Case Name: McNamee vs. Waterbury
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1873-04-05
Citations: 4 S.C. 156
Docket Number: 
Parties: McNamee vs. Waterbury.
Judges: Wright, A. J., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 156–172

Head Matter:
HEARD NOVEMBER TERM, 1872.
McNamee vs. Waterbury.
Where the personal estate of a decedent is insufficient for the payment of his debts, the Probate Court, on the application of his,administrator, has jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to order a sale of the real estate for that purpose.
A purchaser at a sale of a decedent’s land, made under an order of the Probate Court, for payment of debts, cannot maintain a bill in equity against an occupant of the land, to restrain him from excavating and appropriating to his own use minerals therein, until he has established his title by action at law.
Before MELTON, J., at Edgefield, June Term, 1871.
This was a bill in equity, by Richard McNamee against A. G. Waterbury, Frank Holman, James Morrison, Thomas J. Davis, John B. Moore and James Gardner. The facts of the case, and the object of the bill, are stated in the following decree of the Circuit Court:
Melton, J. This case came on to be heard by the Court at the June Term of the Court of Common Pleas for Edgefield County, 1871. The pleadings and the evidence established the facts. Dudley Rountree, late of Edgefield County, died intestate, seized and possessed of a considerable estate, part of -which was a certain tract of land, of five hundred and thirty-five acres, described in the pleadings. He left him surviving his widow, Mary Rountree, and several children, among them Christiana Black, wife of Janies E. Black, and Mary H. Rogers. Under proceedings for partition among his heirs, in December, 1856, this tract of land was sold by the Commissioner in Equity for Edgefield District, and was pur chased by the said James E. Black, who executed his bond for the purchase money, in the sum of thirty-one hundred dollars, with one Joseph Hightower as surety. On this bond are endorsed several credits, for $127.31 on the 9th December, 1856, $700 on the 16th February, 1858, and $1,200 on the 5th December, 1859. In April, 1859, a bill was filed in the Court of Equity for Edge-field District, at the suit of Christiana Black, by her next friend, Joseph Hightower, against James E. Black, her husband, and the heirs and distributees of Dudley Rountree, under which, on the 8th day of June, it was ordered, amongst other -things, that the entire portion of the said Christiana, in the estate of her father, Dudley Rountree, be settled upon her, for her sole and separate use, for life, with power to dispose of the same, after her death, by any instrument of writing in the form of a will; and, in default of any such disposition by her, then, after her de'ath, to belong to the said James E. Black, if he survived her, for and during his natural life; and, after his death, if he survived her, or if he does not survive her, then, from and after her death, to belong to her children, and to be divided amongst them absolutely and in fee, in such proportion as they would take of her intestate estate; that the said tract of land of five hundred and thirty-five acres, bought by the said James E. Black, at the sale by the Commissioner, at the price of $3,100, be received and taken as part of the said Christiana’s portion of her said father’s estate, at the valuation above mentioned; and that the said Joseph Hightower be appointed the trustee under the settlement thereby directed, with the proviso, however, that he should first e'nter into bond, with at least two good sureties, to the Commissioner of the Court, in the penalty of fifteen thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as such trustee. To this proceeding, James E. Black was made a party by regular process, and there was evidence going to show that the order was made with his actual knowledge and consent. Mrs. Christiana Black died without having exercised the power of disposition conferred by this order, leaving her husband and three children, Joseph D., Mary E. and Eliza K. Black, who are minors. ' The husband, James E. Black,- died intestate on the 7th May, 1861, and administration of his estate was granted to Joseph Hightower. On the 10th May, 1866, long after the death of Black, Joseph Hightower, assuming to act as trustee, executed a lease of a parcel of this land, of three acres, to D. Prank Holman, for the sum of fifty dollars, for the term of five years, and on the 23d November, 1867, a lease of a similar parcel, for a like term and consideration, to Thomas J. Davis and M. C. M. Hammond. The lease of Holman has been assigned to A. G. Waterbury, and that of Davis and Hammond is now held by Davis and J. B. Moore. Frank Holman, James Morr.isson and James Gardner, named defendants, disclaim any interest in the matter in controversy.
The parcels of land contain valuable beds of kaolin clay and chalk ; and, in pursuance of their respective leases, the defendants, Waterbury, Davis and Moore, are in possession, and have erected expensive buildings and machinery for the purpose of digging and removing these deposits. In April, 1868, Joseph Hightower died. In June, 1869, Mary H. Rogers obtained letters of ad ministration of the unadministered estate of James E. Black, and, on the succeeding day, 11th of June, filed her petition in the Probate Court for Edge-field County, setting forth, among other things, that the personal estate of James E. Black had been sold, in 1861, by Joseph High-tower, as administrator; that the intestate, Black, was indebted to various persons, and principally on the bond hereinafter referred to, now amounting, in balance due, to about four thousand dollars ; that Joseph Hightower had failed to administer the estate which passed into his hands ; and that there being no personal assets of the intestate remaining, a sale of this tract of 535 acres was necessary for the payment of these debts. On the same day a summons was issued under this petition, directed to the infant children of Christiana Black, returnable seven days • thereafter, requiring them to show cause why the prayer of the petition, for a sale of this land, should not be granted. Under an order of the Probate Court, without date, Mary Rountree, the grandmother of these infants, was appointed their guardian ad litem, and accepted the appointment. The summons was not served upon the infants until the 15th June, 1869. Without having inquired into the statements of the petition, without having taken an account of the administration of Joseph Hightower, without further proceeding looking to a marshaling of the assets of the estate, and without any answer or other pleading on the part of Mary Rountree on behalf of the infants, the Probate Court passed an order authorizing and empowering the petitioner, as administratrix de bonis non of James E. Black, to sell, for cash, either at public or private sale, the real estate of her intestate. On the following day, 19th June, 1869, the petitioner, Mary H. Rogers, accordingly sold and conveyed the said tract of land of 535 acres to the plaintiff, Richard McNamee, for the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars in cash. The proceeds, it was stated, have been paid to the Probate Judge to await the further order of the Court. On the 28th June, 1869, the bill, in this case, was filed, setting up the title of the plaintiff, impeaching the leases under which defendants claim, and praying a cancellation of the leases, an account of the profits derived from the parcels of land included within them, an injunction against the excavating and appropriating, by the defendants, of the clay and chalk within these parcels, and the surrender of the possession so held by the defendants.
Upon motion before His Honor Judge Platt, a preliminary injunction was granted, in accordance with the prayer of the bill, which, upon a further hearing, was dissolved. In May, 1870, the motion was renewed before me upon an amended proceeding, and under an order to show cause, an ad interim injunction was granted, which, by arrangement between the parties, has been continued in force. Upon this statement of facts it is adjudged :
1. The decree of the Court of Equity, under the bill exhibited, in 1859, by Christiana Black, for a settlement of her interest in Dudley Rountree’s estate, to which her husband, James E. Black, and the heirs-at-law and distributees were made parties, is binding upon all the parties, and operated to rescind and vacate the sale by the Commissioner to James E. Black, and to vest the estate in Christiana Black for life, and in James E. Black for life, if he survived her, and, upon the death of the survivor, to vest the estate in remainder in Joseph D., Mary E. and Eliza K. Black, the minor children of Christiana Black. It further operated to entitle James E. Black to be released from the bond given by him for the purchase money. Why James E. Black subsequently made payments on this bond, and why it continues to be held against his estate, and why the payments made by him are not accounted for, are matters not pertinent to this issue; not sufficiently so, certainly, to authorize the Court to disregard the final judgment of the Court of Equity, pronounced upon due course of proceedings.
2. The proceedings of the Court of Probate are irregular. The minor children of Christiana Black were not made parties in the manner prescribed by law. The interest of Mrs. Rountree, their grandmother and guardian ad litem, was largely and directly an tagonistic to theirs, whilst the effect of the proceedings was, if possible, to vacate a decree to which she and the petitioners were parties, of which both — constructively, at least — had knowledge, and by which both were concluded; a decree under which .these minors held an absolute estate in the lands in question. The statements of the petitioner were not supported by proof, and the order thereunder was taken as against these minors by default If these minors held the estate simply as the heirs of James E. Black, they could not be concluded by such questionable and essentially defective proceedings. Clearly they are not concluded, when it appears that the interest of James E. Black terminated at his death, and that these minors held in these lands an absolute estate. The deed of Mary H. Rogers, under the order so pronounced, purporting to convey the estate of James E. Black, in fact conveyed nothing, and the title of the plaintiff is invalid.
It is not pertinent to enquire into the title of the defendants, who were, at the date of the sale to the plaintiff, and are now, in possession of the parcels described in their respective leases. They derive their title from Joseph Hightower, who, having failed to execute the required bond, was not invested, for an instant, with the office of trustee. The consideration for the respective leases is, on their side, grossly inadequate, and they are not regarded as having any claim whatever to the favorable consideration of the Court.
3. The plaintiff, however, must, as at law, depend upon the strength of his own title; and, as this is shown to be invalid, the relief which he seeks must be denied.
It is, therefore, ordered that the bill be dismissed.
The plaintiff appealed, and, for the purposes of the appeal, filed the following exceptions to the decree:
1. To the conclusions of law found by His Honor in paragraph No. 1 of his conclusions of law in his decision herein.
2. To the conclusions of law found by His Honor in paragraph No 2 of his conclusions of law in his decision herein.
3. To so much of the conclusions of law found by His Honor in paragraph No. 3 of his conclusions of law in his decision herein as finds that “the plaintiff must, as at law, depend upon the strength of his own title, and, as this is shown to be invalid, the relief which he seeks must be denied.”
4. To so much of the conclusions of law found by His Honor in his decision herein as orders that the bill be dismissed.
5. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the settlement ordered by the Court of Equity, 8th June, 1859, was only executive, and inoperative to divest the title of James E. Black to the realty in question.
6. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the said settlement, being on the express condition that the said realty should be taken by Christiana Black at a valuation, the result of the non-performance of this condition, was that no right to said realty ever vested in Christiana Black and children.
7. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the bond given by James E. Black to the Commissioner in Equity, being secured by statutory lien, created by Act 1791, the said settlement ordered in a suit to which said obligee was no party, was subject to said lien, and the lien never having been removed by said Christiana Black and children, the said realty was properly sold as the property of James E. Black, on the' application of his administratrix de bonis non for sale of the same for the payment of debts.
8. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that, there being no evidence on the face of said order of settlement or otherwise, that any of the heirs of Dudley Rountree, cestui que trusts of the bond secured by the statutory lien, (except Christiana Black,) ever consented to said order of settlement, said heirs have in no manner waived their claims under said lien, and the bond secured thereby.
9. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the subsequent acts of all the parties connected with the proceedings in ■equity, and of the successive Commissioners in Equity, obligees of the bond given by James E. Black, show that said order of settlement could never have been intended to vacate said bond and lien, was subject to said lien, and, so far as said realty was concerned, embraced only James E. Black’s equity of redemption therein.
10. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that, even in the event of said settlement being valid and effectual, the effect of the payments made on said bond was to vest in Black an equitable interest pro tanto, and the legal title never having passed from him to authorize his administratrix de bonis non to apply for sale of said realty for the payment of Black’s debts.
11. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that, even in the event of said settlement being valid and effectual, and the fee simple in said realty vesting in the children of James E. and Christiana Black, who were parties to the proceedings in the Probate Court, their interest in said realty was transferred to the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser, for valuable consideration, and the claims of said children, if any, attached on the fund arising from said sale in the custody of the Probate Court.
12. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the title of plaintiff and defendants, being from the same source, and the title of defendants being pretensive only and invalid, defendants are estopped from disputing plaintiff’s title.
13. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that the decree of the Probate Court, ordering the sale of said realty, (even if the proceedings are so irregular or defective as to vitiate them, which is denied,) can only be overruled or set aside by appeal to the Circuit Court, or by original proceedings for that purpose at the instance of parties to the proceedings in the Probate Court, or others who have been damnified or aggrieved thereby, and cannot (as is attempted in the present case) be impeached collaterally by defendants, who are not only strangers to the proceedings in the Probate Court, and in no manner damnified or aggrieved thereby, but wrong doers, having, according to His Honor’s decision, “ no claim whatever to the favorable consideration of the Court.”
14 To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, under the decree of a competent Court, is entitled to the equitable aid of the Court of Common Pleas, against defendants, without a shadow of claim, committing irreparable injury.
15. To said conclusions of law, in that it is not decided that plaintiff have the injunction and account prayed for in his bill.
Finley, Youmans, Chamberlain, for appellant.
Carroll, Bacon, Carr, contra,
April 5, 1873.
{a.) As the principal question in the case seems to have been put at rest by a recen Act of the Legislature conferring jurisdiction upon the Probate Court to order sales of real estate for payment of debts in aid of the personalty, it is deemed unnecessary to publish the arguments of counsel.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
"Wiluard, A. J.
Under the view taken of this case it will be necessary to consider only two questions. The first is, whether the Probate Court possesses authority to order the sale of the lands of a decedent for the purpose of raising a fund in the hands of an administrator for the payment of the debts of such decedent when the personal assets are insufficient for that purpose. The second is, whether a purchaser, under an order made by the Probate Court, for the purpose indicated above, can maintain a bill in equity against the occupant of lands so sold, to restrain such occupant from appropriating the usufruct of the land, such as minerals, &e., without having established his title thereto in an action at law.
The determination of the question of the authority of the Probate Court involves the construction of the following language from Art. 4, Sec. 20, of the Constitution : " A Court of Probate shall be established in each County, with jurisdiction in all matters testamentary, and of administration in business appertaining to minors, and the allotment of dower, in cases of idiocy, lunacy and persons 'non compotis mentis." The particular clause to be examined is that conferring jurisdiction in all matters of administration.
It must be considered, first, in reference to the sense of the terms emplojmd, and, second, in relation to the general'intention of the Constitution as to the character of the Court constituted as expressed in the language defining such jurisdiction. We will first consider whether the power of ordering the sale of the lands of a decedent for the purpose of raising a fund in the hands of an administrator for the payment of such decedent's debts is a matter of administration in the sense of the clause under consideration. What are matters of administration is to be determined by the laws of the State existing at the time the language in question was introduced into the Constitution. The object of administration is to pay the debts of the deceased, and distribute his personal estate among those entitled to it, and any act that may properly be performed by an administrator looking to this end is a matter of administration. To accomplish this end the administrator is clothed with authority to collect the personal estate and to convert it into a form suitable for the purpose.
At common law the personal estate alone is assets for the payment of such debts by the administrator. By the Statute (2 Stat., 570,) " the houses, lands and other hereditaments and real estates, situate and being within this State, belonging to any person in debted, shall be liable to and chargeable with all just debts, duties and demands, of what nature or kind soever, owing to any person, and shall and may be assets for the satisfaction thereof, and shall be subject to like remedies, proceedings and process as personal estates." It is the unmistakable intent of this clause to make the real estate of a decedent assets in the hands of his administrator for the payment of his debts, if the exigencies of the estate render that course necessary, for that is the necessary result of assimilating the realty to the personalty, as it regards the mode of applying it to the satisfaction of the debts of the decedent.
The interposition of a Court is not required in order to impose the character of assets on the realty, for that is already done by the terms of the Statute; it is only required to ascertain whether the personal assets are insufficient to discharge the debts. It may well be questioned whether a power to sell the realty, in the event of the insufficiency of personal assets, is not conferred directly by the Statute, so that an adjudication of the insufficiency of assets would authorize such sale without a personal order authorizing and directing such sale. Such a construction has not, however, been put on the Statute by judicial authority, and we are not called upon, at the present time, to consider it. It is enough to know that, assuming the necessity of a judicial declaration of the fact of the insufficiency of personal assets, upon the ascertainment of such fact, the duty is imperative of subjecting the realty to the payment of such debts, and the Court has no discretion but to proceed to do whatever may be requisite to give efficacy to the Statute. Does jurisdiction in all matters of administration embrace the authority to determine the fact of the insufficiency of personal assets and power to conform to the requirements of the Statute, as it regards subjecting the realty to like remedies, as are appropriate in the case of personalty ? As the application of.the personalty, as assets in the hands of the administrator, to the payment of debts, is indisputably a matter of administration, it would seem reasonable that a provision of law, placing realty on the same footing, in this respect, as personalty, was intended to make the application of the realty to such purpose a matter of administration also.
It is true that the administrator cannot, of his own mere motion, reach out his hand and take poásession of the realty and sell it as if it were personalty. He must, indeed, apply to a Court and show grounds for such demand, but the very fact that he may make such a demand of the Court shows that he has a right to the thing demanded, and this right arising under the Statute, he holds in virtue of his office as administrator.
The concession that-the administrator is clothed with authority to demand through the proper Court power to sell the realty is a concession; that the application of the,realty to the payment of debts, in the event of the insufficiency of personal assets is, in a strict sense, a matter of administration, or, in other words, a matter in respect of which the administrator is clothed with power to act in virtue of his office.
This conclusion is strengthened by looking at the terms under consideration from the stand point of the Constitution. They are there employed to define the powers of a Court, not of an administrator. It is judicial jurisdiction that they describe.
Jurisdiction,-in matters of administration, means power to do what a Court ought to do in the matter of administration.
The Constitution furnishes a Court on which the administrator may lean, and which can supplement his legal powers by its process; to say, then, that the measure of the powers of the Court shall be precisely that of the powers of the administrator is to misconceive entirely the distinction between jurisdiction and administrative competency. If it is contended that the power of an administrator, to reach the realty as assets, is not absolute, but depends on the contingency of there being an insufficiency of personal assets, the answer is clear, that the expression 11 all matters of administration " is broad enough to embrace contingent as well as absolute power.
The expression " all " imports an intent to clothe the Probate Court with full power in matters of administration. That it was the intention of the Constitution to clothe that Court with full efficiency, as it regards matters of administration, is evident from the nature of the Court, as established by Sections 1 and 20, Article IV, of the Constitution. It is enumerated among the Courts between' which the judicial power of the State is portioned. Jurisdiction is conferred upon it in matters of great moment, embracing some of the most delicate and responsible powers exercised in Chancery. In addition to matters of administration it has jurisdiction of all matters testamentary. It has charge of the persons and estates of minors and others not possessed of legal competency to act in their own right. It may allot dower. A Court possessed of such large powers must have been regarded as fully competent to ascertain the fact that the personal estate of a decedent was insufficient to pay his debts, and, to comply with the requirements of the Statute, demanding that in such cases the realty should be subjected to the same remedies and process as the personalty.
In the ordinary course of business before the Probate Court the fact would appear whether the personal estate was insufficient for the payment of debts ; in fact, this is the precise place where that fact ought to be judicially ascertained. After that fact is ascertained, the making of the order for the sale of the realty is merely a matter of course under the Statute. Why, then, should the labor and expense be incurred of going into the Circuit Court for such order of sale 1 No good reason has been assigned, nor can be assigned, for the existence of any such necessity.
The case of the Bank of Hamilton vs. The Lessees of Dudley (2 Peters, 492,) was cited as placing a construction on words similar to those under consideration, as employed in the State of Ohio ; but it has no bearing on the case in hand. It was there held that the right to sell realty to pay debts was not included under the words "jurisdiction in all probate and testamentary matters," (p. 524.)
The words " matters of administration " were not involved in that case. Whatever may be the law of Ohio, it is clear that by the law of South Carolina the application of the realty to the payment of a decedent's debts, in the event of the insufficiency of the personalty, is a matter of administration, and, as such, is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Courts under Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution.
The next question to be considered, as already stated, affects the right of the complainant to file a bill in equity as against parties in possession of the land at the time of sale, asking an injunction to restrain them from taking to their own use the profits of the land, the principal profit being a mineral substance found on the land, without first establishing his title in an action at law. The bill was filed prior to the adoption of the Code of Procedure, and must stand or fall by the rules prevailing at that time.
The effect of an order of sale, made by the Probate Court, in the cases under consideration, is to place- the purchaser, in reference to the lands to which it relate's, in the position and title of the decedent as against the various parties interested in and bound by the settlement of the estate before the Probate Court. It cannot determine any question of title between the purchaser and a stran ger to the estate in possession. To obtain possession, as against such stranger, the purchaser must bring his action at law, and establish his title by a verdict.
While his title is in dispute, by one in possession, he cannot obtain the aid of a Court of Equity to restrain the occupant from exercising right of ownership. For the reasons stated, the order dismissing the bill was proper, and the appeal must be dismissed.
Wright, A. J., concurred.