Case Name: G. C. FARTHING v. W. T. CARRINGTON
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1895-02
Citations: 116 N.C. 315
Docket Number: 
Parties: G. C. FARTHING v. W. T. CARRINGTON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 315–339

Head Matter:
G. C. FARTHING v. W. T. CARRINGTON.
Praetiee — Controversy without Aotion — Matter of Public Interest — Searing on Appeal — Conditional Sales and Mortgages, Validity of — Present Consideration — Preexisting Debts — Construction of Statute.
1. Where, under section 567 of The Code, a controversy is submitted which involves matters of great public concern and which is supported by an affidavit that a real case exists, and that the controversy is submitted in good faith to determine the rights of the parties, this Court will, upon appeal, determine the question of law thus raised, although the statement of facts is not full enough to render a judgment commanding or prohibiting a thing to be done. (Avert and Clark, J. J., dissenting.)
2. Under rules 10 and 12 this Court will, by consent of parties, receive printed argument, without regard to the number of the case on the docket or date of docketing the appeal, and in a cause directly involving a matter of great public interest, will assign an earlier place on the calendar or fix a day for its hearing.
3. Chapter 466, Acts of 1895, entitled “An act to regulate assignments and other conveyances of like nature in North Carolina,” applies only to conveyances made to secure preexisting debts and not to those executed to secure a debt growing out of the transaction itself and for a present consideration.
ControveRst, submitted without action, heard before Green, J., at March Term, 1895, of Durham Superior Court, and from the judgment rendered therein the plaintiff appealed. T|ie appeal was docketed in this Court on the-day of-, 1895, after the cases from the 5th District had been disposed of, and by consent was heard on the --- day of April, 1895.
The submission to the Court below was as follows:
To the Hon. L. L. Green, Judge Presiding at the March
Term, 1895, of Durham Superior Cotort:
Gf. C. Farthing, Hiram Jones and "W. T. Carrington, being parties to a question in difference which might be the subject of a civil action, present a submission of the same to the Court for its decision, as follows :
All said parties are residents of Durham County, North Carolina, except Jones, who lives in Chatham. All parties agree that the case may be tried in Durham County.
On the 23d day of March, 1895, said Hiram Jones, desiring to borrow One Hundred Dollars, applied to W. T. Car-rington, who loaned him said sum, which was attempted to be secured by the execution of a bond and mortgage, the following being a copy of the said mortgage:
I, Hiram Jones, of the County of Chatham, of the State of North Carolina, am indebted to W. T. Carrington, of Durham County, in said State, in the sum of One Hundred Dollars for which he holds my note, to be due on the 1st day of November, A. D. 1895, and to secure the payment of the same I do hereby convey to him these articles of personal property, to-wit: One gray mare, name Mollie, known as the Gaston Foard mare, about 6 years old; one bay horse mule, name John, known as the Dick Atwater mule, about 5 years old; one red no-horned cow, about 6 years; one brindle-horned cow about 5 years old ; 8 head of Hogs, now on my farm where I now live; 1 one-horse wagon; all my farming tools and geer; all the crop that I raise on my land or any other land that I tend in the year of 1895, such as wheat, corn, fodder, shucks, cotton, tobacco, &c., all free from any incumbrance or lien.
But on this Special Trust, That if I fail to pay said debt and interest on or before the 1st day of November, A. D. 1895, then he may sell said property, or so much thereof as may be necessary, by Public Auction, for Cash, first giving twenty days’ notice at three public places, and apply the proceeds of such sale to the discharge of said debt and interest on the same and pay any surplus to me after all cost and attorney, &c.
Given under my hand and seal, this 23d day of March, A. D. 1895.
His
HIEAM X JONES. (Sbal). .
Mark.
Witness: J. J. Thaxton.
$100.0.0. Durham, N. C., March 23, 1895.
On or before the 1st day of November, 1895, with interest from date at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum until paid, I promise to pay to the order of "W. T. Carrington the sura of One Hundred Dollars, for value received, and .secured by chattel mortgage with even date with this note.
His HIUAM X JONES. (Seal.) Mark.
Witness: J. J. Thaxton.
That at the time of and before the execution of said mortgage, said Hiram Jones was indebted, by note, to G. 0. Farthing, above named, in the sum of One Hundred Dollars, and said Farthing contends that said mortgage is void, for the reason that at the date of its execution he was a creditor of said Jones, as above stated. Whereas, said W. T. Carrington and Pliram Jones contend that neither the letter nor the spirit of the new anti-preference law embraces a case of this kind, in which one person, however much indebted at the time, creates a new debt and seeks to secure the same by mortgage, trust-deed or other security. And so desiring to save costs and trouble, they ask the decision of the Court upon the state of facts.
W. T. CARRINGTON.
HiraM Jones.
G. C. Farthing.
W. T. Carrington and G. C. Farthing, being duly sworn, states that this controversy is real, and the proceedings in good faith, to determine the rights of the parties.
W. T. Carrington.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this April 1, 1895.
Witness my hand and notarial seal.
Chas. K. Faucette,
Notary Public.
The following judgment was rendered :
“ The Court having carefully read and considered this controversy without action, and after hearing argument of counsel, is of opinion, and so adjudges here and now, that G. 0. Farthing is not entitled to'have the mortgage set out in the £ controversy submitted ’ declared void, but on the contrary, that said mortgage is as operative and effectual to pass title as it would have been prior to the passage of the anti-preference law by the recent legislature.”
Messrs. Boone <& Boone, for plaintiffs (appellants).
Messrs. Fuller, Wvnston <& Fuller, for defendant.

Opinion:
MONTGOMERY, J.:
This case was submitted to the court below under section 567 of The Gocle, and is here by appeal. This section of The Code answers a most excellent and useful purpose, in that it enables parties to have their questions in difference settled upon an agreed state of facts, without delay and without the cost of witnesses and a trial below. It disregards forms, as such, and the perplexities of pleadings. It requires only that, by affidavit, it shall be made to appear that a real case exists and that the controversy is submitted in good faith to determine the rights of the parties. One of the long standing rules of practice of this Court, number 10, provides that, " When by consent of counsel it is desired to submit a case without oral argument, the Court will receive printed arguments without regard to the number of the case on the docket, or date of docketing the appeal " Eule 13 amongst other things provides that the Court at the instance of a party to a cause directly involving a matter of great public interest, may assign an earlier place in the calendar or fix a day for the argument thereof which shall take precedence of other business. Under these rules we have felt it to be our duty to give an early hearing to the matters involved in the case before us, because of its public and general interest.
Upon examination of the proceeding before us, we are not satisfied that the facts are stated with sufficient full ness to entirely comply with the statute under which the matter is submitted; but the question of law which is submitted is presented with entire distinctness. And while ordinarily we might dismiss the proceeding because the case is not full enough as to its statement of facts, yet where a matter involves a great public interest, as does this matter, we have concluded to follow a late precedent of this Court — " Treat the case as in the nature of a submission of the controversy without a formal action." The precedent to which we refer will be found in Appendix "A," 114 N. C. Reports, and is as follows :
Executive Department, March 29, 1894.
To the Justices of the Su/preme Goxort,
Sibs : There exists a difference of opinion in the minds of the citizens of the State in regard to the term of office of a Judge elected by virtue of the provisions of section 25, Article IY, of the Constitution. The Attorney General, in an opinion filed at my request in this office, has advised me that every Judge elected under that section is elected for a full term of eight years. A considerable number of able members of the legal profession differ from him in his construction, and contend that a Judge so elected is only elected for the unexpired term of his predecessor in office. It is all important that the question should be determined by the highest Court in the State before the election of Judges shall take place in 1894. The importance of having this matter determined will be apparent from section 2689 of The Code, which is as follows: "When the election shall be finished the registrars and judges of election, in the presence of such of the electors as may choose to attend, shall open the boxes and count the ballots, reading aloud the names of the persons who shall appear on each ticket; and if there shall be two or more tickets rolled up together, or any ticket shall contain the names of more persons than such elector has a right to vote for, or shall have a device upon it, in either of these cases such ticket shall not be numbered in taking the ballots, but shall be void, and the counting of votes shall be continued without adjournment until completed, and the result thereof declared." I am informed by the Attorney General* that this section has been'construed by the Supreme Court in the case of Deloatch v. Rogers, 86 N. C. Reports, page 351, to mean that if a ticket contains the names of more persons than the elector has a right to vote for "it is not only inoperative as to the person improperly voted for, but as to all others for whom the elector.may vote. The entire ballot for all is vitiated and must-be rejected from the count." This section has not been modified or repealed, and is a part of our present election law. By virtue of its provisions the whole Judicial ticket may be void if it should contain more names than the elector has a right to vote for. It will contain more names than the elector has a right to vote for if upon it is printed or written the name of a candidate for the office of Judge, when the term of such office will not have expired by January 1, 1895. It is manifest that this result will occur if the Attorney General's opinion contains a correct construction of Section 25, Art. IV, of the Constitution, and the electors of the State vote for Judges upon a ticket printed or written in accordance with the opposite construction. In view of the importance of determining the doubt prevailing upon the subject I respectfully request you to indicate what is your construction of the Constitutional provisions relating thereto.
I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully yours,
(Signed) Elias Cabe, Governor.
Raleigh, N. C., April 3, 1894.
To the Governor :
Your communication of the 29th ult., requesting an opinion respecting the term of office of the Judges elected under the provisions of Section 25, Art. IY, of the Constitution, has been received and duly considered by us. We beg to assure your Excellency that we appreciate the importance of the question you have submitted for our consideration, and that we would at once give to it the thorough investigation which its solution would require if we could feel that, in expressing an opinion upon the subject, we were not overstepping the bounds which a proper sense of propriety prescribes for our action. As you are aware, Justices Clark and MaoRae of this Court, and-Judges Armfield, Bynum, Sliuford, Whitaker and Boykin, of the Superior Court, have rights of property in offices which would be affected by a judicial determination of the question which you ask us to answer, and we find our perplexity increased by the fact that these gentlemen do not join your Excellency in requesting us to examine into the matter and express an opinion thereon. If we could be assured that such is their desire, we should feel less embarrassed in coming to a conclusion as to what action we should take in this emergency. We desire to state that Justices Clark and MaoRae have deemed it proper that they should abstain from taking any part whatever in this correspondence.
We are yours very respectfully,
(Signed by)
Shepherd, C. J., and Avery and Burwbll, JJ.
The Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court, whose tenure of office was affected by the question involved, joined in a request that the matter should be left to tbe decision of Chief Justice Shepherd and Associate Justices Avery and Burwell, and the following reply to the Governor contains their opinion :
Raleigh, May 11, 1894.
To THE GOVERNOR,
"Bear Sir: — The communication from our associates and the Judges of the Superior Court which has been forwarded by your Excellency to us relieves us of embarrassment in complying with your request, since it is in the nature of a submission of the controversy in reference to their terms of office without a formal action," &c., &a. (Signed by)
Shepherd, C. J., and Avery and Burwell, JJ.
The controversy arises upon a state of facts which brings before us the construction of the Act of the General Assembly of March 13, 1895, entitled, "An Act to regulate Assignments and other conveyances of like nature in North Carolina." Section 1 is as follows : "That all conditional sales, assignments, mortgages or deeds in trust, which are executed to secure any debt, obligation, note or bond which gives preference to any creditor of the maker, shall be absolutely void as to existing creditors." The plaintiff contends that the mortgage in this case is void under the provisions of the act. We are of the opinion that the mortgage is valid, and that the Act is limited to conditional sales, assignments, mortgages and deeds in trust made to secure pre-existing debts and obligations, and that mortgages of the nature of the one before the Court, growing out of the transaction itself and executed for a present consideration, do not come within the operations of the statute referred to, and that it (the statnte)-evidently refers to pre-existing debts, and was not intended to embrace transactions of this kind where the debt grows out of the transaction itself and is for a present consideration. We are supported in this position by an opinion of this Court at its January Term, 1871, delivered by Chief' Justice Pmarson in the case of McKay v. Gilliam, 65 N. C., 130, construing the Act of 1861, Ch. 4, Sec. 12, which Act is substantially like the one now under consideration. ' The same principle of construction is also recognized in Reeves v. Cole, 93 N. C., 90, although that case arose on the construction of the statute concerning agricultural supplies. However, after deciding the point raised in that case, Chief Justice SMITH, for the Court, further said: "A similar method of construction was pursued in ascertaining the meaning and giving effect to a section in the Act of September 11, 1861, which declared that "all deeds, of trust and mortgages hereafter made and judgments confessed to secure debts shall be void as to creditors" unless providing for the payment pro rata of all the debts aud liabilities of the maker. It was held in McKay v. Gilliam, supra, that, notwithstanding the broad terms of the act, its purpose was "to take from debtors the right to give preference to some creditors to the exclusion of others," and its operation was confined to pre-existing debts and did not include a loan contracted at the time of the execution of the deed and secured by it." We are therefore further of the opinion that the act before us is intended only to prevent a preference in favor of pre-existing creditors in the cases specified in the Act itself. The appellant will pay the costs of this proceeding.