Case Name: R. C. #17 CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Jack KORENBLIT and Lillian Korenblit, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1968-02-13
Citations: 207 So. 2d 296
Docket Number: No. 67-542
Parties: R. C. #17 CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Jack KORENBLIT and Lillian Korenblit, Appellees.
Judges: Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 207
Pages: 296–299

Head Matter:
R. C. #17 CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Jack KORENBLIT and Lillian Korenblit, Appellees.
No. 67-542.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
Feb. 13, 1968.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 1968.
Richard L. Lapidus, Miami, for appellant.
Horton & Schwartz, Miami, Street & Greenfield, Miami Beach, for appellees.
Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

Opinion:
SWANN, Judge.
The issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether a circuit judge in this equity case could properly order a jury trial for a plaintiff in order to determine whether they were entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, and if so, the amount.
The order of the judge below was rendered subsequent to the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision. The history of this case is set forth in pertinent part in the able dissent filed herein.
We are of the opinion that the consolidation of law and chancery procedure, under the revised rules, did not abolish chancery or law, and that the substantive law should be applied to the actual allegations and relief sought in a complaint or petition as was done prior to the adoption of the revised rules. Rule 1.040, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967, 30 F.S.A., simply provides that there shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."
We also find that the question of whether a jury should try the facts in an action is still to be decided by the tests of this right which have existed since the effective date of the Constitution of the State of Florida or by legislative enactment.
With these principles in mind, let us examine this case, in its posture before us, on appeal.
Here, the appellees sought, by their amended complaint, (1) a mandatory injunction to abate a continuing trespass to their real property, and (2) compensatory and punitive damages. They were granted, over objection, a jury trial to determine whether they were entitled to such damages and if so, the amount.
In Florida, it has generally been held that equity can award damages as an incident to restraining a trespass. 12 Fla.Jur. Equity, § 46, p. 198; Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1896).
That portion of the order submitting the issue of compensatory damages, if any, to a jury, as an incident to proper and appropriate equitable relief, is therefore appropriate.
That portion of the order submitting the issue of punitive damages, if any, to a jury conflicts with the rule that equity may not award punitive damages unless authorized by statute. Orkin Exterminating Co. of So. Fla., Inc. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 419. See also 48 A.L.R.2d 947. No authorization for an award of punitive damages by statute has been shown in this cause.
That portion of the order submitting the issue of punitive damages, if any, to a jury for determination, in this equity matter, is reversed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
It is so ordered.