Case Name: HAWAII v. MANKICHI
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1903-06-01
Citations: 190 U.S. 197
Docket Number: No. 219
Parties: HAWAII v. MANKICHI.
Judges: Mr. Justice McKehna authorizes me to say that he also, concurs in the result for the foregoing reasons.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 190
Pages: 197–249

Head Matter:
HAWAII v. MANKICHI.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII.
No. 219.
Argued March 4, 5, 1903.
Decided June 1, 1903.
In interpreting, a statute the intention of the lawmaking power will prevail even agáinst the letter of the statute; a thing may be within the . letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, ~ though not within its letter. .Smythe v. Fisk, 23 Wallace, 874. In inserting in the Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii, a provision that municipal legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States should remain in force until Congress ■ otherwise determined, Congress did not intend to impose upon the islands every clause of the Constitution, and to nullify convictions and verdicts which might, before the legislature could act, be rendered in accordance with, existing legislation of the islands but not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, nor was such the intention of Hawaii in surrendering its. autonomy.
The conviction of one who, between August 12, 1898, and June 14, 1900, was tried on information and convicted by a jury not unanimous, in ac cordance with legislation of the Republic of Hawaii existing at the time of the annexation, is legal notwithstanding it is not in compliance with the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.
This was a petition by Mankichi for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release -from the Oahu convict prison, where he is confined upon conviction for manslaughter, in alleged violation of the Constitution, in that he was tried upon an indictment not found by a grand jury, and convicted by the verdict of nine out of twelve jurors, the other three dissenting from the verdict.
Following the usual course of procedure in the Republic of Hawaii, prior to its incorporation as a Territory of the United States, the prisoner was tried upon an indictment much in the form of an information at common law, by the Attorney. Gen-, eral, and endorsed “ a true bill found this fourth day of May, A. D. 1899. A. Perry, first judge of the Circuit Court,”' etc.
From an order of the United States. District Court discharging the prisoner the Attorney General of the Territory appealed to this court.
Mr. Edmund P. Dole, attorney general of the Territory of Hawaii, and Mr. Solicitor General Richards for appellant.
I. At the time of the cession, the Hawaiian Islands' constituted a sovereign and independent nation, with a government, of its own, republican in form, and a civilized system of law, civil and criminal, defining rights and affording remedies. The courts were open and due process of law provided. At the same time, as in some, of our States, grand juries were not used nor unanimous verdicts required to convict. Republic v. Edwards, 11 Haw. Rep. 571, 579.
The statute which enacts that • a verdict by nine- jurors is sufficient was held to be constitutional in The King v. Andreas Oamacho, 3 Haw. Rep. 385.
By the treaty of annexation which was formally consented to by the Republic of Hawaii and submitted to this country, a cession was-proposed upon certain terms and conditions which were stated. By the. passage-of the resolution of annexation •the offer of cession was accepted and the islands annexed “ as a part of th.e territory of tbe United States ” upon the terms stated in the treaty and incorporated in such resolution. This resolution contains special provisions with respect to the public lánds of Hawaii, the customs regulations and relations of the islands, the public , debt of the Eepublic, the immigration of Chinese, and certain general and significant provisions securing the continuance of the government and laws of the Eepublic during the transition period and until Congress should provide a new and permanent government.
II. That Congress had power thus to provide a temporary government, not subject to all the restrictions of the Constitution, until it could frame a permanent government and incorporate the:islands-as a part of the United States, was held by this court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. Ml.
That the resolution of'annexation did n.ot incorporate the islands within the United States and render them subject to all the limitations of the * Constitution applicable throughout the United States, was evidently the view of the justices who constituted the majority of the court in the Downes case.
The provision that “ no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands,” is totally inconsistent with the theory that Congress intended by the resolution to incorporate the islands as an integral part of the United States, or extend the Constitution over them.
III. The use of the qualifying words “not contrary to the Constitution of the United States,” after the words “ the municipal legislation of . the Hawaiian Islands,” did not carry the Constitution into the islands and render void, and inoperative every provision of the law of the Hawaiian Islands contrary to any of its limitations. The Hawaiian method of indicting and convifeting criminals was an integral part of the criminal law of the islands. The resolution provided that the existing “ municipal legislation ” should remain in force until Congress should otherwise determine. There was no provision for modifying or amending it. '«To strike down the law of criminal procedure was to deprive the government of Hawaii of the ;power to preserve order and proteót persons and property. It is not to be presumed that either party to the contract of ces - sion intended this.
The interpretation placed by President McKinley upon the .resolution o£ annexation appears in the instructions for the transfer of sovereignty in which he directed “ that the civil, judicial, and military powers in question shall be exercised by the officers of the Republic of Hawaii as it existed just prior to the transfer of sovereignty.”
The status in the islands after the transfer of sovereignty under the resolution, is described by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in the Edwards Case, 11 Haw. Rep. 571, 578.
IY. If Congress had intended, by the resolution of annexation, to extend to the Hawaiian Islands our grand and petit jury system, it would have made some provision to that end. See the organic act “ To provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii,”' passed April 30, 1900. 31 Stat. 141. In this measure Congress provided that the islands should be known as the Territory of Hawaii, sec. 2; established a territorial government, sec. 3; made all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 (the date of the transfer of sovereignty), citizens of the United States, sec. 4; and provided that the Constitution and laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, with certain exceptions, should have the same force and effect within said Territory as elsewhere within the United States, sec. 5. The organization of the islands, their incorporation as a Territory of the United States, and the extension to them of the Constitution and laws of the United States, necessarily brought them, and for the first time, within the operation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and therefore required the enactment of the law amending the law of civil and criminal procedure so as to extend our grand and petit jury system there.
If, by the resolution of annexation, the Constitution was extended to the islands, and our grand jury and petit jury system put in force there, why were these provisions inaugurating our grand jury and petit jury system inserted in the organic act? All these provisions look to the future. It is obvious that Congress, in making them, acted in the belief that the Ha waiian law with respect to indictments and verdicts had continued in force during the .transition period and would remain operative until the organic act should take effect.
Y. But what was the'meaning and effect of the qualifying words “ not contrary to the Constitution of the United States,” used in the resolution ? It is argued they must be held to extend the Constitution, with all its limitations, or be rejected altogether. No such alternative exists. The words had a meaning, and the meaning is plain. They were not employed to extend the Constitution. Before the islands could be incorporated and the Constitution with all its limitations' extended, it_ was necessary that a new government should be framed andan organic act passed. But by the transfer of sovereignty, the bringing of the islands under the sovereign dominion: of the United States, certain limitations .of .the Constitution became operative there. These qualifying words were inserted in recognition of the fact that there are certain fundamental rights which the Constitution protects wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 282.
YI.- That the right to be indicted by a grand jury and be tried by a petit jury is not fundamental, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments enforcing this right apply only to the Federal courts, and that a citizen of the United States in a criminal prosecution in a state court may be -deprived of his life, liberty, or property, by due process of law, without indictment by a grand jury and without unanimity in the verdict of a petit jury, is the established doctrine of this court. Brown v. New Jersey, 115 U. S. 172 ; Ea¡ parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642; Iowa Central Railway v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Chicago, Burlington and Qumcy Rail/road v. Chicago, 166 ' U. S. 226 ; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83; Maxwell v. Doto, 176 U. S. 581; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462.
YII. It thus appears that the Hawaiian Islands, in providing for indictment without a grand jury and for conviction without the unanimous verdict of a petit jury, was only doing what a State of the Union may do under the Constitution. The pro posed treaty of 1854 provided for the incorporation' of the Hawaiian Islands into the American Union as a State. By the resolution of annexation the islands were brought under the dominion of the United States, but it was not determined in what way they should be incorporated. Had Congress admitted the Hawaiian Islands into the Union as a State it could have been done without changing in any respect the law of the island^ regulating criminal procedure, and as a State the government of the islands could have continued, under the Constitution, to indict criminals without a grand jury and convict them without .the unanimous verdict of a petit jury. It cannot be reasonably contended that Congress could not permit the government of Hawaii to continue to administer its own law of criminal procedure, until it should be' determined in what way the islands should be incorporated into the United States.
VIII. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply only to the courts of the United States. The courts of Hawaii during the transition period were not such courts but were the courts of the Republic of Hawaii, continued of necessity until Congress could organize the islands and establish Federal courts. The judicial powers which were to be exercised during the transition period were the existing judicial powers of the Hawaiian courts, which did not include the power to impanel grand juries or to subpmna, witnesses before grand juries, or to try criminals by a petit jury after the manner required ifl Federal courts. There was no Hawaiian law for this, and therefore no judicial power. The judicial power which was continued was to accuse and try and convict in the manner provid id by the Hawaiian la# ; and there was no authority to change or modify it, for the resolution expressly provided that the municipal legislation of the islands should remain in force until Congress should otherwise determine.
Among the judicial powers' exercised under the Republic of Hawaii and to be exercised during the transition period, was that of the Supreme Court of the islands to pass finally upon all disputed questions of criminal procedure, and this court alone could do so. The question raised in is this case was unanimously determined by it in favor of the government; While this decision may not be binding upon this court, under the peculiar circumstances, weight ought to be given to the views of the Supreme Court of Hawaii upon the matter.
Mr. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., and Mr. Paul Fuller, with whom Mr. Charles Fred Adams, Mr. George A. Davis and Mr. F. M. Brooks were on the brief, for appellee.
Thé proposition upon which appellee relies, and the soundness of which is determinative of this case, is that from the moment the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands became complete and they passed under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States by virtue of the act of Congress of July Y, 1898,.no citizen or inhabitant thereof could “ be held for a capital' or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment of a grand jury,” nor be convicted for such crime without a unanimous verdict of a petit jury.
a. As Hawaii was annexed by act of Congress and not by treaty, the judicial discussions contained in the opinions in the Insular Gases have little or no relevancy to Hawaii. It is.not disputed that Congress has full power to acquire and annex foreign territories, and to provide for the government thereof, or that it is competent for Congress to extend to the inhabitants of the territories annexed the privileges and protection of the Constitution of the United States. Shvvehf v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48; JMorman Chureh Case, 136 U. S. 44; Butler’s Treaty Making Power; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 28Y, etseq.; Eev. Stat. sec. 1851. This intention is manifest both from the language of the act of Congress (Newlánds resolution) extending the Constitution to Hawaii, and also from the history of the islands which shows them to have been American in institutions, law and government, since 184Y, at which time the government of the United States was prevented by mere accident from admitting Hawaii into the Union as a State. Downes v. Bidwell, swpra, p. 395; Hawaiian Civil Laws, § 1109.
b. Congress having full power to annex did so, and the conditions of the annexation must be sought in the law annexing the islands, The question is thus one involving the construe tion of a municipal statute, and has no relation to questions arising between two sovereign States under a treaty, nor is it affected by" any rules of the “ law of nations.” The Newlands resolution, not only annexed the islands, but provided a code of municipal, legislation by which the islands should be governed “until the Congress of the United States should otherwise determine.” It also abrogated at once all treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations, and all municipal legislation enacted for the fulfillment of such treaties, and all legislation which .was “ contrary to the Constitution of the United States,” or to any existing treaty of the United States; but with these exceptions all other municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, the act declared, “ shall remain in. force until Congress shall otherwise determine.” Thus this act extended the full operation of the Constitution to Hawaii.
g. The bunions of the majority of the court in the Insular Cases fully support the proposition that the action of Congress in extending the full operation of the Constitution to that territory made it unlawful to conduct criminal trials save as prescribed by Article III and by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Conformity to these constitutional requirements was readily attainable; under then existing Hawaiian law. Downes v. B/idwell, 182 U. S. 271,276, 277, 286 ; Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 177; American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S: 464;' Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 348; Hess v. White, 9 Utah, 61.
This proposition cannot be reconciled, with the view of the Solicitor General that the words “ nor contrary to the Constitution ” contained in the act annexing the islands are merely declaratory of rights which would exist in any event without any extension by Congress. . Cases holding that the States may dispense with trial by jury or indictment qan have no relevancy to this case. The first eight amendments are admittedly applicable to'.the Federal government, and its agencies alone. The state ■ governments are the ultimate protectors of the liberties of the citizen, and with the exception of a few instances, mainly provided for in the last three, amendments,, the United States, courts cannot interfere. Burgess Political Science and Constitutional Law, vol. 1, p. 516; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Maxwells. How, 176 U. S. 584; Thompsonv. Utah, 170 U. S. 343.
Upon the theory set forth in the concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would equally apply, because the extension of the Constitution to Hawaii by the language of the N ewlands resolution is evidence of an intention on the part of Congress to incorporate those islands. If-the proposed treaty upon which counsel for Hawaii lay such stress is to be examined with a view to throwing any light upon the interpretation to be given to .the language of the Newlands resolution in this respect, the intention of Congress becomes even clearer. The preamble of- the treaty states that “ the United States and the Republic of Hawaii, in view ... of the expressed desire of the government of the Republic of Hawaii that those islands should be incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof, and under its sovereignty, have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so important to thei r mutual and permanent welfare.”
See also to the same effect: ■ Butler’s Treaty Making Power, vol. 1, p. 72; Treaty with the Republic of Hawaii, June, 1897; Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 March, 1898; Secretary Sherman’s Report to President McKinley, accompanying the proposed treaty of Annexation, -1898, pp. 96-97; Message of President McKinley, June 16, 1897, accompanying proposed treaty (Sen. Doc. last cited); Treaty of 1893 -with Hawaii, Secretary Foster’s report thereon, Sen. Doc. No. 76, 52d Cong. 2d Sess. 1893 ;- Report of Hawaiian Commission, 1898; Ex parte Bai/n, 121 U. S. 1; Thompsons. Utah', Spring-mile v. Thomas, supra-, joint resolution, July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750; Secretary Day’s instructions, July 8, Í898; Minister Sewell’s report to Secretary Day, August 12, 1898; Report of Commission on Territories, H. R. February 12, 1900; Instructions of the Secretary of State, July 8, 1898.
d. The proposition (relied upon by the Solicitor General) that the language of the act does not change or affect the legal situation, but leaves it just where it would have been had Congress been silent on the subject, is fallacious both in its prem ises and conclusion. The plain language of the Newlands act was to put in operation in the Hawaiian Islands all the provi-' sions of the Constitution enforceable anywhere in the United States.
e. The argument ah ineommienti can have no application here. The criminal courts in Hawaii have had criminal law jurisdiction for more than half a century; they had power to empanel a grand' jury and to instruct the petit jury of twelve men before whom this case was tried that conviction could only be had by Unanimous verdict. Constitution, art. I, sec. 3; Ex parte Edwards, 13 Hawaii, 47; Broome Legal Maxims, 7th Am. ed. p. 625; Comyn’s Digest, Grant', E: 14, S. 5; Hah mer v. Moxon, 2 M. & S. 50; Civil Laws of Hawaii, sec. 1109; limited States v. Hill, 1 Brock. 156,159 ; United States v. Glaw-son, 114 .U. S. 486. Congress knew this and must have intended to make trials there conform to those conducted elsewhere under Federal authority.
The argument for Hawaii is that-the Newlands act conferred no constitutional rights vyhich the islands would not have, possessed in any event as a result of simple annexation by treaty or otherwise. We contend that this argument is untenable for the following reasons: The plain intention of the Newlands act was to give to Hawaii every benefit which could be enjoyed by any territory under -the sovereignty of the United States save that already enjoying actual Statehood. Assuming, however, that the words “ nor contrary to the Constitution ” are to be construed by this court as a mere rhetorical flourish — vox et presterea nihil — a mere honne bouehe for use in debate,.nevertheless there is no such distinction between natural and artificial or remedial rights in the Constitution as contended for. The positive prohibitions against certain actions on the part of the .government of the United States are equally imperative whatever view the court may take of the relative importánce of the various provisions in question.
The prohibitions against the establishment of a religion, the .infliction of cruel or unusual punishment, the taking of property without due process of law, and trials without a jury are equally plain and imperative. They must be given equally positive force. To justify an overriding of the plain language of the amendments by an appeal to the philosophy of natural rights' is altogether inadmissible. Gallan y. Wilson, 127 U. S. 549; President McKinley’s instructions to Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900; Downes v. Bidwell, 182-TJ. S. 282; Solicitor General’s Argument in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182. U. S. at pp. 155,. 156; Northwest Ordinance, 1787, Arts. I and II; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ritchie on Natural Rights.
The position of the Solictor General when analyzed must be based upon, one of two alternative theories: (1) Either the natural rights referred to exist of themselves and wholly apart from the Constitution, deriving their sanction from a supposed law of nature and not from that instrument; (2) or, the language of the Constitution itself protecting those rights is so broad and imperative as to be of universal application to governmental action everywhere, Hawaii included.
If the former be the proper interpretation of this interesting theory of the counsel for Hawaii, the question which would arise would not present problems of constitutional law at all, but questions of abstract philosophy. If there are certain rights, which are protected because they are assumed to belong to the category of “ natural rights,” the question In each case would be as to whether such rights were “natural” ov not. If they were they would be protected because of their inherent character, and if they were not, they would either have to rely upon positive man-made law for their sanction, or else in its ábsence be unprotected by any law. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 276, 277, 282, 294.
If the court should believe that there exists a distinction in the Constitution between the prohibitions in favor of natural rights and those in favor of artificial rights, consistency necessarily dictates that all the artificial rights may equally be denied by Congress to the inhabitants of new territory to which the Constitution has not been either expressly extended or which has not been incorporated into the United States. Taking, therefore, these rights seriatim, our opponent must admit that if the language, “No persons shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of the grand jury,” is compatible with a trial on information in Ha.waii, then it must also be admitted that “any. person (in such territory may) be subject for the same offence, to be twice.put in jeopardy of life or limb” or may be-“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; ” or may “be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; ” • and that private property may be “ taken for publie use without just compensation.”
The Sixth Amendment like the Fifth. is devoted to consecrating. the peculiar forms and procedure long deemed necessary to the maintenance of English liberty, and if jury trial belongs to the category of the artificial or remedial rights these rights likewise belong to the same category; and if the court adopt the view of pur learned opponents, it must hold that the Taws of Hawaii, without violation of the Constitution, might have deprived persons in criminal prosecution of the right “ to a speedy and public trial; ” “ to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; ” “ to be confronted with the witnesses against him; ” to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ; and “ to have assistance of counsel for .his defence’’ — rights which were not protected against the action of the government in the Homan Law countries at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and are clearly common law rights in their genesis and development.
It is impossible to hold "that the appellee might lawfully have been convicted without the,intervention of a grand jury and the unanimous verdict of a petit jury without at the same time holding that he might have been deprived of these other constitutional immunities.
Can such a doctrine obtain the sanction of this court ? There can be no reversal of this decision unless the court be prepared to go to that length.
In conclusion, the appellee submits that
(1) By the act of Congress annexing the Hawaiian Islands, its legislation was intended to be made to conform to the re., quirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as is the case in other Territories of the United States, This is' the plain meaning of the language employed.
(2) The situation of Hawaii was such that Congress evidently considered its institutions assimilable to those of the United States, and that to give any other interpretation to the language of Congress would be a plain violation of the spirit as well as of the letter of the joint resolution. .
(3) To argue that the words'” nor contrary to the Constitution” mean nothing, but were employed to show that Congress understood the Constitution to carry some, vague kind of humanitafianism based upon a supposed “ law of nature ” into Hawaii is unsound and fanciful.
Joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. 30 Stat. 750.
Whereas the government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in due form, signified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the' absolute fee and ownership of all public, government or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining: Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United States of America.
********
Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands all the civil, judicial, and military powers'exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such, manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill the. vacancies so occasioned.
The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.
Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.
***** *- * *
There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter tbe United States from the Hawaiian Islands.
The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Brown,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The question involved in this case is an extremely simple one. The difficulty is in fixing upon the principles applicable to its solution. By a joint resolution adopted by Congress, July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750, known as the Newlands resolution, and with the consent of the ^Republic of Hawaii, signified in the manner provided in its constitution, the Hawaiian Islands, and their dependencies, were annexed " as a part of the territory of the . United States, and subject to the sovereign dominion thereof," with the following condition:- "The municipal legislation of. the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted' for the fulfillment of the' treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with-this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the Untied States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress-of the United States shall otherwise determine." The material parts of this resolution are printed in the margin. Though the resolution was passed July 7, the formal transfer was not made until August 12, when, at noon of that day, the American, flag was raised over the government house, and the islands ceded with. appropriate ceremonies to a representative of the United States. Under the conditions named in this resolution the Hawaiian Islands remained under the name of the " Republic of Hawaii " until June 14, 1900, when they were formally incorporated by act of Congress-under the name of the " Territory of Hawaii." 31 Stat. 141. By this act the Constitution was formally extended to these islands, sec. 5, and special provisions made for empanelling grand juries and for unanimous verdicts of petty juries. Sec. 83.
The question is whether, in continuing the municipal legislation of the islands not contrary to the Constitution of the United States, it was intended to abolish at once the.criminal procedure theretofore in force ¡upon the islands, and to substitute immediately and without new legislation the common law proceedings by grand and petit jury, which had been held applicable to other organized Territories, Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, though we have also held that the States, when once admitted as such, may dispense with grand juries, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; and perhaps allow verdicts to be rendered-by less than a unanimous vote. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343.
In fixing upon the proper construction tó be given to this resolution, it is important to bear in mind the history and condition of the islands prior to their annexation by Congress. Since 1847 they had enjoyed the blessings of a civilized government, and a system of jurisprudence modelled largely upon the common law of England and the United States. Though lying in the tropical zone, the salubrity of their climate and the fertility of their soil had attracted thither large numbers of people from Europe and America, who brought with them political ideas and traditions which, about sixty years ago, found expression in the adoption of a code of laws appropriate to their new conditions. Churches were founded, schools opened, courts of justice established, and civil and criminal laws administered upon substantially the same principles which prevailed in the two countries from, which most of the immigrants-had come.. Taking the lead, however, in a change which has since been., adopted by several of the United States, no provision was made for grand juries, and criminals were prosecuted. upon indictments found by judges. By a law passed in 1847, the number of a jury was fixed at twelve, but a verdict might be rendered upon the agreement of nine jurors. The question involved in this case is whether it was intended that this practice should be instantly changed, and the criminal procedure embodied in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution be adopted as of August 12, 1898, when the Hawaiian flag was hauled down and the American flag hoisted in its place.
If the words of the New lands, resolution, adopting the municipal legislation of Hawaii not contrary to the Constitution of the United States, be literally applied, the petitioner is entitled' to his discharge, since that instrument expressly requires, Amendment 5, that " no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; " and, Amendment 6, that " in all criminal, prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a'speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." But there;is another question underlying this and all other rules for the interpretation of statutes, and that is, what was the intention of the legislative body ? Without going back to the famous case of the drawing of blood in the streets of Bologna, the books are full, of authorities, to the effect that the intention of the lawmaking power will prevail, even against the letter of the statute, or, as tersely expressed by Mr. Justice Swayne in Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380: " A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law." A parallel expression is found in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Thompson of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, (subsequently Mr. Justice Thompson of this court,) in People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 381: "A thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing .which is within the letter of the statute, is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers."
Without going farther, numerous illustrations of this maxim are found in the reports Of our own court. Nowhere is the doctrine more broadly stated than in United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, in .which an act of Congress, providing for the punishment of any person who " shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or any driver or carrier," was held not to apply to a state officer who had a warrant of arrest against a carrier for murder, the court observing that no officer of the United States was placed by his position above responsibility to the legal tribunals of the country, and to the ordinary processes for his arrest and detention when accused of felony. " All laws," said the court, " should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions tbits language, which would avoid results of this character. . The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." A case was cited from Plowden, holding that a statute, which punished a prisoner as a felon who broke prison, did not extend to a prisoner who broke out when the prison was on fire, " for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burned." Similar language to that in Kirby's case was used in Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 153.
In Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272, it was held that a suit in personam in admiralty was not a "civil suit" within the eleventh section of the judiciary act, though clearly a civil suit in the general sense of that phrase, and as used in other sections of the same act. See also In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488. So in Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold &c. Co., 93 U. S. 634, 638, it was said by Mr. Justice Davis: " If a literal interpretation of any part of it (a statute) would operate unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection with other clauses, than by considering the necessity for it, and thé causes which induced its enactment." To the same effect are the Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, in which many cases are cited and reviewed, and Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 59. In this latter ease it was held that a statute requiring the permission of the Chinese government, and the identification of " every Chinese person 'other than a laborer, who may be entitled by treaty or act of Congress to come within the United States," did not apply to " Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States, who, having left the country for temporary purposes, animo revertendi, seek to reenter it on their return to their business and their homes." Said the Chief Justice: " Nothing is . better. settled than that statutes should .receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion."
Two recent English cases are instructive in this connection: In Plumstead Board of Works v. Spackman, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 878, 887, it was said by the Master .of Eolls, afterwards Lord Esher: " If there áre no means of avoiding such an interpretation of the statute," (as will amount to a great hardship,) " a judge must come to the conclusion that the legislature by inadvertence has committed an act of legislative injustice; but to my mind a judge ought to struggle, with all the intellect that he has, and with all the vigor of mind that he has, against such an interpretation of an act of Parliament; and, unless he is forced to come to a contrary-conclusion, he ought to assume that it is impossible that the legislature could have so intended." See also Ex parte Walton, L. R. 17 Ch. D. 746.
Is there any room for construction in this case, or, are the words of the resolution so plain that construction is impossible ? There are many reasons which induce us to hold that the act was not intended to interfere with the existing practice when such interference would result in imperiling the peace and good order of the islands. The main objects of the resolution were, 1st, to accept the cession of the islands theretofore made by the Republic of Hawaii, and to annex the same " as a part of the territory of the United States and subject to-the- sovereign dominion thereof;" 2d, to abolish all existing treaties with various nations, and to recognize only treaties between the United States and such foreign nations; 3d, to continue the existing laws and customs regulations, so far as they were not inconsistent with the resolution, or contrary to the Constitution, until Congress should otherwise determine. From the terms of this, resolution it is evident that it was intended to be merely temporary and provisional; that no change in the government was contemplated, and that until further legislation the Republic of Hawaii continued in existence. Even its name was not changed until 1900, when the "Territory of Hawaii" was organized. The laws of the United States were not extended over the islands until the organic act was passed on April 30, 1900, when, so careful was Congress not to disturb the existing condition of things any further than was necessary, it was provided, sec. 5, that only "the laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force arid effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States." There was apparently some discretion left to the courts in this connection. Indianapolis &c. R. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 299. The fact already mentioned that Congress in this organic act inserted a provision for the empanelling of grand juries and for the unanimity of verdicts indicates an understanding that the previous practice bad been pursued up to that time, and that a change in the existing law was contemplated.
Of course, under the Newlands resolution, any new legislation must conform to the Constitution of the United States, but how far the exceptions to the existing municipal legislation were intended to abolish existing laws, must depend somewhat upon circumstances. 'Where the immediate application of the Constitution required no new legislation to- take the place of that which the Constitution abolished, it may be well held to have taken immediate effect; but where the application of a procedure hitherto well known and acquiesced in, left nothing to take its place, without new legislation, the result might be so disastrous that we might well say that it could not have been within the contemplation of Congress. In all probability the contingency which has actually arisen occurred to no one at the time.- If it had, and its consequences were foreseen, it is incredible that .Congress should not have provided against it.
If the negative words of the resolution, " nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States," be construed as impos ing upon the islands every provision of a Constitution, which must have been unfamiliar to a large number of their inhabitants, and for which no previous preparation had been made, the con'sequences in this particular connection would be that every criminal in the Hawaiian Islands convicted of an infamous offence between August 32, 1898, and June 14,1900, when the' act organizing the territorial government took effect, must be set at large ; and every verdict in a civil case rendered by less than a unanimous jury held for naught.' Surely such a result could not have been within the contemplation of Congress. It is equally manifest that such could not have been the intention of the Republic of Hawaii in surrendering its autonomy. Until then it was an independent nation, exercising all the powers and prerogatives of complete sovereignty. It certainly could not have anticipated that, in dealing with another independent nation, and yielding up its sovereignty, it had denuded itself, by a negative pregnant, of all power of enforcing its criminal laws according to the methods which had been in vogúe for sixty years, and was adopting a new procedure for which it had had no opportunity of making preparation. • The. legislature of the Republic had just adjourned, not to convene again until some time in 1900, and not actually convening until 1901. The resolution on its face bears evidence of having been intended merely for a temporary purpose, and to give time to the Republic to adapt itself to such form of territorial government as should afterwards be adopted, in its organic act.
The language of Mr. Buchanan, then Secretary of State, in holding that the military government established in California did not cease to exist with, the treaty of peace, but continued as a government de facto until Congress should provide a territorial government, is peculiarly applicable to this case. " The great law of necessity justifies this conclusion. The consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from the fact that no civilized community could possibly desire to abrogate an existing government, when the alternative presented would be to place themselves in a state of anarchy, beyond the protection of all laws, and reduce them to the unhappy necessity of submitting; to the dominion of the strongest." 16 How. 184.
It is insisted, however, that as the common law of England had been adopted in Hawaii by the Code of 1897, it was within the power of the courts to summon a grand jury, and that such' action might have been taken and criminals tried upon indict.ments properly found, and convicted by unanimous verdict. The suggestion is rather fanciful than real, since section 1109 of the Code of 1897, adopting the common law of England, contained a proviso that " no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the Hawaiian laws." These laws provided expressly, sec. 616, Penal Laws of 1897, as follows: " The necessary bills of indictment shall be duly prepared by a legal prosecuting officer, and be duly presented to the presiding judge of the court before the arraignment of the accused, and such judge shall, after examination, certify upon each bill of indictment whether he finds the same a true bill or not." The question thus squarely presented to every judge in the Eepublic was, whether- he was bound to summon a grand jury under the New-lands resolution, when no provision existed by law for empanel-ling the same or their payment, and when in so doing he was obliged to ignore the plain statute of his own country.
It is not intended here to decide that the words " nor contrary to the Constitution-of the United States" are meaningless. Clearly they would be operative upon any municipal legislation thereafter adopted, and upon any proceedings thereafter had, when the application of the Constitution would not result in the destruction of existing provisions conducive to the peace- and good order of the community. Therefore we should answer without hesitation in the negative the question put by counsel for the petitioner in their brief: "Would municipal statutes of Hawaii, allowing a conviction of treason on circumstantial evidence, or on the testimony of one witness, depriving a person of liberty by the will of the legislature and without process, or confiscating private property for public use without compensation,U-emain in force after an annexation of the Territory to the United States, which was conditioned upon the extinction of all legislation contrary to the Constitution ?" We would even go farther, and say that most, if not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of U^bts of the Con stitution were intended to apply from the moment of annexation ; but we place our decision of this case upon the ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case are not fundamental in their nature, but- concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited, to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their property and their well-being.
Inasmuch as we are of opinion that the status of the islands and the powers of their provisional government were measured by the Newlands resolution, and the case has been argued upon that theory, we have not deemed it necessary to consider what would have been its position had the important words " nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States " been omitted, or to reconsider the questions which arose in the Insular Tariff oases regarding the power of Congress to annex territory without at the same time extending the Constitution over it. Of course, for the reasons already stated, the questions involved in this case could arise only from such as occurred between the taking effect of the joint resolution of July 7, 1898, and the act of April 30, 1900, establishing the- territorial government.
The decree of the District Court for the Territory of Hawaii must he reversed, and the case remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the petition.