Case Name: CHAMBLEE v. TRIBBLE, TREASURER
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1885-04-25
Citations: 23 S.C. 70
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHAMBLEE v. TRIBBLE, TREASURER.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 70–88

Head Matter:
CHAMBLEE v. TRIBBLE, TREASURER.
1. A point not determined in the court below cannot arise or be reviewed in this court.
2. Section 269 of the General Statutes inhibits the courts from issuing a writ of injunction to stay the collection of any tax, whether legal or illegal, and provides for the taxpayer' another efficient remedy.
3. The assessment upon certain townships of Anderson County to pay for their subscriptions to the Savannah Valley Bailroad Company, is a tax, and as such is within the terms of section 269 of the General Statutes.
4. This section is not in conflict with those sections of the constitution that give to the Supreme Court and to the Courts of Common Pleas power to issue writs of injunction. State v. Treasurer, 4 S. 0., 520, and State v. Oailtard, 11 Id., 309, recognized and followed.
Mr. Justice McGowan dissenting.
Before Witherspoon, J., Anderson, July, 1883.
This was an action commenced January 30, 1883, by Lawrence C. Chamblee in behalf of himself and other taxpayers of certain townships of Anderson County against Milton P. Tribble, treasurer, and Thos.' J. Webb, auditor of said county, to restrain the threatened sale of their property for the non-payment of the taxes or assessments laid upon them to meet the subscriptions made by their townships to the Savannah Valley Railroad Company. By order of court the railroad company was also made a defendant. The complaint alleged that there was no tax; that the assessments were levied under the direction of the railroad company; that the act of March 12, 1878, authorizing the subscription and assessments was in violation of art. II., § 20, of the constitution, being defective in its title; also of art. IX., § 8, the taxes not being for corporate purposes; also of art. I., § 14; and that the assessments had not been properly entered by the auditor upon his duplicate.
The answer denied plaintiffs’ right to an injunction, and set forth the regularity of all proceedings under the law leading down to the distress under tax executions ; and the illegality of the tax was denied.
Upon these pleadings, and the evidence taken by a referee, the Circuit Judge passed the following decree:
When the case was called for hearing defendants’ counsel denied the jurisdiction of the court, contending that under section 269 of the General Statutes, 1882, this court could not entertain this action, seeking to enjoin a levy under execution for the collection of taxes. If the assessment, levy, and advertisement of plaintiffs’ property is for the purpose of collecting a tax, it is clear that under section 269 this court is expressly forbidden from granting any order, writ, or process of any kind whatsoever, staying or preventing the collection thereof, whether such tax is legally due or not.
Plaintiffs’ counsel have argued with much force that the assessment and levy by defendants was not for public governmental purposes, which is necessary to constitute a tax, but must be regarded as a special assessment for local improvements. The case of Hanson v. Vernon (27 Iowa, 28); People v. Township of Salem (4 Am. Rep., 400, 20 Mich., 452), and other authorities, were cited to establish the distinction between special local assessments and taxes. Taxes are defined (Cool. Tax., 1) as being “the enforced proportional contributions of persons and property, levied by the authority of the State for the support of the government, and for all public uses.” Taxes are also defined as “burdens, or charges imposed by the legislative powers of the State, upon persons or pi’operty for public purposes.” Black. Tax Tit., 1.
Whether or not the legislature intended that the payment of the subscriptions in aid of the Savannah Valley Railroad should be regarded and enforced as a tax, can best be determined by reference to the provisions of the acts of the general assembly above referred to. In the act of March 12, 1878, § 10, granting the charter to said railroad company (16 Stat., 438), as well as the amendatory act, December 24, 1878, § 10 (16 Stat., 816), it will be observed that the county auditor of Anderson County is required to assess annually upon the property of the townships so subscribing such per centum as may be necessary to pay the instalments of subscriptions, which shall be “known and styled on the tax books as the Savannah "Valley Railroad tax,” and shall be collected by the treasurer at the same time and under the same regulations as are fixed and provided by law for the collection of taxes in towns, cities, or counties so subscribing.
By joint resolution of the general assembly, approved February 20, 1880 (17 Stat., 314), the president and the board of directors of the Savannah Valley Railroad Company were authorized and empowered to direct the “collection of the taxes” voted to said railroad in Anderson County. Thus at different times by expressions of the legislative will that body has declared and provided for the collection of subscriptions in Anderson County to the Savannah Valley Railroad as a tax, and has directed the same methods for the collection of said subscriptions as provided by law for the collection of State and county taxes.
I am constrained to conclude and decide that the assessment and levy upon plaintiffs’ property was made by defendants to collect taxes, as contemplated in section 269, and that the collection of said taxes by sale of plaintiffs’ property cannot be enjoined by this court under said section 269 of the General Statutes, 1882.
This court having no jurisdiction in the premises, neither the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature referred to, nor the liability of the conduct of defendants, can be considered or determined in this action.
It is therefore ordered and adjudged, that the temporary injunction heretofore granted herein by his honor, Judge Wallace, be, and the same is hereby, dissolved, and that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed with costs.
From this decree the plaintiffs appealed upon the following grounds:
I. His honor erred in holding that he had no jurisdiction in the premises under section 269, General Statutes, 1882.
II. His honor erred in holding that the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature referred to in the complaint, to wit, the act chartering the Savannah Yalley Railroad and the subsequent acts amendatory thereto, could not be considered or determined in this action.
III. His honor erred in holding that the liability of the. conduct of the defendants could not be considered or determined in this action.
IV. His honor erred in holding that the township assessments or subscriptions levied or assessed on plaintiffs’ property in aid of the Savannah Yalley Railroad were taxes.
Y. His honor erred in holding that the assessment and levy upon plaintiffs’ property was made bydefendants to collect taxes.
YI. His honor erred in holding that the sale of plaintiffs’ property could not be enjoined under section 269, General Statutes, 1882.
VII. His honor erred in holding that the plaintiffs sought in this action to enjoin a levy under execution for the collection of taxes.
• The appeal was argued January 14, 1884, after which this court passed the following order:
Inasmuch as, in our judgment, the question of the constitutionality of section 269 of the General Statutes of 1882 is necessarily involved, though not formally made, in this appeal, and inasmuch as such question has heretofore been decided by a divided court, we think it desirable that a question of such importance should be maturely considered before it is reaffirmed. It is therefore ordered that the question whether the above mentioned section is in conflict with the provisions of the constitution, be set down for argument at the next term of this court during the call of cases from the Eighth Circuit.
The re-argument was had November 25, 1884, upon the point directed.
Messrs. W. O. Benet and H. Gf. Seudday, for appellants.
Messrs. B. F. Whitner and Frank O. Whitner, contra.
April 25, 1885.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Ciiiee Justice Simpson.
Certain townships in the County of Anderson, under an "act to charter the Savannah Valley Railroad Company," passed March 12, 1878 (16 Stat. 435), and other acts amendatory thereto approved December 24, 1878 (16 Stat., 816), and December 24, 1880 (17 Stat., 418), voted a subscription to said road. The appellant, Chamblee, and twenty-six other land owners and taxpayers in these townships, refused to pay their portion of this subscription. They were published as "delinquent taxpayers" and their lands were advertised to be sold by the auditor and treasurer, with a penalty of fifteen per cent.
The appellants applied to his honor, Judge Wallace, for an injunction, which was granted temporarily until the case could be heard on its merits. The case was afterwards heard by his honor, Judge Witherspoon, who decreed adversely to the appellants, on the ground that, the assessment and levy made upon appellants' property being made to collect taxes, he had no jurisdiction under section 269, General Statutes, 1882, and having no jurisdiction "neither the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature referred to above, nor the liability of the conduct of the defendants, could be considered or determined by him." He, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the temporary injunction be dissolved and the complaint be dismissed. Hence the appeal.
Three questions have been discussed in the appeal. First. The appellants deny the constitutionality of the act of March 12, 1878, and the acts amendatory thereto, chartering the Savannah Valley Railroad Company, under which the subscription was made, alleging that it is in violation of art. II., § 20, of the constitution of this State, "in that its title is defective." Second. They deny that the assessment and levy made by the defendants were for the purpose of collecting a tax in the sense of section 269, General Statutes, 1882; and Third, they deny the constitutionality of said section 269, which forbids the courts and judges of this State from granting any order or process of any kind staying the collection of taxes, whether said tax is legally due or not, and under which the Circuit Judge determined that it was his duty to dismiss the complaint.
Inasmuch as the Circuit Judge made no ruling upon the first question, i. e. the constitutionality of the act chartering the company, we do not regard that question as before us, .as we can only review such questions of law as may be adjudged and determined below. In the absence of any ruling by the Circuit Judge, no question can arise in this court. We have not, therefore, considered this first question, it being put aside as not necessarily arising in the appeal.
Second. Was it error in the Circuit Judge to hold that the assessment and levy upon appellants' property was for the collection of taxes, and on that account subject to the provisions of section 269, General Statutes, 1882, which, as we have seen, inhibits injunction and all other process issuing from the courts, intended to stay such collections? This is a grave question and one not free from doubt, but in our opinion the Circuit Judge was correct in his ruling. It is admitted in the argument of appellants' counsel, that " if the assessment, levy, and advertisement of appellants' property is for the purpose of collecting a tax, it is clear that under section 269 the Circuit Court is expressly forbidden to grant any order, writ, or process of any kind whatsoever, staying or preventing the collection thereof, whether such tax is legally due or not." It is also said in the argument that the provisions of this section are wise, sustained by good authority, and grounded in good sense. Because it is better that the taxpayer, if he conceives the taxes to be unjust or illegal for any cause, should pay them notwithstanding, under protest, and then bring an action against the county treasurer for the recovery thereof, as the act allows.
But it is urged that this is no tax, and consequently that section 269 does not apply, and many authorities are referred to as defining and determining what constitutes a tax; and the conclusion reached is, that a tax can only be legally raised for a publie purpose, for the proper needs of government, and for a public use; and it is urged that this assessment not being for a public use, it is not a tax in the sense of section 269, supra. There can be no question as to the soundness of this principle; and it is con ceded that should the general assembly at any time attempt to levy a tax for any purpose except a public one, the act would not only be unconstitutional, but would, be transcending the powers of the general assembly in a direction the most dangerous and fatal. The mistake, however, in appellants' argument, as it seems to us, is not in the principle itself, but in its application. The argument assumes that if the tax be an illegal tax, that section 269 does not apply, and therefore the case is discussed as if the question before the court was, is this a legal'or illegal tax? If that was really the question before us, the authorities cited and the argument based thereon wmuld be pertinent, but this is not the question; on the contrary, the real question is, were the defendants below attempting to collect a tax legal or illegal when the injunction was applied for? If so, section 269 stayed the hands of the court at once and in express terms.
It should be remembered in this connection that the object of this section was not to deprive the taxpayer of all remedy in the event that the tax levied should prove to be illegal, nor to enforce the payment of an illegal tax, without remedy, as well as a legal one, but its purpose was simply to postpone the question of illegality to a subsequent proceeding, thereby relieving the tax gatherer from responsibility and preventing delay. It thus assumed, in the first instance, the legality of all taxes imposed by an act and forbade the courts from inquiring into that question, upon proceeding by injunction to stay their collection. The act may seem harsh and imperious, and in some instances may be oppressive, but is it not vindicated by the necessities of government, and the importance of public interests, which concern all, and which rise higher than mere personal and private affairs ? Be this as it may, however, the meaning of the act cannot be misunderstood. It inhibits the courts in no doubtful language from stopping the collection of taxes, whether legal or illegal, and therefore where-ever and whenever a tax is being collected, it is present to shield the tax gatherer.
What then is a tax ? is the question. Can there be no tax but a legal one? A tax, in general terms, may be defined to be a pecuniary burden assessed upon the citizen, to be levied upon his property and collected under laws enacted for that purpose. It may be legal or illegal,' dependent upon the purpose of the collection, i. e. whether for a public or private use, but in either case is it not a tax imposed and collectible until, if illegal, the illegality is adjudged and determined by proper authority? Section 269 assumes primarily that all assessments imposed by the authority of an act are taxes, and it prevents any interference in their collection in the first instance, reserving the right of the taxpayer to have the amount paid refunded in the event that the tax is subsequently held illegal.
The question, then, below and now here is, was the burden from which the appellants seek relief imposed upon them as a tax? The answer to this question is plain and free from doubt. In the act of March 12, 1878, chartering the railroad company, and the amendments thereto, it is styled a tax — a railroad tax. The county auditor is authorized and required ' to assess it annually on the property of citizens as a tax. It is required to be entered in the tax books as a tax. By the joint resolution of February 20, 1880, the president and directors of the road are empowered to"direct its collection as a tax ; and, finally, the general State tax machinery is made use of in its collection, with all the incidents and appliances employed in the collection of all other taxes, State and county.. Under these circumstances, and in the face of section 269, assuming it to be constitutional, the Circuit Judge was not required to enter into the investigation of the question, whether this imposed tax was for a public or private purpose, and therefore whether legal or illegal.
This brings us to the third question. Is section 269 constitutional ? It is urged that it is not, because it is in violation of sections 4 and 15 of article IV. of the State constitution. Now, it is conceded that these sections do give to the Supreme and Circuit Courts of the State respectively full power to issue writs of injunction, and the other writs therein mentioned. It is also conceded that the constitution is higher than any act of the general assembly, and therefore when they conflict the act must give way. But the question here is, does the act under consideration conflict with either of these sections when properly understood ? Has the legislature attempted by this act to curtail or limit the constitutional power of the courts in this respect? This must depend upon the purpose which the framers of the constitution had in view when they thus conferred the power upon the courts to issue these writs. Was it their purpose simply to perpetuate these writs, and to fix them as unalterable remedies in certain cases for all times ? Were these writs of such importance as to demand this, and was there a fear that the citizen might be deprived of this mode of relief, if the hands of the legislature were 'not tied? Or was it done simply to confer jurisdiction on the courts in cases where the law, as it stood, when an application might be made for relief, authorized them to be issued ? If the former purpose had been in view, how much easier and freer from doubt could such an idea have been expressed by simply declaring that said writs as heretofore existing should be held inviolate, and that the judges and courts should not only have power to issue them, but should never be prevented from the exercise of that power. If, however, the latter was the intent, no other language more appropriate to that end than that used could have been used.
Section 4 says, the Supreme Court shall always have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, &c. Section 15 provides that the Court of Common Pleas shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, &c. Not that these writs shall remain inviolate, as is said of the right of trial by jury — not that they shall never be suspended except in certain contingencies as is provided in reference to habeas corpus — but simply that the courts should have the power to issue them when, of course, it is proper and legal that they should be issued. The framers of the constitution knew full well how to perpetuate and fix a right beyond the reach of all attack, either from the legislature or any other power, when they so desired, as is shown by the provisions above referred to in reference to the right of trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus, and also by many other provisions found in the bill of rights securing rights to the people.
Besides, what reason could there have been why these special writs should have been placed under the guardianship and protection of the constitution more than any other modes of relief? They were certainly not more important, more effective, nor in any greater danger of being usurped, lost, or destroyed, than other remedies, and there was no special reason why they should have been declared perpetual and irrevocable. On the other hand, there might have been a question whether the conferring of general jurisdiction on the courts in civil and criminal cases, without more, would have embraced these writs, because of their special and limited character, and on this account there was a reason why it was proper to mention them specially, and to confer jurisdiction in terms in reference to them on the courts. When we find, therefore, a sufficient reason for their prominence in the constitution in the fact of jurisdiction conferred, would it not be a strained construction to conclude that underlying this was a purpose to limit the legislative powers of the general assembly as to these writs in the exercise of that discretion Avhich it is admitted that body possesses in general legislation, and Avhich is so necessary not only in such legislation, but especially so in shaping and moulding remedies and proceedings, to be administered by the courts for the proper protection of the citizen in his various rights ?
Independent of all this, however, we have two cases decided by our OAvn court, which, while they remain of force, are direct and conclusive on the question. State v. Treasurer, 4 S. C., 520, and State v. Gaillard, 11 Id., 309. It is true, the first case was decided by a divided court, Chief Justice Moses dissenting, and in the second Mr. Justice Mclver concurred only because he felt himself bound by the first as authority, at the same time declaring that if the question Avas res integra, he could not concur. The dissenting views of íavo such eminent jurists, when the question has come up again, are well calculated to make us pause to review the ground upon Avhich these cases stand, but in such review we must remember how important is the doctrine of stare decisis in the administration of justice, and how ruinous also is uncertainty and vacillation. And unless in such revievv the error is apparent, manifest, and dangerous in its tendencies, it is better to yield than to overrule.
It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.