Case Name: Earl HARGRODER et al. v. COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION CO.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-02-18
Citations: 290 So. 2d 874
Docket Number: No. 53749
Parties: Earl HARGRODER et al. v. COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION CO.
Judges: BARHAM, J., concurs with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 874–878

Head Matter:
Earl HARGRODER et al. v. COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION CO.
No. 53749.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 18, 1974.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1974.
J. Nilas Young, Young & Burson, Ltd., Eunice, for plaintiffs-applicants.
William C. Broadhurst, Crowley, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
This Court granted review in this matter to consider the liability of a pipeline company to a farm lessee, with an unrecorded lease, for damage to the lessee's crops during the construction of the pipeline. The Court of Appeal dismissed the farm lessee's suit on a peremptory exception. We hold that the farm lessee has both a cause and right of action and remand the case for further proceedings.
On March 30, 1972, Earl and Irma Cannon Hargroder, landowners, filed suit against defendant, Columbia Gulf Transmission Company, to recover damages caused by the extension of defendant's pipeline across their property. In the action, plaintiff, Dr. H. H. Hargroder, a farm lessee, sued to recover for damages to his crops and machinery, occurring on and off the right of way. He also sought damages for mental pain and anguish.
To the petition, Columbia filed a peremptory exception of no cause and no right of action. After receiving evidence, the trial court judge sustained the exception as to Dr. Hargroder, because his farm lease was unrecorded. The court overruled the exception as to the landowners, holding that the release of damages applied only to the landowners' damages on the right of way and that they had a right to sue for their off-right-of-way damages.
The lessee appealed. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the right of way contract contained no stipulation pour autrui in favor of lessee. 278 So.2d 864.
Columbia Gulf Transmission Company is the grantee of a right of way to operate a pipeline upon a tract of land situated in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, consisting of 24.7 acres. The land is owned by Earl and Irma Hargroder.
H. H. Hargroder alleges that prior to January 17, 1967, he leased the property from Earl and Irma Hargroder; that he used it to grow coastal bermuda grass for hay; that coastal bermuda grass was harvested in the years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970.
On January 17, 1967, Columbia entered into a right of way agreement with lessors; the agreement was recorded on February 9, 1967. The agreement contains the following pertinent clauses:
"Grantee hereby agrees to bury any pipeline (exclusive of appurtenances customarily located above ground) to a sufficient depth so as not to interfere with normal cultivation of the soil after construction thereof, and agrees to pay such damages which may arise to growing crops, timber, or fences from the construction of said line and appurtenances and to pay such damages which may arise to growing annual crops or fences from the maintenance, alteration, repair, removal, change of size, or replacement thereof.
"It is hereby understood that the grantee, its successors and assigns, shall not be obligated to pay grantors or any subsequent owner of the hereinabove described premises, any damages resulting from the construction of the first pipeline authorized hereunder, such damages having been anticipated and paid in advance at the time of execution of this instrument." (Italic ours).
During 1970, Columbia utilized its right of way and constructed a natural gas pipeline across the land. Thereafter, the tenant, H. H. Hargroder, together with his lessors, Earl and Irma Hargroder, filed suit to recover damages, allegedly caused during the construction of the pipeline. Their petition avers that the damage was due "to surface disturbance and debris thrown off the right of way."
The record does not reflect whether the trial judge sustained the objection of no cause of action or no right of action. Although often pleaded together, the objections raise different issues.
In Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. St. Denis Securities Co., 225 La. 51, 72 So.2d 257 (1954), this Court distinguished the two exceptions as follows:
"Generally speaking, an exception of no right of action serves to question the right of a plaintiff to maintain this suit, i. e., . his interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, whereas an exception of no cause of action addresses itself to the sufficiency in law of the petition and the exhibits attached thereto. Outdoor Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375; Termini v. McCormick, 208 La. 221, 23 So.2d 52 and Bartholomew v. Impastato, La.App., 12 So.2d 700. The latter is triable entirely on the face of the papers, while evidence may be received under an exception of no right of action for the purpose of showing that plaintiff does not possess the right he claims or that the right does not exist. Soniat v. White, 153 La. 424, 96 So. 19; Schmidt v. Conservative Homestead Association, 181 La. 369, 159 So. 587; Duplain v. Wiltz, supra [La. App., 174 So. 652] and La Casse v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 135 La. 129, 64 So. 1012."
See also L'Enfant, Civil Procedure, 31 La.L.Rev. 343 (1970-71); McMahon, Civil Procedure, 15 La.L.Rev. 376 (1957-58); McMahon, Civil Procedure, 18 La.L.Rev. 103 (1954-55).
In the present case, plaintiff's petition alleges that he was a farm lessee, engaged in growing crops on the farm, and that his crops and machinery were damaged by the defendant during the course of construe tion. The damages are itemized. No documents are annexed to the petition, and the petition does not specify whether the lease is recorded or unrecorded. Hence, it is apparent that plaintiff's petition sets forth a cause of action for damages.
The trial judge sustained the peremptory exception after receiving evidence. Because evidence cannot be considered on the objection of no cause of action, at least if introduction is opposed, we assume that the trial judge found merit in the objection of no right of action.
Hence, the issue presented is whether or not the plaintiff, H. H. Hargroder, has an interest to be vindicated in this suit. See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 927. The final determination hinges upon whether or not the right of way agreement, between Columbia and the landowners, contains a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the lessee.
Article 1890 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
"A person may also, in his own name, make some advantage for a third person the condition or consideration of a commutative contract, or onerous donation; and if such third person consents to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor, the contract can not be revoked."
In dealing with an identical question in Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969), this Court adopted the following criteria for determining whether a stipulation pour autrui has been made:
"(1) The existence of a legal relationship between the promisee and the third person involving an obligation owed by the promisee to the beneficiary which performance of the promise will discharge; (2) the existence of a factual relationship between the promisee and the third person, where (a) there is a possibility of future liability either personal or real on the part of the promisee to the beneficiary against which performance of the . . . [promisor] will protect the former; (b) securing an advantage for the third person may beneficially affect the promisee in a material way; (c) there are ties of kinship or other circumstances indicating that a benefit by way of gratuity was intended. See Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 Tul.L.Rev. 18, 58 (1936)."
In the servitude agreement, Columbia "agrees to pay such damages which may arise to growing crops, timber, or fences from the construction of the [pipeline]." The agreement contains no restriction as to beneficiaries. Applying the above criteria, we conclude that it is a stipulation pour autrui, of which the farm lessee and crop grower can avail himself. In fact, we discern no legal difference between the present provision and that in Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., supra, which we held to be a stipulation pour autrui, Hence, that decision is controlling here, and plaintiff has a right of action.
Having found both a cause and right of action, the peremptory exception must be overruled. We are not here concerned with the evidentiary basis or scope of liability. These matters are properly determined at the trial on the merits.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, the peremptory exception of no cause and right of action is overruled, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with the views herein pressed. All costs in the appellate courts are assessed against the defendant, Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. All other costs shall await the outcome of the suit.
BARHAM, J., concurs with reasons.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DIXON, J., concurs.
CALOGERO, J., concurs, agrees with result.
. A note of evidence appears at page 11 of the transcript. The right of way agreement and a construction damage receipt were admitted in evidence. The agreement appears at Tr. 8-9 and the receipt at Tr. 10. It was stipulated that Dr. Hargroder's lease was unrecorded.
. The mineral lease damage clause in Andre-pont v. Acadia Drilling Co., supra, provided: "The Lessee shall be responsible for all damages caused by Lessee's operations."