Case Name: ORRIN A. BILLS, et al., Appellants, v. THE NATIONAL PARK BANK OF N. Y., Impleaded, &c., Respondent
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1881-04-04
Citations: 15 Jones & S. 302
Docket Number: 
Parties: ORRIN A. BILLS, et al., Appellants, v. THE NATIONAL PARK BANK OF N. Y., Impleaded, &c., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 47
Pages: 302–319

Head Matter:
ORRIN A. BILLS, et al., Appellants, v. THE NATIONAL PARK BANK OF N. Y., Impleaded, &c., Respondent.
Attachment—what claims may be attached as debts.— Certification of check—effect of.—Bank account—when cannot be attached, depositor's certified check to amount of balance being outstanding.
A claim to be attachable must be a legal debt, as contradistinguished from an equitable demand, and must be absolutely payable at present, or in the future, and not dependent on any contingency; also, the claim must be in existence at the time of the execution of the warrant.
When a bank certifies and issues a depositor’s check, payable to his own order, to an amount equal to his balance on deposit, and charges the same in its account to him, the deposit account is thereby balanced and closed, and the debt of the bank as a depositary is so far extinguished that an action will not lie upon it, unless the certified check be proved to have been lost, or be produced and canceled at the trial. The bank, by such certification, &c., becomes liable upon a negotiable instrument to any one who may become the bona fide holder thereof.
The above principles applied to the following state of facts: The depositor, a corporation, drew its check for the amount of the balance of its deposit account, payable to the order of R. as its assistant treasurer, which check, upon presentation to the bank, was certified by it and returned to R., who retained it in his possession, as such assistant treasurer, for several days, and until a warrant of attachment against the company had been duly served upon the bank; and thereafter, and on the same day that the warrant was so executed, he deposited the said check, together with other securities belonging to the company, to his individual credit in the bank, and the amount of such deposits was thereafter drawn out by him from time to time, and used to pay just debts owing by the company. Held, in an action brought by the attaching creditor against the bank, that the claim of the company against the bank at the time of the execution of the warrant was not such a debt as could be reached by the service of the attachment on the bank, and that the deposits made by the assistant treasurer, subsequent to the execution of the warrant, could not be reached thereby.
Before Sedo-wick, Ch. J., Freedman and Truax, JJ.
Decided April 4, 1881.
Appeal from judgment entered on report of referee in favor of defendant.
This is an action brought pursuant to the Code, to enforce the levy of an attachment. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the referee, as follows:
“J. S. Bosworth, Referee.—The plaintiff having concluded the testimony on his part and rested, the defendant, the Park Bank, moves to dismiss the complaint. The principal question on this motion is, whether the testimony given establishes a cause of action against that bank.
“ On or about April 30, 1875, the plaintiff, Bills, commenced an action in the supreme court of this State against the New Orleans, St. Louis & Chicago R. R. Co., on contract, and obtained a warrant of attachment in that action, directed to Wm. C. Conner (he then being sheriff of said city and county), and the said sheriff executed said warrant about 2.80 p. m. of that day (April 30), by exhibiting the same to said Park Bank and leaving with it a notice, in effect, that by the said warrant of attachment the said sheriff was required to attach and take into his custody ‘ all books of account, vouchers and effects relating to the property, debts, credits and effects of said defendant (the Railroad Co.), .. . . and that all such property, debts, credits and all rights and shares of stock, with all interest and profits therein or therefrom of the said defendant, now in your possession or under your control, are, and those which may come into your possession or under your control, will be liable"to said warrant of attachment, and are hereby attached by me. “t . . • And without in any wise waiving the attachment, requirement and demand above made, or in any way relieving or discharging you from the obligation or duty under which you are hereby placed, I having been informed that you have in your possession, or "under your control, money, bonds, collaterals or evidences of indebtedness, or other property, belonging to the said defendant, and. that you are indebted to the defendant in a certain sum of money, .... or thereabouts for .... do hereby particularly attach and require you to deliver to me the said property or money so in your possession or under your control, and to pay to me the said moneys so owing by you to said defendant, without delay. '. . .’
“The warrant of attachment commanded the. sheriff to ‘ attach and safely keep all the property of the said defendant, the New Orleans, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Company, within your (his) county, or so much thereof,’ &c.
“ On-and prior to April 27, 1875, this railroad company kept an account with the Park Bank, and on that day the Park Bank was indebted to this company, on account of deposits of money made by this company with the bank, to the amount of $6,485.33, or thereabouts ; on that day, the railroad company drew its check on the Park Bank to the order of John M. C. Rodney, assistant treasurer, for $6,600, which the bank then certified to be good, and charged the amount to said railroad company, and delivered the check thus certified to Rodney. The railroad company kept an office in this city ; Rodney was its assistant treasurer, and was known to the Park Bank to be such officer. As such officer, he made the deposits that were made by (hat company in the Park Bank, and as such officer signed all checks drawn by that company on the Park Bank. Between the 27th and 30th of April, 1875, the railroad company made other deposits in this bank, amounting tó $2,068.26, and drew other checks on the bank, which the bank paid, amounting to $2,760.67 ; so that at the time the attachment was served, the bank would have owed the railroad company $5,793.53, and no more, if the certified check for $6,600 had not been certified by it, and been then outstanding. At the time the attachment was served, the Park Bank had no knowledge or notice as to what had become of the certified check or who owned it.
“As matter of fact, the railroad company continued to own said check, and Rodney continued to be possessed of it as such assistant treasurer. On April 30, 1875, about the close of banking hours and after the said attachment had been served, Rodney individually opened an account with the Park Bank and deposited this check, and other drafts, being the property of the railroad company, to his individual credit; and subsequently drew checks on said bank, for the purpose of paying just debts owing by the company, and which checks were paid by the Park Bank, in amount equal to the deposit thus made to Rodney’s individual credit.
“The plaintiffs claim, that at the time the attachment was served, the Park Bank was a debtor of the railroad company to the amount of $5,793.53, and that such debt was attached, and the Park Bank thereby became liable as such debtor to pay that amount to the plaintiffs as such attaching' creditor. The plaintiffs also insist upon their right to recover the amount deposited by Rodney to his individual credit, on April 30, 1875. For the present, I shall consider only the liability of the bank, arising upon the deposit account, and shall treat the certified check as being, in amount, the precise sum due from the bank to the railroad company at the time it was certified.
“On that state of facts, the deposit account was balanced and closed, when the certified check was issued, and charged in the bank’s account to the railroad company. By certifying the check and delivering it certified, to the railroad company, the bank became liable upon a negotiable instrument, to any one who might become the bona, fide holder of it. The railroad company, on presenting the check to the bank, and a refusal by the latter to pay it, could sue the bank upon the check and recover, if no rights of third persons had intervened. The liability of the bank, upon and by reason of the deposit account, may not have been so completely extinguished, by reason of having certified the check for $6,600, but that an action would lie upon it, at the suit of the railroad company, on a return of the check to the bank canceled and a demand of the payment of the $6,600.
“But the debt owing by the Park Bank, as depositary, was so far extinguished by the delivery of the certified negotiable check, that an action would not lie upon it, unless the certified check should be proved to have been lost, or should be produced and canceled at the trial (Burdick «. Green, 15 Johns. 247; Hughes «. Wheeler, 8 Goto. 77). Although in these cases the defendant’ s pleas are held bad, yet it was also held that the fact of there being an outstanding negotiable note, for the original debt, would defeat an action on the original debt, unless the note should be produced and canceled at the trial, and that such fact might be proved under the general issue (Hughes «.’Wheeler, supra, p. 81).
“The cases, as- I understand them, hold that a debt (so called) owing to the defendant in the attachment suit, to be attachable, must be a legal' debt, as contradistinguished from an equitable demand ; and must be absolutely payable, at present, or in the future, and not dependent on any contingency. ‘ That cannot, properly, be called a debt, which is not certainly, and, at all events, payable either at the present or some future period’ {Drake, § 551).
“ The so-called debt, which, in this case, the plaintiffs claim to have attached, on the facts existing when the attachment was served, was, presumptively, extinguished, so that no action would lie on it, at the suit of the attachment-defendant. The contingency, on the happening of which an action would lie against the Park Bank, on its original liability as depositary, viz.: the return to it of the certified check, canceled, affects the supposed debt itself, and its existence as an obligation.
“The plaintiff Bills, as attaching creditor, could acquire no other or greater rights against the Park Bank, in respect to the liability of the latter on its contract as depositary, than the railroad company had, when' the attachment was served (Drake, § 245). It would seem to follow, that, as that company could not maintain an action and recover judgment against the Park Bank, without, as á condition precedent, returning the certified check canceled, the plaintiff, or sheriff, could not maintain such action, without performing the same condition ; and it was entirely out of their power to perform such condition.
‘ ‘ The Park Bank, at the time the attachment was served, wa's practically in the same condition as it would have been, if it was under no other liability than that of a certifier of the check, or that of a maker of a negotiable promissory note payable to the order of the defendant in the attachment suit, and who was sought to be held as such maker, on the service on him of a copy of the attachment, and a notice that such liability or indebtedness was thereby attached.
“In several States, it has been held on principle-, uninfluenced by statutory provisions, that the maker of a negotiable note shall not be charged as garnishee of the payee while the note is still current (Drake> .§588).
“ In Stone v. Dean (5 N. II. 502), the court said :
“ ‘The reason of this rule is founded upon the negotiable quality of the paper. If the trustee (the0 maker of the note) could be charged in such a case, it might happen that either a bona fide purchaser of the note must lose the amount of it, or the maker, without fault on his part, might- be compelled to pay it twice.’
“In Hutchins v. Evans (11 Vt. 541), being a case which arose when there was no statute, authorizing in terms, a maker of such a note to be garnisheed, the court said:
“ 1 We ought not to hold the maker of the notes liable, unless he could rely upon the judgment as a complete defense against the notes. This he could not do, if, at the time of rendering the judgment, the notes had been already indorsed and the indorsee was not before the court. We cannot know that this is not the case. But if we could know that the notes were now in the hands of the payee, in order to hold the maker we must destroy the future negotiability of the notes, and thus put it in the power of the holder to impose upon innocent purchasers, or else enable the holder to defraud the maker by negotiating the notes after the payment in the attachment suit. There seems to be no other mode of securing the interests of all concerned, short of denying all right to attach, by this process, the interest in negotiable paper while current.’
“ Hence, in this case, when Rodney, on April 30, 1875, was in the Park Bank,, after the attachment had been served on the bank, having this certified check and other securities, which he then deposited to his individual credit, the most the bank could have done, even if it had officiously exerted itself to aid the attaching creditor, would have been to refuse to receive it, and, as a condition of receiving it, have refused to credit it to Rodney on account, and have required him to surrender it to the bank, canceled. This would have been a mere brutum f ulmén. Rodney would have immediately negotiated it for value, and the bank would have been compelled to pay it to such transferee. The payment of it to such an assignee would have been an extinguishment of all liability of the bank as a certifier of the check, and upon its original liability as depositary. Such a result it was out of the power of the bank to prevent. Such being its condition when the attachment was served on it, it must be held, as I think, that it was not, in any proper sense of the word, a debtor of the railroad company at that time.
“ If the bank was not a debtor of the railroad company, at the time the attachment was served, but subsequently became its debtor, a service made before the latter debt was created would not create a lien on such subsequently contracted debt. The attachment only creates a lien upon such property as is actually attached' by seizing and reducing it to possession, when susceptible of manual delivery; or by service of the statutory notice upon the debtor of the defendant in the attachment suit, or upon the person holding choses in action, which is the property of such defendant (DraJcey §§ 263, ■ 271; Rodgers v. Bonner, 45 N. Y. 379).
“The recovery of a judgment in the attachment suit does not make the attachment operate as a lien upon property, which was not in fact attached. As was said in the Merchants’ and Traders’ Bank of Jersey City v. Dakin (51 N. Y. 519): ‘ The property seized, although a chose in action, is held by the attachment and the execution. The attachment and its service create the lien. The judgment determines that the lien shall be enforced to the extent of the payment of the debt. The execution is the continuance of the attachment lien, with the added and conclusive authority of the judgment’ (Lynch «. Crary, 52 N. Y. 181).
“ In Clarke v. Goodridge (41 Yf. Y. 210), it was held, that the service of an attachment upon a bank, at the time holding collateral securities for a loan made to the defendant in the attachment suit, .which securities were the property of such defendant, and which subsequently produced a surplus of $4,800, and which attachment was served by leaving with the bank a copy of the attachment, and a notice that ‘all property, effects, rights, debts and credits of the sued debtor in their possession or under their control, would be liable to such attachment, and particularly that he attached the bank account and book debt due from the bank to the debtor,’ did not create any lien on such securities, which would enable the attaching creditor to reach this surplus, as against a receiver in supplementary proceedings, on another judgment against the. debtor, appointed subsequent to such levy (overruling Grreenleaf «. Mumford, 19 Abb. 469).
“The court said (p. 213), that property capable of manual delivery is to be levied upon in like manner as under an execution. The sheriff must seize and take it into his possession. Property incapable of manual delivery is to be levied upon by leaving with the person holding it, a copy of the warrant of attachment, with a notice showing the property levied on (Old Code, § 235). This shows that an attachment only creates a lien upon such property as it is actually levied upon, either by an actual seizure of it or by the service of such a notice, in respect to choses in action, as will satisfy the terms of the Code. The fact that there was visible tangible property, upon which it might have been but was not levied, does not subject it to any attachment lien, where there was in fact no actual levy.
‘ ‘ When the bank received the certified check from Rodne'y, it received' the check as being his property.
“ The bank opened an account with him, and passed it to his credit, and thereby contracted with him, in respect thereto, the same obligation that it does with every depositor who keeps an account with it. That obligation the bank has satisfied by paying Rodney’s check to an amount exhausting his credit as such depositor.
“ By giving Rodney credit for such check, and paying his checks to an equal amount drawn against such credit, the Bank satisfied and discharged its liability as the certifier of such check.
“The plaintiff seeks to recover of the Park Bank, on the theory that the bank, at the time the attachment was served, was indebted to the railroad company upon its deposit account with the bank, to the amount of $5,793.53. It is clear that it was not then so indebted. At that time, on the facts then existing, no action would lie against the bank on its contract as depositary. At that time, it was not in the power of the attaching creditor to do any act, which, being done, would make such an action maintainable. Neither the attaching creditor nor the railroad company has since done any act or acts which would enable an action to be maintained upon that liability. -
“The certified check was not seized by the sheriff, and taken into his possession ; it was the property of the railroad company, and in its possession at the time the attachment was served. The bank, as the certifier of such check, was not subjected to any liability to the attaching creditor, by the service of the attachment that was made upon the bank. Subsequently to the service of the attachment, the bank credited the check to Rodney, on account, as being his property, and after that, satisfied its liability by reason thereof.
“ However plausible the ground upon which the plaintiffs base their claims to recover, and notwithstanding the acumen and ability with which they have been presented and urged, I think they are shadowy and unsubstantial.
“As to the other securities that were deposited by Rodney in the Park Bank at the same time that he de- ■ posited the certified check, I cannot perceive any ground on which the Park Bank can be held liable for them. When the attachment was served on the Park Bank, that bank did not possess them, or even know that they existed. The notice served on the bank did hot create any lien on securities which it did not then possess and of which it knew nothing. I cannot think that the Park Bank is under any liability in respect of such securities either to Bills as attaching creditor, or to the sheriff by reason and force of the notice served on the bank.
11 In considering the motion to dismiss the complaint, I have regarded the evidence as tending to show that the Park Bank had good reason to believe, at the time Rodney opened the account with it in his own name, that the securities which he then deposited were the property of the railroad company, and that he made the deposit in his own name in order that he-might be able to discharge therewith certain liabilities of that company, which he deemed it a matter of great importance to pay as they matured. If the whole merits of the controversy depended on .the fact of the bank having this notice or knowledge, I do not think the verdict of a jury that it had such notice would be disturbed. But if the views before stated are sound, that fact can hardly be said to be material.
“I conclude that the defendant is entitled to a dismissal of the complaint.”
Holmes & Adams, attorneys, and George H Adams, of counsel, for appellants, among other things, urged:—
I. It has been well settled that the relation between the railroad company and' the bank, so far as the deposit account was concerned, was that of creditor and debtor. An attachment will reach a debt owing to the defendant in the attachment suit; there was such a debt on April 27 due by the bank to the company, and that debt continued in existence as a debt, until the levy, unless, 1. The certification was an assignment of the debt; or, 2. By the certification of the check the debt was extinguished. There certainly was not in this case an assignment of the debt; the check as certified was drawn in favor of the maker; no assignee was named, and none was ever in contemplation; there was no intention to assign the debt or the deposit account, for Rodney says he took this measure solely for the purpose of keeping money out of the bank; and the- company at all times had possession of the check and had the right of enforcing the claim against the bank, whether the claim was upon the check or upon the deposit account. Unquestionably, a check, when certified, may sometimes operate as an assignment ; as for example where the check is given to the payee, and he, instead of getting the money upon it, obtains the certification; in such a case the certification is equivalent to an acceptance of a bill of exchange, which may be sometimes held to constitute an equitable assignment. But no such question can arise where there is no payee named and no assignee in contemplation. Certification has been discussed in reference to the question, whether a maker giving a certified check to the payee is discharged of his debt to the payee ; in other words,- whether' the payee, by accepting the check certified, accepts an assignment of the bank’s debt to the drawer in payment of his demand against the maker. This has been thought to be the effect where the payee himself goes to the bank, and instead of getting money for the check obtains the bank’s certification. But it has never been held to operate as an assignment binding upon any one where the maker himself obtains the certification of his own check. The distinction is observed by Sedgwick, J., in Thompson v. Bank (13 J. & 8.17); so, too, in Espy v. Bank (18 Wall. 620). The intention, after all, governs, and there was no intention by the company to assign by this check any part of this deposit to any one ; nor were there any circumstances to lead the bank to suppose any such assignment to be contemplated. The certification of the check by the bank did not operate as an extinguishment of its indebtedness to the company. The certification being made to the depositor, upon a check to the depositor’s order, which is held by the depositor, cannot be said to extinguish that indebtedness which arose by reason of the deposits ; it is not creating a new obligation, at least between the company and the bank, for the check in this instance is certified for a greater amount than the deposit balance, and the company could not compel the bank to pay to it, the company, the amount of the check simply because of the certification. Such certification, though binding as to third persons, cannot be the creation of an obligation between the parties. If, then, the certified check is good as between the parties only for the amount of the true balance, the certification is no creation of a new indebtedness; it is at most another evidence of the then existing indebtedness ; the indebtedness is the balance of deposit, and the mere giving of any number of agreements to pay it would not change it as between the parties. The views of the subject (i. e. certification) in the earlier cases in this State are generally unsound. But by Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604; Marine N. Bank v. City Bank, 59 N. Y. 72, and Thompson v. Bank, 13 J. & S. 17, and by the report of the latter case in the court of appeals (see 22 Alb. L. J. ), the effect of certification may be said to be settled as follows: By certification the bank guarantees (1) the signature of the drawer; (2) that there are sufficient funds of the drawer to meet the check; and (3) that it will pay to a bona Jide holder on presentation the amount for which the check was originally drawn by the maker. These decisions, in reasoning and prin ciple, negative the affirmations of text writers like Drake, and the dicta in the reports in other States and in some of our own reports, that a certification in itself may constitute an assignment or extinguishment of the original debt. But as the rights of third persons do not affect us here, it cannot be difficult to ascertain ¡¡ust what effect, the certification has upon the debt, as between the company and the Park Bank. This certification may be said to suspend the right of the Railroad Company to call for payment of the debt so long as it fails to present the check; it cannot be said to suspend the debt, but its payment only. But this suspension ceases as soon as the company delivers up the check to. the bank; so, too, it would cease if the check was taken to the bank by the company and the certification erased; or if while in the company’s hands the check was destroyed. It cannot make any difference in legal effect, if it appears that at the time of certification, the bank, for the convenience of its clerks and of its internal affairs, makes a deduction from its depositor’s account of the amount of "the check, and on his delivering it up again, the bank then makes another entry, adding the amount of the check to the account. It has been said that the bank -by certification guarantees to pay a bona fide holder on presentation the amount of the check, provided that amount, is what the check was drawn for. To meet this responsibility the bank may be said to have rights over its depositor’s balance exactly commensurate with this guaranty or responsibility on its part to the holder; the bank’s rights can, surely be no greater than this responsibility ; its right is then merely to retain so much of its depositor’s balance, to refuse to pay so much of its debt to its depositor, until the check certified has been properly presented for payment, or until its responsibility thereon has ceased. It may be said to have a qualified sense a lien upon the deposit. If it amounts to a lien, it needs no authorities to determine that an attachment will reach property subject to a lien, (but see Brownell v. Carnly, 3 Duer, 9). Yet there was no lien, no right even of retention, if at the instant of attaching the bank was not as matter of fact liable to any one on the certified check. And this indebtedness or balance was not subject to any incumbrance or claim, if that contingency or possibility upon which the bank might retain it never happened, and could never happen. A supposed case was urged by the bank below as a test, and appears in the referee’s opinion, viz.: what would have been the effect if Rodney, instead of going to the bank with the check on April 30, had passed it to an innocent holder for value % It may be answered, that it is indisputable that in such a case the bank on payment would be entitled to appropriate so much of the company’s balance. That is the contingency, which, in the supposed case, would have happened ; the quasi lien would become a complete right of enforcing it. But the contingency not only does not happen in fact, but, as said above, there arises at once an impossibility of it ever happening. Not only is the check not transferred to an innocent holder, but the company holds it at all times in its possession, and after the attachment itself goes to the bank and delivers it up. The referee having nonsuited the plaintiffs, it must be presumed in their favor, that when Rodney went to the bank on the 30th of April, he went as the company, and was the company, and held in his hands, as the company, this certified check.
II. This attempted “test” does not afford us any assistance ; it imports into the discussion an element, which, if it existed in fact, would unquestionably lead to a result different from that claimed by us ; and that different result would be reached solely because of the new element; whether the company, the depositor, held the check at. all times and returned it to the bank, or whether a transferee held it, manifestly makes all the difference in the world ; in one case, for example, the company could sue for the deposit, in the other case it could not. The defense that the check was in form negotiable does hot affect the status of the indebtedness, because it was never negotiated. The check cannot be said to have been transferred to Rodney ; he repudiates such a claim utterly; he never exercised any dominion over- the check, as an individual ; he never claimed that it was his; he says that it was at all times the company’s property, and that when he deposited it, it was still the company’s property, and was to be used and was used by the company. There was no legal title in another to be got rid of before the company could sue at law, as there was in Thurber v. Blanck (infra), and Greenleaf v. Mumford, and in this case the company at the time of the levy could have sued the bank for its deposit, which brings us within the rule laid down by Church, Ch. J., in Thurber v. Blanck (50 N. Y. 86).
III. As to the effect upon the company and the bank of the certifying of the check, it may be said that in all cases bearing upon certified checks, it will be found that such certification has been held to create a relation like that arising from the acceptance of a bill of exchange (Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604). It is a material inquiry, then, to ascertain the effect of acceptance of a bill of exchange upon an indebtedness due by the acceptor to the drawer. The giving of an acceptance or an accepted bill, or a note by the debtor to his creditor, has never been held to be a payment or an extinguishment of the debt, unless there was an express agreement that it should be payment (Noel v. Murray, 13 N. Y. 168 ; Byles on Bills, 381; Blakely v. Jacobson, 9 Bos. 140 ; Elwood v. Diffendorf, 5 Barb. 408 ; Porter v. Talcott, 1 Cow. 359; Sheey v. Mandeville, 6 Branch, 253). All these au thorities go to the point that if the Park Bank had refused to pay to the company the amount of the balance due, or at the moment the levy was made, on April 30, 1875, the company could have sued the bank on the original deposit indebtedness, and disregarded the check and the certification, so long as it was held by the company. This brings the case completely within the test put by Church, Ch. J., in Thurber v. Blanck, whether or not the defendant in the attachment could, at the instant of the levy, have sued the garnishee for the debt; if he could then the attachment is effectual; and that the company could have sued in this case is now beyond question. The cases of Burdick v. Green (15 Johns. 247), and Hughes v. Wheeler (8 Cow. 77), cited by the referee, do not sustain the proposition there made as to the extinguishment of the debt upon the certifying of the check. They both hold that an action would lie upon the original indebtedness, and that a plea to the declaration on the original indebtedness, that the defendant gave the plaintiff an outstanding previous note, is bad. These cases say, that if on the trial the plaintiff cannot satisfactorily account for the note, he should not be allowed to recover; but the point is that the cause of action exists, notwithstanding the note or certified check; so that, under these authorities, the railway company could have sued the bank for its deposit at the moment the levy was made, and its possession of the check would have entitled it to recover. The attaching creditor has the same right. The referee’s authorities, to the effect that the maker of a negotiable note shall not be chargeable as garnishee of the payee, go no further than to hold that the maker shall not be charged while the note is outstanding and cannot be presented at time of trial. It is only because there was a present danger, in those cases, that the maker might have to pay his debt twice, that the attaching creditor failed in the proceeding to enforce the levy. When this danger is removed, or is non-existent at the trial, the implication of these cases is that the attachment would be good. The ruling went on the particular facts of those cages.
IY. The appellants call attention to the following authorities: Drake on Attachments, § 601; citing Langley v. Berry (14 N. H. 82); Id. § 599; citing Camp v. Clark (14 Vt. 387); also 1 Dana, 580; 24 Vt. 363 ; 22 Iowa, 565; 6 N. H. 572; 3 Conn. 27; Wood v. Bodwell (12 Pick. 268); Id. § 223 ; Id. § 525 ; citing Briggs v. Block (18 Mo. 281); Brown v. Foster (4 Cush. 214; Id. § 615).
Y. Whatever may be the meaning and legal extent of a certification, the law of this case is definitely set-sled by Kelly v. Roberts (40 N. Y. 432). The claim made by defendant’s counsel that Rodney held the legal title to the -certified check is untenable. It does not appear that the company, or Rodney as treasurer, ever indorsed the check and delivered it so indorsed to Rodney ; he says he held it as the company. For all that appears he indorsed it as assistant treasurer while at the bank on April 30; the defendant must show, in the face of the presumptions attaching to the transaction, an indorsement for delivery, and a delivery. As bearing upon the questions discussed in connection with Kelly v. Roberts, see these cases: Cushman v. Haynes (20 Pick. 132); Mayor v. Chattahouchee Bank (51 Georgia, 325) ; Freund v. Importers, &c., Bank (12 Hun, 540); Taacks v. Schmidt (18 Abb. Pr. 307).
Barlow & Olney, attorneys, and Francis C. Barlow, of counsel, for respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Judgment affirmed, with costs, upon opinion of referee.