Case Name: David A. SPAETH, Respondent, v. Ann WARREN, n/k/a Ann Hiegel, Appellant
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1991-12-03
Citations: 478 N.W.2d 319
Docket Number: No. C9-91-879
Parties: David A. SPAETH, Respondent, v. Ann WARREN, n/k/a Ann Hiegel, Appellant.
Judges: Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, P.J., and CRIPPEN and LOMMEN, JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 478
Pages: 319–328

Head Matter:
David A. SPAETH, Respondent, v. Ann WARREN, n/k/a Ann Hiegel, Appellant.
No. C9-91-879.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Dec. 3, 1991.
Review Denied Jan. 30, 1992.
James R. Peterson, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Jill I. Frieders, O’Brien, Ehrick, Wolf, Deaner & Maus, Rochester, for appellant.
Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, P.J., and CRIPPEN and LOMMEN, JJ.
Retired judge of the district court, acting as judge of the Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 2.

Opinion:
OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge.
The trial court granted respondent David Spaeth's motion for summary judgment in a paternity action, basing the adjudication on the concession of Ann Hiegel, the child's mother, that Spaeth is the child's biological father. Hiegel appeals from the judgment, raising issues of proper parties to the action, best interests of the child, visitation, and appearance of parties at a motion hearing.
FACTS
Appellant Ann Hiegel and respondent David Spaeth dated from April-August 1987. Hiegel admits that Spaeth is the only man with whom she had sexual intercourse during that time. During July 1987, Hiegel conceived a child, M.J.W., who was born on May 6, 1988.
In December 1987, Spaeth was convicted of second degree burglary and began serving a 38-month prison sentence. Spaeth was released from prison in December 1989. He is currently a college, student at St. Cloud State University and works part-time as a nursing assistant. Hiegel has refused contact with Spaeth since before. MJ.W.'s birth, and Spaeth has never visited or provided support for M.J.W.
Hiegel married Mark Hiegel in August 1990. Mark Hiegel treats M.J.W. as his own son. In October 1990 Mark Hiegel filed a petition to adopt M.J.W.
While in prison, Spaeth initiated a paternity action to have himself declared the father of M.J.W. Based on the fact that Spaeth's paternity is undisputed, the trial court granted Spaeth's motion for summary judgment, adjudicating Spaeth to be MJ.W.'s father. Spaeth did not appear in person at the motion hearing. The court concluded that Spaeth was entitled to reasonable visitation and owed M.J.W. a duty of support, and that there was no "reasonable purpose" for appointing M.J.W. a guardian ad litem at that time. However, the court did not set visitation or child support and reserved jurisdiction over those issues. Hiegel appeals, contending; (1) M.J.W. and Mark Hiegel should have been made parties to the action (2) the court should have considered MJ.W.'s best interests in determining paternity (3) the court erred in stating Spaeth was entitled to reasonable visitation (4) the record should be corrected to reflect that Spaeth did not personally appear at the motion hearing.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in declining to join M.J.W. and Mark Hiegel as parties to the paternity action?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to consider MJ.W.'s best interests in determining paternity?
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that David Spaeth is entitled to visitation?
4. Did the trial court err in stating that David Spaeth personally appeared at the summary judgment motion?
ANALYSIS
I.
On appeal from summary judgment, this court reviews the record to determine whether issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn.1989).
Hiegel contends that M.J.W. and Mark Hiegel should have been named as parties to the paternity action under the parentage act, Minn.Stat. § 257.51-.74 (1990). Under Minn.Stat. § 257.60 (1990), "[t]he child may be made a party to the action." Thus, the determination whether to join a child as a party is usually discretionary. See Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (Supp.1991) ("may" is permissive when used in statutes); Minn.R.Civ.P. 21. However, the parentage act specifically requires the child to be made a party whenever:
an action to declare the existence of the father and child relationship is brought by a man presumed to be the father or a man who alleges to be the father, and the mother of the child denies the existence of the father and child relationship.
Minn.Stat. § 257.60(3) (1990). This language does not apply here. Although Spaeth is the presumed father, Hiegel does not deny the existence of the father and child relationship. She concedes that Spaeth is MJ.W.'s biological father. See Minn.Stat. § 257.52 (1990) (father and child relationship refers only to "biological or adoptive father").
Hiegel asserts that case law requires that children be joined in paternity actions, citing Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871 (Minn.1989). Johnson concerned whether res judicata barred a child from bringing a separate paternity action where the mother's paternity action against the same man had been dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 874. Johnson is thus factually distinguishable from this case because it concerned the issue of whether the child could initiate a separate paternity action rather than whether a child could join such an action. Id. at 872. Moreover, Johnson contained a more compelling reason for requiring a child to be joined as a party since denial of the right to bring a separate action would have meant that paternity could not have been established. In allowing the child in Johnson to pursue a separate action, the court noted the desirability of requiring children to be joined in paternity actions and suggested that the legislature consider amending permissive language regarding joinder of children. Id. at 875. That the legislature has thus far failed to do so is further evidence that joinder under these circumstances is permissive and not mandatory.
Here, MJ.W.'s interests were adequately addressed in Spaeth's action, especially since issues of visitation and child support were not determined. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to join M.J.W. as a party.
Hiegel also claims that Mark Hiegel should have been named a party to the action under Minn.Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (1990) because he met the criteria to be a presumed father. Mark Hiegel would be presumed M.J.W.'s biological father if
[wjhile the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child.
Id. This section must be construed liberally, to achieve its "remedial and humanitarian purposes." Larson v. Schmidt, 400 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn.App.1987) (quoting Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Minn.1978)).
While Mark Hiegel has received M.J.W. into his home, he has not held M.J.W. out as his biological child. He has encouraged M.J.W. to call him "Daddy" and has, commendably, provided him financial and emotional support. However, he has taken no action to assert paternity at any time, and M.J.W. does not use his surname. See Pierce v. Pierce, 374 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Minn.App.1985) (man not presumed father where, among other reasons, he "took no action to claim paternity"), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 4, 1985). Mark Hiegel's decision to petition to adopt M.J.W. rather than pursue a paternity adjudication shows he did not hold himself out to be MJ.W.'s biological father. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to make Mark Hiegel a party to the action.
II.
Hiegel further contends the trial court erred in adjudicating paternity without determining whether to do so would be in MJ.W.'s best interests. Minnesota's parentage act is based on the Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 295 (1987) (UPA), which has been adopted in some form by eighteen jurisdictions. 9B U.L.A. (Supp. 1991 at 2). The UPA requires a pre-trial recommendation concerning whether the "best interest of the child" would be served by "a judicial declaration of the [parental] relationship." Unif. Parentage Act § 13, 9B U.L.A. 320 (1987). However, the Minnesota parentage act does not require a pre-trial best interests consideration except when the trial court recommends that the matter be compromised by an agreement between the alleged father, mother, and child, wherein the father and child relationship is not determined but the alleged father undertakes a defined economic obligation to the child. Minn.Stat. § 257.64 (1990). Moreover, other than the pre-trial reference to best interests, neither Minnesota's parentage act nor the UPA suggests that a determination of paternity should include analysis of whether a child's best interests would be served by the adjudication. This is consistent with the purpose of a paternity action, which is to legally determine a biological parent of a child. See Minn.Stat. § 257.54 (1990). We note as well that some actions involving children specifically require a best interests analysis. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 259.28 (1990) (adoption); Minn.Stat. § 260.221, subd. 4 (1990) (termination of parental rights); Minn.Stat. § 518.17 (1990) (custody); Minn. Stat. 518.175 (1990) (visitation). Here, however, we find no statutory requirement or directive to consider a child's best interests in adjudicating paternity.
Furthermore, Minnesota courts have not interpreted the parentage act to require a best interests analysis. In Nicholson v. Maack, 400 N.W.2d 160 (Minn.App.1987), which Hiegel cites as requiring a best interests analysis in all Minnesota paternity actions, the court required a guardian ad litem to consider the best interests of the child in determining whether to initiate a paternity action on behalf of the child. Nicholson, 400 N.W.2d at 165. This requirement applied only to the guardian ad litem, not the court, and is consistent with the role of a guardian ad litem in acting on a child's behalf. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 260.-155, subd. 4 (1990) (guardian ad litem appointed in juvenile proceedings "to protect the interests of the minor"). Nicholson does not require a best interests analysis in paternity actions, nor has any other Minnesota case required its consideration.
In raising the "best interests" issue, Hie-gel appears to attempt to address whether Spaeth has met his parental obligations and whether he is fit to be MJ.W.'s father. These issues are more properly determined in an action to terminate parental rights under Minn.Stat. § 260.221-.245 (1990). As neither the parentage act nor Minnesota case law requires the child's best interests to be considered in determining paternity, the trial court did not err in adjudicating paternity by following the statutory criteria enumerated in the parentage act.
The dissent has ardently described application of the best interests test in proceedings not involving determinations of parentage. In custody, visitation, adoption, and termination of parental rights proceedings, all related to where and with whom a child will live, the legislature has specifically required the court to consider the child's best interests. The parentage determination here, however, only identifies a child's biological parent. It does not logically follow that because the legislature adopted the best interests standard for living arrangements of a child and omitted that same standard for a legal determination of a biological fact, that the standard should now be judicially grafted onto the parentage act. A child's best interests simply are irrelevant to the biological determination.
We also strongly disagree with the dissent's characterization of three decisions of other jurisdictions as constituting a "trend for considering a child's best interests prior to a paternity adjudication." Of the three named cases, only two emanate from jurisdictions which, like Minnesota, have adopted the UPA. See In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254 (1987); 9B U.L.A. (Supp.1991 at 2) (Kansas and Washington among the 18 jurisdictions which have adopted the UPA). Minnesota, unlike Kansas and Washington, excised the portion of the UPA referencing "best interest of the child." UPA § 13, 9B U.L.A. 320 (1987); Minn.Stat. § 257.64 (1990). In the third case, C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990), the court's decision that a putative father had a common law right to bring a paternity action where the mother of the child was married to another man was based not on "best interests of the child," but rather on the existence of a "substantial parent-child relationship" between the putative father and child. C.C., 406 Mass. at 689-90, 550 N.E.2d at 372.
III.
The trial court concluded that Spaeth is entitled to reasonable visitation with M.J.W., but reserved jurisdiction over visitation. Hiegel contends this language could be used by Spaeth to gain visitation with M.J.W. without consideration of the guidelines enumerated in Minn.Stat. § 518.-175 (1990), as required by the parentage act. Minn.Stat. § 257.541, subd. 2 (1990). Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1 requires the court to grant the noncustodial parent visitation rights "to maintain a child to parent relationship that will be in the best interests of the child." We agree that the order must be modified to state that no visitation schedule may be established without consideration of the required statutory factors. Upon proper motion, the trial court may consider this issue.
IV.
Contrary to the trial court's statement in the order for judgment, Spaeth did not personally appear at the summary judgment motion hearing. This minor error is not a basis for reversal. See Miller v. Hughes, 259 Minn. 53, 62, 105 N.W.2d 693, 699 (1960).
DECISION
Affirmed as modified.