Case Name: Sharon MOORE v. ST. BERNARD PARISH POLICE JURY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-05-27
Citations: 619 So. 2d 719
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-1148
Parties: Sharon MOORE v. ST. BERNARD PARISH POLICE JURY.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, C.J., and ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and LANDRIEU, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 619
Pages: 719–723

Head Matter:
Sharon MOORE v. ST. BERNARD PARISH POLICE JURY.
No. 92-CA-1148.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 27, 1993.
Salvador E. Gutierrez, Jr., Mary Ann Hand, Gutierrez & Hand, Chalmette, for plaintiff/appellee.
Thomas P. Anzelmo, Campbell, McCra-nie, Sistrunk, Anzelmo & Hardy, Metairie, for defendant/appellant.
Before SCHOTT, C.J., and ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and LANDRIEU, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHOTT, Chief Judge.
This case arose out of an accident in which the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, tripped and fell on the front lawn of a girls' group home owned and operated by the defendant, St. Bernard Parish Police Jury. The trial court rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor for the damages she sustained and the defendant appealed. The key issue is whether the hole or depression in which plaintiff fell constituted an unreasonable risk of harm so as to make the defendant liable to plaintiff under LSA-C.C. art. 2317.
On the evening of September 17, 1989, plaintiff was on patrol when she was dispatched to investigate a disturbance with broken glass at the Group Home. When she arrived there, she parked her automobile on the street in front of the home and ran across the lawn to the front door. After bringing the situation under control, she exited the front door intending to return to her car the way she came, across the lawn. However, just as she stepped onto the lawn, she tripped in a hole and fell.
There was a paved walkway or sidewalk leading from the front door of the home to the driveway and a parking lot on the side of the home. This driveway and lot were well lighted, but the front of the home where plaintiff fell had little, if any, illumination. Investigation disclosed that the hole in the lawn was really a depression caused by the tires of the group home's van which had been parked there for unloading supplies.
In reasons for judgment the trial judge found that plaintiff fell in the muddy tracks which were made by the home's employees while delivering supplies; that there were no lights on the area; and that defendant had knowledge of the defect since it was created by its own employees. But, he also assigned fifty percent of the fault to plaintiff based upon the following reasoning:
Instead of parking in the lighted parking lot and walking on another provided walkway, Ms. Moore chose to park in the street and walk across the front lawn. When leaving she walked out the exact same area she came in. Had she observed the area when she came in or been looking where she was going, she would have seen the hole. She admitted she did not have a flashlight. The evidence preponderates to the fact that she backed off the sidewalk and stepped in the hole. Therefore, the Court assigns plaintiff 50% fault for this accident.
The trial court did not make a specific finding that this hole constituted an unreasonable risk of harm for the plaintiff, but for our purposes we assume that he made this finding by implication. While this finding is entitled to great deference on appeal, we have resolved to reverse it because it is clearly wrong.
The standards for the review of this case are found in Landry v. State, 495 So.2d 1284 (La.1986). There the court considered whether a hole near the seawall on the New Orleans lakefront constituted an unreasonable risk of harm for the plaintiff who had been catching crabs and who was walking with a hamper and crab nets in his arms when he stepped into a hole and fell. After an extensive discussion of the doctrine of strict liability and related jurisprudence, the court focused on whether the plaintiff met the unreasonable risk of harm test. The court noted that this partially hidden hole was located immediately beside the seawall where anyone stepping from it would place a foot; that the hole was in a recreation area used by thousands; that the plaintiff was engaged in conduct he had every legal right to pursue, recreation which is pursued by thousands. The court observed: "The potential for harm is great because the area is heavily used at all hours by adults and children. This particular defect is located in a spot where foot traffic would probably be frequent." Id. at 1288.
The facts of the instant case stand in sharp contrast. The path plaintiff took when she fell was across a lawn in the dark instead of the walk to the drive which was safe and intended to accommodate persons like the plaintiff. It was not unreasonable for the defendant not to insure that the lawn was free of depressions and holes which might present a hazard for someone who would voluntarily traverse the lawn in the dark instead of taking the walkway. Plaintiff argues that she was justifiably and rightfully in a hurry because she was responding to an emergency, but she fell on the way out, after the situation was under control and at a time when she freely chose to traverse the darkened lawn. The trial judge divided responsibility between the parties noting that plaintiff chose to walk across the lawn instead of using the walkway. It follows from this fact that the hole in the darkened lawn was not an unreasonable risk of harm for the plaintiff who really had no good reason to go across the lawn in the dark.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and there is judgment in favor of defendant, St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, and against plaintiff, Sharon Moore, dismissing her suit at her cost.
REVERSED.
PLOTKIN, J., concurs with written reasons.
WALTZER, J., dissents.