Case Name: Donald DEAN, Appellant, v. Marie Martin DEAN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-09-07
Citations: 793 So. 2d 1121
Docket Number: No. 5D01-40
Parties: Donald DEAN, Appellant, v. Marie Martin DEAN, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs in result only.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 793
Pages: 1121–1125

Head Matter:
Donald DEAN, Appellant, v. Marie Martin DEAN, Appellee.
No. 5D01-40.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 7, 2001.
Sharon Lee Stedman of Sharon Lee Stedman, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
N. Lee Sasser, Jr., of Sasser and Weber, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
SHARP, W., J.
Donald Dean (Donald), the former husband, appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and an order denying his motion for a new trial. Donald argues that the trial court erred in awarding the former wife, Marie Martin Dean (Marie) a portion of Donald's pension plan because the two had earlier separated and distributed certain assets pursuant to an oral separation agreement. He also claims that the trial court incorrectly applied the law. We disagree and affirm.
The parties were married in 1978 and ceased living together in 1991. They have maintained separate residences since that time. At the time they separated, they agreed upon a division of most of their assets: Marie received cash and Donald received non-liquid assets. But there was no evidence as to any specific agreement between the parties regarding Donald's profit sharing plan, and it was not actually divided.
Donald' claimed that they intended to permanently separate and divide their property in 1992, in 1996 (when he first asked for a divorce) and in 1997. However, he offered neither a specific date that the alleged agreement was made, nor the specific property it covered. It did not include alimony or life insurance, as those obligations were set by the court. Marie claimed that the parties did not intend to terminate the marital relationship or partnership, and cited reconciliation discussions, an anniversary celebration, and other similar incidents, including sexual involvement. Her position was that the relationship was the same, although they lived in different residences.
The final judgment recites that the parties' standard of living during the marriage was one of upper middle class. The marriage was of 20 years duration, and Marie was 56 at the time of dissolution. Donald was an engineer, earning over $100,000 per annum. Throughout the marriage, Marie was primarily a homemaker. Her only employment was in a temporary position as a proofreader at Red Lobster for approximately three months in 1995, at which time she received a salary of ten dollars per hour. She has a history of reoccurring depression and has made several suicide attempts, to the point that she is not able to work. As a result, the court found that she required permanent periodic alimony to survive, and it awarded her $3,000 per month. The court also found that the bulk of the parties' assets were in retirement plans, and residences.
The trial court determined that the remaining marital asset — Donald's profit sharing plan — should include accumulations to the account after the parties separated. Pursuant to section 61.075(6), the cut off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital assets is the earliest of the date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of the petition. The court found that Donald had offered no evidence as to the specific time the settlement agreement was entered into and little evidence as to what the actual terms of the agreement were. In fact, the court found that Donald had presented no competent evidence that an agreement was reached and consented to by both parties. Thus it selected the date of filing.
The parties' acts and the evidence presented at best established only a partial settlement as to some of the marital assets, at some earlier date, but it did not specifically include the profit sharing plan. Further, section 61.075(5)(b) sets out substantive requirements for a judge to follow in determining whether an asset is non-marital, and thus the sole property of one spouse. With regard to separation agreements which exclude assets as nonmarital, they must be pursuant to a valid written agreement between the parties under section 61.075(5)(b)4. That requirement has not been met in this case.
In addition, a cut off date prior to 1998, when the petition was filed, to determine marital assets would be inappropriate in this case because section 61.075(6) necessarily assumes that the date of the separation agreement must be established at trial. In this case, the husband was uncertain of the actual date of the alleged agreement, and argued at least two different dates: 1992 after the parties separated, and 1996 when he first told the wife he wanted a divorce. The trial court's determination that 1998 should be the cut off date grew out of its finding that there was no valid separation agreement encompassing this asset. That "fact finding" was supported by competent evidence.
The dissent opines that under section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes, the test for determining the date to identify marital assets for purposes of equitable distribution is when the spouses agreed or intended to withdraw from the marital relationship. The problem in this case is that there was conflicting evidence concerning the parties' intent vel non, to withdraw from the marital relationship, leaving the determination of this fact to the trial judge. Marcoux v. Marcoux, 475 So.2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Had the parties truly decided to permanently separate and cease their marital relationship, they could have instituted divorce proceedings or otherwise formalized their separation. Failing to do so, both parties ran the risk that at some future date a trial judge, in exercising his discretion under section 61.075(6), would distribute any subsequently acquired assets in a manner not to their liking. So long as competent evidence supports a trial court's fact finding, appellate courts should affirm, and refrain from acting as new "fact finders." Nor should appellate courts create new rules of law binding on the trial court's discretion in family law cases. Walter v. Walter, 464 So.2d 538 (Fla.1985).
AFFIRMED.
COBB, J., concurs in result only.
HARRIS, J., dissents with opinion.
. Section 61.075(6) provides:
(6) The cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage. The date for determining value of assets and the amount of liabilities identified or classified as marital is the date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable under the circumstances. Different assets may be valued as of different dates, as, in the judge's discretion, the circumstances require.
. Parties may resolve their disputes by way of partial settlements. See, e.g., Flemming v. Flemming, 742 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Fast v. Fast, 654 So.2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
. Nonmarital assets include,
(5)(b)4. Assets and liabilities excluded from marital assets and liabilities by valid written agreement of the parties, and assets acquired and liabilities incurred in exchange for such assets and liabilities. (Emphasis added).
Other exclusions in that statute are not relevant to the facts of this case.