Case Name: THOMAS B. PARKE vs. GEORGE W. BLACKISTON
Court: Delaware Superior Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1841
Citations: 3 Harr. 373
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMAS B. PARKE vs. GEORGE W. BLACKISTON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 373–379

Head Matter:
THOMAS B. PARKE vs. GEORGE W. BLACKISTON.
i In slander, evidence of the plaintiff’s good character is inadmissible. The law presumes his character to bo good.
Neither can the defendant give in evidence the plaintiff’s general bad character.
Evidence of the rank, profession, or standing of either party is admissible.
¡The defendant’s manner and other circumstances accompanying the slander may be I proved on the question of malice.
¡Where the slander imputes a punishable crime the law implies malice.
Ef there be evidence of express malice, the jury may giye exemplary damages.
[The plea of justification on the truth, wholly unsupported, is evidence of express malice. ¡But this plea is not necessarily evidence of express malice.
Ef the defendant having reasonable cause and good grounds to believe the plaintiff I guilty, on evidence creating a strong presumption of guilt, pleads a justification for I the purpose of getting these circumstances in evidence, and not for the purpose of 1 repealing the slander, this plea is not in itself evidence of express malice.
iJnder the general issue the defendant is not at liberty to give evidence of the truth of I the charge; nor of any circumstances to disprove malice, or mitigate the damages, I if they tend to establish the truth of the charge.
Actiost on the case for words.
I The narr. set out the slander.in numerous counts, all amounting, lowever, to a charge that Parke broke open a letter placed in his lands by defendant to deliver to another, and stole from it ten dollars. In some of the counts there was added a charge, that this was lot the first time he had been guilty of a like offence. The de-ndant pleaded, not guilty, and justification on the truth of the words spoken; and at the trial, on motion, withdrew the plea of not guilty, and stood alone on the justification.
When the defendant had closed his testimony, the plaintiff called witnesses to support his general character. This was objected to.
Ridgely, Smithers and Bates — Wc have not attacked the plaintiff’s general character, and would not have been permitted to do so. Neither shall he be permitted to set up his general good character. The testimony is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the issue in this cause, which is not on the general character of the plaintiff, but on a specific charge of taking money out of a letter. The gist of the action is malice and not character. (5 Exc/i. Rep. G3; 11 Price 235, Jones vs. Stevens; 1 Ry. & Moody 305-, 21 Eng. C. L. Rep. 447; 2 Stark. Evid. 214, 878; 2 Phil. Evid. 107; 10 Johns. Rep. 281; 1 Term Rep. 754; 1 Camp. Rep. 460.)
The law presumes that plaintiff had a good character, and the burden is upon us to prove the charge, even as against this legal presumption. There is no necessity then, nor propriety, in hearing evidence of good character.
Frame and Clayton, contra.
The question is one of great magnitude. We submit that the authorities sustain these positions; thati under the plea of justification the plaintiff may give in evidence his rank and character; and that he has maintained an honest reputation.. The authorities are conflicting, but those of most weight, and bes sustained by principle, are for admitting the evidence. Cornwell vs.| Richardson is merely a nisi prius case, and the reporter discredits i by a reference to several cases which are contra. Chief Justin Abbott rejected the evidence without argument and without authorit; cited — it is a mere hasty decision, and more than counterbalance; by lord Alvanly’s judgment in 5 Esp. N. P. cases 13, 14. Barnjieh vs. Murry, 1 Camp. 460, was a case of seduction and not in point Rnscoe’s Evid. is loose and not sustained. 3 Stark. Evid. 215, &c. on the contrary is well supported.
On principle our position is correct. The charges here are infal mous in their nature. If true, they are totally destructive of th plaintiff’s character. The meanest criminal on his trial may avail himself of his character in his own defence, and yet here in a civi action, a man may be convicted of a crime, without being permittei to give in evidence his character.
The evidence is equally necessary in reference to the damage; How can the jury assess the damage which has been done to plain tiff’s character by the slander, without proof of what that character was before the slander. (2 Stark. Ev. 214-15; 2 Wheat. Selw. 977; 3 Mass. Rep. 546, Lamed vs. Buffington; Stark, on Slander 399, 179; 2 Harr. Rep. 446, Wuples vs. Burton; 3 Yeate&% Rep. 243; 11 Johns. Rep. 38.)

Opinion:
By the Court:
Booth, Chief Justice.
The question submitted to us is, whether in an action of slander on the plea of justification the plaintiff may give his own character in evidence, either to meet the defendant's proof of facts, or to aggravate the damages- It would seem that in the action of slander, on the plea of not guilty, the plaintiff cannot give, evidence of his general good character, either in support of his pwn averments of good name, fame and condition, or to aggravate the damages; though it has often been decided, that the defendant [night, under the general issue, give evidence of plaintiff's bad char-peter in mitigation of damages; but this has been overruled by the pase of Jones vs. Stevens, 11 Price 235, (5 Exc. Rep. 62,) where it was lecided that in an action for slander in reference to plaintiff's1 profes-lional character as an attorney, general evidence of the plaintiff's bad lharacter and ill repute in his business of attorney, could not be given ly the defendant, either to contradict the averment of good profes-ional standing or in support of averments to the contrary in the lea of justification. In this case there is no plea of not guilty; the lea justifies on the ground that the words spoken are true, and the efendant takes upon himself the duty of proving the charge by specific evidence of the fact charged. He would not, according to the Base of Jones vs. Stevens, be allowed even to strengthen his case by roof of the plaintiff's bad character; much less then should a plain-ff when his general character is not attacked, be permitted to give ndence of general good character to disprove the specific charge, he law presumes that he has a good character, and it would seem be a work of supererogation to call evidence in support of that Which is presumed to be good. The plaintiff here has brought the Wfendant into court to makegood a specific charge of dishonesty, or H answer in damages for the slander; the defendant by hispleaofjusti-Wation undertakes to make his charge good, and he must do it by spe-Bc proof of the act or acts of dishonesty charged He will not be Hrmitted to support his charge, nor can the plaintiff rebut it, by ge-Mral proof of bad or good character, which, though it may be affect-by the result, is- not really put in issue by the pleadings. A ma jority of the court, therefore, rule out the evidence offered of plaintiff's good character; but we will, on the authority of 3 Mass. Rep. 546, allow proof of the rank, profession and standing of either plaintiff or defendant. (2 Stark. Ev. 470, n.)