Case Name: LESTER v. OTIS ELEVATOR CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-06-21
Citations: 153 N.Y.S. 1058
Docket Number: 
Parties: LESTER v. OTIS ELEVATOR CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 153
Pages: 1058–1066

Head Matter:
LESTER v. OTIS ELEVATOR CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.
June 21, 1915.)
Master and Servant <@^>250%, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series—Injuries .to . Servants—Workmen’s Compensation Law—-Effect of.
Workmen’s Compensation Law (Laws 1914, c. 41) § 10, declares that' every employer, subject to the provisions of the chapter, shall compensate for injuries, though caused by a third person. Section 11 declares that the liability under the preceding section shall be exclusive, except that if the employer fails to comply with the statute, the injured employe may claim compensation under the act or sue for damages, in which case the defendant cannot avail himself of the defenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk or contributory negligence. Section 29 declares that if a workman entitled to compensation under the chapter shall be injured or killed by the negligence of another, not in the same employ, such workman, or in case of death, his dependents, may elect whether to take compensation under the chapter or pursue his remedy against the third person, that if he elect to take compensation under the chapter, the right of action against the third person shall be assigned to the state for the benefit of the insurance fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, otherwise to the person liable for such compensation, and that if the workman proceed against the third person, the state insurance fund or person liable shall contribute only to the deficiency, if any, between the recovery and the compensation provided. Plaintiff, who was engaged in an extrahazardous occupation, and whose employer had complied with the provisions of the act, was injured through the negligence of defendant, a third person. Held, that the provision that the remedy prescribed by the act should be exclusive applied only to actions by a workman against the master; hence the failure of plaintiff to make the election required was no defense to an action against defendant, although it will preclude plaintiff from claiming any deficiency from the state insurance fund, etc.
Whitaker, J., dissenting.
<gzs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fourth District.
Action by William Lester against the Otis Elevator Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
' Argued May term, 1915, before GUY, LEHMAN, and WHITAKER, JJ.
Bertrand L. Pettigrew, of New York City (Walter L. Glenney, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Edgar Weaver, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
GUY, J.
In this action to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, an employé of Bing & Bing, in the course of his employment, arising out of what may be termed common-law negligence, judgment has been rendered in his favor against the defendant, Otis Elevator Company.
The work done by the plaintiff was hazardous employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his employers, when the action was brought, had complied with all the requirements of the act as to providing insurance for their employes. Section 29 of the statute is as follows:
"If a workman entitled to compensation under this chapter be injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured workman, or in case of death, his dependents, shall, before any suit or claim under this chapter, elect whether to take compensation under this chapter or to pursue his remedy against such other. Such election shall be 'evidenced in such manner as the Commission may by rule or regulation prescribe. If he elect to take compensation under this chapter, the cause of action against such other shall be assigned to the state for the benefit of the state insurance fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, and otherwise to the person or corporation liable for' the payment of such compensation, and if he elect to proceed against such other, the state insurance fund, person or association or corporation, as the case may be, shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, between the amount of the recovery against such other person actually collected, and the compensation provided or estimated by this chapter for such case. Such a cause of action assigned to the state may be prosecuted or compromised by the Commission. A compromise of any such cause of action by the workman or his dependents at an amount less than the compensation provided for by this chapter shall be made only with the written approval of the Commission, -if the deficiency of compensation would be payable from the state insurance fund, and otherwise with me written approval of the person, association or corporation liable to pay the same."
Prior to the commencement of this action the Commission had, by suitable rules and regulations, ordained the manner in which the election provided for in the foregoing section should be exercised; but the plaintiff brought suit without making the prescribed election, and the appellant claims that his failure to comply with the statute in this respect is fatal to the judgment.
Under section 10 the employers were required to compensate for the injuries, even though caused by a third party, and section 11 provides that the liability prescribed by section 10 "shall be exclusive," except that if the employer fails to comply with the statute the injured employé or his representatives may "elect to claim compensation" under the act or to maintain an action for damages on account of the injury, in which action the defendant cannot avail himself of the defenses that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employe assumed the risk of his employment, or that the injury was due to his contributory negligence. Although section 11 states that the liability prescribed by the statute shall be exclusive, I am of the opinion that this refers solely to the liability of the employer, and that the act does not prevent an injured employe such as the plaintiff from seeking redress in a common-law action as against third parties causing his injuries.
A consideration of all the provisions of section 29 in connection with other parts of the act indicates that to carry out the scheme.of subrogation provided for in that section, the "suit" referred to therein is any suit, whether pursuant to the act or otherwise; that an employé sustaining injuries in the course of his employment through the acts or defaults of a party other than his employer, and suing such party, is required to make and signify his election in accordance with the statute and the rules and regulations of the Commission as a condition precedent to the collection through the Commission of any deficiency between the recovery in the action and the compensation provided for by the act; that, no such election having been made by the plaintiff, he has no right to such deficiency, if any, but that the failure to make the prescribed election in no way affects the judgment appealed from, which should be affirmed with costs.
Judgment affirmed with costs, with leave to defendant to appeal to the Appellate Division.