Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Freeman Edgar CROSBY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-04-24
Citations: 599 So. 2d 138
Docket Number: No. 90-1850
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Freeman Edgar CROSBY, Appellee.
Judges: GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 599
Pages: 138–147

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Freeman Edgar CROSBY, Appellee.
No. 90-1850.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 24, 1992.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Daniel J. Schafer, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The defendant stands charged below of one count of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, and one count of lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of sixteen in violation of section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes. The defendant moved to suppress certain statements he made to the police which he alleged were involuntary and in violation of his Miranda rights. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. We reverse.
The suppression hearing began with the testimony of Detective Elizabeth Gilbert of the Palm Bay Police Department. She testified that on April 6, 1990, at 8:15 p.m., the defendant appeared at the police station. He had been contacted by telephone and asked to go there. When he arrived, another detective was speaking to a complainant, Mike (the alleged victim) and to Mike's mother. The victim alleged that approximately five years earlier, when he was eleven (later determined to be twelve) and the defendant was fifteen, the defendant committed the acts with which the defendant is now charged.
Detective Gilbert introduced herself to the defendant and spoke with him in a portable trailer which served as an annex to the police station. They sat in an open area, about 12' x 12'. Gilbert advised the defendant that there had been some sexual charges made against him by Mike. The defendant said he knew Mike and the detective asked if she could interview him concerning the charges. The defendant responded "Okay, No problem". Detective Gilbert, who testified the defendant was not under arrest, read the defendant his Miranda rights from an interview sheet containing eight questions. She asked the defendant each question separately, obtaining and recording an affirmative response to each. She also asked defendant's educational level which he reported to be tenth grade.
The defendant's statement concerning the alleged offenses was recorded on mi-crocassette tape and was played in full at the state's request during the suppression hearing. At the beginning of the recorded statement the defendant was sworn, stated he had been informed of his Miranda rights, understood his rights and wished to give the statement.
The defendant acknowledged he and Mike were friends but initially he denied he and Mike ever had any sexual contact. After being reminded he was under oath, the defendant stated he and Mike had on a couple of occasions engaged in some sexual touching. After the defendant seemed to become embarrassed, Detective Gilbert stated:
I realize this is embarrassing for you, but I talk to kids all the time about this sort of thing. All right? So anything that you say to me is not going to shock me or embarrass me because I've talked to a lot of kids before. So if you do have something to say and if something more happened, I don't want you to feel like you can't tell me. Okay? So why don't you just take a deep breath and think back....
The defendant then described one incident where Mike had sodomized the defendant. The defendant tried to do the same to Mike but he saw he was too large to fit and did not attempt penetration.
The defendant, who was twenty years of age at the time of the police questioning, testified at the suppression hearing that he went down to the police station of his own free will. He stated that he was not told what he was charged with or what the interview was about. He described himself as emotionally handicapped and a slow learner. The defendant testified he understood some but not all of his Miranda rights. The defendant remembered being told he did not have to talk but thought it was the best thing. He did not think he was going to be charged with a crime. There was no expert testimony offered concerning the defendant's I.Q. or level of comprehension.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding:
1. That the Defendant, FREEMAN EDGAR CROSBY, was not in custody at the beginning of the interview by Detective Betsy Gilbert at the Palm Bay Police Department on April 6, 1990.
2. That the Defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights by Detective Gilbert.
3. That the Defendant has a ninth grade education and mentality.
4. That the Defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights during the course of the interview by Detective Gilbert.
5. That a person of normal intelligence would have invoked his rights during the interview by Detective Gilbert.
6. That the Defendant is childlike and unable to comprehend being in jeopardy.
7. That the Defendant did not understand his Miranda rights and did not freely and voluntarily waive them.
Both parties to this appeal seem to agree that the dispositive issue is the "voluntariness" of the defendant's confession. Issues involving confessions by persons of subnormal intelligence are often discussed in terms of "voluntariness". See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 203 (Fla.1989).
The state relies principally on Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). In Connelly the United States Supreme Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissent in Connelly warned that the Con-nelly majority had abandoned the court's previously announced "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether a confession was the product of a defendant's free will. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 177-181, 107 S.Ct. at 527-529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If coercive conduct on the part of the police is the sole test, our task is considerably simplified. See Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129, 132 (11th Cir.1988) (defendant had I.Q. of 62, functional age of 11 years old, but no police coercion). The lower court orally ruled at the close of the suppression hearing that the police had acted properly. ("I don't blame the officer for anything that she did in the interrogation. I think it was well done.")
It is not at all clear, however, that, after Connelly, the "totality of the circumstances" test is dead. The Illinois Supreme Court, in a factual context very similar to the case at bar, recently analyzed this question and concluded that an independent requirement that a Miranda waiver be knowing and intelligent, as well as voluntary, still exists. People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill.2d 349, 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 159, 562 N.E.2d 958, 962 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2052, 114 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). See also United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 299-300 (D.C.Cir.1991).
Initially, we conclude the Miranda warnings given in this case were unnecessary. Crosby was not in custody; he voluntarily came to the police station when he learned the police wanted to talk to him. He was interviewed in a portable trailer annexed to the police station and was free to leave at any time. The court specifically found that Crosby was not in custody "at the beginning of the interview." The interview sheet was marked to show he was only being interviewed, not arrested, and this was signed by the defendant. Detective Gilbert testified he would have been free to leave because they did not have enough evidence to arrest him until he gave his statement. Miranda is only applicable when a suspect is interrogated while in police custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See also Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S.Ct. 1480, 89 L.Ed.2d 734 (1986).
The absence of custodial interrogation places Crosby's statements in a context more analogous to Connelly's original confession in Connelly. Connelly voluntarily approached an officer and confessed to murder before any Miranda warnings were given. The Supreme Court, although acknowledging Connelly's mental incapacity, nevertheless permitted the confession. The Court held:
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements and their admission into evidence, constitutes no violation of that Clause.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 522. Under Connelly, the mental condition of Crosby in the absence of police misconduct does not affect the admissibility of his statements or confession under federal due process requirements or under the exclusionary rule.
Assuming arguendo the Miranda warnings given were necessary in this case, we have also considered the waiver issue. Without addressing the Connelly issues discussed in Bernasco, Bradshaw and other cases, our supreme court, in an opinion written three years after Connelly reiterated the duty of the trial court to ascertain the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary. Thompson, 548 So.2d 198. The Thompson court held that mental weakness is but one factor to be taken into account in determining the voluntariness of a confession. Comprehension of the rights described to the defendant and a full awareness of both the nature of the rights being abandoned and the consequences of abandonment are also factors to consider in determining whether "through susceptibility to surrounding pressures or inability to comprehend the circumstances," a statement made to police was not a product of the defendant's own free will. Id. at 204. This determination is made using the "totality of the circumstances" approach. Id. Accordingly, we will attempt to determine the correctness of the suppression order below by reviewing the totality of the circumstances, as required in Thompson.
The rule in Florida generally is that the trial court's conclusion on the issue of voluntariness will not be upset on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 204 n. 5. However, our supreme court has said this clearly erroneous standard "does not apply with full force in those instances in which the determination turns in whole or in part, not upon live testimony, but on the meaning of transcripts, depositions or other documents reviewed by the trial court, which are presented in essentially the same form to the appellate court." Id.
In the instant case, the trial court made three predicate findings for its suppression order: first, that a person of normal intelligence would have invoked his rights; second, the defendant is childlike and unable to comprehend being in jeopardy and, finally, the defendant did not sufficiently understand his Miranda rights so as to freely waive them. The first of these reasons simply cannot stand as a basis for involuntariness of a waiver of rights. The fact is that persons of ordinary intelligence often do waive their right not to incriminate themselves and do confess to crime for reasons other than overreaching, coercive police conduct. Indeed, the futility of accurately divining the reason for a person's decision to admit to the commission of a crime while being interrogated after being advised of his right to remain silent, favors a bright line-rule like the one announced in Connelly that limits suppression to cases of police misconduct. Even under the most liberal test of voluntariness, what a person of normal intelligence may have done is irrelevant.
It is possible, on the other hand, to determine whether the defendant's "childlike" nature meant that he did not understand he was in jeopardy or did not understand his rights well enough to effectively waive them. As stated, whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent is determined by evaluating the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the defendant's giving of the statement. Several courts have attempted to catalogue the factors that comprise the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a confession is knowing and intelligent. These factors include mental capacity or I.Q., age, physical condition, demeanor, coherence, articulateness, capacity to make full use of one's faculties, memory, level of education, level of reading skill, time of interrogation, prior record or experience with the criminal justice system. E.g., Thompson, 548 So.2d at 204; Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla.1980); State v. Reid, 394 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 1986); State v. Shaver, 233 Mont. 438, 760 P.2d 1230, 1233 (1988); See generally Annotation, Mental Subnormality of Accused as Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession, 8 A.L.R.4th 15, 24-28 (1981). The result of this approach is a complete lack of consistency and frequent disparity of result. Some defendants whose mental capacities and emotional resources were extremely limited have been found to have knowingly and intelligently waived their rights, whereas others whose limitations appear slight are protected. This high degree of arbitrariness suggests a better test is needed.
Faced with the same record to review as the trial court we simply cannot agree that the defendant lacked the requisite comprehension of his rights or that he did not understand that he was in jeopardy when he gave the statement. The audiotape of the interview simply belies that conclusion. Early in his interview with Detective Gilbert, when the defendant began discussing what occurred, he made the remark: "FH probably end up going to jail on this but — ." Detective Gilbert responded:
I'm not going to tell you either way, cause first of all it's not my case. I'm just hear [sic] to interview you and talk to you and I appreciate that you're being honest with me. And as soon as I do hear something, I will let you know what's going on.
This record reflects a consistent pattern of coherent statements and appropriate responses by the defendant which meets or exceeds the "knowing and intelligent" threshold for waiver of Miranda rights. There was no expert testimony offered that might have supported a conclusion that these apparently knowing and intelligent statements were not what they seem. Kight v. State, 512 So.2d 922 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988). Nor was there expert testimony to show that the defendant's mental limitations were severe enough to make him incapable of understanding his rights. Thompson, 548 So.2d at 203.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent forced statements, especially forced false statements. The Fifth Amendment is not designed to protect those whose limited mental or emotional capacity is such that they lack the education, skill or intelligence to protect themselves as well as other more intelligent or more wily offenders. Absent some evidence that the defendant's statements were given because his free will was overborne, his statements to law enforcement were not subject to suppression.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. 1. You are (under arrest (or/being interviewed in connection with) sexual battery.
2. You have a right to remain silent. You do not have to make any statements. You do not have to answer any questions. Do you understand this?
3. Anything you do say can and will be used against you in court. Do you understand this?
4. You have a right not to answer any particular question and you may stop the interview at any time. Do you understand?
5. You have a right to consult with a lawyer now and at any time during this interview. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be provided for you without any cost to you at any time. Do you understand?
6. Do you want a lawyer present now? 7. Knowing these rights, are you willing to make a statement or answer questions without a lawyer being present?
8. Have any threats or promises of any kind been made to you so that you will give us a statement?
. There is also some debate whether the knowing, intelligent and voluntary nature of a confession is a pure question of fact. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).