Case Name: STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v. MARKOWITZ
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-10-30
Citations: 393 Mich. 6
Docket Number: Docket No. 55,291
Parties: STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v MARKOWITZ
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 393
Pages: 6–25

Head Matter:
STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v MARKOWITZ
Opinion op the Court
1. Attorney and Client — State Bar Grievance Board — Suspension.
Order of State Bar Grievance Board should be affirmed without alteration where the suspension imposed is not excessive.
2. Attorney and Client — Suspension—Adoption.
One-year suspension of an attorney is not excessive where he profited from his position as an attorney by acting as a middleman in child adoption proceedings and he not merely used the process to help join those who want to adopt with children who need adoption but abused the process in a piratical fashion.
3. Attorney and Client — State Bar Grievance Board — Suspension —Adoption.
The State Bar Grievance Board did not impose an inappropriate penalty, a one-year suspension, where an attorney asked the adopting father to sign a petition for rehearing, threatening that if the father refused, the attorney would file a motion in the name of the natural mother which would result in the natural mother learning the names of the adopting parents.
4. Attorney and Client — Suspension—State Bar Grievance Board.
An attorney’s conduct was clearly unprofessional and his failure to tell the truth to the probate court attorney acting in an official capacity warrants the one-year suspension recommended by the hearing panel and affirmed by the State Bar Grievance Board.
5. Attorney and Client — Ethical Conduct.
The public should be able to expect and receive a high standard of ethical conduct from those who have been admitted to the practice of law; indeed, the standard of conduct should be above that of the "average” person.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4, 15] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 68.
[5, 6] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law §§ 38-43.
[7-9, 11, 12] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law §§ 17, 64.
[10,13,14] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law §§ 63, 66, 67.
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
T. G. Kavanagh and Levin, JJ.
6. Attorney and Client — Adoption—Medical Bills — Reimbursement — Ethical Standard — Disciplinary Standard.
An attorney’s statement to an unwed pregnant woman who wished to place her child for adoption that her hospital and doctor bills would be paid for her violated no rule of law, ethical or disciplinary standard; when the attorney paid those bills without prior court approval, he ran the risk that he would not be reimbursed.
7. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — Hearing Panel —Findings—Adoption —Reimbursement—Evidence—Professional Misconduct.
A State Bar hearing panel’s ñnding that an attorney told an unwed pregnant woman who wished to place her child for adoption that he would buy her a car for $50 upon receipt of that sum from the adopting parents as reimbursement for money the woman had expended for the baby’s clothing, standing by itself unconnected with other evidence, does not support a ñnding of professional misconduct.
8. Attorney and Client — Professional Misconduct — Adoption— Probate Court — Jurisdiction—Grievance Proceedings— Hearing Panel — Evidence—Fraud.
An attorney did not commit professional misconduct under the circumstances of this case even if he suggested to an unwed pregnant woman who wished to place her child for adoption that she report as her residence to the probate court a home where she did not then live; it does not appear that the attorney knew that the woman did not intend to live with her child in that residence pending the adoption proceedings; the residence where the woman told the probate court she was staying and the residence where she actually stayed were in the same county; and thus, even if the residence of the natural mother had some effect on the jurisdiction of the probate court, no fraud could have been perpetrated on that court by substituting one address for another in the same county.
9. Attorney and Client — Adoption—Interest in Litigation — Medical Bills — Reimbursement—Evidence.
An attorney helping an unwed pregnant woman place her child for adoption did not acquire an interest in the litigation where the woman repeatedly testified that she knew that she was ultimately responsible for the medical bills if the adoption was not completed, she acknowledged that she was obliged to reimburse the attorney if the adopting parents did not take the child, and the adopting parents testified that they had agreed to assume responsibility for the doctor and hospital bills, clothing and transportation costs.
10. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — State Bar Grievance Administrator — Complaint—Request for Investigation — Answer.
An attorney was adequately informed of a charge against him in the State Bar Grievance Administrator’s complaint where it is apparent from both the attorney’s response to the request for investigation and his answer to the formal complaint that he understood the charge.
11. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — Hearing Panel — Findings—'Threats—Probate Court — Evidence— Professional Misconduct.
A State Bar hearing panel’s findings that an attorney threatened to commence an action against his client and failed to respond accurately to an inquiry by the probate court attorney are supported by probative evidence and support the conclusion that he was guilty of professional misconduct.
12. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — Hearing Panel — State Bar Rules — Quorum—State Bar Grievance Board.
A State Bar rule provides that two members of a State Bar hearing panel shall constitute a quorum; if this rule does not adequately protect the rights of the public and of lawyers, the Michigan Supreme Court should change it; unless and until it is changed, the State Bar Grievance Board and hearing panels are justified in relying on it as written (State Bar Rule 16.3.2).
13. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — State Bar Grievance Administrator — Request for Investigation— State Bar Rules.
A count in a grievance proceeding against an attorney was defective where the request for investigation was signed by the Assistant State Bar Grievance Administrator before the adop tion of the amendment to the State Bar rules authorizing the Administrator to serve requests for investigation in his own name (State Bar Rule 16.4.8).
14. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — State Bar Rules — Complaint—Request for Investigation — State Bar Grievance Board — State Bar Grievance Administrator.
The State Bar rules carefully spell out the procedures to be followed before a formal complaint may be died against an attorney, there are a number of safeguards designed to sift out meritless claims, and no formal complaint can properly be died except in accordance with those procedures; if the Michigan Supreme Court were to validate proceedings on a formal complaint died without a proper request for investigation, it would be tantamount to saying that the present limitation of prior approval of one member of the State Bar Grievance Board before the State Bar Grievance Administrator may serve a request need not be observed; even the present safeguard might fall into desuetude.
15. Attorney and Client — Grievance Proceedings — State Bar Grievance Board — Discipline—Suspension—Professional Misconduct — Supreme Court.
The Michigan Supreme Court should dnd the State Bar Grievance Board’s disciplinary order suspending an attorney for two years for professional misconduct excessive and reduce the discipline to suspension for 120 days.
Appeal from State Bar Grievance Board.
Submitted June 7, 1974.
(No. 11 June Term 1974,
Docket No. 55,291.)
Decided October 30, 1974.
Rehearing denied 393 Mich 915.
Disciplinary proceedings against Seymour Markowitz. Order entered suspending respondent from practicing law for two years. Respondent appeals. State Bar Grievance Administrator cross-appeals.
Affirmed.
Louis Rosenzweig, for the State Bar Grievance Administrator.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, Tyler & Gordon, P. C, for respondent.

Opinion:
M. S. Coleman, J.
We concur in that part of Justice Levin's opinion which affirms the respondent's suspension, but cannot agree that the suspension imposed is excessive. Therefore, we would affirm the State Bar Grievance Board order without alteration.
We must not lose sight of what respondent has done. He has profited from his position as an attorney by acting as a middleman in child adoption proceedings, which comes within my definition of "gray marketing" of babies. He has not merely used the process to help join those who want to adopt with children who need adoption. He has abused the process in a piratical fashion. His suspension is not excessive.
The hearing panel found that respondent represented a married couple in adoption proceedings. He received a fee of $500. In addition to this fee, respondent demanded reimbursement for all medical costs attributable to the child's birth. The couple only agreed to pay so much as ordered by the probate court. The court disapproved reimbursement of some $800. Respondent then asked the adopting father to sign a petition for rehearing, threatening that if the father refused, respondent would file a motion in the name of the natural mother. This would result in the natural mother learning the names of the adopting parents. Petition for rehearing was filed. The probate court denied the petition.
It is this conduct which is characterized as "an idle, impetuous threat." The hearing panel obviously did not consider the threat in this light. The Grievance Board obviously did not so treat the threat. There is nothing submitted to this Court which would cause me to treat the threat any differently. Adoptive parents naturally want to preserve their anonymity. Respondent threatened his own clients with disclosure of information gathered during the course of his representation of them. Such conduct would be reprehensible in any case. It is especially so when an attorney conducts himself in such a manner against his own clients. The State Bar Grievance Board did not impose an inappropriate penalty.
As to the other allegation of misconduct here at issue, the hearing panel found that respondent accepted an appointment as guardian ad litem for the natural mother in an adoption proceeding. This occurred after he had received $500 from the adopting parents and had been promised an additional $500. The adopting parents had been told by their attorney that such a fee had to be paid to respondent. Previously respondent had directed the natural mother to contact the attorney representing the adopting parents. After these events occurred, respondent stated to a probate court attorney that he had no interest in the proceedings, nor was he associated with the attorney representing the adopting parents.
Respondent's statements to the probate court attorney are characterized as a failure "to respond accurately" as a "lack of candor" and as "dissembling". Call it what you will, respondent's conduct was clearly unprofessional. I find respondent's failure to tell the truth to the probate court attorney acting in an official capacity warrants the one-year suspension recommended by the hearing panel and affirmed by the State Bar Grievance Board.
The public should be able to expect and receive a high standard of ethical conduct from those who have been admitted to the practice of law. Indeed, the standard of conduct should be above that of the "average" person. Lawyers historically have been expected to obey laws and rules and to assist the court. To deceive the court is to undermine its very foundations, for it is a tenet of our judicial system that lawyers are officers of the court.
We affirm the order of the State Bar Grievance Board.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.