Case Name: DUNBAR v. HINES, director-general
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1922-04-13
Citations: 28 Ga. App. 479
Docket Number: 11493
Parties: DUNBAR v. HINES, director-general.
Judges: Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 479–480

Head Matter:
11493.
DUNBAR v. HINES, director-general.
The former judgment of this court in this ease (25 Ga. App. 675, 104 S. E. 574) is vacated in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court therein rendered on certiorari; and’ the judgment of the trial court, sustaining the general demurrer to the first count of the petition, is reversed, and the judgment sustaining the general demurrer to the second count is affirmed, with direction that leave to amend be given.
Decided April 13, 1922.
Action for damages; from city court of Macon — Judge Guerry. April 9, 1920.
Robert L. Berner, for plaintiff.
Harris, Harris & Witman, for defendant.

Opinion:
Broyles, C. J.
This was an action for damages against the director-general of railroads. The petition contained two counts. The trial court sustained general demurrers to each count and dismissed the case. This judgment was affirmed by this court. Dunbar v. Hines, 25 Ga. App. 675 (104 S. E. 574). Upon certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court as to the ruling that the first count of the petition did not set forth a cause of action, and affirmed it as to the ruling that the second count did not set forth a cause of action. The Supreme Court directed also that leave be given to the plaintiff so to amend the second count as to show that he did not know of the defect and danger in the engine-house referred to in that count. See the full opinion of the Supreme Court (152 Ga. 865, 111 S. E. 396). Accordingly, the judgment formerly rendered by this court is vacated, and the judgment of the trial court, sustaining the general demurrer to the first count of the petition, is reversed, and its judgment sustaining the general demurrer to the second count is affirmed, with direction that leave be given the plaintiff to amend that count in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court.
Judgment reversed in part, and affirmed in part, with direction.
Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.