Case Name: Jennie Minter v. City of Jackson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1911-10
Citations: 101 Miss. 139
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jennie Minter v. City of Jackson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 139–155

Head Matter:
Jennie Minter v. City of Jackson.
[57 South. 549.]
KEEPms Liquor for Sale. Acts of 1908, chapter 115. Evidence.
In a prosecution for keeping liquor for sale under acts of 1908, chapter 115, providing that the fact that any person shall be found in possession of appliances adapted to retailing intoxicating liquors, shall be presumptive evidence that he is keeping for sale intoxicating liquors contrary to law, where the evidence showed that defendant was found in possession of large quantities of intoxicating liquor a part of which was kept concealed, and empty beer bottles in large numbers, and empty glasses with fre’sh beer in them, corkscrews and beer openers were found, it was a question for the jury whether defendant was keeping intoxicating liquors for sale, although there was testimony tending to show that any liquor drunk on the premises was drunk by friends of defendant, and was not sold.
Appeal from the circuit court of Hinds county.
Hon. W. A. Henry, Judge.
Jennie Minter was convicted of keeping liquor for sale and appeals.
This is an appeal from a conviction of keeping liquor for sale. The appellant was prosecuted in the police court of the city of Jackson under an ordinance making criminal laws not amounting to a felony offenses against the city. From a conviction she appealed to the circuit court, where she was again convicted. The opinion state the facts.
On the trial of the circuit court, the following instructions were given:
FOR THE CITY.
(1) “The court instructs the ¡jury, for the city, that it is not necessary that you should know that the defendant is guilty before you are authorized to convict, but only that you should believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty in which event you should say by your verdict. ‘We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged.’ ”
(2) “The court instructs the jury, for the city, that if you believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that Jennie Minter, the defendant had in her possession or .under her control ten quarts of Schlitz beer in the refrigerator on ice, and twenty-six quarts of Schlitz beer concealed in the back yard in a tub, and that the same was kept by her for the purpose of selling it, then it is the sworn duty of the jury to return the following verdict in this case: ‘We, the jury, find the de-' fendant guilty as charged.’ ”
(3) “The court instructs the jury, for the city, that if you believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that ten quarts of Schlitz beer were found in the refrigerator in the defendant’s house, and also a beer opener, a waiter with four beer glasses, empty quart bottles which had contained Schlitz beer, and empty flasks, that all these things may be considered by you in making up your verdict; and if you further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that all these articles were found in the possession of the defendant, and that they were appliances adapted to retaining either whisky or beer, then, under the law of the state of Mississippi, this would be presumptive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”
FOR THE DEFENDANT.
(1) “The court instructs the jury, for the defendant, that it is their solemn duty to "try honestly, fairly, and conscientiously to reconcile the testimony in this case with the defendant’s innocence, and to return a verdict of not guilty, unless from all the evidence in the case they believe beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant kept the liquor with the intent and for the purpose of selling the same.”
(2) “The court instructs the jury, for the defendant, that the defendant is presumed by law to be absolutely and entirely innocent of the crime charged, aild of every act and intent composing the crime, and that this presumption acts as a witness for the defendant, testifying for the defendant throughout the trial, until the jury reach their verdict, that the defendant is innocent; and unless you believe from the evidence beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, it is your solemn duty to find the defendant not guilty.”
(3) “The court instructs the jury, for the defendant, that the crime of keeping intoxicating liquors for sale is composed of two separate and distinct elements: First, the physical act of keeping the liquors; and, second, the mental intent to sell the liquor — and that, although the defendant may have had the liquor, yet unless you believe beyond every reasonable doubt that she intended to sell the liquor, and that she kept it there for the purpose of selling the same, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.”
(4) “It is the right of all persons to keep as much intoxicating liquor in their possession as they may wish, whether it be kept concealed or unconcealed, and to order just as much and just as often as they may wish, provided they do not keep the same for the purpose of selling it; and in this case, if you believe that the defendant ordered the liquor or kept the liquor for her own use, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether she did or did not, it is your duty to find the defendant 'not guilty.’ ”
(5) “The court instructs the jury, for the defendant, that you may believe from the evidence beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant in tliis case had in her possession various quantities of intoxicating liquors, and had received numerous shipments of such liquors at numerous times through the express company, yet the receipt and possession of such liquors is not to be re ceived by you as sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and raises no legal presumption of the defendant’s guilt, but is on the contrary wholly consistent with the defendant’s innocence, for 'the simple reason that she might have received and had such liquors for any one of a numper of purposes, and that before you can convict the defendant you must believe beyond every reasonable' doubt that the defendant had the liquors for the purposes charged in the affidavit, and for no other.”
W. J. Groom, for appellant.
Now I am aware, that the court said, in the Willie Gillespie case reported, in the 51 So. 811, 96 Miss. 856, that where proof of the appliances was made, and the defendant offered no proof, to rebut the presumption, then the jury was warranted in convicting, but the court further says, in the same case that a mere denial, by the defendant, that she had unlawfully sold intoxicating liquors, would have been sufficient, to overcome the presumption, and the court in the same case quoting Mr. Wigmore, on evidence, says: “If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary, the presumption disappears, as a rule of law.” Yet in this case the appellant not only denies that she sold intoxicating liquors, but it is shown, from the record, that a part of the liquor, and beer belonged to another party, and yet the court refused the fourth instruction asked by the appellant, which instruction, simply stated the law, as this court stated it in the Gillespie case, with its quotations from Mr. Wigmore, which, J say was fatal error on the part of the trial court.
See the case of Gillespie v. The State, 96 Miss. 856, 51 So. 811. And I say that every instruction given by the court, for the city was erroneous because of the fact, that there was no evidence to support them, unless the simple fact, of a person, having intoxicating liquors, in his possession, with an instrument to open the vessel containing the liquor, and a glass to drink it out of, would warrant a conviction of the person of keeping the stuff for sale, and this I maintain, has never been the law, is not the law, and in my humble judgment never will be the law. Therefore I say that this woman has been wrongfully convicted, without authority of law, and the case should be reversed.
Jas. B. McDowell, assistant attorney-general, for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of keeping liquor for sale under section 1747 of the Code as amended by chapter 115, of the acts of 1908. The proof shows that on Saturday evening, she received a cask containing seventy-two quarts of beer. On Sunday morning the police raided her establishment, and found seventy-two quart bottles, thirty-six were full of beer, and the other thirty-six were empty scattered around the room, where there were also whisky bottles, a corkscrew, and waiter with, tumblers containing the leavings of fresh beer. The appellant did not take the stand but one of her companions testified that four of the girls drank the thirty-six bottles the night before. This would be an average of about a water-bucket full apiece. At any rate, the jury had the benefit of all the testimony and convicted the defendant.
Our court has recently sustained convictions' in two cases, under practically the same facts. See Gillespie v. State, 96 Miss. 856, and Price v. Gulfport, 52 So. 486. I feel no hesitancy in stating that the court will not reverse this case on the facts.
Counsel complains because the court refused three instructions found on pages 9, 10, and 11, of the record.
Instruction No. 2, page 9, is clearly erroneous, because on the weight of evidence, and again it is in the face of the statute which makes possession of these appliances presumptive evidence that the defendant is en gaged in the unlawful sale of liquor, or keeping same for sale.
The third instruction, and the fourth, were clearly in the face of the statute.
Louis C. Eallam, city prosecuting attorney, for appellee.
I maintain that the holding of the majority of the court in this case is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with the decision of the court in the case of Gillespie v. Stale, 96 Miss. 856, 51 -So. 811, and that either that case ought to be expressly, unequivocally and squarely overruled, or that the judgment of the court in the present case ought to be set aside and the judgment of the lower court affirmed.
In the Gillespie case, Gillespie, a negro woman, was indicted for selling liquors unlawfully. The state proved that at her home she was found in possession of several glasses recently used for holding beer, possibly a corkscrew and beer-opener, and, hidden underneath the bottom plank of the back steps to her house, a quantity of bottled beer in a box. This was practically all of the evidence for the state. The defendant offered none. The state invokes the aid of section 1747, Code of 1906, as amended by chapter 115, Laws of 1908. A conviction was had and this court promptly affirmed the case.
In that case it was urged by Mr. E. P. Thompson, counsel for Gillespie, that the appliances were not such appliances as were contemplated by the statute, according to my recollection, and the court ignored the contention. That Gillespie did not deny that she was keeping liquor for sale, and that the appliances were used for that purpose, does not affect the case. The fact remains that the court held that these were appliances adapted to retailing within the meaning of the statute, and allowed the conviction to stand, and compelled Gillespie to suffer the law’s judgment. In effect that case and the case at bar stand on exactly the same footing before this court, for in the case at bar the jury has said that they did not believe the testimony offered by appellant, not personally, but through others, tending to rebut the presumption of law. So the presumption stands unrebutted, as in the Gillespie case.
These are the facts as they appear in the record in this case, and as stated in the unanswerable dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McLean; after the officer had found ten quarts of beer in the icebox, defendant denied that she had any other intoxicating liquors on the premises ; but the officer of the law found an additional quantity in a tub in the yard covered up with old clothes and weighted down with coal. The proof shows that seventy-two quarts of beer reached this house on Saturday night about ten or eleven o’clock, and that on the following morning thirty-six quarts had been consumed; empty beer and whisky bottles were found; empty glasses with fresh heer in them were found on a silver waiter; and corkscrews and beer-openers were at hand. If anything, the facts in this case are stronger than those in the Gillespie case. If this be true, and the judgment already entered is upheld, should not the Gillespie case be expressly overruled?
But I say that the Gillespie case should not be overruled either expressly or by implication. It is right, and any other holding on the appliance feature means a total annihilation of the statute, section 1747 by judicial legislation.
If the legislature had intended that the question: What are appliances? should be a question of law, it would either have enumerated the appliances, or would have expressly stipulated that this, question should be a matter for the court to determine. It did not do either. It is therefore unmistakably and uncontrovertibly, as stated in the dissenting opinion, a question of fact pure and simple. This is what the court held in State v. Cunningham, 25 Mass. 202, where it is said:
“With what intent a person keeps intoxicating liquors is always a question of fact for the jury, to be determined upon a view of all the evidence. ’ And in disposing of that question they are required by the statute to consider the keeping of the articles in the manner specified in the statute as presumptive evidence of an unlawful intent. But that evidence may be rebutted and controlled by the circumstances, as would be the case in the instances of the sexton and carman alluded to, as well as by any other evidence in the case, whether shown by the accused in his defense, or by the state in connection with the evidence proving the possession. With such evidence the jury may also take into consideration the presumption of the innocence of the accused.” State v. Cunningham, supra.
In other words, not only is the question, What are appliances'? a question of fact for the jury, but whether the legal presumption created by proof of the possession of such appliances- has been overcome by the evidence is, also a question of fact for the jury. That is, the presumption on the one hand, and the evidence tending to overcome the presumption on the other, go to the jury, and their determination that the presumption has or has not been successfully rebutted is final.

Opinion:
Mayes, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court. .
Appellant was prosecuted by the city of Jackson for keeping vinous, spirituous, malt, and intoxicating liquors for sale, in violation of an ordinance framed under chapter 115 of the acts of 1908 amending section 1749 of the Code of 1906. The proof consists in the fact that appellant is shown to have received a cask containing seventy-two quarts of beer a day or two prior to the time a "raid" was made on her house by the police authorities of the city of Jackson. When the police authorities raided appellant's house, they found about thirty-six quarts of beer, and the other thirty-six empty quart bottles. It seems that the police also found a few whisky bottles, a corkscrew, a waiter, and some tumblers containing the leavings of fresh beer. Appellant did not take the stand, but a witness testified that four girls, friends of appellant, drank the thirty-six bottles the night before. It appears from the testimony that only a part of the beer belonged to Jennie Minter; the other belonging to another woman who lived in the house with her. A bottle with a little whisky in it was found. This is all the evidence in reference to Jennie Minter keeping this whisky in violation of the law.
As this court has repeatedly said, there is no law which prohibits a person from keeping whisky, no matter what the quantity, unless it is kept for some unlawful purpose, and when the above charge is made the proof must not only show that the person charged had intoxicating liquors, but that the liquor was kept for an unlawful purpose. The testimony in this case-does no more than create a suspicion that the beer found was kept for an unlawful purpose, if it can be said to do that. That a person ordered a cask of beer raises no presumption that he ordered it for an unlawful purpose. When a house is searched, and it is discovered that the beer has been put to the use which it might be supposed the party ordering it intended it should be, and for which it is made, and when it additionally appears that the beer had been opened with a corkscrew and drunk from a glass, this is not sufficient to warrant the presumption that it was kept for an unlawful purpose. When section 1747 of the Code of 1906, as amended by acts of 1908, p. 117, provides that the fact that any person has in .possession appliances adapted to the retailing of liquor shall be presumptive evidence that the person having the appliances is engaged in keeping intoxicating liquors for sale, or for the purpose of giving same away in violation of law, it does not and cannot mean that when a home is invaded and searched, and glasses, and a waiter, and a corkscrew, and intoxicating liquors are found, that these things alone shall warrant the conviction of any person under this statute. The glasses, waiter, corkscrew, and sometimes intoxicating liquors, are found in many innocent homes. In fact, a home cannot be properly furnished without glasses and waiters. If these things be found in a storehouse, or in and about a person's place of business, this fact may be a stronger circumstance of guilt than when found in a home; but in all cases these things alone cannot be said to be such appliances, within the meaning of the statute, as to warrant a conviction in themselves. It may be difficult to prove the crime charged in this affidavit, and it should be. The legislature has not said that it shall be unlawful to keep whisky for any purpose, and, when a person is found with intoxicating liquors at his home, this fact should not, in itself, warrant the presumption that such person has liquors for an unlawful purpose, unless other facts are sufficient to justify a conclusion that the having of the liquors is for some unlawful purpose. This case falls within the principles declared by the-case of McComb City v. Hill, 56 So. 346, and Stansberry v. State, 53 So. 783.
The case is reversed and remanded.