Case Name: The People ex rel. Alexander Meakim et al., Excise Commissioners, Resp'ts, v. Max Eckman et al., App'lts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-02-18
Citations: 43 N.Y. St. Rep. 457
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. Alexander Meakim et al., Excise Commissioners, Resp’ts, v. Max Eckman et al., App’lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 43
Pages: 457–468

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. Alexander Meakim et al., Excise Commissioners, Resp’ts, v. Max Eckman et al., App’lts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed February 18, 1892.)
1. Excise—Bond—Panties.
The excise commissioners of the city of New York are authorized by § 24, of chapter 628, Laws of 1857, to sue upon a bond given to the People upon the issuance of a license to sell strong and spirituous liquors at a° saloon in said city.
2 Same—Estoppel.
Where such a bond has been given, and a license has been granted upon the faith of it, the obligors therein are estopped from questioning the authority of the excise commissioners to demand the bond.
3. Same—Condition op bond—“ Disokdekly.”
Where a condition of such a bond was that the obligor would not suffer his place of business to become disorderly, and he sold liquor to.a minor under fourteen, which is an illegal act, Held, that the condition was broken. The meaning to be given '‘disorderly” is the common one, and not that of the Penal Code, where it treats of disorderly houses.
Appeal from an interlocutory judgment overruling the defend- . ants’ demurrer to the complaint.
Moses Weinman, for app’lts; Edward Browne, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J.
The complaint in this action is based upon an alleged breach of the condition of a bond given by the defendants to the People of the State of New York, upon the issuance to the defendant Eckman of a license to sell strong and spirituous liquors upon premises. The bond is in the sum of $250, and the condition reads: " That if during the time for which the said license shall be granted he shall not suffer his place to be disorderly, nor suffer any gambling table of any description within the premises so kept by him, or in any outhouse, yard or garden belonging thereto, nor suffer said premises to be used for immoral or unlawful purposes, and that if during the time for which the undersigned shall be licensed he shall keep and observe the provisions of the acts of the legislature known as chap. 628 of the Laws of 1857, and supplementary thereto, and amendatory thereof, then this obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect."
A violation of the condition of the bond is charged against Eckman in ¿his, that on a day specified he sold, and permitted his agent and servant to sell, strong and spirituous liquors to a minor under the age of fourteen years. The demurrer admits the facts, and, therefore, the three questions of law arising upon this appeal open for discussion are:
First. As to the plaintiffs' right to maintain this action.
Second. As to the commissioners' power to demand the bond as a condition of granting the license to Eckman.
Third. Was there a violation of the condition of said bond by the sale of intoxicating liquor tó a minor under the age of fourteen years.
In disposing of these questions relied upon by the appellant, it should be remembered, as stated by the learned judge Below, that " The instrument was exacted, but voluntarily executed and delivered to obtain the desired license." The learned judge was also of the opinion that the obligors should not be permitted to question the validity of an obligation thus assumed. Apart, therefore, from any statutory provision requiring a bond to be * given, the conclusion reached by the learned judge below, it seems to us, can be sustained. It is discretionary with the commissioners as to the persons to whom and the conditions upon which the license shall be issued. Where, therefore, in the exercise of a discretion conferred by law a bond is required as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license, it can Be enforced if its conditions are violated. u This results from the fact that it is a good common law bond.
We-have not overlooked in this connection the fact that a failure to wisely exercise their discretion can be remedied by an application to the court for a mandamus, and upon such an application the court undoubtedly would have the right to determine whether the conditions imposed by the commissioners were reasonable and just. In this case the commissioners required a bond and no objection was made to giving one, nor was any resort had to the court by mandamus for the purpose of determining their right to exact the same. Under such circumstances, the bond being executed became, as stated, a good bond at common law, and can be enforced. In addition, however, we are of opinion that statutory authority can be found for a determination of the questions presented upon this appeal favorable to the commissioners.
First. As to plaintiff's right to maintain the action, it must be conceded at the outset, that unless some authority is found in the statutes, that the obligee of the bond being the People of the state, an a'ction on their behalf could only be maintained by the" attorney general or district attorney. This view is enforced by reference to § 1962 of the Code, which requires such actions to be brought by the officers named where provision is not otherwise specially made.
The act of 1857, chap. 628, provides by § 22 and 24, by whom and in whose name actions shall be maintained. This question has been discussed in the two cases of the People v. Groat, in the 22d of Hun, 164, and in Board of Commissioners of Excise v. Burtis, in 103 N. Y., 140; 2 St. Rep., 755. The latter case decided that for penalties imposed by the act the commissioners of excise were the proper parties to maintain the action. Besides actions to recover penalties imposed by the act, for violations of the excise law, a cause of action exists in favor of some one for a breach of the condition of a bond. This has been specially provided for by § 24 of the Laws of 1857, as construed in the case of the People v. Groat, supra, wherein it was held that an action to recover the penalty incurred by the breach of the condition of s.uch a bond must be prosecuted by the officers named in § 24, which specially names the commissioners of excise as the persons to prosecute in the name of the People.
In view therefore of the express authority given by the statute as construed in the cases cited, it seems reasonably free from doubt that the commissioners of excise, as they have done here, could in the name of the People bring and maintain this action. However we-do not think that the appellants are in a position to urge such an objection upon this appeal, for the reason that it does not appear upon the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs have not legal capacity to sue, and therefore under § 488 and 489 of the Code the objection should be taken by answer and not by demurrer.
Second. Had the commissioners the legal power to demand the bond as a condition of granting the license to Eckman ?
There are two classes of bonds authorized to be taken, and required to be given before a license can be granted to an applicant ; one from applicants who desire to sell liquors to be drunk on the premises, commonly known as hotel and saloon licenses ; the other to applicants who sell liquors not to be drunk on the premises.
The license granted in this case is known as a " saloon license," and with that alone we have to deal upon this appeal. Many changes by amendments and new enactments have taken place in the excise laws since -the adoption of the general scheme in 1857. Laws of 1870, chap. 175; Laws of 1873, chap. 820; Laws of 1878, chap. 109; Laws of 1883, chap. 340, and chap. 496 of the Laws of 1886. Hone of these laws in express terms repeals the general scheme or act of 1857, and except so far as the subsequent acts may be inconsistent with or repugnant to certain sections thereof, which to that extent would be abrogated, what remains of the act of 1857 would still be of binding force and effect.
By § 4 of the act of 1857, the board of excise was given the power to fix the conditions before granting licenses. By § 6 it was provided that the licenses should not be granted to any persons to sell liquors to be drank on the pi emises, unless a person proposed to keep an inn, tavern or hotel. Section 7 (Laws of 1857) makes provision for the bond as follows: Nor shall such license to keep an inn, tavern or hotel be granted until the applicant shall have executed and delivered to the board of commissioners of excise a bond with the condition that such applicant during the time that he shall keep any inn' tavern or hotel will not suffer it to be disorderly, or suffer any gambling or keep a gambling table of any description within the inn, tavern or hotel, so kept by "him, or in any outhouse, yard or garden belonging thereto.
Section 15 provides that any person who shall sell liquors to a minor shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars for each and every offense, and provides by whom such penalty can be recovered.
It will thus be seen that the act of 1857 made no provision for a saloon license, the board of commissioners being restricted to the granting of licenses to persons keeping an inn, tavern or hotel. It is contended further, that because a specific penalty is prescribed for the violation of the law by selling liquors to a mihtir, that a recovery cannot be had on the bond. Our answer is, that the legislature having the power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors could impose dual penalties for the same offense. When the statute fixes both the penalty and declares it a misdemeanor for doing any act, such as selling liquor without a license, they are entirely independent of each other, and the conviction for the misdemeanor is no bar to an action for the penalty. People v. Stevens, 13 Wend., 341; Blatchley v. Moser, 15 id., 215. An examination of the laws referred to will show that no act of the legislature since the passage of the act of 1857 contains anything repugnant to, or inconsistent with, § 4 and 7, so that the situation to-day is, that, so far as the board of excise is concerned, no doubt exists as to their power and as to their duty to exact a bond from all persons who apply for a hotel, inn or tavern license. If, therefore, the contention of the appellant is correct that the commissioners had no power to exact a bond at all from him for a saloon license, then the anomaly is presented that while in all the other cases specified a bond must be. given, a saloon keeper has the right to obtain a license without being required to give any bond.
In 1870, by chapter 175, power was given to the commissioners to license any place to sell strong and spirituous liquors.^ This is the first authority for granting saloon licenses at all. It is true that as amended by the Laws of 1873, chap. 549, no mention whatever is made of the giving of a bond by a saloon keeper, .and this is equally true with regard to chap. 340 of the Laws of 1883. But chap. 496 of the Laws of 1886, being an amendment to chap. 340 of the Laws of 1883, provides that the board of commissioners of excise, "if all other requirements have been •complied with, have power to grant licenses to sell strong or spirituous liquors, etc., to be drank on the premises." Although, therefore, it may be true, as claimed by the appellants, that no mention of the bond as a condition of granting a license is, by express terms, made a provision of any of the acts subsequent to 1857, yet it seems from a fair construction of all the various provisions of the excise law that it was not the intent of the legislature to relieve the saloon keepers from giving a bond, while it imposes the condition upon others in the same business. In other words, we are of opinion that the general policy of the legislature
in extending the power to grant licenses to sell intoxicating liquors to others than to hotel and tavern keepers, was to formulate a gen•eral plan or policy equally applicable to all classes of licenses. 'This conclusion is justified not only by a reference to the general .scheme enacted by the act of 1857, but is fortified by the provision of the Laws of 1886, already referred to, which enables the commissioners, upon a compliance by the appellant with the other requirements of the law, to grant the license. One 6f the requirements of the law applicable to all persons entitled to a license was by the act of 1857 the giving of a bond, and there is nothing in any act subsequent to 1857 indicating that saloon keepers should enjoy greater advantages in the right to sell liquors than other licensees. The legislature undoubtedly intended to treat all applicants for licenses alike, and that the requirement of a bond as a condition in all cases was and is intended.
Third. Was there a violation of the condition of said bond by the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor under the age of fourteen years ?
The appellant contends that the licensee by selling liquor to a minor did not commit a breach of the condition of the bond, and that the sale of liquor to a minor is not such a violation as would entitle the commissioners of excise" to recover upon the bond. This contention is sought to be upheld by a rigid construction of the act of 1857 as to the purposes for which a bond can be exacted. It is insisted that the sale of liquor to a minor is not a violation of any of the conditions expressly fixed by § 7, and •that § 15 by affixing a penalty, and prescribing the manner in which the person guilty of selling liquor to a minor shall be punished, has thus indicated in what manner, and in what manner only, shall an offense of that character be visited. There can be no doubt that selling to minors is a violation of the law, and it is equally clear that the' appellant violated the express condition of the bond by failing to " keep and observe the provisions of the .acts of the legislature known as chapter 628 of the Laws of 1857, .and supplementary thereto, and amendatory thereof."
It is insisted, however, that the commissioners exceeded their power in inserting in the bond the language last quoted, and it is claimed that even though a bond could be exacted, its terms should be restricted to imposing conditions which are expressly prescribed, by the act itself.
The conditions of the bond are. not unreasonable, and they are: directed to cover the evil which it was the evident intention of. the legislature to prevent. We think it doubtful, moreover, if the appellants had the right to challenge the express conditions of the-bond, for the reason that the license was issued and they accepted, thp privilege, and in consideration thereof executed the bond, which has been sued upon., " Whenever a bond" is or shall be required by law to be given by any person in order to entitle him to any right or privilege conferred by law, or to commence any proceeding, it shall not be necessary for such bond to conform in all respects to the form thereof prescribed by any statute, but the same shall be deemed sufficient if it conform thereto substantially, -and do not vary in any manner to the prejudice of the rights of the party to whom and for whose benefit such bond shall have-been given." Supervisors, etc., v. Pindar, 3 Lans., 11; Farley v. McConnell, 7 id., 430; Foster et al. v. Foster, 7 Paige, 49; Ring v. Gibbs, 26 Wend., 510; Village of Warren v. Phillips, 30 Barb., 651.
We do not think, however, that it is necessary to strain the construction of the statute in the present case to uphold the power of the commissioners in maintaining their action upon the bond, for a violation of any of the provisions of the excise law not expressly enumerated in § 7 of the act of 1857, for the reason that, the breach assigned in the present case seems to be covered by the conditions in § 7 mentioned. One of the conditions so expressed is that the obligor will not suffer his place of business to-become disorderly. In determining the construction or meaning to be given to the word " disorderly," it will not do to resort to-the Penal Code, as claimed by appellants, and take the definition therein given as to what would constitute a disorderly house.
As defined by Webster it means " not regulated by the restraints of morality." Not complying with the restraints of order and law." This definition coupled with the one given by Bishop on Criminal Law, in defining what is meant by disorderly inns,, etc. (§§ 1111 and 1119), go far to support the contention that the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor under fourteen years of age is a disorderly act, and a breach of the condition of the bond. Moreover as all the questions raised upon this appeal have been examined in the cases of the People, etc., v. Burgett, and the Board of Excise v. Detterlein, Manuscript opinion, filed December 9, 1889, and determined adversely to appellants, further discussion is unnecessary.
We think the conclusions reached in those cases were correct,, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.