Case Name: R. E. DAGGS, Defendant and Appellant, v. THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1908-03-27
Citations: 11 Ariz. 446
Docket Number: Criminal No. 232
Parties: R. E. DAGGS, Defendant and Appellant, v. THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 446–454

Head Matter:
[Criminal No. 232.
Filed March 27, 1908.]
[94 Pac. 1106.]
R. E. DAGGS, Defendant and Appellant, v. THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent.
1. Assault with Intent to Commit Rape — Indictment—Sufficiency. Under the statutes of Arizona, rape is defined as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator under either of” several circumstances, among them, “where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence.” An indictment for assault with intent to commit rape charged defendant with mating an assault upon prosecutrix with intent to commit rape upon her, and without her consent, by threats, force and violence, attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. Held, that said indictment does not charge a public offense, being defective in failing to charge .that the intent was to accomplish the act of sexual intercourse without prosecutrix’s consent and against her resistance, it being entirely consistent with the allegations of the indictment that the defendant may have attempted sexual intercourse with the woman without gaining her consent, but without an accompanying intention to press his force, threats or violence to the point of overcoming her active resistance or even of overcoming her dissent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Maricopa. Edward Kent, Judge.
Reversed.
J. P. Wilson, and A. J. Daggs, for Appellant.
An assault as defined by Arizona statutes is “An unlawful attempt, coupled with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Rev. Stats. Ariz., Crim. Code. par. 207. “An attempt to use force is a necessary element of every assault.” People v. Gomez, 118 Cal. 327, 50 Pac. 427. “There must be an unlawful attempt, and there must be a present ability to inflict the injury.” People v. Gomez, supra; People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 29 Am. St. Rep. 165, 30 Pac. 804, 17 L. R. A. 626; Cranor v. State, 39 Ind. 64. “Present ability . . . must be alleged as well as proved.” State v. Hubb, 58 Ind. 416; Howard v. State, 67 Ind. 404. The word “assault” is the name and legal appellation of a crime, and need not be stated. Rev. Stats. Ariz., Crim. Code, 207; Robinson v. State, 15 Tex. 318; Brady v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 12, 60 Pac. 698; State v. Anderson, 3 Nev. 256; State v. Johnson, 9 Nev. 177; People v. War, 20 Cal. 117; People v. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326, and cases. The acts which make up the offense must be charged. State v. Murray et al., 41 Iowa, 580. A statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language is required by paragraph 824, Revised Statutes of Arizona. People v. Hamilton, 71 Mich. 340, 38 N. W. 921. Crimes are not generally charged in indictments simply by name, but by alleging facts filling in the given case the definition of the crime. State v. Hubbs, supra.
“The indictment must ‘charge all the elements entering into the statutory description of the offense.’ ” State v. Wright, 52 Ind. 308; Williams v. State, 47 Ind. 568. ‘ ‘ The intent and present ability to commit the battery must be shown before an assault- of any kind can be made out.” Pratt v. State, 49 Ark. 180, 4 S. W. 785; Boles v. State, 18 Tex. App. 426; Jarnigan v. State, 6 Tex. App. 465; Young v. Territory, 8 Okl. 525, 58 Pac. 727; Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okl. 436, 50 Pac. 257. “The specific intent to rape must accompany the means used to effect the rape. ” Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 232, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833, 12 S. W. 601. “The intent is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense. ’ ’ Rev. Stats. Ariz., par. 21. And must be alleged. Rev. Stats. Ariz., par. 20. The particular felony must be charged as fully and as particularly as if it stood alone. Each and every element must be alleged. Adell v. State, 34 Ind. 544; Young v. Territory, 8 Okl. 525, 58 Pac. 727; Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okl. 436, 50 Pac. 257. “It is one of the statutory rights granted to every defendant that the indictment brought against him shall charge every necessary and material ingredient essential to constitute the crime charged. ’ ’ Parker v. Territory, 9 Okl. 109, 59 Pac. 9. The allegation of resistance is absolutely essential. People v. Jailles, 146 Cal. 301, 79 Pac. 965. There must be more force than simply enough to do the act of sexual intercourse. Mills v. United States, 164 U. S. 644, 17 Sup. Ct. 210, 41 L. Ed. 584; Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 489; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
E. S. Clark, Attorney General, for Respondent.
Our statute on this subject is taken from California, and no such strictness of pleading as to the offense here charged is required or ever has been required in that jurisdiction. People v. Brown, 47 Cal. 477; People v. Girr, 53 Cal. 629; People v. Pacheco, 70 Cal. 473, 11 Pac. 761; 4 Kerr’s Cal. Cyclopedic Codes (1906), p. 249, pars, 56-61.

Opinion:
NAVE, J.
— R. E. Daggs was found guilty and sentenced for assault with intent to commit rape. From the judgment of conviction, he has appealed.
Among numerous assignments of error the only one we shall consider is that the court erred in overruling the general demurrer to the indictment. The charging part of the indictment is: "The said R. E. Daggs . . . did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously make an assault in and upon the person of one Esther Power, a female, with intent then and there upon the part of him, the said R. E. Daggs, to commit the offense of rape upon said Esther Power, by then and there without the consent of the said Esther Power, by force, threats, and violence, attempting to have sexual intercourse, with her, the said Esther Power, she, the said Esther Power, not being then and there the wife of the said R. E. Daggs." We interpret the expression "by then and there without the consent of the said Esther Power, by force, threats, and violence, attempting to have sexual intercourse with her," as intended to specify the acts of the defendant upon which it is predicated that he committed an assault with intent to commit rape. The question, therefore, arises whether, if the acts were committed as charged, the defendant was guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. Our attention is directed by respondent to the decision of the supreme court of Oklahoma in Harmon v. Territory, 5 Okl. 368, 49 Pac. 55, from which it would appear that the pleader may have copied the indictment now before us. In that case the indictment was held sufficient to charge the offense. Our statutes, in so far as they are here concerned, are identical with the statutes of Oklahoma. By these statutes rape is defined to be "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator under either of" several circumstances, among them, "where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence." It seems manifest that the rape which the grand jury assumed was intended by the defendant was a rape under circumstances covered by the portion of the statute just quoted. The pleading charges, however, merely an attempt by force, threats, and violence to have sexual intercourse with the woman without her consent. It fails to charge that the intent was to accomplish an act of sexual intercourse against her resistance, and does not even charge that it was intended to accomplish it against her consent. It is entirely consistent with the allegations of the indictment that Daggs may have attempted sexual intercourse with the woman without gaining her consent, but without an accompanying intention to press his force, threats or violence to the point of overcoming her active resistance, or even of overcoming her dissent.
We entertain the view that, for the reasons thus outlined, the indictment does not charge a public offense. Wherefore the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer thereto.
The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the defendant ordered discharged.
SLOAN and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.