Case Name: Timothy Richard FOX, Appellant, v. Pamela Sue FOX, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-12-19
Citations: 262 So. 3d 789
Docket Number: No. 4D17-2092
Parties: Timothy Richard FOX, Appellant,
v.
Pamela Sue FOX, Appellee.
Judges: EN BANC
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 262
Pages: 789–799

Head Matter:
Timothy Richard FOX, Appellant,
v.
Pamela Sue FOX, Appellee.
No. 4D17-2092
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
[December 19, 2018]
EN BANC

Opinion:
May, J.
The effect of a trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings in an alimony award is the focus of this appeal. The former husband argues the trial court's failure constitutes reversible error. The former wife responds the former husband did not preserve the issue because he did not move for rehearing and call the issue to the trial court's attention. And so, a duel between reversible error and preservation is set. The former husband also argues the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to conduct a vocational examination of the former wife.
We visit this issue en banc to resolve a conflict within our court. We hold that the failure to comply with the statute's requirement of factual findings is reversible error regardless of whether a motion for rehearing is filed. In doing so, we recede from Farghali v. Farghali , 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), which departed from our precedent that the failure to make the statutory findings constitutes reversible error. We further certify conflict with the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Districts on whether a motion for rehearing is required to preserve this issue. We also find merit in the former husband's second issue and reverse for further proceedings.
The Facts
The former wife petitioned for dissolution of a thirty-two year marriage. Both parties have a high-school education. The former husband works in a managerial position at an asphalt company; the former wife was employed for more than thirty years as a dental assistant and office manager. In her petition, she alleged she was unemployed and suffered from health issues.
Both parties filed financial affidavits. The former wife attested she had no monthly income and a monthly deficit of $4,017. She listed significant total assets and no liabilities or debt. The former husband's financial affidavit listed a net monthly income around $6,600.
The court granted the former wife's request for temporary alimony, ordering the former husband to pay $3,700 per month. Three days later, the former wife moved for contempt, enforcement, attorney's fees, and costs, accusing the former husband of failing to pay temporary relief.
The former husband filed a notice of vocational examination of the former wife, arguing that her earning ability was in controversy and requesting her to bring her medical records and copies of employment applications. A little less than a month later, the former wife formally objected to the vocational examination, arguing the former husband consented to her not working years earlier and that she suffers from debilitating health conditions.
With the trial set, the former husband moved for a continuance, arguing he had an outstanding notice of vocational examination to which the former wife had originally agreed. The court denied the former husband's request.
The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement, resolving all issues except alimony. The day before trial, the former husband filed an amended financial affidavit, listing his net monthly income as nearly half of that previously indicated.
The trial court tried the alimony issue. The former wife testified that she was a dental assistant for about thirty-four years and a traditional mother. She left her job due to health issues and as part of an agreement with the former husband. The former wife admitted she was unhappy with her job's office culture, but denied she quit for that reason.
The former husband offered the testimony of a vocational evaluation specialist. The expert explained how he evaluates individuals to determine earning potential. He explained that he never examined the former wife, but had discussed her situation with the former husband's counsel. The former wife objected to his testimony based on relevance, speculation, and lack of foundation. The trial court sustained the objections.
The trial court found the former wife had no gross monthly income and the former husband had a gross monthly income of $11,853. Though the former husband disputed the amount, the court awarded the former wife $4,500 per month in permanent periodic alimony. The court expressly found the former husband never sought to impute income to the former wife in the pleadings or the joint pretrial statement.
From this judgment, the former husband now appeals.
The Analysis
The former husband first argues the court erred in awarding permanent periodic alimony based on the former couple's gross monthly income without making factual findings to support its conclusions. Relying on our decision in Farghali v. Farghali , 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), the former wife responds that the former husband failed to preserve the issue when he did not move for rehearing.
In Farghali , we adopted a First District rule that "a party is not entitled to complain that a judgment in a marital and family law case fails to contain sufficient findings unless that party raised the omission before the trial court in a motion for rehearing." Id. at 339 (quoting Simmons v. Simmons , 979 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ). We then stated that "[a]lthough we have not expressly adopted this rule before, we do so now." Id.
Farghali conflicts with our earlier decisions, which did not require a motion for rehearing to preserve the lack of findings issue. See Badgley v. Sanchez , 165 So.3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (error in failing to make statutorily-required findings in an alimony award); Rentel v. Rentel , 124 So.3d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (error in failing to make statutorily-required findings in an alimony award); Mondello v. Torres , 47 So.3d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (error in failing to make statutorily-required findings in an equitable distribution award); Aguirre v. Aguirre , 985 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (error in failing to make statutorily-required findings in a child support award); and Dorsett v. Dorsett , 902 So.2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (error in failing to make statutorily-required findings in an equitable distribution award).
A panel of our court has no authority to overrule or recede from our precedent on the same legal issue. Phila. Fin. Mgmt. of S.F., LLC v. DJSP Enters., Inc. , 227 So.3d 612, 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; see also In re Rule 9.331 , 416 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982) ("[A] three-judge panel of a district court should not overrule or recede from a prior panel's ruling on an identical point of the law."). We therefore review the issue en banc.
In Dorsett , we held that "[e]ven when no trial transcript is provided to the reviewing court, '[f]ailure to make sufficient findings regarding value of property and identification of marital assets and debts constitutes reversible error and requires remand for appropriate findings to be made.' " Id. at 950 (alterations in original) (quoting Wolfe v. Nazaire , 758 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ). In a footnote, we cited Broadfoot v. Broadfoot , 791 So.2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) ; and Mathieu v. Mathieu , 877 So.2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) as having reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at 950 n.3 ; see also Mondello v. Torres , 47 So.3d 389, 400 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("This court has expressed disagreement with Mathieu .").
In Broadfoot , the Third District affirmed an alimony award despite the lack of statutorily-required findings because the award was clear and supported by the record. The Fifth District adopted Broadfoot in Mathieu and affirmed a dissolution judgment even though it lacked statutorily-required findings because the issue was not raised in a motion for rehearing filed by the husband. Notably, both courts adopted an exception to the rule when an appellate court is unable to have a meaningful review due to the lack of findings.
Subsequently, in Rentel , we held that "[b]ecause it is not apparent that the trial court based its alimony calculations on net income, we reverse and remand to make the required findings and to modify the award if necessary." 124 So.3d at 994. And in Badgley , we reiterated that "a trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings nonetheless warrants reversal." 165 So.3d at 744 (citations omitted). We again cited Mathieu as contrary authority. Id.
The First District adopted Broadfoot and Mathieu in Owens v. Owens, 973 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (because the appellant failed to challenge the adequacy of the finding in a motion for rehearing, it failed to preserve the issue for appellate review).
In Esaw v. Esaw , 965 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2007), the Second District affirmed a dissolution judgment because the appellant failed to demonstrate harmful error or provide a transcript. It did so despite the lack of statutorily-required findings. It indicated that the "technical deficiency in the trial court's findings" did not render the error fundamental. And, it acknowledged our disagreement with Broadfoot and Mathieu in Esaw v. Esaw , 965 So.2d 1261, 1265 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Judge Silberman also noted the conflict in his concurring opinion. Id. at 1268 (Silberman, J. concurring).
Despite the other districts' decisions requiring a party to file a motion for rehearing to preserve the issue of a trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings in alimony, equitable distribution, and child support, we adhere to our precedent that a party may raise the issue without having previously filed a motion for rehearing. This is because the rules do not require the filing of a motion, many dissolution appeals are pro se, and a family court judge should be aware of the statutory requirements in rendering a decision on alimony, equitable distribution, and child support.
Dissolution of marriage cases are unlike other civil litigation. The final dissolution judgment is often not the end of the litigation process. The final judgment establishes ground zero for the purpose of petitions for enforcement, modification, and contempt proceedings. Without the statutorily-required findings of fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to review the record for evidentiary support of the judgment, to enforce a judgment, or to subsequently determine if there has been a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of that judgment.
This case involves two competing values-judicial economy vs. a rule that is in the best interest of the children and their families. It makes perfect sense from a judicial economy standpoint to bring "the claim of inadequate findings" to the "attention of the trial court by way of a motion for rehearing." Mathieu , 877 So.2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Surely, the filing of a motion could easily eliminate an issue for appeal. But, because these cases involve children and families, it is equally, if not more, important that the final judgment comport with Chapter 61.
Rather than refusing to reach an appellate issue for want of a motion for rehearing, it is far better to require a trial court to make the statutorily-required findings. To evade review of a trial court's failure to make required findings because someone either forgot or failed to move for rehearing frustrates the very purpose for those findings. Requiring a motion for rehearing is a rule that is too restrictive and imprecise to operate fairly where children and families are the focus. This is especially true where many family court cases are handled pro se.
The dissent suggests however that judicial economy should prevail over children and families and that this is just a common preservation issue. We disagree. The failure to make required factual findings is not the type of error that preservation rules were designed to avoid.
Preservation rules are designed to prevent a party from blindsiding the judge by raising an issue on appeal that was not brought to the trial court's attention. And, we will not review issues that a trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on because they were not raised. Correspondingly, the preservation rules were not designed to allow a trial court to ignore statutory requirements of which it should be aware.
Certainly, a judge sitting in family court should be cognizant of what findings are statutorily required in a final judgment of dissolution. There should be no need to bring those requirements to the trial court's attention. This does not mean that a lawyer or party ignore the rules either. It is preferable for the litigants to encourage the court's compliance with statutory requirements. But, it should not prevent a litigant from raising the issue when the court fails to do so.
While it may not be fundamental error for the court to fail to make statutorily-required findings, it is reversible error. See Esaw , 965 So.2d at 1265. "Fundamental error . is error which goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action." Sanford v. Rubin , 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). It is a means by which an appellate court may address an issue to which the litigant failed to object or raise-an issue of which the trial court would otherwise be unaware. Id.
A trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings is not in the same category. That failure neither goes to the foundation nor the merits of the case. There is no need to call the matter to the attention of the trial court by way of a motion for rehearing. But, it does provide cause for reversal. See, e.g., Walden v. Adekola , 773 So.2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing a sanctions order for failing to contain a willfulness finding, which can be raised for the first time on appeal).
We therefore adhere to our prior precedent that is consistent with this opinion. We approve the rule applied in Badgley, Rental, Mondel , Aguirre, and Dorsett . We recede from our opinions in Farghali and Kuchera to the extent they adopted a new rule requiring a motion for rehearing to raise a trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings on appeal.
The Florida Bar Family Law Rules Committee may want to address this issue because of the judicial economy that results from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth District's rule of requiring a motion for rehearing to preserve the issue of a trial court's failure to make statutorily-required findings. Absent such a rule, however, we will not require a motion for rehearing to "preserve" the issue.
We also find merit in the former husband's second issue-the court's refusal to allow him to discover and present evidence on the former wife's employability. He filed a notice of vocational examination of the former wife, arguing that her ability to earn an income was in controversy. He requested she produce information in that regard. The former wife objected to the notice. The circuit court denied the former husband's request to conduct a vocational examination.
At trial, the former husband attempted to introduce the testimony of a vocational evaluation specialist, who testified that he was familiar with the former wife's employment through information provided by the former husband's attorney. Based on the specialist's admission that he had not evaluated the former wife, the court sustained the former wife's hearsay, relevance, speculation, and lack of foundation objections.
The Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure allow a party to examine the other party for "physical or mental condition, employability or vocational testing, genetic testing, or any other type of examination related to a matter in controversy." Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.360(a)(1). The requesting party must show "good cause for the examination." Id. Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.360(a)(2).
A court must rely on competent, substantial evidence when determining whether a spouse is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Lafferty v. Lafferty , 134 So.3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citations omitted). The court should also consider "evidence of employment potential and probable earnings based on work history, qualifications, and prevailing wages in the community." Zarycki-Weig v. Weig , 25 So.3d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citations omitted).
Here, the former husband asked to conduct a vocational examination. He attempted to present a vocational expert's testimony. The court prevented him from doing either. We therefore reverse and remand the case to the circuit court to allow the former husband to vocationally examine the former wife so that the court can determine her ability to work, earning capacity, and reevaluate the alimony award.
For the reasons expressed above, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and to provide the statutorily-required findings in support of its ultimate decision on alimony.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Warner, Gross, Taylor, Damoorgian, and Klingensmith, concur.
Conner, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Kuntz, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion, in which Gerber, C.J., Ciklin, Levine and Forst, JJ., concur.
Conner, J. concurring specially.
After participating in the panel decisions issued in Farghali v. Farghali , 187 So.3d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) and Kuchera v. Kuchera , 230 So.3d 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) and considering the various positions argued during the en banc consideration of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the majority's position is more persuasive. I have changed my position from that expressed in Farghali and Kuchera for two reasons.
First, the position taken by the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Districts contains the caveat that the district court "reserve[s] the right to reverse on account of an absence of findings (whether the point was raised in the trial court or not) if the absence of the statutory findings frustrates th[e] court's appellate review." Broadfoot v. Broadfoot , 791 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). I submit that caveat is in recognition of the uniqueness of family law cases and the prevalence of statutory requirements for findings. More importantly, just as the dissent contends that either error is fundamental or not, it is equally true that an error is either preserved or not. If an error is not preserved, then the trial judge should not be reversed, unless the error is fundamental. In my view, the caveat represents the notion that the error in failing to make statutory findings can be fundamental. The problem with the caveat is that it is up to a panel of appellate judges to determine whether "the absence of the statutory findings frustrates th[e] court's appellate review," which can sometimes lead to speculation about what a trial judge was thinking. Discerning the unspoken thoughts of a trial judge can be problematic, when a trial judge's thinking is often dependent upon determining the credibility of witnesses.
Second, what makes family law cases uniquely different from other civil cases is the large percentage of cases in which both parties are representing themselves. Unlike the other subject areas of cases coming before the trial court, in more than half the family law cases, the parties are usually not going to be aware of the preservation requirement for an appeal, in order to even attempt to bring a lack of adequate findings to the attention of the trial court by way of a motion for rehearing. That concern is even more prominent when one considers, as the majority points out, that the initial final judgment sets the threshold for future proceedings affecting children in particular.
Thus, I join the majority.
Kuchera v. Kuchera , 230 So.3d 135, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) followed Farghali . To the extent Kuchera departs from our established precedent, we also recede from it.