Case Name: Jose E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS, Petitioner v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent Department of the Army, Intervenor
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-08-16
Citations: 833 F.3d 1342
Docket Number: 2015-3102
Parties: Jose E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS, Petitioner v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent Department of the Army, Intervenor.
Judges: Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 833
Pages: 1342–1349

Head Matter:
Jose E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS, Petitioner v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent Department of the Army, Intervenor.
2015-3102
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Decided: August 16, 2016
RobeRT J. Gajaesa, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also represented by Brett Matthew Sandford, Menlo Park, CA.
Stephen Fung, Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by Bryan G. Polisuk.
Kjustin McGrory, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented by Benjamin C. MizeR, Robert E. Kirsohman, Jr., Elizabeth M. Hosford; John Kasbar, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, FL.
Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK.
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
Mr. Jose Rosario-Fabregas seeks review of a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that Mr. Rosario was not constructively suspended during his four month absence from work. Because the Board's decision applied the correct legal standard to determine whether an employee has been constructively suspended and is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
I
Mr. Rosario served as a biologist and project manager for the Regulatory Division of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) until he was fired in February 2010. In November 2011, the Board determined that the termination violated Mr. Rosario's due process rights and ordered his prompt restoration. This improper removal caused Mr. Rosario to suffer from depression, thus he voluntarily took sick leave to recover before resuming his duties.
On May 7, 2012, Mr. Rosario submitted a letter from his physician, Dr. Juan Rodriguez-Velez, to his supervisor, Mr. Sindul-fo- Castillo, stating that his symptoms, which included severe anxiety, paranoia, chronic insomnia, marked irritability, frequent panic attacks, and aggressive episodes, were not improving. Dr. Rodriguez-Velez recommended either: (1) referring Mr. Rosario for partial hospitalization; (2) relocating Mr. Rosario's working area; or (3) providing reasonable accommodation for three months to evaluate whether Mr. Rosario was emotionally stable to continue working.
One month later, Mr. Rosario submitted another letter to Mr. Castillo from Dr. Rodriguez-Velez, which recommended that Mr. Rosario return to work on July 2, 2012, for 20-30 hours per week, because he had "started to advance emotionally." J.A. 1279. The Corps viewed this letter as a request for reasonable accommodation of Mr. Rosario's medical condition. Therefore, on June 14, 2012, Mr. Castillo requested further information to clarify Mr. Rosario's proposed accommodation, including the number of hours he wanted to work per week, his proposed schedule, and if he was requesting leave for the hours he was not working each week or if he was requesting to be switched to a part-time schedule.
On June 25, 2012, Mr. Castillo reminded Mr. Rosario to submit the information so that the Corps could continue processing his request for accommodation. Mr. Rosario replied that he would not be submitting the forms because he was going to return to work full time.
The next day, Mr. Castillo informed Mr. Rosario that due to his symptomatology and the possibility of aggressive episodes, the Corps had a reasonable belief that he could not perform an essential job function and/or that he represented a direct safety threat to himself or his co-workers. Therefore, to return to duty on July 2, 2012, Mr. Rosario needed to provide a medical release from his physician addressing the history of his medical condition, his prognosis, including an estimated date of recovery, and an explanation of the condition's impact, including any resultant medical restrictions and the reasons for them. Mr. Castillo also informed Mr. Rosario that he needed to request approved leave or risk being placed in AWOL status until he provided the requested medical documentation.
Mr. Rosario requested leave under protest. On July 23, 2012, Mr. Rosario submitted a letter from Dr. Rodriguez-Velez, which recommended that Mr. Rosario apply for disability because his depression had returned. Mr. Rosario did not provide any other medical documentation and continued to request leave under protest. On September 25, 2012, Mr. Castillo informed Mr. Rosario that he had not yet provided adequate medical documentation that would allow the agency to evaluate his request to return to work.
On November 14, 2012, Mr. Rosario forwarded a report from Dr. Rodriguez-Velez which outlined his treatment regimen, and explained that Mr. Rosario could exercise necessary impulse control and perform his duties at an intermediate capacity, if in a structured and predictable environment. Dr. Rodriguez-Velez recommended that Mr. Rosario return to work beginning on November 19, 2012 for 20-30 hours per week.
On November 15, 2012, the Corps issued a "Revised Notice of Proposed Removal" based on the same charges that led to the first removal action in February 2010. Mr. Rosario was informed that he would be placed on administrative leave, beginning November 18, 2012, pending a decision from the deciding official regarding the proposal.
Mr. Rosario appealed, arguing that he was constructively suspended from July 2, 2012 until November 18, 2012, when he was placed on administrative leave. The Board, however, concluded that he was not constructively suspended and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Mr. Rosario appeals. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A), 7702(a)(1)(A), and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
II
We may set aside a Board decision if it is "(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Whether the Board had jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal is a question of law, which we review de novo. Herman v. Dep't of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Middleton v. Dep't of Def., 185 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This court is bound by the Board's jurisdictional factual findings "unless those findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
A
The Board's appellate jurisdiction is limited to agency actions over which it has been granted jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a). Appeal-able agency actions include removals and suspensions for more than 14 days. 5 U.S.C. § 7512, 7513(d). Additionally, this court has recognized that "seemingly voluntary actions in some circumstances may be considered adverse actions" over which the Board has jurisdiction. Garcia v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). Specifically, the Board has jurisdiction "if the employee proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his or her action] was involuntary and thus tantamount to [a forced enumerated adverse action]." Id. at 1329 (alterations in original) (citing Shoaf v. Dep't of Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
One such involuntary action that the Board has jurisdiction over is an appeal based on a "constructive suspension" — an involuntary absence from an agency for more than 14 days. Holloway v. U.S. Postal Serv., 993 F.2d 219, 220-21 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (the dispositive inquiry for whether there has been a suspension for jurisdictional purposes is "whether the employee's absence from the agency was voluntary or involuntary").
In the context of constructive resignations and retirements, the decision to retire or resign is presumed voluntary "and this presumption will prevail unless plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence to establish that the resignation [or retirement] was involuntarily extracted." Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329. Claimants generally allege involuntariness by establishing that the resignation or retirement was the product of (1) misinformation or deception by the agency or (2) coercion by the agency. Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This court has determined that the Board has jurisdiction over involuntary coercion claims if the employee first establishes that: "(1) the agency effectively imposed the terms of the employee's resignation or retirement; (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but to resign or retire; and (3) the employee's resignation or retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency." Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1341).
Here, Mr. Rosario alleges that his decision to take leave was involuntary due to coercion by the Corps. See Pet. Br. 21 ("On behalf of the Corps, Mr. Castillo decided that [Mr. Rosario] could not perform the duties of his position because of his medical disabilities and forced him to use leave indefinitely...."). Therefore, the Board required Mr. Rosario to demonstrate that his absence from work was involuntary by proving that: (1) he lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the Corps' wrongful actions that deprived him of that choice. See Romero v. U.S. Postal Serv., 121 M.S.P.R. 606, 610 (2014). Ultimately, the Board concluded that "[c]onsidering the appellant's failure to engage in the interactive process with respect to his request for part-time work and his failure to provide documentation from his psychiatrist releasing him for full-time work . the agency did not act improperly in refusing to place the appellant back in a duty status." J.A. 12.
Mr. Rosario argues, however, that the Board's requirements for establishing involuntariness erroneously conflated the merits determination (whether the Corps' action was wrongful) with the jurisdictional question (whether Mr. Rosario's absence was involuntary). See Pet. Br. 21-23. We disagree. In the context of constructive action cases, whether an agency acted wrongfully is fundamental to determining jurisdiction because "[a]n action is not voluntary if it is produced by government conduct which is wrongful." Roskos v. United States, 549 F.2d 1386, 1389-90 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Moreover, the Board's requirements for establishing jurisdiction in constructive suspension cases are directly in line with this court's requirements for establishing jurisdiction in constructive retirement and resignation cases. Compare Romero, 121 M.S.P.R. at 610 (requiring an employee to establish involuntariness by proving that the agency's wrongful actions deprived him of a meaningful choice in the matter), with Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (requiring an employee to establish invol untariness by proving, among other things, that the resignation or retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency). Therefore, the standard used by the Board to determine if Mr. Rosario's absence from work was involuntary was appropriate.
B
Because we find the Board's jurisdictional inquiry appropriate, Mr. Rosario's petition for review must be denied if the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. J.A. 12; see Bolton, 154 F.3d at 1316; Hogan v. Dep't of Navy, 218 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[T]his court will not overturn an agency decision if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Mr. Rosario asserts that his absence from work from July 2, 2012 until November 18, 2012, was involuntary — i.e., he lacked a meaningful choice in the matter. Even assuming that assertion is correct, for Mr. Rosario to prevail, he must also show that his absence was involuntary because it was caused by improper agency action. See Romero, 121 M.S.P.R. at 610.
When an employee voluntarily takes leave, an agency may properly refuse to allow the employee to resume working if the employee does not satisfy the agency's conditions for returning to work. Id. at 610 n.2 ("[W]hile the agency's refusal to allow the appellant to return to work is the immediate cause of his absence, the proximate cause is arguably his failure to meet the conditions of the agency's 'clearance to return to work' policy."). In those circumstances, the agency's refusal to allow the employee to return to work does not amount to a constructive suspension.
Here, Mr. Rosario took voluntary leave to recover from depression. When Mr. Rosario was able to resume working, the Corps conditioned his return on the provision of a medical release in which his physician addressed the history of his medical condition, his prognosis, including estimated date of recovery, and an explanation of the impact of the medical condition, including any resultant medical restrictions and the reasons for them. J.A. 1291. Mr. Rosario did not provide the Corps with the requested medical release and thus failed to comply with the Corps' conditions for returning to work. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the Corps did not act improperly by refusing to allow Mr. Rosario to return to work. Because the Corps did not act improperly in refusing to allow Mr. Rosario to return to work, his absence was not involuntary and thus he was not constructively suspended.
Ill
Because the Board applied the correct standard for determining whether an employee has been constructively suspended and substantial evidence supports the finding that the Corps did not act improperly in refusing to allow Mr. Rosario to return to work, Mr. Rosario was not constructively suspended. Therefore, we affirm the Board's decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED
No costs.
. We offer no conclusion as to whether the Corps' conditions for returning to work violate the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, as jurisdiction for those claims lie with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1), or the appropriate United States District Court, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2).