Case Name: XU TONG OUYANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-11-25
Citations: 622 F. App'x 49
Docket Number: No. 13-2767
Parties: XU TONG OUYANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: REENARAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 622
Pages: 49–50

Head Matter:
XU TONG OUYANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-2767.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 25, 2015.
Vlad Kuzmin, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Kelly J. Walls, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sara J. Bergene, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: REENARAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Xu Tong Ouyang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a June 21, 2013 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen sua sponte. See In re Xu Tong Ouyang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 21, 2013). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
It is undisputed that Ouyang's motion to reopen, filed approximately nine years after his removal order, was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the BIA may reopen a case sua sponte at any time. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen pursuant to its sua sponte authority. See Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 95-96 (2d Cir.2011); Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006). A narrow exception applies where the agency has misperceived the law, for example, by erroneously concluding that an application for relief "would necessarily fail." Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469-71 (2d Cir.2009). Here, Ouyang does not argue that the BIA misperceived the law or that Mahmood v. Holder applies; he argues only that the BIA departed from its "established policies" in declining to exercise its sua sponte authority. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because that decision is "entirely discretionary." Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d at 518. Ouyang has not identified any convincing basis for departure from this rale. The BIA's decisions to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen other cases are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction here.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).