Case Name: LIND v. CITY OF BATTLE CREEK
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2004-06-11
Citations: 470 Mich. 230
Docket Number: Docket No. 122054
Parties: LIND v CITY OF BATTLE CREEK
Judges: Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver Taylor, and Young, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 470
Pages: 230–247

Head Matter:
LIND v CITY OF BATTLE CREEK
Docket No. 122054.
Argued December 9, 2003
(Calendar No. 4).
Decided June 11, 2004.
Michael Lind, a white police officer in Battle Creek, brought an action in the Calhoun Circuit Court against the city, alleging “reverse discrimination” in violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(1) (a), with respect to the promotion of a black police officer, instead of the plaintiff, to the position of sergeant. The circuit court, Allen L. Garbrecht, J., granted summary disposition for the city. The Court of Appeals, Bandstra, RJ., and Hoekstra and O’Connell, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam, affirmed on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant is that “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” as required by Allen v Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426 (1997). (Docket No. 227874.) The plaintiff appealed.
In an opinion by Justice Markman, joined by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, and Young, the Supreme Court held:
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(l)(a), draws no distinctions between “individuals” on account of race.
Because Allen v Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426 (1997), draws a distinction between “individual” plaintiffs on account of race in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established under this act, Allen is overruled.
Justice Young, concurring, stated that the dissenters in this case cannot reconcile the language of the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101, and Michigan’s Equal Protection Clause, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, with their contention that, under a statute that explicitly prohibits employment discrimination because of race, some Michigan citizens must bear a higher burden to maintain a lawsuit because of their race.
Reversed and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, stated that the majority overruled Allen v Comprehensive Medical Services, 222 Mich App 426 (1997), because that case drew a distinction between majority and minority plaintiffs although the text of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act does not. MCL 37.2202(1).
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792 (1973), provides a test for discrimination, the first prong of which test presumed that the plaintiff was a member of a minority class. Subsequent cases have stated that the McDonnell Douglas test needed to be adapted to facts in other circumstances. The federal circuit courts of appeals have determined three approaches to adapt the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in making a prima facie case of discrimination for cases involving reverse discrimination, such as this one. One approach is to use the background circumstances test, which requires a plaintiff to show background circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Another is the requirement that a plaintiff only be a member of a class, thus virtually eliminating the first prong. A third allows either the background circumstances test or a showing of indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability that, but for the plaintiffs status, the challenged employment action would have favored the plaintiff.
The majority failed to provide guidance that the lower court, on remand, may use to adapt the McDonnell Douglas test, except to say that the lower court may not use the “background circumstances” test.
Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that she concurred fully with Justice Cavanagh’s dissent and wrote separately to give additional reasons for affirming the summary disposition granted for the defendant.
The plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. The defendant had the discretion to choose one candidate from the promotion list. The defendant was not required to consider the particular attributes the plaintiff thought important and was not required to ignore subjective criteria in making its employment decision.
The background circumstances test from Allen v Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426 (1997), should not be discarded because it is a modification of the test from McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792 (1973). The background circumstances test acknowledges that reverse discrimination cases involve different underlying prejudices than do traditional discrimination cases. The purpose of the Civil Rights Act is to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases. The distinction between the treatment of the majority and of the minority supported the Allen Court’s adoption of the background circumstances test.
Civil Rights — Employment — Reverse Discrimination — Prima Facie Case.
A majority plaintiff in a reverse discrimination suit brought against an employer under the Michigan Civil Rights Act does not have to satisfy standards different from those required of other plaintiffs to show a prima facie case (MCL 37.2202[l][a]).
Roberts, Betz & Bloss (by Marshall W. Grate) for the plaintiff.
Clyde J. Robinson, City Attorney, and Barbara A. Hobson, Assistant City Attorney, for the defendant.

Opinion:
MARKMAN, J.
Plaintiff, a white police officer, alleges that defendant violated the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(l)(a), when it promoted a black officer, rather than plaintiff, to the supervisory position of police sergeant on the basis of race. The issue is whether such a claim of "reverse discrimination" must satisfy standards different from those required of other claims of discrimination. Having granted leave to appeal and heard argument, this Court concludes as follows:
(1) MCL 37.2202(l)(a) provides that "[a]n employer shall not. . . discriminate against an individual with respect to employment.. . because of. . race . ."
(2) MCL 37.2202(l)(a) draws no distinctions between "individual" plaintiffs on account of race.
(3) The Court of Appeals, in reliance on Allen v Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426, 429-433; 564 NW2d 914 (1997), held that a "majority" plaintiff in a "reverse discrimination" case, in order to make a prima facie showing, must, in addition to satisfying the obligations of "minority" plaintiffs in discrimination cases, also present "background circumstances supporting the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority . . ."
(4) Allen draws a distinction between plaintiffs on account of race under MCL 37.2202(l)(a), and is thus inconsistent with our Civil Rights Act. Therefore, Adíen is overruled.
In response to Justice CAVANAGH's dissent, we observe that this opinion is short, not because we disagree with the dissent concerning the significance of this issue, but because Allen is so clearly contrary to the language of Michigan's Civil Rights Act. We are uncertain how many pages the dissent believes are required to explain that "individual" means "individual." Further, we note that in its much longer opinion, the dissent, unlike the majority, never actually bothers to decide the issue before this Court-whether Allen's "background circumstances" standard is consistent with Michigan's Civil Rights Act.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver Taylor, and Young, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
On the basis of scores on written and oral examinations and seniority, plaintiff was rated second among the top five eligible officers and the black officer, who was promoted, was rated fifth. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the city was permitted to select any one of the top five scoring candidates.
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 9, 2002, p 2 (Docket No. 227874).
While Allen involved a gender discrimination, rather than a race discrimination, claim, it held broadly that "reverse discrimination" plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Act must satisfy the "background circumstances" standard.
Because we overrule Allen, it is unnecessary to address the additional question posed by this Court's grant order, i.e., whether Allen's "background circumstances" standard is consistent with the equal protection clauses of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2 ("No person shall be . discriminated against. . because of.. . race .") and the United States Constitution, Am XIX § 1 ("[N]or shall any State . deny to any person . . the equal protection of the laws."). That is, because we conclude that applying different standards to different racial groups in order to determine whether discrimination has been established violates the Michigan Civil Rights Act, we need not determine whether applying different racial standards also violates the equal protection clauses.
In response to Justice Kelly's dissent, we note that we are not concluding that plaintiff did or did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination; rather, we are simply concluding that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination.