Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1986-09-19
Citations: 147 Ill. App. 3d 800
Docket Number: No. 85—0952
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 147
Pages: 800–818

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
First District (5th Division)
No. 85—0952
Opinion filed September 19, 1986.
PINCH AM, J., dissenting.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Gregory W. O’Reilly and Bob Isaacson, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.
Richard M. Daley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Paula M. Carstensen, and Terrence J. Griffin, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE MURRAY
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Larry Davis, was convicted of armed robbery and ag gravated battery after a bench trial and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for armed robbery and to 5 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery. Defendant now appeals raising only two contentions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance and (2) that the mittimus and notice of appeal must be amended to conform to his sentence.
The record indicates that on September 7, 1984, at approximately 5:15 p.m. the victim, Lucille Elliott, was traveling on an eastbound CTA train on the west side of Chicago. The victim testified that she was alone in the car when two black males entered the car, walked passed her and sat down behind her. She described one man, later identified as defendant, as dark complected, 5 feet 5 inches to 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighing between 125 and 130 pounds; she described the second man as light complected and over 6 feet tall. Moments later, defendant came up behind the victim and hit her on the back of the head with a blunt object. She turned to see the second man, holding a gun, who told her not to scream or he would kill her. He then took her two diamond rings, a pair of boots and her purse. As defendant's companion ordered the victim to lie on the floor and instructed defendant "if she moves, kill her," defendant sprayed Mace in her face. The men then fled at the train's next stop. Moments later, a man entered the car and, observing the victim on the floor, asked her if she was hurt. When she explained what had happened, the man sought assistance from a conductor in the next car. The man and the conductor then helped the victim to get off the train and into a waiting ambulance.
Rosalind Banfield testified that she was riding on the same train as the victim but was seated in an adjacent car. She noticed that the victim was sitting alone and observed two men, whom she described as disruptive, pass through her car and enter the victim's car. Her description of the two men was substantially similar to the victim's. A short time later, she observed another man pass through her car and enter the victim's car, then return immediately and approach the conductor. As these two men reentered the victim's car, Ms. Banfield followed them and there observed the bleeding victim lying on the floor. Ms. Banfield later went in an ambulance with the victim to the hospital.
Paramedic Joseph Hogan testified that as he drove the victim and Ms. Banfield to the hospital, he observed defendant standing on a street corner with two other men; defendant matched the description given to him by the two women as one of the offenders. Hogan pulled up to the corner and asked the women if they could identify defend ant and both women did so. Approximately one block later, Hogan encountered a police car on patrol and related the previous incidents. Returning to the corner with police, the victim and Ms. Banfield again identified defendant. Later that evening, both the victim and Ms. Banfield identified defendant at a police lineup.
On the first day of trial, February 20, 1985, at the close of the State's case, defense counsel requested a continuance in order to contact an alleged alibi witness. The case was continued until the following day at which time defense counsel requested a second continuance. A four-day continuance was granted by the court, but counsel was instructed that no further continuances would be granted. When the trial reconvened, counsel told the court that he had spoken to the witness, James Bryant, who would be present that morning, but as of 11:15 a.m., the witness did not appear in court. Counsel then requested a third continuance but the court noted that defendant had demanded trial six weeks previously on January 16, and that two prior continuances had produced no results; the court then denied counsel's request. Counsel did not indicate when the witness would be available. Counsel then made an offer of proof to the potential content of Bryant's testimony in which he would reportedly state that he was with defendant on September 7 from 2:30 p.m. until the time of his arrest. As they stood on a street corner that evening, a third man commented to them about a passing ambulance. Moments later, the ambulance returned and the injured person therein identified the third man as her assailant. All three men were then taken into custody by police, and at a lineup held later that evening, defendant was identified as the offender.
At the close of this offer of proof and after closing argument, defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and aggravated battery. In his motion for a new trial, defendant claimed error in denying his motion for a continuance but did not indicate the availability of the missing witness or his reasons for not appearing.
I
Defendant's first contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance in order to bring his sole alibi witness before the court. It is settled that a motion for a continuance to procure a witness is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court; its disposition will not be disturbed on appeal without a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Rivera (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 49, 380 N.E.2d 1018.) While a motion for a continuance may be made when a material witness is unavail able, whether a continuance is granted or denied depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the request. (People v. Petrovic (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 282, 430 N.E.2d 6.) A motion seeking additional time to secure witnesses is properly denied where there is no reasonable expectation that they will be available in the foreseeable future. People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838; People v. Park (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 108, 400 N.E.2d 966.
In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant defendant a third continuance in an attempt to secure the presence of an alleged alibi witness. Defendant was arrested on September 7, 1984, and was tried on February 20, 1985. It was not until the day of trial, after the State had rested its case in chief, that defendant requested a continuance to locate and bring to court his sole alibi witness. The trial court granted this request and also granted defendant's second request for a continuance the following day, allowing him then a four-day extension and instructing him that no further continuances would be granted. When trial then resumed and the witness failed to appear as he had promised defense counsel, the trial court denied defendant's third request for a continuance.
We believe that defendant's conduct in demanding trial, failing to locate and subpoena his sole alibi witness, failing to notify the court prior to trial of the matter and then seeking that additional time to locate the witness only after the first day of trial at the close of the State's case, clearly demonstrated a lack of diligence. From the date on which he demanded trial, defendant had almost six weeks to locate this alibi witness, yet apparently did not even speak with him until after the second continuance had been granted. Once defendant discovered that the witness was difficult to locate, he should have acted diligently in notifying the court of any problems in presenting this witness and in securing a postponement of his trial until the witness could be secured. Upon consideration of this matter, we find that the trial court properly concluded that there was no reason to expect that granting another continuance would enable defendant to do what he had been unable to do up until that time, i.e., secure the presence of an alibi witness. Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument.
II
Defendant's second contention on appeal is that the mittimus and notice of appeal should be amended to conform with his sentence. Specifically, defendant argues that while the record of the sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court sentenced him to a term of 10 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, the mittimus and notice of appeal indicated that defendant was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for that crime. We find that defendant's argument is without merit as we note that a supplemental record has been filed which contains a corrected transcript of the sentencing hearing which shows that defendant was in fact given a 15-year sentence for his crime. This supplementary transcript is the true and accurate transcription of that proceeding, and, as it now brings the mittimus into conformity with the trial court's intended sentence, it resolves and disposes of defendant's second argument.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request and assess $50 against defendant as costs for his appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
LORENZ, J., concurs.