Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant (State), v. Donald E. HARGIS, Jr., and Richard A. Shuler, Appellees (Defendants)
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-03-19
Citations: 328 So. 2d 479
Docket Number: No. X-531
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant (State), v. Donald E. HARGIS, Jr., and Richard A. Shuler, Appellees (Defendants).
Judges: SMITH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 328
Pages: 479–482

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant (State), v. Donald E. HARGIS, Jr., and Richard A. Shuler, Appellees (Defendants).
No. X-531.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 19, 1976.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., David H. Blud-worth and John Scarola, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Gary R. Dunham, Asst. Public Defender, and Larry G. Turner, Goldin & Turner, Gainesville, for appellees.
Donald E. Hargis, Jr., and Richard A. Shuler, pro se.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
The state appeals from an order which granted defendants' motion to compel the state to honor an agreement not to prosecute them, and which dismissed two counts of the information which charged the defendants with crimes they contended were covered by the agreement. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion, and in dismissing the two counts of the information.
After several contacts between an undercover narcotics agent and the defendants, the defendants offered to sell the agent one ounce of cocaine. The agent requested a sample to test the quality of the cocaine before purchase. The sample was delivered. On the following day and at the time of the purchase, the defendants were arrested and one ounce of cocaine was seized. After their arrest and after their constitutional rights were given, the agent suggested to the defendants that no charge would be made for the delivery of the sample, if they would disclose their source of cocaine. The agent had authority from the state attorney to make the agreement. The defendants identified their source. The trial court was not informed nor consulted. Although neither the agent nor the state attorney made any charges, an assigned state attorney filed an information against the defendants in which he made two charges arising out of the delivery of the sample. These charges were (1) a conspiracy to deliver cocaine, and (2) possession of cocaine. The defendants moved the trial court to compel the state to abide by its promise of immunity. The testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion indicated that the content of the agreement and the witnesses' recollection and construction of it varied considerably. The trial court granted the motion, and as a result dismissed the two charges arising out of the agreement.
The state contends that there was no immunity agreement, that the agreement was merely not to prosecute for delivery of the sample, and that the agreement could not be pled in bar because it was not approved by the trial court. The defendants contend that there was an agreement not to prosecute, that it covered everything arising out of the delivery of the sample, and that the state should be compelled to honor an agreement made by it.
An immunity agreement, without the consent of the court, may not be pled in bar of adjudication of guilt. Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933). The right to immunity is equitable merely, based on the pledge of faith of the public, and does not entitle a defendant to plead 'the promise of immunity as a bar. Cortes v. State, 135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323 (1938). Under an agreement between a state attorney and a defendant, made without the consent of the court, a defendant may be placed on trial in violation of the agreement. Ingram v. Prescott, supra.
At first, it appears to be reprehensible that the state would not be compelled to honor its agreement not to prosecute the defendants. However, there are dangers in an unrestricted rule which would empower a state attorney alone to grant immunity from crime to an accused. The content of verbal agreements, such as the one before us, will provide a prolific source of litigation. The recollection of the parties will be imperfect. Misconstruction is easy. A careless word, a misconstrued statement, or a distorted expression will erupt into litigation.
In addition, such an agreement would be made undercover and in secrecy which is frowned upon by our society.
The office of state attorney is one of fine tradition. It is also one of great power. We decline to extend this power. If an extension is to be made, it should be done by the legislature.
Reversed and remanded for further appropriate proceedings.
SMITH, J., concurs.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., dissents.