Case Name: G. C. Richmond v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-10-24
Citations: 96 Tex. Crim. 598
Docket Number: No. 7430
Parties: G. C. Richmond v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 598–601

Head Matter:
G. C. Richmond v. The State.
No. 7430.
Decided October 24, 1923.
Rehearing denied March 5, 1924.
1. —Possession of Intoxicating Liquor — Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of nossessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, there is noi reversible error.
2. —Same—Evidence—Argument of Counsel — Res Gestae.
The accused cannot sit by silently and permit the admission of testimony without objection which might be subject to objection, and thereafter complain of the use made of it by the State in argument or otherwise; besides, the evidence was admissible as res gestae and there is no reversible error.
3. —Same—Evidence—Sales of Liquor.
There was no error in admitting testimony of sales of liquor made by the defendant shortly before the date of his arrest when he was in possession of the liquor charged in this case, as it is permissible for the State to show sales within reasonable proximity of time. Following Newton v. State, 94 Texas Crim. Rep., 288, 250 S. W. Rep., 1036
4. —Same—Evidence—Practice in Trial Court.
There was no error in permitting the sheriff to bring before the jury at the time he testified a glass jar said by him to be one of the jars of whisky obtained from the defendant at the time of his arrest; besides the whisky was removed upon objection.
5. —Same—Rehearing—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, the evidence supported the conviction, there is no reversible error. Distinguishing Lankford v. State, 248 S. W. Rep., 389, and other cases.
6. —Same—Sale of Liquor — Possession—Accomplice.
This court has never held that a jury’s conclusion of guilt of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale was dependent on proof of actual sale by the accused. The purpose may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, and while no request for any instruction was made as to accomplice’s testimony the case was not wholly dependent thereon, and the conviction rests upon sufficient evidence.
Appeal from the District Court of Jones. Tried below "before the Honorable W. R. Chapman.
Appeal from a conviction of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Lon A. Brooks, and White, Wilcox, Graves, & Taylor, for appellant.
Cited cases in the opinion.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
From a conviction in the District Court of Jones County of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purposes of sale, appellant brings this appeal.
The facts show that appellant was arrested in possession of a car in which were twenty-seven gallons of whisky. Evidence was before the jury showing sales of liquor by appellant about that time. The evidence amply supports the judgment of guilty.
Appellant has two bills of exception complaining of improper argument on the part of the State's attorney. An examination of "said bills discloses that the argument complained of consisted of the repetition before the jury of a statement made by appellant immediately following his arrest in which he stated that he had 27% gallons of liquor in his car. Bach of said bills of exception is qualified by a statement from the learned trial judge that this testimony was admitted without objection. This being the case, it would be permissible to discuss it. This court has said many times that the accused may not sit silently by and permit testimony which might be subject to objection, to be introduced and thereafter complain of use made of it by the State in argument or otherwise. We might further observe with reference to the statement made by the appellant almost immediately following his arrest to the effect that he had in his car 27% gallons of liquor, that it would appear to be admissible under the further rules of res gestae that statements made in connection with or as a part of a confession which lead to the discovery of fruits of the crime and which are found to be true, become thus admissible.
Appellant also complains of testimony of sales of liquor made by him shortly before the date of his arrest in possession of the liquor charged in this case. An essential element of the offense charged herein is the purpose and intent of the appellant in having liquor in his possession, that is, the State must satisfy the jury that such possession was for the purpose of sale As shedding light upon the intent of the ac cused in such possession, it is permissible for the State to show sales of such liquor within reasonable proximity of time. Anderson v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 183, 238 S. W. Rep., 321; Newton v. State, 94 Texas Crim. Rep., 288, 250 S. W. Rep., 1036.
We perceive no error in the action of the sheriff in bringing before the jury at the time he testified a glass jar said by him to be one of the jars of whisky obtained from the appellant at the time of his arrest. If such testimony was in anywise objectionable, it could not be held so in the instant case because the learned trial judge qualifies the bill of exceptions by saying that when the accused objected he directed the officer to remove the whisky. This disposes of the contentions of appellant. Being unable to agree with any of them, an affirmance will be ordered.
Affirmed.