Case Name: Woods v. Lloyd
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1888-11-05
Citations: 1 Monag. 254
Docket Number: No. 104
Parties: Woods v. Lloyd.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; being those cases not designated to be reported
Volume: 1
Pages: 254–256

Head Matter:
Woods v. Lloyd.
In an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s husband caused, by the alleged negligence of defendant, it appeared by the evidence that the deceased was a police officer and that, on the night of his death, he was pursuing a fugitive. When he overtook him, a struggle ensued, and the officer was dragged or fell over an unguarded precipice, upon defendants’ lot, and was killed. The precipice was caused by the grading of a street by the city some years before the accident, and was within the officer’s beat. It was in a thickly settled neighborhood. The court below entered a compulsory nonsuit. Held, not to be error..
Oct. 24, 1888.
Error, No. 104, Oct. T. 1888, to O. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., to review judgment of compulsory nonsuit in an action on the ease, by Elizabeth Woods against E. J. and S. H.. Lloyd, for damages for the death of plaintiff’s husband, by the-alleged negligence of defendants, at Jan. T. 1887, No. 119.
At the trial, the evidence was to the following effect: On the-night of Sept. 4, 1886, an affray occurred-at the corner of Fifth. Avenue and Chestnut Street, in Pittsburgh. During its continuance, a pofice officer came up and arrested one of the participants. The prisoner escaped and George Woods, also an officer, started in pursuit. The fugitive, with a companion, ran up Linden Street and made the ascent to a plateau on which defendants’ lot is situated. Woods followed closely after them. He overtook them near a stable, standing near the edge of a precipice, 38 feet high, overlooking-Locust Sti’eet. Some of the testimony indicated that Woods was-pursuing the fugitive closely and, in the heat of the pursuit, followed. him over the cliff, and some of it that he actually had seized him, and, in the struggle by the fugitive to get away, both fell together.
The plateau is bounded by Linden, Boyd, Locust and Chestnut streets. Defendants own the lot on the corner of Locust and Boyd streets, fronting 80 feet on Boyd and 180 on Locust. The highest elevation above the streets is at this corner, and the accident occurred on the Locust street front, 120 feet from Boyd street, the precipice there being, as stated, 38 feet high. There are no fences or guards whatever surrounding this lot. Linden street, which runs parallel with Locust and about 190 feet from it, ascends from Chestnut by a grade of about ten feet to the hundred until it reaches the cliff overlooking Boyd street. It is there continued by a well worn road (not, however, a public road) winding to the left (toward Locust street), passing close to the-spot from which "Woods and Henning fell, and completing the circuit by returning to Linden street at a point about half way from Boyd to Chestnut. A worn foot-path leads off from this road where it turns back to Linden street, down to Locust, striking the latter at a point some 300 feet above the spot where the accident occurred. There is a stairway leading from the corner of Forbes and Boyd streets to Linden street, striking it at the point where the worn roadway leads off from it. The neighborhood is thickly settled. Linden street has a number of houses on it; many teams pass over the roadway, and a great number of foot passengers go up the stairway and across the plateau past the place of the accident and descend to Locust street by the pathway before described. This wagon road and footpath have existed for a number of years. The precipice in question resulted from the grading of Locust street by the city, which was done a number of years since. The plateau was in Woods’s beat.
The court entered a compulsory nonsuit which it subsequently refused to take off.
The assignment of error specified the action of the court in entering a compulsory non suit, and in refusing a motion to take it off.
S. A. McClung, with him H. A. Miller, for plaintiff in error.
Negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury of which it is not the sole or immediate cause. Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353.
It is immaterial whether the act of the intervening party was mere negligence or a voluntary intermeddling or wrong-doing. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 139; Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93.
The fact that the lot was made dangerous by the act of the city in grading the street will not relieve defendants.
Woods was rightfully on defendant’s property when the accident occurred. “ Police officers of the city of Pittsburgh are entitled to exercise all the authority of constables in making arrests.” Act of April 5th, 1866, P. L. .527.
Police officers are public officers, like constable, sheriff, etc. Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 125; Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 351; Dillon, § 210; Marsh’s Constable’s Guide, p. 80-81.
Under the circumstances, defendants owed Woods a duty not to leave their property in a condition which endangerd his life. Smith on Negligence, p. 35-6; Scott v. Liverpool Dock Co., 3 H. & C. 596; White v. France, 2 C. P., Div. 308.
When the owner of land expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his land, if he permits anything in the nature of a ■snare to exist thereon which results in an injury to one availing himself of the invitation, and who at the time is exercising ordinary care, such owner is answerable for the consequences. Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283. See, also, McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 218.
The owner of real estate may be guilty of negligence as against •even a trespasser. Hydraulic-Works v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332; Schilling v. Abernethy, 112 Pa. 437.
The present case is distinguished from Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Pa. 74, and Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144, both by the possession of ■ the element of openess to accident just referred to, and by the fact that in neither of those cases did the party enter upon the premises as in this, in the performance of a duty, and hence in the exercise of a right.
Defendants are answerable in damages for all the consequences which, proximately, i. e. without the intervention of another cause, result from their negligent act. Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 192; Dubois v. Glaub, 52 Pa. 238.
If the question as to the injury being proximate is a doubtful one, the jury is to determine. Fairbanks v. Kerr & Smith, 70 Pa. 86; R. R. Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. 458; Scott v. Hunter, supra; and Dubois v. Glaub, supra.
R. B. Petty, not heard, for defendant in error.
The act of the fugitive was the immediate, proximate cause, and’ the defendant is not liable therefore. Pa. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373; Underhill on Torts, p. 16; Pa. R. R. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353.
The defendant did not owe to Woods the duty of fencing his lot so as to prevent his (Woods) falling therefrom to the street below, and consequently was guilty of no negligence. Wharton on Negligence, §§ 349, 35Ó, 351.
The cases cited by plaintiff are all cases of invitation for business in which the owner had an interest.
While the law authorizes the commission of a trespass to escape danger, etc., 3 Bl. Com. p. 212, the land owner is not answerable to him for negligence in the manner of keeping the premises. Kohn v. Lovett, 44 Ga. 251.
The case is ruled by Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144.
Nov. 5, 1888.

Opinion:
Per Curiam,
As the plaintiff did not exhibit a single element necessary for the sustentation of her action, the court did well to order a non-suit. The judgment is affirmed.