Case Name: Nancy W. WAKEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-02-20
Citations: 237 So. 2d 61
Docket Number: No. 2629
Parties: Nancy W. WAKEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: CROSS, C. J., and SAMPLE, WALLACE, Associate Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 237
Pages: 61–66

Head Matter:
Nancy W. WAKEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2629.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 20, 1970.
Rehearing Denied June 29, 1970.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 29, 1970.
Joseph D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, and Max B. Kogen, Miami, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
McCAIN, Judge.
Defendant appeals from an order of probation entered after a jury found her guilty of aggravated assault with a recommendation of mercy. We reverse.
Upon arriving at defendant's home at about 12:45 a.m. a police officer found her husband lying on the floor of the bedroom with blood on his pajama tops. In response to the officer's question, the victim said the defendant had shot him. At this point defendant was not put under arrest but the police officer testified he would not have alldwed her to leave.
The defendant had apparently been beaten and was in an intoxicated condition.
The victim accompanied by defendant and police officers was taken to a hospital where defendant was placed under arrest. At that time, a discussion was held between defendant and the officers about obtaining a lawyer for her, but no effort was made to contact one.
The officers and defendant then proceeded to the police station where defendant was asked who her attorney was. She told them his name and requested that they contact him but the officers were unable to locate him. The police interrogator knew of her desire for an attorney and another officer attempted to contact various ones she approved of from those selected from the "yellow pages" of the telephone directory. Her present attorney of record was reached and he advised the officer he would immediately come to the station.
During this interim she was questioned, advised of her rights and signed a waiver thereof. In addition she signed a confession. The officers stated this was done to "expedite" the case.
Shortly after the questioning was completed and the confession was signed, defendant's attorney arrived.
Under these circumstances, defendant's confession was obtained in derogation of her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, the court stated:
"If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning."
and further:
"If he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney there can be no questioning."
As soon as the officers became aware of defendant's desire to have an attorney present, no questioning should have transpired until he arrived.
In Craig v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So.2d 19, we found that a defendant who, during preliminary questioning, stated that "in a way" he would like to have had an attorney but concluded that he did not "see how it can help me", should have been given an opportunity to consult with one or a clear and unequivocal waiver should have been obtained from him.
Defendant herein was in simply no condition to waive her right to counsel and her privilege against self-incrimination. We cannot find she intelligently and understandingly waived them which results in our conclusion that defendant's confession was erroneously introduced into evidence.
Since the defendant was deprived of her freedom of action before the "Miranda warnings" were given, all evidence secured from her through police interrogation must be excluded.
We have considered defendant's other point questioning the introduction of the victim's utterance as a res gestae statement and find it to be without merit. See State v. Williams, Fla.1967, 198 So.2d 21.
Consistent with the views expressed herein, this cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
CROSS, C. J., and SAMPLE, WALLACE, Associate Judge, concur.
. Over defendant's objection the court allowed the victim's response into evidence as a res gestae statement.
. Testimony established that she appeared to have a cut on the bridge of her nose, her ear lobe was bleeding, her forehead seemed to be red, and she was wobbly and too intoxicated to drive.
.Despite her motion to suppress, it was both admitted into evidence and read to the jury. In essence she stated that: she had an argument with the victim; that he beat her; that she warned him not to hit her again, and that she then shot him in the back.