Case Name: Floyd WATKINS, Appellant, v. GILBRIDE HELLER & BROWN, P.A., Lawrence Heller and Timothy Henkel, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-03-08
Citations: 754 So. 2d 759
Docket Number: No. 3D99-681
Parties: Floyd WATKINS, Appellant, v. GILBRIDE HELLER & BROWN, P.A., Lawrence Heller and Timothy Henkel, Appellees.
Judges: Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 754
Pages: 759–765

Head Matter:
Floyd WATKINS, Appellant, v. GILBRIDE HELLER & BROWN, P.A., Lawrence Heller and Timothy Henkel, Appellees.
No. 3D99-681.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 8, 2000.
See also 622 So.2d 1063.
Bedzow, Korn, Brown, Miller & Zemel, and Franklin L. Zemel, Aventura, and Teri L. DiGiulian, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Mitrani, Rynor, Adamsky, Macaulay & Zorrilla, and Pamela A. Chamberlin, and Isaac J. Mitrani, Miami; Kenny Nachwal-ter Seymour Arnold Critchlow & Spector, and Michael Nachwalter, Miami, for appel-lees.
Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
Floyd Watkins appeals an adverse final summary judgment in a legal malpractice claim against his former attorneys, appel-lees Gilbride Heller & Brown, P.A., Lawrence Heller and Timothy Henkel [GHB], We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
This malpractice action arises out of a lawsuit brought by NCNB National Bank of Florida [NCNB] against Watkins. Watkins hired GHB to defend him against NCNB's action, and to file a counterclaim for damages. Watkins lost the NCNB litigation. An appeal was taken to this court which affirmed the trial court's decision, and on September 21, 1993, denied Watkins' subsequent request for rehearing. See Watkins v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., N.A., 622 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Watkins then hired new counsel who sought review by a petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, which petition was denied by that court on January 14, 1994. See Watkins v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., N.A., 634 So.2d 629 (Fla.1994).
On January 12, 1996, just shy of two years after the supreme court's action, Watkins filed a malpractice claim against GHB. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of GHB finding the two-year statute of limitations began to run on the date we denied rehearing (September 21, 1993) and expired on September 21, 1995, thus the claim was barred. Watkins claims on the other hand that the limitations period did not begin to run until the Florida Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review (January 14, 1994). We agree with Watkins that the limitations period began to run only after the supreme court's determination. Thus this malpractice action is not time barred.
Our analysis starts with section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that the statute of limitations for professional malpractice is two years, "commencing from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." In Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla.1998), the Florida Supreme Court construed this language in the context of litigation-related malpractice and held that the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(a) begins to run when "a final judgment becomes final." The court stated its intent to create a "bright line rule," and gave an example or two of when the finality of a final judgment occurs:
"For instance, [ ] a judgment becomes final either upon the expiration of the time for filing an appeal or post-judgment motions, or, if an appeal is taken, upon the appeal being affirmed and either the expiration of the time for fifing motions for rehearing or a denial of the motions for rehearing." [emphasis supplied]
Id. at 1175 n. 2.
GHB's contention, with which the trial court apparently agreed, is that the above quoted "for instance" footnote sets forth the only situation(s) in which a "final judg ment becomes final," which would exclude the supreme court's actions — such as its denial of certiorari in the Watkins v. NCNB predicate case — from the analysis of finality; i.e., all cases would become final at the district court level for limitations period purposes even though review was sought in the supreme court. Nothing in Silvestrone suggests such a result, and the use of "for instance" — i.e., "for example" — contradicts such an intention on the part of the Florida Supreme Court. Indeed, cases prior to Silvestrone offered up additional examples. For instance, in Wilson v. Clark, 414 So.2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the First District Court of Appeal stated:
"In essence an action continues to have life until there is a final determination on an appeal, [citations omitted] Finality of a determination does not of course occur until time expires to file a rehearing petition and disposition thereof if filed, or until a timely filed petition for revieiu in the Florida Supreme Court is acted upon." [emphasis supplied]
Had the Florida Supreme Court by its "for instance" intended to disapprove all other examples, it would have disapproved Wilson — which it did not do. Under this example in Wilson, Watkins' legal malpractice suit is not barred by the limitation statute because Watkins sought review by the Florida Supreme Court, thus the limitations period began running on January 14, 1994, and had not expired by January 12, 1996, the date this malpractice action was filed.
Following Wilson v. Clark, this court stated in Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985):
"Moreover, the trial court's determination that the claim against the Fund is time-barred has been appealed, and until this court issues its decision — or until the Florida Supreme Court resolves the issue if further review is sought — the question has not been resolved to finality. See Wilson v. Clark, 414 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)(on timely appeal by the defendant from an adverse judgment the action continues to have life)." [emphasis supplied]
In Silvestrone, the Florida Supreme Court cited Chapman, with approval:
"[R]edressable harm is not established until final judgment is rendered, see Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action, out of which legal malpractice claim arose, was still pending on appeal)." [ ]
721 So.2d at 1175.
Thus under Chapman this action by Watkins was timely filed.
If we accepted GHB's contention, "finality" would occur in all cases at the district court level even though such a result flies in the face of reality. Obviously, the Florida Supreme Court on a galaxy of occasions has been — as in the Watkins v. NCNB case — the entity which had the final say and thus administered finality to the final judgment. E.g., Henderson v. State, 698 So.2d 1205 (Fla.1997).
GHB also makes a policy argument of sorts, apparently based on its belief that the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction is so severely limited that public policy, in some fashion, would be better served by pretending (for that is what GHB would have us do) that finality arrives in the district court in all events. But the supreme court's jurisdiction is extensive, and not severely limited. It includes not only its direct appeal jurisdiction (death sentence orders, district court decisions declaring a state statute invalid, etc.) but its discretionary jurisdiction, the vastness of which has been set out by the Florida Supreme Court itself in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286, 288 (Fla.1988):
"This Court in the broadest sense has subject-matter jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, over any decision of a district court that expressly addresses a question of law within the four corners of the opinion itself, [footnote omitted] That is, the opinion must contain a statement or citation effectively establishing a point of law upon which the decision rests....
We premise our holding on our conclusion that article V, Section 3(b)(3) creates and defines two separate concepts. The first is a general grant of discretionary subject-matter jurisdiction, and the second is a constitutional command as to how the discretion itself may be exercised. In effect, the second is a limiting principle dictated to this Court by the people of Florida. While our subject-matter jurisdiction in conflict cases necessarily is very broad, our discretion to exercise it is more narrowly circumscribed by what the people have commanded....
. [I]t is not necessary that conflict actually exist for this Court to possess subject-matter jurisdiction, only that there be some statement or citation in the opinion that hypothetically could create conflict if there were another opinion reaching a contrary result. This is the only reasonable interpretation of this constitutional provision. As the final authority on the meaning of the Florida Constitution, see Art. IV, § 1(c), and Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., this Court has the final and inherent power to determine what constitutes express and direct conflict. No other authority exists, except the people pursuant to their power to amend the constitution, that may nullify this Court's pronouncements on that question."
Thus, it is seen that the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court is far more extensive than GHB would have us believe. If we were to accept GHB's' argument, we would face a number of questions that would be counter to the bright line intended by Silvestrone: what happens to the running of the limitations period urged by GHB if the supreme court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction? Is it automatically abated? And if the supreme court a year later decides that it had exercised its discretion improvidently and denies or dismisses the petition that had sought the discretionary review, does the period start running again from that date a year later? Or is that past year now counted as part of the limitation period?
These conundrums can best be avoided by basing the result on the reality that a final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for review by, the supreme court is resolved. In The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the supreme court put a lid on the can of worms GHB attempts to open:
"We thus conclude that we had complete subject-matter jurisdiction to hear B.J.F. and decide the case on its merits with finality. This jurisdiction must be regarded as complete until the time the petition for review is denied. Moreover, the denial of review in B.J.F. did not operate to deprive this Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction retroactively, but merely constituted the point in time at which jurisdiction, for whatever reason, had ended." [emphasis supplied]
530 So.2d at 289.
Watkins v. NCNB became final in the supreme court and thus the instant case is not time barred by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997).
In light of the recent nature of Silves-trone and the rapid dispute over the bright line rule we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
WHERE REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN AN ACTION UNDERLYING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS SOUGHT IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, DOES THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 95.11(4)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, BEGIN TO RUN FROM THE DATE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL BY THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF THAT REVIEW, OR DOES THE PERIOD RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S MANDATE?
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
.Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part:
"Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. -
(a) An action for professional malpractice . whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence."
. Or, as stated by twentieth century philosopher Yogi Berra, "It ain't over till it's over."
. "Instance" is defined as an "example." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 680 (1979). "For instance" is to offer an example.
. In a wondrous display of sophistry, at oral argument GHB contended that the above-quoted language from Silvestrone was actually a disapproval of Chapman because the supreme court omitted — in the parenthetical clause — mentioning Chapman's unequivocal statement that finality is not achieved "until the Florida Supreme Court resolves the issue if further review is sought." Chapman at 529. We seriously doubt that the supreme court — had it intended its "for instance" to be the sole method of finality — would have missed the opportunity to deconstruct Chapman 's language. Indeed, as Chapman specifically cited Wilson v. Clark, this was a second opportunity for the supreme court to drive Wilson into obscurity. This it obviously did not do.