Case Name: B. Warren Stone et al. v. William H. Darnell
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 430
Docket Number: 
Parties: B. Warren Stone et al. v. William H. Darnell.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 430–436

Head Matter:
B. Warren Stone et al. v. William H. Darnell.
Where the property of a defendant in execution was sold at sheriff's sale, and the defendant afterwards recovered it from the purchaser, on the gound that it was exempt from execution as his homestead, the purchaser has the right to recover back his money from the defendant in' execution, for whose benefit the money had been paid.
The purchaser might have plead his right in reconventioh in the ejectment suit, but he was not precluded because he failed to do it.
The measure of damages against the defendant in execution was the amount of money paid to his use.
Where the sheriff was joined with a defendant, who set up a defense unfavorable to the sheriff, the plaintiff might properly dismiss, as to the sheriff, after answer.
Where a bill of exceptions shows that objections to the competency of a witness were overruled, the record should also show that he swore to something material, or the point will not be reviewed.
Appeal from Dallas. The case was tried before Hon. Hat. M. Burford, one of the district judges.
Darnell sued Stone and Adam Hauglit for $280, with interest, for that Haught, as sheriff, on the 3d ¡November, 1855, by virtue of sundry executions in his hands against B. Warren Stone, sold a certain town lot in Dallas, as the properly of Stone, to Darnell, for said sum of money; that the sheriff represented that Stone had “given up” the property, and that it was free from incumbrance, when in fact it was the homestead of Stone, and that it had been so decided by the Supreme Court of Texas.
[The case settling Stone’s right to the property as his homestead, under the 22d section of the 7th art. of the constitution, is fully reported in Stone v. Darnell, 20 Tex., 14; and see Paschal’s Dig., ¡Nbte 198, p. 66.]
This decree of recovery of his property, which had been sold at a forced sale, when it was exempted, under the constitution, as the homestead of Stone’s family, was plead by Stone. There was a long series of amendments of petition and answer and a number of exhibits, but the real facts of the case were, that sundry executions were levied on Stone’s homestead; that it was sold, and. Darnell purchased it, and sold it to Pryor; that Stone sued to recover his property and rents, and recovered; that Darnell and the sheriff and plaintiffs in the execution were defendants in the ejectment suit; but Darnell did not reconvene for his purchase-money, as he might have done, nor did the plaintiffs in the execution reconvene for the money satisfied on the executions. This ejectment suit was tried in Kaufman county, by change of venue. And now, when Darnell sued Stone and the sheriff for the purchase-money paid for the land which he had lost, because it was exempt from sale, he plead the two years’ statute of limitations, and, moreover, that, as Darnell did not reconvene for this money in the ejectment suit, he could not now be heard to claim it. Stone had got the benefit of the purchase-money in the satisfaction of the judgment against him. The answer of Haught being satisfactory to Darnell, he dismissed as to him.
The court charged the jury, that Darnell was entitled to recover the money paid by him to the sheriff for the purchase of the lot, which went to satisfy the executions against Stone; and that the cause of action accrued at the termination of the suit in the Supreme Court settling Stone’s right to recover his homestead.
And the court refused to charge that Darnell had waived his rights by not pleading them in the ejectment suit; or that the law of caveat emptor applied; or that the cause of action accrued from the day of the payment of the money to the plaintiffs in execution under which the homestead was sold; or that Stone was not liable to the purchaser, unless he perpetrated a fraud in pointing out the property to the sheriff; or that Darnell, having defended the ejectment suit for the recovery of the homestead, lost his claim to the money.
It seems, from the bill of exceptions, that Darnell offered Haught as a witness, and the defendant, Stone, objected, on the ground of his interest; which objection was overruled. But the statement of facts does not show that the witness swore anything.
The jury returned a verdict for $188 in favor of Darnell, from which Stone appealed, and assigned the verdict of the jury and every ruling of the court as error.
The view which the court took compels the Reporter somewhat to mar the unity of Mr. Stone’s brief. It is due to him to preserve enough of it to. show his legal points. He seems to have fought his own case to the end of the contest.
B. Warren Stone, for appellant.
—1. If Darnell had any rights in this suit, they were adjudicated in the trial of Stone v. Pryor, tried in the District Court of Kaufman county, in 1856, and affirmed in this court at Tyler, the same year.
Had the questions in this suit not "been adjudicated in the Kaufman county suit, even this failure to enter pleas of payment, &c., is a waiver of his rights, if any he had, and he cannot now be permitted to harass appellant, Stone, with a new suit. The question, then, in this suit is res adjudicaba. (20 Tex., 783; Id., 13, 68; 5 Littell Ky., 168, is also cited; 19 Tex., 380; 17 Ib., 216; 4 Ib., 101; 5 Ib.,290; 10 Ib.,139; 6 Ib., 260; 4 Ib., 387; 20 Tex., 789, and authorities cited.) Our system of practice abhors a multiplicity of suits, and will not suffer parties to speculate on their chances at law, and, when defeated, bring a vexatious and harassing suit for what was before acted upon, or may and should have been acted upon.
2. The statute of limitations was and is a sufficient defense to this suit. (16 Tex., 383.) The plaintiff’s right of action accrued when he paid the money upon his purchase, which was previous to November, 1855, for it is then he says his money was paid by the sheriff in satisfaction of appellant’s debts. More than three years elapsed before the filing of this suit, which was in January, 1858. He could have claimed his money in 1855, or when he had notice of the claim of appellant to the property by the suit in the Kaufman District Court, which was in the fall or spring of 1856, as appears by the decision of the Supreme Court, in 1856, at Tyler. The suit in the Kaufman court does not stop the running of the statute, for then he could have instituted his suit and abandoned his purchase, or he could have claimed to be reimbursed in said suit, as he was a party and had full knowledge. There is nothing in reason or law to stop the running of the statute. (2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 435, 439, 448; 5 Tex., 318; Chitty on Cont., 708.)
3. The principle of caveat empior applies in full force in the sale of the property for which appellee paid his money, and now seeks its recovery.
“Ignorance of the law excuses none.” To avoid the principle of caveat emptor, he asserts fraud. Hone was proved on the sheriff or on this appellant. It is in evidence, that appellant was absent, and in the State of Kentucky, at the time of the sale, and the only assertion of appellant’s was long previous to the sale, and then said to the sheriff, “levy upon this office.” Ho sane man would ° have a piece of real estate worth $120 per annum rent levied upon to pay a debt of $50. And the remark of appellant to sheriff shows that it was the intention of appellant to pay the debt, and by the remark to turn off' the sheriff for a few days, until he could pay the money, and this is in proof that such were his intentions by the testimony of Colonel J. C. McCoy, who was agent for appellant during his absence. The assertion of appellant to sheriff, “levy upon this office,” is not fraud, to prevent the principle of caveat emptor applying. It was no,t proved that this statement ever came to the knowledge of appellee, and that he acted upon it. There was no fraud to ipipose a bad title on appellee; and, if there was', he made the purchase while the means of correct information were at hand. (2 Kent, 482; 1 Story Eq., 208; 15 Tex., 527, 528.)
1st. The charge of the court was error, calculated to mislead, and took away from the jury any liberty to find for appellant.
The third proposition in the charge is clearly not the law, while, as the first, it takes away all action from the jury; first find for appellee, then find eight per cent, damages on an open account, and last bring in your verdict in damages. We think it hard to find greater error in as short space anywhere in the judicial investigations of our State.
The fourth proposition, fixing the time of the statute of limitations beginning to run, is error, and is met by our argument supra on that question.
2d. There was error in refusing the charges asked by appellant, who is not sufficiently vain to say that each sep arate charge, in ipsisimis verbis, is the very law. But we clo thinlc, that, in the main, the charge asked and refused hy the court, if given in whole or in part, would have been decisive of the justice and right of the case, and have produced an entirely different finding by the jury.
3d. There was error in dismissing A. C. Haught, sheriff. He was made a party to the suit originally, came in and answered, confessed cause of action, implicated in his answer appellant, showed that he had money yet from the sale of appellant’s property in his hands, and was liable to some one. And it was further in proof, that said Haught had $35 of appellant’s money, outside of the sale money, but paid him upon the original executions under which the lots or office property was sold, and which was not accounted for. Still, he was dismissed on motion of appellee’s counsel, who was also counsel for A. C. Haught. If any fraud whatever was practiced on appellee, it was by said Haught and not by appellant, and he alone is responsible for any fraud to appellee.
George W. Guess, for appellee.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—When the defendant recovered back the land by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, the right of the plaintiff to have the money he had paid, and which had been applied to the satisfaction of the execution, refunded, was perfect. (Townsend v. Smith, 20 Tex., 465.)
The plaintiff's right, which he asserts in this suit, was not adjudicated or brought into litigation in the easel in the Kaufman District Court. Though a party may plead a demand in reconvention, he is not obliged to do so, nor is he precluded of his action by his failure so to plead.
The measure of the plaintiff's damages was the purchase-money he had paid to the use of the defendant and interest. There was no error in the charge of the court.
There can be no question of the right of the plaintiff to dismiss as to the defendant, Haught. It is not perceived that there was any good objection to the competency of Haught as a witness at the call of the plaintiff; but that point need not be decided, since it does not appear that he was examined as a witness upon the trial, or, if examined, that he testified to anything that was material. It only appears that his competency was objected to on the score of interest, and that the court overruled the objection; but whether he was examined and testified does not appear.
There manifestly is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.