Case Name: Brown v. Saucerman
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1957-11-21
Citations: 237 Ind. 598
Docket Number: No. 29,489
Parties: Brown v. Saucerman.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 237
Pages: 598–622

Head Matter:
Brown v. Saucerman.
[No. 29,489.
Filed November 21, 1957.
Rehearing denied January 30, 1958.]
Rabb Emison and Emison & Emison, of Vincennes, for appellant.
Ernest Tilly, Jr., of Bicknell, for appellee.

Opinion:
Bobbitt, J.
This case is here on transfer from the Appellate Court under Acts 1901, ch. 247, §15, p. 565, being §4-209, Burns' 1946 Replacement, four Judges failing to agree.
Appellee brought this action under Acts 1937, ch. 259, §1, p. 1229, being §47-1021, Burns' 1952 Replacement, to recover damages for the death of her daughter resulting from personal injuries sustained while a guest in an automobile driven by appellant.
Trial was by jury, which returned a verdict for appellee in the amount of $8,000.
Section 47-1021, supra, provides as follows:
"The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefor, in or upon such motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle."
The determinative question here presented is whether the evidence, together with reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to establish wanton or wilful misconduct on the part of appellant.
The rule on wanton or wilful misconduct is concisely stated in Becker v. Strater (1947), 117 Ind. App. 504, at page 506, 72 N. E. 2d 580, as follows:
"Willful or wanton misconduct consists of the conscious and intentional doing of a wrongful act or omission of a duty, with reckless indifference to consequences, under circumstances which show that the doer has knowledge of existing conditions and that injury will probably result." Citing authorities.
The burden was upon appellee herein to show by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant was conscious of his conduct, " . . . and with knowledge of existing conditions that injury would probably result, and with reckless indifference to consequences, he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some duty which produced the injuries." Bedwell v. DeBolt (1943), 221 Ind. 600, 607, 50 N. E. 2d 875.
Acts of alleged wanton or wilful misconduct by appellant are charged in appellee's second amended complaint as follows:
"By driving at such unreasonably high rate of speed under the circumstances as to endanger the safety of others including the said Sue Ann Saucer-man by driving said motor vehicle at from 75 to 80 miles per hour at a time when the roadway was wet and slick from rain and while rain was falling; while driving said automobile having tires with insufficient tread to properly control the operation of same so that said automobile could not be kept in defendant's right hand lane of traffic while approaching a curve to the right in the direction said defendant was traveling, which said curve could not be executed safely at said rate of speed under said circumstances.
"That as a result of the said wanton manner in which the defendant, Ronald Brown, drove said automobile he did then and there drive said automobile to the left of the center line of the roadway and into the path of a motor vehicle, to-wit: A Tractor-trailer approaching from the opposite direction while said Tractor-trailer was in its right-hand lane of traffic and the said two motor vehicles did then and there and as a result thereof collide."
Evidence on this point most favorable to appellee may be summarized as follows:
On the evening of June 13, 1953, appellant, another boy, the deceased and another girl drove to a "Drive-In" three-quarters of a mile south of Bicknell, Indiana, on State Road 67. They stayed about one hour, then left going south on Road 67 toward Vincennes, Indiana. It was dark and raining at the time.
An attendant at the Drive-In, a witness for appellee, testified, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Q. You were inside the Drive-In at that time?
"A. I was.
"Q. Tell the Court and Jury just what happened there, which way did they go and in what manner?
"A. When he left the Drive-In you make a little curve to go out to the pavement. The boy got in the car and when he started he went so fast up to the pavement that when he stopped it made the car slide sort of sideways and threw the gravel. He stopped long enough to look and see if anything was coming, I guess that's what he was doing, and he pulled out and the tires just squealed and made a loud noise and came in the direction of Vincennes. As we watched him, by the time he left our line of vision he was going at a terrific rate of speed.
"Q. About how far down the road towards Vincennes can you see a car after it leaves the Drive-In? You have any idea on that?
"A. I'd be afraid to say how far because I can't judge distance like that.
"Q. What is there on the other side of the road as you come towards Vincennes?
"A. The Sunshine Mine.
"Q. And tell the Court and Jury, in case they are not acquainted with that, where the Sunshine Mine is in relation to this Drive-In.
"A. As you come towards Vincennes the Drive-In is on the lefthand side of the road and I would say approximately one-half a mile toward Vincennes on the right side of the road is the Sunshine Mine.
"Q. Would you say that — where in relation to the Sunshine Mine did that car leave your vision?
"A. Well, it would be a little piece past the Sunshine Mine.
"Q. Towards Vincennes?
"A. Toward Vincennes.
"Q. And at that place when the car left your vision a little past the Sunshine Mine it was going at a high rate of speed?
"A. A terrific rate of speed.
"Q. And what did you estimate the speed of that car to be?
"A. I'd say the boy was doing seventy — seventy-five or eighty miles an hour."
On cross-examination this witness again testified that it was more than one-half mile to the point where the car left her vision, and at that time it was traveling "real fast" and was going 75 or 80 miles per hour.
A "curb-hop" at the Drive-In, also a witness for appellee, testified that appellant left there about 8 P.M., that he drove very fast, and that "He cut sharp to the right and as he stopped he just skidded and threw rocks back and it hit the building rocks threw back so far."; and, further, as follows:
"Q. Did you observe the car as it entered the highway?
"A. Yes, urn hum.
"Q. Would you tell the Jury in what manner was that?
"A. He left at a very high rate of speed. He skidded on the highway as he pulled out.
"Q. Did you then observe the car as it went on down the highway?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. Which way did it go?
"A. It went toward Vincennes.
"Q. What speed, in relationship to slow or fast or medium, did it go down the highway toward Vincennes?
"A. It had to be going at a very high rate of speed because they were out of sight in just a matter of minutes."
The driver of the truck with which appellant collided testified that he was driving north of Vincennes on State Road 67, at about 8:80 P.M., and as he approached a curve on the crest of a hill he saw the lights of a car coming at "a fast rate of speed." He left the highway to avoid an accident but the car hit his truck about four feet across the center line, on his side of the road, knocking the left front wheel of the truck into the oil pan. It was dark and raining at the time and the pavement was slick. The truck traveled 15 to 20 feet after the impact and the car careened off to the other side of the road.
A state policeman, who arrived at the scene of the accident at about 9:05 P.M., testified that it had been raining and that the pavement was wet.
He further testified that he examined appellant's car the next day and found the front tires had very little tread but the rear tires did have some tread. He estimated the speed of the car from the damage done to be "better than sixty-five" miles per hour.
The rule by which we are guided in determining whether the evidence as above summarized is sufficient to sustain a charge of wanton or wilful misconduct under the guest statute is reaffirmed in Miller, etc. v. Smith (1955), 125 Ind. App. 293, at page 299, 124 N. E. 2d 874, 877, as follows:
" 'Because of the difficulty of defining with precision the terms used in guest statutes to describe . . . misconduct for which the owner or operator is liable, in determining whether particular conduct falls within such terms each case must be decided on the circumstances peculiar to it; every act or omission entering into the particular happening must be considered and weighed in connection with all the other circumstances, and in arriving at such decision the consequences of one's conduct as well as the conduct itself may be determining factors, . . . .' 60 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, Sec. 399 (4) f. page 1007; Sheets v. Stalcup, supra [105 Ind. App. 66, 13 N. E. 2d 346] ; Pierce v. Clemens (1943), 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836."
Appellee asserts that the speed at which appellant was driving at the time of the accident was so excessive as to constitute wanton or wilful misconduct.
The question as to whether speed alone is sufficient to establish wanton or wilful misconduct is one of first impression in this State; but other States having similar guest statutes have held that excessive speed alone is not sufficient to prove wanton or wilful misconduct. Birmelin v. Gist (1954), 162 Ohio St. 98, 120 N. E. 2d 711, 717; Davis v. Hollowell (1950), 326 Mich. 673, 40 N. W. 2d 641, 15 A. L. R. 2d 1160; Meyer v. Culley (1952), 69 Wyo. 285, 241 P. 2d 87; Rodney v. Staman (1952), 371 Pa. 1, 89 A. 2d 313, 32 A. L. R. 2d 976.
We adopt the rule as stated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Meyer v. Culley, supra, at page 94 of 241 P. 2d:
"While it is generally true that mere speed of itself does not constitute 'wilful mis-conduct' yet there may be a point at which the speed became so excessive that the danger of injury to a guest was probable at such extreme speed and that this might constitute 'wilful mis-conduct.' Needless to say the circumstances appearing in each case must rule this point."
Considering the circumstances surrounding the speed of the car in this case, if we assume that the jury believed the testimony of appellee's witnesses as to the speed of appellant's car at the time of impact, we find (1) that it was dark and raining; (2) that the pavement was slick; (3) that appellant had driven this stretch of road many times and was familiar with the topography and the curve in the road at the place of the accident; (4) that he was familiar with the car which he was driving; (5) that by the testimony of appellee's own witness, appellant, after being cautioned not to drive too fast when the car skidded as he pulled out onto the highway from the Drive-In, said, "Would forty or forty-five be too fast?"; and after that it didn't seem to her that they were driving that fast; (6) that the accident occurred at the entrance to a sharp curve on the crest of a hill where a car traveling in either direction could not see another car approaching from the opposite direction until it was at the top of the hill and entering the curve; (7) that the accident happened about three miles from the Drive-In, inside of which appellee's witness (who testified that the appellant's car was traveling 75 or 80 miles per hour when it left her vision more than one-half mile down the road) was standing; and (8) that there is undisputed evidence that appellant was in the proper traffic lane until he was "blinded" by the lights of the truck as it came around the curve and over the crest of the hill. Considering all of the circumstances as they appear from the record, it does not conclusively appear that the speed at which appellant was traveling at the time of the accident was so "excessive that the danger of injury" to his guests was of such probability as to constitute "wanton or wilful misconduct" by appellant.
We recognize that "When one by a continuous course of conduct seems to exercise no concern for others he may be both wilful and wanton." Kahan v. Weeksler (1938), 104 Ind. App. 673, 678, 12 N. E. 2d 998, 1000.
However, there is no evidence in the record here that shows any "continuous course of conduct" by appellant from which any reasonable inference could be drawn that he had no concern for the safety of his companions who were riding with him in the car at the time of the accident.
It is also true that "acts such as exhibit a conscious indifference to consequences, make a case of constructive or legal wilfulness." Bedwell v. DeBolt, supra (1943), 221 Ind. 600, 607, 50 N. E. 2d 875.
However, we find nothing in this record which shows, or from which a reasonable inference could be drawn, that appellant displayed a "conscious indifference to consequences" in the manner in which he was driving his car as it approached the curve on which the accident occurred.
There is no evidence to show, or from which a reasonable inference could be drawn, that appellant had knowledge that a truck was approaching from the other side of the hill, or that he realized that an injury would probably result from the speed at which he (appellant) was driving at the time he approached the curve where the accident occurred. We cannot presume that appellant intended to commit suicide or kill or injure his car companions by colliding with the truck. In fact, our presumption must be to the contrary. Birmelin v. Gist, supra (1954), 162 Ohio St. 98, 120 N. E. 2d 711, 718.
In order to sustain the verdict of the jury herein the burden was upon appellee to show more than a mere failure on the part of appellant to apprehend the danger of approaching the curve, where the accident occurred, at an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances. To have been guilty of wanton or wilful misconduct appellant must have intentionally proceeded into the curve with reckless indifference to the consequences, knowing that a condition existed from which, because of his conduct, an injury to his guests would probably result. Bedwell v. DeBolt, supra (1943), 221 Ind. 600, 606, 607, 50 N. E. 2d 875; Hoesel v. Cain; Kahler v. Cain (1944), 222 Ind. 330, 338, 53 N. E. 2d 165; Swinney v. Roler (1943), 113 Ind. App. 367, 47 N. E. 2d 846; Becker v. Strater, supra (1947), 117 Ind. App. 504, 506, 72 N. E. 2d 580. This appellee has failed to show.
Appellee also contends that to hold that the jury could not find from the evidence "that defendant drove iñ a wanton and wilful manner would be to conclude that -the jury had no right to consider the testimony of Appellee's witnesses and should consider only the testimony of Appellant himself and his friend, Richard Madding,' ."
The question which we must determine is not one of deciding what testimony the jury could consider, but rather the question with which we are confronted is: Did the evidence disclose a factual situation which constituted wanton or wilful misconduct by appellant in the operation of his automobile at the time of the accident herein? This question must be answered in the negative.
We recognize that this case presents a set of tragic and regrettable circumstances. However, it is fundamental that the plaintiff in a civil action must prove the allegations of his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. If he should fail to prove any of the material allegations of his complaint, we cannot supply those missing elements for him. Guisóle function here is to determine, by an examination of the evidence, whether it was sufficient to show the necessary elements of wanton or wilful misconduct on the part of appellant in the operation of his automobile at the time of the accident. In performing this function we must be guided by the well-established rules and principles of law. Applying these to the facts as disclosed by the record herein, it is our opinion that appellant is not guilty of wanton or wilful misconduct within the meaning of these terms as used in §47-1021, supra, and the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. Hence, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
Other questions raised by appellant aré not likely to recur in a new trial, hence it is not necessary to consider them.
Judgment reversed with instructions to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.
Landis, J., concurs in this opinion.
Achor, J., concurs in the result reached and dissents in part, with opinion, in which Emmert, J., concurs.
Arterburn, C. J., not participating.
. The only evidence that appellant was driving 75 to 80 miles per hour was the testimony of an attendant at the Drive-In — who, looking through the window on a dark night, while it was raining, watched the car go down the road toward Vincennes and as it left her vision, at more than one-half mile away, it was going at a "terrific rate of speed," which she estimated at 75 to 80 miles per hour. The accident occurred more than two miles on down the road from this point, or about three miles from the Drive-In. This, in our opinion, is not substantial evidence and under the circumstances as shown by the record it can have no probative value.