Case Name: Ronald GAMBRELL v. Iris GAMBRELL
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1995-02-16
Citations: 650 So. 2d 517
Docket Number: No. 93-CA-00564-SCT
Parties: Ronald GAMBRELL v. Iris GAMBRELL.
Judges: HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 650
Pages: 517–527

Head Matter:
Ronald GAMBRELL v. Iris GAMBRELL.
No. 93-CA-00564-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 16, 1995.
Dempsey M. Levi, Levi & Denham, Ocean Springs, for appellant.
Patti C. Golden, Biloxi, for appellee.

Opinion:
McRAE, Justice,
for the Court:
Ronald Gambrell appeals a May 13, 1993 order of the Jackson County Chancery Court awarding Iris Gambrell alimony, attorney fees and child support. Based on our decisions in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994) and Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994), we find that the chancellor failed to consider all awards together, resulting in a less than fair resolution of the parties' financial relationship. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of alimony, attorney fees and child support in light of the stipulated division of marital property entered into by the parties.
I.
Ronald and Iris Gambrell were married on February 14, 1969 and separated on October 30, 1990. They are the parents of two daughters, ages nineteen and fifteen at the time of trial. In May, 1992, Iris was granted a divorce on the ground of adultery.
Ronald, a pilot for Southwest Airlines, joined the military when the couple married. He served for nine years of active duty and for twelve years in the Air Force Reserves. Iris taught high school for the first two and a half years of the marriage, until the couple moved to Guam. After the couple's two daughters were born, Iris managed the household, raised the children, and managed the rental properties accumulated during the course of the marriage. About five years before the parties separated, Ronald obtained the various licenses necessary to become a commercial pilot and began his present career with Southwest Airlines.
Seeking a tax write-off, the couple purchased a dancewear retail shop, All That Jazz, for $4545.00 about two and one-half years before they separated. Iris ran the shop, which was open only twenty hours a week; the couple's older daughter, Kerry, worked there part-time while in college. Pri- or to opening All That Jazz, Iris had worked for Donna's School of Dance for eight years, earning about $200.00 a month.
Iris, who was 45 years old at the time of divorce, has a Bachelor's degree. At the time of these proceedings, she was taking computer science courses to obtain teaching recertification in that area. She hoped to pursue a Masters degree to increase her earnings potential as an educator without requiring any additional years of teaching experience. She estimates that this will take her three years.
Ronald was 46 years old at the time of the divorce. As a pilot for Southwest Airlines, his monthly gross income exceeds $6,664.93. His May, 1991 Financial Disclosure Statement indicated that after pension plan deductions and a $600.00 per month contribution to the children's college fund, he had a net monthly income of $3,113.44. He earned additional gross income from the United States Air Force Reserves of $544.48 per month.
By stipulation, the parties effected a division of their marital assets and settled many of the attendant financial and child custody matters. It was agreed that Iris would be entitled to one-half of Ronald's military retirement pay for the years they lived in community property states and that the court should determine the percentage to which she was entitled for the remaining years. Iris received her doubloon collection, the Honda Accord she had been driving during the marriage, one-half of the notes due on two second mortgages held jointly by the parties (Iris' half provides income of $150.00 a month), the marital home along with its mortgage payments, and a rental house, along with its $205.00 monthly mortgage payment and the right to collect the $415.00 monthly rent thereon; and one-half interest in All That Jazz. In addition, Iris had $400.00 in a checking account, an IRA with an approximate balance of $6,500.00, and approximately $3,500.00 cash, proceeds from a CD she cashed at the time of the parties' separation in order to pay living expenses. It was stipulated that nineteen year old Kerry elected to live with her mother.
Ronald received, by stipulation, a Porsche valued at $6,000.00, a 1977 van, and a Honda CRX; one-half of the notes due on the two second mortgages held by the parties ($150.00 a month); his coin collection; one-half interest in All That Jazz; and two rental houses, along with their monthly mortgage notes of $465.00 and $174.00. Ronald planned to use one of the houses as his residence; the second provided him with a monthly rental income of $270.00. In addition, Ronald had a $5,957.75 Southwest Airlines profit sharing account; savings of $2,668; a $20,000.00 401K plan; a $12,000.00 IRA; and control over $5,756.00 deposited with the Keesler Federal Credit Union, which he said was for the children's college expenses. A flexible custody arrangement was requested for fifteen year old Tracey, who chose to live with her father.
As agreed to by the parties, determination of the amount of periodic alimony to which Iris would be entitled was left to the Chancellor. He awarded her $1,750.00 monthly alimony, to increase by $100.00 a month in April, 1993, when she would no longer be eligible for dependent coverage on Ronald's medical insurance. Ronald was further obligated to provide Iris with $500.00 monthly child support for Kerry, to increase by $400.00 a month should Tracey decide to live with Iris; one-half of his $20,000.00 401K plan, based on its value thirty days from the date of the chancellor's order; one-half of the value of his $5,957.75 Southwest Airlines profit sharing account as of January 1, 1992; 45% of his military retirement income, acquired during the course of the marriage; one-fourth or $3,750.00 of his IRA accumulated during the course of the marriage; most of the household furnishings; and one-half of any 1990 or 1991 federal or state income tax refund Ronald received.
Ronald further was ordered to maintain medical insurance on his children; to pay for both children's four-year college degrees; and to maintain Iris as a dependent on his medical insurance for one year. Ronald was awarded all of his Southwest Airlines Credit Union accounts (approximately $2,200.00); and some furnishings from the former marital dwelling. He was allowed to claim both children as income tax deductions for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. After 1993, Iris could claim Kerry if she is still eligible as a dependent and Tracey could be claimed by whomever has primary custody. Ronald was also ordered to pay Iris' attorney fees in the amount of $7,431.24 and all court costs.
II.
Recently this Court adopted the principle of equitable distribution, wherein assets "acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to distribution by the chancellor." Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994). We acknowledged in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994) that a recognized goal of the equitable distribution of assets is "not only a fair division based upon the facts of the case, but also an attempt to finalize the division of assets and conclude the parties' legal relationship, leaving them in a self sufficient state ." Id. at 929. In providing for the division of many of their marital assets — and liabilities — by stipulation, Ronald and Iris effected what they envisioned as an equitable division of their property. We find, however, that in determining the amount of periodic alimony and child support as required by the stipulation, the chancellor erred in failing to view the issues of alimony, child support and attorneys fees in light of the division of property accomplished by the stipulation. In Ferguson, we emphasized the need for the chancellor to consider all awards together so that a fair and equitable end to the marital relationship might be achieved:
All property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be considered together. "Alimony and equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they command the entire field of financial settlement of divorce. Therefore where one expands, the other must recede." LaRue [v. LaRue ], 172 W.Va. 158, 304 S.E.2d [312] at 334 (1983) (Neely, J., concurring). Thus the chancellor may divide marital assets, real and personal, as well as periodic and/or lump sum alimony, as equity demands.
639 So.2d at 929. In this case, equity demands that the chancellor revisit the areas of periodic alimony, attorney fees and child support.
Periodic Alimony
The stipulation entered by the parties required the chancellor to determine the amount of periodic alimony to which Iris was entitled. In Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281 (Miss.1994) (not yet reported), this Court addressed the role of alimony in those cases where an equitable distribution of the marital assets had been effected. Judge Prather, writing for the Court, stated:
If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse's nonmarital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's nonmarital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony based on the value of the nonmarital assets should be considered. [footnote omitted]. This process does not require divestiture of inherited or gift-acquired nonmarital property.
Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1287.
Ronald and Iris Gambrell, through their stipulations, effected an equitable division of the property acquired during the marriage. In addition, the chancellor further ordered Ronald to pay Iris an additional $3,750.00, one quarter of the value of his IRA plan, to balance the parties' IRA savings. He further provided each party with the opportuni ty to buy the other's half interest in All That Jazz for $3000.00, requiring the business to be sold and the assets equally divided, after payment of debt, if neither desired to purchase.
The stipulation made by the parties expressly provided that Iris would receive alimony. Thus, the chancellor correctly found that she was entitled to alimony. However, in light of our decision in Ferguson, and the division of assets made between the parties by stipulation as well as pursuant to the chancellor's order, we find the amount of the award to be excessive. Determining that Ronald's net monthly salary (after "maximum mandatory deductions") was $5,117.88, in contrast to Ronald's calculation of a net monthly income of $3,118.44 (including pension plan contributions and $600.00 per month toward the children's college fund), and weighing that against Iris' "reasonable" monthly expenses of $2,537.00, $500.00 of which was directly attributable to Kerry's support, the chancellor awarded Iris monthly alimony of $1750.00, to increase by $100.00 after one year, when she would no longer be eligible as a dependent under Ronald's insurance plan. In addition, Ronald was ordered to pay $500.00 child support for Kerry. It appears from these figures that the chancellor did not take into consideration the extent of the assets awarded to Iris and the income therefrom when determining Ronald's supplemental financial responsibilities. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the alimony award in light of the division of assets between the parties.
Attorney Fees
Ronald further was ordered to pay Iris' attorney fees in the amount of $7,431.24, eighty percent of the $9,289.05 in fees she submitted. He contends that Iris is able to pay those fees and thus, that the chancellor erred in making the award. Generally, the award of attorney fees is not appropriate in divorce cases unless the party requesting the award has established an inability to pay. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So.2d 1277, 1287 (Miss.1992). Although Iris stated that she was unable to pay her attorney fees, the Chancellor made no such finding in his extensive Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact, determining only that the fees were reasonable in light of the fact "that the litigation has been protracted and difficult." Thus the chancellor abused his discretion in making the award of attorney fees without a finding that Iris was unable to pay. Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1288-89; McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982). Accordingly, the award of attorney fees is reversed for review upon remand consistent with our holdings.
Child Support
In Ferguson, we recognized that "[a]ll property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be considered together." Id. at 929 (emphasis added). The parties entered a general stipulation that Ronald would pay for each of the two daughter's four year college education. The source of the funds was left to the Court's resolution. Under the terms of the final decree, Ronald was ordered to pay $500.00 per month child support for nineteen year old Kerry and in the event fifteen year old Tracey elected to move in with her mother, an additional $400.00 per month support. He, however, was given no credit for his expenditures on Tracey, who had chosen to live with him. He was further ordered to pay all of Kerry's college expenses, including provision of rehable transportation, drawing first from accounts established for the girls at the Keesler Federal Credit Union when they were young children. In addition, he was required to provide medical insurance for both daughters as well as to maintain a $100,000.00 life insurance policy with the girls as beneficiaries until the Tracey, the younger daughter, finished college. We recaU that the chancellor has no authority to order post-majority support beyond that specifically contracted by the parties. Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Miss.1993) (allowing post-majority support to the extent that very specific provisions had been made by contract incorporated into the divorce decree). Accordingly, considering Ferguson's command that child support be considered together with other financial aspects of the termination of the marital relationship, and that there exist mu tual obligations for child support, we reverse the chancellor's order for reconsideration in light of Ronald's total income and obligations and Iris' ability to contribute to her daughters' support and education.
CONCLUSION
Our decisions in Ferguson and Hems-ley require that when the equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage is accomplished, the resultant division of assets and liabilities must be factored into the determination of other financial matters such as alimony and child support. We find that the chancellor's order fails to take into consideration the parties' stipulated division of assets, placing a disproportionate burden of financial responsibilities on Ronald without regard for Iris' potential for self-sufficiency. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the matters of alimony, attorney fees and child support.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
PRATHER, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PITTMAN and SMITH, JJ.
. During the course of these proceedings, Ronald received a 3% pay raise, increasing his gross monthly income to $6,864.88.
. Iris claimed these funds were not specifically intended for college expenses but for whatever the girls wanted.
. The chancellor entered a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) for both the 401K plan and the profit sharing plan.