Case Name: Reginald Wayne WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Correctional Officer NANEZ, His Individual Capacity; Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-11-04
Citations: 670 F. App'x 555
Docket Number: No. 15-55813
Parties: Reginald Wayne WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Correctional Officer NANEZ, His Individual Capacity; Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 670
Pages: 555–556

Head Matter:
Reginald Wayne WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Correctional Officer NANEZ, His Individual Capacity; Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-55813
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted October 25, 2016
Filed November 04, 2016
Reginald Wayne Whatley, Pro Se, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Todd Grabarsky, AGCA—Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Reginald Wayne Whatley appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Whatley failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") and failed to demonstrate that prison officials interfered with the grievance process. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856, 1860, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (proper administrative exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory, but'may not be required when "prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation"). Whatley's contention that he did not have to exhaust because he brought a civil suit seeking money damages is unpersuasive. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (administrative exhaustion is required under the PLRA regardless of "the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues").
Whatley's motion for leave to exhaust administrative remedies, filed on June 6, 2016, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.