Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Norcott Corby, Also Known as Corby Norcott, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2005-12-22
Citations: 6 N.Y.3d 231
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Norcott Corby, Also Known as Corby Norcott, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 231–241

Head Matter:
[ 844 NE2d 1135, 811 NYS2d 613]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Norcott Corby, Also Known as Corby Norcott, Appellant.
Argued November 16, 2005;
decided December 22, 2005
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Alan S. Axelrod, New York City, and Laura R. Johnson for appellant.
The trial court denied appellant his due process rights to confront his accuser and to present a defense by precluding him from cross-examining the sole witness to implicate appellant regarding her motive to falsely accuse him and to deflect the blame for the crimes from herself, and the Appellate Division erred in ruling that any error was harmless. (Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308; Chapman v California, 386 US 18; Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; Smith v Illinois, 390 US 129; People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40; People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375; People v Rios, 223 AD2d 390; People v Ashner, 190 AD2d 238; Gordon v United States, 344 US 414.)
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Theresa A. Foudy and Sylvia Wertheimer of counsel), for respondent.
I. The court properly precluded cross-examination of essentially cumulative probative value but great potential to unfairly prejudice the People’s case and give rise to jury speculation. (Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673; People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303; People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40; People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22; People v Torres, 289 AD2d 136; People v George, 197 AD2d 588; People v Berg, 59 NY2d 294; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; People v Arthur, 290 AD2d 387; People v Kinard, 215 AD2d 591.) II. The Appellate Division correctly held that any error in precluding the desired cross-examination was harmless. (Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673; Henry v Speckard, 22 F3d 1209, 513 US 1029; People v Allen, 50 NY2d 898; Chapman v California, 386 US 18; People v Sobers, 272 AD2d 418; People v Simmons, 237 AD2d 313.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
ClPARICK, J.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. The trial court precluded defendant from cross-examining the People's primary witness concerning the specific circumstances which led her to inculpate defendant and two others in the subject crimes. Defendant urges that the preclusion of that line of inquiry was a denial of his constitutional right to confront his accuser and an abuse of the court's discretion. We hold that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by precluding such line of inquiry and no constitutional violation occurred.
In January 1996, defendant offered Xanderia Burnett $1,500 in exchange for use of her apartment for an illegal drug transaction. Defendant and Orlando Moreno (Moe) moved into Burnett's apartment while awaiting the arrival of a large amount of heroin to be brought from San Francisco by Yousef Mohammed. While residing in the apartment, Burnett observed defendant loading a small caliber handgun. When Mohammed arrived in New York, Burnett, defendant and Moe visited him at his hotel.
Several days later, Burnett, defendant, Moe and Walter Farrow went to Mohammed's hotel to bring him back to Burnett's apartment. Later that day, Mohammed remained at the apartment with Farrow and Moe while defendant went to visit his parole officer with Burnett. After visiting his parole officer, defendant and Burnett returned to the apartment, obtained Mohammed's hotel key, and proceeded to the hotel. While in Mohammed's suite, defendant searched the rooms and eventually discovered a stash of heroin.
Defendant and Burnett returned to the apartment with the heroin where Farrow and Moe were sitting in the living room watching television. Burnett testified that defendant, Moe and Farrow went into a back bedroom and emerged 15 minutes later at which time she went to the bathroom and saw Mohammed on a bed, face down, with blood pouring from his head. Defendant, Farrow and Moe divided the heroin among themselves, and then, with Burnett, wrapped the body in a rug, removed it from the apartment in Burnett's shopping cart and discarded it along Riverside Drive in Upper Manhattan.
The body was quickly found, identified, and eventually connected to Burnett, whose name and address Mohammed had given for bank accounts he opened before his death. Shortly thereafter, New York City Police Department Detective John Bourges questioned Burnett at her apartment while defendant was still in residence. Burnett denied any knowledge of a murder.
In April 1998, after being released from prison on an unrelated parole violation, defendant approached the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to offer his services as a paid informant if it would locate Burnett for him. While being interviewed by the DEA, defendant cast suspicion upon Burnett in relation to Mohammed's murder. The DEA relayed that information to Bourges.
In July 1998, Bourges visited Burnett at her new home in Philadelphia. Bourges led Burnett to believe that he had spoken with defendant who implicated her in Mohammed's murder. Burnett then "broke down" and stated that it was defendant and two others who murdered Mohammed. Thereafter, Burnett identified defendant, Farrow and Moe in a photo array. She was taken to a local police precinct, and Mirandized. On October 26, 1998, defendant was arrested for Mohammed's murder.
During his trial in Supreme Court, defendant extensively cross-examined the People's witnesses. Defendant cross-examined Burnett, but was precluded from eliciting that she only implicated defendant and his two cohorts after she was told that defendant had implicated her in Mohammed's murder. Defendant argued that, in addition to showing hostility and bias, this line of inquiry was essential to his defense, because it was the only way to show why Burnett—after two years of denying any knowledge of the crime—inculpated him. The trial court precluded such line of inquiry, reasoning that such cross-examination would introduce evidence that would confuse the jury, cause speculation and place defendant's alleged statement before the jury without the People having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. One Justice dissented and granted defendant permission to appeal. We now affirm.
It is well settled that "[a]n accused's right to cross-examine witnesses . is not absolute" (People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 313 [1993]). The trial court has discretion to determine the scope of the cross-examination of a witness (see People v Coleman, 56 NY2d 269, 273 [1982]; see also Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 [1986]). In exercising its discretion to limit the introduction of evidence, a trial court must weigh the probative value of such evidence against the possibility that it "would confuse the main issue and mislead the jury . or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one of the parties" (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-103 [Farrell 11th ed]; see People v Davis, 43 NY2d 17, 27 [1977]; see also Van Arsdall, 475 US at 679).
While Supreme Court might have permitted the precluded inquiry, we cannot say the preclusion was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. Indeed, Supreme Court gave the defendant wide latitude here in showing that Burnett had a motive to lie and delineated the boundaries of cross-examination that would elicit Burnett's bias and hostility toward defendant. Burnett testified that the murder was committed by men she invited into her apartment to engage in a drug transaction, that she assisted in discarding the body and that she cleaned the apartment of any evidence of the murder. Furthermore, Burnett testified that when she was first interviewed by Bourges at her apartment, defendant was in residence and had threatened to harm her child if she said anything about the murder. Burnett also testified that she did not contact the police with the information when defendant left the apartment because she feared for her family's safety and that she relocated to Philadelphia while defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated parole violation. Burnett also admitted to stealing from defendant when he was imprisoned. As such, Burnett's fear-based motive to lie and hostility toward defendant were evident to the jury.
The defense was also permitted to cross-examine Burnett about welfare fraud and her criminal conviction for possession of a weapon as well as her familiarity with the drug trade. Additionally, other evidence at trial, independent of Burnett's testimony, implicated defendant. Phone records and notes found in Mohammed's hotel suite connected defendant to Mohammed and Burnett's apartment immediately prior to the murder. Bourges testified that defendant was present and opened the door when he first visited Burnett's apartment shortly after the murder. If Burnett were to attempt to implicate someone in the murder, the most plausible candidate was defendant.
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, Burnett's motive to lie and hostility toward defendant and need to deflect blame away from herself were apparent to the jury from the accumulated testimony and evidence. Indeed, defense counsel argued vigorously in summation that Burnett had great reason to lie. Defendant argues that evidence of a witness's bias or "reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground" (People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 56 [1988]). Nevertheless, we have previously stated that "[i]f bias or interest has been fully explored through other means, or the precluded area involved cumulative matter already presented, there generally has been no infringement of the right of confrontation" (People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 29 [1986] [citations omitted]).
Any additional evidence of Burnett's bias or motive to lie, that would have been established by the precluded line of inquiry, would have been cumulative and of little probative value to defendant's case. On the other hand, the sought-after testimony would have caused jury speculation and confusion as to the truth of defendant's purported accusation. Burnett's interest in self-preservation was very apparent to the jury who found her credible.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.