Case Name: The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, Appellant, vs. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1902-02-18
Citations: 113 Wis. 161
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, Appellant, vs. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
Judges: Marshall, J., dissents.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 161–175

Head Matter:
The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, Appellant, vs. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
November 8, 1901 —
February 18, 1902.
Railroads: Construction and maintenance: Railroad crossings: Construction of contracts: “Interlocking system“Other similar appliances:” Farol evidence: Specific performance: Equity.
1. Defendant’s railway crossed the tracks of plaintiff’s railway at grade, the crossing having been constructed under a contract which required defendant, “in case flagmen or switchmen are required at or by reason of such crossing,” to pay “the entire hire of such flagmen or switchmen and also the entire cost and expense of constructing and maintaining all watch houses, signal stations, signals, and other similar appliances that may be now or at any time hereafter required.” Plaintiff brought its action for specific performance of such contract, alleging a change of transportation methods since the contract was made, and that, in order to secure reasonable safety to its trains in passing over the crossing without. stopping, it was necessary to construct the “interlocking system” of crossings. This sys tem consists of derailing switches interlocked with each other, connected with levers in'a tower house, from whence they are operated. The crossing in question was remote from settlement or habitation, and the evidence showed that no flagman or switchman, within any reasonable meaning of those words, had ever been required at or by reason of the crossing. Held, that the contingency had not arisen which, by the contract, was to impose on defendant the expense of flagmen, watchmen, watch houses, signal stations, or signals, and hence that no duty had arisen which could he compelled by a specific performance' of the contract.
2. In such action it appeared that the contract related to a particular trade or calling, having a terminology of its own; that ambiguity existed, needing evidence to clear it up; that the situation and circumstances surrounding the contract needed to be ascertained; and. that the words of the contract were to be applied to facts 'ascertainable only by extrinsic evidence. Held, that on the question whether an “interlocking system” was within the calls -of the expression “other similar appliances,” there were presented subjects of which the court, by the aid of parol evidence, became a trior of facts, and its decision thereon, ip the absence of mistake, oversight, or prejudice, is conclusive on appeal.
3. While the ultimate object of the “interlocking system” is safety, the main purpose of its installation is to avoid stopping trains, consistently with safety, and under a contract executed when the statute required all trains, in any event, to' stop at all railway crossings, the “interlocking system” is not necessarily a “similar appliance” within the calls of said contract.
4. In such case the words “other similar appliances” are reasonably ■ attributable to providing for subsequent fliscovery or invention, and cannot he held meaningless because nothing to which they can apply has yet been generally adopted by railroads.
5. Where1 under a contract the party having the burden of performance has not agreed to do anything until “required,” and it appears that the other party has not demanded performance except in a respect held not to be within the calls of the contract, the court will not, in advance, announce the various duties which may be imposed thereunder.
MaRshall, J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Eau Claire county: James O’Neill, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Suit for specific performance of contract made November 20, 1884, between tbe parties, recognizing application by tbe defendant, and consent by tbe plaintiff, that tbe former should cross tbe tracks of tbe latter at a point designated, near Ean Claire, upon tbe following terms and conditions:
“First. Tbe cost of making and maintaining said crossing shall be wholly paid by tbe party of tbe second part, and said crossing shall be made and maintained in tbe best manner.
“Second. In case tbe party of tbe first part shall hereafter desire to construct additional tracks upon its line of railway at tbe point of crossing aforesaid, tbe party of tbe second part agrees to construct and maintain a Crossing over such additional tracks in tbe same manner and on tbe same terms as herein provided in reference to tbe present trades of tbe party of the first part at that point.
“Third. Tbe passenger trains of the first party shall have preference over tbe passenger and freight trains of tbe second party, and tbe freight trains of tbe first party shall have preference over tbe freight trains [of] tbe second party, in passing over tbe said crossing when arriving there at tbe same time; but tbe passenger trains of tbe second party shall have preference over tbe freight trains of tbe first party in passing over said crossing.
“Fourth. In case flagmen or switchmen are required at and by reason of the said crossing, the. said second party shall pay tbe entire cost of such flagmen or watchmen, and also tbe entire cost and expense of constructing and maintaining all watch houses, signal stations, signals, and other similar appliances that may be now or at any time hereafter required.”
Under this contract the crossing bad been put in and bad been maintained ever since by tbe defendant. No kind of signals or precautions bad been maintained at said crossing thenceforward, except that both companies bad been under tbe requirement of tbe law that they should stop all trains before crossing.
Tbe complaint alleged that since the making of that contract traffic bad greatly increased, and tbe size and weight of engines, cars, and trains bad been enlarged, greatly enhancing the-difficulty and expense of stoppage of trains and the danger of crossings; also that greatly increased speed, of trains bad been rendered necessary by a change of conditions and demands of the public, and that great inconvenience and hardship to the plaintiff and to the public resulted from bringing its trains to a full stop at crossings; that a system known as the “interlocking system” is the best known device for safety, and the only one insuring reasonable safety and enabling trains to pass over crossings without stopping; that plaintiff has within two or three years last past repeatedly demanded of the defendant that it construct such interlocking device or system at the crossing in question, which it refuses to do, insisting that it is under no obligation to establish such system, although admitting that it is the best known device in use for safeguarding such crossings. *
After extended trial the court found that such interlocking system is the best known device; that it was not in general use in Western states at the time of the contract, but was in use elsewhere, and was well known to railroad men, and was then generally known and designated by the name “interlocking system or safety device”; that it is necessary to establish and maintain it at the crossing in question; and that demand had been made upon the defendant and refused. The interlocking system, so called, costs about $2,000, and consists of “(1) a mechanical arrangement known as 'interlocking/ by means of which the signals and derailing switches are connected with the levers, and interlocked with each other, in a central building, located near the crossing, called an 'interlocking cabin or tower/ and controlled by an operative located therein; (2) a system of derailing switches located in each track, by means of which, when it is desired to clear one railroad for the passage of trains, the derail switches on that line are closed, and those on the other railroad are opened, so that if, while a train is passing over tbe crossing on the track that is cleared, a train should approach on the other railroad and disregard the danger signals, it would be derailed before reaching the crossing; and (3) a system of home and distant semaphore signals, controlled and operated by the man in the tower by means of the interlocking mechanism.” The court found as fact that the first paragraph of the conditions of said contract referred merely to the construction of the physical crossing structure, and was not understood or intended by the parties to embrace an interlocking device or system. The court also found from the evidence and the situation and circumstances existing at the time said contract was made that the fourth paragraph contemplated any methods of protecting the safety of trains, but did not at the time of the contract, and does not now, refer to, embrace, and include an interlocking device or system, and was not so intended or understood by the parties. It appeared in the evidence that the machine known as the “interlocking device” had no physical connection with the crossing proper; that it was an expensive establishment, costing $2,000 or $2,500; that the defendant ran no trains over the road of such weight or speed as to make stoppage for the crossing seriously burdensome to it, while, On the other hand, the plaintiff’s main line, over which some of its fastest passenger and mail trains were run, was seriously incommoded and burdened by the necessity of stoppage' thereof. A large amount of testimony was taken to show generally that there were various signals used by different railroads for safety at crossings where trains were obliged to stop and ascertain the absence of trains on the other road; such methods being the presence of flagmen, the presence of gates, the presence of semaphore signals, and, in the Eastern states, what is known as the “ball signal,” — ■ none of them, however, adapted to or enabling the safe running of trains over the crossing without stopping. Judgment ■was rendered in favor of the defendant on tire merits, from which judgment plaintiff appeals.
For the appellant there were briefs by H. L. Humphrey and Thomas Wilson, and oral argument by Mr. Wilson.
For the respondent there was a brief by Geo. R. Peck and BuHon Hanson, attorneys, and H. H. Field, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Hanson.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed November 29, 1901:
Dodge, J.
This case was .argued with great vigor, ability, and refinement by counsel upon both sides, invoking most of the well-known rules for construction of contracts, which, however, in the ultimate analysis, all come to the proposition that the duty of every court in the construction of a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties; limited, however, in so doing, to the language of the contract, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and purposes presumably in the minds of the parties at the time of reducing their agreement to writing. Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 243; Brittingham & H. L. Co. v. Manson, 108 Wis. 221, 225.
The situation at the time of making the contract under consideration was that of the respondent exercising its right by statute to cross the existing railway of the plaintiff at a point remote from settlement or habitation. It had a right to do this by putting in and maintaining the physical crossing, and by paying such sum as might be fixed by commissioners in a proceeding under subd. 6, sec. 1828, Stats. 1898, which was the same in 1884 as it is now. By the agreement between the parties, the duty to put in and maintain the physical crossing was, as under the statute, to be borne by the respondent. That duty was subject to increase as the appellant, in its discretion, might desire to put in additional tracks. This was the extent of the obligation assumed by the respondent, except in one contingency, namely, that specified in tbe fourth section of tbe contract, — "in case flagmen or switchmen are required at or by reason of said crossing." Then, and then only, were certain expenses to be paid, namely, tbe hire of "such flagmen or watchmen," etc. It is probable that tbe word "switchmen," in tbe first clause, was intended to be "watchmen," since it is rendered entirely apparent by tbe evidence that a man whose duty it was to attend upon a crossing would be called a "watchman" or "flagman." But, waiving that consideration, if the word "switchmen" was intentionally used, as perhaps we must presume, their function would doubtless be in connection with the possibility contemplated by the crossing statute above referred to, that there might be put in certain turn-outs, sidings, switches, and other conveniences in furtherance of the object of the connection. A mass of evidence was introduced bearing upon the functions of various men employed at railroad crossings, and the appliances used by them, as also with reference to the names used to describe both the employees and their implements. That evidence renders certain, beyond dispute, that, within railroad terminology, neither the designation "flagmen," "switch-men," nor "watchmen," would ever be used or understood to describe or include operators of interlocking plants. Although such operator does perform the duties of a watchman, in that he looks out for trains; duties of a flagman or signalman, in that he signals approaching trains; and of a switch-man, in that he opens and closes the derailing devices, often called -"switches," — yet the plant which he operates is so distinguished by its purpose, its method of construction, and its importance that he is always distinguished in designation by reference to the plant so operated, and never confused with flagmen, watchmen, or switchmen. Nor can we discover in the surrounding circumstances anything to warrant belief that the parties intended by these words more than their ordinary import in railroad parlance. It therefore would seem clear that tbe contingency lias never arisen wbicb by tbe contract was to impose on tbe defendant tbe expenses specified in tbe fourth paragraph; that no flagman, switchman, or watchman, within any reasonable meaning of those words, has ever been required at or by reason of this crossing j hence that no duty has arisen to do* the acts sought to be compelled in this action by a decree of specific performance.
This conclusion, based upon the very words of the contract, makes unnecessary consideration or decision of the very extensively discussed question whether an interlocking plant falls within the calls of the contract for "all watch houses, signal stations, signals, and other similar appliances that may now or at any time hereafter be required," or whether it is so differentiated therefrom as to be dissimilar, instead of similar. That question would involve so extended investigation and so many conflicting considerations that we cannot justify ourselves in entering upon it, although fully debated, and apparently deemed the crucial one by the circuit court. The judgment of that court was right, however this latter question be resolved.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Marshall, J., dissents.