Case Name: Vickey Ann ESTEVE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-02-15
Citations: 343 So. 2d 353
Docket Number: No. 7794
Parties: Vickey Ann ESTEVE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, LEMMON and GU-LOTTA, JJ. .
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 343
Pages: 353–358

Head Matter:
Vickey Ann ESTEVE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 7794.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1977.
Writ Granted May 6, 1977.
Lazard Levy, Marrero, for plaintiff-appellant.
Francipane, Regan & St. Peé Chester Francipane, G. T. Breedlove, Metairie, for defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant, Maryland Cas. Co.
Murphy & Simon, E. Kelleher Simon, New Orleans, for defendant-third party defendant-appellee, Allstate Ins. Co.
Before SAMUEL, LEMMON and GU-LOTTA, JJ. .

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
We are confronted with the question whether LSA-R.S. 22:655, the "direct action" statute, is applicable in a personal injury suit filed by a Louisiana resident in a Louisiana court against an insurer (Allstate Insurance Company) of a nonresident driver when the automobile accident giving rise to the damages occurred in Florida and the insurer issued the policy to the nonresident driver in that state.
The facts are that plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a two-car collision in the State of Florida. Plaintiff was a guest passenger in a vehicle owned by a Louisiana resident. The host-driver was also a Louisiana resident. The other vehicle involved in the accident was owned and driven by a Florida resident.
Plaintiff filed suit in Jefferson Parish against the host-vehicle owner and her insurer, the host-driver and her insurer, and the insurer of the Florida resident-driver. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty (host-owner's insurer) filed a third party demand against Allstate (Florida resident's insurer) and State Farm (host driver's insurer).
The trial court maintained Allstate's exceptions of no right of action and dismissed plaintiff's demand and the third party demand against the nonresident's insurer on the ground that the direct action statute was not applicable. Plaintiff and Maryland Casualty appeal. We affirm.
LSA-R.S. 22:655, as amended, provides for a right of direct action against an insurer when the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana, whether or not the insurance policy was written or delivered in this state. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Webb v. Zurich Insurance Company, 251 La. 558, 205 So.2d 398 (1967) extended the application of this statute to suits filed in Louisiana arising out of accidents which occurred outside of the state, provided the insurance policy was issued in the State of Louisiana. In our case, plaintiff seeks to further extend the applicability of the statute to a suit arising out of an accident occurring outside of Louisiana, when the policy was issued outside of the state.
We have not found, nor have we been cited, any cases from this circuit on this question. However, in Morse v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, 301 So .2d 741 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit, citing the Webb case, stated that the "direct action" statute was inapplicable when both: 1) the accident or injury had occurred outside of Louisiana and 2) the policy sued upon had been written or delivered outside Louisiana. The court in Morse concluded that the Louisiana resident-plaintiff had no right of action against the nonresident's insurer even though the insurer was doing business in Louisiana. See also Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So.2d 701 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1972). We are in accord with the holding of the Third Circuit in Morse and conclude that the sécuring of the policy within Louisiana is a sine qua non of the right of direct action in those cases where the accident occurred outside of Louisiana.
However, we are presented with plaintiff's and Maryland Casualty's interesting argument based on Smith v. Globe Indemnity Co., 243 So.2d 882 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971), in which the First Circuit held that a Louisiana court had jurisdiction over a New York workmen's compensation insurer in a suit arising from a work-related injury in Tennessee to a Louisiana resident where the employment contract had been written in Tennessee. The Smith holding rests on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), which determined that no due process prohibition exists to a suit filed in the state of the plaintiff resident against a nonresident defendant if that nonresident is authorized to do and is doing business in the state where the suit is filed, although the cause of action arose outside of that state. Citing a Florida case, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969), third party plaintiff, Maryland Casualty argues that the Florida case holds that a contract of liability insurance is a contract for the benefit of a third party and an injured plaintiff has a direct cause of action against the alleged tort feasor's insurer. Applying the holding of the First Circuit in the Smith case, which cited the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Perkins, and following the rationale of the Florida court in Shingleton, plaintiff and Maryland Casualty contend that in addition to the rights conferred by the direct action statute against the insurer of the nonresident defendant, an additional right of action exists where a Louisiana resident files suit in Louisiana against a nonresident defendant when the accident occurred outside of the state if the nonresident defendant does business or is authorized to do business in Louisiana. We do not agree.
As pointed out by our brothers on the Third Circuit, the Smith court was confronted with a jurisdiction question. The direct action statute was not before the Smith court, and Morse distinguishes the Smith case on the ground that the Morse court was confronted with a direct action statute and not merely a jurisdiction question. Our problem, as in Morse, is the application of the direct action statute. Absent the right conferred on the Louisiana, resident-plaintiff by the direct action statute, no right of action exists in Louisiana against the insurer directly. It is important to realize, at this point, that the Florida resident-driver, Allstate's insured, is not a party defendant.
If we were to adopt the argument conferring the right upon the Louisiana resident against the insurer of the nonresident defendant by virtue of the combined holdings in the Louisiana Smith case, the Florida Shingleton case' and the U.S. Supreme Court Perkins case, no necessity would exist for the adoption of the direct action statute. If we follow plaintiff's and Maryland Casualty's logic, then in those cases where an insurer of a nonresident defendant does business in this state and the cause of action arises outside of Louisiana, any Louisiana resident can file a direct action suit (without the direct action statute) against the insurer without the necessity of joining the nonresident-tortfeasor-insured. We find no authority beyond plaintiff's and Maryland Casualty's argument based on Smith, Perkins and Shingleton.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Perkins might be applicable if suit were filed against the nonresident-tortfeasor-de-fendant who does business in Louisiana, but the direct action acquired against the insurer of the nonresident tortfeasor comes into existence by virtue of the insurance contract. Without the insurance contract, no cause of action exists against the insurer. The effect of the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Webb is that if the contract were not written in Louisiana and the accident occurred outside of the state, the direct action statute does not apply. Under the circumstances of the instant case, since the accident occurred in Florida and the policy was secured in that state, we conclude, following the rationale of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Webb, plaintiff has no right of direct action against Allstate under LSA-R.S. 22:655. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court, maintaining Allstate's exceptions of no right of action and dismissing plaintiff's, Vickey Ann Es-teve's, and third party plaintiff's, Maryland Casualty Company's, claims against Allstate Insurance Company, are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEMMON, J., dissents with written reasons.
. The Florida holding is not inconsistent with Louisiana's interpretation of automobile liability insurance contracts. Musmeci v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 496 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1962); Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So.2d 297 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1951).