Case Name: Gulp, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. J. M. Miller
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1902-06-28
Citations: 30 Tex. Civ. App. 122
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gulp, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. J. M. Miller.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Civil Appeals Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 122–129

Head Matter:
Gulp, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. J. M. Miller.
Decided June 28, 1902.
1. —Verdict—Evidence—Practice on Appeal.
Where the verdict is against the manifest weight and great preponderance of the evidence, the appellate court will reverse the judgment rendered thereon.
2. —Contributory Negligence—Going on Railroad Track.
Where one goes, as a licensee, upon the track of a railroad at a point where there is danger, it is his duty to use his senses of sight and hearing, and the consequences of a failure to do so are not relieved by the fact of concurring negligence on the part of the servants of the railway company. See evidence of a failure by plaintiff to look and listen held to show such contributory negligence as would, as a matter of law, bar a recovery.
3. —Same—Discovered Peril—Pleading.
See pleading which, had there been exception duly taken thereto, woulhave been insufficient to present a plea of discovered peril for want of affirmative allegation.
4. —Discovered Peril—Evidence Insufficient.
Where plaintiff, injured by being struck by an engine while walking on the railroad track, seeks to recover on the theory of discovered peril, it must be shown that those operating the engine saw plaintiff’s peril in time to have avoided the injury, and evidence merely that they could have seen it is not sufficient.
Appeal from the District Court of Cooke County. Tried below before Hon. D. E. Barrett.
J. W. Terry and Ballinger Mills, for appellant.
B. H. West and Stuart & Bell, for appellee.

Opinion:
CONNER, Chief Justice.
This is a damage suit for personal injuries inflicted upon appellee by a passing engine on appellant's main track extending through the town of Dougherty, Indian Territory. The main line extends in the general direction of north and south, and parallel thereto on either side are certain switch tracks, over one of which appellee approached the main track. There was evidence tending to show that the place of the accident was upon a part of appellant's tracks and grounds which for several years prior thereto had been used as a passway by citizens living on opposite sides of the town, and that the operatives of the engine inflicting the injury were guilty of negligence charged in running rapidly, without keeping a proper lookout, and without sounding either bell or whistle.
It was alleged in defense of the action that appellee was negligent in entering upon defendant's track, and in failing to look or listen for the approach of the engine and cars, and in failing to exercise any care and caution for his own safety, and that but for such negligence the accident would not have occurred.
The verdict of the jury in appellee's favor on the issue of contributory negligence is attacked as "against the manifest weight and great preponderance of the evidence," and after a careful consideration of the evidence and of the authorities pressed upon us in appellee's brief, we feel constrained to sustain the assignments of error presenting this question.
In view of another trial we do not care to discuss at length the testimony, nor will any useful purpose be served by setting it out in full. We deem it sufficient to say that as presented in the record before us the evidence as a whole shows that appellee approached and got upon the main track from the east, walking briskly; that in doing so he crossed a switch track east of the main track in front of a standing engine "popping off" steam; that at all times after passing the side track the view to the north was unobstructed, notwithstanding which appellee did not stop, look, or listen for a train from that direction until after he was upon the main track, whereupon he turned south, and when about half turned, without stopping, turned his head and eyes so that not exceeding forty feet of the main line north was viewed by him; and then, briskly walking, proceeded south some sixty feet along the track, when he was knocked off by the rapidly approaching engine from the north.
In illustration of this conclusion we quote the following from appellee's testimony on cross-examination: "I crossed over (the switch track) towards the main track about ten feet south of the cow-catcher. Yes, sir; I kept right straight on till I got on the main track. I angled a little down. As to whether I looked up on the main track, I said I don't know, as I scarcely stopped, but J looked north up towards the depot, and looked south. I was on the main track when I looked, something near the center of the main track. I didn't walk upon the main track and stand there at all. As to whether I turned my head and looked up to the right, my breast was kinder towards the southwest at that time. I don't know whether I looked as far as the depot; I saw thirty or forty steps that way. I don't know whether there was one or two engines back of the thirty or forty steps. I just saw somewhere along about that distance. It is a very straight track. As to what limited my vision when I threw my eye up the track, will say I didn't stop. I suppose there is a way, if I look in one direction, even for a second, to limit my vision to thirty or forty steps. I don't know, as I did merely try to see whether there was a train in thirty or forty steps. I was looking for the passenger train from the south; as to what I was looking for, when a man hears an engine puffing and blowing he naturally looks up. No, sir; I did not look up towards the depot to see if there was an engine coming from towards the depot; wasn't expecting anything from that direction. I turned my head because there was an engine standing there. As to whether I looked up the track to see if any train was coming, will say I don't know as I did. I never looked for a train towards the depot; I never expected a train from that direction. I might see thirty or forty steps looking towards the depot, and I might see further. Yes, sir; the track looks straight that way. As to what there was to keep me from seeing any distance up the track beyond the depot, even when I came on the main track and looked up the main track north, will say because I didn't stop and stand and look; if I hadn't watched where I was walking I would have stumbled over the ties and fell off."
Excluding from our consideration the testimony denied by appellee, to the effect that he declared immediately after the accident that he did not look for a train from the direction of the depot, and that he "didn't know whatever caused him to do such a trick as that," appellee's own rendition of his action seems to strongly show a failure of a full discharge of his duty. It may be conceded that appellee was not a trespasser, and that after starting south appellee was guilty of no such -negligence as will relieve appellant from its negligence in failing to keep proper lookout and to give the required signals of warning, yet appellee's right to the use of the track as licensee was not greater than that of appellant; on the contrary it was subordinate, and for the preservation of human life and property generally, as well as for his own protection, it was appellee's duty before going into and upon dangerous ground to use his senses of sight and hearing. The consequence of a failure to do so is not relieved by the fact of concurring negligence on the part of another. The doctrine is so well established that authorities need scarcely be cited, but see Railway v. Houston, 95 United States, 702; Railway v. Bracken, 59 Texas, 73.
We can find no cause for the injury intervening between the indicated negligence of appellant's servants and of appellee, as is insisted. Had either party exercised the proper care, no injury would probably have resulted. In view of another trial we also add that it would seem that appellant was entitled to have submitted to the jury special charge number 5, applying the law of contributory negligence to the particular circumstances in evidence, notwithstanding the submission of the issue by the court in general terms. Railway v. Mangham, 4 Texas Ct. Rep., 682.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.