Case Name: PHYSICIANS NATIONAL HOUSE STAFF ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. John H. FANNING et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1980-07-11
Citations: 642 F.2d 492
Docket Number: No. 78-1209
Parties: PHYSICIANS NATIONAL HOUSE STAFF ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. John H. FANNING et al.
Judges: Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and McGÓWAN, TÁMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKlNNON, ROBB, WILKEY, WALD and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 642
Pages: 492–513

Head Matter:
PHYSICIANS NATIONAL HOUSE STAFF ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. John H. FANNING et al.
No. 78-1209.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued En Banc Oct. 9, 1979.
Decided July 11, 1980.
As Amended July 30, 1980.
Certiorari Denied Feb. 23, 1981.
See 101 S.Ct. 1360.
Murray A. Gordon, New York City, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of New York, pro hac vice by special leave of Court, with whom Abraham L. Zwerdling, Janet Kohn, Washington, D.C., and Bernard Katz, New York City, were on brief, for appellants.
Ruth E. Peters, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, pro hac vice by special leave of Court with whom John S. Irving, Gen. Counsel, Margery E. Lieber, Deputy Asst. Gen. Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel and Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellees.
Carl W. Vogt, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for amicus curiae, Ass’n of American Medical Colleges, et al., in support of petition for rehearing en banc.
George G. Gallantz, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for amicus curiae, Greater New York Hospital Ass’n., et al., in support of petition for rehearing en banc.
Carl Taylor and Aileen A. Armstrong, Attys., N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., entered appearances for appellees.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and McGÓWAN, TÁMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKlNNON, ROBB, WILKEY, WALD and MIKVA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBB.
Judge Leventhal participated in the argument in this case but died before the opinion issued.
Circuit Judge Edwards did not participate in the argument or decision of the case.

Opinion:
ROBB, Circuit Judge:
The appellants are the house staff associations of four private, non-profit hospitals, and a national house staff organization. House staffs consist of physicians serving as interns, residents and clinical fellows, and participating in hospital-based training programs in medical specialties or sub-specialties. They render medical services to patients, subject to the direction and control of the hospitals. They receive salaries or stipends and other hospital compensation and benefits, and are subject to statutes providing for workmen's compensation and unemployment benefits.
The 1974 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, removed the exemption of private non-profit hospitals from the Act's definition of "employer". Thereafter at various times during 1974 and 1975 the appellants petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for certification as collective bargaining representatives of their members. They contended that members of house staffs are "employees" under section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The Board dismissed each petition, upon the ground that members of house staffs are "primarily students" and therefore not employees within the meaning of the Act. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).1
Dissatisfied with the Board's decision in their cases the appellants filed suit in the District Court, seeking a declaration that house staffs are employees within the meaning of the Act and an order directing the Board to accept jurisdiction over the petitions for certification. The District Court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, holding that "Absent a plain violation of a mandatory provision of the National Labor Relations Act, this court may not strike down the Board's order denying plaintiffs the status of labor organization." Physicians National House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, 443 F.Supp. 806, 811 (D.D.C.1978). On appeal, a panel of this court, in reliance upon Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958) reversed the judgment of the District Court. Thereafter we granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel's opinion. We now affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Board orders in representation proceedings have long been held to be unreviewable unless they become the subject of unfair labor practice orders under section 10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). Thus, an employer who believes the Board has included in a bargaining unit persons who are not employees within the meaning of the Act must await the outcome of an election, refuse to bargain with the union certified by the Board, and defend against an unfair labor practice complaint by asserting that the Board erred in determining who the employees were. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347 (1940); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 84 S.Ct. 894, 11 L.Ed.2d 849 (1964); see Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61 (1943). The record compiled in the representation proceedings is considered by the Court of Appeals when it reviews the unfair labor practice order. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976). In Leedom v. Kyne, however, the Supreme Court held that in the limited circumstances of that case a district court had jurisdiction over a suit to set aside a Board order in a representation proceeding. The question before us is whether under the rule announced in the Kyne case the District Court had jurisdiction over the appellants' challenge to the Board's order.
In Leedom v. Kyne the Board had included both professional and non-professional employees in a unit which it found to be appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. Section 9(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1976), directs that "the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit." Notwithstanding this flat statutory prohibition the Board refused to take a vote among the professional employees to determine whether a majority of them would vote for inclusion in the unit with non-professional employees. An election was held and a union of which Kyne was president was certified by the Board as the collective bargaining agent for the unit. Thereafter Kyne sued in the District Court, alleging that the Board had exceeded its statutory power by including the professional employees without their consent in a unit with non-professional employees, in violation of the express command of section 9(b)(1). He prayed that the Board's action be set aside.
The Supreme Court held that in the circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) gave the district court jurisdiction "to strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act." 358 U.S. at 188, 79 S.Ct. at 184. By the language used to describe the Board's determination the Court carefully and clearly delineated the narrow scope of its holding: "made in excess of its powers", id. at 185, 79 S.Ct. at 182; "disobeyed the express command of § 9(b)(1) . . . and in doing so . acted in excess of its powers", id. at 186-87, 79 S.Ct. at 183; "an attempted exercise of power that had been specifically withheld", id. at 189, 79 S.Ct. at 184; "agency action taken in excess of delegated powers", id. at 190, 79 S.Ct. at 185. The Court explicitly stated that the suit was "not one to 'review', in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction." Id. at 188, 79 S.Ct. at 184. Thus in order to qualify for the Leedom v. Kyne exception a plaintiff must be able to identify a specific provision of the Act which, although it is "clear and mandatory", id. at 188, 79 S.Ct. at 183, has nevertheless been violated by the Board. That the Board may have made an error of fact or law is insufficient; the Board must have acted without statutory authority.
The federal courts have consistently recognized the limits imposed by the Kyne decision. For example, in Local 130, IUERMW v. McCulloch, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 345 F.2d 90 (1965), this court held that
to say that there are possible infirmities in an action taken by the Board by reason of an erroneous or arbitrary exertion of its authority in respect of the facts before it is not to conclude that there is jurisdiction in the District Court to intervene by injunction. For such jurisdiction to exist, the Board must have stepped so plainly beyond the bounds of the Act, or acted so clearly in defiance of it, as to warrant the immediate intervention of an equity court even before the Board's own processes have run their course.
Id. at 201, 345 F.2d at 95.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recently held:
Jurisdiction is not present simply because the NLRB has made an error of law in a certification proceeding; jurisdiction is warranted only if the NLRB has violated a clear and specific statutory directive.
Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 131 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 191, 403 F.2d 916, 917 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969); Machinery Employees Local 714 v. Madden, 343 F.2d 497, 499 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 822, 86 S.Ct. 53, 15 L.Ed.2d 69 (1965); Cihacek v. NLRB, 464 F.Supp. 940, 944 (D.Neb.1979); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F.Supp. 421, 434 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1950, 44 L.Ed.2d 449 (1975) . These cases make it clear that appellants can succeed here only by demonstrating that the Board violated some specific command of the National Labor Relations Act which mandated a determination that house staff are "employees" eligible to participate in union certification elections. We hold that appellants have not made that demonstration.
The appellants attempt to find in section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) , the clear statutory mandate required by Leedom v. Kyne. We think the attempt fails. That section does not define the term employee nor does any other section of the Act. Whether a particular individual is an employee depends upon the facts. The task of decision on the facts of each ease is assigned to the National Labor Relations Board and in making that decision the Board exercises its informed discretion. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944); NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265, 91 L.Ed. 1563 (1947); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 97 S.Ct. 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 494 (1977). As the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., supra, 322 U.S. at 130, 64 S.Ct. at 860:
It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term "employee". That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination of "where all the conditions of the relation require protection" involves inquiries for the Board charged with this duty. Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers. The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question, like determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed, "belongs to the usual administrative routine" of the Board. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 [62 S.Ct. 326, 332, 86 L.Ed. 301],
[footnote omitted]
In this case the Board carefully analyzed the facts and reached the conclusion that interns, residents, and clinical fellows are primarily engaged in graduate educational training and that their status is therefore that of students rather than of employees; that the programs in which they participate were "designed not for the purpose of meeting the hospital's staffing requirements, but rather to allow the student to develop, in a hospital setting, the clinical judgment and the proficiency in clinical skills necessary to the practice of medicine in the area of his choice." Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976). In making this determination the Board acted within its jurisdiction. Its conclusion could not be reviewed by the District Court.
Appellants contend that because house staff are not specifically excluded from the protections of the Act by section 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), the Board's finding that they "possess certain employee characteristics", 223 N.L.R.B. at 251, required the Board to classify them as employees. This argument cannot stand in light of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Corp., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974), which held that managerial employees are not covered by the Act although they are not specifically excluded from the reach of section 2(3). This decision means that for policy reasons persons who are literally "employees" may nonetheless be excluded from coverage under the Act. See also Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168, 92 S.Ct. 383, 391, 30 L.Ed.2d 341 (1971). It is difficult to see, therefore, how section 2(3) can be read as a mandate requiring the Board to consider all persons who "possess certain employee characteristics" as employees covered by the Act.
The Act's definition of "professional employees" does not help the appellants as they suggest. Section 2(12) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976) states:
The term "professional employee" means—
(a) any employee engaged in work . (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital . or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
Because this definition is applicable to "any employee", it is not a command to the Board to regard anyone as an employee. Rather, it classifies those persons who are already employees. House staff can not be "professional employees" unless they are first found to be "employees".
Appellants argue alternatively that the necessary specific mandate to the Board may be discerned in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments. We disagree. A careful examination of both the language and legislative history of the amendments reveals that Congress was not directing the Board to classify house staff as employees.
The amendments included private non-profit hospitals within the definition of "employer", but they made no attempt to define "employee" nor did they require any change in the Board's procedures for determining who is an employee. The conclusion is inescapable that Congress intended the Board to determine the employee status of hospital workers in its usual manner — by analyzing the facts of each case. This conclusion is supported by the discussion of the Act's definition of "supervisor" in the reports of the congressional committees which considered the legislation. Discussing the application of that definition to health care professionals, both committees said they expected the Board to evaluate the facts of each case in its usual manner in deciding whether particular employees were supervisors. See H.R.Rep.No.93-1051 at 7 (1974); 5. Rep.No.93-766 at 6 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, p. 3946.
It is reasonable to conclude that committees which expected the Board to follow its usual procedures in determining whether employees are supervisors also expected the Board to follow its usual procedures in determining whether persons are employees. At the very least, one would expect that if Congress were enacting a change in the Board's operations, the committees would have said so. Yet nothing in the committee reports gives any indication that Congress was ordering a departure from the usual procedure by directing the Board to find that house staff are employees.
Finally, appellants refer us to remarks by Senator Cranston, one of the floor managers of the 1974 amendments, who specifically referred to the problems of house staff in urging that the bill be enacted. 120 Cong.Rec. 12937 (1974). These remarks, as well as passing references to house staff made by Senator Dominick, an opponent of the measure (Id. at 12971, 22580), indicate at most that these senators believed that the Board's evaluation of the facts would lead it to the conclusion that house staff are employees. They stop short of showing, however, that these senators thought the bill required that house staff be considered employees.
Given the absence of specific language mandating the result sought by appellants, it would require far more forceful indications in the legislative history to convince us that Congress, by telling the Board that members of a particular group must be treated as employees, mandated a significant change in Board procedures. In fact, the strongest evidence of congressional intent available to us supports the Board's position in this case. After we heard oral argument en banc, a bill designed to overrule the Board's house staff decisions by explicitly including house staff within the definition of employees (H.R.2222) was defeated in the House of Representatives. Opponents of the bill stated their agreement with the NLRB's position that collective bargaining was inappropriate for house staff because their relationship with their hospitals was primarily an educational one. H.R.Rep.No.96-504 at 10-18 (1979) (minority views); 125 Cong.Rec. (daily ed., Nov. 28, 1979) at H 11300 (Rep. Erlenborn); Id. at H 11302 (Rep. Erdahl); Id. (Rep. Derwinski); Id. at H 11303 (Rep. Goldwater). The defeat of this bill casts substantial doubt upon appellants' contention that Congress by the 1974 amendments intended to direct the Board to regard house staff as employees.
Appellants emphasize that the Board's decisions in the house staff cases will never be subject to judicial review if the District Court is affirmed. We agree that it may be unlikely that the correctness of these decisions will be tested in an unfair labor practice proceeding reviewable in a court of appeals, but we think this is not a reason to permit District Court review. Congress has considered the likelihood that some Board decisions in representation proceedings may evade all judicial review. Nevertheless, it has rejected attempts to provide review in such cases.
When it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress considered an amendment which would have allowed immediate review of Board certification decisions. This proposal was included in the House version of the bill, see H.R.Rep.No.245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947). Among the arguments made in its favor was one quite similar to the one made by appellants here. The absence of immediate judicial review was described as "unfair to . the union that loses, which has no appeal at all no matter how wrong the certification may be [and to] the employees, who also have no appeal." Id. The provision was eliminated in conference. See H.R.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947), U.S.Code Serv.1947, p. 1135. Senator Taft explained this action by commenting that the proposal "would permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings". 93 Cong.Rec. 6444 (1947). See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 184, 197, 79 S.Ct. 180, 188, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61 (1943).
Thus, Congress was aware that Board decisions such as the ones in this case might never be reviewed by a court and that this might cause hardship to a union. Nevertheless, Congress has not provided for judicial review. Appellants' argument based on the unavailability of review must therefore be rejected.
Courts have agreed that "it is not the unavailability of a remedy which triggers the Kyne exception, but the violation of a clear statutory demand." Cihacek v. NLRB, 464 F.Supp. 940, 944 (D.Neb.1979). In Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1960), the court said Leedom v. Kyne does not "recognize jurisdiction of the District Court to enjoin representation orders whenever there is a colorable allegation that the Board has misread the declared will of Congress and the remedy afforded by § 9(d) is likely to prove inadequate." And, in National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F.Supp. 421, 439 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1950, 44 L.Ed.2d 449 (1975), the court concluded:
It may well be that the occasional injustice which results from this statutory scheme is too high a price to pay for expediting the vast majority of representation elections. It may also be that the Act should permit judicial review when unions are not certified under § 9(c). But as Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Stone concluded more than thirty years ago, "these are arguments to be addressed to Congress and not the courts." (quoting AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411-12, 60 S.Ct. 300, 304-305, 84 L.Ed. 347 (1940)).
The legislative history and case law provide the answer to appellants' suggestions that affirmance of the District Court will mean that without being subject to judicial review the Board may decide that workers such as plumbers or carpenters are not "employees". It is clear that the extent to which the Board's decisions may be reviewed by the federal courts is within the control of Congress. That Congress has not expanded the scope of judicial review of the Board's certification decisions indicates that it is satisfied with the way the Board has been functioning. A series of arbitrary or irrational decisions by the Board might prompt Congress to insist upon a greater degree of judicial scrutiny. Unless Congress does so, however, the district courts are powerless to adjudicate the merits of certification decisions absent a clear violation of the National Labor Relations Act by the Board.
The 1974 amendments gave the Board jurisdiction over private, non-profit hospitals. The National Labor Relations Act however does not expressly command the Board to find that members of house staffs are employees. In the exercise of its jurisdiction the Board has determined that they are not employees. That decision is not reviewable in the District Court. The cause of action recognized by Leedom v. Kyne "is not one to 'review' . a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction." 358 U.S. at 188, 79 S.Ct. at 184. The District Court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
. Section 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
. Cedars-Sinai has been followed by the Board in a number of other decisions. St. Christopher's Hospital for Children, 223 N.L.R.B. 166 (1976); St. Clare's Hospital and Health Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1976); University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics, 223 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1976); Buffalo General Hospital, 224 N.L.R.B. 76 (1976); Kansas City General Hospital, 225 N.L.R.B. 108 (1976); Wayne State University, 226 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1976). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld the Board's position that these decisions also preempt state labor relations boards from asserting jurisdiction over house staff. NLRB v. Committee of Interns and Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1449, 55 L.Ed.2d 495 (1978). The preemption issue is however not before us; and the Second Circuit court expressly recognized that the issue presented to us in this case was not presented there. 566 F.2d at 816.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976):
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.
. The jurisdiction of the district courts recognized by Leedom v. Kyne has been compared to the jurisdiction of a court of appeals in a mandamus proceeding. See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 348 (1965). See also Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (1979), concurring opinion of Leventhal, J., at 8. In both situations, the mere possibility that the decision being reviewed is erroneous is not sufficient to support jurisdiction. The party seeking relief must show that the court or agency which made the decision had no authority to do so. See, e. g., In re United States, 194 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 598 F.2d 233 (1979).
. See note 1 supra.
. The Committees' discussion of the supervisor issue does refer to "health care professionals such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows and salaried physicians." House Report at 7; Senate Report at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974 at 3951. This reference is similar to the statements of senators discussed in the text. The discussion may indicate a belief that the Board's analysis of the facts would lead it to conclude that house staff are employees, but it does not constitute a directive to the Bbard to arrive at such a conclusion.
. Similar bills were introduced in the 94th Congress (H.R.15842) and the 95th Congress (H.R. 2222) but were never brought to a vote.
. The recent defeat of H.R.2222 indicates that Congress is satisfied with the very decisions challenged by appellants in this case.