Case Name: Santiago David PECH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2006-08-03
Citations: 196 F. App'x 554
Docket Number: No. 05-71250
Parties: Santiago David PECH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 196
Pages: 554–554

Head Matter:
Santiago David PECH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 05-71250.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 24, 2006.
Decided Aug. 3, 2006.
Nadeem H. Makada, Esq., Burlingame, CA, for Petitioner.
Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Sam E. Taylor, Dallas, for Respondent.
Before: ALARCÓN, HAWKINS, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Santiago David Pech, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying his motion to remand proceedings to the immigration judge to consider additional evidence. We dismiss the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency's discretionary determination that Pech failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005).
The evidence Pech presented with his motion to remand concerned the same basic hardship grounds as his application for cancellation of removal. See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir.2006). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that the evidence would not alter its prior discretionary determination that he failed to establish the requisite hardship. See id. at 600 (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars this court from reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen where "the only question presented is whether [the] new evidence altered the prior, underlying discretionary determination that [the petitioner] had not met the hardship standard.") (Internal quotations and brackets omitted); see also RamirezAlejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 382 (9th Cir.2003) ("Under BIA procedure, a motion to remand must meet all the requirements of a motion to reopen and the two are treated the same.").
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.