Case Name: M. Johnson against Caulkins
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1799-07
Citations: 1 Johns. Cas. 116
Docket Number: 
Parties: M. Johnson against Caulkins.
Judges: 
Reporter: Johnson's Cases
Volume: 1
Pages: 139–143

Head Matter:
M. Johnson against Caulkins.
In an action for a breach of a promise of marriage, the defendant was allowed to give in evidence in mitigation of damages, the licentious conduct of the plaintiff, without any limitation as to the time he made the promise to her, or to the period of the proposed marriage.
In such a case, it is not necessary for the (female) plaintiff to prove a ¡previous offer to marry the defendant.
This was an action on a promise of marriage. Plea the general issue. The cause was tried before Mr. Chief Justice Lansing, at the last sittings in Albany. The promise and breach were fully proved; and it appeared, that after the promise, to wit, on the 9th of July, 1797, the defendant left the town of Troy, where both parties resided, and [*117] *went to the West Indies; that shortly after his departure, the plaintiff was discovered to be in a state of pregnancy, and was delivered of a child on the 4th April, 1798; that the defendant returned to Troy, in the month of June, 1798, when he acknowledged the child to be his; that he again left Troy in July of the same year, and went to New London, for five or six weeks, having previously agreed to be married to the plaintiff on his return.
The defendant offered testimony to prove licentious conduct in the plaintiff with other persons, and her general reputation subsequent to July, 1798, which was objected to by the plaintiff, and overruled by the judge. The defendant was, however, permitted to give evidence of her conduct and reputation previous to the expiration of the six weeks after he left Troy, in July, 1798, when it was agreed that the marriage should take place ; but no proof applicable to her subsequent character or conduct was admitted. The defendant then gave evidence to show, that the plaintiff’s character as to sobriety and virtue before that period was not good, which was Opposed by proof on the part of the plaintiff, and the weight of evidence in this respect was in favoi of the plaintiff.
A verdict was found for the plaintiff, for 1000 dollars damages. The defendant applied for a new trial, on the ground that he ought to have been permitted to prove other acts of licentiousness in the plaintiff, and her general character, without being restrained to the period above mentioned.
Bliss, for the plaintiff
Woodworth, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Benson, J.
I am of opinion, that with a view to the question of damages, the defendant ought to have been permitted to show licentious conduct in the plaintiff, and her general character as to sobriety and virtue, without any limitation of time. The object of this action is not merely a com- ' pensation for the immediate injury sustained, but damages for the loss of reputation.' This must necessarily depend • on the general conduct of the party *subsequent [*118] to, as well as previous to the injury complained of, and the damages to be recovered, as in actions for defamation, ought to be regulated by all the circumstances of the case. The proof of reputation cannot depend on time ; it is a question which is general in its nature, and the inquiry respecting it, when material, must be general.
Kadcliff, J., Kent, J. and Lewis, J. concurred.
The doctrine of this case is affirmed in Willard v. Stone, 7 Cowen, 22. See Palmer v. Andrews, 7 Wend. 142, and also, Boynton v. Kellogg, 3 Mass. R. 189. In this case, Sedgwick, J. decided : 1. That if the woman was of bad character at the time of the contract, and that was unknown to the defendant, the verdict ought to be in his favor: 2. That if the plaintiff after the promise, had prostituted her person to any person other than the defendant, she thereby discharged the defendant: 3. That if her conduct was improperly indelicate, although not criminal before the promise, and it was unknown to the defendant, it ought to be considered in mitigation of damages : 4. That, if such was her conduct after the promise, it was proper in the same view for the consideration of the jury.