Case Name: Louis LeWINTER, Appellant, v. The GUARDIANSHIP of Louis LeWINTER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-01
Citations: 606 So. 2d 387
Docket Number: No. 92-386
Parties: Louis LeWINTER, Appellant, v. The GUARDIANSHIP of Louis LeWINTER, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 387–391

Head Matter:
Louis LeWINTER, Appellant, v. The GUARDIANSHIP of Louis LeWINTER, Appellee.
No. 92-386.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 1, 1992.
Zemel and Kaufman and Franklin Zemel, Miami, for appellant.
Frederick C. Sake, Miami Beach, for ap-pellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
At the end of a proceeding instituted by a financially dissatisfied adopted son, the trial court determined that ninety-four-year-old Louis LeWinter was incapable of fully exercising his rights to manage his property and to consent to medical treatment, § 744.3215(3)(d), (f), Fla.Stat. (1991), and appointed a guardian to perform those functions for him. See § 744.331(6), Fla. Stat. (1991). We reverse because there is no competent evidence to support the order.
The record of the adjudicatory hearing contains no expert or other testimony that Mr. LeWinter then lacked the capacity to perform the functions referred to in the order. Neither of the grounds relied on for the contrary position by the appellee, which is ironically the guardianship of the appellant himself, supports its position. First, the report of the examining committee established under section 744.331(3)(a), which did contain such findings, but which was filed over six weeks before the hearing, was rendered entirely valueless by the admitted fact that Mr. LeWinter's condition had markedly improved in the meantime. See Bludworth v. Bray, 59 Fla. 437, 52 So. 957 (1910); Golden Glades Regional Medical Ctr. v. State, Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 586 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Second, the trial judge's own opinion that the ward was incapacitated by lapses of attention and memory is a mere non-expert conclusion entitled to no eviden-tiary weight. See Bergman v. Serns, 443 So.2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review dismissed, 450 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla.1984). (It is also directly contrary to LeW-inter's own statements in the record before us.) While the trial court may, indeed must, determine the credibility and weight of the evidence, it is not empowered to create that evidence from the whole cloth.
It is thus apparent that the order below, with its profound effect upon the appellant's privacy and dignity, is unsupported by the clear and convincing evidence required by section 744.331(6). See Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). It is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the proceeding.
Reversed.
BASKIN, J., concurs.
. It is not disputed that he was fully capable of exercising each of the other rights referred to in sections 744.3215(2), (3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. It is unnecessary to pass upon the ward's alternative claim that reversal is required by the violation of the requirement of section 744.-331(5)(a) that the adjudicatory hearing be set and held "no more than 14 days after the filing of the report . unless good cause is shown," which it was not.
.For example, the record contains the following:
THE COURT: You see, Counsel, we are going from one thing to another, and I am convinced that, I want the record, so the Third District knows it, that Mr. LeWinter, in my opinion, cannot follow what is going on.