Case Name: Francis B. Brewer, Resp't, v. James E. Ford, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-01-23
Citations: 35 N.Y. St. Rep. 967
Docket Number: 
Parties: Francis B. Brewer, Resp’t, v. James E. Ford, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 35
Pages: 967–975

Head Matter:
Francis B. Brewer, Resp’t, v. James E. Ford, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed January 23, 1891.)
1. Conversion—Conditional sale.
Where goods are sold, to he paid for in instalments by notes, the title to remain in the vendor until paid for, and while some of the notes are outstanding the vendee makes an assignment for creditors and the assignee refuses to deliver the goods on demand, the vendor may maintain an action for the value of the goods without surrendering the notes.
(Following Brewer v. Ford, 36 N. Y. State Rep., 888.)
3. Sale—Conditional.
Plaintiff sold to defendant’s assignor certain merchandise, machinery, “ and all patterns pertaining to the lock business. * * * Said machinery shall be the property of said Brewer until paid for.” Held, that the intention of the parties, as gathered from the terms of the contract, was that title to the whole of the property transferred should be retained, and that, therefore, the word “machinery” included the patterns.
3. Same—Passing of title.
In the absence of an agreement that title to certain classes of the property should become absolute when a given amount of the purchase money had been paid, a certificate showing that the payments made had been applied first to the merchandise, second to the patterns, and the surplus on the residue of the indebtedness is meaningless, and lias no bearing on the question whether the patterns had been paid for and title thereto passed to the vendee.
(Corlett, J., dissents.)
Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict at the Erie circuit in February, 1890, for $3,515 damages besides costs, and also from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Frank C. Ferguson, for app’lt; William C. Fitch, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Macomber, J.
This action is trover to recover of the defendant, who is the assignee for the benefit of creditors of a firm known as the Clark Manufacturing Company, the value of certain property which came into his hands as such assignee. The plaintiff ana the defendant's assignors entered into an agreement January 29, 1880, by which a' given quantity of personal property, consisting of machinery, patterns and merchandise, was transferred from the former to the_ latter, to be paid for in instalments represented in amount by promissory notes ranging in times of payment between April 1, 1881, and April 1, 1889. When this action was begun, April 17, 1887, three of such notes of $1,000 each remained unpaid, but only one of them was due at that time. By the terms of the contract between the original parties it was agreed that " said machinery shall be the property of the said Brewer in care, custody and charge of said Mix Brothers, until paid for."
Upon the first trial objection was made by the defendant that no recovery could be had except upon a surrender of such outstanding notes. The justice presiding made a ruling to that effect, and afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to surrender the notes, which was declined by counsel, who had the notes in court, and who claimed the right to collect upon the notes any sum over and above the amount of the verdict which the jury might render in this action. A verdict for the defendant was accordingly directed; on appeal to this court, the judgment entered thereon and an order denying a motion for a new trial were reversed and a new trial granted. 26 N. Y. State Rep., 888, and 7 N. Y. Sup., 244.
The prevailing opinion placed the decision upon the ground that the action might be maintained without tendering the unpaid notes, because, as was there decided, the seller was confined in his remedy neither to a repossession of the property nor to the notes, but could avail himself of both.
The dissenting opinion was, in substance, that by holding on to the commercial paper the plaintiff assumed an attitude in this forum so inconsistent with the claim made in the complaint that the court could not properly permit him to proceed; for otherwise the rescission of the original contract, which the beginning of this action necessarily made, would not be a real but a sham rescission, and an action might still be maintained upon each of the outstanding notes; and that the active duty rested upon the plaintiff to restore before recovering a verdict in this action the unpaid paper still held by him. But, as stated above, a majority of the court decided otherwise, and held that the plaintiff had his cumulative remedy of recovering the property or its value on the ground that no sale of it had been made, and prosecuting the outstanding notes to judgment, or proving them for payment or dividends against the defendant as assignee of the estate of The Clark Manufacturing Company, upon the ground that the property had been sold to the defendant's assignors and that a debt existed therefor. The case was treated as though the plaintiff held a chattel mortgage as collateral security for the unpaid purchase money.
The new trial has been conducted in accordance with the prevailing opinion of this court on the former appeal. The same persistent purpose to affirm and dissaffirm the original contract prevails throughout the case. The counsel for the plaintiff in the course of the trial said: " Now, if the court please, I have here the three notes in question; I offer to place them in the possession of the court, or with such person or person's as the court may direct for the purpose and with authority to endorse upon these notes whatever recovery may be obtained in this action; and if the recovery is equal to the amount of the notes, then that the notes may be surrendered to such person or persons as the court may direct; if the recovery is less than the amount of the notes, then the amount of such recovery to be endorsed upon the notes as so much payment."
It was this attitude of counsel which induced the, direction of the verdict at the first trial, which decision on appeal a minority of the court held to be correct. But the court held otherwise. Except for the authority of that decision adherence to precedent, as well as legal principle, would, in my judgment, lead to a different result. But that judgment was given in this case on facts in nowise materially different from those now before us. It stands, therefore, res judicata. It is binding and conclusive on this and all courts of concurrent power. The present case is identical with the former appeal in the parties, in the cause of action and in the thing sued for. It was manifestly tried in accordance with the decision of this court previously rendered. We are not, consequently, at liberty to revise the former adjudication, though the present majority of the court are committed against it.
There remain, therefore, to be considered by us only such subsidiary questions, if any, arising on the second trial as were not in the former case.
It is contended by the appellant that, even though there may be a recovery for certain articles, there can be none for the patterns, for the reason, as is stated, that they are not " machinery," and consequently the clause of the agreement retaining title in the vendor does not apply to them. By the terms of the contract the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant's assignors "a certain amount of machinery and all patterns pertaining to the lock business. Said machinery shall be the property of said Brewer until paid for. And the Clark Manufacturing Company agree to make the above described purchase upon the conditions therein set forth and recited."
It is now argued that the word "machinery " does not include the patterns, which were valued at $3,400 of the original purchase. An attentive perusal, however, of the contract leads quite irresistibly to the conclusion that if the sale was conditioned in any part, and the title retained by the seller to any of the property until paid for, such condition and retention of title related to the whole of the property transferred. This obvious intention of the parties would overcome the restricted meaning given by the appellant to the word " machinery," and bring the patterns within its scope, even though, except in a metaphorical sense, the patterns may not be machinery. But they clearly are a part of the machinery. The word was here used in its most comprehensive sense, and included all the devices, tools and implements used in the manufacturing business for which they were bought. Buchanan v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 61 N. Y., 33.
It is, also, claimed by the appellant, that a written certificate signed by the plaintiff on the 21st day of October, 1887, six months after this action was begun, to the effect that the payments which had been made by the purchasers had been applied, first on the merchandise, and secondly on the patterns, the surplus to apply on the residue of the indebtedness, shows that the patterns have been paid for, and that, consequently, title to them passed absolutely to the Clark Manufacturing Company. But such certificate, in the absence of some agreement that title to certain clases of the property should become absolute when a given amount of the purchase money had been paid, which is nowhere shown, is meaningless and has no bearing upon the question.
The case is not materially different from the record of the former appeal. It follows, therefore, in of such de cisión, that the judgment and order appealed from, should be affirmed.
Dwight, P. J., concurs.