Case Name: Tatevik HAYRAPETYAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-01-14
Citations: 628 F. App'x 555
Docket Number: No. 09-73933
Parties: Tatevik HAYRAPETYAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 628
Pages: 555–556

Head Matter:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Tatevik HAYRAPETYAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 09-73933.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 5, 2013.
Filed Jan. 14, 2016.
Artem M. Sarian, Esquire, Sarian Law Group, APLC, Glendale, CA, for Petitioner.
Catherine B. Bye, Trial, Judith Roberta O’Sullivan, Esquire, Trial, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Tatevik Hayrapetyan appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) denial of her motion to reopen her case based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we affirm.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Cano-Merida v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2002); its determination of questions of law, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005); and its factual findings for substantial evidence, id.
While there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation proceedings, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause ensures that no petitioner's proceeding is "so fundamentally unfair that [she is] prevented from reasonably presenting [her] case." Gonzales, 400 F.3d at 793. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show (1) that her counsel performed defi-ciently, and (2) that she was prejudiced by that deficient performance. Id. Hayrape-tyan cannot make either showing. Hayra-petyan argues that her attorney performed deficiently by withdrawing her application for adjustment of status and requesting voluntary departure as an alternative form of relief. Under Ninth Circuit case law, however, counsel's tactical decision, even if "unwise" in retrospect, does not amount to deficient performance unless petitioner can show that the decision fell below the level of professional competence. See Magal-lanes-Damian v. I.N.S., 783 F.2d 931, 934 (9th Cir.1986). Given Hayrapetyan's inconsistent testimony regarding whether she entered the United States without inspection, and the absence of any evidence corroborating her later claim that she entered with inspection, we cannot construe her counsel's recommended course as anything other than a defensible tactical decision.
Even if we were to bypass this first step, Hayrapetyan cannot satisfy the second. Her representation that she entered the United States without inspection, made through two different attorneys at two different hearings, forecloses any claim that she was prejudiced, as her uninspected entry into the United States made her ineligible for adjustment of status under § 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.