Case Name: Biggus vs. Bradly
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1821-11
Citations: 1 McCord 500
Docket Number: 
Parties: Biggus vs. Bradly.
Judges: Justices Johnson, Colcock and 14ott, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 500–503

Head Matter:
Biggus vs. Bradly.
h. purchaser of land may maintain an action of covenant on the wauaufj, (ag-ainst all persons lawfully claiming or to claim,) before eviction, by showing a paramount title in a third person ; but where the plain» tiff claimed atractofland and thinking that the defendants title was better than his, and, to obtain this outstanding title, purchased this tract, with two others adjoining, and took -a deed in the form prescribed by the act of 1795, (containing a warranty as above,) and af-terwards discovered that his first title was better than the second, and commenced his action against the defendant, for a breach of the warranty, not being disturbed by the claim of any third person, the Cou:t nonsuited the plaintiff; because it could not be intended that the vendor would give a warranty against the title of the vendee himself, .when it was bought for the purpose of protecting that title.
This was an action for a breach of contract.
The plaintiff had purchased a tract of land, which he held for two or three years without disturbance; he then discovered as he supposed, that the defendant had a better title to the land than his own. To obtain this outstanding title, he opened a negotiation with defendant and ultimately purchased from him, this tract and two others adjoin • ing it. A deed in the form prescribed by the act of 1795, (1 Brev. Dig. 176. 2 Faust 5,) was executed. Some time after the purchase of this outstanding title, the plaintiff discovered, or thought he discovered, that his first title Was better than his second, and commenced the present action.
A nonsuit was ordered in the circuit court, from which the plaintiff now appealed.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Huger
delivered the opinion of .the court.
The terms oí the covenant are, that the defendant will forever defend " the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, against every person lawfully claiming or to claim the premises." This is not in terms a covenant of seizin, and according to the English law, unless the vendor covenant that he is sei" zed, an action of covenant will not lie before the purchaser has been evicted. Nor does it imply such a warranty from a general warranty of title. (2 Bos. & Pull. 13. Doug. 654. Implied warranties are not favoured by the common law, and are only tolerated for the convenience of trade, (with the usages of which, the contracting parties are supposed to be acquainted,) and to which they are understood to refer. To chattels, however, these warranties principally apply and are confined to title and actual misrepresentation or disguise. (Cro. Jac. 474. 1 Roll. Abrid. 90. F. N. B. 94. 2 Roll. Rep. 5.) Our courts, however.have abandoned the known and safe rules of the common law in this respect, and adopted the more dangerous, it more inviting maxim of the civil law, " that a sound price implies the warranty of a sound commodity," .and have superadded the niaxim of caveat emplor, and had they gone one step further, as they were invited to do, (and not without some hope of success) in the case of Whitfield and McLeod, (2 Bay, 380,) and determined that a fair price raised an implied warranty of the adequacy of consideration, free agency would have been destroyed and no contract could have been regarded as binding, to which the seal of a court was not appendant. This doctrine of implied warranty has not been confined to chattels. In Champneys vs. Johnson, decided in Charleston in 1800, and in Johnson vs. Nixon, decided in Columbia in 1811, and in many other cases antecedent thereto, this court ruled that to effect the real object of the parties to the deed, that a warranty may be implied. It is in this way tint court has been induced to sustain an action for a breach ol warranty before eviction, where the terms oi the warranty didnot import a warranty of seiz5*-,. In doing pp, howc- ver, they have extended the doctrine of implied warranty even beyond the rules of the civil law, from which they professed to borrow it; for by the civil law, a purchaser cannot proceed against a seller on the warranty before eviction, or some interruption to his quiet enjoyment. (Domat., Lib. 1, Tit. 2.)
In France, this rule of civil law,has been so far altered as to permit the purchaser, on action being commenced against him for the land, to proceed in his action on the warranty against the seller ; so that the purchaser on being evicted receives immediate compensation for the injury. (Code Civil des Francais, L. 3. T. 6. C. 4.—2 Nott and McCord 198.)
If the rule of the common law has been abandoned and that introduced from civil law very much forced to give effect to the intention of tne parties, it becomes necessary to enquire what must, have been the intention of the parties to this covenant at the time it was executed ?
The plaintiff had his first titles in possession. He was well acquainted with them. He was also made acquainted with the defendants titles. In procuring the last, he could not have intended to protect himself against the first. It must have been to protect himself against the defendant and all that might claim adversely from himself, and defendant undertook to defend the plaintiff and his heirs, — against whom ? Not themselves . assuredly, but against all others, claiming or to claim,' — against whom ? The plaintiff and his heirs. No one has yet disturbed the plaintiff in the enjoyment of the property. No one has commenced an action' against him, and there is no outstanding paramount title which can interfere with him. The object then of the parties has been accomplished ; at least it has not been defeated, or is it likely to be defeated.
The plaintiff's knowledge of bis own title, when the contract was executed, must be a bar to his recovery in this action. In the case of Whitfield vs. McLeod, (2 Bay 280,) it was ruled that when the plaintiff was acquainted with ' all tire circumstances, and had a fair opportunity of informing himself of them, he was bound ; and this is in conformity not only to the common law, but to the civil law, for by this, the seller is not bound to restore the price paid, if the purchaser knew at the time of sale, the danger of eviction.- (Code Civil des Francais, L. 3. Tit. 6. 64.)
Gist cs? Thompson, for the motion.
Clendinen Williams, contra.
Justices Johnson, Colcock and 14ott, concurred.