Case Name: William Deininger et al., Resp'ts, v. Christian J. Miller et al., as Executors, etc., App'lts
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-06-17
Citations: 74 N.Y. St. Rep. 758
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Deininger et al., Resp'ts, v. Christian J. Miller et al., as Executors, etc., App'lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 74
Pages: 758–764

Head Matter:
William Deininger et al., Resp'ts, v. Christian J. Miller et al., as Executors, etc., App'lts.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Dept.,
Filed June 17, 1896.)
1. Bills and notes—Protest.
In case of a deceased indorser the holder is required to use the same degree of diligence in giving notice of protest as though the indorser was living.
3. Same.
Such notice may be served upon the representatives of the deceased indorser by inclosing the same in an envelope directed to the indorser himself, at his last place of business, and depositing the same in the postoffice, although he has previously died.
3. Same.
In such case, a notice served some ten or eleven days after the indorser’s death is insufficient.
Appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The defendants’ testatrix, Charlotte Miller, indorsed the note in suit, made by one Amelia Witzelben, and the same was subsequently indorsed by Christian J. Miller, the husband of the first indorser; both of such indorsements being for the accommodation of the maker. The note was thereafter delivered to the plaintiffs, who also indorsed it, and procured it to be discounted by the Germ an-American Bank of Rochester. Charlotte Miller died September 11,1894, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate upon the 22d day of October, following, and letters testamentary were upon the same day issued to the defendants by the surrogate of Monroe county. The note fell due September 24,1894, and the day previous one of the plaintiffs called at the bank where the note was held, and gave directions not to protest the same, giving as a reason therefor that the indorser relied upon was dead, and also directed the bank, in case the note was not paid at maturity, to charge it to the plaintiffs’ account. Iff obedience to such instructions, the note was not protested at its maturity, but was charged up to the plaintiffs’ account, and thereafter, and about October 4th, the plaintiff sent a party to see Christian J. Miller, who was then informed that the note was due, that it was the note that his wife had indorsed for Witzleben, and that the holders looked to him for its payment; and he replied that the matter was in the lawyer’s hands,—referring to his co-executor, Mr. Roe. Shortly thereafter, and about the middle of October, the plaintiffs’ attorney met the defendant Roe, and gave him verbal notice of the nonpayment of the note, and that the plaintiffs would look to the estate of Mrs. Miller for its payment, whereupon Roe directed him to draw up an affidavit of the claim, and present it. Subsequently, and upon the 7th of Rovember, following, the claim was presented in due form, and it was at once rejected by the defendants, and a reference, under the statute, agreed upon. The referee thereafter reported in favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount of the note, with costs.
Charles Roe, for app’lts; H. Perry Blodgett, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
ADAMS, J.
The only question in the case is whether or not, upon the facts above stated, it can be said that sufficient notice Avas given of the demand and nonpayment of the note in suit to charge the estate of the deceased indorser. The learned referee, in reaching a conclusion favorable to the plaintiffs' contention, obviously bases his decision upon the assumption that the personal representatives of the deceased testatrix were notified, within a reasonable time after its maturity, of the nonpayment of the note by its maker, and that a notice of that character was all that could be required. While not intending to be understood as laying doAvn any arbitrary rule to govern in all cases where an indorser dies prior to the maturity of a note, Ave are constrained to differ from the learned referee, and to hold that in the circumstances of this case, at least, the estate of Mrs. Miller is not charged Avith the payment of the note in question. Prior to the statute of 1857, it was the universal rule, under the law merchant, to give notice of dishonor, in case of a deceased indorser, either to his personal representative, or to some agent or person interested in his estate, or by a written notice addressed to the indorser, and left at his last place of residence. Bigelow, Bills & N. (last Ed.) p. 122. But, Avhatever the form of notice, the holder Avas required to use the same degree of diligence in giving it as if the indorser were living. The rule is thus stated by an elementary writer whose authority to speak upon the subject is recognized by every one:
"Where the indorser is dead, notice must be sent to his executor or administrator, and if no person has been appointed, or it cannot be ascertained by the use of due diligence who or where he or they who have been appointed can be found, notice must be forwarded to the last place of residence of the deceased. Hence the death of the indorser is no excuse for neglect to give notice." Pars. Bills & N. p. 526.
The first inquiry, therefore, which suggests itself, is, what diligence is necessary in order to charge a living indorser? Formerly it was held that any notice which was "reasonable" in point of time was sufficient, but this expression was found by experience to be tO'O general to convey a correct idea of the requirements of the law, and later on the period allowed the holder became fixed, and was confined to the expiration of the day following the dishonor of the note. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1035, 1038. And such is the rule which still obtains. Whiting v. Bank, 77 N. Y. 363. In course-of time, however, an in the year 1857, the legislature of this state prescribed an exact form for notifying an indorser of the nonpayment of a note, which has ever since been aop-ted and followed in the commedcial circles of this state, and which is expressed in the following language, viz.:
"Whenever the residence or place of business of the endorser of a promissory note, or of the drawer or endorser of a check, draft or bill of exchange, shall be in the city or town, or whenever the city or town indicated under the endorsement or signature of such indorser or drawer, as his or her place of residence, or whenever in the absence of such indication, the city or town where such endorser or drawer, from the best information obtained by diligent inquiry, is reputed to reside or have a place of business, shall be the same city or town where such promissory note, check, draft or bill of exchange is payable or legally presented for payment, or acceptance, all notices of non-payment and of a nonacceptance of such promissory note, check, draft or bill of exchange may be served by depositing them, with the postage thereon prepaid, in the post-office of the city or town where such promissory note, check, draft or bill of exchange was payable or legally presented for payment or acceptance, directed to the endorser or drawer, at such city or town." Laws 1857, c. 416, § 3.
By this provision of the statute, it would unquestionably have been competent for the plaintiffs to have served notice of the demand and nonpayment of the note in suit upon the representatives of the deceased indorser by inclosing the same in an envelope directed to the indorser herself, at her last place of residence, which it is conceded was in the city of Rochester, and depositing the same in the post office; and, although she had previously died, such a notice would, have operated to charge her estate (Bank v. Birch, 17 Johns. 25); for it not only would have been one which complied literally with the requirements of the statute, but it would have been the one most likely to have conveyed the requisite information to the persons directly interested in obtaining the same (Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines, 121, 127). The plaintiffs, however, did not avail themselves of this statute. Indeed, they appear to have assumed that the death of Mrs. Miller released every one who was liable upon the note, except the maker; for upon the day preceding its maturity, as we have seen, one of them went to the bank, and gave express directions that the note should not be protested,—thereby releasing, beyond all question, the second indorser. It was not until some ten or eleven days-thereafter that any attempt whatever was made to notify any one representing the deceased indorser of its nonpayment, and then only in a very informal and casual manner; and, when notified by Christian J. Miller that the matter was left with his associate, the plaintiffs waited about ten days longer before giving any notice to Mr. Ene, and more than six weeks were permitted to-elapse before proof of plaintiffs' claim was finally filed. Had no directions to the contrary been given the bank, it is entirely safe to assume that the note would have been protested and notice thereof given in the ordinary manner, and in a manner which would have been effectual to preserve the rights of all parties.
As before stated, it is foreign to the purpose of this court to establish, as a rule applicable to all cases, that the statute of 1857 furnishes the only method by which due notice of the dishonor of a note can be given where the indorser has departed this life intermediate its inception and maturity. We simply mean to say that it provides a course which can be followed with entire safety in such cases, and that any other course which involves unnecessary -delay cannot be regarded as sufficient without doing violence to the plain intent and meaning of the statute, and to well-settled principles of commercial law. In other words, we think the statute furnishes a simple method by which the required notice can be given, and that it ought to be adopted save in exceptional circumstances.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
FOLLETT, GREEN and WARD, JJ., concur.