Case Name: James Gallaher v. The State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1889-06-28
Citations: 28 Tex. Ct. App. 247
Docket Number: No. 2669
Parties: James Gallaher v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 247–288

Head Matter:
James Gallaher v. The State.
No. 2669.
Decided June 28.
Motion for rehearing overruled December 7.
1. “Malice.”—Cases Approved.—Charge of the Court defines malice to be “the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal justification or excuse.” Held, sufficient; citing with approval McKinney’s case, 8 Texas Ct. App., 626; Harris’s case, Id., 90; Lander’s case, 12 Texas, 481.
2. Same—Evidence.—The indictment alleges that the murder was committed by the u§e of both a pistol and a lmife. Under this allegation it was sufficient to prove the use of either means, and the court, did not err in charging the jury that if defendant “killed the deceased by shooting her with a pistol or cutting her with a lmife,” etc.
3. Same.—It was not necessary, under the whole proof in the case, for the State to specifically prove, or for the court to charge that the weapon used was a deadly one.
5. Same—Presumption of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt.—The trial court instructed the jury as follows: “ The defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and unless the evidence so satisfies you in this case oí the guilt of the defendant of murder of the first or of the second degree, then you will find him not guilty.” Held, correct and sufficient.
5. Same—Circumstantial Evidence.—The charge of the court on circumstantial evidence reads as follows: “In order to warrant a conviction of a crime on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessaryto the conclusion sought to be established must be proven by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; all the facts (that is, the facts necessary to the conclusion) must be consistent with each other, and with the main fact sought to be proved; and the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature, leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion, and producing in eSect a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant, and no other person, committed the offense charged; and unless the evidence does so, you will acquit the defendant. But if the evidence does satisfy the understanding, reason, and conscience of the jury, and produces in their minds a reasonable and moral certainty of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, then the jury should convict the defendant.” Held, correct, notwithstanding the concluding sentence is unusual in charges upon circumstantial evidence.
6. Same—Alibi.—-The charge of the court upon the issue of alibi is as follows: “Amongst other defenses interposed in this case by the defendant is what is known in legal phraseology as an alibi; that is, that if the deceased was killed as alleged, the defendant was, at the time of such lulling, at another and different place from which such killing was done, and therefore was not and could not have been the person who killed deceased, if she was killed.” * * * * To this portion of the charge the defense objected: 1. That it expresses an opinion as to the weight of evidence. 2. It sums up a material portion of the evidence. 3. It defines as a defense that which is only rebutting evidence. 4. The words • ‘ amongst other defenses ” tends to weaken the prominent exculpatory facts, or evidence, relied on by defendant. 5. It conveys the impression that the evidence on this point was of little weight, and tends to convey to the minds of the jury that the State had sufficiently established the guilt of defendant, and that it devolved on the defendant to show that he was at a different place at the time of the commission of the offense. The majority of the court deciding against each of the exceptions to the charge, holds: 1. That it is not obnoxious to the first and second objections urged against it. 2. That alibi is a defense to a criminal prosecution, and it was not error to so denominate it in the charge. 3. That the burden of proving an alibi is not upon the defendant, and that the charge in this case neither positively nor inferentially shifts the burden of such proof upon the defendant. The rule is that if the evidence, whether in behalf of the State or the defendant, engenders in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s presence at the time and place of the offense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal; and the charge in this case in no degree obtrudes upon this rule. See the opinion of Willson, J., for a discussion of the question; and note his reassertion of the doctrine in the opinion on the motion for rehearing.
7. Practice—Evidence.—It is a statutory rule of evidence in this State, that when a part of a conversation has been brought out by one party, the other party is entitled to have the whole of the said conversation. With reference to certain testimony of the witness Barbee, objected to by the defense, the majority of the court holds it admissible as coming within the terms of this rule, and that the court properly admitted it.
8. Same.—See the dissenting opinion of Hurt, J., on original hearing, for certain proof proposed to be made for the defense by its witnessPeareson, held by the majority of the court to have been properly excluded as coming within the nature of self-serving testimony.
9. Murder—Fact Case.—See the statement of the case for evidence held sufficient to support a conviction for murder of the first degree.
Hurt, J., Disserting.
10. Charge of the Court—Burden of Proof.—Alibi is not a defense to a criminal prosecution in any other sense than as rehutting evidence tending to disprove the facts relied upon by the State for conviction, or as evidence tending to raise a reasonable doubt of the truth of the same. It was error, therefore, to instruct the jury that alibi was interposed as a defense. Moreover, the effect of the charge (see the sixth head note) was to impose upon the defendant the burden of proving the alibi. For an exhaustive discussion of the question, see the dissenting opinions.
11. Practice—Evidence.—Upon the question of motive the State proved that litigation involving real estate had been long pending, and at the time of the homicide was still pending between the accused and the deceased. To meet this proof the defendant offered to prove by his witness Peareson, in substance, that he, Peareson, as the attorney for the accused in the said litigation, advised the accused, prior to the homicide, that his title was absolutely good to all the land he claimed; that after the suit was instituted the accused, through the witness and his associate counsel, offered to surrender to the deceased all of the land to which she had title, and that when the said offer was made to her in open court, her attorneys and the presiding judge advised her to •accept it. Hurt J., holds (in opposition to the majority of the court), that the proposed proof, if true, tending strongly to eliminate the land litigation from the case as motive for the homicide, its rejection was error. See the dissenting opinion on original hearing for a discussion of the question.
12. Same.—Barbee, a State’s witness, was asked on cross-examination by the defense, “if he did not say to Judy James (the principal witness for the prosecution), that her husband’s neck was in danger if she did not tell what she knew ?” Barbee replied that he did not know that he used language so positive, but that he said to her, in effect, that the deceased was taken from her, Judy’s, house, and that she ought to know something about it, and that if she did not tell what she knew, it would place her and her husband in danger. On re-examination by the State, and over defendant’s objection, the witness was permitted to testify to what Judy James said to him in reply. Controverting the ruling of the majority of the court on this question, Hurt, J., holds that it was error to permit the witness to state in evidence the reply made to him by the witness Judy James, because: 1. The questions propounded by the defense did not seek to elicit the conversation between the witnesses Barbee and Judy James, nor did they draw out a single statement made by Judy James to Barbee. 2. The purpose of the defense being to show by Barbee that undue influences may have been applied to induce Judy James to swear to incriminating facts, the State, to support her, and to rebut "the inference of such undue influences, might prove statements made by her before she was subjected to such influences, but not the statements made by her after she was so subjected. See the dissenting opinions in extenso for an elucidation of the principle.
13. Same.—It was the contention of the State that even if the testimony of Barbee :as to the statements of Judy James was incompetent, it was immaterial error, in view •of Judy James’s statement to her husband at the time deceased was taken from her house, that the accused was one of the party who took her, and that, therefore, her subsequent testimony could not have been influenced as alleged by the accused. But Hurt, J., dissenting, holds that the State’s contention is without merit; that Judy James’s testimony shows that at the time of the removal of the deceased she told her husband that “she believed one of the party was the accused,” whereas subsequent to being indirectly threatened by Barbee with prosecution, in connection with her husband, who was then under arrest, she was positive as to the identity of the accused.
14. Same.—Charge of the Court instructed the jury that they were the “sole judges of the weight of the evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses.” Held, sufficient to authorize the jury to credit the testimony of a witness, notwithstanding his impeachment on the question of veracity.
On Motion for Rehearing.
15. “Malice”—Charge of the Court.—To determine the sufficiency of a charge defining malice the appellate court will consider other portions of the charge explaining malice. Immediately following the definition held on the original hearing to be sufficient, the trial court explains express malice as follows : “Express malice aforethought is where one with a sedate and deliberate mind and formed design deliberately kills another,” etc. Held, that such correct definition of express malice, in and of itself, fully expresses the legal meaning of malice.
16. Same—Alibi.—It is urged against the charge on alibi that it requires the jury to believe, in order to acquit the defendant, that he was not and could not have been the person who killed the deceased; that the use of the words “could not” means, in effect, that it was impossible for the defendant to have committed the murder, and thus to have imposed upon the accused the burden of proving the aMbi, or that it was impossible for him to have committed the homicide. Held, by the majority of the court,, that the objections are not maintainable, especially in the light of the concluding part of the charge which reads as follows: “ Now, if the evidence raises in your minds a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place where the deceased was. killed (if killed), at the time of the killing, then you should acquit the defendant.” But see the dissenting opinion of Hurt, J., on the motion for rehearing maintaining the-contrary, and reviewing authorities in support of his dissent.
17. Same—Express Malice.—The trial court charged the jury on express malice-that “a sedate and deliberate mind and formed design is evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention, as lying in wait,” etc. Against this part of' the charge it is urged that it is upon the weight of evidence, and virtually tells the jury that express malice is proved when any of the conditions enumerated in the charge are shown to have existed. Held, that the objection is not well taken. Note the approval on the subject of Sharpe’s case, 17 Texas Ct. App., 486.
18. Same—Evidence.—Note the opinion of Willson, J., on the motion for rehearing, sustaining and elaborating the ruling of the majority of the court on the original-hearing that the testimony of the witness Barbee, as to the declarations to him by the-witness Judy James, was correctly admitted; and note the dissenting opinion of Hurt, J., on the motion, maintaining the converse proposition asserted in his original dissenting opinion. And note that the majority adheres to its original ruling that the trial • court did not err in excluding the proposed testimony of the witness Peareson, offered to rebut the testimony of the State on the question of motive.
19. Same.—The defendant assigned for error, on a trial for murder, that the-“court erred in permitting, to the prejudice of defendant’s rights, the counsel for the State, while re-examining the witness Judy James, to cause the defendant James Qallaher to stand up before the jury and put on his head a broad brimmed hat, and put. over his face a handkerchief, and then thus exhibiting the defendant before the jury to ask Judy James if that was the way Gallaher looked at the time she saw him, on the: night of the murder, and in permitting Judy James to testify that ‘that was exactly the way he looked,’ thus permitting and requiring the defendant to testify against himself, to the material injury and prejudice of his rights.” Held: Primarily, this, question is not revisable by this court in the absence of a bill of exception. But waiving this legal requisite in this instance, the court holds that so far as the record shows, the disguise and exhibition of the defendant was not compulsory, but was consented to> and may even have been desired by him; and he can not now be heard to complain.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Harris, on change of venue from Wharton. Tried below before Hon. O. L. Cleveland.
The conviction in this case was in the first degree for the murder of Mary K. Brown, in Wharton County, Texas, on the seventh day of December, 1887. The penalty assessed by the verdict was a life term in the penitentiary.
Beginning on page 455 of volume XXV of this series of Reports, will be found a condensed statement of the proof elicited on the habeas corpus trial of this defendant for bail, that trial involving the contemporaneous murder of Mary K. and Mayo Brown. Many of the witnesses who testified on that proceeding testified on this trial, and so far as their testimony is the same in extent and detail, it will be merely referred to, and not repeated in this report. Otherwise, only so much of the testimony contained in the 241 pages of the record, which comprises the statement of facts in this case, will be summarized as is necessary to elucidate the rulings on this appeal.
The State’s first witness was J. B. Van Houton who, on the habeas corpus proceeding, testified as a witness for the accused. See 25 Texas Ct. App., 488, et seq. His testimony on this trial was substantially the same. He stated further that the David James house, on the defendant’s plantation, of which the deceased took forcible possession, and from which she was taken to her death, was not situated on, but was fully a half mile distant from the land then involved in the dispute between her and the defendant. Just before retiring on the night preceding the night ' of the tragedy the defendant remarked to the witness that before taking steps to secure the ejectment of Mrs. Brown and her son from the house, he would wait and see what the officers would do about the warrant sued out by the witness for the arrest of Mrs. Brown. He made no harsh remarks about Mrs. Brown, but appeared to be somewhat incensed against the officers for delaying the arrest of the woman. He emphasized his statement on the habeas corpus trial, that when the defendant left on the morning of the fatal Wednesday, to go either to Wharton or Eagle Lake, or to both places, he rode an iron grey horse.
J. G. Barbee was the State’s next witness. He testified for the State on the habeas corpus proceeding, and his then testimony will be found set out at length in the report of that case, in the 25 Texas Court of Appeals, beginning on page 468. His testimony on this trial did not include his statements on the habeas corpus trial as to the search of the house of Andrew Collins, and the discovery therein of the muddy boots, bloody shirt, etc. He stated more fully, however, the particulars of his. interview with Judy James, one of the occupants of the house from which the deceased and her son were taken on the fatal night, and declared that it was in consequence of the information derived from Judy James in that interview that the bodies were discovered. He was not one of the parties who first interviewed Judy James when the search for the bodies was begun, but he understood from those who conducted that interview that no information whatever could be obtained from Judy- Later in the day, after having failed in their search for their bodies, the witness and others went to the James house and the witness took Judy to a point either in front of or behind the house, where he told her, in effect, that she and her husband were in a critical condition; that the missing parties were taken from her house, and she ought to know something about it, and that if she did not tell what she knew, she and her husband were both placed in danger. Judy replied, in substance, that she was afraid to tell it out there in the crowd; that Mr. Gallaher was one of the men; that she heard shots; that she heard the shots over there in the prairie—pointing out the direction; that they were afraid to go out there to see, and that they had not been out there. The particulars of the controversy over the admission of this testimony appears fully in the four opinions delivered on this appeal.
This witness further testified that Judy James told him that the faces of the men were masked with dark bordered handkerchiefs, which they wore from the eyes down. After the discovery of the bodies the witness went to Van Houton’s house, and in one of the rooms found two folded handkerchiefs hanging on some nails against the wall. Those, handkerchiefs had dark blue borders, and had been tied at the ends. The ends and creases or folds indicated that they had been worn for some time, in such manner as handkerchiefs are commonly worn about the neck. Mrs. Brown’s body shoiyed a cut on the throat, and a gun shot wound in the face below one of the eyes.
David James was the next witness for the State. He was a witness for the State on the habeas corpus trial, but his narrative on this trial being more complete, it is summarized below. He testified that he and his wife Judy lived on the defendant’s plantation, in Wharton County, at the time of the murder of the deceased, cccupying the house which, in the history of this case, has come to be known as the “James house.” That house was situated about a half mile from the plantation house which was occupied by Captain Van Houton, the agent of the defendant, and the manager of the plantation. For some time previous to the week preceding the tragedy, the witness was in Fort Bend County. When he got home, several days before that event, he found Mrs. Brown, the deceased, and her son in possession of a part of his house. They had been there but a short while, as their “plunder” had not yet been unloaded from the wagon. A few days thereafter, in the evening, the witness had a conversation with the defendant about the deceased’s intrusion upon his premises, he, witness, being anxious to be reinstated in his previous undivided possession of the place. This conversation, according to the witness’s recollection, occurred on the evening of Tuesday—the evening preceding the fatal day. "Defendant asked the witness if'Mrs. Brown was still at his house? Witness replied that she was. Defendant said: “She won’t be there much longer. Tie your dogs and keep them tied, for I am expecting the officers, and they may be here at any time.” The witness next saw the defendant on the following morning just before he left the plantation and rode oil in the direction of Wharton. On that morning the defendant told the witness again to tie his dogs and keep them tied, as he was expecting the officers, who might arrive at any time. It was between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning when defendant left his plantation going towards Wharton. According to the defendant’s order the witness had his dogs tied late on that Wednesday evening.
The deceased and her son had taken possession of the large room in the house, leaving the witness and his family in possession of the adjoining or shed room and the kitchen, which was connected with the shed room by an open hall. On that Wednesday night while he and his wife, the witness holding his sick child on his lap, were sitting at their supper table in the kitchen, at an hour not later than 8 o’clock, three men, one of whom was Henry Allen, colored, entered the house through the kitchen. Henry Allen was in advance. The other two were white men. The white men wore masks of dark bordered handkerchiefs over their faces, up to their eyes, broad brimmed white hats, and boots drawn up over the trouser legs. Hot a word was said by either of the men when they entered, but they passed rapidly through the kitchen, hall, and shed room to the back door of the room occupied by Mrs. Brown. Allen knocked at that door, and at the instant it was opened by Mrs. Brown, the two men in masks rushed into the room. One of the men seized Mrs. Brown and the other the boy. Presently one of the men called Allen in to help overpower Mrs. Brown. Allen went into the room to do their bidding. One of the men then called to witness to help fasten the boy. Witness did not want to comply, but the man hallooed to him: “ Old man, if you don’t come.in here and help take this boy out, I will kill the last d—d one of you!” He repeated that threat three or four times and finally said to witness, “ I deputise you to come and help fasten him.” Witness reluctantly entered the room and helped the man to take the boy out and through the kitchen, and to tie him. Mrs. Brown was taken out of the house a few moments before the boy was. The boy was immediately taken to the gate, where Mrs. Brown was in the hands of the other man. At the gate the man placed the boy on a bay horse—the only horse that the witness saw—and left the place, one man leading or walking abreast with the horse, and the other man and Mrs. Brown on foot. Witness never afterwards saw Mrs. Brown or the boy alive.
While at the house the men said they were officers from Wharton, and that they were going to take Mrs. Brown and her son to Wharton that night. Mrs. Brown said that she knew Mr. Jones, and that he was a nice man, but if either of the men claimed to be Mr. Jones (the sheriff) the witness did not hear it. Mrs. Brown then begged to be left at the house until morning, but the men replied that they would be taken to Wharton that night. The boy then said, “ I know you are going to kill me.” The man who had charge of Mrs. Brown the witness took to be .and believed was this defendant. He did not see his eyes, nor could he tell anything by the voice, which was muffled with the mask. But he had the physical stature and development of the defendant; his movements were in every way similar to those of the defendant, which were peculiar; he wore such a hat, and such colored clothes as the defendant, jf not habitually, most frequently wore, and he had his pants in his boots, a constant habit of the defendant. Upon the whole the witness was very confident, though not absolutely positive, that the defendant was the man who took Mrs. Brown off. The handkerchiefs used by the men to mask their faces were white, with dark borders strikingly similar to those exhibited on the examining trial.
The testimony of Judy James, the next witness for the State, was a much more detailed, circumstantial narrative of what transpired at the house on the fatal night, but it conflicted in no particular with that of her husband. Her testimony in chief was, in substance, the same as her evidence delivered on the habeas corpus trial (25 Texas Ct. App., 459, ei seq.), except that, instead of a partial, it shows a positive, unequivocal, and absolute identification of the defendant as the disguised man who took the deceased away from her house on the night of Wednesday, December 7, 1887. As on the habeas corpus trial, the witness testified on this trial that about an hour after the men left with Mrs. Brown and the boy, she heard five shots fired from the direction towards which the men took the woman and boy, and where, on the succeeding Friday morning, she saw Mrs. Brown’s dead body.
This witness was subjected to an exceedingly severe and searching cross-examination by the counsel for the defense, but she was not shaken in her testimony positively identifying the defendant by his general appearanee, size, voice, and movement. Fixing time, place, and persons, the defendant’s counsel asked the witness if she did not, in December after the examining trial, state to several parties that she did not know who the men were that came to her house and took Mrs. Brown off; that on the next trial she would tell the truth, and that Mr. Fitzgerald had told her that her husband’s neck was in danger, wherefore she had laid it on the defendant? The witness denied most emphatically that- she had ever made such statements. Upon this denial she was subsequently contradicted by the defendant’s witnesses Burney, Hunter, and Morris. It was upon the re-examination of this witness that the episode occurred which" is made the subject matter of the ruling announced in the nineteenth headnote of this report. The State’s counsel produced a broad-brimmed hat and a handkerchief, and proposed to “ experiment” with the defend ant for the benefit of the jury. He then invited the defendant to stand up before the jury and submit to disguise after the manner of the men who took the Browns away from the witness’s house. He submitted, and was attitudinized by the State’s counsel before the witness in the presence of the jury. In answer to questions then propounded, the witness said that he presented the same appearance, in the several attitudes, while at her house on the fatal night. The record contains no bill of exception to this proceeding, and no objection by the defense is noted in the statement of facts.
The State’s testimony otherwise shows that the bodies of Mrs. Brown and her son were found on Friday, December 9, 1887, on the prairie, about three quarters of a mile from the “James house,” in the direction indicated by Judy James as that in which they were taken off. The cause of Mrs. Brown’s death was a gun shot wound in the face, and a cut across the throat.
Alibi was the defense relied upon, and it was based upon the testimony of the witnesses Anders, Duboy, Moore, Busch, J. 0. Cooper, and Mrs. Cooper. The reputation of J. 0. Cooper for truth and veracity was assailed by a number of State witnesses, and sustained by numerous witnesses for the defense. As on the habeas corpus trial, the good general character of the defendant was supported by a large number of witnesses. Van Ilouton testified that the blue bordered handkerchief taken from his house, and exhibited on the examining trial, belonged to him, the witness. In short the general tenor of the defensive proof on this trial was the same as that adduced on the habeas corpus trial, and reported in the twenty-fifth volume of these Reports. The contention which arose on this trial over the testimony of Colonel P. E. Peareson is shown sufficiently in the opinions of the court.
Able written arguments in support of the briefs, and on motion for rehearing were filed, but aside from being too lengthy for insertion, they ■can not, under the present law, be incorporated in a report.
I. N. Dennis, P. P. Peareson, and Jones & Garnett, for appellant.
The appellant being indicted and on trial for murder, it was the imperative duty of the trial court to define and explain to the jury the meaning of the term malice, because it is a part of the law of and applicable to the case, in that there can be no murder without malice.
The court in its charge tells the jury that “malice is the intentional doing of a wrongful act toward another without legal justification or ex-muse. ” The charge nowhere states that “ malice evidences a heart regardless of - social duty and fatally bent on mischief” nor does it anywhere state that the wrongful act must be one “ without extenuation or mitigation,” as well as without justification or excuse. McCoy v. The State, 25 Texas, 38; Bowers v. The State, 24 Texas Ct. App., 549; Hays v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 330,331; Harris v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 90-103; Tooney v. The State, 5 Texas Ct. App., 163-188; Griffin v. The State, 9 S. W. Rep., 461; 3 Greenl. on Ev., secs. 14, 119,144; 2 Bouv., verb “Malice.”
The court erred to defendant’s prejudice in charging the jury that “if' you believe that defendant killed deceased by shooting her with a pistol, or by cutting her with a knife, you should find defendant guilty,” etc., without at the same time instructing the jury as to the character of the pistol and knife, or either of them, and whether or not said weapons, or either of them, were deadly either in themselves or as used, and likely, as used, to produce death; and in instructing the jury that they should convict defendant if deceased came to her death by being shot with a pistol or cut with a knife, the indictment alleging that deceased came toller death by being shot with a pistol and cut with a knife, thus charging disjunctively as to the weapons, while the allegation of the indictment'is-conjunctive as to the weapons.
It is alleged in the indictment that defendant killed Mary K. Brown by shooting her with a pistol and by cutting her with a knife, and it was. incumbent on the State to prove these allegations, and each of them; and to show that if deceased came to her death by the use of these means: or instruments in defendant’s hands, that the same were deadly weapons, and likely as used to produce death, which proof the State failed to make;, and it being charged in the indictment that deceased was killed by both these means or instruments, the court’s charge as to the means or instruments of death was unauthorized; especially so because it authorized the-jury to convict in the absence of any evidence as to the character of the-instruments or means of death, and whether death resulted from then-use, or the use of one or the other of them.
The indictment charges that deceased was killed by being shot with a. pistol and by being cut with a knife. No person saw the killing, nor did. any one seethe pistol and knife, or either of them, by which it is charged to have been done. The witnesses Spivy and Barbee saw wounds on deceased’s head and face, Barbee being some distance from the body on horseback; Mrs. Spivy did not go very near the body. There was a cut. on the face and neck, and what appeared to be a gun shot wound in or-near the nose, but what kind of a knife made the cut, or whether the shot was from a pistol or not, the evidence does not show. Penal Code, arts. 612-15; Jones v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 680; Lightfoot v. The State, 20 Texas Ct. App., 77; 3 Greenl. Ev., sec. 141; Hartwell v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 88; Howard v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 348; Tooney v. The State, 5 Texas Ct. App., 163; Nichols v. The State, 24 Texas Ct. App., 137 and 139.
The court in its charge failed to instruct the jury that if they are not- satisfied of defendant’s guilt from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that they will acquit the defendant of any offense.
The court in its general charge should always instruct the jury that unless the evidence satisfies them of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to be acquitted. The charge, in so far as it authorizes an acquittal, is vague and indefinite, and not couched in plain and explicit terms, but is negative in its terms. Maddox v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. App., 429; Steagald v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 464; Burkhart v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 599; Jackson v. The State, 15 Texas Ct. App., 84; Reynolds v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 427; Odle v. The State, 13 Texas Ct. App., 612; Hackett v. The State, 13 Texas Ct. App., 406; Snowden v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. App., 105; Irvine v. The State, 20 Texas Ct. App., 41; Robertson v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 607; Cohea v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 173; Terry v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 471.
The court erred in its charge on circumstantial evidence in adding to the first paragraph of its charge on that subject (the said first paragraph being an affirmative proposition) the following: “But if the evidence does not satisfy the understanding, reason, and. conscience of the jury, and produces in their minds a reasonable and moral certainty of the guilt of the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, then the jury should convict the defendant.”
The whole charge on circumstantial evidence is erroneous, and calculated to injure the rights of defendant, because the same was not a correct and full exposition of the law, in that it fails to instruct the jury that to justify his (defendant’s) conviction on circumstantial evidence alone the facts relied upon must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and because the charge on circumstantial evidence submits to the jury the whole subject in two affirmative propositions as to the defendant's guilt, and does not at the same time submit to-the jury the negative or converse proposition of innocence, thus keeping and holding up before the jury the affirmative proposition of defendant’s guilt with marked, undue, and injurious prominence, thereby causing the jury to give undue weight to the court’s charge, in that it directed their minds by repetitions in the charge to defendant’s guilt alone, and did not at the same time and in the same connection permit and allow them to consider the question of his innocence and of his not being guilty.
If the first sentence of the charge on circumstantial evidence was correct (which is not admitted), it embodies all the law on that subject and was complete in itself; but when the court, apparently not satisfied with the manner in which it had presented the subject to the jury, added a new and additional sentence by presenting the affirmative proposition of defendant’s guilt in a strong and prominent manner to the jury, all the force, pith, and meaning of the first portion of the charge that might have benefited defendant were taken away and destroyed. Barnes v. The State, 41 Texas, 342; Hunt v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 235; Stuckey v. The State, Id., 177-79; Harrison v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 186; Barr v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 507; Bishop v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. App., 432-36; Bishop v. The State, 43 Texas, 390; Estep v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 370; Robertson v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 607; Brookin v. The State, 10 S. W. Rep., 219.
The addition by the court of the last part or sentence of the charge on circumstantial evidence to what had preceded it was unauthorized, and it so qualified and limited the meaning and force of the first part as to withdraw the jury’s attention from it, and to cause the jury to look to and consider only the affirmative question of guilt. See authorities under first proposition this assignment, and also Howard v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 348; Gibbs v. The State, 1 Texas Ct. App., 13; McFarlin v. The State, 41 Texas, 23.
The court is only required to state the law directly and plainly, and it is error for it to place by repetition too prominently before the jury any principle of law involved in the case, because by so doing the court creates an impression in the minds of the jury as to what the court’s opinion is with regard to the facts to which the principle is applicable, and conveys by necessary inference the idea that on the court’s mind there is an impression that the defendant is not innocent, but guilty; which was the effect of the court’s language in that part of the charge under discussion here. Irvine v. The State, 20 Texas Ct. App., 39-41; Jackson v. The State, 15 Texas Ct. App., 84; White v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 57; Reynolds v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 412; Taylor v. Townsend, 61 Texas, 147; Powell v. Messer, 18 Texas, 406.
In view of the unauthorized addition made by the court to the general charge on circumstantial evidence, which standing alone may have been correct, the court should have gone further and instructed the jury that “to justify a conviction of defendant on circumstantial evidence alone, the facts relied on must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt,” which the court failed to do.
The first part or sentence of the charge may be a correct abstract statement of the rule of law applicable to circumstantial evidence, but the concluding sentence renders it of no value to the defendant, because it takes from the charge all of its beneficial qualities. The charge, notwithstanding this fact, does not tell the jury that to justify the defendant’s conviction on circumstantial evidence alone the facts relied on must be absolutely incompatible with his innocence, and incapable of explana tion on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt. Barnes v. The State, 41 Texas, 542; Barr v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 512, 513; Pogue v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. App., 283; Black v. The State, 1 Texas Ct. App., 391; Hunt v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 212.
The court erred in charging the jury on reasonable doubt, thus: “ The defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and unless the evidence so satisfies you in the case of the guilt of defendant of murder of the first or second degree, then you will find him not guilty.” This charge is erroneous in form and substance, and prejudicial to defendant’s rights, because it fails to tell the jury distinctly and affirmatively that in case of reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the defendant is entitled to be acquitted; because it fails to apply the reasonable doubt distinctly and clearly to each degree of murder separately; because it fails to instruct the jury that the presumption of evidence is to be indulged as to each degree of murder separately; and because it fails to instruct the jury that before a conviction can be had in this case, the evidence must show that the offense was committed in Wharton County. Code Crim. Proc., art. 227; Penal Code, art. 11; Fury v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 471; Cohea v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 173; Robertson v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 607; Irvine v. The State, 20 Texas Ct. App., 41; McCall v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 353; Guagardo v. The State, 41 Texas, 626-634; Rockhold v. The State, 16 Texas Ct. App., 585.
The court, in charging on reasonable doubt, failed to charge the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt of the identity of defendant as one of the men who removed Mrs. Brown from the house of David James on December 7, 1887, in Wharton County, he was entitled to be acquitted. This charge was suggested by clause eight of defendant’s exception to the charge, and was rendered necessary by the obscurity of the court’s general charge on the subject of reasonable doubt.
The court did not charge the jury on the case as made by the evidence with regard to defendant’s identity, neither did the court apply the facts to the law nor the law to the facts, but only charged in a general and abstract way. The identity of defendant as one of the men who removed Mrs. Brown from the house was the main and pivotal point in the case, and on that point the charge is silent. Mayfield v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 645; O’Connell v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 363; Roddy v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 528, Stephens v. The State, 4 Texas Ct. App., 491; Darnell v. The State, 43 Texas, 147.
The court erred in its charge by using the following language in reference to the means by which deceased came to her death: “ If you believe that defendant did kill her (meaning the deceased) with a pistol or by cutting her with a knife, then you will find defendant guilty,” etc. This charge is erroneous because unauthorized by any allegation in the indictment, or by any evidence adduced on the trial. The indictment alleges, that she was killed by being shot with a pistol and cut with a knife.
The indictment charges that defendant killed deceased by shooting her with a pistol and cutting her with a knife. Two witnesses testified that deceased had a gunshot wound in he:’ face. The charge tells the jury to convict if the evidence shows that she was killed with a pistol, etc., whether by shooting or not. Under the charge the jury might convict if the deceased was “clubbed or beaten to death with the pistol." Conn v. The State, 11 Texas Ct. App., 390; Kouns v. The State, 3 Texas Ct. App., 13; Cooper v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 419; Serio v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 633; Stewart v. The State, 15 Texas Ct. App., 598; Allen v. The State, 24 Texas Ct. App., 216; Orman v. The State, 24 Texas Ct. App., 495; Foster v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 248; Garcia v. The State, 19 Texas Ct. App., 389; Bramlette v. The State, 21 Texas Ct. App., 611; 3 Greenl. Ev., sec. 141.
The court erred in its charge on alibi by using the following language: “ Amonst other defenses interposed in this case by the defendant is what, is known in legal phraseology as an alibi—that is, that if the deceased was killed as alleged, the defendant was at the time of such killing at. another and different place from which such killing was done, and therefore was not and could not have been the person who killed deceased, if she was killed."
This language of the court was erroneous for the following reasons, to-wit: 1. It expresses an opinion as to the weight of the evidence. 2. It sums up a material portion of the evidence. 3. It defines as a defense that which is-only rebutting evidence. 4. The words “amongst other defenses” tends to weaken the prominent exculpatory facts or evidence relied on by defendant. 5. It conveys the impression that the evidence on this point was of little weight, and tends to convey to the minds of the¡ jury that the State had sufficiently established the guilt of defendant, and that it devolved on the defendant to show that he was at a different place at the time of the commission of the offense.
The language of the charge is a comment on the weight of the testimony, and has the effect to belittle in the minds of the jury what the court is pleased to term the defense of an alibi. Penal Code, art. 51;. Walker v. The State, 42 Texas, 369; Ayres v. The State, 21 Texas Ct. App., 399; Humphries v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 302; Harrison v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 186; Stuckey v. The State, 7 Texas Ct.. App., 179.
The court erred, in view of the form and nature of its charge on alibi and reasonable doubt, in failing to charge as suggested in defendant’s bill of exceptions Ho. 6, as follows: 1. If defendant, at the time Mrs. Brown was killed, was at “Rhody" Cooper’s house, and so far away from the place of killing that it was impossible for him to have done the killing, he should be acquitted. 2. And if you have a reasonable doubt that defendant was present at the time and place of killing you will acquit him. 3. And if from all the evidence you can not determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was present at the time and place of the killing of Mrs. Brown, or whether at that time he was at “Rhody” Cooper’s house, then he is entitled to be acquitted.
The main exculpatory fact relied on by defendant was that at the time of the alleged killing of Mrs. Brown he was at “Rhody ” Cooper’s house, twelve or fourteen miles distant from the place of killing. Only one witness pretended to identify defendant as one of the men who took Mrs. Brown from David James’s house. This witness was Judy James. The charge of the court on reasonable doubt was vague, indefinite, and negative, and ot the same nature on alibi. There was no direct, plain, and affirmative application in the charge of the law to the facts in evidence, and it did not apply the law pertinently to the case as made by the allegation in the indictment and the evidence adduced on the trial. Defendant proved by J. C. Cooper, Mrs. Cooper, Louis Busch, Dick Duboy, Richard Moore, and Mr. Anders that he was at Cooper’s house and in its vicinity from 12 o’clock on the 7th day of December, 1887, until the next morning; and 'that he was at Cooper’s house from sundown on that day until 8 o’clock the next morning. Johnson v. The State, 13 Texas Ct. App., 378; Mayfield v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 645; 11 Texas Ct. App., 390; 3 Id., 13; 22 Id., 419; Id., 633; 15 Id., 598; 24 Id., 216; Id., 495; 8 Id., 248; 19 Id., 389; 21 Id., 611; 16 Id., 585.
In view of the importance to the defendant of the testimony of the wit-messes sought to be impeached, the court failed to and should have charged the jury as suggested in defendant’s bill of exception No. 6, clause 3, that a witness sought to be impeached may still be believed by the jury, and notwithstanding such impeaching testimony they are still the judges of the credibility of all the witnesses, including the witnesses sought to be impeached; and also that when a sustaining witness states of a witness sought to be impeached, that he is well acquainted with such witness, and with his friends and neighbors where he is best known, and that he has never heard the general reputation of such witness for truth and veracity questioned, that such sustaining witness thereby qualifies himself to testify as to such general reputation.
The exceptions of defendant to the charge of the court suggested this omission and defect of the charge on this point. The State attempted to impeach the witness “Rhody’’ (J. C.) Cooper, and the defendant .sought to sustain said Cooper by numerous witnesses. Kelly v. The State, 1 Texas Ct. App., 634; Cooper v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 202; Wolf v. The State, 25 Texas Ct. App., 709, 710; Boon v. Weatherford, 23 Texas, 687; Francis v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 501; Stewart v. The State, 15 Texas Ct. App., 605-7; Davis v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 31; Holbert v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 228; Walker v. The State, 6 Texas Ct. App., 607; Willson’s Crim. Stats., secs. 2335, 2349, and anthorites there collated.
Considering the vital importance of the State’s witness Judy James as-against the defendant, and whose contradictory statements out of court were testified to by the witnesses for defendant, the court should have instructed the jury on the law applicable to such evidence.
The court failed to charge the jury on this phase of the case, although the court’s attention was called to it by defendant’s exceptions to the charge. Henderson v. The State, 1 Texas Ct. App., 436, 437; Howard v. The State, 25 Texas Ct. App., 693.
The witnesses Burney, Norris, and Hunter testified to Judy James’s: contradictory statements out of court.
In the paragraph of the charge as to the jury being the judges of credibility of the witnesses, the court omitted to further instruct the jury that this included the credibility of the witnesses sought to be impeached, and that after considering the testimony of all the witnesses, if the jury-have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, he was entitled to be* acquitted.
The defendant sought to impeach the witness Judy James, and produced three witnesses for that purposes to prove her statements made out, of court touching the alleged murder of Mrs. Brown. The State attempted to impeach the defendant’s witness “Rhody” Cooper. The-, charge of the court failed to present this phase of the case to the jury,, although attention was called to it by defendant’s exception to the charge.. See authorities referred to under the two preceding propositions, and Austin Smith v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 199, 200.
The court erred in permitting the State’s witness Barbee while on the-stand to state what Judy James, another witness for the State, told him about defendant being one of the men who took Mrs. Brown out of the house.
The questions by defendant’s counsel to Barbee sought to elicit from the witness facts showing that the witness Judy James was frightened and intimidated by Barbee and the crowd at her house, and through fear- and intimidation was induced to charge the murder of Mrs. Brown on the defendant. Barbee was not asked by defendant’s counsel to state-what Judy James said to him, but was asked what he said to her, and this was all that defendant asked him; but on re-examination of Bar-bee by the State’s counsel the court, over objection of defendant, permitted the witness Barbee to detail what Judy James told him as to-defendant’s connection with Mrs. Brown’s removal from the house on. the night of December 7, 1887. Barbee’s interview with Judy James-took place on Friday evening, two days after Mrs. Brown was removed from the house, and when her husband was under arrest for killing Mrs. Brown. Barbee and Judy James were both witnesses for the State. Barbee was first placed on the stand, and Judy James was not examined as a witness until after he had testified. This proposition is elementary, and citation of authority is deemed unnecessary, but see Baily v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 98; Branch v. The State, 15 Texas Ct. App., 102; McWilliams v. The State, 44 Texas, 116; Rogers v. The State, 9 S. W. Rep., 765.
The court erred in excluding the answers of the witness Peareson to the questions asked him by defendant’s counsel as to the litigation between the defendant and the deceased, Mrs. Brown, and as to state of defendant’s mind concerning said litigation, said answers being sought for the purpose of showing the condition of the defendant’s mind and disposition with reference to the lawsuit; and his knowledge of the same as gained from the witness, who was his attorney in the case; and as showing that the defendant had no motive arising out of the litigation to commit the offense charged against him, the State relying upon and urging such litigation as a motive for the killing tif Mrs. Brown by defendant. 1 Greenl. Ev., 153; Hobbs v. The State, 16 Texas Ct. App., 517; Phillips v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 271; Preston v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 30; Bouldin v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 333, Washington v. The State, Id., 377; Rockhold v. The State, 16 Texas Ct. App., 584.
Goldthwaite & Ewing, also for the appellant, on the motion for rehearing, filed an able and exhaustive argument in support of the motion.
W. L. Davidson, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
Hutcheson, Carrington & Sears, also for the State.
We lay down the following general propositions as to the requisites of a charge which pertain to the questions presented:
A charge need employ no specific language, form, or phraseology. Substantial accuracy and correctness in principle, so expressed as that the jury can comprehend it, and confined to the law of the case, is all that is required. “It need not be framed with entire accuracy and precision of language which render it impervious to the assaults of criticism; it need not give the most approved definition of crime, yet if it be substantially correct, and sufficiently intelligible to enable the jury to apply rightly the law to the facts, and to attain substantial justice, it will suffice.” Alexander v. The State, 12 Texas, 544; Ashlock v. The State, 16 Texas Ct. App., 13. This rule applies to charges on circumstantial evidence, and on defense of alibi, definitions of malice, etc. Harris v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 109; Loggins v. The State, Id., 445; Hubby v. The State, Id., 608; Walker v. The State, 6 Texas Ct. App., 576; Booth v. The State, 4 Texas Ct. App., 202. The charge will be construed as a whole, and not by isolated parts or paragraphs, and if as a whole it is sufficient, it meets the demands of the law. Hart v. The State, 21 Texas Ct. App., 163; Smith v. The State, Id., 316.
Beplying to the appellant’s criticisms of the definition of malice in the charge, we submit that it is in the very language employed by elementary writers and approved by our own court. 2 Bouv. Law Dic., 139; Willson’s Crim. Forms, 709; McKinney v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 626; Lander v. The State, 12 Texas, 481; Bowers v. The State, 24 Texas Ct. App., 549.
The third and eighth assignments apply to the instruction of the court on the means or weapons' producing death. The charge was warranted by the evidence, was correct in itself, and were it subject to verbal criticism, yet, not being excepted to at the time, would only be reversible error, if error, when it operated prejudicially to the defendant. The facts did not call for charges on the law embraced in articles 612 to 614 of the Penal Code, as to deadly weapons. That the evidence warranted the charge: Hackett v. The State, 13 Texas Ct., App., 406; Odle v. The State, Id., 612. That articles 612 to 615 of the Penal Code do not apply: Howard v. The State, 18 Texas Ct. App., 348; Hartwell v. The State, 23 Id., 88; Nichols v. The State, 24 Id , 139.
The charge of the court on reasonable' doubt was substantially in the language of the statute, and is in the very language of a charge approved by this court. To object to the use of the expression “you will find him not guilty,” instead of “you ’will acquit him,” is hypercritical. No such objection was made at the trial, and could only avail defendant here if calculated to injure him, which we do not think the boldest man would claim. 4 Texas Ct. App., 195.
The charge of the court on circumstantial evidence was clear and correct, very favorable to the defendant, and is well sustained by authority. Sims v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App., 239; Hardin v. The State, Id., 657; Rye v. The State, Id., 160; Hubby v. The State, Id., 608; Brown v. The State, 23 Texas, 200; Taylor v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 104.
The court is not called on to charge a reasonable doubt on each fact, phase, or branch of the case, where there is a general charge giving the law on the subject of defendant’s right to all reasonable doubt of his guilt in the entire case. McCall v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 353; Barr v. The State, 10 Texas Ct. App., 507; Ashlock v. The State, 16 Texas Ct. App., 13; McCulloch v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 620.
The error complained of in the eighth assignment was not excepted to below; if the omission of the word “shot” was error, it is fully supplied in the paragraph which charges on conviction of murder in the first degree, which is the very degree of which he was found guilty; and certainly an omission to use the word “shot” in the charge on murder in the second degree could not have induced the jury to convict him of the first degree. They convicted him of murder of the first degree on the charge concerning that degree, the only way they could do so, and this assignment is puerile. Smith v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 316; Hodges v. The State, Id., 415; Steagald v. The State, Id., 464; Hart v. The State, 21 Texas Ct. App., 163.
The charge on alibi is in the very language approved by our court. Willson’s Crim. Forms, No. 713; Walker v. The State, 6 Texas Ct. App., 602.
For the court to have charged, as contended by appellant in the eleventh and twelfth assignments (as to the right of the jury to consider the credibility of impeached witnesses, etc.), would have violated statutory law and correct legal principles regulating charges. The province of the court is simply to pass on the admissibility of evidence, and then never allude to it in its charge. Code Crim. Proc., secs. 677, 678, arts. 728,729; Brown v. The State, 23 Texas, 201; Leverett v. The State, 3 Texas Ct. App., 213; Bishop v. The State, 43 Texas, 397; Allison v. The State, 14 Texas Ct. App., 426; Butler v. The State, 3 Texas Ct. App., 50; Ross v. The State, 29 Texas, 499; Maddox v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. App., 435; Stucky v. The State, 7 Texas Ct. App., 178; Parish v. The State, 45.Texas, 53.
Barbee’s testimony was perfectly legitimate on two grounds:
1. It was a part of a conversation brought out entirely by defendant’s -cross-examination, and we were entitled to the whole conversation.
2. The evidence defendant drew out of Barbee was to reflect on and impeach Judy James, and whenever defendant undertook to do so we had the light to show that she always made the same and consistent statement with her evidence. On the first ground see Code Crim. Proc., art. 751; Pharr v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 129. On the second, Bailey v. ‘The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 98.
Appellant seems to lay stress on the fact that at the time this evidence was adduced Judy James had not been either sworn or impeached. We reply that the only purpose of the Barbee testimony which evoked the evidence complained of was to impeach and did begin her impeachment; that there is no order in which evidence is introduced in this State, and the State can anticipate defendant’s evidence if it wishes. All that is required by the rule in this State is, that the evidence is at the time or by evidence anticipated rendered competent, otherwise it is excluded. But no evidence competent to have been put into a case was ever excluded because introduced too soon. Heard v. The State, 9 Texas Ct. App., 1; Gibson v. The State, 23 Texas Ct. App., 414; Phillips v. The State, 22 Texas Ct. App., 173; Manlove v. The State, 5 Texas Ct. App., 273.
The witness Peareson had stated all that could be of any consequence regarding the suit, and the questions asked him were wholly incompetent for any purpose.

Opinion:
Willson Judge.
Numerous objections are urged by counsel for the defendant to the charge of the court, each of which we have carefully considered, and will briefly refer to and determine.
1. "Malice" in the charge is defined to be "the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal justification or excuse." This definition of the term is precisely the same as that given in McKinney's case and approved by this court. 8 Texas Ct. App., 626; see also Harris, v. The State, Id., 90, as to definition of "'malice"; Lander v. The State,. 12 Texas, 481.
2. It was not error to instruct the jury that if the defendant "killed" the deceased by shooting her with a pistol, or by cutting her with a-knife," etc. It was charged in the indictment that he used both means-in killing her, and it was sufficient to prove that he used either. Hoiwas it necessary to prove or charge, in view of the other evidence in the case, that the weapon used was a deadly one.
3. Upon the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt the-the charge is full and correct, and not subject to the objections made to it.
4. Hor is the charge on circumstantial evidence objectionable, but on the contrary it is substantially the form of such a charge which has repeatedly been approved in this and other States. It has not been usual to add to a charge upon circumstantial evidence the last sentence contained in the one before us, but we can perceive no error in such addition, as it certainly announces a correct principle of law applicable to the case.
5. A majority of the court hold that the charge on alibi is sufficient. It is almost a literal, and is a substantial, copy of the one approved by this court in Walker v. The State, 6 Texas Court of Appeals, 576. It has; been approved by this court in numerous subsequent unreported eases. We are unable to appreciate the objections made to this charge. We can not see that it is upon the weight of the evidence, or that it sums up the evidence or any portion of it. It does not obtrude upon the jury the-opinion of the judge as to the facts upon the issue. It refers to the term alibi as a defense.
It is argued that alibi is not a defense. This objection is to our mind without merit, and but for the dissent of our brother, Judge Hurt, and the earnest insistance of counsel for defendant, we would not regard it as requiring serious consideration. In common parlance the term alibi is understood to mean a defense made in a criminal prosecution. It is denominated a defense in Webster's Dictionary. It is also denominated and treated as a defense by courts of the highest authority, and by stand ard authors. Mr. Wharton defines it as follows: "It is a defense resorted to in criminal prosecutions where the party accused, in order to prove that he could not have committed the crime with which he is charged, offers evidence that he was in a different place at the time the offense was being committed." Whart. Law Dic., "Alibi."
Mr. Saclrett, in his Instructions to Juries, p. 499, gives two approved forms of a charge upon alibi, in both of which it is denominated defense. In the American and English Encyclopsedia of Law we find the following: "A prisoner or accused person is said to set up an alibi when he alleges that at the time when the offense with which he is charged was committed he was elsewhere, that is, in a different place from that in which it was committed. If proved, it is of course a complete answer to the charge. An alibi is as much a traverse of the crime charged as any other defense." Vol. 1, pp. 454, 455. Numerous decisions are cited in the notes to the text above quoted, in many of which alibi is referred to and denominated a defense. We think alibi is a defense; as much so as insanity, or any other exculpatory matter. But it is further insisted that the charge in question erroneously casts upon the defendant the burden of proving an alibi, and that such a charge was condemned by our Supreme Court in Walker v. The State, 42 Texas, 360. An examination, of the charge under discussion in the Walker case will show that it and the charge given in this case are essentially and widely different, and we do not regard the decision in that case as an authority adverse to the views which we here announce. Our understanding of the rule is, that when the evidence for the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that, defendant was present and participated in the commission of an offense, and is guilty as charged, he may rebut the case made by the State by proof of an alibi, but unless he makes such proof, or proves some other matter which will exculpate him, or raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt, his conviction must follow. It is not required, in order to entitle a defendant to an acquittal upon the defense of alibi, that, such defense should be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule is, that if the evidence adduced in the case, whether in behalf of the State or of the defendant, engenders in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to defendant's presence at the time and place of the commission of the offense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. We do not understand the charge under consideration as shifting the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. It does not instruct that the burden of proving an alibi is upon the defendant, or in any way intimate that he must make such proof. It simply and clearly states the rules of the law as to the effect of such proof. This view does not conflict with the decisions of this court in Humphries v. The State, 18 Texas Court of Appeals, 302, and Ayres v. The State, 21 Texas Court of Appeals, 399, as will be seen by a careful analysis of those cases. We can not conceive that the charge in question could in any way have misled the jury to the prejudice of the defendant. We think it a correct charge, and sanctioned as such by reason, and by numerous authorities.
6. A majority of the court are of the opinion that it was not error to admit, the testimony of the witness Barbee relating to the statements made to him by the witness Judy James. Defendant sought to cast discredit upon the witness Judy James by showing on her cross-examination that her testimony against the defendant was the result of fear, and influenced by a desire to shield herself and husband from being accused of the murder. Defendant himself, through his counsel, in his cross-examination of the witness Judy James with a view to impeaching her testimony, called forth, if not directly, yet legitimately, the statements objected to. The statements objected to were a part of a conversation brought out by the defendant, and the State was entitled to have the whole of said conversation. These statements were admissible under the express provision of our statute which expands the common law rule with reference to such evidence. Code Crim. Proc., art. 751; Willson's Grim. Stats., sec. 2481. It was doubtless under said provision of the statute that the trial judge admitted said testimony as part of the conversation between the two witnesses Barbee and Judy James drawn out by the defendant's counsel, and it being in our opinion clearly admissible under said provision, it is unnecessary that we should determine whether or not it was admissible for the purpose of corroborating the witness Judy James. We are inclined to the opinion, however, that it was admissible for that purpose also.
7. A majority of the court hold that it was not error to reject the testimony of the defendant's witness Peareson as to the litigation between defendant and the deceased. Said witness was permitted to and did testify about such facts relative to such litigation as were relevant to the issue and otherwise competent. But the other matters sought to be elicited from said witness were not admissible under any rule of evidence with which we are familiar. They were declarations made by defendant to his counsel, and advice given to him by his counsel. Such testimony must be regarded as in the nature of self-serving and incompetent in behalf of the defendant.
8. There are numerous other assignments of error which we do not discuss because we deem them unimportant and without substantial merit. We have found no error in the conviction. We think the evidence supports it. It was the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and accepting as true the evidence adduced by the State, there can be no question of the defendant's guilt of a most atrocious murder.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.