Case Name: Vélez v. Camacho et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
Jurisdiction: Puerto Rico
Decision Date: 1905-02-14
Citations: 8 P.R. 35
Docket Number: No. 48
Parties: Vélez v. Camacho et al.
Judges: Chief Justice Quiñones and Justice Wolf concurred.
Reporter: Puerto Rico Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 35–62

Head Matter:
Vélez v. Camacho et al.
Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.
No. 48.
Decided February 14, 1905.
Contracts — Purchase and Sale — Consent as to’Price and as to the Thing Purchased and Sold — Execution oe Public Instrument. — A contract of purchase and sale, being consensual, is perfected by the consent of the parties as to the price and as to the thing purchased and sold, although the thing sold may not have been delivered, and the legal provisions in regard to the execution of public instruments for the purposes of conveying the ownership of real property do not change the nature of such contract, nor do they establish any essential condition therefor, but only provide a form in the interest of the public independently of the will of the contracting parties, who are bound to execute the public instrument.
Public Instruments: — Judicial Proceeding. — Judicial proceedings possess the character of public instruments.
Cautionary Notice — Requisite in Order That Same May Have Legal Effect— Preferred Rights — Third Person. — In order that a cautionary notice may have legal force and effect it is a necessary condition that the property with respect to which the same is constituted shall not belong to a third person, but the debtor himself, in order that the right thereby secured may have preference as against other credits created subsequently to the entry of such notice.
Id. — Effects of Entry — Subsequent Credits. — A cautionary notice of attachment directed by judicial order to be entered, and the purpose of which is Only to guarantee the outcome of the proceedings, does not create or establish any right whatever, nor does it alter the nature of obligations, nor can it convert into a real or mortgage action one which does not possess that character, nor does it produce any effect other than to give to the creditor obtaining it, only as to the properties entered, preference over other credits against the said debtor created subsequently to the entry of the cautionary notice.
Id. — Third Persons — Record—Personal Credit. — Eor the purposes of the Mort- ° gage Law, in order to determine whether a party possesses the character of a third person, reference must be had to the records and entries, and the latter must be considered in relation to the credits created subsequently to the personal credit guaranteed by the first entry made in the registry.
Id. — Notice of Attachment.' — Notices of attachment levied on property of the debtor cannot prejudice the right of ownership which a third person may have acquired in the same property prior to the entry of such notice by virtue of a contract of purchase and sale in accordance with law, although on the date the notice was entered the formality of reducing the said contract to writing in a public instrument may not have been complied with.
Id. — The provisions of article 44 of the Mortgage Law are in perfect harmony with subdivision 1 of article 71 of the same legal authority.
Id. — Complaint and Intervention of Ownership — Rights of ti-ie Parties— Purchase and Sale — Delivery of Real Property.' — The question to be discussed and decided in an action in intervention of ownership is merely to determine the rights which the parties may have in the real estate in litigation, just as they appear from the record, and it is immaterial whether the purchaser or plaintiff in intervention acquired a real right in the property by reason of the fact that it was not delivered to him.
Id. — Consummation of Contract of Purchase and Sale. — Upon the perfection of a contract of purchase and sale by the agreement of the parties as to the thing sold and the price thereof, the vendor is bound to comply therewith, and the purchaser has indisputable right to enjoy the ownership of the real estate and to recover the possession thereof. And in this respect it is not a violation of section 1095 of the Civil Code to deny the legal effect, as against the rights of such purchaser, of a cautionary notice entered subsequently to the consummation of the contract.
Id. — Personal Action — Execution of Public Instrument. — An action to compel a party to execute a public instrument is personal in its nature, and the entry of the complaint in the registry of property will have no legal effect whatever, because it does not come within any of the cases provided for by article 44 of the Mortgage Laiv.
Costs. — Costs must be taxed against the party whose demands have been in all things dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of Maya-güez by Tomás Vélez y Vélez, a landowner, residing in Cabo Rojo, as plaintiff, and Bernardo Camacho, a resident of Maya-güez, and Sergio Berenguer y Acosta, a manufacturer, in default, as defendants, in the matter of a complaint in intervention of ownership, which case is pending before ns by virtue of an appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the said district court, which reads as follows:
“In the city of Mayagüez, the 1st day of April, 1903. The oral and public hearing was had in this civil action, prosecuted by Tomás Vélez y Vélez, a landowner, resident of Cabo Rojo, represented by his counsel José de Diego, as plaintiff, and Bernardo Camacho, a resident of this city, represented by his counsel, Francisco Pelegri, and Sergio Berenguer y Acosta, a manufacturer, residing in Cabo Rojo, in default in these proceedings, as defendants, in the matter of a complaint in intervention of ownership of a parcel of land.
“On September 8, 1901, Tomás Vélez y Vélez purchased of Sergio Berenguer y Acosta, for the sum of 200 pesos gold, 100 cuerdas of land situated in the barrio of Boquerón, in said municipal district, bounded on the north by the saltpetre beds belonging to Alberto del Toro, on the east by the property belonging to the estate of Federico Vélez, on the south by lands belonging to Rafael Blanes, and on the west by land belonging to Carlos Jofre y Palmer; and as Berenguer did not execute the proper instrument in his favor, Vélez brought an action against him to compel him to do so, on January 15, 1902, in the court of Cabo Rojo. The suit was prosecuted and the municipal court rendered judgment on February 1 of the same year, adjudging the defendant to execute, within the term fixed, the public instrument relating to the contract of purchase and sale entered into between them, upon the delivery by the plaintiff of the 100 pesos gold which he had in his possession as the remainder of the 200 pesos of the price of the sale of the real property. This judgment was affirmed with costs by this district court on May 3d of that year.
“Don Bernardo Camacho, in proceeding preliminary to execution against Sergio Berenguer, made application for a provisional attachment upon the 100 cuerdas of land situated in the barrio of Boquerón belonging to his debtor, Berenguer, requesting that a cautionary notice of the attachment be entered in the Registry of Property of San Ger-mán. This was done on March 14 of last year.
“On August 18, 1902, the municipal judge of Cabo Rojo, Tomás M. Marini y Ramirez, in the default of Sergio Berenguer y Acosta, sold the property in question to Tomás Yélez y Yélez for the price of $200, of which sum it appeared from the record of the oral trial that Mr. Berenguer had received $100, and the purchaser deposited the remaining $100 with the judge, all this being done in compliance with the judgments rendered by the courts.
“Based upon the foregoing, Tomás Yélez y Yélez, citing sections 348, 349, 353 et seq., 1450 and 1251 of the Civil Code; the opinions of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 13, 1880, and March 11, 1884; articles 920, and the concordant ones, 1533 and 1541 of the Law of Civil Procedure; and Rule 63 of General Order No. 118, series of 1899, prayed that, after the proper proceedings, the complaint in intervention of ownership be definitely admitted, and that, consequently, it be held that the property and the fruits gathered and growing thereon belong to the complainant, and must be held subject to his free disposal, the attachment referred to being dissolved, and that an ordei’ issue to cancel the corresponding notice in the registry of property.
“Bernardo Camacho prayed that the complaint in intervention be dismissed and that judgment be rendered in his favor, and that the suspension of the judicial compulsory proceedings against Sergio Berenguer be raised, with costs against the plaintiff in intervention, Tomás Yélez y Yélez, and against Sergio Berenguer if he should contest the answer. In support of his petition he alleged that on March 15, 1901, Sergio Berenguer had executed in favor of Bernardo Camacho a private document, in which he acknowledged an indebtedness to him in the sum of $500, promising to return it to him on August 1st of the same year, which promise he did not keep, but kept dealing ’with Tomás Yélez y Yélez, endeavoring to sell him an estate of 100 cuerdas, the only real property which he possessed, and by the sale of which he would have remained insolvent, to the prejudice of his creditor, Bernardo Camacho; but Berenguer, fearing, perhaps, the liabilities he might incur, did not execute a deed of sale to the 10Ó cuerdas of land in favor of. Tomás Yélez y Yélez, permitting the latter to bring an action against him, and he thus assisted to bring about the rendition of a judgment by the court requiring him to execute a deed of sale for said land, which appears to have been executed by order of the court on August 18 last. When Bernardo Camacho heard of the negotiations between Yélez and Berenguer he determined to take steps to recover his claim through judicial proceedings, and to this end he instituted proceedings to obtain execution. Upon execution issuing, an attachment was levied on his petition on the 100 cuerdas of land situated in the barrio of Boquerón, in the municipal district of Cabo Rojo, which belonged to his debtor, Berenguer. On March 14 of this year notice was entered in the Registry of Property of San Germán of the attachment levied on said 100 cuerdas of land belonging to Sergio Berenguer, which were recorded in his name in the registry; and five months later, that is to say, on August 22 last, the deed relating to said 100 cuerdas of land was recorded in favor of Tomás Vélez, without prejudice to the aforesaid cautionary notice. The petitioner cited in support of his rights the second subdivision of article 42 of the Mortgage Law, sections 23, 25 and 43 of the same law, articles 606 and 1280 of the former Civil Code, and, in addition, article 71 of the said Mortgage Law.
“A day having been set for the hearing, after Sergio Berenguer had been declared in default, of which he was personally notified, the parties introduced such evidence as they deemed proper, which was admitted by the court.
‘ ‘ The following documentary evidence was introduced in these, proceedings : A certified copy of the judgment rendered by the Municipal Court of Cabo Rojo on February 1 of last year; a certificate issued by the Registrar of Property of San Germán embodying a copy of the notice of attachment requested by Bernardo Camacho, and of the record in favor of Tomás Vélez y Vélez of the deed of sale executed to him by the municipal judge of said town in the default of Sergio Berenguer y Acosta. Upon the date set for the oral trial, counsel for the parties presented their arguments, there being subsequently made a part of the record, in furtherance of justice, a certified copy of the judgment rendered by this court in the proceedings instituted by Tomás Vélez y Vélez against Sergio Berenguer y Acosta to compel the execution of a public instrument, a majority judgment being thereupon rendered by the court.
“In these proceedings all the provisions of the law have been complied with.
“The presiding judge, Arturo Aponte Rodriguez, delivered the opinion of the court.
“Cautionary notices being certain entries made in the registry of property to secure a right provisionally in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by article 42 of the Mortgage Law, and articles 91 and 92 of the Regulations for its execution, it is evident that if these cases comprise the case of a person who has, in accordance with law, obtained an order of attachment in his favor which has been levied on real property belonging to his debtor, it is naturally and logically to be assumed that to produce any legal effect it is necessary that the property against which the notice is made shall not belong to a third person, in which capacity Tomás Yélez y Yélez stands with respect to Sergio Berenguer and Bernardo Camacho; but it must belong to the debtor himself, in order that it may then be given preference over other credits contracted subsequently to said notice.
“Bernado Camacho requested that a provisional attachment issue against property belonging to Sergio Berenguer, a record being made of the one levied on 100 cuerdas of land on March 14 of last year, at which time this land had already been sold by Sergio Berenguer to Tomás Yélez. This land has been the subject of judicial proceedings in two instances, the vendor being in both cases adjudged to execute the deed of sale in favor of the purchaser, who in this case is the plaintiff in intervention. It cannot be alleged that the instrument was an essential requisite to the contract, because it is well known that a contract of purchase and sale, being consensual, it is perfected by the agreement of the parties as to the price and thing, and the legal provisions which refer to the execution of public instruments for the transfer of the ownership of real property do not vary the nature of such contract, nor do they establish an essential condition thereof, but merely a form in the interest of the public, independent of the will of the contracting parties, who consequently become mutually bound to participate in the execution of the public instrument, according to an opinion of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 24, 1894; this apart from the fact that the action of Tomás Yélez against Sergio Berenguer was instituted prior to the attachment, and the municipal judge also rendered prior to such date the judgment directing the execution of the instrument, which judgment did not become final, owing to the appeal taken to this court, which affirmed that of the lower court. The records of these cases have the character of public documents, according to section 1216 of the former Civil Code, in relation to subdivision 7 of section 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
“According to opinions of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico of November 1, 1892, and February 26 of this year, a cautionary notice of attachment, made by judicial order and directed solely to guarantee the results of an action, does not create or declare any right whatsoever, nor does it alter the nature of obligations, nor can it convert an action not partaking of those characteristics into a real and mortgage action, nor does it produce any other effect than that' of making the creditor a preferred one as to the property which is the subject of the notice only, and with regard to those having other claims against the creditor of a date subsequent to the notice, which doctrine is based on a correct interpretation of article 44 of the Mortgage Law.
“The credit of Bernardo Camacho being a personal one, and as he can have preference only over the other creditors of Sergio Beren-guer whose claims are subsequent to the date of the record he obtained, it is evident that Tomás Vélez y Vélez is not in such a position, as he acquired the land attached by Camacho by purchase prior thereto, the judge having done nothing more than comply with the regular formality of executing the instrument which the vendor did not wish to execute of his own free will, in accordance with the consensual contract entered into, of which this deed was a consequence.
“Bernardo Camacho, relying on the rights which a cautionary notice gives him, maintains in his argument the principle that he is a third person with respect to Tomás Vélez and Sergio Berenguer, when, according to the Mortgage Law the theory of a third person refers to records and notices, the latter with relation to credits subsequent to the first personal credit noted, according to articles 23, 25 and 44 of the Mortgage Law.
“Costs shall always be taxed against the party whose claims have been in all things denied, according to Rule 63 of General Order No. 118, series of 1899.
“The complaint in intervention of.ownership filed by Tomás Vélez against Bernardo Camacho and Sergio Berenguer is sustained, and we direct that the attachment levied on the 100 cuerdas of land on the application of Bernardo Camacho be dissolved, placing the said'land at the free disposal of Tomás Vélez y Vélez, and that the cautionary notice be cancelled, the proper order to this effect being issued to the Registrar of Property of San Germán, with the costs against the defendants. Let the defendant in default, Sergio Berenguer, be notified in legal form.
“We so pronounce, order and sign, by this our final judgment. Interlineations: Tomás.— de.— of the subsequent credits.— Valid.— Arturo Aponte, J. A. Erwin, R. Roura. ”
From, the foregoing judgment counsel for Bernardo Camacho took an appeal, which was allowed both for review and .stay of proceedings, and upon the record being sent up to this Supreme Court, the parties were duly cited, counsel for the appellant, Emigdio S. Ginorio, alone entering an appearance. The appeal was perfected and a day set for the hearing which was held without the attendance of the parties.
Mr. Emigdio S. Ginorio, for appellant.
The respondent did not appear.

Opinion:
Me. Justice Figueeas,
after stating the foregoing facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in the judgment appealed from are accepted.
The effects of the notice of attachment made at the instance of Bernardo Camacho being properly set forth in the third conclusion of law contained in the judgment appealed from, it cannot affect the right of ownership which Tomás Vélez y Vélez acquired in the property the subject of the complaint in intervention, almost sis months before, by virtue of the contract of purchase and sale; this doctrine is furthermore in harmony with the principle that "the first in time is the first in law."
Article 44 of the Mortgage Law does not conflict with the first paragraph of article 71 of said law, nor is its scope in the specific case to which it is to he applied unknown; but the moment therefor has not arrived, nor are the other paragraphs to be considered, as they refer to a method of procedure absolutely foreign to the question in controversy.
Upon an examination: of the contract of purchase and sale executed on September 18, 1901, it is not possible to invoke a consideration of section 1095 of the Civil Code in order to deduce that the purchaser and plaintiff in intervention Vélez did not then acquire the property right in the estate because it was not delivered to him, for apart from the fact that this matter has not been discussed in the proceedings, nor been the subject of evidence, the question to be considered and decided here is confined solely and exclusively to the rights iu the estate in-litigation of the parties to these proceedings, as they appear from the record.
This being the ease, it must he agreed that the sale made by Sergio Berengner to Tomás Vélez was perfected and is binding upon both, because they had agreed on the thing the subject of the contract and on the price, even though such thing had not been delivered, as established by section 1450 of the Civil Code.
Camacho had only a personal right of action against his debtor Berengner, and not having acquired any real right of action by the notice of the attachment, other than that mentioned in article 44 of the Mortgage Law, neither he nor the vendor can effectively deny the right of the purchaser to enjoy the ownership of the estate, and the right to recover it, which is the object sought by this intervention.
Considering the question at issue in this light, section 1095 of the Civil Code hereinbefore cited, is not violated, because here we have seen that the vendor of the thing became bound under the contract of purchase and sale, and the creditor who had the notice of attachment made was not, nor- could he have been, in possession thereof, to plead in his favor any property right whatsoever.
Tomás Vélez y Vélez would not have improved his position had he had a cautionary notice made of his action to compel Berengner to execute the deed of sale, because he was then exercising a personal right of action, and such a notice, even if made could not have had any effect by reason of the fact that it is not included in any of the cases set forth in article 42 of the Mortgage Law.
'The costs should be taxed against the defendants.
In view of the legal provisions cited in the judgment appealed from and in this opinion and in the decisions of the Supreme Court and those -of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 12, 1895, February 19 and May 12, 1886, we adjudge that we should affirm, and we do affirm, the judgment ren dered by the Mayagüez court on April 1, 1903, and we tax • the costs against the defendants.
Chief Justice Quiñones and Justice Wolf concurred.
Justices Hernandez and MacLeary dissented.
Me. Justice Hernández.