Case Name: SIFERS v. HOREN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-07-07
Citations: 385 Mich. 195
Docket Number: No. 38; Docket No. 52,769
Parties: SIFERS v. HOREN
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, Adams, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 385
Pages: 195–210

Head Matter:
SIFERS v. HOREN
Opinion of the Court
1. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute.
The Michigan long-arm statute represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents (MCLA § 600.705).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-9,11] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 121 et seq.
42 Am Jur, Process § 78.
Construction and application of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on making or performing a contract within the state. 23 ALR3d 551.
Construction and application of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on the commission of a tort within the state. 24 ALR3d 532.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 146.
7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law §§ 8-11.
7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 3.
2. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute —Constitutional Law.
The Michigan long-arm statute uses the phrase “the transaction of any business within the state” and provides limited jurisdiction which exposes a nonresident to suit in Michigan only for a cause which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction and there is no Federal constitutional question involved (MCLA § 600.705).
3. Words and Phrases — Transaction op Any Business — Doing Business.
The phrase “transaction of any business” is construed as broader than “doing business”.
4. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute —Negotiations—Attorney and Client — Retainer.
Negotiations in Michigan resulting in an attorney’s retainer come within the concept of the transaction of “any” business as provided in the Michigan long-arm statute (MCLA § 600.705).
Dissenting Opinion
T. E. Brennan and Swainson, JJ.
5. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute —Commercial Transactions.
The legislature, in enacting the long-arm statute, has attempted to provide Michigan residents a local remedy for injuries arising out of solicitation hy out-of-state concerns for a wide variety of products and services (MCLA §700.705).
6. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Torts—Long-Arm Statute — Attorney and Client.
The section of the long-arm statute, concerning “the doing or causing any act to he done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort”, appears to he directed at providing redress for tort injuries caused hy out-of-state manufacturers and not for cases involving an attorney-client relationship (MCLA § 600.705[2]).
7. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute —Due Process — Residents op State — Torts.
The long-arm statute does not mean, and cannot consistently with due process provisions mean, that any time an act occurs affecting a Michigan resident there are consequences in the state, granting jurisdiction over the tortfeasor (MCLA § 600.705).
8. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents — Long-Arm Statute —Attorney and Client — Malpractice.
There is no jurisdiction in the Michigan courts under the section of the long-arm statute, concerning “the doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort”, where plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his Kentucky attorney for failure to perfect his appeal in a Kentucky court, as the injury did not occur in the state of plaintiff’s residence (MCLA § 600.705[£]).
9. Courts — Jurisdiction—Interstate Commerce.
Precisely because there has been a tremendous increase in interstate commerce and interstate contacts, the courts must gime consideration to the question of fairness in deciding jurisdictional questions, and necessarily decisions must be reached on a case-by-case basis (MCLA §600.705).
10. Attorney and Client — States—Statutes—Rules.
Within its territorial boundaries, each state, by statute or rule, governs the practice of law, a profession distinguished by its uniqueness from all other endeavors, and an attorney cannot practice law in any state without first being authorized to do so in compliance with the statute or rules governing such matters.
11. Courts — Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents — Long-Arm Statute —Doing Business — Contacts Within State — Attorney and Client.
Contacts within the State of Michigan are insufficient to meet the requirements of doing business under the Michigan long-arm statute, where defendant, a Kentucky attorney, appeared in Michigan upon two separate occasions to lecture at seminars of lawyers and the contract of employment between plaintiff and defendant was executed in Kentucky, as it would violate the precept of fundamental fairness to allow jurisdiction over the defendant in Michigan (MCLA § 600.705[1]).
12. Attorney and Client.
The relationship of attorney and client is not one of a commercial nature but a professional one.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 2, Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Bronson, JJ., affirming Jackson, Gordon W. Britten, J.
Submitted March 4, 1971.
(No. 38
January Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,769.)
Decided July 7, 1971.
22 Mich App 351 affirmed.
Complaint by Letha Sifers, administratrix of the estate of Roger W. Sifers, deceased, against H. Solomon Horen for malpractice. Defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment denied. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, for plaintiff.
Anderson, Patch, Potter & Patch, for defendant.

Opinion:
T. G. Kavanaugh, J.
We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.
Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively.
The statute uses the phrase "The transaction of any business within the state." (Emphasis added.) When we keep in mind that we are dealing not with general jurisdiction which is provided for in another part of the statute (MCLA § 600.701 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.701]) which would expose a nonresident to suit in Michigan for any cause wherever it arose, but rather with limited jurisdiction which exposes a nonresident to suit in Michigan only for a cause which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction we see no Federal Constitutional question.
The courts of those states having "long-arm" statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on "the transaction of any business within the state," have generally construed their statutes as extending the state's jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.
Colorado: Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court of Denver (1968), 167 Colo 456 (448 P2d 783); Illinois: Koplin v. Thomas (1966), 73 Ill App 2d 242 (219 NE2d 646); Ziegler v. Hodges (1967), 80 Ill App 2d 210 (224 NE2d 12); Tennessee: The Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. Russell (ED Tenn, 1966), 261 F Supp 145.
The phrase "transaction of any business" is construed as broader than "doing business". New York: Simonson v. International Bank (1964), 14 NY2d 281 (251 NYS2d 433, 200 NE2d 427); Illinois: Lurie v. Rupe (1964), 51 Ill App 2d 164 (201 NE2d 158), cert den 380 US 964 (85 S Ct 1108, 14 L Ed 2d 154); Haas v. Fancher Furniture Company (ND Ill, 1957), 156 F Supp 564.
It can scarcely be doubted that the negotiations in Michigan resulting in defendant's retainer come within the concept of the transaction of "any" business.
Neither does any valid basis for distinction for this consideration appear from the fact that the retainer involved a professional relationship.
In my view the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the case and applied the sounder rule.
I vote to affirm.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, Adams, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.
See Commentaries by Professor Carl S. Hawkins and authorities cited therein to chapter 7 BJA, MCLA p 329 and to MCLA § 600.705, p 343.
The word "any" means just what it says. It ineludes "each" and "every". See Harrington v. Inter-State Business Men's Accident Ass'n (1920), 210 Mich 327; Gibson v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co. of America (1937), 282 Mich 282. It comprehends "the slightest".