Case Name: In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of JAMES O'NEIL, Deceased
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1882-05
Citations: 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 130
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of JAMES O’NEIL, Deceased.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 34
Pages: 130–139

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of JAMES O’NEIL, Deceased.
Wül— when probate thereof willbe refused, because it is not subscribed at the "end" — ' 2 i?. &, 68, sec. 40.
A will was written upon a printed form or blank consisting of four pages, folded in tbe center like ordinary legal cap. At the top of tbe first page was printed tbe usual first clause of a will. Tbe rest of tbe first page, tbe whole of tbe second and nearly all of tbe third were left blank. At tbe foot of tbe third page was printed a clause appointing executors, a subscription clause, “ In witness whereof,” etc., and an attestation clause; tbe fourth page was blank.
The blanks in the printed portions were filled in, as were also all the vacant portions of the first, second and third pages.
On the third page was written the thirteenth clause, as follows: “ Thirteenth, And I authorize and empower my executors hereinafter named to sell, convey, assign and transfer my real property for the payment of the bequests herein-before named and mentioned, either at private (here the end of the blank space was reached. On the top of the fourth page was written, as follows:) or public sale, and in the manner that they will deem the most profitable and advantageous to my said estate; ” it then directed that the executors should not be compelled to sell the real estate until the lapse of five years from the testator’s death. The will as so drawn, including what was written on the fourth page, was read to the testator, and then signed by him on the third page, at the end of the subscription clause, and by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause.
Held, That the will was not signed by the testator or the witnesses at the “ end ” thereof. ,
That the portion of the will written upon the fourth page could not be rejected, and the residue thereof be admitted to probate.
That probate of the will should be refused. (Learned, P. J , dissenting.)
Appeal from a decree of the surrogate of the county of Essex, admitting to probate the last will and testament of James O’Neil, deceased.
The will was written upon a printed form or blank consisting of four pages, folded in the middle like ordinary legal cap. The form consisted of a printed heading on the top of the first page, the rest of the first page, the whole of the second and the greater part of the third page being left blank. Towards the bottom of the third page was printed a clause providing for the appointment of executors, a subscription clause, “In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name,” etc., and an attestation clause at the bottom. The thirteenth clause was commenced on .the third page, and was written as follows:
“ 13 th. And I authorize and empower my executors, hereinafter named, to sell, convey, assign and transfer my real property for the payment of the bequests hereinbefore named and mentioned, either at private-
“ Likewise I make, constitute^and appoint Dennis Daly, of the town of Moriah, Essex county, State of New York, Oeorge T. Tread/way, also Edward Donohoe, all of Moriah, to be executors of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made.
“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my seal the twenty-eighth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty.
“ JAMES ONEIL. [a. a]
“ The above instrument, consisting of one sheet, was at the date thereof subscribed by James ONeiZ in the presence of us and each of us, he at the time of making such subscription acknowledged that he made the same and declared the said 'instrument so subscribed by him to be his last will and testament; whereupon we then and there, at his request and in his presence and the presence of each other, subscribed our names as witnesses thereto.
“ DENNIS DALEY, residing at Mineville, N Y.
“ GEORGE T. TREAD WA Y, residing at Mineville, N. Y.
“EDWARD DONOHOE, Mineville, N. Y.
“orpublic sale, and in the manner which they will deem the most profitable and advantageous' to my said estate, but in no case shall my said executors be process, by law or otherwise, to sell and convey and dispose of my said real property before the lapse of five years after my death, unless my said executors shall see fit and proper to sell and dispose of the same, by virtue of the power and authority hereinbefore given them as aforesaid I
The last clause was written on the top of the fourth page. This will, as so drawn, was read to the testator in the presence of the witnesses, the portion written on the top of the fourth page being read as if it had all been written in the blank space immediately after the word “ private.” He then signed the will just after the subscription clause on the third page, declared it to be his last will andfestament, and requested the witnesses to sign, who thereupon did subscribe their names to the attestation clause at the bottom of the third page.,
M. D. Grover and Samuel Hand, for the appellants Ann Lynch and others.
Matthew Hale, for the executors, respondents.

Opinion:
Boardman, J.:
The portion of the will offered for probate on the fourth page of the sheet of paper was after the signature of O'Niel and after the attestation clause and signature of the witnesses, all of which were on the third page. In the body of the instrument preceding^, the signatures no reference is made to the part on the fourth page, that part was read to the testator, and the evidence shows he considered it a part of his will. It seems to be the concluding portion of the thirteenth' clause of the will written upon the fourth page, because there was not room enough on the third page before the printed clause appointing, executors and the attestation clause. The question presented is, whether a will so executed is valid under our statutes.
By our statute of wills (2 R. S., 63, § 40), a proper execution of a will requires that it shall be subscribed by the testator at the end of the will, and that each attesting witness shall sign his name as a witness at the end of the will. It is not so signed in this case by either the testator or the witnesses. The part following such signatures was intended by the testator to be a part of his will. It is not referred to in the body of the will.. The instrument seems more objectionable and far more dangerous than the one rejected in Sisters of Charity v. Kelly (67 N. Y., 409), which is quite conclusive of the case now under consideration. Judge Folger, says: " To say that where the name is, there is the end of the will, is not to observe the statute. It is to make a new law to say that where we find the name there is the end of the will." The part which followed the signature of Kelly was of less importance in that case than the part which here follows the signatures. It would be very dangerous to recognize the doctrine contended for by the respondents. In the present case, the part after the signature may not be of great importance. But in the next case it may be of vast importance. If this fourth page may be incorporated in the will in like manner, the third page also could be so incorporated had the signatures been at the bottom of the second page. It would be very dangerous to allow such construction. Wills are quite frequently made with great secrecy. Y ery often their contents are unknown to any one except the testator and the person who prepared them for execution. The witnesses are called in to attest the formal requisites, they see nothing but the signature and the attestation clause which they sign, they know nothing of the contents or the structure of the instruments; after execution it is not uncommonly left with the attorney or person who wrote it for safe keeping. How easy, after testator's death for such person to add to any clause after the signature in the same handwriting, the most important and vital provisions wholly at variance with the testator's will and wish. Who could detect such addition ? How could the estate be protected against such dishonesty, except hy a strict adherence to the rule that the testator must sign the will at the end so as to make such an act impossible ? Such was doubtless the purpose of the statute. As applicable to* this case, I may quote further from the learned judge's opinion (p. 416): "It is evident that the deceased considered the instrument to be one paper. We have no reason to say that he wished one part of it to be carried into effect if the whole was not. The statutory provision requiring the subscription of the name to be at the end, is a wholesome one, and was adopted to remedy real or threatened evils. It should not be frittered away by exceptions." The act of 1 Y ictoria, as is said in Jackson v. Jackson (39 N. Y., 160), "differs but little in its provisions touching the executions of wills from our own." Hnder that act the English courts have repeatedly refused probate to instruments like the present. (Willis v. Lowe, 5 Notes Cases, 428; Smee v. Bryer, 6 id., 20; 406; Ayres v. Ayres, 5 id., 375; Goods of Henry, 2 Robt. Eccl., 140; In re Milward, 1 Curteis, 912.) Other decisions of the English courts of a later date, tending to- sustain the respondent's position, were made under the statute (15 and 16 Yictoria), which " very much relaxed the rigor of the former act," as Judge Folgeb says. Such cases are mot, therefore, of controlling weight with us by reason of the greater latitude given in the execution of wills.
Where a will is complete ;n itself, instructions or directions inserted after the signature may perhaps 'be rejected as forming no part of it. Such was the case of Conboy v. Jennings (1 Thom. & C., 622). So, too, a will by reference to a deed, a record or a map may so far make it a part of the will as to authorize its use for the purpose of making that certain, which otherwise might be doubtful. But such cases do not aid us where the extraneous matter is plainly intended to be a part of the instrument to be executed, (Sweetland v. Sweetland, 4 Sw. & Tr., 6; Hays v. Harden, 6 Penn., 409; approved, 15 id., 291 [Wikoff's appeal]; Glancey v. Glancey, 17 Ohio St., 134; Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y., 140; McGuire v. Kerr, 2 Bradf., 244.)
But without further reference to authorities, we think we are following the decision in Sisters of Charity v. Kelly (supra), when we reverse the decree of the surrogate.
The decree of the surrogate is, therefore, reversed with costs to both parties out of estate, and probate is denied.
Landón, J:
I concur. This will, as a whole, embraces writing following the signature, and therefore, in my opinion, cannot be said to be subscribed at the end. Argument based upon the suggestion of interlineation, or order of paying seems to be inapplicable to this will. To probate it, opens the door to an indefinite extension or modification of the matter directly preceding the signature.