Case Name: George M'Cullough and Isabella his wife against James Allen, John Lick and Benjamin Coburn
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1800-04
Citations: 3 Yeates 10
Docket Number: 
Parties: George M'Cullough and Isabella his wife against James Allen, John Lick and Benjamin Coburn.
Judges: Brackenridge, J. was present and concurred therein.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Yeates)
Volume: 3
Pages: 9–11

Head Matter:
George M'Cullough and Isabella his wife against James Allen, John Lick and Benjamin Coburn.
To bar a widow of dower by a devise, it must be either so expressed, or there must be a strong and necessary implication to that effect, or it must be inconsistent with or repugnant to her claim.
Dower of 7 messuages, 2 barns, 7 gardens, 2 orchards, 30 acres of meadow, 500 acres of arable land, and 200 acres of woodland, in Little Britain township.
The tenants pleaded a devise given by the last will of Thomas Grubb to Isabella the demandant, his widow, and accepted by her, in lieu of her dower at common law {front will.)
The substance of the will was as follows : The testator gave to his son in law Joseph M'Creary and Ann his wife 25I., and to his son in law Alexander Laughlin and Charity his wife, the like sum of 25I., and to his daughter Prudence 150I., her mare, saddle, bridle, bed and furniture. To his son Joseph Grubb, his heirs and assigns, a certain tract of land marked out for him in the presence of witnesses. To his daughter Jane 150I., a good mare, saddle and bridle, bed and furniture, when she came to the age of 18 years. To his sons John, Thomas, William and Benjamin Grubb, and their respective heirs and as- # -, signs, *certain other tracts of land marked out for them *11] respectively in the presence of witnesses. To his son James Grubb 300I. And then came the following clauses: “ And further it is my will, that if any one of my sons depart “this life before their marriage, or arriving at the age of 21 “years, I order that his tract of land be given to my son James “ Grubb, his heirs and assigns, and the 300I. I left to him the “ said James, to be equally divided amongst the rest of my sons ; “and further if the said James depart this life before his mar- “ riage, or arriving at the age of 21 years, the money to be “ equally divided amongst the rest of my sons ; and further, if “my daughter Jane depart this life before her marriage, or arriving at the age of 18 years, then her 150I. to be equally “ divided between my wife and sons. And further, I give unto “ my well beloved wife Isabella Grubb, the remaining part of all “ my personal estate, and the benefits of all my real estate, till “my sons come of age to enjoy their possessions.” And finally he appoints his wife Isabella his sole executrix.
The demandants replied, that the said devise was not given or accepted by the said Isabella in lieu of dower. This action had been originally brought against all the tenants of the lands whereof the testator died seized; but the deaths of Alexander Ewing, (who had bought John Grubb’s tract and part of Thomas Grubb’s tract,) and John Jones, (who had bought James Grubb’s tract, and the residue of Thomas Grubb’s tract,) two of the tenants, were suggested on record; and consequently the tract devised to Benjamin, which he had conveyed to Allen, Lick and Coburn, only came in question.
William Grubb died in his minority, and James his brother succeeded to his tract, who sold to John Jones.
Benjamin Grubb came of age on the 31st March 1796, and then came into possession of the tract devised to them.
It appeared that this farm was of the yearly value of 30I. and a verdict passed for the demandants, with 40Í. damages, subject to the court’s opinion on the point reserved, whether the devise to the widow did not bar her dower.
The court, after consideration of the case in their chambers, desired that the defendant’s counsel would produce the authorities on which they relied.
The counsel on both sides declined arguing the point; but those for the defendants barely referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Buckwalter, in December term 1798, and wished the judgment of the court might be deferred until the next September term.
*This however, the court refused, declaring that they p conceived it to be an impropriety to postpone giving [*12 their judgment, when they entertained no difficulty in their own minds. The counsel had it in their power to appeal to the Supreme Court, if they were dissatisfied with the opinion of the justices now present, upon giving the certificate prescribed by the late circuit law. 4 St. Laws, 362, § 4.
The demandant’s counsel then prayed the opinion of the court.
Messrs. Hopkins and C. Smith for the demandants.
Messrs. Kittera and Montgomery for the tenants.

Opinion:
By the Court.
After the very full consideration which has been given to the case of Hamilton v. Buckwalter, it would be a waste of time now to cite decisions respecting the right of dower, where the former husband has made a devise to his widow. Most of the cases in the books, were cited in that cause by the judges, who gave their opinions seriatim, after long advisement. There the judgment was rendered in favor of the tenant. But the present will is very dissimilar from that of John Patton, on which the determination rested. The devise to the widow, was " of " all his lands in Lampeter township, during her natural life of "widowhood, she making no waste thereupon ; but in case she " married, she was then to leave the plantation, and to receive " Sol., a horse and saddle, with her bed and bed clothes." A freehold estate was actually devised to her, and u]Don the determination thereof, she was to relinquish the land and receive a sum of money and sundry specific articles as an equivalent.
Considering the present will as a simple question of intention, it is but mere conjecture to say, that the testator intended to bar her of dower by the devise " of the benefits of all the real estate, "till his sons came of age to enjoy their possession." There is no strong and necessary implication, that the widow should not have both her devise and dower. The mind in such a case, must be free of all doubts.. The devise to her is not inconsistent with, or repugnant to her claim of dower, which the bounty of the law gives her. And on the fullest reflection, we cannot perceive that the-case before us is so circumstanced, as to justify a deviation from the general rule of law ; and therefore find ourselves constrained to give judgment for the demandants. .
Brackenridge, J. was present and concurred therein.