Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Robert J. REARDON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-06-01
Citations: 763 So. 2d 418
Docket Number: Nos. 5D98-3154, 5D98-3221
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Robert J. REARDON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: DAUKSCH, PETERSON, GRIFFIN, THOMPSON, SAWAYA and PLEUS, J.J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 763
Pages: 418–427

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Robert J. REARDON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 5D98-3154, 5D98-3221.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 1, 2000.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Stephanie H. Park, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
EN BANC
ANTOON, C.J.
Robert J. Reardon was found guilty by a jury of aggravated battery and first degree burglary. Relying on this court's decision in Crawford v. State, 662 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the trial court determined that convictions for both aggravated battery and first degree burglary constituted a violation of Mr. Reardon's protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article. I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. Ac cordingly, the court entered the order of acquittal on the aggravated battery conviction from which the State of Florida appeals. We reverse and, in doing so, recede from our opinion in Crawford.
Mr. Reardon broke into a residence and stabbed Thomas Rawson while Mr. Raw-son was taking a shower. After the incident, Mr. Reardon gave the police a tape-recorded statement admitting his actions. As a result of this conduct, Mr. Reardon was charged with attempted first degree murder and first degree burglary.
The matter went to trial and the jury found Mr. Reardon guilty of aggravated battery as a lesser included offense to the attempted first degree murder charge in count I and "burglary with an assault or battery and/or burglary while armed" in count II. The trial court granted Mr. Rear-don's renewed post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal as to count I on the basis that "it would violate his double jeopardy rights to convict him of both Count I, Aggravated Battery, and Count II, Burglary with an Assault or Battery and/or Burglary while Armed." In explaining its ruling, the court stated, "Under Crawford v. State, 662 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), a court may not sentence a defendant for both aggravated battery and burglary with battery where each offense arose from the same battery." The trial court then adjudicated Mr. Reardon guilty on count II and sentenced him to 100 months' imprisonment followed by 20 years' probation.
In Crawford, the defendant was convicted of committing an aggravated battery on the occupant of a dwelling and first degree burglary based upon evidence that, in the course of the burglary, the defendant committed a battery on the occupant of the dwelling. See Crawford, 662 So.2d at 1017. The defendant appealed his convictions arguing that he was improperly convicted of both crimes because only one battery was committed. Upon review, a panel of this court agreed, concluding that pursuant to paragraph 775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1993), it was improper to convict the defendant on both charges. Id. We now, upon en banc consideration, recede from Crawford based upon our conclusion that there is no statutory or constitutional bar to the entry of convictions for both aggravated battery and burglary with a battery arising out of the same criminal episode.
Section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), states that it is the intent of the Legislature to convict and sentence a defendant for each offense he commits during the course of a single criminal episode. Thus, the Legislature clearly intended to separately punish burglary as enhanced and battery as enhanced. See § 810.02(1), (2)(a), 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). That does not end our inquiry, however. Section 775.021(4)(b) lists three exceptions to this rule of construction under which the offenses at issue must be tested. If burglary with a battery and aggravated battery come within any of the listed exceptions, then convictions for both offenses are precluded. The statute prohibits convictions for both offenses if the offenses are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.
See § 775.021(4)(b)l.,2.,3., Fla. Stat. (1997).
Regarding the first and second exceptions, certainly burglary with a battery and aggravated battery do not require identical elements of proof. Although they both share the common element of battery, each offense in addition requires proof of elements not required by the other. As a result, the two offenses fail the "same elements" test described in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Also, the two offenses are not degrees of the same crime as provided by statute. Thus, the first two statutory exceptions do not apply.
As for the third exception, we conclude that exception is also inapplicable because neither offense is subsumed by the other under the facts presented in the instant case. While simple battery is a lesser included offense of burglary with a battery, see Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), the same is not true of aggravated battery. Aggravated battery requires the use of a deadly weapon, an element not required for the offense of burglary with a battery. In reaching this conclusion, we join the First District in Billiot v. State, 711 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and the Second District in Washington v. State, 752 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), in holding that convictions for both aggravated battery and first degree burglary stemming from the same criminal episode do not violate the terms of the statute.
In Billiot, the First District construed the third exception in the identical context presented in our case — dual convictions for aggravated battery and first degree burglary. The court affirmed both convictions, explaining:
Aggravated battery and first degree burglary do not require identical elements of proof, are not degrees of the same offense and do not fall within category three as lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater.
Billiot, 711 So.2d at 1279. In Washington, the Second District reached the same result, and in doing so, cited conflict with Crawford. See Washington, 752 So.2d at 17-18. Having decided to recede from Crawford, we must reverse the trial court's order of acquittal on count I, reinstate the jury's verdict of guilt, and remand for re-sentencing.
On cross appeal, Mr. Reardon challenges the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court on his first degree burglary conviction, arguing the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to redact portions of his audio-taped confession relative to the possible existence of a restraining order against him and his HIV status. Mr. Reardon's conviction and sentence on the first degree burglary charge is affirmed, no reversible error having been demonstrated.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for re-sentencing.
DAUKSCH, PETERSON, GRIFFIN, THOMPSON, SAWAYA and PLEUS, J.J., concur.
HARRIS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, with opinion.
COBB, J., dissenting, with opinion.
W. SHARP J., dissenting, with opinion.
. § 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).
. § 810.02(1), (2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).
. The instant verdict form reveals that the jury was presented with, and chose the option of, finding Mr. Reardon guilty of burglary with an assault or battery "and/or" burglary while armed. Thus, it is unclear whether the jury found Mr. Reardon guilty of (1) burglary while armed, or (2) burglary with an assault or battery. Upon this record, this court can not determine which facts the jury found to conclude Mr. Reardon was guilty of the first degree burglary. We must read the verdict in a manner which would give the benefit of the doubt to Mr. Reardon. See Valentine v. State, 688 So.2d 313 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 830, 118 S.Ct. 95, 139 L.Ed.2d 51 (1997); Torna v. State, 742 So.2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Of course, a finding that Mr. Reardon committed the burglary while armed would neither trigger Crawford concerns nor raise the specter of double jeopardy because both aggravated battery and armed burglary obviously contain elements not common to the other. See § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1997); M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). However, since such a finding would result in reversal and remand for reinstatement of the aggravated battery conviction, it would not be to Mr. Reardon's benefit to indulge in such an assumption. Neither would it be to Mr. Rear-don's benefit for this court to assume that the jury found him guilty of burglary with a battery, given our recession from Crawford. As a result, it is irrelevant to the disposition of the instant appeal whether the jury found Mr. Reardon guilty of committing the burglary while armed or guilty of committing the burglary with an assault or battery because neither finding would preclude the imposition of the aggravated battery conviction on double jeopardy grounds.