Case Name: SMITH'S ESTATE. Arnold v. Smith
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1904-02-01
Citations: 43 Or. 595
Docket Number: 
Parties: SMITH’S ESTATE. Arnold v. Smith.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 595–612

Head Matter:
Decided 1 February,
rehearing denied 2 March, 1904
SMITH’S ESTATE. Arnold v. Smith.
[73 Pac. 336, 75 Pac. 133.]
Appeal — Order to Sell Realty — Widow as Adverse Party.
1. The widow is not a necessary or even a proper party to a proceeding to procure the sale of the realty of a decedent to pay debts, and her position is not affected by her being a joint maker with her deceased husband of the obligations to be paid. Not being properly in the litigation, she is in no sense an adverse party to any appeal, under Section 549, subd. 1 of B. & C. Comp.
Effect of Administrator’s Sale on Dower.
2. A widow’s right of dower is not affected by a sale of realty to pay debts of her deceased husband.
Order to Sell Realty — Appealable Interest of Administrator.
3. An administrator has an appealable interest in an order of a county court dismissing his petition for a license to sell property of the estate to pay a claim which has been allowed.
Evidence of Residence of Creditor.
4. The evidence is satisfactory that the creditor whose claim was allowed in this case was a resident of this state when the claim became due.
Burden of Broof on the Entire Case.
5. Under the general rule that the party making an allegation has the burden of proof in reference to it, the objectors to an order for the sale of a decedenths realty, on the ground that the claimant was not a resident of this state when his claim matured, must prove their case, taking into account all admissions and all presumptions from conceded or established facts.
Extending Limitations Through Payment by Joint Maker.
6. Under B. & C. Comp. § 25, providing that if any payment shall be made on a contract after it has become due, the limitation shall commence from such payment, a payment by one joint maker of a note before limitation kas.expired will continue the liability as to all.
Statutes of Washington —Claims—Nonintervention Will.
7. Section 6228 of Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & Stat. Wash., providing that claims not presented against an estate within one year after the first publication of the notice to creditors shall be barred, does not apply to claims against an estate settled under what is known in that state as a nonintervention will.
Laches in Asking for Sale of Decedent’s Realty.
8. A delay of nearly ten years in pz*ocuring letters of administi’ation and filing a petition for license to sell real estate to pay a claim against a testator’s estate, the ownership or condition of the realty not having changed, and the time for the running of the statute as to realty not having elapsed, is not such laches as to bar the right to make the sale.
Estoppel — Admissions in Pleadings by Guardians ad Litem.
9. An admission in a pleading must be taken as true not only on the trial of the cause in which such admission is made, but on appeal as well, whether the admission be made by a competezit person or by an infant through a guardian ad litem. For instance: it being admitted in objecting to an administrator’s petition for leave to sell the real property to pay claims against decedent that the only property belonging to the estate is such realty, the objectors, whether adults, or minors acting through a guardian, will not be permitted to urge on appeal an absence of proof that the personalty had been exhausted.
From Multnomah: John B. Cleland, Judge.
Pruceedings for the sale of real estate of a decedent for the purpose of paying claims against the estate. From a decree of the circuit court reversing an order of the county-court aud directing a sale the property, the objectors appeal. A motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled, and the decree afterward affirmed, both opinions being written by Mr. Justice Wolverton.
Motion Overruled : Aeeirmed.
Mr. 8. B. Huston for the motion.
Mr. G. C. Moser, contra.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
Mr. Justice Wolverton
delivered, the opinion.
This is a motion to dismiss the appeal from the decree of the circuit court reversing an order and decree of the county court of Multnomah County, and remanding the cause, with directions to grant an order of sale of the real property belonging to the estate of the deceased, forthe purpose of paying a certain alleged claim against the estate and the expenses of administration. The deceased died testate in the State of Washington, leaving the following-named heirs: His widow, Annie J. Davis, nee Smith, and a son and daughter, named respectively, Albert U. and Ethel M. Smith, to the two latter of whom he devised the land which it is now sought to have sold by order of the probate court. The widow joined with the two children in their objections to the petition for the sale, and, being successful, the petitioner, F. K. Arnold, appealed to the circuit court, making all the objectors parties to the appeal, and succeeded in obtaining the decree from which this appeal is prosecuted. The objectors have all joined in the notice of appeal to this court, but the widow did not join in the undertaking, and the motion to dismiss is based upon the grounds (1) that there is no sufficient undertaking, and (2) that Annie J. Davis is an adverse party, but is not made a party to the appeal.
It is difficult to see how Mrs. Davis can be affected by a reversal' of the decree appealed from, and, if she cannot, she is not an adverse party to the appeal. She is a joint maker, with the decedent, of the note, it is true ; but the proceeding is not against her as such maker, but in rem, to subject the realty of the estate of the decedent to its pay ment, and no decree can be given against her in any event. It is said that, if the real estate is sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the demand, as required by the decree of the circuit court, it would lessen her liability, and that, therefore, a reversal will affect her adversely. Her purpose from the beginning was to defeat the sale, which is inconsistent with the idea that she would get hurt by a reversal; but, whatever part she has taken, the result of the proceedings can only affect her incidentally, and because she is a comaker of the note affords in itself no ground for making her a party to the proceedings in the first instance, and, not being a proper or necessary party thereto, she cannot be accounted an adverse party to any appeal that may be prosecuted.
It is further suggested that she has a dower estate in the realty sought to be sold, and for that reason she is an adverse party. That she has a dower may be assumed, unless cut off by the will or some other way ; but, concede it, the order of the court cannot affect it: Whiteaker v. Belt, 25 Or. 490 (36 Pac. 534). If she is without dower, then she has no interest whatever to be affected ; so that, in any event, she is neither a proper, necessary, or adverse party to the proceedings. This being so, the undertaking is regular, and the motion will be denied.
Motion Overruled.