Case Name: Johnson, &c., v. Sweat, &c.
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1883-11-06
Citations: 81 Ky. 392
Docket Number: 
Parties: Johnson, &c., v. Sweat, &c.
Judges: 
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 392–395

Head Matter:
Cash 62 EQUITY
November 6, 1883.
Johnson, &c., v. Sweat, &c.
APPEAL PROM UUTLISR CIRCUIT COURT.
1. Appellant, Mrs. Johnson’s, cause of action for the recovery of her land, which her husband attempted to convey, exists before his death.
2. The statute of 1846 provides for the alienation of the wife’s land by a joint conveyance by husband and wife, and it results, that unless the wife joins in the conveyance, it is void as to her.
3. Prior to the adoption of that statute, it had been hold that a conveyance by the husband of the wife’s land was operative during his lifetime, and in such case the wife’s right of action did not accrue until his death.
4. Appellant’s cause of action had not accrued for thirty years, when her suit was instituted, and therefore the statute does not apply.
LYSANDER J. SMITH and E. W. HINES por appellants.
1. The wife can only part with her title as provided by the statute. The consent of the husband has no significance.
2. The wife’s right of action accrues as soon as the husband attempts to dispose of her land. (Kennedy v. TenBroeck, 11 Bush, 251 ; Gen. Stat., ch. 24, secs. 19, 20, 21; cli. 52, art. .2, sec. 4; ch. 68, art. 1, sec. 4; Smith v. White, 1 B. Mon., 18; Bartlette v. Shackleford, 6 J. J. Mar., 553; Scarborough v. Watkins, 9 B. Mon., 49; 4 Dana, 123.)
WM. WARD FOR APPELLEES.
1. Appellant, Mrs. Johnson, frequently represented to Martha Sweat and others that she had sold the land to R. M. Johnson, and had made a good title to it.
2. Her husband having sold and conveyed the land, Mrs. Johnson cannot recover until his death, if at all. (Miller v. Shackelford, 3 Dana, 293; Edrington v. Harper, 3 J. J. Mar., 360; Woodruff v. Detheridge, 6 J. J. Mar., 370; McLean v. Gregg, 2 A. Iv. Mar., 457; Acts Í845-’6; 3 Bush, 702; 8 B. Mon., 542; 7 Bush, 298; 3 lb., 360; 14 B. Mon., 517; 3 Mon., 75 ; lb., 291; 3 J. J. Mar., 636; Stafford v. Steele, 7 lb., 343; Boyd v. Snelling, 7 Mon., 415; Murphy v. O’Reilley, 78 Ky., 263.)

Opinion:
JUDGE HIKES
delivered tiie opixiox of the court.
When we considered this case before, we were misled by counsel into saying that the thirty years' statute applied, and that the judgment should be affirmed. Counsel insisted that the statute was not well pleaded, but made no question as to the sufficiency of the proof to support the plea; so that, when we had decided that it was well pleaded, we applied it without a careful examination of the evidence. After carefully reading all the evidence, we must conclude that the thirty years' statute does not apply. R. M. Johnson, appellees' vendor, testifies that he purchased the land in 1848, and as this action was instituted in September, 1877, the thirty years had not elapsed. There is nothing else in the record upon which an affirmance can be based, notwithstanding the manifest justness of appellees' claim. There is evidence strongly tending to show that estoppel might have been applied to appellant, but by some oversight the record does not show whether the representations of Mrs. Johnson that she had sold the land to R. M. Johnson and made him a good title were made to Sweat before or after his purchase from R. M. Johnson. As the record shows that Mrs. Mary Johnson never divested herself of title, and that she has been under the disability of coverture since R. M. Johnson began to claim the land, the judgment must be reversed, and cause remanded, with, directions for further proceedings consistent with this opin-ion.