Case Name: Sie DAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1962-03-23
Citations: 139 So. 2d 408
Docket Number: No. 31380
Parties: Sie DAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERTS, C. J., and THORNAL, J., and WILLIS, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 139
Pages: 408–423

Head Matter:
Sie DAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 31380.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 23, 1962.
Rehearing Denied April 17, 1962.
E. P. Gregory of Gregory & Towles, Quincy, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and B. Clarke Nichols, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
O'CONNELL, Justice.
Sie Dawson was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Roger Glenn Clayton, a two year old boy.
On this appeal appellant's only contention is that a confession made by him, but repudiated at the trial, was not made freely and voluntarily. More specifically he contends that the confession was obtained from him after an unduly long and protracted period of interrogation and was made while he was under the influence of fear or apprehension of personal violence.
The validity of the confession is all important in this case. In its brief the State concedes that "the sole basis for this conviction is the confession obtained from the appellant."
At about eight o'clock on the morning of Thursday, April 14, 1960, the father of the deceased child, in the company of two other persons, found the family station wagon in a wooded area near Chattahoochee in Gadsden County, Florida. In the station wagon there was found the body of Roger Glenn Clayton, the body of the mother of the child, and a four year old brother of the deceased child who was alive but suffering from head injuries. Mrs. Clayton and the children had been missing from their home since the morning of the preceding day.
Appellant, who had worked for the Clay-tons for some nine years and was living near their home, was arrested by a constable shortly after the discovery of the station wagon and its contents and was taken to the scene of the crime.
In turn the appellant was taken to Quincy and surrendered to a Florida Highway Patrolman who drove him to the Leon County Jail, arriving there at about ten o'clock in the morning. Appellant was thereafter driven to the State Prison at Raiford, arriving there at about midnight. It does not appear that appellant was interrogated on this day.
The next morning the State Attorney of the Second Judicial Circuit and Gadsden County Deputy Sheriff Martin interrogated appellant at Raiford. According to appellant the total time involved in this interrogation did not exceed thirty minutes.
Appellant was then carried from Raiford to Perry, Florida, where he remained in the Taylor County Jail from 2 P.M. until about 10 P.M., at which time he was carried to the Leon County Jail in Tallahassee, Florida.
Appellant, on arrival in Tallahassee, was subjected, with his consent, to a lie detector test which was conducted by Mr. Lester Thompson, an employee of the Florida Sheriffs' Bureau. According to appellant the period of time involved in this examination was three to four hours. Appellant was placed in the Leon County Jail at about 3 A.M. on Saturday morning, April 16th.
Later the same morning, during daylight hours, appellant was given another lie detector test. Appellant testified that it lasted about four hours. The State's witnesses said it lasted about two hours.
In the afternoon of the same day Deputy Sheriff Martin interrogated appellant three to four hours.
There is dispute and confusion as to the number of times that the appellant was interrogated after Saturday and up to and including Wednesday, April 20th, when he made a confession in the presence of the State Attorney, the Sheriff of Gadsden County and a secretary to the State Attorney. However, when all the testimony is reconciled in the light most favorable to appellant it seems clear that he was not interrogated on Sunday, but was interrogated by Deputy Sheriff Martin for three to four hours on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday and was again given a lie detector test on either Monday or Tuesday, which test lasted four hours according to appellant, two hours according to the State.
After he had completed his confession appellant agreed to and did go with the State Attorney, the Gadsden County Sheriff, and Deputy Sheriff Martin to the scene of the crime and again repeated his confession, pointing out where the station wagon had been parked and other factors relating to the crime.
Twelve days later he was given another lie detector test. During this test, which he testified lasted about four and one half hours, appellant again repeated his confes sion. He did not testify that he had been interrogated during the twelve days between his first confession and his repeating it on the occasion of this last lie detector test.
On arraignment appellant repudiated his confession by pleading not guilty. At the trial he denied that the confession was his, contending that he said only what Deputy Sheriff Martin told him to say.
As above outlined, accepting in each instance the appellant's testimony as to his interrogations, the record shows that over the period of seven days and six nights (including the day of his arrest) he was interrogated a maximum of about 28 hours, an average of some four hours per day. He was interrogated only once at night and the longest period of questioning on any one day did not exceed eight hours.
Appellant argues that under these facts his confession was not free and voluntary. He compares his case to the case of Chambers v. State, 1936, 123 Fla. 734, 167 So. 697, in which this Court held that the confessions there involved were not free and voluntary where they were made after repeated and persistent questioning at frequent intervals over a period of a week culminating in an all night session of interrogations.
Were the facts in this case equal to those in the Chambers case, supra, we would hold the confession to be invalid, but there is no real similarity between the two cases.
Our conclusion that the interrogation in this case was not so long or protracted as to exhaust his resistance or destroy his will is reinforced by the fact that appellant repeated his confession at the scene of the crime and again 12 days later when he took the last lie detector test.
Too, it is to be noted that appellant did not testify that those who interrogated him and held him in custody abused him in any way or were guilty of misconduct of any kind, except for his claim that he was placed in fear of mob violence throughout the interrogations. We will deal with this point later.
We reject appellant's contention that the confession was not voluntary because it was obtained only after long and protracted interrogation. This Court is committed to the rule that á confession is not vitiated by the fact that it was made while in custody after interrogation, provided the questioning was orderly and properly conducted. Williams v. State, 1945, 156 Fla. 300, 22 So.2d 821. See also Chambers v. State, 1939, 136 Fla. 568, 187 So. 156, reversed 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716.
In support of his contention that he was at all times under the influence of fear or apprehension of violence at the hands of a mob, the appellant testified that immediately after he was arrested and taken to the scene of the crime Deputy Sheriff Martin said in appellant's presence that they had better get appellant away from there before a mob got him. However, there is no testimony that those at the murder scene showed any interest in or animosity toward the appellant.
Appellant testified that shortly after he was arrested and as he was being carried from the scene of the crime he heard Deputy Sheriff Martin radio the Florida Highway Patrol and ask that a car meet them and take appellant to Tallahassee; when the Highway Patrolman took defendant into his car he told him "not to sit up in the car before I get to Tallahassee," as it was likely that the mob might get him ; after he had been several hours in the Leon County Jail the jailer told him they had to get him out so the mob could not get him; after which he was slipped out the back door, put in an automobile and told to lie down so the mob would not take him before they got away; Deputy Sheriff Martin told him "he was tired of running up and down the road and if I didn't go ahead on and confess, he wasn't gonna keep on riding up and down the road, he'd rather the mob get me than to get him"; the operator who gave him the lie detector test repeatedly told him his life was "not worth a penny" and threatened to turn him over to the mob; and that Deputy Sheriff Martin threatened to turn him over to the mob on every occasion that he questioned him, including the interrogation just prior to his confession, and again made such threats after his confession on Wednesday, April 20th.
Appellant testified that he confessed because "I was looking for them to get me at any time and I was scared if I didn't" that the deputy would turn him over to the mob. He testified that he "confessed" only to what Deputy Martin told him to say.
However, appellant made no claim that any of the three persons present when he made his confession, i. e. the Sheriff, the State Attorney, and the State Attorney's secretary, threatened him in any way, but in fact testified that they did not do so.
All of the appellant's testimony regarding threats of turning him over to a mob were controverted by the State's witnesses. Essentially the only testimony not controverted was that which dealt with his being told to lie down in the car during the trips from Quincy to Tallahassee and from Tallahassee to Raiford, his being shuttled from jail to jail, the alleged statement of Deputy Sheriff Martin when he called the Highway Patrol, and the alleged statements of the Leon County jailer as to the reason for moving appellant to Raiford.
Had these statements and actions immediately preceded appellant's confession there would be greater force to his contention that the confession was prompted by fear. However, the record shows that more than five days elapsed between these statements and actions during which period of time appellant stoutly maintained his innocence.
In view of these circumstances we think the trial judge was correct in determining that the uncontroverted facts which might bear on the voluntariness of appellant's confession were not such as to dictate a legal conclusion that the confession was involuntary.
The trial judge properly submitted to the jury the determination of the validity of the confession. It was the function of the jury to resolve the conflicts in the evidence relating to the threats allegedly made toward appellant to obtain his confession. The jury, unfortunately for appellant, apparently believed the testimony of the State's witnesses as it had the right to do. We are unable to discover any error in their decision.
We therefore must reject appellant's contention that his confession was invalid because made under influence of fear or apprehension of violence at the hands of a mob.
As pointed out above, the State concedes that the sole basis for the defendant's conviction was his confession. Although defendant did not raise the point or question the sufficiency of the evidence, the State,, recognizing our responsibility under Sec. 924.32 F.S.A., raised and argued the question in its brief.
An extrajudicial confession of guilt, standing alone, will not support a conviction on a criminal charge. Independent proof of the corpus delicti is required. Tucker v. State, 1912, 64 Fla. 518, 59 So. 941; Frazier v. State, Fla.1958, 107 So.2d 16; Alexander v. State, Fla.App.1958, 107 So.2d 261.
The corpus delicti in homicide cases consists of (1) the fact of death and (2) the existence of the criminal agency of another as the cause of death, connected with (3) the identity of the deceased. Brooks v. State, Fla.1960, 117 So.2d 482.
Prior to introduction of appellant's confession into evidence it had been clearly established that Roger Glenn Clayton had met his death as the result of blows to- his head. These blows had been delivered by a blunt instrument which caused a caving in of the skull. This evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
In his confession appellant in substance stated that on the morning of the crime, April 13, 1960, he went with Mrs. Clayton and her two children in the station wagon to the place of the crime; he and Mrs. Clayton drank whiskey; an argument ensued; he got in the driver's seat and attempted to drive the station wagon out; Mrs. Clayton, who was sitting in the seat behind him, threw a hammer at him; the hammer missed him and fell to the floor and as he reached down to get it Mrs. Clayton grabbed him by the collar; he turned and struck her; and that "the children wasn't even hit at with the hammer, not intending to be hit, they got theirs with an accident." At one point in his confession he stated that he did not intend to hit her with the hammer.
The essential element of premeditation immediately becomes significant. In this case premeditation must either be established through the confession or in the physical evidence found in the circumstances at the scene of the crime. The confession indicates that appellant struck Mrs. Clayton in a quarrel or struggle and that there was no intention to strike or harm Roger Glenn Clayton.
It matters not that the death of Roger Glenn Clayton was unintentional if the acts which produced his death were the result of a premeditated design to effect the death of any human being. Hall v. State, 1915, 70 Fla. 48, 69 So. 692.
Premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances just as other inferences of fact may be drawn by the jury. Parker v. State, 1940, 142 Fla. 210, 194 So. 484; Crawford v. State, 1941, 146 Fla. 729, 1 So.2d 713; Robinson v. State, 1941, 148 Fla. 153, 3 So.2d 804.
In this case we think the circumstances were more than adequate to support an inference of premeditation.
According to appellant's confession Mrs. Clayton threw a hammer at him but he was not struck by it. There is no evidence to indicate that she was armed in any way or that she pursued the encounter beyond grabbing appellant by the collar. He was in the front seat of the station wagon, she in the seat behind him. When found Mrs. Clayton was lying in the back seat with one arm upraised over her head. The medical evidence showed that she had suffered not one blow, but multiple cerebral contusions and skull fractures, all sufficient to produce death; a dislocated left shoulder; and a wound in the left temple extending through and fracturing the jaw and knocking out a tooth.
Whatever the appellant's state of mind' might have been at the beginning of the "tussling", the number of blows struck, the force employed, the unarmed status of Mrs. Clayton and the other circumstances, surrounding the unfortunate incident indicate that there was sufficient time for appellant to have formed the intent to kill Mrs. Clayton and that he did form and' carry out this design. The facts established were sufficient to support the inference obviously drawn by the jury that appellant did effect the death of Mrs. Clayton by premeditated design. This would be sufficient to supply this element in the killing of Roger Glenn Clayton as well.
Finding no reversible error and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and judgment of murder in the first degree, the judgment appealed from must be and is hereby
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., and THORNAL, J., and WILLIS, Circuit Judge, concur.
THOMAS, HOBSON and DREW, JJ., dissent.