Case Name: Phoebe A. Greene, Respondent, v. Peter Couse, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-06-25
Citations: 127 N.Y. 386
Docket Number: 
Parties: Phoebe A. Greene, Respondent, v. Peter Couse, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 386–397

Head Matter:
Phoebe A. Greene, Respondent, v. Peter Couse, Appellant.
Title to land, established by adverse possession, is as effectual, for the purpose of remedy or defense, as that created in any other manner.
The rule that where a vendee enters into possession under a contract, he cannot, while he remains in possession, dispute the title of his vendor, does not apply where, at the time of the contract to purchase, the vendee is in possession as owner claiming title, and his entry was not under his vendor.
One in possession having title may purchase an outstanding title, and thus quiet such title and fortify his own, without being estopped from disputing the title so purchased, in case it should afterwards become necessary so to do.
In an action of ejectment, it was conceded that the plaintiff had the record title to the premises. Defendant claimed by adverse possession. It appeared that defendant entered into possession in 1882 under a deed from A., who entered into possession in 1849 under a written title, and that their occupation had been actual and continuous; that none of the occupants entered under plaintiff, or any one from whom he derived title. In 1874, plaintiff and others, claiming with him as tenants in common, brought actions in ejectment against A. to recover the lands in question. In March, 1875, under an agreement by which1 said actions were settled and discontinued, A. gave his promissory note to the plaintiffs, receiving a receipt; this stated that the note was received for the purchase-price of the premises, which plaintiff agreed to convey to A.; the note was not paid. The trial court decided that defendant was estopped from claiming title by adverse possession. Held (Parker and Haight, JJ., dissenting), error.
-It eeems that if the adverse possession of defendant’s grantor, and those under whom he entered and claimed, had not ripened into a title at the time of the commencement of the action so discontinued, the right to assert the continuance thereafter of such possession would have been defeated by the contract.
(Argued April 17, 1891;
decided June 25, 1891.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered upon an order made April 11888, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict directed by the court.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
James R. Bournes for appellant.
The claim of title raider a written instrument and the cultivation and improvement of the lot as shown by the evidence, perfected title in the defendant’s grantor after the lapse of twenty years. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 369, 370.) It is not necessary that the defendant should have a rightful title in order to succeed in this action. (Towle v. Remsen, 70 N. Y. 316; Sands v. Hughes, 53 id. 296; Munro v. Merchant, 28 id. 9.) Possession under claim of title, with or without a valid deed, is adverse; and though the possessor’s title is clearly defective, yet the true owner must sue within twenty years, or his entry is barred. (Clapp v. Bromagham, 9 Cow. 530; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 739 ; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns. 355 ; LaFrambois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589; Bradstreet v. Clark, 12 Wend. 602.) Couse’s title, if not rightful in the first instance, had been acquiesced in so long that it had become perfect. (Simpson v. Downing, 23 Wend. 320 ; Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N. Y. 478, 485; Ward v. Warren, 82 id. 265, 268; Ottinger v. Strausburger, 33 Hun, 468; Sherman v. Kane, 86 N. Y. 57; Robinson v. Kime, 70 id. 152; Kent v. Harcourt, 33 Barb. 491; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 634; Birdsall v. Cary, 66 How. Pr. 366; Herman on Estoppel [2d ed.] 1295, § 1159 ; Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend. 105 ; Jackson v. Spear, 7 id. 403 ; Jackson v. Given, 8 Johns. 137-139.) One holding adversely, or otherwise, may purchase an outstanding title to support his own, whether he doubts the validity of his previous title or not, and .such purchase or purchases will not affect the right or title under which such purchaser previously claimed to hold. (Northrup v. Wright, 7 Hill, 477, 489, 495; Burhans v. Van Vandt, 7 Barb. 92, 102; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns. 355; Marble v. McMinn, 57 Barb. 615; Parker v. Proprietors, 3 Met. 91; Owen v. Meyers, 20 Penn. St. 134; Bannon v. Brandon, 34 id. 263; 38 id. 63; Lodge v. Patterson, 3 Watts, 74; Coperton v. Gregory, 11 Gratt. 505; Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444; Cannon v. Stockton, 36 Cal. 535 ; Hayes v. Martin, 45 id. 559 ; Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535, 548; Chapin v. Hunt, 48 Mich. 595 ; Tobey v. Secor, 60 Wis. 310, 312, 313 ; S. M. Co. v. Tillman, 21 P. Rep. 818; Griffith v. Smith, 42 N. W. Rep. 749; Giles v. Peatt, 2 Hill, 439 ; 1 Greenl. on Ev. §§ 41, 42.) All the acts tending to show ownership should have been submitted to the jury. (McTeague v. McTeague, 5 N. Y. Supp. 130.) Possession is prima facie evidence of the highest estate, to wit,' a seisin in fee. (3 Phil, on Ev. 595; Hill v. Draper, 10 Barb. 454, 458, 459 ; Gerard’s Title to Real Estate [2d ed.] 642; Dickinson v. Smith, 25 Barb. 102.) A perfect possession, if continued without interruption during the whole period which is prescribed by the statute for the enforcement of the right of entry, is evidence of a fee. Such a title will prevail over the written title. (Angell on Lim. 396, §§ 1, 2; 1 Eumsey’s Pr. 64.) An offer to buy out a hostile claim will not estop the party making such offer from asserting title by adverse possession previously acquired. (Furlong v. Cooney, 14 Pac. Rep. 12 ; Frick v. Simon, 17 id. 439 ; P. M. Ins. Co. v. Strout, 63 Cal. 150.) Where, by open and continuous adverse possession of land, under claim of ownership for over twenty years by a person and his grantors, he has gained title thereto in fee, payment of rent by him thereafter for two years to the person having the paper title will not defeat the title already gained. (Riggs v. Riley, 15 N. E. Rep. 253.) The trial court erroneously decided the case on the theory that there had been an interruption in the adverse holding of the appellant and his grantors by the agreement of Alex. Couse to purchase the Bradstreet interest. (Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 37; Angell on Water Courses, § 216; Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360.) The plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this action upon the third count in the complaint, because the agreement therein mentioned was rescinded by her long before the commencement of the action. (Hubbell v. Mut. Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 47; Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107, 114, 115 ; Morange v. Morris, 3 Keyes, 48 ; Graves v. White, 87 N. Y. 463, 466 ; Starbird v. Barrows, 38 id. 237; Lewis v. McMullen, 41 Barb. 420, 429 ; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 id. 488 ; 38 N. Y. 165 ; Gould v. C. C. Bank, 86 id. 75, 86; Harris v. Hiscock, 91 N. Y. 345.) The agreement of March 5, 1875, had no binding effect upon the defendant’s grantors, because it was made without authority. (Story on Agency, § 42; Martine v. I. L. Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 342 ; Sugden on Powers, 162, 263; Green v. Miller, 6 Johns. 39 ; Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 530; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend. 19; Sanford v. Handy, 25 id. 479 ; Bogert v. Hertell, 4 Hill, 514 ; Cope v. Gilbert, 4 Den. 348; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 182; Perry v. Tynen, 22 Barb. 137; Board of Excise v. Sacrider, 35 N. Y. 158; Franklin v. Osgood, 14 Johns. 553, 554; Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665 ; Carstens v. Barnstorf 11 Abb. [N. S.] 442 ; Cox v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 4 Hun, 176; Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. 529, 540.) The agreement of March 5, 1885, recites that the note was received for the purchase-price, with costs' of suits, of all the interests that the Bradstreet heirs had in the land in question. The taking of a note for the purchase-price of lands or chattels does not come within the rule relating to the taking of a debtor’s note for a precedent debt without an agreement that the note is taken in payment. (Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409; Rew v. Barber, 3 Cow. 272; Breed v. Cook, 15 Johns. 241; Young v. Stahelin, 34 N. Y. 258; Noel v. Murray, 13 id. 167, 171, 172; Story on Prom. Motes, § 405 ; Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. [U. S.] 483, 510 ; Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68, 72,73.)
W. <& G. W. Youmans for respondent.
One who has recognized the title of plaintiff, by offering to purchase of him, cannot set up adverse possession. (Jackson v. Button, 4 Wend. 507; Jackson v. Croy, 12 Johns. 427; Jackson v. Cuerdon, 2 Johns. Cas. 353.)

Opinion:
Potter, J.
The action is ejectment and was brought to recover possession of an undivided one-twelfth part of the premises described in the complaint. The answer was a denial of the complaint, also title in the defendant, also title in the defendant arising from adverse possession of the premises for more than twenty years, and a counter-claim.
The premises as claimed in the complaint consist of one hundred and twenty acres in the north-west comer of the east half of Great Lot ISTo. 24, Evans Patent in Delaware County.
It was stipulated by the defendant for the purpose of this appeal, that the plaintiff showed title in herself as one of the heirs at law of Martha Bradstreet, deceased, to an undivided one-twelfth of the premises in question, except as such title may have been defeated by the adverse holding of the defendant herein and his predecessors, or parted with by force of the agreement of date March 5, 1875, hereinafter set forth.
The plaintiff proved and read in evidence an instrument of which the following is a copy:
"Received from A. Couse his note of $400, for the purchase-price with costs of suits, of an undivided two-thirds interest in 100 acres in the northwest comer of Great Lot 24 Evans Patent, known as the wild lot, and being the same premises claimed to have been occupied by the said Couse for some years past and I agree to forward to said Couse by mail, within ten days, a deed therefor.
"W. YOHMAMS,
"Attorney for JBradsi/reet Sews.
" Dated Delhi, M. Y. Mcwch 5, 1875."
He proved that the land therein mentioned was that in dispute, also gave evidence that the note had not been paid and the recovery of a judgment upon the note which had not been paid.
The defendant examined his grantor at considerable length to prove the defense of adverse possession of the premises and that the defendant entered into the possession under a deed from his father Alexander Couse in 1882, who entered into' the possession of the premises in 1849, under a deed from his father, Peter Couse, Sr., who some years before entered into-possession under a written title from Joseph Mutter, and that such occupation had been continuous for over forty years and that none of the occupants had entered into possession under-plaintiff or any one from whom plaintiff derived title, and was proceeding with the examination of other witnesses upon that subject when the court ruled as follows: " The court: I think I must stop this evidence; you must make some other defense than the Statute of Limitations or, I must direct a verdict against you. The more I think of this question, the more I think the Statute of Limitations cannot prevail here." Defendant's counsel duly excepted to such ruling and decisions. " The court rules that under the contract of March 5th, 1875, and the note of $400 given therefor and the various stipulations and contracts in connection with that, that this defendant has lost his right to avail himself of the adverse possession of himself and of his predecessors and declined to receive any further evidence of occupation and of adverse possession by the defendant and his predecessors." To which ruling and decision the defendant's counsel duly excepted.
After some additional evidence on the part of the plaintiff in relation to a subsequent arrangement as to the time and condition of delivery of the deed and payment of the purchase-price, the court directed a verdict for plaintiff to which defendant excepted.
When the defendant was thus precluded from giving further evidence on the subject of adverse possession, that already given tended to prove title by adverse possession in the defendant's grantor at the time such instrument of March 5, 1875, was made, and thus there was presented a question of fact for the jury in that respect. And title so established may be as effectual as that created in any other manner for the purposes of remedy or defense founded upon it. (Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34; and cases there cited.)
Upon this state of facts the question is presented whether the defendant should have been precluded or estopped from proving the defense of title to the premises by adverse possession.
The plaintiff and Alexander Couse at the time such contract was made respectively claimed to be the owner of the premises and for the purposes of the question it may here be ii.RRnnnp.fi that Alexander Couse and his grantor had been in the actual and continuous possession of the premises for forty or more years, and the plaintiff and those under whom she claimed had not during that period, if ever, been in the actual possession and that neither the said defendant nor any of his grantors had ever entered into or retained possession of tl)e premises with any permission of or privity with the plaintiff or her predecessors in title.
In the absence of any of these relations, the defendant and his grantors owed no duty or obligation to the plaintiff and was, therefore, at liberty to fortify his title or purchase peace at any price and of whomsoever he chose.
If, however, the adverse possession of the defendant's grantor and those under whom he entered and claimed had n'ot ripened into a title at the time the contract of March, 1875, was made, and excluding the time of the pendency of the action which was discontinued, the1 right to assert the continuance thereafter of such possession to perfect and support title as against the plaintiff would have been defeated by it.
I am aware of the rule that where a lessee or vendee enters into possession of premises under a lease or contract, lie cannot, while he remains in possession, dispute the title of the lessor or vendor, but this case is lacking in the essential element which creates such estoppel. ¡Neither the defendant nor his grantors entered into the possession by any manner of consent or contractual relation with the plaintiff or her ancestors or grantors. The rule in relation to estoppel does not apply " where, at the time of the purchase, the vendee is in as owner, claiming title, and his entry was not under the vendor." (Glen v. Gibson, 9 Barb. 634—640.) " Where a man is in possession of land as owner having title, he is at liberty to purchase the land over again as often as claimants shall appear, who are not in possession, and thus quiet such claims and fortify his title without being estopped from disputing the title of such subsequent vendors, should it afterwards become necessary for him to do so." (Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend. 105; Bain v. Matteson, 54 N. Y. 666.)
Even in a consummated purchase, the grantee in fee may
purchase in an outstanding title hostile to his grantor and fortify his own defective title. (Kenada v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 589.)
In Watkins v. Holman, (10 Peters, 54), it is said by the court, in discussing such relations, that " the relation of landlord and tenant in no sense exists between vendor and vendee."
Judge Bbonson, in delivering the opinion of the court in Osterhout v. Shoemaker (3 Hill, 513-518), says : " The grantee takes the land to hold for himself and to dispose of it at his pleasure. He owes no faith or allegiance to the grantor, and he does him no wrong when he treats him as an utter stranger to the title."
These views lead to the conclusion that the exceptions above mentioned were well taken and require a new trial.
Judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.