Case Name: Robert M. Jensen, et ux. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1972-01-18
Citations: 257 Ind. 599
Docket Number: No. 670S133
Parties: Robert M. Jensen, et ux. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 257
Pages: 599–609

Head Matter:
Robert M. Jensen, et ux. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.
[No. 670S133.
Filed January 18, 1972.
Rehearing denied March 27, 1972.]
Fred G. Donnersberger, Wilson, Benne, Feingold & Donnersberger, of Hammond, for appellants.
William F. Kane, Jr., T. H. Clifford, Jr., Lucas, Clifford & Wildermuth, of Gary, Thomas W. Yoder, Livingston, Dildine, Haynie & Yoder, of Fort Wayne, for appellees.

Opinion:
Arterburn, C.J.
This is an appeal from an eminent domain proceeding commenced in 1969 by the appellee electric company to acquire a strip of land across appellant's property for the purpose of construction of an electrical transmission line. The complaint was filed on December 10,1969. The landowners filed their objections to the complaint on December 31, 1969. Trial on landowners objections was set for January 29, 1970. On January 27, 1970, two days prior to the date set for the trial to begin, the landowners filed a Motion for Continuance "until all discovery is complete." On March 9th, the appellant filed sixty-four [64] interrogatories. The appellee, on March 20th, filed a Motion to Deny Requests for Answers to Interrogatories. On March 31st, the motion was sustained and the cause was set for hearing on April 22nd. The court did not sustain the motion until a hearing on the motion had been completed.
On April 22, 1970, the cause was commenced and appellee presented one witness. At the conclusion of the testimony offered by appellee's witness the appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The court deferred ruling on the motion and evidence was heard for the next seven days. On May 21st, the appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. On May 28, 1970, the court overruled appellant's objections and stated: "Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate said right of way and easement under its power of eminent domain, and same should now be condemned to plaintiff's use."
Appellant's first assignment of error states that the court erred in refusing to grant them the right to proceed with discovery by way of interrogatories and they were thereby denied due process of law.
Trial Rule 1 of the Indiana Rules of Procedure states: "Except as otherwise provided, these rules govern the procedure and practice in all courts of the state of Indiana in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity, or of statutory origin. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." [Emphasis Added] Appellee's right of eminent domain power is contained in Burns Ind. Stat. (1968 Repl.), sec. 3-1713. This right is statutory in origin and is, unless otherwise provided, within the coverage of the Indiana Rules of Procedure. Nowhere do we find any provision exempting eminent domain proceedings from the Indiana Rules. We conclude that parties to an eminent domain proceeding have a right to exercise the right of discovery as enumerated in the Indiana Rules of Procedure.
Having decided that the appellant had a right to use discovery methods under the Indiana Rules, we must now decide whether the lower court's ruling in favor of appellee's Motion to Deny Request for Answers to Interrogatories was proper.
It appears to us, from the record in this case, that appellant cannot ask the indulgence of a trial court when appellant waited until two days before the trial to ask for a continuance for discovery purposes and then waited from January 27th until March 9th to file sixty-four [64] interrogatories. The court's ruling sustaining the Motion to Deny Request for Answers to Interrogatories was made on March 31st. It ap pears to us that the court was more than considerate in granting appellant a continuance as an opportunity for discovery and that appellant wasted the court's time and that of the other parties thereafter.
Regardless, however, of that feature, there is no showing in the record that the appellant sustained any prejudice by reason of the court's refusal to require appellee to answer the interrogatories. All papers which were requested were tendered to the appellant. The court took a two day recess to give appellant's attorney time to study any and all documents. In open court appellant's counsel stated: "Your honor, at this time, I have the material I need." By agreement with opposing counsel, arrangements were made for the availability of a technical witness needed to explain the documents. It appears that the questions included in the interrogatories were asked of the witness at trial. Nowhere do we find that the appellants were denied any specific information that would have changed the results of the trial on the objections.
Appellant's second and third assignments of error shall be considered together as they both require a finding of necessity in order to sustain appellee's taking. Appellant's second assignment of error states that the court erred in overruling appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant's third assignment alleges that the lower court erred in finding that appellee was authorized and empowered to take appellant's land by virtue of Burns sec. 8-1713-15. Burns Ind. Stat. sec. 3-1713 provides, in part, as follows:
"Any corporation organized under the law of the state of Indiana, authorized by its articles of incorporation to furnish, supply, transmit, transport or distribute electrical energy . . . to the public or to any town or city, . . . is hereby authorized and empowered to take, acquire, condemn and appropriate land, real estate, or any interest therein, for carrying out such purposes and objects together with all accomodations, rights and privileges deemed necessary to accomplish the use for ivhich the property is taken . . ." (Emphasis added)
Appellant contends that based on the testimony of appellee's one witness, the appellee failed to make a showing of any necessity since the evidence showed that I & M would have approximately 20% more kilowatts of electricity than it needs, six years in advance of the stated need. This fact alone does not amount to a showing of lack of necessity on the part of the condemnor electric company.
In many cases this court has recognized that under the statutory provisions of Burns Ind. Stat. (1968 Repl.) sec. 3-1713-15 — utilities, "A large discretion is necessarily vested in those condemnors who are vested with the power in determining what property and how much is necessary." Indianapolis Water Co. v. Lux (1946), 224 Ind. 125, 64 N. E. 2d 790; and that the condemnor's exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed unless "clear abuse" thereof has been shown. Indianapolis Water Co. v. Lux, supra; Dahl v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1959), 239 Ind. 405, 157 N. E. 2d 194; Guerrettaz v. Public Service Company of Indiana (1949), 227 Ind. 556, 87 N. E. 2d 721; and State ex rel. Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Barber (1964), 246 Ind. 30, 200 N. E. 2d 638.
It is equally well established that the question of "necessity" under the statute "is not limited by a consideration of absolute or indispensible needs of the railroad" condemnor, and that "necessary land" is that which is "reasonably proper, suitable and useful for the purpose sought." Eckart et al. v. Ft. Wayne & N. I. Traction Co. (1914), 181 Ind. 352, 104 N. E. 762; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Lux, supra.
In determining what is "necessary land," courts "may, and in proper cases should, consider not only the present needs of the company, but also those likely to arise in the future." Eckart v. Ft. Wayne & N. I. Traction Co., supra.
We find an ample showing by the appellee of necessity by virtue of its need to protect against insufficient power during its "peak" winter months to provide an ample supply of power in order to protect against a potential "blackout" as occurred in New York City in the mid-sixties. Protection against consequences which can result from an electrical "blackout" constitute sufficient necessity to allow appropriation of land for the purpose of constructing facilities which will provide adequate protection. The demands on the use of electricity in the future could never be estimated with total certainty and it would be foolish for this court to deny the right to prepare for the future when technical evidence shows that a failure to adequately provide could have an immobilizing effect on the area appellee is obligated to serve.
Appellant's final assignment of error states that the lower court erred in refusing to admit appellant's Exhibit A into evidence. Exhibit A was a prospectus of the American Electric Power Company, the company which owned 100% of the stock of I & M Electric. There is no showing that the document was ever properly identified or authenticated. Without such a showing there can be no error on the part of the trial court in refusing to admit the evidence.
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Givan, J., concurs in result; Prentice, J., concurs; Hunter, J., dissents with opinion; DeBruler, J., not participating.