Case Name: Gregory CHRISTOPHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-05-22
Citations: 779 S.W.2d 459
Docket Number: Nos. 05-88-00974-CR to 05-88-00976-CR
Parties: Gregory CHRISTOPHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before HOWELL, LAGARDE, and WHITTINGTON, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 779
Pages: 459–466

Head Matter:
Gregory CHRISTOPHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Nos. 05-88-00974-CR to 05-88-00976-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
May 22, 1989.
As Modified on Grant of Discretionary Review July 5, 1989.
Rehearing Overruled Sept. 14, 1989.
Discretionary Review Refused (State) Oct. 4, 1989.
Discretionary Review Granted (Appellant) Nov. 22, 1989.
R.D. Rucker, Dallas, for appellant.
Kathleen Walsh, Dallas, for appellee.
Before HOWELL, LAGARDE, and WHITTINGTON, JJ.

Opinion:
WHITTINGTON, Justice.
(May 22, 1989)
A jury convicted Gregory Christopher of three separate offenses of burglary of a habitation and assessed punishment at fifty years' imprisonment. In three points of error, appellant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to quash the jury panel; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of an extraneous offense to be admitted. We find merit in appellant's first point of error; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment of acquittal.
A citizen called the City of Dallas police to report his suspicion that three men driving around his neighborhood in a white Toyota might burglarize his house. A patrol car was dispatched to the area. While en route, the officers ran the license plate number of the Toyota through the computer and learned that it had been taken in an aggravated robbery earlier in the day. The officers went to the home of the citizen who phoned in the complaint and then drove around the neighborhood; they viewed the white Toyota and ordered appellant, who was driving, to stop. Inside the car, in addition to the. appellant, were two other men. The man in the front passenger seat had a television set on his lap, and the man in the rear seat had a microwave oven on his lap. One of the officers noticed several other items in the car, including a typewriter, another T.V. set, and a jewelry box. When appellant was asked to identify himself, he gave a false name. Neither appellant nor his companions explained their possession of the property. The three men were placed under arrest. The property found in the car was taken to the City of Dallas Southeast Patrol Division Station and turned over to an Investigator Bird.
The police learned that two houses and an apartment had been burglarized during the morning of appellant's arrest. The houses were next door to each other and the apartment was in close proximity. The three dwellings were within a two and one-half minute drive from where appellant was arrested. Appellant was charged with burglary of all three habitations.
At trial, each complainant testified that his or her dwelling was broken into and certain personal properties were missing. Complainant number one testified that he reported a television, a remote control, a fan, a typewriter, and a trumpet missing. Complainant number two testified she was missing a television, a stereo, and jewelry. The third complainant testified that a video recorder, a microwave, a cassette recorder, and a watch were taken from her apartment. All three complainants testified that they went to the police station where they recovered all of their property.
In his first point, appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). The State concedes that it did not establish through eyewitnesses or through physical evidence that it was appellant who broke into each dwelling. Instead, the State relies on appellant's unexplained possession of recently stolen property for conviction; accordingly, to sustain the conviction, it must be shown that the property found in appellant's possession was the identical property taken from the burglarized place. Vasquez v. State, 694 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref'd).
The evidence relied upon by the State to support the conviction is as follows: The officer testified as to the type of property he found in appellant's car, and that testimony generally corresponded with the complainants' testimony regarding the property reported missing. The officer testified that he transported the recovered property to the City of Dallas Southeast Patrol Division Station and left it with Investigator Bird, and each complainant testified that he or she recovered all their property at the police station. Appellant was in close proximity to the burglarized dwellings, he never explained his possession of the property, and he gave a false name to the arresting officer. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that that evidence is insufficient to establish that the property found in appellant's possession was the identical property taken from the burglarized places.
In Nichols v. State, 479 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Crim.App.1972), the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed a similar situation. There, the complainant testified that her car was broken into and that a jar of Deep Magic hand lotion and a Rayco 8-track tape deck had been taken. The complainant testified that she went to the police station and identified her property. A police officer testified that he observed the defendant sitting near the car and carrying something under his arm. As the officer approached, the defendant fled. When the defendant was arrested he was carrying an 8-track tape deck player and a bottle of Deep Magic hand lotion. Id. at 278. The court held that there was no evidence in the record that the items identified at the police station were the same items that were found in possession of the defendant because there was no testimony concerning the disposition or custody of the items found in the possession of the defendant. Id. The court held that it was not sufficient identification to show that goods were of the same brand as those that were stolen. Id.; see also Moore v. State, 640 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); York v. State, 511 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).
The instant case is indistinguishable from Nichols. The State did not bring any property or photographs of property into the courtroom. Therefore, the complainants were not able to make an in-court identification of their property, and the police officer was not able to point to specific property and testify that appellant had possession of that property at the time of arrest. Nor did Investigator Bird, the property custodian, appear in court and testify that the arresting officer deposited property with him and that same property was identified by each complainant. Identification in the instant case was even more tenuous than in Nichols because the property was identified generically (i.e., a television set, a microwave oven, etc.) instead of by a specific brand name. The only element in the instant case that was not present in Nichols is that appellant gave a false name to the arresting officer. Appellant had motives unrelated to the burglaries to give a false name such as the allegation that he was driving a reportedly stolen car. Accordingly, we do not accord sufficient weight to that factor to uphold the burglary convictions.
We sustain appellant's first point of error asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, we need not address the remaining points. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and judgments of acquittal are rendered.
ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITTINGTON, Justice.
(July 5, 1989)
The State has filed a petition for discretionary review. TEX.R.APP.P. 101. In it the State has brought to our attention the following testimony of complainant Martin:
[Mr. Martin] The next morning when I got to work, I got a message saying that a Detective Bird had called me. So I called him back and, basically, we arranged — he said that they had gotten— recovered my stuff. And we arranged for me to go down and pick it up the next day.
[State] Did you go down and identify and pick it up?
[Mr. Martin] Yes, I did.
Detective Bird is the custodian with whom Officer Allen deposited the property found in appellant's possession. Therefore, in regard to complainant Martin, the State proved disposition and custody of the items, and it was not unreasonable for the jury to find that some of the property found in appellant's possession belonged to complainant Martin. Nichols, 479 S.W.2d at 288. We overrule point one in cause number 05-88-00974-CR.
We now must consider points two and three in cause number 05-88-00974-CR. In appellant's second point of error, he asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to quash the jury panel. During voir dire, the State asked whether any of the panel members had been a victim of a burglary, and the following exchange took place:
[State] Okay. Yes, ma'am .
[Juror] I saw my assailant when he left the house, and I shot at him.
[State] Okay.
[Juror] I don't have anything against Mr. Christopher. Mr. Christopher has a great resemblance of that man and they never did catch him.
[State] Never caught him. But you're not saying that it was Mr. Christopher?
[Juror] No. I am not saying it but close.
After the State completed voir dire, appellant moved for a mistrial asserting that the juror's "identification" made a fair trial impossible.
We may not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial unless appellant shows that the trial court abused its discretion. Babbs v. State, 739 S.W.2d 646, 647-48 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.). Here, several factors militate against a finding of abuse of discretion. First, the juror did not identify appellant as the one who burglarized her home; she said there was a resemblance between the two. Second, the juror was dismissed for cause. Third, appellant never requested that the jury be instructed to disregard the statement made by the panel member. See Hill v. State, 447 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Crim.App.1969). Lastly, appellant has not demonstrated that other panel members heard the comment and were influenced by it. Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 308 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to quash the jury panel. Point two is overruled.
In appellant's third point, he asserts that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of an extraneous offense to be admitted. Specifically, appellant complains of Officer Allen's testimony that while en route to the area, he ran a cheek on the license number of the white Toyota and learned that it was taken in an aggravated robbery.
The State is entitled to show what occurs immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of the offense. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). The exception is when such evidence is inherently prejudicial and has no relevance to any issue in the case. Id. Whether evidence is relevant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. The trial court determined the testimony was relevant because "it gave the officers in question probable cause to stop the vehicle." The court limited the prejudicial effect by excluding testimony that appellant matched the description of the suspect in the aggravated robbery and was at one time charged with the offense. Thus, the officer did not specifically allege that it was the appellant who committed the aggravated robbery. We view the complained of testimony as setting the stage for appellant's arrest on burglary charges. Finding no abuse of discretion, we overrule point three.
Therefore, the State's Petition for Discretionary Review is granted and the judgment of this Court is modified to provide that the conviction in cause number 05-88-00974-CR is affirmed. Except as amended, the judgment of this Court pursuant to our opinion of May 22, 1989 remains intact.