Case Name: Charles SEABROOK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-08-03
Citations: 348 So. 2d 663
Docket Number: No. 76-1190
Parties: Charles SEABROOK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 348
Pages: 663–666

Head Matter:
Charles SEABROOK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 76-1190.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug. 3, 1977.
Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and A. J. Melkus, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Bar-tow, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Marie King, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals the trial court's refusal to allow him to present, evidence as to his reputation for peacefulness and tranquility at his trial for aggravated battery in which he was ultimately found guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated assault. We hold that this refusal was error and reverse.
Appellant's victim, Elizabeth Reed, was shot in the arm at approximately four or five o'clock on the morning of May 8, 1976. Appellant notified the police that the shooting had occurred, then took Ms. Reed to the hospital.
Two police officers testified at trial that appellant made a statement'to them shortly after the incident occurred. The gist of the statement was that appellant and Ms. Reed had had an argument over the lateness of her return home; that appellant, intending to shoot Ms. Reed to "show her that he meant business," had gotten his shotgun out of his car, returned to the house and shot Ms. Reed; and that he had then hidden the shotgun under the house before taking Ms. Reed to the hospital.
Ms. Reed testified on appellant's behalf. She stated that she knew of no reason why anyone would want to shoot her; that she and appellant had not quarreled on the night in question; and that she didn't think appellant could see her in the room at the time the shot was fired.
Appellant took the stand in his own defense and admitted shooting Ms. Reed, but testified that the shooting was accidental. He claimed that he was entering the darkened house carrying the gun when he tripped on a rug and the gun discharged. He denied making the statement attributed to him by the officers. He also denied having any intention to shoot Ms. Reed.
Ms. Reed was recalled as a defense witness after appellant had testified, at which time defense counsel sought to elicit her testimony as to appellant's reputation in the community for peacefulness and tranquility. Upon objection by the State, however, counsel was barred from this line of inquiry, primarily on the erroneous ground that such testimony is admissible only if self-defense is an issue.
The general rule in Florida is that a criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his good character and reputation where such evidence has reference to a trait involved in the offense with which he ,is charged. Norman v. State, 156 So.2d 186 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). Certainly one's lack of propensity toward violence is relevant to the trait of violence inherent in the commission of an aggravated battery or aggravated assault; so the trial court's refusal to allow testimony as to appellant's reputation with respect to that trait was error.
Moreover, we think it was reversible error in this case because such evidence was clearly corroborative of appellant's defense of accident and tended to negate the very heart of an essential element of the offense charged, to wit: an intentional threat of violence. Without it appellant stood naked in his swearing match with two police officers whose testimony constituted the guts of the case againsp him. , In our view, there exists sufficient doubt that appellant had a fair trial, under the circumstances of this .case, so as to warrant a new trial.
Reversed and a new trial is awarded.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
SCHEB, J., dissents with opinion. ,