Case Name: John T. Shanks v. The State of Texas
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 326
Docket Number: 
Parties: John T. Shanks v. The State of Texas.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 326–343

Head Matter:
John T. Shanks v. The State of Texas.
An application for a continuance in a criminal case must either show diligence to obtain the evidence or sufficient excuse for want of effort.
The fact that the witness could not have been got between the time of finding the indictment and the trial is no excuse for want of diligence, if the court continued several days beyond the day of trial.
The 431st art. of the Penal Code defines forgery as follows:- “ He is guilty of forgery who, without lawful authority, and with intent to injure or defraud, shall make a false instrument in writing, purporting to be the act of another, in such manner that the false instrument so made would (if the same were true) have created, increased, diminished, discharged, or defeated any pecuniary obligation, or would have transferred, or in any manner have affected any property whatever.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2093, Note 657.)
It is necessary to allege and prove that the instrument charged to be forged was made without lawful authority.
It is error to charge the jury that the mere making the forged instrument is sufficient, without proving that there was no lawful authority. •
It is an essential element of the crime of forgery, that the false instrument in writing shall have been made without lawful authority.
The want of lawful authority to make it in writing is what makes the instrument false.
Nor is the State relieved from the burden of proving that the instrument in writing was made without lawful authority, because the allegation is of a fact negative in its character; unless the negative allegation, that the instrument of writing was made without lawful authority, is supported by proof on the part of the State, the case is not made out.
The rule of law is, that the burden of proof never shifts, but is on the government throughout. >
Appeal from Travis. The case was tried before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
The indictment runs thus: “That John T. Shanks, late of the county aforesaid, with force and arms, in the county aforesaid, on the 12th day of June, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, did then and there falsely make and feloniously forge, without lawful authority, and with intent to injure and defraud, a false instrument in writing, purporting to be a conveyance from Hugh Henderson to J. C. Kirby, of a donation warrant for six hundred and forty acres of land issued to the said Henderson by the secretary of war of the late republic of Texas, on the second day of January, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine, and is now a legal, valid land claim against the State of Texas, which said land warrant is a legal and valid claim for land against the State of Texas, said claim being numbered seven hundred and twenty-eight; which said false and forged instrument of writing, made by the said Shanks as aforesaid, is in words and figures as follows:
“ ‘ The State of Texas, \
“ ‘ County of Travis. j
“‘For and in consideration of the sum of two hundred and twenty dollars, to me in hand paid by J. C. Kirby, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I do hereby grant, alien, and convey unto the said J. 0. Kirby, his heirs and assigns, all my right, title, interest, and claim to my donation warrant Ho. 728, issued to me by the secretary of war, for 640 acres of land, on the 2d day of January, A. D. 1839, and I hereby authorize the commissioner of the general land office to issue patent to the same to the said-
or his assigns. ,
“‘Witness my hand and seal this 12th day of June, 1857.
“‘Hugh Henderson, [l. s.]
“‘Witness, John T. Shanks.’
“Which said false and forged conveyance in writing, of said donation warrant number seven hundred and twenty-eight, including the signature of the said Hugh Henderson, he, the said Shanks, did then and there falsely make and feloniously forge, with intent to injure and defraud, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and ’ provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.”
The defendant plead not guilty.
When the case was called, the defendant filed an affidavit for continuance, for the following cause:
“ That he cannot go safely to trial for want of the testimony of Thomas Heath, who is the. county surveyor of Cass county, in said State of Texas, and there resides, and also for other causes to be hereinafter in order stated. Affiant further states, that he was arrested in Tarrant county, in said State, sometime in the month of September last, and was immediately-brought thence to this county, and that from that time up to the present he has been confined in the jail of Travis county, being unable to give bail. ' Affiant further avers, that he was then arrested on only one charge, that contained, as he believes, in indictment Ho. 1295, and that, for the other charges, he was ignorant of their existence save from vague and uncertain rumors. Affiant further avers, that the indictments in the above-named causes were filed and found at this term of the court, on or about the 13th and 14th December, A. D. 1859; and that before the finding of the said indictments this affiant knew not what offenses he would be called on to answer, nor what testimony he would need. Affiant further avers, that since his confinement in jail, and since and before the finding of said indictments, this affiant has had no ready means or funds, and has used efforts to retain counsel and secure them fees, but that he has been unable to'retain counsel; that he has been unable, up to this time, to secure any fee to his counsel; and that he has thus, since the finding of said indictments, been deprived of the benefit of counsel and advice, and that he has now made only a temporary arrangement for securing the services of counsel, and has been unable to retain them permanently, owing to the embarrassed state of his affairs, growing out of his imprisonment and the charges in said indictments contained. Affiant avers, that it is only within the last four days that he has had the benefit of advice with counsel. Affiant further avers, that the said .Heath resides at the distance of three hundred miles from this city, and that he is the county surveyor of Cass county, and that, since the date of the finding of the said indictments, no diligence on the part of this affiant, neither by subpoena or attachment or otherwise, would have been sufficient to have enforced the presence of said witness, and that there has not been a full and reasonable time since the service of this deponent with copies of said indictments to procure the attendance of the said Heath, nor has there been time since he has obtained the advice of counsel and ascertained the materiality of this evidence. Affiant further avers, that the said Heath resides twenty miles beyond the town of Jefferson, and that ten days is barely a reasonable time within which a subpoena or attachment could reach the witness. Affiant further avers, that the said Heath is a material witness in behalf of this affiant, and that he expects to prove by the said Heath that he, the said Heath, saw this affiant pay to two or more alleged vendors, whose names he is charged with forging, the money for two or more of the certificates charged in the indictments to have been fraudulently obtained by forgery; that the said payments were made in the presence of the said Heath in this city, [Austin.] Affiant further avers, that, at the time of the said payments, the said vendors then and there, in the presence of the said Heath, spoke with reference to the transfers, and by their conduct and action acknowledged said transfers. Affiant further avers, that he expects td prove the above facts by the testimony of the said Heath; and, further, he expects to prove by the said Heath that the parties then and there called, and represented themselves to be the owners and grantors of said named certificates by the names there signed.”
The motion was overruled, to which the accused excepted.'
The State proved the donation warrant; the assignment set forth in the indictment; the approval of the warrant by the court of claims; the usual entries on such files in the land office; that Kirby purchased the warrant of the accused; that he paid part cash and part in his note, payable to Hugh Henderson; that he received the warrant and the transfer (the transfer being in blank;) that he did not see the transfer written, but the witness identified it. A fac simile of the transfer was in the record. “Two hundred and twenty dollars” and “ J. C. Kirby,” the grantee, were in the handwriting of P. de Cordova, the notary public. The body of the instrument was in the handwriting of the accused, as was also the signature of Henderson. Kirby, the purchaser, said that the defendant told him at the time that he was selling for Hugh Henderson. Henderson has never asserted claim to the warrant. Shanks carried the assignment to .de Cordova, the notary, before whom he swore that he saw Henderson execute the transfer, and that he, Shanks, signed as a subscribing witness. The experts who proved the handwriting of the accused were Robert M. Elgin, chief clerk of the l^nd office, Stephen. Crosby, the commissioner, and P. de Cordova, the notary. Shanks had been a clerk in the land office, and possessed great facility of writing different hands.
The court charged the jury as follows:
“ He is guilty of a forgery, who, without lawful authority and with intent to injure and defraud, shall make a false instrument in writing purporting to be the act of another, in such manner that the false instrument so made would (if the same were true) have created, increased, diminished, discharged, or defeated, any pecuniary obligation, or would have transferred, or in any manner have affected, any property whatever.
“By an instrument which would ‘have transferred, or in any.manner have affected’ property, is meant every species of conveyance or undertaking in writing, which supposes a right in the person purporting to execute it to dispose of or change the character of property of every .kind, and which can have such effect when genuine.
“ The warrant offered in evidence was, at the time of the alleged forgery, such property as that the making of a false assignment of the same, without lawful authority from the owner, and with intent to defraud or injure, would constitute the offense of forgery.
“ The assignment offered in evidence, which is alleged to have been forged, is such an assignment as that, if the same were true, would have transferred the right of Hugh Henderson to the warrant and to the rights secured to said Henderson by the same.
“It is not necessary to a conviction in a cause of forgery, that the evidence of the party whose signature is charged to have been forged should be before the jury, establishing the forgery. The guilt of a defendant charged with forgery may be established by the testimony of a witness or witnesses skillful in recognizing handwritings and familiar with the handwriting of the accused.
“If the evidence satisfy you that the defendant wrote the assignment in evidence, and the signature thereto, purporting to be the signature of Hugh Henderson, the State is not bound to establish, in addition thereto, that he did the same without lawful authority. If the defendant had lawful authority, that is a matter of defense, which he must himself produce, in order that he may be acquitted; provided you are satisfied that he wrote the assignment and the name of Hugh Henderson thereto subscribed.
“It is not necessary that all the writing of the assignment should have been written by the defendant in person in order to constitute him guilty of the charge. If he wrote a portion of the same, leaving blanks therein, and directed or requested another to fill the blanks, and the same was done by such other in his presence, such filling up of said blanks would be the act of the defendant as fully as if done with his own hands. In order to find the defendant guilty, you must be satisfied that the making of the assignment was the act of the defendant, and that he w^ote the name of Hugh Henderson, which is subscribed to said j assignment.” /
The court refused a great number of counter instructions ! which are not in the opinion. The jury returned a verdict of “ guilty,” and assessed the punishment of three years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, for which there was a judgment. There were motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment overruled.
The defendant appealed.
Hancock West, for appellant.
—There is no rule of pleading better established, (and especially in criminal cases,) than that the averments of a pleader must be construed strongest against him; or, in the words of Mr. Chitty, (1 vol. PL, marg. 237:) “It is a maxim that everything shall be taken most strongly against the party pleading, because it is presumed that every person states his case as favorably to himself as possible.’ We may then conclude, that this land warrant was not, at the date of the alleged forgery, a valid claim; but that the indictment shows on its face (undeiythe rule cited) that it was void and worthless. And the naked question is raised, whether an indictment can be sustained which fails to show that the warrant (the transfer to which is alleged to be forged) was valid; or, in other words, can an indictment under our statute be sustained for forging a transfer to a void and worthless warrant? If these questions be settled in the negative, the indictment under consideration is bad, and the court below erred in not sustaining the motion in arrest on that ground.
The second ground of the motion in arrest is, that the indictment fails to allege that the warrant was of any value, or the property of any one, or property of any kind.
Art. 431 Penal Code, (0. & W. Dig., p. 511,) under which this indictment was found, inter alia, says: “Or would in any manner have affected any property whatever, or decreased or diminished any pecuniary obligation.”
From reading this section, it does seem to us that the mind cannot escape the conclusion, that there should have been an averment that the warrant was of some value, or the property of some one; for if it appear (and we contend it does appear) from the face of the indictment itself that the warrant was of no value, (for there is no allegation of value,) and that it was the property of no one, (for there is no "allegation of property,) the court must hold it bad.
We will pass on to the ruling of the court on this motion for continuance. In order to understand fully the ruling of the court on this motion, a short history of the ease, up to that point, as gleaned from the record, may prove instructive. The indictment was returned into court by the grand jury, December 13, 1859, and copy served on defendant same day. The ease was really called for trial on 31st December, 1859, as will appear from the record, and on that the motion for continuance was argued. This was the fact; and the bill says the motion was made on that day, and it was in fact then argued by counsel, and held up by the court, and overruled on 2d January, 1860.
The court overruled the motion to continue, because, first, it did not comply with Art. 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (O. &. W. Dig., 627.)
The accused was brought from the jail, and appealed before the court in forma pauperis, and Mr. C. L. Bobards and ourselves were appointed by the court to represent him.
It is true that it did not show that an attachment or subpoena had been issued, but it showed facts that must be conclusive, that no such diligence could have been exercised by defendant, and, if exercised, that it would have been unavailing. It shows that he had not and' could not obtain the benefit of counsel until four days before the trial, and hence could neither judge of the materiality of the evidence, nor know the steps necessary to secure it. It further shows, that the witness resides three hundred and more miles from Austin, and that ten days would be the shortest time in which an attachment could reach him; and hence, had he even applied for an attachment on the 13th December, the day the indictment was filed, there were only eighteen days from that date' even to the time of the motion, and twenty days (ten for the attachment to go and ten for it to return) was the shortest possible time in which the attachment could be returned. Surely the court will not hold that a party shall do a vain and useless thing, especially under the circumstances of this case. We are certain that the facts disclose that no diligence could have availed the party, and hence he must be excused from using any. Such is the rule even in civil cases. (Payne v. Cox, 13 Tex., 480.)
Another ground taken by the court was, that the evidence did not dearly appear to be material. The court seems to concede that the evidence appeared material, but overruled the showing, because it did not appear so with sufficient dearness to the court. The law only requires the defendant to show it to be material, and does not determine the degree of clearness with which it is to be shown. ’
“In a case like the present,,depending wholly upon circumstantial evidence, the mind seeks to explore every possible source from which any light, however feeble, may be derived; and, in such a case, it is peculiarly proper that the jury should have before them every circumstance, however slight,” &c. (Cooper v. State, 19 Tex., 449.)
The evidence of Elgin, as to the value of the certificate, was permitted by the court to go to the jury. Exception was taken to the ruling of the court, on the ground that there was no allegation of value in the indictment. The court admitted the evidence, and thereby tacitly admitted that the motion in arrest of the judgment, on the ground of the want of such allegation, was well taken. Was it not material to prove the value ? If so, could it he proved without a corresponding averment in the indictment?
The next error committed was the introduction by the State of the indorsement of the approval of the certificate hy the commissioner of the court of claims. This was objected to by the defendant, on the ground that the indorsement was made after the date of the transfer, and after the date of the alleged forgery. The indorsement was dated 17 July, 1857. The forgery is alleged to have taken place 12 June, 1857; hence, the indorsement of the approval was subsequent to the alleged forgery.
The object was to show that the claim was now valid; but such evidence could not affect the guilt or innocence of the party. The question was, was the claim valid at the time of the forgery? The evidence showed clearly that it was not; and we contend that the proof failed in this to show any offense under Art. 431 Penal Code, under which the indictment was framed, and defendant asked an instruction to that effect from the court, which was erroneously refused. Ho conviction can be. had, under the article of the Penal Code above cited, for forging a transfer to a warrant not approved by the court of claims. Until such approval, such a warrant is a nullity; a patent cannot issue on it; a suit cannot be maintained on it; it cannot be introduced in court as evidence of any right, without such approval as .has been held by our court. This case says they cannot be recognized as legal claims until approved. (Peck v. Moody, 23 Tex., 93.) It is not, then, that character of instrument, while unapproved, that comes within any of the provisions of Art. 431, under which this indictment is found; and, if it be not a casus omissus, the forgery of such a species of claim can only come under the cases provided in Art. 247 Penal Code, (0. & W. Dig., p. 486;) and it is doubtful even if it come under that head.
It was admitted that the body of the transfer was in Shanks’ handwriting, with the exception of the words “two hundred and twenty,” and the “ J. C. Kirby,” where-ever it occurs; all the balance was Shanks’ hand, and he did not deny it. The question was, did he sign “ Hugh Henderson.” All the witnesses say that “Hugh Henderson” was written in a different hand from the transfer, though some thought they detected resemblances in it to the body of the transfer; others thought there was no resemblance.
Geo. Flournoy, Attorney General, for the State.
—It is not pretended that the application for continuance is in accordance with the statute. When this is the case, this court will not revise the decision of the court below, unless it clearly appear that injustice was done. (Lewis v. Williams, 15 Tex., 47.)
The'Code of Crim. Pro., Art. 518 (O. W. Dig., p. 627) requires that the affidavit shall state “the facts which are expected to be proved by the witness, and it must appear to the court that they are material.” There is no particular fact stated as applicable to this case, and there does not appear .the slightest materiality in any of the general and vague statements contained in the affidavit. It is almost impossible to imagine an affidavit for a continuance with more of pretension in its general character, and less of merit, in its substantial statements.
The indictment does not charge that the warrant transferred was of any value at the time of the transfer, but “that said warrant is now a legal and valid claim for land against the State of Texas.” Art. 431 Penal Code (0. & W. Dig:, p. 511) is the one upon which the indictment is founded. It embraces all transfers which would “ in any manner have affected any proper ¿y whatever.”
The only purpose of an allegation of value is to distinguish between grand and petit larceny, (in cases of larceny.) 'This was settled upon elementary principles in the case of Lopez v. The State, 20 Tex., 780.
The warrant is copied in the indictment, and clearly purports on its face to be a claim for six hundred and forty acres of land. It is certainly property, if a promissory note is an article of property. The case of Peck v. Moody, 23 Tex., 93, upon which appellant so confidently relies in his brief, has no application whatever. That was an action of “trespass to try title,” and the warrants were offered in evidence, (without having been registered and approved by the commissioner of claims,) together with the field-notes of the surveys made under them, to show title in Peck, the plaintiff, to the land in controversy. The question was not whether the warrants themselves were “articles of property,” but whether, in the condition offered, they were competent evidence of title to the land, upon which surveys had been made under them. An instrument evidencing an inchoate right to land may, in itself, be an “article of property,” and yet, in its imperfect state, be no title to land.
But the allegation in the indictment, “ that said warrant is a legal and valid claim for land against the State of Texas,” is, in effect, an allegation that at any given time heretofore it was at least an inchoate claim.
The warrant, however, purports on its face to be a claim for land, and this is as sufficiently indicative of its property character as a promissory note or a bill of exchange would be of their property character. The general and comprehensive character of the statute fully sustains the view we have taken. If the warrant was of no value, was not, in fact, property, as it purported on its face to be, the defendant below could have shown the fact. So, also, it was strictly following the “probata” with the “allegata” for the State to show that the warrant which was copied in the indictment was what it professed to be,, to wit, a claim for land against the State of Texas, and therefore, of necessity, property.
It is not pretended that the warrant itself had in anywise been altered since the forgery had been committed. The words “registered and approved” had been written across its face, but this did not and could not have changed or added to its character as an article of property; so appearing on its face, however, they may have increased the value of that property. c
The charge of the court I believe to be in accordance with law, as also the refusal to give several charges asked by defendant below. At any rate, there is not the slightest ground for inference that injustice has been done, or that the jury were misled to the injury of defendant. It is said that the proof of the forgery is by experts, but this is not correct. The testimony of an expert depends upon a comparison of handwriting at the time he is testifying, and upon the general or particular appearance of the writing before him. In this case, the witness who testified to the forgery did so from a long and most intimate acquaintance with the defendant’s style of writing. And one of the witnesses very naturally remarks, that he “would recognize the difference between the handwriting of Shanks and Captain Crosby as readily as he would the difference between their features!”

Opinion:
Bell, J.
—We are of opinion that the court below did not err in overruling the appellant's motion for a continuance of the cause. A copy of the indictment appears to have been served on the appellant on the 13th day of December, 1859. The cause came on for trial in the District Court on the 31st day of the same month, which was the eighteenth day after the day on which the copy of the indictment was served, exclusive of the day of service. The application for continuance states, that the witness, for want of whose testimony the continuance was asked, resided in Cass county, and that ten days is barely a reasonable time within which a subpoma or attachment could reach the witness. The argument, based upon the statements of the application for the continuance, is, that inasmuch as twenty days was the shortest time in which an attachment could have reached the witness in Cass county, and been returned to the District Court for Travis county, the appellant is to be excused for not having used any diligence to procure the attendance of the witness, because at the time of making the application for the continuance only eighteen days had elapsed after the service of the indictment.
We think this argument is fallacious. If the appellant could have known that his cause would be called for trial on the 31st day of December, and not afterwards, then, perhaps, he would be excused for not making any effort to do in eighteen days that which required at least twenty days in the performance. But the District Court for Travis county did not adjourn on the 31st day of December, 1859, nor did the appellant have any reason to suppose that it would adjourn on that or an earlier day; for, by law, it might sit, as it did in fact sit, long after the 31st day of December, 1859. We think the application showed a total want of diligence in attempting to procure the testimony for want of which the continuance was asked, without showing any sufficient excuse for the failure to use diligence, and that the motion to continue was therefore properly overruled.
But we are of opinion, that there is error in the charge of the court to the jury. The judge said, in one branch of the instructions, "If the evidence satisfies you that the defendant wrote the assignment in evidence, and the signature thereto, purporting to be the signature of Hugh Henderson, the State is not bound to establish, in addition thereto, that he did the same without lawful authority. If the defendant had lawful authority, that is matter of defense, which he must himself produce, in order that he may be acquitted, provided you are satisfied that he wrote the assignment and the name of Hugh Henderson thereto subscribed."
It is an essential element of the crime of forgery, that the false instrument in writing shall have been made without lawful authority. The want of lawful authority to make the instrument in writing is what makes the instrument false. If the instrument in writing is one -which the defendant had a right to make for himself, or lawful authority to make for another, then it cannot be false. That the instrument in writing was made without lawful authority must always be averred in the indictment, or the indictment must at least contain equivalent averments, in order to constitute it a good indictment for forgery.
Hor is the State relieved from the burden of proving that the instrument" in writing was made without lawful authority, because the allegation is of a fact negative in its character. Unless the negative allegation that -the instrument of writing was made without lawful authority is supported by proof on the part of the State, the case is not made out. To prove that a certain instrument in writing was made, is by no means to- prove that it was a forgery on the part of him who made it; and if the defendant could be put upon his defense before the State had made out the case against him, it would simply be to require an accused person to prove himself not guilty, instead of requiring the State to prove the accusation as laid in the indictment.
The rule .of law, is, that the burden of proof never shifts, but is on the government throughout. Even in civil cases, there are some exceptions to .the general rule that the burden of proof is on the party holding the affirmative. Where a right of action is grounded upon a negative allegation, the plaintiff must establish the negative: as, for example, in a suit for having prosecuted the plaintiff maliciously and without probable cause. Here the want of probable cause for the prosecution complained of must be made out by the plaintiff by some affirmative proof, though the proposition be negative in its terms. So, in a prosecution for a penalty given by statute, if the statute, in describing the offense, contain negative matter, the count must contain such negative allegation, and it must be supported by prima fade proof. (1 G-reenf. on Ev., §78.) After enumerating certain prosecutions for penalties given by statute, where the statute, in describing the offense, contains negative matter, Mr. Greenleaf says: " In these and the like cases, it is obvious that plenary proof on the part of the affirmant can hardly be expected, and therefore it is considered sufficient if he offer such evidencé as, in the absence or counter testimony, would afford ground for presuming that the allegation is true." (1 Greenf. §78.) It is true, that where the subject-matter of a negative averment lies peculiarly within the knowledge- of the other party, the averment is taken as true, unless disproved by that party. There are cases in which it would be practically impossible for the State or party to prove the negative averment, or where the inconvenience of proving it would be very great, and where the defendant can disprove the averment without the least inconvenience, if indeed the fact upon which the prosecution is based does not exist.
This whole subjéct is treated very fully in the sections of Mr. Greenleaf's work from which I have quoted, and in a note to the 81st section of his 1st volume on evidence.
The law presumes every one to be innocent until the contrary is shown; and, in a case like the present, although the allegation, that the instrument in writing was made without lawful authority, is negative in its character, it is not a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and the allegation must therefore be supported by affirmative proof on the part of the State, at least sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence which the law indulges in favor of the defendant.
We think that portion of the judge's charge which has been quoted was calculated to mislead the jury, by creating upon their minds the impression, that, if the mating of the assignment were proved to be the act of the defendant, and if they were satisfied that he wrote the name of Hugh Henderson subscribed to it, they might return a verdict of guilty, without being satisfied by the evidence that those things were done without lawful authority; in other words, that the State need not make out the whole case. Another portion of the judge's charge is also to this effect. In a distinct clause he says: "In order to find the defendant guilty, you must be satisfied that the making of the assignment was the act of the defendant, and that he wrote the name of Hugh Henderson, which is subscribed to said assignment."
We are of opinion, that the land warrant described in the indictment was property in the contemplation of the statute on the subject of forgery, and that it legally imported value, so as to make it unnecessary to allege value in the indictment. But we are also of opinion, that there is no sufficient evidence that such an assignment of the warrant was made by the appellant as would in any manner have affected the property in the warrant. The assignment is proved to have been written by the appellant in blank. The witness. P. de Cordova testified that he wrote the words "two hundred and twenty" in the body of the assignment, and the name of J. C. Kirby, the assignee, wherever it occurred. But it is not shown that this was done at the request of the appellant, or at his suggestion, or in his presence, or with his knowledge. The assignment in blank was inoperative. It could not affect the property in the warrant. That which gave it effect is not shown to have been done by the appellant, or with his knowledge. The charge of the court very nearly assumed that the evidence showed that the blanks in the assignment, as originally written, were filled up by another, at the request of the appellant, or in his presence. The judge said, "It is not necessary that all the writing of the assignment should have been written by the defendant in person, in order to constitute him guilty of the charge. It he wrote a portion of the same, leaving blanks therein, and directed or requested another to fill the blanks, and the same was done by such other in his presence, such filling-up of said blanks would be the act of the defendant as fully as if done with his own hand." '
The evidence, as exhibited in the statement of facts, did not warrant this charge; because, as has been said, there was no evidence that Mr. de Cordova filled the blanks in the assignment at the request, or by the direction of the appellant, or in his presence.
For the reasons here indicated, we are of opinion, that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial, and it is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.