Case Name: GRANTMAN a. THEALL
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1865-03
Citations: 19 Abb. Pr. 308
Docket Number: 
Parties: GRANTMAN a. THEALL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's Practice Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 308–314

Head Matter:
GRANTMAN a. THEALL.
Supreme Court, Seventh District;
General Term, March, 1865.
Guardian ad Litem.—Security for Costs.
A defendant sued by an.infant plaintiff who appears by a guardian ad litem, is not . entitled to require the guardian to give security for costs.
The provisions of the Revised Statutes requiring the next friend of an infant plaintiff to give security for costs, do not apply to a guardian ad litem for an infant plaintiff, appointed under the provisions of the Code of Procedure.
' - Appeal from an order vacating an order requiring security for costs. i ,,
The plaintiff in this action was an infant, appearing by John Grantman, his guardian ad litem, appointed under the provisions of the Code of Procedure.
On the 9th of February last, the defendant presented to Mr. Justice E, D. Smith, at chambers, an affidavit, stating among other things that the plaintiff was an infant, and that his guardian was irresponsible, and that costs coaid not be collected of him ; and thereupon the justice granted an alternative order requiring the plaintiff to file security for costs. On the 13th of February, both parties having appeared before the justice,'and having been heard by him, he made an order vacating the order granted on the 9th, and from the order last made the defendant now appealed.
It is generally agreed that the provisions of the Revised Statutes on the subject of security for costs, arc not repealed by the Code of Procedure. The extent to which the case in the text goes, is to hold that the part of those provisions which relate to the next friend of an infant, is not applicable to a guardian of an infant plaintiff under the Code. (Compare Rutter a. Puckhoffer, 9 Bosw., 639.)
It is to be observed, however, that the court have power to require security for costs, in their discretion, independent of the authority given by statute-(People a. Oneida C. P., 18 Ward, 652; Swift a. Collins, 1 Den., 659 ; Dyer a. Dunivan, 3 How. Pr., 135.) It is a common-law power akin to that which the courts exercise in staying proceedings in a second suit, until costs of a former suit on the same subject shall have been paid. (Compare Jackson a. Miller, 3 Cow., 57 ; Jackson a. Edwards, 1 Ib., 138.)
It is undoubtedly a very common practice to deny applications for security upon the ground that a case within the statute is not made out; but it may very well be that the court have power to require it in their discretion, and in a proper case would do so. (Compare, further, Fulton a. Rosevelt, 1 Paige, 178; Tenbroeck a. Reynolds, 13 How. Pr., 462.)

Opinion:
By. the Court. —E. Darwin Smith, J.
In the Revised Statutes (chap. 8, title 2, part 3, marg. p. 445 ; vol. 2 of 3d ed., p. 543), it was provided as follows:
" § 1. When an infant shall have any right of action," . . . "he shall be entitled to maintain a suit thereon" .
" § 2.Q Before any process shall be issued in the name of an infant, who is sole plaintiff in any suit, a competent and responsible person shall be appointed to appear as next friend for such infant in such suit, who shall be responsible for the costs thereof." *'
In title 2 of chapter 10 of the Revised Statutes (vol. 2, marg. p. ,620), it is provided, that, among other cases, " when a suit shall be commenced in any court,.....in the name of any infant, whose next friend has not given security for costs, the defendant may require such plaintiff to file security" for costs; and also, that when security for costs may be required by the provisions of that title, the plaintiff's attorney, instituting such suit, shall be liable for costs to an amount not exceeding $100. Section 8 of the same title 2, of chapter 8 (marg. p. 446; 3d ed., vol. 2, p. 542), also provided that " after the issuing of process against any infant defendant by which he shall have been arrested, the suit shall not 'be any further prosecuted, until a guardian for such infant be appointed."
It will thus be seen that the Revised Statutes provided, that an infant plaintiff shall sue by a next friend, and that an infant defendant defend by guardian; and such was the practice in this State, under this statute, before the Code of Procedure, and such was the previous rule at common law. In the Code (§ 115), it was provided that " when an infant is a party, he must appear by guardianand section 316 is as follows: " When costs are adjndged against an infant plaintiff, the guardian by whom he appeared in the action shall be respon sible therefor, and payment thereof may be enforced by attachment."
The Code thus introduced a new practice. It dispensed with the "next friend" of the common law and of the Eevised Statutes, and substituted in his place a guardian for the infant,, by whom the infant is both to sue, when he is plaintiff, and by whom he is to appear, when sued, as defendant. The provision of the Eevised Statutes requiring the next friend of an infant plaintiff to give security for costs, does not apply to the guardian of the Code. The guardian is liable for costs, the payment of which-, as above stated, may be enforced by attachment. The Legislature made a distinction between the next friend and the guardian of an infant, in the Revised Statutes, and also in the Code; for in section 114 of the Code, in the amendment of 1857, it is provided that a married woman (who in the amendment of 1851, and previously at common law, was required in most cases to sue by a next friend), " need in no case prosecute or defend by guardian or next friend," and there was ever a distinction between the name and office of next friend (prochein ami) and guardian, at common law. I cannot see, therefore, how we can apply the provision of the Eevised Statutes, requiring the next friend of an infant plaintiff to give security for costs, to the guardian of the Code. It is not necessary to say that this provision is repealed by implication. It does not in terms apply to the guardian. The Legislature has not so applied it, and we are simply to decide that there is no express provision in the statute requiring a guardian, as such, and who sues for an infant plaintiff by that name—a name well known and recognized at law—to give security for costs.
This question was so decided in this court, at an early period under the Code (March term, 1851), in the suit of Catharine Vernon, by her guardian, against William C. Butler. In that case, costs being awarded against the plaintiff, an order was made at special term that the attorney pay the same; no security for costs having been filed by the guardian. This order was reversed at the general term, on the ground, as we understand, and as we must hold in this case, that the guardian was not bound under the Code to give security for costs, and that the provision of the Revised Statutes requiring the next friend of an infant to give security for costs, did not apply to, such a guardian.
I think the Legislature intended to introduce a new rule and a new practice on the subject, and that the plaintiff was not bound to give security for costs, and that the order of the judge below should, therefore, be affirmed.
Johnson, P. J., concurred.
Present, Johnson, P. J., James C. Smith and E. D. Smith, JJ.