Case Name: McKENNA v. SNARE & TRIEST CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-12-29
Citations: 133 N.Y.S. 107
Docket Number: 
Parties: McKENNA v. SNARE & TRIEST CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 133
Pages: 107–118

Head Matter:
(147 App. Div. 855.)
McKENNA v. SNARE & TRIEST CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 29, 1911.)
1. Negligence (§§ 134, 135 )—Injuries—Contbibutoby Negligence—Evidence.
In an action for injuries to plaintiff by the breaking of certain appliances used in subway construction in a city street, evidence held to sustain a verdict for plaintiff on the issues of negligence of defendant and plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 267-270, 272, 273, 274-276; Dec. Dig. §§ 134, 135.*]
2. Evidence (§ 471 )—Opinion of Witness.
Where plaintiff was injured by the negligence oí a foreman in charge of certain subway construction, which defendant claimed was being executed by the M. B. C. Company under a contract with defendant, and that the foreman was a servant of that company and not of defendant, and it appeared that the foreman was paid in envelopes bearing the name of the M. B. O. Company, and that he signed receipts to that company therefor, the foreman should not have been permitted to testify to his opinion that he ivas working for defendant, but should have been confined to proof of the name of the person who employed him and what position, if any, if he knew, such person held with defendant.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 2149-2185; Dec. Dig. § 471.*]
3. Trial (§ 244*)—Instructions—'Undue Prominence to Particular Facts.
Plaintiff, while in a street, was injured by the breaking of certain appliances used by men engaged in subway construction in the street Plaintiff claimed these men were in the employ of defendant, which defendant denied, and claimed that they were employes solely of the M. B. C. Company, with which defendant had contracted for the execution of its subway contract. This contract plaintiff claimed was not in good faith, and that the M. B. C. Company was a paper corporation organized by defendant to relieve it from such liabilities. The court instructed that, as a matter of fact, the work to all intents and purposes was being done by defendant through certain instrumentalities and agencies working under its direction and for its benefit, and left it to the jury to find whether or not the men chargeable with negligence were actually working for defendant “in such a sense as would relieve it from responsibility for accidents so caused,” etc. Held, that the jury was thereby permitted to give too great importance to the question as to whether or not, the contract between defendant and the M. B. O. Company was made in good faith, and authorized to find for plaintiff on the theory that the men were employed by both companies, and the instruction was therefore erroneous.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 577-581; Dec. Dig. § 244.*]
McLaughlin and Miller, JJ., dissenting
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Peter McKenna against the Snare & Triest Company. From a judgment for'plaintiff and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, it appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, SCOTT, and MILLER, JJ.
Hector M. Hitchings, for appellant.
W"m. Edgar Weaver, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’p Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
On the 11th day of August, 1908, Delancey street on both sides of its intersection with Eldridge street had been .excavated for the construction of the subway loop of the Williamsburg Bridge, and a temporary carriageway had been constructed over the excavation on timbers which also supported a gas main owned by the Consolidated Gas Company. Temporary manholes affording access to the gas main had been made at intervals, and they were inclosed on the surface of the streets by rectangular fences formed by four upright pieces of timber to which two boards were nailed on each of the four sides. One of these manholes was just easterly of the intersec-, tion of. the said streets, and another was a short distance westerly of said intersection. The plaintiff was in the employ of the Consolidated Gas Company, and it was his duty to inspect the main at these manholes for leaks. A truck hauling a steel girder which was to be used in the subway construction work broke through the temporary carriageway at the intersection of said streets. One Peter Reeves and a gang of men were engaged on the subway construction work in the vicinity and were using, when occasion required it, a hoisting engine and block and pulley owned by the defendant. It is claimed by the plaintiff that these men were in the employ of-the defendant, and the defendant contends that they were not in its employ, but were working for the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, a New Jersey corporation. With a view to removing the obstruction and to moving the girder to a point where it was needed, Reeves directed that the truck be detached from the girder and drawn out, leaving the girder on the surface of the temporary carriageway, and he then directed that it be moved to the westerly of the crossing by the use of the engine block and tackle. With a view to hauling the girder in the direction desired, a snatch block with a pulley over which the rope connecting the drum of the engine and the girder ran was attempted to be secured in place, by the use of an appliance known as a shackle, in the vicinity of the manhole located westerly of the crossing. The power was finally applied, and after the girder had been moved a few feet the shackle spread, letting the bolt which passed through the eyes of the shackle out at one end, and part of the tackle was thrown across the street to the east and came violently in contact with one of the boards inclosing the manhole opening near which the plaintiff was standing or walking, driving it against him, and inflicting injuries to recover for which he brought this action. .
The jury were warranted in finding that the shackle spread owing to the fact that the bolt was not secured at all by a nut or otherwise, or that an attempt was made to secure it by screwing a nut on only part way, so that when the strain came the threads of the bolt were stripped letting the nut off.
The evidence was sufficient to require the submission to the jury of the question as to .whether the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, and whether there was negligence on the part of those doing the work, and was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury on those issues. The defendant, however, denied liability for the acts from which the plaintiff suffered the injury and contended that the men doing the work were not in its employ, and that became a vital issue on the trial.
The plaintiff called as a witness- said Reeves, who testified that on the day of the accident he was working in Delancey street on the subway between the Brooklyn and Williamsburg Bridges. He was then asked, "In whose employ were you?" This was objected to by counsel for the defendant on the ground that it was incompetent, immaterial, and called for a conclusion of the witness, and that the question was one for the jury to determine. The objection was over •ruled and an exception duly taken. Reeves answered that he was in the employ of the defendant, and that his position was that of foreman of steel erection; and under like objection and exception he was permitted to testify that he had worked for the defendant about four or five years in the capacity of foreman, and was foreman of this work . at the time of the accident. He further testified that the work of moving the girder was being done by a gang of men under him and pursuant to his orders. It appeared that this foreman and the gang of men employed under him received their pay in envelopes upon which was printed "Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company," and that •they signed receipts for their pay as having been received from said company. A letter produced by Reeves, signed in the name of the defendant, by W. G. Triest, as vice president, under date of May 11, 1909, addressed "To Whom It May Concern," introduced in evidence over defendant's objection and exception, certifies that Reeves "has been in our employ for about four years as foreman of erection," and in other respects it was a letter of recommendation. W. G. Triest, who signed the letter, was called as a witness, and he testified that the defendant never employed Reeves, and that he stated that Reeves had been in defendant's employ through inadvertence. Several of 'the men engaged on this work were called by the defendant and testified that they were in the employ of the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company at the time of the accident, and, among others, the head paymaster and timekeeper, who testified to the manner in which the employés were paid, and in which receipts from the employés were taken and preserved by him, that the money which he received to give out, and which he did give out, was in envelopes of •the Metropolitan Bridge 8z Construction Company, and that he never paid out any money in the name of the defendant. An agreement in .writing bearing date the 1st day of May, 1904, and duly acknowledged on the 17th day of November, 1906, between the defendant, a domestic corporation, party of the first part, and the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey, as party of the second part, was introduced and read in evidence on the part of the defendant. By this agreement the party of the second part agreed—
"to accept, enter upon, do and perform all necessary work, labor and service for the erection, construction and completion of the constructive part of each and every contract hereafter obtained by the party of the first part for masonry, iron, steel, composite or construction work of any kind or nature, and to perform such construction or erection work in a good and workmanlike manner, to the satisfaction of the party of the first part, or of any architect specified in the first party's contract, in strict accordance with the plans, 'specifications and details of said work, in accordance with all legal requirements and with the requirements of the various departments, municipal bodies, architects, engineers or such person or persons as may be in charge of and superintending the said work on the part of the person, persons or corporations contracting with said party of the first part, and in the prosecution of this agreement to supply all needful foremen, superintendents and workmen of adequate skill and ability and to accept and receive from' said first party and be responsible for all material necessary for said construction or erection."
The party of the first part, being the defendant herein, obligated itself, upon obtaining any contract for work of the description in that part of the contract already quoted, to—
"turn over the constructive or erective part of said contract to the party of the second part, and to pay the said party of the second part for the said erective .or constructive work, as the same progresses, the actual cost to said second parts' of the said work, labor and services (except services and labor of superintendents), said cost to be arrived at by taking the aggregate weekly pay rolls of the party of the second part and liquidating the same in weekly payments, and that in addition thereto the said party of the first part agrees to furnish and loan to said second party all necessary tools, tackle, derricks, ropes, ladders, scaffolding or appliances necessary for such erection or construction, and to pay to the party of the second part on the first day of each month hereafter the further and additional sum of 5 per cent, upon the total pay rolls herein excepting amounts paid for superintendents and paid during the preceding month, it being understood and agreed that said 5 per cent, is to be received by the party of the second part in full compensation for its services in the said work."
It was further agreed that the party of the second part, being the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, was to hire and pay all employés on the work and the salaries of the necessary superintendents, and to immediately pay and discharge any mechanics' liens filed against the work; and that the party of the first part, being the defendant herein, should furnish all materials and deliver the same'to the party of the second part; and that the contract should continue for five years, but might be sooner terminated by either party on two weeks' notice in writing. The defendant also proved a formal notice in writing given by it to the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company under said agreement submitting plans, specifications, details, and drawings for the steel for its contract for this subway work, and calling upon the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company to do the work pursuant to said agreement, and the acknowledgment in writing from the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company of the receipt of said notification containing a promise on its part to proceed with the work. The secretary of the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company had formerly been a stenographer in the defendant's employ, and the only office the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company had was desk room in the office of the defendant. Triest testified that neither he nor the defendant had anything to do with the incorporation of the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company so far as he knew; but he was subsequently asked whether it was not a fact that the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company "was organized and fostered and got together by Snare & Triest Company," and after an objection that the question was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial had been overruled, and an exception taken, the witness declined to answer. Reeves, on being recalled, testified that Triest visited the work sometimes once a week and sometimes once in two weeks, and at times made inquiries and gave directions with respect thereto, and that in May, 1909, he was notified that he would be laid off work by one Holstein, a superintendent under whom he was working, arid he went directly to Triest's office and^said to him:
"I understand from your superintendent, Mr. Holstein, that I am to be laid off, and I came to see if you would give me a recommendation."
Whereupon he says Triest dictated and subsequently signed the letter the material part of which has been stated.
The Appellate Division in the Second Department, in McCherry v. Snare & Triest, 130 App. Div. 241, 114 N. Y. Supp. 674, affirmed without opinion 198 N. Y. 532, 92 N. E. 1090, by a divided court held, on facts somewhat different from those now before the court with respect to the same or a like contract between defendant and the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, that the question of which of the companies was doing the work was one of fact for the jury. Very likely that was also a question of fact in the case at bar; but it cannot be said that the contention of the defendant that it was not doing the work was made in bad faith, or that its claim was without merit. We are of opinion that the learned trial court erred in permitting the witness Reeves to testify that he was employed by defendant. The defendant being a corporation, he should have been permitted to state only the name of the individual who employed him and what position, if any, if he knew, such person held with defendant. It appearing that he whs paid and receipted for his pay in the name of the Metropolitan Company, his opinion that he was working for the defendant was not competent evidence for the consideration of the jury in deciding the question of fact as to who was his employer and responsible for his acts.
The court instructed .the jury that, if the men engaged in this work were not in the employ of the defendant, would end the case, and that the defendant was not responsible for the negligence of the employés of another. The attention of the jury was then drawn to the testimony of Reeves, the foreman, and to these contracts, and the court said:
"Now, of course this contract of itself does not determine; that is a mere bit of paper, probably at the time of thé accident reposing in the pigeon hole at somebody's safe down town. We are more interested in what actually took place on the job. Reeves says that he and the men moving the beam were in the employ of the defendant. ' There is testimony on the other side that you will recall, the time slips and the pay slips, and other evidence, to show, in the light of the testimony of the witnesses called by the defendant, that these men were being paid by the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company. This agreement, you will note, is an unusual agreement. Now, if is true that a corporation like Snare & Triest Company may, if they take a contract to dig this tunnel in Delancey street or any other construction work, make a bona fide subcontract with some other person to do any part of the work, and, in case the employés of that subcontractor cause injury to another, the general contractor is not responsible. In other words, a general contractor may relieve himself of responsibility by making a contract with some independent contractor who undertakes to do a' certain part of the work. And if the men that subcontractor employs cause injury to some passer-by or some member of the public the general contractor is not responsible; the subcontractor himself is responsible. Now, that is well recognized in law; but, in order that that principle of law may apply, it must be a bona fide contractor; and the contention of the defendant (sic) here is that there was no such bona fide subcontract let. As a matter of fact, the work, to all intents and purposes, was being done by Snare & Triest Company, through certain instrumentalities and agencies working under their direction and for' their benefit. Now, this is evidence that you may consider in connection with all the evidence in the case, the testimony as to what actually took place on the job, who paid the men, who directed the men so far as appears in the testimony, and say whether or not these men were actually, from a common sense point of view, actually working for Snare & Triest Company, instead of for the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, in such a sense as would relieve the Snare & Triest Company from responsibility for accidents caused by the men working upon the job. Of course, if you find that the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company was doing that work, that Beeves worked for it, and that these other men worked for it and not for the Snare & Triest Company at all, that there existed here a bona fide independent subcontract under which this work was being done, why, of course, then your verdict will be for the defendant, because this defendant can be liable only in case you find that these men were in its employ to all intents and purposes. If you find, on the other hand, that they were actually and as a matter of fact in the employ of Snare & Triest Company, then you come to the question of damages."
At the close of the charge the defendant duly excepted to the instruction of the court to the effect that Reeves was in charge of "the work of moving the girder, whereupon the court remarked:
"I did not mean to say that he was. I merely meant to call the jury's attention to the fact that he swore he was. The credibility of the witnesses is for the jury."
Counsel for the defendant excepted to this modification, and also to that part of the charge wherein the court referred to the contract as a mere piece of paper, and requested the court to instruct the jury that the contract expressed the contractual relations between the parties, to which the court replied :
"So charged. When I say it is a piece of paper, I mean, of course, merely that that is all any contract is; that is the expression of the contract in writing; that the actual manner in which the work was done supersedes the written language of the paper."
Counsel for the defendant excepted to this modification, and also to the charge "that the contract is a peculiar contract," to which the court said: .
"I didn't mean that it is a peculiar contract; it is an unusual contract I ask the jury particularly to read the contract, to take it with them into the jury room and read it over very carefully." , •,
Counsel for the defendant also excepted to the charge that it was. for the jury to determine whether the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company was doing the work through the instrumentality of the defendant or its agents, and thereupon specifically called the court's attention to the part of the charge to which his exception was directed by saying that it related to that part of the charge wherein the court left it to the jury to determine, in connection with the bona fides of the contract and of the corporation, whether the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company was not "working through the instrumentality of Snare & Triest Company, and not for themselves." Counsel in taking this exception, was in error with respect to what the court had said to the jury, for in the part of the charge to which the exception relates the court had submitted it to the jury to determine, not whether the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company was doing the work through the instrumentality of the defendant, but whether the defendant was doing it through the instrumentality of the Metropolitan Company.
We are of opinion that the jury were permitted under the charge of the learned trial court to give too great importance to the question as to whether or not the contract between the defendant and the Metropolitan Company was made in good faith. The issue to be determined by the jury was, not whether the defendant was instrumental in having the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company incorporated, or what its motive or purpose was in subletting part of the work to that company, or whether the contract between them was made in good faith. The Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, in so far as appears by this record, was a duly organ-' ized corporation; and it was perfectly competent for the defendant to sublet the whole or part of the work to it. The important question to be determined by the jury was: Whose servants were these men, who were guilty of the acts of negligence which resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff? It was quite immaterial whether the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company was organized in good or bad faith, or whether the contract between the defendant and it was made in good or bad faith. It was competent for the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company to employ these men to do this work, and if it did employ them, and was paying them for their services, the defendant is not responsible for their acts. As has been seen, the court instructed the jury that:
"As a matter of fact, the work, to all Intents and purposes, was being done by Snare & Triest Company, through certain instrumentalities and agencies working under their direction and for their benefit."
And also left it to the jury to find whether or not the men who were guilty of the acts of negligence were actually working for the defendant "in such a sense as would relieve Snare & Triest Company from responsibility for accidents caused by the men working upon the job." Considering the charge as a whole, the jury may very well, have found that the men were actually employed by the Metropolitan Bridge & Construction Company, but that the defendant sublet the work with a view to avoiding liability to the employés or for their acts, and that, since the defendant advanced the amount of the pay roll weekly, it should be held responsible for the acts of the men on the theory that they were in a sense in its employ. The men were not in the employ of both companies, and yet the jury under these instructions may well have found for plaintiff on the theory that they were employed by both.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment and order should' be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to áppellant to abide the event.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.