Case Name: Telles J. BRUNET, Jr., et al. v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-12-05
Citations: 772 So. 2d 974
Docket Number: No. 99-CA-1354
Parties: Telles J. BRUNET, Jr., et al. v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
Judges: Panel composed of Judges CHARLES GRISBAUM, Jr., THOMAS F. DALEY and CLARENCE E. McMANUS.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 772
Pages: 974–994

Head Matter:
Telles J. BRUNET, Jr., et al. v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
No. 99-CA-1354.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 5, 2000.
Opinion Denying Rehearing Dec. 18, 2000.
Mickey P. Landry, Frank J. Swarr, Landry & Swarr, and Ronald L. Motley, Charles W. Patrick, Ness, Motely, Load-holt, Richardson & Poole, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for the Brunet Family — Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Mary L. Dumestre, Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann & Hutchinson, L.L.P., New Orleans, Louisiana, and Blue Williams, L.L.P., Brian C. Bossier, Virgil A. Lacy, III, Mickal P. Adler, Marc E. Devenport, Erin H. Boyd, Metairie, Louisiana, Attorneys for Avondale Industries, Inc., Defendant/Appellee.
Samuel M. Rosamond, Fleming & Rosa-mond, Metairie, Louisiana, Attorney for Commercial Union Insurance Company, Defendants/Appellees.
Robert E. Caraway, Kenan Rand, Jr., Wendy Lappenga, Plauche, Maselli, Landry & Parkerson, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for American Motorists Ins. Co., Peter Territo, and Steven Kennedy, Defendants/Appellees.
Philip Borne, Christovieh & Kearney, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorney for Highlands Ins. Co., Defendants/Appellees.
Gordon Wilson, Lugenbuhl, Burke, Wheaton, Peck & Rankin, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for Travelers Insurance Company, Defendant/Appellee.
Panel composed of Judges CHARLES GRISBAUM, Jr., THOMAS F. DALEY and CLARENCE E. McMANUS.
. See Rivnor Properties v. Herbert O'Donnell, Inc., 92-1103 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/12/94), 633 So.2d 735; writ denied, 94-1293 and 94-1305 (La.9/2/94), 643 So.2d 147.

Opinion:
isDALEY, Judge.
Plaintiffs/appellants, June R. Brunet, Sheila Fernandez, Sandilyn Brunet, and Paula LaChica, as the survivors of Telles Brunet (collectively "Brunet"), appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their claims against defendant/appellee, Avondale Industries, Inc. ("Avondale"). Avondale, its executive officers, and their insurers have filed answers to the appeal. Brunet died of lung cancer on May 16, 1998, allegedly caused by exposure to as-bestoscontaining products while he was an employee of Avondale from 1950-1978. Brunet alleges, among other Assignments of Error, that the trial court erred by not entering judgment against Avondale, specifically on the issue of strict liability. For the following reasons, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tells Brunet was employed by Avondale from 1950-1978. He worked at the Har vey Quick Repair Yard where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products | ¿throughout the years of his employment. Brunet, a heavy smoker for many years, contracted lung cancer and passed away on May 16,1998.
On May 13, 1998, Brunet filed a Petition for Damages against Avondale and, among others, four of its executive officers: Peter Territo, Steven Kennedy, John Chan-trey and James O'Donnell (collectively "officers"). The insurers of the officers, Commercial Union Insurance Company, American Motorists Insurance Company, Highlands Insurance Company, and Travelers Insurance Company, were also named as defendants in the suit. As stated above, Brunet died shortly after the filing of the petition. His wife and three daughters were substituted as party plaintiffs and proceeded with the suit on survival and wrongful death claims.
Both Avondale and its officers filed cross claims and third party claims against various product manufacturers and a number of their executive officers alleging product liability, negligence, strict liability, intentional tort, fraud, conspiracy, and misrepresentation. Many of the officers' third party claims were dismissed as res judicata. Avondale's cross claims were severed from the trial of the main demand.
On July 21, 1999, a twelve person jury was empaneled and the case went to trial. The trial proceeded through August 5, 1999, at which time the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Avondale regarding the wrongful death claim. The trial court also concluded that Brunet had failed to establish a strict liability claim against Avondale and refused jury charges or jury interrogatories on that issue. The jury then retired for deliberations.
On August 6, 1999, the jury returned a verdict finding that Brunet's exposure to asbestos-containing products at Avondale was a substantial cause of his lung cancer, but found Avondale not negligent. The jury also found that the officers were |Knot negligent in providing Brunet a safe place to work. The jury did find various other entities, namely the asbestos-containing products manufacturers, liable to Brunet in the amount of $302,000.00. On August 11, 1999, the trial court issued its judgment adopting the jury's verdict and dismissing Brunet's claims against Avondale, Territo, Kennedy, American Motorists, Commercial Union, Highlands and Travelers.
On August 17, 1999, Brunet filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which was subsequently denied by the trial court. On September 8, 1999, Brunet filed an Order of Appeal that was subsequently granted by the trial court. The officers filed an Answer to the appeal on December 22, 1999. Avondale filed an Answer to the appeal on December 23, 1999.
After the appellants' brief was filed, the Avondale executive officers filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with respect to the officers and their insurers. On February 9, 2000, this Court ruled that the Motion to Dismiss would be referred to the merits of the appeal. The matter is now before this Court for review.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Brunet alleges thirteen assignments of error on appeal. First, Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by not entering judgment in his favor and against Avon-dale. Second, Brunet alleges that the jury erred by rendering an inadequate award for general damages. Third, Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence deposition testimony of witnesses taken in previous litigations of which Brunet was not given notice, did not attend, and at which he was not adequately represented. Fourth, Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by including the names [fiof persons on the interrogatories with whom he had not previously settled and against whom he would have no cause of action under Louisiana law. Fifth, Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with an interrogatory regarding the parties in Assignment of Error Four, substantially similar to Jury Interrogatory No. 5. In Assignments of Error Six through Thirteen, Brunet alleges that the jury erred in its response to Jury Interrogatory No. 9, in that no reasonable finder of fact could determine from the evidence that Garlock, Inc., Uniroyal Inc., Pittsburgh-Coming Corp., Johns Manville Corp., Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc., Dr. John Konzen or Richard F. Shannon are liable for his injuries.
Avondale and its executive officers have filed two separate Answers to this appeal. In their Answer, the officers once again re-urge their Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. We note that in his brief Brunet has not assigned as error the trial court's dismissal of his claims against the executive officers of Avondale named in the suit. Under Rule 2-12.4 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, the Court may consider as abandoned any specification or Assignment of Error that has not been briefed. Absent such specification in brief, Brunet's appeal against the executive officers of Avondale and their insurers must be dismissed. Only Brunet's appeal on the issue of Avondale's potential liability and the Answer to the appeal filed by Avondale will be addressed by this Court.
In its answer, Avondale alleges three assignments of error. First, Avondale alleges that the trial court erred in holding that Brunet had a cause of action premised on the theory of negligence. Avondale alleges that this cause of action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. Second, Avondale alleges that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on |7the issue of whether Brunet contracted lung cancer after September 30, 1976. Under the law in effect at the time of Brunet's contraction of lung cancer, the exclusive remedy was under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. In its third Assignment of Error, Avondale alleges in the alternative that there was no error in the decision of the jury and/or the trial court dismissing the claims against Avon-dale and its executive officers and insurers.
APPLICABILITY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
In our analysis, we find determinative the issue raised by Avondale in its Answer to Appeal, that plaintiff may not sue Avondale in tort because his illness is a covered occupational disease under LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1 as it was in effect at the time of his employment at Avondale.
Mr. Brunet has alleged that he contracted cancer in the 1990's resulting from exposure to asbestos while working at Avon-dale from 1950 to 1978. The jury made a specific finding of fact that Mr. Brunet's exposure to asbestos-containing products at Avondale was a substantial cause of his lung cancer. Avondale, as plaintiffs employer, argues that it is immune from tort suit, as per LSA-R.S. 23:1032. The 1976 amendment rewrote R.S. 23:1032; the applicable section previously read:
"The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations.
Avondale asserts that Mr. Brunet's only legal remedy against his employer or his dependents for his lung cancer is workers' compensation benefits. Avondale argues that lung cancer that has been caused by exposure to asbestos is an occupational disease recognized by the workers' compensation statutes. Avondale 1 ^admits that lung cancer was not a listed occupational disease prior to 1976. Avondale argues that asbestos is both an oxygen compound, as per LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1(A)(l)(d), and a metal compound, as per LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1(A)(1)(g), and because these disease-causing agents are listed by LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1, plaintiffs exclusive remedy is workers' compensation. Avondale argues that the inquiry does not end merely with a finding that the disease is not specifically listed in R.S. 23:1031.1; the court must then inquire whether the disease's pathogen is included in the statute's list. The inquiry does not stop with a determination that the pathogen is not listed by name. Avondale argued to the trial court that asbestos is covered by the list because it is both an oxygen compound (A)(1)(d)) and a metal compound (A)(1)(g)).
LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1 defines the coverage and burden of proof for occupational diseases, and at the time of the majority of Brunet's employment at Avondale, provided, in pertinent part:
Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease as herein defined, or the dependent of an employee whose death is caused by an occupational disease, as herein defined, shall be entitled to the compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
A. An occupational disease shall include only those diseases hereinafter listed when contracted by an employee in the course of his employment as a result of the nature of the work performed, except as herein specified.
(1)Poisoning by or other disease resulting from contact with:
(a) the halogens, halogen compounds, and halogenated hydrocarbons
(1) alkaline materials
(2)arsenic, phosphorus, selenium, sulfur, tellurium, and their compounds
(d) oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, and their compounds
(e) cyanides and cyanogen compounds
(f) lead and lead compounds
(g) metals other than lead and their compound
l9(h) aliphatic hydrocarbons and their nitro, diaso and amino compounds
(l) aromatic and cyclic hydrocarbons and their nitro, amino and other compounds
(j) alcohols
(k) organic and inorganic acids and their derivatives and compounds
(1 ) esters of aliphatic, aromatic and inorganic acids
(m) aldehyde
(n) ketones
(o) ethers, glycol ethers, and their compounds
(p) phenol and phenolic compounds
(2) Diseased condition caused by exposure to X-rays or radioactive substances.
(3) Asbestosis.
(4) Silicosis.
(5) Dermatosis.
(6) Pneumoconiosis.
(7) Tuberculosis when contracted during the course of employment by an employee of a hospital or unit thereof specializing in the case and treatment of tuberculosis patients.
(Emphasis added.)
Avondale made this argument to the trial court; the trial court ruled against Avondale, relying on Gautreaux v. Rheem Manufacturing Company, 96-2193 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96), 694 So.2d 977. After thorough consideration, we find that the trial court's reliance on Gautreaux was error. Avondale submitted proffers A — N in support of their position that asbestos is a listed pathogen in R.S. 23:1081.1. We find that asbestos is both an oxygen compound and a metal compound as per R.S. 23:1031.1, and because plaintiffs cancer is alleged to have been caused by his exposure to asbestos while employed at Avon-dale, his exclusive remedy against Avon-dale for this occupationally-caused disease is workers' compensation benefits.
Both Avondale and Brunet cite the Gau-treaux case; plaintiff for the position that asbestos has already been determined NOT to be an oxygen compound for the purposes of R.S. 23:1031.1; defendant Avondale to point out that the case is not controlling because of its weak procedural posture (the affirmance of a denial of | inexception of no cause of action) and that it garnered only a plurality of a five judge panel.
In Gautreaux, the plaintiffs filed suit for damages incurred in the death of Charles Gautreaux from lung cancer, whose death was alleged to have been caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment at Rheem Manufacturing Company from 1946 to 1982. Defendant Rheem argued by exception of no cause of action that, under former LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1(A)(1)(d), asbestos was an oxygen compound and therefore the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was in workers' compensation. The exception was denied and Rheem sought supervisory review. The Fourth Circuit, in a five-judge panel, granted the application to affirm the decision of trial judge denying relator's exception of no cause of action. Two judges joined in a plurality determination that asbestos was not an oxygen compound as per R.S. 23:1031.1. One judge concurred in the result only, noting that the court was not considering a summary judgment and stating that this matter required a trial where expert scientific evidence might be elicited. In a blistering dissent, the two remaining judges strongly disagreed with the two-judge plurality's analysis and misplaced reliance on other cases (discussed below).
In Gautreaux, the plurality held:
We find no error in the denial of relator's exception of no cause of action. The record contains an extensive dispute over whether asbestos is better characterized as a "mineral" or a "compound" for the purposes of former La. R.S. 23:1031.1(A) 1(d). The attached affidavit of an expert witness suggests that asbestos would be better described as a mineral in the context of the scientific terminology appearing in the statute. Thus, on this showing, it has not been established as a matter of law that asbestos must be considered an "oxygen compound" within the context for former Subsection (d). Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied the exception of no cause of action.
Inlt is clear the court found that the defendant Rheem had not presented enough evidence, in its exception of no cause of action and in its writ application, to establish its position as a matter of law. Despite this finding, the two-judge plurality went on, inappropriately at this procedural posture, to evaluate the evidence and argument that the parties presented, and then found that asbestos was not an oxy-r gen compound as per R.S. 23:1031.1.
Other courts have since relied upon Gautreaux for the position that asbestos is not an oxygen compound , but we find that Gautreaux made no such definitive determination, given that only a two-judge plurality of the court found that asbestos could not be considered an oxygen compound as per R.S. 23:1031.1. A denial of a writ application does not prevent the parties from making an additional showing at trial, and thus does not preclude a trial court from making a different ruling following the presentation of additional evidence at trial.
The Gautreaux plurality relied upon two cases in making its ruling: Hicks v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 165 So.2d 51, 53 (La.App. 2d Cir.1964); and Thomas v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 95-2222 (La.App.1st Cir. 6/28/96), 676 So.2d 1185, writ denied, 96-1965 (La.11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1272. As noted by the dissenters, the plurality's reliance on these two cases is misplaced.
In Hicks, plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for emphysema allegedly caused by exposure to flour. The court denied benefits, holding that emphysema was not a covered disease, nor did plaintiff present evidence that flour contained, in sufficient quantity to produce emphysema, chemical compounds | ^enumerated in R.S. 23:1031.1 as the causes of compensable diseases. The Hicks case did not discuss the compounds at issue here (oxygen, metal). It is not clear which compounds or substances the Hicks court considered or their percentage representation in flour. The following is the sum of the Hicks court's discussion:
Since bronchitis, bronchiolitis and emphysema are not named as diseases for which an employee may recover workmen's compensation, even if causally connected with his employment, we turn to that portion of the statute relating to diseases resulting from contact with the enumerated chemicals or other materials. Plaintiff, in an effort to show that the flour contained either one or a combination of the chemicals and compounds designated in the statute produced the testimony of several eminent physicians and one chemist. From our study of this testimony, we are convinced that flour does not contain any of the elements or their derivatives listed in sufficient quantities to produce emphysema. Therefore, we conclude the plaintiffs disability is not proved to be the result of contact with any of the chemicals or compounds enumerated in LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1 B(l).
Though the court denied benefits, its method of analysis supports Avondale's interpretation of R.S. 23:1031.1.
Gautreaux also relies on Thomas v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.; however, that case held that lung cancer was not compensable because it was not a listed disease and asbestos was not a listed substance. It did not consider whether asbestos might be a listed compound. Further, the Thomas court considered the grant of an exception of no cause of action filed by the defendant ANCO; in reversing it, the court said:
While Anco presents an interesting argument to support the inferential inclusion of asbestos in the provided list of substances within La. R.S. 23:1031.1, it is not sufficient to overcome the fact that asbestos is simply not specifically written as one • of the exclusive substances; nor, is lung cancer provided as one of the diseases that falls under the restricted ambit of a workers' compensation action. The focal issue to be judicially determined is whether the lung cancer was independently caused by asbestos or, alternatively, whether it was a progression of the asbestosis disease that Mr. Thomas had simultaneously contracted. See, Wallace v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, 586 So.2d 149 (La.1991). Defendant is not precluded from demonstrating at the trial level that the asbestosis initiated the lung cancer and, therefore, the lung hücancer would be encompassed within the diseases limited to workers' compensation. However, this is not a legal conclusion that can be determined from the face of the pleadings alone.
Thomas's analysis is flawed in the same way as Gautreaux's and this trial court's because it did not consider whether asbestos could be a listed compound. And, Thomas's procedural posture is just as weak as Gautreaux's, because it, too, considered an exception of no cause of action. Therefore, we agree with Avondale that the Gautreaux court's reliance on Thomas to support its conclusion was misplaced.
Gautreaux is also weak, procedurally, because the Supreme Court's writ denial does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court approved the plurality's conclusion on asbestos's properties; it may only mean that the Supreme court considered the result, the affirmance of the denial of the no cause of action, correct. Additionally, Gautreaux did not consider whether asbestos might be a metal compound. To elevate Gautreaux's dicta about asbestos's classification to proof of the ultimate issue is cursory, shallow legal analysis. No court appears to have fully considered, at a trial on the merits with expert testimony and evidence, whether asbestos should be considered an oxygen and/or metal compound as per R.S. 23:1031.1. Gautreaux's inappropriately drawn conclusions do not relieve this and other courts of the necessity of considering this important threshold issue in a proceeding with full proof. By blindly relying on a case as weak as Gautreaux, the trial court deprived Avondale of its day in court.
Avondale cites several cases for the position that plaintiffs disease, though not listed, should be covered in workers' compensation because the pathogen is listed |uas an included substance or compound thereof, though the pathogen might not be listed by name.
In Zeringue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 271 So.2d 613 (La.App. 1 Cir.1972), plaintiff alleged he contracted bul-lous emphysema from the spray paint fumes. The court found a causal connection between his spray painting job and his illness. The court recognized that his ailment was not a listed disease, but, citing Hicks, found that the spray paint contained enough enumerated substances to make his illness compensable as an occupational disease under the statute.
"... a qualified industrial toxicologist reviewed this paint formula and testified that the paint contained mineral spirits, toluene and ethyl alcohol. These three solvents combined to comprise approximately 38% of the paint formula. Dr. Rinehart further testified that these substances are included in the listed substances under LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1, subd. B, (1), (h), (i), and (j). He also stated that one substance listed as being in the paint, ketoxime, might be ketone, which is listed in subsection (n) of the statute."
Similarly, in Riley v. Avondale Shipyards, 305 So.2d 742 (La.App. 4 Cir.1974), plaintiff was compensated for an unspecified occupational lung disease caused by detergent spray, which contained compounds of phosphorus, sulphur, and metals, included in R.S. 23:1031.1, subd. B(l)(c) and (g).
In Bernard v. Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission, 152 So.2d 114 (La.App. 3 Cir.1963), plaintiff recovered compensation for occupational diseases, chemical pneumonitis and emphysema, caused by his inhalation of the chemical spray 2-4-D. Neither disease was specifically listed in R.S. 23:1031.1, and neither was the pathogen, 2-4-D (Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid), but plaintiff was awarded workers' comp benefits under R.S. 23:1031.1. There was no discussion as to the chemical properties of 2-4-D, other than it was toxic and an irritant, but implicit in the court's analysis is the fact that 2-4-D was a listed compound.
|1KAvondale's argument, therefore, is legitimate. For a plaintiffs occupational disease to be covered under workers' compensation, his occupational disease need not be specifically listed by name in former R.S. 23:1031.1. The inquiry does not end with the finding that the disease is not listed; courts must determine if the pathogen is listed, and must go the extra step, if the pathogen's name is not listed, to determine if the substance is included in the subcategories. In the above cases, none of the pathogens were listed by name, but were found to fall within several categories as compounds of listed elements and metals.
Consideration of expert testimony and proffers
Avondale presented the following evidence in proffers A-N. They would have called Dr. Harry Ensley, a professor in chemistry at Tulane University (with a Ph.D. in chemistry from Harvard University ). He would have testified that asbestos falls into the category of "oxygen and its compounds" and "metals and their compounds."
The Handbook of Chemistry and Physics defines "compounds" as:
Compounds are substances containing more than one constituent element and having properties, on the whole, different from those which their constituents had as elementary substances.
Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary defines a compound as:
Compound. (1) A substance composed of atoms or ions of two or more elements in chemical combination... .A compound is a homogenous entity where the elements have definite proportions by weight and are represented by a chemical formula. A compound has characteristic properties quite different from those of its constituent elements.
[1fiThree compounds are offered as examples. Water is a compound of hydrogen (a flammable gas) and oxygen (a gas) — H20. When joined together, they produce a nonflammable liquid.
Table salt is a metal compound (NaCl). It is composed of sodium, a metal that explodes in water, and chlorine, a poisonous yellow gas. When combined to form table salt, they create a white non-poisonous solid that dissolves in water.
Rust (Fe203), or iron oxide, is a compound of oxygen and iron. Iron is a metal that is a good conductor of electricity. Oxygen is a gas. Combined, they form rust, which is a solid that is a poor conductor of electricity. Rust is both a metal compound and an oxygen compound.
There six forms of asbestos: chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, tremolite, actinolite, and anthophyllite. Proffer "J" gives their chemical compositions, formulas, and lists their oxygen contents both by weight and number of atoms. The proffer shows that oxygen is a significant component of all forms of asbestos, and that each form of asbestos contains a significant amount of different metals. Chrysotile asbestos is the most common and represents over ninety (90%) of the asbestos used in industrial applications. Its oxygen content is 51.96% by weight, and 50% by number of atoms.
Professor Ensley would have testified that oxygen and metal are vital components of asbestos, which, if removed, would leave a substance that is no longer asbestos. He would have testified that there is no distinction, in chemistry, between the terms "oxygen and its compounds," "oxygen-containing compounds," and "compounds that contain oxygen."
[17Avondale proffered the deposition testimony of Dr. Gerald Liuzza. Dr. Liuzza is the expert the Fourth Circuit relied upon in Gautreaux. However, Dr. Liuzza is a pathologist, not a chemist. A pathologist studies the causation of diseases. In his deposition, he states that he would defer to chemists for the definition of "chemical compound." His deposition also displayed a fundamental misunderstanding about the designation "metal and their compounds" and "oxygen and its compounds." Dr. Liuzza argued that no matter how much metal asbestos contained, it is still not a metal itself. That, however, is not the inquiry for the purposes of RS 23:1031.1 and its list. Nowhere does that statute say that a metal compound must also be categorized as a metal itself. The textbook definitions of compound used above make clear that compounds can and do display different characteristics than their constituent elements. Dr. Liuzza also argued that asbestos would not be an oxygen compound because it did not display the reactivity typical to oxygen. However, again, the textbook definition of compound recognizes that compounds may not display the same chemical characteristics, including reactivity, of their constituent elements. The categorization of a substance as a compound does not depend on the substance reacting like its constituent elements.
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature could not have meant these categories to read so broadly, because then "everything" would have been included. However, we must take note that the term "compound," from a chemistry perspective, is a term of art; it has a specific, finite definition of which courts can take judicial notice. The | ^legislature, in using it, is presumed to have understood that. The real question is not whether asbestos is an oxygen compound from a chemical perspective, because clearly it is, but rather did the legislature intend to include substances such as asbestos in categories such as oxygen and metal compounds.
We consider persuasive the fact that asbestosis, an occupational disease caused by asbestos exposure, is included as a compensable occupational disease, as evidence that the legislature intended to include all occupational diseases caused by asbestos exposure. It is well settled that the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law must be given a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate its beneficent purpose of relieving workmen of the economic burden of work-connected injuries by diffusing the cost in the channels of commerce. Lester v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985). Given the focus of the workers' compensation scheme, which is to cover employees who are injured in the course and scope of their employment under the compensation scheme, it is not logical that the legislature intended to provide coverage for only some of the workers made sick from asbestos exposure, and not others. The legislature's action in specifically listing the disease asbestosis could be attributed to their limited knowledge of the disease processes caused by asbestos exposure (and their latency) at the time the statute was enacted (1958). Plaintiffs' interpretation of the workers' compensation statutes creates a scenario where side-by-side workers, exposed to the same disease causing agent (here, asbestos), will be covered differently depending on the specific disease they develop. Such a result is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the workers' compensation scheme. Plaintiffs cancer, if caused by asbestos exposure while in the course and scope of his 113employment , should be covered under workers' compensation the same as his asbestosis. This court finds that asbestos is a pathogen included in the list in R.S. 23:1031.1 (1958), and therefore, plaintiffs exclusive remedy for an occupational disease alleged to have been caused by asbestos is under the workers' compensation scheme.
Because we find this issue case determinative, the remaining assignments of error are pretermitted and will not be considered by this court. Accordingly, though for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL AS TO AVONDALE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
McMANUS, J., dissents with reasons.
. Brunet has not raised the issue of the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death claim. It will not be addressed by the Court.
. Chantrey and O'Donnell are now deceased but their insurers remained in the suit.
. Gautreaux at 978.
. Callaway v. Anco Insulation, Inc., 98-0397 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/25/98), 714 So.2d 730; Meredith v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 97-2593 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/98), 707 So.2d 1334.
.Denial of supervisory review is merely a decision not to exercise the extraordinary powers of supervisory jurisdiction, and does not bar reconsideration of, or a different conclusion on, the same question when appeal is taken from final judgment. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 607 So.2d 8 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992).
. In addition to the foregoing cases, Avondale also cites Hicks v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., which we have discussed previously in this opinion.
. Proffer "C" is his Curriculum Vitae.
. Proffer "E".
. Proffer "F".
. Proffer "G".
. Proffer "J", attached as Appendix A.
. Proffer "K".
. Proffer "N".
. The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Francis Ragan, would have also restricted the definition of a metal compound to a metal containing substance that retained the characteristics and reactivity of metals, and an oxygen compound to a substance containing oxygen that retained the characteristics and reactivity of oxygen, despite the textbook definitions of "compound" that are not restrictive in these ways.
. For a discussion of the concept of judicial notice and its use as an evidentiary tool, see the dissent in Gautreaux.
. O'Regan v. Preferred Enterprises, Inc., 98-1602 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 31.
. See the dissent in Gautreaux.
. The jury made the factual finding that Brunet's exposure to asbestos while working at Avondale was a cause in fact of his lung cancer. No party has appealed that finding.