Case Name: Voris SEBASTIEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants, v. Douglas W. McKAY, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellants/Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-11-23
Citations: 649 So. 2d 711
Docket Number: No. 94-203
Parties: Voris SEBASTIEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants, v. Douglas W. McKAY, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellants/Appellees.
Judges: Before DOUCET, COOKS, SAUNDERS, WOODARD and DECUIR, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 649
Pages: 711–718

Head Matter:
Voris SEBASTIEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants, v. Douglas W. McKAY, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellants/Appellees.
No. 94-203.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Nov. 23, 1994.
Leslie J. Sehiff, Anne Elizabeth Watson, Opelousas, for Voris Sebastien, et al.
Gary McGoffin, LaFayette, for Douglas W. McKay M.D. et al.
Before DOUCET, COOKS, SAUNDERS, WOODARD and DECUIR, JJ.

Opinion:
I í SAUNDERS, Judge.
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice action.
On October 3, 1989, Dr. Douglas McKay, an orthopedic surgeon, performed back surgery on Voris Sebastien, a seventy-four year old man, to relieve leg and back pain. After surgery, a surgical drain was left in place temporarily to drain excess blood and fluid. Such drains are generally removed six to seventy-two hours after surgery. The day after surgery, Dr. McKay attempted to remove the drain from Mr. Sebastien's back. After several attempts, the drain broke with part coming out and part remaining |⅛1 Mr. Sebastien's back. Dr. McKay decided to leave the remainder in Mr. Sebastien's back.
For approximately two months, Mr. Sebas-tien appeared to recover normally. Then he began having pains and running fever. Various tests were run in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the source of the infection.
Finally, in April 1990, while Mr. Sebastien was hospitalized at our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Lafayette, Louisiana, for rehabilitation, radiological studies were done which revealed the presence of the drain fragment. Upon being informed that the drain was in Mr. Sebastien's back, his family agreed to allow it to be removed. After its removal, Mr. Sebastien's condition improved. According to the discharge summary from Lourdes, he regained his ambulatory status, was able to walk with a cane, and was discharged to his daughter's home on April 20, 1990. He received physical therapy until May 12,1990, when he was discharged. At that time, he continued to have problems with tightness in the hamstring muscle on the left side.
Mr. Sebastien and his two adult children pursued this malpractice action against Dr. McKay and others. The matter was presented to a medical review panel which found only Dr. McKay to have violated the applicable standard of care. Its language follows:
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT, DR. DOUGLAS W. MCKAY, FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE AS CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT IN THAT HE FAILED TO REMOVE THE SURGICAL DRAIN FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S BACK. THE CONDUCT WAS A FACTOR IN THE RESULTANT DAMAGES. THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFER ANY PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT OR DISABILITY AS A RESULT OF THE CONDUCT. THE PLAINTIFF DID SUSTAIN TEMPORARY CONSEQUENCES CONSISTING OF PAIN UNTIL THE TIME THAT THE DRAIN WAS REMOVED AND EPISODES OF INFECTION WHICH REQUIRED SUBSEQUENT HOSPITALIZATIONS AND WAS REQUIRED TO UNDERGO TWO SURGICAL PROCEDURES.
Mr. Sebastien filed suit against Dr. McKay. His children, Delores Sebastien Sylvester and Joseph Sebastien, joined in the suit asking for damages for loss of consortium.
laPrior to trial, Dr. McKay and the plaintiffs entered the following stipulation:
"Douglas McKay, M.D. has received the opinion of the medical review panel which has reviewed the claims of Voris Sebastien, Delores Sebastien, [sic] Sylvester and Joseph Robley Sebastien, claim number 90-1018, accepts the opinion of the medical review panel and agrees to compensate the plaintiffs for all damages awarded in a final judgment in this proceeding.
This Stipulation reserves to both the plaintiffs and the defendant the right to seek judicial review of any judgment entered at the district court level with regard to quantum only."
At the beginning of trial, the trial judge ruled that the defense would not be allowed to introduce evidence concerning the responsibility of the manufacturer of the surgical drain for Voris Sebastien's injuries. The defense made an "offer of proof' to the effect that, if allowed, Drs. Nason, McKay and As-well would testify that surgical drains are routinely used in these procedures, the removal of the surgical drain contemplates pulling them from the patient's body, that none of those three physicians has experienced a surgical drain breaking upon removal from the patient's body, nor did they expect that it would, and that, in their opinion, in the absence of a defect in the drain or of an event during the procedure, such as nicking it or suturing it, the drain should be able to be removed without breaking.
The matter was tried before a jury. After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Voris Sebastien and against Dr. Douglas McKay, and awarded damages in the amount of $20,000.00. However, the jury made no award to Delores Sebastien Sylvester or Joseph Sebastien. Judgment was rendered in conformity to the jury verdict. Motions for additur and/or new trial were denied. All parties appealed the jury's verdict. After the appeal, Voris Sebastien died of causes unrelated to this action. His children were substituted for him in this action.
14DEFECT EVIDENCE
Dr. McKay asserts on appeal that he should have been allowed to introduce evidence with regard to a defect in the drainage tube because the allegations that a defect in the tube caused it to break off in Mr. Sebas-tien's back constituted an affirmative defense to the malpractice claim.
"An affirmative defense raises new matter which, assuming the allegations in the petition to be true, constitutes a defense to the action and will have the effect of defeating plaintiffs demand on its merits."
Webster v. Rushing, 316 So.2d 111, 114 (La.1975).
We cannot say that allegations of a defect in the drain raise new matter which would defeat the plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs claim, and defendant has stipulated, that he failed to comply with appropriate standard of care in that he failed to remove the drain from the plaintiff's back. Regardless of whether the drain was defective, Dr. McKay failed to remove it and by this failure, breached the standard of care. The existence of a defect would not relieve the doctor of the need to remove the drain in order to meet the standard of care.
Accordingly, the evidence of a possible defect in the surgical drain is not relevant to this matter as defined by LSA-C.E. art. 401 and was therefore properly excluded.
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The plaintiffs argue that the jury erred in failing to award damages for loss of consortium to Delores Sebastien Sylvester and Joseph Sebastien.
With the exception of its sexual component, a child may be awarded for loss of consortium to the same extent as a spouse provided the requisite showing is made. Higley v. Kramer, 581 So.2d 273, 282 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 583 So.2d 483 (La.1991). These items may include loss of love and affection, society and companionship, material services, support, aid and assistance, comfort, and felicity. 15/⅛, (and cites therein); Horton v. McCrary, 620 So.2d 918, 934 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 635 So.2d 199 (La.1994).
Claims for loss of consortium are usually made by minor children; however, unlike other provisions of the Civil Code, LSA-C.C. arts. 2315, 2315.1 and 2315.2 offer relief without regard to the majority or minority of the parties so aggrieved. Moreover, precedent exists for the award of loss of consortium to adult children. Horton, supra, (college ft'eshman); Barnett v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 286 So.2d 770, 778 (La.App. 2d Cir.) (on rehearing), writ refused, 287 So.2d 528 (La.1973) (ages 18-26); Soileau v. Continental Insurance Co., 228 So.2d 522, 526 (La.App. 3d Cir.1969), writ refused, 255 La. 280, 230 So.2d 587 (La.1970) (ages not specified, but father sixty-six at death and married forty-nine years). Moreover, such damages have been available to the aggrieved children and spouses of surviving loved ones since LSA-C.C. art. 2315 was amended in 1982. Bernard v. State, through DOTD, 563 So.2d 282, 285 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990) ; Finley v. Bass, 478 So.2d 608, 614 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985); Ferguson v. Burkett, 454 So.2d 413, 415-17 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984).
Both adult children, Delores and Joseph, claim to have been aggrieved by their father's need for constant care and for their emotional losses due to his temporarily but significantly weakened condition. Additionally, Joseph Sebastien, himself in poor health, alleged a loss of material services in that he and his father shared a home and his father's weakened state precluded his ability to care for his major son, entitling son Joseph to damages.
leAs to the children's initial claims for emotional losses, we agree that the jury clearly erred in failing to award any damages at all. For their emotional losses and vigilant watch over their father's recovery for several months, we believe that the lowest reasonable award under the circumstances is $5,000.00 for daughter, Delores Sebastien Sylvester, and $2,500.00 for son, Joseph Se-bastien. While both children saw to it that their father kept his medical appointments, it was Delores whose dogged persistence led to the discovery of the malpractice and who steadfastly kept track of her father's appointments throughout his recovery. These awards are further supported by the testimony of psychologist, Dr. Glenn Anthony Alley, who observed that it is always the family that pays the price emotionally for the rapid deterioration in health of a loved one. While it is true that the father's health had been gradually declining for several years, the evidence clearly suggests a correlation between the medical malpractice, leaving a drain in the back of a 79 year old, and the elderly gentlemen's hastened decline.
Next, we turn to the adult son Joseph's allegations that he is entitled to reimbursement for his father's inability to continue to care for him (Joseph) following the malpractice.
We conclude that, given the right circumstances, the laws of this state do afford a needy child compensation for loss of a parent's services without regard to the age of the child, provided the parent would have been able to provide those obligations absent the tortious conduct of a third party.
Ordinarily, the parent's duty to provide largely disappears when the child attains majority, unless the child is still in school, less than nineteen years old, and de-pendant. LSA-C.C. art. 230. Relatives in the direct ascending line remain responsible, however, for life's basic necessities for needy descendants beyond that time, provided circumstances permit. LSA-C.C. art. 229 and comments following LSA-C.C. arts. 17231-234; Ramos v. Ramos, 425 So.2d 989, 991-92 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983). These obligations are described generally in Suire v. Miller, 363 So.2d 945, 948-49 (La.App. 3d Cir.1978).
Nonetheless, we cannot say that the jury's refusal to award the adult child damages for this component was manifestly erroneous: by son Joseph's own admission, he had recovered from a stroke and was self-sufficient by the time his father had the back operation.
VORIS SEBASTIEN'S QUANTUM OF DAMAGES
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the jury's award of damages to Voris Sebastien was inadequate.
"In reviewing the other elements of damages awarded, we are guided by the following:
'The standard of review for quantum was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976), wherein it stated (at 334):
'We do reemphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award, (citations omitted) Only after making the finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its much discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court.'
The Supreme Court further articulated the process for evaluating quantum in Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498, 501 (La.1979) wherein it stated that:
'... the initial inquiry must always be directed at whether the trier court's award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular injured person is, a clear abuse of the trier of fact's 'much discretion,' La.Civ.C. Art. 1934(3), in the award of damages. It is only after articulated analysis of the facts | gdiscloses an abuse of discretion, that the award may on appellate review, for articulated reason, be considered either excessive . or insufficient, (emphasis added).'
Ferro v. Green, 394 So.2d 824, 828 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981)."
Pitre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 596 So.2d 256, 260 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 685 (La.1992). See also, Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993).
The evidence supports the conclusion that the failure to remove the drain caused an increase in pain suffered by Mr. Sebastien during his recovery from back surgery. He also experienced episodes of infection which caused him to be hospitalized. These problems occurred over a period of five months and ended when the remainder of the drain was removed. Mr. Sebastien recovered rapidly after the drain's removal. Additionally, although Mr. Sebastien recovered rapidly after the removal of the drain, there was testimony which indicates that the recovery from back surgery can take from six months to a year and a half in persons much younger and healthier than Mr. Sebastien.
On the other hand, Mr. Sebastien was in a bad general state of health prior to the surgery. He had heart and lung disease and a multiplicity of related problems. Additionally, it appeared that he might need further surgery on the cervical spine for problems unrelated to the back surgery involved in this case.
This evidence, combined with Mr. Sebas-tien's recovery, lead us to conclude that the damage award of $20,000.00 to Mr. Sebastien was not an abuse of discretion.
DECREE
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except its denial of damages to Delores and Joseph, the children of Voris Sebastien, which is reversed. Delores Sebastien Sylvester is awarded $5,000.00 and Joseph Se-bastien is awarded |9$2,500.00 for loss of consortium, both with interest from date of judicial demand. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs taxed to defendant.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED.
DOUCET, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. See e.g., LSA-C.C. art. 216 (parental authority exists only until child's majority or emancipation).
. Overruled in part on grounds wholly irrelevant to this proceeding, Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931, 944 (La.1991) (statute imposing cap on suits against state and political subdivision substantive and prospective only, overruling retroactive application of Bernard and other cases of Fourth Circuit).