Case Name: In re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1993-06-04
Citations: 994 F.2d 1433
Docket Number: No. 91-55809,
Parties: In re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee.
Judges: Before O’SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges, and ZILLY, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 994
Pages: 1433–1441

Head Matter:
In re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 91-55809.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 6, 1992.
Decided June 4, 1993.
Gilbert G. Beezley, pro se.
Mark E. Rohatiner, Ellen L. Frank, Schneider, Goldberg, Rohatiner & Yuen, Beverly Hills, CA, for appellee.
Before O’SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges, and ZILLY, District Judge.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission on the record and briefs and without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4.
Thc Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Debtor Gilbert G. Beezley appeals the decision of the Ninth Circuit BAP, affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of his motion to reopen his bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.
Beezley argues that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion to reopen his case. See In re Herzig, 96 B.R. 264, 266 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (bankruptcy court's refusal to reopen a closed case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) reviewed for an abuse of discretion). We disagree. Based on the assumption that amendment was necessary to discharge the debt, Beezley sought to add an omitted debt to his schedules. Beezley's, however, was a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case. After such a ease has been closed, dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling; amendment of Beezley's schedules would thus have been a pointless exercise. See American Standard Ins. Co. v. Bakehorn, 147 B.R. 480, 483 (N.D.Ind.1992); In re Stecklow, 144 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr.D.Md.1992); In re Tucker, 143 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1992); In re Peacock, 139 B.R. 421, 422 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992); In re Thibodeau, 136 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992); In re Hunter, 116 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989). If the omitted debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), it has already been discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. If the debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B), it has not been discharged, and is non-dischargeable. In sum, reopening here in order to grant Beezley's request would not have "accord[ed] relief to" Beez-ley; thus, there was no abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
. We express no opinion as to whether the omitted debt was or was not discharged.