Case Name: David JORDAN, Arthur A. Floyd, Jo Claire Swayze, James L. Holly, Dr. Joseph W. Curtis, James Moore, and Carl Palmer, Members of the City Council of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi v. Harry L. SMITH, in his Capacity as Mayor of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1996-02-05
Citations: 669 So. 2d 752
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-00151-SCT
Parties: David JORDAN, Arthur A. Floyd, Jo Claire Swayze, James L. Holly, Dr. Joseph W. Curtis, James Moore, and Carl Palmer, Members of the City Council of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi v. Harry L. SMITH, in his Capacity as Mayor of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi.
Judges: PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 669
Pages: 752–766

Head Matter:
David JORDAN, Arthur A. Floyd, Jo Claire Swayze, James L. Holly, Dr. Joseph W. Curtis, James Moore, and Carl Palmer, Members of the City Council of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi v. Harry L. SMITH, in his Capacity as Mayor of the City of Greenwood, Mississippi.
No. 92-CA-00151-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 5, 1996.
Charles Victor MeTeer, McTeer & Associates, Greenville, Shirley Byers, Greenville, for appellant.
Webb Franklin, Sam N. Fonda, Lott Franklin Fonda & Flanagan, Greenwood, for appellees.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice, for the Court:
This matter requires that we construe statutory law with regard to the relative powers and prerogatives of the mayor and the city council in a mayor-council form of municipal government. We conclude that duly adopted city ordinances subjecting mayoral appointments of municipal judges, prosecutors and' of the city attorney to the approval of the city council do not offend the statutory command that the executive power of the municipality vest in the mayor. We also conclude that the "claims docket" method of handling the municipal expenditures, while facially incompatible with the statutory mayor-council form of government, is nevertheless statutorily required. Accordingly, we reverse on the direct appeal and affirm on the cross-appeal.
I.
Prior to July 1, 1985, the City of Greenwood, Mississippi operated under the commission form of government pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 21-5-1 through § 21-5-23 (1972). Under this form of government, a mayor and two commissioners were elected at large. The mayor would then appoint, subject to confirmation by the commission, the city attorney and other municipal court personnel. All claims against the City and proposed expenditures were maintained on a claims docket to be approved by the commission.
On July 1, 1985, the City adopted the mayor-council form of government pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-1 through § 21-8-47 (1972). Under this system, the mayor is elected at large and the seven council members are elected from seven separate wards. After the adoption of the mayor-council form of government, the City continued, pursuant to ordinances adopted by the City in 1985, to appoint municipal court personnel, subject to council confirmation. Also, the aforementioned claims docket procedure, as practiced by the City prior to July 1985, continued in the same fashion.
Louis E. Fancher, Jr. (Fancher), was elected as Greenwood mayor in 1985 under the newly adopted mayor-council form of government for a four year term. During this period, municipal court personnel were selected on an annual basis through mayoral appointment subject to council confirmation. In 1989, Fancher was re-elected to serve another four year term.
Prior to June 1991, Lee Abraham, Jr. (Abraham) served as city attorney. When Abraham's appointment was about to expire, Fancher submitted to the council for confirmation that Abraham be reappointed as city attorney. The council rejected Fancher's nomination of Abraham for city attorney.
Fancher thereafter requested and obtained an opinion from the Mississippi Attorney General as to whether Abraham could be retained as city attorney until a permanent city attorney could be appointed. In a letter of response, the Attorney General informed Faneher that Abraham could continue to act as city attorney for a "short period of time." Because the Attorney General's letter was not specific as to exactly what constituted a "short period of time," the council passed a resolution restricting Abraham's interim term to August 20, 1991. This resolution was subsequently vetoed by Fancher. On August 27, 1991, Abraham resigned as city attorney, but proposed that he be allowed to continue to work on the pending court cases involving the City. The council denied his proposal.
On September 10, 1991, the council passed a resolution appointing Willie Perkins (Perkins) as city attorney. In response, Fancher issued an executive order appointing, without council confirmation, Luke Schissel as city attorney. The council subsequently passed another resolution declaring Fancher's appointment of Schissel to be null and void.
On September 11, 1991, Fancher filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the Chancery Court of Leflore County against the members of the council. The TRO application claimed that pursuant to the Mississippi Code, Fancher, as mayor, was vested with the exclusive authority and power to appoint the city attorney, municipal court judge, municipal court judge pro tempore, municipal court public defender, and administer the municipal budget. The application for the TRO was set to be heard on September 12, 1991.
On September 12, 1991, the council moved the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, invoking that court's federal question jurisdiction. The council claimed that Fancher's actions violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The council also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit Fancher from appointing anyone to serve as the city attorney, municipal judge, city prosecutor or city public defender without the confirmation of the council.
On September 30,1991, a hearing was held in the United States District Court to determine the merits of the council's request for a preliminary injunction and Fancher's request to remand the case to the state court. Fancher testified that for as long as he could remember, all appointments made to the positions of city attorney, city prosecutor, city public defender, and city judge had been made by mayoral nomination and council confirmation. Fancher also testified that the aforementioned appointment procedure had been effective and beneficial to the Greenwood community. However, Fancher testified, in his judgment it was necessary to stray from the historical appointment procedure when the African-American majority of the city council demanded that Perkins be appointed city attorney. The appointment of Perkins was contrary to what Fancher felt to be in the best interest of the community. Furthermore, Fancher testified, although in the past he had interpreted the appointment procedure of the municipal form of government to provide that the mayor nominate and the council confirm, the Mississippi courts, in his opinion in Bucklew v. City of Laurel City Council, interpreted the statute to mean that the mayor was vested with complete authority to appoint the disputed city officials.
On November 5, 1991, the U.S. District Court issued an opinion and order declaring that there were no Voting Rights Act violations, dismissing the council's request for a preliminary injunction, rescinding Sehissel's interim appointment as city attorney and remanding the ease to the chancery court. The court reasoned that although Fancher may have attempted to appoint a city attorney without council confirmation, "the council exercised its right to participate in the confirmation process by expressly denying the confirmation and compensation to the may- or's appointee." Thus, the district court opined, a city attorney was never actually appointed and there was no "change" necessary to claim a § 5 violation.
On November 8, 1991, a hearing was held in the Leflore County Chancery Court to hear the merits of Fancher's September 11th TRO application against the council, allowing Fancher to appoint Schissel as city attorney without interference from the council.
The chancellor reasoned that Greenwood was in need of an attorney and based on the proof presented by Fancher, it was apparent that an impasse existed between the mayor and the council regarding who should assume the city attorney position. The chancellor also noted that the Supreme Court had affirmed without opinion that the mayor had exclusive power in the Bucklew case.
The chancellor declared that he was inclined to follow the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court for purposes of granting the TRO. As a result, Schissel was appointed interim city attorney for a period not to exceed December 31, 1991.
On December 30, 1991, the parties gathered in the final hearing and announced that they had entered into a stipulation regarding certain undisputed facts and issues to the extent that no further testimony was required. Accordingly, the chancellor issued an order to this effect.
On February 7, 1992, the chancellor issued his opinion. The chancellor held that under the Mississippi mayor-council form of government, the mayor had exclusive power and authority to employ the city attorney, the municipal court judge, the municipal court prosecutor and public defender, and the municipal court prosecutor for housing code violations. The chancellor reasoned that the phrase "governing authorities" as it was used in the pertinent statutory provisions, was generic. Furthermore, the chancellor reasoned, when said statutes were read in conjunction with the mayor-council form of government statutes, the term "governing authorities" meant the mayor. The chancellor also held that Fancher's action in appointing Schissel to the position of city attorney without confirmation from the council, did not constitute a change under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Citing Miss.Code Ann. § 21-35-17 (1972) as its basis, the court ruled that there was no infringement upon Fancher's executive power as mayor, when the council voted on claims before they were paid. The court reasoned that the claims docket is essentially an accounting and auditing process. Therefore, the lower court held, it has nothing to do with executive power. Furthermore, since the state Legislature set up the claims-docket procedure to be utilized by all forms of city government, the lower court opined, the claims-doeket process was mechanical and should be used only as a method by which the city ensures it does not spend in excess of its budget.
From this ruling both sides appealed, the council appealing the appointment power ruling, and the mayor cross-appealing the claims-docket ruling.
II.
a.
The council contends that under the mayor-council form of government, the may- or of a municipality does not have exclusive authority to appoint the city attorney and other municipal court officers. It claims that the Mississippi Legislature did not intend that the term "governing authorities" in a mayor-council form of government to mean sole mayoral authority to the exclusion of the council, but rather, that the only proper reading of that term is inclusive of all entities of governance of municipalities.
The code, in the chapter on the mayor-council form of government provides that the "legislative power of the municipality shall be exercised by the municipal council, except as otherwise provided by general law," Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-9 (1972), and that the executive power of a municipality shall be exercised by the mayor. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-15 (1972). It is also prescribed that the "governing authorities may annually appoint an attorney-at-law for the municipality." Miss.Code Ann. § 21-15-25 (1972). Regarding other court officers, the code provides that the municipal judge and prosecuting attorney shall be appointed by the governing authorities. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-23-3 (1972). In Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-43 (1972), the Code provides that in the event a municipality adopts the mayor-council form of government, all statutes conflicting with the provisions of such a form of government are repealed. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-43 (1972).
The Code fails to prescribe the appointment procedure of city legal officials, except for what is found in Miss.Code Ann. § 21-15-25 and 21-23-3 (1972). These particular Code provisions speak to appointment power of the "governing authorities." The Code fails, however, to define "governing authorities" as it pertains to the mayor-council or any other form of municipal government. The chancellor's conclusion that the term is generic has merit. The general statutes applying to multiple forms of governance may refer to "governing authorities" meaning the mayor, the council or board, or both, depending upon the context and the specific statutory provision for each activity in question. This conclusion with respect to the term does not, however, lead to the result reached by the chancellor on the issue here presented. The question, here, is whether, in the context of city legal officers, the term "governing authorities" should be read to mean the may- or, the council or both. More appropriately stated, the question is whether handling those appointments pursuant to duly adopted ordinances giving the council approval or "advice and consent" runs afoul of the may- or-council statutory scheme which purports to vest "executive" power in the mayor and "legislative" power in the city council.
This Court has held that in interpreting statutes, it will not only look to the actual wording, but will also consider the purpose and policy of the Legislature. Aikerson v. State, 274 So.2d 124 (Miss.1973). Additionally, this Court has held that there is no natural law of the separation of powers, and the powers of local government are separate only insofar as the State Constitution makes them. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332 (Miss.1987).
We look, then, primarily to the statutory scheme itself for guidance as to separation of powers in this context. In the mayor-council form of government, a mayor's appointments of departmental directors and members of any "board, authority or commission" are explicitly subject to council confirmation or rejection. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-23 (1972). Moreover, should a city elect to have one, the appointment of a chief administrative officer is also subject to the council's "advice and consent." Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-25 (1972). Thus, although the Legislature has specifically defined the council's role as legislative and the mayor's role as executive, the Legislature has also required the two entities to jointly decide on city department directors, members of municipal boards and a plethora of other municipal authorities and commissions, most of which have unquestionably executive functions. See Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-9 and 21-8-15 (1972).
Moreover, the approval or "advice and consent" requirement in the appointment process for executive and judicial officers has never been questioned as outside the legislative domain. Executive and other non-legislative officials are made subject to legislative advice and consent at all levels of government in our country. See, e.g., United States Constitution art. II, § I and II, cl. 2. United States Constitution (providing, respectively, that the executive power is vested in the President and that the appointment power with respect to officers and judges shall be exercised with the advice and consent of the Senate.); Mississippi Constitution Article 8, Section 213-A, (providing for gubernatorial appointment of Trustees to the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning with the advice and consent of the Senate.). Indeed, as noted above, it is explicitly provided for in the very legislative scheme here under consideration.
The dissent suggests that our holding in City of Jackson v. Freeman-Howie, Inc., 239 Miss. 84, 93-94, 121 So.2d 120 (1960) has some bearing on this question. Its reliance is misplaced. This is not a case in which a municipality seeks to do something that it is not authorized to do. The governing authorities of the City of Greenwood are clearly authorized to appoint a municipal judge and the other officers here involved. See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. § 21-23-3 (1972). The question here involved is the apportionment of responsibility for appointments among the constituent elements of municipal authority. While the city council has no authority to appoint, nothing in our statutes- or precedents denies the council an advice and consent role in the appointive process. In such circumstances, the governing authorities of Greenwood were free to adopt the ordinances here questioned. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-17-5 (1972) ("The goyerning authorities of every municipality . shall have the power to adopt any orders, resolutions or ordinances with respect to municipal affairs . which are not inconsistent with the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the Mississippi Code of 1972, or any statute or law of the State of Mississippi_"). Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg, 263 So.2d 767 (Miss.1972).
We hold that the ordinance duly adopted by the City of Greenwood requiring that the legal officers here in question should be appointed subject to council approval is not inconsistent with the statutory requirement that executive authority be vested with the mayor in the mayor-council form of government. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancellor to the contrary must be reversed. Nothing said here is intended to sanction the city council assuming any right to initiate an appointment. We approve only an ordinance duly adopted applying the confirmation power to the municipal officers here involved. Confirmation should not be withheld without good cause. See Dawson v. Lander, 87 Kan. 474, 124 P. 364 (1912).
b.
Fancher asserts, that as mayor, his executive power includes the right to administer and expend the budget without interference from the council. Hence, Fancher argues, the chancellor's failure to hold that the requirement that all claims be voted on by the council before being paid violates Fancher's executive rights as Mayor, is contrary to the statutes command of separation of powers. Fancher, as he does with reference to the appointive power, cites Hattiesburg Firefighters and Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329 (Miss.1983) in support of this argument.
In Hattiesburg Firefighters, a suit was brought challenging the city ordinance requiring civil service employees to reside within the city limits. This Court held that a municipality can exercise powers which are clearly delegated to it by the state. 263 So.2d at 769. If there is a conflict between a municipal ordinance and a state statute, this Court stated, the latter must prevail. Id. Finding no contrary statute or constitutional provision, this Court upheld the ordinance.
In Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329 (Miss.1983), legislators sued the Attorney General seeking a declaratory judgment that their concurrent service on certain boards and commissions did not violate constitutional separation of powers provisions. Furthermore, the legislators requested a declaratory judgment upholding statutes permitting such concurrent service and rendering it constitutional. Id. This Court defined executive power as the power to administer and enforce laws as enacted by the legislature and as interpreted by the courts. Id. at 1338 citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 75 S.Ct. 668, 672-73, 99 L.Ed. 964 (1955); Mabray v. School Board of Carroll County, 162 Miss. 632, 137 So. 105, 106 (1931). This Court also held the following: (1) legislators could not, consistent with the Mississippi Constitution, serve on a budget preparation commission or agency with members of the executive branch; (2) once the legislature has levied taxes and made appropriations, the legislative prerogative ends in the budget control process and the executive responsibility of administering the appropriation begins; (3) the legislature may not administer an appropriation once it has been made and is also prohibited from imposing new limitations, restrictions, or conditions on the expenditures of such funds; and (4) legislators may not perform any budget control functions after appropriation and thus legislators serving on commissions with budgetary control or responsibility is unconstitutional. Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1340-41 (Miss.1983).
The applicable Code provisions include Miss.Code Ann. § 21-39-9 (1972) and Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-15 (1972). Miss.Code Ann. § 21-39-9 (1972) provides that at "each regular meeting of the governing authorities" the claims on file and not paid are to be paid by the "governing authorities." Greenwood has an ordinance which essentially tracks the statute and provides further that the appropriate department head must bring the claim, properly docketed, before the Council for approval.
It is obvious that this system is incompatible with the division of legislative and executive power as we perceived it in Alexander. It is just as obvious, however, that in reading the plain words of the statute the conclusion cannot be avoided that action on claims is contemplated at each "regular meeting" of the governing authorities. Mayors do not meet with themselves, regularly or otherwise.
In Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-43 (1972), the legislature provided that all statutes in conflict with the mayor-council form of government are "repealed" upon a city's adopting that form. The clear intent is that the may- or-council scheme should take precedence over contrary provisions. Unfortunately, the mayor-council scheme provides no explicit directions for the handling of claims. The positive command of the claims docket statute which speaks to the prompt payment of claims is simply not addressed by the mayor-council legislative scheme. Nor is it addressed by any duly adopted ordinance of the city purporting to give effect to the mayor-council separation of powers goal.
While it is true that the expenditure of funds within the approved budget, appropriation, and general fiscal management legislation is normally an executive function, it is not at all clear that we can ignore the command of the statute to present claims to each "regular meeting." On this record, we are not at liberty to disturb the ruling of the chancellor declining injunctive relief. It is sufficient to say that an annual or other periodic appropriations process would seem to comport with the governance scheme envisioned by the mayor-council plan. That said, however, the chancellor's conclusion that the claims docket process is an insufficient incursion into the executive domain to warrant court proscription must be affirmed in view of the ambiguities presented by the statutory provisions at hand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the chancery court is reversed and rendered as to the appointment power. Subjecting appointments of certain officers to some form of legislative approval comports with general notions of separation of powers. The judgment of the chancery court is affirmed with respect to the budgetary/expenditure process.
REVERSED AND RENDERED ON DIRECT APPEAL.
PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J., concur.
PITTMAN, J., concurs in result with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J.
DAN M. LEE, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by McRAE and SMITH, JJ.
AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL.
DAN M. LEE, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J., and McRAE, J.
MILLS, J., not participating.
.The case referred to was disposed of by this Court. Gaddy v. Bucklew, 580 So.2d 1180 (Miss.1990). The Gaddy decision dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. It did not reach the merits of the issue. In Gaddy, the mayor of Laurel, Mississippi brought an action for a declaratory judgment against the City Council, asking the Circuit Court to find that the statutes establishing the mayor-council form of government granted him exclusive authority to appoint the city attorney, municipal court judge and judge pro tem-pore and the public defender. The Circuit Court judge entered a judgment in favor of the mayor, some of the members of the City Council attempted an appeal to this Court. However, this Court dismissed the case because the appellants lacked standing for the reason that there was no vote by the Council to take an appeal in the name of the City Council. Thus, although the issue is identical to that in the case at bar, this Court did not resolve it. Gaddy, 580 So.2d at 1182 (Miss. 1990).
. As can be seen from a discussion of this case in note 1, this description of the action of this Court is erroneous.
. This code provision states in pertinent part that no claims can be approved or paid if it is excess of the detailed budget appropriations. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-35-17.
. It must be remembered here that we refer to Alexander as a guide to determining whether a particular function is executive or legislative for puiposes of appropriately construing the statutory scheme. We do not apply Alexander to mandate separation of powers in the constitutional sense. Separation of powers that we treat here with regard to the mayor council form of government is of statutory not constitutional origin. Were that not so, the prohibition against the claims docket mechanism urged by my brother Pittman in his dissent would apply equally to all forms of municipal government. That dissent does not cite nor has the writer found an instance in which the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers has ever been applied to municipal government. On the contrary, the code is replete with instances wherein governmental functions are merged at that level. See In re Grant, 631 So.2d 758, 763 (Miss 1994); Ball v. Fitzpatrick, 602 So.2d 873, 877-879 (Miss.1992) (Banks, J., concurring); Broadus v. State ex rel. Cowan, 132 Miss. 828, 96 So. 745 (1923).