Case Name: Nettles' Executors. v. D'Oyley
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1806-01
Citations: 2 Brev. 27
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nettles’ Executors. v. D’Oyley.
Judges: The opinion of the court, consisting of Gkijike, Bay, Treze-vant, Brevard, and Wilds, was delivered by Wilds, J.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 27–31

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
JAN. 1806.
Nettles’ Executors. v. D’Oyley.
The right of action survives where a wrong done to .a person deceased, has occasioned an immediate loss or injury to his estate, or has produced consequences which has occasioned such loss, or damage, if such con. sequences be the natural effect of the wrongful act done.
Where a trespass or other wrong has been done to a testator, or intestate, not of a nature purely personal, but which operates to prejudice his estate, and lessen the assets, the right of action shall survive to the personal representatives of the deceased.
• On demurrer. Motion to reverse the decision of Trezevant, J., in the District Court of Charleston, who overruled the demurrer in this case.
This was a special action on the case. Declaration stated, that the defendant was one of the commissioners of the treasury for the State of South Carolina. That Z. Nettles'.had borrowed of the said -State a certain sum on loan, for which he mortgaged certain land, pursuant to the act passed the 12th October, 1785, the time of payment whereof, was extended by a subsequent act, on paying interest annually, on the first Wednesday in March. That the said Z. Nettles did faithfully pay at all times, prior to the first Wednesday in March, up to the year 1802, such part of the capital of the said sum, and the interest thereon, at the respective times required by law. That the said Z. Nettles, by his agent, prior to the first Wednesday in March, 1802, viz., in February of the same year, called upon the said D. D’Oyley, at the place, and within the hours appointed by law, for him to receive the same, with the interest, and tendered him the same in payment, requesting him to receive the same ; but the said D. D’Oyley, although he knew that he was bound in duty to receive the same, refused to do so, pretending that the said Z. Nettles had given no bond and mortgage, which he could find in the treasury. That the said D. D’Oyley, on the 31st March, 1802, did expose to public sale, and did actually sell, the said laud at a price far below the value thereof. > That Z. Nettles attended within the hours by l.aw appointed, for the payment of the interest, an^ ^le sa’^ ® • D’Ovley did not attend to receive payment, whereby the said Z. Nettles unintentionally did make default in paying the same, and had it not in his power to pay, or tender the said payT ment: and that in consequence of the said sale, the said Z. Nettles, in his life time, was greatly injured, and hjs said executors, since his death, have sustained damage.
To this declaration the defendant demurred ; and stated certain special causes of demurrer, viz : That it appeared from the plaintiff’s pwn shewing, that the causes of action set forth, accrued to the said Nettles in his life tima, and was a mere personal wrong, from which no contract could arise ; and that the cause of action became extinct upon the death of the said Zachanah. General replication.
Pringle, Attorney General, in support of the motion,
cited 8 BI. Com. 302, and Hambly v. Trott, Cowp. 371. 3 Woodes, 78. 1 Com'. Dig. 117. The criterion to judge of actions, which do not survive, is the pleas which are proper to be pleaded to them. If the plea be not guilty, the action survives not. Another criterion is, if the interest or the right of property, or action, is vested in the factor, or not: that is to say, if the interest which the testator had, or right of action, was in nature of a vested right, it will survive, otherwise not,
Simons, contra,
cited l Com. Dig. 261. Stat. 4 Ed. 3 Cap. 7, P. L. 32. Executors authorized to sue for wrongs done to the injury of the estate of their testators. The remedy afforded by the statute is not confined to rights vested in the testator ; but any action for any wrong done to the testator’s estate, will survive to his personal representative. 1 Com. Dig. 261. Cited l Yentr. 187. The statute to he expounded largely and beneficially. Wherever the wrong done has produced a damage as to the estate, executors may sue for satisfaction. Bac. Abr. Toller’s Ex’or, J.21. 1 Esp, 439. 2 Bac. 92.
Pringle, in reply.
The cases cited on the other side manifest this distinction : that where the wrong done, flows immediately from the act of th.e defendant towards the testator, and is not a remote consequence of such act, the-action for such injury will not survive, unless intended with an immediate benefit to the wrong doer ; or where a consequential.damage is sustained, which falls on the estate of the testator, and where the wrong doer gains thereby a benefit tp himself, otherwise not. Quoted, 1 Salk. 12. A difference between mesne and final process, where a right vests in the representative, ^te may sue. 3 Salk. 150. Otherwise the right is not consummate, or vested. 1 Salk. 12. The St. Ed. 3, in derogation of the cora-mon law.
The opinion of the court, consisting of Gkijike, Bay, Treze-vant, Brevard, and Wilds, was delivered by Wilds, J.

Opinion:
Wilds, J.
This case comes before the court on a motion to reverse a judgment on demurrer, given in the District Court. The declaration states, that in consequence of the negligent conduct of the defendant in a public office, the plaintiff's testator sustained a great damage in the sale of his laud. The only question submitted by this demurrer is, whether the present is one of those actions which dies with the person, or survives to the personal representative 1 The maxim, that " actio personalis moritur cum persona," as a general principle, is not correct; it is confined to those cases which arise ex delicto, and not ex contractu, and even then, is received under some restrictions. The distinction is, if the injury be such a one, as thereby the offender acquires no benefit to himself, at the expense of the sufferer, as battery, false imprisonment» slander, &e , there the person injured has only a reparation to be assessed, ad libitum, of a jury ; hut where, besides the crime, property )s acquired, which benefits the testator, there an action for the value of"the property survives against the executor. Cowp. 376» So stands actions at common law against executors. Respecting their testators, only as to their estates, and not as to their persons, they are only to be so far liable as the fund they represent has been affected by the transaction. But in favor of executors, the St 4 Ed. 3, c. 7, has given additional remedies, which, against them, is denied. Actions under its authority, may be brought for them, which are not maintainable against them. Trespass, for an invasion of property, lies for, but not against, an executor; and this statutory provision was necessary, in order to give executors, piaiutiffs, and defendants, reciprocal protection. The distinction between their personal and representative capacities is preserved. Executors' defendants are only liable for offences, wrongs done, committed by the estates, if I may use the expression, not by the persons of their testators ; wrongs done by the testator, in consequence of which a benefit has resulted to his estate ; that is, such as have brought some benefit to the estates under their direction. But before this statute, actions for these species of wrongs were not maintainable by executors, and this from the nature of their situation. They only represent their testator, as to his estate. Until the death of the prin-pipal, the representative cannot exist. To allow him, therefore, to sue for damages done to the estate,'before he had any thing to do with it, would be allowing a remedy where there would seem to be no right. But as these injuries are to the estate, impairing their value, and lessening their worth, it seems but just that the same tribunals which protect estates from all except injuries done by them, injuries from whence a benefit to such estates arises, should grant reparation for those done to them, for those injuries from whence a prejudice is done to, or damage is sustained by such estates. There" fore the statute was passed.
Note. See Wooddes, 78. 3 Bl. Com. 302. 1 Ventr. 187, 1 Com. Dig. 332. Toller's Law of Executors, 121. 2 Bac. Esp 439 Stat. 4 Ed. 3, o. 7. P. I-< 33. Esp. Dig. 578. Poph. 31. 1 Ventr. 349. 1 Sir. 313. 1 Com. Dig. 117. Fonbl. 133.
In the present case, it is admitted that this action would not lie against executors, as there is no pretence that the estate of the det fendant has been benefited by the transaction. But for the same reason, it should be maintained for them, because a very serious in. jury has been sustained by the estate of the plaintiff's testator, to redress which the statute was enacted. The words of the statute, to be sure, do seem to confine the remedy to direct and tortious invasions of property; but, by the equity of the statute, which the Courts have extended very far, every injury, when confined to the personal estate, which affects the personal estate, and not merely the person of the testator, seems to be embraced. The distinction taken, and ably supported by the Attorney Genera], I confess, has given me some difficulty. In most of the cases which I have been able to examine, cited in the argument, wherein executors have been allowed to maintain actions, their testators seem to' have had some ascertained vested rights. In this case, the claim of the tes. tator sounded merely in damages, uncertain, and not capable of certainty, except by the intervention of a jury. To extend, therefore, the equity of the statute to executors in a case where it was yet to be ascertained whether the testator himself had any right, is, I believe, going as far at .least, if not farther, than we are authorized by precedent. But, if the distinction which I have assumed be correct; if it be the estates, and not the persons which executors and administrators represent, then, I think, the rule may be safely laid down, if it has not been already so laid down, " That for every injury done to the estate of a testator, or intestate, a right of action survives to his representatives; and those alone which are done by the estate, and those by which a benefit accrues to their estates, or which benefit their estates, survives against them. But, for every personal injury done to, or committed by a testator, or intestate, the right of action dies with the individual." For these reasons, I am of opinion that the present motion should be discharged.
Motion refused.