Case Name: Smith v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1962-03-29
Citations: 243 Ind. 74
Docket Number: No. 30,017
Parties: Smith v. State of Indiana.
Judges: Jackson and Landis, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 243
Pages: 74–87

Head Matter:
Smith v. State of Indiana.
[No. 30,017.
Filed March 29, 1962.
Rehearing denied June 7, 1962.]
Robert A. Ralston, of Bedford, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Carl E. Van Dorn and Patrick D. Sullivan, Deputy Attorneys General, and Robert N. Skinner, Prosecuting Attorney, 81st Judicial Circuit, for appellee.

Opinion:
Bobbitt, J.
— Appellant was charged by affidavit in two counts, one charging him with the crime of forgery under Acts 1905, ch. 169, §676, p. 584, being §10-2102, Burns' 1956 Replacement, and the other as being an habitual criminal under Acts 1907, ch. 82, §2, p. 109, being §9-2208, Burns' 1956 Replacement, tried by jury, found guilty on both counts, and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than two nor more than fourteen years on the count of forgery, and to the State Prison for life on the count as an habitual criminal.
The sole error assigned is the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial.
Certain questions are raised pertaining to alleged errors as they might affect the judgment based on the first count of the affidavit. However, because of the importance of the question raised concerning •the proof necessary to sustain a conviction as an habitual criminal, we feel that this question should be given first consideration.
The second count of the affidavit charges that appellant was convicted of the felony of second degree burglary in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, on May 16, 1958, and imprisoned in the Indiana State Reformatory as punishment therefor, and that he was convicted of the felony of "Store Breaking" in the Warren Circuit Court of Warren County, Kentucky, on February 5, 1948, and imprisoned in the Kentucky State Reformatory as punishment therefor.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, over defendant's objection, certain purported records, papers, and documents showing that one Joseph G. Smith was convicted of second degree burglary on May 16, 1953, in the Marion Criminal Court, and sentenced and committed to the Indiana State Reformatory on May 21, 1953; and certain papers and certified copies of records showing that one Joseph Smith was convicted in the Warren Circuit Court of Kentucky on January 6, 1948, of the crime of "Storehouse Breaking" and committed to the Kentucky State Reformatory as punishment therefor.
Appellant further asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of the jury finding him guilty as an habitual criminal because there is no evidence in the record which in any way identifies him as being the same person as the Joseph G. Smith named in the Marion County proceedings and as the Joseph Smith named in the Warren County, Kentucky, proceedings.
If appellant is correct in either of these assertions then the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial.
We shall confine our consideration of the questions here presented to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that appellant is an habitual criminal.
We are confronted specifically with the question as to whether or not the introduction of two properly certified copies of prior judgments and two properly certified copies of commitment papers bearing the same or a similar name as that of. the defendant on trial, as an habitual criminal, is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant committed the crimes shown in such judgments and commitment papers.
The Habitual Criminal Act provides an. additional penalty — of life imprisonment — upon conviction for the commission of a third felony, because of the defendant's previous criminal acts which must be specifically alleged and proved.
In our judgment there must be some evidence, other than a similarity of names, to identify the defendant-appellant, as being the same person as the one named in the former judgments and commitment papers. No man. should be sentenced to life imprisonment upon the mere presumption that he has been previously twice convicted of a felony simply because his name is the same as or similar to that appearing in the record of some other conviction.
As we view the situation here, the test in the. trial court is not a matter of establishing a prima facie case, but rather one of proving beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant has been previously twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution, for felonies, . . . ." Acts 1907, ch. 82, §2, p. 109, being §9-2208, Burns' 1956 Replacement, supra; Metzger v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 113, 118, 119, 13 N. E. 2d 519.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt "requires each juror to be so convinced by the evidence that as a prudent man he would feel safe to act upon such conviction in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own dearest and most important interests, under circumstances where there was no compulsion or coercion upon him to act at all." Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 61, 138 N. E. 2d 641, 644; Chambers v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 349, 356, 111 N.E. 2d 816.
The burden rests upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, appellant herein, has been previously twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution for the commission of a felony. Metzger v. State, supra (1938), 214 Ind. 113, 119, 13 N. E. 2d 519.
In our judgment the mere introduction into evidence of certified copies of judgments and commitments containing a name which is the same as or similar to that of the defendant, without any supporting evidence to show that the person named in such judgment and commitment papers is the same as the défendant then on'trial, is not sufr ficient to establish the fact that the defendant has previously twice been convicted for the commission of a felony and confined in a penal institution.
In the present case a set of fingerprints was a part of each set of commitment papers which were introduced into evidence. However, no effort was made by the State to show that such fingerprints were those of the defendant-appellant herein, and no other evidence was offered to show that defendant-appellant, Joseph Smith, was the same person as the Joseph G. Smith named in the judgment in the Marion Criminal Court and as the Joseph Smith named in the judgment and commitment papers from the State of Kentucky.
The evidence here on the essential element of the commission of former felonies and commitments in penal institutions is insufficient to sustain a conviction as an habitual criminal and for this reason the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
Because of the result which we have reached, it is not necessary to consider the other questions properly raised by appellant's brief.
Judgment reversed with instructions to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.
Jackson and Landis, JJ., concur.
Achor, C. J., dissents.
Arterburn, J., dissents with opinion.
. This appeal was assigned to the writer On March 23,1962.