Case Name: Max T. MALONE, et al., v. Joe SHYNE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2006-09-13
Citations: 937 So. 2d 343
Docket Number: No. 2006-C-2190
Parties: Max T. MALONE, et al., v. Joe SHYNE.
Judges: VICTORY, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 937
Pages: 343–371

Head Matter:
Max T. MALONE, et al., v. Joe SHYNE.
No. 2006-C-2190.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 13, 2006.
The Pesnell Law Firm, Billy Ray Pes-nell, John Whitney Pesnell, William Alan Pesnell, Shreveport, for Applicant.
Booth, Lockard, Politz & Lesage, Bennett Louis Politz, Weiner, Weiss & Madison, Michael Allyn Stroud, Shreveport, S.P. Davis, for Respondent.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Chief Justice.
hThe pivotal issue in this election case, which involves a challenge to candidacy of a person who seeks election to the Shreveport City Council, is whether, pursuant to La. Const, art. I, § 10, a pardon issued by the governor of the state of Louisiana is sufficient to restore the right to seek and hold a municipal or state office to one convicted of a federal felony (a right that is lost under Louisiana law as a collateral consequence of a felony conviction in a federal court), or whether only a pardon from the president of the United States is sufficient to restore that right. Finding that only a pardon from the president of the United States can restore collateral consequences of a federal felony conviction, even if those rights are lost solely as a consequence of Louisiana state law, the district court held that the candidate herein is prohibited from seeking or holding a municipal or state office. By a 6 to 3 majority, the court of appeal, sitting en banc, found that the governor of the state of Louisiana has constitutional authority to issue a pardon that restores collateral civil rights lost as a consequence of Louisiana law, even when a party is convicted of a federal felony. Thus, the court of appeal reversed the district court decision.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the governor of the state of Louisiana does indeed have constitutional authority to issue a pardon that restores collateral 12civil rights forfeited as a consequence of state law, even if the party was convicted of a federal felony, and thus we affirm the decision of the court of appeal.,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, Joe Shyne, was convicted of a federal felony on April 7, 1994, when he pled guilty in United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, to the crime of extortion by a public official, a violation of the "Hobbs Act," 18 U.S.C. 1951. Mr. Shyne served a twelve-month, one-day prison sentence, from which he was released on May 15, 1995. Thereafter, Mr. Shyne attempted to run for election to the Shreveport City Council in 2002, but was disqualified as a candidate pursuant to the 1998 amendments to La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), which prohibit convicted felons from seeking or holding public office until fifteen years have elapsed from the completion of their sentence. La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) provides an exception to that prohibition for convicted felons who "have been pardoned either by the governor of this state or by the officer of the state, nation, government or country having such authority to pardon in the place where the person [Rwas convicted and sentenced." On August 29, 2003, following Mr. Shyne's disqualification from seeking and holding a municipal or state office in 2002, he was issued a "Grant of Clemency" by Louisiana Governor Murphy J. "Mike" Foster, upon the recommendation of the State Board of Pardons. The "Grant of Clemency" stated as follows:
Whereas, the louisiaNA BOARD of parDONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ART. 4, SEC. 5 OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OP 1974, HAS RECOMMENDED THAT I GRANT A FULL PARDON WITH RESTORATION OP ALL CIVIL AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, EXCEPT FOR THE RIGHT TO OWN, POSSESS, RECEIVE, SHIP, AND TRANSFER FIREARMS to Joe Shyne:
Now, THEREFORE, I, M.J. "MiKE" FOSTER, jr., Governor of the State of Louisiana BY THE POWER VESTED IN ME BY ARTICLE 4, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution OF 1974, DO HEREBY grant A FULL pardon WITH RESTORATION OF ALL CIVIL AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, EXCEPT FOR THE RIGHT TO OWN, POSSESS, RECEIVE, SHIP AND TRANSFER FIREARMS TO JOE SHYNE AND DO HEREBY DIRECT YOU TO ACT ACCORDINGLY, AND FOR SO DOING THIS SHALL BE YOUR SUFFICIENT WARRANT AND AUTHORITY.
In Witness Whereof, I have set my HAND AND CAUSED TO BE AFFIXED THE GREAT Seal, of the state of Louisiana, at the CAPITOL, IN THE CITY OF BATON R.0UGE, ON this 29th day of August, 2003.
(Italics emphasis in original; boldface emphasis added.)
Relying on Governor Foster's pardon, Mr. Shyne filed a notice of candidacy for District "F" of the Shreveport City Council in the primary election to be held on September 30, 2006. James Edward Green (hereinafter "the challenger"), who is also a candidate for the District "F" Shreveport City Council seat, filed a timely petition to disqualify Mr. Shyne as a candidate for office, asserting that the governor of the state of Louisiana lacks constitutional authority to pardon someone convicted of a federal felony and that Mr. Shyne is therefore disqualified by La. Const, art. I, |4§ 10(B) from seeking and holding a municipal or state office until the passage of 15 years from the completion of his sentence. In support of his argument that the governor of Louisiana lacks authority to pardon Mr. Shyne of his federal felony offense, the challenger cited La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), which authorizes the governor to pardon "offenses against the state," a phrase that he defines to mean only convictions for offenses that violate Louisiana state law.
Following a trial in the matter, the district court found that Mr. Shyne was "prohibited from qualifying at this time for the public office of District 'F' of the Shreveport City Council," and ordered that his name be removed from the list of qualified candidates for the primary election. In so concluding, the district court stated that, given a choice, it might find that the governor's pardon was sufficient to restore Mr. Shyne's right to seek and hold a municipal or state office, but that it could not "ignore" two things: (1) this court's statements in State v. Baxter, 357 So.2d 271 (La.1978) relative to the power of the President of the United States to pardon federal felonies, and (2) the language of La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E)(1), which establishes the general gubernatorial pardon power, giving the governor authority to pardon "offenses against the state." Accordingly, the district court found that "a conviction for a federal offense is not relieved by a pardon issued by the governor." Id. at 273.
A 6 to 3 majority of the court of appeal, sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the district court and held that Mr. Shyne is qualified to seek and hold a municipal or state office. In support of its decision, the court of appeal majority focused primarily on the fact that La. Const, art. I, § 10(B)(1) expressly provides that disqual- iñcation from seeking or holding a municipal or state office ends if the party has "been pardoned either by the governor of this state or by" the President of the United States. Malone v. Shyne, 41,781, at 6 (La.App.2d Cir.8/29/06), 936 So.2d 1279, 1283 (emphasis in original). On the basis of the either-or language in the constitutional provision, the court of appeal stated as follows:
A literal reading of this pardon provision does not require that only the president may pardon a federal felon and free him from Louisiana's constraint. Likewise, the provision indicates that the governor may pardon a person convicted in the federal system of a crime which would amount to a felony in Louisiana. Our research finds that the federal law allows a gubernatorial pardon of a federal felon to lift a state imposed constraint on the party. Thus, the question presented is solely a matter of our state's constitutional grant of the power to the governor and whether it allows the governor to remove the Louisiana disqualification from a person convicted of a federal crime.
Id. at 6, 936 So.2d at 1284. The challenger sought supervisory writs in this court, which we granted on September 5, 2006. Malone v. Shyne, 06-C-2190 (La.9/5/06), 936 So.2d 820.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Determination of whether Governor Foster's pardon of Mr. Shyne was sufficient to restore his right to seek and hold a municipal or state office depends upon the interpretation and interplay of the following provisions of the Louisiana Constitution, quoted in pertinent part:
La. Const, art. I, § 10: Right to Vote; Disqualification From Seeking or Holding an Elective Office
⅜ ⅜ ⅛ ⅜ ⅜
(B) Disqualification. The following persons shall not be permitted to qualify as a candidate for elective public office or take public elective office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this state:
(1) A person who has been convicted within this state of a felony and who has exhausted all legal remedies, or who has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would be a felony and who has exhausted all legal remedies and has not after-wards been pardoned either by the governor of this state or by the officer of the state, nation, government or country having such authority to pardon in the place where the person was convicted and sentenced.
_[^(Emphasis added.)
La. Const, art. I, § 20: Right to Humane Treatment
No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.
(Emphasis added.)
La. Const, art. IV, § 5: Governor; Powers and Duties
Section 5. (A) Executive Authority. The governor shall be the chief executive officer of the state. He shall faithfully support the constitution and laws of the state and of the United States and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.
⅝ ⅜ ⅜; ⅜ ⅜
(E) Pardon, Commutation, Reprieve, and Remission; Board of Pardons.
(1) The governor may grant reprieves to persons convicted of offenses against the state and, upon favorable recommendation of the Board of Pardons, may commute sentences, pardon those convicted of offenses against the state, and remit fines and forfeitures imposed for such offenses. However, a first offender convicted of a non-violent crime, or convicted of aggravated battery, second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal damage to property, purse snatching, extortion, or illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence, without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.
⅜ ⅜ :¡s ⅜ *
(K) Other Powers and Duties.
The governor shall have other powers and perform other duties authorized by this constitution or provided by law.
^DISCUSSION
Interpretation of constitutional provisions is controlled by the principles set forth below by this court in Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 04-0066 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1:
The starting point in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the language of the constitution itself. When a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect. Unequivocal constitutional provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning.
When the constitutional language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is necessary to determine the intent of the provision. In seeking to ascertain constitutional intent, the same general rules used in interpreting laws and written instruments are followed. When construing an ambiguous constitutional provision, a court should ascertain and give effect to the intent of both the framers of the provision and of the people who adopted it; however, in the case of an apparent conflict, it is the intent of the voting population that controls.
In construing a constitutional provision, the courts may consider the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied, in light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the provision was framed. Additionally, if one constitutional provision addresses a subject in general terms, and another addresses the same subject with more detail, the two provisions should be harmonized if possible, but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail. However, where the language of a constitutional prohibition makes its aim evident and unequivocal, courts need not consider the historical basis for the prohibition and may not, by separately considering related constitutional provisions, arrive at a construction that detracts from the effectiveness or manifest meaning and purpose of the related provisions.
Id. at 6-8, 880 So.2d at 7 (citations omitted).
Interpretation of the constitutional provisions at issue in this case is complicated by the fact that the conflicting lower court decisions are apparently based on applica tion of the same general principle of statutory construction, that the language of plain, unambiguous constitutional provisions must be given effect. However, the two courts applied that principle to two different constitutional |8provisions. The district court's decision focuses on the language of La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E) authorizing the governor of the state of Louisiana to "pardon those convicted of offenses against the state." Based on the emphasized language, the district court found that the governor's authority to pardon is limited to "offenses against the state," a phrase that he she apparently interpreted to apply only to felony violations of state law, in contrast to felony violations of federal law. The court of appeal, on the other hand, focused on the language of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), excepting, from the general rule prohibiting parties convicted of felony offenses from seeking or holding a municipal or state office, those who have "been pardoned either by the governor of this state or" by the President of the United States (in this latter instance, for a federal felony offense, no doubt). Based •on the emphasized language in that provision, the court of appeal found that "the provision indicates that the governor may pardon a person convicted in the federal system of a crime which would amount to a felony in Louisiana." Malone, 41,781, at 6, 936 So.2d at 1284.
However, our consideration of the constitutional provisions cited above in light of the arguments of the parties and the decisions of the lower courts, as well as our understanding of the meaning of the terms used therein, convinces us that the language of neither of the two constitutional provisions relied upon by the lower courts is entirely "clear and unambiguous."
For example, the challenger insists and the district court found that the language in La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), authorizing Louisiana's governor to pardon "offenses against the state," can only be interpreted to limit the governor's general pardon power to persons convicted of a felony by a Louisiana state court. In fact, this argument is the linchpin of the challenger's claims. He asserts that, if La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) and La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E) are properly read in pari materia, they are not [9ambiguous. According to the challenger, La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) cannot be considered to extend the governor's power to pardon beyond his general power to pardon "offenses against the state," established by La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E). This argument is, however, premised on the challenger's insistence that "offenses against the state," can only mean convictions under Louisiana law.
On the other, hand, Mr. Shyne argues and the court of appeal found, that the phrase "offenses. against the state" has a broader meaning and refers to any felonious conduct that is prohibited by Louisiana law, even if the person was actually convicted by a court in another jurisdiction. We find that both of those interpretations are reasonable interpretations of the phrase "offenses against the state,"' as used in La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), such that the provision is not "clear and unambiguous." Ultimately then, the question of the proper interpretation to be given, "offenses against the state," depends on something other than the language of the constitutional provisions.
Likewise, the arguments of the parties and the decisions of the lower courts reveal a disagreement over the correct definition to be given to the word "pardon," as it is used in La. Const, art. I, § 10(B). The challenger contends • that the word "pardon" is essentially a "term of art" that can only be used to describe an act of an authorized official that has a number of different effects: (1) relieves the punish ment ordered, (2) restores the convicted felon's "status of innocence," and (3) incidentally restores any collateral civil effects flowing from the conviction. Conversely, Mr. Shyne asserts, although a pardon may have the three effects listed above, a pardon from the governor, who he admits cannot relieve punishment imposed by a federal court or restore his "status of innocence," can nevertheless restore the collateral civil effects imposed by state law flowing from his federal felony conviction, and still [inqualify as a pardon for purposes of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B). Again, our consideration of these arguments, coupled with our understanding of the meaning of the term "pardon," as used in La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), convince us that that term is not "clear and unambiguous." The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the term "pardon" is "generic," and necessarily includes "every species of pardon." See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 351, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), which recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to issue limited or partial pardons.
Interpretation of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) is difficult also because of the "either-or" language, which Mr. Shyne claims authorizes either the governor or the president of the United States to issue a pardon to restore his right to seek and hold a municipal or state office. The challenger argues that the either-or language in La. Const, art I, § 10(B) anticipates two classes of convicted felons: (1) those convicted of a felony violating a state law, who may be pardoned by the governor, and (2) those convicted of a felony violating the law of some other jurisdiction, who cannot be pardoned by the governor, but only by the official having authority to issue a pardon in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred.
The parties to this case cite primarily two. constitutional provisions in support of their arguments. Those two provisions address the same subject matter to the extent that they both contain clauses relative to the authority given to the governor of the State of Louisiana to issue pardons. Neither of those provisions, we have found, is clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, we are required by the principles set forth in Ocean Energy to determine , the intent of the provisions by application of the well-recognized principles for construing constitutional provisions set forth therein. 04-0066 at 7, 880 Ao.2d at 7. One of those principles is as follows:
[I]f one constitutional provision addresses a subject in general terms, and another addresses the same subject with more detail, the two ^provisions , should be harmonized if possible, but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail.
Id.
A rational construction of these two provisions is that they are not really in conflict. As we interpret La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), and as the court of appeal held, the phrase "offenses against the state" refers to convictions for felonious conduct that incidentally offends any provision of Louisiana state law, even if the conviction for that offense occurs in a federal court or a court in another state or jurisdiction. Thus, La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E) does not restrict the gubernatorial power to pardon to convictions in Louisiana state court, as the challenger asserts.
Further, even if the two constitutional provisions cited by the parties herein are in conflict, La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) prevails over La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), pursuant to two well-recognized provisions of statutory construction. The first of those is the principle that a more detailed provision will prevail over a more general provision addressing the same subject matter. Id. The basic controversy in this case is whether Mr. Shyne is qualified to seek and hold a municipal office in the state of Louisiana. While La. Const, art IV, § 5(E) addresses the general gubernatorial pardon power; La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) is the more detailed provision on the question of disqualification of a convicted félon to seek'and hold a municipal or state office and the' governor's authority to issue pardons to restore qualifications to seek and hold a municipal or state office.
The second general principle of constitutional construction applicable here provides that the latest expression of the will of the people prevails over previously-[genacted conflicting provisions. See Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 2005-979, p. 13 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1202, 1210. When La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E) was adopted by the people of Louisiana as a part of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, the constitution contained no provision disqualifying a convicted felon from seeking a municipal or state office. Because no such disqualification existed, no reason existed to expressly include a provision authorizing the governor to issue a pardon to remove that disqualification. It was not until the adoption of the 1998 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) that such a disqualification became a part of the constitution. Concurrent with the adoption of that disqualification, the people of the state of Louisiana limited the disqualification by specifically providing that a pardon removes the disqualification. Thus, in addition to being the more detailed of the two provisions, La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) is the latest'expression of will of the people. Given the historical context surrounding the adoption of the two provisions, as well as the fact that La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) is both the more detailed provision and the latest expression of the will of the people, La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) prevails over La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E), if the two provisions are in conflict.
The only remaining question is the proper interpretation of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), which we have already found is rendered ambiguous both by the generic nature of the word "pardon" and by the either-or language therein. Thus, this court must move on to the other principles of constitutional construction stated in Ocean Energy and "determine the intent of the provision." Id. In this step, we are to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of both the framers of the provision and the people who adopted it," if possible, and remember that "in the case of an apparent 113conflict, it is the intent of the voting population that controls." Id. We may further "consider the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied, in light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the provision was framed." Id.
The legislative history relative to the adoption of the 1998 amendments to La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) at issue herein provides some information about the various discussions that preceded the adoption of the amendments by the 1997 Louisiana Legislature, as well as the text that ap peared on the ballot when the voting population approved the amendment. However, the value of those materials in determining the "intent" of the framers and the voters, especially their intent concerning the provision allowing "either the governor of the state or" the president (or other official) to issue a pardon, is questionable at best.
The 1998 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 10 was introduced as Senate Bill 321 of the 1997 Louisiana Legislature. In the entire legislative history, only one statement refers to the "intent" behind the proposed amendments to La. Const, art. I, § 10(B). That statement appears in the minutes of a May 14, 1997, meeting of the Senate Committee on Senate and Governmental Affairs, when the author of the provision, Senator Malone, said that the intent was "to get the most honorable people in the state running for public office." Despite that general intent of the framers, however, not every convicted felon was prohibited from seeking or holding a municipal or state office, as is clear from the text of the amended provision. Relative to the portions of the amendment that allow some convicted felons to seek and hold a municipal or state office, the minutes of a June 5, 1997, meeting of the Committee on House and Governmental Affairs contain the following statement concerning at least one Louisiana legislator's understanding of the amendments:
| uRepresentative Bruneau stated that the bill provides that if a felon has been pardoned he can run for office, and if not he can still run after 15 years. Further, he said, because there is virtually an automatic pardon for first offenders under the constitution, the bill basically refers to second offenders - and allows them to run after 15 years. He suggested amendments that would clarify that a convicted felon who has completed his sentence and has not been pardoned may seek and hold elective office if the date of qualification for candidacy is more than 15 years after completion of the original sentence. He expressed support for the bill.
. The "Digest of the Senate Bill [321] As It Left the Senate" stated that the proposed amendment "prohibits convicted felons who have exhausted all legal remedies from seeking or holding an elected office," and that it "[pjrovides for restoration of certain right by gubernatorial pardon." (Emphasis added.) The final, "enrolled" joint resolution, which contains the language that appeared on the ballot when La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) was adopted by the voting population, includes, in addition to a preamble and the express language of the proposed amendment, the following proposition:
To prohibit convicted felons from seeking or holding public office within fifteen years of completion of sentence and to provide for expressed restoration of those rights by pardon.
As previously noted, the above summary of the legislative history provides little in sight into the "intent of the voting population," which, when available, should control construction of a constitutional provision. Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at 7, 880 So.2d at 7. The voters were presented with the language of the text and a summary "proposition" that refers simply to the fact that the provision includes an "expressed | ^restoration of [the right of a convicted felon to seek and hold a municipal or state office] by pardon.". The question presented here — i.e., whether the provision is intended to allow the governor of the state of Louisiana to issue a pardon that restores that right when the person was convicted of a federal felony — cannot be answered by reference to information regarding the intent of the voters. On the other hand, oh the question of the intent of the framers of the provision, the digest that described the proposed amendment when it left the Louisiana Senate (where it was originally introduced) specifically stated that the amendment provides for "restoration of certain right by gubernatorial pardon." To the extent that this statement can be assumed to reflect the intent of the Senate, one might conclude that the intent of the framers was to allow for the restoration of the right to seek and hold a municipal or state office to a convicted felon through a .pardon issued simply by the governor of the state of Louisiana, even regarding a federal conviction.
Because the available legislative history is not conclusive and because of the importance of this issue, we continue to the next step in the suggested analysis set forth by Ocean Energy for construing constitutional provisions — the "history of the times and conditions and circumstances under which the provision was framed." 04-0066 at 8, 880 So.2d at 7. As noted by both of the lower courts, various opinions of the Louisiana Attorney General reveal that Louisiana governors have historically enjoyed the authority to pardon federal offenses, at least to the extent of eliminating the consequences of a Louisiana resident's conviction of a federal felony offense that flow solely from Louisiana law, such as disqualification from voting or holding a municipal or state office. La. Atty. Gen. Op. 103, 97-878 (3/13/80), which concedes that the governor of a state cannot fully pardon a federal offense, but nevertheless concludes that a governor can "grant executive clemency, effectively restoring rights |1fiof citizenship in the state to one who has been disqualified for public office or has lost other civil rights."
Further, research into the historical perspective on the pivotal issue in this case leads us to the conclusion that the state of Louisiana is not the only state where governors have historically exercised authority to issue pardons that restore collateral civil rights forfeited by parties convicted of federal felonies as a result of state law, as demonstrated by the following statements of the general rules:
The chief executive of a state has no power to grant a pardon for an offense against the .United States for which a conviction has been had in the federal court, in the sense of taking away any part of the corporal punishment inflicted upon the offender. However, in the exercise of the pardoning power, the chief executive of a state may grant executive clemency, effectively restoring rights of citizenship in the state to one who has been disqualified for public office or has lost other civil rights, such as a right to vote, to act as juror, to testify as a witness, and so forth, as a result of a conviction of crime in a federal court or in the courts of another state for which no pardon has been granted. This remains applicable to allow a state official to restore citizenship notwithstanding that the person in question has not been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the President of the United States.
50 Am.Jur.2d Pardon and Parole § 24, relying on Arnett v. Stumbo, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889 (1941); State of Iowa ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 248 Iowa 978, 83 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1957).
The well-settled general rule is that a full pardon restores one to all his citizenship rights, including the rights of suffrage, to serve on a jury, and to be a witness. Generally, it is held that a presidential pardon has this effect equally with a pardon by the governor of a state, even though the right to suffrage was forfeited by state law, although there is some authority to the contrary. While a pardon does not restore a person to a public office forfeited on his conviction of the crime for which he was pardoned, a pardon restores to the pardoned offender his eligibility for state elective office which was forfeited by his conviction.
39 Am.Jur. Pardon and Parole § 60, also relying on Arnett, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889; Dean, 248 Iowa 978, 83 N.W.2d 451.
|17The seminal case on this issue, Arnett, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889, involved remarkably similar facts to the facts in this ease. Like this case, Arnett involved a challenge to the candidacy for state election of a party who had previously been convicted of a federal felony offense. Id. According to the court, the "entire foundation" of the challenger's argument in Ar-nett was the proposition that the candidate "was never pardoned by the President of the United States and because thereof he was never restored to his rights of citizenship so as to qualify him to run or hold the office he seeks, or the nomination for that office." Id. at 891. The court stated as follows:
As is well said in brief for [the candidate] "it must be borne in mind that the disqualification which results from the conviction is not derived from the laws of the United States (or other convicting sovereignties), but rests solely upon the Constitution of Kentucky. It is a collateral consequence, not flowing from the offense, but resulting to the offender by reason of the Constitutional provisions alone. The right to vote and to hold office in a state comes from the State and is subject to its regulation and control." We also approve another statement in the same brief saying "the conviction is not affected by the Governor's act; merely the incidental consequences (relating exclusively to suffrage and office holding rights in this Commonwealth) resulting from the operation of state laws, are cancelled and relieved."
Id. at 891-92.
Another historical case on this issue is Dean, 248 Iowa 978, 83 N.W.2d 451, in which the court held that a candidate previously convicted of a federal felony was eligible to seek and hold office following the restoration of his citizenship rights by the Iowa governor. One of the primary bases of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Dean is the language of U.S. Const. Amend. 10, concerning which, the court stated as follows:
The 10th amendment to the constitution of the United States is important in our consideration of this case. Same provides; 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' There are no provisions in the Constitution of the United States nor in the Federal Statutes, concerning qualification of electors or office holders within the respective states. Even as to election of President,Vice-President and members of Congress, the election details are assigned to state control. The qualifications of voters and office holders within the states were reserved to the states and are exclusively under state control.
Id. at 982, 83 N.W.2d at 453.
As demonstrated by the above quotations, the authority of state governors to issue pardons restoring collateral civil rights forfeited solely as a result of state law, including the right to seek and hold a municipal or state office, to persons convicted of federal felonies has historically been affirmed. Thus, our conclusion that Louisiana's governor has the constitutional authority and legal right to restore Mr. Shyne's right to seek and hold a municipal or state office by issuing a pardon, despite the fact that Mr. Shyne was convicted of a federal felony, is not out of step with the historical rule or other jurisdictions, and is well within the authority granted to the governor by the Louisiana Constitution, as we interpret it.
Further, the well-established principle that "rules in derogation of a common right should be strictly interpreted," supports our decision herein. See Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, 567 So.2d 1097, 1100 (La.1990). The right to seek and hold a municipal or state office is a common right, so that any restriction on that right must be strictly construed. See State v. Adams, 355 So.2d 917, 922 (La.1978), in which this court listed the right to hold public office as one of the "basic rights of citizenship." La. Const, art. I, § 10(B) is a restriction on that right and strict construction of that provision supports this court's finding that the provision gives the governor of the state of Louisiana authority to issue pardons that restore that common right, even if the party receiving that pardon was convicted of a federal felony offense. This conclusion is also consistent with La. Const, art. I, § |1fl20, quoted at the outset of our decision, which provides that "[f]ull rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense."
Finally, we note that our decision does not denigrate or impinge upon the exclusive right of the president of the United States to grant pardons to parties convicted of federal felony offenses that would remove and/or relieve all of the consequences of that conviction. That right has previously been recognized by this court in Baxter, 357 So.2d at 273, and this decision does not change the statements made to that effect therein. Indeed, only the president of the United States has authority to issue a pardon that would relieve a federal felon of the punishment for his offense, and restore his "status of innocence." The challenger has been unable to point to any federal law or constitutional provision that would be offended by an interpretation of Louisiana constitutional law to give Louisiana's governor authority to restore collateral civil rights to a party who has lost those rights solely as a consequence of state law. In fact, as noted by the court in Dean, the 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically reserves to the states all "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States," including the right to seek and hold a municipal or state office. See 248 Iowa at 982, 83 N.W.2d at 453.
The issues in this case are solely issues of state law, not impacted in any way by United States constitutional or statutory provisions. In fact, the matter of establishing qualifications for seeking and holding a municipal or state office is a matter expressly reserved to the states by virtue of the 10th amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we find that, under the provisions of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), a pardon issued by the governor of the state of Louisiana is sufficient toj^restore the right to hold a municipal or state office to one convicted of a federal felony offense because that right is lost solely as a consequence of Louisiana law. By virtue of his gubernatorial pardon, Mr. Shyne is therefore no longer disqualified under La. Const. Art. I, § 10(B) to seek and hold a municipal or state office in the state of Louisiana.
DECREE
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed. The challenge to the candidacy of Mr. Shyne is hereby dismissed.
AFFIRMED.
VICTORY, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
TRAYLOR, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
KNOLL, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
WEIMER, Justice, concurs and assigns additional reasons.
. The court of appeal opinion determining that Mr. Shyne was disqualified from running for Shreveport City Council in 2002 indicated that he was at that time the incumbent candidate for the District "F" Shreveport City Council seat. See Malone v. Tubbs, 36,816, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/6/02), 825 So.2d 585, 590. In fact, Mr. Shyne was elected to that office on November 3, 1998, after his federal felony conviction, and was apparently allowed to serve in that position from 1998 until 2002. Following his election in 1998, his qualifications to seek and hold a municipal or state office were questioned by Shreveport Mayor Robert W. "Bo" Williams, who requested an opinion from the Louisiana Office of the Attorney General. Id. Attorney General Opinion No. 98-445, issued in response to the mayor's question, concluded that Mr. Shyne was not prohibited from appearing on the general ballot because no objection to his candidacy had been made. Id. According to the 2002 Malone decision, Attorney General Opinion No. 98-445 did note that a question remained as to whether Mr. Shyne was qualified to take office after being elected. Id. Attorney General Opinion No. 98-445 has since been "recalled."
In 2002, Mr. Shyne had argued that the automatic first offender pardon recognized by La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E) restored his right to seek and hold a municipal or state office. The court of appeal rejected that argument, and ruled against Mr. Shyne, applying against . his candidacy its interpretation of La. Const, art. I, § 10(B). Id. Because the record herein contains no evidence to show that Mr. Shyne qualifies for an automatic "first offender pardon," we make no decision herein regarding the correctness of the court of appeal's conclusion in the original Malone case that an automatic pardon is insufficient to restore a convicted felon's right to seek or hold a municipal or state office.
. The challenge to candidacy herein was originally filed by two challengers, Mr. Green, and Max T. Malone. However, Mr. Malone was dismissed by agreement of counsel after Mr. Shyne objected to his standing to bring this action, citing the fact that Mr. Malone does not reside in Shreveport City Council District "F."
. This interpretation is supported by the historical practice of Louisiana governors to issue pardons to federal felons. See La. Atty. Gen. Op. 103, 97-878 (3/13/80), which recites the fact that Louisiana governors issued 87 pardons to persons convicted of federal felonies in the 15 years preceding 1980.
. The Pumphrey case- stated this as a principle of statutory, rather than constitutional, construction. However, Ocean Energy expressly recognizes that the same rules followed to interpret laws and written instruments apply to constitutional provisions.
. Assuming that Representative Bruneau's statement to the Committee on House and Governmental Affairs is a correct assessment of the intent of the framers in adopting La. Const, art. I, § 10(B), Mr. Shyne would presumably not have needed even a gubernatorial pardon in order to seek and hold a municipal or state office in Louisiana, because he was automatically restored to that right upon completion of his sentence. However, that argument was rejected regarding Mr. Shyne's rights by the court in Malone v. Tubbs, 36,816 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/6/02), 825 So.2d 585, 590. As noted in footnote 2 of this decision, the record in the case before us contains insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Shyne is entitled to the benefits of the automatic first-offender pardon set forth in La. Const, art. IV, § 5(E). Thus, this court expressly declines to consider that issue herein.
. Judge Peatross cited this rule in his concurrence to the majority opinion of the court of appeal in this case.
. No application for rehearing of a decision of this court in a case involving an objection to candidacy shall be entertained. La. Sup.Ct. Rule X, § 5(C). See also La.Rev.Stat. 18:1409(1). La.Rev.Stat. 18:1409(1).