Case Name: Raymond WALKER, Jr., Claimant-Appellant, v. HENSLEY TRUCKING, Employer, and Argonaut Northwest Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1984-11-05
Citations: 107 Idaho 572
Docket Number: No. 14671
Parties: Raymond WALKER, Jr., Claimant-Appellant, v. HENSLEY TRUCKING, Employer, and Argonaut Northwest Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: ' DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 572–575

Head Matter:
691 P.2d 1187
Raymond WALKER, Jr., Claimant-Appellant, v. HENSLEY TRUCKING, Employer, and Argonaut Northwest Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 14671.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Nov. 5, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1984.
L. Clyel Berry, of Pike & Berry, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.
John W. Barrett, of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Chartered, Boise, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
BISTLINE, Judge.
On March 25, 1980, Raymond Walker was injured in an automobile collision with Tom Jones. The accident occurred during the course of Walker's employment with Hensley Trucking. Hensley was insured by respondent Argonaut Insurance Company, which paid Walker $4,463.81 in worker's compensation benefits. In April of 1980, Walker instituted a lawsuit against Jones, who was insured by Safeco Insurance. Shortly thereafter, Walker's attorney asked Argonaut if it would like him to at the same time represent Argonaut as to its subrogated interest. Argonaut did not respond to this inquiry, nor did it retain any other counsel.
In September of 1980, Argonaut wrote Safeco asking if Safeco "would honor our subrogation interest." There followed an exchange of letters between Argonaut and Safeco culminating in March 1981, with a request by Argonaut for the $4,463.81, which it had paid out as aforesaid.
The following month, Safeco settled the pending civil action with Walker and tendered two checks, one for $10,000 payable to Walker and his attorney and another for $4,463.81 payable to Walker, his attorney, and Argonaut. This controversy arose when Argonaut demanded that it be given the entire amount of the subrogation interest, without any deductions for attorney's fees. In reliance on I.C. § 72-223(4), Walker's attorney refused to turn over the check without first deducting the percentage for attorney's fees and costs which had been agreed upon by Walker and his attorney. Section 72-223(4) reads:
"(4) On any recovery by the employee against a third party, the employer shall pay or have deducted from his subrogated portion thereof, a proportionate share of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in obtaining such recovery."
Notwithstanding that the industrial case was closed, other than for re-opening on change of condition within five years pursuant to I.C. § 72-719, Argonaut filed a petition with the Industrial Commission asking that the Commission declare Argonaut's subrogation interest in Walker's recovery (the Safeco check in the amount of $4,463.81) not subject to attorney's fees and costs. Walker and one of his attorneys were served as named defendants, and appeared without challenging the Commission's jurisdiction to entertain and determine the controversy. The Commission apparently believed that it had jurisdiction, and upon submission of a stipulation of facts accompanied by documentation, the Commission ruled as a matter of law that I.C. § 72-223(4) should not be interpreted to impose attorney's fees involuntarily upon the employer and surety where the relationship of attorney-client did not exist between claimant's attorney and the surety. Without passing upon the questionable jurisdiction of the Commission, which has not been raised as an issue, we turn to the issue submitted to us: Under § 72-223 are Walker's attorneys allowed to deduct proportionate fees and costs from Argonaut's subrogation interest amount.
A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965). The plain, obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense. Id. The words of I.C. § 72-223(4) are clear and unambiguous. Its crucial language reads, "On any recovery____" (Emphasis added.) The statute does not limit payment of attorney's fees and costs to situations where there is or has been an administrative or judicial proceeding. The statute applies to all circumstances where any recovery has been effectuated by the employee against a third party. A civil action is not a condition precedent to the application of § 72-223(4). A recovery is often obtained without the necessity of suit. The Industrial Commission erred in concluding that § 72-223(4) was not intended to require the surety to share attorney's fees and costs with the employee. That is precisely what it provides.
The judgment of the Commission is accordingly reversed. No attorney's fees. Costs to appellants.
' DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.