Case Name: Benjamin Trapp and Wife (formerly Billings) and Samuel Billings, and infant by his next friend, children of Samuel Billings, deceased, who was brother of J. Billings v. Sarah Billings, widow, and Mrs. Billings mother of John Billings, Deceased
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1827-03
Citations: 2 McCord Eq. 404
Docket Number: 
Parties: Benjamin Trapp and Wife (formerly Billings) and Samuel Billings, and infant by his next friend, children of Samuel Billings, deceased, who was brother of J. Billings v. Sarah Billings, widow, and Mrs. Billings mother of John Billings, Deceased.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 569–570

Head Matter:
Benjamin Trapp and Wife (formerly Billings) and Samuel Billings, and infant by his next friend, children of Samuel Billings, deceased, who was brother of J. Billings v. Sarah Billings, widow, and Mrs. Billings mother of John Billings, Deceased.
Where an intestate leaves a mother and widow, as well as brothers and sisters, the widow is entitled to one moiety and the mother to the other moiety. The act of 1797 does not let in brothers and sisters with a father or mother, where the intestate leaves a ividovj.
The bill in this case seated that John Billing's died intestate without issue, leaving a mother and a widow, tile defendants, and leaving also brothers and sisters, and the complainants who were children of a deceased brother of the whole blood. John Billings, the intestate, was possessed of real and personal estate, and complainants claimed in behalf of themselves and the next of kin a distribution of the estate, one-half to the widow, and the other half to be equally divided between the mother and brothers and sisters, and the complainants children of a deceased brother. But the defendants insisted that they were entitled to the whole. The bill prayed an account, a sale of the real estate, and an inquiry as to the next of kin. The defendants demand on *the ground that by the act of assembly of 1791 the whole estate was vested in them in moieties.
April, 1826. DeSaussure, Chancellor. This case depends on the construction of the statute of 1791, entitled an act for the abolition of the rights of primogeniture and for giving an equitable distribution of the real estate of intestates, and for other purposes therein mentioned. Among those other purposes, the personal estates of intestates were made distributable as real estates. By the third clause of the first section of the statute, it is enacted, that if the intestate shall not leave a child or lineal descendant, but shall leave a widow and a father or mother, the widow shall be entitled to one moiety, and the father, or if he be dead, the mother the other moiety. This is the very case stated in the bill. The intestate died leaving no lineal descendants, but leaving alive a widow and a mother. They will therefore be entitled exclusively to the whole estate, unless some alteration has been made in the law. It is alleged by the complainants that an alteration has been made by the statute of 1797, by which it was enacted, that in all cases in which any person shall die intestate, leaving neither wife child or children or lineal descendant, but leaving a father or mother and brothers and sisters, (one or more) that the estate, real and personal, of such intestate, shall be equally divided amongst the father (or if he be dead the mother) and such brothers and sisters as may be living at the time of the death of such intestate : so that such father or mother as the case may be, and each brother or sister, so left living by the intestate, shall each take an equal share of his estate real and personal, provided that the issue of any deceased brother or sister shall take among themselves the same share which their father or mother if living would have taken. It appears to me obvious that the provision in the act amending the former* act is confined to one single case. That where the intestate left no wife or child or lineal descendants, and then only, the father or mother and the brothers and sisters, and the issue of the deceased brothers and sisters, are to take under the new act, which materially alters the eighth clause of the first section of the act of 1791. The preamble to the statute of 1797, and the enacting clause both speak the same language. 1 think that the case cannot be made plainer by construction than it is by the very words of the two statutes. As the intestate in this case left a widow, the amendatory act of 1797 does not apply, but leaves the case to the operation of the act of 1791, which gives the estate of the intestate who dies leaving no lineal descendant, wholly between the widow and the father, or if he be dead the mother. The widow and the mother are the defendants in this case, and are- entitled to the whole property. The counsel cited the eighth clause of the first section, but it does not appear to me that that clause applies to this question ; for it provides for the case where the intestate leaves no widow; hut in our case there is a widow, and the third clause of the first section applies to it. It is ordered and decreed that the demurrer be sustained and the bill dismissed.
March, 1827.

Opinion:
From this decree there was an appeal, but the decree was unanimously affirmed.
Decree affirmed.