Case Name: FOSTER v. WOODS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-09-07
Citations: 71 Mich. App. 147
Docket Number: Docket No. 25009
Parties: FOSTER v WOODS
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and T. M. Burns and W. Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 71
Pages: 147–151

Head Matter:
FOSTER v WOODS
Opinion op the Court
1. Limitation op Actions — Statutes—Infants—Age op Majority.
A plaintiff who was 19 years old when the Age of Majority Act became effective on January 1, 1972, had one year from that date to bring an action on a claim accruing during his infancy, although the period of limitations on the claim had expired (MCLA 600.5851, 722.51; MSA 27A.5851, 25.244[51]).
2. Limitation op Actions — Infants—Age op Majority.
The Age of Majority Act did not shorten a limitation period but only changed the age at which disability due to infancy was removed.
Dissent by T. M. Burns, J.
3. Limitation of Actions — Change in Time Period — Reasonable Opportunity to Sue.
A person does not have a vested right in the speciñc length of the statute of limitations in effect when his cause of action accrues; however, a legislative change in that length of time cannot be so radical as to deprive a prospective plaintiff of a reasonable opportunity to enforce his cause of action.
4. Limitation op Actions — Constitutional Law — Due Process.
A statute of limitations that does not afford a reasonable time within which suit may be brought violates the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
5. Limitation op Actions — Infants—Statutes—Constitutional Law — Due Process.
A plaintiff was denied due process of law by a statute relating to the disability of infancy where the statute arbitrarily and unreasonably reduced the time in which a plaintiff could com menee a civil action from 2-1/2 years to 9 months and 11 days (1972 PA 87; MCLA 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851).
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1-5] 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions § 182 et seq.
Appeal from St. Clair, Halford I. Streeter, J.
Submitted June 11, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 25009.)
Decided September 7, 1976.
Leave to appeal denied, 399 Mich 805.
Complaint by Thomas Foster against Peter Woods, Port Huron Area School District and others for damages for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The school district moved for accelerated and summary judgment. Motion denied. The school district appeals by leave granted.
Reversed.
Wm. R. Walsh, Jr., for plaintiff.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen, P. C. (by Mark D. Shoup), for Port Huron Area School District.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and T. M. Burns and W. Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Defendant Port Huron Area School District appeals a St. Clair County Circuit Court order denying its motions for accelerated and summary judgment.
Plaintiff was born on December 16, 1952. He was injured in an automobile accident in June of 1967 and commenced a civil action for damages against the defendants on December 11, 1974. Such action is properly barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff was 19 years old when the Age of Majority Act of 1971 became effective. See MCLA 722.51 et seq.; MSA 25.244(51) et seq. Thus, due to the passage of 1972 PA 87 (see MCLA 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851), the time within which plaintiff could bring his action expired January 1, 1973. Tyner v Fishman, 56 Mich App 240; 223 NW2d 651 (1974), see also Smith v Bordelove, 63 Mich App 384; 234 NW2d 535 (1975), lv den, 395 Mich 772 (1975). Hence, plaintiff commenced his action almost two years too late.
Plaintiff argues that the above cited statutes operate to unreasonably and retroactively shorten the period within which he previously would have been able to bring this action. Cf. Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), Reich v State Highway Department, 386 Mich 617; 194 NW2d 700 (1972). These cases are inapposite. The Age of Majority Act of 1971, supra, and 1972 PA 87, supra, did not shorten a limitation period but only changed the age at which disability due to infancy was removed. Once disability was removed, a 1-year period remained during which an action could properly be brought.
Because we find that the motion for accelerated judgment must be granted, we need not discuss the defendant's argument concerning the motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the defendant's motion for accelerated judgment with costs to the defendant.
W. Van Valkenburg, J., concurred.
Defendant Port Huron Area School District moved for accelerated judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(5) on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5851(6); MSA 27A.5851(6). The motion also sought summary judgment on the ground that the school district was immune from tort liability under MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).