Case Name: Joseph Dobbins, Respondent, v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1917-03-07
Citations: 177 A.D. 132
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Dobbins, Respondent, v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 177
Pages: 132–137

Head Matter:
Joseph Dobbins, Respondent, v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, Appellant.
Third Department,
March 7, 1917.
Carriers — whan shipper not bound to accept erroneous bill of lading — liability of carrier' for réfusal to issue bill of lading and to deliver goods to consignee — pleading — complaint — statement of facts according to legal effect.
A shipper is not obliged to accept a bill of lading making an admission against himself not warranted by the facts.
When a carrier refuses to ship cabbage placed in its cars unless the shipper accept a bill of lading stating, contrary to the facts, that the cabbage were " more or less frozen when received, ” and ships them to another place and claims that a sale has been made on the shipper’s account, the latter is entitled to recover their value.
Complaint in an action by the shipper, under such circumstances, and the evidence received thereunder examined, and held, that a recovery in favor of the plaintiff should be affirmed.
Pacts may be stated in a pleading according to their legal effect. Woodward and Cochrane, JJ., disented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, from a judgment of the County Court of Cortland county in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 23d day of May, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury for $387.85, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the same day denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
Thomson & Byrne [F. W. Thomson of counsel], for the appellant.
James F. Dougherty [Thomas H. Dowd of counsel], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Kellogg, P. J.:
When the cabbage were put in the cars, furnished by defendant for them, it was its duty to transport them to the consignee, and in issuing a bill of lading it must issue it according to the facts. Defendant refused to ship the cabbage unless plaintiff would accept a bill of lading with a notation upon it that the cabbage were "more or less frozen when received." The evidence quite conclusively shows that the cabbage were in good condition and were not "more .or less frozen when received." In any question between the plaintiff and the company about the condition of the cabbage this false notation would be some evidence against the plaintiff. He was not obliged to accept the bill of lading, thus making an admission against himself not warranted by the facts. The requirement of the defendant was, therefore, unreasonable and arbitrary, and it violated its duty in refusing to ship the cabbage. Plaintiff was not bound to abandon his effort to ship the cabbage and remove them from the car, as it was defendant's duty to forward them. The defendant shipped the cabbage, not to the destination indicated by the plaintiff, but to another place, and sold them, as it claimed, on the plaintiff's account. The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to recover their value.
These facts were properly proved under the complaint. It alleged that the plaintiff loaded the cabbage into defendant's car and requested it to transport them to the consignee; that the defendant wholly refused and neglected to issue to the plaintiff a bill of lading and deliver the same to the consignee, and that by reason of the defendant's failure to transport the cabbage and give plaintiff a bill of lading, according to its duty, the cabbage were injured and the plaintiff suffered loss of the value thereof. The recovery is well justified by the allegations of the complaint and the evidence.
It is not necessary to set forth in a pleading all the circumstances attending a transaction; the facts may be stated according to their legal effect. (Brown v. Champlin, 66 N. Y. 214; Kunz v. Bosselman, 131 App. Div. 288.)
I, therefore, favor affirmance.
All concurred, except Woodward, J., who dissented in opinion, in which Cochrane, J., concurred.