Case Name: BOWEN v. RECORDER'S COURT JUDGE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1970-09-22
Citations: 384 Mich. 55
Docket Number: Calendar No. 14, Docket No. 52,165-1/2
Parties: BOWEN v. RECORDER’S COURT JUDGE
Judges: T. E. Brennan, C. J., and Kelly and Black, JJ. concurred with Dethmers, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 384
Pages: 55–62

Head Matter:
BOWEN v. RECORDER’S COURT JUDGE
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law- — Presentence Confinement — Sentence.
Refusal of judge to credit plaintiff’s sentence with the time plaintiff was held in a county jail without bail awaiting final disposition of his ease, was proper where plaintiff was sentenced before the statute went into effect which requires a trial court to grant credit against a sentence for time served in jail prior to sentencing (MOLA § 769.11b).
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur Criminal Law 582.
[3] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 478.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 582.
2. Criminal Law — Presentence Confinement — Sentence—Statutes — Prospective.
A statute which requires a trial court in imposing sentence to specifically grant credit against the sentence for time served in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond is specifically made prospective only (MCLA § 769.11b).
3. Statutes — -Retroactive Application — Equal Protection.
There can be no merit to a claim that the denial of retroactive application to a newly created statutory right is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Dissenting Opinion
T. M. Kavanagh, Adams, and T. G-. Kavanagh, JJ.
4. Criminal Law — Presentence Confinement — Sentence—Statutes — Prospective.
A statute which requires a trial court to grant credit against a sentence for time served in jail prior to sentencing is prospective in its application and all defendants sentenced after March 31, 1966, will receive credit against their sentence for time served in jail prior to sentencing (MCLA § 769.11b).
5. Criminal Law — Presentence Confinement — Sentence—Statutes.
The principle of fair dealing which impels judges m passing sentence to talce into account the time a defendant was deprived of his liberty while awaiting trial, has been written into the law of this state (MCLA § 769.11b).
6. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Due Process — Criminal Law — Presentence Confinement — Sentence.
As a matter of constitutional right as it relates to the doctrines of equal protection and due process, if a judge was not impelled to give credit for time served prior to sentencing, the sentence was erroneous.
7. Criminal Law — Presentence Confinement — Sentence—Statutes — Remand.
Failure of trial court to extend credit for a period of time served by defendant in jail prior to sentencing resulted in disparity of treatment as between defendant and those defendants who were able to malee bail prior to the adoption and effective date of the statute' requiring credit against a sentence for time served in jail prior to sentencing and as to all defend ants sentenced after that act became effective and thereby resulted in an excessive sentence; therefore, the case should be remanded with instructions, in accordance with the excessive sentence statute, to credit defendant’s sentence to the. extent of time served by defendant in jail while awaiting his sentencing (MCLA §§ 769.11b, 769.84).
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, Lesinski, C. J., and J. H. Grillis and Quinn, JJ., denying complaint for superintending control over Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Donald S. Leonard, J.
Submitted June 25, 1970.
(Calendar No. 14, Docket No. 52,165-1/2.)
Decided September 22, 1970.
Complaint by Tommie Lee Bowen in the Court of Appeals for superintending control against Recorder’s Court Judge Donald S. Leonard, to compel him to credit on his sentence time spent in presentence confinement. Order denied. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Kenneth A. Webb, for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Gahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief of Appellate Department, and Luvenia D. Dockett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for defendant.

Opinion:
Dethmers, J.
On August 5, 1963, plaintiff was arrested and arraigned on a warrant charging him with murder in the first degree. From that date to July 18, 1964, a period of 11 months and 13 days, he was held in county jail without bail awaiting final disposition of his case. On the latter date he was sentenced in the Recorder's Court to serve a term of 10 to 15 years in state prison, after having entered a plea of guilty, just 15 days earlier, to a charge of second-degree murder. The record does not disclose whether the time spent in the county jail prior to sentence was taken into consideration in determining the length of sentence imposed.
One year and eight months after sentence, to wit, on March 31,1966, PA 1965, No 73 (MCLA § 769.11b [Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.1083(2)]), went into effect. It provides as follows:
"Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing-sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing."
By its language, the act is specifically made prospective only.
On March 27,1968, a judge of the Recorder's Court acknowledged a recent motion by plaintiff to credit on his sentence and subtract from it the 11 months and 13 days spent in county jail, and denied it for the stated reason that the act did not go into effect until long after the date of sentence and was, therefore, inapplicable to this case.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Court of Appeals for superintending control to require the Recorder's Court to comply with his request for presentenee time credit. The Court of Appeals denied the complaint and petition. The case is now here on leave granted to appeal from the denial.
Acknowledging that the statute in question reads prospectively only and went into effect after imposition of sentence upon him, plaintiff contends that denial of his petition for presentence time credit under such interpretation of the statute renders it violative of the equal protection of the laws guarantees of the state and Federal Constitutions.
Plaintiff admits that he has found only two decisions in this nation on the precise question raised hy him and that they both hold adverse to his position. The cases are: State v. Sedillo (1968), 79 NM 255 (442 P2d 213), and State v. Thomas (1968), 79 NM 346 (443 P2d 516). See, also, State v. Dalrymple (1968), 79 NM 670 (448 P2d 182), and cases therein cited. In substance, the New Mexico court held, on this subject, that since the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have denied retroactive application to such basic constitutional rights as those enunciated in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 US 478 (84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed 2d 977), Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974), and Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 US 719 (86 S Ct 1772, 16 L Ed 2d 882), there can be no merit to a claim that the denial of retroactive application to a newly created statutory right is a denial of equal protection of the laws. We agree.
When sentence was imposed upon plaintiff on July 18, 1964, it was a perfectly legal sentence in keeping with the statutory limits for the crime of which plaintiff was convicted. Had the legislature later seen fit to amend the statute to fix the punishment for second-degree murder to be a term of not less than 5 nor more than 10 years in prison, would that have operated then to render plaintiffs previous sentence of 10 to 15 years invalid and entitled him to a new term in keeping with the limits of the amendment? By no means. Neither can the subsequent enactment here alter the earlier sentence.
Court of Appeals and Recorder's Court affirmed.
T. E. Brennan, C. J., and Kelly and Black, JJ. concurred with Dethmers, J.
Const 1963, art 1, § 2; US Const, Am 14.
CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549): "Life, or any term of years."