Case Name: NIGHTINGALE v. J. H. & C. K. EAGLE, Inc.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-12-30
Citations: 126 N.Y.S. 339
Docket Number: 
Parties: NIGHTINGALE v. J. H. & C. K. EAGLE, Inc.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 126
Pages: 339–350

Head Matter:
NIGHTINGALE v. J. H. & C. K. EAGLE, Inc.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 30, 1910.)
1. Evidence (§ 429 )—Parol Evidence—Purpose—Intention of Parties— Invalidating Writing.
In an action for services rendered, plaintiff testified that he made an oral agreement with defendant, whereby plaintiff and another salesman were to receive 2 per cent, commission, to be divided equally between them, on all sales over a certain sum, and that defendant guaranteed that plaintiff should receive at least $7,500 a year, and that thereafter defendant told plaintiff that the other salesman wished a written contract, but they would not guarantee to pay him over $5,000 a year, with a certain commission, and that to induce the other to sign the written contract on those terms defendant desired plaintiff to join therein, which he did, and that the fact that plaintiff was only guaranteed $5,000 a year, with a commission, by the written contract, would not affect their prior oral agreement guaranteeing a larger salary. Held, that the evidence was admissible, not to destroy the written contract, but to show that it was not intended by the parties as a contract between them.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1969-1074; Dec. Dig. § 429.*]
2. Master and Servant (§ 80*)—Wages—Actions—Sufficiency of Evidence.
In an action to recover an amount claimed to be due for services rendered defendant as a salesman, evidence held to show an oral agreement between the parties by which plaintiff and another salesman were to receive 2 per cent, commission, to be divided equally between them, on all sales over a certain amount, and by which defendant guaranteed that plaintiff should receive not less than $7,500 a year.
[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 118, 119; Dec. Dig. § 80.*]
3. Evidence (§ 432*)—Parol Evidence—Contracts—Failure of Consideration.
As between the original parties to a written agreement, parol evidence is admissible to show want or failure of consideration.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1981-1989; Dec. Dig. § 432.*]
4. Evidence (§ 444*)—Parol Evidence—Contracts—Time Effective.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that the written agreement sued upon was delivered to take effect only upon the happening of a future event.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1929-1944; Dec. Dig. § 444.*]
5. Evidence (§ 462 )—Parol Evidence—Contract—Purpose of Contract.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that the purpose oí a written contract was different from that which its language alone would indicate.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Evidence, Cent Dig. §§ 2134-2139; Dec. Dig. § 462.*]
6. Work and Labor (§ 27*)—Actions—Admission of Evidence.
In an action for the reasonable value of services rendered, evidence is admissiblei of what plaintiff was to receive under an oral contract between the parties, for the purpose of establishing the value of his services rendered, though the oral contract was void under the statute of . frauds.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Work and Labor, Cent Dig. §§ 50-54; Dec. Dig. § 27.*]
Ingraham, P. J., and Dowling, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by William Nightingale against J. H. & C. IC. Eagle, Incorporated. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, MILLER, and DOWLING, JJ.
William P. Niebrugge, for appellant.
John C. Tomlinson, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 tó date, & Rep*r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
Action to recover $2,500, alleged to be due plaintiff for services rendered the defendant. The complaint states two causes of action—one on an express contract to pay the plaintiff a commission of 1 per cent, on all sales made by him and one Keller during the time stated, with a guaranty that plaintiff's compensation should be not less than $7,500 each year; the other on a quantum meruit, alleging that the services rendered were reasonably worth $15,000, and that he had only been paid $12,500, leaving a balance due of $2,500, for which judgment was demanded. The answer put in issue the material allegations of the complaint, and alleged payment, accord, and satisfaction, and that the agreement referred to in the first cause of action was void under the statute of frauds.
At the trial the rendition of the services was not disputed; the main question litigated being how much the defendant agreed to pay therefor. The plaintiff testified that he had an oral agreement by the terms of which he and another salesman named Keller were to have 2 per cent, commission, divided equally between them, on all sales over , $500,000, and the defendant guaranteed he should receive not less than $7,500 a year; that, some time after he entered the defendant's employ, John H. Eagle told him that Keller wanted a written contract ; that they would not guarantee to pay him over $5,000 a year, . plus a certain commission, and for the purpose of inducing him to sign such contract he wanted the plaintiff to also join in it, and that if he would do-so the fact that he was therein only guaranteed a salary of $5,000, plus a certain commission, would have no effect whatever on their previous parol agreement, by which defendant had guaranteed he should receive not less than $7,500; that the plaintiff thereupon signed the agreement, and each month thereafter was paid $416.67, making the $5,000 a year specified in the contract; that at the end of the first year Keller and the plaintiff were each paid $1,100, commissions earned, and the plaintiff received a check, drawn to the order of J. H. Eagle and indorsed by him, for $1,400, making the total amount received $7,500; that the second year no commissions were earned, and the defendant refused to pay any sum in excess of that specified in the written agreement, whereupon this action was brought.
That the plaintiff had the oral agreement testified to by him is established by the overwhelming weight of evidence. His testimony on that subject is not only uncontradicted, but he is corroborated by the witness Toepfer, the bookkeeper of the defendant, who stated that John H. Eagle, with whom the agreement was made, told him, when giving directions as to certain entries to be made upon the books, that—
"he had made a gentleman's agreement with Mr. Nightingale, according to which he was to give him $7,500, but that he wanted me to credit Mr. Nightingale and Mr. Keller alike, in.order not to let Mr. Keller know about this agreement."
Not only this, but he was in fact paid the amount called for by the oral agreement the first year, notwithstanding the fact that he was only entitled under the written agreement to $6,100. The only explanation offered why this difference—$1,400—was paid to him was that it was a present. The jury found that such agreement was made, and it is difficult to see how they could have arrived at any other conclusion.
But it is said, despite the fact that the evidence shows the oral agreement was made, nevertheless the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because his compensation was limited to that specified in the written agreement; in other words, that the evidence tending to establish the oral agreement was inadmissible, inasmuch as the effect of it was to destroy the written agreement. I think this evidence was admissible, not for the purpose of destroying the written agreement, but to show that the writing which purported to be an agreement was not, in fact, intended by the plaintiff and defendant as such. There is nothing new or startling in holding that parol evidence may be given to show that a writing purporting to be a contract was not, in fact, intended by the parties as such. There are numerous authorities to this effect, of which only a few need be cited: Grierson v. Mason, 60 N. Y. 394; Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74, 34 Am. Rep. 512; Julliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 529; Union Trust Co. of New York v. Whiton, 97 N. Y. 172; Schmittler v. Simon, 114 N. Y. 176, 21 N. E. 162, 11 Am. St. Rep. 621; Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. 961; Baird v. Baird, 145 N. Y. 659, 40 N. E. 222, 28 L. R. A. 375; Higgins v. Ridgway, 153 N. Y. 130, 47 N. E. 32; Bank of Hamilton v. Klock, 73 Hun, 304, 26 N. Y. Supp. 259.
The question was directly passed upon in Grierson v. Mason, supra, and Judge Miller, who delivered the opinion of the court, in which all of the judges concurred, holding that such evidence was admissible, said:
"The object of the testimony was to show that the instrument was executed for a specific purpose, and, that purpose being accomplished, was of no effect in changing the contract previoúsly made with the defendant. I think that it was competent evidence for this purpose. The defendant had made out a contract. The plaintiff proved an instrument which altered the contract, and the defendant had a right to prove that the instrument introduced was not intended as an alteration of the contract, but with a view of accomplishing a particular purpose. Such evidence was not given to change the written contract by parol, but to establish that such contract had no force, efficacy, or effect; that it was not intended to be a contract, but merely a writing to be used in inducing Woods to make advancements upon the goods. This is in avoidance of the instrument, and not to change it, and I do not see why .the testimony was not as competent in this case as it would be to show that a written instrument was obtained fraudulently, by duress, or in an improper manner. Such evidence does not come within the ordinary rule of introducing parol evidence to contradict written testimony, but tends to explain the circumstances under which such an instrument was executed and delivered, or to show that it was canceled or surrendered. It would, I think, have been proper to show that the instrument was given up, and equally so that it did not constitute the entire contract, as it was only for a special purpose."
This authority, so far as I have been.able to discover, has never been questioned, but has been- approved and followed many times by the Court of Appeals.
Judge Wann, in Thomas v. Scutt, supra, referring to the rule, said:
"Such proof does not recognize the contract as ever existing as a valid agreement, and is received from the necessity of the case to show that that which appears to be is not, and never was, a contract. Illustrations of this class may be found in the following citations: Beecker v. Vrooman, 13 Johns. 302; Hammond v. Hopping, 13 Wend. "505; Johnson v. Miln, 14 Wend. 195; Benton v. Martin. 52 N. Y. 570; Grierson v. Mason, 60 N. Y. 394; 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 284 ; 2 Cowen & Hill's Notes, 665; note 494."
|l. As between the original parties to a written agreement, it is always permissible to show want or failure of consideration. So one may prove by parol that the instrument sued upon was delivered to take effect only upon the happening of some future event (Seymour v. Cowing, 1 Keyes [*40 N. Y.] 532; Benton v. Martin, supra), or that its purpose and object were different from what its language, if alone considered, would indicate. Denton v. Peters, L. R. 5 Q. B. 474; Blossom v. Griffin, 13 N. Y. 569, 67 Am. Dec. 75.
It is also urged that the judgment ought not to be permitted to stand, because it is predicated upon an oral contract which was void under the statute of frauds. I am unable to see any force in this contention. The complaint contains, as already stated, two causes of action, one on contract and one on quantum meruit; but the plaintiff had a right to prove what he was to receive under the oral contract for the purpose of establishing the value of the services rendered (Jeffery v. Walker, 72 Hun, 628, 25 N. Y. Supp. 161), and that this was the purpose, in establishing the oral contract, is evidenced by the reference which the trial judge made to the authority just cited. Says Wells, J., in Lisle v. Sherman, 25 Barb. 433, cited with approval by Haight, J., in the Jeffery Case:
"It is the value of the services or property which the party receiving agreed to pay for them. In such cases it is said the contract furnishes the measure of damages, and it makes no difference that the contract is declared void by the statute, provided it might be enforced except for the statute."
Not only this, but the issue submitted to the jury, to which defendant's counsel did not except in any way, was whether plaintiff was to be compensated at the rate of $7,500 a year, as he claimed, or $5,000 a year, as claimed by. defendant. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, and the verdict is sustained by the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, I think the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
LAUGHLIN and MILLER, JJ., concur. '