Case Name: Nicholas A. RADICK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2007-03-27
Citations: 863 N.E.2d 356
Docket Number: No. 56A05-0608-CR-428
Parties: Nicholas A. RADICK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Judges: CRONE, J. concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 863
Pages: 356–362

Head Matter:
Nicholas A. RADICK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 56A05-0608-CR-428.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
March 27, 2007.
Samantha M. Joslyn, Demotte, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Scott L. Barnhart, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
SHARPNACK, Judge.
Nicholas A. Radick appeals his convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor. Radick raises one issue, which we restate as whether his conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor is inconsistent with his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony. We affirm.
The relevant facts follow. On April 19, 2003, Radick was driving a car involved in a one-vehicle accident in which his friend, Joseph Hedger, was killed. The first officer on the scene smelled alcohol on Rad-ick's breath and saw that Radick had watery eyes and slurred speech. Radick told the officer that he had been drinking and that he was driving the vehicle. Radick also told paramedics that he had consumed six beers and smoked marijuana. Lab tests taken at the hospital revealed that Radick had THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, and alcohol in his system. Radick also admitted to the emergency room physician that he had used alcohol and marijuana.
The State charged Radick with operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II causing death as a class C felony. A jury found him guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and a lesser included offense of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Radiek to six years for the operating a vehicle while intoxicated conviction and sixty days for the operating a vehicle with a controlled substance conviction and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.
The issue on appeal is whether Radick's conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor is inconsistent with his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony. When this Court reviews a claim of inconsistent jury verdicts, "we will take corrective action only when the verdicts are extremely contradictory and irreconcilable." Powell v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ind.2002), reh'g denied. A jury's verdict may be inconsistent or even illogical but nevertheless permissible if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Id. In resolving such a claim, we neither interpret nor speculate about the thought process or motivation of the jury in reaching its verdict. Id.
Radiek argues that if the jury "believed the testimony that [Radiek] was intoxicated and also had THC in his system" and found that "the way in which [Radiek] was driving caused [Hedger's] death," the jury should have found him guilty of both class C felonies. According to Radiek, the verdicts were inconsistent, and he requests a new trial on the charges.
In Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ind.2002), the Indiana Supreme Court clarified that the State is not required to prove that the defendant's intoxication directly and proximately caused the resulting injury. However, the State is required to prove that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated was a "substantial cause" of the resulting death, not merely a "contributing cause." 766 N.E.2d at 1177-1178. Consequently, Radiek is correct that the jury should have found him guilty of both class C felonies if it found that he was driving while intoxicated, that he was driving with THC in his system, and that the way in which he was driving caused Hedger's death. The State concedes that "[t]he illogical nature of the verdicts appears to be the result of the jury going beyond the State's burden and [attributing] the cause of Hedger's death to Radick's intoxication rather than just the act of driving." Appellee's Brief at 5. However, as noted above, a jury's verdict may be inconsistent or even illogical but nevertheless permissible if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Powell, 769 N.E.2d at 1131; see also Hodge v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1246, 1248-49 (Ind.1997) (when the trial results in acquittal on some charges and convictions on others, verdicts ordinarily will survive a claim of inconsistency when the evidence is sufficient to support convictions). Despite the inconsistency in the verdicts, both of the verdicts are supported by sufficient evidence.
The offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death as a class C felony is governed by Ind.Code § 9-30-5-5(a), which at the time of Rad-ick's offense provided:
A person who causes the death of another person when operating a motor vehicle:
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(2) with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person's body; or
(3) while intoxicated;
commits a Class C felony.
The State presented evidence that Radick was operating the vehicle at a high rate of speed when the accident occurred. Hedger died as a result of the accident. When officers arrived on the scene, Radick smelled of alcohol, had watery eyes and slurred speech, and admitted to the officers, paramedics, and emergency room physician that he had consumed alcohol. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find Radick guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death as a class C felony. See, e.g., Ballinger v. State, 717 N.E.2d 939, 943 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony).
Similarly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Radick's conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor. The offense of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor is governed by Ind.Code § 9-30-5-l(c), which is a lesser included offense of Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5 and provides: "A person who operates a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person's body commits a Class C misdemeanor." The State presented evidence that Radick operated the vehicle with THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in his system. Marijuana is a controlled substance listed in schedule I of Ind.Code § 35-48-2-4. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Radick's conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor.
Despite any inconsistency in the verdicts, the convictions are permissible because they are supported by sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Slate v. State, 798 N.E.2d 510, 519-520 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (holding that the jury's guilty verdict for the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor was not wholly inconsistent with its acquittal of the defendant on the charge of public intoxication).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Radick's convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J. concurs.
SULLIVAN, J. dissents with separate opinion.
. Ind.Code § 9-30-5-5 (Supp.2003) (subsequently amended by Pub.L. No. 76-2004, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2004); Pub.L. No. 82-2004, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2004); and Pub.L. No. 2-2005, § 36 (eff. April 25, 2005)).
. Ind.Code § 9-30-5-1 (2004).
. Ind.Code § 9-30-5-5.
. We note that, had the jury found Radiek guilty of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II causing death as a class C felony, the trial court could not have entered judgment of conviction on both verdicts due to double jeopardy principles. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that "[ejnhancement of one offense for the very same harm as another is not permissible." Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 2002); see also Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (holding that "where a burglary conviction is elevated to a Class A felony based on the same bodily injury that forms the basis of a Class B robbery conviction, the two cannot stand").