Case Name: John B. Gerald v. Theodore B. Gerald
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1850-04
Citations: 5 La. 242
Docket Number: 
Parties: John B. Gerald v. Theodore B. Gerald.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 242–248

Head Matter:
John B. Gerald v. Theodore B. Gerald.
Where a family meeting is held under the act of 18th of March 1§47, for the emancipation of a minor, the tutor must be cited before the meeting is held.
Article 62 of the Constitution, which invests the courts with the judicial powers, cannot be extended by implication.
The grant of judicial power, in article 79 of the Constitution, is an exception to article 62. The grant of judicial power therein conferred upon clerks of court does not extend to their deputies.
The laws of 29th of May, 1846, and 16th of March, 1848, do not confer on deputies the judicial powers vested in clerks by the Constitution. Those acts give no other powers to deputy clerks than those previously vested in them by law.
APPEAL from the District Court of East Feliciana, Stirling, J.
Roberts and Thompson, for plaintiff,
contended: The first point is, as to the service made upon the tutor. It is contended, that service should have been made upon him previous to the meeting of the family. The authority recited to sustain this point is 1 N. S. 551. We also call attention to the same authority as having no sort of bearing upon the case at the bar. We contend, however, that his presence at the time of the homologation of the proceedings, and acquiescence therein, cured the error, if it was one, and bars him from raising the point now. If such a mode of proceeding were allowed in our courts, for parties to acquiesce in all the proceedings that are had in any case until after its final judgment, and then to prevent their execution, and raise quibbles of this character, the courts, instead of being the defence of the oppressed, would be the most potent agent in the hands of the oppressor. For various and palpable reasons, this court will readily see that such a course could not be allowed.
The second objection is, that no under-tutor was present at the family meeting. Now, the fact was proved most clearly before the court, when the rule to show cause why distringas should not issue was made absolute, that the under-tutor resided out of the State at the time these proceedings were had. But, admitting the position that he was not absent, and that if he was, an under-tutor ad hoc could not be appointed to him, what weight is it entitled to in this court ? It was never contemplated by law, that an under-tutor should be present at family meetings, provoked by the minor himself by virtue of a peculiar law made for his special benefit, as the one under which this emancipation was sought. A mere reference to the act itself refutes such a position. See acts of 1847, p. 65. Such family meetings being provoked by minors themselves, the necessity for the under-tutors does not exist. For the powers and duties of under-tutor, see C. C., 301, 302, 303; 1 N. S. 462; 2 L. R. 145; C. N. 420, 442; 11 L. R. 189; 4 L. R. 389; 10 L. R. 328. We are happy that this point is made, as it is important the question should be settled, and settled now. The appointment of minor’s counsel under-tutor ad hoc is an objection altogether technical; for we cannot conceive how the duties of an under-tutor and an attorney would clash. The one, sworn to protect the interest of his client; the other, his ward.
The third objection, that a judgment by default, should have 'been taken, -we deem unnecessary to notice, further than to invite the court to an examination of the authorities cited by defendant’s counsel, which show that the doctrine does not apply, even by the most latitudinal construction, to a case like the present.
The objections to the legality of these proceedings, on the ground that the deputy clerk happened to sign the papers and orders, is, indeed, a novel one. We have been accustomed, in this State at least, to regard the act of the deputy, either of the clerk, sheriff, or notary, as being the act of the clerk, sheriff, or notaiy, himself. To unsettle this principle would be dangerous to the interests of every party litigant in the State. We have examined the authorities referred to by defendant’s counsel, and find nothing to sustain the position whatever. We refer to the same authorities, and submit them for construction and decision.. It was certainly contemplated, that the clerk should have the power of calling family meetings to emancipate minors. Such would be the most natural construction which could be placed upon the act of 1846. The language of the statute is directory, as it is in all cases of a similar nature. The petition for family meetings in all cases must be addressed to the' judge, though the same may be ordered by the clerk, or his deputy. The clerk has many powers of a judicial character given him by the act of 1846, and yet all petitions must be addressed to the judge, and he is to decide all points where any opposition is made. Such being the case, why make this case exclusive of that rule ? We see no good reason why the subsequent action of the judge in this case is not curative, if he should have made the order; nor why the clerk is not fully authorised to order the meeting.
E. T. Merrick, for defendant,
contended : In this case, defendant’s counsel will merely call the attention of the court to the points of law raised by the assignments of error, and in the same order, viz.: 1st. The record shows that, March 21st, the family meeting was ordered to be held nn the 28th day of -March, 1848. The .citation was not served on defendant until April 1st, 1848. A fair construction of the act of 1.847, p. 65, s. 2, requires the .citation .to be served previous to the holding of the family meeting. Cause is to be shown to the family meeting as well as to the judge. Their (the family meeting’s) advice is worthless, unless they are informed of the facts. See 1 N. S. 551, as to the necessity of citation. 2d. There is nothing to show that the under-tutor was absont.' In truth he was and still is in the parish. His presence (or at least that of the tutor under the act of 1847,) was indispensable to the validity of the family meeting. C. C. 302. An under-tutor ad hoc is an office unknown to our law- If one existed, plajnti.ff’s attorney could not, as was sought to be done in this case, act contradictorily with himself, and approve for the opposite party or oppose a proceeding which his client was provoking. 3d. The judgment by default or an answer was indispensable to a decree of emancipation, for want thereof ,th.e proceeding apd judgment qr.e null ip this case. p. P. art. 606, No. 4. Ibid, 60.9, 359. Bird v. McMicken, 5 ,N. S, 515. 6 N. £. 212. 7 N. S. 287. 8 N. S. 284. Ibid, 302, Calvet v. Calret et al. 4th. The foregoing points b.eing established, it must follow that ajl the .subsequent, proceedings were null. Sublato fundamento cadit opus. 5th. The ninth section of the act of 1846> P.. 65, did pot contemplate investing the clerk with power to condemn ex parte. The order certainly could not be made except after citation. In this case it was made by the deputy clerk before citation.
The act of J846, p. 63, conferring judicial power in certain cases upon clerks, can never be held to confer the same power upon their deputies. This act gives to the clerks a large part of the judicial power of the late parish judges. The most important interests of the parish are thus conferred upon them. The Constitution authorises this judicial pow.er to be confided to clerks and not deputies. Art. 79. This being an exception t.o article 62, which invests the Supreme Court, the District Court, and Justice of the Peace, with judicial power, cannot be extended to any other .officers except those specified, and whose election had b.een .expressly provided for by the Constitution. Article 82. The statute of 1846, p. 67, sec. 18, and the act amendatory thereto, of 1848, p. 116, do not confer on deputy clerks the judicial power given to the clerks, but simply ‘‘the power now vested bylaw in deputy clerks.” Yariops reasons will occur at once .to your honors why this very great power was not .conferred on the deputies, and why they were left with the simple power which they had possessed prior to said act of 1846. As to the distinction between clerk and deputy, under act of Congress, 1790, see S.ampson & Qverend, 4 Bib. 409, 1 Greenleaf, No. 5,06. See also ,C. P. 7.82,
6th and 7th. No judgment by default or contestatio litis having been formed either upon the petition to file an account or for a writ of distringas, the order to file an account, and the decree for and writ of distringas, were also erroneous. 4 L. R. 13.
8th. For the foregoing reasons, we contend that all the proceedings in the court below ought to be reversed and annulled.
We further contend, that, inasmuch as under the act of 1847, p. 6.4, ss. 1 and 2, the district judge alone was the person to whom the petition is to be presented and who alone is authorised by said act to call a family meeting j and inasmuch as said family meeting in this case was ordered by the clerk, that, therefore the whole proceedings are null, apd the petition, instead of being sent back for further proceedings, ought to be dismissed. See a.ct 1829, s. 2, Bullard .and Curry, p. 582, and act 1847, p. 65, s. 2.

Opinion:
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
Rost, J.
The plaintiff, who is a minor over eighteen years of age, applied to the district court to be emancipated, under the act of 1847, providing for the emancipation of minors. The clerk of the district court made the order for the family meeting required in such cases, and appointed an under-tutor ad hoc, to attend said meeting, on the suggestion of the plaintiff that his under-tutor had left the State. The family meeting advised the emancipation, and its proceedings were homologated. The plaintiff then presented another petition, praying that his tutor might be ordered to account. The order on this petition was made by the clerk's deputy. The defendant took no notice of it, and after the operation of the legal delays, the plaintiff obtained a rule to show cause why a distringas should not issue against him to compel obedience to the order of the court. On the plaintiff's motion to make that rule absolute, the defendant appeared and excepted to the proceedings, on the ground that they were illegal and void ; that the plaintiff has never been legally emancipated, and that, if he had been, he could not stand in judgment. These exceptions were overruled ; and the defendant has appealed from the decree making the rule absolute.
The following grounds of error are assigned on the appeal : 1st. The defendant was not cited till after the family meeting had been held. Under the act of 1847, he should have been cited before that time. 2d. The act of 1846 which confers certain judicial powers upon clerks does not confer the same powers upon their deputies.
These grounds of error are both well founded in law. The citation, with a copy of the petition and of the order made thereon, should have been served upon the tutor before the family meeting was held, as has been the uniform practice under the act of 1829, on the same subject-matter. Family meetings have not the means of arriving at correct conclusions, unless they are informed of the facts within the knowledge of the tutor. It is stated, in the procés verbal, that the tutor was cited, but did not appear at the meeting. This is an error: the citation was served four days after the family meeting had been held.
Article 79 of the Constitution authorises the clerks of the district courts to exercise important judicial powers. This is an exception to article 62, which invests the Supreme Court, District Courts,- and Justices of the Peace with the judicial power of the State, and cannot be extended by implication to any officers not specified in the article. The grant of judicial power is made to an officer recognised by the Constitution, and elected by the people; not to the deputies whom he appoints and dismisses at pleasure. The organic laws of 1846 and 1848 do not purport to confer on deputy clerks the judicial powers vested in clerks by the Constitution. They give them no other powers but those previously vested by law in deputy clerks.
It is urged, that under the former organisation of the judiciary, clerks were entrusted with certain judicial powers which their deputies uniformly exercised, and that the framers of the Constitution and the Legislature of 1846 must be presumed to have known and contemplated the ancient practice, legislation, and jurisprudence. A majority of the court do not consider this a legitimate presumption. The only act giving judicial powers to clerks under the old system was passed in 1828. It speaks of clerks alone; deputy clerks had no authority to act under it; and we cannot, without an express declaration of the Convention and of the Legislature, presume that they intended to sanction and authorise that which is wrong and illegal. If the wording of the 79th art of the Constitution left it doubtful whether the powers it confers were extended to deputy clerks, the former practice and the former jurisprudence of the State might assist us in ascertaining the intention of its framers. But, in the absence of all grant of judicial power to deputy clerks, there is no room for interpretation.
This distinction between the clerk and his deputy is not peculiar to our jurisprudence, An act of Congress provides, that the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State shall be proved or admittéd in any other court in the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, &c. Under this act, it has been uniformly held, that the clerk who certifies the record must be the clerk of the court himself: the certificate of his under-clerk, in his absence, or of the clerk of any other tribunal, is incompetent for that purpose. X Greenleaf, No. 506, and cases there cited.
There being no emancipation, and no legal order to account, the defendant is not in default.
For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, that the judgment in this case be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings according to law; the plaintiff and appellee paying the costs of this appeal.