Case Name: ABC LIQUORS, INC., and United Self Insured Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Linda CREED, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-12-19
Citations: 573 So. 2d 35
Docket Number: No. 90-994
Parties: ABC LIQUORS, INC., and United Self Insured Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Linda CREED, Appellee.
Judges: JOANOS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 573
Pages: 35–37

Head Matter:
ABC LIQUORS, INC., and United Self Insured Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Linda CREED, Appellee.
No. 90-994.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 19, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1991.
Charles R. Stepter, Jr., of Fishback, Dominick, Bennett, Stepter & Ardaman, Orlando, for appellants.
Michael M. O’Brien, of O’Brien & Hooper, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Employer/carrier appeal a workers' compensation order, contending that the claim should be barred by the two year statute of limitations under section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1986). We find that in the circumstances of this case the claim, which was filed within two years of employer/carrier's last payment for medical care, is timely and we therefore affirm the order appealed.
Employer/carrier maintained below that the claim was untimely in that it "was filed more than two years after the last rendering of medical treatment or payment of compensation but was filed within two years of payment of a medical bill." Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1986), imposes a two year limitations period from "the date of the last payment of compensation or . the last remedial attention . furnished by the employer_" (e.s.) In Whiteman v. United Parcel Service, 438 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), this court determined that the relevant date was when the claimant last received authorized medical care, rather than when the bill for such care was paid. But in the subsequent cases of Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Center and Seibels, 498 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and Iuen v. Livewire Electric Co., 538 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in the context of a dispute over the revival of the limitations period, which involved the same statutory language, this court emphasized that the employer/carrier's "voluntary payment " was the circumstance which revived the limitations period.
In a case where, as in Whiteman, medical services are rendered by a clearly authorized physician for an undisputed compensable condition, they might be deemed to have been "furnished" under section 440.49(l)(b) when received by the claimant, as a minimal administrative delay in effecting payment would not impact the employer/carrier's established acknowledgment of responsibility. However, when pri- or authorization does not exist or there is some question as to the employer/carrier's acceptance of responsibility for the particular service, medical care is not reasonably deemed to be "furnished" by the employer under the statute until the employer/carrier accept in some way their obligation, such as by payment of the medical bill. In Iuen the employer/carrier's payment of a medical bill was deemed to be determinative in establishing authorization for the medical care, so that such services were then "furnished" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. The record in the present case is inconclusive as to whether the medical care in question was expressly authorized, or if employer/carrier otherwise acknowledged their responsibility apart from later payment of the medical bill for this treatment. The record is likewise unclear as to the extent of any delay in effecting payment. In these circumstances the judge was entitled to conclude that employer/carrier had not "furnished" such care within the meaning of section 440.49(l)(b) until payment of the medical bill, and in accordance with Proctor and Iuen the claim was thus timely filed.
The order appealed is affirmed.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
ALLEN, J., dissents with written opinion.