Case Name: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent McFADDEN, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 2006-05-16
Citations: 191 S.W.3d 648
Docket Number: No. SC 86857
Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent McFADDEN, Appellant.
Judges: WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH and TEITELMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 191
Pages: 648–662

Head Matter:
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent McFADDEN, Appellant.
No. SC 86857.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
May 16, 2006.
Rehearing Denied June 13, 2006.
Rosemary E. Percival, Office of Public Defender, Kansas City, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

Opinion:
RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge.
I.
A jury convicted Vincent McFadden (McFadden) of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. McFadden was given the death penalty consistent with the jury's recommendation. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3. Among his nine points of error, McFadden raises a valid Batson challenge. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
II.
The facts, which this Court reviews in the light most favorable to the verdict, indicate that on July 3, 2002, McFadden and Michael Douglas encountered Todd Franklin. An altercation ensued, during which Douglas and McFadden each shot Franklin who died at the scene. McFadden was charged with the first-degree murder and armed criminal action.
At trial, the State exercised five of its nine peremptory challenges to remove African-American venirepersons, leaving only one African-American to serve on the jury. The defense counsel challenged the strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, After the State offered explanations, defense counsel argued that these reasons were merely pretextural. The trial court denied McFadden's Batson claim. The jury found McFadden guilty of both charges. During the penalty phase, the jury found five statutory aggravators and recommended a sentence of death. On April 22, 2005, the court sentenced McFadden to death and to a term of life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
III.
McFadden's Batson challenge is dispositive. It has been long recognized that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause. In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant could make out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by "the totality of the relevant facts" of the prosecutor's behavior during the defendant's trial.
In State v. Parker, this Court set forth the procedure to be followed when a defendant makes a Batson challenge. First, a defendant must challenge one or more specific venirepersons struck by the State and identify the cognizable racial group to which they belong. Second, the State must provide a race-neutral reason that is more than an unsubstantiated denial of discriminatory purpose. Third, the defense must show that the State's explanation was pretextual and the true reason for the strike was racial.
To show pretext, the defense can present "side-by-side comparisons" of veni-repersons allegedly struck for racially discriminatory reasons with those who were allowed to serve. Evidence of purposeful discrimination is established when the stated reason for striking an African-American venireperson applies to an otherwise-similar member of another race who is permitted to serve. In evaluating a Bat-son challenge, the trial court's "chief consideration should be the plausibility of the prosecutor's explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case."
The trial court's findings with regard to a Batson challenge will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In light of the totality of the following facts and circumstances, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court was mistaken in this case:
Venireperson C.W.
It appears that African-American venireperson C.W. would have been a strong juror for the State. Her father had been shot to death and she had a working relationship with law enforcement. De spite these facts, the State claims it struck C.W. for two reasons: (1) her telephone rang and (2) it would have been difficult for her to be absent from work.
First, the State contends it struck C.W. because her telephone rang. The prosecutor claimed that C.W. did not take the process seriously because she was fiddling with her telephone and distracting other members of the panel. Defense counsel countered that it appeared C.W. was fumbling because she was having difficulty turning her telephone off, but eventually succeeded.
It does not appear that there was a white juror who had trouble with her telephone, but such an identical comparison is not necessary. "A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters."
Even though the State made no record of C.W.'s telephone ringing at the time and failed to ask the court to instruct venire-persons to turn off their telephones, the State was apparently so bothered that it used the strike on C.W. and allowed white venireperson J.B. to remain on the jury. During voir dire, J.B. repeatedly stated that he would want the State to prove guilt beyond any possible doubt before he could impose a death sentence. The State unsuccessfully moved to strike J.B. for cause, arguing that it "was quite clear he would require a higher burden for guilt before he would consider the death penalty." Yet, rather than striking a white venireperson who required a higher burden of proof, the State struck an African-American because her telephone rang.
Second, the State asserts that it struck C.W. because it would have been difficult for her to be absent from work. During voir dire, C.W. stated:
I'm a manager for a cleaning company and in our group there is three area managers. One is out of town — I mean one is sick, brain concussion and the other one has his own area, and I don't know if my boss will allow me to be out because I have to handle all buildings in the evening. Make sure all the cleaners are at work on time and any problems that come up.
The State failed to strike white juror S.R. who also expressed that she would have difficulty taking time away from work. S.R. worked for a company that was about to undergo an audit. She was "one of the key people" and her employer had written a letter for her to give to the court explaining the extent of the hardship. She worked in the "back office" and needed "to account for all the transition. The cash coming in and out and stuff." A lot of work was needed to prepare for the audit.
Not only was S.R.'s statement of hardship more definite than C.W.'s claim, but S.R. had an additional reason to be struck. S.R. expressed a familiarity with the scene of the murder. The State indicated that there had been extensive construction in the area since the time of the murder and had concerns that jurors familiar with the scene would not rely exclusively on witness' accounts of the scene as it existed at the time of the murder. This familiarity with the area of the crime served as the rationale for striking African-American venirepersons C.N., M.B., V.G., and W.S. Yet, in addition to S.R., there were four additional white jurors with familiarity with the area of the crime who were not struck.
Venireperson C.N.
The State contends African-American venireperson C.N. was struck for four reasons: (1) she was an employee of the St. Louis City School District and would likely be liberal, (2) she lived in a high crime area but never heard gunshots, (S) jury service would create a hardship, and (4) she was familiar with the area of the crime. Each of these reasons either equally applied to white jurors who were not struck by the State or had no relevance to the case.
First, the prosecutor claimed he struck C.N. because she was an employee of the St. Louis School District. However, in State v. Edwards, this Court rejected the notion that a juror's employment as a postal worker was sufficient reason to justify a peremptory strike. This Court held that, "[i]f the mere incantation of the phrase 'he is a postal worker' were sufficient to overcome any showing of pretext, the third step of the Batson test would be illusory." In that case, the following guidance was offered:
In the future, trial courts should similarly consider strikes based on occupation carefully, assessing them for pretext by looking at whether the occupation and the claimed traits relate to the particular case or juror, whether similarly situated jurors are treated differently, and so forth, considering the factors set out above, and not allow a strike to rest solely on the claim that the juror is "a postal worker."
The Court held that the trial court had not clearly erred in allowing the strike, because the prosecutor described his prior negative experiences with postal workers as jurors, gave specific reasons why they would not be good jurors, and struck two other jurors who had similar occupations to the challenged postal worker.
Here, the prosecutor failed to explain the basis for his opinion, or describe what his prior experiences entailed, or give specific reasons for why an employee of the St. Louis school system would be unfavorable for the State. Without more, C.N.'s employment with the school district is pre-textual.
Second, the prosecutor argued that he struck C.N. because she lived in a high crime area and had never heard gunshots. This appears to be loosely related to the case because witnesses living in high crime areas would be testifying that they heard a gunshot. However, C.N.'s recognition of a gunshot is irrelevant. Not only was the witnesses' recognition of a gunshot was not in dispute, but even if it were in dispute, it is unclear why a juror's lack of experience in hearing a gunshot is relevant. Additionally, had this issue been relevant, the State would have asked all venirepersons if they could recognize the sound of a gunshot. "[T]he State's failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire ex- animation on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination."
Finally, the prosecutor asserts he struck C.N. because of hardship and her familiarity with the area of the crime. C.N. suggested it would be difficult for her to serve because it would be hard for her employer to replace her for a week and she was a full-time evening student approaching the end of the term. The State also claimed to have struck C.N. because of her familiarity with the area of the crime. However, as noted above, white juror S.R. also expressed hardship and, along with four other white jurors who were not struck, had a familiarity with the area of the crime.
Venireperson M.B.
Like C.W., it appears that African-American venireperson M.B. would have been a strong juror for the State. She expressed confidence in the ability of fingerprint evidence to show guilt. Since the defendant had given notice of an alibi defense, M.B.'s belief in the accuracy of fingerprint evidence would have served the State well. Also, like C.W., M.B. had a family member who had been shot to death.
However, despite these facts, the State struck M.B. citing the following four reasons: (1) she had problems with the concept of acting in concert, (2) she was familiar with the area of the crime, (3) she knew a relative of a potential witness, and (4) she had an unrealistic view of scientific evidence.
First, the State argues that it struck M.B. because she had problems with the concept of acting in concert. However, there is no support for this position. Although other venirepersons had expressed difficulty with the concept, M.B. never did.
Second, the State claims that M.B. was familiar with the area of the crime. However, as noted above, five white venireper-sons also possessed familiarity with the area of the crime and were not struck from the jury.
Third, the State asserts that it struck M.B. because she knew a relative of a potential witness. M.B. indicated that her niece had dated someone with the same last name as one of the witnesses, but that she did not know any family members of the man her niece had dated. The prosecutor stated that he removed M.B. because she knew the witness's family and her "close involvement" with the family could be a problem. However, M.B. did not know the witness and was not even asked how well she knew the man her niece had dated. Additionally, because this loose connection was to a witness for the State, any bias would arguably be in favor of the State.
Finally, the State contends that it struck M.B. because she had an unrealistic view of scientific evidence. M.B. had indicated that she was a medical laboratory technologist who worked full time for the crime laboratory in St. Louis County. She indicated that she did not personally do any testing and she did not have contact with people who did. She stated, "If you are going to [commit a crime], you are going to get caught with the technology that they have today." While M.B.'s confidence in forensic evidence may be high, such a belief would only strengthen the credibility of the State's fingerprint evidence linking McFadden to the crime.
In addition, the State failed to strike white juror L.S. who also had exposure to police laboratory work. L.S.'s boss worked with the Missouri State Highway Patrol to create standards for laboratory testing and prepare training aids for drug sniffing dogs. L.S. would meet with police officers for the dogs to test the products. He had discussed with police officers "interesting kind of gruesome stories in the federal lab but not police work in general." Because of M.B.'s certainty that fingerprint evidence would determine guilt, she was a stronger juror for the State than L.S.
Venireperson V.G.
The State gave six reasons for striking African-American venireperson V.G.: (1) she was elderly, opinionated, and hard-headed, (2) she denied that she lived in a high-crime area, (3) she had an ulcer on her leg, (4) she may have read about the case, (5) she was familiar with the area of the crime, and (6) her sister lived in the area of the crime and was the victim of arson. Each of these reasons either equally applied to white jurors who were not struck by the State.
First, the State alleged it struck V.G. because "[s]he's elderly, very opinionated, corrected both myself and defense counsel about questions.... She seems very hard-headed and opinionated and may not be good in discussing and considering views of other jurors." However, as Judge Teitelman recognized, strikes based on vague references to attributes like demeanor "are largely irrelevant to one's ability to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory strikes for no real reason except for their race." Accordingly, such vague references are heavily scrutinized.
Second, the State offered that V.G. "lives in a high crime area but denied that it is high crime." V.G. stated that she lived in an area that the City of St. Louis considered a high crime area. She did not consider it a high crime area even though she was robbed there once. However, this Court must consider whether the explanation provided by the State was related to the case to be tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate. Here, it is unclear that V.G.'s assessment of her own neighborhood has any bearing whatsoever on the case at hand.
Third, the prosecutor allegedly struck V.G. because she had a problem with her leg, and he did not want to run out of jurors because of an infirmity. While V.G. had an ulcer on her leg and she had planned to see the doctor the following week, she also indicated that it was doing better and healing. In addition, the State failed to strike white juror C.S. for his infirmity. C.S. was questioned at length regarding his problem with anxiety attacks. C.S. informed the court that he has taken medication to fight anxiety attacks for fifteen years, and he did not know how he would handle sequestration. If he felt a panic attack coming on, he could take extra medication, but it would not help right away and he would be unable to listen to the evidence. If the State was truly afraid of losing a jury due to infirmity, C.S. appears to have been a stronger candidate for the use of the State's peremptory strike.
Fourth, the State expressed concern that V.G. had read about the case, yet failed to strike a similarly situated white juror. V.G. indicated that she might have read about the case in the newspaper, because she reads the paper daily. However, V.G. indicated that if she had read about the case, she did not remember any of the details. She indicated that if she recalled something during the course of the trial, she knew she could set it aside, and nothing she read would keep her from being fair and impartial. Although white juror R.K. could not recall details, he was more certain that he had read about the case in the newspaper.
Fifth, the State removed V.G. due to her familiarity with the area of the crime. As previously examined, this reason equally applied to five white jurors who were not struck by the State.
Finally, the State commented that V.G.'s sister resided in the area of the crime and was an arson victim. However, the State alleged in this case that McFadden had terrorized the area and if the jurors cared about the people in the area, they would find McFadden guilty. Logically, a juror with a personal connection to a crime victim in the area would only strengthen the credibility of the State's argument.
Venireperson W.<S.
The State stated the following four reasons for striking African-American venireperson W.S.: (1) he seemed to be agitated and confused about his role as a juror, (2) although he lived very close to the area of the crime, he stated he was not familiar with it, (3) he did not want to share details about his nephews' work in law enforcement with the rest of the panel, and (4) he appeared to be sleeping during voir dire.
First, the State argues that it struck W.S. because he seemed to be agitated and confused about his role as a juror. The State's allegation appears to be based on the following exchange:
VENIREPERSON W.S.: You got aggravation and what do they get, the crime attorney, the defense attorneys, they got an eye witness. How do that work? It's up the jury or who are you going to believe?
MR. BISHOP: Right.
VENIREPERSON W.S.: You said only one eye witness.
MR. BISHOP: I'm sorry.
VENIREPERSON W.S.: What if there is more than one eye witness? You got one, she got one. How do that work?
MR. BISHOP: I guess I'll ask you. If you are selected as a juror, you have to determine the credibility of the witnesses. That's your job. Can you make that decision? If there are witnesses with competing stories, can you make the decision of who is telling the truth and who is lying?
VENIREPERSON W.S.: Yes.
While W.S. may have been initially confused about his role as a juror, this confusion seems to have been alleviated by counsel's explanations. There is no indication that W.S.'s confusion would have impaired his ability to serve as a juror.
Second, the State asserts that it struck W.S. because, although he lived very close to the area of the crime, he stated he was not familiar with it. Although, W.S.'s zip code indicates he lived in Jennings, which is near the area of the crime, the State faults him for not responding that he was familiar with the area. Even if it were established that W.S. was familiar with the area of the crime, the State did not strike five white jurors who responded affirmatively that they were familiar with the area. For example, E.D. stated that she lived in Jennings for over thirty years and frequently shopped in the area of the crime. The State removed W.S. on the mere possibility that he was familiar with the area, yet left E.D. and four other white jurors who definitely were familiar with it.
Third, the State asserts that it struck W.S. because he did not want to share details about his nephews' work in law enforcement with the rest of the panel. When defense counsel asked the panel if anyone had relatives in law enforcement, W.S. responded that he had three nephews in law enforcement. He then asked to approach the bench where the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: [W.S.], you had indicated that you had three nephews?
VENIREPERSON W.S.: Three nephews. One is a police officer. One is in Denver, Colorado, and one Washington, D.C., F.B.I. Agent. We don't discuss their affairs. I don't want to get into that.
THE COURT: Is there anything about your nephews being involved in law enforcement that would affect your ability to be a fair juror in this case?
VENIREPERSON W.S.: No, I'm fair and open minded. I am just concerned about their safety.
MS. TURLINGTON: You don't want to disclose their location?
VENIREPERSON W.S.: Yes.
THE COURT: It won't affect your ability to listen to police testimony. You can listen to that fairly and impartially?
VENIREPERSON W.S.: Yes, I can.
While W.S. had high concern for his nephews' safety, his attitude toward law enforcement appears to be generally positive. Such an attitude is usually favorable to the State's position.
Fourth, the State contends that it struck W.S. because he appeared to be sleeping during voir dire, which is usually a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike. However, the existence of a valid justification will not preclude this Court from recognizing a Batson violation when examining the facts of the case in a larger context.
IV.
The State used its peremptory strikes to remove five of the six qualified African-American venirepersons. In response to the defense's properly-raised Batson challenge, the State offered explanations for its strikes — some of which, when examined in isolation, appear to have some validity. However, in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances, it becomes obvious that these explanations were merely pretext for the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes for racially discriminatory reasons. "To excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party can also articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination in jury selection."
"However guilty a defendant may be, the law requires that a conviction only be obtained through a fair trial. The right to sit before a jury of one's peers, chosen not because of race, but because of their standing as citizens doing their civic duty, is essential to a fair trial." The trial court's denial of the McFadden's Bat-son challenge was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment can not be allowed to stand.
V.
Because McFadden's Batson claim is dispositive, it is not necessary to address the remaining eight grounds for appeal. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH and TEITELMAN, JJ., concur.
LIMBAUGH, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; PRICE and RUSSELL, JJ., concur in opinion of LIMBAUGH, J.
. State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Mo. banc 2004).
. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). "It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to person of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy." Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2323, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880)). Racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury, Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2323 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308, 10 Otto 303), and essentially creates "state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reí. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). This discriminatory practice "invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality," Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), undermines public confidence, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), and jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial system. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2324.
. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308, 10 Otto 303; Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2324; State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 524 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Brown, 958 S.W.2d 553, 553 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. banc 1992).
. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. See also Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2324; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 933; State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. banc 1987).
. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. See also Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525; Antwine, I A3 S.W.2d at 65.
. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2325; Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65.
. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939. See also Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2331; Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 527; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 64.
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525; Antwine, I A3 S.W.2d at 66.
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 66.
. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2329, n. 6.
. The following five white jurors said they were familiar with the area of the crime and were not struck by the State: S.R. (whose aunt and uncle had lived in the area); J.S. (whose father and grandparents had lived in the area), L.S. (who had worked in the area), R.K. (who had done electric utility work in the area), and E.D. (had lived in a nearby community for 30 years and often had shopped in the area).
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525-28.
. Id. at 526. See also Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 550 (Teitelman, J., concurring) ("in the vast majority of cases, a prospective juror's employment has nothing to do with his or her ability to fairly weigh the evidence and arrive at a just decision").
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 528.
. Id.
. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2328 (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 (Ala.2000)).
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 550 (Teitelman, J., concurring).
. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2324; Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 527; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 934; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 64.
. State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 205-06 (Mo. banc 1997).
. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. at 2325; Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65; State v. Hopkins, 140 S.W.3d 143, 157 (Mo.App.2004).
. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ind.2004). See also Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65.
. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 551 (Teitelman, J., concurring).
. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. at 2340. With regard to the dissent, the principal opin ion does not inappropriately conduct a de novo review as the dissent claims when applying the "totality of relevant facts" test, but rather follows Batson and Miller-El exactly in that McFadden established a "prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). Once McFadden established his prima facie case, the principal opinion followed the United States Supreme Court's precedent and performed side-by-side comparisons between the black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. at 2325-2340.
Nor has the Court deviated from its established precedent that when "evaluating a Batson challenge," the trial court's chief consideration should be the plausibility of the prosecutor's explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Miller-El, happenstance was unlikely to explain the disparity of the prosecutor's use of its peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. at 2324. Happenstance also fails the prosecutor in this instance, where 83% of the eligible African-American venire members were stricken using pretextual reasons.
Moreover, Justice Breyer's reluctant concurrence in Rice v. Collins,-U.S.-,- -, 126 S.Ct. 969, 976-977, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) does not set precedent, nor does it, as the dissent alleges, in any way alter the "totality of the relevant facts" test explained in Batson that was applied in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162
L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), or the clearly erroneous standard used to review a trial court's ruling in a Batson challenge (See Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525). Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 525. Instead, Justice Breyer opines about the failure of Batson to adequately "ferret out unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of jurors," Id. at 976, and the passage that follows the paragraph quoted by the dissent addresses the need to ensure those Constitutional protections:
The upshot is an unresolvable tension between, on the one hand, what Blackstone called an inherently " 'arbitrary and capricious' " peremptory challenge system, Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, supra, at -, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2343, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (BREYER, J., concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 346 (1769)), and, on the other hand, the Constitution's nondiscrimination command. Given this constitutional tension, we may have to choose. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, supra, at -, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2343, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (BREYER, J., concurring); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Were it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former"); Batson, supra, at 107, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).
Faced with this tension, this principal opinion will not waiver in its responsibility to ensure that a jury is chosen in conformity with the Constitution's requirements, and in this case in particular, it will not accept the prosecutor's attempt to mask racially discriminatory peremptory challenges with absurd rationales.