Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, v. Eddie Lee ARNOLD, Appellant
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2002-06-27
Citations: 351 S.C. 302
Docket Number: No. 3523
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Eddie Lee ARNOLD, Appellant.
Judges: HEARN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 351
Pages: 302–313

Head Matter:
569 S.E.2d 379
The STATE, Respondent, v. Eddie Lee ARNOLD, Appellant.
No. 3523.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard April 10, 2002.
Decided June 27, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 2002.
J. Brent Kiker and Scott M. Merrifield, both of Kiker & Douds, of Beaufort; and Samuel C. Bauer, of Hilton Head Island, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Derrick McFarland, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Randolph Murdaugh, III, of Hampton, for respondent.

Opinion:
HOWARD, Judge:
Eddie Lee Arnold was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Arnold raises several issues on appeal, including the assertion that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and, therefore, we reverse.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of June 18, 1997, Dr. Jennings Cox ("the victim") left his office for a dental appointment. Because the victim's car was being repaired, he borrowed a co-worker's car. The victim did not return from his dental appointment or answer his pager that afternoon, and his wife subsequently filed a missing person's report with the Savannah, Georgia, Police Department. Three days later, his body was located on the side of an access road in a wooded area in Colleton County, South Carolina.
Two days after the victim disappeared, the borrowed car was located in a parking lot in Johnson City, Tennessee. In a search of the vehicle, Tennessee police discovered a plastic tab from a coffee cup lid in the center console. In the meantime, Colleton County detectives learned that the victim had recently been involved in a sexual relationship with Arnold. Arnold's fingerprints were compared with the fingerprint on the coffee cup lid, and they matched. Arnold was then charged with murdering the victim. Arnold was later tried and convicted of murder. He appeals from the jury verdict.
DISCUSSION
Arnold argues the trial judge erred in failing to grant a directed verdict. We agree.
The State's case is entirely circumstantial. When the State relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence and a motion for directed verdict is made, the circuit court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not with its weight. State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000). The circuit court should not refuse to grant the directed verdict motion when the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty. Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 409, 535 S.E.2d at 127. "The trial judge is required to submit the case to the jury if there is 'any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may fairly and logically be deduced.' " Id. (quoting State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 275, 379 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1989)). In reviewing a denial of a directed verdict motion, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Childs, 299 S.C. 471, 477, 385 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1989).
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the following facts were established. Bobby Ray Ware, a long-distance truck driver, had an ongoing, sexual relationship with the victim. Ware also knew Arnold, and on June 13, 1997, Arnold asked Ware to drive him from Jacksonville, Florida, to Savannah, Georgia. Upon arriving in Savannah, Arnold stayed at Ware's apartment where he later met the victim. During this encounter, Arnold and the victim engaged in sexual acts. According to Ware, Arnold also displayed a handgun during his stay at Ware's apartment.
On the morning of June 18, the victim's wife drove him to his office where he borrowed a co-worker's new automobile. The victim left his office between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. for a dental appointment. At 1:20 p.m., the victim called his secretary, and as a result of this call, she cancelled his afternoon appointments. During the afternoon, both the victim's wife and his secretary unsuccessfully tried to contact him by calling his pager. On the evening of June 18, the victim's wife filed a missing persons report with the police.
On June 21, the victim's body was discovered in a wooded area approximately one-quarter mile down a dirt road in Colleton County, South Carolina. The victim had been shot, once in the heart and once in the head. No tissue, blood, shell casings, bullets, fragments or other evidence was found at the scene. No blood spatters were found on any plants or groundcovering, and there was no evidence of a struggle. In short, no evidence indicated whether the victim had been murdered in the woods where he was found or at a different location. An autopsy performed on June 22, 1997, indicated that the time of death was approximately three and one-half days before the examination.
The borrowed automobile was found in Johnson City, Tennessee, on June 20. The only fingerprint capable of analysis inside the car was on the tab of a plastic coffee cup lid and was later identified as belonging to Arnold. No evidence of the homicide, such as blood or bullet holes, was discovered in the vehicle.
On June 17, the day before the homicide, Ware left Savannah to pick up a shipment, heading for Chicago, Illinois. He was supposed to deliver the shipment the following afternoon. However, according to Ware, when he arrived in Chicago, the dispatcher made him wait until the morning of June 19 to unload. Ware testified that while he was in Chicago he received a message from his dispatcher to call a number in Tennessee. Ware stated he called the number and spoke with Arnold by telephone on June 19. During this call, Arnold stated he was back in Tennessee.
Other than the bullet wounds, there is no evidence of the circumstances under which the victim met his death. The State did not establish the scene of the murder, although in a light most favorable to the State, the lack of blood or other evidence in the woods did not exclude the possibility that Cox was shot where he was found. Arnold's gun was not connected to the crime, and no evidence placed Arnold at any crime scene, in the woods or otherwise. Nor is there any evidence of the circumstances by which Arnold obtained possession of the borrowed vehicle, if at all, or that the vehicle was involved in the murder. At most, the State's testimony established that the borrowed car was capable of traversing the dirt road leading to the victim's body.
The above evidence supports the conclusion that Arnold knew the victim, had access to him, and was in the area on the day of the homicide. The State's evidence also reasonably tends to prove that Arnold did have some contact with the victim on June 18, in view of the fact that his fingerprint was found in the borrowed car. Furthermore, the evidence provides a reasonable basis for concluding that Arnold drove the car to Tennessee. Indeed, in a fight most favorable to the State, Arnold had a gun which could possibly have been used to kill the victim. However, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the State has failed to meet the "any substantial evidence" standard.
In State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 450 (1984), the defendant was convicted of two murders. At trial, the State attempted to link Schrock to the murders by presenting evidence Schrock was in the area of the murders and that a footprint at the scene was similar to footprints found in an area in which the defendant admitted he had been walking. However, our supreme court reversed the convictions, ruling Schrock was entitled to a directed verdict because the evidence was exclusively circumstantial and nothing placed Schrock at the scene of the crime. The court concluded the circumstances were suspicious, but were insufficient to establish a basis for the conviction.
In the more recent case of State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 533 S.E.2d 572 (2000), our supreme court again reversed a murder conviction when the State's case was purely circumstantial and the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime at the time of the murder. Although the State presented evidence that a car resembling the one in the possession of the defendant was at the victim's apartment complex the night of the murder, there was no evidence that this car was actually the car in the defendant's possession. In reversing the conviction, our supreme court stated, "[l]ike the footprints in Schrock, the possibility that it was the same car, without any other evidence placing the defendants at the scene, is not enough evidence to place [the defendant] inside the Victim's apartment." Id. at 603, 533 S.E.2d at 575.
Except in cases where the crime is alleged to be procured or caused indirectly, our supreme court has clearly stated that "[b]y bringing the case, the State assumes the burden of proving that the accused was at the scene of the crime when it happened and that he committed the criminal act." Schrock, 283 S.C. at 133, 322 S.E.2d at 452. The evidence in this case, as in Schrock and Martin, established only that the circumstances were strongly suspicious, but falls short of providing a basis upon which the jury could have reasonably and logically determined Arnold's guilt.
CONCLUSION
We find that the evidence presented by the State does not rise to the level of substantial evidence which reasonably tended to prove Arnold's guilt or from which his guilt may fairly and logically be deduced. Therefore, Arnold's murder conviction is
REVERSED.
HEARN, C.J., concurs.
. The dissent repeatedly contends that Johnson City, Tennessee, is near the home of Arnold's father in Gray, Tennessee, but there is no evidence in the record to support this contention.
. Latent fingerprints not matching Arnold's were also recovered from the exterior of the vehicle. Although they were forwarded for analysis, they were not compared to other known suspects.
. The State also introduced evidence that additional phone calls were placed on the day the victim disappeared. These calls were made from Arnold's father's phone in Tennessee to Ware's apartment.
.The dissent provides citations standing for the proposition that possession, soon after a murder, of property belonging to the victim may be the foundation of an inference of guilt. See 40A Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 252 (1999); 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 245 (1991). However, cases cited under these sections involved defendants with no prior relationship to the victim or, at best, a casual relationship with the victim. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (noting defendant, who was recently introduced to the deceased by a third party, was in possession of the victim's belongings); Gibson v. State, 178 Ga. 707, 174 S.E. 354 (1934) (indicating accused was in possession of the deceased's watch, but not indicating any prior relationship between the accused and the deceased); State v. Grissom, 35 N.M. 323, 298 P. 666 (1930) (noting dentist, convicted of second degree murder for producing an abortion after which the mother died, had the deceased woman's recently missing ring); People v. Mitchell, 176 A.D.2d 897, 575 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y.App.Div.1991) (noting defendant, who had assisted performing renovation work for the deceased, was found in possession of the victim's credit card); McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (affirming capital murder conviction and noting at the time of arrest defendant was found driving a car belonging to the victim's father when he had no previous relationship with either person). Unlike those cases, Arnold and the victim had an intimate relationship.
. The dissent notes an "examination of the [car] revealed scratches on its exterior that suggested, according to the lead investigator, it had been driven down 'something rough.' " However, read as a whole, the investigator's testimony makes it clear that this conclusion is purely speculative.
. The dissent points out the proposition that fingerprint evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction if the prints are "found at the scene of the crime under such circumstances that they could only have been made at the time of commission of the crime." 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1482 (1994). However, Arnold's prints were not found at any place established as the scene of the crime. Arnold's fingerprint was located only on a coffee cup lid in the car. The car was never connected to the crime in any way.
. The dissent argues that in Schrock and Martin the evidence was only similar or resembled the defendants' shoes or car, whereas in this case there is no question but that the fingerprint on the coffee cup lid belonged to Arnold. However, this overlooks the fact that the evidence in Schrock and Martin was discovered or viewed at the scene of the crime. Arnold's fingerprint was not found at any place established as the scene of the crime, but was only found on a coffee cup lid in a vehicle which had been in the possession of the victim at some time before he was killed.
. In light of our decision to reverse Arnold's murder conviction, we need not address the other issues on appeal.