Case Name: THE FRÉMONT CONTRACT CASES. John E. Reeside v. The United States; Benjamin Higdon v. The Same; The Same v. The Same; Samuel J. Morgan v. The Same; Oliver H. Geffroy v. The Same
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1866-12
Citations: 2 Ct. Cl. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE FRÉMONT CONTRACT CASES. John E. Reeside v. The United States. Benjamin Higdon v. The Same. The Same v. The Same. Samuel J. Morgan v. The Same. Oliver H. Geffroy v. The Same.
Judges: Peck, J., concurred in this opinion.
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 1–68

Head Matter:
THE FRÉMONT CONTRACT CASES. John E. Reeside v. The United States. Benjamin Higdon v. The Same. The Same v. The Same. Samuel J. Morgan v. The Same. Oliver H. Geffroy v. The Same.
On, the Proofs.
Major General 'Frémont is assigned to the command of a military department during actual hostilities at a time of great public danger," and with no expressed restriction on his powers. Hi appoints Reeside, a civilian, inspector of horses and purchasing agent of the government, allowing him a percentage upon the price paid, and imposing a responsibility as to their actual value. Reeside, without advertisng, enters into express contracts with various persons. The horsespurchased are dcliv&'ed to the quartermaster of the department, wlio gives the usualvouchers and accounts for them in the usual way. The property so bought is used in the lawful service of the government.
Payment is suspended on all contracts authorized by GeneralFrémont. anda commission is appointed by the Secretary of War to examine such claims. The commission allows on certain claims less than the full amount, and exacts a receipt in the nature of a release, not under seal and without consideration, for the full amount thereof. The claimants subsequently accept the amounts allowed to each without objection or protest.
I. The authority of a general commanding a military department to bind the government by express contract in time of actual hostilities and of great public danger, must bo derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States.
II. During the administration of Major General Frémont as commander of tlio western department in 1861, a “public exigency" undoubtedly existed, wliieli required “ an immediate dc-liveiy or performance," and authorized contracts to be made without advertising for proposals under the act 2 March, 1861. (12 Stat. L. p., 220.)
III. The responsibility and discretion ap pertaining to tho purchase of military supplies is vested in the officers of the quartermaster’s department by the acts 28 March, 1812, (2 Stat. D. p., 696;) 24 April, 1816, (3 Stat.L. p., 297,) and 23 Alt gust, 1842, (5 Stat. L., p. 512.) Therefore a commanding goneral cannot appoint a civilian purchasing agent of the government, nor invest him with discretion to make express contracts, nor transfer to him tlio responsibility which the law imposes on quartermasters. Neither has such an agent power to bind the government by express contract. (Per Nott, J.; Loring and Peck, «TJ., concurring; Casey, Ch. J., dissenting.)
IV. 'Where the proper officers of the government receive services or property under a contract made by one who was not an authorized agent of the government, and they use it for a lawful purpose, so that the government derives a legal benefit therefrom, the contractor may recover the actual value of the property sold or service rendered. (Per Nott, J.; Caset, Ch. X, and PECK, J., concurring; LORING, X, dissenting.)
V. A release not under seal and without consideration, exacted by an ex parte commission appointed by the Secretary of War, cannot be upheld by the doctrine of arbitrament and award, nor as the release of an existing indebtedness. And if it was exacted before the act 3d March, 1863, (12 Stat. L., p. 765,) reorganizing the Court of Claims, it cannot be upheld as the compromise of a doubtful claim. Per Casey, Ch. X, and Nott, X
Mr. R. M. OoRWiNE for the claimants :
By agreement these causes are to be heard together, the testimony taken in any of them to be used in the others, as far as the same is relevant and applicable.
Some of the questions I propose to consider apply to all — and some again are applicable to only one or two. For the-sake of convenience, and in accordance with agreement, I proceed to consider these cases together, making such distinctions, as 1 pass along, as will clearly define the cases to which the propositions respectively will apply. I shall not undertake to examine the evidence in detail, or with much critical care, hut leave that for the oral argument, which I design to address to the court, on the hearing.
It will be observed, in the first place, that all these claims find their origin in the western department while commanded by Major General J. O. Fremont.
In the second place, they are for supplies furnished that department, or work and labor done for it, in pursuance with arrangements made with military officers in that department.
In the third place, it is not denied that the supplies furnished and tlie work done were necessary, proved profitable, and were acceptable to the authorities of the United States, immediately charged with that business.
that the Holt-Davis commission, which allowed and ordered paid portions of all these claims, save two, had no other evidence of authority for the purchase and delivery of property by these parties except that found in the contracts made in pursuance with Major General Frémont’s orders.
In the fifth place, it appears that all the parties to whom allowances wore made by the Holt-Davis commission were compelled to sign receipts in full for the money paid them on those accounts, or they were told they could receive nothing’, and in one instance one of the commission threatened in advance to report against the claim if the owner would not consent to sign a receipt in full for whatever the commission mig'lit allow him, hut, in every other instance, they signed such receipts under protest, denying the legality of the proceedings of the commission, and also expressly disclaiming the right or authority of the commission to curtail their accounts or impose such terms upon them with respect to the receipt of the money awarded.
In the sixth place, the Holt-Davis commission possessed no judicial power, were clothed with no legitimate' authority, which authorized them to enter judicial judgments or final decrees, whereby legal rights, before that time established, eould be impaired or diminished, in whole or in part; • the said commission being merely a board of accountants created by the Secretary of War, to assist him in auditing accounts. There was no law authorizing their appointment or confering jurisdiction of any kind on them.
In the seventh place, Major General Fremont was ordered by the commander-in-chief of the army and navy to assume exclusive command of the western department, as a military district, and when he assumed that command war was already a fact in many parts of the command. He was clothed with all the authority of a commander of a military department, having special authority from the President, as the commander-in-chief, to do and exercise all needful authority, to the end that he might accomplish the purpose for which the President had sent him there.
contracts made at the times and under the circumstances was apparent — the immediate peril to public interest and the pressing demands upon General Fremont from all parts of his command, being the controling considerations for making them.
In the ninth place, the government is estopped from denying the authority of General Frémont by its acts of recognition of that authority: first, by the IIolt-Davis commission; second, by the resolution of Congress directing the payment of awards of that commission ; third, by the repeated recognition of John E. Reeside as a government inspector, by Captain Turnly, assistant quartermaster, and by Major Allen, chief quartermaster of the western department, both while General Frémont was in command and afterward when General Halleck was in command; and fourth, by the order of General Halleck, dated December 7, 1861, general order No. 19, revoking and annulling his authority “ to purchase or inspect horses, &c., or to allow him a per centage,’’ &c., thus recognizing him as a legal officer, enjoying the authority thus taken away from him. (See the communications of Captain Turnly and Major Allen, and the order of General Halleck, exhibited to Colonel Reeside’s petition.)
I. Major General Fremont was clothed with all the authority necessary to make these contracts.
a. He was appointed by the President of the United States to command the military department of the West. A portion of it was in a state of war when he assumed command. His power was unrestricted. Whatever the commander-in-chief might do in that department Major General Frémont might do also.
b. The President conferred special as well as general authority on him.
c. He could and it was his duty to do everything needful to carry out the object of his command.
cl. He was furnished with no adequate pecuniary means, and was compelled to buy property from those who would sell it for the government’s use without the ready cash.
e. If he deemed it necessary to create agents to effectuate this grand end, his right to appoint them was co-extensive with the exigency of the case, and a necessary incident of the general power, and also the end designed.
f. All contracts made were made by him through his agents, and are expressly referable to him and through him to the President of the United States, the source of all military power in this country.
g. Thus, if he had the authority to buy property for military purposes, and he' acted, the act was legal, whether it was wisely or unwisely done, and the government must assume all the consequences. The people who dealt with him in good faith cannot suffer, but must have tlieir legal rights enforced, more especially when the government enjoyed the benefits of these contracts.
h. Every act of his done in pursuance with the authority thus conferred upon him was valid, and bound the government.
i. No usage of the War Department, or any other branch of the government, for the mere management of such department in reference to the mode or manner of purchasing supplies for the army, whether the same relates to forces in the field or at military posts, in garrisons or elsewhere, can be set up in bar of a claim which grows out of a contract ordered to be made by the commander of a department in time of war.
j. It has been the universal custom in the army for commanders of departments to give all such orders as they might deem necessary for supplies of every kind, and in every instance the same has been recognized and held valid.
h. Here General Frémont, deeming these supplies necessary for his armies, ordered them, and directed contracts to be made for them. He exercised the power and authority vested in him by the commander-in-chief and the usage of the army; and, so far as the parties who furnished the supplies under these contracts are concerned, what he did is conclusive against the government and cannot be denied, and these contracts must be enforced.
l. During this war it is known, as part of its history, that but for the exercise of this authority and power by commanders the movements of whole armies would have been imperiled and often paralyzed, to the great injury of the nation’s cause.
m. In the early-struggles with this monster rebellion the government had no pecuniary means and very little credit with those who furnished supplies, and often the people came forward and supplied our national wants, in a great measure, upon the good faith and credit of our commanders. The cases under consideration afford the highest evidence of this fact. These supplies were furnished to the western department by these parties with the full knowledge that General Fremont was “ not in funds,” either through his quartermaster or otherwise, but they relied on the good faith of General Frémont and the ultimate justice of their government. The government took the benefit of the contracts he thus made.
It will be further noticed that General Fremont was all along advised of the views of the administration, through the Hon. Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General, including the approbation of General Meigs, the Quartermaster General, of General Fremont’s purchases of the superior class of horses then being supplied to his armies by the plaintiffs at Cincinnati. Ho was told by Mr. Blair that he must take all needful responsibility, as he could get no attention at Washington to western department matters.
This being in accordance with the general instructions given General Frémont by the President on the occasion of his appointment, the former had the right to presume that his acts were not only valid, but were approved by his superior officer, the President, and these plaintiffs point to these two circumstances as fixing the express grant of power to General Frémont, and as clothing him with all the authority necessary to make these contracts.
If, then, general authority was conferred on him, these contracts were valid contracts. Judge BlaiPs letters and Mr. Lincoln’s assurances to him gave him special authority to do whatever his judgment sanctioned as necessary and right.
When the commander has decided a question, that decision must stand, unless the integrity of his judgment is successfully attacked. It is analogous to the case of the judgment of a judge. There is no difference in the rule as applicable to both. When an officer honestly exercises his judgment he cannot be held responsible. (Cowell v. McFadon, 8 Cranch, 94; 9 Cranch, 355. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 19, 33; 9 Peters, 134. Wilkes v. Finsman, 7 Howard, 128, 129. Luther v. Borden, ibid., 45, et seq.)
See 16 Peters, 302, United States v. Ehasen, where it is declared that the Secretary of War is the organ of the President for the administration of the military establishment of the nation.
See, also, case of Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard, 115.
The case of Felassus v. The United States, 9 Peters, 134, is to the point, that he who alleges that an officer has acted without authority must prove it. The presumptions are all against the truth of such an allegation.
Believing that he was clothed with all needful power and authority, and acting from the best lights then around him, General Fremont did not stop to inquire what the usage in the army had been in time of peace, but he looked into the circumstances which he found surrounding him, or rather encompassing him, and resolved that whatever was necessary to meet these exigencies should bo secured without the delays incident to the observance of the then sluggish administration of the War Department at Washington. Within five days of his assuming command of the department he wrote the President, under date of the 30th of July, setting forth in a wonderfully graphic letter the startling condition of bis command. With a master-pen be literally photographed tlie dangers which threatened him, and the poverty of means with which to meet these dangers. Frankly stating the facts as to the rapid depletion of his command, mostly attributable to the want of means to pay the troops, he boldly announced his purpose to make the public money available to stop this reduction of his army; and then adds, by way of assurance to the President, “ I will hazard everything for the defence of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to yoti, for support.” Being satisfied with the course General Fremont was pursuing, as indicated in this letter, the President made no reply to it himself, nor did any of his subalterns reply to it, but all were content to allow General Frémont to pursue the energetic and wise course he marked out in the letter. This silence, taken in connection with Postmaster General Blair’s letter of the 26th of July, wherein he tells General Fremont that it is impossible for him to get any attention to Missouri matters, and that he (General Frémont) will have to do the best he can, and “take all needful responsibility to defend the people over whom you are specially set,” and which General Frémont says, (page 35, Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, part 3d,) “I will satisfy the committee that I was expected to do every act which, in my judgment, the public service might require,” leaves no reasonable doubt of his full power to make all purchases, to enter into all contracts, and do all things “ needful" to the end for which he was sent there.
Having selected and appointed Colonel Reeside to purchase and inspect horses, his agreement to pay him a fixed compensation for his services was a necessary incident to the exercise of authority to appoint him. Having made up his judgment as to the kind of horses that 'were necessary for the service in which he proposed to use them, and finding that he could not procure them in such numbers and as fast as he needed them, he sought for the services of one whose well-known ability and integrity would insure him the faithful and prompt execution of his views, and sent him to Cincinnati, the greatest horse market in. the country, to make the purchases. He could not procure his services for the reward paid ordinary inspectors and purchasers, and, therefore, agreed to pay him a price commensurate with his ability and personal responsibility. The commission was to cover the purchase and inspection of the property.
The next question to which I will call the attention of the court is that involved in Mr. Mowry’s case. I assume that the views already considered, involving the right of General Frémont to make. contracts, or order them made, apply, in full force to this claim. This contract was made by the chief quartermaster by order of General Fremont, and the only question is was it fraudulently made ? was it necessary ? and did it serve a good purpose 1 General Fremont’s testimony before the committee on the Conduct of the War, part second, page 61, contains all the answer necessary to he made to these questions.
I take leave to observe the right of the general or the quartermaster to make any arrangement for the cases being conceded, the liability of the government to pay Mo wry the sum due on the contract cannot be questioned, but must be granted.
1. The general rule is that the orders of the general commanding are obligatory upon subordinates, and valid. In this case General Frémont ordered the contract made, because he deemed it'necessary. Having been made by his orders, it hinds the government, and must be executed.
2. General Meigs, quartermaster general, states the same rule, and makes it specially applicable to General Fremont and his orders.
3. If the President, as commander-in-chief', could make such an order, then General Frémont could make it, because he was clothed with all the power and authority of the President in the premises.
II. It is claimed that the receipts given by Higdon, Morgan, Mowry, and Geoffroy for the money awarded by the Holt-Davis commission, being in form and language final, precludes any right of action for the alleged balance. To this we have to say :
1. No receipt is final, but is merely prima fade, and may be explained by oral testimony. 2. These receipts are for only a portion of the sum claimed, and-when executed those parties protested against their validity, or the right of the government to compel them to take the money as in full for their claims. 3. The commission had no power to determine the legal rights of these parties. They might pay a sum of money, but could not legally proscribe terms which wouH cut off legal and just rights for the balance. 4. After these rights were duly acquired, these parties could not he compelled to part with them without a valid legal consideration. The payment of a less sum than the true sum due, received, not by way of compromise, but with a protest that it was not in full, would not ho regarded in law or in fact such valid consideration. 6. The threat of one of the commission not to report in favor of any of these parties, if he would not agree in advance to take less than the sum claimed by him, showed the true animus of the commission to ho coercive and compulsory.
I claim that the government has estopped itself from denying the validity of the contracts by its own acts.
1. If the IIolt-Davis commission had.legal power to speak for the government, then what they did do was in affirmance of those contracts.
2. But Congress has likewise affirmed these contracts. The following resolution, ordering these awards to bo paid, expressly recognizes the validity of General Fremont’s proceedings in contracting these debts, and the principle that if he could contrae tdebts he could make valid arrangements for their payment.
Resolved, That all sums allowed to bo due from the United States to individuals, companies, or corporations, by the Secretary of War, (for the investigation of military claims against the department of the west,) composed of DavidDavis, Joseph Holt, and Hugh Campbell, now sitting at St. Louis, Missouri, shall be deemed to be due and payable, and shall be paid by the disbursing officer, either in St. Louis or Washington, in each case, upon the presentation of the voucher, with the commissioners’ certificate thereon, in any form plainly indicating the allowance of the claim and to what amount. This resolution shall,apply only to claims, and contracts for service, labor, or materials, and for subsistence, clothing, transportation, arms, supplies, and the purchase, hire, and construction of vessels. (Approved March 11, 1862. 12 Stats. L., p. 615.)
It will be observed that the resolution expressly fails to ratify the proceedings of the commission, except in so far as to direct the amount they did award should be paid. They do not legalize the commission any further, but they leave the parties to work out any other right they may have. It is particularly noticeable that they do not legalize the order of the Secretary, touching all claims not presented to the commission, and they fail significantly to adopt the unjust rule of the commission to require the claimants to give up their whole claim or take nothing.
Mr. B. H. Gillet for the same :
First. — General Fremont had power to contract with the claimants for the horses and cars furnished.
See his evidence in the stipulated evidence in the record.
See also the President’s message to Congress of May 26, 1S62, in House Journal, second session thirty-seventh Congress, p. 761.
The war power the President possessed was conferred upon General Frémont, and lie bad tbe right to judge of the exigencies of his situation and to resort to the means necessary to meet it; and of these he had a right to judge. It was not the duty of the vendors to inquire into these matters.
Second. — If General Frémont was not expressly clothed with such power, the United States have recognized his authority and ratified his acts.
1. By not publicly disavowing his acts, returning the property to the claimants, and putting them in as good a position as when they parted with it.
2. By accepting and receiving and using, through their agents, authorized the property so purchased.
3. By paying a portion of the contract price.
The President, by disavowing of the propriety of shooting certain rebels, and the right to confiscate certain property and to manumit slaves, impliedly approved of the residue of his acts in his department.
ThiRD. — The Holt commission was unauthorized bylaw, and had no power to adjudicate and cut down these claims.
FOURTH. — Á receipt is always explainable by proper evidence, and is not good as accord and satisfaction.
Harrison v. Close, 2 John., 448; Seymour v. Minturn, 2 John., 169; Dederich v. Leman, 9 John., 333.
Fifth. — An agreement to release a debt, if without consideration, can have no effect; and the payment of a part of pre-existing debt cannot operate as a consideration.
Cratcford v. Millspaugh, 13 John., 87; Seymour v. Minturn, 17 John., 169; Dewy v. Derby, 20 John., 462; Bernard v. Darling, 11 Wen., 28; Harrison v. Close, 2 John., 448; Jackson v. Stack-house, 1 Carden, 122 ; Iiidder v. Kidder and others, 9 Casey, 268 ; Snowden v. Thomas, 4 H. & J., 335; Geiser v. Kershner, 4 G. & J., 305.
Mr. T. J. D. Fuller for the claimant Reeside:
Claimant rests his claim upon two separate grounds :
I. The special contract.
II. A quantum meruit.
Under the first head Fremont had authority to make the contract:
1. He possessed it by virtue of bis commission.
2. By special authority of the President.
3. By reason of the extraordinary exigencies of the country.
4. And, generally, under the war-making power. •
III. The law does not prohibit the making of such a contract under certain contingencies.
1Y. The compensation is but reasonable. It is lower than is ordinarily paid between private individuals in matters of contract of so great risk and responsibility. The claimant assumed a personal responsibility in his inspection; hence his solicitude.
This court will ex officio take notice of a state of war, of the existing rebellion in the United States, in what localities it has existed. It can judicially hear cited historical works, or the current sources of information of the day on the progress of the war, and consult it for the enlightenment of its own judgment, bearing upon any questions pending before it.
General Fremont, by virtue of his commission and the instructions given to him by his government, became clothed with the unlimited and undefinable war-making power — a power which knows of no limit that stands in the way of its success.
He had the authority, and was authorized to make use of such agencies that might seem most effective, to accomplish the great purpose with which he was charged. He was to raise, organize, arm, and equip an army of forty thousand men. He was to overthrow treason, suppress rebellion, and sustain the power of his government. He was to do this in a department whore the entire social fabric was undermined; where bad faith and treachery lurked in unsuspected places; where defection embraced officers as well as citizens. The Executive acted wisely in conferring upon General Fremont the unusual and extraordinary powers he exercised. He was untrammelled that he might act according to the emergencies, of the case, use such means, select such agencies, and employ them in such localities as would, in his judgment, be most likely to effect and secure the attainment of the great end sought for — the overthrow of the rebellion and the support of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The Assistant Solicitor for the defendants :
I. Our first inquiry is as to the authority which General Frémont might rightfully exercise in virtue of his appointment to the command of a military department in time of war, as well as in virtue of his commission as a major general in the army of the United States. If it shall he judicially asserted that ho possesses powers so extensive, as claimed for him in the brief of the learned solicitor for these claimants, then he is little less than a dictator, and the limitations which the law has so wisely imposed upon those public agents who are charged with the duty of directing the movements of our armies in the field will have been adopted in vain. If we refer to the regulations adopted for the government of the army, we find that all property, stores, and supplies of every kind necessary to the perfect equipment and subsistence of an army are committed entirely and exclusively to the officers detailed for service in the bureaus to which they are respectively assigned. First, there is the quartermaster’s department, to which is assigned the following duties, to wit:
“Article XLII. — Quartermaster’s department. — 1064. This department provides the quarters and transportation of the army ; storage and transportation for all army supplies; army clothing; camp and garrison equipage; cavalry and artillery horses ; fuel; forage; straw and stationery.”
Then to the subsistence department are committed duties equally distinct and specific, as follows, to wit:
“Article XLIII.— Subsistence department.— Supplies.— 1176. Subsistence stores for the army, unless in particular and urgent cases the Secretary of War shall otherwise direct, shall be procured by contract, to be made by the commissary general on public notice, to be delivered on inspection in the bulk, and at. such places as shall be stipulated; the inspector to give duplicate inspection certificates, (see Form.No. 15,) and to be a legal inspector where diereis such officer.”
To the corps of engineers and topographical engineers are assigned another and equally distinct branch of service and duty. They are as follows:
“Article XLVL — Corps of engineers and topographical engineers. —1358. The duties of these corps usually relate to the construction of permanent and field fortifications; works for the attack and defence of places; for the passage of rivers ; for the movements and operations of armies in the field ; and such reconnaissances and surveys as may be assigned to them. By special direction of the President of the United States, officers of engineers may be employed on any other duty whatsoever. (See 63d Article of War.)”
The duties assigned to the ordnance department are as follows:
“ Article XLVII. — Ordnance department. — 1375. The ordnance department has charge of the arsenals and armories and furnishes all ordnance and ordnance stores for the military service.
“ 1376. The general denomination ‘ ordnance and ordnance stores’ comprehends all cannon and artillery carriages and equipments; all apparatus and machines for the service and manoeuvres of artillery; all small-arms and accoutrements and horse equipments; all ammunition ; and all tools and materials for the ordnance service.”
The duties assigned to the medical and pay department are none the less distinct and specific. Indeed, it will readily occur to one familiar with military service that the duties which by law and regulations devolve upon the officers of the several branches of the military service include and relate to every essential requisite necessary to the proper maintenance and equipment of an army in the field. There is little left for the commander of a military department to do, other than the actual direction and management of the troops under his immediate command,
The duties which General Fremont directed Colonel Reeside to perform were such duties as by law are assigned entirely and exclusively to officers of the quartermaster’s department.
Cites the act of Congress approved March 28, 1812, (2 Stat., p. 696,) provided for the organization of the quartermaster’s department for the United States army.
Also the act of June 18, 1S56, (9 Stat., p. 17, sec. 5,) and art. XLI, secs. 989, 990, Revised Army Regulations.
It is not claimed that Colonel Reeside ever, at any time, complied with the requirements of this law or these regulations. If he did not, then he did not become an officer of either of those departments, entitled to discharge the duties or receive the emoluments thereof.
An attempt is made to relieve the claimants of the effect of these provisions of law by showing that the President had given assurance that he would recognize and appoint those to whom General Fremont might give commissions. How well this assumption is sustained will be better understood by reference to the evidence adduced in its support; here it is: On the 19th of August, 1861, Colonel Frank P. Blair telegraphed to the Postmaster General as follows :
“ It is necessary, in order to facilitate the organization here, that Major General Fremont have power to commission officers, as Governor Gamble has neglected to accede to a request to do it, much to the detriment of the public service. If the President telegraphs that he will appoint the officers General Fremont commissions, it will remove a great stumbling block from our path.”
Oil the 21st of August the President replied to the despatch of Colonel Blair as follows ;
“ I repeat, I will commission the officers of Missouri.”
It will be seen by reference to the “ Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War,” from which this testimony is taken, that a misunderstanding had arisen between Governor Gamble and General Fremont in regard to making appointments of officers for the Missouri troops, and it was for the purpose of getting rid of this difficulty that the President sent the above despatch to Colonel Blair. It related to the officers of Missouri troops, and none others. It gave to General Fremont no authority to appoint officers to discharge the duties of either the quartermaster, commissary, or pay departments. The law had committed the power to make these appointments exclusively to the President, “ with the consent of the Senate.” The President could not confer this power upon General Fremont or any one else. It is a familiar rule of construction that the express mention of one thing implies the intention to exclude others. (Broom’s Legal Maxims, 505 )
This principle applies with peculiar force here ; for the law having provided that the President should alone exercise the power of appointing the officers of the quartermaster’s department, excludes the presumption that this power might be rightfully exercised by either the Secretary of War or a major general. It will require no elaborate argument to demonstrate that if the appointment of Colonel Reeside to the position to which he was assigned by General Fremont was unauthorized and void, then any contracts which he may have made on behalf of the United States under such appointment were not valid and binding upon the United States as express or special contracts.
It is believed that an examination of the authorities cited by the claimant comes far short of establishing, in a major general in command of a military department, authority to appoint an officer of the quartermaster’s department without any ratification of such appointment by the President or confirmation thereof by the Senate, or the giving of any bond as prescribed by law, to confer upon such appointee power to make contracts binding upon the United States. Those cases refer only to the exercise of judgment or discretion in a public officer, in cases where the law had specially committed to such officer the right to act upon his own judgment, asserting the principle that if such judgment is honestly exercised there can be no appeal. Such was the case of Crowell v. McFadden, 8 Oraneli, 94, and the case of Otis v. Watkins, 9 Cranch, 355.
So in Martin v. Mott 12 Wheaton, p. 19, it was held that the au thority to decide whether the exigencies have avisen (contemplated in the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress, in which the President has authority to call forth the militia “ to execute the ■laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions”) is exclusively vested in the President, and his decision as to that question is conclusive.
It will be observed that none of these cases discuss at all the question of the power of a major general to appoint those officers whose appointment rests exclusively with the President; nor do these cases relate in the slightest degree to the power of a major general to make contracts, or pledge the credit of the United States.
General Fremont had placed upon his authority no limitations, except such as were imposed upon him by the law and regulations for the government of the army.
Of those limitations all persons dealing with him or his agents were bound to take notice. Story on Agency, 5th edition, p. 381, sec. 307 a.
Put in cases of public agents, the government or other public authority is not bound unless it manifestly appears that the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, or he is held out as having authority to do the act, or is employed in his capacity as a public agent to malee the declaration or representation for the government.
These principles are fully recognized in the following cases : State v. Hastings, 10 Wis. Pep., 531, 535. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 10 Mass. Rep., 30. Murrey v. Carothers, 1 Met., 165.
It is assumed on the part of the government that General Frémont became, in virtue of his assignment to the command of a military department, merely the special agent of the United States, charged with the duty of giving force and direction to the movements of the troops assigned to his command ; that he had no right either to make contracts or to appoint officers, and confer upon them the authority to make contracts.
His authority was limited and special, and it must be strictly pursued. If he exceeds that power the principal is not bound. (Munro v. Commission Co., 15 Johns. Rep., 44. Beals v. Allen, 18 Johns. Rep., 363. Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. Rep., 172. Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cowen’s Rep., 354. Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerger’s Tenn. Rep., 71. Kent’s Commentaries, sec. 41, vol. 2, p. 835.)
The letters of the late Postmaster General to General Fremont are freely quoted. Those letters cannot be considered as evidence for any purpose, for they were not the utterance of him who might legally speak for tlie President in regard to the management of the military affairs of the nation. The Secretary of the Department of War is alone authorized to do that. (United States v. Eliason, 16 Peters, 302. United States v. Parker, 1 lb., 165.)
The brief of claimant’s solicitor announces the following rather extraordinary proposition:
“ It has been" the universal custom in the army for commanders of departments to give all such orders as they might deem necessary for supplies of every kind, and in every instance the same have been recognized and held valid.”
There is not in the record of any of these cases the slightest evidence of the existence of the custom referred to. Courts will not presume the existence of a custom. Whether a custom exists is a question of fact to be established by the evidence of witnesses who speak directly to the fact of the existence of the custom relied on. {Lewis v. Marshall, 7 M. & Grr., 729. Allen v. Merchants’ Bank, 22 Wend., 222. Crofts v. Marshall, 7 C. & P., 597. Winthróp v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. 0., 7. Edie v. East Ind. Co., 2 Burr., 1228. Austin v. Taylor, 2 Ohio R., 282.)
II. The making of the several propositions by these claimants, and the acceptance of them by Colonel Reeside, did not create express contracts binding upon the United States. • It is admitted that these contracts were made without previous advertisement. The law provides two methods of procuring- supplies for the army : 1st, by advertising- for proposals, and, 2d, by purchase in open market where the exigencies of 'the service do not admit of previous advertisement. In making the purchase of these horses neither of these plans was adopted.
We are again aided in the solution of this question by the regulations for the government of the army. They were adopted for the purpose of giving practical effect to the several acts of Congress which have from time to time been passed upon this subject.
Those sections of the army regulations applicable to this subject are as follows :
“ 1044. All purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the army, except personal services, when the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the article or performance of the service, shall be made by advertising- a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting- the same.
“ 1045. The officer advertising for proposals shall, when the intended cona-act or purcb_.se is considerable, transmit forthwith a copy of the advertisement and report of the case to the proper bureau of the War Department.
“ 1046. Contracts will be made with the lowest responsible bidder, and purchases from the lowest bidder who produces the proper article. But when such lowest bids are unreasonable they will be rejected and bids again invited by public notice; and all bids and advertisements shall be sent to the bureau.
“ 1048. When immediate delivery or performance is required by the public exigency, the article or service required may be procured by open purchase or contract at the places and in the mode in which such articles are usually bought and sold, or such services engaged, between individuals.
“1049. Contracts shall be made in quadruplicate; one to be kept by the officer, one by the contractor, and two to be sent to the military bureau, one of which for the office of the Second Comptroller of the Treasury.
“ 1050. The contractor shall give bond, with good and sufficient security, for the true and faithful performance of his contract, and each surety shall state his place of residence.
“ 1051. An express condition shall be inserted in contracts that no member of Congress shall be admitted to any share or part therein, or any benefit to arise therefrom.”
It will be borne in mind that none of these requisites were complied with in making the arrangements for the purchase of these horses by Colonel Reeside. There was no advertisement for proposals, no opportunity given for competition, no making out of any contract in quadruplicate, no execution of a bond for the faithful performance of these contracts, no condition inserted that “ no member of Congress should be admitted to any share or part therein or any benefit to arise therefrom.” These are all statutory provisions and essential to the creation of a valid contract binding upon the United States. Where a statute has prescribed the manner of making a contract or performing a duty the statute must be strictly followed.
III. 1. The instrument in writing executed by these claimants, upon their receiving from the Holt-Davis-Oampbell commission the evidence of the amount allowed them respectively by that commission, is binding upon the parties, and sufficient and conclusive evidence from which the court may infer that there has been a conqn-omise by those who signed it of a claim about which there had been a dispute and controversy.
“ The undersigned, acknowledge to have received the vouchers referred to and described below, which, when paid, will be in full of all demands against the United States on account of their respective claims set opposite their several names.”
If it can be inferred that the intention and purpose of these parties in signing the above agreement was to compromise and settle a doubt-fid claim, then, although the whole sum which the claimants had demanded was not paid, the agreement is sufficient to discharge the United States from further liability. It is not necessary that the evidence of this purpose should have been a release under seal. (Millihen v. Brown, 1 Rawle, 391.)
2. The consideration for the execution of those instruments by the claimants was immediate and present payment of a doubtful claim. The consideration was therefore sufficient, and with the payment of it became an executed consideration. The instrument executed by these claimants was also a good release. No special form of words is necessary to constitute a release if it declare with entire distinctness the intention and purpose of the creditor to discharge the debt and the debtor. (Parsons on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 219fi)
If any contract existed between the United States and these claimants it was a,parol contract, and such contracts may be discharged by parol release. (Story on Contracts, sec. 992. Wentz v. De Haven, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 312. Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick., 2S9. Lattimore v. Plarsen, 14 Johns., 330.)
3. This instrument is sufficient as evidence of ACCORD and satisfaction. This claim was not liquidated hut was open to dispute, and a receipt in full of such a demand could be pleaded as an accord with satisfaction on the ground that a fair compromise and settlement of a claim should be upheld. (Story on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 571, sec. 982. Longbridge v. Dorville, 5 Barn. & Aid. R., 117. Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 Adolph. & Ell. R. 106. Palmerson v. Bkxford, 4 Denio R., 166. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met. R., 551. Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 Mees. & Welb. R , 651.)
IV. The entire inapplicability of the doctrine of estoppel, to these cases will be readily seen by a brief reference to the principles upon which it is based, as well as the facts from which it is sought to apply it. Greenleaf, Ev. Vol. 1, Sec. 22.
The acts from which it is claimed that an estoppel against the government has been created are: 1st, the action of the Ilolt-Davis-Campbell commission in regard to these claims; and, 2d, the joint resolution of Congress authorizing the payment of the amount allowed by said commission to tbe several claimants “upon the presentation of the voucher with the commissioner’s certificate thereon, in any form plainly indicating the allowance of the claim and to what amount.”
The organization of the Holt-Davis-Campbell commission resulted from the unwarrantable usurpations, the unblushing violations of law and regulations, and the reckless extravagance of General Fré-mont. It would have had no existence hut for the necessity that existed to protect the best interests of the government, and save the little credit of the government there was left in that department. The action of that commission was a constant protest, not only against these, but against all other unlawful contracts which General Fremont had directed to be made. They never, by any admission, accepted these contracts as legal and binding upon the government. If they had done so, then they clearly had no legal right to make any deduction from the amount which the government was bound to pay under them.
They recognized the vouchers only for the purpose of showing what property had been furnished by the several claimants to the government, and then they establiseed the value of such property by other evidence.
The joint resolution of Congress merely recognized the action of that commission, and authorized the payment of the sums they allowed to the respective claimants. Even if such admissions as would result in the establishment of an estoppel wore shown, the government would not be, concluded by it.

Opinion:
Nott, J.,
opinion:
The case of Reeside is brought to recover the sum of $20,376 62, being the amount of certain commissions allowed to him as inspector and purchasing agent of the government under an appointment of Major General Fremont; and the cases of Higdon,Morgan, and Geffroy are brought to recover certain balances alleged to be dueunder-the contracts made with them by Reeside as the purchasing agent of the government. These cases have been under advisement for an unprecedented length of time, partly on account of the great magnitude of the questions and interests involved, and partly because it was understood that there were a number of other cases which would present the same questions. The court desired that such parties should be heard and that the matters to be determined should be presented, if possible, in every form before a final decision should be rendered. Jt is to be regretted that, notwithstanding the prolonged consideration given to these cases, we have arrived at different conclusions as regards some of the questions involved; hut we have, nevertheless, been able to reach a common result, which I now proceed to state.
On the 25th July, 1861, Major General Fremont arrived at St. Louis and assumed command of the "Western Department." He was an officer but recently commissioned in the regular army, yet well known to the government and to the people of the United States by an experience replete with incidents of extraordinary energy and of extraordinary daring. Beside the personal adventures of his wondrously romantic life, there was then fresh in the minds of all men the history of his organizing, without commissioir or authority, a miniature army and government, remote from sympathy and support, and seizing for the United, States against greatly superior power and numbers, the Mexican province of California. He had also resigned a high diplomatic position to assume such responsibilities as the government might choose to assign to him; and the government, upon his arrival, had assigned to him the military command of a department which included the three great rivers of the United States, and extended from the northern to the southern boundaries of the country.
The department'needed an extraordinary commander. The rebellion had been gathering strength for three months, and the first great reverse had just been suffered by the national arms. Within the chief city of the department an outbreak was constantly apprehended. Its wealthy and influential inhabitants, for the most part, sympathized with the enemy. The flower of its young men had already joined the forces that were making war upon their country. The native-born and adopted citizens had taken opposite sides, and stood arrayed class against class. Different hostile camps had been established by the two parties, and the threatened anarchy and civil strife had been averted by a blow struck with decisive energy by the loyal side, but which the other denounced as a bloody and needless massacre. The arms and munitions of the United States had been saved by hurrying them from the arsenal by night, and ingloriously carrying them within the protection of the loyal States. Throughout the department everything was unorganized or incomplete. The western country had suffered from bad harvests and disastrous enterprises, and was poor and illy fitted to prepare for war. No officer of high rank or approved experience had been sent by the government to direct affairs, save one, and his fidelity had been suspected. The rapidly increasing forces of the enemy were gathering within Missouri and threatening speedily to fall upon St. Louis, which was the' military key of the department. The rivers and railways still remained in the possession of the government, but their retention was not due to a superior force; for, against great odds, they had been saved only by the military genius of a captain in the second regular infantry, the brief period of whose glory is clouded alone by the national bereavement of his heroic death.
Of all the officers from whom the government might have selected a commander, there certainly was not one more likely to disregard the means, provided he could thereby attain to great public ends, than General Frémont. His whole life was a pledge of his readiness to assume great responsibilities. And at this time the government required of him much more than the services of a military commander. It required of him not only that he should command, but that he should create. His citizen troops were unarmed, unclothed, undisciplined, constantly marched and countermarched, and from them he was required to organize an army. The department was bisected by the greatest of navigable rivers, and for it he was required to construct a navy. The governor of Missouri had given the authority of his office to the rebellion, and for the State the general was required to reorganize a civil government. For all of these duties General Fremont received none of the ordinary machinery by which such duties are usually performed. He was obliged to provide his material as well as to organize his army and build liis navy. And the government gave to him the most absolute and uncontrolled power which it could give, for it fettered him with no instructions. Under such circumstances, knowing the events that wore to be controlled, and the man sent to control them, silence was more expressive than language. No case could be framed that would present more strongly the legal right of a military officer to exercise the power which it is claimed General Frémont lawfully exercised. The remark said to have been made by President Lincoln, that he had given to General Frémont more ' power than he possessed himself, though a paradox, was illustrative of the truth.
General Frémont exercised these powers. The evidence in these cases shows that he exorcised them with all the zeal and energy that might have been anticipated or apprehended. Among them was the power of making- contracts without regard to the conditions and methods prescribed by the statutes of the United States, and these contracts, made for the public defence, it is now the unpleasant task of this court to pronounce void.
The five cases now before us differ somewhat in detail, but we are met at the threshold of each by this preliminary and important question : Is an express contract made by a commanding general in the midst of war, and when the requirements of civil law cannot be complied with, valid by virtue of public necessity or martial law, if it bo in effect forbidden by tbe law of the land ? Since these cases were submitted, others also have been brought before the court, arising out of the acts of other generals, and involving the same question of military power — a question as difficult and delicate as a court of justice can be called upon to decide.
The varied and able arguments which have been addressed to the court on-this question may be reduced to two embarrassing propositions. First, it may be said that without the recognition of this " war power " (as it was termed upon the argument) ¡the nation may be left defenceless in time of great peril — in times of absolute necessity, when civil gives place to martial law, and when the life of the republic depends on the ability of the government to use all the resources which the country possesses. Second, it may be also said that the existence of such a power as a matter of legal right would enable a military officer to override all laws and restrictions, and under the plea of military necessity encumber the republic with a debt from which it can never legally escape. Or (to apply these principles to the cases before us) it maybe urged on the one hand, that without the exercise of this most necessary power General Fremont would have had an army without arms; and replied upon the other hand, that if such a power does legally exist, and which the law cannot restrain, then General Fremont might have contracted for entire navies, and in the arbitrary exercise of his discretion might have placed a burden of debt upon the nation from which it could never lawfully be free.
The ordinary resource in difficult cases — authorities—here gives to us no aid. The great elementary writers, Grotius and Vattel, with their followers, have written for absolute sovereignties, and not for a constitutional and limited government. Their words, moreover, are addressed rather to the conscience of the ruler than, to the understanding of the judge. Their conclusions set forth principles for the guidance of those possessed of discretionary power, rather than rules which must be followed by those who have no discretionary power, and whose duty it is simply to search out and declare the law.
Beside these authorities, those great fountains of legal learning, the reports of adjudged cases are equally unavailing. Neither the courts of the common law, nor the numerous constitutional decisions that embody the reasoning of our greatest jurists, have determined the principle now involved. I have looked with care through the authorities cited by the counsel who have addressed the court, and I find nothing which in my opinion decides or elucidates this perplexing question. It is indeed a new question, now to be determined for the first time under the laws and Constitution of the United States.
The doubts which beset this question grow out of a non-appreciation of the great and terrible nature and effects of war. A remote war prosecuted against a distant enemy, as our naval war with Algiers, or carried on in a corner of the country, as the Indian war in Florida, prosecuted through the agency of a reg-ular army or navy, and estimated by the dollars and cents which it costs, does not bring the question home to the nation, nor affect the civil functions of the government, nor produce that upheaval of all settled and established domestic affairB which comes within what we may term the state of war.
It appears to me useless to speak of law — meaning thereby the laws of peace — when this state of war actually exists. Statutes and decisions have then no authority, and war changes the views as the acts of the body politic. To take the life of another is a great and heinous crime at the civil law, punishable by a disgraceful death. In war, it changes to a noble and commendable act. He who labors for the welfare of mankind in peace, increasing their comforts and prolonging their lives, is praised as a public benefactor. In war, the one who stands not upon the destruction of human life, whether of friends or foes, is deemed worthy of gratitude, and the highest honor belongs generally to him who destroys the greatest number. At the common law, one who was guilty of self-destruction was deemed guilty of the foulest of crimes; a stake was driven through his body; it was buried where four roads met, and his children' forfeited their inheritance. In war, self-destruction may be the highest or fairest of virtues. Under no system of municipal law can a man break into my enclosure, or trespass upon my grounds, or cut down my trees, or carry away my crops; he cannot enter my dwelling, nor compel me to go with him against my will, nor evict me from my estate; yet all of these things may be done in war.
A vague idea has been attached to the Constitution as though it could rise superior to other laws and control the events of war. Such questions have been'argued gravely before courts; as, whether there could be a war, except in the form and manner which the Constitution prescribes. It was said that inasmuch as the President could not declare war, he could not accept it, and hence that under the Constitution there could be no war until Congress should declare or accept it. A sufficient answer to these sophisms is^to say that the existence of war is not a question of theory or of law, but of fact. The Consti tution is self-declared to be but law. It is true that it is the supreme law of the land, but it is still law. It provides a frame-work of government, and contains certain civil safeguards, and there it stops. It does not affect to provide for the state of war, (save that it designates the commander-in-ehiof of the army and navy, and enjoins that soldiers shall not be quartered in the homes of citizens, "but in a manner to be prescribed by law;") nor does it attempt to limit and control events which are governed by the law of force alone.
To understand this it is but necessary to apply the Constitution to the state of war. The Constitution guarantees to every citizen "the free exercise of religionbut the state of war prevails, and the free exercise of religion is gone. The Constitution, in the most solemn manner, declares that " the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;" but the state of war comes, and the right to keep and bear arms is gone. Under the Constitution the people may peaceably assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances; but, under the rule of war, a commanding officer may disperse their assemblies and forbid their petitions. A citizen of the United States " shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury;" but in the state of war the form and manner of his trial depend on the orders of him who commands. A citizen cannot be compelled to travel against his will; but war comes and carries him from one extreme of the country to another. A citizen may be entitled to the exercise of the elective franchise; but in war another may prohibit him from crossing the road to deposit his ballot. Slavery and involuntary servitude are forever prohibited by the Constitution; yet in war a military officer may impress the citizen, and place him in the trenches of his fort, and compel him to labor like a slave. Before the Constitution all men are equal; but in this state of war one man may command another; he may force him to yield him respect, to obey his orders, to travel where he wishes, to halt where he directs. This state of war, therefore, is repugnant to every principle of constitutional law, and its necessities or powers are not to be lightly invoked nor needlessly continued in a state of peace.
This surrender of its power and functions the law recognizes and regulates by an expressive maxim — Inter arma silent leges. The maxim expresses with wonderful precision the exact limits to which the state of war must be confined. It will be observed that the law does not become silent in the neighborhood of martial events, but in their midst; and even amid such events the law is not abrogated or repealed, or even suspended, but simply refrains from speaking, and is, of its own accord, silent and unenforced.
When tlie state of war lias passed, the law resumes its sway. It does so instantly and of its own vigor. Yet it recognizes tbe changed circumstances which, may have been recast in this crucible of war. Without the interposition of statutes or treaties it perceives that what was lawful has become unlawful, and what was unlawful has become lawful. It can perceive that boundaries have been changed, and that territory which was a part of the republic has ceased to be such, or that what was foreign soil has become the property of the nation. It can recognize the fact that citizens have become aliens, or aliens citizens. Its tribunals reverse the ordinary practice and receive instruction from the political branches of the government. Thus, with regard to foreign governments, they recognize only those which the political power of the nation recognizes. (4 Cranch, 272.) Thus, with regard to our internal polity, the Supreme Court, through its late Chief Justiee, has gone so far as to be bound by the decision of another branch of the government (Congress) when the question before the court involved the constitutional existence of a State government. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 42.) We may conclude, therefore, that the law always recognizes facts as they exist after the state of war has passed, and that it never attempts to undo or change what war has done.
But the argument demands more than this, and requires that this court should complete and carry out what the military power • has left undone. It would seem a sufficient answer to the request to say that a court of law can never carry out or enforce that which the law prohibits. Acts which can be defended only by showing that at the time the civil law of necessity was silent, and did not then absolutely prohibit them, cannot receive the aid of the civil law when it again speaks, and speaks to forbid. War, so far as jurisprudence is concerned, is a return of society to its rude, primeval state, where life and liberty and property have no safeguards, and all wrongful acts may be justified by the will of the commanding general. Within such a chaotic state there are no settled principles or rules which can deserve the name of law, or which can extend beyond that state and give validity to prohibited acts, or be obligatory upon civil courts. What has actually been done by war the civil courts accept as a fact accomplished, beyond human control, and decided by what is justly termed the supreme arbiter of nations; but those illegal acts which the war leaves unper-fected must of necessity fall, unless rendered legal by the legislature.
As I have already said, the authorities upon this question were not intended so much for the guidance of civil courts as addressed to the conscience of sovereigns. The same might be said of the able arguments addressed to us by the learned counsel who have presented these and similar cases. But the moral obligations requiring that legal effect should be given to these contracts, I think must fall upon the legislative rather than upon the judicial branch of the government. The safety of the state may become the supreme law, but it is a supreme law that lasts no longer than the circumstances which created it. When they have passed away, it also has passed away; and if, while it existed, a military officer should have entered into agreements which the honor of the nation requires should receive a continuing legal effect, the presumption is that the legislative department of the nation will give to them that legal sanction which will enable its courts of law, if necessary, to enforce them. At all events, the power -and responsibility of approving or disapproving rest with the legislature and not with the judiciary.
If these principles be brought down to the ease of contracts made by a general in the field, they will be applicable respectively to contracts executed and executory, or, to speak with more precision, to contracts performed and contracts left unperformed. As to the former, courts of law will not suffer them to be disturbed. The government cannot treat them as illegal and recover back the purchase money; the contractor cannot treat them as nullities and recover a greater price than they provided. But as regards the latter class, courts of law cannot aid them, unless they are authorized by law. If the law should prohibit them, then the only redress which the suffering parties may invoke is that which the law-making power may give. If the legislature refuses this, then they are without redress. We therefore think that the cases now before us must be determined by the law of the land as established and declared in the statutes of Congress; and that where they conflict with the law of the land they cannot be aided or legalized by the extraordinary circumstances attending their inception, or by that supreme necessity which morally might justify them, and which, upon the argument, was spoken of as the "war power" of the government.
When we come to examine these cases upon their legal merits we find that three objections are presented by the defendants against a recovery. These we will examine separately.
I. It is objected that these contracts were not preceded by advertisement. The act of 2d March, 18G1, (12 Stat. Lp. 220,) directs that " all contracts for supplies or services when the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the article or performance of the service shall be made by advertising. When immediate delivery or performance is required by the public exigency, the articles or service required may be procured by open purchase or contract at the places and in the manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold, or such services engaged between individuals." Without now holding that this statute is merely directory, and that where a contract is in good faith made by a general intrusted with an important command, he will be deemed intrusted with the power of determining the question of exigency, it is enough to say that here was an exigency greater than was ever contemplated by the fr.amers of the law, and that the object of the contracts was to procure an immediate delivery of the articles purchased. We therefore dismiss this objection as unworthy of further consideration.
II. The second objection which these cases disclose arises from the following facts :
On the 11th August, 1861, General Fremont appointed John E. Eee-side as inspectouof horses for the western department. The appointment in express terms made him responsible "that every animal passed" by him should be " equal in value to the price paid," and it allowed to him a percentage of two and a half per cent. On the previous day an order had been given to him which said : " You will proceed, without delay, to Cincinnati and purchase, cause to be purchased, or inspect, when purchased by other contractors, two thousand horses for the service of the army. You will not pay, on an average, over $130 each at such places as you may name as places of inspection."
The agent seems to have been well chosen, for the evidence indicates that he possessed wealth, reputation, great energy, and unusual experience, and that he saved to the government more than the amount of his commissions in railroad freight alone. It also indicates that the commission of two and a half per cent, to be allowed to him was just and reasonable for the services to be rendered and the responsibility to be assumed.
Under these two orders, and instructions subsequently given, Mr. Eeeside purchased, between the 11th August and 7th December, 1861, 5,027 horses, besides other property.
The amount of commissions claimed by him on account of inspections is nineteen thousand seven hundred and ninety-one dollars and twelve cents, ($19,791 12,) and for cash disbursements the sum of five hundred and eighty-five dollars and fifty cents, ($585 50,) making the whole amount claimed t wenty thousand three hundred and seventy-six dollars and sixty-two cents, ($20,376 62.)
His travelling expenses, the cost of advertising, and other items incidental to his duties as purchasing agent, were borne by himself.
By virtue of this authority, Mr. Reeside entered into executory contracts on behalf of the government with various persons, and among others with the claimants Higdon, Morgan, and Gefiroy. By the terms of these agreements they were to furnish horses to the government and the government was to pay for them certain specified prices. Pursuant to the agreements, these horses were duly furnished, and were turned over to the United States quartermaster, who, recognizing the orders of General Fremont and the contracts of Reeside, gave to the contractors the usual vouchers for the agreed price. This price was higher than that paid for ordinary cavalry or artillery horses, and the horses furnished were of a superior quality; but the price paid did not exceed the price authorized by General Fremont, viz : an average of $130 per horse.
It will be perceived from this statement that the position and powers of Mr. Reeside were peculiar. On the one hand, he acted as a purchasing agent with power sufficient, it is claimed, to bind the government by express contracts. On the other hand, he was not intrusted with public funds, nor did he receive and account for the property purchased, nor did he give a bond for the faithful performance of his duties, nor did he take the oath prescribed for quartermasters by law, nor did he assume to act as a quartermaster of the United States. On the contrary, after the horses were purchased and branded by Mr. Ree-side, they were forwarded to the regular quartermasters of the department, who gave vouchers for them to the contractors, and who received and accounted for them as for other property purchased by him for the use of the government. Yet the quartermaster did not control Mr. Reeside nor exercise any discretion with regard to his purchases, but, sinking into a strictly ministerial officer, gave his official vouchers as a necessary step toward completing the business really transacted by the purchasing agent.
Such being the facts, as we understand them, this legal question arises: Who are the agents of the government with power to bind the United States by express contracts ?
This question is one of the most important and difficult that has ever been before the court, relating not only to the number of suits now awaiting our decision, but to numberless other suits, which, so long as this court may exist, will arise from every department of the government, and which, if our conclusion here is sustained, must to all intents and purposes be determined now.
Among private persons and bodies corporate, the relations of agency may be easily established. An express authority need not be shown; and where no agency in fact existed a subsequent ratification will relate back and legalize that which had no legal inception. So also where an agent has no authority to delegate his powers to another, the recognition of the. sub-agent will establish a second agency, and constitute him the agent of the principal. It is the settled rule of this court, aud the principle upon which it was established, to administer the same law between the government and a claimant which is administered between ordinary suitors. But the difficulty in these cases is to determine lohcit is the government. The President and his cabinet are frequently spoken of as the government, yet they are merely high officers possessing delegated and restricted powers. But it is not necessary to hold the law-making power alone to be the government, for in many instances, as, for example, in our relations with foreign powers, the President, or the President and Senate are to all intents and purposes the government. After prolonged consideration I have come to the conclusion that when the object and the purpose of the agency is to create an indebtedness on the part of the United States, then that such an agency can only be authorized by that branch of , the government whose function it is to pledge the public credit, and whose duty it will be to provide for this as for all other publie indebtedness. I am, therefore, prepared to say that he who deals with one professing to be a financial agent of the United States, must look to the law for the existence and limits of the agency, and that there can be no agents possessed of power to bind the government by express contracts except such as are expressly authorized by law.
But by this expression "expressly authorized by law," it is not intended that the agency must be expressly named in a statute. When Congress is recognized as the principal, the analogies of the law of agency can be preserved in these and all similar cases. The agency may be expressly named or necessarily implied. So, too, acts not binding on the government may be made valid by legislative ratification; and those who were not agents may become such by the recognition of Congress. It is merely intended that an authority to bind the government by contract can only be imputed to one whose power proceeds directly or indirectly from the legislature, and whose authority is created and defined by express law, or by necessary implication.
With regard to the cases now to be decided, we do not find that there is any statute prohibiting a general in time of war from appointing purchasing agents like Mr. Roeside. But we do not find that there is any statute which expressly or by implication confers any such power, or authorizes any such appointment. Further than this, the acts of Congress have provided with particularity and care for the purchase of military supplies, and have organized a complete corps of officers originally called by the expressive name of " the purchasing department," (Act 24th April, 1816, 3 Stat. L., p. 297,) who are the military purchasing agent3 of the United States. It was formerly the duty of the chief of these officers, (the Commissary General'of purchases,) "under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of War, to conduct the procuring and providing of all articles of supply requisite for the military service of the United States;" and it was made the duty of his assistants, (the deputy commissaries,) "when directed thereto, either by the Secretary of War, the Commissary General of purchases, or, in cases of necessity, by the commanding general, Quar • termas ter General, or deputy quartermasters, to purchase all such of the aforesaid articles as may be requisite for the military service of the United States." (Act March 28,1812, 2 Stat. L., p. 696.) By a subsequent statute, (A.ct August 23, 1842, 5 Stat. L., p. 512,) the purchasing department was abolished, but " the duties thereof " were required to be " performed by the officers of the quartermaster's department." Thus it is seen that the only military purchasing agents contemplated by the statutes are specifically named by Congress, and are moreover selected by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and before entering into their office, take an official oath, and give security for the faithful performance of their duties. It also appears that not only are all of the articles requisite for the military service of the United States to be purchased by these officers, but that the statute also contemplates "cases of necessity," and provides that then the purchases shall be made by the same officers, under the direction of the commanding general, not requiring the sanction of the Secretary of War. If General Fremont had given the order to a quartermaster of the United States, or if Mr. Reeside had been made the agent of the quartermaster, and his acts been made subject to the quartermaster's approval, the legal aspect of the case would have been different, though the practical result might have been the same. As it is, he was not made subordinate to the quartermaster of the department, but the quartermaster was made subordinate to him. Whether the government would havé been better served by its officers than by a zealous and experienced agent like Mr. Keeside, is not for us to say. It is our simple duty to administer the law as we understand it. After a full consideration of the point, a majority of the court are of the opinion that among General Frémont and Mr. Reeside aud the quartermaster there was such a mingled and divided responsibility as was never contemplated by the statutes, and that the chief discretion was exercised by one to whom the law had never committed it. We, therefore, are compelled to hold that the express contract made by General Fremont with Mr. Reeside, whereby the latter was allowed a commission of 2'¿- por cent., as a purchasing agent of the government, and the express contracts made by Mr. Reeside under this authority with the claimants, Higden, Morgan, and Geffroy, were not authorized by law, and imposed no legal obligation upon the government.
But it is desirable that this decision should not be carried further than the court intend, nor applied to facts differing from those to which we apply it. We do not decide that if General Fremont had made these contracts himself, and in his own name, he might not have done himself what he might have compelled a subordinate to do; neither do we decide that if Mr. Reeside had been appointed by the President or Secretary of War, who appoint quartermasters, his acts would not have bound the United States; nor do we decide that an officer detailed to act as quartermaster is not a quartermaster de facto, and authorized to enter into contracts which will be obligatory upon the government; we only decide that a private person who is neither military nor civil officer of the government, and who is not a quartermaster of the United States, cither dejure or de facto, and whose agency has neither been created nor recognized by Congress, has no authority to bind the United States by express contracts.
But the cases do not stop at this point. These parties have voluntarily placed tlieir property at the disposal of the government, and they have done so on the faith of a contract sanctioned by an officer of the highest military rank, and intrusted with the highest military responsibility. They have, moreover, given evidence by which the court can estimate the value of the property sold; and they have shown that this property was .used in the service, taking the place of other property which would otherwise have been purchased, and being provided for by ample appropriations previously made by Congress. It would, therefore, be an ungracious answer were the law to deny them all relief, and an unjust and harsh conclusion to say that they are entitled to no redress when the government has accepted their property and received a benefit thereby. The maxim which G-rotius applies to the compacts of generals in war seems not inapplicable here: " Whatever brings profit is binding;" as, also, is his comment thereon: " We must condemn them of injustice who refuse to perform the agreement, and yet still retain that which they could never have had without the agreement."
But this acceptance of the property by the government is not to be understood as resting upon the ground of its acceptance by the govern-ernmcnt quartermaster. An officer of the government has no power to bind the government by the acceptance of property where its purchase would be illegal. On the contrary, such property could not be deemed to be received to the use of the United States. In the cases before us I look beyond the naked act of the quartermaster, and place the acceptance of the government upon the following grounds: First, upon the fact that the object of the sale was lawful and proper; that Congress had authorized such purchases by general appropriations, and that they would have been valid if made by the proper agents. Second, upon the fact that though property was purchased by an unauthorized person, not the agent of the government, yet still that it was regularly and properly delivered to tie officers charged with the receipt of such property, and was duly accounted for by them as property of the United States, their accounts being accepted and acquiesced in by both the administrative and legislative branches of the government. Third, upon the fact that this property entered into the actual use of the government, that an actual benefit was derived from it, and that if it had not been thus furnished by the claimants, other property of a like nature must have been purchased by the United States. All of these facts may not be necessary to constitute a legal and binding acceptance on the part of the government; but existing, I deem them to be conclusive,
A distinction, nevertheless, is to be made between services and things which are in themselves legal, and those which are illegal. The services of Mr. Reeside, even though they were wholly beneficial, were partly lawful and partly unlawful. Iiis claim for commissions rests upon the fact that he was required to assume a responsibility as the purchasing agent of the government. This responsibility the law vests in the officers of the government; they could not divest themselves of it, nor contract with Mr. Reeside to assume it. Much less could they compel the government to assume the expense and burden of his undertaking to bear that which they were required by law to bear. At the same time, his services as inspector and forwarding agent were legal; a benefit was derived from them; they were accepted by the government, and for them the government is liable.
I have arrived at the general conclusion which governs these cases, after careful reflection, endeavoring to look beyond them, and to rest the decision on a broad and enduring principle, which will be applicable to all other cases, and will shield the government from the enlarging exercise of a dangerous power, and do substantial justice to every person who may voluntarily part with property upon the faith of a supposed agreement, and for the benefit of the United States. It is not perceived that beyond the hardship of an exceptional case, any injury can be done under the rule which this case suggests. That rule is this : The power to bind the government by contract can only be exercised by those officers whom Congress have constituted its agents, either by the express words of a statute or by necessary legal implication; yet, where a person has parted with his property for a lawful purpose, which has been received and used by the proper agents of the government in the necessary service of the government, there the owner may recover for its actual value.
III. The third and last objection, which is applicable to only some of these cases, we will now consider.
In October, 1861, payments were suspended by order of the War Department on all contracts made under or by the authority of General Frémont. The reason of this suspension was that frauds were supposed to have been practiced on the government in some instances, and in others, that-the contracts were irregular and illegal. On the 25th October, 1861, a commission, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Holt, and Campbell, was appointed by the Secretary of War. The order for their appointment states that they were appointed "to examino and report upon all unsettled claims." And the former Secretary of War has testified in another case that " It was an exparte commission of inquiry, and they were to report to the War Department, subject to its revision. The commission had no final powers." The War Department also from time to time gave to the commission specific instructions respecting its proceedings, which were complied with. The commission was therefore ex parte in its nature, and was not intended as an arbitration, nor supposed to he possessed of judicial or quasi judicial functions. Public notice was given that all the suspended claims might ho submitted to the commission before a specified day, arid, if allowed, would be paid. The department did not oblige the claimants to submit their claims, but as this was tlie only remedy afforded, and no claims save those submitted were paid, it was in effect a practical compulsion. In some instances the papers and vouchers of the claimants were sent to tlie commissioners by tlie quartermaster to whom they had been presented for payment; in others, the parties themselves submitted them. When the commissioners liad reached a conclusion, they required the party to sign a release, not under seal, in the following form:
" The undersigned acknowledge to have received the vouchers referred to and described below, which, when paid, will be in full of all demands against the United States on account of the respective claims set opposite to their names :
Receipt. $00, 030 Samuel J. Morgan.* 302 Name of claimant. Nature of Samuel J. Morgan.. Horses. - - I! $67,8G0 Amount al-Sdiedulc.
At the time o£ signing the release, some of the parties protested, averring that they did so under compulsion, and in order to procure their papers, otherwise withheld by the commission. Others of the parties signed without making any protest, or raising any objection; all subsequently accepted the money awarded by the commission, and gave therefor the ordinary voucher, without objection or protest. •
We think it evident that the proceedings of the commission did not constitute an arbitrament. We think it also evident that the stipulation exacted by the commissioners, inasmuch as it neither expressed a consideration nor was under seal, cannot be deemed a valid release of an existing indebtedness. We think it also evident that if the express contracts were valid, this receipt or agreement could not be an accord in satisfaction of a disputed or doubtful claim. But when the illegality of the express contracts is established, then it becomes a question whether the offer of a certain amount by the one party, upon a claim whose validity he correctly denies, on the express condition that the payment shall be taken in full satisfaction of the protended indebtedness, followed by the signing of a stipulation to that effect by the other party, and his acceptance of the amount offered, does not conclude him from ever disturbing the case thus adjusted, and from recovering the balance which he expressly relinquished?
If this were a suit between ordinary persons, we might say undoubtedly that the plaintiff was thus concluded. And if the analogy between these suits and an ordinary action were complete, we also might say that the claimants were concluded. But the analogy is defective in this essential — that if the claim had been against an ordinary person the plaintiff might have enforced it by a legal remedy, and hence that his settlement or compromise of what was doubtful or disputable was voluntary; while, here, the claimants had at that time no legal redress, and their refraining to accept what the commission offered would have been a sacrifice of all that was due to them. In the ordinary case the defendant says, you may accept what I offer you, or you may pursue your legal remedy; in this case the government said, you may accept what is offered, or you may go without anything. The controlling element of voluntary compromise was tliere--fore wanting; or, as was said by-Mr. Justice Story, in the case of The United States v. Dickson, 15 Peters, p. 161: "The construction given to the laws by any department of the executive government is necessarily ex parte, without the benefit .of an opposing argument, in a suit where the very matter is in controversy; and when the construction is once given, there is no opportunity to question, or revise it by those who are most interested in it, as officers deriving their salary and . emoluments therefrom, for they cannot bring the case to the test of a judicial decision. It is only when they are sued by the government for some supposed default or balance, that they can assert their rights. Their acquiescence, therefore, is almost from a moral necessity, when there is no choice hut obedience, as a matter of policy or duty."
I say that "at that time" the claimants had no legal redress, for at that time the Court of Claims as at present constituted did not exist. The court, down to its re-creation, in 1863, sat only to determine questions of law and fact, which, when determined, were to be submitted to the discretion of Congress. To procure the passage of a claim which had received the sanction of the court was found to be as difficult as to pass one which had never been submitted to it for adjudication. 'It was also found that Congress disregarded or rejected more of the judgments of the court than they enforced. In practical effect, therefore, as in legal theory, the court possessed no adequate remedy, and gave no judicial redress.
As at present constituted, the Court of Claims has all the power requisite for giving to the creditor upon contract against the United States effective and complete redress. It has power to summon witnesses, to enforce their attendance, to adjudicate " set-offs and counterclaims," to render final judgment against the government or against tiie claimant. These "final judgments," if in favor of the claimant, "shall be paid out of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims." (Act March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. L., p. 765.) The law and the ncmedy, therefore, are essentially different from the law and remedy existing at the time the claimants accepted the award of the military commission. The element of voluntary concession and compromise might now well exist in a similar transaction, and we should not in any sense be able to say that the party would have sacrificed everything if he had not accepted what the government saw fit to give him. Under the existing law we miglif well hold, upon the facts in these cases, that the claimants had a perfect legal option, and that they elected to compromise and settle their respective demands.
In the case of Reeside v. The United States, the amount claimed is $16,168 97, for commissions upon 5,027 horses, costing in the aggregate $646,760; and the further sum of $3,622 15, commissions upon military equipments and other property purchased by the claimant under the directions of the quartermaster, and costing the sum of $144,488 10; and for the further sum of $585 50, being money paid to the use of the United States, in furnishing necessary subsistence to the horses after purchase, &c., &c.; all of which amount in the aggregate to tbe sum of $20,376 62. This claim we reduce to $4,000. The evidence shows that Mr. Reeside was in the service of the government for a period of four months, and that he bore his expenses — travelling, advertising, &c. — of which no account was kept, he assuming that the contract allowing him commissions was valid. We find from the evidence that the sum of $4,000 is a reasonable compensation for these services andexpenses; and of the money paid to the use of the government, that the sum of $161 is established by the evidence, amounting in the • aggregate to $4,161, for which judgment will be rendered.
In the cases of Higdon, Morgan, and Geffroy, the findings of the court will be separately filed.
Peck, J., concurred in this opinion.
An accomplished scholar, Mr. James C. Welling, assistant clerk of the Court of Claims, has pointed out tho fact that this maxim is a corruption of tho text of Cicero, Silent euim leges inter arma, and hardly entitled to be called a maxim of constitutional law. " The saying," as Mr. Welling remarks, " takes its origin from Cicero, having been used by that great lawyer in the argument made in defence of Milo, when on trial for the killing of Clodius. Cicero, who was tho warm personal and political friend of Milo, appeared as his advocate before the judges selected to try him, and the great orator determined to rest his case on the theory that his client had killed Clodius in self-defence, under circumstances which rendered the killing of the latter justifiable, or excusable homicide. Having in the exordium of his argument briefly unfolded this view of the case, and excluded the idea that all acts of homicide were necessarily criminal, ho proceeded to say:
" 'There is then, judges, a law of this kind — not written, but inborn — which we have apprehended, drank in and extracted from nature herself; in conformity to which we have not been taught, but made; in which we have not been educated, but ingrained ; and this law is, that jf our life fall under peril from any ambush, violence, or weapon, whether of robbers or of personal enemies, recourse should be had to every honorable means to safety. For the laws are silent in the midst of arms.' "
Mr. Welling also cites Lord Coke as using the maxim in its original and proper form and
"And therefore when the courts of justice be open, and the judges and ministers of the same may by law protect men from wrong and violence, and distribute justice to all, it is said to be lime of peace. So, when by invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or such like, the peaceable course of justice is disturbed and stopped, so as the courts of justice be as were shut up, et silent leges inter arma, then it is said to be time of war." — Co. Litt. 249, b.
But the maxim is recognized in in its more modern sense by Sir James Mackintosh, in one of his greatest speeches, and the passage is quoted with approval by Sir Frederic Thesiger in the debate in Parliament upon the Ceylon disturbances. — Hansard, Vol. 117, p. 167 :
" While the laws arc silenced by the noise of arms, the rulers of the armed force must punish as equitably as they can those crimes which threaten their own safety and that of society, but no longer. Every moment beyond is usurpation. As soon as the law can act, every other mode of punishing supposed crime is itself an enormous crime." — Speech in the case of "Missionary smith," Mackintosh's Works, p. 734.