Case Name: PITTS v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2003-03-26
Citations: 260 Ga. App. 553
Docket Number: A02A2122
Parties: PITTS v. THE STATE.
Judges: Smith, C. J., Andrews, P. J., Ruffin, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. Barnes and Ellington, JJ, dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 260
Pages: 553–571

Head Matter:
A02A2122.
PITTS v. THE STATE.
(580 SE2d 618)

Opinion:
Eldridge, Judge.
A Fulton County jury found Orlando Pitts guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana — less than an ounce, which charges arose after Pitts was stopped by Atlanta Police Officer J. L. Stafford for a traffic violation at the intersection of Metropolitan and Wells Street in Atlanta, and marijuana was discovered in plain view on the driver's seat of Pitts' vehicle; from a subsequent search of Pitts, the passenger/co-defendant Darlene Harmon, and Pitts' vehicle, Stafford seized 69.5 grams of cocaine packaged in three separate bags, and twenty-eight grams of marijuana packaged in five separate bags. Pitts appeals and raises numerous claims of error and subparts thereto in a 70-page brief. Upon careful review of Pitts' contentions, we find as follows.
1. In his first claim of error, Pitts makes several arguments by which he attempts to demonstrate that the trial court erred in admitting all of the bags of drugs contained in State's Exhibits 1 and 2 without proper "authentication" of each bag.
(a) The record shows that State's Exhibit 1 contained the five seized bags of marijuana and State's Exhibit 2 contained the three seized bags of cocaine. Only one bag in State's Exhibit 1 and one bag in State's Exhibit 2 were tested by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Crime Laboratory ("GBI Crime Lab") and identified as marijuana and cocaine, respectively. Because of this, Pitts claims that seizing officer Stafford could not "authenticate" the contents of all of the bags contained in State's Exhibits 1 and 2, thereby rendering both exhibits inadmissible. We disagree.
No objection was made in the court below on the basis now urged; accordingly this claim is waived. Further, the actual contents of the several plastic bags recovered from the crime scene were irrelevant to the "authentication" established by seizing officer Stafford; his testimony went to the "chain of custody" of the bags containing suspected drugs, not the actual contents of the bags. In this instance, the issue is whether there is a reasonable certainty that the marked bags introduced are the same as those seized, without substitution or tampering.
At trial, Officer Stafford testified that, after he seized the bags of suspected drugs, he personally transported them to police property. There, Stafford separated the bags of suspected cocaine from the bags of suspected marijuana; he packaged the bags of suspected marijuana in one bag and marked it with his name and case identification number. He packaged the bags of suspected cocaine in another bag and marked it with his name and case identification number. He then packaged the two marked bags in a single bag, marked it with his name and case identification number, and turned the bag into police property by placing the bag in a secured "Drug Mailbox." Based upon appearance, his handwriting, his name, and the case identification number, Stafford identified at trial State's Exhibits 1 and 2 as containing the same bags he seized at the scene, packaged, and turned into police property. This testimony established with reasonable assurance the identity (as opposed to the contents) of the bags, which met the State's burden as to "authentication" from Stafford.
(b) GBI Crime Lab forensic expert Michelle Young testified about the analysis she personally performed on a sample bag from State's Exhibit 1, which showed the contents thereof to be marijuana, and the analysis she personally performed on a sample bag from State's Exhibit 2, which showed the contents thereof to be cocaine. She also stated that, as a matter of Crime Lab standard procedure, a lab assistant performed a "mass spec" test on the contents of each sample bag to ensure the accuracy of the Crime Lab's analysis. Young testified that only after conducting her own tests and reviewing the results of the "mass spec" tests could she conclude that the contents of the tested sample bags were marijuana and cocaine, respectively. Pitts argues that, because Young did not personally perform the "mass spec" tests, her testimony regarding the results thereof was inadmissible hearsay, leaving the contents of the tested sample bags "unauthenticated" under the Crime Lab's own standard procedure and, thus, inadmissible.
Again, no objection was raised in the court below on the basis now urged, and this claim of error is waived. Further, Young's testimony was not hearsay.
Where an expert personally observes data collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based in part on the other's findings. . . . Where, as here, the expert is available for full and searching cross-examination, the failure of the expert to test independently the control sample, after observing its analytical test results, goes only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.
In addition, fulfillment of the GBI Crime Lab's standard operating procedures is not a condition precedent for evidentiary admission. "[M]ere contradiction of a recognized expert's method of conducting a scientifically acceptable test is not fatal to admissibility." Pitts' argument goes to weight not admissibility.
(c) Pitts also claims that each bag in State's Exhibits 1 and 2 was not individually "designated," thereby causing confusion and denying him a fair trial. Other than this conclusory statement, however, Pitts directs our attention to no example of due process-denying "confusion" engendered by the bags contained in State's Exhibits 1 and 2, and our review of the record reveals none. In fact, it appears that the bags were individually designated for the jury's consideration, rendering Pitts' contention factually meritless.
2. Next, Pitts contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, and, thus, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict thereon. We do not agree.
(a) Pitts' first claim is premised upon his earlier argument that the identification of State's Exhibit 2 as cocaine was based on hearsay concerning a lab assistant's "mass spec" test, making such identification inadmissible. This contention has been decided adversely to Pitts in Division 1 (b), supra.
(b) Pitts' next claim is that, in order to support a conviction for trafficking in cocaine, "[t]he burden was upon the State at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contents of every bag contained in State's Exhibit #2 was cocaine[,]" and, thus, the testing of only one bag, State's 2-A, rendered the evidence insufficient to support his conviction for trafficking.
An appellate court determines only the legal sufficiency of the evidence adduced below. As long as there is some evidence to support each necessary element of the State's case, the verdict will be upheld. Here, Pitts was indicted for trafficking in that he possessed cocaine in excess of twenty-eight grams with a purity of at least ten percent. At trial, expert testimony established that the sample bag tested from State's Exhibit 2, State's 2-A, contained 54.3 grams of cocaine with a purity of 85 percent. This evidence was sufficient to sustain Pitts' conviction for trafficking in cocaine under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, notwithstanding the failure to test the other two bags contained in State's Exhibit 2.
(c) At the time of the traffic stop, the passenger in Pitts' vehicle, co-defendant Harmon, told the police that the vehicle belonged to her. Thus, Pitts claims that the State presented "no evidence" that the trafficking amount of cocaine contained in State's 2-A, found under the front passenger seat of the vehicle, was in Pitts' actual or constructive possession. This argument ignores the fact that Harmon took the stand at trial and testified that the vehicle was, in fact, Pitts' car; that she introduced a receipt demonstrating Pitts' purchase of the car; that she testified that she was present when Pitts purchased the cocaine contained in State's 2-A; and that she only told the police that Pitts' vehicle was hers because she "was scared and . . . panicked." Issues involving conflicts in the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are matters entirely within the province of the jury. Clearly, the jury found Harmon's version of events credible, since they acquitted her of each of the offenses for which they found Pitts guilty. This Court addresses only the sufficiency of the evidence, and "we do not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses." Accordingly, the instant claim provides nothing for us to review.
3. Pitts also claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute because the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the element of "intent to distribute." We disagree.
To support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the State must prove more than mere possession. Here, the twenty-eight grams of marijuana were divided into five individual packages, as opposed to a single bag. The five individual bags of marijuana were found with a large, distribution amount of cocaine. Harmon testified that both the marijuana and cocaine belonged to Pitts, and there was no evidence that the individual bags of marijuana were for a purpose other than distribution, just like the cocaine with which the marijuana was found. Pitts did not take the stand and presented no evidence that the marijuana was for personal use. Further, Harmon testified that Pitts was unemployed. Viewing these circumstances in a light most favorable to upholding the verdict, as we must, the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pitts sells both the marijuana and the cocaine with which he was found.
We reject Pitts' contention that, because only one bag from State's Exhibit 1 was tested, there was no evidence that the four other individual bags in State's Exhibit 1 contained marijuana so as to support an inference of intent to distribute. The GBI Crime Lab forensic expert testified that the contents of the four untested bags looked the same as the contents of the tested bag of marijuana. Harmon testified that the bags contained marijuana. The bags were found at the same time in the same location. And the jury had all five individual bags before them for inspection. This was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that each of the five bags in State's Exhibit 1 contained marijuana.
4. At sentencing, the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was merged into the offense of trafficking in cocaine pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7. Accordingly, any claims of error with regard to sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating possession of cocaine with intent to distribute are rendered moot.
5. In two claims of error, Pitts contends the trial court should have excused for cause prospective juror no. 29, Brent Davis, and prospective juror no. 10, Frankie Kirby, because of their strong feelings against drug use. We disagree.
(a) The decision whether to strike a juror for cause lies within the trial court's discretion and will only be disturbed upon an abuse of that discretion.
Before a juror can be disqualified for cause, it must be shown that an opinion held by the potential juror is so fixed and definite that the juror will be unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence or the court's charge upon the evidence.
During voir dire, Davis explained that he has "zero tolerance" for drug use. Pitts' motion to excuse for cause was made on the basis that Davis' "zero tolerance" for drug use made him unable to judge a drug case. Similarly, Kirby testified on voir dire that she feels drugs "are wrong. Strong feeling against drugs."
Drug use, however, is illegal. That a prospective juror has "zero tolerance" for or "strong feelings" against an illegal activity is not grounds to strike for cause; nor does it render a prospective juror unable to sit in judgment. In that regard, what is prohibited is a personal view of an illegal activity which would make a prospective juror unable to listen to the facts before convicting — not a personal view of an illegal activity that would ensure conviction if the facts demonstrate commission of the illegal activity.
In this case, the record shows that neither Davis nor Kirby had prejudged the facts or Pitts. Any confusion came from inappropriate voir dire questions which, in the guise of inquiring about "impartiality," in reality asked Davis and Kirby to improperly judge the effect that evidence of drug use would have on them. The trial court rightly attempted to explain to the jurors the difference between a condemnation of drug use in general and an improper prejudgment of the facts of the case. After such explanation, Davis stated he would "attempt to be impartial," and Kirby stated that she would "try to be fair." Under the circumstances presented, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in denying Pitts' motion to strike prospective jurors Davis and Kirby for cause.
(b) Because, as noted above, the trial court refused to permit Davis or Kirby to speculate on the facts of this case and, instead, inquired as to the jurors' ability to be fair and impartial, Pitts claims that the court engaged in an improper "rehabilitation" of the jurors in violation of the holding in Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259 (549 SE2d 797) (2001), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177 (563 SE2d 847) (2002). This contention lacks merit.
Since the decision in Kim v. Walls, supra, we see more and more frequently this claim of error raised whenever a trial court inquires about a juror's ability to be "fair and impartial." However, it has long been the law that "the control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion." It must be understood that the decision in Kim v. Walls did not impair the trial court's longstanding authority to ensure a fair and impartial jury. To the contrary. What Kim ultimately prohibited was the curtailment of a plaintiff's voir dire which demonstrated a personal relationship/bias between a prospective juror and the defendant and, thereafter, the trial court's reliance on its own, insufficient rehabilitative questions in rejecting this clear evidence of bias.
Because the trial court failed to allow plaintiff's counsel to develop competent evidence as to bias as required by statute, and itself conducted only a cursory, inadequate rehabilitation of the juror, we hold that the court abused its broad discretion in qualifying the juror.
The factual situation in Kim v. Walls was distinct, and the holding therein cannot be expanded to somehow undermine a trial court's authority to control voir dire and properly inquire about a juror's ability to be impartial.
Nor do we in any way limit the extremely broad discretion of trial courts in deciding whether to exclude a juror for cause once an adequate inquiry has been conducted. We simply conclude that when voir dire questioning is curtailed as it was here, the process fails to achieve its purpose of ferreting out bias, and an abuse of discretion results.
The instant case is not a case where the trial court curtailed voir dire and summarily "rehabilitated" a prospective juror who had expressed well-founded doubts about being able to serve impartially because of a close relationship with one of the parties. Pitts' reliance on Kim v. Walls, supra, is misplaced.
6. We likewise find meritless Pitts' contention that the trial court erred in excusing for cause prospective juror no. 20, Eric Kolsrud. Contrary to the facts illustrated above, Kolsrud testified that he had been wrongly accused by law enforcement and that the police had "put me through a lot." Kolsrud specifically testified that his view of law enforcement made him unable to listen to the facts of the instant case, because "I have a tendency not to believe people in uniform at all." Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial , court's discretion in excusing Kolsrud for cause.
7. Next, Pitts contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial made when co-defendant Harmon's attorney elicited testimony from Harmon that allegedly injected Pitts' character into evidence. We find no error.
Harmon testified on direct examination that, sometime during the course of her boyfriend-girlfriend relationship with Pitts, "we got into a fight and he pushed me against the wall. And caused me to have torn ligaments." Pitts' attorney objected and moved for a mistrial on the basis of relevance. The trial court denied the motion and instructed Harmon's attorney to "move on . . . and get into a different area of questioning," which Harmon's attorney did. No further objection was registered, and Pitts' attorney neither renewed the motion for mistrial nor asked for further curative action.
Where a defendant objects and moves for a mistrial during the examination of a witness, and the trial court denies the motion but takes some corrective action, if the defendant is dissatisfied with that action, he must renew the objection or motion; otherwise, the issue is waived. [Pitts'] silence after the trial court's purported corrective action amounts to a waiver.
8. In his next two claims of error, Pitts challenges the trial court's conclusion on motion for new trial that he received effective assistance of counsel. He contends his attorney was constitutionally deficient for failing to properly object to certain testimony from co-defendant Harmon.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant must show counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct, and the trial court's determination with .respect to effective assistance of counsel will be affirmed unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
(a) The first instance of allegedly objectionable testimony is the same as that complained of in Division 7, supra, wherein co-defendant Harmon testified that Pitts and she "got into a fight and he pushed me against the wall. And caused me to have torn ligaments." Pitts' attorney objected and moved for a mistrial on the basis of relevance. In this claim of error, Pitts contends the objection and mistrial motion should have been made on the basis of improper character evidence.
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pitts has the burden to show not only error, but prejudice. As applied here, Pitts must show that, had his attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis of "character," as opposed to "relevance," there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the motion. Before this Court, however, Pitts asserts only error and makes absolutely no showing — or even an argument — that the trial court would have granted a mistrial motion if "character" had been the basis therefor. Certainly, Harmon's testimony, itself, does not demand a mistrial as a matter of law on the basis of either "relevance" or "character."
It is generally within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether to grant a mistrial based on improper character evidence. In reviewing the trial court's decision, an appellate court may consider the nature of the statement, the other evidence in the case, and the court's and counsel's action in dealing with the impropriety. A trial court's discretion in granting or refusing to grant a mistrial should not be disturbed unless a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.
In contemplating a motion for mistrial on the basis of "character," the trial court's determination would necessarily have taken into account that the drugs at issue were found in Pitts' car within his arm's reach; that the complained-of portion of Harmon's testimony was completely irrelevant as to the commission of the charged drug offenses, making it highly probable that such evidence would not contribute to the jury's verdict on such offenses; and that, following the motion for mistrial, the trial court instructed Harmon's attorney to "get into a different area of questioning," and Harmon's attorney did so. "Given the nature of [Harmon's] statements and the other evidence introduced at trial, the court was authorized to find that nothing which was introduced was so prejudicial as to require the declaration of a mistrial."
As best we can discern, Pitts also contends under this same claim of error that his attorney was ineffective for failing to renew the motion for mistrial following the trial court's ruling, thereby preserving such for this Court's review. It is not clear from Pitts' allegations whether he claims that such renewal should have been made on the basis of "relevance" or "character," but, as mistrial was not demanded as a matter of law on either basis, this claim plainly lacks merit as a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, as mistrial was not required as a matter of law, we do not find it unreasonable that Pitts' trial attorney did not renew her motion because she "did not want to place any greater emphasis on her [(Harmon's)] testimony at that point, in the presence of the jury." This was a reasonable strategic decision that this Court will not second-guess, "[Wlhile [Pitts] and his current counsel may disagree with this decision, it is one of strategy and does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We will not judge counsel's trial strategy by hindsight or result."
(b) The second instance of allegedly improper testimony also came during co-defendant Harmon's direct examination, as follows:
[Harmon's attorney:] Okay. All right. So, what — what did he [(Pitts)] do for a living?
[Harmon:] Nothing. Sold drugs.
Pitts' attorney immediately objected to such testimony, and the objection was sustained; the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and admonished the witness. Pitts now contends his trial attorney should have moved for mistrial on the basis of improper character evidence. We disagree.
Pitts was indicted, inter alia, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and trafficking in cocaine, 69.5 grams. Generally, "trafficking" is defined as, "Trading or dealing in certain goods and commonly used in connection with illegal narcotic sales." An amount of cocaine sufficient to constitute the offense of trafficking, i.e., 28 grams or more, well exceeds a "user" amount of cocaine and implies that a defendant so charged "trafficks" or deals in cocaine. This is why possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is a lesser included offense of trafficking.
The "intent to distribute" which is necessary to the crime of possession of a substance under § 16-13-30 (b) is satisfied by the reasonable inference that a person who possesses more than the 28 grams of cocaine under § 16-13-31 [trafficking] intends to distribute it.
Consequently, there was nothing objectionable about Harmon's testimony that, from February 1999 to August 1999, which time frame included the June 1999 incident date, Pitts "sold drugs" for a living. This was not evidence of Pitts' general bad character, a prior conviction, or a specific instance of misconduct. Instead, Harmon's testimony that Pitts sold drugs during the time of the incident went to the gravamen of the charges against him and established both the motive for possession of the drugs located in his car — which issue was extremely relevant since each defendant blamed the other — as well as the element of the intent to distribute such drugs. The admission of such relevant evidence is not limited to "good character" rebuttal only, as the dissent would have it. Nor is evidence which is directly relevant to an issue in the case subject to a similar transaction Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 hearing.
Evidence is not inadmissible simply because it might incidentally reflect on the defendant's character. Any evidence establishing that a defendant has committed the crimes for which he is being tried will inevitably say something about his character. What is forbidden is the introduction . in the first instance of evidence whose sole relevance to the crime charged is that it tends to show that the defendant has bad character.
"[T]he evidence to which [Pitts] objects in the instant case was not introduced merely to impugn his character, but was relevant to the central issue in the case of whether [Pitts] was involved in dealing drugs." Since the testimony that, during the time of the incident, Pitts "sold drugs" was not legally objectionable on the basis of improper character evidence, the failure to object (or the making of an objection on grounds other than "character") cannot support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Failure to make a merit-less objection is not error.
Further, testimony that Pitts purchased distribution amounts of cocaine was properly admitted by the trial court as res gestae of the charged offenses. In that regard, Harmon testified that just prior to being stopped by the patrol officer,
[Harmon:] He [(Pitts)] stopped at the store. We both stopped at this store. He got out of the car. And met this guy. . . . He met this guy named Rick. And him and Rick exchanged — I can't — could I say it? He met Rick, him and Rick exchanged money, with drugs, okay. Orlando Pitts got back in the car and we left. . . . The rock cocaine, the little cookie that he had, he placed it on the floor beside my feet. . . . All of a sudden the police pulled us over. . . . Mr. Pitts took the drugs out of his — what he had down in here in his pocket and he placed them in my lap and that's how the drugs get on me. I panicked. . . . [Prosecutor:] Okay. And make sure I'm correct on this, you actually accompanied defendant Pitts to actually purchase the drugs [(69.5 grams of cocaine)] that were under the seat and on your person; is that correct? [Harmon:] Yes, sir.
Accordingly, Harmon's earlier comment that Pitts "sold drugs" was simply cumulative of evidence properly admitted as res gestae that Pitts purchased distribution amounts of cocaine for, perforce, distribution purposes. This fact, coupled with the trial court's instructions to the jury, twice, to disregard the complained-of "sold drugs" comment, is sufficient to permit the conclusion that there is no reasonable probability that — had the single "sold drugs" comment not been made — Pitt's would have been acquitted.
9. Pitts' additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to object to the errors alleged in Divisions 1, 5, and 6, supra, are rendered meritless by virtue of our substantive review of such errors and our findings in relation thereto.
10. Pitts' remaining claim of error ásserts that the jury returned an "ambiguous verdict" by finding.him guilty of both the greater offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana; thus, he argues that he should be given the "benefit of the ambiguity" and sentenced only on the lesser offense. This claim lacks merit. A finding of guilt on a greater offense necessitates a finding of guilt on a lesser included offense. That a jury specifically finds a defendant guilty of both in its verdict form creates no ambiguity. "[I]t is proper to convict and sentence a defendant for that crime which includes all others." Pitts was properly sentenced on the greater offense.
Judgment affirmed.
Smith, C. J., Andrews, P. J., Ruffin, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. Barnes and Ellington, JJ, dissent.
See Court of Appeals Rule 23 (e) (briefs shall be limited to 50 pages in criminal cases).
No allegations of substitution or tampering are before this Court.
The remainder of the chain of custody from police property to the GBI Crime Lab was established by Officer T. J. Chambers and has not been challenged herein; nor has the chain of custody from the GBI Crime Lab to the courtroom.
Mosely v. State, 217 Ga. App. 507 (1) (458 SE2d 165) (1995).
Gas chromatography mass spectrometry.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) (498 SE2d 579) (1998).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
Upshaw v. State, 249 Ga. App. 741, 745 (3) (549 SE2d 526) (2001).
443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); see also Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 246 (7) (464 SE2d 851) (1995).
The jury convicted Harmon of the lesser included offenses of simple possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
Kellibrew v. State, 239 Ga. App. 783 (1) (521 SE2d 921) (1999).
Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 544 (1) (405 SE2d 539) (1991).
See, e.g., Parris v. State, 226 Ga. App. 854, 856 (487 SE2d 690) (1997) (division of drugs into individual packages is evidence of intent to distribute).
Compare Clark v. State, 245 Ga. App. 267, 268-269 (537 SE2d 742) (2000) (eight small bags of marijuana were found in car with four people, and testimony showed that defendant had just purchased the marijuana for their use, as opposed to sale); Parris v. State, supra at 856 (defendant testified that the marijuana was for his individual use and, at time of arrest, he "exuded the odor of burnt marijuana").
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 460 (1) (431 SE2d 130) (1993) (that defendant is unemployed while in possession of valuable drugs can be evidence of intent to distribute); Nixon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 343, 346 (2) (574 SE2d 404) (2002) (unemployed status coupled with large amount of drugs can be evidence of intent to distribute).
Wiley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 334, 336 (5) (519 SE2d 10) (1999).
See, e.g., Joachim v. State, 263 Ga. 816, 817 (2) (440 SE2d 15) (1994); Black v. State, 248 Ga. App. 626, 627 (2) (548 SE2d 9) (2001); Carter v. State, 237 Ga. App. 703, 710 (6) (516 SE2d 556) (1999).
Rocha v. State, 248 Ga. App. 53 (1) (545 SE2d 173) (2001).
(Citation and footnote omitted.) Id.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 423-424 (3) (349 SE2d 717) (1986).
Kim v. Walls, supra at 179.
(Citation omitted.) Id.
(Footnote omitted.) Frazier v. State, 247 Ga. App. 500, 501-502 (544 SE2d 198) (2001); accord Braswell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 602, 605-606 (6) (b) (538 SE2d 492) (2000); Garrett v. State, 184 Ga. App. 593, 594 (2) (362 SE2d 150) (1987).
(Citations omitted.) Myers v. State, 275 Ga. 709, 713 (4) (572 SE2d 606) (2002).
(Citation, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Clemons v. State, 257 Ga. App. 96, 105 (4) (574 SE2d 535) (2002); accord Gardner v. State, 273 Ga. 809, 812 (5) (546 SE2d 490) (2001).
Davis v. State, 238 Ga. App. 736, 737 (3) (520 SE2d 475) (1999); see also Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580 (1) (b) (439 SE2d 471) (1993) (grant of a motion for mistrial may be required where the injury is so grave that no act of the court could remove the damaging effect)
(Citation omitted.) Gillison v. State, 254 Ga. App. 232, 236 (4) (c) (561 SE2d 879) (2002).
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.); see also Guyton v. State, 206 Ga. App. 145, 146 (3) (424 SE2d 87) (1992) (police target areas for investigation where people are "trafficking^ drugs).
See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) (502 SE2d 502) (1998) (4.9 grams of cocaine is sale amount not personal use amount); Bacon v. State, 225 Ga. App. 326, 327 (483 SE2d 894) (1997) (9.8 grams of cocaine is distribution amount, and it is "'extremely unusual for one person to have for his personal use' ").
Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 261 (1) (430 SE2d 391) (1993); see also Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370 (2) (370 SE2d 146) (1988) ("the amount of controlled substance was chosen [by the legislature] as the basis for distinguishing the crime of trafficking from the somewhat less serious crimes").
See OCGA § 24-9-20 (b).
OCGA § 24-2-2 ("The general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are irrelevant matter[s] unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of such conduct") (emphasis supplied).
See Stafford v. State, 275 Ga. 337, 338 (2) (566 SE2d 663) (2002) (testimony that defendant was upset because someone had stolen his marijuana plants admissible to show defendant's state of mind and to prove the marijuana charges); see also Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 691 (8) (512 SE2d 896) (1999) (State's evidence of defendant's drug dealing admissi ble as motive for murder); accord Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. 457, 458 (2) (396 SE2d 888) (1990); McGinnis v. State, 258 Ga. 673, 674 (2) (372 SE2d 804) (1988); Burney v. State, 252 Ga. 25, 26 (2) (310 SE2d 899) (1984); Kitchens v. State, 235 Ga. App. 349, 352 (509 SE2d 391) (1998); Higgins v. State, 221 Ga. App. 335, 336 (2) (471 SE2d 275) (1996); Brown v. State, 197 Ga. App. 155 (398 SE2d 34) (1990).
Sterling v. State, 267 Ga. 209, 211 (4) (477 SE2d 807) (1996); Motes v. State, 229 Ga. App. 489 (1) (494 SE2d 283) (1997).
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original and omitted.) Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 698 (16) (362 SE2d 351) (1987); Harris v. State, 260 Ga. 860, 865 (6) (401 SE2d 263) (1991).
(Footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 254 Ga. App. 150, 153 (4) (561 SE2d 833) (2002).
Fultz v. State, 274 Ga. 82, 87 (7) (548 SE2d 315) (2001).
See Ramey v. State, 239 Ga. App. 620, 623 (2) (521 SE2d 663).(1999) (defendant failed to demonstrate how testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial when such testimony would have been cumulative of other evidence).
Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 420, 423 (5) (499 SE2d 63) (1998).
Id. at 424.