Case Name: Stuart HARRISON v. BOYD MISSISSIPPI, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1997-05-22
Citations: 700 So. 2d 247
Docket Number: No. 96-CV-00382-SCT
Parties: Stuart HARRISON v. BOYD MISSISSIPPI, INC.
Judges: PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 700
Pages: 247–255

Head Matter:
Stuart HARRISON v. BOYD MISSISSIPPI, INC.
No. 96-CV-00382-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
May 22, 1997.
Edward A. Williamson, Philadelphia, for Appellant.
Richard C. Williams, Jr., Upshaw Williams Riggers Beckham & Riddick, Greenwood, for Appellee.
Charles E. Ross, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Jackson; James W. Clancy, Jackson, for Amicus Curiae. .

Opinion:
MILLS, Justice,
for the Court:
Stewart Harrison appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Hinds County dismissing his complaint against Yvonne Ellis, Bryan Page, Alanea Ellis, and Boyd Mississippi, Inc. pursuant to motion of the defendant Boyd under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(i). On appeal, Harrison contends that the circuit court erroneously found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We agree and reverse and remand.
FACTS
Stuart Harrison, the plaintiff, was employed by Boyd Mississippi, Inc. ("Boyd") as a craps dealer at the Silver Star Casino in Neshoba County, Mississippi. The Silver Star Casino is wholly owned by the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, but is operated and managed by Boyd, a Nevada Corporation, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(D), (d)(9). The Silver Star Casino is located and all incidents occurred on Choctaw Indian country. Neither the plaintiff Harrison nor any of the defendants are members of the Choctaw band.
On July 13, 1995, the off duty Harrison was with his father and two Mends in the proximity of the craps tables where he normally works when he was approached by security officers employed by Boyd. Tribal gaming regulations prohibit casino employees "from gaming in their gaming area."
The security personnel asked Harrison to go into the back offices and speak with a supervisor. Harrison refused stating that he did not want to speak with a supervisor, but would prefer to instead go home. The security personnel wrestled the resisting Harrison to the ground, handcuffed him, and refused to allow him to leave. After the altercation, the security personnel, all of whom were Boyd employees, took Harrison to the detention facilities of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. Harrison was then transferred to the Neshoba County Jail where he was confined until bond was made.
Harrison filed suit in the Circuit Court of Hinds County alleging that the actions of the defendant's agents, servants, and employees constituted battery, false imprisonment, false detention, and kidnaping. Harrison named Boyd Mississippi, Inc. as a defendant, but did not include the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.
DISCUSSION
1) Standard of Review
Jurisdictional issues are reviewed by the Mississippi Supreme Court de novo. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 308 (Miss.1989). "In making this determination, this Court is in the same position as the trial court, since all facts are set out in the plead ings or exhibits, and the chancellor may be reversed if he erred whether the error was manifest or not." MISS CAL 204, Ltd. v. Upchurch, 465 So.2d 326, 330 (Miss.1985) (determining jurisdiction over foreign corporation). However, the Court should proceed on the assumption that when the trial court made no specific finding, all fact issues were resolved in favor of appellee. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss.1990).
The Mississippi Constitution grants to the circuit courts "original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court...." Miss. Const. art. 6, § 156. "In reviewing a subject matter jurisdiction challenge to the Constitution's grant of authority, the Supreme Court looks at the type of case by examining the nature of the controversy and the relief sought." Singing River Mall Co. v. Mark Fields, Inc., 599 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss.1992). See also Hood v. Dep't of Wildlife Conservation, 571 So.2d 263, 266 (Miss.1990). As in Singing River Mall, the question is limited to whether Mississippi or federal law authorizes some other body to entertain this case, therefore, giving the trial court judge the authority to dismiss this ease.
ISSUE
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI POSSESSES JURISDICTION OYER BOYD MISSISSIPPI, INC., A NON-INDIAN NEVADA CORPORATION.
The circuit judge below found that "the cause of action arose within the boundaries of the tribal reservation of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (more specifically the Silver Star Casino).... " He applied the "center of gravity" rule and found that "substantial tribal interests are present in this controversy and the sovereignty of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians must be recognized by this Court."
We note at the outset, as stated in the amicus brief filed by the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, that a "state court would determine its own jurisdiction and the same is true for Tribal Courts."
Article 6, § 156 of the Mississippi Constitution states in whole as follows:
The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law.
No party to this action has challenged the subject matter or in personam jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Hinds County in this proceeding. Since the lower court possessed jurisdiction and no cause was pending in the tribal courts, did the lower court err in dismissing the complaint?
A. The "center of gravity" analysis is inapplicable in the instant case.
The lower court based its decision to dismiss the plaintiffs cause of action on "the center of gravity" analysis. The center of gravity test is used to determine which state's laws apply when the substantive laws of the forum court conflict with the law of a sister state or foreign jurisdiction. See McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989); Boardman v. United Serv. Automobile Ass'n., 470 So.2d 1024 (Miss.1985); Vick v. Cochran, 316 So.2d 242 (Miss.1975); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss.1968); Craig v. Columbus Compress & Warehouse Co., 210 So.2d 645, 649 (Miss.1968).
In the present action, the substantive tort law grounding the cause of action is identical under both state and tribal law. Thus, the center of gravity analysis is inappropriate in this proceeding.
B. The doctrine of comity does not compel Mississippi courts to defer to Tribal courts.
Boyd argues that the lower court's dismissal should be upheld based upon the principle of comity. Comity suggests that forum courts, as a matter of judicial courtesy, should give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of other courts beyond that mandated by the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1.
Comity, however, should not be applied when its application would render meaningless substantial rights of the non-moving party. Further, comity is inapplicable when the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction is unknown ' or not reasonably predictable. The forum court must also balance the rights of its own citizens against any interests suggested by the proponents of the law of the foreign jurisdiction. Finally, the courtesy of comity should not be considered when the subject matter jurisdiction of the non-forum court is in question. Finding that the tribal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in this case, we decline to further examine the doctrine of comity in this proceeding.
C. The tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians lack subject matter jurisdiction over the present course of action.
The case sub judice is not the first word in Mississippi on the subject of the jurisdictional parameters of the tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989), the United States Supreme Court dealt with the Mississippi chancery court adoption of two minor children, the unmarried parents of whom were both enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. The children wfere born in Harrison County, Mississippi and the parents both executed consent-to-adoption forms. The band sought unsuccessfully before this court to vacate the adoption and appealed ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court which found that even though the natural parents had both consented to the adoption, that Congressional intent and tribal interests outweighed any individual rights possessed by the parents and that pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, the rights of the Band, not the welfare of the children, should prevail. The adoption decree, which had been upheld by this Court, was reversed and the issue was ultimately, upon remand, transferred to the tribal court.
Holyfield grants exclusive jurisdiction of adoption proceedings concerning Indian children to the tribal courts pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Specifically Section 1911(a) of this act states in full as follows:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any state over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.
Holyfield is consistent with prior U.S. Supreme Court renderings which establish that tribal courts have authority to punish tribal offenders, to determine tribal membership, to- regulate domestic relations among members and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members of the Band. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981).
Montana must be read in conjunction with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) in which the United States Supreme Court held that Oliphant, a non-Indian, could not be tried within the tribal court even though the incident occurred on tribal territory. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1016. The Court stated that "Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sovereigns . (and) have lost any right of governing every person within their limits except themselves." Id. at 209, 98 S.Ct. at 1021.
Montana states that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, Keensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (citations omitted).
Montana further adds "A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has further fleshed out the Montana analysis to state that an Indian tribe has no "inherent sovereign powers over the activities of nonmembers" outside the above named two exceptions. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993). Bourland in fact states that "after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive without express congressional delegation.'" Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 2320 n. 15. The Montana rule was most recently applied, consistently with Bourland, by the Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997).
Before applying the above line of decisions to the present case, we note initially that the parties cite no congressional authority granting jurisdiction to tribal courts over common-law tort cases between non-Indians.
We first confront the question of whether this case deals with "consensual relationships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." We answer this question in the negative. The case at bar concerns a tort action, not a contract, lease or other arrangement. No consensual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the Band of Choctaws or any of its members. All of the parties are non-Indians. Any potential contract (or other "arrangement") at issue in this case concerns relationships between the parties to this action, not the Band or any of its members.
Next we find that the conduct of the parties to this action does not threaten or have any direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of the Band. Regardless of the outcome of this litigation, the Band will still own the casino; continue to act pursuant to the terms of its present contract with Boyd; and no threat to its "political integrity" may be discerned from the facts presented to us. The appellee has presented no facts establishing adverse consequences to the health or general welfare of the Band. Finally, no direct effect on the economic security of the Band can be predicted under the facts known to us. To the contrary, the only economic interests which can be directly affected by this litigation are the interests of the parties to the litigation. Neither the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians nor any of its members are parties.
We therefore find that the tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians lack jurisdiction of this cause of action. In so finding, the question of comity becomes moot.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
BANKS, J., concurs in part with separate written opinion joined by DAN LEE, C.J.
SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
. The area in Neshoba County was declared by Congress in 1939 to be held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the Mississippi Choctaw Indians. U.S. v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 2549, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978). The declaration was followed in 1944 by Congressional approval of a constitution and bylaws as adopted by the Band, which also issued a proclamation establishing the reservation at that time.
. The "center of gravity" test is more properly referred to as the "significant relationship" test. See, e.g., Boardman, 470 So.2d at 1030 (stating that "[w]e apply the center of gravity test to each question presented, recognizing that the answer produced in some instances may be that the law of this state applies and on other questions in the same case the substantive law of another state may be enforceable.")
. We are cognizant of the federal line of cases which analyze jurisdiction on a mere territorial basis. See, e.g., Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.) (finding concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal courts over tort arising between two non-Indians since tort occurred within tribal territory), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 988, 115 S.Ct. 485, 130 L.Ed.2d 398 (1994); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). However, we decline to adopt these authorities. We further note the line of Federal cases requiring the exhaustion of tribal remedies prior to review by Federal Courts. See, e.g. National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 2453, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). Since no companion case is pending in tribal court, this doctrine is not applicable in the case sub judice.