Case Name: CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Appellant, v. Donald AUSTRINO and Maria Austrino, his wife, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-02-09
Citations: 898 So. 2d 955
Docket Number: No. 2D02-5802
Parties: CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Appellant, v. Donald AUSTRINO and Maria Austrino, his wife, Appellees.
Judges: GREEN, OLIVER L., Senior Judge, Concurs:
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 898
Pages: 955–966

Head Matter:
CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Appellant, v. Donald AUSTRINO and Maria Austrino, his wife, Appellees.
No. 2D02-5802.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 9, 2005.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 2005.
John C. Wolfe, City Attorney, and Deborah Glover-Pearcey, Assistant City Attorney, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Marcus A. Castillo of Haas & Castillo, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellees.

Opinion:
CASANUEVA, Judge.
The City of St. Petersburg appeals a jury finding of liability for false arrest and an award of damages of $45,000, for which the City was found to be ninety percent liable. We affirm on all points raised, writing only to comment on the issue of probable cause.
At approximately 5:00 a.m. on April 9, 1998, fifty-five-year-old Donald Austrino was awoken and arrested in his home by City of St. Petersburg Police Officer John Douglas for prescription fraud, a violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1997). Allegedly, Mr. Austrino had violated the law by altering a prescription in order to obtain an unauthorized refill for Vicodin, a controlled substance.
Two days earlier, Mr. Austrino had been treated by Dr. Scott Plantz at the emergency room of St. Anthony's Hospital for complaints arising from kidney stones. Following the examination, the ER physician released him and prescribed two medications: Vicodin and Anaprox. Because Mr. Austrino was shortly to depart on vacation, and so he would not be caught without sufficient medication, Dr. Plantz wrote the prescription with one refill noted. He wrote the designation for one refill on the prescription in his typical handwriting, which the doctor described as merely printing the numeral. The doctor did not customarily note the number of permitted refills on the patient's chart, and he did not do so in this instance either. It was unusual, but not unheard of, for an ER physician to prescribe a refill.
Of importance to the circumstances of this case, the doctor was not contacted prior to Mr. Austrino's arrest by any hospital personnel, any pharmacist employed by Walgreen's, or by Officer Douglas.
Mrs. Austrino took the prescription to a Walgreen's pharmacy to be filled during the next day, April 8. This store was near their home where they had lived for over twenty years, and she had been taking all the family's prescriptions to its pharmacy for at least ten years. She received the medication without any question. Late that evening, Ms. Jean Fernandez, the night shift staff pharmacist on duty, reviewed all the prescriptions filled that day, including Mr. Austrino's. The first thing that caught her eye about this prescription was that an ER physician had ostensibly authorized a refill. Further, it appeared to her to be written with a different pen, did not appear to be the same writing as on the rest of the prescription, and the numeral itself was of a different type than elsewhere on the prescription. She thus became suspicious of the refill's authenticity and contacted the hospital. She did not speak to Dr. Plantz. Instead, she spoke with an ER nurse at the hospital who pulled Mr. Austrino's chart. The chart, although noting that a narcotic had been prescribed, contained no indication that a refill had been authorized. The nurse was not on the same shift as Dr. Plantz and did not speak with Dr. Plantz before confirming Ms. Fernandez's belief that ER physicians do not usually prescribe refills. Based on her conversation with the ER nurse, the pharmacist noted on the back of the prescription that she had verified with the ER that the doctor had not authorized the refill. Because this indicated to her that a crime had been committed, she reported it to the police department, which dispatched Officer Douglas. She and Officer Douglas were acquainted with each other as they had previously worked together on similar claims. Officer Douglas responded to the Walgreen's shortly after 4 a.m. on April 9.
Ms. Fernandez told the officer that she had determined that the prescription was forged because the numeral "1" in the refill space was different from the rest of the script, and she had verified with the hospital that a refill had not been authorized. The officer examined the prescription himself. He did not contact either the hospital or Dr. Plantz; instead, he went directly to Mr. Austrino's home. Mr. Aus-trino, although awakened from a sound sleep, was cooperative with the officer but denied altering the prescription. Both he and Mrs. Austrino, who was nearly hysterical at this point, asked the officer to contact the doctor to confirm that the refill was authorized. Mr. Austrino testified at trial that the officer told him then that he had already spoken to the doctor, who denied authorizing the refill. Despite Mr. Austrino's continued denial of wrongdoing, the officer arrested him at approximately 5 a.m. Mr. Austrino was taken to jail, booked, and required to submit to a body cavity search. Around noon, after the police department learned from the doctor that he had, in fact, written the authorization for one refill, as Mr. Austrino had previously maintained, Mr. Austrino was released from jail.
The gravamen of the tort of false arrest is the unlawful restraint of a person against that person's will. Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So.2d 699, 700 (1944); Spears v. Albertson's Inc., 848 So.2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). In a false arrest action, probable cause is an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant. Bolanos v. Metro. Dade County, 677 So.2d 1005, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Probable cause is a fluid concept. The courts recognize that probable cause for an arrest may be based upon hearsay and does not require the same quantum of evidence needed to sustain a conviction. Otherwise, as Judge Learned Hand wrote, "the powers of the peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties." United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir.1945). Thus, law enforcement officers are afforded some latitude for error. See Lee v. Geiger, 419 So.2d 717, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ("[T]he facts in this case show that at most Detective Lee was guilty of poor judgment in conducting his investigation . "). However, their mistakes "must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed in 1983 "the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Focusing on the totality of circumstances requires an assessment of probabilities in that particular factual context. These probabilities are "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id. at 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302). From these considerations, common sense conclusions regarding human behavior can be reached. The facts and circumstances, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, must be such that "would cause a prudent person to believe" the suspect has committed a crime. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir.1995)).
With these standards in mind, we turn to an analysis of the facts in this case. The City of St. Petersburg asks us to review, in the light most favorable to the Austrinos, the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment to the City and the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury award in favor of the Austrinos. If we concluded that there were no material facts in dispute, then in order to reverse, we would be required to find that the City established, as a matter of law, that Officer Douglas had probable cause to arrest Mr. Austrino at 5:00 a.m. on April 9. Because the evidence and all inferences from it lead inevitably to the conclusion that Officer Douglas arrested Mr. Austrino without conducting a reasonable investigation, we hold that the facts and circumstances known to the officer were insufficient to give rise to probable cause. See Liabos v. Harman, 215 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968) (holding that it was error to enter summary judgment when there remained a material issue of fact about whether store employees had probable cause to sign an affidavit alleging that the plaintiff wrote worthless checks to the store; the jury could well decide that further investigation was warranted by the facts).
On the most basic level, the trial court was correct in denying the City's motion for summary judgment because there were material facts in dispute. See Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that summary judgment is improper if the record raises the .slightest doubt that a factual issue might exist). At the time of the City's motion for summary judgment, there was deposition testimony from one of Officer Douglas's fellow officers; he had called her shortly after arresting Mr. Austrino and reported that he had personally called the prescribing doctor to verify that the prescription form had been altered. When motions for summary judgment turn on issues of credibility, summary judgment is improper. Sutherland v. Pell, 738 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). There were still other factual matters in dispute, such as the pharmacist's noting on the back of the prescription that her contact at the ER had verified that the ER doctor had not authorized the refill. Although Officer Douglas's suspicions may have been properly aroused by the pharmacist's report, a reasonably prudent police officer would have conducted further investigation before determining that he had cause to arrest.
In Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425 (11th Cir.1998), the plaintiffs asserted that a Palm Beach County Sheriffs deputy falsely arrested the plaintiff without probable cause due to an improper investigation. The court stated: "An arresting officer is required to conduct a reasonable investigation to establish probable cause." Id. at 1435; see also Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("Where it would appear to a 'cautious man' that further investigation is justified before instituting a proceeding, liability may attach for failure to do so, especially where the information is readily obtainable, or where the accused points out the sources of the information."). In Rankin, the investigating sheriffs deputy interviewed the three-and-a-half-year-old child abuse victim, who identified her alleged abuser by his nickname; the child's mother; and the child's pediatrician, who had examined her and found signs indicating possible sexual abuse. This investigation was found sufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest although Mr. Rankin was later exonerated. 133 F.3d at 1437. "In the context of an arrest which requires probable cause, it is incumbent upon a police officer to make a 'thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment before invoking the awesome power of arrest and detention.' " Mahon v. City of Largo, 829 F.Supp. 377, 386 (M.D.Fla.1993) (quoting BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir.1986)).
The probable cause investigation is a function of both factual information and exigency. BeVier, 806 F.2d at 127. In BeVier, where a charge of child neglect led to a civil suit for false arrest, probable cause was found lacking because the investigating officer made the mistake of failing to question the parents, the medical personnel who treated the child, or the babysitter who was taking care of the child when the alleged neglect was identified. The court found the officer's mistake was unreasonable when a few questions would have provided him some important information. Id.
Inquiry into the reasonableness of an officer's perceptions of critical facts supporting an arrest does not focus upon facts not available to him at the time. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). "By the same token, however, it must charge him with possession of all the information reasonably discoverable by an officer acting reasonably under the circumstances." Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 n. 5 (4th Cir.1988). "A police officer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of an arrest." BeVier, 806 F.2d at 128.
We review the basis for the probable cause by focusing upon the facts known to Officer Douglas at the time of the arrest along with any exigencies that affected his ability to undertake a thorough investigation, keeping in mind that a reasonable amount of investigation is always warranted. "Reasonable avenues of investigation must be pursued especially when, as here, it is unclear whether a crime had even taken place." Id. The crime of prescription fraud is not one of possession, of either the prescription or the illegally obtained drug, but rather one of intent and action. It was the officer's role to investigate and establish probable cause to conclude that the prescription had been altered from the original and then to identify the person who inserted the number for the refill.
Here, the source of the officer's information was first and only Ms. Fernandez, the Walgreen's night pharmacist, who did not herself fill this prescription. What she reported to the officer was the result of her personal investigation consisting of undocumented hearsay. Although an identification or a report from a single credible victim or eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause, Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979 (7th Cir.2000), Ms. Fernandez was neither of these. She reported that the number "1" on the prescription denoting the allowable refills seemed to her to be different from the others on the prescription, she thought that the ink with which it was written also appeared different, and she believed, based on her experience, that ER physicians did not prescribe refills. The record is unclear whether she informed the officer of her familiarity - with the physician's handwriting or office procedures or any knowledge of Mr. Austrino's history with the pharmacy. Although she told the officer that she had sought further information from personnel then on duty at the hospital, at best they provided information that the records did not indicate a refill had been authorized. However, neither did the records indicate that a refill had been precluded.
Because of the hearsay nature of the information provided by the pharmacist, it was incumbent upon the police officer to further investigate whether there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. The primary problem here is that the officer undertook no investigation of his own; instead, he apparently relied solely upon that undertaken by the pharmacist. -In essence, he abrogated his responsibility to investigate the circumstances of a crime to the pharmacist who was, at best, remote from what had occurred and untrained in proper investigative techniques. Proper investigation would have also uncovered the fact that it was Mrs. Austrino, not Mr. Austrino, who presented the prescription for filling. The persons who were the source of information for the pharmacist did not write the prescription, were not present at the time the prescription was written, and had no direct knowledge of that event. The lack of a direct source of information was known by the officer and was a fact whose significance he should have realized. This compounded his failure to conduct a reasonable investigation. A simple telephone call to Dr. Plantz would have provided the officer with the necessary factual information to make a reasonable probable cause determination. If the officer was reluctant to disturb the physician's slumber because of the early morning hour, he had only to wait a few hours to obtain the necessary information.
Alternatively, the officer, by contacting the hospital, could have identified the staff who had assisted during Mr. Austrino's hospital visit, staff who might have provided direct evidence regarding the prescription or easily put him in touch with the doctor. See BeVier, 806 F.2d at 127 (discussing Moore v. The Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir.1985), where the police awakened suspects who were sleeping and arrested them for failing to pay a restaurant check, without further questioning, once they admitted they had been to the restaurant that evening; summary judgment reversed). Officer Douglas did not speak to any hospital staff before arresting Mr. Austrino; his questioning of these potential witnesses would have provided a sounder basis upon which to determine probable cause. Furthermore, this record contains no information suggesting that exigent circumstances, existed, e.g., that Mr. Austrino was a flight risk, so as to abridge the ability to further investigate. Instead, without further delay or investigation, the officer elected at 5 a.m. to arrest Mr. Austrino — without questioning according to Mr. Austrino — even though it was Mrs. Austrino who presented the allegedly falsified prescription to the pharmacy. He roused longtime, stable residents of the neighborhood and customers of the store, denied their reasonable request that he contact the doctor, and precipitously made an arrest.
At the moment of the arrest, Officer Douglas possessed no information indicating a crime had been committed, only his suspicion and the unsubstantiated belief of the pharmacist. No exigent circumstances circumscribed the time he possessed to undertake or to continue an investigation. Simply stated, the officer conducted no investigation of his own, much less a reasonable one, before arresting Mr. Austrino. "[I]t is incumbent upon law enforcement officials to make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment before invoking the awesome power of arrest and detention." Moore, 754 F.2d at 1346.. This failure supports the trial court's denial of the City's motion for summary judgment and the, jury's final conclusion that the officer, lacked probable cause to justify Mr. Austrino's arrest. Had the officer known what he could have easily learned from common prudence, a simple phone call to the doctor, and appropriate investigation, he would not have arrested Mr. Austrino.
Finally, we note that if Officer Douglas had, in fact, reviewed the hospital records, probable cause might have existed. But, it is equally likely that the ambiguity found in the hospital records regarding whether an authorization for a refill existed might have prompted an investigative call to the physician.
Judging "not with clinical detachment, but with a common sense view to the realities of normal life[,]" Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.1985), we hold that Officer Douglas failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and had no probable cause to arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment against the City of St. Petersburg for the false arrest of Mr. Aus-trino.
GREEN, OLIVER L., Senior Judge, Concurs:
CANADY, J., Dissents with opinion.
. Walgreen's, the other defendant, settled before trial, but the jury found it ten percent negligent.
. When the officer was called to testify at trial, he denied saying this to Mr. Austrino. Such credibility determination was properly left up to jury.
. Based upon the efforts of Mr. Austrino's son, the prescribing physician was contacted within a few hours and verified that he had, in fact, authorized the refill.
. We do not hereby suggest that there was probable cause to arrest Mrs. Austrino, as there was not, but merely point out that the officer still had suspects to rule out before jumping to the unwarranted conclusion that it was Mr. Austrino who altered the prescription. The evidence would later show that Mr. Austrino never touched the prescription. The prescription was given directly to Mrs. Austri-no at the hospital; she put it in her purse where it stayed until she took it to the Walgreen's pharmacy to be filled the next" morning.