Case Name: Arthur LEONARD, James Leonard, and Patricia Leonard, infants, by and through Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., their father and next friend, and Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., and Marjorie Leonard, Appellants, v. SUSCO CAR RENTAL SYSTEM OF FLORIDA, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Domingo Gonzales, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1958-06-05
Citations: 103 So. 2d 243
Docket Number: No. 57-351
Parties: Arthur LEONARD, James Leonard, and Patricia Leonard, infants, by and through Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., their father and next friend, and Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., and Marjorie Leonard, Appellants, v. SUSCO CAR RENTAL SYSTEM OF FLORIDA, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Domingo Gonzales, Appellees.
Judges: HORTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 103
Pages: 243–250

Head Matter:
Arthur LEONARD, James Leonard, and Patricia Leonard, infants, by and through Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., their father and next friend, and Arthur H. Leonard, Jr., and Marjorie Leonard, Appellants, v. SUSCO CAR RENTAL SYSTEM OF FLORIDA, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Domingo Gonzales, Appellees.
No. 57-351.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
June 5, 1958.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1958.
Truett & Watkins and Levenson & Thomas, Miami, for appellants.
Knight, Smith, Underwood & Peters, Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
PEARSON, Judge.
The trial judge granted motion of the appellee, Susco Car Rental of Florida, Inc., for a summary final judgment in a negligence action brought by the plaintiffs-appellants. The action arose out of an automobile accident in which the appellants were injured. It is alleged that the accident was a result of the negligence of the driver of a car owned by the appellee, a rental car agency. The driver of the rented car at the time of the accident was not the person to whom it was rented.
The appeal is in this court upon a stipulated record, of which, the following are the significant paragraphs:
"1. On September 18, 1956, one Humberto Salicetti rented a 1956 Chevrolet four-door Sedan, license plate # IE-2163, from Susco Car Rental System of Florida, Inc., at its Miami Office; in connection with this rental, a contract of rental was executed, a true copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit 'A'.
"2. At the time the rental contract was signed the manager of defendant company advised Mr. Salicetti the rented vehicle was to be driven by no one other than himself,- inasmuch as that was one of the conditions of the rental and insurance contract.
"3. On September 19, 1956, in or about the 4600 block on N.W. 36th Street in Miami, the rented automobile being driven by one Domingo Gonzales, a person unknown to the defendant company, was involved in an accident with the plaintiff's automobile; subsequently a claim for damages was filed naming as defendants Susco Car Rental System of Florida, Inc., the car owner, and Domingo Gonzales, the operator; in the automobile at the time of the collision were the operator and two other young men.
"4. A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by defendants Susco Car Rental System of Florida, Inc., upon the basis of the pleading, the deposition of Marjorie Leonard, and the Affidavit of the manager of the company; service of process was not obtained upon defendant Domingo Gonzales and his whereabouts are unknown.
"5. The Court, on April 25, 1957, entered Final Summary Judgment in favor of defendant Susco Car Rental of Florida, Inc., upon the basis that the contract violation in allowing the. vehicle to be driven by someone other than the lessee, contrary to the expressed terms of the rental agreement, relieved the company of responsibility for damages resulting from the operation of the vehicle, the alleged negligence of the operator notwithstanding; copy of such Final Summary Judgment is attached hereto as exhibit 'B'.
"6. The sole issue on appeal is whether or not the owner company is relieved of responsibility for damages resulting from the operation of the vehicle by someone other than the person to whom it was rented, when such operation is contrary to the expressed terms of the printed contract, and the oral instruction given Mr. Salicetti at the time of rental."
It will be observed that the parties have stated in their stipulation the sole point which they find is presented. It is also apparent that other points might be raised, but inasmuch as the question as stated does arise from the facts stipulated, and it is the question argued before us, we will limit our discussion to that question. However, let us state it in this manner; Where an owner of a rental auto, contracts with a bailee, that the bailee shall not allow another to use the car, is the owner by said contract relieved from responsibility for the negligent operation of the automobile by any person, save and except the one person who executed the contract of rental ? For it may be accepted as true, without demonstration, that there are many situations, neither included nor excluded from the stipulated facts, whereby the owner might be relieved from liability. We are concerned here only with the holding of the trial judge that the owner could not be liable because of the provision in the rental contract that no one except the renter was authorized to operate the car. We hold that the provision in the contract between the owner and the bailee was not sufficient to bar all liability of the owner for the negligent operation of the auto by a person other than the bailee, and that therefore the summary final judgment must be reversed.
The Supreme Court of Florida has announced and consistently adhered to the so-called dangerous instrumentality doctrine as applied to automobiles. The principle of liability thus referred to has been stated to be: "When an owner authorizes and permits his automobile to be used by another he is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation so authorized by the owner."
In addition this principle of liability has been recognized by legislative enactment in Florida, since its announcement by the Supreme Court.
The judicial development of this ground for liability in the negligent operation of automobiles has been traced in Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268.
Upon first impression it was held that a person who rented an automobile to another was not liable to a third person who was injured as a result of the negligent operation of the automobile by the hirer.
However, in the case of Herr v. Butler, 101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815, the Court held an owner of an automobile liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of the automobile by a gratuitoüs bailee. And in Lynch v. Walker, supra, the Court held the owner, who was engaged in a U-Drive-It business, liable for the negligent operation of a rental automobile. It will be noted that the opinion was not based upon the relationship of "principal and agent" but upon the ground that such an owner had "authorized and permitted" the use by another.
A case which soon followed the Lynch case was Carter v. Baby Dy-Dee Service, 159 Fla. 380, 31 So.2d 400. The Court held an owner liable for the negligent operation of his automobile where the borrower of the automobile allowed another to drive the automobile. However, the opinion did not follow to its conclusion the route of suggested reasoning in the Lynch opinion but grounded the holding upon the fact that the bailee, being in the automobile, was still in presumptive possession of the automobile.
" In Johnson v. Mills, Fla.1948, 37 So.2d 906, the driver was an employee of the owner and was using the business truck on Sunday without permission. The owner was not held liable because it affirmatively appeared that the operation of the truck was without the owner's consent.
The emphasis upon consent as an element necessary for liability was again illustrated in Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 65. There the Court held an owner was not liable where a night watchman without permission, expressed or implied, took one of defendant's trucks from the premises on a personal mission.
However where consent has been given and the agent has exceeded his authority in the use made of an automobile, it appears that the liability of the owner will not be altered because of a departure beyond the scope of the authority.
In Chase & Co. v. Benefield, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 922, 924, the driver was the employee of the owner and had custody of the automobile on week-ends. The owner was held liable even though the Court found: "It may be that he (the driver) was instructed by the owner not to use the truck except to haul the crew but he was given custody of the truck and he was particularly employed as a truck driver, by the owner." The conclusion of liability could only have been reached upon the basis of an implied consent growing out of custody.
A further development in the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to U-Drive-It cases is the case of Fleming v. Alter, Fla.1953, 69 So.2d 185, 186. An automobile was rented to a hotel patron. The hirer or bailee allowed another (his ostensible wife) to use the automobile. The owner was held liable for an accident arising out of the negligent operation of the automobile by the permissive operator. Certain language of the opinion is indicative of the basis of the holding. It is as follows:
" . To hold that liability would be limited to damage caused by the bailee alone when a dangerous instrumentality is put in circulation in such fashion would be entirely beyond our conception of the responsibility one should assume where he is in the business of entrusting vehicles of such character to another for a price. This implication is underscored by the nonexistence of any clause in the contract specifying that the motor car should be operated only by the renter."
The appellee points out that it has now-removed the underscoring mentioned in the-last quoted sentence. In the instant case the rental contract contained a special' provision that the car could be operated by no one except the bailee. The appellee-urges that when the Supreme Court referred to the absence of such a clause in the contract in Fleming v. Alter, supra, it actually pointed out an escape hatch. It is argued that the inclusion of the clause suggested, provides an exception to liability, implicit in the opinion. Such an interpretation seems to us strained especially in view of the fact that appellee does not suggest that the inclusion oí the sentence: "I further agree to abide by all Federal, State and Municipal laws which pertain to operation and return of said auto," also provides a shield from liability for a traffic violation.
It may be pointed out that we are not in the instant case dealing with a gratuitous lending of an automobile to a friend for a limited purpose or errand. The defendant is in the business of furnishing automobiles for hire. When this defendant turns over an automobile to another for a price, he in actuality intrusts that automobile to the renter for all ordinary purposes for which an automobile is rented. The fact that the owner had a private contract or secret agreement with the renter cannot make such restrictions a bar to the rights of the public. The restrictions agreed upon do not change the fact that the automobile was being used with the owner's consent. iNor does it appear that the car was not being used for the purpose for which it was rented, i. e., the pleasure, convenience or business of the renter.
The summary judgment in favor of the defendant-owner is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not in conflict with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HORTON, J., concurs.
CARROLL, CHAS, C. J., dissents.
. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L.R.A.1917E, 715; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255.
. Weber v. Porco, Fla.1958, 100 So.2d 146.
. Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268, 271.
.Section 51.12 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. "Complaint; negligent operation of vehicle by person other than owner. In any action brought by a person for damages claimed to have been sustained by reason of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a person other than the owner thereof, with respect to the element of liability of such owner for any such negligence of such driver of said vehicle, it shall be sufficient in the complaint filed in such action to allege operation of said vehicle by the driver thereof and the name of the owner thereof, without the necessity of alleging the legal relationship existing between such owner and driver or any other averments of fact related to authority or consent of such owner with respect to the operation of said motor vehicle by the driver thereof. In any such action, should the owner of any such motor vehicle desire to urge as a defense therein a denial of liability for the alleged negligent acts of any such driver in the latter's operation of said vehicle, such defense shall be set forth in the answer, particularly alleging the facts upon which said owner relies for his denial of liability for such acts of said driver. Upon trial of any such action, the plaintiff therein, with respect to the element of liability of said owner for such acts of said driver, shall be required only to prove by competent evidence the ownership of said vehicle and the driver thereof at the time of the alleged negligent operation of the same, to establish a presumption of liability of said owner for any such negligent acts of said driver in his operation of such vehicle, said presumption being subject to rebuttal by said owner by competent evidence within the limits of the facts set forth in the answer."
.See also note, "The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile Daw in Florida," 5 U.Fla.L.Rev. 412 (1952).
. White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251, 103 So. 623.
. "As to those cases following the broad statements quoted above from each of the two appeals of the Southern Cotton Oil Co. cases there has arisen some confusion as to the basis of liability of a bailor-owner of an automobile for torts committed by his bailee. In some cases the liability is based on the general' allegations of principal and agent and in other cases the liability is an implied agency growing out of the relationship of master and servant; while in other cases liability is one mere bailment often called 'entrustment'; others speak of liability because of 'license'.
"Ordinarily when one bails an automobile to another and such other negligently injures a third person, liability as a matter of substantive law is not essentially dependent upon the relationship of 'master and servant', 'principal and agent' or 'license'.
"In all these different relationships there appears a common basic factor to wit: When an owner authorizes and permits his automobile to be used by another he is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation so authorized by the owner." Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268, 271.
. See Boggs v. Butler, 129 Fla. 324, 176 So. 174, 176, where the Court states "Under the law of this state, if the owner once gives his express or implied consent to another to operate his automobile, he is liable for the negligent operation of it no matter where the driver goes, stops, or starts." To the same effect, see Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Carlile, 153 Fla. 661, 15 So.2d 443; May v. Palm Beach Chemical Company, Fla.1955, 77 So.2d 468.
, "I agree to return to the Susco Rent-A-Car System said automobile within 1-2-days in perfect condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, pay promptly all charges which have accrued from such rental and agree to pay for all repairs, parts and labor, for any loss, damage, injuries or expenses to said car, together with same daily charge until ear is repaired. It is understood that while the car is in my possession, and until it is returned to you, I accept and assume full responsibility from whatever cause for all damages or injuries that may be caused by me or by the said car and covenant to hold you free and harmless, and indemnify and protect you from any and all loss, liability, claim or damage-done to others.
"I further certify that the above reference statement is true and correct- and warranted and represented by me to-be the truth, knowing that you will rely-thereon. I certify that no one but myself will drive this car without your express written consent. I further agree-to abide by all Federal, State and Municipal laws which pertain to the operation and return of said auto.
"Car will be driven Miami area