Case Name: Arthur IRBY and Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Mary TRAVIS, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Travis, Deceased, and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Michael Travis, Deceased
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2006-05-25
Citations: 935 So. 2d 884
Docket Number: No. 2004-CA-00414-SCT
Parties: Arthur IRBY and Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Mary TRAVIS, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Travis, Deceased, and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Michael Travis, Deceased.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, J.; RANDOLPH, J., JOINS IN PART.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 935
Pages: 884–945

Head Matter:
Arthur IRBY and Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Mary TRAVIS, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Travis, Deceased, and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Michael Travis, Deceased.
No. 2004-CA-00414-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
May 25, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 24, 2006.
Glenn F. Beckham, Harris Frederick Powers, Edward Blackmon, Jr., attorneys for appellants.
Donna Brown Jacobs, Anita K. Modak-Truran, John C. Henegan, Dennis C. Sweet, III, Alyson Lee Bustamante, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion:
CARLSON, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Illinois Central Railroad Company and Arthur Irby, its locomotive engineer, (collectively Illinois Central) appeals to us from an adverse judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict awarding damages to the wrongful death beneficiaries of the decedent driver due to a fatal accident at a grade crossing in Holmes County. The plaintiffs have also cross-appealed based on the trial court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of punitive damages. Finding several reversible errors committed at trial, we reverse the trial court judgment and remand this case to the Circuit Court of Holmes County for a new trial consistent with this opinion. Based on our disposition of Illinois Central's direct appeal, we find it unnecessary to address the issue raised in the plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the cross-appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
¶ 2. This fatal accident involving a collision between a westbound truck driven by Michael Travis (Michael) and a southbound Illinois Central train occurred on May 16, 1997, at a rural Holmes County grade crossing known as Mileston crossing. Around 10:00 a.m., that day Michael was driving his truck in a westerly direction toward Mileston crossing. At the same time, a farm tractor was approaching the Mileston crossing, traveling in an easterly direction, and approaching the grade crossing from the west. Michael stopped at the tracks, backed up to allow the farm tractor to cross over, and then proceeded on to the tracks, where the truck-train collision occurred.
¶ 3. As a result of Michael's death in this collision, Michael's mother, Mary Travis, individually, and as administratrix of Michael's estate, and on behalf of Michael's wrongful death beneficiaries, filed this wrongful death suit against Illinois Central and certain railroad employees. The plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that Illinois Central and its locomotive engineer, Arthur Irby, caused the accident by (1) failing to make a proper and timely application of the train brakes; (2) failing to keep a proper and reasonable lookout; (3) failing to properly train the crew on the train; (4) failing to adopt and enforce adequate policies and procedures relating to train operation under similar circumstances; and, (5) failing to properly warn of the dangerous conditions at the Mileston crossing, at a time when Illinois Central and Irby knew, or should have known, that the Mileston crossing was unreasonably dangerous.
¶ 4. In its subsequently filed answer and affirmative defenses, Illinois Central asserted, inter alia, a federal preemption issue, resulting in this state court action being removed to federal court. In due course, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson Division) entered summary judgment on all issues in favor of Illinois Central. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which found that the federal courts lacked diversity jurisdiction over this case; therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court judgment and remanded this case with instructions that the case be returned to state court. Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644 (5th Cir.2003).
¶ 5. Upon remand to the Circuit Court of Holmes County, Illinois Central filed numerous pre-trial motions, including a motion for summary judgment, a motion for change of venue, and a motion to exclude evidence of two prior accidents at Mileston crossing. The two prior accidents were referred to as the 1990 "Haymer accident," and the 1994 "Hawkins accident." The trial court denied Illinois Central's motion for summary judgment and motion for change of venue; however, the trial court granted Illinois Central's motion in limine to exclude evidence of these two prior accidents. However, on the day of trial, the trial court, evidently sua sponte, reconsidered its prior ruling on the motion in limine and granted the motion to the extent that evidence of the 1994 Hawkins accident would be allowed. The trial of this case resulted in a jury verdict as to liability, assigning percentages of fault as follows: Michael Travis — 25%; Illinois Central — 75%; and, Arthur Irby — 0%. The jury also assessed damages in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000,000. The subsequently entered trial court judgment took into account the jury's assessment of damages and fault by entering judgment against Illinois Central and in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $3,750,000.
¶ 6. Upon the trial court's denial of the customary post-trial motions, Illinois Central appealed to this Court on February 27, 2004; and, after briefing was completed by the parties, this case was submitted to us on November 9, 2005, for a decision. Illinois Central assigns numerous issues concerning perceived trial court error in (1) denying Illinois Central's motions for instructions D-l, D-2, and D-3; (2) allowing testimony regarding other accidents and other alleged near accidents at the Mileston crossing, and in failing to grant Illinois Central's motions for mistrial after (a) the plaintiffs' presentation of evidence regarding the Haymer accident; (b) Thelma Washington's testimony of other accidents at the Mileston crossing; (c) Annie Marie Sago's testimony regarding other accidents at the Mileston crossing; and, (d) R.C. Howard's testimony regarding "near accidents" he experienced at the Mileston crossing; (3) denying Illinois Central's Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. David Lipscomb, the plaintiffs' audiologist; (4) overruling Illinois Central's objection to Dr. Lipscomb's testimony regarding the manufacturer's specifications for the horn on the subject locomotive; (5) denying Illinois Central's motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiffs' expert, Jim Scott, from testifying due to his illegal trespass onto Illinois Central's property, and in denying Illinois Central's Daubert motions regarding Scott's testimony; (6) allowing Scott to testify regarding a video which he made of the Mileston crossing on July 28, 1997; (7) allowing the plaintiffs to conduct a redirect examination of Scott as to the speed of the subject locomotive; (8) denying Illinois Central's objections to portions of the depositions of Illinois Central's train crew (A.C. Isaac and Arthur Irby) regarding the training they received from Illinois Central; (9) denying Illinois Central's motion in limine and Daubert motion to exclude the expert witness testimony of Dr. Kenneth Wayne Heathington; (10) allowing Dr. Heathington to testify that the City of Tchula and Holmes County cannot install safety devices at the Mileston crossing; (11) allowing Dr. Heathington to testify that the conditions at the Mileston crossing on September 14, 1994, (the date of the Hawkins accident) were substantially similar to the conditions existing on the date of Michael's accident; (12) allowing Dr. Heathington to testify that other railroads voluntarily place active warning devices at their crossings; (13) denying Illinois Central's objections to the plaintiffs' jury instructions, and allowing Instructions P-2, P-3, P-4, P-9, and P-12 to be given either in whole or as amended; (14) denying or amending Instructions D-l, D-2, D-3, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-8A, and D-9, as proposed by Illinois Central; (15) allowing portions of Steven Edwards's deposition to be presented to the jury during Dr. Heathington's testimony; (16) allowing the plaintiffs to introduce, via the testimony of Dr. Heathington, a plan view of the Mile-ston crossing depicting irrelevant quadrants of the subject intersection; (17) allowing Dr. Heathington to testify regarding photographs and what Michael saw on the date of the accident, and whether these photographs accurately reflected Michael's view of the crossing on the date of the accident; (18) admitting into evidence and allowing testimony regarding the revised report of the plaintiffs' economist, Dr. G. Richard Thompson; (19) allowing the plaintiffs to present testimony regarding meetings which allegedly took place in the Mileston community before and after Michael's accident; (20) denying Illinois Central's motion for mistrial when the plaintiffs' counsel elicited testimony from Illinois Central's risk manager, Kenneth Robinson, concerning a 1991 survey of Holmes County railroad crossings; (21) denying Illinois Central's "for cause" jury challenges to the potential jurors who admitted to driving across the Mileston crossing in the previous year; (22) failing to dismiss for cause the potential jurors in the venire who admitted to taking medication which made them drowsy; (23) denying Illinois Central's Batson challenges to the plaintiffs' peremptory jury strikes; (24) allowing the plaintiffs to include in the record as an offer of proof the letter dated December 3, 1990, from Thomas Zeinz to Joe Clark; (25) denying Illinois Central's motions for change of venue; (26) excluding portions of the federal court record from the record in this cause; and, (27) failing to grant certain post-trial motions because the jury's assessment of fault and the amount of damages were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶ 7. We find that the trial court appropriately denied Illinois Central's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, on the other hand, we find that several reversible errors occurred during the course of the trial which required the trial court to grant Illinois Central's motion for a new trial. Because the trial court failed to grant Illinois Central's motion for a new trial, we reverse the trial court judgment and remand this case to the Holmes County Circuit Court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
DISCUSSION
¶ 8. While we have already set out Illinois Central's numerous assignments of error, we will restate and reorder certain issues for the sake of clarity. Since we are remanding this case for a new trial, we will discuss only certain issues which we find to mandate a remand, and which we find will aid the trial court and the attorneys upon the retrial of this case.
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ILLINOIS CENTRAL'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
¶ 9. In today's case, Illinois Central, in being dissatisfied with the trial court's entry of a judgment against it, both as to liability and damages, quite understandably filed a post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that the evidence before the trial court was legally insufficient to undergird a verdict for the plaintiffs. Our cases are legion where we have been called upon to consider the issue of whether the trial court appropriately denied a jnov motion. We recently stated:
The standard of review in considering a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is de novo. Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 883 So.2d 56, 64 (Miss.2004). The trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and look only to the sufficiency, and not the weight, of that evidence. Id. at 63. Here, when considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party], if such evidence were insufficient to uphold the verdict, the trial court must grant the motion for a j.n.o.v. [The moving parties] claim through this motion that the evidence, when taken as a whole, and when viewed in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party], will leave no reasonable doubt in the jury's minds that [the non-moving party] was negligent. They claim that the verdict was against both the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. That weight and sufficiency of the evidence are not synonymous bears repeating both here and in the final issue below. Our recent opinion in Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005), discussed sufficiency versus weight of the evidence. When determining whether the evidence was sufficient, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence is of such quality that reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So.2d 706, 713-14 (Miss.1984) (Robertson, J., specially concurring). When looking at all of the evidence, even that which [the moving parties] argued was objectionable, we cannot say that the jury could have only properly found for [the moving parties]. Conflicting evidence exists which could cause fairminded jurors to reach different conclusions and thus, granting this motion would have been improper.
Poole ex rel. Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 726 (Miss.2005).
¶ 10. In applying this standard of review, we return now to the relevant facts of today's case in addressing the jnov issue. A brief description of the Mileston crossing is helpful. The railroad tracks run generally north and south. Highway 49 runs generally parallel with the tracks, and in the area of the Mileston crossing, Highway 49 is located a mere seventy-five feet west of the tracks. A relatively short distance north of the Mileston crossing, the tracks curve. A southbound train approaching Mileston crossing from the north would curve to the right. If a southbound train is approaching this curve as the driver of a westbound vehicle is approaching Mileston crossing from the east, that driver, if the driver is looking, should be able to notice the headlights of the train as it comes into the curve. On the date of the accident, Michael was driving his truck in a westerly direction as he approached Mileston crossing. At the same time, a tractor with an oversized farm implement was approaching Mileston crossing traveling in an easterly direction. Throughout the trial, the west side of Mileston crossing was referred to as the "highway side" and the east side of Mileston crossing was referred to as the "field side." Certain "day-of-the-accident" color photographs introduced at the trial revealed that the driver of a westbound vehicle approaching Mileston crossing from the field side should have a clear, unobstructed view of a southbound train as far north of the crossing as the curve. Once Michael reached the crossing, he had to back up his truck in order to allow the eastbound tractor to cross the tracks. Once the tractor approaching from the highway side had cleared the tracks on the field side (Michael's side), Michael then slowly drove his truck up on the tracks where the southbound train collided with his truck. We admittedly find questionable certain trial testimony indicating that once the tractor was on the field side, it would have blocked Michael's view of the southbound train. Once the tractor was on the field side of the tracks and passing Michael's truck, the tractor would have been on the south side of Michael's truck. The southbound train was approaching Mileston crossing from the north side of Michael's truck. If Michael is looking to his right, he should see, not the tractor, but instead the southbound train traveling fifty-two miles per hour. It also appears to be indisputable that, as the southbound train was approaching Mile- ston crossing, the train's horn was blowing. Additionally, there is no dispute about the fact that there were no crossing gates, flashing lights and ringing bells at the Mileston crossing.
¶ 11. However, based on conflicting testimony as to the existing vegetation at the Mileston crossing on the date of the accident, and the actions of Michael and the crew members on the train, we are constrained to find, as a matter of well-established law, that there exists in the record evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors, in the exercise of impartial judgment, might have reached different conclusions as to the appropriate verdict. Id Thus, we are unable to find that the trial court committed error in denying Illinois Central's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; therefore this issue is without merit.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ACCIDENTS AT THE MILESTON CROSSING.
¶ 12. At a pretrial conference, the trial judge granted a motion in limine filed by Illinois Central, to the extent that evidence of two prior accidents at Mileston crossing would not be admissible. The two prior accidents at issue were referred to as the "Hawkins accident," which occurred in 1994, and the "Haymer accident," which occurred in 1990. However, on the day of trial, the trial judge, evidently sua sponte, reversed herself to the extent that she reconsidered and decided to allow evidence of the 1994 Hawkins accident to be considered by the jury. Although the trial court offered little by way of an on-the-record analysis to support its decision to allow evidence of the Hawkins accident, we do know from the record that the trial judge relied on this Court's decision in Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Williams, 242 Miss. 586, 135 So.2d 831 (1961), to undergird her decision to allow evidence of the Hawkins accident. The gist of the trial judge's reconsidered sua sponte ruling was that based on Williams, the Hawkins accident was "substantially similar" to Michael's ease.
¶ 13. We are fortunate to have a detailed account of the Hawkins accident since the Hawkins case was appealed to this Court. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 830 So.2d 1162 (Miss.2002). In Hawkins, we generally described the Mileston crossing as it existed on September 14, 1994, the date of the "Hawkins accident."
The collision that is the subject of this appeal occurred at the Mileston crossing in Holmes County. The railroad tracks there run north and south parallel to U.S. Highway 49E. A public gravel road intersects Highway 49 on the east side, crosses the track, then forks into two directions. The Mileston crossing is marked by one railroad crossbuck sign on each side.
On September 14, 1994, Cox was visiting her mother, Bertha Winters. Winters's home is approximately 125 feet from the Mileston crossing. Testimony at trial showed that Cox backed out of her mother's driveway sometime around 4:00 P.M. and headed west toward the crossing.
830 So.2d at 1168. Also, a review of the facts in Hawkins reveals that while the vehicle involved in the train collision was traveling west across the Mileston crossing (the same direction as Michael's vehicle), the northbound train was coming from the south, to the left of the vehicle. ("... that [the decedent] was not even looking at the train, but that she was looking north and appeared to be pointing at a passenger in the car." Id at 1169). The record in today's case also confirms that the train in the Hawkins accident was northbound, and not southbound, as was the train in the case sub judice. Additionally, the train in Hawkins suddenly appeared from an existing tree line on the east side of the tracks and south of the Mileston crossing. Id. Further, the plaintiffs' own witness, Alvin P. Haymer, testified that between the time of the 1994 Hawkins accident and the time of Michael's accident in 1997, trees had been removed from the Mileston crossing area all the way north to the curve, and that the "[ojnly thing we got now is the growing up vegetation; that's what we got."
¶ 14. Turning now to the trial court's reliance on Williams, we will discuss this Court's decision in Williams as it relates to the relevant facts of today's case. It is interesting to note that while the accident in Williams occurred at a railroad crossing on Northside Drive in the City of Jackson, the case was tried in the Choctaw County Chancery Court before a chancellor, sitting, without a jury, with jurisdiction having been obtained by way of a nonresident attachment. The accident occurred at 1:00 a.m., and involved a decedent driver who was not familiar with the Northside Drive railroad crossing, and involved, inter alia, the issue of whether the decedent driver could have seen the train which was already occupying the crossing at the time of the collision (the decedent driver collided with the forty-seventh car of a ninety-one car freight train). This Court discussed the poor lighting at the railroad crossing, such as the lack of adequate City of Jackson street lights; the inability of the decedent driver to see the headlights of another ear on the other side of the crossing due to the angle of the grade crossing; and, the bright lights of a generating plant on the opposite side of the tracks from the decedent driver, which lights were reflecting in the nighttime sky, thus making it difficult for the decedent driver to see the unilluminated box cars already occupying the grade crossing. Williams, 242 Miss. at 596-98, 135 So.2d at 834-35.
¶ 15. While we can unhesitatingly state that Williams stands for the proposition that prior-accident evidence may be properly admitted for the purpose of showing that the railroad had notice of the existence of a dangerous condition at the subject crossing, that is not all Williams has to say on this subject. This Court, in Williams, stated:
The trial court admitted into evidence, over objections of defendants, answers to complainants' interrogatories concerning two other accidents which happened at the Northside Drive crossing with the Y. & M.V. line, within less than nine months before Williams was killed. On January 1, 1959, a locomotive struck a car, and four people were killed. In the second accident on March 19, 1959, the automobile struck the side of a locomotive, and four young people were injured. Appellant contends that the facts and circumstances of these accidents were entirely different from those in the instant case, so the evidence should have been excluded; and that prior occurrences must involve substantially similar facts having a bearing on the litigated case.
This evidence was admitted for the purpose of showing notice to the railroad of the unusual danger and the existence of a dangerous condition. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Markline, 117 Miss. 37, 77 So. 858 (1917)[1918]; Anno., 128 A.L.R. 595 (1940). 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, Sec. 304, summarizes the general rule as follows: ' evidence of other similar accidents or injuries at or near the same place or by the use of the same appliance suffered by persons other than the plaintiff and in other and different times, not too remote in point of time from the particular occurrence, is admissible. Evidence of prior similar accidents, when admissible, is generally admissible for the following purposes only: (1) To show the existence of a defective or dangerous condition or appliance and the dangerous character of the place of injury or of the machine or the appliance, and (2) to show the defendant's notice or knowledge thereof.'
242 Miss. at 605-06, 135 So.2d at 839 (emphasis added).
¶ 16. Illinois Central asserts in the case sub judice that the trial court improperly relied on Williams in deciding to admit evidence of the Hawkins accident because Williams was decided under the "occupied crossing doctrine," meaning that the train entirely occupied the crossing at the time of the subject accident, and that vegetation did not factor into our decision in Williams. The plaintiffs counter these arguments by stating that as in this case, the railroad in Williams argued that the facts of two other accidents at the same crossings were entirely different, that the prior occurrences must involve "substantially" similar facts, and thus the evidence of the prior accidents should have been excluded; however, the plaintiffs conclude that, notwithstanding this argument by the railroad in Williams, this Court allowed the evidence for the purpose of showing notice to the railroad of an unusual danger.
¶ 17. We read the plaintiffs' argument to be that, notwithstanding the fact that the "prior-accident" evidence in Williams involved prior accidents which "were entirely different," this Court held that the evidence was still admissible for the purpose of showing that the railroad had prior notice of an unusually dangerous crossing. However, we disagree that Williams stands for this proposition. First of all, the Court, in Williams, did not provide the details concerning the two pri- or accidents. All we know is that this Court, in Williams, merely stated that the railroad contended that the facts and circumstances of the prior accidents were "entirely different" from the facts of the accident in Williams. Id. at 605, 135 So.2d at 839. A fair reading of Williams cannot lead one to conclude that this Court found that the two prior accidents in question were factually dissimilar from the facts of the accident under discussion. In fact, a close reading of Williams under-girds our long-held position that prior-accident evidence is admissible to show the railroad's knowledge of a dangerous condition at the crossing, only when the prior-accident evidence involves accidents which are "similar." Id. Also, we have to remember that the "city street" railroad crossing in Williams, which did not involve a vegetation issue, had more permanent conditions than does the Mileston crossing, which has vegetation changing due to the seasons, and due to the evidence of tree-cutting by the railroad between the 1994 Hawkins accident and the 1997 accident which is the subject of today's appeal.
¶ 18. Even accepting as true Alvin P. Haymer's opinion that in 1997, the conditions of the Mileston crossing were "wor-ser" than they were in 1994, a review of the record reveals the fact that the conditions of the Mileston crossing on May 16, 1997, at the time of Michael's accident, were substantially different than the conditions of the crossing on September 14, 1994, at the time of the Hawkins accident. Stated differently, the substantially dissimilar facts in these two accidents are, inter alia: (1) the Hawkins accident involved a northbound train suddenly appearing from an existing tree line on the east side of the tracks and south of the Mileston crossing, while today's accident involved a clearly visible southbound train coming out of the curve north of the Mileston crossing; (2) after the 1994 Hawkins accident, and prior to the occurrence of Michael's accident, there had been extensive tree-cutting from the Mileston crossing all the way to the curve north of the crossing; (3) the decedent driver in Hawkins drove up on the tracks at the crossing without stopping, while Michael drove up to the tracks, stopped, backed up and stopped to allow the farm tractor to cross the tracks, and then started again, and drove up on the crossing; (4) the Hawkins accident occurred in September, while Michael's accident occurred in May, meaning, there would most likely have been a difference in the color and extent of the vegetation; and, (5) the decedent driver in Hawkins would have been looking into the sun at 4:00 p.m. on the day of her accident, whereas Michael would have had the sun to his back as he approached the Mileston crossing at 10:00 a.m. on the day of his accident. These are but a few of the substantial differences which we find between the Hawkins accident and the accident which is the subject of today's appeal.
¶ 19. In Mitcham v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 515 So.2d 852 (Miss.1987), this Court stated that "[w]here evidence of other accidents or injuries is used to show the risk that a defendant's conduct has created, the requirement of substantial similarity is applied strictly." Id. at 855 (citing McCormick on Evidence, § 200 (3rd ed.1984)). In Mitcham, which, like today's case, was a "vegetation" case, this Court stated:
In the case sub judice, it must be noted that there is no record of the hearing on the motion in limine, but it can be gathered from the trial record that the lower court found that this situation lacked the requisite permanence of conditions, in that the conditions of the crossing that would have been put into issue, the height of vegetation on ICGRR's right-of-way, change with the seasons.
Id. at 856. Even though this Court acknowledged that there was very little in the record to aid it in comparing the similarity or dissimilarity of the three prior accidents with the train accident under discussion, we stated:
[W]e must assume that there was never a substantial showing of similarity of conditions so as to satisfy the lower court. Under these circumstances the evidence was not admissible to show either the existence of a dangerous condition or knowledge of hazardous circumstances.
Id. (citing Parmes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 440 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1983)).
¶ 20. In Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Ishee, 317 So.2d 923, 925-26 (Miss.1975), this Court held an experiment that depicted conditions of a train accident was inadmissible where the issue involved the line of sight. At the time of the accident, a dense amount of weeds was growing along the railroad's right of way. Id. at 925. However, at the time of the experiment, the right of way had been cleared of the weeds. Id. We held the experiment was inadmissible, stating "the presence of weeds substantially in the amount that existed at the time of the accident was of vital importance to the experiment for it to have had any probative value whatsoever." Id. at 926. Although the issue in Ishee involved a reconstruction of the conditions at the time of the accident, we find this case to be instructive.
¶ 21. Thus, in the case at bar, as to the issue of a motorist being able to see an oncoming train, trees and vegetation are quite different. Moreover, the fact that the train was traveling in a different direction from the train in Hawkins weakens the plaintiffs' claim that the conditions of the Hawkins accident were substantially similar as to those in the case sub judice. Because the Hawkins accident was not substantially similar to the case sub judice, the trial judge erred in allowing such evidence, and as such, the evidence "result[ed] in harm and prejudice or adversely affect[ed] a substantial right of [the defendant]." Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So.2d 258, 263 (Miss.2003).
¶22. In reliance on Mitcham, we unquestionably find that the substantial differences between the facts and circumstances of the 1994 Hawkins accident and the 1997 accident involving Michael, caused evidence of the Hawkins accident, and its surrounding facts and circumstances, to be inadmissible. Because the trial court allowed evidence of the Hawkins accident in today's case, it committed error which we find to be reversible.
¶ 23. We again considered prior-accident evidence in our recent decision in Richardson v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 923 So.2d 1002 (Miss.2006). Richardson involved "other accident evidence" by way of a prior accident which occurred at the same crossing over thirteen years prior to the accident under discussion, and a "yet-to-happen 2003 accident" which occurred more than three and one-half years after the accident under discussion. Richardson, Id. at 1010. In Richardson, we found this prior accident evidence to be inadmissible, and affirmed the trial court's exclusion of this evidence. Id. One could argue that in Richardson, we did not state that evidence of an accident which happened three years prior to the accident under discussion could not be used to prove that a railroad was on notice that a "dangerous condition existed." However, what we unquestionably did state in Richardson is the following:
The rule has been long established in Mississippi that evidence of prior accidents may be introduced at trial to show two things: (1) the existence of a dangerous condition; and, (2) the defendant's notice or knowledge of such dangerous condition. Yoste v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 822 So.2d 935, 936 (Miss.2002); see also Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). However, evidence of prior accidents will only be admitted upon a showing of substantial similarity of conditions. Yoste, 822 So.2d at 936. This Court has made it clear that when evidence of other accidents is introduced, it may not be too remote in time from the accident in issue. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Williams, 242 Miss. 586, 135 So.2d 831, 839 (1961). We found in Williams that "other accident" evidence occurring within nine months of the subject of the dispute was not too remote in time for the evidence to be inadmissible. Id. This Court has also found "other accident" evidence occurring over time periods less than one year close enough in time to be admissible. Barrett v. Parker, 757 So.2d 182, 188-89 (Miss.2000) (one year); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Markline, 117 Miss. 37, 77 So. 858, 864 (1918) (two years).
923 So.2d at 1009-10.
¶ 24. As noted in Richardson, we cited our 2000 decision in Bamtt, which involved, not a train-vehicle collision, but instead, a suit against a cattle owner by the driver of a motor vehicle which struck one of the cows which had wandered on to a county road in Lamar County. At trial, the plaintiff attempted to offer evidence of other incidents where the same cattle owner's cows had escaped from a field and wandered on to the county road. The trial court allowed limited evidence of these other incidents as long as there was proof that these other incidents had occurred no more than one year prior to the car-cow accident in question. On this point we stated:
Rather than absolutely prohibiting all evidence of incidents involving Parker's cattle, the trial court allowed Barrett to introduce this type of evidence as long as these alleged events occurred no more than one (1) year prior to Barrett's accident. This one-year limitation is reasonable under the holding in Massey, as it is certainly possible that the circumstances surrounding any alleged incidents occurring more than one (1) year prior to Barrett's accident may not have existed when Barrett's accident happened.
757 So.2d at 188-89. In Barrett, we cited to Hartford Insurance Group v. Massey, 216 So.2d 415 (Miss.1968). Massey also involved a car-cow accident, this time on a highway. In Massey, the plaintiff also attempted to offer evidence of other prior accidents involving cows in the same location. In addressing this issue, this Court stated:
The evidence of the commission of similar acts or the occurrence of prior accidents is admissible mainly where there is some special connection which tends to show plan, notice or knowledge of danger, or a dangerous condition. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence s 298 (1967). Mississippi has long followed the rule of admitting evidence of prior acts or accidents for the purpose of showing a dangerous condition and notice thereof, but this evidence has been admitted only in cases where other proof of negligence is present. Gulf Hills Dude Ranch, Inc. v. Brinson, 191 So.2d 856 (Miss.1966); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 242 Miss. 586, 135 So.2d 831 (1961); and S.H. Kress & Co. v. Markline, 117 Miss. 37, 77 So. 858 (1918).
In general, the admissibility is limited to conditions of permanency and the evidence must show that former accidents happened under substantially the same circumstances as those existing at the time of the accident. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence s 298 (1967).
216 So.2d at 417.
¶25. In the end, in "strictly applying" the proof-of-substantial-similarity requirement for prior-accident evidence, as prescribed by Mitcham, and for all the reasons discussed, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of the 1994 Hawkins accident, and that this error rises to the level of being reversible, especially when considering the questionable extent of liability/fault on the part of Illinois Central, as found by the jury, and certain other trial court errors which we will discuss, infra.
¶26. In discussing the Hawkins accident, Annie Marie Sago testified as to other "accidents" (plural), to which Illinois Central objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, but denied the motion for a mistrial, because it was no more than a "slip of the tongue." The plaintiff argues Illinois Central suffered no prejudice as a result of this testimony. However, we disagree, especially when this evidence on non-similar accidents is coupled with Thelma Washington's testimony. The plaintiffs' attorney questioned Washington about an area meeting to try to get additional signalization at the Mileston crossing. Washington testified, in part, as follows:
Q: Tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what this meeting was concerning.
A: It was concerning — talking about the meeting?
Q: Before Michael Travis' death.
A: It was concerning getting some lights up at that crossing.
Q: And why was it concerning — what was the reason that was being discussed?
A: Because there were so many accidents.
Illinois Central's counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial. Again, based on the totality of the record before us, we find this testimony to be highly prejudicial and reversible error.
¶ 27. Finally, we consider the testimony of R.C. Howard, who testified at trial, via deposition, as to his experiences regarding "near-accidents" at the Mileston crossing. Over Illinois Central's objection, the trial court allowed Howard's deposition testimony that he was almost hit by a train at the Mileston crossing on two different occasions prior to Michael's accident. As to Howard's experiences, there was no evidence presented to the jury as to possible fault on the part of Howard which placed him in the position of a "near-accident." In Sawyer v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R., 606 So.2d 1069 (Miss.1992), we found that the trial court did not commit error in excluding "near-accident" evidence. En route to this finding, we stated:
We have no doubt there are cases (sic) where evidence of near accidents may be admissible for the purpose of showing the dangerous character of a place and to show notice thereof to the person in control. Rules 401, 402, Miss.R.Ev.; S.H. Cress[Kress] & Co. v. Markline, 117 Miss. 37, 77 So. 858, 862 (1918); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Civ.App.1955). On the other hand, the fact of a near miss, and, for that matter, a hit, in and of itself proves very little and indeed may be quite prejudicial. See Rule 403, Miss. R. Ev. The fact that an accident almost occurs at a particular location does not necessarily imply any fault or neglect on the part of the person in control of the premises. The point has an important context. Railroad crossings are dangerous places, and they are no less so that we encounter the danger with less frequency than in other days. Wilner v. Mississippi Export Railroad Co., 546 So.2d at 681. Accepting these realities, our statute law mandates a motorist "look and listen as he approaches a crossing." Mitcham v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 515 So.2d at 855; Slay v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 511 So.2d at 880; Dale v. Bridges, 507 So.2d 375, 377 (Miss.1987). When trains approach sounding their signals, roadway travelers must give heed. Miss.Code Ann. § 77-9-249 (1972). Accordingly, to be admissible, prior-accident-and certainly near-miss-testimony-must be carefully qualified. Mitcham, 515 So.2d at 855-56; Parmes v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 440 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1983).
606 So.2d at 1075-76 (emphasis added). There is absolutely no question that Howard's "near-miss" testimony was not "carefully qualified" by the trial court, consistent with Sawyer, prior to determining admissibility. The admission of this testimony was error.
¶ 28. In the end, we have discussed but mere examples of only some of the errors which were committed regarding the trial court admission of prior-accident and "near-accident" evidence. Because of the cumulative effect of these various errors in allowing "other-accident" evidence, we are compelled to find that a new trial is required; however, we will proceed to a discussion of certain other issues.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE VOLUNTARY ACTIONS OF OTHER RAILROAD COMPANIES CONCERNING THE PLACEMENT OF ACTIVE WARNING DEVICES AT THEIR GRADE CROSSINGS.
¶ 29. Getting right to the point on this issue, we find that it was also highly prejudicial, and reversible error, to allow Dr. Kenneth Wayne Heathington to testify that other railroad companies had voluntarily placed active warning devices at their grade crossings, and that Illinois Central could have upgraded the Mileston crossing by installing gates and flashing lights if it had only chosen to do so. The effect of this and other similar evidence is that it was drilled into the collective head of the jury that Michael would be alive today if Illinois Central had only installed gates and flashing lights at the Mileston crossing. That is wholly unfair, because while it is true that fatalities at railroad grade crossings would become virtually nonexistent if every railroad crossing in the United States had gates, flashing lights and ringing bells, such a requirement would be unquestionably impractical.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CERTAIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.
¶ 30. The trial court granted Jury Instruction Number 8 (submitted by the plaintiffs as Jury Instruction P-4). This instruction stated:
The Court instructs the jury that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to May 16, 1997, Illinois Central Railroad failed to exercise reasonable care in erecting adequate warning devices at the Mileston Crossing so that the crossing was not reasonably safe for motorists like Michael Travis, or that the railroad should have placed more or different warnings than it did, and if you further find by a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, by Illinois Central Railroad proximately caused or contributed to the injuries to and death of Michael Travis, then you must return a verdict for the Plaintiff Mary Travis, as Admin-istratrix of Michael Travis's estate and on behalf of Michael Travis's Wrongful Death Beneficiaries.
We agree with Illinois Central that this jury instruction was impermissibly vague and confusing in using terms and phrases such as "adequate warning devices," and "that the railroad should have placed more or different warnings than it did," without any guidance to the jury as to the use of these terms. See Clark v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 872 So.2d 773, 777 (Miss.Ct.App.2004). After all, we have stated: "The test of whether a railroad crossing is unusually dangerous has been said to be the ability of the traveler to observe the approach of a train from the direction in which it is coming." Illinois Cent. R. v. McDaniel, 246 Miss. 600, 615, 151 So.2d 805, 811 (1963) (citing 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 711, page 1306).
¶ 31. The trial court's granting of this instruction was error, and when combined with the other errors, such as "other-accident" evidence and Dr. Heathington's improper testimony about the gates and flashing lights, the giving of this jury instruction certainly rises to the level of reversible error. Again, improper evidence had already planted the seed in the jury's mind that Michael would be alive today if Illinois Central had only spent a little money and placed gates, flashing lights, and ringing bells at the Mileston crossing; and, the giving of this jury instruction only etched in stone that all the jury had to do in order to find for the plaintiffs was to find that Illinois Central failed to erect "adequate warning devices" and that Illinois Central "should have placed more or different warnings than it did."
¶ 32. Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact that the record unquestionably reveals that prior to the date of the aeci- dent which claimed his life, Michael had traveled across the railroad tracks at the Mileston crossing on numerous occasions. In fact, there is evidence that Michael crossed the railroad tracks at the Mileston crossing on an average of 3-4 times per week. Thus, Michael was unquestionably familiar with the crossbuck signs which were present at the Mileston crossing. In other words, on this clear day on May 16, 1997, Michael knew that he was approaching the railroad tracks. Somewhere along the way during the trial of this case, the jury's attention most assuredly had been diverted away from such critical issues as the condition of the vegetation at the crossing, Michael's actions before the accident, and what Michael could have seen if he were looking to his right as he approached the Mileston crossing from the field side of the crossing.
¶33. For these reasons, we find that the granting of the plaintiffs' jury instruction number was reversible error, especially in light of the highly prejudicial evidence which the trial court erroneously allowed to be considered by the jury.
¶ 34. Because of our disposition of the issues thus far discussed, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the remaining issues raised by Illinois Central on direct appeal; therefore, we now proceed to briefly mention the issue raised by the plaintiffs on cross-appeal.
Y. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
¶ 35. After the jury returned its verdict awarding compensatory damages, the plaintiffs requested that the trial court proceed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of punitive damages; however, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' request. Based on our disposition of the issues raised by Illinois Central in its direct appeal, we find it unnecessary to address the this issue raised via the plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.
CONCLUSION
¶ 36. Every party to civil litigation— whether a private citizen, rich or poor, or a corporation which has a multi-billion dollar bottom line in a financial statement — is entitled to fair treatment in the courts of this state. We unquestionably conclude that the record in today's case is fraught with inadmissible evidence which could only have impermissibly aroused the emotions of the jury so as to divert the jury's attention away from focusing on the properly admitted evidence in order to calmly and rationally decide first the issue of liability, and, if necessary, then the issue of damages.
¶ 37. While we find that the trial court properly denied Illinois Central's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we find that the trial court erred in denying Illinois Central's motion for a new trial. Additionally, because of our grant of a new trial, it becomes unnecessary to address the issue of the trial court's denial of a hearing on punitive damages, as raised on cross-appeal by the plaintiffs.
¶ 38. Accordingly, the trial court judgment entered against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and in favor of Mary Travis, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Davis, Deceased, and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Michael Travis, Deceased, is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Holmes County for a new trial on all issues, consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs' cross-appeal is dismissed as moot.
¶ 39. ON DIRECT APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: DISMISSED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, J.; RANDOLPH, J., JOINS IN PART.