Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAWRENCE K. HERRON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1980-11-06
Citations: 89 Ill. App. 3d 1048
Docket Number: No. 79-82
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAWRENCE K. HERRON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 89
Pages: 1048–1066

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAWRENCE K. HERRON, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District
No. 79-82
Opinion filed November 6,1980.
Rehearing denied November 26,1980.
Robert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Michael M. Mihm, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL
delivered the opinion of the court:
Lawrence Herron, defendant, was tried before a jury and found guilty of armed robbery. He was sentenced to a term of 12 years. Defendant appeals arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence, (2) that the police officers improperly stopped the defendant pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, (3) that the trial court erred in finding that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany the police officers to the scene of the offense, (4) that the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, which urged the initial identification of defendant was improper because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence the following facts were presented. On August 30, 1978, Officers Walters and Look of the Peoria County Sheriff's Department were on patrol in a marked squad car when, at 12:30 a.m., they were advised by the police radio that there had just been an armed robbery at a nearby 7-11 store. No description of the suspect was given. Upon receiving the call, the officers, who were only about Hi blocks from the store, immediately turned toward the store when Officer Walters noticed a black male, the defendant, walking toward them in a direction away from the scene of the armed robbery, carrying something in his hand which the officers could not discern.
Both officers, Gary Walters and Harold Look, stepped out of their marked police car and drew their weapons because they were suspicious of what was in the defendant's hand. As Officer Look approached defendant, while Officer Walters remained at the side of the squad car, Look testified, "I drew my revolver but I did not approach him with it drawn. I put it away as I was going up to him," after seeing defendant drop the object he was carrying. A limited pat-down of defendant for weapons was conducted. The search revealed no contraband or weapons. It was later discovered that the objects dropped by the defendant were the same hat and sunglasses worn by the robber.
Officer Look explained to the defendant that there had just been an armed robbery, and defendant indicated he had seen someone running in a northerly direction. Look asked defendant if he would go to the 7-11 store as a witness. Defendant agreed to go, walked with Look to the squad car and got in. Defendant was not placed under arrest nor was he handcuffed. We believe it important to note that defendant opened the rear door of the police car himself, got into the back seat alone and rode to the store sitting by himself in the back seat, while both officers occupied the front seat, contrary to the customary police practice of transporting suspects who are under arrest.
After they arrived at the store, Look went inside and spoke to the cashier, the victim of the armed robbery, and she related the description of the bandit as a black male, about 5T1", sunglasses, a hat, light-colored jacket and armed with a blue revolver with pearl handle. The victim further related that defendant took five $5 bills, some $1 bills, and a paper bag containing certain bottle caps. Look recognized that the description matched defendant and, returning to the car, he asked defendant to step out. Walters also got out of the car and stood next to the defendant. Look then asked the cashier if she could identify defendant, and she indicated defendant was the man who had just held her up. Defendant was placed under arrest and searched by Officer McCoy who recovered $71 in currency, which included five $5 bills. After Walters took defendant to the Peoria County jail, he returned to the street where he had first encountered defendant. There he found a paper sack containing the bottle caps which had been taken in the robbery and a revolver, both having been thrown under a parked truck.
The sack had defendant's fingerprints on it, but no fingerprints were found on the handgun. Defendant testified at trial that he had won $71 at a crap game and was walking down the street where he was to be picked up by a friend when he saw a paper bag near a truck. He picked it up, saw it was only bottle caps and threw it away.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the currency found on his person, the pearl-handled revolver, the sack containing bottle caps, articles of defendant's clothing, fingerprints and the out-of-court identification.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant contends that the initial stop was impermissible under the fourth and fourteenth amendments and that defendant's consent to accompany the police to the 7-11 store was not voluntary.
We first consider the permissibility of the initial stop. Defendant urges us to hold that the original stop was an arrest for which there was no probable cause. The People urge us to consider it a permissible stop which met the standards promulgated in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. There is a difference between an arrest and a stop for questioning. An arrest is the initial stage in a prospective criminal prosecution. It is the taking of a person into custody (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 102—5), and is accomplished by an actual restraint of that person or by his submission to custody (111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107 — 5(a)). On the other hand, a brief, investigative questioning is not an arrest. The Code of Criminal Procedure of our State provides that:
"A peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person ° " 0 has committed an offense °, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of his actions." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107—14.)
The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides that during this temporary questioning a peace officer may search the person for weapons if he reasonably believes that he is in danger of attack. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 108—1.01.
Although defendant contends the officers did not consider Herron a suspect when he was initially stopped, we believe they had a right to make an investigatory stop because they were in possession of sufficient articulable facts reasonably to infer that criminal activity was afoot. When the defendant voluntarily suggested that he had seen someone running from the scene of the offense, the officers were entitled to make further inquiry. See People v. Rogers (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 390 N.E.2d 542.
In People v. Thomas (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 293 N.E.2d 698, a similar set of facts was presented. There the defendant contended that, when the police officers received a radio message of a woman screaming for help on the 10th floor of a building, and they arrived about a minute later and observed defendant, a male Negro shabbily dressed, run past them from the vicinity of the stairway in the lobby, his arrest was unlawful, thereby tainting subsequent on-the-scene and in-court identification of him. The court held:
"[T]he officers were faced with the 'appropriate circumstances' under which they reasonably could detain the defendant until the matter could be more fully investigated. Contrary to defendant's contention, he was not placed under arrest at that time, but only detained for questioning; probable cause did thereafter exist for his arrest when the officers received the description of the assailant which matched that of the defendant. The actions of the officers under these circumstances were reasonable and within the scope of the statute and the Terry case." 9 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1081.
We believe the initial stop of defendant here was for investigative purposes pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, and within the context of the instant case we do not believe the initial encounter, prior to the time the defendant was identified by the victim of the armed robbery, can be denominated an arrest.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873, 880-81,45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 616, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580, the court said:
"We elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972), holding that a policeman was justified in approaching the respondent to investigate a tip that he was carrying narcotics and a gun.
'The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response . A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.' Id., at 145-146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct. 1921."
In the case before us the officers in answering the radio call of an armed robbery left their squad car with guns drawn because they were uncertain what defendant was carrying in his right hand near the scene of the armed robbery and within minutes of its commission. Certainly the officers had reason to fear for their safety. We do not believe it reasonable to assume under these circumstances that an inference can be drawn that they intended to restrain defendant. In People v. Chestnut (1980), 51 N.Y.2d 14,_, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489, 409 N.E.2d 958, 961-62, the court considered a closely resembling set of facts and said:
"Nor does the fact that the officer approached the two men with guns drawn mandate that a different conclusion be reached. The officers had reason to believe that Hernandez had just committed a robbery, armed with a revolver. Certainly, they were justified in taking precautionary measures to ensure their own safety and well-being, not knowing for certain whether Hernandez or the defendant has possession of the gun. To hold that policemen, thrust into emergency situations where the difference between life and death is often measured in seconds, must isolate those persons whom they have probable cause to arrest from all bystanders before they can draw their guns is patently absurd. We simply cannot accept the premise, urged by defendant, that once a gun is drawn all persons being addressed by the officer are necessarily under arrest. Given the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the presence of the drawn gun did not transform the stop and frisk of defendant into an arrest."
To attempt to counter this reasoning, defendant contends he was not a suspicious individual but was merely walking down a residential sidewalk after midnight. This ignores the fact that he was moving away from the nearby scene of an armed robbery; was alone on the street without moving automobiles or other pedestrians; and was carrying something in his right hand. It is the totality of the circumstances which must be considered. In Terry, the police officer observed "e * # a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation." (392 U.S. 1, 22,20 L. Ed. 2d 889,906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880-81.) Moreover, each case must be decided on its own facts, and a reviewing court must affirm the trial court's decision unless that decision was manifestly erroneous. People v. Blakes (1977), 55 Ill. App, 3d 654, 370 N.E.2d 872.
A Terry stop is appropriate when the facts and circumstances are such that any competent police officer would be expected to act quickly in order to maintain the status quo rather than to observe the situation further. People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 370 N.E.2d 537, 540, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 975,56 L. Ed. 2d 69, 98 S. Ct. 1624, involved an officer who saw two men wearing dark clothing enter a street from between a building and a vacant lot and proceed to walk in a normal fashion. The stop was made without knowing of any burglary or robbery having been committed — unlike the instant case. The court found it proper for the police to stop the defendant since the defendant might have eluded the officers had the officers attempted merely to observe them further rather than stop them immediately. 69 Ill. 2d 73, 76, 370 N.E.2d 537, 540.
Furthermore, in judging whether the officer had cause to act, the reviewing court must keep in mind that police officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the information before them.
We would not fault the police officer for stopping defendant here because, even if the officers had received a detailed description of the robber, it would have been necessary, because of the darkness and urgency, to stop the pedestrian to determine whether he was a suspect. Thus, the fact that the officers had no physical description does not invalidate the investigatory stop of a pedestrian under the circumstances of this case. See People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77, 342 N.E.2d 356, 358.
The case before us is almost identical to People v. Sanford (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 990, 341 N.E.2d 453, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 554. In Sanford two officers of the Rockford police department were on patrol duty when they received a radio message at about midnight of the armed robbery of a gas station, without any description of the bandits. As they were driving toward the gas station at a point approximately 17-18 blocks from the station, they observed a motor vehicle traveling at a higher than normal rate of speed in a direction away from the gas station. They proceeded to follow the vehicle and when it stopped, the officers then, with shotguns, approached the occupants of the car and advised them that they were investigating an armed robbery. After this stop, the officers were advised by police radio that one of the robbers was Mark Dover. When Dover identified himself, all three men in the car were arrested, and a search was conducted that revealed a coin changer, a gun, and money. Just as in the instant case, the defendants contended their stop and arrest were illegal and that the evidence should have been suppressed. But the court held the detention and arrest were proper, and the seizure of the items incident thereto was, likewise, proper.
An attempt to distinguish McGowan by contending that in the case at bar, defendant was simply walking in a residential neighborhood, ignores the basic facts. Here the stop occurred just minutes after the reported robbery and within 1/2 blocks of the store that was robbed. It was after midnight, and there was no one else around. Defendant was carrying something at his side, and he was walking in a direction away from the 7-11 store and in a predominantly white neighborhood. It is clear to us that these facts provided the officers with the articulable facts necessary to justify an investigatory stop under the Terry doctrine embodied in our statute. If these are not articulable facts, what could be more significant? Just common sense alerted the officers to the fact that defendant was in an unlikely place at an unlikely time.
In evaluating the facts and deductions, we should be aware that trained police officers "may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained ob server." (United States v. Mendenhall (1980),_U.S_,_, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 515, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1882, (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brown v. Texas (1979), 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 n.2, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 n.2).) Accordingly "the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience." 100 S. Ct. 1870,1882.
The defendant argues that Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, forbade the police from taking him to the scene of the crime. Because of the difference between the factual situations in Dunaway, and in the case at bar, we believe Dunaway is inapposite. Dunaway, particularly, has no application to the instant case except in its general reaffirmance of Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
In Dunaway, police officers were ordered to "pick up" the defendant and "bring him in," despite the absence of probable cause to arrest him. (442 U.S. 200, 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 829, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2251.) When he was found, the defendant was taken into custody and had he resisted, he would have been physically prevented from leaving. (442 U.S. 200, 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 830, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2251.) Hence the defendant in Dunaway was detained without his consent and without probable cause to be arrested.
In District of Columbia v. M.M. (D.C. App. 1979), 407 A.2d 698, a police officer stopped the two defendants on the street and advised them of a robbery a short time earlier. The officer also told the defendant that he was going to take them back to the scene of the robbery to be viewed by a witness. Prior to placing the defendants in his car, the officer frisked them for weapons. Upon returning to the scene of the crime, the witness identified the defendants as the robbers.
The trial court suppressed evidence and a statement obtained as a result of the officer's stop of the defendants because, in the trial court's opinion, the officer's action in placing the defendants in his car and returning them to the crime scene for identification constituted an arrest for which there was no probable cause. The appellate court reversed the lower court's suppression order and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
The appellate court reasoned that the officer's stopping the defendants on the streets was no more than a temporary investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, justified by articulable circumstances. The court then considered whether transporting the defendants to the crime scene was an unreasonable intrusion and concluded that it was not, considering the brief period of time consumed in the transport, the proximity of the place of the stop to the scene of the crime, and the purpose of transporting the defendants, i.e., identification by a known eyewitness to a confirmed robbery. In a footnote, the court rejected the defendants' contention that Dunaway was applicable to their case. The court stated:
"There [in Dunaway], the defendant was taken to the police station and placed in its interrogation room for questioning without probable cause. The court concluded that this governmental intrusion 'was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest' and hence went beyond what Terry permits. Here, the record reflects police action of detaining prime criminal suspects on the street until identification could be made." 407 A.2d 698, 701 n.3.
The inapplicability of Dunaway to the instant case is even more compelling than it was in M.M. While, in M.M., the defendants apparently were taken to the crime scene against their will, in the case at bar defendant was asked if he would accompany the officers to the scene as a potential witness. We believe that defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the scene as a possible witness, but even had he been taken involuntarily, M.M. would support the position that Dunaway is inapplicable. As in M.M., the time consumed in taking the defendant to the crime scene was short, the proximity of the place of the stop to the scene of the crime was close, and the purpose was not even for identification but to insure that the defendant would be immediately available as a witness to the offender's identity.
We next consider defendant's argument that his consent to accompany the officers to the 7-11 store was not voluntary. In the instant case, when the police first encountered defendant, he volunteered the statement that he had seen someone running from the area of the store. Defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the 7-11 store to assist in their investigation. Defendant admits in his reply brief "there is no direct testimony that the two officers had their guns out when defendant consented." Consent is a factual matter to be determined in the first instance by the trial court, and the trial court's determination will not be reversed unless clearly unreasonable. People v. Denwiddie (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 184, 365 N.E.2d 978.
Within the past few months the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Mendenhall (1980),_U.S__, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497,100 S. Ct. 1870, where they considered factual circumstances closely analogous to those presented here. Two DEA agents on duty at the Detroit Airport observed Ms. Mendenhall, the last passenger to disembark from a plane that had just arrived from Los Angeles. Her behavior attracted the attention of the agents and they followed her. After a time, they approached her on the concourse and identified themselves as Federal agents. They requested to see her ticket and some identification, which she produced, and asked her a few questions. Thereafter the agents accompanied Ms. Mendenhall to the airport DEA office, and a subsequent body search revealed that she was carrying heroin__U.S__,_, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 504-05,100 S. Ct. 1870,1873-74.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had erred in reversing Ms. Mendenhall's conviction.
The Supreme Court found that no "seizure" of the respondent occurred. After returning the airline ticket and driver's license to her, the agent asked if she would accompany him to the Airport DEA office for further questions, and she did so, although the record does not indicate a verbal response to the request. The court observed, "The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that the person asking the question was a law enforcement official." (_U.S__1, -, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 510, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877.) The court went on to say:
"Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a 'seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has on other occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws. 'Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, and those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,515, [10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 1344].' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041."_U.S__,_,64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877.
In the instant case, when the police first encountered defendant, he volunteered the statement that he had seen someone running from the area of the store. Ironically, Mendenhall,_U.S__,_, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 510,100 S. Ct. 1870,1878, states: "It may happen that a person makes statements to law enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily." Defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the 7-11 store to assist in their investigation as a potential witness. He opened the rear door of the police car himself, got into the back seat alone and rode to the store sitting by himself in the back seat, while both officers occupied the front seat. We believe these facts support the trial court's finding that defendant went with the officers voluntarily.
Mendenhall construed a similar issue where it stated:
"Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218. We also reject the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the respondent acted in a manner so contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to answer the agents' questions. It may happen that a person makes statements to law enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily." Mendenhall,_U.S--,-, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 510, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1878.
Even if the defendant had been unconstitutionally seized, his con-, tention that the on-the-scene identification and the in-court identification by the victim should be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree is without merit. (See People v. Holdman (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 213, 383 N.E.2d 155.) We also believe that the in-court identification should not be suppressed because of a strikingly similar issue in United States v. Crews (1980), 445 U.S. 463, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537,100 S. Ct. 1244. There the Supreme Court held that the in-court identification of a robbery defendant by his victim was not a suppressible fruit of the defendant's earlier illegal arrest. In the case at bar, the on-the-scene identification was not the result of an illegal arrest nor did it taint the victim's ability to give an accurate in-court identification. The victim was able to describe the defendant to the police before the police showed him to her.
It is clear that the evidence obtained after the defendant's arrest at the 7-11 store was incidental to that arrest and not the fruits of the poisonous tree. Furthermore, the sack of bottlecaps and revolver were found under a truck parked on a public street when, after the defendant was arrested, the officers returned to the area where the defendant was first discovered. This was abandoned property, and the defendant has no standing to attack these items. Its discovery was in no way a result of any alleged illegal detention.
For the above mentioned reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.