Case Name: HARVEY v. BELL
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1932-05-13
Citations: 52 S.W.2d 281
Docket Number: No. 9706
Parties: HARVEY v. BELL.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 52
Pages: 281–284

Head Matter:
HARVEY v. BELL.
No. 9706.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
May 13, 1932.
Rehearing Denied July 27, 1932.
Pouts, Amerman, Patterson & Moore, of Houston (A. E. Amerman, of Houston, of counsel), for appellant. -
Ward & Ward, of Houston, for appellee.

Opinion:
PLEASANTS, C. J.
This is a suit by appellee against appellant to recover the sum of $5,400, with interest.
The plaintiff in her petition alleges in substance that on March 18, 1920, George A. Burns conveyed to the defendant, Harvey, nine one-acre lots or parcels of land in the Riverside oil field subdivision of the John Brown Jones survey in Harris county, and that by the terms and recitals of this deed of conveyance the grantee, defendant, Harvey, paid his vendor, Burns, the sum of $5,-400 in cash, and agreed to further pay to Burns, his heirs or assigns, the further sum of $5,400 out of one-half of the first oil produced and saved from the land, and also to pay a one-sixteenth royalty out of all oil so produced from the land, and that, in event Harvey should' sell any portion of the land conveyed to him, he would pay or cause to be paid to George A. Burns, his heirs or assigns, the said sum of $5,400 in cash, or the sum of $G00 per acre for each acre so sold. It is then alleged that plaintiff has acquired by mesne conveyances all of the right, title, and interest of Burns in and to the reservations and contract agreements contained in this deed of conveyance, as*above set out; and that defendant, I-Iarvey, on October 27, 1927, sold the land so conveyed to him by Burns, and thereby became and is liable to plaintiff for said sum of $5,400, for which plaintiff prays judgment.
We copy from appellant's brief the following sufficient statement of the further pleadings in the ease:
"The defendant answered, denying that he ever obligated himself personally to pay said $5,400.00, or any part thereof, for the reason, among others, that under an agreement between George A. Burns and J. O. Stribling by which the land was conveyed from George A. Burns to R. A. Harvey, an employee, for the use and benefit of J. O. Stribling, the said George A. Burns agreed that the obligations in the deed were in truth and in fact the obligations of J. G. Stribling. Defendant denied that he sold the property to J. C. Stribling, within the terms and provisions of the deed, but that when his business relations with Stribling were terminated he executed a conveyance without consideration. He further plead that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statutes of limitation of two and four years.
"By supplemental petition the plaintiff alleged that she was an innocent purchaser for value of the mineral interest and.she alleged that the said R. A. Harvey had estopped himself by his acts.
"Defendant, by supplemental answer, plead the statute of four years limitation as. applied to this instrument and any other instrument plead, or otherwise."
The trial in the court below without a jury resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum off $5,400, with interest at 6 per cent, from October 27, 1927.
There is little, if any, conflict in the testimony. The undisputed evidence shows that the lands in question were purchased' by appellant for the use and benefit of his employer, J. C. Stribling, who made the cash payment of $5,400 recited in the deed, and had title placed in appellant's name to enable him to more readily handle the property as Stribling's agent. This arrangement was known to and acquiesced in by the grantor, Burns, who at no time held appellant liable for any part of the deferred consideration recited in the deed, and looked only to Stribling, or an oil corporation thereafter to be organized by him, for the performance of the agreements set out in the deed. When the land was purchased by Stribling, Burns knew that it was contemplated by him and appellant that a corporation would be formed in which they and others would be incor-' porators and shareholders, and that in the meantime the appellant would be in position, by holding the title in his name, to make such agreements for development of the oil under the land by executing oil leases thereon, and the formation of a corporation to carry on such development and operate any producing well such corporation might complete thereon. After several years of effort on tlie part of appellant to accomplish the results contemplated in his agreement with Stribling, and his failure to find oil under the lands or organize a corporation for their further development for oil, on October 14, 1927, appellant, by deed of that' date which recites a consideration, conveyed the title held by him to J. O. Stribling. No consideration was received by appellant for this conveyance ; the only consideration therefor being the desire and inténtion of the parties to place the legal title to the lands in their real owner,
Upon these facts it cannot be held that this was such a sale of the lands in the purview of the agreements in the deed from Burns to appellant as would fix liability upon appellant for the payment of the $5,400 for which this suit is brought. Five Per Cent. Cases, 110 U. S. 471, 4 S. Ct. 210, 28 L. Ed. 198; Words and Phrases, Second Series, vol. 4, p. 453, and authorities there quoted, and Words and Phrases, First Series, vol. 7, p. 6292, and authorities quoted.
It is, we think, perfectly clear that, upon the facts before stated, Burns could not claim any liability on the part of appellant or Stribling because of this conveyance, and there is no principle of equity or rule of law which puts a purchaser from Burns in a better position to assert such claim.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to discuss the remaining assignments presented by appellant's brief, and requires that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and judgment here rendered for appellant, and it has been so ordered.
Reversed and rendered.