Case Name: G. B. ANTLEY v. MISSISSIPPI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1975-09-22
Citations: 318 So. 2d 847
Docket Number: No. 47989
Parties: G. B. ANTLEY v. MISSISSIPPI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.
Judges: GILLESPIE, C. J„ and PATTERSON, SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 847–856

Head Matter:
G. B. ANTLEY v. MISSISSIPPI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.
No. 47989.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 22, 1975.
Adams & Odom, Meridian, for appellant.
Williams, Gunn & Crenshaw, Robert D. Jones, Meridian, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO RETAX COSTS
SUGG, Justice:
The Mississippi State Highway Commission filed a petition to condemn some land belonging to G. B. Antley in Lauderdale County. Antley appealed from a judgment awarding him $13,000 damages for the land condemned by the Highway Commission. The case was affirmed without opinion on April 7, 1975 and appeal costs were taxed against Antley. The Highway Commission filed a motion to correct the judgment to allow it five percent damages on the amount of the judgment. Antley answered, denied the right of the Highway Commission to recover damages, and filed a motion to retax appeal costs.
The question is, does the "due compensation" requirement of Article III, Section 17, Mississippi Constitution of 1890 and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibit taxing a landowner with appeal costs and damages when he appeals from a judgment of a special court of eminent domain and is not successful in having the award increased on appeal ?
Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-27-29 (1972) provides that any party may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a judgment entered by a special court of eminent domain and that all parties, except the State of Mississippi or any political subdivision, shall file a bond for costs conditioned to pay all costs that may be adjudged against him. Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-3-23 (1972) provides in part as follows:
In case the judgment or decree of the court below be affirmed, or the appellant fail to prosecute his appeal to effect, the supreme court shall render judgment against the appellant for damages, at the rate of five per centum and costs, as follows: If the judgment or decree affirmed be for a sum of money, the damages shall be upon such sum. .
The constitutionality of the application of these statutes to a landowner in eminent domain cases is a question of first impression in Mississippi. We note a diversity of opinion in cases from other jurisdictions, but the better reasoned cases permit taxing appeal costs against a landowner when the award is not increased on appeal.
The reason for taxing appeal costs against a landowner who appeals unsuccessfully is set forth in Kelly v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 269 P.2d 359 (Okl.1954), in the following language:
As pointed out in the Jarvis case, supra, there are two lines of authority respecting this question. One line of authority holds that upon appeal no costs may be assessed against the owner, without regard to which party took the appeal or to the eventual outcome thereof. See Lewis on Eminent Domain, Sec. 559; City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 172 Cal. 332, 156 P. 468, Ann.Cas.1917E, 259. This rule is based upon the principle that an appeal constitutes merely another step in condemnation proceedings by which it is sought to establish the owner's compensation, so that no part of the costs may be assessed against such owner, on appeal by the condemnor.
The other line of authority, which announces what we conceive to be the better rule, is to the effect that condemnation proceedings end at the point where an award has been determined by the "tribunal established for that purpose." Thereafter an appeal constitutes a separate proceeding, so that allowance of costs on appeal does not violate constituí tional provisions requiring just compensation to landowners whose property is taken by eminent domain. Music v. Big Sandy, etc., R. Co., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S. W. 44, Ann.Cas.1916E, 689: Moffat v. City and County of Denver, 57 Colo. 473, 143 P. 577. (269 P.2d at 364, 365).
In Moffat v. Denver, 57 Colo. 473, 143 P. 577 (1914), the Colorado Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, and said:
By the decree of the trial court it was provided that petitioner pay the costs up to the time of and including the filing of the report of the commissioners, and that plaintiffs in error pay the costs incurred by them subsequent to the filing of such report. With respect to costs the statute (section 6598, Rev.St.1908) provides:
"The costs of the proceedings, up to and including the filing the report of the commissioners, shall be paid by the city, and as to any costs caused by subsequent litigation, the costs shall be paid by the losing party."
Counsel for plaintiffs in error contend, that this provision is unconstitutional, for the reason that requiring a respondent in condemnation proceedings to pay any part of the costs is an infringement of his constitutional right to full and just compensation for taking and damaging his land. As applicable to this case we think not. If either party is dissatisfied with the award of the commissioners, objections thereto may be filed. If this course is pursued a new issue, so to speak, is presented, namely, whether the award should stand, and there can be no valid objection to taxing the costs in such proceeding to the losing party, although he be the respondent. He takes the chances, when objections are interposed to the report if he contests them, of having them sustained, wholly or in part, and when he does so and is rightfully defeated, he ought to pay the reasonable costs entailed by such proceedings. This is a different proposition from taxing him with any part of the costs down to the time the commissioners make their report, as that would reduce the amount of compensation to which he is entitled before his property can be taken or damaged. There is some conflict in the decisions on the question presented, but we think the weight of authority upholds the statutory provisions under consideration, and that the taxation of costs in the particulars involved is controlled by the statute on the subject. (57 Colo, at 483-484, 143 P. at 580-581).
In Kitsap County v. Melker, 52 Wash. 49, 100 P. 150 (1909), appeal costs were taxed against an appealing landowner. The Court held that the condemning party-had performed its full duty toward the landowner with respect to costs when it bore the costs of the proceeding in the trial court, and concluded:
To hold otherwise would be to hold that an appeal is a necessity in all condemnation cases, and that any law providing a procedure which does not direct an appeal at the expense of the condemning party would be invalid . (52 Wash, at 52, 100 P. at 151).
See also State v. Miller Home Development, Inc., 243 Minn. 1, 65 N.W.2d 900 (1954), 50 A.L.R.2d 1377 (1954); Music v. Big Sandy and Kentucky R. R., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S.W. 44 (1915); Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Smith, 136 Ky. 725, 125 S. W. 157 (1910), 50 A.L.R.2d 1386 et seq.; 27 Am.Jur. § 473 & 475, pp. 399 et seq.
In addition, the text writer in 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3rd Ed. 1909), states:
When the compensation has once been ascertained by a competent tribunal, at the expense of the condemning party, the law has done all for the owner which the constitution requires. If the owner is given a right of appeal or review, it may be upon such terms as to costs as the legislature may deem just. . (2 Lewis Eminent Domain § 812 (559) at 1436).
Where the owner is dissatisfied with the amount of damages awarded him in the first instance, and takes an appeal or other proceedings to have a re-assessment of the damages, it is usual to provide that he shall pay the costs of the appeal if he fails to secure an increase of damages, and such provisions are proper and valid. To exempt the owner from costs in such cases, the increase must be exclusive of interest. Of course if the owner secures more on appeal he is entitled to costs. . (2 Lewis, Eminent Domain, § 815 (562) pp. 1438 and 1439).
In this case Antley's damages for the property condemned by the Highway Commission were ascertained in the special court of eminent domain at the expense of the Highway Commission. At this point, the law had done all for Antley which the Constitution requires. He was then entitled to receive the just compensation for his property as fixed by the jury verdict without being diminished by the court costs necessary for the original determination of his award. Antley was not satisfied with the $13,000 judgment awarded him, and when he appealed he was in the same position, with reference to appeal costs, as any other litigant who appeals from a decree of a trial court. When he appealed without having the award increased, taxing him with appeal costs did not nullify the constitutional requirement of due compensation to landowners whose property is taken by eminent domain. We therefore hold that Mississippi Code Annotated section 11 — 27— 29 (1972) is constitutional.
For the same reasons, Antley should be assessed with the five percent damages prescribed by Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-3-23 (1972). The damages under this section constitute a condition of taking an appeal. Davis v. Wilkins, 127 Miss. 490, 90 So. 180 (1921). We have applied the five percent damages to an agency of the state and held in State Highway Commission v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 4 So.2d 345 (1941), motion to correct judgment, 192 Miss. 595, 6 So.2d 468 (1942), as follows:
[W]hen an agency of the state is authorized by statute, without any qualification or restriction, to condemn under the general statutes relating to Eminent Domain, the agency has thereby the same rights and is subject to the same liabilities as private parties seeking to condemn for public use, and this would carry the five percent on affirmance, as well as costs and interest. (192 Miss, at 598, 6 So.2d at 470).
See also Pearl River Valley Supply District v. Brown, 254 Miss. 453, 181 So.2d 631 (1966) and Housing Authority of the City of Gulfport v. Barbee, 283 So.2d 591 (Miss.1973).
We have also assessed the five percent damages against a plaintiff who recovers a judgment and appeals without having the judgment increased. Pearce v. Ford Motor Co., 235 So.2d 281 (Miss.1970).
Antley stands before this Court as any other litigant. When he appealed he was faced with the possibility of being taxed with appeal costs and damages as a condition of his appeal. He is not entitled to an appeal free of the conditions imposed upon other appellants.
All of the Justices concur that Antley is liable for appeal costs, but Justices Rodgers, Inzer, Walker and Broom are of the opinion that he should not be assessed damages.
Motion of State Highway Commission to correct judgment sustained. Motion of Antley to retax costs denied.
GILLESPIE, C. J" and PATTERSON, SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
RODGERS, P. J., and INZER, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., dissent.
. Grand River Dam Authority v. Jarvis, 124 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1942).