Case Name: Jake KING, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. MORTON, Secretary of the Interior of the United States
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1975-10-09
Citations: 520 F.2d 1140
Docket Number: No. 73-1995
Parties: Jake KING, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. MORTON, Secretary of the Interior of the United States.
Judges: Opinion for The Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBB.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 520
Pages: 1140–1161

Head Matter:
Jake KING, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. MORTON, Secretary of the Interior of the United States.
No. 73-1995.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 10, 1975.
Decided Oct. 9, 1975.
As Amended Nov. 26, 1975.
Linda F. Blumenfeld, Washington, D. C., for appellant. Daniel A. Rezneck and Anthony Z. Roisman, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellant.
Edwin E. Huddleson, III, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen., Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and Robert E. Kopp, Atty. Dept. of Justice, were on the brief for appellee.
Opinion for The Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBB.
Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TAMM, dissenting.
Before TAMM and ROBB, Circuit Judges, and HART, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).
1. Section 18.0405 has been recodified as 34 Am. Samoa Code § 214 (1973). American Samoa has adopted, with few changes, the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 34 Am. Samoa Code §§ 201-214 (1973). Section 214 provides:
Any act or failure to act with respect to the American Samoa income tax which constitutes a criminal offense under chapter 75 of subtitle A of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as adopted by this chapter, shall be an offense against American Samoa and may be prosecuted in the name of American Samoa by the appropriate officer thereof.
Chapter 75 of subtitle A of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 includes section 7203, 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1970), which provides:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015), keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

Opinion:
ROBB, Circuit Judge:
In this action begun in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia the question presented to that court was whether, under the Constitution of the United States, an American citizen charged with a crime in violation of the laws of the unincorporated territory of American Samoa was entitled to a trial by jury. The District Court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
American Samoa is an unincorporated territory of the United States consisting of a cluster of small islands in the South Pacific. The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for administering the government of the territory. Exec. Order No. 10264, 3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp. 765.
On January 3, 1972, Jake King, a citizen of the United States and a resident of American Samoa, was charged by information filed in the Trial Division of the High Court of American Samoa with willful failure to pay his 1969 Samoan income tax and file his 1970 Samoan income tax return, in violation of section 18.0405 of the Revised Code of American Samoa (1961). King moved for a jury trial, and on October 3, 1972, the Trial Division denied the motion for the following reasons:
1. The legislation and statutes of the Government of American Samoa do not provide for a jury trial, and
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to territories which were not incorporated into the Union. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, [42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627] (1922).
King was tried in American Samoa on October 11 and 12, 1972. On December 11, 1972, the Trial Division issued its "Memorandum, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment", finding King guilty of willfully failing to pay his 1969 income tax and acquitting him of willfully failing to file his 1970 income tax return. Government of American Samoa v. King, Crim.Case No. 785 (High Ct.Am.Samoa, Trial Div., decided Dec. 11, 1972). On February 2, 1973, King was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation for twelve months, conditioned in part on his payment of all back taxes together with a fine of $250.00 and court costs of $25.00.
King appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the High Court of American Samoa. On April 1, 1974 the Appellate Division issued its opinion upholding King's conviction. Relying on the "Insular cases " and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922), the court held that the right to jury trial guaranteed by the United States Constitution did not extend to persons tried in American Samoa and that the imposition of the Anglo-American jury system upon Samoa's legal structure "would be an arbitrary, illogical, and inappropriate foreign imposition". Government of American Samoa v. King, No. App. 63-73 (High Ct.Am.Samoa, App. Div., decided April 1, 1974). The decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court of American Samoa is final under Samoan law. 15 Am.Samoa Code § 5104 (1973).
On October 10, 1972, one week after the Trial Division had denied King's motion for a jury trial and the day before his trial began in American Samoa, King commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Interior as administrator of American Samoa "to declare unconstitutional the denial of the right of trial by jury to an American citizen charged with a crime in the court of American Samoa, a territory of the United States." Jurisdiction was grounded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343 and 1361 (1970). King asked:
(A) That this Court declare and adjudge that the provisions of the Revised Code of American Samoa, the Rules of the High Court of American Samoa, and the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, which deny the right of trial by jury in criminal cases in American Samoa are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to plaintiff, and that the defendant, his appointees, agents, employees, and all other persons subject to his authority and control cannot lawfully enforce these provisions or act pursuant to them;
(B) That this Court permanently enjoin the defendant, his appointees, agents, employees, and all other persons subject to his authority and control from enforcing any judgment of criminal conviction against plaintiff obtained without according him a right to trial by jury; and
(C) That this Court award plaintiff such other and further relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
In May 1973, before King's conviction had become final in American Samoa, both King and the Secretary of the Interior moved for summary judgment. The District Court heard argument on the motions and afterward by order dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. King appeals.
I. Jurisdiction of the District Court
A. Geographical Jurisdiction
Since the District Court proffered no explanation for dismissing King's case for want of jurisdiction, we must look to the government's argument in this court to find the reasons for the decision. The government's argument is that American Samoa is outside the geographical bounds of the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, and that conse .quently those courts cannot "rule on matters affecting and altering the customs and traditions of the Samoan people." The government contends that the Samoan courts are competent to adjudicate claims of Samoan litigants arising under the laws of the United States so that jurisdiction of the district courts over such claims is unnecessary. Moreover we are warned that if the doors of the district courts are opened to such claims the federal courts will soon be inundated with cases concerning matters halfway around the world without the knowledge to handle such matters or the power to order relief.
Whatever force the government's argument might have in cases against the Samoan government or its officers involving the interpretation or application of Samoan law, the argument has no application to this case. Here the sole defendant is the Secretary of the Interior, and the issue is whether he has administered the government of American Samoa in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution. Clearly, the Secretary is within the geographical jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and that court is competent to judge the Secretary's administration of the government of American Samoa by constitutional standards and, if necessary, to order the Secretary to take appropriate measures to correct any constitutional deficiencies. Although it may be necessary for the District Court to inquire into matters of Samoan law and custom in order to determine the applicability of principles embodied in the laws and Constitution of the United States, this case focuses on the applicability of those principles and not on Samoan laws and customs themselves.
Furthermore, that Samoan courts are competent to adjudicate claims of Samoan litigants arising under the laws of the United States does not prevent district courts from hearing such claims when jurisdiction is otherwise proper. The availability of remedies in the Samoan courts may give rise to a requirement that such remedies be exhausted before proceeding in the district courts, but that availability cannot act as a complete bar to district court proceedings. Exhaustion is not at issue here, since King has already appealed his conviction to the highest court in American Samoa. What is at issue is whether King can ever bring this action in the district court when alternative remedies were available to him in the Samoan courts. We hold he can, provided there is some statutory basis for jurisdiction. This does not mean that the door of the district court is open wide to claims properly within the peculiar province of the Samoan courts, but only that it cannot be shut to Samoan plaintiffs properly challenging the lawfulness of the actions of an official of the United States government.
Assuming that the District Court relied exclusively upon the government's geographical jurisdiction argument in dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction, we think the court erred. We do not hold, however, that jurisdiction was proper, for, as we explain below, we cannot tell from the record whether there is a sufficient statutory basis for jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, we must remand the case for further proceedings, but before we do, we examine briefly each of the jurisdictional bases claimed by King.
B. Statutory Bases for Jurisdiction
King first claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Although King's action is a civil action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, we cannot determine on the basis of the record before us whether the action involves a "matter in controversy [which] exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." This amount-in-controversy requirement is a prerequisite for jurisdiction under section 1331(a), even in cases in which fundamental constitutional rights are at stake, however difficult the valuation of such rights may be. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). As we have said in Gomez v. Wilson, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 252 n. 56, 477 F.2d 411, 421 n. 56 (1973):
So notwithstanding a deep-seated feeling that price-tagging of fundamental human rights is dangerous business, we realize that any automatic finding of the required amount in controversy just because such rights are in issue may be a more simplistic solution than § 1331(a) will tolerate.
The burden of establishing the amount in controversy is on the person claiming jurisdiction, and the district court may question at any time whether the jurisdictional amount has been shown. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3561 (1975).
King alleged in his complaint that "[t]he amount in controversy in this case exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." When King filed his complaint he had not yet been tried in American Samoa and faced a possible maximum penalty greatly in excess of $10,000. Normally, jurisdictional amount is determined as of the filing of the complaint. However, before the District Court could take any action the Trial Division of the High Court of American Samoa convicted King and sentenced him to pay $1,098.26 in back taxes plus interest, a fine of $250.00 and court costs of $25.00. Thus, when the cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and argued in the District Court the total amount of King's actual liability under this conviction was much less than $10,-000, and might have been even less had the conviction been overturned on appeal. If the determination of amount in controversy were so simple we might well hold that King failed , to prove the necessary jurisdictional amount, even though his potential liability at the time his complaint was filed exceeded $10,000, since his actual liability at the time the case came before the District Court did not. But the "amount in controversy" here, which must exceed $10,000, is not the cost to King of his conviction but the value of his right to a trial by jury. The value of that right is certainly no less than the liability incurred by King as a result of his conviction, but we cannot say on the basis of this record whether it is more, or if it is, how much. This determination is for the District Court.
King next claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
Subsections 1343(1) and (2), which give the district court jurisdiction over civil actions "[t]o recover damages", cannot provide the basis for King's action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Nor can subsection 1343(3), which applies to actions to redress the deprivation of fundamental rights under color of State law, support King's claim that under the laws of American Samoa and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior he has been deprived of his constitutional right to trial by jury. This leaves subsection 1343(4), which gives the district court jurisdiction over actions brought "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights". King cites no such Act, applicable to the Secretary of the Interior, and we can find none, so that jurisdiction cannot be founded on subsection 1343(4). Accordingly, we hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) does not provide a jurisdictional basis for King's action.
King also claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
Not only is a duty owed to the plaintiff necessary to give the district court jurisdiction under section 1361, but as this court has said, "The writ should be used only when the duty of the officer to act is clearly established and plainly defined and the obligation to act is peremptory." Hammond v. Hull, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303, 131 F.2d 23, 25 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777, 63 S.Ct. 830, 87 L.Ed. 1145 (1943) [footnote omitted]. Thus, the writ is not available to King unless the Secretary of the Interior has a "clearly established", "plainly defined" and "peremptory" duty, in administering the government of America Samoa, to require that government to provide for trial by jury as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Whether the Secretary has such a duty is a jurisdictional question, which cannot be answered without inquiry into the merits of King's claim. That inquiry should be made in the first instance by the District Court. Accordingly remand for further proceedings is appropriate.
II. The Right to Trial by Jury in American Samoa
Because of the importance of King's constitutional claim we have decided that the jurisdictional problems discussed above must be resolved before that claim is finally adjudicated. In addition to those problems there is another obstacle which prevents us from reaching the merits of King's claim, and we think it proper to add a few words to assist the District Court on remand in the event that court finds it has jurisdiction. We emphasize, however, that in so doing we intimate no opinion as to the proper adjudication of the jurisdictional issues we have raised.
King's argument that he is entitled to a jury trial in American Samoa is a tidy syllogism. He admits that only "fundamental" constitutional rights apply to unincorporated territories such as American Samoa. Insular Tariff Cases, supra note 2; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S.Ct. 808, 49 L.Ed. 128 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922). He also concedes that the Supreme Court has held that the right to trial by jury is not "fundamental". Hawaii v. Mankichi, Dorr v. Unit ed States, Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra. But, he says, the Supreme Court has reversed its position in those cases and held the right to trial by jury to be "fundamental". Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). So, he concludes, the right to trial by jury applies to American Samoa.
The feature of King's argument that gives us pause is not its logic but its generality. Chief Justice Marshall warned against basing decisions on bare general principles enunciated in other cases:
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). The simple words of the opinions King cites are not as important as the contexts in which those cases were decided. The Balzac, Dorr, Hawaii and the Insular Tariff cases all involved unincorporated territories similar to American Samoa, but at a time much earlier in our nation's history. Those cases have never been overruled; specifically, they have not been overruled by the Duncan and Baldwin cases, which dealt with the right to trial by jury in states rather than unincorporated territories. The decision in the present case does not depend on key words such as "fundamental" or "unincorporated territory" in those opinions, but can be reached only by applying the principles of the earlier cases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the situation as it exists in American Samoa today. As Mr. Justice Harlan wrote in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1260, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result), "the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress' power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas."
The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a decision in this case rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts. Specifically, it must be determined whether the Samoan mores and matai culture with its strict societal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a defendant is tried before his peers; whether a jury in Samoa could fairly determine the facts of a case in accordance with the instructions of the court without being unduly influenced by customs and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice; and whether the implementation of a jury system would be practicable. In short, the question is whether in American Samoa "circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 75, 77 S.Ct. at 1260. That the Samoan system of criminal justice is in many respects similar to the Anglo-American system does not supply the answer to this specific and crucial question. Nor is the answer to be found in the failure of the Samoan Constitution, originated by the Samoan people, to provide for trial by jury in criminal cases.
In support of his motion for summary judgment in the District Court King relied upon various provisions of the Samoan Constitution and Code which assimilate features of American criminal procedures. Reliance was also placed on an affidavit on information and belief from King's Samoan counsel, to the effect that so far as logistics are concerned jury trials in Samoa are feasible. Finally, King cited a law review article by a former intern in the Office of the Attorney General of American Samoa in 1970 (Some Observations on the Judiciary in American Samoa, 18 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 581 (1971)). The government countered with provisions of the Samoan Constitution and Code, a 1970 report on the future political status of Samoa submitted to the Samoan legislature in 1971, and a letter from the Chief Judge of Samoa to the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, dated October 10, 1961. Having examined these materials we find them inadequate to supply an answer to the important question presented here, and therefore insufficient to support a judgment for either party. On the basis of an affidavit on information and belief, an ex parte letter fourteen years old, a law journal article and a legislative report which appears to be largely irrelevant no one can say with certainty whether trial by jury in Samoa would be impractical and anomalous. The answer to that question must come from more solid evidence of actual and existing conditions. For this reason, since we have determined that there is probable jurisdiction in the District Court we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in which an adequate factual record may be developed. When the facts have been found and elucidated the District Court will be in a position to determine whether summary judgment for either party is appropriate. So ordered.
. The Appellate Division cited as "Insular Cases" De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S.Ct. 743, 45 L.Ed. 1041 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 21 S.Ct. 742, 45 L.Ed. 1065 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 21 S.Ct. 762, 45 L.Ed. 1074 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 21 S.Ct. 827, 45 L.Ed. 1086 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901); and Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Company, 182 U.S. 392, 21 S.Ct. 827, 45 L.Ed. 1146 (1901). These cases, properly referred to collectively as the Insular Tariff Cases, also include, in addition to the foregoing, Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 22 S.Ct. 62, 46 L.Ed. 128 (1901), and Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 22 S.Ct. 59, 46 L.Ed. 138 (1901).
. The government does not argue that cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States in American Samoa are totally outside the judicial power of the United States under Article III of the Constitu tion; it argues only that United States District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and that Congress has not extended those limits to include American Samoa. This case does not present the question whether the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the Samoan courts, a question on which we intimate no view.
. See General Constructors Co. of Nevada v. Morton, Civ. No. 71-3409 (D.Hawaii, decided Sept. 16, 1971), which involved the award of a construction contract by the government of American Samoa on the basis of competitive bids received.
. App. Item 10. The Government of American Samoa has adopted, with relatively minor alteration, the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 18.0405 of the Revised Code of American Samoa, enacted in 1963, Am.Samoa Pub.L. No. 8-1, now codified at 34 Am.Samoa Code § 214 (1973), makes "a criminal offense under chapter 75 of subtitle F[A] of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 . an offense against American Samoa . . . ." Id. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 provides:
§ 7203. Willful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax.
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015), keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.