Case Name: James A. GARDNER, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee; John DOE, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-03-04
Citations: 413 So. 2d 10
Docket Number: Nos. 58761, 58735
Parties: James A. GARDNER, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee. John DOE, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee.
Judges: SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 413
Pages: 10–15

Head Matter:
James A. GARDNER, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee. John DOE, Appellant, v. The BRADENTON HERALD, INC., Appellee.
Nos. 58761, 58735.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 4, 1982.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1982.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and James A. Pur-dy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for James A. Gardner.
Edwin T. Mulock and Robert A. Farrance of Mulock & Farrance, Bradenton, for John Doe, Appellants.
Larry K. Coleman of Knowles, Blalock, Coleman & Landers, Bradenton, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a trial court judgment holding section 934.091, Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutional because it violates the freedom of the press provisions of the United States Constitution. The subject statutory section makes it a third-degree felony for any person to publish or broadcast in a newspaper, publication, or electronic medium the name of any person who is a party to an interception of wire or oral communications until that person has been indicted or informed against. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1972). We affirm.
This cause commenced when the Braden-ton Herald, a newspaper of general circulation, sought a declaratory judgment against State Attorney James Gardner as to the constitutional application of section 934.091. The Herald possessed and wished to publish the names of persons who were the subjects of a wire intercept, among them that of intervenor John Doe. The trial court granted the requested relief, finding the statutory prohibition "obviously unconstitutional, in part, on the basis of its vagueness and uncertainty." The trial court further found the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of the press.
The sole and limited issue for our determination concerns the authority of the state to direct without exception or procedural safeguards the criminal punishment of any person who truthfully publishes without malice the name of an unindicted subject of interceptions or wiretaps.
Section 934.091, Florida Statutes (1977), reads as follows:
(1) No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause to be printed, published, or broadcasted, in any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication, or from any television or radio broadcasting station, the name or identity of any person served with, or to be served with, an inventory or notification of interception of wire or oral communications pursuant to s. 934.09(7)(e) until said person has been indicted or informed against by the appropriate prosecuting authority.
(2) Whoever is convicted of the violation of the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 by a fine not to exceed $10,000, or as provided in s. 775.084.
In our opinion the statute, in its present format, is an unconstitutional restraint upon the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The absolute terms of this statute effectively result in a prior restraint on the press. Prior restraints have always been accorded the most exacting judicial scrutiny. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the method of imposing restrictions on the press is not the critical factor:
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2669-70, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979). The Supreme Court has recently defined the relevant constitutional standards in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and then commented in Daily Mail that "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy" such standards. 443 U.S. at 101-2, 99 S.Ct. at 2669-70.
In Landmark a newspaper was fined under a statute for truthfully publishing the identity of a judge under investigation by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. The Court posed the issue as follows:
It can be assumed for purposes of decision that confidentiality of Commission proceedings serves legitimate state interests. The question, however, is whether these interests are sufficient to justify the encroachment on First Amendment guarantees which the imposition of criminal sanctions entails .
435 U.S. at 841,98 S.Ct. at 1544. The Court concluded that the publication Virginia sought to punish lay "near the core of the First Amendment .," and reiterated the conclusion in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1436, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966), that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." 435 U.S. at 838, 98 S.Ct. at 1541.
The Landmark issue is almost identical to that in the instant case. As in Landmark, the instant statute asserts through the means of criminal sanctions that the total confidentiality of a governmental activity is a legitimate state interest that must be preserved even at the cost of restraint upon the press. Also as in Landmark, the state in the instant case generally asserted that absent criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined. While not dispositive, we note that although most of chapter 934 tracks the federal wiretap law contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1976), there is no provision in the federal statute which corresponds to section 934.091.
Clearly, there is no meaningful way under the statute to balance the asserted overriding governmental interest allegedly inherent in the confidentiality sought here with the restraint on the first amendment rights of the appellee newspaper. The statute as written is thus clearly unconstitutional.
We do not minimize the asserted state interests which could be affected by the contemplated publication. We believe it is important to recognize that we are not faced in this cause with a narrowly drawn statute closely tailored to interests such as protecting the national security, protecting the safety of undercover officers, preserving an ongoing investigation, protecting the life of a kidnap victim, or ensuring a fair trial. Nor are we faced with a statute incorporating adequate procedural safeguards such as a prior hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, which would allow a balancing of interests. Finally, we emphasize that this case does not involve any question of access of the press to the identities of persons whose communications have been intercepted under chapter 934.
We also do not have before us, nor do we reach, any question concerning the possible private cause of action that John Doe or similarly situated persons might have for libel or invasion of privacy against any news medium. We decline appellant Gardner's invitation at oral argument to retroactively apply our newly approved constitutional right of privacy to sustain the constitutionality of section 934.091. The state in the person of the state attorney has no standing in this proceeding to assert the privacy rights of those persons it has wiretapped.
The judgment below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Section 23 of article I of the Florida Constitution, approved by the electorate in November of 1980, provides:
SECTION 23. Right of privacy. — Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.