Case Name: Edward H. Bartlett and others, Vestry of St. Matthew's Parish, Oakland vs. The Rev. Frederick S. Hipkins
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1892-04-08
Citations: 76 Md. 5
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward H. Bartlett and others, Vestry of St. Matthew’s Parish, Oakland vs. The Rev. Frederick S. Hipkins.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 76
Pages: 5–40

Head Matter:
Edward H. Bartlett and others, Vestry of St. Matthew’s Parish, Oakland vs. The Rev. Frederick S. Hipkins.
Protestant Episcopal Church — Choosing a Rector — Powers of Vestries — Termination of Contract — Act of 1798, ch. 24 —Incorporation of Vestry.
The canon of the Protestant Episcopal Church (Canon 4, Title II) which provides that in case of any disagreement between a Rector and the vestry in regard to the dissolution of his pastoral relation, either party may give notice of such disagreement to the Bishop, and that his decision in the premises shall be final and binding upon the parties, and which declares by its fourth section that the Canon shall not be in force in any diocese with whose laws or charters it may interfere, is not in force in the diocese of Maryland, being in conflict with the Act of Assembly of 1798. ch. 24, incorporating the vestries of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and vesting them with full power and authority, from time to time, to choose ministers to officiate in any Church or Chapel belonging to the parish, for such time as the said vestry may think proper, and to agree and contract with such ministers for their salary, &c.
Where there was a vacancy in a parish, and tho vestry by resolution tendered to II. the rectorship of the parish, and agreed at the same time to pay him 8700 a year, and this call, and the terms upon which it was offered were accepted, and the call and agreement were both recorded among the proceedings of the vestiw, such resolution, notwithstanding it did not designate a definite time for which II. was chosen rector, was not only a substantial, but a literal compliance with the Act of 1798, ch. 24.
Where the Convention of the Diocese has constituted a parish, and the parishioners have elected a vestry, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1798, ch. 24, such vestry, ipso facto, becomes a corporate body.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Garrett County, in Equity.
This appeal was taken from the order of the lower Court overruling the motion to dissolve the injunction previously granted, and making said injunction permanent. The opinion of this Court, together with the separate opinion of Chief Judge Alvey, furnish a full statement of the case.
The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, MoSherry, and Briscoe, J.
Henry D. Davis, and William Pinkney Whyte, (with whom were James W. Thomas, and Henry Wise Garnett, on the brief,) for the appellants.
The solution of the question at issue, is dependent upon the Maryland vestry law — the Act of 1798, ch. 24. — Under that law the vestry may choose a minister for such time as it may think proper, and may agree with him as to salary on such terms and conditions as it may think reasonable and proper; and upon the expiration of the contract the vestry may renew it, but if not renewed the vestry’s choice and contract shall remain until it declares its desire to make a new choice or contract.
The vestry in this case called — that is, chose — the appellee as rector, and promised him $700 a year. This was on the 3rd of December, 1887. Nothing was said in the vestry’s resolution about canons or laws. Of course, it was acting under the vestry law, and that only. The appellee accepted the vestry’s invitation and became rector.
It is simply a question of civil law what this action on the part of the vestry and the appellee means. The reciprocal action of the vestry and the appellee constituted a contract between them of indefinite employment and service. And such a contract is terminable at the will of either party, or, at the least, upon reasonable notice.
An agreement to pay for future services at the rate of a certain sum per year is not of itself a hiring for a year or any definite time. Prentiss vs. Ledyard, 28 Wis., 131.
By the terms of a contract between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff, in consideration of a certain sum for the year 1873, and of another sum for 1874, to be paid in semimonthly or monthly instalments, agreed to devote his whole time and attention solely to the business of the defendant. Under the contract, plaintiff entered the service of the defendant and continued it up to June, 1873, when the defendant suspended business. It was held, that the plaintiff could not recover of the defendant. Orr vs. Ward, 73 Ill., 318.
By a written contract reciting that B. intended to carry on a certain business, and wished to secure the services of A., A. agreed to give “during the term of not exceeding three years from the date” of the instrument, his exclusive time and skill to the business, and not to be connected “during the continuance of this agreement” with any other person in such business; and B. agreed “during the said term to pay” A. “$>30 per week as compensation for his services so rendered.” In an action by A. against B. for wrongfully discharging him before the expiration of three years, it was held that B. could terminate the contract at any time by giving reasonable notice. Harper vs. Hassard, 113 Mass., 187.
“There can be no doubt that, in this country, the rule is, an indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will. It is also well settled that a hiring at so much a week, month, or year, no time being specified, does not, of itself, make more than an indefinite hiring.” McCullough Iron Co. vs. Carpenter, 67 Md., 557.
In this case it was held that the employment of an assistant manager at $1,000 per year was indefinite, and so at will. And see, to the same effect, Coffin vs. Landis, 46 Pa. St., 426; Peacock vs. Chambers, 46 Penn. St., 434; De Briar vs. Minium, 1 Cal., 450; Blaisdell vs. Lewis, 32 Me., 515.
The result is, that the contract of employment between the appellants and. the appellee, being for an indefinite period, and so an employment at will, was terminable at the pleasure of either party. On the 13th of September, 1890, the appellants requested of the appellee his resignation, to take effect the 1st of January, 1891. The appellee declined to resign, and thereupon the appellants notified him that they would consider his rectorship as terminated on the 1st of Janitary, 1891. Clearly,'this ended the appellee’s contract relations with the appellants; and, accordingly ended his rights as rector.
The Court below thought otherwise; and cited in support of its view the cases of Avery vs. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass., 160; Sheldon vs. Congregational Parish of Easton, 24 Pick., 286, and Youngs vs. Ransom, 31 Barb., 58. Of these the first two are cases of Congregational ministers, the last a case of a Protestant Episcopal rector.
In Avery vs. Tyringham, Parker, C. J., said (p. 177); “It is a general rule that an office is holden at the will of either party, unless a different tenure be expressed in the appointment, or is implied by the nature of the office, or results from ancient usage.” The Court, considering the nature of the office of a Congregational minister, the constitution, laws and usages of Massachusetts as to the settlement of such, concluded that an agreement involved in the settlement was not at will. The case in Pickering is similar.
The short answer to these cases is, that Maryland has no laws or usages from which a similar conclusion could be deduced. On the contrary, her ecclesiastical history clearly shows a hostility to the notion that such a contract is to last for the life-time of a clergyman. The history of Canon 4, of Title II, puts this beyond doubt. And, besides, the very law under which the contract between the parties hereto was made, was conceived in the purpose of putting an end to life-tenures of the clergy, and the church establishment, and of throwing the whole matter of the incumbency of rectors upon the law of civil contract.
The case of Youngs vs. Ransom is not in point. In that case, the diocese of which the rector's parish formed part was subject to Canon 4, Title II, and the Court relied upon this Canon. Says the Court (pp. 58-’9) : “When a minister is called or settled in an Episcopal parish without any such limitation, he can only be dismissed, or sever the connection, by mutual consent, or by superior ecclesiastical authority, on the application of one of the parties. The 33d Canon of the General Convention of 1832 [Canon 4, Title II] is very explicit to this effect. ’’
This case is instructive on one point: The Court says in so many words, “The ecclesiastical law of the mother country is no part of the law under which we live.” p. 60.
There are similar cases, not cited by the Court. Thus, in Batterson vs. Thompson, 8 Phil., 251, (the “St. Clement’s Church Case”), the Court says : “The charter being granted, the rector and his parishioners, together with the vestry, held rights under and by virtue of that fundamental law, which in terms ‘adopts the constitution, canons, doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church’ in this diocese and in the United States, and acknowledges their authority.”
In Lynd vs. Menzies, et at., 33 N. J. L., 162, there was a dedication of a lot for a church, “to be consecrated, appropriated and devoted forever, exclusively to the service of Almighty God, according to the doctrine, discipline and worship of the Protestant. Episcopal Church in the United States of America,” and the canon was applied.
In Bird vs. St. Marie’s Church of Waterloo, 62 Iowa, 567, the Court relies expressly upon the fact that the church by its articles of incorporation, &c., subjected itself to the General Convention and its canons, saying that by reason of such subjection “these canons became just as much a part of the contract of employment as if they had been specifically referred to, or written out in full therein.” (p. 572-’3.) No case can be found militating or appearing to militate against the position taken, in behalf of the appellants, under the law of Maryland; and every case supposed so to militate will be found to have arisen where the canon is in conceded operation, and to turn upon the canon.
Edward N. Rich, and Charles Handfield Wyatt, for the appellee.
This case involves no dispute as to facts, nor any conflict between the civil law and the ecclesiastical law, to which both parties, as members of the same religious organization, are equally subject.
Under the ecclesiastical law of England, as to the Church of England, to which the Protestant Episcopal Church is the successor in this country (1798, ch. 24, sec. 9), the incumbent held a life tenure de bene esse, and together with the wardens formed the corporation; and the vestry was composed of all the contributing parishioners. This law, in so far as not varied by statute, or the changed circumstances of the country, or the laws, customs, usages and discipline of the Protestant Episcopal Church, is, if not the law of the Church, at least the basis of that law, (Lynd vs. Menzies, 33 N. J. L., 162,) to which we must look in interpreting the existing law. In 1692, when the Grown had seized into its own hands the government of the Province of Maryland, a law was passed directing the County Justices to lay out each county into parishes, and the freeholders in each parish were to choose the vestrymen, who were to levy rates, Ac., hut no change in the tenure was made. To this law there were some supplements, and in the course of a few years the State was divided into probably thirty-one parishes. In 1702 the former Acts were repealed and a new one passed, establishing what was called a select vestry of six, who, with the incumbent, had like powers, but the tenure was not changed.
This life-tenure was fully recognized by the Act of the Provincial General Assembly of Maryland, passed May 1st, 1744, ch. III, entitled “An Act to divide St. Stephen’s, alias North Sassafras parish, in Cecil County,” in which, after dividing that parish into two, it provides that the Rev. Hugh Jones, the then incumbent, shall continue the incumbent of both parishes during his life.
This law continued until 1779, when a new law was passed for the establishment of select vestries, and in this law for the first time appeared any grant of power to the vestry to call a rector, which grant of power originated probably in the exigencies of the time of the Revolution. This law continued until 1798, ch. 24, commonly known as the Vestry Act. By sec. 15 of that Act, the vestry have granted to them a power which they may exercise if they please, to limit the tenure of the rector, but it can only be exercised in the one way set forth, by direct contract or agreement with the rector, and such agreement or contract must be entered in their proceedings; in the absence of the exercise of such power, the tenure of the rector must remain a life-tenure so far as the civil law in Maryland affects it.
This was not only the case in Maryland, but in most of the other States. Such tenure and pastoral connec tion might of course he terminated by the mutual agreement of the parties, as it had been formed by such agreement, but the church recognized the fact that circumstances might arise under which it might be desirable to terminate the relationship, even though one party might he unwilling to agree to it.
As early as 1808 the Church enacted a Canon on this subject, and its provisions, with modifications, from time to time, have continued, and are embodied in Canon 4, Title II. This Canon provides for this case more fully and more satisfactorily than possibly could he done by the civil law. It recognizes the fact that the pastoral relation exists not only between the rector and the vestry, hut more especially between the rector and Ms parishioners, and that the vestry acts as such, only when authorized to act in the premises. By this Canon a tribunal is established, comprised of the Bishop and his Standing Committee, who are fully empowered to hear the whole matter, and their decision is final and absolute.
This tribunal being composed of the Bishop and the Standing Committee, who in this diocese consist of eight presbyters, elected annually by the Convention — members who are supposed to be those most to be trusted with the ecclesiastical affairs o’f the diocese — is the one than which none could be more fit to consider and decide such questions. 'It is one before which not only the rector and vestry may appear, hut also any of the parishioners, so that the full facts of the case may he understood, and no man can be dismissed from his “office” without charges being made, and opportunity given him to meet and refute the same.
This Canon provides in its last section that it shall not he in force in any diocese which has made, or shall hereafter make, provision by Canon on this subject. The diocese of Maryland has no Canon on this subject.
It also provides that it .shall not be in force in any diocese with whose laws or charters it may interfere. There is nothing in the organization or charter of St. Matthew’s parish with which it interferes. Nor is it in conflict with the civil law of Maryland; for it is shown that under that, there is only one way in which the vestry may limit the tenure of the rector, viz., by express agreement and contract with him, entered among the proceedings; if such agreement exists, and the pastoral relation is terminated by it, then the case does not come under this Canon, which provides in the first section: “nor may .such rector or minister be removed therefrom by said parish or vestry against his will;” if he have agreed to a limitation of the tenure, the ending of it cannot be against his tuill.
A rector is not a mere hireling. He is elected to an office. He does not agree to serve for a year or for any specified time, but until the pastoral relation is terminated by mutual consent, or the intervention of the ecclesiastical authority. In Avery vs. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass., 170, it is said: “'I cannot, therefore, entertain a doubt that a contract made between a minister and his people, in terms like the one before us, continues for the life of the minister.”
“Before and since the Revolution this question has been considered by the Courts of Law, * * and it has been the uniform opinion of all the Judges who have successively filled the bench of our highest Judicial Courts, that when no tenure was annexed to the office of a minister, by the terms of settlement, he did not hold the office at will, but for life, determinable for some good and sufficient cause, or by the consent of both parties. ” (p. 178.) See Youngs vs. Ransom, 31 Barbour, 58; Lynd vs. Menzies, 33 New Jersey Law, 162; Sheldon vs. Cong. Parish of Easton, 24 Pick., 281; Batterson vs. Thompson, 8 Phila., 251, (the St. Clement's Church Case) ; Perry vs. Wheeler, 12 Bush, 541; Webber vs. Zimmerman, 22 Md., 156-170.
The appellants have undertaken to construe this “call” to be for one year, and that it continued from year to year until terminated by their resolution of the 15th of November, 1890. Undoubtedly under sec, 15 of the Vestry Act they might have made such a call, and if agreed to by Mr. H., and entered among their proceedings, it would have been the law of the case. But they did not do so; the call is indefinite as to time, and with one restriction alone, that the salary should be seven hundred dollars per annum, &c. Even were the call a mere hiring, and not an election to office, in McCullough vs. Carpenter, 67 Md., 557, this Court has decided “There can be no doubt that in this country the rule is, an indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will. It is also well settled that a hiring at so much a week, month or year, no time being specified, does not make more than an indefinite hiring. It is competent for the parties to show what the mutual understanding was, but unless there was a mutual understanding it is only an indefinite hiring. ”
Under, this decision the stipulation as to salary did not make the call one for one year. The nature of the case, the relationship established, and the intimate, responsible and solemn duties undertaken, render it unreasonable to suppose-that the call to the office was offered or accepted as a call at will. Youngs vs. Ransom, and Avery vs. Inhabitants of Tyringham, supra.
Before the civil law, religious organizations are merely voluntary associations, and members uniting themselves to such organizations impliedly consent to and are bound to obey the laws which they thus make for themselves; and the decisions of the tribunals established by such bodies concerning any question of doctrine, discipline or worship, are final, when properly rendered, and the civil Courts will not undertake to review such decision. German Reformed Church vs. Seibert, 3 Barr, 282-291; Watson vs. Jones, 13 Wallace, 727; Ferry vs. Wheeler, 12 Bush, 541; Tartar, et al. vs. Gibbs, et al., 24 Md., 323, 338 and 339.
What is the status of the appellants — are they a de jure vestry, duly incorporated, or merely a de facto vestry, constituted by the Convention of the Diocese of Maryland, aud who have to look to the civil law to make them a body politic ? The question properly arises in this case, because if they are a voluntary association, only constituted and recognized by the religious organization to which they belong, they are absolutely bound by the laws, canons, customs, usages and discipline of that body, and can lay claim to no powers which by the civil law are granted to a duly incorporated body. The question, therefore, properly arising in this case (though not essential to the contention of the appellee), it is important that it shall be determined.
All parishes had been established by the civil law in this State under the Acts of 1692 and 1702 of the Provincial Assembly, and all changes therein had been made by the same authority until the Vestry Act of 1798, under the 33d section of which the complainants claim to be incorporated; the Convention of the Diocese of Maryland, was a voluntary association originating in 1783, and which was never even incorporated until the year 1840, by Act of Assembly of that year, ch. 67, amended in 1856, ch. 17, and again in 1878, ch. 403, and this was only for the purposes therein set out as to holding and managing property and money. The Act of 1802, ch. 111, was the first general law for the incorporation of religious bodies; this Act in its 10th section grants to persons desiring to separate from the Church or congregation to which they belong and establish a separate place of worship and employ a minister for themselves, the right to do so on certain terms, and they shall then he entitled to all the benefits of that Act, anything in the Act of 1798 to the contrary notwithstanding; it also, by section 11, repeals so much of the Act of 1798, as gives to the church wardens the powers of civil officers of the place, and in section 12 reaffirms the Act of 1798, except as altered by these sections 10 and 11. The general incorporation law, 1868, ch. 471, embodies the provisions of the Act of 1802, and in its 169th section has a saving clause reserving to the Protestant Episcopal Church the right to incorporate vestries in its several parishes according to. the usages of said Church; and this saving clause is also embodied in the Code of 1888, Art. 23, sec. 217. Did the Legislature intend by the 33d section of the Vestry Act that the election of a vestry, when the Convention had constituted a parish by metes and bounds, should ipso facto work the incorporation of that vestry ? or do the words in that section “and be incorporated by the name of the vestry of such new parish" imply that such vestry must -take such further step of incorporating itself as incorporations were then effected by the Act of'the Legislature, or since the Act of 1802, ch. 111, as that Act provides? If this vestry ought to have incorporated under that Act they have failed to comply with its terms and are not incorporated. Boyce vs. Trustees of the Towsontown Station of the M. E. Church, 46 Md., 369.
If the Act of 1798, ch. 24, is supposed ipso facto to incorporate the vestry, there is no provision for any public record of such final action. In the matter of the holding or transfer of property it would introduce an element of great uncertainty as to title, and should such a corporation be sued, it would render the proving of its corporate existence almost impossible. Boyce vs. Trustees of the Towsontown Station of the M. E. Church, supra. See McKim vs. Odom, 3 Bland, 416.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is an interesting one, and one too of more than ordinary importance. The plaintiff is a clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the defendants are vestrymen of Saint Matthew's parish, in Garrett County. After some correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendants, and the Bishop of the diocese, in regard to filling a vacancy then existing in the rectorship of the parish, the defendants on the 3d December, 1887, passed the following resolution: "That in consideration of the letter received from the Bishop, the Rev. F. S. Hipkins is hereby called to the rectorship of St. Matthew's parish, Oakland, Md., also that the vestry pledge to the Rev. F. S. Hipkins the sum of seven hundred dollars a year, independent of what he may receive from the mission fund."
This call, with the terms and conditions on which it was offered, was accepted by the plaintiff, and he at once entered upon the discharge of his duties as rector. Subsequently, on the 13th of September, 1890, the vestry by resolution requested the plaintiff to resign his rector-ship, the said resignation to take effect January 1st, 1891. This however he refused to do, and the vestry by resolution passed 15th of November, 1890, notified him that his rectorship of the parish would terminate 1st of January next ensuing. From this action of the vestry the plaintiff appealed to the Bishop of the diocese, claiming under Title II, Canon 4, of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, that the vestry had no power to terminate his pastoral relations against his consent. This canon provides, that in case of any disagreement between a rector and the vestry in regard to the dissolution of his pastoral relations, either party may give notice of such disagreement to the Bishop, and that the decision of the Bishop in the premises shall be final and binding upon the parties. Section 4, how ever, provides, that "this canon, shall not he in force in any diocese which has made, or shall hereafter make, provision by canon upon the subject, nor in any diocese with whose laws or charters it may interfere." In every diocese, therefore, in which this canon is in force, the termination, of the pastoral relations of the rector must, it is clear, he governed by its provisions. On the other hand, if any diocese has adopted a canon of its own in regard to the subject-matter, or if the general canon law interferes with the State law, then the general canon law has no application or force in such diocese or State. No canon, it is conceded, has been adopted in this diocese upon the subject-matter, and the question, then, is whether there is any State law inconsistent with the provisions of the general canon law, for, if so, the canon is not, it must be conceded, in force in this State. Now the Act of 1198, chapter 24, incorporating the vestries of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and vesting in them the title and possession of all lands and property belonging to the church, provides (section 15) that "the vestry of every parish shall have full power and authority, from time to time, to choose one or more ministers or readers of the Protestant Episcopal Church, (heretofore called the Church of England), to officiate in any church or chapel belonging to the parish, and to perform the other duties of a minister therein, for such time as the said vestry may think proper, and they may agree, and contract with such minister or ministers, reader or readers, for his or their salary, and respecting the use and occupation of the parsonage-house, or any glebe or other lands, or other property, if any, belonging to the parish, and on such terms and conditions as they may think reasonable and proper, and. their choice and contract shall be entered among their proceedings; and upon the expiration of such contract, the said vestry may, in their discretion, renew their choice, or make a new contract; but if they do not incline so to do, their former choice and contract shall remain, until they declare their desire to make a new choice or contract." This Act was in force at the time the plaintiff accepted the call tendered to him by the vestry, and when he entered upon the discharge of his duties as rector. By this Act the vestry was not only authorized to "choose" or appoint a minister, but his tenure and the termination of his pastoral relations were made the subject-matter of contract between the vestry and himself, provisions altogether inconsistent with the canon law, and, being inconsistent, we do not see on what grounds that law can be considered as being in force in this State. The Bishop, however, decided that the canon law was applicable in this particular case, because the vestry failed to comply with the conditions of the civil law; and this being so, he decided also that the vestry had no power, either under the civil or ecclesiastical law^to terminate the pastoral relations of the plaintiff. Now, if it be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the vestry had failed to comply with the requirements of the civil law, the Act of 1798 still being in force, we do not see, with great deference, how its failure in this respect could make operative a canon not in force in this State. But, be that as it may, whether the resolution of the 3rd of December, in pursuance of which the plaintiff accepted the rectorship of this parish, be a compliance with the Act of 1798, depends upon the terms of the resolution, as construed in the light of the facts and circumstances under which it was passed, and the law as it then existed in reference to the subject-matter. And in considering these it will be necessary to refer briefly to certain facts connected with the Colonial history of the Church which led to the passage of that Act by which the vestries in this State were authorized to employ ministers, and to contract with them in regard to the tenure of their office. By the Act of 1702, ch. 1, the Church of England, with its Rites, Ceremonies and Sacraments, was declared to be the established Church of the Province; and by it provision was made for the support of its ministers by an annual levy "of forty pounds of tobacco per poll upon every taxable person" within each respective parish. How far and to what extent, the Church thus established, was subject to the English Ecclesiastical law has given rise to a good deal of discussion, and about which there is some conflict of opinion. It may be fairly assumed, however, that the Colonial Church was subject to and governed by this law so far as it was applicable and was consistent with the chartered rights of Lord Baltimore. The Bishop) of London, as Bishop) Ordinary, not only claimed, but exercised so far as was practicable, ecclesiastical jurisdiction; but the distance and want of communication with the Mother Country and other causes rendered the exercise of this jurisdiction almost powerless. But in the Presentation, Appointment and Induction of clergymen the Colonial Church was not governed, it is clear, by the ecclesiastical law. In England the Presentation was made by the patron, the founder of the parish, having the right of advowson, or by his heir or alienee; and when presented if there was no objection to him, he was instituted by the Bishop, that is, put in the care of' the souls of the parish. Then followed Induction by the mandate of the Bishop, being a ceremonial act performed by the inductor, the Archdeacon; such as the delivery to the incumbent of the key of the church door, and then the tolling of the bell, or other like ceremony, being a symbolical delivery to him of the possession of the church, and all the property belonging to the parish, including tithes, &c. And when once inducted, he thereby acquired a freehold interest in the property of the parish of which he could not be deprived except by ecclesiastical sentence. Here, however, the appointment was made by Lord Baltimore as the owner of all the livings and entitled therefore to the right of advowson, and when so appointed the minister was licensed by the Bishop of London, and he was then inducted by the Governor. And, though there does not appear to have been any ceremony accompanying the act of Induction, the same legal effect followed it as in England. At least no clergyman once inducted, was ever deprived of his benefice during the Colonial period, for although subject to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of London, yet such were the difficulties attending its exercise that all efforts on his part, or by his commissary to bring offending clergymen to trial and punishment proved unavailing. And, referring to this subject, the Rev. Dr. Hawks says: "Thus Lord Baltimore selected a clergyman in England and appointed him to a living; the Bishop of London gave him a license; the Governor inducted him; if he did wrong, the commissary tried him, if there happened to be a commissary; and when convicted, no power punished him; for after induction even his Lordship, the Proprietor, could not remove him; and the Bishop of London, his Diocesan, could neither give nor take away the meanest living." Hawks' Eco. Con., 194. This condition of things produced its legitimate fruits, and the persistent but unsuccessful efforts on the part of the vestry to dissolve the pastoral relation, when such dissolution seemed so desirable, forms a painful chapter in the Colonial history of the Church, the details of which we have no inclination to consider. And this continued down to the American Revolution, when Maryland, having formed a Constitution for its own government, put an end forever to the Establishment. But the troubles of the Church did uot cease with its disestablishment. Many of its clergy remained loyal to the Mother Country, and before the Revolution was over, a majority of the parishes were left without a rector. The proprietary rights of Lord Baltimore being annulled by the Revolution, he no longer had the power of appointment; and the Bishop of London, if his jurisdiction still continued, no longer attempted to exercise it, and if he had, such was the temper of the times, it is doubtful whether his authority would have been respected. There was no Bishop in the State, and strange to say, there never was a Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country until after the Revolution, Bishop Seabury of Connecticut, consecrated in 1784, being the first American Bishop. So practically speaking there was no law, civil or ecclesiastical, for the government of the Church, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to provide by law some mode for the appointment of ministers to fill, not only the vacancies then existing, but such as might occur in the future. And hence the Act of 1779, ch. 9, providing for the election of a vestry in every parish, in whom, when elected, was vested the title to all churches, chapels and property belonging to the parish; and this Act further provided "that the said vestrymen or a major part of them shall have full power and authority to employ a minister of the Church of England, to officiate in their respective churches or chapels for such time as may be agreed upon." We have thus briefly traced the causes which led to the passage of this Act. The laity had felt the mischiefs resulting from the appointment of ministers by patrons and strangers, and they had experienced, too, the difficulties in dissolving the pastoral relation when once established, however, much the best interests of the parish might require such a dissolution. And to remedy all this the power to select or "'choose" a minister — for such is the language of the Act — was conferred upon the vestry, and his tenure was made a matter of contract between himself and the vestry. This Act remained in force until the Act of 1798, ch. 24, in which was embodied the same provision in regard to the selection of a minister and his tenure when so selected, the word "choose" being substituted for "employ" used in the Act of 1779; and with this further significant and important modification, that if, upon the termination of his tenure as fixed by the contract, the vestry failed "to make a new choice or contract," the minister was still to continue in his rectorship, until the vestry deemed it advisable to "make a new choice or contract."
This Act was in full force when the defendants tendered the rectorship of this parish to the plaintiff and when it was accepted by him, and Canon 4 being inconsistent with its provisions, it necessarily follows that the dissolution of the plaintiff's pastoral relations must be governed by and determined by the Act. The contention, however, and it is the sole contention, of the plaintiff, is that the general canon law must be considered operative, in this particular case at least, because the defendants by the resolution of December 3rd, by which the plaintiff was called to the rectorship of the parish, failed to comply with the conditions of the Act of 1798. Without conceding for a moment that the failure of the defendants in this respect, could make operative a canon law otherwise conceded not to be in force in this State, let us see whether it can be fairly said that they have failed to comply with the conditions of the law. Here was a vacancy in the parish, and. after some correspondence with the Bishop the vestry offered to delegate to him its authority to call a minister. But this offer he declined, because he had some doubts whether he could lawfully exercise delegated power, and, further, because he did not believe the plaintiff would accept the appointment unless he thereby had the full authority of a rector. Then, by the resolution of 3rd December, the defendants tendered to the plaintiff the rectorship of the parish, agreeing at the same time to pay him seven hundred dollars a year. This call, and the terms upon which it was offered, were accepted. Here, then, is a case in which the plaintiff was chosen rector by the vestry, and in consideration of his services as such, an agreement on its part to pay to him a stipulated sum of money a year, and this call and agreement were both recorded among its proceedings. What more does the Act of 1798 require? But it is said the resolution of the 3rd of December, fails to comply with the conditions of the Act, because it does not fix a definite* time for which the plaintiff was chosen rector; that it does not fix a day for the termination of his pastoral relation. This is a question of law, to be determined by the terms of the contract itself, and the nature and character of the services to be rendered under it. The plaintiff knew, or in law is presumed to have known, that the vestry in tendering to him the rectorship of the parish was acting in pursuance of the authority conferred on it by the Act of 1798. This we say because there was no other law, civil or canonical, in force in this State conferring upon a vestry the power to call a minister, and to contract with him in regard to his tenure as minister. And for the purposes of this case it is altogether immaterial whether the resolution of 3rd December be construed as a contract for a definite, or an indefinite time. It is immaterial because, if it be construed as a contract for a definite time — for a year, — then the plaintiff's rectorship terminated at the end of that year. On the other hand, if it be construed as a contract for an indefinite time, then it is a contract at will, terminable any time at the will of either party. So in any aspect in which this resolution under which the plaintiff assumed his rectorship may be considered, it is, it seems to us, not only a substantial but a literal compliance with the terms and conditions of the Act. If it be construed as a yearly contract, a contract for a year, then the defen dants had the right, beyond question, to terminate the plaintiff's pastoral relations on the 1st of January, 1891, or, if it be construed as a contract at will, they had the right to terminate it at any time they might deem it proper.
Now, as to the doubt, suggested in regard to the incorporation of the vestry of this parish it is sufficient to say the Act, of 1798, declared, in the first place, every vestry elected in pursuance of the provisions of that Act to be a corporate body; and then it further provided that the Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this Diocese may from time to time constitute new parishes, by dividing or uniting the several parishes then existing, and the vestries of such parishes elected in pursuance of the Act are thereby declared to be incorporated. So all that is necessary to incorporate a vestry under this Act, is that the Convention of the Diocese shall in the first place constitute the parish, and then that the parishioners shall elect a vestry, and when these conditions are complied with the vestry ipso facto becomes a corporate body. And such has been the practice and usage of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the formation of parishes, and the incorporation of vestries ever since the Act of 1798, was passed. And the general corporation law, Art. 23, sec. 217, provides in express terms, that "nothing in this Article shall prevent the Protestant Episcopal Church from incorporating the vestries in the several parishes according to the usages of the said church."
The Act of 1798 is not to be found, it is true, in the Code. But the Code is a codification of the Public General Laws, and the Public Local Laws. This Act, is neither a Public General Law nor is it a Public Local Law. It is a mere private Act incorporating the vestries of a particular Religious denomination, private corporations, and being a private law it was not and could not properly be codified as part of the Public General Laws. It follows from what we have said that the order granting an injunction in this case must be reversed, and that the bill filed by the plaintiff must be dismissed.
(Decided 8th April, 1892.)
Order reversed, and bill dismissed.
On the 23rd of April, 1892, a motion was made by the appellee for the rehearing of the foregoing case, but the motion was overruled.