Case Name: ROYCE'S APPEAL
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1874-06-04
Citations: 1 Walk. 215
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROYCE’S APPEAL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 215–233

Head Matter:
ROYCE’S APPEAL.
The functions of newly-elected School Directors attach as soon as the terms of their predecessors expire, and they are entitled to participate in the organization of the new board.
If the board does not organize, because no one can obtain a majority of the votes for President, it is such a neglect of duty .as will justify the Court in declaring their seats vacant and appointing others in their place.
. The continuing members of a School Board are not the judges of the legality of any election of Directors.
Less than a majority of the whole number of Directors can fill vacancies, only when the number has been thus reduced, from the causes mentioned in the seventh and eighth sections of Act of May 8, 1854.
Appeal from Common Pleas of Luzerne County. In Equity.
This was an appeal by G. E. Royce from an injunction restraining him from collecting school taxes in the Fourth School District of the City of Scranton. The case was referred to a master, who reported in favor of Royce, but on exceptions the Court below on November 29,' 1873, reversed the master: the opinion, which states the facts, was as follows by
Harding, P. J.:
The plaintiff’s bill of complaint ig substantially as follows :
1. That he is a citizen and taxpayer of the Fourth School District of the city of Scranton, composed of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth wards of said city.
2. That C. E. Royce, the defendant, claims to be a member of the School Board of said district, and receiver of taxes therein > and, as such receiver, has demanded from the plaintiff and other taxpayers of the district, the school tax assessed agaiust them for for the year 1873; and because of the non-payment of the amount assessed against the plaintiff, the said Royce has issued a warrant and caused the personal property of the plaintiff-to be levied upon and advertised for sale.
3. That the defendant claims to be such tax receiver by virtue of an Act of Assembly, entitled “Au act relating to the duties of the Secretary of the School Board of the Fourth School District of the City of Scranton,” approved April 4th, 1872, and by virtue of his election as such Secretary, on the 6th of June, 1873. The plaintiff, however, says he is informed and believes that the election referred to was without authority of law and void for the following reasons: First, that the Board of School Directors for the district is composed of nine Directors, three of whom are elected each year, and all hold their offices severally for the term of three years. Second, that on the first Friday of May, 1873, an annual election of Directors took place, and Patrick Blewitt, R. T. Black and M. J. Walsh were elected respectively for the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth wards of the district. Third, that on the 6th day of June, 1873, the recently elected Directors, Blewitt, Black and Walsh, and the continuing members of the Board, the defendant being one, met at the proper place in the City of Scranton, to organize the new Board for the current year, agreeably to law. Fourth, that the defendant and two other of the continuing members, E. C. Lynde and J. W. Schultz, refused to recognize Blewitt, Black and Walsh as Directors, alleging that their election was altogether void, because the first Friday of May? 1873, was not the proper day for holding elections for School Directors in the City of Scranton. Fifth, that the three other continuing members, however, did recognize the said newly elected members as Directors, and acting with them, or, at least, with Blewitt and Walsh, an organization of the Board was effected by the election of Patrick Blewitt President, and M. J. Walsh Secretary. Sixth, that Royce, the defendant, and Lynde and Schultz remained in the room while the organization took place, protesting against it, however, as illegal and unauthorized; and, even while the Directors Avere present who participated in the organization, the defendant, Royce, and Lynde and Schultz attempted another organization, and began ballotting for a President. Where upon the Directors Avho had already organized the Board Avithdrew from the room. The second organization was then completed by the election of E. O. Lynde President, and the defendant, Royce Secretary.
4. That the election held in the City of Scranton on the first Friday of May, 1873, was strictly in accordance Avith law, and that Patrick Blewitt, R. T. Black and M. J. Walsh Were duly elected Directors from their respective wards, and entitled to their seats as members of the Board of School Directors of the Fourth School District of the City of Scranton.
5. That the action of the defendant, Noyce, he not having been elected Secretary of the lawfully organized School Board of the Fourth School District of Scranton, in issuing a warrant and levying upon the plaintiff’s property, besides being prejudicial to the plaintiff’s interests, is wholly without authority of law ; and further, that if the defendant is permitted thus to collect the school tax, the plaintiff’ and other taxable citizens of the said district will be greatly injured thereby.
The bill concludes with a prayer on the part of the plaintiff, as well in his own behalf as in behalf of other taxable citizens of the district, that an injunction may issue restraining the defendant from collecting the said school tax from the plaintiff, or from the other taxable inhabitants of the district.
The defendant, in his answer, does not set up anything seriously contradictory of the material matters charged in the plaintiff’s bill. He denies, however, the legality of the May election in loto; he recognizes Blewitt, Black and Walsh as “citizens,” not “Directors” of the Fourth School District of the City of Scranton ; he alleges that the office of School Director in the .said Seventh, Eighth and Ninth wards respectively, was vacant on the 6th of June, 1873, he insists that the organization of the School Board by the election of Blewitt as President, and Walsh as Secretary ; was illegal; he claims that the organization subsequently effected by the election of Lynde as President, and himself as Secretary, was in strict conformity with law ; and that, therefore, his action in issuing a warrant, and levying upon the property of the plaintiff, is lawful and right.
It will be seen at a glance that the bill and answer raise, at least, these questions:
First. When is the proper time for holding the municipal elections in the City of Scranton ?
Second. What are the rights of recently elected School Directors when the time arrives to organize the School Board for the current year, in conjunction with the continuing members of said Board ?
Third. What constitutes a proper and lawful organization of a School Board ?
As originally established by statute, P. L. 1866, p. 1035, the time for holding the municipal elections in the City of Scranton was the first Tuesday of June in each year. The Act' of April 17th, 1869, P. L. 49, commonly known as the “Registry Law,” requiring all elections for city, ward, borough, township and election officers to be held on the second Tuesday of October in each year, was not lasting in this respect: the first Tuesday of June was soon restored as the day for holding the charter election in Scranton.
On the 4th of April, 1872, however, an Act of Assembly was passed, P. L., 861, entitled “A supplement to an act to incorporate the City of Scranton, changing the date of the election of certain officers.” It contains five sections, but only the first and second sections need be specially examined in disposing of the particular branch of the case now under consideration. The first section is in these words : “That the next election for District Attorney of the Mayor’s Court for the City of Scranton, for clerk of said Court, and for marshal of said Court, shall be held in the said City of Scranton, in the borough of Dunmore, and in the townships of Covington, Jefferson, Madison, Spring Brook and Roaring Brook, said city, boroughs and townships being in the County of Luzerne, and within the jurisdiction of the said Mayor’s Court, on the first Friday of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two ; and that all officers of the said City of Scranton to be voted (for) as prescribed in the original charter of said city, and its supplements, the first Tuesday of June next, and on the day of the next general election, shall be voted for by the qualified electors of said city on the said first Friday of May, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two ; and that it shall be sufficient notice of said election this year, to the qualified voters of said city, borough and townships, to publish this act five times previous to the day of said election in any tour of the papers published in the said city, borough and township, as the majority of the members of the Legislature from Luzerne County may designate in writing, the proper costs of said publication to be paid by the Treasurer of said city out of the city funds.”
The second section follows, thus: “That the returns of said election shall be made after two o’clock, afternoon, on the Saturday next after the day of said election ; and that all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.”
The three remaining sections relate to the division of certain wards into election districts, and the establishment of places for holding the election therein. They are not at all important in connection with the issue involved here, except possibly, in so far as they might render the whole act liable to the curse fulminated in the amendment of 1864 to the constitution — “no bill shall be passed by the Legislature, containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, except appropriation bills.” It was decided, however, in Comlth vs. Green, 8 P. F. S. 226, and also in Yeager et al. vs. Weaver, 14 P. F. S. 425, that it was not intended by this provision that the title of an Act of Assembly should he a complete index of its contents. Besides, the whole five sections are in pari materia, and concern exclusively the City of Scranton — the first two fixing a time for holding the municipal elections, generally, and the last three a place for holding them in certain newly-created election districts respectively.
But to recur directly to the question, “When is the proper time for holding the municipal elections in the City of Scranton ?” That the Act of April 4th, 1872, as it stands upon the statute book is eminently inartistic, and, to some extent, vague in its terms, no one will pretend to deny ; but whether the difficulty was caused by imperfect or careless transcribing, or whether it arose from heedless framing originally, is a matter now necessarily of mere conjecture. We must seek the intention of the Legislature; and finding it, if that be possible, we must construe the Act' accordingly. This is the cardinal rule of construction after all. Dwarris, in his work on statutes, § 698, says, “the safe and established rule of construction is, that the intention of the law-giver and the meaning of the law, are to be discovered and deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of a statute taken and compared together.” We may now consult even the title of an Act of Assembly in looking after the legislative intent. This was not the old rule, however. In Wills vs. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62, Holt, Chief J ustice, says, “the title of an Act of Parliament is no part of the law, no more than the title of a book is part of the book ; lor the title is not the law, but the name or description given to it by the makers.” But in the case of the United States vs. Fisher, 3 Cranch, 389, Chief Justice Marshall says, “when the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived ; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration.” And in the Supreme Court of this state, it was held in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. vs. Riblet, 16 P. F. S. 161 — tha since the amendments of 1861 to the constitution, the title of an Act of Assembly is part of it.
How is it with the title to the Act under consideration here ? The purpose announced in it is a change in “the date of the election of certain officers.” The beginning of the first section of the act indicates the “officers” referred to, naming them as the District Attorney, the marshall and the clerk of the Mayor’s Court; and, yet, further along, it appears in direct terms, that the contemplated change applies to “all officers of the said City of Scranton, &c.” It will be seen, therefore, that the title fails to indicate the true purpose of the act, even as respects.the change in the election of officers under the city charter, to say nothing about the division of wards, and the consequent establishment of additional election districts. In short, the title is of no avail whatever in leading us to the legislative intent, further than that, taken in connection with the first, section of the Act, a purpose to change the time of holding the municipal elections in the City of Scranton is clearly manifest.
Was this change to be for che year 1872 alone, or was it to be permanent? Herein lies the controversy; herein practically rests the whole ease.. And at this point we remark, that if there was nothing else to be considered but the language of the section alone — “shall be held in the said City of Scranton * * on the first Friday of May, in the 3ear of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and severity-two” — a correct adjudication could be reached at once; and the same would be equally true if, after the language already quoted, there has been added the words, “and annually thereafter.” But notwithstanding the omission, we think, by adopting “the safe and established rule rule of construction,” namely, “the intention of the law-giver and the meaning of the law * * to be discovered and deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of it, taken and compared together,” every difficulty fades away.
And here we may ask, why the City of Scranton should afford the only example in the Commonwealth, or elsewhere even, of invoking legislative enactment to change the time of holding her municipal elections but for one year ? What had occurred already, or what was likely to occur during the particular year 1872, which made it necessary for the Legislature thus temporarily to blot out an established election day under a city charter, and fix another but little more than a month in advance of it? The usual prelude to such extraordinary legislation is a preamble setting out the causes. No preamble is here, however. And in the very able argument which was made on the part of the defendant, not a cause was suggested for legislation confessedly so anomalous.
Again, if the time for holding the municipal elections was to . be changed only for the year 1872, and not permanently, it seems clear that the concluding language of the first section of the act, relating to notice -would have been thus: — “and * * * it shall be sufficient notice of said election, to the qualified electors of said city * * * * to publish this act five times previous to the day of said election in four of the papers published in said city * * * * as the majority of the members of the legislature from Luzerne county may designate in writing,” &c. This would have been measurably explicit.' Moreover, the section would have been complete. Not one word more was necessary. But such is not the language. On the contrary, it is thus: — “and * * * it shall be sufficient notice of said election this year, to the qualified electors,” &c. Now, the implication is irresistable, unavoidable, that for succeeding years the ordinary method, as prescribed by the charter, of giving notice to the electors of the city of the time of holding elections therein, was to be continued. The singular method prescribed by the act was to operate but for “this year,” namely, the year 1872.
And again, the first section of the act under consideration was all the legislation requisite to change the time of holding the municipal elections in the city of Scranton, if a change for the year 1872 only, was contemplated. The second section was surplusage —it was not needed at all to accomplish the purpose. The repeal of a word or a line of the original charter, or any of its supplements, was not necessary. And yet, a second section was enacted which contains a repealing clause of unlimited application as respects all prior laws relating to the time of holding the municipal elections in that city. The language is thus, — “all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.” Now, as every act relating to the time of holding these elections in Scranton, whether a part of the original charter, or of any supplement thereto, was inconsistent with holding them on the first Friday of May, 1872, it follows, of course that every one of them was repealed, thus leaving the city, after the year 1872, without any law to authorize the holding of municipal elections. This conclusion cannot be escaped. The act of 1872, now in question,and which the defendant claims was but temporary in its operation, repealed absolutely, as we'have seen, all prior laws inconsistent with it, and substituted in their stead other provisions on the same subject, but made no provisions for their revival after its own force had been spent. In the Court of King’s Bench, Warren v. Windle, 8 East, 205, it was substantially said by Lord Ellenborough, C. J., all the other judges concurring, that where a statute professes to repeal absolutely a prior law, and substitutes other provisions on the same subject, which are limited to continue only till a certain time, the prior law does not revive after the repealing statute^ is spent, unless the intention of the legislature to that effect, be expressed.
Now, in the case before us, if the words, “so far as the year 1872 is concerned,” had been incorporated in the repealing clause, making it read, “all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith, so far as the year 1878 is concerned, are hereby repealed,” the legal effect of the section, besides securing the purpose in view, would not have been to wipe out irrevocably all prior laws relating to the same subject.
But taking the subject as it stands, as it is, not as it might have been, and recognizing its full, legitimate force, who can urge successfully that the legislature intended by this law to change the time of holding the municipal elections in the city of Scranton, temporarily, or but for the single year of 1872 ? Why, all that was required to make this act perfect legislation to change per manently the time of holding these elections from the first Tuesday of .1 une in each year to the first Friday of May, was the addition of the words “and annually thereafter,” in the first section of the act, following the words “one thousand eight hunred and seventy-two.” In Brinsfield v. Carter, 2 Nelly, 143, the word “grant,” was inserted in a statute by the court,.where the legislature evidently designed it should be, as shown by other parts of the law, and where, if it had not been inserted, the purpose of the law would have been frustrated. So in Cochran v. Library Co., 6 Phila. 492, Judge Sharswood held that the word “foreign” belonged to the sixth section of the act of April 8th, 1851, P. L. 354, entitled “An act * * relative to service of process on foreign insurance companies and other corporations,” although the language of the section itself was, “in any case where any insurance company or other corporations,” &c.
But without adding by implication a single word to the statute under consideration, and regarding only the language used, and the facts existing at the time, we cannot avoid the conviction that the legislature designed to change the time of ■ holding the municipal elections in the city of Scranton, not temporarily, but permanently. Adjudication necessarily follows then, that so far as a properly appointed day was concerned, the municipal election held in the city of Scranton on the first Friday of May, 1873, was in conformity with law.
It was alleged in the argument on the part of the plaintiff, and not contradicted on the other side, that the qualified electors of the city of Scranton, met at the proper election polls in that city, on the first Friday in May, 1873, and elected such municipal officers as were to be chosen during that year, not doubting, of course^ that the legislature had permanently changed the time for holding the municipal elections. Again, as a matter not entirely foreign, at least, to the merits of the present controversy, the fact appears in the report of the Master, and may properly be mentioned here, that Mr. G-. A. Fuller, one of the acting school directors of the Fourth School District of the city of Scranton, who voted for the defendant for secretary of the board, recognized the first Friday of May, 1873, as the proper day for electing a school director in the Ninth Ward of that city; for, as shown by the evidence re turned with the report, he chanced an election on that day himself, but was not successful. Had he been, however, the first Friday in May, 1873, very possibly might not have been considered as an improper day for holding the municipal elections in the city of Scranton; indeed Mr. Fuller might have been in the school board by popular election, and not by appointment.
A somewhat novel point was urged in the argument on the part of the defendant, namely, that the office of school director was neither a ward nor a city office; and that, therefore, even though the time for electing'ward and city officers had been changed, still? the time for electing school directors must neccessarily continue as before. This position is altogether untenable. Apart from the fact that there is no provision in the charter of the city of Scranton, nor in any of the supplements, authorizing the election of school directors on any other day than that appointed for the election of city and ward officers, the twenty-sixth section of the act of 30th of Mai’ch, 1867, extending and defining the powers of the city, P. L. 636, organizes the school districts, and provides in terms that the directors shall be elected “at the city elections.” The time for holding “the city elections,” as we have seen, having been fixed by statute to take place on the first Friday in May of each year, it follows, of course, that the election of school directors must also take place on that day.
We come now to consider the rights of recently elected school directors when the time arrives to organize the board for the current school year, in connection with the members whose terms of office still continue. In the townships throughout the state, and in some of the cities and boroughs, school directors are elected nearly three months prior to the beginning of the current school year. But, yet, they cannot exercise any control over the schools, nor any of the powers pertaining to their office, until the full term of their predecessors has expired. When this has taken place, however, their official functions attach; and, on presentatation of their certificates, or other proper evidence of their election, they are entitled to meet with the continuing members of the board, and to participate both in the temporary and permanent organization.
A decision, purporting to be by a former state superintendent of public schools, certainly very high authority in such matters, has been referred to, and urged as being in conflict with the doctrine just laid down. The language of the decision is this: “Directors elect can exercise none of the powers pertaining to their office till after the organization of the new board, which cannot take place till after the first Monday in June.” Now, it is not meant by this, that the continuing members of the board shall, exclusively and by themselves, organize it for the current year, and then admit the directors elect. The decision, indeed, does not refer to the organization of the board at all; but, on the contrary, it refers simply to the time when directors elect may enter into participation in the control over the schools, and may also exercise other powers pertaining to their office.
But as the first duty of school directors, at their annual meeting in “ cities and boroughs,” is to organize, let us see in what a lawful organization consists, and how it is to be reached. The first part of this inquiry, the statute answers, Purd. 240, pi. 28 : — - “ shall meet and organize by choosing a president and secretary, who shall be members of the board, and a treasurer,” &c. This is the only sort of organizatidn known to the law: there can be, therefore, none other. If the difficulties arise which the members of this particular school board encountered on the evening of the 6th of June last, then the ninth section of the act of May 8th, 1854, Purd. 220, pi. 20, meets it at once: — “ If all the members of any board of directors * * * shall neglect or refuse to perform any * * * duty enjoined by law, the court of quarter sessions of the proper county may, upon complaint in writing by any six taxable citizens of the district, and on due proof thereof, declare their seats vacant and appoint others in their stead, until the next annual election for directors.” Now, conceding all that is claimed on the part of the defendant respecting the illegality of the election on the first Friday of May, 1878, and assuming that vacancies existed in the said Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth wards, there was still a majority of the board of directors for the district in existence. E. C. Lynde, J. W. Schultz, Anthony Kelly, Joseph G-rieser, John Brazelle, and the defendant, O. E. Royce, held over. It was their duty, under the law, to organize the board. This was the first work they had on hand. Indeed, they could lawfully do no other work until this had been done. And that the statute just quoted applied to their case, there is not even a shadow of doubt. In 2 Wh. Dig. 605, pi. 11, a decision oí the State Superintendent strikes the point squarely : — “ If a hoard of directors fail to organize because none of them can obtain a majority of votes for president, it is such a neglect of duty as will justify the court of quarter sessions, upon the complaint of six taxable citizens of the district, and upon due proof thereof, to declare their seats vacant, and appoint others in their stead.”
But having already decided that the first Friday of May, 1878, was the proper day for holding the municipal elections in the city of Scranton, and presuming that Patrick Blewitt, R. T. Black, and M. T. Walsh were then lawfully chosen school directors from the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth wards, respectively, how should the board have been organized ? Why, manifestly, when a board is composed in part of continuing and in part of newly elected members, a temporary organization may be effected for the purpose of ascertaining who the directors are. And here we remark, that when certificates of election, duly vouched by the lawful officers of an election board, or the returns of the elections themselves, are presented, showing who the directors elect are, i.t is not for the continuing members of the board to sit in judgment on “ the legality of the election.” The certificates, or the returns of the election, as the case may be, when thus presented, constitute evidence, prima facie, entitling the persons referred to in them to seats in the board. And in case there be a question about the right of such persons to hold their seats, growing out of any informality or illegality connected with the election, the sixth section of the act of May 8th, 1854, Purd. 239, pi. 21, provides the course to be pursued: “ If the legality of any election for directors be contested, in writing, by not less than ten qualified citizens of the district, the * * court of quarter sessions is hereby authorized and required forthwith to examine into the election, and to con firm or set it aside, as shall seem just and proper; and if set aside, to order a new election,” &c.
We turn in conclusion to the report of the Master, with a view of ascertaining how far there has been a conformity on the part of the members of this particular school board with the principles herein laid down. After a preliminary recital of the case, the Master continues as follows: — “ The six members of the board whose terms did not expire on the first of June last are Anthony Kelly, Joseph Grieser, J ohn Brazelle, E. O. Lynde, J. W. Schultz, and the said C. E. Royce. The old board, prior to final adjournment, fixed upon the evening of 9th June last, at seven and a half o’clock, as the time, and the central school building in Scranton, as the place, for the organization of the new board. At the time and place mentioned, the six continuing members, and the three claiming to be newly elected, met; and Kelly, Grieser, and Brazelle, acting in concert with Blewitt and Walsh, proceeded to vote for Walsh for chairman pro tern,., and Brazelle for secretary pro tern,.; and then Walsh, acting as chairman, read the returns from the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth wards, and declared himself and Blewitt and Black as duly elected. For the purpose of permanent organization, Messrs. Kelly, Grieser, Brazelle, Blewitt, and Walsh voted for Blewitt for president, Walsh for secretary, and Grieser for treasurer: the other three members, Messrs. Lynde, Royce, and Schultz, together with Mr. Black, voted No as each vote was taken; and Lynde, Royce, and Schultz protested that the whole proceeding was irregular and without authority of law, and that Messrs. Blewitt, Black, and Walsh had not been duly elected as school directors for the year 1873.”
For convenience the Master designates Mr. Blewitt and the gentlemen acting with him as the “ Blewitt Board.” He then pro - ceeds: “After voting a levy of tax for the present year,the Blewitt Board adjourned, but all continued to remain in the room.” Now, upon the state of facts thus reported by the Master, we have no hesitation in pronouncing the “Blewitt Board.lawfully organized. It follows, therefore, that any other or further organization » of the board by the other directors, on that evening, could not have been in conformity with law.
But to continue with the report: “ Then Mr. Royce, the president of the board for the year 1872, called the six continuing members to order, and stated that the object was to organize the board for the coming year, according to law and the custom of that oody, and he proposed Mr. Lynde for temporary chairman. Lynde, Royce, and Schultz voted aye, and Kelly, Grieser, and Brazelle voted no. After several ballots Brazelle left the room, and another vote being taken, Mr. Lynde received three votes as against two, and was declared elected. Upon his taking the chair, Mr. Blewitt protested, and attempted his removal; but finally the whole Blewitt Board retired from the room. The three continuing members who remained then declared vacancies existing in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth wards, on the ground that there had been no legal election in said wards, and proceeded to vote for R. T. Black to fill the alleged vacancy in the Eighth ward, and he was declared elected. The same three continuing members and Mr. Black then voted for G. A. Puller as director for the Ninth ward, and he being declared elected, the same three continuing members, together with Messrs. Black and Puller, then voted for Mr. Blewitt as director from the Seventh ward, and he was declared elected. Immediately after this, these gentlemen concluded a temporary organization, with Lynde as chairman, and G. A. Pulieras secretary; and for purposes of permanent organization for the year 187-3, Lynde was elected president, O. E. Royce, secretary, and J. W. Schultz, treasurer, by the unanimous vote of the five present.”
Thus the “ Lynde Board ” had its origin. We need not repeat that it was with out authority of law in every aspect of the case. And even though we had not already held that the “ Blewitt Board ” was the lawfully organized school board of the Fourth School District of the city of Scranton, we could in no possible way recognize the “ Lynde Board ” as representing any semblance of a lawful organization. We have already shown that the first duty of the six continuing school directors of this district, being a majority of the whole number, was to organize the board ; and, in fact, that they could do nothing else lawfully until this had been done; we have shown, out of the very mouth of the statute, what an organization ^consisted in — “ annually * * after the election * * each board of school directors * * in cities and boroughs, shall meet and organize by choosing a president and secretary, who shall be members of the board, and a treasurer,” &c.; we have shown that whenever they failed to do this, the statute authorized the proper court, under the very circumstances conceded to have existed here, namely, a failure to elect a president, because no one of the directors could obtain a majority of the votes, to declare their seats vacant, and appoint others in their stead; and yet, these “ three continuing members,” Lynde, Schultz, and the defendant, Royce, in bold default of observance of these plain statutory provisions, assumed to exercise the highest prerogative incident to the office of school director, namely, that of filling vacancies in the board without consulting the popular will. Why, conceding that vacancies existed, they had no right thus to fill them. The seventeenth section of the act of May 8th, 1854, Purd. 241, pi. 33, has been referred to as warranting their action in this respect — “ If less than a majority of directors * * attend any meeting, no business shall be transacted thereat, except that of adjournment, and of appointment to fill vacancies, as is hereinbefore directed.” Now, the words, “as is hereinbefore directed,” refer to the eighth section of the same act, Purd. 240, pi. 23, which only authorize the declaring and filling of vacancies where “ any person duly elected a school director shall refuse to attend a regular meeting of the board, after having received written notice from the secretary to appear and enter ■..upon the duties of his office:” or where “ any person, having taken upon himself the duties of his office as director, shall neglect to attend any two regular meetings of the board in succession, unless detained by sickness, or prevented by absence from the district;” or where a director refuses “ to act in his official capacity when in attendance,” &c. The courts, too, construe strictly this authority of declaring and filling vacancies in a school board, without consulting the popular will. In Zulich et al. v. Bowman, 6 Wr. 83, it was decided that the seat of no member of a school board could be declared vacant, and a new member appointed in his stead by the other directors, unless he had failed to attend two regular meetings of the board in succession : failure to attend two special meetings in succession was held to be not enough.
It is true that the meeting in the case before us was a regular meeting; but the vacancies were not occasioned by the causes enumerated in the statute as quoted ; nor were they occasioned “by death, resignation, removal from the district, or otherwise,” so that the whole number had been reduced to “ less than a majority.” On the contrary, two-thirds of the whole number of directors composing the board in that district, were not only alive, but they actually resided within the borders of the district. The law authorizing “ less than a majority ” of directors to fill vacancies in a school board, only applies where the number has been thus reduced from the causes mentioned in either the seventh or the eighth section of the act to which we have referred, or from both combined.
Wherefore, it was, on the twenty-ninth day of November, A. D. 1873, considered, adjudged, and decreed, the case having been heard upon bill, answer, and proofs, and having also been fully argued by counsel on both sides, that an injunction issue as prayed for in the bill, to perpetually enjoin and restrain the defendant, C. E. Boyce, from proceeding to collect the school tax in the Fourth School District of the city of Scranton, and from collecting the same from B. A. Bouton, the plaintiff, or from any other taxable citizen, living in, or having property in, said school district ; and that the costs of this proceeding be paid by the defendant.
Boyce then appealed, assigning the following errors :
1. The court erred in deciding that the Act of April 4th, 1872, changed the time of holding the municipal election in Scranton, and applied to any other officers than those specially mentioned therein.
2. Tbe„court erred in deciding that the said Act repealed absolutely and forever all prior laws relating to the time and notice of holding elections in Scranton.
3. The court erred in deciding that the said Act did not expire on the 1st Friday of May in the year 1872.
4. The court erred in deciding that less than a majority of School Directors can legally fill vacancies only when the whole number has been reduced below a majority.
6. The court erred in granting the injunction.
Henry M. Hoyt, David C. Harrington, and C. E. Royce, Esqs., for appellant, argued:
that the court erred in assuming that the Act of April 4, 1872, P. Laws 961, changed the time of holding the municipal election in Scranton. The title of the act of 1872' is a “ A supplement to an act to incorporate the city of Scranton, changing the date of the election of certain officers.” The officers of the Mayor’s Court mentioned in the' act were three, the District Attorney, Marshal, and Clerk. The officers ot the Mayor’s Court not mentioned are five, viz.: Recorder, two assistant Recorders, and two Jury Commissioners. The city officers, excluding those annually elected, to be voted for in June, 1872, were seven, viz.: Mayor, Treasurer, four Select Oouncilmen, and one Auditor. The city officers not to be elected in 1872 were ten, viz.: eight Select Couneilmen and two Auditors. One alderman was to be voted for and twelve were not to be voted for. Three school directors were to be voted for and six not to be voted for, but ward election officers and school directors are not mentioned in the act. The act, should not be extended to all officers, when it mentions less than half of the officers.
The suggestion "quoted from Warren vs. Windle, 3 East 205, was in the synopsis, and was overruled in the decision of the case; and in Collins vs. Smith, 6 Wharton 294, it was also denied. The expiration of an act by its own limitation, ipso facto, revives a statute which had been repealed and supplied by it;" Collins vs. Smith, 6 Wharton 294; Directors of the Poor vs. Railroad Company, 7 W. & S. 236; Steckel vs. Weber, 8 Harris 434. The repealing clause in section second “ adds nothing to the previous parts of the statute ;” Hickory Tree Road, 7 Wright 142. The word “ repeal sometimes only suspends temporarily the operation of the act repealed; Rex vs. Rogers, 10 East 573; Smith vs. People, 47 N. Y. 338; Dwarris’ Statutes, 158.
The rule is to take the intention, of the Legislature as evidenced by the words. Dwarris on Statutes, Sect. 698, United States vs. Bright, Bright, 9; United States vs. Bassett, 2 Story 389; Ogden vs. Strong, 2 Paine 584. There is nothing in the act of 1872 to warrant the court in holding that it referred to any other election than the one of 1872 specified in the act.
The third section of the act of 1872 is unconstitutional, as its subject is not mentioned in the title; and is different from the subject of the first section. Article 2, Sect. 8, Constitution of Penna. of 1857; Union Passenger Railway Co.’s Appeals, 32 P. F. S. 91; Gaskin vs. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186; People vs. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404; Huber vs. People, 49 N. Y. 132. Hence there was no valid election in the second district of the Ninth ward. School Directors may refuse to receive a man returned as elected Collins Case, 2 Grant 214. Majorities at an irregular election go for nothing: Commonwealth vs. Baxter 11 Casey 263.
There is nothing in the school laws which requires that the school directors be reduced to less than a majority before less than a majority can fill vacancies: Act May 8, 1854, P. Laws, 618.
The continuing school directors have a right to organize before admitting new directors in order to protect the public from the intrusion of unauthorized persons: Kerr vs. Trego, 11 Wright 292; Commonwealth vs. Green, 4 Wharton 532.
The plaintiff has mistaken his remedy: he should have applied for a quo warranto: Updegraff vs. Crans, 11 Wright 103.
A. A. Chase and Henry W. Palmer, Esqs., contra:
The election was held, and Black, Walsh, and Blewitt l’eturned as elected. They presented their credentials and became de facto school directors. If not elected, their election could be contested in the Quarter Sessions: Act May 8, 1854, P. Laws 618, Sect. 6.
The question whether Walsh or Fuller was elected cannot be determined in this proceeding, but only by a contested election: Updegraff vs. Crans, 11 Wright 103. A bill in equity will lie to restrain the collection of an illegal tax: Dunne vs. Deegan, 7 Wright 334; Miller vs. Gorman, 2 Wright 309.
The title of the act of 1872 refers to changing the date of the election. It does not limit the change to one year, and therefore shows it meant to change the time of holding the municipal elections generally thereafter.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below on June 4, 1874, in the following opinion:
Per Curiam.
A majority of the court in this case think that the organization of the Board of School Directors called the Lynde Board," under which the defendant, C. E. Royce, holds the appointment of Tax Receiver, was illegal and void, and did not supersede the organization made at the same meeting, earlier in the evening, when a quorum of six members met and the " Blewitt Board " was organized. It is not necessary in this view of the case to enter into the question as to the regularity of the organization of the " Blewitt Board." It is sufficient that the defendant has no legal t right to exercise the duties of the Receiver of Taxes. The de-. cree of the court below is affirmed, and the appeal of the defendant dismissed, and he is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.