Case Name: FIRST NAT'L BANK OF MANNING v. PIERSON
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1923-05-14
Citations: 124 S.C. 327
Docket Number: No. 11227
Parties: FIRST NAT’L BANK OF MANNING v. PIERSON
Judges: Mr. ChiEE Justice Gary concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 124
Pages: 327–342

Head Matter:
No. 11227
FIRST NAT’L BANK OF MANNING v. PIERSON
(117 S. E., 542)
1. Jury — Juror’s Indebtedness to Bank Does Not Disuualify Him for Service In Case In Which Bank Is Interested. — A juror’s indebtedness to a bank does not disqualify him for service in a case that the bank is interested in per se.
'2. Appeal and Error — Jury—Dismissal of Juror Within Court’s Discretion; not Ordinarily Interfered With. — Whether a juror should be excused in a particular case is left to the discretion of the judge, which discretion .ordinarily will not be interfered with.
3. Evidence — Foreclosing Mortgage on “One Pair of Mules,” Evidence Establishing Identify Not an Attempt to Vary the Contents of the Mortgage. — In an action . to foreclose a mortgage on “one pair of mules,” wherein plaintiff has alleged right of possession of “one pair of mules,” and the Sheriff under claim and delivery has seized “one pair of mules,” the plaintiff has a right to show what mules the defendant had at the time the mortgage was taken, and testimony tending to establish the identity of the mules is admissible and competent, and not an attempt to vary the contents of the mortgage.
4- Evidence — Chattel Mortgage Containing Blanket Provision Covering Future Indebtednesses Held Not to be Varied by Parol Evidence. — The terms of a chattel 'mortgage on mules which contained a blanket provision making it secure all other debts' of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, no matter how arising, then and thereafter owing, held not capable of being disputed or destroyed by parol evidence as to what debts the mortgage was intended to secure.
5. Trial — Instruction That Chattel Mortgage Secured Debt Involved Held Not Charged on Pacts. — In an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage containing a blanket provision securing future indebtedness, instructions that the mortgage secured the debt involved, though it was not the primary debt intended to be secured, held not a violation of the constitutional prohibition of a charge on facts.
6. Trial — Submission oe Form oe Verdict Prepared by Counsel After Jury Had Announced Their Decision Held Not Error.'— —In an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, where the jury had returned and announced that they wanted to render a verdict for plaintiff, held, that the Court did not err in delivering to them the form of verdict prepared by plaintiff’s counsel, with the instruction, “I will give this to them and see if it is what they mean. Retire again, gentlemen.”
Before Wilson, J, Clarendon, Summer Term, 1922.
Affirmed.
Action by First National Bank of Manning against R. A. Pierson. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
The" following is the testimony of the witnesses Thompson and Plowden, referred to in the opinion:
R. E. Thompson, recalled: My place adjoined the place of Mr. Pierson in 1920. Pie had two mules, one red horse mule and one black mare mule, about 950 or 1,000 pound weight, and about nine or ten years old. They were good mules.”
Cross-examination: “I was at his house often. In November he had a mule that belonged to his brother. He had a mule — another mule later. He got the last mule in the fall of the year. He had two mules during plowing season. Q. How about the gathering season? Mr. Thompson, are you in a position to swear that this man (Pierson) didn’t have more than two mules in September, 1920? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. That is what I am asking you. A. I can’t swear to something I don’t know. Q.- You can’t say he didn’t have more than two mules of your own knowl edge? A. To my knowledge he didn’t have but two. 'I saw them every day at times, some days two times a day; many a day I didn’t see them at all. There was nothing which caused me to pay particular attention to Pierson’s mules. I have used the mules. He is supposed to have owned them. Q. He might have had other mules during the latter part of the year? A. I guess it is possible; he might have had a thousand.”
' Redirect examination: “I said that up until near Christmas I saw no other mules than the ones I described. Along in January of the following year, 1921, I saw Pierson with smaller mules.”
Mr. R. Plowden, sworn.
Direct examination: “In 1920 'I lived at the old Chandler place, and went back and forth frequently by Mr. R. A. Pierson’s place. He had two and only two mules during the year 1920. He'had no other mules during that year except those he worked. I passed there frequently, and din’t see any. One was a red horse mule and one a black mare mule.”
Cross-examination: “I lived about two miles from Mr. Pierson. I have been to his house. I think. I went there in 1920. I am willing to say definitely I went there in 1920. He worked only two mules at his place. I didn’t go to his place to see what — my observation was only of a casual nature; only on glancing in as I passed. I don’t know how many he had in 1920 of my own knowledge. I don’t know what he had.”
Redirect examination: “I saw only two mules there during 1920. If there had been any other mules I think I could have seen them.”
The defendant handed up the following requests to charge, 'all of which were refused:
(1) I charge you that, if you find that the defendant owned more than one pair of mules at the time he made the chattel mortgage in suit, then the mortgage is void for insufficiency of description, and the plaintiff cannot recover.
(2) The burden is on the plaintiff to show by the greater weight of the testimony that the defendant owned only two mules at the time he made the chattel mortgage in suit, and if it fails to do that the verdict must be for the defendant.
(3) 'If you find that-the chattel mortgage introduced in evidence is void for insufficiency of description, or that the debt secured thereby is paid, then the claim delivery proceedings issued thereon were void, and the seizure of any property of the defendant was a trespass.
(4) If any property of the defendant was seized under void process, and such process was issued by the' plaintiff willfully, or in a reckless or high-handed manner, or with reckless disregard of the defendant’s rights, then the plaintiff would be liable for all actual damages sustained by the defendant, and also punitive damages, as you think the circumstances of the case warrant, except that no punitive damages can be given for any act committed after the defendant’s reply bond was made.
(5) A trespass is any interference with the dominion over, or possession of, the property of another without warrant of law.
(6) Where one commits a trespass against the property of another, the person so suffering such trespass, is entitled to such actual damages as he has sustained by reason thereof, and, in the absence of any proof of actual damage, he is entitled to at least nominal damages.
(7) That, in order to complete a trespass under void process, there need not be an actual seizure of the property, for a constructive seizure will be sufficient.
The Court charged in part as follows:
Gentlemen, the .view I take in this case, I think your duty is very much simplified,' and the facts I am going to submit to you are1 in a very narrow compass. I charge you this: That, neither by his answer nor upon the stand. that I remember, has the defendant Pierson denied the indebtedness represented by the Thompson note. This being either admitted or not denied and can be easily arrived at by calculating the note — I believe counsel has already made this calculation, and you can take that calculation, and verify it, or make a new one, just as you see fit. The defendant denies that the mortgage secured the debt, the $182.75 note, the defendant denied that. Now, notwithstanding that denial, I charge you that it does cover that debt; that it is covered by the provision in the mortgage. So far as the provision in the mortgage is concerned, I charge you that this ' provision covers that. This provision is what I am speaking of (reading) : “And whereas, I or we desire to secure to said bank the payment of said indebtedness and of any and all other sums of money which I or we may now or hereafter owe unto the said bank (my or our intention being to make this permanent and continuing security' for all my or our past, present, and future liabilities and indebtedness of .every nature and description in favor of said bank, no matter how the same may arise or may have arisen and no matter whether such liabilities and indebtedness be of all or of any of the undersigned), I or we do hereby convey to said bank the following described property.” I say that condition in the mortgage covers — does cover this debt. It is my duty to construe the mortgage, and I hold that that provision covers the $182.75 note. If I am wrong, the Supreme Court will correct me. It is your duty to try the case according to the law as I give it to you. The Judge states the law, and if he is wrong the Supreme Court can correct him. I can’t invade your province; you can’t invade mine; you take the law as I give it to you.
I further charge you, gentlemen, that, upon default being made of a debt sucured by a valid mortgage, the mortgagee has a legal right, provided by law, to secure the payment; not only sue, but he can, by entering into the proper bond —he can seize the property, and then defendant can give a bond for the value of the property to secure all costs, etc., to replevy and take the property back. The mortgagee has the legal right to take the legal right provided by law to secure the payment, and, even if the defendant suffered damage, he could collect no damages.
It seems to me that it narrows down mainly to this: What two mules are covered by the mortgage in evidence? You will recall that I admitted testimony to clear up any doubt about the identity of the mules. You have heard the testimony, and the plaintiff must make out its case by the greater weight of the testimony. 'What is the greater weight? The weight that you the jury will give it. You see the witness on the stand. You are the judges of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their statements. The greater weight of the testimony does not necessarily mean the greater number of witnesses. You may give more weight to the testimony of one witness than you would to the testimony, of a half dozen-witnesses. You strive to get at the truth, and, when you get it, hold it, and be governed by it. You have heard the testimony of both sides, and 1 can onfy say that the plaintiff must make out its case by the greater weight of the testimony. If the plaintiff has done that, then it is your duty to find for the plaintiff; if .not, you should find for the defendant. If the plaintiff has established his right to the mules — if he has shown you what mules are covered by the mortgage; what mules by the greater weight of the evidence- — your verdict will be for the plaintiff. If, not, your verdict will be for the defendant. If your verdict is for the plaintiff, you should say: “We find for the plaintiff, the mules in dispute.” If you render that kind of verdict, you better describe the mules. You have heard the testimony, what kind of mules they were. “In case delivery cannot be made, their value, so many dollars.” If you find for the plaintiff, you say: “We find for the plaintiff the mules in dispute, and, in case delivery cannot be had, then so many dollars in value.” You should also render, in addition to that verdict if you find for the plaintiff: “We find that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of so many dollars.” If you find for the defendant, you simply say, “We find for the defendant,” and sign your name as foreman.
Now, it is-a peculiar verdict, and 1 have often had jurors to have some difficulty in framing a verdict, If there is no objection, they can take this form in the room.
Mr. Tatum: I don’t think, your Honor, the form of the verdict should be sent in. I would like for them to find the amount due; there is no doubt as to the amount due under the Thompson note.
The Court: I told them that. Your verdict will be written'on this paper called summons — ■
Mr. Davis: I know how difficult it is. It is even hard for a lawyer to write that verdict.
The Court: The jury can go in there and pass on the facts, and say what yoúr verdict is. If you have any difficulty in writing it out, let us know, and we will try to agree on a form. (Jury retires and returns.)
The Court: What is the finding?
The Foreman: We want to render a verdict for thé plaintiff.
Mr. Davis: It seiems to me, then, if your Honor please, this is the correct form.
The Court: Mr. Tatum, they say they have found for the plaintiff, and want the form of the verdict, and I will give this to them, and see if that is what they mean. Retire again, gentlemen.
The jury returned the following verdict: “We find for the plaintiff the pair of mules in dispute, to wit: one red horse mule, weighing about 900 pounds, and about 9 years old, and one black mare mule, weighing about 900 pounds, and about 9 years old, or their value of $400 in case delivery cannot be made. We further find that there is due by the defendant on the within note, to wit: the Thompson note,, the sum of $229.48 this 8th day of July 1922.” This was. the form handed up by plaintiff’s counsel and submitted to-the jury by the Court.
Messrs. Tatum & Wood for appellant.
Jurors indebted to plaintiff shoidd have been excused: 113 S. C., 508; Mortgage void for insufficiency of description: 11 Mont., 451; 57 N. W., 677; 48 A. S. R., 810; 76 lows., 503; 7 Col., 426; 14 A. S. R., 238; 25 S. E., 793; 34'S. E-, 72; 88 Mo. Ap., 292; 4 N. W., 481; 67 N. W., 392 ; 18 S. C„ 381; 30 S. C., 326. No intention evident to waive homestead: 68 S. E., 579. Testimony that it was not intention to secure Thompson note improperly excluded: 11 C. J., 494; 63 S. C., 306; 88 S. C., 355. Charge on facts: 81 S. C., 541.
Mr. W. C. Davis, for respondent,
cites: Indebtedness to Bank does not disqualify juror: 1 Civ. Code 1912, Sec. 4045; 116 S. C., 526; 76 S. C., 541. Parol testimony competent to apply contract to' subject mdtter: 27 S. C., 324; 111 S. C., 287. Description if clarified by testimony is sufficient: 94 S. C., 142; 75 S. C., 229. Parties presumed to know content of writings: 3 R. C. L., Sec. 333. General law applicable to case: 27 Cyc., 1057, 1059, 1060, 1071, 1072, 1074, 1161; 31 S. C., 262; 88 S. C., 357; 111 S. C, 289; 111 S. C., 516; 113 S. C„ 317; 117 S. C., 64; Greenl. Ev., 275. Not charge on facts: 72 S. C., 10; 90 S. C., 184; 54 S. C., 174; 47 S. C., 517; 37 S. C., 253; 77 S. C., 53. Instruction not based on evidence should not be given: 90 S. C., 414; 91 S. C., 316; 85 S. C„ 221. Law as to charge: 83 S. C., 530; 90 S. C, 25; 91 S. C., 201.
May 14, 1923.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.
"On May 28, 1920, the defendant made to one R. E-Thompson his note for $182.75, payable October 1, 1920. Thompson at once discounted this note with the plaintiff. The defendant borrowed from the plaintiff $126.17 on September 20, 1920, and executed his note and chattel mortgage to secure this indebtedness payable on September 25, 1920, the mortgage covering 'one pair of mules.' The mortgage signed by the defendant contained a blanket. The provision making it secure all other debts of defendant to plaintiff, no matter how arising, then owing or thereafter owing. When defendant paid the note executed at the time of the execution of the mortgage he demanded his note and mortgage, and the bank stamped his note 'Paid' and delivered it, but .refused to deliver the mortgage, claiming that it secured other indebtedness then due to it by the defendant. That dispute originated this action, which is claim and delivery for the mules. The plaintiff gave bond and demanded inmmediate possession. The defendant made reply bond and maintained possession. The defendant answered, denying that the mortgage sucured any other indebtedness than the note for $126.17, and set up a counterclaim for damages for the refusal of the plaintiff to deliver his security upon the same being paid, and for the unlawful seizure of his property. It was not denied that the defendant owed the plaintiff the Thompson note, but it was denied that he knew anything about the bank owing the Thompson note at the time of the execution of the $126.17 note and the chattel mortgage securing it, or at the time of its payment. The cause came on for trial before Judge John S. Wilson and the jury at the summer term; 1922, of the Court of common pleas for Clarendon County, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount demanded, or for the possession of two mules, described in the verdict. This appeal questions the rulings of his Honor in the trial of the case."
The exceptions are 17 in number; at the hearing exception 7 was abandoned.
Exception 1 is overruled. A juror's indebtedness to a bank does not disqualify him for service in a case that the bank is interested in per se.
The Court is willing at all times to give a litigant a fair and impartial trial before an impartial jury, and, if, upon the examination of a juror under oath, the trial Judge is satisfied that he is not an impartial juror, he can excuse him in the cause. The excusing must, in the fitness of things, be left in the exercise of the Judge's discretion, and ordinarily that discretion will not be interfered with.
The exceptions raise the question, under the pleadings, testimony, written and oral, and the verdict in the case: Is the chattel mortgage relied on void for want of certainty in the description of the property covered therein?
The mortgáge is of "one pair of mules"; the Sheriff, under claim and delivery, seizes "one pair of mules," and the defendant replevies a pair of mules seized by the, Sheriff, and the jury found the mules seized by the Sheriff the mules covered by the mortgage. The plaintiff had the right to show what mules the defendant had at the time the mortgage was taken. The evidence, of Thompson and Plowden was competent, and supplied testimony as to the identity of the mules, and in no way attempted to vary the contents of the mortgage. 'It elucidated on this point the mules intended to be covered by the mortgage, and was competent to go to the jury for their determination. Jones, Chat. Mortg. (2d Ed.), § 53.
These exceptions are overruled.
The exceptions raise the question: "Does the chattel mortgage, although the debt primarily secured thereby has been paid, cover any other indebtedness owing by the maker to the bank, whether specifically mentioned at the execution of the mortgage or not, and can the recitals be disputed or destroyed by parol?"
These exceptions are overruled under the plain provisions in the mortgage which was the contract between the parties and the recent decision of this Court, in Lipscomb v. Bank of Tatum, 117 S. E., —, and the admitted competent testimony as to the mules as clarified by evidence as to the mules described in mortgage and verdict of jury is sufficient.
The exceptions asking for reversible error as a charge on facts are overruled, as we fail to see any such error as complained of, and his Honor in his charge left the matter to the jury for their determination, without violating the Constitution preventing a charge on facts.
The other exceptions are overruled. After the jury found for the _ plaintiff, his Honor had the right •either himself to write out form of verdict, or have some one else write it out, and submit it to the jury, and let them retire and consider it, and determine whether that was what they meant to find. 'In this case that is what was done, and we see no -error.
The refusal by his Honor to charge the request asked for by the defendant does 'not appear to be prejudicial.
All exceptions are overruled, and judgment affirmed.
Mr. ChiEE Justice Gary concurs.