Case Name: SCHAFF v. RIDLEHUBER
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-05-09
Citations: 261 S.W. 523
Docket Number: No. 6591
Parties: SCHAFF v. RIDLEHUBER.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 261
Pages: 523–529

Head Matter:
SCHAFF v. RIDLEHUBER.
(No. 6591.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.
May 9, 1923.
On Motion for Rehearing June 27, 1923.
On Second Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 16, 1924.
On Further Motion for Rehearing, March 5, 1924.)
1. Death <&wkey;67 — Evidence of earnings of conductor held admissible to show damages from death of brakeman.
In an action for the death of a railroad brakeman, who had acted as substitute conductor, and was in line for promotion to conductor, evidence as to the wages received by conductors was permissible to show the probable earnings of deceased in the near future.
2. Master and servant <&wkey;>270(IO) — Evidence moving train caused dust held admissible.
Where plaintiff claimed her intestate was killed by falling from a slippery step on a moving locomotive tender, evidence that a moving .train created suction and dust was not irrelevant or immaterial, since the dust thrown on a step which was wet would tend to make it slippery.
3. Appeal and error <&wkey;>I050(l) — Admission of evidence substantially similar to that previously given without objection is not prejudicial.
It is not reversible error to permit a witness to testify to a fact when substantially the same testimony has been given by another witness without objection.
4. Trial <&wkey;252(l I) — Instruction unsupported by evidence held properly refused.
In an action for the death of a railroad brakeman who fell from a step on a moving train which he was attempting to board, an instruction requested by defendant that, if deceased made a hop and jump to the bottom step, such action was negligent was properly refused where there was no testimony he had attempted to board the train in that manner.
5. Master and servant <&wkey;>228 (I) — Requested instruction denying recovery for contributory negligence properly refused under federal act.
Where the action was for the death of an interstate employé, and therefore, under the federal statute, under which contributory negligence is not a defense, a requested instruction that certain acts by deceased would be negligence, and, if they caused his injury, the verdict should be for defendant, was properly refused.
6. Appeal and error &wkey;»2l6(2) — Request for further charge is necessary to support objection to charge not affirmatively erroneous.
A proposition complaining of error in a paragraph of the court’s charge does not require reversal where there was no affirmative error in that paragraph, and appellant made no request for further charge on that subject.
7. Appeal and error <&wkey;> 1004(1) — Verdict cannot be set aside as excessive unless it indicates passion and prejudice.
An appellate court will not determine what damages its members would have allowed if they had been on the jury, but will sustain the verdict as to damages, unless it is so excessive as to indicate it was probably influenced by passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other improper cause.
8. Death <&wkey;99 (I) — $20,000 for death of brakeman held not excessive.
In an action for the death of á railroad brakeman, a verdict awarding $20,000 as damages does not show passion or prejudice, and will not be set aside as excessive.
On Motion for Rehearing.
9. Statutes &wkey;117(8) — Amendment under title not mentioning receivers did not repeal existing provision relating to' receivers.
The amendment of Rev. St. 1911, art. 4694, by Laws 1915, c. 143 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 4694), which was entitled an act to amend that article, giving cause of action for death caused by the negligence of a corporation, its agents or servants, did not repeal the provision of the original article not changed by the amendment authorizing recovery in such action against a receiver, though the title did not mention receivers.
On Second Motion for Rehearing.
10. Master and servant <&wkey;265 (3) — Burden of proof on plaintiff to show negligence, causing injury, under federal statutes.
In action for death under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Oomp. St. §§ 8657-8665) and Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Oomp. St. § 8605 et seq.), burden of proof rests on plaintiff to establish negligence and that it was proximate cause.
11. Master and servant <®=ol29(6) — Law of proximate cause applicable to liability under federal statute's.
Rules of law generally applicable to issue of proximate cause control in action for death under .federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) and Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.)
12. Appeal and error <S&wkey;l 169(5) —Negligence in both respects alleged held to be proved under charge.
Where petition alleged two independent grounds of negligence, the first that tender tank leaked, causing steps to be slippery, and the second that wooden tread had been worn, so as to present slanting edge, and cause was submitted to jury on general charge, in which these two grounds were submitted in the alternative, a reversal is required, if there was no evidence in support of either one of two grounds.
13. Evidence <&wkey;588 — Jury not required to ac--cept testimony of witness, especially where inconsistent with properly drawn inferences.
The jury are not required to accept in toto testimony of any witness, especially where inconsistent with inferences properly drawn from other evidence.
14. Master and servant &wkey;>278 (6) — Finding of negligence as to brakeman sustained.
In action for death of brakeman, alleged to result from falling while attempting to board train with slippery step, evidence held- sufficient to show negligence.
«gcsFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NOMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
On Further Motion for Rehearing.
15. Witnesses <&wkey;50 — Relationship of witnesses only goes to weight of testimony, and not to admissibility.
The faet that witnesses are related to plaintiff only goes to weight, and not to admissibility, of their testimony.
d&wkey;]?or other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Appeal from District Court, McLennan County; Jas. P. Alexander, Judge. •
Action by Mrs. Beerah Ridlehuber, as ad-ministratrix, against C. E. Schaff, as receiver of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Spell, Ñaman & Penland, of Waco, for appellant.
Williams & Williams and Conway & Scharff, all of Waco, for appellee.
Writ of error dismissed for want of Jurisdiction April 23, 3921.

Opinion:
JENKINS, J.
Appellee brought this suit to recover damages for the death of her husband, alleged to have been killed through the negligence of appellant. Judgment was rendered in favor of appellee for $20,000.
The alleged grounds of negligence were that the step of the tender of an engine of the railway company was worn; that the tender leaked, and caused the step to become slippery, and that appellee's husband, in attempting to get upon the tender, and in the proper discharge of his duty, slipped, fell, and was killed by being run over by the tender.
Appellant's first proposition is that Revised Statutes 1911, art. 4694, is unconstitutional, in that the caption to said act did not authorize the inclusion of receivers, and was therefore in violation of section 35; art. 3, of the Constitution of this state.' The caption of the act referred to is as follows:
"An act to amend article 4694 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1911, giving cause of action where injuries resulting in death is caused by thd negligence of a corporation, its agents or sefttfints, and declaring an emergency."
Section 1 of this act is as follows:
"1. When the death of any person is caused by the neglect or carelessness of the proprietor, owner, charterer or hirer of any railroad, steamboat, stage coach or other vehicle for the conveyance of goods, passengers, or by the unfitness, neglect or carelessness of their servants or agents; when the death of any person is caused by the neglect or'carelessness of the receiver or receivers, or other person or persons in charge or control of any railroad, or their servants or agents; the liability of receivers shall extend to cases in which the death may be caused by reason of the bad or unsafe condition of the railroad or machinery or other -reason or cause by which an action may be brought for damages on account of injuries', the same as if said railroad was being operated by the railroad company." Gen. Laws 33d Leg. p. 288 (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 4694).
It will be observed that the caption does not refer to receivers, and it is( for this reason that appellant contends that, in so far as it relates to receivers, it is unconstitutional. The article amended included receivers. We hold that the failure of the caption to mention receivers did not repeal the law as it formerly existed. Holman v. Cowden (Tex. Civ. App.) 158 S. W. 571; Pasture Co. v. Carpenter (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 408; Id., 109 Tex. 103, 200 S. W. 521. Should we be in error as to the statute of this state with reference to the responsibility of receivers, this would be immaterial in the instant case, for the reason that the deceased at the time of his death was engaged in interstate commerce, and the federal statute upon this issue includes receivers.
Appellant's second proposition is that the court erred in refusing to instruct a verdict for the defendant, for the reason that the evidence does not raise any issue for the jury. We overrule this contention, for the reason that the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue of negligence on the part of appellant, in that the evidence showed that the engine leaked; that the steps were worn and were wet from the leakage, and that deceased probably slipped when attempting to board the train. The deceased had thrown a switch, and was standing near the railway track. It was proper for him to attempt to board the train by the use of the steps referred to. He was seen near the track as the train approached him. He was seen to fall from where the step was situated. The reasonable inference is that he attempted to board the train, and that his foot slipped, causing him to fall under the engine. It is true that a witness for the appellant, a negro, who was on a platform some distance away, testified that the deceased raised his foot, and that the same was struck by the steps before he got upon them. This testimony was sufficient to raise the issue as to the manner in which deceased was killed. The jury decided this issue in favor of appellee. The evidence not only justified the submission of the issue, but is sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury.
Appellant's third proposition is that it was error to permit the witness Weatherred, a train conductor, to testify as to what were his earnings as such conductor at the time of the death of Ridlehuber. The testimony showed that Ridlehuber had been in the employ of the railroad company- for a number of years, and that he was a brakeman at the time, and also a substitute conductor, and that he was in the line of promotion. Such testimony was permissible to show the proba ble earnings of tbe deceased in tbe near future. Hines v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 837.
Appellant's fourth proposition is that it was error to permit a witness to testify that, when a train was moving, it created suction and dust, tbe grounds for sucb objection being tliat tbe testimony was irrelevant and immaterial. We do not tbink that it was either irrelevant or immaterial, for tbe reason that, if tbe train created suction, it would throw dust on tbe steps, and, as tbe leakage cause the steps to be wet, they would probably be in a slippery condition. Besides this, the witness Payne testified, without objection, to substantially tbe same state of facts. Strachbein v. Gilmer (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 333; Hadnott v. Hicks (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 359. These cases reiterate the well-recognized rule that it is not reversible error to permit a witness to testify to a state of facts when substantially the same testimony has been given by another witness without objection.
Appellant objects to -the refusal of the court to charge the jury that, if the deceased, Ridlehuber, in getting upon the steps in question, made a hop and a jump to the bottom step, and such action was negligence on the part of Ridlehuber, and tended directly to cause his injury, they would find for the defendant. There was no error in refusing to give this charge. There was not testimony that Ridlehuber attempted to board the train in this manner at the time he received the injury from which he died. The only reason that could be assigned for giving such a charge would be that such act was contributory negligence on the part of deceased. Under the federal statute, contributory negligence is not a defense where an employé is injured. The charge required the jury, in the event they so found, to return a verdict for the defendant.
The charge refused, as complained of in the sixth proposition, was improper, because it was upon the weight of the evidence. The seventh proposition is based on the assumption that there was no evidence sufficient to require the case to be submitted to the jury. We have disposed of this issue under our remarks on the second proposition. We do not think the charge of the court is subject to the criticism submitted under appellant's proposition 7a. Nor do we think that the charge is-subject to the criticism submitted under appellant's eighth and ninth propositions. The evidence is sufficient to show that the steps of the tender were defective within the meaning of the Boiler Inspection Act of February 17, 1911, as amended in 1915 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, § 8630-8639d), and as applied under rule 153 of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which provides:
"(a) Feed Water Tmiles. — Tanks shall be maintained free from leaks, and in safe and suitable condition for service. Suitable screens must be provided for tank wells or tank hose."
"(b) Not less frequently than once each month the interior of the tank shall be inspected and cleaned, if necessary.
"(c) Top of tender behind fuel space shall be kept clean and means provided to carry off waste water. Suitable covers shall be provided for filling holes."
The tenth proposition complains of the fifth paragraph of the court's charge. No objection was made to this prior to submitting the case to the jury; but had there been there was no affirmative error in this paragraph of the court's charge. Had appellant desired a further charge on this subject, he should have requested the same.
The eleventh proposition submits appellant's contention that the verdict is excessive. An appellate court is not called upon to state what damages its members would have allowed had they been members of the jury; but the verdict of the jury as to damages will be sustained in all cases, unless it is so excessive as to indicate that it was probably influenced by passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other improper cause. We cannot say that such is shown to be the case by the testimony herein; and therefore we overrule appellant's contention as to the verdict being excessive.
Finding no reversible error of record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.