Case Name: Rush, Appellant, v. Plains Township
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1952-05-29
Citations: 371 Pa. 117
Docket Number: Appeals, Nos. 110 and 111
Parties: Rush, Appellant, v. Plains Township.
Judges: Before Drew, C. J., Stearns, Jones, Bell, Chidsey and Musmanno, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 371
Pages: 117–128

Head Matter:
Rush, Appellant, v. Plains Township.
Argued April 16,1952.
Before Drew, C. J., Stearns, Jones, Bell, Chidsey and Musmanno, JJ.
Elizabeth, P. Menseh, for appellants.
Maurice H. Kirshner, with him Herman E. Cardoni, for appellee.
May 29, 1952:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell,
Was a nonsuit — viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs: Davies v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 370 Pa. 180, 87 A. 2d 183, properly entered in this case?
Sterling Kush, aged 7, by Francis Kush, his guardian, and Francis Kush in his own right, brought an action in trespass against the Township of Plains to recover damages for burns and other injuries sustained by Sterling on a refuse and garbage dump leased and maintained by the Township. The dump covered about a quarter of a city block and had originally been a strip mining hole. The township as well as other people of the community dumped refuse and garbage into this excavation or dump, commencing sometime during 1946.
The dump was approximately one mile distant from plaintiffs' home and from any other habitation.
On July 28, 1949, Sterling Rush left his home with his brother at approximately 3 o'clock p.m. and went to the dump for the the purpose of getting some funny books. There was a fire on the right hand side of the dump about thirty feet away and smoke was issuing from the ground ten feet away. Sterling walked on the left hand side of the dump to find the funny books when the surface suddenly gave way underneath him and he sank through the refuse almost up to his neck. There were hot coals on the bottom and he was burned about his legs and hands. The surface appeared to him and to other witnesses to be solid and no fire or smoke or hot coals were visible at the point of the accident until after the surface gave way. A watchman was maintained at this dump. There was no testimony that the township had started the fire, or had actual knowledge that any fire was smouldering underneath the surface; and the dangerous condition was undoubtedly a latent one. There was ample evidence that children went to the dump several times á week during vacation periods and on holídávs for the purpose of pick ing up funny books, toys, junk, rags and similar objects and that occasionally boys shot rats there. The evidence also disclosed that since 1946, a fire had often been seen burning in some part of the dump, although not where the injury occurred.
We agree with the court below that the evidence was entirely insufficient to establish this dump as a playground; and that a dumping ground for ashes and refuse does not constitute an attractive nuisance: Cf. Zellman v. Philadelphia, 17 D. & C. 493 (Judge Horace Stern) ; Bruce v. Kansas City, 128 Kan. 13, 276 Pac. 284; Harlan v. Peaveley, 224 Ky. 338, 6 S. W. 2d 270.
Plaintiff relies upon Allen v. Silverman, 355 Pa. 471, 50 A. 2d 275, where this Court said (page 474): "This case is ruled by the principle set forth in Section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which we adopted in Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A. 2d 729, and Altenbach v. Leh. Val. R. R. Co., 349 Pa. 272, 37 A. 2d 429. It reads as follows: 'A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children because of their, youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein.' "
We agree with the contention of the plaintiffs that the township should under the testimony have known that children were likely to trespass upon this dump; but we disagree with their contention that the township should have realized that the place where the accident occurred involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to trespassing children. If plaintiff's injury had occurred at the place where the fire was or had been burning, a different question would have been presented; but since the injury occurred in a part of the dump where there was no fire and no evidence that prior to the accident there had been any fire, and since it was clearly and indisputably a latent condition of which the defendant did not have any actual knowledge, or constructive notice, plaintiff cannot recover.
The language of Chief Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island, R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 182 N. E. 99, is particularly applicable: . . the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty. . . . The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. . . ."
We believe the evidence produced is insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the defendant or to warrant submission of the case to the jury.
Judgment affirmed.