Case Name: William F. O'Rourke, App'lt, v. John I. Hadcock, Resp't
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-06-18
Citations: 24 N.Y. St. Rep. 511
Docket Number: 
Parties: William F. O’Rourke, App’lt, v. John I. Hadcock, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 24
Pages: 511–521

Head Matter:
William F. O’Rourke, App’lt, v. John I. Hadcock, Resp’t.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed June 18, 1889.)
1. Contract—Conditional sale op chattels—Right op vendor to sell.
When several distinct chattels are sold, upon condition that the title shall not pass from the vendor to the vendee until the agreed price is paid, and the vendor, in affirmance of the contract, seizes the chattels, for the avowed purpose of selling them and collecting the amount due upon the contract, he has no right to seize and sell, or seize and return, more than sufficient to satisfy his demand and expenses; and when he continues to sell, after he has realized enough to satisfy the debt and costs, he becomes a trespasser.
2. Same—When vendor cannot terminate contract.
Where an executory contract for the sale of chattels provides that the title shall not pass until the agreed price is fully paid, which is payable in installments, and the vendor permits the vendee to retain possession and make other payments after the whole contract price is due, the vendor cannot seize the property and terminate the contract for non-payment, until he has demanded payment of the vendee.
S. Judgment-Former action—When conclusive.
Where the record shows that a judgment in a former action was rendered on the merits, it becomes conclusive between the parties, and such judgment-roll, in a subsequent action, is evidence of the amount due from defendant to plaintiff. Bradley, J., dissenting.
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the superior court of the city of Buffalo, affirming a judgment in favor of the defendant, for $8,500, damages, and for the return of two canal boats, and in case a return cannot be had, for their value, $1,400.
On the 31st day of May, 1873, the plaintiff was the owner of the canal boat Jay Pettibone, its tackle and furniture, ■and four mules and their harnesses, then used in towing the boat. On that day, a written contract was entered into between the parties, by which plaintiff agreed to sell to defendant, this property, for $6,000, which the defendant agreed to pay in twelve equal installments, with interest, the last payment falling due November 1, 1875. To secure the payment of these sums, defendant gave twelve promissory notes. It was stipulated in the written contract that defendant should have immediate possession of the property, but that title to the boat should not pass from the plaintiff to the -defendant until the purchase price was paid, but the contract contains no provision in respect to the mules and their harnesses. At the date named, defendant was the owner of the canal boat, Dr. M. S. "Kittinger, its tackle and furniture. To secure the payment of said $6,000, the defendant mortgaged fche property last mentioned, to the plaintiff.
On the 27th of June, 1876, there was an unsettled account between these parties, embracing many items, extending through several years, and aggregating more than thirty thousand dollars, inclusive of the outstanding notes, given by the defendant to the plaintiff, for the purchase price of said boat. At this time, a dispute as to the state of these accounts arose between the parties, each claiming to be the creditor of the other. On the day last named, the plaintiff advertised that by virtue of the contract and chattel mortgage, he would sell the boats by public auction, on the seventh of July, 1876, and, at the same time, seized the Pettibone, and held possession of it for one day.
July 7, 1876, Hadcock, the defendant herein, began an action against O’Rourke, the plaintiff herein, setting up the existence of the aforesaid executory contract, the promissory notes and chattel mortgage, the open account, and alleged that he had fully paid for the boat, and prayed for an accounting, and for a judgment that O’Rourke surrender up the notes, chattel mortgage and contract, execute to him a bill of sale of the Jay Pettibone, and that he be restrained from selling the property described in the contract and mortgage. An issue was joined in this action, which was referred to a referee, who found that the plaintiff, Hadcock, was still indebted to O’Rourke, the defendant, in the sum of :$136.38, and directed a judgment dismissing the complaint with costs. December 30, 1881, a judgment was entered pursuant to the report.
July 21, 1876, the plaintiff claimed that the notes, or some part of them, were unpaid, and took from the defendant and converted to his own use, without defendant’s consent, said four mules and harnesses. On the next day, July 22, 1876, the plaintiff advertised that he would sell, on July 28, at 10 o’clock A. M., the Pettibone, her tackle, apparel, furniture, and the four mules and their harnesses, at public auction, by virtue of the executory contract of sale. And on the same day, by a separate notice, advertised that he would sell the boat Dr. M. S. Kittinger, her tackle, apparel and furniture, at public auction at the same time, by virtue of the chattel mortgage.
_ July 22, 1876, this action for the recovery of the possession of the two boats, their tackle, apparel and furniture, was begun, and on the 24th of July, the sheriff seized the property, and the defendant not excepting to the plaintiff’s sureties, nor requiring the return of the chattels pursuant to the Code of Procedure, the sheriff delivered the chattels to the plaintiff. July 28, 1876, the plaintiff sold the Kittinger, pursuant to his notice of sale, under the chattel mortgage, for $800, and the Pettibone pursuant to his notice ■of sale under the executory contract, for $1,500.
This action was referred to the same referee who determined the first action, and he found that on the 21st of July, 1876, the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant, on account of the executory contract and twelve notes, in the sum of $126.38. He also found that the four mules and their harnesses were, on July 21, 1876, of the value
of............................................ $770 00
deducting from this amount................... 126 38
the remainder due upon the note, from the value
of the mules, left........................... $643 62
due from O’Rourke to Hadcock. It was found
that the value of the Pettibone at the time of
trial was......................... $750 00
that the value of her use and the dam-
ages for her detention was......... 4,150 00
--$4,900 00
that the value of the Kittinger at the
time of the trial was.............. 650 00
and the value of her use and the dam-
ages for her detention was......... 3,350 00 4,000 00
total......................................... $8,900 00 and judgment was directed for $8,500, the value of the use and the damages for detention of the two boats, and for the return of the two boats, but, in case a return could not be had, for $1,400, their value. A judgment was entered, in accordance with this report, with costs. From this judgment, the plaintiff appeals to the general term, where the judgment was affirmed, from which judgment he appeals to this coui’t.
J. M. Humphrey, for pl’ff-app’lt; George J. Sicard, for def’t-resp’t.

Opinion:
Follett, Ch. J.
The referee, by his decision, in effect, finds that the plaintiff elected to affirm the contract of sale, and collect the amount due upon it. The plaintiff's conduct was entirely consistent with this theory, and entirely inconsistent with the plaintiff's present theory, that he disaffirmed the contract of sale and relied upon his title reserved by the contract. The plaintiff advertised that, by virtue of the contract and chattel mortgage, he would sell by public auction, July 7, 1876, all of the property described in these instruments, and again, that he would sell the property by public auction, by virtue of the contract and mortgage, July 28, 1876, and on the day last named he did sell all of the property (he having acquired possession of it through this action), except the mules and their harnesses. The plaintiff called Mr. Davis as a witness, who testified that he attended the sale as attorney for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was present. He also testified: "Both boats were sold within half an hour. The Pettibone was sold first; I recall it because the Pettibone was the original security, and the Kittinger was sort of a collateral. After the sale of the Pettibone, I recall that I asked Mr. O'Rourke to give me the amount of his claim, and Mr. Anthony, who had kept, the books for Mr. O'Rourke, gave me the amount of claim, a statement. Then I directed the sale of the Kittinger, upon the information that the Pettibone had not sold for enough to satisfy the claim. I gave that direction." It is apparent that the plaintiff did not avail himself of his right, to rescind the sale and re-possess himself of the property described in the contract, by virtue of his legal title, in case-any part of the price was unpaid; but he elected to collect the sum which he claimed to be due, and he thereby affirmed the sale. Had he disaffirmed the sale, he could not have legally dorie more than to retake the property sold. But instead of doing only this, he enforced the chattel mortgage and the contract, for the avowed purpose of collecting' his debt. It is well settled that when a mortgagee, holding a mortgage upon several chattels, continues to sell after he-has realized enough to satisfy the debt and costs, he becomes a trespasser. So when several distinct chattels are sold, upon condition that the title shall not pass from the vendor to the vendee until the agreed price is paid, and the: vendor in affirmance of the contract seizes the chattels for the avowed purpose of selling them and collecting the amount due upon the contract, he has no right to seize and sell, or seize and retain more than is sufficient to satisfy his demand and expenses. The plaintiff asserted in his notice •of sale that he would sell the mules and their harnesses to satisfy his claim, and, though the title to them was not reserved by the contract, we think he is now estopped from saying that his act was not by virtue of the contract, and for the purpose of collecting his debt, but was wholly wrongful. But it is said that the case does not show that the mules and their harnesses were sold. The only evidence upon this subject was given by Davis, who testified: "The mules were not sold at this time (July 28, 1876), nor were the harnesses."
The trial of this case was not concluded until March 3, 1884, more than seven years after the plaintiff took the mules and their harnesses. He was examined, but did not explain what he had done with this property, and the evidence justified the referee in finding, either that the property had been sold, or its condition so changed that he was liable to account for its value by way of application as a payment upon the very debt which he sought to collect by taking the property, and by this action arising out of the very contract, by virtue of which they were taken. When an executory contract for the sale of chattels, provides that title shall not pass until the agreed price is fully paid, which is payable in installments, and the vendor permits the vendee to retain possession and make other payments after the whole contract price is due, the vendor cannot seize the property and terminate the contract for non-payment, until he has demanded payment of the vendee. Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y., 155. There is no evidence in this case that the plaintiff demanded payment of the defendant. Davis testified that he demanded the boats and property covered by " these mortgages," which the defendant denied. The referee did not find whether possession of the boats and their furniture was demanded, but he did find that the plaintiff took the mules and their harnesses without a previous demand.
The judgment roll in the first action between these parties was evidence of the amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff. This amount was the subject litigated in the action. The record shows that the judgment was rendered on the merits, and so it became conclusive between the parties. Code Civil Procedure, section 1209.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Bradley, J., who reads dissenting opinion.