Case Name: GUENTHER v. RIDGWAY CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-12-30
Citations: 156 N.Y.S. 534
Docket Number: 
Parties: GUENTHER v. RIDGWAY CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 156
Pages: 534–538

Head Matter:
GUENTHER v. RIDGWAY CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 30, 1915.)
1. Witnesses <@=>393—Impeachment—Prior Testimony—Mode of Proof— Transcript on Appeal.
The typewritten record on appeal in another suit of the testimony of a witness was not competent proof of the testimony of such witness to impeach his testimony in the later suit.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1252-1257; Dec. Dig. <@=>393.]
2. Evidence <@=>473—Opinion.
In an action for libel, testimony of a witness that when he was special district attorney an investigation he made disclosed no evidence that plaintiff was interested in a certain business, other than in handling its advertising, was inadmissible, as the witness’ opinion as to whether a thorough investigation conducted by him into the affairs of the business, interviewing witnesses, and conducting a prosecution against one of the members of the company, showed that plaintiff was connected with it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 2220-2233; Dec. Dig. <@=>473.]
3. Libel and Slander <@=>7—Charge of Blackmailing—Libelous Character.
A charge that plaintiff was a blackmailer was libelous.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 17-78; Dec. Dig. <@=>7.]
4. Libel and Slander <@=>19—Justification by Truth—“Blackmail.”
In an action for libel for having published the charge that plaintiff was a blackmailer, it was error for the court to limit the defense of justification to blackmail as defined by Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 40) § 856, relating to a threat in writing, since “blackmail” has a broader meaning than the crime of blackmail, being defined as extortion in any mode by means of intimidation, as the extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure, or of unfavorable criticism in the press.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 98, 99; Dec. Dig. <@=>19.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blackmail.]
5. Libel and Slander <@=>123—Justification—Truth-—Question for Jury.
In an action for libel by having published of plaintiff that he was a blackmailer, whether defendant justified by showing truth of the charge, in the colloquial sense in which the word is ,ordinarily used and understood, held for the jury under the evidence.
<@zzoFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
[Eel. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 356-861; Dec. Dig. <@=>123.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Louis Guenther against the Ridgway Company. Judgment for plaintiff for $17,000. From the judgment, and from an order denying a motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
See, also-, 159 App. Div. 74, 143 N. Y. Supp. 961.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, DOWLING, and SMITH, JJ.
James B. Sheehan, of New York City (Francis Rooney, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
E. C. Crowley, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, P. J.
The plaintiff was the editor of the Financial World, a weekly periodical having a circulation of 12,000, published in New York by the Guenther Publishing Company, of which he was the president and treasurer and the owner of a majority of its capital stock; and he brought this action to- recover damages for an alleged libel in the September, 1911, issue of the Adventure, a monthly periodical published by the defendant.
We are of opinion that it was error to receive a typewritten record on appeal in Kellogg v. United States to impeach the testimony given by the witness Eberman, for the certified case on appeal was not competent proof of the testimony given by the witness on that trial to impeach his testimony given on the trial of the issues herein.
We are also of opinion that it was error to receive the testimony, given by the witness Oicott, to the effect that an investigation which he made as special district attorney did not disclose any evidence that the plaintiff was interested in the business of E. S. Dean & Co-., other than in handling its advertising, for the reason that it consisted merely of his opinion as to whether a thorough investigation conducted by him into the affairs of E. S. Dean & Co., consisting of the examination of the books of the company and interviewing witnesses and conducting a prosecution against one of the members of the company, showed that the plaintiff was in any manner connected with the company, otherwise than in handling its advertising.
The court ruled, and instructed the jury, that the charge that the plaintiff was a blackmailer was libelous. Those rulings are sustained by the decision of this court in Town Topics Pub. Co. v. Collier, 114 App. Div. 191, 99 N. Y. Supp. 575. Without, so far as the record shows, the point having been taken or claim made by counsel for respondent, the court announced when this question first arose that the only blackmail he knew or would recognize was that defined in the Penal Law of this state, and that position was maintained by the court throughout the trial. The court read section 856 of the Penal Law to the jury, and ruled that the defense of justification of this charge required proof of blackmail as defined in that section, which relates to a threat in writing, and charged, as matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to establish this defense. There was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had attempted to blackmail advertisers by written threats, but we are of opinion that the court erred in so limiting the proof of justification. It cannot be said, as matter of law, that the libel charged the plaintiff with having committed the crime of blackmail. The word "blackmail" has a broader meaning. It is defined in tire Century Dictionary as:
"Extortion in any mode by means of intimidation, as the extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure, or of unfavorable criticism in the press."
Blackmail has frequently been construed by the courts as synonymous with extortion. Edsall v. Brooks, 17 Abb. Pr. 226; People v. Davis, 156 App. Div. 279, 141 N. Y. Supp. 83; Matter of Lenney, 169 App. Div. 509, 155 N. Y. Supp. 473; Mitchell v. Sharon (C. C.) 51 Fed. 424. See, also, Holmes v. Jones, 50 Hun, 345, 3 N. Y. Supp. 156; Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465, 24 Pac. 979, 21 Am. St. Rep. 300. We are also of opinion that the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether the appellant justified in the colloquial sense in which tire word is ordinarily used and understood.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
CLARKE, DOWLING, and SMITH, JJ., concur.