Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Marion NEAMES
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-11-01
Citations: 377 So. 2d 1018
Docket Number: No. 64044
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Marion NEAMES.
Judges: MARCUS, J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 377
Pages: MXCVIII–MCIII

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Marion NEAMES.
No. 64044.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 1, 1979.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 4, 1980.
Lemuel E. Hawsey, III, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Michael E. Ponder, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appel-lee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The principal issue before us is whether a conviction of guilty, once set aside by the trial court, can be reinstated upon the trial court's subsequent conclusion that it had erred in the vacation of the original conviction.
After bench trial, unrepresented by counsel, the defendant was convicted of making harassing telephone calls to his sister and brother-in-law over a period of three months. La.R.S. 14:285(A)(2). He was sentenced on October 13, 1978 to two years in the parish prison.
Subsequently, on November 22, 1978, the trial court set aside this conviction and sentence, found the accused not guilty by reason of insanity, and ordered his commitment to a mental hospital for examination.
The accused, for the first time retaining counsel, then filed a writ of habeas corpus. The writ questioned the legality of the accused's commitment.
At the hearing on the writ, the trial court vacated its order of November 22 (which had vacated the earlier conviction in October). This had the effect of reinstating the earlier conviction and sentence.
The defendant's appeal questions the reinstatement of the original sentence.
I.
The colloquy at the time of the original sentence of October 13, at which at the urging of the trial court the defendant made statements which equivocally asserted an intent to appeal, indicates non-normal statements and attitudes on the part of the defendant. The trial judge indicated concern at that time with the defendant's adamant failure to request a sanity commission and his insistence that, despite mental troubles in the past, he was perfectly competent and sane.
After the sentence, the trial court ex proprio motu issued a rule to amend sentence. The hearing on the rule took place on November 22. The defendant was still unrepresented by counsel.
At this hearing, the conscientious trial judge stated that, based on the pre-sentence report indicating a medical opinion casting doubt on the defendant's competency, he had questioned another doctor (mentioned by the accused in the sentencing colloquy) and had become aware of a civil commitment hearing which had taken place. In that hearing, three psychiatrists and the coroner had concurred in the view that the accused could not distinguish between right and wrong.
The trial judge concluded: After lengthy conversation with doctors and people associated with the accused, "I have come to the conclusion in fairness and in justice I cannot let your sentence or conviction stand." The trial judge set aside the conviction and sentence based upon the accused's mental incapacity.
II.
The trial court thus concluded that this mental condition had caused the accused to refuse counsel at the trial or for the purported appeal. Because of his mental condition, the accused had likewise failed, despite requests, to take any requisite step to advance the purported appeal.
The trial court noted that it had erroneously failed earlier to notice the accused's earlier mental incapacity. In effect, the trial court held that the accused's waiver of counsel, his failure to raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, and his equivocal assertion of an appeal (which the accused had then refused to take steps to complete), were all ineffectual because of the accused's mental condition. Therefore, because the accused lacked the mental capacity to do so or to retain counsel to do so, the trial court set aside the original conviction and sentence as if the accused through counsel had properly raised these issues through appropriate post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings. See State ex rel. Clark v. Martillo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977).
III.
The issues thus posed concern the legality of the trial court's vacation of the initial sentence and the legality of the reinstatement of the sentence upon the habeas hearing, which had sought only the accused's release.
Under our jurisprudence, a trial court's vacation of a conviction, even if beyond its authority, effectively and conclusively invalidates the verdict thus invalidated. State v. Reed, 315 So.2d 703 (La.1975); State Oglesby, 164 La. 329, 113 So. 865 (1927). This jurisprudential rule was adopted to effectuate double jeopardy protections of our state constitution, now La.Const. of 1974, Art. 1, Section 15.
As a consequence, not only are the courts prohibited from resurrecting the vacated verdict under the jurisprudence cited, but likewise the state is barred from further prosecution on the charge. The present defendant is therefore entitled to be discharged, as urged by the habeas corpus writ filed in the present proceedings (questioning the commitment of the accused following the vacation of the original plea).
Decree
Accordingly, the defendant's conviction is reversed and set aside, and the defendant ordered discharged.
REVERSED; DEFENDANT ORDERED DISCHARGED.
MARCUS, J., dissents.
SUMMERS, C. J., dissents and assigns reasons.
BLANCHE, J., dissents and hands down reasons.
.Based upon the unanimous opinion of the psychiatrists, as well as of the record at the civil commitment hearing, the trial judge also on November 22 entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity for the accused and entered verdict on that plea. Although this action was done in the interest of avoiding penal confinement for the accused and of securing mental treatment for him, the trial judge subsequently (at the habeas hearing on December 19, 1978) recognized that he was not empowered to take this action on a plea not raised and on evidence not formally heard by him. Accordingly, the trial court vacated its rulings of November 22.
. Because of this jurisprudence rule, we do not reach the propriety of the trial court's action in vacating the original verdict, nor consider the state's arguments questioning the legality of the vacation of the sentence.
. Article 1, Section 15: " No person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his application for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or when a motion in arrest of judgment is sustained."