Case Name: M. E. Sandsberry, Jr. Et Al and Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company Et Al v. International Association of Machinists Et Al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1956-07-25
Citations: 156 Tex. 340
Docket Number: No. A-5061
Parties: M. E. Sandsberry, Jr. Et Al and Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company Et Al v. International Association of Machinists Et Al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 156
Pages: 340–365

Head Matter:
M. E. Sandsberry, Jr. Et Al and Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company Et Al v. International Association of Machinists Et Al.
No. A-5061.
Decided July 25, 1956.
Rehearing Overruled December 5, 1956.
(295 S.W. 2d Series 412)
Simpson, Clayton & Fullingim, A. J. Folley, E. A. Simpson, and Lewis Jeffrey, all of Amarillo, J. C. Gibson, R. S. Outlaw, Wm. J. Milroy, and C. G. Niebank, all of Chicago, 111., and Preston Shirley, of Galveston, for petitioners.
The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the union shop statute and respondent unions’ effort thereunder to procure the signing of the union shop contract do not constitute governmental action sufficient to raise constitutional questions under the Bill of Rights and in failing to hold that the union shop statute, and a union shop contract thereunder deprive petitioner employees of their right to work, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and their property, contrary to the First, Fifth and Ninth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L.Ed. 680, 97 A.L.R. 680; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed 987; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23.
Schoene & Kramer and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., Charles Morris, of Dallas, Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, and Donald W. Fisher, all of Toledo, Ohio, for respondents.
Cited Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 178 S.W. 38; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L.Ed. 112; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 Sup. Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432.
Certiorai to Supreme Court of the United States denied. 353 U.S. 918, 77 Sup. Ct. 669, 1 L. Ed. 2d 665.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Culver
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Certain employees of petitioner, Railway Company, instituted this suit for themselves and on behalf of all other employees similarly situated against Santa Fe Railway Company and sixteen non-operating railway labor unions to restrain them from entering into a union shop agreement, and to restrain and enjoin the unions from striking or using other economic force to compel Santa Fe to enter into such contract.
Santa Fe answered, consenting to the relief sought, and by cross-action against the unions, itself sought an injunction against the unions to restrain them from using economic force to compel a "union shop" contract. Judgment in the trial court resulted in favor of petitioner employees and Santa Fe, and the relief prayed for was granted. On appeal the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals reversed and dissolved the injunction. 277 S.W. 2d 776.
The trial court concluded that Sec. 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act as amended, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 152, Eleventh, known as the union shop statute is unconstitutional and void and therefore the Right-to-Work Statute, Art. 5207-a, Vernon's Ann. Civ. Stat., is applicable within the State of Texas forbidding the execution of any union shop contract that makes membership in a union a condition of employment between the parties. The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Railway Employes' Dept. et al v. Hanson et al has held to the contrary. 351 U.S. 225, 100 L.Ed. 633, 76 Sup. Ct. 1044.
In their supplemental brief petitioners assert that under the issues and facts in this case the Hanson decision requires an affirmance of the trial court's judgment enjoining the execution of a union shop contract compelling full union membership and that the record here presents the constitutional issues which the court did not decide in the Hanson case for the reason that they were not brought before the court in that record.
The contract proposed by respondent unions to the Santa Fe was worded substantially in terms of the union shop statute and apparently similar in all respects to the contract under attack in Hanson. The nature of that contract is described by the court as follows:
"This is a suit brought in the Nebraska courts by employees of the Union Pacific Railroad Co. against that company and labor organizations representing various groups of employees of the railroad to enjoin the application and enforcement of a union shop agreement entered into between the railroad company and the labor organizations. Plaintiffs are not members of any of the defendant labor organizations and desire not to join. Under the terms of the union shop agreement all employees of the railroad, as a condition of their continued employment, must become members of the specified union within 60 days and thereafter maintain that membership. It is alleged that failure on their part to join the union will mean the loss of their employment together with seniority, retirement, pension, and other rights."
Petitioners vigorously urge that the proposed contract makes the absolute requirement that nonunion employees become full union members. But it no more requires full union membership than does the contract in Hanson and as expressly held in that case the conract does not compel full union membership.
The petitioners principally argue here that the record in our case shows many facts and circumstances that were not contained in the Hanson record, all of which bear, they say, on the practices of the unions, the requirements laid down in their constitutions and by-laws for membership, the disciplinary control exercised by the unions over their members, the obligations a member must assume and the unions' interpretation of the statutory requirements.
While this record does contain probably more factual data, for the most part, it would seem to be cumulative and amplified rather than distinctive. Basically, we think, evidence of the same facts was before the court in the Hanson case, for that decision quotes liberally in footnotes from the constitutions and by-laws of a number of the respondent unions that place certain restrictions upon the freedom of activity and expression of its members and provide, among other things, for compulsory dues and assessments to finance insurance and death benefit plans. A large part of petitioner's supplemental brief is devoted to a discussion of the provisions of these same constitutions and by-laws that were in the Hanson record and noted by the court.
The legislative history of the union shop amendment indicates an intention on the part of Congress only to eliminate the so-called "free rider problem." It was asserted in debate that the strife and dissatisfaction existed among the rank of the union members because of the fact that nonmembers received the benefit of representation without contributing their pro rata share of the bargaining expense. 96 Cong. Rec., p. 16374 et seq. Mr. Justice Douglas made this point in quoting from the remarks of Senator Hill who managed the bill on the floor of the Senate: "The question in this instance is whether those who enjoy the fruits and the benefits of the union should make a fair contribution to the support of the unions." Id. p. 16279.
Additionally, in our case it was shown that the union committee after making demand for a union shop contract, refused to discuss or consider changes to provide only for the payment of fees or charges to defray the permanent cost of collective • bargaining. But a misconception on the part of the unions as to the effect of the union shop contract would not warrant us in upholding an injunction against the execution of that contract.
The testimony also reveals that in the past other railroads, after the execution of a similar union shop agreement, lost hundreds of employees by discharge or resignation. Some five or six witnesses testified that they had been discharged, two of them for refusing to take the oath of union membership. But regardless of any conditions for membership set forth in any union constitution or by-laws, or any discharges or resignations that have taken place as a result of the union shop contract on any other railroad lines, the membership requirements of this contract and of the union shop statute are merely formal and fictional aside from the financial obligation. Of course all of the resignations and discharges referred to above occurred before the Hanson decision and may have resulted as a misinterpretation of the legal effect of the contract. Both the statute and the contract expressly provide that the requirement of membership as a condition of employment shall not apply "to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring and retaining membership."
The Hanson opinion holds that "the enactment of the Federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the constitution operates." It also observes "that Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility, (i. e. that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression) by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects 'periodic dues, initiation fees and assessments.' " The unwilling employee need assume no pledge of conformity nor promise of obedience, nor even make application for membership to retain employment under the union shop contract.
Although the Supreme Court in Hanson only held "that the requirement for financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who received the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the commerce clause and does not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments," it upheld the union shop agreement theretofore entered into between the unions and the railroads, and left open the question as to any objection that may be raised to the use by the unions of these funds.
As to the matter of financial support petitioners say; "Perhaps the most decisive fact leading the Supreme Court of the United States to conclude that violation of the First and Fifth Amendments was not shown in the Hanson case was its inability to find upon the record in that case that the members' funds may be used to carry on political activities imposed by them." They cite from the record before us one or more instances of political assessments made by one of the defendant unions and discuss generally the political activity of union labor. They quote from union organs statements by union leaders of their intention-, past and present, to support measures and candidates deemed favorable to their cause and the necessary implication is drawn that some union funds are and will be devoted to political activity.
We think a political assessment was not contemplated by the Congress in using the term "assessments" in the union shop statute, nor that failure to pay a political assessment would be a valid ground for discharge. But the contract has not been signed, no one has been discharged for refusal to pay any dues or assessments. Surely the United States Supreme Court in consideration of the Hanson case, if not otherwise, judicially knew of union political activity and that funds to carry on that activity are essential. We are of course bound by that decision and can say no more than "if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case."
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals dissolving the injunction must be affirmed.
Opinion delivered July 25, 1956.
"Eleventh. Nothwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted.
"(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to render the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
"(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership: Provided, That no such agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual employee until he shall have furnished the employer with a written assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and assessments, which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner."