Case Name: WHITE v. SCHWEITZER et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-12-28
Citations: 132 N.Y.S. 644
Docket Number: 
Parties: WHITE v. SCHWEITZER et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 132
Pages: 644–652

Head Matter:
WHITE v. SCHWEITZER et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
December 28, 1911.)
1. Sales (§ 161 ) — Passing of Title — Delivery to Carrier.
Under a contract to “sell and to ship to the buyers in New York” a car load of turkeys at an agreed price, less freight, delivery to the carrier by the seller was not a delivery to the buyers, so as to place upon them the risk of transportation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 377-380; Dec. Dig. § 161. ]
2. Carriers (§ 76 ) — Freight — Loss or Injury — Right of Consignee.
Ordinarily, under a contract to sell and ship poultry, the seller is bound to deliver the shipment to a suitable carrier, properly prepared for transportation, and thereupon the consignee becomes the presumptive owner thereof, entitled to recover for breach of the carrier’s duty; as between the parties delivery to the carrier being delivery to the buyer.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 256-271; Dec. Dig. § 76. ]
3. Sales (§ 140 ) — Bill of Sale — Necessity.
Under a contract of sale, no bill of sale is required to pass title where delivery is made to the carrier, according to the agreement.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 339; Dec. Dig. § 140. ]
4. Sales (§ 181 ) — Delivery — Acceptance—Evidence—Sufficiency.
Evidence held insufficient to raise an issue of acceptance by the buyers of a shipment of poultry as affecting the risk of transportation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Dec. Dig. § 181. ]
5. Sales (§ 178 ) — Delivery — Acceptance—Evidence.
Acceptance of goods by the buyer thereof may be implied from circumstances, where he does some act respecting them which necessarily involves the conclusion that he has taken them as owner.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 451-455; Dec. Dig. § 178. ]
Hirschberg, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Nassau County.
Action by William E. White against Nathan Schweitzer and another. From a judgment for plaintiff and from an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before JENKS, P. J., and HIRSCHBERG, THOMAS, BURR, and CARR, JJ.
Gerald B. Rosenheim, for appellants.
Hartwell Cabell, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
THOMAS, J.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff "sold and agreed to ship to defendants in New York" a car load of turkeys "at an agreed price of eighteen cents per pound, less the freight on said car between Maysville and New York City." The answer, without otherwise denying the allegation, states as a defense that the plaintiff "sold and agreed to ship to the defendants in New York," dry-picked stock, and that defendants "agreed to pay for the same at and after the rate of eighteen cents per pound, less the freight on said car between Maysville and New York City, to wit, f. o. b. New York." I shall discuss only the question whether the delivery to the carrier at Maysville was a delivery to the defendants so as to place upon them the risk of transportation.' There is no evidence of special contract with the carrier on the part of the consignor. But it- is shown that, before receipt of the goods, the invoice and bill of lading came to the buyer, and that the seller asked for and received an advance by check (later stopped) on the purchase price, which indicates that the parties did not contemplate that the payment of the whole price should precede delivery of the goods, but that the buyers should make the advancement and pay the freight, to be deducted from the whole sum promised. The goods arrived in New York in bad condition, and one issue is whether this arose during transportation, and, if so, at whose risk.
The seller's legal duty, if further unmodified, was to deliver to a suitable carrier a car load of the goods ordered, properly prepared for transportation. Waldron v. Romaine, 22 N. Y. 368. Thereupon the consignee became the presumptive owner thereof, enabled to recover for breach of its duty against the carrier (Everett v. Saltus, 15 Wend. 474; Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y. 335), and as between the parties delivery to the carrier was a delivery to the buyer, and the title thereupon vested in the latter. This rule is elementary. In Krulder v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 402, a merchant in New York received from persons in Rochester an order in writing that there be sent them "via canal" goods, later lost in transit. The consignees recovered against the carrier under the above rule. That case presented two facts that do not appear in the present record: (1) The sellers sent the buyers a bill of sale; (2) the buyers directed shipment over a particular line of transportation.
But neither fact affects the result, as no bill of sale is required where delivery is made according to the agreement to a shipper, and the rule is that, in absence of specific directions, delivery may be made to any proper carrier. For instance, in Gilbert v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 4 Hun, 378, the delivery of a full car load as ordered had not been made to the carrier. Hence the title did not vest in the consignee, but the rule was recognized that:
"When property is sold to be shipped by cars or other public conveyance, ordinarily the title passes on delivery to the carrier."
In Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Bosanquet & Puller's Rep. 582, as interpreted in the opinion in Krulder v. Ellison, supra, if a tradesman order goods to be sent by a carrier, though he names no particular carrier, the moment the goods are delivered to the carrier it operates as a delivery to the purchaser. The rule has been the basis of decision in actions against the carrier for loss or injury to the goods, as well as in actions between sellers and buyers. Some exceptions to it have been suggested, as where the consignee agreed to pay the freight, where the consignor had a special contract with the carrier which enabled him to maintain an action, where the buyer was not charged under the statute of frauds, and the further exception has been suggested, where the expense of transportation is borne by the consignor or is included in the whole purchase price. In the case at bar the consignee upon paying the freight could deduct it from the price payable, for it would be a partial payment thereon. None of the conditions, unless it be the last one, is pertinent to the present discussion. If thus far there has been no error in the -reasoning, I consider that Mee v. McNider, 109 N. Y. 500, 17 N. E. 424, is decisive, that due delivery aboard at Maysville was delivery to the buyer. In that case plaintiff agreed to sell to defendant 500 bags of cocoa to "be shipped by steamer from Bahia to New York for a specified price, "C., F. & I.," meaning cost, freight, and insurance. The agreement was in this signed memorandum:
"Sold for account of Mee, Billings & Go., London, to James McNider .[certain goods] at 59 s. per cwt., C., IT. & I., by steamer to N. Y., buyers to furnish cable credit or pay bankers' commission."
The opinion states:
"The price is fixed at 59 s. per cwt., and this is made up of the cost, the freight and the premium of insurance. Thus the purchaser deals with the matter in gross, and not in detail, transacts the various branches of the business with one person instead of three, fixes his liability at a lump sum, and, in case of loss, will recover the amount of his interest under the policy. On the part of the vendor, the shipment by steamer was an effectual appropriation of the cocoa to the buyer, and at that moment the agreement on the vendor's part was executed. The plain obligation of the purchaser, as defined by the written contract, then attached, and he was bound to accept- and pay for the cargo at the price named and in the manner specified. It necessarily follows that injury to the cocoa during the voyage was no excuse for nonperformance, and as the amount due, if anything, was conceded, there was no evidence which required the submission of the case to the jury."
It is noticeable that in that-instance there was a memorandum of sale, but this is immaterial if all that was required of the seller to perfect the sale and vest the title in the buyer was to deliver to the carrier. . The suggestion that, where the buyer is to pay the freight, the title remains in the seller, has no present application. If such be an indication of continued ownership by the consignor, it may be upT on the ground that the buyer has not fulfilled.the agreement for sale, but here' such payment is a part of the purchase price, and the seller did not exact payment before delivery.
In Dutton v. Solomonson, supra, an action, against the buyer for the price of the goods, it was stated by counsel , that while a delivery to: a carrier is in law a delivery to the vendee,. and thereafter .the goods remain at his risk,, there is an exception when by special contract the vendor is to pay for the carriage, but the court interrupted the argument with the- intimation that the delivery to the carrier was delivery to the buyer, and later Lord Alvanley, Ch. J., stated that the "only exception to the purchaser's right over the goods is that the vendor, in case of the former becoming insolvent, may stop them in transitu." In Mee v. McNider, supra, reference is made to Ireland v. Livingston, L. R. (5 H. of L.) 395, where plaintiffs, commission agents at Mauritius, were ordered by defendant at Liverpool to purchase and ship to the latter in England goods at a price covering freight and insurance. The decision involved the issue whether the order was fulfilled in regard to the amount shipped, but the discussion aids present solution. ,Mr. Justice Blackburn said:
"The terms at a price, 'to cover cost, freight, and insurance, payment by acceptance on receiving shipping documents,' are very usual, and are perfectly well understood in practice. The invoice is made out debiting the consignee with the agreed price (or the actual cost and commission, with the premiums of insurance, and the freight, as the case may be), and giving him credit for the amount of the freight which he will have to pay to the shipowner on actual delivery, and for the balance a draft is drawn on the consignee which he is bound to accept (if the shipment be in conformity with his contract) on having handed to him the charter party, bill of lading, and policy of insurance. Should the ship arrive with the goods on board, he will have to pay the freight, which will make up the amount he has engaged to pay. Should the goods not be delivered in consequence of a peril of the sea, he is not called on to pay the freight, and he will recover the amount of his interest in the goods under the policy. If the nondelivery is in consequence of some misconduct on the part of the master or mariners, not covered by the policy, he will recover it from the shipowner. In substance, therefore, the consignee pays, though in a different manner, the same price as if the goods had been bought and shipped to him in the ordinary way."
In comment upon that case, Danforth, J., said:
"But even that case throws the risk of damage at sea upon the buyer, for he engaged to pay a fixed price in consideration of the shipment in a prescribed manner, and, except the freight, without reference to its actual delivery."
In Davis v. James, 5 Burrow's Rep. 2680, the consignor was allowed to recover for goods lost against the carrier, with whom be made the contract of carriage and paid the freight. In the case at bar there is no evidence of such contract. The consignor did not pay the freight, while the consignee was to pay the freight upon due delivery by the carrier. In Joseph v. Knox, 3 Campbell, 320, the plaintiff was the consignee's agent, resident abroad, and was allowed to recover against the carrier on contract for carriage made by the plaintiff with him, whereby the agent paid the freight. In Brown v. Hodgson, 2 Campbell, 36, the goods were consigned to a merchant abroad, and were in the bill of lading stated to be shipped by order and on account of the consignee, and it was considered that the consignor could not recover against the carrier. Lord Ellenborough said:
"I can recognise no property but that recognised by the bill of lading."
There the contract with the carrier was with the consignee, and made through the consignor as agent. In Dawes v. Peck, 8 Durnford & East's Rep. 330, the seller at London prepaid the freight for carrying goods which were ordered by a buyer at Warwickshire to be sent by a certain carrier. It was decided that the consignor could not recover for loss of the goods upon the ground that the title vested in the buyer.
So tracing back the decisions from Mee v. McNider, 109 N. Y. 500, 17 N. E. 424, through Krulder v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 402, to decision preceding 1800, it is found that, in absence of modifying agreement shown by stipulations, usage, or conduct, the vendor, by delivery to some suitable carrier, vests the title to the goods in the vendee. It is suggested that the title does not vest until the buyer has opportunity for inspection. It is a sufficient answer that it would not vest unless the goods ordered were delivered, wherever the place of delivery. In Coombs v. Bristol, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Hurlstone & Norman's Rep. 510, it was considered that the goods could not vest by delivery to the carrier unless the statute of frauds were satisfied. If delivery to the carrier is delivery to a bailee on the buyer's account, as stipulated by the parties, the possession passes out of the vendor to one holding it for the buyer. The carrier receives in such case for the buyer. Scharff v. Meyer, 133 Mo. 428, 34 S. W. 858, 54 Am. St. Rep. 672; Bailey v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70, 76; A. J. Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 54 Neb. 321, 74 N. W. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534. In conclusion, it should be noticed that while the fact that the consignee paid the freight was regarded as material in Hunter v. Kramer, 71 Kan. 468, 80 Pac. 963, yet such fact alone does not overthrow the presumption that the delivery to the carrier under the circumstances here present is a delivery to the vendee. A. J. Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., supra, following Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720, 46 N. W. 286.
I concur with Mr. Justice BURR for reversal upon the ground that there is no evidence of acceptance of the goods on the part of the defendants.