Case Name: Oliver W. Ingersoll, Appellant, v. Nassau Electric Railroad Company, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-07
Citations: 96 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 213
Docket Number: 
Parties: Oliver W. Ingersoll, Appellant, v. Nassau Electric Railroad Company, Respondent.
Judges: Brown, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 96
Pages: 213–218

Head Matter:
Oliver W. Ingersoll, Appellant, v. Nassau Electric Railroad Company, Respondent.
Injuries sustained by one person in common with the general public — cannot be redressed in an action brought by him — street railroads' — § 102 of chap, 565 of the Laws e/1890, as a/mended by chap. 698 of 1894 — § 18, mticle 3, of the New York Constitution applies only to a new street railroad.
Injuries sustained "by one person, in common with the general public cannot be redressed in a private action brought by him.
A street railroad company may operate its road in any legal manner consonant with the purposes for which it was organized. It may hire out its line, or it may permit other railroad companies to run their cars over its tracks by authority of section 102 of chapter 565 of the Laws of 1890, as amended by chapter 693 of the Laws of 1894.
The provision in the Constitution of the State of New York (Art. 3, § 18), which provides that ‘ ‘ no law shall authorize the construction or operation of a street railroad, except upon the condition that the consent of the owners of one-half in value of the property bounded on, and the consent also of the local authorities having the control of that portion of a street or highway upon which it is proposed to construct or operate such railroad, be first obtained,” was directed against the construction and operation of a new street railroad without the proper consents, and there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory prohibition against the use of the tracks of one railroad by the cars of another without such consents.
Pratt, J., dissenting.
Appeal by tlie plaintiff, Oliver W. Ingersoll, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 12th day of January, 1895, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the Kings County Special Term.
Wood & Hill, for the appellant.
John J. Allen, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Dykman, J.:
The plaintiff in this action is the owner of real property on the south side of Bergen street, between Rogers avenue and Nostrand avenue.
The suit is instituted for the procurement of an injunction to restrain the defendant from constructing, operating or maintaining any surface railroad or tracks through Bergen street, between thfe avenues above mentioned.
Bergen street, between tiiose two avenues, is included in the route of the defendant's railroad, but there is in that street already a double-track railroad owned and operated by the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company, and the defendant has obtained the permission of that company to run the cars of the defendant over the tracks of the Atlantic Company on that block.
At Rogers avenue aifd Nostrand avenue curved tracks are to be laid to connect the defendant's track with the track of the Atlantic Company, but the complaint contains no claim of injury from the construction of such connecting track.
- The action is based upon the Constitution and the statute, and the constitutional provision invoked is this : "No law shall authorize the construction or operation of a street railroad except upon the condition that the consent of the owners of one-half in value of the property bounded on, 'and the consent also of the local authorities having the control of that portion of a street or highway upon which it is proposed to construct or operate such railroad be first obtained." (Art. 3, § 18.)
Section 91 of the Railroad Law (Chap. 565 of the Laws of 1890), as amended by chapter 434 of the Laws of 1893, contains substantially the same interdiction.
The complaint alleges that the defendant, in pursuance of the consent of the common council of the city of Brooklyn, is constructing and preparing to maintain and operate -its tracks or road on Bergen street, between Rogers and Nostrand avenues, and that such construction and operation would irretrievably injure the value of the plaintiff's property and infringe his rights.
The facts, however, fail to sustain those charges of the complaint, because, as we have seen, the defendant is not constructing, and does not propose or intend to construct or operate, its tracks or road on Bergen street at all.
The tracks of the Atlantic Avenue Company are laid there, and we must assume that the consent of the property owners and of the local municipal authorities has been obtained for the construction and operation of that road through Bergen street. All the constitutional and statutory requirements are, therefore, satisfied.
The Atlantic Company may operate its road in any legal manner consonant with the purposes for which it was organized. It may hire out its line, or it can permit other railroad companies to run their cars over its tracks according to statutory provisions upon that subject. (§ 102 of chap. 565 of the Laws of 1890, as amended by chap. 693 of the Laws of 1894.)
The legal use of the franchises of the Atlantic Company is untrammeled. The defendant does not intend to appropriate Bergen street to any new use. The interests of the locality have been consulted in relation to the construction and operation of the railroad already there, and the street is to be no further obstructed. The defendant does not intend to lay down or operate its railroad tracks in that street.
It is quite conceivable that the right to use the tracks of the Atlantic Company and operate its road may be transferred to another company by a voluntary or forced sale; but it will not be contended that any new consents from property owners or local authorities would be necessary in such a case to the continued operation of the railroad by a new transferee of the property and franchises of the old company.
The right to exercise the franchises of the Atlantic Company became vested upon the procurement of the necessary consents. (Matter of Application of Rochester Electric Ry. Co., 123 N. Y. 351.)
The constitutional inhibition under consideration is leveled against the construction and operation of a new railroad without the proper consents, but there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory prohibition against the use of one railroad by the cars of another without such assents.
Moreover, the question seems to be set at rest by the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of The People v. Brooklyn, F. & C. I. R. R. Co. (89 N. Y. 15).
It was there decided that one railroad company could run its cars over the road of another compay without obtaining the constitutional consents.
In any view, however, the defendant intends to do nothing of which the plaintiff can complain in this suit. To sustain his action he must show that the defendant is doing or intends to do some thing in Bergen street that will be of special and peculiar injury to him or liis property. This is not a taxpayer's suit to jnevent waste or injury, or a public wrong. It is a private action to restrain the defendant from doing an act in a public street in a great city, which is under the control of the municipal authorities for the benefit of the whole people, and in which the plaintiff has no peculiar interest. He does-not stand for the community. He must show an infringement of some private right, or, in other words, he must show that the defendant is doing or is about to do some act in Bergen street from which he will sustain some in jury peculiar to him or his property. Injuries sustained by the plaintiff in common with the general public cannot be redressed in a private action by him.
It already ajipears that the defendant has done nothing in Bergen street, and only intends to run its ears in that street over the railroad tracks now laid down and in use. N o change is contemplated, no additional space is to be occupied, and it is impossible to see how the plaintiff can sustain any peculiar injury from the use of the tracks which the defendant proposes to make.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Brown, P. J., concurred.