Case Name: City of Louisville v. Wilson; Same v. Nevin; Same v. Hoertz; Same v. Martine; Same v. O'Connell
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1896-06-24
Citations: 99 Ky. 598
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Louisville v. Wilson. Same v. Nevin. Same v. Hoertz. Same v. Martine. Same v. O’Connell.
Judges: Judge Gully and DuRelle dissenting.
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 99
Pages: 598–610

Head Matter:
Case 87 — AGREED CASE
June 24.
City of Louisville v. Wilson. Same v. Nevin. Same v. Hoertz. Same v. Martine. Same v. O’Connell.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, LAW AND EQUITY DIVISION.
1. Constitutional Law — Reduction of Salary — Staturory Construction. — The provision in the charter for cities of the first class (sections 2824 and 2861 of the Kentucky Statutes), that members of the boards of public works and public safety in such cities “shall receive a salary of not less than $2,500,” does not fix the salaries of such officers; and there being no salary fixed, an ordinance passed after the appointment and qualification of the members of those boards fixing their salaries at $3,000, was not violative of the provisions of section 161 of the Constitution, prohibiting any change in the compensation of municipal officers, during their terms of office.
2. Municipal Officers. — Members of such boards are “municipal officers” within the meaning of section 161 of the Constitution, and their compensation after being once fixed can not be changed during their terms.
3. Sajie. — The secretary of the board of public works in a city of the ' first class, who is required to execute a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties, and who is custodian of the journals of the-board’s proceedings and other papers and records affecting the public, the assistant bailiff of the police court, .who performs the duties of a peace officer and is authorized to serve process and make arrests; and the official stenographer of the police court, whose official acts have the same verity and force as do those of the clerks of the police court, are each and all municipal officers within the meaning of section 161 of the Constitution. To constitute an officer, it is not material whether his term be for a period fixed by law or endures only at the will of the appointing power. If he be invested with some portion of the function of government, to be exercised for the public benefit, he is an officer.
HENRY S. BARKER, D. W. FAIRLEIGH and JOHN "W. BARR, JR., FOR APPELLANTS.
1. The city charter provides definitely that the members of the two boards shall receive a salary of not less than $2,500, and this is not dependent upon any action whatever of the general council, but is payable by force of the statute itself; -in' the absence of any action to the contrary by the council the salary must be considered as fixed by the charter. The salary having been, fixed at the time of the appointment and qualification of the members of the two boards can not be changed during their terms. (Sec. 161 Constitution of Kentucky.)
2. The secretary of the boards of public works is not a municipal officer; his duties are only clerical, no governmental authority is delegated to the position, and no functions of the board can be exercised by one holding the place. The office was created by the council, without specifying what length of time the occupant should serve, and it has the right at any time to abolish the place or reduce the salary. The occupant is nothing more than an employe of the municipal government.
3. The stenographer and assistant bailiff of the police court are neither officers for the same reasons given as to the secretary of the ■ board of public works; and in addition to that the charter in section 126 prescribes what shall be the offices of the police court, and neither of them is included therein. (Charter for Cities of First Class, sec. 126.)
4. What distinguishes an “office” from an “employment” or “contract” is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the government, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. (Abbott’s Law Dictionary; Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 19, p. 390; Mechem on Public Offices, secs. 2 and 4; Ryan v. Mayor, 50 Howard, Pr. (N. Y.), 91; In re. Corliss, 23 Amer. Rep., 558; Geuntor v. Griffin, 4 Abbott Pr. (N. Y.), 310; People v. Langdon, 40 Mich.; O’Brien v. Mayor, 84 Hun. (N. Y.), 50; People v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y., 377; Goetzman v. Mayor, 6 Hun. (N. Y.), 132; Cramer v. Water Co., 31 Atl., 384; U. S. v. Monat, 124 U. S., 303; Collopy v. Cloherty, 95 Ky., 330; Com. v Adams, 95 Ky., 588; Hoke v. Com., 79 Ky., 574.)
TURTLE & TRABUE and HUMPHREY & DAVIE for- appellees.
1. The legislative provision in the city charter that the salaries of the members of the executive boards should not be less than $2,500, does not fix the salaries at that amount; butthematterisleftwholly to the general council with one restriction that it should not fix such salaries at less than the amount named in the charter. And the council having failed, as was its duty, to fix these salaries before the appointment and qualification of the members of these boards, it had a right to do so afterwards. (Purcell v. Parks, 82 111., 346; 84 111., 551; State v. McDowell, 19 Neb., 442; Wheelock v. McDowell, 20 Neb., 160; Rucker v. Supervisors, 7 W. Va., 641.)
% The clerks of the executive boards are officers within the meaning of the Constitution. They are the custodians of the records of their respective boards, and the charter end o.dinances impose upon them duties independent of and apart from the duties of the members of the boards. Where one performs a public function and exercises a public power independent of anybody else, he is a public officer, and not merely an employe.
3. The general council has no power over the appointment of or the fixing of the salaries of the subordinate officers selected by the members of the executive boards, except it may prescribe the limitations as to compensation. (Secs. 2809 and 2810, Ky. Stats.)
4. While the general council had no authority to fix the salaries of these subordinates, still it having attempted to do so by an ordinance, and the boards having ever since acquiesced in the salaries'so prescribed by making out pay-rolls and warrants in accordance therewith, the salaries became fixed, and can not be changed under the provisions of section 161 of the Constitution.
DODD & DODD, CARROLL & HAGAN and D. W- BAIRD of course® ON SAME SIDE.
Briefs not in the record.

Opinion:
JUDGE LEWIS
DEEIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is agreed in these five cases, submitted and decided without action, as follows: Appellees Wilson and Nevin were appointed by the mayor for the term of four years, December 14, 1893, confirmed by the board of aldermen of Louisville, and immediately qualified as members respectively of the board of public safety and board of public works.
January 9, 1894, by ordinance of the general council the salary of each member of the two boards w'as fixed at $3,000 per annum.
By ordinance approved January 26, 1894, it was provided there should be one secretary of the board of public works, his compensation being fixed at $2,000 per annum; and January 31,1896, appellee Hoertz was, by the board of public works, appointed secretary for the term of four years.
By ordinance approved May 21,1894, it was provided the compensation of deputies of the police court should be $1,500 each, payable monthly; and January, 1895, appellee, J. J. O'Connell, was by I. N. Vetter, bailiff of said court, appointed one of his assistants or deputies.
January 9,1891, by ordinance, the compensation of official stenographer of the city court was fixed at $1,000 per annum; and- February, 24, 1894, appellee, John P. Martine, was, by the judge of the court, appointed to the office.
December 26, 1895, the general council, composed of newly-elected members, passed an ordinance, duly approved by the mayor, changing salaries of members of the boards of' public safety and of public works to $2,500 each per annum; that of secretary of board of public works to $1,200 per annum ; that of deputy bailiff to $1,200 per annum; and that of official stenographer to $900 per annum-.
The main question in this case is whether the ordinance of December, 1895, violates section 161 of the Constitution, as follows: "The compensation of any city, county, town or municipal officer shall not be changed after his election or appointment or during his term of office; nor shall the term of any such office be extended beyond the period for which he may have been elected or appointed." And the proper determination of it involves the inquiry whether the various ordinances referred to, which first fixed the compensation of these officers, were valid and effectual for that purpose.
If any of them be invalid at all it is only because they were passed after the officers affected by them had qualified and commenced the discharge of their duties, for all appear-to have been regularly passed and- approved under authority-conferred by section 2753, Kentucky Statutes, applicable to-Louisville, a city of the first class, as follows: "Except as-otherwise herein provided, the general council may, by ordinance, prescribe the duties, define the terms of office, fix the compensation, and the bonds and time of election of all officers and agents of the city."
But as none of those ordinances, except the particular one fixing salaries of members of the board of public safety and of the board of public works, were passed subsequent to appointment and qualification of the several officers mentioned, there is no reason for calling in question the validity of any except it may be that one.
The purpose of section 161 ovas to prevent as well the reduction of compensation of officers, sometimes the result of prejudice and false economy, as increase of it, sometimes brought about by importunity and undue influence on their part, and so there can not be any change at all of an officer's compensation during his term; but there is an essential difference which we are satisfied the framers of the Constitution had in mind, between fixing the amount of compensation an officer shall receive, not hitherto ascertained and settled, and changing it after it has been fixed
It is the obvious and uniform policy of government, State and municipal, as well as just to each officer, to fix his compensation definitely and certainly as to amount, except when he is paid by fees of office. And section 161 does not in terms, nor was intended to forbid or at all, relate to any statute or ordinance that for the first time does fix the salary of an officer; but it is equally necessary for the protection of both the government and officer that his salary, when, once fixed, should not be changed during his term, and for no other purpose than to prevent that evil was section 161 made part of the Constitution.
It is, however, contended that section 2824 and section 2861 had the effect to fix and secure to the members respec tively of the board of public safety and board of public works a definite amount of compensation, the two sections being alike, and as follows: "Each member shall receive a salary of not less than twenty-five hundred dollars."
But it is plain the legislature did not intend thereby any more than to prescribe a minimum of the compensation which the general council had,been, by section 2753, already empowered to definitely and authoritatively fix; and it is to us equally plain that until the ordinance of January 9, 1894, was passed and approved the members of the two boards did not have the legal right to demand nor the 'city treasurer legal authority to pay them any compensation whatever.
In our opinion the last-named ordinance is valid, and, consequently, the one of December 26, 1895, must be held invalid.
There can be no question of appellees Wilson and Nevin being officers in the meaning of section 161, and the remain* ing inquiry is whether the other appellees are.
There are various tests by which to determine who are officers in the meaning of the law, but at last, in case of uncertainty, the intention of the law-makers control. To constitute an officer it does not seem to be material whether his term be for a period fixed by law or endure at. the will of the creating power; but if an individual be invested with some portion of the functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public, he is a public officer. (Meacham on Public Offices, section 1.)
The board of public works is by statute vested conjointly with the mayor with executive power, and, as its name indicates, has control and supervision of public places and public improvements, with authority to make contracts in regard thereto.
By section 2803 it has power to prescribe rules, not inconsistent with any statute or ordinance, regulating its own proceedings and conduct of its officers, clerks and employes-, distribution and performance of its business, and preservation of the books, records, papers and property under its control; and, while it does not appear from the agreed statement of facts what particular duties are assigned to the secretary of the board, it is manifest he was intended to be and is more than a mere employe, for he is req aired to execute bond for the proper discharge of his duties, and, being next in authority to members of the board, is the proper per. son to keep the required journal of its proceedings, preserve books, papers and records affecting the public. In our opinion he should be held an officer in meaning of section 161.
As to appellee O'Connell performing, as assistant bailiff, the duties of a peace officer, and having authority to serve process and make arrests, there can be no question of his being an officer. Besides, the statute expressly provides for the appointment of assistant bailiff, as it does for the appointment of official stenographer, whose official acts have in degree the same verity and force as do those of the clerk of the police court.
We think appellees are all officers in the meaning of section 161.
Judgment affirmed.
Judge Gully and DuRelle dissenting.