Case Name: The State v. Taylor, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1898-03-01
Citations: 143 Mo. 150
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State v. Taylor, Appellant.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 143
Pages: 150–165

Head Matter:
The State v. Taylor, Appellant.
Division Two,
March 1, 1898.
Murder: killing in defense of one’s dwelling. The maxim “every man’s house is his castle” does not mean that the owner of a dwelling house has the right to take life because of trespass upon the dwelling house alone, irrespective of the nature of the trespass. To justify the taking of the life of the trespasser the trespass must be with a design to commit a felony thereon or therein, or upon its inmates. A mere civil trespass upon one’s dwelling house does not justify him in slaying the trespasser. The owner may resist such a trespass, opposing force against force, but he has no right to kill unless it becomes necessary to prevent a felonious destruction of property or the commission of a felony therein, or to defend himself against a felonious assault upon his person or that of some member of his family.
Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court. — Hon. E. M. Hughes, Judge.
Affirmed.
Edmonston & Cullen and Bickley & Bickley for appellant.
(1) At the common law a man .can defend his dwelling house even to the extent of taking life if necessary to prevent an unlawful entrance, without being liable even for manslaughter. The defense of the dwelling house stands on different grounds from the defense of personal property. 2 Bishop’s New Crim. Law, sec. 707; 1 Bishop’s New Crim. Law, sec. 858; Wharton’s Cr. Law [9 Ed.] sec. 503 and note 1; 1 Hale’s P. C. 458, 486; 1 Chitty Cr. L. [4 Am. Ed.] 56; 1 East P. C. 321; 1 Russell on Crimes [5 Am. Ed.], 662; 4 Bl. Com. 223; Com. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391; Beg v. Sullivan, Car & M. 209; State v. Sellers, 2 Halst. 220; Hudgkins v. State, 2 Kelly’s, 173; Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465; Temple v. People, 4 Lans. 119; Carey v. People, 45 Barb. 262; State v. Patterson, 45 Yt. 308; State v. Medlin, 2 Winst. Law, 488; Ford's Case, J. Kel. 51; State v. Taylor, 82 N. C. 554; 1 Hawk P. C. [Curf. Ed.] p. 98, sec. 36; Parrish v: Com, 81 Va. 1; Nicholson’s Translation of Britton, p. 113; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150;. Deforest v. State, 21 Ind. 23; 6 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, title “Homicide,” p. 606. (2) The doctrine that one can take life if necessary to prevent an unlawful entry into his habitation prevails in all its original strength in Missouri. Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; State v. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405; State v. Pollard, 139 Mo. 220.
Edward C. Cro-io, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General for the State.
(1) The right to defend person' or property can only be exercised where it is actually necessary. The law of self-defense is a law of necessity. No instru ment or force beyond what will actually prove effectual can legally be employed, for if one stabs or shoots one who merely assaulted him with his fists or strikes before his peril is imminent, or when he is not in immediate danger, he commits a felonious homicide State v. O’Connor, 31 Mo. 389; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586; State v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 440; State v. Rider, 95 Mo. 474. (2) The defendant here was really the aggressor in the last scene. If the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the deceased only intended to chastise or'whip him, this would not justify defendant in taking the life of deceased. Kelley’s Orim. Law, sec. 519; State v. Benham,23 Iowa, 154; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554; State ' v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 53; State v. Parker, 106 Mo. 217. (3) Entering into a man’s house after warning not to enter does not necessarily constitute a forcible trespass, and one killing another under such circumstances, when there is not reasonable ground for apprehending imminent danger to his person or property, is guilty of either murder or manslaughter, according to whether or not the killing is accompanied with malice, expressed or implied. Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608; Roberts v. State, 55 Am. Dec. 97. (4) Danger of a battery being committed upon one will not alone justify the taking of human life. McClain on Crim. Law, sec. 302; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Scales v. State, 96 Ala. 69; State v. Jones, 89 Iowa, 182. (5) One who commences an assault or voluntarily enters into a combat in which neither party uses dangerous weapons is not excused in going to the extent of taking life in avoiding a danger to his own life which arises by reason of the violence of the party whom he first assaulted. State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270; State v. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; State v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121; State v. Davidson, 95 Mo.- 155; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554. (6) A homicide upon sudden combat is not excusable if undue- advantage is taken of the adversary. State v. Christian, 66 Mo. 138.
Note. — Decided November 9, 1897; rehearing granted, and again affirmed March 1,189s.

Opinion:
Sherwood, J.
The defendant, a negro, was awarded twenty years in the penitentiary for shooting and killing with a musket a negro boy some sixteen or seventeen years old. The killing was done at Taylor's house.
Lee Smith, the deceased, went to Taylor's the evening of the homicide, as did a number of other negroes of both sexes. After being there a short time, Smith became involved in a quarrel with defendant; both parties threw off their coats and after exchanging a few blows, Smith was led out or put out of the room, and walked away with a friend. Having proceeded a short distance, Smith remembered that his coat had been left in Taylor's house, and saying he would return for it, went back toward Taylor's house, and in a very short space of time the report of the shot was heard which took his life, and his friend returning to Taylor's, found Smith shot through the body and dead, but without any weapons on his person, nor does it appear that he attempted to draw or use any. He was shot just as he entered the room which he had so recently left. There was testimony to show that he knocked or kicked the door open as he entered, and there was testimony of a contrary effect.
On Smith's return for his coat it seems his approach was heard, and Taylor was told that Smith was outside, when he ran into another room and seizing his musket returned and said: "I will kill the first one that comes in." Thereupon Caldwell, another negro, grabbed the musket and expostulated with Taylor, but to no purpose, and as Smith entered the door, Taylor wrenched the musket away from Caldwell, find exclaiming: "Get away from that door, 1 will kill the first man that comes in," and immediately fired and Smith fell dead. Whereupon Taylor patted Caldwell on the shoulder and said: "lam the man that done it!"
The court gave of its own motion eleven instructions, one at the instance of the State and two at the request of defendant, and refused three asked by the latter. The instructions given by the court embraced murder in the first and second degrees, manslaughter in the fourth degree and self-defense. The jury returned a verdict for murder in the second degree. There was ample evidence to support the-verdict, indeed to have justified a finding of murder in the first degree. It is difficult to see what evidence there was of self-defense, but of this defendant can not complain.
The instructions were in substance such as are usually given, and finding no error in the record, we affirm the judgment.
All concur.