Case Name: Mary Alice HEBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James F. BREAUX, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-05-06
Citations: 398 So. 2d 1299
Docket Number: No. 8120
Parties: Mary Alice HEBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James F. BREAUX, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before GUIDRY, SWIFT, STOKER, DOUCET and LABORDE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 398
Pages: 1299–1307

Head Matter:
Mary Alice HEBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James F. BREAUX, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 8120.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 6, 1981.
Writ Denied June 22, 1981.
Michael Harson, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.
Onebane, Donohoe, Berrand, Torian, Diaz, McNamara & Abell, Frank X. Neuner, Voo-rhies & Labbe, John N. Chappuis, McBride & Brewster, Norman P. Foret, Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.
Before GUIDRY, SWIFT, STOKER, DOUCET and LABORDE, JJ.

Opinion:
SWIFT, Judge.
In this suit plaintiff, Mary Alice Hebert, seeks recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of a policy of insurance issued by Bellefonte Insurance Company, hereafter Bellefonte, to her father, Alfred Hebert. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim against Belle-fonte. Plaintiff appeals.
There are three issues presented on appeal:
(1) Is plaintiff afforded coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of the automobile insurance policy issued by Bellefonte to plaintiff's father, Alfred Hebert?
(2) Assuming coverage is afforded, can plaintiff "stack" the UM coverage provided on two vehicles insured by the subject policy resulting in UM coverage of $20,-000.00 for each person and $40,000.00 for each occurrence?
(3)Assuming coverage is afforded, is plaintiff entitled to recover penalties and attorney's fees under the circumstances of the present suit?
The parties stipulated to the facts pertinent to a resolution of the issues presented and submitted the matter to the trial court for its decision. The trial court, without rendition of reasons, dismissed plaintiff's claim concluding that the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy issued by defendant afforded no coverage to the plaintiff. Thus, the lower court did not reach the "stacking" issue or the issue of penalties and attorney's fees.
According to the record, on September 13, 1977, James F. Breaux drove his automobile over the center line of Cameron Street in Lafayette, Louisiana, striking plaintiff's vehicle head-on. The negligence of Breaux is undisputed. The parties stipulated that plaintiff's injuries entitled her to recover damages in excess of $36,000.00.
At the time of accident, plaintiff was thirty-two years old and resided with her parents in Lafayette. Ms. Hebert owned the 1975 Chevrolet Nova which she was driving at the time of the collision. It is undisputed that plaintiff is a member of her parents' household.
Plaintiff settled her claims against Breaux and his liability insurer, Dairyland Insurance Company, for $5,000.00. In addition, plaintiff settled her claims against her own liability insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for $10,-000.00 under that policy's uninsured motorists provisions. In each of the aforesaid settlements, plaintiff reserved her rights against all other remaining parties in the litigation. Subsequently, plaintiff's claims against Breaux, Dairyland, and State Farm were dismissed by the trial court.
On February 4,1977, Bellefonte issued an automobile liability insurance policy to plaintiff's father, Alfred Hebert, which was in full force and effect on the date of plaintiff's accident. The subject policy provided coverage for two vehicles owned by Mr. Hebert, specifically, a 1974 Toyota pickup truck and a 1973 Chevrolet Impala. Further, the policy provided uninsured motorists coverage in the amount of $10,000.00 ' for each person and $20,000.00 for each accident.
IS PLAINTIFF AFFORDED COVERAGE UNDER THE UNINSURED MOTORIST PROVISIONS OF THE BELLE-FONTE POLICY?
The plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court erred in its conclusion that she was not afforded coverage under the uninsured motorists provisions of the policy issued by Bellefonte. Under the pertinent terms of the policy, an "insured" for the purposes of UM coverage is defined as:
"(a) the named insured and any relative;" Further, the policy defines a "relative" as "a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household;".
Under the facts stipulated to by the parties, plaintiff is an insured for the purposes of UM coverage under the Bellefonte policy absent any applicable exclusions. The only exclusion pertinent to the plaintiff provides:
"Exclusions: This policy does not apply under Part IV:
(a)to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured or a relative, or through being struck by such an automobile; ."
As we appreciate defendant's argument in support of the trial court's judgment, defendant contends that although plaintiff falls within the policy's definition of an "insured", she is precluded from coverage because she was not driving an "insured automobile" at the time of the accident. An "insured automobile" as defined by the policy means:
" 'insured automobile' means:
(a) an automobile described in the policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded,
(b) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile, ownership of which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period, provided
(1) it replaces an insured automobile as defined in (a) above, or
(2) the company insures under this Coverage all private passenger, farm and utility automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of such acquisition and the named insured notifies the company during the policy period or within 30 days after the date of such acquisition of his election to make the Liability and Uninsured Motorist Coverages under this and no other policy issued by the company applicable to such automobile,
(c) a temporary substitute automobile for an insured automobile as defined in (a) or (b) above, and
(d) a non-owned automobile while being operated by the named insured; and the term 'insured automobile' includes a trailer while being used as an automobile described in (a), (b), (c) or (d) above, but shall not include:
(1) any automobile or trailer owned by a resident of the same household as the named insured,
(2) any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or
(3) any automobile while being used without the permission of the owner."
In other words, Bellefonte maintains that in order to recover under the subject policy's UM provisions, the plaintiff must not only be within the policy's definition of an "insured", but also, be driving an "insured automobile" as defined in said policy. This argument has been rejected by our courts on numerous occasions. At the outset, we observe that the exclusionary provision of the subject policy as quoted above has been declared to be against public policy as expressed in LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D). See Guillot v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 338 So.2d 334 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976), writ refused 341 So.2d 408 (La.1977); Bourgeois v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 385 So.2d 584 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Armond, 358 So.2d 647 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978); Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So.2d 847 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974), writ refused 299 So.2d 791 (La.1974); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1972), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266 So.2d 223. The intent of the statute is to provide protection to an insured who becomes the innocent victim of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. As long as the claimant is an "insured" under the policy, he is entitled to UM coverage whether or not he is driving an automobile insured by the policy. Any exclusion providing more restricted UM coverage is in derogation of the statute. Elledge v. Warren, supra; Griffin v. Armond, supra; Bourgeois v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, supra. In Bourgeois, supra, our brethren of the Fourth Circuit expressed agreement on this issue with this court and our brethren of the First Circuit stating:
". . . Although neither the Supreme Court, nor this Court, have passed on the issue confronting us in the instant case, our brothers on the First and Third Circuits have concluded that an exclusion for uninsured motorist coverage of an insured as defined in the policy is against public policy. See Griffin v. Armond, 358 So.2d 647 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978); Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So.2d 847 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974), writ, denied [La.] 299 So.2d 791; Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1972), writ refused [262 La. 1096], 266 So.2d 223.
"To reach this conclusion, these cases relied on the following statement by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 253 La. 521, 218 So.2d 580 (1968):
'We conclude that the intent of our uninsured motorist statute and the policy endorsement issued thereunder is to afford protection to the insured when they become the innocent victims of the negligence of uninsured motorists.' 218 So.2d at 583.
"In Elledge v. Warren, supra, the Third Circuit concluded:
'(t)he intent of the coverage is to protect the insured at all times against the generalized risk of damages at the hands of the uninsured motorists and not to limit coverage to certain situations or to a certain degree of risk of exposure to the uninsured motorist.
"It follows that any policy provisions which narrows the coverage mandated by the statute will not be enforced.
"There is no requirement in the statute that the insured have any relation, at the time of the accident, with any vehicle he owns and that is insured with the insurer.' 263 So.2d at 918.
"We are in agreement with the First and Third Circuits.
"The statute requires that automobile liability policies provide UM coverage for the protection of persons insured under the policy, unless the named insured rejects the UM coverage. As long as a claimant is insured under the policy, he is entitled to UM coverage whether or not he is driving a vehicle listed or covered under the policy, unless the named insured has rejected the UM coverage. UM coverage, as required under the statute, is designed to protect the persons insured under the policy. Any exclusion providing for more restricted UM coverage is in derogation of the statute." (Emphasis ours.)
Therefore, we conclude that the jurisprudence clearly confirms that the plaintiff herein is afforded UM coverage under the Bellefonte policy issued to her father, Alfred Hebert.
CAN PLAINTIFF STACK THE UM COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THE BELLEFONTE POLICY?
The plaintiff contends that she should be allowed to "stack" the UM coverages provided by the policy issued by defendant to plaintiff's father which provides UM protection on two vehicles. As previously stated, this issue was not reached by the trial court. The insurance policy issued by Bellefonte to Mr. Hebert contains the following language to prohibit "stacking":
"(a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorists coverage stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each accident' is the total limit of the company's liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one accident."
The subject policy was issued on February 4, 1977 and expired one year from the date of issuance. The accident which precipitated the present litigation occurred on September 13, 1977. On September 9, 1977, Act 63 of 1977 which amended LSA-R.S. 22:1406 became effective. Act 623 provided, among other things, that the policy limits of UM coverage shall not be increased because multiple vehicles are covered by the policy. Bellefonte argues that since the policy at issuance prohibited "stacking" and since the collision giving rise to the instant suit occurred after the effective date of the 1977 amendment to LSA-R.S. 22:1406, the plaintiff should not be allowed to "stack" the limits of her father's policy in that the policy provisions were not inconsistent with the law in effect at the time of the accident.
The precise question was before this court in Thibodeaux v. Olivier, 394 So.2d 684 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981), and we held that "stacking" was not permitted under similar circumstances. Our supreme court has denied an application for writs therein. (1981). We adhere to our decision in Thibo-deaux and conclude that the plaintiff's recovery herein against Bellefonte is limited by the latter's policy to $10,000.00.
IS PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO RECOVER PENALTIES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES?
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover penalties and attorney's fees because of the alleged arbitrary and capricious refusal by Bellefonte to pay any benefits due her under the subject policy. We note that the parties stipulated to the pertinent facts of the instant case, therefore, the only issues presented concerned the interpretation of the Bellefonte policy in the light of settled jurisprudence. In Carney v. American Fire and Indemnity Company, 371 So.2d 815 (La.1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
"An insurer's liability to pay penalties and attorney's fees is based on whether their action in denying coverage is arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause. LSA-R.S. 22:658. An insurer must take the risk of misinterpreting its policy provisions. If it errs in interpreting its own insurance contract, such error will not be considered as a reasonable ground for delaying the payment of benefits, and it will not relieve the insurer of the payment of penalties and attorney's fees. Albert v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society, 255 So.2d 170 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971), and cases therein cited."
In the suit presently before this court Belle-fonte relied upon the provisions of its insurance policy to deny plaintiff UM coverage. However, the terms relied upon had previously been held by the appellate courts of this state to be null and void and in derogation of public policy. We therefore conclude that Bellefonte acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to pay the $10,-000.00 UM benefit to which the plaintiff is entitled. We consider that an award of $2,000.00 for her attorney's fee will adequately compensate for the services rendered by plaintiff's counsel at the trial level and on appeal.
As indicated at the outset of this opinion, this matter comes to us on appeal from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellee, Bellefonte, dismissing plaintiff's claim against that insurance company. Ordinarily, upon finding that a motion for summary judgment has been improvidently granted by the trial court this court would not dispose of the case on the merits, but rather remand the suit for further proceedings. However, in the instant case, we observe that the parties filed a joint motion for summary judgment on an agreed stipulation of facts not limited to the resolution of the motion. Specifically, the joint motion states:
"NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes Plaintiff, MARY ALICE HEBERT, and Defendant, BEL-LEFONTE INSURANCE COMPANY, who respectfully represent that certain agreements have been reached by and between the parties, in order to avoid any unnecessary litigation, court time and expense and that in connection with said agreements, would desire to present this matter for final resolution to this Court by means of a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment .
"Inasmuch as this matter has resolved itself into primarily issues of law and contractual interpretation, the parties have agreed to present this matter to this Court by way of stipulations of fact and the introduction of certain uncontested documents and to ask this Court to render a summary judgment in favor of the party in whose' favor this Court determines the law and evidence to be in favor of." (Emphasis ours.)
Under such circumstances and under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Article 2164, we consider that a remand of this case for further proceedings would be useless, result in unjustifiable delay and would impede the administration of justice. We find support for our conclusion in this regard in the recent decision on rehearing in the case of DeFelice v. Garon and Carimi, 395 So.2d 658, (La.1981) wherein the court stated:
" . An opinion reversing a summary judgment in favor of one party should not be written in terms that may result in a final determination (as the law of the case) granting in effect the benefit of an affirmative adjudication in favor of the opponent to the motion, unless the issues presented are purely legal and utterly devoid of factual considerations."
For the above reasons, the decree of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant is reversed and set aside and it is now ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:
There be judgment rendered herein in favor of plaintiff, Mary Alice Hebert, and against the defendant, Bellefonte Insurance Company, in the full sum of Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000.00), plus a penalty of Twelve Per Cent (12%) thereof and an attorney's fee in the amount of Two Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($2,000.00), with legal interest on all amounts from date of judicial demand at the rate of Seven Per Cent (7%) per annum until September 12, 1980, and thereafter at the rate of Ten Per Cent (10%) per annum until paid. Defendant is cast for all costs incurred at the trial level and on appeal.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
STOKER, J., concurs.
GUIDRY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
LABORDE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
. LSA-C.C.P. Article 2164 provides:
"The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages for frivolous appeal; and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable."