Case Name: In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jenae K. S.: Howard M., Appellant, v. Jean R., Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1995-07-06
Citations: 196 Wis. 2d 16
Docket Number: No. 94-0955
Parties: In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jenae K. S.: Howard M., Appellant, v. Jean R., Respondent.
Judges: Before Dykman, Sundby, and Vergeront, JJ.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 196
Pages: 16–35

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jenae K. S.: Howard M., Appellant, v. Jean R., Respondent.
Court of Appeals
No. 94-0955.
Submitted on briefs June 13, 1995.
Decided July 6, 1995.
(Also reported in 539 N.W.2d 104.)
For the appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of John H. Short of Vance, Wilcox, Short & Ristow, S.C. of Fort Atkinson.
For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of Leon D. Stem of O'Melia, Schiek & McEldow-ney, S.C. of Crandon.
Before Dykman, Sundby, and Vergeront, JJ.

Opinion:
DYKMAN, J.
Howard M. appeals from an order which terminates his guardianship of a child, Jenae K.S., and transfers her to the custody of her mother, Jean R. The first issue is the appropriate standard of review for deciding custody when a guardianship is terminated and a custody contest develops between the child's parent and a third party, in this case, the guardian. The second issue is whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that there were no compelling circumstances making it appropriate to award custody to a third party, Howard.
We conclude that when a guardianship is terminated, a parent is entitled to custody of a child unless the trial court finds that the parent is unfit or compelling reasons exist for awarding custody to a third party. We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that no compelling reasons existed for awarding custody of Jenae to Howard. We therefore affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Though modification of custody determinations are reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion, In re Stephanie R.N., 174 Wis. 2d 745, 764-66, 498 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (1993), this case does not involve a custody dispute between two parents, but between a parent and a third party. Whether a parent is "unfit" or whether "compelling reasons" exist to award custody to a third party is a mixed question of fact and law. We separate mixed questions of fact and law into two components, reviewing disputed issues of material fact under § 805.17(2), Stats., and reviewing the legal issues de novo. DOR v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 N.W.2d 94, 101 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 1984, Jean gave birth to a daughter, Jenae. Jean was not married to Jenae's father, and never heard from him or saw him after she told him that she was pregnant. In 1985, Jean moved to Beaver Dam, Wisconsin. She relied upon her sister, Rita, and her sister's partner, Howard, for child care while she worked. Jenae resided with Howard and Rita during the weekdays and on some weekends.
In 1988, Jean and Jenae moved to Crandon, Wisconsin, to live with William R., but after a brief time, Jean returned Jenae to Howard. In 1989, Jean married William. Later that year, Jean petitioned the trial court, asking that Howard be appointed Jenae's guardian. She did this because of difficulties Howard was experiencing in obtaining medical attention for Jenae and because Jenae was about to begin school.
The parties agree that Jean and Jenae maintained a relationship during Howard's guardianship although they differ as to the extent and quality of that relationship. Howard provided all of Jenae's financial support although Jean claims that she offered financial help which he refused.
In September 1992, Jean petitioned the trial court, asking that the guardianship be terminated. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, and Jean, Jenae and Howard underwent various psychological evaluations. The court held a hearing on Jean's petition in August 1993 at which Jean, Rita and Jenae testified. The record also contains the reports of several professionals. On March 1,1994, the court determined that Jean was a fit parent and that no compelling reasons existed to award custody to Howard, a third party. Accordingly, it terminated the guardianship and transferred custody of Jenae to Jean. Howard appeals.
DECISION
Jean relies upon Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 568-69, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (1984), to support the trial court's order. In Barstad, the supreme court said:
We conclude that the rule to be followed in custody disputes between parents and third parties is that a parent is entitled to custody of his or her children unless the parent is either unfit or unable to care for the children or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a third party. Compelling reasons include abandonment, persis tent neglect of parental responsibilities, extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child. If the court finds such compelling reasons, it may award custody to a third party if the best interests of the children would be promoted thereby.
(Citation and footnote omitted.)
Howard asserts that Barstad involved an initial custody determination, not a reevaluation of custody as is involved in the instant case. He notes that § 767.325(1)(b), Stats., which governs revisions of legal custody and physical placement orders after two years have passed from the date the initial order was entered, was not enacted when Barstad was decided. He also contends that the facts in Barstad were much different from the facts of Jenae's guardianship.
The reason, however, that the Barstad court concluded that a parent is entitled to the custody of his or her child absent unfitness or compelling circumstances turned on the constitutionally protected right of a parent to the custody of his or her child. That is why the standard for governmental interference in the relationship is higher than the "best interest of the child" test. The court said:
While neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has ever addressed the specific question posed by this case, i.e., what the constitution requires in a custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent third party, a number of relevant principles emerge. On the one hand, "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their children to the State." On the other hand, it is evident... that the assertion of parental rights is to some extent dependent on the assumption of parental responsibilities, and that the zone of constitutionally protected family autonomy is not defined solely by genetic ties. A biological parent who has never borne any significant responsibility for the child and who has not functioned as a member of the child's family unit is not entitled to the full constitutional protections.
Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 562-63, 348 N.W.2d at 486 (citations omitted).
The supreme court has recently reaffirmed Barstad. In In re H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis. 2d 649, 664-65, 533 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1995), a case involving, in part, a third-party request for custody, the supreme court con sidered the trial court's order granting sole custody to the child's parent. The supreme court said:
A person who is not a biological or adoptive parent may not bring an action to obtain custody of a minor Tinless the biological or adoptive parent is "unfit or unable to care for the child" or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a nonparent.
Id.
The constitutional underpinning of Barstad is the reason why we reject Howard's assertion that § 767.325(1)(b), Statas, is applicable to guardianship proceedings where the contest is between a parent and a third party. Section 767.325(1)(b) uses a "best interest of the child" test for determining custody between parents. As we have discussed, Barstad rejects that test in cases involving third parties in favor of one which makes it more difficult to separate a child from a parent. Were we to conclude that § 767.325(1)(b) provides the proper test for termination of minor guardianship proceedings where the contest is between a parent and a third party, we would then have to conclude that § 767.325(1)(b) is unconstitutional in that setting. We are to interpret statutes so as to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality. See In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 570, 320 N.W.2d 806, 812 (1982). Accordingly, we conclude that § 767.325(1)(b), which does not, on its face, apply to guardianship proceedings, is inapplicable in guardianship litigation between a parent and a third party.
While we agree with Howard that a failure to exercise parental responsibilities may result in the forfeiture of constitutional rights to custody or visita tion, we disagree that we can decide that issue as he requests, as a matter of law. Howard argues:
If Jean R. had assumed her parental responsibilities and raised her daughter Jenae as a member of her own household, there is no question that Jean would be permitted to continue to raise Jenae free of government interference. That didn't happen, however. Not only did Jean choose to have Jenae raised by Howard, but Jean herself invoked government "interference" by petitioning the Dodge County Circuit Court to appoint Howard as Jenae's guardian.
This is not an argument about the standard applicable for reviewing the instant case. It is an assertion that the facts of the case require a result different from that reached by the trial court. Howard does not challenge the court's finding that Jean is a fit parent. He claims, however, that there are compelling reasons to deny custody to Jean.
The trial court found that there were no compelling reasons to continue Jenae's custody with Howard. We may not upset the factual component of that finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Section 805.17(2), Stats. Howard's brief recounts in detail the evidence of Jean's inadequacies. However, evidence which would support a finding contrary to that made by the trial court does not mandate reversal. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 249, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979).
The record contains evidence that Jean maintained an interest in Jenae, though hampered by the demands of being a working single parent without a high school education. She worked a second shift which ended at 1:00 a.m. She agreed to the guardianship so that Jenae could get medical care and be enrolled in school. For a time, Jean was hospitalized with a form of diabetes and she was in a severe car accident. When she moved to Crandon, she encountered financial problems. She had meager savings and there was minimal employment there. She sent Jenae back to Howard because she felt that it was best for Jenae at the time. She maintained as much contact with Jenae as she could, but Howard did a lot of traveling. She telephoned many times, but often was unable to reach Howard or he had other plans. She asked Howard to bring Jenae to Crandon to visit, but he refused. She continued to offer money to help raise Jenae but Howard always refused. Jean left cards and gifts for Jenae at her parents' house when she couldn't see Jenae. She would travel to Beaver Dam about every month, though she tried to see Jenae more often. Jean telephones Jenae once a week.
Jenae is not afraid to get close to Jean when they are alone together, but Jenae is afraid to show her love to Jean when Howard is present. Consequently, Jean and Jenae worked out a code so that Jenae could tell Jean that she loved her when Howard was present. When Jenae was interviewed by a psychologist in October 1992, she showed the psychologist a message on a chalk board reading: "Dear Dr. Gina, I really want to live with my mom." After the psychologist read the message, Jenae insisted on erasing it.
The facts of record from which the trial court concluded that there were no compelling circumstances to deny Jean custody of Jenae differ from the facts Howard has stressed in his brief. After hearing the evidence, the court might have concluded that Jean was the parent Howard asserts her to be. But it did not. The evidence we have recited permitted the court to conclude, as it did, that there were no compelling circumstances which would permit it to award custody to Howard, a third party. And, our standard of review does not permit us to second guess the inferences drawn by the court. Once we accept those inferences, the conclusion that Howard has not met the Barstad test follows. We therefore affirm.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.
Section 805.17(2), Stats., provides in relevant part:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Section 767.325(1), Stats., provides in relevant part:
[T]he following provisions are applicable to modifications of legal custody and physical placement orders:
(b) After 2-year period. 1. Except as provided under par. (a) and sub. (2), upon petition, motion or order to show cause by a party, a court may modify an order of legal custody or an order of physical placement where the modification would substantially alter the time a parent may spend with his or her child if the court finds all of the following:
a. The modification is in the best interest of the child.
2. With respect to subd. 1., there is a rebuttable presumption that:
a. Continuing the current allocation of decision making under a legal custody order is in the best interest of the child.
b. Continuing the child's physical placement with the parent with whom the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of the child.