Case Name: Sheila Diane COLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-03-16
Citations: 616 So. 2d 1017
Docket Number: No. 90-2182
Parties: Sheila Diane COLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 616
Pages: 1017–1036

Head Matter:
Sheila Diane COLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-2182.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 16, 1993.
Lubin and Gano, and Thomas C. Gano, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.
Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
. A violation of paragraph 794.011(4)(a) is a first degree felony. Under that statute, consent is a defense to the charge.
At trial the jury was also instructed on the permissive lesser included offense of lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault upon or in the presence of a child in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1989), a second degree felony. Consent is not a defense to the latter charge.

Opinion:
COPE, Judge.
Sheila Diane Coley appeals her convictions and sentences for sexual battery upon a person twelve years or older while physically helpless to resist, and two counts of conspiracy to commit sexual battery. We reverse.
I.
A.
Coley was charged with one count of sexual battery on a person twelve years or older while physically helpless to resist, and two counts of conspiracy to commit sexual battery. A codefendant, Harold Bullington, was charged with the same crimes. In addition Bullington was charged with delivery, and conspiracy to deliver, cocaine.
Coley was tried separately and convicted. The principal question presented is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Coley of the crimes charged.
On appeal of a conviction in a criminal case, the test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether "a rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Melendez v. State, 498 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Fla.1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Kaufman v. State, 429 So.2d 841 (Fla. 3d DCA1983) (citing Jackson); D.M. v. State, 394 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (citing Jackson). As stated in Jackson,
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction 'except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.'
. [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' . Instead, the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . The criterion thus impinges upon 'jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 315, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d at 571, 573-74 (footnotes and citations omitted; emphasis added). See also Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974); Stewart v. State, 158 Fla. 753, 757-58, 30 So.2d 489, 490-91 (1947); Weinshenker v. State, 223 So.2d 561, 563 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 918 (Fla.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 973, 90 S.Ct. 462, 24 L.Ed.2d 441 (1969).
If the evidence is insufficient under the foregoing standard, then the convictions must be reversed.
B.
For purposes of determining the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is confined entirely to the record in Coley's case alone. The dissent filed in this case includes a lengthy discussion of the evidence in the separate trial of Bullington. As there are differences in the witnesses and testimony at the two trials — including differences in the testimony of the victim in the two trials — we confine our attention to the record from Coley's trial, not Bulling-ton's, "to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89.
II.
Coley was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit sexual battery. The panel is unanimous that there was no evidence to show the existence of a conspiracy under subsection 777.04(3), Florida Statutes (1989). See Ashenoff v. State, 391 So.2d 289, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The convictions for conspiracy are reversed.
III.
The next question is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Coley's conviction on the sole remaining charge, sexual battery.
Count I of the Second Amended Information charged Coley and codefendant Bull-ington with committing "sexual battery upon S.E.M., a fifteen-year-old juvenile, without the victim's consent, while the victim was physically helpless to resist, contrary to Section 794.011(4)(a), (d), Florida Statutes...."
Coley argues that the State failed to prove essential elements of the crime — that the victim was "physically helpless to resist" within the meaning of the statute and that the sexual acts took place without S.E.M.'s consent. We agree.
The elements of a sexual battery under paragraph 794.011(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), are as follows:
(1) a sexual battery as defined by section 794.011(l)(h), Florida Statutes ., is committed;
(2) The act was not consented to; and
(3) The victim was physically helpless to resist.
Gould v. State, 577 So.2d 1302, 1304 (Fla.1991).
We first consider whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the third element beyond a reasonable doubt, namely, that the victim was physically helpless to resist. The phrase, "physically helpless to resist," is a misnomer. The phrase suggests that it applies where, as here, the victim is tied up, but in fact the phrase has nothing at all to do with being physically restrained.
The statute gives "physically helpless to resist" an unusual and very limited definition. "The. term 'physically helpless' means that a person is unconscious, asleep, or for any reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act." § 794.011(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). In order to prove this element, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was physically unable to communicate unwillingness, by reason of sleep, unconsciousness, or otherwise. It is the settled interpretation of the statute that being tied up does not meet this element of the offense; if the victim, although physically restrained, can communicate unwillingness, then this element is not satisfied. Gould v. State, 577 So.2d at 1305, aff'g in part, quashing in part, 558 So.2d 481, 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Norman v. State, 555 So.2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Davis v. State, 538 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 544 So.2d 201 (Fla.1989).
In light of those principles, we examine the facts of this case. The victim, S.E.M., had run away from home and was living with a female roommate in Tampa. S.E.M. met Stephen Lackey, with whom she developed a sexual relationship. Although fifteen years old, S.E.M. told everyone she was nineteen.
S.E.M. and Lackey went to the Florida Keys with Lackey's stepfather, Bulling-ton, Coley, S.E.M.'s roommate, and several other people. During their stay in the Keys, the group consumed alcohol and cocaine. S.E.M. engaged in consensual sexual acts with Lackey, including S.E.M.'s being tied up at her request for sexual activity-
On the date in question, S.E.M. and several of the other persons voluntarily consumed cocaine which was on a plate in the motel room. At some point S.E.M. stated that she would like to try sex with a woman. Sexual activity followed, with defendant Coley engaging in two acts of oral sexual contact with S.E.M. while S.E.M. was tied to the bed.
The initial question is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that during this episode S.E.M. was physically helpless to resist as defined in the statute, i.e., physically unable to communicate unwillingness. We conclude that there was no such evidence.
Two witnesses testified at trial regarding this episode, S.E.M. and Lackey. The testimony shows that S.E.M. was physically able to communicate at all relevant times. The entire episode began with a communication between S.E.M., Coley, and others, in which S.E.M. expressed a desire to have sex with a woman. (Tr. 117, 121). S.E.M. was neither asleep nor unconscious, for she described each of the sexual acts on which the State based its case. (Tr. 50-52). Obviously she would not be able to describe the sexual acts charged in the information if she had been unconscious or asleep during them.
S.E.M. also testified that she communicated during each of the acts in question. She specifically asserted during parts of her testimony that she had communicated unwillingness, while conceding elsewhere in her testimony that she may have consented. (Tr. 51-53, 81, 88, see also Tr. 117, 121). The testimony shows ability to communicate at the relevant times; there is no evidence which would support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a physical inability to communicate unwillingness.
Coley's conviction of sexual battery on a person physically helpless to resist must be reversed.
IY.
Given that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction under paragraph 794.011(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the next question is whether the offense may be reduced to a lesser included offense under authority of section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1989). That statute provides, in part,
When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not prove the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does establish his guilt of . a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment for . the lesser included offense.
Id.
In Gould v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute only allows an appellate court to reduce the offense to a necessarily included lesser offense, not to a permissive lesser included offense. 577 So.2d at 1304-05 & n. 6.
Gould also holds that the necessarily lesser included offense for paragraph 794.-011(4)(a) is battery. 577 So.2d at 1305. The question is whether there is sufficient evidence to support conviction on that charge.
Insofar as pertinent here, "[a] person commits battery if he . [ajctually and intentionally touches . another person against the will of the other_" § 784.-03, Fla.Stat. (1989). In this case the victim testified that the episode started out as consensual sexual activity. (Tr. 50, 51, 75). She testified, however, that at some point during the sexual activity she said no, i.e., that she wanted the sexual activity to stop. (Tr. 51-53, 88). However, on cross-examination S.E.M. also testified that she may have consented with regard to each of the sexual acts that took place. (Tr. 81, 88, see also Tr. 109, 121, 125).
The applicable standard for sufficiency of the evidence is that the evidence must "reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89. Here, S.E.M. conceded that she may have given consent to the acts in question. That concession gives rise to a reasonable doubt with respect to the offense of battery.
The argument is made that there could be no consent for purposes of the battery statute because defendant was forced to consume cocaine. If there were such evidence we would have a different case, but all of the evidence indicates that the victim's consumption of cocaine was entirely voluntary. S.E.M. testified:
Q. Did anyone force you to take the coke?
A. No.
Q. You were allowed to have it if you wanted it or you could leave it if you didn't want it?
A. Yes.

Q. You did it voluntarily?
A. Yes.

A. It was sitting in the middle [of] the bed [on a plate], and we would use it as we wanted to.
(Tr. 72, 74, 82). During the sexual episode, at one point Bullington held the plate up to S.E.M.'s nose for her to inhale. (Tr. 103-04). There was no testimony that any of the cocaine consumption was involuntary.
It is also argued that there could be no consent for purposes of the battery statute because of S.E.M.'s voluntary cocaine consumption. In order to examine this contention it must first be noted that the law distinguishes between involuntary and voluntary alcohol or drug use for purposes of determining the voluntariness of a consent.
By way of overview, the American Law Institute states:
Common-law authorities treated intercourse with an unconscious woman as rape and occasionally expanded this rule to cases where the female was not technically unconscious but was so incapacitated by alcohol or drugs as to be in a condition of utter insensibility or stupefaction. Most current statutes, however, differentiate unconsciousness from lesser impairment and require in the latter case that the drug or intoxicant be administered by or with the privity of the defendant in order to constitute the highest degree of forcible rape.
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II, § 213.1, at 317 (1980).
The Florida sexual battery statute provides that evidence of mental incapacity resulting from involuntary drug or alcohol consumption "is admissible to prove that the consent was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary_" § 794.011(6), Fla.Stat. (1989); id. § 794.011(l)(a), (c). The theory of the statute is that defendant has administered the drug or alcohol without the consent of the victim, and accordingly the defendant is held accountable where the drug or alcohol renders the victim "temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct_" Id. § 794.-011(l)(c).
There is, however, no comparable provision in the sexual battery statute relating to voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol. The question' whether voluntary drug or alcohol consumption will vitiate the vol-untariness of consent is a difficult issue under decisional law and under the criminal codes. Plainly as a matter of statutory- construction, the Florida sexual battery statute does not place voluntary drug or alcohol consumption on the same footing as involuntary consumption; if they were to be treated as equivalent, the statute would say so.
The prevailing view is that voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol does not, without more, render consent involuntary. Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 218 (3d ed. 1982) "The mere fact that alcohol or drugs have confused the victim's judgment or reduced inhibitions is not enough...." Id. There must be a showing that the victim was unable to give a knowing and voluntary consent, and — in order to charge defendant with criminal responsibility — that the inability to consent was known or apparent to the defendant. See id. at 212-13; 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.11 (1986). See generally American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part I, § 2.11, at 689 (1985); Part II, § 213.1 Comments 3 & 5 (1980); 3 Charles Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 289 (1980).
Here, there is a dearth of evidence on which to hold defendant criminally accountable. On the night in question, S.E.M. began consuming cocaine alone before joining the group. By the victim's own account, she knew what she was doing when the encounter started. While the state elicited much testimony about the victim's subjective state of mind, there is an absence of evidence to show defendant knew, or that it was apparent to defendant, that the victim was unable to give a knowing and voluntary consent. As to the victim's age, it is uneontroverted that S.E.M. had represented that she was an adult, and that no one knew the victim's true age until after the incident in question. For the reasons stated, the evidence is insufficient to support the necessarily lesser included offense of battery.
V.
Alternatively, if it is assumed arguendo that the evidence was sufficient to show absence of knowing consent, and therefore that defendant is guilty of battery, defendant is still entitled to be discharged at this time. Defendant has served the term required for battery, a first degree misdemeanor.
VI.
We conclude that the law requires reversal of the defendant's convictions. We have carefully considered the position advanced by the dissent, and have reexamined the record in light thereof. Having done so, we adhere to the view that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict the defendant.
We note that in the present case the State could have made the main charge against defendant the offense of lewd, lascivious or indecent act upon or in the presence of a child, in violation of section 800.-04, Florida Statutes (1989). That crime is a second degree felony in which consent is not a defense and ability to communicate is not an issue. The State elected to proceed under paragraph 794.011(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), a first degree felony. When the State did so, it was obliged to prove each essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented was insufficient to discharge that burden with respect to the offense charged and the battery offense necessarily included therein.
As this court has stated in another insufficiency-of-evidence case:
This reversal should not be interpreted, however, as condoning the [defendant's] behavior.... We only hold that this behavior, without more, was insufficient to adjudicate [defendant guilty of the offense charged].... Our law, for reasons deeply rooted in our . devotion to human freedom, has always set high standards of proof for the state to meet before we condemn a person for violating our criminal laws.... We do no more than follow that decisional law in this cause believing, as we do, that no person — whatever one may think of him [or her] personally — should be stigmatized by a criminal conviction . based, as here, upon less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
D.M. v. State, 394 So.2d at 520 (citing Jackson v. Virginia).
The convictions are reversed and the matter remanded with directions to discharge the defendant from the cause.
Reversed and remanded.
. Jackson also held that the previous "no evidence" criterion for review of evidentiary sufficiency "is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt.... '[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a "no evidence" standard.' " Id. at 320 (citation omitted). Under Jackson, the question is "not whether there was any evidence to support a state-court conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 312-13 (emphasis in original).
. The quotations set forth in part II of the dissent are taken almost entirely from Bullington's case. There are differences between the testimony in the Bullington and Coley cases. Part II of the dissent quotes testimony from the Bull-ington trial regarding whether the victim passed out from time to time and whether at one point the victim was physically unable to talk. Those questions were not asked at Coley's trial, and there was no testimony at Coley's trial indicating intermittent unconsciousness by the victim or physical inability to speak. The dissent also relies on the testimony of "a friend of the victim," Theresa Smith. Smith did not testify at Coley's trial.
. The "to resist" terminology is also a misnomer. Under the statute, there is no duty for a sexual battery victim to resist a sexual assault. As the Gould summary of elements indicates, under this statute the inquiry is whether the victim consented, not whether the victim resisted. See 577 So.2d at 1304. See generally E. Sue Bernie, Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias Against The Victim Still Prevails, 30 U.Fla.L.Rev. 419 (1978).
. Bullington was actually Lackey's former stepfather, as Bullington and Lackey's mother had divorced.
. There is no evidence that S.E.M. was kept with the group against her will. S.E.M. testified that she had the freedom to go and come as she pleased. (Tr. 69).
. According to the testimony, there was also an act of anal penetration by vibrator, done by another female participant, not this defendant. (Tr. 104, 129).
. Both were called by the State. Lackey had entered into a plea agreement with the State. Both parties argued that Lackey was a truthful witness.
. The dissent relies on McIlwain v. State, 402 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So.2d 467 (Fla.1982). There the victim testified specifically about the physical effects of nitrous oxide and testified that he was immobilized thereby. Id. at 1196. The victim's testimony was supported by one of the expert witnesses. Id. The testimony in Mcllwain contrasts sharply with the testimony in the present case.
The dissent suggests that there was evidence of unconsciousness. Although S.E.M. testified that she eventually passed out and woke up the next morning, unconsciousness after the fact does not meet the requirements of the statute. The question is physical ability or inability to communicate unwillingness at the time of the acts in question.
. Coley argues an additional basis for reversal of the conviction under paragraph 794.-011(4)(a) — that the evidence was insufficient to show absence of consent by S.E.M. Given that the conviction must be reversed in any event for the reasons just stated, the issue of consent is deferred for consideration in the next section.
. That holding therefore excludes the possibility of reducing the charged offense to the permissive lesser included offense of lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon a child pursuant to section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1989).
. Effective for offenses committed on or after April 8, 1992, sexual battery as defined in subsection 794.011(5), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992), will also be a necessarily lesser included offense. See ch. 92-135, preamble & s. 3, Laws of Fla. For purposes of the present case, the version of the statute in effect at the time of the charged offenses is controlling, see State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 616-17 (Fla.1989), as authoritatively construed in Gould. The 1992 amendment is intended to override Gould. Ch. 92-135 (preamble), Laws of Fla. Cf. State v. Lanier, 464 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fla.1985) (statute in effect at time of crime is controlling; where supreme court has not previously interpreted statute, supreme court may consider later enacted expression of legislative intent in arriving at authoritative interpretation).
. The sexual battery statute provides:
Evidence of the victim's mental incapacity or defect is admissible to prove that the consent was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary; and the court shall instruct the jury accordingly.
Id. § 794.011(6).
The term "mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance administered to that person without his or her consent or due to any other act committed upon that person without his or her consent.
Id. § 794.011(l)(c) (emphasis added).
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 405 Mass. 456, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (1989) (victim "wholly insensible so as to be unable [to] consent[ ]_").
Although it has been suggested that Saavedra v. State, 576 So.2d 953, 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), is pertinent, that case involved the entirely distinct issue of consent to a search under the Fourth Amendment.
. The state of defendant's knowledge is pertinent for purposes of the offenses of sexual battery and battery. Consent is not an issue, and lack of knowledge of age is not a defense, under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1989) (lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of child).