Case Name: Charles Thompson v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-05-10
Citations: 79 Tex. Crim. 478
Docket Number: No. 4068
Parties: Charles Thompson v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 478–483

Head Matter:
Charles Thompson v. The State.
No. 4068.
Decided May 10, 1916.
1. —Murder—Evidence—Bes Gestae — Dying Declarations.
Upon trial of murder, the State was permitted to introduce the res gestae declarations and dying declarations of the deceased made a short time after the fatal injury, there was no reversible error, and the question as to whether the deceased was conscious at the time would not render the testimony inadmissible, but would only go to its weight.
2. —Same—Evidence—Impeaching Witness.
Upon trial of murder, where defendant introduced a witness who testified that in her opinion the declarations of deceased were made when she was unconscious, there was no error to impeach her testimony by showing that she had made different statements prior thereto.
3. —Same—Evidence—Motive.
Upon trial of murder, there was no error in admitting testimony of a previous quarrel between deceased and the defendant and what defendant said, to show motive for the crime.
4. —Same—Continuance—Imputing Crime to Another.
Upon trial of murder, there was no error in overruling defendant’s application for a continuance, as it appeared from its face that the parties who were imputed to have committed the crime had no opportunity to commit the offense.
5. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence — Charge of Court.
Where, upon trial of murder, the case depended upon direct and positive testimony for a conviction, there was no error in the court’s failure to charge on circumstantial evidence.
6. —Same—Bes Gestae — Declarations of Deceased.
Where, upon trial of murder, the statements made by the deceased were made a short time after the homicide, when her suffering excluded the idea of fabrication, there was no error in admitting the same as res gestae. Following Boothe v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 208, and other cases.
7. —Same—Evidence—Bes Gestae — Dying Declarations — Questions and Answers.
Where, upon trial of murder, the court admitted testimony as to declarations of the deceased who was then in a dying condition and who stated that the de fendant assaulted her, and this occurred shortly thereafter, there was no reversible error, although the statements were made in answer to questions which were not calculated to lead the deceased to make any particular statement. Following Hunter v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 439, and other cases.
8. —Same—Evidence—Conduct and Declarations of the Deceased.
Upon trial of murder, there was no error in permitting the witness to testify that the deceased was conscious when he shaved her head, describing her conduct, and which was introductory to her dying declaration that defendant ■hit her with a hammer.
9. —Same—Evidence—Predicate—Impeachment—Bill of Exceptions.
Where appellant contended that there was no predicate laid to impeach one of his witnesses, but the bill of exceptions did not show that any such objection was urged in the trial court, it comes too late.
10. —Same—Evidence—Qualifying Bill of Exceptions — Threats.
Where defendant permitted his bill of exceptions to be qualified, with reference to the admission of testimony as to defendant’s threats against the deceased, there was no reversible error. Following Blain v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 448.
11. —Same—Opinion of Witness.
Where the witness, in language could not portray what she saw and observed, there was no error to permit her to express an opinion that from the conduct of the deceased at the time she was conscious when she declared that the defendant assaulted her.
12. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence — Death Penalty.
Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the death penalty by showing a wanton and cruel murder, there was no reversible error.
Appeal from the District Court of Wichita. Tried below before the Hon. ffm. N. Bonner.
Appeal from a conviction of murder; penalty, death.
The opinion states the case.
Ralph P. Mathis and Wayne Somerville, for appellant.
On question of dying declarations: Lyles v. State, 86 S. W. Rep., 763; Craven v. State, 90 S. W. Rep., 311.
On question of res gestae: Lockhart v. State, 111 S. W. Rep., 1024; Ward v. State, 159 S. W. Rep., 272; Porterfield v. State, 141 S. W. Rep., 968.
C. C. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of the murder of Pearl Bransford, and his punishment assessed at death.
Dr. MacKechney testified to being called to see the woman; that he had her carried to the sanitarium, and that the wounds she received were the cause of her death. He testified her face was literally torn all to pieces — that her upper jaw was broken, and all her teeth on the right side were broken loose; her lower jaw was broken, and there were, seven distinct wounds- on her head; that he found a hammer there bloody; that there were wounds practically all over her entire scalp,. -and there were several places where the outer table oí her skull was broken. He says he told Mr. Nelson and his wife that he thought it was useless to attempt to do anything for her, but at their request he treated her. That in his opinion the woman was conscious; and he furthermore testified that he informed the woman she was going to die and that she wanted to tell the truth. Mrs. Nelson says the woman was informed that she was going to die, and the doctor thought she was dying.
The doctor's testimony and Mrs. Nelson's testimony would be admissible both under the res gestae rule and as dying declarations. While the statements made to the undertaker were some time after the statements were made to the doctor, yet his testimony would tend strongly to show that she was conscious, and his testimony would be admissible as a dying declaration.
There are a number, of bills objecting to testimony wherein when asked who did it, she would answer to "Sharles"; to others Charles Thompson, and to others would nod her head in the affirmative when asked the question. It is true that witnesses for appellant testified they did not think she was conscious, but this would not render the testimony inadmissible, but go to the weight to be given it by the jury. When the State's witnesses testified that she was conscious and informed that she was going to diej this made a prima facie case, and rendered the testimony admissible. When the defendant offered testimony that she was not conscious of what she was saying, this rendered it a question of fact to be determined by the jury. None of the bills complaining of the admissibility of this testimony present error.
The testimony of Dr. MacKechney as to what Miss Gossler said to 'him was admissible. Appellant introduced Miss Gossler and had her testify that in her opinion the woman was unconscious when she made the istatements that appellant inflicted the injuries on her head. Any statement she had made to Dr. MacKechney prior to her so testifying would ',be admissible as tending to impeach her, and the court in approving the bill says hé so limited the testimony.
The testimony of a previous quarrel between deceased and appellant was admissible as tending to show motive for the crime. The witnesses testify that appellant had told the negro woman that "no other man should have her." It was shown another man called on her that evening and was to call again that night, and when he did' call he found the negro woman murdered. It is shown that appellant could have and probably did know that Ben Henderson had called that evening and was to call again that night.
The court did not err in overruling the application for a continuance. While it is always permissible to show that another probably committed the crime, or that another had made threats, or had ill-will, if the testimony goes further and would place such person in such proximity to the person that he might or could have committed the deed. The fact one absent witness would testify that he "knew the woman was quarrelsome, and knew of two men who had made threats" would be immaterial, unless •such other two persons, or one of them, were placed in such position where they had an opportunity to commit the offense. There is no allegation in the motion as to where the two persons were on the night of the homicide, nor is the name of either of them given. The fact that the absent witnesses had never heard appellant make any threats toward deceased, would be immaterial, nor would such testimony tend to weaken the testimony of the State's witnesses who heard and testified to the threats. Doubtless any number of men could have been picked up who would have testified and testified truthfully they had never heard appellant - make a threat. Before the testimony of such witnesses would become material they would have to place themselves in position to have heard the threats testified to by the witnesses for the State. There is no allegation they were present on such occasion, nor is it so contended in the record before us.
Three or four witnesses testify to the fact that deceased, in her dying declaration, said appellant committed the offense and the court did not err in refusing to charge on circumstantial evideneb. It was a case depending on direct and positive testimony. If the jury had not believed the woman rvas conscious when she made the statements chárging appellant with having inflicted the wounds which caused her death, they should not and would not have convicted him, much less assess the highest penalty known to the law.
The judgment, is affirmed.
Affirmed.