Case Name: F. M. LOWE, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1912-06-03
Citations: 165 Mo. App. 523
Docket Number: 
Parties: F. M. LOWE, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 523–556

Head Matter:
F. M. LOWE, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.
Springfield Court of Appeals,
June 3, 1912.
Motion for Rehearing Overruled, July 9, 1912.
1. MASTER AND SERVANT: Negligence: Injury to Servant While Using Dull Pick. While plaintiff was engaged in taking old ties out from under the rails on defendant’s track, by imbedding one end of the pick in the tie and pulling on the handle of the pick, the pick slipped out on account of being dull and plaintiff fell backward and was injured. It appeared in evidence that before the accident plaintiff had complained to defendant’s foreman that the pick was dull and the foreman had promised to have it sharpened the next morning, but there was no evidence that the request to sharpen the pick of the promise to sharpen it was prompted by fear of an injury in case it was not sharpened. Held, under the evidence that the trial court should have granted defendant’s request for a peremptory instruction. NIXON, P. X, dissents and holds that under the evidence the judgment in plaintiff’s favor should stand.
2. -: -: Duty as to Tools Furnished Servant. The master is not required to furnish tools or appliances that are absolutely safe, but only such as are reasonably 'safe for the purpose for which they are to be used, and what is ordinary care in a particular case depends upon the nature and character of the tools or appliances and the dangers to be encountered in their use.
3. -: -: Burden of Proof. The burden of proving negligence on the part of the master rests upon the servant, and his case is not always made by showing the condition of the tool or appliances and the resultant injury.
4. -: -: -: Degree of Care. Ordinarily where a servant is injured because of the use of a defective appliance, he must present to the jury a state of facts that will show that at the time of the injury an ordinarily prudent man, in the place of the master, would have apprehended that the use of the tools or appliances furnished would by reason of their condition probably result in injury to the servant.
5. -: -: Use of Simple Tool: Knowledge of Servant: Apprehending Danger. Where a servant works with an ordinary tool like a pick and is possessed of all the knowledge in relation to its safety that anyone possesses, the fact that he apprehended no danger at the time is the strongest possible reason why the master should not be held responsible for not having apprehended the danger and provided against it.
6. -: -: -: -: -: Contributory Negligence. It is the duty of every one to use ordinary care for his own safety and if a servant, using a pick that is dull, in pulling ties out from under defendant’s track, apprehended danger of falling on account of the pick slipping out of the tie, he could have placed one foot back and thus braced himself against the apprehended fall and having failed to do so he would be guilty of contributory negligence in not taking so simple a precaution. NIXON, P. J., dissents, and holds that the question of contributory negligence would depend upon the servant’s position when the pick slipped and would ordinarily'be for the jury to determine.
7. -: Duty of Master: Simple Tools. The duty of the master to examine and repair the instrumentalities used by the servants is a continuous one, and is imperative upon the master whether the appliance furnished is simple and easily understood, and the defects open to the servant’s observation, or is a piece of complicated machinery. NIXON, P. J., in dissenting opinion.
8. PROXIMATE CAUSE. A proximate cause is one which in natural and continuing sequence is unbroken by an intervening cause, producing the injury and without which the result would not have happened. NIXON, P. J., in dissenting opinion.
9. -: Jury Question. Whether the defect complained of was the proximate cause of an injury is usually a question of fact for the determination of the jury. NIXON, P. J., in dissenting opinion.
10. NEGLIGENCE: Unusual Accident. A defendant charged with negligence is to be held liable for any injury inflicted upon another, if after the injury is completed it appears to have been . the natural and probable consequence of his act, or omission, and hence the fact that it was unusual will not defeat a recovery. (NIXON, P. J., in dissenting opinion).
11. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: Using Defective Appliance. The proof that plaintiff was injured by the use of an appliance specifically defective with knowledge of its defect and dangers will not defeat a recovery, unless he knew or ought to have known that the use of an appliance would expose him to imminent peril. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
12. -: -: Master and Servant. If the master fails in his duty and if the servant knows, or by the exercise of ordinary car© could know that the appliances furnished are not altogether or reasonably safe, the servant is not obliged to refuse to use the appliances or quit the service, if he reasonably believes that by the exercise of proper care and caution he can safely use the appliances, notwithstanding they are not so reasonably safe, and if he does so and exercises ordinary care and caution and is injured, he does not waive his right to compensation for injuries received in consequence thereof, nor is he guilty of negligence. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
13. NEGLIGENCE: Standard of Due Care. The rule of law is firmly established in this state that no man is held to a higher degree of skill than the fair average of his profession or trade and the standard of due care is the conduct of the average employer. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
14. WITNESSES: Evidence: Expert Witness: Hypothetical Question. The right of medical experts having proper knowledge and capacity to give an opinion in proper cases, is generally admitted, but there is a distinction between “drawing a conclusion” and “giving an opinion.” The hypothetical question in this case is approved. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
15. MASTER AND SERVANT: Duty of Master: Putting Simple Tool to Uncommon Use. The construction of a common pick and its ordinary use to break up closely compacted soil and rock is a matter of common knowledge and the risk of using it in the usual way, when in normal condition of repair, would be presumed to be well understood by a laborer, but in this ease the pick was put to ah uncommon use by the defendant, that of pulling out ties with its point, and the master’s liability must be considered not by the usual way of using such tool, but by the way it was actually uised by the direction of the employer. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
16. -: -: Duty to Examine and Repair. The master is required to exercise care that no risks and hazards to those in his employ should be unnecessarily increased, and the vigilance of the master must not relax after the instrument® are put into use by the employee and extends to the duty of examination and repair. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
17. -: -: -: Usual Way of Conducting Business. Where the business is conducted in the usual and ordinary way and the way commonly adopted by those engaged in the same business, a jury cannot he permitted to say that it is a negligent way for which a liability should be imposed, hut the master is exculpated upon compliance with the common usuage only on the condition that ‘the instrumentality is kept in good repair. NIXON, P. X, in dissenting opinion.
18. NEGLIGENCE: Jury Question. Negligence is a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and it is for the jury to consider all the circumstances and surrounding conditions and say whether defendant’s act or omission was or was not violative of this obligation, and to say whether the conduct of the parties was such as would be expected of reasonable and prudent men under a similar state of facts. NIXON, P. J., in dissenting opinion.
Appeal from Stone Circuit Court. — Hon. John T. Moore, Judge.
Affirmed. Certified to Supreme Court.
Sizer & Kemp for appellant.
(1) As respondent did not stand on its demurrer at close of plaintiff’s case, but put on its evidence, apReliant is entitled to all tbe evidence from the defendant’s side in aid of his case. Phelan v. Paving Co., 227 Mo. 704; McPherson v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 253; Klockenbrink v. Railroad, 172 Mo. 683. (2) In reviewing a case to determine whether the court erred in giving or refusing a demurrer, the appellate court will look to the whole evidence, no matter by whom offered. Eswin v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 294; Jennings v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 268. (3) After plaintiff called attention of foreman to the condition of pick and received the assurance that he would attend to it as soon as he got time, or the next morning, that eliminated the Question of assumption of risk from this case. Pouts v. Swift, 113 Mo. App. 532; Hough v. Railroad, 100 U. S. 225; Holman v. Iron Co., 152 Mo. App. 681; Har ris v. Railroad, 146 Mo. App. 551. (4) The master’s negligence, if proven, or conceded, eliminates the question of assumption of risk. Holman v.- Iron Co., 152 Mo. App. 685: Wiley v. Gas Co., 132 Mo. App. 380; Warren v. Railroad, 113 Mo. App. 498; Tinkle v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 468; Strickland v. Woolworth, 143 Mo. App. 528; George v. Railroad, 225 Mo. 364. (5) Where the master has expressly promised to repair a ■defect, the servant can recover for an injury caused thereby within such a period of time after the promise as it would be reasonable to allow for its performance. Meyer v. Mfg. Co., 67 Mo. App. 393; Conroy v. Iron Co., 62 Mo. 39; Burkhead v. Horse & Mule Co., 221 Mo. 700; Morden Co. v. Pries, 81 N. E. 862. (6) It was the duty of the company to keep the place and appliances in reasonably safe repair and condition. A failure to do so was negligence. Burkhead v. Horse & Mule Co., 221 Mo. 710; Curtis v. McNair, 173 Mo. 270. (7) Although the pick was a simple tool, yet a review of the cases in Missouri with reference to the pick and maul and claw bar, all simple tools, when being used in and about railroads and tracks, will show that whenever negligence was conceded, admitted or proven, plaintiff has always recovered, when free of contributory negligence. Franklin v. Railroad, 97 Mo. App. 473; Browning v. Railroad, 118 Mo. App. 449; Deckard v. Wabash, 111 Mo. App. 117; Robins v. Mining Co., 105 Mo. App. 78; Blankenship v. Glass Co., 154 Mo. App. 483; Johnson v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 340; Prash v. Railroad, 151 Mo. App. 410; Harris ,v. Railroad, 146 Mo. App. 524.
W. F. Evans and Mann, Johnson db Todd for respondent.
(1) The court’s action in sustaining motion for new trial was proper, because the court ought to have given defendant’s demurrer offered at the conclusion of plaintiff ?s case and renewed at the conclusion of all the evidence. Mathis v. Stock Yards Co., 185 Mo. 434; Blundell v. Mfg. Co., 189 Mo. 552; Meyers v. Class Co., 129 Mo. App. 556; Christy v. Railroad, 131 Mo. App. 266; Post v. Railroad, 121 Mo. App. 562; Saver snick v. Schwarzchild Co., 141 Mo. App. 509. (2) The servant when he enters the employment of his master assumes not only the risks incident to his employment, but all dangers which are apparent and obvious as result thereof. The master is no insurer against all accidents that may overtake or befall the servant in his employ. Nugent v. Milling Co., 131 Mo. 245; Mathis v. Stock Yards Co., 185 Mo. 445. (3) It is well settled law that an employer is not bound to furnish an employee the safest known appliances, tools or machinery, the látest approved patterns of tools and improvements thereof, nor does he render himself liable by failure to discard tools or appliances which are not suited and to supply their place with those which are more safe. Steinhauser v. Spraul, 127 Mo. 562; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 983; Mathis v. Stock Yards Co., 185 Mo. 445. (4) It is equally well settled that a master can conduct his business in his own way, and the servant knowing the hazards of his employment as the business is conducted impliedly waives the right to compensation for injuries resulting from causes incident thereto, though a different method of conducting the business would have been less dangerous. Bradley v. Railroad, 138 Mo.-302; Mathis v. Stock Yards Co., 185 Mo. 446. (5) An injury cannot reasonably be anticipated that would not have happened except under exceptional circumstances. It was not necessary to take precautionary measures to prevent it, although if taken the injury would not have happened. Hysell v. Swift ,& Co., 78 Mo: App. 39; Moffatt v. Railroad, 113 Mo. App. 544; Mfg. Co. v. Railroad, 117 Mo. App. 453. (6) A master is only required to use ordinary care in furnishing reasonably safe appliances for the servant, and does not have to provide against all possibly anticipated happenings. Browning v. Eailroad, 118 Mo. App. 456; Fuchs v. St. Louis, 167 Mo. 645; Pinldey v. Eailroad, 92 N. E. 896. (7) The rule is that where a master has promised to repair and has not done so, the servant can recover for an injury caused thereby only when he relied upon the promise, and if he did rely upon the promise only if he was injured within a reasonable time after the promise was made. In other words, as soon as the period contemplated for the removing of the dangerous condition terminated the servant’s position is precisely what it would have been if no promise had been given. That is to say, he reassumes the risk. Stalzer v. Packing Co., 84 Mo. App. 576; 1 Labatt on Master and Servant, 1204, sec. 425; Steel Co. v. Mann, 40 L. E. A. 781; Eailroad v. Duffield, 47 Am. St. Eep. 310; Trotter v. Furniture Co., 47 S. W. 425; Andercisk v. Tube Co., 4 L. E. A. (N. S.) 918; Holloran v. Iron Co., 133 Mo. 480; Meyers v. Glass Co., 129 Mo. App. 562. (8) The court should have sustained the motion for new trial for the additional reason that the court erred in permitting Dr. Bailey to answer the hypothetical question put to plaintiff and to state that in his opinion such a fall as plaintiff received would probably have produced the condition which the doctor found him in, because it is not competent to permit a physician to testify that in his opinion the condition of plaintiff has probably been brought about by the fall. Taylor v. Eailroad, 185 Mo. 239; Glasgow v. Eailroad, 191 Mo. 366; Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 203; Eoscoe v. Eailroad, 202 Mo. 594; Holtzen v. Eailroad, 140 S. W. 767; DeMaet v. Fidelity Co., 132 S. W. 732.

Opinion:
COX, J.
Action for personal injury caused by plaintiff falling while working as a section hand on defendant's track. Judgment for plaintiff for $1000. Motion for new trial sustained upon the ground that the court erred in not sustaining a demurrer to the testimony, and from the order sustaining the motion for new trial plaintiff has appealed.
The injury came about as follows: Plaintiff was engaged in taking old ties out from under the rails on defendant's track. In doing this the usual course and the one pursued by plaintiff was to take away the ballast from the sides of the. ties, then jack up the rails sufficiently to permit the tie to be slipped out, then imbed one end of the pick in the tie by a blow with the pick and by pulling on the handle of the pick, pull the tie out from under the rails. On the occasion of this injury, plaintiff attempted to strike his pick into the tie but the pick was so dull it did not take hold at the first blow. He repeated the blow and it again failed to catch but on striking the third blow, it seemed to have a firm hold and he began pulling on it "very gradually" when it slipped out and he fell backward and received the injury of which he complains. The negligence of defendant relied upon for the recovery is its failure to have plaintiff's pick sharpened. The •contention of plaintiff being that if the pick had been properly sharpened it would not have slipped out and plaintiff would not have fallen.
Plaintiff testified that he had used the pick nearly two months and at the time of the injury, the pick had not been sharpened for a week and a half and was very dull. He had said to the boss: "How much longer will we have to work with these dull picks" and the boss said: "They are in bad shape and as soon as I get time I will have them sharpened." Continuing plaintiff testified: "This day, when in that -condition, it was difficult for a man to work with pick in that shape because of it being dull it was hard to stick in the ties. You could hardly get a dull pick in the ties to stick. The boss had promised to have the picks' sharpened the next morning." Q. "Why did yon go ahead with the tool in that shape?" A. Because of the promise that he would have it fixed the next morning.'' Further: "I stuck my pick in the tie and as I went to make my pull I saw the pick was not properly imbedded in the tie and I taken it out and stuck it in the tie and saw it wouldn't hold again, and the third time I stuck the pick in the tie it seemed to be solid and I started to pull at it very gradually and my pick came out and I fell. . I worked practically all the time with a dull pick. It was getting a little duller all the time. It was good and dull practically all the time except the two or three days after sharpening. They would begin to get dull in two or three days. . . . My pick had slipped out various times but not so as to throw me. I can't say whether it had that day or not as I paid no attention to that and don't know as I would to this if I hadn't got the. fall. It had slipped-before this but not in the way it did this day. That was the first time I got a fall. It had slipped before but I say at different times. I never said many. I could not tell how many. Yes, when the pick got dull, it would slip out because you could not imbed it in the tie. I knew the pick was dull and knew it had not been sharpened. I won't say that I knew it was likely to slip because I never had been hurt before. I did not know it was going to slip with me. I never gave it any thought that morning. I never .thought about getting hurt. I can't say I thought about the pick slipping out. I can't say it entered my mind for I don't know."
Golden Hankins, a witness for plaintiff testified: "We do not quit when the pick gets dull. We keep on working. We don't get so much done with a dull pick but I don't know as a fellow is much tireder. It is very difficult to get done what we do. Anybody ought to know when a pick is dull. If you don't stick a sharp pick in, they pull out. Sometimes they will slip out of a creosote tie, not often though., not as often as a dnll one. You can hardly put a dull one in one. A sharp one won't pull out if you catch them right."
W. H. Haney, a witness for defendant, testified:
Q. "When you say it is customary to take out ties with a dull pick, you don't mean to say that it is a custom generally?" A. "No,' not generally. It is customary that the picks will get dull. They would get dull down there, so much so that I would take the picks home occasionally and sharpen them." Q. "If it was the custom to take ties out with dull picks, why did you do that?" A. "It made it much easier work and didn't cost nothing to keep it sharp." Q. "And made it some safer to work with?" A. "Some safer, yes, sir."
The foregoing covers every material fact in this case. Was it sufficient to send the case to the jury? There are no difficult legal questions involved in this case. The master is required to use ordinary care to furnish his servants with reasonably safe tools and appliances and must use the same care to keep them in reasonably safe condition and the servant must use ordinary care for his own safety. The master is not required to furnish tools or appliances that are absolutely safe but only such as are reasonably safe for the purpose for which they are to be used, and what is ordinary care in a particular case depends upon the nature and character of the tools or appliances and the dangers to be encountered in their use. [Franklin v. M., K. & T. R. R., 97 Mo. App. 473.] The burden of proving negligence on the part of the master always rests upon the plaintiff and his case is not always made by showing the condition of the tool or appliances and the resultant injury. To make a case, the plaintiff must present to the jury a state of facts that will show that at the time of the injury an ordinarily prudent man in the place of the master would have apprehended that the use of the tools or appli anees furnished would, by reason of their condition, probably result in injury to the servants.
To our mind, the testimony in this case solves every question in it against appellant's contention here. There is an entire absence of any testimony tending to show any duty resting upon defendant to keep plaintiff's pick sharpened in order to prevent his being hurt by using it as it was being used at the time of the injury. The only testimony that could by any possible construction lend any support to appellant's contention is the testimony of witness Haney to the effect that a sharp pick would be a little safer than a dull one. This was, at best, only stating a conclusion, but if we give it its full force, it is still not sufficient, for the fact that a sharp pick may be a little safer than a dull one does not prove that a dull one is not reasonably safe. A pick is a very simple tool with which every one is familiar and whether dull or sharp would not ordinarily cause apprehension of danger in its use, but be that as it may, plaintiff knew all about the pick he was using; knew its condition; knew a dull pick would not stick in a tie like a sharp, one; knew it had been slipping out because it was dull, hence, must have known that it was likely to slip out at any time and yet he did not apprehend any danger of getting hurt in case it did slip out for he says: "I never gave it any thought that morning. I never thought about getting hurt." It had slipped out before and had not hurt him, so the thought of getting-hurt on that day in case it should slip out again did not enter his mind. If he did not apprehend danger of getting hurt in case of a slip after he had used the pick for nearly two months and had experienced slips before, the master should certainly not be held to have anticipated injury in case of a slip. This is not a case of a latent defect or a ease in which the master has superior knowledge of the condition of the appliances furnished but is a plain case of a man work ing with an ordinary tool and possessed of all the knowledge in relation to its safety that any one possesses and the fact that he apprehended no danger at the time is the strongest possible reason why no one else should be held responsible for not having apprehended danger and provided against it. The fact that the pick had slipped out several times before and the plaintiff had not fallen coincides with the common knowledge of every one that a pick slipping out as this one did is not likely to cause a man using it to fall and such a result would not be anticipated by any reasonably prudent man and, therefore, there is no basis for a charge of negligence on the part of the servants of defendant in not sharpening the pick.' There being no reason to apprehend danger of injury to plaintiff by his use of it while dull, there could be no duty to keep it sharp for his protection. The sharpening of the picks was not done to protect the men using them from injury but was done to facilitate the work in which they were engaged.
If, however, we assume that defendant should have apprehended danger of plaintiff falling in case the pick should slip, plaintiff's case is not helped to any extent, for he would also be chargeable with the same apprehension and it would then have been his duty to have used ordinary care to have prevented it, and the fall could have been prevented by a very slight precaution. If he were to fall at all, he would of course, fall backward and had he taken the simple precaution to have placed one foot back and thus braced himself against the apprehended fall, it would have been prevented. It is the duty of every one to use ordinary care for Ms own safety and if there was any reason to apprehend a fall, then such apprehension would also have suggested guarding against it, and since tMs could have been so easily done plaintiff would have been guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take so simple a precaution.
Our conclusion is that the trial court was right in sustaining the motion for a new trial for the reason stated and the judgment will, therefore he affirmed. All concur.
The motion for rehearing is overruled by Cox and Gray, JJ. But Nixon, P. J., was for granting the motion and files a dissenting opinion. For the reason set out in the dissenting opinion it is ordered that the case be certified to the Supreme Court.