Case Name: Edwin L. MENDENHALL v. SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a SKAGGS ALPHA BETA
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1985-03-18
Citations: 285 Ark. 236
Docket Number: 84-227
Parties: Edwin L. MENDENHALL v. SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a SKAGGS ALPHA BETA
Judges: Purtle, Dudley, and Newbern, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 285
Pages: 236–243

Head Matter:
Edwin L. MENDENHALL v. SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a SKAGGS ALPHA BETA
84-227
685 S.W.2d 805
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered March 18, 1985
Bob Scott and Tom Hinds, for appellant.
Wright, Lindsey ir Jennings, for appellee.

Opinion:
Darrell Hickman, Justice.
Edwin L. Mendenhall, the appellant, was arrested for shoplifting at one of the appellee's Little Rock stores. Wilbur Page, an off-duty policeman employed by the appellee as a detective, testified that he observed Mendenhall place two bottles of men's cologne in a paper bag and leave the store. Page followed Mendenhall from the store, stopped him, identified himself as a police officer, took Mendenhall to the store office, and arrested him. A store supervisor corroborated Page's testimony. Mendenhall denied he had stolen the items but maintained that he brought the items in to exchange them. Mendenhall was convicted of theft of property in municipal court. On appeal to the circuit court, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. Mendenhall sued the appellee for false arrest and false imprisonment. The jury found for the appellee and we affirm.
On appeal Mendenhall argues that the court erred by instructing the jury that probable cause is a defense to false arrest by a private citizen for a misdemeanor. This is the instruction given to which Mendenhall objected at trial:
Where a person has probable or reasonable cause to believe that another person is attempting to take property without payment, he is legally justified in detaining the person for a reasonable length of time for the purpose of making an investigation in a reasonable manner. It is for you to determine whether any restraint or detention shown by the evidence in this case was reasonable in time and manner.
This is the instruction proffered by Mendenhall and rejected:
An arrest by a private person for a misdemeanor is legally justifiable only if the Plaintiff is guilty of the offense for which it is claimed he was arrested, and the Plaintiff is not bound to show either want of probable cause or malice to entitle him to recover.
Mendenhall argued at trial that the instruction given was erroneous because he was "arrested" rather than "detained." He also contends it was wrong to give instructions which track the theft of property statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2203 [Repl. 1977]), the shoplifting presumption statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2202 (2) [Repl. 1977]), and the shoplifting detention statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2251 [Supp. 1983]). The Arkansas shoplifting statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2251, provides in relevant part:
(a) A person engaging in conduct giving rise to a presumption under Section 2202 (2). . . may be detained in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time by a peace officer or a merchant or a merchant's employee in order that recovery of such goods may be effected. Such detention shall not render such peace officer, merchant or merchant's employee criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention.
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(c) A peace officer may arrest without a warrant upon probable cause for believing the suspect has committed the offense of shoplifting. Sufficient probable cause may be established by the written statement by a merchant or merchant's employee to the peace officer that the affiant has observed the person accused committing the offense of shoplifting. The accused shall be brought before a magistrate forthwith and afforded the opportunity to make a bond or recognizance as in other criminal cases.
Mendenhall's argument, which is more clearly presented on appeal than below, is that the shoplifting statutes are not applicable because in this case the policeman was employed by Skaggs, and was, therefore, an employee of the appellee and could only "detain" Mendenhall rather than "arrest" him under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2251. The appellee admitted that Page was acting as its employee when he arrested Mendenhall. Mendenhall argues that a private person can only arrest one committing a felony; that a private person cannot arrest a misdemeanant even upon probable cause; and since shoplifting is only a misdemeanor and Page was acting as a private person, probable cause is no defense.
We reject this argument. Unlike some other states, we have recognized for some time that probable cause is a defense to a civil action for false arrest or false imprisonment in connection with a misdemeanor. In Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945), we rejected an instruction which stated that the grocery store could justify an arrest for shoplifting only by showing that the plaintiff actually committed a misdemeanor. We plainly stated that this was not the law. We held that if the store employee acted in good faith in stopping the plaintiff and causing her arrest then no civil action would lie against the defendants. In so holding we affirmed the rule of Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Quick, 199 Ark. 1134, 137 S.W.2d 263 (1940), that, as a matter of law, probable cause would defeat an action for false arrest.
Mendenhall asks us to ignore these precedents since in his case he was actually arrested by a store employee rather than just detained. Does it matter that the merchant or his employee actually arrested, rather than just detained, the suspect? The appellant would argue so. There is no doubt that if a merchant detains a person, calls the police and causes the arrest, probable or reasonable cause is a defense. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, supra; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2251 (Supp. 1983).
In this case, without objection, the jury was instructed that if they found Skaggs was not "legally justified" in arresting the appellant or in falsely imprisoning him it should find for the appellant, and the converse. Was Page detaining Mendenhall as an employee of Skaggs but arresting him as a police officer? This question was never presented to the jury. While the appellant asked the word "policeman" be changed to "employee" in one of the instructions, the argument the appellant makes was never clearly made to the court. Neither was an instruction requested which explained the distinction. The proffered instruction would have been meaningless to the jury without an instruction asking the jury to decide if the policeman was acting in his official capacity or as an employee of Skaggs when he detained and arrested the appellant. See Dillard Dept. Store v. Stuckey, 256 Ark. 881, 511 S.W.2d 154 (1974). It was appellant's duty to present his theory of the case through his instructions. Since he did not present instructions which embodied his theory, we find no error. Bovay v. McGahhey, 143 Ark. 135, 219 S.W. 1026 (1920).
Affirmed.
Purtle, Dudley, and Newbern, JJ., dissent.
. The distinction in the shoplifting statute between "detain" and "arrest" may be insignificant so far as a civil suit for false arrest is concerned. See W. Ringle, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions, 928.3 (c)(1984).