Case Name: Ray M. Thompson, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Respondent-Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1995-10-17
Citations: 197 Wis. 2d 688
Docket Number: No. 94-3293
Parties: Ray M. Thompson, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: Before Cane, P.J., LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 197
Pages: 688–708

Head Matter:
Ray M. Thompson, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Respondent-Appellant.
Court of Appeals
No. 94-3293.
Oral argument September 14, 1995.
Decided October 17, 1995.
(Also reported in 541 N.W.2d 182.)
On behalf of the respondent-appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs oí James E. Doyle, attorney general and 'Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general. There was oral argument by Warren D. Weinstein.
On behalf of the petitioner-respondent the cause was submitted on the briefs of Stephen Pieroni and Chris Galinat of Wisconsin Education Association Council of Madison. There was oral argument by Stephen Pieroni.
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by Douglas F. Bates for National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification.
Before Cane, P.J., LaRocque and Myse, JJ.

Opinion:
MYSE, J.
The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction ("department") appeals a trial court judgment that reversed the decision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction ("superintendent") to revoke Ray M. Thompson's teaching license. The department contends that the trial court erred because: (1) it refused to use a deferential standard of review to the superintendent's conclusions of law and statutory interpretations; (2) it determined that the superintendent applied the wrong standard to determine whether a nexus existed between Thompson's immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil; and (3) it determined that the department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Thompson's immoral conduct had a nexus to the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil.
While we agree with the department that the superintendent's determination is entitled to deference, we conclude that the superintendent applied the wrong standard in determining whether a nexus existed between Thompson's immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil. Further, we do not reach the sufficiency of the evidence issue because we conclude that the superintendent should be allowed to review the facts and apply the proper legal standard. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse it in part and remand the matter to the superintendent for the application of the proper standard.
Thompson has a life teaching license in music for pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade. Thompson was a full-time music teacher for over twenty years in Wisconsin, working primarily for the Oshkosh School District elementary and secondary schools.
However, Thompson was involved in two incidents of unwanted sexual touching that led to license revocation proceedings. The first occurred when Thompson went to Rainbow Park in Oshkosh, a known meeting place for homosexual men. Thompson played "automobile tag" with a man he believed to be homosexual. The man parked his vehicle and walked over to a park bench. Thompson followed and sat down beside him. Thompson then reached over, grabbed the other man around the breast area, fondled his breast and reached down the inner part of his left thigh. When a police car approached, the man ran to the police car and told the officer that he had been assaulted by Thompson. Thompson pled no contest to a disorderly conduct violation.
Approximately two years later, Thompson went to a video bookstore that displayed pornographic movies and materials and served as a meeting place for homosexual men. Thompson entered an unlocked booth occupied by an undercover police officer and immediately began unbuttoning the officer's shirt. The officer protested that he did not want to do anything in the booth, but Thompson persisted and grabbed the officer's genitals. A jury convicted Thompson of fourth-degree sexual assault. In the subsequent license revocation proceeding, the finder of fact found that Thompson's behavior did not reflect a predatory nature and that the assault was not aggravated.
The Oshkosh Board of Education discharged Thompson and the department subsequently issued a Notice of Probable Cause and Intent to Revoke License. Following a five-day hearing and the submission of briefs, hearing examiner Hal Harlowe issued a proposed decision recommending that the revocation action be dismissed. He concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence that a nexus existed between Thompson's actions and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil. See Wis. Adm. Code § PI 3.04. However, the superintendent declined to adopt the examiner's recommendation and issued a decision to revoke Thompson's license.
Thompson filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court held that the superintendent had not complied with § 227.46(4), Stats., because he failed to hear the case or review the record prior to issuing his decision. The court stayed the revocation order and remanded the case to the superintendent.
On remand, the superintendent assigned Dr. Thomas Stefonek, a department employee, to read the record and issue a proposed decision. Stefonek agreed with Harlowe that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Thompson's conduct had a nexus to the physical health, welfare or safety of any pupil. However, Stefonek accorded different weight to the expert testimony presented at the hearing and found that the department did prove by clear and convincing evidence that Thompson's immoral conduct had a nexus to the education of pupils and their welfare as it related to the educational process. The basis for Stefonek's conclusion was that Thompson could no longer be an effective role model for the students because the pupils, their parents and the public would lack confidence, respect and regard for Thompson. Accordingly, Stefonek rec ommended that Thompson's license be revoked. The superintendent adopted Stefonek's recommendation.
On review of this decision, the trial court reversed. The court reviewed the superintendent's conclusions of law de novo. The court held that the superintendent used an improper standard in revoking Thompson's license because he based the decision upon an impossibly high role model standard under which any teacher deemed to be a poor role model could have his or her license revoked. The court further held that the superintendent's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The superintendent's decision to revoke Thompson's teaching license was based on the revocation provisions in § 118.19, Stats., 1989-90 , and Wis. Adm. CODE § PI 3.04 (February 1989). The relevant portions of § PI 3.04 provide:
(1) Definitions.
(a) "Immoral conduct" means conduct or behavior which is contrary to commonly accepted moral or ethical standards.
(2) STANDARDS FOR REVOCATION.
(a) A license may be revoked for immoral conduct if there is clear and convincing evidence that the person engaged in the immoral conduct and there is a nexus between the immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil.
On appeal, we review the decision of the superintendent, not the trial court. See St. Paul Ramsey Medical Ctr. v. DHSS, 186 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 519 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1994). Our scope of review is identical to that of the trial court. Id.
The proper standard of review regarding the superintendent's determination of whether Thompson's immoral conduct had a nexus to the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil is disputed. This issue involves a review of the superintendent's interpretation of § 118.19, STATS., and § PI 3.04 and application of facts to these laws, which is a question of law. Carrion Corp. v. DOR, 179 Wis. 2d 254, 264, 507 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Ct. App. 1993).
Generally, appellate courts apply "three levels of deference to conclusions of law and statutory interpretation in agency decisions." Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256, 258 (1992). The first level of review, "great weight," is applied where the "agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute . . . ." Id. at 291, 485 N.W.2d at 258-59. The second level, "due weight" or "great bearing," is applied if the decision is very nearly one of first impression. Id. at 291, 485 N.W.2d at 259. The lowest level of review, "de novo," "is applied where the case is one of first impression for the agency and the agency lacks special expertise or experience in determining the question presented." Id.
Thompson contends that the trial court did not err when it applied the de novo standard to the superintendent's conclusions of law and statutory interpretations because this case involves legal issues of first impression and the superintendent lacks experience using a role model standard in determining whether a nexus exists between the immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil.
However, the record shows that the superintendent has ordered revocation of teacher licenses based upon immoral conduct and determined whether a nexus exists between a teacher's immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil in nearly 100 cases. Through this experience, the superintendent has developed special skill, experience and understanding of the educational process and the appropriate atmosphere necessary to support effective education. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred by applying a de novo standard of review to the superintendent's conclusions of law and statutory interpretation.
We further conclude that the appropriate standard of review in this case is due weight and not great weight. While the superintendent does have expertise in dealing with nexus issues, this is the first time he has used a role model standard to determine whether a nexus exists. Because this is the first time the role model standard has been used, it has not been tested by time, it has never been judicially reviewed and the superintendent has no experience in its application. Accordingly, we conclude that while the superintendent has experience with the general area in controversy, the superintendent's rationale is one of first impression. Therefore, we apply the due weight standard of review. See West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12 n.12, 357 N.W.2d 534, 540 n. 12 (1984).
The department agrees that under § PI 3.04 it has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a nexus exists between Thompson's immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil. In this case, Stefonek first determined that Thompson's immoral conduct did not have a nexus to the physical safety of any pupil. However, he concluded that Thompson's immoral conduct had a nexus to the education of pupils because Thompson could no longer be a good role model for students. Stefonek reasoned that the educational experience could not be effective when the pupils, their parents and the public lack confidence, respect and regard for the teacher.
While the superintendent's conclusions of law are subject to various interpretations, the department acknowledged at oral argument that he relied on a standard that has been identified as the "role model standard." Under this standard, a teacher must be a good role model and have the confidence, respect and regard of the pupils, their parents and the community. We conclude that this is an unreasonable interpretation of § PI 3.04 because it would make the requirement of nexus superfluous and permits revocation based solely on public attitudes.
Applying a role model standard reflecting community attitudes effectively eliminates the nexus requirement. All cases of immoral conduct are by definition offensive to community standards. Because a role model rationale assumes all conduct offensive to the community standard hinders the educational pro cess, nexus is subsumed in all cases involving immoral conduct. However, the plain meaning of § PI 3.04 provides that not all immoral conduct should result in license revocation. The nexus requirement is there for a reason: to make sure there is a direct link between the immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil.
Further, a standard based on community attitudes cannot be applied consistently. Community attitudes are difficult to measure, they vary from community to community, and they change over the course of time. This standard is so amorphous as to give no criterion upon which the agency can meaningfully and consistently apply this rationale to license revocation proceedings.
We therefore conclude that the standard used by the superintendent in this case was inappropriate. It is not the superintendent's role to speculate how the general public may perceive specific conduct or determine who is a good role model. Rather, the superintendent, under the terms of § PI 3.04 is obligated to determine whether there is a direct relationship between the immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil. If the conduct is of such severity as to adversely affect the atmosphere in which education must exist to be effective, or to endanger the health, welfare or safety of any of the children, revocation is appropriate.
We have no doubt that conduct sufficient to sustain a conviction for fourth-degree sexual assault can be a sufficient basis to warrant revocation of a teacher's license. The superintendent can examine the convictions and their severity to determine whether these offenses would interfere with the educational process. The impact, if any, upon a child's ability to learn based upon the seriousness and nature of these offenses are matters committed to the superintendent under the provision of § PI 3.04. Because these offenses are criminal in nature and involved nonconsensual sexual touching, the superintendent may conclude that the educational process is irretrievably compromised. However, in making this determination, the superintendent must examine the offense and not the community reaction to it.
Thompson suggests that his immoral conduct could not adversely affect the educational process because the public did not know of the conduct in the communities where he was substitute teaching. We disagree. The superintendent need not wait for the public to discover the conduct before initiating revocation proceedings. In an age of rapid mass communications, it is unrealistic to believe the public would forever remain ignorant of his conduct. More importantly, it is immaterial that the public does not know of the conduct because the superintendent is required to examine the conduct and not the public reaction to it.
Next, Thompson contends that the evidence of his alcohol rehabilitation and his recent substitute teaching must be considered by the superintendent in making the determination of nexus. The record discloses that alcohol played a role in Thompson's immoral conduct, and Thompson introduced evidence that he has sought counseling with Alcoholics Anonymous and is no longer drinking. In addition, Thompson has served as a substitute teacher in various Fox River Valley School Districts and has had satisfactory evaluations.
The department contends that this evidence is only relevant to possible reinstatement proceedings because the revocation proceeding only requires a nexus between the immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil; it does not require consideration of new factors. In reinstatement proceedings, Thompson would have to establish that the cause for revocation no longer exists and that he no longer endangers the health, welfare, safety or education of pupils. Wis. Adm. Code § PI 3.04(5)(b). Although it is permissible for the superintendent to consider the evidence in revocation proceedings, we conclude the superintendent is required to consider the evidence only upon an application for reinstatement.
We affirm the trial court's determination that the superintendent applied the wrong standard to decide whether a nexus exists between Thompson's immoral conduct and the health, welfare, safety or education of any pupil. However, we conclude the superintendent is entitled to an opportunity to review the facts of this case and to apply the proper legal standard to Thompson's immoral conduct. See § 227.57(5), STATS. Therefore, we affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part and remand the matter to the superintendent to determine, under the proper standard, whether Thompson's immoral conduct has a direct link to the educational process.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
Section 118.19, STATS., 1989-90, provides in part:
(1) Any person seeking to teach in a public school or in a school or institution operated by a county or the state shall first procure a certificate or license from the department.
(5) After written notice of the charges and of an opportunity for defense, any certificate or license to teach issued by the department may be revoked by the state superintendent for incompetency or immoral conduct on the part of the teacher.