Case Name: Carl DUNCAN v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1978-04-17
Citations: 263 Ark. 242
Docket Number: CR 77-213
Parties: Carl DUNCAN v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Fogi.eman and Byrd, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 263
Pages: 242–248

Head Matter:
Carl DUNCAN v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 77-213
565 S.W. 2d 1
Opinion delivered April 17, 1978
(In Banc)
[Rehearing denied May 22, 1978.]
Frierson, Walker, Snellgrove & Laser, for appellant.
Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Joyce Williams Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Darrell Hickman, Justice.
Carl Duncan was charged and convicted of rape before the new Arkansas Criminal Code was adopted. We reversed his first conviction for prejudicial error. Duncan v. State, 260 Ark. 491, 541 S.W. 2d 926 (1976). Duncan was again tried on the same information, convicted and now alleges one error on appeal.
Before the trial the trial judge ruled in chambers that the victim could not be cross-examined about her previous sexual conduct or misconduct. The court also informed the lawyers that the defendant could not be examined about his previous sexual behavior or sexual offenses. Duncan's lawyer objected to the court's ruling which apparently was based on Act 197 of 1977.
This act was passed after Duncan's first trial and after the new criminal code was adopted. Duncan was tried for forcible rape under the old rape statute. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3401 (Repl. 1964). Generally, Act 197 prohibits inquiry of a victim's previous history of sexual conduct. The act provides for the exclusion of evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct unless it is determined to be relevant at a pre-trial hearing.
There were three objections to the court's ruling: (1) it denied the defendant's right to equal protection of laws and right to due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and Arkansas Constitutions; (2) the act is void and unconstitutional for the same reasons; and, (3) it prohibited the defendant from questioning the victim as to her virginity or offering extrinsic evidence regarding her virginity.
The appellant did not proffer any evidence at this hearing or later during trial; nor did appellant renew his objection at any other time. During the trial the victim was subjected to a rather pressing cross-examination. However, the appellant argues that his cross-examination was limited by the court's ruling.
The appellant did question a doctor who examined the victim about all his findings as to. the victim's physical appearance after the incident. He also obtained information about the condition and size of her vaginal cavity. This was some of the evidence that he argued he would be prohibited from presenting.
We cannot say from this record that Duncan was prejudiced by the ruling of the court. First of all, virginity is not relevant per se in a rape case. The courts have historically permitted a defendant's attorney to cross-examine in detail a victim as to her complete sexual history. This information is usually totally irrelevant to the charge of rape. Act 197 was obviously designed to limit this type of examination and protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation.
There was no proffer whatsoever of any extrinsic evidence that Duncan may have had, bearing on the victim's sexual history, to aid us in determining if Duncan was prejudiced. Duncan indicated he had such evidence. We have said many times that the failure to proffer evidence so that we can see if prejudice results from its exclusion precludes review of the evidence on appeal. Goodin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W. 2d 419 (1970); Barnes v. Young, 238 Ark. 484, 382 S.W. 2d 580 (1964); cf., Hill v. State, 250 Ark. 812, 467 S.W. 2d 179 (1971). See also, Rule 103(a)(2) Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1977).
Duncan argues on appeal, in addition to the constitutional arguments raised at the trial, that Act 197 cannot be applied to Duncan because it only applies to one charged under the new criminal code. It is unnecessary for us to answer this argument or the constitutional arguments because we can find no prejudicial error resulting from the trial court's ruling.
Affirmed.
Fogi.eman and Byrd, JJ., dissent.