Case Name: Fredrick BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-06-08
Citations: 743 So. 2d 1054
Docket Number: No. 97-KA-01528-COA
Parties: Fredrick BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: BEFORE KING, P.J., BRIDGES, DIAZ, AND LEE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 743
Pages: 1054–1059

Head Matter:
Fredrick BARBER, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 97-KA-01528-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 8, 1999.
Gary B. Jones, Meridian, Thomas M. West, Attorneys for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Pat S. Flynn, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE KING, P.J., BRIDGES, DIAZ, AND LEE, JJ.

Opinion:
DIAZ, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Fredrick Barber appeals his conviction of simple assault on a police officer raising the following issues as error: 1) whether defense counsel was deficient in his performance and whether counsel's deficiency was prejudicial and 2) whether the court erred in not giving defense jury instruction D-2. Finding the last issue to be dispositive, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
¶ 2. On August 28, 1996, a minor traffic accident occurred in Waynesboro, Mississippi. Barber was part of this accident. Officers Joe Gray and Marvin Overstreet were investigating the accident. When Gray called the dispatcher to check on the drivers's licenses of the individuals involved, he was informed that there was an outstanding warrant for Barber issued by the Waynesboro Municipal Court. As Overstreet attempted to arrest Barber, he ran from the scene. The officers gave chase, but lost sight of Barber in an alley. After five to ten minutes the officers spotted Barber walking back toward them. Barber asked them what the warrant was for and the officers told him. Gray held out his hand to arrest Barber, and Barber swung at him, hitting him in the face and cutting Gray's eye. Barber again ran. Gray tackled him and all three ended up fighting in a ditch. Finally, Barber gave up. The officers transported Barber to the police station. Gray received a cut over his face and a dislocated finger.
DISCUSSION
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED-OFFENSE OF RESISTING ARREST
¶ 3. Barber requested a lesser-included-offense instruction on resisting arrest which was denied. He argues that this instruction was warranted by the evidence.
¶ 4. Trial courts should instruct juries about the defendant's theory in the case if it is supported by the evidence, no matter how meager or unlikely. Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss.1995). A lesser-included-offense instruction should be granted where there is an evidentiary basis in the record for it. Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230 (Miss.1985). "[T]he evidence in a particular case generally warrants granting a lesser offense instruction if a 'rational' or a 'reasonable' jury could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense." Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss.1987). Common sense dictates that if someone resists too strongly it becomes an assault, and therefore, resisting arrest is clearly a lesser-included-offense of simple assault on an officer. Murrell v. State, 655 So.2d 881, 886 (Miss.1995) (holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer).
¶ 5. Officer Gray testified that there was a five to ten minute interval between the time they lost sight of Barber and the time he came back and walked toward the officers. When Barber got close Gray testified that he, "put [his] hand out, come on. You are under arrest. Let's go back to the car. He swung at me and backed up." Barber's theory of the case was that he was guilty of resisting arrest instead of simple assault on an officer. The trial court confused the issues and the jury by giving State's jury instruction S-3, which reads "one may not resist arrest by any force, means or in any manner," but would not grant Barber's jury instruction on resisting arrest. Barber was entitled to have the jury instructed regarding any offense carrying a lesser punishment arising out of the same core of operative facts with the scenario giving rise to the charge laid in the indictment. Since resisting arrest is a lesser offense of assault on an officer and the trial judge denied the jury instruction to that effect, we reverse and remand this case with instructions for the trial judge to include the resisting arrest instruction to the jury upon retrial.
II.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
¶ 6. To facilitate the trial court on remand we will address one of Barber's issues he puts forth in his submitted brief. Barber, through new counsel on appeal, cites three reasons why his trial counsel was ineffective. The one issue we are concerned with is Barber's contention that he had a viable double jeopardy issue that was deficiently handled by his trial counsel. Barber claims that his trial in circuit court for simple assault on a law enforcement officer was double jeopardy since he had previously been convicted in municipal court of resisting arrest for the same incident.
¶ 7. After Barber's trial, a hearing was held on trial counsel's motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. Officer Overstreet testified that the resisting arrest charge came from Barber's action of running from him when he first tried to arrest him. The simple assault charge came from the act of Barber hitting Officer Gray in the eye. Barber's appellate counsel argues that trial counsel was ineffective during cross-examination of Overstreet because trial counsel did not have the affidavit and arrest warrant for the resisting arrest case. On appeal, we do not have either of these documents. Because we do not have a complete record before us to determine what facts were used to convict Barber of resisting arrest, we cannot say whether his simple assault trial was a subsequent punishment for the same offense. See White v. State, 702 So.2d 107, 109 (Miss.1997). "Double jeopardy protection applies to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense." Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). "[Wjhere the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the 'same-elements' test, the double jeopardy bar applies." White, 702 So.2d at 109 (quoting Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849).
¶ 8. A close inspection of the record seems to bolster Barber's argument that his trial for simple assault came from the same common nucleus of operative facts as his conviction of resisting arrest. It seems the prosecution was treating Barber's fleeing from the scene and the melee between the officers and Barber in the alley as one offense. During discussion of jury instructions, the prosecution made the statement, when referring to State's jury instruction S-3, "to tell you the truth, this [instruction] is primarily directed at the initial stop and the initial action of the defendant at the scene of the wreck." On remand the trial judge should address the issue of double jeopardy should the defense present sufficient evidence on this proposition.
¶ 9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF SIMPLE ASSAULT ON AN OFFICER IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO WAYNE COUNTY.
KING, P.J., BRIDGES, COLEMAN, IRVING, LEE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J. AND PAYNE, J.