Case Name: F. A. Glass v. Adoue & Lobit
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1905-04-09
Citations: 39 Tex. Civ. App. 21
Docket Number: 
Parties: F. A. Glass v. Adoue & Lobit.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Civil Appeals Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 21–23

Head Matter:
F. A. Glass v. Adoue & Lobit.
Decided April 9, 1905.
1. —Promissory Note—Time of Payment.
Where defendant sent to plaintiffs liis note in settlement in which no time of payment was specified, but stated in the accompanying letter that he would pay it as soon as able, the note, when accepted, formed with the statement in the letter a single transaction, and the obligation was to pay the amount when defendant become able to do so.
2. —Same—Limitation.
Plaintiffs’ action on the note was not barred by limitations where it was begun within two years after defendant became able to pay, although this was seventeen years after the date of the note,
ON REHEARING.
3.—Same—Ability to Pay.
Evidence considered and held insufficient to show that defendant had become able to pay the note.
Appeal from the County Court of Galveston. Tried below before Hon. Lewis Fisher.
This was an action by appellees, as plaintiffs, upon a promissory note. The suit was begun October 17, 1903, and the defense of limitations was interposed. The judgment was for plaintiffs, from which the defendant appealed.
John G. Walker, for appellant.
1. Where no day of payment is specified the note is payable on demand, and it is construed as if it contained these words on its face. Salinas v. Wright, 11 Texas, 575.
2. If the words “ivhen able” had been inserted in the instrument, limitations would have run from its date, as it would have been payable on demand or at once, no time for payment being specified, and the new promise would have no more vitality than the original one. Howard & Hume v. Windom, 86 Texas, 565.
Kleberg, Davidson & Neeihe, for appellees.
The court did not err in overruling defendant’s exception of the statute of limitation, because the petition alleges that the defendant agreed to pay the debt sued upon when he should be able to do so, and it alleged that not until within two years prior to the filing of plaintiff’s petition did he become able. The action could not have been commenced until he was able, and therefore it was not barred by limitation. Salinas v. Wright, 11 Texas, 571; Carlisle v. Hooks, 58 Texas, 421; Lange v. Caruthers, 70 Texas, 722.

Opinion:
JAMES, Chief Justice.
The case was tried by the judge, and this court must consider that he accepted the testimony, if any, which will support the judgment. The action was upon a note which read as follows:
"February 7, 1886.
"After date I promise to pay to the order of Adoue & Lobit three hundred and ninety-six and nineteen one-hundredths dollars, at their office in Galveston, Texas, value received. F. A. Glass."
It appears, from the testimony of Lobit, that Glass owed appellees money on a prior note, and sent the above in settlement of the old note. When received appellees returned it to him, saying that they could not accept it in that shape—asked him to fill it out (meaning the blank), and wanted to know when he would pay it. He returned it, and said he could not tell when he would be able to pay it, and asked appellees to hold it, and that he would pay it as soon as he was able. This was by letter. Lobit testified that the letter, with other letters of that date, had been lost in the storm at Galveston.
In our opinion, this testimony would show that the note was not accepted by appellees when first sent, and ivas not accepted, nor finally delivered to them, until it was returned with the letter, whereby appellant fixed the time of payment at the time when he should become able to pay it. The note and letter formed a single transaction, hence all contentions founded upon the theory that they constituted separate transactions are not well taken. The obligation evidenced by the two writings was one to pay the amount called for in the note when plaintiff should become able to do so.
There was evidence sufficient to warrant the finding that appellant did not become able to pay the note until about a year before the trial.
The first assignment of error will not be considered because not a proper one under the rules.
The second assignment relates to a matter that is immaterial.
Affirmed.