Case Name: GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION 745 et al. v. DALLAS COUNTY CONST. EMPLOYERS' ASS'N et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1951-12-14
Citations: 246 S.W.2d 677
Docket Number: No. 14474
Parties: GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION 745 et al. v. DALLAS COUNTY CONST. EMPLOYERS’ ASS’N et al.
Judges: BOND, C. J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 246
Pages: 677–686

Head Matter:
GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION 745 et al. v. DALLAS COUNTY CONST. EMPLOYERS’ ASS’N et al.
No. 14474.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
Dec. 14, 1951.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1952.
Second Motion for Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1952.
Mullinax, Wells & Ball and Marion C. Ladwig, all of Dallas, for appellants.
Locke, Locke & Purnell, Stanley Neely, and Clark, 'Coon, Holt & Fisher, and Harold Hoffman, all of Dallas, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
CRAMER, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction in favor of ap-pellees, enjoining appellants from picketing certain concrete mixer trucks at, on or near, in or about the premises where ap-pellees are constructing buildings, and from picketing on or near Concrete Haulers, Inc., trucks in or about building construction sites where appellees may be performing work; also from picketing on, near or about the premises and places of business of appellees and from establishing and maintaining ambulatory pickets to follow or accompany any of Concrete Haulers, Inc., concrete mixer trucks while operating in the usual course of business in the delivery of ready-mixed concrete to ap-pellees' job sites. The injunction excepted from the force of the order appellants' right to picket the places of business of the concrete concerns with which appellees are found to be in a bona fide labor dispute and also the place where the concrete mix trucks are stored when not on the public street.
Appellants brief but one point, to wit: "The injunction is void since it deprives appellants of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Constitution of Texas and the United States."
Appellees brief seven counterpoints, in substance that the picketing constituted, (1) a boycott; (2) a secondary picketing; (3) that appellants' right of free speech was protected by the limitation placed in the 'judgment; (4) that no constitutional right of free speech protects the picketing enjoined; (5) that the findings of the trial court of no conspiracy to boycott appellees was without support in the evidence; (6) as was the finding that the acts and conduct of appellants did not violate the Anti-Trust Laws of Texas; (7) • that the trial court was justified in granting .the temporary injunction because of appellants' conspiracy for the purpose of limiting production, transportation, use, and consumption of concrete transported by Concrete Haulers, Inc., and formed an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Laws of Texas.
The parties stipulated that a labor dispute existed between appellants and Concrete Haulers, Inc., not a party to this suit; that no labor dispute existed between appellant union and its members and appellees, who were customers of Wamix, Inc., and Red-D-Mix Corporation.
The record shows that appellees are engaged in the commercial construction business, both as contractors and as subcontractors ; and as such, among other building materials, at times use a ready-mixed concrete which is delivered to them on their jobs by trucks owned by Concrete Haulers, Inc., who receive such ready-mixed concrete from Réd-D-Mix Corporation and Wamix, Inc., separate corporations, and transport such ready-mixed concrete in special 'trucks from the place where received to the places of business of appellees and other members of the ap-pellee association; such trucks having a drum thereon into which the concrete is placed or poured, which drum continually rotates after being filled and while the truck is in transit from the place where it is received to the point where it is delivered to appellees on the job for use. The appellants are the employees of Concrete Haulers, Inc., who are on strike for the purpose of persuading their employer to unionize their truck drivers in the union in which they are members; and at the times in question the appellant employees were picketing their employers at their fixed place of business, and, in addition, placed ambulatory pickets in automobiles who followed the concrete delivery "drum trucks" from the places where they loaded, then along public streets where delivery was to be made, then getting out of their automobiles and picketing upon the public streets and sidewalk around said trucks, which point was adjacent to the property on which the trucks made delivery. The signs used by the pickets for such purpose were as follows: "Concrete Haulers, Inc. The Corporation which owns and operates this truck is Unfair to its employees and their union. Please Do Not Use This Concrete. We are picketing only this truck. Teamster's L.U. No. 745 — A.F. of L."
On a few occasions the pickets followed the trucks on to the job sites but always left the private property on request.
At some of the job sites union members who worked for appellees honored the banners of the pickets and would not work with or use the concrete delivered in such trucks, causing temporary stoppage of the work on the jobs they were employed upon, and damage in varying amounts to ap-pellees.
The trial court found that the union men who quit work and walked off the jobs of appellees, or who refused to use the concrete delivered by Concrete Haulers, Inc., trucks, did so individually and of their own free will and volition, and not because of any agreement or conspiracy between them and their union or between them and appellants, and that there was. no conspiracy to boycott appellees and no violation of the Anti-Trust statutes of Texas; further that the location of the plants of Wamix, Inc.; and Red-D-Mix Corporation, a*nd the place of the storage of such trucks of Concrete Haulers, Inc., in the metropolitan area of Dallas, afford ample opportunity for the union and other appellants to picket, etc., and make known to the public their labor dispute with Concrete Haulers, Inc.; that none of the appellees owned any interest, financially or otherwise, nor did they have any connection with Wamix, Inc., Red-D-Mix Corporation, or Concrete Haulers, Inc. The trial court found that appellants would continue such picketing against appellees if not restrained by the court and that such picketing constituted a secondary picket ing and secondary boycotting, for purposes prohibited by statute; that such conduct was unlawful and a temporary injunction should be issued.
As we view the record, the material questions on the trial on the merits are whether ambulatory picketing is a proper exercise of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, and, if so, whether the manner in which appellants conducted such ambulatory picketing would or would not come within a proper exercise of such rights.
But such are . not the questions here. Appellate 'Courts will not disturb the exercise of a proper discretion by the trial judge in granting a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo unless the trial court abused such discretion. Nor will they determine, upon an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction, an unsettled question of law or fact. Only where the record shows a clear and positive abuse of discretion by the trial court in passing on settled questions of law as applied to undisputed facts, will the Appellate Court disturb the trial court's exercise of his discretion in passing upon a question of whether justice to all parties will be best served by granting temporary relief against changing the last settled status of the parties. Texas Digest, Vol. 4, Part 1, Appeal and Error, subds. (1), (3) and (4).
The trial court's discretion, however, does not extend to an erroneous application of settled law to undisputed facts. Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Egan, 126 Tex. 160, 86 S.W.2d 722; 4 Texas Digest, Appeal and Error,
The case before us was filed by third persons, not' interested in the bona fide labor dispute between the union and the employers of its members. They alleged and introduced evidence of injury by reason of the union's lawful picketing of the trucks of a third party, the employer of such picketing union members.
Appellants cite the case of Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 721, 94 L.Ed. 985. In that case Justice Frankfurter said: "However general or loose the language of opinions, the .specific situations have controlled decision. It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance." See comment thereon in 30 Texas Law Review, p. 206, No. 2, December 1951, published since this case was briefed and submitted.
Appellants also cite Turner v. Zanes, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 144, and assert that Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588, did not modify or overrule the Zanes case. In 30 Texas Law Review (cited above), at p. 222, there is a comment in connection with the Henry and Zanes cases which reads as follows: "In reaching its result in the Henry case the court had to consider the case of Turner v. Zanes, which it had earlier refused to review on the ground that there was 'no reversible error.' The Zanes case had established the proposition that, while a business engaged in a labor dispute could be picketed by the employee disputants, the picketing could not extend across the transportation access to the plant. After the Texas Supreme Court had refused to review this case, some trial courts in Texas had followed the principle of Turner v. Zanes. In Ex parte Henry, the Texas Supreme Court overruled this aspect of the Zanes case. It should be noted that factually the Henry case is closely related to the International Rice Milling case (National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 71 S.Ct. 961, 95 L.Ed. 1277) recently decided by the United States Supreme Court and discussed above. As previously stated, there seems to be no justification in the cases for a holding that while picketing is constitutionally privileged it cannot be used to persuade persons to refrain from crossing the picket line and entering the business establishment being picketed. So to hold would be closely analogous to paying only lip1 service to free speech by permitting the speech but forbidding anyone to listen to it. Ex parte Henry laid the ghost of this abortive Texas picketing doctrine."
So far as we have been able to find, the question of whether or not the picketing of trucks, away from the fixed place of business, for the purpose of advertising a labor dispute, carried out in such a manner that union men, working on independent jobs for employers who have no labor dispute with such pickets, or their union, would refuse to use the contents of the trucks, to the financial injury of their employers (third parties to the labor dispute), has never been directly or inferentially passed upon by any court.
Therefore in view of the present status of the decisions, neither the facts, nor the law on the matters herein in issue have been settled with such certainty as to justify us in holding that the trial court abused his discretion in granting the temporary injunction here appealed from.
An early trial on the merits should be had to settle such issues, and if such early trial is not accorded either party on request, appellants are fully protected by our statute, Art. 1824, Vernon's Ann.Civ..St.
For the reasons stated, other questions presented becoming immaterial, the judgment of the trial court is
Affirmed.