Case Name: DUNIWAY v. CELLARS-MURTON CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1919-01-29
Citations: 92 Or. 113
Docket Number: 
Parties: DUNIWAY v. CELLARS-MURTON CO.
Judges: McBride, C. J., and Harris and Bennett, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 92
Pages: 113–122

Head Matter:
Motion to dismiss appeal denied January 29,
rehearing denied February 19, 1918,
argued on the merits February 27,
reversed. March 25,
rehearing denied April 22, 1919.
DUNIWAY v. CELLARS-MURTON CO.
(170 Pac. 298; 179 Pac. 561.)
ON MOTION TO DISMISS.
Appeal and Error — Assessments—Payment Under Protest — Effect.
1. After certain property was sold under a sewer assessment the owner sued to quiet title, claiming that the assessment was void. The court decreed that defendant had an interest by reason of the sale whieh would mature in the absence of redemption within three years, and the owner appealed. Pending appeal, fearing the time for redemption would expire, he paid the assessment under protest, expressly reserving all rights arising from the appeal. Held, the payment was not a waiver, and furnished no ground for dismissing the appeal.
ON THE MEiRITS.
Municipal Corporations — Sewers—Assessment—Benefit—Necessity.
2. Land which is not, and cannot be, drained by a sewer cannot be assessed therefor.
Municipal Corporations — Sewers—Assessments.
3. Under Portland City Charter, Section 389, a property owner cannot be assessed for a sewer unless he receives a special benefit therefrom.
Municipal Corporations — Sewers.
4. Under Portland City Charter, Section 389, an assessment for a sewer was void, where sewer was laid through private land of another, and land owner could not use it without being a trespasser.
Quieting Title — Matters Occurring After Action Brought.
5. In action to quiet title, title is to be determined by conditions as they existed at time issues were made.
Quieting Title — Scope of Inquiry.
6. A special assessment levied for a municipal improvement may be questioned and tested in a’ suit to quiet title to real property assessed.
Municipal Corporations — Improvements—Assessments—Sale—Right of Purchaser.
7. Purchaser at sale for street assessment, in absence'of fraud, is governed by rule of caveat emptor, and after purchase, if it transpires that assessment is void, such purchaser obtains no title to or equity in land purchased.
Pleading — Supplemental Pleading — Matters Occurring After Issue Joined.
8. In suit to quiet title, where purchaser at sale for street assessment was a defendant, assessment being void at time made by reason of sewer being laid through private property, subsequent proceedings by city for obtaining an extension of street where sewer was laid might form basis for a reassessment, but could not validate assessment made prior to suit; subsequent matter not being brought into suit by any supplemental pleading.
Quieting Title — Burden of Proof.
Sh In suit to quiet title, burden was upon defendant, who purchased the land at a sale for street assessment, to allege and prove his interest in the property.
[As to right to maintain suit to remove lien of special assessment as cloud on title, see note in Ann. Cas. 19T4A, 888.]
From. Multnomah.: Edwin Y. Littlefield, Judge.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal. The facts are these: Certain property of the appellant valued at $750. which was included in a sewer assessment made by the City of Portland, said assessment amounting to $74.07. In January, 1915, said assessment being unpaid and delinquent, the city treasurer in compliance with the' charter and ordinances of the City of Portland, sold the property to respondent for the sum of $84.60 and issued a certificate of sale of said property; thereupon appellant claiming that the assessment and sale were invalid brought a suit to quiet his title which being decided adversely he appealed to this court giving the usual bond for costs and disbursements.
The court below decided among other matters that the respondent had a valid claim upon and interest in said property by reason of said treasurer’s sale, and that if no redemption should be made therefrom within three years from the date of the certificate of sale the defendant would be entitled to receive a deed to said property in accordance with the charter and improvement code of the City of Portland. "While the appeal was pending here the appellant foreseeing that the three years allowed for redemption might elapse before the appeal could be heard, paid to the auditor of the City of Portland under protest the amount of the assessment, costs and penalties, and in writing notified respondent that he in no way waived his appeal, and that he intended to prosecute the same and if the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed he would expect to recover the money so paid. Based upon this payment the respondent moves to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that by such payment the appellant has recognized and complied with the decree and can have no further interest in the prosecution of the appeal.
Motion Denied.
Mr. George S. Shepherd and Mr. George B. Cellars, for the motion.
Mr. Ralph R. Duniway and Mr. James R. Bain, contra.

Opinion:
McBRIDE, C. J.
The redemption under the circumstances under which it was made was not voluntary and, as shown by the protest accompanying it, was not made with any intent to waive appellant's rights on appeal. In similar cases we have held that such a payment does not furnish ground for dismissal of the appeal: Edwards v. Perkins, 7 Or. 149; Moores v. Moores, 36 Or. 261 (59 Pac. 327); Eilers Piano House v. Pick, 58 Or. 54 (113 Pac. 54). See, also, Plano Mfg. Co. v. Rasey, 69 Wis. 246 (34 N. W. 85); Bush v. Aetna Bldg. & Loan Assn., 51 Okl. 529 (151 Pac. 850); Warner Bros. v. Freud, 131 Cal. 639 (63 Pac. 1017, 82 Am. St. Rep. 400).
This holding is not to he confounded with those cases holding that a party voluntarily accepting the benefits of a decree or voluntarily doing some act inconsistent with his contention on the appeal is precluded from maintaining such appeal, or with those cases in which the entire subject matter of the appeal having disappeared there would be nothing left which a reversal of thé decree could affect. In the case at bar the appellant in the event of reversal would be entitled by appropriate proceedings for that purpose, to a restitution of the moneys which he was compelled to pay to prevent a deed to his property being issued by the city treasurer: McFadden v. Swinerton, 36 Or. 336, 354 (59 Pac. 816, 62 Pac. 12).
The motion is overruled.
Motion to Dismiss Denied.