Case Name: Adrian WOODBURY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-03-19
Citations: 730 So. 2d 354
Docket Number: No. 97-2332
Parties: Adrian WOODBURY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, W. SHARP, GOSHORN, PETERSON, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 730
Pages: 354–359

Head Matter:
Adrian WOODBURY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-2332.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 19, 1999.
Rehearing Denied April 23, 1999.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM.
We grant the Appellee's motion for rehearing en banc filed August 10, 1998. We withdraw our opinion issued July 24, 1998 and substitute the following opinion in its stead.
The family of Linda Anderson reported to the police that she had been missing for two or three days and described her vehicle as "a light blue 1991 Ford Tempo with a luggage rack and a temporary tag." Anderson's family was concerned because "she might have a drug problem . and she'd lent her car out for drugs in the past." Officer Hewitt saw a car which met that description and pulled it over. The driver indicated that Ms. Anderson had given her the authority to drive the vehicle. While the officer ran a check on the driver's license and the temporary tag, another officer conducted a canine search of the vehicle's exterior. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs at the "passenger side front door." The occupants of the vehicle, including Woodbury, were searched and cocaine was found on Wood-bury. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress the cocaine and Woodbury appeals. We affirm.
It was Woodbury's position at the suppression hearing and on appeal that stopping the vehicle without a "well-founded, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" made the stop illegal, and that the subsequently found drugs, being the fruit of the poisonous tree, must be suppressed. He is wrong. His reliance on Sumlin v. State, 433 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), is misplaced. Although Sumlin discussed the requirement of reasonable suspicion in the context of the commission of a crime, it did so because the BOLO in that case involved criminal activity. However, the police are also charged with the responsibility of looking for missing persons. Here, the police received a description of the vehicle belonging to a woman who was reported missing for two or three days. It was a reasonably good description. There is no question but that the vehicle "looked like" the vehicle described as belonging to Ms. Anderson. Indeed, it was that vehicle. The officer acted reasonably in stopping the vehicle to determine if it belonged to Ms. Anderson and, if it did, to see if she was safe. The officer further had reason to check the driver's license of the driver once she acknowledged that the car belonged to Ms. Anderson, and also to check the tag. The canine search was conducted within a reasonable time after the vehicle was stopped and the "dog alert" justified the search of the vehicle.
Woodbury raises an additional issue: "There being no evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that the Appellant, a passenger, was involved in any criminal activity, the State, below, failed to offer a sufficient basis for any detention and/or search of the defendant's person." This issue, however, was not raised or argued below and is waived for the purpose of appeal.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, W. SHARP, GOSHORN, PETERSON, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
COBB, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
ANTOON, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
HARRIS, J., dissents with opinion in which GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs.
. It is well recognized that the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with the presumption of correctness. Medina v. State, 466 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 1985).
. See, e.g., Gliszczynski v. State, 654 So.2d 579 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).