Case Name: Nocenzo Cusumano et al., Respondents, v. City of New York, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2010-10-14
Citations: 15 N.Y.3d 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nocenzo Cusumano et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 319–328

Head Matter:
[937 NE2d 74, 910 NYS2d 410]
Nocenzo Cusumano et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant.
Argued September 16, 2010;
decided October 14, 2010
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Elizabeth S. Natrella and Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel), for appellant.
I. This Court should direct dismissal of this action in its entirety for failure to establish a prima facie case under General Municipal Law § 205-a, for the reasons stated in the Appellate Division dissenting opinion. Because the handrail requirements of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-375 (f) were inapplicable, plaintiffs reliance on that provision to establish a violation of Administrative Code §§ 27-127 and 27-128 was legally barred, and plaintiffs only other evidence was either conclusory or inapplicable as a matter of law. (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493; Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72; Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 NY2d 423; Galapo v City of New York, 95 NY2d 568; Desmond v City of New York, 88 NY2d 455; Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352; Hotaling v City of New York, 55 AD3d 396, 12 NY3d 862; Dooley v Vornado Realty Trust, 39 AD3d 460; Weiss v City of New York, 16 AD3d 680; Walker v 127 W. 22nd St. Assoc., 281 AD2d 539.) II. Solely in the alternative, a new trial should be granted. (Feblot v New York Times Co., 32 NY2d 486; Bernstein v City of New York, 69 NY2d 1020; Marquart v Yeshiva Machezikel Torah D’Chasidel Belz of N.Y., 53 AD2d 688; Franco v Jay Cee of N.Y. Corp., 36 AD3d 445; People v Duncan, 46 NY2d 74; Cooler & Gell v Hartmarx Corp., 496 US 384; Pullman-Standard v Swint, 456 US 273.)
Miller & Eisenman, LLP, New York City (Michael P. Eisenman of counsel), for respondents.
I. Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 27-127 and 27-128 provide independent predicates upon which liability may be imposed under General Municipal Law § 205-a. (Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352; Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72; Terranova v New York City Tr. Auth., 49 AD3d 10; Brennan v New York City Hous. Auth., 302 AD2d 483; Lustenring v 98-100 Realty, 1 AD3d 574; Rabinowitz v City of New York, 286 AD2d 724; Hart v DiPiazza, 262 AD2d 283.) II. Sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to rationally lead the jury to conclude that defendant violated Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 27-127 and 27-128.) (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493; Munoz v City of New York, 55 AD3d 697.) III. Once defendant elected to install a handrail in the main stairwell between the basement and the first floor, it had a duty to act reasonably and carefully. (Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY 236; Marks v Narnbil Realty Co., 245 NY 256; Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 NY2d 57; Frazer v Bader, 263 App Div 838; Bucek v Merritt, 37 AD2d 905; Parker v Jenkins, 135 Misc 666; Decorato v Cozzoli Bros., LLC, 16 Misc 3d 1108[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51347[U]; Steelworkers v Rawson, 495 US 362.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Pigott, J.
On December 22, 1999, plaintiff Nocenzo Cusumano, a firefighter in the New York City Fire Department attending a first responders training session, fell down a flight of stairs that ran from the first floor to the basement of a building owned by defendant City of New York. Plaintiff commenced this action against the City pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-a, asserting a statutory cause of action for firefighters who sustain a line of duty injury "as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the . . . city governments" (General Municipal Law § 205-a [1]). To recover under that section, however, a firefighter "must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties" (Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 364 [2004] [discussing General Municipal Law § 205-e, the sister provision of section 205-a] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
Plaintiff contended at the liability trial that he slipped on debris at the top of the stairs and, due to a poorly constructed handrail, he was unable to grasp the handrail to prevent his fall. He relied on three provisions of the Administrative Code of the City of New York as predicates for his section 205-a claim, namely, sections 27-127, 27-128 and 27-375 (f). The first two are general provisions that require that "[a] 11 buildings and all parts thereof... be maintained in a safe condition," that "[a]ll service equipment, . . . devices, and safeguards that are required in a building . be maintained in good working order" and that "[t]he owner shall be responsible at all times for the safe maintenance of the building and its facilities." Section 27-375, entitled "Interior stairs," mandates, among other things, that interior stair "[h]andrails shall provide a finger clearance of one and one-half inches" (Administrative Code § 27-375 [f]).
Two experts testified for the plaintiff that the handrail violated section 27-375 (f) and was therefore unsafe. After the parties rested, the City argued at the charge conference that section 27-375 (f) was inapplicable because the stairs constituted "access stairs" pursuant to Administrative Code § 27-232, as opposed to "interior stairs" which must provide egress to the outside. Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the stairs constituted "interior stairs" and prohibited the City from arguing the inapplicability of section 27-375 (f) during summation. Plaintiffs counsel, on the other hand, argued to the jury that the City violated section 27-375 (f)'s height and clearance requirements, and Supreme Court issued a jury charge relative to sections 27-127, 27-128 and 27-375 (f).
In response to separate interrogatories, the jury found that the City violated Administrative Code § 27-127 and 27-375 (f); the court did not submit an interrogatory relative to section 27-128. Following a separate damages trial, the City moved to set aside the verdict. As to the liability portion of the motion, the City reiterated, its argument that section 27-375 (f) was inapplicable because the stairs at issue constituted "access stairs," not "interior stairs." It further argued that the jury's finding of liability under section 27-127 was unsustainable because the evidentiary basis for the jury's finding was the City's noncompliance with the inapplicable section 27-375 (f). Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the City should have pleaded as an "affirmative defense" the inapplicability of section 27-375 (f) (2006 NY Slip Op 30626DJ], *3 [2006]).
The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, modified the jury's damages award to the extent of ordering plaintiff to stipulate to a reduction thereof or face a new trial on that issue (63 AD3d 5, 12 [2d Dept 2009]). It unanimously held, however, that section 27-375 (f) did not apply to the underlying facts because the stairs did not constitute "interior stairs" as defined by the Administrative Code, and that Supreme Court improperly shifted the burden to the City of demonstrating the inapplicability of section 27-375 (f) (id. at 8-9, 14). However, the majority and the dissent parted company as to whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence independent of the section 27-375 (f) violation to establish that the City violated sections 27-127 and 27-128, with the majority concluding that he had (see id. at 9-10), and the dissent arguing that those sections did not provide a sufficient predicate for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a (see id. at 17).
The Appellate Division properly concluded that section 27-325 (f) is inapplicable. That code provision applies to "interior stairs," which are defined as "stair[s] within a building, that serve[ ] as a required exit" (Administrative Code § 27-232). By all accounts, the stairs from where plaintiff fell did not serve as an "exit" as defined by the Administrative Code (see id.), but rather as a means of walking from the first floor to the basement. Therefore, Supreme Court erred in denying the City's motion to dismiss the section 205-a claim to the extent it was premised on the City's alleged violation of section 27-375 (f).
The effects of this error are not limited to the claim based on that provision, however, because it cannot be assumed that the jury viewed plaintiffs' experts' handrail testimony in a vacuum. Both experts testified that the handrail clearance requirements were governed by section 27-375 (f) and that the City violated those requirements. Further conflating the distinction among the Administrative Code sections was testimony that the City violated sections 27-127 and 27-128 because it violated section 27-375 (f). Supreme Court's erroneous submission of section 27-375 (f) to the jury, coupled with the expert testimony, renders it impossible to discern the basis of the jury's verdict.
We decline the City's invitation to address the issue of whether sections 27-127 and 27-128 form a sufficient independent predicate to support a General Municipal Law § 205-a claim. There is no record evidence that the City contested plaintiffs' argument that those sections provided an independent predicate, as the record indicates that the City objected to the applicability of those sections only to the extent that they were interwoven with section 27-375 (f).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered. The certified question should not be answered upon the ground that it is unnecessary.
Both Administrative Code § 27-127 and 27-128 were repealed effective July 1, 2008 and replaced by section 28-301.1.