Case Name: BECK v. McLANE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-01-06
Citations: 114 N.Y.S. 44
Docket Number: 
Parties: BECK v. McLANE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 114
Pages: 44–48

Head Matter:
BECK v. McLANE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
January 6, 1909.)
1. Crops (§ 6 ) — Deed of Land — Oral Reservation of Growing Crops fob. Third Person.
After the tenant of plaintiff’s farm had sowed rye on part of it, on an. oral agreement that half the crop was to belong to him, and that he might-harvest it after expiration of his lease, plaintiff conveyed the land to defendant, who orally agreed to respect the agreement with the tenant, and. to take care of him as respects the rye for plaintiff’s benefit. Held that, the rye being personal property and belonging to a third person, the agreement between the parties to the deed, amounting to a constructive severance of the rye, effectively reserved or excepted it.
[Ed. Note.—For other .cases, see Crops, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 6. ]
2. Subrogation (§ 11*)—Person Liable for Fault of Another.
After the tenant of plaintiff’s farm had sowed rye on it, on an oral agreement that half of it should belong to him and that he might harvest it after expiration of his lease, plaintiff conveyed the land to defendant, who orally agreed to respect the agreement with the tenant and to take care of him as respects the rye for plaintiff’s benefit. Held that, the tenant having obtained judgment against plaintiff, on defendant refusing the-rye to the tenant, plaintiff was subrogated to the tenant’s right of action against defendant for conversion.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Subrogation, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig.. § 11. ]
3. Indemnity (§ 13 )—Contract of Indemnity.
The oral agreement of defendant, on receiving a deed of a farm from plaintiff, to respect the oral agreement of plaintiff with his tenant, under which the tenant had sowed rye on the land, that half the crop should belong to the tenant, and that he might harvest it áfter expiration of his lease, was in effect one to indemnify plaintiff against the tenant’s claim, so that, defendant having refused to let the tenant remove the crop and the tenant having recovered judgment of plaintiff because thereof, plaintiff could recover over against defendant.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indemnity, Cent. Dig. §§ 29-35; Dec, Dig. § 13. ]
McLennan, P. J„ and Kruse, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Erie County.
Action, by Michael J. Beck against James McLane. From a judgment for defendant, and from an order denying a motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
M. B. Harrington, for appellant.
L. P. Hancock, for respondent.
For other eases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
On the 16th of March, 1906, the plaintiff conveyed ."his farm to the defendant; the deed containing covenants warranty. .At the time of the delivery of the conveyance the farm was in possession of a tenant, whose term was to expire on April 1st following. In -the fall preceding the tenant had sowed five acres of rye on the farm, upon an oral agreement with the plaintiff, his landlord, that one-half of the rye was to belong to him, and that he was to have the right to "harvest the same in the fall, after the expiration of his tenancy. The defendant owned a farm adjoining that of the plaintiff. He knew of -the possession of Larkin, the tenant; knew that he had sowed the rye; was informed specifically of the title of Larkin to one-half of this crop and of his right to harvest the same, and at the time of the execution of the deed expressly agreed to respect the agreement with Larkin; and the defendant understood that the deed was delivered on condition that he would take care of Larkin as to the rye for the benefit of the plaintiff. In the fall Larkin attempted to harvest the crop. The defendant, who was in possession of the farm, prevented this, asserting title in himself, and harvested it. Larkin sued the plaintiff in justice's court on his agreement, and recovered the value of the "rye. The defendant had notice of this suit and did not defend, although present at the trial. The plaintiff has now sued the defendant, setting out the facts above, recited and the judgment recovered by Larkin against him.
The rye was personal property, and the tenant became the owner by virtue of the oral agreement with his landlord. Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550, 554; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. 39, 41; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24, 10 Am. Rep. 318; Sexton v. Breese, 135 N. Y. 387, 32 N. E. 133 While growing crops ordinarily pass by a conveyance, yet slight proof is sufficient to retain their character as personal property and exempt them from the transfer. The agreement of the parties to this action was equivalent to a constructive severance of the rye, and its reservation or exception was effective, although not contained in the deed. Sherman v. Willett, 42 N. Y. 147; Banta v. Merchant, 45 App.. Div. 141, 61 N. Y. Supp. 218; Leonard v. Clough et al., 133 N. Y. 292, 297, 21 N. E. 93, 16 L. R. A. 305.
In the last case cited, Robie Clough, the defendant, conveyed a tract of land to her daughter, Mary Gilbert, reserving a small strip of the land. A barn was located on the premises, one-third of which extended on the strip reserved. The grantee stated at the time of the conveyance that the barn belonged to the grantor. Subsequent conveyances by warranty deed were made, without reservation in any of the .conveyances, although each grantee was informed that the. original
grantor owned the barn, and she all the time was in possession of it. The defendant, the grantor, moved off the barn in spite of the protest of the plaintiff, who had become vested with the title to the land, and he sued in trespass. Parol proof was received of the oral reservation of the barn, and the Court of Appeals held this was error. The court in its opinion says that the barn was real estate, like growing trees or a mine, and that, as the reservation was in favor of the grantor, it could not be- established by parol. The distinction between assertion of title based on such a reservation by a grantor and one in favor of a stranger to the conveyance is well recognized; the court saying, at page 297 of 133 N. Y. and page 94 of 31 N. E. (16 L. R. A. 305):
"If at the time of the conveyance of Mrs. Clough the barn had been personal property in the ownership of some other person, and the grantees had been notified of that fact, the title to it would not have passed by the successive conveyances. If this barn had been placed upon the lot by some third person with the consent of the owner, and with the understanding that such third person could at any time remove it, it would have remained personal property, and would not have passed to a purchaser under any form of conveyance, providing such purchaser had notice of the fact. But, where the land and the buildings thereon belong to the same person, then the buildings are a part of the real estate, and pass with it upon any conveyance thereof.''
The distinction noted obtains in the present case. The title to the rye was in Earlcin, the tenant, not plaintiff, the grantor. It was personal property, and Larkin could hold it against the defendant, who purchased with notice of the title, and also agreed to recognize it.
In Banta v. Merchant, 45 App Div. 141, 61 N. Y. Supp. 218, the defendant had sowed a crop of rye on shares. The land was sold on a judgment in an action of partition before the rye was harvested, and it was claimed that the referee on the sale reserved the rye. The court held the growing crop was personal property and that the reservation by parol was effective. The trial court in that case submitted to the jury the proposition whether the referee did in fact make such a reservation, advising the jury that, if so, a recovery could be had; otherwise, not. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial (173 N. Y. 292, 66 N. E. 13) upon the ground that the statement of the referee was too indefinite to establish a reservation or to advise the purchaser of the precise nature of the claim. The general principles above adverted to were recognized (page 296 of 173 N. Y. and page 13 of 66 N. E.).
Larkin, the tenant, might have maintained his action against the defendant for conversion. He elected to sue on the contract made with his landlord. Upon the recovery and payment of the judgment, the latter became subrogated to all the rights of his tenant.
Beyond that, the defendant agreed to take care of Larkin, either by payment or by permitting him to harvest the rye.' It was in effect an agreement to indemnify the plaintiff against Larkin's claim, which the defendant failed to do. The only purpose of the plaintiff in insisting upon the promise as a condition of the delivery of the deed was to save himself harmless. He knew his liability to Larkin, and the defendant was willing to protect him against it. At least, the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict of the jury upon the facts.
The judgment should be reversed.
Judgment and order reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide event. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissented in an opinion, and KRUSE, J., dissenting in a memorandum.