Case Name: Clarence and Peggy McLAUGHLIN v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-02-25
Citations: 582 So. 2d 203
Docket Number: No. 86 CA 1636
Parties: Clarence and Peggy McLAUGHLIN v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and FOIL, JJ., and VIAL LEMMON , J. Pro Tern.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 582
Pages: 203–241

Head Matter:
Clarence and Peggy McLAUGHLIN v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
No. 86 CA 1636.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Feb. 25, 1991.
On Rehearing June 5, 1991.
Writ Denied Oct. 4, 1991.
Byard Edwards, Jr., Ponchatoula, for plaintiffs-appellants Clarence and Peggy McLaughlin.
Richard S. Vale, Metairie, for defendants Howard Glasper, Jr., William McNabb and Fireman’s Fund Ins., appellee.
Frank Gremillion and William Doran, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Dept, of Transp. and Development, appellee.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and FOIL, JJ., and VIAL LEMMON , J. Pro Tern.
Judge Wallace A. Edwards has recused himself from hearing this case.
Judge Daniel W. LeBlanc did not participate.
Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon of the 29th Judicial District Court is serving as Judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court to fill the vacancy created by the illness and subsequent death of Judge Steve A. Alford, Jr.

Opinion:
CRAIN, Judge.
This is a suit for damages in tort arising out of a vehicle accident which resulted in a fatality. The parents of the deceased driver claim damages for wrongful death. After a trial on the merits, the jury found the defendant driver was not negligent. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing plaintiffs' demands. Plaintiffs took a devolutive appeal to this court.
This court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed with a dissent. The majority held that the jury verdict that the defendant driver was not negligent was not manifestly erroneous and declined to rule on the plaintiffs' assignments of error concerning the admission of the results of a blood alcohol test of the deceased because it pertained to the issue of the deceased's comparative negligence and was not relevant to the defendant driver's fault. The dissenter disagreed with the majority's view that the results of the decedent's blood alcohol test were not relevant to the fault of the defendant driver and expressed the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the blood tested was that of the decedent.
On application of the plaintiffs, the Louisiana Supreme Court peremptorily granted a supervisory writ with the following per curiam:
The court of appeal declined to address the issue of the admissibility of the results of plaintiff's second blood alcohol test on the basis that the results were only relevant to plaintiff's comparative negligence in this intersectional collision. Because there was a reasonable basis for the jury to find defendant (who was faced with a stop sign at the intersection) at least concurrently at fault, one cannot reasonably conclude that the admission of the test results, if erroneous, could not have affected the jury's finding that defendant was totally free of fault. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is set aside, and the case is remanded to the court of appeal to rule upon the admissibility of the test results and to reconsider the fault of the parties in the light of that ruling. McLaughlin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 533 So.2d 340 (La.1988).
On remand this court held that the plaintiffs failed to properly preserve their chain of custody objection for appellate review and ruled that it was unnecessary to rule on the assignments of error relating to the admissibility of the decedent's blood alcohol test. This court also held the jury verdict finding that the defendant driver was not negligent was not manifestly erroneous and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. This court again affirmed with a dissent. McLaughlin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 549 So.2d 327 (La. App. 1st Cir.1989). The dissent was of the opinion that (1) the chain of custody objection was properly preserved, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the blood tested was that of the decedent and the blood alcohol analysis results were improperly admitted into evidence, (3) this error in admitting evidence was prejudicial and interdicted the jury verdict on the defendant driver's fault, (4) a de novo review of the evidence showed that the defendant driver was negligent, (5) there was no admissible evidence in the record to show that the decedent driver was intoxicated, and (6) the plaintiffs should recover $150,000 each.
The plaintiffs again applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for supervisory relief. The Louisiana Supreme Court again peremptorily granted a supervisory writ with the following per curiam:
Granted. Judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. We find that the chain-of-custody objection was properly preserved for appellate review. The case is remanded to the court of appeal to determine whether defendants laid a proper foundation for admission of the blood-alcohol test results and to reconsider the apportionment of fault between the parties. McLaughlin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 551 So.2d 622 (La.1989).
BASIC FACTS
On April 10, 1983, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Kirk D. McLaughlin was driving his 1978 Chevrolet Monza in a westerly direction on Louisiana Highway 1040 (Old Baton Rouge Highway) in the vicinity of the Interstate 55 (1-55) overpass in Tangi-pahoa Parish, Louisiana. The 1-55 overpass is approximately 900 feet east of the intersection of La. 1040 and Stein Road. The posted speed limit on La. 1040 is 55 miles per hour. At this same time, Howard Glasper was operating an 18-wheel tractor-trailer rig (truck) owned by Hammond Sandblasting, Inc. in a southerly direction on Stein Road. Glasper stopped the truck at the stop sign at the intersection of La. 1040 and Stein Road. Glasper then entered the intersection with the intent to turn left to proceed in an easterly direction on La. 1040. As Glasper was making this turning maneuver, the front of McLaughlin's vehicle struck the left rear wheels of the trailer and McLaughlin was killed. The point of maximum impact between the two vehicles was near the centerline of the roadway in the eastbound lane of La. 1040.
Kirk McLaughlin was survived by his parents, Clarence "Red" McLaughlin and Peggy Crisp McLaughlin. Glasper was employed by William McNabb d/b/a B-Line Truck Services and was in the scope and course of his employment at the time of the accident. The insurer of Glasper, McNabb and Hammond Sandblasting, Inc. was Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman's Fund).
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST
The plaintiffs assert the blood alcohol test results were improperly admitted into evidence with the following rationale:
In McLaughlin herein there were two alleged blood samples drawn from the deceased and the testimony as to their handling is a muddle of inconsistencies, contradictions and unknowns. The coroner, Dr. Maxwell, testified both that he drew one blood sample at the accident scene and that he (contradictory) drew two samples at the autopsy. He may have drawn three samples. The State Police got one sample but it was rendered useless by its improper handling. Dr. Maxwell testified that he gave one sample to someone in the autopsy lab with him but he does not know who it was. That that unknown person identified the sample (but curiously did not identify himself). There is not further evidence either documentary or testimo-nily as to who, when or where the evidence was handled until the medicine technologist received it from some unknown person and performed his tests. His testimony was that he didn't even know if the sample was in a sealed or unsealed kit.
The plaintiffs cite Bufkin v. Mid-American Indemnity Company, 528 So.2d 589 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988), and the courts of appeal cases cited therein, as authority.
The defendants assert "the procedures followed and testimony offered with regard to the custody of the blood samples in this case were sufficient to support the admissibility of the blood tests at issue," citing State v. Turner, 392 So.2d 436 (La.1980); State v. Flood, 301 So.2d 637 (La.1974); State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971); State v. Coleman, 254 La. 264, 223 So.2d 402 (1969); and Ballou v. R.E. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 901).
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law determined by the court. See cases cited in Comment (a) for La.C.E. art. 104. When factual questions must be decided to determine the admissibility of evidence, the court should follow the preponderance of evidence standard, unless a special rule of law requires a different standard. See authorities cited in Comment (c) for La.C.E. art. 104.
This is a civil case, and the special rules of La.R.S. 32:661 et seq. do not apply. La.R.S. 32:662(C); Pereira Enterprises, Inc. v. Soileau, 551 So.2d 39 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). However, a litigant in a civil action may prove intoxication by introducing evidence of a person's blood alcohol content and expert testimony interpreting the effects of such a level (content) on the person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. Parker v. Kroger's, Inc., 394 So.2d 1178 (La.1981); Clay v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 401 So.2d 1257 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 409 So.2d 616 (La.1981). What constitutes a proper foundation for the admissibility of test results of a blood sample in a civil case is found in Allemand v. Zip's Trucking Co., 552 So.2d 1023 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 558 So.2d 569 (La.1990). There it was stated that:
The requirements for the introduction of a blood test analysis are very stringent; the party seeking to introduce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation for its admission. Pearce v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 534 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), application not considered, 256 La. 888, 239 So.2d 543 (La.1970). This predicate must connect the specimen with its source, show that it was properly taken by an authorized person, properly labeled and preserved, properly transported for analysis and properly tested. Pearce v. Gunter, 238 So.2d at 537.
552 So.2d at 1026. See also Wells v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 573 So.2d 223 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990).
The confusion in this case stems from the fact that three blood samples were taken. Two were sent to the state police and one of them was not properly preserved. However, a third sample was sent to TPL and the result of this sample was admitted in evidence. With reference to this sample the evidence shows that the coroner of Tangipahoa Parish, Dr. Ralph Maxwell, drew the TPL sample. He used an intracardiac needle to remove the TPL blood sample from McLaughlin's heart. He testified that he placed the blood in a Beckdin, Dickinson Vacutainer forensic blood collection kit vial. This vial contained potassium oxalate to keep the blood from coagulating and sodium fluoride to preserve it. The vial was labeled with the date, McLaughlin's name, Dr. Maxwell's name and the Coroner's Office TPL number of 1855. Dr. Maxwell placed the TPL sample in the TPL "collection area" at the Hospital. It is not contested that Dr. Maxwell took the TPL sample. His testimony to that effect is corroborated by the testimony of Captain Keating, Trooper Bluns-chi, and the records of TPL. Dr. Maxwell's qualifications for drawing the blood are not contested. Dr. Monroe Samuels, a medical doctor qualified as an expert in forensic pathology and toxicology testified Dr. Maxwell removed the blood in the proper manner. The fact that Dr. Maxwell received a report from TPL on its testing of McLaughlin's blood sample is circumstantial evidence that TPL received the McLaughlin blood sample that Dr. Maxwell took.
Stanley S. Chigoy, a medical technologist, testified that TPL dispatched a courier who during his routine day would pick up specimens (blood samples) at Dr. Maxwell's office, or a place specified by him, and the courier would transport the specimen back to TPL for testing. The courier in the instant case was not identified and did not testify. However, this is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of the evidence. It is gaps in possession of the sample as opposed to lack of evidence pertaining to the taking of the sample and its analysis which result in different language by the courts as to foundation evidence necessary to introduce a sample. Gaps in a chain of custody usually affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and an unbroken chain of custody is not essential for the admissibility of the evidence as long as the foundation evidence as a whole shows it is more probable than not that the evidence tested was that which was originally taken. State v. Ray, 521 So.2d 582 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 525 So.2d 1055 (La.1988). Evidence of custom or routine shows a regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 195, pp. 462-465 (2d ed. 1972). The fact that there is a custom of meeting a particular situation with a specific type of response is circumstantial evidence that on the particular occasion in question, the response was the same. See, for example, State v. Brown, 395 So.2d 1301 (La.1981); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 477 So.2d 1161 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 479 So.2d 922 (La.1985); Bonvillain v. Realty Operators, 26 So.2d 25 (La.App. 1st Cir.1946). Thus, La.C.E. art. 406 provides as follows:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. The evidence may consist of testimony in the form of an opinion or evidence of specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine.
Chigoy's testimony on this issue is corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Maxwell, the TPL log book entry (Defendants' Exhibit 9) and Dr. Maxwell's request for analysis form (Defendants' Exhibit 8). Dr. Maxwell testified he drew the blood sample on the night of April 10, 1983. He put the blood in a special container and marked it with (1) the date, (2) his name, (3) McLaughlin's name, and (4) his TPL identification number of 1855. Dr. Maxwell testified he routinely placed the samples in a TPL "collection area" at the Hospital and, in the normal course of events, received a report from TPL, and he received a report from TPL in the instant case. The TPL records show TPL received the blood sample on April 11, 1983 (within 24 hours after it was taken), and the sample had McLaughlin's name and Dr. Maxwell's name and number on it. Chigoy's testimony, together with the testimony of Dr. Maxwell and the TPL records, were sufficient to establish the connexity between the taking of the blood and the testing of the blood by a preponderance of the evidence. See, for example, Lawless v. New Orleans Police Department, 550 So.2d 252 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1344 (La.1989), Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1202 (M.D.La.1986), affirmed, 806 F.2d 259 (1986).
Chigoy testified about how he tested the blood in a gas-liquid chromatograph. He was qualified without objection as an expert in the analysis of blood samples. The plaintiffs did not take issue with the quality of the testing machine or the maintenance of the testing equipment.
Dr. Samuels testified that a chromato-graph provides a "state of the art test" and that TPL "observed all of the necessary precautions in order to render a valid answer."
The test result of the TPL sample was admissible.
This assignment of error is without merit.
RECONSIDERATION OF THE FAULT OF THE PARTIES
The plaintiffs assert that Glasper's version of how the accident happened is "physically impossible" and submit various calculations to support this view. They further assert the evidence shows the lights on the trailer were off at the time of the accident and conclude that the accident occurred because the truck pulled out in front of the car, the driver of the car did not see the unlighted trailer, and the driver of the car could not avoid a collision when faced with this unexpected emergency. The defendants respond that the jury determination that McLaughlin was solely at fault is not manifestly erroneous.
McLaughlin's Fault
The defendants presented evidence to show that McLaughlin was at fault in the accident by (1) driving while intoxicated, (2) speeding, and (3) failing to take proper action to avoid the accident.
Evidence tending to show that McLaughlin was intoxicated was introduced throughout the testimony of Trooper Blunschi, Trooper McGlothren, Earle H. Boudreaux, a retired police officer presently employed as a claims manager for two insurance companies, qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, Dr. Maxwell and Chi-goy. The jury's verdict indicates that it accepted this testimony. This factual ruling is not clearly wrong. Driving while intoxicated is a violation of La.R.S. 14:98.
Boudreaux gave the opinion that McLaughlin failed to take proper evasive action to avoid the accident. McLaughlin was in a position to see the truck for 900 feet after he topped the 1-55 overpass. Boudreaux opined McLaughlin should have applied his brakes to stop his vehicle and/or steered to the right to pass around the truck. Boudreaux was of the opinion that McLaughlin did not apply his brakes because there were no skid marks in his lane of travel. Trooper Blunschi testified that brakes could be applied on a vehicle and no skid marks left. Trooper McGlo-thren and Boudreaux testified there was sufficient room on the unblocked portion of La. 1040 and the shoulder of the roadway for the McLaughlin vehicle to pass around the truck. Paul Knight testified the truck and trailer blocked both lanes of La. 1040 and it was impossible to pass the truck and trailer on the right because of a steep ditch. Troy Milton testified there was not enough room to pass around the truck and trailer on the right. The jury could have accepted the testimony of Boudreaux and Trooper McGlothren and concluded McLaughlin did not attempt to apply his brakes (or did not do so hard enough) and steered to the left, instead of to the right where he could have avoided a collision with the truck, and that this failure to take proper evasive action was negligence. Such a factual determination is not clearly wrong.
Glasper's Fault
We have been ordered by the Louisiana Supreme Court to "reconsider the apportionment of fault between the parties." This directive was not made contingent on how we ruled on "whether defendants laid a proper foundation for admission of the blood-alcohol test results." Since the trial court jury apportioned the fault herein as 0% to Glasper, and, thus, 100% to McLaughlin, a reconsideration means we must consider an apportionment of different percentages and that the jury's apportionment was clearly wrong. This further means that some fault must be attributed to Glasper.
The plaintiffs presented evidence to show that Glasper was operating a truck without adequate lights and that Glasper failed to yield the right-of-way to the McLaughlin vehicle.
Paul Knight testified he observed lights on the cab of the tractor but did not observe lights burning on the trailer. " However, he conceded he could not deny that the lights were on. Mr. McLaughlin testified that after the accident he went to look at the trailer and observed that the wires on the trailer were rusted off of the light fixtures. Trooper McGlothren's accident report indicates that no defects were observed in the truck's condition and that the vehicle's headlights were on. Glasper testified that prior to the accident he did a routine operational check of the truck and the lights were in proper working order. Boudreaux testified on April 18, 1983, he examined the lights on the tractor and trailer and there was nothing wrong with them. McNabb testified he went to the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred, personally inspected the lights of the tractor and trailer, and found the lights were "all burning." The jury's verdict indicates it accepted the testimony of Glasper, Bou-dreaux and McNabb and rejected that of Knight and Mr. McLaughlin. This factual finding is not clearly wrong.
The answer to the question of whether Glasper failed to yield the right-of-way is one where we find the jury to be clearly wrong. The main evidence on this issue is the testimony of Glasper, Bou-dreaux and Trooper Blunschi. The rules applicable to reviewing this testimony are set forth in Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840, 844-845 (La.1989), as follows:
It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong," and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable_ The appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court, but if the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in light of thé record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.... In applying the manifestly erroneous-clearly wrong standard to the findings below, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their initial review function is not to decide factual issues de novo.2 .
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the fact-finder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.... Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination.... But where such factors are not present, and a fact-finder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that the appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts. La. Const. 1974, Art. V Sec. 10(B). This provision, resulting from Louisiana's history as a civilian jurisdiction, has been interpreted as giving an appellate court the power to decide factual issues de novo. The exercise of this power is limited, however, by the jurisprudential rule of practice that a trial court's factual finding will not be upset unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Nevertheless, when the court of appeal finds that a reversible error of law or manifest error of material fact was made in the trial court, it is required to redetermine the facts de novo from the entire record and render a judgment on the merits.
Where the testimony of expert witnesses differ, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine which evidence is the most credible. Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). In the instant case, obviously the jury found Boudreaux's testimony more credible than Trooper Blunschi's testimony. The rule that questions of credibility are for the trier of fact applies to evaluations of expert testimony, unless the stated reasons of the expert are patently unsound. Lirette v. State Farm Insurance Company, 563 So.2d 850 (La.1990).
Glasper testified he stopped at the stop sign on the north side of the La. 1040-Stein road intersection. This stop sign is located 36 feet north of the north edge of the La. 1040 roadway. The length of the truck (tractor and trailer) is 46 feet (per the Boudreaux scale drawing). Glas-per testified that after he ascertained the roadway was clear, he commenced to make a left turn across the intersection, and, when the tractor of the truck was in the eastbound lane of La. 1040, he observed the McLaughlin vehicle coming over the 1-55 overpass, which was approximately 900 feet away. At this point in time, the front of the truck had traveled approximately 58 feet (36 feet from the stop sign to the roadway, 12 feet across the westbound lane, and 10 feet from the front to the rear of the tractor). Glasper accelerated and pulled left (eastward) across the intersection and onto the south shoulder of La. 1040. At the point where the truck came to rest on the south shoulder, the front of the truck was located 67 feet east of the Stein Road edge of the intersection. The truck crossed the intersection diagonally rather than at a right angle. Thus, it would appear that the front of the truck traveled approximately 135 feet from the stop sign to its final resting position (36 feet from the stop sign to the north edge of the La. 1040 roadway, 32 feet diagonally across the intersection, and 67 feet to final resting position).
If it is assumed that the McLaughlin vehicle was traveling 65 miles per hour (as Boudreaux stated and apparently what the jury believed), it would have taken 9.5 seconds for it to travel the 900 feet from the 1-55 overpass to the point of impact (65 miles per hour is 95 feet per second and 900 feet divided by 95 feet per second is 9.5 seconds). This assumes that McLaughlin did not take his foot from the accelerator and/or attempt to brake the vehicle.
Trooper Blunschi testified that it should have taken the truck 6 or 7 seconds to leave the stop sign and clear the eastbound lane. Thus, Blunschi opined it was impossible for the accident to happen as Glasper testified because if Glasper could clear the westbound lane 7 seconds after leaving the stop sign, and Glasper had 9.5 seconds to clear the eastbound lane with the truck after first observing the McLaughlin vehicle, then there would have been no contact between the vehicles. From this, Trooper Blunschi opined that Glasper must have pulled out in front of McLaughlin when McLaughlin was in Glasper's range of vision and McLaughlin was unable to avoid the accident, albeit due in some degree to McLaughlin's intoxication. The jury's failure to find that Glasper did not yield the right of way was clearly wrong.
Apportionment of fault between parties litigant involves weighing their conduct in light of five factors: (1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger, (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct, (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought. Kimble v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 539 So.2d 1212 (La.1989); Watson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985); Day v. South Line Equipment Company, 551 So.2d 774 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So.2d 474 (La.1989). The fault of McLaughlin was (1) driving while intoxicated, and (2) failure to take the proper evasive actions of braking his vehicle and steering to the right. The fault of Glasper is failing to yield the right of way. After weighing the conduct of the parties in light of the five factors enumerated above, we conclude that the fault should be apportioned 50% to McLaughlin and 50% to Glas-per.
QUANTUM
Because the jury found no fault by Glasper, it did not reach the issue of quantum. The evidence shows the McLaughlins were a close, loving family. Kirk lived with his parents and helped with the family chicken farm when he came home after work in the evening. Accordingly, we fix damages for the loss of their son at $150,-000 for Mr. McLaughlin and $150,000 for Mrs. McLaughlin, each to be reduced by 50%. See, for example, Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, 563 So.2d 233 (La.1990); Llorence v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 558 So.2d 320 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1990); Acy v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 499 So.2d 262 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 503 So.2d 16 (La.1987).
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin and against Glasper, McNabb and Fireman's Fund, in solido, in the amount of $150,000 for each plaintiff, each to be reduced by 50%, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid. All costs are assessed in accordance with the parties' percentages of fault.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
LOTTINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns written reasons.
SHORTESS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.
CARTER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by SHORTESS, J.
LANIER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
COVINGTON, C.J., concurs in part, dissents, and with LANIER, J., assigns reasons.
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON, J. Pro Tem., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
FOIL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.