Case Name: Joseph Regan, Administrator of E. W. Harring, deceased, vs. Thomas Stone
Court: High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1842-01
Citations: 4 S. & M. 691
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Regan, Administrator of E. W. Harring, deceased, vs. Thomas Stone.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 691–700

Head Matter:
Joseph Regan, Administrator of E. W. Harring, deceased, vs. Thomas Stone.
An appeal or writ of error does not lie from an interlocutory order of the probate court; where no final judgment has been given.
Where commissioners of insolvency have reported upon the estate of the decedent, and the court under the statute (How. •& Hutch. 410) refers a rejected claim to referees, such order of reference is ajuere interlocutory order, and cannot be made the subject of appeal or writ of error.
The statute gives the probate court the right (How. & Hutch. 410) to refer a claim rejected by the commissioners of insolvency to referees upon good cause shown ; the reference is therefore a discretionary matter with the judge, and error will not lie for its mere exercise.
This is an appeal from the probate court of Claiborne county.
The record sets forth that at the May term of the probate court for said county, in the year 1840, the appellant, as the administrator of said Earring, made an exhibit to said court, showing the said estate to be insolvent, and the court thereupon ordered the exhibit to be recorded, and appointed commissioners of insolvency on the same for six months.
At the December term 1.840, of said court, James E. Maury, one of the creditors of said estate, after the expiration of said commission of insolvency, applied to said court, to extend the commission of insolvency on said estate, for one month, and that creditors be allowed that time to bring in and prove their claims, which application was allowed by said court.
At the January term 1841, the commissioners of insolvency failed to make their report, and a further order was obtained from said court, to allow them till the 4th Monday in February next thereafter, to make their report, and to hear and audit claims against said estate.
And at the February term, 1841, of said court, the commis sioners of insolvency on said estate, made their report to said court, and the appellant moved the court to have the same confirmed. The confirmation was opposed by Thomas Stone, a claimant against said estate, whose claim had been rejected, and disallowed by said commissioners, to which rejection and disallowance, the said Thomas Stone took no exceptions before the said commissioners, but on the coming in of their report, excepted to the same generally, and prayed for a reference of his claims to referees.
The court allowed the exception to the report of the commissioners to prevail, and referred the said claims of Stone to referees “ without any evidence of any character whatever, or cause assigned to show why said claims should be referred to referees,” as appears by the bill of exceptions taken in the cause, to the decision of the court, by the appellant.
To this opinion and decision of the court, the appellant excepted, and prayed an appeal to this court, which was granted.
It appears, by the commissioners’ report, that the claims of Stone were presented to them, but that the claims were objected to by the appellant, because they were not presented to him within eighteen months after notice of publication made by him for all persons interested in said estate to present their claims within the time prescribed by law. And the said claims were disallowed and rejected by the commissioners on the ground, that there was no evidence to show that they had been presented to the appellant within the said eighteen months after publication made, and that they were barred by the said statute of eighteen months limitation.
It was also reported by the commissioners, that Stone was not a resident and citizen of this state, but that he had an agent in whose possession his claims were placed during his absence, who resided in the county of Claiborne, and was acting for him during the said eighteen months as such.
Two errors were assigned : 1. That the court erred in refusing to confirm the commissioners’ report of insolvency as no exceptions were taken before them. 2. In referring Stone’s claim to referees, without “ good and sufficient cause shown.”
R. Garland, for appellant.
It is contended that the commissioners of insolvency on said estate very properly rejected the claims of Stone, on the statement of facts reported by them to the probate court concerning his claims against said estate.
The appellant objected to their allowance by the commissioners, because they were not presented to'him within eighteen months after publication made by him for creditors to exhibit their claims against said estate. It was then incumbent on Stone to prove, that either he or his agent who was a resident of this State did present these claims to the appellant within eighteen months after publication of notice, for creditors to present their claims to him. This he failed to do, and thereby was barred by the statute of eighteen months limitation. Tide Statute Laws of Mississsippi, (H. & H. 413, 414, s. 92.) '
This statute expressly declares that all claims against the estate of deceased persons, shall be presented within eighteen months after publication of notice for that purpose, by the executor, administrator, &c., and not after; and all claims not presented within that time shall be forever barred.
But this law does not apply to creditors who reside beyond the limits of this state, and who have no agent or attorney, resident within the same; in such case the further time of eighteen months to present their claims to the administrator is allowed.
The probate court clearly erred in refusing to confirm the report of the commissioners, as no exceptions had been taken to it before them, and to use the forcible and explicit language of the statute, “no good and sufficient cause was shown” to the court why a general captious exception to their report should have been sustained, and the claims of Stone, without any evidence of any character whatever, or cause assigned, to show why said claims should be referred to referees.
The order of the court, referring said claims to referees, Was in contravention to the express declarations of the statute. The bill of exceptions contained in the record show that no evidence of any character whatever, or cause was assigned, by the claimant to show why the said claims should be referred to referees. As to this point vide Statute Laws of Mississippi, (H. & H. 409, 410, s. 80, in the proviso of said section.)
The proviso in the said 80th section declares that notwithstanding the report of any commissioners (of insolvency) the creditor whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or any executor or administrator, who may be dissatisfied with such report on a particular claim, may for good and sufficient cause shown by the said creditor, executor, &c. to the court, have their claims referred by the said court to referees, whose report and award thereon shall be final and conclusive.
The rules which govern proceedings before masters in chancery apply with equal force and reason to- commissioners of insolvency appointed by a probate court, their duties being precisely' similar, namely, the ascertainment of facts on which the courts may found some order or decree.
The rules which govern proceedings before- masters in chancery are well established both in England and in this country. To declare these rules, I invoke the attention of your honors to the Methodist Episcopal Church, et al. v. John D. Jaques and others, reported in 3 Johns. Chan. Rep. 78. In answer to the third exception taken to the report of the master in chancery, to whom the matters in controversy in said cause were referred, to-state an account, Chancellor Kent observed that it was a sufficient answer to that exception, that it was not taken before- the master, and that it would be oppressive, and under cases of reference a grievous burden, if a party might be permitted to lie by, after a tedious and expensive litigation-; and declared the rule of practice to be founded in much good sense, that no exceptions are to be taken to a report, which were not made before the master had signed the report. For, says the Chancellor, the master might have allowed- the objections, and saved the parties unnecessary expense, as well as the court unnecessary trouble. This rule is never departed from except in special cases, and there is-nothing in the record in this cause, to take the claim of the appellee out of the general rule.
In the case cited, we have not only the rule, but the reason of the rule, by which it appears that the rule is as applicable to proceedings before commissioners of insolvency, as before masters in chancery.
In the case of Wilkes and wife v. Rogers, and others, 6 Johns. R. (marginal) 592, Justice Spencer, in the course of his decision in that case, said that exceptions to the master’s report, partook of the nature of special demurrers, and if a report was erroneous, the party must put his finger on the error, and if he does not do so, the parts not excepted to, are admitted to be correct, not only as it regards the principles, but as relates to the evidence on which they are founded, and that not even a chancery court could set aside a report, upon exceptions not taken before the master, and require further proof, when the parties, whose interest would excite them to make every possible objection, are satisfied.
The court will bear in mind, that not only “ no good and sufficient cause was shown” for the order referring said claims to referees, but no cause whatever. And even if there had existed a good and sufficient cause in fact, it was too late on the coming in of the report of the commissioners. As the reason for making a reference to referees ought to have appeared by exceptions, before the commissioners, and to have accompanied it, on such exceptions the probate court would have been able to judge of their sufficiency or insufficiency, and decided on a reference accordingly.
To conclude, I contend that the order of the probate court, referring the said claims to referees, ought to be reversed, and that the report of the commissioners of insolvency on said estate ought to stand confirmed.'
E. S. Fisher, on the same side.
In this case there are two errors assigned, both of which appear by the bill of exceptions in the record. The first error is, that the court erred in refusing to confirm the report of the commissioners of insolvency. The questions growing out of this error, are, 1st, What are the powers of commissioners of insolvency. 2d. By what rules must they be governed in dis charging those duties which the law has assigned them. And 3d. Whether they have, in performing their office, departed from any of those rules. The first question is now under consideration, to wit: What are their powers ? They have all the powers, where the claim in its character is legal, that the courts of law have, to afford to the injured party a remedy, and must, in cases where the remedy of the party is at law in similar cases, be governed by the same rules which govern proceedings in courts of law. And where the claim is in its nature equitable, they must be governed by those rules which govern the Chancellor, in determining similar matters between other parties. The law has, indeed, made them a substitute for the courts of the country, and has virtually conferred upon them powers coextensive. For the statute, creating those commissioners, has prohibited the institution of suits against the administrator, after their appointment. And it was not intended to preclude the administrator from making any defence, or resisting the claim upon grounds the courts would hold to be valid. It may then be stated as a general rule, that when the remedy of the creditor, if the estate had not been reported insolvent, was at law, against the administrator, the commissioners in determining upon this claim, will be governed by the same rules, and admit the same defence which a court of law would be governed by or admit. And the same rule would prevail when the creditor’s remedy was in equity. The commissioners would govern themselves by those rules, and admit all matters of defence which the Chancellor would admit. The extent of the power of the commissioners having been shown, and the rules for their government having been pointed out, it now only remains to be considered, whether or not the commissioners have invaded any of those rules.
Have the commissioners, then, in deciding upon the appellee’s claim, departed from any rule, which the courts of the country do not sanction 1 Why were the claims of the appellee rejected by the commissioners ? It was because they had not been presented to the administrator within the time prescribed by law. This is the reason assigned by the commissioners for rejecting said claims. The question for consideration is, whether this reason be sufficient in law. Besides the expressive provision of the statute on this subject, this court has held it to be sufficient. Will the court, then, in its decision, censure the commissioners, while acting as a court, clothed with all its authority touching the matters before them, for observing the same rules, the same law, and for giving the same judgment, which the courts of the country would be bound to observe and give? The commissioners, in discharging their duties, have only done what this court, under the same state of facts, would do. They have only, by their decision, given to the administrator that protection and defence against the claims of the appellee, which the courts of justice would give him, if he, the appellee, had resorted to those courts. It having then been shown th$t the commissioners, in deciding upon the claims of the appellee, committed no error; the second error assigned comes up for consideration, to wit: Did the court err in referring the claims to referees ? It appears by the record that the court made this reference, 1st, without any cause, whatever being shown by the appellee; and 2d, without any testimony whatever.
This application to the court may be considered in the nature of motion for a new trial. What, then, is an inflexible rule observed by courts in granting new trials? In ail cases, where substantial justice has been done, or the court has committed no error as to matters of law, a new trial will not be granted. Does it appear by this record that the commissioners have not impartially applied the law to the facts of the case before them ? It does not. To authorize the court to interfere with the report of the commissioners, it must appear affirmatively, upon a showing made by the appellee, that the commissioners have not done him justice, according to law; and he must point out wherein the commissioners have failed to do him justice. It does not appear by the record that the facts upon which the commissioners acted are untrue. The only complaint, then, which the appellee can urge, is the application they have made of the law to the facts. To create a dissatisfaction on the part oí the appellee, which the court can notice, it must appear that the commissioners have, in their decision, failed to mete out justice, according to the law of the land. For, if they have followed the law, no dissatisfaction can exist; at least, a complaint of dissatisfaction will not be heard. It is only where a violation of law has taken place, when a party will be allowed to urge his complaint. When the law has been strictly observed no man can be allowed to complain of a decree.
H. T. Eltett, for appellee.
I. The first error assigned is, that the court erred in refusing to confirm the report of the commissioners of insolvency, as no exceptions had been taken by the appellee before them, before the signing of the report.
The answer to this is, that there is nothing in the statute requiring a bill of exceptions to be taken before the commissioners. How. & Hutch. Dig. 409, sec. 80.
2. The second error assigned is, that the court referred the claim of Thomas Stone to referees, without “ good and sufficient cause” shown.
The act is, that, notwithstanding the report, the creditor, whose claim is rejected, or the administrator, &c., may,- for good and sufficient cause shown, have the claim referred, &c. Ib. 410.
The probate court is a court of general jurisdiction over probate matters, and it is to be presumed that everything was regularly done, unless the contrary is shown.
What was “ good and sufficient cause,” was a question for the court to decide, and is not required to be spread upon the record.
The bill of exceptions does not show that no good añd sufficient cause was shown, nor does it show that no testimony was given. It states that the attorney excepted, because no evidence was given, or cause assigned for the reference, and that the court overruled the objection. But whether the court thought that sufficient cause was in fact shown, or was of opinion that no cause need be shown, does not appear.
But the record itself shows a good and sufficient cause for such reference.
The commissioners rejected the claims, “ because there was no affirmative evidence produced before them, that said two notes were presented to the administrator within eighteen months after notice of publication,” &c.; the administrator objecting on that ground, and the plaintiff having had an agent, &c.
' Now, by the section just referred to, the commissioners are not authorized to regard this limitation of eighteen months, imposed by sec. 92, p. 413. They are “ to receive and examine all claims against the estate,”_and to present a list, on oath, of all claims laid before them, with the amount allowed on each claim. The creditors present their claims de novo to the commissioners, and their powers are not at all limited to the examination of such only as had been previously presented to the administrator or executor. ■
But if this idea is incorrect, the rejection of the claim of the appellee was erroneous, for it nowhere appears that any publication was in fact made by the administrator, or that any limitation had in fact attached.
This is “ good and sufficient cause ” for the reference, and was apparent on the face of the commissioners’ report.
The order of the probate court ought, therefore, to be affirmed.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Sharkey
delivered the opinion of the court.
Joseph Regan, the administrator on the estate of E. W. Harring, reported the estate insolvent. Whereupon auditors were appointed by the probate court of Claiborne county, to audit claims against the estate. They proceeded in the discharge of their duty and made report, which was received. They also made a supplement to the report, by which it appears that they had rejected the claim of Thomas Stone, because it was not reported in due time to the administrator. Stone appeared in court, and excepted to the report, and prayed that referees be appointed to determine the same; and his exception was sustained, and referees appointed by the court. To this Regan excepted, and the case comes up from the judgment of the court in allowing Stone's exceptions, and in appointing the referees.
We cannot interfere with the judgment, for two reasons. First — it was but an interlocutory order; no final judgment has been given. The statute provides that, notwithstanding the report of the auditors, a creditor, whose claim is in whole or in part rejected, may, for good cause shown, have the said claim referred to referees, whose award and report shall be final. How. & Hutch. Dig. 410. The right is thus given to have referees appointed on good cause shown. Second — the court is made the judge of whether the showing be sufficient or not. It is therefore a discretionary matter, and at this stage of it error will not lie, if it will at all. The referees are a sort of appellate tribunal, who are to. supervise the report of the auditors on the particular claims submitted to them, and their decision is to be final. When their report is made, if the parties be dissatisfied then the matter can be reviewed, on proper exceptions taken.
Judgment affirmed.