Case Name: Sarah Ruth Mann, Respondent, v. Ferdinand Munch Brewery, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-07-10
Citations: 173 A.D. 746
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sarah Ruth Mann, Respondent, v. Ferdinand Munch Brewery, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 173
Pages: 746–752

Head Matter:
Sarah Ruth Mann, Respondent, v. Ferdinand Munch Brewery, Appellant.
First Department,
July 10, 1916.
Landlord and tenant — effect of eviction toy summary proceedings upon liability of tenant to pay rent accruing in future—when evicted tenant liable for failure to perform covenants.
An eviction by summary proceedings terminates the liability of a tenant to pay rent accruing in the future.
A tenant evicted by summary proceedings is not thereafter liable in damages for failure to perform the covenants contained in the lease, unless there is-an express provision permitting the landlord to re-enter, lease the property and hold the tenant liable for the difference between the amount received and the amount to be paid.
A party in possession of leased property with the consent of the tenant who had been evicted by summary proceedings, cannot be held liable for future rent in the absence of proof that the lease was assigned to it or that it agreed to perform any of the covenants contained in the lease other than to pay rent.
Smith and Scott, JJ., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, Ferdinand Munch Brewery, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 13th day of January, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court after a single question had been submitted to the jury and its verdict thereon taken, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 27th day of January, 1916, as resettled by an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 11th day of February, 1916, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
Victor E. Whitlock, for the appellant.
" Leon Sanders, for the respondent.

Opinion:
McLaughlin, J.:
When the defendant was dispossessed its relation with the plaintiff as tenant ceased. An eviction by summary proceedings terminates the liability of. the tenant to pay rent accruing in the future. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2253; McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400; Michaels v. Fishel, 169 id. 381.) Nor" is the tenant thereafter liable in damages for failure to perform the covenants contained in the lease unless there is an express provision permitting the landlord to re-enter, lease the property and hold the tenant liable for the difference between the amount received and the amount agreed to be paid. (Slater v. Von Chorus, 120 App. Div. 16.)
In the present case there is no proof that the lease was ever assigned to the defendant or that it ever agreed to perform any of the covenants contained in it other than to pay rent. The letter set out in the dissenting opinion, in which defendant said it would "assume the lease," was in answer to one from the plaintiff asking who was going to pay the rent. Obviously it refers only to the payment of rent while defendant was in possession. There are several covenants by the original tenant in the lease: (a) To use the premises only for a saloon; (b) to keep the premises in repair during the term; (c) to comply with all the requirements of the municipal authorities; (d) to exempt the landlord from liability for accidents, and (e) to pay for insurance of the plate glass in that portion of the premises covered by the lease. It can no more be said that the defendant after being dispossessed was liable for damages under the covenant to pay rent than it can that it was liable for failure to carry out the other covenants, which had been made impossible by the plaintiff herself. Before the defendant can be made liable in damages something more must be shown than that it was in possession with the consent of a tenant to whom the plaintiff leased her property.
The judgment and order appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Clarke, P. J., and Page, J., concurred; Scott and Smith, JJ., dissented.