Case Name: Donald R. PARKER, et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1988-06-17
Citations: 850 F.2d 708
Docket Number: No. 87-7039
Parties: Donald R. PARKER, et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant.
Judges: Before MIKVA and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 850
Pages: 708–729

Head Matter:
Donald R. PARKER, et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant.
No. 87-7039.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 16, 1987.
Decided June 17, 1988.
Donna M. Murasky, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Acting Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellant.
William W. Taylor, III, with whom Roger E. Zuckerman and Christine Nicholson, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellees. Michael R. Smith, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appel-lees.
Before MIKVA and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, Senior District Judge.
Of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).

Opinion:
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge MYRON L. GORDON.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.
MYRON L. GORDON, Senior District Judge:
Don R. Parker sustained serious injuries after being shot by an officer of the District of Columbia metropolitan police department Repeat Offenders Project [ROP]. This is an appeal from a judgment based upon a jury verdict that awarded Mr. Parker $425,046.67 in damages and nominal loss of consortium damages to his wife, Betty. The Parkers sued the District of Columbia and the ROP officers involved; they alleged state law assault and battery and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out the District's failure adequately to train, discipline and supervise its ROP officers in matters of extrajurisdictional arrest and disarmament. Prior to trial, the Par-kers dropped their claims against the individual officers and proceeded only against the District.
At the close of all the evidence in the trial, the court denied the District's motion for a directed verdict. The case went to the jury, which found in favor of the District on the state law claims, but against the District with respect to the section 1983 claim. The District moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the court denied this motion. The District now challenges the court's ruling on the motion for judgment n.o.v. and aspects of the charge tendered to the jury. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
This case is the result of confusion and a series of mistakes leading to tragic consequences. On the morning of November 15, 1982, two ROP officers, William Hayes and Ronnie Motley, set out to locate Don Parker, for whom an armed robbery felony warrant was outstanding.
To begin their search, the officers traveled to suburban Maryland in plain clothes and in an unmarked car, a 1974 Pontiac station wagon. There they intended to interview Betty Parker. The officers did not bring the Parker warrant because they mistakenly assumed that their arrest authority in Maryland was curtailed and that Don and Betty Parker did not live together. When they arrived at the Parker address, they unsuccessfully attempted to contact their dispatcher by radio. Unfortunately, the officers were parked in a radio "dead spot," and they could not communicate with the ROP.
When the officers went to the door and identified themselves to Ms. Parker, she brought Mr. Parker to the door. Mr. Parker invited the officers into the house. The officers described the purpose of their visit and requested that Mr. Parker voluntarily accompany them to the D.C. police department. Mr. Parker denied any wrongdoing; indeed, the armed robbery charge was eventually dropped. Mr, Parker also refused to leave with the two men who were not in possession of a warrant. Because his phone was disconnected, Mr. Parker asked the officers to radio either the local police or their ROP supervisors regarding the warrant, but the officers' dead radio barred that procedure. Finally, Mr. Parker ostensibly agreed to accompany the officers but asked for the opportunity to change his clothes. Officers Hayes and Motley granted this request; Mr. Parker went into his bedroom and escaped through the window into the neighboring woods.
Once the officers realized that they had been duped, they jumped into their station wagon and chased Mr. Parker around the surrounding neighborhood. To escape, Mr. Parker commandeered a late model Volvo, one that had just careened into the rear end of the officers wagon. Officer Hayes rushed out of his vehicle and tried to extricate Mr. Parker from the Volvo, but he was unable to accomplish this task. Operating under the erroneous assumption that Mr. Parker was threatening the driver of the car and that he was armed, Officer Hayes yelled: "Freeze Parker, don't do it." Transcript at 200. Mr. Parker continued to turn towards Officer Hayes, and the officer shot at him four times. Don Parker was hit twice, once in the abdomen and once in the spine, causing serious and permanent injury.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing Judge Green's ruling on judgment n.o.v., we apply the standard applied when reviewing directed verdict rulings. See Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2407, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979). A directed verdict or judgment n.o. v. is inappropriate unless there is only one reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence and that conclusion is inconsistent with the verdict rendered. Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1987). Our task on review is not to weigh or reconsider the evidence.
[W]e are required to evaluate the evidence under the presumption that the jury resolved all factual disputes in favor of the prevailing party. Moreover, we must give the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference to the prevailing party. Finally, we may not assess the credibility of the witnesses; that function is reserved exclusively for the jury. Our function is limited to certifying "only that fairminded jurors could reach the verdict rendered."
Id. (quoting Grogan v. General Maintenance Service Co., 763 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir.1985)).
Despite strong factual underpinnings and clear precedent to the contrary, the District is, in effect, urging us to impose a less onerous standard for overturning jury awards in municipal liability cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Morgan opinion illustrates with eloquent detail, jury awards are always "given the utmost of deference and respect." Id. at 1056. There is no authority to veer from this standard in cases involving awards against municipalities; we decline to adopt the District's implied suggestion to do so.
Our colleague's dissent is primarily based on his own interpretation of the facts, which is contrary to that of the jury. In our view, the dissent is seriously flawed by its failure to apply the "utmost . deference" standard referred to above.
B. Substantive Law
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when execution of its policy or custom causes a plaintiff to suffer constitutional injury. Since Monell, the Court has continued to explore the contours of municipal liability under § 1983. In a case involving a police shooting allegedly caused by inadequate training, the Court determined that "[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).
The District contends that inadequate training cannot amount to a custom or policy giving rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as required by Monell and that even if it could, the Parkers' proof does not support a finding of such a custom or policy. We disagree. Unlike Tuttle, this case does not involve a single incident that gives rise to an inference of inadequate training. It involves a sad series of mishaps linked to a policy of sorely deficient training, supervision and discipline.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question, the issue of whether liability can arise for injuries caused by a policy of inadequate training has come to the attention of the Court. See City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 107 S.Ct. 1114, 94 L.Ed.2d 293 (1987); Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S. at 814 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. at 2431 n. 2. In Kibbe, for example, the Court originally granted certiorari to address the question of inadequate training and liability under Monell, but dismissed such certiorari as improvidently granted upon determining that the petitioner failed to preserve the "fairly included" question, see Supreme Court Rule 21.1(a), of whether more than negligence in training is required in order to establish such liability.
In Tuttle, the Court rejected a finding of § 1983 municipal liability for inadequate training based on a single incident of police misconduct. Whether the facts of a particular case could contain sufficient examples of misconduct to infer a policy of inadequate training was a question left unresolved by Tuttle. The Supreme Court has, however, recently accepted for review the sixth circuit case of City of Canton v. Harris; the issue of inadequate training for law enforcement officers and its relationship to municipal policy would appear intrinsic to that case. See City of Canton v. Harris, 798 F.2d 1414 (6th Cir.1986), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1105, 99 L.Ed.2d 267 (1988).
Until we receive contrary direction from the Court, we believe that § 1983 liability may be found under Monell when there is evidence of deliberate indifference manifest by systemic and grossly inadequate training, discipline, and supervision. We also believe that the standard articulated in the instruction proffered to the jury in this case reflects a proper standard. Limiting Monell to affirmative policies that violate constitutional protections is not necessary; the "policy or custom" language of Monell warrants no such conclusion. See generally Note, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct: Must Victims Now Prove Intent?, 97 Yale L.J. 448 (1988).
As another panel of this court recognized in Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C.Cir.1986), "[pjolice misconduct cases such as this one . do not involve express statements of policy.... To succeed, a plaintiff must show a course deliberately pursued by the city...." To establish the existence of a Monell pattern or policy, a plaintiff must present "concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated scenarios." Id. at 125.
Thus, we uphold the district court's conclusion that liability may be imposed on a municipality upon a showing of deliberate indifference exhibited by a pattern of inadequate training, supervision and discipline of police officers provided there is a causal connection between such inadequacies and the risk of harm to others. Accord, e.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 752, 98 L.Ed.2d 765 (1988); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.1986) ("deliberate indifference"), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1384, 94 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2656, 81 L.Ed.2d 363 (1984) (so grossly negligent as to constitute "deliberate indifference").
The incidents giving rise to the case at bar present the requisite "fully packed" scenario. Inadequately trained officers — in terms of both arrest procedure and physical aptitude — committed a series of mistakes resulting in serious injuries to an innocent man. There were no consequent sanctions or even reprimands. From these facts, a clear pattern of inadequate police training and discipline emerges.
C. Specific Challenges
The District challenges the jury's determination on two grounds. First, the District contends that the evidence was not sufficient to establish inadequacies in training, discipline or supervision. Second, the District claims that even if some such deficiencies were established, they were not the "moving force" behind Mr. Parker's injuries because Mr. Parker's own actions were superseding causes. Both of the District's challenges go to factual issues which were before the jury, and we will not disturb its findings in this case.
We find that there is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's finding of deliberate indifference to adequate training, supervision and discipline. For instance, Roy C. McLaren, Chief of Police at Miramar, Florida and co-author of Police Administration, a widely used police textbook, testified as an expert regarding the ROP's training in extrajurisdictional arrest procedures. In Chief McLaren's opinion the ROP officers lacked sufficient knowledge in this area.
A: Although the outline for the training consists of one week of instruction, the amount of instruction given to the officers, from what I can gather from looking at the reports and depositions and the responses made by the officers, the actual instruction given to them for some of the activities that they had to confront was inadequate.
Q: And in what way was it inadequate, Chief McLaren?
A: It failed to cover the circumstances that they would confront in making an arrest or a detention in Maryland, in Prince Georges County or in the State of Maryland, or in any outside jurisdiction outside of the District, and it did not give instructions on how to remain in contact with headquarters and guidance on what to do in the event that that contact was lost, in the event that they could not maintain radio contact or telephone contact with their supervisors.
And it did not clarify the authority that the officers would have in making an arrest or a detention on an individual outside of the District of Columbia.
Transcript at 677-678.
Indeed, the officers' training regarding ex-trajurisdictional arrest authority consisted of a single memo by the head of the ROP, Edward Spurlock. Mr. Spurlock's memo failed to disclose that the ROP was authorized to arrest suspects in Maryland in circumstances like those leading up to the shooting underlying this case.
We have considered also the record evidence on Officer Hayes' general physical training and, specifically, his disarmament training and believe that it too illustrates deliberate indifference to adequate training. Charles W. Bates, a security consultant and former F.B.I. agent, testified as an expert regarding Officer Hayes' disarmament training. Agent Bates described, and eventually demonstrated on the Parkers' counsel, how Officer Hayes could have subdued Mr. Parker without use of deadly force. See Transcript 281-285. According to Agent Bates, Officer Hayes' failure physically to subdue Mr. Parker evidenced a serious deficiency in the officer's training program.
It is undisputed that Officer Hayes had no physical training for four years prior to the Parker incident. Indeed, he was off duty because of a fractured shoulder until just two months before the incident that gave rise to this lawsuit. Given Officer Hayes' physical condition, it is not hard to fathom that his most effective method for subduing the objects of his pursuits would be the use of a firearm as opposed to the application of physical force. Officer Hayes simply was not in adequate physical shape. This condition posed a foreseeable risk of harm to others. We are persuaded that a fair-minded jury could have concluded that Officer Hayes' conduct was the result of deliberate indifference on the part of the District with respect to the physical training of its police officers.
As to the inadequacies of its discipline and supervision, a telling example is the District's failure to take any disciplinary action whatsoever with respect to Officer Hayes. Assistant Police Chief Theodore Carr, the administrative officer responsible for reviewing cases involving alleged misconduct, determined that Officer Hayes mishandled the Parker incident and should have been "recycled through the firearms training course so that any — so he can be refreshed in terms of policies and procedures." Transcript at 920. Despite this internal order, no such action was ever taken.
We turn now to the District's challenge to the jury's finding on causation. As the District correctly points out, a municipal policy must be the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation before a plaintiff may recover under § 1983. Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S. at 820, 105 S.Ct. at 2434. In this circuit, a municipal policy is deemed to be the moving force of a constitutional injury if the
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm.... The defendant may be held liable for harm that is "foresee-ably attributable" to his conduct as well as for unforeseeable harm attributable to his conduct, unless it appears that the chain of events is "highly extraordinary in retrospect."
Morgan, supra, 824 F.2d at 1062-63 (quoting White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 106 (D.C.Cir.1986)) (citation omitted).
We can easily conclude that the record supports the jury's determination that the District officers' deficient training was a substantial factor in bringing about Mr. Parker's injuries. The unreasonable use of deadly force was an immediate cause of such harm. Officer Hayes shot at Mr. Parker four times. He resorted to use of his gun because he was unable physically to subdue Mr. Parker by less drastic means; his physical condition was deficient because the District was deliberately indifferent to his physical training program.
Moreover, the record adequately supports the finding that the officers' misunderstanding of their extrajurisdictional authority caused the underlying confused atmosphere. Chief McLaren articulated the nature and dangers associated with such confusion. He testified that "[t]he confusion may introduce uncertainty in the mind of the person that they are confronting so that in fact, a person being confronted in the field by a police officer . may act differently than the person would have had that element of confusion not been there." Transcript at 682. The record establishes a "substantial factor" relationship between the officers' uncertainties and Mr. Parker's reaction. Considered together with Officer Hayes' lack of physical conditioning and disarmament training, the circumstances giving rise to Mr. Parker's injuries persuade us that the moving force element of Monell is satisfied.
To bolster its moving force argument, the District attempts to analogize this case to Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782 (6th Cir.1987). In the latter case, the plaintiff filed a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that a Pontiac police officer's unreasonable use of deadly force caused her husband's death; he was hit by a truck when he ran across a highway in an attempt to escape from a city police officer. The court of appeals for the sixth circuit upheld the trial court's determination that the plaintiff's death was "completely independent" of the application of deadly force by the defendant's employee-police officer.
The District contends that Cameron is similar to the case at bar. Accordingly, the District urges us to adopt the Cameron court's reasoning and reject the existence of a causal connection between Officer Hayes' conduct and Mr. Parker's injuries. We disagree. The chain of events leading to Mr. Cameron's death was "highly extraordinary in retrospect." Morgan, supra, 824 F.2d at 1063. "[Mr. Cameron] was killed when he, at his own election, ran onto a high speed freeway. The district court was correct in concluding that this was unforeseeable, and that it would be an absurd result indeed to permit recovery for a felon's unwise choice of an escape route." Cameron, supra, 813 F.2d at 786.
Unlike Mr. Cameron, Mr. Parker was not injured when he was run over by a truck passing coincidentally along his escape route, he was seriously injured when the plainclothed police officer, who did not possess an arrest warrant, chased him and shot at him. The connection between Officer Hayes' actions and Donald Parker's injuries can readily be found to be direct and causal whereas the connection described in the Cameron case is far more attenuated and non-causal. We conclude that the jury's verdict on this issue is not unreasonable.
D. Jury Instructions
The defendant also contends that reversal is warranted by the trial court's decision not to charge the jury regarding use of deadly force according to the language set forth in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In that case the Supreme Court held as follows:
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not unconstitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.
Id. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. at 1701.
Before the jury was instructed, the parties argued about the contents of the charge to be submitted to the jury. At that time, the District advocated the use of an instruction that included language quoted from Tennessee v. Garner, contending that the District's official policy is consistent with this language.
What the District's official policy consists of is not the issue here and is not properly the basis of a jury charge. That Officer Hayes may have believed that he was being threatened, and that he did, in fact, issue an oral warning to Mr. Parker to "freeze," does not dispose of this aspect of the appeal. The jury was charged with evaluating the adequacy of District police training, supervision and discipline with regard to the use of deadly weapons rather than investigating the official weapons policy of Officer Hayes and the District. The jury arrived at its verdict upon a consideration of the actual customs and policies of the ROP. For this reason, we deem Judge Green's instructions on the use of excessive force, although not comprehensive, to be sufficient to convey the law of this fact-bound case.
Furthermore, the District failed properly to preserve its objection on this matter. The District requested the giving of a Gamer instruction and Judge Green denied this request. In so doing, Judge Green commented that the District's request, and its underlying interpretation of Gamer, could constitute interesting issues for appeal. Judge Green's comments, however, did not preserve the issue for appeal. Rule 51, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the procedure for effectively preserving challenges to jury instructions: "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection" Id. (emphasis added). The District failed to adhere to Rule 51; it neglected to state distinctly its specific objections to Judge Green's charge before the jury retired to deliberate. Absent such specified objection, it would be overreaching for this court to reject the instructions and to upset the jury's verdict.
The current posture of this case distinguishes it from a recent decision in which the Supreme Court did not require strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 51. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Court declined to dismiss a challenge to a jury verdict imposing municipal liability despite the petitioner's failure timely and properly to preserve its objection to a portion of the underlying jury instruction. The Court found that dismissal subsequent to its decision to grant cer-tiorari would "undermine the policy of judicial efficiency that underlies Rule 51." Id. 108 S.Ct. at 922. By contrast, policies of judicial efficiency and finality of judgments require us, at this relatively early stage of the appellate review process, to adhere to the clear directives of Rule 51. In any event, we are convinced that the instructions presented to the jury did not contain any flaws which rise to the level necessary to constitute plain error.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.