Case Name: Wm. H. Leonard, Plaintiff in Error, v. Henry C. Sparks, Defendant in Error
Court: Kansas City Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1890-05-19
Citations: 63 Mo. App. 585
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. H. Leonard, Plaintiff in Error, v. Henry C. Sparks, Defendant in Error.
Judges: G-ill, J., concurs. Smith, P. J., dissents.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 63
Pages: 585–615

Head Matter:
Wm. H. Leonard, Plaintiff in Error, v. Henry C. Sparks, Defendant in Error.
Kansas City Court of Appeals,
May 19, 1890.
1. Municipal Corporations: Kansas city: jurisdiction of mayor’s court: assessment of benefits: opening street. Where the proceeding to take private property for public use originates in an inferior tribunal of limited statutory power only, strict construction is applied and every statutory requirement must appear; and where under the Kansas City charter of 1875 the mayor’s court undertakes to assess benefits accruing from the opening of a street, the service of a proper notice on the landowner five days instead of six, renders the proceedings of the court void and subject to collateral attack. Smith, P. J., dissents in a separate opinion.
2. -:-:-:-. In a proceeding for assessing benefits accruing from the opening of a street, the notice prescribed by the statute is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and if not given as required, the whole proceeding is void, Smith, P. J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
3. -: -: -: -. The fact that the mayor’s court adjudged all parties had been duly notified and all persons interested duly served, is not conclusive as an adjudication of the service and is merely a recital. But there should be a finding of the facts which gives the court jurisdiction. Even in a court of general jurisdiction, such recital would be considered in connection with the whole record; and if the actual service was defective, there would be no presumption of other service.
4.--:-:-:-: appeal. On appeal the recital in the record of the circuit court that “Now come the parties to these proceedings, etc.,’’ is not conclusive with the personal appearance of one not served intime for the mayor’s court, Smith, P. J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
5. -:-:-:-: continuance. Though on the day to which the party is summoned the mayor continues the hearing for a period of more than six days, such continuance will not have the effect to cure the defect of the service.
6. -:-:-:-: jury: appeal. Smith, P. J., dissenting in a separate opinion: The fact that in a mayor’s court a,proper jury was not summoned can not render the proceeding void, since on appeal the jury was had in the circuit court.
ON MOTION EOR REHEARING.
7. --:-:-:-. Smith, P. j., dissenting in a separate opinion: Conceding that the jurisdiction involved by defective service went only to the person, and not to the subject-matter, the lack of notice for the statutory length of time renders the judgment void.
8. -:-:-:-: recital on appeal. Smith, P. J., dissenting in a separate opinion: In all cases where the expression as to service in the judgment is general, it will be confined to the parties served with process.
Appeal from the Saline Circuit Court. — Hon. Richard Field, Judge.
Aeeirmed and transferred to the supreme court and, on being remanded, reversed with directions.
Samuel Boyd and Franlc P. Sebree for plaintiff in error.
(1) The notice to Edward H. Bouton in the mayor’s court was sufficient. It was served more than six days before the jury was impaneled. This was all that was required by the charter of the city. Laws, 1875, p. 244, see. 2; see, also, Bowman v. B,ailroad, 102 111. 472. ’(2) The record shows that Bouton was a party to the proceedings, and the recital of the mayor’s record is that “the court adjudges that all parties have been duly notified and all persons interested duly served.” The cause was appealed to the circuit court by one of these parties and this appeal carried up the whole case to be tried de novo. Laws, 1875, pp. 247, 248, sec. 6; State ex ret. v. Gill, 84 Mo. 248. The record of the circuit court recited on two occasions that the parties to the proceedings were present. The recitals of the record are entitled to absolute verity. They can not be .contradicted in a collateral proceeding, but must be taken as true. Freeman on Judgments, sec. 130; Grow v. MeyersiecTt, 88 Mo. 411, 415, 416; Runfelt v. O’Brien, 57 Mo. 570; Bwiham v. Wilfong, 69 Mo. 355; Freeman v. Thompson, 53 Mo. 183, 190, 193; Lin-dell v. Bank, 4 Mo. 228; Gates v. Listen, 89 Mo. 13; Schad v. Sharp, 95 Mo. 573; Huxley v. Harrold, .62 Mo. 516; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 124.
D. D. JDuggins for defendant in error.
(1) Edward H. Bouton was entitled to six days’ notice. He only had five. The record shows this; the petition states it, and the same is taken as true. This notice is entirely insufficient. Laws, 1875, sec. 2, p. 245, line 19. (2) In proceedings to open streets, a person whose property is assessed with benefits to be served with notice in the same manner that a person whose property is condemned is required to be served. State v. St. Louis, 67 Mo. 113'; Fils v. Railroad, 51 Mo. 200,203. ' ( 3 ) A person not served with process or notiee of a proceeding to condemn his land, is not bound thereby. State v. St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 503; Moses v. St. Louis Lock Go., 84 Mo. 245. (4) The want of notice and the failure to impanel the proper jury are both jurisdictional questions and can be raised at any time by any person to the proceedings. Railroad v. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585; Hansberger v. Railroad, 43 Mo. 196, 200; France v. Fvans, 90 Mo. 74, 77. (5) In proceedings of this nature, in derogation of common law and right, the utmost strictness is required in order to give them validity, and, unless it appear upon the face of the proceedings that every- essential prerequisite of the statute conferring the authority has been fully complied with, every step, will be coram non judice. Ells v. Railroad, 51 Mo. 200; Qmningham v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 33; Anderson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo. 61; Bliae v. Gastlio, 8 Mo. App. 290. Notice of proceedings to take property for public use, when required to be given, is the foundation of the right to proceed; and if such notice be not given, or if not given in the way prescribed, the proceedings are void. Baltimore v. Bouldin, 23 Md. 328; Darlington v. Commomoealth, 41 Pa. St. 68; Horbeclc v. Toledo, 11 Ohio, 219; Nichols go. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Goudy v. Hall, 30 111. 109; Wort v. Finley, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 335. Downs v. Fuller, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 135; Outhwite v. Porter, 13 Mich. 533. (6) The judgment rendered without notice is void. Anderson v. Broim, 9 Mo. 640; Roach v. Burnes, 33 Mo. 319; Railroad v. Reynold, 89 Mo. 146. And advantage may be taken of such judgment in a collateral proceeding. Abbott v. Shepperd, 44 Mo. 273; Higgins v. Piltser, 49 Mo. 152; Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502; Ferguson v. Crowford, 70 N. T. 253; France v. Evans, 90 Mo. 74, 77; Daughtery v. Brown, 91 Mo. 26, 30. “No question is better settled than that a judgment by default rendered upon a service within the time the law provides is invalid.” France v. Evans, supra; Miller v. Snider, 6 Ind. 1; Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 247; Bank v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453; Swiggart v. Harber, 5 111. 4 (Scam.) 364; Seely v. Reid, 3 Iowa, 374; Dick v. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Camden v. Mulford, 26 N. J. L. 49; Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491; McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300; Gait v. Harén, 30 Com. 190. And ever though the jurisdiction of' the court over the person appear affirmatively from the record. Eagor v. Storer, 59 Mo. 87; Norton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 367; Mayer v. Hartman, 14 Mo. App. 132. (7) The recital of the mayor’s record to effect that “the court adjudges that all parties have been duly notified, and all persons interested duly served” is flatly contradicted by the balance of the record, the marshal’s return on the notice to Bouton, as shown by the allegations in plaintiff’s petition. Such recitals are not absolute, but can be thus contradicted. The record shows no appearance of any kind by Bouton.' The marshal’s return must prevail against those of the judgment. Coon v. Ciato, 83 Ind. 417; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 503, 506; Higgins v. Beckwith, 102 Mo. 456,462. (8) The fact that the clerk, in entering up an order, uses the term “defendants” does not affect, nor purport to affect, defendants not served. Dawson v. Bridges, 19 111. App. 280; Freeman on Judgment, sec. 155.
Statement by Ellison J. — In this case the plaintiff sues the defendant on his covenants to recover $484.56 with interest from October 3, 1888, which the plaintiff alleges he was bound to pay and did pay as special tax on lots'6, 7, and 8, of Block 3, of Downing’s resurvey of Longview Place, an addition to the City of Kansas, Jackson county, Missouri. The trial court found for defendant, and he brings the case here by writ of error.
The defendant sold plaintiff these lots and conveyed the same to him by deed dated the fifth day of October, 1887, and duly acknowledged on the eighth day o£ November, 1887. The deed was a general warranty deed, with the usual covenants of warranty. Following the covenants of warranty is this language: “Except the mortgage above referred to and except taxes assessed since January 1, 1887, exemptions not to include special tax assessed before the date of this deed.”
On the eighteenth day of January, 1887, an ordinance passed by the common council of the City of Kansas to open Elma street in said city from Wabash avenue to E. L. Henkle’s addition, was duly approved and went into effect. Said ordinance provided for the taking of private property in order to open said street and for the paying the owners just compensation. It also prescribed the limits within which private property should be deemed benefited by the opening said street, and be assessed and charged to pay the compensation for the private property taken for the purpose of opening said street. The said lots were in the prescribed limits.
At the time of the approval and taking effect of such ordinance one Edward H. Bouton was the owner of said lots, and he afterward conveyed the same to defendant.
Upon the taking effect of said ordinance the city engineer made out and delivered to the mayor of said city a statement of the property to be taken, and the property deemed benefited and to be assessed to pay compensation as provided by said ordinance, giving the names of the owners of such lots or parcels of property, who were such at the time of passage and taking effect of said ordinance.
That on the twenty-seventh day of - June, 1887, the mayor, under and in pursuance of said ordinance appointed a day and place for impaneling a jury to ascertain the compensation for the property to be taken for said street, and to make assessments to pay the same, the date being July 12, 1887, and the place the common council chamber of the city. The city clerk thereupon issued the proper notices required by the amended charter in such cases. Notice was served on said Edward H. Bouton on the seventh day of July, 1887.
On the twelfth day of July, 1887, it appeared that notice had not been served on several of the parties interested, and the mayor continued the matter of impaneling the' jury until August 24, 1887. • The record of the mayor of August 24 recites that “the court adjudges that all parties have been duly notified and all persons interested duly served.” On August 24, 1887, a jury was duly impaneled in the mayor’s court, heard the evidence, viewed the property, heard the instructions, and rendered a verdict August 25, 1887, which, among other things, assessed certain benefits against said lots. The verdict was reported to the common council and confirmed and approved by ordinance, and the mayor entered judgment in accordance With the verdict.
In due time one of the parties to said proceedings appealed the same to the circuit court at Nansas City, and the cause came on for trial in the circuit court on March 13, 1888, and the record of said court recites that on said day “came the parties;” a jury was impaneled, a trial had, and afterward the jury returned into court their verdict, and the said circuit court record recites as follows: “Now on this nineteenth day of March, 1888, come the parties to these proceedings;” and the jury having returned their verdict, “and no cause to the contrary being shown,” the court ordered and adjudged that said verdict be approved and .confirmed, and rendered judgment accordingly.
That by said proceedings, verdict and judgment there was assessed against said lots benefits and assessments of $150 against each lot, in all $450 which by the amended charter of said city became a lien on the lots dating from the taking effect of said ordinance, viz., January 18, 1887. Neither said Bouton nor de fendant paid said taxes, and the plaintiff was compelled to and did pay the same, together with $34.56 interest, on the third day of October, 1888, in order to prevent the sale of said lots by said city under said judgment.
The section of the charter of Kansas City authorizing the proceeding is as follows:
“When any ordinance provides for taking private property, as authorized in the preceding section, the common council shall by ordinance, before any steps are taken to impanel a jury, determine and prescribe the limits within which private property shall be deemed benefited by the proposed improvement, and be assessed and charged to pay compensation therefor; and thereupon the city engineer shall make out and deliver to the mayor a statement, by plat, map, or otherwise, containing a correct description of the several lots or parcels of private property to be taken, together with a correct description of the several lots or parcels of property deemed benefited and to be assessed to pay compensation as provided by ordinance, as aforesaid, and containing also the names of the owners and claimants of such lots or parcels of property, or of any interest or estate therein, who may be such at the time of the passage of the ordinance providing for taking such private property.
“The mayor shall, thereupon, by order, appoint a day or place for impaneling a jury to ascertain the compensation for the property to be taken, and to make assessments to pay the same. The city clerk shall then issue a notice, under his hand and the seal of the city, which shall give the names of the owners of the property to be taken, and state that their property will be taken for the purpose specified in the ordinance, giving the title and date of approval thereof, and that a jury will be impaneled to ascertain'the compensation therefor on the day and at the place fixed by the mayor. The city clerk shall also issue another notice under his hand and the seal of the city, which shall give the ’ names of the owners of the property to be assessed for compensation and state that their property will be assessed to compensate for the taking of private property for the purpose specified in the ordinance, giving the title and date of the approval thereof and that a jury will be impaneled to take such assessment on the day and at the place fixed by the mayor. Each property owner shall be served with the notice in which the name of such owner is given, either by delivering to such owner a copy of the notice, or leaving such copy for such owner at the usual place of abode of such owner with some member of the family of such owner over the age of fifteen years (corporations to be served in like manner as with summons in ordinary civil action), or if service can not be made on all or any of the parties, as aforesaid, within the city limits, the return shall so state, and the return on such notice shall be prima facie evidence of all facts stated therein; whereupon a copy of the notice not fully served, or, if necessary, an alias notice, specifying a different day to be fixed by the mayor for impaneling a jury shall be published for four weeks before the day fixed for impaneling the jury, in the newspaper for the time doing the city printing.
“The mayor may continue the matter for impaneling a jury from time to time, and cause new notices to be issued or published for owners named by the engineer or others interested, until jurisdiction of the proper parties is obtained. An affidavit of any publisher of any notice, accompanied with a copy of the notice, shall be evidence of the fact of publication as therein stated. Service of the notices shall be made at least six days before the jury shall be impaneled; publication shall he sufficient if made for the four weeks next preceding the impaneling of the jury. It shall be sufficient to bring in the owners of property, who may be such at the date of the passage of the ordinance providing for the improvement, and all parties claiming or holding through or under such owners, or any of them, shall be bound by the proceedings without being brought in; in respect to any property affected by the proceedings through all or any of the parties claiming or holding through or under such owners, or any of them, may be joined on their own motion, or be brought in on order of the mayor.”
This case only reached the reporter, December 2, 1895.

Opinion:
Ellison, J.
A perusal of the statement of this cause will disclose that the question for solution here is that of the validity of the proceedings had in the matter of the condemnation of property for a public street; in other words, the taking of private property for public use, where such proceedings originated before an inferior tribunal of limited statutory power only. "Where such is the case, we merely assert common, learning when we say that a strict construction must be applied and that every statutory requirement must appear to have been performed in order to validate the proceedings. State ex rel. Greely v. City of St. Louis, 67 Mo. 113; Ells v. Railroad, 51 Mo. 200.
This strict and close adherence to the statutory requirement must be followed until jurisdiction be fully obtained; after having acquired jurisdiction there are doubtless some irregularities which would not subject the proceedings to collateral attack. And in this connection plaintiff made one of his principal points in argument. He contends that jurisdiction of the subject-matter was obtained by the mayor's court upon the passage of the ordinance prescribing the limits in which private property may be benefited, and also, perhaps, the filing with the mayor the engineer's statement; that jurisdiction of the person of Bouton, who then owned the property, was obtained by service of the notice upon him, however erroneous or defective such service may have been; that defective service, unlike no service, causes jurisdiction over the person to attach, and that the defect can only be reached directly and not collaterally. These are his contentions and he has cited strong authority which maintains that irregular or defective service of notice secures jurisdiction of the person and will not defeat .jurisdiction of the cause. Freeman on Judg., sec. 26; Harrington v. Wofford, 46 Miss. 31; Isaacs v. Price, 2 Dillon C. C. 347; Ballinger v. Tarbell, 16 Iowa, 491. The latter ease was where the statute required five days for service and only four were given.
But in these authorities it appears, or is assumed, •or it is shown, that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter regardless of notice, and the distinction between jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person is in the mind of those courts.
The case at bar belongs to a different class. It is of that class where the tribunal can only act conditionally ; where the notice required by the statute is a prerequisite to jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Wright v. Wilson, 95 Ind. 408; Doody v. Vaughn 7 Neb. 28; Van Auken v. Highway Com. 27 Mich. 414; Leavitt v. Eastman, 77 Maine, 117; Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 95.
Notice, as prescribed by the statute, must be given before jurisdiction can by acquired to act at all in oases involving a special statutory proceeding for taking the property of the citizen for public use. Whether such notice be personal or constructive can make no difference in the principle. And, if not so given, the whole proceeding is void (at least as to the party affected) and may be attacked collaterally. Authorities supra, and Frizzel v. Rogers, 82 Ill. 109; Hull v. Railroad, 21 Neb. 371; Commissioners v. Harper, 38 Ill. 103; Brazee v. Raymond, 59 Mich. 548; Odle v. Knisken, 54 N. Y. 52; Fravent v. Frinfrock, 43 Ohio St. 335; Platt v. Highway Com. 38 Mich. 247; Morgan v. Railroad, 36 Mich. 428; Stanford v. Worn, 27 Cal. 171.
The case last cited was a defective or irregular service, in that the publication of the notice was for a shorter period than that prescribed. The case of Morgan v. Railroad was where the notice was mailed to the wrong post office. In each, the proceedings were held void for lack of jurisdiction. In Leavitt v. Eastman, 77 Maine, 117, it is declared that, 'under statute authority, all the statute requirements must be fully and strictly complied with. In the procedure, no step, however unimportant, seemingly, must be omitted, nor will the substitution of other steps, in the place of those named in the statute, be sufficient. To deprive the citizen of his property requires the whole statute, and nothing in the place of the statute. If there be' any degree in the importance of the requirements, that of notice of the intended proceedings, would be the' chief."
In all the foregoing authorities the proceedings were held not merely erroneous, but void. Most of the cases, were a collateral attack on the proceedings, and in several there was a notice, but not of the character or for the time prescribed by the statute conferring .the jurisdiction.
But we need not confine ourselves to the investigation of cases in other states. The supreme court of this state, in our opinion, has passed upon kindred questions in accord with the foregoing views. The case of State ex rel. Greely v. City of St. Louis, 67 Mo. 113, was a case of defective service, though it was a direct and not a collateral attack on the proceedings, but the court says that: "Notice to relators was a jurisdictional fact and is an essential prerequisite to be complied with before their property could be assessed with benefits." Chicago, R. I. & P. Railway Co. v. Young, 96 Mo. 39, was a direct attack upon proceedings had to open a public road and the court held: "The fact of notice having' been given in the mode pointed out by the statute, is as much a jurisdictional prerequisite as is the residence of the statutory number of petitioners. If either be lacking, the jurisdiction fails, and for the obvious reason that such proceedings, being in invitum, in derogation of the common law and common right, are always regarded as strictissimi juris, and receive no aid from intendments or implication." Zimmerman v. Snowden, 88 Mo. 218, and Doughtery v. Brown, 91 Mo. 26, were collateral attacks upon proceedings opening public roads, and it was held that notice of the intended application for the roads should be put up for twenty days as required by statute and that such was a jurisdictional fact. The case of Whitely v. Platte Co., 73 Mo. 30, though a direct appeal to reverse the order laying out a new road, is quite applicable to this case. There was a notice, but it was defective and irregular in that it did not comply with the statute, and the court held that notice for twenty days was jurisdictional and an indispensable prerequisite.
II. It is, however, further insisted that, as the record of the mayor's court recites that "the court adjudged that all parties have been duly notified and all persons interested duly served," that this is an adjudication of service and conclusive in a collateral proceeding. This is not tenable. An inferior court with special limited jurisdiction will not be permitted to give itself jurisdiction by a mere recital that it had such. The matters showing the jurisdiction must affirmatively appear. The service which the court recites was due-service, should have been stated affirmatively.
Again, even if the court had been one of general common law jurisdiction, such recital would be considered in connection with the whole record, and would be held to refer to the particular service actually made as is shown by other parts of the record, and, if the-actual service shows itself to be fatally defective, there-is no presumption of any other service. Cloud v. Peirce City, 86 Mo. 357; Adams v. Cowles, 95 Mo. 501; Blodgett v. Schaeffer, 94 Mo. 652.
III. It is further insisted that on the appeal of the case before the mayor to the circuit court there is a. recital in the record of the circuit court, that: 'Now-on this nineteenth day of March, 1888, come the parties-to these proceedings," which is contended to be conclusive as to the appearance of Bouton, under the rule laid, down in Crow v. Meyersieck, 88 Mo. 411. The .rule in that case is not applicable. That was with reference to-jurisdiction over the person, and we have shown that in this case there was no jurisdiction by the mayor's court over the subject-matter, in that, there was lacking-the essential prerequisite of statutory notice. It needs no argument to show that if there was no jurisdiction of the subject-matter by the mayor's court, there could be-none conferred upon the circuit court by appeal, and that,[if such case comes before the circuit court, the proceedings should be dismissed. Haggard v. Railroad, 63 Mo. 302; Jist v. Loring, 60 Mo. 487.
IY. It is further insisted that, as the jury was not impaneled on the day named in the notice to Bouton but that the cause was continued to a period of more-than six days from the date of service upon him, he had the requisite six days' notice. The charter-requires that a day and place for assessment shall be fixed by the mayor and that notice of such day and place when and where a jury will be impaneled shall be issued by the city clerk and that service of such notice shall be made at least six days before the day fixed for empaneling such jury. The fact that there was a continuance of the case can in no case aid the jurisdiction which had not attached. The provision of the charter in regard to continuances where proper service has not been had, does not aim to cure an improper service.When there has nob been a proper service, the mayor may, says the charter, continue the matter of impaneling a jury from time to time, and cause new notices to be issued or published until jurisdiction is obtained. This we regard as a command of the statute which is in the face of the contention here urged.
We have been cited to the case of Bowman v. Railroad, 102 Ill. 472, a condemnation case, as sustaining the view taken by pliantiff as to the continuance curing the defect of the service and as to jurisdiction being obtained by the defective service. We are not advised as to the statutes under which the proceedings were instituted. But whatever the statute may be, the court, in announcing that strict construction need not be given in such cases and that a close adherence to the statute need not be had, is diametrically opposed to our notions of the law in such cases as it has been frequently declared by our supreme court.
The result is that the judgment should be affirmed.
G-ill, J., concurs. Smith, P. J., dissents.