Case Name: In the Matter of Edward K. Barsky, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent; In the Matter of Jacob Auslander, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent; In the Matter of Louis Miller, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1953-02-26
Citations: 305 N.Y. 89
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Edward K. Barsky, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent. In the Matter of Jacob Auslander, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent. In the Matter of Louis Miller, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 305
Pages: 89–109

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Edward K. Barsky, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent. In the Matter of Jacob Auslander, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent. In the Matter of Louis Miller, Appellant, against Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, Respondent.
Argued October 23, 1952;
decided February 26, 1953.
Paxton Blair and Abraham Fishbein for appellant in first above-entitled proceeding.
I. Respondent lacked jurisdiction because the offense of which appellant had been convicted in the District of Columbia is not defined as a crime in New York. (People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266; People v. Conti, 127 Misc. 244; Matter of Lindenfeld v. Board of Regents, 273 App. Div. 1040; People v. Fisher, 145 Misc. 406, 241 App. Div. 722; Matter of Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285; People ex rel. Marks v. Brophy, 293 N. Y. 469; People ex rel. Atkins v. Jennings, 248 N. Y. 46; People v. Stovali, 172 Misc. 469; People ex rel. Stein v. Murphy, 256 App. Div. 856; The Antelope, 10 Wheat. [U. S.] 66; United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466; Matter of Cohen, 164 Misc. 98, 254 App. Div. 571, 278 N. Y. 584; Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of N. Y., 298 N. Y. 184.) II. Even if the Court of Appeals should hold that appellant had been convicted of a crime within the meaning of paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 of section 6514 of the Education Law, nevertheless respondent’s determination was arbitrary, capricious and unconscionable. One cannot be punished twice for the same offense. Respondent has no power to impose additional punishment merely for the sake of additional punishment. (Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263; Matter of Donegan, 265 App. Div. 774, 294 N. Y. 704; Matter of Mandel v. Board of Regents, 250 N. Y. 173; Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271; Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U. S. 306; People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368.) III. Respondent’s determination was predicated upon matter elicited by the Attorney General which has been held to be reversible error as a matter of law. (Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123; Matter of People [International Workers Order], 199 Misc. 941.) IV. Respondent committed reversible errors in its exclusion of evidence and in predicating its determination on contrived conjecture. On the one hand, respondent ruled that appellant had so completely demonstrated that the organization was purely a relief organization, that no further evidence of its activities or expenditures would be allowed. On the other hand, respondent based its determination on conjecture, without proof, that there may have been wrongful activities or expenditures. (Matter of Lynch’s Builders Restaurant v. O’Connell, 277 App. Div. 705.) V. The courts have uniformly annulled determinations that were made without direct evidence involving the licensee, or that were predicated upon conjecture. The sole “ evidence ” adduced consisted of hearsay-upon-hearsay statements and conjecture, to the effect that the organization may have carried on unspecified propaganda. There was an utter absence of direct testimony to this effect, and not the slightest evidence to support this claim, and no attempt was made to link up any such claim with appellants. (Matter,of Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N. Y. 347; Matter of Toyos v. Bruckman, 266 App. Div. 28; Matter of Konopka v. Bruckman, 290 N. Y. 777; Matter of Stevensville Lake Holding Corp. v. O’Connell, 269 App. Div. 804.) VI. Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the contempt of which appellant was convicted is a crime even under the Federal law. The contempt for which appellant was convicted is excluded from the “ Contempts constituting crimes ” listed in section 402 of title 18 of the United States Code. (Egbert v. Chew, 14 N. J. L. 446; Matter of Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285; Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505; Watts v. United States, 161 F. 2d 511.) VII. Section 6514 and subdivision 2 of section 6515 of the Education Law are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to the facts o£ this case. (Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of N. Y., 298 N. Y. 184; Matter of Mandel v. Board of Regents, 250 N. Y. 173; Matter of Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288; Matter of Seignious v. Rice, 273 N. Y. 44; Matter of Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N. Y. 347; Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271.)
Matthew Silverman for Haven Emerson and others, amici curiæ, in support of appellant’s position in first above-entitled proceeding.
On the facts of this case there exists no valid basis for discipline beyond the statutory minimum of censure and reprimand; the suspension violates the spirit if not the letter of the law allowing such discipline.
Paxton Blair, Joseph E. Brill, Coleman Gangel and Benjamin J. Jacobson for appellants in second and third above-entitled proceedings.
I. The offense of which petitioners have been convicted in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia does not come within the purview of the “ crime ” contemplated by paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 of section 6514 of the Education Law. (Matter of Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285; People ex rel. Marks v. Brophy, 293 N. Y. 469; People v. Fury, 279 N. Y. 433; People ex rel. Goodrich v. Martin, 183 Misc. 790, 268 App. Div. 1077.) II. The crime of which petitioners have been convicted, not involving moral turpitude or their professional qualifications, is not such a crime as is contemplated by paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 as a basis for disciplinary action. (Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105; Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U. S. 306; People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263.)
Osmond K. Fraenkel and Herbert Monte Levy for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiæ, in support of appellants’ position in all proceedings.
The statute as construed below permits suspension or revocation of a physician’s license on grounds not involving moral turpitude and having no relation whatsoever to a physician’s qualifications for the practice of medicine. Such a construction is in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Garner v. Los Angeles Bd., 341 U. S. 716; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262; Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105; Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165; Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265; Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. [U. S.] 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. [U. S.] 333.)
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Henry S. Manley and Wendell P. Brown of counsel), for respondent in all proceedings.
I. The statutory provision for disciplinary action does not provide either expressly or by implication that the “ crime ” must impute moral turpitude or involve professional activity or qualifications. (Matter of Okin, 272 App. Div. 607; Matter of Swift v. Graves, 173 Misc. 1085; Matter of Weinrib v. Beier, 269 App. Div. 481; Barretta v. Barretta, 182 Misc. 852; Hofferman v. Simmons, 177 Misc. 962, 290 N. Y. 449; United States v. Francioso, 164 F. 2d 163; Matter of Sagos v. O’Connell, 301 N. Y. 212; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265; People v. Hawker, 152 N. Y. 234, Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189.) II. The Federal offense for which Dr. Barsky was convicted is a “ crime ’ ’ within paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 of section 6514 of the Education Law. (Matter of Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285; People ex rel. Marks v. Brophy, 293 N. Y. 469; Matter of Donegan, 265 App. Div. 774, 294 N. Y. 704; Matter of Greenberger, 265 App. Div. 343; Matter of Turley, 268 App. Div. 706; Matter of Butcher, 269 App. Div. 545; Matter of Hiss, 276 App. Div. 701; Matter of Sheinman, 277 App. Div. 39; People v. Lafaro, 250 N. Y. 336; Matter of Platzman v. Board of Regents, 274 App. Div. 952; Matter of Garsson v. Wallin, 279 App. Div. 1111, 304 N. Y. 702; Matter of Tonis v. Board of Regents, 295 N. Y. 286; Matter of Lindenfeld v. Board of Regents, 273 App. Div. 1040.)

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
These are proceedings, brought under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, to review determinations of respondent Board of Regents, suspending for certain periods the medical licenses of petitioners Barsky and Auslander, and censuring and reprimanding petitioner Miller. In each instance the board found authority for its action in paragraph (b) of subdivision 2 of section 6514 of the Education Law, which authorizes disciplinary action against a physician who '£ has been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime ' '. The question on this appeal is as to the meaning and application of that statute.
Each of the petitioners-appellants is a physician licensed to practice in this State. All three were members of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, a voluntary association which functioned during the Second World War and immediately thereafter (see the brief statement of its history and aims, in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 130,131). All three were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for, and all were, after a jury trial in that court, convicted of the misdemeanor of contempt of Congress, under section 192 of title 2 of the United States Code, in that each of them failed to obey a subpoena requiring him to produce before a Congressional Committee the financial books and records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. Each was sentenced to a fine and to imprisonment. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on appeal (Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241), certiorari was twice denied by the Supreme Court (334 U. S. 843; 339 U. S. 971), and each petitioner paid his fine and was imprisoned. Then followed the charges with which we deal here.
We consider that, in these records on appeal, there are no controlling facts other than those above summarized, since the voluminous testimony before the Regents as to the character and purposes of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and as to the motives of these appellants, could not change the admitted fact of their conviction. From the record it is clear that each petitioner has, in fact, ££ been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction without this state, of a crime " (Education Law, § 6514, subd. 2, par. [b]). Petitioners, however, make these arguments: first, that the statutory language applies only to such offenses as are crimes under New York law, and that contempt of Congress (U. S. Code, tit. 2, § 192) is not a crime under any statute of this State; second, that the legislative intent of section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) is to authorize disciplinary action for such offenses only as involve moral turpitude, or are related to professional ability or conduct, and, third, that the Regents imposed unwarranted punishment, and took into account prejudicial matter in fixing the penalties.
There is nothing in section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) which says that, in order to serve as a predicate for action thereunder, the " crime " must be one specifically forbidden as such by a New York penal statute. Indeed, a directly opposite idea is expressed in the language: '1 convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state ". Such language is too plain to permit construction by addition of unexpressed qualifications or exceptions (Matter of Rathscheck, 300 N. Y. 346, 350). Petitioners, however, argue that such decisions as Matter of Donegan (282 N. Y. 285); People ex rel. Marks v. Brophy (293 N. Y. 469); Matter of Tonis v. Board of Regents (295 N. Y. 286), and Matter of Garsson v. Wallin (304 N. Y. 702) mean that the New York courts construe such statutes as section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) as authorizing penalties for such offenses only as are made criminal, if committed in this State, by our own laws. As to the Donegan, Marks, Tonis and Garsson cases, each had to do with the imposition of stringent additional penalties on, and solely because of, conviction of a " felony ". Donegan, Marks, Tonis and Garsson had each fallen afoul of a foreign statute which made certain conduct a felony which was either a misdemeanor in New York or not cognizable at all under our domestic statutory definitions and classifications of crimes. Indeed, this court, as to Donegan (see 282 N. Y., p. 293), made it clear that it was not denying the Appellate Division's discretionary power to deal with him as one guilty of a " crime " (Judiciary Law, former § 88, subd. 2, now § 90, subd. 2). In the statute now before us (Education Law, § 6514, subd. 2, par. [b]), the Legislature has authorized disciplinary action against one convicted, not of a " felony ", but of a " crime ". Traditionally as well as by express statute (Penal Law, § 2), the word " crime " in New York law includes misdemeanors as well as felonies, and so it.is patent that these petitioners have " been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction without this state, of a crime ". As we remarked in People ex rel. Marks v. Brophy (supra, pp. 474-475), it is the policy of our State not to decree forfeitures in our courts, if we can avoid them, for violations of the criminal laws of another jurisdiction. But public policy is made by the Legislature (see Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N. Y. 31, 36) and the policy of this section of the Education Law cannot be misunderstood. It does not require the imposition of any particular penalties, but leaves it to the Regents to decide on the measure of discipline, up to the extreme limit of license revocation.
We do not find it necessary to rely on an additional ground, put forward in the report of the Regents' Committee on Discipline in those proceedings for holding that petitioners' conviction in the District of Columbia was for a " crime ", as that word is used in the Education Law section. The Committee on Discipline noted that New York does have, in section 1330 of the Penal Law, a provision making it a misdemeanor willfully to refuse to produce material and proper documents before a committee of our State Legislature. That enactment, the Regents' Committee thought, is so similar in meaning to section 192 of title 2 of the United States Code, that one violating the latter is really committing about the same offense as is made criminal by our section 1330. Be that as it may, we construe section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) of the Education Law as it plainly reads, that is, to authorize discipline by the Regents in the event of a conviction of a physician of a crime in any court of competent jurisdiction. Section 1330 (supra) does, however, have this significance at this point: it illustrates, at least, that making a criminal offense out of a refusal to obey a legislative subpoena is in line with New York public policy, as well as that of the Federal Government.
Appellants suggest that a literal construction of section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) will empower the Board of Regents to destroy a person, professionally, solely on a showing of the commission by him in some other State (or country) of an act which we in New York consider noncriminal, or even meritorious. Two answers are available to that: first, some reliance must be placed on the good sense and judgment of our Board of Regents, in handling any such theoretically possible eases; and, second, the offense here committed, contempt of Congress, is no mere trivial transgression of an arbitrary statute.
Turning to appellants' second main argument, we consider it impossible to read into section 6514 (subd. 2, par. [b]) a condition or qualification that, to justify professional discipline, the crime must be one involving moral turpitude (see, as to there being no moral turpitude in this offense Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 299), or one related to the profession itself. The Legislature knows how to state such limitations when it so desires (see, for instance, present Education Law, § 7406, subd. 1, as to certified public accountants, and, as to physicians, compare former Public Health Law, § 161, with present Education Law, § 6502). Nor is this an attempt to " enforce the criminal laws of the United States " (People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 275). We are enforcing our own statute, of not uncertain meaning, which simply empowers the Regents to impose a penalty upon any physician who has been convicted of a crime in any competent court anywhere. Stringent as it is, that statute needs no cutting down for constitutionality's sake. In is no argument against the validity of this statute that it considers a criminal conviction anywhere as a showing of unfitness, for " it is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the violation of the penal laws of a State, has some relation to the question of character " (Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 196). A professional license is a high privilege from the State, and the State can attach to its possession conditions onerous and exacting. The special equities of individual cases can be reflected in variety of punishment, as was done here, but the choice among such varieties is for the board, not the courts (Matter of Sagos v. O'Connell, 301 N. Y. 212).
Somewhat similar to the argument (supra) that moral turpitude must be shown, is the contention that the Regents acted arbitrarily in acting on the Federal conviction alone, without regard to the moral right or wrong of what petitioners actually did, that is, refuse to obey legislative subpoenas, and without regard to their motives. Of course, the statute itself was justification for taldng the conviction as a professional fault, and the Regents, receiving voluminous testimony as to the nature of the work of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and of the character and purposes of these petitioners, are presumed to have taken all those things into account in fixing the penalties.
As to the assertions, by appellants, that the Regents dealt too severely with them, or that the Regents, in deciding on punishment, ignored weighty considerations and acted on matters not proper for consideration, it is enough to say that we are wholly without jurisdiction to review such questions (People ex rel. Masterson v. French, 110 N. Y. 494, 500; People ex rel. McAleer v. French, 119 N. Y. 502, 507; Matter of Greenebaum v. Bingham, 201 N. Y. 343, 347; People ex rel. Morrissey v. Waldo, 212 N. Y. 174,179; People ex rel. Regan v. Enright, 240 N. Y. 194,198,199; Matter of Sagos v. O'Connell, 301 N. Y. 212, 215, supra; 1 Benjamin, Report to the Governor on Administrative Adjudication, pp. 170, 217; see Jaffe v. State Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 352, 353, 354; Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 246 et seq.). Matter of Tompkins v. Board of Regents (299 N. Y. 469) does not announce or apply any different rule as to court review of administrative direction in measuring out discipline against physicians. In the Tompkins case, we reversed an Appellate Division order annulling a Regents' determination, because the Appellate Division had exceeded its powers in so doing. Sending the whole matter back to the Regents, because of that error of law, we reminded the board of the physician's fine record, etc., and suggested that such factors should be significant to the board in again " exercising its broad discretion to frame the appropriate discipline, for the offense and for the offender." In that same connection, however, in Tompkins, we made it entirely clear that the " exercise of that discretion is beyond our power to review" (p. 476). Had we not there found an error of law (not as to punishment but as to the Appellate Division's unwarranted annulment order) we could not, in the Tompkins case, have done other than affirm. In the present case there is no error of law, and so no basis for any interference by us.
The orders should be affirmed.