Case Name: Jerry H. SUMMERS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mayor Robert L. THOMPSON, et al., Respondents-Appellants
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1988-05-28
Citations: 764 S.W.2d 182
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jerry H. SUMMERS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mayor Robert L. THOMPSON, et al., Respondents-Appellants.
Judges: HARBISON, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and O’BRIEN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 764
Pages: 182–199

Head Matter:
Jerry H. SUMMERS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mayor Robert L. THOMPSON, et al., Respondents-Appellants.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.
May 28, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 18, 1988.
Jacqueline E. Schulten, Soddy-Daisy City Atty., Chattanooga, W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Kevin Steiling, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondents-appellants.
Jerry H. Summers, Jack R. Brown, Robert L. Moon, Chattanooga, for petitioner-appellee.
Deborah S. Swettenam, Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Dickson, J. Anthony Farmer, Trial Lawyers’ Ass’n, Knoxville, for amicus-curiae.

Opinion:
OPINION
DROWOTA, Justice.
This direct appeal raises a significant issue of Tennessee constitutional law, that is, whether certain statutes permitting a municipal judge to be terminated at will are valid. The Petitioner, Jerry H. Summers, sat as city judge for Soddy-Daisy, Hamilton County, Tennessee, for 14 years until he was summarily terminated by the Board of Commissioners of Soddy-Daisy (the Board). Petitioner sought review of his termination by a common law writ of cer-tiorari, contending that at will employment of a judge violated the requirement of separation of powers under Article II, § 1, of the Constitution of Tennessee. The Chancery Court of Hamilton County found that the at will employment provisions of T.C.A. § 6-21-501 and 16-18-102 violated the State Constitution and ordered Petitioner's reinstatement. Respondents, including the Attorney General, have brought this direct appeal to this Court as the sole determinative issue is the constitutionality of these two statutes. T.C.A. § 16-4-108.
I.
Given the posture of this case, a common law writ of certiorari, the evidence consists primarily of the record made at the meeting of the Board. The record of this meeting is rather meager, although some other evidence in the form of affidavits, exhibits to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and Respondents' Answers to Requests for Admission are also included in the record. Respondents did not, however, offer any evidence in their favor at the meeting, rely ing on the terms of the statute under which they acted. The facts are relatively simple.
Petitioner was appointed to serve as city judge of Soddy-Daisy City Court in 1971 and served continuously in that position for 14 years. The parties have relied upon T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b)(3), which provides that "[t]he board of commissioners shall appoint a city judge who shall be an attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the courts of the state and who shall serve at the will of the board." Although several Boards of Commissioners were elected following Petitioner's initial appointment, he was never reappointed or removed by any Board until the meeting of October 3, 1985. Petitioner apparently served without significant conflict with any successive Board; however, according to Petitioner's statement before the Board at the October, 1985, meeting, friction began to develop over the previous summer with the Mayor, Robert L. Thompson, the members of the Board, and the Chief of Police. The exhibits to the Petition, consisting of a series of letters between the Police Chief and Petitioner and between the Mayor and Petitioner, corroborate these allegations made by Petitioner at this meeting, which allegations were reiterated in the Petition itself. Apparently, the Mayor and members of the Board attempted to influence the judicial functions of the city court by attempting to utilize the court to increase city revenue, by requesting that the authority to issue warrants be delegated to city officers or employees who were not magistrates, and by seeking to establish a fixed schedule for appearance bonds, which would be set by clerks. In addition, Mayor Thompson attempted to persuade Petitioner to impose harsher sentences on first offenders in cases involving driving under the influence but Petitioner resisted, contending that judicial discretion was involved in determining the appropriate punishment within the ranges permitted by statute. Evidently, when the Mayor and Board concluded that Petitioner could not be persuaded to conduct city court in the manner in which they wished, they concluded that the at will employment statute could be utilized to terminate Petitioner and replace him with a more malleable city judge.
At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Board on October 3,1985, without notice to Petitioner or to the citizens of Soddy-Daisy, Petitioner was terminated. No cause for termination was given by the Board of Commissioners. According to the transcript of the meeting, Mayor Thompson made a motion to change the city judge effective immediately, which motion was carried unanimously. Several citizens protested Petitioner's removal and pressed the members of the Board to give some cause for his removal. The Mayor repeatedly refused to provide any reason for Petitioner's removal, stating that the city attorney had advised the Board not to respond to such questions. When citizens continued to press for some explanation, the city attorney stated that the city charter granted the Board the authority to appoint a city judge who served at will and that the Board was not required to have any reason for termination of at will employees. Some citizens persisted in their protests, a few expressing their suspicions that the Board intended to turn the city court into a "cash register court."
Although the formal termination vote had already been taken, the Board invited Petitioner to speak. He stated that politics had been injected into the operation of the court by the Mayor, Board, and Chief of Police. He explained that he had been pressured to increase city revenue and to impose harsher penalties on certain types of offenders. Noting that compliance with the Board's requests would infringe upon his judicial functions, Petitioner warned that the potential for abuse of the city court was high, depriving persons brought before the court a fair and impartial hearing.
On November 27, 1985, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Hamilton County Chancery Court challenging his termination as arbitrary, capricious, and illegal in that the statutes permitting at will employment of a city judge violated the Constitution of Tennessee. Other claims were asserted by Petitioner as well. Although the Mayor and Board denied many of the allegations of the Petition, by an order of February 9,1987, the issue was narrowed to the constitutionality of the statutes in question and additional claims asserted by Petitioner against the Board were severed. On March 6, 1987, the Chancellor filed his Memorandum Opinion. Although finding no violation under the language of the statute, as written, the Chancellor observed that city court meets regularly and exercises substantial, local judicial authority and noted the importance of the constitutional issue presented. Finding that judicial independence and impartiality could not be assured if the city judge had no definite term and was subjected to the whims of the local legislative body, he concluded that the at will provisions of T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b) and 16-18-102 violated the principle of separation of powers and ordered Petitioner's reinstatement until the next Board of Commissioners election. Notices of Appeal were duly filed by Respondents.
II.
The majority of this Court does not find it necessary to address the constitutional issue presented by this case because the issue may be resolved by a proper construction of the statutes involved. Moreover, the holding of this case is expressly limited to those city courts that are not vested with concurrent jurisdiction with a General Sessions Court, which is an inferi- or court, under T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b) or T.C.A. § 16-18-101 (Supp.1987). The jurisdiction of these city courts is wholly limited to traffic violations or violations of city ordinances, as the judges of these courts have no authority to impose fines exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of imprisonment and, as a practical matter, are essentially administrative judges. Such a judge is not cloaked with the powers of a judge of an inferior court within the meaning of Article VI, § 1. See State ex rel. Haywood v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse, 195 Tenn. 265, 270-271, 259 S.W.2d 159, 161 (1953). We now turn to the proper construction of the statutes at issue.
T.C.A. § 6-21-501 has two separately operative subsections. Subsection (a) grants only a limited jurisdiction to city courts that are not covered by the terms of subsection (b). Under subsection (a), "[t]he city judge shall have jurisdiction in and over all cases for the violation of and all cases arising under the laws and ordinances of the city." Subsection (b) courts, however, are "vested with concurrent jurisdiction and authority with courts of general sessions of the county . in all cases of the violation of the criminal laws of the State of Tennessee within the limits of such municipalities." T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b)(2). Furthermore, the applicability of subsection (b) is limited by the population classifications of subsection (b)(1). If a city incorporated under the City Manager-Commission Charter does not come within the population ranges of subsection (b), then only subsection (a) can apply and that city court can exercise very limited jurisdiction. A careful examination of the application of this rather complicated statutory scheme is useful.
T.C.A. § 6-21-501(a) was originally enacted in 1921 as part of an act to provide a uniform City Manager-Commission Charter. 1921 Public Acts, chapter 173, article 9, § 1. In 1965, this subsection was amended to read as it does in its present form. 1965 Public Acts, chapter 330, § 1. Until 1979, subsection (a) was the sole provision of what is now codified as T.C.A. § 6-21-501. What is now subsection (b) was amended piecemeal into the statute in 1979, 1981, and 1982. T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), and (b)(3) were enacted together in 1979. 1979 Public Acts, chapter 309, § 1. Two years later, subsection (b)(1)(B) was added by 1981 Public Acts, chapter 176, § 1. The following year, two more amendments were enacted to add subsections (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(D). 1982 Public Acts, chapters 888 and 889. The first two subdivisions of (b)(1), that is, (A) and (B), required the governing body of the municipality to adopt the statute within a specified time for it to have become effective. The last two expressly extend the jurisdiction of municipal courts in the cities within the stated population ranges over violations of T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (driving under the influence). Subsection (b) must be read as a whole and can be operative only in municipalities properly coming within its classifications.
From our research, apparently when subsection (b)(1)(A) was enacted in 1979, only Williamson County, which then had a population of 34,423 by the 1970 Federal census, came within its terms. Presently Campbell County (34,841) and Dyer County (34,663), by the 1980 Federal census, are within the classification of (b)(1)(A). We have been unable to find any county presently covered by (b)(1)(B) as county populations are reflected in the 1980 Federal census; under the 1970 census, again only Williamson County was within the range specified. For the population ranges of subsections (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(D), only Lawrence County (1980 population of 34,110) falls within these classifications; the cities of St. Joseph (population 897) and Loretto (population 1612) are located in Lawrence County and incorporated under T.C.A. § 6-18-101, et seq. Soddy-Daisy, however, has a population of 8,388 (1980) and is located in Hamilton County, which has a population of 287,740 according to the 1980 Federal census. Clearly, Soddy-Daisy is not within any classification of subsection (b), and Hamilton County, even by the 1970 Federal census, could not have qualified under any provision of subsection (b). If no provision of subsection (b) is applicable, then only subsection (a) is operative.
In addition to T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b), the parties relied on T.C.A. § 16-18-101 and 16-18-102. T.C.A. § 16-18-101 is applicable to "any municipality . having a may- or's court or a municipal court presided over by the mayor . or the city recorder . and having no other provision for a municipal judge for such municipali-ty_" (emphasis added). T.C.A. § 6-21-501(a) expressly provides that a city court shall be established under the City Manager-Commission Charter, and "[whenever the office of city judge is not filled by the appointment of some other person, the recorder shall be the city judge." Otherwise, the city recorder under the City Manager-Commission Charter does not ordinarily exercise judicial functions. T.C.A. § 6-21-401; 6-21-403; 6-22-101. Since T.C.A. § 6-21-501 already specifically provides for a city court for municipalities with a City Manager-Commission Charter, sections 16-18-101 and 16-18-102, which are general provisions, are not operative under that charter system.
Although the parties litigated this case on the theory that T.C.A. § 6-21-501(b), 16-18-101, and 16-18-102 were applicable, we have concluded that these statutes were misapplied by the parties and the trial court. Soddy-Daisy City Court has not been shown on this record to constitute a subsection (b) court under T.C.A. § 6-21-501 and T.C.A. § 16-18-101 and 16-18-102 do not apply ; thus, being a subsection (a) court, the city court at issue is not vested with any concurrent jurisdiction with an inferior court within the meaning of Article VI. Without any concurrent jurisdiction, a city judge of a subsection (a) court does not exercise constitutional judicial power. While we think that the apparent motives of the Board were highly questionable as a matter of public policy, we can only conclude that under the terms of these statutes and the provisions of the Constitution, the action of the Board must be upheld; however, this case amply demonstrates the need to secure a definite term of office for subsection (a) judges, but the limited jurisdiction of subsection (a) courts over city ordinances, with their restricted fines and penalties, rather than over any State laws, does not entail an exercise of constitutional judicial power. On these facts, and given our construction of the relevant statutes, at least absent a showing of actual prejudice to a litigant before the city court as a result of the Board's attempt to exercise improper influence over the city judge, we decline to extend the reach of Article VI beyond the exercise of jurisdiction of an inferior court.
III.
Accordingly, because we have concluded that the parties litigated the case on an incorrect reading of the statutes, we hold that the action of the Board in removing Petitioner was within their power under T.C.A. § 6-21-501(a), which is the applicable statutory provision in this case. We tax the costs equally among the parties. The judgment below is reversed and the case is dismissed.
HARBISON, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and O'BRIEN, JJ.
ADDENDUM OF STATUTES
Tennessee Code Annotated sections:
6-21-501. Jurisdiction of city judge— Appointment and qualifications. — (a) There shall be a city court presided over by a city judge. The city judge shall have jurisdiction in and over all cases for the violation of and all cases arising under the laws and ordinances of the city. The board of commissioners may appoint a city judge who shall serve at the will of the board. He shall have such qualifications and receive such compensation as the board may provide by ordinance. Whenever the office of city judge is not filled by the appointment of some other person, the recorder shall be the city judge.
(b)(1)(A) The provisions of this subsection shall become effective in any municipality incorporated pursuant to the provisions of chapter 18 of this title, having a population of not less than one thousand six hundred (1,600) nor more than one thousand seven hundred (1,700) according to the federal census of 1970, or any subsequent federal census, which lies within a county having a population of not less than thirty-four thousand (34,-000) nor more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) according to the federal census of 1970, or any subsequent federal census, upon approval within fifteen (15) days after May 15, 1979, by two-thirds (%) vote of the governing body of such municipality and upon certification of such approval by the presiding officer of the governing body to the secretary of state, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary.
(B) The provisions of subsection (b) shall also become effective in any municipality incorporated pursuant to the provisions of chapter 18 of this title, having a population of not less than four thousand fifty (4,050) nor more than four thousand one hundred fifty (4,150) according to the federal census of 1970, or any subsequent census, which lies within a county having a population of not less than thirty-four thousand four hundred (34,400) nor more than thirty-four thousand five hundred (34,500) according to the federal census of 1970, or any subsequent federal census, upon approval within fifteen (15) days after May 15, 1981, by two-thirds (%) vote of the governing body of such municipality and upon certification of such approval by the presiding officer of the governing body to the secretary of state, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary.
(C) In municipalities incorporated pursuant to the provisions of chapter 18 of this title, having a population of not less than eight hundred ninety-five (895) nor more than nine hundred (900) according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, which are located within a county having a population of not less than thirty-four thousand seventy-five (34,075) nor more than thirty-four thousand one hundred seventy-five (34,-175) according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the city judge shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the general sessions judges and circuit court judges to try persons charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant as prohibited by § 55-10-401, within the geographic boundaries of such municipalities.
(D) In municipalities incorporated pursuant to the provisions of chapter 18 of this title, having a population of not less than one thousand six hundred (1,600) nor more than one thousand six hundred thirteen (1,613) according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, which are located within a county having a population of not less than thirty-four thousand seventy-five (34,075) nor more than thirty-four thousand one hundred seventy-five (34,175) according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the city judge shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the general sessions judges and circuit court judges to try persons charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant as prohibited by § 55-10-401, within the geographic boundaries of such municipalities.
(2) There shall be a city court presided over by a city judge. The city judge shall have jurisdiction in and over all cases for the violation of and all cases arising under the laws and ordinances of the city. In addition, the city judge shall be vested with concurrent jurisdiction and authority with courts of general sessions of the county, as set forth in title 40, in all cases of the violation of the criminal laws of the state of Tennessee within the limits of such municipality.
(3) The board of commissioners shall appoint a city judge who shall be an attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the courts of the state and who shall serve at the will of the board. He shall receive such compensation as the board may provide by ordinance. All fees shall be paid into the treasury of the city and are not to be considered a part of the compensation of the city judge. In the absence or disability of the city judge, the mayor may designate a qualified person to serve as city judge. Any vacancy in the office of city judge shall be filled by the board of commissioners.
16-18-101. Governing body may provide for office of municipal judge. — In any municipality in this state having a may- or's court or a municipal court presided over by the mayor of the municipality or the city recorder of the municipality and having no other provision for a municipal judge for such municipality, the governing body of the municipality is authorized by ordinance to provide for the office of municipal judge.
16-18-102. Contents of ordinance.— The ordinance providing for the office of municipal judge shall provide:
(1) That the municipal judge shall be vested with the judicial powers and functions of the mayor or city recorder of such municipality, and shall be subject to the provisions of law and the municipality's charter governing the mayor's court or the municipal court presided over by the mayor city recorder;
(2) For qualifications of the municipal judge;
(3) That the municipal judge shall be appointed by the governing body of the municipality, to serve at the pleasure of the governing body;
(4) That vacancies in the office shall be filled for the unexpired term by the governing body;
(5) For oath of office and bonding of the municipal judge before he shall enter upon the duties of this office;
(6) That the cost of making the bond of the municipal judge shall be paid by the municipality;
(7) That the salary of the municipal judge shall be fixed by the governing body before his appointment, and shall not be altered during his term of service; and
(8) For the designation of a person to serve as judge during the absence or disability of the municipal judge.
. Petitioner was terminated at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the Board of Commissioners held on October 3, 1985.
. The parties also considered T.C.A. § 16-18-102 (Supp.1987) as applicable; it was enacted a few years subsequent to Petitioner's initial appointment in 1971. It provides that the ordinance establishing the office of municipal judge, authorized by T.C.A. § 16-18-101, "shall provide: . [tjhat the municipal judge shall be appointed by the governing body of the municipality, to serve at the pleasure of the governing body...." T.C.A. § 16-18-102(3).
. These statutes are reproduced in an addendum to the opinion.
. See, e.g., T.C.A. § 6-19-101(29); 6-21-502.
.These city judges may be appointed to serve indefinite terms at the pleasure of the governing body of the municipality.
. At that time, Hamilton County's population exceeded 250,000.
. See footnote 2, supra. These provisions were enacted in 1973 (1973 Public Acts, chapter 330) and were subsequently amended by 1975 Public Acts, chapter 231.
.We note that this case would have been better and more adequately tried as a declaratory judgment action.