Case Name: VICTOR WINE & LIQUOR, INC., and The Travelers Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Harry BEASLEY and The Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-05-03
Citations: 141 So. 2d 581
Docket Number: No. 30872
Parties: VICTOR WINE & LIQUOR, INC., and The Travelers Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Harry BEASLEY and The Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
Judges: THOMAS, C. J., and THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 141
Pages: 581–589

Head Matter:
VICTOR WINE & LIQUOR, INC., and The Travelers Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Harry BEASLEY and The Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
No. 30872.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 3, 1961.
On Rehearing April 4, 1962.
Rehearing Denied June 12, 1962.
Leo M. Alpert, Miami, for petitioners.
Allen Clements, Miami, Paul E. Speh and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Justice.
The claimant, a laborer, sought workmen's compensation for a disability diagnosed as a coronary occlusion. The facts are that claimant had two mild, non-disabling premonitory attacks on Friday, December 5, 1958, and then suffered an acute heart attack on the following Tuesday while engaged in his usual employment of lifting, carrying and stacking cases of whiskey on a truck.
The deputy commissioner found that, " as a result of his heart attack claimant was temporarily and totally disabled from date of said accident and is entitled to workmen's compensation ". His award of compensation was appealed to the Commission, which found that there was " ample competent substantial evidence to sustain the Deputy's finding that claimant's condition was causally related to his employment". The employer and carrier have brought this petition for writ of certiorari.
The issue may be stated as follows: Is a heart attack suffered by an employee, while at his usual work with its accustomed physical exertions, a compensable injury "by accident" ? We think the question must be answered in the negative.
We are once again confronted with the problem of whether we have workmen's compensation, or whether we have health insurance. In General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908, 911, we said, "This very valuable statute, [Chapter 440, Florida Statutes] while fulfilling a long standing public need, was not designed to take the place of general health and accident insurance. As was said by this court, in Protectu Awning Shutter Co. et al. v. Cline, 16 So.2d 342 : 'The purpose of the act is to shoulder on industry the expense incident to the hazards of industry; and to ultimately pass on to the consumers of the products of industry such expense. Our act affords no relief for disease or physical ailment not produced by industry.'", and further, "Can the courts, in their sympathy for the unfortunate, question the wisdom and policy of the legislature in this regard? The wisdom and policy of legislative acts is a matter for the legislature to determine."
Thus far the legislature has not seen fit to include as compensable a condition such as is here involved.
In Cleary Bros. Const. Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525, 526, deceased's wife brought a claim for compensation where decedent working on a hot day and after unloading cement sacks had suffered a heart attack and had fallen either dying or dead from a boxcar. The court stated: "It does not appear that deceased had been subjected to any unusual strain or overexertion uncommon to the type of work he was accustomed to doing. The fact that he collapsed at his work, even though the work was arduous, is not sufficient, within itself, to make out a case for recovery In a later case, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Hudson, Fla.App., 112 So.2d 29, where the court denied compensation to a claimant who had suffered a heart attack while at his usual strenuous job of changing tires, the district court commented on whether we have workmen's compensation or health insurance and then found that there was no accident and the claimant had not been exposed to a danger not ordinarily risked by the public.
The only instance in which we find any support for claimant's contention is Standard Oil Co., Inc. v. Gay, Fla., 118 So.2d 212 where the claimant was watching and lifting cases of oil cans off a conveyor and thereafter suffered an attack of angina. Upon scrutiny, we conclude that the award of compensation was there made because there was no evidence or testimony to negate the affirmative testimony of the claimant and his witnesses.
In this case we fail to find there is competent evidence which accords with log ic and reason that claimant was subjected to overexertion uncommon to the type of work that he was accustomed to or that claimant's heart attack was an accident which arose "out of and in the course of employment".
Accordingly, certiorari is granted, the order reviewed is quashed and the cause is dismissed.
THOMAS, C. J., and THORNAL and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., dissents with opinion.