Case Name: Ridley B. Thomas v. Alexander Beaton
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 318
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ridley B. Thomas v. Alexander Beaton.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 318–322

Head Matter:
Ridley B. Thomas v. Alexander Beaton.
He who asks a recision of a sale of land, where he has secured a large portion of the purchase money, is subject to the maxim, that he who asks equity must do equity; he must have offered to restore the consideration money which he had received.
Where the intervener showed that he had parted with the equitable title to the land in question, and failed to show that he had reacquired it, he was not entitled to recover.
Where the intervenor amended, by tendering back the purchase money, which the plaintiff accepted, and the court entered a decree for specific performance and for an equitable lien according to the facts, the Supreme Court refused to disturb the judgment.
Appeal from Havarro. The case was tried before Hon. John Gregg, one of the district judges.
Beaton sued William J. Kirkpatrick and others in an action of trespass to try title.
The appellee instituted suit in the District Court of Havarro county, against Kirkpatrick-and Hogan and wife, to récover a tract of land described in his petition; the defendants filed no answer. Thomas, the appellant, intervened, and claimed the land in controversy as his own, and Kirkpatrick as his tenant, alleging title in himself by regular chain from the government, and possession under deeds duly registered for more than five years prior to the institution of the suit. Thomas also averred that he had, on the 4th March, 1857, entered into an executory contract with Hogan, one of the defendants, agreeing to convey to Hogan the land in controversy upon the performance of certain conditions mentioned in the agreement between Hogan and Thomas, which agreement he brought into court, and prayed that the contract between himself and Hogan might be cancelled, alleging as a reason, the failure of Hogan to comply agreeably to the terms of their contract, and an entire inability to perform, as well as an abandonment of the contract by Hogan. The plaintiff', appellee, then filed an amended petition, excepting to the petition of the appellant, Thomas, and denying that Hogan had abandoned the contract, and alleging that he, the plaintiff, as attorney for another party, had a judgment against Hogan and one Henderson, upon which an execution issued; that the land in controversy was pointed out by Henderson, levied on by the sheriff, sold and purchased by the appellee; that Thomas was estopped from setting up title to the land by his own admissions and other averments. The appellant also filed a transcript of the case upon which the execution issued, under which he purchased. The land was purchased by the appellee at ten cents per acre.. The exceptions of appellee to appellant’s petition, coming on to be heard, were sustained, and Thomas compelled to amend, offering to pay back to Hogan, and tendering into com’t the amount paid by Hogan to Thomas.. Upon this amendment coming in, the plaintiff accepted the tender and prayed judgment therefor, as well as for interest and a lien upon the land in controversy. The plaintiff' then dismissed, as to Hogan and wife, and the court, without a trial, proceeded to enter judgment in favor of Beaton for the amount admitted to have been paid by Hogan to Thomas on the land, with interest, and decreeing a judgment lien upon the land to secure its payment, and decreeing the land to Thomas; from which judgment the appellant comes to this court for relief. The errors assigned involve the correctness of the rulings of the court in sustaining exceptions to the petition of the appellant, and in ordering the amount paid by Hogan to Thomas to be paid to Beaton, the appellee, as well as giving a judgment lien upon the land to secure its payment.
C. M. Winkler, for appellant, argued the facts of the case.
And, if the petition be true, it is submitted, that Hogan did not even have an equitable interest in the laud, if he had failed to comply or had abandoned the contract, or if he was unable to comply with the stipulations he had taken upon himself to perform. He could not have maintained an action against Thomas for specific performance, or to recover back the amount of his payment. (Dolan & Foy v. Mayor and C. C., 4 Gill., 394; Ives v. Armstrong, 5 R. I, 567; O. & W. Dig., Art. 205.)
JR. Q. Mills, for appellee.
—At the last term of this court the appellee demanded the transcript in this cáse, and filed it with this court, with a suggestion of delay.
The appellant intervened in the court below, and prayed the recision of the contract, alleged its abandonment, and Hogan’s insolvency and inability to execute it. This .is the only allegation in his petition necessary to notice. It is not sufficient, for two reasons: 1st, the bond was proved up by Thomas (13th October) after that time, and this was an acknowledgment of the existence of the contract; 2d, time was not of the essence of the contract by the bond, and there was nothing in the acts of the parties that made it so. And if the party sought the aid of a court of equity for relief, he must come offering to do equity. (See Fullerton v. Doyle, 18 Tex., 10; Prim v. Barton, 18 Tex., 206. Besides, appellant waived all right to except to the ruling. Tie acquiesced in it, and voluntarily tendered back the money to whomsoever the court might decree it. We accepted it, and there was an end of it. It was a judgment by confession.
Appellee suggests delay.

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—We think it free from doubt, that the plaintiff was entitled to be heard to except to the legal sufficiency of the petition of the intervenor, since it was interposed to defeat his action; and we are of opinion that the exceptions were well taken.
The intervenor asserted title in himself to the land in question, and undertook to set forth the nature and constituents of his title. In so doing, he disclosed that he had sold the land to Hogan and received a largé part of the consideration, and had thus divested himself of the ownership. But, in order to obviate the effect of the sale and divestiture of title, he asked a recision of the sale, on the ground that Hogan had abandoned and failed to complete, and was unable to complete, the performance of the contract. He did not rely for a recovery on the strength of his legal title; but anticipating that that would be met by the fact that he had sold to Hogan, and invested him with the superior equitable title which the plaintiff had subsequently acquired, and that his action would be thus defeated, he invokes the aid of equity to rescind the sale to Hogan and reinvest himself with the equitable title. He comes into court, therefore, invoking the interposition of its equitable powers in his behalf to make out his title. And the maxim applies in its full force, that he who seeks equity must do equity. He seeks to make his title available against the plaintiff; and, to enable him ,to do this, he -must show that it is a good equitable title. This he has failed to do; because, while he seeks the aid of equity, he has failed to show that he had done that which equity required of him on his part to perform. To entitle him to the aid of & court of equity to rescind the contract of sale to Hogan, he must have restored or offered to restore the consideration which he had received. This it does not appear hy his petition that he had done. His petition, therefore, failed to show that he had reacquired the equitable title, or that he was in a situation to ask of a court of equity a recision of the sale to Hogan. He does not appear to have been entitled to relief on the maxim that equity will consider that as actually done which ought to he done; because he has failed to show that in equity and good conscience the sale ought to be rescinded. In fine, the petition of the intervenor shows that he had parted with the equitable title to the land in question, and fails to show that Jie had reacquired it, and was, therefore, rightly adjudged by the court insufficient to entitle him to maintain his action.
Deeming that the court ruled rightly in sustaining exceptions to the petition, it does not become necessary to decide upon the effect of the tender proposed hy the amended petition and its acceptance, upon the right of the intervenor to assign error in the ruling of the court upon the exceptions.
We are of the opinion that there is no error in the judgment, and it is
Aeeirmed.