Case Name: PEOPLE v. PEARSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-02-24
Citations: 123 Mich. App. 462
Docket Number: Docket No. 56966
Parties: PEOPLE v PEARSON
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Mackenzie and T. L. Brown, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 123
Pages: 462–466

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v PEARSON
Docket No. 56966.
Submitted October 5, 1982, at Grand Rapids.—
Decided February 24, 1983.
Owen R. Pearson was convicted by a jury in the Muskegon Circuit Court, Ronald H. Pannucci, J., of burning real property. Defendant appeals alleging error was committed when the prosecutor questioned him on cross-examination regarding the value of the liquor license for his burned restaurant. Held:
The defendant had previously adduced evidence regarding the value of the liquor license, therefore, the prosecutor’s cross-examination was based on prior evidence and was not an impermissible injection of innuendo into the proceedings.
Affirmed.
Mackenzie, J., dissented and would hold that the prosecutor’s question on cross-examination was improper testimonial questioning. She would also hold that the prosecutor’s closing argument contained assertions of facts not in evidence and representations to the jury based on his personal knowledge. Although no objection was made to the prosecutor’s argument, she would find it to be manifest and serious error resulting in a fundamental injustice and would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Trial — Questioning by Prosecutor — Innuendos.
A prosecutor may not attempt to inject unfounded prejudicial innuendo into the proceedings, however, where a prosecutor’s question is based upon prior testimony it is not an impermissible injection of innuendo.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 251.
75-Am Jur 2d, Trial § 257.
5 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 548.
Dissent by Mackenzie, J.
2. Trial — Criminal Law — Improper Testimonial Questioning — Questioning by Prosecutor.
A prosecutor’s questioning of a defendant on cross-examination regarding whether the defendant was aware that a liquor license in the community had a value of approximately $25,000 to $30,000 was improper testimonial questioning by the prosecutor where no evidence was ever introduced from which it could be inferred that the fair market value of a liquor license in the community was approximately $25,000 or $30,000.
3. Criminal Law — Trial — Prosecutor’s Argument — Representations by Prosecutor.
A prosecutor may not assert facts not in evidence in his argument and may not make representations to the jury based on his personal knowledge where he is not testifying as a witness.
4. Appeal — Fundamental Injustice — Preserving Question.
The Court of Appeals will reverse when confronted with manifest and serious error resulting in a fundamental injustice although no objection was made to such error in the trial court.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Gerald D. Warner, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith K Simonson, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Vander Ploeg, Mullally & Grimm (by Jack M. Grimm), for defendant.
Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Mackenzie and T. L. Brown, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of burning real property, MCL 750.73; MSA 28.268. He appeals and we affirm.
The prosecution's case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence. The prosecutor's theory of the case was that defendant had set fire to his restaurant in order to get out of debt. Although defendant could not have received any insurance proceeds from the fire, because his indebtedness exceeded his coverage, the prosecution argued that defendant would have benefited by disposing of many of his financial obligations while retaining the real estate and the restaurant's liquor license.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed error by questioning him regarding the value of the liquor license. Specifically, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant over defense counsel's objection:
"Are you aware, Mr. Pearson, that currently, in this community, a liquor license — just the license itself — is of a value of approximately 25 to 30 thousand dollars?"
Defendant stated that he believed he paid $5,000 for the "good will" of the business, meaning the liquor license. Following this answer, the defendant acknowledged that defense exhibit "A", the closing statement from the purchase of the business, reflected that defendant had paid $30,000 for "personal property and good will".
The prosecution may not attempt to inject unfounded prejudicial innuendo into the proceedings. People v DiPaolo, 366 Mich 394; 115 NW2d 78 (1962); People v Moreno, 112 Mich App 631; 317 NW2d 201 (1981). However, if a prosecutor's question is based upon prior testimony, it is not an impermissible injection of innuendo. People v Williams #2, 45 Mich App 630; 207 NW2d 180 (1973); People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301; 187 NW2d 434 (1971).
Because defendant had previously adduced evidence regarding the value of the liquor license, the prosecutor's cross-examination in the instant case was based on prior evidence and was not improper. Therefore, no error occurred.
Affirmed.