Case Name: Antonio ISLAS -VELOZ, AKA Antonio Islas, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2019-02-04
Citations: 914 F.3d 1249
Docket Number: No. 15-73120
Parties: Antonio ISLAS -VELOZ, AKA Antonio Islas, Petitioner,
v.
Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 914
Pages: 1249–1261

Head Matter:
Antonio ISLAS -VELOZ, AKA Antonio Islas, Petitioner,
v.
Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 15-73120
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed February 4, 2019
Submitted August 27, 2018 Seattle, Washington
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Antonio Islas-Veloz petitions for review of a final order of removal following the dismissal of his appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). We conclude that Supreme Court and circuit precedents require us to deny the petition.
Islas-Veloz was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") § 9.68A.090. An immigration judge found that Islas-Veloz's conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the United States and found him removable on that basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The BIA dismissed Islas-Veloz's appeal, ruling that communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of RCW § 9.68A.090 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.
Islas-Veloz argues that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States , - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya , - U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018). In the alternative, he claims that the crime of "communication with [a] minor for immoral purposes" in violation of RCW § 9.68A.090 is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude, and hence that his final order of removal is invalid.
In assessing the constitutional status of the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," we remain bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Jordan v. De George , 341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). In De George , the Court held that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 231-32, 71 S.Ct. 703. The Court's more recent decisions in Johnson and Dimaya did not reopen inquiry into the constitutionality of the phrase. Notably, Dimaya acknowledged that the Court in De George had "ultimately uph[e]ld" the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" against an unconstitutional vagueness attack. Dimaya , 138 S.Ct. at 1213.
We have repeatedly echoed the holding that the Supreme Court laid down in De George . In Tseung Chu v. Cornell , we cited De George in ruling that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was constitutional. 247 F.2d 929, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1957). More recently, in Martinez-De Ryan v. Sessions , we again held that the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague. 895 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Olivas-Motta v. Whitaker , 910 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2018). De Ryan explicitly addressed Sessions v. Dimaya , explaining that the Supreme Court's opinion in that case did not change the constitutional status of the phrase. See 895 F.3d at 1193-94. As the concurrence acknowledges, our precedent cannot be read differently.
Islas-Veloz's alternate claim that communicating with a minor for immoral purposes is not a crime of moral turpitude is foreclosed by our decision in Morales v. Gonzales , 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds in Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder , 594 F.3d 673, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2010). In Morales , we "conclude[d] that [a] conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes" constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Id. at 978. We elaborated: "The full range of conduct prohibited by section 9.68A.090 of the Revised Code of Washington categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude." Id.
Apart from any ongoing debate about the degree of ambiguity inherent in the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," these precedents are directly on point, bind us here, and foreclose Islas-Veloz's arguments.
PETITION DENIED.