Case Name: In re MERCURE ESTATE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-04-16
Citations: 391 Mich. 443
Docket Number: No. 8; Docket No. 54,597
Parties: In re MERCURE ESTATE
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, Williams, Levin, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 391
Pages: 443–453

Head Matter:
In re MERCURE ESTATE
Opinion of the Court
1. Wills — Revocation—Presumptions—Intent—Divorce—Property Settlement.
The facts raise no presumption that the will should be revoked by operation of the divorce and the intent of the testator is clear where the will was executed after the parties had signed a property settlement agreement and the decedent made no reference in this will to plaintiff as his wife but devised his estate to Vera Evelyn Mercure (plaintiff’s name at that time).
Separate Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, Swainson, Williams, and Levin, JJ.
2. Evidence — Presumptions—Conclusive Presumption.
There cannot be such a thing as a "conclusive presumption”; wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second fact’s existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent’s case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence; the term has no place in the principles of evidence and should be discarded.
3. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Presumptions — Conclusive Presumption — Evidence.
Michigan Supreme Court did not mean to establish as a rule of law that a divorce coupled with a property settlement raises a "conclusive presumption” that the testator intended to revoke his will executed prior thereto, but, it established a rule of law based on true presumption, which of course could be overcome by evidence.
References for Points in Headnotes
57 Am Jur, Wills §§ 535, 536.
57 Am Jur, Wills §§ 91, 437.
Presumption and burden of proof as to undue influence on testator, 154 ALR 600.
57 Am Jur, Wills § 521.
4. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Presumptions — Intent.
The law will and should imply a revocation where a divorce and property settlement, in the usual circumstance of estrangement, raises a strong presumption that there was an intention to revoke a prior will and there is nothing in the record to rebut it. I
5. Wills — Revocation—Ruling op Law.
The implication of revocation of a will from a given set of facts is a ruling of law and no amount of "testimony” could rebut a ruling of law.
6. Wills — Revocation—Intent—Statutes.
Express revocation of a will is provided for in the manner set forth in a statute and it requires specified acts to be done with the intention to revoke (MCLA 702.9).
7. Wills — Revocation—Presumptions—Intent—Evidence.
Burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating a will by the testator gives rise to the "natural” presumption that the testator intended thereby to revoke the will, but the specified act alone will not operate to revoke if a court has suflicient evidence to rebut such presumption of intent.
8. Wills — Revocation—Presumptions—Intent—Evidence.
An implied revocation arises out of a change of condition or circumstances of the testator recognized by the common law as giving rise to the "natural” presumption that the testator would have revoked his will if he had thought about it; but, any change of condition or circumstances alone will not revoke a will in face of evidence to rebut such presumption of revocation even as such evidence would rebut the presumption of intention that arises when a will is burned, torn, canceled, or obliterated by the testator; whenever a presumption of revocation arises, whether by the acts prescribed for express revocation by the Legislature or by a change of condition or circumstances of the testator recognized by the common law as implying a revocation, any evidence tending to rebut such presumption must be considered in assaying the validity of the conclusion of revocation.
9. Wills — Revocation—Evidence—Divorce—Property Settlement —Presumptions.
Evidence was adequate to support the conclusion of a circuit judge that a will be admitted for probate where decedent was divorced, a property settlement was filed, 1 day after filing the property settlement stipulation and 2 months prior to the . divorce, decedent executed a will devising all of his estate to his wife, with no reference to her as his wife and no reference to the pending divorce, 23 years later the decedent died after an extended illness with several periods of hospitalization inter-spaced by residency with and care by the former wife, and the circumstances surrounding the relationship of the former wife and decedent, coupled with the fact that the will was executed after the breakdown of marriage while the divorce was pending, rebut any presumption of revocation by divorce.
Appeal from order of Court of Appeals, Division 2, Danhof, P. J., and Quinn and McGregor, JJ., reversing Schoolcraft, William F. Hood, J.
Submitted January 11, 1974.
(No. 8
January Term 1974,
Docket No. 54,597.)
Decided April 16, 1974.
Petition by Vera E. Stephens for the probate of the will of Louis A. Mercure. Mrs. Bill Scoon, Mrs. Floyd Anderson and Percy Olmsted objected to the petition. Petition for probate denied. Plaintiff appealed to circuit court. Reversed. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Reversed. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Gifford D. Smith, for plaintiff.
Herbert & Wood, for defendants.

Opinion:
M. S. Coleman, J.
I concur in the result, but am of the opinion that the cases cited are not applicable to the present set of facts. The cases discussed involved wills written prior to the filing of divorce proceedings and to the execution of property settlement agreements.
In this case, the will was executed after the parties had signed a property settlement agreement. Decedent made no reference in this will to plaintiff as his wife but devised his estate to Vera Evelyn Mercure (plaintiff's name at that time). The facts raise no presumption that the will should be revoked by operation of the divorce. The intent of the testator is clear.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, Williams, Levin, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.