Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy CURTIN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-04-25
Citations: 764 So. 2d 645
Docket Number: No. 1D98-3690
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy CURTIN, Appellee.
Judges: MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR; PADOVANO, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 764
Pages: 645–648

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy CURTIN, Appellee.
No. 1D98-3690.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 25, 2000.
Rehearing Denied June 5, 2000.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
John W. Gray, II, Tallahassee, for Ap-pellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
In the instant case, the state petitions for writ of certiorari and argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it denied the state's motion to declare respondent a sexual predator. See State v. Galloway, 721 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that state appeal from an order denying a motion for written finding of sexual predator status should be made pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari).
Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the first degree felony of sexual battery on a physically helpless victim, a violation of section 794.011(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which was committed on August 23, 1997. Subsequently, the state filed a motion to declare respondent a sexual predator under section 775.21, Florida Statutes, which the lower court denied. The state argues that because respondent met the statutory criteria for designation as a sexual predator, the court was required to enter the finding. Respondent counters that under the legislative intent statement in section 775.21(3)(a) , the sexual predator designation is limited to violent or repeat offenders and those who commit sex crimes against children and that the facts of respondent's offense demonstrate that respondent did not fall within these categories.
Section 775.21, Florida Statutes (1997) ("The Florida Sexual Predators Act"), provides the process and criteria for designating persons convicted of various designated crimes as sexual predators and requires those so designated be subject to certain registration and community notification requirements. See § 775.21(3), Fla. Stat. Section 775.21(5)(a) provides that "[a]n offender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(c) who is before the court for sentencing for an offense committed on or after October 1, 1996, is a sexual predator, and the sentencing court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator." If, as in this case, the designation is not made at sentencing, the statute provides for the state to petition the court to make such a finding. See § 775.21(5)(b), Fla. Stat.
The statutory provision at issue, section 775.21(4)(c) (emphasis added), contains the criteria for the sexual predator designation as follows:
For a current offense committed on or after October 1,1996, upon conviction, an offender shall be designated as a "sexual predator" under subsection (5), and subject to registration under subsection (6) and community and public notification under subsection (7) if:
1. The felony meets the criteria of former ss.775.22(2) and 775.23(2), specifically, the felony is:
a. A capital, life, or first degree felony violation of chapter 794 or s. 847.0145, or of a similar law of another jurisdiction!;.]
We find, contrary to respondent's argument, that there is no ambiguity in this section regarding the substantive criteria for a court's finding of an offender's status as a sexual predator. See State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996) (stating that if "the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended."). Neither does paragraph (3)(a)'s statement of legislative intent superimpose into paragraph (4)(c) any classification system for a capital, life, or first degree felony violation of chapter 794 or section 847.0145 that would provide a court with discretion to find, based on the specific facts of the case, that one of these offenses cannot serve as a basis for the sexual predator designation.. Section 775.21(4)(c) requires the court to make a finding of sexual predator status in the instant case because respondent was convicted of committing a first degree felony violation of chapter 794 and the offense was committed on or after October 1,1996.
Accordingly, we grant the petition, reverse the order denying the state's motion, and remand with directions that the court enter an order containing the requisite finding.
MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR; PADOVANO, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
. Respondent alleges that this is a scrivener's error on the judgment and that respondent's plea was nolo contendere.
. Section 775.21(3)(a) (1997) provided as follows:
Repeat sex offenders, sex offenders who use physical violence, and sex offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Sex offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses, and most sex offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. This makes the cost of sex offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant.