Case Name: Jermaine L. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-08-30
Citations: 936 So. 2d 1190
Docket Number: No. 1D04-1598
Parties: Jermaine L. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: POLSTON, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., dissents with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 936
Pages: 1190–1196

Head Matter:
Jermaine L. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D04-1598.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 30, 2006.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Carl S. McGinnes, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Alan R. Dakan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
VAN NORTWICK, J.
Jermaine Lamar Martin appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, a report of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), which indicated that the substances seized from Martin were contraband. The prosecution offered this report under the business records exception to the hearsay rule in lieu of presenting at trial the live testimony of the person who performed the tests. The defense objected to the admission of the lab report, arguing that admission of such without the testimony of the author of the report denied Martin his right under federal and state Confrontation Clauses. We hold that the admission of the FDLE report as a business record without giving appellant the right to examine the author of the report was reversible error.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court established a test for determining when the admission of hearsay evidence violates the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The Crawford court held that the admission of hearsay evidence which was "testimonial" in nature violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and unless the defendant had a prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. 124 S.Ct. at 1369. While Crawford did not provide a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," it did explain that business records "by their nature" are not testimonial, id. 124 S.Ct. at 1367, but that statements "reasonably expect[ed] to be used prosecutorially" or which "would be available for use at a later trial" were. 124 S.Ct. at 1364. More particularly, the Court explained in Crawford that testimonial statements include:
ex-parte in-court testimony, or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, pri- or testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially [....] extrajudicial statements . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, [... and] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
While the FDLE report at issue in the instant case may meet the definition of a business record under the Florida statute permitting admission of such records, see section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (2003), an issue we do not address, the report obviously was prepared for litigation purposes. The testing memorialized in the report was occasioned solely by the arrest of appellant and was performed by a state law enforcement agency, and the report was offered by the State in furtherance of a criminal prosecution.
Applying Crawford, Florida courts have consistently held that records such as the FDLE report before us are testimonial in nature. In Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), we held that a "breath test affidavit" prepared by a law enforcement officer following the arrest of the subject tested was testimonial hearsay evidence in that the affidavit "contained statements one would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and was made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the statements would be available for trial." Id. at 618; see also Belvin v. State, 922 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that a breath-test affidavit was testimonial hearsay and not admissible as a business record because the affidavit was prepared in anticipation of trial); Johnson v. State, 929 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("an FDLE lab report prepared pursuant to a police investigation and admitted to establish an element of a crime is testimonial hearsay even if it is admitted as a business record"), rev. granted, 924 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2006); Rivera v. State, 917 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (explaining that while drug or alcohol tests performed by a hospital in the usual course of business are admissible as business records, similar tests performed by an FDLE lab are not pursuant to the Confrontation Clause); Sobota v. State, 933 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Here, the State has not claimed that the person who tested the substances seized from appellant and who authored the report at issue was unavailable to testify. Also, the State has not claimed that the defense had been previously given an opportunity to examine the author of the FDLE report in a meaningful manner. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting the FDLE report, and the error cannot be deemed harmless as it was the only proof of the contraband nature of the items seized from appellant. See Crawford v. Washington.
Because a new trial is required, it is not necessary to address the other issue raised on appeal. The cause is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
POLSTON, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., dissents with written opinion.
. Appellant also argues on appeal that the lab report in question was not a "business record," and accordingly was not properly admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, relying on amendments to section 90.803 and section 90.902, Florida Statutes, enacted by chapter 2003-259, Laws of Florida, as well as Baber v. State, 775 So.2d 258 (Fla.2001), United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1977), and the concurring opinion in Kettle v. State, 641 So.2d 746, 750-51 (Miss. 1994) (Banks, J., concurring). This precise argument was not made to the trial court, however, and, thus, has not been preserved for review by this court. See F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226 (Fla.2003) (holding that, except in cases of fundamental error, for an argument asserting error to be cognizable on appeal, the specific contention raised by the argument on appeal must have been asserted as the legal ground for the objection below).
. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to be confronted with the witnesses against him...." Article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution similarly provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . have the right to . confront at trial adverse witnesses...."