Case Name: SPREKELSEN v. STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1915-11-22
Citations: 23 Wyo. 420
Docket Number: No. 792
Parties: SPREKELSEN v. STATE.
Judges: Scott, J., concurs.
Reporter: Wyoming Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 420–445

Head Matter:
SPREKELSEN v. STATE.
(No. 792;
Decided November 22nd, 1915;
152 Pac. 791.)
Intoxicating Liquors — Sales Defined — Retail Liquor Dealers— When Clubs Are Retail Dealers — When License Required-Giving Away Liquor — Criminal Offenses — Evidence—Facts or Conclusions — Statutes.
1. An incorporated fraternal organization maintaining a buffet and dispensing intoxicating liquors to its members only, each paying for what he orders and receives, is a retail liquor dealer within Compiled Statutes 1910, Sec. 2832, defining such dealers and requiring a license, though the furnishing of such liquors is merely incidental to the objects and purposes of the organization, and where such organization is unlicensed, a sale of whisky by its steward to a member for 15 cents is a sale and a violation of the statute.
2. Such a sale by an organization incorporated with power to own, control and sell property, whereby it disposes of property which it owns for a valuable consideration, does not come within the doctrine of an equitable distribution of property among the owners in common of the property.
3. Comp. Stats. 1910, Sec. 2832, prescribes no penalty for giving ■ away intoxicating liquor, and such giving is not an offense.
4. It is proper to sustain an objection to a question calling for the conclusion of a witness on a question of law involved in the case.
Error to the District Court, Earamie County; Hon. W. C. Mbntzur, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
H. Donzelmann, for plaintiff in error.
Plaintiff in error is a bona fide lodge organization duly incorporated,' maintaining a buffet wherein intoxicating liquors are dispensed to its members by and through its steward, an employee of the organization. It was not a violation of Section 2832, Comp. Stats. 1910, to sell liquor to a member without a retail license, for the reason that it is not a liquor dealer, but makes sales only to members, as an incident to the objects of its organization. There is a conflict of decision on the question, but the weight of authority, as well as the better reasoning, is on the side of plaintiff in error, who is the steward and an employee of said organization. The court erred in sustaining an objection to a question asked a witness, as to when a member’s property right in liquor dispensed to him was lost. (People v. Aldephi Club, 149 N. Y. 5.) The court erred in giving instruction number 2, which was not based upon any evidence in the case. (Firmas v. State, 20 N. W. 663; Marian v. State, 29 N. W. 911; Dunbier v. Day, ti Neb. 605; Bkadshaw v. State, 17 Neb. 147.) The court also erred in-giving instruction number 3 for the same reason. The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff’s requested instructions numbered t and 2. Sec. 2832, Comp. Stats. 1910, requiring retail liquor licenses, is not applicable to Elk Lodge No. 660, in whose, employ plaintiff in error was acting. The following decisions are from states where statutes and city ordinances relating to sale of liquor are quite similar to Sec. 2832: Manassas Club v. City, 121 Ala. 561; Cunzer v. Cal. Club, 100 Pac. 868; Seim v. Maryland, 55 Md. 566. I-Towever, in Maryland the statute was changed and thereafter the following cases were decided requiring a license: State v. Maryland Club, 66 Atl. 667; State v. Easton Club, 73 Md. 97. But continuing a general citation of authority, we call attention to Comm. v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; Comm, v. P'omphret, 137 Mass. 564; Comm. v. E^ig, 145 Mass. 119; State v. St. Louis Club, 125 Mo. 308, 26 L- R. A. 573; State v. Tindall, 40 Mo. App. 271; Bardin v. Montana Club (Mont.), 25 Pac. 1042; Sothman v. State (N'eb.), 92 N. W. 303; State v. University Club (Nev.), 130 Pac. 468, 44 L. R. A. N. S. 1026;. People v. Adelphi Club, supra/ overruling People v. Semmel, 34 N. Y. 898; People v. Bradley, .33 N. Y. 362; People v. Luhr, 28 N. Y. S. 498; Klein v. Club, 177 Pa. St. 224; Comm. v. Smith, 2 Pa. St. Ct. 474; Comm. v. Pefferman, 12 Pa. S. Ct. 202; Columbia Club v. McMaster, 28 Am. St. Reps. 826; Tenn. Club v. Dwyer, ix Lea, 452; Moriarity v. State, 25 L. R. A. N. S. 1252; Hermitage Club v. Shelton, 104 Tenn. 101; State v. Austin Club, 89 Tex. 20; Coenig v. State, 26 S. W. 835; Winters v. State, 26 S. W. 839; Ward v. State, 116 S- W. 1154; State v. Duke, 104 Tex. 355; Peidmont Club v. Comm., 87 Va. 540, 12 S. E. 963; Graff v. Evans, 8 G. B. D. L. R. 373 ;■ Newell v. Hemingway, L. J. R. 58, Q. B. Div. 46; Davies v. Burnett, D. R. 1, K. B. Div. 666. This court apparently approved an instruction in Russell v. State, 19 Wyo. 282, to the effect that if a club was organized for a lawful purpose other than the sale óf liquors and sales thereof were incidental, such club would not be required to have a dealer’s license. We regard the case of Moriarty v. State, supra, as being on all fours with the case at bar.
D. A. Preston, Attorney General, and Samuel M. Thompson, County and Prosecuting Attorney, for defendant in error.
The statute is broad in its provisions and applies to clubs that sell liquors, even where sales are limited to members. The weight of authority supports this proposition. (Woolen & Thornton on Intoxicating Liquors; Joyce on Intoxicating Liquors; Ann. Cas. 1912, A-1088.) The English doctrine is to the contrary and many of the cases hinge on this distinction, hence the transaction involved here is a sale. The following authorities support our contention that the facts in this case constitute a violation of Sec. 2832, Comp. Stats.: Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 Ala. 643; Martin’s Case, 59 Ala. 34. The Manassas Club case cited by counsel is not in point, as it turns upon the definition of the word “business” as used in the statute. The case of Cuzner v. Club cited by counsel is governed by the same question. A later California case, Ex parte Bond, 107 Pac. 143, does decide that a club, not a bona fide club, must have a license. In Colorado, clubs are required to pay a license. (Lloyd v. Canyon City, 103- Pac. 288; Manning v. Canyon City, 45 Colo. 571, 101 Pac. 973; Canyon City v. People, 121 Pac. 120; Army & Navy Club v. Dist. of Columbia, 8 App. D. C. 544; Morham v. State, 105 Ga. 709, 52 S. E. 143, 43 L. Rj. A. 398; Diel v. State, 80 S. E. 537; South Shore Club v. People, 228 Ill. 73, 81 N. E. 805, 12 L. R- A. N. S. 519; County v. Club (Idaho), 118 Pac. 1086; Marmont v. State, 40 Ind. 21; State v. Johns, 140 la. 125, 118 N. W. 295; Kentucky Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309-; State v. Club (La.), 12 So. 895; University Club v. Rattennan, 3 Oh. Cir. C. 18; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250, 41 N. W. 908; State v. Minn. Club, 119 N. W. 494.)- The Nebraska case, Soth-man v. State, cited by the opposition, relates to non-bona fide clubs and is not in point.. In New Jersey a license is required. (Newark v. Club, 53 N. J. L. 99.) Also North Carolina. (State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633; State v. Weis, 108 N. C. 787, 13 S. E. 225.) The following cases from Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia hold that a license is necessary: Bachelors’ Club v. State, 119 Pac. 339; State v. Kline, 50 Ore. 426; State v. Mudie, 115 N. W. 107; Hermitage Club v. Shelton, supra; City of Spokane v. Baughman,. 103 P'ac. 14; State v. Shumate, 44 W. Va. 490. (See also U. S. v. Giller, 54 Fed. 656.) The case of Moriarty v. State cited by plaintiff in error involved the question of sales of liquor for profit. The point is unimportant here, as the evidence showed the sale to have been made for profit. The Wyoming cases cited by counsel relate to non-bona fide clubs. The Idaho case of Ada County v. Club, supra, is strong and supports our contention. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the assignments of error with reference to instructions given at the trial, for if the statute applies, the instrucions were proper.

Opinion:
Beard, Justice.
The plaintiff in error, Frank Sprekelsen, was convicted in the district court of the crime of selling whisky without a license. From that judgment he brings error.
The question to be decided is fairly and accurately stated by counsel for plaintiff in error in his brief, and is as- follows : "Whether the Cheyenne Lodge No. 660 of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Files, whose objects are to inculcate the principles of charity, justice, brotherly love and fidelity; to promote the welfare and enhance the happiness of its members; quicken the spirit of American patriot ism; to cultivate good fellowship; to perpetuate itself as a fraternal organization, and to promote for its government, the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, can dispense liquor to its members, receiving either cash or a check for the same, in accordance with the regulations of the governing.board of said order, and dispense such liquor hy and through its steward, who was an employee of said organization, and who, in the case at bar, was the above named Frank Sprekelsen, plaintiff in error; and whether the said organization, for the dispensing of such liquor, had to have a retail liquor license under the laws of the State of Wyoming?"
There is no dispute as to the facts. The organization is a bona fide lodge of Elks, incorporated under the laws of Wyoming, owning its building, consisting of its lodge rooms, reading room, card rooms, billiard room, and a room used as a buffet, in which are kept intoxicating liquors, which are dispensed to its members only, each paying for what he orders and receives. That the furnishing of such liquors is not the principal business of the organization, but merely incidental to its objects and purposes. There is no dispute as to the sale of a drink of whisky to one of the members for fifteen cents by the steward, Sprekelsen, if such a transaction constituted-a "sale" within the meaning of the statute. The statute under which the conviction was had is as follows :
"Every person who shall sell, barter, or give away any spirituous, malt, fermented or intoxicating liquor or wine by the glass, or to be drunk on the premises, or by bottle, or in less quantity than by the case of five gallons at any time, shall be known as a retail liquor dealer. Any person who shall sell or give away any such liquor or liquors, wine or wines by the case or in quantities more than five gallons at a time, shall be known as a wholesale liquor dealer. Each retail liquor dealer shall pay for a license hereunder, the sum of one thousand dollars, payable annually in advance. Each wholesale dealer shall pay for his license the sum of three hundred dollars, payable annually in advance. A re- ' tail license granted under the provisions hereof shall a-lso' authorize a person to sell by wholesale. No person or persons within the state, directly or indirectly, in person or by agent or employee, shall vend, sell, barter or dispose of for any pecuniary advantage,. any spirituous, malt, fermented or intoxicating liquors or wine without first obtaining a license therefor as provided in this chapter. Every person who shall violate any provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, together with the costs of suit, for each and every offense, and shall be confined in the county jail until such fine is paid, or until otherwise discharged according to law. In case of any violation hereof by any corporation, every officer, agent or employee making, or in any way countenancing or conniving at any sale or sales in violation hereof shall be deemed and held a person making such sale or sales liable to the pains and penalties herein imposed." (Section 2832, Comp. Stats. 1910.)
The main contentions of counsel for plaintiff in error are: (1) that the transaction did not constitute a sale; and (2) that, if it be held to have been a sale, the Elks Lodge was not a retail liquor dealer and was not engaged in business as a retail dealer, and was not therefore required to procure a license. There-is some conflict in the decided cases as to whether or not such transaction constitutes a sale. The cases holding that it does not, generally .put it on the ground that it is an equitable distribution of property among the owners in common of the property; but that doctrine has no application to the case at bar. Here the lodge, a corporation — a distinct legal entity having power and authority to own, control and sell property— was the absolute and unqualified' owner of the property and had it in its possession. It parted with its title, possession and right to possession to another for a valuable consideration. Not a single-element of a valid sale is wanting in the transaction. That the transaction constituted a sale is supported by abundant authority, and we deem it necessary to cite only a few of the many cases so holding. (Martin's case, 59 Ala. 34; Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 Ala. 643, 42 So. 1040, 121 Am. St. Rep. 82; The Manassas Club v. The City of Mobile, 121 Ala. 561, 25 So. 628; Manning v. Canon City, 45 Colo. 571, 101 Pac. 978, 23 L. R. A. N. S. 192; Lloyd v. Canon City, 46 Colo. 195, 103 Pac. 288; Canon City Labor Club v. People, 21 Colo. App. 37, 121 Pac. 120; Ada County v. Boise Commercial Club, 20 Idaho, 421, 118 Pac. 1086, 38 L. R. A. N. S. 101; People v. Law & Order Club, 203 Ill. 127, 67 N. E. 855, 62 L. R. A. 884; South Shore Club v. The People, 228 Ill. 75, 81 N. E. 805, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 519, 119 A. S. Rep. 417, 10 Ann. Cas. 383; State v Shumate, 44 W. Va. 490, 29 S. E. 1001; Army & Navy Club v. Dist. of Columbia, 8 App. D. C. 544; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250, 2 L. R. A. 494, 41 N. W. 908; State v. Minnesota Club, 106 Minn. 515, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 1101, 119 N. W. 494.) Many more decisions holding such transactions by clubs to be a sale are to be found in the reports. We can see no good reason for holding that a transaction by an incorporated social club, which if it had to do with other property owned by it would unquestionably be held to be a sale, should not likewise be held to be a sale when the subject is intoxicating liquors. The case of Russell v. State, 19 Wyo. 270, 116 Pac. 451, is cited by counsel for plaintiff in error as decisive of this case. But the question here presented was not in that case. The trial court in that case submitted to the jury the question of the purpose for which the club was formed, and the jury found against the. defendant, and all that this court said was that the instruction was as favorable to defendant as he could ask. But on the question now being presented we hold that the instruction in the Russell case was more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to.
The next question to be determined is whether the Elks Lodge was a retail liquor dealer within the meaning of the statute. Oh that question the authorities are also conflicting, and in the cases holding such clubs are not required to pay a license the decisions have been based largely on the particular language of the statute or ordinance. The statute, for the violation of which the plaintiff in error was convicted, in clear and unambiguous language declares who shall be known as a "retail liquor dealer" and includes "every person who shall sell," etc. No exceptions whatever are to be found in the definition placed on the term by the Legislature. The Legislature having thus clearly defined who "shall be known as a retail liquor dealer," that definition must be accepted by the courts and they are not at liberty to give to the term a different meaning as they might be called upo.n to do had the term not been defined in the statute. Under the United States statute which reads: "Every person who sells, or offers for sale, malt liquors, in less quantities than five gallons at one time, but who does not deal in spirituous' liquors, shall be regarded as a retail dealer in malt liquors," the federal courts have Held that such clubs or organizations as the lodge in this case are retail dealers as defined by that statute and are' required' to pay a revenue tax. (United States v. Gilder, 54 Fed. 656; United States v. Wittig, 28 Fed. Cases, 744, case number 16748; United States v. Alexis Club, 98 Fed. 725.) A number of the cases cited in the former'paragraph of this 'opinion also apply to the point'now being considered. In addition to those we also refer to City of Spokane v. Baughman, 54 Wash. 315, 103 Pac. 14: Mohrman v. State, 105 Ga. 709, 32 S. E. 143, 43 L. R. A. 398, 70 Am. St. Rep. 74; Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21; State v. Boston Club, 45 La. Ann. 585, 20 L. R. A. 185, 12 So. 895; Kentucky Club v. City of Louisville, 92 Ky. 309, 17 S. W. 743; Newark v. Essex Club, 53 N. J. L. 99, 20 Atl. 769; State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633, 59 A. Rep. 287. We have not attempted a review of the decisions. To dó so'would'fill a volume.' We are, however,' convinced that the better reasoning and weight of authority sustains our conclusions. We do not think that it can be fairly deduced from the plain language of the statute that the Legislature intended to exempt from the operation of the statute every bona fide fraternal society, social or other club, or union in the state which might see fit to establish a "buffet"' in its meeting place and to sell to its members intoxicating liquors without restriction and without contributing to the revenues of the city or state.
It is suggested that our construction of the statute would require every one who serves a guest with wine at dinner in one's own home would be required to have a license or be subject to a fine, and that such was not the intention of the Legislature. But the statute does not so provide. That is criminal only which the statute declares to be so, and it does not prescribe any penalty for the giving away of liquor. The language is: "N0 person or persons within this state, directly or indirectly, in person or by agent or employee shall vend, sell, barter or dispose of for any pecuniary advantage, any spirituous, malt, fermented or intoxicating liquors or wine without first obtaining a license therefor as provided in this chapter." Thus it will be seen that the giving away of liquor without consideration is not made a crime, nor is any penalty prescribed for so doing.
The court sustained an objection to the' following question: "What is the fact, Judge Matson, does a member lose his particular property right in the whisky by having it distributed to him by the drink ?" The ruling is assigned as error. The ruling was clearly right. The question called for the conclusion of the witness on a question of law.
Two instructions given to the jury are complained of. The first correctly stated the. substance of the statute under which the prosecution was had; and by the other the jury was told that if it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had violated the provisions of the statute he should be found to be guilty; otherwise he should be acquitted. The instructions were applicable to the issues and evidence in the case and contained nothing of which the defendant could rightfully complain.
The court refused to instruct the jurjq as requested by the defendant, to the effect that the distribution of intoxicating liquors to members of bona fide clubs, such as the Elks Lodge in this case is admitted to be, does not constitute a sale within the meaning of the statute, and that such clubs are not required to pay a license. We have already in the former part of this opinion held otherwise, and nothing further need be said on that subject. As we construe the statute those instructions were properly refused.
Upon the facts in the' case as they are conceded to be, and the law as we understand it, the defendant below, Frank Sprekelsen, was rightfully and legally convicted, and no error being made to appear by the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Affirmed.
Scott, J., concurs.
Potter, C. J., dissents.