Case Name: WILSON et al. v. LANE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2005-06-06
Citations: 279 Ga. 492
Docket Number: S05A0548
Parties: WILSON et al. v. LANE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears, P. J., Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 279
Pages: 492–497

Head Matter:
S05A0548.
WILSON et al. v. LANE.
(614 SE2d 88)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Chief Justice.
After Executrix Katherine Lane offered Jewel Jones Greer's 1997 last will and testament for probate, Floyd Wilson filed a caveat, challenging Greer's testamentary capacity. A Jasper County Superior Court jury found that Greer lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed her will, but the trial court granted Lane's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wilson appeals. Because we agree that there was no evidence to show that Greer lacked testamentary capacity, we affirm.
A person is mentally capable to make a will if she "has sufficient intellect to enable [her] to have a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of [her] property. . . ," In this case, the propounders introduced evidence that the will in question distributed Greer's property equally to 17 beneficiaries, 16 of whom are blood-relatives to Greer. The only non-relative beneficiary is Katherine Lane, who spent much of her time caring for Greer before her death in 2000. The drafting attorney testified that in his opinion, at the time the 1997 will was signed, Greer was mentally competent, and that she emphatically selected every beneficiary named in the will. Numerous other friends and acquaintances also testified that Greer had a clear mind at the time the will was signed.
Thus, the propounders established a presumption that Greer possessed testamentary capacity. The caveators, however, never presented any evidence whatsoever showing that Greer was incapable of forming a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of her property, even when the evidence is examined in the light most favorable to their case.
The caveators challenged Greer's capacity by showing that she was eccentric, aged, and peculiar in the last years of her life. They presented testimony that she had an irrational fear of flooding in her house, that she had trouble dressing and bathing herself, and that she unnecessarily called the fire department to report a non-existent fire. But "[t]he law does not withhold from the aged, the feeble, the weak-minded, the capricious, the notionate, the right to make a will, provided such person has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of his property." Although perhaps persuasive to a jury, "eccentric habits and absurd beliefs do not establish testamentary incapacity." All that is required to sustain the will is proof that Greer was capable of forming a certain rational desire with respect to the disposition of her assets.
In addition to Greer's eccentric habits, the caveators also introduced evidence of a guardianship petition filed for Greer a few months after the will was executed, the testimony of an expert witness, and a letter written by Greer's physician. None of that evidence, however, was sufficient to deprive Greer of her right to make a valid will, as none of it showed that she was incapable of forming a rational desire as to the disposition of her property.
The expert admitted that he had never examined Greer, and that his testimony was based solely on a cursory review of some of Greer's medical files. Further, he was equivocal in his testimony, stating only that "it appears that she was in some form of the early to middle stages of a dementia of the Alzheimer's type." Regardless of the stigma associated with the term "Alzheimer's," however, that testimony does not show how Greer would have been unable to form a rational desire regarding the disposition of her assets. Indeed, the expert offered no explanation of how her supposed condition would affect her competency to make a valid will.
The testimony of Greer's physician also failed to show how she lacked testamentary capacity. In 1996, the physician wrote a letter stating that Greer "was legally blind and suffered from senile dementia " But the doctor testified that he was "not sure whether she had senile dementia at the time or not, even though I wrote that." He stated further that he only wrote the letter to try and assist Greer in obtaining help with her telephone bill because she had been having trouble with her eyes. In any event, a vague reference to "senile dementia" cannot eliminate testamentary capacity. If it could, it would undermine societal confidence in the validity and sanctity of our testamentary system.
Finally, as the dissent points out, Lane filed a guardianship petition in 1998, after the will was executed, proclaiming that Greer was no longer capable of managing her own affairs alone. According to the testimony, however, the petition was filed solely in order to satisfy the Department of Family and Children Services' concerns regarding Greer's ability to continue living on her own, and thus to allow Greer to remain in her home. Even if Greer's inability to live alone existed at the time the will was executed, which was not proven by any evidence, that fact bears no relation to her ability to form a rational desire regarding the disposition of her assets.
In Brumbelow v. Hopkins, the caveators challenged a will by showing that the testator was of unsound mind, including a physician's testimony that a few days before the will's execution, the testator's "mind was not good." But this Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to deprive the testator of the "valuable right" to make a will, as allowing it to do so would undermine "certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice." Accordingly, this Court ruled that the jury verdict to the contrary should have been set aside.
Similarly, in this case, no testimony, expert or otherwise, was offered to establish that at the time the will was executed, Greer suffered from a form of dementia sufficient in form or extent to render her unable to form a decided and rational desire regarding the disposition of her assets. Notwithstanding the dissent's attempt to piece together "the totality of the evidence," none of the evidence, either alone or in combination, provided any proof that Greer lacked testamentary capacity, as that term is defined in this State. At most, there was evidence that Greer was an eccentric woman whose mental health declined toward the end of her life. Accordingly, the evidence demanded a verdict upholding the validity of the will, and the trial court was correct to reverse the jury's contrary verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Sears, P. J., Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.
Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 747 (57 SE 69) (1906); OCGA § 53-4-11 (a) ("testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property"); see also Morris v. Stokes, 21 Ga. 552, 571 (1857) (wisdom of testator irrelevant so long as she is not "totally deprived of reason").
OCGA § 53-4-11 (a).
Hill v. Deal, 185 Ga. 42, 46 (193 SE 858) (1937).
Sarajane Love, Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 45, at 82 (5th ed. 1988); see also OCGA§ 53-4-11 (d) ("[n] either advancing age nor weakness of intellect nor eccentricity of habit or thought is inconsistent with the capacity to make a will").
197 Ga. 247, 250 (2) (29 SE2d 42) (1944).
Id. at 255-256.
Id. at 256; see also Beman v. Stembridge, 211 Ga. 274 (85 SE2d 434) (1955) (error to deny j.n.o.v. where evidence showed that testator suffered from paranoid delusions, because that is insufficient to deprive the testator of the right to make a will); Anderson v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 464, 467-473 (80 SE2d 807) (1954) (directed verdict properly granted where evidence of weak and vacillating mind was insufficient to raise a jury issue with respect to testator's capacity); Griffin v. Barrett, 183 Ga. 152, 154-165 (187 SE 828) (1936) (viewing evidence in light most favorable to caveators, evidence of senility insufficient to deprive testator of capacity where evidence failed to show he was "totally bereft of reason").
See Pendley v. Pendley, 251 Ga. 30, 30 (302 SE2d 554) (1983) (directed verdict or j.n.o.v. properly granted only where all "the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. . .").