Case Name: BERRY et al. v. DOLES et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-06-26
Citations: 438 U.S. 190
Docket Number: No. 76-1690
Parties: BERRY et al. v. DOLES et al.
Judges: with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 438
Pages: 190–203

Head Matter:
BERRY et al. v. DOLES et al.
No. 76-1690.
Decided June 26, 1978

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This appeal presents a challenge to the scope of the remedy allowed by a three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for failure of appellees to comply with the approval provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V).
In 1968, the State of Georgia enacted a statute intended to stagger the terms of the three members of the Peach County Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues. The then-existing statute, adopted in 1964, provided that all three posts were to be filled at four-year intervals. By operation of the 1968 amendment, the single at-large member was to be elected to a two-year term in 1968 and to a four-year term at subsequent general elections. Appellees concede, and the three-judge court found, that the 1968 statute constituted a change in voting procedures subject to the provisions of § 5 and that the change had been implemented without first having been submitted for approval either to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney General as required by § 5.
Four days prior to the August 10, 1976, primary election for the two seats on the Board not including the at-large post, appellants filed this action to enforce the requirements of § 5. Appellants' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were not acted upon until after the scheduled 1976 primary and general elections.
-On February 28, 1977, the three-judge court, without a hearing, enjoined further enforcement of the 1968 statute until such time as appellees effected compliance with § 5. However, the District Court refused appellants' request to set aside the 1976 elections, noting "the rather technical changes made in the county's election law by the 1968 amendment and, more important, the apparent lack of any discriminatory purpose or effect surrounding the use of the law in the 1976 elections." In expressly limiting its order to prospective relief, the District Court also relied on our decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969).
On April 26, 1977, the three-judge court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration.
In this Court, appellants take the position that the relief awarded in this case is wholly inadequate in failing to remedy the existing § 5 violation. Appellants assert that by refusing either to set aside the 1976 election or to order that all three Board members be elected in 1978, the District Court, at least until the 1980 election, leaves undisturbed the effects of the § 5 violation, thereby acknowledging that, at least for a time, local officials may successfully disregard § 5 requirements.
Appellees urge us to affirm the District Court judgment on grounds that the 1976 election involved the two Board posts which were not mentioned in the 1968 statute. Accordingly, appellees argue, election to these posts is not subject to § 5. However, even assuming that the District Court had the power to effect one of the alternative remedies suggested by appellants, appellees believe that the court below was correct in refusing to do so.
At our request, the United States, as amicus curiae, has filed a brief in this case. The Government takes the view, espoused by appellants, that the 1976 election was affected by the voting change prescribed in the 1968 statute and that the District Court's failure to require prompt compliance with § 5 permits the violation to continue. It is the submission of the United States that the question whether the staggering of Board terms provided for by state' statute in this case necessarily-has a racially discriminatory effect should properly be promptly submitted to either the District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney General in conformity with the approval procedures set forth in § 5.
In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), decided after Allen, supra, we had occasion to address the remedy issue which now confronts us. We indicated in that case that "[i]n certain circumstances . it might be appropriate to enter an order affording local officials an opportunity to seek federal approval and ordering a new election only if local officials fail to do so or if the required federal approval is not forthcoming." 400 U. S., at 396-397. The circumstances present here make such a course appropriate.
In this case, appellees' undisputed obligation to submit the 1968 voting law change to a forum designated by Congress has not been discharged. We conclude that the requirement of federal scrutiny imposed by § 5 should be satisfied by appellees without further delay. Accordingly, we adopt the suggestion of the United States that the District Court should enter an order allowing appellees 30 days within which to apply for approval of the 1968 voting change under § 5. If approval is obtained, the matter will be at an end. If approval is denied, appellants are free to renew to the District Court their request for simultaneous election of all members of the Board at the 1978 general election.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed insofar as it holds that appellees have violated the approval provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; the judgment is reversed insofar as it denies affirmative relief, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to issue an order allowing appellees 30 days within which to apply for approval of the 1968 voting change under § 5, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.