Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANCIS RAYMOND GROVES, Appellant
Court: District Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1935-10-02
Citations: 9 Cal. App. 2d 317
Docket Number: Crim. No. 2704
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANCIS RAYMOND GROVES, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Second Series
Volume: 9
Pages: 317–324

Head Matter:
[Crim. No. 2704.
Second Appellate District, Division Two.
October 2, 1935.]
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANCIS RAYMOND GROVES, Appellant.
Richard H. Cantillon for Appellant.
U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

Opinion:
CRAIL, P. J.
The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife and entered a plea of "Not guilty" and "Not guilty by reason of insanity". On the plea of "Not guilty" he was tried by a jury which returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with the recommendation of life imprisonment, and subsequently on the plea of "Not guilty by reason of insanity" the same jury returned a finding that the appellant was sane at the time the crime was committed. Upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial, the trial court reduced the offense to murder in the second degree. This appeal is from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying the motion for a new trial. It was the theory of the defendant on his defense of "Not guilty" that the shooting was accidental, but unfortunately for this theory the deceased was shot not once but twice, and a moment after the shooting the defendant was found unconscious lying face down across the lap of the deceased with a bullet wound in the mastoid bone of his head. No powder burns were found around the wounds of the deceased. Threatening remarks had been made previously by defendant to deceased. The jury did not be lleve defendant's story that the shooting of the deceased was unintentional and a result of accident or misfortune.
The primary point upon which the defendant relies and the one upon which he places the greatest emphasis is of the evidence under the plea of "Not guilty". The briefs are voluminous and the record is long, and we have given them careful consideration. It is sufficient to say with regard to this contention that there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict. It would serve no useful purpose to set out the facts and circumstances in evidence upon which this statement is based. (Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 634 [48 Pac. (2d) 104].)
The defendant contends that the court erred in to give two instructions on the subject of accidental death which were offered by the defendant, and contends also that no instructions were given to the jury on the contained in them. In this the appellant is in error. Indeed, the court carefully and adequately instructed the jury upon every theory advanced by the defendant in the trial. The defendant cannot complain merely because the law was not given to the jury in the exact phraseology which he
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony of a physician and in admitting other testimony. Assuming that these two rulings were erroneous, which we do not find, nevertheless they are óf small consequence in the extended trial and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from these rulings such as would entitle defendant to a new trial under section 4%, article YI, of the Constitution.
The defendant next contends that an instruction given by the court in the trial of the insanity issue on the subject of direct and circumstantial evidence was erroneous. The first part of the first sentence in the instruction was somewhat clumsy in the use of the phrase "if you are satisfied by a preponderance that defendant is either sane or that he is insane". However, the instruction was not on that subject, but upon the familiar rule that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence in the degree of proof required. The instruction was not a formula instruction. The correct law as to preponderance of evi dence was fully and accurately stated elsewhere and obviously the phrase did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The defendant also complains because other instructions offered by the defendant were refused. These instructions were in each instance either fully covered by other instructions or were not correct statements of the law.
The defendant finally contends that the court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the imposition of sentence on the ground that sections 1016 and 1026 of the Penal Code, which governed the conduct of the trial, were repugnant to and in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution in that they denied to the defendant due process of law and equal protection under the law. The Supreme Court has already decided this question adversely to appellant's contention. (People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [268 Pac. 909, 270 Pac. 1117].)
Judgment and order affirmed.
Wood, J., and McComb, J., pro tem., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on October 17, 1935, and the following opinion then rendered thereon-: