Case Name: Kay Hollingshead Donald HOLMES v. Fred M. HOLMES
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1993-12-09
Citations: 628 So. 2d 1361
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-0493
Parties: Kay Hollingshead Donald HOLMES v. Fred M. HOLMES.
Judges: Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 628
Pages: 1361–1368

Head Matter:
Kay Hollingshead Donald HOLMES v. Fred M. HOLMES.
No. 92-CA-0493.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 9, 1993.
Leonard B. Melvin, Billie J. Graham, Melvin & Melvin, Laurel, for appellant.
Franklin C. McKenzie, Jr., Laurel, for ap-pellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
I.
This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Jones County, Second Judicial District, wherein Fred M. Holmes ("Mr. Holmes") filed a complaint seeking a divorce from his wife, Kay Hollingshead Donald Holmes ("Mrs. Holmes"). Thirty-one days after he filed for divorce, Mr. Holmes was granted a divorce from his wife on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor entered judgment in favor of Mr. Holmes due to Mrs. Holmes' failure to answer the complaint within thirty days. How ever, counsel for Mrs. Holmes did in fact contact counsel for Mr. Holmes within thirty days, advising counsel for Mrs. Holmes of his representation of Mrs. Holmes and of his wish to settle the case if possible. Upon the entry of judgment in favor of Mr. Holmes, Mrs. Holmes moved to set aside the judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 55(b). Said motion was overruled. Feeling aggrieved, Mrs. Holmes appeals to this Court, assigning as error the chancellor's refusal to set aside the judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 55(b). We reverse.
II.
Mr. and Mrs. Holmes were married on March 31, 1984. Prior to this marriage, the parties entered into an ante-nuptial agreement by which the parties agreed on a division of property in the event the marriage came to an end. Some eight years later, on January 8, 1992, Mr. Holmes filed a complaint for divorce in the Chancery Court of Jones County, Second Judicial District. Mrs. Holmes was served with process on January 9, 1992. Mrs. Holmes contacted an attorney and on January 20, 1992, her attorney wrote to Mr. Holmes' attorney informing him of his representation. In this letter, counsel for Mrs. Holmes stated:
This letter is to advise you that this firm represents Mrs. Kay Holmes, who is the Defendant in a cause of action filed in the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi. Service was obtained on Mrs. Holmes on January 9, 1992.
If there is any chance of you and I reaching a settlement in behalf of these parties before we go to the expense of depositions and other pleadings, I would appreciate it greatly if you would let me hear from you within this next week.
Mr. Holmes' attorney, by letter dated January 23, 1992, responded to this inquiry. In his reply letter, counsel for Mr. Holmes stated:
I will be happy to pass along to my client any settlement proposal you wish to offer. However, based upon my conversation with my client, I doubt that he would be receptive to any monetary settlement.
On February 10,1992, Mrs. Holmes' attorney wrote counsel for Mr. Holmes with an offer of settlement. In this letter, he stated:
I have been asked to make this offer to you in behalf of Kay Holmes.
Ms. Holmes is willing to accept $20,000.00 in cash, health insurance, car insurance and car tag, a new Cadillac vehicle, and a Dixie Golf membership and monthly dues.
If Mr. Holmes is desirous of trying to work something out with reference to this situation, I will be happy to sit down and discuss this matter with you at your convenience.
However, on February 11, 1992, before receiving this offer of settlement, counsel for Mr. Holmes appeared before the chancellor, presented evidence supporting the allegations of the complaint for divorce, and obtained a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Mrs. Holmes was given no notice of this hearing and, as a result, filed a motion to set aside the judgment of divorce on February 13,1992, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 55(b). The chancellor conducted a hearing on Mrs. Holmes' motion on March 18,1992. At the close of this hearing, the chancellor entered an order denying the motion. This appeal followed.
III.
Mrs. Holmes contends that "because settlement negotiations were ongoing in this matter and Appellee's attorney knew Mrs. Holmes was represented, and by whom, he was obligated to notify Mrs. Holmes' attorney of his intention to proceed with the divorce hearing." Thus, Mrs. Holmes argues that in light of the provisions of M.R.C.P. Rule 55(b) that the chancellor erred in failing to set aside the judgment of divorce.
. Mr. Holmes counters by arguing that as Mrs. Holmes never entered an appearance, she was not entitled to three-day notice as required by M.R.C.P. 55(b). In addition, Mr. Holmes contends that the three-day notice requirement set forth in Rule 55(b) is not even applicable in divorce actions as Rule 55 is supplanted by the statutory procedures set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 et seq. (1972).
IV.
In Rawson v. Buta, 609 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1992), we recognized that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure have limited applicability to actions for divorce and alimony. See also Mayoza v. Mayoza, 526 So.2d 547, 548 (Miss.1988); Clark v. Whiten, 508 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Miss.1987). These actions are governed by the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-1 et seq. (1972). However, to the extent that the applicable statutes stand silent, the Rules of Civil Procedure govern. Rawson, 609 So.2d at 430. As § 93-5-1 et seq. provides no guidance in the area of notice, we therefore conclude that the notice requirement of Rule 55(b) is applicable.
Rule 55(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Judgment. In all cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the Court therefor. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing of such application .
Rule 55(b) requires written notice to the party against whom a judgment is sought. However, in order for the non-mov-ant to be entitled to notice, the non-movant must have entered an appearance in the action. We must therefore determine whether Mrs. Holmes entered an appearance so as to merit said notice. Of relevance is our decision in Journey v. Long, 585 So.2d 1268 (Miss.1991). In Journey, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking to recover damages arising from the defendants' alleged negligent maintenance of a water system. The plaintiffs' complaint requested actual and punitive damages. However, no answer was filed and an application for entry of default, with the supporting affidavit of the plaintiffs' attorney, was filed. Notice of the application for entry of default was served on the attorney for the defendants but no response was filed. Thereafter default was entered against the defendants and a judgment was returned in favor of the plaintiffs.
The defendants filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and at a hearing of this motion, the defendant and the defendants' attorney testified an answer was filed and was slipped under the door of the circuit clerk's office after working hours. The defendant further testified that she had engaged in negotiations with the plaintiffs before the suit was filed. Although we reversed on other grounds, we stated, albeit via dicta, that the actions of the defendants constituted an appearance for purposes of Rule 55(b) notice, stating:
Because it was not raised, we do not reach the question whether defendants made an "appearance" sufficient to be entitled to notice of any hearing on application for default judgment. No cases in Mississippi have addressed this issue. Thus, we would analyze decisions from courts of the United States construing and interpreting Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which contains provisions essentially identical with our state rules. Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d 933, 935-36 (Miss.1986).
Traditionally, for an action to constitute an appearance, one had to file documents in or actually physically appear before a court. Trust Co. Bank v. Tingen-Millford Drapery Co., 119 F.R.D. 21, 22 (E.D.N.C.1987). Today, however, those requirements have been relaxed considerably for Rule 55 purposes. "Courts now look beyond the presence or absence of such formal actions.... " Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270, 271 (6th Cir.1981). The appearance command ed by Rule 55(b) has been defined broadly and interpreted liberally and is not limited to formal court appearance. Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 (D.Del.1984) quoting H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1970). Indeed, several eases have held that informal contacts between parties may constitute an appearance. See, e.g. H.F. Livermore Corp., 432 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1970) (defendant found to appear in action where the court was informed that during the settlement negotiations, letters, in which the defendant made clear its intention to defend suit, were exchanged between the attorneys for the parties); Hutton v. Fischer, 359 F.2d 913 (3rd Cir.1966) (court found that telephone call from defendant's counsel for more time, sufficient to meet the appearance standard of Rule 55(b)(2)); United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 459 (E.D.Tex.1972) (court held that the defense attorney's filing with the I.R.S. of a claim to the property forfeited and a court bond to transfer jurisdiction was sufficient notice of claimant's clear purpose to defend and sufficient to constitute an appearance); Heleasco Seventeen, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 909 (D.Del.1984) (defendants made appearance where their attorney initiated telephone conversations with plaintiff's attorney and defendants' attorney conveyed to plaintiffs attorney problems defendants were having due to the complexity of the case); Trust Co. Bank, 119 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.C.) (telephone conversation between defendant's attorney and plaintiffs attorney inquiring as to date on which answer had been filed constituted an appearance by implication).
It is clear that defendants have now made an appearance by any standard and they are therefore entitled to notice and to be heard on any motion to assess damages on remand.
Journey, 585 So.2d at 1272-1273, n. 5; see also DynaSteel v. Aztec Industries, 611 So.2d 977, 981 (Miss.1992) ("the appearance commanded by Rule 55(b) has been defined liberally and is not limited to formal court appearances").
Mrs. Holmes' attorney attached to the Motion to Set Aside Judgment all correspondence between the parties in addition to his own affidavit that he had never received any notice whatsoever of the divorce hearing scheduled on February 11,1992. This correspondence, detailed above, clearly demonstrated that Mrs. Holmes had entered an appearance in the suit. The plain language of the letter indicated Mrs. Holmes' desire to reach a settlement; equally as clear was Mrs. Holmes' intent to defend the suit in the event a settlement was not reached. The official comments to Rule 55(b) provide:
The purpose of this portion of Rule 55(b) is simple: It is intended to protect those parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the thirty day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit. On the other hand, when a defaulting party has failed to appear, thereby manifesting no intention to defend, he is not entitled to notice of the application for a default judgment.
See also DynaSteel v. Aztec Industries, 611 So.2d 977, 981 (Miss.1992) ("the focus of the inquiry is on whether the non-movant has manifested to the movant a clear intent to defend the suit").
In the case at bar, Mrs. Holmes promptly contacted an attorney. Her attorney wrote her husband's attorney and informed him that Mrs. Holmes was represented by counsel and that she wished to settle the case if possible; however, he made clear Mrs. Holmes' intent to defend the suit should no settlement be reached. With knowledge of this letter, Mr. Holmes' attorney nevertheless proceeded to secure a divorce by default against Mrs. Holmes. In this regard, his conduct suggests gamesmanship. In the Comment to M.R.C.P. 1, it is stated that "properly utilized, the rules will tend to discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away needless procedural controversies that either delay a trial on the merits or deny a party his day in court because of technical deficiencies." Conversely, improper utilization of the rules invariably results in the type of gamesmanship and ambush techniques, employed in the case at bar, that the rules were designed to abolish. We refuse to condone such behavior and therefore reverse the judgment of the chancellor and remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion rendered in this cause.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE OPINION RENDERED IN THIS CAUSE.
HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., BANKS and SMITH, JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by HAWKINS, C.J., SULLIVAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
. Justice Pittman notes that a default judgment is not permitted in divorce cases in any event. However, because the appellant has proceeded under Rule 55, we dispose of the case on that ground.