Case Name: Robert E. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-01-12
Citations: 923 So. 2d 442
Docket Number: No. SC03-2110
Parties: Robert E. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 923
Pages: 442–455

Head Matter:
Robert E. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC03-2110.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 12, 2006.
Rehearing Denied March 2, 2006.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Anthony c. Musto, Special Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Chief-Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Maddox v. State, 862 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons more fully expressed below, we disapprove the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Dixon, and approve the result reached by the Second District Court of Appeal in Maddox.
Facts
The instant action arises from the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Maddox v. State, 862 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), affirming the circuit court's conviction of the petitioner (Maddox) and certifying conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The facts of the instant case, summarized in Judge Davis's opinion below, are as follows:
A Polk County Deputy Sheriff stopped Maddox for an improper lane change. Upon being asked for his driver's license and proof of insurance, Maddox advised the deputy that he did not have his license or proof of insurance with him. The deputy then asked for his name and date of birth, in response to which Maddox said his name was Nathaniel Lewis Maddox and his date of birth was November 1, 1980. Based on this information, the deputy issued two citations in the name of Nathaniel Lewis Maddox — one for improper lane change and the other for failure to produce proof of insurance. When Maddox was hesitant to sign the citations, the deputy advised that failure to sign was a criminal offense. Maddox then signed the citations.
During the traffic stop, a second deputy arrived on the scene. The owner of the car, who had been riding in the front passenger seat, gave permission for the deputies to search the vehicle. During the search, the second deputy found an identification card that identified Maddox as Robert Edwin Maddox. A license check for Robert Edwin Maddox showed that his driver's license was suspended. The deputy retained possession of the two traffic citations issued to Nathaniel Maddox and issued a citation to Maddox charging him with driving while his licensed was suspended. Maddox initially refused to sign this citation but agreed to after the deputy issued him a subsequent citation for refusing to sign a citation. Later, while in custody, Maddox volunteered that Nathaniel Maddox was his brother. Accordingly, Maddox was charged with two counts of forgery for signing the citations issued in the name of Nathaniel and two counts of uttering a forged instrument.
Maddox went to trial on the forgery and uttering counts, as well as on one count of giving false information to a police officer and one count of driving while license suspended. He was found guilty as charged.
Maddox, 862 So.2d at 783-84. Maddox appealed his convictions to the Second District Court of Appeal.
The Second District affirmed Maddox's convictions and sentences without comment but wrote to specifically address his contention that the forged traffic citations were inadmissible pursuant to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001). See id. at 783. The district court determined that the trial court did not err in allowing the forged traffic citations into evidence. See id. at 784. In support of its holding, the district court noted that "the purpose of the statute is to protect the person to whom the citation is issued." Id. The district court stated that the person to whom the citations were actually issued in the present case, Nathaniel Maddox (Maddox's brother), was not on trial for either of the infractions underlying those forged traffic citations, nor was Maddox himself on trial for those violations. See id. Fur ther, the district court found that when the deputy issuing the citation learned that Maddox was not Nathaniel Maddox the deputy "withdrew the charges . and retained the documents as evidence of the criminal offense of forgery." Id. Therefore, the district court determined that the charges were no longer pending against anyone and, as a result, the documents relating to those charges "were not 'citations' as contemplated by the statute, but rather were documentary evidence of Maddox's criminal conduct." Id. Accordingly, the district court held that section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes did not apply to the present case and certified conflict with the First District's decision in Dixon. See Maddox, 862 So.2d at 784.
Analysis
In analyzing the conflict that exists between the decision here and that of the First District in Dixon, it is helpful to consider a brief summary of the material facts presented to the First District in Dixon. The factual predicate in Dixon was essentially identical to that in the present case:
Upon being stopped by a police officer following the commission of several traffic infractions, [Dixon] provided a false name to the officer. That name was placed on the traffic citation, which [Dixon] signed using the false name. When it was learned that [Dixon] gave a false name, he was charged with forgery under section 831.01 and driving without a valid driver's license.
812 So.2d at 595-96. However, contrary to the decision of the district court in the present case, the First District in Dixon determined that the language of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), was unambiguous and for that reason was not subject to any judicial interpretation or construction whatsoever. See id. at 596. Therefore, the district court in Dixon simply determined without elaboration that the language contained in section 316.650(9) — that "traffic citation[s] 'shall not be admissible evidence in any trial' "— required the exclusion of forged citations in the State's prosecution for forgery. Id. (quoting § 316.350(9), Fla. Stat. (2000)).
Maddox urges this Court to approve and adopt the First District's approach and decision in Dixon and hold that the First District appropriately applied section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), when it concluded that the language of the section is unambiguous and, therefore, not subject to judicial interpretation. Maddox continues that the plain meaning of the particular section makes it absolutely clear that citations simply should not be admissible in any trial under any circumstance. The outcome of this case necessarily turns on the application of principles of statutory construction with regard to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes. Turning to these principles, we note that we have previously held that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation." Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000) (alteration in the original) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992)). However, this Court has
also stated that related statutory provisions should be read together to determine legislative intent, so that "if from a view of the whole law, or from other laws in pari materia the evident intent is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intent should prevail, for that, in fact is the will of the Legislature."
Id. (quoting Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 454); see also McGhee v. Volusia County, 679 So.2d 729, 730 n. 1 (Fla.1996) ("The doctrine of in pari materia requires the courts to construe related statutes together so that they illuminate each other and are harmonized."). Moreover, "a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion." Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984).
The statute at issue here is found within chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes entitled "Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law." § 316.001, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). The stated purpose of this chapter of the Florida Statutes was outlined by the Legislature in section 316.002:
It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities.
§ 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). Additionally, when section 316.650 was originally enacted by the Legislature in 1971, the description of the bill expressly stated that it was
AN ACT relating to the regulation of traffic on highways; . to provide for a uniform traffic citation; requiring its statewide use; prescribing duties of traffic officers and chief administrative officers in connection with the issuance, distribution and maintenance of records .
Ch. 71-321, preamble, at 1501, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). When section 316.650 is read in the context within the chapter in which it is found, its related statutory provisions, and the legislative history surrounding its passage, it is clear that a strict literal reading of the phrase "any trial," as suggested by Maddox and endorsed by the First District in Dixon, would inappropriately extend the effects of this statutory provision far beyond the scope of that which was intended by the Legislature when it originally enacted this section. It would extend far beyond cases in which the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle was an issue in controversy. In addition, we agree with Second District that the purpose of this statutory provision is to protect the person to whom the citation is issued which in this case was Nathaniel Maddox, the appellant's brother, who is not even a party in this matter. See Maddox, 862 So.2d at 784. We further conclude that the statute was intended to apply only in connection with matters directly associated with the substance of the charge upon which the citation is issued — a traffic infraction.
Another principle of statutory construction that compels our conclusion that the Second District appropriately determined that section 316.650 is inapplicable to the instant matter is the rule which recognizes that "[t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)); see also Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So.2d 146, 152 (Fla.1997) (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ('When the legislature has used a term . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.")). Tellingly, in section 316.066(4) of the Florida Statutes (2001), located in the same chapter as the statutory provision at issue in this case, the Legislature enacted a provision that mandates that neither a crash report nor a statement made in connection with such a report "shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal." § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). The Legislature's use of the language "civil or criminal" in section 316.066(4) to modify the phrase "any trial," and the exclusion of those same modifiers in the statutory provision under review here, compels us to conclude that the Legislature intended different meanings of the term "any trial" in each statute. If the Legislature had intended section 316.650(9) to include "any trial, civil or criminal," then the Legislature would have included that language within its enactment, as it did in section 316.066(4). However, the Legislature chose not to include these modifying terms in section 316.650(9), and we conclude that it would not be proper for us to imply this missing language where the Legislature has obviously intended that it be omitted. See State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 819 (Fla.2001); Beach, 692 So.2d at 152 (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc., 654 So.2d at 914). Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the phrase "any trial" in section 316.650(9) should not be interpreted to mean "any trial, civil or criminal," but instead that the phrase "any trial" in section 316.650(9), consistent with the statutory chapter in which that statutory provision is found, was intended to refer to the use of traffic citations in proceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy.
Moreover, contrary to the dictates of this Court in Auld, if we were to agree with the view of the dissent and approve of the First District's interpretation of the phrase "any trial" and conclude that this phrase was intended to absolutely encompass all proceedings in a court of law, we would in essence be sanctioning a construction of this statutory provision that would lead to "unreasonable or ridiculous" results. Auld, 450 So.2d at 219. An example of the absurd results that could follow if we were to approve the First District's decision in Dixon was outlined by Chief Judge Altenbernd in his dissenting opinion in State v. Veilleux, 859 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). He reasoned:
Hypothetically, if Mr. Veilleux had been charged with first-degree murder and he wished to introduce a traffic citation as alibi evidence to establish that he was receiving a traffic ticket in another county at the time of the murder, it is inconceivable to me that a court could constitutionally prohibit him from introducing this document as evidence. Yet, if read literally, this statute would prevent anyone from introducing the traffic citation in any court proceeding.
Id. at 1231 (Altenbernd, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). In a similar manner, under the dissenting opinion's view, a citation found at the scene of the murder of a police officer would be inadmissible to show the last person having contact with the officer when the substance of the particular citation was in no way in controversy-
We find further support for our conclusion in this matter when recognizing that the First District's interpretation of section 316.650(9) essentially eradicates all prosecutions for forgery of a traffic citation. Under Florida's statutory scheme, to obtain a conviction for forgery the State must demonstrate that the alleged document forged falls within the classes of documents specified in section 831.01 of the Florida Statutes (2005). See State v. Escobedo, 404 So.2d 760, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ("Our forgery statute . makes whoever 'forges' documents of specified classes 'with intent to injure or defraud any person' liable to a maximum of [five] years' imprisonment.") (quoting Green v. State, 76 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla.1954)). To accomplish this, the State must specifically prove that the allegedly forged document is in fact a "public document" and is therefore actionable under the statute. Such could never be accomplished in the context of the instant matter if the traffic citation could not be admitted into evidence. The dissent expresses concern that allowing traffic citations into evidence could be unduly prejudicial to defendants due to the potential that the citation may contain "unflattering, legally irrelevant information recorded on the citation," and that a citation will "invariably . proclaim the officer's judgment that the defendant committed an offense other than forgery." Dissenting op. at 454. However, the dissent's concerns could be alleviated by merely redacting the portions of the citation that do not relate to the forgery charge and that could potentially prejudice a defendant, a practice that is used by trial courts throughout Florida when a critical piece of probative evidence also contains prejudicial information. When the First District's construction of section 316.650(9) is considered in light of the above, it is clear to us that the Legislature surely did not intend for the phrase "any trial" to be construed so literally to exclude the use of traffic citations in all judicial proceedings' — including proceedings other than those involving traffic control and related motor vehicle operation matters such as civil litigation flowing from motor vehicle operation.
In summary, although the strict meaning .of the words in the abstract employed by the Legislature when it drafted section 316.650(9) may admittedly support the outcome of the First District's opinion in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), such a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results. See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Fla.1981). When section 316.650 is read in the context in which it is found and in conjunction with related statutory provisions, the reasonable construction of this statutory provision is that the Legislature intended only to exclude traffic citations in a more limited fashion in matters with issues related to the operation, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle. To hold otherwise would expand the scope of this statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results. Accordingly, we disapprove the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), and approve the result reached by the Second District Court of Appeal in Maddox v. State, 862 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) for the reasons stated herein.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., concur.
CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
. The State requests that this Court revisit its decision to grant jurisdiction in the instant matter. The State alleges that the decision below is distinguishable from Dixon because the forged traffic citations at issue in Dixon were determined to have been "issued," 812 So.2d at 595, whereas the district court below determined that the citations at issue in the instant matter had been withdrawn by the issuing officer after he discovered that they had been issued in the name of Maddox's brother. Maddox, 862 So.2d at 784. While the State's assertion may be true, we conclude that this is a distinction without a material difference. The heart of the conflict revolves around the differences in the district courts' interpretations of the scope of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001). Therefore, we adhere to our initial decision to accept jurisdiction in the instant matter to resolve the conflict presented.
. The language of the version of section 316.650(9) that was at issue in Dixon was identical to the language found in the version of the statute that is at issue in the instant matter.