Case Name: Charles Gustafson vs. Theodore Hamm
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1894-01-30
Citations: 56 Minn. 334
Docket Number: No. 8380
Parties: Charles Gustafson vs. Theodore Hamm.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 334–345

Head Matter:
Charles Gustafson vs. Theodore Hamm.
Argued Jan. 4, 1894.
Modified Jan. 30, 1894.
No. 8380.
Crossing a street with private railroad switch track.
The city council of St. Paul has no authority, either under 1878 G. S. ch. 34, § 47, or Sp. Laws *1889, ch. 37, to grant a license to construct and operate a purely private railroad upon or across public streets. These statutes have reference to railroads which perform the duties of common carriers, and are therefore public or quasi public in their character.
Owner’s right in the street in front of his lot.
As the owner of a lot abutting on a street has, as appurtenant to the lot, and independently of the ownership of the fee of street, an easement in the street, to its full width, in front of his lot, for purposes of access, light, and air, which constitutes property, therefore the maintenance and operation of a railroad on any part of the street in front of his lot so as to pollute the air, and thus depreciate the rental value of the premises, constitutes a positive invasion of property rights, for which the owner may maintain a private action; and where his legal right is clear, and the nuisance or trespass a continuing one, he may maintain an action to enjoin it.
Oanty, J., dissenting.
■ Appeal by plaintiff, Charles Gustafson, from a judgment of the District Court of Eamsey County, HascalR. Brill, J., entered August 10, 1893.
The defendant, Theodore Hamm, in August, 1892, built a switch track from the Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. railway tracks southwest about twenty rods to his brewery and mill in the eastern part of St. Paul. Fauquier street is sixty feet wide and runs east and west midway between the railroad and the brewery. Hamm’s switch track crosses it obliquely. Plaintiff owns a house and lot fronting north onto Fauquier street at the point where the switch track crosses it. Hamm owns the opposite lot across the street and also the lot adjacent to plaintiff’s on the west. The city on June 5, 1890, by ordinance gave Hamm authority to construct and operate this switch track across the street. Plaintiff brought this action to restrain and enjoin defendant from maintaining and operating the switch track in the street in front of his lot. He obtained such judgment as to the south half of the street, but was refused as to the north half and he appeals, claiming he should be granted relief for the full width of the street in front of his lot.
Owen Morris, for appellant.
The city could not give permission to any one to construct or operate a purely private railroad upon or across any public street of the city. The statutes which have reference to constructing or operating railroads through or across the public streets of a city, have reference to such railroad companies as perform the duties of common or public carriers, and to such railroads as are public or quasi public in their character. A private switch not owned by the railroad company, but by individuals for their own private use, is not a public railroad. Koelle v. Knecht, 99 Ill. 396; Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kans. 509; Heath v. Des Moines & St. L. Ry. Co., 61 Ia. 11; State v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 79; Carliv. Stillwater Street Ry. & T. Co., 28 Minn. 373.
If a railroad not touching one’s premises obstructs a street abutting on or leading to them so as to cut off or materially interfere with his only access to them, the inconvenience is deemed to be special and an action lies. Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286; Brakken v. Minneapolis, & St. L. Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 41; Lamm v. Chicago, St. P. & O. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 71.
If there be an obstruction in the street in front of or near abutting property so as to prevent access to it, the damage which the owner sustains is different, not merely in degree but in kind, from that experienced in common with other citizens, and he may maintain a puivate action for the injury to him, notwithstanding there is a remedy in behalf of the public. Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147; Wilder v. DeCou, 26 Minn. 10; Newell v. Minneapolis, L. & M. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 112; Aldrich v. Wetmore, 52 Minn. 164; Clowes v. Staffordshire P. W. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 125; King v. Ward, 4 Ad. & El. 384.
The case of Story v. New York El. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, was decided upon the assumption that the abutting owner did not own the fee in the street or any part thereof. In the case of Lahr v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268, there was practically a reargument of the foregoing Story case and the court was pressed to reconsider and modify its decision, but it refused.
In Forbes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505, it was decided that a steam railroad company which under license of the city lays its track upon the surface of the street, is not liable for damages resulting from a reasonable use thereof to the easement of an abutting lot owner who does not own the fee of the street.
Then in the case of Lamm v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 71, this court was asked to reconsider and overrule its decision in the Adams case, because the New York court did not hold its doctrines as to elevated railways set forth in the Story case as applicable to surface railways in the Forbes case; but this court refused to change its decision in the Adams case.
Munn, Boyeson & Thygeson, for respondent.
Plaintiff has not suffered special or peculiar damage by reason of the construction of the track in question so as to entitle him to maintain an action to enjoin its use. He has suffered no damage not suffered by the public in general. It may differ in degree but it is of the same land and nature. A court of equity will not interfere by injunction to correct imaginary or technical wrongs, nor where the damages suffered are slight and insignificant, but will leave the complaining party to such action as he may have for damages. Schurmeier v. St. Paid & P. R. Co., 8 Minn. 113; Zabriskie v. Jersey City & B. R. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 314; Booraem v. North Hudson R. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 557; Hamilton v. New York & H. R, Co., 9 Paige, 171; Shaubut v. St. Paul c& S. C. R. Co., 21 Minn. 502; Rochett v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201; Barnum v. Minnesota T. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 365; Carrol v. Wisconsin Cent. Co., 40 Minn. 168; Chicago & P. R. Co. v. Francis, 70 Ill. 238; Patterson v. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co., 75 Ill. 588; Truesdale v. Peoria G. S. Co., 101 Ill. 561; Railway Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41; Pennsylvania R. Co.'s Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 514.

Opinion:
Mitchell, J.
The relief sought in this action, as finally limited on the trial, was an injunction against defendant's maintaining and operating a railroad track across Fauquier street, in the city of St. Paul, immediately in front of plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff owned a house and lot fronting north on this street, which was the only means of access to the premises.
Defendant owned a brewery and mill about two blocks south of plaintiff's premises. The Omaha Railroad was about a block north of plaintiff's premises. Defendant had constructed an ordinary commercial railroad track from the Omaha road to his mill and brewery. This was his private track, and was used to carry in supplies to the mill and brewery, and to carry out their products. The only authority for the maintenance of this track was an ordinance of the city, assuming to grant to defendant the privilege to lay, use, and operate the same across the street. This track strikes the north side of Fauquier street directly opposite the center of plaintiff's lot, and runs thence diagonally across the street in a southwesterly direction, striking the south line of 'the street fifteen feet west of plaintiff's west line. It crosses the center line of the street in such a way as to occupy a small triangular piece of the south half of the street, of which plaintiff owns the fee.
This railroad track is operated with ordinary railroad freight cars and locomotives, there being, on an average, about one train a day, which takes about one minute to cross the street. These trains have been operated with reasonable care, but, when they pass, smoke and cinders are emitted and cast on plaintiff's premises, which, to some extent, pollute the air, and interfere with the enjoyment of the property, and depreciate its rental value. Plaintiff never consented to the construction of the track or the operation of trains upon it.
The trial court held that the maintenance and operation of this track on the small triangular piece of the street, of which plaintiff owned the fee, was a continuing trespass, which he was entitled to have enjoined; but the court denied the motion of plaintiff for judgment enjoining the defendant from maintaining the track, or operating trains on and over any part of the street, to its entire width, lying immediately north and in front of plaintiff's premises. The correctness of this ruling, upon the facts stated, is the only question in the case.
1. The city had no right or authority to grant defendant a license to construct and operate a purely private railroad upon or across a public street. The provisions, both of 1878 G. S. ch. 34, § 47, and of Sp. Laws 1889, ch. 37, must be construed as having reference only to such railroads as perform the duties of public or common carriers, and which are therefore public or quasi public in their character. Even assuming that the legislature has the power to authorize the use of a public street for the purposes of a purely private railroad, it would require very clear and explicit language to that effect to warrant a court in holding that such was the legislative intention. The right to license one necessarily implies the right to license all to use the streets for such private purposes, which would render the streets well nigh impassable by the public, and amount to a perversion of them from their lawful purposes. Hence, if the defendant has the right to maintain and operate this track, he did not acquire it under this ordinance. State v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 79; Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kan. 509, (9 Pac. 278;) Heath v. Des Moines, St. L. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa, 11, (15 N. W. 573;) Mayor, etc,, v. Harris, 75 Ga. 761; Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 710, note 2.
2. That the construction and operation of any ordinary commercial railroad on a street is the imposition of an additional servitude, and amounts to a perversion of the street to a use for which it was not intended, which the state or municipality cannot, as against private rights, authorize, the decisions of this court are explicit. Carli v. Stillwater Street Ry. & T. Co., 28 Minn. 373, (10 N. W. 205;) Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, (39 N. W. 629.)
If this is so as to a public railroad, it certainly must be so as to a purely private one.
It is merely begging the question to say that defendant, as the owner of the fee of the north half of the street, has the right to use it for any purpose not inconsistent with the public easement. The private right is always subordinate to the public right, and subject to all the limitations and abridgements caused by the exercise of the latter; and hence cannot extend to any use which amounts to a perversion of the street from the uses for which it was intended.
The right of an abutting owner, under certain municipal regulations, to use a part of the street for areas, for purposes of access to basements, for the temporary storage of building material, for laying underground pipes to connect with water and gas mains, stands on a different principle. These are all really included in the general right to use a street for purposes of access to the abutting premises, and have been long sanctioned as legitimate street uses. It is not necessary to consider here just what is the precise limit to the uses to which an abutting owner may put a street for purposes of access to his premises.
It is at least certain that he cannot use the street in any way or for any purpose that amounts to a perversion of it, or to an invasion upon the private right of property of another in the part of the street so used; and this is as far as it is necessary to go for present purposes.
It is the settled doctrine of this court that the owner of a lot abutting on a public street has, as appurtenant to the lot, and independently of the ownership of the fee in the street, an easement in the street, to its full width, in front of his lot, for the purposes of access, light, and air, which constitutes property. Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, (39 N. W. 629;) Lamm v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 71, (47 N. W. 455.) The act of defendant in maintaining and operating this track on any part of the street, to its full width, in front of plaintiff's premises, so as to pollute the air, and depreciate their value, was, if not a trespass, at least a nuisance, which amounted to a positive invasion upon plaintiff's private property rights, and for which he may maintain a private action.
The legal right being clear, and the trespass or nuisance, whichever it be, being a continuing one, he is not confined to successive actions for damages, but may maintain an action to enjoin the constantly recurring grievance; and, where a clear legal right is thus violated, the fad* that the actual damages, if substantial, are comparatively small, is not important
Cause remanded, with, directions to the court below to amend the judgment in accordance with plaintiff's request.