Case Name: PEOPLE v. AARON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-08-27
Citations: 99 Mich. App. 650
Docket Number: Docket No. 46789
Parties: PEOPLE v AARON
Judges: Before: Bashara, P.J., and D. C. Riley and E. A. Quinnell, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 99
Pages: 650–653

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v AARON
Docket No. 46789.
Submitted June 10, 1980, at Detroit.
Decided August 27, 1980.
Defendant, Walter Aaron, appeals from convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and also from his conviction of habitual offender, fourth offense, in Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Dalton A. Roberson, J. Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his prior convictions; (2) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the armed robbery and felony-firearm convictions; and (3) that defendant’s habitual offender conviction must be reversed as being contrary to the requirements enunciated in People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96; 282 NW2d 168 (1979), in that the prosecutor did not proceed on the habitual offender charge until after defendant’s convictions of armed robbery and felony-firearm had already occurred, even though defendant’s past record was readily available to the prosecutor. Held:
1. The trial court heard arguments on the motion to suppress evidence of defendant’s prior convictions and recognized, on the record, its discretion to deny the motion. There was no error in holding that the evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes.
2. Defendant’s contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his armed robbery and felony-firearm convictions is without merit because the eyewitness testimony of the victim, coupled with the recovered stolen check made payable to the defendant, would enable a finder of fact to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Because of defendant’s allegation of error with respect to the habitual offender conviction, defendant was sentenced to a lesser term in prison. Defendant has not been prejudiced by that alleged error.
Affirmed.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 320 et seq.
[2] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 327.
D. C. Riley, J., concurred but would hold that, in future cases involving the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions, trial courts must note the following three factors on the trial record before the prior convictions may be used against the defendant: (1) that the use of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions relate to credibility; (2) that the probative value of admission of évidence of the prior convictions outweighs any prejudicial effect; and (3) that there are no alternative, less burdensome means of impeaching the defendant while protecting his right to choose whether or not to testify.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Evidence — Prior Convictions — Motion to Suppress — Discretion.
A trial court has the discretion to deny a motion to suppress evidence of prior convictions, and where the court hears arguments on the motion and recognizes its discretion on the record no abuse of discretion is shown.
Concurrence by D. C. Riley, J.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence — Prior Convictions — Admissibility — Discretion.
A trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence of prior convictions, but the court must note, on the record, its consideration of the following three factors before evidence of prior convictions may be admissible for purposes of impeachment: (1) that defendant’s prior convictions relate to credibility; (2) that the probative value of admission outweighs any prejudicial effect; and (3) that there are no alternative, less burdensome means of impeaching the defendant while protecting his right to choose whether or not to testify.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Don W. Atkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Gerald S. Surowiec, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bashara, P.J., and D. C. Riley and E. A. Quinnell, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant also appeals his guilty-plea conviction of habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085.
Initially, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress evidence of his prior convictions. The court heard arguments on the motion and recognized its discretion on the record. People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196; 282 NW2d 280 (1979). We find that the court did not err in holding that the evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes, based upon the factors enunciated in People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), and MRE 609.
Defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the armed robbery and felony-firearm convictions is also without merit. The eyewitness testimony of the victim, coupled with the recovered stolen check made payable to the defendant, would enable a finder of fact to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).
Finally, defendant alleges that the habitual offender conviction must be reversed as being obtained contrary to People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96; 282 NW2d 168 (1979). In view of the fact that defendant was sentenced to a lesser prison term as a result of the alleged error, we find no possible prejudice.
Affirmed.
E. A. Quinnell, J., concurred.