Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Barry Lee MILLER, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-11-05
Citations: 399 Pa. Super. 180
Docket Number: No. 01357
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Barry Lee MILLER, Appellant.
Judges: Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 180–192

Head Matter:
582 A.2d 4
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Barry Lee MILLER, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 15, 1990.
Filed Nov. 5, 1990.
Franklin D. Roush, Jr., Johnstown, for appellant.
Carolann A. Young, Asst. Dist. Atty., Somerset, for Com., appellee.
Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, President Judge:
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County on August 8, 1989 against appellant Barry Lee Miller. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The following is a summary of the relevant facts: Miller was charged with corruption of minors and indecent assault with respect to his two nieces, R.M. and H.M. The cases were consolidated for trial. Prior to trial, defense counsel attempted to discover the contents of reports prepared by the Erie Rape Crisis Center on R.M. and H.M. These reports were in the possession of the district attorney for the Commonwealth. The district attorney provided all the information that the defense had requested with the exception of the reports. In the hope of obtaining possible exculpatory evidence, Miller filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(A), requesting that psychological reports for both victims be disclosed to the defense. The trial court conducted an in camera review of the reports and Miller's motion was denied on October 11, 1988. Consequently, Miller was denied access to these reports. Following a jury trial Miller was convicted of both charges with respect to R.M. A mistrial was granted with respect to the charges concerning H.M. Miller filed timely post-trial motions which were denied. On August 8, 1989, Miller was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than four months and not more than twenty-three months, and directed to pay the costs of prosecution and five hundred dollars to the office of the clerk of courts of Somerset County. Miller filed a petition for modification of sentence which was denied by the trial court on August 29, 1989. This appeal followed.
Miller raises six issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty on the counts of corruption of minors and indecent assault where only the testimony of R.M. was given to substantiate the allegations in the information.
2. Is the verdict against the weight of the evidence.
3. Whether the defendant was denied access to possible exculpatory evidence as well as evidence useful in cross-examination of the witness, R.M., when the trial court denied access to a psychological report on the alleged victim.
4. Whether or not the trial court committed an error in preventing the defendant from placing into evidence accusations by the alleged victim, R.M., against a neighbor of her grandfather accusing said neighbor of similar activities as she accused the defendant.
5. Whether or not the court improperly refused to grant a mistrial in the case of R.M. after a mistrial had been granted in the case involving H.M.
6. Did the court commit an error in refusing to grant the demurrer of the defense on the basis of the Commonwealth failing to meet the burden of proof where [the] sole evidence offered by the Commonwealth was testimony by R.M., which was confused, [was] poor[ly] recalled] and thus cast grave doubt as to the alleged act.
We find Millers' third argument to be meritorious and hence only address that issue.
In his third issue, Miller claims that because he was denied access to a psychological report prepared by the Erie Rape Crisis Center on R.M., he was precluded from obtaining evidence that might have exculpated him and was prevented from using the information contained in the report to cross-examine R.M. Miller concedes that the trial court indicated that the psychological reports contained no exculpatory information but maintains, nonetheless, that the reports may have contained useful information regarding the motives and mental abilities of the victims. Miller contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him access to these reports. We agree.
The issue presented by Miller is controlled by our supreme court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989). There, defendant Lloyd sought to discover records of the victim's psychotheraputic treatment rendered by Psychiatric Institute of the Medical College of Eastern Pennsylvania. The trial court conducted an in camera review of the records, determined that Lloyd's allegations that the victim was delusional and/or hallucina tory were unfounded, and denied defense counsel access to the records. The supreme court held that "under the confrontation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, [Lloyd] . was denied his right to confrontation when his attorney was denied access to the contents of the victim's psychotheraputic records." Id., 523 Pa. at 431, 567 A.2d at 1359. The court further held that "the right to inspect these records is also mandated by the compulsory process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id.
The court reasoned that Lloyd was entitled to view the records in camera so that his attorney might adequately prepare Lloyd's defense. The court acknowledged that the Commonwealth has an interest in preserving the confidentiality of a victim's treatment by her psychotherapist, but that interest is overridden by a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him. The information contained in a victim's psychological treatment records may, therefore, provide the defendant with a defense which would be unavailable to him without such access. The court thus held that Lloyd's counsel was entitled to see the hospital records in an in camera proceeding, and stated that the trial court may issue orders to insure confidentiality. Id., 523 Pa. at 432, 567 A.2d at 1360.
Applying the Lloyd holding to the present case, we find that Miller was denied his right under the confrontation clause and compulsory process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution when his attorney was denied access to the contents of the report prepared by the Erie Rape Crisis Center on the victim, R.M. Miller, like Lloyd, is entitled to view the instant report in order to prepare his defense against the charges made against him and to knowledgeably confront his adverse witnesses through cross-examination. See Lloyd, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Carillion, 380 Pa.Super. 458, 552 A.2d 279 (1988) (Cirillo, P.J., concurring) ("the Commonwealth's interest in the confidentiality of the information contained in the Children's Services' file must yield to the Commonwealth's greater interest in promoting and protecting the defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him----[and therefore,] I would have recogniz[ed] a higher level of protection under our state constitution, and allowed] defense counsel complete access to the . file").
In applying the holding of Lloyd to the present case we are recognizing that our constitution places limits on the discretion of the trial court to grant or to deny a defendant's motion for pre-trial discovery of material in the Commonwealth's file. See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 305(B)(2). When the nature of the evidence is such, however, that denying defendant the opportunity to review it in effect denies him his constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process, he is entitled to view that evidence, regardless of whether it is in the hands of the Commonwealth or a private institution. As our supreme court stated in Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976),
Whether the statements . would have been helpful to the defense is not a question to be determined by the prosecution or by the trial court. They would not be reading the statements with the eyes of a trial advocate engaged in defending a client. Matters . may appear innocuous to some, but have great significance to counsel viewing the statements from the perspective of an advocate for the accused about to cross-examine a witness.
Id., 466 Pa. at 429, 353 A.2d at 429. Consequently, we conclude that constitutionally guaranteed rights may not be abridged by a rule of procedure which vests the trial court with the discretion to deny the defendant's request for information in the possession of the Commonwealth merely because the trial court has concluded that such information is not material to the preparation of his defense.
Judgment of sentence is vacated and a new trial is ordered.
Brosky, J., joins opinion by CIRILLO, President Judge, and files a concurring opinion by BROSKY, J.
FORD ELLIOTT, J., dissents.
. The order of sentence states "[A]s agreed by defense counsel and the [commonwealth] the offense of indecent assault will merge into the offense of corrupting children."
. In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person to give evidence against himself.
Pa. Const, art. I, § 9.
. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion, the trial court noted that it followed the procedure set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). While we agree that the trial court complied with Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, that decision involved federal constitutional guarantees. See Lloyd, supra, ("while the minimum federal constitutional guarantees are equally applicable to the analogous state constitutional provisions, the state has the power to provide broader standards than those mandated by the federal constitution"). At oral argument, Miller's counsel suggested that Miller's claim arose under our state constitution and so we have analyzed it under our state constitution.
. We note the similarity between the present case and Commonwealth v. Higby, 384 Pa.Super. 619, 559 A.2d 939 (1989). In Higby, this court stated that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b), which grants sexual assault counselors a privilege, is inapplicable where the defendant seeks to obtain disclosure of discoverable items in the possession of the Commonwealth. Id.-, see also Commonwealth v. Cacek, 358 Pa.Super. 381, 384, 517 A.2d 992, 994 (1986) (section "5945.1 does not grant the Commonwealth a privilege to prevent disclosing of discoverable items and information requested by a defendant pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 305"). In Higby, appellant averred that certain statements were made to individuals at a rape crisis center, and that these statements were in the possession of the Commonwealth. Likewise, Miller claims that the report prepared by the Erie Rape Crisis Center contains information that may exculpate him and that the report is in the possession of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth does not dispute that it has possession of the report. In Higby, we distinguished such a situation from the circumstances where a subpoena duces tecum was issued upon a rape crisis center. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988). Because the Commonwealth disputed Higby's contention that it had the statements in its possession, we were required to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the Commonwealth did in fact have the statements. See Higby, supra.
. In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rule 263 . if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable:
(a) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses;
(b) all written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial;
(c) all written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by any co-conspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals have been charged or not;
(d) any other evidence specifically identified by the defendant, provided the defendant can additionally establish that its disclosure would be in the interests of justice.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B)(2).