Case Name: Richard D. KIPER and Central Florida Greyhound College, Inc., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-03-11
Citations: 310 So. 2d 42
Docket Number: No. U-443
Parties: Richard D. KIPER and Central Florida Greyhound College, Inc., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: RAWLS, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 310
Pages: 42–44

Head Matter:
Richard D. KIPER and Central Florida Greyhound College, Inc., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. U-443.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 11, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1975.
J. B. Walkup, Jr., and Gregory E. Tucci, of Blowers, Walkup, Berk & Tucci, Ocala, for appellants.
Gordan G. Oldham, Jr., and Louis A. Tally, Leesburg, for appellee.
Carl E. Rude, Jr., of Ervin, Varn, Jacobs & Odom, Tallahassee, for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
BOYER, Judge.
The State of Florida, by and through the State Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court seeking to enjoin appellants from continuing an alleged public nuisance. The plaintiff, appellee here, adduced testimony from a single witness, seeking to establish by that witness that appellants' actions were in violation of F.S. 828.02 and F.S. 828.12. At the close of the plaintiff's case defendants (appellants here) moved for a judgment in their favor, in the nature of a directed verdict, which motion was denied. Defendants then called several witnesses and rested their case, renewing their motion which was again denied. The trial judge thereupon found that appellants were in violation of the above mentioned statutes and that their activities constituted a public nuisance, issuing the injunction prayed for. We reverse.
Our examination of the brief record reveals that the plaintiff below, appellee here, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence violation of F.S. 828.02 or F.S. 828.12, therefore the defendants' motion for a judgment in their favor at the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the close of all of the evidence should have been granted.
Even had violation of the above mentioned statutes been established the evidence falls far short of demonstrating the existence of a public nuisance.
Having determined that the order granting the injunction here appealed was improvidently issued we find it unnecessary to consider appellants' remaining point relating to the constitutionality of the above mentioned statutes as applied to appellants by the order here appealed.
Reversed.
RAWLS, C. J., concurs.
McCORD, J., dissents.