Case Name: Elmer Naquin, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maryland Casualty Company, and Ford Motor Company, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-01-15
Citations: 311 So. 2d 48
Docket Number: No. 4846
Parties: Elmer NAQUIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, and Ford Motor Company, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 311
Pages: 48–55

Head Matter:
Elmer NAQUIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, and Ford Motor Company, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 4846.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Jan. 15, 1975.
On Rehearing March 19, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 15, 1975.
Writ Refused June 13, 1975.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe by V. Farley Sonnier, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant Ford Motor Co.
L. H. Olivier, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant City of Lafayette.
Domengeaux & Wright by William P. Rutledge, for plaintiff-appellee.
Harmon F. Roy, Mouton & Roy, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Defendants Maryland Casualty Company (liability insurer for the City of Lafayette) and Ford Motor Company appeal the $65,000 jury award to plaintiff Elmer Na-quin for personal injuries caused when a Lafayette garbage truck (on a Ford chassis) ran into the rear of Naquin's car. He was waiting for a favorable traffic light. Each defendant contends the other's negligence was the sole legal cause of the accident. We affirm.
On July 26, 1968 Naquin stopped for a traffic light. While waiting, his vehicle was struck from the rear by a fully loaded Ford garbage truck owned by the City of Lafayette and driven by its employee Gilbert Comeaux. The suit against the city's insurer Maryland Casualty is based upon Comeaux's alleged negligence in running into Naquin's properly positioned vehicle, and upon the alleged negligence of the city's maintenance department in failing to properly service the garbage truck. The claim against Ford is based upon its alleged failure to supply proper brake linings when it manufactured and sold the truck. Third party actions seeking contribution were filed by Ford against the city, Maryland, and Comeaux, and by Maryland against Ford. The jury awarded Naquin $65,000 and found negligence on the part of the city and Ford to be a legal cause of the accident. The trial judge severed Ford's third party claim against the city, Maryland, and Comeaux, and the judge ruled that the city and Maryland were liable for contribution to Ford on Ford's third party claim. There was no decision affecting Comeaux.
The most impressive assignment of error raised by both Maryland Casualty and Ford is their contention that the jury's verdict was influenced by information not admissible and not produced in evidence. This argument was presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial. The motion was set for trial, but no juror was subpoenaed to testify. No evidence was presented to support one juror's ex parte statement which had been attached to one application for new trial. The statement indicated that during deliberations two jurors informed the remaining jurors that plaintiff had rejected a settlement offer of $70,000, and that this influenced five jurors to find for plaintiff.
The trial court is obliged to see that justice is done between litigants. Even in jury cases, if the judge believes the verdict is unauthorized and unjust, he should grant a new trial. Matthews v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 45 So.2d 547 (La.App. Orls. 1950). See also, William Volker & Company of Louisiana v. Allen, 96 So.2d 506 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1957).
These rules do not help defendants because the time to prove the alleged jury tampering was at the scheduled hearing on the motion for new trial. Since no attempt was made to present evidence to support this serious charge, we fail to find manifest error in the trial court's rejection of the jury tampering charge.
There are several lines of testimony relating to the alleged negligence of the city's maintenance department, its driver, and Ford. The city's negligence was established by the fact that this garbage truck (and the three exactly like it) were operated on a 24 hour a day, 7 day a week, schedule. During each eight hour shift the truck was stopped some 1100 to 1500 times. Although the truck was rated to carry 30,000 pounds, the weight checks showed that they usually carried between 34,000 and 38,000 pounds when fully loaded. The truck that struck Naquin's vehicle was fully loaded and on its way to the city dump. There is evidence that all four of the new Ford trucks had braking problems. The only maintenance performed by the city's maintenance department consisted of frequent brake adjustments to meet the complaints that the brakes were not holding. Testimony in the record by Comeaux's fellow employee indicates that the brakes had been adjusted only a few minutes before the accident. The jury properly rejected the defense that the city was free from fault.
The case against Ford is premised on the finding that Ford manufactured and supplied (four) garbage trucks to the city with substandard brake linings on the rear wheels. The linings (or blocks) were supposed to be inch thick when installed, and there is convincing evidence that these trucks were sold with Y& inch thick linings. Ford impressively denies this line of testimony and produced convincing testimony to support its contention that even if $4 inch lipings had been supplied, this would not have contributed to the accident. But the record is replete with testimony that the four trucks which were some six months old (and had travelled some 7,000 miles) were constantly presenting brake problems. These problems were brought to Ford's local dealer, but a complete check was never performed. On each occasion, the brakes were adjusted and the trucks returned.
After the accident the wheels were removed for the first time and it was immediately determined by the city's maintenance department that the brake linings did not meet Ford's specifications. The linings were changed on all four trucks and the brake problems disappeared. This line of testimony was supported by one driver's description of an accident caused by defective brakes when the new trucks were being delivered to Lafayette.
Ford points to the fact that the city is unable to produce the brake shoes and lining removed from the truck. The city explained that these shoes were available for some eighteen months, had Ford desired to inspect them, but they were thrown away during a cleanup compaign. Shoes and linings from a sister truck were presented in evidence. Ford made an impressive attack on the city's attempt to explain that these exhibits supported its contentions.
While we have reservations concerning the finding that Ford's four trucks were manufactured and sold with defective brake linings, we do not find manifest error in the jury determination.
Maryland Casualty's and Ford's burden of showing error is not discharged in a case involving issues of fact by pointing to conflicts in the evidence. Davitt v. Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, 162 La. 59, 110 So. 88 (1926). Where issues of fact are appealed, appellants are required to show the verdict is manifestly erroneous in order to support a reversal. Falgout v. Johnson, 191 La. 823, 186 So. 349 (1939); Glorioso v. Glorioso, 223 La. 357, 65 So.2d 794 (1953). Questions of credibility and veracity are for the trier of fact. Hopson v. Allstate Insurance Company, 286 So.2d 99 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1973).
Naquin's vehicle was struck a severe blow from the rear by a truck weighing about nineteen' tons. Although the medical evidence is far from uniform, there is support for Naquin's claim that he suffered a severe spinal injury which cannot be cured by surgery because of his pulmonary and orthopedic complications. In reaching this conclusion the jury accepted medical evidence provided by a discogram and rejected the negative myelogram.
Relevant here is Ford's contention that it was deprived of testimony of its medical expert because of the trial judge's ruling that under the sequestration rule, all witnesses had to remain in the witness room through the entire trial (which lasted eight days). We understand that this ruling effectively prevented Ford from presenting live testimony of its New Orleans physician. Ford further complains that this injustice was compounded by the court's refusal to allow the jury to hear the entire deposition. We are unable to defend the trial judge's rulings, but we find these errors did not improperly influence the jury's verdict. Although Ford was not permitted to read substantial parts of it's medical expert's (Dr. Levy's) testimony supporting his reasons for rejecting the discogram findings, a reading of the entire deposition does not require a reversal of the jury's consideration of this test. The fact that some physicians have grave reservations concerning the validity of the discogram test was made known to the jury.
When a review of the record indicates the trial court judgment is correct and that justice has been done, the judgment will not be overturned because of errors which did not affect the merits. LSA-C.C.P. 2164; Shows v. Williamson, 256 So.2d 688 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1972). When error is detected, it must be weighed to determine whether such error is harmless or prejudicial. Lauro v. Travelers Insurance Company, 261 So.2d 261 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972). When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon reasonable evaluation, furnishes a factual basis for the trial court's finding, the appellate court, on review, should not disturb this factual finding absent manifest error. Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973).
We fail to find manifest error in the $65,000 award and in the finding that the negligence of the city and Ford contributed to this accident.
The trial court judgment is affirmed at appellants' costs.
Affirmed.