Case Name: Deborah NOVAK, John Witek, And Witek & Novak, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WARNER BROS PICTURES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-07-15
Citations: 387 F. App'x 747
Docket Number: No. 08-56957
Parties: Deborah NOVAK, John Witek, And Witek & Novak, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WARNER BROS PICTURES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: CANBY, GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 387
Pages: 747–750

Head Matter:
Deborah NOVAK, John Witek, And Witek & Novak, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WARNER BROS PICTURES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-56957.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 4, 2010.
Filed July 15, 2010.
Ladell Hulet Muhlestein, Esquire, Manning & Marder Kass Ellrod Ramirez LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Christopher G. Caldwell, Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CANBY, GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Deborah Novak, John Witek, and Witek & Novak, Inc., (collectively, the "Producers") hold the copyright in Ashes to Glory, a documentary film that portrays the rebuilding of Marshall University's football program after it lost all but a handful of its players, coaches, and prominent supporters in a disastrous plane crash in 1970. The Producers brought this action against Warner Brothers Pictures and several related parties (collectively, "Warner Brothers"), alleging copyright infringement, breach of contract, and unfair competition, all in connection with the Warner Brothers' subsequent production of the allegedly infringing work, the dramatic film We Are Marshall. We Are Marshall is based on the same historical facts as Ashes to Glory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Warner Brothers on all claims. The Producers timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Upon de novo review, see Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2006), we affirm.
Proof of infringement in this case requires a fact-based showing that We Are Marshall and Ashes to Glory are "substantially similar." Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.1996)). The district court, for its part, conducted a meticulous, almost frame-by-frame analysis of the two works and concluded that the Producers had failed to raise a triable issue of substantial similarity. Having reviewed the two works ourselves, we agree with the district court that the works are not substantially similar.
It is true that the same historical facts underlie both productions, but historical facts are not protected by copyright. See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910-11 (9th Cir.1989). The issue for purposes of summary judgment is whether the Producers raised a triable issue of substantial similarity between We Are Marshall and the protected expression in Ashes to Glory. That issue is determined by applying an "extrinsic" test, which "focuses on 'articu-lable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events' in the two works." Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.1994)). Except for matters of historical fact, these elements of the two works before us are not substantially similar, as the district court explained in detail. Contrary to the Producers' claims, we conclude that the district court did compare the "actual concrete elements" between the two works, rather than mere plot ideas. Narell, 872 F.2d at 912.
The Producers contend that the district court imposed an improperly severe standard of infringement when it quoted Na-rell for the proposition that "[historical facts and theories may be copied, as long as the defendant does not 'bodily appropriate' the expression of the plaintiff." Narell, 872 F.2d at 910-11 (quoting Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.1984)). But neither Narell nor the district court substituted a "bodily appropriation" standard for the "substantial similarity" standard. See id. at 912-13. Although allowances necessarily must be made for permissible similarity in relating unprotected facts, see Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488-89, the substantial similarity standard of infringement has long been and remains the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc., 462 F.3d at 1076-77. The district court properly applied that standard in conducting its analysis.
The Producers also rely on the fact that Warner Brothers had total access to Ashes to Glory before producing We Are Marshall. The Producers rely on the "inverse ratio" rule, which ostensibly lessens the quantum of proof required to show copying when the plaintiff can show that the defendant had a " 'high degree of access' " to the protected work. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485 (quoting Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218). This proposition does not aid the Producers here, however, because "[n]o amount of proof of access will suffice to show copying if there are no similarities" between the protected expressions in the two works. Funky Films, 462 F.3d at 1081 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even under a relaxed standard, the requisite similarities must be "concrete or articulable" to satisfy the extrinsic test. Id. at 1081-82. In this case, the only concrete or articulable similarities between Ashes to Glory and We Are Marshall consist of unprotectable scenes á faire, see Smith, 84 F.3d at 1216, and historical facts, which, like all facts, whether "scientific, historical, biographical, [or] news of the day[,] . ' may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person.' " Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.1981)). The Producers also argue that evidence of substantial similarity can be shown in the same sequencing of events in the two films, especially in the two works' opening montages. Upon reviewing the films, we conclude that the two films do not contain the same sequencing of events: even in the two films' opening sequences, Ashes to Glory differs significantly from We Are Marshall by including the film's title and many additional shots of the town of Huntington and the university campus. The Producers have failed to raise a triable issue of substantial similarity, and the district court did not err in entering summary judgment for Warner Brothers on the copyright infringement claim.
The Producers next argue, on various grounds, that the district court committed error in granting summary judgment for Warner Brothers on the breach-of-contract claims. We have considered those arguments and find them meritless. The evidence conclusively establishes that, when negotiations broke off, the parties had not reached agreement on the purchase price. "'The failure to reach a meeting of the minds on all material points prevents the formation of a contract even though the parties have orally agreed upon some of the terms, or have taken some action related to the contract.' " Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 704 (2006) (quoting Banner Entm't, Inc. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 598, 604 (1998)) (brackets and emphasis omitted). No rational jury could find that a contract was entered between the Producers and Warner Brothers. Nor have the Producers produced evidence of disclosure of their work under conditions that would permit a jury to find an implied contract under the rule of Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 738-39, 299 P.2d 257 (1956). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. As the Producers recognize, their unfair competition claim depended on their establishing their copyright or contract claims.