Case Name: Jacquetta ALEXANDER, Circuit Clerk of Pulaski County, Arkansas v. W. E. BEAUMONT, County Judge of Pulaski County, Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1982-03-22
Citations: 275 Ark. 357
Docket Number: 82-27
Parties: Jacquetta ALEXANDER, Circuit Clerk of Pulaski County, Arkansas v. W. E. BEAUMONT, County Judge of Pulaski County, Arkansas
Judges: Purtle, J., dissents.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 275
Pages: 357–360

Head Matter:
Jacquetta ALEXANDER, Circuit Clerk of Pulaski County, Arkansas v. W. E. BEAUMONT, County Judge of Pulaski County, Arkansas
82-27
629 S.W. 2d 300
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered March 22, 1982
John Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.
House, Holmes if Jewell, P.A., by: David Hargis, for appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On February 9, 1982, petitoner filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari to complete the record. After fully considering the petition we denied it on February 22, 1982. Petitioner, by her attorney John Wesley Hall, Jr., has now filed a motion asking us to reconsider, and states:
If the Court refuses to reconsider the Petition, whether this is the result the Court desires or not, the Court should enter a per curiam order for publication that explains to the rest of the Arkansas bar and public that, henceforth, circumstances beyond the control of parties to an appeal can preclude the use of a transcript of testimony. The public needs to know that their rights to effectively pursue appeals can be lost by the conduct of others. This is a novel and unprecedented reversal of this Court's prior holdings and is erroneous.
Because petitioner has requested that we publish our reasons we shall do so.
The notice of appeal, given on August 10,1981, does not contain a statement that the transcript had been ordered as required by Rule 3 (e), Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ark. Stat. Ann. Vol. 3A (Repl. 1979). On October 21, 1981, petitioner obtained an extension of time to docket the appeal. This extension was in violation of Rule 5 (b), Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that an extension of time for filing the record may be given upon the trial court "finding that a reporter's transcript... has been ordered..." We have issued a clear warning that the provision must be followed. Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 155, 492 S.W. 2d 255 (1973) and appendix. This warning was repeated in Perry v. Perry, 257 Ark. 237,515 S.W. 2d 640 (1974). We stated that the purpose of the rule (a statute at that time) was to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals and "We expect compliance with the spirit of the statute, to the end that lawsuits may progress as expeditiously as justice requires." In Owens v. Bill and Tony's Liquor Store, 258 Ark. 887, 529 S.W. 2d 354 (1975), we pointed out that the rule "furnishes ground for such action as we deem appropriate." In Canal Insurance Co. v. Arney, 258 Ark. 893, 530 S.W. 2d 178 (1975), we dismissed a case under this rule. We reiterated the necessity for ordering a transcript and conducting a hearing on the necessity for an extension in Harper v. Pearson, 262 Ark. 294, 556 S.W. 2d 142 (1977).
Petitioner's attorney, John Wesley Hall, Jr., still without ordering a transcript and again without a hearing, obtained from the trial court a second extension of time for the filing of the record. One day before expiration of the second extension of time Mr. Hall filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari with this court stating that the court reporter had been paid and that 60 days' additional time was needed. The petition implied that the transcript had been ordered for some time.
Both court reporters involved have now executed affidavits to this court stating that Mr. Hall had not ordered transcripts when the extensions of time were granted. They affirm that Mr. Hall did not order the record until sometime after January 7, or approximately 30 days before the second extension expired. Quite naturally, the transcript and record were not then timely filed.
The rules for timely ordering of the record have been flagrantly violated. As previously stated, we expect compliance with our rules in order that unnecessary delays may be eliminated and so that lawsuits may proceed as expeditiously as possible.
The petition for reconsideration is refused.
Purtle, J., dissents.