Case Name: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. KLAUS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-07-07
Citations: 130 N.Y.S. 713
Docket Number: 
Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. KLAUS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 130
Pages: 713–722

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. KLAUS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 7, 1911.)
1. Appeal and Error (§ 843 )—Moot Questions—Review.
Appellate courts frequently pass upon questions affecting public interests, though the question has become moot in the particular ease and the appellate division will determine whether the statute permitting, witnesses in this state to be subpoenaed to another state is constitutional,, the special term having decided that it was invalid.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3331-3341; Dec. Dig. § 843. ]
2. Witnesses (§ 6 )—Subpoenaed to Another State—Criminal Cases.
Code Or. Proc. § 618a, added by Laws 1902, c. 94, provides that if a judge in any state bordering on this state which has heretofore provided! for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal cases therein, certifies that there is a criminal action pending in such state, and a person residing or being within this state is a material and necessary witness therein, a judge of a court of record in this state-upon proper proof, opportunity being given such witness to appear and' be heard in opposition to the subpoena, shall issue a subpoena commanding such witness to appear and testify in the court where such criminal action is pending, and if any person so served and tendered mileage and. witness’ fees as provided, shall unreasonably neglect to attend and testify, he shall be punished as stated, provided that the laws of the other-state gives to persons coming therein, under such subpoena, protection from the service of papers and arrest. Held,, that the statute was not invalid for requiring a witness within this state to give evidence for use-in courts of another state, this state having power to compel all citizens to give evidence in court.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig.. § 6. ]
3. Constitutional Law (§ 48 )—Validity of Statutes—Presumptions.
Every statute is presumed to be valid, and will not be declared unconstitutional because novel or because the court may believe it to be opposed to natural justice.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48. ]
4. Constitutional Law (§ 48 )—Constitutionality of Statutes.
A statute is presumed constitutional until the specific provision of federal or state Constitution which it infringes is pointed out.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48. ]
5. Constitutional Law (§ 257 )—Due "Process of Law.
Code Or. Proc. § 618a, added by Laws 1902, c. 94, does not deprive a proposed witness of his liberty without due process of law.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 746, 747; Dec. Dig. § 257. ]
6. Constitutional Law (§ 206 )—Privileges and Immunities.
The statute is not unconstitutional as interfering with a right of -free ingress or egress of citizens of the United States to the several states, the privileges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution only-preventing a state from discriminating between a citizen of the United, States and a citizen of the state.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 625-648; Dec. Dig. § 206. ]
7. Witnesses (§ 6 )—Subpoena to Another State—Criminal Case—Validity op Statute.
The statute is not invalid as having extraterritorial effect, as it acts upon a proposed witness within New York while he is under the jurisdiction of this state.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. § 6. ]
Laughiin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
On motion by the People for an order for the issuance of a subpoena requiring Rembrandt Peale to appear and testify in a criminal prosecution pending in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against Maurice H. Klaus. From an order denying the motion, the People appeal.
Reversed.
See, also, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1117.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Robert C. Taylor, for the People.
Francis X. Carmody and George A. McLaughlin, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
This is an appeal from an order of a justice sitting at Special Term denying a motion to issue a subpoena requiring Rembrandt Peale, a .person within the state to appear and testify in a criminal action pending in the state of Massachusetts. The application was made under section 618a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was added to that Code by Laws 1902, c. 94, and which reads as follows:
"If a judge of a court of record in any state bordering on this state which by its laws has heretofore made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal actions in this state, certifies under the seal of such court that there is a criminal action pending in such court, wherein the defendant is charged with a crime of the grade of a felony, and that a person residing or being within this state is believed to be a material and necessary witness in such action, a judge of a court of record in this state, upon the presentation of such certificate and such proof of the materiality and necessity of such witness as he may require, opportunity being given such witness to appear before such judge and be heard in opposition thereto, and upon request so to do by the clerk of the court issuing such certificate, shall issue and attach to such certificate a subpoena commanding such witness to appear and testify in the court where such criminal action is pending at the time and place to be stated therein. If any person on whom such subpoena has been served in the manner provided by this chapter, having been tendered by the party asking for the subpoena the sum of ten cents for each mile to be traveled to and from such court, and the sum of five dollars for each day that his attendance is required, the number of days to be specified in the subpoena, shall unreasonably neglect to attend and testify at such court, he shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of disobedience of any other subpoena issued from a clerk, of a court of record in this state, provided, however, that the laws of the state in which the trial is to be held gives to persons coming in the state under such subpoena, protection from the service of papers and arrest.''
The motion was denied, as we gather, for want of power arising from the supposed invalidity of the provision for constitutional rea sons, the justice who made the order appealed from, as well as a justice to whom a former application had been made, following a decision of the Special Term in Matter of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. Rep. 46, 90 N. Y. Supp. 808. By the subpoena applied for, it was sought to procure the attendance of Peale in Massachusetts in September, 1910, and it may be that the criminal prosecution has already ended so that his attendance would now be useless.
On this point the papers on appeal do not advise us, but even if such were the case we should deem it our duty to examine the question of the validity of the act because the Special Term decision already referred to will, unless overruled, probably serve to render the act nugatory. Appellate courts not infrequently pass upon questions affecting important public interests, even where in the particular case the question has become academic. People ex rel. Hummel v. Reardon, 186 N. Y. 164, 78 N. E. 860. The papers upon which the application for a subpoena was made seem to show that a case for its issuance was made -out under the terms of the statute, and we do not understand that the refusal to issue the subpoena rested upon the ground that the,case had not been brought within the statute. It is shown that Massachusetts has passed a similar though not identical statute being contained in the Revised Laws, § 12 and 13. So have Pennsylvania (see Matter of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra), Vermont (P. S. c. 111, § 2280, 2281), Maine (Rev. St. c. 133, § 12), New Hampshire (Rev. St. c. 224, § 8, 9), and Rhode Island (Gen. Laws, c. 292, § 16-17). So if the Legislature of this state has in this instance passed an unconstitutional law, a number of other states have fallen into the same error. [2] There can be no doubt that it is a duty which every ,man owes to society to give evidence, when called upon to do so in a court of justice, with some few exceptions not relevant here. Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 3, § 2192; In re Board of Aldermen, 68 Misc. Rep. 478-481, 124 N. Y. Supp. 70. Such being the clear duty of the citizen it is beyond question that the state has the correlative power to compel him ,to perform that duty, a power which is universally recognized and is exercised every day. Nor is the duty to give evidence, or the power to compel it to be given limited' to causes pending in the courts of the state. Witness our statutes under which persons within this state are required to give evidence in the form of depositions for use in other states. We may therefore consider it settled that it is not an objection to the statute under consideration that it requires a witness within this state to give evidence for use in the courts of a foreign state. So far as concerns civil causes this can be accomplished by means of depositions taken within this state. In criminal prosecutions however, in any state which bases ,its jurisprudence upon the common law, the defendant is entitled to be confronted with the witnesses against him, hence evidence taken in this state by deposition would be of no avail. People v. Bromwich, 200 N. Y. 385, 93 N. E. 933. Unless, therefore, there is power somewhere to compel a witness to proceed from one state to another to testify, many guilty persons must necessarily escape due punishment for their crimes, and it is manifest that if the power exists anywhere it must be in the state within which the witness is, and where he can be served with the necessary order or subpoena. The question then resolves itself into one of power, and the only question is as to the power of the state to compel a witness to.-cross its boundaries and proceed into another state to perform there his plain duty to society. It is this-power that the statute asserts, and which has caused the validity of the act to be called in question. It is a proposition not to be questioned that, except as limited by constitutional restrictions, state or federal* the state acting through the Legislature has absolute and unrestrained power over its own citizens and those who may be within 'its borders. This was clearly pointed out and demonstrated in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568, which was decided in 1796. In Rhode Island v. Mass., decided in 1838, 12 Pet. 657, 720, 9 L. Ed. 1233, Judge Baldwin referred to the individual state as:
"Those states in their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people thereof, on whom, by the Revolution, the prerogative of the Grown and the transcendent power of Parliament devolved, in a plenitude unimpaired, by any act, and controllable by no authority."
As was said in Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 546, 8 L. Ed. 751:
"The power existing in every body politic is an absolute despotism."
We take it to be well and clearly settled that, except as limited by the federal or state Constitution the power of the state over persons within its confines, whether citizens or strangers is absolute and plenary, and would extend even to banishment. In considering the validity of the act under consideration we are concerned only with the power of the state to enact it, and have nothing to do with the policy of the state in so enacting it. The question of comity therefore does not enter into our consideration because comity cannot confer power, but merely offers a reason for its exercise.
It is a fundamental rule that a presumption of validity attaches to every statute of a state, and that such a statute is not to be lightly declared unconstitutional merely because it is novel, or because the court may be of opinion that it is opposed to natural justice and equity. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389-398, 17 N. E. 343, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465.
The act under consideration is a state statute, and is presumed to be warranted by the Constitution until the objector has been able to point out the specific-provision of either the federal Constitution or the state Constitution with which it is incompatible. Black's Const. Law (3d Ed.) Hornbook Series, § 17, pp. 35-36. It was suggested by the learned justice who wrote in Matter of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra, that the enforcement of the act "would deprive the proposed witness of his liberty without due process of law." This objection we think is untenable. Any witness subpoenaed to attend a trial within the state is in the same sense deprived of his liberty, but we have never'heard it suggested that the provisions of law providing for -the summoning of witnesses and for enforcing their attendance were unconstitutional and void. In fact under the act we are considering the proposed witness is afforded more protection in the way.of •due process than is a witness summoned to testify within the state for he must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before a subpoena can be issued, and in addition is assured of ample indemnity for expenses, and immunity from the service of process while in the foreign state. This would seem to be due process of law in a very real sense.
It is suggested.by the respondent that the act contravenes the right of free ingress and egress of all citizens of the United States to the several states as secured by the federal Constitution. It is conceded upon the brief, however, and the concession is a complete answer to the charge of unconstitutionality upon this head, that the right of free ingress and egress was never intended to enable a citizen of the United States to interfere with the orderly administration of justice within the territorial boundaries of the state, and that, as has been repeatedly held, when a citizen of the United States is within the boundaries of a state he is amenable to the constitutional laws of that state, and that the only protection which the privileges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution affords him there is that no state Legislature shall discriminate between him and the citizens of the state proper. For this there is ample authority. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 43 L. Ed. 432. This objection does not affect the act we are now considering, even if the proposed witness be (as respondent claims to be) a nonresident temporarily present in the state, for it applies impartially to persons "residing or being" within the state.
Finally, it is objected that neither the statutes of the state nor the orders of the courts have any extraterritorial effect, and hence that a person cannot be compelled to act or ordered to do any act without the boundaries of the state. The argument involves a non sequitur. The state does not undertake to impart extraterritoriality to its statute. It acts upon the proposed witness here, within the state, while he is under its jurisdiction. It is quite immaterial what it requires him to do or where it requires him to do it, provided its power to direct his movements has not been restricted by a paramount law. We have considered all the legal objections which have been suggested to the act under discussion, and have been unable to find that it violates any provision of either the state or federal Constitutions. As has been said we are not concerned with the policy of the state in enacting the law, but we may say, to avoid misconstruction, that in our view the act is one calculated to promote the ends of justice, and that there is no greater hardship in compelling a witness to travel from this state into an adjoining one, than is involved in compelling him to travel from one end of the state to the other. It follows that the justice at Special Term had power to entertain and grant the application. 'The act contemplates that the subpoena, if issued, shall be issued by a justice and not by the court. We shall therefore content ourselves with reversing the order appealed from, remitting the application to the Special Term to be acted upon by the justice sitting there.
INGRAHAM, P. J" and McLAUGHLIN and CLARICE, JJ., concur.