Case Name: STATE, Respondent, v. A. E. BLANK, Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1921-05-02
Citations: 33 Idaho 730
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. A. E. BLANK, Appellant.
Judges: Rice, C. J., and Lee, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 730–736

Head Matter:
(May 2, 1921.)
STATE, Respondent, v. A. E. BLANK, Appellant.
[197 Pac. 821.]
Grand Larceny — Pair Trial.
When, from an examination of the entire record, it clearly appears that a defendant charged with crime has not had a fair and impartial trial, the judgment will he reversed and a new trial granted.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Washington County. Hon. Isaac F. Smith, Judge.
Judgment of conviction of crime of grand larceny.
Reversed.
Devaney & Carter and Jas. W. Galloway, for Appellant.
Questions tending to degrade defendant must be those directly tending to affect his credibility as a witness, or to show his character (the defendant’s character had1 not been made an issue in the case), thus compelling him to' answer as to past transactions, even though similar, but which are separate and distinct. Through such admission the jury might be led to infer his guilt, rather than'to establish it from the evidence, violating the constitutional guaranty protecting him from giving evidence against himself. . (People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 28 Am. Eep. 183; Whartons Criminal Evidence, p. 904; 12 Cyc. 405; People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 112 Pac. 281.), ’ i
Roy L. Black, Attorney General, and Alfred F. Stone and Jas. L. Boone, Assistants, and Geo. Donart, Pros. Atty. for Washington County, for Respondent.
Whenever there is substantial evidence to support a verdict the same shall not be set aside. (See. 7170, C. S.; State v. Downing, 23 Ida. 540, 130 Pac. 461; State v. Silva, 21 Ida. 247, 120 Pae. 835; State v. Max Mox, 28 Ida. 176, 152 Pac. 802.)
Where the question is whether the defendant’s explanation of his possession of the fruits of crime is reasonable, the court is not justified in substituting its opinion for that of the jury, unless it finds that the defendant’s explanation was so clearly satisfactory that it was unreasonable of the jury to refuse to give it credence. (State v. Curtis, 29 Ida. 724, 161 Pac. 578; State v. Williams, 12 Ida. 483, 86 Pac. 53; State v. Ireland, 9 Ida. 686, 75 Pac. 257; State v. Steen, 29 Ida. 337, 158 Pac. 499; State v. Collett, 9 Ida. 608, 75 Pac. 271.)
The matter of the propriety of permitting the introduction of evidence cannot be reviewed on appeal when no objection whatever to the introduction thereof is made at the trial. (State v. Roe, 19 Ida. 416, 113 Pac. 461.)
See. 9014, C. S., enumerates all rulings in a criminal case which are deemed excepted to. (See, also, sec. 9012.) Secs. 9006 and 9007, C. S., contemplate that an exception to an order overruling an objection to the introduction of evidence must be taken in order that such order may be reviewed on appeal.
It is an established principle in practice that when evidence is admitted under objections, and no exception is taken to the ruling of the court, the objection is waived. (.People v. Knok Wah Choi, 2 Ida. 90, .6 Pac. 112; 3 C. J. 897.)

Opinion:
DUNN, J.
Appellant was tried in the district court of Washington county on a charge of grand larceny, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than fourteen years. He has appealed to this eourt and assigns as errors the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the admission and rejection of certain testimony.
The claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict rests upon the contention that the colt which was the subject of the alleged larceny was not sufficiently identified to warrant the conviction of the appellant. It must be admitted that the evidence of identification was very weak. "Whether it could properly be held sufficient to support the -verdict, if that question were before us under other conditions than those present in this case, it is not necessary for us to decide. Over the objection of appellant very much matter was admitted in evidence which could not fail to be highly prejudicial to him. Much of this matter tended to show that appellant had been guilty of other crimes having no connection whatever with the offense for which he was being tried. It seems impossible that the jury could have been wholly uninfluenced against appellant by this immaterial and irrelevant matter.
It clearly appears from the record in this case that the appellant was not accorded a fair trial. The judgment is therefore reversed and a new trial granted.
Rice, C. J., and Lee, J., concur.