Case Name: Sylvester LIPSCOMB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-01-31
Citations: 573 So. 2d 429
Docket Number: No. 89-213
Parties: Sylvester LIPSCOMB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, COBB, W. SHARP, GOSHORN, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 573
Pages: 429–439

Head Matter:
Sylvester LIPSCOMB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-213.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 31, 1991.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Glen P. Gifford, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Colin Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
CORRECTED OPINION
EN BANC
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CERTIFICATION
HARRIS, Judge.
Pursuant to the motion for rehearing filed by appellant, we withdraw our prior opinion in this cause dated September 6, 1990, and substitute the following:
Sylvester Lipscomb appeals his departure sentence entered after a nolo conten-dere plea to grand theft of a motor vehicle. The facts reveal that Lipscomb committed the crime on September 18, 1988 after being released from prison on March 25, 1988. Because the timing of the new grand theft charge was less than six months after his release from prison on a similar charge, the court departed from the guidelines and sentenced Lipscomb to five years in prison. We affirm.
This case returns us to that mystic land of guideline sentencing where we must attempt to discern what the law is at this particular moment. We recognize that the law in this area remains in a state of flux. A unanimous court told us in State v. Pentaude, 500 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), receded from Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla.1989) that it was appropriate to exceed the guideline range plus one cell for violation of probation when the reason for violation was sufficiently egregious. Timing was considered sufficiently egregious to warrant departure. The same unanimous court told us in Williams v. State, 504 So.2d 392 (Fla.1987), receded from Gibson v. State, 553 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1989) that it was appropriate to base a departure from the guideline range when sentencing for a substantive charge on the "continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity" or "the timing of each offense in relation to prior offenses and release from incarceration or supervision". Even in State v. Jones, 530 So.2d 53 (Fla.1988) (Jones I), after two of the Pentaude justices had been replaced, the court was still unanimous in holding that timing, now referred to as "temporal proximity" of commission of offenses, was a valid and suffi- dent ground for departure.
However, the truths of Pentaude, Williams and Jones I were short-lived. Along came Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla.1989). In Lambert, we are told by a divided court that it is no longer possible to depart in violation cases in excess of the authorized one cell bump up. The same 4-3 majority confirmed this decision in State v. Tuthill, 545 So.2d 850 (Fla.1989) and a unanimous court approved this position in Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla.1989). A 6-1 majority approved it in Dewberry v. State, 546 So.2d 409 (Fla.1989). In Hamilton v. State, 548 So.2d 234 (Fla.1989) a 5-2 majority again held that factors relating to violations of probation cannot support departure.
Even so, it appears that it might still be possible to depart based on timing or temporal proximity in new substantive cases under section 921.001(6). In fact, in Gibson v. State, 553 So.2d 701 (Fla.1989) the court held that timing, under appropriate circumstances, could be a valid reason for departure in non-violation cases. This truth, however, was somewhat precarious because two justices specially concurred but held that because of the difficulty of determining articulable standards, timing as a factor for departure should no longer be permitted. In Jones v. State, 553 So.2d 702 (Fla.1989) {Jones II), the court again confirmed that timing was a proper basis for departure. The two justices specially concurring in Gibson now dissented.
But then, in State v. Simpson, 554 So.2d 506 (Fla.1989), one of the Jones dissenting judges wrote the opinion in which all of the justices seem to agree that "temporal proximity" is a valid reason for departure if it is shown that the crimes committed demonstrate a continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity as evidenced by the timing of each offense in relation to prior offenses or the release from incarceration or other supervision. The opinion specifically holds:
However, we stress that timing may be a valid reason if based on facts that demonstrate the type of escalating or persistent pattern described with approval in Keys [v. State, 500 So.2d 134 (Fla.1986) ], Williams I [v. State, 504 So.2d 392 (Fla.1987)], [State v.] Rousseau [509 So.2d 281 (Fla.1987)], and Jones, providing the trial court does not rest its conclusion preponderantly on unconvicted conduct. Williams II [v. State, 500 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1986)].
Simpson at 510.
From the advance sheets now available to us it appears that timing is an appropriate reason for departure in non-violation cases if the timing of the new offense in relation to the prior offense or other supervision shows an escalating or persistent pattern of criminal behavior. In our case appellant committed grand theft in Virginia and was sentenced to prison. Upon release he came to Florida and within six months of his release from prison committed the present grand theft offense.
While there is some doubt as to what length of time between the prior offense or release from prison and the new offense will justify a timing departure, we have previously held that 11 months is not so long as to prevent departure. Roseman v. State, 519 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We hold that a new offense within 6 months of release from prison is of sufficient "temporal proximity" to justify departure.
The next issue is whether two offenses can establish a pattern — escalating or persistent. The courts in Frederick v. State, 556 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) and McKinney v. State, 559 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) hold that two offenses do not a pattern make. We find however that just as two points can establish a line and just as two felonies can establish a habit, two similar violations of the theft laws separated by a short prison term show a pattern of criminal behavior as it relates to taking other persons' property.
For the foregoing reasons, and at the present time, we affirm.
However we certify the following question of great public importance to the Supreme Court:
MAY A TRIAL JUDGE IMPOSE A DEPARTURE SENTENCE IN A NONVIO-LATION OF PROBATION CASE IF THE TIMING OF THE NEW OFFENSE IN RELATION TO THE PRIOR OFFENSE OR THE RELEASE FROM INCARCERATION OR OTHER SUPERVISION SHOWS A PERSISTENT PATTERN OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR?
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, COBB, W. SHARP, GOSHORN, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
DIAMANTIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. The court stated additional grounds for departure but none of the others were appropriate. However, one valid reason justifies departure. § 921.001(5), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. While we seek to discern, from an analysis of the Supreme Court holdings, what the law presently is, the dissent seeks to determine what the law should be.
. The lone dissenter believed, unlike the majority, that the facts in the case justified the trial court's determination that departure was appropriate.
. It may be argued that subsections (7) and (8) limit the application of section 921.001(6). That is, that the only permitted reasons for departure are excessive victim trauma or escalating pattern of criminal conduct. No decision of the Supreme Court has yet accepted this argument.
. Three justices dissent because the Simpson majority found the facts did not show a persistent pattern of criminal activity.
. Compare Gibson v. State (14 months too long) and Jones v. State (8 days not too long).
. Although the scoresheet reflects the commission of a third third degree felony and a misdemeanor conviction, the record does not reveal the nature of the offenses or when they were committed.
. § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989).