Case Name: Franklin Delano Wade Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus vs. Warden of the State Prison
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1950-04-25
Citations: 145 Me. 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: Franklin Delano Wade Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus vs. Warden of the State Prison
Judges: Sitting: Murchie, C. J., Thaxter, Fellows, Merrill, Nulty, William:son, JJ. (Murchie, C. J., dissenting; Merrill, J., concurring with majority specially; Williamson, J., concurring with majority with reservations; Murchie, C. J., further dissenting.)
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 120–169

Head Matter:
Franklin Delano Wade Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus vs. Warden of the State Prison
Cumberland.
Opinion, April 25, 1950.
Richard S. Chapman, for petitioner.
Daniel C. McDonald, for State.
Sitting: Murchie, C. J., Thaxter, Fellows, Merrill, Nulty, William:son, JJ. (Murchie, C. J., dissenting; Merrill, J., concurring with majority specially; Williamson, J., concurring with majority with reservations; Murchie, C. J., further dissenting.)

Opinion:
Fellows, J.
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus of Franklin Delano Wade of Portland, Maine who brings the petition by Catherine A. Wade, his mother. Franklin Delano Wade is a child under the age of seventeen years.
The petition comes to the Law Court on report upon facts agreed, Revised Statutes, (1944), Chapter 91, Section 14, and certified for immediate decision, by agreement of counsel. Welch Petr. v. Sheriff, 95 Me. 451, 454. The Law Court is to determine whether or not the writ shall issue.
The facts are these: Franklin Delano Wade was born in Portland, Maine on July 27, 1933. He was 16 years old when the offense was alleged to have been committed, and when he was arrested upon a complaint and warrant issued November 22, 1949 from the Portland Municipal Court. He was charged with manslaughter. The record of the Municipal Court shows "Date of hearing — November 22, 1949. Plea — Not guilty — waived reading and hearing. Judgment of Court — Probable cause. Result in Full — Bound over to the January Term of the Superior Court, A. D. 1950 — Bail — $5000."
The stipulation made by counsel says that the Judge of the Municipal Court "refused to exercise jurisdiction over the offense with which the Defendant was charged, and rendered judgment of 'Probable Cause.' "
Wade was indicted for manslaughter at the January Term, 1950 of Superior Court for Cumberland County, to which indictment he pleaded not guilty. He was placed on trial and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. He was sentenced by the Presiding Justice to a term of not less than seven years nor more than fourteen years in the State Prison, where he is now held under warrant of commitment issued by the Superior Court.
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleges that Wade is now unlawfully imprisoned by the Warden of the State Prison because, in the words of the petition, "the offense for which he was charged, not being one the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to try and sentence him upon the indictment which was returned against him, but that the exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense with which he was charged in said Complaint and Warrant and in the Indictment returned in the Superior Court, was and now is in the Portland Municipal Court as a Juvenile Court."
The statutes under consideration are Revised Statutes (1944), Chapter 133, Section 2 and Section 6, as amended by Chapter 334, of the Public Laws of 1947. The pertinent parts of these sections, as amended, are as follows:
"Section 2. Judges of Municipal Courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses, except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years, committed by children under the ag'e of 17 years, and when so exercising said jurisdiction shall be known as juvenile courts. Any adjudication or judgment under the provisions of sections 4 to 7, inclusive, shall be that the child was guilty of juvenile delinquency, and no such adjudication or judgment shall be deemed to constitute a conviction for crime.
Section 6. A municipal court may place children under the age of 17 years under the supervision, care and control of a probation officer or an agent of the department of health and welfare or may order the child to be placed in a suitable family home subject to the supervision of a probation officer or the department of health and welfare or may commit such child to the department of health and welfare or make such other disposition as may seem best for the interests of the child and for the protection of the community including holding such child for the grand jury or commitment of such child to Pownal State School upon certification of two physicians who are graduates of some legally organized medical college and have practiced three years in this state, that such child is mentally defective and that his or her mental age is not greater than % of subject's life age nor under 3 years, or to the state school for boys or state school for girls; but no boy shall be committed to the state school for boys who is under the age of 9 years and no girl shall be committed to the state school for girls who is under the age of 9 years, and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison; any child or his next friend or guardian may appeal to the superior court in the same county in the same manner as in criminal appeals, and the court may accept the personal recognizance of such child, next friend or guardian, and said superior court may either affirm such sentence or order of commitment or make such other disposition of the case as may be for the best interests of such child and for the peace and welfare of the community.
Where, however, an appeal is taken and the offense is one that must be prosecuted by indictment, the county attorney shall submit the evidence relating to such crime to the grand jury convening at the criminal term at which the appeal is to be heard, and if the grand jury return an indictment for such offense the accused may, in the discretion of the court, be tried on such indictment, or the court may order it placed on file, or make such other disposition thereof as it may determine, including the dismissal thereof, and proceed to hear the appeal, and either affirm such sentence or order of commitment, or make other disposition of the case in accordance with the provisions relating to appeal hereinbefore provided."
The above statute makes every municipal court a juvenile court when exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses committed by a child under the age of seventeen years. It has such jurisdiction over all offenses committed by such children "except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years." The sixteen year old petitioner stands committed to the State Prison by the Superior Court for the offense of manslaughter. He was so committed without prior action by the Municipal Court acting as a Juvenile Court. We must therefore determine whether or not manslaughter is a crime "the punishment for which may be for any term of years," as that phrase is used in the foregoing exception to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The punishment for murder, kidnapping, and for treason, is imprisonment for life. Such offenses are clearly excepted from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. What crimes are excepted by the phrase "the punishment for which may be for any term of years?" Does it, as claimed by the State, except all crimes which may be punished by a term of years, a term of years being two years or more? Or does it except only those crimes which may be punished by a term of years, the length of which term is limited only by the discretion of the judge imposing sentence? In other words, does the phrase in the foregoing exception have the same meaning as when used in the statutes to fix punishment for many serious offenses like robbery, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 16; rape, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 10; corrupting water, R. S. (1944), Chap. 124, Sec. 1; burglary, R. S. (1944), Chap. 118, Sec. 8; perjury, R. S. (1944), Chap. 322, Sec. 1; burning of buildings in the night time, R. S. (1944), Chap. 118, Sec. 2; counterfeiting, R. S. (1944), Chap. 120, Sec. 5; depositing bomb to cause injury, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 22; conviction of felony after prior conviction and sentence, R. S. (1944), Chap. 136, Sec. 3, in all of which foregoing offenses the punishment is "any term of years?" State v. Fraizer, 144 Me. 383; 64 Atl. (2nd) 179.
For some felonies like manslaughter, R. S. (3944), Chap. 117, Sec. 8, the punishment is restricted to not more than so many years, and in a multitude of other offenses the amount of punishment is restricted, and varies from months to years, depending on whether made a misdemeanor or a felony. There are very few felonies, if any, where punish ment for the felony has been restricted to a period of less than two years.
The purpose of juvenile courts, and laws relating to juvenile delinquency, is to carry out a modern method of dealing with youthful offenders, so that there may be no criminal record against immature youth to cause detrimental local gossip and future handicaps because of childhood errors and indiscretions, and also that the child who is not inclined to follow legal or moral patterns, may be guided or reformed to become, in his mature years, a useful citizen.
The work of the judge of a municipal court, sitting as the judge of a juvenile court, is vitally important to the welfare of our state. He does not pass upon the crimes and misdemeanors of childhood wholly from the legal standpoint. The basic and primary idea of the legislature is salvation, not punishment. The nature of juvenile work is more philanthropic than the work of the common law jurist. The legislature of Maine has therefore placed this authority in the hands of men who know humanity and can inspire the child with confidence and with a desire, in most instances, to become an upright citizen.
The history of the juvenile law in Maine shows that there is now a growing tendency in legislation to enlarge the jurisdiction and authority of juvenile courts, and if possible to save every child from a criminal record. The age of the child has been increased from 15 to 17 years, and jurisdiction has been extended from misdemeanors to some felonies. The jurisdiction has been enlarged from concurrent to exclusive and original.
The early common law treated alike the crimes of the adult and the offenses of those minors who had reached the age of criminal responsibility. The administration of the old criminal law with relation to children differed only according to the possession of paternal and benevolent attributes of the judges who presided in the courts. There are many instances, in days long past, where a humane and understanding judge has dismissed or filed the charges against a first offending minor child, or has created, without statute authority, a juvenile probation system of his own to fit the circumstances.
In the past the fundamental idea of the law has been punishment and not reformation, but modern legislation recognizes that the treatment of a child should be correctional and rehabilitative rather than punitive. The child of today is the adult citizen of tomorrow and should be removed from the influence of improper environments and directed into the paths of rectitude by preventative and corrective means, if the next generation is to live in a peaceful and law abiding community. The immature must be given the chance to become the good citizen, or if necessary be forced to give up an immoral or criminal life. It is the welfare of the child and the State, that the statute is aimed to protect, by exercising a parental control, without the scar of the so-called criminal record. Unfortunately, it will be necessary at times to inflict punishment on the vicious or depraved, and this the statute recognizes.
Juvenile courts are courts of special and limited jurisdicdiction and authority. Children are to be dealt with in a different manner than are adults. The offending child is not found by the juvenile court to be a criminal but guilty of juvenile delinquency. The cases are heard at such times and at such places as the court may determine, and the general public is excluded. The records are not open to inspection by the public except by permission of the court. R. S. (1944), Chap. 133, Sec. 4. Special probation officers may be appointed to care for offenders under the age of seventeen. R. S. (1944), Chap. 133, Sec. 5. A child may be placed under the care of a probation officer or an agent of the department of health and welfare, or placed in a suitable home or in the State School, or "such other disposition as may seem best for the interests of the child and for the protection of the community including holding such child for the grand jury and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison." R. S. (1944), Chap. 133, Sec. 6 as amended by Chapter 334 of the Public Laws of 1947. This statute also provides for appeal to the Superior Court by the child or by his guardian or next friend from the decision or order made by the juvenile court, and on appeal the Superior Court has jurisdiction to affirm the sentence or order of the juvenile court or to make such other disposition as may be for the best interests of the child and for the peace and welfare of the community. Public Laws of 1947, Chapter 334.
"Delinquency," as the term is used in the present juvenile law, was unknown to the common law. A delinquent child is a child under the age limit who violates the criminal law or who is disobedient or incorrigible, or unmanageable, or immoral, or growing up or likely to grow up in idleness and crime. The statute says delinquency is not crime, and a delinquent child is not a criminal. 43 C. J. S. "Infants," 228, Section 98, 99. "Delinquency, as distinguished from crime, usually implies a psychological rather than a judicial attitude toward the child offender." Webster's New International Dictionary.
At the common law, the same court had jurisdiction over juvenile offenders that had jurisdiction over those of mature years. Children under seven years of age were conclusively presumed to lack mental capacity to commit a crime. In the case of felonies, if the child was over seven years, he could be proceeded against by complaint and warrant before a magistrate, and if the magistrate found that a crime had been committed, and that there was probable cause that the infant was guilty, he could be held for the grand jury; or a prosecution could be instituted before the grand jury without going before the magistrate in the first instance. Such was the law in Maine until the year 1931. Richardson v. Dunn, 128 Me. 316; Knight v. Fort Fairfield, 70 Me. 500.
By Chapter 241 of the Public Laws of 1931, it was provided that judges of municipal courts should have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses committed by children under the age of fifteen years, and that no adjudication or judgment should be deemed to constitute a conviction for crime. A child could be held for the grand jury if the offense was aggravated. State v. Rand, 132 Me. 246. By Public Laws of 1943, Chapter 322, an exception was made, and after the enactment of R. S. (1944), Chap. 133, Sec. 2, the municipal courts, when acting as juvenile courts, had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses, except for a capital or otherwise infamous crime committed by children under the age of 17 years. The wording of this exception in the Statutes of 1944 was probably suggested by the Constitution of Maine, Article 1, Section 7, that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." Maine now has no capital crime punishable by death, but all felonies are considered infamous. State v. Vashon, 123 Me. 412.
From 1943 to the time of the amendment by Chapter 334 of the Public Laws of 1947, the municipal courts, as juvenile courts, had no exclusive original jurisdiction over any cases of felony, and the child over seven and under 17 accused of felony was dealt with as a common law criminal and could only be held for action by a grand jury. The amendment of 1947 struck out of the law the words "capital or otherwise infamous crime" and inserted in place thereof the words that we are now considering "a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years."
The municipal courts have had, from the establishment of the juvenile courts, jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and authority to find juvenile delinquency when the child offender has broken a law where the punishment was less than one year. The juvenile court had no exclusive original jurisdiction over any felony from 1943 to the amendment of 1947. It now has exclusive original jurisdiction over all felonies "except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years."
The largest number of felonies, and felonies likely to be committed by the child under 17 years, carry a statute term of punishment of "not more than." Examples of such felonies are maliciously killing or injuring domestic animals, R. S. (1944), Chap. 127, Sec. 1; assault with intent to kill, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 6; assault with intent to rape, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 12; assault with intent to rob, R. S. (1944), Chap. 117, Sec. 17; breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, R. S. (1944), Chap. 118, Sec. 11. In all felonies where the maximum allowed is two years, or more than two years, it can be said that punishment is for "a term of years." It is not punishment for "any term of years" because only in those serious crimes formerly capital, or punishable by life imprisonment, such as rape, robbery and burglary, does the statute permit the court to sentence for "any term of years."
In view of the manifest plan of the legislature to broaden the authority of the juvenile court, it is plainly apparent that a term of years is not any term of years. To give to "any term," the meaning of "a term," does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to an appreciable extent, if it does to any degree. The felonies where the juvenile court would have jurisdiction, under such interpretation, would be only those where punishment may be for one year and for less than two years, and such felonies, if any, are very few. If the legislature had meant to give jurisdiction in only those felonies where punishment may be less than two years, it would have been a simple matter to say so. The legislature, on the contrary, has used the term commonly used by it in the statutes to fix punishment for some of the very serious offenses.
There are some cases where terms of years have been defined, as in a lease where right to renew for "a term of years," meant not less than two years. Metcalf v. Norton, 119 Me. 103, and in Massachusetts "any term of years" was construed as two or more years where a particular statute provided for punishment in cases of former conviction. Ex Parte Seymour, 14 Pickering 40; Ex Parte Dick, 14 Pickering 86. We have found no case where a statute excluded from jurisdiction a crime punishable by "any" term of years where the construction was "a" term, and we cannot believe the legislature intended to exclude the very many felonious acts of which juvenile offenders are so frequently guilty. It would limit, in effect, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to misdemeanors only, as was provided in the statute before the last amendment of 1947. There would be no real, sufficient, or sensible reason for the 1947 amendment "any term of years" if there was not an intention to extend the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. See P. L. of Maine (1931), Chap. 241; P. L., 1933, Chap. 18 and Chap. 118; P. L., 1937, Chap. 238; P. L., 1941, Chap. 245; P. L., 1943, Chap. 177 and Chap. 322; R. S. (1944), Chap. 133 as amended by the Public Laws of 1947, Chap. 334; see also 43 C. J. S. "Infants" 228, Sections 98 and 99; 31 Am. Jur. "Juvenile Courts" 796, Sections 24-44.
Manslaughter is not a crime punishable by imprisonment for any term of years, as that phrase is used in our statutes. It is punishable for a term of years. The juvenile court has jurisdiction. It is a crime, however, where the facts may be serious, in every sense of the word, and if the proper procedure is taken by the juvenile court, there is no question but that it may hold the child for grand jury action. If in the determination of the municipal court, acting as a juvenile court, a child guilty of juvenile delinquency should be dealt with as a criminal, for the protection of the community as well as for the interests of the child, it can hold such child for the grand jury. R. S. (1944), Chap. 133, Sec. 6 as amended by Chapter 334 of the Public Laws of 1947. The only adjudication or judgment of guilt making final disposition of the case that the judge of the municipal court can make is that the child is guilty of juvenile delinquency. By express provision of Section 6 he cannot sentence a juvenile offender to prison or even to jail. By constitutional provision no one can be sent to the state prison except on conviction on an indictment returned by the grand jury. Neither does the judge of the municipal court, in dealing with the juvenile offender and in the exercise of his exclusive original jurisdiction, have authority to find a crime committed and probable cause in the same manner as when dealing with an adult. If the child is held for the grand jury when charged with an offense within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court, it is only because as a juvenile delinquent it seems under the circumstances to be for the best interest of the child and for the protection of the community that he be so held.
The legislature has seen fit to provide a separate and distinct method of handling certain offenses when committed by juveniles under the age of seventeen years, and manslaughter is one of these offenses. The original jurisdiction of the common law courts over such offenses has been taken away by legislative enactment. The original jurisdiction has been exclusively conferred upon the municipal courts acting as juvenile courts. The Law Court has no legal power or ethical right to determine or to express an opinion as to the wisdom of legislative enactments. We are only permitted to interpret the laws as enacted by the legislature and to determine if they are within constitutional requirements or have been properly applied to the case then before us.
It is clear that the legislature has recognized that under certain conditions juvenile offenders under the age of seventeen years should be dealt with as criminals and made amenable and accountable to the rigors of the criminal law.
It is the right of the juvenile and the state that the juvenile be treated as a delinquent unless and until there be a judicial determination by the municipal court, exercising its jurisdiction as a juvenile court and exercising its discretion as to disposition of the case and the juvenile with which it is invested by Section 6 of the juvenile law, that the juvenile be held for the grand jury. The requirement that such jurisdiction be exercised and that the determination to hold for the grand jury as an act of discretion under the authority conferred by Section 6 are both jurisdictional and must be complied with before the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear, sentence, or commit after a conviction on an indictment. These statutory requirements being jurisdictional cannot be waived.
The record of the municipal court must show, either by express statement or by necessary implication from what is expressly stated therein, that the aforesaid necessary action has been taken in and by the municipal court. And especially must the record of the municipal court show by express declaration or by necessary implication that in holding for the grand jury it exercised the discretion conferred upon it by Section 6 of the juvenile law in making such disposition of the case. Brooks v. Clifford, 144 Me. 370; 69 Atl. (2nd) 825; Faloon v. O'Connell, 113 Me. 30; Porell v. Cousins, 93 Me. 232; State v. Hartwell, 35 Me. 129.
A finding of probable cause and the fixing of bail is not in and of itself sufficient for such purposes. Especially is it not sufficient in this case where there is an express stipulation that after a plea of not guilty "the judge of said municipal court then refused to exercise jurisdiction over the offense with which the defendant was charged and rendered judgment of 'Probable Cause.' " Such docket entry and such stipulation not only fail to show that the municipal court in this case did exercise its jurisdiction over the offense with which the petitioner was charged and that it held him for the grand jury in the exercise of the discretion as to disposition of the case and the juvenile with which it was invested by Section 6 of the juvenile law, but establish that it did not do so. The sentence was pro nounced by a court which lacked the jurisdiction to try and sentence and the juvenile must be discharged. Wallace v. White, 115 Me. 513; State v. Elbert, 115 Conn. 589; 162 Atl. 769.
Writ to issue.