Case Name: In re Bronn Keynen SALMON and Shells Reschel Salmon
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-30
Citations: 318 So. 2d 897
Docket Number: No. 12603
Parties: In re Bronn Keynen SALMON and Shells Reschel Salmon.
Judges: Before AYRES, PRICE and HALL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 897–907

Head Matter:
In re Bronn Keynen SALMON and Shells Reschel Salmon.
No. 12603.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 30, 1975.
On Rehearing Sept. 3, 1975.
Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, by W. S. McKenzie and G. Michael Pharis, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Bodenheimer, Jones, Klotz & Simmons, by C. Gary Mitchell, Shreveport, for appel-lee.
Before AYRES, PRICE and HALL, JJ.

Opinion:
PRICE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment permitting the adoption of children under 17 years of age by a step-parent and rejecting the opposition of the natural father whose consent was found unnecessary because of his failure to comply with an order to pay support for a period in excess of one year.
Michael Paul Harrington and Dwanna Salmon Harrington filed this action seeking to adopt each other's children by former marriages. Mrs. Harrington was al lowed to adopt the Harrington children without opposition, Mr. Harrington's former wife being deceased, and that part of the case is not before this court.
In response to Harrington's petition in which he seeks to adopt Bronn Keynen Salmon, age 9, and Shelis Reschel Salmon, age S, the children's father, Barry Kit Salmon, filed an opposition, reconventional demand, and third party demand. All but the opposition were subsequently dismissed by consent of the parties.
Petitioner, Michael Paul Harrington, contends the consent of the natural father of the children is unnecessary as he has forfeited his rights under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:422.1, which reads as follows:
"422.1 Adoptions by step-parent, grandparent; consent
"If the spouse of the petitioner is the legitimate parent of the child or if the petitioner is the grandparent or grandparents of the child, then the consent of the other legitimate parent is not necessary if the first and second or the first and third conditions exist:
(1) The spouse of the petitioner or the grandparent or grandparents or the mother or the father have been granted custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction and
(2) The other legitimate parent has refused or failed to comply with a court order of support for a period of one year or
(3) The other legitimate parent is a nonresident of this state and has failed to support the child for a period of one year after judgment awarding custody to the mother or father or grandparent or grandparents."
The record shows that Barry Salmon and Dwanna Salmon were married in Marshall, Texas, on January 8, 1966, and of this marriage the two children sought to be adopted by petitioner were born. This marriage ended in divorce on July 13, 1971, while the Salmons were living in St. Louis County, Missouri. In the Salmons judgment of divorce rendered in St. Louis County, Missouri, Mrs. Salmon was granted custody of the two minor children of the marriage and Salmon agreed to assume the debts of the marriage and to pay $15.00 a week for each of the two children of the marriage as child support.
In September of 1971 Salmon remarried. The record reflects during this period he was current, although not prompt with his child support payments. Beginning in November of 1971 Salmon and his second wife kept the children in their home in St. Louis for a period extending to July of 1972. This was at the request of Mrs. Salmon who wanted sufficient time to establish herself in another location. At the end of July, 1972, Mrs. Salmon again took custody of the children and moved to Shreveport to live. Salmon resumed paying child support payments, which were current until the end of November of 1972. He concedes that he has not paid child support payments since November, 1972, through the filing of the instant suit in May, 1974.
Defendant, Salmon, contends the requirement for his parental consent to this adoption has not been forfeited by the operation of R.S. 9:422.1(2) for these reasons :
(1). The Missouri judgment ordering him to pay support was not an enforceable decree in the State of Louisiana without having first been recognized and made executory. Therefore, as he was a resident of Louisiana during a portion of the time his failure to pay support is alleged, there was no failure to comply with a court order as intended by the statute.
(2). The failure to pay child support was not without justification and did not constitute neglect of his parental responsibility.
We find no merit in the first defense asserted by defendant. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and we cannot read into the statute the requirement that "a court order for support" must be a judgment which is subject to immediate enforcement by the courts of this state.
Defendant's contention that his failure to pay support was not without justification is a serious question which has caused us much concern. This defense is grounded on the judicial interpretation of R.S. 9:422.1 by the Supreme Court in In Re Ackenhausen, 244 La. 730, 154 So.2d 380 (1963), that the legislature never intended to forfeit the parental rights of a parent whose noncompliance with a court order to pay support was for reasons beyond his control and therefore justified.
In support of his position that his failure to pay any support from November, 1972, through the filing of this action in May, 1974, was not without justification, defendant offered evidence tending to show financial inability due to excessive indebtedness and employment difficulties amplified by domestic problems resulting in the failure of his second marriage. Defendant also attempts to show he was justified in not making any payment after Harrington's marriage to Dwanna Salmon because of the attitude exhibited toward him by Harrington which lead him to believe his payment of support was not wanted, nor would it be accepted.
The evidence shows that at the time defendant was divorced from Dwanna Salmon he was employed in St. Louis by an optical firm and earned $763 per month. He remarried in September, 1971, and separated from his second wife in December, 1972. He lost his employment in June, 1973, and in August, 1973, he filed a petition in bankruptcy. He was unemployed from July until October, 1973, during which time he drew unemployment benefits of $48 per week. In October, 1973, defendant moved back to his former home in Shreveport where he was employed at a business belonging to his father. For a brief period of time around the first of the year in 1974 defendant was unemployed because his father's business burned down. Thereafter he was employed by a firm which transferred him to New Orleans and almost immediately transferred him back to a branch in Shreveport where he has continued to be employed through the date of trial of these proceedings.
Defendant testified that he contacted Dwanna Salmon on several occasions after becoming unable to pay support in November of 1972, and explained his circumstances to her. He contends she stated she understood and that she was getting along all right on her earnings of approximately $150 per week as a beauty shop operator. Dwanna Harrington acknowledged contacts were made by defendant who made promises to catch up on his support payments which were never fulfilled.
Defendant testified that upon his return to Shreveport in October, 1973, he learned of his former wife's plans to remarry. He contends he was thwarted in his efforts to visit regularly with his children and in making arrangements to resume payment of support by the actions of her new husband, Harrington. Defendant testified his wife informed him he would have to discuss such matters with her husband and that Harrington advised him he could only visit at Harrington's convenience, which turned out to be very seldom. Defendant further testified that when the subject of support was discussed Harrington declared they did not need or desire his money and if checks were sent they would be torn up.
Harrington admits making some similar comments as contended by defendant, except that he denies saying the checks would be torn up. We observe that at the time of these conversations defendant was about 11 or 12 months in arrearage on support payments.
On the basis of this evidence the Juvenile Court judge granted the petition for adoption giving reasons for rejecting defendant's opposition as follows:
"After the separation and divorce of the now Mrs. Harrington, the natural mother of the children and Mr. Barry Kit Salmon, some interest was shown by Mr. Salmon in his children and at a time he actually took them into his home. And the Court can reasonably conclude that he was dutiful toward his children for a while, however, from the record it is apparent that when times got rough for various reasons, including matrimonial difficulty with his then wife he then discontinued any interest in his children and devoted his full energies to himself and none to his children. This continued on until after the marriage of the petitioner and the natural mother of the children and after this marriage Mr. Salmon and Mr. Harrington did have a conversation and according to the testimony of Mr. Harrington he said that he intended to catch up on his child support payments, to which Mr. Harrington testified that he made the statement that 'we did not need his money', and he further testified that he possibly told him that they did not want it, but he was not sure of this last statement. No where in the record is there any evidence that Mr. Salmon came forward with any proposed plan to Mr. Harrington or to his former wife for the care of his children or to make any real substantial or concrete payments for their maintenance and support. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the neglect by Mr. Salmon was not due to any coercion by the mother of the children or by Mr. Harrington and that he was not thwarted in his efforts to support his children by the natural mother or by Mr. Harrington, the petitioner, and that it was due solely to his own neglect and the devoting of his energies and interests to himself rather than his children."
Although we are aware of the extreme consequences resulting from the granting of an adoption which results in the severance of the legal rights of the children toward one of their natural parents, we must conclude that in accord with the provisions of R.S. 9:422.1 and the controlling jurisprudence, there is no manifest error in the judgment of the Juvenile Court appealed from.
As pointed out in In Re Ackenhausen, supra, p. 383, "Whether a legitimate parent has failed or refused to comply with an order of support so that consent is not required for adoption will, of course, have to depend on the facts of each case."
Approximately one year and six months expired between defendant's last payment of any sum and the filing of the petition for adoption. The tender of the balance of arrearages by bank money order after the filing of suit is, of course, ineffective and defendant's counsel does not urge it as a bar to the proceedings. See In Re LaFitte, 247 La. 856, 174 So.2d 804 (1965). During this year and a half defendant was employed for all except three or four months. He also saw fit to contract a third marriage during November of 1973.
The finding of the trial judge that defendant was not thwarted or misled into withholding payments after the remarriage of his former wife is a close question since at the time these negotiations took place defendant was already approximately one year behind in payments and made no tender of payment of any amount during the ensuing period until suit was filed, we feel compelled to accept the trial judge's finding in this regard.
The effect of defendant's petition in bankruptcy and subsequent discharge in April, 1974, does not appear to have prevented defendant from making some bona fide effort to have attempted a compliance with his obligation of support after November of 1972. We must observe that the evidence does show defendant's ability to pay did change during the summer of 1973, and had he made a reasonable effort to provide his children with a proportionate amount of his lessened ability, then his position would have been more favorable. Unfortunately, this did not occur and the total noncompliance must be construed against him.
The evidence showing he purchased a savings bond for $18.75 for each child monthly during the period between March, 1973, and September, 1973, cannot be construed as a compliance with his obligation of support of these bonds were retained by him and were cashed by him as an alternative payee in connection with his bankruptcy proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant's costs.