Case Name: ER BIAO ZHENG, aka Takahilo Hanyu, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-03-25
Citations: 644 F. App'x 67
Docket Number: No. 13-1817
Parties: ER BIAO ZHENG, aka Takahilo Hanyu, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN,' Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 644
Pages: 67–68

Head Matter:
ER BIAO ZHENG, aka Takahilo Hanyu, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-1817.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 25, 2016.
Gary J. Yerman, Yerman & Associates, LLC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Jesi J. Carlson, Senior Litigation Counsel; Joseph A. O’Connell, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN,' Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Loretta E. Lynch is substituted for Eric H. Holder, Jr, as Respondent,

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Er Biao Zheng, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of an April 16, 2013, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Er Biao Zheng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Apr. 16, 2013). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). It is undisputed that Zheng's motion was untimely because it was filed over four years after the agency's final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). However, the time limit can be waived if the motion is "based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
We find no error in the BIA's determination that Zheng failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China. As an initial matter, Zheng's argument that the BIA failed to consider the country reports in their entirety is misplaced. Contrary to Zheng's assertion, the BIA acknowledged that church members, and not just leaders, have been harassed by Chinese officials.
However, that finding is not determinative. Zheng fails to identify a change in conditions between the time of his hearing and the filing of his motion to reopen, which is the showing required to excuse the untimely filing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). Although the BIA did not parse the earlier reports, it did cite S-Y-G-. Accordingly, and because the country conditions evidence supports the BIA's decision, we presume that the BIA considered the evidence. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (presuming that the agency "has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise").
A comparison of the 2005 and 2010 country reports supports the BIA's determination that there was no material change in conditions in China. Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir.2008) ("[W]e will not disturb a factual finding if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record when considered as a whole" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Reports from both years show that church leaders and members were subjected to harassment, arrest, and detention as a result of their religious activities. Thus, rather than showing a material change in conditions, these reports show a continuation of the same conditions. While Zheng's brief cites the 2012 U.S. Commission Report on International Religious Freedom for the proposition that restrictions placed on Protestant house churches were "systematic and intense," the same report also states that religious communities continue to grow and hundreds of millions of believers practice their faiths openly in China. Thus, the report does not undermine the BIA's conclusion.
Because Zheng's failure to establish a material change in country conditions is dispositive, we do not reach his arguments regarding his prima facie eligibility for asylum. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously' granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal of this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).