Case Name: TRACY et al. v. EGGLESTON et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1901-04-16
Citations: 108 F. 324
Docket Number: No. 909
Parties: TRACY et al. v. EGGLESTON et al.
Judges: Before PARDEE. McCOEMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 108
Pages: 324–334

Head Matter:
TRACY et al. v. EGGLESTON et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 16, 1901.)
No. 909.
1. Boundaries — Evidence—Declaration of Deceased Surveyor.
Under the rule established by decision in Texas, which, as a rule of property, is binding upon the federal court* sitting in that state, declarations of a deceased surveyor in regard to the lines and corners of a survey which was originally made by him, made on the ground while pointing out a monument placed there by him in making the survey, are admissible in evidence in an action involving the location of the survey, although at the time the declarations were made he was part owner of the land embraced in such suivey, and interested in a controversy then pending as to its boundaries. The objection that such declarations were self-serving is not fatal, since they could not be used as evidence during his lifetime, or while his testimony was obtainable.
2. Aw’Hal — -Review or IvstiujotioKs — Exceptions.
a general exception to a charge, which does not direct the attention of the trial court to the particular portion or portions to which objection is made, raises no question for review in the appellate court.
Pardee, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the Circuit Court oí the United States for the Western District of Tonus.
This notion was brought by Eustace It. Tracy and others, citizens of the slate of Now übrk, against Mary S. Eggleston and others, citizens of the state of Texas. It is an action of trespass to try tide to 040 acres of land situated in (Sutton county, Tex. The jury forrad a verdict Cor the defendants, on which judgment was entered. During the trial p. bill of exceptions was reserved by the níacuflit's. The following is a part of the bill of exceptions: “It. Von Rosenberg, a witness for the defendants, duly sworn, was, over plaintiff's’ objection, permitted by the court to testify that in 1885 witness was an employ?) of the stale land oiiiec; that Jacob Koucnler, formerly land commissioner of the general land office, requested the commissioner of the land office to issue mi patents to lands lying between block C, if. 15. & W. T. By. Oo„ avid the Devil’s river, until the real location of the surveys now claimed by defendants could bo ascertained: iliac in ¡he fall of 1885. witness, Jacob Kenchler, and «idlers went to the pla.ee of alleged conflict, and witness was there sworn in as a cnecial slate surveyor; that Jacob Kenchler pointed out to witness a loose mount! of rock on the north bank of Elbow Lake, and informed witness that, rho same was c mound of rock placed there by himself (Keuehler) at the time lie located Rusk Transporiation No. 3 and its constructed surveys; that Kenc-h-ler informed witness that the beginning corner of Busk Transportation No. 3 was SíñO varas if., 45 degrees W.. from said loose mound of rock; that witness did not go S., 45 degrees "VV., 950 varas, to ascertain whether said beginning corner of No. 3 was located there or pot; that ho did not run out any ol the lines of No. 3 at the time, and did not see any of the corners (.hereof; that the stone mound shown him by Keuehler on the bank of Elbow Lake was not called for by Keuehler in the original field notes of survey No. 3; that, while there were trees there, which might readily have been used as bearing trees, bo did not then, nor has ho since, discovered any marked bearing trees there; chat, ordinarily, a surveyor, in making an actual survey, whore bearing trees were accessible, would have used the same. All of which testimony as to the declarations of Jacob Kenchler made to witness was objected to upon the grounds that, defendants admitting that Jacob Keuehler at the dato of said declarations was a joint owner spid tenant in common with defendants in said lands, said declarations by Kenchler were self-serving, and made post litem motanx, at the time when he (Keuehler) had requested that no patents issue by the state until lie could go upon the ground and designate where he intended the location of his surveys; because said declarations permitted said Iveuchlor. in his own interest, after the location of plaintiffs’ certificate and the issuance of their patents, to go upon the ground, and select and designate the land which he intended, or claims to have intended, to have appropriated by his original entry, notwithstanding such location varied the relative location of his original field notes, placed his said survey at the junction of streams different from those named in his original field notes, and appropriated lauds in conflict vvilli plaintiffs’ lands at a point shown by the official records and his field notes to have been vacant and unappropriated at the time of plaintiffs’ location of their surveys; because said statement of said Keuehler was an ex parte statement, made in his own interest, without affording opportunity of cross-examination; because said testimony of the witness Von Rosenberg was hearsay, — which objections so made were each and all by the court overruled, and the testimony of said witness was by the court permitted to go before the jury; to which action of the court in overruling said objections and allowing said testimony to go before the jury plaintiffs then and there, in open court, before the retirement of the jury, excepted.”
The court charged the jury as follows: “Gentlemen of the jury, this is an action brought by the plaintiffs named1 in the petition against the defendants, Mary S. Eggleston and O. T. Word, in the ordinary form of trespass to try title for the recovery of five sections of land surveyed and patented by certificates issued to the Houston, East & West Texas Railroad Company. The defendants allege, substantially, that they are the owners and are in possession of six sections of land set out in their answer, surveyed and patented,— one of said tracts being survey No. 3, patented by virtue of a certificate issued to the Rusk Transportation Co.; that-defendants’ locations, surveys, and patents were all prior to those of plaintiffs, and hence that, if the lands described in plaintiffs’ patents include the lands described in defendants’ patents, that defendants have the superior title, because their locations and patents were prior in point of time to those of plaintiffs. I charge you that defendants admit that plaintiffs are the owners of the certificates by virtue of which their patents were issued, and that plaintiffs admit that the defendants are the owners of the certificates by virtue 'of which their patents were issued; consequently, there is no issue as to titles between the parties to be submitted to you. The sole question for you to determine is, ‘Where were all the surveys of the defendants located on the ground?’ If the lands embraced in the patents of plaintiffs are the same lands embraced in the patents of defendants, then defendants are entitled to a verdict in their favor, because their locations and patents are prior in point of time to these of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contend in this case that defendants’ surveys should be constructed by beginning at the northeast corner of survey No. 21, as shown by the map, and thence by running east 11,400 varas for the beginning corner of No. 3, and that by thus locating defendants’ land such lands will not embrace those of plaintiffs, and that in such case plaintiffs would be entitled to recover the land in controversy. Defendants, however, contend that the call above named for the northeast corner of survey No. 21, thence east 11,400 varas, made by the surveyor Keuchler, is a mere random or guess call, and by mistake, and that their survey No. 3 was in fact made by this surveyor Keuchler on Elbow Lake, as explained to you by the map and by the evidence. In order to determine the location of a survey made on the ground, it is your duty to follow the footsteps of the surveyor on the ground, and to locate the survey on the ground as the surveyor made the survey. If you believe from the testimony that Keuchler, the surveyor who made the survey of the defendants, actually surveyed on the ground defendants’ survey No. 3, commencing at Keuchler or Elbow Lake, and that from that point he constructed said survey No. 3, you will return a verdict for defendants. If, on the other hand, you do not believe from the evidence that said Keuchler actually made said survey on the ground (and the presumption of law is that it was made on the ground, unless the evidence in the ease shows to the contrary), then you will endeavor, from the evidence and the field notes, to ascertain where the surveyor intended to locate said survey No. 3. The law in such cases lays down certain rules for your guidance, and they are as follows: Galls in field notes are divided into three classes, and their dignity and importance are stated in the following order: First, calls for natural objects, such as rivers, creeks, etc., which stand first; second, calls for artificial objects, such as stakes, mounds, etc., which come next; and, third, course and distance, which come last. Course will prevail over distance. Where there is a conflict between calls in a grant, you must reject those which are most uncertain, and adopt those which are most certain, and which will the more nearly preserve the configuration of the survey, and conform the more nearly to all the other calls, and reflect the intention of the surveyor in locating the grant. In this case there is a conflict between the northeast comer of survey No. 21 and the other calls in the grant; and, if you do not believe that the surveyor actually made a survey of No. 3 on the ground, then you will apply the above rules to the evidence in (lofermining whether the surveyor intended to locate said survey No. 3 11,400 varas from the northeast comer of survey No. 2.1, or whether he intended to locate the same on Elbow or Kenehler Lake. If you believe that said surveyor, under the above instructions, intended to locate said survey No. 3 11,-100 varas from the northeast corner of said survey No. 21, then in such case you will return a veidict in favor of plaintiffs. But, on the other hand, if you believe that the surveyor intended to locate said survey No. 3 on Keueli-ler or Elbow Lake, then you will disregard tiie call for the northeast corner of survey No. 21, aud in such case your verdict will be for the defendants. Each call in the survey must he given effect to, if possible; but.where all cannot be, and one call conflicts with many others, which, if given effect to, would override many other calls, then it would be your duty to disregard this one call so conflicting with many others. When a survey is actually made upon the ground, and some of its lines ami corners are fixed, and can be found and identified, then the survey must be located by those lines and corners so found and identified. If you believe that the surveyor actually surveyed No. 3 on the ground, on Keuchler or Elbow Lake, and that some of the corners and lines established by him can be found, then in such ease you will disregard Hie call 11,400 varas for northeast corner of No. 21, and return a verdict for defendants. You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony; and in a civil suit, such as the present, you may predicate your finding on a preponderance of Hie evidence. If your verdict bo in favor of tiie plaintiffs, you will return it in the following form: ‘We, the jury, find lor the plaintiff's for the lands de-sciibed in their petition.’ If your finding be in favor .of the defendants, you will simply say: ‘We, the jury, find for tiie defendants.’ ”
' Tiie bill of exceptions shows that an exception was reserved to this charge, as follows: “'To which charge of the court so given the jury plaintiffs then and there in ojien court excepted, because the same did not charge the law applicable to the case made by the evidence; because the same was on the weight of the evidence; because the same incorrectly stated the issues involved, and failed to present tiie law of the entire case under the pleadings and evidence, and incorrectly states the law as given.”
It is assigned as error, and insisted on in the argument: (1) That the court erred in permitting the declarations and statements of Keuchler, the deceased surveyor, lo be proven; and (2) that the court erred in the charge given.
John D. House and Win. Grant, for plaintiffs in error.
II. U. Ward, for defendants in error.
Before PARDEE. McCOEMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SHELBY, Circuit Judge,
after stating the case as above, delivered tiie opinion of the court.
There had been offered in evidence a map or survey of 1878, which was in use in 1879 in the general land office and Bexar land district. Tliis map was based on a survey made by Jacob Keuchler, who died before the trial. In the fall of 1885, É. Yon Rosenberg, accompanied by Jacob Kenehler and others, went on the lands alleged to be included in the survey, and Von Rosenberg was sworn in as a special state surveyor, Jacob Keuchler pointed out to the witness a loose mound of rock on the north bank of Elbow Lake, and informed the witness that it was a mound of rock placed there by himself (Keuchler) at the time he located Rusk Transportation No. 3 and its constructed surveys. He said that the beginning cor-nel' of Rusk Transportation No. 3 was 950 varas S., 45° W., from this loose mound of rock. The defendants objected to this testimony as to the declarations of Jacob Keuchler. The first question for consideration is whether or not these declarations of Keuchler were admissible in evidence. Von Eosenberg was acting officially. He was on the ground as special state surveyor, and his acts in that connection are clearly admissible in evidence. No objection is made to them. No objection is made to proof of the fact that the mound of rock was on the land as stated. No objection is made to the fact that Keuchler pointed out the mound of rock. This part of Von Rosenberg's evidence is a statement of facts to which no objection was or could properly be made. The objection, therefore, is confined to the declaration of Keuchler, made at the time he pointed out the mound of rock, that they were placed there by himself at the time he located the corner, and that the corner was at a certain distance and in a designated direction from the mound of rock. It was said by the supreme court in 1880, after an examination of the Texas cases, that there was no essential difference between the rule there as to the question here considered and the general rule held by the American courts. The court observed, however, that, if there was a difference, which had become a rule of property in Texas applicable to the determination of controversies respecting disputed boundaries, such rule would be controlling in the federal courts. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, 364, 26 L. Ed. 113.
In George v. Thomas, 16 Tex. 74, 92, the court admitted the declarations of a public surveyor. "He was a public surveyor," said the court, "and his declarations while making the survey were clearly admissible as a part of the original res geste. On these questions of boundary the courts have gone much further, and, under certain restrictions, have freely admitted hearsay evidence to establish old surveys and boundary lines."
In Stroud v. Springfield, 28 Tex. 649, 665, a memorandum was offered in evidence as having been made by a surveyor. It was found among the surveyor's papers, but the handwriting was not proved, and no effort was made to show its genuineness. The paper was excluded, but the court sgid:
"If tne genuineness of these papers had been sufficiently proved, we are of opinion that they would have been admissible in evidence as the declarations of the party making them, for the purpose of aiding in the ascertainment of the boundaries of the Powell league."
In Welder v. Hunt, 34 Tex. 44, 48, the court said:
"The declarations of public officers are held admissible to prove their official acts, and we see no reason why the declarations made by a surveyor, who claims to have run the line upon the ground, as to the location of a boundary line, may not, after the death of the surveyor, be proved by the witness to whom he made the declarations. We might hesitate to go so far as to admit the declarations of an interested party, .yet we have no hesitation in saying that the declarations of a surveyor as to an official act of his own, made upon the- ground, may be given in evidence, after his decease, by any competent witness who heard the declarations."
In Hurt v. Evans, 49 Tex. 311, 316, it was held that the declarations of a deceased owner of a tract of land as to the corners of the tract of which he was in possession at the time they were made are admissible in a contest as to the locations of such corners and lines,
The case of Reeves v. Roberts, 62 Tes. 550, is very much like the case at bar. A witness was on the stand, who had made a survey of the land in question. He testified that one Tinnon, an old surveyor, told him that he had been at that place (on the land surveyed) 20* years before that time, and recognized it as the southeast corner of the grant; that he had seen bearing trees, and the marks on them, while they were standing; and that in making surveys in the neighborhood he had made that a beginning point. The court held that the evidence of declarations made by Tinnon, in connection with his acts and means of knowledge, reaching back as they did for a period of .36 years prior to the trial, in connection with the other evidence in the cause, was admissible for the purpose of establishing the ancient boundary.
In Russell v. Hunnicutt, 70 Tex. 657, 8 S. W. 500, the declarations of a surveyor, giving his opinion as to the identification of corners and lines of the survey, were excluded because the land was not originally surveyed by him, and because it appeared that he had no previous knowledge of the original survey. The court, however, said:
"Where it is shown that the surveyor was in a position to know the truth of his declarations from having made the^original survey, or from other knowledge possessed hy him, the rule is different."
In the recent case of Ayers v. Harris, 77 Tex. 108, 115, 13 S. W. 768, a memorandum, being properly identified as being made by the surveyor, who died before the trial, was received in evidence. The court observed:
"It is a well-recognized rule that the declarations of the surveyor may he proved under the circumstances existing at the time of the trial of this cause. Such evidence can certainly rank no higher, and cannot he so safe or satisfactory, as evidence written down by the surveyor at the time."
The opinion of the supreme court in Hunnicutt. v. Peyton, supra, indicates that in questions of private boundary declarations of particular facts, as distinguished from reputation, made by deceased persons, are admissible when "made by persons who it is shown had knowledge of that whereof they spoke, and who were on the land, or in possession of it, when the declarations were made."
In one or (he Texas cases which we have quoted the court refers to the declarations which were admitted as being those of persons who are disinterested, and in another one of the cases the court said it might hesitate to go so far as to admit the declarations of an interested party. We have found no case, however, that excluded the declarations, which were otherwise relevant, because the declar-ant was in ¡('rested. ' In several of the cases where the declarations of owners in possession as to boundaries were received the declarant manifestly had an interest, and yet the declaration was received. Such declarations, when not received as a part of the res gestae, and when not received as declarations against interest, are really accepted in evidence as a substitute for the dead or absent declarant. If he were present as a witness, as the statutes now stand, his interest, or his being a party to the action, would not make him incompetent. Rev. St. Tex. 1895, § 2300; Rev. St. U. S. (2d Ed.) § 858. We do not think, therefore, that the fact that Jacob Keuchler had an interest in the real estate involved in the controversy rendered his declarations inadmissible.
The only other question raised by the plaintiff in the argument at bar or in the briefs relates to the charge of the court. The charge and exception have been given in full in the statement of the case. It will be seen that the charge was intended to cover the several questions in the case. There are portions of it that are not objected to in the argument at the bar or in the briefs filed. An excerpt consisting of three sentences is selected by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error as being erroneous. It is as follows:
"In order to determine the location of a survey made on the ground, it is your duty to follow the footsteps of the surveyor to locate the survey on 11h> ground as the surveyor made the survey. If you believe from the testimony that Keuehler, the surveyor who made the survey of the defendants, actually surveyed on the ground defendants' survey No. 3, commencing at Keuehler or Klbow Lake, and at which point he constructed said survey No. 3, you will return a verdict for defendants. If, on the other hand, you do not believe from the evidence that said Keuehler actually made said survey on the ground (and the presumption of law is that it was made on the ground, unless the evidence in the ease shows to the contrary)', then you will endeavor, from the evidence and the field notes, to ascertain where the surveyor intended to locate survey No. 3."
This part of the charge was not singled out and excepted to on the trial. The exception there taken was to the entire charge. The objections which were stated in the exception reserved related to the entire charge.. The objections were that the court did not charge the law applicable to the case made by the evidence; that the charge was on the weight of the evidence; and'that it incorrectly stated the issues involved, and failed to present the law of the entire case under the pleading and evidence, and incorrectly stated the law as given. These exceptions and objections manifestly go to the entire charge. No portion of it was selected for exception or objection. No separate objection was made to the part of the charge now singled out in argument for objection. It is well settled that a general exception to the whole of a charge to the jury will not avail a plaintiff in error if the charge contains distinct propositions, and any one of them is free from error. If the exception does not direct the attention of the trial court to a particular portion or portions of a charge to which objection is made, it raises no question for review in the appellate court. Burton v. Ferry Co.. 114 U. S. 474, 5 Sup. Ct. 960, 29 L. Ed. 215; Anthony v. Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 172, 10 Sup. Ct. 53, 33 L. Ed. 301; Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 19 L. Ed. 106; Cooper v. Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148, 4 Sup. Ct. 360, 28 L. Ed. 382.
The assignments of error, we think, are not well taken. • The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.