Case Name: Jim Leeper and Ed. Powell v. The State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1890-05-24
Citations: 29 Tex. Ct. App. 63
Docket Number: No. 6936
Parties: Jim Leeper and Ed. Powell v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 29
Pages: 63–82

Head Matter:
Jim Leeper and Ed. Powell v. The State.
No. 6936.
Decided May 24.
Rehearing refused June 25.
1. Murder—Evidence—Charge of the Court.—On this trial for murder the State proved first that two persons, for the purpose of rohhery, assaulted, shot, and mortally wounded the deceased. The State then proved that a few minutes after the shooting of the deceased, and at the same locality, three other parties were assaulted by two persons; that one of the said three parties was shot and wounded by the said two persons; that one of .the said two persons who made the assault upon the said three parties was the defendant Powell, and that the other one resembled the defendant Leeper, and that the said assault upon the said three parties was made by the said two persons for the purpose of robbing the parties so assaulted. This proof of the assault upon the said three persons was objected to by the defense upon the ground that it was evidence of extraneous matter; of separate and distinct offenses committed subsequent to the offense charged in the indictment, and that it did not relate to or connect the defendants with the -offense on trial. Retd, that the objections were properly overruled. The proof showed that the several assaults, committed at the same place, almost simultaneously in point of time, and for the same manifest purpose, were so closely connected with, related to, and illustrative of each other as to make each res gestae of the other. Moreover, the evidence was competent upon the questions of identity and motive, was relevant to the main issue in the case, and was not extraneous matter within the rule which requires the charge of the court to restrict the jury in their consideration of extraneous matter admitted in evidence to the specific purpose for which it was admitted.
2. Same.—The State proved that after the arrest and incarceration of the defendant Powell his shirt was removed by the jailer, whereby certain bruises on his body, indicating that he had been struck one or more blows, were discovered. This proof Was objected to upon the ground that it amounted to the coercion of the defendant into giving evidence against himself. But failing to show that Powell was compelled to expose his body, or that his shirt was removed without his consent, or that any right of the defendants was prejudiced by the proof, the bill of exceptions raises no issue for revision.
3. Charge of the Court—Drunkenness.—In the absence of evidence tending to show the intoxication of the defendants, the trial court did not err in omitting to instruct the jury as to the law where a homicide is committed by a person who at the time is in a state of intoxication.
4. Same.—Upon the Law of Circumstantial Evidence the court gave in charge to the jury the usual form of instruction, but in addition concluded as follows: “ If you can account for or explain the facts and circumstances which you find from the evidence to be true upon any reasonable theory or' hypothesis consistent with the innocence of either of the defendants, then as to such defendant you must find a verdict of not guilty.” Reid, incorrect; but in the absence of exception, and considered in con nection with the preceding portion of the charge, and in the light of the evidence on the trial, the error is immaterial.
5. Same—Continuance.—Considered with reference to the evidence adduced on the trial, the absent testimony set forth in the defendants’ application for continuance was not probably true; wherefore the continuance is held to have been properly refused.
6. New Trial—Disqualification of a Juror—Cases Overruled.—Article 777 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the specific causes for which new trials shall be awarded, and none of the causes so enumerated embrace as a ground the disqualification of a trial juror. To authorize a new trial because of the disqualification of a juror who served on the trial it must be further made to appear that probable injury resulted to the defendant by reason of the service of such juror upon the trial. The cases of Lester v. The State, 2 Texas Court of Appeals, 432; Armendares v. The State, 10 Texas Court of Appeals, 44; Boren v. The State, 23 Texas Court of Appeals, 28; and Brackenridge v. The State, 27 Texas Court of Appeals, 513, in so far as they announce the contrary doctrine, are overruled.
7. Murder—Fact Case.—See the statement of the case for evidence held sufficient to support a capital conviction for murder.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
8. New Trial—Disqualification of a Juror.—-The ruling on the original hearing as announced in the sixth head note is the only ground relied upon for rehearing which is considered by this court. The majority of the court, adhering to the original determination of this question, announce the doctrine that the courts of this State must be controlled by the statutes of this State, to the exclusion of conflicting rules of the common law or the decisions of other States. Under our statute the disqualification of a juror, although such disqualification did not come to the knowledge of the defendant or his counsel until after verdict, is not of itself a cause for new trial, and can not be made a cause for new trial, unless it he further made to appear that probable injury resulted to the defendant by reason of the service on the trial of the disqualified juror. Furthermore, probable injury not being shown, it is immaterial that a juror disqualified in fact qualified himself on his voir dire, and that the defense is not chargeable with loches or want of diligence. For an elaboration of the question see the opinion of Willson, J., on the motion for rehearing.
9. Same.—Dissenting from the opinion of the majority on the motion for rehearing, Hurt, J., considering the whole question, holds that while the ground of disqualification, of the juror relied upon in this case—i. e., that the juror was neither a householder in in the county nor a freeholder in the State—is not per se cause for new trial, still, under certain circumstances other than a showing of probable injury to the defendant by reason of the service on the trial of such a disqualified juror, such disqualification can be made an available cause for new trial; that if, as shown in.this case, the juror qualified himself upon voir dire as a householder or freeholder, when in fact he was neither, and that if without loches or want of diligence on the part of defendant or his counsel such disqualification was not ascertained until after verdict, then such disqualification, without regard to the question of injury, is available as a ground for new trial, and such facts being affirmatively shown, new trial should be awarded. For an elaborate exposition of the doctrine, see in extenso the dissenting opinion.
Appeal from the District Court of Coryell. Tried below before Hon. C. K. Bell.
The appellants were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted in the first degree for the murder of J. T. Mathis, in Coryell County, Texas, on the 17th day of December, 1889. The death penalty was assessed against each of them.
Alex Dargent was the first witness for the State. He testified that in December, 1889, he lived on Cowhouse Creek, in Coryell County. At the time that Mathis was said to have been shot the witness was at Mr. Jackson’s house, about a mile and a half from the place where the shooting occurred. That place was on the Gatesville and Lampasas road, near the ten-mile post, and about fifteen steps from the crossing of Eiley’s Branch. Witness went to that place on the morning after the shooting and found blood stains at a point on the side of the road. Fences at that point formed a lane about fifty yards wide. About thirty steps further west on the road the witness found the place where mules attached to a wagon had turned suddenly around and run. At that point he found the tracks of a man who had evidently seized the head-trappings or bridles of the mules. They showed that the man had either jumped or been pulled around by the mules. From this point the mule tracks led off parallel with the road and then back into the road. The man’s track did not follow. At a point about sixty yards east of the branch the witness found where two horses had been hitched either to a bush or to a fence post. The horse tracks at that place were so indistinct—the ground being hard— that witness could not get a good measurement of them. In a swag or marshy place about twenty steps further east the witness found a distinct impression of a horse’s foot, and óf that track he took an accurate measure. The impression showed it to be a peculiar foot and unusually round in shape. It was the track of a shod horse. When later in the day the sheriff brought the defendant Powell into Gatesville the witness applied his measure to the foot of the bald-faced sorrel horse ridden by Powell. The measure fit it exactly. A 45-calibre cartridge hull was picked up at the place of the shooting.
Dr. J. C. Baird testified for the State that J. T. Mathis was shot on the night of December 17, 1889, and died from the effects of that shot on the morning of December 19, 1889. The fatal bullet entered the left side, and ranging upward passed through one kidney and the liver and out on the right side. By this witness the State, establishing the necessary predicate, proved the dying declarations of Mathis as follows:
“I was coming home from Gatesville. Just after dark, and just after I had passed the ten-mile post and crossed Eiley’s Branch, some one grabbed my mules which were hitched to the wagon in which I was riding. The mules 'shied to the right and jumped from the road. Just at this time a man stepped up to the left side of the wagon, presented a pistol at me and said, “Give up your money!” I pulled on the reins, but the mules about this time made a lunge and broke loose from the man who had been holding them. The man at the side of the wagon shot at me, the ball passing just back of my neck. My little boy was sitting by me on the wagon seat, and I pushed him off of the wagon seat down into the wagon bed. Just as I did so I came up even with the man who had hold of the mules, and he stepped forward, put his pistol close to me, and shot me through. The other man fired another shot at me but missed me. I I fell forward in the wagon. My mules continued to run and soon overtook the wagons of the other members of our party, by whom I was assisted home. I noticed the two men just before my mules were stopped, but supposed it was some of our crowd, and thought nothing about them until the mules were stopped. I did not know either of the men, but I could see that one was considerably taller than the other. The short man was the man who grabbed my mules, and he was also the man who shot me.” This dying statement of the deceased was proved in detail, as made to Dr. Baird, by W. M. Mathis.
W. K. Bates testified for the State that he was one of several persons, including the deceased, who took cotton to the Gatesville market on the fatal day. After selling his cotton and receiving about $125 in five dollar bills therefor, the witness went into Holmes’s saloon in Gatesville and bought a jug of whiskey. In paying for the whiskey he exhibited his roll of money. Witness did not know whether either of the defendants was in the saloon at that time. The several parties left Gatesville about the middle of the afternoon. The witness passed the ten-mile post about dark. He had traveled about 300 yards beyond that post when he heard three pistol shots fired at or near the said ten-mile post. A few minutes later the witness and his party were overtaken by Mathis’s wagon. Mathis, mortally wounded, was lying in the wagon. He was taken home, where he died about thirty-six hours later.
Pete Walker testified for the State that he was in the employ of A. J. Holmes, a saloon keeper in Gatesville, and tended bar on the day Mathis was shot. The defendants were together in Holmes’s bar room pretty much all of the time on the day of the shooting, but the witness could not say that either of them was in the bar when Bates bought the jug of whiskey mentioned by him in his testimony.
R. B. Wells testified for the State that on the day of the shooting of Mathis he went to his brother’s pasture and returned on the same evening. He traveled the Gatesville and Lampasas road. At about an hour and a half by sun the witness, returning to Gatesville, met two men about two miles from town. As he passed them one of them asked him, “How far is it a mile up the road?” Witness stopped, and observing that the men were strangers he scrutinized them closely. One of the men was the defendant Leeper and the other was the defendant Powell. Leeper was riding a bay horse and Powell a blazed-face sorrel. They were in their shirtsleeves, but had coats tied in bundles behind their saddles. The coats were bulky, and covered what witness took by shapes to be pistols. Witness asked the men their names. Leeper said, “ My name is Lusk; I laid six months in jail in this county for killing a man.” Witness replied, “ That is not so, for I know Lusk, and you are not he.” He then asked witness, “Do you know Albert Deeper?” Witness replied, “I know him well, and you are not he.” He then asked the men where they were going. Deeper replied, “ We are going as far west as the road is cut out.” Witness remarked, “ Then you will go a long ways.” He replied, “We want to go a long ways.” Sheriff Danham arrested Deeper in Gatesville on the next day, and witness and others arrested Powell at Buster’s house. They found at Buster’s house the horses ridden by the defendants on the previous day. When arrested Powell’s ear was found to be bruised and bloody. After Powell was put in jail his shirt was taken off, and two large whelks or bruises were found on his back, extending from the left to the right shoulder and inclining downward. While the witness was talking with the defendants on the road on the evening of the shooting, W. H. H. Harvey passed in a wagon, going towards Dampasas. A few minutes later the defendants left, going towards Dampasas.
W. H. H. Harvey testified for the State that he and the deceased and others hauled cotton to Gatesville on the day of the shooting. The witness having an ox team started home much earlier than the others of the party. At a point on the road about two miles from Gatesville the witness passed two men talking to R. B. Wells. One of those men was the defendant Powell. He was riding a blazed-face sorrel horse. The other man, whose features the witness did not get to see, was riding a bay horse. When witness reached the point on the road where it was intersected by "the Brown wood road, two miles beyond where he saw the men talking with Wells, he looked back and saw the same two men. Thenceforward he watched them, seeing them at intervals until he reached Hard Bargain "Springs, which was eight miles from Gatesville. At or near Hard Bargain they passed the witness and traveled on towards the place where Mathis was subsequently shot. W. K. Bates passed the witness at the nine-mile post, and Mathis passed him about a half mile further on. Witness followed as fast as he could make his oxen travel. When he reached a point within 500 yards of the ten-mile post he saw the fiasfi 0f a pistol fired at or near that post, but on account of the noise made by his heavy wagon he did not hear the report. Immediately after crossing Riley’s Branch, just beyond the ten-mile post, the witness saw the defendant Powell and the other man standing on the side of the road. One of them stopped the witness’s oxen while the other covered the witness with a pistol, and said, “ God damn you, give up your truck!” Witness replied, “All right, gentlemen,” but dropped his purse into the wagon bed. About this time two horsemen were heard coming up the road. They proved to be the witness’s son Will and Jack Bates. One of the men covered Bates with a pistol and ordered him to stop. Bates did so, and about that time witness’s oxen started off. One or the other of the men then ordered the witness to stop the oxen, which the witness did, and climbed out of the wagon. As he did so he turned his whip handle—a large one—so as to grasp the small end. He then observed that the defendant Powell, who; was covering his, witness’s, son with a pistol, had his back to witness. The witness thereupon struck Powell over the head with the whip handle, the blow glancing so as to strike the left shoulder. He then struck. Powell a blow across the back. Powell then turned and shot at but missed the witness. He fired again, the ball striking witness about the left hip, passing out at the end of the spinal column. Witness fell, and Powell fired again, the ball striking witness in the bottom of the foot. Powell and the other man then ordered Bates and Will Harvey to leave, which they did. As they started off witness called to Bates, “ Oh, Jack! ” Bates replied, “All right, Mr. Harvey,” and rode off. Powell and his companion then approached witness, turned him over and felt of his person. Powell’s-companion then said, “ Oh hell, he’s done for; let’s go.” They then left. Powell, the defendant, was the man who shot the witness, and the man who was with Powell was about the size, shape, and make of, and looked, like the defendant Leeper.
Jack Bates and Will Harvey corroborated the witness W. H. H. Harvey as to what transpired after they reached the scene of the assault on said W. H. H. Harvey. Bates testified that in every particular the defendantLeeper resembled the man who covered him with a pistol and robbed him.
Sheriff Lanham testified for the State that he arrested the defendantLeeper in Gatesville on the morning after the shooting of Mathis. Before placing Leeper under arrest he asked him if he was out on the Lampasasroad on the preceding day. He replied that he was. Witness then asked him what he was doing on that road. He replied that he had started to-Buster’s house, but being under the influence of liquor he went the wrong-way; that he discovered his mistake a few miles out from town and returned, reaching town about dusk. On that same evening witness, Wells, and others arrested Powell at Buster’s house, which was in the direction opposite from the place where Mathis was shot, and about twelve miles-distant from town. Powell told the same story as Leeper as to how became to be on the Lampasas road on the previous day. Buster showed witness a drawer in his house from which witness got two pistols, one of them being a 45-calibre. The State closed.
Alibi was the defense interposed by the defendants, but no witness fixed their whereabouts at the time Mathis was shot. J. V. Buster testified that they came to his house on the Sunday before Mathis was shot. They left his house to go to Gatesville on the day of the shooting. Witness did not know when they returned, but they were at his house when he, witness, got up on the next morning.
J. E. Thomas and G. P. M. Turner, for appellants.
W. L. Davidson, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
WILLSON, Judge.
Over the defendants' objections the State was permitted to prove that a few minutes after Mathis, the deceased, was .attacked and shot, and at the same locality, Bates and the two Harveys were assaulted by two persons; that the elder Harvey was shot by said two persons and severely but not mortally wounded; that one of said two persons making said assault was the defendant Ed. Powell, and that the other one resembled the defendant Leeper; that said assault was made by ¡said two persons for the purpose of robbing the persons assaulted. Defendants reserved a bill of exception to the admission of this testimony, from which it appears that the learned trial judge admitted it upon the ground that it was res gestee of the assault made upon Mathis, the deceased.
We coincide with the trial judge in his view of the testimony. The assaults upon Bates and the two Harveys were almost simultaneous with the previous assault made upon Mathis, and were made at the same place. Robbery was manifestly the motive actuating the assailants. They had deliberately planned the robbery of the parties assaulted and had laid in wait for them at the place where the assaults were committed. Each of the assaults was a part of the general scheme—a part of the conspiracy to rob the persons assaulted. They were s© closely connected with, related to, and illustrative of each other as to make each res gestee of the other. This testimony was essential to identify the parties who assaulted and shot Mathis, and to show the motive and intent of such assault. It bore directly upon the main issue in the case, and was not extraneous matter within the meaning of the rule which requires that the jury should be instructed to restrict their consideration of extraneous matter adduced in evidence to the specific purpose for which it was admitted. McKinney v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 626; Willson's Crim. Stat., sec. 2344.
We hold that said testimony was admissible, and that it was not required that the court should instruct the jury as to the purpose for which it was admitted and to limit their consideration of it to such purpose.
Furthermore, the main if not the sole reason of the rule which requires the court to restrict the jury in the consideration of extraneous matter admitted in evidence does not obtain,in this case. Defendants were being prosecuted for the murder of Mathis by shooting him immediately before the attack was made upon Bates and the Harveys. It was conclusively proved that Mathis died within a few hours from the effects of that shooting. None of the other parties assaulted were killed. Hence the jury could not have been influenced or misled by the testimony relating to the assaults upon Bates and the Harveys to convict the defendants of those assaults. It is not clear to the mind of the writer that in such case, even if the matter admitted in evidence was extraneous, that it would be error to omit to give an instruction limiting its consideration by the jury. It would be the better practice, perhaps, in such case to give such an in struction, but it is not necessary that this question should be here determined.
It is made to appear by another bill of exception that after the defendant Ed. Powell had been arrested and placed in jail his shirt was taken off his body by the jailer, and marks or bruises were found upon his body, indicating that he had been struck one or more blows. This testimony was objected to by the defendant upon the ground that it was compelling the defendant to testify against himself. We do not think that the bill of exception shows that any error was committed in this matter. It does not appear that the defendant was compelled to expose his body, or that his shirt was removed without his consent. Nor is it shown by the bill of exception what injury or prejudice might have been caused said defendant by the admission of said testimony. In the manner in which this ruling of the court is presented by the bill of exception it does not appear that any material error, if error at all, was committed. Willson's Crim. Stats., sec. 2368.
There is but one bill of exception reserved to the charge of the court, and that is, that it does not instruct as to the law where a homicide is committed by a person who at the time is in a state of intoxication. We are of the opinion that such instruction was not demanded by the evidence. There is no evidence in the record that the defendants were drunk at the time of the homicide. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the homicide was deliberately committed by persons who evidently were in possession of their full mental powers, and whose purpose was to rob, even at the expense of human life.
Counsel for the defendants object to the charge of the court upon circumstantial evidence. No objection was made to this portion of the charge in the court below. While the last sentence of the said portion of the charge may not be correct and should have been omitted, still the error, if error it be, was not, in view of the evidence in the case and of the preceding portion of said charge, calculated to mislead the jury or in any manner to injure the rights of the defendants. If said portion of the charge had been excepted to we are, not prepared to say that we would hold it to be free from error.
With respect to the absent testimony set forth in defendants' application for continuance, it is apparent, we think, in view of the evidence adduced on the trial, that said testimony was not probably true. Hence the refusal of the application for a continuance does not afford good ground for a new trial. Willson's Crim. Stats., sec. 2186.
It is made a ground in the motion for a new trial that B. F. Smith, who served on the jury in the trial of the cause, was not a householder in the county or a freeholder in the State. When tested upon his voir dire as to his qualifications to serve as a juror, the said Smith gave an affirmative answer to the question, "Are you a householder in the county or a free holder in the State?" Defendants and their counsel state, under oath, that at the time of accepting said juror they were ignorant of his disqualification and did not ascertain that fact until after the conclusion of the trial.
We will not stop to inquire into and determine the question as to the competency of the juror, for the reason that the mere disqualification of the juror is not a valid ground for a new trial. It is not a statutory ground. Code Crim. Proc., art. 777. In order to constitute it a good ground for new trial it must be further made to appear that probable injury had resulted to the defendant by reason of such juror having served upon the trial. O'Mealy v. The State, 1 Texas Ct. App., 180; The People v. The State, 6 Crim. Law Mag., p. 334, and note. There are some decisions of this court which hold to the contrary of the rule above stated. Lester v. The State, 2 Texas Ct. App., 432; Armendares v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 44; Boren v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 28; Brackenridge v. The State, 27 Texas Ct. App., 513. These decisions are not, we think, after a more thorough consideration of the question, consistent with the statute, and we therefore overrule them in so far as they hold that the mere disqualification of a trial juror is of itself good ground for a new trial, it not being shown that probable injury has been done the defendant by reason of the disqualified juror serving in the case. In this case it is not shown or even pretended that the juror Smith was not an impartial juror. Ho fact is made to appear which raises the slightest suspicion of the fairness of the jury which tried the case.
We hold that the court did not err in refusing the new trial because of the disqualification of said juror, even if he was disqualified.
We find the evidence amply sufficient to warrant the conviction and to justify the extreme penalty of the law.
There is no error apparent of record for which the conviction should be disturbed, and it is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges all present and concurring.'
ON MOTION FOB BEHEABING.
WILLSON, Judge.
A majority of the court adheres to the opinion heretofore rendered. Judge Hurt dissents from that portion of the opinion which holds that the mere disqualification of the juror Smith does not constitute ground for a new trial, and will deliver a dissenting opinion. He concurs in other views expressed in the original opinion. We shall therefore confine our discussion to the question as to whether or not the disqualification of said juror, if in fact he was disqualified, entitled the defendants to a new trial.
We shall not enter upon an investigation and review of authorities, for whatever may be the common law rule, or the rule established by the decisions of other States, we consider that in the decision of this question we must be controlled by our statute.
In this State for more than thirty years we have had a Penal Code and a Code of Criminal Procedure, which having been carefully prepared by distinguished, experienced, and able jurists, were adopted by the Legislature. These codes have been pronounced by the bench and bar of our State to be the most perfect system of criminal laws ever devised. It is declared to be the design of the Penal Code "to define in plain language every offense against the laws of this State and affix to each offense its proper punishment." Penal Code, art. 1. It is declared that the Code of Criminal Procedure "is intended to embrace the rules applicable to the prevention and prosecution of offenses against the laws of this State, and to make rules of proceeding in respect to the prevention and punishment of offenses intelligible to the officers who are to act under them, and to all persons whose rights are to be affected by them." Code Crim. Proc., art. 1.
We regard it as the imperative duty of this court, and of all other courts of this State, in the trial and determination of causes, to be guided and controlled by the statutes of the State, whenever there is a statute applicable to the question presented. Our observation is that many errors have crept into the decisions of the courts of this State, especially in criminal cases, by following common law rules and decisions of other States, overlooking our own statutes. These errors should be corrected whenever detected, and a strict adherence to statutes should be the rule governing courts in their decisions.
With respect to new trials in felony cases our Code of Criminal Procedure is specific, plain, and'emphatic. It provides that "new trials in cases of felony shall be granted for the following causes, and for no other." Then follows an enumeration of the causes for which a new trial shall be granted. Hone of the causes enumerated embrace as a ground the disqualification of a trial juror. What authority, then, has a court to grant a new trial for such cause? If such authority exists it is certainly not conferred by any express provision of the statute. Nor do we think that it is impliedly conferred. One of the statutory grounds for a new trial is, " Where the court has misdirected the jury as to the law, or has committed any other material error calculated to injure the rights of the defendant." Code Crim. Proc., art. 777. Under this subdivision the error committed must be a material one calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. Is it error for a person who is not a householder or a freeholdes to serve upon a jury? Hot necessarily. Such a person is not an illegal juror to the extent that his presence upon the jury will vitiate the verdict. Such disqualification is merely a cause for challenge. If chai lenged by the defendant it would be error to not sustain the challenge, but such error would not be material unless calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. In such case this court would not set aside the conviction unless it was made to appear that the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges and was compelled to accept an objectionable juror. Willson's Grim. Stats., sec. 2293.
In the case we are considering the juror was not challenged by the defendant. The juror having by his answers under oath shown that he was qualified, the court could not do otherwise than require the parties to pass upon him. Was this error? But if error, was it material error? It is not shown or pretended that the juror was not fair and impartial. It is not shown that he was corrupt, had been convicted of any felony, or was under indictment for felony, or that he was insane, or had such bodily or mental defects as rendered him unfit for jury service, or that he had been guilty of any misconduct as a juror. How then can it be said that his being a juror in the case was calculated to injure the defendant? Does the mere fact that a juror does not have a house or does not own land in this State render it probable that he would not try an accused person fairly and impartially? True, it is the policy of the law that jurors shall be either householders in the county or freeholders in the State, but we do not believe that this policy is founded on the supposition that the non-householders and non-freeholders in our State are morally unfit to serve as jurors. We think the reason of the policy is to induce men to become permanent citizens; to identify their interests with the interests of the State; to add to the prosperity of the community in which they are by having homes and by owning and cultivating lands and paying taxes thereon.
In conclusion, we will say that we rest our decision of this question upon our statute. We think the statute is not only plain but mandatory that a new trial in a felony case should not be granted because of the disqualification of a trial juror, although such disqualification was unknown to the defendant at the time of the trial, and although such want of knowledge was not because of any fault on the part of defendant or his counsel.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
DISSENTING OPINION ON THE MOTION BOB BEHEABING.