Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Roger HENZE, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1984-10-17
Citations: 356 N.W.2d 538
Docket Number: No. 83-1549
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Roger HENZE, Appellant.
Judges: CARTER, J., joins this dissent.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 356
Pages: 538–541

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Roger HENZE, Appellant.
No. 83-1549.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Oct. 17, 1984.
Gary J. Boveia, Waverly, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Paul W. Riffel, County Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
McGIVERIN, Justice.
Defendant James Roger Henze appeals from his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.281 (1983). Defendant contends that the trial court erred in restricting the testimony of a doctor called as a defense witness. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Shortly after defendant was arrested for OWI on November 26, 1982, police officers took him to a hospital emergency room so that a doctor could determine whether he was in a condition to tolerate overnight confinement at the Waverly police station. The doctor, Michael Berstler, made a brief examination of defendant and concluded that he probably could tolerate such confinement. Dr. Berstler had never seen defendant previously.
Sometime later, but before defendant's trial in September 1983, Dr. Berstler reviewed defendant's medical records. These records had been prepared by other doctors, members of the same medical clinic as Dr. Berstler. Those other doctors had seen and treated defendant as a patient at various times before his November 26 arrest. The records allegedly showed long-term use of Valium by defendant and repeated diagnoses of anxiety neurosis and depression.
At trial, defendant denied that he had been intoxicated at the time of his arrest. In support of this defense, he offered expert testimony by Dr. Berstler.
As shown by defendant's offer of proof, Dr. Berstler was prepared to testify, relying partly on his observation of defendant on the night of his arrest and partly on his later review of defendant's medical records, that defendant's appearance and behavior at the time of his arrest on November 26 did not require a conclusion that he was intoxicated but instead could be explained by his history of anxiety neurosis, depression, and Valium use. The State objected to Dr. Berstler's use of defendant's medical records as a basis for his testimony, contending that the records were hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection and allowed Dr. Berstler to base his testimony only on those matters that he had personally observed on the night of defendant's arrest.
Based on those observations, Dr. Ber-stler testified before the jury that he was unable to form an opinion as to whether defendant was intoxicated on the night of his arrest. Dr. Berstler was not allowed to supplement his opinion testimony by using knowledge gained from his reading at a later date of defendant's medical records made by other doctors.
After conviction and sentence for OWI, defendant appealed.
As noted above, the State objected to that part of Dr. Berstler's opinion that was based on his review of defendant's medical records on the grounds that the records were hearsay. Section 801(c) of the Iowa Rules of Evidence, which became effective July 1, 1983, defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." By this definition, defendant's medical records were hearsay, because they were statements about his physical and mental condition, not made by Dr. Berstler, and offered to show that such physical and mental conditions actually existed and may have affected defendant's actions on November 26.
Under Iowa R.Evid. 802, hearsay is not admissible except as provided by constitution, statute, or rule. The trial court's ruling excluding the proffered testimony as hearsay, therefore, was not error unless the record shows that the testimony was admissible under some provision of law despite its reliance on hearsay.
Defendant contended at trial and again here on appeal that the proffered testimony was admissible under Iowa R.Evid. 703, which states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
We agree with defendant. We believe that rule 703 would allow an expert's opinion to be based on hearsay if the provisions of the rule are satisfied.
In this ease the facts or data upon which Dr. Berstler was in part basing his proffered testimony were defendant's medical records, which were made known to Dr. Berstler before the trial. Although the records were hearsay, rule 703 will permit Dr. Berstler's opinion testimony based on them if the records are facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon by doctors in forming opinions.
The evidentiary record shows that the medical records in question were prepared by other doctors at the medical clinic where Dr. Berstler practiced. We may and do hereby judicially notice the fact that doctors customarily rely on medical records prepared by other doctors in forming opinions about their patients' conditions. See United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 n. 7 (7th Cir.1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 440-41 (Iowa 1978); Miller v. McCoy Truck Lines, 243 Iowa 483, 488, 52 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1952); Fed.R.Evid. 703 advisory committee note.
We conclude, therefore, that Dr. Ber-stler's proffered testimony was admissible under rule 703 and the hearsay objection was not tenable. The trial court erred in excluding the testimony on hearsay grounds.
When error is found, prejudice is presumed unless the contrary is affirmatively established. Lewis v. Kennison, 278 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1979). The record in this case does not overcome the presumption of prejudice to the defendant. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except WOLLE and CARTER, JJ., who dissent.
. Iowa R.Evid. 201 has no bearing on this taking of judicial notice, inasmuch as the fact here noticed is of a "legislative" rather than an "adjudicative" nature. See Iowa R.Evid. 201(a); Fed. R.Evid. 201 advisory committee note. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, the originator of this terminology, has said:
adjudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their business.
Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum.L.Rev. 945, 952 (1955). Legislative facts are
those which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take. Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern [only] the immediate parties.
Id. For further discussion of these concepts, see also 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 201.10; 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 200[03].