Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Mark WEST, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1982-11-24
Citations: 326 N.W.2d 316
Docket Number: No. 67575
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Mark WEST, Appellant.
Judges: All Justices concur except HARRIS, CARTER, LeGRAND, and McGIVERIN, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 326
Pages: 316–319

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Mark WEST, Appellant.
No. 67575.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Nov. 24, 1982.
Helen L. Stirling of Roehrick, Lavorato, Schuster & Hassel, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles G. Neighbor, Jasper County Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
McCORMICK, Justice.
Defendant Christopher Mark West appeals from his conviction and sentence upon his guilty plea to second degree robbery as defined in Iowa Code section 711.3 (1981). He attacks the validity of his plea on the ground that the trial court misinformed him concerning the penal consequences of the plea on two occasions, once before the plea was accepted and once just after sentencing. We remand the case to allow defendant a hearing on his claim his plea should be set aside because he was misled by misad-vice about sentencing possibilities before his plea was accepted.
Defendant did not challenge the validity of his plea by motion in arrest of judgment. The bar to appellate challenge that is ordinarily applicable in such circumstances under Iowa R.Crim.P. 23(3)(a) is inapplicable here, however, because the trial court did not advise him pursuant to rule 8(2)(d) that a failure to challenge the plea by motion in arrest of judgment operates as such a bar. See State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980). Moreover, the time for filing a motion in arrest of judgment expired five days before occurrence of the incident after sentencing. We therefore reach the merits of defendant's present contentions.
I. Becuase second degree robbery is a forcible felony, conviction of the offense carries a mandatory penalty. Iowa Code § 702.11, 907.3 (1981). Before taking the plea, the trial court had a duty to address the defendant personally to tell him and determine that he understood the maximum penalty for the offense. Iowa R.Crim.P. 8(2)(b)(2). It was not necessary for the court to inform him he was ineligible for deferred judgment or probation, but the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea would be affected by any misstatement of the court placing in defendant's mind "the flickering hope of a disposition on sentencing that was not possible." State v. Boone, 298 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Iowa 1980).
Here, before accepting the plea, Judge Missildine told defendant not to plead guilty on the assumption he was going to receive other than the maximum sentence. Nevertheless, he also said:
I intend to order a presentence investigation from the department of court services in this case. I will be guided quite a bit by that. When the time for sentencing arrives, I will consider what the county attorney says, if anything, and what your attorney says, if anything, and arrive at what I think is the proper sentence in this case.
Even though the judge did not tell defendant he was eligible for deferred sentence or probation, the judge's statement made it appear he had discretion concerning what the sentence would be. Defendant requests an opportunity to show his plea was induced by the erroneous belief the court had such discretion.
This case comes within the holding in Boone. If upon remand defendant demonstrates that the court's statement led him to believe he was eligible for a sentence for which he was ineligible, he is entitled to have the judgment and plea set aside and to plead anew. See 298 N.W.2d at 338.
II. Defendant also complains that a statement made by the sentencing court, Judge Denato, misled him concerning his right to reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to section 902.4. He argues that this caused him to pass up an opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea.
It is true defendant's sentence was not subject to reconsideration because a person sentenced for a forcible felony is ineligible for shock sentencing. See State v. Broten, 295 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 1980). The court's alleged misadvice, however, did not occur until after sentence had been pronounced. It certainly could not have affected the voluntary and intelligent nature of defendant's guilty plea entered a month earlier, and it surely could not have influenced defendant's failure to move to withdraw his plea before judgment as authorized by rule 8(2)(a). The case is thus factually and legally distinguishable from Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.1970), on which defendant relies. The mistake in Spradley occurred before sentencing.
We find no merit in defendant's contention that he was deprived of an opportunity to attack his plea before sentencing by an event that occurred after sentencing.
For the reasons in division I, however, we remand for further proceedings.
CASE REMANDED.
All Justices concur except HARRIS, CARTER, LeGRAND, and McGIVERIN, JJ., who dissent.