Case Name: PEOPLE v. COLEMAN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1990-09-12
Citations: 436 Mich. 124
Docket Number: Docket No. 84313
Parties: PEOPLE v COLEMAN
Judges: Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 436
Pages: 124–137

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v COLEMAN
Docket No. 84313.
Argued April 3, 1990
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided September 12, 1990.
Era May Coleman was charged in the 36th District Court with possession with the intent to deliver less than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine as a result of the discovery of certain evidence in her purse during a valid premises search pursuant to a warrant designating the premises and the items to be seized. The court, Robert J. Sattler, J., suppressed the evidence on the ground that the purse was an extension of her person and dismissed the charge. The Detroit Recorder’s Court, Samuel C. Gardner, J., affirmed, finding that the defendant’s mere presence on the premises did not justify the search either of her person or her effects. The Court of Appeals, D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and C. W. Simon, Jr., J. (Doctoroff, J., dissenting), affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, finding the purse was an extension of the defendant’s person and further that because of the failure to demonstrate a special relationship between the defendant and the premises being searched, the purse could not be considered a part of the premises (Docket No. 98200). The people appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Levin, joined by Justices Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, the Supreme Court held:
The search of the defendant’s purse did not amount to a search of her person because the purse was not in her possession, under her control, or in proximity to her during the execution of the search warrant. The search of the defendant’s purse was permissible as a search of a container in which items specified in the warrant might be found.
Justice Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Riley and Justice Griffin, stated that the purse was properly searched as a container located on the named premises that might be used to conceal the objects designated in the search warrant as items to be seized.
Generally, a lawful search of a fixed premises extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. Consequently, a particular description in a warrant of the place to be searched and the items to be seized necessarily includes a search of all the personal effects of the person occupying the premises if they are containers that may conceal the object of the search. The proper scope of a search is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted; rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. The warrant in this case satisfied the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement with regard to the premises to be searched and the things to be seized.
The defendant’s purse in this case cannot be considered an extension of her person; rather, it was proper to search her purse as a container that fell within the scope of a lawful search of the premises described in the warrant. The defendant’s connection to the premises was more than that of a mere casual or transient visitor who happened to be on the premises at the time it was subject to a lawful search, and it was reasonable for the police to have believed that the defendant’s purse might be used as a container to conceal the objects listed in the warrant as items to be seized. The facts evidence more than mere propinquity to the premises and in fact show that the defendant had a special relationship to the person named in the search warrant and to the premises being searched. The defendant’s expectation of privacy in a purse not in her possession or under her control must give way to the magistrate’s official determination of probable cause.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Criminal Division, Research, Training and Appeals, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Kim Robert Fawcett) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Levin, J.
As set forth in the concurring opinion, the search of Coleman's purse did not amount to a search of her person. The search was permissible as a search of a container in which items specified in the warrant might be found.
Because the search of Coleman's purse was not a search of her person, there is no need to consider Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85; 100 S Ct 338; 62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979), People v Arterberry, 431 Mich 381; 429 NW2d 574 (1988), or the other authorities cited in the concurring opinion concerning a search of a person.
Reversed and remanded.
Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
See post, p 134.
Id