Case Name: GEORGE McKAY vs. HUGH W. BRYSON, & AL
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1844-12
Citations: 5 Ired. 216
Docket Number: 
Parties: GEORGE McKAY vs. HUGH W. BRYSON, & AL.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 216–218

Head Matter:
GEORGE McKAY vs. HUGH W. BRYSON, & AL.
In an action for enticing away an apprentice, the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, as for a total loss of his services, if a total loss had in reality been the consequence of the acts of the defendant; if not, then the damages should be estimated according to the chances the plaintiff had of regaining his apprentice.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Iredell County, at the Fall Term, 1844, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.
This was an action on the case brought to reco ver damages for enticing the plaintiff’s apprentice from his service, and conveying him out of the State. It was in evidence that the lad, George W. Sharpe, was bound in the year 1833, then of the age of 9 years, to' learn the business of a tailor, and that he continued in the service of his master until the year 1840, when the defendant conveyed him away. He has not since returned to this State,- but when last heard from, was in Tennessee.
The court, in instructing the jury as to the rule of damages, informed them that in general terms, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the injury inflicted upon him by the wrongful conduct of the defendants, and by the usual and natural consequences thereof. Supposing the defendants to have enticed away and conveyed the boy beyond the limits of the State, and that he had not yet returned to his master’s service, the injury would be equal to the value of his services to the present time, added to such sum, ranging between the full value of his services for the remainder óf the tíme and a mere nominal sum, as the jury might think proper to give, on account of the plaintiff’s risk of regaining his apprentice, or again realizing any benefit from his services. This additional sum would seem to be damages consequential upon the conduct of the defendants directly and necessarily, and should be assessed in a case of this sort; but of course it ought to be governed by the character of the risk,'and be moré or less in amount, as the chances of further benefit from the apprentice were fewer or greater, more improbable or probable.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff,' and judgment being rendered pursuant thereto,'thé defendants appealed.
No counsel for the plaintiff.
Boyden for the defendants!'

Opinion:
Daniel, J.
The charge of the judge was, in substance as follows, that if the services of the apprentice had become a total loss to the plaintiff, in consequence of the acts of the defendants, then he was entitled to recover damages for such loss, up to the expiration of the term of apprenticeship; but if there were any chances for the plaintiff again getting his apprentice, then the damages should only be for the injury he had actually sustained up to the time of the trial, with such additional damages as the said chances and contingencies indicated of a total loss. It seems to us, that .the charge is within the decision of Hadsall v. Stallbrass, 38 Eng. C. L. R. 35, where the plaintiff, a watchfiiaker, sent his apprentice on business to the defendant's house, who kept a dog known and ac customed to bite mankind ; the dog bit the hand of the Boy and rendered- him incapable ever after of doing his duty, as a watchmaker;' Held, that'the jury might award damages for the loss of the master; up to the end of the term of apprenticeship. In the case now before us, the judge charged, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, as for a'total loss, if a total loss had in reality been the consequence of the acts of the defendants; if not, then the damages should be reduced in proportion to the chances the plaintiff had of regaining his apprentice. It seems to us, that the rule reaches the plaintiff's actual loss as nearly as it can possibly be ascertained, and is therefore reasonable, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Per Curiam, Judgment affirmed.