Case Name: SARAH E. MELLEN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM C. BANNING, Sole Surviving Executor of the Last Will and Testament of ABNER MELLEN, Deceased, Respondent, and Others, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-05
Citations: 67 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 151
Docket Number: 
Parties: SARAH E. MELLEN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM C. BANNING, Sole Surviving Executor of the Last Will and Testament of ABNER MELLEN, Deceased, Respondent, and Others, Appellants.
Judges: Daniels, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 67
Pages: 151–155

Head Matter:
SARAH E. MELLEN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM C. BANNING, Sole Surviving Executor of the Last Will and Testament of ABNER MELLEN, Deceased, Respondent, and Others, Appellants.
Will — an action for its construction is proper only where a trust exists — cloud upon a title — equity will not relieve therefrom, if the defect appears upon the face of the record.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity to pass upon the interpretation of wills is incidental to that over trusts, and where there is no question relating to a trust in a will the case is not a proper one for the bringing of an action for its-construction.
The complaint in an action brought, among other things, to restrain executors-from executing a power of sale contained in a will, alleged, as a ground therefor, that said power was inoperative, null and void, and never had any validity. To this complaint a demurrer was interposed, alleging that it did not state facts constituting a cause of action.
Held, that a court of equity would not give relief in such a case.
It is only where the claim of the adverse party to the lands in question is valid upon the face of the instrument or proceeding sought to be set aside, and extrinsic facts must be proved to establish such invalidity or illegality, that equity will intervene.
(Lawrence, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendants, Gordon McKay Mellen, Stanley Mellen •and Evelyn Mellen, by Jane JI. Pierce, their guardian ad litem, from an order entered in the clerk’s office of the county of New York on the 30th day of January, 1891, overruling a demurrer interposed herein by said defendants; and also an appeal by said •defendants, by their said guardian ad litem, from an interlocutory judgment entered in said clerk’s office on the 9th day of February, 1891, overruling said demurrer, with leave to defendants to answer within five days upon payment of costs.
A. T. Ackert, for the guardian ad litem of the infant defendants ■demurring.
U. Dcdly, Jr., for the respondent.

Opinion:
Van Brunt, P. J.:
This action, according to the complaint, is brought to obtain a construction of the will of one Abner Mellen, deceased, and also to restrain his executors from executing a power of sale contained in that will upon the ground that such power was inoperative, null .and void, and never had any validity. To this complaint the infant defendants demurred upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
While concurring with the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice Lawrence in his opinion thereon, although the point is not distinctly taken by the counsel for the infant defendants, I do not think that the court ought to entertain jurisdiction of this action for the reason that it cannot be maintained as an action for the construction of the will, because the jurisdiction of courts of equity to pass upon the interpretation of a will is incidental to that over trusts, and there is no question of trust in the will mentioned. This rule was distinctly enunciated in the case of Monarque v. Monarque (80 N. Y., 320), in which, in speaking of a certain action which had been brought to construe a will, it was held that the case was not a proper one for the action for the construction of a will, because there was no trust •or other element to justify invoking the jurisdiction of the court for that purpose. Therefore, it is clear that this action cannot be maintained as an action to construe a will.
But it is urged that the action may be maintained for the purpose of removing a cloud upon the title, and in support of that proposition the counsel for the respondents cite the case of Butler v. Johnson (111 N. Y., 204) and De Witt v. Van Schoyk (110 id., 7).
An examination of these cases will show that they do not support the claim in this action. It is a well-settled principle regulating the invocation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to remove a cloud upon a title that, if the defect appears upon the face of the record or proceedings which are claimed to be invalid, the court will not entertain an action to declare such invalidity, and it is only where the claim of the adverse party to the land is valid upon the face of the instrument or proceeding sought to be set aside, and extrinsic facts are necessary to be proved in order to establish the invalidity or illegality, that a court of equity will intervene.
Now, in the case at bar, it is claimed that the power of sale contained in the will is null and void upon its face. If that is the fact, then there is no room for the intervention of a court of equity, because it does not depend upon extrinsic evidence. That is the allegation and the judgment that is asked for.
The two cases above- cited in no way -conflict with this rule. In Butler v. Johnson the fact that the debts were outlawed, for the payment of which the executor was about to exercise the power of sale, was a fact extrinsic of the instrument creating the power, and, therefore, the case was brought within the rule above mentioned.
In the case of De Witt v. Van Schoyk the intervention of a court of equity was sustained because, unless the action of the defendant was restrained, its effect would be to change or confuse the boundary of two farms and render their location doubtful, and open over the land of the plaintiff a right of way through which the public would be allowed to travel, facts showing that the action against which an injunction was sought would confuse the plaintiff's rights, which confusion would not necessarily appear of record.
It seems to me, therefore, that the court should not entertain jurisdiction of this action, and that the complaint does not state a cause of action within the rules limiting the invocation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
The judgment should be reversed and the demurrer sustained.
Daniels, J., concurred.