Case Name: In the Matter of the Marriage of Sally V. Main, Respondent, and Roger J. Main, Appellant
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1984-07-26
Citations: 38 Wash. App. 351
Docket Number: No. 6110-4-II
Parties: In the Matter of the Marriage of Sally V. Main, Respondent, and Roger J. Main, Appellant.
Judges: Worswick, J., concurs.
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 351–357

Head Matter:
[No. 6110-4-II.
Division Two.
July 26, 1984.]
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sally V. Main, Respondent, and Roger J. Main, Appellant.
Don Taylor, for appellant.
Steven P. Weinberg, for respondent.

Opinion:
Reed, J.
Roger Main appeals the trial court's decision requiring him to continue paying child support for a son who has reached 18 years of age. We reverse.
On April 29, 1974, the Thurston County Superior Court entered a dissolution decree terminating the marriage of Roger and Sally Main. The Mains had three children, Brian, Christine, and Karen. The decree awarded custody of the children to Sally and provided for child support in the amount of $150 per month per child, to continue "until said children are no longer dependent, are emancipated, or until further order of this court."
Since Brian's 18th birthday, Roger has refused to pay support for him. When Brian reached 18, he was a senior in high school and still living at home. After graduation in June 1981, Brian worked full time throughout the summer. During the fall of 1981 he enrolled at Olympia Technical Community College. He continues to live at home and Sally has paid, except for his automobile expenses, all of Brian's living and educational expenses.
In January 1982, Sally obtained a judgment ordering Roger to pay accumulated back support and continue to pay support for Brian so long as he is enrolled in a full-time undergraduate program and remains a dependent child. Roger appeals.
RCW 26.09.170 provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child.
As used in this statute, emancipation occurs upon reaching the age of majority or emancipation in fact, whichever event first occurs. In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 629 P.2d 450 (1981). Brian was emancipated at the time this suit was brought because he had reached the age of 18. See RCW 26.28.010. Roger is still living and he and Sally have not agreed in writing to terminate Brian's support. The issue, then, is whether the divorce decree expressly provided for child support beyond emancipation. It did not.
"Express" means "directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or left to inference: not dubious or ambiguous". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 803 (1969). The divorce decree in this case does not unambiguously provide for child support beyond emancipation. The decree states that child support shall continue, "until said children are no longer dependent, are emancipated, or until further order of this court." The three conditions or events terminating child support are in the disjunctive. Therefore, the occurrence of any one of the events terminates Roger's obligation to support the child. The trial court properly concluded that Brian, having reached the age of 18, was emancipated. See RCW 26.28-.010. Emancipation was an event triggering the end of support payments and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
Sally contends that the decree's reference to dependency requires continuation of child support until the child is no longer dependent, regardless of when emancipation is reached, citing Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). We disagree. Childers did not hold that the mere use of the word "dependent" in a decree mandates continuation of child support until the child is no longer dependent. The case simply held that, consistent with RCW 26.09.170, a trial court has authority to order a parent to pay child support beyond the age of majority while a college education is pursued. However, the decree must "expressly provide" for support beyond emancipation. RCW 26.09.170. Unlike Childers, the decree in the case at bar does not expressly provide for child support beyond emancipation.
Reversed.
Worswick, J., concurs.
The medical insurance provision of the decree is consistent with the support provision. The decree ordered Roger to provide medical insurance for "so long as they [minor children] are dependent and unemancipated." This language clearly indicates that medical insurance will terminate upon emancipation, regardless of whether the child is still dependent.