Case Name: Robert Ralph JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1986-04-17
Citations: 709 S.W.2d 345
Docket Number: No. C14-85-159-CR
Parties: Robert Ralph JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before DRAUGHN, ELLIS and JU-NELL, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 709
Pages: 345–351

Head Matter:
Robert Ralph JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. C14-85-159-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
April 17, 1986.
Benjamin F. Walker, San Antonio, for appellant.
Michael R. Little, Georgia L. Clapper, Anahuac, for appellee.
Before DRAUGHN, ELLIS and JU-NELL, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
JUNELL, Justice.
Robert Ralph Johnson appeals a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. In his three grounds of error appellant contends that (1) his conviction was barred by double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Texas Constitutions; (2) his prior conviction in cause no. 5593 could have been based on evidence of the offense that is the subject of this prosecution; and (3) that the trial court erred in overruling his plea of former conviction. We affirm.
Appellant, a teacher and coach at a Bay-town junior high school, befriended the thirteen year old complainant who was his student. In cause no. 5605 appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with complainant on or about October 28, 1983. Prior to the conviction in cause no. 5605, appellant had been convicted in cause no. 5593 of aggravated sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with the complainant on or about November 6, 1983.
Appellant filed a plea of former conviction claiming his conviction in cause no. 5593 bars prosecution in cause no. 5605 because the same offense could have formed the basis for both convictions. Appellant argues that the instant prosecution is barred because in the trial on cause no. 5593 the court admitted evidence that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant on both October 28 and November 6, 1983. He claims the jury in the first trial could have based its guilty verdict on either offense and thus the second prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.
The indictment in cause no. 5593 alleged appellant:
"on or about the 6th day of November A.D. 1983, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the County of Chambers and State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the vagina of [the complainant] who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and was not the spouse of the said Robert Ralph Johnson by the penis of Robert Ralph Johnson."
The jury charge in cause no. 5593 read in part:
"Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, ROBERT RALPH JOHNSON, on or about the 6th day of November, A.D. 1983, in the County of Chambers and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the vagina of [the complainant] who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and was not the spouse of the said ROBERT RALPH JOHNSON by the penis of ROBERT RALPH JOHNSON, then you will find the defendant, ROBERT RALPH JOHNSON, "Guilty" of the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, as alleged in the indictment, and so say by your verdict, but if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "Not Guilty"."
In his first ground of error appellant contends his conviction in the instant case, cause no. 5605, was barred by the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Texas constitutions and Articles 1.10 and 28.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The protection of the constitutional prohibition against former conviction or acquittal applies only where the second prosecution is for the same offense as that for which the person has already been in legal jeopardy. The former trial must have been upon the same identical act for which the state is again seeking to prosecute the defendant. The same offense means the identical criminal act, not the same offense by name. Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.1973).
Appellant was indicted in cause no. 5605 for aggravated sexual assault upon the complainant which occurred on or about October 28, 1983. The indictment in cause no. 5593 was based on an assault alleged to have occurred on or about November 6, 1983. The November 6, 1983 incident took place at the home of one of the complainant's female friends. Appellant and the complainant were caught in the act by the friend's mother. The October 28th assault occurred during a party at the house of a male acquaintance; various people at the party saw the couple having sex. The two assaults were separated in time, place and circumstance; only the parties involved were the same. The indictments in the two cases were clearly based on two separate criminal acts.
Appellant's second ground of error contends the prosecution in cause no. 5605 was barred because evidence of the October 28, 1983 offense was introduced in the cause no. 5593 prosecution and could have been used by the jury as the basis for the guilty verdict in cause no. 5593. The trial court gave the following limiting instruction in the first prosecution (cause no. 5593):
You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case regarding the defendant's having committed offenses other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other offenses, if any were committed, and even then you may only consider the same in determining the intent, motive, system, scheme, or design of the defendant, if any, in connection with the offense, if any, alleged against him in the indictment in this case, and for no other purpose.
The state is entitled to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses in prosecutions for the rape of a child. In prosecutions for statutory rape evidence of other acts of intercourse upon the complainant, either prior or subsequent to the date charged, can be utilized in determining whether the particular act relied upon by the state was committed. Grantom v. State, 415 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex.Crim.App.1967); Garcia v. State, 629 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, pet. ref'd).
Since appellant failed to object to the court's limiting instruction or to submit a charge of his own, nothing is preserved for review. Pinney v. State, 679 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, pet. ref'd). Furthermore, the court's instruction properly limited consideration of extraneous offenses to determine appellant's intent, motive, system, scheme or design. The charge in cause no. 5593 required a conviction be based on the assault which occurred on or about November 6, 1983. Nothing in the record indicates the jury disregarded the court's instruction and based its verdict on the October 28, 1983 assault. Even if the indictment in cause no. 5593 would support a conviction in the instant case, and it will not, the mere fact that both causes were within the same statute of limitations would not preclude prosecution in this cause. The controlling factor is the proof that they were different offenses. Luna, supra at 855.
In his third ground of error appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his plea of former conviction. Appellant relies on the rule that:
"If evidence of more than one offense is admitted and a conviction for either could be had under the indictment, and neither the state nor the court elects, a plea of former conviction is good upon a prosecution based upon one of said offenses, it being uncertain for which offense the conviction was had." Jones v. State, 586 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
Appellant cites various cases in which either the indictment contained multiple counts and no election was made, or the court's charge authorized the jury to convict for committing an act constituting the alleged offense at any time within the period of limitations. See, Jones, supra.
The court's charge in cause no. 5593 properly instructed the jury to convict only if they found appellant had committed the November 6, 1983 offense. The charge restricted the jury to considering extraneous offenses only to determine motive, plan, or scheme. Nothing in the record indicates the jury failed to comply with the court's charge. The record does show that appellant failed to preserve error by filing a motion to elect or objecting to the court's charge in cause no. 5593.
The jury in cause no. 5593 could not have convicted appellant for any offense but the November 6, 1983 assault. The indictment in that case alleged only the November 6th incident; the court's charge named only the November 6th offense and properly limited consideration of extraneous offenses. We find appellant's conviction in cause no. 5605 was not barred by double jeopardy, that the conviction in cause no. 5593 was not and could not have been based on any offense save the November 6, 1983 assault alleged in the indictment in that cause, and that the trial court properly overruled appellant's plea of former conviction. Appellant's first, second, and third grounds of error are overruled. We affirm the judgment.