Case Name: Robert N. CAHALA, Claimant-appellant, v. OK TIRE STORE, Employer, and United Pacific Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1987-05-15
Citations: 112 Idaho 1020
Docket Number: No. 16608
Parties: Robert N. CAHALA, Claimant-appellant, v. OK TIRE STORE, Employer, and United Pacific Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-respondents.
Judges: SHEPARD, C.J., and DONALDSON and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 112
Pages: 1020–1024

Head Matter:
739 P.2d 319
Robert N. CAHALA, Claimant-appellant, v. OK TIRE STORE, Employer, and United Pacific Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-respondents.
No. 16608.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
May 15, 1987.
Robert L. Jackson, of Goicoechea Law Office, Pocatello, for claimant-appellant.
Thomas Y. Munson, of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
BAKES, Justice.
This claim for worker's compensation resulted from an altercation between two employees of the OK Tire Store in Jerome, Idaho. During the fight the appellant Robert N. Cahala (Cahala) broke his leg. Cahala's subsequent claim for benefits was denied by the employer. A hearing was requested before the Industrial Commission which heard the matter on March 11, 1986, and subsequently denied the claim. Cahala appeals the Industrial Commission's decision, claiming that the commission erred in its application of Idaho law. We disagree and affirm the Industrial Commission.
Cahala was the only witness to testify at the Industrial Commission hearing. He testified that during his employment at OK Tire another OK Tire employee named Kemp had continuously harassed him verbally over the years. The verbal attacks included Kemp's use of extremely offensive epithets. Cahala related that this situation was aggravated when Cahala pleaded guilty to the felony crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child. Four days after judgment was entered on August 10,1984, Kemp again called Cahala several offensive names, including a child-molester, in front of two female customers. Cahala complained to the management, as he had previously done, but no action was taken. Thereafter, following another verbal incident, Cahala raised the level of confrontation from verbal to physical by taking a swing at Kemp who was kneeling down at the time. Cahala stated that he intended to frighten Kemp, but admitted that his action was sufficient to justify Kemp's belief that Cahala meant to hit him. Kemp grabbed the claimant about the waist, they struggled and fell over a floor jack, breaking Cahala's leg. On July 31, 1986, the commission entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of Cahala's employment because the cause of the altercation was wholly disconnected with Cahala's employment or his employer's business.
"Our review of the decisions of the Industrial Commission is limited to questions of law and to determination [of] whether the commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 419, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980), citing Id. Const. Art. 5, § 9; Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978).
On appeal both parties agreed that Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969), is the controlling law in Idaho where an employee's injury was the result of an altercation at the workplace. Mayo divided assault cases into three classifications:
"First, there are those assaults which are inherently related to the employment, such as assaults arising out of work disputes, and which generally result in award of compensation. Second, there are those assaults which are inherently personal and private in origin, which assaults arise from disputes imported by the employee from outside the sphere of employment, the only connection with the employment being the location at which the assault occurs. This class of assaults is generally considered as being noncompensable. The third classification by Larson is the 'neutral' assaults, wherein the cause of the assault can neither be assigned to the employment nor to the personal disputes with the employee." Id. at 163, 457 P.2d at 402, citing 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 11.31, p. 184 (1968).
The commission found that "the evidence explains the assault and the injury as having arisen from the personal animosity between the claimant and his co-worker." As a result, the commission found that the altercation was derived from a dispute that was "inherently personal or private in origin and was not compensable." Cahala argues that as a matter of law the facts produced at the Industrial Commission hearing fell into the third or "neutral" category and are therefore compensable.
The commission was correct in applying the law as outlined in Mayo v. Safeway, supra. Mayo is the controlling authority in this state, as both parties admit.
There is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the commission's findings of fact. There was evidence that the assault that led to Cahala's injury was precipitated by the personal animosity between Cahala and Kemp which was not related to the workplace. Cahala admitted that he swung his fist with the intention of scaring Kemp. Cahala's intention to scare Kemp must have been accompanied by the knowledge that such action could precipitate a fight, thereby escalating the personal animosity from a verbal dispute into a physical altercation. While the evidence might have been subject to another interpretation by the factfinder, the commission's ultimate finding that the assault and injury was the result of a dispute that was "inherently personal and private" is supported by the record. Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 420, 614 P.2d 955, 960 (1980) ("Although we might conclude otherwise if we were the finder of fact in this case, there is evidence to sustain the commission's findings and they are affirmed.").
Accordingly, the order of the commission is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DONALDSON and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.