Case Name: Lucretia Buckalew, by next friend, vs. Willis Blanton et al.
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1869-12
Citations: 7 Cold. 214
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lucretia Buckalew, by next friend, vs. Willis Blanton et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 214–216

Head Matter:
Lucretia Buckalew, by next friend, vs. Willis Blanton et al.
1. Husband and Wife. Marital rights of husband. Land conveyed to wife for sole and separate use for life. A conveyance of land to the wife for life, and to her sole and separate use, vests the title in her; and the husband, by virtue of his marital right, acquires no estate whatever in the lands thus conveyed to the wife.
2. Statute of Limitations. Semen years’ possession of land. When statute of limitations ceased to run. When it began. Blanton took possession of the land in controversy on the 6th of September, 1854, and the bill in this case was filed on the 1st of January, 1867. Held, that to exclude the time from the 6th of May, 1861, when the statute of limitations ceased to run, to the 1st of January, 1867, when it began again to run; and the defendants have not had adverse possession of the land for seven years.
FROM COFFEE.
In this cause there was a decree rendered in favor of respondents, at the February Term, 1867, of the Chancery Court for Coffee County. Chancellor B. M. • Tillman, presiding. Complainant appealed to this Court.
Isbell, for complainant.
Robebt B. Davidson, for respondents.

Opinion:
Alvin Hawkins, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plea of defendant sets up the adverse possession, of the defendants, under deeds purporting to convey a,n estate in fee, in bar of complainant's rights, and is in substance, a plea of the statute of limitations.
It is insisted in argument that the case falls within the principles of the case of Guión vs. Anderson — 8 Hum., 298.
We do not think so. In that case it was held the husband and wife were jointly seized of the lands which had descended to the wife.
The husband, by virtue of the marriage, had an estate of freehold in right of his wife, in her inheritance, which might continue' during their joint lives, and possibly might last during his own life.
There was a joint estate in husband and wife. The disseizin was of the entire joint estate; and to recover possession thereof, they must have joined in the suit; and in such case, the statute of limitations would begin to run against both husband and wife at the time of the adverse entry; hence, the joint right of action was barred by an adverse possession of seven years, under an assurance of title purporting to convey an estate in fee simple. The heirs of the wife, in such case, must sue within three years next after the death of the wife, or they would be barred.
In this case, the conveyance to the wife is for life, and to her sole and separate use; consequently, the husband, by virtue of his marital right, took no estate whatever in the lands conveyed to the wife. There was no joint estate.
But, suppose we were wrong in these conclusions, the result would be the same upon another ground.
Excluding the time from the 6th of May, 1861, when the statute of limitations ceased to run, to the 1st of January, 1867, when it again began its course, defendant, Huffman, and those under whom he claimed, have not had the adverse possession of the land in controversy for seven years next before the filing of this bill.
The possession of Blanton commenced September 6, 1854, and this bill was filed in January, 1867.
The decree of the Chancellor is erroneous, and must be reversed.