Case Name: Nicholas Trammell et al. v. John W. Watson
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 210
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nicholas Trammell et al. v. John W. Watson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 210–217

Head Matter:
Nicholas Trammell et al. v. John W. Watson.
The limitation of one year within which to apply for an injunction, after a judgment has been obtained, does not apply to a case where judgment has not been rendered against a surety on an appeal bond upon affirmance in . the Supreme Court. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3931, Note 924.)
The appeal bond required by the 136th section of the act of 13th May, 1846, to regulate proceedings in the district court, does not have the force and effect of a judgment. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1491, Note 583.)
Where, in rendering the judgment of affirmance, the clerk had omitted the name of one of the sureties, an execution was not warranted by the judgment of the Supreme Court, nor by the statutory effect of the appeal bond ; and the execution against such surety was void, and it was properly perpetually enjoined.
This court has often recognized and acted upon the rule in equity, that, although the party in his special prayer for relief has mistaken the relief to which he is entitled, yet under the prayer for general relief he shall have awarded him the appropriate relief to which, upon the allegation and proof, he may appear to be entitled.
But it is essential that the defendant should have so framed his answer as to show himself entitled to judgment upon the bond. At all events, the allegations of the party must not be repugnant to the granting of such relief.
Where the petition charged, that in affirming the judgment the Supreme Court did not render judgment against the plaintiff in an injunction cause, and the answer did not admit that charge, but seemed to deny it, upon the general prayer for relief in the answer, the defendant was not entitled to the relief to which he would have been entitled upon a proper case made in reconvention.
Appeal from Gonzales. The case was tried before Hon. . Fielding Jones, one of the district judges.
The record of the original case of Trammell v. Trammell et al., was filed in the Supreme Court on the 1st of •December, 1855. The judgment was affirmed on the 21st December, 1857, and the case is reported, Campbell v. Campbell, 15 Tex., 291, and see the same case, post. In rendering the usual judgment against the appellant and his sureties on the appeal bond, the clerk omitted the name of John C. Watson, whose name appeared in the transcript as one of the sureties.
Upon the return of the mandate, the clerk of the district court proceeded to issue executions against Watson on said judgment, as well as the principal and the other sureties in said bond. The first execution that so issued was dated 2d March, 1858, and from term to term the clerk of said court continued to 'issue executions against said Trammel and his sureties on said appeal bond, until 12th February, 1859.e The appellee, being called on for a levy to satisfy said execution, sued out an.injunction, alleging the above facts, and that he never signed the appeal bond in said suit, or authorized any one to sign it for him. The-appellants moved to dissolve the injunction, upon the ground that the judgment had been rendered more than twelve months previously; which motion was overruled. Appellants then answered, alleging that said judgment was “confirmed in all things;” that said Watson did execute the appeal bond; that he was a party defendant to said judgment in this court; and that he is liable as surety for the payment of the whole of said judgment; prayed that the injunction be dissolved; for ten per cent.' damages; that execution issue, &c., and for general relief.
The proof was clear that Watson signed the appeal bond by making his mark.
On the hearing, the law and facts being submitted to tire court, the injunction was perpetuated.
Watson was also surety on a replevin bond in the same case, and the injunction was made operative against the force and effect of both bonds; also as to a previous judgment, Trammell et al. v. Trammell et al., Ho. 579, in said district court; from which judgment, perpetuating said injunction, defendants appealed.
W. L. G. L. Robarás, for appellants.
—We do not insist that the court erred in overruling the motion to dissolve the injunction, because Watson had sworn that he never executed the appeal bond, and the exhibits showed that, by mistake, no judgment had been rendered against him on the bond; neither do we contend that the bond had the force and effect of a judgment; but we do sincerely urge, that, when the pleadings and proofs were submitted to the court, the injunction should have been dissolved, and the court, under the prayer for general relief, should have rendered judgment on the bond, and ordered execution to issue against Watson for the balance due on the judgment. It is true, the court might have properly ordered costs to be taxed against Trammell, but even that is questionable, as Watson had permitted several executions to issue against him before the error was pointed out. As stated before, the first execution that so issued was dated 2d May, 1858, and continued to issue from term to term, and the injunction was not sued out until 12th February, 1859; all the time no motion having been made to quash the execution.
It is admitted, that if the appeal bond had been plead in reconvention, the court would have been authorized-to render judgment thereon. We insist, that is the force and effect of the answer. Though it may not be plead in technical language, the facts were stated, and the proof showed the plaintiff was entitled to no equities; and we submit the following authorities, in justification of the position, that under the prayer for general relief, judgment should have been renclered on the bond, and execution ordered against Watson for the balance due on the original judgment; he being the only party before the court that was bound by the bond.
“ Under our system of procedure, all matters touching the cause of action, which might, under our former jurisprudence, have been pleaded in reconvention, or which may, in chancery practice, be set up in a cross bill, may be alleged in the answer, by way of defense and for redress.” (Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex., 184-205; Bennett v. Spillers, 7 Tex., 600-602; Egery v. Power, 5 Tex., 501-506: Walcott v. Hendrick, 6 Tex., 406-415; Bradford v. Hamilton, 7 Tex., 55-59; Hill v. George, 5 Tex., 87-89; Wells v. Fairbanks, 5 Tex., 582; Smith v. Doak, 3 Tex., 215-218; Carter v. Hunt & Wallace, 2 Tex., 206-209; Pridgin v. Strickland, 8 Tex., 427-436; Johnson v. Davis, 7 Tex., 173-175; Fitzhugh v. Custer, 4 Tex., 391-395; Smith v. Clopton, 4 Tex., 109; Hardy v. De Leon, 5, Tex., 211-246; Hill v. Huchett, 4 Tex., 20-24; Castro v. Gentiley, 11 Tex., 28; Holman v. Criswell, 15 Tex., 394-397; Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex., 400-403; Bracken v. Neill, 15 Tex., 109-115; Wave v. Bennett, 18 Tex., 794; Oldham v. Erhart, 18 Tex., 147; Williams v. Wright, 20 Tex., 499; Gothard v. Reiley, 14 Tex., 461.)
By reference to the above authorites, it will be seen that this court has laid it down as the settled policy, that technical forms in pleading are not absolutely essential; but where the facts are sufficiently stated to authorize the court to act with reasonable certainty, it will so shape its judgments and decrees that the substantial ends of justice may be attained.
The forthcoming bond was referred to in brief, to call the court’s attention to the fact, that Watson had delayed the appellants in the enforcement of their rights in two instances in this very case, and that he was entitled to no indulgence at the hands of the court, from the fact that he was merely surety.
It is exceedingly technical to insist, that the clerk of the court, the officer required by law to approve appeal bonds, was not alone competent to prove its execution.
It is insisted, that even if the name of Watson had been inserted in the judgment of this court, it would have only bound him. for the negroes, or their value. It is sufficient answer to say, that the appeal bond was executed to appeal the judgment, and that Henry Trammellalone appealed, against whom the moneyed judgment for $1,443 was alone rendered. The bond was given to appeal the whole judgment, and the judgment was “in all things affirmed.” The usual form of a judgment of affirmance is, that appelleesrecover the amount adjudged below, and all costs, &c.; but as there were negroes in this controversy, it added, that the property, or its value, be delivered or recovered.
Technical grounds for injunction should meet with no favor in this court. (Smith v. Power, 2 Tex., 57-74; Cameron v. White, 3 Tex., 152; Gothard v. Reiley, 14 Tex., 457; Clegg v. Varnell, 18 Tex., 294; Spann v. Sterns, 18 Tex., 557; Cyrus v. Hicks, 20 Tex., 483.)
If this court should affirm the judgment of the court below, and should decide that the judgment of affirmance cannot be amended, appellants are remediless. (Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex., 101-104.)
The fact that plaintiff’s petition was sworn to, gives it no weight. (Antry v. Cannon, 11 Tex., 110.)
Ho exceptions were taken to the answer before the trial. (Graines v. Salmon, 16 Tex., 311.)
Special attention is called to the answer.
Win. H. Stewart, for appellee.
—1. The appellant assigns three errors. The first assignment is the refusal of the court to dismiss the petition, on the ground that more than twelve months had elapsed from date of the judgment. O. & W. Dig., Art. 1017, (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3931,) has no application to causes of injunction arising subsequent to the judgment, and there never having been any judgment against Watson, and the statute not having given appeal bonds the force and effect of judgments, the twelve months mentioned in said art. 1017 is not applicable, and there was no error in the ruling of the court upon the motion to dismiss. (Williams v. Bradbury, 9 Tex., 487; Beardsley v. Hall, 9 Tex., 119.)
2. The second assigned error is as to the judgment of the court upon the law and evidence. It is manifest that there was no judgment in the Supreme Court against Watsoii upon which execution could issue, neither was there any judgment against Watson in the District Court; neither does the statute give to appeal bonds the force and effect of judgments. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 549.) The statute expressly gives to writ-of-error bonds, and stay bonds, forthcoming bonds, and some others, the force of judgments, and authorizes execution to issue on them upon their forfeiture; but the statute does not give such effect to appeal bonds. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 549; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1491.) Therefore the judgment of the court was right in perpetuating the injunction. It is possible that, had the appellant plead the bond in reconvention, he might have had judgment of the court upon the appeal bond; hut, as he did not thus plead, it is fruitless to speculate on what might have been done in another state of case.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—There was no error in the judgment enjoining the execution as to-the plaintiff, Watson, for the plain reason, that there was no judgment to .support the execution as to him. He had joined in the appeal bond, it is true—at least his name appears as one of the sureties on the bond; but the appellees had not chosen to take judgment against Mm on the bond upon the affirmance of the judgment, as was their right. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 1921.) And as the appeal bond had not the force and effect of a judgment, (Ib.,Art. 549,) it is manifest that execution could not legally issue either upon the judgment of tMs court or upon the appeal bond. The execution, having issued without authority of law, was void, and was, therefore, very properly enjoined.
It is not controverted that the execution was improperly issued; but it is insisted, for the appellant, that, upon the case brought before the court by the allegations and proof, and under the prayer for general relief, the court should have proceeded to give judgment and award execution against the plaintiff, Watson, upon the bond. This court has often recognized and acted on the rule in equity that, although the party, in his special prayer for relief, has mistaken the relief to wMch he is entitled, yet under the prayer for general relief he shall have awarded him the appropriate relief to which, upon the allegations and proof, he may appear to be entitled. And if the allegations of the appellants and the proofs clearly showed them entitled to the rendition of judgment and execution upon the bond, the present might be a proper case for the application of the rule. But it is essential that the defendant should have so framed his answer as. to show himself entitled to judgment upon the bond. At all events, the allegations of the party must not be repugnant to the granting of such relief; which, it is conceived, is the case here presented by the answer. It is averred that the plaintiff, Watson, was a party defendant to the judgment ren dered in the Supreme Court, and that the execution was legally sued out against him. This is equivalent to saying, that the liability of the plaintiff upon the bond had already been adjudicated by the Supreme Court; and, if this he so, the party was not entitled to have it again adjudicated in that court. To have proceeded to judgment, as it is now insisted the court should have done, would have been repugnant to the case presented by the allegations of the party. There is nothing in the answer which, by way of averment or admission, submitted to the court a state of case as existing, upon which the court would have been warranted in proceeding to render judgment and award execution upon the bond. The admission which the answer contains respecting the averments of the petition, concerning the action of this court upon the appeal, is so carefully framed as not to admit the averment that judgment was not rendered against Watson upon the bond. To have proceeded to give judgment and order execution to issue on the bond, therefore, would have been to grant relief, not only not according to the case made by the answer, hut repugnant to its allegations.
We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment, and it is •
Affirmed.