Case Name: JAMES WALL, Appellant, v. EMIGRANT INDUSTRIAL SAVINGS BANK, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-05
Citations: 71 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 249
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAMES WALL, Appellant, v. EMIGRANT INDUSTRIAL SAVINGS BANK, Respondent.
Judges: Yan Brunt, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 71
Pages: 249–261

Head Matter:
JAMES WALL, Appellant, v. EMIGRANT INDUSTRIAL SAVINGS BANK, Respondent.
Savings bank — payment to a stranger — contributory negligence — when a right is waived by not asserting it on the trial.
A bank-book, issued by a savings bank, contained the following rules: “ The passbook shall be the voucher of the depositor, and the possession of the pass-book shall be sufficient authority to the bank to warrant any payment made and entered in it. The bank shall not be liable or called upon to make any payment without the presenting of the pass-book at its counter that the proper entry may be made in it.” It contained also the following: ‘‘Although the bank will endeavor to prevent fraud on its depositors, yet the payments to persons producing the pass-books issued by the bank shall be valid payments to discharge the bank.”
James Wall made his first deposit in the bank in 187S, and at that time wrote his name in its signature-book. Thereafter, and prior to the payment hereinafter mentioned, a stranger wrote to Wall requesting information as to certain facts, knowledge of which would enable the stranger to answer the test questions commonly put by the bank to a depositor. Wall answered the letter, giving the information asked for. In 1889 a stranger, calling himself James Wall, appeared at the bank with the pass-book. The paying teller, after examination, thought the signature, in the receipt to be signed and retained, slightly different from that in the signature-book. He asked the stranger several of the test questions, and these he answered correctly. The teller then paid the sum demanded.
In an action by Wall to compel the bank to pay to him the amount which it had thus paid to the stranger :
Held, that, notwithstanding the rules of the bank, it was bound to exercise, in making a payment, reasonable care and diligence.
That the plaintiff, in furnishing a stranger with information as to the county ini Ireland in which he was born, the ship in which he emigrated and his mother’s name, thus enabling the stranger to answer the test questions, was guilty of such contributory negligence as barred a recovery as matter of law.
That, upon the facts, this defense presented a question of law which the court properly decided in favor of the bank.
(Andrews, J., dissenting, on the ground that the case should have been submitted, to the jury.)
After deducting this money paid to the stranger there still remained a balance in the plaintiff’s savings bank-book to his credit. The complaint in the action claimed the whole amount of this account, and alleged a refusal by the bank to pay the whole amount.
Upon the trial the plaintiff did not ask to recover for the balance.
Held, that it was too late on appeal to raise the question that he was entitled to judgment for this balance, and that the court would not, because such judgment had not been rendered for this balance, order a-new trial.
Appeal by the plaintiff Janies Wall from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York on the 25th day of June, 1891, upon a verdict for the defendant, rendered by direction of the court on a trial at the New York Circuit before the court and a jury; and also from an order, entered in said clerk’s office, nunc pro tunc, as of the 21th day of June, 1891, denying a motion for a new trial.
The action was brought to recover the amount of a bank deposit, part of which it was alleged by the defendant had been paid. The disputed payment was made September 3, 1889. Wall, from the time of the first deposit, never drew an amount from the bank which required his signature. He once drew ten dollars, but the bank did not require a signature for so small an amount.
Mitchell <& Mitchell, for the appellant.
Goudert Brothers, for the respondent.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J.:
In Kummel v. The Germania Savings Bank (127 N. Y., 492) it is said: " Assuming that the by-laws printed in the book are binding upon the depositor and constitute a contract between the parties, we still think that the duty devolves upon the officers of the bank to exercise care and diligence in order that their depositors may be protected from fraud and larceny." In another form the rule is thus stated in Allen v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank (69 N. Y., 319): "The officers of savings banks, acting under rules such as those shown to us in this case, are bound to the exercise of care and diligence, up to the mark which is fixed for the bank by those rules." " The extent of the duty which the savings bank is under will in some degree be measured by the strictness or extent of the rule it has put upon itself. Ordinarily it is bound to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, which will be a question of law or of fact as the proofs are conclusive and undisputed or debatable and conflicting."
Whether or not the defendant failed to comply with the duty devolving upon it, of exercising reasonable care and diligence to protect its depositors from fraud or larceny, resort must be had to the evidence to determine whether it was presented in such form as to make it a question of fact for the jury or one of law for the court.
The circumstances under which the moneys were paid out were detailed by the paying teller of the defendant, who testified: " The pass-book came to me in the regular course, with a draft ticket in it, signed James Wall; it had been presented at'the other window before it came to me, and upon its arrival at my window I took the ticket out of the book, and either at that time or a minute or two afterwards I ran my eye over the account to see if there was money enough in it to pay the demand. 1 then took the draft ticket, signed James Wall, over to this book, which lay a little at my right on a desk, and compared the signatures. I then asked the person who presented the book, and who was in the line, what his name was: He said ' James Wall; ' I then asked him what county in Ireland he was born in, and he said ' County Lontli; ' I asked him what ship he came over in, and he said the ' Somerset; ' I asked him his mother's maiden name, and he said ' Ann Levins.' Then, upon the strength of the comparison and those answers, I paid him the money after asking him how much he wanted."
Upon cross-examination, he testified that there were some slight discrepancies between the signatures upon the signature-book of the bank and the ticket presented by the person attempting to draw the money, and he stated' that this put him on his guard, and it was for that reason that he asked the question, though, as he stated, he thought, upon comparing the signatures that it was Wall's, although there were one or two slight changes; that eleven years had elapsed, and that this, among persons not accustomed to write frequently, makes a difference in the regularity of the signature.
Unless the force of this testimony is impaired, rebutted or destroyed, we fail to see, upon such testimony undisputed, how any inference could be drawn by a jury that the defendant had violated the rule which required, in paying over money to one in possession of the pass-book, the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. Not only was it not impaired, but in many respects it was supported by the testimony of the signature clerk of the defendant, who testified that he heard the teller asking the questions that were on the test-book containing the signature and test questions. The plaintiff offered no testimony to contradict these witnesses showing the conduct of the defendant's employees at the timfe the money was paid; and assuming such testimony to be true, no inference could be drawn therefrom that the bank was wanting in that degree of care and diligence which the law would exact to prevent fraud upon depositors. The only question which upon this testimony could remain for the jury would be the credibility of the witnesses, which was in no way assailed or impugned, or in any way affected, unless it is to be assumed that their relations as employees of the defendant, and the interest therefrom resulting, would subject their testimony to scrutiny and suspicion. Theré are cases holding that where a cause of action is supported by the testimony of a single witness, who is interested in the result thereof, and no evidence is presented to the contrary, that the jury is not obliged to credit such testimony, or find a verdict thereon; but that the question of credibility of such witness is to be left to the jury, and a verdict against such witness will not for that reason be disturbed. Those cases, we take it, however, are cases where the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish a cause of action. I-Iere, it is true, the manner in which the moneys were paid out raised a presumption in plaintiff's favor which shifted the affirmative of establishing its defenses upon the defendant, and the defendant having assumed the affirmative and presented evidence tending to support its defense, which was in no way contradicted or impaired, a verdict, under such circumstances, for the plaintiff would have been against the weight of evidence, and would necessarily have to be set aside. We do not regard the conclusion to be reached upon such evidence as either debatable or conflicting, and it, therefore, properly presented a question of law for the court, and justified the direction which was made.
But, however this may be, if there was any question of fact to be presented to the jury, as to defendant's negligence, it would have been error to have submitted it in view of the other testimony in the case, showing, conclusively, that the proximate cause of the fraud or loss that resulted to the plaintiff was due to his own negligence. It appeared that, prior to the presentation of the pass-book to the bank, the plaintiff had received a letter requesting him to furnish to a stranger the very information which enabled the person presenting the book to answer the test questions which were in the defendant's test or signature-book. Even though we assume, therefore, that the discrepancy in the signatures was sufficient to demand scrutiny and an inquiry into the right of the one presenting the pass-book to the money, the suspicion, thus aroused in the employees of the bank, was allayed by correct answers given to the test questions relating to the plaintiff's birth place, mother's maiden name, and the ship upon which he came over. These had been furnished to the stranger, who, it would appear, had obtained the plaintiff's pass-book, and being in possession of the latter and of the necessary information, was placed in a position to perpetrate the fraud which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. As to plaintiff's carelessness in thus supplying the information to a stranger, no question is presented; and however strongly we may hold the rule to be, in respect to the degree of care required of a savings bank or bank of deposit, it is equally well settled that it is the duty of a depositor, upon his side, to use all reasonable care against fraud upon the bank. There being no dispute but that this duty which was imposed upon the plaintiff had been violated, and the plaintiff's own testimony having shown that he was negligent, this alone was sufficient to bar his right to a recovery and justified the verdict which was directed for the defendant, bank.
A more difficult question presented on this appeal relates to the right of the plaintiff to recover the balance of his deposit with the defendant, which he is and was, undoubtedly, entitled to receive. It was conceded that, in addition to the $540 which had- been fraudulently withdrawn, that plaintiff had still to his credit with the defendant bank the sum of $141.08 and interest. Had the plaintiff requested a direction for this amount, it should have been granted. In his complaint he claimed the whole amount, and the demand alleged upon the defendant related to the whole amount, and the refusal to pay had reference to the whole amount, the defendant, so far as the evidence shows, never having been requested to pay this sum of $141.08, which still remained to the credit of the plaintiff. It is true that this amount was included in the entire amount demanded by the plaintiff, and the right to recover the entire amount was denied by the defendant. Plaintiff did not make any claim for this balance on the trial, although it was conceded that that amount stood to the credit of his account, and at the end of the trial he asked to go to the jury upon " issues of fact denied." The testimony showed that the only issue of fact denied was as to defendant's liability for the $540 which had been withdrawn by some third person from the defendant bank. There was no evidence that any demand had ever been made for this specific sum, but, on the contrary, the evidence was that the demand had been made for the entire amount which had been deposited by plaintiff, which included this, together with the $540 withdrawn. We do not agree with the respondent, that to have obtained this amount it would have been necessary to produce the pass-book, or that it would be unreasonable to require it to take the risk of payment of this $141.08 without the presentation of the pass-book, for the reason that, upon the facts appearing on the trial, it was evident that the pass-book had been taken from the plaintiff's possession, and its absence could not be regarded as destroying the plaintiff's right to the balance of the deposit. As held in Kummel v. The Germania Savings Bank (supra), " The pass-book of a savings bank cannot be regarded as negotiable, and its possession does not constitute proof of a right to draw money thereon. The book imports a liability of the bank to the depositor for the amount of moneys entered therein as deposited, and an agreement to repay at such time and in such manner as he shall direct." We think, however, that a trial which proceeded entirely upon the question as to plaintiff's right to recover $540 which had been withdrawn under the circumstances appearing from the testimony, and the court's attention being directed solely to that contention presented between the plaintiff and the defendant, that it would be violating the rules relating to the conduct of litiga tions and the proceedings upon a trial to destroy the whole effect thereof by giving undue weight to a point, which, however good, was not then presented, but is presented for the first time upon the appeal. .This amount the plaintiff can obtain from the bank, and while it may be regarded as a hardship that, with this balance in his favor, he should have suffered a judgment for costs, we do not see that the court below was to blame; nor can we, without doing violence to what we regard as the settled rules of practice, afford any relief. The effect of holding that this point was well taken would be to require a new trial of a question which was once litigated, because the court had failed to consider a question which could have been resolved in plaintiff's favor, but which was never either raised or suggested to the court.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment should, in all respects, be affirmed, with costs.
Yan Brunt, P. J., concurred.