Case Name: GUSTAVE E. WIEDENMAYER, ET AL., ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND CHARLES E. VILLANUEVA, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR BRUCE ALEXANDER JOHNSON AND JENNIE ANNE JOSEPHINE JOHNSON, MINORS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1969-06-17
Citations: 106 N.J. Super. 161
Docket Number: 
Parties: GUSTAVE E. WIEDENMAYER, ET AL., ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND CHARLES E. VILLANUEVA, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR BRUCE ALEXANDER JOHNSON AND JENNIE ANNE JOSEPHINE JOHNSON, MINORS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 161–169

Head Matter:
GUSTAVE E. WIEDENMAYER, ET AL., ETC., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND CHARLES E. VILLANUEVA, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR BRUCE ALEXANDER JOHNSON AND JENNIE ANNE JOSEPHINE JOHNSON, MINORS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey-Appellate Division
Argued May 19, 1969
Decided June 17, 1969.
Conford, S. J. A. D., dissented in part.
Before Judges Coneokd, Kilkenny and Leonakd.
Mr. Charles E. Villanueva argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Van Riper, Belmont & Villanueva, attorneys; Mr. John J. O'Grady, of the New York Bar, and Messrs. Gadwalader, Wichersham & Taft, of counsel).
Mr. James G. Pitney argued the cause for plaintiff-respondents (Messrs. Pitney, Hardin & Kipp, attorneys).
Mr. Thomas J. Bitar argued the cause for R. Carter Nicholas, guardian ad litem for certain minors (Messrs. Jeffers and Billon, attorneys).
Mr. Alfred C. Clapp argued the cause for defendant-respondent, guardian ad litem for John Seward Johnson, III.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Kilkektny, J. A. D.
Charles E. Villanueva, as guardian at litem for Bruce Alexander Johnson and Jennie Anne Josephine Johnson, appeals from that portion of the Chancery Division judgment, entered on May 29, 1968, which provides:
"1. The determination of the plaintiffs to distribute and pay over to John Seward Johnson, Jr. all of the Trust Property to enable him to establish a new trust in the form annexed hereto is confirmed, ratified and approved, and the plaintiffs are authorized to make such distribution at such time as they shall determine."
Plaintiffs cross-appeal from that part of the same judgment, which provides:
"5. Charles E. Villanueva is allowed $40,000 for his services as Guardian Ad Litem, as well as his unreimbursed expenses and out-of-pocket disbursements aggregating $806.00."
They assert that the allowance was excessive and should be reduced.
Alfred C. Clapp, as guardian ad litem for John Seward Johnson, III, also cross-appeals, and for the same reason, from that part of the judgment allowing "Charles E. Villanueva $40,000 for his services as Guardian Ad Litem."
We affirm the portions of the judgment brought before us for review, both as to the main appeal and as to the cross-appeals.
As to the main appeal we affirm essentially for the reasons expressed by Judge Kingfield in his oral opinion rendered at the close of the proofs, and for the further reasons expressed in the brief supplement herein.
As to the cross-appeals covering the $40,000 award made to Charles E. Villanueva for his services as guardian ad litem, we find a proper exercise of the discretion vested in the trial judge in such matters, based upon the totality of the circumstances, as evidenced by the record herein, especially in the light of the fact that the subject matter of this trust is valued at approximately $18,000,000 and the litigation involved important and difficult issues of law and equity.
The inter vivos trust in issue was one of six substantially similar trusts which John Seward Johnson established in 1944 for each of his six children. We are concerned herein only with the one established essentially for the benefit of his son John Seward Johnson, Jr. The original corpus of the trust consisted of shares of common stock of Johnson & Johnson, Inc., and the approximate value of that corpus as of this time is the large sum mentioned above.
The trustees were directed to pay to the son "so much of the net income in any year as the trustees in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion may deem to be for his best interests," following his attainment of majority. We are not concerned herein with the payment of income. Our concern is with the power given to the trustees:
"3. To distribute the Trust Property as follows:
(a) from time to time and whenever in their absolute and uncon- ' trolled discretion they deem it to be for his best interests, to use for or to distribute and pay over to John Seward Johnson, Jr., or to his guardian ad litem if he is under the age of twenty one (21) years, to be his absolutely, outright and forever, any or all of the Trust Property."
The son reached his majority a number of years ago.
"The absolute and uncontrolled discretion" of the trustees to distribute and pay over to the son "any or all of the Trust Property" is limited only by the trustees' determination that such distribution of the corpus is for the son's "best interests." The trustees so decided herein. If they could make that distribution to the end, as the trust indenture expressly stated, that the trust property would be the son's "absolutely, outright and forever," it seems logical to conclude that the trustees could, to safeguard the son's best interests, condition the distribution upon his setting up a substituted trust. The son is satisfied with that condition and the distribution was approved and confirmed, a copy of the son's trust agreement being annexed to the judgment.
The son's "best interests" is not defined in his father's trust indenture. The expression is not limited to a finding that distribution must be to the son's best "pecuniary" interests. His best interests might bo served without regard to his personal financial gain. They may be served by the peace of mind, already much disturbed by matrimonial problems, divorce and the consequences thereof, which the new trust, rather than the old contingencies provided for in his father's trust indenture, will engender. Of what avail is it to rest one's "best interests" on a purely financial basis, and without regard to the effect upon a man's mind, heart and soul, if the end result would produce a wealthier man, but a sufferer from mental anguish?
The creator of this inter vivos trust was obviously concerned primarily with his son's best interests. The interests of others were important, but they were only secondary in relation to the son. Courts may not substitute their opinions as to the son's "best interests," as opposed to the opinion of the trustees vested by the creator of the trust with the "absolute and uncontrolled discretion" to make that determination. The trustees' decision herein was made in good faith, after consideration of all the facts and attendant circumstances, and for reasonably valid reasons. Only unwarranted judicial interference would induce a negating of the eom'se pursued by the trustees.
The basis of the argument by those attacking the action of the trustees is that the children, Bruce and Jennie, would suffer under this new arrangement a loss of their contingent remainder interest, provided for in the settlor's original trust indenture. However, if distribution of the corpus of the trust were made to the son absolutely, as permitted within the unqualified discretion of the trustees, as opposed to the challenged distribution subject to the condition imposed, the same loss of the contingent remaindermen's interest would equally be effected. Thus, these children are not suffering by this approved new setup the loss of any vested remainder interest. The basic intention of the original creator of the trust, that the trustees' decision should serve the son's best interests, is not being defeated by the distribution made by the trustees.