Case Name: Mary Ellen O'NEIL, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Crawford & Company, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-03-07
Citations: 468 So. 2d 904
Docket Number: No. 64809
Parties: Mary Ellen O’NEIL, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Crawford & Company, Respondents.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 468
Pages: 904–908

Head Matter:
Mary Ellen O’NEIL, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Crawford & Company, Respondents.
No. 64809.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 7, 1985.
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1985.
L. Barry Keyfetz of Keyfetz, Poses & Halpern, Miami, for petitioner.
Kay & Silber, P.A., and Douglas J. Glaid of Glaid & DiMauro, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.

Opinion:
ALDERMAN, Justice.
Mary O'Neil seeks review of the decision from the District Court of Appeal, First District, in O'Neil v. Department of Transportation, 442 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), which certified the following question to be of great public importance:
Does Section 440.15(3)(b)3.d., Florida Statutes (1979), violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because it conflicts with the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (1976)?
We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the district court.
O'Neil filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability benefits or, in the alternative, for wage loss benefits due to work related injuries occurring on May 17, 1980. The deputy commissioner denied her request for permanent total disability benefits finding no competent or substantial evidence of the claimant's inability to return to work. The commissioner also found that section 440.15 precludes the recovery of wage loss benefits when the claimant is over the age of 65 and is receiving social security benefits. Therefore, he found that O'Neil's right to such benefits terminated on August 4, 1980, when O'Neil attained the age of 65 and was eligible to receive social security benefits.
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the commissioner's order, citing its earlier decision in Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The district court's decision in Sasso was subsequently approved by this Court in Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 452 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, — U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 498, 83 L.Ed.2d 391 (1984). In that case, we held that section 440.15(3)(b)3.d. did not deny access to the courts or unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of age.
On rehearing, the First District, in the present case, also held that section 440.-15(3)(b)3.d. was not unconstitutional under the supremacy clause as violative of 29 U.S.C. § 623, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; . (Emphasis supplied.)
The district court reasoned that the provisions of Florida's Workers' Compensation Law do not constitute "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 623. We agree.
We find no merit in any of the other arguments raised by O'Neil.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.
ADKINS, J., dissents.