Case Name: Lee-Ann KEEVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary E. BOETSCH; Rob Bony; Frances Dougherty; Lee-Ann Easton; Jeanne Greene; Louis A. Ling; Lori Meredith; Robert Miller; Nevada Commission on Ethics; R. Hal Smith; Thomas R.C. Wilson; Joni Wines, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-12-23
Citations: 116 F. App'x 165
Docket Number: No. 03-16051; D.C. No. CV-00-00143-KJD/RAM
Parties: Lee-Ann KEEVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary E. BOETSCH; Rob Bony; Frances Dougherty; Lee-Ann Easton; Jeanne Greene; Louis A. Ling; Lori Meredith; Robert Miller; Nevada Commission on Ethics; R. Hal Smith; Thomas R.C. Wilson; Joni Wines, Defendants—Appellees.
Judges: Before KOZINSKI, W. FLETCHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 116
Pages: 165–165

Head Matter:
Lee-Ann KEEVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary E. BOETSCH; Rob Bony; Frances Dougherty; Lee-Ann Easton; Jeanne Greene; Louis A. Ling; Lori Meredith; Robert Miller; Nevada Commission on Ethics; R. Hal Smith; Thomas R.C. Wilson; Joni Wines, Defendants—Appellees.
No. 03-16051.
D.C. No. CV-00-00143-KJD/RAM.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 9, 2004.
Decided Dec. 23, 2004.
Lee-Ann Keever, Reno, NV, pro se.
James T. Spencer, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KOZINSKI, W. FLETCHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
The district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs failure to cooperate in discovery was the result of willfulness, fault or bad faith. See Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Henry v. Gill Indus., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.1993)). In addition, it correctly determined that defendants were prejudiced by plaintiffs conduct, and that alternatives less drastic than dismissal — which it had repeatedly offered — would be insufficient to stop plaintiffs abuses. See id. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment for defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for a protective order. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.2004).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.