Case Name: Beatrice Furman CARTER, Russell Carter, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Musa Tony RUKAB and South Carolina Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-09-12
Citations: 437 So. 2d 761
Docket Number: No. AO-286
Parties: Beatrice Furman CARTER, Russell Carter, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Musa Tony RUKAB and South Carolina Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: JOANOS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 437
Pages: 761–764

Head Matter:
Beatrice Furman CARTER, Russell Carter, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Musa Tony RUKAB and South Carolina Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. AO-286.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 12, 1983.
Harris Brown and Ronald L. Palmer, Mathews, Osborne, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for appellants.
John I. Todd, Jr., Jacksonville, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
LARRY G. SMITH, Judge.
The Carters and their insurer appeal from a final judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict denying them recovery in their personal injury suit against Musa Tony Rukab and his insurer. They argue that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the traffic citation issued to Mrs. Carter charging her with running a red light and her admission of guilt thereto. We agree that under the circumstances of this case, the admission of the citation and guilty plea constitutes reversible error. Because we find that this error is dispositive of the case, we do not reach the other point raised by appellants.
Mrs. Carter and Rukab were involved in an automobile accident at the Jacksonville intersection of Edgewood Avenue and Post Street on May 24, 1980. Mrs. Carter was driving westbound on Post Street and Ru-kab was headed southbound on Edgewood Avenue when their cars collided. The investigating officer issued Mrs. Carter a traffic citation charging her with running the red light at the intersection.
Although the traffic citation provides that Mrs. Carter was required to appear in court for this infraction, Mrs. Carter was permitted to submit an affidavit admitting the infraction and pay a fine of $25.00 in lieu of a court appearance. Her son explained that he advised his mother to follow this procedure because her leg was in a cast, she was taking medication, and he felt that she was unable to make a court appearance. He testified that Mrs. Carter did not understand the implications of what she was signing and that it was always her position that the light was green when she travelled through the intersection.
At the trial below, Mrs. Carter continued to maintain that the light was green when she went through the intersection. Mrs. Abrigail Brown, who was travelling westbound on Post Street when the accident occurred, also testified that the light was green for Mrs. Carter. On the other hand, Rukab testified that the light was green when he went through the intersection. His testimony was corroborated by Arlene Williams' testimony that the light was green when Rukab passed her and travelled through the intersection.
The trial court did not permit any testimony concerning the traffic citation, but defense counsel was permitted to inquire of Mrs. Carter whether she pled guilty to running the red light at the intersection on May 24. In addition, the traffic citation and guilty plea were introduced into evidence over objection. On appeal, appellants contend this constituted reversible error.
Our inquiry begins with the premise that any fact relevant to prove a fact at issue is admissible into evidence unless its admissibility is precluded by some specific rule of exclusion. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 658 (Fla.1959). See also Section 90.402, Florida Statutes (1979) which provides that all evidence is admissible except as provided by law. Historically, admissions by a party opponent have been admissible as substantive evidence. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 803.18, p. 287. In that vein, past decisions of this state hold that a plea of guilty to a traffic offense is admissible as an admission against interest by a party opponent. Chimerakis v. Evans, 221 So.2d 735 (Fla.1969); Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216 (Fla.1967).
However, the rule of admissibility was changed in 1974 when the legislature decriminalized certain minor traffic violations. The new law provided that any person charged with such an infraction could pay a civil penalty or forfeit bond, if posted, and that this would constitute an admission to the infraction and a waiver of any right to a hearing. It further provided, however, that this admission could not be used as evidence in any other proceeding. See Section 318.14(4), Florida Statutes (1979). At the same time, the legislature provided that in more serious accidents, involving the death or personal injury of another or property damage in excess of $250.00 (now $750.00, Chapter 81-34, Laws of Florida (1981)), persons cited for infractions shall not have the provisions of Section 318.14(4) available to them, "but must appear before the designated official at the time and location of the scheduled hearing." See Section 318.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Since this statute contains no exclusionary provision similar to that found in Section 318.-14(4), a plea of guilty to a traffic infraction covered by this statute would be subject to the usual rule of admissibility in other proceedings.
There is evidence in the record that this accident resulted in more than $250.00 property damage. If this case were to be governed solely by the gravity of the accident, Mrs. Carter would obviously not be entitled to the exclusion contained in Section 318.-14(4). On the other hand, since the issue is the admissibility of evidence concerning her conduct in pleading guilty, we conclude that Mrs. Carter is entitled to insist that we look to the manner in which her plea was influenced by the two statutes — as actually applied in her case — before characterizing her conduct as falling under the protection of Section 318.14(4) or under the self-inculpa-tory effect of Section 318.19(1).
Analyzing the problem in this manner, we observe that Section 318.19(1) contemplates a mandatory court appearance. Thus, one entering a plea of guilty under this statute would do so in the courthouse milieu. It follows that one pleading guilty under these conditions would more fully comprehend the significance of an incriminating admission than if that person had utilized the innocuous mail-order adjustment procedure permitted by Section 318.-14(4). In enacting Section 318.14(4), the legislature recognized that persons charged with minor traffic offenses often pay their fines, as a matter of expediency, rather than contesting the charge. MacNeil v. Singer, 389 So.2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In fact, it is the relative ease and lack of restraint with which one would customarily approach an informal and convenient means of paying a traffic fine that tends to encourage use of this prompt and inexpensive settlement procedure which is mutually beneficial to the county and the individual.
Although under the provisions of Section 318.19(1) Mrs. Carter presumably could have been required to attend a mandatory hearing on her traffic citation, the fact is that she did not appear in court. Compare, Mackey v. Reserve Insurance Company, 349 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Instead, Mrs. Carter mailed in her fine and affidavit, apparently to avoid the hardship of a court appearance in her condition. We can find no basis upon which appellees can insist that although Mrs. Carter, possibly through some bureaucratic misstep, was permitted to utilize an informal disposition procedure, she should be deemed to have acted in compliance with a statute mandatorily prescribing an entirely different procedure. In terms of appellees' right to introduce evidence of a plea of guilty under Section 318.19(1), we simply hold that it must first be shown that the plea was entered under that statute. Such is not the case here.
Because the evidence of fault in this case was so conflicting, we decline to find that the admission of the traffic citation and guilty plea in this case was harmless. MacNeil v. Singer, supra. Accordingly, the final judgment is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for a new trial.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
NIMMONS, J., dissents with opinion.