Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ex rel PARKS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-03-01
Citations: 412 Mich. 610
Docket Number: Docket No. 64141
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ex rel PARKS v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Judges: Coleman, C.J., and Ryan, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 412
Pages: 610–668

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ex rel PARKS v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket No. 64141.
Argued November 14, 1980
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided March 1, 1982.
Mary Parks brought a complaint before the Civil Rights Commission against General Motors Corporation under the State Fair Employment Practices Act, charging that the defendant had dismissed her from its employment because her religious beliefs, as a Seventh-day Adventist, conflicted with her assigned hours of work. The plaintiffs religion forbids work on the Sabbath, between sunset on Friday and sunset on Saturday. She was assigned to work the second shift at the defendant’s Pontiac Fisher Body plant, from 4 p.m. until 12:30 a.m., and after telling her foreman on the day before each Friday that she could not work the following day because of her religious beliefs, she failed to report to work on three consecutive Fridays. The defendant admits that it terminated her employment without considering other action to accommodate her religious practice. The Civil Rights Commission found the defendant guilty of unlawful religious discrimination and ordered it to reinstate her with back pay and other benefits. The Oakland Circuit Court, Francis X. O’Brien, J., reversed the order on the ground that requiring the defendant to make the accommodation exceeded the authority of the Civil Rights Commission under the State Fair Employment Practices Act. The Court of Appeals, Beasley, P.J., and Allen and D. C. Riley, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 78-1885). The Department of Civil Rights appeals.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4, 9-11, 14, 15, 19, 20] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 195, 196.
Fair employment statutes designed to eliminate racial, religious, or national origin discrimination in private employment. 44 ALR2d 1138.
[2] 1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 127.
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 301.
16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 490.
[3] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 145.
[5] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 318.
[6] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 194.
[7, 21] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 199.
[8] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 193.
[12, 13, 16] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 233, 234, 236.
[17-19] 16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 466 et seq.
Supreme Court cases involving establishment and freedom of religion clauses of Federal Constitution. 37 L Ed 2d 1147.
In opinions by Justices Kavanagh, Levin, and Williams, the Supreme Court held:
The State Fair Employment Practices Act does not impose a duty on the employer to make reasonable accommodations to an employee’s religious needs. However, there may be a finding of discrimination based on evidence that an employer failed to act affirmatively to avoid the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Justice Kavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Ryan, would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth in that Court’s opinion. They are:
1. The interpretive guidelines promulgated by the Civil Rights Commission, which construed the statute as imposing a duty on the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees where the accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business, were not binding on employers. An interpretive guideline of this kind is, under the Administrative Procedures Act, an agency statement of policy which does not have the force of law, and which binds the agency but not any other person. The guidelines were issued without either the authority or procedure necessary to have them given effect as a rule.
2. The statute, which by its terms prohibits religious discrimination, does not include a duty reasonably to accommodate the religious needs of employees. The Legislature did not enact legislation expanding the prohibition to include the duty, as did the Congress after the' substantially identical federal statute was held not to include the duty. In the absence of any clear legislative interpretation that the term "discrimination” includes a duty to make reasonable accommodations, such a construction goes beyond the legislative mandate. Not only did the Legislature fail to enact positive legislation, but on three occasions when it amended the act for other purposes, it failed to deal with religious accommodation. Furthermore, the courts are reluctant to find affirmative duties in a general ban on discrimination. The doctrine of legislative acquiescence in administrative interpretation does not apply in this case because none of the factors relied on by the courts in applying the doctrine are present.
Justice Levin agreed with Justice Kavanagh that the State Fair Employment Practices Act does not impose a separate obligation to accommodate the religious needs of employees. An employer may nevertheless be required to act affirmatively to avoid discriminating against an employee because of religion.
1. It is the duty of the Civil Rights Commission, under the Constitution of 1963, to investigate allegations of discrimination because of religion in the enjoyment of civil rights guaranteed by law and the constitution, and to secure the equal protection of those rights without religious discrimination. The right to an opportunity to be employed is a civil right guaranteed by law. Justice Levin agreed with Justices Williams and Moody that "discrimination” includes practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. An employer may be obliged to act affirmatively to avoid a discriminatory effect.
2. The stipulation of facts does not say whether General Motors, in particular cases or as a matter of policy or practice, made changes in the work schedule so that employees can refrain from work on their days of religious observance. Nor does it appear whether the refusal to accommodate Mary Parks’ religious needs was inconsistent with past conduct, policy or practice of General Motors, or otherwise might have discriminated against her because of religion. The concession that General Motors refused to consider an alternative to discharge does not, standing alone, establish a policy or practice "discriminatory in operation” or that GM discriminated against her because of religion.
3. Whether a particular policy or rule of federal law should be incorporated into Michigan law should be decided as the issue arises. The guideline adopted by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which requires an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of employees may reflect a perception that employers of large numbers of persons generally make an effort to do that where it can be done without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business, and may further reflect the view that it is therefore appropriate to presume discrimination because of religion from a failure so to accommodate with the burden of justifying the failure on the employer. However, it has not been shown that such a generalization has a factual basis in the experience of the administrative agencies to support it as the proper construction of the statute.
4. In this case, the Department of Civil Rights and General Motors apparently desire an answer to the abstract question whether the State Fair Employment Practices Act should be read as imposing a duty of reasonable accommodation. Justice Levin agreed, for the reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals, there is no present reason for reading the State Fair Employment Practices Act, enacted in 1955, as imposing the duty of an employer under federal law to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of an employee.
5. The opinion of the Court does not preclude a finding of discrimination based on evidence that an employer failed to act affirmatively to avoid the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice, and leaves open the questions whether failure of an employer to accommodate the religious needs of employees or prospective employees may constitute discrimination, what would be a fair allocation of the burden of proof, and what should constitute valid defenses.
The cause should be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Justice Williams, joined by Justices Fitzgerald and Moody, would hold that the statutory duty to refrain from religious discrimination in employment imposes a duty on the employer to make reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religious needs unless an undue hardship would be occasioned thereby. This duty does not violate either the state or federal constitutions. However, they agreed with Justice Levin that there is nothing in this matter to preclude a finding of discrimination based on evidence that the employer failed to avoid the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice. Therefore, they would remand to the circuit court on that issue.
1. The language of the State Fair Employment Practices Act does not show clearly whether the Legislature intended to impose upon an employer an obligation of reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religious practices, as part of the duty to refrain from religious discrimination in employment. The administrative guideline or interpretation by the Civil Rights Commission which requires reasonable accommodation is not controlling, and under the Administrative Procedures Act does not have the force or effect of law, but is merely explanatory. The task, then, is to construe the legislative will as found in the statute.
2. Case law from other jurisdictions, while not controlling, can guide the Court where it is appropriate and sound. A common thread in such cases is that discriminatory consequences of otherwise neutral employment practices should be eliminated unless an undue hardship would be placed on the employer’s business. In addition, the guideline promulgated by the Civil Rights Commission is due some particular deference because of the constitutional establishment of the commission. A requirement of reasonable accommodation is a valid and reasonable construction of a general prohibition of religious discrimination and is in accord with the purpose of the State Fair Employment Practices Act to prevent and eliminate religious discrimination. The burden of proving that a reasonable accommodation cannot be made without undue hardship is on the employer.
3. The prohibition against religious discrimination in employment embraces the concept of religious practice as well as that of religious belief, and the Legislature necessarily included both concepts in the statute. It follows that a duty to make reasonable efforts to accommodate religious practices arose with the enactment of the law in order to achieve fully the prohibition of religious discrimination in employment. The failure of the Legislature to amend the State Fair Employment Practices Act to incorporate the substance of the administrative guideline of the Civil Rights Commission does not raise the inference that the Legislature intended to disapprove it.
4. The traditional view is that to be constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, a law concerning religion must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. That three-part test, however, only serves as a guideline to identify impairment of the objectives of the Establishment Clause and does not set the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that it will not tolerate either govern-mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Total separation between church and state is not called for, nor is it possible; some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Incidental, indirect or remote benefits to religion do not alone render a particular law constitutionally invalid. The problem, like many others in constitutional law, is one of degree.
5. The requirement of reasonable accommodation in this case is entirely consistent with the constitutionally necessary governmental neutrality in matters of religion. The primary and direct effect is to provide individual persons with a greater opportunity to secure or retain employment. Any aid filtering to a particular religious institution or to religion in general from the imposition of the requirement is too indirect and remote to be constitutionally significant. The requirement is not tainted by the evils of sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the government against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection.
6. Each case involving reasonable accommodation necessarily depends on its own facts and circumstances; the trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the considerations of the individual employment relation. An employer, in response to a communication of the religious needs of an employee, must at least make some good-faith effort at accommodation or show that it was unable reasonably to make the accommodation without undue hardship to its business. In this case, the claimant has made a prima facie showing of religious discrimination and the need for accommodation between her observance of the Sabbath and the defendant’s work schedule. General Motors has taken the position that it has no duty of reasonable accommodation. The Court agrees with General Motors on that issue but there is nothing to preclude a finding of discrimination based on evidence that General Motors failed to act affirmatively to avoid a discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice.
Opinion by Kavanagh, J.
1. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Duty of Employer.
The State Fair Employment Practices Act does not impose a duty on an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of employees (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
2. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Administrative Law.
The Civil Rights Commission cannot legislate or impose substantive duties or penalties beyond the scope of its authority under the State Fair Employment Practices Act to proscribe religious discrimination in employment (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
3. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Statutes — Construction.
To construe the State Fair Employment Practices Act to require an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious practices of an employee goes beyond the legislative .mandate (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
Opinion by Levin, J.
4. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act.
The State Fair Employment Practices Act does not impose a separate obligation upon an employer to meet the religious needs of employees (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
5. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Civil Rights Commission.
It is the duty of the Civil Rights Commission, under the Constitution of 1963, to investigate allegations of discrimination because of religion in the enjoyment of the right to an opportunity to be employed, which is a civil right guaranteed by the State Fair Employment Practices Act, and to secure the equal protection of that right without religious discrimination (Const 1963, art 1, §2; art 5, §29; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.4B8[1] et seq.).
6. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Words and Phrases.
The term religious discrimination, under the State Fair Employment Practices Act, includes practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation; an employer may be obliged to act affirmatively to avoid a discriminatory effect (Const 1963, art 5, § 29; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
7. Civil Rights — Sundays and Holidays — Fair Employment Practices Act.
A stipulation by an employer that it refused to consider an alternative other than discharge from employment of an employee because her observance of the Sabbath as a Seventh-day Adventist confficted with her assigned hours of work does not, standing alone, establish a policy or practice discriminatory in operation or that the employer discriminated against the employee because of religion (MCL 423.303; MSA 17.4S8[3j).
8. Civil Rights — Fair Employment Practices Act — Administrative Law — Constitutional Law.
Neither the State Fair Employment Practices Act nor the Constitution of 1963 requires the assimilation into Michigan law of whatever Congress enacts, federal agencies promulgate or federal courts decide on the issue of discrimination in employment; whether a particular policy or rule of federal law should be incorporated into Michigan law should be decided as the issue arises (Const 1963, art 5, §29; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
9. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act.
There is no present reason for reading the State Fair Employment Practices Act as imposing a duty upon an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of an employee where that can be done without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer’s business (Const 1963, art 5, § 29; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
10. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Administrative Law.
A decision that the State Fair Employment Practices Act does not impose a duty on an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of an employee as a matter of law does not preclude a finding of religious discrimination, as a matter of fact, based on evidence that an employer failed to act affirmatively to avoid the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice (Const 1963, art 5, § 29; MCL 423.303; MSA 17.458[3]).
Opinion by Williams, J.
See headnote 10.
11. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Duty of Employer — Reasonable Accommodation.
The statutory duty under the State Fair Employment Practices Act to refrain from religious discrimination in employment imposes a duty on an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of an employee where that can be done without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer’s business (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
12. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Administrative Law.
An administrative guideline or interpretation of the State Fair Employment Practices Act concerning religious discrimination may not exceed the power expressly given to the Civil Rights Commission by statute or the constitution, and any such guide-" line, under the Administrative Procedures Act, does not have the force or effect of law, but is merely explanatory (Const 1963, art 6, §29; MCL 24.207[h], 423.301 et seq.; MSA 3.560[107][h], 17.458[1] et seq.).
13. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Constitutional Law — Administrative Law.
An administrative guideline concerning religious discrimination promulgated by the Civil Rights Commission under the State Fair Employment Practices Act is due some particular deference because of the constitutional establishment of the commission (Const 1963, art 5, §29; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
14. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Reasonable Accommodation — Burden of Proof.
The burden of proving, under the State Fair Employment Practices Act, that a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s religious practices cannot be made by an employer without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer’s business is on the employer (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
15. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Reasonable Accommodation.
The prohibition against religious discrimination in employment embraces the concept of religious practice as well as that of religious belief, and the Legislature necessarily included both concepts in the State Fair Employment Practices Act; it follows that a duty to make reasonable efforts to accommodate religious practices arose with the enactment of the law in order to achieve fully the prohibition of religious discrimination in employment (US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, §4; MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
16. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Construction.
The failure of the Legislature to amend the State Fair Employment Practices Act speciñcally to incorporate the substance of an administrative guideline by the Civil Rights Commission interpreting the statutory prohibition against religious discrimination in employment does not raise the inference that the Legislature intended to disapprove that construction of the statute (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
17. Constitutional Law — Establishment of Religion — Statutes.
The traditional view is that to be constitutional under the Establishment Clause a law concerning religion must reñect a clearly secular legislative purpose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion; that test, however, only serves as a guideline to identify impairments of the objectives of the Establishment Clause and does not set the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry (US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 4).
18. Constitutional Law — Establishment of Religion — Statutes.
Total separation between church and state is not called for by the constitution, and incidental, indirect, or remote beneñts to religion do not alone render a particular law constitutionally invalid (US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 4).
19. Constitutional Law — Establishment of Religion — Civil Rights — Fair Employment Practices Act — Religious Discrimination.
The requirement of the State Fair Employment Practices Act that an employer make reasonable accommodation to the religious practices of an employee where that can be done without undue hardship to the conduct of the employer’s business is entirely consistent with the necessary governmental neutrality in matters of religion because the primary and direct effect is simply to provide certain individuals with a greater opportunity to secure or retain employment without giving up the practices of their religion; the requirement is not tainted by the evils of sponsorship, ñnancial support, and active involvement of the government against which the Establishment Clause of the constitution was intended to afford protection (US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 4).
20. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Reasonable Accommodation — Question of Fact.
The good-faith effort which an employer must make to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of an employee, as part of the proscription of the Fair Employment Practices Act against religious discrimination, cannot be given a hard and fast meaning; each case necessarily depends on its own facts and circumstances, which the trier of fact is in the best position to weigh (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA. 17.458[1] et seq.).
21. Civil Rights — Religious Discrimination — Fair Employment Practices Act — Reasonable Accommodation.
An employee who was dismissed from employment because her observance of the Sabbath as a Seventh-day Adventist conflicted with her assigned hours of work has made a prima facie showing of religious discrimination against her religious needs and the need for reasonable accommodation of them under the State Fair Employment Practices Act where the employer took the position that it had no duty of reasonable accommodation to the requirement of her religion to perform no work between sunset on Friday and sunset on Saturday (MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458[1] et seq.).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Lockman, Assistant in Charge, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Division, for Department of Civil Rights.
Michael J. Connolly for defendant.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
(for affirmance). Judge Allen's opinion for the Court of Appeals, 93 Mich App 366; 287 NW2d 240 (1979), fully and accurately analyzes the Michigan statute and case law and recounts the pertinent history of federal cases applying the comparable federal law.
For the reasons set forth in that opinion we affirm.
Coleman, C.J., and Ryan, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.