Case Name: Russell against Lithgow
Court: South Carolina Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1795-01
Citations: 1 Bay 437
Docket Number: 
Parties: Russell against Lithgow.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 437–440

Head Matter:
Russell against Lithgow.
discomu “¡a An assignee bond is a good the hands of an assignee,, under the die-count lari;' of ^5”
DEBT on a bond. The defendant, the bond on which this suit was instituted, together with WOW* Signed three others, to the nominal plaintiff, Russelh and several. It is joint
This bond was afterwards assigned by Russell to the late Col. Kershaw, for a valuable consideration, and is now in the hands of his trustees, the bona fide holders, who directed this suit to be commenced against the defendant. After the assignment of this bond to Col. Kershaw, and long before the commencement of this action, William Ancrim... who held several of Kershaw’s bonds, and more than the amount of the one on which this suit is founded, assigned them over to the defendant, Lithgow, for a valuable con™ sideration. So that the real question was, whether Ker-shaw,s bond in the hands of Lithgow, the assignee, can be set off and discounted against his, Lithgow's bond, in the hands of Kershaw's trustees in the present action, or not ?
The cause was tried at Camden, before Burke, J. who was of opinion, that the bonds in the hands of the defendant, could be legally set off in the present action, and di™ rected the jury to that effect, who found a verdict accordingly.
The present, therefore, was a motion for a new trial, orr the ground of misdirection in the judge.
Pinckney and Ford, for the motion.
Pringle, contra.
In support of the motion it was generally contended, that under our discount law these bonds could not be set off because not betzveen the same parties. That a man could not give in evidence the right of another. That an assignee could not sue in his own name ; and if he could not maintain suit, he could not give it in evidence by way of discount. It was next urged, that our discount law followed the principles of the British act of parliament relative to mutual debts, and ought to have the same construction. And lastly, that no judgment could be entered up under our discount law, in case the verdict should stand for the overplus, or sum which the bonds in the defendant’s hands exceeded that due on the bond on which this action was founded.
For the defendant, it was replied, that there was a great difference between the British act of parliament relative to setting off mutual debts, and our discount law of 1759. That in the one case, the matters and things pleaded, must be between the same parties, and presupposed mutual dealing between them. Whereas our discount law was upon a much broader basis, and embraced a variety of transactions which were never contemplated by that act; and expressly declares, that “ any account, reckoning, de« 'l mand, cause, matter, or thing, which the defendant has a in his own right, shall and may be given in evidence, by u way of discount, against the plaintiff’s demand.” That these terms were the most comprehensive the mind could well form an idea of, and included all claims of whatever nature which a man had or could have, either originally with the plaintiff himself, or by assignment or transfer from any third person. All that the law required was, that the right should be in the defendant. It was perfectly immaterial how it accrued to him. That the assignment of a bond transferred the right from the obligee to the assignee, and from that moment the right became vested in the assignee only, (l Durn. fc? East, 619. 621. 4 Do. 340.) so much so, that no payment to the obligee, after notice of the assignment, was good; and if the obligor should pay it after such notice, he must pay it over again to the as-signee. This, therefore, proved, that the right was as much in the assignee as if the bond had originally been made payable to him ; and if so, then it came both under the letter and spirit of our discount law. That with regard to the entering of judgment for the balance due the defendant, it was extremely questionable how far the act would warrant any such entry. That it was expressly against the principles of the common law ; and that all the defendant wished in the present case, was a confirmation of the verdict, by which he should be for ever released from the demand of the plaintiff.

Opinion:
Per tot. Cur.
By the assignment of a bond, a beneficiary interest passes to the assignee ; and from that moment he becomes not only entitled to the paper and the wax, (as the old law terms it,) but also to the money mentioned in it. No payment to, or release from, the obligee, will dis charge the obligor, after notice. He must pay it to the as-signee only. The right to the money, which is the essence of the thing, passed by the assignment, is as completely vested in the assignee, as if the contract wgs originally made with him, and the bond and assignment are only the evidences of this right. This kind of right comes literally under the words of our discount law, which is much more extensive and comprehensive than the British act respecting mutual debts. Indeed, justice and policy both require that a liberal construction should be given to this act, in cases similar to the present: otherwise, persons in insolvent circumstances, might recover their demands against those in good circumstances, while the solvent one would remain, remediless. A discount, therefore, is the fairest way of doing justice to all parties.
The Court declined giving an opinion respecting the propriety of entering up a judgment in favour of the defendant, for the surplus of the bonds in his hands, as it appeared extremely doubtful whether the act would warrant it, notwithstanding a practice to the contrary.
Judgment for defendant.