Case Name: REYNOLDS v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1919-02-01
Citations: 23 Ga. App. 369
Docket Number: 10120
Parties: REYNOLDS v. THE STATE.
Judges: Bloodworth, J., concurs.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 369–374

Head Matter:
10120.
REYNOLDS v. THE STATE.
Decided February 1, 1919.
While in every criminal case where the .guilt of the accused depends wholly upon circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the court, even in the absence of a written request, to charge the law of circumstantial evidence, it is immaterial what language is employed to convey this instruction, if every possible hypothesis arising from the circumstantial evidence, favorable to the defendant, be presented in concrete statement to the jury, and if they are instructed that if they believe any one of these hypotheses the defendant should be acquitted. Mangum v. State, 5 Ga. App. 445 (2) (63 S. E. 543) ; Barrow v. State, 80 Ga. 191 (3) (S. E. 64); Richards v. State, 102 Ga. 569 (27 S. E. 726); Jones v. State, 105 Ga. 649 (31 S. E. 574) ; Bush v. State, 23 Ga. App. 126 (9S. E. 554).
Indictment for misdemeanor; from Eloyd superior court—Judge Wright. September 24, 1918.
The only ground of the motion for a new trial other than the grounds which relate to the verdict was that the court erred in failing to charge the jury that “to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Penal Code, § 1010.) The charge of the court was as follows: “The defendant in this case is charged with the offense of having in her possession, “custody, and control intoxicating liquors. I charge you, as a matter of law, that if, on the date alleged in this bill of indictment, the defendant had in her custody, possession, or control intoxicating liquors, you would be authorized to find her guilty. I charge you, that, in order to convict the defendant of this offense, it is necessary for the State to show to your satisfaction that the defendant had a guilty knowledge of the whisky in question beipg on her premises, if you believe any whisky was found on her premises. If the whisky was found on defendant’s premises and she had no knowledge of the whisky being there, then you will acquit the defendant.” The court then charged on the weight that the jury could give to the statement of the accused, and concluded as follows: “If you believe the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you will convict the defendant; otherwise acquit her.”
W. B. Mebane, for plaintiff in error.
C. H. Porter, solicitor-general, contra.

Opinion:
Broyles, P. J.
The defendant was charged with having pos session and control of intoxicating liquors, and upon the trial the undisputed evidence showed that several half-gallon jars containing whisky were found on her enclosed premises,—two of the jars being within five or six feet of a window of her house. The sole question left for the determination of the jury was whether the defendant knew of the presence of the whisky on her premises. She introduced no evidence, and in her statement denied having any knowledge that the whisky was on her premises. This evidence, in our opinion, raised more than a mere suspicion of the defendant's guilt, and was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that it excluded every reasonable hypothesis save that of her guilt.
Under the particular facts of this case, we do not think the court erred in failing to charge the exact language of section 1010 of the Penal Code upon the law of circumstantial evidence. The only possible hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused, arising from the evidence and her statement, was that she did not have any knowledge of the whisky being on her premises. The judge presented this hypothesis in concrete form to the jury, and instructed them that before the defendant could be convicted, the State must show that she had a guilty knowledge of the whisky being on her premises, and that if it failed to do so, she must be acquitted. Under the ruling in the cases cited in the headnote, we think the charge of the court sufficiently presented the principle of the law of circumstantial evidence applicable to the facts of the ease.
Judgment affirmed.
Bloodworth, J., concurs.