Case Name: Florence PERRY, Appellant, v. J. M. LANGSTAFF, M.D., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-04-23
Citations: 383 So. 2d 1104
Docket Number: Nos. 78-850/T4-93, 78-1092/T4-93A
Parties: Florence PERRY, Appellant, v. J. M. LANGSTAFF, M.D., Appellee.
Judges: CROSS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 1104–1107

Head Matter:
Florence PERRY, Appellant, v. J. M. LANGSTAFF, M.D., Appellee.
Nos. 78-850/T4-93, 78-1092/T4-93A.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 23, 1980.
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1980.
Arnold R. Ginsberg of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Hawkesworth & Schmick, P. A., Miami, for appellant.
John G. Rooney of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, P. A., Rockledge, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
In this malpractice action, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendant urologist, and timely appeal was initiated to this . Court. The plaintiff claimed the defendant negligently severed the right external iliac artery during surgery to remove kidney stones from the ureter.
The evidence viewed most favorably for the plaintiff supports, at least inferentially, the proposition that the defendant surgically severed the artery after identification was made of the ureter. Does this constitute actionable negligence based upon a departure from the accepted standard of care prescribed by Section 768.45(1), Florida Statutes? The appellant asserted at the trial level and in her appellate brief that it does. At least one expert witness, a vascular surgeon, Dr. LaRosa, testified in his deposition that this type of incident is recurrent even with the most careful urologic surgeons.
The defendant testified before the trial court that the artery should not be cut in normal circumstances, but in this case of abnormal scarring he did not admit that cutting the artery was negligence. He did make the statement, "In a normal anatomical decision, you'd have to be an idiot to cut it." He denied making such a decision, and the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court' was that this was not a normal anatomical situation, but an extraordinary case of sear tissue formation resulting from past surgical procedures and disease. No evidence, expert or lay, was presented to the trial court to support the breach of the requisite statutory duty under these facts.
Once the movant for summary judgment has met his initial burden of tendering competent evidence demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue. It is not enough to merely assert that a breach of duty existed. See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368 (Fla.1979); Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla.1965); Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla.1957). Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
CROSS, J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.