Case Name: Sherwood COLBURN, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Michigan, as Receiver of Michigan Surety Company, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND REALTY CO., Inc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1963-04-17
Citations: 153 So. 2d 731
Docket Number: Nos. 3383 and 3384
Parties: Sherwood COLBURN, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Michigan, as Receiver of Michigan Surety Company, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND REALTY CO., Inc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: SHANNON, C. J., and ALLEN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 153
Pages: 731–737

Head Matter:
Sherwood COLBURN, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Michigan, as Receiver of Michigan Surety Company, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND REALTY CO., Inc., et al., Appellees.
Nos. 3383 and 3384.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
April 17, 1963.
Rehearing Denied June 6, 1963.
Stephen W. Sessums of Albritton, Ses-sums & Gordon, Tampa, for appellant.
Charles Talley of Coles, Himes & Talley, Tampa, for appellee, Highland Realty Co.
Leonard H. Gilbert of Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Fields & Ward, Tampa, for appel-lee, McMurry & .Co. of Tampa.
Joseph A. McGowan, Miami, for appel-lees, Carey, Goodman, Terry & Dwyer.
Talbot W. Trammell, Miami, for appel-lees, The Kippy Corporation, Dempsey Transportation, Inc., Charles C. Papy, Jr., Alex Mathas, David Katz and Carl Katz, individually and as father and next friend of David Katz, a minor, and John Lacz.
Sherwood Spencer of Ellis, Spencer & Butler, Hollywood, for Springer Motor Co., Hollywood Bus Lines.

Opinion:
WHITE, JOS. S., Associate Judge.
This appeal brings for review a "Second Amended Summary Final Decree'' entered in a suit brought by the purchaser of real estate against the vendor, Michigan Surety Company, a corporation of the State of Michigan, referred to herein as the Company, to obtain specific performance of an executory written contract of sale. Other persons said to have liens or claims upon the real estate were made party defendants. The decree in question required specific performance of the contract in favor of the purchaser. The appeal has been taken by Sherwood Colburn, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Michigan, as Receiver of the Company.
UPON THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Motions to dismiss the appeal have been filed by one of the defendant lienors. The motions are based upon the proposition that the appeal is taken from an interlocutory order entered subsequent to the final decree, was taken more than sixty days from entry of the final decree and does not properly bring the final decree before this Court for review. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 1943, 153 Fla. 501, 15 So.2d 175; Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, Fla.1960, 121 So.2d 648; Quackenbush v. Town of Palm Beach, Fla.App., 151 So.2d 348.
Likewise, it is contended that the lower court had lost jurisdiction when it entered the "Second Amended Summary Final Decree", and that, therefore, the appeal brings nothing here for review because the decree from which the appeal has been taken is a nullity. This contention is-based upon the rule that after a decree becomes absolute the court is without jurisdiction to enlarge it. See Mabson v. Christ, 1928, 96 Fla. 756, 119 So. 131; Morrison v. Morrison, Fla.App.1960, 122 So.2d 199.
The record discloses that a "Summary Final Decree", granting specific performance to the purchaser, was rendered March 8, 1962. On April 25, 1962, plaintiff moved for the entry of the "Second Amended Summary Final Decree". The motion was based upon the proposal that the decree of March 8, 1962, should be made current by including new computations of amounts accruing during the interim.
Accordingly, on May 25, 1962, the Chancellor entered the "Second Amended Summary Final Decree", from which this appeal was taken June 22, 1962. Thus, it is argued that the decree of March 8, 1962, had become absolute and beyond the power of the lower court to enlarge; that, therefore, the decree of May 25, 1962, was a nullity; that the decree of March 8, 1962, remained the "final decree" of the court; that there was no appeal from that decree; that the appeal, being from the decree of May 25, 1962, a void decree, was taken more than sixty days from entry of the "final decree" and brings nothing to this Court for review.
A final decree'' based upon a decree pro confesso becomes absolute 10 days after entry. Rule 3.10, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. Decrees in general become absolute after expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing, which is 10 days after recording. Rule 3.16, F.R.C.P.; Mabson v. Christ, supra; Morrison v. Morrison, supra.
The argument advanced in support of the motions to dismiss ignores the fact that on March 14, 1962, pursuant to Col-burn's application, the Chancellor ordered that the performance and enforcement of the decree of March 8, 1962, he stayed. The purpose of the stay was to give Col-burn an opportunity to petition for vacation of a decree pro confesso which had been entered against him. The stay order tolled the running of the time for the decree of March 8, 1962, to become absolute. On March 16, 1962, Colburn filed his petition to vacate the decree pro confesso. It was heard March 26, 1962, and on April 24, 1962, the court entered an order denying the petition. On May 25, 1962, the Chancellor vacated the stay order. This ended the tolling of time for the decree of March 8, 1962, to become absolute.
Thus, it appears that from March 8, 1962, the date upon which the "Summary Final Decree" was entered, to March 14, 1962, the date upon which the stay order was granted, six days had elapsed. The stay order remained in effect until May 25, 1962. On that date the Chancellor vacated the stay order and, at the same time entered the "Second Amended Summary Final Decree". It was filed for record May 28, 1962, three days after the stay order had been vacated. Thus, actually only nine days had elapsed between rendition of the "Summary Final Decree" and the "Second Amended Summary Final Decree". Therefore, the former decree had not become absolute when the latter one was entered, and the lower court had jurisdiction to enter it.
The "Second Amended Summary Final Decree" provides that the decree of March 8, 1962, "be and it is hereby amended in its entirety as follows:" Then follows a full, complete and current decree. Thus, there was a merger of the former decree into the new one. The old decree was superseded and replaced. The "Second Amended Summary Final Decree" is not an interlocutory decree entered subsequent to the final decree. On the contrary, it is the final decree in the case. See De Bowes v. De Bowes, 1942, 149 Fla. 545, 7 So.2d 4; Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 397.
It should be understood that this procedure allows no possibility for a revival of the former decree.
When one disregards the period during which the stay order was in effect, it is seen that the appeal was taken within the allotted time. The appeal opens the record for review. 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, Sec. 304.
The motions to dismiss are denied.