Case Name: WOOL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1918-03-06
Citations: 201 S.W. 1006
Docket Number: No. 4547
Parties: WOOL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 201
Pages: 1006–1009

Head Matter:
WOOL v. STATE.
(No. 4547.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 6, 1918.)
1. Criminal Law <@=>371(2) — Evidence—Other Oeeenses — Admissibility.
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, where the state relied on circumstantial evidence, it could show that several burglaries had occurred in the vicinity about the time of the offense alleged, where the stolen goods had been identified in the possession of accused, for the purpose of showing criminal intent, but such evidence should not be extended to other burglaries unless accused subsequently possessed the stolen goods.
2. Criminal Law <@=425 — Evidence—Admissibility.
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, statements of accused’s ex-partner, after termination of partnership, were not admissible against accused.
3. Receiving Stolen Goods <@=9(1) — Questions for Jury.
In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, where accused’s ex-partner testified that accused told him he bought the goods, a defensive theory was raised which should have been submitted to the jury.
4. Receiving Stolen Goods <§=>3 — Elements of Offense.
Knowledge of fact that goods were stolen is an essential element of the offense of receiving stolen goods.
Prendergast, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Wichita County; Edgar Scurry, Judge.
J. Wool was convicted of receiving stolen property and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Martin. ■& Oneal, of Wichita Falls, for appellant. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property. This is a companion case to No. 4546 (201 S. W. 1002); and the facts, while not identical, are so similar as to make, I think, the same principles with reference to introduction of proof of other acts applicable to each.
In this case there is no definité proof as to the identity of the thief. There is evidence, however, that the stolen property taken from several houses burglarized were received by appellant at the same time that there were previous negotiations with reference to it with unknown parties, and the state, relying upon circumstantial evidence to show criminal intent, was, we think, entitled to prove the burglaries with reference to those transactions in which the stolen property was identified in the possession of appellant. Such evidence, I think, however, should be limited to such transactions,' and not extended to evidence of transactions in which the possession of the stolen property by the witness Mike Levine tended to connect him alone wtih the particular collateral crime.
The statements and transactions of Mike Levine, after the termination of his connection with appellant, were not admissible against appellant. As they were not made at a time when the evidence discloses that appellant and Levine were acting together, their subsequent acts, in the nature of a confession by Levine, are not binding upon appellant.
The state's testimony given by the accomplice, Mike Levine, to the effect that appellant bought the stolen goods, is quite confusing and contradictory. 1-Ie states in one place, "I didn't know whether it was stolen goods or not." He claims that appellant told him he bought the goods, and I think the issue of purchase without knowledge of the theft was raised. These facts present a defensive theory, which, on request of appellant, should have been submitted to the jury. It was not submitted, and the appellant, in a charge couched in appropriate language, requested the court to tell the jury that the receipt of the goods by appellant alone was not sufficient to convict; that it must be accompanied by proof that he knew they were stolen.
Knowledge of the fact that the goods were stolen is an essential element of the offense, and, the state's testimony tending to suggest that they were purchased without guilty knowledge or intent, a charge on the subject should have been given. Cases will he found listed in Branch's An. P. C. pp. 1365-1367.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the cause remanded.
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