Case Name: Horace SIMPSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1963-06-06
Citations: 320 F.2d 803
Docket Number: No. 17442
Parties: Horace SIMPSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 320
Pages: 803–808

Head Matter:
Horace SIMPSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 17442.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 28, 1963.
Decided June 6, 1963.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied En Banc Aug. 1, 1963.
Mr. Philip W. Amram, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Barry Sidman, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Tim Murphy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bazklon, Chief Judge, and Bastían and Wright, Circuit Judges.
. See note 1 supra.
. If defense counsel had conducted such an investigation and found _ nothing to support appellant’s story, we would not expect this to appear in the record. The same, however, cannot be said in refezence to St. Elizabeths Hospital or the prosecution.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
After a trial by jury, appellant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to kill, and was sentenced to three to nine years imprisonment. His appeal centers about the trial court's instruction relating to his defense of insanity.
Appellant presents "no objection to the basic statements of the court in its charge on sanity." He objects only to the "right and wrong gloss" the court introduced into the instructions when it illustrated its correct definition of product. The pertinent portion of the charge reads as follows:
"As an example of this causal connection or relation, if a person at the time of the commission of a crime is so deranged mentally that he cannot distinguish between right and wrong, or, being able to tell right from wrong, he is unable by virtue of his mental derangement to control his actions, then his act is the product of his mental derangement."
In McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (1962), we said "the jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially aifects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." We said, too, that "the jury may be instructed, provided there is testimony on the point, that capacity, or lack thereof, to distinguish right from wrong and ability to refrain from doing a wrong or unlawful act may be considered in determining whether there is a relationship between the mental disease and the act charged. It should be remembered, however, that these considerations are not to be regarded in themselves as independently controlling or alternative tests of mental responsibility in this Circuit. They are factors which a jury may take into account in deciding whether the act charged was a product of mental disease or mental defect." Id. at 851-852.
It is true that the record here reveals no testimony directly bearing on appellant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. But we cannot say that, in the circumstances of this case and in the absence of objection to the instruction at trial, the court's charge was infected with plain error. See Rules 30 and 52(b), F.R.Crim.P.
Appellant also complains about the following instruction given by the trial court on the weight to be accorded expert testimony:
"On the issue of insanity there was called in this case a psychiatrist, a person who, by profession, is known as an expert in his particular field, in other words, a doctor specializing in psychiatry.
"A person who, by education, study, or experience, has become an expert in any art or science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed, and which is material to the case.
"Such witnesses are referred to as expert witnesses.
"You should consider the testimony of the expert and weigh the reasons, if any, given for his opinion.
"You are not, however, bound by such opinion. You may give to his opinion such a weight as you deem it entitled to receive, and you may reject expert testimony if, in your judgment, the reasons for that opinion are unsound."
The psychiatrist referred to was called by the Government and he relied, for the most part, on the opinions, reports and tests of others. Appellant says that under our decision in Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 637 (1962), the jury must be cautioned that such reliance is a factor in weighing such testimony. But it was not requested and we cannot say that the trial court's failure to so inform the jury constitutes plain error in the circumstances of this case.
We have considered appellant's other claims and find no error requiring reversal. The conviction must therefore be
Affirmed.