Case Name: DAVID BALSZ et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. ADOLPH LIEBENOW, Plaintiff and Appellee
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1894-01-26
Citations: 4 Ariz. 227
Docket Number: Civil No. 382
Parties: DAVID BALSZ et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. ADOLPH LIEBENOW, Plaintiff and Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 227–236

Head Matter:
[Civil No. 382.
Filed January 26, 1894.]
[36 Pac. 209.]
DAVID BALSZ et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. ADOLPH LIEBENOW, Plaintiff and Appellee.
1. Public Lands—Ejectment—Eight to Maintain—Beceiver’s Duplicate Beceipt op Entry—Bev. Stats. Ariz. 1887, Par. 3138, Construed.—A receiver’s duplicate receipt of a homestead filing upon land, made after contest and cancellation of the entry of a prior occupant, is not sufficient evidence of title and right to possession in the holder thereof to maintain an action of ejectment against such prior occupant. Statute, supra, construed.
Bouse, J., dissents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Maricopa. H. C. Gooding, Judge.
Reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
H. N. Alexander, for Appellants.
The court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff’s exhibit number one. This is a receipt of the register of the land office at Tucson, Arizona, which defendants claim was inadmissible to prove title or right of possession in plaintiff. In some states, by statute, such papers are sufficient to maintain ejectment, notably Arkansas and Nebraska, and in some others, but in Arizona we have no such statute. Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U. S. 74, 82, 83, 84, 85, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429.
The court should have instructed the jury to render a verdict for defendants at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, as the proof showed at the time, by plaintiff’s own evidence, that he had never been ousted from the possession by defendants or any one else, and that at that time he was in possession of the premises.
C. E. Ainsworth, for Appellee.
This action being one to try the right of possession to the property in question, the title is not involved, it being conceded by the appellants that the title to the land in question is in the United States government; the only question is the right of possession.
Under our statute (see. 3135) this action is maintainable wherever the plaintiff is legally entitled to the possession of the premises sought to be recovered. No allegation of ownership is required to be set out in the complaint; the plaintiff is only required to set out in his complaint that he was entitled to the possession of the premises, describing them, and that the defendant on a day named in the complaint afterwards, and before the commencement oí the action, entered into and dispossessed him of the premises and unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff the possession thereof, etc. Rev. Stats. 1887, sec. 3137.
The defendant, under a general denial, may introduce testimony to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to the possession, or that the title is in some other person other than the government (Rev. Stats. 1887, sec. 3138); thus clearly implying that when the title is in the United States government that that is no defense to the action.
It is further provided by section 3139 that it shall be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover to show, at the time the action was commenced, that the defendant was in possession of the premises claimed, and that the plaintiff had a right to the possession thereof.
Section 3152 also provides in all actions involving the title or right of possession to real estate the court shall frame the judgment so as to grant the relief demanded by the proof and the law applicable to the case, and all writs necessary to enforce the judgment may be issued thereon.
These statutes clearly show that there are two classes of cases in which the action for the recovery of the possession of real estate may be maintained:-™
First—Where the title is involved, and the question of right of possession is based upon the title to the land;
Second—In cases where the title is not involved, but where the right to possession is based upon other facts and circumstances which entitle a party to possession of such real estate.
The latter is the ease at bar. The government of the United States is presumably in possession of all its lands. By acts of Congress the United States is authorized to dispose of its lands through a tribunal created by Congress known as the general land office of the United States. It is also provided by acts of Congress that lands may be conveyed to citizens of the United States under what are known as the Timber Culture Act, the Homestead Act, the Pre-emption Act, and the Desert Act, upon the terms and conditions specified by the general land office, to whom this power is delegated to supervise the sale and disposition thereof under the different provisions so provided by the acts of Congress.
The appellee in this action, as the record shows, was the favorable contestant,—that is to say, his contest was finally allowed by the general land office and the secretary of the interior. Under this contest he was, by section 2 of the act of Congress passed March 14, 1880, (Stats. 21, p. 140,) expressly allowed the right to enter the land to which such contest referred at any time within thirty days after he should be notified that such contest had been decided in his favor. He accordingly took advantage of his right, made his filing as provided by the rules and regulations of the general land office, and to him was issued a receiver’s certificate. Now, what is the object of this receiver’s receipt? It is for the purpose of authorizing the party to whom it is issued to enter into possession of the lands therein described for the purpose of completing and perfecting a title to said lands under the requirements of law. If it is not for the purpose of authorizing the party to whom it is issued to enter into possession, then it amounts to nothing. For if some other person is in possession of the premises described in the receiver’s, certificate, and who has no title whatever, he may defeat the government of the United States from disposing of its lands to persons seeking to obtain the title in the manner provided for obtaining title by the Homestead Act. The government itself would in that case first have to institute suit to dispossess parties before they could execute said certificates to entrymen, and we submit that in this case both parties claim their right to possession to these lands in question, not by any title that either of them have, but by the right of entry.
The appellants claim through and under C. H. Yail, who made the entry under the Timber Culture Act. His entry was contested by the appellee and such contest sustained, and his entry ordered by the secretary of the interior canceled; therefore, the right to enter upon the land which he obtained in the first instance has been by this act of the government set aside. These appellants, taking under and through Vail, are bound by that judgment and decree, and that question cannot be litigated in this court in this collateral proceeding. Courts cannot exercise any appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of the officers of the land department, nor can they reverse or correct their decisions in collateral proceedings between private parties. Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420.
The land department is a tribunal appointed by Congress to decide certain questions relating to the disposition of public land, and its decisions upon matters of fact cognizable by it, in the absence of fraud or imposition, is conclusive everywhere else. Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Baldwin v. Starks, 107 U. S. 463, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514.
The land department having decided in favor of Liebenow's entry, it is conclusive as between the parties to this action, and the receiver’s certificate is also sufficient evidence to the right of possession to maintain this action as against the appellants herein, who show no title to the land; and especially is this so where the appellee is a successful contestant authorized to make the entry. McDonald v. Edmonds, 44 Cal. 328.

Opinion:
SLOAN, J.
Appellee brought suit in the district court, Maricopa County, against appellants, to recover the possession of the northeast quarter of section 12, in township 1 north, range 3 east, Gila and Salt River base and meridian. There was a jury trial, and verdict for appellee. From the judgment and order overruling their motion for a new trial, appellants have taken this appeal
The facts, as they appear from the transcript, are substantially these: On the twenty-ninth day of August, 1881, one Vail made a timber-culture entry for the land in question. On February 2, 1885, Vail conveyed said land by quitclaim deed to Luz R. Balsz, one of the appellants, who, with her husband, David Balsz, ever since the date of said deed, until after the commencement of this suit, was in the possession and occupancy of the whole thereof. In September, 1886, appellee filed a contest in the local land office against Vail's entry, and on January 15, 1891, finally succeeded in having said entry canceled, and was thereupon notified by the land officers of his preference right to enter same, and did, on February 9, 1891, make a homestead filing upon the land, and receive the receiver's duplicate receipt therefor. Appellee then brought his suit for the possession of the land. At the trial the court admitted the duplicate receipt of the receiver in evidence, over objection, as evidence of title and right of possession in appellee, and instructed the jury that it constituted sufficient title in appellee to entitle him to recover in the action. The action of the court in admitting the duplicate receiver's receipt, and in instructing the jury, as above stated, are assigned as errors.
Assuming that Liebenow had a right to make a valid homestead entry upon the land in question, notwithstanding the occupancy of Balsz, and that the doctrine of Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 513, does not apply, the question still remains, Does the mere filing made by Liebenow under the Homestead Act, as evidenced by the receiver's duplicate receipt entitle him to maintain his action in ejectment? In many of the states and territories it has been provided by statute that certificates issued by registers of the land office, and receivers' receipts issued after final proof, shall be held to be prima facie evidence of title sufficient to support ejectment. Such certificates evidence an equitable title in the holders, and show that, having fully complied with the requirements of the law, the holders are entitled to patents from the government. But inasmuch as the legal title to public land remains in the government, even after final proof, until patent issues, and as delays often occur whereby the legal title may not for years be vested in the holder of such an equitable title, in order to protect the latter in his possession, the legislatures in many states have extended the action of ejectment to embrace such titles. There is a clear distinction to be observed between certificates issued after final proof and receipts issued by receivers or registers of the local land office, showing mere filings upon public lands under the various land acts. The former, as we have said, evidence the equitable title, while the latter are not evidence of any title. As was held by the supreme court of California in Hemphill v. Davies, 38 Cal. 577, in regard to the register's certificate of the filing of a declaratory statement, such a certificate "is not a title." "It is merely an implication—an offer—to purchase after the requisite proof of residence, qualification, etc., shall be made. When this is done, and payment is made, and the certificate of purchase is firmed, then the purchaser acquires what is recognized 'by fine laws of this state as title derived from the United States." A statute of the state of California was in force at the time that this decree was rendered in Hemphill v. Davies, which provided that "the certificate of purchase or of location of any lands in this state, issued or made in pursuance of any of the laws of the United States, or of this state, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the legal title in the plaintiff." We have no statute which can be construed as giving the holder of such inchoate "and uncertain claim to land as a duplicate receiver's receipt a right to dispossess one in the prior possession of land in a suit of this character. We have been cited to paragraph 3138 of the Revised Statutes as sustaining the contrary view. This paragraph provides that in the action of ejectment, under the plea of "Not guilty," the defendant may "give in evidence any testimony tending to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to such possession, or that the title is in some other person, other than the government." This statute goes no .further than to recognize that one may maintain his action of ejectment, provided he has a right to the possession, even though the legal title be in the United States. Possibly, it may give the right to the holder of an equitable title evidenced by the certificate of a register of the local land office, issued upon final proof. At any rate, it does require of the plaintiff that he show a right to the possession,, and falls very short of declaring that a mere naked filing' as evidenced by a duplicate receiver's receipt, establishes that right. The land department has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions between conflicting claimants, at least until an equitable estate has vested in the entryman, and the courts cannot interfere by putting one claimant in possession and ousting another. If the United States cares to put an entryman in possession, it may undoubtedly do so by ejecting parties unlawfully in possession, but it does not confer upon the holder of a duplicate receiver's receipt this right. Of course, an entryman in possession may bring a possessory action, if ousted, to be returned to his possession. He may do this upon the well-settled principle in ejectment that one in possession of land under claim of right cannot be dispossessed by one having no greater right.
We hold, therefore, that the court erred in its ruling in admitting the duplicate receiver's receipt as evidence of title, and instructing the jury that it was sufficient' title upon which a recovery might be had. The cause is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted.
Hawkins, J., concurs.
Baker, C. J., did not take part in this case.