Case Name: FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC. v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al.; CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-12-02
Citations: 309 So. 2d 659
Docket Number: Nos. 55298 and 55410
Parties: FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC. v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al. CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC.
Judges: DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 309
Pages: 659–674

Head Matter:
FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC. v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al. CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. FOUR STATES REALTY CO., INC.
Nos. 55298 and 55410.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 2, 1974.
On Rehearing March 17, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 3, 1975.
See also La., 301 So.2d 49.
Joseph F. Keogh, Parish Atty., Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant in No. 55298 and for plaintiff-relator in 55410.
Robert L. Roland, Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee in No. 55298 and defendant-respondent in No. 55410.
R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Sanders, Miller, Downing & Kean, Baton Rouge, for inter-venor-relator in No. 55410 and for interve-nor-appellant, B. R. Bank & Trust Co. in No. 55298.

Opinion:
SUMMERS, Justice.
A comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted by the City Council of the City of Baton Rouge on July 19, 1950. Zoning regulations and districts were established. The ordinance, with changes, was reenacted effective in October 1958. Zoning regulations and districts were again created in accordance with a comprehensive plan to promote the health, safety, morals and the general welfare of the community. They are designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements.
At the time, the regulations and districts were designed with reasonable regard, among other things, for the character of the district, and its peculiar suitability for particular uses; and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the community.
The area involved in this litigation is situated along the banks of the Mississippi River and comprises the central business district of the city. Here the city was born in 1719. It is "downtown", and since 1971 the locality has been referred to as the Riverside Area in an attempt to focus on the Mississippi River as an inspirational characteristic. Today it is bounded on the north by the grounds occupied by the State Capitol and the complex of state buildings located there. The new Civic Center for the Greater Baton Rouge area lies to the south. An interstate highway bounds the area on the east. The mighty Mississippi flows on the west.
Within these limits lies densely populated commercial property in the heart of the central business district. Riverside also contains three major levels of governmental organization: a small Federal complex at the post office building, a rapidly growing State complex centered around the State Capitol Building and a Parish group with the newly designed Government Civic Center Complex at its heart. Riverside contains the best of the past heritage of Baton Rouge, is undergoing a rapid economic growth at present, and is the center of the hopes of the people of that city for a strong and prosperous future.
By the terms of the 1958 ordinance, the area involved here was contained in a district zoned C-5. This permitted the general use of the property allowed in other higher zoned districts, and, in addition, authorization was provided for such uses as: assembly plants, barge loading repairs and fabrication, canneries (except meat and fish products), cellophane products manufacturing, concrete mixing or batching plants, foundry casting, grain elevators, ornamental ironworks (no foundry, drop hammer, and no punch presses over 20 tons capacity), paint mixing and treatment (not employing a boiling process), bulk terminals for petroleum products, poultry processing plants, and a variety of other manufacturing activities.
In 1967 the City-Parish Council, upon recommendation of its Planning Commission, authorized a study of traffic and parking conditions in the central business district. This study was made by a firm of architects and planning consultants with the cooperation of all agencies of the City-Parish government and the Louisiana Department of Highways. The data and projections developed during the study disclosed a very significant future increase in traffic congestion and a decrease in parking capacity.
Predicting that the future of Baton Rouge and its central business district would be one of remarkable and unprecedented growth, the study considered the current and future problems. By the year 1985, according to the study, the then existing traffic volume in the central business district would be over two times the 1967 volume. A finding bearing upon this case
" . . . revealed that many persons parked in overcrowded and sub-standard lots, in lots where attendants crowd automobiles into every available niche, where customer service and convenience are sacrificed in the interest of merely having a place to park. Many persons park illegally on the streets, overpark at meters, and occupy metered curb space continuously for several hours."
Clearly the acute parking problem has been one of long standing. Included in a comprehensive plan to cope with this condition, the study recommended that on-street parking be eliminated as soon as adequate off-street parking facilities could be provided.
In October 1971 an ordinance was adopted by the City-Parish government in which it proclaimed the Mississippi River as one of its greatest assets. Citing the example of St. Louis, Memphis and other cities which capitalized on riverside locations, and the development of that asset into a major resource for educational, recreational, cultural and economic betterment, the ordinance announced that Baton Rouge had not properly understood the great potential of and had not employed and developed its "Riverside Area".
Development and expansion by the State of Louisiana of its riverbank in the gov ernmental complex surrounding the State Capitol Building was recognized. The City-Parish acquisition and development of a multi-purpose Civil Center was also acknowledged. The Old State Capitol Building serving a major part of the City's cultural activities was also adjacent to Riverside. Streets and sidewalks were being resurfaced, ornamental light standards and subsurface wiring installations were in progress. A plan of beautification was being undertaken with a mall, trees and decorative sidewalks. All these factors, the ordinance declared, presented an opportunity for the people of the city to undertake a program of renewal, improvement and betterment, the elimination of unsightly and run-down structures and to accomplish solutions of parking problems.
To encourage, promote and assist in this endeavor, the area was named "Riverside"; a symbol or logogram was authorized to identify and publicize the area. Street names were changed to conform with the "Riverside" concept, while historic and architecturally significant buildings were identified as part of the Riverside area. Businesses and all others in the area were memorialized to undertake a comprehensive program of renewal and revitalization. A color chart was authorized to serve as a .guide for this effort. "The Riverside Association", a combination of business and professional interests, was designated to serve as a coordinating body. The ordinance contemplated that interested agencies would be kept informed, would be consulted and would assist in the plan of development and improvement the ordinance envisioned.
In part, the implementation of this declaration of public policy was undertaken by the City-Parish Planning Commission. An 81/£ month study by that body ended in January 1974. The purpose of the study was to investigate the downtown area which was undergoing tremendous land and building-use changes. In its findings, the Commission recounted the^history of the central business district, observing that since creation of a shopping center outside the central business district in 1960, downtown Baton Rouge was no longer the trade center. As a result many retail establishments relocated outside the area. Many believed the downtown area was dead. To others this signified a change in the dominance of functions in the area.
Three events of the early sixties served to indicate the growth potential of Riverside : The interstate highway was constructed making Riverside easily accessible from all points, the expansion of the State Capitol complex served to strengthen Riverside as the seat of State Government, and the construction of a 22-story office building forecast Riverside's resurgence as a major business center.
A proposed government Civic Center begun in April 1973, expansion of the state capítol complex, designation of the city as a national Bicentennial City, construction of a 25-story office building, extensive renovation of buildings and landscaping in the area, street improvements and the preservation of historic or visually significant structures all served to add to the revitalization of Riverside.
The study's comprehensive analysis of the area's major handicaps included recommendations to alleviate transportation and parking problems. As a primary objective, it proposed that zoning ordinance changes should be made to require that all new construction in C-5 commercial zones provide for its parking demands.
Four States Realty Company, Incorporated, is the plaintiff in these proceedings. Four States builds and constructs bus terminals which it leases to its sister corporation popularly known as Continental Trailways, a combination of two bus transportation businesses. The bus station site formerly in use by Continental was expropriated by the city for the Civic Center development on February 14 and March 7, 1974, and Four States acquired a new site de scribed as lots 6, 7 and 8 of Square 6, Hickey, Duncan, Mather Town. The site measures approximately 148.S feet front on the south side of Convention Street by a 291.6 foot depth along the west side of North 7th Street. This property is located in the Riverside Area, and at the time of acquisition was in a district zoned C-S.
The lots are to be used as a commercial bus terminal. They are located immediately north of the main banking facilities of Baton Rouge Banker Trust Company, separated only by Convention Street. Buses will travel along Convention Street to gain access to the terminal.
The United States Post Office Building and its adjacent parking facilities are located immediately across North 7th Street to the east. The United States Courthouse is just to the north and east. The First Presbyterian Church is to the south and the First Baptist Church is one block to the west. All of these localities are major traffic generators; each provides the needed off-street parking its use requires.
It is evident that unless Four States provides adequate off-street parking on its site for its customers, employees and those required to stop at the bus terminal, unauthorized use of the private off-street parking provided by others in the neighborhood will result.
This prospective shifting of the parking burden to their parking lot and to other lots in the neighborhood and the consequent disruption of the planned renewal program of Riverside caused the Baton Rouge Bank & Trust Company to file an application on February 18, 1974 to rezone the Four States property from C-5 to C-2. C-2 zoning requires one parking space for each 400 square feet of floor area. In a C-5 district no parking space need be provided. Thereafter, on February 20, 1974, the Bank applied to the Zoning Commission to rezone all of Square 6, including the three lots acquired by Four States. The applications were rejected for want of the requisite signatures of the property owners affected.
After much deliberation and controversy over the rezoning of the Four States property, Council action resulted in the adoption of an ordinance on June 26, 1974, rezoning the Four States property to a C-4 Highway Commercial District, requiring one parking space for each 200 square feet floor space and front and side yard offsets. The ordinance, moreover, declared the City's public policy "to rezone for the public good and in the best interest of the public all property lying within the boundaries of that area know as the 'Riverside Area' " "wherever such rezoning is deemed appropriate and proper within the sound legislative discretion of the Council, and that the Planning and Zoning Commission has been requested by previous action of this Council to review and make recommendations for such rezoning where appropriate."
Two days prior to the adoption of the ordinance, on June 24, 1974, Four States obtained a building permit. According to the site development plans for the terminal, 19 parking spaces will be provided, which would satisfy the C-5 zoning requirements. On the other hand, 38 parking spaces are required by the C-4 zoning regulation. Set back and side yard restrictions were also required by the C-4 classification, whereas none are necessary in a C-5 zoning district.
Shortly after the ordinance was adopted, Four States filed suit on July 1, 1974 against the City, the Council and its members (the individual members were later dismissed) seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance of June 26, 1974 which rezoned its proposed building site. The Bank, Four States and the interrelated corporations of Four States, Continental Southern Lines, Inc., Continental Trailways, Inc., and TCO Companies, Inc., intervened. After hearings, judgment was rendered in the trial court declaring- the ordinance unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. Accordingly, a decree was entered enjoining its implementation or enforcement. The City and the Bank appealed, and a preferential hearing was granted.
On this record, it is manifest that the C-5 zoning regulations, if unaltered, will not prdmote the revitalization and upgrading of Riverside envisioned by the City-Parish government. The uses permitted by C-5 zoning would not only burden this concept, but would, to the contrary, result in downgrading the planned improvements. No provision for off-street parking is found in the C-5 zoning, and there is no front yard set back, side yard, or minimum lot width requirement. Zoning under the C-5 regulations permits boundary to boundary building construction.
On the basis of this record it cannot be said that the reclassification of the Four States property was not justified; nor was the action capricious or unreasonable. This action was the beginning of a much needed change, a fair and rational decision to adjust and resolve the immediate problem at hand. To permit Four States' change in use to violate the planned improvement simply because it came first would compromise the plan from the beginning.
We believe the plan of revitalization, improvement and upgrading of the Riverside Area is real, viable and in being in the city of Baton Rouge. Because the necessary explicit ordinance establishing the details of that plan were not yet enacted in this transitional period, the City was not powerless to implement its declared policy in this instance simply because it involved only one property owner. A starting point in fulfilling the improvement concept was compelled by Four States' commendable urgency to reestablish a bus terminal. No unreasonable invasion of Four States' rights are involved.
The ordinance seeks to compel conformance with a plan designed for the good of the entire community by a reasonable regulation. The diverse established uses to which the property had been put in Riverside Area over the years were not subject to a comprehensive change in zoning regulation effective immediately because of the nonconforming use they acquired. Only changes in use were subject to the planned upgrading of the area by zoning changes as the changes in use occurred. For only when properties are put to new uses do they lose their nonconforming status and become subject to rezoning. Thus the rezoning will be piecemeal as the existing nonconforming uses are abolished. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to rezone Four States at this stage before it acquires a nonconforming use and can no longer be compelled to upgrade its property by retrospective zoning.
Municipal authority to enact zoning regulations is derived from the police power of the governmental authority; it is legislative in nature and the adoption of such an ordinance is a legislative matter. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929).
Courts will not interfere with that legislative prerogative unless it is plain that the action is palpably erroneous and without any substantial relation to the public health, safety or general welfare. City of Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 La. 737, 33 So.2d 503 (1947); City of Shreveport v. Bayse, 166 La. 689, 117 So. 775 (1928).
A presumption exists in law that an ordinance adopted by a legislative body exercising its police power is valid; the burden of proving the contrary is on him who asserts the invalidity or nullity. City of New Orleans v. Beck, 139 La. 595, 71 So. 883 (1916); Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52 (1938); Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, 185 So.2d 278 (La.App.1966); Archer v. City of Shreveport, 85 So.2d 337 (La.App.1956).
Generally, the rules by which the validity of an ordinance is determined are also applicable to an amending ordinance. See Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, supra; also Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal.App.2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958); Bliss v. City of Fort Worth, 288 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Civ.App.1956). The presumption of validity is not altered by the fact that an amendment to a zoning ordinance is involved. Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sand Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501 (N.Y.1959).
Zoning is not static. In recognition of this fact, Louisiana statutes specifically provide that the original regulations may be "amended, changed, modified or repealed." La.R.S. 33:4725.
The zoning changes at issue in the instant case, on the authority cited, are presumed to be valid, and the burden of proving the contrary rests upon the party attacking the amendment. No evidence was offered by Four States to refute the inadequacy of off-street parking in the Riverside Area, nor has it refuted the need for revision in the C-5 classification to cope with the parking problem and eliminate inconsistent uses in the already partially revitalized area. Instead, Four States has rested its case primarily upon the proposition that its acquisition of the terminal site occurred while the property was zoned C-5, and the change to C-4 zoning would affect the use to which it proposed to put the property.
The mere acquisition of property under a particular zoning classification in a municipality creates no vested right in the absence of a nonconforming use acquired in accordance with recognized standards. Restrictions on the use to which property may be put by municipal authority, standing alone, do not foreclose a zoning change. Zoning is but an exercise of the police power and all owners in a municipality hold their property subject to a reasonable exercise of that power. For example, in Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, 216 La. 994, 45 So.2d 601 (1950), prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance, the property owners commenced construction of a building for commercial purposes. When the ordinance was enacted restricting the contemplated use of their property, they sought to enjoin its enforcement "because the zoning ordinance would be retroactive" if applied to their property. Although their deed specifically recited that the property could be used for commercial purposes, we denied relief holding that the deed provision was
" . . . nothing more than a declaration on the part of the vendor that on the date of purchase there existed no legal impediment against the use of the property for commercial purposes, and cannot possibly be construed as a warranty that the property would at no time in the future be zoned by the police jury under constitutional authority permitting such zoning."
In addition, the Ransome Court declared, "it is well settled that everyone holds his property subject at all times to every valid exercise of the police power, and the adoption of such an ordinance (zoning) . is undoubtedly a valid exercise of the police power." The proposition is supported by Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 66 S.Ct. 850, 90 L.Ed. 1096 (1948), in which the United States Supreme Court said: "But in no case does the owner of property acquire immunity against exercise of the police power because he constructed it in full compliance with existing laws."
In order to justify a holding that the legislative action is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, it must be shown that there was no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, and that there was no substantial evidence upon which the legislative action could have been justified.
There is substantial and weighty evidence here to justify the zoning reclassification-; and the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the use of the property, which were not applicable at the time the property was acquired, is no cause to invalidate the Council action. There was also room for a difference of opinion here as demonstrated by the close three-to-four vote of the Council on several occasions before it cast the five-to-two vote required for passage.
Without again detailing the chronology of events relating to the zoning change, it is clear that the Council had this matter under intensive consideration for many months before it took final action. Before its decision, the Council heard and received much information, pro and con, concerning the need for the change. Its action was deliberate, not hasty, and nothing in the record supports a conclusion that it was arbitrary or capricious. The reference by the trial judge to "political pressure" was nothing more than the democratic process at work. Expressions of opinion to the Council for and against the change were voluminous and came from many sources. By this means a legislative body learns the will of the people and determines what is for the public good. Because legislative action is a manifestation of the will of the people, every presumption of law and fact must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So.2d 192 (1965). For these reasons, the actions of legislative bodies should not be set aside unless palpably arbitrary and capricious.
' "The terms 'arbitrary and capricious action', when used in a matter like the instant one, must mean willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case. On the other hand, when there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." ' Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 3rd ed. 1974, Cumulative Supp. Vol. 1, pages 2-26.
Tested by this standard, it cannot fairly be said that the action of the City was "willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts or circumstances." It is otherwise. The evidence demonstrates convincingly that the authority of the Council was "exercised honestly and upon due consideration."
Four States' contention that the zoning amendment should be declared invalid because only its property was affected is without merit. Aside from the fact that the record does not support a contention that only its property has received special treatment in the city zoning regulations, spot zoning is not for that reason alone illegal. It depends upon the particular facts of each case, and on whether the municipality's action is properly related to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, designed to serve the best interest of the community as a whole, and in accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan. Sears, Roebuck & Company v. City of Alexandria, 155 So.2d 776 (La.App.1963).
The action taken by the Council was in furtherance of the plan to revitalize the Riverside Area. It was necessary to avoid further deterioration of acute parking conditions and to further the development concept for the entire area. Even though plaintiff's property was the first affected by the contemplated change in zoning regulations, it is evident from the record, and the action of the Council in ordering a zoning study of the entire area, that other affirmative action was to follow, or that restrictions would be imposed as the need arose. The Council action was in furtherance of the health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community. La.R.S. 33:4721.
Four States also contends that it acquired a vested right when the building permit was issued just two days prior to the zoning reclassification. The permit was obtained at a time when a public hearing on the rezoning application was scheduled and was being advertised. At the time, the controverted issue had been under active consideration by the Planning Commission and the Council for approximately six months. No showing has been made that expenditures were made in reliance upon the permit when the issue was brought to court and nothing was spent in reliance on the permit at the time of trial.
In the absence of a showing of substantial expenditures in reliance upon the building permit, there is no vested right to complete the building for which the permit was issued. Since the ordinance was amended two days after the permit was issued, Four States could only rely on the permit during those two days. Thereafter, faced with the zoning reclassification, Four States could no longer rely on the permit, for the two were in irreconcilable conflict. Faced with this dilemma, Four States could not prudently proceed. The issue is controlled by the holding in State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927), where the Court made this pronouncement:
"The question is whether the council had a right to prohibit the issuance of permits previously applied for, though not granted, such as the permit in this case. We think that the council had such right. Every one holds his property subject to the police power. Because a person applies for a permit at a time when it might be lawfully granted does not give him a vested right to the permit. An ordinance may be validly passed after the making of such application which would prohibit the issuance of the permit." (emphasis added).
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 3234 adopted by the City Council of Baton Rouge on June 26, 1974 is valid and in full force and effect from the date of its enactment.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that Four States Realty Company, Incorporated be and they are hereby prohibited, restrained and enjoined from using the property described in Ordinance No. 3234 in any manner contrary to the restrictions imposed in said ordinance.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this case be and the same is hereby remanded to the trial court in order that this decree and judgment may be implemented and enforced.
DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., dissent.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.