Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Edward BAGLEY
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-06-25
Citations: 378 So. 2d 1356
Docket Number: No. 63538
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Edward BAGLEY.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., dissents for reasons assigned by DENNIS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 378
Pages: 1356–1361

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Edward BAGLEY.
No. 63538.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 25, 1979.
Donald R. Miller, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eugene W. Bry-son, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Patrick G. Quin-lan, Walter L. Smith, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
BLANCHE, Justice.
Defendant, Charles Edward Bagley, was indicted for forcible rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42.1. After trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. Defendant urges three assignments of error as the basis of his appeal. Assignments one and two will be treated together as one assignment.
Testimony indicated that the defendant went to the home of the victim, a person with whom he was acquainted, and by means of a ruse gained entry into the house. The victim testified that Bagley then dragged her to one of the bedrooms and forcibly raped her.
The defendant admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim on the night in question but claimed that the victim voluntarily engaged in the act. Bagley testified that the victim and her husband were his regular suppliers of marijuana and, as a result, he had became acquainted with the victim. According to Bagley, on the night in question he went to the victim's home to purchase some marijuana. Instead, he was invited inside where he and the victim smoked some marijuana and afterwards engaged in sexual intercourse. To bolster his consent defense, Bagley called several witnesses to the stand to testify to his good reputation in the community.
ASSIGNMENT NOS. 1 AND 2
By these assignments, the defendant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecution to question his character witnesses as to their knowledge of a complaint of rape filed against the defendant some years previous to the offense for which the defendant was being tried.
The defense called four witnesses to testify concerning the defendant's reputation in the community. Counsel for the defendant asked each witness what sort of reputation the defendant had and asked three of the witnesses if they would feel comfortable if their wives were alone with the defendant. All testified that the defendant had a good reputation and that they would feel comfortable if their wives were alone with the defendant.
On cross-examination, the State asked, for the purpose of testing the witnesses' knowledge of the defendant's reputation and standard of evaluation, the following question:
"Did you know that a complaint was lodged with Caddo Parish Sheriff's Department September 25, 1973 by [Mrs. X] alleging that the defendant here, Charles Bagley, attempted to rape her in her own home on that day and choked her?"
Over the defendant's objections, the witnesses were permitted to answer the question. Only one answered that he had heard of the incident. The defendant claims that the inquiry was highly prejudicial and requires that this Court reverse his conviction. We disagree.
Evidence of a defendant's good character is always admissible to show that it is unlikely he committed the crime with which he is charged. LSA-R.S. 15:480. However, the State is not permitted to show that the defendant is a bad person for the purpose of convincing the jury it is more likely than not that he is guilty. Thus, the State is allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character only for the purpose of rebutting evidence of good character presented on the defendant's behalf. LSA-R.S. 15:481. LSA-R.S. 45:479 provides that a man's character, good or bad, is that reputation which he enjoys in the community, and hence no witness may testify as to his personal opinion of the defendant.
When a defendant chooses to place his character at issue by introducing evidence of his good character, the State is permitted to rebut such evidence either by calling witnesses to testify to the bad character of the defendant, or by impeaching the defense witnesses' ability to testify to the defendant's character. This Court has adopted the position that the cross-examination of a character witness may extend to his knowledge of particular misconduct, pri- or arrests, or other acts relevant to the particular moral qualities as are pertinent to the crime with which the defendant is charged. R.S. 15:480; State v. Frentz, 354 So.2d 1007 (La.1978); see also State v. Harvey, 329 So.2d 731 (La.1976); State v. Knight, 323 So.2d 765 (La.1975); State v. Ivy, 307 So.2d 587 (La.1975); State v. Banks, 307 So.2d 594 (La.1975). The purpose of such inquiries is to expose the witnesses' possible lack of knowledge regarding the character of the defendant, or the witnesses' standard of evaluation.
The defendant urges us to reconsider our prior holdings. As we said in State v. Harvey, supra, 329 So.2d at 733, a case in which we were also asked to reconsider the jurisprudence on this question:
" . . . Upon a review of the jurisprudence, we still find the following rationale from State v. Banks, supra, to be sound:
' . . . [W]e conclude that neither law nor justice permits a defendant to foist a spurious reputation upon a jury because the State is so limited in its cross-examination of the character witnesses that it may not inquire about knowledge of prior arrests. . . .'"
Since there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the State, and the record reflects the question had sufficient foundation in fact, we find defendant's assignment Nos. 1 and 2 to be without merit.
ASSIGNMENT NO. 3
By this assignment, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Defendant sought a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and on the grounds raised and disposed of in this appeal in assignment Nos. 1 and 2 above.
Article 851 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter alia, that a new trial shall be granted when:
"(3) New and material evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before or during the trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty . .
Defendant, by affidavit attached to his motion, offered the testimony of two additional witnesses who swore that they had been with the defendant on several occasions when he had bought marijuana from someone at the residence of the victim and her husband. Defendant claims this evidence would further corroborate his defense of consent.
Defendant's claim must fail for two reasons. First, the motion fails to allege the witnesses could not have been produced at trial. This is required. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 851; State v. Charles, 350 So.2d 595 (La.1977). Moreover, the record discloses that the defendant, while on the stand, alluded to several persons by name who could testify that he had bought marijuana from the victim and her husband. The defendant said he did not call them because they did not want to testify that they had purchased marijuana. Hence, the defendant elected not to present the same evidence, which he now claims is newly discovered, in order to avoid putting his friends on the spot.
Secondly, the test for whether a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence should be granted is whether the additional evidence is so material that it ought to produce a different result. State v. Huckaby, 368 So.2d 1059 (La.1979); State v. Williams, 362 So.2d 530 (La.1978). While this additional evidence would serve to impeach the victim's credibility, as she testified that she had rarely seen the defendant and had never sold him marijuana, such impeaching testimony had already been given at trial by the defendant's uncle. We are unable to conclude that the trial judge erred in finding the evidence ought not to produce a different result.
For these reasons, we find this assignment without merit.
DECREE
The conviction and sentence of the defendant are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. The question was phrased in various other forms, but all contained essentially the same substance. All incorporated in one form or another a "did you know" inquiry as opposed to a "have you heard" query.
. After the first witness was allowed to answer, over the defendant's objection, defense counsel took the lead and asked the question of subsequent witnesses on direct. We believe this was done in an attempt to lessen the impact of the inquiry when made by the State. We do not view the defensive action taken by counsel as a waiver of his objection to the original ruling, however,