Case Name: Joseph Duane SAUCER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-12-17
Citations: 736 So. 2d 10
Docket Number: No. 97-4134
Parties: Joseph Duane SAUCER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 736
Pages: 10–15

Head Matter:
Joseph Duane SAUCER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 97-4134.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 17, 1998.
Joseph Duane Saucer, pro se, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
BARFIELD, C.J.
Our Order dated August 17, 1998, is withdrawn, and the Respondent's motion for rehearing is denied in view of the revised order which follows.
Joseph Duane Saucer sought a belated appeal from his judgment and sentence by writ of habeas corpus directed to this court. His petition alleged that he had timely requested his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but that request was not honored. After considering the state's response, jurisdiction was relinquished and a special master was appointed to conduct a hearing. The special master's report found that, while client and counsel discussed an appeal after a suppression motion was denied, later Saucer entered a plea with the understanding that there would be no appellate review. Based upon these findings, the petition for belated appeal was denied without comment. Saucer v. State, 718 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
The state now asks this court to order a forfeiture of gain-time in accordance with section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). This statute authorizes sanctions if the court finds that, among other things, an appeal is frivolous or that a prisoner "knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information or evidence before the court."
As an initial matter, this court has expressed its agreement with the view of the Second District Court of Appeal that it is the role of the Department of Corrections, not the court, to order the forfeiture of gain-time. Martin v. Singletary, 713 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(relying upon Mercade v. State, 698 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). More importantly to resolution of respondent's motion, we are persuaded that the provisions of section 944.28(2) are applicable to the instant proceeding. Saucer sought a belated direct appeal from his judgment and sentence; therefore, this is a "criminal proceeding."
Section 944.279(2), Florida Statutes (1997) authorizes disciplinary proceedings in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 944.09 for frivolous or malicious actions in civil proceedings and provides that "[t]his section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." Section 944.28(2) authorizes a sanction of forfeiture of gain time if the prisoner "is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court; is found by a court to have knowingly or with reck less disregard for the truth brought false information of evidence before the court." This sanction is without the limiting language of section 944.279 and appears to apply in both civil and criminal proceedings.
Chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida, amended chapter 944, Florida Statutes, to add section 944.279 and amended section 944.28(2)(a) for the expressed purpose of reducing the onslaught of frivolous prisoner civil lawsuits. The amendments provided for loss of gain-time upon certain findings by the court. The new section 944.279 provided that court findings would be forwarded to the appropriate prison facility for disciplinary action provided in section 944.28(2). This section further provided that it would not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding. The gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28 did not contain a civil action limitation; however, there was no declared intent in chapter 96-106 to target frivolous or malicious proceedings in criminal matters.
In chapter 97-78, Laws of Florida, the legislature amended section 944.279 by deleting all reference to loss of gain-time and section 944.28(2) and added provisions for disciplinary procedures pursuant to rules of the department provided in section 944.09. The gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28 were not changed. It appears the legislature has now authorized gain-time forfeiture and other disciplinary action in the case of frivolous civil litigation. In the absence of limiting language in section 944.28, there appears to be no reason why the gain-time forfeiture cannot apply to criminal proceedings.
In view of the historical treatment of gain-time forfeiture and its statewide application in criminal proceedings, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance:
May the gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) apply in criminal and collateral criminal proceedings?
The motion to forfeit gain-time is granted, in part, and we find the petitioner either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information before the court.
LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
WEBSTER, J., dissents with opinion.