Case Name: Albert HLAD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-07-19
Citations: 565 So. 2d 762
Docket Number: No. 88-2389
Parties: Albert HLAD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, HARRIS, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 565
Pages: 762–783

Head Matter:
Albert HLAD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-2389.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 19, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 13, 1990.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara C. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Dee R. Ball, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC
COBB, Judge.
The defendant below, Albert Hlad, Jr., pled guilty to, and was convicted and sentenced for, a fourth DUI offense. On appeal he urges that the trial court erred in disallowing withdrawal of his plea and not striking a prior 1978 DUI conviction. He argues, inter alia, that his earlier DUI conviction was uncounseled (i.e., he was not afforded court appointed counsel and did not waive counsel) and therefore it may not be used to enhance the severity, hence punishment, of a subsequent offense. In other words, he claims that the present DUI conviction should be his third, not his fourth.
Hlad's brief argues that the case of Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) precludes the use of the uneounseled 1978 conviction to enhance the present offense from a misdemeanor to a felony pursuant to section 316.193(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). He contends that such enhanced punishment is violative of his sixth amendment right to counsel, and that the burden was on the state at trial to show that his 1978 conviction was counseled or that counsel was waived. In the instant case, Hlad argues, the state could not produce the files pertaining to the 1978 conviction, and therefore failed to meet its burden. Hlad concedes that he was not incarcerated for the 1978 conviction and that the maximum incarceration period possible for that conviction was six months.
It is well established that a conviction obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional right to counsel is void and cannot be used by the state in a subsequent criminal proceeding to support conviction under an enhancement or reclassification statute designed to increase the otherwise allowable period of imprisonment. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). However, the sixth amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases established by Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) applies only where a defendant is actually imprisoned for the misdemeanor conviction, not where there is merely a possibility of such imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979).
Hlad's reliance on Baldasar is misplaced and his argument must fail for the simple reason that the crime to which he pled guilty in 1978 was not one which was punishable by more than six months imprisonment, and he was not actually subjected to a term of imprisonment. The result is that the 1978 conviction was not "constitutionally invalid for enhancement purposes." The limited applicability of Baldasar has been ably analyzed by Judge Zehmer in Allen v. State, 463 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985):
In Baldasar, supra, the defendant was charged with petit theft and the state introduced evidence of a prior theft conviction to reclassify the misdemeanor charge to a felony. The defendant objected to admission of the prior conviction, arguing that he had not been represented by counsel and, as a result, his conviction was too unreliable to support enhancement. This argument was made even though the defendant, under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), was not entitled to court-appointed counsel in the prior petit theft proceeding because he was not actually sentenced to jail. The Court split 4-1-4 on the issue of using the prior uncounseled conviction for reclassification purposes. The four-member plurality held that the uncounseled conviction could not be used to support the jail sentence for the subsequent felony petit theft because that would result in the defendant being deprived of his liberty as a direct consequence of his uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction, in violation of the rule in Scott v. Illinois. The four dissenting justices held the view that because the misdemeanor conviction was constitutionally valid under Scott v. Illinois, it could properly be used to support the subsequent felony charge and enhanced penalty. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun followed the "bright line" approach enunciated in his dissenting opinion in Scott and concluded that, since Baldasar, under the "bright line" scheme, had a right to counsel in the prior misdemeanor action because he was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, his prior misdemeanor conviction was invalid and could not be used to support the felony petit theft charge.
Because Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion limits the impact of Baldasar, the most that can be derived from that decision is the rather unremarkable holding that a misdemeanor conviction, void because obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel, cannot be subsequently used to support conviction for an offense requiring imprisonment under a reclassification or recidivist statute. This holding is a logical extension of Burgett v. Texas to misdemeanor actions.
Even Justice Blackmun's opinion in Baldasar would not preclude the use of Hlad's 1978 conviction for enhancement purposes in the instant case. In Baldasar, Justice Blackmun held the decisive vote and ex pressly adopted the view he had previously enunciated in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979):
In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), I stated in dissent:
"Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal ease must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, [88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491] (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, [90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970); or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, [92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530] (1972).
"This resolution, I feel, would provide the 'bright line' that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger." Id. at 389-390, 99 S.Ct., at 1170.
I still am of the view that this "bright line" approach would best preserve constitutional values and do so with a measure of clarity for all concerned. Had the Court in Scott v. Illinois adopted that approach, the present litigation, in all probability, would not have reached us. Petitioner Baldasar was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, and, under my test, was entitled to counsel at the prior misdemeanor proceeding. Since he was not represented by an attorney, that conviction, in my view, is invalid and may not be used to support enhancement.
Judge Zehmer's analysis of Baldasar has been followed by the Second District in State v. Hanney, 15 F.L.W. 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA April 25, 1990) and Leffew v. State, 518 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The Fourth District also has adopted the same approach in Cooper v. State, 538 So.2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), expressly holding that the points from a defendant's previous convictions may be used to enhance the defendant's sentence on a subsequent conviction if the defendant did not have a right to counsel in the prior proceedings. See also Hamm v. State, 521 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Of the other appellate courts in Florida, only the Third District has not addressed the issue now before us.
The problem with which we deal here has been thoroughly and perceptively discussed by Professor David S. Rudstein in his article entitled. "The Collateral Use of Uncoun-seled Misdemeanor Convictions After Scott and Baldasar" appearing in Volume XXXIV, University of Florida Law Review at page 517. Therein, Professor Rudstein observed:
Baldasar should not be read, however, to preclude the subsequent use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction under an enhanced penalty provision when the previous offense was punishable by imprisonment for six months or less and the conviction did not actually result in the defendant's imprisonment. The opinions of Justices Marshall and Stewart would- clearly preclude the subsequent enhancement use of any prior uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction. These opinions focused only on the increased imprisonment for the subsequent offense without any mention of the authorized punishment for the prior offense. It is equally clear the four dissenters would allow such a conviction to be used for enhancement purposes if, as in Balda-sar, the prior conviction was constitutional under Argersinger and Scott.
The deciding opinion, therefore, would be that of Justice Blackmun. Although he did not expressly deal with this situation in Baldasar, it is fair to infer from Justice Blackmun's emphasis on the invalidity of Baldasar's previous conviction under his bright-line test that he would allow a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that was constitutionally valid to be subsequently used under an enhanced penalty provision. Additionally, in Justice Blackmun's view, a misdemeanor conviction for an offense punishable by not more than six months imprisonment that does not actually result in the defendant's imprisonment is constitutionally valid, even though uncounseled. It therefore follows he would join with the four Baldasar dissenters and allow its subsequent use for sentence enhancement purposes. [Footnotes omitted].
Ibid at 534-535.
Professor Rudstein also observes in his article, which was published in 1982, that the change in the Court's composition caused by Justice Stewart's retirement and his replacement by Justice O'Connor could easily result in adoption by the Court, upon a revisitation of Baldasar, of the position that all constitutionally valid misdemeanor convictions of record may be utilized for subsequent enhancement purposes. See 34 Fla.L.Rev. 535, n. 87.
Hlad urges the minority view in Balda-sar in an attempt to justify reversal of his present conviction. He fails to acknowledge that five members of the United States Supreme Court in Baldasar rejected the view which he advances in the instant appeal. Any reliance on Burgett is equally misplaced since that case involved the erroneous admission of prior felony convictions obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
The appellant also relies on Harrell v. State, 469 So.2d 169 (Fla.lst DCA), review denied, 479 So.2d 118 (Fla.1985), wherein the First District accepted the over-simplification of Baldasar that is urged by the appellant and the dissent herein: no prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be used for subsequent enhancement under any circumstances. See also Pilla v. State, 477 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). While that was the minority view in Balda-sar, it was not the view of Justices Blaek-mun, White, Rehnquist, Powell and Chief Justice Burger. This distinction was completely overlooked in Harrell, placing it in direct conflict with Allen. Although both Harrell and Allen emanated from the same appellate court in the same year, the later case (Harrell) makes no mention of the earlier one. The First District appears to have receded from Harrell, sub silentio, in Kearse v. State, 501 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In any event, we agree with Allen.
The dissent cites to State v. Troehler, 546 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In that case, the opinion of the court, without discussing the analytical problems inherent in the Baldasar 4-1-4 split, assumed that an earlier 1976 DUI conviction, if uncounseled, could not be used for later enhancement. There is no indication in Troehler as to whether or not the 1976 conviction resulted in incarceration. If there was no incarceration imposed for that conviction, then we would disagree with the Troehler result.
We note that the trial court relied, at least in part, on our opinion in State v. Caudle, 504 So.2d 419 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) in denying Hlad's motion to strike consideration of his 1978 DUI conviction. The trial court felt that Caudle was guilty of laches and precluded from attacking his 1978 DUI conviction nine years later, after the records of the 1978 proceedings were disposed of, when that conviction was not challenged at either of his subsequent DUI convictions in 1983 and 1984. It is not necessary to rely on Caudle in the instant case for the reasons previously explicated in this opinion. In any event, we believe the result reached by this court in Caudle was correct because the liberty interest to be protected in Argersinger and Scott dealt only with "imprisonment," not probation or the revocation of a license.
In conclusion, we find that Hlad had no constitutional right to appointed counsel in 1978 pursuant to Baldasar, Scott, Hanney, Cooper, Leffew, and Allen. Hence, the appealed conviction for Hlad's fourth DUI is affirmed. As a collateral reason for our affirmance, we would point out that while Hlad could have been imprisoned for over one year pursuant to section 775.082 or section 775.084, the trial court only sentenced Hlad to five years probation, contingent on serving 364 days in jail. This was within the range of a third conviction under section 316.193(2)(a)2.c. and thus, Hlad cannot claim that his prison term was unconstitutionally enhanced resulting in a "greater prison term."
We find no merit in appellant's remaining issues except one: the state concedes that the trial court imposed costs and fees against Hlad without notice or opportunity to be heard contrary to Mays v. State, 519 So.2d 618 (Fla.1988).
The judgment and sentence below are affirmed, except for the cost order, which is reversed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, HARRIS, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
SHARP, W. and GOSHORN, JJ., concur in result only.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion with which DANIEL, C.J., concurs.
. A broad interpretation of the word "imprisonment" might lead to the conclusion that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction resulting in probation violates the rule of Argersinger and Scott. We believe the correct interpretation of the word means confinement in a jail or state penitentiary. Note the court's use of the word "incarceration" in Scott, 440 U.S. at 372, 99 S.Ct. at 1161.
. See Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla.1957); State Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Vogt, 489 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). According to Justice Blackmun's bright-line test, where there was a conviction for a traffic offense, the defendant was not actually imprisoned, and the authorized penalty did not exceed six months imprisonment, this would be constitutionally valid and could be used to revoke a driver's license. If, however, the offense was punishable by more than six months imprisonment, but the defendant was not actually imprisoned, the conviction would be invalid under Justice Blackmun's test. Regardless, this does not mean that Justice Black-mun would not allow the prior traffic offense conviction to be used collaterally in a civil proceeding which could result only in a civil disability.