Case Name: Eli W. Gwynne v. Christopher Niswanger
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1851-12
Citations: 20 Ohio 556
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eli W. Gwynne v. Christopher Niswanger.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 20
Pages: 471–492

Head Matter:
Eli W. Gwynne v. Christopher Niswanger.
Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant, sueh lands become subject to taxation; and if sold for taxes, the purchaser at such tax sale will take a legal title, as against the former owner, although the patent has never issued from the United States.
If the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 1827, be defective ' at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to perfect his title.
This is a bill in chancery, filed by Gwynne, in June, 1845, in the court of common pleas of Madison county, and was subsequently removed, by appeal, to the Supremo Court.
The material facts, and the manner in which the case now comes up for decision, are stated in the opinion of the court.
Joseph R. Swan and John W. Andrews, for G-wynne:
Supposing the tax sale good, had the complainant a remedy at law? We refer to 6 Ohio, 477 ; 7 Ohio, 158; 8 Ohio, 540; 10 Ohio, 154; 16 Ohio, 61; 14 Ohio, 217.
The general assembly had no power to divest the United States of title. No title to lands belonging to the United States can be acquired by a law of the state. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498. The laws relating to listing, taxing, and selling entries and surveys not patented, show that these lands were charged with taxes in the name of the holders of the entries *and surveys; that the survey was the subject of the tax and sale, and that this tax was enforced by distress against the owner. To say that it was the land, as disconnected from title, is only to say that no title, legal or equitable, was sold. 7 Ohio, 190, pit. 2. The purchaser at tax sale can not get a better title than was in the party whose interest was subject to taxation.
Henry Stanbery, for Niswanger.
1. 1 claim that if any title passed by the tax sale, it was a legal title ; and if such title did not pass, there is no ground for equitable relief; and I propose, in the first place, to show that the decisions of this court, when fully considered, establish that proposition. Holt’s Lessee v. Hemphill, 3 Ohio, 232; Stewart v. Parrish, 6 Ohio, 477; Wallace v. Seymour and Renick, 7 Ohio, 156, pt. 1; Renick v. Wallace, 8 Ohio, 339 ; Douglas v. Dangerfiold, 10 Ohio, 152.
Tho controversy between these parties was originally presented at law upon an ejectment brought by Niswanger (13 Ohio, 74), and was very summarily dispiosod of. Neither counsel nor court seem to have noticed the case of Douglas v. Dangerfiold, and the only previous decision referred to by the court is Stewart v. Parrish, 6 Ohio, 477.
That case proceeded upon the distinction recognized in Douglas v. Dangerfiold, for the court held that Parrish acquired by his tax purchase, not an independent title to the land, but only such title as was in the former owner.
Following that case, founded ori a distinction which did not apply to Gwynne’s tax title; and wholly overlooking Douglas v. Dangerfield, the court conclude that G-wynno did not acquire a legal title, and intimate that his remedy is in equity.
According to the intimation so given, Gwynne then filed the bill in the case now before the court, which was met by demurrer, and is reported in 15 Ohio, 367.
*The demurrer was overruled, and the court found the decision upon Stewart v. Parrish, which did not apply, and upon Niswanger v. Gwynne, which erroneously followed Stewart v. Parrish. It is a singular fact, that Douglas v. Dangerfield was again overlooked or not noticed.
I submit to the court that these decisions, when taken together, ought not to be held as authority ; but that, upon the clear distinction recognized in Douglas v. Dangerfield, two errors have been fallen into with respect to this tax title. First, in holding that a legal title did not pass to the land; and secondly, in holding that there was relief in equity.
It is the land that is taxed, not the title to it. Ross v. Borland, 1 Pet. 664.
2. I have endeavored to show that the decisions of this court, holding that a legal right does not pass at tax sales where the legal title is in the United States, are erroneous.
But, if this has not been shown, it remains to be seen whether an equitable right passes.
It was supposed that when a court of law was shut against the tax purchaser, whose title was in conformity with the tax law, that of necessity a court of equity must relieve him. But such is not a necessary consequence.
“It has been said by Lord Northcote,” says Judge Story (Eq. Jur. 627), “ that where there is no legal remedy, it does not therefore follow that there must be an equitable remedy, unless there is also an equitable right.” Story’s Eq. 627 ; Hughey v. Horsey, 2 Ohio, 233.
Now, if a legal right does not pass at a tax sale, what sort of -equitable right passes? Even ata sheriff’s sale, if anything passes, it is a legal right. No equity grows out of such a purchase, failing the legal right, although the purchaser at sheriff’s sale is a favorite.
Much less can an equitable right arise out of a sale for taxes— a sale for a consideration usually so inadequate that, for that reason alone, a court of equity would have nothing to do with it. In this very case, the land was bought in for less than one-
*third its valuation on the duplicate, and such valuations were notoriously greatly below the actual value.
Now if Niswanger, owning this land by entry, had by solemn contract agreed to sell to Gwynne at such a price, and had subsequently acquired the patent and refused to convey, a court of equity would not then have compelled him to convey. The rule is, that a purchase at half the value prevents the court from interfering in behalf of the purchaser. It is against conscience to uphold and ratify such inadequacy, and to assist the parties to such a sacrifice.
As to the construction of the act of 1827 (3 Chase, 1562). That clause which declares that no error in listing, etc., shall invalidate the title, is repugnant to all the other provisions of the statute, and void. Smith’s Stat. L. 618; Alton Wood’s case, 1 Rep. 47; 6 Bacon’s Ab., tit. Stat. 380. The evidence shows that the tax sale was irregular and void.

Opinion:
Caldwell, I.
This is a bill, filed by a purchaser, at a tax sale of lands, to compel the assignee of the former owner to convey to him the legal title.
The bill states, in substance, that the land in controversy, six hundred and forty acres, was entered by David Boss, June 22, 1810, and surveyed April 26, 1816. That the land was regularly sold for taxes, in December, 1829, to Lyne Starling, for S201; that the auditor made him a deed in July, 1831, and that Starling, in 1832, conveyed to the complainant. That about January 20,1838, no patent having been previously issued, the defendant, as assignee of David Boss, obtained a patent for the land, and brought an action of ejectment against complainant, and obtained a judgment, which was affirmed in the court in bank, December term, 1844, and that defendant was about to take out a writ of possession.
The bill prays fora perpetual injunction against the proceedings on the judgment in ejectment, and that defendant be compelled to convey all his title to complainant.
The answer admits most of the facts stated in the bill, except *those that relate to the regularity of the proceeding, relating to the delinquency and sale of the land for taxes, which are specifically denied. This controversy was first brought before this court, in an action of ejectment, reported in 13 Ohio, 74.
The court in that case held, that the legal title of the patentee, Niswanger, was not affected by the sale for taxes, made before the patent issued, and that Niswanger, having obtained the patent for the land, was entitled to recover in ejectment, notwithstanding the tax title. The court also decided, that if the tax sale was regular, Gwynne's remedy was by bill in equity.
The complainant afterward filed this bill, to which the defendant demurred, and'the cause was heard and decided on demurrer, and is reported in 15 Ohio, 367. The question then presented on demurrer was the same that is here presented : whether a court of chancery has jurisdiction in such a case. The court there decided that Niswanger, by virtue of his patent, held the naked legal title; but that he held it in trust for Gwynne, who, by the tax sale, had. acquired an equitable title, and overruled the demurrer.
The defendant then filed his answer, and the case as now presented was heard by this court, and is reported in 18 Ohio, 400. The court then held, in conformity with the decision in 15 Ohio, that Gwynne had obtained merely an equitable title to the land by the tax sale; that the sale was regular, and that he was entitled to a conveyance, from Niswanger, of the legal title. A now hearing was afterward granted, and the cause now again comes up for decision. Two questions are presented for the consideration of the court:
1. Is a purchaser at a tax sale (under the law in force at the time these proceedings were had) entitled to the aid of a court of chancery, as against the former owner, to enable him to perfect his title ?
2. If a court of chancery has jurisdiction in such a case, ^have the proceedings and sale in this ease been regular and legal, so as to entitle the purchaser to the relief sought ?
The statute of 1827, the one in force when this sale was made, provides that the auditor " shall execute and deliver to such purchaser or qrarchasers, his or their heirs, or assignee or assignees, a deed therefor, in due form of law ; which deed shall convey to the purchaser or purchasers, his heir or their heirs, or assignee or assignees, a good and valid title to the land so sold; and such deed shall be received, in all courts in this state, as good evidence of title to the-purchaser or purchasers, his or their heirs, etc. Nor shall the title conveyed by said deed to the purchaser or purchasers, his or their heirs, assignee or assignees, be invalidated or affected by any error .previously made in listing, taxing, selling, or conveying said lands." 3 Chase's Stat. 1562. Now, it can not be contended that a deed made under this law, will not convey a complete legal title, if the state had the power to make such title. The deed, it is provided, shall bo one conveying, in terms, the property absolutely, without reservation or condition, in a form that, if made between individuals, and attended with the usual covenants, would hold the grantor liable for a complete title against all claims, either legal or equitable. It is also declared, that it shall convey a good and valid title to the land. And tho legislature, as if to remove every possible cavil, .•gives it the still further explicit sanction, that it shall be received, in all courts, as good evidence of title. It would be vain to say that such a title was not complete, both in law and equity, if the party making it had the power to pass such a title. The power of tho state has been exerted, to its utmost capacity, to make a perfect title.
It is contended, on tho part of complainant, that the patent, not having issued to Ross at the time of the tax sale, the sale merely conveyed an equity; that the legal title being in the United States, the state could not interfere with, or change its course, by any appropriation or conveyance of land. This proposition is founded on the supposition, that the sovereignty *of the United States, in controlling the title to the land, still exists, and that it would, be an attack on that sovereignty, for the state to meddle with the legal title. It is true, if the United States has any interest in the land, has not parted with all control over it as owner; if the general government holds any title, either legal or equitable, for its own benefit, either of a pecuniary or strictly governmental character, the state could not appropriate it, or change the legal title; such attempted appropriation would bo an attack on the sovereignty of the general government. But what is the character of the right which the United States holds in such a case ? The pai'ty, by his entry, location of his warrant, and survey, has made, as it were, complete and perfect payment for his land; he has acquired a perfect right to the title from the government; he has the faith of the government of the United States pledged to complete his legal title; he is treated by the government as the rightful owner of the property. The United States holds the mere naked legal title, which of right belongs to him, and which will be delivered to him, .and which, when delivered, will relate back to the time of the entry and survey. The state has the guaranty of the "United States, that he is the rightful owner of the land, and so far from its being an attempted infringement on the sovereignty of the gen. eral government, it is only carrying out its intentions, for the state to treat the person thus holding it, as the real owner thereof. Now, if it could be held that the general government, by thus holding the title, had such a right that the state was precluded from disposing of the legal title, for taxes, as against the owner, the same theory would prohibit the state from taxing the land. The states have no more power to tax the lands of the United States, than they have to make a title for them; the one would be an equal attack on the rights of the general government with the other. "We think the proposition proves too much for the complainant's cause ; it would prove the tax unwarranted, and all the proceedings under it void. It is to be observed that this is not a controversy where any right is or can be set *up, on the part of general government; it is solely between individuals. The state would have a clear right to make, as between individuals, the equitable title of Ross a legal one, and treat it as such. This principle is clearly recognized in the case of Ross v. Borland et ah, 1 Peters, 664. That was an action of ejectment, and the state court of Mississippi had held that a junior patent, issued on a prior certificate, should prevail over a senior patent.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in that case, say: " For the plaintiff in error, it is argued, that the state court erred in deciding that the elder grant should not prevail in the action of ejectment. It is undoubtedly true, that upon common-law principles, the legal title should prevail in the action of ejectment, upon the same grounds that the legal right prevails in other actions, in courts of law. It is so hold in those states in which the principles of the common law are carried into full effect, and the course of proceedings in the action of ejectment is according to those j)rineiples. In the states where these principles prevail, it is held, that in a trial at law, the courts will not look behind or beyond a grant, to the rights upon which it is founded, nor examine the progressive stages of the title, antecedent to the grant. But, in other states, the courts of law proceed on other principles. In the action of ejectment, they look beyond the grant, and examine the progressive stages of the title from its inception, whether by warrant, survey, entry or certificate, until its final consummation by grant; and if found regular and according to law in these progressive stages, the grant is held to relate back to the inception of the right, and have dignity accordingly. This latter course seems to bo the one adopted and pursued by the courts of Mississippi. It is enough for us to say, that in doing so, and in applying their peculiar mode of proceeding to titles derived through and under the laws of the United States, they violated no provisions of any statute of the United States."
Vo think, then, that the State of Ohio had the power to determine that Ross, who had a complete equitable right to the Uand, should be treated as the owner, and that the land should bo subjected to taxation ; that the state could sell this land for taxes, and provide that the purchaser, as against Ross, or those claiming under him, should take a good and valid title, both in law and equity; and this the state has done. And the purchaser at the sale, if the proceedings be substantially correct, has a complete legal title, and does not require the aid of a court of chancery. We are of opinion that much of the difficulty in this case arises from attempting to make a tax title analogous to an ordinary chain of title. A tax title, from its very nature, has nothing to do with the previous chain of title; does not in any way connect itself with it. It is a breaking up of all previous titles. The party holding such title, in proving it, goes no further than his tax deed ; the former title can be of no service to him, nor can it prejudice him.
It was well said by counsel in argument on this point, that a tax sale operated on the property, not the title. In an ordinary case, it matters not how many different interests may be connected with the title, what may be the particular interest of the party in whose name the property may be listed, for taxation ; it may bo a more equitable right; if the land be regularly sold for taxes, the property, accompanied with a legal title, goes to the purchaser, no matter how many estates, legal or equitablo, may be connected with it.
And in case the person in whoso name it was listed, who had but an equitable title to the land at the time of the tax sale, gets a conveyance from the person holding the legal title, he can not avail himself of it. The land is gone, and another title has intervened. Just so with a person holding under a purchase from the government; until the patent issues, he can hold nothing but 'an equitable right, because he can not trace his title to any origi ®al source; but if the land be sold for taxes whilst his right is a mere equitable one, he can not reclaim it, although he afterward obtain a patent from the United States.
A majority of the court think the title created by a tax sale is *a legal title, and when not good at law, that a court of chaneery has no power to aid the purchaser in completing his title.
The bill will therefore be dismissed.