Case Name: HAND MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. MARKS
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1900-01-08
Citations: 36 Or. 523
Docket Number: 
Parties: HAND MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. MARKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 523–535

Head Matter:
Decided 8 January;
rehearing denied 26 February, 1900.
HAND MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. MARKS.
[52 Pac. 512, 53 Pac. 1072, 59 Pac. 549.]
1. Mechanic’s Lien — Necessary Parties to an Appeal. — A contractor for the construction of a building, though made a party below, is not a necessary party to an appeal by the owner from a decree foreclosing a mechanic’s lien for material furnished the contractor, where no demand was made for a personal judgment against the latter, and no such judgment was rendered: Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Delahunt, 36 Or. 402, followed.
2. Mechanic’s Lien Cases — Advancement on Calendar. — The requirement of Section 3677 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, that mechanic’s lien cases shall be tried in the circuit court, “shall have preference upon the calendar of the court, and shall be tried by such court without unnecessary delay,” applies to the circuit court only, and is not binding on the supreme court.
3. Idem. — Suits for the enforcement of mechanics’ liens are not entitled to precedence on the calendar of the supreme court because of their subject-matter.
4. Right of Sureties to Enforce Mechanics’ Liens. — A surety on a contractor’s bond engaging to protect a building against mechanics’ liens cannot claim a lien on such structure so long as he remains bound by that obligation, but the prohibition ceases on his being released.
5. Release of Surety by Premature Payment. — A surety on a contractor’s bond is not discharged by the owner making a premature payment to the contractor, where such payment does not impair any security reserved under the contract and which would inure to the benefit of the surety.
6. Releasing Surety by Taking New Bond. — The acceptance of a second bond with different sureties does not discharge the sureties on the first, where the second bond was given as additional security, and was so understood and accepted by the parties to the contract.
7. Releasing Surety by Withholding Payments. — A surety on a contract- or’s bond securing the owner against mechanics’ liens is not discharged by the owner withholding beyond the time provided in the contract a deed of land to be given the contractors in part payment, where there were undischarged liens on file against the contractor and owner: Henry v. Hand, 36 Or. 492, followed.
8. Releasing Surety by Disbursing on Contractor’s Orders. — An agreement between a contractor and the owner that, instead of making payments as they became due, the owner would retain the amounts and disburse them on the contractor's order, is not such a violation of the contract as to discharge a surety.
9. Construction of Written Memorandum. — A relinquishment by a con tractor of claims against the owner is not a release of claims of the owner against the contractor.
From Multnomah.: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge.
Suit by the Hand. Manufacturing Company against J. S. Marks and divers others to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. By a process of elimination, the case finally consisted of a dispute between the sureties on the contractor’s bond and the property owner, the particulars of which' are stated in the opinion. A motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled, the court declined to advance the case on the calendar, and finally confirmed the decree of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Mr. Arthur C. Emmons, for the motion.
Mr. Thomas N. Strong, contra.

Opinion:
Decided 14 March, 1898.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
f 52 Pao. 512.]
Per Curiam.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal. The transcript shows that plaintiff, a private corporation, commenced this suit to foreclose a lien upon lots 5 and 6, in block 92, in the City of East Portland, for material furnished to the defendant J. S. Marks, who, by virtue of a contract with one L. D. Brown, now deceased, had charge of the construction of a brick building for the latter on said premises, then owned by him. The defendants Theodore Jensen, James Lyons, and the East Portland Mill & Fixture Company, filed separate answers, in the nature of cross bills, seeking to foreclose their respective liens upon said premises for material furnished to be used in the construction of said building, and the defendant E. P. Brown, executrix of the last will and testament of L. D. Brown, deceased, and the present owner of said premises, filed an answer to the complaint and to the cross bills of her co-defendants. Marks was made a party and demurred to the complaint, but, his demurrer being overruled, he failed to plead further, and the cause being tried, resulted in a decree foreclosing the liens of plaintiff and the East Portland Mill & Fixture Company for the amount demanded by each respectively; but, the court having found that Jensen and Lyons were sureties on Marks' undertaking for the faithful performance of his contract, a breach of which necessitated an outlay of money by the owner in completing the building, after Marks had abandoned his agreement, in excess of the amounts demanded by said sureties as lien claimants, their cross bills were dismissed, and they jointly, and E. P. Brown separately, appeal, but did not serve the notices thereof upon Marks.
It is contended that Marks is an adverse party, and not having been served with a notice of the appeal this courtis without jurisdiction, and therefore the appeal should be dismissed. In Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Delahunt, 36 Or. 402 (51 Pac. 649), we had occasion to examine this question and reached the conclusion that while the contractor having charge of the construction of any building is made by statute the agent of the owner, for the purpose of binding the latter for the value of the material used in or labor performed upon such building at the request of the former, he is not a necessary party to a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien, unless a personal decree is sought against him by the owner, and, no such relief being demanded in the case at bar, it follows that the motion must be denied. Motion Overruled.
Decided. 15 August, 18D8.
On Motion to Advance Case on Calendar.
[53 Pac. 1072. [
Submitted without argument.
Mr. Justice Wolverton
delivered the opinion.
This is a motion to advance the above cause upon the calendar for hearing, based upon Section 3677, Hill's Ann. Laws, which provides, among other things, as follows : "Suits to enforce the liens created by this act shall be brought in the circuit courts, and the pleadings, process, practice, and other proceedings shall be the same as in other cases. All suits to enforce any lien created by this act shall have preference upon the calendar of the court over every civil suit so brought, except suits to which the state shall be a party, and shall be tried by such court without unnecessary delay." By a fair intendment, the language of the act states simply a rule of procedure to be observed by the circuit courts, in which it is provided such cases shall be instituted. The injunction that they shall be tried by such court without unnecessary delay is an unmistakable indication that the trial, and not the appellate, court was intended.
The plain purpose of the act is to promote an early trial in the interest of a deserving class of persons, many of whom are dependent (as we have said in Falconio v. Larsen, 31 Or. 137, 37 L. R. A. 255, 48 Pac. 703) upon their recent earnings for the sustenance of themselves and those dependent upon them, and to make the wages of labor speedily available. This purpose is in most instances subserved when the trial court has given the parties a hearing ; and hence it is evident that the legislature deemed it sufficient for all practicable purposes that the court of original jurisdiction be required to give prece dence to cases coming within the purview of the act. At any rate, the language employed indicates such to be the intendment, and we cannot invade the legislative domain to give it broader scope. The motion will be denied. Motion Overruled.
For Lyons and Jensen there was a brief over the names of Fred Larkin Keenan and Guy G. Willis, with an oral argument by Mr. Keenan.
For E. B. Brown and E: B. Brown, executrix, there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Thomas N. Strong.