Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Virgil ANDERSON, C. M. "Max" Anderson, A. F. Brown and Nick Maltezo, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-09-25
Citations: 389 So. 2d 1034
Docket Number: No. LL-37
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Virgil ANDERSON, C. M. “Max” Anderson, A. F. Brown and Nick Maltezo, Appellees.
Judges: Upon consideration by the court, en banc, MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concurred in majority opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 1034–1040

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Virgil ANDERSON, C. M. “Max” Anderson, A. F. Brown and Nick Maltezo, Appellees.
No. LL-37.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 25, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1980.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Martha J. Cook, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
David W. Palmer, II, Crestview, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
LARRY G. SMITH, Judge.
The Department of Revenue appeals a final judgment which enjoined the collection of admissions taxes on admission fees collected. from appellees' deep-sea party-boat fishing customers. The trial judge found the facts sufficient to indicate a "representation" by the Department that it would not hold appellees accountable for uncollected admissions taxes accruing during the period from August 1, 1970, to February 6, 1972, the date of issuance of the mandate of this court in Department of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), cert. den. 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), cert. dism. 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974). The trial judge also found that the facts presented "an exceptional set of circumstances" justifying application of the defense of estoppel to prevent collection of the taxes for that period. We affirm.
The essential facts and circumstances of this latest episode in the continuing saga of fishing boat admissions tax controversies are set forth adequately in the final judgment, from which we quote as follows: This suit involves four specific plaintiffs. Those are C.M. (Max) Anderson, Virgil Anderson, A.F. Brown and Nick Maltezo. This was a suit filed on behalf of those four plaintiffs to contest their liability to the State of Florida for admissions taxes accruing between the dates of August 1, 1970 and July 31, 1973. Between those dates, each of the plaintiffs operated deepsea [sic] "party" fishing boats. These boats, for a fee paid, or otherwise arranged for, at dockside within the State of Florida, would take customers into the offshore waters beyond Florida's territorial limits where they would spend the day fishing and relaxing. Later, usually at the close of the day, the customers are returned to the dock from which the boat departed. Brown's business operated out of Pensacola, Florida; Maltezo's operated from Destin, Florida. Both Andersons operated out of Panama City, although C. M. Anderson also operated out of Sarasota, Florida during the period in question. During most of the period between August 1, 1970 and July 31, 1973, none of the plaintiffs collected an admissions tax from their customers or remitted any such taxes to the Department of Revenue on the fares which were charged their customers to board their boats. In July of 1973, plaintiffs were all served with a document styled "Notification of Intent to Examine Books and Records Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes." The An-dersons received theirs by certified mail; Brown's and Maltezo's were hand delivered by various auditors of the Department of Revenue. The tolling of the statute of limitations is not in dispute. Neither is the computation of the taxes which accrued during the period in question. The taxes accruing during this three year period, computed at 4% of each of the plaintiff's gross sales of admissions, are as follows:

Although each of the plaintiffs also failed to collect taxes on his sales of admissions for various periods prior to August 1, 1970, the Department concedes that assessment and collection of these taxes is barred by the statute of limitations. F.S. § 212.14(6).
The plaintiffs contend that the Department of Revenue is estopped from asserting tax liability for all, or at least a portion, of that period. Each of the plaintiffs except C. M. Anderson testified that he had never received any contact from the Department of Revenue concerning his admissions tax liability prior to July of 1973, when they were contacted by auditors in connection with the audit which is the subject of this litigation. However, C.M. Anderson testified that as a result of his operation in Sarasota, Florida, he was contacted during this period by auditors of the Department of Revenue who covered Sarasota, Florida. His testimony is that these auditors in Sarasota insisted that he collect and remit to the State of Florida admissions taxes on this operation and threatened to take collection actions against him in the event that he did not.
One Joe Ed Davis who operates a similar business out of Panama City, Florida also testified to the effect that he had had certain conversations with agents of the Department of Revenue during this period in question which had led him to believe that his operation would not be subject to back assessments of admissions taxes in the event that he did not collect those taxes from his customers. Although when he first ceased collecting these taxes, Mr. Davis had structured his prices so as to absorb a deficiency should one be assessed as a result of his failure to collect these taxes, as a result of these conversations, he stopped structuring his prices so as to cover a possible deficiency. There was some evidence adduced to the effect that, at a certain undisclosed point in time he may have informed the various plaintiffs of some or all of these conversations. However, none of the plaintiffs were present at the time these conversations between Davis and the Department of Revenue transpired. Likewise, no representatives of the Department of Revenue were present at such times as Davis may have informed any of the various plaintiffs about the substance of these conversations.
The Bureau Chief of the Department of Revenue Sales Tax Bureau, W.D. Mayo testified to the effect that the two An-dersons periodically had received sales and use tax report forms for some time through 1968 and 1969. He testified that they continued to be sent forms for several months after they had ceased collecting and remitting tax but that eventually the Department of Revenue, several months after tax remissions had ceased, stopped sending forms to them. Brown continued to receive sales and use tax report forms throughout the period and continued to make small remissions, apparently for sales other than admissions. Nick Maltezo never registered with the Department of Revenue until some time in 1973 and hence received no forms until that time.
The various plaintiffs all testified that the fact that they ceased to collect, or in the case of Brown and Maltezo never collected, admissions taxes was due to their knowledge of the case of Straughn v. Kelly Boat Services, 210 So.2d 266 (1 D.C.A. Fla. 1968), and to some extent, the advice of counsel. Also, the plaintiffs brought forth evidence that DOR officials indicated that no effort would be made to collect the taxes after the Kelly case (cited above).
Without digging more deeply than is necessary into the quagmire of decided cases on this issue, we can now say with assurance that Kelly I, supra, footnote 3, was in error, either by indicating (improperly) that admissions taxes could not be assessed on admission fees charged to fishing boat customers, as stated in Pelican, supra footnote 3, or by erroneously holding the admissions tax void, as declared in George W. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Askew, 343 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), although it was actually valid, according to Pelican. The Kelly I error and its correction have been revisited most notably in Department of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), hereafter Kelly II, Davis, and Department of Revenue v. Hobbs, 368 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), with seemingly disparate and virtually irreconcilable opinions. Kelly II held that the Department was not foreclosed by Kelly I or otherwise from collecting the admissions tax. However, as recognized by the court in both the Davis and Hobbs decisions, the "primary focus" (Davis at 1333) of the complaining taxpayers in Kelly II was the alleged illegality of the tax, not that the State was estopped to collect it. The Hobbs case was similar to Kelly II in that (although the court's opinion dealt extensively with the estoppel theory and its inapplicability in that case) the "entire thrust" (Hobbs at 368) of the taxpayers' original and amended complaint was that Kelly I prohibited collection of the admissions taxes, with no issue of estoppel being raised by the pleadings.
Summarizing, we are thus faced with the holding of Kelly II that collection of the tax was not prohibited by Kelly I; the holding of Davis that Kelly I might nevertheless be the basis for estoppel in favor of a taxpayer who, with the approval of the Department of Revenue, followed the law as announced in Kelly I, and neglected to collect the admissions tax from his customers; and finally, the holding of Hobbs that the admissions tax was collectible notwithstanding Kelly I, and estoppel, which could be a defense, could not be applied in the circumstances present in that case.
Our analysis convinces us that in certain respects the essential facts of this case are similar to those found in Hobbs, in which the court said:
Even if it were established it was common knowledge among party boat operators that the Department had decided to delay its audits until the uncertainty of its authority to collect-created by Kelly I -was resolved, the circumstance of knowledge still would not create an es-toppel against the State. (Id. at 369)
As previously noted, however, the taxpayers did not plead estoppel in the Hobbs case, whereas in the present case they did. Furthermore, the trial judge, in his resolution of this controversy, undoubtedly found this case similar to the circumstances in Davis, in that the taxpayers established their reliance upon the Kelly I decision, and properly pleaded the estoppel defense. Even though, as the Department appropriately points out, the appellees here could not establish any direct contact with Department officials as did the taxpayers in Davis, we nevertheless find the reasoning of the Davis opinion in refusing to allow collection of taxes accruing during the questionable period equally applicable here.
The well-established rules concerning retrospective and prospective application of a decision of a court of last resort have been recognized in Florida, as in Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 18 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1944). Ordinarily, a decision of a court of last resort overruling a former decision is retrospective as well as prospective in its operation, unless specifically declared by the opinion to have a prospective effect only. Generally, a judicial construction of a statute will ordinarily be deemed to relate back to the enactment of the statute, much as though the overruling decision had been originally embodied in the statute. To this rule, however, there is a certain well-recognized exception that,
. where a statute has received a given construction by a court of supreme jurisdiction and property or contract rights have been acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such rights should not be destroyed by giving to a subsequent overruling decision a retrospective operation. . . . (Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, supra, at 253)
This exception has been held to apply to the construction of taxation statutes. Mercan tile Nat. Bank of Cleveland, Ohio v. Lander, 109 F. 21 (C.C. Ohio 1901), affirmed Lander v. Mercantile Nat. Bank of Cleveland, Ohio, 118 F. 785 (C.A. Sixth Cir. 1902); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194, page 329. See also City of Naples v. Conboy, 182 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1965), and Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1973). Cf. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1959), and Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
Without expressly saying so, both this court and the trial court in Davis unmistakeably gave effect to the principle that an overruling decision should not be given retrospective application so as to impair or abridge contract rights acquired under the former decision, as may be seen from the opinion's many references to the taxpayers' justifiable failure to collect the tax from his customers at the time he contracted with them, and his inability to "go back" and collect these back taxes after Pelican reversed Kelly I.
We conclude, after a careful examination of Kelly I, Pelican, and succeeding cases, that a highly unique set of circumstances and precedents has developed during this prolonged admissions tax controversy. The plain fact of the matter is that this court in Pelican distinguished or clarified Kelly I by stating that Kelly I did not deal with the admissions tax, but in Davis, this court placed an entirely different interpretation upon Kelly I by stating that the court in Kelly I "ruled the admissions tax void and later in Pelican receded from such ruling and held the admissions tax valid." (Davis, at 1332) Further, we find language in Davis that amounts to a virtual overruling of Kelly II, but without so stating. The existence of these diverse interpretations and the futility of efforts, even on the part of the trial judges, to apply them in some rational manner furnishes ample reason, in our opinion, to uphold the trial judge's finding of "exceptional circumstances" upon which to base his estoppel ruling.
Under the highly unusual and complex circumstances presented by this controversy, we have determined to leave undisturbed the ruling of the trial judge, who found the facts sufficiently compelling to apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel to enjoin collection of admissions taxes from appellees accruing prior to February 6, 1972, the date of our Pelican mandate.
The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Upon consideration by the court, en banc, MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concurred in majority opinion.
ERVIN, J., dissented with opinion, joined by ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and SHAW, JJ.
SHIVERS, WENTWORTH and JOA-NOS, JJ., by recusal, did not participate in the decision.
. Section 212.04, Fla.Stat. (1969).
. The date August 1, 1970 is fixed by application of the three year statute of limitations to the Department's demand date of July 31, 1973.
. The Pelican case held that the court's decision in Department of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), Kelly I, prohibited collection of sales taxes on transactions occurring outside Florida's territorial waters, but did not enjoin collection of admissions taxes on admissions fees charged to or paid by fishing boat customers as they boarded the vessels at dockside.
. This interpretation of Kelly I, found in the Davis opinion, apparently was not considered in arriving at the court's earlier Kelly II decision, and is not discussed in the Hobbs decision which followed Davis.
. . During the interim between the court's final opinion in Kelly I and its opinion in Pelican reversing its decision in Kelly I, appellant bad no authority to collect the tax. . (Davis, at 1332, emphasis supplied).
.As a final note, the 1980 Legislature, by amendments to Subsection (16) of Section 212.-02, Florida Statutes, (Chapter 80-213, Laws of Florida, 1980, effective July 1, 1980.), eliminated the admissions tax on "any charge made for entering or staying upon any boat or vessel for the privilege of participating in any sport or recreation, including fishing."