Case Name: WILSON v. MID-CO PETROLEUM CO. et al.
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1926-02-02
Citations: 116 Okla. 115
Docket Number: No. 16226
Parties: WILSON v. MID-CO PETROLEUM CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 115–116

Head Matter:
WILSON v. MID-CO PETROLEUM CO. et al.
No. 16226
Opinion Filed Feb. 2, 1926.
Darnell & LaRue, for petitioner.
George Short, Atty. Gen., and Ames, Lowe, Richardson & Cochran, for respondents.

Opinion:
Opinion by
FOSTER, C.
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court by William D. Wilson, to review an order of the Industrial Commission denying claimant compensation for an accidental injury alleged to have been sustained by him as an employe of the Mid-Co Petroleum Company. The Federal Surety Company was the insurance carrier. William D. Wilson will be hereinafter designated as petitioner and Mid-Co Petroleum Company, Federal Surety Company, and the State Industrial Commission as respondents.
The Industrial Commission, among other things, found:
"That any disability suffered by the claimant was not the result of an alleged accident sustained by him while in the employment of respondent on the 8th day of November, 1924. The Commission is of the opinion, by reason of the aforesaid facts, that the claim of the claimant for compensation should be denied and the cause dismissed. It is therefore ordered that the claim of the claimant to compensation be and the same is hereby denied, and the cause dismissed."
It is agreed that there is but one proposition for this court to determine, and that is whether there was any evidence to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission, to the effect that the disability suffered by petitioner was not the result of an accident sustained by him while in the employment of the respondent. It is conceded that if there is any evidence reasonably tending to support such finding, the- same is binding upon the Supreme 'Court, but it is urged that the finding complained of is without any evidence to support it, and. that therefore it is reviewable as á matter of law.
In the hearing before the Industrial Commission the .petitioner testified, that he was employed by the Mid-Co Petroleum Company as warehouseman, and that on the 8th day of November, 1924, be went to load a car of gasoline at tbe loading rack of tbe respondent in Noble county, climbed on top of tbe tank car, and while attempting to unscrew a tap from tbe dome of tbe car, and while attempting to place a two-inch pipe in tbe tank, suffered a cramp in tbe calf of bis right leg; that be did not remember strik-. ing bis leg against anything except tbe pressure on the leg occasioned by lilting tbe cap and in bolding on to keep from falling from, the top of the tank ear; that, tbe pain gradually increased until November 25, 1924, at which time tbe leg was amputated by Dr. Mayberry; that in tbe interim between tbe date of tbe injury and tbe date of amputation, be consulted Dr. Baker and Dr. Hudson, both of whom, together with Dr. Mayberry, testified at tbe bearing before tbe Industrial Commission which was bad on February 16, 1925.
There was a direct conflict in tbe testimony of tbe examining physician^ as to tbe origin of tbe disability. All of them agreed that petitioner was suffering from an occlusion of the artery in tbe right leg, su-perinducing gangrene below tbe knee, and making tbe amputation of tbe leg imperative. They were also in agreement that by tbe occlusion of an artery was meant tbe plugging up of the artery, cutting off the flow of blood in tbe affected member. Dr. Hudson testified, however, that gangrene was an infection caused either by some foreign substance in tbe circulation entering a blood vessel and plugging it up, or on account of the thickening or hardening of tbe muscular walls of tbe artery, or thickening of tbe blood, causing tbe artery to stick tor gether, and that it was very unlikely for an occlusion to result from an external injury unless the injury was so severe as to lear and lacerate the arteries, causing tbe blood to clot, and he pointed out in that connection that the occlusion of an artery' rarely resulted even in eases of compound fractures accompanied by bruising and laceration of tbe muscular tissue. He further pointed out that in extreme cases of injury from external causes, tbe problem confronting surgeons was to keep down infection, and not so much in keeping tbe circulation in tbe injured member intact, and that if it were possible to keep down infection, except in very rare and extreme cases, it would not be difficult to avoid amputation. There is no evidence in this case of any external injury, such as Dr. Hudson referred to in bis testimony, of that severe type which might cause an occlusion of tbe artery, and from bis testimony tbe only way in which tbe disability could be accounted for would be from internal causes, such as tbe presence of a foreign substance in tbe circulation or tbe closing of tbe walls of tbe artery due to a thickening or hardening of tbe walls thereof. It is true Drs. Baker and May-berry testified that in their opinion tbe disability was tbe result o; an injury of some kind, but they testified that no external evidence of such injury appeared, and neither of them was very definite or specific in reference to tbe nature and extent of an external injury which could cause an occlusion of the artery. The petitioner himself could remember no injury resulting from external violence, unless tbe pressing of tbe leg on the top of the dome of tbe tank car in unscrewing the tap could be regarded ás external injury.
On the -whole case there was, in our judgment, evidence fully justifying tbe Industrial Commission in finding and concluding that tbe disability complained of did not arise out of and in tbe course of bis employment, and that it was not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
It has been held in a number of cases that:
"The decision of the State Industrial Commission as to all matters of fact is final where there is any evidence tending to support the finding." Hidden Treasure Coal Co. and U. S. Casualty Company v. Joe Urist and State Industrial Commission, 112 Okla. 245, 240 Pac. 640.
The prayer of petitioner to set aside tbe order is therefore denied.
By tbe Court: It is so ordered.