Case Name: OFFICE OF the PUBLIC DEFENDER, et al. v. STATE of Maryland
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2010-04-16
Citations: 413 Md. 411
Docket Number: No. 9
Parties: OFFICE OF the PUBLIC DEFENDER, et al. v. STATE of Maryland.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 413
Pages: 411–474

Head Matter:
993 A.2d 55
OFFICE OF the PUBLIC DEFENDER, et al. v. STATE of Maryland.
No. 9
Sept.Term, 2009.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
April 16, 2010.
Peter F. Rose. Gen. Counsel (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Appellants.
Andrew H. Baida (Caroline L. Hecker of Rosenberg, Martin, Greenberg, LLP, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Appellees.
ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

Opinion:
HARRELL, J.
In the present case, we must determine whether a Maryland trial court possesses the authority, statutory or otherwise, to appoint an attorney from a local Office of the State Public Defender ("OPD") to represent a criminal defendant who qualifies for public representation based on indigency, as defined by the Maryland Code, upon the court's finding that the local OPD denied previously and erroneously representation to the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we answer that question in the affirmative. As such, we shall hold that the Circuit Court for Cecil County did not exceed its authority when it appointed John K. Northrop ("Northrop"), the Deputy District Public Defender for Cecil County, or a member of his office or a panel attorney, to represent Jason Flynn Stinnett ("Stinnett"), a criminal defendant whom the Circuit Court found qualified as indigent under the Maryland Code, but to whom representation had been denied previously and wrongfully by the local OPD. Despite our holding, we shall reverse the Circuit Court's judgment of contempt against Northrop, issued in response to his refusal (on orders from his superiors) to appear in court on Stinnett's behalf in accordance with the order of appointment, because the Circuit Court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Maryland Rules governing contempt judgments.
FACTS
Jason Flynn Stinnett was indicted by a grand jury in Cecil County on multiple burglary charges and other related offenses. Stinnett applied timely for public legal representation from the local OPD. On 19 March 2008, the local OPD determined that Stinnett failed to meet the requirements for its services because his income exceeded 110% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines, the limit to qualify for representation by the OPD according to COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2). Thus, the local OPD informed Stinnett, by letter dated 19 March 2008, that, because his income exceeded the maximum net income level, he did not qualify for representation by that agency.
On 7 April 2008, Stinnett appeared, unrepresented by counsel, at a status hearing before the Circuit Court and requested that an attorney be appointed for him because he could not afford to retain private counsel and the local OPD had denied representation. Upon Stinnett's request, the trial judge proceeded (at some length) to describe his perception of the relative roles of the local OPD and the court in providing counsel for indigent defendants, and the authority of the court to appoint counsel on an indigent defendant's behalf where the local OPD denies representation:
Our Chief Administrative Judge here . has indicated that he has researched this matter and has determined that case law does not seem to indicate that we cannot appoint the Public Defender's ourselves and has ask (sic) us, other judges, from now on that if we do find indigency to actually appoint the Public Defender. He said he's reviewed the cases and there is some dicta about their being Executive Agency, but he does not believe that's controlling because the issues before the Appellate Court, at that time, were not those that dealt with the authority of the Court to appoint the Public Defender's Office to represent somebody. I just checked with . the Acting Administrative Judge, and he says exactly the same thing. That, if we do find a defendant indigent, we are to appoint the Public Defender's Office itself to represent the defendant. And the Court has done a lot of investigation on this, previously, personally talked with Judge Bell, this Court had ordered . or requested the Court Clerks to research this issue about 5 years ago and we had researched 42 other states, we hadn't quite got all 50, and every single one, the Court always has the authority, at least as a last resort to appoint the Public Defender. In speaking with Judge Bell, Judge Bell told me, personally, on the telephone that he had- researched all 50 states and all 50 . Maryland would be the only one that, it didn't seem to him, that we had a direct authority to appoint the Public Defender. But, he didn't say that prohibited it, either.
Anyway, I'm following the Administrative Judges (sic) and the Acting Administrative Judges (sic) decisions that we are to appoint the Public Defender if we do find indigency.
#
The next thing, under Article 27A, Section 7,[ 1 it's the Public Defender article. It talks about the duty of the Public Defender's Office. Um . to provide representation and it follows the case, I believe, of State v. Baldwin,[ ] if I'm remembering this correctly.
Anyway, as a result of the case, the case spelled out what the Public Defender's Office has to do in determining whether a defendant qualifies for the Public Defender's services. It also states, basically, that the Court has to do the same thing when it makes it's (sic) own determination. Although, it does make a separate, independent determination. And the Court certainly will do that. But what happened after Article 27A, Section 1 et sec. (sic) was passed, evidently the Public Defender's Office then went and got a regulation passed which was actually contrary to the . Art. 27A, Sec. 1 and thereafter. In that it used a formula which is not at all what Baldwin v. State says or State v. Baldwin. You have to figure each case separately and then there is supposedly the District Public Defender then can review some . a determination made by the local Public Defender's Office, but that certainly is not presented to any defendant and the determination factor is 110% of the Federal Poverty guidelines for Circuit Court cases. There's absolutely nothing in the underlying case which provided for those factors to be used.
Following this explication, the court proceeded to conduct an indigency hearing, examining the factors to be considered in determining indigency contained in Maryland Code, Article 27A, § 7; COMAR 14.06.03.05A; and Baldwin; rather than applying the maximum income level rule contained in COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2), the standard used by the local OPD with regard to Stinnett's application. In doing so, the Circuit Court maintained that, under Baldwin, any determination of indigency, whether conducted by the local OPD or a trial court, must take into account the statutory indigency factors contained in Art. 27A, § 7, and COMAR 14.06.03.05A, and that the local OPD acted contrary to the mandates of Baldwin when it considered solely whether Stinnett's net annual income exceeded 110% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines.
Turning to examine the specifics of Stinnett's financial situation, in response to the court's questioning, Stinnett testified that: (1) he was employed with Mid-Atlantic Electrical Contractors, a job which paid him $19 per hour (resulting in a net take-home income of approximately $2123 per month), without any opportunity for overtime; (2) he had approximately $400 in a bank account and no other assets that could be liquidated to pay for an attorney; (3) at the time of the hearing, he resided in a halfway house, paying $650 per month in boarding costs and $65 per month for food; (4) he had been ordered by the Circuit Court for Harford County to pay $331 per month in restitution arising from a prior robbery conviction; (5) he paid the entirety of his daughter's private school tuition, at a cost of $440 per month; (6) he spent approximately $108 per month to purchase lunch; and, (7) he paid $520 per month for transportation operating costs to and from work in a vehicle loaned to him by his father. In addition, based on standard child support calculations, the Circuit Court determined that Stinnett's expenses relating to the shared custody of his daughter amounted to $420 per month.
Totaling Stinnett's income and expenses, each aspect of which it found to be "fair and reasonable," the Circuit Court determined that Stinnett had, in fact, no net income; Stinnett's net income of $2123 per month fell well below the $2534 in expenses he incurred each month. In addition, the Circuit Court found that the reasonable cost for a private attorney to represent Stinnett would be between $3000 and $5000. On this basis, the judge determined that, despite the local OPD's conclusion to the contrary, Stinnett, in fact, was indigent under the factors enumerated in Art. 27A, § 7, and COMAR 14.06.03.05A, as explicated in Baldwin, and was entitled to the appointment of an attorney at the State's expense. Accord ingly, the Circuit Court issued an order naming Northrop, the Deputy District Public Defender for Cecil County, or another qualified attorney from the local OPD or its list of panel attorneys, to represent Stinnett. Northrop filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing him counsel for Stinnett, but did not seek to stay its effect pending the outcome of the appeal.
At a later hearing in Stinnett's case, held on 8 August 2008, Northrop did not appear. As a result, the trial judge found him in direct contempt of court and fined him $10.00. Subsequent to the contempt finding against Northrop, Stinnett entered a guilty plea, which the Circuit Court accepted, and was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, suspended, and two years unsupervised probation. Stinnett did not appeal the judgment entered against him. On the other hand, Northrop noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the 8 August 2008 order finding him in direct contempt. He also filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, in which he raised two questions:
(1) Did the trial court err in ordering Public Defender staff attorney/s to represent a criminal defendant in a criminal case after the Public Defender declined to provide representation in the case; and
(2) Did the trial court err in finding Mr. Northrop in contempt?
We granted Northrop's petition for writ of certiorari, 407 Md. 275, 964 A.2d 675 (2009), prior to further proceedings in the intermediate appellate court.
MOOTNESS
As a threshold matter, the State contends that the present case is moot, noting that Stinnett was convicted and sentenced, but did not appeal. We disagree.
Ordinarily, in order for a case to be heard and an appellate court to provide a remedy, there must be an existing controversy. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219, 935 A.2d 731, 736 (2007); Dep't of Human Res., Child Care Admin. v. Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143, 919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007); Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979). If no existing controversy is present, the case is moot and an appellate court ordinarily will not consider the case on its merits. Suter, 402 Md. at 219-20, 935 A.2d at 736; Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221; State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (1989); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562, 510 A.2d 562, 565 (1986); State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 506-07, 295 A.2d 231, 235 (1972).
Although it is true, as the State contends, that the criminal proceedings against Stinnett (which, in turn, led to the contempt finding against Northrop) have concluded with a final judgment from which no appeal has been taken, the issue at the center of the present appeal does not concern the merits of Stinnett's case, i.e., the adequacy of his guilty plea or the propriety of the sentence he received. Rather, this case presents the question of whether a circuit court possesses the authority to appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent an indigent criminal defendant, where the circuit court determines the local OPD denied erroneously representation. When Northrop was held in contempt for refusing to comply with the Circuit Court's order appointing him counsel for Stinnett, an entirely new controversy, separate from Stinnett's case, arose. That it arose out of the underlying criminal prosecution of Stinnett, which has concluded, does not ameliorate, in any way, the jeopardy in which the order placed Northrop. Northrop's timely appeal of the contempt judgment against him entitles him to adjudication of the propriety of both the order appointing him to represent Stinnett and the order holding him in contempt. As such, because the present appeal presents an existing controversy which has yet to be resolved, it is not moot.
In addition, even where a case may be moot technically, there exist a number of exceptions to the general rule that the appeal must be dismissed. For example, where a case, while technically moot, presents a recurring matter of public concern which, unless decided, will continue to evade review, we nonetheless have considered the case on its merits. In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 665-66, 967 A.2d 776, 780-81 (2009); Suter, 402 Md. at 220, 935 A.2d at 736; Arrington v. Dep't of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 91-92, 935 A.2d 432, 439-40 (2007); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996); Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. at 328, 407 A.2d at 752; Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 381-82 (1954). It is clear that the question of a trial court's authority to appoint counsel, including an attorney from the local OPD, for an indigent individual, and the relation of that authority to OPD's power to determine eligibility for representation by its attorneys in the first instance, are matters of public concern. As noted by the Circuit Court, these questions are impacting presently numer ous criminal proceedings in Cecil County. Unless addressed and decided on appeal, the questions at issue likely will recur, in Cecil County and in other counties within Maryland. Accordingly, even if the case was moot technically, we nevertheless would consider the issues raised in the present appeal as matters of public concern likely to evade review.
THE APPOINTMENT OF NORTHROP
At the outset, it is clear to this Court, as it was to the Circuit Court in the proceedings below, that the local OPD denied erroneously representation to Stinnett. As noted swpra, Article 27A, § 7, entitled "Determination of eligibility for services; investigation of financial status of defendant; recovery of expenses," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Determination of eligibility for services.—Eligibility for the services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of the need of the person seeking legal representation. Need shall be measured according to the financial ability of the person to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. Such ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on the nature, extent and liquidity of assets; the disposable net income of the defendant; the nature of the offense; the effort and skill required to gather pertinent information; the length and complexity of the proceedings; and any other foreseeable expenses.
Art. 27A, § 7(a) (emphasis added). Rather than apply the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency provided by Art. 27A, § 7(a), the local OPD, in denying representation to Stinnett on this record, relied solely on certain language contained in COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2). CO-MAR 14.06.03.05, entitled "Determination of Eligibility for Services," provides in pertinent part:
A. Pursuant to Article 27A, § 7, Annotated Code of Maryland, eligibility for services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of need of the individual seeking legal representation. Need may be measured according to the applicant's maximum annual net income level and asset ceiling. In cases where good cause is shown, need may be measured by the financial ability of the applicant to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. This ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on:
(1) The nature, extent, and liquidity of assets;
(2) The disposable net income of the defendant;
(3) The nature of the offense;
(4) The effort and skill required to gather pertinent information;
(5) The length and complexity of the proceedings; and
(6) Any other foreseeable expenses.
D. Maximum Income Level.
(1) Except as provided in § D(3) of this regulation, the maximum net annual income level for persons accepted for representation in District Court cases, violation of probation, and contempt proceedings may not exceed 100 percent of the current official federal poverty income guidelines as found in § 673(2) of OBRA-1981 (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2)).
(2) Except as provided in § D(3) of this regulation, the maximum net annual income level for persons accepted for representation in all other cases may not exceed 110 percent of the current official federal poverty income guidelines as found in § 673(2) of OBRA-1981 (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2)).
(3) In cases where good cause is shown, a district public defender or division chief may exempt an applicant from the maximum income level requirement upon due consid ©ration of factors enumerated in Regulation .05 of this chapter.
COMAR 14.06.03.05 (emphasis added). By evaluating Stinnett's application solely under the maximum net annual income and asset ceiling standard of COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2), while ignoring wholly the statutorily-mandated indigency factors contained in Art. 27A, § 7(a), and COMAR 14.06.03.05A, the local OPD applied the incorrect standard for determining indigency of applicants and erred, both legally and factually, in concluding that Stinnett did not qualify for representation by its attorneys. See Medstar Health v. Maryland Health Care Comm'n, 376 Md. 1, 21, 827 A.2d 83, 96 (2003) ("Moreover, where the General Assembly has delegated . broad power to an administrative agency to adopt [legislative rules] or regulations [in a particular area], this Court has upheld the agency's rule or regulations as long as they did not contradict the language or purpose of the statute.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Christ v. Dep't of Natural Res., 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994) ("Regulations promulgated by an administrative agency must, of course, be consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Russell, 159 Md.App. 594, 611, 861 A.2d 92, 102 (2004) ("Where the language of a statute differs from relevant language in a departmental regulation, the statutory language must control.").
Stinnett's testimony before the Circuit Court regarding his inability to afford private counsel demonstrated clearly that, under a proper evaluation of the indigency factors listed in Art. 27A, § 7(a), he qualified as indigent for purposes of representation by the local OPD. As noted supra, according to the Circuit Court's calculations, the defendant's net income totaled $2123 per month, falling well below the $2534 in expenses he incurred each month. In addition, the trial judge determined that the reasonable cost of a private attorney in Stinnett's case would be between $3,000 and $5,000. As such, the Circuit Court found properly that Stinnett qualified as indigent under Art. 27A, § 7(a), the applicable standard for determining indigency, and that the local OPD's conclusion to the contrary, based solely on the maximum net annual income level and asset ceiling language of COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2), was erroneous and contrary to law.
After concluding properly that Stinnett, in fact, was indigent under Art. 27A, § 7, the trial court appointed Northrop, the Deputy District Public Defender for Cecil County, or, alternatively, another attorney from the local OPD or its list of panel attorneys, to represent Stinnett. On appeal, OPD contends that the Circuit Court's actions in this regard exceeded its authority, and that, although a circuit court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who has been denied repre sentation by the local OPD, the circuit court may not appoint an attorney from the local OPD once the local OPD declines representation of the defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we disagree and hold that, upon finding that the local OPD denied erroneously representation to an indigent defendant, a circuit court may appoint any attorney, including an attorney from the local OPD, to represent a defendant.
We previously addressed the statutory division of labor between the courts and the local OPD, with regard to assuring legal representation to indigent individuals, in Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978). In Thompson, the OPD determined, at an initial proceeding, that the defendant was "technically" eligible for representation, although it noted to the trial court that, despite having no income, the defendant managed to post $750 for a surety bond. Id. at 127, 394 A.2d at 1197. Two weeks later, at a subsequent hearing, the defendant requested that the court appoint counsel to represent him, having failed to acquire private representation on his own. Id. at 127-28, 394 A.2d at 1197. At that hearing, the OPD maintained to the court that it determined at its initial interview with the defendant that, in fact, he did not qualify for representation and that it informed the defendant that it would not represent him. Id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. Apparently, the OPD "wanted to leave it up to the court, making clear that if the court so ordered [it] would provide representation." Id. Rather than make an independent determination of the defendant's alleged indigency, the trial court accepted in full the OPD's conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to have representation provided, stating that "you tell me he is not eligible and that is good enough for me." Id. at 130, 394 A.2d at 1198.
We reversed the trial court, holding that it erred by failing to determine independently whether to appoint counsel under Art. 27A, § 6(f), following the local OPD's denial of represen tation. Id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. Specifically, we observed that "there is a clear duty imposed on the court, in order to decide whether it should appoint counsel, upon the Public Defender declining to do so, to make its own independent determination whether a defendant is indigent and otherwise eligible to have counsel provided." Id. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198. Regarding the OPD's representation to the court that it would represent the defendant if the court so ordered, we stated, in dicta and without citation to authority, that "[t]he court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court." Id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197.
Four years after our decision in Thompson, the Court of Special Appeals, in Baldwin, observed, also in dicta, that Thompson "seemed to hold that if the Public Defender declines to represent a defendant—even on grounds of non-eligibility (as opposed to a potential conflict of interest)—the court has no authority to order him to provide representation." Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067. In a footnote, the intermediate appellate court conjectured further that "[i]t would appear from [the language of Thompson], by logical extension, that, although the court may appoint any other qualified counsel to represent an indigent defendant, it may not appoint the Public Defender against his wish." Id. at 552 n. 11, 444 A.2d at 1067. This question, however, was not at the core of Baldwin. Rather, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court based on the latter's refusal to appoint counsel for the defendant on the ground that the trial court, in making its required independent determination of indigency, violated Art. 27A, § 7(a), by relying improperly "upon inferences of wealth for which there is no support in the record and upon resources over which [the defendant] had no control." Id. at 554, 444 A.2d at 1068.
In the present appeal, the OPD and the Dissent rely heavily on the above quoted language, and other dicta in Thompson and Baldwin, to support their contentions that, where the OPD declines representation, a reviewing court is powerless to correct a manifest error in the local OPD's determination of eligibility by appointing the local OPD as counsel for the indigent defendant. Such dicta is wholly unpersuasive, particularly in light of the statutory scheme designed by the General Assembly to govern the respective responsibilities of the OPD and the courts in determining whether a criminal defendant qualifies as indigent and whether such individual is entitled to representation paid for by the taxpayers.
Under Art. 27A, § 7, the "initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender," based upon the criteria enumerated in the statute for determining indigency. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 551, 444 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added). The OPD's initial determination of indigency is not final, however, because "[i]n obvious recognition of the fact that the whole system has Constitutional underpinnings and that the courts must, of necessity, be the ultimate protector of those underpinnings," id. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067, the General Assembly provided in Art. 27A, § 6(f), a clear oversight and corrective role for the courts in the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. Art. 27A, § 6(f), entitled "Panel attorneys; courts not deprived of authority to appoint counsel in certain situations," provides:
Authority of courts to appoint counsel in certain situations.—Nothing in this article shall be construed to deprive any court mentioned in § 4(b)(2) of this article of its authority to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent person where there is a conflict in legal representation in a matter involving multiple defendants and one of the defendants is represented by or through the Office of the Public Defender, or where the Office of the Public Defender declines to provide representation to an indigent person entitled to representation under this article.
Art. 27A, § 6(f) (emphasis added). Although Art. 27A, § 6(f), does not specify either the procedure or the standard to be employed by the court, under Thompson, the court must "make its own independent determination whether a defendant is indigent and otherwise eligible to have counsel provided," 284 Md. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198, considering "any information offered by the parties which may reasonably bear upon the defendant's ability to afford private counsel . [and] us[ing] the same statutory standards" provided in Art. 27A, § 7, which, as discussed supra, are the statutory indigency factors that the local OPD should have applied. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 553-54, 444 A.2d at 1067-68.
Of utmost importance to the present case, Art. 27A, § 6(f), contains no language indicating a legislative intent to prohibit the appointment of an attorney from the local OPD by a trial court to represent an individual that the court determines qualifies as indigent, except where an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest would arise. Despite the OPD's argument to the contrary, the proposition that a court may not appoint the local OPD against its unjustified wishes finds its legal toehold solely in the crevice of the unpersuasive dicta of Thompson and Baldwin. In order to conclude, as the OPD urges, that Art. 27A, 6(f), prohibits the court, in exercising its responsibility to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, from appointing an attorney from the local OPD, after the local OPD has refused to provide representation for the defendant, we would have to add the phrase "other than the local OPD" to the language of Art. 27A, § 6(f), which states that the trial court may "appoint an attorney to represent an indigent defendant." Such a judicial insertion into clear legislative language violates sound canons of statutory interpretation and should be avoided. See Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Dep't of Env't, 410 Md. 326, 339, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (stating that we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute). Although it is clear that the trial court may not appoint the local OPD where the local OPD is prevented from representing an indigent defendant due to an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest, the language of Art. 27A, § 6(f), contains no language prohibiting a court from appointing the local OPD where it determines that the local OPD found erroneously that a defendant did not qualify for representation based on the local OPD's failure to consider the appropriate eligibility criteria, consideration of which is mandated by Art. 27A, § 7. To the extent Thompson and Baldwin relied on the statutory scheme in support of the conclusion that the court may not appoint the local OPD to represent an indigent defendant where the local OPD declined representation of that individual erroneously, such reliance was wholly misplaced.
As opposed to the contentions put forth by the OPD in its appeal, we hold that, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 27A, § § 6 and 7, and the holdings of Thompson and Baldwin, where the local OPD declines representation to a defendant erroneously, because of the local OPD's failure to consider properly the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency, and where a court finds, upon its subsequent mandatory independent review, that the individual qualifies for representation, the trial court, in carrying out its role as "ultimate protector" of the Constitutional right to counsel, may appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent the indigent individual unless an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest would result thereby.
Though by no means a perfect analogy to the situation here, such a procedure is somewhat analogous to legislatively-sanctioned judicial review of decisions made by an administrative agency. Where an administrative agency acts contrary to law by ignoring its statutory mandate and instead relies solely on a self-initiated regulation that does not comply with its enabling statute, a court has the power to order the agency to comply with its statutory mandate. See Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 302, 884 A.2d 1171, 1207 (2005) ("An agency decision, for example, may be deemed 'arbitrary or capricious' if it is contrary to or inconsistent with an enabling statute's language or policy goals.").
In the present case, where the local OPD disregards the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency provided by Art. 27A, § 7, and relies instead on language contained in a regulation that, as discussed supra, is contrary to its enabling statute, a court may direct the local OPD, upon a proper finding of indigency by the court, to represent the indigent individual for which the local OPD denied representation erroneously. Of course, where the local OPD rejects representation based on its own consideration of the indigency criteria provided by Art. 27A, § 7, its determination is entitled to deference, and the court will interfere only when that decision is arbitrary or capricious. Where the OPD acts, however, contrary to its statutory mandate by wholly disregarding the indigency factors contained in Art. 27A, § 7, it abuses its discretion and its eligibility determination is entitled to no weight. In such a scenario, under the plain language of Art. 27A, § 6(f), the trial court, upon finding properly that the defendant qualifies as indigent under the statutorily-mandated indigency factors appearing in Art. 27A, § 7, may appoint "an attorney" to represent the defendant, including an attorney from the local OPD.
No language in the Public Defender Statute suggests that, when the General Assembly provided the trial courts with the power to appoint "an attorney" for an indigent defendant where the OPD declines representation means, in fact, only the power to appoint "an attorney other than the OPD." No appellate court in this State has held previously that the attorneys in the local OPD are ineligible from appointment by a circuit court following the local OPD's factually and legally erroneous rejection of representation of an indigent defendant. As such, we hold that, under the Article 27A and case law, where the OPD has denied representation for an indigent individual erroneously, based on the OPD's failure to apply the statutorily-mandated indigency criteria contained in Art. 27A, § 7, and the circuit court finds that the defendant, in fact, is indigent under that standard, the circuit court may appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent the defendant, unless an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict of interest would result.
THE ORDER OF CONTEMPT
Although we hold that the Circuit Court acted within its authority when it appointed Northrop to represent Stinnett, we nevertheless reverse the Circuit Court's order finding Northrop in direct contempt for refusing to appear as Stinnett's counsel. We do so on the ground that the order was entered improperly according to Maryland Rule 15—203(b)(1). That Rule, entitled "Direct civil and criminal contempt," requires that a written order of direct contempt specify "whether the contempt is civil or criminal." Rule 15-203(b)(l). Failure to comply with the requirement mandates reversal of the judgment of contempt. See King v. State, 400 Md. 419, 445, 929 A.2d 169, 184 (2007) (noting that the failure of a court to comply with the Maryland Rules renders its order of contempt fatally defective and requires reversal). In the present case, the Circuit Court's contempt order against Northrop failed to specify whether the contempt was civil or criminal, and, thus, the judgment of contempt against Northrop must be reversed.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT ENTERED AGAINST JOHN K. NORTHROP; COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE STATE.
BELL, C.J., files a dissenting and concurring opinion in which BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ., join.
. The record contains no information, formal or informal, as to the local OPD's specific calculation of Stinnett's income for the purpose of determining his eligibility for legal representation.
. In 2008, when the local OPD considered Stinnett's application for representation, the Federal Poverty Guideline was $10,400 for a single individual and $14,000 for a family or household of two individuals.
. COMAR 14.06.03.05A, entitled "Determination of Eligibility for Services," provides:
Pursuant to Article 27A, § 7, Annotated Code of Maryland, eligibility for services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of need of the individual seeking legal representation. Need may be measured according to the applicant's maximum annual net income level and asset ceiling. In cases where good cause is shown, need may be measured by the financial ability of the applicant to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. This ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on:
(1) The nature, extent, and liquidity of assets;
(2) The disposable net income of the defendant;
(3) The nature of the offense;
(4) The effort and skill required to gather pertinent information;
(5) The length and complexity of the proceedings; and
(6) Any other foreseeable expenses.
COMAR 14.06.03.05A (2008).
. COMAR 14.06.03.05D, entitled "Maximum Income Level," provides:
(1) Except as provided in § D(3) of this regulation, the maximum net annual income level for persons accepted for representation in District Court cases, violation of probation, and contempt proceedings may not exceed 100 percent of the current official federal poverty income guidelines as found in § 673(2) of OBRA-1981 (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2)).
(2) Except as provided in § D(3) of this regulation, the maximum net annual income level for persons accepted for representation in all other cases may not exceed 110 percent of the current official federal poverty income guidelines as found in § 673(2) of OBRA-1981 (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2)).
(3) In cases where good cause is shown, a district public defender or division chief may exempt an applicant from the maximum income level requirement upon due consideration of factors enumerated in Regulation .05 of this chapter.
COMAR 14.06.03.05D. Although no statute or regulation defines the phrase "net annual income level," the "Application for Public Defender Services" contained in COMAR 14.06.03.08 requests information from the applicant concerning his or her "total net monthly income" and provides entries for net income from "Employer," "Self-employment," "Social Security," "Unemploy/Strike Benefits," "Alimony/Child Support," "Workman's Compensation," "Other," and "Pensions/Insurance Payments." The application and regulation do not state whether "net income" should be calculated using pre-tax or post-tax income.
. In 2008, Article 27A, § 7, was re-codified as Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article § 16-210. Because the proceedings in the present case occurred prior to the re-codification, we shall refer to the provisions of Article 27A, the version of the statute in effect at the time.
. The Circuit Court was referring to the Court of Special Appeals's opinion in Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 444 A.2d 1058 (1982).
. Article 27A, § 7, entitled "Determination of eligibility for services; investigation of financial status of defendant; recovery of expenses," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Determination of eligibility for services.—Eligibility for the services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of the need of the person seeking legal representation. Need shall be measured according to the financial ability of the person to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. Such ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on the nature, extent and liquidity of assets; the disposable net income of the defendant; the nature of the offense; the effort and skill required to gather pertinent information; the length and complexity of the proceedings; and any other foreseeable expenses. In the event that a determination of eligibility cannot be made before the time when the first services are to be rendered, the office may undertake representation of an indigent person provisionally, and if it shall subsequently determine that the person is ineligible, it shall so inform the person, and the person shall thereupon be obliged to engage his own counsel and to reimburse the office for the cost of the services rendered to that time.
Md.Code, Art. 27A, § 7 (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.).
. Under Baldwin, when conducting its own determination of eligibility for public representation based on indigency, a court should consider "any information offered by the parties which may reasonably bear upon the defendant's ability to afford private counsel...." 51 Md.App. at 553, 444 A.2d at 1067. In that case, the Court of Special Appeals noted that "the real key to determining indigence (eligibility) is stated in § 7(a)." Id. at 550, 444 A.2d at 1066.
. This was an amended order, issued sua sponte, on 14 July 2008. Substantively, it was the same as the initial order, issued 8 April 2008, except that it appointed specifically Northrop to represent Stinnett. The Circuit Court's initial order had appointed merely "an attorney" from the local OPD to represent Stinnett. Following the issuance of the initial order, Northrop wrote a letter to Stinnett advising him that, notwithstanding the court order, the local OPD would not be representing him. On 25 April 2008, Northrop wrote, "despite [the Circuit Court's] having ordered this office to represent you, we will not be representing you at your Status Conference on August 8, 2008 and your Trial on September 9 and 10, 2008." The letter did indicate that Stinnett could reapply for representation, but that a decrease in his income was a prerequisite to the OPD's reconsideration of Stinnett's eligibility. Two reminder letters reiterating the aforementioned information also were sent to Stinnett, on 29 April 2008 and 19 June 2008, respectively.
. The record reflects that, well before any consideration of Stinnett's indigency by either the local OPD or the Circuit Court in the present case, the Circuit Court was informed, by letter from the County Attorney dated 19 March 2003, that the Board of County Commissioners had "no funds to pay for any 'public defender fees that are not covered by the State of Maryland.' " In addition, according to a generic reference in the record, the local bar association indicated previously (the date and manner of which notice is unclear) that its members were not willing to "volunteer" their services in criminal cases, other than through a program such as Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Service. As such, based apparently in part on the dearth of other options from which to appoint counsel, the Circuit Court appointed Northrop, or another attorney from the local OPD, to represent Stinnett.
. The Dissent does not contend seriously to the contrary.
. Although we are not called on in the present case to address directly the legal validity of COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2), we pause to note that a seemingly compelling argument exists that those subsections, as they presently stand, purporting to allow the OPD to consider an applicant's maximum net annual income and asset ceiling in determining eligibility for representation, rather than mandating consideration of the six indigency factors, are unauthorized by, and, in fact, conflict directly with, Art. 27A, § 7, the enabling statute.
In this regard, it may be helpful to note the history of COMAR 14.06.03.05. In 1995, the OPD, through the standard process for issuing administrative regulations, amended unilaterally and significantly COMAR 14.06.03, the general regulation entitled "Eligibility for Services." See 22 Md. Reg. 474—75 (March 17, 1995). Prior to the change, Section ,05A, entitled "Determination of Eligibility for Services," provided:
Pursuant to Article 27A, § 7, Annotated Code of Maryland, eligibility for services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determinated on the basis of need of the individual seeking legal representation. Need shall he measured according to the financial ability of the person to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. This ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on:
(1) The nature, extent, and liquidity of assets;
(2) The disposable net income of the defendant;
(3) The nature of the offense;
(4) The effort and skill required to gather pertinent information;
(5) The length and complexity of the proceedings; and
(6) Any other foreseeable expenses.
See 21 Md. Reg. 1896 (October 28, 1994) (emphasis added). Prior to the changes, no regulation provided for a maximum net annual income or asset threshold above which representation by the OPD would be denied categorically.
In 1995, the OPD added Section .05D, concerning maximum net annual income levels for representation, to the regulation and changed significantly the language of .05A. See 22 Md. Reg. 474-75 (March 17, 1995). Following the amendments, Section .05A provided:
Pursuant to Article 27A, § 7, Annotated Code of Maryland, eligibility for services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of need of the individual seeking legal representation. Need may be measured according to the applicant's maximum annual net income level and asset ceiling. In cases where good cause is shown, need may be measured by the financial ability of the applicant to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation. This ability shall be recognized to be a variable depending on [the six factors enumerated above].
See id. at 475 (emphasis added). Apparently, the OPD undertook these changes to the regulation on advice of the Attorney General. See 79 Op. Atty Gen. 354 (1994). Previously, the OPD utilized an internal manual to assess an applicant's eligibility for representation which contained a grid, arranged by income levels and number of dependents. Id. at 355. An applicant "with income in excess of the amount allocated for a particular number of dependents w[ould] be denied representation." Id. The OPD was concerned that, if the public had access to these eligibility criteria, applicants might tailor their applications to meet the requirements. Id. at 356. Nevertheless, the Attorney General opined that, in order to be used by the OPD, the eligibility criteria based on net income and number of dependents, by virtue of its nature as a "regulation," needed to be adopted under the formal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act and included in COMAR. Id. at 361.
Section .02B, also added by the OPD as part of the 1995 amendments, further defined the self-perceived role of the OPD in making eligibility determinations, providing that:
"[t]hese regulations are designed to ensure that client eligibility will be determined according to criteria that give preference to the legal needs of those least able to obtain legal assistance and afford sufficient latitude for the Office to consider local circumstances and its resource limitations."
See 22 Md Reg. 474-75 (March 17, 1995); 21 Md. Reg. 1896 (October 28, 1994). It should be noted that such language is inconsistent with certain language in Baldwin, in which the Court of Special Appeals stated:
Finally, it goes without saying that reductions in the Public Defender's budget and his desire to be frugal have no relevance whatever in the matter. The question is whether appellant was indigent, not the Public Defender. The court's obligation was to uphold the Constitution in the manner directed by the statute and by Maryland Rule 723, and that obligation is not subject to or in any way dependent upon the level of appropriations received by the Public Defender.
Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 555, 444 A.2d at 1069 (emphasis in original). In addition, it is worth noting that consideration of the OPD's resources and maximum net income levels of applicants is not provided for by Art. 27A, § 7, the enabling statute from which COMAR 14.06.03.05 is derived.
. Section 6(f), entitled "Authority of courts to appoint counsel in certain situations," provides:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to deprive any court mentioned in § 4(b)(2) of this article of its authority to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent person where there is a conflict in legal representation in a matter involving multiple defendants and one of the defendants is represented by or through the Office of the Public Defender, or where the Office of the Public Defender declines to provide representation to an indigent person entitled to representation under this article.
Art. 27A, § 6(f).
. In a grudging, but revealing, concession, the Dissent here concedes that Thompson, which it characterizes as "controlling]" (Dissent op. at 446, 993 A.2d at 76), "did not state [] expressly" that OPD's and the courts' responsibilities to ensure legal representation for indigent defendants were separate or that the courts may not trump or supercede the OPD's initial action. Dissent op. at 451, 993 A.2d at 79-80.
. The Dissent, endeavoring to elevate the relevant dicta in Thompson to the status of a holding, relies for that purpose solely, through bootstrapping, on dicta in Baldwin and sweepingly claims therefore that "Maryland courts" have held that Thompson held as the Dissent imagines.
. The Dissent seems to hold out the possibility of other means of assuring representation of indigent defendants where the OPD wrongfully denies representation. See Dissent slip op. at 35, where it rejects "that appointing the OPD is necessary in order to avoid the court from being rendered 'powerless to correct a manifest error.' " Yet, the scant consideration given such alternatives (Dissent op. at 467-68, 993 A.2d at 89-90) and the Dissent's expansive, but inconclusive, footnote 6 (Dissent op. at 441-43, 993 A.2d at 73-75), where it stops short of embracing the local funding/pro bono obligations for appointing private counsel for indigent defendants abandoned by the OPD, belie a comprehensive and coherent resolution of the problem at hand. In reality, the Dissent offers no more than the assurance of endless future litigation between multiple layers of State and local government and the private Bar, with indigent defendants as mere pawns.
. See generally Duvall v. State, 399 Md. 210, 923 A.2d 81 (2007), for analysis of conflict of interest situations in a public defender's office context.
. There is no suggestion in the record of the present case that the OPD could not represent Stinnett due to a conflict of any kind. In such an event, the OPD would assign as counsel one of the OPD's panel attorneys or the court could go outside that resource to the general Bar. Were the latter to be necessary, the question of who would pay for the services of outside counsel makes for an interesting question for another case and another day.
. The Dissent accuses the Majority of resolving the present case, which it describes as "riddled with complexity," by "adopting] simple solutions that do not enjoy legal support, or stretch logic to the breaking point, for the sake of reaching a preferred resolution." (Dissent op. at 445, 993 A.2d at 76). We say in reply only that the principle of "Occam's Razor," which states that "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily," strikes us as a more compelling model to follow here. In other words, oftentimes, the simplest solution is the better one.
. In passing, the Dissent asserts that the Majority's holding "tramples on the doctrine of separation of powers," although the Dissent devotes but a paragraph to such an argument, stating merely certain core principles of the doctrine. (Dissent op. at 446, 472-73, 993 A.2d at 76-77, 92-93). In its brief, the OPD gave similarly short shrift to a "separation of powers" argument, providing not much more than a block quotation from Atty. Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 688-89, 426 A.2d 929, 933 (1981), and presciently contending that the Majority's conclusion "would, in effect, sanction the expenditure of Executive Branch resources at the direction and discretion of the Judiciary in violation of the doctrine of 'separation of powers.' " The devotion of such little attention by the OPD and the Dissent to a "separation of powers" argument makes considerable sense because this is simply not a "separation of powers" case. Our holding in no way exercises judicial power over Executive Branch monetary resources. OPD staff attorneys are salaried employees, hired to represent qualifying indigent defendants, according to statutory criteria. Our holding requires mere ly that the OPD do no more than comply with its existing, statutorily-mandated job description, i.e., perform the services they are paid to perform.
. Rule 15—203(b), entitled "Order of contempt," provides:
Either before sanctions are imposed or promptly thereafter, the court shall issue a written order stating that a direct contempt has been committed and specifying:
(1) whether the contempt is civil or criminal;
(2) the evidentiary facts known tot he court from the judge's own personal knowledge as to the conduct constituting the contempt, and as to any relevant evidentiary facts not so known, the basis of the court's findings,
(3) the sanction imposed for the contempt;
(4) in the case of civil contempt, how the contempt may be purged, and
(5) in the case of criminal contempt, (A) if the sanction is incarceration, a determinate term, and
(B) any condition under which the sanction may be suspended, modified, revoked, or terminated.
Rule 15-203(b) (2008).