Case Name: STEIN v. DUNNE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-04-19
Citations: 103 N.Y.S. 894
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEIN v. DUNNE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 103
Pages: 894–901

Head Matter:
(119 App. Div. 1)
STEIN v. DUNNE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 19, 1907.)
1. Breach of Marriage Promise—Pleading—Negativing Exceptions to Law Declaring Marriage Void.
Domestic Relations Law, Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272, § 3, declares a marriage void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living, unless either the former marriage was annulled or dissolved for a cause other than the adultery of such person, or the former spouse has been sentenced to imprisonment for life, or has absented himself or herself for five successive years without being known to be ■ alive. In a suit for breach of marriage promise the validity of plaintiff’s marriage to a third person, on account of his having a living spouse by a former marriage at the time, become material. Held, that it was not necessary for her to specifically negative the exceptions to the law in a reply setting up the prior existing marriage of her alleged husband.
2. Same—Right to Amend.
Where a demurrer to a reply in an action for breach of marriage promise was sustained because it did not negative the exceptions under Domestic Relations Law, Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272, § 3, providing that a marriage is void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living, unless certain conditions exist, a judgment should not be entered on the merits, but the plaintiff should be allowed to amend.
Lambert and Laughlin. JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by Edith C. Stein against James Dunne. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and EAUGHEIN, HOUGHTON, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ.
Charles Goldzier, for appellant.
Morgan J. O’Brien, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The plaintiff sues for breach óf a promise to marry. Defendant denies that he ever promised to marry plaintiff; and, by way of separate defenses, alleges that prior to the alleged agreement the plaintiff had been lawfully married to one Julius Stein, and had lived and cohabited with him as his wife, and that such marriage had never been annulled, nor had the parties ever been divorced from the bonds thereof, and that in consequence the plaintiff was not competent to contract a marriage or to make a valid engagement to marry; that plaintiff had brought two actions against said Stein, one for a separation and one for an annulment of the marriage, on the ground that at the time of his marriage with plaintiff, Stein had another wife living, and that plaintiff, by holding herself out as the wife of said Stein, had estopped herself from claiming to be a single woman capable of entering into a valid engagement to marry. The plaintiff, although not required to do so, voluntarily replied to these defenses, alleging that prior to January 10, 1900, the date upon which she went through a marriage ceremony with Julius Stein, he had been duly married to another woman, who on said 10th day of January, 1900, was living; that no divorce or annulment of said marriage had been obtained; that the same was on said 10th day of January, 1900, in full force and effect, and that by reason thereof the plaintiff never became nor is the lawful wife of said Stein; and that her marriage to said Stein was and is absolutely void and of no effect whatever. To this reply the defendant demurred upon the ground of its insufficiency. His demurrer was sustained, and a final judgment entered dismissing the complaint upon the merits. It is sought to sustain this judgment upon two grounds: First, that the attempted marriage to Stein, although void, incapacitated plaintiff from making a valid agreement td enter upon another marriage until the invalidity of the first marriage should be judicially determined; and, second, because the continued existence of Stein's former marriage was insufficiently pleaded in the reply.
If' we assume that the continuing validity of Stein's first marriage is sufficiently pleaded in the reply, that pleading would seem to be proof against demurrer. The domestic relations law makes a clear and sharp distinction between marriages which are absolutely void and those which are merely voidable;' and this distinction has been recognized in our jurisprudence from the earliest days. A marriage is absolutely void if at the time of its celebration the former husband •or wife of one of the parties was living, and that marriage was then in force. Domestic Relations Law, Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272, § 3 ; Code Civ. Proc. § 1743. Such a marriage imposes upon the party imposed upon no legal restraint against contracting another (Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. [U. S.] 550, 12 L. Ed. 553), and no judicial sentence of nullity is necessary to free the party imposed upon (Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001). There is undoubtedly a fitness and propriety in procuring a judicial decree determining the nullity of such a marriage, and the Code permits an action to be maintained for that purpose, but a decree in such an action does not, however, avoid the marriage, but merely declares its invalidity. If plaintiff's former marriage to Stein was void, as she attempts to allege, then she and defendant could have contracted a valid marriage on the date on which, as she says, defendant promised to marry her, and, if this be so, she certainly could have lawfully agreed to do that which she could lawfully perform.
The objection to the form of the reply is extremely technical. The domestic relations law (section 3) declares that:
"A marriage is absolutely void If contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living, 'unless either: (1) such, former marriage has been dissolved for a cause other than the adultery of such person; (2) such former husband or wife has been finally sentenced to imprisonment for life; (3) such former husband or wife has absented himself or herself for five successive years then last past without being known to such person to be living during that time."
The allegation of the reply respecting Julius Stein's former marriage is that:
"No divorce or annulment of said marriage had been obtained; that the same was on said 10th day of January, 1900, in full force and effect."
The criticism upon the reply is that the allegation that the former marriage was "in full force and effect" is a mere conclusion of law; that the word "unless," in the section quoted from the domestic relations law, is to be construed as an exception, and that, since exceptions must be pleaded, the reply should have alleged specifically that Julius Stein's former marriage had not been dissolved for a cause oth•er than his adultery, that his former wifé had not been finally sentenced to imprisonment for life, and that she had not absented herself for five successive years then last past without being known to said Stein to be living during that time. If it is necessary to plead these exceptions in this manner in a reply asserting the invalidity of plaintiff's marriage to Stein, it would be equally necessary to so plead them in an action to declare that marriage void;' and it is quite certain that the profession has not so understood heretofore, and no court has ever so held. In my view the so-called exceptions partake much more of the character of provisos; but, whether considered as exceptions or provisos, it was not necessary to negative them in the pleading. This precise question came before the Court of Appeals with reference to an indictment for bigamy. Fleming v. People, 27 N. Y. 329. The statute under which the defendant was indicted declared that every person having a wife living, who shall marry any other person, "except in the cases specified in the next section, shall be adjudged guilty of bigamy," etc. 2 Rev. St., p. 687, pt. 4, c. 1, tit. 5, § 8. The next section declared that the preceding one "shall not extend to" certain persons and cases arranged in siy classes, embracing those contained in the domestic relations law respecting void marriages. The indictment failed to negative the exceptions, and its sufficiency was for that reason called in question. The Chief Judge (Denio) was of the opinion that the cases stated in which a second marriage would be bigamous constituted exceptions which should technically have been negatived in the indictment; but that the defect was purely formal and immaterial, because the people would be under no necessity to offer proof to negative the exceptions, -which were matter of defense. Judge Emott, however, with whom the other judges agreed, was of opinion that the cases specified in the statute were rather in the nature of provisos than -of exceptions, and that it was necessary neither to negative them in the indictment nor to offer proof thereon upon the trial.
In my opinion, therefore, the reply was sufficient and the demurrer should have been overruled; and, even if it had been sustained, the judgment appealed from is wrong, for the plaintiff should at least have been afforded an opportunity to amend her reply so as to sufficiently allege the .invalidity of her marriage to Stein.
The judgment should be reversed and the demurrer overruled, with costs in this court and the court below.
PATTERSON, P. J., and HOUGHTON, J., concur.