Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. Michael W. MEYER and Dale James Schultz, Relators, v. The Honorable Lawrence E. KEOUGH, as Circuit Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-01-07
Citations: 325 So. 2d 75
Docket Number: No. 75-1482
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Michael W. MEYER and Dale James Schultz, Relators, v. The Honorable Lawrence E. KEOUGH, as Circuit Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: McNULTY, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 325
Pages: 75–79

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. Michael W. MEYER and Dale James Schultz, Relators, v. The Honorable Lawrence E. KEOUGH, as Circuit Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Respondent.
No. 75-1482.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 7, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1976.
Gregory G. Gay, New Port Richey, for relator Schultz.
Robert M. Focht, Asst. Public Defender, New Port Richey, for relator Meyer.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCHEB, Judge.
Relators seek a writ of prohibition against the respondent trial judge, contending the state is barred under the provisions of the speedy trial rule RCrP 3.191(h)(2) from trying them on an information charging possession and sale of a controlled substance. We grant the writ.
The narrow question we resolve here is what constitutes a "single episode of criminal conduct" under the speedy trial rule as relates to certain drug offenses. .
The relevant chronology leading to the present posture of the case starts on January 1, 1975, at about 11:30 p.m. At that time a confidential informant for the Pas-co County Sheriff's Department made a controlled purchase of methylenedioxy amphetamine (MDA) at the relators' mobile home. Then, about 3:30 a.m. on the following day, pursuant to a search warrant obtained almost immediately after the 11:30 p.m. purchase, officers searched re- lators' mobile home and discovered quantities of both MDA and marijuana, the MDA being in the same place as the drugs were kept when the controlled purchase was made by the confidential informant. As a result, relators were arrested on January 2, 1975, on charges of possession of these two controlled substances on that date.
On March 25, 1975, the state filed three informations charging relators as follows:
(1) Case No. 75-2 - possession of marijuana on January 2, 1975;
(2) Case No. 75-3 - possession of MDA on January 2, 1975; and
(3) Case No. 75-420 - possession and sale of MDA on January l, 1975.
On June 20, 1975, Cases 75-2 and 75-3 were dismissed. Then on August 14, 1975, both relators were arrested on the charges in Case No. 75-420, relating to the offense of possession and sale of MDA on January 1, 1975.
On October 2, 1975, relators filed a motion to be discharged under RCrP 3.-191(h)(2). They contended the state was barred from proceeding with the trial since 180 days had elapsed from the date of their original arrest for this particular criminal episode. Unquestionably the 180 day period specified in the rule did elapse from initial arrest of relators on January 2, 1975, until the scheduled date for their trial on the offense charged under Case No. 75-420. Likewise, no question is raised concerning the continued availability of the relators for trial. The thrust of re-lators' contention below and on this appeal is that the drug offenses for which they were originally arrested on January 2, 1975, resulted from the same conduct or criminal episode as gave rise to the offense for which the state is now prosecuting them.
The testimony on the motion leaves no question but that the relators' possession of the controlled substances was first discovered by the authorities as a result of the confidential informant's purchase, and that almost immediately thereafter Detective Richard L. McCoy of the Pasco County Sheriff's Department made the required affidavit and obtained the search warrant. Within approximately four hours from the time of the controlled purchase the search warrant was executed at relators' mobile home. The relators argue that while not the "same offense," the alleged sale and possession and the latter possession were all part of the same conduct or episode since all took place within the same mobile home within four hours with the same individuals involved in both instances. Further, relators point out that the factual predicate for the search warrant led to discovery of the drugs at 3:30 a.m. on January 2, 1975, in relators' refrigerator, being the identical location of the same type of drugs as the controlled purchase on January 1, 1975, at 11:30 p. m.
The state, however, sees the issue here as being whether the relators had the right to be arrested on all charges at some specific point in time. Concluding that the statute of limitations alone controls this aspect of the case, the state emphasizes our previously stated view that the objective of the speedy trial rule is merely to insure that once a person has been arrested, that he be brought to trial with reasonable promptness. See Sumbry v. State, Fla.App.2d 1975, 310 So.2d 445. The state argues it should not be precluded from prosecuting the relators for any criminal charges within the statute of limitations merely because the relators now incorrectly view their own conduct as an event which is part of one continuing sequence of activity.
The proper resolve of the problem depends upon a correct interpretation of the language in RCrP 3.191(a)(1), which states in part:
"[Ejvery person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall without demand be brought to trial . within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony . . . The time periods es tablished by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged . " (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of authority interpreting what constitutes the "conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged."
In Bryant v. Blount, Fla.App.1st 1972, 261 So.2d 847, the defendant was initially charged with conspiring to commit bribery and later with a substantive charge of bribery. The court stated that two separate informations clearly charged a crime " 'based on the same conduct or criminal episode.' " The court there distinguished between whether two crimes are the same offense for purpose of double jeopardy and for the "same criminal episode" test. It is apparent from the court's opinion that the criminal episode concept is viewed in a broader context than the concept of what constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See also State v. Boren, Fla.App.3d 1973, 273 So.2d 415.
In Crain v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 302 So.2d 433, this court held the conduct of a defendant arrested for driving while under the influence of a prohibited drug, who was later charged with contemporaneous possession of marijuana, involved only one criminal episode. We said there that even though the offenses were separate, if they were grounded on the same conduct they must both be tried within the time prescribed under the speedy trial rule. Here, the basis for the search warrant for entry into the relators' mobile home at 3 :30 a.m. on January 2, 1975, was within the factual context related to the charge of possession and sale arising directly from the conduct of the relators on January 1, 1975, at 11:30 p.m. The January 2, 1975 offense is closely related to the continued possession and sale of the same controlled substance at the same location by the same parties and close to the same time. When coupled with the fact that recitation of the prior sale was a significant part of Detective McCoy's affidavit for the search warrant relating to the possession charges, this constitutes the same conduct or criminal episode.
Were we to find that the possession and sale of controlled substances at 11:30 p.m. on January 1, 1975, and the possession of the same drug four hours later were, for the purpose of the speedy trial rule, two separate criminal episodes it would permit the prosecution to avoid the salutary purposes served by the speedy trial rule.
Our holding today is limited to a situation where the enforcement authorities obtain knowledge of controlled substances being possessed by individuals through a "controlled buy" and almost immediately thereafter obtain and execute a search warrant and as a result thereof seize additional unlawful drugs of the same type their confidential informant first obtained and which drugs were possessed by the same individuals in the same place. Under these circumstances we hold that the prosecution arising out of such factual situation should take place within the time requirements of the speedy trial rule with the time running from the initial taking of the accused parties into custody.
Accordingly, the writ of prohibition is granted and the respondent is hereby prohibited from taking further action toward trial of the relators.
Writ granted.
McNULTY, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.
GRIMES, J., dissents with opinion."
. "The intent and effect of this Rule shall not be avoided by the State by entering a nolle prosequi to a crime charged and by prosecuting a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode, or otherwise by prosecuting new and different charges based on the same- conduct or criminal episode whether or not the pending charge is suspended, continued, or is the subject of entry of a nolle prosequi."