Case Name: John Fowler, Respondent, v. Maria B. Seaman, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-09
Citations: 40 N.Y. 592
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Fowler, Respondent, v. Maria B. Seaman, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 592–597

Head Matter:
John Fowler, Respondent, v. Maria B. Seaman, Appellant.
Where a married woman is the owner, in her own right, of a leasehold interest in a city lot, and her husband makes a contract, in his own name, for the erection of a building thereon, which is erected under the contract, and the price paid, principally, from moneys raised from encumbrances placed upon the property for that purpose by such married woman, and before the completion of the building, she leases the property, covenanting in the lease to complete the building described precisely as in the building contract; these circumstances are sufficient, in an action by the contractor, to recover from her the price of extra work done upon the building by direction of her husband, to authorize a jury to find that he directed such extra work as her authorized agent, and in her behalf, and she is.liable therefor.
(Argued April 1st, 1869; held over the June term for further consideration,
and decided at the September term.)
This action was for extra work on a building erected for and owned by the defendant, who was a married woman, the plaintiff claiming the amount as an equitable charge on her separate estate, which consisted of the building and the lot ■ on which it stood.
The plaintiff’s brother and assignor contracted to erect the. building on the 27th of October, 1856. The contract was made in the name of the defendant’s husband, James V. Seaman. It appeared that the property was purchased for the defendant in 1827, with her share of her father’s estate, and was conveyed to Legget and "Wright as trustees for her, and to become hers absolutely on the death of her husband. Provision was made in the deed for the substitution of other trustees, with her assent. On the 18th of April, 1853, the other beneficiaries in the trust released their interest to the defendant. On the 18th of August, 1855, the trustees first named declined to serve further, and with her consent, conveyed the premises in question, in pursuance of the provision in the trust, to her husband as substituted trustee. On the 27th of October, 1856, the building contract was entered into with plaintiff’s assignor.
The work was done wholly on the credit of the wife’s property. During its progress, and on the 1st of Hay, 1857, she united with her husband as her trustee, in a mortgage to the plaintiff for the amount due, so far as the work had then progressed upon the contract. She had previously leased the lot, covenanting to complete the building. Both these instruments were executed before the extra work in question was done, and it was work which was not embraced in the original contract.
The judge found, as matter of fact, that the extra work in question was done in her behalf, with her knowledge, by her authority, and for the benefit of her separate estate. He "adjudged the balance due to be a lien and charge on the property in question, and gave the usual direction for the satisfaction of the demand by a sale of the property. The judgment was affirmed at the General Term, and the defendant appealed.
G. Tillotson, for the appellant,
cited Yale v. Dederer (18 N. Y., 265); S. C. (22 N. Y., 450).
John K. Porter, for the respondent,
cited Robbins v. Dillaye (37 N. Y., 38, 39); Owen v. Cawley (36 N. Y., 600); North American Coal Co. v. Dyett (7 Paige, 9); Valton v. National Ins. Co. (20 N. Y., 35); Merritt v. Seaman, (6 Barb., 335).

Opinion:
Grover, J.
The separate estate of a married woman was chargeable in equity for the payment of a debt contracted by her for the benefit of such estate before the passage of the act of 1860, protecting and enlarging the rights of married women. (Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y., 450; Owen v. Cawley, 36 id., 600; Robbins v. Dillaye, 37 id., 35.) Since the passage of that statute, such debts may generally be recovered out of such separate property, in like manner as if the wife were sole. In. the present case the only question is, whether the defendant contracted the debt or whether it was the debt of the husband. This question arises upon the exception taken by the defendant's counsel to the denial of a motion for a nonsuit, and to the finding of the fact that the debt was contracted by the husband as agent for the defendant, and on her behalf. It was undisputed that the debt was for the benefit of the separate estate of the wife. The sole question is, whether it was contracted by the husband on his own account, or as agent for and on account of his wife. The case shows that the defendant was owner, in her own right, of a leasehold interest, for a term of years, of a lot upon Broadway in the city of Hew York. That her husband made a contract, in his own name, with the plaintiff's assignor for the erection of a building thereon, for the sum of $11,400. That the building was erected under the contract, and the contract price paid principally from means procured by the appellant, from and by encumbrances placed by her upon her separate estate. That before the completion of the building, the appellant leased the premises for the term of seven years, and in the lease covenanted to erect and complete a building thereon in precise accordance with that specified in the contract. The debt in question was for extra work done upon the building by direction of her husband. The above facts tended to show that the husband was acting in relation to the building with the knowledge and by the authority of the appellant, and .justified the finding that he directed the work as her agent and on her behalf. It was, therefore, her debt in equity the same as though directed by herself. It is an elementary principle that where an agent contracts in his own name for an unknown principal, such principal is liable upon the contract to the same extent as though the contract was made in the name of the latter. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.