Case Name: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Douglas B. Williams, Appellant
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1998-05-28
Citations: 91 Wash. App. 344
Docket Number: No. 16582-5-III
Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Douglas B. Williams, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 344–356

Head Matter:
[No. 16582-5-III.
Division Three.
May 28, 1998.]
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Douglas B. Williams, Appellant.
Paul J. Wasson II, for appellant.
James R. Sweetser, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin M. Korsmo, Deputy, for respondent.

Opinion:
Kato, J.
— Douglas B. Williams was convicted of delivery of cocaine. Contending the court committed reversible error by failing to inform him of his CrR 3.5(b) rights at a pretrial suppression hearing, he appeals. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Mr. Williams was charged with one count of delivery of a controlled substance, arising from a confidential informant's controlled buy of crack cocaine from him. The court held a pretrial suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of certain statements made by Mr. Williams at the time of his arrest. The only witness was Detective Mark Burbridge, who testified that he arrested Mr. Williams and read him his constitutional rights. Upon questioning by the detective, Mr. Williams stated he had never sold crack cocaine and did not know anything about the drug business. The court did not advise Mr. Williams of his right to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the statements nor was he advised he could testify at the suppression hear ing without waiving his right to remain silent at trial as required by CrR 3.5(b). Finding Mr. Williams voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, the court determined the statements were admissible.
At trial, Mr. Williams testified he neither sold drugs nor told the detective he knew nothing about the drug business. The jury found him guilty as charged. He appeals.
The dispositive issue is whether the failure of the trial court to advise Mr. Williams of his CrR 3.5(b) rights at the suppression hearing constitutes reversible error. Since he did not object below, however, we must determine if the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal.
In State v. Alexander, 55 Wn. App. 102, 105, 776 P.2d 984, review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1039 (1988), this court held that the failure to comply with CrR 3.5(b) was error of constitutional magnitude which could be raised for the first time on appeal. We thus consider the issue.
The voluntariness of a confession depends upon the totality of the circumstances. State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 679, 683 P.2d 571 (1984), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988). The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination precludes the use of a defendant's statement unless the privilege was knowingly and intelligently waived following the giving of Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
After the suppression hearing, the court admitted Mr. Williams' statements upon finding he had voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. But its decision was based on the testimony of Detective Burbridge alone. The court's failure to advise Mr. Williams of his CrR 3.5(b) right to testify as to the voluntariness of his statements without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege deprived him of the opportunity to make a learned decision as to whether he should testify at the suppression hearing:
In order to have full knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding a statement, it is necessary that the defendant be allowed to testify in his own behalf. Here, the court made its decision to admit this statement based only on the officer's version of the facts, without permitting the defendant the opportunity to testify or present other evidence, if any. We conclude the court erred, because it failed to comply with CrR 3.5(b). The error is of constitutional magnitude.
This issue is dispositive .
Alexander, 55 Wn. App. at 105 (citation omitted). The court erred by not advising Mr. Williams of his CrR 3.5(b) rights.
Because Mr. Williams' statements were seemingly exculpatory, the State argues the error was harmless. But the admission of an involuntary statement cannot constitute harmless error. State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 37, 750 P.2d 632 (1988). The only issue before the trial court at the CrR 3.5 hearing was the voluntariness of Mr. Williams' statements. The error requires automatic reversal. See State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 431-32, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985) (Brachtenbach, J., concurring), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Schultheis, C.J., concurs.
CrR 3.5(b) provides:
"It shall be the duty of the court to inform the defendant that: (1) he may, but need not, testify at the hearing on the circumstances surrounding the statement; (2) if he does testify at the hearing, he will be subject to cross examination with respect to the circumstances surrounding the statement and with respect to his credibility; (3) if he does testify at the hearing, he does not by so testifying waive his right to remain silent during the trial; and (4) if he does testify at the hearing, neither this fact nor his testimony at the hearing shall be mentioned to the jury unless he testifies concerning the statement at trial."
In State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 767, 764 P.2d 250 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1006 (1989), the court held that the failure to inform the defendant of his CrR 3.5(b) rights did not require remand because the sole basis for the defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his statement was the taint stemming from the prior search of his room. Unlike Summers, Mr. Williams' only challenge to admissibility of his statements was whether they were made after a voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights.