Case Name: Gail PERSAN, et al, Appellant, v. LIFE CONCEPTS, INC. etc., et al, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-08-06
Citations: 738 So. 2d 1008
Docket Number: No. 98-199
Parties: Gail PERSAN, et al, Appellant, v. LIFE CONCEPTS, INC. etc., et al, Appellee.
Judges: THOMPSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 738
Pages: 1008–1014

Head Matter:
Gail PERSAN, et al, Appellant, v. LIFE CONCEPTS, INC. etc., et al, Appellee.
No. 98-199.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 6, 1999.
Michael J. Bittman and Aristides J. Diaz, of Rosenbluth, Losey, Bittman, Morse & Keidaish, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants, Gail Persan, Steven G. Buchbin-der and Terry Perrott.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant, State of Florida.
James V. Etscorn, Robert W. Thielhelm, Jr., and Deborah E. Muntwyler, of Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Orlando, for Appellees.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, J.
Appellants, Gail Persan, et al., timely appeal a final judgment of involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiffs case in a non-jury trial. We affirm.
The action was filed on behalf of disadvantaged adults who claim to be beneficiaries of a charitable or resulting trust created when donors contributed property and funds in 1979 to the Central Florida Sheltered Workshop, Inc. ["CFSW"] to be used to construct living facilities for them. The homes were operated for almost fifteen years until the decision was made to close them and sell the property. The defendant, Life Concepts, Inc., d/b/a Quest, Inc., the entity that closed the group homes, is the successor to CFSW.
In 1979, William Demetree and some twenty partners donated twenty-four acres to CFSW. Demetree, who had a handicapped son, testified that he and his partners donated the parcel:
[T]o build some homes there so their clients or the people who went to Cen tral Florida Workshop would have a place to go and maybe raise some . do some gardening, or what have you, and have a place to stay, and the parents would come and help on the weekend and relieve the people in charge. And that's what they did do.
CFSW solicited over $200,000 from the community to raise the additional costs of construction of the homes. The day-to-day operation of the homes was paid for by the residents' social security checks and payments made by their parents.
Although we may agree that it is regrettable that the homes will not continue to operate as residences for the disabled plaintiffs, there is no merit to the plaintiffs' suit and the lower court correctly entered a judgment of dismissal after trial. The lower court found that the donations had been made for a specific purpose but that no trust was proved. The dissent finds this to be inconsistent but it is not. Making a gift to a charity for a specific project or purpose does not create a charitable trust. For this court to suggest that it does would create havoc for charitable institutions. A charity has to be able to know when a donation is a gift and when it is merely an offer to fund a trust for which the charity is taking on fiduciary responsibilities. The creation of such a trust must be express. Besides, as the lower court noted, the object oí the gift was carried out — the two homes were built and were operated for almost fifteen years.
We reject appellant's contention that the lower court erred in not finding the existence of a resulting trust, as a matter of law. The evidentiary burden to prove a resulting trust is "clear, strong and unequivocal," beyond a reasonable doubt. Harnish v. Peele, 386 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). No evidence of any intent to create any type of trust is present. There is only an intent to donate land, and money for the homes to be established. CFSW's plan to make the homes "permanent" does not convert the gift into a trust.
Although the land for these homes was donated by Mr. Demetree and many other persons, and the funds for construction were solicited from the public, only Mr. Demetree testified:
Mr. Etscorn: Sir, in your professional career, you've created trusts before, have you not?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And you've done that on at least ten occasions, have you not?
Mr. Demetree: I don't know how many, but I've done some trusts.
Mr. Etscorn: Actually, more than ten, isn't it?
Mr. Demetree: I can't stop and count at the moment.
Mr. Etscorn: Okay. When you intend to hold land in a trust, you give it to a trust, do you not?
Mr. Demetree: Yes.
Mr. Etscorn: In this case, however, you did not do that; isn't that correct?
Mr. Demetree: We gave them land, gave them a deed to it.
Mr. Etscorn: Did not give it in trust?
Mr. Demetree: No, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And didn't intend it to be a trust, correct?
Mr. Demetree: Well, the intention was for it to stay there and be used for that. It was not written out as a trust, but I guess the trust was the trust, the trust between people and parties; that if you give them something, they will use it for that.
Mr. Etscorn: Prior to 1979, sir, you've been a trustee or co-trustee on several pieces of property, haven't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: Now, you gave property to Boys Town right next-door to CFSW Group Home; correct?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: You gave that property in fee simple, didn't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yeah. Yes.
Mr. Etscorn: Now, the property you have to CFSW, pursuant to the deed here, you gave that as a gift, didn't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And the deed that you gave that's been identified previously was not given with any conditions; correct?
Mr. Demetree: That's correct.
Mr. Etscorn: And when you signed this deed, when you went to execute it, you read the deed, didn't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And the deed was clear when you executed it, wasn't it?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And you understood the deed at the time that you executed it, didn't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: In fact, there are no restrictions whatever in this deed, are there?
Mr. Demetree: There are no restrictions in the deed.
Mr. Etscorn: And there are no possible rights of reverter in the deed; correct?
Mr. Demetree: That's correct. I mean I'm not an attorney, but that's what the law says.
Mr. Etscorn: You know what a right of reverter is, don't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And there is none here?
Mr. Demetree: No, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: There are no conditions subsequent cited in the deed, are there?
Mr. Demetree: No, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: Now, Tom Ball, the person that you indicated drafted this deed, did I understand you correctly to say that you spoke to him?
Mr. Demetree: Yes.
Mr. Etscorn: Okay. However, you never told Mr. Ball, did you, sir, prior to the time that you executed that deed, that there was supposed to be any language in this deed holding the property in trust; is that correct?
Mr. Demetree: That's correct.
Mr. Etscorn: Now with respect to this donation of land, you took a tax deduction, didn't you?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And you know that if you had a possible right of reverter coming back to you that the IRS might come back to you with that, wouldn't they?
Mr. Demetree: I presume they would. I don't know that now, I'm not — I won't start talking about Internal Revenue laws, but we did take a deduction, to answer your question.
Mr. Etscorn: And you did that because you intended this as a gift; correct?
Mr. Demetree: Yes, sir.
Mr. Etscorn: And at no time prior to executing this deed to CFSW, did you ever speak to anyone at CFSW and say, I would like you to act as a trustee for this land; correct?
Mr. Demetree: That's correct.
Even if any evidence of an intent to create a trust could be found in this record, the lower court, which is the factfinder charged with weighing the evidence, found that a trust was not proved. Our standard of review is limited to ascertaining whether no one could not find the evidence was clear, strong, unequivocal, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780, 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 625 (Fla.1994). The dissent's disagreement "that the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence tending to prove a resulting charitable trust" falls far short of the threshold for reversal of the lower court's evaluation that the evidence was too weak to support a verdict for the plaintiffs.
As for the question of whether a charitable trust has to be in writing, appellees rely on section 737.501(6) and section 689.05, Florida Statutes (1997). Reading Part V of Chapter 737 yields no clear answer. Some portions of it do appear to limit its application to private foundation trusts and split interest trusts, but other subsections suggest the opposite. See § 737.501(6), § 737.502, .506-.08. Section 689.05 does make clear, however, that creation of a trust in land must be in writing and signed by the party creating the trust. There is only the limited exception where the trust results "by construction of law."
There is no "construction of law" that will create a "resulting trust" in favor of these disabled persons. A resulting trust is a reversionary, equitable interest that arises under circumstances which raise the unrebutted inference that the transferor does not intend the one who receives the property to have the beneficial interest. It is called a "resulting trust" because the conveyance to the transferee is deemed incomplete in that the beneficial interest in equity cannot go to him. A resulting trust most commonly covers a situation where one person supplies the funds to another to purchase land on his behalf. Here, there were no funds given to purchase land from a third party. The transferor owned the land and then conveyed it free and clear to CFSW. This cannot be a resulting trust:
A fundamentally different situation is presented, however, when an owner of property transfers it directly to another without declaring a trust and without other manifestation of intention concerning beneficial enjoyment. In these facts there is no inference that the transferee holds the property on resulting trust even though the transfer is gratuitous. Instead, the inference is that the trans-feror in such a case intends to make a gift to the transferee,
Restatement (Third) of the Law: Trusts § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). Here, there is no "implication of law" that excuses the failure to follow the formalities required by section 689.05 for creation of a trust.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The dissent says it is clear that the trust in question is not a split interest trust but, as described in the dissenting opinion, the hypothetical trust sounds exactly like a split interest trust, i.e., the trust is to exist for the benefit of identified children of the donors until their death and then be used for public charitable purposes.
. Precisely because a resulting trust protects a transferor of property whose disposition of the property is incomplete or the payor of the purchase price who is supposed to get the title but does not, the creation of a "resulting trust" in favor of the third party disabled tenants of the home appears to be a legal impossibility.