Case Name: Peter PAPOURAS, Appellant, v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., a foreign profit corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-10-04
Citations: 940 So. 2d 479
Docket Number: No. 4D05-3923
Parties: Peter PAPOURAS, Appellant, v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., a foreign profit corporation, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 940
Pages: 479–483

Head Matter:
Peter PAPOURAS, Appellant, v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., a foreign profit corporation, Appellee.
No. 4D05-3923.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 4, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 2006.
Eric S. Block of Law Offices of Eric S. Block, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant.
John R. Hargrove and Carol A. Gart of Gordon Hargrove & James, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
MAY, J.
The "particularity" and specificity of a proposal for Settlement is challenged in this appeal. The plaintiff appeals an order denying his motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida. Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.He argues the court erred in finding the proposal lacked the requisite specificity to allow for an award of fees. We disagree and affirm.
The plaintiff was injured in an auto accident involving a vehicle owned by Bell-South Telecommunications, Inc., and driven by a BellSouth employee. The plaintiff alleged that BellSouth was directly liable as the owner of the vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver. The plaintiff did not include the driver in the lawsuit.
A jury found BellSouth liable and awarded damages in the amount of $769,902.48. The plaintiff then filed a motion to tax costs and attorney's fees, pursuant to the proposal for settlement that had been rejected by BellSouth. The proposal offered to settle the case for $375,000. Paragraph 3 of the proposal set forth the following conditions:
a. Plaintiff, PETER PAPOURAS, shall execute a full release.
b. Plaintiff, PETER PAPOURAS, shall enter a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to all claims against Defendant, BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., a foreign profit corporation.
c. This proposal includes all interest and costs, if any connected with this claim.
The proposal excluded attorney's fees and there was no claim for punitive damages.
The trial court entered a final judgment against BellSouth. After a hearing, the court entered an order denying the plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and costs. The trial court did not articulate the basis for the denial, but the parties agree the only basis was the lack of the requisite particularity required by rule 1.442.
The question of whether a proposal for settlement complies with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is reviewed de novo. See Hall v. Lexington Ins. Co., 895 So.2d 1161, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Our supreme court recently defined the parameters of the "particularity" requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and established a bright-line rule for proposals for settlement. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So.2d 1067 (Fla.2006).
Applying the plain meaning of rule 1.442, we agree with those courts that have treated releases as conditions for nonmonetary terms that must be described with particularity. A "condition" is traditionally defined as "a stipulation or prerequisite in a contract, will, or other instrument, constituting the essence of the instrument." A "term" is defined more broadly as "a contractual stipulation." We think it clear that when an offeror insists that an offeree sign a general release, the release becomes a stipulation or prerequisite of the contract. Even if the release does not constitute the essence of the settlement proposal — and thus a condition under subdivision (c)(2)(C) of the rule — at the very least it qualifies as a nonmone-tary term under subdivision (c)(2)(D).
Nichols, 932 So.2d at 1078-79 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 312,1509 (8th ed.2004)). The court agreed "that a summary of the proposed release can be sufficient to satisfy rule 1.442, as long as it eliminates any reasonable ambiguity about its scope." Id. at 1079. This requirement insures that the intended purpose of a proposal for settlement — the end of judicial labor — is fulfilled. The court then held that the language in the settlement proposal — " 'a full and final satisfaction and settlement of any and all of Nichols's claims and causes of action in, or arising out of, the above-styled case' " — was too ambiguous. Id. In doing so, the court focused on the essential ingredient in the recipe for clarity: the proposal must articulate "which of an offeree's outstanding claims against the offeror will be extinguished by any proposed release." Id. at 1080.
In this case, the proposal simply provided for the plaintiff to execute a full release without further detail. A copy of the release was not attached and no summary of the terms was included in the proposal. BellSouth argues, and we agree, that this proposed release lacked sufficient detail to eliminate any reasonable ambiguity about its scope. It failed to indicate which party was required to draft the re lease, and more importantly failed to indicate whether BellSouth's employee, the driver of the other vehicle, would be released in exchange for the payment.
Just as our supreme court found in Nichols, the proposal for settlement in this case was too ambiguous to satisfy Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying the plaintiff attorney's fees, pursuant to the plaintiffs proposal for settlement.
Affirmed.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
HAZOURI, J., dissents with opinion.