Case Name: Michael MANSUR and Marie Grigsby, Appellants, v. Mary G. EUBANKS, Jean M. Barnett, and Auto Owners Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-03-20
Citations: 368 So. 2d 645
Docket Number: Nos. HH-404, HH-405
Parties: Michael MANSUR and Marie Grigsby, Appellants, v. Mary G. EUBANKS, Jean M. Barnett, and Auto Owners Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: MILLS, Acting C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 368
Pages: 645–651

Head Matter:
Michael MANSUR and Marie Grigsby, Appellants, v. Mary G. EUBANKS, Jean M. Barnett, and Auto Owners Insurance Company, Appellees.
Nos. HH-404, HH-405.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 20, 1979.
O’Gwen L. King, of Reeves, Barfield & King, Pensacola, for appellants.
Donald H. Partington, of Clark, Parting-ton, Hart & Hart, Pensacola, for appellees.

Opinion:
MELVIN, Judge.
Appellants-plaintiffs appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of appel-lees-defendants in the suit of each plaintiff against such defendant, seeking damages for burns each party-plaintiff claimed that he sustained when gas fumes were ignited in an apartment owned by Eubanks and Barnett and rented by appellant Grigsby.
Barnett showed the apartment to Grigsby in the summer of 1976, and discussed repairs to the refrigerator and painting walls that the owners would do. Occupancy was to begin as of August 1, 1976. Grigsby made a $25 deposit to the rental agency handling the transaction on July 11, and it was understood that such deposit would hold the apartment for her until August 1, at which time payment of the agreed rent was to be made. Grigsby asked for permission to return to the apartment and measure for drapes. She was given a key and was also given permission to move her things into the apartment on a Thursday or Friday prior to August 1. On July 31, Grigsby began the task of moving into the apartment and, in this, she had the assistance of a neighbor, Michael Mansur. Grigs-by decided to turn on the gas. She told Mansur she had. no experience with gas and asked for his assistance.
Prior to the time Grigsby moved into the apartment there had been no discussion concerning gas, but she knew that if she was going to have the gas turned on that would be her responsibility. Grigsby and Mansur went outside the apartment to the nozzle used to turn on the gas and, having turned on the gas, they walked back into the apartment. Neither claimant checked any of the appliances to make sure that they were turned off before they opened the gas valve to the apartment. They tried without success to light the stove, then decided to see if the hot water heater worked. Mansur struck a match near the bottom of the hot water heater and an explosion occurred. During the process of trying to light the stove, Grigsby smelled gas fumes and asked Mansur to check and see if he also smelled gas. Neither Mansur nor Grigsby notified the owners or checked about the stove prior to the explosion. Grigsby knew that it was her responsibility to make arrangements for the furnishing of the gas supply. Neither defendant ever made any representation to Grigsby or Mansur concerning the gas appliances.
There was a gap between a pipe coming from the back of the stove and a pipe coming into the house from a gas bottle. Gas escaping through such gap was the cause of the explosion. For some reason unknown to the owners prior to the explosion, the connecting length between these two pipes had been removed. At the time of the explosion the stove was in the same position that it occupied at the time the apartment was used by the last tenant. The owners had not authorized anyone to change stoves in the apartment or to move or disconnect any stoves. No tenant had complained that the stove had been disconnected or was not in operational order.
When considering a motion for the entry of a final summary judgment, the trial court must consider all of the agreed facts, as well as inferences properly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the person against whom such judgment is sought. When equated by that formula, Grigsby was entitled to assume that, upon the delivery to her of the key to the apartment, she had possession of the apartment as a tenant, with rent yet to be paid. The owners did not reserve control over the appliances, however they did agree to fix the refrigerator. In the complaint filed by her in this cause, she identified herself as a tenant. In Brooks v. Peters, 157 Fla. 141, 25 So.2d 205 (1946), the Supreme Court of Florida settled the law relating to the duties of a landlord to a tenant, and the liability of a landlord to the tenant. The court ruled at pp. 206 and 207:
"It is established law that when a landlord delivers to the tenant possession and control of the demised premises, including the plumbing, drains, and appliances for heating, lighting, and power, the landlord is not liable for an injury to the property or person of the tenant or those on the premises in the right of the tenant, although such injuries are attributable to defects in such apparatus, appliances or fixtures. Thus a tenant may not hold a landlord liable for injuries caused by explosion of plumbing, or heating apparatus on premises, the possession and control of which have been surrendered to him in the absence of fraud or concealment. The landlord's liability is based on his right of control over the appliances and he is not liable for injuries from defects in appliances located on the leased premises if he does not reserve control thereof, and accordingly it has been held that he is not liable for defects in water pipes in an apartment when the only purpose of such pipes is to supply and distribute water for the apartment. On the other hand, he is liable for defects in pipes on the leased premises if he retains control thereof.
Where the landlord surrenders possession and control of the leased premises to the tenant, in the absence of fraud or concealment, the tenant assumes the risk as to the condition of the premises, including the heating, lighting apparatus, plumbing, water pipes, sewers, etc. In other words, the rule of caveat emptor applies; hence the landlord is not- liable for any personal injuries or sickness of tenants, although attributable to the defects in the fixtures." (cites omitted) (Emphasis supplied)
The plaintiffs urge that we follow the Third District Court of Appeal and adopt the rationale of its decision in Alexander v. Fiftieth Street Heights Co., 334 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We have carefully examined that case, and are aware that the opinion here set forth is in direct conflict with the case mentioned. In arriving at the conclusion that the trial court is to be sustained in the entry of the summary judgments here reviewed, we follow that which we understand to be the law as mandated by the Supreme Court in Brooks v. Peters. If conflict now exists, so be it.
The summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants and against the appellants are each AFFIRMED.
MILLS, Acting C. J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., specially concurring.