimpeachable. The facts that he prosecuted a groundless action, and that the result has involved him in a heavy responsibility, supply no grounds for his relief here. If the peculiar provisions-of the statute regulating the proceedings in replevin operate hardly in a particular case, that circumstance • invests the court with no power to relieve against them. 4 Ves. 639. The injunction must be dissolved, and the bill dismissed with costs.