Case Name: STATE ex rel EVERETT M. SWEELEY, Prosecuting Attorney of Twin Falls County, relator, Appellant, v. CATHERINE M. BRAUN and E. L. ROGERS, Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1941-02-13
Citations: 62 Idaho 258
Docket Number: No. 6831
Parties: STATE ex rel EVERETT M. SWEELEY, Prosecuting Attorney of Twin Falls County, relator, Appellant, v. CATHERINE M. BRAUN and E. L. ROGERS, Respondents.
Judges: Budge, C. J., and Morgan and Holden, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 258–269

Head Matter:
(No. 6831.
February 13, 1941.)
STATE ex rel EVERETT M. SWEELEY, Prosecuting Attorney of Twin Falls County, relator, Appellant, v. CATHERINE M. BRAUN and E. L. ROGERS, Respondents.
[110 Pac. (2d) 835.]
Everett M. Sweeley, for Appellant.
W. L. Dunn, for Respondents.

Opinion:
GIVENS, J.
The prosecuting attorney of Twin Falls county instituted this action against Catherine M. Braun as owner of the premises, and E. L. Rogers as operator, to abate under 1939 Sess. Laws, chap. 222, as a public nuisance a place where alcoholic liquors were illegally kept and sold.
Upon respondents' default following due and legal service, overruling of respondents' respective and separate demurrers and failure to plead further within the time granted and after appellant had submitted proof adequately establishing a prima facie case, judgment of closure was entered.
This appeal is from an order setting aside the default because of the claimed excusable fault and neglect of their attorney in failing to file answers in time.
Under sec. 5-905, I. C. A., as amended 1921, the neglect of the attorney in causing or permitting the default is a mandatory excuse. (Brainard v. Coeur d'Alene Antimony Mining Co., 35 Ida. 742, 208 Pac. 855; Wagner v. Mower, 41 Ida. 380, 237 Pac. 118; Miller v. Brinkman, 48 Ida. 232, 281 Pac. 372; Kivett v. Crouch, 61 Ida. 536, 104 Pac. (2d) 21, at 25.)
While there are vagrant, hypothetical expressions to the effect that under such circumstances no showing of merits is required as a concurrent condition precedent (Weaver v. Rambow, 37 Ida. 645, 217 Pac. 610), the established and repeated rule is that unless facts showing a meritorious defense are set forth by way of accompanying answer or affidavit it would be idle to set aside the default even though the neglect be that of the attorney, not the litigant, and where defaults have been set aside there have been proffered defenses. (Brainard v. Coeur d'Alene Antimony Mining Co., supra; Consolidated W. & M. Co. v. Housman, 38 Ida. 343, 349, 221 Pac. 143; Wagner v. Mower, supra; Miller v. Brinkman, supra; Voellmeck v. Northwest M. L. Ins. Co., 60 Ida. 412, 92 Pac. (2d) 412; Beltran v. Roll, (Ariz.) 7 Pac. (2d) 248.)
Respondent Braun's answer admits she is a nonresident of the state. By filing her demurrer and proffering her answer she appeared generally and thus has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. (Wayne v. Alspach, 20 Ida. 144, 149, 116 Pac. 1033; Central Deep Creek Orchard Co. v. C. C. Taft Co., 34 Ida. 458, 202 Pac. 1062; Elliott & Healy v. Wirth, 34 Ida. 797, 198 Pac. 757; Armitage v. Horseshoe Bend Co., 35 Ida. 179, 204 Pac. 1073; Willman v. Friedman, 4 Ida. 209, 38 Pac. 937, 95 A.S.R. 59; McDonald v. McDonald, 55 Ida. 102, 39 Pac. (2d) 293; Newman v. Cheesman Automobile Co., 33 Ida. 685, 197 Pac. 826; Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. C. J. Webb & Co., 36 Ida. 442, 211 Pac. 556; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 99 Fed. (2d) 651, 308 U. S. 66, 84 L. ed. 85; Poage v. Co-operative Pub. Co., 57 Ida. 561, 66 Pac. (2d) 1119, 110 A. L. R. 1322.) Hence her plea of non-notification under sec. 1006, chap. 222, 1939 Sess. Laws, p. 482 (other than by summons), is not now a defense.
Her main plea is that of ignorance of any illegal acts. This is not a defense against abatement proceedings of a liquor nuisance, because it is a proceeding in rem against the property. (State ex rel Eubanks v. Dick, (Kan.) 92 Pac. (2d) 92; Linsley v. Werner, (Colo.) 283 Pac. 534; Holmes v. United States, 269 Fed. 489, 12 A. L. R. 427.) Also because the owner has a remedy under the statute. (Sec. 1011, chap. 222, 1939 Sess. Laws, p. 483; Gaskins v. People, (Colo.) 272 Pac. 662, 62 A. L. R. 693; United States v. Brown, 31 Fed. (2d) 307; Hill v. United States, 44 Fed. (2d) 889; United States v. All Buildings, etc., 28 Fed. (2d) 774.)
Respondent Rogers' answer contained only specific denials, no affirmative showing of any defense. (Harr v. Knight, 18 Ida. 53, 108 Pac. 539.) The showing of merits must set forth the facts of defense so the trial court in the first instance and the appellate court in the second may determine whether the submitted defense is meritorious. This is for the court, not counsel or his attorney, to decide. (Holland Bank v. Lieuallen, 6 Ida. 127, 53 Pac. 398; Holzaman v. Hereberry, 11 Ida. 428, 83 Pac. 497; Beck v. Lavin, 15 Ida. 363, 367, 97 Pac. 1028; Harr v. Knight, supra; Parsons v. Wrble, 19 Ida. 619, 115 Pac. 8, 13; Hall v. Whittier, 20 Ida. 120, 127, 116 Pac. 1031; Miller v. Brinkman, supra; Voellmeck v. Northwest M. L. Ins. Co., supra; Beltran v. Roll, supra; Thompson v. Caddo County Bank, (Okla.) 82 Pac. 926; Linsey v. Goodman, (Okla.) 157 Pac. 344; Dana v. Thaw, 107 N. Y. S. 870; Dandowitz v. Duane, 62 N. Y. S. 744; Black v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 N. Y. S. 334.)
Claimed defenses bruited in respondents' brief are of no avail and cannot take the place of an answer or affidavit of merits.
No facts constituting a defense having been presented by respondents the default should not have been set aside.
The judgment is reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the original judgment of abatement.
Costs to appellant.
Budge, C. J., and Morgan and Holden, JJ., concur.