Case Name: Michael Snow v. The Russell Coe Fertilizer Co. Appeal of Robert C. Davidge
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-10-24
Citations: 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 959
Docket Number: 
Parties: Michael Snow v. The Russell Coe Fertilizer Co. Appeal of Robert C. Davidge.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 33
Pages: 959–962

Head Matter:
Michael Snow v. The Russell Coe Fertilizer Co. Appeal of Robert C. Davidge.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed October 24, 1890.)
Corporations—Priority of creditors—Agreement to postpone claim.
PT. & Co., who were creditors of the corporation, having pressed their claim for payment, the appellant, who was president ot the company, agreed not to draw or receive any salary while its affairs were liquidating, in consideration of the firm’s not pressing their claim to compulsory collection. Ileld, that as the agreement did not state the time of forbearance of either party thereto there was neither a valid consideration nor mutuality, and it could not be enforced by the receiver by way of postponement of appellant’s claim to that of PL & Co.
(Bartlett, J.. dissents.)
Appeal by Bobert C. Davidge from a special term order postponing payment of his claim against the defendant until all the claims of other creditors have been paid by the receiver.
F. C Canline, for app’lt; Henry Sanger Snow, for receiver.

Opinion:
Barrett, J.
I agree with Mr. Justice Bartlett that the promise alleged to have been made by Davidge to Nichols & Oo. is not enforceable by the receiver as the representative of the company or of its stockholders generally. But I cannot concur in the conclusion that such promise is enforceable by the receiver as the representative of Nichols & Co. The receiver does not represent any particular creditor, nor has he any privity in the disputes between individual creditors growing out of special arrangements between themselves, such as are set up in this proceeding.
If Nichols & Co. are entitled to exclude Davidge or to take for themselves the whole or any part of the dividend coming to him, they must act directly.
The receiver cannot, for their benefit, avail himself of any estoppel which may have enured to them.
But further, I am of opinion that no. case for Davidge's exclusion, oven as against Nichols & Co., has been made out. The agreement on that hand is too vague and indefinite for enforcement. Nichols & Co. did not bind themselves to refrain from proceeding against the company for any given period, nor was the period of Davidge's forbearance, with regard to his salary, stipulated. There was neither a valid consideration nor mutuality.
Now that the company is in the hands of a receiver, I can see no good reason for discriminating between these creditors. They should share alike. Davidge's claim, however, is only for the sum of $1,945.87, that being the amount which had accrued at the date of the appointment of the temporary receiver.
The order should be reversed, and the receiver directed to admit Davidgo's claim to the above extent as valid, and to pay it pro rata with the other claims against the company.