Case Name: Bolton against Hamilton
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1841-09
Citations: 2 Watts & Serg. 294
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bolton against Hamilton.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Watts & Sergeant)
Volume: 2
Pages: 294–308

Head Matter:
Bolton against Hamilton.
The mere exclusive receipt of profits by one tenant in common for a period exceeding twenty-one years, is not sufficient evidence upon which to found a legal presumption of actual ouster of his co-tenant: but it raises a natural presumption of it, which will operate upon the minds of the jury so far as it happens to produce actual conviction of the fact.
ERROR to the Common Pleas of Washington county.
This was an action of ejectment brought in the Common Pleas of Washington county to August Term 1840, to recover 100 acres of land, situate in Carroll township, Washington county. The land had been originally entered in the name of William Hamilton, the father of the plaintiffs. Daniel Hamilton, the elder son, who acted as the agent of the father, took possession, and retained the legal estate in himself until after the death of his father, William Hamilton, who died intestate. David Hamilton, the second son, administered.
Daniel Hamilton, retaining to himself his purpart of the real estate of William Hamilton, deceased, conveyed by his article to David Hamilton, dated 1st February 1787, “ in behalf of himself, {David) and in trust for the other heirs of William Hamilton,” the land in dispute. From that time until his conveyance to David Hamilton, the defendant, by his deed, bearing date 15th of April 1839, he remained in possession, and took the profits.
William Hamilton left seven children, two of whom are the plaintiffs in this action.
David Hamilton, in 1787, made application to the Orphans’ Court of Washington county for partition or valuation of the real estate of his father, William Hamilton; it was appraised, and David agreed to take the same at the valuation, but entered into no recognizance for the payment of distributive shares.
In 1794, of March Term, David Hamilton brought his action of covenant on the article of agreement already alluded to, bearing date the 1st day of February 1787. The declaration in covenant set forth the article in full, showing that Daniel conveyed in trust for the heirs of William Hamilton. By agreement, when the jury was empannelled and sworn, a juror was withdrawn, and David Hamilton, by consent, took judgment for costs.
On the 15th of April 1839, David Hamilton conveyed by special covenants, &c., the land the subject of this ejectment, to Joseph Hamilton, the defendant. In his deed he l’ecites as follows: “ It being part of the same tract of land which was formerly owned by William Hamilton, deceased, and which was appraised by order of the Orphans’ Court of said county, and report made thereon to our said court on the first day of May 1787, whereupon Daniel Hamilton, heir at law, resigned his right of redemption to the said premises, and David Hamilton, the grantor aforesaid, second son of the said William, accepted the same at the appraisement, as will more fully appear on reference to the record being had; and the said David Hamilton, Esq., had a suit against the said Daniel Hamilton to No. 29, March .Term 1794, upon summons covenant, &c., and brought to trial, whereupon the said Daniel confessed judgment for costs, under which judgment the said David Hamilton, Esq., holds his title to the said tract of land.”
On the trial the evidence of Sept. T. Hamilton, of Harrison county, Kentucky, was offered and read as taken in pursuance of a commission issued out of the Common Pleas of Washington county, the material parts of which are in answer to interrogatory third.
“ I had a conversation with David Hamilton, about the 10th of August 1833, between David Bolton’s and David Hamilton’s, while helping them to load rock, and David Hamilton stated that he lived on the land, and intended to do so as long as he lived, but said the title was not in him, but in his father, William Hamilton; but as he had defended it in a long lawsuit, he considered himself entitled to it as long as he'lived, and said it was but little difference to him who got it after he was dead, as he had no family; and then stated that Daniel Hamilton had received his share allotted to him before he left Pennsylvania, and that he had settled with M’Donough for his part some years before; he also stated one other legatee had no interest, as he had assigned his right to him. Whether it was Hugh Wily or Robert Barr I cannot now say, but it was one or the other of them; he also stated that his mother lived with him several years, and that after she left him he had to pay her twenty dollars a year as long as she lived; he also stated that John Hamilton, David Bolton, and one other of the heirs, had an interest in the land, naming the other, but I do not now recollect who that other was; it was either Hugh Wily or Robert Barr; he also stated that John Hamilton left Pennyslvania when very young, and had never called for anything.”
The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury upon these points:
1. That as David Hamilton came into possession of the land in dispute, under an express trust from Daniel Hamilton, all the proceedings of the Orphans’ Court of Washington county, as offered in evidence by the defendant, are absolutely void, the said court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter.
2. That if, in the opinion of this court, the Orphans’ Court as aforesaid, had jurisdiction, the court is then requested to charge —That David Hamilton acquired no interest in the land, the subject of this ejectment, by virtue of those proceedings, inasmuch as those proceedings were not consummated by the said David entering into recognizances for the payment of the distributive shares to the heirs of William Hamilton, deceased, and that he had abandoned all claim, by virtue of those proceedings, is to be further inferred, from the fact, that in the recital of his deed to Joseph Hamilton, the defendant in the present ejectment, he expressly disclaims holding title other than that which he derives by virtue of the judgment No. 29, March Term 1794, of the Common Pleas of Washington county.
3. That the judgment above referred to confers no title, but it being recited in the deed of David Hamilton to Joseph Hamilton, the defendant, it operates as a re-affirmance of the trust estate, and the right of the heirs of William Hamilton, deceased, to the land in dispute, as late as the year 1839; and that Joseph Hamilton, the grantee of David Hamilton, is bound by the trust, and is fully notified of its recognition, by the recital in the deed under which he claims.
4. That inasmuch as David Hamilton came into possession of the premises in dispute, by virtue of an express trust, in behalf of the heirs of William Hamilton, deceased, he could not in equity do any act in derogation of the interests of his cestui que trust.
5. That in all cases of express trusts, no lapse of time is a bar to recovery.
6. That the deed conveying to David Hamilton the land in dispute, by Daniel Hamilton, is an express trust direct, and of the kind exclusively belonging to chancery.
7. That Joseph Hamilton, the defendant in this ejectment, is affected by. the trust, inasmuch as the deed under which he claims from David Hamilton, recites the trust conveyance from Daniel to David.
' 8. That to enable time to be a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery, defendants must show a peaceable adverse possession for twenty-one years; and that inasmuch as the grantor came into possession as a trustee, under an express trust, it would require some decisive act to make the possession adverse, and of this adverse holding the cestui que trust must have notice, of which fact the iury are to judge.
9. That the conveyance to the defendant by David Hamilton is the only decisive act of an adverse holding, and that the statute would only begin to run from the time of that conveyance.
Charge of the court:
I shall not trouble and confuse the jury by a detailed answer to each of the plaintiff’s points. The case does not demand it, and if the plaintiff thinks that it will be of any benefit to his case, the jury may assume that David Hamilton derived no title to the land in dispute from the proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, or under the judgment No. 29, of March Term 1794. To simplify the case, we instruct you to allow him all this. The defendant then stands upon a peaceable and exclusive possession for upwards of fifty years, or at least upwards of forty years.
The land belonged originally, no doubt, to William Hamilton, the father of the plaintiff, and of David Hamilton, and may have been taken up in the name of Daniel, his eldest son. This may explain both the proceedings in the Orphans’ Court and the conveyance from Daniel to David. But, suppose these things not to exist, William Hamilton died at all events before February 1787, fifty-four years ago. David took possession of what we suppose and take for granted belonged to all the children of William Hamilton. William left three sons, Daniel, David, and John, (one of the plaintiffs,) and five daughters, Mrs Wylie, Mrs M’Donough, Mrs Scott, Mrs Bolton, (the plaintiff,) and Mrs Barr. David lived on the land from 1787 to his death, which was two or three years ago, and the defendant, who claims under him, since his death, until the present time. The sisters of David Hamilton lived with him until they respectively married. Mrs Barr was the last to marry, and she was married and left forty years ago; since then no one of the children of William Hamilton has lived on the land.
Therefore there was no other trust than such as exists between tenants in common; and whatever may be the case of express trusts, this- is not a trust unaffected by the lapse of time. It has been decided in England that after thirty-six years, the jury may presume an ouster of one tenant in common by his co-tenant, and I am inclined to think that when one tenant in common has had the exclusive and peaceable enjoyment of the land for twenty-one years, the jury may, and probably ought, in Pennsylvania, to presume an ouster. At all events, we instruct you, in this case, that after the lapse of forty or fifty years, you not only may, but ought to presume an ouster, and the defendant’s title has become indis-putable by the Statute of Limitations, or by the lapse of time independent of any statute.
The recital in the deed of David Hamilton to the defendant does not amount to a recognition of a subsisting trust, nor is the defendant affected by any trust which may, fifty years ago, have existed between David Hamilton and his co-tenants.- It requires-nothing more than the peaceable and exclusive perception of the profits by one tenant in common for the length of time which exists in this case, or, as I said before, probably for twenty-one years, to be sufficient evidence of an ouster of his co-tenants. Of this exclusive perception they of course had notice, and from the commencement of that exclusive perception, and not from the deed of David to defendant, the statute would begin to run. At the time of the alleged declarations of David, as proved by Septimus Hamilton, David’s title had become impregnable, and any admissions as to its origin would not restore the title of his co-tenants,
What we have said, answers, we think, all the points of the plaintiff, so far as they bear upon the case. This is all that is incumbent for us to do, and all that is necessary to enable you to dispose of the case.
The plaintiffs excepted to the charge.
The errors assigned embraced all the points answered by the court.
Jllden and Dunlop, for plaintiff in error,
contended, that an exclusive perception of profits by one tenant in common, without any other attendant circumstance, for twenty-one years, or any greater length of time, would not bar the recovery of his co-tenant ; and cited 10 Watts 185; 16 Serg. Sf Rawle 36. The acknowledgments of David, as testified to by Septimus Hamilton, were sufficient to prevent the effect of lapse of time. 10 Watts 261. The recital in the deed from David to Joseph Hamilton, amounts to a recognition of the subsisting trust. 2 Caines’ Cas. 326 ; 10 Johns. 374; 4 Binn. 231; 1 Dali. 67 ; 2 Serg. Sf Rawle 350; Amb. 311; 2 Mason 531; 1 Gallis. 41; 7 Crunch 506; 1 Chit. Chan. Dig. 29; 1 Sim. Sf Stew. 347.
Possession, to give title, must be adversary. 9 Wheat. 241,288. The entry of one tenant in common, is the entry of all; so the entry of trustee, is for the benefit of cestui que trust; and either as trustee under an express trust, or as tenant in common, there must be some decisive act, showing an intention to disseise, before an ouster can be presumed. The mere perception of profits is not sufficient, as decided in the case of Hart v. Gregg, (10 Watts 185), nor claiming title, because claim does not alter possession. But there must be some decisive act, tantamount of itself to a disseisin. The conveyance of David to Joseph is the only act which appears on the record that of itself amounts to a disseisin. The statute could only begin to run from the execution of that conveyance.
M’Kennan, for defendant in error.
It is indisputably true, that the defendant, and those under whom he claims, have been in the exclusive possession of the land in dispute for fifty-four years, claiming title under a decree of the Orphans’ Court. The question, therefore, does not arise, whether a receipt of profits alone by one tenant in common for any length of time, would amount to an ouster in law. The recital in the deed is unintelligible, as is plainly seen, and can have no influence upon the cause. 9 Watts 379; 4 Serg. Sf Rawle 570; 16 Serg. Sf Rawle 384; 5 Watts 149; 2 Rawle 305; 10 Serg. 4* Rawle 187; 10 Watts 158. The loose declarations of David Hamilton as to his possession, cannot affect his title. The law requires greater solemnity than parol evidence of conversations, to deprive a man of his land. 4 Whart. 289.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Gibson, C. J.
It is, perhaps, not to be maintained that a jury is bound to raise a legal presumption of ouster from an exclusive actual possession by a tenant in common for twenty-one years, though it is indicated as the opinion of the court in Mehaffy v. Dobbs, (9 Watts 363). The matter was perhaps not very clearly stated by the judge in that case; but the design was, to put the decision of the point on the basis of Frederick v. Gray, (10 Serg. & Rawle 182), in which it was held that the possession of a tenant in common is to be deemed adverse from the time he exclusively claimed the whole; and so the law was laid down in Phillips v. Gregg, (10 Watts 158), with this qualification, that his claim appear to have been indicated by some unequivocal act, which is perhaps the true criterion. In Frederick v. Gray, it was held sufficient that a claim of exclusive ownership was manifested by the occupant's acts; yet such acts ought so necessarily and notoriously to import a claim of exclusive right, as to apprize the co-tenant of the nature and existence of it. Thus, in Law v. Patterson, (1 Watts & Serg. 186), the land was purchased and paid for by the co-tenant in possession; and he had not only taken all the profits of it to himself, but had let it, and exercised all the usual acts of exclusive dominion over it, under the immediate eye of his co-tenant, who lived in the neighbourhood, and whose claim to ownership in common rested only upon the fact that his name was found as a grantee in the deed. And perhaps the decision of the court in Hart v. Gregg, (10 Watts 190), went no further, though it contains a dictum that a claim of exclusive right, attended by a receipt of all the profits, is insufficient to let in a presumption of ouster — a position not easily maintainable against the preceding decisions, or that in Doe v. Prosser, (Cowp. 217). It seems to be admitted by the opinion of the court, in Hart v. Gregg, that claiming the whole, and denying possession to the co-tenant, as the law was held in Doe v. Bird, (11 East 219), would have that effect; but it is hard to perceive a substantive difference between such a denial and a claim of exclusive right. The one is perhaps implied by the other, and the difficulty has regard to the notoriety of the act by which the assertion of right is to be proclaimed. Still, the judge below went too far in directing that a receipt of profits merely, may be sufficient to found a legal presumption of actual ouster. Such a receipt, for a great length of time, may indeed raise, not a legal, but a natural presumption of it, passing with the jury for what it is worth, and operating no further than it happens to produce actual conviction of the fact, as it was allowed to do in Nickle v. M'Farlane, (3 Watts 167), where it was ruled-that the jury were not bound to presume an ouster from an exclusive possession of sixty years, even though the parties had not stood in the relation of tenants in common. When the cause goes to another trial, therefore, it will be for the jury to say whe ther they ought to believe, from lapse of time merely, that the plaintiffs or their ancestor had parted with, or lost their title. The judgment is therefore reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.