Case Name: JANE DOE (A FICTITIOUS NAME), A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARTHA FISHER AND MARTHA FISHER, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1981-03-25
Citations: 178 N.J. Super. 499
Docket Number: 
Parties: JANE DOE (A FICTITIOUS NAME), A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARTHA FISHER AND MARTHA FISHER, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 178
Pages: 499–508

Head Matter:
JANE DOE (A FICTITIOUS NAME), A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARTHA FISHER AND MARTHA FISHER, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued January 5, 1981
Decided March 25, 1981.
Before Judges ALLCORN, KOLE and PRESSLER.
Shannon Z. Taylor argued the cause for appellants (D’Alessandro, Sussman, Jacovino & Dowd, attorneys; Paul J. Hirsh, on the brief).
Paulette M. Sapp, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (John J. Degnan, Attorney General, attorney; Erminie L. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLCORN, P. J. A. D.
The present action was commenced by plaintiffs seeking damages for an asserted physical assault and rape committed against plaintiff Jane Doe while she and her alleged assailant were residents of Ewing Residential Center, a DYFS facility. The cause of action sounds in negligence, asserting that plaintiff's injuries resulted from the failure of defendants adequately to supervise the residents of the facility and their failure to take proper precautions for plaintiff's safety. On motion, the trial judge granted the application of defendants for summary judgment on the ground that, under the Tort Claims Act, the State, its agencies and employees are not liable for damages arising from "any injury caused by . a prisoner to any other prisoner." N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 b(4). Plaintiffs appeal.
The record reveals that in 1974 the parents of the minor plaintiff entered into an agreement with the predecessor agency of DYFS requesting foster care for plaintiff and two other children. Thereafter, although placed in a number of foster homes, plaintiff ran away and refused to stay in individual foster homes. As a result, a proceeding was ultimately initiated against plaintiff by DYFS in the Morris County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. After a hearing plaintiff was adjudicated a juvenile in need of supervision (JINS) and was remanded to the Youth Shelter pending exploration of residential placement. A subsequent hearing resulted in the placement of plaintiff in Ewing Residential Center. The Center is a group foster home—a residential facility for "hard to place" children, who are emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted. It was during her stay at the Center that the asserted assault and rape occurred. The alleged perpetrator concededly was also a resident at the Center by virtue of his adjudication as a JINS and an order of placement to the Center.
The single issue raised on this appeal is whether the minor plaintiff (as well as her alleged assailant) was a "prisoner" within the contemplation of that term as used in N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 b(4). The cited subsection provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for:
b. Any injury caused by:
(4) a prisoner to any other prisoner.
By common definition, "[a] 'prisoner' is a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of judicial or other lawful process." 60 AmJur.2d Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 1 at 808. A juvenile who, in an appropriate proceeding in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, has been adjudicated a JINS and who, by order of that court, has been committed to a youth facility such as the Center—a group foster home operated by the State (DYFS) to provide care and supervision for those youths committed to it—is "in the custody of the person in charge of the . [facility] and is not free to come and go at will." State in the Interest of M. S., 73 N.J. 238, 244 (1977). He or she has been committed to the custody of the person in charge of the juvenile facility and is there under a restraint against leaving voluntarily. Such juvenile is thus deprived of his or her liberty by virtue of judicial process issued in and as the result of a judicial proceeding.
We recognize, of course, that a JINS in custody at such a juvenile facility is not a "prisoner" in the sense of being an inmate of State Prison or some other state or county penal establishment. Indeed, it is of some significance that the Legislature utilized the term "prisoner" in the statutory context, rather than the designation "prison inmate." See, e. g., White v. Lewis, 156 N.J.Super. 198 (App.Div.1978).
Of even greater significance is the fact that our Tort Claims Act was modeled upon the California tort claims statute (Cal. Government Code § 810 et seq.), which undoubtedly was subjected to thorough study by the members of our Legislature before the adoption of the New Jersey statute. Section 844.6(a)(2) of the California Government Code provided that a public entity should not be liable for "[a]n injury to any prisoner." In defining the term the California Legislature stated that " 'prisoner' includes an inmate of a prison, jail or penal or correctional facility." The Legislative Committee comment to that section sets forth in so many words that the immunity so provided makes the public entity "immune from liability for injuries to prisoners (which includes wards of the juvenile court). ."
Indeed, the very issue now before us was presented to the California courts in Jimenez v. Santa Cruz Cty., 42 Cal.App.3d 407, 116 Cal.Rptr. 878 (D.Ct.App.1974). It was there held that the statutory proviso immunized the public entity against any tort claim by reason of the drowning death of a juvenile who, at the time of the occurrence, had been judicially declared a ward of the juvenile court and committed to a group foster home facility. The California court determined that the juvenile was a "prisoner" within the comprehension of the immunity statute by reason of the fact that "a ward of the juvenile court, committed to a place of custody such as a foster home, is 'one involuntarily restrained,' 'one who is in custody as the result of a legal process' and one 'deprived of his liberty by virtue of a judicial . . process.' " Id. at 410, 116 Cal.Rptr. at 879. The court concluded that, in the circumstances, the juvenile was a "prisoner" in the custody of the director of the foster home facility, even though "the drowning occurred while the director of the home had taken the juvenile on a vacation trip with other inmates of the home." Id. at 412, 116 Cal.Rptr. at 881.
We are not unmindful of the policy and purposes of the legislation dealing with JINS and juvenile delinquents, "to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of juveniles coming within the provisions" of the act. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-42(a). Nothing in the purpose or terms of the act dealing with juveniles, however, imposes liability upon the State, explicitly or implicitly when a juvenile committed to its custody by order of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is injured by the intentional act of another juvenile while both are in custody.
N.J.S.A. 59:5-1 sets forth plainly and unambiguously the underlying policy and purpose of the Tort Claims Act in this area. That section provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide a prison, jail or penal or correctional facility, or if such facility is provided, for failure to provide sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities in a prison or other correctional facility.
Fundamentally, N.J.S.A. 59:5-1 et seq. recognize the accepted principle that the allocation of the limited funds available to the State and other public entities for equipment and personnel in the administration, supervision and operation of custodial facilities to which prisoners are committed "involves the type of governmental policy determinations which must remain free from the threat of tort liability." Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:5-1.
Hence we discern no real conflict between the purposes and policies, of the two statutes. They speak to separate and independent subjects and concerns. But, even upon the dubious assumption that some general conflict does exist, the specific immunization contained in N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 b(4) must control. This conclusion receives added support from the immunization of the State and other public entities against similar liability in the case of persons suffering from mental illness. In the face of the obvious concern and policy of the Legislature for the care, custody and protection of persons affected with mental illness (see, e. g., N.J.S.A. 30:4-24, 24.2), here, too, the Legislature has immunized the State and public entities against liability for injury "caused by any person who has been confined for mental illness . upon any other person so confined," N.J.S.A. 59:6-7(b). Thus, we perceive no bases in reason or logic for construing the statutory section here in question as being inapplicable to a JINS.
In light of all the foregoing we are convinced that the Tort Claims Act bars a cause of action against the State or other public entity or public employees for an injury occurring to a JINS while committed to and in custody of a group foster home facility, which injury is caused by another JINS so committed to and in custody at the same facility.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Law Division is affirmed. No costs.