Case Name: MILLER vs. HOLSTEIN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1840-10
Citations: 16 La. 395
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILLER vs. HOLSTEIN.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 395–413

Head Matter:
MILLER vs. HOLSTEIN.
ON A RE-HEARING.
The courts in Louisiana, are not bound by the technical and artificial rules of the common law of slander, but where our law is silent, we may resort to a foreign system for a rule consonant to reason and equity.
But the court is not prepared to adopt the common law distinction, between words actionable in themselves and words which are not so ; and to say a plaintiffis not entitled to recover in an action of slander, unless charged with an indictable offence, without proof of special damages.
Garland, J. Actions of slander may be maintained, without proving damages, and the party may recover.
Every act of man which causes damage to another, creates responsibility, and when that responsibility is not defined, we must proceed under article 21 of the Louisiana Code, and resort to natural law, reason and usage.
Marlin, J., dissenting. In actions of slander, there are words which are actionable in themselves, and damages will be given, although none are proved; but there aro others not actionable, and no damages will be given unless some are proved.
The judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to the judge, not to instruct the jury, that “ charging the plaintiff falsely and maliciously, with moral turpitude, so as to injure his character and standing in society, they should find damages for him, without any special damage being proved.
The opinion in this case, was first pronounced at the close of the October term, 1839, and the judgment had not become final, at the adjournment of the court. The court then consisted of but three judges, and the presiding judge dissented, and was dissatisfied with the decision. On I he return of the judges from the Western District, judge Strawbridge resigned, who had made the opinion of the court. The court was about to be remodeled, or made to consist of five judges, and three new ones were to be appointed. Under these circumstances and from the great importance of the principles involved in the case, the propriety of a re-hearing and re-argument was suggested. Mr. Strawbridge, after his retirement from the bench drew up the following synopsis of Lhe law of slander, as understood in this state, and upon which, a re-hearing was allowed by the five judges at tire the October term, 1840.
Strawbridge, as amicus cttrice, submitted the following brief of argument to the judges.
The argument of the defendant, after referring to articles 1928 and 2294, of the Civil Code, as the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, proceeds to say, that the latter article is only declaratory of a principle existing in the common law :
“ That whenever an article of our Code is copied literally from the Napoleon Code, we are in the habit of adopting the construction of the Court of Cassation,” and from thence infer that we might fairly refer to the decisions of the English courts, in applying a similar principle.”
This inference was unnecessary, inasmuch as the article 2294 of our Code is identical with article 1382, of the Napoleon Code, so that if we are to look abroad for light, according to his own argument, it would have been to the jurisprudence of France. This was in part done, so far as the limited means at hand allowed; little it is true was found, but certainly that little did not countenance any thing like the charge required from the court by the defendant. Admitting, however, the reasoning tobe sound in its application, it evades the question by leaving out of view article 1928, which formed the main support of plaintiff’s claim. If the principles therein declared, were shown to form a part of the common law, the case would be widely different; but whilst that permits damages not specially proved to be given, where the libel charged an offence indictable, &c., and denies them unless specially proved in cases not charging an offence indictable, &c., the textual provision of article 1928, provides, “ that where the injury done affects some intellect ual enjoyment, &c., damages in the discretion of the judge may be given. “Damages not appreciable in money;” in other words, “ damages not specially proved.” The common law confines thqse to libels not charging an indictable offence, &c. Our law extends them to all cases “of intellectual enjoyment, in matters of taste, morality or religion,” or to “matters of convenience, or other legal gratification.” As a matter of taste, most men would prefer that some tattling neighbor, should quietly say, “ John swore falsely” in his testimony given in the suit of A. vs. B., than that another should publish in the Gazette, that “John had perjured himself, and that he had the documents to prove it,” ,and yet, whilst the first of these would be actionable, the latter would not be a construction at war with the terms of article 1928.
The defence is further pressed on other grounds, viz : that even leaving out of view the common law authorities, the former decisions of our own courts support the charge required. Should this be found to be so, it would indeed be matter of serious import. But a careful examination of the cases cited, will show that with the exception of one case, (Wamack vs. Kemp,) not only lias no such question been decided, but that it has never been discussed. That question emphatically is, can a person falsely and maliciously charged with purjury, not committed in a legal proceeding, recover damages “not appreciable in money, or damages not special 1”
One of these cases, Cauchoix vs. Dupi^q gave damages for calling the plaintiff a colored man, words not actionable in themselves by any English or American authority referred to, though under our construction of article 1928, that judgment was correct; this is supported by analogy to those common law decisions, which make actionable the charge of some contagious disease, which would have the effect of excluding a man from society. Yet, though, the moral disease of purjury might produce the same effect, the charge of it is not actionable.
Take another case, a man is called an abolitionist; if the words were uttered in London, they would be complimentary instead of libelous, yet here they would as certainly exclude him from society as calling him a colored man; yet, where is the common law authority for sustaining an action on them without special damage. Words then may be actionable in one place, or under certain circumstances, when in another place or in other circumstances, they would not. If we were about to make a rule instead of interpreting one, the sensible rule would be that which refers to the state of society we are in. What there tends to bring a man into the contempt and disrespect of his neighbors, deprives him of the enjoyment of good society, and wounds his feelings and destroys his happiness, is a wrong; and any Code professing the rule, that every wrong has a remedy, should furnish that remedy. A young lady may be called a whore; that is not actionable out of London, but she may show special damage, viz : that she lost a chance of marriage. But as was said in Stewart vs. Carlin, “a professional man may not be able to administer positive or direct evidence of his injury,” and therefore, the words were held actionable. Much more difficult would it be for the female, to furnish positive or direct testimony of her injury, or to value it in dollars and cents. Yet, by common law rule, we must hold these words not actionable, though every intellectual enjoyment maybe destroyed for life.
The case of Wamack vs. Kemp does furnish a precedent; had it appeared that article 1928, of the Code, then recently adopted, was under consideration, it would carry greater weight if it was not; the case was not fully discussed ; the important legislative enactment now referred to, was not under consideration, in consequence, one precedent, if it can be so called, has been made. But would the decision have been the same had the attention of the court been drawn to the article in question1? The author of these remarks, is opposed to change in law matters, but he cannot think that one unadvised declaration of a principle ought to controvert the plain letter of a positive law ; he would however, under the circumstances, be pleased that a re-hearing should be granted.
Dunbar and Hyams, for the plaintiff,
contended, that this case should be decided according to the practice and principles of the law of slander, as understood and practised in the United States, and not adopt the arbitrary rules of the English law. But it was proper to remark, that the charge of the judge a quo, to the jury, so much deprecated by the defendant’s counsel, is even in conformity to the law of libel as understood in England, in this, that the words spoken are to be taken in their popular sense; and if the words used by the defendant, of and concerning the plaintiff, might in their most offensive sense have been construed or understood to import a charge of perjury in its legal signification, the judge was right in refusing a new trial.
2. Bui, admitting that there was doubt whether the action could be maintained for the words alleged in the petition, without showing special damage under the law of libel, as understood in England, yet, under the provisions of the Louisiana Code, articles 21, and 2294-93; and the expositions which had been given by the Supreme Court, to those articles in the cases of Stewart vs. Carlin, 2 Louisiana Reports, 72 ; and Trimble vs. Moore, Idem,., 377; and also another case, 3 Idem., 206, of Cauchoix vs. Dupuy, there could be no question of the right of the plaintiff, to sustain his action under the laws of Louisiana.
3. In the case of Stewart vs. Carlin, it had been expressly said, that the action of slander could be maintained under the articles above mentioned of our own Codé, without a resort to the laws of other countries; and that it was not necessary to prove special damages, as when a professional man should be accused of being ignorant of the first principles of his profession, &c. That it might be impossible to show special damage in such a case. It cannot be fairly inferred from the fact of the example given above, being in conformity to one of the rules of the English law, that at the time the court declared that we were to be governed by our own law on this subject, it was intended that this elucidation, by way of an example^ should hold us to the strict rules of the English law of libel: on the contrary from this decision, and all subsequent ones of this court, on this subject, it is probable that it has been the object of the court to establish this action upon the provisions of our code, untrammeled by the rules of the English law ; which in many respects would be opposite to the principles of our jurisprudence, unsuitable to the circumstances of the country, and in opposition to the equal rights of every citizen, as exercised under our state and federal constitution.
4. The principle of the English law of libel, that to make words actionable without showing special damage they must amount to an accusation of a criminal offence, is founded not upon the damage which has been sustained, but upon the damage which might have been sustained, if the party of whom the words were spoken, lmd been prosecuted criminally. On the contrary, our law gives redress for damages sustained, or what it may be fairly presumed have been sustained. “ Every act whatever of man, that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Louisiana Code, article 2294.
5. The English law of libél would be unsuitable to the circumstances and condition of the country. When actions of this kind became too frequent in England, the judges had to depart from the liberal and equitable rules by which they were first governed, in their decisions in cases of slander, and, instead of them established principles arbitrary, restrictive and unreasonable. For all this, however, there was some apology in England. The great number of offences made criminal in that country, still left a good deal of room for this action, and a plausible excuse given by the judges for not affording redress, in many cases of great outrage, was that .the canonical or ecclesiastical courts would give relief. In Louisiana, we have cause to congratulate ourselves that we have neither the multitude of penal laws, nor the ecclesiastical courts. That from the character of our people no danger was to be apprehended of such actions becoming too frequent ; and it was more to be feared, that instead of seeking redress in a court, they would take the law into their own hands, and attempt to wipe out with the blood of the slanderer the stain upon the reputation of themselves or their families.
6. That it was to be hoped, at least, this court would not adopt, of its own accord, the English law of libel, when it was so palpable that its rules and principles were unsuitable to the circumstances and condition of our country.
7. The distinctions made by the English law, as to the persons who could maintain this action, and for what words uttered against them, is contrary to the equal rights of our citizens, as secured to them by our fundamental laws. What reason was there, that a lawyer, when accused of not knowing the first principles of his profession, should be entitled to his action ; and a poor man, like the plaintiff, earning his bread by the sweat of his brow, should be without redress, when charged with swearing falsely1? Rather let this action be maintained according to the idea of the great jurist Toullier, (so eloquently expressed by him) upon the principles of honor and sublime morals. Do unto others as you would others should do unto you : See Toullier, vol. 11, JVb. 12Í. 1 Idem., No. 210; Penal Code, No. 367.
8. In conclusion, that nothing was to be apprehended from leaving such cases to the. discretion of a jury, guided and controlled by the power of the court to grant a new trial whenever it appeared that damages were given disproportioned to the offence, or when indeed no grave offence had been committed.
Purvis, for the defendant,
argued to show that the judge who tried this case in the first instance, erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested, and also in giving the charge which was addressed to them. According to the best writers and highest authorities on the law of libel and slander, the words charged in the petition are not actionable of themselves, and no special damage is shown. Without actual damage having been proved, the jury should not have found a verdict for the plaintiff. 2 Chittifs Blackstone, 92, and notes. Starkie on Libel, 46. 5 Johnson’s Reports, 187.
2. Public policy requires that some limit should be fixed to actions of this character, and the principles which have guided the English courts in their decisions upon this subject, “ that an action'lies for any words which import the charge of a crime, for which a party may be indicted,” or if the charge be not indictable, then “special damages must be shown,” appear to fix a just and proper limit, avoiding the extreme on the one hand of encouraging frivolous and vexatious suits, and on the other, shutting the door of justice to real injuries and well grounded complaints.
3. That the principles upon which the decisions of the Supreme Court of our state are based, upon the subject of slander, are by no means incompatible with the common law doctrine prevalent in England, and the common law states. See, Stewart vs. Carlin, % Louisiana Reports. There a charge of perjury (an indictable offence) was preferred against the party plaintiff. In the case of Cauchoix vs. Dupuy, 3 Louisiana Reports, the charge being a man of color, would affect plaintiff’s rights of inheritance under our law. See also, 2 Blackstone, 98, Slander of Title. That the evidence of malice was wholly insufficient to justify the verdict.
Brent, on the same side,
argued in support of the common law principles, as furnishing the best rules to govern in actions of slander. The rule was the best, that words importing the charge of a criminal offence for which the party might be indicted or punished criminally, or which caused injury to one’s trade or profession and such like, are actionable in themselves, and that in all other cases, special damages should be proved before any recovery can be had.
2. Words of scandal or tending to bring a person into contempt, or wound his feelings, are not actionable per se. See Starkie on Libel and Slander.
3. In the present case, the words spoken do not charge the party with committing perjury, for which he might be indicted, as that offence can only be committed in a judicial proceeding. It is not every false swearing that amounts to perjury. The words charged were evidently spoken in heat, and not calculated to injure the plaintiff. He has, in fact, shown no damage resulting from the words spoken. The charge of the judge a quo, was too broad in telling the jury that if the words spoken charged the plaintiff with moral turpitude, in such a way as in their opinion was calculáted to injure him, they should find for him without showing any special damage. The judgment should, therefore, be reversed.

Opinion:
Bullard, J.
The members of the court do not appear to differ materially upon any part of this case, except as to the propriety of the last part of the charge given to the jury, to wit: " that the words are to be understood in their common popular meaning, and if they charged the .plaintiff falsely an(j maliciously with moral turpitude, so as to injure his character and standing in society, they might find for the plaintiff, without showing any special damage."
The courts in Louisiana, are not bound by the artificio! rules of of6 slander" 'but where our law is resort to^afin^ anil/consonant to reason and
the court to "adopTpathe common law tween words acséTvesand words which are not so; and to say a plaintiff is recoverin'anaction of slander, unless charged with an indictawithout prooTof special damages,
If this part of the charge were to be tested by the common law, it is probable it would be found inaccurate and loose. None of us suppose that we are bound by the technical and artificial rules of the common law of slander, but when our , law is silent, it is supposed that we may resort to a foreign system for a rule, if that rule be consonant to reason and e(lu'fy> I ara by n0 meaas prepared to adopt from the common law the distinction between words which are actionable in themselves, and words which are not; and to say that a pHintiff is not entitled to' recover in an action of slander, unless charged with an indictable offence without proof of special damages. In the present case, the latter part of the judge's charge was perhaps uncalled for, because the words alleged to have been uttered, might well be found by the jury to amount in a popular sense to a charge of perjury, an mdicta^e °ffencej and, consequently, it was not important to inquire what would be the law of the case if the charge had ° only amounted to one of moral turpitude. And yet it may be said that, under the charge of the court, the jury might go beyond the inquiry, whether the words in a popular sense J 1 J , r * imported a charge of an indictable offence, and say that they a<- least imputed great moral turpitude, for it cannot be ¿[oukte(j but that it is highly immoral to swear falseljq even in an affidavit, not connected with any judicial proceedings. I am disposed, therefore, to look at the charge in that point of view, and while we all agree that the judge acted correctly in refusing to charge in the main as prayed by the defendant's counsel, my opinion is, that he did not 'err in charging as above stated. I'concur with the judge of the District Court in his view of the law. I should, however, be disposed to reconsider my opinion, if upon inquiry I should be satisfied that this court in its previous decisions, had sanctioned a contrary doctrine. But it does not appear to me to have done so, either expressly, on a point directly before it, or by necessary iinpli cation. The case of Wamack vs. Kemp, is perhaps the strongest; but it does not appear to me, that the point now under consideration was made or decided expressly. In that of Stewart vs. Carlin, the court held, that when the charge was of perjury, the plaintiff might recover without showing special damages, but the court did not say that there might not be cases in which the plaintiff could recover, when the accusation conveyed only a charge of moral turpitude, injurious to his reputation and standing in society.
sla¿ dermaybemainproving damages ,Ü!LeF.arty
I am of opinion, therefore, that the judgment first pronounced, remain undisturbed.