Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth ATKINSON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2002-11-15
Citations: 50 F. App'x 649
Docket Number: No. 02-4342
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth ATKINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 50
Pages: 649–651

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth ATKINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-4342.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 7, 2002.
Decided Nov. 15, 2002.
C. Gordon McBride, Hartsville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose M. Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Kenneth Atkinson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute hydromorphone and methadone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000), and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Atkinson was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. Counsel for Atkinson has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising two issues but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Atkinson has been informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, and although he expressed dissatisfaction with counsel's brief, he raised no issues regarding his conviction or sentence.
Atkinson challenges the inclusion of Dilaudid (hydromorphone) as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. The sentencing court heard testimony from four witnesses and found as a factual matter that Atkinson was involved in the distribution of Dilaudid (hydromorphone). We find that the sentencing court did not clearly err in this finding. United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989).
Atkinson further notes he was sentenced based on the total weight of the pills involved in the conspiracy, and not the pure drugs less any filler. "Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (2000). We have held that this gross weight methodology applies to pharmaceuticals. United States v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 31-32 (4th Cir.1990). We see no reason to depart from this well established rule.
Atkinson further disputes the application of a sentencing guideline enhancement for the possession of a firearm in conjunction with a drug trafficking crime. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The determination that a weapon enhancement is warranted is a factual question subject to clear error review. United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 914 (4th Cir.1990). The district court did not clearly err when Atkinson's sentence was enhanced for possession of a dangerous weapon because Atkinson did not show it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. USSG § 2D1.1, comment, (n.3); United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 852 (4th Cir.1997). Finally, the sentence was within the range prescribed by the statute of conviction.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for ap peal. We therefore affirm Atkinson's conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.