Case Name: STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA v. F. A. NELSON
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-05-08
Citations: 36 N.D. 564
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA v. F. A. NELSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 564–570

Head Matter:
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA v. F. A. NELSON.
(163 N. W. 278.)
Compiled Laws — statutes — act charged — applicable to.
1. Section 10250 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 is only applicable where no other punishment.is provided in the statutes for the act complained of.
Information — criminal offense — charging — sodomy — exposing private parts — injury to.
2. An information which charges that the defendant “did then and there wilfully and wrongfully expose her, the said M’s, private parts and lap and suck the same with his tongue and mouth to the gross injury of the said M, and to the gross injury of the public morals of said county,” involves the crime of sodomy.
Sodomy — crime of — statutory definition — common law — carnal knowledge — by mouth — included.
3. The crime of sodomy, as defined by § 9615 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, is much broader than the common-law offense, and includes carnal knowledge by or with the mouth.
Opinion filed May 8, 1917.
Prosecution under § 10250, Comp. Laws 1913, for grossly injuring tbe person of another in a manner injurious to the public morals. Appeal from the District Court of Traill County, Charles A. Pollock, J.
Judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Purcell & Divet and P. J. Swenson, for appellant.
The facts as proved do not make out the crime charged. There is no proof of any wrongful public act. There is not a thing to show that public morals have been disturbed or outraged, nor is there any proof of physical injury to the person mentioned. The act was in private if done at all. Comp. Laws 1913, § 10250; State v. Stevens, 33 N. D. 540, 157 N. W. 668.
Note. — On whether sodomy may be committed by penetration of mouth, see notes in 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 478, and 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 473.
The acts contemplated by this statute must be done openly — publicly —exposed to view, not in private or secretly. 29 Cyc. 1494; Com. v. Catlin, 1 Mass. 8.
It is the mutual disposition of the parties to a crime involving joint guilt that is material. State v. Butts, 107 Iowa, 653, 78 N. W. 687.
When the defendant in a criminal case goes upon the witness stand he subjects himself to a full cross-examination not only as to all relevant matters of the case, but as to collateral inquiries as affect his credibility, even though such matters involve a showing of the commission of other crimes. The defendant’s right to protection, however, lies in the discretion of the trial, a sound judicial discretion that evinces fair judgment and real conviction in the selection of one of two alternative courses. Such discretion is subject to abuse. State v. Kent (State v. ÍPancoast) 5 N. D. 516, 35 L.R.A. 518, 67 N. W. 1052; State v. Nyhus, 19 N. D. 326, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 487, 124 N. W. 71; Jones, Ev. § 834 (842), and cases cited, note 31; 3 Ene. Ev. 909..
Karl Iljori, State’s Attorney, and Wm. Longer, Attorney General, for respondent.
“All the provisions of our Code are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.” Such is the rule of interpretation in this state. Comp. Laws 1913, § 9201.
“A crime is any wrong which the government deems injurious to the public at large and punishes through a judicial proceeding in its own name.” 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 32.
As the public suffers with its individual members, so does every individual member suffer with the public. Bishop, Crim. Law, p. 235.
Every person while in this state is subject to its jurisdiction and entitled to its protection. Comp. Laws 1913, § 15.
The essential element of the crime charged consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the female. The rule admitting proof off extraneous crimes is subject to certain qualifications and exceptions;. All relevant facts may be shown, even though they tend to prove other similar offenses. Butt v. State, 81 Ark. 173, 118 Am. St. Eep. 42, 98 S. W. 723; Farris v. People, 129 111. 521, 4 L.E.A. 582, 16 Am. St. Eep. 283, 21 N. E. 821; People v. Jennings, 252 111. 534, 43 L.E.A. (N.S.) 1206, 96 N. E. 1077; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa, 685, 94 N. W. 204; Thompson v. United States, 75 O'. C. A. 172, 144 Fed. 14, 7 Ann. Oas. 62; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L.E.A. 330, note; Dawson v. State, 32 Tex. Grim. Eep. 535, 40 Am. St. Eep. 791, 25 S. W. 21; People v. Bercovitz, 163 Gal. 636, 43 L.E.A. (N.S.) 667, 126 Pac. 479; Sykes v. State, 105 Am. St. Eep. 983, note; State v. Lapage, 72 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Eep. 69, 2 Am. Grim. Eep. 506; Lipham v. State, 125 Ga. 52, 114 Am. St. Eep. 181, 53 S. E. 817, 5 Ann. Oas. 66.
Testimony which tends to prove a distinct and different offense from that for which defendant is on trial is not admissible. But proof of like offenses, within a reasonable time, is admissible. State v. Place, 5 Wash. 773, 32 Pac. 736; Eogers v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 355, 50 S. W. 338; People v. Patterson, 102 Gal. 239, 36 Pac. 436. •
Evidence of a prior act is not competent as substantive testimony, but it may be considered, if believed, as corroborative evidence of a subset quent like offense when the latter offense is in issue. People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 137, 46 Am. Eep. 128; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393; State v. Dulces, 119 N. O. 782, 25 S. E. 786; People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305; People v. Grauer, 12 App. Div. 464, 42 N. Y. Supp. 721; State v. Peres, 27 Mont. 358, 71 Pae. 162; State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605; Williams y. State, 8 Humph. 585; Taylor v. State, 22 Tex. App. 529, 58 Am. Eep. 656, 3 S. W. 753; People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541; People v. Hooghkerk, 96 N. Y. 149; People v. Eckert, 2 N. Y. Grim. Eep. 470.
Defendant here claimed no privilege. Jones, Ev. § 842, and cases cited; State v. Kent (State v. Pancoast) 5 N. D. 552, 35 L.E.A. 518, 67 N. W. 1052; Territory v. O’Hare, 1 N. D. 30, 44 N. W. 1003; State v. Fallon, 2 N. D. 510, 52 N. W. 318; State v. Eozum, 8 N. D. 549, 80 N. W. 477; State v. Ekanger, 8 N. D. 559, 80 N. W. 482.
The latitude to be allowed on cross-examination is largely discretionary with the trial court. Schwoebel v. Fugina, 14 N. D. 375, 104 N. W. 848; Mathews v. Hanson, 19 N. D. 692, 124 N. W. 1116; State v. Madison, 23 S. D. 584, 122 N. W. 647; S. J. Vidger Co. v. "Great Northern K. Co. 15 N. D. 501, 10Y N. W. 1083; State v. Staber, 20 N. D. 515,129 N. W. 101.

Opinion:
Bruce, Oh. J.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against "the defendant in a criminal prosecution which is brought under' the provisions of § 10,250 of the Compiled Laws of 1913. The information was as follows: "That heretofore, to wit, on or about the 15.th day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifteen .at the county of Traill, in said state of North Dakota, one E. A. Nelson, late of said county of Traill and state aforesaid, did commit the crime of wilfully and wrongfully committing an act which grossly injured the person of another and which was injurious to public morals, committed as follows; to wit:
"That at said time and place the said E. A. Nelson, being then and there a male person of mature years, did wilfully and unlawfully entice unto himself one Grace Irene Stipp, a female child of tender years, and •after having thus secured her unto himself, did then and there wilfully and wrongfully expose her, the said Grace Irene Stipp's, private parts and lap and suck the same with his tongue and mouth, to the gross injury ,of the child, who was then and there too young and inexperienced to consent to such act or to understand the nature thereof, and to the gross injury of the public morals of said county.
"This contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of North Dakota."
The statute under which the action was brought reads as follows: "Section 10,250. Every person who wilfully and wrongfully commits any act which grossly injures the person or property of another, or which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly outrages public decency, and is injurious to public morals, although no punishment is expressly prescribed therefor by this Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
A demurrer was filed to the complaint and was overruled. In our opinion it should have been sustained. If guilty at all, the defendant was guilty of the crime of sodomy as defined by § 9615 of the'Compiled Laws of 1913. Section 10,250 (under which the prosecution was brought) is, by its terms, only applicable where "no other punishment is prescribed." Section 9615 is extremely broad in its terms. While the common-law offense of sodomy involved the direct use of the genital organs of the male, § 9615 includes carnal hwwledge of "any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouthWe do not desire, to discuss the revolting details of an act such as that complained of.. We are satisfied, however, that it involves an attempt to carnally know with the mouth. See Psychopathia Sexualis by Krafft-Ebing.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is, remanded.