Case Name: Princeton Coal Company v. Dorth
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1921-12-22
Citations: 191 Ind. 615
Docket Number: No. 23,906
Parties: Princeton Coal Company v. Dorth.
Judges: Ewbank, J., dissents.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 191
Pages: 615–626

Head Matter:
Princeton Coal Company v. Dorth.
[No. 23,906.
Filed December 22, 1921.
Rehearing denied February 23,1922.]
1. Accord and Satisfaction. — Payment of Less than Due after Due Date. — Where a debtor pays his creditor at' or after the due date less than the liquidated amount due, such payment is not satisfaction, as there is no consideration, p. 618.
2. Accord and Satisfaction. — Payment of other than Agreed Consideration. — Satisfaction.—If the debtor pays a different consideration than that stipulated in a contract, it may be satisfaction, even though what the creditor receives may seem of less value than that for which the contract calls, as the creditor, in accepting such consideration, is his own judge of the matter. p. 618.
3. Accord and Satisfaction. — Payment of Less than Due before Due Date. — Presumptions.—Where a debtor pays his creditor before the debt is due a less sum than the contract calls for at the due date, it must be assumed that the creditor deemed a lesser amount paid before the due date more advantageous to him than the whole amount on that date. p. 618.
4. Accord and Satisfaction. — Payment of Wages in Advance of Pay Day. — Acceptance by Employe. — Effect.—Statutes.— Where an employer paid his employes on the tenth and twenty-fifth of each month pursuant to §§7989a, 7989b Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 47, but when partial payments were requested before pay day, the employer deducted a certain per cent, for additional expense incurred for bookkeeping, etc., an employe was bound by his acceptance of the lesser amount in consideration of payment before it was due. p. 619.
5. Master and Servant. — Assignments of Wages. — Statute.—. Scope and Applicability. — Discounts on Wages Paid before Pay Day. — Section 7996 et seq. Burns 1914 Acts 1909 p. 76, as to assignments of wages, does not render illegal discounts made by an employer in making payments to employes at their request before pay day, the statute being inapplicable, as such transactions do not constitute an assignment of wages within the meaning thereof, p. 619.
6. Appeal. — Questions JReviewable. — Findings.—Failure to Save Exception. — A party cannot claim on appeal that the findings are outside the issues, where he fails to point to any exception saved, p. 619.
7. Appeal. — Presenting Questions for Review. — Briefs.—Pointing Out Exceptions. — It is incumbent upon one claiming error to point,-in his briefs, to the record, showing exceptions saved. p. 620.
8. Appeal. — Questions Reviewable. — Findings.—Applicability to Issues. — Where, in an action by an employe to recover from his employer sums claimed to have been illegally deducted from his wages, he filed a bill of particulars itemizing the amounts so deducted, he could not claim on appeal that a finding that the employer was entitled to deduct one -item, showing payment for goods at a store, was outside the issues and a surprise to him, on the ground that the answer was a plea of payment,- and not of accord and satisfaction, p. 620.
9. Master and Servants. — Contracts of Hire. — Wages.—Money Payment. — Waiver.—Statutes.—Section 7981b Burns 1914, Acts 1911 p. 110, prohibits the. making of a contract of employment providing for the payment of wages in anything except lawful money of the United States, but does not forbid the payment of wages after they are earned by property which the employe accepts as payment; and such acceptance is binding upon him. p. 621.
10. Master and Servant. — Payment of. Wages. — Time.—Demand. — Statutes.—Section 7989a Burns 1914, Acts 1918 p. 47, providing for semi-monthly payments of wages, and §7981 Burns 1914, Acts 1911 p. 110, requiring wages to be paid weekly on demand by employe are in derogation of the common law and penal, and an employe desiring weekly payment of wages • under the latter section must invoke its operation by a clear and explicit demand, p. 621.
From Gibson Circuit Court; A. P. Twineham, Special Judge.
Action by Charles L. Dorth against the Princeton Coal Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant áppeals. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under §1399 Burns 1914, Acts 1901 p. 565.)
Reversed.
Lucius C. Embree and Morton C. Embree, for appellant.
T. Morton McDonald, for appellee.

Opinion:
Townsend, J.
Appellee worked as a day laborer in and about appellant's coal mine from October 15, 1912, until November 30, 1916. There were about 200 other employes at the mine. Appellant paid appellee on the tenth and twenty-fifth of each month for the half month ending ten days previous to the day of payment. §7989a Bums 1914, Acts 1913 p. 47. From time to time during this employment the employes of appellant, including this appellee, made requests for partial payment of wages before the pay days. It was the practice of appellant and known to these employes, and to appellee, that when such payments were made there would be a deduction of ten per cent, of the sum paid; that this deduction was made, as claimed by appellant, because of increased bookkeeping, and because of additional expense incurred in paying appellant's banker. The aggregate of the various items of deductions made for payment before the wage was due is $190.70. There are also items paid to a store, aggregating $102.55, which items were also deducted from appellee's wages. The store was not owned by appellant. Appellee, during all the time he was so employed by appellant, acquiesced in the deductions of the several items for payments before the wage was due, and also the several items paid to the store for merchandise sold to appellee. Five days before each pay day appellee was given a statement showing these deductions.
This action was brought by appellee against appellant to recover these items. The answer was general denial and payment. The court found the facts specially and concluded that appellee was not entitled to recover the items paid at the store but was entitled to recover the $190.70, deductions because of advanced payments. To this latter conclusion appellant excepted, and on this it predicates error.
The consideration for the deductions from appellee's wages is that they were paid before they were due. The wages earned from the first to the fifteenth of each month were due and payable on the twenty-fifth. The wages from the fifteenth to the last of the month were due and payable on the tenth of the next month. Appellant was bound under penalty to pay on the tenth and twenty-fifth of each month — at least after the 1913 act became effective. §7989b Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 47.
If a debtor pays his creditor at or after the due date less than the liquidated amount due, this is not satisfaction, because there is no consideration. Fletcher v. Wurgler (1884), 97 Ind. 223, 225; Fitzgerald v. Smith (1848), 1 Ind. 310; Bateman v. Daniels (1839), 5 Blackf. 71, and note citing Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke 117; Stone v. Lewman (1867), 28 Ind. 97; Smith v. Tyler (1875), 51 Ind. 512; Beaver v. Fulp (1894), 136 Ind. 595, 597, 36 N. E. 418, and authorities there cited. If the debtor pays a different consideration than that in the. contract, it may be satisfaction, even though what the creditor receives may seem of less value than that for which the contract calls. Courts have no practical way to fathom the mental processes of the creditor in accepting a consideration different in kind than that in the contract. The creditor is his own judge in this matter. He is deemed to have seen something more advantageous in the consideration received than the consideration in the contract, even though it may appear to the court to be of less value.
When a debtor pays his creditor before the debt is due a less sum than the contract calls for at the due date, it must be assumed by the court that the creditor deemed a lesser amount paid before the due date more advantageous to him than the whole amount on that date. Fletcher v. Wurgler, supra; Wells v. Morrison (1883), 91 Ind. 51; Bateman v. Daniels, supra, and note citing Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke 117; Quarle v. Jones (1863), 20 Ind. 143; Fensler v. Prather (1873), 43 Ind. 119, 122. See also, mono-graphic note to Fuller v. Kemp (1893), 138 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. 1034, 20 L. R. A. 785, at 790. This consideration moves to the creditor. The thing lost by the debtor is the right to stand on his contract and not pay until the due date. And if he, in consideration of this loss, demands and gets from his creditor a discount, courts are not required to inquire into the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the debtor's conduct in so demanding, nor of the creditor's conduct in accepting payment so reduced.
Appellee is bound by his acceptance of an amount less than the face of his claim, in consideration that he got it before it was due. It is contended, however, by counsel for appellee that the discounts for payment before due are illegal, because of a statute concerning the assignment of wages. §7996 et seq. Burns 1914, Acts 1909 p. 76. This has no application. The present case is not an assignment of wages in the sense of that act, and does not come within the purview of it. What we have here is an acceptance by an employe — who is not an infant, not a person of unsound mind, not under guardianship — of an amount less than the wages earned, in consideration of payment of wages before pay day. Appellee's counsel also contends that appellee had a right to have his wages paid each week, pursuant to §7981 Burns 1914, Acts 1911 p. 110. It is true that this statute gives him this right, "if demanded." But he did not demand it.
Appellee claims the findings are outside the issue, because there was no answer of accord and satisfaction. But he nowhere points to any exception saved. Therefore he has waived his right to complain. The court erred in its conclusion of law allowing appellee to recover $190.70.
Judgment is reversed, with instructions to the trial court to restate the second conclusion and enter judgment accordingly.
Ewbank, J., dissents.