Case Name: Dennis VENTRESS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANEL-RYDER, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-05-22
Citations: 225 So. 2d 765
Docket Number: No. 2693
Parties: Dennis VENTRESS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANEL-RYDER, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before TATE, SAVOY, and CUL-PEPPER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 225
Pages: 765–776

Head Matter:
Dennis VENTRESS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANEL-RYDER, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 2693.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
May 22, 1969.
On Rehearing Aug. 7, 1969.
On Rehearing Aug. 14, 1969.
On Rehearing Aug. 18, 1969.
Taylor & Trosclair, by Frank P. Tros-clair, Jr., Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellant.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, by James E. Diaz, LaFayette, for defendants-appellees.
Before TATE, SAVOY, and CUL-PEPPER, JJ.

Opinion:
TATE, Judge.
The plaintiff Ventress appeals from the dismissal of his suit to recover additional workmen's compensation benefits from his employer and its insurer. In October, 1966, Ventress was injured at work as a common laborer. He was paid compensation during disability for five months, until discharged by his attending physician as able to return to work.
The chief issues of this appeal concern whether there is any compensable residual disability.
1.
The facts are as follows: Ventress sustained a severe lumbosacral strain at work. Such an injury consists of a tearing of the ligaments supporting the lumbosacral joint.
Ventress underwent treatment for five months, was discharged, and immediately returned to work. His attending physician noted that he was still complaining of back pain at the time, but Ventress wanted to return to work in view of the absence of objective symptoms. He has been working as a bricklayer ten hours per day at $3.00 per hour consistently since his discharge.
On the other hand, Ventress suffers recurrent episodes of back pain, which do not, however, prevent him from performing the duties of his employment. He likewise feels unable to perform heavy lifting, although he does feel able to perform the continuous stooping and other duties of bricklaying.
Following his discharge by his attending general practitioner, Ventress was examined by two different orthopedists, twice each. Their uncontradicted testimony shows that he does have a permanent residual from his severe lumbosacral sprain which produces the recurrent episodes of pain. The orthopedists concluded this on the basis of the consistency of his localized complaints and of his responses to leg-raising tests, in the light of his history and complaints. Both of these specialists rated Ventress as having a 10% permanent impairment or loss of function of the back, based upon these recurrent episodes of pain and a continuing susceptibility to reinjury.
Neither of these specialists felt that he was unable to perform the duties of manual labor, either physically or because of substantial pain or substantial possibility of re-injury. However, each was of the opinion that as a residual of the work-accident (partially aggravated by a preexisting back-instability), the claimant has sustained a definite loss of function, producing temporary soreness of the back after days of work involving with much bending aud also producing recurrent episodes of nondisabling pain.
2.
The claimant's attorney ably argues that he is entitled to compensation for either total or partial disability. The trial court correctly rejected these contentions.
a. Total Disability
A common laborer may be entitled, as suggested, to compensation for total disability if unable to perform the ordinary duties of his occupation without substantial pain, Schram v. Lake Charles Ready-Mix, La.App. 3d Cir., 125 So.2d 213, or without substantial susceptibility to re-injury, Mitchell v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App. 3d Cir., 136 So.2d 143, or if his ability to compete for employment in the general labor market has been substantially decreased by the accident-residual, Olivier v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 241 La. 745, 131 So.2d 50. See also, Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, Sections 272, 274, 275 (1951).
Nevertheless, in the present case, the medical experts do not advise against performing heavy labor because of any substantial susceptibility to reinjury. The medical and lay evidence does indicate recurrent discomfort, but not of a substantial enough nature to be considered disabling nor to put the claimant at a competitive disadvantage in the common labor market. Therefore, the claimant is'not entitled to recover benefits for total disability. Ball v. American Marine Corp., 245 La. 515, 159 So.2d 138.
b. Partial Disability
Alternatively, counsel argues that the claimant is entitled at least to an award for partial disability. LSA-R.S. 23:1221 (3)provides that, for partial disability, an injured employee is entitled to receive compensation based upon the difference between wages paid at the time of injury and wages which the injured employee is able to earn thereafter.
Scattered awards for partial disability are found where a residual is not substantial enough to be totally disabling, but where nevertheless a residual functional disability results in some slight impairment or reduction of earning capacity, although it does not constitute a competitive disadvantage to employment in the general market. Blanchard v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 223 La. 577, 66 So.2d 342; Stogner v. American Motorists Ins. Co., La.App. 4th Cir., 123 So.2d 655.
We must reject the present claim for partial disability, because no impairment or reduction of earning capacity is shown. The later decisions consider this to be a prerequisite, under the statutory text, for an award for partial disability. White v. United States F. & G. Co., La. App. 3d Cir., 158 So.2d 210; Lee v. Royal Indemnity Co., La.App. 1st Cir., 149 So.2d 606, certiorari denied.
Decree
Accordingly, finding no disability, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's claim.
Affirmed.
. Professor Malone points out that, where a comparison of pre-injury and post-injury earnings does not meaningfully relate to disability, then the courts have sometimes used medical disability percentage as a guide to the award. Malone, Section 277. See, e. g., Blanchard v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 223 La. 577, 66 So.2d 342.