Case Name: STATE of Texas ex rel. Ronald L. WILSON, Criminal District Attorney, Galveston County, Texas, Relator, v. Ed J. HARRIS, District Judge, 10th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, as Acting Judge, 212th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Respondent
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1977-09-14
Citations: 555 S.W.2d 470
Docket Number: No. 55315
Parties: STATE of Texas ex rel. Ronald L. WILSON, Criminal District Attorney, Galveston County, Texas, Relator, v. Ed J. HARRIS, District Judge, 10th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, as Acting Judge, 212th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 555
Pages: 470–478

Head Matter:
STATE of Texas ex rel. Ronald L. WILSON, Criminal District Attorney, Galveston County, Texas, Relator, v. Ed J. HARRIS, District Judge, 10th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, as Acting Judge, 212th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Respondent.
No. 55315.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Sept. 14, 1977.
Ronald L. Wilson, Dist. Atty. and Michael J. Guarino, II, Asst. Dist. Atty., Galveston, for relator.
Andrew Z. Baker, Ted R. Allmond and Richard Thornton, Galveston, for respondent.
Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
This is an original action seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent to set aside an order entered on June 13, 1977, in the State of Texas v. Donnie Botello, cause number 32,975 in the 212th District Court of Galveston County.
On February 16, 1976, cause number 32,-975 was called for trial in the 212th District Court, and Botello was convicted of a lesser included misdemeanor on February 19, and was assessed a punishment of one year in jail and a $2,000 fine. On February 26 sentence was pronounced and notice of appeal was given. The judgment was affirmed by this Court in a per curiam opinion on March 23, 1977, and mandate issued on April 8. The district court received our mandate on April 13, capias issued on April 14, and was executed April 25. Thereafter on June 13, 1977, respondent issued an order reciting:
"The sentence herein having been affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and the defendant having been remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Galveston County, to begin serving his sentence, and,
It appearing to the court that the ends of justice would be best served by permitting the defendant to serve said sentence during his off-work hours; it is therefore
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant, DONNIE BOTELLO be sentenced to one (1) year in the Galveston County Jail and pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000) DOLLARS, and all costs herein, provided that said defendant shall be released by the Sheriff of Galveston County each day during the hours of 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 Midnight, during each day of said sentence, for purposes of working at the Knights of Columbus Hall, at 1912 Winnie Street, Galveston, Texas."
Relator seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to set aside the June 13 order as an act beyond the power of respondent and in violation of this Court's exercise of its jurisdiction through issuance of its mandate of affirmance on April 8, 1977.
Respondent contends (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction under Art. 5, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution, because the order does not violate our mandate and does not interfere with this Court's exercise of its jurisdiction, (2) that a writ of prohibition rather than writ of mandamus should have been sought, and (3) on the merits, respondent has not violated the mandate of this Court.
The first and third contentions of respondent turn on a single issue: is the June 13 order a violation of this Court's mandate. If yes, this Court has the extraordinary writ power to compel compliance with our mandate. Article 5, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution, provides in part:
"The Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, issue such writs as may be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction."
Violation of this Court's mandate is such interference with this Court's jurisdiction as to authorize issuance of extraordinary writs under this Court's constitutional powers. While the Legislature may regulate the exercise of that writ power in form and procedure, it may neither abolish nor restrict the substantive scope of those powers, nor is regulatory legislative action required before this Court may exercise those powers. Therefore, if the June 13 order is in violation of this Court's mandate, our writ power will be exercised to enforce our jurisdiction. State ex rel. Vance v. Hatten, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 625; State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, Tex.Cr.App., 465 S.W.2d 164; State v. Klein, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 31, 224 S.W.2d 250.
We are also of the opinion that mandamus rather than prohibition is the proper relief to seek to set aside an improper order. The reasons are well explained in State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, supra, at 168-169.
We turn now to the merits. Sentence was pronounced February 26, 1976, and states in part:
"It is the order of this Court that the defendant, Donnie Botello, who has been adjudged to be guilty of the offense of misdemeanor possession of gambling paraphernalia be and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) and sentenced to confinement in the County Jail for a period of one (1) year and all costs of this proceeding for which execution may issue."
This Court's mandate commanded the trial court "to observe the order of our said Court of Criminal Appeals in his behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed and executed." Over a month after execution of the mandate by Botello's arrest and incarceration in the county jail, respondent entered the order now under attack.
Respondent contends the challenged order was proper under Art. 42.03, Sec. 5, V.A.C.C.P. That provision states:
"Where jail time has been awarded, the trial judge may, when in his discretion the ends of justice would best be served, sentence the defendant to serve his sentence during his off-work hours, or on weekends. When such a sentence is permitted by the trial judge it must be served on consecutive days or consecutive weekends. The trial judge may require bail of the defendant to insure the faithful performance of the sentence. The trial judge may attach conditions regarding the employment, travel, and other conduct of the defendant during the performance of such a sentence." (Emphasis added.)
From the language quoted, and particularly the part emphasized, we conclude this provision may be invoked only at the time of sentencing. Under the facts of this case and in compliance with Art. 42.04, V.A.C. C.P., sentence was pronounced and was required to be pronounced before the appeal. After the appeal the trial court was only authorized to order execution of the sentence previously pronounced, and to perform such other ministerial duties as required by law. The discretion afforded by Art. 42.03, Sec. 5, supra, could have been exercised at the time of sentencing, but not after the mandate of this Court issued. Respondent was without authority to enter the June 13, 1977 order.
We conclude as we did in State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, supra:
"We conclude that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is necessary in order to protect this court's jurisdiction and to insure that the mandate of this court not be thwarted and the relator has no other adequate remedy.
"We assume that the respondent will immediately perform his duty as herein set out. Writ of mandamus will issue only if he refuses to do so.
"No motion for rehearing will be entertained."
It is so ordered.
. Another order to similar effect was entered June 7, but was subsequently superseded by the June 13 order.