Case Name: In re Peggy Thompson HARDGE, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1986-07-15
Citations: 713 S.W.2d 503
Docket Number: No. 66941
Parties: In re Peggy Thompson HARDGE, Respondent.
Judges: HIGGINS, C.J., and DONNELLY, WEL-LIVER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 713
Pages: 503–507

Head Matter:
In re Peggy Thompson HARDGE, Respondent.
No. 66941.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
July 15, 1986.
Ben Ely, Jr., St. Louis, for Bar Committee.
Doris Gregory Black, St. Louis, for respondent.

Opinion:
BILLINGS, Judge.
Disciplinary proceeding by the Bar Committee of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri pursuant to Rule 5. The information by the Bar Committee charged respondent, Peggy Thompson Hardge with violating Rule 4, DR 6-101 and DR 7-101(A).
This Court appointed the Honorable Daniel J. O'Toole as Master to take evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Master's report having been filed herein, and the issues briefed and argued in this Court, we find there is substantial evidence of violations warranting discipline and reprimand of respondent.
We first note that the Master's findings, conclusions and recommendation are helpful in attorney disciplinary proceedings, but they are advisory only. It is our duty to determine the credibility of witnesses, to review the evidence and to make our own determination of the facts. Matter of Colson, 632 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. banc 1982); In re Connaghan, 613 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. banc 1981).
The evidence shows that attorney Justin Meehan referred complainant Elois Woodward to respondent to handle her bankruptcy case. Woodward spoke with respondent on the telephone first, but the initial interview at the office was conducted by an associate of respondent, Doris Black. Black asked Woodward questions regarding her creditors, and had her sign a "Debt- or's Petition" for bankruptcy. Before leaving, Woodward wrote a check to respondent in the amount of $210.00, which represented $150.00 down on an attorney's fee and $60.00 in filing fees. Woodward understood that her petition would be filed promptly, and that respondent would notify her if more information was needed.
Woodward was a laundry supervisor at City Hospital, earning approximately $500.00 every two weeks. Her wages were being garnished in the amount of approximately $50.00 every two weeks.
The only evidence of any contact between respondent and Woodward over the next four months is a copy of a letter respondent claims she mailed to Woodward. The letter told Woodward that her petition would not be filed until the full fee was paid. Woodward claims she never received this letter, and that she was unaware that full payment was required before any action would be taken. Eventually, Woodward learned of this requirement from attorney Meehan. She immediately paid the balance of $150.00 to respondent on October 27, 1981, and was told that her petition would be filed. The check cleared the bank for payment on November 9, 1981. Respondent still failed to file the petition despite the fact that she now had her full attorney fee, the filing fee, and her client's wages were still being garnished.
Although respondent asserts that the attorney-client relationship was terminated later in November because of an "abusive" phone call from Woodward's daughter to respondent's secretary, the fact remains that respondent did not return her client's money until March, 1982. Woodward and respondent finally met March 24, 1982. Woodward demanded her money back, received a check for $200.00 and instructed respondent to stop all bankruptcy proceedings. In April, 1982, Woodward secured the services of another attorney. Her bankruptcy petition was filed and creditors ceased garnishment procedures.
At the time respondent undertook representation of Woodward, respondent was not admitted to practice in the Bankruptcy Court of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. At no time did respondent tell her client that she was not admitted to practice in the Bankruptcy Court, nor is there any evidence showing a financial association with a lawyer competent to handle the matter.
Respondent contends that Woodward signed a written contract for legal services, which made it clear that respondent would not initiate bankruptcy proceedings until all of her fee had been paid. Woodward denied ever signing such contract, and respondent failed to produce the signed contract.
Rule 4, DR 6-101(A) prohibits a lawyer from (1) handling a legal matter he knows he is not competent to handle without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it, and (3) neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. We believe that the evidence presented in the record demonstrates that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(l) and (3). When respondent accepted a bankruptcy case knowing she was not admitted to practice in the Eastern District, and without associate counsel, she violated the rule. A delay of almost one year in filing a bankruptcy petition amounts to neglect of a matter entrusted to her.
The findings also support the conclusion that respondent violated DR 7-101(A). Rule 4, DR 7-101(A) prohibits a lawyer from (1) failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client; (2) failing to carry out a contract of employment, and (8) prejudicing or damaging his client. There is no doubt that by not filing the bankruptcy petition for Woodward between June, 1981 and March, 1982, respondent failed to seek the lawful objective of her client. There was a contract of employment entered into for professional services, to file bankruptcy, and those services were never carried out. The delay in filing the bankruptcy case meant that Woodward continued to have her wages garnished from her paycheck. Woodward was damaged by not receiving her total paycheck as she would have had the bankruptcy petition been timely filed.
The Bar Committee urges that the conduct of respondent warrants disbarment. In deciding the appropriate measure of discipline, we are mindful that the instant proceeding is designed not with a primary purpose of punishment, but as an inquiry into respondent's fitness to continue as an attorney, and any discipline imposed has as its objective the protection of the courts and the public and the maintenance of the integrity of the professions and the courts. In re Haggerty, 661 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. banc 1983).
Having considered the entire record as presented we conclude that reprimand is adequate and proper. The failure of respondent to timely pursue her client's legal interests represents conduct that is simply unacceptable. The consequences of such conduct harms both the public and the legal community. Our action here is meant to protect the public and the profession by making it clear to both that the Court expects lawyers to be diligent and competent in all aspects of handling their clients' business.
Respondent is hereby reprimanded and the costs of this proceeding are assessed against her.
HIGGINS, C.J., and DONNELLY, WEL-LIVER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
BLACKMAR, J., concurs in result in separate opinion filed.
RENDLEN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
. DR 6-101. Failing to Act Competently
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Rule 4, DR 7-101(A) provides:
DR 7-101. Representing a Client Zealously (A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1)Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B).