Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bryant Roseboro, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2015-04-15
Citations: 127 A.D.3d 998
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bryant Roseboro, Appellant.
Judges: Dillon, J.P., Dickerson and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 998–1001

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bryant Roseboro, Appellant.
[6 NYS3d 629]—

Opinion:
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rungs County (Reichbach, J.), rendered July 7, 2011, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with murder in the second degree and related charges based on allegations that he shot six bullets at the victim, in the defendant's apartment, in the presence of the defendant's roommate and the roommate's girlfriend. While the girlfriend testified at trial, the roommate did not. The defendant was acquitted of the murder charge but convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
The defendant requested a missing witness charge against the People for the People's failure to produce the defendant's roommate, who had observed the shooting and had spoken with the police at the investigatory stage of the case. The court denied the charge on the ground that the witness was not under the People's control.
A missing witness charge is warranted for a party's failure to produce a witness, under its control, where his or her testimony would have been material and noncumulative of other testimony or evidence (see People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 733, 735 [2010]). A defendant seeking the charge has "the initial burden of proving that [the missing witness] was under the control of the People and that his testimony would be relevant, noncumulative and beneficial to them" (People v Townsley, 240 AD2d 955, 958 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Vanhoesen, 31 AD3d 805, 809 [2006]; People v Drayton, 24 AD3d 686 [2005]; Buttice v Dyer, 1 AD3d 552, 553 [2003]; People v Williams, 283 AD2d 944 [2001]; People v Williams, 256 AD2d 1110, 1111 [1998]; People v Swinton, 200 AD2d 892, 894 [1994]; People v Hicks, 154 AD2d 713, 714 [1989]; People v Ryklin, 150 AD2d 509, 511 [1989]). The element of control, for missing witness purposes, does not concern physical availability, but instead concerns the relationship between the witness and the parties (see People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192, 200 [2003]; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 429 [1986]).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the missing witness charge (see People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 197; People v Otigho, 113 AD3d 637 [2014]; see also People v Macana, 84 NY2d 173, 179-180 [1994]). The defendant failed to meet his initial burden of establishing that the roommate was under the People's control. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the roommate was not under the People's control at the time of trial by virtue of having provided a statement to the police during the initial investigation stage of the case. In addition, control cannot be found from the People's placement of the roommate on their witness list, as their wish for his testimony is not indicia of having control over him. There was no material witness order. Indeed, the record contains no evidence that the People's relationship with the defendant's roommate gave them any more control over him at trial than the defendant may have had himself.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. A review of the totality of the circumstances (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 413 [2004]; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 [1977]) demonstrates that the defendant's statements to the police, which were given after he was informed of, and waived, his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), were voluntarily made (see CPL 60.45 [2] [a], [b] [i]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d at 414; People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]).
The defendant's challenge, made in his pro se supplemental brief, to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation, is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the challenged remarks were proper because they were within the broad bounds of rhetorical comment permissible in closing arguments, and constituted a fair response to arguments made by defense counsel in summation (see People v Halm, 81 NY2d 819, 821 [1993]; People v Molinaro, 62 AD3d 724, 724-725 [2009]; People v Holguin, 284 AD2d 343 [2001]; People v Stokes, 282 AD2d 553, 554 [2001]; People v Alexandria, 126 AD2d 655 [1987]).
Under the circumstances of this case, the sentence imposed upon the defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree was not excessive (see generally People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
Dillon, J.P., Dickerson and Cohen, JJ., concur.