Case Name: Steven Edward WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-06-26
Citations: 601 So. 2d 1253
Docket Number: No. 91-681
Parties: Steven Edward WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HARRIS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 601
Pages: 1253–1258

Head Matter:
Steven Edward WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 91-681.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 26, 1992.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Darrell L. Brock, Special Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rebecca R. Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
. § 951.075, Fla.Stat. (1989).

Opinion:
DIAMANTIS, Judge.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND/OR CLARIFICATION
We withdraw the previous opinion and issue the following in its stead.
Appellant Steven Edward Williams appeals the judgment and sentence entered on his pleas of nolo contendere to first degree murder and armed robbery following the denial of his motion to dismiss those charges on double jeopardy grounds. Appellant also appeals the guidelines departure sentence he received following his plea of guilty to battery in a county jail facility. We affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss and the departure sentence.
In the late evening of December 2, 1989 or in the early morning of December 3, 1989 a convenience store in Daytona Beach was robbed and the store clerk was murdered. Detective Francis J. Allman of the Daytona Beach Police Department conducted an investigation during which he learned that appellant was a former employee of the store and had been seen around the convenience store before it closed on December 2. Allman located appellant in Marion, Kentucky and had Kentucky officials arrest him on an unrelated capias. Kentucky law enforcement officers recovered a .38 caliber "Llama" revolver from appellant's residence, which revolver was later identified as the murder weapon in this case.
Allman went to Kentucky and interviewed appellant. Appellant initially denied any involvement in the homicide but later recanted. He told Allman that he was staying at a hotel in Daytona Beach and met up with a man named Luis Vargas. Appellant stated that Vargas became interested in appellant's .38 caliber Llama revolver and purchased it from appellant, who then drove Vargas to an area near the crime scene and dropped him off, at which time appellant returned to his hotel. Appellant told Allman that Vargas later returned to the hotel and stated that the gun was now "very hot" because he had shot someone and stolen money. According to appellant, Vargas paid appellant to take the gun back and, after doing so, appellant became scared, checked out of the hotel and returned to Kentucky.
Appellant was subsequently charged with the offense of accessory after the fact to armed robbery and extradited to Florida in March of 1990. On April 24, 1990 appellant entered a plea of guilty to the crime of accessory after the fact to armed robbery which plea was accepted with the condition of a six month prison cap. A presentence investigation was ordered.
On May 24, 1990 Detective Allman executed a sworn complaint affidavit alleging appellant committed the murder of the convenience store clerk. The state then filed a motion to vacate and set aside appellant's plea to the offense of accessory after the fact, alleging appellant had committed a fraud on the court by denying his involvement in the homicide and that the state believed appellant was not guilty of the offense of accessory after the fact. At a hearing on that motion, defense counsel indicated that he had no problem with vacating the plea and saw no double jeopardy problem, noting that the state had uncov ered after-the-fact evidence. The trial court vacated the plea at the request of defense counsel and the state entered a nolle prosequi on that charge.
Subsequently, appellant was indicted for first degree murder and armed robbery. Appellant was then appointed other counsel who filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. After the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, appellant entered a plea of nolo conten-dere to the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Appellant was later charged with the second degree felony of battery in a county jail facility to which he entered a plea of guilty.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the murder and armed robbery indictment on double jeopardy grounds. This argument is without merit.
The double jeopardy clause bars any subsequent prosecution in cases in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in the prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). See also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); State v. Gibson, 452 So.2d 553, 556-57 (Fla.1984). This is not an "actual evidence" or "same evidence" test; but instead, the critical inquiry is what conduct the state will prove. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. Cf. State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420 (Fla.1986).
In the instant case the conduct of appellant which establishes the offense of accessory after the fact is entirely different from his conduct to establish the armed robbery and the murder which occurred during the armed robbery. Although some or all of the evidence may show conduct that constitutes the crimes of armed robbery, murder, and accessory after the fact, appellant's conduct in acting as an accessory after the fact in no way constitutes an element of either armed robbery or murder. See Dixon v. State, 584 So.2d 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Because the state need not prove conduct that constitutes the offense of accessory after the fact in order to establish an essential element of armed robbery or murder, double jeopardy does not bar appellant's prosecution for armed robbery or murder.
We note that it would not violate appellant's double jeopardy rights to be convicted of robbery and murder, as well as being an accessory after the fact of the same robbery, if appellant took part in the robbery and murder and later assisted Vargas to avoid or escape detection for the robbery. Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 625 (Fla.1988); Morman v. State, 458 So.2d 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Conviction as a principal and as an accessory after the fact for the same crime does not raise double jeopardy concerns, although under statutory interpretation a principal cannot be an accessory after the fact. Staten, 519 So.2d at 625. Thus, if appellant aided Vargas in avoiding or escaping detection, the vacating of his plea for the offense of accessory after the fact resulted in appellant not being convicted for this conduct. Further, if appellant was the sole perpetrator of the robbery and murder, convictions for both robbery and accessory after the fact of robbery would violate due process because one cannot aid and abet himself to commit a crime: aiding and abetting oneself is a nonexistent crime. Morman, 458 So.2d at 89. In such a situation the court would be required to set aside the conviction for accessory after the fact (the relief which was granted in this case). See Jackson v. State, 543 So.2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
Appellant also contends that his counsel had no authority to move the trial court to vacate his initial plea to the offense of accessory after the fact. We need not reach this issue in light of the discussion above.
We reject appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing guidelines for the offense of battery in a county jail facility based upon his murder conviction. At sentencing the scoresheet reflected a permitted sentence of 2½ to 5V2 years imprisonment for the armed robbery and battery offenses, respectively. The trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines in sentencing defendant to 15 years imprisonment on each offense. These sentences were ordered to run concurrent with the sentence of life imprisonment with a 25-year minimum mandatory which was imposed for the murder offense. The trial court stated as its reason for departure the unscored murder conviction.
A trial court is authorized to depart from the guidelines in sentencing for a non-capital offense based upon an unscored capital offense. See Livingston v. State, 565 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1988); Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081 (Fla.1987); Jones v. State, 571 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 165 (Fla.1991). Appellant asserts that such a departure sentence is authorized only where the capital and non-capital offenses are related, as in both Livingston and Hansbrough. However, neither Livingston nor Hansbrough require that capital and non-capital offenses be related in order to base a departure sentence for the non-capital offense upon the unscored capital offense. Further, it is well established law in Florida that uns-cored convictions (including extensive juvenile convictions and convictions for offenses committed subsequent to the offense being sentenced) can provide a valid basis for departure. See Puffinberger v. State, 581 So.2d 897 (Fla.1991); Wichael v. State, 567 So.2d 549 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Kirby v. State, 553 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) rev. denied, 562 So.2d 346 (Fla.1990). Therefore, the trial court properly departed from the sentencing guidelines in sentencing appellant on both the armed robbery and the battery convictions, based upon the unscored capital offense.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss the armed robbery and murder charges and we affirm his convictions and sentences for all three offenses.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents, with opinion.
. § 777.03 and § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989).
. The colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court indicates the following:
THE COURT: You're asking me to vacate the plea and set it aside?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Granted....
. § 782.04(l)(a)l and/or § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1989).
. § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989).
. The ruling in State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420 (Fla.1986) is not contrary to the ruling in Grady v. Corbin, supra. In Johnson the defendant was initially charged with aggravated battery, a felony, and three related misdemeanors: reckless or negligent operation of a vessel, operation of a vessel while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and failure to render assistance after a collision or accident. Pursuant to an unconditional plea, Johnson pled nolo contendere to the offenses of culpable negligence with injury, which is a lesser included misdemeanor to the offense of aggravated battery, and to two of the three related misdemeanors. Because fraudulent statements were made by Johnson at his plea hearing, the trial court later set aside the plea and reinstated the original charges. Johnson was convicted of those charges. The supreme court vacated Johnson's convictions, ruling that the prohibition against double jeopardy barred the trial court from reinstating the original charges because the conduct involved in the reinstated charges was the same conduct involved in the lesser misdemeanor charge and the two other related misdemeanors to which Johnson had earlier pled nolo contendere.
. Appellant's conduct which pertained to the offense of accessory after the fact consisted of assisting Luis Vargas in committing armed robbery by taking the gun out of the state with the intent that Luis Vargas escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment.
. Appellant's conduct which related to the crime of armed robbery consisted of appellant, by the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear, taking certain property of another person with the intent to deprive that person of his rights to or from such property, and while committing such acts, carrying a handgun.
. Appellant's conduct which pertains to the offense of first degree murder consisted of unlawfully killing another person from a premeditated design to effect such person's death or while engaged in or in the attempt to commit a robbery did kill such person by shooting him with a handgun or aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring or procuring another to commit the murder. The conduct of aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or procuring another to commit the offense of murder by its nature would have had to have occurred prior to or during the killing and not after the fact.
. "[T]he state may only punish one who had committed an offense; and an offense is an act clearly prohibited by the lawful authority of the state, providing notice through published laws." State v. Sykes, 434 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla.1983).