Case Name: FERGUS v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-02-23
Citations: 45 Mich. App. 196
Docket Number: Docket No. 13475
Parties: FERGUS v CHRYSLER CORPORATION
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P, J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 45
Pages: 196–209

Head Matter:
FERGUS v CHRYSLER CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
1. Workmen’s Compensation — Appeal Board — Findings of Fact— Appeal and Error.
The Court of Appeals cannot overturn findings of fact made by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board when the findings are supported by any evidence (MCLA 413.12).
2. Workmen’s Compensation — Appeal Board — Findings of Fact— Implied Findings — Appeal and Error.
The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board is not required to make specific findings of fact in its opinion; where there is evidence to support the findings of the majority opinion the Court of Appeals draws necessary inferences from the findings to affirm an award.
Dissent by Levin, J.
3. Workmen’s Compensation — Appeal Board — Decision of Referee —Presumption of Validity — De Novo Review.
The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board may not indulge some kind of presumption of validity in favor of the conclusion of the referee but is obliged to exercise its own independent judgment because the appeal board is required to review the referee’s conclusion de novo.
4. Workmen’s Compensation — Appeal Board — Findings of Fact— Implied Findings — Appeal and Error.
The Court of Appeals may not affirm a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board denying benefits to a claimant by assuming that the appeal board resolved issues of credibility against the claimant where it appears that the board acted under an erroneous understanding of the law.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 532.
[3] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 538.
[5] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 247, 255.
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Proximate Cause of Injury — Pre-existing Disease.
In a case involving a heart attack where the claimant had a history of a heart condition, exertion need not be the sole cause of an injury for the claimant to qualify for workmen's compensation beneñts; it is enough that it is a contributing cause of the injury, because the presence of a pre-existing disease does not bar compénsation where the record shows that a disabling injury arose out of and during the course of employment.
Appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board. Submitted Division 2 June 23, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 13475.)
Decided February 23, 1973.
Leave to appeal granted and case remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for further proceedings and determination, 389 Mich 811.
James Fergus presented his claim for workmen’s compensation benefits against Chrysler Corporation. Benefits denied. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Levine & Benjamin, P. C, for plaintiff.
Lacey & Jones (by Hayim I. Gross), for defendant.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P, J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
McGregor, J.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for workmen's compensation benefits. The compensation hearing referee found that plaintiff had failed to establish that his disability was causally related to his employment. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the referee. Plaintiff appeals this decision.
» There is agreement between the litigants and between the majority and dissenting opinions of the appeal board that the plaintiff had a heart condition and that he suffered four separate heart attacks from 1955 through 1963. What is disputed is whether the condition arose out of claimant's employment or as a result of a diabetic condition not related to his employment.
Before we examine that issue it is best to reexamine our function as an appellate court when reviewing decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. In Thornton v Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162-163 (1956), a unanimous Court explained:
"Our jurisdiction, invoked upon issuance and return of certiorari to the workmen's compensation department, is markedly limited. The writ brings us questions of law only. It does not permit scale-weight of evidence and inference here, as on appeals from circuit court judgments, to determine whether administrative Endings of fact offend rules governing clear weight and preponderance. Our obligation is to accept, without question, Endings that are certified here if there be any evidence whatever to sustain those Endings, regardless of thought or suggestion addressed to improbability thereof. Furthermore, and when we employ as above the word 'evidence,' synonymity with the word 'facts' is not intended. 'Evidence' is really the means by which inferences may logically be drawn as to the existence of facts." (Emphasis supplied.)
That the dispute in the instant case concerns findings of fact, and not questions of law, is made clear in the opinion of the dissenting members of the appeal board:
"As was pointed out by my associate, Member Bower-man, plaintiff testified that he suffered heart attacks in 1955, 1959, 1962 and 1963 and that in each case the attack had its onset while at work for the defendant. Of course, this one fact, standing alone, is not determinative of the question of causal relationship.
"Medical reports from doctors examining on behalf of the two parties arrive at different conclusions regarding causality.
"The type of stress described by plaintiff is measured subjectively. What is stressful to one individual might be incidental to another. Most often the trier of the facts is limited in such a determination when faced with diametrically opposing medical opinion."
The dissenting members of the appeal board found that the emotional stress of plaintiff's job was too much for his condition. Defendant's doctor stated that the plaintiff's heart disease was associated with a diabetic condition.
This was a 4-3 decision. Had one of the majority members of the appeal board voted with the dissenting members, we would have been likewise bound to affirm that decision under our Constitution, statutes, and existing case law. We are not fact finders, and this Court cannot overturn the findings of fact made by the appeal board when these findings are supported by proof. See Johnson v Vibradamp Corp, 381 Mich 388, 390 (1968).
As noted above, the dissenting board members concede that there was evidence offered to support both sides on the disputed causality issue. We can inquire no further. This panel is in complete agreement that we are required to affirm a finding of the appeal board if it is supported by any evidence.
In Clark v Apex Foundry, Inc, 7 Mich App 684, 688-689 (1967), this Court, in an opinion written by Judge Levin, stated the following:
"The appeal board made no express finding as to the adequacy of notice. Nevertheless, since a finding thereon for Clark is essential to an award of compensation, we are warranted in concluding the appeal board impliedly found that Apex received proper notice and must affirm such implied finding if it is supported by evidence. See Trice v Orchard Farm Pie Co, 281 Mich 301, 305 (1937), where the Supreme Court stated it was a 'necessary inference' from the finding denying compensation that it had been found that a certain report had been properly filed by the employer, because otherwise the statutory limitation there relied on to deny compensation would not have been applicable; and Ganges School District No 4 v Smith, 330 Mich 254, 259 (1951), where the Supreme Court stated that a finding that the workmen's compensation act is applicable is 'inherent' in an award of compensation; and Donahpe v Ford Motor Co, 295 Mich 422, 427, 428 (1940), where the Supreme Court inferred from the amount of the award a finding as to the employee's earning capacity."
We fully recognize that a busy appeal board with a backlog of cases often may not make specific fact findings in its opinion. Nevertheless, as noted by Judge Levin in Clark, supra, and our Supreme Court in Trice, supra, where there is evidence to support the findings of the majority opinion, we draw necessary inferences from the findings and affirm the award. We do not require the appeal board to give a complete analysis of why it believed or disbelieved a particular witness or why it feels that the burden of proof on the part of the claimant has not been met.
The concluding paragraph of the appeal board's majority opinion stated:
"The record does not support a finding of a compensable injury and is extremely inadequate and completely lacking the consistency necessary to support a reversal of the referee."
The appeal board is affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, P. J., concurred.
The claimant contended that the physical exertion of his work brought about the heart condition while the dissenting members of the appeal board and plaintiffs doctor stated that emotional stress precipitated the injury.
Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
MCLA 413.12; MSA 17.186.