Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Paul Ira Ferber, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1981-05-12
Citations: 52 N.Y.2d 674
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Ira Ferber, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 674–688

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Ira Ferber, Appellant.
Argued April 2, 1981;
decided May 12, 1981
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Herald Price Fahringer, Paul J. Cambria, Jr., and Barbara Davies Eberl for appellant.
I. Section 263.15 of the Penal Law is patently unconstitutional because it omits the constitutional requirement that a child’s sexual performance be obscene. (Graham v Hill, 444 F Supp 584; St. Martin’s Press v Carey, 440 F Supp 1196, 605 F2d 41; Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205; Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809; Doran v Salem Inn, 422 US 922; Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104; Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518; Coates v City of Cincinnati, 402 US 611; Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 US 479; United States v Raines, 362 US 17.) II. Prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor during the summation denied appellant his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and require that the judgment of conviction be reversed. (People v Garcia, 40 AD2d 983; People v Lombardi, 20 NY2d 266; People v Streeter, 67 AD2d 877; People v Slaughter, 28 AD2d 1082; Viereck v United States, 318 US 236.) III. The court committed reversible error in shifting the burden of proof when it refused to charge the jury that the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the players in the films were under the age of 16. (Matter of Winship, 397 US 358; People v Brown, 25 NY2d 374; People v Guarino, 56 AD2d 638; People v Miller, 247 App Div 489; Patterson v New York, 432 US 197; Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684; Dunn v Perrin, 570 F2d 21; People v Tucker, 47 AD2d 583; People v Marks, 146 App Div 11; People v Fields, 174 Misc 309.)
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Donald J. Siewert and Robert M. Pitler of counsel), for respondent.
I. The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt of promoting a sexual performance by a child. II. Section 263.15 of the Penal Law, which was enacted to prevent commercial sexual exploitation of children, is constitutional. (Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92; St. Martin’s Press v Carey, 440 F Supp 1196, 605 F2d 41; People v Davis, 43 NY2d 17, 435 US 998; Matter of Van Berkel v Power, 16 NY2d 37; Communications Assn. v Douds, 339 US 382; Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77; East N. Y. Sav. Bank v Hahn, 293 NY 622, 326 US 230; People v Broadie, 37 NY2d 100, 423 US 950; Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v Barr, 1 NY2d 413; Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601.) III. Appellant has failed to preserve a question of law with respect to his contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s argument, in summation, that the jury must apply contemporary community standards in determining whether the films were patently offensive. In any event, appellant was not deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s argument. (People v Heller, 33 NY2d 314; Miller v California, 413 US 15; Smith v United States, 431 US 291; Pinkus v United States, 436 US 293; People v Liccione, 50 NY2d 850; People v Martin, 50 NY2d 1029; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.) IV. The jury was properly instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the children in the films were less than 16 years old.
Henry R. Kaufman for Association of American Publishers, Inc., and another; Kenneth P. Norwich for New York Civil Liberties Union, and Roy Gainsburg for St. Martin’s Press, Incorporated, amici curiae.
I. Section 263.15 of the Penal Law — which clearly applies to nonobscene expression — is an unconstitutional prohibition of protected speech. (Stromberg v California, 283 US 359; Cohen v California, 403 US 15; Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92; Consolidated Edison v Public Serv. Comm., 447 US 530; Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568; Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518; Hess v Indiana, 414 US 105; Miller v California, 413 US 15; St. Martin’s Press v Carey, 440 F Supp 1196; Graham v Hill, 444 F Supp 584; Bellanca v New York State Liq. Auth., 50 NY2d 524.) II. By prohibiting nonobscene speech, section 263.15 violates the principle that where First Amendment freedoms are at issue, the Legislature must adopt the least restrictive means of accomplishing its purpose. (Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479; St. Martin's Press v Carey, 440 F Supp 1196; First Nat. Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765; Cohen v California, 403 US 15; Consolidated Edison v Public Serv. Comm., 447 US 530; Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v Virginia Consumer Council, 425 US 748; Spence v Washington, 418 US 405.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
Based on the sale of two films to an undercover New York, City police officer, defendant was indicted on two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child (Penal Law, § 263.10) and two counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child (Penal Law, § 263.15). Prior to trial he moved to dismiss the charges on the ground, among others, that the latter statute (Penal Law, § 263.15) was unconstitutional. The motion was- denied. A jury subsequently acquitted the defendant of the obscenity charges, but found him guilty of both counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, without opinion. The defendant appeals. The primary question is whether section 263.15 of the Penal Law on its face infringes rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
At the outset we note that where First Amendment rights are in issue, a party generally has standing to challenge a statute on its face, that is, as applied to other cases (Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 611). Although this type of broad attack is more limited when the statute regulates or proscribes conduct as opposed to "pure speech" (ibid., at pp 614-615), the statute at issue here is clearly aimed at books, films and other traditional forms of expression (see Penal Law, § 263.00, subd 4) as is evident from the defendant's indictment and conviction.
Section 263.15 of the Penal Law is part of a statutory scheme enacted in 1977. The stated purpose is to protect children from exploitation in sexual performances (L 1977, ch 910, § 1). The use of a child less than 16 years of age in a sexual performance is prohibited by section 263.05 of the Penal Law. Those who promote such performances are also subject to prosecution. Section 263.10 of the Penal Law makes it a class D felony to promote an obscene sexual performance involving a child. Section 263.15 of the Penal Law provides a similar penalty for promoting any sexual performance by a child.
It is evident from the statutory scheme that the statute at issue in this case (Penal Law, §263.15) is not directed at obscene performances which, as noted, are proscribed by the preceding section (Penal"Law, § 263.10). In fact if section 263.15 serves any independent purpose, its goal must be to prohibit nonobscene sexual performances involving children. Thus on its face the statute would prohibit the showing of any play or movie in which a child portrays a defined sexual act, real or simulated, in a nonobscene manner. It would also prohibit the sale, showing, or distributing of medical or educational materials containing photographs of such acts. Indeed, by its terms, the statute would prohibit those who oppose such portrayals from providing illustrations of what they oppose. In short, the statute would in many, if not all, cases prohibit the promotion of materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection from government interference under the First Amendment.
A court should, of course, interpret a statute so as to avoid constitutional infirmities, if at all possible (see, e.g., Matter of Lorie C., 49 NY2d 161, 171). In this case, however, it is not possible to save section 263.15 by limiting its application to those who promote obscene performances. The fact that such activity is already proscribed by section 263.10 indicates that the Legislature did not intend the statute now before us to be similarly limited in its application. To read the two statutes as covering the exact same activity would, in any event, effectively invalidate section 263.15 by rendering it meaningless.
Nevertheless, the District Attorney urges that "the issue here is not one of censorship. Rather, promotion of these materials is prohibited in order to protect the children from the sexual exploitation necessarily involved in the production of such materials." In other words the purpose of the statute is not to protect the audiences from viewing offensive materials, but to protect the performers from being exploited by removing the commercial incentive for such productions. Given that objective it is urged that any question as to whether the material is obscene is not determinative because the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the effect on a child is no less damaging when the finished product happens not to be obscene.
By the same token the effect on freedom of expression is the same whether the government bluntly seeks to censor what it finds offensive, or more benignly acts to protect the health and welfare of the performers. Thus no matter what the government's objective, First Amendment standards remain applicable whenever the effect of a government regulation is to curtail protected modes of expression (see, e.g., People v Remeny, 40 NY2d 527). However, as the District Attorney notes, First Amendment rights are not absolute and may on occasion be outweighed by superior governmental interests.
The State has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of minors within its borders, and, at times, that interest may transcend First Amendment concerns (see, e.g., Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158). The statute at issue in this case would go further, if as the District Attorney urges it is designed to protect children employed in the making of plays, films and books. With respect to recorded performances or photographs the statute draws no distinction between those made in this State and those made elsewhere. Anyone who promotes such materials would be subject to prosecution even though the act recorded may have occurred in another State or country where such conduct may not be prohibited. It applies equally to a live performance of a Broadway play and a filmed report of New Guinea fertility rites. Indeed in this case defendant's conviction did not rest on any contention that the film was made in this State. To the extent the statute would purport to regulate the sexual performances of children throughout the world there is some question as to whether that goal, however commendable, necessarily comes within the police powers of the State of New York.
Equally troublesome is the means adopted by the State to accomplish its purpose. The State contends, in essence, that it may prohibit the sale, showing, distribution, or other promotion of any film, or other visual materials, whenever the making of the film necessarily involved a violation of some other law designed to protect the performers, at least youthful performers, from a danger to their health and well-being. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature generally has the power to do this consistent with the First Amendment, the fact remains that it has not done so uniformly in this. State. Section 263.15 does not prohibit the knowing sale or promotion of any film, or other item, in which a child has performed a dangerous stunt or where production required a child to engage in any of the numerous activities which the Legislature in the exercise of its police power has determined is dangerous to the health or well-being of child employees or employees generally (see, e.g., Penal Law, § 260.10, subd 1; Labor Law, § 130 et seq.; Education Law, § 3215 et seq.; § 3228 et seq.; cf. Penal Law, § 245.05, subds 2, 3). The severe penalties imposed by section 263.15 of the Penal Law are reserved for those who promote plays, films, books and photographs, dealing with adolescent sex in a nonobscene manner. Thus to the extent that section 263.15 is designed to protect child employees from engaging in acts which the Legislature has found to be dangerous to their well-being the statute is "strikingly underinclusive" (Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 214). In short, the statute discriminates against films and other visual portrayals of nonobscene adolescent sex solely on the basis of their content, and since no justification has been shown for the distinction other than special legislative distaste for this type of portrayal, the statute cannot be sustained (Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, supra, at p 215).
In conclusion it is important to emphasize that the statute considered in this case (Penal Law, § 263.15) does not deal with child pornography. Those who employ children in obscene plays, films and books, are still subject to prosecution as are those who sell or promote such materials (see Penal Law, § 263.05, 263.10). We merely hold that those who present plays, films, and books portraying adolescents cannot be singled out for punishment simply because they deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed.
. A Federal court found the statute unconstitutional in St. Martin's Press v Carey (440 F Supp 1196). Although that judgment was set aside on appeal on the ground that there was an insufficient likelihood of prosecution (605 F2d 41), that cannot be said in this case.
. Section 263.15 of the Penal Law states: "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." The definitions provided in section 263.00 of the Penal Law indicate that "sexual conduct" includes specified acts real or simulated (subd 3), and that a performance includes any play, motion picture, photograph, dance and "any other visual representation exhibited before an audience" (subd 4).
. Neither was there any contention that the film was made after the statute went into effect.