Case Name: Shore, Appellant, v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1957-06-03
Citations: 389 Pa. 445
Docket Number: Appeals, Nos. 106 and 117
Parties: Shore, Appellant, v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, Appellant.
Judges: Before Stern, O. J., Jones, Bell, Ohidsey, Mtjsmanno and Arnold, JJ. Re-argued April 24, 1957. Before Jones, 0. J., Bell, Chidsey, Mtjsmanno, Arnold, Jones and Cohen, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 389
Pages: 445–459

Head Matter:
Shore, Appellant, v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, Appellant.
Argued April 23, 1956.
Reargued November 26, 1956.
Before Stern, O. J., Jones, Bell, Ohidsey, Mtjsmanno and Arnold, JJ. Re-argued April 24, 1957. Before Jones, 0. J., Bell, Chidsey, Mtjsmanno, Arnold, Jones and Cohen, JJ.
further reargument refused July 16, 1957.
June 3, 1957:
J. B. H. Carter, with him J ohn B. King and Pepper, Bodine, Frick, Scheetz & Hamilton, for defendant.
S. Regen Cinsburg, with him H. P. Abramson and Jay B. Leopold, for plaintiff.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell,
Plaintiff, who was the estranged wife of a deceased employee of defendant, brought a suit in assumpsit to recover additional Sickness Death Benefits under defendant's Plan for Employees' Pensions, Disability Benefits and Death Benefits. The employee died of sickness July 7, 1952. Plaintiff, who was his widow, was not living with him at the time of his death and had not been living with him since October, 1945, but was entitled to support of $20 a week under a court order which she obtained on February 26, 1946. The decedent also left a mother to whom he had been contributing $6 a week. There were no children or other dependent relatives.
Employees' Benefit Committee of the defendant, which is charged with the administration of the Plan, awarded plaintiff a Sickness Death Benefit in the sum of $1,044, representing one year's payment at $20 a week, and awarded to decedent's mother $313.20, representing a year's payment at the rate of $6 a week. Plaintiff-wife claimed there should be awarded to her under Section 7 (4) (a) the maximum amount, to wit, $6,180, which would be payable under the Plan to a surviving wife who ivas living with her employee-husband at the time of his death, and that nothing should be awarded to the employee's mother.
The lower Court reversed the Committee and awarded to plaintiff-wife under Section 7(4) (a) four-fifths of the maximum amount of $6,180, which would be payable under the Plan to a surviving wife who was living with her employee-husband at the time of his death, and awarded one-fifth thereof to the employee's mother. From the judgment entered sur this order, Bell Telephone Company and plaintiff have each taken an appeal.
Plaintiff-wife has no vested rights, indeed she has no rights of any kind or to any amount, except what she is given under the Plan. I-Ier rights arose, if at all, only upon the death of her husband (decedent-employee), and then only if she proved that she came within the terms and conditions of the Plan. Defendant's Plan has been in existence since 1913 and has always operated in the manner in which it was operated in the instant case. It is noncontributory on the part of the employees, all benefits and pensions being paid by defendant.
The pertinent provisions of defendant's Plan for sickness-death benefits to its employees are as follows: "Section 1. Undertaking. The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania undertakes in accordance with these Regulations, to provide for the payment of definite amounts to its employees when they are disabled by accident or sickness or when they are retired from service, or, in the event of death, to their dependent relatives. . . . Section 3. Committee. 1) There shall be a Committee of five (5) appointed by the Board to serve during its pleasure, which Committee shall be called the Employees' Benefit. Committee. This Committee shall be charged with the administration of the Plan. 2) The Committee shall have the specific powers elsewhere herein granted to it and shall have such other powers as may be necessary in order to enable it to administer the Plan. 3) It shall determine conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration of the Plan. .
"4) The persons who may he beneficiaries of the Accident or Sickness Death Benefit or of payments on the death of a pensioner hereunder are limited to the wife (or husband) and the dependent children and other dependent relatives of the deceased. The amount to be paid in each case and the beneficiary or beneficiaries who shall receive the same, and the share which each shall receive, shall be determined by the Committee, subject to the following provisions and to the provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Section, (a) . . . in the event of death by sickness, the maximum Sickness Death Benefit specified in Paragraph 2 of this Section, shall be paid, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) of this Paragraph 4, to the wife of the deceased employee if living with him at the time of his death; . If the employee leaves both wife (or husband) and a child or children, as here described, the Committee, in its discretion, may pay the Death Benefit to or for any one or more of such possible beneficiaries in such portions as it may determine.
"b) If there be no beneficiary of the deceased employe as described above in sub-paragraph (a), then, . . . in the event of death by sickness, a Sickness Death Benefit in an amount not to exceed the amount specified in Paragraph % of this Section, may be paid to any other person or persons who may be beneficiaries, as defined in the first sentence of this Paragraph 4, and be receiving or entitled to receive support from the deceased employee at the time of his death.
"Subject to the limitations expressed in this sub-paragraph (b) the Committee shall have full authority to determine to -whom payments shall be made and the amount of the payments, taking into consideration the degree of dependency and such other facts as it may deem pertinent."
The key words in this case are "to the wife of the deceased employee if living %oith Mm at the time of his death." Appellant in the court below interpreted these clear words to mean "If living with him at the time of his death, or if living separate and apart from him without her fault or without her consent." Such an interpretation distorts and violates the clear language of this Plan. Under the language of the Plan it is clear as crystal that a wife who is not living with her husband at the time of his death, and has not been living with him for over seven years prior to his death, is not entitled to the maximum Sickness Death Benefit under the provisions of the Plan. A wife-plaintiff falls, as does the decedent's mother, within the clear language of Section 7 (4) (b), which provides for cases where there is no wife of the deceased employee living with him at the time of his death. In such an event, Section 7 (4) (b) clearly provides that "a Sickness Death Benefit in an amount not to exceed the amount specified in Paragraph 2 of this Section, [to wit: $6,-180.00] may he paid to any other person or persons who may be beneficiaries [under the Plan] . . . and be receiving . . . support from the deceased employee at the time of his death." It further provides that the Committee shall have full authority to determine which beneficiaries are entitled and the amount to which each may be entitled "taking into consideration the degree of dependency and such other facts as it may deem pertinent."
Moreover plaintiff's construction of this Plan would not only violate the clear language of the written Plan to which neither plaintiff nor her deceased husband contributed a cent, but would require the defendant, or the Employees' Benefit Committee, to investigate every case where a wife was not living with her husband at the time of his death, and to decide why the wife was not living with her husband, and which party was to blame for the separation. Such an investigation and determination is often difficult for courts to make, and is so unrealistic that it is clear it was not intended to be required of the defendant in this Plan.
To summarize, if a wife was living with her deceased husband at the time of his death, she would be entitled, under the clear language of the Plan, to maximum Sickness Death Benefits. If there was no wife, or if she was not living with him at the time of his death, then the Committee had "full authority to determine which beneficiaries (as defined in the first sentence of Paragraph 4) should receive payments and the amount of money payable to each," provided that in no event the total payments could exceed the maximum Sickness Death Benefit.
While reasonable men may sincerely differ as to the amount of money which in good conscience should be paid to this wife and to the decedent's mother, we cannot say that the Committee to whose judgment and discretion this question was specifically left committed an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed; and judgment is here entered for defendant.
Italics throughout ours.