Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RENEE HENDERSON, Appellant
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1978-01-27
Citations: 71 Ill. 2d 53
Docket Number: No. 49114
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RENEE HENDERSON, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 71
Pages: 53–61

Head Matter:
(No. 49114.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RENEE HENDERSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed Jan. 27, 1978.
Rehearing denied March 30, 1978.
CLARK and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., dissenting.
Michael J. Rosborough, Deputy Defender, of Mt. Vernon, and Richard J. Wilson, Deputy Defender, of Springfield, both of the Office of State Appellate Defender (Ann L. Carr and Richard E. Cunningham, Assistant Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.
William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and J. E. Dull, State’s Attorney, of Jefferson County (Donald B. Mackay and Anne Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY
delivered the opinion of the court:
On April 2, 1975, defendant presented to a pharmacist a prescription for 30 tablets of preludin, a form of
phenmetrazine, a controlled substance under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 5614, par. 1208(b)). Upon the arrival of the police, defendant fled without obtaining the drug. Defendant knew the prescription bore a false signature.
On April 3, 1975, a complaint charging her with forgery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 17—3) was filed in the circuit court of Jefferson County. She waived indictment, right to counsel, and jury trial. She pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, and was sentenced to a term of one to three years.
In the appellate court the State confessed error on defendant's waiver of counsel and waiver of indictment. However, the appellate court held defendant could be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1—1 et seq.), and reversed and remanded the cause so that defendant could plead anew. (42 Ill. App. 3d 758.) We allowed her petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (58 Ill. 2d R. 315).
The question for decision is whether defendant can be charged with forgery, a Class 3 felony under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 17-3(d)), or whether the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 5614, par. 1101 et seq.) is the exclusive basis for criminal prosecution for the delivery of a false prescription. Under this statute such an offense is a misdemeanor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56½, par. 1406(b)).
Defendant's contention is that the Illinois Controlled Substances Act is the only statute under which she can be prosecuted.
Since the respective statutes are of such importance, we set them forth. Section 17—3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
"(a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:
(1) Makes or alters any document apparently capa ble of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not have such authority; or
(2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or
(3) Possesses, with intent to issue or deliver, any such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered.
(b) An intent to defraud means an intention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property.
(c) A document apparently capable of defrauding another includes, but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property may be created, transferred, altered or terminated.
(d) Sentence.
Forgery is a Class 3 felony." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 17 — 3.
Section 406(b)(6) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides:
"(b) It is unlawful for any person knowingly:

(6) to possess without authorization, official blank prescription forms or counterfeit prescription forms; *." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56½, par. 1406(b)(6).
Defendant does not urge that her conduct does not come within the broad terms of the crime of forgery as defined by the Criminal Code of 1961. Examination of subparagraphs (b) and (c) of section 17-3 makes this obvious.
Under People v. Gordon (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 166, and People v. Brooks (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 343, when a defendant's act is in violation of more than one statute, and each statute requires different proof for conviction or provides for different defenses, the State has the discretion to determine under which statute, including that providing for a greater sentence, the defendant will be prosecuted. This assumes, of course, that the two statutes are not the same.
In accord with these decisions, we hold that the Illinois Controlled Substances Act does not prevent prosecution under the Criminal Code of 1961 for the crime of forgery even though the Code may provide for a greater sentence.
Defendant urges that because she did not obtain a pecuniary advantage and did not defraud the pharmacist or doctor, she could not be guilty of forgery. This argument has been frequently urged in the past, but never with success. "The gist of the offense of forgery is the intent to defraud involved in the making of a forged instrument or knowingly uttering the same." (People v. Crouch (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 485, 488.) The words "uttering" or "to utter" have a clear definition in law; they mean substantially "to offer" (People v. Katz (1934), 356 Ill. 440, 445). It is immaterial to the crime of forgery whether anyone was in fact defrauded. People v. Meyer (1919), 289 Ill. 184, 186; People v. Church (1937), 366 Ill. 149, 151.
"Forgery * does not require that anyone be actually defrauded of his money or property. One who has never had a chance to pass his forged document, or whose forgery is spotted when he tries to pass it, is nevertheless guilty of forgery." W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law sec. 90, at 671-72 (1972).
For the reasons herein expressed, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.