Case Name: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL on Behalf of William HARRIS and Karen Harris, husband and wife, parents of Sara Harris, an infant, who are medical indigents, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard PENCE, Clerk; Twin Falls Board of County Commissioners; and Twin Falls County, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1982-09-16
Citations: 104 Idaho 172
Docket Number: No. 14004
Parties: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL on Behalf of William HARRIS and Karen Harris, husband and wife, parents of Sara Harris, an infant, who are medical indigents, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard PENCE, Clerk; Twin Falls Board of County Commissioners; and Twin Falls County, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: DONALDSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 172–179

Head Matter:
657 P.2d 469
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL on Behalf of William HARRIS and Karen Harris, husband and wife, parents of Sara Harris, an infant, who are medical indigents, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard PENCE, Clerk; Twin Falls Board of County Commissioners; and Twin Falls County, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 14004.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Sept. 16, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1983.
Dean Williams, Blackfoot, for plaintiff-appellant.
Lloyd J. Webb, of Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pederson & Paine, Twin Falls, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
McFADDEN, Justice.
The instant appeal arises from an action initiated by the filing of a complaint by University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center, on behalf of William T. Harris and Karen F. Harris, parents of Sara Harris, a minor child. The actual nature of the complaint was that of a collateral attempt to appeal a decision of the Board of County Commissioners for Twin Falls County refusing to grant the plaintiff benefits under the provisions of I.C. § 31-3401 et seq. and 31-3501 et seq, as those references relate to the aid to the medically indigent. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. We affirm.
The complaint as well as the affidavits and deposition filed below establish the following facts for purposes of review.
On October 25, 1975, Sara Harris, the daughter of the Harrises, was born prematurely, with attendant serious physical complications. The necessary facilities for medical treatment of the child being unavailable in Idaho, the Harrises' doctor ordered that the child be immediately transferred to the University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. The child received medical treatment at the hospital through the 25th of February, 1976. The statement for the medical treatment of the child over this period of time totalled $42,117.78.
On November 5, 1976, the hospital, on behalf of the Harrises, filed an application for aid for the medically indigent with the former Twin Falls County Clerk, H.A. Lancaster. Mr. Lancaster failed to file a certificate with the Twin Falls Board of County Commissioners, as required in situations of medical indigency.
On January 28, 1977, the plaintiff filed the complaint seeking payment of $42,-117.78 in medical bills. Attached to the complaint was the verified application of William T. Harris, which stated the following:
"WILLIAM T. HARRIS and KAREN F. HARRIS, husband and wife, own no real estate nor any interest therein. They have equity in a 1974 Datsun automobile on which they have paid $800 and which has a balance owing thereon of $2,000. They also own a 1963 Dodge Dart automobile which is valued at not more than $100. They also own a 1962 Honda which is not in running condition and stove for which they paid $50.00. None of the said assets have a market value of any consequence. Include washer and dryer machine equity $250.00, balance of $350.00.
"WILLIAM T. HARRIS is employed by the Twin Falls Soil Conservation service in the Ag Department and his average monthly wage is $920.50 — that the applicants, WILLIAM T. HARRIS and KAREN HARRIS are unable to receive or expect financial assistance from their parents, neither of whom have the means to render any aid."
Reference is also made to a document titled "Monthly Living Expenses." The document reflects that the Harrises after-tax income was $710.00 per month and that they were incurring expenses in the amount of $707.00 per month.
The defendants moved to dismiss the action, raising the following objections, (1) the failure of the plaintiff to timely file an application for medical indigent benefits; (2) the allegation that the Harrises were not medically indigent; and (3) the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies. Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment of dismissal. The motion was based in pertinent part upon the deposition taken of William T. Harris on March 2,1977. The deposition disclosed that prior to the birth of their daughter, the Harrises combined income was in excess of $1,150.00 per month, they had accumulated $2,000.00 in a savings account, and incurred approximately $620.00 per month in expenses. The deposition also discloses that as of March 2, 1977, Mr. Harris was earning $1,400.00 a month with his after-tax income totalling $903.00 a month.
On November 25, 1980, the plaintiff also moved for summary judgment on its claim.
Both motions for summary judgment were argued to the district court on December 1, 1980. Two days later the district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment of dismissal. In so ordering, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's application for medical indigency benefits was untimely and that the parents were not medically indigent within the meaning of the applicable law. The district court also opined that the plaintiff hospital was not a party which could lawfully claim relief under the provisions of I.C. § 31-3401 et seq. and 31-3501 et seq.
The plaintiff thereafter perfected the instant appeal. Three issues are presented on appeal: (1) did the district court err in ruling that the application for medical indigency benefits was untimely; (2) did the district court err in ruling that the Harrises were not medically indigent, and (3) did the district court err in its ruling that the University of Utah Hospital could not file a claim on behalf of the Harrises for medical indigency benefits. Given our determination that the district court correctly ruled that the application for medical indigency benefits was untimely, the second and third issues presented on appeal need not be discussed.
The district court relied upon I.C. § 31-3504 (1976) in its ruling that the appellant was barred from pursuing its claim. The provision reads:
"An application for or on behalf of a medically indigent person receiving emergency medical services may be made any time within forty-five (45) days following the admission of said person to the hospital furnishing said care. If a person becomes medically indigent subsequent to admission to a hospital or subsequent to receiving treatment by a hospital, an application for the person, or on his behalf, shall be made within thirty (30) days of the time the person becomes medically indigent. The chargeable county or counties shall be notified as soon as practicable upon the hospital's obtaining information disclosing that a patient is medically indigent." (Emphasis added.)
This statutory provision became effective July 1,1976 (1976 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 121), a time subsequent to the admission and release of the Harrises' child from the hospital.
The appellant contends that the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504 is inapplicable. Rather, appellant points point to the 1974 version of I.C. § 31-3504, which was in effect at the time the medical treatment of the child, as being the applicable law in this case. Under this earlier provision an indigent receiving emergency medical treatment could apply for county aid within one year of discharge from the hospital, and the instant application would have been timely.
Retroactive application of the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504 to the instant situation would run contrary to general principles of law disfavoring such application. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 41.04 (1973). Consonant with this view, I.C. § 73-101 states that "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Similarly, there is general agreement in the case law of this jurisdiction that there must be a clear expression of legislative intent of retroactivity before a statute will be given such effect. Baker v. Baker, 100 Idaho 635, 603 P.2d 590 (1979); Edwards v. Walker, 95 Idaho 289, 507 P.2d 486 (1973); Application of Forde L. Johnson Oil Co., 84 Idaho 288, 372 P.2d 135 (1962); In re Pahlke, 56 Idaho 338, 53 P.2d 1177 (1936). Applied retroactively, the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504 would have required the application to have been made by April 10,1976, some two and a half months before the effective date of the law. Clearly, such retroactive application would unfairly penalize the appellant for failure to comply with a statute of which it had no notice. This court could not countenance such a result inasmuch as there is no expression of legislative intent that the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504 be applied retroactively. Nonetheless, it does not follow that the prior version of the statute would remain in effect after July 1, 1976. From that date forward the appellant had fair notice of the new requirements of when an application for medical indigency benefits had to be filed and had forty-five days in which to make such application.
An examination of the relevant case law from other jurisdictions indicates that a statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment for its operation. Holt v. Morgan, 128 Cal.App.2d 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954); Hill v. City of Billings, 134 Mont. 282, 328 P.2d 1112 (1958); Earle v. Froed tert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264 (1938); Lewis v. City of Medina, 13 Wash.App. 501, 535 P.2d 150 (1975). As the California Supreme Court reasoned in Holt v. Morgan, supra, "[t]he contention [as here made by the appellant] is based on a misunderstanding of 'retroactive' as a legal concept." 274 P.2d at 917. In this regard, it is to be observed further that there is almost universal agreement that when a statutory period of limitation is amended to reduce the limitation period, the party whose right accrues before the effective date of the amendment cannot be heard to complain if he is given the full time allowed for action according to the terms of the amended statute from and after the effective date of the amended statute. Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 274 P.2d 476 (1954); Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); Day & Night Heating Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 (1967); O'Donoghue v. State, 66 Wash.2d 787, 405 P.2d 258 (1965); Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., supra. In Olivas v. Weiner, supra, the statutory time within which a child could file a claim for prenatal injuries against an individual for his tortious conduct was shortened from until the time the child reached majority to six years from the date of birth. The appellant, who apparently had been injured during the course of his birth, brought suit within the prior statutory period, but more than twelve years after the statutory period was shortened. In ruling that the suit was not timely, the court made the following observations:
"It has repeatedly been held that the Legislature may reduce a statute of limitations and that the new period applies to accrued causes of action provided a reasonable time is allowed within which to assert the cause. Estate of Whiting, 110 Cal.App. 399, 294 P. 502; Estate of Venners, 119 Cal.App. 417, 419, 6 P.2d 544; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73, 76, 35 P.2d 185; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54, 65, 53 P.2d 952; Kline v. San Francisco v. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174, 176, 104 P.2d 661, 105 P.2d 362; Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 125, 238 P.2d 982; Crothers v. Edison Elec. Co., C.C., 149 F. 606; Terry v. Anderson, 96 U.S. 628, 24 L.Ed. 365.
A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its enactment. Thus changes in procedural law have been held applicable to existing causes of action. The effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Downey, 98 Cal.App.2d 586, 590, 220 P.2d 962; Argues v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal.App.2d 763, 778, 155 P.2d 643; Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264." 274 P.2d at 478, 479.
Similarly, in Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., supra, the court stated that "[t]he limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced when the cause of action was first subjected to the operation of the statute, that is, upon its effective date." 85 P.2d at 266.
The appellant argues that the foregoing authority is inapplicable in light of the court's decision in the early case of Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088 (1923). In Cook, the judgment from which the appeal was taken was dated April 25, 1921, and service of notice of appeal was filed July 15, 1921. Nine days after the judgment was entered, a new statute became effective restricting the period within which an appeal could be perfected to twenty days from the date of judgment. The court disagreed with the argument that the appellant only had twenty days from the effective date of the new statute within which to perfect his appeal, and held that the new time limit for perfection of an appeal could not be applied retroactively. 38 Idaho at 269, 220 P. at 1089.
In our view, the Cook decision is no longer good law. First, the decision rests upon the mistaken assumption that the question before the court is retroactive versus prospective application. As we have seen from the authority previously cited, this simply is not the case. Secondly, the opinion in Cook rests upon two nineteenth century California cases, i.e., Melde v. Reynolds, 120 Cal. 234, 52 P. 491 (1898), and Pignaz v. Burnett, 119 Cal. 57, 51 P. 48 (1897), which apparently have been overruled in California, witness Olivas v. Weiner, supra. Accordingly, the case of Cook v. Massey, supra, is overruled to the extent it is in conflict with our holding today.
In summary, we conclude that the proper measure of the time limitation period begins to run from July 1, 1976, the effective date of the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504. This means that the forty-five day period would have run August 15,1977, approximately three months before the appellant's application. Thus, the district court did not err in holding that the instant application for medical indigency benefits was untimely.
Order of summary judgment of dismissal affirmed. Costs to respondents.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.
SHEPARD, J., concurs in the result.
Submitted by McFADDEN, J., prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.
. It is to be noted that the appellant does not contend that the Harrises became medically indigent within thirty days of the time of the filing of the application. Rather, the application relates back to the time of the hospitalization of Sara Harris. Thus, we are only concerned with the applicability of the forty-five day limitation contained in the 1976 version of I.C. § 31-3504.
. Attention is drawn by respondents in their brief to an unpublished opinion in the case of The Children's Hospital v. Planting, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County, Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, District Judge (case no. 59455 April 1,1977). In that opinion, Judge Schroeder considered the precise question now before this court. An excellent discussion of the applicable principles of law is contained in that opinion, and Judge Schroeder's reasoning has been closely followed in this opinion.