Case Name: PEOPLE v. HARPER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-09-20
Citations: 1 Mich. App. 480
Docket Number: Docket No. 124
Parties: PEOPLE v. HARPER.
Judges: J. H. Gillis, P. J., concurred with Quinn, J.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 1
Pages: 480–486

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. HARPER.
Opinion of the Court.
1. Statutes—Constitutionality.
Courts strive to sustain the validity of an act if that may be done without doing actual violence to the language used in it, every intendment favorable to a conclusion sustaining the law being indulged.
2. Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Police Laws—Classification.
The equal protection clause admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in the classification of police laws, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and, therefore, purely arbitrary (US Const, Am 14, § 1; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 1).
3. Same—Equal Protection—Mathematical Nicety of Classication.
A classification in police laws having some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality (US Const, Am 14, § 1; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 1.).
4. Same—Presumption.
Any state of faets that can reasonably bo conceived will be assumed in order to sustain a classification in police laws under the equal protection clause (US Const, Am 14, § 1; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 1).
References for Points in Headnotes
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 144 et seq.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 485 et seq.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 494 et seq.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 137, 143.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 172.
6/7] 17A Am Jur, Drugs and Druggists § 7 et seq.
5. Same—Classification—Burden of Proof.
One who assails the classification in a police law has the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
6. Druggists — Statutes — Narcotics —■ Classification — Licensed Sellers and Nonlicensed Sellers.
Classification between licensed illegal sellers and nonlicensed illegal sellers in State narcotics laws held, not an arbitrary classification and not to violate the equal protection clause, because of the controls placed on licensed sellers (US Const, Am 14, § 1; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 1; CL 1948, §§ 335.54-335.57, 335.66; CLS 1961, §§ 335.152, 335.153).
Concurring Opinion.
T. G. Kavanagh, J.
7. Same—Statutes—Equal Protection—Licenses.
Statutes pertaining to sale and possession of narcotie drugs which do not differentiate between wrongdoers there%mder according to whether they are licensed are not in violation of the equal protection clause of either the Constitution of the United States or of this State (US Const, Am 14; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 1; CL 1948, §§ SS5.51-SS5.78; CLS 1961, §§ 385-.152, SS5.15S).
Appeal from Genesee; Parker (Donn D.), J.
Submitted Division 2 June 9, 1965, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 124.)
Decided September 20, 1965.
Leave to appeal granted by Supreme Court January 6, 1966.
See 377 Mich 695.
Johnny Harper was convicted for illegal possession of narcotics and for illegal sale of narcotics. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard J. Ruhala, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Johnny Harper, in propria persona, and John W. Thomas, for defendant.

Opinion:
QuINN, J.
Appellant was tried and convicted in the circuit court of G-enesee county in January, 1960, on a two-count information charging him with violation of PA 1952, No 266, §~ 2 and 3 (OLS 1961, §~ 335.152 and 335.153 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §~ 18.1122 and 18.1123]). He was sentenced to terms of 20-30 years and 8-10 years respectively. Contending his detention is illegal due to unconstitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted, he asks this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. It has been stipulated that the alleged unconstitutionality is the sole issue before this Court.
The gist of appellant's argument to establish unconstitutionality is that because a licensed person who sells narcotics unlawfully is subject to a maximum penalty of 10 years (PA 1952, No 132 [OLS 1961, § 335.70 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1090)]), and an unlicensed person who does the same thing is subject to a minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum of life (section 335.152 supra), the latter is denied equal protection of the law as guaranteed by US Const, Am 14 and Const 1908, art 2, § 1. Appellant is not licensed. The precise question for de~ cision is whether the classification "licensed" and "unlicensed" is reasonable. Appellee's contention that In re Wright (1960), 360 Mich 455, controls is untenable; it did not deal with this classification Problem.
The basic rule, stated in People v. Babcock (1955), 343 Mich 671, 679:
" 'In approaching the consideration of a legislative enactment with the purpose of passing upon its constitutionality, courts usually do and always should strive to sustain its validity, if that may he done without doing actual violence to the language used in the act. Every intendment favorable to a conclusion sustaining the law must he indulged in' ",
and the specific rule with respect to standards of classification, as found in Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Company (1960), 360 Mich 510, 514:
" 'The standards of classification are:
" ' "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can he conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must he assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, hut is essentially arbitrary." Citing cases.' "
must control the approach to the question presented. The statutes here involved were enacted to control manufacture, possession, and distribution of narcotic drugs. In order to facilitate and regulate the legitimate trade in these products, certain people are licensed. (CL 1948, § 335.54 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1074].) By licensing this group, the legislature places severe controls over their contact with nar. cotíes. (CL 1948, § 335.55-335.57 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1075-18.1077].) Every transaction that they make is governed by law and the records that they keep are subject to close scrutiny by the appropriate authorities. (CL 1948, § 335.66 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §18.1086].) The licensing act is aimed primarily at safeguarding and regulating legitimate trade of narcotics. The act under which defendant was convicted and sentenced is directed solely at suppressing illegal traffic in narcotics. The purpose of the two acts is entirely different, and it is a reasonable basis for the classifications "licensed" and "unlicensed".
The statutes involved are not unconstitutional. Writ denied.
J. H. Gillis, P. J., concurred with Quinn, J.
CLS 1961, 335.152, prescribes puoishment for the sale of liarcotn3s by an un1i~ensed person. OLS~1961, 335.153, 1)TCSCr1beS punishment for the unlawful possession of narcoties.-REP0R'raa.
See GCR 1963, 712, as amended e~7ee~ive January 1, 1965, 373 Mich cviii. On September 2, 1964, the Supreme Court ordered that the application for~ the writ of habeas eorjrns he treated as an application for leave to appeal and leave to appeal was granted.-RaPoaTER.
For current provisions see Const 1963, art 1, § 2.-REPOaTaR.
Quoted iii Babcock from Attorney General v. Detroit United Railway, 210 Mich 227, 253-Reporter