Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roger Daniel HARTMAN, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1980-08-01
Citations: 627 F.2d 7
Docket Number: No. 79-5126
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roger Daniel HARTMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before MERRITT, KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 627
Pages: 7–11

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roger Daniel HARTMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-5126.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 14, 1979.
Decided Aug. 1, 1980.
Roger Jon Diamond, Pacific Palisades, Cal. (court appointed), for defendant-appellant.
W. J. Michael Cody, U. S. Atty., Devon L. Gosnell, Asst. U. S. Atty., Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MERRITT, KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Hartman appeals from his jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and for aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(aXl), 846 (1976). He argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the District Court erred in instructing the jury with respect to accomplice testimony; (3) the District Court erred in denying a motion for suppression of evidence; and (4) the District Court erred in combining the conspiracy instruction with the instruction on aiding and abetting. For the reason set forth below, we reverse the judgment entered upon the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Hartman's conviction grew out of the undercover work of narcotics agent Mehr. On August 11,16, and 23,1978, Mehr purchased from one Carter in Memphis a total of approximately five ounces of methamphetamine (sometimes called "speed") for $10,-000. In an effort to determine and apprehend the person who was supplying Carter with the narcotics, Mehr offered to purchase an additional pound of speed. Carter advised he could obtain this amount and September 14, 1978, was set up as the date for delivery. On that date, Carter informed Mehr that his supplier was in town staying at the Airways Travel Lodge. Carter agreed to and did bring the narcotics later that day to Mehr's motel room. He advised Mehr that his source had two more pounds of narcotics in a lock box. Carter was then arrested and interrogated. He told Mehr that he had come to the motel with the defendant Hartman, who at that time was standing in the parking lot of the motel near his automobile. Based on Carter's statement that he had come to the motel with Hartman in the automobile, the officers arrested Hartman and seized the automobile for purposes of forfeiture under a Tennessee statute providing for forfeiture of vehicles used in narcotics traffic.
The officers searched Hartman's automobile. They found two suitcases that Hartman said belonged to him. One of the suitcases contained a quantity of "speed." In the automobile, the agents also found a large ring of keys which had on it the automobile ignition key and a safety deposit box key. Subsequent investigation showed that the safety deposit box which matched the key contained a large quantity of methamphetamine and that Hartman had registered in the Airways Travel Lodge but under a false name.
Hartman's defense was that he had driven another person to Memphis, one Payne, that the two of them had checked into the Airways Travel Lodge and that unknown to Hartman at the time was the fact that Payne was the source and supplier of the narcotics. Hartman testified that the two suitcases were not his and that he did not know that Payne had put narcotics in his suitcase.
Hartman's defense does provide an innocent explanation of the facts. Payne did accompany Hartman to Memphis, and they did check into the motel together. Both Carter and Payne testified in support of Hartman's version of the facts. Payne said that Hartman was an innocent bystander.
A rational jury nonetheless could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hartman's innocent explanation was false. Hartman's presence at the scene coupled with his false registration at the motel, his conflicting statements to officers concerning his purpose for being in Memphis, and the presence of a key to the safety deposit box containing the methamphetamine on the same key ring with the automobile ignition key provide substantial evidence of Hartman's participation. It thus would not be impossible for a rational jury to convict Hartman on the basis of these facts.
Hartman also complains that the District Judge implied and allowed the jury to find that Payne, whose testimony supported Hartman, was an accomplice and that an accomplice's testimony should be "received with caution and weighed with great care." Hartman did not object to the instruction during trial. He now argues, though, that the instruction was erroneous because there is no reason for suspicion or caution concerning accomplice testimony given on behalf of a defendant for, in the words of Professor Wigmore, "The essential element . is this supposed . . . expectation of conditional clemency. If that is lacking, the whole basis for distrust fails." 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2057 (3d Ed. 1940). Where the accomplice is the defendant's witness, Hartman contends that such an instruction is misleading. We think that even if the instruction were error, the defendant's failure to object effectively waives the error. The instruction, even if error, was not so harmful as to constitute "plain error" or affect the substantial rights of the defendant. Moreover, there is reason to distrust such testimony given on behalf of a defendant. Such a witness may want to save his friend or prevent disclosure of further details that would more seriously incriminate them both. See United States v. Stulga, 584 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Urdiales, 523 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975).
We do not read the District Court's charge as permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting a conspiracy. The instruction on aiding and abetting only allowed the jury to find that the defendant could be convicted as a principle on the substantive counts if he aided and abetted their commission. The instruction is not confusing and does not lead the jury in any way to believe that it could convict the defendant of conspiracy upon finding the defendant to be an aider and abetter.
Nor was admission of the key ring into evidence erroneous. In United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973), our Court recognized that the seizure and subsequent search of an automobile which law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe had been used for the transportation of contraband and thus is subject to forfeiture, is proper. Accord: United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Edge, 444 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1970). The key ring was a product of a valid search and, therefore, properly admitted to the jury's consideration.
It was error, however, to admit into evidence the quantity of methamphetamine found in a suitcase that contained numerous personal articles belonging to Hartman. Agents found the suitcase in the car that Hartman was driving. They had not procured a warrant to search the suitcase. Nor, apparently, did any exigent circumstances require an immediate inspection. "Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation," and the search of which often does not require a warrant, said the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), "luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum," the Court observed, "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." Thus the Court held that issuance of a warrant was a necessary prerequisite to admission of evidence found in luggage seized for probable cause in the absence of exigent circumstances. Because the agents had not obtained a search warrant, and because there evidently were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search in the present case, the methamphetamine found in the luggage was not properly admissible.
We are unable to say, without a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have convicted Hartman without the introduction of the suitcase methamphetamine. The items of evidence that most strongly tied Hartman to the drug conspiracy were the methamphetamine found in his suitcase, the drugs found in the safety deposit box to which the police were led by the keyring in Hartman's car, and Hartman's presence in the motel parking lot. Hartman had an innocent explanation of the keyring and of his presence at the scene. The suitcase methamphetamine may well have convinced at least some jurors.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment entered upon the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
. The Court made clear in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592-94, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), that the Chadwick warrant requirement applies to- luggage found in seized automobiles.