Case Name: POCIOPA v. OLSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1968-09-24
Citations: 13 Mich. App. 324
Docket Number: Docket No. 2,002
Parties: POCIOPA v. OLSON.
Judges: McGregor, J., concurred with J. H. Gillis, J.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 13
Pages: 324–333

Head Matter:
POCIOPA v. OLSON.
Opinion op the Court.
1. Judgment — Fraud—Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud — Belief.
A court may grant relief from a judgment procured by intrinsic fraud upon a timely application for a rehearing or to vacate or to set aside the judgment, filed directly in the same proceeding from whieh relief was sought, but equitable relief sought in a separate proceeding can only be obtained if the fraud is extrinsic (G-CB 1963, 528).
2. New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Court Bule.
Newly discovered evidence can only be the basis for a new trial if the evidence itself and not merely its materiality is newly discovered, the evidence is not merely cumulative, the evidence is such that a different result is probable on a retrial of the cause, and it is such that the party offering it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered it prior to trial (GCE 1963, 527.1[6] ).
3. Same — Newly Discovered Evidence.
Newly discovered evidence that is to be used merely to impeach is not grounds for a new trial.
4. Same — Newly Discovered Evidence.
Denial by trial court of plaintiff’s motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence held, proper where the new evidence was solely to impeach a witness who testified he was riding in the automobile whieh was in collision with plaintiff, where it was cumulative as to matters already adduced by cross-examination at trial, where the witnesses to impeach were available to plaintiff before trial and where with due diligence the newly discovered evidence could have been produced at trial.
Deferences for Points in Headnotes
[1] 30A Am Jur, Judgments § 784 et seq.
[2-6] 39 Am Jur, New Trial § 156 et seq.
Dissenting Opinion,
Fitzgerald, P. J.
5. New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Court Bule.
A party moving for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must show that such evidence could not have been produced at the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence (60S 1963, 627.1).
6. Same — Newly Discovered Evidence — Intrinsic Fraud.
Denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence was error where certain fact findings were made by the trial court under a misinterpretation of present law and where new evidence introduced by both parties was so contradictory and confusing that the ends of justice would best be served by giving both parties an opportunity to present all of their evidence to a jury.
Appeal from Iron, Brown (Ernest W.), J.
Submitted Division 3 May 7, 1968, at Marquette.
Docket No. 2,002.)
Decided September 24, 1968.
Leave to appeal denied by Supreme Court January 21, 1969. 381 Mich 797.
Complaint by Daniel Pociopa, by Ms next friend Dorothy Pociopa, and derivative action by Dorothy Pociopa, against Eino Olson and Willard Andrew Olson for automobile negligence. Verdict and judgment for defendants. Plaintiff moved for new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence. Motion denied. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Wisti, Jaashelainen & Schroch, for plaintiff.
Humphrey £ Weis, for defendants.

Opinion:
J. H. G-illis, J.
Plaintiffs sought recovery for damages sustained when Daniel Pociopa was struck by an automobile driven by defendant Willard Olson and owned by defendant Eino Olson. Daniel Poci opa was operating a motorbike on US Highway 2 at the time of the accident; and, along with a companion cyclist, Robert Weeks, was riding in the right hand lane or the right side or shoulder of the highway. Defendants' theory is that Daniel made an unexpected and sudden left turn into the path of defendants' automobile, without due diligence and without proper observation.
Plaintiff cyclist and defendant driver were both 15 years old at the time of the accident. Testimony as to the location of plaintiff's motorbike just before making the turn was a matter of sharp controversy at trial. The disputed testimony was resolved by the jury in favor of defendants and a judgment of no cause of action was entered upon the verdict of the jury.
A key defense witness at trial was Prank Marinoff who was purportedly, and by his own testimony, a passenger in defendants' automobile at the time, and who testified that Daniel was riding on the right shoulder and turned in front of defendants' automobile.
Subsequent to the jury verdict plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The evidence was testimony of certain witnesses to the accident who would testify that Marinoff was not present in the automobile at the time of the accident. The trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion pursuant to GCR 1963, 527.3, at which plaintiffs' witnesses testified to their observations at the time. The trial judge denied the motion and assigned as his reason therefor (GCR 1963, 527.7) that "intrinsic fraud or perjury is not the basis for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence."
This is not a correct statement of the law as to relief from a judgment in the pending action. See the author's comments to GCR 1963, 528, at 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed) pp 184, 185. However, under the facts presented by the record, the motion for new trial was properly denied, albeit for the wrong reason, and the decision of the trial judge is affirmed.
Grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are found in GCR 1963, 527.1(6). The standard for application of this rule has been stated in the committee comment to rule 527 and in Reardon v. Buck (1952), 335 Mich 318, 321, 322, as:
"The trial judge correctly applied the rule stated in Canfield v. City of Jackson, 112 Mich 120, which is as follows: 'To entitle one to a new trial upon this ground it should be shown: First, that the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered ; second, that the evidence is not cumulative merely; third, that it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; fourth, that the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial.'
"The granting of a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, with which we will not interfere, unless there has been a palpable abuse of that discretion. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Genesee Circuit Judge (1891), 89 Mich 549. See also, authorities cited in Wilson v. Johnson (1917), 195 Mich 94, 101."
To like effect is the recent decision of this Court in Graham v. Inskeep (1967), 5 Mich App 514, 523, in which we stated that newly discovered evidence is not grounds for a new trial where it is merely to impeach.
In the present ease, not only is the newly brought evidence solely to impeach, but it is cumulative as to matters already adduced by cross-examination at trial. Moreover, the hearing indicates that these witnesses were known to plaintiffs at trial, that their testimony was available all along, and that with due diligence the so-called newly discovered evidence could have been produced at tidal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Graham v. Inskeep, supra; Township of Commerce v. Rayberg (1967), 5 Mich App 554.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
McGregor, J., concurred with J. H. Gillis, J.