Case Name: Lucathryn WILSON a/k/a Lucatheryn Wilson a/k/a Lucatherine Wilson v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1993-10-28
Citations: 661 So. 2d 1109
Docket Number: No. 91-KA-0294
Parties: Lucathryn WILSON a/k/a Lucatheryn Wilson a/k/a Lucatherine Wilson v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: Before HAWKINS, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 661
Pages: 1109–1117

Head Matter:
Lucathryn WILSON a/k/a Lucatheryn Wilson a/k/a Lucatherine Wilson v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 91-KA-0294.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 28, 1993.
Opinion Granting Rehearing Sept. 28, 1995.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Smith on Grant of Rehearing Sept. 28, 1995.
David, G. Hill, Hill White & Minyard, Oxford, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Ellen Y. Dale, Sp. Ass’t. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for ap-pellee.
Before HAWKINS, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
[Filed Sept. 28, 1995]
Hawkins, Chief Justice, for the Court:
This case is before the Court on petition for rehearing after being previously affirmed by per curiam decision. We now reverse and remand.
The Petition for Rehearing in this case is granted with the following opinions of this Court.
Lucathryn Wilson has appealed her conviction in the circuit court of Marshall County of the sale of cocaine. Because of the erroneous cross-examination of Wilson in a weak case factually, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
There are three individuals involved in this case: Donna Conner, an investigator in the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics (MBN), Esau Shaw, a confidential informant, and Lucathryn Wilson, the defendant.
Agent Conner, who worked out of the Oxford office, was asked by her sergeant, Eddie McCullough of the MBN, who worked out the Tupelo office, to assist him in an investigation in Holly Springs and Marshall County.
She went to Holly Springs on February 25, 1987, and met with McCullough, another MBN officer and Shaw. After Shaw was searched, he got into Conner's car, an official state vehicle, and the two went to a building on Memphis Street (also Old Highway 78), which housed a district office of MBN and also "Moffitt's Hair Care Center." Conner parked in the parking lot. It was between 6:30-6:85 p.m.
Conner saw Shaw go into the beauty parlor and return with a black female who Shaw identified as Lucatheryn Wilson. (Whether it was then or later that Shaw told Conner it was Wilson is not made clear in the record.) According to Conner the car light in her car was on. The woman entered on the passenger side of the car and got onto the back seat. Shaw got into the front seat, passenger side. In a transaction lasting not more than two minutes, Shaw purchased a white packet of cocaine from the woman, and Conner paid her $100. A recording was made of the purchase, but somehow Conner lost it at a later date after the defense made a motion to hear it.
Before that evening Conner had never seen the woman from whom they made the purchase.
No arrest was made then or subsequently by the MBN. Instead, the MBN presented the matter to the Marshall County grand jury 20 months later, and on October 14, 1988, Wilson was indicted for the felonious sale of cocaine, a controlled substance, under Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-115(A)(a)(4) (1972) and for violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(a)(1) (1972). Conner did not see Wilson in the interim. On cross-examination Conner testified she did not see Wilson from February 25, 1987, until 18 months later when she was indicted in October 1988. A.77,119. On redirect examination during trial, she testified she had seen Wilson "a couple of times from then until now at different times." R.II, m.
From this record Conner's identification of Wilson at trial was based solely upon the sale which occurred February 25, 1987. She had not seen the seller of the packet of cocaine before that evening, and not again until indictment.
Shaw's confused testimony at trial was of no benefit to the State.
The case went to trial November 8, 1990. Wilson testified in her own behalf, vigorously denying any sale of cocaine. On cross-examination Wilson was first asked if she participated in the drug transaction of February 25, 1987, which she denied. She was then asked if she had any knowledge of it, which she again denied. She was then asked if she knew Esau Shaw, and she replied that she did, and had known him a long time. Had she had any dealings with him? She had not.
Further on cross-examination she denied knowing what cocaine looked like. Upon further questioning she testified the first time she ever saw Conner was at a hearing after she had been arrested following her indictment. R.II, 17k- The following testimony was then elicited on cross-examination:
Q. And I guess you're going to tell us you don't even know anybody that fools with cocaine?
A. Say what now.
Q. I guess you're going to tell us you don't know anybody that fools with drugs?
A. I don't fool with anybody that fools with drugs. I hear of people fooling with drugs but I don't fool with anybody that fools with drugs.
Q. Well, do you know Percy Eckells?
A. I sure do.
Objection was made, the jury retired and a motion was made for a mistrial, because Ee-kells was under indictment for a drug offense. The State argued it was being offered for impeachment purposes, and the court overruled the objection. The jury returned and the cross-examination continued.
Q. My last question was do you know Percy Eckells?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that he's charged with some type of drug offense?
A. Yes.
Another objection, again overruled.
Q. And is it your opinion — how do you know Percy Eckells?
A. Well, he's my boyfriend.
Q. And you've known him for a long while, several years?
A. About four or five years.
Q. And are you saying that the charges against you are just crumped [sic] up — made up — a lie? '
A. Yes. It's a lie.
Q. And then you're also saying, I presume, . that the charges against him were made up?
A. Yes.
With this the State concluded its cross-examination and both sides rested. No proof was offered as to Eckells.
Before this transaction Wilson had never been charged with any drug offense.
LAW
While factually weak, the State did make a jury issue on whether or not the woman who sold the packet to Conner was Wilson.
The cross-examination of Wilson above-quoted was inflammatory and prejudicial. She was charged with the sale of cocaine. She had pleaded not guilty and just testified, denying any sale to Shaw or Conner. None of her testimony on direct examination opened the door to a line of inquiry by the prosecution, asking her to deny she even knew anybody who fooled with drugs. This was compounded by asking her if she knew Percy Eckells, followed by the prosecution informing the jury that Eckells was charged with a drug offense. It was compounded even further by making her admit or deny the charges against Eckells. Wilson's acquaintance with Eckells was totally irrelevant to the indictment against her.
"Relevant evidence" is defined by Rule 401 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." M.R.E. 401. Furthermore, Rule 402 states that "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." M.R.E. 402. Clearly, the fact that the defendant's boyfriend had been charged with a drug offense had absolutely no "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action" more or less probable. Rule 402 commands that this evidence be therefore excluded. It is also well established that "guilt by association is neither a recognized nor tolerable concept in our criminal law." Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 821 (Miss.1991). Any attempt by the prosecutor to use the relationship between Wilson and her boyfriend to infer her guilt was improper and should not have been allowed.
In addition, any attempt to characterize this evidence as "impeachment" evidence must also fail. According to Rule 608(a):
the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
As the existence of the relationship between Wilson and her boyfriend is neither opinion nor reputation evidence, it is not admissible under Rule 608(a).
Furthermore, 608(b) states in part: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
According to the recent case of Brent v. State, 632 So.2d 986 (Miss.1994), under Rule 608(b) "the proffered conduct must be such as to reflect upon the witness's character for truthfulness. If the past conduct did not involve lying, deceit, or dishonesty in some manner, it cannot be inquired into on cross-examination." Id at 944. Furthermore, "the trial court has no discretionary authority to permit inquiry by cross-examination into conduct not involving truthfulness." Id In the case at bar, the defendant's conduct of having a relationship with a man who was charged with a drug offense did not involve lying, deceit, or dishonesty and had absolutely no probative value whatsoever in regard to her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Under Rule 608(b), as clarified by Brent, the introduction of such evidence is not permitted.
Finally, once the State raised the issue, they had a duty to offer proof which would back their claim. 'When the State or any party states or suggests the existence of certain damaging facts and offers no proof whatever to substantiate the allegations, a golden opportunity is afforded the opposing counsel in closing argument to appeal to the Ninth Commandment. 'Thou shall not bear false witness....' Exodus 20:16" Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789 (Miss.1988). For the State to so accuse the defendant and then let suspicion fester in the minds of the jury is impermissible. Unsubstantiated innuendo such as that which was raised here should never be allowed.
Wilson's "Motion for Stay of Mandate Pending Consideration of Petition for Rehearing" is granted.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.
SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.