Case Name: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. William J. DOUGLAS, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-03-09
Citations: 654 So. 2d 118
Docket Number: No. 83242
Parties: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. William J. DOUGLAS, Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, KOGAN and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 654
Pages: 118–126

Head Matter:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. William J. DOUGLAS, Respondent.
No. 83242.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 9, 1995.
Rehearing Denied May 4, 1995.
James K. Clark and Frances Fernandez Guasch of Clark, Sparkman, Robb & Nelson, Miami, for petitioner.
Christopher M. Cannon of Fazio, Dawson, DiSalvo, Cannon, Abers & Podrecca, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
WELLS, Justice.
We have for review Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Douglas, 627 So.2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in which the district court held that an automobile insurance policy issued by Government Employees Insur- anee Company (GEICO) provided Douglas with uninsured motorist coverage because the insurer failed to comply with section 627.727(9), Florida Statutes (1987). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
The district court's decision was in accord with Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 609 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and Carbonell v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 562 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We, thereafter, quashed the Fifth District's decision in Nationwide, Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 640 So.2d 53 (Fla.1994), based on our decision in World Wide Undenvriters Insurance Co. v. Welker, 640 So.2d 46 (Fla.1994), issued on the same date. We now recede from our decision quashing Natiomvide because that decision failed to give effect to section 627.727(9), Florida Statutes (1987).
In 1971, this Court decided Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla.1971). In that decision, we determined:
Richard Lamar Mullis is a member of the first class; as such he is covered by uninsured motorist liability protection issued pursuant to Section 627.0851 whenever or wherever bodily injury is inflicted upon him by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. He would be covered thereby whenever he is injured while walking, or while riding in motor vehicles, or in public conveyances, including uninsured motor vehicles . owned by a member of the first class of insureds.
Id. at 238. Further, this Court held:
In sum, our holding is that uninsured motorist coverage prescribed by Section 627.0851 is statutorily intended to provide the reciprocal or mutual equivalent of automobile liability coverage . where an uninsured motorist negligently inflicts bodily injury or death upon a named insured, or any of his family relatives resident in his household, or any lawful occupants of the insured automobile covered in his automobile liability policy.
Id. at 237-38.
These two statements initiated a debate over uninsured motorist coverage which re-suited in disparate decisions in the district courts, as well as disparate statements about Mullis by this Court. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Queen, 468 So.2d 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); France v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Coleman v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, Inc., 517 So.2d 686, 689 (Fla.1988).
The factual situation involved here also stirred debate. At the time of the accident in May 1989, Douglas had two vehicles insured by GEICO for liability and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. A third vehicle, a truck which Douglas was occupying at the time of the accident, had previously been insured by GEICO under the same policy. In 1988, Douglas canceled the GEICO insurance coverage on the truck and obtained a personal injury protection (PIP) only policy with another insurance carrier. Douglas was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist while operating the truck and sought uninsured motorist benefits under his existing GEICO policy.
In applying Mullis to these facts, one line of cases would hold that no uninsured motorist coverage is available because no liability or uninsured motorist coverage was purchased for the particular vehicle involved in the accident. This theory prevailed in World Wide, wherein this court cited Valiant Insurance Co. v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408 (Fla.1990), and stated:
In Valiant we construed Mullis and noted that after the Mullis decision "the courts have consistently followed the principle that if the liability portions of an insurance policy would be applicable to a particular accident, the uninsured motorist provisions would likewise be applicable; whereas, if the liability provisions did not apply to a given accident, the uninsured motorist provisions of that policy would also not apply (except with respect to occupants of the insured automobile)." Valiant, 567 So.2d at 410.
World Wide, 640 So.2d at 49. While the recitation from Valiant is accurate, we recede from the statement that courts have consistently tied uninsured motorist coverage to the applicability of liability coverage for a particular accident.
Rather, our analysis is that the most consistent principle followed by courts interpreting Mullís was described in note 3 of Justice Shaw's dissenting opinion in Valiant:
The majority claims that Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla.1971), and subsequent cases "follow the principle" that uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is unavailable if the corresponding liability coverage is inapplicable to a particular accident. This principle, however, is wholly unmentioned in Mullís and in each of the cases cited by the majority for support. Quite the contrary, all of these cases apply an analysis that focuses exclusively on the injured individual rather than the accident; they rule simply and clearly that UM coverage is unavailable if liability coverage is inapplicable to a particular individual. The majority, unsupported by caselaw, broadens the exclusion from the "individual" to the "accident, " apparently in order to embrace the facts of the present case.
567 So.2d at 412 (emphasis in original removed) (emphasis added). Our analysis follows this Court's decision regarding Mullis in Coleman v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, Inc., 517 So.2d 686 (Fla.1988), which concerned the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage:
Uninsured motorist protection does not inure to a particular motor vehicle, but instead protects the named insured or insured members of his family against bodily injury inflicted by the negligence of any uninsured motorist under whatever conditions, locations, or circumstances any of such insureds happen to be in at the time.... Thus, the insured may be a pedestrian at the time of such injury, riding in motor vehicles of others or in public conveyances or occupying motor vehicles owned by but which are not "insured automobiles" of the named insured. Mullis, 252 So.2d at 233. It is this aspect of uninsured motorist coverage which gives rise to aggregation or "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverages.
Id. at 689 (citations omitted). This analysis likewise follows what this court said in respect to Mullis in Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Hurtado, 587 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Fla.1991):
The Court relied in part on its prior opinion in Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla.1971), which did not involve stacking, but did determine that under Florida law, an insurance company could not exclude a named insured from uninsured motorist coverage even though the named insured was not operating a vehicle insured under the policy.
We believe the legislature accepted as the prevailing Mullis theory the principle enunciated in Justice Shaw's footnote when it enacted the 1987 amendment to the uninsured motorist statute and, thereby, changed the state of the law. Pursuant to this amendment, which became section 627.727(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), insurers could issue motor vehicle liability insurance policies which contained limited uninsured motorist coverage. The limitation was described as follows:
The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy does not apply to the named insured or family members residing in his household who are injured while occupying any vehicle owned by such insureds for which uninsured motorist coverage was not purchased.
§ 627.727(9)(d), Fla.Stat. (1987).
As recognized by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, to limit coverage validly, the insurer must satisfy the statutorily-mandated requirement of notice to the insured and obtain a knowing acceptance of the limited coverage. An insurer who provides coverage with the section 627.727(9)(d) limitation is also statutorily required to file revised, decreased premium rates for such policies.
It is our opinion that these requirements were the quid pro quo given by the legislature to insurers for the right to limit uninsured motorist coverage by this exclusion. As further recognized by the Fourth District in its opinion in this case, if the policy exclusion is valid despite noncompliance with the statute, the provision of section 627.727(9)(d) is rendered meaningless.
Section 627.727(9)(d) was applicable in this instance and the insurer, GEICO, was found not to have complied with the statute. The Fourth District, therefore, quite correctly held that the insured was covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of the GEICO policy. We approve that decision.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, KOGAN and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which GRIMES, C.J., and HARDING, J., concur.