Case Name: Alice Barbee Wick, Appellant, v. Julius L. Baldwin, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1929-03-18
Citations: 151 Wash. 259
Docket Number: No. 21651
Parties: Alice Barbee Wick, Appellant, v. Julius L. Baldwin, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 151
Pages: 259–262

Head Matter:
[No. 21651.
Department Two.
March 18, 1929.]
Alice Barbee Wick, Appellant, v. Julius L. Baldwin, Respondent.
Martin J. Lund, for appellant.
Edwin H. Flick and J. L. Baldwin, for respondent:
Reported in 275 Pac. 545.

Opinion:
French, J.
The appellant is a resident of the state of Pennsylvania. She owned a large tract of land situated on Lake Chelan, and the Chelan Electric Company and Chelan county were engaged in condemnation proceedings for the purpose of raising the level of Lake Chelan and flooding a portion of appellant's property, and also acquiring certain of appellant's property for road purposes. Appellant's nephew is Adrien W. Vollmer. He has been admitted to practice law both in the state of Pennsylvania and in the state of Washington.
In January, 1927, acting for and on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Vollmer engaged respondent to do a certain limited amount of work to assist in the defense of the condemnation proceedings. Other attorneys had already been engaged by appellant in connection with this work, and respondent's employment was of a very limited nature. In the middle of April, 1927, a new contract was entered into between the parties, evidenced by certain letters written by respondent and Adrien W. Vollmer, whose authority to represent appellant seems to be conceded. There seems to have been considerable dispute at all times between Mr. Vollmer and the respondent as to the amount of work respondent was required to do by virtue of the terms of his contract, respondent insisting that the work which he was employed to do was limited in its nature, other lawyers having been at all times engaged to act as leading counsel in the case. This finally led to a rupture, and appellant brought suit for breach of contract.
Respondent counter claimed, asking for money which he claimed due under the contract and for certain extras; also asking for the foreclosure of an attorney's lien. The case was tried before the court, with a jury; and at the end of appellant's case, a nonsuit was' granted. On respondent's counter claim, a verdict was rendered in his favor for $500. The court treated the verdict of the jury as advisory only, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law and adopted the amount found by tbe jury as correct, and entered judgment in respondent's favor for $500, and tbis appeal follows.
Appellant's first assignment of error is tbat tbe court erred in granting defendant's motion for a non-suit.
No good purpose could be served by detailing tbe testimony. It is sufficent to say tbat we bave carefully read all of tbe statement of facts, and are unable to find a scintilla, of evidence wbicb would warrant judgment in favor of tbe appellant.
Appellant also complains of tbe admission of certain evidence as tending to support respondent's cross-complaint.
Tbe trial court construed tbe contract between tbe parties, as shown by their correspondence, as one requiring only a limited amount of work on tbe part of respondent, and tbis construction of tbe contract, we think, was correct. Tbe question of whether or not extra work was performed by respondent, and tbe kind and value of tbe services, became purely one of fact, was submitted to tbe jury and the jury returned a verdict of $500 in respondent's favor. Tbe trial court, who bad listened to all of tbe testimony, accepted and confirmed tbe findings of tbe jury. Tbe evidence wbicb appellant claims to be inadmissible, was all both competent and relevant, and would be inadmissible only in case it was work wbicb respondent was required to do under and by virtue of tbe terms of bis written agreement. But it should be remembered tbat tbe contract was not a general retainer made by a layman, but tbis was tbe employment of one lawyer by another to do certain work within tbe terms of tbe agreement, and it was peculiarly within tbe province of tbe trial court and jury to say, as a question of fact, what its valué was and it also became a question of fact for tbe trial court and jury to pass upon as to whether pr not this claimed extra work was within the terms of the original written employment.
All of the questions involved in this case are either questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact, and have been resolved against appellant both by a jury and trial court. An examination of the record convinces us that the judgment must be affirmed.
Mitchell, C. J., Millard, Main, and Parker, JJ., concur: