Case Name: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Kela RICHARDSON, Deceased. Bernice Richardson, Administratrix of the Estate of Kela Richardson, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Virgil Cornes, Jr., Individually and as The Natural Father and Duly Appointed Guardian of Virgil Cornes, III, A Minor, Jerome Cornes and Julian Cornes, Appellees/Cross Appellants
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-05-18
Citations: 905 So. 2d 620
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01485-COA
Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Kela RICHARDSON, Deceased. Bernice Richardson, Administratrix of the Estate of Kela Richardson, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Virgil Cornes, Jr., Individually and as The Natural Father and Duly Appointed Guardian of Virgil Cornes, III, A Minor, Jerome Cornes and Julian Cornes, Appellees/Cross Appellants.
Judges: KING, C.J., THOMAS, LEE, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., AND MYERS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 905
Pages: 620–644

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Kela RICHARDSON, Deceased. Bernice Richardson, Administratrix of the Estate of Kela Richardson, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Virgil Cornes, Jr., Individually and as The Natural Father and Duly Appointed Guardian of Virgil Cornes, III, A Minor, Jerome Cornes and Julian Cornes, Appellees/Cross Appellants.
No. 2002-CA-01485-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
May 18, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 3, 2004.
Ellis Turnage, Cleveland, Tamekia Rochelle Goliday, attorneys for appellant.
William Harvey Gresham, Clarksdale, attorney for appellees.

Opinion:
IRVING, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Bernice Richardson, in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased daughter, Kela Richardson, filed a petition to disinherit Virgil Cornes, Jr., Kela's biological father, and his three children, Jerome Cornes, Julian Cornes, and Virgil Cornes, III (the Corneses) because Virgil Cornes, Jr. had not acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime. This petition was filed after Richardson had filed three previous pleadings in which she alleged, without qualification or explanation, that the Corneses, along with her and her children, were Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries.
¶ 2. The chancellor denied the petition, finding that Richardson possessed unclean hands and that she should be equitably estopped from seeking to disinherit the Corneses. The finding was predicated upon the fact that Richardson had filed the previously, mentioned pleadings in which she alleged that the Corneses were Kela's heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries. Richardson contends that the chancellor erred by refusing to consider the merits of her petition to disinherit the Corneses.
¶ 3. The Corneses filed a cross-appeal asserting that the chancellor erred in awarding administratrix's and attorney's fees and expenses.
¶ 4. We reverse the chancellor's decision that Richardson is estopped, because of unclean hands, from seeking to disinherit the Corneses and remand the matter for a hearing on the merits of Richardson's allegations that Virgil Cornes, Jr. did not acknowledge and support Kela during her lifetime. We also reverse and remand the chancellor's decision awarding Richardson $40,000 in administratrix's fees, as we find this amount excessive and not made in accordance with the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. We do not find that the amount of attorney's fees awarded is necessarily excessive. However, we reverse and remand the attorney's fee award because we find it, like the administratrix's fee award, was not made in accordance with the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. Both awards are remanded to the chancellor for further consideration in accordance with the appropriate rule, provided that Richardson presents proper documentation.
FACTS
¶ 5. On August 8, 1996, Richardson filed, in the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, a sworn petition for grant of letters of administra tion upon the estate of Kela Richardson, who died intestate on January 29, 1996. In her petition for grant of letters of administration, Richardson alleged, inter alia, that "[u]pon information and belief, Kela Richardson left surviving her the following heirs at law and next of kin: Bernice Richardson, mother; Virgil Carnes, father; Chrysanthemum Richardson, sister; Nathan P. White, brother; and Kamia White, sister." Richardson asked to be appointed administratrix of Kela's estate.
¶ 6. Letters of administration were granted to Richardson as requested. Thereafter, she filed and successfully pursued a wrongful death claim against the physician and other medical care providers who provided treatment to Kela prior to her death.
¶ 7. The next relevant pleading filed by Richardson was the petition to determine Kela's lawful heirs. This petition was filed on August 11, 2000. In this petition, Richardson alleged the following:
The decedent, Kela Richardson, was survived by the following heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiary, [sic] under Mississippi's Wrongful Death Act set forth in Mississippi Code Ann. Section 11-7-13 (Cum.Supp.1992): Bernice Richardson, mother; Virgil Cornes Jr., father; Chrysanthemum Richardson, sister; Nathan P. White, a minor brother; Kamie White, a minor sister; Virgil Cornes, III, a minor brother; Julian Cornes, a minor brother and Jerome Cornes, a brother.
¶ 8. The third pleading filed by Richardson was the petition to settle the claim of the estate and the claim of the wrongful death beneficiaries. In this petition, Richardson alleged that:
[A]t the time of [Kela's] death, she was survived by the following heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries under the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute, [sic] 11-7-13 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972): Petitioner; her father, Virgil Cornes, Jr.; her sister, Chrysanthemum Venquil Richardson; her brother, Jerome Cornes; her brother, Julian Cornes; her brother, Nathan Duwell White; her sister, Kamica White; and, her brother Virgil Cornes III. They have been declared wrongful death beneficiaries by separate order of the court.
¶ 9. The final relevant pleading filed by Richardson was a petition in which she sought to prevent the Corneses from receiving a share of the wrongful death proceeds realized as a result of Kela's death. Richardson denominated the pleading "Petition for Determination of Heirs at Law and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and to Disinherit Natural Father and His Kindred." In paragraph 4 of this pleading, Richardson alleged the following:
The decedent, Kela Richardson, was survived by the following heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries, under Mississippi's Wrongful Death Act [sic] set forth in Mississippi Code Ann. Section 11-7-13 (Cum.Supp.1992): Bernice Richardson, mother, 1301 Church Street, Apt. 28, Shelby, Bolivar County, Mississippi and Virgil Cornes Jr., father; 1020 Quail Wood Drive, Fayetteville, North Carolina 28314; Nathan White, a minor, brother; Kamica White, a minor, sister; and Chrysanthemum Richardson, a sister of 1301 Church Street, Apt. 28, Shelby, Bolivar County, Mississippi; Virgil Cornes, III, a minor brother, 1020 Quail Wood Drive, Fayetteville, North Carolina 28314; Jerome Cornes, a brother; and Julian Cornes, a brother of Saarpsalzstr # 126, Hamburg, Germany.
¶ 10. After listing Kela's heirs at law, which list included the Corneses, Richardson set forth her reasons for asserting that the Corneses should not take a share of the wrongful death proceeds, stemming from Kela's death, even though Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father. The reasons, as laid out by Richardson in her petition, are set forth in the following paragraphs:
8. After petitioner learned that she, [sic] was pregnant in January 1973, Virgil Cornes, Jr. who was then in the United States military [sic] abandoned her and had no further contact and/or communications with petitioner.
9. During her pregnancy, Virgil Cornes, Jr. provided no financial or emotional support to petitioner. After Kela Richardson's birth, Virgil Cornes, Jr. visited with Kela Richardson on two occasions. On the first occasion Virgil Cornes, Jr. ever saw Kela Richardson, she was two and a half years old. The next time Virgil Cornes, Jr. saw Kela Richardson she was four to five years old. Virgil Cornes, Jr. did not see Kela Richardson again until 1991. After the 1991 visit, Virgil Cornes, Jr. never saw Kela Richardson again before her death on January 29,1996.
10. Virgil Cornes, Jr. never financially or emotionally supported or acknowledged Kela Richardson as his child and to date has never paid any of her medical or hospital bills related to the prenatal care, labor and delivery treatment rendered to Kela Richardson and necessitated by her birth.
11. Virgil Cornes, Jr. deserted petitioner during her pregnancy and provided no emotional or financial support to petitioner during the pregnancy. Virgil Cornes, Jr. had no communication with petitioner during her pregnancy, during Kela Richardson's life or after the death of Kela Richardson on January 29, 1996.
12. Virgil Cornes, Jr. did attend Kela Richardson's funeral and paid $300 toward the Hank Byas funeral bill which amounted [to] $3,619.
13. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Section 91 — 1—15(3) (d) (i) (1994), Virgil Cornes, Jr. and his natural kindred Virgil Cornes, III, Julian Cornes, Jerome Cornes, are precluded from inheriting from Kela Richardson. Virgil Cornes, Jr. did not openly treat Kela Richardson as his child and refused or neglected to support the child in anyway. Neither Virgil Cornes, Jr. nor his kindred are entitled as a matter of fact or law to inherit from Kela Richardson.
14. Virgil Cornes, Jr. should not be allowed to receive an economic windfall simply because he impregnated petitioner. Virgil Cornes, Jr. refused to openly treat Kela Richardson as his daughter or to comply with his duty to provide essential support, and he and his kindred should be prohibited from receiving an inheritance.
¶ 11. Pursuant to Richardson's first petition to determine Kela's heirs, the chancellor issued an order in which he found that Kela's lawful heirs and beneficiaries under Mississippi's Wrongful Death Act were Richardson, her children, and the Corneses.
¶ 12. In the order granting authority to settle the claim of the estate, Richardson was authorized to pay "any and all attorney's fees and expenses and satisfy all liens on the estate" and to distribute the remainder of the wrongful death proceeds to the heirs and beneficiaries as determined in the order entered pursuant to the first petition to determine Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries.
¶ 13. Ultimately, the chancellor authorized payment of administratrix's fees in the amount of $40,000 and attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $5,496.61. It is the award of these fees that forms the basis of the Corneses's cross-appeal.
¶ 14. After Richardson filed her petition to disinherit the Corneses, the Corneses responded three months later by filing a petition to enforce the court's prior orders, including the order authorizing distribution of the remainder of the wrongful death proceeds. Thereafter, the chancellor issued an order pursuant to the Corneses's petition for enforcement of the court's prior orders. In this order, the chancellor acknowledged that his prior order determining Kela's heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries was not a final judgment. However, the chancellor held in paragraph 11 of his order:
That the Administratrix [sic] is prohibited, based on the clean hands doctrine and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from maintaining her Petition to Disinherit because the Administratrix [sic] has made numerous sworn statements that the Cornes [sic] are heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent [sic] to this Court and the Court has found them in fact to be heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent, and the Administratrix [sic] cannot now make another sworn statement contrary to her prior sworn statements and receive a benefit to the detriment of the Cornes [sic].
¶ 15. It is from this order that Richardson prosecutes her appeal.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶ 16. This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when those findings are supported by substantial evidence, unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Denson v. George, 642 So.2d 909, 913 (Miss.1994).
1. Whether Richardson is Estopped from Seeking to Disinherit the Corneses
¶ 17. By statute, the father of an illegitimate child, and his kindred, may not inherit from the illegitimate child unless the father acknowledged and supported the child during the child's lifetime.
¶ 18. The relevant statute is Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-1-15(3)(a)-(d) (Rev.1994) which reads as follows:
(3) An illegitimate shall inherit from and through the illegitimate's natural father and his kindred, and the natural father of an illegitimate and his kindred shall inherit from and through the illegitimate according to the statutes of descent and distribution if:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before the birth of the child, even though the marriage was subsequently declared null and void or dissolved by a court; or
(b) There has been an adjudication of paternity or legitimacy before the death of the intestate; or
(c) There has been an adjudication of paternity after the death of the intestate, based upon clear and convincing evidence, in an heirship proceeding under sections 91-1-27 and 91-1-29. However, no such claim of inheritance shall be recognized unless the action seeking an adjudication of paternity is filed within one (1) year after the death of the intestate or within ninety (90) days after the first publication of notice to creditors to present their claims, whichever is less; and such time period shall run notwithstanding the minority of a child,...
• (d) The natural father of an illegitimate and his kindred shall not inherit:
(i) From or through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused or neglected to support the child.
¶ 19. Before filing her petition to disinherit the Corneses, Richardson had not stated in any prior pleading or action that Virgil Comes, Jr. had openly treated and supported Kela as his child nor had she waived the provisions of section 91-1-15(3)(d), thereby entitling him, and his kindred, to inherit from Kela.
¶ 20. It seems to us that the legislature, by enacting subsection 3(d) of section 91-1-15, made a public policy decision that the father of an illegitimate child may not receive the benefit of inheritance from the child unless, during the lifetime' of the child, he had stepped up to the plate and shouldered his responsibility toward the child. In the statutory scheme providing for the right of inheritance by the father of an illegitimate child, the legislature constructed a two-prong standard that must be met.
¶21. First, the biological father must prove that he is in fact the father of the illegitimate. As proof, he may show (1) that he and the mother of the illegitimate participated in a marriage ceremony before the birth of the child, (2) that there has been an adjudication of paternity or legitimacy before the death of the intestate, or (3) that there has been an adjudication of paternity after the death of the intestate, based upon clear and convincing evidence, in an heirship proceeding under sections 91-1-27 and 91-1-29. Miss.Code Ann. § 91 — 1—15(3)(a)(b)(c) (Rev.1994). An action seeking an adjudication of paternity must be timely filed, i.e., within one year after the death of the intestate or within ninety days after the first publication of notice to creditors, whichever-is less. Id.
¶ 22. Second, the father must prove that he acknowledged and supported the illegitimate during the illegitimate's lifetime. Miss.Code Ann. § 91 — 1—15(3)(d) (Rev.1994). Timely proof of the first prong may make the father an heir, in a general sense, of the intestate, but he does not become an heir entitled to inherit from the illegitimate intestate until he offers satisfactory proof of the second prong.
123. In the absence of a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous waiver of the requirements of section 91 — 1— 15(3)(a)(b)(c) and (d) by the maternal heirs of an illegitimate child, we think the natural father, who has not fulfilled his obligations to acknowledge and support the child during the child's lifetime, is prevented from enjoying the benefits of inheritance. We are not persuaded that Richardson's listing the Corneses as heirs and beneficiaries in her earlier pleadings operates as a waiver of this prohibition.
¶ 24. In our view, Richardson's prior pleading that the Corneses were heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries of Kela does not mean that she was saying, in the same breath, that she waived the statutory requirement that Virgil Cones, Jr. prove his and his children's entitlement to inherit from Kela. Further, we find that Richardson was required to list all known potential heirs of Kela's estate. Therefore, Richardson had no other alternative but to list the Corneses as persons who fell in the heirship category because she, as Kela's natural mother, certainly knew the identity of Kela's natural father. Perhaps, it would have been better if she had stated simply that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father rather than stating that he and his children ' were heirs. Had she used the term "father" instead of "heir," would it now be contended that she, by use of that descriptive term in stating Virgil Cornes's relationship to Kela, had also waived the requirement that the Corneses prove their right to inherit from Kela? We think not. Although Richardson was represented by an attorney, there is no reason to assume that she was using the word "heir" as a term of art when she filed her pleadings.
¶ 25. It seems to us that at most, Richardson's admission in her pleadings — that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father and heir — only dispensed with the requirement that he prove paternity. As already noted, she said nothing about Virgil Cornes, Jr.'s acknowledgment and support of Kela which is the subject matter of the second prong. Requiring the natural father of an illegitimate child to acknowledge and support his illegitimate child during the child's lifetime or be barred from inheriting from the child serves an important public policy. It should not lightly be cast aside.
¶ 26. Before one is deemed to have waived a valuable right, it ought to be clear, beyond doubt, that a waiver was intended. As a minimal, a waiver should never be found where the specific matter which is alleged to have been waived is not contained on the face of the pleading which allegedly constitutes the waiver. This would appear to be especially true in notice pleading jurisdictions such as ours. Therefore, since Richardson never specifically stated, nor otherwise clearly indicated, that she waived the statutory requirement that Virgil Cornes, Jr. prove his worthiness to inherit from Kela, we do not find that a waiver occurred here.
¶ 27. Moreover, even if there were a waiver by Richardson, it, in our judgment, would only be enforceable against her. We do not believe she could waive any portion of her children's right of inheritance. By his action, the chancellor effectively cut off a portion of Kela's maternal siblings' right of inheritance who, beyond question, did not file anything or take any action which could even arguably be considered a waiver of their rights.
¶ 28. As we stated during the recitation of facts, the chancellor, in his order, stated that he was relying upon two doctrines, unclean hands and collateral estoppel, in determining that Richardson could not seek to disinherit the Corneses. In the chancellor's view, Richardson
[had] made numerous sworn statements that the Cornes [sic] are heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent [sic] to this Court and the Court has found them in fact to be heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of the Decedent, and the Administratrix [sic] cannot now make another sworn statement contrary to her prior sworn statements and receive a benefit to the detriment of the Cornes [sic].
¶ 29. Clearly, the chancellor was incorrect if in fact he was relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel inasmuch as none of the prior orders which had been entered by the chancellor pursuant to the various pleadings filed by Richardson were final judgments. We accept that he meant equitable estoppel since that is what he said during the hearing on Richardson's motion. However, we find that his reliance upon equitable estoppel, as well as upon the unclean hands doctrine, to be misplaced.
¶ 30. The chancellor's finding that Richardson's hands were unclean is not supported by the evidence and is clearly erroneous. We do not believe that the exercise of a statutory right, without more, can be the basis for sustaining a charge of unclean hands. Nor do we believe that the unclean hands defense is strengthened by the fact that Richardson's action caused or permitted an initial order to be entered adjudicating the Corneses, Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries. The initial order was clearly an interlocutory order, subject to modification at any time before the final judgment was entered.
¶ 31. We further find that the chancellor was not warranted in finding that Richardson's petition to disinherit the Corneses constituted a "sworn statement contrary to her prior sworn statements." Although Richardson did file several pleadings in which she asserted that the Corneses were Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries, as we have already discussed, she did not back away from or contradict this assertion in her petition to disinherit the Corneses, nor did she ever contradict her earlier assertions that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father. What she did in the petition to disinherit was to add an explanation as to why the Corneses were not entitled to inherit from Kela. She had not asserted, in any of her prior pleadings, that Virgil Cornes, Jr. had acknowledged and supported Kela during Kela's lifetime and was thereby entitled to inherit from her. Further, it is evident that Richardson's statement that Virgil's children were Kela's heirs was predicated solely on her admission that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's biological father. As we have already noted, we find no reason to believe that Richardson, in her earlier pleadings, was using the word "heir" as a term of art rather than in the general sense of the meaning of the word.
¶ 32. The chancellor also observed that Richardson's action in filing the petition to disinherit the Corneses was designed to benefit her to the detriment of the Corneses; therefore, she was equitably estopped. We do not follow the chancellor's reasoning in this regard. There is nothing in the record to support the notion that the Corneses gave up anything of value in exchange for Richardson's agreeing not to oppose their right to receive an heir's share of the wrongful death proceeds. Therefore, the question must be asked: what detriment did the Corneses suffer as a result of Richardson's actions. What did they give up and subsequently lose as a result of Richardson's actions? The answer is nothing.
¶ 33. Richardson's pleading that the Corneses were heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries was the result of her fiduciary obligation to list all known or possible heirs of Kela. Nothing that the Corneses did was responsible for Richardson's averment that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's natural father. But more importantly, the Corneses possessed the same right after Richardson's attempt to disinherit them as they did before her attempt to do so. Nothing prevented them then, nor does anything prevent them now, from proving that Virgil Cornes, Jr. acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime. Richardson's petition to disinherit the Corneses does not alter this fact.
¶ 34. For sure, if Richardson were successful in disinheriting the Corneses, that would be to their detriment, but that circumstance would not be brought about as a result of a changed position by Richardson because she never stated that Virgil Cornes, Jr. acknowledged and supported Kela, and was thereby entitled to inherit from her. It would be Virgil Cornes, Jr.'s failure to prove that he acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime which would cause his and his children's detriment. Richardson's actions would have contributed in no way to this result. The result would emanate solely from Virgil Cornes, Jr.'s own dereliction of his parental obligations to Kela.
¶ 35. While we appreciate the importance of the fact that Richardson did not alert the chancellor — during any of the pleadings which she filed prior to filing her petition to disinherit the Corneses — that there was or would be a dispute regarding the Corneses's right to inherit from Kela, and that Richardson's failure to do so resulted in an order being entered that adjudicated the Corneses Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries, we are not persuaded, for three reasons, that this omission rises to the level of unclean hands. First, she was not required to divulge her trial strategy if indeed that is what it was. Second, she had a statutory right, in the absent of a clear, unambiguous and unequivocal waiver, to insist on a showing that Virgil Cornes, Jr. had met the statutory prerequisite for inheriting from Kela. Third, the Corneses have not suffered a detriment as a result of Richardson's actions, unless their having to prove that Virgil Cornes, Jr. acknowledged and supported Kela during her lifetime is considered a detriment. If this can be considered a detriment, we are satisfied that it is not the kind of detriment that will support the imposition of equitable estop-pel, for nothing Richardson has done will prevent Virgil Cornes, Jr. from making the proof necessary to ensure his entitlement to inherit.
¶36. Although it is perhaps implicit in our discussion, regarding equitable estoppel, that we likewise do not find judicial estoppel applicable to our facts, we make clear that is the case. The dissent, citing Dockins v. Allred, 849 So.2d 151, 155 (¶ 8) (Miss.2003) correctly notes that "judicial estoppel precludes a party from asserting a position, benefitting from that position, and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating from that position later in litigation." Even if we were to accept that Richardson made prior inconsistent statements, there is no showing that she received a benefit from any of her prior statements which she now seeks to abandon to the detriment of the Corneses. In fact, her earlier statements would result in a detriment, not a benefit, to her. "[Wjhen the party making the prior statement, which is inconsistent with his position in the present action has not benefitted by the assertion, the doctrine should not be applied." Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Miss.1979.)
2. Whether the Chancellor Erred in Allowing Administratrix and Attorney's Fees
¶ 37. In their cross-appeal, the Corneses recognize and admit that an award of administratrix's and attorney's fees is a matter vested and left to the sound discretion of the chancellor. In Re Estate of Thomas, 740 So.2d 332 (Miss.App.1999). They argue that Richardson supplied "no evidence as to the reasonableness of her fees" and that her attorney did not submit supporting documentation to justify his fee. In other words, the Corneses argue that the chancellor erred in awarding the administratrix's and attorney's fees because "he made no inquiry as to the reasonableness of the fees." Citing In Re: Estate of Johnson, 735 So.2d 231, 236 (¶ 25) (Miss.1999), the Corneses argue that the matter of the fees should be remanded to the chancellor "for a hearing on the reasonableness of the administratrix's and attorney's fees." We have reviewed the record, and we agree with the Corneses on this issue. Therefore, we reverse and remand the matter of the administratrix's and attorney's fees for further consideration in accordance with established precedent and the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. See Unif. Ch. Ct. R. 6.11 and 6.12.
¶ 38. The dissent, noting that we have focused on whether Richardson waived or had the authority to waive the requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated Sec tion 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) (Rev.1994)," states (1) that "[w]aiver was not considered by the chancellor," (2) that neither the facts nor the law supports our conclusion, and (3) that we "should not sanction, indeed reward, a litigants's deception."
¶ 39. We acknowledge that neither waiver nor judicial estoppel was mentioned or discussed by the chancellor, yet we find nothing inappropriate with our discussing waiver, or the dissent's discussing judicial estoppel, if we determine that the two concepts have a bearing upon the proper resolution of the issue before us.
¶ 40. We construe the basis of the chancellor's ruling, as indicated by the wording of paragraph 11, to be the unclean hands doctrine and equitable estoppel. We note that the chancellor was concerned about "the detriment to the Corneses." If he intended judicial estoppel, there would have been no need to mention detriment to the Corneses, for a finding that one of the parties has suffered a detriment is not a prerequisite to the imposition of judicial estoppel.
¶ 41. In his bench opinion, the chancellor stated:
The court is concerned, however, since this ruling is based upon equity, primarily equitable estoppel, and the unclean hands doctrine, a maximum [sic] equity which predates just about all of our law, old English law, the Court is concerned, however, that based upon the petition that was subsequently filed by Mrs. Richardson as the administratrix of the estate to determine heirs and to disinherit Virgil Cornes, Jr., as being the father of Kela Richardson as to whether or not Virgil Cornes, Jr.; Virgil Cornes, II; and the other two Cornes sibling are entitled to an equal share of the proceeds from this wrongful death settlement.
¶ 42. The chancellor could not have been clearer that equitable estoppel and the unclean hands doctrine were the basis for his ruling. It is also clear that the chancellor believed that Richardson's petition to disinherit the Corneses had merit. It is perhaps significant that the chancellor framed Richardson's petition as being one "to disinherit Virgil Cornes, Jr., as being the father of Kela Richardson." That is not what the petition says. Richardson has never wavered in any of her pleadings, even the petition to disinherit, on her statement that Virgil Cornes, Jr. was Kela's father. It may be that the chancellor failed to discern the difference between an assertion that Virgil Cornes, Jr. is an heir because he is Kela's biological father and an assertion that Virgil Cornes, Jr. is an heir who is not entitled to inherit because he shirked his natural and statutory responsibility.
¶ 43. We have found no authority supporting the notion that Richardson's actions should bind her children, Chrysanthemum Richardson, Nathan P. White and Kamia White. Yet, our adopting the dissents's view would compel this result. As we have already stated, these persons are heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries from Kela's maternal side. Should they be estopped from seeking to disinherit the Corneses? They never filed anything asserting that the Corneses were Kela's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries.
¶ 44. Finally, we note that the dissent— in suggesting that this Court reverse and render on the issue of fees because no supporting documentation was attached to the applications for fees and because the chancellor failed to consider the required factors — argues for a result that even the Corneses do not seek. Were this Court to embrace this suggestion, any finding that a chancellor failed to follow the proper factors in an award of child support, alimony, or the equitable distribution of marital property, would of necessity, cause the right to be forever lost. That is not the law, nor should it be the law.
CONCLUSION
¶ 45. The decision of the chancellor finding that Richardson is estopped from pursuing her petition to disinherit Virgil Cornes, Jr. and his children is reversed and rendered, and this case is remanded to the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County for a full hearing on the merits of Richardson's petition to disinherit. If on remand Richardson can show that Virgil Cornes, Jr. did not openly treat Kela Richardson as his child and refused or neglected to support her during her lifetime, then the chancellor shall enter an order disinheriting Virgil Cornes, Jr. and his children from participating in the wrongful death proceeds emanating from the settlement of the wrongful death lawsuit. On the other hand, if she fails to meet her burden of proof in establishing that Virgil Cornes, Jr. did not openly treat Kela Richardson as his, and refused or neglected to support Kela during Kela's lifetime, then an order shall be entered adjudging that Virgil Cornes, Jr. and his children be included in the denomination of Kela Richardson's heirs who are entitled to inherit from her.
¶ 46. As we find that Richardson has clearly admitted that Virgil Cornes, Jr. is Kela's natural father, the necessity to prove paternity is dispensed with notwithstanding the fact that Virgil Cornes, Jr. never instituted a paternity action as required by section 91-1-15(c) of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended.
¶ 47. The matter of the administratrix's and attorney's fees is remanded for a hearing on the reasonableness of the fees requested.
¶ 48. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF BOLIVAR COUNTY IS REVERSED ON BOTH DIRECT AND CROSS-APPEAL AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED ONE-HALF TO THE APPELLANT AND ONE-HALF TO THE APPELLEES.
KING, C.J., THOMAS, LEE, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., AND MYERS, J.
. Bernice Richardson and Virgil Comes, Jr. were never married. Virgil's surname is spelled "Carnes" in the petition for letters of administration. Elsewhere it is spelled "Cornes" and sometimes the "Jr." is omitted. We spell it as it appears in the various documents.
. Virgil Cornes's children were listed as heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries in only two of the previously-filed pleadings.
. Kamia's name is also spelled in the record as "Kamie" or "Kamica." We spell it as it appears in the various documents.