Case Name: Dibble et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Corbett et al., Defendants and Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1859-07-28
Citations: 5 Bosw. 202
Docket Number: 
Parties: Dibble et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Corbett et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 18
Pages: 202–213

Head Matter:
Dibble et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Corbett et al., Defendants and Appellants.
1. Where a person contracts to purchase goods, which, at the time, hre on board of a vessel at sea, and expected to arrive, it is his duty to receive such goods within a reasonable time after notice of their arrival, and a ten-, der of the goods at the place designated by him for the delivery of them.
2. Where such purchaser refuses to accept a delivery within a reasonable time, he is liable to the vendor for the damages necessarily caused by such delay.
3. Although the contract be made in such form that the title to the property does not pass until the goods are delivered, yet the contract being valid and obligatory, and the purchaser having accepted the goods under it, it is no answer to the claim for damages for delaying an unreasonable time to receive them, that the title of the purchaser does not become vested until the goods are delivered and accepted.
(Before Hoffman, Woodruff and Pierrepont, J. J.)
Heard, May 9;
decided, July 28, 1859.
This is an appeal by John A. Corbett and Andrew Johnston, who are the defendants, and compose the firm of Corbett & Co., from a judgment in favor of Calvin B. Dibble and Jonathan E. Bunce, who are the plaintiffs, and compose the firm of Dibble & Bunce. The action was commenced in October, 1856, and was tried before Mr. Justice Woodbuff and a jury, o.n the 28th of May, 1858. The plaintiffs recovered a verdict, and from the judgment entered on that verdict, the present appeal is taken.
The complaint states that on the 2d of August, 1856, the plaintiffs bargained and sold to the defendants, who purchased of the plaintiffs certain goods then on board of the schooner F. A. Godwin, which goods the plaintiffs agreed to deliver, and the defendants to accept, on the arrival of the schooner at the port of ISTew York; that she arrived there on the 5th of said August; that the plaintiffs were then ready and offered to deliver the goods, and requested the defendants to receive them; that they neglected and refused to receive them until the 15th of August, in consequence of which neglect and refusal the plaintiffs were obliged to and did stow and keep the goods on board of said schooner, at a great loss and damage, whereby they sustained loss and damage to the amount of $200; and prays judgment for that sum, with interest from the 15th of August, 1856.
The answer denies that the plaintiffs agreed to deliver, and the defendants to receive the goods, on the arrival of said schooner, but avers a readiness to receive them on such arrival, and that the delay in receiving them arose from the fact that the defendants also purchased of the plaintiffs other goods on board of another schooner, viz., the Ocean Wave; that the goods could not be received from both schooners at the same time, and by permission of the plaintiffs they first received those on board of the Ocean Wave; that the delay was not unnecessary; and that as soon as the goods were received, the defendants paid and satisfied the plaintiffs therefor.
Before any evidence was given, the defendants moved a dismissal of the complaint, on the grounds, (1.) that the action is for or in the nature of demurrage, and cannot be sustained, except upon a contract expressed or implied, and that no such contract is stated in the complaint; (2.) that such an action will only lie in favor of the owners of a vessel, and against the freighter or consignee, and that the complaint does not state that the plaintiffs are owners, or the defendants freighters or consignees ; (3.) that the complaint does not show that the plaintiffs were compelled to pay demurrage, which the defendants should refund; (4.) that the ultimate acceptance of the goods by the defendants, and receipt by the plaintiffs of payment therefor, is an answer to any claim for damages from delay in receiving the goods. The Judge refused to dismiss the complaint, holding that it was good in substance, and the defendants excepted.
J. B. Bunce, one of the plaintiffs, testified, without objection, that they “ sold a quantity of rosin to Corbett & Co., to arrive, and to be delivered afloat on the arrival of the vessel. Edward C. Cartwright effected the sale as broker.”
The plaintiffs offered to read the broker’s note of the contract of sale. The defendants admitted its due execution, but objected to its being read, “ on the ground that there is nothing in the complaint to sustain it.” The objection was overruled, and they excepted. It was then read in evidence, viz.:
“Few York, August 2d, 1856.
“ Messrs. Dibble & Buses:
“ Sold for your account, to Messrs. Corbett & Co., 1,265 barrels common rosin, a $1.55 per 310 lbs., delivered afloat, and i weighing 1 c. jier brl., to arrive per schooner F.- A. Godwin.”
“ Edward C. Cartwright,
“ Broker in Faval Stores and General Merchandise.
“ Cash Brokerage, 1 c. per brl.”
He further testified that the schooner E. A Godwin arrived on the 5th of August, 1856 ; that the defendants were notified of it on the same day, and instructed the plaintiffs to send her alongside of the ship Valleyfield, at Pier 50, East River, which was done, and that the discharge of the schooner was completed on the 15th of August; that the plaintiffs were ready, on the morning of the 6th, to discharge her, and kept men on hand for the purpose every da)r, until she was discharged; that the discharging was commenced about the 12th of August.
The plaintiffs offered in evidence copies of three letters written by them to the defendants. The defendants admitted due notice to produce the originals, but objected to copies being read “ as not being admissible under the complaint.” The objection was overruled, they excepted, and the copies were read in evidence.
That of the 6th of August states that the “Schooner Ocean Wave is lying idle alongside ship. * * The schooner cannot be thus detained without demurrage. Schooner E. A. Godwin is also waiting. We look to you for all damages we sustain by this delay of the two schooners.”
That of the 7th of August states, that “The schooners F. A. Godwin and Ocean Wave are lying idle alongside of ship to which they were sent. We are liable for demurrage on each of thirty dollars per day, which please note, as we look to you for all damages we sustain.”
That of the 9th of August states, that “ Schooner F. A. God-win continues to lie alongside ship where sent, at Pier 50, idle, and on demurrage, while the Valley field is taking in some other freight.”
Each of these notes was delivered to the defendants, on the day of its date.
The defendants objected to evidence of a “ reasonable time for discharging the rosin from the schooner,” “on the ground that the complaint does not state what is a reasonable time, nor that the defendants delayed the vessel unreasonably,” and excepted to the decision admitting it.
Q. “ Was the keeping of the rosin, during the period of delay, attended with any expense ?”
Objected to by the defendants on the ground that there is no allegation in the complaint to warrant any such evidence. Objection overruled and exception taken.
A. “It was attended with expense.” Q. “What was the expense?” A. “ The actual expense was $25 a day.” Q. “What for?" A. “ The hire of the vessel and storing of the goods, the wages of the men that we sent up there to discharge the rosin, and the captain, and the hiring of the vessel.”
The witness also testified that “besides the F. A. Godwin there was the ‘Ocean Wave; * * this is the sale note of the Ocean Wave. The Ocean Wave unloaded first; they were both to be delivered alongside of whatever vessel the defendants designated.”
The sale note of the Ocean Wave was read in evidence, viz.:
“ New York, August 2d, 1856.
“ Messrs. Dibble & Dunce :
“ Sold on your account to Messrs. Corbitt & Co., 1085 brls. common rosin a $1.55 per 310 lbs. delivered and 1 weighing 1 c. per brl. to arrive per. schooner Ocean Wave.
“ Edward 0. Cartwright, “Broker in Naval Stores and General Merchandise.
“ Cash Brokerage, 1 c.”
This and other witnesses were examined upon the questions, when each schooner began to be discharged; the time necessary and actually occupied for the purpose ; and whether both schooners could have been discharged at the same time; and as to the per diem expenses from the delay.
When the plaintiffs rested, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, because, (1.) the proof differs materially from the allegations in the complaint; (2.) the plaintiffs have'not proved they owned the schooner, and that the defendants freighted or chartered it; (3.) nor that there was unreasonable delay after the schooner came alongside the ship; (4.) the contract does not authorize a recovery for the damages claimed; (5.) the plaintiffs have not shown payment by them of the amount sought to be recovered. The motion was denied and the defendants excepted.
The defendants produced receipts of the plaintiffs for payment of whole amount “ of bill of rosin,” for the rosin covered by both contracts, the last receipt being dated August 28th, 1856. The evidence tended to show that the discharging of the Ocean Wave was commenced on the 6th and completed on the 11th of August, and that the defendants urged the captain of the Valley-field to receive the cargo of the schooners as fast as he could, and that the plaintiffs as soon as the schooners were discharged presented-to the defendants a bill for the damages claimed.
When the testimony was closed, the defendants requested the Judge to charge “ that no demurrage can be recovered by the plaintiffs in this action, nor any damages in the nature of demurrage.”
He charged (among other things) “ that it was the duty of the defendants, under these contracts, to be in readiness to receive the goods, upon notice that the vessels had arrived in port, and of plaintiffs’ readiness to deliver, and if the defendants desired the delivery of the goods alongside any particular vessel, then it was their duty, on receiving notice of the arrival, to designate the place to which the schooner should be taken for the purpose of the discharge.
“ That it was the duty of the plaintiffs to notify the defendants, that the schooner was ready to deliver the goods, and to be in readiness to discharge them from one vessel to the other.
“ That it was the defendants duty to attend to the reception of the goods, and to receive them within a reasonable time. .
“ That it does not excuse the defendants for delay in receiving the goods, that their vessel was not in readiness to receive therm If the defendants designated the Valleyfield as the ship to receive the goods, and that vessel was not ready, it was their duty to find another, or receive the goods at some other place.
“ That the plaintiffs should not be compelled to wait beyond a reasonable time, because the defendants’ vessel was not in readiness to receive the goods; that it was not the plaintiffs’ fault that the defendants’ vessel was not in readiness, but the defendants’ misfortune only.
“ And that the defendants are responsible for whatever damages the plaintiffs necessarily sustained, by reason of an unreasonable delay of the defendants in receiving the goods.
“ That if two cargoes come in at the same time, the defend ants have a right to proceed and discharge one vessel first, and then to discharge the other. This is reasonable.
“ That the defendants’ counsel are right in saying, that it is the plaintiffs’ duty to present their vessels in readiness to discharge the cargo.'
“ That the rule of damages, in this case, does not depend upon the charter party of the schooner, but the plaintiffs are to have simply the necessary expenses of taking care of the property, and keeping it during the period of unreasonable delay, and nothing more can be recovered.
“ The necessary expenses incurred during the period of the delay, beyond a reasonable time to receive the goods, is the rule of damages, and it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the money has been actually paid by the plaintiffs before suit, but it is sufficient to show that the expenses have been necessarily incurred.
“To each and every of which propositions of said charge, the said defendants’ counsel did then and there, separately and specifically, except.
“And the Judge further charged the jury—
“That the plaintiffs cannot recover demurrage; they were not bound to keep the schooner here, and the defendants cannot be affected by any contract between the plaintiffs and the owners of the schooner, entitling such owners to demurrage.”
The jury, under said charge, retired, and afterwards returned a verdict for the plaintffs of $196.85.
The defendants moved, on a Case containing the exceptions, for a new trial, and the motion was denied. Judgment having been entered on the verdict, the defendants appealed from it to the General Term.
H, Z. Hayner, for defendants, (appellants.)
I. On the trial, the Judge in his charge in terms met the motion for a dismissal of the complaint, (but had before disregarded the rule in the admission of testimony,) in the following particulars, viz.:
1. That the action for demurrage, or in the nature of demur-rage, could not be sustained except upon a contract, express or implied. (Abb. on Ship., 804; Horn v. Bensusan, 9 Carr. & P., 709.)
2. That an action for demurrage can only be sustained by the owner of the vessel. (Clendaniel v. Tuckerman, 17 Barb., 184; Evans v. Forster, 1 Barn. & Ad., 118; Brouncker v. Scott, 4 Taun. R., 1.)
8. The action for demurrage will only lie against the freighter or consignee, and only for unreasonable delay occasioned 'by defendants, and properly alleged in the complaint. (Abb. on Ship., 304; Horn v. Bensusan, 9 Carr. & P., 709.)
IL The Judge, before his charge, had admitted evidence, under exceptions, in direct conflict with his charge.
III. The defendants agreeing to purchase .certain goods (the rosin) of plaintiffs, to arrive, and pay therefor on the delivery thereof, the plaintiffs, by delivering the same, and accepting the pay therefor, waived and precluded themselves from all claim for damage for the delay or neglect on the part of the defendants in accepting the delivery thereof, when first requested by plaintiffs.
IV. The plaintiffs did not sustain the relation of bailees to bailors to the defendants, whereby they would be enabled to sustain this action against the defendants.
Y. The charge of the Judge was erroneous—as he assumed that the plaintiffs held the relation of common carriers to the defendants as owners or consignees of the goods.
"VI. The sale and purchase were not completed, nor did the title of goods pass from the plaintiffs to the defendants until the delivery of the same; at any time before that, it was only an agreement to sell and deliver the goods on the-part of the plaintiffs, and an agreement on the part of the defendants to accept them, and pay therefor on delivery. (Chapman v. Lathrop, 6 Cow., 110; Clarkson v. Carter, 3 id., 84; Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio, 571; Conway v. Bush, 4 Barb., 564.)
VII. The weight of the barrels was also to be ascertained before delivery, for each of the parties agreed to pay one-half of the expense of weighing. (Rapelye v. Mackie, 6 Cow., 250; Outwater v. Dodge, 7 id., 85; Fitch v. Beach, 15 Wend., 221; Russell v. Nicoll, 3 id., 112.) o
VIII. The plaintiffs still, owning the goods, the title thereto not having passed to the defendants, have no right to charge for the expense of storing or keeping their own goods, to the defendants.
1. By subsequently delivering the goods the plaintiffs waive the right of considering the offer to deliver, as the time of delivery.
. By that act the plaintiffs waived the right to consider the date of offer as the time for the completion of the contract.
2. The charges or expense of storing or keeping the goods between the time of the offer to deliver and the actual delivery were also waived.
3. Story on Sales, (§ 394,) has the dictum, “ if between the sale and delivery, the vendor be put to charge in preserving and harboring the goods, the vendee is bound to reimburse him therefor.” (Story on Sales, § 394.)
4. Also, section 404: “It is the duty of the vendee to take the goods within a reasonable time, or he will be 'liable to the vendor for warehouse rent and other expenses growing out of the-custody of them,'or even to an action for not removing them in case the seller is prejudiced by his delay.” (Story on Sales, § 404.)
The authorities he- quoted for the doctrine are: Brown on Sales, (§§ 497, 498,) Greaves v. Ashlin. (3 Camp. R., 426.)
5. The rule is correct with this limitation, that-it applies, only to.perfected sales, and where the title to the goods has passed from the- vendor to the vendee, and the possession thereof still remaining in the hands of the vendor. Such were the following cases.: Greaves v. Ashlin, (3 Camp., 426,) Sands v. Taylor, (5 Johns. R, 395,) Maclean v. Dunn, (4 Bing. R., 722,) S. C., (1 M. & P., 761.)
6. The doctrine is laid down in- Parsons on Contracts, .as follows, viz.:
“ That the vendee is bound to receive and pay for the thing sold at the time and place expressed or implied in the contract of sale, and to pay all charges for keeping it after sale and delivery.” (1 Parsons on Con., 447.)
7. If,-, after the title passes to the vendee, the goods are left in the hands or possession of the vendor, he then no longer holds them under the contract of sale as vendor, but as bailee. And all the. duties and liabilities of.bailor forthwith attach-to the vendee.
8. But, before the title passes, no such consequence can follow from the possession of the goods by the vendor.
9. In the case of Cole v. Kerr, (20 Vt. R., 21,) it-was held there was no implied contract, upon the sale of personal property, that the vendee shall pay the vendor-.for any services in relation to the property previous to the completion- of the sale by delivery. (Cole v. Kerr, 20 Vt. R., 21.)
10. Why- not as well for sacking the wool, as for storing the goods?
.1 am at a loss -to discover a reason for the difference.
. 11. The Judge’s charge was therefore clearly erroneous.
IX. If the plaintiffs, under the law and evidence of the case, were entitled to a verdict, the damages-are clearly excessive. •
Wm. E. Curtis, for plaintiffs, (respondents.)
- The action is brought to recover for the expenses growing out of the custody of certain goods which the defendants, the vendees, neglected to take until after the expiration of the time within which they were to be taken.
The defendants, for answer, set up that the plaintiffs consented to the delay, and also that there was no delay. The jury found for the plaintiffs a verdict for $196.85.
I. The right of the plaintiffs to recover in an action of this nature is well settled. (Story on Sales, §§ 394, 404, 436.)
“ If the buyer does not carry away the goods bought within a reasonable time, the seller may charge warehouse room, or he may bring an action for not removing them, should he be prejudiced by the delay. But the buyer’s neglect does not entitle the seller to put an end to the contract.” (Greaves v. Ashlin, 3 Camp., 427.)
II. The evidence clearly shows a delay beyond a reasonable time to receive the goods, and that such delay caused necessary expenses tobe incurred by the plaintiff.
The evidence shows that the goods were kept waiting on board the schooner from August 5th to August 15th,. being ten days, and all the witnesses agree that two or three days-is a sufficient and reasonable time for their discharge. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Opinion:
By the Court—Hoffman, J.
The contract between the parties clearly imported, that the defendants should be prepared, promptly to take the rosin from the hands of the plaintiffs, upon their being apprised of the arrival of the schooner, and upon the plaintiffs following their directions as to the place of delivery, and using proper diligence in facilitating the discharge and reception of the goods.
Under the charge of the Judge, the jury have in effect found that the plaintiffs were faultless, and the defendants negligent.
It is perfectly settled that it is the duty of the vendee to take the goods within, a- reasonable time, or he will be liable to the vendor for warehouse rent and other expenses growing out of the custody of them, or even to an action for not removing them, in case the seller is- prejudiced by his delay. (Story on Sales, § 404.)
It is insisted bv the learned counsel of the defendants, that this rule is only applicable when a sale is so perfected as that the-property has passed to the vendee, and possession remains in the vendor.
If it were necessary, in order to support the plaintiffs' claim and the verdict, that such a transfer of property should be made out, our impressions would be that the right of property did actually pass upon the arrival of the schooner, so that in England; under an act of bankruptcy, the goods would pass to assignees, they paying the price; and so that the defendants •could sustain trover for them against others. The weighing of the rosin under this contract may have been as much intended to be done by the purchasers as by the sellers. (Ross on Venders, 82; Law L., vol. 12, p. 17, and cases; Ward v. Shaw, 7 Wend., 404.)
But whether this is so in all respects or not, when the defendants completed the purchase, took the rosin, and paid the price, they may be treated as purchasers and owners from the date of the contract which they acted under and fulfilled. When they began to unload and take the rosin about the 11th of August, the title then at least became vested in them as owners, and from the time of the contract. They could have recovered any advance of price beyond the amount to be given as fixed on .that day. They claimed to be owners and got the property by virtue of this contract; and then by relation, for the purposes of this 'question at least, they must be treated as owners from its date.
Now,'if a buyer's neglect of this character does not entitle the seller to put an end to the contract, (3 Camp., 427,) he has no redress for the injury done him, and expenses incurred by him through the purchaser's fault, but by an action of this nature; and to hold that the subsequent performance of the bargain which he could not prevent, shall rob him of this redress, would be a conclusion as manifestly unjust as we think it is untenable.
There is nothing before us on which we can pass upon the question of an excess of damages.
The observations above made dispose of the motion to dismiss the complaint which was made before the plaintiffs had given evidence and was renewed upon 'his resting.
The copies of the plaintiffs' letters to the defendants upon the subject of the vessel's arrival, and urging a prompt discharge, were given in evidence, after an admission of a notice to produce the originals. The admission was excepted to. On what ground ,we are at a loss to understand. No point as to this admission is now made. To have set these letters out in the complaint would have been pleading matters of evidence.
The same remarks apply to the admission of the conversation of the witness with the defendants, upon the same subject of the discharge of the rosin.
The exceptions as to the inquiry, -what would be a reasonable time for discharging the rosin, are clearly untenable. Those as to the expense of keeping the rosin and schooner are equally so.
The judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.