Case Name: Ernest BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-05-15
Citations: 312 So. 2d 528
Docket Number: Nos. W-267, W-268
Parties: Ernest BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: RAWLS, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 312
Pages: 528–531

Head Matter:
Ernest BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. W-267, W-268.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 15, 1975.
Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Opinion:
McCORD, Judge.
These are consolidated appeals from judgments and sentences in Case Nos. W-267 and W-268.
In Case No. W-267, appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sen-tenced to an indeterminate sentence of from six months to two years. The trial judge, in accepting the plea, did not require that a factual basis for the plea be shown as is required by Rule 3.170(j), F. R.Cr.P. Appellee relies upon our previous decision in Estes v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 294 So.2d 122, but inasmuch as the plea did not result from plea bargaining, such failure is not harmless error in the case sub judice as we held it to have been under the facts of Estes.
In addition, the trial judge, in accepting the guilty plea, did not comply with another provision of Rule 3.170(j), F.R. Cr.P., and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, in that he did not make a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plea to show that appellant had a full understanding of the significance of the plea and its voluntariness. After being advised by appellant's counsel that appellant wished to change his not guilty plea to a plea of guilty, the full inquiry made by the court was as follows:
"Q Is that what you wish to do ?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you discuss with your attorney the defenses that you might have in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you discuss it with him ?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you entering a plea because you are guilty ?
A Yes, sir.
Q Mr. O'Grady: The Court finds that you are an intelligent man and that you have been well advised by competent counsel and the Court accepts your plea of guilty . . . . "
While in Kelly v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 254 So.2d 22, this court held that Boykin does not require a step-by-step recitation of each and every of the defendant's rights, the court indicated that the record must reflect that the consequences of the guilty plea were fully explained to the defendant. In Mower v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 308 So.2d 586, Opinion filed January 28, 1975, we stated that Boykin and due process require that the record as a whole reveal that the accused was informed of all relevant rights which are waived by the guilty plea.
Prior to appellant's guilty plea in Case No. W-267, he pled guilty to passing a worthless bank check and had been placed on probation. After a guilty plea in Case No. W-267, an affidavit was filed charging that he "violated the conditions of his probation in a material respect by violation of probation condition (h) which states that the defendant shall live and remain at liberty without violating any law, in that on May 23, 1974, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault in Taylor County Circuit Court." He was brought before the court on July 1, 1974, on the probation violation charge and the court said:
"Q You are charged with violating your probation by violating condition H which states that the Defendant shall live and remain at liberty without violating any law in that the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault in Taylor County Circuit Court, and do you admit or deny you violated your probation in that respect ?
A I violated it.
Q You admit you did ?
A Yes, sir."
The violation of probation which appellant admitted was that he had pled guilty to aggravated assault. Since such guilty plea is here being held invalid in Case No. W-267, his conviction in Case No. W-268 of probation violation based upon such invalid guilty plea must also be vacated.
The judgments and sentences in Cases Nos. W-267 and W-268 are reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RAWLS, C. J., concurs.
JOHNSON, J., concurs in case No. W-267 and dissents in case No. W-268.