Case Name: ELLA HENNIGS et al., Appellants, v. CENTREVILLE TOWNSHIP et al., Appellees
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1973-11-30
Citations: 56 Ill. 2d 151
Docket Number: No. 45558
Parties: ELLA HENNIGS et al., Appellants, v. CENTREVILLE TOWNSHIP et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 56
Pages: 151–158

Head Matter:
(No. 45558.
ELLA HENNIGS et al., Appellants, v. CENTREVILLE TOWNSHIP et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed Nov. 30, 1973.
Modified on denial of rehearing January 29, 1974.
GOLDENHERSH, J., took no part.
RYAN, J., dissenting.
Kassly, Weihl 8c Bone, of Belleville, for appellants.
John R. Sprague and N. Dean Nester, of Sprague, Sprague & Ysursa, of Belleville, for appellee Centreville Township.
Ray Freeark and Ted Harvey, Jr., of Belleville, for appellee Louis T. Knauer.

Opinion:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD
delivered the opinion of the court:
In a personal injury action brought by plaintiffs, Ella Hennigs and her spouse, the circuit court of St. Clair County directed a verdict for defendants, Centreville Township and Louis T. Knauer, at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed (Hennigs v. Centreville Township (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 240), and we granted leave to appeal.
The cause of action arose when Ella Hennigs tripped and fell over a pile of frozen gravel while walking along a township road at night. The gravel was in a publicly owned area, frequented by pedestrians and cyclists, between defendant Knauer's front property line and the paved road surface. Plaintiffs alleged the highway commissioner of Centreville Township placed the gravel there in response to defendant Knauer's complaints about holes in the road in front of his property.
We do not agree with plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendant Knauer, or that whether he created or maintained a dangerous obstruction in the public roadway was a jury question. There is no evidence the pile of gravel was on his property or that Ella Hennigs was on his property when she tripped and fell. Nor does the evidence indicate that he ever requested a pile of gravel or directed its placement; he merely complained about the condition of the roadway. The trial court was clearly correct in directing a verdict in his favor in the absence of any evidence that he maintained or created a dangerous obstruction in the roadway. Pedrick v. Peoria and Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill.2d 494, 510.
The directed verdict in favor of the defendant township requires more extended consideration. It rested on the theory that the township is a legal entity distinct and separate from the office of its highway commissioner, and, therefore, it is not liable for any negligence or breach of duty on the part of that officer. Plaintiffs maintain that the township should be liable for the tortious acts of the highway commissioner, or that, in any event, the trial court should have allowed a substitution of parties to permit the naming of the highway commissioner as a defendant, since naming the township as the governmental defendant was a mere misnomer.
This court has, in the past, viewed the highway commissioner as a distinct entity separate from the township in regard to road repair contracts (Western Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Cornwall (1954), 2 Ill.2d 560); indebtedness for materials used for road repair (American Mexican Refining Co. v. Wetzel (1932), 350 Ill. 575); and the authority to levy a tax to pay claims for road work (People ex rel. Book v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. (1926), 322 Ill. 623). It has also held a township not liable in a private action for damages occasioned by the neglect of the town authorities to keep public highways in repair (Town of Waltham v. Kemper (1870), 55 Ill. 346); that a township is not liable in an action based on the conduct of its highway commissioners in diverting a stream from its natural course in order to construct a highway, thereby causing water to flow onto plaintiffs' land (Cooney v. Town of Hartland (1880), 95 Ill. 516); and that the highway commissioners of a township are not liable for their failure to provide railings on a bridge from which a plaintiff fell on the theory that, since townships were immune from such actions, highway commissioners, as an agency through which the town performs a public duty, should also be immune from such suits (Nagle v. Wakey (1896), 161 Ill. 387). In addition, defendant Centreville Township places heavy reliance on the more recent case of McEathron v. Township of Worth (1942), 315 Ill. App. 47, wherein the appellate court held that a township cannot be held liable in tort except under a statute expressly providing such a remedy; and that the highway commissioner was the only proper party to be sued in an action based on his negligence. That decision, however, as did all of those cited above, preceded Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, which abrogated the doctrine of governmental tort immunity, and likewise preceded the enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 85, pars. 1—101 through 10—101). Both Molitor and the Tort Immunity Act made substantial changes in the law relating to the tort liability of governmental entities and employees, and it is clear under present statutes that a township as a local governmental entity is now amenable to suit for the tortious acts of a highway commissioner in his official capacity.
A local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 85, par. 3—102.) It seems clear from this that the legislature intended local public entities to be liable for injuries resulting from their failure to maintain their property in that condition. Townships are included in the definition of local public entity under the Tort Immunity Act (ch. 85, par. 1—206), and their officers are included as employees (par. 1—202). A township highway commissioner is an elected official and is by statute designated as an officer of the township (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 121, par. 6—112; People ex rel. Dennison v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1934), 355 Ill. 424); it is his duty to perform various functions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 121, pars. 6—201.1 to 6 — 201.17), including levying taxes for the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges (par. 6—201.5), constructing, maintaining and repairing roads and bridges and letting contracts for that purpose (par. 6—201.7), and he has "general charge of the roads of his district" (par. 6—201.8). It should be noted that for the performance of these duties the highway commissioner receives his compensation from the general township fund in districts comprising a single township. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 121, par. 6—207.) Further, any judgment recovered against him in his name of office is a town charge. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 139, par. 49.
It is alleged that the injury to Ella Hennigs occurred on township property. In these circumstances, and considering the affirmative duty placed on the township to maintain its property in reasonably safe condition, we believe the township is amenable to suit for the alleged negligence of its employee, the highway commissioner.
The directed verdict in favor of defendant Knauer was proper, and the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed as to him. As to Centreville Township, however, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court of St. Clair County for a new trial.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.