Case Name: James M. Riggs et al. v. William S. Horde & Wife
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 456
Docket Number: 
Parties: James M. Riggs et al. v. William S. Horde & Wife.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 456–461

Head Matter:
James M. Riggs et al. v. William S. Horde & Wife.
Where a school-mistress engaged to teach a session of five months, and taught four months, at which time she voluntarily broke her engagement, she can maintain an action upon a quantum meruit for her services.
Where the failure to complete the contract is neither the fault of the plaintiff, nor of the defendants, the true measure of damages is the value of the teacher’s services for the time, not by s, pro rata division of time, but according to the actual value of the teacher’s services, or the amount of benefit the defendants received, not to exceed the contract price.
Where no errors are assigned, and an error does not go to the foundation of the action, the court might affirm the judgment; but if the plaintiff suggest delay, the court is required to revise the rulings of the court below.
Appeal from Havarro. The case was tried before Hon. 3ST. W. Battle, one of the district judges.
Lavinia A. Edwards was born on the 14th day of March, A. D. 1837. According to an advertisement of the defendants, in the Prairie Blade, a newspaper published in the good town df Corsicana, she must have been liberally educated, for these gentlemen, on the 16th day of February, 1856, held her out to the world as “a lady eminently qualified for the high and important trust confided to her keeping,” and the teaching of “ spelling, reading, writing, arithmetic, English grammar, geography, rhetoric, logic, composition, history, (ancient and modern,) natural and moral philosophy, chemistry, astronomy, mineralogy, botany, the higher branches of mathematics, French, Italian, embroidery, ornamental work, and music;” and that they charged for this instruction, for a session of five months, from $8 to $15, with $10 extra for French and Italian, and $20 for music. And for these valuable services, to he performed by her, the defendants, “The Trustees of the Corsicana Female Literary Institute agreed to pay Lavinia A. Edwards $250 for that advertised session, to commence on the 1st of March, 1856, and to continue for five months.” Lavinia commenced and taught from the 1st of March until the 20th of June, 1856, during all of which time the flaming advertisement continued to run in the Prairie Blade, of which the literary editor thereof doubted not Lavinia was a reader, because several numbers of the paper were sent to the house “where Lavinia staid,”—whether to the “institute” or her lodgings, the witness did not state. On the 20th of June, Lavinia was summoned by her sick mother to go to Bell county, and, like a dutiful child, she placed filial duty above her obligations to her patrons, and went; and, according to the answers of the defendants, she did not ask leave of the trustees of “ The Corsicana Female Literary Institute.” Lavinia returned no more. And, according to the editor of the Prairie Blade, and another witness, who knew all the inhabitants, there was not another lady in all that county (indeed, not within reach of the trustees) able to have taken Lavinia’s place, and to have finished that scholastic session. Lavinia demanded her pay for .the time she had taught, at the rate of $50 per month, and she claimed that she had taught four of the five months, according to the reckoning of teachers. But the trustees refused to pay a farthing, and they said to the agent and relative of Lavinia, “we cannot recover from the patrons of the school, because Lavinia has broken her contract with us, hut we will give her the school hills,” which they averred would have been worth $350 for the session, had she finished it; and a witness swore that the hills would have been worth $306 59, and that the trustees had not collected any of these bills, save and except 75 cents. “ The trustees also offered to let Lavinia return and finish the session after her mother should get well.” To this Lavinia replies, that her mother remained sick a long time. Just when her mother did get well does not appear. That lady, signing herself “C. Hayes,” proved the age of Lavinia, and on cross-examination offered another reason why she did not return, which the defendants made a point against Lavinia, and, regardless of the sparse population of the country, they charged it as her “fault.” The mother says, “William L. Horde commenced visiting Lavinia about the time she returned from Corsicana to Bell county. If he visited her before that time, I am not aware of it. She remained at my house until her marriage with said Horde. I do not know whether her • engagement with William Horde kept .her from returning to Corsicana to complete her school or not.” Lavinia blessed William Horde at the altar in October, 1856. By the laws of Texas, marriage gives the female her majority. And on the 29th of July, 1858, joined by her husband, who seems to have been slow to espouse her quarrel, Lavinia commenced suit for the value of her services. And such a congeries of petitions, amended petitions, answers, amended answers, replications, rejoinders, exceptions, evidence, instructions, bills of exceptions, motions, and counter-motions, has rarely befogged any case.
The pleadings, however, may be resolved into the claim of Lavinia for payment at the rate of $50 per month for four scholastic months; the answers of the defendants that the action was not brought within two years; that she had forfeited her contract; and that they had been damaged $350 by loss of the school bills, and $150 for fitting up the house; which sums they plead in reconvention, and insisted upon by proofs and instructions. To the plea of limitation, Lavinia replied, that she was an infant when she taught, and remained an infant until her marriage, since which, time two years did not elapse before she commenced her suit. To this the trustees replied, that she was doing business on her own account, with the consent of her parents, and that it was a fraud not to tell them of her minority.
We have seen that the proofs were with her as to her age and marriage, and they were with the trustees as to her “ acting for herself,” (which seems to have been immaterial.)
A custom was proved that one hundred school days make five months. The court instructed the jury that the contract was divisible, and that Lavinia was entitled to the value of the time she did teach at the pro rata rate, that is, $50 per month. The jury gave her $200. The judge overruled a motion of ten pages for a new trial, and rendered judgment. The defendants appealed, but assigned no errors.
Unfortunately, Lavinia suggested delay, and this opened the errors of record, and compelled the court to state a different measure of damages.
[The suggestion is given in full, in order that it may be seen that one of the grounds of suggestion was that the appellants had not assigned errors. Therefore, to suggest delay is less safe than a motion to affirm without reference to. the merits.]
J. L. Halbert, for appellants.
—It is respectfully suggested, that the court below erred in charging the jury that the contract was “ divisable.” For there was no monthly hiring, or stipulation as to what pay per month appellee (L. A. Horde) was to receive, but the contract was entire, that she was to teach jive months in consideration of $250, and she cannot recover without averring performance on her part, or some act of appellants preventing her performance. (Shaw v. Lewiston Turnpike Company, 2 Pa., 454; 2 Pars. on Con., 171; Ripley v. Chipman, 13 Vt., 268; Sutton v. Tyrrell, 12 Ib., 79; Hunt v. Otis Manufacturing Company, 4 Met., 465; Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Ib., 286; Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick., 528; Sickles v. Pattison, 14 Wend., 257; Ketchum v. Eversson, 13 Johns., 365; Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cow., 63; Marsh v. Rulesson, 1 Wend., 514; Stak v. Parker, 2 Pick., 267.) The case of Davis v. Maxwell, in 12 Met., was fully recited.
Li the case of Baird v. Ratcliff, 10 Tex., 81, this court said, if the plaintiff had voluntarily abandoned his contract, he could not recover on a quantum meruit; and it is hard to tell how, under the proof, this can be deemed aught else than a voluntary abandonment, for it is not even averred in appellee’s petition that the abandonment was for the purpose of visiting an afflicted parent, but only that the school was abandoned during said visit.
Lavinia Horde’s refusal to complete her term of service after the recovery of her mother, when requested to do so by appellants, is deemed an effectual answer to her demand for a quantum meruit. (Shaw v. Turnpike Company, 3 Pa., 445; Preston v. Finney, 2 Watts & Serg., 55.)
W. II. Neblitt, for appellees.
—“How come appellees, in above-entitled cause, and suggest that this case was appealed for delay, and ask that they be allowed the damages in such cases granted by the law, and, there being no assignment of errors by appellants, that the judgment of the court below be affirmed.”

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—We think the court held rightly, that the action was maintainable, though the plaintiff" had not fully performed her undertaking, according to the terms of the contract. Although there is great diversity of decisions and opinions on the question, we think the better opinion and the course of decisions of this court support the ruling of the court below upon that point. The subject was very ably examined by Chief Justice Parker, in the case of Bolton v. Turner, 6 N. H., 497, and much of the difficulty caused by the disagreement and want of. harmony among the cases was removed by his harmonious opinion. (See also Sedg. on Meas. Dam., § 215 n, 2d ed.)
But we think the court erred in the instruction to the jury upon the measure of damages. Although the failure to complete performance ought not to be deemed the fault of the plaintiff", neither was it the fault of the defendants; and in that case the plaintiff can only recover quantum meruit. The amount for which the defendants ought to he charged is only the reasonable worth, or the amount of benefit they received from the services actually rendered, not to exceed the contract price. The contract price, however, does not furnish the rule, but the actual value to the defendants of the services rendered, subject to that limitation. The charge of the court made the contract price the rule for the measure of the damages absolutely, for the jury were instructed that the plaintiff was "entitled to recover pro rata pay for services already rendered." The true rule was here departed from, and the jury were required to find for the plaintiff according to the contract price, though the value of the services to the defendants may not have been so much. This is error, for which the judgment must be reversed.
There is no assignment of errors; and, as the error does not go to the foundation of the action, and is not, therefore, of a character to require notice without an assignment of error, we might have affirmed the judgment, and put an end to this unfortunate litigation, had not the appellee seen proper to suggest delay. That requires a revision and reversal of the judgment for any error apparent upon the record, though not assigned as error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
Remanded.