Case Name: State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Larry Joe Gaston, appellant
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1974-01-18
Citations: 191 Neb. 121
Docket Number: No. 38910
Parties: State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Larry Joe Gaston, appellant.
Judges: Heard before White, C. J., Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, Newton, and Clinton, JJ.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 191
Pages: 121–127

Head Matter:
State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Larry Joe Gaston, appellant.
214 N. W. 2d 376
Filed January 18, 1974.
No. 38910.
Frank B. Morrison, Sr., and Bennett G. Hornstein, for appellant.
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and Harold S. Salter, for appellee.
Heard before White, C. J., Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, Newton, and Clinton, JJ.

Opinion:
White, C. J.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment, sentence, and commitment to the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for an indeterminate period of not less than 20 or more than 30 years.
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of forgery, and by the court of being an habitual criminal in a subsequent proceeding. § 29-2221, R. S. Supp., 1972. On November 13, 1972, he appeared for sentencing on these two convictions.
Instead of imposing one sentence on the forgery conviction for the mandatory minimum of 10 to 60 years required by the habitual criminal act (section 29-2221, R. S. Supp., 1972), the District Court imposed a separate sentence of 1 to 2 years on the forgery conviction and another and second sentence of 20 to 30 years on the conviction under the habitual criminal act. This was error. State v. Tyndall, 187 Neb. 48, 187 N. W. 2d 298; State v. Sheldon, 179 Neb. 377, 138 N. W. 2d 428.
On the same day, November 13, 1972, the court committed the defendant to the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex by entering a formal written journal entry of judgment and commitment, "that the defendant be delivered to the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for an indeterminate period of not less than Twenty (20) years and not more than Thirty (30) years on the charge of Forgery and being an habitual criminal This would have been a proper sentence but it does not conform to the two sentences actually imposed in open court and is no proper judgment. Preuit v. People, 5 Neb. 377, at 382.
The defendant now contends on direct appeal, citing numerous decisions in support, that the second and separate habitual criminal sentence is illegal and void, and that he only has to serve the l-to-2 year indeterminate sentence for forgery.
The answer to this contention is that both sentences orally pronounced on the defendant are unauthorized, not according to law, and invalid. By its terms, the habitual criminal act provides for one single sentence on the principal charge and mandatorily requires that single sentence to be for a period of from 10 to 60 years. The sentence for only 1 to 2 years was improperly entered. § 29-2221, R. S. Supp., 1972; Preuit v. People, supra; Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N. W. 510; In re Fanton, 55 Neb. 703, 76 N. W. 447. On direct appeal this court has the power to remand a cause for a lawful sentence where the one pronounced was void as being beyond the power of the trial court to pronounce and where the accused himself invoked appellate jurisdiction for the correction of errors. Hickman v. Fenton, supra; Drawbridge v. State, 115 Neb. 535, 213 N. W. 839; Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N. W. 619; In re Application of Cole, 103 Neb. 802, 174 N. W. 509, 848. The holdings of these cases apply "with equal force to a sentence for a shorter period than the minimum prescribed by statute." Hickman v. Fenton, supra.
Both original orally pronounced sentences were unauthorized by statute, illegal, and of no force and effect. The two convictions are valid and stand unchallenged. The defendant remains legally without sentence.
Our recent decision in State v. Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212 N. W. 2d 90, is not contrary to our present holding. In that case there was a valid sentence orally pronounced on the defendant on the principal charge and a subsequent attempt to convict and sentence the defendant on an habitual criminal charge. The case of State v. Solano, 181 Neb. 716, 150 N. W. 2d 585, insofar as it is in conflict with this opinion, is overruled.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to resentence the defendant in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.