Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leonard J. Lo Verde, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1959-12-30
Citations: 7 N.Y.2d 114
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leonard J. Lo Verde, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 114–121

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leonard J. Lo Verde, Appellant.
Argued October 8, 1959;
decided December 30, 1959.
Charles J. McDonough for appellant.
I. The People’s theory and proof resulted in a merger of both the second and third counts in the first count. (People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84; Elkin v. People, 28 N. Y. 177; People v. Luscomb, 292 N. Y. 390; People v. Florio, 301 N. Y. 46; People v. De Groat, 5 A D 2d 927; People v. Adler, 272 App. Div. 1032; State v. Mitchell, 54 Kan. 516; People v. Cosad, 253 App. Div. 104.) II. If defendant committed any crime, it was rape. The third count should have been dismissed. (People v. Lindloff, 259 App. Div. 749.) III. Complainant’s testimony required corroboration. The court’s instruction to the contrary was reversible error. (People v. Porcaro, 6 N Y 2d 248; People v. Oyola, 6 N Y 2d 259; People v. Gibson, 232 N. Y. 458; People v. Masse, 5 N Y 2d 217; People v. Farone, 308 N. Y. 305.) IV. The cross-examination deprived defendant Lo Verde of a fair trial. (People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73; People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198.) V. The District Attorney’s cross-examination of both defendants was highly prejudicial. VI. The trial court committed reversible error in the exclusion of testimony.
Julian Hanley, District Attorney, for respondent.
I. There was no merger of the counts in the indictment. (People v. Adler, 272 App. Div. 1032; People v. Luscomb, 292 N. Y. 390; People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84.) II. No corroboration is necessary for the misdemeanor charge and the court properly refused to dismiss the third counts. (People v. Phillips, 204 App. Div. 112, 235 N. Y. 579; State v. Hatfield, 75 Iowa 592; People v. Porcaro, 6 N Y 2d 248; People v. Oyola, 6 N Y 2d 259; People v. Fagan, 163 Misc 495; People v. Chimino, 270 App. Div. 114, 296 N. Y. 554; People v. Manwaring, 3 A D 2d 952; People v. De Groat, 5 A D 2d 1045; People v. Jones, 177 Misc. 922.) III. Cross-examination of defendants was proper. (People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198; People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73.) IV. The trial court’s exclusion of testimony was proper.

Opinion:
Froessel, J.
Defendant was indicted on three separate counts: (1) first degree rape (Penal Law, § 2010); (2) assault with intent to commit rape (Penal Law, § 242), and (3) endan gering the health and morals of a 15-year-old minor (Penal Law, § 483). He was acquitted of the first degree rape charge. The assault count was dismissed on consent at the close of the People's case. He was found guilty on the third count.
That third count charged defendant with causing and permitting said minor "to be placed in such a situation that her morals were likely to be impaired, in that said defendant did then and there perpetrate an act of sexual intercourse with said child" (emphasis supplied). The crime thus charged necessarily amounted to a misdemeanor rape since defendant was under 21 and the complainant under 18 years of age (Penal Law, § 2010 [last paragraph]). Were we to hold that no corroboration was necessary to support the conviction of the crime as charged in this indictment, then a prosecutor might easily circumvent the requirement of corroboration necessary for a conviction of misdemeanor rape simply by charging instead the impairment of the morals of a minor, as he did here. The law may not be so circumvented. Inasmuch as the jury was erroneously instructed that no corroboration was necessary, the judgment of conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.