Case Name: In the Matter of the Intermediate Accounting of Hanover Bank, as Trustee under a Trust Made by Sybil H. Ricks for the Benefit of James B. Ricks, Deceased, and Others, Respondent. Sandra L. R. Humphrey et al., Infants, by Osborne A. McKegney, Their Guardian ad Litem, Appellants; Pamela S. Ricks et al., Infants, by C. Murray Kavanagh, Their Guardian ad Litem, Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1961-07-07
Citations: 10 N.Y.2d 231
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Intermediate Accounting of Hanover Bank, as Trustee under a Trust Made by Sybil H. Ricks for the Benefit of James B. Ricks, Deceased, and Others, Respondent. Sandra L. R. Humphrey et al., Infants, by Osborne A. McKegney, Their Guardian ad Litem, Appellants; Pamela S. Ricks et al., Infants, by C. Murray Kavanagh, Their Guardian ad Litem, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 231–237

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Intermediate Accounting of Hanover Bank, as Trustee under a Trust Made by Sybil H. Ricks for the Benefit of James B. Ricks, Deceased, and Others, Respondent. Sandra L. R. Humphrey et al., Infants, by Osborne A. McKegney, Their Guardian ad Litem, Appellants; Pamela S. Ricks et al., Infants, by C. Murray Kavanagh, Their Guardian ad Litem, Respondents.
Argued May 31, 1961;
decided July 7, 1961.
Osborne A. McKegney, as guardian ad litem for infants, appellants.
I. The order appealed from violates the legislative command of the Domestic Relations Law. (Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253; Matter of Upjohn, 304 N. Y. 366.) II. The Appellate Division incorrectly determined that the word “ descendants ” as used in the trust agreement excluded the adopted children of the grantor’s son. (Matter of Upjohn, 304 N. Y. 366; Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253; Matter of Title Guar. & Trust Co., 195 N. Y. 339; Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 127; Matter of Leask, 197 N. Y. 193; New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11; Matter of Ward, 9 N Y 2d 722; Matter of Cook, 8 Misc 2d 103.) III. The grantor’s affidavit is strongly persuasive of an intention to include adopted children and conclusive of an intention not to exclude them. (Johnson v. Brasington, 156 N. Y. 181; People v. Levan, 295 N. Y. 26.)
C. Murray Kavanagh, as guardian ad litem for infants, respondents.
I. The determination of the Appellate Division that the adopted children of James B. Ricks, deceased, under the terms of the trust instrument dated December 21, 1950, now before this court, are not to be included as ‘ ‘ descendants ’ ’ of him entitling them to participate thereunder, is sound on the facts and the law. (Matter of Upjohn, 304 N. Y. 366; Matter of Nelson, 268 N. Y. 255; Matter of Day, 10 A D 2d 220; Dwight v. Fancher, 245 N. Y. 71; Matter of Fabbri, 2 N Y 2d 236; New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11; Matter of Ward, 9 N Y2d 722; Matter of Hilts, 5 Misc 2d 862, 4 A D 2d 1013.) II. An affidavit of the settlor sworn to 10 years after she executed the trust was submitted to the court below by the adoptees respondents to support their claim that they should be deemed to be “ descendants ” on a par with the natural children of James B. Ricks, deceased, and it is respectfully submitted the same is inadmissible to prove her intention as of December 21, 1950, the date she created the trust. (Dwight v. Fancher, 245 N. Y. 71; Matter of Nelson, 268 N. Y. 255; Matter of Fabbri, 2 N Y 2d 236.) III. Assuming, but not conceding, that the said affidavit is admissible in the within proceeding on the question of construction before this court, then the grantor has divulged a state of mind as of the date she created the trust which negates an intention to benefit the adopted children herein.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The public policy of the State has been established by the Legislature by the provision in section 115 of the Domestic Relations Law that '1 As respects the passing and limitation over of real or personal property dependent under the provisions of any instrument on the foster parent dying without heirs, the foster child is not deemed the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen."
Although this appeal immediately concerns the distribution of income of a trust during the second measuring life, the language of the instrument directs distribution in the same verbiage which is employed in directing the passing of the remainder at the termination of the trust. It is improbable that the settlor intended that the same words should bear a different meaning when used to designate the recipients of the income during the secondary life period from that which they bear in designating the remaindermen.
For this reason and for the other reasons stated in the opinion of the Appellate Division, its order should be affirmed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable out of the trust.