Case Name: In the Matter of the Petition of the New York Cable Company, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-12-17
Citations: 104 N.Y. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Petition of the New York Cable Company, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
Judges: Ruger, Oh. J., Miller, Danforth and Finch, JJ., concur.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 1–44

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Petition of the New York Cable Company, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
The act of 1875, known as the “Rapid Transit Aqt” (Ohap. 606, Laws of 1875), prior to the passage of the “ General Surface Act ” (Chap. 252, Laws of 1884), authorized the formation of companies to construct street railways on the surface, to he operated hy any power other than animal. (Earl, J., dissenting.)
The “General Surface Act” was not intended to, and does not interfere with the rights of any street surface railroad company organized before its passage under the “Rapid Transit Act;” it only prohibits the construction of surface roads hy corporations thereafter organized. The saving clause in the “ General Surface Act” protects, not only consummated and perfected rights of a company theretofore organized, but such rights as the company had, although inchoate and subject to the performance of further conditions; and hy the subsequent perform anee of the conditions those rights are perfected. (Earl, J., dissenting.)
As, however, the “Rapid Transit Act” prescribes the proceedings hy which rights may he acquired, a substantial compliance with the material requirements of the act is a condition precedent, without performance of which a company never became legally incorporated or acquired any rights under the act.
The intent of the provision of the “ Rapid Transit Act ” (§ 6), requiring the commissioners appointed by the mayor of a city to fix and determine the time within which the proposed railway or railways, or portions thereof shall be constructed, is to limit the corporation in respect only to time during which it is possible for it to prosecute the work, excluding time when legal barriers exist to such prosecution.
Where, therefore, the commissioners appointed by the 'mayor of New York specified a time within which each of twenty-nine different routes located by them should be completed, but provided that the time should begin to run from the date of the obtaining the requisite consent of property owners and of the local authorities, or, in case of failure to procure such consent, from the date of the confirmation of the report of commissioners appointed by the court; and also provided that the time unavoidably consumed by the pendency of legal proceedings or the interference of public authorities, or the omission to open or grade shall not be deemed a part of the time limited. Held, that this was a substantial compliance with the act.
The articles of association, framed by the mayor’s commissioners, instead of providing, as required by said act (§ 7), for the release and forfeiture to the supervisors of the county of all the rights and franchises acquired by the corporation, in case the proposed railways were not completed in time, provided, that in case the several portions of such railways were not completed each within the time limited, the rights and franchises “for and as to any portion of such railway or railways not so completed,” shall be released and forfeited. Held, that this was a material departure from the requirements of the act; that the provision should have been for the release and forfeiture of all the rights and privileges; that the provision was an attempt to override the action of the Legislature in refusing to make the amendment to the “Rapid Transit Act ” of 1883 (§ 3, Chap. 393, Laws of 1883), applicable to the city of New York, by incorporating the substance of the amendment in the articles of association.
Also, held, that as there was no general law, declaring a forfeiture or requiring a release to the supervisors, a compliance with the provision was necessary to carry out the legislative intent, and the failure to comply was a fatal defect in the articles.
Also, held, that while by the act of 1870 (Chap. 190, Laws of -1870) the board of supervisors of the county of New York, composed of supervisors, as before elected or appointed, was declared abolished, a new board of supervisors was created (Chap. 137, Laws of 1870) and is in existence to which the franchises of the company may be forfeited and released.
Under the provision of the Rapid Transit Act (§ 5), requiring the mayor’s commissioners to fix the plan or plans for the construction of the railway or railways, it is, at least, essential that they shall determine whether the contemplated road shall be an underground, overground or surface road, and a failure on their part to determine this ques tian is a failure to comply with one of the conditions precedent to the acquisition of corporate power.
By the resolutions of the commissioners, incorporated in the articles of association, as to several of the routes laid out, it was left to the subsequent election of the company whether they should be surface or elevated roads As to other routes, where the articles provided for elevated roads, with a double track, authority was given to the company to add such other tracks as might, from time to time, be needed to accommodate increasing traffic and to make such additions to the structures as might be needed. It was, also, left to the company to determine as to the method of supporting the tracks, i. e., whether they should be carried on longitudinal girders resting on the top of columns or by transverse girders supported by columns. .The power to erect stations and platforms was not restricted or defined, but it was left to the company to decide where they were necessary, it was authorized to occupy so much of the sidewalks for stairways and approaches '■ as may be necessary,” and also to construct “ such supports, turn-outs * * * stations, buildings, platforms, stairways * * * and such other requisite appliances as shall be proper. ” Held, that the commissioners failed to substantially comply with the act, and that as such compliance was essential there was no valid organization of the petitioner.
A motion for reargument was made upon papers showing proceedings instituted to amend in the particulars in which the court had held the articles to be defective. Held, that, conceding such proceedings were effectual, they would not afford ground for a reargument, as the jurisdiction of this court is confined to a review of the determinations actually made by the Supreme Court, and must be had upon the same papers which were before the General Term.
It seems that the order of this court affirming the order of General Term, denying the application of the petitioner will be no obstacle to a rehearing by the General Term, or to a new application, based upon new facts.
Where it is sought to take the property of an individual under powers granted by statute to a corporation, to be formed in a particular manner therein directed, the constitutional protection of the rights of private property requires that the powers granted be strictly pursued, and all the prescribed conditions performed.
It seems where the power is conferred upon a corporation duly formed, it will not be defeated simply because the corporation has done or omitted some act which may be a cause of forfeiture of its rights and franchises, as it rests with the State to determine whether such forfeiture will be enforced.
In re & R R. Go. (70 TST. Y. 361); In re H. T. R. R. R. Go. (70 id. 327); In re B. W. <6 H. R. Go. (72 id. 245) distinguished.
(Argued October 21, 1886;
decided December 17, 1886.)
Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, made December 1, 1884, denying a motion on the part of the petitioner, the Hew York Cable Railway Company, to confirm the report of commissioners appointed by the Supreme Court to determine whether the railways described in the petition of said company ought to be constructed 'and operated.
The report of the commissioners was in favor of the petitioner. The refusal to confirm their report was upon the ground that the petitioner had no legal right to construct or operate a railway.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
Wm. M. Evarts, Robert Sewell, Everett P. Wheeler, Chas. P. Shaw for appellant.
The decision is this case having been put solely on legal grounds is appealable to this court. (Allen v. Myer, 73 N. Y. 1; Tolman v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R. Co. 92 id. 356; Russell v. Conn. 20 id. 83.) The motion to confirm the report of the comm'issioners should be granted. (Morris v. Talcott, 96 N. Y. 100; Marvin v. Marvin, 78 id. 541; Fredericks v. Taylor, 52 id. 526; Sturgis v. Spofford, 58 id. 103; Fulton Fire Ins. Co., v. Baldwin, 37 id. 652.) Section 16 of the act of 1884 (Chap. 252) cannot be so construed as to take away vested rights, and would be void if it attempted to do so. ( Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209; State Constitution, art. 1, § 6; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 id. 183.) The Legislature cannot pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract. (U. S. Con. art. 1, § 10; In re Bank of Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 14,15 ; In re Reciprocity Bank, 17 How. Pr., 327; Farrington v. Sec. of Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; Dodge v. Woolsey, 16 How. [U. S.] 367; State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 18 id. 331.) A contract between the State and a citizen cannot be modified or changed by any act of the legislature. (Donald v. State, 89 N. Y. 36; People v. Otis, 90 id. 48.) Statutes are never to have a retrospective or retroactive operation unless it is so clearly expressed in the act, and not then if it would take away vested rights (as distinguished from remedies). (Goillotel v. Mayor, etc., 87 N. Y. 441; People v. Lord, 12 Hun, 282; Johnson v. Burrell, 2 Hill, 238; Butler v. Palmer, 1 id. 325-334; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John. 477; McMannis v. Butler, 49 Barb. 176; Waddell v. Elmendorf, 12 id. 585; Burley v. Pampacher, 5 Duer, 188; Ganson v. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes, 460-461; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 162, n. 9; 1 Kent's Com., 455; Jarvis v. Jarvis, 3 Edw. Ch. 462; Van Rensselaer v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 420-491.) The right of the company to complete its proceedings is a vested right. (In re Thirty-fourth St. R. Co., 5 East. R. 697; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202; Hurd v. Cass, 9 Barb. 866; Holmes v. Holmes, 4 id. 295; Snyder v. Snyder, 3 id. 621; Benson v. Mayor, etc., 10 id. 223-234; 2 Kent's Com., 275.) When the right to alter, amend or withdraw franchises is provided for in the charter itself, it may be done, as that is a part of the contract, but not otherwise. (McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige, 102.) The act of 1875, under which the Cable Company is incorporated, contains no such provision. (McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige, 102; Benson v. Mayor, etc., 10 Barb. 223; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518; State Bank of Ohio v. Koop, 16 How. [U. S.] 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 id. 331; N. O. Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650.) If there be a bona fide endeavor to comply with the requirements of the general acts for the creation of corporations and a certificate be filed, which is in good faith an attempt to follow them, a corporation de facto is created, which has the right to sue and be sued, and whose existence cannot be challenged collaterally, but only in a proceeding by the attorney-general. (Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119,121; Buffalo & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Cary, 26 id. 75-77; In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 id. 338 ; Methodist Church v. Pickett, 19 id. 482; Bank of Toledo v. International Bank, 29 id. 542; Holmes v. Gilliland, 41 Barb. 588; Mechanic's Building Association v. Stevens, 5 Duer. 676; In re Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 335.) Even if the railroad crosses prohibited streets the part not prohibited is valid. (Gilbert El. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 361, 373; Laws of 1881, chap. 485 § 2.) Even if there was a defect in the organization of the corporation, it could only be taken advantage of by the State, by a direct proceeding for that purpose by the attorney-general, which the State could waive, either expressly or by omitting to proceed, or by subsequent legislative recognition. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 338; White v. Ross, 15 Abb. 66 ; Black River & Utica R. R. Co. v. Barnard, 31 Barb. 258.) A provision in a public statute like this, prescribing a time within which an act should be done, containing no negative words forbidding the doing of the act afterwards, is directory, and a literal compliance with its terms in regard to time is not essential to the validity of the act. (Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law. 370, 371, 376; People v. Sup’rs. of Ulster, 34 N. Y. 272; Barnes v. Badger, 41 Barb. 99.) When any act or thing is ordered to be done or agreed to be done, and no time is specified, it must be done in a reasonable time. (Fickett v. Brice, 23 How. 194; Story on Con. § 790; 2 Pars, on Con. 47, 173.) All the circumstances being known what is a reasonable time is a question of law. (Story on Con. § 790; 2 Pars, on Con. 173.) The order of the General Term is appealable under chapter 270 of the Laws of 1854. (In re Brady, 69 N. Y. 219; Allen v. Myer, 73 id. 1; Tolman v. S. B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 92 id. 356; Bussell v. Conn. 20 id. 83; In re Kings Co. El. R. Co., 82 id. 95; N. Y. El. R. Co., 70 id. 327, 333; Thirty-fourth St. R. Co., 5 East. R. 697.)
William C. Trull and Luke F. Coscms for the Chambers Elevated, etc., Eailroad Company and others, respondents.
Statutory provisions as to time are to be deemed directory unless of the essence of the thing to be done. (Wood v. Chapin, 3 Kern. 509; In re Emp. City Bk. 18 N. Y. 200; People v. Cook, 4 Seld. 69; Bowers v. Badger, 41 Barb. 98, 99; In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 7 Hun, 241.) The proviso of section 4 of the act of 1875, makes the consent of the property owners and local authorities, or the determination of the commissioners confirmed by the court in lieu of consent of the property owners, a condition precedent to the exercise of the power previously of locating routes. ( Voorkes Bk. of U. S. 10 Pet. 449; Weyman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 150; In Re Second Avenue M. E. Church, 66 N. Y. 395; In re Webb, 24 How. 247; In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 359.) The mayor’s commission had no power to locate a route upon the surface of the streets. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 343; In re Gil. El. R. R. Co., id. 361.) The action of the mayor’s commission in resolving, as it did, that “ on streets chiefly used for residences, or bordering on parks or public squares, or on a river front, stations may be placed over the sidewalks of the streets,’’ was a clear neglect of duty arid assumption of power. (Mattlage v. N. Y. E. & M. R. R. Co., 67 How. Pr. 232; In re Boston, etc., 10 Abb. [N. C.] 104; N. Y., etc., v. Godwin, 12 Abb. [N. S.] 21; N. Y., etc., v. New York, 11 Abb. [N. C.] 383; N. Y. C. v. Cottle, 90 N. Y. 342, 347-349.) The provision of the sixth section of the act requiring the commissioners to “ fix and determine a time ” within which the road should be constructed and ready for operation, demand that- a fixed, stated and definite time should be named. (Donahue v. O'Connor, 45 Sup. Ct. R. 299; N. Y. Cable R. Co. v. Forty-second St. R. R. Co. Ms. op.) The failure of the mayor’s commission to comply with all the requirements of the statute in these particulars, renders the organization of the petitioner as a corporation defective and invalid. (1 Wood Rail. Law, 13, § 8; In re N. W. & M. R. Go., 72 N. Y. 245; Steam Transit Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 78 id. 524.) The provision of the act of 1884, expressly prohibiting the construction by the petitioner of any railway upon the surface of the streets, applies to every street surface railroad not then constructed which claims the right to construct, under the authority of a commission appointed under the act of 1875. (Falconer v. B. N. J. R. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 491; People v. Trustees of Ft. Edward, 70 id. 28.) The legislature has power thus to prohibit the construction of the petitioner’s road. (1 R. S. 800; Const., art. 8, § 1; Laws of 1875, chap. 606, § 34.) If the act of 1875 authorizes the construction of railways of the .character of those claimed by the petitioner, it is unconstitutional, because of its failure to provide adequate compensation for the private property required to be taken in the construction and operation of the petitioner’s railways. (70 N. Y. 327, 354,360; Wilson v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 161; Arnold v. H. R. R. R. Co., 55 id. 661; Story v. El. R. R. Co , 90 id. 146.) The “ court commission ” erred in receiving .oral and unverified statements, in favor of the proposed railways. (T. & B. R. R. Co. v. North. Turnp. Co., 16 Barb. 103.)
D. J. Dean for the Mayor, etc., respondent.
The Eapid Transit Act (Chap. 606 of the Laws of 1875) does not provide for or permit the creation of a steam surface railway. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. R. 343, 352, In re Gil. El. R. Co., id. 361, 366.) The construction and operation of the petitioner’s road is prohibited by section 16 of chapter 252 of the Laws of 1884. (In re Kings Co. El. R. R. 20 Hun, 225; Spring Val. W. Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347; Tomlinson v. Branck, 15 Wall. 460; Beer Co. v. Mass. 97 U. S. 25; Beik v. Chicago R. R. Co., 94 id. 167, 176; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 62.) The proceedings set forth in the record are insufficient under the Eapid Transit act (Chap. 606 of the Laws of 1875) to entitle the petitioner to the confirmation of the report presented. (In re Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 245; N. Y. & L. R R. Co., 35 Hun, 220; 99 N. Y. 12; Jenkins v. Onion Turnp. Co., 1 Cai., Cases 94; Crocker v. Kane, 21 Wend. 211 ; Hawes v. Aug. Sax. Co, 101 Mass. 983; Alley v U. Tool Co., 11 Gray, 139 ; In re Trustees, 57 How. Pr. 500; 80 N. Y. 642; In re Em. Ind. Sav'gs Bk. 75 id. 388; Dillon on Mun. Corp., § 96; Birdsall v. Clarke, 75 N. Y. 73; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 id. 92; N. Y. & B. R. R. Co., v God- win, 12 Abb. [N. S.] 26.) All the facts, showing inability to agree as to price of lands must be fully stated in the affidavits presented to the court, and the inability to agree must appear, otherwise the court has no jurisdiction to appoint appraisers. (Dykman v. Mayor, etc., 1 Seld. 493; In re B. H. & R. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 71; In re Marsh, 71 id. 319.)
Aaron J. Yanderpod for respondents.
It was the duty of the commissioners to locate the stations, landing places, buildings, platforms, stairways, etc. (In re Kings Co. El. R. Co., 20 Hun, 234.) It was also their duty to fix and determine the time within which the consents should be obtained. (Donahue v. O'Connor, 45 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 278, 299.) The Act of 1875, chapter 606, was not intended to provide for surface roads. (In re N. Y. El. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 343; 3 Abb [N. C.] 414; Laws of 1884, chap. 252; 1 R. S. 600, § 8; White v. Syr. & U. R. R. Co.. 14 Hun, 559; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. 478; Hyatt v. McMahon, 25 Barb. 457; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327.) The legislature has authority to make grants of franchises or to confer powers, on the consent of parties who may in any wise be affected thereby. (Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116, 118; Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121, 131.) The fact that Guy B. Pelton was an applicant to the mayor to appoint a commission rendered him incompetent to act as a commissioner to determine whether the railways should be constructed, notwithstanding the refusal of the owners of' property to consent thereto. (In re Houston St., 7 Hill, 175; Peninsular R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Pond v. Town of Milford, 35 Conn. 32; Page v. Contoocook Valley R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 438; In re Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 82 N. Y. 99; Corporation v. Manhattan Co., 1 Cai. R. 507, 508; Anthony v. South Kingston. 13 R. I. 129; Ex parte Hinckley, 8 Me. 146; State v. Delasdernier, 11 id. 473; Wilson v. Mitchell, 49 Wis. 284; Brooks v. Hishen, 40 id. 674; In re Albany St., 6 Abb. Pr. 273; Inhabitants v. Dilley, 24 N. J. [4 Zab.] 209, 213; People ex rel. Cooke v. Com. of Highways, 57 N. Y. 549, 551; Taylor v. County Comrs. of Worcester, 105 Mass. 225; In re Mt. Morris Square, 2 Hill, 14; In re B., N. & P. R. R. Co., 32 Hun, 289 ; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219, 221; Queen v. Aberdare Canal Co. 14 Ad. & Ell. [N. S.] 584, 586; In re Canada Northern R. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 653, 655; Shelton v. Town of Duley, 27 Conn. 414; Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 213, 223; Hazard v. Middletown, 12 R. I. 227; Peninsular R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Mich. Air Lime R. Co. v. Barnes, 40 id. 383; Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 294, 300, 308, 309; In re Hancock, 27 Hun, 78; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219; Taylor v. County Comrs., id. 225; Stephens v. People, 18 L. J. 277; People v. Mullin, 3 Abb. L. J. 150; In re B., N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 32 Hun, 289; People v. Brooklyn & Flatbush, 89 N. Y. 75; In re Grove St., 61 Cal. 438; In re Newport Highway, 48 N. H. 433; Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, 1 Zab. 656; Mitchell v. Kirkland, 7 Conn. 229; People v. Landreth, 1 Hun, 544; Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 294; The Peninsular R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; People, ex rel. Vandeusen v. The First Judge of Columbia, 2 Hill, 398 ; Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 213; R. & S. R. R. Co. v. Budlong, 6 How. Pr. 467; Cooley’s Const. Lim. 563; Redfield on Railways 218, 219.) The proper time to make the objections was at the confirmation of the report. (2 Doug. [M.] 367; 1 Comp. L. 643.) There was no waiver. (16 Mich. 351; 15 Vt. 61; 2 Doug. [M.] 367; 1 B. Monroe, 213; 32 Me. 310; 47 id. 593; 6 Clarke [Ia.] 62; 1 Conn. 401.)
Wheeler H. Peckham for Madison avenue owners, respondents.
The mayor’s commission is alone authorized to impose conditions of any kind, and they must be expressed in the manner pointed out by the act. (70 N. Y. 358-359.) At the time of the passage of the act of 1884, the petitioner had not obtained the consent of the local authorities or of the property owners, and it is only after the routes are designated and these consents obtained, that the petitioner could become invested with the powers conferred by section 26 of the act of 1875. (70 N. Y. 348.) The petitioner was thus proceeding to obtain these powers when the legislature repealed the provisions under which it was acting. Such repeal is effectual. (Falconer v. B. & J. Co., 69 N. Y. 491; People v. Trustees, 70 N. Y. 28.) Section 18 of the act of 1884, applies only to street surface railroad companies organized under special charters prior to the constitutional amendments of 1870. (21 N. Y. 461; In re El. Road, 70 id. 348.) Repeal of statutes, jurisdictional in character are absolute and nothing thereafter done, even though already commenced, has any validity. (Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 330; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 338.) Whatever right the petitioner has under the law is much like the right of a public officer to future fees or emoluments. It is not property — not a right recognized by or the subject of law. (Connors v. Mayor etc., 5 N. Y. 296.)
Aug. S. Hutchins and Waldo Hutchins for Second Avenue Railroad Company, and others, respondents.
The petitioner has no standing in court, not having been duly organized as a corporation. (Donahue v. O’Connor, 45 N. Y. Sup. 301; N. Y. Cable Railway Co., 40 Hun, 15; Birdsall v. Clarke, 73 N. Y. 73. In re Emigrant Ind. Sav'gs Bk., 75 id. 388 ; N. Y. Cable Ry., 36 Hun, 358.) The object of the act of 1875 was to provide for the construction of elevated and underground railways. (40 Hun, 12.)
Crosvenor Lowry and Abram Wakeman for Thirty-fourth Street Railroad Company, and others, respondents.
The consents required by the statutes must first be obtained before the location by the commissioners operates in any manner to confer any rights, inchoate or other. (Gaylor v. Wilder, 10 How. [U. S.] 493 ; Kerr v. Doherty, 79 N. Y. 327; Austin’s Juris. 886-887.)
John M. Scribner for certain respondents.
Chapter 606, Laws of 1875, does not authorize the construction of surface railroads, but clearly contemplates only elevated or underground railroads. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 343, 346, 347, 352; In re Gilbert El. R. R. Co., id. 336; Stranahan v. Sea View R. R. Co., 84 id. 308-314.) Where a power is granted by legislative enactment, with a proviso annexed, the enactment is to be read as if no more power was ever given than is contained within the terms or bounds of the proviso. (In re Second Ave. M. E. Church, 66 N. Y. 395.)
James M. Varnum, for trustees of Gramercy Park and others, respondents.
The fact that the commissioners appointed by the mayor both exceeded their powers and neglected to comply with certain mandatory provisions of the statute affected fatally all subsequent proceedings. (Laws of 1873, chap. 606, § 6 ; Donohue v. O' Connor, 45 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 301; N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Forty-second St. & Man. R. R. Co.; In re Meth. Church, 66 N. Y. 395; In re Brooklyn R. R. Co., 72 id. 245; Rapid Transit Act, § 7; In re N. Y. L. etc. R. R. Co., 35 Hun, 220; aff’d 99 N. Y. 12.). Chapter 606 of the Laws of 1875, conferred no authority upon commissioners appointed by the mayor to fix, determine or locate cable railways, or railways of any kind, upon the surface of a-street, such as was done in this case. (In re El. R. R., Co., 70 N. Y. 327, 373; 6 id. 366.)

Opinion:
Rapallo, J.
On the hearing of this motion at the General Term, the learned judges entertained different views. Daniels, J., who delivered the principal opinion, was in favor of denying the motion on various grounds. He considered, in the first place, that the act under which the petitioner claimed to have been organized, commonly known as the Rapid Transit Act (Laws of 1875, chap, 606), did not authorize the construction of a railroad upon the surface of the land, but related only to elevated or underground railways ; also that if the Rapid Transit Act ever did authorize the construction of surface roads, the General Surface Railroad Act of 1884 (Chap. 252, § 16), prohibited the erection of surface roads under the Rapid Transit Act, and abrogated any authority which the petitioner might previously have had to construct surface roads, and further that the commissioners appointed by the mayor, as prescribed in the Rapid Transit Act, had failed to comply with some of the requirements of that act which were essential to the legal organization of the petitioner as a corporation.