Case Name: Stanley Eugene MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-08-04
Citations: 418 So. 2d 1070
Docket Number: Nos. 81-496, 81-583
Parties: Stanley Eugene MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, C. J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 1070–1073

Head Matter:
Stanley Eugene MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 81-496, 81-583.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 4, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1982.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was charged with two separate aggravated assaults, case numbers 78-1638 and 78-1749. On case number 78-1749, appellant was released on bail and notified to appear before the trial judge for a pre-trial conference on January 15, 1979. On case number 78-1638, appellant was released on his own recognizance and notified to appear before the trial judge for a pre-trial conference on January 15, 1979. Appellant failed to appear before the trial judge on January 15, 1979, and he was charged in case number 80-1589 with two counts of willfully failing to appear for his pre-trial conference.
Appellant moved for a statement of particulars and while the state responded, it provided nothing that distinguished count I from count II.
The defense then moved to dismiss the information on the ground that count II was identical to count I, but the motion was denied. On appeal, appellant has requested this court to vacate one of the judgments and sentences.
We agree with appellant's contention. Count II was identical in its language to count I. The state did not supply any additional information distinguishing the two charges in its statement of particulars nor was the jury instructed that in count I appellant was charged with committing a separate and distinct crime from that charged in count II. Thus, it appears that appellant was twice charged with and later convicted of, the same crime. It is basic that one cannot be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. U.S.Const.Amend. V, There being nothing to distinguish count I from count II, the conviction for one must be vacated. Therefore, the conviction and sentence as to count I are AFFIRMED. As to count II, the conviction is REVERSED and the sentence VACATED.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
ORFINGER, C. J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur.
COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. The information in case number 81-1589 charged as follows:
COUNT 1
CHARGE: FAILURE TO APPEAR, in Violation of F.S. 843.15(l)(a)
SPECIFICATIONS OF CHARGE: In that STANLEY EUGENE MILES, on or about the 15th day of January, 1979, at or near DeLand within Volusia County, Florida, did unlawfully, while released pursuant to Chapter 903, willfully fail to appear for his Pretrial Conference on charges of Aggravated Assault before the Honorable Uriel Blount, Jr. as required.
Count II repeated verbatim the allegations of Count I. Thus, although the original crimes were separate and distinct, the information charging appellant with failure to appear contained nothing to distinguish Count I from Count II.