Case Name: PEOPLE v. STANLEY JONES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-06-14
Citations: 69 Mich. App. 459
Docket Number: Docket No. 23535
Parties: PEOPLE v STANLEY JONES
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J., and Mc-Gregor and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 69
Pages: 459–464

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v STANLEY JONES
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — Instructions to Jury — Accidental Killings — Request for Instructions.
Failure of a trial court, in a prosecution for first-degree murder, to clearly direct the jury’s attention to the central issue of the case, the defendant’s theory that the killing was accidental, was reversible error even though the defendant did not request such an instruction nor object to the instructions as given.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J.
2. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Defendant’s Theory of Case.
A criminal defendant is afforded the right to have the trial court inform the jury as to his theory of the case where there is some evidence introduced to support the theory, and the duty of the court to so instruct the jury is imposed even though the defendant does not request such instruction.
3. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Defendant’s Theory of Case — Homicide—Accidental Killings.
A trial court need only generally instruct a jury in accordance with a defendant’s theory of the case absent a timely written request by the defendant for a speciñc instruction; the jury was sufficiently informed of a defendant’s theory of accident as the defense to a charge of ñrst-degree murder where the trial court deñned and explained the elements of intent, malice and premeditation, explained that if the homicide was an accident such elements were negated, and that the prosecution had to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appeal from Recorders Court of Detroit, Susan D. Borman, J.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 498, et seq.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 727, 728, 906, 909, 915, 916.
Submitted March 3, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 23535.)
Decided June 14, 1976.
Stanley Jones was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, and Maura D. Corrigan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carl Ziemba, for defendant on appeal.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J., and Mc-Gregor and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
McGregor, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548, and subsequently sentenced to life in prison. He appeals as a matter of right.
Defendant raises four issues for our consideration. However, we need discuss only one as it necessitates the reversal of defendant's conviction.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing adequately to present to the jury the defense theory that the killing was accidental. On the authority of People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), we are constrained to agree.
In Ora Jones, the Supreme Court stated:
"The defense theory was accidental shooting. The trial court's instruction did not adequately present this to the jury. The only places in the instruction which touched directly upon the theory of accident were two: In defining homicide the court said:
" 'Members of the jury, the word homicide means the killing of one human being by another human being.
" 'Homicides in turn are divided into a number of classifications or degrees: felonious homicides, excusable homicides, justifiable homicides, or accidental homicides.
" 'It is only felonious homicides, members of the jury, that are punishable by statute in Michigan.' "
and in defining 'wilfully' the court said:
" 'It means a wrongful criminal act done intentionally as opposed to an act done accidentally.'
'The court did not instruct the jury that if the jury found the shooting was accidental it should £nd the defendant not guilty. While a logician or one skilled in the law could have gleaned such a rule from the instructions given, we are not satisfied that the instructions fairly and fully presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case and read as a whole these instructions did not direct the jury's attention to this issue." (Emphasis added.) 395 Mich 379, 394.
The instructions in the instant case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those given in Ora Jones. The instructions in the instant case touched directly upon the theory of accident only once but did not clearly direct the jury's attention to this central issue. Furthermore, although the defendant in the instant case did not request such an instruction nor object to the instructions as given, the same situation was present in Ora Jones and not deemed controlling. See Ora Jones, dissenting opinion. Consequently, we hold that the trial court's failure adequately to present the defendant's theory to the jury was reversible error in spite of the fact that no request or objection was made.
Conviction reversed; remanded for a new trial.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.