Case Name: McCollum v. Boughton, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1896-03-03
Citations: 132 Mo. 601
Docket Number: 
Parties: McCollum v. Boughton, Appellant.
Judges: Macearlane and Robinson, JJ., concur; but Brace, C. J., dissents.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 132
Pages: 601–633

Head Matter:
McCollum v. Boughton, Appellant.
In Banc,
March 3, 1896.
to secure payment of a note signed by her husband and several other parties, it was held that, as between the wife and one of the signers of the note, the latter was first liable to respond for the indebtedness, even although he had joined in the note as surety for the husband, and the wife knew of that relation between those parties to the note.
2. -: -: -. A party may become surety for a surety; and, as between themselves, the court will enforce whatever contract sureties may make touching their respective liability to answer for the debt secured.
3. -: -: -. Where land of a wife is, by deed of trust, charged with the payment of a note made by her husband and other parties, in ease of default of payment thereof by them, the land stands in the relation of security to the note and its makers.
4. -:--: -. Where a party first liable to respond to a debt, secured by deed of trust, purchases at trustee’s sale the land conveyed by such deed, he can not, in the circumstances described in the opinions, recover the land of one of the grantors in the deed, where the latter is only secondarily liable for the debt secured.
5. Contract: sureties inter sese. In ascertaining the relations and liabilities of sureties among themselves, the true test is the intention of the parties as evidenced by their agreements.
6. Husband and Wife: wipe’s general estate: surety, a husband is not authorized, merely by reason of his marital relation, to enter into stipulations binding upon the wife in respect of property forming part of her “general or legal estate.’’
7. -: -: -: mortgage. In 1888 a wife (joining her husband) might lawfully mortgage her legal estate in land to secure an obligation of her husband and other parties, by complying with the statutory requirements.
8. -: deed op trust: suretyship: oral agreement. The liability of a wife as surety for her husband and others by deed of trust (in the circumstances shown in this ease) can not be enlarged by oral evidence of an oral agreement or understanding to that effect had before, or at the execution of that instrument.
9. Practice: pleading: action at law: equitable answer: appeal: instructions. An equitable answer in an action at law converts it into a proceeding in equity, and, on appeal in such case, it is wholly unnecessary to consider declarations of law given or refused.
10. -: -: several defenses: ejectment: equitable defense of contribution. A defendant may set up as many defenses as he may have (R. S. 1889, sec. 2050) and in ejectment he may plead the equitable defense of contribution.
11. -: equity: jurisdiction. When a court of equity has once become possessed of a cause it will retain control of it until it has accomplished complete justice between the parties.
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court. — W. C. Brown, Esq., Special Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
division ONE.
The material parts of the deed of trust mentioned in the opinion are as follows:
“This deed, made and entered into this 24th day of August, one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-eight, by and between Geo. N. Boughton and Oallie G. Boughton, his wife, of the first part, and F. M. Ladd, of the second part, and Ohas. D. Mathews, of the third part,
uwitnesseth: That the parties of the first part, in consideration of the debt and trust hereinafter mentioned and created, and the sum of one dollar to them paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents grant, bargain and sell unto the said party of the second part, and to his heirs and assigns forever, the following described tract of land, situated in the county of Stoddard and State of Missouri, to wit:” (Here follows description.)
“The said Geo. N. Boughton and Oallie G. Bough-ton remain in possession of said premises as tenants of said E. M. Ladd, and in the event of a sale, however, we hereby covenant to quit and deliver possession thereof to the purchaser, without notice to quit, with all 'the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging.”
“In trust, however, for the following purposes: Whereas, the said Geo. N. Boughton and others did on the 24th day of August, .1888, make and deliver to the said C. D. Mathews a promissory note as follows: “‘$1,500. Sikeston, Mo., August 24, 1888.
“ ‘Two years afterdate we promise to pay to C. D. Mathews, or order, fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), for value received, with ten (10) per cent per annum thereon .from date, which interest shall be due and payable annually; and if interest is not paid annually the same shall become a part of the principal, and bear interest at the same rate.
(Signed by) “ ‘G-eo. N. Boughton,
“ ‘Thos. J. Ulen,
“ ‘J. W. McCollum, and
“‘E. J. Malone.’.
“And whereas, for the purpose of better securing said indebtedness, said parties of the first part contract and agree:”
(Then follows a number of agreements regarding taxes, insurance, and liens.)
“Now, if said promissory note shall be paid at maturity, and if the covenant aforesaid shall be met and truly kept, and all amounts expended as aforesaid shall be refunded and paid to the said party of the third part, or his assigns, by the .said party of the first part, or their legal representatives, then the property hereinbefore conveyed shall be released at the cost of the said parties of the first part; but if said promissory note, or either or any part of any one of them, shall be allowed to remain due and unpaid, or in case of pay ment of any amount expended as aforesaid shall not be made, or in case of said covenants, or any part thereof, shall not be fully kept, then this deed shall remain in force, and the said party of the second part, or in case' of his death or absence from the state of Missouri, or failure or refusal to act, then the sheriff of the county of Stoddard, in the state of Missouri, acting as such for the time being, may proceed to sell the property hereinbefore described, or any part thereof, at public vendue, to the highest bidder, at the courthouse door in the county of Stoddard, state of Missouri, for cash, first giving thirty days’ public notice,” etc.
(Then follows a number of the usual stipulations in regard to sale by trustee, application of proceeds, and maturity of whole debt in case of failure to meet any installment when due, etc.)
“In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year aforesaid.
“Geo. N. .Boughton. [seal]
“Callie G. Boughton. [seal]”
Acknowledged in due form, August 24, 1888, and filed for record, August 29, 1888. The other material facts appear in the opinion.
C. L. Keaton and J. J. Bussell for appellant.
(1) The sale under the deed of trust was void, and the deed thereunder passed no title to plaintiff. Siemers v. Schrader, 88 Mo. 20; Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 311; Schanewerk v. Hoberecht, 117 Mo. 22. (2) This deed of trust specified on its face that, “For the purpose of better securing said indebtedness,” etc., so that the makers of the note, including plaintiff, were primarily liable in the premises. Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407. (3) At most, Mrs. Boughton, defendant, not being a party to the note, could not be held to be more than a cosurety, and her property could not be taken to pay the whole debt, otherwise it would be a fraud on her rights. She should be required to do no more than to contribute. And any defense that could have been made to prevent the sale of the land can still be made under her equitable answer in this ease to prevent injustice and multiplicity of suits, as the makers of the note bought and plaintiff, one of them, took the deed to the same from the trustee, and a court of equity will still do justice between the parties. 46 Mo. 557. (4) The plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and can not recover against defendant in this action over her equitable answer upon a defective, fraudulent, oppressive, or void title fraught with injustice to the defendant in the premises. And the court permitted witnesses to testify to agreements made with Q-eo. N. Boughton in defendant’s absence as to this property being first liable for this debt. This was incompetent and very prejudicial to defendant’s rights to a court that believed the same to be material, and changes the written instruments. Biers v. Wolf, 116 Mo. 179; Harding v. Wright, 24 S. W. Rep. 211; Ford v. French, 72 Mo. 250; Dunlap v, Henry, 76 Mo. 106; Henry v. Sneed, supra; Riddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153. (5) The. payment of the note by plaintiff, a comaker thereof, extinguished the deed of trust. Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 336; Hagerman v. Sutton, 91 Mo. 519; Meads v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 620; 119 Mo. 280.
J. L. Fort for respondent.
(1) A married woman in Missouri may, by joining with her husband as prescribed by our statute of conveyances, execute a valid mortgage or deed of trust upon her legal real estate to secure a debt of her hus band, and may appoint therein a trustee to make sale of the property in default of payment of the debt secured. Schneider v. Staihr, 20 Mo. 269; Hagermanv. Sut-ton, 91 Mo. 519; Bines v. Mansfield, 96 Mo. 394; Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 390; Ferguson v. Soden, 111 Mo. 208; Meads v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 620; Comings v. Leedy, 114 Mo. 454. (2) And such mortgage, or deed of trust, is valid and binding upon the feme covert, notwithstanding the note secured by the mortgage is void as against her. Hagerman v. Sutton, 91 Mo. 519; Bines v. Mansfield, 96 Mo. 394; Meads v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 620; Comings v. Leedy, 114 Mo. 454. (3) Where a married woman and her husband mortgage the legal real estate of the former to secure the debt of the latter the wife occupies the attitude of a surety toward her husband. Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388; Mayes v. Bobinson, 93 Mo. 114. (4) There is no evidence in this record that the respondent was a comaker or a cosurety on the note. His contract was to pay if Geo. N. Boughton and the deed of trust failed to pay. Brandt on Suretyship and Guarantee [2 Ed.], section 265; Adams v. Flanagan, 36 Yt. 400; Keith v. Goodwin, 31 Yt. 269; Sherman v. Blade, 49 Yt. 198; Oldhami v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 41; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 815, note 5. (5) Appellant executed the deed of trust without any understanding that respondent should sign the note which it was intended to secure. When she executed the deed of trust' and delivered it to her husband her liability to pay the entire debt was attached. Geo. N. Boughton had authority to negotiate it in that condition, or, if not acceptable to the creditor, to obtain other signatures to make it so, and might therefore accede to conditions on which others were willing to sign. When this note was presented to respondent for him to sign he was under no obligations to appellant to sign it. She had already executed the deed of trust and was already liable for the entire debt. Therefore any limitations that respondent placed on his contract of suretyship could not affect appellant’s rights. Hence it was competent for respondent to mate the contract as he did, and what he said to Geo. N. Boughton at the time about it, is competent as part of the res gestae to show his relations to the note. Oldham v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 41, and cases cited on pp. 52, 53. (6) This is not a suit in equity. Carter v. Prior, 78 Mo. 222; Pistes v. Fry, 94 Mo. 266. If it is a suit in equity then appellant will have to stand or fall on consistent defenses. She can not deny the validity of the respondent’s title and at the same time claim contribution. She can not claim under and against the sale. State to use v. Koch, 47 Mo. App. 269; Tracy v. Cover, 28 Ohio St. 61; ShrainJcay. Bohan, 18 Mo. App. 340.

Opinion:
Barclay, J.
The petition is in ejectment for certain lots in the town of Dexter, Stoddard county, Mo. It follows the usual statutory form, and lays the ouster, September 21, 1890.
The answer denies the petition, in general terms, and then sets up a defensive state of facts, which will be discussed further along.
The plaintiff filed a reply bringing into the case more new matter, the nature of which will soon appear.
A trial came on in due course, resulting in a finding and judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed, after the usual motions and exceptions to preserve her rights for review.
The defendant was the owner of the property in suit when the deed of trust upon whose effect this appeal must turn was given. As she charges in her answer, and the evidence of both parties shows, she is a married woman, and was such at all the dates men tioned in the case. The property belonged to "her general estate," as the plaintiff's evidence disclosed.
The deed of trust which she and her husband executed, August 24, 1888, was duly acknowledged by both of them. In August, 1890, Mr. Boughton disappeared, and the note described in the deed of trust was not paid at maturity. The trustee, Mr. Ladd, after the usual preliminaries, put up the property to be sold, in conformity to the deed, to meet the demands of the trust, September 19, 1890. The land was bid in for $1,691.40 by an attorney representing the plaintiff as well as Messrs. Ulen & Malone. These three made such an adjustment of the matter between themselves, that the trustee's deed, September 20,1890, was finally made to Mr. McCollum, the present plaintiff, who was. also one of the signers of the note secured.
The defense stated in the answer is based upon these facts, somewhat elaborated. Defendant's contention is that plaintiff and the other signers of the note are primarily liable, and that they should respond for the debb which the note represents before her estate can be held for it.
The plaintiff meets this claim with a charge in his-reply that he and all the signers of the note, except Mr. Boughton, were merely sureties for the latter, and that it was expressly agreed between Mr. Boughton and them, before the note was signed, that they were not to be liable until the security afforded by the deed of trust was exhausted. Other matters are sated in the reply, but, in the view we take of the admitted facts it will not be necessary to go further into the particulars of the pleadings.
At the hearing on the circuit, the court, over defendant's objection and exception, admitted proof that plaintiff and the last three signers of the note executed it as sureties for Mr. Boughton, and upon the faith of the deed of trust which had been prepared before the note was actually executed.'
But no-person testified or asserted that Mrs. Bough-ton, the defendant, was even present when Mr. Bough-ton made the agreement to stand as primary debtor, as between the note signers, or that she ever made any such agreement to that effect herself with plaintiff, or with her husband, or with any of the signers of the note, other than as appears in the deed of trust.
It may be assumed. that the evidence tends to prove that defendant knew that the money represented by the note was borrowed and used by Mr. Boughton alone.
The question then is, what are the relations between Mrs. Boughton and the plaintiff, as one of the makers of the note, touching liability for this debt, on the facts above disclosed.
On the face of the deed of trust, the land of Mrs. Boughton was pledged to secure payment of the note,, as described in that instrument. The land was part-of # defendant's "general estate," as her counsel describe it,'or of her "legal estate," as plaintiff's-counsel assert.
No claim is made that the land was her separate-state, though the date of its acq uisition by her is not clearly given.
Whatever the nature of her estate, it is not claimed that she entered into any agreement that affects her rights touching the .subject-matter of this suit, other than the one embodied in the deed of trust, even if she had power to make such an agreement.
Her land, by virtue of that deed, was pledged as a security, to be resorted to. if said promissory note should "be allowed to remain due and unpaid." Hagerman v. Sutton (1887) 91 Mo. 519 (4 S. W. Rep. 73); Barrett v. Davis (1891) 104 Mo. 549 (16 S. W. Rep. 377).
But in the note all the signers were ostensibly principals; and, as between the defendant's land and the makers of the note,.the latter were primarily liable, according to the deed of trust.
It may be conceded that, as between Mr. Bough-ton and the other signers of the note, he was primarily liable, and that they were merely sureties, by reason of their agreement to that effect at the time of giving the note. But that relation between the signers of the note did not necessarily change the order of liability between them as the makers of the note (whether as principal or sureties) and the defendant, as the owner of the land pledged as security for the payment of the note, without other stipulations than those contained in the deed of trust.
Mr. Boughton was not authorized merely by reason of his marital relation to defendant, to enter into other agreements on her behalf altering her liability as expressed'in the deed of trust. Wilcox v. Todd (1877) 64 Mo. 388; Henry v. Sneed (1889) 99 Mo. 407 (12 S. W. Rep. 663).
No other authority or agency on his part to speak for her on that topic is even suggested.
She may have known that her husband was in fact principal and the others sureties upon the note. But it is entirely competent for one person to become surety for another surety, or to limit the extent or sequence of his liability with respect to other sureties. Such agreements will be enforced as made.
The true test of liability in these cases is the intent of the parties, as indicated by their mutual agreements. McNeilly v. Patchin (1856) 23 Mo. 40. Here the •defendant's attitude toward the parties who signed the note is defined by the deed of trust. Whatever be the relations of those signers to each other, there can be no substantial doubt that the relation of the defendant's land to the note, as it stands, is that of surety for the payment of the note. See the Hagerman and Barrett cases above cited.
In Harris v. Warner (1835) 13 Wend. 400, one signed a note as "surety for the above names," following four other signatures, to three of which the word "surety" was added, while the other (that of the principal) stood alone; and it was held that the last signing surety was not bound with those whose names preceded his, but that he was liable only after them.
That ruling was afterwards followed in the same state by Sayles v. Sims (1878) 73 N. Y. 551. Many other cases illustrate the same principle. Craythorne v. Swinburne (1807) 14 Ves. 160; Dawson v. Pettway (1839) 4 Dev. & B. 396; Sherman v. Black (1876) 49 Vt. 198; Moffitt v. Roche (1881) 77 Ind. 48; Baldwin v. Fleming (1883) 90 Ind. 177.
It is wholly immaterial, in view of the terms of the deed of trust, that defendant was aware that her husband was the primary debtor, as between him and the other signers of the note. It was competent for her, with such Knowledge, to pledge her estate as surety for their payment of the note, even in the capacity of sureties for her husband, as principal, which the instrument executed by her in effect did. Chapeze v. Young, (1888) 87 Ky. 476 (9 S. W. Rep. 399).
Whether the case be viewed as legal or equitable in its nature, it is very clear that no person liable on the note can compel payment of the note from the land pledged only to respond for the debt in event the note should not be paid, according to its promise. Freeman v. Moffitt (1893) 119 Mo. 280 (25 S. W. Rep. 87). By the terms of the deed of trust, the plaintiff is liable to answer for the debt represented by the note, before the land can be resorted to for payment.
On the facts established by plaintiff's own evidence, the learned trial court should have found for the defendant, under the law as contained in the first instruction asked by her. It committed error in not so finding; and it is wholly unnecessary to consider any question as to the form in which the case was dealt with on the circuit.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for defendant.
Macearlane and Robinson, JJ., concur; but Brace, C. J., dissents.
in .banc.
Barclay, J.
Since the transfer of this cause to the court in banc we have been favored with an opinion of our learned brother Gantt upon which he would reach a judgment affirming that of the circuit court. His comments on the case seem to call for a few remarks supplemental to the opinion delivered May 14, 1895, in the first division (30 S. W. Rep. 1028).
Our learned brother advances the proposition that Mrs. Boughton and the plaintiff should both be treated as sureties for Mr. Boughton, her husband.
That opinion is based upon two distinct grounds, if we correctly analyze the reasoning: first, that the legal effect of the instruments was to make her a surety for her husband; and, secondly, that ' £it was entirely competent to receive parol evidence of the collateral contract between Boughton and the plaintiff, McCollum, Ulen, and Malone, that they were only sureties for Boughton."
We will examine each of these grounds.
1. By the terms of the deed of trust Mrs. Bough-ton was, no doubt, surety for her husband, as he was one of the signers of the secured note. But that proposition is stated, and used, as though she became surety for her husband only, and not surety for the note with its other signers besides her husband. According to the deed, her land became bound for the payment of the note by those whose promise to pay it contains, namely, the four makers, of whom Mr. Boughton was but one. If (as my brother G-antt appears to intimate) the deed of trust made her surety for her husband only, then the conclusion he points out might follow. But that interpretation of the deed is erroneous. The error, too, is a radical one. It vitiates the whole argument that our learned brother has founded upon it.
The decision cited to confirm it (Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388) deals with a case in which a husband (alone) borrowed money, and, to. secure his debt, he and his wife joined in a deed of trust conveying a piece of land belonging to the wife, as well as another piece belonging to the husband: it was held that she was surety for her husband as to her piece of land so conveyed.
That case falls far short of deciding that the legal effect of the instruments (namely, the note and deed of trust in this case) was to make her a surety for her husband, if by that statement the husband alone is meant.
The effect of those instruments seems to us quite different. The principle declared in the very precedent cited sustains the conclusion we would reach on the present appeal, provided we are right in interpreting those instruments to mean this: that Mrs. Boughton conveyed her legal estate to secure payment of the note by its signers.
If, as to her, all the makers of the note are primarily liable, and her land is security for the debt represented by the note (which all of them signed), then it must follow that no one of the makers of the note can eject her from the land by a title obtained through that very deed of trust.
The crucial question then is, what is the correct meaning of the deed of trust?. Did it bind Mrs. Boughton's land to secure the debt of Mr. Boughton, or the debt of all the makers of the note?
Can there be any reasonable doubt that, on the face of that instrument, the land is conveyed in trust to secure payment of the note, and the note is recited as signed byfour persons, of whom plaintiff is one andMr. Boughton another? How then can it be properly held that all the signers of the note are not primarily liable, as against the land conveyed to secure it, when the terms of the deed make no distinction whatever between them in respect of their liability as makers?
So far as appears from the note and deed of trust all the makers of the note are principals. Its language is "we promise to pay," and all sign that promise. What rule of law justifies the holding that only one of these makers is the principal, and that the others are only sureties for that one, assuming now that we stick to the construction of the paper itself?
No word or suggestion in the deed of trust is-pointed out to sustain the position that, on the face of that instrument, its legal effect was to make Mrs. Boughton's land any more a security for her husband than for the other signers of the note. That effect could be given it only if the law were such that she might mortgage her land to secure a debt of her husband, but not to secure the debt of anyone else. But there is no such distinction recognized by the law of Missouri. If a wife, at the time of the deed in question (1888), joined her husband in a conveyance of her legal estate, in the manner prescribed by the statute touching such instruments (R. S. 1879, sec. 669), the conveyance could as validly secure a debt of a third party as a debt of her husband.
That proposition was assumed as the basis for the judgment reached in Rines v. Mansfield (1888) 96 Mo. 394 (9 S. W. Rep. 724), and there can be no doubt that it is a sound statement of the law in force in 1888.
There was nothing in our statute law at that time to forbid Mr. and Mrs. Boughton from mortgaging her land to secure the debt of third persons any more than there was to prevent them from mortgaging it to secure a debt of her husband. That they might mortgage it, in proper form, for the latter purpose, is settled in this state.
Hence we consider that, by the deed of trust, Mrs. Boughton bound her land as security to respond to the promise of the note as it stands; but not to respond for one only of the makers of that note.
2. We then come to the other contention, as to the admissibility of oral evidence, in such a case as this, to show that (as between themselves) Mr. Bough-ton was the principal debtor and the other signers of the note were his sureties.
My brother Gantt holds that it "was entirely competent" to receive such evidence, as against the defendant. We respectfully differ from that declaration.
We have nothing to do now with the question of the competency or relevancy of such evidence in a controversy between the parties to the note; and the discussion of such a question would be wholly foreign to the issues in the actual case in hand.
If on the face of the deed of trust Mrs. Boughton's land was security, and all the makers of the note were principals, that sequence in the order of liability could not be broken by oral evidence, as against her.
The deed of trust was made in 1888, and her rights thereunder were then fixed. The property was not her separate estate. She could only bind her legal estate by the methods sanctioned by the law. Her rights and liabilities under the deed of trust were measured by its terms. They can not properly be enlarged as to her, by oral evidence to the effect that some of those .who are stated in the deed of trust to be makers of the note are in reality (as between themselves) only sureties. As against the rights of a married woman to her legal estate such evidence is plainly inadmissible in this state.
That rule of law is so well settled in Missouri by prior decisions that it is not necessary to do more than to refer to a few of them. Shroyer v. Nickell (1874) 55 Mo. 264; Hagerman v. Sutton (1887) 91 Mo. 519 (4 S. W. Rep. 73); Gwin v. Smurr (1890) 101 Mo. 550 (14 S. W. Rep. 731); Meads v. Hutchinson (1892) 111 Mo. 620 (19 S. W. Rep. 1111).
The plaintiff's case, therefore, must at last be brought to book upon the interpretation of the deed of trust. In our opinion, with all due respect to the views of our dissenting brethren, when we reach that point the result, that should follow seems very plain.
All the signers of the note are primarily liable to pay it before resorting to the wife's legal-estate, conveyed to secure that note as described in the deed of trust.
We hold that the conclusion reached in the first division should not be disturbed; and, approving the opinion there delivered, we direct that the circuit judgment be reversed and the cause remanded as then ordered.
Brace, C. J., and Uantt and Burgess, JJ., dissent. Macearlane, Sherwood and Bobinson, JJ., concur.