Case Name: WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-08-05
Citations: 425 Mich. 527
Docket Number: Docket No. 74427
Parties: WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
Judges: Williams, C.J., and Levin and Riley, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 425
Pages: 527–542

Head Matter:
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
Docket No. 74427.
Argued March 5, 1986
(Calendar No. 10).
Decided August 5, 1986.
Whirlpool Corporation brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court, challenging a decision by the Civil Rights Commission that Whirlpool’s rule prohibiting the hiring of spouses of its employees violated the marital status provisions of the Civil Rights Act, and that the rule was not exempt as a bona fide occupation qualification. The court, Zoe S. Burkholz, J., reversed, holding that no violation of the Civil Rights Act had occurred. The Court of Appeals, Beasley, P.J., and Allen and Breighner, JJ., reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 72928). The plaintiff appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Brickley, joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justices Levin and Riley, the Supreme Court held:
No-spouse rules which prohibit the hiring of spouses of employees do not constitute discrimination on the basis of marital status.
1. Under the Civil Rights Act, an employer may not discriminate on the basis of marital status. However, the prohibition was not intended to provide a person a right to be employed by the same employer as the person’s spouse. An employer may lawfully prohibit any person from working for the employer if related to another person already employed by it. Such lawful conduct does not become unlawful merely because certain related persons are permitted to be employed.
2. In this case, the no-spouse rule at issue is not discrimina-_tion on the basis of marital status. Rather, it results in differ ent treatment of job applicants on the basis of the place of a spouse’s employment. Marital status is irrelevant to the employer unless it already employs the applicant’s spouse.
References
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 176 et seq.
Distinctions based on marital status as constituting sex discrimination under § 703(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS § 2000e-2(a)). 34 ALR Fed 648.
What constitutes employment discrimination on basis of "marital status” for purposes of state civil rights laws. 44 ALR4th 1044.
What constitutes illegal discrimination under state statutory prohibition against discrimination in housing accommodations on account of marital status. 33 ALR4th 964.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Archer, joined by Justices Cavanagh and Boyle, dissenting, stated that the plaintiffs rule which prohibits the hiring of spouses of current employees violates the Civil Rights Act in that it facially discriminates against persons on the basis of marital status, while not similarly discriminating against persons otherwise related to or living with its employees, and because it necessarily involves inquiry concerning the marital status of prospective employees.
Opinion of the Court
1. Civil Rights — Employment Discrimination — No-Spouse Rules — Marital Status.
No-spouse rules which prohibit the hiring of spouses of employees are not discrimination on the basis of marital status where the marital status of an applicant for employment is irrelevant to the employer unless the applicant’s spouse already is employed by that employer (MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548[101] et seq.).
Dissenting Opinion by Archer, J.
2. Civil Rights — Employment Discrimination — Marital Status.
Prohibition by an employer of the hiring of spouses of its employees violated the Civil Rights Act in that it facially discriminated against persons on the basis of marital status, while not similarly discriminating against persons otherwise related to or living with its employees, and because it required inquiry concerning the marital status of prospective employees (MCL 37.2202[l][a], 37.2206[2][a]; MSA 3.548[202][l][a], 3.548[206][2][a]).
Butzbaugh, Page, Butzbaugh & Dewane (by John E. Dewane) and Matkov, Griffin, Parsons, Salzman & Madoff (by David J. Parsons) for the plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Felix E. League and Dianne Rubin, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants.

Opinion:
Brickley, J.
The facts of this case are set forth in the opinion of Justice Archer. The issue presented is whether the Legislature intended the Civil Rights Act to prohibit employers from having "no-spouse rules" in their personnel policies. We recently held that antinepotism policies which prohibit "any relatives (natural or through marriage)" of a current employee from being hired do not constitute discrimination on the basis of marital status. Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). We believe the reasoning in Miller compels a like result in this case.
At issue in Miller and Lowry v Sinai Hospital, a companion case, were employer's personnel policies which prohibited related employees from working for the same employer at the same restaurant (CA Muer) or in the same department (Sinai Hospital)- The C. A. Muer policy applied to "any relatives (natural or through marriage)" and the Sinai Hospital policy applied to "parents, children, siblings, spouses, grandparents, and legal guardians." 420 Mich 364. In Miller, plaintiff worked as a waiter at defendant's restaurant when he became engaged to an employee of the same restaurant. When the employer learned of the engagement, it informed Miller that he would be required to choose between quitting his employment, being discharged, or being transferred to another restaurant operated by Muer. In Lowry, plaintiff worked as a security guard at Sinai Hospital. After she married a co-worker who was also a security guard, her employer informed her that policy required one of them to leave the employment or transfer to another department. 420 Mich 358-359.
The question in this Court was whether these policies impermissibly discriminated on the basis of marital status within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. We began our analysis by noting that the term "marital status" is not defined in the act. Various definitions of the term were offered:
It has been said that the term means "whether one is married or not married," . or "the social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to participate in a marriage." . . . The usual answer to a query about one's marital status is "married," "single," "divorced," "widowed," or "separated." . . . The relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. [420 Mich 361-362. Emphasis in original. Citations omitted.]
After observing the split of authority on this issue in other jurisdictions, we went on to discuss the purposes of the act. One of the goals is to "prevent discrimination against a person because of stereotyped impressions about the characteristics of a class to which the person belongs." 420 Mich 362-363. The Michigan act is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases. Id.
We opted for a narrow definition of the term "marital status":
By including marital status as a protected class, the Legislature manifested its intent to prohibit discrimination based on whether a person is married. To include the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse within the definition of "marital status" might enlarge the protected class to include all married persons who desire to work with their spouse. Such a construction would invalidate most antinepotism policies.
We declined to speculate whether such personnel policies are sound, but instead found that they did not reflect offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, or biases. We concluded:
Absent a more specific manifestation of legislative intent, we conclude that the prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of "marital status" was not meant to protect a right to be employed in the same department as one's spouse. [420 Mich 364.]
We believe the result and reasoning of Miller compels the conclusion that Whirlpool's policy does not violate the Civil Rights Act. The most obvious reason for this conclusion is that the employer, under Miller, can lawfully prohibit any relative from working in the plant if related to another already there. The. lawful conduct of not allowing relatives to work together should not become unlawful merely because certain relatives are so allowed.
Also, this is not discrimination on the basis of marital status. It is different treatment based on the fact that one's spouse works in the same place as the applicant. Marital status is irrelevant to the employer unless there is a spouse already working for the employer. This is not discrimination based on a stereotypical view of the characteristics of married or single persons.
The question here is one of legislative intent, and we do not believe the Legislature intended to so severely regulate employers' personnel policies so as to prohibit no-spouse rules. If the lawmakers did intend such a change, then their intent must be manifested more clearly.
The dissent partially bases its conclusion on the assumption that the "determination of whether an applicant's spouse works [at the same place] necessarily involves an inquiry into the marital status of the prospective employee." Post, p 541. As noted by the dissenters, §206(2)(a) forbids an employer from making an inquiry as to the marital status of an applicant. They conclude from these two premises that the no-spouse rule violates the statute.
We do not believe this reasoning is sound. Under this rationale an employer could arguably retain a no-spouse rule, if it chose to enforce the rule by means other than inquiring into the applicant's marital status.
We believe Miller mandates the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to include no-spouse rules among the conduct constituting discrimination on the basis of marital status.
The Court of Appeals here followed pre-Miller authority in concluding that the no-spouse rule is facially discriminatory on the basis of marital status and thus did not address appellee's claim that the rule discriminates on the basis of sex. We noted in Miller that "[a] facially neutral employment practice can operate as a mask or pretext for impermissible discrimination." 420 Mich 365.
We believe that many of the factual arguments asserted by appellees in attempting to distinguish the policies in Miller from the employment policy in the present case, with regard to the marital status discrimination issue, actually are more related to the underlying sex discrimination claim. The arguments challenging the soundness and necessity of Whirlpool's policy, for example, would not seem relevant to the primary statutory issue presented. Likewise, the fact that Whirlpool does not also base employment decisions on other familial relationships, or that it does not prohibit the employment of applicants "living with" current employees, would also seem irrelevant. Yet, these arguments could raise the inference that the "no-spouse" rule involved in this case may be intended to discriminate against women.
Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the sex discrimination claim.
Williams, C.J., and Levin and Riley, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.
Such an expansive construction of "marital status" would also include in the protected class an employee whose wife is the chief executive officer of his employer's major competitor. We do not wish to be understood as saying that an employer should not hire a close relative of one of its competitors' employees; we conclude only that the Legislature did not require an employer to make all personnel decisions without regard to the identity of an employee's spouse. [Citations omitted. Emphasis in original.]
Moreover, we believe that in the great majority of cases it will be possible for an employer to determine whether an applicant's spouse is already employed at the same place without inquiring about marital status. The employer could simply ask: "Do you have a spouse that currently works for this company?" A "no" answer to this question does not reveal the marital status of the prospective employee to the employer. While a "yes" answer does reveal the applicant's marital status, it is the only instance in which the marital status of the applicant will be revealed, and the information clearly sought is not marital status, but whether the spouse, if there is one, works for the same employer.