Case Name: Kenneth Allen STEWART, Petitioner, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-05-13
Citations: 880 So. 2d 529
Docket Number: No. SC02-2716
Parties: Kenneth Allen STEWART, Petitioner, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., etc., Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 880
Pages: 529–533

Head Matter:
Kenneth Allen STEWART, Petitioner, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., etc., Respondent.
No. SC02-2716.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 13, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 2004.
Daphney E. Gaylord, Assistant CCRC and Robert T. Strain, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Kenneth Stewart petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. Stewart was convicted of first-degree felony murder, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and arson. The trial court imposed a death sentence, which this Court affirmed on direct appeal. Stewart v. State, 588 So.2d 972 (Fla.1991). The facts and procedural history of this case are set out fully in Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d 59 (Fla.2001), where this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Stewart's motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Stewart has now filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which raises three claims. We deny Stewart's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Stewart first argues that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the United States Constitution under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This Court has previously addressed and rejected this claim. See Jones v. State, 845 So.2d 55 (Fla.2003); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070, 123 S.Ct. 662, 154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002); King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067, 123 S.Ct. 657, 154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Further, one of the aggravating circumstances in this case was that Stewart had been convicted of a prior violent felony. The prior violent felony aggravator alone satisfies the mandates of the United States Constitution; therefore, imposition of the death penalty was constitutional. See Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 119 n. 79 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 320, 157 L.Ed.2d 216 (2003). Stewart is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Stewart's remaining claims present issues that lack merit or are procedurally barred because they were raised or properly could have been raised in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. In his first two subclaims, Stewart asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal trial counsel's ineffectiveness with respect to possible mitigation and a voluntary intoxication defense. In these claims, Stewart presents a procedural variant of claims which this Court addressed and rejected in Stewart's rule 3.850 motion. It is improper to argue in a habeas petition a variant to a claim previously decided. Porter v. Crosby, 840 So.2d 981, 984 (Fla.2003). Stewart is not entitled to relief on these claims.
Stewart's third subclaim, challenging the competency hearing, presents no argument or factual grounds to support the claim; therefore, it is dismissed as insufficiently pled. See Shere v. State, 742 So.2d 215, 218 n. 6 (Fla.1999).
Stewart's subclaim regarding his incompetence to proceed at all material stages during trial lacks support in the record on direct appeal. Appellate counsel may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel only where the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record. Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 437-38 (Fla.2001). Stewart is not entitled to relief on this subclaim.
In his final claim, Stewart asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of trial counsel's concession of guilt. Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal because such claims are more effectively raised in a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850. See Grubbs v. Singletary, 120 F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377, 1384 (Fla.1987)). The claim is procedurally barred.
Because all of Stewart's claims are either without merit or procedurally barred, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANTERO, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
. In this petition, Stewart alleges: (1) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); (2) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal four meritorious issues relating to trial counsel's ineffectiveness and other errors at trial; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of trial counsel's concession of Stewart's guilt.
. Indeed, Stewart raised twenty-six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial in his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. Each claim was denied by the trial court. We affirmed this denial in Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d 59 (Fla.2001).