Case Name: STILLWELL v. GRUBAUGH
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1959-10-12
Citations: 357 Mich. 344
Docket Number: Docket No. 49, Calendar No. 47,792
Parties: STILLWELL v. GRUBAUGH.
Judges: Smith, Black, Edwards, and Voelker, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 357
Pages: 344–361

Head Matter:
STILLWELL v. GRUBAUGH.
1. Automobiles — Intersections — Traffic Lights — Contributory Negligence — Question for Jury.
Whether or not plaintiff, westbound motorist in north lane of 4-lane highway, who had stopped for traffic light was guilty of contributory negligence in proceeding into northbound lanes of intersecting 4-lane highway after change of the light held, question for jury in his action against northbound motorist who crashed into plaintiff’s ear.
:2. Same — Intersections—Traffic Lights.
A motorist cannot .totally disregard the circumstances that exist at the time he approaches an intersection governed by a traffic light but he has good reason to believe he is protected from danger .by' the red light so far as traffic approaching the light. •>
3. Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Evidence.
. The facts in relation to plaintiff’s negligence should be very clear to warrant deprivation of a citizen’s right to a jury trial.
4. Same. — Contributory Negligence — Directed Verdict — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.
Neither a motion for directed verdict nor for judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff will be granted on the issue of latter’s contributory negligence, where evidence as to it presents a question of fact.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 5A Am Jur, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1067. Liability for accident at street or highway intersection as affeeted by reliance on or disregard of traffic sign, signal, or marking. 164 ALR 8.
'[3] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 335, 336.
'[4] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 348.
‘[5] 5A Am Jur, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1097.
.[6] 5A Am Jur, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 991-993.
5. Automobiles — Intersections—Trampic Light — Instructions.
Claim of error in instruction in automobile accident ease arising from collision at an intersection controlled by a red and green traffic light that was premised on the idea that plaintiff did not have the right to rely upon the fact that he was protected to his left when he entered intersection with the green light in his favor held, without merit.
6. Same — Intersections—Evidence—Conclusions.
It was not an abuse of discretion to permit a witness to an automobile accident at an intersection controlled by a traffie light to testify he did not think that northbound defendant could have entered the intersection before the light turned in favor of westbound plaintiff and the witness who was in ear in the south westbound lane alongside plaintiff’s ear, had testified as to the length of time the ear in whieh he was riding had stopped, waiting for the light to change, that sueh ear had not started up immediately subsequent to the change of light and the distance it had traveled before the impact between defendant’s and plaintiff’s cars, since sueh witness had given the facts upon whieh his alleged conclusion was based.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Gratiot; Cash (Paul R.), J.
Submitted April 16, 1959.
(Docket No. 49, Calendar No. 47,792.)
Decided October 12, 1959.
Case by Don Stillwell and Preferred Insurance Company, subrogee, against Lawrence Grubaugb for property damage resulting from automobile collision. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defend-
ant appeals.
Affirmed.
Netsorg & Plaxton, for plaintiffs.
Karl E. Mihho, for defendant.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
Plaintiffs brought this action in the circuit court for the county of Gratiot to recover alleged damages to plaintiff Stillwell's automobile in a stipulated amount of $835.99.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of plaintiff Stillwell's damages; that plaintiff Stillwell was free from contributory negligence; and that the negligence of the defendant was a violation of CLS 1956, § 257.611 (Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 9.2311) in failing to observe the traffic light.
Defendant answered denying negligence on his part and claiming plaintiff Stillwell was guilty of contributory negligence by reason of the fact he entered the intersection without making- proper observation that he could do so safely contrary to the statute.
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' proofs and at the close of all proofs, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict of no cause for action on the theory that plaintiff Stillwell was guilty of contributory negligence. This motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $835.99, the amount of the damages having'been stipulated. Defendant then made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The circuit judge denied this motion.
Defendant appeals and contends:
(1) The court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant on the ground of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff Stillwell as a matter of law.
(2) The court erred in refusing to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial.
(3) The court erred in its instructions to the jury.
(4) .The court erred in permitting into evidence .a portion of the testimony of one of plaintiffs' witnesses.
The accident out of which this action arose took .place in the city of St. Johns, Michigan, at the Intersection of highways M-21 and US-27, at about 2:30 p.m. on January 31, 1957. Traffic at this intersection is governed by the usual intersection traffic light. Plaintiff Stillwell was traveling* in a westerly direction on highway M-21. As he approached the intersection he observed the light was red and he made a stop in the extreme north lane of M-21. Both M-21 and US-27 are 4-lane highways at this point, permitting 2 lanes of traffic to travel each way. Immediately to the left of plaintiff Stillwell when he completed his stop was another motor vehicle stopped parallel to him awaiting a change of the light from red to green so that they might pass into the intersection.
Plaintiff Stillwell testified as follows:
"Q. Now Mr. Stillwell when you came to that light was the light just changing or was it necessary for you to come to a complete stop there !
"A. I had to come to a complete stop.
"Q. You stopped all the way on there!
"A. Stopped dead, yes.
"Q. All right, then what happened!
"A. Well, when the light changed I proceeded on out to the highway.
"Q. When the light changed from—
"A. My direction.
"Q. The light changed, in other words it went from red to green!
"A. That's right.
"Q. And you proceeded on. Now in which direction were you going!
"A. I was headed straight west.
"Q. And you proceeded out into the intersection!
"A. Out into the intersection.
"Q. What happened at that time!
"A. I don't remember. All I know is that I was suddenly hit from the left side."
Under cross-examination he was questioned as to whether or not he had looked to the north or to the south. The following constitutes his testimony in this regard:
"Q. Then when it turned green you moved out in the intersection?
"A. That's right.
"Q. Did you look to the north on US-27 before you moved out ?
"A. I don't remember whether I looked north or not.
"Q. Did you look south on US-27?
"A. I don't recall that either.
"Q. How far into the intersection had you gotten when the impact occurred?
"A. Just about into the line of traffic that was headed north."
Merlin Durbin, a disinterested witness who was riding in the automobile to plaintiff Stillwell's left, testified the driver of the automobile in which he was riding stopped because the light was red; that he noticed plaintiff Stillwell's vehicle stopped in the lane immediately to the right from the automobile in which he was riding. He further testified that when the light changed to green the vehicle in which he was riding started up and moved just a few feet, at which time the driver slammed on the brakes and defendant's automobile passed in front of them and c'rashed into plaintiff Stillwell's automobile. He testified that the vehicle in which-he was riding did not start until after the red light had turned to green; that the Stillwell automobile did not move until the light turned green.
Mr. Dwrbiri was called for rebuttal testimony arid testified as follows:
"Q. Will you tell the jury what that discussion was please?
"A. Well, after we made our left turn we got out of our vehicle we was riding in, and they come, over to take our names for a witness; and during- the discussion why I asked Mr. Grubaugh why he run the light, or what made him go through it, or something like that I said; and he made the statement, 'I didn't see the light.' "
Defendant Grubaugh testified on direct examination that the visibility was good; that he had power brakes; that he was traveling north on US-27 at approximately 30 miles per hour; that he had first observed the traffic light about 40 feet before he entered the intersection and it was .green at that time; that he last observed the traffic light when he was about 10 feet south of the curb before entering the intersection and it was green at that time. He further testified that he continued on into the intersection and he noticed 2 other vehicles near the intersection headed west on M-21 and stopped for the light. He testified that he did not see the automobile in which witness Durbin was riding move at all; that he first noticed the Stillwell automobile when he was approximately the length of an automobile to the south of the Stillwell automobile and the Stillwell automobile was then about 8 to 10 feet into the intersection.
Under cross-examination defendant Grubaugh testified as follows:
. ."Q. Well, supposing that you come up to a green light and that green light is changing, it changes from green to amber ?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Which is caution?
"A. That's right.
"Q. And then to red and stop, does it not?
"A. Yes sir, that's right.
"Q. And then when it comes time to change again it changes directly from red to green, does it not?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Now as I understand it you first — or, you last observed the traffic light when you were 10 feet to the south of the intersection?
"A. Yes.
"Q. At that time it was green ?
A. That's right.
"Q. You first observed Mr. Stillwell's car pro- . ceeding into the intersection when you were still a car length away from it, is that right?
"A. Oh, I believe I said a third of a car.
"Q. A third of a car. In other words then Mr. Grubaugh this light changed from green to amber to red while you were traveling from a point south of the intersection until you were down into the intersection, is that what you want us to believe?
"A. I didn't run a red light.
"Q. Now will you answer my question. Is that what you want us to believe? We will come to that.
"Q. You wish us to believe that in the point 10 feet south of the intersection down into the intersection there was time for that traffic signal to change from green to amber to red?
"A. No.
"Q. And also for this car to pull out into it?
"A. No, I don't think so.
"Q. Well now, you have heard Mr. Stillwell say that the light turned to green before he ever got out in here, before he ever started to move, didn't you?
aA. I think that is what he stated.
"Q. Well, your light had turned from green to amber to red from the time you last observed it until you got down to this point in the intersection?
"A. I had—
"Q. Now, as a practical matter, wasn't it considerably further south than 10 feet when you last observed that light?
' "A. No, it wasn't."
Clearly, under the above testimony, a question of fact existed as to whether plaintiff Stillwell had acted as an ordinary careful and prudent man under the circumstances. While it is true that one cannot totally disregard the circumstances that exist at the time he approaches and enters an intersection that is governed by a traffic signal, he has good reason to believe he is protected from danger by the red light so far as traffic approaching the light. If one crossing with a green light cannot depend upon the safety the law affords him, but must wait each time to see whether the driver approaching the red light will observe the light and stop, he may find himself in a dangerous position, particularly if the light changes against him before he has completed his trip across the street. Travis v. Eisenlord, 256 Mich 264; Barron v. City of Detroit, 348 Mich 213. In so far as Boyd v. Marushi, 321 Mich 71, and Morse v. Bishop, 329 Mich 488, are in conflict with the rule as established in this case and in Travis v. Eisenlord and Barron v. City of Detroit, the Boyd and Morse Cases are overruled.
Mr. Justice Black spoke for a majority of the Court in Barron v. City of Detroit, supra, where he compared the ability of a jury to determine the question as opposed to a court, and said (p 217):
"Our competence in such regard fades when arrayed against the comparably better experience and judgment of 12 citizens of the community who, literally, are 'on location.' I answer that in all but the rarest of cases the former (court) are less apt to be rightly equipped to decide such an issue."
Justice Edwards in Ware v. Nelson, 351 Mich 390, 397, said:
"The facts in relation to plaintiff's negligence should be very clear to warrant our depriving a citizen of his right to a jury trial."
• In the case of Landon v. Shepherd, 353 Mich 500, 508, the Court said:
"Were plaintiff's actions those of an ordinary careful and prudent man under like circumstances ? Can the minds of reasonable men differ in answering this question? If so, the evidence should have been submitted to the jury. Detroit & Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99; Adams v. Canfield, 263 Mich 666; Davis v. New York Central R. Co., 348 Mich 262."
Clearly, with the dispute and conflict of testimony in this case, the court did not err in refusing to grant the motion for a directed verdict or in submitting the case to the jury.
The reasoning applied in answer to the first question satisfactorily disposes of the second question as to whether the court erred in refusing to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The third error alleged by appellant is with reference to the instructions to the jury. In view of our ruling with respect to the duty of plaintiff Stillwell in this case and the reliance he had a right to make upon the fact that the light was red for approaching traffic on US-27 from the south, the argument of appellant with respect to the charge, on the face of it, must fail. It is built upon a false premise that plaintiff did not have the right to rely upon the fact that he toas protected to his left. Therefore, reading the instruction complained of together with the rest of the charge, in view of what has been said above, we discover no reversible error in the charge given. A comparison of the charge in this case and the charge in Barron v. City of Detroit, supra, discloses that almost the exact words were used. At page 220 of that decision Justice Black said:
"In view of what has been said above, I discover no reversible error in the charge as quoted."
The remaining position relied upon by defendant for reversal is that the trial court erred in permitting into evidence alleged conclusion testimony on the part of one of the witnesses.
Witness Durbin was asked the following question and made the following answer:
"Q. Now would yon say that this car (defendant's) could have started into the intersection before the light turned, the ear coming from Lansing?
"A. No, I don't think he could of."
Defendant contends that permitting this question and answer to stand over his objection was error in that this testimony was opinion evidence which pervades the province of the jury.
Control of such testimony is largely a matter of discretion with the trial court. Undoubtedly it is true that witnesses should not in general be allowed to state conclusions, although this rule is qualified (Zuidema v. Bekkering, 256 Mich 327), and where a witness gives fully and definitely the facts upon Avhich a conclusion is based, there is no presumption of prejudice.
In the instant case witness Durbin had previously testified that he was riding in the automobile immediately to plaintiff Stillwell's left and the automobile in which he was riding Avas stopped waiting for the light to change. He had described the length of time the automobile in Avhich he was riding was stopped, the fact that the automobile had not immediately started up subsequent to the change of the light. He had further testified as to the approximate distance the automobile in which he was riding had moved before the impact. The witness, having given the facts upon Avhich the alleged conclusion was based, makes the statement more one of fact than a conclusion, and its admission was within the discre- • tion of the court. Vezina v. Shermer, 198 Mich 757. No reversible error was committed in receiving this testimony.
Judgment affirmed, with costs in favor of plaintiffs.
Smith, Black, Edwards, and Voelker, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.