Case Name: BRITT v. SMITH
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2001-11-19
Citations: 274 Ga. 611
Docket Number: S01A0873
Parties: BRITT v. SMITH.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C. J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Sears, P. J., and Thompson, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 611–623

Head Matter:
S01A0873.
BRITT v. SMITH.
(556 SE2d 435)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
On December 8, 1993, in Spalding County, Georgia, Victor Britt killed Mr. Milton Cochran, a store owner, by stabbing him 16 times in the chest and slashing his throat from ear to ear. When he was captured a short time later, he confessed to the authorities. Represented by competent and able counsel, he thereafter negotiated a plea bargain to avoid the State's pursuit of the death penalty. He pled guilty to malice murder and to the commission of aggravated battery on a person over the age of 65. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed the bargained-for sentences. Britt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of his guilty plea. The habeas court denied relief. We granted Britt's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, in order to determine whether the habeas court correctly concluded that he knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Having considered the transcript of the guilty plea hearing and finding no constitutional violation, we affirm the denial of the petition.
At the guilty plea hearing, Britt's attorney made the following statement:
My client deeply regrets what happened and pleads openly and freely to the murder and aggravated battery count. . . . [W]e are . . . appreciative of both the District Attorney and Your Honor's willingness to accept a plea that eliminates the death penalty . in this case.
(Emphasis supplied.) At that same guilty plea hearing, Britt made an emotional apology to Mr. Cochran's family and stated to them and to the trial court that he wanted "everybody to heal, and so I'm taking this upon myself, you know, [be] cause I'm a man. I accept the responsibilities of taking this upon myself." Britt now seeks to evade responsibility for his crimes by alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional. However, the record in this case shows that, before entering the guilty plea, Britt was fully apprised that by pleading guilty, he would relinquish the right to remain silent, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to trial by jury. Thus, the habeas court clearly was authorized to find that the guilty plea was constitutionally valid as against the attack made upon it. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969); Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893 (471 SE2d 869) (1996).
Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 33.8 requires a trial court to inform a criminal defendant on the record that he will waive cer tain enumerated rights by pleading guilty. However, that Rule is not a constitutional provision, and habeas corpus relief is not available unless Britt suffered a substantial denial of his federal or state constitutional rights. OCGA § 9-14-42 (a). A written constitution is "the original law by which our system of government was set up." Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 331 (3) (37 SE2d 322) (1946). This Court is authorized to promulgate the Rules "in order to provide for the speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions. . . ." USCR 1. However, this Court cannot amend the federal or state constitutions by incorporating the Rules therein, so as to elevate those provisions to the status of "rights" which are guaranteed by the paramount law of this state. See USCR 1. " 'The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intention of the people in adopting it . . . [.]' [Cit.]" Laurens County v. Keen, 214 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (102 SE2d 697) (1958). The United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution of 1983 as "adopted by the people of this State . . . [are] binding on this [C]ourt." Cox v. Peters, 208 Ga. 498, 505 (67 SE2d 579) (1951). As a criminal defendant, Britt certainly had the constitutional right to due process, which right mandates that the plea he entered be a knowing and voluntary admission of his guilt. Boykin v. Alabama, supra; Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 865 (1) (11 SE2d 23) (1940). However, the citizens of Georgia also have the fundamental right to a convicted defendant's continued incarceration, if lawful, and to a judiciary which adheres to the limitations on its authority to grant habeas relief when addressing the validity of convictions.
Because USCR 33.8 is not a constitutional provision, the question of whether its requirements "were violated is not cognizable in a habeas action. . . ." Parker v. Abernathy, 253 Ga. 673, 674 (324 SE2d 191) (1985). The only legitimate issue before this Court is whether the habeas court correctly held that Britt's guilty plea passes constitutional muster because he knowingly and voluntarily entered it. The only burden on the Warden was to address Britt's challenge and show that the " 'guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights.' [Cit.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285 (519 SE2d 893) (1999). The three Boykin rights are the " 'right to trial by jury, [the] privilege against self incrimination, and [the] right to confront [one's] accusers.' " Nash v. State, supra at 285.
Thus, resolution of this appeal is not dependent upon the Warden's showing that Britt waived any additional rights enumerated in USCR 33.8 (B). We cannot elevate the provisions of that Rule to the status of requirements of constitutional dimension, by ignoring the controlling principle that "habeas corpus is available to review constitutional deprivations only. . . ." Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 795 (2) (325 SE2d 370) (1985).
Byrd v. Shaffer, 271 Ga. 691 (523 SE2d 875) (1999) is not support for engrafting USCR 33.8 onto either the United States or Georgia Constitutions. There, unlike here, the habeas court found a violation of constitutional rights and granted the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the issue on appeal in Byrd was the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding. Although the transcript of the guilty plea hearing did not show a waiver of the three Boykin rights, trial counsel testified that his typical practice was to review with his clients the rights they were waiving. The petitioner, however, testified that the attorney did not follow that routine in his particular case. On appeal, this Court affirmed because, under those circumstances, the habeas court's finding that there had been a constitutional violation was
not clearly erroneous. Shaffer testified that his counsel did not go over the waiver of rights and his counsel testified that his typical practice was to go over the rights being waived. Because there was conflicting evidence regarding what Shaffer's counsel might have told Shaffer about the consequences of a guilty plea, the habeas court, as the finder of fact, was authorized to resolve the conflicts in the manner in which it did. [Cit.]
Byrd v. Shaffer, supra at 692 (1). Thus, Byrd stands only for the limited proposition that, when the transcript of the guilty plea hearing fails to show an express constitutional waiver, the testimony of a habeas petitioner that he was not informed of any of the Boykin rights will authorize the grant of relief. Byrd does not support the conclusion in this case that the habeas court's finding that there has not been a constitutional violation is itself clearly erroneous because the record does not show that the petitioner was informed of the rights listed in USCR 33.8.
Likewise, Clowers v. Sikes, 272 Ga. 463, 464 (532 SE2d 98) (2000) does not hold that the failure to inform the defendant of the rights enumerated in USCR 33.8 will render his guilty plea constitutionally invalid. That Rule is not mentioned in Clowers, because that case does not concern the voluntariness of a guilty plea, but deals with the entirely separate and distinct question of the waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. Boykin v. Alabama, supra at 242. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (90 SC 1463, 25 LE2d 747) (1970); White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (83 SC 1050, 10 LE2d 193) (1963); Ward v. State, 248 Ga. 60, 64 (3) (281 SE2d 503) (1981); Pur-vis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764, 766 (182 SE2d 892) (1971). Even the Rules recognize the distinction between those two issues. USCR 33.2 (B), 33.7. Clowers is simply not relevant here, because Britt was rep resented by competent and effective counsel at all times. The only issue in this case is whether the habeas court was authorized to find that Britt's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary as a matter of constitutional law. The answer to that question must be based upon controlling constitutional authority rather than the inapplicable provisions of USCR 33.8.
Moreover, even accepting the flawed assumption that USCR 33.8 applies here, Britt would not be entitled to habeas relief under existing law. We have long held that, in order for a guilty plea to meet the voluntariness standard of that Rule, the defendant need not be specifically apprised of each and every right enumerated therein. McClendon v. State, 256 Ga. 480, 481 (2) (350 SE2d 235) (1986). See also Thompson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 539, 540 (4) (524 SE2d 239) (1999), cert. denied, 240 Ga. App. 906; Stephens v. State, 235 Ga. App. 756 (510 SE2d 575) (1998); Moore v. State, 225 Ga App. 860 (1) (485 SE2d 552) (1997); Johns v. State, 223 Ga. App. 553, 554 (1) (479 SE2d 388) (1996). " ' "[T]he question is not whether the trial court followed the letter of USCR 33.8 but whether the record, as a whole, affirmatively shows [the] plea was knowing and voluntary." (Cits.)' [Cit.]" Thompson v. State, supra at 541 (4).
The Georgia Constitution recognizes the rights enumerated in USCR 33.8. However, the issue in this case is whether there is an additional constitutional requirement that the trial court inform Britt of those rights in order for him to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. This Court has never expressly held that a trial court's failure to comply fully with USCR 33.8 violates the defendant's right to due process guaranteed under the Georgia Constitution. See Byrd v. Shaffer, supra (no mention of USCR 33.8). To date, we have always considered the rights that are conferred by our state constitution upon one who pleads guilty to be coextensive with those granted by the comparable provision of the federal constitution. See generally Claybourn v. State, supra at 865 (1). Thus, our decisions dealing with the validity of a guilty plea are generally couched in terms of the defendant's waiver of the three Boykin rights. See Nash v. State, supra. While this Court would have the authority to construe the Georgia Constitution so as to provide greater protection than Boykin, the issue in this habeas case is whether Britt's constitutional rights were violated when he pled guilty almost a decade ago. Even assuming that a majority of this Court might now wish to incorporate USCR 33.8 into the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution, as suggested by the dissent, such a holding could not be applied retroactively so as to mandate a reversal of Britt's conviction. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U. S. 831 (89 SC 1498, 23 LE2d 16) (1969); Laidler v. Smith, 227 Ga. 759, 760 (2) (182 SE2d 891) (1971) (habeas case holding that Boykin is not applicable to guilty pleas entered before that case was decided); Purvis v. Connell, supra at 767 (habeas case holding that Boykin is not to be given retroactive effect). At the time Britt pled guilty in order to avoid the possibility of a death sentence, compliance with the requirements of Boykin satisfied the due process mandate of both the federal and state constitutions.
Although USCR 33.8 applies in a guilty plea hearing, this is a habeas corpus proceeding, and that Rule does not apply here because it is not of constitutional magnitude. Thus, we conclude that the evidence authorized a finding that Britt entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, after a valid waiver of his three Boykin rights, and that the habeas court correctly denied the petition.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C. J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Sears, P. J., and Thompson, J., who dissent.