Case Name: WAGNER v. PORTLAND
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1902-01-20
Citations: 40 Or. 389
Docket Number: 
Parties: WAGNER v. PORTLAND.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Bean concurs in the result.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 389–408

Head Matter:
Argued 16 December, 1901;
decided 20 January, 1902.
WAGNER v. PORTLAND.
[60 Pac. 985, 67 Pac. 300.]
Rules of Court — Amending Abstract.
1. Where a rule of court has become uncertain in meaning by the enactment of statutes since its announcement, parties who have attempted in good faith to comply with the rule should be allowed to amend their papers so as to prevent injustice or hardship.
Rules — -Excusing Default in Filing Briefs.
2. Sickness of counsel is a sufficient excuse for a short delay in filing a brief, under Rulé 6 of this court, the delay not affecting the jurisdiction.
Municipality — Agency of Board of Fire Commissioners.
3. A board of fire commissioners appointed under a city charter authorizing the mayor to appoint a board of fire commissioners, which board shall have exclusive power and authority to organize and control the fire department, is not an independent body, but its acts are those of the city, for which the latter Is liable.
Liability of City for Negligence of Its Agents.
4. A city engaged in the legal duty of repairing its fire alarm system through private and corporate agencies is acting in its corporate capacity and in the performance of ministerial acts, and is liable for injuries received by a workman therein.
Actions Against Public Corporations.
0- Hill’s Ann. Laws, § 350, providing that an action may be maintained against any public corporation in this state, in its corporate character, and within the scope of its authority, for an injury to plaintiff from some act or omission of such public corporation, authorizes an action against a city only when it is liable in its corporate capacity, as distinguished from its political or governmental capacity.
Fellow Servants — Negligence of Employer.
6. Workmen jointly engaged with plaintiff in removing an electric wire, who were not under any special directions, but were using their judgment as to the manner of the work, are fellow servants with plaintiff; and a recovery cannot be had from the common employer for injuries received, unless it was derelict in its duty, in not taking proper precautionary measures for the safety of employes, whereby the Injury ensued without the concurrence of plaintiff’s acts, or those of fellow servants.
Master and Servant — Providing Rules — Question for Jury.
7. In an action by a workman against his employer for damages from an injury claimed to have been caused by the negligence of the latter, the question whether defendant was negligent in omitting to adopt suitable rules is for the court, in the absence of any evidence showing the necessity and practicability of such rules.
Qualification of Witness on Expert Subject.
8. Before a witness should be permitted to testify on a matter requiring expert knowledge he should be shown to be skilled touching the subject of inquiry.
Evidence — Showing Necessity fob Rules by Employee.
9. Questions asked a witness who was not shown to be an expert as to the necessity of rules for taking down electric wires, and questions regarding the adoption of rules by other companies doing that class of work, but which were not confined to the specific rules which plaintiff insisted should have been adopted, which questions were objected to by defendant, did not constitute such an effort to show the necessity of such rules as to preclude defendant from insisting on a lack of evidence in this particular.
Necessity foe Rules — Electeic Wiees.
.10. When several fellow servants are taking down electric wires,, and not acting under any regulations, the cutting of a wire at the proper place for the convenience of the work and to insure the safety of the employees, is a detail of the work, which was for the judgment and control of the workman themselves, and not for the master to regulate by the adoption of rules for their guidance.
Master and Seevant — Assuming Risk of Employment.
11. A workman who has worked for two months and a half in taking down electric wires without using rubber gloves, or boards to stand on, knowing the hazards attending the work, will be deemed to have assumed the risk of performing this work without such appliances.
Hazaed of Employment — Knowledge' of Employee.
12. A man of mature years, not laboring under any mental disability, engaged in taking down fire alarm wires, who had been warned by a fellow servant of the danger of being killed while working in proximity to an electric company’s wires, and who had heard two fellow servants say they had received shocks, and had witnessed the effect of electricity on a horse, will not be' deemed ignorant of the danger of electricity, and of the hazards of the employment.
From. Multnomah: Alfred F. Sears, Jr., Judge.
Action by Henry M. Wagner against tbe City of Portland. From a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff, tbe defendant appeals. A motion to dismiss tbe appeal was overruled, and the ease was beard on its merits.
Reversed.
Decided 5 May, 1900.
Mr. Thos. O’Day, for the motion.
Mr. Joel M. Long, contra.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Per Curiam.
This is a motion to dismiss tbe appeal herein for two reasons: First, tbe abstract of record contains no assignment of errors relied upon for a reversal of tbe case; and, second, appellant has not filed its brief within the time required by the rules of this court. '
The procedure on appeal has been materially amended by the late act of the legislative assembly.: Laws, 1899, p. 227. A party may now appeal by giving notice in open court, or before the judge thereof at chambers, at the time of the rendition of the order, judgment, or decree, that he appeals therefrom, or from some specified part thereof; or, if not taken at the time, he may. appeal by causing a notice signed by himself or attorney to be served on the adverse party or parties that have appeared in the action, and such notice shall be sufficient if it contains the title of the cause, the names of the parties, and notifies the adverse party, or his attorney, that an appeal is taken to the higher court (designating it) from the judgment, order, or decree, or some specified part thereof. It will be observed that it is not necessary to specify or assign errors in the notice of appeal, as was formerly the ease. The rules of the court were adopted in view of the old law, and hence, under rule 9 (24 Or. 599, 37 Pac. vii.), it is prescribed that, if the appeal is from a judgment in an action, the appellant shall set out in his abstract of record those assignments of error in the notice of appeal on which he intends to rely, and none other. As the law now requires no assignments of error in the notice of appeal, it is urged that under rule 9 no statement of errors in the abstract is necessary, and that rule 10 (37 Pac. viii.), providing that where an abstract has been served no question appearing upon the record will be examined or considered on the hearing in this court except such as may arise upon the assignments of error contained in the printed abstract, is thereby rendered nugatory, in so far as it may pertain to actions at law. There is much force in the contention, for, under the present law, at least, it is not clear what assignments of error in law eases must be set out in the abstract. The appellant should, therefore, in the interest of justice, have the benefit of the doubt, and be allowed to amend its abstract by serving and filing assignments of error within ten days. This is the first time that our attention has been called to the want of clearness in the rules in this regard since'the amendatory act of 1899, and the necessary amendments are now being considered, and will be promulgated at an early day.
Decided 20 January, 1902.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Joel M. Long, city attorney, and Ralph R. Duniway, with an oral argument by Mr. Long.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of O'Day & Tarpley, with an oral argument by Mr. Thos. O'Day.
As it pertains to the second reason for dismissal, it appears that appellant's brief was filed a few days after the expiration of an extended time for filing same. In this appellant is in default, but it is not vital to the jurisdiction of the court. The delay was caused by sickness of counsel, and appellant will be relieved of the default, and the brief allowed to stand as filed. The motion will therefore be overruled.
Motion Overruled.