Case Name: City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Company
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1916-11-23
Citations: 122 Va. 178
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 178–195

Head Matter:
Richmond.
City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Company.
November 23, 1916.
Absent, Prentis, J.
Reheard January 17, 1918.
1. Taxation—City of Richmond’s Powers—Limitation.—While the city of Richmond under its charter has plenary powers of taxation, its power to tax any particular property is subject to any limitation that may be placed thereon by the legislature.
2. Taxation—Merchant’s Tax—Powers of City to Tax—Acts 1915, page 119.—The capital of merchants is intangible personal property, and under Acts 1915, page 119, it cannoi be taxed by a city at a higher rate than thirty cents upon the one hundred dollars of assessed valuation thereof. The State imposes a license tax on merchants regulated by the amount of their purchases. The language of the act “that the capital -of merchants shall not be subject to State taxation, but may be taxed locally as prescribed by law,” means that such capital shall not be subject to State taxation on the ad valorem basis so long as the State continues to tax merchants with a license, and that as to local taxes they must be in accordance with the general law of the State, and had reference to the preceding provision' of the same section placing a maximum of thirty cents thereon.
3. Taxation—Authority to be Plain.—A tax must be plainly authorized before the citizen can be charged therewith.
ON REHEARING.
4. Taxation—Merchantsf Tax—Powers of City to Tax—Acts 1915, page 119.—The capital of merchants is “intangible personal property” within the meaning of the tax laws. By the express terms of the segregation act (Acts 1915, page 119), such capital is excepted from taxation by the State in the ordinary sense (that is, upon an ad valorem basis), and, therefore, is not within the class of intangible property segregated for State taxation, but is subject to be taxed locally “as prescribed by law.” The phrase “as prescribed by law” does not mean the prescribed rate of thirty cents mentioned in-the segregation act, but means that the local taxation of merchants’ capital is to be controlled by other statutory provisions outside of the terms of that act; and statutory provisions outside of the segregation act, contemplating and authorizing a tax on merchants’ capital at such rate as the county and city authorities deem necessary and proper, and thus responding to the expression “as prescribed by law,” are found in section 69 of the charter of the city of Richmond (under which tax here in question was levied) and in sections 833-a and 1043 of the Code and section 46 of the tax bill.
6. Taxation—Merchants’ Tax—Powers of City to Tax—Acts 1915, page 119.—The language of the act in regard to merchants’ capital is, “Except that the capital of merchants shall not be subject to State taxation but may be taxed locally as prescribed by law.” The words “as prescribed by law” were not apt and natural words to convey the idea that local taxation on mar-chants’ capital was to be limited to the rate fixed by the act. If the purpose of the draftsman had been to restrict local taxation of the capital of merchants to the rate previously, named in that particular act, undoubtedly he would have used the words “as prescribed by this act,” or their equivalent, instead of “as prescribed by law.” The purpose of the General Assembly seems to have been to leave merchants’ capital to be taxed by localities practically as it had been prior to the passage of the segregation act, and this becomes the more apparent upon a consideration of the terms of that act in connection with the other kindred provisions of the tax laws enacted at the same time.
6. Statutes—Construction—In Pari Materia—Acts Passed at same Session of Legislature.—The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together applies with peculiar force' to statutes passed at the same session of the legislature; it is to be presumed that such acts are imbued with the same spirit and actuated by the same policy and they are to be construed together as if parts of the same act. They should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effect should be given to the provisions of each.
7. Taxation—Merchants—Policy of the State.—It has been the policy of our law for years to impose a license tax on merchants as the exclusive method of State taxation, and to permit a property or ad valorem tax thereon by localities. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the General Assembly, in launching a new but tentative and partial segregation plan of taxation, should- have refrained from disturbing the status of the tax laws as to this particular property. A-judicial construction in keeping with this natural and probable legislative purpose avoids conflict, and harmonizes all the provisions of the law enacted on the subject at, the extra session of 1915,' and its effect is to take from the general class of intangible personal property segregated to the State, the capital of merchants and to place it, as heretofore, in a class to itself.
8. Taxation-—Merchant’s' Tax—Schedule C of the Tax Bill.—The capital of merchants was not intended to be embraced in schedule C of the tax bill. While such capital might, upon a casual reading, appear to- be included in that classification, yet when sections 8 and 9 of the schedule are read in connection with other provisions of the tax laws, particularly the segregation act itself and section 46 of the tax bill, it is clear that the capital of merchants was not intended to be embraced within this classification, but that the same is expressly excepted and excluded therefrom.
9. Statutes—Practical Construction—Period^ of Practical Construction.—The rule of interpretation which permits the courts to look to the practical construction adopted by executive officers is usually applied to cases in which such construction has continued and been acquiesced in for a long period of time; but it is not to" be confined to such cases. One reason for the rule is that the officers charged with the duty of carrying new laws into- effect are presumed to have, familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the new law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon.
10. Taxation—Construction of Statute—Authority to he Plain.— It is undoubtedly true as a general proposition, that taxes must be plainly authorized before they can be collected; but this rule does not go to the extent of cutting off and shutting out all the lights that may be reasonably brought to bear in determining the intention of the law-making power.
11. Taxation—Construction of Statutes—Repeal of Statutes.—The question of the righf; of the city of Richmond to impose upon the capital of merchants an ad valorem, tax in excess of thirty cents on the one hundred dollars of assessed valuation is not one’of an original grant of power to tax, to which the rule of strictissimi juris applies. It is unquestioned that the power to levy the tax complained of in, the instant case was expressly given by statute and had been exercised for many years. • The real question is whether the former law has been repealed by implication by the segregation act, for it certainly has not been repealed thereby in express terms. Repeals by implication are not favored. But there is always a presumption more or less strong, according to circumstances, that a statute is not intended to repeal a prior statute on the same subject, unless it does so in express terms. In the case of grants of power to tax—or indeed for other purposes—to municipal bodies, the presumption that it was not intended to modify or repeal them by subsequent general legislation is so strong as to be almost conclusive.
12. Taxation — Constitutional Law — Uniformity.—As merchants’ capital is not embraced in the classification of schedule C of the tax bill, but remains where it has practically always been, in a class to itself, subject to a license tax only by the State but liable to a local property tax, and the propriety and legality of such a classification has been too long recognized in this State to admit of serious question, and is, moreover, plainly authorized by section 169 of the Constitution of 1902, therefore, there is no force in the contention that if this construction is correct, the segregation act itself is unconstitutional because it violates section 168 of the Constitution of 1902, requiring uniformity in taxation.
13. Taxation—Uniformity—Intangible Property.—There can be no question about the power to tax different classes of intangible property at different rates. A contrary holding would strike a fatal blow to the entire plan of taxation as established by the General Assembly in 1915 (see section 9 of the tax bill); and would, furthermore, be contrary to the settled law on the subject.
Error to a judgment of the Hustings Court of the city of Richmond. Judgment for petitioners. Defendant assigns error.
Reversed.
The opinion states the case.
H. R. Pollard, A. H. Light and E. P. Buford, for the plaintiff in error.
Geo. Bryan, Hill Montague and E. Warren Wall, for the defendant in error.
Hunsdon Cary and Henry C. Riely, for others interested not parties to the proceeding.

Opinion:
Harrison, P.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This proceeding involves the right of the city of Richmond to assess the capital of merchants with an ad valorem tax in excess of thirty cents on the one hundred dollars.
By an ordinance approved April 9, 1915, the city assessed the capital employed by the defendant in error in its business as a merchant at the rate of $1.40 on the hundred dollars, and now appeals from the decision of the lower court holding that its power to levy such a tax was limited to thirty cents on the one hundred dollars. It is true that the city of Richmond, under its charter, has plenary powers of taxation, but its power to tax any particular property is subject to any limitation that may be placed thereon by the legislature.
By an act approved March 15,1915, the General Assembly of Virginia installed a new system of taxation, under which the several kinds and classes of property were segregated, specifying and determining upon what subjects local taxes might be levied. Acts, extra session, 1915, page 119. By this act all taxable real estate and all taxable tangible personal property is set apart and made subject to local taxation only. It is then declared that "all insurance taxes and licenses on insurance companies and all taxable intangible personal property, rolling stock of all corporations operating railroads by steam, and all other classes of property not hereinbefore specifically enumerated in this act shall be and the same are hereby segregated and made subject to State taxation only; provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent any city from levying a tax upon said segregated intangible personal property assessed to the residents therein at a rate not to exceed thirty cents upon the one hundred dollars of assessed valuation thereof."
The foregoing language is clear and comprehensive and standing alone, leaves it free from doubt that the legislature limited localities to thirty cents on the one hundred dollars as the maximum rate of taxation that they could impose upon taxable intangible personal property.
It is admitted, as it must be, that the capital of merchants belongs to the class known as intangible personal property. The city of Richmond in maintenance of its right to levy the tax here called in question, insists that the capital of merchants has not been segregated, but has been excepted from the operation of the act; resting that contention upon the following language of the same paragraph containing the prescribed limitation of thirty cents, namely: "except that the capital of' merchants shall not be subject to State taxation, but may be taxed locally as prescribed by law." This contention cannot be sustained. The State taxes the capital of merchants on the basis of their purchases, calling it a license, and the purpose of the language relied on was clearly to exclude the idea that the State intended to tax the capital of merchants with both a license and an ad valorem tax. The act had already, by clear and specific language, segregated and set apart all taxable intangible personal property as one of the subjects that the State alone could tax, providing that localities might levy a tax thereon not exceeding thirty cents on the one hundred dollars, and it is not to be supposed that in the next breath the legislature intended to emasculate what it had just done by excepting from the operation of the act one of the largest classes of intangible personal property, thereby rendering its action meaningless.
Apart from the manifest desire and purpose of the legislature, as shown throughout this legislation, to adopt a more equitable system of taxation than had theretofore existed, it is clear that one of its chief purposes was to reduce the rate of taxation upon intangible personal property in order thereby to induce a more general return of such property, and to bring about uniformity in the rate of tax thereon by establishing a fixed rate applicable alike to all 'localities. The uniformity, consistency and reasonableness sought to be attained would be wholly defeated if the contention of the plaintiff in- error were tenable. The whole legislation on this subject makes it, we think, clear that under the act of March 15, 1915, the city of Richmond was limited in its power to tax the capital of merchants to thirty cents on the one hundred dollars. The language of the' so-called exception, "that the capital of merchants shall not be subject to State taxation, but may be taxed locally as prescribed by law," meant that such capital should not be subject to State taxation on the ad valorem, basis, so long as the State continued to tax merchants with a license. The language, "but may be taxed locally as prescribed by law," meant that the local tax must be in accordance with the general law of the State, and had reference to the preceding provisions of the same section placing a maximum tax of thirty cents, by localities, upon intangible personal property.
If, however, this interpretation of the act of March 15, 1915, were doubtful, the result would be the same in this case, it being well settled that a tax must be plainly authorized before the citizen can be charged therewith.
The judgment complained of must be affirmed.