Case Name: The Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road Company vs. Brice J. Worthington
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1864-04-14
Citations: 21 Md. 275
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road Company vs. Brice J. Worthington.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bowie, C, J., and Bartol and Cochran, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 275–302

Head Matter:
The Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road Company vs. Brice J. Worthington.
Negligence: Rail Roads: Province of Court and Jury.- — A railway train was thrown from the track by the rail being displaced at a switch. The switch was in a position where the switch indicator could not be seen by the engineer in time to prevent an accident, and there was no switch-tender stationed at that point, in an action l'or damages brought by a passenger who was injured, Held:
1st. That the injury to the plaintiff was presumptive evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants, and it was incumbent on them to prove that they were not negligent, in order to discharge themselves from liability.
2nd. That the jury wore correctly instructed, — that it was a question for them to determine from all the evidence, whether the injury to the plaintiff arose from any neglect on the part of the defendants or their agents, and if they should find that the injury was the result of an accident or act against which humane care and foresight could not guard, and was not the result of negligence, in any degree, on the part of the defendants, then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
3rd. That the jury wore correctly instructed, that in determining these questions they were to have regard to the character of railway transportation.
Appeal from, the Superior Court of Baltimore City :
This was an action brought by tbe appellee against tbe appellant, to recover damages for injuries sustained while riding as a passenger over tbe road of the appellant, on a train which was thrown from the track. The case is very fully stated in the opinions of the several Justices of this-. Court by whom the case was heard.
The cause was argued before Bowie, C, J., and Bartol and Cochran, J.
J. H. B. Latrobe, for the appellant:
The Court below erred in substituting its own instructions for those asked for by the defendants.
The first inquiry is as to the difference between the two sets of instructions. The difference, it is contended, is this fundamental and vital one. The defendants’ instructions would have given to the jury the law applicable to the case, leaving it to the jury to find the facts. The Court’s instruction gives no law to the jury, virtually, but leaves it to the jury to settle, for the particular case, both the law and the facts, which is done when it is left to the jury to say whether the injury arose “from any neglect on the part of the defendants.”
It is very true that, in ordinary parlance, “neglect,” is a fact; but .technically, and in the present connection, this is not so. Neglect, here, is a question of both law and fact; and it was the duty of the Court below to have separated the law from the fact, and deciding the one, to have left the other only to the jury. Had the defendants’ instructions been given, this would have been done, and the failure to do so is the error now sought to be repaired.
Railroad companies are under certain obligations to the public, irrespective of the facts in any particular case, and which, when explained to the jury, furnish a certain key to the verdict. What these are, the Court here did not tell the jury. The Court told the jury that their verdict must be for the plaintiff, if they believed he was injured on the particular occasion, of which there was no doubt; unless the defendants show that they were not in fault; but the Court gave the jury no standard by which to determine whether the defendants were in fault or not.
It is true that the Court say, the jury must look in this connection to the character of railroad transportation; but the Court do not say in what respect, though the reference to the switch-tender, that immediately follows, warrants the conclusion, that it is to him and to his duties that reference is made. The instruction here, is, to say the least, indefinite.
What is asked, now, of the Court of Appeals, is, that it shall declare it to he the duty of the Court below, to instruct the jury, as matter of law, in regard to the obligations of tbe railroad companies to tbe public, looking to the question of negligence, and declaring what negligence is. And the best illustration of the defendants’ views in this regard, is furnished by the instructions asked for in their behalf.
These instructions assume the right of the defendants to employ a speed customary on railroads for passenger trains to be a matter oflaw, leaving it to the jury to find, however, that they were traveling at such a speed; and they admit as matter oflaw, that there must ho no defect in the road or the machinery or any neglect or misconduct in the agents, leaving to the jury the fact, whether there was either.
In rejecting the defendants’ second instruction, there seems to have been clear error. The rejection of this instruction made the defendants responsible for the act of a wrong-door, of which they had no notice, which could not have been anticipated, and which, when seen, it was impossible to obviate. The refusal of tbe 2nd instruction places the railroad companies in tbe category of commort carriers of merchandize, making them insurers of li fe and limb in tbe one caso, as they are of property in the other. Tbe books are full of cases in this connection. Tbe leading one is Stockton & Stokes vs. SoJsionslall, in 13 Peters, 181, wbicb it is believed fully sustains the views here taken. The Court there instead of leaving the case generally to the jury on the question of negligence, confines it to the facts in regard to the driver’s competency, it being one of the obligations of the stage owners to have a competent driver who uses proper skill. This obligation was matter of law decided by the Court; whether it 'was complied with, was a matter of fact left to the jury. In the case of Grafts vs. Waterhouse, (3d Bingham,) 11 Eng. G. L. Bep., 119, referred .to in Bedfield on Baihoays, 325, the views of the defendants are still further sustained.
So in the case of Curlis vs. Drinkwater, 2 Barn. & Adol., 169, (22 Eng. O. L. Rep., 57,) cited at the same page of Bedfield, it is said: “The obligation of a stage proprietor in regard to conveying passengers safely, has reference to the team, the load, the state of the road, as well as the manner, of driving.” See also Sharp vs. Grey, 9 Bing., 457, (23 Eng. O. L. Rep., 331.)
In Maryland, the views of defendants are fully corroborated by the case of Stockton vs. Frey, in 4 GUI, 414, where the plaintiff's first prayer, which was granted by the Court below, and sustained on appeal, instead of leaving the question of negligence generally to the jury, as has been done in the present case, states the obligations of the stage owners as matter of law, and confines the jury to the facts in connection therewith. This authority is full up upon the points now in dispute.
In the case lately decided in this Court, of Eiualt & Myers vs. Harding & Hopkins, 16 Md.- Bep., 160, the general principle now contended for was fully sustained. The Court of Appeals reversing the Court below, declare it to be well settled, that whether diligence has been observed, is a question to be decided by the Court on facts to be found by the jury; or, which is the same thing, that it is the duty of the Court, when asked, to declare what is the standard of diligence, leaving it to the jury to say whether the facts show that the party has come up to it.
Negligence is a question of law growing out of the facts to be passed upon by the Court. Steam Nav. Go. vs. Hunger-ford, 6 G. & J., 291. What amounts to negligence is a question of law. Herring vs. Wil. & Bal. B. B. Go., 10 Iredell, 407. Moore vs. Cent. B. B. Go., 4 Zahriski, 269. McKenney vs. Neil, 1 McLean, 550, 552. Maury vs. Tal rnadge, -2 Id., 165, 167. Ingalls vs. Bills, 9 Mel., 1, Hegemanvs. R. B. Go., 16 Barb., 353. Brooks vs. R. R. Go., 25 Id., 600.
With regard to the second instruction, its refusal, making as it does the defendants insurers, is so.clearly against the well known current of authority, that a citation of cases is deemed altogether unnecessary.
George H. Williams, for the appellee, argued:
1. That the instruetious of the Court are in exact conformity with the law, as pronounced hy the Court of Appeals in the case of Stockton vs. Frey, 4 Gill, 416, 423, and wore as favorable to the appellant as it could have desired; that they covered the whole case, and therefore it was not error to reject the appellant’s prayers, even though in themselves correct. Pettigrew vs. Barnwm, 11 Md. Rep., 451. Mutual Safety Ins. Go. vs. Cohen, 3 Gill, 481. Stokes vs. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 191. B. & O. R. R. Co. vs. Resley, 14 Md. Rep., 444. Keech vs. Balto. <& Wash. R. R. Go., 17 Md. Rep., 32. McElroy vs. R. R. Go., 4 Cush., 400. Steamboat New World vs. King, 16 lloio., 474.
2. That the Court properly rejected the defendant’s first prayer:
(1st.) Because the instruction of the Court covered it.
(2nd.) Because it was calculated to mislead the jury, inasmuch as it assumes their customary speed not to have been reprehensible, and assumes also that the company were not bound to protect their road and guard it from the misconduct of others, even though such protection was perfectly feasible, and the prayer improperly restricts their legal liability.
3. That the defendant’s second prayer was properly rejected, as well for the foregoing reasons as that there was no evidence to go to the jury on which it could have been based. There was not a particle of evidence in the cause from which the jury could, have inferred any wrongful act contributing to the accident, by the misplacing of the switch, on the part of any one not connected with the defendant. There was no proof tending even to show that any human being bad purposely deranged the lock or switch. The prayer is also faulty, because it assumes that the company were to be exonerated if the misplacement “could not have been anticipated, and when visible could not have beeu obviated by the utmost care and diligence.”
Accidents would rarely, if ever happen, if.they were anticipated; and the evidence in this cause conclusively demonstrates the absurdity of relying on an “indicator” for warning at a switch, when the indicator is only visible at two hundred and fifty yards distance, and at a point on a descending grade, where, an experienced engineer, Galloway, in the company’s service eighteen years, says, a train could not be stopped under one thousand yards. This indicator is no protection at any time to trains coming from Washington at the customary speed of this company’s train — the road is to them as safe without it as with it; and so long as the company rush their trains around a curve at such velocity as to make all precautions practically useless, it will be contended that they are liable in law for all accidents at that switch; and it is respectfully submitted, after the warning given by this case, they will be liable in morals also.
From the evidence in the record, there is scarce room for doubt, that had an experienced hand carefully locked the switch, or if the switch had not been so fatally located, or when so located, if the company’s trains were not rushed around a curve at such velocity as to make all precautions perfectly useless for the avoidance of existing danger, even when seen, then this accident would not have happened, and this action would not have been instituted.
4. Negligence is a question of fact for the jury. 2 Stark. Ev., 728. Redfidd on Railways, 333. • Pierce on Am. Railways, 282, 284 & 357. Aldridge vs. Gr. Wes. Railioay Co., S Man. & Grang., 2, 515, (42 Eng. C. L.Rep., 272.) Vaughan m. Menlove, Bing. N. 0., 468, (32 Eng. G. L. Rep., 208.) Á Harrington, 253. Md. Big., 660. Cent. R. R. Co. vs. Moore, 4. ZabrisJei, 828. Huyettys. R. R. Co., 23 Pa. Rep., 374. 27 Vt. Rep.,49. Macon & Western R. R. Co. vs. Winn., 26 Oa. Rep., 250. Beers vs. Housatonnic R. R. Co., 19 Conn., 566. BiiMey vs. JY. Y. & JY. JET. R. R. Co., 27 Conn., 459. Park vs. O’Brien, 23 Id., 347. Henderson vs. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 400. Edwards vs. Balto. Fire Ins. Go., 3 Id., 189. Keech vs. Balto. & Wash. R. R. Co., 17 Md. Rep., 32.
In many of these cases there is a distinction made between cases of admitted and disputed facts. Generally, where the facts are admitted, the question is a mixed question of law and fact' for the Court and jury. In disputed cases it is always a question for the jury.

Opinion:
Bartol, J.,
delivered the following opinion, in which Cochran, J. concurred :
In my opinion the appéllants have no good cause to com-' plaiu of the ruling of the Superior Court in this case.
Nothing is better settled, than that a judgment will not be reversed on account of the rejection of prayers, even though correct in themselves, if the instructions given to the jury are correct, covering the whole case, and giving the law to the jury, as favorably for the appellant as he is entitled to ask. 3 Gill, 481, 482. 11 Md. Rep., 451. 14 Md. Rep., 444. 13 Peters, 191.
That rule seems to me to he conclusive of the present appeal. The appellee, who was the plaintiff below, was a passenger on the railroad of the appellants, in the afternoon of the 7th of duly 1856. The train ran off the track at a switch, used occasionally by dirt trains, and the plaintiff was seriously injured by the accident, and instituted this suit to recover damages for the injury.
The evidence shows that the train was thrown off by the rail on the main track being displaced at the switch. It appears also from the evidence that the switch was at or sear a curve, and on approaching it, in the direction th© appellee was traveling, the indicator could be seen by the engineer, some of the witnesses say at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards, others say two hundred and fifty yards; and that a train running at the usual speed of twenty-five miles an hour could be stopped in the space of from three'hundred to'five hundred yards, or according to the testimony of some of the witnesses, of one thousand yards. It is clear however from all the testimony, that in the position this switch was placed, the indicator could not be seen by the engineer upon a passing train, in time to prevent an accident, even if the indicator showed the misplacement of the switch. There is evidence in the cause showing that in this instance the lever of. the switch, or indicator, was in the position it would have occupied had the track been safe, and therefore when seen by the engineer from the train, gave no sign of the danger. How it got into that position is not explained by the testimony.
*In this state of facts the Superior Court instructed the jury substantially as follows:
1st. That the injury to the plaintiff was presumptive evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants, and it was incumbent on them to prove that they were not negligent, in order to discharge themselves from liability.
2nd. That it was a question of fact for the jury to determine from all the evidence in the cause, whether the injury to the plaintiff arose from any neglect on the part of the defendants or their agents, and if the jury should, find that the injury in question was the result of an accident, or act against which human care and foresight could not guard, and was not the result of negligence in any degree, on the part of the defendants, then the plaintiff was not entitled to. recover.
3rd. That in determining these questions, the jury were to have regard to the character of railway transportation.
And 4th. That if they found there was no person in charge of the switch, and that the presence of such person might have prevented the accident; still the plaintiff is not, for that reason, entitled to recover; unless the jury should find that the want of such switch-tender was an act of negligence on the part of the defendants.
I have stated the substance of the instruction, omitting the formal parts, which properly left the facts to be found by the jury; and, in my judgment, there is no part of them of which the appellants have any right to complain.
The first proposition T do not understand to he controverted. The case of Stokes vs. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181, and Stockton vs. Frey, 4 Gill, 414, conclusively establish the law; that in such ease the occurrence of the accident is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants, throwing upon them the onus of rebutting the presumption, by proving there was no negligence. Of course that can he done only by proving the facts and circumstances explaining the cause of the accident, showing it to be such as could not have been guarded against by the utmost care and diligence; or in other words by proving, in the language of Chief Justice Shaw, "the most exact care and, diligence, not only in tbe management of the trains and cars, but also in tbe structure and care of tbe track, and in all the subsidiary arrangements necessary to tbe safety of the passengers." 4 Cushing Rep., 402.
This is precisely the rule laid down in the Court's instruction here, as embodied in the 2nd and 3rd proposition above stated. The jury were told that if the injury was the result of an accident, or an act against rvhich human care and foresight could not guard, and was not in any degree the result of negligence, then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Much objection was made by the appellants in the argument, to this part of the instruction, upon the ground that it extended their liability beyond the obligations imposed on them by law, and would have the effect of destroying altogether the transportation of passengers by railroads.
But the very words of this instruction were used by Sir James Mansfield, C. J., in the case of Christie vs. Griggs, 2 Camp. R. 81; whore, in speaking of the obligation for, the safe carriage of passengers, he says: "His undertaking, as to them went no further than this, that as far as human care and foresight could go, he would provide for their safe conveyance." This language is cited with approbation by the Court of Appeals in Stockton vs. Frey, and in that case the defendant had asked for an instruction in the words used by the judge in this case, which the Court of Appeals said it was error to refuse. It is a little remarkable that the instruction complained of here, as unduly enlarging the defendant's liability, was considered by the Court in Stockton vs. Frey, as an important qualification to the plaintiff's first prayer in that case, materially beneficial to the defendant.
But apart from the direct sanction to the language hore employed, given in the case of Stockton vs. Frey, I am of opinion as the result of the authorities cited, as well as from sound reason and public policy, that the measure of responsibility of railroad companies for the safe carriage of passengers, is correctly stated by the Superior Court in this case, especially when accompanied with the important qualification, that in passing upon the question of negligence, " the jury were to have regard to the character of railway transportation;" necessarily subject to greater perils and risks than attended the old, slower and simpler modes of conveyance.
With reference to the last part of the instruction, relating to the switch, which in this case was the cause of the accident, the appellants have no just cause to complain; the instruction, in my opinion, was more favorable to them than they were entitled to ask. The Court left it to the jury to decide whether the absence of a switch-tender at that place was an act of negligence on the part of the railroad company. Looking at the facts of this case, as disclosed by the evidence, I should have little, hesitation in declaring, as, matter of law, that the failure of the company to have a switch-tender at that place, was an act of gross and culpable negligence, which would render the defendant liable for the consequences of sucli an accident as occurred in this case, if the jury should find that the presence of a switch-tender might have prevented it. Since the introduction of indicators at switches on railways, it could hardly be successfully contended that a railroad company could escape legal responsibility for the consequences of neglecting to provide so important and useful a safeguard against accidents. But what is the use of an indicator at a switch, which cannot be seen by tbe engineer in time to provide against the consequence of its being out of place ? If a railroad company, for its own convenience, makes a switch at a place where an indicator is of no use, it would seem to me that even ordinary care and prudence would require them to employ at such a place, a person to attend to the proper adjustment of the switch. In this case the question of negligence in this particular was left to the jury, and furnishes no ground for a reversal of the judgment on this appeal.
The view I have taken of this ease, renders it unnecessary to discuss the prayers offered by the appellants, because the same propositions being substantially given to tbe jury, in an instruction covering tbe whole case, tbeir refusal, as I have said, would be no cause of reversal.
I consider the first prayer of. the appellants as asserting tbe same measure and degree of obligation on tbe part of tbe company as that contained in the Court's instruction. All that it was proper for tbe Court to do in tbis case, was to furnish to the jury for their guide, the legal rule or standard hy which the obligation of the company was to he determined — that is, to prescribe the degree of care and diligence required hy law, and then to leave the fact of negligence, or want of care, for tbe jury to decide from tbe evidence in tbe cause; and it seems to mo, notwithstanding all that bas been urged in tlie argument by tbe appellants' counsel, that tbe rule in this respect, prescribed by the Court's instruction, is quite as definite and certain as that contained in the first prayer.
The second prayer of tbe defendants was properly refused, because there was no evidence upon which it could be based. The bill of exceptions contains no testimony tending to show any wrongful act on the part of any one, not connected with the defendants, contributing to the accident by displacing the switch. But if I am in error in this, still the-defendants had the benefit of that defence, under the Court's-instruction, which exempted them from liability for any act against which human care and foresight could not guard; and farther than that they were not entitled to exemption.
Finding no error in the ruling of the Superior Court, I think the judgment ought to be affirmed.