Case Name: FRANKLIN et al. v. TACKETT
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1993-07-13
Citations: 209 Ga. App. 448
Docket Number: A93A0523
Parties: FRANKLIN et al. v. TACKETT.
Judges: Cooper, J., concurs. Beasley, P. J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 209
Pages: 448–455

Head Matter:
A93A0523.
FRANKLIN et al. v. TACKETT.
(433 SE2d 710)

Opinion:
McMurray, Presiding Judge.
Plaintiffs brought this personal injury action against defendant seeking damages stemming from an automobile collision. Defendant denied liability and the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant and judgment was entered accordingly. This appeal followed. Held:
1. The plaintiffs are black and defendant is white. There were three blacks on the jury and defendant used his peremptory challenges to strike each one of them. Plaintiffs made a Batson (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69)) motion and called upon defendant to explain why he struck all of the blacks on the jury panel. Defense counsel offered race-neutral explanations for striking two of the black potential jurors. With regard to the third black potential juror, defense counsel stated: "I don't know why I struck [her]. If I've got to come up with an excuse, I'm sure I could come up with an excuse. I might ask [plaintiffs' counsel] why he struck the people he struck. I resent it. I resent it that every time a black person is in court or in any place in this society, the first thing that comes to mind from people like [plaintiffs' counsel] is that there's something racial about a case, that there's something racially involved in the case. I resent it, I strongly resent it, I think the system ought to resent it, and I think your Honor ought to resent it. That's the only thing I have to say about this. I would ask that the Court reject his motion, whatever it is. I don't deal in those kind of things so I don't even know what kind of motion he's talking about."
Because defense counsel failed to give a race-neutral reason for striking the third black potential juror, plaintiffs urged the trial court to grant their Batson motion and declare a mistrial. The trial court denied the Batson motion, after first noting "that it was [plaintiffs' counsel] who injected race into this case" when he probed for bias during voir dire.
Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred in denying their Batson motion. We agree.
" '(C)ourts must entertain a challenge to a private litigant's racial discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial.' (Emphasis supplied.) Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S__, - (II B) (111 SC 2077, 114 LE2d 660) (1991). As the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari and remand in Chavous v. Brown, _ U. S.-(111 SC 2791, 115 LE2d 966) (1991), clearly demonstrate, the holding in Edmondson does not merely apply to civil actions in federal court. It applies equally to civil actions in state courts." Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga. App. 85, 86 (1) (424 SE2d 368).
"[Defendant] does not contend that employment of peremptory strikes against [all three of the] black potential jurors would not serve to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 'Thus, the only remaining question is whether [defendant] sufficiently showed "that discriminatory purpose was not involved." (Cit.)' Gamble v. State, [257 Ga. 325, 326 (357 SE2d 792)]." Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga. App. 85, 87 (3), supra.
We have no hesitation in concluding that defendant failed to show the lack of a discriminatory purpose. Why? Because defendant failed to give a " ' "clear and reasonably specific," explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges.' Batson, supra at 1723, 1724 and 1724 (fn. 20)." Gamble v. State, supra at 327. In fact, defendant offered no explanation whatsoever for striking the third black potential juror. Defendant simply stated that he did not know why he struck that juror and resented being called upon to explain his challenges. That statement was wholly insufficient to successfully rebut plaintiffs' prima facie Batson case and the trial court clearly erred in ruling otherwise. Gamble v. State, supra; Strozier v. Clark, supra.
2. The trial court also erred in refusing to qualify prospective jurors with regard to relationships they may have with any insurance carrier having a financial interest in the outcome of the case. Weatherbee v. Hutcheson, 114 Ga. App. 761 (1) (152 SE2d 715). Cf. Widener v. Mitchell, 137 Ga. App. 730, 732 (5) (224 SE2d 868). Contrary to defendant's assertion, Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 (402 SE2d 269) did not eliminate the practice of qualifying prospective jurors concerning their relationships with insurance carriers involved in a lawsuit.
Judgment reversed.
Cooper, J., concurs. Beasley, P. J., concurs specially.