Case Name: MATTER OF MAYNARD N. CLEMENT, COMR. OF EXCISE, IN RE JOHN ULINSKI
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-05
Citations: 21 N.Y. Crim. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: MATTER OF MAYNARD N. CLEMENT, COMR. OF EXCISE, IN RE JOHN ULINSKI.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 115–121

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT—APP. DIVISION—FOURTH DEP.,
May, 1907.
MATTER OF MAYNARD N. CLEMENT, COMR. OF EXCISE, IN RE JOHN ULINSKI.
(119 App. Div. 622.)
Liquor Tax Law—Slot Machine—Use By Cotenant.
Where it appeared that defendant was the lessee of a single room in a building; that an adjoining room containing a slot machine was leased by another person in no way connected with the defendant in business and that defendant had complained to the owner of the slot machine and to the landlord asking that it be removed, Held, that the defendant’s certificate should not be revoked; but that the decision must not be taken as a precedent where the circumstances are similar but where there is no evidence of connivance and collusion between the parties to carry on gambling.
Appeal by the petitioner, Maynard N. Clement, as State Commissioner of Excise, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Erie Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 8th day of June, 1906, denying his motion for an order revoking liquor tax certificate No. 14,648 theretofore issued to the respondent and dismissing the above-entitled proceedings.
II. Walter Lee and Daniel A. Deed, for the appellant.
Henry W. Killeen, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Williams, J.:
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
The certificate was issued April 28, 1905, to expire April 30, 1906, authorizing the defendant to traffic in liquor at premises situate on the southwest corner of Wasson avenue and Iron street, Lackawanna, Erie county, N. Y. The petitioner claimed that on October 13, 1905, the defendant permitted gambling in said premises by means of a nickel slot machine. The defendant denied this. The evidence was taken before a referee and reported to the court and the court made the order appealed from based upon such evidence. It appeared by the evidence that the defendant's brother owned the building in which defendant carried on his business. The defendant leased the front room on the first floor, about twenty-six feet square, for his business, and occupied no other part of the building. Just back of this room and adjoining it was another room leased by one Smiegel and occupied for a billiard room which he conducted. Other parts of the building were leased and occupied by other parties. There was a partition between the two roofs, and a door in such partition six feet wide. There was a door leading from defendant's room out towards the street, and two doors from the back room, one at the side leading outdoors, and the other at the back leading to other parts of the building. The door in the partition betwéen the two rooms was usually left open. Smiegel leased the back room from June 25, 1905. Neither of these two men was interested in the business of the other, or in the room rented by him. Their business was entirely separate, except that people playing billiards ordered drinks from defendant's room when they desired. The slot machine was put in the back of the billiard room by Smiegel about October 5, 1905. As soon as defendant saw the slot machine there he told Smiegel it was unlawful and he' must take it out, and if he did not, he would tell the owner of the building and he would put it out. Smiegel did not take the machine out, and defendant complained to the owner of the building about it, who spoke to Smiegel, and he said he would take it out. The machine was still there on the 13th of October, 1905, when the agents of the State Excise Commissioner went there and used it, and upon their evidence the proceeding was based and the revocation of the license sought to be obtained. No claim has been made that there was "any collusion between defendant and Smiegel with reference to the maintenance of the machine. From the first the defendant insisted it should be taken out— we desire this to be distinctly understood. The Special Term justice, in his opinion, expressly says: " Ho question of collusion or bad faith has been suggested in this matter," and the concession was made by counsel in this court and on the argument to the same effect. There is no evidence in the record tending to show collusion or fraud or bad faith on defendant's part. The defendant always claimed, and now claims, that he" tried to have the machine taken out when it was first put in,, and did all he could to procure it to be done, and that he had no power himself to "remove it or prevent its maintenance and use by Smiegel. It will be seen that, while in the petition it. was claimed that the defendant permitted gambling in his-premises, the evidence showed that the gambling was in the premises occupied by Smiegel, and the license was sought to-be revoked finally upon the claim that defendant suffered and permitted the gambling to he carried on in a place appertaining to or connected with his premises. The matter was disposed of at Special Term upon the holding that, even though the place where the gambling was carried on might be regarded as one appertaining to or connected with the defendant's premises, still the defendant did not suffer or permit it to be maintained there, and the case was not one covered by the statute. In this conclusion we concur with the Special Term upon the grounds very fully set forth in the opinion there given. We would not regard it necessary to add any opinion of our own, except that we "want to make it entirely clear that our affirm- - anee of this order is not to be regarded as a precedent in cases where premises are located as these are, but where there is connivance and collusion between the parties to maintain and carry on the gambling. In such case there would be a violation of the statute and the license should be revoked. That element concededly does not exist in the present case, and we are deciding this case in view of the conditions here existing and not establishing a precedent for any other different case.
All concurred, except Kbuse and Robson, JJ., who dissented in an opinion by Kbuse, J.