Case Name: Michael BRISCOE, Petitioner, v. GOODMARK CORP., Richard C. Poe, and Dick Poe Motors, Inc., Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2003-03-27
Citations: 102 S.W.3d 714
Docket Number: No. 02-0498
Parties: Michael BRISCOE, Petitioner, v. GOODMARK CORP., Richard C. Poe, and Dick Poe Motors, Inc., Respondents.
Judges: in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, Justice O’NEILL, Justice SCHNEIDER, and Justice SMITH joined.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 102
Pages: 714–720

Head Matter:
Michael BRISCOE, Petitioner, v. GOODMARK CORP., Richard C. Poe, and Dick Poe Motors, Inc., Respondents.
No. 02-0498.
Supreme Court of Texas.
March 27, 2003.
Rehearing Denied May 22, 2003.
Randy Lee, Law Office of Randy Lee, El Paso, for Petitioner.
John P. Mobbs, Doris A. Sipes, El Paso, for Respondents.

Opinion:
Justice ENOCH
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, Justice O'NEILL, Justice SCHNEIDER, and Justice SMITH joined.
On July 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Goodmark Corporation, Richard C. Poe, and Dick Poe Motors, Inc., and against Michael Briscoe, based on jury findings after a trial on the merits. Briscoe filed a notice of appeal, but pointed out in his notice of appeal that he did not think he had a final judgment. The court of appeals agreed, and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Back in the trial court, Goodmark moved for and obtained an order from the trial court declaring that its original judgment disposed of all parties and claims, and that the judgment was final and enforceable. Briscoe once again appealed; this time the court of appeals held that the original judgment had indeed been a final judgment, and dismissed the second appeal for want of jurisdiction because Briscoe's second appeal had not been timely filed. Under the law of the case doctrine, the court of appeals had the authority to reconsider its first dismissal of the appeal, and to change that first decision if it was clearly erroneous. However, the court of appeals should not have dismissed the second appeal for want of jurisdiction. Rather, having found that there was a final, appealable judgment, it should have considered the merits of Briscoe's first appeal. We grant Briscoe's petition and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals' dismissal of Briscoe's appeal for want of jurisdiction, and remand the appeal to that court to consider Briscoe's remaining issues.
On July 14, 2000, after a jury trial, the trial court signed a "Final Judgment." That order awarded damages, as well as pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs to Poe and Poe Motors, Inc. The final phrase of each section of the judgment reads simply: "for all of which let execution issue." Briscoe timely filed a motion for new trial, partly on the basis that the judgment did not appear to be final because it did not dispose of all claims and parties. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on September 20, 2000, declaring that its judgment disposed of all parties and was final.
Briscoe timely filed a notice of appeal in the court of appeals. Still not convinced that he had a final judgment, Briscoe pointed out in his notice of appeal the possibility that the judgment was not final. The court of appeals apparently agreed that there was a question about finality, for it asked the parties to respond within ten days showing grounds to continue the appeal. Briscoe filed nothing further, having already brought the question of finality to the court's attention in his notice of appeal. Receiving no response from Good-mark that the judgment was final, and before even reaching the briefing stage, the court of appeals issued a judgment on January 19, 2001. That judgment dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, but also included the statement that "the trial court is authorized to enforce its judgment and this decision be certified below for observance." Both parties, perplexed by the order, responded with motions— Briscoe for reconsideration and clarification of judgment and opinion, Goodmark for clarification or alternatively for rehearing. On February 7, 2001, the court of appeals denied both motions, once again dismissing the appeal based on the record and this time succinctly concluding "that the complained of judgment is not a final judgment."
Goodmark did not appeal the court of appeals' decision to this Court. Rather, Goodmark brought a motion in the trial court for interpretation of the judgment. In response to that motion and after a hearing, the trial court, on March 23, 2001, issued an "Order on Motion for Interpretation of Judgment." In that order, the trial court found that its July 14, 2000, judgment had disposed of all parties and issues and that it was a final enforceable judgment. Briscoe filed another notice of appeal within thirty days of the interpretive order. This time, the court of appeals held that the trial court's original July 14, 2000, judgment was indeed final, that Bris-coe had not therefore timely filed an appeal (since it was now nine months since the original final judgment was rendered), and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Briscoe appeals the second dismissal.
Under the law of the case doctrine, a court of appeals is ordinarily bound by its initial decision if there is a subsequent appeal in the same case. The law of the case doctrine states as follows:
The 'law of the case' doctrine is defined as that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. By narrowing the issues in successive stages of the litigation, the law of the case doctrine is intended to achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and efficiency. The doctrine is based on public policy and is aimed at putting an end to litigation.
A decision rendered on an issue before the appellate court does not absolutely bar reconsideration of the same issue on a second appeal. Application of the doctrine lies within the discretion of the court, depending on the particular circumstances surrounding that case.
The Court has long recognized as an exception to the law of the case doctrine that if the appellate court's original decision is clearly erroneous, the court is not required to adhere to its original rulings. "It would be unthinkable for [the court], after having granted the writ, reconsid ered the case, and arrived at the conclusion that the opinion on the former appeal was clearly erroneous, to hold that it is bound by considerations of consistency to perpetuate that error. Our duty to administer justice under the law, as we conceive it, outweighs our duty to be consistent."
Because application of the law of the case doctrine is discretionary, the court of appeals had the authority to revisit its jurisdictional decision. Finding clear error in its first decision, it had the power to overturn that first decision on the second appeal. Based on the incomplete record before it at the time of the first appeal, and because it did not receive any additional briefing from the parties, the court of appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because it did not appear that there was a final judgment in the case. On the second appeal, armed with a complete record and more extensive briefing, as well as a positive statement from the trial court that its July 14, 2000, judgment was indeed final, the court of appeals was then able to hold that a final, appealable order had indeed been issued on July 14, 2000. Because its first decision was clearly erroneous, the law of the ease doctrine did not apply and the court of appeals was not bound by its first decision.
Being incorrect in that decision, however, does not mean that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing this appeal for want of jurisdiction. As incorrect as that decision was, as a matter of law, the judgment was then interlocutory. Consequently, the court should have asserted jurisdiction over Briscoe's second appeal and considered his issues on the merits. This is consistent with our oft-repeated position that a party should not lose the right to appeal because of an "overly technical" application of the law. Here, Bris-coe did everything that he possibly could to preserve his appellate rights. The court of appeals originally held that the July 2000, judgment was not final. Bris-coe should not now have to lose his appellate rights because the court of appeals later found that its original decision was erroneous.
We reverse the court of appeals' judgment dismissing the appeal and remand the matter back to the court of appeals to consider the merits of Briscoe's appeal.
Justice JEFFERSON filed a concurring opinion.
Justice WAINWRIGHT did not participate in the decision.
. Kempner v. Huddleston, 90 Tex. 182, 37 S.W. 1066, 1066-67 (1896).
. Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.
. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986) (citations omitted).
. Kempner, 37 S.W. at 1066.
. Id. at 1067; accord Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Bryson, 148 Tex. 86, 219 S.W.2d 799, 800 (1949); Miller v. Winn, 28 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ ref'd); see also Howlett v. State, 994 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Faber, 77 Tex. 153, 8 S.W. 64, 65 (1888).
. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 219 S.W.2d at 800.
. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex.2001); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616-617 (Tex.1997).