Case Name: In the Interest of B. L. S., a child
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1994-11-21
Citations: 264 Ga. 643
Docket Number: S94A1035
Parties: In the Interest of B. L. S., a child.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears, J., who concurs in part and dissents in part.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 643–649

Head Matter:
S94A1035.
In the Interest of B. L. S., a child.
(449 SE2d 823)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
Appellant was found to be delinquent by reason of his commission of an act of statutory rape in violation of OCGA § 16-6-3. He appeals and raises, among his enumerations of error, the juvenile court's denial of a challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-6-3.
1. Appellant urges that, to adjudge him to be delinquent for engaging in sexual intercourse with an under-age female "merely because [he] happens to be a male, and the [under-age] female . is not held to any sort of . . . responsibility is a clear violation, by state action, of equal protection under the law."
The age of criminal responsibility is 13. OCGA § 16-3-1. For purposes of delinquency, however, a "child" is one who is under the age of 17. OCGA § 15-11-2 (2) (A). OCGA § 16-6-4 provides penalties for child molestation identical to those for statutory rape. Thus, a woman of at least 13 years of age who engages in sexual intercourse with a male who is under the age of 14, "while violating a different Code section, is subject to the same penalties as a man who commits statutory rape." Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 305 (1) (260 SE2d 40) (1979). A "delinquent act" is "[a]n act designated a crime by the laws of this state. . . ." OCGA § 15-11-2 (6) (A). Thus, a female "child" under the age of 17 who engages in sexual intercourse with a male who is under the age of 14 is subject to the same delinquency adjudication as a male "child" who is adjudged to be delinquent by reason of his commission of statutory rape. It follows that OCGA § 16-6-3 "is not invalid as depriving [appellant] of equal protection of the law." Barnes v. State, supra at 305 (1).
2. Appellant enumerates the general grounds, urging that the evidence did not show his delinquency "beyond a reasonable doubt" as required by OCGA § 15-11-33 (c).
The victim's testimony showed that an act of sexual intercourse occurred. It was not necessary that the victim's testimony be corroborated in every particular and the corroborating evidence here was sufficient. Long v. State, 189 Ga. App. 131 (1) (375 SE2d 274) (1988). The evidence further showed that appellant and the victim were not cohabiting as husband and wife and that, due to their age, neither appellant nor the victim could have entered into a marriage contract without parental consent. OCGA § 19-3-2 (2). There was no evidence that parental consent had ever been given for appellant and the victim to marry. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that, in violation of OCGA § 16-6-3, appellant had engaged in sexual intercourse with an under-age female who was not his spouse and, thus, had committed a delinquent act. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
3. When not sitting, the part-time juvenile court judge engages in the private practice of criminal law in other courts. For this reason, appellant moved to recuse the juvenile court judge. Appellant's motion was denied after it was heard by another juvenile court judge and the denial of the motion is enumerated as error. Appellant's motion stated no viable grounds for the recusal or disqualification of the juvenile court judge. OCGA § 15-11-3 (g). Accordingly, it was properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Sears, J., who concurs in part and dissents in part.