Case Name: Morris Symonds and Joseph Symonds v. The City of Cincinnati
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1846-01
Citations: 14 Ohio 148
Docket Number: 
Parties: Morris Symonds and Joseph Symonds v. The City of Cincinnati.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 14
Pages: 148–185

Head Matter:
Morris Symonds and Joseph Symonds v. The City of Cincinnati.
In an action for the value of private property taken for public uses, it is competent to the defense, to show the benefit conferred on the owner by the appropriation. Such benefit may he considered by the jury, in estimating the damages.
This is a special action on the case, reserved in the county of Hamilton, on a motion for a new trial.
*Tbe plaintiffs are the owners of a city lot on the north side of Lower Market street, between Sycamore and Broadway. The city council, by an ordinance passed February 5, 1840, in pursuance of the city charter and its amendments, ordered Lower Market street to be widened on the north side, and, for that purpose, appropriated for the public use, twenty-six feet of the plaintiffs’ lot, leaving it thirty-eight, instead of sixty-four feet deep. The object of this suit was the recovery of the value of tho ground thus appropriated, with the buildings thereon, which were removed by order of the city council.
A trial was had in the Supreme Court for Hamilton county, at the April term, 1843, and a verdict rendered by the jury for the plaintiffs, for $4,292, the supposed value of the property appropriated.
The defendant filed her motion for a new trial, and assigned the following reasons:
1. That the court refused to instruct the jury that the record of tho proceedings of the city council was a bar to the action.
2. That the court would not admit in evidence the difference in value of the plaintiffs’ premises, before and since the opening of the street.
3. That the court instructed the jury that they must leave out of view, in estimating the plaintiffs’ damages, the benefits which accrued to the remainder, after the appropriation of the twenty-six feet of the plaintiffs’ lot.
4. That now evidence had been discovered.
5. That the damages were excessive.
The questions, arising on this motion, were reserved for decision in this court.
Hart & Pugh, for defendant, in support of the motion :
Waiving, for the present, the other points raised, we propose to confine ourselves to those presented by the second and third reasons assigned for a new trial.
*Our proposition is, that the term “compensation” means nothing but a redress of the damage done by a public work. We are strengthened in it by divers considerations.
1. By the doctrine of “collateral damages” itself, as the fashionable though rather indefinite term is. For land taken, we are told by the supporters of this faith, the full price must be paid in money; but against collateral damage — such as occurs in the case put by Mr. Fox, on the fifth page of his Symonds brief, where the grade of a street is raised so as to render useless one story of a house — benefits may be set off. Now we beg to have the distinction drawn which shall bring the instance of land taken within the scope of the constitution, and exclude the instance of collateral damage like this. Is not the rendering useless one story of a citizen’s house as much a violation of private property, as taking ten feet of his land? The constitution says that “private property” — not land alone, but “property” of all kinds, and the right to its perfect enjoyment, wheth ersuch “property ” be in a house or in anything else — “private property ought and shall ever be hold inviolate.” It seems to us that both branches of this doctrine about “ collateral damages ” can not be sustained. If benefits accruing to an individual in other respects, from the same act, may be recouped from the sum assessed for an injury to his house, where is the pretense of an argument that they ¿an not likewise be recouped from the sum assessed for his land taken? We have yet to learn that property in the soil is more sacred, in the eye of the constitution, than property in a house, or in anything else; and, until so informed, we shall hold the two cases mentioned above, the same in principle.
Again, the city of Cincinnati does not appropriate, the land for a street, but only takes a right of way. For, although by statute, the fee of land dedicated for a street is vested in the corporation, yet this does not apply to the case of a street opened by the corporation itself. The’ statute, on the subject of the latter, merely ordains that “all streets and alleys in towns, which are or may be laid out agreeably to law, shall *be, and the same are hereby declared, public highways for every purpose whatever." Swan’s Stat. 809. By this, a right of way only is given to the corporation — such as the king has in highways at the common law. Now “it*is laid down in the old books,” says Vfoolryeh, “that, in a highway, the king has nothing except the passage for himself and his people, but that the freehold and all the profits, as trees, etc., appertain to the lord of the soil.” Woolrych on Ways, 5; S. P., Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 143, per Lord Mansfield ; Bingham v. Doane, 9 Ohio, 167. The whole estate remains in the citizen, subject to the easement of the public. And as the city, in raising the grade of a street, merely obstructs the citizen in a complete enjoyment.of his house, so, in widening a street, she simply obstructs his dominion over the land by vesting a right of way in others. There can not, therefore, be any distinction in the cases. But even if the court should hold the case of streets opened by the corporation, to bo identical with that of streets dedicated, the argument needs a slight change merely. The fee which the corporation takes in the case of streets dedicated, is not an absolute one, but for the uses and purposes only which are “set forth and expressed or intended ” in the deed of dedication. Swan’s Stat. 937. The corporation, can not use the property in any other way than that. The Town of Lebanon v. The Commissioners of Warren County, 9 Ohio, 80. Nor can the legislature authorize the corporation to use it otherwise. Le Clercq v. The Town of Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, 221, pt. 1. The fee is, therefore, a base or qualified fee within Blackstone’s definition— “such a one,” namely, “ as hath a qualification subjoined thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end. As, in the case of a grant to A. and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Bale; in this instance, whenever the heirs of A. cease to be tenants of that manor, the grant is entirely defeated.” 2 Bla. Com. 109.- Whenever the land ceases to bo used for the purposes of the dedication, it reverts to the owner. Really, the estate of the public, even in this view, is *nothing but a right of way. It is an estate so long as the land is used for a street, and no longer. In practice, therefore, it matters not whether Rower Market street come under the statutory provision firstly or secondly above mentioned. Neither makes this a case of confiscation — that is, a ease where the whole interest of the citizen is extinguished, as where wheat is taken for the subsistence of an army, or personal property otherwise consumed — but a case in principle, like that supposed by Mr. Fox, whore the citizen is merely obstructed in the perfect enjoyment of his estate. It is no answer to say that the easement or the base fee, whichever we declare the title of the city to be, may long incumber the land; for in proportion to its probable continuance, of course, must the rate of damage be.
2. It is clear, we think, also, from the very nature of this action, that damages are what the citizen has to claim of the government when his property is condemned to public use. If so, the argument just made derives force from the decisions of the Queen v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company, 1 Gal. & Dav. 589, and Dodge v. The Commissioners of Essex, 3 Met. 380, that property may be damaged by a public wox-k, though not so much as touched by it. But we refer to the point as supporting, separately from this, our main px-oposition.
3. By the ancient common law on the subject of public wox-ks. Although, indeed, the principle of compensating for the injury thereby done was not x-ecognized, yet our cautious ancestox-s permitted no such work to be undertaken till after an inquest of its expediency. This was by suing out the writ of ad quod damnum, which Rox-d Chief Bai-on Comyn defines as “awx-it to inquire whether a grant intended to be made by the king will be to the damage of him or others.” Com. Dig. title Ad Quod Damnum, A. Thus, also, in Thomas v. Sorrel, Vaugh. 341, it is said to be a writ had for the turning of ancient highways, which may not be done without the king’s license obtained by this writ, on inquisition found that such a change will not be detx-imental to the public.
So in Hind v. *Mansfield, Noy, 103, the river Thames is said to be a highway, and can not be diverted without an ad quod damnum, and to do such a thing ought to be by patent of the king. And so Fitzhei-bort: “If there be an ancient trench or ditch coming from the sea, by which boats and vessels use to pass to the town, if the same be stopped in any part by outrageousness of the sea, and a man will sue to the kina: to make a new tx-ench, and to ’ stop the ancient trench, etc., they ought first to sue a writ of ad quod damnum,, to inquire what damage it will be to the king or others.” F. N. B. 225, E. In times of the pure common law, therefore, we see that tho principle of estimating damage was pursued whenever a public work was intended. That is the principle upon which we insist in the present ease.
4. To this the law of England, as administered in our time, fully agrees. Their railway and canal and turnpike acts all provide for compensation to the owners of property in the manner intended by our constitution. Their modern legislation, in this respect, is' an improvement on the common law. Upon what principle, let us ask, do they proceed in assessing damages ? Not upon that of paying the value of the land taken, but that of redressing the injury done. For proof of'this, we refer to the fact that the court of Icing’s bench, in construing the acts of parliament, use the words “satisfaction ” and “ indemnity ” as synonymous with “compensation.” Boyfield v. Porter, 13 East, 200; Lister v. Lobley, 7 Ad. & E. 124.
5. Another point is suggested to us by the language of Lord Denman, in the last case cited. That was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit against the trustees of a turnpike, who were empowered by parliament to enter upon the lands, etc., “ making or tendering satisfaction to the owners or proprietoi’S,” but who had taken the plaintiff’s land for their road, without previously making him compensation. It was argued on their behalf that, although the words of the act did certainly favor the idea that compensation must be made or ^tendered, at the time of entry upon the lands, and before actual seizure to road purposes; yet that idea must be rejected, because the amount of compensation could not be ascertained till the turnpike was fiuished. The court thought this argument unanswerable, and stopped the discussion. “ The effect of the words in question is,” said Lord Den-man, “ that they (the trustees) shall not do it without being liable to make compensation,” because, as his lordship had just before remarked, “the amount of compensation can not, generally, bo ascertained till the work is done.” Et per Littledale, J.: “I am of the same opinion. There may be a damage done which was not intended. The lord of a manor often has a power reserved to him to enter lands and dig mines, making compensation ; but, in: justifying under such a right, he need not plead that he made compensation before entering.” Now if the doctrine contended for by the plaintiff’s counsel here be sound, the argument to which the court of king’s bench attached so much force is futile. If the price of land taken be the true criterion of damage, it is absurd to say that the amount of compensation can not be estimated till the work is done. It can be estimated before the work is begun— so soon, in fact, as the plat is made, or even the route determined. But if our doctrine bo sound — that it is the damage, the injury less the benefit, which must be estimated — the court of king’s bench were undoubtedly correct in their decision. It does seem to us that, when to such authority are joined arguments drawn from all the analogies of the law, as well as the decisions of two of the greatest states of the Union, the matter ought to admit of no further controversy.
6. Lastly, we have to urge the history of this clause, as affording proof of the truth of our construction. No such principle, we have already intimated, is known to the common law as the king’s making compensation to a subject for property seized to public uses. It exists in America only by force of our federal and state constitutions. That it was introduced originally with sole reference to a state of war, seems to *us almost certain. The language of the ordinance of 1787, which was prior to all our constitutions, can leave little doubt upon this point. The language is: “Should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.” Surely, we do not need to mention, with much particularity, the various sacrifices of private property demanded by war, the seizure of provisions and beasts of burden, the destruction of bridges and houses, tho laying waste whole districts of countiy. For all these, at the common law, there was no redress; the damage was done in defense of the state, for which end, it used to be argued, the citizen ought freely to give up all his property, and even his life. The founders of the American constitutions, however, had other notions of justice, and they thought it only fair that an injury done by the government to one citizen for the-safety of the citizens at large ought to be borne by a general contribution. Such, wo are convinced, was the origin of this principle in our frame of jurisprudence; its operation, however, has proved so benign, that by the constitutions founded subse quent to 1787 it has been extended to sacrifices by an individual to the public benefits, even in the season of peace. If this be so, we are referred back, for the proper application of this principle, to the usages of the country in time of war. We shall not tire the court by detailed discussion of them. Surely, it was never considered that a citizen could claim more of his government for the seizure of his property to feed the army, or retard the progress of the foe, than mere compensation. That compensation, in the case of perishable articles, would, in general, be their full value; but, in the case of a farm laid waste, it would only be annual profits, with interest. In other words, it would be the simple damage done.
Let us now proceed to notice some of the most prominent objections to our doctrine:
1. The constitution says that compensation shall be made in money; and therefore, argues Mr. Fox, the full value of the *land must be paid without any reduction for benefits.
This objection, like all the rest, takes for granted the very point under argument, namely, whether compensation means the value of the land. To be sure, the party injured must be redressed in money; but compensation, as we define it, can be thus rendered quite as well as the value of the land can be paid. The reason why money is specified as the only medium may*be explained with ease. In England, commissioners to inclose wastes and open roads are empowered by statute to make “ full compensation,” or “just compensation,” in the ter.ms of the constitution of the United States; and yet they are allowed to compensate the parties’ injuries, not in money, but in other property. Doe v. Preston, 7 B. & C. 392; Wingfield v. Tharp, 10 B. & C. 785; Townly v. Gribson, 2 Term, 701; Arundel v. Viscount Falmouth, 2 M. & S. 440; Smith v. Smith, 2 Price, 101; Askew v. Wilkinson, 3 B. & Ad. 152; Ellis v. Arnison, 5 B. & Ald. 47; Thorpe v. Cooper, 5 Bing. 116; Barwick v. Mathews, 5 Taunt. 365. Our constitution, however, provides that the compensation must be made in money. But for this the government might, in evil times, put off upon a party injured other property, real or personal, at a fictitious value. To that imposition the citizens of all other states in the Union except Yermont are exposed.
2. Mr. Fox asserts that the act of 1839, amending the city charter, demonstrates the intention of the legislature to make “ the actual value of property” the measure of damages in this case. Tho act referred to gives tho city council power to appropriate land for streets, etc., “making the owners compensation for the value thereof, or for the damages they may sustain thereby.” Digest of City Ord. 38, 39. Upon this the learned gentleman claims that tho actual value is to be paid where land is taken, and compensation to bo made whero other injuries are done. But thero is no ground for such a construction. The council, be it remembered, is to make compensation for the value of the land, as well as for damages which accrue. Of course, therefore, the question returns as *to the moaning of the word “compensation.” It seems to us that, in the clause of the act quoted, the legislature contemplated these two cases: 1. Where the whole of a piece of real estate is appropriated. 2. Where a part only is appropriated. In the former, the measure of compensation is the value of the property, for the whole interest of the citizen is extinguished as it would be by a sale. In the latter, the city has merely injured the property, and must pay for the damage done. No other construction accords with the general purview of tho act. This case belongs to the second class, where the damage only is to be compensated; and, in fact, the plaintiff has adopted such a form 'of action as to indicate this.
Every argument, therefore, which legal ingenuity can devise results at last in the question : What docs compensation mean? That question has been answered by a reference to the analogies of tho law, and to the judgment of the great English tribunals. The word has also been specially defined by the courts of last resort in Pennsylvania and New York, between whose constitutions and ours the sole difference is; that wo are confined to money as the means of compensation, while they are not. Nor does the constitution of Vermont, to which we have been referred as a parallel to our own, at all militate against this argument. There the doctrine of our opponents may possibly prevail, because there the owner receives an equivalent in money, and not compensation, as he would under our law. This question has' been settled, too, as Mr. Fox admits, by a uniform course of legislation ever since the first statute was promulgated in Ohio. But he tells th9 court to set that at naught, because, forsooth, last winter it decided that “ healing acts ” were unconstitutional. Wo ask no favor from this court; we do not wish to bo protected by any error, however ancient or generally received. When, hpwever, a grave question arises upon the constitution, the whole object of this court must bo to ascertain the intention of those who framed that instrument; and we submit that the construction which it received from its founders, and which has been followed without misgiving for half a century, ought to go very far toward *deciding the question. This case presents no feature kindred to the cases instanced, for the very passage of those healing statutes indicated the opinion of the legislature that the practice theretofore existing was illegal.
We have said that we ask no favors. We claim for the city of Cincinnati a faithful application of those rules which have been wisely ordained to protect suitors and quiet litigation — without which, indeed, trial by jury is an utter farce. And wo .challenge for this clause of the constitution its natural construction — one that does not fritter away the sense of its most important word, and smuggle in a doctrine foreign to the context, and hitherto unknown to the legislature and the profession. In all respects, we desire nothing but the full measure of the law, and its consequent, exact justice.
Charles Fox, for the plaintiff:
The principal question arising in this cause is, as to the right of the city to set off against the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, in the value of his property, taken for public purposes, any supposed benefit conferred on other property belonging to the plaintiff, by the alleged improvement.
The proposition I maintain is, that when the city takes individual property for public purposes, they are bound to pay the value of the property so taken. This is a right secured to every individual by the constitution.
By section 4 of article 8 of the constitution, it is declared that “ private property ought and shall ever be held inviolate, but always subservient to the public welfare, provided a; compensation in money be made to the owner.” Here, then, is an express provision declaring that a compensation shall be made only in money. T he proposition of the city counsel is, that they have the right to pay for the property taken, by improving other property owned by the plaintiff,, against his wishes. It would seem there could hardly be a difference in ^opinion as to the meaning of the words of the constitution — a compensation in money is to be made to tho owner. How can the court say that a compensation can be made in any other way than in money ? If the principle is to be tolerated, as contended for by the city, then it follows that a man’s house may be taken down and half his lot taken, and he is to be compensated by bringing visionary men into court, who swear that, in their opinion, the improvement made, will make his remaining half-lot equal in value to the house and whole lot.
Again : Independent of the constitutional objection urged, I maintain a true construction of the amendment to the city charter, upon which the city founds its right to take property for public purposes, leads to the same result.
Section 2 of the act amending the city charter, passed March 16, 1839, confers authority on the city to condemn and appropriate any real estate necessary for such improvements, by making the owners compensation for the value thereof, or for the damages they may sustain thereby; they shall have power to make any ordinance, not inconsistent with this act; to ascertain all damages and benefits that may accrue to the real estate in the section or sections in the vicinity of, or through which such street, lane, alley, market space, or'common may pass or be made; or by going beyond the vicinity, when in their opinion, it shall be just and equitable so to do, and to provide for a final adjustment of the same, by the assessment and collection of a special tax from the real estate bounding on, and in the vicinity of such street, lane, alley, market space, or common benefited thereby.
Now the clear reading of this charter shows that the legislature intended:
1. To authorize the city to take the property of individuals, by making the owners compensation for the value thereof.
2. The city is to make compensation for the damages they (the owners) may sustain thereby. That is, the property of persons may be damaged by the opening of the street, although *none of this property is taken, and for this damage, compensation is to be made.
And in the third place, the city is authorized to pass ordinances to ascertain all damages and benefits that may accrue to the real estate in the section or sections in the vicinity, or by going beyond the vicinity.
And fourthly, the city council are to provide for a final adjustment of the same, by the assessment of a fpocial tax from the real estate bounding on and in the vicinity of the street, etc., benefited thereby.
As I understand the meaning of this charter, it follows the constitution. It directs that the city shall make the owners compensation for the value of the property actually taken. This, without any regard to any collateral damage sustained, or benefit received by the owner in consequence of the improvement. And to show more clearly that this was the intention of the legislature, ,it is expressly provided that an ordinance shall be passed to ascertain all these collateral damages and benefits that may accrue to the real estate in the section, etc.; and to pay the difference between the damage and benefit, a special tax is to be assessed on the real estate bounding on the street, etc., so far as the same may be benefited. For instance, in this particular case, supposing the twenty-six feet taken by the city in this case, belonging to A., should just reach the south line of B.’s lot, but should not take an inch of his ground; as they had taken none of his lot, they would not have to make compensation for the value thereof. But suppose B. had a valuable building on his lot, and the council should find it necessary to raise the street ten feet higher than it originally was, and thereby cover up or render useless one story of B.’s house, it is very clear that B. would sustain a collateral damage, say of $>300. But as no property is taken, this damage may be compensated by the benefit conferred upon B.’s property, by the street running along the south side of his lot, thus giving him a front on a valuable street, which he did not before possess. Now in such a case, it is evidently proper that the collateral benefits *and damages should all be taken into consideration, and if the benefits conferred are greater than the damages sustained, it is clear they ought to be set off against each other. If these benefits conferred on the class of persons thus collaterally damaged, are equal to the collateral damage in each case, nothing further need be done. But as tho collateral damages may be greater than the benefits conferred, it is further provided that the council shall provide for a final adjuntment of the same, by collecting a special tax from the real est-ato hounding on the street which shall be “ benefited thereby." Test is, all the property on the street which is benefited, shall contri'o&te to the extent of the benefit received, to making compensation for the collateral damages sustained by individuals, over and above tiu par ticular damage sustained. The present case also shows the pro-propriety of such an assessment for benefits.
All the eastern portion of the block stood back twenty-six feet, and thus standing, was not so valuable as the western portion ; but as soon as the twenty-six feet was taken off the western part of the block, the eastern part became more valuable, and ought to contribute toward the improvement.
The proposition, then, that I maintain is, that by the words of the charter, the city council have authority to condemn and appropriate individual property “by making the owners compensation for the value thereof,” and on no other terms.
Second, that to ascertain other damages sustained, the city may make ordinances, and when ascertained, they are to assess and collect a special tax on the property benefited. But this last provision to ascertain damages and collect a tax, etc., has nothing to do with regard to the value of property actually taken. This view of the case makes the charter consistent with the constitution, and it is the duty of the court so to construe the acts of the legislature as to make them agree with the fundamental law, whenever the language pei’mits of such a construction.
If the court should take a different view, and say that the ^ordinance to be passed to ascertain all damages and benefits, is to include in the term damages the actual value of the land, then I contend that the benefits conferred on the real estate are to be assessed only on the property benefited, and one piece of property equally with another is to be taxed, and thus the burden divided among all who are benefited, and not be thrown all upon one person, as is contended for on the other side, by the set-off principle.
I will now consider the claim set up in bar of the plaintiff’s right to recover at all.
It is claimed by the counsel for the city, that there is a special provision made in the charter that the city council shall provide, by ordinance, a mode to ascertain all damages and benefits, and that the amount so ascertained shall be assessed by way of special tax on the real estate bounding, etc. And that such an ordinance has been passed, and therefore the plaintiff’s remedy is under the provision of the ordinance.
The first answer to this provision is already given, if my construction of the charter is correct. I maintain that no power or authority is given to the council, by this charter, to pass any ordinance to ascertain the value of the property actually taken. But the city is bound, by the constitution and the charter, to make the owners compensation for the value of the necessary land. The charter makes no provision for ascertaining the value of the land taken, and therefore it is to be ascertained, as in all other cases, by the judicial tribunals of the country. 11 Ohio, 410. It is the value of the land and buildings only these plaintiffs seek to recover. They do not seek to recover for any collateral damage. And there being no provision made to ascertain the value of property actually taken for streets, and as the owners are undoubtedly entitled to compensation, the only mode left by which the plaintiffs can obtain that compensation, is by action. 5 Ohio, 143; Foot v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408; 2 Kent’s Com. 339.
^Again, it is clear that neither the city nor the state can take individual property without first declaring, “by law, that the public welfare requires it, and directing the mode of ascertaining its value, and providing for its payment.
Now the legislature, in the amended charter, have not provided for anything, as 1 understand it, but a final adjustment of the collateral damage and benefits, that a provision is made by taxing the property benefited.
Again, suppose I am wrong in my interpretation of the act, I can not be wrong in this proposition, that the only provision made is an authority to provide for a final adjustment of the same, by the assessment and collection of a special tax from the real estate bounding on, and in the vicinity of such street, lane, etc., “ benefited thereby.”
Now it is very clear that the only authority given to council to tax property for the payment of damages, either direct or collateral, is to the extent of the benefits actually conferred on the property. In New York this question has been decided, that although the city may tax adjoining property for the actual benefit conferred, yet the city can not tax one cent beyond that benefit, and the benefit is not to bo speculative and distant, depending upon remote and uncertain contingencies, but it should be substantial, certain, and capable of being realized within a reasonable and convenient time. 3 Wend. 452 ; 9 Wend. 257.
In the last case the court say, “the parties can not be assessed beyond the benefits received, and if the statute can not be executed without this, the statute must fail.” And it follows that if the assessment, when made, was beyond the benefit received, the same could not be legally collected, because it would be unauthorized, and therefore void. 12 Wend. 165.
The error of Mr. Hart, in his argument, consists in the supposition that the council have the power to assess all the damages sustained on the adjoining property of individuals, without regard to the extent of benefits conferred. No such authority is conferred by the charter.
*Here, then, the difficulty is presented. The owner of the property is entitled to compensation for the value of his land taken. The provision for payment is only a tax on other property, which may be benefited by the improvement. Of course, if there is no property benefited, the owner has no provision for his compensation; and, therefore, the case comes directly within the ease of 5 Ohio, 143, where the court hold the legislature are bouud to “direct the mode of ascertaining its value and providing for its payment.”
If the owner is thus to be thrown upon the contingency of there .being sufficient benefits conferred upon other property, for obtaining compensation, is it not, in effect, repealing the constitution ? The man’s property is taken away for the public use. He is entitled for that to compensation in money. But instead of money, the legislature say he is to be satisfied if there is sufficient benefit conferred upon other people’s property — if no such benefit is conferred, he is to have nothing. And this is claimed to be a “compensation in money.”
I claim, then : 1. That the charter, authorizing the individual property to be taken for public use, to have a fair constitutional interpretation, must be held to authorize the city to take the property only on paying the value thereof.
2. That no provision is made, in the charter, for ascertaining the value of property taken for streets (although there is such provision made for valuing property taken for wharves and landings).
3. That the provision attempted to be made is not certain, but contingent (depending upon finding property benefited), and there is not such a provision for compensation in money as the constitution requires.
Now, I suppose the owner of property is not to be dealt with in this manner. His means of obtaining his compensation must be certain, and not contingent; and nothing short of an absolute certain provision for payment can be set up as a bar to his right of action.
Thus far I have only referred to the provisions contained in'the ^charter. I will now examine the provision made by ordinance, with a view of complying with the requirements of the charter. I maintain that the ordinance of May 29, 1839, is not such an ordinance as is required by the charter.
The charter confers power on the counsel “ to make any ordinance not inconsistent with this act, to ascertain all damages and benefits that may accrue to the real estate, etc., in the section or vicinity, or by going beyond the vicinity, when in their opinion it shall be just so to do ; also to provide for a final adjustment of the same, by the assessment and collection of a special tax from the real estate bounding on, and in the vicinity of such street, etc., benefited thereby.”
The first, thing, then, to be done by the city, is to provide, by ordinance, a mode of ascertaining the damages or benefits.
The council are to determine whether it is just and equitable to go beyond the vicinity.
Then the council are to provide for the adjustment, by the assessment of a special tax from the real estate benefited thereby.
The counsel have, by a general ordinance, ordained that the damages and benefits, including costs and expenses, that may accrue to the real estate in the section or sections in the vicinity or through which the street, etc., may pass, shall be finally ascertained and assessed by three freeholders of said city, to be appointed by the city council, if application be made for the purpose in six months from the day of establishing the same, upon the real estate bounding on, and in the vicinity, or beyond the vicinity, as the said freeholders may deem just and equitable, taking into consideration the nature of the estate injured, and all the advantages that each party will derive from such improvement. And the appraisers are to enter their proceedings to the city clerk. At the expiration of four weeks, the clerk is to deliver a certified copy of such assessment to such persons as the council may appoint to collect — when collected, it is to be paid to the person entitled, by order of the council.
*It is clear, from the previous decisions of the court, that, if the legislature required private property for public use, a law must be passed “to direct the mode of ascertaining its value, and provide for its payment.” Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the legislature'can delegate this power of legislation to the city council, yet it is clear the city council must make the same provision to secure compensation as the legislature must have done. There is no mode fixed in this ordinance for ascertaining the value of property actually taken for streets; but the ordinance only provides that “ the damages, including costs and expenses, that may accrue to the real estate, etc., shall bG ascertained and assessed, if application is made in six months.” Is this such a provision as ought to be made ? The right to apply is limited to six months. There is no mode pointed out by which owners are to be notified of the city’s intention to condemn — or of its having been condemned. Under this ordinance, a man’s property may be condemned without any notice, and the city may lay by for six months after “ the day of establishing the same,” and then order the buildings torn down, and the owner then is too late to apply, because the six months have elapsed.
Again: When the damages are ascertained, I claim they must be reported to the council, and then the city council must declare their opinion whether it is just and equitable to go beyond the vicinity in order to assess damages. The charter requires the council to exercise its judgment and determine this question, and this can only be done by ordinance. Instead of doing this, the council, by the ordinance, havo left this matter to bo ascertained by “ three freeholders," thereby substituting the judgment of the three freeholders for the judgment of the whole city council. This can not be legally done, and of course no assessment so made can be collected; and therefore the ordinance does not make a legal provision for the payment of the value of the land taken.
Again : The city council is to provide for a final adjustment of the same, by the assessment and collection of a special tax from the real estate bounding, and in the vicinity, etc.
*Now, the city council have made no ordinance by which they have assessed a special tax on the property benefited. And can it be pretended that any tax or assessment can be collected unless it is assessed by the city council ? It is made the special duty of the council to assess this tax; and, before they can do that, they must first determine what portion of the property in 'or beyond the vicinity shall contribute ; yet these two important matters, instead of being acted on by council, have been delegated by them to three freeholders, and the clerk, after four weeks, is to deliver a copy of the assessment of the freeholders to the collector.
I maintain that, in order to carry out the provisions of the charter, the city council ought first to provide for the ascertaining the damages. After the amount is ascertained and reported, then the city council must, by ordinance, determine whether it is “ just and equitable to go beyond the vicinity” to assess for benefits; and, after the benefits are ascertained, an ordinance must be passed assessing a special tax on the property so found to be benefited. This tax can only be assessed by council, and yet the council claim that, without such ordinances, we must rely upon this right to collect the special tax, for our constitutional right to a compensation in money.
Again: I claim that this ordinance is void, because it seeks to compel the owners of adjoining property to pay the “ costs and expenses,” which the charter does not authorize; and, not being authorized, can not be assessed. 9 Wend. 257.
In my estimation, the council have made no provision for the payment of our claim — have made no provision by which we can legally assert our right in any other way, than by coming into court.
Again : Take the ordinance as it is, and supposing it to be perfect, the council has disregarded their own ordinance, and the charter also, in the proceedings on the review. Both the charter and the ordinance secure to the owner the right to select two persons, who, with two to be selected by the city, and one by the four, are to determine the value, etc. Now, in this *case, the plaintiffs applied for this review, and named their appraisers; the city also named theirs ;.and afterward, without notice to the plaintiffs, under the pretense that the appraisers refused to act, and, on the application of Mr. Yolant, they appointed another set of appraisers, none of whom were selected by those plaintiffs; and now they claim that these plaintiffs are bound by this assessment, made directly contrary to the charter and ordinance. Surely, no such proposition can be sustained. These plaintiffs did all they could do, and all the law required them to do, by naming their appraiser. That is all they had to do, and they are not responsible for the appraisers or reviewers not acting; they had no control over their actions. But the fact is, the reviewers could not find any property which had been benefited by the opening of the street; and the council would not receive the report, because they could not assess benefits to the amount of damages sustained.
The city council have acted, from the beginning, under the impression that they could take any man’s property for a street, and whatever the property taken should be found to be worth, they could pay for by assessing a tax on adjoining property to the same amount, no matter whether that adjoining property was benefited or not. This erroneous notion has regulated and controlled all the city legislation and proceedings on this subject. And it is in consequence of this erroneous impression, that they never have made any legal provision for the payment of the value of the property, or for damages sustained. Now, the owners of the property can not prevent the legislature from taking the same. If the government will take it, the owner can not object or resist; but the govment “ must have the value ascertained, and pay for it.” 5 Ohio, 184.
An ordinance which does not provide a clear, precise, and adequate remedy to the owner to ascertain the value of the property taken, and a certain, unquestionable fund for the payment of the value of the property, is null and void. 20 Johns. 105. The ordinance must itself provide a fund for the payment of the compensation required by the constitution, or the party may resort to his common-law remedy. ,
*1 maintain that, if all the necessary ordinances had been passed ; if the assessments had been regularly made, and the benefits conferred were sufficient to pay for the value of the land taken, and other damages sustained, still the owner can not be thrown on the assessments. The owner is entitled to his constitutional compensation, whether the assessment for benefits is or is not collected, and the city or legislature must provide the fund for, payment.
Again : I claim, the city council, being the party liable to pay these damages, ought not to have the whole control of these proceedings. I maintain that the ordinance which the council ought to pass, to carry out the powers conferred by the charter, should make provision for the determination of the matters in contro versy between the owners of' property and the city, by a judicial tribunal. I claim this power can not bo honestly exercised by one of the parties in the controversy. Is it not strange that the city, who is to pay the value of the property, and compensate for damage done, should be selected to decide every controversy which may arise in proceedings of this nature ? Can it be said that such an ordinance is not “inconsistent with the act,” in the language of the charter? The city council is authorized to pass all ordinances to carry into effect the provisions of the charter; but is it a fair interpretation of this grant of power, to say that the city council may pass an ordinance giving to the council judicial powers ? To invest themselves with the power of deciding all controversies between the city and individuals? Surely no such power can be claimed. And yet the counsel for the defendants claim such powers for the council. The ordinance is founded on this supposition. The city claims the right, by ordinance, to name the appraisers, if application is made in six months. The ordinance prohibits the paying over the money collected for benefits, except by order of the city council.
In all other cities and countries, provision is made by law for settling all the controversies which so frequently arise in carrying out these powers to appropriate private property to public use, by judicial bodies. In New York, the proceedings must *be had in the Supreme Court; and some of the most intricate questions of law have originated in these matters, requiring the utmost research and reflection. By this ordinance, all these matters are to be decided, if decided at all, by the city council of Cincinnati. Is this giving a remedy “ by due course of law, and administering justice without denial or delay ? ” I should say not; but, on the contrary, it is a declaration that the power of my client to obtain payment for his land, depends upon the mere will and pleasure of the city council.
Again, in this very case, the city own the market-house property, 400 feet in length, and this is to be assessed for benefits; and the city market house, not benefited ten cents, is charged with |1,844, because it was considered necessary to raise the amount by assessment, not because the property was in fact benefited. And yet the city council, having to pay the largest sum of any property holder, are permitted to act judicially in this matter, and decide every important question which may arise. Is it not a mockery to send these plaintiffs to such a body to obtain redress, or even to complain of grievances? I would meet such an ordinance at once, by declaring it inconsistent with the charter, viola» tivo of every principle of justice, and not sanctioned by the constitution or laws of the land. Such an ordinance ought to be condemned at once by every man who wishes to preserve the distinction between legislative and judicial functions ; who wishes a fair and impartial administration of justice. Why should this council bo tolerated in passing an ordinance of the character of the one in question, making themselves the judge in their own case? The charter has established the office of mayor, to whom exclusive jurisdiction is given to determine violations of the ordinances of the city. And he is “to perform such duties, and exercise such powers as, from time to time, may devolve upon him by the ordinances of the city.” Now the amended charter authorizes the council to pass any ordinance to carry its provisions into effect, not inconsistent with the act.
And is it not clear, that such an ordinance must bo passed as *will confer on the mayor, the judicial officer of the city, the power of deciding the several questions that may arise, in the execution of his duty, in opening streets? By the passage of such an ordinance, an effectual mode of settling all these difficulties and controversies would have been provided, satisfactory to individuals, and consistent with our notions of right. But to make the members of the council the judges in these matters, shocks all our notions of justice. Chancellor Kent, in his note, 2 Kent, 339, says, the government “is bound to provide some tribunal for the assessment of the compensation or indemnity, before which each party may meet and discuss their claims on equal terms.” And he appears to hold the opinion that the money must be paid when the property is condemned. This is so held in Mississippi. 3 How. 249; so in 1 Dana, 90, 91, 233.
This court, in 5 Ohio, 393, decided that the council had no power to declare a forfeiture of gunpowder; but if the city had the power, it was held the forfeiture could only be enforced by a judicial proceeding. They could not, by ordinance, forfeit the powder — there must be a legal investigation; and any “ ordinance which violates this principle, is not consistent with the spirit of the laws of the United States or of this state.” I maintain the spirit of the law is equally violated, by constituting the council the active agents of the corporation, the judges and regulators of these proceedings; and that the ordinance, on this account, is inconsistent with the charter.
My objections, then, to this ordinance, are:
1. Because it does not provide for valuing the property taken, or paying for the same.
2. That the right even to apply for damages, is limited to six months.
3. That the council are bound to have a valuation made at the same time they condemn, whether application is or is not made; and the ordinance only provides for a valuation if damages shall be claimed.
*4. The ordinance is void, because it provides no mode of giving notice to the owners.
5. Because it delegates to freeholders the power of deciding what property shall be assessed for benefits, whereas it is the duty of the council to decide what extent beyond the block the proporty shall bo assessed.
6. Because, after the return of the amount of benefits conferred by the appraisers, nothing can be collected until a special ordinance is passed, assessing the tax, which is not done.
7. It is void, because it seeks to add the “ costs and expenses ” of the proceedings to the amount authorized by the charter.
8. Because it does not provide a disinterested tribunal to investigate and decide upon the matters in controversy, before which each party may meet and discuss their claims.
9. Because it is inconsistent with the principles of justice to permit the city to be the judge,-where it is the party directly in interest.
10. Because there is no certain mode provided for the payment of damages, but the right to compensation is made to depend upon the contingency of finding property benefited by the improvement.
11. Because, even after the tax is collected, the owners of the property can not receive, unless the council see proper to order it to be paid.
12. Because the ordinance is based upon the supposition that all the losses and damages sustained by individual owners must bemiado out of the property of other owners, whether the latter.property is benefited or not.
13. Because the ordinance is based upon the supposition that the council have the right to set off advantages or benefits, real or supposed, against the actual value of the property taken.
The council, perceiving that there was a defect in the ordinance of 1839, passed the amended ordinance of June 23, 1841.
*This' amended ordinance is more defective, if possible, than the one it attempts to amend, for it provides that, if the persons appointed to review can not agree, the original assessment shall stand. Thus, by a very cunning operation, the Gordian knot is loosened, and the charter which secures to the owner a right of having the assessment reviewed, is, in fact, repealed, pro tanto, by this ordinance. I think this is rather inconsistent with the provisions of this charter. •
As to the cases cited by the defendant’s counsel, the caso of Bates v. Cooper, 5 Ohio, 115, establishes no proposition contrary to what the plaintiffs’ counsel contends for, but that case fully recognizes the principle that the state can not take individual property without making a provision to compensate the owner.
In Scovil v. Geddings et al., 7 Ohio, the action was brought for a consequential .injury, and the damage claimed was only for an inconvenience sustained, and the court say: “That the indirect injury which may be done to private property, by lowering or raising a street, does not come within section 4 of article 8 of the constitution.”
The action in that case was not against the city, but against an agent, and all that was decided was, that the city, having authority to do the act, the agent of the city could not be sued.
In the case of Hickok v. City Council of Cleveland, 8 Ohio, 543, the action was for collateral or consequential damage; and it was held that, inasmuch as the council were authorized to grade the streets, no action could be sustained for consequential injury. The difference between this last and the Goodloe case was this: In the latter case the-improvement was alleged to have been fraudulently done. But in the Hickok case, it is again held not to be a case within the clause of section 4 of article 8 of the constitution, “ that private property is not in reality appropriated to publio uses,” because no property was, in fact, taken.
*The case of Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159, decides that corporations, notwithstanding they are authorized by law to grade streets, yet, if the exercise of the lawful right occasions damage to others, an action lies to recover for the injury done, in the same manner as against individuals. This last case does in fact overrule the case in 8 Ohio, so far as the right to sustain the action is concerned. But, in none of these eases has the question been presented which is now before the court. We are not asking damages for consequential injury, but simply asserting our right to recover the actual value of the land taken.

Opinion:
Wood, C. J.
The principal question, in the case before us, has its origin in the second and third reasons assigned in the motion for a new trial: Whether the defendants can set off against the value of the plaintiff's property, appropriated for public %ises, any increased benefit, arising from the improvements, made by the city, to the balance of the lot?
It is insisted by the defense, that the court erred in rejecting the evidence offered on the trial, of the difference in value of the plaintiffs' premises, before and after the improvement made, by widening the street; and that the court should have instructed the jury to consider the benefits resulting from the improvement, to the residue of the lot, in estimating the damages.
It is not denied by the plaintiffs but what their property is subject to the public use, when the necessity of the community de-mands its surrender. The right of eminent domain is an incident to sovereignty, and exists in every government. Private mischief, rather than public, of necessity must be endured. The obligation to make compensation, however, follows thjs right, as the shadow does the substance, and is concomitant with it. It is not in all countries a legal obligation; but it is an obligation of natural equity and justice everywhere. That this right of eminent domain may be conferred, not only on municipal ^corporations, but private, can not at this day be questioned, without upsetting the legislation of Ohio for half a century, and the repeated adjudications of our own courts and those of our sister states. 1 Kin. Com. 218.
It is, however, incorporated into our organic law, that compensation in money shall be made to the owner, whenever his property is appropriated for the public welfare. Not as a condition precedent to the appropriation; but provision must be made by law for the assessment of the damages the owner of the property will sustain, in some fair and equitable manner, and before some corn- potent tribunal, where the parties can bo heard; and payment must be provided for, from an unquestionable fund, by law, before permanent possession of property can be taken, or its appropriation made, in the exercise of this incident to sovereign power.
It is contended by the plaintiff's counsel, that, by compensation to the owner in money, as the words are employed in the constitution, is signified the actual value of the property appropriated, in money, subject to no deduction whatever! Wo can not adopt this opinion. If such were the intention of its authors, they probably would have used language like this: Provided the value of the property be paid, in money, to the owner.
That just, full, -and adequate compensation must be made, and in money, is certain ; more can not bo required; but if, in appropriating property of the value of $4,000, when, by the same appropriation, the value of what remains is increased $2,000 and the value of the property taken is the rule of damages, the owner actually takes $2,000 without the least consideration, and receives more than the constitution enjoins to be paid, because it is more than a compensation.
Other cases may occur where the full value of the property will not be a just compensation. His house may be taken down, and he and his family thrown out of employment, and, in addition to the value of his house, he would clearly be entitled *to consequential damages, or he would not receive full compensation.
The word compensation imports, that a wrong or injury has been inflicted, which must be redressed in money. Money must be paid to the extent of the injury, whether more or less than the value of the property; and then, in our view, is the language of the constitution satisfied.
We are confirmed in our opinion of the correctness of the construction we place on the word compensation, as employed in the constitution, from the fact that such construction has obtained and been acquiesced in, from a period not far short of the organization of the state government. In the opening of roads, constructing turnpikes, and appropriating lands for canals, benefits conferred have been constantly and unceasingly deducted from the value of the property, or damages otherwise sustained. Long contemporaneous construction of an instrument is seldom erroneous, and is always deserving of great consideration, when the meaning of the instrument is obscure.
Under a similar provision, tho Supreme Court of Kentucky is the only tribunal of which we are aware, that has come to a different conclusion. 1 Dana; 9 Dana.
We think the court erred in rejecting the testimony offered, and in the instruction it gave tbe jury; and that a new trial should be granted.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the other points made.