Case Name: SEHL v. CITY OF SYRACUSE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-03-10
Citations: 81 N.Y.S. 482
Docket Number: 
Parties: SEHL v. CITY OF SYRACUSE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 81
Pages: 482–490

Head Matter:
(81 App. Div. 543.)
SEHL v. CITY OF SYRACUSE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March 10, 1903.)
1. Cities—Action eor Injuries—Notice—Retroactive Statute.
The provision of Laws 1898, p. 438, c. 182, § 461, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 1290, c. 581, § 37, that omission of a person claiming damages for injury to file the claim within three months shall be a bar to an action therefor against the city, will not be construed to apply to the claim of a person injured four days before the statute went into effect, though after its passage, when the claim might be filed within six months; the words preceding, that the city shall not be liable for injuries.sustained in the absence of actual notice, being applicable only to cases thereafter arising, and the saving clause (Laws 1898, p. 442, c. 182, § 482) expressly excluding from the operation of the act any right already existing or accrued.
Spring and Hiscock, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Onondaga County.
Action by Margaret Sehl against the city of Syracuse. From a judgment dismissing the complaint on the opening, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before ADAMS, P. J., and McLENNAN, SPRING, FUS-CO CK, and NASH, JJ.
John H. McCrahon, for appellant.
Alexander FI. Cowie, for respondent.

Opinion:
NASH, J.
The plaintiff's complaint herein was dismissed at the trial upon the facts stated by her counsel in his opening to the jury. Thereupon an offer was made to prove certain additional facts, which was refused by the court; but, for the purposes of this appeal, it must be assumed that those facts could have been proven; had the opportunity to do so been granted. Higgins v. Eagleton, 155' N. Y. 466, 50 N. E. 287; Place v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 167 N. Y. 345-347, 60 N. E. 632. And this assumption brings up for our review the following case, viz.: On the 27th day of December, 1899, the plaintiff received serious personal injuries by reason of falling upon an icy sidewalk on Dewitt street, in the city of Syracuse, which icy and unsafe condition the defendant had negligently permitted to exist. At the time of receiving such injuries the charter of the city (Laws 1885, p. 73, c. 26, § 250), as amended by Laws 1888, p. 741, c. 449, § 22, provided that no liability therefor should attach to the municipality "unless written notice specifying the time, place and cause of such injury or damage shall be served upon the mayor or city clerk within six months of the time the injury or damage was received, nor unless an action shall be commenced within one year after the service of such notice." But on the 1st of January, 1900, four days after the accident, the new charter for the government of cities of the second class (to which the city of Syracuse belongs) went into effect, and by its terms it was provided that the omission of a party claiming damages for injury to person or property to present such claim in writing to the common council "within three months,, or to commence an action therefor within one year, shall be a bar to any claim or action therefor against the city." Laws 1898, p. 438,. c. 182, § 461, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 1290, c. 581, § 37. The plaintiff, in compliance with the requirements of the charter in existence at the time of the accident, filed the notice therein specified on the 27th day of June, 1900, nearly six months after the new charter went into operation, and brought her action on the 1st day of October-following. The single question, therefore, with which we have to deal, is whether or not the plaintiff has lost her right to maintain this action by reason of her omission to file her claim within the time-specified in the new charter.
Judge Earl states the rule for the construction of statutes as follows :•
"It is always to be presumed that a law was intended, as is its legitimate-office, to furnish a rule of future action, to be applied to cases arising subsequent to its enactment. A law is never to have retroactive force unless its-express letter or clearly manifested intention requires that it should have such, effect. If all its language can be satisfied by giving it prospective operation,, it should have such operation only." New York & Oswego M. R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473-478.
And in the same case, quoting Jewett, J., in Palmer v. Conly, 4 Denio, 376:
"It is a doctrine founded upon general principles of the law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation without express words to that effect, either by an enumeration of the cases in which the act is to have-such retrospective operation, or by words which can have no meaning unless-such a construction is adopted."
Also Duer, J., in Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer, 188, says:
"Although the words of the statute are so general and broad as in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases, they must yet be construed as •applicable only to such as may thereafter arise, unless the intention to embrace all is clearly and unequivocally expressed."
Applying the rule thus stated to the language of section 461 of the act for the government of cities of the second class, it cannot be held that the Legislature intended that the provision of the section should have a retroactive force or apply to existing cases. There are no express words to that effect, and therefore, as stated by Duer, J., even though the words of the statute are so general and broad as in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases, they must be construed as applicable only to such as may thereafter arise. Moreover, it is plainly to be inferred from the context that the section is intended to operate prospectively only. The opening sentence of the section, prescribing that the city shall not be liable for injuries sustained, in the_ absence of actual notice, unless the defective and dangerous condition of the street or walk shall have existed for so long a period that the same should have been discovered and remedied in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, is applicable only to cases which should thereafter arise. The second sentence following comprehends the preceding matter, and must be regarded as having reference to it. To give to the general words, which have direct reference to the matter preceding them, a more comprehensive meaning, would be interpolating a sense beyond their grammatical construction. The saving clause of the statute is also of importance in this connection. Any right already existing or accrued is thereby expressly excluded from the operation of the act. Section 482, c. 182, p. 442, Laws 1898. A right existing or accrued includes both an injury received, and a claim therefor, upon which a right of action has accrued, by giving the requisite notice under the former or existing statute. The existing right, in the sense there used, is the injury—the cause of action—as distinguished from the notice required to be given, which pertains to the remedy, and is the sense in which the word "right" is used by Judge Gray in Missano v. Mayor, 160 N. Y. 133, 54 N. E. 744, in that part of his opinion which expressed the views of the court. It is the only sense in which the word as used in the statute can have any application, for, if the right to maintain the action has accrued by giving the requisite notice under the prior statute, a saving clause was not necessary. Again, the statute itself, if intended to be applicable to existing rights, should have made provision for their enforcement. As stated by Judge Gray in Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 124, 53 N. E. 754, 45 L. R. A. 118, "It should not be left to supposition and inference from the circumstances." If an injury occurred on the last day before the statute took effect, the injured person would have had the full period in which to give the six-months notice; and, going back, the time to give the requisite notice would be lessened until the existing right would be entirely lost. A statute having that effect was held in Gilbert v. Ackerman to be an invalid exercise of legislative power.
The power of the Legislature to make the statute relating to the remedy operate retroactively within reasonable limits is not questioned, but it must expressly so enact. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, on questions of law only; the facts having been examined, and no error found therein.
ADAMS, P. J., and McLENNAN, J., concur. SPRING and HISCOCK, JJ., dissent