Case Name: Boston Glass Manufactory versus Amos Binney et al.
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1827-04-03
Citations: 4 Pick. 425
Docket Number: 
Parties: Boston Glass Manufactory versus Amos Binney et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 441–444

Head Matter:
Boston Glass Manufactory versus Amos Binney et al.
Articles of agreement entered into between some of the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, manufacturers of glass, each not to employ workmen while in the service of the others, were held to be inadmissible in evidence, in an action on the case for enticing workmen from the plaintiffs9 service.
To induce a servant to leave his master9s service when the time for which he haa hired himself shall expire, although he had previously no intention of quitting such service, is not the subject of an action.
This was an action on the case, charging the defendants with enticing from the plaintiffs’ employment certain workmen skilled in several departments of glass-making, and taking them into the service of the defendants, who were proprietors of a glass manufactory at Lechmere’s Point in Cambridge.
The plaintiffs proved that some of the workmen were in their employment until the day when they were engaged in the employment of the defendants, and that it was mutually understood that neither party should withdraw from the engagement without giving a fortnight’s notice.
The plaintiffs also offered in evidence certain articles of agreement, made between some of the officers of the plaintiff corporation, some of the defendants, and other persons, all being concerned in the manufacture of glass, by which each party stipulated, that he would not employ any workman who might be in the service of either of the others, unless such workman first produced a written discharge, and would not encourage any such workman to seek a discharge ; that each party should keep the others advised of the names of the workmen in his employment; and that the agreement should continue in force five years. The defendants objected that this agreement, if it proved any thing, was a contract, and not evidence in this action. It was rejected by the chief justice ; but lists of the names of workmen, which had been furnished by the plaintiffs, were admitted in evidence.
One of the men supposed to have been enticed, having been called as a witness by the defendants, testified that Parmenter, one of the defendants, agreed with him, the day after he had given notice to the plaintiffs that he should leave their service in a fortnight, to receive him into the de fendants’ works ; and it appeared that this man, and another who was called by the defendants, received pay from the defendants for the last fortnight while they were under pay from the plaintiffs ; but it did not appear that any offer was made before notice had been given, and the men remained with the plaintiffs until the fortnight after notice had expired.
March 31st, 1826
The defendants contended that they had a right to make a bargain with the men during the continuance of their service with the plaintiffs, to take effect only after the expiration oí that service according to notice. But the chief justice instructed the jury, that while the actual employment continued, though after the notice to quit, it was not lawful for the defendants to malte any bargain or any offer of employment to take effect at a future time, and that if the jury believed the witness, they must return a verdict against Parmenter, and such others of the defendants as they should be satisfied participated in the transaction.
A verdict was found for the defendants. If the evidence offered by the plaintiffs and rejected at the trial ought to have been admitted, a new trial was to be granted. If the foregoing instruction to the jury was correct, the Court were to judge whether a new trial should be granted on account of the verdict’s being against the evidence on that point.
Sullivan and Hubbard, for the plaintiffs,
said it might be doubtful whether the agreement was any thing more than an honorary engagement; which would not sustain an action, but he insisted that it ought to have been received in evidence as an admission by the defendants that the plaintiffs were glass-makers, that the men enticed were essential to them in that business, and that the defendants knew these men were in the employment of the plaintiffs when they contracted with them. If the agreement would support an action, the plaintiffs had a choice of remedies, and a recovery here would be a bar to an action on the contract, so that on this ground there could be no objection to the admission of the paper in evidence.
April 3d, 1826
But the strong ground of the plaintiffs is, that ti ,iefendants hired and retained the men while in the actúa employment of the plaintiffs, and which fact was knows to the defendants at the time. In the course of the fortnight after the notice the plaintiffs might have reengaged the men, if the defendants had not improperly interfered. Giving the notice was in consequence of a combination between the defendants and the workmen, which was an enticing, within the true meaning of the term. Blake v. Lanyon, 6 T. R 221; 15 Vin. 319, 325, Master and Servant, I 2, and O; Fawcet v. Beavres, 2 Lev. 63; Bro. Laborers, pl. 21; Hart v. Aldridge, Cowp. 54; Eades v. Vandeput, 5 East, 39, note; Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511; Adams v. Bafealds, 1 Leon. 240.
Shaw and Peabody, contra,
cited Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18, 19; Nichol v. Martyn, 2 Esp. R. 734; Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345; S. C. W. Bl. 373; and Hart v. Aldridge, ubi supra.

Opinion:
Wilde J.
delivered the opinion of the Court. The counsel for the plaintiffs move for a new trial on two grounds , first, because certain contracts offered by them in evidence were not admitted ; secondly, because the verdict, according to the law as laid down at the trial by the chief justice, is against the evidence.
As to the first point, we think it very clear that the contracts offered in evidence were not admissible, not having any tendency to establish any fact material to the issue. The contracts with the laborers who are said to have been enticed from the plaintiffs' employment, had expired long before the \3ts complained of; they could not therefore by any possibility be material; and as to the contract or agreement between some of the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, it is a sufficient objection, that the defendants are not sued upon that agreement; nor could they be, for it is between different parties.
As to the second point, we are of opinion that the verdict is right. The evidence is clearly insufficient to support the action, as we understand the law. The defendants had a legal right to make a contract with the plaintiffs' laborers to take effect after the expiration of their term, of service with the plaintiffs. The law is laid down correctly by Lord Kenyon, in the case of Nichol et al. v. Martyn, 2 Esp. R. 732, that "to induce a servant to leave his master's service at the expiration of the time for which the servant had hired himself, although the servant had no intention at the time, of quitting his master's service, was not the subject of an action." It is damnum absque injurié. The cases cited by the plaintiffs' counsel do not countenance a. different doctrine. If the law were otherwise, it would lead to the most mischievous consequences, and would operate injuriously both to Iaoorers and their employers.
Judgment according to the verdict.