Case Name: PINKERTON'S d/b/a Pinkerton Security Investigation Services, Appellant, v. David MANRIQUEZ, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1997-11-26
Citations: 964 S.W.2d 39
Docket Number: No. 14-96-00560-CV
Parties: PINKERTON’S d/b/a Pinkerton Security Investigation Services, Appellant, v. David MANRIQUEZ, Appellee.
Judges: Before YATES, HUDSON and FOWLER, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 964
Pages: 39–54

Head Matter:
PINKERTON’S d/b/a Pinkerton Security Investigation Services, Appellant, v. David MANRIQUEZ, Appellee.
No. 14-96-00560-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
Nov. 26, 1997.
Rehearing Overruled Jan. 29, 1998.
Evelyn T. Ailts, Dean G. Pappas, Houston, for appellant.
Kevin Dubose, John Michael Devlin, R. Christopher Goldsmith, John L. Barnes, Houston, for appellee.
Before YATES, HUDSON and FOWLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MAJORITY OPINION
YATES, Justice.
Appellant, Pinkerton's d/b/a Pinkerton Security Investigation Services ("Pinkerton"), appeals a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of appellee, David Manriquez ("Manriquez"), for personal injuries sustained when he attempted to assist the owner of a stalled vehicle by pushing the vehicle up an incline of a parking garage. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment that Manriquez take nothing on his claims against Pinkerton.
I. Background
In February 1991, Manriquez worked as a general maintenance person for Pedus Building Services ("Pedus"), which was hired to provide cleaning services for the Regency Parking Garage ("the garage"), located in downtown Houston. Pinkerton was hired to provide security for the garage. At 6:45 a.m., on February 19,1991, a contract parker in the garage, Arttemus Jones ("Jones"), called Pinkerton's security officer, Timothy Chaney ("Chaney"), in the cashier's booth, and informed him that his car was stalled. Chaney, who could not leave the cashier's booth unattended, ordered Manriquez to assist Jones with the stalled car.
Manriquez found Jones and his ear on the up-ramp between the 12th and 13th floors. Manriquez and Jones, without reporting back to Chaney, decided to push the car up the ramp to the floor above. Manriquez stood behind the car while Jones put the car in neutral. After Jones put the car in neutral, the car rolled backwards, pinning Manriquez against the wall. As a result of the accident, Manriquez lost part of his fourth and fifth fingers on his left hand. Manriquez's back and left knee were also injured.
Claiming negligence, Manriquez and his wife, Flor Manriquez ("Flor"), sued Jones, Chaney, Pinkerton, and Block 299 Venture, comprised of Tenneco Realty, Inc. d/b/a Regency Parking Garage ("Tenneco") and Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential"), the owners of the garage. Flor nonsuited all the defendants and Manri-quez nonsuited Jones. Based on the statute of limitations, all claims against Chaney were dismissed on summary judgment. Tenneco and Prudential were nonsuited after they had reached a settlement agreement with Manri-quez. Pinkerton was the only remaining defendant at trial.
At trial, finding Pinkerton 35% negligent, Manriquez 35% negligent, and Tenneco and Prudential 30% negligent, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Manriquez for $303,-500.00 in damages even though Manriquez had only pled $150,000.00 in damages. Man-riquez moved for leave to file a post-trial amended petition, in which he sought to plead for total damages of $303,500.00, in order to conform to the amount of damages the jury had awarded him. The trial court, however, denied Manriquez leave and calculated the damages according to the amount which Manriquez had originally pled.
Manriquez appeals the trial court's calculation of damages. In his sole point of error, Manriquez claims the trial court erred in calculating the damages in accordance with the amount Manriquez had pled rather than the amount which the jury had awarded him.
Pinkerton filed a cross-appeal, raising eight points of error. In its first two points of error, Pinkerton claims that as a matter of law they owed no duty to Manriquez, or, alternatively, that there was no evidence upon which to impose a duty to Manriquez. In its third and fourth points of error, Pinkerton attacks both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that Pinkerton proximately caused Manri-quez's damages. In its fifth point of error, Pinkerton asserts it cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of an employee who did not owe a duty to Manriquez. In its remaining points of error, Pinkerton claims the evidence is insufficient to support an award of damages for mental anguish and for future physical pain. Because the issues of duty and proximate cause are dispositive, we shall address these points of error before addressing Pinkerton's remaining points of error and Manriquez's point of error.
II. Standard of Review— Legal Sufficiency
When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence, i.e., a "no evi dence" point of error, the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and inferences that support the challenged findings and should disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.1996); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1995); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.1994). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the claim is sufficient as a matter of law, and any challenges merely go to the weight of the evidence. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.1993). The court may sustain a "no evidence" point of error if the record reveals one of the following:
(1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact;
(2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;
(3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; and
(4) the evidence established conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.
Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). There is some evidence when the proof supplies a reasonable basis upon which reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about the existence of a vital fact. Orozco v. Sander, 824 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.1992). When the reviewing court sustains a "no evidence" point, it is the court's duty to render judgment for the appellant because that is the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176 (1986); National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Blagg, 438 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.1969).
III. Legal Duty
In order to prevail on a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.1995); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex.1995). The threshold issue in a negligence case is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990). The plaintiff must establish both the existence of a duty and the violation of that duty by the defendant. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 801 S.W.2d at 525; El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex.1987); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). Whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff is a question of law for the court to decide from the particular facts of the case. Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex.1996).
In ascertaining whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the court considers: "the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant." Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex.1994); Greater Houston Transp. Co., 801 S.W.2d at 525. Additional factors for consideration include whether one party had superior knowledge of the risk or a right to control the actor who caused the harm. Golden Spread Council, Inc., 926 S.W.2d at 290.
Of the above listed factors, foreseeability is the most significant consideration. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 801 S.W.2d at 525. It is not necessary for the defendant to have anticipated the particular occurrence in order for a duty to arise. Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Rather, a risk of harm is held to be foreseeable if the risk reasonably appears or should appear that others in the exercise of their lawful rights may be injured. Id.
A. Premises Liability
Manriquez asserts that as an invitee, Pinkerton owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care, including the duty to protect and safeguard him from unreasonably dangerous conditions on the premises or to warn of their existence.
Under Texas law, an invitee is a person who enters the premises of another in answer to an express or implied invitation from the owner or occupier for their mutual benefit. Montes v. Indian Cliffs Ranch, Inc., 946 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, writ requested) (citing Peerenboom v. HSP Foods, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, no writ)). The duty owed to an employee of a contractor working on the premises of an owner or occupier at the time of injury is that owed to a business invitee. Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex.1973); Staublein v. Dow Chemical Co., 885 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, no writ). An owner or occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care to protect an invitee from reasonably foreseeable injuries. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex.1975); Yeager v. Drillers, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (citing Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex.1985)). Generally, a person who does not own or possess the premises does not assume any liability under a premise liability theory, unless he assumes control over, and responsibility for, the premises. City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.1986); Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd as moot).
The duty of an owner or occupier of land to keep the premises in a safe condition may subject him to liability in two situations: (1) those arising from a defect in the premises, and (2) those arising from an activity or instrumentality. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 417; Kovar v. Krampitz, 941 S.W.2d 249, 255 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.). To recover on a premises defect theory, a person must have been injured by a condition on the property, rather than an activity. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.1992); Kovar, 941 S.W.2d at 255. Otherwise, in order to recover for injuries sustained as a result of a negligent activity, the plaintiff must have been injured by, or as a contemporaneous result of an activity. Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264; Rendleman, 909 S.W.2d at 60.
Manriquez's injury arose as a result of an alleged negligent activity conducted on the premises rather than as a result of a premise defect. Even if this ease involved a premise defect, Pinkerton would not owe a duty to Manriquez under a premise liability theory. A review of the evidence and testimony presented at trial reflects that Regency manage ment kept close control over the garage. Ray Schneider, manager of the Regency garage at the time of the accident, testified that he had the ultimate responsibility for all the day-to-day operations of the garage, including safety and adequate staffing. Schneider supervised Pinkerton and Pedus personnel in an "indirect manner." The contract services personnel reported directly to other garage managers, who, in turn, reported to Schneider. Thus, Pinkerton did not exercise sufficient control over the premises to impose upon it the duties of a possessor occupier. See Rendleman, 909 S.W.2d at 60.
This court has previously held that where the employees of two subcontractors are working on a construction site 1) in close proximity, 2) with the same objective, and 3) aware of each other's presence on the site, those employees owed a duty to prevent injury to the other through negligence. Christian v. Dishongh, 449 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ). More recently, however, decisions from other courts of appeals, and an opinion from this court, have found where the owner or general contractor is in control of the premises, there is no special relationship between the employees of different subcontractors which would bring them within the scope of each other's duty. See, e.g., Rendleman, 909 S.W.2d at 60; Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Here, there was no special legal relationship between Pinkerton and Manriquez — employees of two separate contractors — which would bring Manriquez within the scope of Pinkerton's duty under a premises liability theory. See Rendleman, 909 S.W.2d at 60; Bennett, 628 S.W.2d at 473. Thus, duty, if any, would have to arise under the negligent activity theory.
B. Negligent Activity
In order to recover for injuries sustained as a result of a negligent activity, Manriquez must have been injured by, or as a contemporaneous result of, that activity. Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264; Rendleman, 909 S.W.2d at 60.
The trial testimony of Chaney, Ralph Bur-dette, district manager for Pinkerton, and Schneider described the procedures to be followed in the event of an unusual occurrence such as a vehicle stalled on the ramp of the garage. First, the guard on duty was required to call his supervisors located in the Tenneco building, who, in turn, were to call Schneider. Schneider would then arrange to block the floors below the stalled vehicle and then move the stalled vehicle with a truck. Burdette testified that Pinkerton did not train its security personnel specifically to handle stalled cars. They were responsible, however, for gathering information and reporting the situation to Pinkerton's personnel in the Tenneco building.
It is not disputed that Manriquez was injured as a result of trying to push a car up a steep incline. Chaney's failure to first report the stalled vehicle to his supervisors rather than ordering Manriquez to assist Jones with his stalled car was not the activity which injured Manriquez. Rather, the trial testimony of both Jones and Manriquez established that they alone made the decision to move the car, not Chaney.
C. Affirmative Duty
Manriquez further asserts that Chaney voluntarily entered into a course of conduct to aid Jones, thereby assuming a duty not to make the situation worse. While an individual is under no legal duty to come to the aid of another in distress, he has a duty to avoid any affirmative act which might worsen the situation. Otis Eng'g Corp., 668 S.W.2d at 309.
If a party negligently creates a situation, then it becomes his duty to do something about it to prevent injury to others if it reasonably appears or should appear to him that others in their exercise of their lawful rights may be injured thereby.
El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 311 (quoting Buchanan v. Rose, 138 Tex. 390, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1942)).
While perhaps Chaney did not exercise his best judgment by not following the correct procedure by first calling his supervisors, ordering Manriquez to assist Jones did not make the situation worse. As already ob served above, Chaney played no role in Jones and Manriquez's decision to push the car up the garage ramp. See City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Tex.1986) (Kilgarlin, concurring) (plaintiff could not recover under theory that defendant voluntarily undertook an affirmative course of action where there was no evidence that defendant's actions increased the risk of harm).
Manriquez further claims Chaney should have reasonably foreseen that Manriquez, without any training and equipment would have been injured when he sent Manriquez to aid Jones. We find, however, it was not reasonable for Chaney to have anticipated that Manriquez would stand behind a vehicle, which was in neutral on a steep incline, and attempt to push it up the ramp.
D. Right of Control
Manriquez also argues that Pinkerton assumed control of him and directed him into a dangerous situation. Manriquez testified that he was afraid he would lose his job if he did not follow Chaney's order. Under Texas law, the obligation of one contractor to supervise the work of another contractor is imposed only by contract, not by law. Yeager, 930 S.W.2d at 118; Williford Energy Co. v. Submergible Cable Serv., Inc., 895 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1994, no writ). At trial, no documents or testimony evincing a contract between Pedus and Pinkerton was presented. Pinkerton, therefore, did not have a contractual right to control or supervise Manriquez's work.
Moreover, contrary to Manriquez's assertions, the evidence presented at trial, including Manriquez's testimony, establishes that Pinkerton had no right of control over Manri-quez or his work. First, Manriquez testified that no Pinkerton personnel had ever directed him to anything on any prior occasions. Second, Manriquez further testified that his supervisor had never told him that if he did not follow orders from Pinkerton's personnel, he would lose his job. Third, Manriquez testified that although Chaney ordered him to assist Jones with the stalled car, Chaney did not order him to stand behind the car, with it in neutral, and push it up the ramp. Fourth, Manriquez testified that he and Jones, alone, devised the plan to push the car up to the next floor. Other than Manriquez's testimony that Chaney ordered him to assist Jones and that he was afraid of losing his job if he did not follow Chaney's orders, Manri-quez failed to present even a scintilla of evidence that Pinkerton had a right to control his work.
We conclude that Pinkerton owed no duty to Manriquez. Therefore, we sustain Pinkerton's first two points of error. Even if we were to determine that Pinkerton owed Man-riquez a duty, Manriquez, nonetheless, failed to establish that Chaney's actions proximately caused his injuries.
IV. Proximate Cause
In its third and fourth points of error, Pinkerton challenges the jury's finding of proximate cause on the basis of both legal and factual insufficiency. Because Pinkerton raises both legal and factual sufficiency points, we must first review the legal sufficiency to determine if there is any evidence of probative value to support the jury's finding on proximate cause. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex.1981). If there is legally sufficient evidence to support the finding on proximate cause, we must then review the factual sufficiency of the evidence by weighing and considering the evidence both in support of, and contrary to, the challenged findings. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). Under a factual sufficiency review, we must uphold the jury's findings unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986).
Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) foreseeability. Leitch, 935 S.W.2d at 118; Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477 (Tex.1995); Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995). The plaintiff may not establish these elements by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477. Cause in fact exists if "the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury which would not otherwise have occurred." Union Pump Co., 898 S.W.2d at 775. The plaintiff, however, has not shown cause in fact if the defendant's negligence did no more than provide a condition which made the injury possible. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477 (citing Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.1968)). Rather, "'[t]he evidence must go farther, and show that such negligence was the proximate, and not the remote, cause of [the] resulting injuries . [and] justify the conclusion that such injury was the natural and probable result thereof.'" Id. (quoting Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1939)). Even if the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's actions, the nexus between the defendant and the plaintiff's injuries may be too attenuated to constitute legal cause. Id.; Union Pump Co., 898 S.W.2d at 776; Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.1991).
Foreseeability requires that a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger created by a negligent act or omission. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 478; Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992). The danger of injury is foreseeable if its " 'general character . might reasonably have been anticipated.' " Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 478 (quoting Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex.1985)). The determination of foreseeability turns on " 'common experience applied to human conduct.'" Id. (quoting City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Tex.1987)). "Foreseeability requires more than someone, viewing the facts in retrospect, theorizing an extraordinary sequence of events whereby the defendant's conduct brings injury." Id.; Green v. GS Roofing Prods. Co., 928 S.W.2d 265, 268 (TexApp.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
At most, Chaney, by sending Manri-quez to assist Jones with his car, provided the condition which made his injury possible. See Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d at 477 (citing Bell, 434 S.W.2d at 120). Any connection between Chaney ordering Manriquez to assist with the stalled ear, and Manriquez and Jones' decision to push the car up a steep incline by placing the car in neutral and standing behind it, is too attenuated to constitute "cause in fact" of Manriquez's resulting injuries. Moreover, based on common experience, it was not foreseeable that Manriquez and Jones would devise a plan to push the ear up the steep ramp to the next floor. Considering the evidence in support of the verdict, we conclude there is no evidence to support the jury's finding that Chaney's actions proximately caused Manriquez's injuries.
Thus, we sustain Pinkerton's third point of error. Because we may reverse the judgment of the trial court on either Pinkerton's first, second, or third point of error, it is not necessary to address Pinkerton's remaining points of error or Manriquez's sole point of error regarding damages.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Manriquez take nothing on his claims against Pinkerton.
. Manriquez's claim that Chaney ordered him to assist Jones with his car was disputed at trial. Chaney testified that he asked Manriquez to check out the situation and report back to him. Also, it was disputed whether Chaney knew Jones' car was stalled on the ramp between floors and whether he had relayed that information to Manriquez. Manriquez asserted that Chaney had told him the car was stalled on the ramp. Manriquez also testified that he was not aware that Chaney could not leave the cashier's booth unattended.
.Manriquez specifically pled the defendants were negligent in:
1. Failing to enforce policies and procedures to move stalled vehicles from the ramp or about the parking garage in a safe manner;
2. Failing to call a wrecker or person similarly equipped who is trained in the safe handling of stalled vehicles to clear the ramp;
3. Chaney's failure to contact his-supervisor to obtain direction as to how to proceed to deal with the situation presented by the stalled vehicle on the ramp;
4. Chaney's failure [to] follow his oral and/or written instructions to first contact his superiors after notification by Jones that his vehicle was stalled;
5. Chaney's failure to follow instructions to contact his supervisor if anything occurred on his shift that he did not know how to handle;
6. Chaney's directing Plaintiff David Manri-quez to assist the driver of a stalled vehicle without Plaintiff David Manriquez having been properly trained to engage in such activity and without adequate mechanical or human assistance;
7. Failing to provide Plaintiff David Manri-quez with a written job description setting out the limits of his responsibility;
8. Failing to provide to Plaintiff David Manri-quez instructions as to what personnel had authority to direct his activities; and,
9. Failing to provide to Plaintiff David Manri-quez written instruction as to what personnel had authority to direct his activities.
. Pinkerton, in post-submission briefing requested by this court, argues that when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in support of an implied finding of duty, we should include all the facts surrounding the event at issue, not just the facts supporting the verdict. To hold otherwise, according to Pinkerton, means this court would be reviewing only part of the evidence the trial court considered in establishing that Pinkerton owed a duty to Manriquez.
In support of this argument, Pinkerton cites to a recent court of appeals case, Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, n.w.h.). The San Antonio court noted the standard for determining the existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 766.
The court further stated, " 'However, a jury question arises when (1) the facts and circumstances that a court would use to determine duty are disputed, or (2) the inferences that may be drawn from the facts are disputed.' " Id. (quoting 1 Texas Torts and Remedies § 1.03, cited with approval in Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990); see also Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.1991)). The court then stated:
While we recognize and follow Mitchell and Sbrusch insofar as they state that the underlying circumstances, if disputed, may give rise to a question of fact, we question whether these statements mean that the evidence arguably giving rise to a duty is subject to legal and factual sufficiency review. If this were true, and the evidence were legally but not factually sufficient to support [the] imposition of a duty, the usual rules relating to disposition would require that we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. But duty is a question of law and logically should be decided de novo on the record before the trial court.
Id. at n. 1.
Recognizing this "conundrum," the court assumed "without deciding that the question of fact underlying imposition of legal duty, like other questions of fact, is subject to legal and factual sufficiency review." Id. While we agree with the San Antonio court of appeals that the situation presented is a conundrum, we find it is not necessary for us to reach this issue because the result is the same whether we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment, or whether we also consider the evidence contrary to the judgment.