Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Randy A. LEDET, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-06-10
Citations: 298 So. 2d 761
Docket Number: No. 54375
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Randy A. LEDET, Appellant.
Judges: MARCUS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 298
Pages: 761–773

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Randy A. LEDET, Appellant.
No. 54375.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 10, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1974.
William M. Bass, Robert L. Morris, Houma, for appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norval J. Rhodes, Dist. Atty., James L. Alcock, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant Ledet was convicted of murder, La.R.S. 14:30, and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. He relies upon fifteen perfected bills upon his appeal. Substantial contentions of error are presented, however, only by Bill No. 15 (concerning note-taking by a juror during the trial) and by Bill Nos. 13 and 14 (a reference by the prosecutor in his closing argument to the defendant's prior criminal record).
1. Bill No. 15: Note-Taking by a Juror During Trial
By motion for a new trial, the defendant alleged that, after the verdict, he had discovered that one of the trial jurors had taken notes during the trial and referred to them during the jury deliberations, in violation of La.C.Cr.P. art. 793 (quoted in Footnote 4 below). Evidence was taken which proved that such a violation had occurred. Bill No. IS was taken to the trial court's holding that the violation constituted harmless error and to its denial of a new trial.
Two jurors testified at the hearing on the motion. The state did not object to their testifying.
Their testimony shows:
The juror Gros took notes on a paper towel during the second and final day of the trial, the day that the defendant's witnesses testified. The notes, which he recopied in a notebook, after the trial, are in evidence. In the main, they constitute a critical commentary upon the defendant's own testimony when he took the stand, pointing out its inconsistencies with other testimony or other unfavorable aspects of it.
The two jurors testified that the notes were not shown to anyone, although the juror Gros had referred to them occasionally to verify his own memory of the evidence. Further, on one or two instances, Gros used the notes in the deliberation to verify other jurors' recollection of the testimony. However, Gros testified, his statements and votes during the jury deliberations were based upon his independent recollection, not the notes. Both juror-witnesses testified that the notes were not used to settle disputes, as well as to their belief that the reference to the notes did not influence the deliberations nor the verdict of guilty.
In denying the motion, the trial court held that the note-taking and note-reference was harmless error. The court pointed out that the note-taking had been done surreptitiously, without any notice of it by the trial judge, prosecutor, or defense counsel, and that the evidence of the two jurors indicated that the verdict was reached, as required by the code article, upon the memory of the jurors rather than being at all based upon the notes.
The unobjected-to evidence thus shows without contradiction a substantial violation of the provision of Article 793 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: "A juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written evidence. " (Italics ours.)
A majority of this court nevertheless concludes that no reversible error is shown. Although reference to notes by a juror is prohibited, we do not find that such use of notes by a juryman is inherently prejudicial or violative of any fundamental right of an accused designed to aid him to obtain a fair trial. In the absence of connivance by the state, we are unwilling to hold that the use of notes by a juror is, per se, "prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right", La.C.Cr.P. art. 921, so as to be reversible error under such cited code article.
We are influenced in reaching this conclusion by: (a) the preponderance of national authority and informed legal thought, which does not regard note-taking as inherently prejudicial to an accused;, and (b) the policy of La.R.S. 15:470 (quoted in Footnote 9 below), which forbids receipt of testimony by a juror after a verdict as to misconduct within the jury or which impeaches the jury verdict. As will be stated, we find the policy established by the latter statute outweighs and is more important by far than the policy set forth by the code article here violated.
As to (a):
Note-taking by jurors and reference to them during jury deliberations is either permissible or expressly authorized by statute or court-rule in at least twenty-six American state jurisdictions and in the federal courts. It is prohibited in only four states, including Louisiana; but even in them we could find only one reversal resulting from such note-taking — most of the few decisions on the point refused to reverse unless prejudice and gross misconduct was clearly shown.
See: Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking — Misconduct, Right, or Privilege?, 18 Okla.L.Rev. 125 (1965); Note, 46 Chicago-Kent Law Review (1970) ; Annotation, Jury's Trial Notes, 14 A.L.R.3d 831 (1967).
The essential reason for the prohibition is that a note-taker may unduly influence the jury by reference to the notes and that, if the notes are inaccurate and incomplete, the parties before the court may be prejudiced by the jurymen's acceptance of them in preference to actual testimony heard by them and their individual memory, if any, of it. On the other hand, the jurisdictions which reject the prohibition regard note-taking as a legitimate aid to memory and dismiss the contrary considerations as anachronisms from times when few men were literate.
The American Bar Association Standard for Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury approves the taking and use of notes by trial jurors. We regard this authoritative statement, resulting from study by leading scholars, prosecutors, and practitioners in the field of criminal justice, as at least persuasive to the conclusion that the use of notes by a juror is not inherently prejudicial to an accused nor such gross misconduct on his part as should nullify a jury verdict.
Thus, although Article 793 prohibits the reference to notes by a juror, a discovery of the violation of this article after a verdict is reached does not necessarily constitute prejudicial and reversible error. Nor are we here faced with a situation where the state encouraged an open violation, nor where the trial court refused over defense objection to prohibit compliance with this legislative direction, so that reversal is the only way to enforce this legislative mandate.
As to (b):
We are also influenced in our conclusion by the more important policy considerations set forth by La.R.S. 15:470. This enactment provides that no juror "is competent to testify to his own or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach . . . any verdict" of a jury on which he served.
The underlying policy reasons behind this statute relate to the public interest in finality of verdicts and in encouraging freedom and frankness in jury discussion in reaching them. To permit post-verdict judicial examination of the mental processes by which the jury reached its verdict would lead to indefinite prolongation of the trial process by the losing party. To permit revelation, after the verdict, of the jury debate would inhibit it during the discussion.
See, e. g.: McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); Renz v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co., 138 So.2d 114, 122-125 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1962) (summarizing Louisiana jurisprudence), certiorari denied (La.1962); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2353 (McNaughton rev. 1961). (Louisiana deci sions are summarized at 8 Wigmore, Section 2354, p. 706.)
A majority of this court has recently decided that the policy of this statute is so important that, if objected to, the testimony of trial jurors is inadmissible to prove that notes were referred to during jury deliberations. This amounts, at the least, to a determination that the policy reasons underlying the protection of jury privacy outweigh those incorporated in the statute forbidding reference by jurors to notes.
A majority of American jurisdictions have adopted an interpretation of the principle incorporated by La.R.S. 15:470 to the effect that no testimony by a juror will be received, at least if objected to, as to jury conduct, not even testimony proving misconduct prohibited by statute. Wigmore, cited above, at Section 2354. All jurisdictions agree that the principle forbids evidence as to the mental processes and reasons of the jury in reaching a decision.
Nevertheless, a substantial minority follow the variation represented by the "Iowa rule" to the effect that the policy was not intended to prevent proof of "overt acts" constituting illegal conduct or a violation of fundamental statutory requirements for jury deliberation of importance equivalent to jury-privacy, but unprovable except by the testimony of the jurors themselves. Wigmore, cited above, at Section 2353. Wigmore himself was of the opinion that the Iowa rule was preferable to the iron-clad exclusion of juror testimony even as to objective acts constituting gross misconduct. So is the weight of modern critical commentary. See, e. g.: Note, 53 Marquette L.Rev. 258 (1970); Note, 22 U. of Miami L.Rev. 729 (1968); Note, 56 Col.L.Rev. 952 (1956). The American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury, Standard 5.7 adopts this approach.
In Louisiana, the decision of State v. Riggs, 110 La. 509, 34 So. 655 (1903), held that the testimony of a juror may be used to prove an overt act (in the case, intimidation of a juror within the jury room), an overt act being defined as one "done in pursuance of a criminal design." 110 La. at 516, 34 So. at 657. In an earlier decision, bribery of members of the jury was at issue; in ordering a new trial, this court stated: "Without the power to interrogate them [the jurors], the exposure of the bribery would, in most instances, be impossible. But we do not find it necessary to decide authoritatively now whether that particular misconduct of a juror, i. e., bribery can be elicited by his own testimony. In this case, the testimony of the crier to the court was offered to prove his own successful attempt to bribe one of the jurors Hawkins v. New Orleans Printing & Publishing Co., 29 La.Ann. 134, 140 (1877).
Likewise, in State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937), this court permitted testimony by grand jurors to impeach their indictment. They testified that the district attorney was present during their deliberation, which is prohibited by law. In permitting this testimony, we pointed out that only the jurors themselves could prove this infringement of this protection for the accused.
We concluded that the policy of the statute forbidding jurors to impeach their act was outweighed by "[the] public policy . that no one should interfere with the deliberations of a grand jury during its findings." 173 So. at 173. Construing the two statutory prohibitions together, this court did not believe it to be the legislative intent both to forbid the district attorney to be present and also to forbid proof through the jurors (the only means possible) of such illegal presence.
In the present instance, no objection was made to the testimony of the jurors that one of them referred to his notes. Nevertheless, we do not believe a different result is required than if objection had been made and sustained. The use of notes is prohibited but, as previously noted, is not inherently prejudicial to the accused nor to his right to a fair trial. Aside from the lack of evidence that reference to such notes had any effect on the jury's deliberations resulting in its verdict, testimony by members of the jury is under the statute (La.R.S. 15:470) incompetent and inadmissible to prove the mental processes by which they reached their decision.
Essentially, therefore, we hold that the mere fact that notes were taken and referred to by a member of the jury does not, if proved, constitute reversible error. We reach this conclusion also because, as compared with the statutory policy prohibiting note-reference, the statutory policy is of far greater importance that testimony of jurors, by which alone such note-reference could be proved, is incompetent and inadmissible to prove misconduct by members of the jury which impeaches their verdict.
2. Bill Nos. 13 and 14: Prosecutor's Reference in Closing Argument to the Defendant's Prior Criminal Record
The defendant contends that the trial court committed error by not ordering the mandatory mistrial required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 770, when the district attorney refers "directly or indirectly" before the jury to "another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible." La. C.Cr.P. art. 770(2).
In closing argument, the district attorney, in comparing the credibility of the defendant against that of the state witnesses, referred to him as "a three-time loser". The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial under Article 770. The reference to the defendant's criminal record, in an argument limiting such reference to its pertinence in weighing the defendant's credibility, did not, under the literal terms of Article 770 refer to other crimes "as to which evidence is not admissible."
The defendant had taken the stand in his own defense during the trial. When the state cross-examined him, it elicited from him that he had been convicted of burglary three times. A witness may be asked as to his conviction of a crime for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. La.R.S. 14:495. Technically, the defendant's three prior convictions were in evidence before the jury for the limited purpose of assisting it in evaluating his credibility.
Under these limited circumstances, (a) where the convictions were properly before the jury in connection with the defendant's credibility and (b) where the prosecutor's brief and passing reference to them in argument was limited to their applicability to the defendant's credibility, we are not prepared to hold that the trial court committed error by failing to grant a mistrial for a violation of Article 770. However, since without a strict admonition the jury may easily accept such an argument as tending to prove the defendant's guilt instead of his lack of credibility, and because in the absence of the restraint shown by the present prosecutor such a reference may easily constitute a violation of Article 770, such reference in the state's argument to the jury is not encouraged.
3. Other Bills
The remaining bills present no serious issue of error:
Bill Nos. 1-8: The trial court committed no error in denying the motion for a bill of particulars for pre-trial discovery of the details of the state's case. State v. George, La., 298 So.2d 760 (decided this date).
Bill No. 9: No prejudicial error was committed when the court sustained an objection by the state to a question asked by defense counsel. The question attempted to elicit an opinion of the witness when (out of the presence of the trial jury) the state was laying a foundation for the introduction, as voluntary, of an oral incul-patory statement given by the defendant soon after his arrest.
Bills Nos. 10 and 11: The trial court did not commit error in its ruling that the oral inculpatory statement made by the defendant was admissible in evidence. The statement was given after the defendant had been arrested as he- drove up to his home and after he had been taken to the courthouse some fifteen minutes away. He did not object in any way to accompanying the officers. He was not asked, nor did he make, any statements during the trip. Before he was questioned or gave any statement, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that the evidence was given freely and voluntarily.
Bill No. 12: The defendant objected to the qualification of a defense witness as an expert in the field of criminology. He was a college graduate with a chemistry degree, but he had taken no university courses in criminology. The witness possessed nine years' experience as a member and supervisor of the state's crime laboratory. The competency of an expert is a question of fact. The trial judge has a wide discretion in passing upon the qualifications of such a witness, which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. La.R.S. 15:466; State v. Richmond, 278 So.2d 17 (La.1973). We find no abuse of discretion here.
Decree
For the reasons assigned, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
MARCUS, J., concurs.
DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. E. g.,: "Didn't detectives testify Ledet [the defendant] picked up victim [Duplantis] on Hwy. 90 — by questioning Ledet." This note apparently referred to Ledet's trial testimony that Duplantis had stopped him at the corner of Pitre and Tupelo in town and asked him to take Duplantis to New Orleans to apply for overseas work, after which they left town and took Highway 90 to Harvey, La., some fifty or so miles away.
. E. g.: "Knew & remembered things too clearly & readily after almost 1 yr. — wanted to rem. only some things"; "Had criminal rec."; "Could't or didn't want to explain blood on boots & ear" ; "Detectives testified he told his wife to wash his boots and dispose the pictures". (The latter reference was to pictures of the victim's daughter, previously in his wallet, which were found at the defendant's home and which the defendant testified the victim had given to him during their drinking spree).
. See, e. g., his testimony at Tr. 85:
"A. Well, we were discussing different points of the case, and some of the jurymen wasn't — they said, well you know, didn't something like that transpire. And I happened to look, and it was on my notes. You know, maybe one juror said this.
"Q. So the matters that were unclear for the other jurors, you explained to them from your notes? Is that correct?
"A. No, no. I had taken the notes and one of the jurors had asked me, didn't the detective testify that something — and I said yes. I just happened to have it on my notes. And then one of the other jurors said, yes, that's right, too."
Or again, his testimony at Tr. 87:
"Q. Did any of the jurors ask you specifically, on a point that may have been in dispute or in discussion, what your notes reflected on that point?
"A. Not exactly, Like I said before, one of them wanted to know what was one of them's testimony, and I think I had just happened to write it down, and I said, "Well, this was it". After I said that, I said "Was that it" ? I asked the jurors and they said yes, that was it.
"Q. Let's take that instance. Were you saying, no, this was it because of what you had taken down, or were saying no, this was it because of an independent recollection of it?
"A. No, I had a recollection of it."
.La.C.Cr.P. art. 793 in full provides:
"A juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written evidence. Testimony shall not be repeated to the jury. Upon the request of a juror and in the discretion of the court, the jury may take with it or have sent to it any object or document received in evidence when a physical examination thereof is required to enable the jury to arrive at a verdict."
So far as we can ascertain, the prohibition against note-taking has only been considered in two reported Louisiana decisions. In State v. Clark (Docket No. 54,220, decided April 29, 1974), a juror's note-taking was held not to be reversible error, where defense counsel knew about it and did not object to it before the jury retired and reached a verdict. In State v. Joseph, 45 La.Ann. 903, 12 So. 934 (1893) likewise a conviction was not reversed, where the notes had been taken by a juror but not used by him.
. Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955).
. As the cited sources also show, other reasons given for the policy are:
(1) Since all jurors do not possess the same note-taking abilities, the skilled note-taker will have a marked advantage in influencing other jurors;
(2) The process of note-taking diverts attention ;
(3) During deliberation, too much weight may be given notes;
(4) Conflicts of memory may be settled by inaccurate notes;
(5) Unimportant evidence may be emphasized ;
(6) Evidence as to which notes are taken may be given greater attention than equally important evidence as to which notes are not taken.
.The cited sources list the following as among the reasons advanced to support the propriety of note-taking by jurors:
(1) Judges, experienced in the art of hearing and weighing evidence, take notes; why shouldn't jurors? ;
(2) A faulty memory can be refreshed by notes;
(3) A person with a sharp memory could exert as much influence as a sharp note-taker ;
(4)Notes may be necessary in long, detailed trials.
. Standard 4.2 ("Note taking by jurors") :
"Jurors may take notes regarding the evidence presented to them and keep these notes with them when they retire for their deliberations. Such notes should be treated as confidential between the juror making them and his fellow jurors."
. La.R.S. 15:470 in full provides:
"No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any indictment or any verdict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or petit, is a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a member."
. This was the sole issue before this court, when after full discussion a majority of this, court denied supervisory writs in State v. Johanson, 294 So.2d 831 (decided May 24, 1974). Mr. Justice Barham and the writer dissented; Mr. Justice Calogero did not take part.
. It is named after the leading American decision of Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866), which first persuasively enunciated it.
. Standard 5.7 provides:
"Impeachment of the verdict.
"(a) Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror or concerning the mental processes by which the verdict was determined.
"(b) The limitations in subsection (a) shall not bar evidence concerning whether the verdict was reached by lot.
" (c) Subject to the limitations in subsection (a), a juror's testimony or affidavit shall be received when it concerns :
"(i) whether matters not in evidence came to the attention of one or more jurors, under circumstances which would violate the defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him ; or
"(ii) any other misconduct for which the jurisdiction permits jurors to impeach their verdict."