Case Name: Florence S. Leeds, Respondent, v. New York Telephone Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-03-22
Citations: 178 N.Y. 118
Docket Number: 
Parties: Florence S. Leeds, Respondent, v. New York Telephone Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 178
Pages: 118–126

Head Matter:
Florence S. Leeds, Respondent, v. New York Telephone Company, Appellant.
Negligence — Intervening and Proximate Cause—Fall of Chimney, to Which Telephone Wire Was Attached, Caused by the Wire Being Struck by the Boom of a Derrick. Where a telephone '•wire, which had been attached to a chimney 39 feet above the ground for a period of two years, and which extended across the street, and beyond, to the top of a building 100 feet from the ground, was struck by the boom ■of a high derrick, used in hoisting materials upon a building being erected -on the opposite side of the street, with sufficient force to pull the chimney -over, and a person passing along the street was injured by the bricks falling from the chimney, the negligence of the persons operating the derrick must he deemed an intervening and the responsible cause of the accident, although there was evidence that the chimney had been weakened by age and decay; since .the wire was far enough above the street to be out of the way of interference from usual street uses and the chimney was strong enough to sustain the wire until it was struck by the boom of the derrick. Even assuming that the telephone company was negligent in continuing to maintain its wire upon a chimney which inspection would have shown to have become unsound, its omission of the duty oí inspection was not the proximate cause of the fall of the chimney; remotely, it may have been a cause, but proximately it was simply the intervention of the derrick boom, carelessly allowed to swing out in the street, which enabled the accident to occur, and the person injured cannot, therefore, maintain an action against the telephone company to recover for such injuries.
Leeds v. N. T. Telephone Oo., 79 App. Div. 121, reversed.
(Argued February 16, 1904;
decided March 22, 1904.)
Appeal from a judgment of- the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered January 28, 1903, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The nature of the action and the facts, so .far as material^ are stated in the opinion.
Eugene Lamb Richards, Jr., for appellant.
Assuming that defendant was negligent either in maintaining the wire around the chimney or over the lot, or in both, as parts of a single act, such negligence was not a concurrent proximate cause of the injury. (Travell v. Baunerman, 71 App. Div. 439 ; Merritt v. Fitzgibbons, 29 Hun, 634 ; Gray v. Gas Co., 114 Mass. 149 ; Phillips v. R. R. Co., 127 N. Y. 657 ; Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83 ; S. & R. on Neg. § 26 ; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73 ; Lowery v. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 158 ; Thompson on Neg. [2d ed.] § 1245 ; Bigelow on Torts, 608-626.) The negligence of the iron works was an intervening cause insulating the negligence of this defendant and relieving it from liability. (Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73 ; Rider v. S. R. T. Ry. Co., 171 N. Y. 139 ; Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618 ; Trapp v. McClellan, 68 App. Div. 362 ; Mitchell v. R. R. Co., 4 Misc. Rep. 575 ; Connely v. Rist, 20 Misc. Rep. 31 ; Hofnagle v. R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 608 ; Howard v. St. Thomas, 19 Ont. 719 ; Bartlett v. G. Co., 117 Mass. 533.)
Louis Hicks for respondent.
The immediate cause of plaintiff’s injury was the falling of the chimney. The running and maintaining by defendant of its wire in such manner that any interference with the wire would precipitate the chimney to the sidewalk was an act without which the chimney would not have fallen. Defendant might reasonably have anticipated that the accident would result from its act, and its act was, therefore, negligent and unlawful and the proximate cause of the accident. (Sheridan v. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 39 ; Koplan v. B. G. L. Co., 177 Mass. 15 ; McCauley v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584 ; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 ; Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N. Y. 312 ; Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83 ; Rider v. Ry. Co., 171 N. Y. 155 ; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 101 ; Webster v. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 260 ; Barrett v. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628 ; Philips v. R. R. Co., 127 N. Y. 657.)

Opinion:
Gbay, J.
The plaintiff, while walking upon a street of the city of New York, was struck by bricks falling from a chimney and she has sued the defendant for damages, upon allegations that its negligence was the cause of her in j nries. The material facts may be briefly stated. One of the telephone wires of the defendant was attached to the chimney of a house, at a height of some 39 feet above the ground, and, thence, was extended over the street and beyond, to the roof of a building, at a height of about 300 feet from the ground. The wire had been in that position for two years, with the permission of the municipal authorities, when the construction of a steel frame building was commenced by the Jackson Architectural Iron Works, on the side of the street opposite'to the house, from whose chimney the wire extended. On the third floor of the building in course of construction, a derrick was placed for the purpose of lifting up materials for the framework. The mast of'tlie derrick was 65 feet high and the boom of the derrick was 55 feet in length and was in such a position as to project beyond the sidewalk and fifteen feet over the roadway of the street. A steel girder was being lifted, by means of attachments from the end of the boom, and, through some careless handling, was allowed to swing against the wire with sufficient force to pull the chimney over.' Some of the-bricks fell upon the plaintiff and produced the injuries com plained of. There was evidence that the chimney had been, weakened by age and decay and the negligence of the defendant in maintaining its wire upon it, under the circumstances, is alleged, and is relied upon, as constituting an efficient and the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
I am not able to agree in this view and, in my opinion, the negligence of the iron works was an intervening, and the responsible, cause of the accident.' The theory of defendant's negligence must rest upon the proposition that in the condition of the chimney, which inspection would have disclosed, the defendant should have foreseen possible interference with its wire, in the course of the building operations on the other side of the street, and the possible consequence to the chimney. An apparent vice in this proposition is the assumption that, had the chimney been different, or newer, or sounder, in its construction, it would have been able, successfully, to resist the strain caused by the blow of the great derrick boom against the wire. I doubt that we can indulge in such an assumption, in order to ñnd a concurring act, or omission of duty. It seems to me that guilty, or responsible, concurrence in causing an injury involves the idea of two, or more, active agencies, co-operating to produce it; either of which must be an efficient cause, without the operation of which the accident would not have happened. These few cases will suffice for the discussion of the doctrine: Hofnagle v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (55 N. Y. 608) ; Ring v. City of Cohoes (77 ib. 83) ; Lowery v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (99 ib. 158), and Laidlaw v. Sage (158 ib. 73). A very good illustration is to be found in Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R. R. Co. (36 N. Y. 39), where the conductor of the car, in compelling the child to stand upon the platform, and the passenger's carelessness, in trying to get off the car when in motion, were efficient and active agencies, co-operating to cause the accident. The Barrett Case, (45 N. Y. 628), also, furnishes a good illustration ; where two cars of street railway companies collided at a crossing of tracks. In every such case, the question is what was the proximate cause of the occurrence and, if concurrence in negligence is claimed, were the acts, or omissions, of the parties so closely related and co-operative as to make either a probable and an efficient cause ? Could it be said of each cause that without its operation the accident would not have happened %
Was the specific act of negligence charged against the defendant in this case the natural, efficient and, hence, a proximate cause of the accident; or was it the result of the intervention of an independent cause, which defendant was not bound to anticipate and without which the injury would not have happened ? I think that the latter was the case. The negligent conduct of the persons in using the derrick upon the building was an unusual occurrence and not such as should have been foreseen by the defendant. In Laidlaw v. Sage, (158 N. Y. 73), the definition of that which is the proximate cause of an event was expressed by Judge Martin as " that which in a natural and continual sequence, unbroken by. any new cause, produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred; and the act of one person can not be said to be the proximate cause of an injury, when the act of another person has intervened and directly inflicted it." (Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 26 ; Wharton on Negligence, § 134.)
This is a case where the negligence of the iron works intervened between the defendant's negligence, in making use of an unsound chimney, and the receipt by the plaintiff of her injuries, and the former's negligence, as a cause, was remote. The chimney was strong enough to sustain the wire and the wire was far enough above the street to be out of the way of interference from usual street uses. We may assume that the defendant was negligent, for continuing to maintain its wire upon a chimney, which inspection would have shown to have become unsound, and, still, I do not think we could, reasonably, say that such conduct in the omission on its part of the duty of inspection was the proximate cause of the' injury to the plaintiff. Remotely, it may have been a cause ; but, proximate!/, it was, simply, the intervention of the derrick boom, carelessly allowed to swing out in the street, which enabled the accident to occur.
In the sequence of events, the blow to the wire from the derrick boom was the causa causans and that was the intervening act of another party. That was an independent force, which came in upon the existing situation and produced the plaintiff's injuries.
I think, on the state of facts disclosed by this record, that there was nothing to warrant a recovery against the defendant and I advise that the judgment be reversed and that a new trial be ordered; with costs to abide the event.