Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. THE KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (In Re Henderson)
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-01
Citations: 45 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 601
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. THE KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (In Re Henderson).
Judges: Rradt and Daniels, JJ.,
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 45
Pages: 601–603

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. THE KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (In Re Henderson).
Revaluation of a claim filed with the receiver of an insolvent life insurance company —when it will not be granted on account of the uninsurable condition of the assured at the time of the valuation, which was followed by his death.
Appeal from an order of tbe Special Term, denying a motion for a revaluation of policies of insurance upon tbe life of Elisba W. Henderson.
Tbe Knickerbocker Life Insurance Company was dissolved and a receiver thereof appointed by a judgment entered on tbe 29th of December, 1882. An order was made by tbe court requiring tbe filing of claims within tbe prescribed period, which expired on tbe 15th of August, 1883. Before tbe expiration of that time, policies on tbe life of Elisba W. Henderson were filed as claims with tbe receiver. No claim or proof was filed with tbe receiver showing that tbe life of tbe insured bad ceased to be insurable, or that any state of facts existed which took tbe case out of the general rules of valuations. Tbe valuation of tbe policies as running claims was, therefore, made in accordance with the rule and system prescribed by tbe American Experience tables, and on or about tbe 7th day of August, 1884, tbe actuary made and filed with tbe receiver bis report, which was, on or about tbe 1st day of September, 1884, confirmed by this court, and a dividend of twenty per cent declared on tbe reserved value of all valid claims filed with the receiver. Tbe party insured by these policies died on tbe 27th of February, 1885. After bis decease, proofs of death were filed in tbe office of tbe receiver on or about tbe 1st day of July, 1885, showing that tbe direct and immediate cause of tbe death of tbe life insured was a carbuncle from which he had been suffering about two weeks, and that the remote cause of death was diabates. The affidavits now presented show that the decedent had been afflicted with diabates during the last two years of his life, and was, on the the 1st of September, 1884, at or about which time the valuation was made, in feeble health, and was not what would be considered an insurable risk at that time.
The court at General Term said: “ TJpon this state of facts it is now moved that a revaluation of the policies be made treating them substantially as death claims. The court below denied the motion holding in substance that the rule laid down in the Croissant case (at Special Term, Baeeett, J., reported Daily Register, April 18, 1885, vol. 27, p. 768, affirmed People v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Op., 36 Hnn, 645), should not be extended, and that the facts of this case did not show that the decedent was moribund or in extremis when the valuation was made.
“We think the conclusion of the court at Special Term, was right and should not be disturbed. No claim was made at the time of filing the policies which would put them upon any different footing than those of other running policies, nor was any knowledge brought home to the receiver or to the actuary that any state of facts existed which required a different rule to be applied in the valuation of those policies. The valuation was complete and confirmed by the court some months before the decease of the assured. He subsequently died of a carbuncle which might have been superinduced by the previous condition of his health caused by the alleged lingering and fatal disease. But to adopt the course claimed on the part of the appellant would introduce so much uncertainty in proceedings of the receiver in cases of this kind as to render them extremely difficult and embarrasring. The party very clearly was not moribund at the time of presenting his claim nor in danger of immediate death, though his life might have become a non-insurable risk. The subsequent cause of death may have been superinduced by the existing dis< iase, and it was the duty of the assured, if he were in fact in that condition, to have presented his claim upon the basis of his non-insurable condition. If we were to-order a revaluation upon the facts presented in this case, we should open the door to incessant litigat on in the case of every person. nsured in tbe company who subsequently and before tbe final closing of tbe receiver’s account shall have died.
“We are of opinion that tbe court below properly disposed of tbe motion, and that tbe order should be affirmed, but under tbe circumstances, without costs.”
Horace Russell, for tbe appellant.
J. M. Gifford, for tbe respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Davis,P. J.;
Rradt and Daniels, JJ.,
concurred.
Order affirmed, without costs.