Case Name: W. C. DALY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sol ABRAMSON, Defendant-Appellant, Frank J. Zuzak (Called in Warranty), Appellant, Cahn Electric Company, Inc. (Called in Warranty), Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1959-10-30
Citations: 117 So. 2d 772
Docket Number: No. 9055
Parties: W. C. DALY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sol ABRAMSON, Defendant-Appellant, Frank J. Zuzak (Called in Warranty), Appellant, Cahn Electric Company, Inc. (Called in Warranty), Appellant.
Judges: HARDY, Judge, dissents from that portion of the judgment rejecting plaintiff’s claims, in toto, for expenditures in connection with the repair of the heating system.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 117
Pages: 772–781

Head Matter:
W. C. DALY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sol ABRAMSON, Defendant-Appellant, Frank J. Zuzak (Called in Warranty), Appellant, Cahn Electric Company, Inc. (Called in Warranty), Appellant.
No. 9055.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
Oct. 30, 1959.
On Rehearing Jan. 26, 1960.
Wilson, Abramson, Maroun & Kaplan, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
Freyer & Freyer, Shreveport, for Frank J. Zuzak called in warranty.
Lewis Weinstein, Shreveport, for Cahn Electric Company, Inc. called in warranty.
Mecom, Scott & Despot, William B. Phelps, Jeter & Sawyer, Shreveport, for appellee.

Opinion:
GLADNEY, Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, W. C. Daly, against Sol Abram-son for $735.71, and in favor of. Sol Abramson against Frank J. Zuzak, war-rantor, for $496. Orders of appeal were granted on behalf of Zuzak, Abramson and the Cahn Electric Company, Inc., but the latter, a third party also called in warranty, failed to perfect its, appeal. Plaintiff-appellee has not answered the appeal. •.
W. C. Daly purchased from Sol Abrarri-son by cash deed dated August 1, 1957, the premises at 311 Ratcliff Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The vendor expressly represented to his vendee that "the air-conditioning and heating system is to be in good working order", but Daly, upon occupancy, immediately experienced difficulty with the air-conditioning unit and on August 2nd called in the Cahn Electric Company, Inc., which company found it necessary to clean filters, drain and clean the tower, acidize the condenser, and supply new filters and a gallon of Belco. After the system again failed to render proper service, Cahn Electric Company, Inc. replaced the water pump motor, certain pipe fittings and again acidized the condenser. Called back on September 21, 1957, Cahn Electric Company, Inc. removed the old pump and installed a new one, placed a flexible connection on the pump and performed other services. Daly paid $239.71 for these expenses.
With the arrival of colder weather, Daly requested A. H. Otto, a representative of the Climate Engineering Company, Inc., to inspect his central heating system, and after this inspection Otto informed him the heating system could cause asphyxiation as it was not installed in accordance with building code requirements of the City of Shreveport and the National Board of Fire Underwriters. Otto proceeded to correct these deficiencies, rendering an invoice for $496 for work he described as including "necessary grilles, sheetmetal work, new flue, duct insulation, electric wiring, carpenter work, miscellaneous pipe and fittings, and labor as outlined in attached report." The report referred to does not appear in the record. Otto testified, however, the mechanical parts of the unit were in good working order and his concern was caused by the improper method provided for the return air, and defective ventilation of the burned gas.
The heating unit was installed during the erection of the house in 1948. Zuzak, the builder, made a cash warranty sale of the premises to Sol Abramson, who lived there with his family continuously until the property was sold to Daly. While living in the house, Abramson, in 1953, had the Cahn Electric Company, Inc. install the subject air-conditioning unit.
Petitioner's suit is in the nature of a red-hibitory action. He alleges the vices and defects complained of in the air-conditioning and heating unit existed prior to his purchase and that he was unaware of such vices or defects which were not discernible by simple inspection. The defendant, im-pleading Zuzak in warranty, made similar allegations.
Redhibition is defined by LSA-C.C. Art. 2520 as "The avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice", and the article immediately following declares that "apparent defects, that is, such as the buyer might have discovered by simple inspection, are not among the number of redhibitory vices". The Code also imposes a limitation as to the commencement of such action in LSA-C.C. Art. 2534, which prescribes the "red-hibitory action must be instituted within a year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the sale", but "this limitation does not apply where the seller had knowledge of the vice and neglected to declare it to the purchaser."
The foregoing legal principles have special application here. The issues considered are, first, as to the warranties of the air-conditioning unit, and second, as to the warranties of the heating unit. An important factor in a resolution of the questions presented is the expressed warranties by the defendant to Daly to the effect the heating and cooling units were in good working order. Zuzak, of course, is not bound thereby and his warranty to Abram-son is necessarily restricted to that supplied in the provisions of LSA-C.C. Art. 2520. Zuzak may not be charged with any responsibility for the air-conditioning unit as it was installed subsequently to his sale of the premises.
The numerous repairs made by the Cahn Electric Company, Inc. show to our satisfaction the air-conditioning system was not in good working order prior to its purchase by Daly, hut in argument it is contended by counsel for Abramson that these were ordinary repairs which the vendee is expected to bear. The trial court found no merit in this defense, in view of the special warranty and we concur in its finding.
The vices charged to the heating system must stand or fall with the evaluation accorded the testimony of A. H. Otto, and concerning which we have several comments.
First, we note the witness has not itemized the charges for the services rendered. Admittedly, certain items of the work performed were not required in order to correct the dangers which he assumed to exist.
Second, we are not convinced such a dangerous condition existed as the witness would have us believe. The presence of such dangers was not substantiated by other witnesses who were equally as experienced. Zuzak, the builder, testified he sought the advice of the Dykes Air Conditioning Company before installing the unit, that it was inspected and approved in 1948 by the building inspector of Shreveport, and by the inspectors for the Federal Housing Administration, which approved the house for a loan, Abramson testified he had continuously used the unit for nine years, during which time it gave good service and he had registered no complaint. Vincent F. Giglio, who serviced the unit during the entire period of Abramson's occupancy, testified that he had not observed any indication of danger or he would have brought it to the attention of the owner. Abry S. Cahn, Jr., testified that in 1953 when his organization installed the air-conditioning unit the heating system was inspected for the purpose of determining if the newly installed air-conditioning ducts could be used for the hot air, and no dangerous condition therein was found. Clyde Juneau, the present inspector for the City of Shreveport, and other witnesses uniformly stated the method of installation followed in 1948 by Zuzak was then generally practiced without objection. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence strongly favors a finding that the heating system as so installed and sold in 1948 was without vice or defect. Otto's testimony establishes only that the unit did not comply with certain later prescribed building regulations.
The third objection to the evidence is that it leaves us without a conviction the so-called vices were not apparent to the buyers upon simple inspection. Otto produced photographs which portrayed the conditions of which he complained, thereby demonstrating the conditions were discernible to the eye by simple inspection. Argu-endo, even if the alleged conditions were plainly visible but not understood by Abramson as a source of danger, surely these patent defects would not have escaped the professional attention of Giglio for a period of nine years, and of the employees of the Cahn Electric Company, Inc., and others who had inspected the heating system. We must conclude, therefore, that plaintiff has failed to prove .the existence of defects or vices in the heating system.
Another defense urged by Zuzak is the one year limitation provided in LSA-C.C. Art. 2534. Our findings of fact exonerate Zuzak of knowingly concealing any vices in the heating system, and, therefore, the special plea of prescription should have been sustained.
A plea of ten years prescription also relied upon by Zuzak is predicated on LSA-C.C. Art. 3544, which provides "All personal actions, except those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years." (Emphasis supplied.) This plea is inap-posite, we think, for the words "those before enumerated" exclude personal actions embraced by LSA-C.C. Art. 2534.
From the foregoing conclusions, it follows :
First, tlie judgment in favor of plaintiff, Daly, against defendant, Abramson, for Four Hundred Ninety-Six ($496) Dollars, is annulled, set aside and reversed, and this demand of plaintiff is denied; second, the judgment in favor of Abramson against Zuzak for Four Hundred Ninety-Six ($496) Dollars is annulled, set aside and reversed, and defendant's demand in warranty is denied; and, third, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, save as to costs, which are to be equally divided between Daly and Abram-son.
HARDY, Judge, dissents from that portion of the judgment rejecting plaintiff's claims, in toto, for expenditures in connection with the repair of the heating system.