Case Name: Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of William H. Hollister et al., as Executors, etc.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-02
Citations: 14 N.Y. St. Rep. 335
Docket Number: 
Parties: Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of William H. Hollister et al., as Executors, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 14
Pages: 335–339

Head Matter:
Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of William H. Hollister et al., as Executors, etc.
(Supreme Court, General Term,, Third Department,
Filed February, 1888.)
1 Wills—Interpretation op—“Recovery”—Meaning op.
The will of the testator directed the payment of all his just debts and the division of the residue of his property among his children. By a codicil thereto he directed that in case any one of his children, or the husband or wife of any child should, up to. the final settlement of his estate, recover of him or his estate any sum or sums which accrued or were 'claimed to have accrued to him or her previous to the date of the codicil, then the legacy of such child should abate to the amount of such recovery. Held, that the term “recover” must be broadly interpreted, and that assignment of money made upon the presentation of a verified claim to executors was a recovery within the meaning of the codicil. Parker, J., dissenting.
2 Same—One who accepts benefits op, also accepts burdens imposed.
Held, that a person accepting the benefits of the will must also accept the burdens imposed by it.
3 Same—Provision op—Effect given to.
Held, that the provision of the codicil could not be evaded by an assignment of a claim by one of the legatees, and its recovery by the assignee.
Appeal- by Mary J. Palmer, one of the residuary legatees under the will of Osmer Hollister, deceased, from so much of the decree of the surrogate of Greene county, made upon the final accounting of the executors, as adjudges that the distributive share of said Mary as one of the residuary legatees of said Osmer Hollister be reduced, to the extent of $1,042.81 on account of the claim to that amount paid by the executors to John 0. Palmer, the surrogate holding such to be the requirement of the wifi. The testator executed his will October 25, 1880.
By his will, the testator ordered his executors to pay all his just debts, made certain bequests and provisions,' not material to this case, and then gave all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate to his five children, share and share alike. On the 20th day of October, 1883, the testator made a codicil to his will, the provision of which, material to be considered here, is set forth in the opinion. The other material facts are therein stated.
Griswold and Cornell, for app’lt; A. T. Clearwater, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Landon, P. J.
We think the decree of the surrogate should be affirmed. By his will, which was dated October 25, 1880, the testator directed his executors to pay all his just debts. He had five children, of whom Mary J. Palmer was one. He made these children equal residuary legatees. David E. Palmer was the husband of Mary, and it now appears that he had an account against the testator, dating prior to May 3, 1876, of $635.44. This account was thus a little more than four years old when the testator made his will. On the 20th day of June, 1883, when the account was more than seven years old, the testator made a codicil to his wifi in which he provided, "That incase any one of my children, or the husband or wife of such child, shah, up to the time of the final settlement and distribution of my estate, recover, in any suit or proceeding at law, or otherwise, against my estate or said executors, or the survivor of them, for any sum or sums of money accrued, or claimed to have accrued, to him or her, as a creditor, against me previous to the date of my codicil, then and in that case the gift, bequest or legacy, or gifts and legacies in my said wiU to such child shall abate to the amount of such recovery or recoveries, and such amount shall be deducted from such gift, legacy or bequest to such child. "
It is difficult to resist the conviction that this provision of the codicil was framed to meet the case in hand. The testator did not apply the provision to biEs or claims thereafter to accrue, but to those claimed or accrued " previous to the date of my codicil."
He aimed the provision at the biEs or claims of the husband or wife of any of his children. It is true his will provided that all just debts should be paid, but it was com petent for him to annex such a condition as this to the pay ment of any of them. Shouler on Wills, § 598. Possibly he thought this claim was barred by the statute of limit ations, possibly that it was not just, possibly that his daughter, whose husband should recover it, would then be as weE provided for as his other children. Possibly he had the idea that his son-in-law was waiting for him to die in order to coEect the bill without prejudice from his testi many. His daughter, by accepting the benefits of the will, accepts the burdens annexed to them. Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y., 153; Brown v. Knapp, 79 id., 136; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 id., 424.
It is objected that David E. Palmer, the husband of Mary, did not recover the bill, but that he assigned it to his father, John 0. Palmer. The assignment was made after the death of the testator, upon the consideration of one dollar, and obviously to avoid.the letter of the will. We do not think the intent of the testator can be defeated by an evasion so transparent.
The executors paid the bill to' John C. Palmer without litigation or contest, and hence it is objected that he did not "recover in any suit or proceeding at law, or otherwise "
If the word "recover" is held to be here used in its technical sense as signifying the amount realized by a party by means of the successful prosecution of a suit or proceeding, it appears that a proceeding was initiated. David E. Palmer made out the bill against the estate and verified it in due form, and his assignee presented it to the executors. That, certainly, was the first step in the proceeding for its recovery. That step sufficed to procure payment from the executors, and the amount paid was equivalent to the like amount recovered. But we must use the word in as broad a sense as we think the testator intended, and we think he meant that it should cover whatever sum David E. Palmer should succeed in causing to be collected from his estate.
Decree affirmed, with costs against the appellant
Fish, J., concurs.