Case Name: Higney J. MARCANTEL et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-02-14
Citations: 219 So. 2d 180
Docket Number: No. 2589
Parties: Higney J. MARCANTEL et ux., PlaintiffsAppellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUCÉ and'MILLER, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 219
Pages: 180–186

Head Matter:
Higney J. MARCANTEL et ux., PlaintiffsAppellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 2589.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Feb. 14, 1969.
Rehearing Denied March 12, 1969.
Cormie & Morgan, by Nathan A. Cor-mie, Lake Charles, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Hall, Raggio, Farrar & Barnett, by Louis D. Bufkin, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellee.
Stockwell, St. Dizier, Sievert & Viccel-lio, by Fred H. Sievert, Jr., Lake Charles, for defendant-appellee.
Before TATE, FRUCÉ and'MILLER, JJ-

Opinion:
TATE, Judge.
Higney Marcantel and his wife were driving westward when they collided with an eastbound 1963 Corvair driven by Virginia Babineaux. The Marcantels sue the liability insurer (Aetna) of the Corvair. The plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their suit.
The Babineauxs sued Marcantel and his liability insurer for damages arising out of the same accident. The Babineaux suit was consolidated with the present one for trial and for appeal. The issues in the two consolidated suits are identical. See Babineaux v. Marcantel, La.App., 219 So.2d 187, decided this date.
The trial court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the head-on collision had occurred because either the Marcantel or the Babineaux car was across the center line. The Marcan-tel witnesses testified that the Babineaux vehicle had crossed into their lane, while the Babineaux witnesses testified that it was the Marcantel vehicle which protruded into its wrong lane.
The trial court could not, however, determine which set of witnesses testified accurately. The court found discrepancies in the testimony of one set of witnesses, and a discrepancy between the physical facts and the testimony t>f the other set of witnesses. Being unable therefore to determine that a preponderance of the evidence proved negligence of either driver, the trial court dismissed both the Babineaux suit against Marcantel and the present Mar-cantel suit against Aetna, the Babineaux liability insurer.
We find that our trial brother erred in dismissing both suits and in failing to apply, under the circumstances of the present case, the principle set forth by Nelson v. Zurich Insurance Co., 247 La. 438, 172 So.2d 70, 72:
" [When] the opposed versions are irreconcilable, [the court] must resort to the application of the well recognized rule that: 'Where witnesses differ, the courts should reconcile, if possible, the apparent contradictions their testimony presents. If this cannot be done, then the probabilities or improbabilities of their respective statements must be considered in the light of their capacity, opportunity or incentive for observation, the amount of corroboration, if any, and the degrees of proof required.' "
Under the present facts, a head-on collision caused the damage for which recovery is sought in the consolidated suits. The essential issue is, where on the roadway did the accident occur ?:
Under the Marcantel version, it occurred in the Marcantel (westbound) lane, so the cause of the accident is Mrs. Babineaux's negligence in being in the wrong lane. Under the Babineaux version, the impact occurred in the Babineaux (eastbound) lane, so that the cause of the accident is Mr. Marcantel's negligence in traveling over the center of the roadway. Rizley v. Cutrer, 232 La. 655, 95 So.2d 139; Breaux v. Valin, La.App. 3d Cir., 138 So.2d 405.
The evidence shows that the accident occurred in Lake Charles on McNeese Street just after 11:00 P.M. McNeese is a concrete roadway, 32 feet wide, running east-west. It does not have a painted center line, but a narrow expansion joint separates the eastbound and westbound lanes.
Prior to the accident, the plaintiff Marcantel was driving his Plymouth westward, accompanied by his wife and Mr. and Mrs. Joe Benoit. From the opposite direction were approaching Mrs. Virginia Babi-neaux driving a black Corvair, and her husband, driving a 1957 aqua (blue-green) Chevrolet.
The plaintiff Marcantel testified that the accident was caused when the Babi-neaux Corvair suddenly pulled into his path to pass a forward car, which front car he believed to be the aqua Chevrolet driven by Mr. Babineaux. Mrs. Marcantel and the Benoits corroborated their driver's testimony that the accident occurred when the Corvair suddenly pulled out into Marcen-tel's lane to pass another eastbound vehicle. All of these witnesses were positive from their own observation that the Marcantel vehicle was in its right lane when the accident was so caused.
On the other hand, the Babineauxs testified that they remained always in their own eastbound lane. They testified that the black Corvair driven by the wife had at all times preceded the aqua Chevrolet driven by the husband. However, neither of the Babineauxs saw the accident, since (they testified) they each happened to be glancing to their right when the impact occurred.
In evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court expressly stated its impression that the Babineauxs had testified with intended credibility. On the other hand, the trial judge felt he could not give great weight to the testimony of the Marcantels and the Benoits, partly because of numerous discrepancies in their testimony — mainly relating to the amount the two couples had had to drink during the three previous hours together, when they had enjoyed a seafood dinner and then gone dancing for an hour or so.
Primarily, the trial court did not accept the version of the accident to which the Marcantels and their passengers testified, because it could not under such version account for the Marcantel Plymouth striking the Chevrolet after the impact with the Corvair (as was established), if indeed the Chevrolet was preceding and being passed by the Corvair immediately before the first impact, as the Marcantels and Benoits believed.
On the other hand, the trial court could not accept the testimony of the Babineauxs indicating that the accident probably happened in their lane, because the physical debris from the accident was largely in the Marcantel lane, suggesting that the impact must have occurred there.
We may at this point state that we believe the physical evidence greatly preponderates to this effect. In the Marcan-tel lane was left the predominant portion of the glass and oil and gasoline leaking resultant from the impact and sudden rupture of automobile parts caused by the impact between the Babineaux Corvair and the Marcantel Plymouth.
The suggestion that the liquid residual in the westbound lane came from a firetruck after the accident, rather than from the Corvair's oil and gas lines, is disproved by the uncontradicted testimony that the fire-equipment was not used to wash down the gasoline until after the police photographs were taken. Likewise, markings in the Babineaux lane are, we believe, more probably accounted for by the collapse of the Marcantel bumper an instant or so after the impact, when the Marcantel vehicle was swung leftward into the Babineaux lane, as the Corvair likewise pivoted leftward further into the Marcantel lane.
We consider the physical facts as strongly corroborative of the Marcantel testimony that the impact occurred because the Babineaux Corvair veered into the Mar-cantel lane. Likewise, we note the following: 1) The testimony of the Marcantels from the moment of the accident, during various investigative statements, and at the trial was consistent in main outline that the accident was caused when the Corvair suddenly veered into their lane (despite discrepancies because of inadequacies of sudden observation of an unexpected emergency, and also because of language difficulties, since the Marcantels and Benoits were more at home in French; 2) On the other hand, neither of the Babineauxs admitted to seeing the impact or knowing anything of the accident, since they both happened to be glancing to their right at that instant or for a second or so before (although they were both positive that both Babineaux vehicles were in their right lane).
The trial court did not evaluate the credibility of the Marcantels and Benoits favorably, partly because of discrepancies— which mostly, however, went to the amount of beer the parties had consumed before the accident (as to which, regrettably, it is not uncommon for witnesses to be less than forthright).
Chiefly, however, the trial court felt unable to accept their testimony because he could not reconcile the version of Mr. Mar-cantel that the Corvair had pulled out from behind the preceding Chevrolet driven by the Babineaux husband to pass it. After the impact, this Chevrolet was struck and scraped along its left side by the left front end of the Marcantel Plymouth. The trial court felt this to be impossible if the Chevrolet were forward (east) of the Corvair at the time of the impact (as the Babi-neauxs testified), since then the Marcan-tel Plymouth could not have touched it as it proceeded westward past the Corvair. (If passing the Chevrolet, the Corvair would be either between the Plymouth and the Chevrolet, or else behind or west of the Chevrolet.)
As to this circumstance, however, a close examination of the testimony of the Mar-cantels and Benoits shows the following: While all four were positive that the Cor-vair had pulled out to pass some forward car, actually three of them saw only the headlights of oncoming eastbound cars, with the second car pulling out to pass a first car (which first was not necessarily Mr. Babineaux's Chevrolet). Likewise, although the Marcantel driver confusingly testified that the forward car was the husband's Chevrolet, he also felt that after the impact the old Chevrolet was behind the Corvair, Tr. 191, and he also admitted having made prior statements that this Chevrolet was behind the Corvair at the time of the impact, Tr. 189-90.
We think the more probable explanation of the confusion and seeming discrepancy in Mr. Marcantel's testimony is simply that he and the other witnesses could not be expected to note and recollect the make and looks of the lead car of an opposing lane of traffic innocently approaching. It may well be that the forward vehicle which the Corvair veered out from behind is an unknown vehicle of a stranger to this litigation, as counsel for the Marcantels suggests. (And we note that Mrs-. Babineaux, when asked if there was a vehicle preceding her in her lane, simply replied "I don't remember It's possible." Tr. 324.)
At any rate, without deviation the version of Marcantel and his passengers at the trial and over the months before, including in the sudden moments immediately after the accident, is that the accident resulted when the Corvair suddenly pulled or veered into his path for the purpose of passing a front vehicle. The physical evidence preponderantly corroborates this testimony, while Mrs. Babineaux and her husband testify only that they do not know how the impact occurred and that they did not see it.
In our opinion, the plaintiffs Marcantel have preponderantly proved that the accident happened while they, on their right side of the road, were struck when the Corvair suddenly veered into their lane. As summarized by us in Gassiott v. Gordey, La.App. 3 Cir., 182 So.2d 170, 175: "By a preponderance of evidence is meant simply, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact or causation sought to be proved is more probable than not. Town of Slidell v. Temple, 246 La. 137, 164 So.2d 276; Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company, 244 La. 569, 153 So.2d 395; Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646. This proof may be made not only by direct evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence which excludes other reasonable hypotheses 'with a fair amount of certainty.' Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company, supra." See also, Sanders, The Anatomy of Proof in Civil Actions, 28 La. L.Rev. 297 (1968).
The evidence therefore proves that this sudden negligent swerve of the Babi-neaux Corvair was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming that Mar-cantel was not entirely sober due to beers consumed during the evening, any negligence of himself or his passengers in that regard is not causally connected with the accident. See Rizley v. Cutrer, 232 La. 655, 95 So.2d 139, 143 and Viator v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., La.App.3d Cir., 182 So.2d 165.
The defendant Aetna, as the liability insurer of the operation of the Corvair, is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiffs.
Quantum.
Mrs. Marcantel suffered a cervical sprain producing objective symptoms for approximately six months, as well as disability to do housework for about two weeks. She also suffered a severe blow to her head, which produced a large bump and a black eye of about three weeks duration. Fortunately, she has sustained no residual effects. For these injuries, we believe an award of $2,000 general damages may be appropriate. See, e. g., Fontenot v. Snow, La.App. 3d Cir., 149 So.2d 172; Doyle v. McMahon, La.App. 4th Cir., 136 So.2d 89.
Mr. Marcantel sustained a slashed elbow, and both his knees were bruised. He did not require hospitalization or medical treatment, and he was able to report to work on the day following the accident. For these injuries, we believe an award of $250 general damages will be appropriate. See, e. g., Vander v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., La.App. 3d Cir., 149 So.2d 635; August v. Delta Fire & Casualty Co., La.App. 1st Cir., 79 So.2d 114.
Mr. Marcantel has also proved special damages in the following amounts:
a.Total loss of his 1966 Plymouth, $2,000. (A competent appraiser valued it at $2,200 before the November, 1967 accident, and with salvage value of only $200 afterwards; this testimony is unconvincingly sought to be impeached by a witness who attempted to appraise the destroyed automobile from photographs, and without knowing the prior condition or accessories of the vehicle);
b. Medical expenses for medical treatment and examination for medical purposes of wife: $145 (Dr. Hargrove, $54, Tr. 75, 89; Dr. Morin, $85, Tr. 312; Dr. Mayes, $6.00, Tr. 63) ;
c. Medicines prescribed, $17.98 (Tr. 51);
d. Total: $2,162.98 special damages.
In summary, then, Mr. Marcantel is entitled to an award of $250 general damages and $2,162.98 special damages, whereas Mrs. Marcantel is entitled to an award of general damages of $2,000. (The record shows various items by way of taxable court costs were expended, but we think the preferable way to tax these will be by rule in the trial court, LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1920, since neither record nor briefs contain any organized summary thereof.)
Decree.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff Hig-ney J. Marcantel and against the defendant, the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, holding it liable in the sum of Two Thousand Four Hundred Twelve and 98/100 ($2,412.98) Dollars; and further that there be judgment herein in favor of the coplaintiff, Mrs. Louella L. Marcantel, wife of Higney, against the said defendant in the sum of Two Thousand and no/100 ($2,000.00) Dollars; both awards to bear legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid. The defendant-appellee is cast with all costs of these proceedings and of this appeal.
Reversed and rendered.
. See testimony of Mrs. Benoit: Tr. 323, 332, 340, 342-43, 345; of Joseph Benoit : Tr. 349, 358-59; of Mrs. Marcantel: Tr. 248, 252, 261 ("There was more than two or three ears. I can't recall, but I could see headlights in the opposite lane".)