Case Name: Luke Eldert, Respondent, v. Cross Country Railroad Company and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Samuel M. Meeker and Milford B. Streeter, as Executors, etc., of Peter Wyckoff, Deceased, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-11
Citations: 165 A.D. 917
Docket Number: 
Parties: Luke Eldert, Respondent, v. Cross Country Railroad Company and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Samuel M. Meeker and Milford B. Streeter, as Executors, etc., of Peter Wyckoff, Deceased, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 917–918

Head Matter:
Luke Eldert, Respondent, v. Cross Country Railroad Company and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Samuel M. Meeker and Milford B. Streeter, as Executors, etc., of Peter Wyckoff, Deceased, Appellants.
Real property — registering title — complaint.
Appeal by the defendants, Samuel M. Meeker and another, as executors, etc., from an order of the Supreme Court, made at Special Term as resettled, and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 9th day of June, 1914, and from an interlocutory judgment entered in said office on the 17th day of June, 1914.

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
Although the plaintiff alleges possession of the land, the complaint and certificate of title show that the Wyekoff Estate has built several structures on portions of the land, which are actually occupied by numerous persons, who recognize the Wyekoff Estate or Sarah Maria Streeter as their landlord. These persons in no way recognize the plaintiff and claim no interest through him. The statute clearly requires that the plaintiff be in possession of the land as a condition precedent to registering the title. It is unnecessary to make the complaint more definite and certain, inasmuch as it clearly shows that the plaintiff does not occupy the land either directly or indirectly, and that his assertion of possession is denied by the physical fact that there is occupation under an adverse title. The order and interlocutory judgment should be reversed, with costs, and the demurrer sustained, with costs, with leave to the plaintiff to plead over within twenty days upon payment of such costs. Jenks, P. J., Burr, Thomas, Carr and Putnam, JJ., concurred. Order and interlocutory judgment reversed, with costs, and demurrer sustained, with costs, with leave to plaintiff to plead over within twenty days upon payment of such costs.
See Real Prop. Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 60; Laws of 1909, chap. 52), art. 12, as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 627; Id. § 878.— [Rep.