Case Name: HATTIE E. WADE v. WILLIAM L. MAJOR and Allie Major, his wife, and W. J. Johnson, as Sheriff of Slope County, North Dakota
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-03-31
Citations: 36 N.D. 331
Docket Number: 
Parties: HATTIE E. WADE v. WILLIAM L. MAJOR and Allie Major, his wife, and W. J. Johnson, as Sheriff of Slope County, North Dakota.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 331–341

Head Matter:
HATTIE E. WADE v. WILLIAM L. MAJOR and Allie Major, his wife, and W. J. Johnson, as Sheriff of Slope County, North Dakota.
(162 N. W. 399.)
Mortgage foreclosure — sale — redemption — riglit of — lapse of one year from sale — extended — equity and justice — to meet demands of.
After the lapse of a year from the date of a mortgage sale, the courts have full power to permit a redemption when equity and justice demand it.
Opinion filed March 31, 1917.
Rehearing denied April 23, 1917.
Appeal from the District Court of Slope County, Hon. W. C. Grawford, Judge.
Affirmed.
Theo. B. Torkelson, for appellants.
The time to redeem from foreclosure and sale should not be extended for the parties to ascertain whether it will be for their interest to redeem ; nor is it a legal cause for extending the time that the mortgagors did not come into knowledge of their rights until too late. Eastman v. Thayer, 60 N. H. 408; Cilley v. Huse, 40 N. II. 358.
The time prescribed in which to exercise the right of redemption acts us a limitation upon the mortgagors, and after that time has expired, the purchaser is entitled to a deed and the right is gone, and courts can-hot extend the time beyond the statutory period. Carroll v. McCullough, 63 N. H. 98; Ross v. Mead, 10 111. Ill; Lowry v. M’Ghee, 8 Yerg. 242; Campbell v. Leonard, 132 111. 232, 24 N. E. 65; Cross v. Weare, -62 N. II. 125; Vallandingham v. Worthington, 85 Ky. 83, 2 S. W. II2; Eelton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485; Taggart v. McIIinsey, 85 Ind. 392; Carver v. Howard, 92 Ind. 113; Scheffermeyer v. Schaper, 91 Ind. 10; George v. Hart, 56 Iowa, 106, 10 N. W. 265; Newell v. Pennick, 62 Iowa, 123, II N. W. 433; Ex parte Bank of Munroe, I Hill, III, 42 Am. Dec. 61; Littler v. People, 43 111. 188; Durley v. Davis, 69 111. 133; Silliman v. Wing, I Hill, 159; Gates v. Ege, 51 Minn. 465, 59 N. W. 495; Rorer, Judicial Sales, §§ 1148 et seq.; Traeger v. Mutual Bldg. & L. Asso. 3 111. App. 288; Styles v. Dickey, 22 N. D. 511, 134 N. W. 702; Nichols v. Tingstad, 10 N. D. 173, 86 N. W. 691; Wiltsief Mortg. Foreclosure, p. 812; Little v. Worner, 11 N. D. 382.
In our state this period is extended only in one instance, and that is when the last day of the year period falls on Sunday. Styles v. Dickey, 22 N. D. 517, 131 N. W. 702; Nichols v. Tingstad, 10 N. D. 173, 86-N. W. 691; Wiltsie, Mortg. Foreclosure, p. 812; Little v. Worner, 11 N. D. 382, 92 N. W. 156; Kenmare Hard Coal, Brick & Tile Co. v, Biley, 20 N. D. 182, 126 N. W. 211; Prondzinski v. Garbutt, 8 N. D.. 191, 77 N. W. 1012; Murphy v. Teutsch, 22 N. D. 102, 35 L.B.A(N.S.) 1139, 132 N. W. 135, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1185.
Here the purchaser never promised to extend the time in which to-redeem, and this fact renders this case dissimilar to- many of the cases-holding that a redemption can be made after the lapse of one year. In all these cases there has been some fact on which courts of equity have' acted, like a promise or something done to lead to the belief that the-time was actually extended. In such cases it is but just that courts of equity intervene in the interest of justice. But no such condition exists here. Kenmare Hard Coal, Brick & Tile Co. v. Biley, 20 N. D. 182,. 126 N. W. 211; Prondzinski v. Garbutt, 8 N. D. 191, 77 N. W. 1012;-. Murphy v. Teutsch, 22 N. D. 102, 35 L.B.A.(N.S.) 1139, 132 N. W-135, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1185; Summerville v. Sorrenson, 23 N. D. 160,. 12 L.B.A.(N.S.) 877, 136 N. W.-.988.
“One who sells real property has a special or vendor’s lien thereon independent of possession, for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer.” Comp. Laws 1913, § 6861.
The defendants in any event have a vendor’s lien on the property,, for in this court of equity all questions of an equitable nature arising out of the foreclosure should be considered and equal justice done to all parties. Defendant may counterclaim against plaintiff any matter-arising out of the same transcation. Comp. Laws 1913, § 7119.
J. P. Gain, for respondent.
One is not prevented from redeeming where he acts promptly upon his first information respecting a foreclosure and sale of his land, where through accident, ignorance, and excusable mistake, he has allowed a few hours to lapse over the statutory period. Equity grants relief from such a condition where it entails no actual loss to the other party. Kopper v. Dyer, 59 Vt. 477, 59 Am. Rep. 742, 9 Atl. 4; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 823, 824.
Forfeitures are odious, and courts struggle against them. This is "the rule of equity, that a forfeiture shall not bind when the thing can be taken afterward, or compensation can be made for it. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. ■¶ 833; Cage v. Russell, 2 Vent. 352, 86 Eng. Reprint, 481; Adams v. Haskell, 10 Wis. 123; Pierson y. Clayes, 15 Vt. 93; Bostwick v. Stiles, ■35 Conn. 195.
In such matters the term “accident” includes casualty arising from unforeseen occurrences without the fault of the parties. Daggett y. Mendon, 64 Vt. 323, 24 Atl. 242; Massueco y. Tomassi, 78 Vt. 188, 62 Atl. 57; Salsbury v. Black, 4 Am. St. Rep. 634, note; Houston v. Curian, 101 111. App. 203; O’Callaghan v. Cooper, 5 Ves. Jr. 117, 31 Eng. Reprint, 501; Sandford y. Flint, 24 Mich. 26; Foley y. Grand Hotel Co. 57 C. C. A. 629, 121 Fed. 509; Warren v. Stinson, 6 N. D. .293, 70 N. W. 279; Seaman v. Riggans, 2 N. J. Eq. 214, 34 Am. Dec. .200; Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. y. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321, 59 S. E. 499; Page v. Higgins, 5 L.R.A. 152, and note, 150 Mass. 27, 22 N. E. 63; German F. Ins. Co. v. Gueck, 6 L.R.A. •835, and note, 130 111. 345, 23 N. E. 112; Riegel v. American L. Ins. •Co. 11 L.R.A. 857, and note, 140 Pa. 193, 23 Am. St. Rep. 225, 21 Atl. 392; 16 Cyc. 39B.
The common law always protected parties against the consequences -of certain accidents, but in cases not within the protection of the common law, equity has jurisdiction to grant relief. 10 R. O. L. pp. 288, .292, 328, 335, ¶¶ 32, 37 39, 75, 84; 27 Cyc. 1817, ¶ D; Stephenson v. Kilpatrick, 166 Mo. 262, 65 S. W. 773; 35 Century, Dig. p. 2842, note 1706; 5 Words & Phrases, p. 4539, “Mistake;” 4 Words & Phrases, p. 3386, et seq. “Ignorance;” 1 Words & Phrases, pp. 70, et seq. “Accident;” Murphy y. Teutsch, 22 N. D. 102, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1139, 132 N. W. 435, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1185.
The allegation of counterclaim of defendants is not against any party to this action, and therefore has no place here. Comp. Laws 1913, § 7499.
One in redeeming as owner must pay the amount of the sale with Interest and any other prior lien held by the purchaser against the personal property, but not a second mortgage or other claim held by the purchaser, where he is not personally liable. Hays v. Cretin, 102 Md. 695, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1039, 62 Atl. 1028; MacKenna v. Fidelity Trust Co. 184 N. T. 411, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1068, 112 Am. St. Rep. 620, 11 N. E. 721, 6 Ann. Gas. 471; Shaylorv. Cloud, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171, and note, 63 Fla. 608, 57 So. 666, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 277; Styles v. Dickey,. 22 N. D. 515, 134 N. W. 702.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
In December, 1912, the plaintiff made to the first-named defendants a purchase-money mortgage on 320 acres of land in Billings county (W¿ 15-134-100), to secure $1,100, and interest. The mortgage was promptly foreclosed by a sale of the land to the mortgagees on February 26th, 1914, for $1,287.55. In the latter part of February, 1915, to redeem from the foreclosure sale, the plaintiff went from her home in Michigan to Medora, in Billings county, and paid the sheriff of that county the sum necessary to redeem. That was on February 24th, 1915. Then she learned that to redeem she must go to Amidon, the county seat of Slope county, which had been part of Billings county until a month previous. At Medora she sent a telegram toller mortgagees, offering them a bonus of over $500 for an assignment of their sale certificate, and they made no answer, because they had made a conditional contract to transfer the land to another party.- Then, on February 26th, she went to Dickinson, consulted a lawyer, and had him make out redemption papers, and started in haste to Amidon by way of New England. At this place she was forced to wait until the morning of February 27th, 1915. Then she went to Amidon and quickly put her redemption papers and money into the hands of the sheriff. He accepted and retained the money, but declined to make to her a redemption certificate or deed, claiming that time to redeem expired on the day previous. She then commenced this action to redeem, and judgment was duly given in her favor by Judge Crawford.
The defendants appeal to this court, insisting on two points. The. first is that, as a condition of being allowed to redeem, the plaintiff should be required to pay them about $550 that she does not owe them, which point has no merits.
The second point is that the court is powerless to decree a redemption because it was a day too late. To redeem the plaintiff incurred a great expense. She risked her health and life.in driving over the cold drifting snows when her driver lost his way. She put her redemption money into the hands of two sheriffs in the best of good faith, but, by reason of accidents which she could not foresee or prevent, she got to the-last sheriff a few hours after the lapse of the year from the date when her mortgagees had caused her property to be sold to themselves for much less than its value. Now it would seem that if courts cannot give relief under such circumstances, it is time for the judges to go to bed and cover their heads in shame. The statute gives a mortgagee only a conditional right to become a purchaser of land at his own foreclosure sale. He must act fairly and in good faith, so as to avoid oppression and to take no advantage of his mortgagor through the forms of the law. He is entitled to only his money, with interest at the enormous rate of 12 per cent, even though he gets it a few days before or after the year of redemption. He has no right to avail himself of the law to get something for nothing, or to speculate on the misfortunes of his debtor.
To mitigate the asperities of the law and to grant relief against forfeitures, penalties, accidents, and mistakes, — this has always been the special function and the duty of courts of equity. This court is not disposed to give the pound of flesh, because it is so denominated in the bond. The judgment of the district court is highly commended; and it is affirmed. This is without prejudice to any claim the defendants may have for a vendor's lien.