Case Name: CHARLES A. BAYLY, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MUEHE, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1884-06-27
Citations: 65 Cal. 345
Docket Number: No. 8,765
Parties: CHARLES A. BAYLY, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MUEHE, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 65
Pages: 345–350

Head Matter:
[No. 8,765.
In Bank.
June 27, 1884.]
CHARLES A. BAYLY, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MUEHE, Appellant.
Pokeoloswb—Parties—Heibs of Mobtoaoob.—In an action against an administrator to foreclose a mortgage, the heirs of the deceased mortgagor are not necessary parties.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco.
Action to quiet title. The remaining facts are stated in the opinion.
F. J. Castelhun, and Stanly, Stoney & Hayes, for Appellant.
The heirs of the mortgagor were not necessary parties to the foreclosure suit. Pending administration on the estate of a deceased mortgagor, his administrator represents the title, and is the only necessary party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1582; Union W. Co. v. Murphys F. F. Co. 22 Cal. 627; Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 490; Ellis v. Polhemus, 27 Cal. 350; Eubanks v. Leveridge, 4 Sawy. 274.) This representation of the title by the administrator is not an exception to the rule of practice in this State, but is in perfect harmony with our system.
Our courts have decided that an action of ejectment is properly brought in the name of the administrator (Curtis v. Herrick, 14 Cal, 117. Meeks v. Hahn, 20 Cal. 620); that the heir during administration cannot maintain ejectment (Meeks v. Kirby, 47 Cal. 169; McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 151), not even when a vacancy occurs in the office of administrator (Chapman v. Hollister, 42 Cal. 463); that a judgment in ejectment against the administrator operates upon the title of the heirs, although not parties to the action. (Cunningham v. Ashley, 45 Cal. 485; Meeks v. Vassault, 3 Sawy. 206; De Halpin v. Oxarart, 58 Cal. 101.) If the administrator neglect to bring suit until the right of action to recover the land be barred by limitation, the heirs, whose right of action has been suspended, will be barred also. (Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U. S. 564; Meeks v. Vassault, 3 Sawy. 206.)
An action to quiet title is properly brought in the name of the administrator (Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 265; Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 20); and cannot be maintained by the heir. (Harper v. Strutz, 53 Cal. 655.)
“An executor or administrator or trustee of an- express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may sue without joining with him the person or persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted,” etc. (Code Civ. Proc. § 369.) “When a person, who is bound by contract in writing to convey any real estate, dies before making the contract, and in all cases where -such decedent, if living, might be compelled to make such conveyance, the Probate Court may make a decree authorizing and directing his executor or administrator to convey such real estate to the person entitled thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1597.)
An action to compel the specific performance of a contract to convey land may be maintained against the administrator. (Lowell v. Kier, 50 Cal. 646.) And when the purposes of administration are accomplished, after notices have been posted in three public places for ten days, the Probate Court renders a decree conclusively determining who are the heirs or devisees, and distributing to them the property, real or personal, of the decedent. (Freeman v. Rahm, 58 Cal. 114.)
The enforcement of the lien in an action to which the heirs of the mortgagor are not parties, is not taking property “without due process of law.” (Rorer on Judicial Sales, § 27; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 627; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters, 25; Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Robb v. Lessee etc. 15 Ohio, 689; Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. 185.)
Stetson & Houghton, and A. & H. C. Campbell, for Respondent.
Ho title passed by the sheriff’s deed, as the parties who held the legal title, the heirs of the mortgagor, were not parties defendant in the foreclosure action.
Upon the death of a person in this State without disposing of his property by will, it “ passes to the heirs of the intestate,” etc., subject to the control of the Probate Court, and to the possession of any administrator appointed by that court for the purposes of administration. (Civ. Code, § 1384; 1 Hittell, § 2329; Crosby v. Dowd, 61 Cal. 557; Beckett v. Selover, 7 Cal. 216; § 1504, Code Civ. Proc.; Falkner v. Folsom, 6 Cal. 412.) It is elementary law, that the heir takes an absolute title to the land of the intestate, subject only to be defeated or charged with the debts in the manner provided by the statute. (Fonda v. Chapman, 23 Hun, 121.) The legal title is vested in such heirs, and temporary possession given to the administrator for certain purposes. And in all cases the parties holding the legal title to the land must be made parties defendant in foreclosure suits, or their rights will not be affected. (Whitney v. Higgins, 10 Cal. 551; Montgomery v. Tutt, 11 Cal. 314; Burton v. Lies, 21 Cal. 87; Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291; Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461; Boggs v. Hargrave, 16 Cal. 562; Skinner v. Buck, 29 Cal. 256; Renshaw v. Taylor, 7 Oreg. 321.)
“ If the mortgagor has died seized of the mortgaged estate, his heirs at law are indispensible parties. It is not enough to make his executor or administrator a party to it. The personal representative has no title to the land, though in some States he has a temporary right of possession.” (2 Jones Mortgages, § 1414; 2 Hilliard Mortgages, § 133; Calverly v.. Phelps, 6 Madd. 144; Williamson v. Field, 2 Sand. Ch. 562; McIver v. Cherry, 8 Humph. 715; Edwards on Parties, 91; Ohling v. Luitjens, 32 Ill. 23; Hall v. Huggins, 19 Ala. 200; Story Eq. Plead. § 196, 9th ed.; Doe v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 709; Hunt v. Acre, 28 Ala. 580; Stark v, Brown, 12 Wis. 572; George v. Cooper, 15 W. Va. 672.)
There is no privity between the heirs and executors or administrators. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 78 and authorities; Garnett v. Macon, 6 Call, 308; Stone v. Brown, 16 Tex. 425; 2 Phill. Ev. p. 14, n. 259, and authorities; Osgood v. Manhattan Co. 3 Cowen, 622; Masons etc. v. Peters’ Adm’r, 1 Munf. 446; Neal v. McCombs, 2 Yerg. 12-17.)
A statute which would conclude the heir without his being a party, would be unconstitutional. (Renshaw v. Taylor, 7 Oreg. 321.)

Opinion:
The Court.—
For the reasons given in the opinion delivered when this case was before Department One of this court, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded, with directions to the court below to render judgment for defendant on the findings.