Case Name: CHESTER v. WORLD FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-05-04
Citations: 75 Mich. App. 455
Docket Number: Docket No. 27584
Parties: CHESTER v WORLD FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 75
Pages: 455–466

Head Matter:
CHESTER v WORLD FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Opinion of the Court
1. Principal and Agent — Right to Control Test — Liability—Re-spondeat Superior.
The proper test to determine an agency relationship, for purposes of respondeat superior liability, is the right to control.
2. Master and Servant — Employer-Employee Relationship — Test —Voluntary Assumption of Salary Obligation.
There is no support for finding an employer-employee relationship where there is nothing in the record to indicate the right to control, hire or fire, or discipline; furthermore, the voluntary assumption of a salary obligation, by itself, does not meet this test.
Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part by V. J. Brennan, J.
3. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Evidence—Material Issues of Fact — Questions of Law.
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment is given the benefit of all doubt; where there are unresolved material issues of fact or evidence is incomplete or in dispute, the case is not appropriate for summary judgment; however, where no material question of fact remains, a motion for summary judgment raises a question of law for the trial court.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency §§ 261, 267.
[2] 53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant § 2.
[3] 73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment § 30.
Proper procedure and course of action by trial court, where both parties move for summary judgment. 36 ALR2d 881.
[4, 5] 53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant §§ 139, 140.
[4] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 240.
[6 — 9] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 329, 330.
Right to maintain direct action against fellow employee for injury or death covered by workmen’s compensation. 21 ALR3d 845.
4. Workmen’s Compensation — Personal Injury — Compensation— Statutes.
An employee is entitled to compensation if he receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act (MCLA 418.301; MSA 17.237[301]).
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Employer-Employee Relationship— Economic Reality Test.
An employer-employee relationship for purposes of workmen’s compensation is determined by use of the "economic reality” test wherein four factors are considered: control, payment of wages, the right to hire and fire, and the right to discipline.
6. Workmen’s Compensation — Suit Against Co-Employees — Injury —Course of Employment — Bar to Action.
A suit against co-employees for injuries is barred under the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the injuries occur or develop in the regular course of the employment.
7. Workmen’s Compensation — Injury—Assault—Course of Employment — Broad Construction.
"Course of employment” under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is given broad construction and injuries received in assault, either sportive or malicious, are not, by reason of this fact alone, beyond the realm of compensability; if the injury results from the work itself, or from the stresses, the tensions, the associations, or the working environments, human as well as material, it is compensable.
8. Principal and Agent — Assault—Independent Misconduct— Outside of Agency Relationship.
A corporate defendant is not liable for an agent’s independent misconduct such as an assault which is outside of, and does not stem from, the agency relationship.
9. Workmen’s Compensation — Employment Relationship — Economic Involvement — Economic Realities — Exclusive Remedies.
A suit against a corporation for injuries arising from an assault is barred under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the plaintiffs economic involvement in the daily affairs of the corporation was consistent with the economic realities of an employment relationship.
Appeal from Wayne, Benjamin D. Burdick, J.
Submitted December 17, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 27584.)
Decided May 4, 1977.
Complaint by Albert and Ardis Chester against the World Football League, Detroit Wheels, Inc., and Joseph (Bubba) Wyche, Jr., for damages for injuries from an assault arising out of a dispute over wages. Summary judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. Judgments for Detroit Wheels and Joseph Wyche, Jr., affirmed.
Judgment for World Football League reversed.
Marston & Marston, P. C., for plaintiffs.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen, P. C. (by Phillip G. Alber), for defendant Joseph (Bubba) Wyche, Jr.
Eggenberger, Eggenberger, McKinney & Weber, for defendants World Football League and Detroit Wheels, Inc.
Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
N. J. Kaufman, J.
While we concur in the results reached in Judge Brennan's opinion on the propriety of the summary judgments granted to defendants Wyche and Wheels, we must respectfully dissent from his disposition regarding the defendant WFL. Our reasons for doing so will be outlined below.
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint against the WFL asserted two separate theories of recovery. First, plaintiffs contended that the WFL was vicariously liable for Wyche's battery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The second theory of liability articulated by plaintiff was that the WFL was negligent, among other reasons, in keeping Wyche, a man purportedly of known violent propensities, within the WFL organization, provoking Wyche to violence by failing to act to satisfy his grievances and failing to act to prevent those grievances from arising.
As has been noted by Judge Brennan, both of these theories were disposed of by way of summary judgment. However, it is unclear from the record what was the exact basis of the trial judge's reasoning. Since this is so, we will frame what we perceive to be the relevant inquiries on appeal: First, if there were undisputed facts below showing that Wyche did not act within any agency relationship with the WFL, summary judgment was warranted as to the first theory of recovery. Secondly, if the undisputed facts below show that Chester was an employee of the WFL, summary judgment was appropriate on both theories and the trial judge should be affirmed in toto. We will discuss each issue separately.
Plaintiffs rely on the fact that the Wheels had become insolvent and that the WFL had taken over the payroll to establish that Wyche acted as an agent for the WFL. In his brief, plaintiff asserts that the WFL had the right to hire or fire Wyche, "or as it ultimately did move him to another franchise", purportedly relying on Wyche's interrogatories. We have examined these interrogatories and we find no support for the statement regarding the WFL assigning his contract.
The proper test to determine an agency relationship, for purposes of respondeat superior liability, is the right to control. Arnett v Hayes Wheel Co, 201 Mich 67; 166 NW 957 (1918), Birou v Thompson-Brown Co, 67 Mich App 502, 507; 241 NW2d 265 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 808 (1976). Examining the facts under the right-to-control test, there is clearly no agency between Wyche and the WFL. Wyche was under contract with the Wheels, not the WFL. Wyche was sent to see plaintiff to collect his money with permission of the Wheels, not the WFL. On the record before us, there is nothing to indicate that the WFL had the right to control Wyche. The only evidence adduced below of any relevance is that the WFL had voluntarily undertaken to meet the Wheels' payroll. In the instant case, this does not suffice to show that the WFL had the right to control Wyche; accordingly, summary judgment as to the first theory of liability was proper.
Plaintiffs' second theory, however, does not stand in the same position. In defendant WFL's brief, it is argued that Chester was an employee of the WFL. This view is premised upon the theory that if Wyche's salary was undertaken by the WFL, then Chester's salary was also taken over by the league. As we noted above, in the instant case the voluntary assumption of a salary obligation, by itself, does not meet the control test. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Chester's salary was taken over by the league. In fact, it was never alleged below. We are now asked on appeal to infer this fact from the bankruptcy of the Wheels. We must decline this invitation.
As we previously noted, even were this true, the control test was not met. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the WFL had the right to control, hire or fire, or discipline Chester. Thus, there is nothing on the record to support the finding that Chester was an employee of the WFL. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence theory.
R. M. Maher, P. J., concurred.