Case Name: Patsy Ann Collins DOMINGUE, et al. v. EXCALIBAR MINERALS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2006-07-26
Citations: 936 So. 2d 282
Docket Number: No. 2005-1018
Parties: Patsy Ann Collins DOMINGUE, et al. v. EXCALIBAR MINERALS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, et al.
Judges: Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, OSWALD A. DECUIR, JIMMIE C. PETERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and BILLY H. EZELL, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 936
Pages: 282–292

Head Matter:
Patsy Ann Collins DOMINGUE, et al. v. EXCALIBAR MINERALS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, et al.
No. 2005-1018.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
July 26, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 2006.
J. Louis Gibbens, Dennis Stevens, Gib-bens & Stevens, New Iberia, LA, Cole A. Wist, Willa Perlmutter, Marci Fulton, Patton, Boggs, LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Patsy Ann Collins Do-mingue, et al.
Ralph E. Kraft, F. Douglas Gatz, Jr., Jessica A. Devitt, Preis, Kraft & Roy, Lafayette, LA, for Defendani/Appellant, Ca-meco Industries, Inc.
Kirk Lindsay Landry, Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Interve-nor/Appellee, Valley Forge Insurance Company.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, OSWALD A. DECUIR, JIMMIE C. PETERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and BILLY H. EZELL, Judges.

Opinion:
DECUIR, Judge.
hln the workplace accident giving rise to this lawsuit, the plaintiffs' decedent was run over by a dump truck operated by his co-employee. The manufacturer of the dump truck, Cameco Industries, Inc., appeals the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and finding Cameco 30% at fault in causing the accident. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the JNOV and deny both the plaintiffs' and the intervenor's answer to appeal.
FACTS
The decedent, Russell Domingue, was killed in an industrial accident on the afternoon of June 14, 2000. Mr. Domingue and two other employees of M. Matt Du-rand, Inc. (MMD), Charles Judice and Brent Gonsoulin, were stockpiling barite ore at a mine site operated by Excalibar Minerals of Louisiana, L.L.C. and located at the Port of Iberia. MMD was a contractor hired by Excalibar to offload the ore. Judice and Gonsoulin were operating Cameco 405-B articulated dump trucks (ADTs) to offload the ore from a barge and transport it to a pile being built up by Mr. Domingue with a bulldozer. The two ADTs would make several trips, passing each other on the way to and from the barge and the stockpile where they would drop their loads. Mr. Domingue would then push the barite onto the growing pile of ore.
Sometime after 2:00 p.m., Gonsoulin, who was new to the job, had trouble dumping a large load of barite. Mr. Domingue, who was an experienced ADT operator, got off the bulldozer and walked over to Gonsoulin's ADT to give his co-worker some advice on how to dump the heavy load. If a load was too heavy, the bed of the dump truck would not go up without some assistance. Mr. Domingue instructed Gonsoulin to back toward the pile, hit the brakes, and pull the lever. Gonsoulin explained in his testimony, "The velocity of it's going to make the dump Lpull up." This maneuver should be done repeatedly until the bed goes up and the load can be dumped.
While this conversation between Mr. Do-mingue and Gonsoulin took place, Judice continued on to the stockpile to dump another load. As he finished dumping his load, he turned his truck away from the pile and started to pull forward. Judice testified that he then saw "a pair of sunglasses and cigarettes fly." Judice immediately stopped his truck and discovered Mr. Domingue's body which he had run over.
TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs are the widow and major children of the decedent: Patsy Ann Collins Domingue, individually, and as the admin-istratrix of the estate of Russell Do-mingue and the natural tutrix of the minors, Adam, Elaine, and Rusty Domingue; Crystal L. Domingue; Chantelle Do-mingue Theriot; Angela S. Domingue; and Theresa Marie Domingue. The widow and her seven children brought suit against Cameeo, alleging defects in the manufacture of the ADT which caused Mr. Domingue's death. Also named as defendant was Excalibar Minerals, which settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial and is no longer a party to this litigation. Valley Forge Insurance Company, the workers' compensation carrier for Mr. Do-mingue's employer, intervened seeking reimbursement for benefits paid on behalf of MMD. The case was tried to a twelve-person jury over five days. The verdict form submitted to the jury instructed the jury to assess fault among the following: Mr. Domingue; his co-worker, Judice; his employer, MMD; the lessor of the ADT, Barras & Durand, Inc.; the manufacturer of the ADT, Cameeo; and the mine operator, Excalibar.
laThe jury found MMD 60% at fault in causing the death of Mr. Domingue. The jury also found the decedent was 35% at fault and Judice was 5% at fault. Barras & Durand, Cameeo, and Excalibar were absolved of any liability. Damages were set at $1,101,050.00. The plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was granted by the trial court, reallocating fault as follows: Judice, 35%; Mr. Domingue, 35%; Cameeo, 30%; and no fault on the part of MMD, Barras & Du-rand, and Excalibar. The judgment also gave Valley Forge a credit against the plaintiffs' award.
Cameeo appeals the judgment of the trial court, seeking reinstatement of the jury verdict. The plaintiffs answered the appeal, arguing the 35% fault allocated to Judice should have been allocated to Ca-meco and the 35% fault allocated to the decedent should be reduced. Valley Forge also answered the appeal seeking to have this court "precisely state the dollar amount rendered in [its] favor," and award "additional recovery against the Defendants for any workers' compensation payments made between the date of the trial and the rendition of Judgment."
ANALYSIS
The law applicable to this case was recently reviewed by this court in Williams v. W.O. Moss Regional Medical Center, 05-022, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1150, 1152:
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1811(F) is the authority for a JNOV. The article provides that a motion for JNOV may be granted on the issue of liability or on the issue of damages or on both. In Smith v. Lee, 00-1079, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/01), 783 So.2d 642, 644, writ denied, 01-1731 (La.9/28/01), 798 So.2d 116, the court noted:
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is warranted when the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary |4verdict. The motion should be granted when the evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving party that reasonable men could not reach different conclusions, not merely when there is preponderance of evidence for the mover. If there is evidence opposed to the motion which is of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied. In making this determination, the court should not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and all reasonable inferences of factual questions should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. New Orleans Public Services[Service], Inc., 583 So.2d 829 (La.1991), LSA-C.C.P. art. 1811 and Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-445[,] 774 So.2d 84 (La.11/28/00).
The standard of review for a JNOV on appeal is a two part inquiry: first, the appellate court must determine if the trial court erred in granting the JNOV, which is done by using the same criteria used by the trial judge in deciding whether to grant the motion. Second, after determining that the trial court correctly applied its standard of review as to the jury verdict, the appellate court reviews the JNOV using the manifest error standard of review. Martin v. Heritage Manor South Nursing Home, 00-1023 (La.4/3/01), 784 So.2d 627.
Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether the trial court erred in granting the JNOV.
For the following reasons, our review of the record convinces us that the trial court correctly granted the plaintiffs' motion for JNOV. In apportioning fault, the jury regarded the employer as primarily at fault. The employer's fault was not based on vicarious liability for the actions of its employee, since the employee was listed separately on the verdict form. Rather, the employer's fault as found by the jury was independent of the fault of Judice. The employer's fault, if it is to be construed as knowledge of the ADT's hazards, existed in isolation, without regard for the conduct of the ADT manufacturer or the mine site operator. The trial court could not reconcile these findings, and in granting the motion for JNOV, the court determined, as was stated in Gibson v. Bossier City General Hospital, 594 So.2d 1332, 1336 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991), that "there was no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men and women to the conclusion reached by the jury."
As did the trial court, we have reviewed the evidence to determine if the record supports a finding of 60% fault on the part of the employer. Because of the workers' compensation scheme, the employer cannot be found liable in tort to the plaintiffs and was not a party to this litigation or represented at trial. Consequently, evidence of MMD's actions was minimal. There was no evidence that MMD, a contractor at the mine site, was primarily responsible for safety at the site. There was insufficient evidence that additional employees at the site or further training of employees would have prevented this accident. Suggestions that MMD had knowledge of the ADT's significant blind spot, as well as other alleged design defects, necessarily implicates the manufacturer of the ADT, not its lessee. Finally, the proposition that MMD or Barras & Durand may have made modifications to the ADT, or may not have properly maintained it, were not causally linked to the accident which caused Mr. Do-mingue's death. Accordingly, in considering the plaintiffs' motion for JNOV, the trial court properly determined the evidence did not support a finding of the employer's 60% fault. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court correctly granted the plaintiffs' motion for JNOV.
We turn now to the trial court's reapportionment of fault. Both the plaintiffs and Cameco presented a wealth of expert testimony regarding the issue of Cameco's alleged fault. The history and design of the 405-B ADT, including its advantages and shortcomings, were discussed at length. Essentially, the testimony and evidence presented by the plaintiffs' witnesses, 0. Peter Smith, H. John Head, and Michael USutton, support the conclusion that Cameco shared the fault for Mr. Domingue's death. Conversely, while the testimony and evidence presented by Cameco's expert witnesses implicated both the decedent and his co-worker in causing the accident, their testimony did not exonerate Cameco.
Evidence of Cameco's liability, as found by the trial judge in granting the JNOV, is so strong and overwhelming that reasonable persons could not have found otherwise. The trial court found "the expert testimony presented by Mike Sutton and Peter Smith demonstrated that the blind spot on the 405B truck was caused by a [design defect] and was a proximate cause of Domingue's death." The trial court found the blind spot was exceptionally large, causing a driver to be unable to see, at all, a person of Domingue's height in the location of the accident. The court also found the design defect which causes the blind spot was not necessary to the functioning of the truck and could have been easily modified at minimal cost. Finally, the trial court explained that the driver's ability to articulate the truck in such a way so as to alleviate the blind spot is irrelevant in a situation such as this where the driver was already in the process of turning when the danger arose.
These factual conclusions are not manifestly erroneous and are supported by the evidence before us. Cameco acknowledged an "area of restricted visibility" for the driver of its ADT, an area much greater than that calculated for the truck used as a model for the design of the 405-B. Evidence of the blind spot was clear and showed that a person of the decedent's height could not be seen by the driver until he was more than sixteen feet in front of the truck. He could not be seen from head to toe until he was standing over fifty-two feet in front of the truck. The configuration of the truck which created the blind spot was not necessary for the proper functioning |7of the truck, and, in fact, design modifications costing about $5,000.00 could have eliminated or greatly reduced the blind spot. Finally, the unre-futed testimony of the plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert showed that the design defect of a significant forward blind spot was a direct cause of the accident at issue. The trial court considered this evidence and determined Cameco was 30% at fault in causing the accident which resulted in Mr. Domingue's death. We find no manifest error in this conclusion.
In two additional assignments of error, Cameco questions the trial court's exclusion of certain expert testimony of which the plaintiffs had no knowledge until after they had rested their case, and Cameco complains of improper communication between the trial judge and the jury following the verdict. We have reviewed the record and find no manifest error in the actions of the trial court.
We now address the plaintiffs' answer to appeal wherein they seek to have the percentage of fault attributed to Mr. Domingue reduced or eliminated. The record establishes that Mr. Domingue was an experienced heavy machinery operator. He had extensive experience in the operation of the 405-B ADT and, in fact, had operated one the week before this tragic accident. As the bulldozer operator at the Excalibar site, Mr. Domingue was responsible for building up the stockpile of barite ore and, thus, to a large extent determined the pathway used by the ADTs between the barge and the stockpile. He was also responsible for the placement of the bulldozer at the time of the accident. His placement of the bulldozer, in close proximity to the stockpile, necessitated that the operators of the ADTs make sharp right hand turns after dropping their loads in order to return to the barge for more barite ore. When Mr. Domingue left his bulldozer to assist Gonsoulin, he knew he was placing himself | sin an area of danger. As an experienced ADT operator, he was well acquainted with the characteristics of the 405-B, including the areas of restricted visibility.
In reviewing the fact finder's allocation of fault, we are guided by the following standard of review:
The applicable standard of review regarding the factual consideration of respective degrees of fault is the manifest
error or clearly wrong standard. Clement v. Frey, 95-1119, 95-1163 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607. This well-known standard prohibits an appellate court from altering a fact finder's determinations, unless those determinations and findings have been found to be clearly wrong upon review of the trial court record. While applying this standard, great deference must be given to the fact finder's results; however, the appellate court is required to simultaneously remain mindful of its constitutional duty to review the facts. La. Const. art. 5, § 5(C), 10(B); Clement, 666 So.2d 607; Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dept. Ambulance Serv., 93-3099, 93-3110, 93-3112 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216. In doing so, should it be determined that the record supports a finding that the fact finder was clearly wrong or that it abused its wide discretion, this court is empowered to reallocate fault. Clement, 666 So.2d 607. The deference we continue to owe to the fact finder, however, restrains us in any such reallocation, in that we are allowed to adjust fault only to the extent of lowering or raising it to the highest or lowest point, respectively, which would have been reasonably within the jury's discretion. Id.
Yellott v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 04-1342, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/31/05), 915 So.2d 917, 926, writ denied, 05-2439 (La.4/24/06), 926 So.2d 540. Considering all the facts— Mr. Domingue's experience, his familiarity with the 405-B ADT, that he determined the path of the ADTs by his manipulation of the ore pile and his placement of the bulldozer, and that he placed himself in a location of known danger- — we cannot say that the jury's allocation of 35% comparative fault is manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' answer to the appeal is denied.
We also deny the answer to appeal filed by Valley Forge, the workers' compensation intervenor. As an appellate court, we cannot take new evidence but may properly consider only evidence and testimony which is part of the record [ 9submitted from the trial court. We find insufficient evidence in the record to allow us to render a money judgment in favor of Valley Forge reflecting the amount of benefits paid prior and subsequent to the judgment rendered herein. A final determination of what credit is due Valley Forge can be made only by the trial court.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict issued by the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Came-co Industries, Inc.
AFFIRMED.
PICKETT, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
EZELL, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Judge PICKETT.