Case Name: PEOPLE v. LEWIS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-01-09
Citations: 94 Mich. App. 752
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-4968
Parties: PEOPLE v LEWIS
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and D. S. DeWitt, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 94
Pages: 752–758

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LEWIS
Docket No. 78-4968.
Submitted October 17, 1979, at Detroit.
Decided January 9, 1980.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Kenneth Lewis was charged with second-degree murder and with possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a felony. At trial, the jury was instructed on several lesser included offenses under the second-degree murder count. None of the instructions on lesser included offenses dealt with attempts. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of second-degree murder and of all the lesser included offenses, but found the defendant guilty on the felony-firearm charge. Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Robert Lorion, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony-firearm conviction. The prosecution appeals. Held:
The trial court properly dismissed the felony-firearm conviction. It would be impossible to explain rationally how the defendant could be convicted of having carried or possessed a gun in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony when he was simultaneously acquitted of any wrongdoing with respect to the underlying felony. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the felony-firearm conviction since one of the required elements, the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, was specifically rejected by the jury.
Affirmed.
M. J. Kelly, J., dissented. He would hold that, since the jury was not instructed on any attempt offense as lesser included offenses to the second-degree murder count, the jury could have based the felony-firearm conviction on a determination that the defendant was in possession of a firearm while attempting to commit a felony. The jury’s finding that the defendant was not guilty of any of the offenses under count one does not serve as a rejection of the defendant’s possible attempt to commit a felony. Judge Kelly would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s conviction.
References for Points in Headnotes
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 1154, 1156, 1157.
Inconsistency of criminal verdict as between different counts of indictment or information. 18 ALR3d 259.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 876 et seq.
1. Criminal Law — Inconsistent Verdicts — Rational Basis.
Inconsistent verdicts cannot stand unless they can be explained on a rational basis.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence — Felony-Firearm.
There was insufficient evidence to sustain a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony where the existence of a required element, the defendant’s commission of or attempt to commit a felony, was specifically rejected by the jury.
Dissent by M. J. Kelly, J.
3. Criminal Law — Felony-Firearm — Inconsistent Verdicts — Attempts.
A defendant may be properly convicted of possession of a ñrearm in the commission of or the attempt to commit a felony, even though the jury has found the defendant not guilty of the charged felony offense and of the lesser included offenses on which the jury was instructed, where the jury could have been instructed on certain attempt offenses as lesser included offenses had the defendant so requested and the jury’s ñnding of guilt on the felony-ñrearm charge could have been based on a determination that the defendant possessed a firearm during an attempt to commit a felony.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James D. O’Connell, for defendant on appeal.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and D. S. DeWitt, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Upon agreement by the parties, the following lesser included offenses were also charged: voluntary manslaughter; involuntary manslaughter — gross negligence; involuntary manslaughter — death resulting from the intentional aiming of firearm; and careless, reckless or negligent use of firearm causing death. The jury returned a verdict of guilty for the felony-firearm charge, but not guilty of all the other charges listed under the second-degree murder count. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the felony-firearm conviction and the prosecution claimed this appeal.
The prosecution argues that the inconsistent verdict rule of Michigan has scant support in Michigan law, that it has been rendered plainly inappropriate by People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), and that Michigan should join the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in holding that criminal verdicts need not be consistent.
The prosecution's reliance on People v Chamblis, supra, is misplaced. There, our Supreme Court addressed the ability of a jury to ignore evidence of a greater charge and convict a defendant of a lesser offense. People v Chamblis, supra, 425-427.
It is granted that various jurisdictions do differ with respect to an "inconsistent verdict rule". See Anno: Inconsistency of criminal verdict as between different counts of indictment or information, 18 ALR3d 259. And it is apparent that the prosecution's citation of People v Chamblis, supra, was primarily for its reference to Dunn v United States, 284 US 390; 52 S Ct 189; 76 L Ed 356 (1932), perhaps the most prominent case to reject conviction reversals due to inconsistent verdicts.
We note that there are many varying factual circumstances in which claims of inconsistent verdicts may arise, but we feel that it is sufficient to restate the rule recognized in this Court that, "In this jurisdiction, inconsistent verdicts cannot stand unless they can be explained on any rational basis". People v Goodchild, 68 Mich App 226, 237; 242 NW2d 465 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 830 (1976). In the present case it is impossible to rationally explain how the defendant could be convicted of having carried or possessed a handgun in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony when he was simultaneously acquitted of any wrongdoing in the death of the decedent. People v Vaughn, 92 Mich App 742; 285 NW2d 444 (1979).
Moreover, there is a fatal flaw in the felony-firearm conviction in that one of the required elements, viz., the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, was specifically rejected by the jury verdict on the other count. Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. People v Johnson, 83 Mich App 1, 18; 268 NW2d 259 (1978).
Dismissal of the conviction is affirmed.