Case Name: Susan M. BRACEY, Appellant, v. Michael G. BRACEY, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1991-04-16
Citations: 589 A.2d 415
Docket Number: No. 88-732
Parties: Susan M. BRACEY, Appellant, v. Michael G. BRACEY, Appellee.
Judges: Before STEADMAN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and KERN, Senior Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 589
Pages: 415–419

Head Matter:
Susan M. BRACEY, Appellant, v. Michael G. BRACEY, Appellee.
No. 88-732.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Submitted March 5, 1991.
Decided April 16, 1991.
Susan Bracey and Michael Bracey filed briefs pro se.
Before STEADMAN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and KERN, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
STEADMAN, Associate Judge:
On April 28, 1988, the trial court entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Absolute Divorce," into which a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (Agreement) entered into by the parties was incorporated by reference but not merged. The parties had separated in early 1979. Their son, then almost two years old, had subsequently spent two years (1981-83) in the custody of his father and the remaining time with his mother. At the divorce proceedings, several issues were raised and explored at length, includ ing visitation rights and a requested increase in the child support provision of $200 per month agreed to by the father in the Agreement.
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its judgment that child support payments should commence under the Agreement on January 1, 1987, instead of July 1, 1986. Appellant's argument in support of the latter date is that the Agreement bears a date of June 4, 1986, and provides that child support will be payable "commencing on the first day of the month immediately following the date of this Agreement." The trial court, however, concluded that since in fact the Agreement was not finally agreed to until December 10, 1986, payments should begin on January 1, 1987.
Both parties had the advice of counsel in entering into the Agreement and at trial. The trial court found that in the execution of the Agreement, there was no fraud, duress, concealment or overreaching. It further found that the provision for child support at the time took into account the full needs of the child and adequately protected the child's best interests, and that the Agreement was "fair and reasonable under the circumstances."
"[T]he law in this jurisdiction allows and indeed encourages the use of separation agreements to settle the financial affairs of spouses who are not able to maintain a harmonious marriage relationship." Lanahan v. Nevius, 317 A.2d 521, 523 (D.C.1974). Accordingly, such agreements are generally enforced in accordance with their terms. "If the parties disagree on the meaning of their agreement, then the court must interpret it according to principles of contract law and the court's statutory responsibilities . [Wjhere the trial court has resolved factual disputes regarding a contract between the parties, this court must treat these factual findings as presumptively correct, unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record." Spencer v. Spencer, supra note 2, 494 A.2d at 1286 (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court tacitly resolved the meaning of a provision which was arguably ambiguous; viz., whether the "date of this Agreement" governing the beginning of child support payments was the date appearing in the Agreement itself or the date on which the Agreement was in fact finally made. It did so after a hearing that extended over three days of testimony and some 400 pages of transcript, in which the issue of the actual date of the Agreement and its effect on the child support provision, including the question of' when payments were to begin, was specifically raised and thoroughly explored.
We recognize that a persuasive case can be made to the contrary, as the dissent ably sets forth. But there is nothing inherently implausible in a view that where in June, a party makes a counteroffer in contract negotiations that certain payments will begin "on the first day of the month following the date of this Agreement" and an acceptance of that counteroffer does not occur until December, the payments are intended to begin on January 1, even though the contract itself may bear a formal date of June 4 because of the peculiar manner in which the negotiations took place. Resolving such interpretative ambiguities is a trial court role and function. We simply cannot say that the judgment here was "clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record." D.C.Code § 17-305 (1989). See Waverly Taylor, Inc. v. Polinger, 583 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C.1990) (trial court interpreting ambiguous contract essentially acts as a finder of fact).
Affirmed.
. The oddity as to the date apparently came about because of the unorthodox manner in which the negotiations took place. Signed copies of the proposed agreement were shipped back and forth between the parties, with pages removed and alternate pages inserted containing the desired provisions of the affected party. Among disputed provisions were child support and rights in South Carolina property.
. Where a support agreement establishes a support arrangement which is inadequate in its inception to meet the child's foreseeable needs, the court has the power and responsibility to order additional child support. Portlock v. Portlock, 518 A.2d 116, 119 (D.C.1986). An originally adequate agreement can be modified if a party demonstrates a change of circumstances unforeseen when the Agreement was entered and which is substantial and material to the welfare and best interests of the child. Spencer v. Spencer, 494 A.2d 1279, 1287 (D.C.1985). The trial court here found that there had been no substantial increase in the child's expenses, which it set at $473. (The mother had no out-of-pocket expenses for housing costs because of an advantegeous rental arrangement taken into account in negotiating the Agreement.) The trial court further found that the net disposable income of the two parties was "relatively equivalent," and that the father was at the time financially able to pay only the agreed-upon amount of child support. The trial court here left open the possibility of future changes, noting that the present request for modification was "premature."