Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Randy Eugene KINCHEN, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-08-30
Citations: 490 So. 2d 21
Docket Number: No. 64043
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Randy Eugene KINCHEN, Respondent.
Judges: ADKINS, OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 21–24

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Randy Eugene KINCHEN, Respondent.
No. 64043.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 30, 1985.
Rehearing Denied July 17, 1986.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and James P. McLane, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Richard B. Greene, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDONALD, Justice.
In Kinchen v. State, 432 So.2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the district court acknowledged conflict between Kinchen and Gains v. State, 417 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 426 So.2d 26 (Fla.1983), and State v. Bolton, 383 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we quash Kinchen.
In a joint trial a jury convicted Kinchen and his co-defendant of kidnapping, sexual battery, and attempted first-degree murder. The co-defendant called a witness who testified that Kinchen had told him that he, Kinchen, had been the aggressor in the attack. This witness also testified that he was a friend of Kinchen's co-defendant, but not of Kinchen. Kinchen's father testified that this witness had told him that he would do what he could to help Kinchen's co-defendant.
During his summation, the co-defendant's counsel made the following statement:
Besides all of the physical evidence then . the statements from this man's [Kin-chen's] own mouth that were unrefuted, let's say it was the truth. Brett [the witness] did not deny he made that state- merit, that, "I would do anything I could
Kinchen's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The court overruled the objection and refused to grant the mistrial. On appeal, however, the district court found the statement to be fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on Kinchen's failure to testify and reversed and remanded for a new trial. In dismissing the state's petition for rehearing the district court noted that the first and second district courts had applied a different standard of review for comments on a defendant's failure to testify.
Both Gains and Bolton, referred to by the fourth district on rehearing, adopted the federal test for reviewing comments on a defendant's failure to testify. "The test in determining whether such a transgression has occurred is whether the remark was manifestly intended or was 'of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' " Bolton, 383 So.2d at 928, quoting Samuels v. United States, 398 F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 630, 21 L.Ed.2d 566 (1969); Gains, 417 So.2d at 724. Although both Bolton and Gains rely on a 1968 case, the Samuels test is still in use. United States v. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1186, 84 L.Ed.2d 333 (1985). The state urges us to adopt this federal test concerning comments on a defendant's failure to testify.
Kinchen, on the other hand, argues that we should not abandon the fairly susceptible test adopted in David v. State, 369 So.2d 943 (Fla.1979), and applied by the district court in the instant case. David does not define "fairly" susceptible. A dictionary definition of "fairly," however, is "[i]n a fair manner; equitably; justly; legitimately; without unfair advantages; . [p]lainly; clearly; distinctly." Webster's New International Dictionary 911 (2d ed. 1956).
The right to stand mute at trial is protected by both our state and federal constitutions. Commenting on a defendant's failure to testify is a serious error. The fairly susceptible test offers more protection to defendants than does the federal test, and we decline the state's invitation to adopt the latter. We disapprove Bolton and Gains.
This refusal, however, may not be the end of Kinchen's problems. We recently adopted the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), in reference to comments on a defendant's failure to testify. State v. Marshall, 476 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1985). We therefore quash the district court's opinion in this case and remand for reconsideration in light of Marshall.
It is so ordered.
As To Application of Fairly Susceptible Test:
ADKINS, OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., concurs with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, C.J., concurs.
As To Application of Harmless Error Rule:
BOYD, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
ALDERMAN, J., concurs with an opinion, in which BOYD, C.J., concurs.
EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
ADKINS, J., dissents.
As To The Remand To The District Court for Reconsideration:
BOYD, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
ALDERMAN, J., concurs with an opinion, in which BOYD, C.J., concurs.
EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
ADKINS, J., dissents.