Case Name: ESTATE of Edward A. GALLAGHER, Deceased
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1979-05-03
Citations: 485 Pa. 62
Docket Number: No. 202
Parties: ESTATE of Edward A. GALLAGHER, Deceased.
Judges: Before EAGEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 485
Pages: 62–72

Head Matter:
400 A.2d 1312
ESTATE of Edward A. GALLAGHER, Deceased.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Jan. 17, 1979.
Decided May 3, 1979.
Lawrence M. Aglow, West Chester, for appellant.
Duffield Ashmead, III, Christopher H. Gadsden, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
MANDERINO, Justice.
Edward A. Gallagher died on December 18, 1969. Appellee, Provident National Bank (Provident), presented for probate a document which was handwritten on a printed will form. The trial court in the matter before us described this document as one written "in a confused and haphazard manner." The document contained writing after the signa ture and contained writing in a vertical direction in the margins. When the handwritten document was presented for probate, Provident also submitted a typed "copy" of the document. Unlike the handwritten document, all the provisions in the typed copy appeared in an orderly fashion with the decedent's signature at the end thereof. This typed copy is referred to in the record as a "copy fair." Provident was granted letters of administration and proceeded to administer the estate. On May 9, 1975, the trial court's adjudication confirming Provident's first and final account was made absolute and distribution proceeded in accordance with the court's decree.
Approximately eleven months later, on April 5, 1976, appellant, Daniel Gallagher, a brother and legal heir of the decedent, filed a "Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Audit Should not be Set Aside and Letters of Administration Revoked." Appellee, Provident, responded by filing "Preliminary Objections," following which, the trial court without holding any hearing dismissed appellant's petition.
Appellant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing. We agree.
Appellant does not dispute the fact that when he filed his petition on April 5, 1976, the normal appeal time had expired. He argues, however, that his petition collaterally attacking probate and the trial court's final adjudication and decree of distribution, was not subject to the ordinary appeal periods because the petition alleged fraud. The trial court considered the fraud argument but dismissed the petition nonetheless stating that "a mere allegation is not sufficient" and further stating "the charge of fraud is merely an unsupported declaration."
We agree with appellant that his petition alleging fraud was timely filed and we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition contained "a nebulous claim of fraud."
Appellant's petition read as follows:
"The petition of Daniel Gallagher, respectfully represents that:
1. Your Petitioner resides at 70 Darby Road, Paoli, Chester County, Pennsylvania and is a brother of the decedent, Edward A. Gallagher.
2. Edward A. Gallagher died December 18, 1969 in Letterkenny County Donegal, Republic of Ireland having first made and published his handwritten last will and testament dated September 28, 1965 which was witnessed by two persons. A copy of said document with subsequent alterations, is attached hereto as Exhibit 'A'.
3. Thereafter, on September 15, 1972, Letters of Administration, C.T.A. were granted to Provident National Bank which presented with the Petition therefore an alleged 'fair copy' of the handwritten will of decedent.
4. The said 'fair copy' indicated the location of testator's signature at a place on the will different from that on the original handwritten will (see Exhibit 'A').
5. The original will, at the time it was executed, was signed at the end thereof but, subsequent to its execution, was altered by the addition of writing after the signature.
6. At the time said will was offered for probate, Provident National Bank knew, or should have known, that the 'fair copy' submitted did not accurately represent the handwritten will but, notwithstanding such knowledge, Provident fraudulently represented to the Register of Wills that the 'fair copy' of said will as prepared by Provident was a true copy of the will as executed when, in fact, the bequests set forth in the 'fair copy' were added to the will after it had been signed and witnessed.
7. As a result of fraudulently obtaining Letters of Administration, Provident illegally obtained possession of the assets of the Estate of Edward A. Gallagher resulting in a disposition of those assets to those not legally entitled.
8. On January 17, and May 6, 1974, Provident presented its First and Final Account for Audit and in continued reliance upon its 'fair copy', fraudulently represented to your Honorable Court that the decedent died testate with respect to all his property, that the will was properly executed and that the residuary estate was to be divided equally among Hanneman Hospital, Jefferson Hospital, Temple University Hospital, University Hospital and Presbyterian Hospital of New York. The account of this estate was approved by the Court on the basis of a will substantially different from that submitted for probate by Provident and upon which letters were granted to Provident.
9. In the alternative, the probate of the will as aforesaid has resulted in a mistake on the part of the Court in the distribution of the residuary of the Estate of Edward A. Gallagher.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner asks that a Citation issue upon Provident National Bank to show cause why the audit should not be set aside, the Letters of Administration granted to Respondent revoked and the compensation paid to the Administrator returned."
It is true that a petition alleging fraud without specificity is insufficient. On the other hand, neither a petition nor any other pleading alleging fraud is required to contain in detail all of the evidence in advance of its development during a hearing. The above petition contains more than a mere allegation of fraud. The petition and the reasonable inferences contained therein allege that the appellee when it presented the handwritten document to the register also presented "fair copy" (typed copy) which was different from the original. The petition alleges that the original was not signed at the end thereof but the submitted "fair copy" indicated a signature at the end thereof. The petition further alleges that fraudulent representations were made to the trial court which resulted in the court's approval of the account on the basis of the "fair copy" which was different from the original.
These allegations are specific and are sufficient to allow the petition to successfully withstand the claim that it is "nebulous" or only contains "a mere allegation of fraud" or that the charge of fraud in the petition is "merely an unsupported declaration."
It may be that at a hearing appellant will be unable to convince the fact finder that fraud existed in the probate of the will or in the administration of the estate. This is not the issue now before us. Appellant is entitled to his day in court on the issue of fraud. From the record before us, there is no evidence concerning the practice of using a "copy fair." (The parties interchangeably use "copy fair" and "fair copy.") Although this Court was given some information during oral argument about the local practice, this cannot be a substitute for testimony taken under oath during a hearing. Moreover, the record is silent concerning the specific use made of the "copy fair." We do not know whether the probate records would reasonably alert a searcher. We do not know whether the trial court had before it the original will or only the typed copy. We do not know whether persons entitled to legal notice during the administration of the estate had any way of knowing that the original existed or that it was different from the typed copy. These matters are only illustrative of what we do not know from the record before us. Appellant is entitled to an opportunity to prove whether or not there was fraud.
Since appellant's petition contains a sufficient allegation of fraud, its consideration is not barred by the ordinary time limits for appeals. See In re Estate of Bell, 463 Pa. 109, 114, 343 A.2d 679, 681 (1975) ("[irrespective of the statute, the [orphans' court division of the Court of Common Pleas] possesses an inherent discretionary right, recognized at common law, to correct its own records and decrees in the interest of justice. . . . This would naturally include cases of . fraud.") Osterling Estate, 337 Pa. 225, 10 A.2d 17 (1940). See also, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3521 (five year review period during which court "shall give such relief as equity and justice shall require.")
The decree of the trial court dismissing appellant's petition is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
O'BRIEN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which EAGEN, C. J., joined.