Case Name: Isham W. ADAMS, Appellant, v. NEWS-JOURNAL CORPORATION, Julius Davidson, Herbert M. Davidson and Tippen Davidson, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1955-11-02
Citations: 84 So. 2d 549
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isham W. ADAMS, Appellant, v. NEWS-JOURNAL CORPORATION, Julius Davidson, Herbert M. Davidson and Tippen Davidson, Appellees.
Judges: TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 84
Pages: 549–554

Head Matter:
Isham W. ADAMS, Appellant, v. NEWS-JOURNAL CORPORATION, Julius Davidson, Herbert M. Davidson and Tippen Davidson, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
Nov. 2, 1955.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1956.
Adams & Judge, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Alfred A. Green, Daytona Beach, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
A client of the appellant was about to face charges in the municipal court of Day-tona Beach after an arrest which he had evidently resisted. The appellant, in his capacity as attorney, applied to the circuit court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the municipal judge from exercising jurisdiction of the case. To support the claim that the client was entitled to the writ, certain'representations were made in the petition which was signed by appellant and verified by his client. Parenthetically, the circuit judge made the writ absolute and his action was affirmed by this court.
The editors of News-Journal Corporation took umbrage at the conduct by appellant of the prohibition case and caused to appear in papers published and circulated by the corporation an editorial on the subject.
We quote the whole editorial which the appellant claims to have caused him suffering and injury, to have damaged his reputation "in his personal, social, business and professional life" and to have exposed him to hatred, distrust, contempt and ridicule:
"THERE IS A LIMIT
"DECENT CITIZENS believe there should be a limit to the accusations which a defense attorney should be allowed to make against law abiding persons, including law enforcement officers, in any move to protect his client.
"What is said here in this connection refers to one particular attorney, but it applies as well to many others.
"This week Isham Adams, attorney for Henry Hanna, filed a petition in Circuit Judge Revels' Court which challenges the attention of all citizens who believe in law enforcement. The petition sought a writ of prohibition preventing the Court from trying Hanna on charges dating back to Jan. 29, 1952. The writ was granted temporarily.
Jje *
' "ATTORNEY ADAMS made grave accusations against some of our police officers in his zeal to save his client, Hanna, from going to trial on charges growing out of a fracas on that night more than two years ago.
"We read in the lawyer's petition that the police officers who arrested Hanna that night 'did then and there commit an unlawful assault and battery' and did 'beat, bruise, wound and physically overpower and subdue him.' The 'him' refers to Hanna, who is a widely known character in the night life of Daytona Beach.
"Did Attorney Adams have any right to accuse these policemen of such dastardly behavior? Was the attorney a witness of what happened that night? Did he himself see his client suffer such beating, assault, bruising and wounding as he writes of in his petition?
"On the other hand did Attorney Adams see Police Officer Marvel King suffer such a terrific blow that night that he had to have an operation, and lie for weeks in a hospital?
"Did Attorney Adams question King and the other police officers as well as his client before making those accusations? If he did, then why did he choose to believe his client rather than the officers?
"We can see case hardened attorneys smile at these questions. We can hear some of them say Attorney Adams was only repeating in the petition what his client had told him. We can hear them say the attorney was not responsible for the allegations in the petition.
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"BUT WE DON'T ACCEPT that view. Having read the canon of professional ethics for practicing lawyers, we take the position that the attorney in this case, as in others like it, was responsible for trying honestly and diligently to get the facts in this case before accusing these police officers of committing crimes while on the job.
"We laymen in the law are held responsible for knowing the law and the facts in all matters having to do with law enforcement. Lawyers should be held at least as responsible as laymen.
"To accuse law enforcement officers of serious crimes, in a technical move to save a client from facing trial, is a mighty serious business.
"Henry Hanna's nocturnal doings are pretty common knowledge in Daytona Beach. If our police did nothing to discipline him they would he subjected to merited censure. For them to be subjected to criminal accusations for acting in the line of duty is revolting to decent citizens. — F. B."
The lone question presented by the appellant and accepted by the appellee is whether or not the editorial was "defamatory of this plaintiff [appellant], a practicing attorney at law, and actionable per gg ¡M*
The circuit judge decided that it was not and dismissed the complaint at the cost of the plaintiff.
In a recent decision of this court certain rules were announced for our governance in determining whether or not publications are libelous per se. We held that they would be of this character when, "considered alone without innuendo," they contain (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime, or (2) has contracted an infectious disease, or (3) they carry statements tending to subject a person to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace, or (4) to injure a person in his trade or profession. Richard v. Gray, Fla., 62 So.2d 597.
The first two of these categories may be eliminated from this discussion leaving as our main concern the effect the editorial might have had on appellant's professional standing, and the allied question whether or not he might have been held up to hatred, distrust, and so forth. The language used will be given neither a mild nor harsh construction but the words will be construed "in that sense in which they may be understood and in which they appear to have been used and according to the ideas which they were adopted to convey to those who hear them, or to whom they are addressed." Budd v. J. Y. Gooch Co., Inc., 157 Fla. 716, 27 So.2d 72, 74. The task of testing the effect of the language used is not an easy one because there is no fixed rule that would guide us to a conclusion. The judgment in each case must depend upon the facts peculiar to that case and a search for two identical instances would probably be unrewarded.
We will undertake to interpret the editor's phraseology "as the common mind would understand it." Loeb v. Geronemus, Fla., 66 So.2d 241, 245.
In the very beginning of the article there appears the declaration that decent citizens believe there should be a limit "to the accusations which a defense attorney should be allowed to make against law abiding persons" in his effort to protect his client. (Our italics.) It would tax the imagination to draw a conclusion that references to "decent citizens" and "law abiding persons" were slurs against the appellant. And the use of the word "allowed" seems to us to have implied that there was privilege or authority for what the attorney did in his client's behalf even though the editor, assuming to speak for the citizenry, disapproved the process.
This is followed by a statement that but one named attorney was in mind though the criticism could be applied to many others. Then the fact of the application for prohibition, a fact of which we take judicial notice inasmuch as the prohibition case was reviewed and affirmed here, is stated and the statement is amplified by the opinion that by the petition the attention of citizens believing in law enforcement is challenged. It would be illogical to read into this part of the editorial any defamation of the appellant. Almost any criminal case, or proceeding connected with it, might challenge "attention" but the suggestion would not reflect discredit on anyone concerned, except those directly charged with an offense.
Appellant is then said to have made grave accusations against police officers, but this is only an elaboration of the first paragraph where it was inferred that what he did was "allowed." The use of the word "zeal" was hardly libelous, for a lawyer is expected to show a keen interest in his client's welfare and it is only when he goes beyond the bounds of propriety that his actions may be condemned.
. Then follow rhetorical questions about appellant's own knowledge of the occurrence that accompanied the arrest of his client, and about his preference for the story given him by the client. How such questions are a reflection upon appellant's integrity or professional conduct we do not comprehend.
Next is an allusion to 'case-hardened' attorneys and the smiles the rhetorical questions would evoke from them. As we understand the term a 'case-hardened' attorney would be one who had become callous or unfeeling, however, there is no need to pursue the thought that the application of the term would be libelous because as it was used it would not to the "common mind" apply to the appellant but to those of that character who would be amused by the editorial itself.
Drawing to a conclusion, the writer took the position after relating that he had read the canon of ethics that the appellant in the case in question "as in others like it, was responsible for trying honestly and diligently to get the facts before accusing police officers of committing crimes while on the job." Such was the construction placed by the writer on .the canon he had examined.
The editorial concluded with the general statement that lawyers should be as responsible as laymen "for knowing the law"; that accusing "law enforcement officers of serious crimes, in a technical move to save a client from facing trial, is a mighty serious business"; and that the goings ón of the client were of such nature that the police would deserve censure if they did not curtail them.
Our study of the article brings us to the view that it constituted a criticism of a system by which the attorney acting within bounds, but within bounds the writer thought should be contracted, had succeeded in keeping a rascal from being tried. Although by the use of our "common mind" we can understand how irked the appellant may have become by the comment on the procedure that irked the editor, we do not find from the whole editorial, and such of the circumstances of its publication as are apparent in the record, the qualities which would stamp it as libelous per se. Cooper v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 159 Fla. 296, 31 So.2d 382.
So the judgment is
Affirmed.
TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, J., concurs specially.
DREW, C. J., and HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., dissent.