Case Name: Barbara MARTIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Eugene L. MARTIN, Defendant and Appellee
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1984-11-21
Citations: 358 N.W.2d 793
Docket Number: No. 14280
Parties: Barbara MARTIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Eugene L. MARTIN, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: MORGAN, J., DUNN, Retired Justice, and HERTZ, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 358
Pages: 793–803

Head Matter:
Barbara MARTIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Eugene L. MARTIN, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 14280.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs March 20, 1984.
Decided Nov. 21, 1984.
Daryl L. Hecht of Crary, Huff, Clem, Raby & Inkster, P.C., North Sioux City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Glenn A. Fingerson of Fingerson & Sev-erson, Huron, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion:
WOLLMAN, Justice.
Plaintiff, Barbara Martin, was granted a divorce from defendant, Eugene Martin, on the ground of extreme cruelty. She appeals from certain provisions of the judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Plaintiff, who is presently thirty-seven years of age, and defendant, who is forty-one, were married on September 4, 1967. Plaintiff, who had just graduated with an associate nursing degree, then became employed as a nurse at Sacred Heart Hospital in Yankton, while defendant started his third year of law school at the University of South Dakota.
Following defendant's graduation from law school in the spring of 1968, the parties moved to Huron, where defendant became associated with a law firm and plaintiff obtained a nursing position at St. John's Hospital. Defendant was inducted into the United States Army in late 1969. During the period of defendant's basic training, plaintiff lived with her parents in Jefferson, South Dakota, and was employed as a nurse at St. Luke's Hospital in Sioux City, Iowa. Following the completion of defendant's basic training, he was stationed at Ft. McClellan, Alabama. Plaintiff joined him there, where she worked as a nurse in Anniston, Alabama, from March of 1970 until November of 1971.
Following defendant's release from active duty, the parties returned to Huron, where defendant resumed his law practice and plaintiff resumed her nursing career at St. John's Hospital, where she worked until December of 1971, when she obtained a position as a nurse with a local doctor, for whom she worked until June of 1973, when she was forced to terminate her employment because of complications associated with her pregnancy. Following the birth of their second child, plaintiff did not return to work outside the home for several years. When she did decide to seek reemployment, she was unable to find a position as a nurse in a clinic.
Two children were born to the marriage, the first on June 4,1972, and the second on December 27, 1973. (Because the parties entered into a stipulation and agreement, approved by the trial court, regarding the custody of the children, no issue regarding custody is presented to us on this appeal.)
Defendant accepted an appointment as a judge of the circuit court in March of 1979. (We take judicial notice of the fact that he was re-elected to an eight-year term in the November 1982 general election.)
Plaintiff alleged, and the trial court found, that defendant had conducted himself towards plaintiff in a manner that constituted the infliction of emotional cruelty. According to plaintiff's testimony, defendant ignored her emotional needs and was difficult to communicate with. The parties sought marriage counseling from March until June of 1982, which apparently was unsuccessful. In August of 1982, defendant refused plaintiffs request that he resume counseling. Defendant informed plaintiff that he chose not to change in any way and that if she wanted to live with him she would have to live with him the way he was. The parties separated in late August of 1982. At the time of the separation plaintiff had been accepted for enrollment in a medical assistant training program in Watertown. It was plaintiffs understanding that her tuition and support for herself and her children would be paid by defendant. After she had moved herself and the children to Watertown, however, plaintiff was informed by defendant that any money expended on plaintiffs training would be deducted from her share of the property division in the divorce action. Plaintiff then decided that she would not go through with the training program and instead tried to find a position as a nurse in Watertown and the surrounding area, as well as in Sioux Falls and in Sioux City. At the time of trial, January 28, 1988, plaintiff had been actively seeking employment since November of 1982 with no success, due to a lack of nursing positions. She testified that several of the hospitals that she had contacted had informed her that they will hire only someone who has had experience within the last five years. Plaintiff herself has been away from nursing in a clinic situation for some nine and a half years and in a hospital position for eleven and one-half years. Accordingly, plaintiff enrolled in a home study refresher course in nursing offered by South Dakota State University. The refresher course involves fifty hours of home study, followed by one hundred hours of clinical work in a hospital under the supervision of a registered nurse.
Plaintiff testified that she anticipated that it would take her some three months to complete the refresher course. She also testified that a registered nurse with an associate degree could expect to work forty hours per week and earn from $7.00 to $8.00 per hour.
In her opening brief to this court, filed on October 27, 1983, plaintiff states that she only recently found a job at a Sioux City, Iowa, nursing home, where she earns $6.50 per hour.
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff owned a small amount of furniture and some personal effects. In addition, she had received a cash wedding gift from her father in the amount of $300.00. The income from her employment at the hospital in Yankton was used for the couple's living expenses during defendant's final year of law school. Thereafter, plaintiff's income was pooled with defendant's and utilized for living expenses.
Plaintiff owns a remainder interest in two tracts of land in Union County, South Dakota, from which she presently receives no income. One of the tracts is held in trust, subject to a life estate in plaintiff's grandmother, who at the time of trial was some 81 years of age. Upon the death of plaintiff's grandmother, the land is to be sold and the net sale proceeds remaining after payment of bequests in the amount of $1,500.00 are to be divided among plaintiff and her two brothers and her sister. This tract consists of some 70 untillable acres, 20 acres of which were described by defendant as an "an absolute jungle" that would have to be cleared in order to be utilized as farmland. Defendant testified that he thought the 70 acre tract was worth $2,000.00 per acre. Plaintiff had no opinion regarding the value of the land, other than the fact that several years ago farm land in the area was selling for between $1,500.00 and $2,000.00 an acre. Defendant introduced as an exhibit a compu tation by a certified public accountant, based upon current rates used for federal estate tax' purposes, that showed the present value of the remainder interest in this land as having a total value of $100,-115.40, based upon a value of $2,000.00 per acre.
The same accounting firm prepared an exhibit which showed plaintiffs one-fourth interest in the other tract of land as having a present value of $16,871.43.
Prior to trial, plaintiff, as a result of discussions with defendant concerning her post-separation expense, living and retraining and expenses, withdrew $6,550.00 from the parties' joint savings account. Also, the parties divided their personal property.
The trial court found that the parties had accumulated an equity of $20,000.00 in their personal residence and held a certificate of deposit in the amount of $9,130.00. Defendant's HR-10 retirement account had a value of some $31,350.00, although the present value, after deducting the income tax due on early withdrawal, was $14,-137.00 at time of trial. His state judicial retirement account had grown to some $12,600.00 at time of trial (although the trial court valued it at $11,402.01, which was the balance in the account as of September 1982). The money in this account is available to defendant only if he leaves his position as circuit court judge. The trial court found that the only outstanding liabilities of the parties, other than the mortgage on their residence, were 1982 income and real estate taxes totaling $2,050.00.
Plaintiff testified that her health was fairly good, although she does have back problems resulting from a degenerating cervical disc. Her testimony in this regard was borne out by copies of medical reports that she introduced into evidence. Defendant did not dispute that plaintiff suffers from a degenerative disease of her cervical spine.
Plaintiff testified that she has difficulty lifting anything over twenty-five pounds in weight and that any grasping with her left hand results in pain. In her opinion, this restriction in her physical ability would limit her availability to work as a nurse in a hospital setting, such as in an intensive care unit.
A June 18, 1982, medical report indicated that plaintiff's CAT scan showed a very small bulging centrally of the L5-S1 disc.
The trial court's findings refer to the medical report regarding the herniated disc at the L5-S1 level, but make no reference to the problem with her cervical spine. The trial court found that with the exception of the back problem plaintiff was in good health. The trial court found that defendant was in good health.
The trial court ordered defendant to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per month per child, including the two months of the year when he is to have custody of the children pursuant to the agreement of the parties.
The trial court divided the property as follows:
Plaintiff's Share
Personal property (divided prior to trial) $11,000.00
Cash 25,000.00
Remainder interest in grandfather's land -0-
Remainder interest in grandfather's land -0-
$36,000.00
Defendant s share
Residence (equity) $20,000.00
Personal property (divided prior to trial) 5,000.00
Certificate of Deposit 9,000.00
H-R 10 account 31,351.75
State retirement account 11,402.01
$76,753.26
Liabilities
1982 income 1,000.00 tax
1982 real 1,050.00 estate tax
Cash payment 18,450.00 to plaintiff ($25,000 less $6,550 received by plaintiff prior to trial) 20,500.00
$56,253.26
Although the trial court took into account plaintiffs vested interest in this land, it made no specific finding with respect to the value of that interest. Plaintiff offered no specific evidence regarding the value of the land or her interest therein and did not propose a finding regarding the value. Defendant's proposed finding regarding the value of plaintiff's interest in the land was rejected by the trial court.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the property of the parties. We do not agree.
Trial courts have full power to make an equitable division of the property belonging to the parties to a divorce action, and in making such division of the property they shall have regard for equity and the circumstances of the parties. SDCL 25-4-44. In making a division of property in a divorce action, the trial court is bound by no mathematical formula. See, e.g., Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984); Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1984); Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139 (S.D.1984); Wolff v. Wolff, 349 N.W.2d 656 (S.D.1984); Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. 143, 87 N.W.2d 601 (1958). The trial court must take into consideration the duration of the marriage, the value of the property owned by the parties, the ages of the parties, the health of the parties, the competency of the parties to earn a living, the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the property, and the income-producing capacity of the property owned by the parties. See, e.g., Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, supra; Booth v. Booth, supra, Owen v. Owen, supra; Wolff v. Wolff, supra; Watt v. Watt, 312 N.W.2d 707 (S.D. 1981); Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749 (S.D.1979).
The trial court has broad discretion in dividing property, and a division of property will not be set aside or modified on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
It appears that the trial court took each of the above-cited factors into consideration in arriving at its division of marital property. With the exception of the problem with her cervical spine and lower back, plaintiff is apparently in good health. It does concern us that the trial court made no finding with respect to plaintiffs degenerating cervical spine, inasmuch as the evidence is uncontroverted that this condition exists. We conclude, however, that the trial court will have an opportunity to address this matter in greater detail on remand when considering the matter of rehabilitative alimony, discussed in greater detail below.
The trial court found that once plaintiff has completed her retraining, she should be able to earn approximately $12,000.00 per year as a registered nurse.
At time of trial, defendant's annual salary as a circuit judge was $43,750.00. (We take judicial notice of the fact that effective July 1, 1983, his salary rose to $45,-500.00 per year (SDCL 16-6-5, as amended by 1983 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 2, § 9), and that effective July 1, 1984, his salary rose to $49,140.00 per year (SDCL 16-6-5, as amended by. 1984 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 147, § 2).)
The trial court found that both parties had contributed to the accumulation of the marital property. Likewise, the trial court found that defendant had contributed to the value of plaintiffs remainder interest in the Union County land by providing free legal services in connection with the title to that land.
As pointed out above, the trial court made no specific finding regarding the value of plaintiffs interest in the Union County land. In the usual case, we would be required to remand the case to the circuit court for a finding on this issue. See, e.g., Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1977). Plaintiff, however, offered no evidence regarding the value of the property other than her own nebulous opinion regarding sales of other land in the area several years earlier. As we held in Hanks v. Hanks, 296 N.W.2d 523 (S.D.1980), it is the obligation of the parties to provide the trial court some competent evidence in addition to their own personal testimony regarding the value of their property. The trial court should not be expected to go on a treasure hunt of its own to try to ferret out evidence that it is the parties' duty to provide.
Moreover, plaintiff did not submit a proposed finding on this issue or object to the trial court's general finding regarding plaintiff's interest in the land, other than to object to a finding that defendant had contributed to the value of plaintiff's interest and to generally object to the trial court's assigning any value to that interest in making a division of the marital property. Although plaintiff's interest in the land may not have had the value argued for by defendant, certainly it had some value. In the absence of a proposed finding or an objection to a proposed finding, plaintiff cannot be heard to complain that the trial court did not assign a specific value to this interest. Burke v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. #40-1, 347 N.W.2d 343 (S.D.1984).
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award alimony to her. We agree.
In Guindon v. Guindon, supra, we held that
[t]he amount and length of alimony payments is therefore left to the discretion of the trial court. SDCL 25-4-41. The factors for consideration in exercising that discretion are similar to those used in the property division, i.e., (1) the length of the marriage; (2) their respective earning capacity; (3) their respective financial condition after the property division; (4) their respective age, health and physical condition; (5) their station in life or social standing; and (6) the relative fault of the parties in the termination of the marriage.
256 N.W.2d at 898. In Hanks v. Hanks, supra, we adhered to the foregoing holding in Guindon and noted that although no longer generally a factor in making a division of property, the relative fault of the parties continues to be a consideration in making an award of alimony. See also Booth v. Booth, supra.
Quite understandably, plaintiff does not request alimony in the way of reimbursement for her contribution to defendant's completion of his law school education. In Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, supra, we held that in a proper case the trial court should award reimbursement alimony to a spouse who has contributed to the attainment of his or her spouse's professional degree. As a number of courts have pointed out, however, such reimbursement is not appropriate where the contributing spouse has benefited from the increased earning capacity resulting from the professional training that he or she had helped to finance. As the Supreme Court of Washington has stated:
We point out that where a marriage endures for some time after the professional degree is obtained, the supporting spouse may already have benefited financially from the student spouse's increased earning capacity to an extent that would make extra compensation inappropriate. For example, he or she may have enjoyed a high standard of living for several years. Or perhaps the professional degree made possible the accumulation of substantial community assets which may be equitably divided.
Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 168, 181, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984). See also Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo.1984).
We conclude that plaintiff has realized many of the benefits of the contribution that she made to defendant's professional education in terms of an increased standard of living during the course of their marriage and the social station that is attendant upon membership in the bar and as a member of the judiciary. Moreover, the trial court equitably divided the assets that defendant's increased earning capacity helped to purchase. Finally, plaintiff had secured her professional degree prior to the marriage and thus did not forego her own professional advancement. Accordingly, reimbursement alimony would not have been properly awarded in this case.
Rehabilitative alimony, however, as recognized by our holdings in Booth v. Booth, supra, and Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, supra, should have been awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff had not practiced her profession for at least nine and one-half years prior to her separation from defendant and was required to undergo refresher training in order to be fully employable. In addition, we believe that the record quite clearly shows that at time of trial plaintiff was suffering some physical problems resulting from the degenerative condition of her cervical spine and the problems with her lower back that resulted in an impairment of her capacity to be employed in certain types of nursing positions. Although it is true that the trial court was in a much better position than we to judge the credibility of plaintiff's testimony regarding her physical condition, Booth v. Booth, supra, in view the uncontradicted medical reports and defendant's acknowledgement that plaintiff was suffering from problems with her back and with her cervical spine, we conclude that the trial court should have given more weight to plaintiff's health problems in making the decision on whether to award alimony.
As noted above, plaintiff presently receives no income from her interest in the Union County land. Her only income-producing property, then, is that portion of the cash award remaining after the payment of her living expenses not met by the child support award and her salary.
Finally, inasmuch as fault is a factor to be considered when deciding the question of alimony, Guindon, supra; Hanks, supra, we believe that the trial court should have taken into account the fact that it was defendant's refusal to change his conduct vis a vis plaintiff that caused plaintiff to leave the marital home and commence this action. Granted that this conduct was not as egregious as that which is demonstrated in many cases, it caused plaintiff to conclude that she had no choice but to leave the marital home and to terminate a marriage to a person who by virtue of his intelligence, hard work, and demonstrated professional ability had secured a position of social and professional standing and public respect. It is true that defendant is burdened with substantial child support payments, as well as the living expenses attendant upon maintaining a lifestyle commensurate with one who holds an office of public visibility and public trust. Nevertheless, we believe that the trial court should have made some award of alimony to plaintiff to enable her to rehabilitate her professional skills and to make the transition from the role of full-time mother and housewife to that of her former professional career. Accordingly, we direct the circuit court to enter an award of alimony in accordance with the views set forth herein and in Booth, supra, and Saint-Pierre, supra. The amount of alimony and the period over which it is to be paid, must, of course, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, based upon the present circumstances of the parties. On the basis of the record before us, however, and in view of the inherently temporary nature of rehabilitative alimony, we would think that the period would not exceed five years. Whether the circumstances will require that lengthy a period we do not venture to say.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding her attorney fees. We agree.
The allowance of attorney fees ip a divorce action is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, supra; Ver Meer v. Ver Meer, 90 S.D. 351, 241 N.W.2d 571 (1976); Jameson v. Jameson, 90 S.D. 179, 239 N.W.2d 5 (1976). In making an award of attorney fees, the trial court should consider the property owned by each party, their relative incomes, whether the requesting party's property is in liquid or fixed assets, and whether the actions of either of the parties unreasonably increased the time spent on the case. Barrett v. Barrett, 308 N.W.2d 884 (S.D.1981); Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21 (S.D.1979). Granted that plaintiff was awarded an immediate cash payment of $18,450.00 and that she receives $500 per month child support, she is faced with the need of providing adequate housing for herself and the children, together with other attendant living costs. Her personal property is not income-producing, nor is her interest in the property in Union County. Moreover, she was required to use for living expenses the $6,550.00 she withdrew from the savings account prior to trial, her request for temporary support during the pendency of the action having been denied. Accordingly, we direct that upon remand the trial court award plaintiff $1,500.00 in the way of attorney fees for the trial court proceedings.
We also direct the trial court to award plaintiff $1,500.00 for her attorney fees and costs on this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed with respect to the property division and is reversed with respect to the denial of alimony and attorney fees. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the views and directions set forth in this opinion.
MORGAN, J., DUNN, Retired Justice, and HERTZ, Circuit Judge, concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents, in part.
HERTZ, Circuit Judge, sitting for FOSH-EIM, C.J., disqualified.
DUNN, Retired Justice, participating.
WUEST, Circuit Judge, Acting as Supreme Court Justice, not participating.
We note that present counsel for plaintiff did not represent her at trial.