Case Name: Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Myers
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1912-05-29
Citations: 52 Ind. App. 59
Docket Number: No. 7,537
Parties: Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Myers.
Judges: Ibach, C. J., Lairy, Adams, Myers and Hottel, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 59–76

Head Matter:
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Myers.
[No. 7,537.
Filed May 29, 1912.
Rehearing denied December 31, 1912.]
1. Negligence. — Complaint.—Charges of Several Acts of Negligence. — A complaint for personal injuries is not objectionable for charging several acts of negligence in one paragraph, unless it counts upon the combined effects of two or more of the alleged negligent acts. p. 62.
2. Negligence. — Complaint.—Charges of Several Acts of Negligence. — Proof.—Where several acts of negligence are charged in the same paragraph of complaint, proof that any one of such acts was the proximate cause of the injury is sufficient to sustain the action, p. 62.
3. Railboads.— Crossing Accident.— Complaint.— Sufficiency.— In an action against a railroad company for injuries received in a crossing accident, a complaint averring that defendant maintained double tracks across a street that was used by many people, that such crossing was dangerous and was so recognized by defendant, that on the evening of the injury, plaintiff was waiting to cross as¡ soon as defendant’s west-bound train had passed, that such train was closely followed by another train on the same track, that plaintiff attempted to cross when said train had passed and was struck by an east-bound train which approached without notice or warning, and charging negligence in failing to light the crossing, in failing to maintain a flagman thereat, in running the west-bound trains in such close proximity to each other as to divert plaintiff’s attention from the danger of the east-bound train, in failing to give warning or signal of the approach of the east-bound train, and in running said train at a dangerous rate of speed, sufficiently averred actionable negligence warranting a recovery in the absence of contributory fault on the part of plaintiff, p. 63.
-1. Negligence. — Complaint.—Contributory Negligence. — Jury Question. — Where, in an action for personal injuries, the averments of the complaint do not show contributory negligence as a matter of law, it is for the jury to determine from the evidence whether plaintiff used due care to prevent the injury, p. 63.
5. Railboads. — Crossings.—Signals.—Duty.—It is the duty of a railroad company, independently of statute or ordinance, to give reasonable and timely warning of the approach of its trains to a public highway crossing, p. 64.
G. Railroads. — Crossing Accident. — Contributory Negligence. — Verdict. — Answers to Interrogatories. — Where, in an action for injuries sustained in a railroad crossing accident, the jury’s answers to interrogatories show that plaintiff looked and listened before attempting to cross the tracks, that ho heard no sound or signal of a train from the west on the north track, but saw a train approaching from the east on the south track, the speed of which he could not determine, that his line of vision was cut off and that as he approached the north track he heard a signal which confused him and caused him to halt, and that his position on the south track was one of danger, it cannot be said that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law in attempting to cross the north track, since he was not hound to wait until absolutely certain that no train was approaching on the north track, but to use ordinary care in attempting to cross, and such answers are not in irreconcilable conflict with the finding in the general verdict for plaintiff, that he was in the exercise of ordinary care, p. 65.
7. Adpeal.— Review.— Verdict.— Ansicers to Interrogatories.— A general verdict will not be set aside on appeal on answers to interrogatories that are not in irreconcilable conflict therewith. p. 66.
8. Trial. — Ansicers to Interrogatories. — Contradictory Answers.— Effect. — Where the answers to interrogatories returned by the jury are contradictory, they nullify each other and are rendered ineffective, p. 68.
9. Railroads. — Crossing Accident. — Care Required by Person in Perilous Position. — Contributory Negligence. — The law does not hold a person, who, without fault on his part, Is placed in a position of imminent peril, to the same rule of deliberation and care that governs one who is not in such peril and has timo and opportunity more accurately to determine his line of conduct, so that where plaintiff, after waiting for a west-bound train to pass on defendant’s south track, saw another west-bound train approaching while he was crossing the track, and after he had advanced far enough to see an east-bound train on the north track, was in a position of peril from which there was no escape, except by continuing across the north track or retreating across the south track, it cannot be said as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence, but the question was one for determination by the jury. p. 69.
10. Railroads. — Highway Crossings. — Rights of Persons on Highway. — The rights of a person on a public highway are equal to those of a railroad company whose tracks are situate thereon, except as to the latter’s right of priority when both need to use the highway at the same time. p. 70,
11. Railroads.— Grossings.— Signals.— Statutory Provision.— Section 5431 Burns 1908, §4020 R. S. 1881, requiring the sounding of the whistle and the ringing of- the bell on the approach of a train to a crossing, applies to crossings in an incorporated town, in the absence of an ordinance of the town prescribing different regulations, pp. 70, 71.
12. Railroads. — Grossing Accident. — Instructions.—Harmless Error. — An instruction in an action against a railroad company for injuries incurred in a crossing accident, stating that the whistle on defendant’s engine should have been sounded when the train was within eighty rods of the crossing, though technically incorrect, was harmless where the jury found that the whistle was not sounded at all. p. 71.
13. Appeal. — Review.—Instructions.—Invading Province of Jury.— Refusal. — An instruction which invades the province of the jury is properly refused, p. 71.
14. Railroads. — Grossing Accident. — Instructions.—Harmless Error. — 'In an action against a railroad company for injuries received in a crossing accident, an instruction submitting to the jury the question of whether ordinary care on the part of defendant required the presence of a watchman at the crossing, and an instruction on defendant’s liability with reference to lighting the crossing, if erroneous, were harmless, where the jury by its answers to interrogatories, found that defendant’s failure to sound the whistle or ring the bell as the train approached the crossing was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, p. 73.
15. Appeal. — Burden of Shoicing Error. — Appellant must show prejudicial error, to obtain relief on appeal, since a judgment will be affirmed where the only errors disclosed by the record were harmless, p. 74.
10. Appeal. — Review.—Harmless Error. — Evidence.—The erroneous admission of evidence which in no way affected the result of the case, was harmless, p. 75.
From DeKalb Circuit Court; Emmet A. Bratton, Judge.
Action by Guy Myers, by Ms next friend, George Myers, against the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Walter Olds and F. J. Jerome, for appellant.
P. V. Hoffman, and C. M. Phillips, for appellee.

Opinion:
Felt, J.
Appellee brought this action, by his next friend, for damages resulting from an injury to appellee alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant. There was a trial by jury, verdict for appellee in the sum of $1,000 and judgment thereon.
The first error assigned and relied on by appellant is that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint.
The complaint, in substance, avers that appellant's double-track railroad crosses a street in the business center of Waterloo; that said crossing was used by many people, both on foot and in vehicles; that it was a dangerous crossing, and was so recognized by appellant; that on the evening of April 4, 1908, appellee was at said crossing, waiting to cross said railroad as soon as one of appellant's west-bound freight-trains had passed; that said west-bound freight was closely followed by another train on the same track; that when said freight had passed, appellee, without warning or notice of the approach of another train, attempted to cross, and was struck by an east-bound train, and injured.
'It is then charged that appellant was negligent (1) in not maintaining a flagman at said crossing during the evening, (2) in failing to keep said crossing lighted, (3) in running a second train in such close proximity to said west-bound freight as to divert appellee's attention from danger on the other track from a train running in the opposite direction, (4) in negligently failing to give the statutory or any other warning of the approach of said east-bound train, and (5) in running said train over said crossing at night at a dangerous rate of speed of twenty miles an hour.
It is not a valid objection to a complaint for personal injuries that it charges several acts of negligence in the same paragraph. Proof that any one of such acts was the proximate cause of the alleged injury is sufficient to sustain the action, unless the complaint counts upon the combined effects of two or more of such alleged acts. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Barnes (1905), 164 Ind. 143, 149, 73 N. E. 91; Standard Oil Co. v. Bow ker (1895), 141 Ind. 12, 16, 40 N. E. 128; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. German Ins. Co. (1909), 44 Ind. App. 268, 271, 87 N. E. 995; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Callahan (1907), 40 Ind. App. 223, 225, 81 N. E. 670.
The averments of the complaint are sufficient to charge appellant with actionable negligence, and to warrant a recovery in the absence of .contributory fault on the part of appellee. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Miles (1904), 162 Ind. 646, 650, 70 N. E. 985. The averments of the complaint do not show appellee to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and it was, therefore, a question for the jury to determine from the evidence whether he used due care to prevent the injury. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, supra, 654; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Rosborough (1907), 40 Ind. App. 14, 18, 80 N. E. 869.
The substance of the jury's finding in its answers to interrogatories is as follows: Appellee was injured about 8 o'clock p. m. on April 4, 1908, by being hit by an eastbound freight-train on the north main track of appellant's railroad, at the crossing of said railroad and Wayne street, one of the business streets of the town of Waterloo; that said train was running at a spded of about twenty-five miles an hour; that at said crossing there were two main tracks, and two side-tracks south of the main tracks; that said crossing was much used by the people of the town and surrounding country; that the night of April 4, 1908, was a dark night, and said crossing was not so lighted that the north track could be seen for any considerable distance on such a night while a train was passing over said crossing on the south track; that just prior to the injury, appellee stood on the south side of a west-bound train on the south track waiting for said train to pass so he could cross over to the other side; that he looked and listened for a train from the west, and continued so to do until he started to go across the tracks, which he did as soon as the caboose of the west bound train had passed far enough to let him proceed; that at the time he started to cross said tracks he saw another train about 240 feet distant, coming from the east on the south track; that he did not know whether said train was a freight-train or a passenger-train; that at the time appellee started to cross said tracks he had no knowledge that a train was approaching on the north track from the west; that the passing caboose obstructed the angle of his vision so that he could not see the train approaching from the west, until near the north track; that if appellee had looked to the west when he passed across the south main track in the rear of the caboose of the west-bound train, and before stepping on the north main track, he could not have seen the eastbound train in time to have avoided the injury; that as appellee approached the north track there was a warning call from the conductor of the west-bound train that a train was coming, but such call did not say from which direction; that this call confused appellee, and momentarily halted him, so that he was caught by the north side of the pilot on the east-bound train; that but for such delay he would have gotten safely over; that the bell on the engine of said east-bound train was not ringing as it approached and crossed Wayne street, nor was the crossing whistle sounded; that if the crossing whistle had been sounded appellee could have heard it and if a flagman had been at the crossing to signal him back, he would not have been injured.
Independent of statute or ordinance, it is the duty of a railroad company to give reasonable and timely warning of the approach of its trains to the crossing of a public highway. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Terrell (1912), 177 Ind. 447, 95 N. E. 1109, 1113; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, supra; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Burton (1894), 139 Ind. 357, 375, 37 N. E. 150, 38 N. E. 594; Pennsylvania Co. v. Krick (1874), 47 Ind. 368, 371; Indianpolis, etc., R. Co. v. Hamilton (1873), 44 Ind. 76, 82; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Boyts (1897), 16 Ind. App. 640, 646, 45 N. E. 812. In view of these authorities, it is clear that, under the circumstances, the jury was warranted in finding that appellant was negligent in the operation of its trains at the Wayne street crossing, and that such negligence resulted in appellee's injury. It follows, then, that the general verdict will stand, unless it appears from the answers to interrogatories that appellee was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence. As already stated, the answers to interrogatories show that appellee looked and listened before he attempted to cross appellant's tracks; that he heard no sound or signal of a train from the west, but did see a train approaching him from the east on the south track, the speed of which he could not determine; that his line of vision was cut off, and as he approached the north track he heard a signal which confused him and caused him to halt.
His position on the south track was one of danger, and we cannot say, as a matter of law, that he was negligent, under the circumstances, in attempting to cross the north track. He was not bound to wait until absolutely certain that no train was approaching the crossing, but to use ordinary care in attempting to cross. There is nothing in the answers to interrogatories which is irreconcilable with the jury's finding in the general verdict, that he did use such care. Stoy v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (1903), 160 Ind. 144, 149, 66 N. E. 615. In the case of Dieckman v. Louisville, etc., Traction Co. (1910), 46 Ind. App. 11, 89 N. E. 909, 91 N. E. 179, speaking of a situation similar to that in the present ease, this court, at page 17, said: ' ' If one acts naturally in a case of sudden and instant peril, put on him by another, and is injured, he is not guilty of negligence, although afterwards, out of the presence of danger, with time to reflect, and in the light of all known facts, it may appear that another course of conduct might have led to his escape." To the same effect are the following cases: McIntyre v. Orner (1906), 166 Ind. 57, 69, 76 N. E. 750, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, 117 Am. St. 359, 8 Ann. Cas. 1087; Indiana, R. Co. v. Maurer (1903), 1.60 Ind. 25, 28, 25 N. E. 156; Clarke v. Pennsylvania Co. (1892), 132 Ind. 199, 31 N. E. 808, 17 L. R. A. 811; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. McHenry (1894), 10 Ind. App. 525, 527, 37 N. E. 186.
Dieckman v. Louisville, etc., Traction Co., supra, and Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, supra, are similar in principle and in their main facts to the case at bar, and the important and controlling questions raised by appellant in this case are fully answered by those decisions, adversely to appellant's contention. The Dieckman case also distinguishes the line of eases relied on by appellant from those applicable in that and in this case, making it unnecessary for us again to discuss in detail such propositions.
The question of contributory negligence was, under the averments of the complaint and the evidence, a question for the jury. The answers to interrogatories are not in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict, and this court cannot on such showing disturb the finding of the jury. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Oland (1912), 49 Ind. App. 494, 97 N. E. 543; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Van Laningham (1913), 52 Ind. App. 156, 97 N. E. 573.
Objection is made both to instructions given and to the refusal of the court to give certain instructions tendered by appellant. The instructions given were quite as favorable to appellant as the law will warrant. Those refused all center around the proposition that the jury should have been told that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and to propositions having to do with the town of Waterloo and appellant.
We find no error harmful to appellant in relation to the instructions given or refused. Neither was there any harmful error in the admission or exclusion of evidence as shown by the record.
The motions for judgment on the answers to the interrogatories and for a new trial were properly overruled.
Judgment affirmed.