Case Name: EDWARD LEVINSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. D'ALFONSO & STEIN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, MARIO D'ALFONSO, INDIVIDUALLY AND MARIO D'ALFONSO, ESQUIRE, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, DONALD STEIN, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1999-04-15
Citations: 320 N.J. Super. 312
Docket Number: 
Parties: EDWARD LEVINSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. D’ALFONSO & STEIN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, MARIO D’ALFONSO, INDIVIDUALLY AND MARIO D’ALFONSO, ESQUIRE, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, DONALD STEIN, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 320
Pages: 312–325

Head Matter:
727 A.2d 87
EDWARD LEVINSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. D’ALFONSO & STEIN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, MARIO D’ALFONSO, INDIVIDUALLY AND MARIO D’ALFONSO, ESQUIRE, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, DONALD STEIN, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted February 18, 1999
Decided April 15, 1999.
Weeker, J.A.D., issued concurring opinion.
Before Judges STERN, LANDAU and WECKER.
Edward Levinson, appellant pro se
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys for respondents (Paul A Snyder and Michelle L. Maute, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LANDAU, J.A.D.
Plaintiff Edward Levinson appeals pro se from a final order of April 17, 1998 granting the motion of defendants D Alfonso & Stein, a professional corporation, Mario DAlfonso, Esq. and his professional corporation, and Donald Stein, Esq., for dismissal of Levinson's complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A 2A53A-26 to 29.
That statute, effective June 29, 1995, requires that an affidavit of merit be filed within sixty days following the date of filing of the answer in "any action for damages . resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation____" N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. In such affidavit, an "appropriate licensed person" must indicate that "... there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards...." Ibid.
In Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401 (1998), the Supreme Court interpreted the affidavit requirement not to apply where the principal facts giving rise to the cause of action occurred prior to the statute's June 29, 1995 effective date. The Comblatt Court was considering a client's malpractice counterclaim to her lawyer's Law Division complaint for fees. Although phrased in terms of a breach of contract, the gravamen of the counterclaim was the plaintiff lawyer's alleged failure to carry out his duties and render services in a reasonable manner by negligent delay, failure to settle, forcing a trial and increasing fees by prolonging the period of representation. Id. at 225, 708 A.2d 401. The Court evidently had no difficulty in considering such allegations to be embraced by the Affidavit of Merit statute. Concluding that the legally significant facts giving rise to the counterclaimant's cause of action did not arise after June 29,1995, the Comblatt Court reversed the order of dismissal. It also made clear, however, that dismissals under the Affidavit of Merit statute should be with prejudice, absent "extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 242, 708 A.2d 401.
Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that dismissal of the negligence-professional malpractice aspects of Levinson's complaint, for failure to comply with the Affidavit of Merit requirements, should be affirmed, substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial judge's oral opinion of April 17,1998. We affirm, too, dismissal of the fraud count for several reasons. As the motion judge indicated, this count essentially repeats the allegations of the initial count, merely adding the label "fraud" to those allegations. The Affidavit of Merit statute, and its evident policy objective, cannot be so readily circumvented. Of equal significance, the allegations do not set forth with specificity, nor do they constitute as pleaded, satisfaction of the elements of legal or equitable fraud. See Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 432 A.2d 521 (1981); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J.Super. 625, 503 A.2d 386 (App.Div.1986).
We note, however, that respondent's brief asserts that Levinson's "... argument, involving the terms of an agreement, sounds more consistent with a contract claim — which he has not alleged — rather than a 'negligent act'." In fact, the Levinson complaint makes these assertions, among others, in Count One:
3. On or about October 10, 1992, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant, MARIO J. D'ALFONSO, ESQUIRE, a Professional Corporation to provide legal services concerning the handling of a personal injury/automobile negligence claim as against Donald King and Treadway Express involving an accident that occurred on October 8,1992.
4. Subsequent to the contractual arrangement entered into by the parties to provide professional legal services, a number of actions were taken by Mario D'Alfonso individually, the professional corporation known as Mario D'Alfonso, Esquire, the professional corporation known as D'Alfonso and Stein, and Donald Stein, Esquire, individually which actions were in furtherance of the contract entered into between the parties and further pursuant to the professional duty owed to the Plaintiff. .
5. All defendants consulted with the Plaintiff on various occasions during the course of their representation of the Plaintiff and ultimately litigation was instituted on his behalf. During the course of that litigation, a number of discussions occurred between the parties involving potential settlement of the case and at no time did the Plaintiff ever authorize any of the named Defendants to settle the case on his behalf at an agreed sum.
6. At some point in time, the Defendant, DONALD STEIN on behalf of the ' Plaintiff, EDWARD LEVINSON advised the attorney for Treadway Express and Donald King that the case would be settled in the sum of $42,500.00. This communication was made to the Defendant's attorney, Tracy Burnley, Esquire without any authority from the Plaintiff and in direet contravention of the Plaintiffs specific instructions.
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9. The various Defendants, at all times failed to act in a professional manner towards the Plaintiff, breached their contractual and professional duty owed to the Plaintiff in their capacity as attorneys for the Plaintiff and otherwise acted in a professionally negligent manner which actions have caused the Plaintiff to suffer damages.
The parties' entire retainer agreement is annexed hereto as an Appendix. We are not called upon to consider the validity or propriety of all of its provisions. It suffices to recognize that the agreement specifically makes the attorney's authorization to effect a settlement or compromise subject to the client's approval. The provision mentioned in footnote one even sets forth a substantial, if questionable, remedy to the attorney when, contrary to his advice, the client elects not to settle and an adverse verdict is returned.
We read count one of Levinson's complaint to assert not only a claim of professional negligence of the nature contemplated by the Affidavit of Merit statute, but also a simple breach of the express terms of the retainer agreement. The latter requires no expert evaluation of professional standards applicable in the circumstances.
Simply put, Levinson asserts that defendants agreed in writing that a settlement would require his authorization but proceeded to settle without authority, perhaps even with awareness of his disapproval. Unlike the Comblatt scenario, or Levinson's own "fraud" count, this is not merely a professional negligence claim dressed in other legal clothing; it is a classic contract claim against an agent, asserting damages alleged to arise because the agent breached his written contract of employment. The distinction has received scholarly recognition. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 29A (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) and § 76A (Tentative Draft No. 8 1997).
Courts should not countenance an attempt to dilute the Affidavit of Merit statute by giving effect to a mere change in nomenclature. Similarly, however, we should not judicially subject a matter of contract, when its breach requires no expert assessment of care, skill or knowledge, to the requirements of those tort claims which do.
We affirm the order under review to the extent it dismisses the allegations of professional negligence and fraud. We reverse the order to the extent it dismissed, as subject to the Affidavit of Merit statute, the allegation of breach of the retainer agreement's approval-of-settlement clause. Remanded for further proceedings.
CONTIHSENT FEE AGREEMENT
IN CONSIDERATION OF legal services to be rendered by MARIO J. D'ALFONSO, Enquire, A professional Corporation, hereinafter referred to os "attorney", the undersigned individual^*), hereinafter referred to as "client", does hereby retain said attorney to prosecute all claims, including claims under uninsured notorist insurance and no fault coverage (where applicable), including medical payments, property damages, and pip payment for client's injuries and damages sustained^n or about the day of />!A'PLC r HtCc' ÁJ. j at
THE ATTORNEY ACCEPTS said employment and are authorized to effect a settlement or compromise, subject to client's approval or to institute such legal action, or actions, aa may be advisable in attorney's judgment, in order to enforce client's rights.
THE ATTORNEY'S FEE SHALL be a'sum equal to 33 1/3 percent of any amount recovered by compromise or settlement prior to filing suit, and 33 1/3 percent oE any amount recovered after suit and/or arbitration proceedings have been filed. If no recovery is obtained, no fee shall be payable to attorney; however, client agreed to pay and to reimburse attorney any and all costs and expenses incurred or deemed necessary by attorney in the handling of client's case.
COSTS KAY BE ADVANCED by attorney, including investigation and experts' fees,, and said advance shall be deducted from any recovery and returned to attorney at the time of disbursement of the funds. Associate counsel may be employed at the discretion and expense of the attorney. Attorney shall have a lien on said claim, suit or recovery, for said fees and expenses.
CLIENT AGREES that in the event client, for any reason advises attorney to discontinue the handling of this claim, or if client fails to cooperate with attorney in the handling of his/her claim, then client agrees to compensate attorney for time spent on this claim on an hourly basis at $125.00 per hour.
One provision purports to entitle the lawyer to the amount of contingent fee that otherwise would have been earned, if the client does not approve a recommended settlement and the case is lost or concluded for an amount less than the recommended settlement. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, NMEBA, 146 N.J. 140, 156, 679 A.2d 1188 (1996)(discussing reasonable fee provisions in retainer agreements.)
§ 29A. Client-Lawyer Agreements
(1) An agreement between a lawyer and client concerning the client-lawyer relationship, including an agreement modifying an existing agreement, may be enforced by either party if the agreement meets other applicable requirements, except that:
(a) If the agreement or modification is made after a reasonable time after the lawyer has begun to represent the client in the matter (see § 50(1)), the client may avoid it unless the lawyer shows that the agreement and the circumstances of its formation were fair and reasonable to the client; and
(b) if the agreement is made after the lawyer has finished providing services, the client may avoid it if the client was not informed of facts needed to evaluate the appropriateness of the lawyer's compensation or other benefits conferred on the lawyer by the agreement.
(2) A tribunal should construe an agreement between client and lawyer as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.
§ 76A. Civil Liability to Client Other Than for Malpractice
(1) A lawyer is subject to liability to a client for injury caused by breach of contract in the circumstances and to the extent provided by contract law.
(2) A lawyer is subject to liability to a client for injury caused by intentional breach of the fiduciary duties set forth in § 28(3) in the circumstances and to the extent provided by law governing intentional breach of fiduciary duties.
(3) A client is entitled to restitutionary, injunctive, or declaratory remedies against a lawyer in the circumstances and to the extent provided by generally applicable law governing such remedies.