Case Name: Charles G. KINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tyson TAKEUCHI; Michele Clark, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-12-28
Citations: 708 F. App'x 414
Docket Number: No. 16-56733
Parties: Charles G. KINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tyson TAKEUCHI; Michele Clark, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 708
Pages: 414–415

Head Matter:
Charles G. KINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tyson TAKEUCHI; Michele Clark, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-56733
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 18, 2017
Filed December 28, 2017
Charles G. Kinney, Pro Se
Eric Chomsky, Esquire, Attorney, Marcus & Enowitz, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Kinney's action was proper under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Kinney's claims constitute a "de fac-to appeal" of prior state court judgments, or are "inextricably intertwined" with those judgments. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claim for injunction based on allegedly erroneous and "void" state court judgment because "[gjranting the injunction would require the district court to determine that the state court's decision was wrong and thus void").
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We reject as without merit -Kinney's challenges to the district court's interlocutory orders, including the orders regarding venue, transfer, and relation of cases.
We reject as unsupported by the record Kinney's contention that the district judge was biased.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
. Appellees' requests for sanctions and for leave to fíle a motion for a vexatious litigant pre-filing review order against Kinney, set forth in the answering brief, are denied.
Appellees' corrected motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 18) is granted.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.