Case Name: UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOXIE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-03-01
Citations: 375 Mich. 102
Docket Number: Calendar No. 18, Docket No. 50,546
Parties: UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOXIE.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, J., concurred with Adams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 102–119

Head Matter:
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOXIE.
Decision of the Court.
1. Automobiles — Car Shoppers — Imputed Negligence.
Judgment for defendant in action by automobile dealer’s subrogee for damages to subrogor’s car resulting from its negligent operation by ear shopper when it collided with negligently-operated car owned by defendant is reversed, the negligence of the car shopper not being imputable so as to prevent recovery.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris and Adams, JJ.
2. Automobiles — Liability of Owner — Owner’s Right to Recover for Wrong Done to Him.
Provision of Stale vehicle code imposing liability upon owner for negligence of operator of car does not deny to an owner the right to recover for a wrong done to him (CLS 1961, § $57.401).
References for Points in Headnotes
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 581, 675, 676.
Dealer’s liability for negligent operation of car by prospective purchaser or one acting for him. 31 ALR2d 1445.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 676.
Contributory negligence of driver of motor vehicle as imputable to owner under statute mailing owner responsible for negligence of driver. 11 ALR2d 1437.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 668, 675, 676.
Negligence of driver of automobile as imputable to passenger. 90 ALR 630, supplemented in 123 ALR 1171.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 676.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 675.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § § 581, 675.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 668.
Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as imputable to passenger. 90 ALR 630, supplemented in 123 ALR 1171.
8 Am Jur 2d, Bailments § 253.
Imputable negligence of bailee to bailor where subject of bailment is damaged by third person. 6 ALR 316, supplemented in 30 ALR 1248.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 581, 675.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 668.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 581, 675.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 727.
3. Same — Doctrine op Imputed Negligence Abolished.
The doctrine of imputed negligence whereby the negligence of a driver is imiputed to the occupants or owner of the car in their action against another motorist has been abolished in this State.
4. Same — Imputed Negligence.
Provision of State vehicle code imposing liability upon owner for negligence of operator of car does not operate to impute negligence of driver of owner’s car upon owner in latter’s action against another motorist whose negligence also may have proximately caused damage to the owner’s ear (CLS 1961, § SS7.401).
5. Same — Contributory Negligence.
The doctrine of contributory negligence is concerned with barring recovery between wrongdoers and has no application to bar recovery by an owner for driver’s negligence, in owner’s action against another motorist, at least where the owner has no control of the vehicle or its driver at the time of the accident.
6. Same — Negligence op Operator — Negligence op Dependant.
Pact that car shopper was negligent while driving car owned by plaintiff’s subrogor and being demonstrated by its salesman when it collided with defendant’s car, also negligently operated would not preclude recovery by subrogee from negligent defendant.
Separate Opinion.
Smith and O’Hara, JJ.
7. Automobiles — Imputed Negligence.
The doctrine of imputed negligence has not been completely abolished but has been repudiated as it had theretofore been applied to bar recovery by a blameless passenger in an action against a third party.
8. Bailments — Contributory Negligence op Bailee — Imputed Negligence.
The contributory negligence of the bailee concurring with that of a third person to injure the bailed property is not to be imputed to the bailor who is free from any negligence.
9. Automobiles — Imputed Negligence op Car Shopper — Negligence op Dependant.
The doctrine of imputed negligence is not applicable to bar recovery by the subrogee of owner of a car which was being driven by a negligent car shopper while on a demonstration drive with salesman when it collided with negligently operated car belonging to defendant.
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ.
10. Automobiles — Imputed Negligence.
The doctrine of imputed negligence has not been completely abolished but has been repudiated as it had theretofore been applied to bar recovery by a blameless passenger in an action against a third parly, where passenger is not a joint venturer or master or principal of the driver.
11. Same — Imputed Negligence of Car Shopper — Eight to Control by Salesman.
Negligence of car shopper who was driving subrogor’s car with subrogor’s salesman present when car collided with defendant’s automobile, also negligently operated, is imputed to the subrogor so as to preclude subrogee from recovering damages for injury to the subrogor’s car at common law, it not being shown that the salesman did not have the right to control.
12. Appeal and Error — Wrong Seasons for Eight Eesult.
Result attained by the trial judge that is correal will not be disturbed on appeal even though other reasons should have been assigned.
Appeal from Ionia; Bebean (Leo B.), J.
Submitted June 3, 1964.
(Calendar No. 18, Docket No. 50,546.)
Decided March 1, 1965.
Case by Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, subrogee, against Richard Hoxie for damages to automobile sustained in collision. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for plaintiff.
Mitts, Smith & Raughey (Sherman R. Gone, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Fraser, Trebilcoclt, Davis & Foster, for defendant.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
The facts in this case are undisputed. An accident occurred at an uncontrolled country road intersection when two automobiles collided due to negligence by both drivers. A salesman for Breimayer Chevrolet Sales Company was on a demonstration drive. The Breimayer car was under the sole operation and control of the car shopper, one of the negligent drivers. Plaintiff, subrogee of Breimayer, sued to recover from the second driver the damages to that automobile.
The case was tried to the court. Judgment was entered of no cause for action, based on a finding that under section 401 of the Michigan vehicle code (CLS 1961, § 257.401 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev §9. 2101]) the negligence of the driver of the Breimayer automobile should be imputed to the owner.
The trial judge reasoned:
"Since the owner's liability statute does charge the owner with the negligence of the driver, it would appear logical that such negligence cannot be shed when the owner desires to recover for his damage from the third party who contributed to his damage."
The statute is a liability statute. It creates liability for a wrong. Nowhere does it deny to an owner the right to recover for a wrong done to him.
The doctrine' of imputed negligence was abolished by this Court in Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich 218 (163 ALR. 697). As was noted by the Court in that case (p 229), the doctrine was based on the theory that the passenger was so identified with the driver that unless the driver was free from negligence the passenger could not recover.
The Court concluded:
"Ever since 1872 we have adhered to the imputed negligence rule. "We have recognized from time to time the changes brought about by the innovations of science and engineering, and we have carefully considered at much length the implications of the rule, its application, and the effect of its abandonment. As a result of our study and observation we are convinced that in the long run the application of the rule is more harmful than helpful and results in more injustice than it prevents; and that we should not continue the invariable application of the so-called imputed negligence rule merely and solely on the ground that the injured person was a voluntary, gratuitous passenger in an automobile, the driver of which was guilty of negligence which was a contributing proximate cause of an accident and injury to such passenger.
"Our holding herein should not be construed as excluding under appropriate circumstances the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the passenger, if relative to the cause of the accident the passenger failed to exercise such reasonable care and caution as he should have exercised under the circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.)
Ever since then, there have been attempts from time to time, by virtue of some legal relationship or theory of control, to identify a passenger or car owner with the driver in such a way as to keep alive the doctrine of imputed negligence.
Parks v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 315 Mich 38, upheld a charge to the jury as to negligence by the owner where a 17-year-old driver, without a driver's license, was driving with the permission and under the instructions of the injured-passenger owner. In that situation, the negligence of the driver was charged to the owner. There is language in the opinion which would indicate that "the right of control" of the vehicle, as opposed to actual control, is the test to be applied; but the facts in that case were such as to justify a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the owner-passenger since it was his actions which led directly to the negligence by the 17-year-old driver.
In Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich 146, an owner-passenger was allowed to sue his own driver for injuries sustained due to the sole negligence of the driver. The rule stated in Bostrom is (p 157):
"The negligence of an agent is not imputable to his principal nor that of a member of a joint enterprise to his fellow member in an action by the latter against the former."
In Ter Haar v. Steele, 330 Mich 167, recovery was denied to plaintiff-employer in a suit against another driver because of the contributory negligence of the employee-driver of plaintiff's car. The case was tried on this assumption:
"Neither party questions the law that any contributory negligence of Underhill's would be imputable to his employer, the plaintiff."
In the cases of Marrs v. Taylor, 327 Mich 674, and Miller v. Pillow, 337 Mich 262, the question came before this Court but did not reach decision because in each case the jury found no contributory negligence by the owner's driver.
In Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich 387 (14 NCCA3d 149), the plaintiff husband sustained personal injuries in a collision caused by the joint negligence of his wife and defendant driver of the second car. This Court reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant, based upon a fictional theory of control of the car by the husband, and permitted the husband to recover. Justice Talbot Smith, writing the majority opinion, noted (pp 394, 395, 397):
"It [imputed negligence] was a pernicious doctrine in its lifetime. In its reincarnation it is no more appealing. It employs a discredited fiction to deny a just result.
"Our case involves a motor-vehicle passenger who was injured through the negligence of others. He, himself, is free from fault. Yet his action against one of those responsible for his injuries is said to be barred.
"This conclusion results, apparently, from the holding that they were joint adventurers. it is thought to follow that the contributory negligence of the driver should be imputed to the spouse passenger, thereby depriving him of recovery against a negligent third person, though the injured spouse himself was without personal fault. To paraphrase, the husband's teeth have been set on edge because his wife ate sour grapes. Is this law or is it magic?
"Yet we must still contend with the doctrine. It has survived, in Huxley's words, 'long after its brains have been knocked out.'
"Actually there is no right to control, in the case before us, in any matter causally connected with the accident, and the imputation of negligence upon such grounds is clear error.
"When we are interpreting such words as 'agent' and 'control,' we must constantly ask, agency for what purpose? Control in what respect? It is hornbook learning that because one is an agent for one purpose he is not an agent for all. An agent to sell and convey lands has no authority to mortgage. 1 Restatement, Agency, §67(2). No more can we say that because joint ownership results in real control for some purposes {e.g., transfer of title), there is control for all purposes {e.g., steering and braking while car is being driven by another)."
Sherman v. Korff, supra, and section 401, Michigan vehicle code, are concerned with the right of recovery of an innocent person for damages resulting because of the negligence of another. The doctrine of contributory negligence is concerned with barring recovery between wrongdoers. It does not merit extension to the innocent simply because they are employers, principals, members of a joint enterprise, or gratuitous passengers.
"The right to control" or constructive control, absent contributory negligence of a passenger or owner, is insufficient to charge them with the negligence of the driver. In the present case, the car was under the sole operation and control of the driver. The owner was in no way responsible for the negligence. There being no bar in the statute, Breimayer's subrogee may recover.
In a given case, this could result in allowing two owners of motor vehicles to recover their damages from each other as a result of the negligence of the drivers of their vehicles, but it would seem better that the doors of the courts be open to make right two wrongs than that they be closed to those who have been wronged in their persons or property..
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment of $931-.90, with costs to appellant.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, J., concurred with Adams, J.
Black, J., concurred in result.
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed to abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of any of the provisions of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, his agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of sueh motor vehicle whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of the State or in the failure to observe sueh ordinary care in sueh operation as the rules of the common law requires. The owner shall not be liable, however, unless said motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It shall be presumed that sueh motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of said injury by his or her father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family: Provided, however, That no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against sueh owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in ease of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of sueh motor vehicle and unless sueh gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the aetion is brought."