Case Name: PEOPLE v. FULLER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-12-18
Citations: 395 Mich. 451
Docket Number: Docket No. 54738
Parties: PEOPLE v FULLER
Judges: Coleman and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 395
Pages: 451–461

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v FULLER
Docket No. 54738.
Argued September 10, 1974
(Calendar No. 3).—
Decided December 18, 1975.
Rehearing denied 395 Mich 924.
Cornell Fuller was convicted by a jury in Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Thomas L. Poindexter, J., of first-degree felony murder. The prosecution contended that he aided and abetted, by acting as a lookout, in an arson which resulted in the death of two girls. The Court of Appeals, Quinn, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and O’Hara, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 11308). Defendant appeals. Held:
1. A jury may believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.
2. Evidence was presented which, if believed by the jury, showed that the defendant acted as a lookout for the arsonist.
3. The jury determined that the prosecution had negated every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence of the crime charged.
Conviction affirmed.
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., was joined by Levin, J., in voting to reverse the conviction and discharge the defendant. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a conviction of felony murder. There was inadequate proof of defendant’s intention to act in concert with the principal to set the fire. The fact that the defendant was seen with the arsonist, and that he was seen standing by the alley at the back of the house looking around, does not establish that he was acting as a lookout, nor is a witness’s speculation as to what defendant was doing sufficient to allow a conclusion that he was acting as a lookout.
44 Mich App 297; 205 NW2d 287 (1973) affirmed.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1080 et seq.
[2, 4-6, 8, 9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 115 et seq.
[3, 6, 7] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1091.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Trial—Evidence—Trier of Fact.
The trier of fact in a criminal case, particularly the jury, has the right to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.
2. Criminal Law — Aiding and Abetting — Verdict.
A jury verdict that a defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting a felony murder should not be disturbed where evidence of defendant’s activities was presented which was consonant with a theory of active participation in the crime, if the jury believed the evidence.
3. Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Trier of Fact.
It is for the trier of fact to determine if the prosecution has, by the circumstantial evidence presented, negated every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence of the crime charged.
Dissenting Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, J.
4. Criminal Law — Aiding and Abetting — Evidence—Sufficiency.
The fact that defendant and an arsonist were seen together, defendant standing by a gate at an alley at the rear of a house, looking around, while the arsonist set ñre to the back porch of a house, does not establish that defendant was a lookout aiding and abetting the arson.
5. Criminal Law — Aiding and Abetting — Evidence—Sufficiency.
Speculation by a witness that he guessed that defendant, near the scene of an arson, was acting as a lookout for the arsonist, was not sufficient to allow the conclusion to be drawn that defendant was acting as a lookout.
6. Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Inferences.
An inference may be drawn from circumstantial evidence in a criminal case only if it follows with impelling certainty from that evidence.
7. Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Inferences.
Allowing a trier of fact to draw an inference in a criminal case only if the inference follows with impelling certainty enforces the requirement that, where the people’s case is based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must negate every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence of the crime charged.
8. Criminal Law — Aiding and Abetting — Presence—Sufficiency.
Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed, is not enough to make a person an aider or abettor or a principal in the second degree nor is mere mental approval sufficient, nor passive acquiescence or consent.
9. Criminal Law — Aiding and Abetting — Evidence—Sufficiency.
It is not reasonable to conclude that defendant agreed to act as a lookout for an arsonist or that he did in fact assist the arsonist in perpetrating the crime from the sole fact that the defendant may have been in a position to observe what the arsonist was doing or to warn him of danger.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training & Appeals, and Gerard A. Poehlman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office, by Dennis H Benson, Assistant Defender, for defendant.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
This Court has steadfastly supported the right of the trier of fact, particularly the jury, to believe, or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented. The instant case involves this doctrine.
As my brother the Chief Justice in his opinion observes, "There was uncontradicted testimony that 16-year-old Zerious Meadows started the fire by throwing a Molotov cocktail, and by striking a match." However, as he correctly notes, the question before us is not whether defendant Cornell "Fuller planned the arson, or that he lit the fire, but rather that he acted as a lookout for Meadows by standing by the back gate of the yard and looking up and down the alley".
In our opinion, evidence was presented which, if believed by the jury, would show just that. This is not a case of "mere presence at the scene", for, if the jury believed it, defendant's activities were consonant with a theory of active participation in the crime.
The Chief Justice in his opinion carefully lays out the testimony of the important witnesses. There is no need to repeat this material in this opinion.
The jury could connect Fuller with Meadows who perpetrated the arson, because, as the Chief Justice summarized,
"One witness testified she saw five or six boys huddled together on the sidewalk in front of the Turner home before it burned. She identified one of the boys as Fuller. She said she saw him go through the gate to the back yard of the Turner home. She saw another of the boys in front throw something at the house and the house caught fire. She identified one of the other boys as a boy named 'Jefferey'."
This boy was Jefferey Coleman, whose testimony, well set out by the Chief Justice, described Fuller's role in the crime. Even if we eliminate Jefferey Coleman's speculation that "I guess he [Fuller] was watching out for Zerious", he still testified that defendant was looking back and forth "to Jefferson" and "back towards Kercheval" several times and that after the fire started, Fuller and Meadows together took off and ran toward Kercheval.
Another witness, Gary Martin, in the words of the Chief Justice "testified that he saw Cornell Fuller, Zerious Meadows and four others walking together in the alley between Fairview and LeMay going towards Jefferson. He said he next saw Fuller and Meadows run through a yard and then run down to Kercheval through the alley."
It is for the trier of fact to determine if the prosecution has "negate[d] every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant's innocence of the crime charged". It was so determined in this case.
Conviction affirmed.
Coleman and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.