Case Name: Robert Earl COOLEY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-10-16
Citations: 803 So. 2d 485
Docket Number: No. 2000-KA-00561-COA
Parties: Robert Earl COOLEY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 803
Pages: 485–496

Head Matter:
Robert Earl COOLEY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2000-KA-00561-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 16, 2001.
Anthony J. Buckley, Laurel, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jean Smith Vaughan, Attorney for Appellee.
Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.

Opinion:
KING, P.J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Robert Earl Cooley was convicted of aggravated assault in the Jones County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to serve a term of eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by both the conviction and sentence, Cooley has filed this 'appeal and assigned the following as error: whether the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and insufficient as a matter of law, to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault.
FACTS
¶ 2. During the late evening hours of February 2, 1998, Robert Earl Cooley drove to William Clark's home armed with a gun. Cooley believed that Clark had been stealing bricks from a construction site on his property. Cooley confronted Clark in the yard and allegedly struck him on the head and upper body with a weapon. Clark testified that he was not sure what he had been struck with, but believed that it had to be a gun. After the incident, Cooley drove away. Grady Marshall, Clark's neighbor, witnessed a portion of the confrontation. He helped Clark onto the porch where he called 911.
¶ 3. Upon returning home, Cooley called 911 and reported the incident and expressed a fear that he might have killed Clark. Officer Thad Windham, dispatched to Cooley's home to investigate this incident, saw Cooley exiting his mobile home with a hatchet in his hand. The hatchet appeared to contain blood splatters, so Windham assumed it to be the assault weapon. Officer Windham read Cooley his Miranda rights and inquired about what had happened. Cooley said that he had assaulted Clark for stealing bricks from his property. Cooley was then taken into custody.
¶ 4. The hatchet was sent to the crime laboratory for DNA analysis. DNA testing later revealed that the blood on the hatchet did not belong to Clark. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b) (Rev. 2000) Cooley was charged with aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon identified as a hatchet. The relevant portion of the indictment read: "[t]hat Robert Cooley . unlawfully, wilfully, and felo-niously did cause serious bodily injury to one William L. Clark, by beating him in the face and head with a deadly weapon, to wit: hatchet...."
¶ 5. Cooley was convicted and sentenced to serve eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. His motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, a new trial having been denied, Cooley now appeals his conviction and sentence.
ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
Whether the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault?
¶ 6. Cooley contends that since there was no evidence that he struck Clark with a hatchet, as charged in the indictment, the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain a verdict of guilty. As evidence of this insufficiency, Cooley points to (1) Clark's uncertainty about what he was hit with and (2) the results of the DNA test, which proved that Clark's blood was not on the hatchet. Cooley, therefore, suggests that this case should be reversed and remanded for consideration of the lesser-included offense of simple assault.
¶ 7. However, when determining whether a jury's verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict. Isaac v. State, 645 So.2d 903, 907 (Miss.1994). Reversal is proper only if we are convinced that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a new trial. Id. Consistent with this standard, we find the following evidence on the issue of aggravated assault with a hatchet: (1) Clark was struck and injured by Cooley, (2) he did not know whether Cooley struck him with his fist or some instrumentality, (3) the only time a hatchet was observed was when an officer came to Cooley's home and saw him with a hatchet in his hand, (4) the laboratory analysis established that Clark's blood was not present on the hatchet taken from Cooley, (5) Clark saw Cooley with a gun in his hand, and (6) Clark kept his eye on the gun and was sure Cooley did not strike him with that. When this evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is not substantial evidence upon which to predicate a verdict of aggravated assault. We conclude that the weight of the evidence is so against the verdict that an unconscionable injustice occurred. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 781 (Miss.1993).
¶ 8. Having addressed the matter of weight of the evidence, we are also asked to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. When presented with the question of the sufficiency of evidence, the scope of review by an appellate court is limited. Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192 (Miss.1989). That limited scope of review was reiterated in wherein the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
When on appeal one convicted of a criminal offense challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, our authority to interfere with jury's verdict is quite limited. We proceed by considering all of the evidence — not just that supporting the case for the prosecution — in the light most consistent with the verdict. We give the prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the accused with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty, reversal and discharge are required. On the other hand, if there is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb.
Swinford v. State, 653 So.2d 912, 914 (Miss.1995) (citations omitted).
¶ 9. Our application of this standard to the facts of this case leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the record contains insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable person might find Cooley guilty of aggravated assault.
¶ 10. The indictment charged Cooley with aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon, identified as a hatchet, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97 — 3—7(2)(b) (Revised 2000). There is no evidence of the use of a deadly weapon, to make this aggravated assault, pursuant to section 97 — 3—7(2)(b).
¶ 11. According to the dissent, "the victim stated that he clearly saw Cooley with a pistol and that he was holding something else as well." The victim's actual testimony on direct examination on this issue was as follows:
Q. Did you see anything in the truck before he got out?
A. He had a gun in his right hand.
Q. Where did you see that in the truck?
A. He had it in his hand upon the steering wheel. Then he said that he was going to kill me. And he opened the door back and I had to step back out of the way of the door. As I did that, I just caught a motion and he hit me with something.
Q. With that hand? With the hand he had the gun in?
A. No, I don't believe so.
Q. Did you see if he had anything in his other hand?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Could you see his other hand or was it hidden from your view?
A. His left hand was hidden from view. I was concentrating on the gun.
Q. I understand. All right, then what happened when he said he was going to kill you?
A. As he opened the door and got out of the truck he hit me with something. I don't know what. Then the next thing I knew, I was on the ground and he was on me, beating me.
Q. Were you able during this confrontation, Mr. Clark, to determine what he was beating you with?
A. No, ma'am. I was not.
¶ 12. The State elected to indict Cooley for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. It was therefore incumbent upon the State to either prove that an instrument which by its very nature is a deadly weapon was used, or that an instrument, was used which, the jury, as finder of fact, could determine was a deadly weapon. Rushing v. State, 753 So.2d 1136 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2000).
¶ 13. There is no testimony that a hatchet or any other deadly weapon was used. The dissent seems to concede this point, but glosses over it by saying, "Apparently use of a hatchet was consistent with Clark's injuries."
¶ 14. That assumption finds no support in the record. Indeed the fallacy of this assumption can be seen by viewing the State's exhibit 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, which are black and white photos of Clark's injuries. The injuries reflected by these exhibits are not inconsistent with the injuries which could be inflicted by a human fist.
¶ 15. The evidence at best will only sustain a conviction of simple assault. Shields v. State, 722 So.2d 584 (¶ 17) (Miss.1998). Accordingly, this Court reverses and renders the conviction of aggravated assault, and remands this case for sentencing on the conviction of the lesser-included offense of simple assault.
¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS REVERSED AND RENDERED; REMANDED FOR SENTENCING ON SIMPLE ASSAULT ONLY. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND MYERS, JJ.
. Miss.Code Ann. § 97 — 3—7(2)(b) reads as follows: "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm...."