Case Name: Baker v. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1894-05-28
Citations: 122 Mo. 396
Docket Number: 
Parties: Baker v. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 396–426

Head Matter:
Baker v. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, Appellant.
In Banc,
May 28, 1894.
1. Dower: railroad: right op way. A widow is not entitled to” dower in land which her husband conveyed by general warranty deed, and which his grantee conveyed by similar deed to a railroad company, and which is used by it for a right of way, although she did not join in the conveyance to her husband’s grantee or to the company. Venable v. Bailroad, 112 Mo. 103, affirmed. (Black, C. J., Gantt and Maoparlanb, JJ., dissenting.)
2. -: -: -. The owner of the land at the time of the conveyance to the railroad represents the fee under the statute. (E. S. 1889, sec. 2734; Ibid., G. S. 1865, p. 351, sec. 1) and his conveyance carries with it all inchoate dower rights.
Appeal from Knox Circuit Court. — Hon. B. E. Turner, Judge.
Reversed.
Plaintiff, the widow of Melker Baker, on the nineteenth of March, 1891, brought this action for the assignment of dower in a certain strip of ground used by defendant corporation for its track, roadbed and right of way. Melker Baker djed in March, 1890. The ■answer admitted the incorporation of defendant, and that it had obtained such right of way for the purposes of its railroad over the land in controversy from the legal owners thereof, and that it is- now in possession of said strip of ground. The reply was a general denial.
The only evidence before the court, sitting as a . jury, consisted of the following agreed statement of facts:
“1. It is admitted that Melker Baker, deceased, was, in his lifetime, seized in fee of all the lands described in the petition; that plaintiff was his wife while so seized; that she is now his widow; that she Ras never relinquisRed dower in any of said lands.”
“2. It is admitted, that on the twentieth day of March, 1865, said Melker Baker conveyed, by a general warranty deed of that date, to Jacob Gh Baker, all the lands described in the petition.
“3. It is further admitted that defendant is a railroad corporation, and is in possession of, and operating its line of railroad over, the lands described in the petition; that defendant obtained its right of way over one-half of said lands by a bill of condemnation, regularly prosecuted in the circuit court of Knox county, Missouri, against the legal owners thereof; that defendant purchased the remaining half of said lands, by virtue of general warranty deeds, from the several grantees of said Jacob Gh Baker, in 1887, and has ever since been in possession thereof as a right of way for the purposes of its said road.
“4. It is further agreed that the value of the lands described in the petition is $655; that the widow is sixty-three years old, and that the court shall fix the value of the dower interest, if any dower be allowed; and this agreement shall not bar right of -appeal, writ of error, or other proceedings for review in the supreme court of Missouri on the part of either party.”
At the close of the case, the defendant asked a declaration of law in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, which was denied. Thereupon the court assessed the total present value of plaintiff’s dower at $93, and the yearly value at $12.08; found that plaintiff was entitled to dower, and ordered and adjudged that defendant pay plaintiff the said sum of $12.08 annually in lieu of dower. In consequence of this ruling, defendant has appealed to this court.
Gardiner Lathrop, L. F. Cottey • and 8. W. Moore for appellant.
This case falls within the decision of Venable v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 103, and is controlled by it.
O. D. Jones for respondent.
(1) The judgment should be affirmed on the •authority of Nye v. Railroad, 113 Mass. 227. (2) It ■devolves on an appellant to show affirmative error to procure a reversal. It does not appear from the bill of ■exceptions or abstract what was the width of the right •of way claimed by defendant, whether one, two, or five hundred feet. The width or necessary extent of a right ■of way is a judicial question. City v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 215; Aldridge v. Spear, 101 Mo. 400; Railroad v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 535. (3) The legislature can not destroy an inchoate right of dower. Williams v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 588. (4) If the contention of appellant in this case is to prevail, we think the corporations will soon demand the right to vote, marry, hold office and take the sacrament.

Opinion:
Sherwood, J.
Defendant relies on Venable v. Wabash, etc., R'y Co., 20 S. W. Rep. 493; 112 Mo. 103, as decisive of this case, and so it is; for it was there ruled that a conveyance of land by the owner to a railroad corporation for a right of way as effectually extinguished the doweiv right of his wife, as if such right of way had been regularly condemned by the usual proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. One-half of the land which forms the subject of the present litigation was appropriated by the defendant corporation in the ordinary way. Afterwards, the other half of the •strip used for a right of way was acquired by such corporation in 1887, through general warranty deeds made by the grantees of Jacob Q-. Baker, who, in 1865, had acquired, by general warranty deed from Melker Baker, the land through which the railroad of the defendant company now runs. .
At that time, that is, in 1887, the general law in regard to the acquisition of lands for railroad purposes was then in force. Under that law it was competent for a railroad company to acquire land for such purposes in one of two ways: First, by voluntary relinquishment, as in the present instance, or, second, if. the •owner could not agree on the proper compensation to be made, by proceeding in the circuit court to condemn such land, and in such proceeding only the "owner" of the land was necessary to be made a party. Even when married women owned the land in fee they were not required to be joined in the proceedings; but it was declared that "their husbands must be made parties defendant," and the section in question, after setting forth that the owners of the land "shall be made parties defendant," concludes by declaring that: "It shall not be necessary to make any persons party defendant in respect to their ownership, unless they are either in actual possession of the premises to be affected, claiming title or have a title to the premises, appearing of record upon the proper records of the county." 1 R. S. 1879, sec. 892. The same statutory provision was in force long before 1879. Gr. S. 1865, p. 351, sec. 1; and R. S. 1855, cited in margin of the Greneral Statutes. And this is the law to-day. R. S. 1889, sec. 2734.
Under these statutory provisions, plaintiff, the wife of Melker Baker, could not have been made a party •defendant to the condemnation proceedings against the legal owners of the land; there was no law for it, and, .at that time, even if she had been brought into court, her husband living, there were no scales and no measure provided whereby the value of her inchoate dower, with its remote and contingent possibilities, could have been weighed or estimated. Mills on Eminent Domain [2 Ed.], sec. 71, and cases cited.
The owner of the land, tvhoever he is, represents the fee, and compensation to him appropriates the entire fee, and he is the only one to be looked to, when the right of way is to be acquired, whether by condemnation or otherwise. There is, and there can be, no difference in this regard between dedication and condemnation. The former being voluntary and the latter compulsory; both are mere conduits through which flows the current of eminent domain. Venable's case, supra.
For the reasons given, the judgment should be reversed and the petition dismissed.
This cause has been transferred to court in banc, and we reverse the judgment and dismiss the petition; and in the foregoing opinion Brace, Barclay and Burgess, JJ., concur; Black, C. J., and Macfarlane and GtANtt, JJ., dissent.