Case Name: Celestino SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roland G. VALDEZ and Farmers Insurance Group, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1978-01-31
Citations: 91 N.M. 705
Docket Number: No. 2991
Parties: Celestino SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roland G. VALDEZ and Farmers Insurance Group, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: SUTIN, J., specially concurring.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 705–712

Head Matter:
580 P.2d 131
Celestino SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roland G. VALDEZ and Farmers Insurance Group, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 2991.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Jan. 31, 1978.
Writ of Certiorari Quashed April 13, 1978.
Walter K. Martinez and Gary Fernandez, Grants, for plaintiff-appellant.
David W. Yount, Civerolo, Hansen & Wolf, P. A., Albuquerque, for defendantsappellees.

Opinion:
OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant Farmers Insurance Group. For clarity's sake, we shall refer to Sandoval, the appellant in this appeal, as the plaintiff, and Farmers Insurance Group, a defendant in the trial court and the appellee in this appeal, as Farmers. We reverse.
This case presents the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction; and (2) whether the "time to sue" provision of the uninsured motorists clause in plaintiff's insurance policy is controlling in this action.
Facts
On May 14, 1973, Farmers issued to Sandoval, then a resident of Colorado, an automobile insurance policy which included uninsured motorist coverage. The expiration date of said policy was November 22, 1973. Sandoval alleged that on August 31, 1973, Valdez, then a resident of the State of Colorado, negligently caused Sandoval's vehicle to go off the road resulting in his injuries.
Sandoval believed that Valdez was uninsured. On July 29,1976, Sandoval filed suit in Rio Arriba County alleging that both he and Valdez are residents of the State of New Mexico; Sandoval, a resident of Bernalillo County; and Valdez, a resident of Rio Arriba County. Sandoval's first claim asked for judgment against Valdez for $46,-000.00 for personal injuries, medical expenses and reimbursement under 42 U.S. Code § 2651-2653 (1970), for medical expenses incurred by the United States on Sandoval's behalf.
Sandoval's second claim was against Farmers, alleging that because Valdez was both negligent and uninsured, Farmers is indebted to Sandoval for personal injuries sustained, to the limit of liability stated in the policy.
Separate answers were filed by each of the defendants in the trial court. Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found the action was controlled by the policy provision which limited Sandoval's time for bringing an action to one year and entered summary judgment.
Jurisdiction
Farmers argues that this Court has no jurisdiction and the case should be transferred to the Supreme Court. We disagree. Section 16-7-8, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970).
Sandoval filed suit under § 16-7-8, supra, seeking damages for a tort. Although in one respect the action against Farmers is based on breach of contract, the action against Farmers is inseparable from the tort action against Valdez. The provision of the insurance policy clearly indicates that the liability of Farmers is contingent upon the liability of Valdez; i. e., that Valdez was negligent and the proximate cause of the accident. Subsequently, we do have jurisdiction. Section 16-7-8, supra. Further, once this Court determines it has jurisdiction and proceeds to decide the matter, that determination of jurisdiction is final. Section 16-7-10, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 4, 1970).
Time to Sue Provision
The issue presented here is whether the "time to sue" provision in the insurance policy is controlling in this case. Although in many cases a "time to sue" provision is as controlling as any other contract provision agreed upon by both parties, the question involved in this appeal is the effect New Mexico's uninsured motorist statute has on this "time to sue" provision.
The pertinent portion of Sandoval's insurance policy reads as follows:
" . . . (3) no cause of action shall accrue to the insured unless within one year from the date of accident (a) suit for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured motorist, in a court of competent jurisdiction, or (b) agreement as to the amount due under this Part II has been concluded, or (c) the insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings . . . ."
Sandoval argues that the trial court erred in granting Farmers' motion for summary judgment, as the one year time to sue provision is an exclusionary provision of his insurance policy; enforceable only if it is not in conflict with statutory law or public policy of New Mexico. Willey v. Farmers Insurance Group, 86 N.M. 325, 523 P.2d 1351 (1974); Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 553 P.2d 100 (1975).
Farmers raises several arguments to rebut Sandoval's contention that the trial court erred in its ruling, among which are: (1) the challenged provision is valid under Colorado law; and (2) plaintiff should not rely on New Mexico public policy to avoid the contractual provisions of a Colorado contract.
Defendant's first contention, that the challenged provision is valid under Colorado law, is without merit. We could not find nor did defendant refer us to any case law in which Colorado has considered whether such a "time to sue" provision violates the legislative declaration of policy embodied by Colorado's uninsured motorist statute.
Defendant's second contention revolves around the effect of New Mexico's public policy, as set out in its uninsured motorist statute, on a contractual provision.
The validity of a contract executed in a sister state will be determined according to the laws of such state unless such construction conflicts with some settled policy of the jurisdiction of the forum. Railway v. Rogers, 16 N.M. 120, 113 P. 805 (1911). Although New Mexico applies the First Restatement of Conflicts generally, First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. Benson, 89 N.M. 481, 553 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App.1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976), if the application of Colorado law would violate New Mexico's public policy, this Court is not bound.
New Mexico's uninsured motorist statute is set out in § 64-24-105, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, pt. 2, 1972). Uninsured motorist statutes were adopted, and the legislative intent was to expand insurance coverage to protect the public from damage or injury caused by other motorists who were not insured and could not make the impaired party whole.
"In short, the uninsured or unknown motorist statutes are designed to protect the injured party from the uninsured or unknown motorist. The statutes are not designed to protect the insurance company from the injured party." Montoya v. Dairyland Insurance Company, 394 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.N.M.1975).
New Mexico has an uninsured motorist statute which embodies such a public policy. Farmers argues that this is a purely contractual matter which should be determined by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. However, such contractual restrictions are void where they place a limitation upon or conflict with a statute granting uninsured motorist coverage. Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra.
In Chavez, supra, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the object of compulsory uninsured motorist coverage is:
" 'to protect persons injured in automobile accidents from losses which, because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.' [Citations omitted.] In other words, the legislative purpose in creating compulsory uninsured motorist coverage was to place the injured policyholder in the same position, with regard to the recovery of damages, that he would have been in if the tortfeasor had possessed liability insurance." Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 52, 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1973).
Chavez held that the only limitations under the New Mexico Uninsured Motorist Act shall be those specifically set out in the act itself. That is, that the insured be legally entitled to recover damages and the negligent driver be uninsured. The New Mexico Uninsured Motorist Act does not mention any other limitations on actions.
Although many uninsured motorist statutes do not include a limitation period, the intent to protect the victim or the insured motorist from having to bear the total loss is obvious.
In most states where "uninsured motorist" statutes d.o not contain any specific provisions governing the period within which claims based on uninsured motorist coverage must be advanced, the question is not whether a shorter limitation contained in a policy is valid as against the general personal injury statute of limitations, but whether the personal statute of limitations or the longer, general written contracts statute of limitations should be applied in actions against an insurance carrier. Only two jurisdictions have dealt with the issue of whether a shorter limitation contained in a policy is valid as against the general personal injury statute of limitations; Illinois, in Burgo v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, 8 Ill.App.3d 259, 290 N.E.2d 371 (1972), and Ohio, in Globe American Casualty Co. v. Goodman, 41 Ohio App.2d 231, 325 N.E.2d 257 (1974). The Illinois Court sets out the rule most in line with the legislative intent of our uninsured motorist statute.
The Illinois Court was faced with a suit against an insurance company where the same provision was at issue as in the instant case. The case also involved an uninsured motorist statute which had no time limit in which the insured could exercise his rights. The court held that the exclusionary provision in the liability policy violated the two year statute of limitation for bringing a personal injury suit; deprived the insureds of their uninsured motorist coverage; and was void as against public policy. Burgo, supra.
Under the applicable limitation period, Sandoval has a right to recover from Valdez for personal injuries caused by the negligence of Valdez, if he brings an action against him within three years. Section 23-1-8, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Vol. 5). In the instant case, the one year limitation of time provision in the insurance contract is not controlling.
We need not decide at this time whether the applicable time limitation must be based on the personal injury statute of limitations or the longer contract statute of limitations, as the plaintiff brought the action within the shorter three year period. Therefore, Sandoval's suit was timely filed and is not barred by the exclusionary provisions'of the insurance policy.
The summary judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to determine whether Valdez was in fact negligent and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SUTIN, J., specially concurring.
HERNANDEZ, J., concurs.