Case Name: Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Swartz
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1913-11-20
Citations: 115 Va. 723
Docket Number: 
Parties: Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Swartz.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 723–744

Head Matter:
Richmond
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Swartz.
November 20, 1913.
On Petition to Rehear January 15, 1914.
1. Pleading—Declaration—Assumption of Rislc—Contributory Negligence.—Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are matters of defense, and the fact that the plaintiff has not assumed the one or been guilty of the other need not be averred in the declaration. If, however, the' declaration shows that the plaintiff has assumed the risk or been guilty of contributory negligence, it will be held bad on demurrer.
2. Master and Servant—Fellow-Servants—Railroads.—By the express terms of section 162 of the Constitution of Virginia a railroad employee is declared not to be the fellow-servant of a co-employee in charge of a locomotive engine.
3. Pleading—Declaration—Bill of Particulars.—Where a declaration states a good cause of action and the defendant desires a more particular statement of the grounds of complaint, he should demand a bill of particulars under section 3249 of the Code.
4. Pleading—Declaration—Allegation of Negligence—Disobedience of Rules.—A count of a declaration which sets out in detail how the defendant had modified or partially abrogated one of its rules, and then substantially alleges that the injury complained of was occasioned by the negligent failure of the defendant to observe the rule as modified, states a good cause of action.
5. Pleading—V ariance — Amendments — Continuance—Code, Section 3384.—Where there is a variance between the allegations of the pleadings and the evidence, it is in conformity with section 3384 of the Code to allow- the pleadings to be amended and, if need be, continue the case, and the practice is to be commended as promotive of substantial justice.
6. Evidence—Published Rules of Railroad—Partial Abrogation—Parol Evidence.—It is entirely competent to show by parol that a printed rule of a railroad company had been modified or partially abrogated in its application to a particular yard of the company by those charged with its application and enforcement on that yard, and that its application in the modified form was the universal practice on that yard. This does not vary or contradict the terms of the rule nor submit its interpretation to the jury.
7. Evidence—Railroads—Personal Injury—Report to Company—Production.—In an action against a railroad company to recover for a personal injury, the court may require the production by the defendant of a contemporaneous written statement of an employee concerning the injury complained of who was examined as a witness by the defendant. The statement is admissible for the purpose of impeachment if it contradicts the witness, and if it does not contradict, but corroborates him, then it is not prejudicial to the defendant.
8. Railroads—Personal Injury—Negligence—Ads of Agent.—The acts of the engineer and fireman of an engine, done in the presence and by the direction or at the request of a hostler who has taken charge of the engine on a railroad yard, and who knows that the train is protected by blue lights, are as much the acts of the hostler as if done by him personally.
9. Appeal and Ebeor—Verdicts—Conflict of Evidence—Plaintiff in Error.—Where the evidence is conflicting the verdict of the jury settles the conflict; and the plaintiff in error occupies the position of a demurrant to the evidence.
10. Appeal and Ebeor—Personal lnjwry—Verdicts—Excessive Damages.—Where a personal injury case has been fairly submitted to the jury on the law, and there is ample evidence to sustain the findings of the jury, their verdict, approved by the trial court,, awarding the plaintiff $17,000 damages for a broken leg and other injuries and suffering, will not be set aside on appeal.
On Petition eob Rehearing.
11. Master and Servant—Railroads—Rules—Construction—Modification.—The allegation that a rule of a railroad company had been modified and partially abrogated by the company in certain designated particulars is not altered by the fact that the pleader has elsewhere spoken of the change as the construction of the rule habitually practiced and acquiesced in with the knowledge of the company.
12. Master and Servant—Negligence of Eellow-Servani—Virginia Constitution and Statute.—A declaration in an action against a railroad company which charges that the relation of master and servant existed between the defendant and the plaintiff; that the plaintiff at the time of the injury was engaged in work on a car, and that the injury sustained was occasioned by the negligence of the hostler, a fellow-servant in charge of a locomotive engine, states a case for recovery by the plaintiff under section 162 of the Constitution and section 1294-k of the Code.
13. Master and Servant—Safe Place—Injury to Oar Repairer—NonAssignable Duty—Negligence of Engineer—Proximate Oause.— Independently of statute, the master owes to the servant the non-assignable duty of using ordinary care to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which to perform his work, and if the hostler in charge of a train directs an inexperienced fireman to back the engine in order to give slack for uncoupling, and he does it negligently, thereby injuring a repairer under the train who had given due notice of his presence, the master is liable. The omission of the hostler to discharge his duty was, in legal contemplation, the proximate cause of the injury as between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the negligence of the fireman was but a link in the chain of causation. It is not the negligence of the fireman for which the company is liable, but the dominant negligence of the hostler, who was the defendant’s alter ego. For discussion of “proximate cause” see opinion of Whittle, J.
14. Master and Servant—Injury to Oar Repairer—Avoidable Injury— Instructions.—In an action by a ear repairer for an injury inflicted on him by backing the engine attached to the car he was repairing after a blue light had been put on the car, indicating his presence, it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury “that if, upon the evidence, the plaintiff could have avoided the injury by waiting till the engine was uncoupled, he could not recover” where the undisputed evidence was that the plaintiff went under the car in the proper discharge of his duty as car repairer, and also in obedience to the express command of the car inspector, whose' orders he had been specifically directed to obey.
15. Instructions—Sufficiently Instructed.—It is not error to refuse an instruction substantially covered by another instruction already given by the court.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of Clifton Forge in an action of trespass on the case. Judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.
Affirmed.
The following instructions were given by the court:
At the Request of the Plaintiff.
No. 1. The court instructs the jury that the law presumes that the plaintiff, Swartz, was not guilty of contributory negligence and that he 'exercised due and proper care for his own safety; and if the defendant company relies on the defense that he would not have been injured but for his contributory negligence, then the burden of proof is on the defendant company to establish such contributory negligence of the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence unless such contributory negligence appears from the plaintiff’s evidence, or can be fairly inferred from all the circumstances in the case.
No. 2. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant was guilty of negligence, as charged in the first, second, third, fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff’s second amended declaration, or guilty of negligence as charged in any one of said counts, and that such negligence of said defendant company was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, then they ought to find a verdict for the plaintiff.
No. 3. The court instructs the jury that if they should find for the plaintiff, they may, in estimating his damages, take into consideration the physical and mental suffering of the plaintiff caused by his injury; his loss of wages for the time during which he was prevented, by said injury, from working; proper compensation for his b'eing unable, because of his injury, to follow such a calling or business as he could otherwise have followed; and if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff’s injury is permanent, they are further instructed that, in estimating his damages, they may also take into consideration his probable duration of life, and to show this they may take into consideration the standard mortality tables as showing the probable duration of the plaintiff’s life under all proof in this case.
At the Instance of the Defendant.
A. The court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in this case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence to their satisfaction that the defendant was guilty of negligence, as stated in the declaration, and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. H'e cannot recover if it is just as probable that the injury resulted from some cause for which the defendant was not responsible as for some cause for which it was responsible.
B. The court instructs the jury that it is their duty to try this case without being influenced by sympathy from the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured and has suffered, for the jury as much as the court are under the solemn obligation of an oath to decide according to the law and the facts. Without negligence on its part the defendant cannot be held liable, and even if the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant has been negligent, and if they further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff also was negligent, and that his carelessness contributed to any extent to his injury, he cannot recover against the defendant.
O. The court instructs the jury that the defendant did not insure or guarantee Swartz’s safety. Its only duty was to exercise ordinary care for his safety. Ordinary care depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and is such care as a person of ordinary prudence, under all circumstances, would exercise, and if the defendant used such ordinary care, it is not liable in case of injury.
On the other hand, Swartz’s duty was to use ordinary care for his own safety-—that is, such care as a man of ordinary prudence, under all circumstances, would exercise. And Swartz cannot recover, regardless of any failure of the defendant to use ordinary care (if the jury believe such failure on the part of the defendant appears • from the evidence), if the jury believes from all the evidence that Swartz also failed to use such ordinary care and that his own imprudence contributed to the injury in any degree.
D. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence in this case that Swartz crossed over the train and walked east to the car next to the engine, where he met Inspector Deaton; that he ktteiv that the engine had not been taken away from the train and did not inquire or ascertain whether or not the road engine had been uncoupled; that he knew, or should have known, that the blue light had been placed on the front of this car, between the car and the tender of the engine; that by the custom of the yard the road engine might be uncoupled and moved away at any time' when the lights were so placed; and that in giving slack in the usual way to uncouple, the front car might be moved or jarred back by the engine, then the jury are instructed that the plaintiff took upon hims'elf the risk of the injury he received and they must find for the defendant.
J. M. Perry, for the plaintiff in error.
W. B. Allen and Charles and Duncan Curry, for the defendant in error.

Opinion:
Whittle, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
For convenience the defendant in error and the plaintiff in error will b'e called, respectively, plaintiff and defendant.
The second amended declaration contained seven counts, and there was a demurrer to the declaration as a whole and to each count. The circuit court sustained the demurrer to the fourth count and directed the jury to disregard the seventh count, and overruled the demurrer to the other five counts.
(1) The first and second grounds of demurrer to each of the remaining counts are that plaintiff assumed the risk of the alleged injury and was guilty of contributory negligence.
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are matters of defense, and the fact that a plaintiff has not assumed the one or been guilty of the other need not be averred. It is nevertheless true that where a declaration affirmatively shows that the plaintiff has assumed the risk, or been guilty of contributory negligence, it will b'e held bad on demurrer, but that is not predicable of this declaration. Penn Foundry Co. v. Probst, 114 Va. 264, 76 S. E. 323.
The third ground of demurrer is that the third and fifth counts show that the alleged injury was occasioned by the action of fellow-servants of plaintiff.
The gravamen of the averment in each of these counts is that the hostler in charge of the engine, discovering that he could not uncouple the engine from the train, as it was his duty to do, until it was backed sufficiently to give the necessary slack, with knowledge that the attached train was protected by blue lights, and without warning to the plaintiff, who was at work under the car nearest to the tender, negligently passed an order to the fireman to back the engine for the purpose indicated, which was done in such a careless, reckless and unskillful manner as to occasion plaintiff's injury.
By the express terms of section 162 of the Constitution of Yirginia a railroad employee is declared not to be the felloAV-servant of a coemployee in charge of a locomotive engine.
The fourth ground of demurrer is that neither the declaration, nor any count thereof, shows the neglect by the defendant of any duty laAvfully owing by it to the plaintiff, or any actionable negligence on the part of the defendant.
To the contrary, it is alleged that the relation of master and servant existed between the parties, and in varying from the duty owing from the master to the servant and the negligent breach of such duty, the defendant was guilty of negligence. Hortenstein v. Va. Carolina R. Co., 102 Va. 914, 47 S. E. 996; Cedar Works v. Dalea, 109 Va. 237, 64 S. E. 41.
The fifth ground of demurrer is that the first'and second counts do not set forth the matters discussed in the last preceding assignment with sufficient particularity and clearness to enable the defendant to understand the nature of the charge which it was called on to answer.
It is an established rule of practice in this jurisdiction that where a declaration states a good cause of action, and the defendant desires a more particular statement of the grounds of complaint, he should demand a bill of particulars under section 3249 of the Code. Interstate R. Co. v. Tyree, 110 Va. 38, 65 S. E. 500; Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S. E. 1032.
The sixth and last ground of demurrer is that the material allegations of the second count are self-contradictory and repugnant.
This ground is not well taken. The count substantially alleges that the accident was occasioned by the negligent failure of the defendant to observe the terms of rule 26 with respect to the protection of trains by blue light signals in its modified or partially abrogated form, as set out in detail in that count. The binding effect upon the defendant of the partial abrogation of rule 26 will again be adverted to in considering the case on the merits.
(2) The second assignment of error is that the court at a former trial, having excluded evidence on behalf of the plaintiff for variance between the evidence and allegations, allowed the pleadings to be amended and continued the case.
This ruling was in conformity with section 3384 of the Code, and the practice is to be commended as promotive of substantial justice, and was without prejudice to the defendant.
(3) The next assignment of error presents the conflicting theories of plaintiff and defendant, involving the very-right of the case. The contention of the defendant is that rule 26 (designed for the protection of workmen at work under or about a car, engine or train) is controlling, and being clear and unambiguous, its legal import is to b'e determined by the court, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to contradict or vary its terms.
This assumption is founded upon a misapprehension of the plaintiff's position. He does not seek to submit to the jury the interpretation of rule 26, nor to contradict or vary its terms. His proposition is that it is competent to allege and prove as a matter of fact that the printed rule in its integrity was never in force with respect to trains on the Clifton Forge yards, bnt that it had been modified or partially abrogated in regard to such trains. This was the object of the second count in the declaration, already noticed, and for that purpose the evidence, the admission of which is the ground of this assignment of error, was offered. In sustaining the theory of the plaintiff the circuit court was well within the decisions of this court. Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 111 Va. 499, 69 S. E. 323; N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Cofer, 114 Va. 434, 76 S. E. 909.
The part of rule 26 applicable to the present controversy reads: "A blue flag by day and a blue light by night, placed on or at the end of a car, engine or train, denote that workmen are at work under or about the car, engine or train. The car, engine or train thus protected must not be coupled to or moved until the blue signal is removed by the person who placed it."
This rule was modified in the following particular: As soon as practicable after a train comes in on the yard at night, and while the engine is still attached, blue lights are to be placed on the rear end of the rear car and on the front end of the foremost car next to the tender, and not on the front of the engine. As soon as these lights are placed in position it is the duty of the car inspectors and car repairers to commence work on the string of cars, the bine lights denoting their presence, and are intended for their protection, as indicated in rule 26. It was likewise the duty of the yard hostler, promptly on the incoming of a train, to take charge of the engine and uncouple it from the cars and take it to the round-house for inspection and repairs. If the blue light was placed at the head of the engine, instead of the front end of the car next to the tender, it would "tie it up" so that the hostler could not uncouple it until the blue light was removed. The modified rule was intended to expedite the business of the defendant on the yards, and by careful handling the necessary slack could be given and the engine uncoupled without endangering the safety of workmen under the cars, and this was the universal practice on the Clifton Forge yards.
(4) The next assignment of error denies the right of the trial court, on motion of the plaintiff, to require the production of a contemporaneous written statement of an employee concerning the accident who was examined as a witness by the defendant.
We do not think the trial court exceeded its authority in the premises. Such statement was admissible for purposes of impeachment—as much so as would have been the testimony of an impeaching witness that the employee had, on another occasion, made a contradictory statement. On the other hand, if the statement is not contradictory, but tends to corroborate the testimony of the witness, it would not be prejudicial to the defendant. The trend of modern practice is to relax rather than restrict the rule in regard to the admission of evidence in the effort to develop the whole truth of the matter under investigation.
(5) There was evidence to sustain the claim of the plain tiff that the hostler had assumed charge of the engine fo • the purpose of uncoupling it from the train preparatory to taking it to the round-house at the time he called on the engineer to give him slack, and he knew at that time that the train was protected by blue lights. In these circumstances in legal contemplation, the acts of the engineer and fireman, done in his presence and by his direction or at his request, were as much his own acts as if done by him personally.
(6) The verdict of the jury has set at rest the conflicting-testimony of witnesses, and the case must be considered by this court as upon a demurrer to the evidence by the defendant. Considering the case from that viewpoint, the salient facts are these: At the time of the accident the plaintiff was a car repairer in the service of the defendant, doing night work on its upp'er yards at Clifton Forge. The yards contain numerous tracks running east and west, and the custom was for two inspectors and two car repairers to work each train as it came in. One inspector, with a car repairer, would take the south side of the train and work from east to west, while the other inspector and car repairer would work the north side from west to east. The inspectors examined each car for defects, and the repairers made such light repairs as they were ordered to make by the inspectors. When the plaintiff was employed as car repairer he was directed to report to the general foreman of car inspectors on the yards, by whom he was assigned to duty under Inspectors Deaton and Holland. He was told that they would instruct him as to his duties and the rules for his guidance, and that he must take orders from them and obey them. He was not given a book of rules, and never saw or knew of rule 26 until after the accident. The inspectors instructed him as to his duties and the terms of the rule as modified with respect to the placing of blue lights. During the entire term of Ms ser vice the above rule was in force and observed in tbe yards, and be bad never known a train protected with blue lights, as prescribed by tbe rule, to be moved. It was impossible for tbe bostler to uncouple tbe engine and tender from tbe front car without seeing tbe blue light.
On tbe night of tbe accident plaintiff was working under Inspector Deaton, when a freight train came in on the yards and stopped. Deaton told him they would work that train from tbe south side, beginning at tbe end of tbe car next to tbe tender, and immediately placed a blue light on that end of tbe car on tbe south side. In obedience to an order from Deaton, plaintiff went under tbe rear end of tbe front car to replace a yoke bolt. It was necessary for him to go underneath tbe car to replace tbe nut, and to assume a sitting posture with bis back toward tbe rear axle of tbe car. While thus engaged tbe yard bostler came on tbe scene to take charge of tbe engine, and, discovering that tbe engine could not be uncoupled without slack, be went forward to tbe engine. He found tbe engineer standing on tbe step of tbe engine in tbe act of stepping off on tbe ground. Tbe bostler told him to give him a little slack to cut tbe 'engine off; whereupon tbe engineer directed tbe fireman, who was still on tbe engine, to give tbe slack. Tbe fireman reversed tbe lever and turned on such a bead of steam that tbe impact forced tbe front car back for a distance varyingly estimated at from six to fifteen fe'et. There were thirty-odd iron cars in tbe train loaded with coal. Tbe violence of tbe collision was such that it threw plaintiff's right leg across tbe rail, and bis jacket was caught under tbe wheel and so wound up that be was dragged a number of feet and well-nigh choked to death before be could be released. But tbe chief injury was to bis right leg, tbe bone of which was crushed and tbe flesh torn off one side. He was in tbe hospital for seventeen months, and bad since undergone six or seven operations for the removal of diseased pieces of bone. The accident happened in April, 1910, and at the last trial, in July, 1912, there was a running sore on his leg; and some of the medical experts were of opinion, from the diseased condition of the leg, that amputation might still become necessary. Plaintiff had be'en compelled to give up work, his general health was impaired, and he continued to suffer great pain. Prior to the injury he was a robust young man, within a few months of attaining his majority, and with an earning capacity of from sixty-five to seventy dollars per month.
Without discussing the instructions, it is sufficient to say that the case was fairly submitted to the jury on the law, and their verdict awarding the plaintiff $17,000 was approved by the trial court. The assessment, it is true, is larger than usual in such cases, but there was ample evidence to sustain the finding, and, upon familiar principles, this court would not be warranted in disturbing the verdict.
We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.