Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David FONTAINE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-05-16
Citations: 955 So. 2d 1248
Docket Number: No. 4D05-3772
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David FONTAINE, Appellee.
Judges: STEVENSON, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 955
Pages: 1248–1251

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David FONTAINE, Appellee.
No. 4D05-3772.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 16, 2007.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
William B. Richbourg, Pensacola, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The state appeals a downward departure sentence for appellant's conviction for aggravated child abuse. The trial court departed on two grounds. As competent substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law was substantially impaired at the time of the offense, we affirm.
Appellant, David Fontaine, pled guilty to aggravated child abuse for beating his fi-aneée's nine-year-old son. During the course of disciplining the child, Fontaine struck him repeatedly with a belt, causing welts and bruises all over his body. Fon-taine filed a motion for downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence under the criminal punishment code, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on the grounds for departure.
At the evidentiary hearing, Fontaine's fiancée, with whom he had a child, testified that his behavior changed after he had been in a serious accident and was given a substantial amount of drugs. She described him as very depressed. Fontaine's mother testified similarly and noted that the more medications he took, the angrier he got.
Fontaine himself testified and explained that after the accident he went through multiple surgeries. Between his depression and "the pain and the anger from the oxycontin, I was not myself." He said that he was still depressed, and he felt that the incident of child abuse occurred due to his problems with depression, pain, and the side effects of oxycontin. He had a lot of anger and hostility. Moreover, he did not remember the entire incident. Shortly after the incident, he changed doctors and was taken off several of his medications. After he was released from jail, he signed up for anger management classes. Trying to explain his behavior, he said, "It wasn't me; I exploded. I didn't do it on purpose." He expressed extreme remorse.
The trial court decided to downward depart based upon its conclusion that the offense was an isolated incident for which Fontaine showed remorse. The court also found that Fontaine's capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct or to conform that to the requirements of law was substantially impaired at the time of the offense. The court placed him on probation for five years. The state appeals the downward departure.
A trial court uses a two-step inquiry when deciding whether to depart from the sentencing guidelines. Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla.1999). First, the trial court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it. Id. Legal grounds are set forth in case law and statute, and facts supporting the grounds must be proven at trial by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The burden of proof lies with the defendant. State v. Silver, 723 So.2d 381, 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). This is a mixed question of law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court applied the right rule of law and if competent substantial evidence supports its ruling. Banks, 732 So.2d at 1067. Second, the trial court further must determine whether it should depart, i.e., the court weighs the totality of the circumstances to determine whether departure is the best sentencing option for the defendant in the pending case. Id. at 1068. This second aspect of the decision to depart is a judgment call within the sound discretion of the court and will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
The state contests the trial court's findings on both reasons for departure. Fon-taine abandons any argument in support of the trial court's first ground for departure, but contends that competent substantial evidence supports the departure on the second ground. We need not address the first ground because the second ground is dispositive.
Section 921.0026(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that a downward departure is permitted if "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature of the conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." The trial court applied a valid basis for downward departure. The record contains factual support for this ground. As a result of a serious accident and multiple surgeries, Fontaine was on multiple medications, including ox-ycontin. 'His fiancée testified that his doctor did not properly dose-reduce medications when changing them. Both because of the accident and the medications, he had significant pain, depression, and anger. Fontaine did not remember much of the incident which occurred in a fit of anger while Fontaine was disciplining the child. Such an incident had never occurred before and shocked his fiancée. After the incident, he stopped taking oxy-contin and several other medications.
This evidence could lead to the conclusion that Fontaine's capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct in striking the child while disciplining him was substantially impaired because of the effects of the various medications he was taking, his pain, and his depression. While the case is close, and some of the evidence was conflicting, the trial court as finder of fact had evidence from which to draw its conclusion. Thus, the first step of the inquiry is met.
As to the second step of the inquiry, the trial court exercised its sound discretion in departing, and we find no abuse of that discretion.
For these reasons, we affirm the downward departure sentence imposed by the court.
STEVENSON, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.
WARNER, J., concurs specially.