Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Arthur J. MONROE, Jr., Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-11-03
Citations: 329 So. 2d 193
Docket Number: No. 56419
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Arthur J. MONROE, Jr., Appellant.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 329
Pages: 193–203

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Arthur J. MONROE, Jr., Appellant.
No. 56419.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 3, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Nov. 24, 1975.
On Rehearing March 29, 1976.
Sanders, C. J., and Marcus, J., dissented from original opinion.
Summers, J., dissented from original opinion and assigned written reasons.
Wilfret R. McKee, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant Monroe was convicted of armed robbery, La.R.S. 14:64, and sentenced to twenty years at hard labor.
Reversible error is presented by bills of exception numbers one and two. They relate to a substantial curtailment of voir dire examination of prospective jurors by the defense. As will be noted, voir dire examination is an important trial right given to both the state and the defendant to aid them in securing an impartial trial jury and to uncover predispositions -or attitudes of prospective jurors which might serve as the basis for causal or peremptory challenge.
Context Facts
The trial court's rulings foreclosed lines of inquiry concerning the prospective jurors' attitudes toward the presumption of innocence, to which those accused of crime are entitled before our courts. The rulings were especially prejudicial in the light of the context facts of this prosecution.
The robbery occurred in the early afternoon. The victim, a route salesman, was robbed at gunpoint of his wallet and eight dollars or so in change. He did not see the face of the robber, nor could he ever identify him. He did, however, note that the robber was wearing a red, white, and blue plaid shirt and so reported to the police shortly after the robbery.
In roving the neighborhood about thirty minutes later, a police officer saw the defendant Monroe, wearing a shirt similar to the one described by the victim. Monroe was standing on the sidewalk, three blocks from the robbery, in conversation with another man. The officer approached Monroe, grasping his revolver, to interrogate him. He saw an expression of shock and surprise on the face of Monroe, who started to walk away. When the officer ordered Monroe to stop, the defendant commenced running away.
Within a minute or so, under continuous observation of the police, Monroe was stopped. He had a pistol and one dollar and ninety cents in change. The wallet and amount of change stolen in the robbery were never located, nor did the officers see the suspect drop them during the chase, nor did immediate examination of his path locate them.
The defendant Monroe took the stand. He stated he was talking to a friend on the street, about a block from his own home, on his way to his employment. On his person was some marijuana and a pistol (which he carried, he said, to protect himself because of a quarrel over a girlfriend). Because of this illegal possession, he said, he ran when he thought the police officer was going to search him. Other uncontradicted evidence produced by Monroe showed that he had never been arrested before and was of quiet, law-abiding good character.
The defense thus raised was that, although the state undoubtedly proved a robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused himself was a suspect simply because he wore a shirt similar to one worn by the robber. (In fairness to the state, it also relied upon a fingerprint taken from the truck which matched that of the left index finger of the defendant.)
The Issue
The defense counsel had first asked the prospective jurors if they could acquit the defendant if the state failed to prove its case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. After receiving their affirmative responses, the defendant attempted to explore more concretely the juror's understanding of this general principle. Sua sponte, the trial court curtailed further voir dire examination along the lines of inquiry raised by the following two questions :
"Does it present any problems to you or do you have difficulty in accepting the fact that it is better to see a crime go unpunished than to find the wrong man guilty. Can you accept that?" (Bill of Exception No. 1.)
"If the State should fail to prove who did in fact commit the crime and you are satisfied that we didn't, could you find him not guilty?" (Bill of Exception No. 2.)
The record does not indicate that any further voir dire examination was permitted on the issue.
The trial court disallowed the first question as argumentative and the second as repetitious. (The latter reasoning was solely because the defense had already secured juror assent to the general principle that they must acquit if the state failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.)
In State v. Drumgo, 283 So.2d 463 (La. 1973), decided some time prior to the present trial, in accordance with long-established jurisprudence we held that this type of questioning was proper to explore the jurors' attitudes towards the presumption of innocence to which the accused is entitled, La.C.Cr.P. art. 804(A). The purpose would be to establish the basis if any for exercise of a challenge for cause, La. C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) (as well as, of course, for an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges, La.C.Cr.P. art. 799).
In Drumgo, although we recognized the error, we held it harmless, partly because, there, our examination of the entire voir dire examination indicated that in fact defense counsel was afforded wide latitude in his voir dire examination. Here, however, neither the record nor the trial court's per curiam indicate other than that the questions were disallowed as repetitious or argumentative probing of the veniremen's assent that they understood the generally expressed general principle that an accused must be acquitted if the state failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, we are not, here, faced with a situation where the questions were truly repetitious nor where wide latitude or voir dire examination had in fact afforded the accused a reasonable opportunity to uncover predispositions or misunderstandings of the veniremen which might militate against their impartial service as jurors or might afford a reasonable basis by which the defendant might exercise his constitutional right to challenge jurors peremptorily, see La.Constitution of 1921, Art. I, Section 10 and Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. I, Section 17. The foreclosing of the lines of inquiry effectively denied the accused the voir dire right of ascertaining the prospective jurors' understanding of an attitude toward the presumption of innocence, as disclosed by minimal but specific questioning as to its application— including not only that the state prove that an armed robbery had occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, but also that the accused himself beyond a reasonable doubt had committed it.
As we noted in State v. Brumley, 320 So.2d 129 (1975) in likewise reversing a conviction because of the denial to an accused of voir dire rights:
"A defendant who is unable to inquire of potential jurors as to any tendentious attitude toward these criteria is unable to effectively make challenges for cause and peremptory challenges Defendant's questions were not an attempt to lecture on the law . . . nor were they an attempt to induce the jurors to commit themselves in advance. Nor does it offer adequate security toward obtaining an unbiased jury, for a potential juror, in response to the general question whether he will accept the law as given him by the court, to recite that he will accept such instruction when the juror has no concept of the complex nature of the law and where the issue is so interrelated to basic rights
The state suggests that the error was cured by the trial court's instructions to the prospective jurors that they must accept the law as given to them by the court, to which they assented, and by general instructions as to the presumption of innocence. This suggestion overlooks the historic function of voir dire examination.
As we stated in State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12, 31 (1961) :
"It is a general view as to voir dire examination that the defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to make reasonable and pertinent inquiries of the prospective juror so that he may exercise intelligently and wisely his right of peremptory challenge — since each party has the right to put questions to a juror not only to show that there exists proper grounds for a challenge for cause, but to elicit facts to enable him to decide whether or not he will make a peremptory challenge. For this reason, a wide latitude is allowed counsel in examining jurors on their voir dire, and the scope of inquiry is best governed by a liberal discretion on the part of the Court so that if there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision, this may be uncovered. It is by examination into the attitudes and inclinations of jurors before they are sworn to try a case that litigants are enabled to reject those persons, by use of peremptory challenges where necessary, who are deemed to be unlikely to approach a decision in a detached and objective manner. The Constitution itself (La.Const. of 1921, Art. 1, Sec. 10) guarantees to the accused the right to peremptorily challenge jurors . . . . The intelligent exercise of the right of rejection, by use of those twelve peremptory challenges, is the meat of the privilege, and can be substantially weakened by a restriction of questions — the answers to which might be regarded as informative of a juror's attitude and therefore of vital importance to his defense."
See also other instances where convictions were reversed because of improper curtailment of voir dire examination, such as: State v. Jones, 282 So.2d 422 (La. 1973); State v. Crittle, 263 La. 418, 268 So.2d 604 (1972) (opinion authored by Hamlin, J.); State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940); State v. Guidry, 160 La. 655, 107 So.2d 479 (1926). See also American Bar Association Standards for the Administration of Justice Relating to Trial by Jury, Standard 2.4 and official commentary thereto (1968).
.These cited decisions hold that in Louisiana the accused's intelligent exercise of his substantial right to exercise peremptory challenges or challenges for cause cannot be curtailed by the exclusion of non-repetitious voir dire questioning reasonably exploring potential misunderstandings of law, predispositions, or prejudices of prospective jurors relevant to the issues of the case in which they will serve.
We therefore hold that, since the present accused was denied his exercise of this basic trial right, his conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a trial in accordance with law.
This trial was held prior to the adoption of the 1974 constitution. Nevertheless, the importance of the traditional rights here asserted is emphasized by their explicit recognition by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. I, Section 17: " The accused shall have a right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily.
Other Bills of Exceptions
Other Bills:
Six other bills of exceptions were reserved and perfected.
We need here note only that two of them raise substantial issues of trial conduct which probably will not arise on the re-trial: Bill No. 4, where the trial court sustained an objection to a question attempting to lay a foundation for securing as inconsistent with trial testimony a pretrial statement of the accused, cf. State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957); Bill No. 5, where the defense was denied an opportunity to inspect (or at least have the trial court inspect in camera) a document used by the witness to refresh his memory on the stand and after doing so gave testimony which varied from his earlier trial testimony, see State v. Perkins, La., 310 So.2d 591 (1975).
The other bills, at least as raised, do not present substantial issues.
Decree
For the reasons assigned, we reverse the conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with law.
SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
. La.C.Cr.P. art. 804(A) (1968) provides: "In all cases the court shall charge the jury that:
"(1) A person accused of crime is presumed by law to be innocent until each element of the crime, necessary to constitute his guilt, is proven beyond a reasonable doubt "(2) It is the duty of the jury, in considering the evidence and in applying to that evidence the law as given by the court, to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evidence or out of the lack of evidence in the .case; and"
"(3) It is the duty of the jury if not convinced of the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, to find him not guilty."
"The court may, but is not required to, define 'the presumption of innocence' or 'reasonable doubt' or give any other or further charge upon the same than that contained in this article."
It is to be noted that, since the accused is not entitled as of right to further explanation, by the court of bis presumption of innocence, voir dire examination may be important to establish the understanding of this principle by prospective jurors.
The importance of. the right of the accused... to a presumption of innocence on his trial before an American court is emphasized by the reiteration of this ancient principle by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. I, Section 16: "Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty.