Case Name: Enochs et al. v. State ex rel. Roberson, Atty. Gen.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1922-03
Citations: 128 Miss. 361
Docket Number: No. 22086
Parties: Enochs et al. v. State ex rel. Roberson, Atty. Gen.
Judges: Cook, J., concurs in this dissent.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 361–401

Head Matter:
Enochs et al. v. State ex rel. Roberson, Atty. Gen.
[91 South. 20.
In Banc.
No. 22086.]
1. Taxation. Statutory provision for collecting taxes held not to apply to inheritance tax.
Section 4356, Code 1906 (section 6887, Hemingway’s Code), providing that every lawful tax imposed is a debt due by the person or corporation owning the property or doing the business upon which the tax is levied or imposed, and may be recovered by action in the courts, does not apply to an inheritance tax created by chapter 109, Taws 1918 (chapter 133a et seq., Hemingway’s ' Code, Supp. 1931.)
3. Taxation. Special remedy provided by statute creating tax is ex elusive.
Where a statute creates a tax and provides also a special remedy for its collection, such remedy is exclusive, and an action to recover the tax will not lie, in the absence of legislation authorizing it.
3. Taxation. Inheritance tax not recoverable by action unless so made by statute.
No tax is a recoverable debt by action unless made so by statute; and, if it be assumed that our Inheritance Tax Act imposes personal liability, it is not a personal liability until after it is assessed in the exclusive manner prescribed by the act.
4. Taxation. Remedy for assessment or collection provided by Inheritance Tax Act is exclusive.
The Inheritance Tax Act creates a tax and provides a coercive remedy for its assessment and collection, which remedy is exclusive; it gives a right to the Tax Commission to assess a tax, and to this extent is an obligation imposed upon the taxpayer, but the tax must be assessed in the exclusive manner provided by the act.
Ethridgb and Cook, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from chancery court of Hinds connty.
Hon. Y. J. Steickeb, Chancellor.
Snit by the state, on the relation of Prank Eoberson, attorney-general, against Martha 0. Enochs and other executors and heirs of I. 0. Enochs, deceased. Decree for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Beversed, and bill dismissed.
Oreen & Green and Niles Moseley, for appellant.
Is an inheritance tax a debt within the meaning of section 4256, Code of 1906, . . . prior to the determination by the state tax commission of the full and fair cash value of the net estate, on which the tax is to be computed?
Whereunto, answering brief of attorney-general, we submit no. because: (A) Prior to filing suit herein payment was made of an amount which discharges the tax liability. (B) Section 4256 does not apply to inheritance taxes. (C) Assessment' in accordance with the mandate com tained in the inheritance tax by the functionary designated by the legislature a condition precedent to the imposition of an obligation. House v. Qutnble & Go., 78 Miss. 259.
We invite especial attention to the exhibits; they demonstrate that the commission had before it everything possessed by Mr. Enochs when this payment was accepted; the only point in controversy is as to the value of oue thousand, two hundred shares in now Enochs & Flowers, Ltd. This was fixed by the executors upon the basis of a capitalization of earnings; that basis was accepted by the tax commission, as appeared specifically from the reports submitted, and where the specific thing, the .value of one thousand, two hundred shares has been submitted to and passed by the commission; taxes accepted by the commission as due from these parties on the right to transmit and on the right to receive these one thousand, two hundred shares, thus valued them as to such one thousand, two hundred shares, so thus made the basis of affirmative action by the commission, it is without power. Robertson v. Bank, 85 So. 178; Darnell v. Johnston, 68 So. 738; Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss. 224; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 501; Original Brief, 68.
Section 24, Hemingway’s Code Supp., 1921, sec. 4987, provides: “If any inventory or statement filed in accordance with the provision of this act shall be considered by the state tax commission to be an erroneous or incomplete inventory or statement of the property, real, tangible, and intangible, or any part thereof of the decedent, the said state tax commission shall within thirty days after the filing of said inventory or statement give notice to the executor.”
This is the sole authority of the commission to proceed. The averment is not, as it could not be, that the inventory is either erroneous, or incomplete, but is that it was complete and though complete, there was thereby a gross undervaluation of the same. Here, therefore, is a case where the specific property has been brought before the commission and assessed by it, and having been so assessed, is there now a right to redetermine that which was then passed on because a new method of valuation is desired? Robertson v. Banh, 85 So. 178; Darnell v. Johnson, 68 So. 783; Adams v. Banh, 66-So. 409; Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss. 224; State v. Simmon's, 70 Miss.’ 485; Banh v. Oxford, 78 Miss. 532; Investment Go. v. Suddoth, 70 Miss. 416.
Section 4256 does not apply to inheritance taxation. This section appears first in the Code of 1892. Prior to that date taxes did not constitute a personal liability and therefore no action could be brought. Delat, etc., v. Adams, 93 Miss. 340.
We have examined the original Code section in the office of the secretary of state and it varies somewhat from the Code as written. It reads thus: “Taxes a debt recoverable by action — every lawful tax levied or imposed by the state, ■ or by a county, city, town, or village or levee board, is a debt due by the person or corporation owning the property, or doing the business upon w'hich the tax is levied or imposed, whether assessed or properly assessed or not. And may be recovered by action, and in all actions for the recovery of taxes the assessment-roll shall only be prima-facie correct.
It will be seen that there is a comma after the words, owning the property, and as originally introduced the section stopped after whether assessed or properly assessed or not, whereat a period occurred, and thereafter, in the handwriting of E. H. Thompson, in red ink, appears the interlineation, and may be recovered by action, and in all actions for recovery, of taxes tlie assessment roll shall only be prima-facie correct. At the date of the integration of this section into our statutory law there were but two forms of taxes known, ad valorem taxes and privilege taxes. Statutes imposing obligation upon .the citizens are to be strictly construed. If the state desires to tax them, let it expressly so declare. Vicksburg, etc., B. B. v. State,-62 Miss. 105; Ex parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 482; Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 767; Johnson v. Befining Go., 108 Miss. 416. Furthermore statutes in derogation of the common law are likewise construed strictly. Hophins v. Sandidge, 31 Miss. 668; McKenzie v. Boykin, 111 Miss. 256; Johnson v. Beeves, 112 Miss. 227; Bullock v. Sneed, 13 S. & M. 293; Glen v. Thistle, 23 Miss. 42; Buoker v. Dyer, 44 Miss. 591; Bichardson v. Neblett, 54 So. 695.
See section 1721, Hemingway’s Code, defining assets as personal property with a right to recourse to the land to pay the debts; section 4256 malees the tax a debt due by the person owning the property. This act could not apply because the administrator never owns the property under any conceivable situation. Therefore, as ownership is the criterion for the creation of the debt, where there is no ownership, of necessity the statute cannot apply. If this act is to create property taxation against a person owning the property, then it will fall within section 112 of the Constitution.
But this tax cannot be a privilege tax upon the doing of business and falls clearly without the purview of section 4256. This section says further: whether assessed or properly assessed or not, what is the meaning of this phrase?
We cite Powell v. McKee, 81 Miss. 232, where Justice Teeeal said: “By section 3747, á tax upon personal property is made a debt due by the person owning the property when assessed, whether properly assessed or not.”
This'is entire harmony with the preceding section 4255 which makes the tax a charge upon the thing taxable, whether rightfully or wrongfully assessed. In short, as did Justice Terral, we construe sections 4255 and 4256, as being in prai materia, and thereunder is a definition of what is meant by wrongful assessment, and here the liability of the owner to the tax is determined solely by the ownership at the date of the assessment. In short, if I am the owner of land, and a tax is levied thereon, I become liable as such owner to suit for the tax. Should I sell this land, the vendee is not liable under section 4256, because he was not the owner of the property at the time the assessement was made. Ownership at the date of assessment measures personal liability under this section. Potoell v. McKee, 81 Miss. 229.
Assessment in accordance with the mandate contained in the inheritance tax by the functionary designated by the legislature a condition precedents to imposition of obligation. Johnson v. Puffer, 71 So. 377. Thus where the legislature designates the person to make an assessment the court cannot substitute' the chancery court in its place. This contention is exactly that made in Railroad Company V. Adams, 83 Miss. 315, 5 C. J. 813.
The case of Johnston v. Puffer, 71 So. 377, completely and perfectly supports this theory, and counsel’s effort to distinguish is futile, because the imposition of taxes for either ad valorem or privilege must first exist as a tax law, fully levied and imposed, before such tax so thus lawfully levied and imposed can be transmuted, into a personal obligation of the person owning the property or doing the business. Hattiesburg Grocery Go. v. Robertson, 88 So. 7; Thompson v. Kreutzer, 60 So. 334; G. & 8. I. R. R. Go. v. Adams, 83 Miss. 300.
The precise point was adjudicated in the Puffer case, supra where it was declared: “When the constitution devolved that,duty upon a particular person, the legislature may not substitute another.”
So when the legislature denominates a particular person for the performance of a legislative function, under sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution this court is not authorized to denominate another.' ■ The fundamental mis conception in this case is due to a desire to disregard tbe terms of tbe statute under which valuation by a legislative authority — i. e. the tax commission — constitutes tbe condition upon which if at all, liability for inheritance taxation may be imposed.
Counsel assumes the whole case when he says: “The statute embraces every lawful tax levied or imposed. There is no exception. It is all embracing. It involves ad va-lorem taxes, privilege taxes, income taxes, inheritance taxes, and any taxes which the state, under our Constitution, may impose. Therefrom we respectfully dissent. Section 4256 is specifically limited to the creation of a debt from the person owning the property or doing the business, neither of which occur in income taxation, nor inheritance taxation, and counsel disregards the citations expressly made by the court in the Hattiesburg Grocery Company case, supra. While State-Y. Piazza,, 66 Miss. 426, and Thibo-deaux v. State, 69 Miss. 685, may announce a view so conservative and so favorable to the taxpayer, yet these decisions but announce the fundamental rule that was applied in Johnston v. Puffer, supra, collating all of the authorities, wherefrom we have seen no dissent, that compliance with legislative requirement was requisite in converting individual acquisitions into public property. The court in the Puffer case did not do more than quote the Tonella case, 70 Miss. 701, which had collated the standard authorities holding compliance with law was requisite to the imposition of a statutory obligation.
Counsel assume that section 4256 embraces income and inheritance taxes while in fieri and before they have become consummated by completion of the legal prerequisites of their imposition and therein constitutes what, we submit, is counsel’s fundamental error. Counsel relies- upon Cochran v. United States, 254 U. S. 387, which was an action to recover an amount paid under an act that had been repealed, the court saying': “It is to be remembered, besides, that the case does not present a case of resistence to the payment of a tax, but of the recovery of taxes voluntarily paid.”
So that if an assessment was necessary, the party to be assessed could waive it and the party who received taxes could not take advantage of its default in failing to assess when payment had been made wherefore assessment was solely requisite.
The pith of counsels contention is contained thus: “Our contention is' that the taxes imposed by the statute are debts regardless of whether they have been assessed in the sense in which the statute provides for assessment.” Here we squarely join issue, and rely in the words of State v. Adler, 68 Miss. 496. See, also, authorities collated in original brief.
True the law fixes the rule, and so it does as to ad valorem taxes, but the law does not fix the value, the sole thing here in dispute, which in ad valorem taxes must be fixed by the functions of each, are precisely coequal.
Counsel is in error in overlooking the express provision of the privilege tax chapter, whereby anyone exercising the privileges is made liable for the amount, with damages, and a failing to note that express authority for suit is therein to be found in section 3905. See, also, State v. Fragiacomo, 70 Miss. 803; McBride v. State, 70 Miss. 716.
Counsel cites Providence Institution v. Mass, 6 Wallace 611. But that case merely holds that where the legislature has directly imposed a franchise tax, it may be collected without assessment. We would concede as much. Counsel cites next State v.- Life Insurance Go., 119 Ark. 314, but that opinion does not in any way support the proposition that where valuation by a specific official is required, the courts will disregard the law'and substitute their own machinery for such official.
No question of due process of law is made in this act because requisite notice is integrated into its enforcement. Counsel cites 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 818, for the proposition that normally license taxeS do not require assessment, but on page 819, the same authority declares: “Where the statute imposing the tax provides a special remedy for its collection, such remedy is conclusive,” Citing as appropriate State v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426, whereupon we with confidence rely. 18 C. J. 1072; McClanahan V. Davis, 8 How. 183; Story’s E. PL, sec. 312, and note; 17 Me. 404; 3 Edw. 107, Beav. 284; Woodruff v. State, 71 Miss. 115.
It is argued that this bill may be maintained in the chancery court as a straight suit for taxes. Such undoubtedly is its theory precisely similar to the suit in the Puffer case, which was dismissed.'
The decisions quoted from North Carolina and Revenue Agent v. Stonetcall Mills, 80 Miss. 94, all agree with the proposition that no such right exists until after there shall have ben a compliance with the statutory prerequisites to the imposition of liability.
We .find no fault with Savings Bank v. U. S., 86 U. S. —, 22 L. Ed. 82, but that case is inapplicable for the reasons pointed out in the reply brief and not here again reiterated. The same is true of United States v. Chamberlain, 55 L. Ed. 210. We have never contended that an action at law could not be maintained for duties imposed, nor for stamp taxes levied under the peculiar verbiage of our Federal taxation statutes.
The Alabama cases and those from Tennessee do not contravene our contentions, because none of those cases passed on a statute where a condition to liability was the fixation of value by a constituted authority appointed by the legislature. Under our system of government it is incompetent for the legislature to associate with itself any department of government in the discharge of legislative functions, the true rule being stated in Alcorn v. Earner, 38 Miss. 749.
Counsel erred in declaring that section 4256 makes the heirs of the Enochs estate debtors. Not so, it makes of a debtor only those who own the property, who do the business in neither category of which are the appellees averred to be.
Counsel’s interpretation of section 4256 is sadly at variance with the decisions by this court made. He says: “The statute expressly provides that every lawful tax may be recovered by action, whether assessed or properly assessed or not, and thereby showing that the legislature had in mind that taxes should be a debt prior to assessment and regardless of assessment.”
Thus it is seen that there would be no need for an assessment or an assessor if taxes became a debt before they were assessed. Naught more would be-required than to make demand. The exercise of the power of sale is the exception, not the rule, and counsel’s conception of section 4256, overlooks, as hereinbefore set out, the fundamental factor that the evil therein sought to be removed was only to compel a tax debtor of a lawful assessed tax to assume therefor individual responsibility.
To contend that a debt for taxes was created before the date of a completed, perfected assessment is to completely overturn constitutional government and in its room substitute anarchy. The section of the law upon which we rely in this portion is set forth accurately upon page 63 of counsel’s printed brief thus: “When the Constitution devolves that duty upon a particular person, the legislature may not substitute another.” To which we add: “Neither can this court.” In answer to the- contention about the absconding taxpayer, if this statute is valid, ample protection is vouchsafed.
Question II.
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 63 L. Ed. 1124, was before the court in Travis v. Yale, 252 U. S. 60, and was by that court limited to its proper sphere. For the constitutional questions, we malte reference to the other briefs, and, with deference, submit that this statute is violative of those provisions of our Constitution which have been heretofore set out, especially in view of the peculiar jurisprudence of Mississippi, wherein its administration of decedent’s estate is sui generis.
Question III.
Finally, with deference, we submit that the interpretation placed upon section 34 of this section, is correctly announced in our reply, and counsel for appellee has not pro-, duced any authority to controvert the conclusion there arrived at.
Frank Roberson, Attorney-General, and Wells, Stevens & Jones, for appellees.
Counsel argues that the state tax commission has no authority to re-appraise, and that inasmuch as the executors filed an inventory and valuation of the estate, and the commission accepted this. inventory and received tentatively the amount of tax based thereon, that this is final and conclusive. At least this is the way we interpret counsel’s brief. As a matter of fact the state tax commission never did appraise the I. C. Enochs estate. The executors filed an inventory in which they undertook to appraise the estate at a valuation which the state tax commission, and the attorney-general, believe to be not only incorrect and erroneous, but a wilful evasion of the law. By the express terms of section 24 of the act, it is provided that if any inventory or statement be considered by the state tax commission erroneous or incomplete in whole or in part, that the commission may give notice to the executors to appear and furnish additional information, or subject themselves to an examination and inquiry. The bill of complaint in this cause charges that the commission in fact considered the statement: “Incorrect in divers and sundry particulars, and especially in that the said estate is valued at only a total of five hundred and seventy-seven thousand seven hundred and forty-nine dollars and fifty-four cents whereas in truth and in fact, as your complainant is informed and believes, and so charges' on information and belief, the said estate was of a value between two million five hundred thousand dollars and three million dollars.” The bill also avers that said statement is a gross undervaluation of the same, and proceeding under the statutes, the said commissioner named the Hon. George Butler, Esq. of Jackson, Miss., appraiser to take testimony and report back, etc. In other words the bill and exhibits show that the commission followed the statutory procedure, and were met by an open defiance on the part of the executors, and beneficiaries. These allegations are admitted by the demurrer.
If the commission had obtained the information and valued the property, or if the appraiser had gone into the questions and appraised the estate, and made his report, then there might be some room for counsel’s argument. But nowhere does this law malee final the valuation placed by the taxpayer.
Counsel also state on page 61: “The provisions of section 24 are for a- current assessment and not back assessment.” .With this we agree, and again call the court’s attention to the fact that the purpose of this proceeding is to arrive at a proper valuation of the I. C. Enoch’s estate, and is in deed and in truth a current, and not a back assessment. The executors were in process of administration. The estate has not been closed. The estate has never been valued by the commission. The estate has never received an acquittance or receipt in full by the commission. The commission did not approve the inventory as filed by the executors; on the contrary they disapproved and found that the inventory was incorrect and a gross undervaluation of the net value of the estate. The state through its chief law officer charges in the bill these facts. The demurrer admits that the estate is worth from two and one-half to three million dollars.
There is a preliminary receipt given by one member of the Tax Commission, with the distinct understanding that it was not in final settlement, and it was given at a time when the law itself, by section 24 gave the commission a right to check over the inventory as returned by the taxpayer, and to find that it was incorrect, and not binding on the public, surely the commission cannot be inveigled into giving a preliminary receipt of this kind and conclude the public interests. To accomplish this result would place the stamp of approval upon fraud and perjury, and proclaim a day of artifice and legal legerdemain. Even upon the assumption that the inventory as returned by the executors listed all of the property belonging to the estate which the bill denies, nevertheless, as stated by the supreme court of the United States in Winona & St. Peter Land Company v. Minn., 40 L. Ed. 247, the state has a remedy against a gross undervaluation of property. Savings, etc., Society v. Austin, 46 Cal. 416.
If any inventory or statement filed in accordance with the provisions of this act shall be considered by the state Tax Commission to be an erroneous or incomplete inventory or statement, etc., the state Tax Commission can proceed in the manner provided by law to make its own ap-praisement. Nowheré does the law make the inventory returned by the taxpayer conclusive. On the contrary as expressly held, by the supreme court of Illinois in People v. Sholem, 244 Ill. 502, 91 N. E. 704: “The people have a right to compel the filing in the county court of the inventories required to be filed by the executor, and by surveying parties, to aid in determining the extent and value of the estate for inheritance tax purposes, and while said inventory is not conclusive, the people have the right to have the benefit thereof, without having the burden of proving the value of the estate by examining witnesses.”
There is no law providing that the inventory as returned by the taxpayer is conclusive, and in fact no law that any certificate given by the state Tax Commission is conclusive except the following language in section 29, viz.: “The certificate of the state Tax Commission of the amount of said tax, and the receipt of the commission for the amount of tax so certified shall be conclusive as to the payment of the tax to the extent of said certification.”
This law only has application to the allowance of the fina], account of executors, and contemplates a certificate to the chancery court that the tax has been paid in order that the executor may receive his. discharge. No provision of the statute makes the receipt of certificate from the com mission to the taxpayer, sole evidence of the transaction or conclusive.
Coming more closely to the facts in the case at bar, payment tendered by the executors was received by Mr. Thompson, a member of the commission, but with the distinct understanding that it would not be final or conclusive. This is distinctly alleged in the bill, and admitted by the demurrer. The payment was made at a time when the law authorized the commission to make its own appraisement. Action was taken by the commission within the time allowed by the statute looking toward further inquiry and and appraisement by the commission. The commission acted in accordance with the statute. The bill shows this and the demurrer admits it. Furthermore, as hereinbe-fore stated, one member of the commission is without power to execute an acquittance that binds the commission. The commission acts as a quasi-judicial body and can only speak through orders entered upon its minutes. If one member of the commission had the power to execute acquittance, or receipt in full, then he could nullify the will of the majority,.over throw the best judgment of the majority and by curb stone conversations and receipts issued down town or on railroad trains, thwart the very purpose of the law, and throw the administration of the law in utter confusion. As stated, counsel can point to no order of the commission accepting their check as full payment and no order of the commission approving their inventory. While the bill states that the value of the estate is not less than two.and one:half million dollars, well founded rumor and scraps of information point to the conclusion now that the estate of I. C. Enochs was worth not less than five million. This large .estate was built up by a long resident and honored citizen of our state, and under the protection of Mississippi laws. If I. C. Enochs were living he would pay his honest obligations, and all the state asks is that his executor measure up to the same rule of conduct with which the life and actions of.the deceased always squared.
One word more before closing. On page 42 of counsel’s brief they record the following admission: “Strictly speaking an inheritance tax is not a tax upon the property itself, but upon its transmission by will or descent.”
This admission, we respectfully submit, knocks out the only prop upon which the entire argument for appellants rests. If the tax is not a property tax then no constitutional provision, either state or federal, has been violated or infringed, and the mass of authorities arrayed by counsel are not in point.
We repeal the declaration of the supreme court of the United States in the leading and oft approved case of U. 8. v. Perkins. “The legacy becomes the property of the legatee only after it has suffered a diminution of the amount of the tax, and it is only upon this condition that the legislature assents to the bequest of it.”
It is a righteous tax. It goes a long way toward the defraying the necessary expenses, and the ever increasing expense of the government. The state has a vested right in the transaction and in the case at bar has a clear right to discovery. As stated by Gleason & Otis, page 31: “State has a vested financial right in the estate of the decedent and therefor it has a right to know what property is in the safe deposit box.”
That is exactly what we are asking for in the case at bar. If the executors will open the safe deposit box and disclose the full amount and value of the estate, justice will be done, and the rights of no one hurt or infringed. Let the facts speak for themselves. On this right to discovery we also refer the court to National 8afe Deposit Company v. Stead, 250 Ill. 284, 95 N. E. 973.
We reiterate, that the state has the right of classification and a wide range in allowing exemptions. This subject is discussed by Gleason & Otis, p'ages 41, et seq. On page 44, it is stated: “A classification by residence is valid. A state may tax residents and exempt non-residents from the state as to some or all their property within the jurisdiction. This is one of the most common elassifica- tions known to inheritance taxation, and does not seem to have ever been challenged.”
The Classification by Relationship.
It is to the best interest of the state that the helpless widow and the minor children should be placed in a favored class, a class different from collaterals or strangers. Classifications of the present law are reasonable and in line with the classifications that have been approved in other states, and that have been approved by the supreme court of the United States. As well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a very recent case) the New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, Advance Opinions, 620, in viewing the decision in Knowlton v. Moore, and commenting on the historical view of the law: “Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” We are confident the court will not tear out a page of history by upsetting the law here under attack.
Appellant have paid a little over .nine thousand dollars where they are probably due from fifty thousand dollars to one hundred thousand dollars. The decree of the learned chancery court overruling the demurrer, should be promptly affirmed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Opinion:
Holden, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill in chancery on the relationship of Frank Roberson, attorney-general for the state, against Martha C. Enochs and other executors and heirs of the estate of I. C. Enochs, deceased, wherein it is sought to compel the defendants to discover and disclose the true amount of the estate subject to an inheritance tax under the Inheritance Tax Act (chapter 109, Laws of 1918; chapter 122a, Hemingway's Code of Supp. of 1921) ; and praying for a personal decree against the defendants and the estate for the inheritance taxes due thereon.
The bill charges:
"That the said executors submitted to (the Tax Commission of the state a statement purporting to give a true and correct statement of the assets and the property of said I. G. Enochs deceased, but that the Tax Commission was in formed and believes said statement is incorrect in divers and sundry particulars, and especially in that the said estate is valued at only a total of five hundred and seventy-seven thousand dollars, whereas in truth and in fact the complainant is informed and believes and so charges, that the said estate was of value between two million, five hundred thousand dollars and three million dollars."
The bill further charges in substance that the Tax Commission was convinced that the statement contained a gross undervaluation of the estate, and, acting under the law, proceeded to summon one of the defendants to come before the appraiser appointed by the Commission and give testimony on oath as to the true value of the said estate, whereupon the defendant declined and refused to appear and give testimony as ordered so to do under the authority of the said Inheritance Tax Law.
That the Tax Commission, being unable to procure said testimony in the manner provided by law, deemed it necessary and proceeded to file this bill for discovery, and ordered the attorney-general to so proceed, in order to discover the true amount and value of said estate; that the value of said estate is totally unknown to the complainant, and, being unable to secure the information from the defendants, in whom it alone reposes, as to the value of the said estate, discovery is prayed so that the true amount due as an inheritance tax may be ascertained by the Tax Commission.
It is charged that the defendants are due inheritance taxes to the state of Mississippi, but the exact amount of which is unknown to complainant, because he does not know the exact value of the said estate. The bill prays that process issue to the defendants, asks for specific discovery, and that on final hearing a personal judgment be given against defendants for the inheritance taxes due the state upon the said estate of the deceased, I. C. Enochs.
A demurrer to the bill was filed by the defendants, which challenged the validity of the Inheritance Tax Act on several grounds, and also raised the question of jurisdiction of the chancery court to entertain the bill. From a decree oyerruling the demurrer this appeal is prosecuted.
It will be unnecessary, at this time, for us to consider the points raised as to the constitutionality of the act, because a determination of the question as to the jurisdiction of the chancery court to maintain the bill will dispose of the appeal, and a decision of the other points would be mere dicta.
The contention of the appellant, as we understand it, is that the chancery court has no jurisdiction to compel discovery, nor to render a personal decree for the taxes, because the act expressly provides the method of ascertaining and assessing the inheritance tax due upon the estate of the deceased, and that where the method or remedy for assessment and collection is provided by the act that gives the right to tax, the method is exclusive, and must be followed.
The opposing view of the attorney-general is that the bill is maintainable, for at least discovery, for the reason that the Inheritance Tax Act imposes a tax which is a debt, and may be ascertained and collected by an action in the courts, relying upon section 4256, Code of 1906 (section 6887, Hemingway's Code), and section 4805, Code of 1906 (section 3169, Hemingway's Code), which sections we here set out:
"6887 (4256) Taxes a Debt Recoverable by Action.— Every lawful tax levied-or imposed by the state, or by a county, city, town, village, or levee board, is a debt due by the person or corporation owning the property or doing the business upon which the tax is levied or imposed, whether assessed or properly assessed or not, and may be recovered by action; and in all actions for the recovery of taxes the assessment roll shall only be prima-facie correct."
"3169. (4805) The State Entitled to All Actions — Unlawful Detainer for its Lands. — The state shall be entitled to bring all actions and all remedies to which individuals are entitled in a given state of case; it may maintain the action of unlawful entry and detainer in all cases, at its option, for the recovery of land."
It is further contended by the attorney-general, as we gather from the arguments, that the bill may be maintained even without the aid of section 4256, Code of 1906 (section 6887, Hemingway's Code), above referred to, on the ground that the Inheritance Tax Act itself Imposes a tax or obligation, or personal debt, in favor of the state against defendants which may be ascertained by discovery, and collected by suit in the same way that an individual could sue under the said section 4805, Code of 1906 (section 3169, Hemingway's Code).
After a careful consideration of the question involved we are convinced the suit is not maintainable upon either ground urged by the appellee, nor upon any other. The said section 4256, Code of 1906 (section 6887, Hemingway's Code), making taxes a debt recoverable by action, has no application to the recovery of an inheritance tax. It is obvious from the language of the statute the legislature had in mind only property and privilege taxes; as it plainly says every lawful tax imposed "is a debt due by the person or corporation owning the property or doing the business upon which the tax is levied or imposed." It was only intended to provide that the tax should be a debt against the person owning the property or doing the business upon Avhich it is levied; a property tax or a tax upon a privilege, not an inheritance.
At the time of the enactment of the statute inheritance and income taxes were to our state unknown, or at least were not within the design of the legislature. Therefore, the section does not make the inheritance tax a debt recoverable by action; and since the inheritance tax is not made a debt by statute, the act creating the tax and prescribing the method of its assessment and collection is exclusive and must be followed.
The statute does not afford a cumulative remedy to collect inheritance taxes, as it does in cases of taxes imposed upon property or upon the business, as held in Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Adams, 93 Miss. 340, 48 So. 190. Blit the rule announced in State v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426, 6 So. 316, which holds that, "if the statute which creates a tax provides a special remedy for its collection, such remedy is exclusive, and an ordinary action to recover the tax will not lie, unless it is so expressly provided," is the settled law, and should be followed in the case before us. This- latter decision ivas rendered after the enactment of said section 4805, Code of 1906 (section 3169, Hemingivay's Code).
The same principle is announced in State Revenue Agent v. Tonella, 70 Miss. 701, 12 So. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642, in Avhich it was held that the assessment can only be made by the officer designated by law. It is true the court there was speaking of the duty of assessing as imposed by the Constitution; but the principle is the same, in that, where the statute designates the method of assessment in order to ascertain and collect a tax, the statute is equally impelling as the Constitution, and must be followed as the exclusive remedy of collection.
The rule seems to be universal in this state and elsewhere that the method of assessing and collecting the tax prescribed by the act creating the tax must be followed to the exclusion of any other remedy. This principle was announced by this court in the recent case of Hattiesburg Gro. Co. v. Robertson (Miss.), 88 So. 4, wherein it was held that the method provided in the Income Tax Act must be followed exclusively in the assessment and collection of the tax. This is undoubtedly the true rule, and actions in the courts to assess and collect taxes cannot be maintained unless there be a statute so providing, either by declaring such a tax a recoverable debt, or by giving jurisdiction expressly to assess and collect such taxes by suit, provided, of course, such authority does not come in conflict with the Constitution. We have been unable to find any decisions contrary to the views expressed above; on the other hand the rule we announce seems to have been long established in our state. See Board of Super visors v. Johnston (Miss.), 7 So. 390 ; Johnston v. Puffer Mfg. Co., 111 Miss. 240, 71 So. 377.
As to the second, proposition presented by the appellee, that is, that the Inheritance Tax Act imposes a tax which constitutes a debt or personal obligation in favor of the state, we are unable to agree with the contention, for the reason that, as we have already said, no tax is a recoverable debt unless made so by a statute, and in the case at bar the Inheritance Tax Act, if we assume it imposes personal liability, does not make the tax a debt or personal liability against the defendants until after the amount is ascertained and assessed by the Tax Commission. And the act provides the exclusive method of ascertaining and assessing the tax.
Section 4987d, Hem. Supp., provides that the tax imposed shall be assessed and determined by the state Tax Commission, and notice of the amount shall be mailed to the executor, and the commission shall collect the taxes so assessed. Section 4987g makes a similar provision for the ascertainment of the tax. Section 4987k provides that the tax imposed shall be due and payable when the amount thereof is determined by the board of Tax Commissioners. Section 4987y provides that the Tax Commission may reappraise the estate and sets out the method of so doing. And, finally, section 4987z provides a remedy by coercion for ascertaining and assessing the tax, by compelling the representatives or heirs of the estate to disclose and discover the true amount of property subject to the tax, upon which the Tax Commission will determine and make the assessment and proceed to collection.
We think from a careful reading of the Inheritance Tax Act it will be clearly seen that no tax is due against the estate of the decedent, and consequently is not a recoverable debt, until after the amount has been ascertained and assessed in the manner provided in the act. The method prescribed by the act in order to establish the tax is available and exclusive, and must be followed in the absence of other legislation authorizing the state Tax Commission to proceed to ascertain, assess, and collect by an action in the courts.
The act can be said to give a right to the Tax Commission to assess a tax. To this extent it may be said to be an obligation imposed upon the taxpayer in favor of the state, but this obligation cannot be enforced in the courts, unless authorized by statute, before the tax is assessed in the exclusive manner provided by the act, which gives the remedy as well as the right.
The decree of the lower court is reversed, the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed, without prejudice to the rights of the appellee.
Reversed and Mil dismissed.