Case Name: Sylvester MORMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-11-01
Citations: 458 So. 2d 88
Docket Number: No. 84-331
Parties: Sylvester MORMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 458
Pages: 88–90

Head Matter:
Sylvester MORMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 84-331.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 1, 1984.
Sylvester Morman, pro se.
No appearance for appellee.

Opinion:
SHARP, Judge.
We affirm the trial court's denial of Mor-man's motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 because the result is correct, although the basis given for the denial is erroneous. Morman's pro se rule 3.850 motion alleged he was convicted of robbery (Count I) and also of being an accessory after the fact of the same robbery (Count II). He argues it was a violation of his double jeopardy rights, U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Fla. Const, art. I, § 9, to be convicted of both crimes, and that his attorney who failed to advise him of these rights prior to his entering a guilty plea to both crimes, was incompetent. Chapman v. State, 389 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
However, we do not think double jeopardy is involved in this context. An accessory after the fact contains a completely different bundle of elements than the crime of robbery. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1983), provides:
Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the of fender, maintains or assists the principal or accessory before the fact, or gives the offender any other aid, knowing that he had committed a felony or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be deemed an accessory after the fact, and shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.-082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
To commit such a crime it must be proved that the defendant aided or assisted another person to commit a crime, or to escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment. Clearly a person cannot aid and abet himself to commit a crime. Conviction for such a fact situation would be a violation of due process because it would be a non-existent crime. State v. Sykes, 434 So.2d 325 (Fla.1983).
However, Morman's allegations in this case and the records furnished to us are insufficient to raise this issue because we cannot ascertain whether there was more than one robber or principal involved in his criminal activity. Conceivably if there were two robbers, and if Morman later aided his co-robber to avoid or escape detection, he could be convicted for both robbery and for being an accessory after the fact. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); State v. Gibson, 452 So.2d 553 (Fla.1984).
Our affirmance in this case is without prejudice to Morman to file another rule 3.850 motion properly raising the due process issue, if it is applicable.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.