Case Name: MIRACLE BOOT PULLER COMPANY, LIMITED v. PLASTRAY CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-06-19
Citations: 84 Mich. App. 118
Docket Number: Docket No. 26913
Parties: MIRACLE BOOT PULLER COMPANY, LIMITED v PLASTRAY CORPORATION
Judges: Before: Bronson, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. J. Byrns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 84
Pages: 118–127

Head Matter:
MIRACLE BOOT PULLER COMPANY, LIMITED v PLASTRAY CORPORATION
Docket No. 26913.
Submitted April 6, 1977, at Lansing.
Decided June 19, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Miracle Boot Puller Company Limited, a Canadian corporation, obtained a United States patent on a boot puller. It purchased a mold and manufactured and distributed the boot puller in the United States and Canada. Miracle Boot Puller Company Limited entered into a contract with Magloire Lucier granting Mr. Lucier a possessory right to the mold and exclusive right and license in the United States to the patent on the boot puller. After the mold was delivered to Mr. Lucier, he delivered the mold to Plastray Corporation, a Michigan corporation, contrary to the terms of the contract. Miracle Boot Puller Company Limited sued Plastray Corporation for damages for breach of contract, conversion of the mold and conversion of the intangible property right to benefit from the patent. Summary judgment was granted to defendant. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded. Miracle Boot Puller Co, Ltd v Plastray Corp, 57 Mich App 443; 225 NW2d 800 (1975). On retrial, plaintiff obtained a verdict and the Macomb Circuit Court, Robert J. Chrzanowski, J., entered judgment accordingly. Defendant appeals and claims inter alia that the trial court had no jurisdiction in a suit involving a patent. Held:
1. The question of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is one which cannot be waived and may be raised at any time by the parties or by the court on its own motion.
2. A cause of action for "conversion of patent rights” is a claim "arising under” the patent law over which Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction: state courts have no jurisdiction to consider such a claim.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 88, 92, 95, 97, 105, 139.
[2, 5] 60 Am Jur 2d, Patents § 283 et seq.
[3] 58 Am Jur 2d, New Trial § 3 et seq.
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 1111.
[4] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 744.
50 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 74.
3. Judgment on a general verdict must be set aside where the jury considered a claim over which the court had jurisdiction and claims over which it did not and it cannot be determined upon which claim the jury returned a verdict.
Reversed and remanded.
Bronson, J., dissented. He would hold that the Court of Appeals is bound to follow its own prior ruling in this case that the plaintiff stated a cause of action submissible to a jury for conversion of patent rights; it may not now in the same case determine that the cause is one over which the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. He would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Courts — Jurisdiction—Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time by any party or may be considered by the court on its own motion; objection to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.
2. Courts — Jurisdiction—Patents—Conversion of Patent Rights.
A complaint for conversion of patent rights states a claim "arising under” the patent law and Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
3. New Trial — Verdicts—General Verdicts — Multiple Theories.
A new trial must be granted in a case where the jury returned a general verdict after submission of a case upon several theories, ■ some of which the court lacked jurisdiction to consider.
Dissent by Bronson, P. J.
4. Appeal and Error — Courts—Law of the Case.
Prior decisions of the same court in the same cause become law of the case and may not be reexamined for error.
5. Appeal and Error — Jurisdiction—State Jurisdiction — Federal Jurisdiction — Law of the Case — Patents—Conversion.
The Court of Appeals is bound to follow its own prior ruling in a case where it previously ruled that a plaintiff stated a cause of action submissible to a jury for conversion of patent rights; it may not later in the same case determine that the cause is one over which the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Shrauger, Shively & Dunn, for plaintiff.
James H. Hudnut, P. C. (Jay L. Cooke, of counsel) and Fisher, Gerhardt & Groh, for defendants.
Before: Bronson, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. J. Byrns, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, J.
We cannot agree with our brother Bronson's disposition of the troublesome question of jurisdiction involved herein.
Our brother begins his analysis by conceding that:
"While this [Court's previous] holding assumes that a state court has jurisdiction over such a conversion claim, the Court never so determined; the specific issue of jurisdiction was never raised nor addressed. (Emphasis added.)
Yet, a few paragraphs later he states:
"Thus, as we held that plaintiff's claim arose under state law, state courts had jurisdiction over the claim." (Emphasis added.)
The prior decision never held that plaintiff's claim arose under state law for purposes of state, as opposed to exclusive Federal, jurisdiction.
In relevant part, the previous opinion of this Court states:
"Plaintiff also asserts that there was sufficient evi dence to warrant submission to the jury the question of conversion of patent rights and the mold. We agree.
"The mold being a specifiable, physical chattel can be the subject of conversion; likewise, intangible personal property can also be the subject of conversion. Warren Tool Co v Stephenson, 11 Mich App 274, 298; 161 NW2d 133, 147 (1968), and Tuuk v Andersen, 21 Mich App 1, 13; 175 NW2d 322, 328 (1969). As such, the intangible right to benefit from a patent right can be converted." Miracle Boot Puller Co, Ltd v Plastray Corp, 57 Mich App 443, 450-451; 225 NW2d 800 (1975). (Footnotes omitted.)
Again, there is no discussion here of jurisdiction. Our brother concedes that "this holding assumes that a state court has jurisdiction over such a conversion claim". However, as was stated by Justice Cooley in Allen v Duffie, 43 Mich 1, 11; 4 NW 427 (1880), "A point thus assumed without consideration is of course not decided". On point, and to our minds dispositive, is the following language from City of Stuart v Green, 91 F2d 603, 604 (CA 5, 1937):
"It is contended that the question of jurisdiction was foreclosed by the decision of this court on the former appeal, but, as the question was not raised by any of the parties or decided by the court, we know of no principle in the doctrine of estoppel or the doctrine of the law of the case which relieves us of the duty of considering and determining whether the cause was properly brought in the federal court. The objection is one which cannot be waived, and may be raised by the parties at any time or considered by the court on its own motion. Utah-Nevada Co v Delamar (C.C.A.) 133 F. 113."
Looking squarely at the question, we are convinced the state court has no jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. While it is clear that the state is empowered to hear and resolve "conversion" claims, it is equally clear that this does not resolve the issue before us. Providing for exclusive Federal jurisdiction, as Congress has for patent infringement suits (28 USC § 1338[a]), would be a meaningless exercise if a complaint were not, on its face, one for which there would otherwise be concurrent state jurisdiction. The very function of the exclusive Federal jurisdiction statute is to oust any concurrent state jurisdiction. Therefore, our starting point must be whether this suit was one "arising under" the patent law1, for which exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Federal courts.
In 60 Am Jur 2d, Patents, § 4, p 335, it is stated:
"An inventor has no common-law right to a monopoly of his invention. He has the right to make, use, and vend his own invention, but if he voluntarily discloses it, such as by oifering it for sale, the world is free to copy and use it with impunity. A patent, however, gives the inventor the right to exclude all others. As a patentee, he has the exclusive right of 'making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States.' The right to 'make' within the meaning of the patent law embraces the construction of the thing invented; the right to 'use' embraces within its meaning the right to put into service any given invention; and the right to 'sell' secures to the inventor the exclusive right to transfer the title for a consideration to others; in these exclusive rights to make, use, and sell, fairly construed, reside the extent of the patent monopoly under the statutes of the United States."
The conduct alleged in the count for "conversion of patent rights" was wrong only by virtue of the Federal patent law. Therefore, this claim was one "arising under" the patent law and the state court had no jurisdiction to consider it. We hold that it was error to allow it to go to the jury. Because the jury returned a general verdict, and it is impossible to tell whether it rested upon the conversion claim or one of the other claims, we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Rock v Derrick, 51 Mich App 704, 709; 216 NW2d 496 (1974), lv den, 391 Mich 836 (1974). Costs to appellant.
C. J. Byrns, J., concurred.
"Defendant did not file a brief in that appeal."