Case Name: Conrad H. ROWE; and Dodge City Games, LLC, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF DUVAL, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida; Jacksonville Sheriff's Office; and Harry Shorstein, State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-01-24
Citations: 975 So. 2d 526
Docket Number: No. 1D06-6520
Parties: Conrad H. ROWE; and Dodge City Games, LLC, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF DUVAL, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida; Jacksonville Sheriff's Office; and Harry Shorstein, State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Appellees.
Judges: KAHN, J., concurs; VAN NORTWICK, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 975
Pages: 526–530

Head Matter:
Conrad H. ROWE; and Dodge City Games, LLC, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF DUVAL, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida; Jacksonville Sheriff's Office; and Harry Shorstein, State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Appellees.
No. 1D06-6520.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 24, 2008.
Rehearing Denied March 4, 2008.
Kelly B. Mathis of Mathis & Murphy, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and George Waas, Special Counsel, Tallahassee; and Thomas M. Beverly, Office of General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appel-lees.

Opinion:
BENTON, J.
Conrad H. Rowe and Dodge City Games, LLC, d/b/a Copacabana (Copaea-bana) appeal the final summary judgment denying them declaratory and injunctive relief they sought against Duval County, the Jacksonville Sheriffs Office, the State of Florida, and Harry Shorstein, State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit. Owners and operators of amusement centers in Duval County, appellants contend they fall within the safe harbor provision in section 849.161(1)(a)(l.), Florida Statutes (2006), and therefore outside the ban on gambling houses and slot machines. See § 849.01 and 849.15, Fla. Stat. (2006). The trial court ruled the safe harbor provision unavailable on the ground that the "amusement games or machines" also took bills. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The availability of a "safe harbor" depends on whether Copacabana's establish ment is "an arcade amusement center," which turns on the answers to two separate questions. The safe harbor provision reads:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be taken or construed as applicable to an arcade amusement center having amusement games or machines [1] which operate by means of the insertion of a coin and [2] which by application of skill may entitle the person playing or operating the game or machine to receive points or coupons which may be exchanged for merchandise only, excluding cash and alcoholic beverages, provided the cost value of the merchandise or prize awarded in exchange for such points or coupons does not exceed 75 cents on any game played.
§ 849.161(1)(a)(l.), Fla. Stat. (2006) (bracketed numbers inserted). On this record, whether skill wins the prizes is disputed, but the dispute is material only if the machines "operate by means of the insertion of a coin." Id.
The trial court entered summary judgment against Copacabana without reaching the skill question, relying on State v. Cyphers, 873 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Delorme v. State, 895 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), which it read as holding that the phrase "games or machines which operate by means of the insertion of a coin" in section 849.161(1)(a)(1.) reflects a legislative intention to limit the exception to machines that operate by coin only. The facts concerning coin-operation in the present case are not in dispute: Copaeabana's machines "operate by means of the insertion of a coin," but the same machines can also operate by means of the insertion of bills.
The trial court's reliance on Cyphers and Delorme was misplaced. Neither case decided the question presented here where machines that can take bills also "operate by means of the insertion of a coin." § 849.161(1)(a)(l.), Fla. Stat. (2006). Both hold simply that machines that do not take coins cannot bring an arcade amusement center within the safe harbor provision. In Cyphers, the "[defendants' machines were not coin operated. Rather, Cyphers testified that the machines did not accept quarters and were operated by cash bills." 873 So.2d at 473 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in DeLorme, the "parties stipulated that none of the machines involved was coin-operated." 895 So.2d at 1254-55 (emphasis supplied).
The safe harbor provision at issue here dates to the original enactment of the statute. See Ch. 84-247, § 3, at 1101, Laws of Fla. The difference in wording between the "safe harbor provision," § 849.161(1)(a)(1.), Fla. Stat. (2006), and the "truck stop provision," § 849.161(1)(a)(2.), Fla. Stat. (2006), can be fully explained by technological change between 1984 and 1996. Obiter dicta in Cyphers can be read to support the trial court's view, but the language in question overlooks the historical development of the statute. When the safe harbor provision was enacted in 1984, there were no amusement games or machines that took bills. Such machines did exist by the time the separate "truck stop provision" was enacted in 1996. See Chs. 96-320, § 159, at 1683-84 and 96-323, § 79, at 1848, Laws of Fla.
The record establishes that Copacabana owns an arcade amusement center with machines that "operate by means of the insertion of a coin." The fact that bills, too, can operate these coin-operated machines does not render the safe harbor provision unavailable to Copacabana. But the safe harbor provision does not apply unless the machines in question are also such that, not mere chance, but "application of skill may entitle the person playing or operating the game or machine to receive points or coupons . [worth not more than] 75 cents on any game played." § 849.161(1)(a)(1.), Fla. Stat. (2006). On remand, the trial court must reach and resolve this second, concededly disputed question before entering declaratory judgment, whether for or against Copacabana.
Reversed and remanded.
KAHN, J., concurs; VAN NORTWICK, J., dissents with opinion.
. In an order not challenged here, the trial court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim for declaratory relief against the State of Florida and dismissed the State as a party defendant.
. The trial court did not dismiss Conrad H. Rowe as a party plaintiff even though he seeks to establish the scope of an exception to a penal statute under which he is currently being prosecuted. See Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 186 So. 538, 540 (1939) (noting "the well settled equitable principle that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution"). See generally Duval County Sch. Bd. v. Armstrong, 336 So.2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (reversing order enjoining administrative proceeding convened in connection with teacher's discharge, saying any "necessity that the Board honor such rights as Armstrong demands . must be determined in the concrete circumstances of the case after the Board has acted"). In any event, under Deeb v. Stoutamire, 53 So.2d 873 (Fla.1951), the trial court was obliged to reach the "safe harbor" question it addressed in the declaratory judgment at the behest of Mr. Rowe's fellow plaintiff and appellant, Dodge City Games, LLC d/b/a Copacabana.
. Relying on an opinion of the attorney general, see Op. Att'y Gen. Fla.2004-12 (2004), the Cyphers court stated in obiter dicta:
The definition of slot machine includes a machine that may be operated by the insertion of "any piece of money, coin, or other object." In contrast, section 849.161(1)(a)(1) refers specifically to machines which operate by the insertion of "a coin." Furthermore, section 849.161 (1)(a)(2), creating an exception per-taming to truck stops, refers to machines operated by the insertion of "a coin or other currency." The legislature's use of different terms in different sections of the same statute is "strong evidence that different meanings were intended." Clarke v. Schimmel, 774 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Thus, "[w]hen the legislature has used a term . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded." Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995).
State v. Cyphers, 873 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
. Undisputed materials of record established when the new machines became available.
. Requiring different constructions because of the difference in wording between the "safe harbor provision" and the "truck stop provision" would, at most, give rise to an ambiguity in the definition of a crime. The rule is that "statutes defining crimes are to be strictly construed against the State." Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 741 (Fla.1996).