Case Name: State vs. William Fisher
Court: Delaware Court of Oyer and Terminer
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1898-05-28
Citations: 1 Penne. 303
Docket Number: 
Parties: State vs. William Fisher.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 303–319

Head Matter:
State vs. William Fisher.
Breaking into Dwelling-house—Intent to Commit Rape—Circumstantial Evidence—Reasonable Doubt—Best Evidence.
1. The defendant in a criminal case being called as a witness in his own behalf cannot be asked upon cross-examination, “Were you ever convicted in this Court of house-breaking,” because the best evidence of the fact would be the records of the Court, and they are of easy access.
2. In an indictment for breaking and entering into a dwelling-house in the night time with intent to commit rape, it is necessary for the State to prove (1) that the dwelling-house was broken and entered into by the defendant, and (2) that it was done by the defendant with the intent to commit rape upon the female named in the indictment; but it is not necessary to prove that such intent was in fact executed. The house must be shown to be a dwelling-house and actually inhabited at the time of the offense. The breaking of' the house may be actual, by the application of physical force, or constructive, as where the entrance is obtained by fraud, threats or conspiracy.
3. The intent to commit rape also includes the design and purpose to accomplish it with force and against the will of the woman, or by putting her in great fear and terror, and the burden is upon the prosecution to show such design and purpose. • The circumstances must be such as to show that it would have been rape had the accused executed his felonious assault.
4. The intent ma}’ be proven by direct evidence, such as the express declaration of the accused, or by indirect or circumstantial evidence, such as the acts and conduct of the prisoner, and the facts and circumstances attending them. But when the evidence is circumstantial the jury must be fully satisfied not only that the circumstances proved are consistent with the prisoner’s having committed the act and with the intent charged as constituting the crime, but they must also be likewise satisfied that the facts are such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the accused is guilty of the alleged offense.
5. If the jury are satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the breaking and entering into the dwelling-house, but not guilty of the intent to commit rape as charged, they may, under the statute, find him guiity of the breaking and entering only.
6. Reasonable doubt defined.
(May 28, 1898.)
Tore, C. J., and Spruance and Grubb, J. J., sitting.
Robert C. White, Attorney-General, and Peter L. Cooper, Jr., Deputy Attorney-General, for the State,
John P. Nields, for the defendant.
At a Court of Oyer and Terminer in New Castle County, beginning May 24, 1898, the defendant was tried upon the charge of breaking a dwelling-house with intent to commit rape. When put upon the stand to testify in his own behalf Fisher was asked in cross-examination, by the State, the following question as affecting his credibility, viz :
Have you ever been convicted in this Court of housebreaking ?
Objected to by counsel for defendant on two grounds:
First, That the record was the best evidence.
1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 375; Section 3, Chapter 598, Volume 11, Laws of Delaware, (Revised Code, 797).
Second. That the witness was not bound to answer a question that tended to render him infamous in thfe eyes of the community.
People vs. Herrick, 13 Johnson's Reports (N. Y.), 82; The King vs. The Inhabitants of Castell, 8 East, 77: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 458; Rex vs. Lewis, 4 Esp., 225.
The State contended that they were not obliged to prove conviction by the record, but were permitted to ask the witness on cross-examination not only whether he had been convicted of a crime, but whether he had been arrested for a crime, whether he had been in jail, whether he had been whipped; anything that would tend to disgrace him in the minds of the jury or affect his credibility as a witness, and not as a defendant; that the authorities cited were not applicable to the case because the test there was to discover whether or not the witness was competent to testify and there was a danger that the witness might falsify the record in his desire to testify or not to testify. But in the case at bar there was little or no danger that the witness would falsify the record as against himself and say that he had been convicted of a crime, when as a matter of fact he had' not been convicted, and that therefore the reason for the rule that the record should be produced as the best evidence was not applicable to the case at bar.
State vs. Bacon, 8 Criminal Law Magazine, 83; State vs. Elwood (R. I.), 24 Atl. Reporter, 782 ; State vs. Miller (Mo.), 13 So. Western Rep., 836; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 474; Smith vs. State, 20 Atl. Reporter, 1026; Light vs. State, (Tex.), 17 So. Western Rep., 428; Parker vs. State, (Ind.), 35 N. E. Rep., 1105; Baker vs. State (Ark.), 25 So. Western Rep., 513; People vs. Foote (Mich.), 52 N. W. Rep., 1036; Clemens vs. Conrad, 19 Mich., 170.

Opinion:
Grubb, J:—
The question put to the witness by the State is
this: "Have you ever been convicted .in this Court of housebreaking?" The counsel for the prisoner has objected to the admissibility of the prisoner's answer to the question on one ground that the best evidence of his conviction in this Court is the record of his conviction, which is in this Court and available for immediate use. In view of these circumstances, it is the opinion of the majority of this Court that we should not allow the prisoner, who is a witness in his own behalf in this case, to answer the question, because to do so would be to undertake to prove by parol testimony that which is evidenced by written record testimony of this Court, and the very best and highest testimony; which, as I said, is in this Court and available to the State. Therefore it is not unreasonable for us to insist upon the observance of the general and well recognized rule of evidence, that where the best evidence exists and is obtainable it alone is admissible and that all other testimony is excluded.
There is another matter to be considered in this connection, and that is that the courts in this State, in this county—and probably in each of the other counties—have admitted testimony of this character. I myself do not recall any instance where the question has been asked precisely under the circumstances of this case; that is, whether the witness has been convicted of any offense in the very court in which he is testifying and where the record is. But even assuming that we have allowed a witness to answer that question without requiring the production of the record of his conviction to prove it to the jury for the purpose of affecting his credibility before the jury, and even although it may have been done (and I remember no case myself where it has been done where the question was formally raised, considered, argued and decided), we can find certainly so far no reported case. Therefore, in the absence of any reported case of that kind covering this particular point, although we may have allowed it to be done in some instances, still we do not consider that that has established the law in this State in such a manner as to be controlling upon us now, and in a case like this, where the question is formally presented and considered, and in a capital case, we do not feel that we are under any obligation to be controlled by what may have been allowed in some other one or more cases, even if it had been a case precisely of this kind, without being formally raised and argued and deliberately considered. and decided to be allowable under the law. So that we treat it now, especially in a case of this magnitude, as if it was for the first time raised and formally presented, thoroughly argued, deliberately considered and solemnly decided; especially, as I say, since in our judicial reports of this State we know of no instance in which the question has been formally passed upon by the courts.
While I am opposed personally—and have heretofore so declared myself in a dissenting opinion—to any ruling which overrides a decision where the question has been solemnly adjudicated by a unanimous' Court, and where we have satisfactory evidence of that fact, either in the printed report or upon the assurance of a Judge who sat in the case and is positively clear about the question having been there decided; yet, so far as this case is concerned, although I have been on the bench longer than any of my brethern, I remember no case in which this question has been formally decided, and I find none in the reports. And I do not feel, therefore, required to follow what I consider a practice at variance with sound principles of law, nor do I think the Court is obliged to do it under the present circumstances; especially where a writ of error can be taken, as it can be now in criminal cases under our recently adopted Constitution. The ground I have taken, and expect to adhere to, unless I see very good ground to the contrary, where there is a writ of error and a higher court to correct our error, is that we ought to follow the adjudications of our courts where they are clearly known, and not to undertake to overrule them, or set them aside, or disregard them in this Court, but let their correction be left to the Court above.
But such is not this case. For, as I said, we knpw of no case in which this precise question now before us has formally been decided. There is no such case in our reports, and I have no satisfactory information that it has heretofore been formally presented, deliberately considered and solemnly decided.