Case Name: Francis R. LELONG v. Matthew R. SUTHERLAND et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1961-11-07
Citations: 134 So. 2d 627
Docket Number: No. 583
Parties: Francis R. LELONG v. Matthew R. SUTHERLAND et al.
Judges: Before REGAN, YARRUT, SAMUEL, JOHNSON, and JANVIER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 134
Pages: 627–634

Head Matter:
Francis R. LELONG v. Matthew R. SUTHERLAND et al.
No. 583.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1961.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 29, 1961.
Ogden, Woods, Henriques & Rives, Charlton B. Ogden, II, for plaintiff-appellant.
Samuel I. Rosenberg, for defendants-ap-pellees.
Before REGAN, YARRUT, SAMUEL, JOHNSON, and JANVIER, JJ.

Opinion:
YARRUT, Judge.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment denying him a preliminary and permanent injunction after a trial on the merits. Plaintiff appears alone and solely in his capacity of a taxpayer and citizen, not as a claimant to the office. Defendants, respectively, are the Orleans Parish School Board and the individual members thereof, who are presently holding office by virtue of an election under LSA-R.S. 17:121; pursuant to La.Const. mandate under Art. 12, § 10, LSA.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to restrain and prohibit defendants, collectively and individually, from holding themselves out and acting as the legally constituted Orleans Parish School Board for the current year 1961-1962. The basis for plaintiff's relief is that defendants are functus officio and unauthorized to act as the School Board by virtue of Act 4, Third Extra Session of 1960 of the Louisiana Legislature, which repealed LSA-R.S. 17:121, creating it. At the conclusion of the trial the district judge, while giving no formal written reasons for denying the injunction, made the following observation, viz.:
" You have a great many serious constitutional questions involved, but I do not see how it is necessary to pass on any of these questions, whether you are right or wrong in your contentions. All other Boards have been enjoined. There is nobody to run the schools except this Board. Whether it is a de jure board or a de facto board, it is the only one that can operate the schools. If I issue the injunction, all of the schools in Orleans Parish would have to close at once, those that are segregated as well as those that are integrated; and we would have nothing but chaos in this city.
"If this Board doesn't adopt the budget and pay the teachers and the cost of operating schools, we won't have any schools. Since they are at least a de facto board, they are the only ones who can adopt the budget and pay the teachers.
"I believe that this was the basis of the decisions in the cases in the other three divisions of this Court. This is the only Board that is functioning, and the only men who can do anything; all the others are out of business by virtue of the Federal Court injunctions. "
Defendants first challenge plaintiff's right, solely as a taxpayer or citizen, to institute this suit, contending that the right to try title to public office is governed exclusively by LSA-R.S. 42:76, par. (1), and LSA-R.S. 42:77, as follows:
LSA-RS. 42:76
"An action shall be brought in the name of the state in any of the following cases:
"(1) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises or attempts to remain in possession of any public office or franchise within this state.
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"This action shall be brought by the attorney general of the state or by the parish district attorney of the parish in which the case arises against the offender, and the suit shall be filed in the district court of that parish.
"The action may also be brought by the governor appearing in proper person or through the attorney general of the state or other counsel he may select."
LSA-RS. 42:77
"In the cases provided in R.S. 42:-76(1) and 42:76(2), the action may be brought by any person demanding possession of the office against any person claiming or exercising the functions of the office."
On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff urges that LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901, Chapter 4, verbo "Quo Warranto," which reads as follows, authorizes this proceeding:
"Quo warranto is a writ directing an individual to show by what authority he claims or holds public office, or office in a corporation, or directing a corporation to show by what authority it exercises certain powers. Its purpose is to prevent usurpation of office or of powers."
On the merits defendants contend that Act 4 is violative of the state Constitution in that, by the mere device of repealing a former statute creating the Board, and providing for the election of its members, it has sought to deprive defendants of their duly elected public office, in violation of the impeachment, addressing out of office, and recall elections, as provided by La. Const. Art. 9, § 1 through 9.
Defendants further contend that Act 4 has been declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal court and approved by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, D.C., 191 F.Supp. 871, in which suit a temporary injunction was granted, specifically declaring said Act to be unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 19, 1961 (Nos. 868 and 967, October Term, 1960). Denny v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908, 81 S.Ct. 1917, 6 L.Ed.2d 1249; Legislature of Louisiana v. United States, 367 U.S. 908, 81 S.Ct. 1925, 6 L.Ed.2d 1250.
The Intrusion into Office Statute makes it clear that a taxpayer, as such, has no standing to challenge the right of an incumbent .to hold and perform the duties of such public office. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901, Chapter 4, under "Quo War-ranto," might appear to give such authority. While there is nothing in the text of Art. 3901 to justify such conclusion, the editorial comment under the Article (par. b), explains that the provision referring to "public office" was incorporated on the theory that the Intrusion into Office Act does not give an individual the right to file suit except when he is claiming the office.
In the case of Roberts v. Caddo Parish School Board, 213 La. 436, 34 So.2d 916, our Supreme Court held that, under the Louisiana Constitution (Art. 14, § 14 (n), LSA, resident property taxpayers of a school district were "persons in interest" entitled to bring suit to contest parish school board action and bond issues creating consolidated School District No. 2, in Caddo Parish, embracing previously operative school districts, and were not confined to their remedy under the Intrusion into Office Statute.
That case is not decisive here. Plaintiff here is not seeking to enjoin defendants from performing an unconstitutional act, but is seeking to declare that defendants have no valid legal right to perform any act, whether constitutional or not.
The Intrusion into Office Statute is a special substantive statute, limiting to those named the right to challenge incumbents of public office to hold and exercise the duties of such office. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901 is a general procedural statute defining the character of a writ of "Quo Warranto," and establishes an immediate, direct, adequate and speedy remedy only for those who, by substantive law, have the right to challenge public and private corporate officers in their right to hold and perform the duties of such office.
Where there is an apparent conflict between a general law and a special law on the same subject, the special law must prevail in the particular matter to which it applies, and even though the general law has been enacted subsequent to the enactment of the special law, the special law is not thereby repealed by implication; and is only affected if reference is made to it expressly. Hewitt v. Webster, La.App., 118 So.2d 688, and authorities therein cited.
Plaintiff, then, appearing as a taxpayer only, without any claim to the office challenged, has no right to remedy; hence, has no right of action herein. As plaintiff has no right of action herein, the adjudication of the other issues would be mere obita dicta.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, plaintiff to pay the costs in both courts.
Affirmed.