Case Name: Joseph BOND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-05-02
Citations: 695 So. 2d 778
Docket Number: No. 96-2557
Parties: Joseph BOND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 695
Pages: 778–782

Head Matter:
Joseph BOND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-2557.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 2, 1997.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1997.
Appellant pro se.
No appearance for AppeUee.

Opinion:
PADOVANO, Judge.
The defendant, Joseph Bond, appeals a final order summarily denying his posteonviction motion under rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We conclude that the files and records attached to the trial court's order conclusively refute all of the claims that were properly before the trial court on the defendant's motion. Therefore, we affirm.
On January 19, 1995, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of sexual battery. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the defendant to seventy-four months in the Department of Corrections. Following the dismissal of an untimely appeal to this court, the defendant filed a posteonviction motion in the trial court under rule 3.850. The motion as amended is based on three grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective because he had misled the defendant to believe that he could subsequently withdraw his plea of nolo con-tendere, (2) the plea was involuntary because the defendant was under the influence of psychotropic medication at the time, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file an appeal as requested. The trial court summarily denied the motion on the ground that the defendant's claims were refuted by the transcript of the plea hearing and by representations he made to the court in a written plea form. The transcript and plea form were attached to the order.
A claim that a defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere based on the erroneous advice of counsel is generally cognizable in a posteonviction motion under rule 3.850. Thompson v. State, 351 So.2d 701 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998, 98 S.Ct. 1653, 56 L.Ed.2d 88 (1978). If the motion is facially sufficient and if the defendant's claim is not conclusively refuted by the record, the trial court must grant an evidentiary hearing. As the supreme court held in State v. Leroux, 689 So.2d 235 (Fla.1996), a general acknowledgment during a plea hearing that the defendant received no promises for the entry of a plea does not conclusively refute a sworn allegation that the defendant was prompted to enter the plea by the incorrect advice of his own lawyer.
The supreme court's decision in Leroux and the earlier decisions to the same effect in the district courts of appeal all share one common feature: in each case the defendant alleged that he had been advised about a material issue that was not addressed during the plea hearing. See, e.g., Carmichael v. State, 631 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (the record did not refute an allegation that defense counsel failed to advise the defendant he was ineligible for control release); Hamlin v. State, 627 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (the record did not refute an allegation that defense counsel promised the defendant he would not be habitualized); Gilyard v. State, 675 So.2d 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (the record did not refute a claim that defense counsel failed to inform the defendant of the possible maximum sentence). Here we have a different situation. Any misunderstanding the defendant may have had about the plea after speaking with his lawyer was corrected by the information the trial court provided during the plea hearing. As the supreme court acknowledged in Leroux, it is proper to deny relief summarily under rule 3.850 if the record of the plea hearing conclusively refutes the defendant's claim that the plea was motivated by incorrect legal advice. See, e.g., Rackley v. State, 571 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
The answers the defendant gave to the questions by the trial court during the plea hearing plainly reveal that he understood that he would not be entitled to a trial if the court accepted his plea. At the time of the hearing the defendant told the trial court that he was satisfied with the advice of his counsel, that he was entering the plea voluntarily, and that he thought that the plea to a stipulated sentence of seventy-four months was in his best interest. The transcript of the hearing reflects the following dialogue between the court and the defendant
THE COURT: . Do you understand the rights you are giving up by this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right, you understand we could have a trial, we started a trial last week and a mistrial was declared, you've got another trial next week, you could go through the same process again, see and confront the witnesses against you and have an opportunity to cross examine them as well as bring in witnesses on your own behalf with the assistance of your counsel, so you understand all that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand there won't be any right to appeal this sentence because it's within the guidelines?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And I am going to give you the sentence that you have agreed upon, and do you know how many days credit you are entitled to, no probation, and this case will be over with, is that still what you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma'am.
When the plea was entered, the defendant also made certain representations to the court in a written plea form. In response to questions by the trial court, the defendant represented that he had read and understood this form. Among other things, the defendant represented to the court in the plea form that he understood he was giving up his right to a trial by entering the plea, and that no one, including his own attorney, had made promises to him other than those reflected by the plea agreement.
This ease differs from those involving advice about the wisdom of choosing a plea over a trial and those involving advice about the actual time the defendant will be required to serve. Here, the defendant's claim that he thought his plea would not be binding is refuted by his answers to the most basic questions about the consequences of entering the plea. The defendant's statement to the court that he understood the rights he was giving up to enter the plea and that the imposition of the seventy-four month sentence he bargained for would bring the case to an end refutes his present claim that he thought he could withdraw the plea. Likewise, his statement in the plea form that he had received no promises from anyone, including his own attorney, contradicts his present claim that he was induced to enter the plea by the incorrect advice of counsel.
The records of the plea hearing also conclusively refute the defendant's claim that his use of psychotropic medication affected the voluntariness of the plea. The defendant represented to the trial court in the written plea form that he was in full command of his faculties and that he was not under the influence of drugs or sedatives that would affect his ability to understand the plea. Additionally, during the plea hearing, the trial court asked the defendant directly, "[a]re you under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medication" and the defendant said "no."
We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the files and records conclusively refute the defendant's claim to a belated appeal. This issue does not require reversal, however, because the defendant may now seek a belated appeal by filing a petition in this court under rule 9.140(j) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So.2d 773 (Fla.1996). We decline to treat the present appeal as a petition under rule 9.140(j), because the defendant may have intended to file a direct appeal to obtain relief from his plea, a matter now fully decided in this appeal from the order denying his posteonvietion motion. If the defendant intended to obtain other relief, he may file a petition for a belated appeal under rule 9.140(j).
For these reasons we conclude that the portions of the record attached to the order conclusively refute all of the defendant's claims that are properly asserted in a postconvicton motion under rule 3.850. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order summarily denying the motion.
Affirmed.
LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
WEBSTER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.