Case Name: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. PATRICK
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1909-11-03
Citations: 18 Wyo. 130
Docket Number: No. 610
Parties: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. PATRICK.
Judges: Potter, C. J., and Beard, J., concur.
Reporter: Wyoming Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 130–152

Head Matter:
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. PATRICK.
(No. 610.)
Highways — County Roads' — Obstruction—Authority or County Board to Consent to — Prescription—Use or Road Over Vacant and Unoccupied Land — Burden or Proop — Road Plats and Field Notes — Record or — Evidence—Presumption.
1. Where there is no record evidence of any official action of the board of county commissioners in the matter, the mere verbal consent of the individual members of the board is insufficient to authorize a landowner to obstruct a public highway by removing his fence across it to' another line.
2. Where land is vacant, and unoccupied, and remains free to public use and travel until circumstances induce the owners to inclose it, the mere travel across it by the public without objection from the owners does not enable the public to acquire a public road over the same, but such use will be regarded as merely permissive and not adverse.
3. There being no statute providing otherwise, it is necessary in order to establish a prescriptive right in the public to a road across wild, uncultivated, unoccupied, open and uninclosed land, as against the mere silence of the owner, that, in addition to the use of the road by the public, there should be shown the assumption of control and jurisdiction over it by the board of county commissioners for the statutory period of limitation.
4. The burden of proof is upon the county to establish that a road traveled by the public across uninclosed lands had become a public highway by prescription, where it defends on that ground an action brought against it to enjoin it from removing or interfering with a fence built by the plaintiff obstructing the road.
5. The rule that a right cannot be acquired by the public by prescription to a road across vacant and unoccupied lands applies although the land on one side of the road was inclosed, the land on the other side, and that over which the road was traveled remaining open, uninclosed, unoccupied and uncultivated.
6. It appearing that field notes and a plat of a road had been certified as true copies respectively from the records of J. County, and by the county clerk thereof transmitted, as provided by law, to the county clerk of S. County, and kept among the records of the latter county, after its organization by the division of the former county; Held, that they were authorized public records, and duly authenticated as such.
7. The field notes and" plat of a designated road on record in the county clerk’s office are presumptive evidence of the line of the road as officially recognized and controlled, and are admissible in evidence against the county, in an action wherein it seeks to establish the existence of the " road by prescription along a route slightly diverging from the line shown by the plat and field notes, where it crosses certain lands.
8. In a suit by a landowner against the county to enjoin interference with a fence built by the former obstructing a road that had been used by the public across his premises while they remained vacant, unoccupied and uninclosed, the county claiming that the public had acquired a right to the road by prescription; Held, upon a review of the evidence, that it was insufficient to show that the county board had assumed jurisdiction or control over the road more than ten years before its obstruction, and, therefore, insufficient, notwithstanding the use by the public of the road for 19 years, to establish a highway by prescription.
[Decided November 3, 1909.
Rehearing denied March 14, 1910.]
(104 Pac. 531.)
(107 Pac. 748.)
Error to' the District Court, Sheridan County, Hon. Carroll H. Parmelee, Judge.
The action was brought by Algernon S. Patrick against the Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County, to enjoin the defendant from interfering with a fence built by the plaintiff across a traveled road. The defendant alleged that the road had been used by the public continuously, exclusively, and without interruption, as a public highway, for 20 years; that such use had been open, notorious, peaceable, and adverse to plaintiff and his grantors, and under a claim of rightthat during said time plaintiff and his grantors had full knowledge of such use of the road, and that they acquiesced therein; that for more than 17 years the Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County had exercised control and supervision over the road, and had kept the same in repair as a public highway, with the knowledge of plaintiff and his grantors. Judgment1 was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought error. The other material facts are stated in the opinion.
Charles A. Kutcher, for plaintiff in error.
The proceedings, if any, leading up to the appointment of viewers to view the “Soldier Creek” road by the Commissioners of Johnson County are not shown by the record in this case, unless the plat introduced in the evidence constitutes such a record. However, viewers laid out a road on the ground following the most practicable route without regard to section lines, according to the testimony of the witness W. M. Curtis. It will appear that the road as traveled through the Patrick place was the most sensible and convenient route, and that was the route subsequently traveled. This seems to confirm the testimony of Mr. Curtis that it was so located. If any presumption is to be indulged in the case, it ought to be that if any road was established by the Commissioners, it was established where located. The public traveled a definite and well defined route, with some deviation at places on account of the condition of the road in muddy weather. The facts are sufficient to establish the road by prescription, even though the proceedings under which it was located were irregular. (13 Cyc. 480, 485; 22 Ency. Law (2nd Ed.), 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223.) The width of the road established by user is not confined to the actual track) but should be wide enough to make the road practicable. (13 Cyc. 481; Mar-chard v. Town, &c., 51 N-. W. 606; Davis v. City, 10 N. W. 768; Yakima County v. Conrad, 66 Pac. 411.)
The plat and field notes of the road are wholly incompetent, standing alone, to show that the road was ever established on the section line. A public road established by the statutory method can be proved only by the production of the record of the Board showing a legally established road. (R. S. 1887, Secs. 1843, 3863; 15 Ency. Law (2nd Ed.), 387, note 8; People v. Madison Co.; 17 N. E. 802; O’Connell v. Chicago, 56 N. E. 355; Eastland v. Eogo, 16 N. W. 632; Kruger v. LeBlanc, 37 N. W. 880; Whitten v. Clayton, 12 N. E. 513; Lathrop v. Central, &c., 28 N. W. 465; Chaplin v. Highway Com., 22 N. E. 484; Shepard v. Turner, 62 Pac. 106; Heawak v. Sullivan, 79 Pac. 659; Postal v. Martin, 95 N. W. 8; Close v. Swanson, 89 N. W. 1043.) The judgment cannot, therefore, be upheld on the theory that the County Commissioners originally established the road on the section line, since no competent evidence of that fact was given. Neither can it be upheld on the ground that the County Board consented to fencing the old road and opening the new one, because the Board is not permitted to-act in such summary manner in the matter of changing roads, and for the reason that no official action was taken by the board as such. The evidence is insufficient to show that any such-consent was given, even unofficially. The evidence does, not show a mutual mistake as to the location of the road. On the other hand, the evidence is sufficient in every respect to show the establishment of the road by prescription.
(On petition for rehearing.) Although the matter involved in this case is unimportant so far as this particular l'oad is concerned, the decision is extremely important in its effect upon other county roads. The court will doubtless take judicial notice of the fact that the early road records were imperfectly kept, and that many county roads must be sustained, if at all, by the doctrine of prescription. We again contend that the plat and field notes cannot be considered as competent evidence of the legal establishment of any road along the section line. The only evidence, on the other hand, of any proceeding by the County Board is the testimony of Curtis to the effect that he, as one of the viewers, located the road in 1885 exactly where it was traveled until changed by the defendant in error. Even if the plat and field notes should be considered, the line actually run on the ground would, under the familiar rule as to surveys and boundaries, control in this case. (5 Cyc. 915, note 85.) Moreover, the plat describes a road in range 86 which is six miles west of the road in question. The establishment of a public road can be proved only by the records of the proceedings had by the board relative thereto. There being no record of the proceedings of the Board establishing a road along the section line, the situation presented is that either the county had a road by prescription, where it was laid out in 1885, or it had no road whatever. We think that the County Board assumed control over the road for the statutory period necessary to establish a road by prescription. The Board treated the road as a county road and kept it open and repaired. In the nature of things, it could not do more. Even under the rule of "adverse possession, if the occupant shows that he treated the tract as his own and used it for the purposes for which it was reasonably adapted, his possession will be deemed adverse and under a claim of right. (Lang-try v. Parker, 55 N. W. 962; Carpenter v. Coles, 77 N. W. 424.) Suppose the road in question had required no repairs. Would it be held under such a state of facts, even though it had been traveled for twenty years as a public road, that no rights by prescription could possibly attach, merely because the assumption of control and jurisdiction was not evidenced by repairs? Many roads exist which do not require repairs over their entire length. It is not necessary that the road be repaired or worked throughout its entire length. (Gross v. McNutt, 38 Pac. 935.) The road in the case at bar did not run across land altogether vacant upon prairie land. It was completely fenced on one side and followed a-well defined track along the fence. This case, therefore, does not come under the rule applied by the court. (O’Connell v. Chicago, &c., 56 N. E. 355; Hartley v. Vermillion, 70 Pac.. 273.) Instead of the presumption that the use of the road was permissive, the presumption ought to be that it was adverse upon the facts disclosed in the case. Where there has been actual, continuous and exclusive possession for the statutory period, unexplained, the presumption is raised that the possession is hostile. (Greene v. Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168; Sherry v. Frecking, 4 Duer, 452; Neel v. McElhenny, 69 Pa. St. 300; Morse v. Churchill, 41 Vt. 649; Ill. Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499; Meyer v. Hope, 101 Wis. 123; Wilkes v. Elliott, 5 Cranch. (U. S.), 611; 29 Fed. Case No. 17, 660; Metz v. Metz, 48 S. C. 472.)
Patrick’s attempt to obtain permission from the Board to change his fence was an acknowledgment that the use of his land was not permissive, but adverse. The witness Curtis surely intended to say that his work was performed under the direction of the supervisors of Johnson County, although he said* “Sheridan.” Plis mention of the wrong-county was overlooked upon the trial by both the court and counsel, or it would have been corrected, and it seems that his testimony ought not to be disregarded because of the inadvertence of his statement. However, it is immaterial, for it makes no difference whether the witness thought the county was Sheridan or Johnson, so long as-he actually laid out and worked the road by the direction of the constituted authorities. It is true that without the testimony of Mr. Curtis no evidence exists of any repairs-more than ten years prior to the time Patrick interrupted travel on the road.
No appearance for defendant, in error.

Opinion:
Scott, Justice.
The defendant in error (plaintiff below) brought this action in the District Court of Sheridan County against the plaintiff in error (defendant b.elow) to enjoin the county from interfering with or. removing a fence theretofore constructed by him across a road known as the Soldier Creek road. A temporary injunction was allowed, which upon issue joined and trial thereon was made perpetual. The county brings the case here on error.
It is assigned as error first. That the decision and judgment are contrary to law, and, second, that the decision and judgment are not sustained by sufficient evidence and are contrary to and against the great weight of the evi-. dence. For convenience these assignments will be considered .together.
From the record it appears that as early as 1883 Patrick was and continuously thenceforth has been and is now the owner in fee of Sections 29 and 30 of Township 56 North of Range 86 West of the Sixth Principal Meridian, formerly in Johnson County, but since the time of its organization in 1888, in Sheridan County, Wyoming.
The evidence tended to show that on February 4, 1886, there was filed in the office of the County Clerk of Johnson County a plat and the field notes of the County Surveyor of that county of a survey theretofore made by him of the Soldier Creek road and which plat and field notes show the location of the road as surveyed to be on the north boundary and along the section line of said sections 29 and 30. Owing to the fact that there was a hill or bluff upon the north boundary of section 30, the road as actually followed by the public from the time of such survey until closed by Patrick, diverged to the south of the section lines over and across Patrick's land and around the base of the hill. Patrick's north fence was parallel to, south of and followed the road in its divergence around the hill. The road was a thoroughfare and one of the main traveled roads from Dayton in said county of Sheridan to the county seat until the spring of 1905, when Patrick, being in ignorance of the true location of the north section line of said sections 29 and 30, procured a survey to be made and discovered that the fence which he supposed had been erected on the section line as well as the road was south of the section line in some places more than 400 feet, and that there was about 15 acres of his land unenclosed and north of the fence. He then tore down his fence, or rather, moved it north and reconstructed it klong and parallel with the section line as surveyed and opened a road as originally surveyed on the section line over the bluff which had been avoided by that part of the road which had theretofore crossed his land. The members of the Board of County Commissioners threatened or were about to take official action by causing the fence to be removed from the line of travel as theretofore used by the public under the provisions of Section 1926, R. S-, and had notified him officially of their intention to do so, whereupon this action was commenced to enjoin the Board from so doing.
The county did not defend upon the ground of a legally located highway, that is, a highway located under the provisions of the statute, but on the ground that the road had become a lawful public road by user for more than the period of ten years, that being the time limited by statute within which an action for the recovery of real estate mav be brought after the cause of action accrues. (Sec. 3451, R. S. Wyo. 1899.)
Patrick claims that when he discovered the true north line of his land by reason of the survey he called at the room where the Board of County Commissioners held their sessions and conversed with the individual members of the Board, and was told by them to move his fence to the section line. There is no record evidence of any official action of the Board in this matter, and that being so, there was no authority vested in Patrick by the verbal consent of the individual members of the Board. (Schwerdtle v. County of Placer, 108 Cal. 589.) The public could not be deprived of its right, if any, to use the road except by and through the official • acts of the Board, and in the absence of such act, the parties would be left in the same position as though no such consent had been given.
There is no question here raised as to the validity of the road as originally surveyed along the section line. The question presented by the record is, can a road so located be diverted from its original course to and over lands of another, in the absence of dedication by the owner, without official action or the assumption of control by the Board, and by long continued use by the public, become a public or county road? It will be observed that the part of the road here involved, that is, in so far as it run south of the section line across Patrick's land, had been so used by the public for 19 years without objection by him before he moved his fence. The land was wild and unenclosed, and while there is some conflict in the decisions, we are of the opinion that this long period of uninterrupted use by the public was not of itself sufficient to vest title by prescription. The great weight of authority supports this view and is based Upon the proposition that such user, in order to ripen into title, must in some way be adverse to occupancy or actual as opposed to constructive possession, under a claim of public right known to the owner. (22 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1221, 1222.) The record does not disclose, nor is it here contended, that the part of the road involved was the only practical way for a road at that point, so as to bring it within the exception to this rule, but, on the contrary, it shows the travel of a road by the public in that vicinity, since the fence was moved, upon a different line and 'as originally surveyed.
In addition to the use of the road by the public in the absence of a dedication, express or implied, by the owner of the land, other than by his mere silence, assumption of control and jurisdiction over it by the Board of County Commissioners for the period of limitation should be shown. The burden of proof was on the county, to prove its affirm ative defense. Evidence of assumption of control and of jurisdiction over the road by the public, through its proper authorities, as by recognition and working the road by public authority for the required length of time is. we think, necessary to support the title by prescription. In other words, a claim of public right is essential, and such claim can only be made by the public through its duly constituted authorities. (Stewart v. Frink, 94 N. C. 487, 55 Am. Rep. 618.) Its use would then be under a claim of right, and if with the knowledge of the owner, would constitute adverse user. (Jones v. Bright, 140 Ala. 268; Gehris v. Fuhrman (Neb.), 94 N. W. Rep. 133; Washington v. Steiner, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 392.) The land in question, being unimproved and unenclosed prairie land until some public authority, acting within its proper sphere, assumed supervision or control of the road or kept it in repair, the use of it by the public will be deemed to have been permissive by the owner. (O'Connell v. Chicago, &c., R. Co., 184 Ill. 308, 56 N. E. 355; Watson v. Adams County, 38 Wash. 662; 22 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1222.) Such use, that is to say, use by permission or sufferance, is not adverse and can not ripen into title, no matter how long continued. (Jones v. Bright, supra; Hartley v. Vermillion (Cal. 1902), 70 Pac. Rep. 273; 1 Cyc. 1030; 22 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1221, 1222, and cases cited in the footnotes.)
In the case before us, one witness testified that he viewed and laid out the road in 1885, and that since then there had been very little divergence from the road as laid out and that traveled by the public over Patrick's land. He further testified that in the following summer, that is in 1886, he worked on that part of the road which was closed by the fence, and that he so worked under the direction of the road supervisors of Sheridan County. This court takes judicial notice of the fact, as the trial court undoubtedly did, that Sheridan County was unorganized untill 1888. The witness was undoubtedly mistaken, but his evidence stands in the record uncontradicted. We know judicially that Sheridan County was a part of Johnson County at that time, and it may be that the witness meant to say Johnson instead of Sheridan, but we cannot go beyond the record nor read into it something which is not there. His evidence could, therefore, have been of no value to the trial court in fixing any time when the public, through their constituted authorities, if they ever did so, assumed control of the road. The only evidence in the record of repairs to or the assumption of control over this road by any public authority relates to work performed more than ten years thereafter, and within ten years prior to the time when Patrick moved his fence, and by so doing interrupted the running of the statute. (Rollman v. Erurich, 122 Wis. 134; Gehris v. Fuhrman, supra; Coward v. Llewellyn, 209 Pa. St. 582; Washington v. Steiner, supra; Ft. Worth v. Cetti (Tex. Civ. App., 1905), 85 S. W. Rep. 826.) It follows that the title or the right to maintain the road had not accrued by prescription. The judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Potter, C. J., and Beard, J., concur.