Case Name: Omar CLIETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-01-26
Citations: 951 So. 2d 3
Docket Number: No. 1D05-3193
Parties: Omar CLIETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LEWIS, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 951
Pages: 3–7

Head Matter:
Omar CLIETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D05-3193.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 26, 2007.
Rehearing Denied March 16, 2007.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
SILVERMAN, SCOTT J., Associate Judge.
Appellant Omar Cliett challenges his conviction and sentence for robbery. We affirm and address only Cliett's argument pertaining to the standard jury instruction for robbery.
Cliett argues that the standard jury instruction for robbery does not adequately reflect the law on robbery. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.1. Cliett contends that the "putting in fear" element of the instruction improperly focuses on the victim's subjective fear, instead of on whether the victim's fear was reasonable. See Brown v. State, 397 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ("[T]he question is not whether the victim here actually feared appellant, but whether a jury could conclude that a reasonable person under like circumstances would be sufficiently threatened to accede to the robber's demands.").
We reject Cliett's argument. The supreme court adopted the standard jury instruction in 1981 and, although the instruction has been amended three times, the "putting in fear" element has gone unchanged. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.1 cmt.; see also Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1071 (Fla.2000) (stating that "standard jury instructions are presumed to be correct"). The instruction does not use the term "subjective," nor does it ask the jury to view the circumstances from the victim's point of view. The instruction simply asks whether, from a jury's external viewpoint, the victim was put in fear — an objective analysis. Although Cliett points to one reported case in which the state sought a special reasonable person jury instruction, the instruction simply clarified the standard instruction and did not substantively alter it. See Smithson v. State, 689 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The challenged instruction, read as a whole, fairly presents the law and does not mislead the jury. See Waters v. State, 298 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with opinion.