Case Name: SILVER & CO. v. WATERMAN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-06-29
Citations: 111 N.Y.S. 546
Docket Number: 
Parties: SILVER & CO. v. WATERMAN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 111
Pages: 546–551

Head Matter:
SILVER & CO. v. WATERMAN et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
June 29, 1908.)
1. Courts—New York Supreme Court—Jurisdiction op Justices.
One justice of the Supreme Court sitting at Special Term has no jurisdiction to review an act of another justice at Special Term; the Code of Civil Procedure provision for appeals to the Appellate Division and to the Court of Appeals being exclusive.
2. Appeal and Error—Right to Review—Waiver.
A justice of the Supreme Court at Special Term having allowed defendants to insert matter in their answer over plaintiff’s opposition, plaintiff could have appealed to the Appellate Division, but, having accepted the costs imposed as a condition for the allowance of the amendment, it waived its right to have the order reviewed, and could not have it indirectly reviewed by moving to strike out the matter inserted at Special Term held by another justice.
iGaynor, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term.
Action by Silver & Co. against Henry Waterman and others. From an order refusing to strike denials from an answer, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
See 122 App. Div. 373, 106 N. Y. Supp. 899.
Argued before WOODWARD, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
Edward L. Blackman, for appellant.
George B. Beattys, for respondents.

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
The plaintiff sets up a cause of action against .the defendants for the purpose of restraining the latter from the manufacture and sale of certain lamps, claimed to be made upon a model and under labels belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants, answering the complaint, denied generally the allegations of the complaint, and then set up five affirmative defenses. Subsequently the defendants moved the court at Special Term for permission to insert in each of the separate defenses the words:
"Repeat the denials to plaintiffs complaint herein contained in paragraphs marked T' and 'II' of this amended supplemental answer, and hereby make the same a part of this defense."
Plaintiff opposed this motion, was heard orally and by brief,' and the motion was granted. In the following month the plaintiff moved this court at Special Term, held by another justice, to strike out these identical words, and, from the order denying such motion, this appeal is taken.
We know of no rule of practice which permits one justice of the Supreme Court, sitting at Special Term, to review the act of another justice at Special Term, and if for no other reason the order appealed from, and which in effect refused to sanction this practice, should be affirmed. When the plaintiff had contested the right of the defendants to this amendment, and was defeated, there was a right of appeal to this court. Instead of taking such an appeal, the plaintiff accepted the costs imposed as the condition of granting the original order, thus waiving a right to review such order (Logeling v. New York Elevated R. R. Co., 5 App. Div. 198, 200, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1112), and seeks to accomplish, through indirection, what would not be permitted directly. As said by the court in Platt v. N. Y. & Sea Beach Ry. Co., 170 N. Y. 451, 458, 63 N. E. 532, 534:
"The practice of moving before one judge at Special Term to declare void the order or judgment of another judge at Special Term is not sanctioned by any provision of the Code that I am aware of or by any controlling authority. It virtually amounts to an appeal from one Special Term to another Special Term for a review of the first order."
The Code of Civil Procedure provides for appeals to the Appellate Division and to the Court of Appeals, and thése provisions are exclusive of all other appeals. The plaintiff clearly waived any right to appeal from the original order, and it would not be in line with the orderly administration of courts to permit indirectly a review of an order where the party, by accepting a benefit under the order, has waived all right to review.
The pleading as it stands, while it may be in the way of a demurrer, does not prevent a fair and impartial trial of the cause of action set forth, and there is no good reason why well-settled principles of practice should be overlooked to help the plaintiff to an opportunity to demur.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except GAYNOR, J., who reads for reversal.