Case Name: Jose Miguel Ricardo ALVES, Appellant, v. BARNETT MORTGAGE COMPANY and J.J. Kislak Mortgage Corporation, and Paula Maria Alves, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-03-05
Citations: 688 So. 2d 459
Docket Number: No. 96-3300
Parties: Jose Miguel Ricardo ALVES, Appellant, v. BARNETT MORTGAGE COMPANY and J.J. Kislak Mortgage Corporation, and Paula Maria Alves, Appellees.
Judges: GROSS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 688
Pages: 459–462

Head Matter:
Jose Miguel Ricardo ALVES, Appellant, v. BARNETT MORTGAGE COMPANY and J.J. Kislak Mortgage Corporation, and Paula Maria Alves, Appellees.
No. 96-3300.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 5, 1997.
Michael L. Addieott of Addieott & Addi-cott, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
Patricia Alexander of Gardiner and Gard-iner, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Paula Maria Alves.

Opinion:
PARIENTE, Judge.
This is an appeal of a civil contempt order entered in a dissolution proceeding. We previously issued an order reversing the contempt order because the order failed to set forth a specific purge amount and failed to include a purge provision after incarceration. This opinion explains our reasoning.
The civil contempt order in this case is defective because it lacks a specific purge provision adequately informing appellant of the exact dollar amount necessary to purge his contempt. See Rosen v. Rosen, 579 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Small v. Small, 422 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Novak v. Snieda, 659 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Palmer v. Palmer, 530 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Because the purge provision is the contemnor's key to the jailhouse cell, see Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985), it is essential that the contemnor — and the jailor — be apprised of the exact amount of the purge which will enable the contemnor to purge the contempt and gain release from jail.
In this case the trial court's order provides that "[t]he husband has ten (10) days to comply with Orders and become completely current or shall serve thirty (30) days in jail starting October 1, 1996." The order does not identify which previous orders have been violated. Even assuming appellant could ascertain which orders are referred to, appellant should not be required to investigate prior court orders to determine what he must do to purge.
A further defect apparent on the face of the order is that the order allows appellant to purge prior to going to jail, but does not contain a purge provision once he goes to jail. See Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So.2d 422 (Fla.1977). As the order stands now, if appellant does not pay the unspecified purge amount within ten (10) days, he will be jailed for thirty days. In Thurman v. Thur man, 637 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), a husband was held in contempt for nonpayment of child support and alimony and ordered to be incarcerated unless he purged by paying a specified amount'. The first district found the contempt order defective because it lacked a provision allowing the husband to purge the contempt at any time, including after incarceration. See also Carter v. Carter, 645 So.2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Siegel v. Felcher, 636 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
We reject the husband's other argument that there is insufficient record evidence to show the husband's willful failure to pay and present ability to pay. However, the finding of present ability to pay should refer to a specific purge amount. See Bowen. Accordingly, we reverse because the contempt order is facially defective in that it fails to adequately inform the husband of the exact purge amount and fails to provide a means for the husband to purge after incarceration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GROSS, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. This court has previously reviewed contempt orders entered prior to final judgment as non-final appeals pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C), without specifically designating which subdivision of the rule applies. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 445 So.2d 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Langbert v. Langbert, 409 So.2d 1066, 1067 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In contrast, we have reviewed post judgment contempt orders pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(4). See Dehler v. Dehler, 639 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The first and third district review pre-judgment contempt orders by exercising certiorari jurisdiction under rule 9.030(b)(2)(A). See Sears v. Sears, 617 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Stewart v. Mussoline, 487 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We agree with Judge Farmer's concurrence that a speedy, efficient review of contempt orders, which impose incarceration if the contemnor does not purge, should be uniformly available.
. Although appellant's incarceration was scheduled to begin October 1, 1996, according to ap-pellee's brief the trial judge is "holding this Order until October 17, 1996" to give appellant another opportunity to become current with his support payments.
.Appellant does not specifically attack the inclusion of the thirty-day jail provision. It is apparently the practice in Broward County and elsewhere to state a specific period of confinement in a civil contempt order for incarceration. This practice is probably based on the holding in State ex rel. Trezevant v. McLeod, 126 Fla. 229, 231, 170 So. 735, 735-36 (1936), where the court said: "the contempt . is void because it specified no definite term of imprisonment." Thus we can understand why the practice has persisted.
We doubt that later holdings of the supreme court require civil contempt orders to provide a specific period of confinement, other than the obligatory provision requiring release upon compliance. See Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla.1977); Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So.2d 498, 501 (Fla.1956). The purpose of civil contempt is to coerce, not to punish. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985).
Although there is no constitutional impediment to a court's imposing a determinate sentence which also includes a purge provision, see Shilli-tani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n. 6, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1536 n. 6, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966), we again suggest that such limitations not be utilized as a matter of routine practice in judgments for civil contempt. See Pasin v. Basin, 480 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Inclusion of a determinate term may blur what should be a bright line between criminal and civil contempt.