Case Name: POULSEN v. MANNESS et al.
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1952-02-28
Citations: 121 Utah 269
Docket Number: No. 7663
Parties: POULSEN v. MANNESS et al.
Judges: McDONOUGH and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 121
Pages: 269–276

Head Matter:
POULSEN v. MANNESS et al.
No. 7663.
Decided February 28, 1952.
(241 P. 2d 152.)
See 61 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, sec. 526. Automobile accidents at intersections. 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, sec. 287 et seq.; 172 A. L. R. 1141.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Grant C. Aadnesen and Robert A. Bums, all of Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, Preston D. Richards, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
WADE, Justice.
This suit was brought by Archie Poulsen to recover for damages to his car and for personal injuries sustained in an intersection collision between a green, brown-topped jeep he was driving and a car owned by C. V. Manness and being driven by Udel Wood, the other appellant herein, his agent. This appeal is from a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Poulsen.
The appellants contend there was insufficient evidence of negligence on their part to justify the submission of the case to the jury and that Poulsen was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to respondent, as we must, the jury having found in his favor, the evidence discloses that on August 4, 1949, at about 11:00 a. m., respondent, accompanied by his wife and small son in his jeep automobile, left Delta, Utah, to return to his home in Sugarville. He was driving north on the Sugar-ville-Hinckley road when he reached its intersection with the Topaz road about 11:30 a. m. The Sugarville-Hinckley road is a 24-foot graveled road running in a general northerly and southerly direction, and the Topaz road is a 20-foot oiled road with 2 or 2% foot graveled shoulders on each side running in a general easterly and westerly direction. Both these roads on the day of the accident were heavily lined with tall sunflowers and weeds for miles before the intersection at which the accident occurred. There were no stop signs at this intersection. When Poulsen reached the intersection he stopped his jeep about three feet from the oiled portion of the Topaz road and first looked to the east, the direction from which Wood was coming. He testified he could see east on the road from where he was sitting for a distance of about 400 feet and saw no traffic coming from that direction. He then looked west but could not see very far in that direction because his vision was obscured by some sunflowers growing further out into the road around a ditch on that side so he put his jeep in low gear and proceeded to cross the intersection at about five to ten miles an hour; as soon as he could see that the road was free from traffic coming from the west he looked east again, by which time he had traveled about 10 feet or almost halfway across the intersection, and then for the first time saw a car about 40 or 50 feet away speeding towards him at about 70 miles an hour. Before respondent had time to get his jeep out of the way, this car ran into the middle of the right side of the jeep catapulting respondent, his wife and child into a ditch on the south side of the Topaz road, and knocking the jeep 40 to 45 feet west up that road. Appellant's car came to a stop about 30 feet west of the point of impact.
Udell Wood, the driver of the car, testified that on the morning of the accident he, with a companion, was going to Abraham which is located on the Topaz highway about one and a half miles west of the place where the accident occurred; that he had been driving about 10 miles per hour because of the roughness of the road until he reached a point about 1500 feet from the intersection where the accident happened where the road was oiled and he accelerated his speed until it reached 50 miles per hour. He had looked at his speedometer and had noted that this was his speed, when he glanced up and first saw respondent's jeep in the intersection about 40 or 50 feet ahead of him. He immediately put on his brakes but was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting the jeep. He also testified that although he had traveled that road once before he did not know there was an intersection where the accident occurred because of the sunflowers and weeds lining the road on both sides and that before the accident he had not looked to the north or south but was looking straight ahead.
Part of Wood's job was to sell roofing and to accomplish this he would, drive around looking for houses which needed roofing and then contact the owners. Respondent's wife testified that while she was lying in the ditch and Wood came up to help her, he said:
" if I had only been watching the road instead of looking for houses and not driving so fast this never would have happened."
Wood denied making such a statement and another statement attributed to him by one of respondent's witnesses that he was driving 70 miles an hour.
From this evidence the jury could reasonably find that defendant's car was traveling unreasonably fast for the existing conditions, that plaintiff, although there was no stop sign, stopped and looked to the east at a point where he could see 400 feet on the highway from the direction which defendant's car was coming and that at the time defendant's car was not within his vision, that plaintiff then looked to the west and as soon as he could move his jeep forward enough to see that the highway was free from traffic in that direction he looked to the east again at which time defendant's car was bearing down on him so near that he was unable to avoid the accident. Such facts present a jury question both on defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence and we cannot disturb their finding.
The facts in this case are very similar to those in the case of Lowder v. Holley, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350. recently decided by this court. In that case, as in the instant case, there was evidence that the plaintiff had stopped and looked in both directions before proceeding into the intersection and that the driver of the other car was going at a high rate of speed and did not see the plaintiff's car which was already in the intersection until almost upon it. In the Lowder v. Holley case, as in the instant case, there was evidence of visual obstructions at the intersection which the factfinder had to consider. We there held that the questions of negligence or contributory negligence were questions of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. That case is controlling here and the court did not err in submitting these questions to the jury.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
McDONOUGH and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.