Case Name: In the matter of the petition of SHERMAN M. BOOTH, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and to be discharged from imprisonment
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1854-06
Citations: 3 Wis. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the matter of the petition of SHERMAN M. BOOTH, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and to be discharged from imprisonment.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 1–144

Head Matter:
In the matter of the petition of SHERMAN M. BOOTH, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and to be discharged from imprisonment.
CERTIORARI TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE A. D. SMITH, OF THE SUPREME COURT.
A writ of certiorari lies u> one of the justices of' this com l, to review judicial acts done by Iiiin in vacation.
Upon proper application, a writ of Habeas Corpus may bo allowed, board and determined by a justice of this court in vacation, in conformity with the statute.
This court has jurisdiction of the common law writ of Habeas Corpus, and to hear and determine the same, conferred upon it by the Constitution of the State, independent of any legislative action in reference thereto.
The writ of Habeas Corpus may be directed to any person or officer within this State; and such person or officer is bound, upon due service thereof, to make return thereto, and upon failure so to do, such return will be enforced.
Upon such return, the court or magistrate before whom the case is heard, may enquire into the nature and validity of the process, if any, by which the de tention of the prisoner is sought to be justified, by whatsoever authority the same may have keen issued.
Xf; upon enquiry into the nature and cause of the caption and detention of the Prisoner, it shall be found that he is held by virtue of process issued by a court or judge of the United States, having exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter of the process, the prisoner must be remanded, and this as well by the comity of courts as by the provisions of the statute.
The warrant set forth in the return to this writ of certiorari, is not sufficient to justify the detention of the prisoner.
The order of discharge set forth in the return to this writ of certiorari was properly made.
The act of Congress of 1850, commonly called the Fugitive Slave Act, is unconstitutional and void.
1. Because it does not provide for a trial by jury of the fact that the alleged fugitive owes service to the claimant by the laws of another State, and of his escape therefrom.
2. It authorizes a hearing and determination of the claim of the master, and the fact of escape, by commissioners of the United States, who cannot be endowed with judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States.
3. The judicial power of the United States can be vested only in courts, or in judges, whose term of office is during good behaviour, and whose compensation is fixed and certain.
4. The functions with which United States commissioners are endowed by the act of I860 are judicial, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution.
5. By the said act, any person alleged to be a fugitive may be arrested and deprived of his liberty “without due process of law.” Crawford, J., dissenting.
The act of Congress of 1850, commonly called the Fugitive Slave Act, in relation to fugitives from service or labor, is unconstitutional and void; because Congress has no constitutional power to legislate upon that subject. Per Smith, J.
On the 27th day of May, A. D. 1854, in vacation, the petitioner, Sherman M. Booth/ made application to Mr. Justice Smith, of the Supreme Court, for a writ of Habeas Corpus, and to be discharged from imprisonment, which application was based upon the following petition, and the document annexed :
Sherman M. Booth respectfully represents to the Hon. Abram D. Smith, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of said State, that he, the said Sherman M. Booth, is restrained of his liberty by one Stephen V. R. Ableman, the marshal of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, and that said restraint is in the' city and county of Milwaukee, and that the said Booth is not committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of any process, judgment or decree, or execution, prescribed in section 2, of chapter 124, of the Revised Statutes of said State ; but that the cause and pretence of said restraint are, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the said Booth, by virtue of a pretended warrant, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and for the reasons in said warrant set forth.
And the said Booth alleges that the restraint of his liberty is illegal, for the reason that the said act of Congress referred to in the said warrant, approved September 18th, A D. 1850, is unconstitutional and void.
Also, for the reason that the Cougress of the United States has no constitutional power or authority to punish the offence with which said Booth is charged, and for which he is detained by said warrant ; for which reasons said warrant is of no force or validity whatever.
And the said Booth further alleges, as a reason for the illegality of said imprisonment, that the said act of Congress is in violation of the compact, unalterable, except by common consent, contained in the ordinance of Iff Sff, for the government of the Territory northwest of the Ohio river, and that therefore said act is not in force'in said State.
And also the further reason, that it is alleged in said warrant, and also in the complaint on which the same is founded (all of which appears in said warrant), that the said Joshua Glover was “ the property” of the said Benammi S. Garland; whereas, the act of Congress under which, said complaint was » , . 1 made, punishes the aiding, <fcc., m the escape of “persons held to service or labor under the laws,” &c., and no^ ^.|ie g¿¿|ng the escape of “ property for which reason said warrant is defective in substance and form.
Therefore, the said Booth prays that a writ of Ha-beas Corpus may be issued in his favor, directed to the said Stephen V. R. Ableman, and commanding him to bring the said Booth before your Honor, to be dealt with according to law.
Subscribed and sworn, &c.
“ United States of America, District of Wisconsin,ss:
The President of the United States of America to the Marshal of the District of Wisconsin, and the keeper of the common jail in Milwaukee county, in the District aforesaid, Greeting :
Whereas, Sherman M. Booth has been brought before me, a commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United States for said District, under and by virtue of the several acts of Congress, charged on oath with having, on the lltli day of March, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, at the city of Milwaukee, in the county of Milwaukee, in said county and district, unlawfully aided, assisted and abetted a person named Joshua Glover, held to service or labor in the State of Missouri, under the laws thereof, and being flic property of one Benammi S. Garland, and having escaped therefrom into the State of Wisconsin, to escape from the lawful custody of Charles 0. Cotton, a deputy of the marshal of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, the said Charles C. Cotton having then and there arrested and taken into custody the said Joshua Glover, by virtue of a -warrant issued by the judge of the United States for the said dis trict, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress in that case made and provided, approved September 18th, 1850. And whereas, an examination was, in the month of March aforesaid, held before me, and I, the said commissioner, being satisfied that an offence had been committed, as charged in said complaint, and that there was probable cause to believe the said Sherman M. Booth guilty thereof’ did thereupon require the said Sherman M. Booth to recognize with sufficient sureties, in the sum of two thousand dollars, for his appearance before the said District Court, on the first day of the next stated term thereof, to be held on the first Monday of July next, at Madison, in said District, and that he would not depart from said court without leave. And whereas, the said Sherman M. Booth did accordingly so recognize as required, and has now this day been arrested by Charles E. Wunderly, .his bail or surety inji&ah* recognizance, and delivered to the marshal of said district, before me, the said commissioner ; and whereas, the said bail or surety has requested me to re-commit the said Sherman M. Booth to the custody of the said marshal; and whereas, the said Sherman M. Booth has failed again to recognize, as so required by me ; now therefore, you, the said marshal, are hereby commanded forthwith to convey and deliver into the custody of the keeper of the said common jail, the body of the said Sherman M. Booth ; and you, the said keeper of the said common jail, are hereby commanded and required to receive the said Sherman M. Booth into your custody in the said jail, and him there safely keep, until he shall be discharged by due course-of law.
Given under my hand, at the city of Milwaukee, in- Baid District, this 26th day of May, eighteen hundred and fifty-four. Winmelb Smith,
Ocmmission r, cHo.”
Upon this petition a writ of Habeas Corpus was allowed, and issued on the same day, and the respondent, Stephen V. E. Ableman, Esq., United States Marshal for the District of Wisconsin, on the same day made return to said writ, with the body of the petitioner, before the said justice, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, via: That he received the said Booth into his custody on the 26th day of May, A. D. 1854, as marshal of the United States for the said District of Wisconsin, and had since held and still do'.s hold him in custody, by virtue of a warrant of commitment issued by Winfield Smith, a commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United States for said District; a copy of which was appended to the return, which was the same as that of the warrant annexed to the petition.
The district attorney of the United States having been duly notified of the application, appeared; the return of the marshal was demurred to, and by consent the hearing was postponed until the 29th day of May, and in the meantime the petitioner was placed in custody of the marshal.
On the 29th and 30th of May, the case came on to be heard upon the return of the marshal and the demurrer thereto, and was argued by Byron Paine, Esq.; for the petitioner, and by J. E. Sharpstein, Esq., in behalf of the marshal. The case was held under advisement until the 7th day of June, 1854, when the petitioner was discharged by order of the justice, and the following opinion then delivered:
Smith, J. Oh the 27 th ult. application was made to me by Sherman M. Booth, the petitioner, for a writ of Habeas Corpus, to be directed to Stephen V. B. Able-man,who, it was alleged, restrained the petitioner of his liberty. Accompanying the petition was a copy of the process, by virtue of which, it was alleged, the petitioner was held in custody. This writ purported to be what is commonly called a Mittimus, issued by Winfield Smith, Esq., “ a commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United States for said district, (District of Wisconsin,) under and by virtue of the several acts of Congress;” and recited that the petitioner was “ charged on oath with having, on the 11th day of March, 1854, at the city of Milwaukee, in said county and district, unlawfully aided, assisted and abetted a person named Joshua Glover, held to service or labor in the State of Missouri, under the laws thereof, and being the property of one Benammi S. Garland, and having escaped therefrom into the State of Wisconsin, to escape from the lawful custody of Charles C. Cotton, a deputy of the marshal of the United States for said district, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress in that case made and provided, approved September 18th, 1850,11,1 &c. The writ goes on to recite an examination before the commissioner, its result in holding the petitioner to bail, the giving of the required bail, his subsequent arrest and surrender by his bail, the order of the commissioner to enter into recognizance again, his neglect and refusal so to do, and hence the issuing the writ; and closes with the following command:
“ How therefore, you the said Marshal, are hereby commanded forthwith to convey and deliver into the custody of the keeper of the said common jail, the body of the said Sherman M. Booth, and yon the said keeper of the said common jail are hereby command- and required to receive the said Sherman M. jn^0 y0Tir custody in the said jail, and him there safely keep, until he shall be discharged by due course of law.”
In his application or petition, the petitioner alleges the illegality of his imprisonment to consist in the following, viz: That the act of Congress referred to in the said warrant, is unconstitutional and void; also that Congress has no constitutional power or authority to punish the offence with which said Booth is charged and for which he is detained; that the act of Congress of 1850, is in violation of the provisions ■ of compact, unalterable, except by common consent, contained in the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Territory north-west of the Ohio river, and that therefore said act is not in force in said State: “And also that it is alleged in said warrant and also in the complaint on which the same was founded, (all of which appears by said warrant,) that the said Joshua Glover was the property of the said Benammi S. Garland, whereas the said act of Congress under which said complaint was made, punishes the aiding, etc., in the escape of ‘ persons hold to service or labor under the laws,’ etc., and not the aiding the escape of £ property,’ for which reason said warrant is defective in substance and form.”
Upon this application I could not hesitate to issue the writ according to the prayer of the petition. I had hoped, indeed, that, inasmuch as at least two opportunities had been presented to the petitioner, since his original arrest, to apply to the Supreme Court in term time for this writ, that he would have done so, had he been disposed £o avail himself of its instrumentality. The court was in session at the time of his arrest, and an adjourned session was held, commencing the 15th day of May, at either of which times the petitioner might have presented his application, and obtained the opinion and judgment of the whole court; and I am at a loss to conceive the motive which may have induced him or Ins advisers to forego such opportunities. But I have no right to complain that any citizen calls upon me for the discharge of any duty pertaining to my office. I do not complain. Yet I cannot but feel the immense respon-sihility thrown upon me alone, and may be pardoned for expressing my regret that I am deprived of the aid and counsel of my associates, so much better aide to copo with the grave and intricate questions involved, than I am myself. Whether by design, or from necessity, this application has been made to me, I meet the emergency with all the anxiety and concern which it cannot fail to excite, and, I hope, with some share of the firmness which the occasion and the nature of the questions involved imperatively demand.
There was no question pertaining to the subject matter of the application, nor connected with the parties, which approached, in the slightest degree, to a conflict of jurisdiction between the State and Federal courts, or the judges thereof. The warrant, by virtue of which the petitioner was held, was not issued by a federal judge or court, but by a commissioner of the United States. No exclusive, or ultimate jurisdiction can he claimed for an officer of this kind. As one of the Justices of the highest judicial tribunal of this State, which tribunal represents in that behalf the sovereignty of the State, I could not deny to.any citi zen or Person entitled to the protection of the State, the proper process by which the validity of a warrant issued by such authority, could be examined. Nor can I admit, that a court commissioner, holding his appointment at the will of the court, responsible only to such court — in fact, irresponsible and unimpeachable — has the right or the power, or can have the right or the power, to issue any process by which a citizen of the State may be imprisoned, that may not be examined, and its validity tested, by the proper judicial authority of the State. Indeed, we may go farther, and say, that as every citizen has a right to call upon the State authority for protection, and as the judicial power is that only to which application can usually be made by the citizen, it is the duty of the judicial officer, when applied to, to see that no citizen is imprisoned within the limits of the State, nor taken beyond its limits, except by proper legal and constitutional authority. It is not in the power of any body to divest the State judiciary of such authority, nor can any body, but the people themselves, absolve the judicial officers of the State from the performance of their duty in this behalf.
It is not necessary here to inquire what would be the force and effect of a warrant like the present one, were it issued by a judicial officer of the United States. I confess, however, that I have never been able to appreciate the liability to, or danger of, or necessity fox’, collision between the judicial and ministerial authority of the States and the United States.
The line of demarkation is not very dim, and a proper regard to the peculiar functions of each class of officers, will render all apprehension on that score a work of supererogation. But the States will never submit to the assumption, that United States commissioners have the power to hear and determine upon the rights and liberties of their citizens, and issue process to enforce their adjudications, which is beyond the examination or review of the State judiciary. They will cheerfully submit to the exercise of all power and authority by the federal judiciary, which is delegated to that department by the federal Constitution; but they have a right to insist, and they will insist, that the State judiciary shall be and remain supreme in all else, and that the functions of the federal judiciary within the territory of the States shall be exercised by the officers designated or provided for by the Constitution of the United States, and that they shall not be transferred to subordinate and irresponsible functionaries, holding their office at the will of the federal courts, doing their duty and obeying their mandates, for which neither the one nor the other is responsible.
Every jot and tittle of power delegated to the federal government will be acquiesced in, but every jot and tittle of power reserved to the States will be rigidly asserted, and as rigidly sustained.
It is only by exacting of the federal government a rigid conformity to the prescribed, limitation of its powers, and by the assertion and exercise on the part of the States of all the powers reserved to them, and a due regard by both to their just and legitimate sphere, that obedience can be rightfully exacted of the citizen, to the authority of either.
Entertaining the opinion that a commissioner of the U nited States has no rightful authority to imprison a citizen of this State, or any other person entitled to the protection of its laws, by any process which pre- clixcLecL tlie State authority from inquiring into the proceedings of such commissioner, and on inspection of the writ, a copy of which was presented with the pe-I could not deny the writ of Habeas Corpus prayed for.
The marshal to whom the writ was directed, in conformity with the double allegiance which we all owe to the State and to the United States, promptly made return, bringing the body of the petitioner before me, and showing as the cause of his caption and detention, a copy of the mittimus hereinbefore mentioned and set forth.
The petitioner demurred to the return of the marshal, and thus the whole question of the legality of the commissioner’s process, both in respect to its form and substance, and the validity of the law of Congress, for the alleged violation of which the petitioner was arrested, is fairly and fully presented.
The petitioner demands his discharge from imprisonment on two grounds:
1st. Because the law of Congress, approved the 18 th of September, 1850, in relation to the extradition of fugitives from service or labor, is unconstitutional; and 2d, because the writ is defective.
Had the determination of this matter been placed upon the insufficiency of the writ alone, I should have had but little difficulty in arriving at a conclusion; because I entertain no doubt, that the writ is so substantially defective, that the discharge of the petitioner must, for that cause alone, have been ordered. But the petitioner has, through his counsel, expressed his desire to waive all objections to the form or substance of the warrant, and to rest his case solely upon his objections to the constitutionality of the law in question.
The Constitution of the United States is the fundamental law of the land. It emanated from the very source of sovereignty as the saméis recognized in this country. It is the work of our fathers, but adopted and perpetuated by all the people, through their respective State organizations, and thus becomes our own. It is natural that tho citizen should have a more profound regard for the fundamental law of his State or government, than for a mere act of a legislature, because the former is more directly the work of his own hand. He has, by his vote, mediate or immediate, established it as the great charter of his rights, and by which all his agents or representatives in the conduct of the government, are required to square their actions. By the standard of the Constitution, he has a right to judge of the acts of every officer or body whose existence as such is provided for by it. By the same standard he must regulate his own acts, and to it he may at all times appeal for the protection of his rights, secured by it, and for a measured judgment upon his own conduct.
. I recognize most fully the right of every citizen to try every enactment of tho legislature, every decree or judgment of a court, and every proceeding of the executive or ministerial department, by the written, fundamental law of the land. This must be done in a proper and legal manner, in conformity with the rules prescribed by that same law, or in accordance with its provisions; but no law is so sacred, no officer so high, no power so vast, that the line and the rule of the Constitution may not be applied to them. It is the source of all law, the limit to all authority, the primary rule of all conduct, private as well as official, and the citadel of personal security and liberty.
Byut as was saicl Before, though I recognize the right of every citizen to appeal to the Constitution in proper manner, (not in any mode which the individual may prescribe for himself,) such appeal should be made in good faith, and not for the mere purpose of expeiimenting upon the opinions of the judicial officer to whom such application is made. Every citizen has the right to test every law by the Constitution of the State or National government, according to the forms, and through the appropriate tribunals of the country. Every one has a right to resist an .unconstitutional enactment of the legislature; but he does so upon his peril, until the conformity or non-conformity of the act with the Constitution is judicially determined. It is unsafe for any person to resist an act of the State or National legislature on the ground of its unconstitutionality, unless he is prepared to abide the consequences, in case his judgment should prove to be erroneous. Passive obedience cannot be exacted, nor can private judgment in this behalf become the rule of action.
But I do not admit the right of the citizen to complain to me of illegal imprisonment, and apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus for his discharge therefrom, and then waive or decline his discharge except upon such grounds only as he shall see fit to prescribe. While I am willing faithfully to discharge my duty in every instance when called upon, and to extend the protection of the law to every person entitled to its protection, I do not admit the right of any one to devise a fictitious imprisonment, merely to experiment upon my opinions or research in regard to particular questions of law which may chance to be deemed of more or less interest in the community. The petitioner has complained tliat lie is imprisoned without the authórity of law, and asks my official interposition in his behalf. On the hearing, he sees fit to waive all objeetion to the form or substance of the warrant by which he' is held, and to demand his discharge upon the invalidity of the law by virtue of which the warrant was issued, or not have it at all. I can neither permit nor accept such issue. If he really sought relief from his imprisonment by applying for this writ, he should be willing to enjoy such relief upon any ground which the law would sanction. If he did not really and in good faith desire release from imprisonment, but merely resorted to the writ of Habeas Corpus as a device by which to obtain an opinion as to the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act, I feel bound to say that the occasion is not commensurate with the sacred character and beneficent functions of that writ.
I shall take this case, therefore, as the petition and the return to the writ present it for adjudication.
. The act of Congress under and by virtue of which the petitioner is arrested, purports to have been enacted in conformity with, and under the power as is alleged, granted by the third clause of the second section of the fourth article of the federal Constitution, which is in the following words:
“No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor is due.”
Either fortunately or unfortunately, we are left for a construction of this portion of the federal compact, almost exclusively to the meaning to be' derived from the words. There was very little debate upon, the introduction or adoption of the clause, and but feeble aid is furnished from contemporaneous interpretation, £or a comparatively recent period, it has not become a subject of any very considerable discussion.
Without stopping here to inquire, whether the clause in question confers upon the general government any power of legislation in regard to the subject matter thereof, let us endeavor to arrive at its true intent and meaning, so far as it affects the rights or condition of the class of persons to whom it is supposed especially to refer.
Let it be taken for granted, that this clause was intended to refer exclusively to fugitive slaves; of which I think the history of its adoption into the Constitution leaves no doubt; the question at once arises, how far, and in what particulars, does it affect the persons alluded to in it? 1st. It contemplates the fact that certain persons were, or might be, held to service or labor in one or more States under the laws thereof. 2d. That it was by the laws of such State or States alone, under which such persons could be held to service or labor. 3d. That the laws or regulations of the respective States under which such persons might be held to service or Libor, or discharged therefrom, might be different. 4th. That such persons might escape from one State in which they were held to labor under the laws thereof, into another State in which such persons were held to labor under different laws, or in which they were by the laws of the State discharged from service or labor. 5th. That the service or labor here spoken of is of a kind which is exacted of such persons by law, and not of a kind stipulated for by contract, and hence is in restraint of, and derogatory to human liberty. 6th. That such persons escaping from oue State into another, should not be discharged by the laws of the State to which they may have fled, but that the condition of the fugitive should remain the same in the State from which he had fled, in case the person to whom he owed the service should choose to claim him and convey him thither, Hh. That in the event of a claim by the person to whom the fugitive owed the service under the laws of the State from which he fled, being made, he should be delivered up, on establishing the fact that the labor or service of the fugitive was due to such claimant.
From this analysis of the clause of the federal Constitution above quoted, it will be seen that the status of the fugitive is essentially different in this State from his status or condition in the State from whence he fled. In the latter, he remained subject to all the disabilities of his class, though he may have escaped from the domicil or premises of his master. Here, he is entitled to the full and complete protection of our laws; as much so as any other human being, so long as he is unclaimed. He may sue and be sued ; he may acquire and hold property; he is, to all intents and purposes, a free man, until a lawful claim is. made for him ; and this claim must be made by the person to whom his service or labor is due, under the laws of the State from which he escaped. No one else can interfere with him. If no claim is set up to his service or labor by the person to whom his service or labor is due, there is no power or authority, or person on earth, that can derive any advantage from his former condition, or assert it, to his prejudice. So long as the owner does not choose to assert his claim, the cottage of the fugitive in Wisconsin is as much Ins castle — his property, liberty and person are as much the subject of legal protection,' as those of any other person. Our legal tribunals are as open to his comp]a|n^ or appeal, as to that of any other man. He may never be claimed ; and if not, he would remain forever free, and transmit freedom to his posterity born on our soil.
It is apparent, therefore, that the fugitive slave leaves his condition of slavery behind him, and takes with him into this State only the dread contingency of the assertion of the claim of the person from whose service he has escaped, upon the establishment of which he may be reduced to his former condition in the State from which he fled.
The act of Congress of 1850 fully recognizes this view of the Constitution, and contemplates the re-capture of the fugitive, as dependent entirely upon the olaim of the master. The sixth section provides that “the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized by power of attorney, in ivriting, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court of the State or Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and claim such fugitive person,” <fcc. No one but the owner, or his agent or attorney, appointed by writing, may claim him. No one may volunteer to render his neighbor a friendly service, by capturing in his behalf and returning to him his fugitive. It must be the master’s own act, and its responsibilities be all his own.
This writ simply asserts, as the cause of the petitioner’s arrest, that he “ aided, abetted and assisted a person named Joshua Glover, held to service or labor in the State of Missouri, under the laws thereof, and "being the property of Benammi S. Garland, and having escaped therefrom into the State of Wisconsin; to escape from the lawful custody of Charles C. Cotton, a deputy of the marshal of the U. S., the said Charles C. Cotton having then and there arrested and taken into custody the said Joshua Glover, "by virtue of a warrant issued by the judge of the United States, for the said District, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress, in that case made and provided, approved Sept. 18, 1850.”
The material allegations herein contained are, that Glover was held to service or labor, in the state of Missouri, under the laws thereof, had escaped therefrom, and was the property of Garland. All this may "be very true, and yet-Garland may never have claimed Glover. Some one else may have caused the arrest? without the authority or wish of Garland. There is no allegation that he was claimed by any one whomsoever; much less that the claim of Garland was interposed, without which Glover was as free as Garland himself. It is true, the writ recites that Glover was in the lawful custody of the marshal, by virtue of a warrant issued by the district judge under the provisions of the act of 1850. But it is to he remarked that the mere recital that such custody was lawful, is not sufficient. The lawfulness must affirmatively appear, by facts set forth in the warrant. But, admitting that Glover was in the lawful custody of the marshal, it still does not appear that he was in such custody as a fugitive from labor. Though the warrant for his arrest was issued under the act of 1850, yet it by no means follows that he was arrested as a fugitive The petitioner is arrested under that act, and Glover may have been charged with some violation of it, for ke was liable to arrest. The gist of the offence with which the petitioner is charged, as described by the act of 1850, is “the aiding, abetting or assisting -¡¿e person so owing labor or service, to escape from such claimant, his agent or attorney, or other person or persons legally authorized, as aforesaid.” There certainly is no such charge in the warrant of commitment returned here. There is no averment of a claim. by Garland, even admitting that the allegation of property in Garland implies that service or labor was due to him. There is no allegation that Glover was-in custody as a fugitive from labor, or that the petitioner aided in his escape from any claimant, his agent or attorney, nor any other person lawfully authorized to hold him as such fugitive.
I have been referred to two or three cases, going to show that strict technical exactness, is not required in preliminary warrants. This is undoubtedly the true doctrine. Where the defendant was charged in the warrant with having committed the crime of larceny, it was held sufficient. (Whart. Prec. 502.) But in all these cases, the language used imported a crime— an act malum in se. In all cases where the offence is merely malum proMbitu/m, it must be set out in the warrant substantially in conformity with the statute which creates it.
The offence here charged is peculiarly the creature of the statute. It is not resistance to the marshal in the execution of his duty; it is not the breaking open the jail; that is an offence against the State; it is not a rescue as known to the common law, but it is intended to be the aiding of a fugitive slave to escape from the service to which he is held. It is a penal statute, and must be construed strictly. It is in restraint of freedom, and therefore every presumption arising mi-der it must be in favor of liberty. It creates a new offence, and adds new and severe penalties, and therefore all process and prosecution under it must be in substantial conformity with its requirements. I do not mean to say that a warrant for arrest or commitment for trial must contain all the particularity of an indictment, but to say what I understand the law to be, that it must contain the substance of the offence intended to be charged, as the same is described in the statute. No greater strictness is applied to this warrant than the law applies to all process of that class; though a much stricter rule might be justified ; for this is a “ wicked and a cruel ” enactment, and those who feel compelled to execute it, may well require of those who demand official service at their hands, that in taking their'“pound of flesh” they shall not “ shed one drop of Christian blood.”
Since the close of the argument upon this case, there has been placed in my hands the act of Congress, approved Feb. 26, 1853, commonly called the fee bill. That act provides, among the various provisions in regard to the fees of officers, witnesses, etc., as follows:
“ When two or more charges are, or shall be made, or two or more indictments shall be found against a person, only one writ or warrant shall be necessary to arrest and commit him for trial, and it shall be sufficient to state in the writ the name or general character of the offence, or to refer to them in very general terms.”
This provision does not change the law; it is only designed as a restraint upon the clerk or commissioner, preventing him from issuing a multiplicity of warrants, where one would answer, and to guard against unnecessary prolixity, merely for the purpose of swel- ^ees °f Slick officer where he is paid by the folio. What had been the experience of Congress or heads of departments, which suggested this enactment, j q0 no^. pI10w. certainly was never designed to create, nor does its language tend to establish, a new rule of law, abrogating the law which requires the charge against the citizen to be plainly set forth in the warrant for his arrest. Here are not two offences charged, and if there were, the rule of law would be the same. .
The warrant, a copy of which is returned by the marshal, as the authority by which the prisoner is held, is clearly, substantially and radically insufficient., and the petitioner is therefore entitled to a discharge.
And here, perhaps, I might dismiss this case, and avail myself of the defect of the process to escape from the performance of any further duty in the premises ; but it is further urged that the act of Congress-of 1850 is unconstitutional and void. I would gladly escape from the responsibility of deciding upon a question so grave. It would be a much more easy and quiet course to stop here, if I could reconcile such a course with my sense of duty. But believing, as I do,, that every State officer who is required to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States as well as of his own State, was designedly placed by the federal Constitution itself as a sentinel to guard the outposts as well as the citadel of the great principles and rights which it was intended to declare, secure and perpetuate, I cannot shrink from the discharge of the duty now devolved upon me. I know well its consequences, and appreciate fully the criticism to which I may be subjected. But I believe most sincerely and solemnly that the last hope of free? representative and responsible government rests upon the State sovereignties, and fidelity of State officers to their double allegiance, to the. State and federal gov-eminent; and so believing, I cannot hesitate in performing a clear, an indispensable duty. Seeking and enjoying the quiet and calm so peculiar to the position in which I am placed, I desire to mingle no farther in the political discussions of the times, than the clear suggestions of official obligation require. But he who takes a solemn oath to support the Constitution of the United States, as well as of the State of Wisconsin, is bound by a double tie to the nation and his State. Our system of government is two-fold, and so is our allegiance. Federal officers feel less of this, because their oath binds them only to the Constitution of the United States ; but State officers have the weight of both resting upon them. To the latter is peculiarly the duty assigned, or rather upon the latter, of necessity does the obligation rest, of ascertaining clearly} and of asserting firmly, the peculiar powers of both governments, as circumscribed by the fundamental law of each. . To yield a cheerful acquiescence in, and support to, every power constitutionally exercised by the federal government, is the sworn duty of every State officer ; but it is equally his duty to interpose a resistance, to the extent of his power, to every assumption of power on the part of the general government, which is not expressly granted or necessarily implied in the federal Constitution.
Nor can I yield to the doctrine early broached, but as early repudiated, that any one department of the government is constituted the final and exclusive judge of its own delegated powers. No such tribunal has been erected by the fundamental law. The judi- dePai'tinent of the federal government is the creature by compact of the several States, as sovereign-ties, and their respective people. That department can exercise no power not delegated to it. All power not delegated, and not prohibited to the States, the States have expressly reserved to themselves and the people. To admit that the federal judiciary is the sole and exclusive judge of its own powers, and the extent of the authority delegated, is virtually to admit that the same unlimited power may be exercised by every other department of the general government, both legislative and executive, because each is independent of, and co-ordinate with the other. Neither has any power but such as the States and their respective people have delegated, and all power not delegated remains with the States and the people thereof. In view of the vastly increasing power of the federal government, and the relatively diminishing importance of the State sovereignties respectively, the duty of the latter to watch closely and resist firmly every encroachment of the former, becomes every day more and more imperative, and the official oath of the functionaries of the States becomes more and more significant. As the power of the federal' government depends solely upon what the States have granted, expressly or by implication, and as no common judge has been provided for, to determine when the one or the other shall be proved unfaithful to the compact, the solemn pledge of faith exacted frombothhas been deemed an effectual guaranty ; and a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles on which our government is organized, a sufficient stimulus to every public officer and to the people at large, both to yield and exact a perfect conformity. But I solemnly be- üieve that the last hope of free representative and fed-erative government, rests with the States. Increase of influence and patronage on the part of the federal government naturally leads to consolidation, consolidation to despotism, and ultimate anarchy, dissolution and all its attendant evils.
If the sovereignty of the States is destined to be swallowed up by the federal government; if consolidation is to supplant federation, and the general government to become the sole judge of its own powers, regardless of the solemn compact by which it was brought into existence, and of the source of its own vitality, as an humble officer of one of the States, bound to regard the just rights and powers both of the Union and the States, I want my skirts to be clear, and that posterity may not lay the catastrophe to my charge. I am truly thankful for the same feeling of conscientious firmness on entering upon the discharge of the duty before me, as would be required in case of direct invasion, open rebellion, or palpable treason, against our common country.
Without the States there can be no Union; the abrogation of State sovereignty is not a dissolution of the Union, but an absorption of its elements. He is the true man, the faithful officer, who is ready to assert and guard every jot of power rightfully belonging to each, and to resist the slightest encroachment or assumption of power on the part of either.
The Constitution of the United States is a peculiar instrument, and it has brought into existence and operation a peculiar system of government. But little if any aid is furnished in its construction by analogy. It is not merely a grant of powers. It not only confers powers upon the federal government, but it guarantees rights to the States and to the citizens. It was not designed merely to provide a general government for áll the States, but to provide security and protection f01« the States and people, who are parties to the compact by which it is created. Not only did it confer certain powers upon the general government, but it imposed solemn duties upon the government thereby created, and upon the States who were its creators. More than this, it solemnly enjoined upon both the state and general government, the exercise of certain powers and duties, and the abstaining by each, from the exercise of powers and functions exclusively pertaining to the other.
It is an instrument of grants and covenants. Somewhat like an indenture of conveyance, it contains not only grants of powers, but covenants for the faithful observance of the stipulations therein contained. It creates three distinct departments of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, and grants to each, the powers which it was designed that they should respectively exercise; and those powers not granted or prohibited to the States, it especially reserved to the States and the people. In addition to this, the States, parties to the instrument, by it, solemnly and mutually engaged that they would do certain things, and that certain things should not be done either by the government of the Union or of the States. The language of the Constitution is so peculiar, that the distinction between power to be conferred upon the government about to be created, and covenants entered into between the parties, as States, is obvious at a glance. Congress may exercise all the legislative power granted in the Constitution, but no other, because all others are especially reserved to the States and to the peo- pie. In the same article which grants the legislative powers to Congress, and enumerates and defines them, is contained also a prohibitory covenant or compact by which the States have agreed not to do certain things, which, before, as sovereignties, they had an undoubted right to do. “ No State shall grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a legal tender, pass any bills of attainder, ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts,” &c.
Now suppose, in violation of this compact, any State should do any of the things herein prohibited. Is it pretended that Congress has the right to make such acts on the part of the officers of the State penal ? or by legislation, call such offending State to account ? exclude it from the Union ? expel its representatives from their seats ? arrest its executive, its legislators and judges, and imprison them ? The acts of such State would be simply void; and it would be the duty of all courts, both Federal and State, so to declare them. They would afford no protection to any person or officer acting under them, not because Congress has any legislative power to denounce or abrogate them, but because they are in violation of the fundamental law.
So also, in the same section are contained sundry prohibitions üpon the United States, among which is the following : “The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public service may require it.” Suppose, in a time of profound peace and quiet, the federal government should pass a law suspending the privileges of this writ, would the State governments have the power to call to account the federal officers who had violated the compact in this behalf? the Congress who passed, and the executive who approved it ? Would the State courts be bound by it ? j>Tot at all. Such an act of Congress would simply be void, and it would be the duty of every State and Federal court so to pronounce it, and it would afford no protection to any officer, State or Federal, for refusing to obey such writ. I mention these illustrations to show that a great portion of our federal constitution rests in compact, while still another rests in grant. Where powers are granted, they are to be exercised: where rights rest in compact, they have still the force of law; but the federal government has no power to legislate upon them; they are to be obeyed and enforced by the parties to the compact, the States themselves.
I come now to consider the fourth article of the federal constitution. The first section provides that “ Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State,” &c. The first appearance of the various provisions of this article (except that in relation to fugitives from labor) in the National Convention, was in the “plan of a federal constitution,” submitted by Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, May 29, 1787. (2 Mad. Pap.) That plan contained no reference to fugitives from labor. Various plans were submitted and referred, propositions made, and adopted or rejected, when, on the 25th day of July, 1787, a committee of detail was appointed, consisting of seven members, of which Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, was chairman, “to report a Constitution conformable to the resolutions passed by the convention.” 2 Mad. Pap. 1197.
On the 6th day of August, Mr. Rutledge, from the committee of detail, made a report. In that report, the several sections now contained in the fourth article . . . , , (except the clause m relation to fugitives from labor, which had not yet been thought of,) followed each other, and the article in regard to records, as yet stopped with the mere assertion of the covenant, that full faith, &e., should be given to them; no power was given to Congress over the matter as yet.
The first suggestion that appears in regard to fugitives from labor, was made on the 28th day of August, 1787, when article 15, as reported by the committee of detail, was taken up. The article provided for the surrender of fugitives from justice.
Mr. Butler and Mr. Pinckney, (of S. C.) moved to require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.
Mr. Sherman saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse.
Mr. Butler withdrew his proposition in order that some particular proposition might be made apart from this article. Mad. Pap, 1447-8.
On the 29th of August, the provision in regard to public acts and records, came under consideration, when various propositions of amendment were made and were finally referred to a committee of which Mr. Rutledge was chairman. On the first of September, the article among other matters was reported back, and now, for the first time, was incorporated in it a power on the part of Congress to legislate upon the subject. Dr. Johnson, of Connecticut, objected to the grant of such power, because it would authorize the General Legislature to declare the effect of the legislative acts of one State in another State, and Mr. Randolph objected that it might enable the government to usurp all State powers. After some amend-metl^g the report was agreed to ; and thus, in addition to the compact by which full faith and credit were covenanted to be gi/en to the public acts, records, &c., of one State by every other State, Congress was granted the “ power to prescribe by general laws the manner of proving them and the effect thereof.”
This history is important, as it not only justifies and requires a distinction to be taken between grants of power and articles of compact, but it clearly demonstrates that the convention all along discriminated between grants of power to the government, and articles of compact between the States, and was extremely jealons and cautious in making such grants, and only did so when it was deemed absolutely necessary.
Having now traced through this compact, and discovered the time and manner when it became coupled with a power, let us trace along its neighbor, in regard to the reclaiming of fugitive slaves, and discover, if we can, the time and manner in which it shall be coupled with a grant of power to Congress, to secure its efficacjr by legislation. We have seen that the first suggestion in regard to the subject was on the 28th day of August, when Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Butler moved to connect it with the surrender of fugitives from justice, but withdrew the proposition for the purpose of making a separate provision. On the 29th day of August, Mr. Butler offered such provision in these words :
“ If any person bound to service or labor in any of the United States, shall escape into another State, he or she stall not be discharged from such service or labor in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.” “ Which was agreed to nem eon?
Here we have all the discussion upon the subject. Plan after plan for the organization of the government was made and presented, resolution upon resolution offered and discussed, embracing the whole ground of Federal and State rights and powers, without one word being mentioned of fugitive slaves ; and when it did occur to the minds of some members, suggested, unquestionably, by the clause in regard to fugitives from justice, it is quietly agreed that the States would deliver up such fugitives from labor. No power was asked for the federal government to seize them ; no such power was -dreamed of; the proposition that the States should respectively deliver them up, was acquiesced in without any dissent. Yet we are told arguendo by judicial authority, that without such a clause the Union could not have been formed, and that this provision was one of the essential compromises between the South and the North. In point of fact, it did not enter in the slightest degree into the compromises between the North and South. I have had time and opportunity to examine the debates in the conventions for the adoption of the Constitutions of only the States of North Carolina and South Carolina. In the former, the whole of article four was read, and though the grants of power, as contradistinguished from mere compact, were scrutinized closely, no objection was made to the absence of such grant, but the article was acquiesced in with only a few words of explanation from Mr. Iredell, who stated that the “northern delegates, owing to their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the word slave to be mentioned, but that was mearLing,” In the South Carolina convention, I have been unable to find a word of comment upon the subject. In Virginia, it was discussed by Messrs. Madison and Randolph, who never claimed for it the character of a power delegated to the national government. It is nowhere mentioned as entering into the compromises of the Constitution. How, then, can any one say, that without this provision the Union .could not have been formed ? And yet such assertion, contradicted by the truth of history, is made the pretext for the exercise of powers by the general government, that could not stand for a single moment upon a similar basis, in respect to any other subject matter.
We have seen how the power of legislation was granted to Congress in respect to public records, <fcc. We have seen that no such power is granted in respect to the surrender of fugitives from labor, and that it was not even asked for; and from the known temper and scruples of the national convention, we may safely affirm, that had it been asked it would not have been granted, and had it been granted, no Union could have been formed upon such a basis. The history of the times fully justifies this conclusion. Can it be supposed for a moment, that had the framers of the constitution imagined, that under this provision the federal government would assume to override the State authorities, appoint subordinate tribunals in every county in every State, invested with jurisdiction beyond the reach or inquiry of the State judiciary, to multiply executive and judicial officers ad infinitum, wholly independent of, and irresponsible to the police regulations of the State, and that the whole army and navy of the Union could be’sent into a State, without the request, and against the remonstrance of the legislature thereof; nay, even that under its operation the efficacy of the writ of Habeas Corpus could be destroyed, if the privileges thereof were not wholly suspended; if the members of the convention had dreamed that they were incorporating such a power into the constitution, does any one believe, that it would have been adopted without opposition and without debate-And if these results had suggested themselves to the States on its adoption, would it have been passed by them, sub sil&ntio, jealous as they were of State rights and State sovereignty ? The idea is preposterous. The Union would never have been formed upon such a basis. It is an impeachment of historic truth, to assert it.
The clause in regard to public records forms one section by itself, with its grant of power added upon full consideration. The second section of the same article contains three clauses, but all grouped and numbered together.
“ The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”
“A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive au* thority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.”
“ No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in conse(luence of any law or regulations therein, be dis-chai'ged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor 01> serv^ce may &liey
Here is the whole of the section, without one word of grant, or one word from which a grant may be inferred or implied. Congress has the same power to legislate in regard, to fugitives from justice or labor. But it may be asked, how are the rights here stipulated and guaranteed, to be enforced? I answer, that every State officer, executive, legislative and judicial, who takes an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, is bound to provide for, and aid in their enforcement, according to the true intent and meaning of the Constitution. But what if one or more States should refuse to perform their duty, and its officers violate their oaths and repudiate the compact ? This question is answered by asking another — "What if Congress should declare a single violation of one of its laws, treason, and that a conviction thereof should work corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate beyond the life of the person attainted, and the judicial department should pronounce it valid, and the executive attempt to enforce it? The simple answer is, that when the State and federal officers become so regardless of their oaths and obligations as either question implies, anarchy or revolution, or both, must supervene, for the government would be a wilful departure from the fundamental law of its organization, and the people would be absolved from their allegiance to it. I do not mean to say that every minor, or unintentional departure from the constitution must work such disastrous results. On the part of the States and people there is a fixed attachment to the Constitution, and when its provisions are violated or its restraints overleaped, discussion ensues, and the government is “brought hack to the constitutional tack; hut I repudiate the degrading insinuation that State officers are less faithful to the constitution, than federal officers. On the contrary, from the very fact that upon them is devolved the duty and responsibility of guarding the rights and sovereignty of the States under the compact of the Union, they must necessarily he more watchful of the exercise or assumption of power, on the part of the States respectively and of the general government, than federal officers would naturally he.
■ It may he again repeated, and cannot he repeated too often, that upon the States rests the immense responsibility of preserving not only their own sovereignty, hut the just constitutional powers of the general government. Let it also he remembered, that the States and their civil functionaries are as essential to the existence and operation of the government of the Union as are the peculiar officers of the latter. Each and all are parts of a united whole, and all are bound by the most solemn ties of fidelity to all and every part thereof.
"What would he thought by the people of this country, should Congress pass a law to carry into effect that clause of the fourth article in regard to citizenship ? and declare pains and penalties against any State functionary who should fail to comply ? What would he thought if Congress should declare it a penitentiary offence, for any executive of a State to refuse to surrender a fugitive from j ustice? What state would submit to see its chief magistrate dragged before the federal tribunals, on charge of infraction of such a law, or what federal court would assume to compel his ohe- dience by mandamus ? And yet the assumption of power to legislate at all upon the subject, is assuming supreme and unlimited power over the whole matter. ipjjere -g no uQLxddle ground. A bare statement of the proposition assumed, is its most effectual refutation.
The law of 1793 was in fact but little, if any more than organizing the State authorities for the accomplishment of the constitutional duties devolved upon them. For that very reason it passed without scrutiny, and for a long time was obeyed without question. It waspractically nothing more than the states themselves carrying out the constitutional compact. Not until it began to be required that the States should yield up all control over these subj ects, and a prostration of their sovereignty was demanded, did attention become aroused. No importance therefore can justly be attached to the fact that this act was passed by an early Congress and was signed by the father of his country, and was acquiesced in by the states and people. It is a remarkable fact that the most startling deviations from strict constitutional limits occurred in the very earliest years of the Republic. So it must always be. But time, discussion, and experience have heretofore proved adequate correctives. So may they ever prove. Added to these, State sovereignty jeopardized, federal encroachment apprehended, and consolidation menacing, can hardly fail to accomplish the desired ends.
To my mind therefore, it is apparent that Congress has no constitutional power to legislate on this subject. It is equally apparent, that the several States can pass no laws, nor adopt any regulations, by which the fugitive may be discharged from service. All such, laws and regulations must be declared void whenever they are ’brought to the test of judicial scrutiny, state or national.' It is equally apparent, that it is the duty of the respective States to make laws and regulations for the faithful observance of this compact. They have generally done so, and doubtless would have continued so to do, but for the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Prigg versus Commonwealth of Penn. It is still their duty so to do.
Again, it is to my mind apparent, that the provision of the constitution in regard to fugitives from lar bor or service, contemplates a judicial determination of the lawfulness of the claim which may be made.
Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, who reported the clause, for the first time, Aug. 29th, 1787, framed its conclusion as follows: “ but shall be delivered up to the person JUSTLY claiming their service or labor.” How was the justice of the claim to be ascertained? Who were to determine it ? — -Fugitives were not to be discharged in consequence of any law or regulation of the States to which they may have fled. Not discharged by whom? The federal government ? No, but by the States, in consequence, or by virtue of any law or regulation therein. “But shall be delivered up.” By whom ? Evidently by the same power which had covenanted not to discharge them. Shall be delivered up by the States, not seized by the federal government.
The clause as finally adopted reads, “ but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor is DUE.” Here is a fact to be ascertained, before the fugitive can be legally delivered up, viz : that his service or labor is really due to the party who claims him. How is the fact to be ascertained? A claim is set up to the service of a 'person. He who makes the claim, is denominated by the Constitution a party. The claimant is one party, the person who resists the claim is another party. If he really owes the gervjce accorcling to the laws of the State from which he is alleged to have escaped, and has in fact escaped, he must be delivered up. If the claim is unfounded, he cannot be delivered up. The Constitution itself has made up the issue, and arranged the parties to it. Can any proposition be plainer, than that here is suspended a legal right upon an issue of fact, which can only be determined by the constitutional judicial tribunals of the country? It bears no analogy to the extradition of fugitives from justice. In the latter case, no issue is presented by the Constitution. Judicial proceedings have already been commenced, and this is but a species of process to bring the defendant into court. No claim is to be determined. He is to be delivered up from the mere fact that he is charged, to be removed to the State dem'anding him for trial. He is placed in the custody, and under the protection of the law, in the regular course of judicial proceedings. But in the former case there can be no delivery until the claim is tried and determined, and then the fugitive is delivered, not into the custody of the law, but into the possession and control of the party who has established his claim; not to be removed to another State or tribunal for trial,-with the shield of the law over him, but to be reduced, without further process or trial, to absolute subjection, fco be taken whithersoever the claimant may desire. In the one case, the proceedings are commenced and terminated where the claim is made; in the other, the suit is commenced where the offence is committed, and the law sends out its process to bring in the defendant to meet the charge. While that process is being served, through all its mutations, he is as much under the protection of the law as he who executes it, and in its eye, both are equal.
Here there is a fact, an issue, to be judicially determined, before a right can be enforced. What authority shall determine it ? Clearly the authority of the State whose duty it is to deliver up the fugitive when the fact is determined. Until the issue which the. Constitution itself creates, is decided, the person is entitled to the protection of the laws of the State. When the issue is determined against the fugitive, then the constitutional compact rises above the laws and regulations of the State, and to the former the latter must yield.
To my mind this seems very clear and simple. The whole proceeding is clearly a judicial one, and I will not stop here to demonsti’ate what, from the preceding remarks, appears so obvious. The law of 1850, by providing for a trial of the constitutional issue, between the parties designated thereby, by officers not recognized by any constitution, State or national, is unconstitutional and void.
It has been already said, that until the claim of the owner be interposed, the fugitive in this State is, to all intents and purposes, a free man.
The interposition of the claim, by legal process, is the commencement of a suit. “ A suit is the prosecution of some claim, demand, or request.’’ 6 Wheat. 407. The trial of such claim is the trial of a suit. Therefore the trial thereof must not only be had before a judicial tribunal, but whether proceedings be commenced by the fugitive to resist the claimant, or by the claimant to enforce, and establish his claim, it would seem, that either party would be entitled to a jury. It is no answer to this position to say that neither the States nor the General Government have pro-yj¿[e£L means for such a mode of trial. The Constitutional right of the party remains the same. The late organization of our County Courts, failed to provide a trial by a constitutional jury, yet the Supreme Court held that parties were nevertheless entitled to demand it. If provision is not made for such a trial, it is the. duty of the proper authority to make it. Nor is- it any answer to this position to say, that the proceeding to reclaim and re-possess a fugitive from service, is not a “ suit at common law.” This question is already settled. It has been judicially determined that the term “ common law ”. was used in the Constitution in contradistinction to suits in admiralty or equity. Were it otherwise, Congress need only to change the common law form of procedure, to nullify the right of trial by jury in all cases. See Story Comm. 645, et seq.; 3 Pet 446.
Mr. Justice Story says, “ in a just sense, the amendment may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume, to settle legal rights.” We have already seen that the legal right of the claimant must be settled be. fore a fugitive from labor can be delivered up. We have already seen that a suit is held to be “ the prosecution of some claim, demand, or request.” The conclusion seems to be irresistible, therefore, that the prosecution of the claim to a fugitive from labor, or resistance to such claim by legal proceedings on the part of the fugitive, is a suit, not in equity or admiralty, and hence at common law, within the purview of the Constitution. Of course I do not pretend to say that such a proceeding is technically a suit at common law ; nor is a proceeding by foreign attachment, and many other proceedings which are held to be embraced by the jury provision of the Constitution. Authorities might be multiplied on this subject, were it necessary.
Again, it is said that the Constitution evidently contemplates a summary mode of proceeding in the case of a fugitive from labor. Where is the evidence of it ? Nothing of the kind is found in the history of the provision, nor in its pathway to the Constitution. Nothing of the kind is apparent from the language used ; for it distinctly imports a trial of the claim, and a determination of the fact that labor or service is due to the claimant before a delivery can be made. When the evidence of such an intention is furnished, there will be time enough to trample down all forms of law, and set at naught every settled rule of construction. But, admit the fact. A provision may be made for obtaining a jury in a summary manner, as is sometimes done for the trial of the right of property seized by attachment. But I can pursue this subject no further.
Again, the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. This last phrase has a distinct technical meaning, viz: regular judicial proceedings, according to the course of the common law, or by a regular suit commenced and prosecuted according to the forms of law. An essential requisite is due process to bring the party into court. It is in accordance with the first principles of natural law. Every person is entitled to his “ day in court,” to be legally notified of the proceedings taken against him, and duly summoned to defend.' The passing of judgment upon any person without his “ day in court; ” without due process, or its equivalent, is contrary to the law of nature, and of the civilized world, and without the express guaranty of the Constitution, it would be implied as a fundamental condition of all civil governments. But the tenth section of the act of 1850, expressly nullifies this provision of the Constitution. It provides that the claimant may go before any Court of Record, or judge, in vacation, and without process, make proof of the escape, and the owing of sendee or labor ; whereupon a record is made of the matters proved, and a general description of the person alleged to have escaped ;. a transcript of such record made out and attested by the clerk with the seal of the court, being exhibited to the Judge or Commissioner, must be taken and held to be conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that service or labor is due to the party mentioned in the record, and may be held sufficient evidence of the identity of the person escaping.
Here is a palpable violation of the Constitution. Can that be said to be by due process of law which is without process altogether ? Here the status or condition of the person is instantly changed in his absence, without process, without notice, without opportunity, to meet or examine the witnesses against him, or rebut their testimony. A record is made, which is conclusive against him, “in any State or Territory in which he may be found.” It is not a process to bring the person before the court in which the record is made up, but it is to all intents and purposes, a judgment of the court or judge, which commits the person absolutely to the control and possession of the claimant, to be taken whithersoever he pleases, to be dragged from a State where the legal presumption is in favor of his freedom, to any State or Territory where the legal presumption is against his freedom.
Is not this depriving a person of liberty without due process of law ? Other Courts and other Judges, may pronounce this provision of the Act of 1850 to be in conformity with that provision of the Constitution which declares that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” but while I have a mind to reason and a conscience to dictate me, and an oath to support the Constitution of the United States resting upon my soul, I cannot so declare it, and for the price of worlds I will not.
Upon this branch of that act I am not aware that there has been any adjudication. Certainly there has been none that can be claimed as authority here. The same may be said in regard to the trial by Jury. There are other points equally fatal to this act when tested by the Constitution, but I have not time nor inclination now to discuss them.
I ought not to dismiss the consideration of this question, without particularly adverting to the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Penn., 16 Peter’s Pep. 540. The opinions in the other cases cited, are so conflicting, casual, or incidental, as to be of no force; and of the case of Prigg vs. Penn., it may be justly remarked that the discrepancy of opinion among the members' of the court, was so wide and fundamental, as greatly to impair the authority of that decision. It affirms the constitutionality of the act of 1193 upon contemporaneous exposition, in one respect, and ex- Pressty defies the same- rule in another, for itpronoun-ces the act constitutional in part, and unconstitutional in another part. Whatever of authority may attach ^ conseque!lce 0f the character and eminence of the men who passed it, and of him who signed it, is effectually counteracted by the decision of the court that in one part of it, at least, the constitution was violated. Contemporaneous construction confers the power of legislation and execution upon the States as well as Congress; for, long before Congress assumed to act upon the subject, the State legislature had passed laws in fidelity to the compact, in most of which some of the framers of the constitution had seats, and all of the slave States, and all or nearly all the free States' continued to exercise the power up to a very recent period.
Contemporaneous history, contemporaneous exposition, early and long continued acquiescence, all go to show the interpretation given to this provision of the Constitution by the States and the people. The slave States passed acts to execute the 'compact. The free States did the same. The action of the several States, or many of them, shows conclusively that they interpreted the provision as a compact merely addressed to the good faith of the States. The slave States appealed to the free States for legislative action to carry into effect this provision of the federal Constitution, and demanded of the latter the stern exercise of a power which it is now sought to wrest from them. In 1826, the State of-Maryland appointed commissioners to attend upon the session of the legislature of Pennsylvania and induce the latter to pass an act to facilitate the reclamation of fugitive slaves. Their mission was successful. Pennsylvania yielded to the solicitations of Maryland’s commissioners, and passed the act of 1826, which was afterwards declared void by the Sir preme Court of the United States in Prigg vs. Penn In 1836 or 1837, similar commissioners were appointed by the State of Kentucky to the State of Ohio, whose mission resulted in the passage of a most string-entrfugitive act by the legislature of Ohio. So also, about the same time, in regard to Indiana, and I believe Illinois. Up to 1837, the States esteemed it their duty, and slave States demanded its performance, to provide by law, for the execution and faithful observance of this compact. All seemed to regard it as a compact and nothing else ; binding, it is true, and operative as law equally upon all, but still a compact and a compact only.
Again, it is respectfully suggested, that the whole argument of Mr. Justice Story is based upon what is sometimes called the petitio prineipii. He assumes that the constitution makes it the duty of the federal government to enforce the right of the owner secured by the compact, and then infers that it must necessarily have the power, and then, if Congress has it, the States cannot have it.
All admit that there is no express power in the Constitution to legislate upon this subject, but it is claimed to be necessarily implied, as incidental to the grant of judicial power. The reclamation of a fugitive is first decided to be a “ case ” arising under the Constitution of the United States, and hence within the judicial power. But this mode of implying powers can never be sustained. The judicial power is extended in several respects beyond the legislative .power. The judicial power has jurisdiction in cases arising between the citizens of different States. A citizen of Yew York may sue a citizen of Wisconsin, upon a promissory note, bill of exchange, covenants in a deed, in partition of real estate, or even in ejectment for the p0gsegs^0Il or title to lands. • If a power of legislation may therefore be grafted by implication upon a judicial power, Congress may assume the whole power of legislation over these subjects in the respective States, and necessarily exclude State legislation, and accomplish at a blow the complete prostration and overthrow of the State sovereignty. Other illustrations might be given to manifest the danger of engrafting a legislative power upon a judicial, by implication. This was tried at an early day, and by the same course of reasoning, common law jurisdiction was claimed for the courts of the United States, and power of legislation over all common law subjects, claimed by implication in Congress. The Alien and Sedition laws were chiefly defended on these grounds.
On the contrary Chief Justice Taney, in his dissenting opinion, though he admits the right of Congress to legislate, but does not argue it, thinks the compact peculiarly enjoins the duty upon the States.
Again, this case explicitly decides the claim of the owner to a fugitive slave to be a “ case” within the meaning of the Constitution; hence it is a suit, not in admiralty, or equity, and hence at common law, within the meaning of the Constitution. It also decides the determination of the claim to be a judicial proceeding, and bases the power of the federal government in the premises, upon the grant of judicial power, and the power of legislation is assumed to be incidental to that. All these points, which are held to be res adjudicata, strike at the very vitality of the act of 1850, which attempts to confer such judicial power upon Commissioners. Time will not permit a further review of this case. In my judgment the opinion of the Chief Justice completely overthrows that of the Court, and so far as he attempts to argue his points, beyond doubt or controversy, establishes the doctrine here contended for.
In view of the dissentient opinions of the members of the Supreme Bench ; in view of the discrepancy of opinion which has characterized all other decisions wherein the question has been raised and argued ; in view of the fugitive character of the power here claimed by Congress, leaping from article to article, from section to section, and from clause to clause, hovering now over a grant, then over a compact, fluttering now around an implication, then around an incident, to find whereon it may rest its foot; in view of the alarm which has seized upon many of the States in consequence of the enormous power which it has called upon Congress to assume in its behalf, and the deep wounds which it seeks to inflict upon the rights and sovereignty of the States, and upon the great principles of human freedom; in view of all this, are we not justified in asking of the Supreme Court of the United States to review their decision as the majority pronounced it in the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ?
If, after all the principles of that decision shall be re-affirmed, there still remain the great questions of trial by jury, the unauthorized delegation of judicial power, the exporte proceedings, without process, which change the status of the person whose liberty is attacked, and some others untouched and undetermined.
We thus find ourselves without any authoritative judicial guide in relation to the Act of 1850. The fundamental questions here raised, have, some of them, been controverted for some years, and those which it was the design to settle in the case just quoted, remain ag fruj£fu]_ subjects of bitter discussion, and discordant action; for it may be truthfully affirmed that that decision has never been deemed satisfactory, but has often been called in question on both sides of the controversy. Other questions here presented have not been settled judicially, but as yet, every Court and Judge is bound to consider and determine for itself, according to its best judgment.
What, then, is to be done ? Let the Free States return to their duty, if they have departed from it, and be faithful to the compact, in the true spirit in which it was conceived and adopted. Let the Slave States be content with such an execution of the compact as the framers of it contemplated. Let the federal government return to the exercise of the just powers conferred by the Constitution, and few, very few, will be found to disturb the tranquility of the Nation, or to oppose, by word or deed, the due execution of the laws. But until this is done, I solemnly believe that there will be no peace for the State or the Nation, but that agitation, acrimony and hostility will mark our progress, even if we escape a more dread calamity, which I will not even mention.
However this may be, well knowing the cost, I feel a grateful consciousness of having discharged my duty, and full duty; of having been true to the sovereign rights of my State, which has honored me with its confidence, and to the Constitution of my country, which has blessed me with its protection ; and though I may stand alone, I hope I may stand approved of my God, as I know I do of my conscience.
Afterwards a writ of certiorari was applied for, and 1 \ allowed by the justice, who ordered the discharge, and Ms return tliereto is substantially the same as herein-before set forth.
The cause came on for argument before the Supreme Court at the June term, 1854, before a full Bench.
Byron Paine, Esq., for the petitioner.
J. R. Bharpstein, Esq., cmd E. G. Ryan, Esq., for the respondent.
[The arguments of counsel in this case were long and able, but it is difficult to abreviate them, without materially impairing their force, and the plan of this volume will not permit their insertion at length.]

Opinion:
By the Court,
Whitok, C. J~.
The questions presented by this record are of great importance. A citizen of this State presented a petition to a justice of this court, setting forth that he'was unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and praying that a writ of habeas corpus might be issued to bring him before the said justice, together with the cause of his imprisonment, in order that he might be liberated, if, upon investigation, it should be ascertained that his confinement was illegal.. The writ was issued and served, and the prisoner brought before the officer ; and such proceedings were there had, that the prisoner was discharged. A writ of certiorari was issued to bring the record of these proceedings before this court, in order to correct any error that might have been committed.
The first question that presents itself, is, whether the writ of certiorari can properly issue from this *n a case the present. It is contended by the relator (Booth,) that the writ ought not to have been issued, because we have no power to remand him -j-jagk; again to the custody from which he was discharged. But this, if true, would, as the matter appears to us, constitute no objection to our jurisdiction. It would only show that, if we should be of opinion that the relator was improperly discharged, we should not have the power to give entire relief in the premises ; but a simple reversal of the order of discharge, by this court, without remanding the prisoner, would enable the person from whose custody the relator was discharged, to retake his prisoner. The Constitution of this State, (Art. 7, Sec. 8,) gives this court power to issue writs of " Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Quo warranto, Certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same." We held in the case of the Attorney General, vs. Blossom, 1 Wis. R. 317, that this power was not granted to the Supreme Court merely to enable it to enforce the jurisdiction conferred upon it in other parts of the Constitution, but, on the contrary, that this clause of the Constitution conferred jurisdiction upon this court to issue the writs mentioned, in all proper cases. It follows that this court has the power to issue any of the writs enumerated, in any case proper for their issue, and to hear and determine them.
It will hardly be contended that this is not a proper case for the exercise of this power. A judicial decision has been had, by force of which a person has been discharged from imprisonment, and those who have an interest in having the imprisonment continued, as public officers or otherwise, and from whose custody he was discharged, have a right to the proper writ or process to "bring the case "before this court for revision. And the writ of certiorari is the proper one for that purpose. We therefore think that this objection of the relator is untenable.
The nest question presented is, whether a justice of this court has the power to issue, in vacation, a writ of Habeas Corpus, and make it returnable before himself at chambers. It is contended by the plaintiff in error, (Ableman) that as this power is given by the statute, (Rev. Stat.,chap. 124, sec. 3) to "judges of the Supreme, Circuit or County Courts" only, a justice of this court has no power to issue the writ. The reason given to sustain this position, is, that at the time the act conferring this power was passed, there were no justices of the Supreme Court; that the Constitution of the State provided for the election of circuit judges ; and that by force of the Constitution they were to be judges of the Supreme Court for five years, and after-wards, until the Legislature should otherwise provide.
It is further urged in support of this position, that the provision in the Constitution providing for the organization of a separate Supreme Court, after the expiration of five years, (if the Legislature should see fit to establish one,) and the organization of the present court by virtue of this provision, show that the justices of the court should do no act which can come before the court for review; it being the intention of the framers of the Constitution and of the Legislature which passed the act regulating the manner in which the writ of Habeas Corpus is to be issued, that the present court should not sit in review upon any decisions made by one of its members ; thus avoiding what was thought to be an evil, while the Supreme Court was composed of the circuit judges.
"We no^ fbink fbis objection well taken. The act to provide for the organization of this court, (Sess. Laws 1852, chap. 395, sec. 4) expressly declares chief justice and associate justices of this court shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities to which the judges of the former Supreme Court were subject. Among those duties was that of granting writs of Habeas Corpus, when applied for in a proper case; and we think that we should be guilty of a gross violation of duty, were we to refuse them merely because the case might be reviewed before the whole court. The Legislature have a right to impose any duty upon us as a court, or upon the justices who compose the court, which is not incompatible with the Constitution ; and we do not think that the term " Separate Supreme Court," which is applied to this tribunal, necessarily implies that the justices of the court cannot be empowered by the Legislature to do any act which may come before the whole court.
The next question is, whether the writ ought to have been issued, it appearing from the petition of the relator that he was imprisoned by color of legal process issued by a Commissioner of the United States for the district of Wisconsin. It is insisted by the counsel of the plaintiff in error, that in all cases the general comity of courts which have concurrent jurisdiction, leaves the case to the court whose jurisdiction first attaches, and that such jurisdiction cannot be taken from the court by subsequent proceedings in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction. It is further insisted, that this rule applies on higher grounds to courts of the distinct jurisdiction of the States and the United States, and that the process and proceedings of commissioners form no exception to this rule, as they are officers of the courts, and recognized as part of the judicial organization of the United States. We do not see how these commissioners can properly he called officers of the courts of the United States. It is true that they are appointed by the judges of those courts, but neither the courts nor the judges are responsible for their acts. On the contrary, their duty and power are prescribed with particularity in acts of Congress. The courts have no power to direct them as to the mode in which the duties imposed upon them by law shall be performed, and it seems to us to be a great misuse of language to call them officers of the courts. Nor do we think that they can, with any propriety; be called judicial officers. The Constitution of the United States, art. 3, sec. 1, provides that " the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the superior and inferior courts, shall hold their office during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation,which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." In the case of Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, 1 Wheaton R. 305, the Supreme Court of the United States say, after quoting this section of the Constitution: " Could Congress create or limit any other tenure of the judicial office? Could they refuse to pay, at stated times, the stipulated salary, or diminish it during the continuance in office ? But one answer can be given to these questions ; it must be in the negative." And again, in the same case : " Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in the courts ordained and established by itself." We there- d° n°t see how these commissioners can be regarded as a part of the judicial organization of the United States. But the position assumed by the counge} £01. -¿Pe plaintiff in error, that the court whose jurisdiction first attaches to a case will retain it, notwithstanding that proceedings may be subsequently commenced in other courts of concurrent jurisdiction, is, we think, indisputably correct. It is a familiar principle, and will be denied by no one. But the question arises, whether the facts stated in the petition of the relator for the writ of Habeas Corpus, show such a case.
It will not be denied that the citizens of the State naturally and properly look to their own State tribunals for relief from all kinds of illegal restraint and imprisonment. These courts are clothed with power sufficient for their protection, and would be recreant to their duty were they to refuse to exercise it upon all proper occasions. We do not think the principle contended for by the plaintiff in error applies to a case of this nature.
The petitioner stated, in his petition for the writ, that he was restrained of his liberty by reason of a pretended warrant, a copy of which is annexed to the petition. By that it appears that Winfield Smith, acting as a commissioner of the United States, had, upon an examination of the petitioner for an alleged offence against the laws of the United States, ordered the petitioner to recognize with sufficient sureties in the sum of two thousand dollars, for his appearance at a term of the District Court, to be held at Madison on the first Monday of July then next, and that, in default of the recognizance, the marshal was commanded to deliver him to the common jail, <fec. The warrant recites that the petitioner had been charged on oath " with having, on the eleventh day of March, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, at the city of Milwaukee, in the county of Milwaukee, in said county and district, unlawfully aided, assisted and abetted a person named Joshua Glover, held to service or labor in the State of Missouri, under the laws thereof, and being the property of one Benammi S. Garland, and having escaped therefrom into the State of Wisconsin, to escape from the lawful custody of Charles C. Cotton, a deputy of the marshal of the United States for the district of Wisconsin; the said Chaxdes C. Cotton having then and there arrested and taken into custody the said Joshua Glover, by virtue of a warrant issued by the judge of the United States for said district, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress in that case made and provided, approved September eighteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty."
In order to show that the ease is within the principle in question, it must appear that the District Court of the United States had the case pending before it which was made by the issuing and service of the writ of Habeas Corpus ; that the question of the legality of the imprisonment of the petitioner was then pending before that court; and this the facts in the case do not show. At most, they merely show the case of a person arrested upon a charge of having committed an offence, and an imprisonment in order to compel his appearance before the court which has the power to try him. In such a case, the investigation of the legality of his imprisonment does not necessarily involve an inquiry into the question of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, nor of his liability to be held to answer for the alleged offence.
Tims, if the imprisonment is by virtue of a warrant issued by a State magistrate, any officer in the State, authorized to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus, may exam^ne the cause of his imprisonment, and may discharge the prisoner upon his giving bail for his appearance at the proper court, to answer for the offence with which he is charged, if bail has been refused by the magistrate, and the officer who issues the writ of Habeas Corpus should be of opinion that the offence was bailable. So if the magistrate has no authority to imprison. So if the warrant of commitment should set forth no offence, and the commitment should be for that reason irregular, unless proof should be offered with the return of the writ, to show that the prisoner was guilty of an offence. Rev. Stat., chap. 124, sec. 21. In these cases and many more which might be put, the question of the legality of the imprisonment is investigated without ousting a court of any jurisdiction which it has acquired. Nor do we think the question is changed by the fact that the officer who issued the warrant by virtue of which the petitioner was imprisoned, was an officer of the United States. In many cases the State courts and United States courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In some the jurisdiction of the State courts is exclusive ; and in some that of the United States courts is exclusive. When the jurisdiction is concurrent, the court whose jurisdiction first attaches will retain the case, and the other courts will not interfere, as in no other way can a conflict between the different courts be prevented ; and, of course, when a court has exclusive jurisdiction, no other court can take jurisdiction.
But if the conclusions we have arrived at are correct, the jurisdiction of no court is disturbed by issu ing a writ of Habeas Corpus and discharging a prisoner who has been committed by an inferior magistrate for refusing to procure bail for his appearance at some court, to answer for an alleged offence, or when bail has been refused and the prisoner is held in custody.
In Sims' case, (7 Cush. R. 285) the Supreme Court of Massachusetts saw no objection, on this account, to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus to bring before the court a prisoner in the custody of a marshal of the United States, under a'warrant issued by a commissioner of the United States, though the court refused the writ for other reasons. See also 7 Cowen's R.. 471; 10 Johnson's R. 328.
It was insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that our statute (Rev. Stat. chap. 124 sec. 28) interposed an insurmountable objection to the jurisdiction of a State officer in a case like the present, because it provides that the officer shall, although the commitment be irregular, remand the prisoner to custody, or hold him to bail, if it appears from the testimony offered with the return that he has been guilty of an offence. In such a case it is insisted that the officer acts as an examining magistrate, whose duties he cannot discharge if the offence proved is one of which the United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction. But we think that whatever difficulties this section of the statute may create as to the proper course to be pursued by the officer, in a case of that description, it should not be construed so as to deprive a State court or officer of the power to issue the writ in all cases where a citizen of this State is held in custody on the ground of an alleged violation of a law of the United States. The same difficulty would P1,esen* itself if a State magistrate should commit a person to prison for .refusing to give bail for his appearance at a court of the United States, to answer £or an 0£fence against the laws of the United States, under the act of Congress approved September 24th, 1789.
There being no valid objection to issuing the writ and bringing the prisoner before the officer, the question arises, whether the discharge of the prisoner was in accordance with law. The return of the marshal to the writ of Habeas Corpus sets out substantially the same reason for the detention of the prisoner as that stated in the petition for the writ above given, so that there is no necessity for re-stating it. The first objection taken to the return, is that it does not set forth a valid warrant. Upon this subject we fully concur in.the opinion of the justice of this court who discharged the prisoner. The warrant fails to state any offence under the act of Congress in question, inasmuch as it does not show for what purpose Joshua Glover, therein named, was in the custody of the deputy of the marshal. He may have been in custody pursuant to the act of Congress approved September 18th, 1850, and not have been arrested as a fugitive from labor. The warrant does not therefore state that the petitioner aided, abetted or assisted a person who was arrested as a fugitive from labor, to escape from custody. This is essential in order to constitute an offence against the act of Congress. We are aware that it is sufficient in a warrant to state the offence, without that particularity required in an indictment; but still there must be at least a general statement of the offence, in order to justify the arrest.
It is further objected to the return of the marshal, that, admitting Glover to have been arrested as a fugitive from labor, under the act of Congress approved September 18th, 1850, still his arrest was unlawful for the reason that the act is repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore void. And it is contended by the relator that it can be no crime to abet or assist a person to escape from illegal imprisonment, without using force or violence. The principal reasons urged in favor of this position of the relator, are that the Constitution of the United States confers no power upon Congress to legislate upon the subject of the surrender of fugitives from labor; that the act in question attempts to confer judicial power upon commissioners and not upon courts ; and that by virtue of the act a person may be deprived of his liberty "without due process of law."
On the other hand, it is contended by the plaintiff in error that these questions are not now open for discussion, as they have all been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States ; and that as that court is the only one which has the power to settle finally the question of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, all other courts are bound to acquiesce in its decision. It is not of course claimed by the plaintiff in error that the act of Congress in question has been before that court for consideration, but it is contended that an act passed by Congress February 12th, 17 93, (1 U. S. Stat. at large, 302) contains provisions not distinguishable in principle from those of the act of September 18th, 1850, and that that court has decided this act to be valid and obligatory. We do not understand that the two acts are in all respects alike in principle, or even similar. The act of 1793 provides for the surrender of fugitives from justice, and also fugitives from labor, and so far as it relates to the latter description of persons, it is similar to the act of 1850. But the two acts differ essentially in the manner -n -fcPg surrender is to be effected. By the former, the person to whom the service or labor was due, was authorized to seize or arrest the fugitive, and to take him before any judge of the circuit or district court of the United States, residing or being within the State, or before any magistrate of a county, city or town corporate wherein such seizure or arrest was made, and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit taken and certified by a magistrate of any such State or Territory, that the person so seized owed service or labor under the laws of the State from which such fugitive fled, to the claimant, it became the duty of-the judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to the claimant, his agent or attorney, which was sufficient warrant for the removal of the fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped. It will be observed that the alleged fugitive was to be taken before some judge of the Circuit or District Court of the United States, or before some State magistrate, who decided upon the question of the surrender of the fugitive to the claimant, upon proof to be submitted to him. ITe had the power to weigh the testimony and to decide upon its sufficiency. The act of September 18th, 1850, differs from that of 1793 in two essential particulars. By the former certain officers called commissioners are authorized to make the surrender and give the certificate, and the testimony to show the fact that the alleged fugitive owes service or labor, and that he has escaped, is not to be weighed by the commissioner, but has an effect given to it by the act, independent entirely of the opinion of the commie-sioner in regard to its sufficiency. The tenth section of the act provides that when any person held to service or labor in any State or Terri tory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom such service or labor shall be due, or his agent or attorney, may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court, or judge in vacation, of the escape aforesaid, and that the person escaping owed service or labor to such party. Whereupon the court shall cause a record to be made of the matter so proved, and also a general description of the person so escaping, with such convenient certainty as may be, and a transcript of such record authenticated by the attestation of the clerk and of the seal of said court, being produced in any other State, Territory or district in which the person so escaping may be found, and being exhibited to any judge, commissioner or other officer authorized by the law of the United States to cause persons escaping from service or labor to be delivered up, shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service or labor of the person escaping is due to the party in such record mentioned.
It can hardly be claimed, we think, that any adjudication upon the act of 1193 could decide all the questions involved in the act of 1850. But we will examine the cases referred to by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, upon this point. The act of 1193 received a very elaborate examination in the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters R. 640. The question, however, involved in the record before the court, was simply whether Prigg, the plaintiff' had the right to seize without process in the State of Pennsylvania Margaret Morgan, a fugitive slave, and remove her to the State of Maryland, from which she had escaped, contrary to the statute of the former State. The decision of the court was, that he had the power, and the court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had affirmed the judgment of the court in which Prigg was convicted. The principal question discussed by the justices of the court who gave opinions, was, the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of the reclamation of fugitives from labor; and they were all of opinion that Congress had the power ; a majority holding that the power was exclusive, and that the State could not pass laws even in aid of the legislation of Congress. In the course of this discussion nothing was said in relation to the powers of commissioners, for those officers did not exist at the time when the act of Congress was passed ; nor of the right of the alleged fugitive to a trial by jury to decide the question of fact upon which his surrender depends. In the case of Jones vs. Van Zandt, 5 How. R. 215, the act of 1793 came again before the court for its consideration ; and in the course of the opinion given that case, the court says : " This court has already, after much deliberation, decided that the act of February 12th, 1793, was not repugnant to the Constitution. The reasons for their opinion are fully explained Justice Story in Prigg vs. Penn., 16 Peters 611."
In the case of Moore vs. Illinois, 14 How. R. 13, the court states what was decided in the case of Prigg vs. Penn., and among the questions to be decided in that case was this : " That the government is clothed with appropriate authority and functions to enforce the delivery (of fugitive slaves) on claim of the owner, and has properly exercised it in the act of Congress of February 12th, IN 9 3." These are aH the cases which we have been able to find where the act of 1793 has come before the Supreme Court of the United States for review, and in none of them is the question of the power of commissioners to give the certificate to the claimant which authorizes the removal of the fugitive, discussed or decided.
These cases are equally silent upon the question (a most important one) raised in this case, as to the right of a person claimed as a fugitive from labor to have the facts, which must be proved befoi*e he can be surrendered to the claimant, tried and decided by a jury. It is true that the act of 1793 provides for the surrender of the person claimed as a fugitive, without such a trial and decision, and it is said in substance by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Jones vs. Van Zandt and Moore vs. Illinois, that the court did decide in the case of Prigg vs. Penn. that the act of February 12th, 1793, was constitutional. But upon looldng at that case, we find that the question of a trial by jury to determine the facts of the case, was not raised by the record and was not discussed by the court in giving its opinion. We think it would be most unjust to tliat court to hold that it has decided questions which its judges have not even discussed, and which have not even been before it for adjudication.
We are of opinion, therefore, that, whatever may be the duty of this court in relation to the question of the power of Congress to provide by law for the surrender of fugitives from labor to the persons to whom their labor is due, we are not at liberty to con- aider question of the right of a person claimed as fugitive to a trial by jury before he can be surrendered or delivered up to the claimant, as already set-py the court which has the power dually to decide all questions growing out of an alleged violation of the Constitution of the United States by an act of Congress. We must consider the question as an open one.
It becomes, therefore, our duty to decide whether so much of the act of Congress of September 18th, 1850, as provides that certain officers called commissioners shall decide the questions of fact which must be proved, before the surrender of the alleged fugitive can take place, is valid and obligatory. We think that we are also called upon to decide whether the proceedings provided for in the act for establishing judicially the fact of the escape of the alleged fugitive and the fact that he owes service or labor, are in conformity with the Constitution of the United States. These questions are most grave and important; we would, that we could avoid them ; but they are forced upon us, and we are not at liberty to refuse to consider them.
We are of opinion that so much of the act of Congress in question, as refers to the commissioners for decision, the questions of fact which are to be established by evidence before the alleged fugitive can be delivered up to the claimant, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void for two reasons: First, because it attempts to confer upon those officers judicial powers ; and second, because it is a denial of the right of the alleged fugitive to have those questions tried and decided by a jury, which we think is given him by the Constitution of the United States. We have referred to the case of Martin vs. Hunter's Lessees, 1 Wheaton 305, and to article 3 section 1 of the Constitution of the United .States, to show that Congress cannot vest any judicial power under the Constitution except in the courts provided for in the clause of the Constitution referred to. We are r.ware that Congress has established courts in the various Territories, and has provided for the appointment of judges with a different tenure of office from that fixed by the Constitution ; but the power to appoint these judges is supposed to be derived from article 4 section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that " Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States."
But, however this may be, we are not aware that the authority to vest any portion of the judicial power in any tribunals created by itself, except those mentioned in section 1 of article 8 of the Constitution, is claimed for Congress by any one, save in the single instance of judicial officers for the Territories belonging to the United States, and for the District of Co-umbia. We think that the duties performed by the commissioners, under the act in question, are judicial in their character ; as clearly so as those performed by a judge in the ordinary administration of justice.. He is obliged to decide upon the questions presented, judicially, and- to give a certificate to the person claiming the alleged fugitive, which authorizes his transportation to the State from whence he is alleged to have escaped, or withhold it, as- he shall think proper in view of the evidence submitted for his consideration. It is true that the act, by providing that the record made in the State from whence the alleged fugitive may Lave escaped, shall be conclusive evidence of the escape, and of the fact that the person claimed owes service or labor to the claimant, materially lessens the labor of the commissioner ; but this does not alter the nature of the act which he performs : it must be regarded as a judicial determination of the matter submitted to him. We are therefore of opinion that the act under consideration, by attempting to vest -judicial power in officers created by Congress and unknown to the Constitution, is repugnant to that instrument, and for that reason void.
Ahd we think it equally clear that the Constitution is violated by withholding from the person claimed, the right to a trial by jury before he can be delivered, up to the claimant.
The fifth article of amendments to the Constitution of the United States provides, among other things, that "no person shall be deprived of life,'liberty or property, without due process of law." Chancellor Kent in his commentaries (2 Kent. Com. 3) says : " It may be received as a self-evident proposition, universally understood and 'acknowledged throughout this country, that no. person can be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, or liberties or estate, or exiled, or condemned, or deprived of life, liberty or property, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
" The words £ law of the land,' as used in Magna Charta in reference to this subject, are understood to mean'due process of law ; that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men ; and this, says Lord Coke, is the true sense and exposition of these words."
We are aware'that it has been said that slaves are not persons in the sense in which that term is nsed in the amendment to the Constitution above referred to. But this, admitting it to be true, does not affect the question under consideration, as persons who are free are liable to be arrested and deprived of their.liberty by virtue of this act, without having had. a trial by a jury of their peers. We do not propose to discuss the question whether a slave escaping from .the State where he is held to service or labor, into a State where slavery does not exist, thereby becomes free by virtue of the local law, subject only to be delivered up to be returned again to servitude, as it -is' a question not' necessarily involved in the consideration of the subject before us. But we propose to examine the operation of the act upon a free citizen of a free State, and to show that by it such a person may be deprived of his liberty without " due process of law." It will be observed that the claimant can go before any court of record, or any judge thereof, in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court or judge, in vacation, of the escape, and that the person escaping owes service or-labor to such party. It then becomes the duty of the court' to cause a record to be made of the matters so proved, and also a description of the person escaping, and such record being exhibited to any judge, commissioner or otheyfficer authorized by law to cause persons escaping from service or labor to be delivered up, shall be held and taken, to be conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the. service or labor of the person escaping is due to the party in such record mentioned. This testimony is taken, and this record is made, in the absence of the person to be affected by-the proceeding. He has no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who depose to the facts which are thus conclusively proved ; hut without his knowledge, evidence is manufactured, which, hy virtue of this act, prove* beyond question that he is a slave and that he has escaped from servitude. We are at a loss to. perceive how this proceeding, by virtue of which a freeman becomes a slave, can be justly called "due process of.law," in the sense in which- that language is used in the Constitution. We are aware that it has been said that the proceedings before the commissioner do not determine the question of freedom or slavery, that the fugitive is only sent back to the State from which he is alleged to have escaped, and that when he reaches there he is a freeman or a slave as his status shall be determined by the local law. It is further said that these proceedings are analogous to those by which the fugitive from justice is delivered up to be taken to the State from which he has escaped; that a person may be arrested by virtue merely of an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate, charging him with treason, felony or other crime committed in some other State, and that upon the production of a copy •of the indictment or affidavit certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State.or Territory from which he fled, he shall be delivered up to be taken back. ' ^ is said that as this proceeding does not deprive the. person of his liberty in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution, but merely delivers him up to be ta'kcn to the State where, according' to the indictment or affidavit, the offence was committed, to be dealt with according to the local law, so, neither do these proceedings accomplish more than the mere transfer of the alleged- fugitive to the State where, as is claimed, he owes'service labor by force of the local law. We think this is a mistaken view of the question. The fugitive from justice is delivered to an agent appointed by the governor of the State where the offence is alleged to have been committed, without any adjudication upon the question of his guilt or innocence ; in other words, he is delivered to the officer of the law, and is in the custody of the law for the purpose of being taken to the State where alone he can be tried for the alleged offence. But the case is very different with the alleged fugitive from labor. Iñ his case there is an adjudication before the commissioner that he owes service labor, and that he has escaped. By force of the act of Congress under consideration, the record made the State from which he is said, to have escaped conclusive evidence that his status is that of a slave»
The commissioner is obliged, if his identity is proved, so to adjudge, and the certificate which is given to the claimant is given because the commissioner has so adjudged. Moreover, the commissioner can only give, the certificate to the claimant, who must be the person to whom the labor or service is due, his agent or attorney, and it is given to him for that reason. It is-not material to enquire what the condition of the person will be when he has been taken to the State where the service or labor is said to be due. ITe may regain his freedom, but if he does, it will be by force of the law of- the State, and not by virtue of the act of Congress under consideration ; for under that he has been adjudged a slave, and by force of it he has been taken as- a slave by the person adjudged to be his ownei, his agent or attorney, from the State where he was ki rested, to the State from which he is alleged ^'° have escaped. We are therefore obliged to con-elude that the alleged fugitive from labor is taken back to the State from which' he is said to have es-eapecl, as a person who has been proved and adjudged to be a slave, and, as we believe, without due process of law, without having his rights passed -upon and determined b}^ a jury ,of his peers. We think it essential that his right should be maintained by all courts and all tribunals, and, for the reasons above given we must affirm the order made in this case, discharging the relator.