Case Name: The Liberty Insurance Company of the City of New York, Respondent, v. The Central Vermont Railroad Company and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Eugene H. Ladd and William E. Smallman, Composing the Copartnership of Ladd & Smallman
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-07
Citations: 19 A.D. 509
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Liberty Insurance Company of the City of New York, Respondent, v. The Central Vermont Railroad Company and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Eugene H. Ladd and William E. Smallman, Composing the Copartnership of Ladd & Smallman.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 509–518

Head Matter:
The Liberty Insurance Company of the City of New York, Respondent, v. The Central Vermont Railroad Company and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Eugene H. Ladd and William E. Smallman, Composing the Copartnership of Ladd & Smallman.
Warehousemen—goods stored, destroyed by fire—burden of proof as to negligence — res ipsa loquitur does not apply fo a fire—the opinion of a referee considered by the appellate court to ascertain the grounds of his decision.
The fact that an appellate court has affirmed a judgment in one action based upon negligence, to the effect that no negligence existed, is not conclusive in its decision of another action arising out of the same occurrence in which it was found by the trial court that negligence did exist.
In such a case it becomes the duty of the appellate court to ascertain the cause of such difference, and when an opinion has been delivered by the trial court it will look at it to ascertain the standpoint from which the trial court viewed the evidence, and to see whether it came to its consideration with any erroneous views as to the rules which should govern the decision of the case—for example, as to the party upon whom rested the burden of proof.
Where, upon an examination of the opinion of a referee, delivered in an action brought against warehousemen to recover for a loss by fire, sustained through their alleged negligence, of grain stored in their elevator, it appears that the referee considered that, after the plaintiff had proved the fact of the fire, the burden of proof then rested upon the defendants to show that they were, not ■ negligent, the judgment must be reversed. Where, in such a case, the defendants, by their answer, have denied the fact of negligence, the burden of proof never changes, and it lies with the plaintiff at all times to prove the fact of negligence, notwithstanding the rule of law that a demand made of warehousemen and their refusal to deliver makes out a, prima facie case of liability upon their part.
Where goods stored in an elevator are destroyed by fire, the maxim res ipsa loquitur hgfs no application, as fires often occur without negligence, and it is requisite that the plaintiff should go farther and show from the attendant facts and circumstances that the fire resulted from the negligence of the parties in control of the elevator.
Facts stated which the court considered to be insufficient to show that a fire which destroyed an elevator was caused by the negligence of its owners or that of their employees.
Appeal by the defendants, The Central Vermont-Railroad Company and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of St. Lawrence on the 1st day of Juné,,'1896, upon the report of a referee.
The defendants, with the exception of Ladd ■& Smallman, are corporations, and at the time of the fire hereinafter mentioned operated together an elevator situated at Ogdensburgli, receiving, transporting, storing and delivering' grain from. vessel's arriving at Ogdensburgli.
Some' time in August,. 1890, Ladd & Smallman shipped to themselves at Ogdensburgli about 10,000 bushels of grain; upon' its arrival it was transferred from the vessels to such elevator, and was there stored and kept pursuant to a general agreement by Ladd & Smallman with the' superintendent of said elevator that it was so to be kept and forwarded to them from time to time as- requested..
On or about the 9t'h day of September, 1890, the elevator was destroyed by fire and the grain therein was burned of damaged, •
The plaintiff is an insurance corporation with which the firm of Ladd & Smallman had insured the grain in said elevatorthe plaintiff paid the loss thereon and has become subrogated to the rights of Ladd & Smallman.
The elevator was situated' on the bank of the St. Lawrence river; it was. 180 feet in length, by 80 feet in width, and its height from the dock was. Ill feet. There were docks on.three sides of. it, -and the ■ vessels were unloaded into the elevator on the east and west sides. ' ■ . •
The outer walls of the building up to the bottom of the bins hereinafter referred to, Were of brick, and about twelve inches thick;. above, that the Walls were of wood veneered with brick, about the' thickness of a single brick. .
Upon, the' first floor there were several doors of iron. The upper part of the building consisted of bins for the diolding and storage of grain; the height' of these bins was-about fifty or sixty feet, and for that distance there were no windows or other openings in the building. The bottom of the bins formed the ceiling of the first, story. On the east and west sides, of the building were projections built of wood coming down to within about twelve feet of the dock, and in the upper part of each projection was an iron door which led into the main building - some seventy .feet above the dock; there was an opening from each of these projections into the building, about thirty feet above the dock, through which a wooden spout was constructed to receive the grain coming from the marine leg and conveying it to the receiving bin immediately on the inside of the elevator wall.
• The marine leg, so called, was substantially an iron box about fifty-six feet long inside the wooden projection; at each end was a pulley around which passed a belt carrying buckets for scooping up the grain. The lower part of the marine leg was free, and when a boat was to be unloaded it was lifted from the dock, lowered into the.hold of the vessel, and by means of machinery the buckets were kept revolving and scooping up the grain from the hold of the vessel and carrying it up to the spout, from whence it passed through the wall of the elevator into the receiving bin above mentioned, Erom the receiving bin the grain passed into what was called a hopper bin, in or at the bottom of which were located scales for the purpose of weighing grain; this hopper or weighing bin rested upon the first floor of the elevator building. At one side of this weighing bin was a lofting leg which was constructed upon the same general principle as the marine leg situated outside of the building; it was constructed of iron and was about sixty-five feet in height; inside of it ran a belt upon which were fastened buckets that carried the grain from the weighing bin to the top of the building; from thence it was distributed into the various bins for storage. The bottom of the lofting leg containing the lower pulley, around which passed the belt to which the buckets were attached, extended about four feet below the floor. The bottom of the lofting leg went into what is' called a boot composed of iron, and that rested on a timber upon the ground under the floor. The first story of the elevator was about fourteen feet high.
Around the bottom of the lofting leg and below the floor was a wooden bin three or four feet deep used to receive the grain from the lofting leg in case it became choked.
The arbor, so called, upon which the iron pulley at the bottom of the lofting leg was fastened, revolved in a box of iron packed with Babbitt metal; the arbor required frequent oiling to prevent friction. The operation of the lofting leg and the hoisting of the grain caused a considerable amount of dust to accumulate around the bottom of the leg inclosed in the small box of iron above described.
There is evidence to show, although it is controverted, that the dust accumulated during the day from the operation of the elevator had not been swept or cleaned out the evening before the fire at the close of the day’s business, something that the rules of the company required its employees to do. ’ •
The fire when, first discovered was in the' wooden projection on the west side of the building, about thirty-five feet above the dock, being seen through the second- window in such projection. The theory of the 'plaintiff is that the arbor at the foot of' the lofting leg became overheated and set fire to the accumulations of dust there, and the fire was then transmitted through the weighing bin; into the receiving bin, and thence through the wooden spout into the projection, there being communication through these different places.
The referee found that there was negligence upon the part of the defendants which caused the fire in question, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which j udgment the defendants appeal to this court.
Louis Hasbrouck, for the appellants.
John. P. Hellas, Julien T. Davies and Charles E. Hotchkiss, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Herrick, J.:
An action arising out of. the same fire which gives rise to the appeal now here has heretofore been before us (North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. C. V. R. R. Co., 9 App. Div. 4), and in that case the referee found that the fire was not caused by the negligence of the defendant, and this court, after a consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the decision of the referee in that respect was correct.
I have not been able to find, nor have counsel pointed out, any substantial difference.between the evidence in that case and the one now before us.
While, the fact that this court in a former case affirmed a judgment, where the finding as to negligence was directly the contrary to the finding in this case, is not conclusive (Underwood v. Cook, 3 N. Y. St. Repr. 467); and while it may well happen that, in a case that is somewhat- close upon the facts, the court, upon appeal, will not disturb a finding made either way, and as different minds,, equally intelligent and upright, may take different views of the evidence and come to diverse conclusions, and there being evidence to-sustain either conclusion, the appellate court, under well-settled. rules, would not feel at liberty to- reverse either as against the-weight of evidence, yet conflicting decisions upon the same evidence-are to be avoided, if -possible, being calculated, in' the non-professional mind at least, to lessen confidence in the administration of' justice.
When,- therefore, a case is presented where,.upon conflicting evidence, or evidence from which different inferences may be drawn,, the trial courts have come to directly opposite conclusions, one of which we have already sustained, it becomes our duty to ascertain, if possible, the causes for such differences, whether improper elements have been allowed to enter in, or the evidence weighed and the facts considered upon erroneous principles.
In all contests over questions of fact upon conflicting evidence, or evidence susceptible of different inferences, the question as to who has the burden of proof resting upon him is a very important one, and the decision of that question may, and frequently does, practically determine the finding as to the facts. Hence, the holding of the trial court in that respect becomes a matter of importance.
Formerly, in a properly tried case, this could be ascertained by.an inspection of the rulings upon requests to find, but under the present practice that resource, as a general rule, is not open to us. It seems to mé, therefore, .that when there is an opinion we may properly look into that to ascertain the standpoint from which the trial court viewed the evidence, and see whether he came to its consideration with any erroneous views as to 'the rules which should govern him in its consideration. (Kenyon v. Kenyon, 88 Hun, 211, and cases cited.)
It is somewhat difficult in this case to determine precisely just what views the referee had as to the burden of proof.
In the course of his opinion he says : " The demand by the bailor of his property in the possession of a bailee, and the simple refusal to deliver without explanation, is sufficient evidence of conversion — a loss or destruction of it, and would be deemed- sufficient proof to maintain an action and recovery of damages.
" Again, if the bailee alleges and proves that it has been destroyed -by fire, or had been stolen, he must show that the fire or the 'theft -occurred without his fault. •
" Hence it may well occur that the bailor, instead of proving a demand and a refusal, proves the destruction of the'property by fire. The party (plaintiff) has proved oné fact,, viz., that the fire destroyed -the property, but he has not proved the other fact, viz., that the fir.e '.occurred and destroyed the property without the fault of the bailee.
" Now, I think it well established by the cases that the nature of an accident may itself afford prima facie proof of negligence. (Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 544; Story on Bailments, 338, and other cases cited in Russell Manf. Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 50 N. Y. 121, 127.)
" Negligence may be inferred from the circumstances of the casé. Where the accident is one. which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened but'for w.antnf proper care on the part of the defendant, it is incumbent upon him to show that he had taken such precaution as prudence would require, and the failure to furnish, the proof, if it existed, it would be in his .power' to make, may subject him to the inference that, such precautions were omitted. (Scott v. London, etc., Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596.) "
Taking these passages in connection with- the rest of'his opinion, it seems to me that he approached the consideration of the evidence and made his findings of fact upon the assumption that when the .fire was' proved that then the burden of proof rested upon the. "defendants to affirmatively prove that it occurred without negligence ripon their'-part. This, I think, was error.
The referee has held that the defendants were' acting as ware-.housemen in keeping the grain .in the elevator, and that such grain was retained in the elevator for the mutual benefit and. advantage of .the defendant corporations and of Ladd and Smallman, .and in so holding I think he was correct.
The complaint alleges the destruction of .the .grain by fire, and .also alléges. that such fire occurred by reason of. the defendants' -negligence ;: the .answer, denies any negligence upon the part of the defendants, and the. question of negligence was practically .the only question litigated.' . . :
As a rules, the burden of proof remains where the .issue madefy the pleadings places it, although, the weight of evidence on one side may have a controlling effect unless met by proof of the other party. (Blunt v. Barrett, 124 N. Y. 117.)
This rule has not been changed, nor the case of an action against a bailee for loss of merchandise made an exception to that rule by the case of Wimtringham v. Hayes ( 144 N. Y. 1), wherein it is said that, " While it is true, as a general proposition, that a bailor charging negligence on the part of a bailee rests under the burden of proof, yet, oftentimes, slight evidence will shift the harden to the bailee. In an action against a bailee for .loss or damage to goods by accident, proof of nature of the accident may afford prima facie proof of negligence."
The expression used in that and some other opinions as to the " shifting " of the burden of proof has led to some confusion and misapprehension as to the rule. The true rule, I think, is, as I have above .stated, the burden rests where the issue made by the . pleadings placed it, and it never changes.
" During the progress of a trial. it often happens that a party gives evidence tending to establish his allegation, sufficient, it' may be, to establish it prima facie, and it is sometimes said the burden of proof is then shifted. All that is meant by this is, that there is a necessity of evidence to answer the prima faeie case, or it will prevail; but the burden of maintaining the affirmative of the issue involved in the action is upon the party alleging the fact which constitutes the issue, and this burden remains .throughout the trial." (Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448; Heilman v. Lazarus, 90 id. 672 ; Spencer v. C. M. L. Ins. Assn., 142 id. 505.)
"As a general rule, where a bailee fails on demand to deliver to the bailor property to which the latter is entitled,, the presumption of liability arises, and if the goods cannot be found it furnishes the imputation of negligence' as the cause.
" But such prima facie case may be overcome when it is made to appear that the loss was occasioned by some misfortune or accident not within the control of the bailee; then the onus continues upon the bailor to prove that it was chargeable to the want of care of the bailee.
" And although it may be that the proof given by him, explanatory of the reason for non-delivery, may disclose circumstances which, in their nature, permit or .require the inference of negligence on his part, the affirmative of the issue is not shifted" to the defendant, but remains through the trial with the plaintiff. - ' "
" In the present case the plaintiff alleged in his complaint and it appeared that the loss resulted from the destruction of the factory by fire. Erom that fact alone no presumption arose to furnish .suprima faeie case against the defendant. But upon the main issue, whether it was attributable to the negligence of the defendant, the burden was with the plaintiff." (Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500.)
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff who alleges negligence against a warehouseman who accounts for his failure to deliver goods by showing "their destruction by fire.
The plaintiff must, in all cases, suing him for the loss of goods, allege and prove negligence. This burden is never shifted from him ; a demand and a refusal to deliver' unexplained are sufficient prima facie to show negligence, but if it appears either in the plaintiff's or defendant's proof that the goods were lost by fire, the evidence must show that .the fire arose from the negligence of the warehouseman. (Cluflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260; Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. R. & T. Co., 46 id. 271.)
I think, .therefore, that the burden of proof of- .tiegligence of the defendants rested upon the plaintiff all through the case.
Neither do I think that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to this case.
The occurrence of fires without negligence is frequent, and the mere fact of a fire does not justify the inference or constitute a prima facie cáse of negligence. (Whitworth v. Erie R. Co., 87 N. Y. 413; Stewart v. Stone, 127 id. 500.)
The attendant or surrounding circumstances may characterize the fire as one caused by negligence,"but the fire alone does not speak 'for itself, and proof of the circumstances showing the fire to have, occurred through the negligence of the defendants must be given by the plaintiff; he cannot rest by merely proving the fire and then call upon the defendants to show that it did not occur through their negligence.
In this.case it does not seem to me that the evidence, in addition to. the mere proof of the fire itself, establishes affirmatively the fact that it occurred by reason of the defendants' negligence. As first above stated, the plaintiff's .theory, which was apparently adopted by the referee, is that the arbor at the foot of the lofting leg became overheated and set fire to the accummulation of dust there, and the fire was then transmitted through the weighing bin into the receiving bin and thence through the wooden spout into the projection.
There is evidence - that the dust at the foot of the lofting leg had not been brushed away at the close of the day's work, as the rules adopted for the working of the elevator required, although that is disputed by the foreman of the elevator; and there is also evidence that the arbor was liable to become overheated by friction, and that it required constant oiling, and that the tubes through which the arbor was oiled had been removed ; and also evidence that the dust from the grain was inflammable in characterand there is also evidence that at the close of the day's work, and before nine o'clock in the evening, the arbor was somewhat heated, and that there Was a smell as though of something heated or burning, although there was no evidence of any fire at that time. The witness, testifying to the heat of the arbor, testified that it did not burn his hand in placing it upon it. There was evidence, also, that the watchman employed was inefficient. Notwithstanding this evidence I do not think that the facts in the case justify a finding that the fire was caused in the manner or originated at the place claimed by the-plaintiff.
The defendants controverted all the evidence as to the matters just stated, but assuming the plaintiff's testimony to have substantiated them all, yet, unless those acts of negligence or omissions caused the fire, it cannot be said that it occurred by reason of the defendants' negligence.
The finding that the fire occurred through the defendants' negligénce is predicated upon the assumption that its origin was at the foot of the lofting leg, and that the defendants' neglect in caring for the machinery at that point produced the fire, and that if the watchman had been efficient and alert he would have discovered it in its incipiency and extinguished it.
"Unless, then, it appears that it did so originate at the foot of the lofting leg, the whole foundation for the finding that the fire occurred by reason of the defendants' negligence is swept away.
The .first seen of the fire was between four and five o'clock in the morning in the west projection, about' thirty-five feet from the ground. . One witness testified'that he was in the building at the first outbreak of the fire and before any alarm was sounded, and that he saw fire in two places upon the first .floor. According to his¡ _ testimony .they were apparently small fires, and neither one of them was near the foot of the lofting leg or arbor.
Five other witnesses, four of them members of the fire department, came in there very shortly afterwards looking for the fire,'and all" of them testify that there was no fire in or upon the first floor of the building.
The lofting leg itself was composed of iron; there was no inflam-, mable material inside of it; the pulleys around which the belt passed "were of ironits lower end rested- in an iron boot, so that there; seemed, to be nothing that could furnish a blaze that, could be carried up through the interior of the pipe; the only inflammable material at or near the foot of the lofting leg was the dust, if any, the wooden box and the wooden floor; if the fire originated there it must have been the box. and floor that- furnished the burning material from which the fire would be communicated up through the receiving bin and thence through the spout into the west projection ; it could not go. up through the lofting leg, and must consequently have gone up directly from the floor. Not Only these facts, but the testimony of the witnesses I have referred to dispute the fact that the' fire originated either at the foot of the lofting leg or upon the first floor, so that neither, the alleged negligent care of the 'machinery of the lofting leg caused the fire, nor did the alleged inefficiency of the watchman' prevent its' early discovery, because however vigilant he may have been, he could not discover what did not there exist.
For these reasons the judgment should be reversed, the referee-discharged and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
All Concurred, except. Merwiñ, J., dissenting.
Judgment reversed, referee discharged, new trial granted, costs to j abide the event. .