Case Name: Warren MADISON, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS ISLAND COUNTRY CLUB, LTD., and Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-29
Citations: 606 So. 2d 687
Docket Number: No. 91-2972
Parties: Warren MADISON, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS ISLAND COUNTRY CLUB, LTD., and Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.
Judges: Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 687–690

Head Matter:
Warren MADISON, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS ISLAND COUNTRY CLUB, LTD., and Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.
No. 91-2972.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 29, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1992.
Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., and Thomas Eugene Zamorano, Miami, for appellant.
William T. Moore, Ormond Beach, for appellee Unemployment Appeals Commission.
Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Warren Madison (Madison), challenges the Unemployment Appeals Commission decision affirming the denial of unemployment benefits. We reverse.
Madison, a man who could neither read nor write, worked for the Williams Island Country Club from 1983, until May 1991, when he was discharged for refusing to work overtime without overtime pay. The appeals referee found that on many occasions Madison, a salaried employee, had been asked and had worked overtime without pay.
Before the day in question, Madison's supervisor informed all employees that they would have to work late that day. However, as the record reflects, Madison was the only employee actually asked to work overtime.
When given the position of irrigation technician in 1988, Madison was told that his work would be limited to irrigation work. On this day, Madison was asked to work overtime mowing the lawn.
Madison noticed that the hourly mowing employees were not asked to work overtime that day. Madison then indicated that he too would not work late and left at the end of his regular shift. This was the first time in his employment with appellee that he had refused to work overtime.
Madison contends that overtime work requires overtime pay and that when an employer refuses to pay required wages, a claimant does not commit misconduct in deciding not to work. Appellee asserts that as a salaried employee, Madison was not entitled to overtime wages, and thus, his refusal to complete an assigned task constituted misconduct.
An employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he has been "discharged by his employing unit for misconduct connected with his work." Section 443.101(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991).
Section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1991), defines "misconduct":
"Misconduct" includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer.
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that an employee working longer than forty hours a week must be paid overtime, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), unless he or she is a "bona fide executive," or meets another exemption. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). There is no exemption for salaried workers. Further, there is no record evidence that Madison's employment falls within any other exemption.
To invoke the "bona fide executive" exemption, the "employee's primary duty must consist of the management of the enterprise . or of a customarily recognized department." The employee must "customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other employees," and possess hiring and firing responsibilities as well as other "discretionary powers." 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a), (b), (c), (d).
These exemptions are "construed narrowly against the employer" who carries the burden of proof to establish the exemption. Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir.1990); Blackmon v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 835 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.1988); Cobb v. Finest Foods, Inc., 755 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.1985); Marshall v. Erin Food Services, Inc., 672 F.2d 229 (1st Cir.1982).
The standard of review in this case is whether the conclusion of the appeals referee, finding misconduct, was supported by competent substantial evidence. Lun-dy's Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 373 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
To determine whether an employee's refusal to do extra or different work constitutes misconduct, a reasonableness standard is applied. Kraft, Inc. v. State, Unemployment Appeals Commission, 478 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
We accept the appeal's referee's findings of fact. However, we reject his legal conclusion that Madison's actions constituted misconduct. When asked by his supervisor why he would not work overtime, Madison responded, "Slave days are over." We agree.
This case presents a one-time refusal of an employee, non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, to work overtime without overtime pay. We find that Madison acted reasonably and within the law.
Madison was not a "bona fide executive" and did not meet any other exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Thus, Madison was entitled to overtime pay for overtime hours.
We recognize that the issue of noncompliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act may not have been expressly raised below by Madison. However, Madison is not able to read or write and was not represented by counsel before the Unemployment Appeals Commission. It is unreasonable to expect an illiterate layman to argue that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a defense to a charge of misconduct.
Furthermore, implicit in the referee's finding that Madison was guilty of misconduct, is that Madison was legally required to work overtime without overtime pay. This is not the law. Therefore, in deciding whether Madison was guilty of misconduct, it is necessary for this court to determine whether Madison was legally required to work overtime.
In Mueller v. Harry Lee Motors, 334 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), this Court held that an employee had good cause to terminate his employment for not receiving overtime compensation for overtime worked. Thus, he remained entitled to receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. Accordingly, an employee who was discharged for refusing to work overtime without pay is also entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
Accordingly, we reverse.
BASKIN and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.