Case Name: Mezerkor, Admr., Appellant, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellees; Mezerkor, Admr., Appellee, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1994-09-21
Citations: 70 Ohio St. 3d 304
Docket Number: Nos. 92-1734 and 92-1763
Parties: Mezerkor, Admr., Appellant, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellees. Mezerkor, Admr., Appellee, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellants.
Judges: Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 70
Pages: 304–310

Head Matter:
Mezerkor, Admr., Appellant, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellees. Mezerkor, Admr., Appellee, v. Mezerkor et al.; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., Appellants.
[Cite as Mezerkor v. Mezerkor (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 304.]
(Nos. 92-1734 and 92-1763
Submitted February 23, 1994
Decided September 21, 1994.)
Michael J. Flament and Daniel J. Ryan, for administrator, appellant in case No. 92-1734 and appellee in case No. 92-1763.
Timothy P. Ristau Co., L.P.A., Timothy P. Ristau and Robert N. Stein, for USF&G and Fidelity, appellees in case No. 92-1734 and appellants in case No. 92-1763.

Opinion:
A. William Sweeney, J.
The instant cases present this court with the opportunity to straighten out what has developed into nothing short of a procedural morass. In order to make sense out of what took place in the courts below, we have abridged the procedural history of these cases by relating only those aspects which are germane to our resolution of these causes.
Predictably, the procedural quagmire these cases have produced has led the parties to assert a number of issues relating to consolidation and merger of cases under Civ.R. 42, whether cases retain separate identities even when consolidated, and whether a court of appeals can entertain an appeal of a case decided by a trial court from another jurisdiction. These issues may all be interesting material for a law school exam, but are not necessary to our disposition of the causes sub judiee.
In any event, the determinative issue posed in these appeals is whether the summary judgments granted in favor of USF&G and Fidelity were appealable orders pursuant to Civ.R. 54.
Civ.R. 54 provides in part:
"(B) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
In Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 352, 617 N.E.2d 1136, this court recently upheld the appealability of an order granting summary judgment as to fewer than all of the parties involved in litigation since, inter alia, the trial judge had certified the order as being appealable under Civ.R. 54(B) by stating that there was "no just reason for delay."
In the instant cause, however, the trial judge made no such certification that the orders of summary judgment were appealable, presumably because he wished to reserve the right to revise such a decision before adjudicating all the claims of all the parties involved in this litigation. In its decision below, the court of appeals noted that "[t]he previous summary judgments granted in this case [Cuyahoga County Common Pleas case No. 110564, now case No. 92-1763] in favor of Fidelity and USF&G had not been final appealable orders up to this time because of the absence of Civ.R. 54(B) language."
However, we believe that the court of appeals below erred in holding the appeal of the administrator in case No. 92-1734 (Cuyahoga County Common Pleas case No. 139678) to be untimely because the summary judgment "independently became a final appealable order." While the appellate court correctly noted the timeliness of the appeal in case No. 92-1763 based on the absence of a Civ.R. 54(B) certification order, the court apparently forgot that the absence of a Civ.R. 54(B) certification order in the consolidated cases delayed the necessity of an immediate appeal by the administrator in case No. 92-1734 as well.
While we might be tempted to digress in this matter and discuss the effect of Civ.R. 42 on the consolidation of the cases in the trial court below, the instant cases are more readily disposed of on the basis that the absence of Civ.R. 54(B) certification language prevented the immediate appealability of the summary judgments granted in favor of Fidelity and USF&G in both of the consolidated cases.
In any event, under the peculiar facts herein, justice will ultimately be served in the causes sub.judice given the fact that the relevant holding in Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 360, 513 N.E.2d 1324, was overruled in State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309, during the pendency of these actions. Thus, the rights and liabilities of the parties will now be determined under the current state of Ohio law which disallows family exclusions in uninsured motorist insurance policies.
In addition, the argument raised by Fidelity in case No. 92-1763 that the plaintiff-administrator lacked proper standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against it without first obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor was recently settled in plaintiffs favor in Krejci v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 15, 607 N.E.2d 446.
Therefore, based on all of the foregoing, we hold that in case No. 92-1734 the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded, and in case No. 92-1763, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Judgments accordingly.
Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Douglas, J., concurs in judgment only.
Moyer, C.J., and Wright, J., dissent.
. Our recent decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, may also have some bearing on the resolution of the instant causes on i-emand.