Case Name: The Farmers Bank v. Clarke
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1833-11
Citations: 4 Leigh 603
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Farmers Bank v. Clarke.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 1051–1054

Head Matter:
The Farmers Bank v. Clarke.
November, 1833.
Debt on Note — Statute of Limitations— Subsequent Conditional Promise. — In debt on a promissory note negotiable at bank, by holders against in-dorsers, the indorser pleads the general issue, with leave to give the statute of limitations in evidence; and, at the trial, the plaintiffs provea conditional promise made by the indorser to pay the debt, within the period of limitation: Hbld, such conditional promise does not suffice to take the case out of the statute, unless performance of the condition be shewn.
Debt in the circuit court of Henrico, brought by the president, directors and company of the farmers bank of Virginia, indorsees and holders, against Frederick Clarke, the maker, and Miles Bott and Colin Clarke, indorsers, of a *note negotiable and payable at the bank, for 1200 dollars. The action was founded on the statutes of Virginia, giving an action against the maker and indorsers of such notes jointly; 1 Rev. Code, ch. 126, $ 2, p. 485; 2 Id. ch. 196, \ 15, art. 13, p. 90. Frederick Clarke confessed judgment. The writ abated as to Bott, by the return, that he was ‘‘no inhabitant.” The defendant Colin Clarke pleaded nil debet; and the plaintiffs agreed, that he might give in evidence under that plea, any matter which he might give in evidence under a plea of the statute of limitations.
At the trial the plaintiffs filed a bill of exceptions, stating, that the plaintiffs offered in evidence the note on which the action was founded, which was dated the 12th February 1819, and payable sixty days after date, with two credits indorsed thereon, one for 187 dollars received from W. Clarke trustee, dated the 11th June 1825, and the other for 564 dollars received from J. Brockenbrough and other trustees, dated the 13th March 1826; and proved the making of the note by Frederick Clarke, and the indorsements thereof by Bott and Colin Clarke; and that the note had been discounted at the bank for the accommodation of the maker, and had been protested for non-pajnnent at maturity, and due notice of the protest given to the defendant Colin Clarke. And, then, to take the case out of the statute of limitations, on which that defendant relied, the plaintiffs introduced a witness, who testified, that some years after the protest of the note, the defendant offered a note at the same bank for discount for his own accommodation, which the bank refused to discount; and shortly after this, and within five years next before the commencement of this action, the defendant asked the witness (who was a director of the bank at the time) why his note had been rejected; to which the witness answered, that he had voted for rejecting it, because the defendant was on the protest book of the bank, alluding to the protested note of Frederick Clarke indorsed by Bott and the defendant Colin Clarke, on which this action was brought; and thereupon, the defendant said, *“that the bank was well secured in that case, for it had a deed of trust on Frederick Clarke’s real property, as collateral security, and if the bank would sell, or when it should sell, that property, should it not sell for enough to discharge the debt, he, the defendant, would pay the balance; that the property was sufficient to pay Frederick Clarke’s bank debt, and he would pay the debt for the property.” Whereupon the court, upon the motion of the defendant’s counsel, instructed the jury, that if they should find from the evidence, that the defendant’s supposed admissions were to the effect, that, upon condition the plaintiffs would resort to the collateral security they held for Frederick Clarke’s debt, he would pay any balance that might remain unsatisfied, then such conditional admission was not sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations, unless the plaintiffs should prove that they had performed the condition. And then the plaintiffs’ counsel moved the court to instruct the jury, that if an indorser of a note acknowledges that there is a subsisting debt, but says, that before he will pay it, the holders must resort to collateral security given by the maker or any other indorser, to which, in point of law, the holders were not bound to resort before they could recover on the note, this does not prevent the acknowledgment of the debt from taking the case out of the statute of limitations: but the court refused to give this instruction to the jury, and instructed them, that if they should find from the evidence, that the defendant’s acknowledgment was unconditional, such acknowledgment was sufficient to take the case out of the statute; but if they should find that the supposed acknowledgment of the defendant was dependent on any act to be performed by the plaintiffs, such conditional acknowledgment was not sufficient for that purpose, unless the plaintiffs proved performance of the condition. To these opinions of the court the plaintiffs excepted.
There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant; from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.
^Daniel, for the appellants.
The attorney general, for the appellee.
Debt on Note — Statute of Limitations — Subsequent Acknowledgment. — ‘See foot-note to Butcher v. Hixton, 4 Leigh 519, where the cases citing the principal case are collected.

Opinion:
CASE, J.
I think the instructions given by the circuit court to the jury were correct. It is not consonant with either law or reason, that when a man makes a promise or acknowledgment, you shall take a part of it, and reject the rest; that when he says, "if you will do this or that, I will pay you," you shall discard the condition, and make his promise unconditional. I know there are many old cases, which consider the statute as founded on the presumption of payment; that whatever repels that presumption, is, in legal effect, a promise to pay the debt; and that, though such acknowledgment is accompanied with only a conditional promise, or even a refusal to pay, the law considers the condition or refusal void, and the acknowledgment itself as an unconditional answer to the statute. But the more recent, and, I think, the more rational, decisions take a different view of the case. They consider this a statute of repose, which ought to receive | from the courts a fair and • just support. They consider the acknowledgment a new promise, not a continuance of the old; and that to revive the debt, it must be unqualified and unconditional. This is decided in Clementson v. Williams, 8 Cranch 72. And again in Wetzell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. 314, chief justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court, and speaking of the acknowledgment, says, "If it be connected with circumstances which in any manner affect the claim, or if it be conditional, it may amount to a new assumpsit, for which the old debt is a sufficient consideration -y or if it be construed to revive the original debt, that revival is conditional, and the performance of the condition, or a readiness to perform it, must be shewn." In Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters 351, 362, the court after repeating what it had decided in the cases before cited, says, "We adhere to the doctrine thus stated, and think it the only exposition of the statute which is consistent with its true object and import. t If the bar is sought to be removed *by the proof of a new promise, that promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved, in a clear and explicit manner, and be in terms unequivocal and determinate; and if any conditions are annexed, they ought to be shewn to be performed." In Moore v. Bank of Columbia, 6 Peters 92, the court reassert verbatim, the doctrine of the former cases, and consider it thé settled doctrine of the court. The supreme court of Massachusetts, in Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick. 368, after reviewing" the principal cases, held, that to take a case out of the statute, there must be an unqualified acknowledgment, not only of the debt as originally due, but that it continues so; and, if there has been a conditional promise, it must be shewn that the condition has been performed. The same doctrine has been held in New York; Sands v. Gelston, 15 Johns. Rep. 511; Roosevelt v. Marks, 6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 266, 290. And in Pennsylvania; Brown v. Campbell, 1 Serg. & Rawle 176; Fries v. Boisselet, 9 Id. 128. If I were to go into the english authorities, the field would be still wider: but I will not. These cases assuredly sustain the correctness of the instructions of the circuit court in this case, and shew that the loose conversation of Clarke with the bank director, was wholly insufficient to take the case .out of the statute.
It is not necessary to examine the more general proposition discussed in the argument, whether in debt on a promissory note, any subsequent acknowledgment can be resorted to, to take the case out of the statute. However, as the case of Butcher v. Hixton, [ante] in which that point was decided, has excited some remark, I shall barely say, that the case was very ably argued; that for myself, I examined it very laboriously;. and that on a reexamination, I continue to think the opinion there given correct, whether we take it upon the pleadings, upon the plain meaning of the statute, upon principle, or upon authority.
CABELL, J.
I am of opinion that a conditional promise to pay a debt, will not take the case out of the statute of *limitations, without proof of the performance of the condition. It is competent to him who makes a promise, to •annex to it what terms or conditions he pleases; and it would be unreasonable to permit him in whose favor it was made, to avail himself of the benefit of it discharged of the condition. The point has been repeatedly adjudged in the supreme court of the U. States. On this ground, I am for affirming the judgment. Whether •a promise, sufficient to take a case out of the statute of limitations, operates as a revival or continuation of the old contract, or as a new, distinct and substantive contract, founded on the old consideration, or whether there is any difference between the action of debt and the action of assump-sit, as relates to this subject, I do not deem it necessary to decide at present; since, in any aspect of this case, the judgment is right.