Case Name: BARBARA LEE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1956-05-01
Citations: 46 Cal. 2d 414
Docket Number: S. F. No. 19386
Parties: BARBARA LEE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 414–423

Head Matter:
[S. F. No. 19386.
In Bank.
May 1, 1956.]
BARBARA LEE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
Johnson, Thorne, Speed & Bamford and Harry Bamford for Petitioner.
Everett A. Corten, Daniel C. Murphy, Leonard, Hanna & Brophy and Edmond G. Leonard for Respondents.

Opinion:
SPENCE, J.
Petitioner seeks annulment of an order of the respondent commission dismissing her "Petition for Increased Disability Rating, ' ' which order was made upon the ground of "want of jurisdiction."
Petitioner, a witness, was suffering from a preexisting, progressive "congenital defect in the fifth lumbar process associated with a spondylolisthesis," at the time that she fell to a sitting position on January 1, 1949. She did not immediately "notice any particular pain," and she continued her work until the following month. Since leaving her work, there has been a serious dispute as to whether her difficulties at any given time have resulted from her preexisting, progressive condition or the fall, or both. She was given a temporary disability award on February 27, 1950. That award was terminated on September 7, 1950, with a reservation of the issue of permanent disability for later determination. In 1951 her permanent disability rating was fixed by the commission at 31 per cent. No part of her disability was apportioned to her "pre-existing permanent disability," as the referee found no evidence of "work disability from the pre-existing physical defect." Reconsideration was granted but the award was confirmed on June 11, 1952. The referee's report upon which the commission acted stated: "Concerning the question of apportionment, whether this should or should not be done is a decision completely within the province of either the Referee or the Commission. This Referee feels that the disinclination or refusal of the Referee to apportion was proper." Petitioner thereafter filed in 1953 a "Petition for Further Medical Treatment," which was denied on July 27, 1954. The present "Petition for Increased Disability Rating" was filed on February 25, 1955, and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on March 15, 1955.
As the date of the injury was January 1, 1949, and as the "Petition for Increased Disability Rating" was not filed until February 25, 1955, being more than six years after the date of injury, we are of the opinion that the commission correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain said petition. (Lab. Code, § 5804, 5410.)
Petitioner seeks to avoid the jurisdictional limitations of the cited sections by pointing out that her "Petition for Increased Disability Rating" purports to refer to "the issue of increased permanent disability rating, as previously raised in applicant's last petition." She claims that her prior "Petition for Further Medical Treatment, ' ' filed within the five-year period, raised the issue that the original injury had caused "new and further disability" within the meaning of section 5410 of the Labor Code, and that the commission therefore had jurisdiction to hear and determine her petition for an increased permanent disability rating after the expiration of the five-year period. (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 31 Cal.2d 853 [193 P.2d 468]; Gold v. Industrial Acc. Com., 1 Cal.2d 100 [33 P.2d 413]; Westvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 136 Cal.App.2d 60 [288 P.2d 300]; Furness Pacific, Ltd. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 74 Cal.App.2d 324 [168 P.2d 761].) We are of the opinion, however, that the cited authorities do not sustain petitioner's position here.
Petitioner's prior petition was entitled "Petition for Further Medical Treatment," and it prayed only for an order requiring the furnishing of "further medical treatment." Said petition was denied in its entirety and without qualification by an order reading "Applicant's Petition for Further Medical Treatment, filed herein on November 24, 1953, is denied." It was not suggested upon the hearing of that petition that petitioner was seeking an increased permanent disability rating because of any "new and further disability." On the contrary, her counsel agreed at the time of the hearing that the "only question" was that of "need for further medical treatment." It appeared that petitioner had discontinued the use of a recommended support, and there was medical testimony showing that the use of a support was the only appropriate treatment. The testimony of one doctor, who had only recently examined petitioner and who advocated a spinal fusion, was rejected by the commission. Petitioner sought neither reconsideration nor judicial review, and the order of denial became final.
If there is merit in petitioner's contention that under a liberal construction of her "Petition for Further Medical Treatment, ' ' it might be treated as sufficient to raise the claim of a "new and further disability" by reason of a recital therein that she had "suffered from increased disability and pain," it is a conclusive answer that it was stipulated at the hearing that the only issue raised was the "need for further medical treatment"; and that petitioner did not thereafter claim, by petition for reconsideration or for judicial review, that any issue that had been raised had been left undetermined. Under these circumstances petitioner cannot now consistently attribute to her prior petition the widest possible significance for jurisdictional purposes, and at the same time fail to give the unqualified denial of that petition the same significance for the same purposes.
Petitioner's cited authorities are readily distinguishable. In none of those cases had the petition, filed within the five-year period, been unqualifiedly denied by the commission after a hearing upon the merits. In Gobel v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 1 Cal.2d 100, the petition was admittedly filed two days before the expiration of the prescribed time, and was thereafter dismissed without a hearing on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was there held that the commission had jurisdiction to determine the merits of the petition after the prescribed time, as the petition had been filed within the prescribed time. The same principle was applied in Furness Pacific, Ltd. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 324. In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 31 Cal.2d 853, the commission stated, in making its prior award upon a petition timely filed, that "Applicant's condition is not yet stationary and permanent, and jurisdiction is hereby reserved to determine extent of permanent disability . . . upon request of any party in interest." (P. 855.) In Westvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 136 Cal.App.2d 60, the commission similarly stated in making its prior award, that "Applicant's condition is not stationary, and a Finding in respect to the nature and extent of disability, temporary or permanent, or both, is not being made at this time, and jurisdiction is hereby reserved to re-determine said issue at a later date." (P. 61.) No comparable situation is presented by the record before us, as the only petition filed here within the prescribed time had been denied after a hearing on the merits, and the commission's unqualified order of denial had become final.
While the courts have properly given a liberal construction to the sections establishing jurisdictional limitations upon the power of the commission (Lab. Code, § 5804, 5410), we cannot hold here that any proceeding was left pending and undetermined before the commission after the time that the commission's unqualified order of denial of petitioner's prior petition became final. The "Petition for Increased Disability Rating" must therefore be treated as an independent petition for that purpose, and as it was admittedly filed more than six years after the date of injury, the commission correctly determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain said petition. (Lab. Code, § 5410.)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.