Case Name: MARATHON FINANCE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Respondent, v. HHC LIQUIDATION CORP., a Delaware corporation (f/k/a The Hilton Head Company, Inc.), Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership, Property Research Holdings, Inc., a South Carolina corporation, and Town of Hilton Head Island, a South Carolina municipality and body politic, Defendants, of whom Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership is Appellant
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1997-01-27
Citations: 325 S.C. 589
Docket Number: No. 2625
Parties: MARATHON FINANCE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Respondent, v. HHC LIQUIDATION CORP., a Delaware corporation (f/k/a The Hilton Head Company, Inc.), Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership, Property Research Holdings, Inc., a South Carolina corporation, and Town of Hilton Head Island, a South Carolina municipality and body politic, Defendants, of whom Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership is Appellant.
Judges: ANDERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 325
Pages: 589–614

Head Matter:
483 S.E.2d 757
MARATHON FINANCE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Respondent, v. HHC LIQUIDATION CORP., a Delaware corporation (f/k/a The Hilton Head Company, Inc.), Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership, Property Research Holdings, Inc., a South Carolina corporation, and Town of Hilton Head Island, a South Carolina municipality and body politic, Defendants, of whom Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership is Appellant.
No. 2625.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard Dec. 3, 1996.
Decided Jan. 27, 1997.
Rehearing Denied April 24, 1997.
John C. Bruton, Jr., Benton D. Williamson, and Deborah P. Morgan, all of Sinkler & Boyd, Columbia, for appellant.
G. Richardson Wieters, of Hilton Head Island; and Stephen A. Spitz, Columbia, for respondent.

Opinion:
GOOLSBY, Judge:
This is an appeal from an action by Marathon Finance Corporation seeking a declaration that certain restrictive covenants and deed restrictions no longer encumbered a tract of its land on Hilton Head Island known as the Barony Tract. The trial court declared the covenants and deed restrictions to be extinguished, null, void, and of no force or effect whatsoever and further ordered the Register for Mesne Conveyances of Beaufort County to note their extinguishment and cancellation on the pertinent documents. The trial court further held that, with the exception of certain specifically enumerated easements, Westin Resort Hilton Head Limited Partnership (Westin), an adjoining landowner and one of the defendants in the lawsuit, had no rights in or to or concerning Marathon Finance's property. Westin appeals. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1983, the Hilton Head Company owned three adjacent tracts of land: the Barony Tract, the Hotel Tract, and the Mid-Rise Tract. That same year, the Hilton Head Hotel Company (Hotel Company), an affiliate of the Hilton Head Company, together with Aries Property Holdings and R.H./ A.E. Hotel Company, formed a general partnership known as The Barony Company. In a joint venture agreement dated November 5, 1983, these three entities proposed to develop the three tracts.
On November 5, 1983, pursuant to the joint venture agreement, the Hilton Head Company, conveyed by separate instruments each of the three tracts to The Barony Company. Covenants executed the same day 'restricted the Barony Tract to residential, short-term rental, and limited commercial uses. In February, 1984, these covenants restricting the use of the Barony Tract were recorded with the deed conveying the tract. A number of these covenants were identical to restrictions placed on the Hotel Tract and the Mid-Rise Tract.
On September 4, 1985, as hotel construction on the Hotel Tract neared completion, The Barony Company redeemed all partnership interests held by the Hotel Company in The Barony Company. The joint venturers ratified the purposes of the joint venture and agreed to continue to cooperate in the development of all three tracts. As consideration for the redemption, however, The Barony Company conveyed the Barony Tract to the Hotel Company. On September 23,1985, the Hotel Company, in turn, executed a mortgage on the Barony Tract to Marathon Finance. The mortgage secured a note in the original principal amount of $8,500,000.00.
The deed conveying the Barony Tract from The Barony Company to the Hotel Company contained restrictions limiting the number of dwelling units per acre on the tract, the type of structures to be placed on the tract, and the height of the buildings and structures to be built on the tract. The deed was recorded before Marathon Finance recorded its mortgage from the Hotel Company and further provided that these restrictions were to run with the land.
On December 30, 1985, The Barony Company conveyed the improvements on the Hotel Tract to R-H Hilton Head, Inc. These improvements constituted the present Westin Resort.
Subsequently, on November 24, 1986, the Hotel Company went into bankruptcy. Several months later, on July 27,1987, the trustee in bankruptcy filed a Motion for Approval of Compromise requesting approval of a settlement agreement between the trustee and Marathon Oil Company, a company related to Marathon Finance. The agreement, which was dated June 24,1987, provided for the transfers to "a Marathon entity or entities" of certain properties, including the Barony Tract. The transfers were to be "free and clear of all liens, charges and encumbrances whatsoever," and subject only to certain secured real property interests. The settlement was later clarified by the trustee on August 29,1987, in a report in which the trustee specifically stated that "covenants . [and] restrictions . shall be treated as provided for under South Carolina law."
On July 30,1987, the trustee filed a Notice of Sale of Assets that advised of the proposed sale of the Barony Tract and other properties. The notice stated the sale would be "free and clear of all pledges, security interests, liens, charges, other encumbrances, claims, options and interests" except for certain specifically enumerated mortgage liens. The Barony Company, however, on August 17, 1987, filed an objection to the notice, asserting its right to protection of ten interests. These interests consisted of recorded easements and access and use agreements and did not include any of the covenants and restrictions at issue in this appeal.
On September 10, 1987, Marathon Oil Company and The Barony Company entered into a settlement agreement that provided for the protection of the ten interests asserted by The Barony Company. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement, filing its order on September 24, 1987.
On September 30, 1987, the trustee recorded a document entitled "Release and Cancellation of Restrictions, Covenants & Encumbrances." This document referenced the Barony Tract and an adjoining tract now owned by the Town of Hilton Head Island. It expressly waived, relinquished, released, cancelled and forever discharged all covenants, restrictions, and deed restrictions.
After approval by the bankruptcy court of the settlement agreement, the trustee filed a complaint to sell the properties listed in the June 24, 1987 agreement free and clear "of all liens, encumbrances and other interests" except those otherwise defined.
The Barony Company responded by filing an answer on October 5, 1987, in which it requested protection of the same ten recorded easements and access and use agreements listed in its prior objection to the Notice of Sale of Assets. Later, however, The Barony Company withdrew its answer and entered into a second stipulation. The second stipulation provided for the superior status of only the ten recorded easements and access and use agreements.
On October 31,1987, the trustee conveyed the Barony Tract to Marathon Properties, Inc. The deed referenced the prior proceedings in the bankruptcy court and conveyed the proper ty free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except as specifically defined in the June 24,1987 settlement agreement.
On November 4,1987, the bankruptcy court issued an order stating, among other things, "[t]hat all persons or entities who have failed to assert any lien, encumbrance, or other interest in [the Barony Tract and other properties], other than Permitted Exceptions, are forever barred from doing so."
After the trustee conveyed the Barony Tract to Marathon Properties, a dispute arose between Marathon Properties and The Barony Company concerning the enforceability of one of the restrictions. Marathon Properties commenced an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court on May 11, 1988, in which it requested "a declaration of [its] rights with respect to the [effect of the] transfer of [t]he Barony Tract free and clear of the restrictive covenants found in the former deed between The Barony Company and [the Hotel Company]."
On January 4,1990, the bankruptcy court determined Marathon Properties held title to the Barony Tract unencumbered by the restriction at issue, holding the prior proceeding had extinguished that restriction.
Marathon Properties subsequently conveyed the Barony Tract to Marathon Finance, its affiliate.
AOKI Carolina Hotel Company acquired the Hotel Tract and its improvements from The Barony Company and R-H Hilton Head Company in October, 1988. The contract documents disclosed to AOKI the pendency of the declaratory judgment action in the bankruptcy court concerning a restrictive covenant on the Barony Tract. Westin Hotel Company, an AOKI affiliate, assisted in the acquisition of the property and continued to manage it after the conveyance. On June 27, 1989, AOKI deeded the Hotel Tract to the Westin Hilton Head Limited Partnership.
I.
Westin first argues the designation of the sale of the Barony Tract as "free and clear" of "encumbrances" did not by its terms eliminate the covenants and restrictions in question. Westin maintains (1) the covenants and restrictions were not "encumbrances"; (2) the covenants and restrictions were not "interests" that could be extinguished in a bankruptcy sale; and (3) even if the covenants and restrictions were "interests" in property, the statutory requirements for their extinguishment were not met. We reject all three arguments.
A.
The trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law the term "encumbrance," as used in the context of this litigation, included covenants and restrictions. See Morris v. Lain, 176 S.C. 310, 313, 180 S.E. 206, 208 (1935) ("An incumbrance is a burden upon land depreciative of its value, such as a lien, easement, or servitude, which, though adverse to the interest of the landowner, does not conflict with his conveyance of the land in fee."); Grice v. Scarborough, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 649, 652 (1844) ("[A] right to an easement of any kind is an incumbrance.... "); 20 Am. Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 74, at 518 (1995) ("An encumbrance may be defined . as any right to or interest in the land which may, subsist in a third party, to the diminution of the value of the land, but at the same time consistent with the passage of the fee thereto.").
B.
Westin also argues that the covenants and restrictions at issue were not "interests" in property that could be extinguished in a bankruptcy sale, and even if they were, none of the conditions of 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), the statute authorizing such a sale, had been met. These arguments, however, were neither presented to nor ruled upon by the trial court; therefore, they are not preserved for appellate review. See Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 403 S.E.2d 122 (1991) (where the trial court does not explicitly rule on a question and the appellant fails to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion to amend or alter the judgment on that ground, the issue is not properly before the court of appeals and should not be addressed); Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (an issue on appeal must first have been fairly and properly raised to and passed on by the lower court).
II.
A.
We do not agree with Westin's argument that because The Barony Company, as owner of the Hotel Tract, did not execute the "Release and Cancellation of Restrictions, Covenants & Encumbrances" dated September 30, 1987, that document failed to terminate the covenants and restrictions in question.
What Westin overlooks is that, as we noted above, before the trustee executed the release and cancellation, The Barony Company had agreed to—and the bankruptcy court had approved—the trustee's conveyance of the Barony Tract free and clear of any express or implied covenants except the ten interests for which The Barony Company had specifically requested protection as part of an overall settlement.
Moreover, after the trustee filed a complaint to sell the Barony Tract, among other properties, free and clear "of all liens, encumbrances and other interests" except as otherwise defined, The Barony Company withdrew the answer it had filed to the trustee's complaint and then entered into a stipulation in which it sought to protect only ten enumerated interests that did not include the covenants and restrictions at issue. The bankruptcy court, as we mentioned, thereafter issued an order barring "all persons or entities" from asserting any lien, encumbrance, or other interests in the Barony Tract, other than the ten interests The Barony Company endeavored to protect. These "persons or entities" included The Barony Company, a party over which the bankruptcy court then had jurisdiction and a party with which Westin is in privity. There being no appeal from the bankruptcy court's order by The Barony Company, its right or the right of any of The Barony Company's successors-in-interest to challenge any of the order's provisions no longer exists. See In re Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir.1988) (after the time for an appeal lapses, the doctrine of res judicata bars a new suit attacking an order confirming a judicial sale by a party to a sale proceeding, a successor to the party, or anyone in privity with the party).
B.
We likewise find no merit to Westin's contention that the trustee did not record the release and cancellation in such a manner that the document would have been discovered by an examination of the Hotel Tract's chain of title. Even if this were the case, contract documents disclosed to AOKI, Westin's predecessor-in-interest, the then pending litigation and its potential impact on the use of the Barony Tract. Certainly, then, irrespective of record notice, Westin's predecessor-in-interest had actual notice of what was taking place. See First Presbyterian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S.C. 410, 27 S.E.2d 573 (1943) (one having actual notice of an instrument that affects title to property is bound by such notice regardless of whether the instrument is recorded); 66 C.J.S. Notice § 14, at 653 (1950) ("Actual notice may dispense with required constructive notice."). Notice to AOKI was notice to Westin.
III.
Westin next asserts The Barony Company, as owner of the Mid-Rise Tract, assigned to Marathon Properties in 1989 certain easements, licenses, and agreements benefitting the Mid-Rise Tract, including the covenants and restrictions in question and thus, if it had enforcement rights that could be assigned to Marathon Properties, then The Barony Company, as owner of the Hotel Tract, had equivalent rights that it could assign to AOKI, a subsequent owner of the Hotel Tract. This argument was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the trial court; therefore, we cannot review it on appeal. Hendrix v. Eastern Distribution, Inc., 320 S.C. 218, 464 S.E.2d 112 (1995); Hubbard at 19, 5 S.E.2d at 189.
IV.
Westin argues that, as a successor-in-title to The Barony Company, it has the right to enforce the covenants and deed restrictions as negative reciprocal easements. The problem with this argument is that, as we indicated above, these covenants and restrictions no longer exist.
Moreover, and as the trial court found, neither they nor the deed to the Barony Tract referenced any general plan or scheme, one of the elements required to establish a negative reciprocal easement. Bomar v. Echols, 270 S.C. 676, 244 S.E.2d 308 (1978).
V.
Westin next argues the bankruptcy court's order of January 4, 1990, was not binding on AOKI, its immediate predecessor-in-interest, because AOKI was an indispensable party to the litigation insofar as a contract had been executed for its purchase of the Hotel Tract. Because the trial court did not address this argument, we have no authority to decide it on appeal. Hendrix at 218-19, 464 S.E.2d at 113; Hubbard at 19, 5 S.E.2d at 189.
VI.
Finally, Westin argues the trial court exceeded its authority in holding Westin had "no rights in or to or concerning" the Barony Tract except for the matters set forth in Exhibit A of its order. In support of this argument, Westin notes many of the matters set forth in Exhibit A dealt with properties other than the Barony Tract. Insofar as the trial court confined its holding to Westin's rights in the Barony Tract, we fail to see how the ruling affected matters not before the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
ANDERSON, J., concurs.
CURETON, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
. The names "Marathon Finance Company" and "Marathon Finance Corporation" appear to have been used interchangeably. We assume both names refer to the same entity, which we refer to as "Marathon Finance."