Case Name: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerard Cotero J. LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellee
Court: Utah Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1992-05-05
Citations: 831 P.2d 1040
Docket Number: No. 900484-CA
Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerard Cotero J. LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 831
Pages: 1040–1056

Head Matter:
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerard Cotero J. LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 900484-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 5, 1992.
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.

Opinion:
AMENDED OPINION UPON REHEARING
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an order granting defendant Gerard Lopez's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police traffic stop and subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle. On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in: (1) Determining the police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was driving without a license, and (2) determining the stop was a pretext stop. We reverse and remand.
I. FACTS
The question of whether a warrantless police traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we review the underlying facts of this case in detail. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App.1988), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The arresting officer was the only witness called during the suppression hearing, and the facts are therefore largely based upon his testimony.
At 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 1990, Officer Hamner was patrolling in his police car. Officer Hamner saw defendant's vehicle traveling southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City, and recognized the vehicle as one he had seen on several occasions near two local bars known for criminal activity, including illegal drug use. Officer Hamner believed the vehicle belonged to Jose Cruz, and after observing the driver of the car, believed the driver was Cruz. Officer Hamner recognized Cruz from his undercover operations in the area approximatély nine months earlier. During this period, individuals had pointed out Cruz to Officer Hamner and indicated Cruz was a drug dealer. The individual believed to be Cruz had also introduced himself to Officer Hamner. Further, Officer Hamner had seen photographs of Cruz during his work with the Metro Narcotics Strike Force.
Because Cruz did not have a valid driver's license nine months earlier, Officer Hamner called police dispatch to see if Cruz had a license. The radio operator informed Officer Hamner that there was no record of Jose Cruz having a driver's license. Officer Hamner then observed defendant turn onto 700 South without signaling. Officer Hamner pulled defendant over and asked to see his driver's license. Although Officer Hamner admitted he suspected defendant had been involved with drugs, he testified that he stopped defendant for driving without a license and failing to signal. Defendant was unable to produce a driver's license but did give Officer Hamner an identification card indicating he was "Geraldo Lopez." Officer Ham-ner then did a warrants check on defendant under the name of Lopez which revealed three outstanding warrants. Officer Ham-ner placed defendant under arrest and cited defendant for driving without a license and failing to signal before turning. Officer Hamner impounded defendant's car and during an inventory search, he and another officer discovered several bags of cocaine.
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp.1990). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his car. Relying on this court's opinion in Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, the trial court concluded Officer Hamner's stop of defendant was an unconstitutional "pretext" stop, and ordered the evidence seized by Officer Ham-ner suppressed. Following the trial court's suppression ruling, the State petitioned for interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling, which we granted.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS
In considering a motion to suppress, we review a trial court's underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); see State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah App.1991). "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated . because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the highway. See id. at 654-56, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-98. Among the situations that courts have identified where a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle are: (1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation; e.g., State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 882-83; Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1095-96 (Fla.1988); (2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license; e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135; State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App.1988); and (3) when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs; e.g., United States v. Lyles, 946 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975.
The issues presented at the suppression hearing and now on appeal pertain to the first two categories outlined above. The State contends Officer Hamner was justified in stopping defendant because defendant had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal before turning, and the officer had reason to believe defendant was driving without a license. Alternatively, the State argues the case should be remanded because of insufficient findings under both these issues and because the trial court incorrectly applied the pretext doctrine. We agree with the State that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when holding Officer Hamner's traffic stop was a pretext stop. We also agree that the court's findings of fact were inadequate with regard to both the pretext stop and whether Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without a license. We therefore reverse and remand. Because we reverse and remand for a fresh analysis of the legality of .the traffic stop, we do not reach the issue of the legality of the subsequent detention.
III. PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOP
A. When the Pretext Doctrine Applies
In recent years, this court has joined other courts in construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext doctrine." See, e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135-37; State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986); sources cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court determines the stop was not made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal course of action expected of a reasonable officer. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a "reasonable . officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the unconstitutional motivation. Id.
Whether a traffic stop was an unconstitutional "pretext" stop requires a legal conclusion — thus we review it for "correctness." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215; State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App.1990), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the facts demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic violation. Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979. The second situation is where the driver committed a minor traffic violation or the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1097. Because defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal before turning in violation of Utah law, we address the second variation of the pretext doctrine, i.e., where a traffic violation has occurred.
B. Reasons for the Pretext Doctrine
Because Judge Russon in his dissent has chosen to follow the State's plea that we abandon the pretext doctrine, we reexamine the underlying policies that persuaded us to adopt the doctrine in the first instance.
The adoption of the pretext doctrine is consistent with existing legal authority. Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address the pretext doctrine, a number of federal circuit courts have approved the doctrine. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11. In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, ratified our application of the pretext doctrine in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). There, the Utah Supreme Court reached the issue of whether a voluntary consent which occurred after a pretextual traffic stop was sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal pretext stop to allow the consent to validate the warrantless search. If the Arroyo court disapproved of the pretext doctrine, logic suggests the court would have rejected the doctrine and reversed this court without ever reaching the attenuation-consent issue. In fact, the Arroyo court referred to our pretext holding with approval:
The court of appeals agreed [with the lower court's pretext finding], stating that under the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable officer would not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for 'following too closely' except for some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." The trial court and the court of appeals were clearly correct on [the pretext] issue — Trooper Mangel-son's stop was an unconstitutional pretext.
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). Additionally, the majority of other states which have considered the issue have adopted the pretext doctrine.
We are persuaded the pretext doctrine is necessary to prevent the abuse of various exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.1989). Furthermore, the doctrine protects citizens from arbitrary activity by police officers and supports the Fourth Amendment's requirement of objective reasonableness to support any invasion by law enforcement. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). Finally, the pretext doctrine requires courts to focus on the realities of police practices — not pretenses — thus protecting the integrity of the courts. See United States v. Keller, 499 F.Supp. 415, 418 (N.D.Ill.1980); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689.
There can be little dispute that in our society, minor traffic and equipment violations are pervasive. See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978-79 (quoting 5 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 1987)); Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1097. Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any minor violation when the officer in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow officers to seize almost any individual on the basis of otherwise unconstitutional objectives. Such unfettered discretion offends the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
Further, allowing police officers to make pretext stops implicates equal protection concerns and policies. We cannot ignore the reality that many pretext stop cases involve minorities and that in some cases one of the articulated reasons for the stop was that the occupants were Hispanic. We are mindful that law enforcement officials often use racial characteristics as a basis for "hunch" criminal profiles in pre-textual traffic stops. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711 (pretext stop occurring during officer's use of drug courier profile). Courts have consistently held these profiling techniques unconstitutional where they are the sole basis for making a traffic stop. To permit police officers to use any minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle encourages the selective enforcement of traffic regulations against minorities or "suspicious" classes, such as those with an unorthodox appearance or out-of-state license plates. Accordingly, in addition to Fourth Amendment concerns, equal protection policies constrain us to uphold the pretext doctrine.
Our colleague in dissent criticizes the pretext doctrine, claiming the doctrine invades the province of the legislature. We disagree. The pretext doctrine does not restrict the state legislature from enacting traffic regulations, nor does it facially invalidate any traffic regulation. Rather, the pretext doctrine restricts police discretion when used unconstitutionally. Long ago the United States Supreme Court recognized that a facially constitutional statute may become unconstitutional when selectively and arbitrarily enforced on a suspect class. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (valid statute applied unconstitutionally where evidence showed administrative body granted or denied statutory licenses based on race of applicant).
Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption of the pretext doctrine. It protects the privacy of all individuals by requiring that police be consistent in their enforcement of traffic regulations and prevents police from conducting warrantless searches and seizures based on an otherwise insufficient hunch of more serious criminal activity.
C. The Reasonable Officer Standard
On appeal, the State asserts the trial court improperly focused exclusively on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in its pretext analysis. We agree.
In Sierra, we stated a court should make an "objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officer] at the time." 754 P.2d at 977. We emphasized that the proper inquiry is "whether a . reasonable officer . would have stopped" the defendant solely for commission of the traffic offense. Id. at 978; see also Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1097. "The proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly have made the stop." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
Further, we clearly indicated that the officer's subjective motivation is not the relevant inquiry. Id. at 977. Were the officer's subjective motivation the key factor, a defendant could use this improper motivation as an excuse to escape the consequences of an otherwise valid and reasonable stop. The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is primarily grounded in protecting an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). An individual does not have a reasonable expectation that the police will not make a traffic stop when the individual commits a traffic violation the police regularly enforce. Thus, if a driver is stopped for traveling at eighty miles an hour in a school zone or running a red light — traffic offenses all drivers know the police regularly enforce — the driver does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In this circumstance, the driver should not be able to avoid a stop simply because the police officer also subjectively believed the driver might be transporting drugs as such a stop is not "unexpected" or "arbitrary." See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876-77, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
Thus, the issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop cannot turn on the issue of an officer's subjective intent, but rather, must turn on the objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop under the same circumstances absent the illegal motivation. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1097.
"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence of a greater offense, but because it [i]s clear that an officer would have been uninterested in pursuing the lesser offense absent that hope." In other words, "the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated from the usual practice in this case but simply that he did deviate."
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 and 1 W. Lafave, Searches and Seizures § 1.4(e) at 94).
Further, a focus on an individual officer's subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext would violate the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police activity. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71, 105 S.Ct. at 2783; Scott, 436 U.S. at 137-38, 98 S.Ct. at 1223.
In making its suppression ruling, the trial court set forth its findings of fact which included, inter alia, the following:
Officer Hamner observed defendant make a left turn and says he did not see a signal at which time a stop was made; The underlying motivation for the stop was to search for drugs and all conclusions as to the identity of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz were erroneous.
The trial court's conclusions of law included the following:
The underlying motivation [was] to follow and to stop the search for drugs; The stop was a "pretext stop" the subsequent search of the car and seizure of the contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's state and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In its cursory findings and conclusions, the trial court erred in focusing exclusively on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in determining the officer's stop was a pretext stop. The court also failed to address many relevant uncontested facts. The officer testified he stopped defendant's car because he believed defendant was Cruz, believed defendant was driving without a license and because he saw defendant make a turn without signaling. The officer further testified that he routinely issues citations for failure to signal — writing about seven tickets per month. He stated he always stops vehicles where he believes the driver is driving without a license unless he is on a high priority call. There was no contrary evidence as to what Officer Hamner routinely did, nor any evidence suggesting that what he routinely did was at odds with what a reasonable officer would do. The court further did not comment on the officer's credibility as to his claimed reasons for the stop in this instance. The court's only relevant findings were that the driver made a turn without signaling and "the underlying motivation for the stop was to search for drugs." The trial court incorrectly focused exclusively on the officer's subjective motivation while ignoring whether the officer would have made the stop regardless of that motivation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that the stop was a pretext stop and remand the case for the trial court to apply the proper legal standard and to make relevant findings of fact necessary to apply that standard.
D. Relevant Evidence
Because we are remanding the case for a further evaluation under the reasonable officer standard, we comment on the type of evidence that is relevant to determine what a reasonable officer would do under the same circumstances. The fundamental rule is that a trial court may look to all facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop to determine if a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
Although the pretext question does not turn on the arresting officer's subjective motivation, a trial court may consider the officer's testimony as to his usual practice. Also relevant are the objective facts and circumstances preceding the stop. The involved officer's actions are neither irrelevant nor determinative as to what a reasonable officer would do under the circumstances.
In United States v. Smith, the court explained:
In determining the validity of the stop of [defendant's] automobile by [the officer], we therefore are not concerned with [the officer's] subjective intent. His actions and his description of the circumstances surrounding the stop are, however, relevant to our inquiry. Thus, while [the officer's] courtroom declaration of motive is intriguing, what turns this case is the overwhelming objective evidence that [the officer] had no interest in investigating possible drunk driving charges: he began pursuit before he observed any "weaving" and, even after he stopped the car, he made no investigation of the possibility of intoxication. That he described the vehicle as being driven with an abundance of caution further indicates that the stop was unrelated to any possible concern with traffic safety. Based on this objective evidence, we conclude that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the car absent an additional, invalid purpose.
799 F.2d at 710-11.
This court has repeatedly looked to the circumstances surrounding the stop in deciding whether the officer involved would have stopped the car for the traffic violation absent the unconstitutional motivation. The evidence is not determinative — as the relevant legal inquiry is wheth er a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation. However, the evidence is probative of the inquiry as the officer involved is within the class of competent witnesses. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979-80. Utah courts have never excluded the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop in evaluating the reasonable officer standard. Certainly the conduct of the officer involved is some evidence of what the objective reasonable officer would have done, especially if it is coupled with an indication by the officer as to whether the conduct is consistent at least with his own practice. Simply put, if an officer testifies to routinely making stops for a particular offense, it tends to show the stop was objectively reasonable; if the officer admits to having never before stopped a driver for the offense, it tends to show a reasonable officer would not have made the stop.
In addition to evaluating the facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, a trial court may also properly consider evidence of the normal practices of other police officers under similar circumstances, as well as indications of departmental policy. The reasonable officer inquiry considers all relevant facts and circumstances probative of whether a reasonable officer would have made the traffic stop absent the illegal motivation.
E. Burden of Proof
Both the State and defendant seek a clarification of the burden of going forward and the burden of proof in a pretext stop suppression hearing. When a search or seizure is made without a warrant, the burden is, in the first instance, upon the State to show the warrantless search meets an exception to the warrant rule. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 886-87; New Mexico v. Mann, 103 N.M. 660, 712 P.2d 6, 10 (Ct.App.1985), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 (1986).
In the pretext stop setting, this means the State first has the burden to show the warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, the State must establish that a traffic violation occurred in the officer's presence or that the officer had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 ("weaving" not a violation of Florida law). Once the State makes this showing, the defendant must point to some evidence to support the defendant's claim that the stop was a pretext stop. Cf. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 886 (party with burden of pleading affirmative defense has burden of going forward with evidence sufficient to raise issue). This evidence will often come from the officer's own testimony.
If the defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, the burden of proof is then ultimately upon the State to show that a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the alleged illegal motivation. See, e.g., Mann, 712 P.2d at 10 (State must show valid legal basis for stop and within exception to warrant rule); see also Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88 (in consent setting, State has burden of showing consent was voluntary).
The State may easily meet its burden by introducing the testimony of the arresting officer's justifications for the actual stop and the officer's normal practices. Absent some concession that the stop was outside normal practice, this may be all that is necessary. See, e.g., Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771. The defendant then may of course challenge the State's showing by identifying facts and circumstances of the stop that demonstrate a reasonable officer would not have made the traffic stop ab sent the unconstitutional motivation. A defendant might also introduce evidence that other officers normally do not stop vehicles for the same infractions or that stopping for such infractions is at odds with departmental policy or practice.
IV. INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT ON REASONABLE SUSPICION
In addition to its pretext arguments, the State also argues the trial court's findings of fact were inadequate as to whether Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without a license. We agree. Initially, we note that the trial court's findings were very brief and did not set out the circumstances of the stop of defendant's car. More importantly, the findings do not clearly establish how Officer Hamner arrived at the suspicion that defendant was driving without a license, and are particularly confusing in describing the relationship between Cruz and Lopez — including whether Officer Hamner had ever been introduced to defendant under any name. The trial court's only finding of fact with regard to this issue stated: "[A]ll conclusions as to the identity of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz were erroneous." With no other findings on the relationship between Lopez and Cruz, we are unable to evaluate whether the court's conclusion that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for driving without a license was in error. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App.1990). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court should more fully explain the factual basis for its conclusion regarding reasonable suspicion.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's conclusion that Officer Hamner's stop of defendant for failing to signal was a pretext stop on the ground that the trial court applied an improper legal analysis under the pretext doctrine and therefore made inadequate findings of fact. We also remand the case for further findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning whether Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was driving without a license.
ORME, J., concurs.
. This amended opinion replaces the opinion in Case No. 900484-CA issued March 2, 1992.
. Although on appeal defendant claims Officer Hamner violated his rights under both the federal constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendant offers no argument that our judgment or analysis should differ under these two provisions. We thus limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment and make no comment concerning the search and seizure provisions of the Utah Constitution and pretext stops. See generally State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) (plurality) (analyzing Utah Constitution "search and seizure" provision where analysis under federal Constitution may differ).
. The defendant claims we should simply "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision," citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991). However, we can utilize this approach only "if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support [the decision]." Id. The record in this case is ambiguous and incomplete on the critical factual issues. The record evidence does not clearly support the trial court's ruling and thus we must remand. Id. at 788 (Utah 1991).
. We have never expressly considered whether the pretext doctrine is also rooted in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. There is, however, no reason to believe at least the same protections are not afforded under our state constitution.
. We have also referred to this standard as the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard. See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78.
. See generally State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1298-1301 (Utah App.1991) (discussing in some detail bifurcated standard of review applied to mixed questions of fact and law in Fourth Amendment context).
. There is little question that under these circumstances a traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge Russon's dissenting opinion would recognize such stops as unconstitutional.
. Apart from Judge Russon's dissent in this case, every other judge on the Utah Court of Appeals has cited the pretext doctrine with approval. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.).
. But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir.) (rejecting pretext doctrine), cert. denied sub nom., Cummins v. United States, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448-49 (1991); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1990) (same), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448-49 (1991).
. See New York v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224, appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 953, 573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991); Tarwid v. Georgia, 184 Ga.App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1987); Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1096; Illinois v. Guerrieri, 194 Ill.App.3d 497, 501, 141 Ill.Dec. 580, 583, 551 N.E.2d 767, 770, appeal denied, 132 U1.2d 549, 144 Ill.Dec. 261, 555 N.E.2d 380 (1990); North Carolina v. Morocco, 99 N.C.App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990). But see State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App. 380, 786 P.2d 734, 736, appeal denied, 310 Or. 122, 794 P.2d 793 (1990) (rejecting pretext doctrine).
. Numerous federal and state cases dealing with a pretext stop question have involved vehicle occupants of Hispanic or African-American descent. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones-Sandoval, 943 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Rivera, 906 F.2d 319, 322 n. 1 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Laymon, 730 F.Supp. 332, 339 (D.Colo.1990); United States v. Suarez, 694 F.Supp. 926, 931 (S.D.Ga.1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1989); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687 n. 3; Limonja v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 416, 419, 375 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1988), on rehearing, 8 Va.App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 476 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 1925, 109 L.Ed.2d 288 (1990).
. See, e.g., Laymon, 730 F.Supp. at 339 (use of drug profile to make traffic drug stop unconstitutional where evidence showed stop was based on race of defendants); Lowery v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 314, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990) (defendant's race impermissible factor in traffic stop where driver matched drug courier profile); see abo State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah App.1988) (eschewing procedure that would permit selective enforcement in favor of one that promotes "a certain equality of treatment''); Comment, The Use of the Drug Courier Profile in Traffic Stops: Valid Police Practice or Fourth Amendment Violation?, 15 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 593, passim (1988) (use of drug courier profiles in making traffic stops may violate Fourth Amendment); Note, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 Nova L.Rev. 273, 295-96 (1987) (drug courier profiles are susceptible to racial abuse and implicate Fourth Amendment concerns).
. The reasonable officer standard is well entrenched as the proper standard under the pretext doctrine. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515— 16; Smith, 799 F.2d at 708; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1096; Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135; Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216; Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882-83; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80.
. The facts in the record are undisputed as only Officer Hamner testified. The trial court intimated nothing which would suggest the court found the testimony not credible. In such situations, this court would ordinarily apply the undisputed facts and determine the proper result without the need for remand. See, e.g., Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 & n. 10. We refrain from doing so here because the scope of the evidentiary hearing and its focus on Officer Hamner's subjective motives were products of confusion as to the proper analysis under the pretext doctrine — which we hope is clarified by this opinion. Therefore, we remand to allow the opportunity for the introduction of additional evidence, if necessary, and to allow the necessary findings for application of the pretext doctrine.
. On appeal, the State points out that several of our prior opinions may be confusing to practitioners and courts attempting to apply the standard, and has requested that we clarify what evidence is relevant to a pretext inquiry to assist the trial court on remand.
. The ultimate burden of proof is properly on the State for several reasons. First, because the seizure was conducted without a warrant, the State should bear the burden of showing the stop was not an intrusion on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, including a showing of what a reasonable officer would do under the same circumstances. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 695. Additionally, because the State has the primary access to most of the relevant evidence, including the officer's past stop practices and the practices of other officers, we believe the burden of proof is properly placed on the State. See, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1982) (burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access to evidence).
. We concede that the pretext doctrine complicates matters for trial counsel and trial courts. However, the effort is justified by the important constitutional principles involved. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2781, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ("the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution"). Furthermore, the doctrine will be rarely applied if properly used. Only a small minority of traffic stop cases implicate the pretext doctrine when the focus is on "whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation." In clear-cut cases, as mentioned earlier, of driving eighty miles-per-hour in a school zone or consuming alcohol while driving, common knowledge suggests that reasonable officers everywhere routinely stop such offenders. In such cases, the pretext doctrine cannot be asserted in good faith and can be dismissed quickly by trial judges.
The pretext doctrine has been applied only to the unusual stop where discretion is broad, such as weaving or following too closely or a minor equipment problem. The cases often involve a clear admission by the officer that the stop was not made for the cited violation but because of a hunch that more serious criminal activity was involved. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 and n. 3; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; see also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) ("erratic" driving with police tailing insufficient to support reasonable suspicion); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 706.