Case Name: THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE E. MILLS
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-04
Citations: 18 N.Y. Crim. 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE E. MILLS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 269–312

Head Matter:
Court of Appeals.
April, 1904.
THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE E. MILLS.
(178 N. Y. 274.)
1. Crimes—Receiving Property of the State Brom any One, under Any Circumstances, with Intent to Steal It, Is a Crime.
Where an individual owner delivers his property to one who wishes to steal it, there is no trespass, but where the property of the state is delivered by any one, under any circumstances, to any person for the purpose of having him steal it and he takes it into his possession with intent to steal it, there is a trespass and the attempt is a crime.
2. Theft of Public Records—Penal Code, §§ 94, 531.
The instigator of a plot to obtain possession of certain indictments for the purpose of destroying them; by bribing an assistant district attorney having them in his special charge to remove them from the files of the court and deliver them to him for a consideration to be agreed upon, and who, after a feigned compliance with the scheme by an intermediary pretending to act for such officer, receives the indictments, puts them in his pocket and walks away, whereupon he is immediately arrested and the indictments are taken, is properly convicted, under section 94 of the Penal Code, of an attempt to commit the crime of willfully and unlawfully removing documents from a public office, and, under section 531, of the attempt to commit the crime of grand larceny in the second degree.
3. Delivery of Public Records by Public Officer to One with THE INTENT TO HAVE HlM STEAL THEM NO DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION for Theft upon the Ground that the State, through Its Representative, Attempted to Create a Crim:e.
The fact that the district attorney, upon being informed of the scheme, directed his employees to seemingly comply therewith, and for the sole purpose of apprehending the defendant in the commission of a crime and of securing his subsequent conviction, procured the indictments with the consent of a judge out of court and ordered their delivery to the defendant, is not available as a defense upon the ground that the object of the district attorney was not to detect but to create a crime, and that the defendant was innocent because he took the indictments into his possession with the consent of the state as represented by the district attorney. The indictments were the property of the state which no court, even by formal or•der, could lawfully direct to be removed for any purpose, except as provided in section 866 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certainly not for the purpose for which they used; they were not in the lawful possession of the district attorney; he could not lawfully give them away or permit them to be taken by the defendant, and the latter’s appropriation of them with the intent to steal was as much a crime as though he had with such intent removed them from the records himself. The state detects and punishes crime after its •commission, but there can be no such thing as the state tempting a •citizen to its commission for the purpose of detecting and punishing it. The district attorney could not and did not represent the state, although he thought he did, and his sole desire was to ren der it official service. His acts, therefore, exceeded his authority, were individual, did not bind the state and did not estop it from prosecuting and convicting the defendant. ,
4. When the Defendant Is a Principal.
The defendant having proposed the scheme and put in motion the forces by which the indictments were actually removed from the -files of the court, was a principal throughout the transaction; but if he had not instigated it, if he took them animo furandi from any place or from any person, either with or without consent, he was guilty of the offenses charged.
People v. Mills, 91 App. Div. 331, affirmed.
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered February 17, 1904, which affirmed a judgment-entered upon a verdict convicting the defendant of an attempt to commit the c^ime of grand larceny in the second degree, and of an attempt to commit the crime of willfully and unlawfully removing certain public documents from the custody of the officer to whom they were confided by law.
The indictment against the defendant contains two counts, each charging an attempt to violate a distinct section of the Penal Code, the first being founded on section 94 and the second on section 531. The facts appearing on the trial, as well stated by the Appellate Division, are as follows : “Richard C. Flower was a physician and was also
engaged in promoting certain mining interests. In connection with such enterprise he was indicted under six different indictments for alleged larcenies, and was also suspected of being implicated in the suspicious death of one Hagaman, which case the district attorney was investigating shortly prior to the offenses charged in the present indictment. Francis P. Garvan, an assistant district attorney of the county of New York, had special charge of the prosecution of the indictments against Flower and also of the investigation of the death of Hagaman. The defendant was a lawyer, engaged in the practice of his profession in the city of New York with a son of Richard C. Flower, and he was also interested in various mining companies in connection with Dr. Flower and Andrew D. Meloy and others at the time when the indictments were found against Flower, and when he was being otherwise investigated, and he took a very lively interest in Dr. Flower’s behalf.
It appeared from the testimony of Meloy that he was president and a member of the board of directors of the Lone Pine Mining Company of which board the defendant was a member; that on Saturday, March 28, 1903, at a directors*, meeting of this mining company, the defendant called attention to the prosecutions against Dr. Flower, and stated that it was having a bad effect upon the company; that he thought Garvan was persecuting Flower ; that the ends of justice were not being promoted, and he expressed a wish that the directors should pass some resolution asking Gar-van, or the district attorney’s office, to discontinue the attack upon Flower. Such resolution, however, was neither adopted nor offered. On the next day Meloy testified that he received a telephone message from the defendant asking him to meet him on Riverside drive about Eighty-fifth or Eighty-sixth streets; that he met him there alone, had a conversation with him in which he spoke of Flower’s increasing difficulties, about his counsel, 'what they had done and what his anxieties and fears were. He discussed Gar- • van and the latter’s attitude to the case, and asked Meloy if he would not make an engagements with Garvan so that the defendant could see and have a talk with him and see if the prosecutions could not be stopped, and there was some conversation about the money which had been paid for counsel, and that if it were given to Garvan it would accomplish greater results. The defendant finally said: “I will not give Hart any money or any lawyer. * * * I know the head of this thing and I am going to give what money I give to Garvan. * * * What I want to do is to get in contact with Garvan and I want you to do it for me. * *
* When he said he wanted to get in contact, I asked him if he knew what he was doing, what he was about ; he said he thought he did. Then I said the same general remark—be careful. At the end of the conversation I left Mr. Mills and stated I would see Mr. Garvan the next day and make an engagement. ” Meloy further testified that he asked the defendant why he did not get in touch with Gar-van himself, and in reply the defendant stated, in substance, “that if he came himself Mr. Garvan would be afraid, but that you could arrange it for him.” Meloy then parted from the defendent with the understanding that he was to see Garvan and make an appointment for him the next day. Meloy, however, took an entirely different course. The next day he consulted with his own counsel, telling him what had occurred. Thereupon his counsel and himself interviewed Garvan over the telephone, with the result that the three had a meeting in the afternoon and the whole matter of the conversation was stated to Garvan, after which Mr. Jerome, the district/attorney, was brought into the conference and informed of what had taken place. Jerome testified that on the next day after the conference he communicated with Detective Sergeant Brindley and gave him directions concerning the case, as a result of which he was to put himself into communication with the defendant for the purpose of detecting him in the commission of any crime which he might commit or attempt to commit. Meloy had no communication with Brindley, but the latter called him up on the telephone for the purpose of making arrangements by which he could meet the defendant.' Meloy then saw the defendant, informed him that he had seen Garvan and made arrangements for him to meet Gar-van’s wardman, Brindley. The defendant demurred to this, stating that he wanted to meet Garvan. Meloy told him that Garvan would not do business with him directly, but that he would have to do it with Brindley, and thereupon the defendant consented to see him, and Meloy, in the defendant’s presence, called up Brindley by telephone at the district attorney’s office and told him that the defendant would meet him. As a result of this, the defendant and Brindley met in the afternoon in Haan’s restaurant, No. n Park Row in the city of New York. After identifying each other they went into one of the booths, when Mills stated that he had been instructed by Dr. Flower to have an interview with Garvan about the disposition of the charges against Flower. Brindley informed him that it was impossible for him to see Gar-van, and defendant said : ‘ ‘Well, Dr. Flower is anxious for me to talk to Garvan and I do not see why he does not want to talk to me just as lawyer to lawyer, that would be all right.” And when informed that this was impossible, he said, “Well, if you can assure me that you will fulfill any contract or proposition that I make to you I am willing to talk with you.” After some further conversation defendant stated: “That Dr. Flower was a fool to have let the matter go as far as it did, as the opportunity was presented to him when Mr. Garvan had him in his office for examination in the Hagaman matter; that this was his time for to make a settlement instead of fighting it out, and that now he has engaged high-priced counsel who would drag the case out so as to justify a large fee; * * he would go to the fountain-head and settle the case. I asked him then, ‘Well, what is it you want us to do?’ He says, ‘Well, these indictments that have been found against Dr. Flower you can withdraw them and misplace them, lose them or dispose of them in some way or Mr. Garvan could go into court and permit him to go. into court on a demurrer and have the indictments quashed.’ I told (him) that I would see Mr. Garvan and submit this to him and let him know. He then said, ‘Well, Mr. Garvan ought to be satisfied with this; the matter is not worth as much money now as it would have been to us if it had been disposed of before indictment and all of this publicity; Dr. Flower’s business has suffered very much from this, and, of course, it is not worth the money it would have been before the publicity.’ He said that as to the Hagaman matter, ‘Mr. Garvan could say that after thorough examination of witnesses and the autopsy and the examination of the report of the physician and chemist, he had come to the conclusion that the death of Mr. Hagaman was caused by natural causes, and that this would relieve both Dr. Flower and his client, Mrs. Hagaman—that is Mills’ client of this notoriety.’ * * * He said he would have to see Dr. Flower so as to make the arrangements for the money ; that Dr. Flower is an old bird at this game, has had twenty years’ experience and would be very particular about arranging these matters.” After arranging that the defendant should be known thereafter as McChesney, the parties separated. This conversation was repeated by Brindley to Jerome, and thereupon Jerome applied to “ a judge of ” the court having the custody of the indictments, explained * * * how he desired to use them, without, however, mentioning any name, and the “judge” permitted them to be taken from the files of the office and Jerome delivered them to Brindley. In the afternoon of the next day the defendant telephoned Brindley at the district attorney’s office that everything was all right; that he had seen Dr. Flower and “that it would be a go.” At twelve o’clock of that day Brindley and the defendant again met at Haan’s restaurant, when the defendant asked “ ‘as to those indict ments, what have you done ?’ I says, ‘Well, pursuant to your suggestion of yesterday about these indictments I have, inquired as to what effect it would have, and find that there are copies in the District Attorney’s office of these indictments.’ He says, ‘yes, that is right; by taking these indictments, the originals, the copies could be made demurrable, and Mr. Garvan could go into court and with all apparent good faith fight our motion to demur on those indictments, and, of course, the judge would decide against him.’ He says, ‘but how do we know as to your good faith in those other matters that may come up in the future?’ ‘Well,’ I says, ‘you.would have possession of the indictments then, and that would be evidence of good faith on our part. ’ He says, ‘yes, but I do not want those indictments; I will take them from you, buy them and would go somewheres with you and destroy them.’ I says, ‘well, I have withdrawn those indictments, have given no reason why I did and have them with me, ’ and I showed them to him. He took them and examined them. After carefully examining them he says, ‘well, there are only five indictments here, and there has been no indictment on the bribery charge ; that makes that the easier to dispose of; one prisoner already having been discharged, it would be an easy matter for Mr. Garvan to have the other one discharged. ’ He said, ‘I will have to see Dr. Flower to get the money and will try to find him by five o’clock this afternoon.’ I said, ‘well, that would be after banking hours and would be rather late,’ and he says, ‘well, I will have to try to find him somewheres.’ I then said, ‘well, what amount did you want to pay for this service?’ He says, ‘well, $1,500.’ I says I thought that was rather cheap. He said, ‘well, I will make it $2,000, in this way, $1,500 to be paid to Mr. Garvan and $500 you and I will divide.’ ” Brindley consented to this, and after some further conversation the parties separated, agreeing to meet again later in the afternoon. Subsequently the defendant
called Brindley over the telephone, stating that he could not make the arrangements for that day; would have to postpone it to the next. Brindley replied that it was a risky thing for him to keep the indictments out of the Court of General Sessions. “He said, ‘well, under no conditions put them back; keep them out; it will be all right; you can make any excuse—say you cannot find them, but keep them out, anyway.’ ” The parties had prior to this time agreed to refer to the indictments as “subpoenas” and the money as “additional evidence.” A meeting was arranged for next day, at which time Brindley posted in Haan’s restaurant other officers and persons to observe what transpired between him, and the defendant. He met the defendant shortly after one o’clock at Haan’s rathskeller, and after considerable conversation with respect to the Hagaman matter and what might occur in the future with respect to complaints against Dr. Flower, defendant said : “,I have the money here, and we can do more business in the future.’ He put his hand in his inside poclce; and withdrew an envelope—this one (indicating)—and passed it to me and said, ‘just count it; there is $1,500.’. The envelope was open when he handed it to me. I took it from him, from his hand. I looked into it; it had fifteen one hundred dollar bills in it. I counted them ; they are there now.” The envelope and money were then received in evidence. Defendant then said: “This is for Mr. Garvan ; give this to Mr. Garvan, you and Mr. Garvan can settle for this $1,-500.” He said : “Look out, be careful.” Thereupon the defendant called attention to certain persons who were observing them and Brindley told him they were all “grafters.” He then gave to Brindley $250 more and said: “The other $250 I have in my pocket.” Brindley then produced the indictments, which the defendant examined and finally suggested as they were being watched that they go upstairs. He picked up the indictments, placed them in his outside pocket, walked to the stairway leading to the cafe upstairs when Brindley placed him under arrest. He was searched in the presence of other persons in the cafe, the indictments were found upon him and he was taken to the station house. The defendant admitted that the indictments were found upon his person at the time of his arrest, and he did not deny but that he had meetings with Brindley, as testified to by the latter, or but that the money which was produced in court and introduced into evidence was given by him to Brindley at the place and time that the testimony established. The defendant’s claim in answer thereto was that he and Brindley were engaged in buying up claims against Dr. Flower, and that in all the negotiations which he had with Brindley he was acting as the representative of Flower against creditors and their attorney, Mr. Hart, from whom he was to receive releases to be delivered to him by Brindley ; but he admits that Brindley produced the indictments, told him what they were ; that he looked at them and subsequently put them in his pocket at the request of Brindley.”
The jury found the defendant guilty upon both counts and he was sentenced accordingly. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division the judgment was affirmed, one of the justices dissenting, and the defendant thereupon came to this court.
John R. Dos Passos, Benjamin S. Steinhardt and Edmund F. Harding for appellant.
The defendant, under the evidence disclosed, committed no indictable crime, either the principal offense or an attempt to commit it. (Beccaria on Crimes [ed. 1705], 7; Connor v. People, 18 Col. 373;, O’Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665; Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Penn. Dist. Rep. 206; State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76; People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185; State v. Stickney, 53 Kans. 308, 36 Pac. Rep. 714; State v. Hull, 33 Oreg. 56; Williams v. State, 56 Ga. 391.) There was no evidence to show that defendant was guilty of a violation of sections 94 and 531 of the Penal Code, under which he was indicted. (Thorn v. Turck, 94 N. Y. 95; Zink v. People, 6 Abb. [N. C.] 413; 77 N. Y. 114; People v. Nichols, 3 Park. Cr. Rep. 579; 17 N. Y. 114; Dodge v. Brittain, Meigs, 83, 85; People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 125.)
William Travers Jerome, District Attorney (Robert C. Taylor of counsel), for respondent.
As defendant’s felonious intent was fully shown, his participation in the removal of the indictments constituted an attempt to violate section 94 of the Penal Code and also an attempt to commit grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of section 531, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code. (People v. Lawrence, 137 N. Y. 517; People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 91; People v. Cotto, 131 N. Y. 597; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576; King v. Higgins, 2 East, 5; People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 135; People v. McDermott, 5 Park. Cr. Rep. 102; Bish. New Crim. Law [8th ed.], §§ 767, 768; Rex v. Lawrence, 4 Cox C. C. 438; Rex v. Walsh, 1 Mood. C. C. 14; Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518.) The proposition that Mills’ possession of the indictments was lawful ; that the district attorney had presented Mills with the indictments and that the district attorney had power to bind the state so as to make the transfer of the indictments lawful is untenable. (1 Bish. New Crim. Law, §§ 257, 262; Riley v. State, 16 Conn. 47; Forsythe v. State, 6 Ohio, 20; Grimm v. United States, 156 U. S. 604; People v. Krivitzky, 168 N. Y. 182.) The claim that the deception perpetrated upon defendant has the effect of leaving him guiltless when the evidence is weighed in the balance is untenable. (Matter of Cross, 85 Hun, 343; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574; People v. White, 176 N. Y. 331; People v. Noelke, 29 Hun, 461; Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553; Grimm v. U. S., 156 U. S. 604; Goode v. U. S., 159 U. S. 663; Rosen v. U. S., 161 U. S. 29; Andrews v. U. S.; 162. U. S. 420, People v. Krivitzky, 168 N. Y. 182.)
For opinion of Dugro, J., refusing stay, see 41 Misc. 195; 17 N. Y. Crim. 466.

Opinion:
Vann, J.
The indictments against Dr. Flower were records or documents filed in a public office under the authority of law. (Code Crim. Pro. § 272; Code Civ. Pro. § 866.) They were the property of the state and a willful and unlawful removal of them constituted a crime under section 94 of the Penal Code. Any one who unlawfully obtained or appropriated them was guilty of grand larceny in the second degree, according to the provisions of another section of the same statute. (Penal Code, § 531.) Whoever is guilty of violating either section may be convicted of an attempt to commit the offense specified therein, even if it appears on the trial that the crime was fully consummated, unless the court in its discretion discharges the jury and directs the defendant to be tried for the crime itself, which was not done in the case before us. (Code Crim. Pro. § 35 and 685.) The jury found the defendant guilty of an attempt both to remove and to steal the indictments, and after affirmance by the Appellate Division we are confined in our review to such questions as were raised by exceptions taken during the trial.
In view of the able and exhaustive opinion of the Appellate Division, the only question we feel called upon to consider is that raised by the challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. He claims that even on the assumption that ail the evidence for the prosecution is true, still the facts thus proved do not constitute the crime charged in either count of the indictment. His argument is that the object of-the district attorney was not to detect, but to create a crime, and that no crime was committed by the defendant in talcing the indictments into his possession, because he took them with the consent of the state as represented by the district attorney.
The flaw in this argument is found in the fact that the records were the property of the state, not of the district attorney, and that the latter could not lawfully give them away or permit them to be taken by the defendant. Purity of intention only could prevent the. action of the district attorney from being a crime on his part. This is true also as to the detective, for if either had in fact intended that the defendant should permanently remove the indictments, and steal, appropriate or destroy them, he would have come within the statute. Neither of those officers represented the state in placing the records where the defendant could take them, but each was acting as an individual only. Neither had the right or power, as a public officer, to deliver them to the defendant, and if either had acted with an evil purpose, his act would have been criminal in character.
An act done with intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that crime. (Penal Code, § 34.) Felonious intent alone is not enough, but there mvst be an overt act shown in order to establish even an attempt. An overt act is one done to carry out the intention, and it must be such as would naturally effect that result, unless prevented by some extraneous cause. In People v. Bush (4 Hill, 133) the prisoner solicited one Kinney to burn a barn, and gave him matches for the purpose, and it was held sufficient to warrant a conviction for attempt at arson, although the prisoner did not mean to be present at the commission of the offense, and Kinney did not intend to commit it. The furnishing of the matches was the overt act. If the defendant did anything with intent to steal the papers, which in the ordinary course of events, unless interfered with, would have resulted in the theft thereof, it was an overt act. (People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 133.) Taking up the records, putting them in his pocket and walking away with them was an overt act, because it was done with the intent to remove and appropriate them, and would ordinarily result in carrying that intention into effect. It was a trespass to take the indictments into his possession under the circumstances, for he did it, as the jury found, with the intention of stealing them. It was not necessary that the trespass should be accompanied with violence, as it was enough for him to secure the physical custody of the papers and have it in his power to take them away and appropriate them, the same as if he had picked them up in the clerk's office. No more force would be required in the case supposed than in the case proved. The touch of a pickpocket is so light that it cannot be felt, yet the force is sufficient to constitute a trespass and an attempt to commit a crime, even if there is nothing in the pocket to steal. (People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254.) As was. said by the court in a late case : "It is now the established law, both in England and in this country, that the crime of attempting to commit larceny may be committed, although there was no property to steal, and thus the full crime of larceny could not have been committed. " (People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 125, and cases cited.)
Knowing that he had no right to the indictments, and that the officers had no right to let him have them, when the defendant picked them up from the table and put them in his pocket animo furandi, the law presumes that the act was done vi et armis, for the amount of violence is not important. He removed the papers from the control of the real owner and had them in his own control, so that the state could not have recovered possession without his consent or by forcibly taking them away from him, which was in fact done. The detective could only get them back if he and his assistants were strong enough, unless the defendant voluntarily gave them up. He had the same control of them that he had of his own pocket book, for both were in his pocket and neither could be taken from him except by the use of force. Temporary possession, though but for a moment, by one who intends to steal is enough, and possession "is the having or holding or detention of property in one's power or command." (Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518.) As was said by Judge Folger in the case cited, quoting with approval from an old manuscript of a distinguished judge : "If every part of the thing is removed from the space which that part occupied, yet the whole thing is not removed from the whole space which the whole thing occupied, the asportation will be sufficient; so, drawing a sword partly out of its scabbard will constitute a complete asportavit." The defendant picked up the papers from the table; he held them in his hand ; he put them in his pocket and was walking away with them when he was arrested. In whose possession were they at that time if not in his, and how did they get there unless by his unauthorized, physical interference with them? The district attorney did not authorize him to take them, for he could not and the defendant knew that he could not. Neither the district attorney nor the detective stood for the state of New York in placing them where the defendant could get them, for no court or officer has that power under the law. The statute expressly prohibits a record or document "whereof a transcript duly certified may by law be read in evidence," from being "removed, by virtue of a subpoena duces tecum from the-office in which it is kept; except temporarily, by the clerk having it in custody, to a term or sitting of the court of which he is clerk; or by the officer, having it in custody, to a term or sitting of a court or referee, held in the city or town where his office is situated." Where it is required at any other place, for use as evidence, it may be removed by order of the court "entered i'n the minutes;. specifying that the production of the original, instead cf the transcript, is necessary." (Code Civ. Pro. § 866.)
This is the only statute which confers any power on the court in relation to the subject and, clearly, it did not authorize the court to allow the district attorney to take the indictments in question for the .purpose of giving them away, even temporarily, or permitting them to zbe taken into possession by one who wanted to steal them. An order made for such a purpose would be void, but no order of the kind was actually made by the court, or "entered in the minutes." The district attorney told one of the judges, out of court, what he wanted of the indictments, and, to use his own words, "that I desired to keep them over night, but I did not want to go to the clerk's cffi.ce about it and that I did not want to do it without the consent of some judge and he was the only judge in the building and he consented." While such consent gave some moral support to the district attorney, it added not a whit to his legal powers. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires that an indictment i 'must be filed with the clerk and remain in his office as a public record." (§ 272.) No one is authorized to take it away, except when if is needed as evidence, or in court upon the trial of the accused. We have recently held that a record made for the purpose of identifying a convict and kept in the office of the superintendent of state prisons, could not be given away or surrendered, even after the person convicted had been acquitted upon a new trial granted through appeal. We declared that the record was beyond the control of the superintendent except for preservation and use, and that even the courts could not .compel him to give if up without express authority from the legislature. (Matter of Molineux, 177 N. Y. 395, 398.)
If the district attorney had had the indictments in his possession for use in court in prosecuting Dr. Flower, such possession would have been the possession of the state, for it would have been lawful and in the line of his duty. When, however, he had them in his possession for the purpose of delivering them to the defendant, or letting him take them with intent to carry them away and destroy them, such possession was not that of the state, for the district attorney was not then acting in an authorized or official capacity, although it is conceded that he thought he was.
As the defendant "proposed the scheme and put in motion the forces by which the indictments were actually removed from the files of the court and delivered to him, '> we agree with the Appellate Division that he was a principal throughout the transaction. (Penal Code, § 29; People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576.) However, even if he had not instigated the scheme pursuant to which the indictments were removed from the office cf the clerk and brought where he could put his hands upon them, still, if he then took them into his possession with intent to steal them, knowing what they were and where they came from, he was guilty of the offense charged. It was unnecessary for him to remove them from the clerk's office, but was sufficient if he took them animo furandi from any place, or from any person, either witlixor without consent.
We shall not review the authorities cited on either side, for that duty has been so thoroughly discharged by the Appellate Division that we can throw no further light upon the subject. We merely state that an important distinction between this case and those relied upon by the appellant is found in the difference between public and private ownership of the property taken by the accused. In most cases some third person is injured by the crime and is directly or indirectly the complainant, but in this case the state was, as it must be in all criminal cases, the prosecutor and it was also the injured party, for its property was the subject of the attempt at larceny. If an .individual owner voluntarily delivers his property to one who wishes to steal it there is no trespass, but when the property of the state is delivered by any one, under any circumstances, to any person for the purpose of having him steal it and he takes it into his possession with intent to steal it, there is a trespass and the attempt is a -crime. The state did not solicit or persuade or tempt the defendant, any more than it took his money when he handed it over to the detective. Neither did the district attorney, as such, but Mr. Jerome did, acting as an individual, with the best of motives, but without authority of law and, hence, his action did riot bind the state. 'While the courts neither adopt nor approve the action of the officers, which they hold was unauthorized, still they should not hesitate to punish the crime actually committed by the defendant. It is their duty to protect the innocent and punish the guilty. We are asked to protect the defendant, not because he is innocent, but because a zealous public officer exceeded his powers and held out a bait. The courts do not look to see who held out the bait, but to see who took it. When it was found that the defendant took into his possession the property of the state with intent to steal it, an offense against public justice was established and he could not insist as a defense that he would not have committed the crime if he had not been tempted by a public officer whom he thought he had corrupted. He supposed he had bought the assistant district attorney when he handed over the money, but he knew he had not bought the state of New York and, hence, that the assistant had no right to give him its property for the purpose of enabling him to steal it.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.