Case Name: PAUL J. ECKERT, RESPONDENT, v. STAR OF ELIZABETH COUNCIL, NUMBER 37, DAUGHTERS OF AMERICA, ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY, APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1920-11-15
Citations: 95 N.J.L. 248
Docket Number: 
Parties: PAUL J. ECKERT, RESPONDENT, v. STAR OF ELIZABETH COUNCIL, NUMBER 37, DAUGHTERS OF AMERICA, ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY, APPELLANT.
Judges: For affirmance — -Tete Chief Justioe, TbeNOHAbd, Beu-geh, White, Heppenheimeb, Williams, JJ. 6.
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 248–254

Head Matter:
PAUL J. ECKERT, RESPONDENT, v. STAR OF ELIZABETH COUNCIL, NUMBER 37, DAUGHTERS OF AMERICA, ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY, APPELLANT.
Submitted March 22, 1920
Decided November 15, 1920.
On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:
“The suit was on a benefit certificate issued to plaintiff’s deceased wife as a member of the defendant association. The two defences overruled by the trial court,- and asserted here as grounds for reversal, aré that the plaintiff is not the beneficiary designated by the rules of the order, and that if this be overruled, the deceased member was in such default in her obligations to the order as to have forfeited the benefit.
“As to the first point, the by-laws provide'that in case of death the sum claimed ‘shall be paid to the nearest relative (of the member), provided they are (sic) otherwise qualified.’ The present suit is by the surviving husband, and it is urged that he is not a ‘relative’ in the sense intended because not a relative by blood. It was held by the late Yice Chancellor Yan Fleet, in Suprema Council v. Bennett, 47 N. J. Eq. 39, that the wife of a nephew was not so ‘related to’ the deceased as to be lawfully designated his beneficiary under the rules of that order. But this decision was unanimously reversed by the Court of Errors and Appeals (page 563 of tire same volume), Justice Scudder saying, ‘the construction contested for * * * would exclude a member’s wife,’ unless she came within a dependency clause. The court laid down the broad rule that the word ‘relatives’ includes relations by marriage, and on the authority of that case and its citations we conclude that for present purposes the words ‘nearest relative’ are intended to point out the person entitled to take personal property under the statutes of distribution or jure mao'iti, as the case may be. Donovington v. Mitchell, 2 Id. 243; Nelson v. Nelson, 36 Atl. Rep. 280; Grmttamfs 'Estate, 78 N. J. Eq. 232. The surviving husband is consequently the ‘nearest relative’ intended by the by-laws in this case.
“Tiie point that the benefit was forfeited by default in payment of dues we think is also without substance. The claim is that after thirteen weeks’ default in dues the member is. under the by-laws, automatically suspended and benefit ceases until all arrears, both those which led to the alleged automatic suspension and those occurring afterwards, are paid up and the account is absolutely clear and has so continued foal four weeks; and that the deceased member in fact became thirteen weeks in arrear and never squared the account until two days before her death. The facts are correctly recited but do not lead, on our view of the by-laws, to the result claimed. Article 7, section 10, reads': ‘This council shall require a member who has become thirteen weeks or more in arrears for weekly dues, to pay the entire amount due and stand suspended from sick and death benefits for the space of four weeks after the entire amount of arrearages has been paid.’
“Section 1 of article 10 is to the same effect, and section 2 provides for a report of arrearages to the council, notice by mail to the member, and declaration of suspension in open council. Plainly some official action of the council was required to effect a suspension; and apparently none was taken. Later, by the proper application of payments on account, whether at common law or under the by-laws as recited in appellant’s brief, the default was cut to less than thirteen weeks and never reached that point up to the member’s death. Her good standing was therefore not forfeited because the prescribed action was not taken, and after the shortage was reduced below thirteen weeks could not be forfeited at all.
“These considerations lead to an affirmance of the judgment.”

Opinion:
PjíR Cueiam.
The judgment under review herein is affirmed by an equally divided court.