Case Name: REDFEARN et al. v. HUNTCLIFF HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC.; and vice versa
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1999-11-23
Citations: 271 Ga. 745
Docket Number: S99A1121, S99X1124
Parties: REDFEARN et al. v. HUNTCLIFF HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC.; and vice versa.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Carley, JJ, who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 745–757

Head Matter:
S99A1121, S99X1124.
REDFEARN et al. v. HUNTCLIFF HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC.; and vice versa.
(524 SE2d 464)

Opinion:
Sears, Justice.
This appeal is brought from the trial court's grant of summary judgment awarding a homeowner's association injunctive relief to remedy the violation of its restrictive covenants. In answering the homeowner's association's complaint, the defendant homeowners claimed that they had been accorded special permission to disregard the covenants. The homeowners also asserted the equitable defense of laches. Appeals concerning a trial court's ruling on a claim for injunctive relief in order to remedy the violation of restrictive covenants are not within the Supreme Court's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over "equity cases." Furthermore, the mere assertion on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling on an equitable defense such as laches does not place an appeal within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, this appeal must be transferred to the Court of Appeals.
Alec and Margaret Redfearn hold title to two adjoining lots in the Huntcliff subdivision, located in Roswell, Georgia. One of the lots remained undeveloped, while the other lot served as the site of the original Redfearn residence. In time, the Redfearns decided to build a new house on the undeveloped lot, and began preparations for its construction. Recorded restrictive covenants that apply to the Hunt-cliff subdivision require that all new homes must be approved by the Huntcliff Homes Association, Inc. ("the Association"), and mandate that all new construction must comply with a 25 foot setback requirement. The covenants, however, allow that the setback requirement may be waived by written permission of the Association.
The Association failed to approve several plans submitted by the Redfearns for the construction of their new house. Eventually, however, the parties reached a written agreement ("the Agreement") regarding construction of the house, in which the Redfearns agreed, among other things, to relocate the property line between their two tracts. According to the Redfearns, they understood the Agreement to include the Association's approval of construction within the setback area of a driveway and a turnaround that would be supported by a 12 foot high retaining wall abutting the neighboring property. The Association contends that it did not approve the retaining wall, and that it had no prior notice of the Redfearns' intention to build the wall.
On April 18, 1997, construction of the retaining wall was completed at a cost of $13,000. On April 30, the Association informed the Redfearns that it considered the wall to violate the covenant requiring the 25 foot setback, and on May 6, the Association filed suit seeking injunctive relief enforcing the covenant and the recovery of attorney fees. In their answer, the Redfearns claimed they had the Association's permission to build the wall, and asserted the affirmative defense of laches.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Association, granting its request for injunctive relief and ordering the Redfearns to remove the wall. The trial court denied the Association's claim for attorney fees. The Redfearns appealed directly to this Court claiming that the Agreement between them and the Association permitted construction of the retaining wall, and also claiming that the trial court erred in rejecting their defense of laches. The Association filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's denial of its request for attorney fees.
1. It is, of course, the Supreme Court's duty to raise and resolve questions pertaining to its jurisdiction whenever there is any doubt concerning whether such jurisdiction exists. This duty is especially important when it impacts upon the Court's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over equity cases, the definition of which has been the subject of confusion and frustration for the Georgia bar as well as both of Georgia's appellate courts. The uncertainty surrounding equity jurisdiction, however, is not a recent occurrence, as it existed even when the distinction between law and equity was a great deal more pronounced than it is today. The concept of "equity" has been evolving for many years, and today much of what used to be considered substantive principles of equity have merged into our law to the extent that they no longer retain their uniquely equitable character. In order to keep pace with both the law's absorption of certain equitable principles, as well as other developments in equity, this Court must continue to delineate as clearly as possible the scope of its jurisdiction over "equity cases."
2. In 1991, this Court issued Beauchamp v. Knight, which held that whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal "depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not upon how the case is styled nor upon the kinds of relief which may be sought by the complaint," and that "[c]ases in which the grant or denial of such relief are merely ancillary to underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues were resolved, are not equity cases."
Beauchamp's guidelines for this Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction were refined in Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., which involved a claim for injunctive relief based upon restrictive covenants found in employment contracts between physicians and the clinic at which they practiced. In Pittman, we reiterated that "whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of invoking appellate jurisdiction in this court depends upon the issue raised on appeal." Based upon that principle, we determined that the primary issue to be resolved in Pittman was whether the trial court properly construed restrictive covenants found in the contracts, and we concluded that the grant or denial of equitable relief was entirely ancillary to that underlying legal issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to decide Pittman, and the appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Since it was decided, Pittman has consistently been relied upon for the proposition that appeals addressing the trial court's grant or denial of equitable relief for the breach of restrictive covenants do not come within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
The present matter, like Pittman, is concerned with whether the trial court erred in finding that the Redfearns violated both the Association's restrictive covenants and the Agreement concerning con struction of the new house. On appeal, the Redfearns assert that the trial court erroneously construed the Agreement, which they argue relieved them of the obligation to comply with the 25 foot setback requirement contained in the covenants. Relying upon the express terms of both documents, the trial court found that the Redfearns' construction of the retaining wall within 25 feet of the adjoining property line violated both the covenants and the Agreement. Thus, "the primary issue" to be resolved in this appeal "is whether the trial court properly construed the contracts" at issue, and while the Association did seek equitable relief, the trial court's resolution of the equitable claim was "secondary to the principal issue of the construction of the contracts — an issue of law." It follows that under Pittman., because the primary issue to be resolved is legal and the viability of any equitable claim is ancillary thereto, this appeal is outside the realm of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "equity cases."
3. The Redfearns' enumeration as error on appeal of the trial court's rejection of their laches defense does not take this case out of the Pittman analysis discussed above, and does not place this case within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Quite to the contrary, this Court has consistently transferred cases that are identical to the present matter (i.e. — suits seeking injunctive relief for the breach of restrictive covenants in which laches is asserted as a defense) to the Court of Appeals under the authority of Pittman.
Furthermore, as discussed above, this Court's seminal case on equity jurisdiction, Beauchamp v. Knight, states that whether an action is an equity case for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not upon the kinds of relief sought in the complaint. It only stands to reason that if the relief sought in a complaint cannot be a basis for determining equity jurisdiction, neither can the defenses asserted in the answer to such a complaint. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has consistently held that neither the mere assertion of an equitable defense in the trial court, nor the enumeration as error on appeal of the trial court's ruling on such a defense, converts a case into one that falls within its equity jurisdiction. In fact, the Court of Appeals has expressly stated that it has jurisdiction over appeals concerning equitable defenses, and has recognized that the assertion of an equitable defense does not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of an appeal that otherwise falls within the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction, thereby affirming that any equitable defense (including but not limited to laches, unclean hands, estoppel and equal fault) asserted in response to a complaint seeking equitable relief does not invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to decide an appeal.
4. The ruling in Division 3, above, is consistent with Pittman's pronouncement that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to decide appeals in which the grant or denial of equitable relief is ancillary to any underlying "issue of law."
As recognized by Professor Dobbs, many of the substantive principles of equity — including (but not limited to) undue influences, mistake, unjust enrichment, fraud, and equitable defenses that include estoppel and laches — have worked themselves into the law to the extent that "there is nothing particularly 'equitable' " about them. Just as we no longer maintain the chancellor's court to administer equitable remedies, but instead rely upon trial judges to administer both legal and equitable relief, we no longer treat certain principles that used to be considered purely equitable as being viable only in equity cases. Rather, these principles have been assimilated into the law, and have been accepted by law courts as proper grounds for either granting or denying relief. Though these principles have equitable origins, and may have been historically considered purely equitable, they have evolved beyond that point and are now either partially or fully legal.
Thus, Pittman's ruling that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide any appeal in which the grant or denial of equitable relief is ancillary or incidental to an underlying "issue of law" supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction of any case in which a long-standing principle of equity that has come to be embodied in our substantive law is merely asserted to support or oppose an appeal touching upon the grant or denial of equitable relief. The defense of laches obviously has its historical origins in equity, and while it still retains certain equitable characteristics, it is among the principles to have worked its way into the law until it is no longer an exclusively equitable defense. Therefore, the enumeration as error on appeal of the trial court's rejection of a laches defense does not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction over this matter.
Of course, the Supreme Court continues to exercise its constitutional grant of jurisdiction to decide appeals in "equity cases," as is most recently evidenced by our decision in Goode v. Mountain Lake Investments. However, for the reasons discussed above, the present appeal is not an "equity case," and there being no other basis for the Supreme Court to assert jurisdiction over it, it must be transferred to the Court of Appeals.
Transferred to the Court of Appeals.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Carley, JJ, who dissent.
Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995).
Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (2) ("Unless otherwise provided hy law, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of. . . all equity cases.").
See Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Heinemann, 268 Ga. 755 (493 SE2d 132) (1997).
See, e.g., Albright v. American Central Ins. Co., 147 Ga. 492 (94 SE 561) (1917); Bernstein v. Fagelson, 166 Ga. 281 (142 SE 862) (1928).
See Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Remedies, § 2.3, pp. 74-78 (1973).
As always, it remains the responsibility of the Supreme Court to construe all constitutional provisions regarding appellate jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's rulings regarding such construction are "a binding and conclusive determination of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals." Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, 267 Ga. 177, 178 (476 SE2d 587) (1996).
261 Ga. 608 (409 SE2d 208) (1991).
Id. at 609.
Id.
263 Ga. 66 (428 SE2d 328) (1993).
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
See King v. Baker, 214 Ga. App. 229 (447 SE2d 129) (1994) (suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the breach of restrictive covenants in which laches was asserted as a defense does not fall within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction). See also Levingston v. Crable, 203 Ga. App. 16 (416 SE2d 131) (1992).
Pittman, 263 Ga. at 66-67.
King, supra. See also Levingston, supra.
261 Ga. at 609.
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bischoff, 179 Ga. 255 (175 SE 560) (1934). See Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71 (65 SE2d 178) (1951), overruled on other grounds, 233 Ga. 824 (213 SE2d 682) (1975).
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 191 Ga. App. 139,140 (381 SE2d 84) (1989); see King, supra; Levingston, supra.
Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga. App. 251 (384 SE2d 394) (1989); Walsh v. Campbell, 130 Ga. App. 194 (202 SE2d 657) (1973).
To the extent that McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731 (492 SE2d 893) (1997), holds otherwise, it is overruled.
A contrary conclusion is not mandated by the assertion in Beaulieu of America v. L.T. Dennard & Co., 253 Ga. 21, 21-22 (315 SE2d 889) (1984), that "laches is peculiarly a factual defense, the resolution of which will rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge, sitting as a chancellor in equity, and without the intervention of a jury." Beaulieu relies upon McGregor v. Town of Ft. Oglethorpe, 236 Ga. 711, 713 (225 SE2d 238) (1976), for that statement, but McGregor makes no holding that laches cases must be decided without the intervention of a jury. Hence, because Beaulieu's reliance on McGregor is misplaced, its assertion concerning laches is invalid. Moreover, this Court has held in numerous cases that laches is ordinarily a question of fact properly submitted to a jury. Davidson Mineral Properties v. Gifford-Hall & Co., 235 Ga. 176,178 (219 SE2d 133) (1975); Bacon v. Edwards, 234 Ga. 100, 103 (214 SE2d 539) (1975); Jackson v. Chatham County, 225 Ga. 641, 645 (170 SE2d 418) (1969).
263 Ga. at 66-67.
See Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 2.6, p. 74. See generally id., § 2.6, pp. 72-78. In fact, throughout history, "law courts [have] continuously tak[en] over equity's substantive ideas." Id. at § 2.6, p. 73. Concomitantly, the right to trial by jury has been expanded. See id. at § 2.6, p. 80.
See id., § 2.6, p. 74.
See id.
271 Ga. 722 (524 SE2d 229) (1999).