Case Name: NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HOLLOWAY
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1932-02-17
Citations: 48 S.W.2d 435
Docket Number: No. 8741
Parties: NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HOLLOWAY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 48
Pages: 435–437

Head Matter:
NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HOLLOWAY.
No. 8741.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
Feb. 17, 1932.
Rehearing Granted March 16, 1932.
Further Rehearing Overruled April 13, 1932.
G. Woodson Morris, of San Antonio, for appellant.
Augustus McCloskey, of San Antonio, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, J.
This is another appeal from a judgment of recovery upon an industrial life insurance policy. The amount of the policy was $310, of the premium 25 cents a week. No medical examination was required by' the company, but the policy contained the usual stipulation that it should not be operative unless at the time of its issuance the insured was alive and in good health. Such stipulations are universally held to be reasonable, and in accord with a sound public policy.
The insured applied for the policy upon May 30, 1930. The first two weekly premiums were paid by appellant's local soliciting agent, the policy was issued on June 16, and forwarded to said agent for delivery. When the agent tendered it to the prospective insured, she said she did not want the insurance but the agent left the policy with her, nevertheless.
The insured paid the succeeding premiums up to June 30, but paid none during the next four weeks, whereby, under its terms, the policy lapsed and became void, and was canceled on the books of the company on July 28.
It was provided in the policy, however, that such lapsed policy could be reinstated upon the payment of delinquent premiums and the presentation of satisfactory evidence that the insured was in sound health.
On August '7 the insured's husband, appel-lee herein, left $5 at a certain drug store, together with the policy and receipt book, for the purpose of having the policy reinstated, and telephoned appellant's district manager to have the local agent call for same. In response to this call the local agent went to the drug store, got the money and papers, went to the insured's home, took her application for reinstatement, and delivered it with the policy to the district manager, who in turn forwarded them to appellant's home office at Nashville, Tenn., there to be acted upon. This process, and the issuance and delivery of reinstatement papers, usually occupied about three weeks' time, as it did in this case. The papers mentioned, together with a certificate of revival, effective August 25, were received from the home ofliee by appellant's district manager on August 22, and on the following day, August 23, were left at the drug store to be called for by the insured.
But in the meantime, on August 21, the insured died.
' The revival certificate, as did the original policy, contained a stipulation that it should be void "unless the insured is alive and in sound health at" its date — which was August 25. The stipulation, as before stated, is a reasonable one, was plainly set forth in the contract, is universally upheld by the courts, and of course must prevail in this case, since the insured was not alive on its effective date, or when it was attempted to be delivered. The question of estoppel is not in the ca'se.
The trial court rendered judgment for the amount of the policy, with penalty and attorney's fees, upón the single finding of the jury that the insured was in sound health on August 7, the date of the insured's application for reinstatement. But that issue was quite beside the controlling question, which was, under the plain provisions of the certificate of reinstatement: Was the insured alive and in good health at the date of that certificate? The evidence is undisputed that the insured died after the policy lapsed and before it was reinstated, and according to its terms it was void and no recovery could be had thereon.
The judgment is reversed, and judgment will be here rendered that appellant go hence . with its costs.