Case Name: William Klingenberg, Resp't, v. Frederick Werner, Trustee, App'lt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-01-04
Citations: 42 N.Y. St. Rep. 186
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Klingenberg, Resp’t, v. Frederick Werner, Trustee, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 42
Pages: 186–187

Head Matter:
William Klingenberg, Resp’t, v. Frederick Werner, Trustee, App’lt.
(New York Common Pleas,
General Term,
Filed January 4, 1892.)
Tbade unions—Distbict oeganizer—Discharge op.
Plaintiff was employed by the executive board of a trade union as a district organizer, for a term expiring March 1. In February, becoming dissatisfied with his work, they undertook to discharge him without hearing or trial. Held, that mere dissatisfaction with the way in which he did his work was not sufficient to authorize his discharge; that he could only be discharged for gross negligence, refusal to do the work assigned, or such cause as would authorize the discharge of an employee.
Appeal from a judgment rendered in the district court of the city of Hew York for the seventh judicial district.
John Fennel, for resp’t; Edward Gros-se, for app’lt.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This action was brought to recover the salary of the plaintiff as what is known as a district organizer, for three weeks from February 9,1891. The constitution of the Journeymen Tailor's Union provides for the election of these organizers by the general membership of said union; it also provides that in case of a vacancy, such vacancy may be filled by the executive board of the union. A vacancy having occurred, the plaintiff was appointed to fill it by that board on the 10th September, 1890. The mere appointment, as we understand, does not carry with it any salary. The executive board on the 4th January, 1891, employed the plaintiff as a district organizer for the term expiring on March 1, following. The evidence shows that that board became dissatisfied with the plaintiff's work, and on the 9th of February, 1891, undertook to discharge him without hearing of trial, claiming that they had the right to do so. In this we think they erred, as they had made a contract for a specific period of time, and the defendant could be discharged only for gross negligence, refusal to do the work assigned him, or such other causes as authorize a discharge of an employee. Mere dissatisfaction with the way in which he did work is not sufficient.
We therefore think that the judgment of the court below was correct both as to the law and the facts, and should be affirmed.
Bookstaver and Bischoff, JJ., concur.