Case Name: Willie J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. KRAFT, INC. and Crawford Risk Management, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-09-12
Citations: 585 So. 2d 1120
Docket Number: No. 90-2424
Parties: Willie J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. KRAFT, INC. and Crawford Risk Management, Appellees.
Judges: WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 1120–1123

Head Matter:
Willie J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. KRAFT, INC. and Crawford Risk Management, Appellees.
No. 90-2424.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 12, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 16, 1991.
Lawrence M. Kukey of Harris, Kukey & Helgesen, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellant.
Deborah L. Graham of Law Offices of David A. Danielson, West Palm Beach, Diane H. Tuft, Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
Willie J. Williams (claimant) appeals from an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) which determined the amount of wage-loss benefits due for the time period of October 1989, through April 1990. Claimant asserts (1) the JCC erred in ruling that, in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, claimant was not entitled to recalculation of wage-loss benefits paid; (2) the stipulation regarding the value of fringe benefits needed to be approved by the JCC in order to be enforceable; and (3) the JCC erred by failing to address an alleged mathematical inaccuracy in determination of wage-loss benefits. We affirm as to the first two issues, but reverse and remand for further consideration of the appropriate mathematical calculations of wage loss.
The dispute between the parties involves the continued enforceability of a stipulation dated September 23, 1988. The stipulation addressed the value of the fringe benefits provided by claimant's current employer (part of the amount which must be deducted in order to determine wage loss due from his former employer: appellee, Kraft, Inc.).
In pertinent part, the stipulation stated: Beginning September 1, 1988, the value of fringe benefits provided to the claimant by the Palm Beach County School Board is $63.19 per week, and for pur-
poses of wage-loss calculations, $271.72 per month.
After hearing testimony from the only witness presented by the parties, the JCC ruled in pertinent part as follows:
This second stipulation was apparently the process of bargained for negotiations among the parties. It is not entirely clear, nor was there any specific evidence offered by either party as to how the parties arrived at the figures contained in the stipulation on May 23, 1988. Although the claimant argued that the figures contained therein were not accurate, there was no specific evidence presented as to why this is such. Although the parties stipulated that the claimant's retirement benefits had not vested, it is not clear as to what other elements were considered in arriving at the stipulated figure. It is neither possible nor the function of the undersigned to attempt to determine the parties intentions and precise mechanics in arriving at this stipulated figure. The law is clear that a stipulation should not be ignored or set aside in the absence of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, withholding of the facts by an adversary or some element as would render the agreement void. See Howard Johnson's v. Pineda, First District [560 So.2d 336] ([Fla.App.] 1990) and cases cited therein. Since there has been no affirmative basis demonstrated to ignore or set aside the stipulation, I find that this stipulation of the parties is controlling.
The claimant asserts that the JCC erred and should have overridden the stipulation in light of Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d 876 (Fla.1982). In the absence of any evidence of mistake, fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation or change of circumstance which would justify a modification, the JCC was correct in ruling that the stipulation was still enforceable. Howard Johnson v. Pineda, 560 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
The claimant's additional argument, that since the stipulation failed to specify a duration it was only applicable to Septem ber, 1989, is unpersuasive. The stipulation addressed a fact, the value of the fringe benefits received. Unless there is a change in those benefits, there is no reason to find that the stipulation of fact does not continue to remain in effect.
The claimant also argues that the stipulation in the instant case is unenforceable unless approved by a JCC pursuant to section 440.20(12) and (13), Florida Statutes. The statutory sections in question apply to lump-sum settlements. The stipulation in this case does not involve the acceptance of a lump sum in lieu of future benefits. The statutory sections are, therefore, inapplicable.
The claimant also asserts that the JCC failed to rule on his assertion that the wage-loss benefits were being incorrectly calculated. We feel that this issue was properly presented to the JCC and that the claimant is entitled to a ruling. We, therefore, remand this case to the JCC for a determination of whether wage-loss benefits are properly being calculated.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
ALLEN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with written opinion.