Case Name: Selestino Gonzalez PARRA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-11-23
Citations: 671 F. App'x 416
Docket Number: No. 13-71493
Parties: Selestino Gonzalez PARRA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 671
Pages: 416–417

Head Matter:
Selestino Gonzalez PARRA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-71493
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted November 8, 2016 Pasadena, California
Filed November 23, 2016
Areg Kazaryan, Law Offices of Areg Kazaryan, Glendale, CA, for Petitioner.
OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathleen Kelly Volkert, Trial Attorney, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument, Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Selestino Gonzalez Parra, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision upholding the Immigration Judge's (IJ) order of removal based upon Parra's engaging in alien smuggling. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). We deny the petition.
(1) Parra asserts that the BIA erred when it upheld the IJ's refusal to suppress Parra's statements in which he essentially admitted- to alien smuggling. He claims that suppression was required because the Customs and Border Protection officers who took his statements did not advise him of his rights pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c). We disagree. At the time Parra gave his statements, he had not yet been '"placed in formal proceedings,' " because no Notice to Appear had been filed in the immigration court. Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c), 1239.1(a); Matter of E-R-M-F-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 580, 583 (B.I.A. 2011). Thus, the BIA did not err when it denied the requested relief. See Samayoa-Martinez, 558 F.3d at 901-02; see also Matter of E-R-M-F-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 583.
Similarly, Parra argues that the BIA erred when it failed to suppress his statements on the basis that he was not read Miranda warnings before he was questioned. However, because immigration proceedings are civil in nature, questioning for purposes of those proceedings need not be preceded by Miranda warnings. See United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1997).
In the same vein, Parra asserts that his statements should have been suppressed because they were not given voluntarily. The mere fact that he was held for a period before he made his statements did not suffice to show coercion. See Gonzagar-Ortega v. Holder, 736 F.3d 795, 799-800, 804 (9th Cir. 2013). He points to no other evidence that supports suppression. The evidence did not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA's decision. See Samayoa-Martinez, 558 F.3d at 902; Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 815 & n.1, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).
In fine, the BIA did not err when it denied suppression of the statements.
(2) Parra finally asserts that the BIA erred when it denied withholding of removal on the basis that he had not shown that "Americanized Mexicans" constituted a particular social group, within the meaning of the law. However, we have held that Americanized Mexicans do not constitute a "particular social group." Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Nothing in the record of this case suggests, much less compels, a contrary conclusion.
Petition DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3
. To the extent that Parra suggests that we should overrule our prior decision, this panel, of course, cannot do so. See United States v. de la Torre-Jimenez, 771 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. We note that the BIA did not improperly rely upon the 1-213 report in reaching its conclusions. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).