Case Name: Gary MOORE, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-12-22
Citations: 553 So. 2d 1368
Docket Number: No. 89-918
Parties: Gary MOORE, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
Judges: BARFIELD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 553
Pages: 1368–1371

Head Matter:
Gary MOORE, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
No. 89-918.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 22, 1989.
Norton Bond, Pensacola, for appellant.
Larry Hill of Moore, Hill & Westmore-land, P.A., Pensacola, for appellee.

Opinion:
JOANOS, Judge.
Gary Moore has appealed from a final judgment pertaining to attorney's fees sought pursuant to Sections 627.428(1) and 627.727(8), Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm.
Moore was injured by an uninsured motorist in January 1986, and contended that, under the uninsured motorist provisions of his insurance policies with Allstate, he was entitled to coverage amounting to $200,000. Allstate maintained that the correct coverage amount was $50,000. Moore sued Allstate in March 1986, alleging injury as the result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist, and setting forth the coverage dispute. Allstate answered in April 1986, denying that the uninsured motorist had been negligent, but conceding that Moore's coverage amounted to $200,000. The discovery phase of the case thereafter proceeded on the issues of liability and damages, but in November 1987, on the eve of trial, Allstate paid the $200,000 policy amount.
Moore thereafter filed the instant motion for fees and costs. Prior to the hearing thereon, the parties stipulated that Moore was entitled to costs and to an attorney's fee. The stipulation further provided that a $1,000 fee would be paid if the court ruled that entitlement thereto extended only for the period up to Allstate's April 1986 concession on the coverage issue, but that a $35,000 fee would be paid if entitlement was found for the entire litigation period, that is, until the policy proceeds were paid in November 1987.
Section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that:
Upon rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named . insured . under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court . shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured . a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured's . attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.
For its contention that Moore's entitlement to fees herein ended when the coverage issue was conceded, Allstate relied on the further provisions of Section 627.727(8), Florida Statutes (1985):
The provisions of s. 627.428 do not apply to any action brought pursuant to this section against the uninsured motorist insurer unless there is a dispute over whether the policy provides coverage for an uninsured motorist proven to be liable for the accident (emphasis supplied).
Once the coverage issue was eliminated, argued Allstate, so too was Moore's entitlement to further fees.
Moore countered that, once a suit was filed involving a dispute over coverage, so that an award of fees was permissible under Section 627.727(8), an insurance company could not absolve itself from liability for those fees by thereafter conceding on the coverage issue. In other words, once entitlement to fees was activated by an initial coverage dispute, it could not be cancelled by elimination of that dispute from the suit.
The trial court first noted the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage, that is, to place the injured party in as good a position as he would have been had the tortfeasor had insurance. It then held that adoption of Moore's argument would mean that an injured party would be better off if his tortfeasor was not insured, since both fees and damages could then be recovered; if the tortfeasor was insured, only damages could be recovered. The court thereupon ruled that Moore's entitlement to fees ended with Allstate's April 1986 concession on the coverage issue, and entered judgment for a $1,000 attorney's fee.
Section 627.727(8) specifically provides that the fee awardable under section 627.-428(1) is not applicable to uninsured motorist actions unless there is a dispute over coverage. In Cooper v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 485 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the insured maintained that his uninsured motorist coverage amounted to $1,000,000, Aetna that it equalled only $100,000. The insured sued, and the trial court entered a partial summary judgment finding $1,000,000 in coverage.
A subsequent jury trial on damages resulted in judgment for the insured, who thereafter sought a $120,000 attorney's fee, $40,000 for the coverage dispute, and $80,000 for liability and damages. Section 627.727(8), Florida Statutes (1983) was applied so that only the $40,000 attributable to the coverage dispute was awarded. The appellate court reversed, but on the ground that the statute could not be retroactively applied to a 1977 cause of action.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stack, 543 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the trial court had awarded a section 627.428(1) fee on remand after the appellate court ruled that the insured was covered by State Farm's uninsured motorist policy and remanded for arbitration on the issue of whether the insured could recover. State Farm appealed the fee award, arguing that it was premature in that the question of actual money recovery was dependent on the success of the arbitration. The appellate court disagreed, holding that "[a] determination of coverage in favor of the insured finally disposes of a discrete piece of litigation which is concerned with that issue [and thus] qualifies for a fee under the statute.... The fact that a separate proceeding must be conducted to resolve the factual questions concerning the liability of the uninsured motorist does not mitigate from plaintiffs' success in the present case." Stack at 784 (emphasis supplied).
Although Stack is not directly on point, we find the holding sufficiently analogous to the factual situation herein so as to be controlling thereon. Here, the litigation commenced with disputes on all issues— coverage, liability and damages. However, prior to litigation of the latter two issues, the coverage issue was eliminated. As did the partial summary judgment in Stack, Allstate's answer conceding on the coverage issue "finally dispose[d] of a discrete piece of litigation . and qualifies for a fee." Under the language of section 627.-727(8), the issue of coverage was not in dispute after Allstate's answer, and thus services rendered on the remaining issues were not susceptible of a section 627.428(1) award. The trial court's order is affirmed.
Pursuant to Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, we certify the following question as being of great public importance:
WHEN AN INSURANCE COMPANY DENIES COVERAGE AND LIABILITY UNDER THE UNINSURED MOTORIST PROVISION OF ITS POLICY, SO THAT ITS INSURED IS FORCED TO FILE SUIT AGAINST IT, BUT THEREAFTER CONCEDES COVERAGE SO THAT ONLY LIABILITY AND DAMAGES REMAIN AT ISSUE, DOES SECTION 627.727(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985) LIMIT THE FEE AWARDABLE UNDER SECTION 627.428(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985) TO ONLY THAT PERIOD DURING WHICH COVERAGE WAS AT ISSUE, ALTHOUGH LIABILITY AND DAMAGES CONTINUE TO BE LITIGATED AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF THE COVERAGE ISSUE?
BARFIELD, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.