Case Name: George B. LINCOMBE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendant and Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1964-07-30
Citations: 166 So. 2d 920
Docket Number: No. 1207
Parties: George B. LINCOMBE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, TATE and HOOD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 166
Pages: 920–926

Head Matter:
George B. LINCOMBE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendant and Appellant.
No. 1207.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
July 30, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1964.
Gist, Gist, Methvin & Trimble, by De-Witt T. Methvin, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cavanaugh, Hickman, Brame & Holt, by Meredith T. Holt, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellee.
Rogers & McHale, by Jack Rogers, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before FRUGÉ, TATE and HOOD, JJ.

Opinion:
HOOD, Judge.
This is a tort action instituted by George B. Lincombe arising out of a motor vehicle collision which occurred on February 24, 1963. One of the automobiles involved in this collision was owned and was being driven by plaintiff and the other was owned by Sulphur Motor Company, Inc., and was being driven by Mrs. Hazel Grigsby. The suit was instituted against Mrs. Grigsby, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and The Travelers Insurance Company.
Answers were filed by State Farm and by Travelers in each suit. Thereafter, each of these defendants, State Farm and Travelers, filed a motion for summary judgment in which motion each denied insurance coverage and for that reason demanded that the suit be dismissed as to it. These motions for summary judgment were tried and judgment was rendered by the trial court on January 2, 1964, granting the motion of Travelers and dismissing the suit with prejudice as to that defendant, but denying the motion for summary judgment filed in behalf of State Farm.
After the judgment was rendered, State Farm entered into a compromise settlement with the plaintiff, and in connection with that settlement plaintiff assigned to State Farm all of his claims and rights against Travelers. On a joint motion of plaintiff and State Farm, judgment was then rendered by the trial court dismissing the suit with prejudice as to State Farm and as to Mrs. Grigsby, but reserving all rights of "plaintiff and/or his assignee" against Travelers. Judgment also was rendered by the trial court on the same day substituting State Farm as the plaintiff in this suit instead of Lincombe. State Farm then, as the assignee of Lincombe and as the substituted plaintiff, appealed from the summary judgment rendered by the district court on January 2, 1964, dismissing the suit as to Travelers.
A companion suit was instituted against the same defendants hy Mrs. Mary Louise Adams, who was riding as a guest passenger in the Lincombe automobile at the time the accident occurred. Substantially the same pleadings were filed and similar judgments were rendered by the trial court in both of these cases, and the two suits have been consolidated for the purpose of trial and appeal. Judgment is being rendered by us in the companion suit on this date. See Adams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al., 166 So.2d 926.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal
After the records in the cases were lodged in this court Travelers filed a motion to dismiss the appeals, alleging as the principal grounds for that motion that the cause of action had been extinguished by confusion, that State Farm did not properly raise the issue of coverage as against Travelers, that another suit involving the same issues has been instituted by State Farm against Travelers which suit is now pending, and that the record does not contain sufficient evidence upon which this Court can dispose of the dispute between State Farm and T ravelers.
An obligation is extinguished by confusion when the qualities of debtor and creditor' are united in the same person. LSA-C.C. Article 2217. In the instant suit the record does not show that the qualities of debtor and creditor have been united in appellant, as contended by Travelers, so we conclude that the alleged debt has not been extinguished by confusion.
Plaintiff Lincombe alleges that "Travelers is the public liability insurer of Hazel Grigsby and/or the automobile she was driving at the time of the said accident." This allegation raises the issue of whether there was coverage under an insurance policy issued by Travelers, and since State Farm has been substituted as party plaintiff in this suit we think the issue of coverage is before the Court. The fact that another suit involving the same issue was instituted by State Farm against Travelers after the judgment appealed from here had been rendered does not constitute grounds for dismissing this appeal. It is true that the record does not contain sufficient evidence upon which we can dispose of the dispute between State Farm and Travelers, but the case has never been tried on its merits and the parties have not been afforded an opportunity to present evidence.
For these reasons, we find no merit to Travelers' motion to dismiss these appeals and, accordingly, the motion to dismiss is. denied.