Case Name: Jeffrey WOODARD and Carol Gload, Appellants, v. JUPITER CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, INC., and Todd Bellhorn, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-10-12
Citations: 913 So. 2d 1188
Docket Number: No. 4D04-3531
Parties: Jeffrey WOODARD and Carol Gload, Appellants, v. JUPITER CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, INC., and Todd Bellhorn, Appellees.
Judges: STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 913
Pages: 1188–1195

Head Matter:
Jeffrey WOODARD and Carol Gload, Appellants, v. JUPITER CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, INC., and Todd Bellhorn, Appellees.
No. 4D04-3531.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 12, 2005.
Michelle Hankey and William Booth of Legal Aid Society, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
John L. Bryan, Jr., and S. Brian Bull of Scott, Harris, Bryan, Barra & Jorgensen, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellees.

Opinion:
MAY, J.
The application of the impact rule to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is the focus of this appeal. The plaintiffs argue their claim is consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's recognized exception to the impact rule and the trial court erred in dismissing count three. We disagree and affirm.
The minor plaintiff was a student at the Jupiter Christian School (JCS), a private Bible-centered school, unconnected with any established church. However, the school , has a chapel and students are required to attend weekly chapel services. JCS employed Todd Bellhorn as a "Secondary Teacher-HS/Chaplain." The complaint alleged the chaplain's stated objective was to "minister to high school teenagers" and "to not only be a teacher to them, but also one whom they can trust and approach without fear or intimidation."
The student had attended JCS since the ninth grade. In his senior year, JCS administrators directed Bellhorn to meet with him to question and counsel him about his sexual orientation. Bellhorn asked the student to leave his class, and took him to a private area of the campus.
According to the allegations, Bellhorn assured the student their conversation was confidential. Only after receiving this assurance, did the student disclose he was homosexual. The complaint alleged the student made this disclosure to seek spiritual counsel from Bellhorn as chaplain to receive salvation. Bellhorn then counseled the student about Biblical views of homosexuality.
Bellhorn relayed the information to the school's administrators, who then disclosed the information to others. The administrators expelled the student from JCS. The complaint alleged the studént' was berated by the press and the president of JCS, and shunned by his schoolmates as a result of the disclosure.
The student and his mother filed suit against JCS and Bellhorn.. Count three of a six-count amended complaint alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress related to Bellhorn's and JCS's breach of the fiduciary' duty of confidentiality. JCS and Bellhorn moved to dismiss count three and argued the claim was barred by the impact rule. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed count three with prejudice.
We review the order dismissing count three de novo because it concerns a question of law regarding the application of the impact rule. Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 782 (Fla.2002).
The plaintiffs suggest the impact rule does not apply to the wrongful disclosure of confidential information such as that alleged in this case. They claim the alleged breach of the confidential relationship between a member of the clergy and an individual is the same as that excepted from the impact rule by our supreme court in Gracey v. Eaker, 887 So.2d 348 (Fla. 2002) (a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress for a psychotherapist's disclosure of confidential information is not barred by the impact rule). The defendants counter that our supreme court has not yet created an exception for a disclosure made by a member of the clergy. They also argue that Bellhorn's status as "chaplain" does not fall within the clergyman privilege provided by section 90.505, Florida Statutes (2003) because the school is not connected with any established church.
We begin our analysis with the genesis of Florida's impact rule — a judicially-created rule designed to assure the validity of claims for emotional distress. See Int'l Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893). "The impact rule . requires that 'before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact.' " See Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla. v. Welker, 908 So.2d 317 (Fla.2005) (quoting R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So.2d 360 (Fla.1995)). "[T]he underlying basis for the rule is that allowing recovery for injuries resulting from purely emotional distress would open the floodgates for fictitious or speculative claims." Id. at 362.
Since its creation, the Florida Supreme Court has adhered to the impact rule, carving out limited exceptions in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla.1990) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress absent impact); Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla.1985) (allowing recovery where plaintiff is in the "sensory perception" of physical injuries sustained by a close family member); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992) (finding rule inapplicable to ac tions for wrongful birth); Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So.2d 705 (Fla.1997) (impact rule does not preclude recovery of non-economic damages for parents of stillborn child); Gracey v. Eaker (impact rule inapplicable for, breach of statutory duty of confidentiality to patient); Rowell v. Holt, 850 So.2d 474 (Fla.2003) (impact rule does not preclude recovery for psychological injury due to attorney's negligence). In short, "[exceptions to the rule have been narrowly created and defined in a certain very narrow class of cases in which the foreseeability and gravity of the emotional injury involved, and lack of countervailing policy concerns, have surmounted the policy rationale undergirding application of the impact rule." Id. at 478.
Here, the plaintiffs allege breach of a fiduciary duty arising from the relationship between the student and the chaplain. While similar in nature to the claim in Gracey, it is yet another set of circumstances asking to be excepted from the reach of the impact rule. This is a task best suited for our supreme court especially in light of the statutory scheme under which the plaintiff seeks recovery.
Section 90.505(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2004) defines a "member of the clergy" as "a priest, rabbi, practitioner of Christian Science, or minister of any religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a church, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him or her." The statute then provides that a "communication between a member of the clergy and a person is 'confidential' if made privately for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel and advice 'from the member of the clergy in the usual course of his or her practice or discipline and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the communication." See § 90.505(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003).
This statute creates a four-part test to establish the existence of a privilege. First, the communication must be made to a "member of the clergy." Second, the statement must be made' for the' purpose of seeking spiritual counseling or advice. Third, the information must be received in the usual course of the clergyman's practice or discipline. And fourth, the communication must be made privately and not intended for further disclosure. Nussbaumer v. State, 882 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
While the facts may ultimately disprove the allegations, Bellhorn is alleged to be an individual the student "reasonably believed" to be a member of the clergy. Bellhorn approached the student, took him to a private location, and questioned him concerning his sexual orientation. He did that in his capacity as school chaplain. The student alleged he did not intend his discussion with Bellhorn to be shared with others and specifically asked Bellhorn about the confidential nature of the conversation before answering any questions. Taking these well-pled allegations as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has alleged the disclosure of confidential information arising from a special relationship between the student and a member of the clergy.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida has not yet recognized an exception to the impact rule for disclosure of information by a member of the clergy. And, because of the far-reaching consequences that will result if such an exception is created, we decline to ignore the impact rule to which our Supreme Court rightfully continues to adhere. We certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does the impact rule preclude a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the breach of confi dential information provided to a clergyman?
Affirmed.
STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. Because the dismissal of count three completely disposes of the claim against Bellhorn, it is a final appealable order. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(k). Other counts remain pending against Jupiter Christian School.