Case Name: MISTROT-CALAHAN CO. v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-01-15
Citations: 209 S.W. 775
Docket Number: No. 6005
Parties: MISTROT-CALAHAN CO. v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 209
Pages: 775–777

Head Matter:
MISTROT-CALAHAN CO. v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS et al.
(No. 6005.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
Jan. 15, 1919.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 12, 1910.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 1919.)
1. Carriers <©=3119 — Liability for Loss oaf Goods — “Act of God.”
An act of God, which releases a carrier of goods from its liability for loss, is one resulting from such force in nature as could not reasonably have been foreseen and provided against (Words & Phrases, vol. 1, p. 118).
. [Ed. Note. — For other- definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Act of God.]
2. Contracts <⅜^66 — Consideration — Assumption o-f Liability.
A mere promise by a carrier to pay for goods lost, for which it was not liable, not in the nature of a compromise, is not binding upon carrier, because without consideration.
On Motion for Rehearing.
3. Carriers <⅜=>108 — Carrier of Goods — Liability.
When a common carrier receives goods for shipment, it insures their delivery in accordance with bill of lading, unless the loss is occasioned by act of God, or of a public enemy, or by reason of inherent defect or vice of goods or animals, or on account of fault of consignee.
4. Carriers <©=3132 — Carriers of Goods — Liability — Burden of Proof.
When plaintiff proves delivery of goods to common carrier, and failure of carrier to deliver goods at point of destination, he makes prima facie case, and burden is upon carrier to prove that loss was occasioned by act of God or of the public enemy, or by reason of inherent defect, or on account of fault of consignee.
5. Carriers <©=^132 — Carriers o-f Goods — Negligence — Burden of Proof.
In action against carrier for goods lost, where carrier proves that loss occurred by act of God, burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that, notwithstanding such act of God, negligence of carrier was proximate cause of loss.
6. Carriers <⅜=>123 — Liability — Acts of God — Negligence.
The fact that a storm was unprecedented would not relieve a carrier from liability for loss of goods, where, after storm had begun and water was rising in docks so that there was apparent danger that they would reach and injure the goods, the carrier could by use of reasonable diligence have removed goods to a place of safety.
7. Trial <©=3203(3) — Instructions.
A plaintiff is entitled to an affirmative presentation of a material issue raised by the pleadings and the evidence.
Appeal from McLennan County Court; Jas. P. Alexander, Judge.
Suit by the Mistrot-Calahan Company against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
W. B. Carrington, of Waco, for appellant.
W. E. Spell, G. I-I. Penland, and Spell, Bog-gess, Ñaman & Penland, all of Waco, for ap-pellee Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas.
Stribling & Stribling, of Waco, for appel-lee Southern Pac. Go.

Opinion:
JENKINS, J.
This suit was brought to recover the value of four cases of shoes shipped to appellant from Boston, Mass., three cases of which were lost in the Galveston storm of 1915, and the other damaged so as to render it worthless to appellant. The defense was that the loss was occasioned by the act of God.
The appellant contends that the shipment was a through shipment to Waco. The ap-pellees insist that the shipment was to Galveston.
Whether it was the one or the other, it was an interstate shipment. The loss occurred while the goods were in the possession of appellee, the Southern Pacific Company. If the shipment was to Galveston, the appel-lee the M., K. & T. Ry. Co. is not responsible for the loss. On the other hand, if the shipment was to Waco, the M., K. <& T. Ry. Co., being a connecting carrier for the transportation of said goods, if the Southern Pacific Company is liable under the facts of the case, the M., K. & T. Ry. Co. is also liable under the Carmack Amendment, unless its failure to receive and forward the goods was due to the fault of appellant.
The court instructed a verdict for the M., K. <& T. Ry. Co. We do not know whether this instruction was based upon the finding of the court, as a matter of law, that the shipment was not sent to Waco, or that the goods were detained at Galveston from August 4th, the time of their arrival until Au gust 16th, the day the storm reached Galveston, by reason of the fault or negligence of Seifer, the agent of appellant. The evidence would have justified a finding in favor of the M., IV & T. Ry. Co. upon either of these theories, but we do not think it was sufficient to establish either theory as a matter of law. Hence, if judgment should have been rendered against the Southern Pacific Company, it was error to peremptorily instruct the jury to return a .verdict in favor of the appellee the M., K. & T. Ry. Co.
The court submitted to the jury, under appropriate instruction, the issue as to whether the loss was occasioned by the act of God. The verdict of the jury, being for the defendants, shows that they found in favor of appellees on this issue. Thd evidence is sufficient to support such finding. Such being the case, judgment was properly entered for appellees unless the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the Southern Pacific Company. The only negligence on the part of the Southern Pacific Company suggested by the evidence was in not having the floor of its warehouse elevated sufficiently to have kept the goods above the water during the storm. If such contingency might reasonably have been anticipated, and was not provided against, the loss did not occur from the act of God. The act of God is when the result is from such forces in nature as could not reasonably have been foreseen and provided against. Irrigation Co. v. Dodd, 162 S. W. 946; Words & Phrases, vol. 1, p. 118.
The evidence shows that appellees, in common with all people in Galveston, had warning from the weather bureau that a storm was approaching. Such warnings were frequent at that season of the year. In none of the previous storms, unless in that of 1900, had the water been high enough in Galveston to have injured the goods in the manner in which they had been stored. Subsequent to the storm of 1900, the sea wall was erected oh the Gulf side of the island, some 17 feet in height. In the light of the facts in reference to the storm of 1900, this was deemed sufficient to protect Galveston from the waters of the Gulf. It proved insufficient for this purpose in the storm of 1915, which would indicate that this storm was of greater violence than that of 1900. The testimony of several witnesses indicates that such was the fact. The storm of 1915 threw a schooner of 800 or 900 tons capacity over the wall, and did serious damage to property behind the sea wall, and caused the loss of at least 150 lives.
The loss having been occasioned by the act of God, without negligence on the part of the Southern Pacific Company, it is immaterial whether such company was in possession of the goods as a common carrier or as a warehouseman.
There is one other issue presented by the pleadings, the evidence, and the offer of evidence. The appellant alleged that it presented its claim to the receiver of the M., K. & T. Ry.' Co., and that it stamped the same "Vouchered," which meant that the claim had been passed upon, approved, and ordered paid by said receiver, acting through the claim department. Appellant offered to prove by a witness, who qualified as an expert in such matters, that such was the meaning of the word "Vouchered." The court sustained an objection to this testimony, and appellant assigns error on such action of the court.
We overrule this assignment for the reason that, if the M., K. & T. Ry. Co. was not liable on said claim, its promise to pay the same was without consideration, and therefore not binding upon it. There is nothing in the pleadings or evidence to indicate that such promise, if made, partook in any respect of the nature of a compromise.
Finding no error of record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
<&=>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes