Case Name: DILZELL ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Limited, v. LEHMANN et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1907-03-04
Citations: 120 La. 273
Docket Number: No. 16,492
Parties: DILZELL ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Limited, v. LEHMANN et al.
Judges: MONROE, J. I dissent from the final conclusion and decree, though concurring in some of the views expressed in the opinion.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 273–287

Head Matter:
(45 South. 138.)
No. 16,492.
DILZELL ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Limited, v. LEHMANN et al.
(March 4, 1907.
On the Merits, Nov. 4, 1907.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1907.)
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. Appeal — ORDeb op Appeal.
There was an order of appeal, as shown by the minutes.
2. Same — Minutes Tkue Unless Contrary is Shown.
The minutes are the proper record of the court. They are under the eye of the judge, who takes part in the proceedings, and are at least prima facie correct. In Edgerly v. Smith, 27 La. Ann. 97, the motion for an appeal with the usual order appended was in the record. Here it appears that it was in the record, and, besides, copied as part of the minutes.
3. Same — Return Day was Not Suggested by Appellant.
The return day of the appeal, if improper, was inserted in the order of the court by the order of the court, and is the act of the court.
The maxim is relevant: “Whatever is done by the court is presumed to be rightly done.”
“Quse in curia acta sunt rite acta agi prse-sumhntur.”
On The Merits.
4. Corporations — Insolvency — Receivership — Parties to Proceeding.
Individually the managers or the stoekhold-ers of an insolvent corporation in the hands of a receiver are not parties to the receivership proceedings; and hence a suit to hold them liable individually to the corporation must be brought as a separate suit, subject to the rule of allotment that prevails in the civil district court, parish of Orleans, and cannot be brought as a mere incident to the receivership proceedings.
5. Pleading — Petition—Inconsistency.
A petition which states the facts and draws therefrom alternative legal conclusions, as that the defendants are not incorporated, but, if they are, then, etc., is not open to the objection of inconsistency.
6. Corporations — Act op Incorporation — Validity.
Where an act of incorporation fulfills all the conditions prescribed by the general incorporation law of 1904 (Act No. 78) incorporation is effected, even though the intention was to incorporate under the limited liability act of 1888 (Act No. 36) and the conditions prescribed by the latter act are not fulfilled.
7. Same — Insolvency — Action Against Receiver.
A receiver cannot sue himself, and by our law creditors may, for the satisfaction of their claims, exercise the rights of their debtors which the latter neglect or refuse to exercise; hence the creditor of an insolvent corporation in the hands of a receiver may bring suit for the corporation against the receiver, and also against associates of the receiver in the matter out of which the liability of the receiver has arisen.
8. Same — Liability of Stockholders.
By article 266 of the Constitution the shares of stock of a corporation issued without value received by the corporation are null; but the persons to whom the stock is thus issued cannot invoke such nullity for escaping liability to the creditors of the corporation for the face value of the stock. They are estopped.
9. Same — Who Are Stockholders.
Where stock is issued in that manner to one person, with the understanding that the issue is for the benefit of several, among whom a distribution is to be made, all those who participate in such agreement, and in pursuance thereof receive a part of the stock, are liable.
10. Same — Action Against — Joinder.
In such a case all the parties to the agreement and who have received the stock may be joined in one suit. There is among them a unity of defense, if no other.
11. Same — Premature Action.
Where all the known assets of an insolvent corporation in the hands of a receiver have been sold, and have realized no more than enough to pay costs, a suit by a creditor to bring assets into the corporation for the purpose of satisfying its debts is not premature.
[m Note. — For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 12, Corporations, § 1016.]
Monroe, J., dissenting.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; John St. Paul, Judge.
Action by the Dilzell Engineering & Construction Company, Limited, against Gus Lehmann and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
William Lee Hughes, Gus Lemle, and Benjamin Rice Forman, for appellant. Dinkel-spiel, Hart & Davey, Charles Rosen, Edward Rightor, Gilbert Louis Dupré, Jr., and Anthony Joseph Rossi, for appellees. E. How ard McOaleb, Jr., for appellees Oiolina and Davies.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
BREAUX, O. J.
The grounds of the motion are that there is no order of appeal, and that if there is such an order it is absolutely defective by reason of the fact that it was made returnable on the first Monday of February, 1907; that it should have been made returnable on the third Monday of January, 1907; that it was not suggested to the court, and that no order of the court was issued, showing that a later return day was necessary in order to enable the clerk to complete the transcript in time; that the record of the lower court will show that the return day fixed is the act of plaintiffs' counsel.
One of the counsel for appellant, by whom the petition for the appeal is written, and who presented it to the judge of the district court, took an oath that when he presented the motion for an order of appeal the amount of the bond and the return day for the appeal was left in blank, and that on presenting his petition he asked the judge to fix the amount of the bond, at the same time re^ marked to him that it was Friday, and that there would be only one-half day intervening before the third Monday of January, which was the 21st, and that immediately thereafter the judge fixed the amount of the bond and the return day and directed counsel to fill the blank with the amount of the bond for an appeal and with the date of the return day as fixed by the judge; that he immediately thereafter handed the order and the motion to the minute clerk, to be entered on the minutes.
Taking up the first ground, it is evident that there was an order of appeal. The minutes show that the order of appeal was allowed. The order, which is copied in the transcript, showing that the judge granted the appeal and fixed the amount of the bond, is a part of the minutes of the ease. It is a copy of the minutes, and as such sufficiently indicates that there was an order of appeal.
The minutes of the court are prima facie proof of the court's proceedings.
The statement before us is that the court granted the order of appeal and fixed the amount of the bond.
The second ground; that is, that the appeal was not made returnable on a proper day: The facts sworn to by counsel, the correctness of which are not questioned, amply prove that the order of appeal and the amount of the bond were fixed in accordance with the order of the court and under the immediate direction of the court. For good reasons the appeal was made returnable for a day mentioned in February. Had it been made returnable on the first date, it is evident that the clerk of the court would not have had time to prepare the transcript, as there was less than one day intervening.
If there was error, it was the error of the judge, and not one fatal to the appeal.
The motion for the appeal was made in open court, and the return day fixed. "Such an order, although made in compliance with the motion of the appellant's attorney, was the act of the court, and hence /the error of it was not imputable to the appellant." Chaffe v. Heyner, 31 La. Ann. 594.
It is not ground to dismiss the appeal if the return day was fixed by the court. Chaffe v. Heyner, 31 La. Ann. 594; State v. Dellwood, 33 La. Ann. 1229; Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 South. 196, 6 South. 30; Orleans & Jefferson R. R. Co. v. International Construction Co., 113 La. 409, 37 South. 10; Pearce v. State ex rel. Dist. Attorney, 49 La. Ann. 643, 21 South. 737.
The motion to dismiss is overruled.