Case Name: Melvin J. GIEPERT v. Lorain F. WINGERTER and Edwin A. Lombard Clerk of Criminal District Court and Secretary of Board of Election Supervisors
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-09-12
Citations: 531 So. 2d 754
Docket Number: No. 88-C-2175
Parties: Melvin J. GIEPERT v. Lorain F. WINGERTER and Edwin A. Lombard Clerk of Criminal District Court and Secretary of Board of Election Supervisors.
Judges: DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 531
Pages: 754–763

Head Matter:
Melvin J. GIEPERT v. Lorain F. WINGERTER and Edwin A. Lombard Clerk of Criminal District Court and Secretary of Board of Election Supervisors.
No. 88-C-2175.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 12, 1988.
Gary Giepert, New Orleans, for applicant.
Martin Wingerter, New Orleans, for respondents.

Opinion:
COLE, Justice.
Melvin J. Giepert brought this action alleging Judge Lorain Wingerter is not eligible to seek reelection because he is beyond the mandatory retirement age for judges of 70 years set out in Article V, sec. 23 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans rendered judgment for Giepert and ordered Wingerter's name removed from the list of candidates. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding Wingerter had a constitutionally protected right to remain in office until age 75. 529 So.2d 1389. We granted writs to review the decision of the Court of Appeal and to settle the important constitutional question presented.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Judge Wingerter's birth certificate shows he was bom September 18, 1917 and is currently 70 years old. He was first elected a City Court Judge for the City of New Orleans in 1948 and he has served continuously since that time. He was last reelected, without opposition, in 1982. He qualified as a candidate for reelection on July 27, 1988.
Two distinct questions are presented for review. The first is whether Giepert properly challenged Wingerter's candidacy on the basis of age by a suit under the Election Code, Title 18 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. The second is whether Wingerter, a judge in office on the date the 1974 Constitution was adopted, is subject to the age 70 mandatory retirement provision of Article V, § 23(B). Implicit in the second question are three distinct but related issues:
1. Whether the term "judicial service rights" in La. Const., Art. V, § 23(A) protects Wingerter's eligibility to serve past age 70 as provided by the 1921 Constitution;
2. Whether the proviso clause of La. Const., Art. V, § 23(B) applies to a judge in office on the effective date of the 1974 Constitution; and
3. Whether a judge's "service rights" under the 1921 Constitution are limited by Article XIV, § 16A of the 1974 Consti tution which adopted the earlier constitutional judicial retirement provisions as statutes, now codified at La.R.S. 13:30.
PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Wingerter argues Giepert failed to state a right or cause of action in his challenge to Wingerter's candidacy on the grounds of age. He notes age is not mentioned in the statute establishing the qualifications of New Orleans City Court judges, La.R.S. 13:1873. He also claims the Election Code, La.R.S. 18:492 sets out four precise and exclusive grounds for objection to a candidacy. Since Wingerter satisfies all the statutory requirements, he argues Gie-pert's action should be dismissed.
Wingerter also contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pass on his ability to hold office if reelected. He argues this Court, with the assistance of the Judiciary Commission, has original and exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution to decide this issue. See La. Const., Art. V, § 25. Therefore, Wingerter concludes, Giepert's action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction below.
Giepert contends the trial court was correct in its decision "that it would be a legal absurdity to declare a person qualified to run for an office which he cannot hold under the law." Giepert v. Wingerter, No. 88-15629, Reasons For Judgment at 3 (Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, August 12, 1988).
Because we conclude Wingerter can hold office if reelected, and because of the need for prompt action in this matter, we preter-mit discussion and resolution of the procedural and jurisdiction issues presented.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. Whether the term judicial service rights in La. Const., Art. V, § 23(A) protects Wingerter's eligibility to serve past age 70 as provided by the 1921 Constitution.
As a threshold matter, we cannot say the term "judicial service rights" is a recognized term of art with a known and accepted meaning. We also cannot say the meaning of the term is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the context does not provide a precise definition. Thus, the use of constitutional history to help clarify the meaning of the phrase is not precluded. We note in our decision in Small v. Guste, 383 So.2d 1011 (La.1980), we looked to the history of Article V to clarify the meaning and purpose of § 25. Id. at 1014 fn. 3; see also, New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New Orleans, 422 So.2d 402, 407 (La.1982).
Article V, § 23(A) provides in relevant part: "The retirement benefits and judicial service rights of a judge in office or retired on the effective date of this constitution shall not be diminished ." La. Const. Prior judicial interpretation of this provision is limited to the 1983 case of In Re Levy, 427 So.2d 844 (La.1983). In Levy we noted simply: "Section 23 required the legislature to provide a new retirement system for new judges, optional for judges already in office whose retirement benefits and rights already earned by judicial service would not be diminished." Id. at 846. The facts in Levy were quite different from those presented here. Judge Levy was over 80 years old at the time of the proceedings, so even under the retirement provisions of the 1921 Constitution, a judge in Levy's position would have been retired. See id. Wingerter, at age 70, is well below the ordinary retirement age prescribed by the earlier constitution.
Levy argued he should be allowed to serve out his current term under Article V, § 22 of the 1974 Constitution, alleging this provision trumped the mandatory retirement provisions of both the 1921 and 1974 constitutions. We rejected this contention, refusing to hold both retirement provisions inapplicable. The validity of some constitutional mandatory retirement age for judges is not in doubt. Every other state supreme court considering this question has upheld the validity of such provisions. See the cases collected in Annotation, Mandatory Retirement of Public Officer or Employee Based on Age, 81 A.L.R.3d 811 (1977). Here Wingerter does not seek to avoid mandatory retirement as Levy did; he seeks to serve until age 75 as was his right under the 1921 Constitution, Art. VII, § 8.
In our decision in Levy, we adopted the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana. 427 So.2d at 847. The position of the Commission on the meaning of § 23(A) was clearly set out in its brief to this Court: "Thus, it is clear that Subsection (A) of Article V, sec. 23, was intended by the Constitutional Convention to provide an age 75 or age 80 mandatory retirement age for judges already in office on January 1, 1975 ." Brief for Judiciary Commission at 16, In Re Levy, 427 So.2d 844 (La.1983). The interpretation of the Judiciary Commission is not binding on this Court but it is entitled to some weight. After an independent review of the pertinent authorities, we conclude the Commission's interpretation of § 23(A) is correct.
Both the constitutional history and the scholarly literature support the conclusion the "service rights" of a judge in office on January 1, 1975 include the right to serve until at least age 75 as provided in the 1921 Constitution. In a 1977 law review article on Article V, Professor Hargrave, Coordinator of Legal Research for the 1973 Constitutional Convention, states flatly the purpose of the "service rights" clause was to keep 75 as the retirement age for judges in office under the old constitution. See Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La.L.Rev. 765, 827 (1977). Of the applicability of § 23(B), the current retirement provision, he writes: "The mandatory retirement age of 70, however, applies only to judges who were not in office on the effective date of the constitution." Id. The actual records of the 1973 Constitutional Convention support this conclusion.
The present text of § 23(A) was introduced as an amendment by Delegate Kean. See, 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 852 (1977). The only definition of the phrase "judicial service rights" in the constitutional history was supplied by Delegate Tobias. In attempting to define the scope of the mandatory retirement age amendment (present § 23(B)), Tobias said: "Now this phrase [§ 23(B)] would not affect any presently sitting judge. The reason is that under the Kean amendment, the phrase 'judicial service rights' would continue any judge in office until that time." Id. at 857. Giepert cites no alternative definition of "judicial service rights" in the constitutional history and we found none.
We conclude Wingerter's "service rights" preserved by § 23(A) include the right to remain in office until at least age 75 as provided by the 1921 Constitution. In the 1921 Constitution, Article VII, § 8 initially provided for a judicial retirement age of 75. In a 1936 amendment, the mandatory retirement age for judges was raised to 80. Finally, in 1960, a constitutional amendment lowered the age to 75. The 1960 amendment did not except judges then in office from its scope, but it did permit sitting judges to continue to serve until age 80 or until they had achieved 20 years of service, whichever came first. See La. Const., Article VII, § 8 (1921) (as amended in 1960). No further changes were made in judicial retirement age prior to the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. Wingerter's "service rights" were fixed on December 31, 1974, the last day before the new constitution took effect. These rights provided by the 1921 Constitution included the right to serve until age 75, or until age 80 if he needed additional years to achieve 20 years vested retirement service.
Section 23(A) was expressly designed to protect the rights and expectations of judges who took office prior to 1975. Simply put, the "judicial service rights" phrase was designed to protect all the benefits of office possessed by judges prior to the adoption of the present constitution. The phrase is used in the context of an exception to the new mandatory retirement age provision, and means no judge in office prior to the adoption of the new constitution could be forced to retire at age 70. The new retirement provision in § 23(B) was directed to judges taking office on or after January 1, 1975, the effective date of the 1974 Constitution. We find no merit in the claim the protection was limited to the current term of judges then in office. The Convention expressly rejected the Zervig-non amendment which would have incorporated such a limitation, and no language in the final text of § 23(A) supports such a claim. See 6 Records, supra, at 856-857.
2. Whether the proviso clause of La. Const., Art. V, § 23(B) applies to a judge in office on the effective date of the 1974 Constitution.
Our conclusion Wingerter's right to serve past age 70 is a protected "service right" under § 23(A) is bolstered by the proviso clause of § 23(B). Subsection (B) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a judge shall not remain in office beyond his seventieth birthday." La. Const., Art. V, § 23(B) (emphasis added). Under accepted rules of construction, the proviso clause must be given effect. See, e.g., Public Housing Administration v. Housing Authority of Bogalusa, 242 La. 519, 137 So.2d 315, 320 (1961); Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812, 25 So.2d 601, 603 (1946). For this proviso to have effect, the drafters must have contemplated circumstances in which the mandatory retirement age would not apply.
We find the circumstances contemplated are those presented here. A judge in office was to be exempted from the new mandatory retirement age since he was already in office subject to the retirement age provision of the 1921 Constitution. This conclusion is amply supported by the remarks of Delegate Tobias, supra, and is in keeping with the interpretation of the Judiciary Commission. See Brief for Judiciary Commission at 16-17, In Re Levy, 427 So.2d 844 (La.1983) "Subsection (B) of that same section 23 was intended by the Constitutional Convention to provide an age 70 mandatory retirement age for judges taking office for the first time on or after the January 1, 1975 effective date of the 1974 Constitution." No language limits the proviso to the current term being served by judges then in office. The defeat of the Zervignon amendment discussed above also militates against such a restrictive reading of the clause.
3. Whether a judge's "service rights" under the 1921 Constitution are limited by Article XIV, § 16(A) of the 1974 Constitution which adopted the earlier constitutional judicial retirement provisions as statutes, codified at La.R.S. 13:30.
This final issue is readily resolved. We find La.R.S. 13:30 places no limitations on Wingerter's protected service rights for the following reasons. First, Article XIV, § 16(A) provides for adoption of certain provisions of the 1921 Constitution, but only to the extent these earlier provisions do not conflict with the 1974 Constitution. Since Wingerter's right to serve until age 75 is protected by Article V, § 23(A), any contrary provision in R.S. 13:30 would conflict with the constitution and be thus facially invalid.
Second this problem is avoided since nothing in the borrowed provisions codified in R.S. 13:30 conflicts with Wingerter's right to serve until age 75. The reference to age 70 as the mandatory retirement age in R.S. 13:30(B) is prospective in effect as is its counterpart in Article V, § 23(B). It is not applicable to Wingerter. Third, La.R.S. 13:30 is not applicable here since it deals with eligibility for judicial pension benefits, an issue not before us. Finally, we note Wingerter's right to serve is not a product of R.S. 13:30; it stands or falls under the 1921 Constitution itself through the operation of the "service rights" clause of § 23(A).
CONCLUSION
We conclude Wingerter, a judge in office when the 1974 Constitution took effect, has the right to serve past age 70 as provided in the 1921 Constitution. Only this interpretation of Article V, § 23(A) gives meaning to the "service rights clause" and the proviso clause of § 23(B) while avoiding any possible conflict with Article XIV, § 16(A)'s adoption provision. Accordingly we hold Wingerter is an eligible candidate for reelection and is eligible to serve, if reelected, at least until his 75th birthday. The decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.
WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., dissents and assigns reasons.
. A decree was handed down by this Court on August 30, 1988, 531 So.2d 255, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal for reasons to be later assigned.