Case Name: PARKER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-10-10
Citations: 261 S.W. 782
Docket Number: No. 7255
Parties: PARKER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 261
Pages: 782–786

Head Matter:
PARKER v. STATE.
(No. 7255.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 10, 1923.
Rehearing Denied April 30, 1924.
Application to File Second Motion Denied May 14, 1924.)
1. Jury <&wkey;67(3) — Jurors held properly summoned by sheriff who took prescribed oath.
Where, on objection to jurors summoned by the sheriff’s deputies after the judge administered the prescribed oath to the sheriff, as required by Rev. art. 5170, the court again directed the sheriff to summon the required number, whereupon the same men were summoned by the sheriff, and their names placed on the jury list, held, that there was no ground for objection.
2. Jury- <&wkey;d 10(9) — Accused held not entitled to complain of manner of summoning additional talesmen.
Where number of regular jurors was reduced on their voir dire to 15 men, and the judge then suggested that additional talesmen should be summoned, to which accused’s counsel agreed, and in making up the jury list the ñames of the 15 regularly drawn appeared first, held, that there was no ground for complaint.
3. Criminal law <@=11661/2(5) — Trial court’s refusal to attach jurors and delay trial held not reversible error, in absence of showing of prejudice.
Trial court’s refusal to attach jurors not appearing, and to delay trial until they were brought in, held not reversible error, in absence of showing that accused exhausted his challenges or that .objectionable juror was forced on him.
4. Criminal law <3=1044 — Failure to move to exclude remark, of witness held to preclude review.
Where accused made no motion to exclude an unresponsive part of witness’ answer to question, there was nothing before the trial court for his decision upon which error could be claimed.
5. Criminal law <@=697 — -Mere exception to unresponsive testimony .held not sufficient for review.
Where part of a witness’ answer was not responsive to question, accused’s mere statement that he excepted to that part of testimony held not sufficient to presenj question to trial court for its decision.
6. Criminal law <&wkey;366(4) — Remark made after shooting held res gestee.
Remarks made by party whom accused shot, while being helped up after the shooting, “I knew he was going to get me,” held res gestse.
7. Homicide <&wkey;l69(3) — Cross-examination of defense witness as to why he watched difficulty between accused and prosecuting witness held unobjectionable.
In a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, permitting state on cross-examination of defense witness to ask why be watched the difficulty, and permitting him to answer that it was because of former trouble between accused and prosecuting witness, held not objectionable, especially where accused admitted that he had had trouble with prosecuting witness.
8. Criminal law &wkey;>923(3) — That some jurors were not fully naturalized held not ground for new trial.
That some jurors had not bee,n fully naturalized held not ground for new trial.
9. Criminal law <&wkey;025i/2(2) — Refusal of trial court to grant new trial because jurors passed scene of shooting held proper exercise of discretion.
Where there was no evidence that jurors received evidence other than testimony which came from the witnesses, in passing the place where the shooting occurred, with which accused was charged, the trial judge was within his discretion in refusing new trial on that ground.
IÓ. Criminal law <&wkey;925¡/2 (3) — Juror’s explanation to another of word “guilty” held not error.
That one juror explained to another in the Bohemian language the meaning of the word “guilty” held not to constitute error.
11. Criminal law <3=9251/2(3) — Statement after arrival at verdict before jury of manner of loss by prosecuting witness of his finger held not error.
Where accused was prosecuted for an assault with intent to murder, the fact that, after the jury had arrived at their verdict, and were waiting to be called before the court to announce it, some statement was made as to how prosecuting witness lost a finger held not error.
12. Criminal law <&wkey;942(l) — Newly discovered-impeaching evidence not ground for new trial.
Néwly discovered evidence of an impeaching character would not call for new trial.
<&wkey;>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests a'nd Indexes
On Motion for Rehearing.
13. Homicide &wkey;300(!4) — Requested charge on self-defense held not sufficiently specific.
In a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, requested instruction applicable to a phase of the defense not embraced in main charge, that is, prosecuting witness’ superior strength, held not sufficiently specific.
14. Criminal law &wkey;l038(3), I056(I)— Omissions in main charge presented, either by exception or by special charge.
Accused may have an omission in the main charge supplied or preserve the question for review, in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 735, 737, 737a, 743, either by exception specifically pointing out the omission, or by a special charge so framed as to inform the trial judge of the omission, and which corrects the alleged error, and does not itself contain instructions incorrect or otherwise objectionable.
15. Homicide &wkey;>300(l4)—Instruction on self-defense held) properly refused, as omitting limitation on right.
An instruction that a party has a right to defend against any violent or unlawful attach held properly refused, as omitting to state that the extent to which he may defend depends upon the character of the violence threatened as it may appear to the party attacked.
16. Criminal law &wkey;1043(2)—Requested special charge which was erroneous held not to present for review alleged error in main charge.
Where accused did not take specific exceptions to the main charge for an alleged omission therefrom, his requested special charge, which did not embrace a correct proposition of law, and which the court was not therefore required to submit, held, not to present for review the error alleged in the main charge in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 735, 737, 737a, 743.
©r^Eor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Appeal from District Court, Lee County; R. J. Alexander, Judge.
John C. Parker was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
E. T. Simmang, of Giddings, L. D. Brown, of Houston, and N. A. Rector, of Laredo, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ■ the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Lee county of assault with intent to murder, and his punishment fixed at five years in the penitentiary.
The evidence in the record seems ample to support the verdict, and will not be set out or discussed further.
But 15 jurors being before the court when this case was reached for trial, the judge administered to the sheriff the oath prescribed by article 5170, Revised Civil Statutes, and directed him to summon other jurors. The sheriff 'phoned to certain deputies, who thereupon caused 26 men to attend court as jurors, at the time directed by the court in his instructions to the sheriff. Objection being made that these proposed jurors had been summoned hy men not sworn so' to do, the court then again directed the sheriff to summon the required number of jurors, whereupon the 26 men who had appeared were summoned by the officers, and their names placed on the jury list. Without lengthy discussion it would appear that complaint of this procedure is not sound.
Appellant's bill, complaining that additional talesmen were summoned and added to the list of jurors drawn by the jury commission, before he was called on to strike the 15 names of jurors who had been regularly drawn, is qualified by a statement of the learned trial judge that, when the number of regular jurors was reduced on their voir dire to 15 men, he suggested to appellant's counsel that a jury could not be gotten from said number, and that additional talesmen should be summoned, to which appellant's counsel agreed, and it was done accordingly. In making up the jury list the names of the 15 regularly drawh appeared first. This presents no ground for complaint.
Five jurors on the list drawn by the jury commission failed to appear. Appellant asked for attachments, and that the case not proceed until the absent jurors were brought in. The record contains no suggestion of injury to appellant from the court's refusal to both requests. It is not shown that appellant exhausted his challenges or that any objectionable juror was forced on him. Sweeney v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 370, 128 S. W. 390.
Witness Fields was asked to tell what he saw or did with reference to Pitts (the injured party) after the shooting. No objection was made to this question. As part of his answer the witness said that Pitts remarked as he helped him up from the ground after the shooting: "I knew he was going to get me." This was not responsive to the question. No motion was made to exclude said remark. It was res gestee, but in any event, no motion having been made to exclude, there was nothing before the trial court for his decision upon which error could be claimed. King v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 253 S. W. 262. The mere statement of appellant that he excepted to that part of the witness' testimony brought nothing before the court.
TJie argument of state's attorney complained of in bills of exception. Nos. 5 and 6, as qualified by the trial judge;, presents no error.
In the main charge the learned trial judge told the jury as follows:
"I£ you believe from the evidence that the defendant, John O. Parker, did, with a pistol, shoot the said H. R. Pitts; and you further believe from the evidence that at the time of such shooting the said H. R. Pitts did make a demonstration, as if to draw a weapon, that induced the defendant to believe, viewed .by you from the defendaht's standpoint at the time, that he, the said H. R. Pitts, was about to attack him, and inflict death or serious bodily injury on him, then you are charged that the defendant had the right to shoot the said H. R. Pitts, and he would not be required to retreat in order to avoid the necessity, or apparent necessity, of shooting the said H. K. Pitts; and if you so find you will acquit the defendant.
, "In this connection you are charged that the danger need not have been real; it is sufficient if it so appeared to the defendant, and in passing upon this matter you must do so from the defendant's standpoint at the time as it appeared to him."
Analysis of this makes apparent that it obviates the necessity for giving special charges, seeking to present the theory of the right of the accused to act on apparent danger.
That the state on cross-examination of a defense witness, who said he was watching the parties to the difficulty when it occurred, was allowed to ask said witness why he was watching them would appear legitimate, and his answer that it was because of former trouble between the parties would appear a fair examination and in no way injurious. The record discloses that, while appellant was a witness in his own behalf, he swore: "I had had some trouble with that man, and it was reasonable to suppose he was mad." We find no ground for objection to said cross-examination.
That jurors sat in appellant's case who had not been fully naturalized was held not available as ground for a new trial in Squyres v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 160, 224 S. W. 1024.
The principal way into the courthouse, in fact according to the witnesses practically the only one that was used, led near where the shooting occurred. An effort was made to show that the jury in passing saw and observed the surroundings at said place which would require granting a new trial upon the ground that they had received other testimony than that which came from the witnesses. We have carefully examined the evidence introduced before the trial court in support of the motion for new trial, and think it entirely lacking in showing that any of the jury observed or considered any material things seen by them at said pluce, and that the trial judge in refusing to grant the new trial on this ground was, wholly within his discretion.
That one juror explained in the Bohemian language to another the meaning of the word "guilty" would seem in no wise ,to constitute error; nor would the fact that, after the jury had arrived at their verdict,' and were waiting to be called before the court to announce same, some statement was made about how the prosecuting witness lost a finger.
Newly discovered evidence impeaching in its character would not call for the granting of a new trial, and such we consider to be that introduced by appellant in support of this ground of his motion for new trial.
Being unable to agree with appellant in any of the contentions. made, the judgment will be affirmed.