Case Name: Edward F. MERRIMAN, Appellant v. Robert Lowe MINTER, and WCSC, Inc., d/b/a WCSC-TV, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1989-02-21
Citations: 298 S.C. 110
Docket Number: 22973
Parties: Edward F. MERRIMAN, Appellant v. Robert Lowe MINTER, and WCSC, Inc., d/b/a WCSC-TV, Respondents.
Judges: Toal, J., dissenting in separate opinion.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 298
Pages: 110–113

Head Matter:
22973
Edward F. MERRIMAN, Appellant v. Robert Lowe MINTER, and WCSC, Inc., d/b/a WCSC-TV, Respondents.
(378 S. E. (2d) 441)
Supreme Court
Joseph F. Kent, Guardian ad litem, Charleston, for appellant.
Thomas A. Tisdale and Stephen P. Groves, Charleston, for respondent WCSC, Inc.
M. Dawes Cooke, Charleston, for respondent Robert Lowe Minter.
Heard Oct. 5, 1988.
Decided Feb. 21, 1989.

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
Appellant commenced this action while incarcerated on a lifetime sentence for murder. He alleged respondent Minter, a police investigator, gave false information to respondent WCSC-TV during the trial of his case indicating that appellant had hired someone to kill the State's witness-in-chief. This information was broadcast by WCSC-TV.
Appellant filed his complaint in March 1986, three years after the alleged libel occurred. Respondents moved for dismissal on the ground the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations under S. C. Code Ann. § 15-3-550(1) (1976). Appellant argued in return that he was entitled to a five-year disability by virtue of his status as an inmate pursuant to S. C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40(3) (Supp. 1987). The trial judge found the disability did not apply to an inmate serving a life sentence and dismissed the action as untimely.
Section 15-3-40(3) provides for tolling of the applicable statute of limitations if the person entitled to bring the action is at the time the cause of action accrued "imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than his natural life." This disability may be claimed for a maximum of five years.
Appellant argues on appeal that the statute is unconstitutional because it deprives him of equal protection. He claims there is no rational basis to exclude a lifetime prisoner from the class of inmates entitled to the disability.
This constitutional argument was not raised below nor ruled on by the trial judge and should not be considered for the first time on appeal. Talley v. S. C. Higher Ed. Tuition Grants Comm., 289 S. C. 483, 347 S. E. (2d) 99 (1986).
Appellant further claims the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because he will be eligible for parole after twenty years and therefore he stands in the same position as one convicted for a term less than life.
This argument is without merit. Appellant was sentenced for murder under S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) (1985) which provides he is not eligible for parole until the service of twenty years. An award of parole, however, is discretionary with the Parole Board even after appellant becomes eligible. S. C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1987). Appellant's status is therefore not the same as that of an inmate serving a definite term of twenty years.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is
Affirmed.
Toal, J., dissenting in separate opinion.