Case Name: Mohamed Karim JALLOH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-04-01
Citations: 645 F. App'x 29
Docket Number: No. 14-3215
Parties: Mohamed Karim JALLOH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 645
Pages: 29–30

Head Matter:
Mohamed Karim JALLOH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-3215.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
April 1, 2016.
Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Claire L. Workman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Edward C. Durant, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Mohamed Karim Jalloh, a native and citizen of Sierra Leone, seeks review of a July 31, 2014, decision of the BIA denying Jalloh's untimely motion to reopen. In re Mohamed Karim Jalloh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 31, 2014). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, "mindful that motions to reopen 'are disfavored.'" Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)).
Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limit may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.2008); Jin Bo Zhao v. INS, 452 F.3d 154, 159-60 (2d Cir.2006). However, the mov-ant must demonstrate "due diligence" in pursuing a claim "during the entire period he ., seeks to toll." Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132; see also Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2000). "[T]here is no period of time that ., is per se unreasonable, and, therefore, disqualifies a petitioner from equitable tolling — or, for that matter, any period of time that is per se reasonable." Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir.2007).
Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Jalloh failed to exercise due diligence. There was a 13-month gap between his meetings with his attorney, and Jalloh took no action during that period despite the attorney's statement at the first meeting that he would no longer represent Jalloh. See id. at 715-16; Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132. Jalloh contends that the BIA erred in finding that he should have discovered his attorney's ineffective assistance at the first meeting. His argument misses the mark. He was required to demonstrate due diligence during the entirety of the period he seeks to toll, including the time before he discovered counsel's ineffective assistance. See Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132.
To the extent that Jalloh contends that the BIA erred in denying sua sponte reopening, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's determination. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).