Case Name: HUE BING HUANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-09-02
Citations: 615 F. App'x 879
Docket Number: No. 13-71190
Parties: HUE BING HUANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: MeKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 615
Pages: 879–880

Head Matter:
HUE BING HUANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-71190.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 25, 2015.
Filed Sept. 2, 2015.
Michael Brown, Law Offices of Michael Brown, LLC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Kiley L. Kane, Esquire, Trial, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: MeKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Hue Bing Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his motion to reopen deportation proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.2011), and we deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang's motion to reopen on the grounds that notice was proper and that Huang failed to rebut the strong presumption of effective service arising from the service of his hearing notice by certified mail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(l)(F) (1994) (repealed) (obligation to notify court of address change); see also id. § 1252b(a)(2)(A), (c)(1) (written notice is considered sufficient if sent to the most recent address provided).
To the extent Huang contends he failed to appear due to exceptional circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as untimely where he waited seventeen years to file a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (motion to reopen in ab-sentia proceedings generally must be filed within 180 days of the removal order), and he did not establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline where he admits he purposefully evaded numerous opportunities to redress his in absentia order, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80.
In addition, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying where Huang failed to establish that reopening was warranted based on a claim of changed country condi tions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678 ("The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Huang's remaining contentions are unavailing.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.