Case Name: Ansonia Brass Company agt. William C. Conner, Sheriff, etc
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1881-05
Citations: 62 How. Pr. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ansonia Brass Company agt. William C. Conner, Sheriff, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 272–283

Head Matter:
N. Y. COMMON PLEAS.
Ansonia Brass Company agt. William C. Conner, Sheriff, etc.
Sheriff—Liability of, for not retu/rning execution—Sheriff’s return not conclusive as to amount collected—Appeal— When arid how interlocutory judgment reviewaMe — Failure of proof as to plaintiff being a corporation — Time to make objections as to.
Where, in an action against the sheriff for damages for neglecting to return an execution within sixty days, the court, upon the trial, gave an interlocutory judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the pleadings, and sent the cause to another branch of the court that the plaintiff’s damages might he assessed:
Held (reversing judgment for plaintiff), 1. That the interlocutory judgment is reviewable upon this appeal, notwithstanding the defendant, in his notice of appeal, did not mention the interlocutory order, because the Code which was then in force did not require any such specification to review interlocutory judgments or intermediate orders.
2. As the complaint, which alleged that the plaintiff “isa corporation duly created and existing, doing business in the city of New York,” did not aver that the plaintiff was a corporation created under a statute of New York, and the answer put in issue the existence of the corporation, proof should have been given of the corporate character of the plaintiff.
3. The allegation of the complaint that the plaintiff had recovered a judgment against one Wilson being denied by the answer, and the fact being essential to the existence of the cause of action, the court erred in directing judgment on the pleadings.
Balt, O. J. (dissenting), holds: 1. That as it appeared the sheriff on receiving the execution levied on the property of defendant, and all proceedings were stayed five days thereafter, and that after the stay was removed he had a month and twelve days before the sixty days expired, that was ample time within which to sell the personal property levied upon and make his return; and for failure to do so he was liable to plaintiff.
2. The sheriff’s return is not conclusive as to the amount collected.
3. The time to make objection as to failure of proof that plaintiff was a corporation and that the execution was founded upon a valid judgment, was when the motion was made for judgment upon the pleadings.
General Term, May, 1881.
Befoi'e Daly, Oh. J., Vast Hoesen and J. F. Daly, JJ.

Opinion:
Van Hoesen, J.
— The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a " corporation duly created and existing, doing business in the city of ¡New York." The answer denies any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of that allegation. Whether or not the plaintiff was bound to offer any proof as to its corporate character depends upon the question as to whether it was a domestic corporation created under a statute of this state. If the plaintiff be a corporation created under a statute of this state it was unnecessary, under the pleadings as they stood, to introduce any evidence of its charter; but if the plaintiff is a corporation created by the law of any other state or country, it was bound, to. prove that it was a corporate body, clothed with the right to sue. It will be seen that the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff was created a corporation under any statute of the state of Hew York, and the omission to make that allegation may have arisen from the fact that the plaintiff owes its existence to the laws of Connecticut. Where the complaint does not aver that the plaintiff is a corporation created under a statute of Hew York (there being no presumption that it was so created), the court must apply the old rule of the common law which required proof of the corporate character of the plaintiff when the plea put the existence of the corporation in issue. Oorporatio ml non was, therefore, one of the issues to be tried in this case.
Again, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had recovered a judgment against one Wilson. This the answer denied. Was the fact that a judgment against Wilson had been recovered by the plaintiff a fact essential to the existence of the cause of action ? If it were, it certainly was error to direct that the plaintiff should have judgment on the pleadings in this action without proof that a judgment against Wilson had ever been rendered. This action was for the failure to return an execution within sixty days.
The foundation of the sheriff's liability to the plaintiff is that he has neglected a duty which he owed to the plaintiff. There is no duty due from the sheriff to the plaintiff unless the latter had a judgment which he had an interest in having executed. Thus one of the elements of his cause of action is the possession of a judgment which he was entitled to collect by execution (Addason on Torts, p. 811). Just as in an action for not serving mesne process, or in an action for an escape,, or in an action for a false return, the plaintiff must prove that he had a good cause of action which entitled him to call on the sheriff to execute the process; so in an action for failing to return an execution he must show that he was a creditor, and that he had a right, as such, to place the writ in the sheriff's hands and require it to be served and returned in accordance with the practice of the court. Forsyth agt. Campbell (15 Hun, 236) is an authority, if authority were needed, directly in point.
It appears from the case that when this action came on for trial the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, and notwithstanding the defendant's opposition, the court ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and sent the cause to another branch of the court that the plaintiff's damages might be assessed. After the assessment of damages judgment was entered up from which an appeal was taken to the general term of the marine court, which affirmed the proceedings at the trial term.
It is insisted that even if the plaintiff had no right to a judgment on the pleadings, the defendant cannot now complain because he did not mention in his notice of appeal the order of Justice Goepp, which gave the plaintiff judgment. The answer is that the Code, which was in force when the action was tried and the appeal taken, did not require the appellant to specify in his notice every order of which he complained. It was enough that the order involved the merits and necessarily affected the judgment, as the order of Judge Goepp unquestionably did.
It is evident that there has been no trial at all of some of the material issues raised by the pleadings. Those issues must be tried, and decided in the plaintiff's favor before a recovery can be had.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
J. F. Daly, J., concurs.