Case Name: Smith v. Gallagher, Appellant. Leonard Petition. White v. Gold. Crumlish Petition
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1962-10-26
Citations: 408 Pa. 551
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 424; Appeal, No. 425; No. 327, Miscellaneous Docket No. 12; No. 328, Miscellaneous Docket No. 12
Parties: Smith v. Gallagher, Appellant. Leonard Petition. White v. Gold. Crumlish Petition.
Judges: Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Keim, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 408
Pages: 551–652

Head Matter:
Smith v. Gallagher, Appellant. Leonard Petition. White v. Gold. Crumlish Petition.
Argued September 12, 1962.
Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Keim, JJ.
David Berger, City Solicitor, for appellants.
W. Wilson White, in propria persona, and for F. Eastings Griffin, Jr., intervening appellants.
Herbert A. Fogel, with him David O. Maxwell, for Republican Alliance, intervenor, in support of appellants.
Louis Lipschitz, for appellee.
Thomas D. McBride, with him Herbert 8. Levin, for Democratic County Executive Committee, intervenor, in support of appellee.
David Berger, City Solicitor, for appellant.
Robert M. Landis, for appellee, F. Hastings Griffin, Jr.
W. Wilson White, petitioner, in propria persona.
October 26, 1962:
Edwin P. Rome, Special Counsel, with him James G. Grumlish, Jr., District Attorney, in propria persona, for petitioner.
F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., with him W. Wilson White, in propria persona, for respondents.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Ms. Justice Musmanno,
Four cases are involved in this appeal and they all will be disposed of in one opinion. One has to do with an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County, another is an appeal from an interlocutory rule and order of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, a third is an application by W. Wilson White, Esq., to this Court for a writ of prohibition and mandamus directed to Court of Common Pleas No. 6, and the fourth is another application to this Court's original jurisdiction presented by James C. Crumlish, Jr., district attorney of Philadelphia County, seeking a writ of prohibition directed to Judge Eugene Y. Alessandboni and W. Wilson White, Esq.
All these proceedings are predicated on certain actions taken in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County beginning in March, 1962 and running into September, 1962. Those actions lack legality and cannot be allowed to stand. An asserted "Special Grand Jury" was ordered, for which there is no warrant in law; an attorney was appointed as "Special Prosecutor," an office which does not exist; an investigation was directed without limitation as to subject matter or time, contrary to the most fundamental precepts of precision in the administration of the law; a constitutional officer, duly elected by the people of Philadelphia County, was displaced from office, with out due process; additional personnel was employed, supplemental quarters were rented, new facilities were obtained, all at the expense of the taxpayers when personnel, quarters and facilities for the contemplated action were already in existence.
The facts follow. On March 22, 1962, a petition addressed to the judges of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of the City and County of Philadelphia, signed by Robert L. Leonard and other "citizens, taxpayers and residents" of Philadelphia, was filed with the clerk of quarter sessions, averring widespread violations of law in the government of the City of Philadelphia and that the district attorney, James C. Crumlish, Jr., was unable or unwilling to cope with the situation. The petition prayed that the grand jury be instructed to investigate into the matters therein described.
The petition came into the hands of Judge Guerin, assigned to Quarter Sessions Court No. 4 (Bail Arraignment Court), which court was charged with conducting all miscellaneous business coming before the Criminal Courts of Philadelphia County for the month of March, 1962.
It is to be noted at the outset that pursuant to Article Y, §8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board of Judges of Philadelphia County, made up of 21 judges, details for each succeeding month a court of common pleas (consisting of three judges) to the criminal court to conduct, supervise, direct and handle all matters pertaining to the grand jury which convenes in Room 653, City Hall, known as Quarter Sessions Court No. 1. Court of Common Pleas No. 7 was designated to that duty for the month of March. Within No. 7 itself, it was decided that President Judge Sloane would preside in Room 653 for the weeks beginning March 5th and March 12th and that Judge Gleeson would preside for the weeks beginning March 19th and March 26th. Thus Judge Gleeson was presiding in Room 653 from March 19th until the termination of the March term.
For a reason never explained, the petition of Robert Leonard et al. (hereinafter to be referred to as the Leonard petition), was not presented to Judge Gleeson but went to Judge Guerin in Quarter Sessions Court No. 4, that division of the court, as above stated, which administers all miscellaneous business of the court. It is obvious that by no liberal construction of language can the summoning of a grand jury be regarded as a miscellaneous item. "Miscellaneous" connotes odds and ends of affairs: remnants and scraps, heterogeneous and promiscuous. In the classification of what is important, a grand jury investigation is not to be found in the heterogeneous and promiscuous scraps of a court's activities.
On March 30, 1962, Judge Guerin ordered a hearing on the petition in Courtroom 646 for April 27, 1962. The record does not disclose how it came about that as Judge Guerin finished his term of service in criminal court the Leonard petition did not revert to Quarter Sessions Court No. 1, its logical depository, but instead came into the hands of Judge Alessandroni, President Judge of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 who now'succeeded Judge Guerin in the Miscellaneous Division (Court No. 4) for the month of April. Among the incongruities in the history of this case, no light is shed on the inevitable query as to why Judge Alessandroni, once he perused the Leonard petition, and, being thoroughly conversant with the division of duties and responsibilities in the criminal court, did not himself immediately refer the petition to Judge Griffiths, who was ready to instruct the grand jury in Court No. 1 during the entire month of April.
On April 13, 1962, the District Attorney of Philadelphia County filed an answer to the Leonard petition in which he denied that he was unable or unwilling to meet the situation outlined in the petition. He also made factual averments in support of his assertion that he had been and was fully capable of performing properly the duties of his office.
On April 27, 1962, when the Leonard petition was argued before Judge Alessandroni, Attorney Fogel, representing the Republican Alliance which had initiated the Leonard petition, stated that Judge Alessandroni would not have jurisdiction over the petition in the event his term in the Court of Quarter Sessions expired before it was acted upon, and he recommended that Judge Alessandroni enter into a concord with other judges to obtain authority to charge any grand jury which might be convened for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Judge Alessandroni stated that that could not be done. The colloquy was as follows: "Mr. Fogel: The point, sir, is that Your Honor may come to a determination in the matter when Your Honor might not then be sitting in the Court of Quarter Sessions, and not being in the Court that has jurisdiction over the Grand Jury, I would like to make sure that there would be no objections interposed if Your Honor should determine that special instructions should be given and that Your Honor have jurisdiction and the power to convene a special Grand Jury so instructed. The Court : Mr. Fogel, I admire you for raising a question of that kind. However, I don't see how that can he waived."
Mr. Fogel commented: "I think it was done before Judge Alexander as to that point." And then Judge Alessandroni, in the following language, definitively took himself out of the possibility of convening a grand jury: "The Court : Even if they agreed maybe on some other constitutional basis — in other words, a Grand Jury summoned by this Court, would have to be summoned within the jurisdiction of my term. I would still have to be a Quarter Sessions Judge. However, my term ends the first Monday in May. I don't think 1 can extend my jurisdiction beyond that "
Judge AlessandronEs term as quarter sessions judge ended, as he himself stated it wonld, on the first Monday of May, and he returned to the court of common pleas. Before quitting the criminal court he had made no definitive decision on the Leonard petition and he did not pass it on to his successor in the miscellaneous branch of the court, as Judge Guerin had bequeathed it to him. Nor did he make any effort to call it to the attention of Judge Doty who was now presiding in Criminal Court No. 1 and who stood ready to charge the grand jury on all matters which required action. The month of May wended its accustomed way through the calendar and then came June which in due time melted into July, but during all this time the Leonard petition was ignored, neglected and unmentioned.
As indicated, Judge Griffiths had charge of the grand jury in April, he was followed by Judge Doty in May. Judge Doty, in turn, was succeeded by Judge L'llman for the month of June and when Judge Ullman had completed his assignment Judge Sporkin assumed command of the grand jury for July. It would have been a simple matter to refer the Leonard petition to any of these judges to determine the question of a grand jury investigation.
From March 22nd to July nothing happened on the Leonard petition, and in the meantime the cobwebs of inaction formed their inevitable film of obliteration over form and substance. Undue passage of time nearly always works adversely in the ascertainment of truth. Where there is any controversy, truth is a ripe fruit which must be timely picked. After maturity passes, disintegration sets in. Memory fades, and what is worse, it often enters into the shadowland of guesswork, loss of focus and even unconscious distortion. In addition, deaths, translocations and other mutations also make holes in the fabric intended to reproduce in testimony what has occurred in fact.
Of course, some delays in law are inevitable but this was not the case here. The record does not offer the slightest explanation as to the reason for the inert lodgment of the Leonard petition from March until July 11, 1962. The only possible explanation for this inertness, consistent with adherence to judicial responsibility, is that the judge was in grave doubt as to whether there should be a grand jury investigation. Finally, on July 11th, under the heading of Quarter Sessions Court, March Session, 1962, Miscellaneous Docket No. 279, Judge Alessandroni ordered what he called a "Special Grand Jury." But even then, another protracted procrastination intervened. The July grand jury, under the presidency of Judge Sporkin, was in session, ready and prepared to take action, but the learned judge of Court of Common Pleas No. 5 ignored the established machinery of the court. He passed over Judge Sporkin. Judge Sporkin, in the grand jury courtroom, was followed by Judge Hagan who was to conduct all grand jury business for the month of August. Judge Alessandroni was indifferent to Judge Hagan and the grand jury over which he presided and which, equally, was standing by for any special instructions throughout that month.
Judge Alessandroni ordered a "Special Grand Jury" to be convened on September 5th which was five months after the Leonard petition had come into his hands. In ordering a special grand jury investigation to begin in September he also declined to recognize Judge Alexander who was presiding in the grand jury courtroom for that entire month.
This is all related not as censure, but to emphasize what can occur when the regular forms and procedure of government are not followed, and judges embark on independent ventures, sailing in ships without sails of authority, using engines devoid of constitutional power and employing a compass lacking decisional direction. All the judges mentioned in this case are jurists of wide experience and of the highest probity. Judge Alessandroni, particularly, who granted the Leonard petition, is a veteran jurist of scholarly attainments whose judicial integrity is not questioned. Orderly procedure in the Courts and the laying down of rules for guidance of future conduct in matters of this kind, however, require the narrative and observations which have been made and which may follow.
The history of what happened to the Leonard petition is needed not only as background in disposing of the issues here on appeal but it serves also as a reminder of the manner in which the business of the Criminal Courts of Philadelphia should not be conducted. Why the Board of Judges of Philadelphia County allowed the inordinate delays recounted, the entangling and thwarting of the schedules they themselves had set up in the criminal courts, we are not informed. But that the inertia, lack of coordination and absence of frank disclosure among judges which have been manifested in this entire proceeding bestows no credit on the whole administration of the criminal courts in Philadelphia is written too plainly on the gray and ancient walls of City Hall.
We now come to the question as to whether the order of July 11, 1962, summoning a grand jury, carried the imprimatur of the court of quarter sessions. Judge Alessandroni was not sitting in that court in July. His term there having expired the first Monday of May, he had returned to his regular post as President Judge of Court of Common Pleas No. 5. In fact, the reverse side of the backing sheet of the order in which he called for a grand jury investigation bears the printed designation: "Court op Common Pleas No. 5 in and por the County op Philadelphia."
The fact that he had shed his robe in criminal court would not of itself disqualify him from acting on criminal subjects. When a common pleas judge completes his term in criminal court it not infrequently happens that he must attend to unfinished matters and these he may and must dispose of even after he has reverted to his common pleas court status. However, the ordering of a grand jury investigation could not possibly qualify under the heading of unfinished business. We have seen that the Leonard petition was not presented to Judge Alessandroni in the first instance, we have observed how on April 27th he stated that he could not summon a grand jury unless he was actually in criminal court, and we have noted that he could have passed the petition on to the judge who succeeded him in criminal court as he had inherited it from his predecessor.
What was being sought in the Leonard petition was not in Judge AlessandronPs competence alone, if, indeed, it was within his competence at all. Since a grand jury investigation could not, as already stated, in any view of the matter, be regarded as unfinished business and since Judge Alessandroni was not sitting in criminal court in July, the order he signed on the eleventh day of that month was of no more binding effect than if he were sitting in Delaware.
A judge must be assigned to the court over which he purports to preside. Judge Alessandroni in effect commandeered the grand jury courtroom when he took possession of the Leonard petition, but he was not assigned to the grand jury room. If he could assume jurisdiction, when not assigned thereto, over grand jury matters, then any judge in the criminal court could take similar jurisdiction. If petitions or other applications for judicial action do not go to the judge designated to handle the subject matter of the petition but may, in billiard-ball fashion, make the rounds of the courts, haphazardly striking and missing jurisdiction until the final destination and disposition becomes a matter of chance, then the mists of potential chaos will hover constantly over the courthouse. The Pennsylvania Constitution specifically aimed at dissipating such mists in the workshop of justice through the operation of Article V, §8, which says that judges shall be detailed "to hold the courts of oyer and terminer and the courts of quarter sessions" "in such manner as may be directed by laxo."
Even if the call of a special grand jury could have been justified in law, it did not follow that Judge Alessandroni was the judge to preside over it. As pointed out by Justice Cohen in his concurring opinion in Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, 373, the authority to charge a grand jury, in a situation like the one at bar, could only come through the approval of the assignment judge and the individual grand jury judges sitting during the months involved. No such approval Avas even remotely suggested in the case before us.
It should be stated here that much of the confusion, complications and complexities in this case did not result from the error of any single judge but was caused by the strange composition of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Instead of one integrated court with a president judge over all, the court is made up of seven separate courts, each comprising three judges with a president judge of its own. Each of these seven courts exercises a certain amount of autonomy which separates it from the other six, as much as if it were in another county. Judges who are not president judges feel a certain inferiority toward all the seven president judges so that the president judges may be led astray simply because of the lack of free and candid discussion which should characterize the entire bench of the county. This is not the place to discuss reorganization of the courts of Philadelphia County, but it is to be hoped that proper constitutional action will be taken to dissolve the seven individual courts of Philadelphia and amalgamate them into one court of common pleas, with one president judge, who will have authority to assign the judges to the various departments of work and to schedule the court's business so as to remove all overlapping or collision of effort and endeavor, creating in the end a homogeneous, close-knit, harmonious-working court.
Had there been one president judge having administrative direction over all judges assignable to the criminal courts of Philadelphia County when the Leonard petition was filed, he would have decided, after consultation, of course, with the whole body of judges, whether he should call upon the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, under the Act of April 9, 1929, P. L. 177 (Administrative Code of 1929, P. L. 177, §907, 71 P.S. §297), which provides, inter alia: "When the president judge, in the district having jurisdiction of any criminal proceedings, before any court of oyer and terminer, general jail delivery, or quarter sessions, in this Commonwealth, shall request the Attorney General to do so, in writing, setting forth that, in his judgment, the case is a proper one for the Commonwealth's intervention, the Attorney General is hereby authorized and empowered to retain and employ a special attorney or attorneys, as he may deem necessary, properly to represent the Commonwealth in such proceedings, and to investigate charges, and prosecute the alleged offenders against the law. Any attorney, so retained and employed, shall supersede the district attorney of the county in which the case or cases may arise, and shall investigate, prepare, and bring to trial the case or cases to which he may be assigned."
The lack of a single coordinating president judge in the Philadelphia district, however, did not suspend the applicability to Philadelphia of the quoted Act. The duty still devolved on Judge Alessandroni to take up Avith the other judges of the court the question as to whether, under the circumstances presented to him, the Attorney General should be requested to supersede the district attorney. Instead of considering this definitive procedure, Judge Alessandroni acted on his own volition and displaced the district attorney. A displacement of this character, even if only partial and temporary, is a serious and solemn matter. The learned judge treated it with a casualness which amounted almost to unconcern. The petitioners had charged the district attorney Avith misconduct and the district attorney had denied such misconduct, declaring under oath that he had "taken legal steps necessary to vigorously investigate the matter and prosecute any proven Avrongdoers." He asserted "that the usual machinery for investigation and prosecution of crimes is operating efficiently and vigorously." If these assertions actually represented fact, there could not be any need for the action ordered by Judge Alessandroni.
On April 26, 1962, the district attorney moved the court of quarter sessions to dismiss the Leonard petition, because the petitioners had "failed to establish that the public interest would suffer from the application and pursuit of the ordinary forms and procedures of law or that there exists in Philadelphia an emergency shaking the social fabric, or causing terror and dismay among the citizens, or the demoralization of public security."
These were assertions of substance made by an officer of the court. Instead of summarily dismissing them, the judge should have opened the door of inquiry, but he did not even raise a window; he made no effort to ascertain bilaterally whether the averments of the district attorney in his answer and motion to dismiss represented fact or not. With a few strokes of the pen he disposed of the whole serious situation by writing: "We accordingly dismiss the answer and motion without further comment." Since his pen had not addressed itself at all to the district attorney's averments, the "further" was superfluous language.
Of course, it is abundantly clear that in refusing to consider the district attorney's answer, the learned judge permitted himself an arbitrary exercise of judicial power. When he treated with aloofness the provisions of the Act of 1929 (supra), he abused his discretion. When he appointed a "Special Prosecutor," he attempted the impossible because he was making an appointment to a phantom office. We will consider later the matter of the "Special Prosecutor," and take up now the main issue in the case, namely, whether the court was warranted in summoning what it called a "Special Grand Jury."
The learned judge in his opinion did not cite one statute, quote one authority, or point to one decision which authorized him to direct the summoning of a special grand jury. A clarification must be made at once as to tbe meaning of a Special Grand Jury as contradistinguished from a Regular Grand Jury, because the terms have confusedly and almost inexcusably been used interchangeably. A Special Grand Jury is one that is chosen specially to investigate specially into certain conditions, and then make recommendations. It has no other purpose than this. A Regular Grand Jury (although it is usually simply called a grand jury) is one which is convened in the normal course of court business to receive complaints and accusations and find bills of indictment where they are satisfied a trial ought to be had. Such a grand jury, of course, is also available for the purpose of conducting investigations under special instructions from the court. In Philadelphia County a regular grand jury is assembled the first Monday of each month throughout the year.
The confusion between a Special Grand Jury and a Regular Grand Jury conducting a special investigation has produced a terminological melange to which, unfortunately, even judges have contributed. Lamentably, even in the State Reports, the phrase "Special Grand Jury" is occasionally used when the writer really has in mind a Regular Grand Jury conducting a special investigation.
There is no provision in the law for a special grand jury in Philadelphia County. The Act of March 13, 1867, P. L. 420, §2 (17 P.S. §472) specifies that there shall be monthly sessions of the Quarter Sessions Court in Philadelphia County. Section 2 reads: "The said courts shall, before the commencement of each term, as hereby established issue a venire, for the summoning of twenty-four residents of said city and county, to serve as grand jurors; and one or more venires for the summoning of petit jurors, shall be issued before or during said term; the number of petit jurors, so to be summoned, and the time they are to serve, to be determined by said court, when said venire or venires shall be ordered."
It will be particularly noted here that while there may be more than one venire of petit jurors summoned in any given month, the summoning of grand jurors is limited, to one venire per month. If the action of the lower court were to be upheld it would mean an invitation to chaos, for, if one judge can issue a special venire, so can every other judge. With eight or nine judges continually sitting in the criminal courts of Philadelphia it would not take much visualization to picture the turmoil and disorder which would engulf the courthouse with a large population of grand jurors investigating every subject which might pique the interest of the individual judges. And if every judge in Philadelphia. County may issue a special venire, what would prevent the individual judges throughout the State from doing likewise? (There are 197 nisi prius judges in Pennsylvania.)
On August 16, 1962, the City Council of Philadelphia, accepting Judge AlessandeonFs orders as binding on it, enacted, and the Mayor approved, an ordinance appropriating f112,000 (with more to be appropriated later) to meet the expenses of the ordered grand jury investigation.
On August 21st Beatrice M. Smith, a taxpayer of Philadelphia, through her attorney Louis Lipschitz, Esq., filed a complaint in equity, in the Court of Common Pleas and of the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County against Francis A. Lalley, Finance Director ; Alexander Hemphill, Controller; and Philip P. Poorman, Treasurer, all of the City of Philadelphia, praying that the court restrain them from expending any moneys appropriated by the City Council as above indicated because, the complaint asserted, the ordering of a special grand jury and the appointment of a special prosecutor was contrary to law.
On August 29th W. Wilson White, the named Special Prosecutor, petitioned this Court to issue a writ of prohibition or mandamus ordering the Court of Common Pleas No. 6, which now had before it for consideration the suit in equity filed by Beatrice M. Smith, to cease consideration of the named suit or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to Judge Alessandroni. Argument on this petition was presented by City Solicitor Berger, Attorney White and Attorney Lipschitz before Justice Jones sitting in night special session in Wilkes-Barre. On August 30th the petition was denied.
On August 30th, Court of Common Pleas No. 6, made up of President Judge Gold and Judges Kelley and Blanc heard argument on Miss Smith's application for an injunction against Philadelphia's enumerated fiscal officers.
On September 5th, Court of Common Pleas No. 6 filed its adjudication in the Smith action stating that orders convening the special grand jury and appointing the Special Prosecutor were contrary to law and therefore null and void. It entered a decree enjoining the defendants from expending any sums in connection with the ordered special grand jury investigation.
The City Solicitor of Philadelphia, David Berger, in order to obtain a definitive decision on the matters in issue, filed in behalf of the City of Philadelphia, an appeal to this Court from the decree entered by the Court of Common Pleas No. 6. The Republican Alliance, represented by Attorney Fogel, and the purported Special Prosecutor, W. Wilson White, and his assistant, F. Hastings Griffin, representing themselves, intervened as party appellants. The Democratic County Executive Committee of Philadelphia, represented by Attorney Herbert S. Levin and Former Justice Thomas D. McBride, petitioned this Court for, and was granted permission to, leave to file briefs and make oral argument, in the appeal.
On September 6th, the District Attorney of Philadelphia, James C. Crumlish, Jr., having for his special counsel, Attorney Edwin P. Rome, filed in this Court a petition praying that we issue a writ directed to Judge Alessandroni to prohibit W. Wilson White from serving as Special Prosecutor pursuant to the order of appointment of July 18th.
The appeal from Court of Common Pleas No. 6 and the argument on the petition for a writ of prohibition were heard on September 12th. The intervening appellants attacked the decision of Court of Common Pleas No. 6 on the ground first of jurisdiction and then on the merits. They argued that Miss Smith's action in the court of common pleas constituted a collateral attack on the decision of a court of equal jurisdiction and therefore could not be sustained.
We do not find that Miss Smith's action lacked legal vitality. Beatrice Smith had a direct, substantial interest in the subject in controversy. The purpose of her lawsuit was to determine whether moneys, part of which came from taxes she had paid, should be used to support an operation which she claimed was, in fact and in law, not legal. There is precedent for a procedure in the court of common pleas to question the legality of an order issuing from the court of quarter •sessions. In Moskowitz's Registration Case, 329 Pa. 183, the Registration Commission of Philadelphia struck off its registry the name of David Moskowitz because of a sentence of disfranchisement imposed on him in the court of quarter sessions. Moskowitz protested in common pleas court this action of the Registration Commission, contending that the sentence of the court of quarter sessions was illegal because it was imposed after the expiration of the term at which he had been convicted. This Court sustained his position, declaring that the controverted sentence was a mere nullity and, therefore, subject to attack in any Court passing upon the rights of Moskowitz involved in the sentence: "Such a judgment is entitled to no authority or respect, and is subject to impeachment in collateral proceedings at' any time by one whose rights it purports to affect. In Camp v. Wood, 10 Watts 118, it was held that a void judgment of a justice of the peace could not be introduced to establish rights in a subsequent proceeding over the same property. And, in Simpson's Estate, 253 Pa. 217, 225, this Court said: ' "When the jurisdiction does not exist, and usurpation takes its-place, then all the acts of the tribunal are void 'and of none effect,' and may be so treated in any collateral proceeding . . . Where there is no.jurisdiction there is no aúthority to pronounce judgment, and consequently a judgment so entered is so but in.form and similitude, and has ho substance, force, or authority'"...
It has been argued that the action of the Court of Common Pleas No. 6 was ineffective, lacking indispensable parties. The record would not substantiate this argument. It will be noted, however, and particularly, that regardless of the action of the court of common pleas, this Court, under its King's Bench powers, possesses the power to pass upon all orders issuing from any court in the Commonwealth. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Commonwealth v. Onda, 376 Pa. 405, declared: "More than two centuries ago section XIII of the Act creating the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth (Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L. 131) provided that the court should 'minister justice to all persons, and exercise the jurisdictions and powers hereby granted concerning all and singular the premises according to law, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as the Justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, may or can do.' Thus the power of superintendency over inferior tribunals became vested in this court from the very time of its creation." Sir William Blacks tone explained that the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench "keeps all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority." (Book 3, ch. 4)
It has also been argued that since there was never a direct appeal from Judge Alessandroni's order of July 11th that that order is legal and is not the subject of attack. This is an incorrect appraisal of the law. An order which is illegal in its inception does not gain legality or validity because it is not appealed from. This Court has the power to strike down any illegal act of a lower Court regardless of antecedents. Justice Brown, speaking for a unanimous Court, quoted with approval in Schmuck v. Hartman, 222 Pa. 190, 194, from Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520: "The judicial authority of this court extends to the review and corree tion of all proceedings of all inferior courts, except where such review is expressly excluded by statute, in accordance with the constitution; and we may issue all sorts of process, and use and adopt all sorts of legal forms that are necessary to give effect to this supervisory authority."
But the intervening appellants say that Judge Alessandroni did have the jurisdiction and the authority to order a special grand jury and appoint a special prosecutor. The oral and written arguments submitted in behalf of this thesis, however, lack conviction or even persuasion. They speak vaguely of inherent authority, common law jurisdiction and traditional powers. One sentence in the brief of Attorneys F. Hastings Griffin and W. Wilson White illustrates the nebulosity of the contention, namely, "He [Judge Alessandroni] convened a special grand jury, not a law enforcement agency but an investigating agency, not part and parcel of the usual law enforcement procedures assigned by statute to the Attorney General and the District Attorney but a highly unusual judicial procedure bottomed on the inherent power of a court to intercede in a highly specialized situation." (Emphasis in original).
This is an argument which sails a sea glittering with generalities, from which there emerges not one solid rock of jurisprudence on which one can stand and assert a tangible rule, or palpable principle, recognizable in law.
It is a mistake to assume that judges have unlimited power to "intercede in a highly specialized situation." A judge's function is to adjudicate and not to intercede, his duty is to pass upon questions presented to him in accordance with established procedure and not, of his own volition and initiative, to issue orders, edicts and decrees "bottomed" on his own personal estimate of a "highly specialized situation". The juridically im mortal Chief Justice Marshall spoke pointedly on this subject when he said: "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." (Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton 738, 866, 6 L. Ed. 204.)
The contention of the intervening appellants splinters against the stone wall of these wise and authoritative words uttered by the greatest exponent of law in the history of our country. Our own Court, speaking through the scholarly Justice Mitchell, said in the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 185 Pa. 553: "No man, even for the accomplishment of a great good, can be permitted to set himself above the law, and least of all the judge appointed to administer it."
It is argued that the workload of a regular grand jury would not permit it to undertake an investigation, but in Philadelphia County it has always been the regular grand jury which conducted investigations. Moreover, under the Pennsylvania statute of March 18, 1875, provision is made for anticipating the call of a regular grand jury and of protracting its duration in order to dispose of any unusual workload. Section 2 provides that a grand jury may be summoned "to meet at such time prior to the holding of said terms as the judges of the said courts shall deem expedient; and if in the opinion of the said judges the business of the said courts at any time shall require it, the grand jury may be detained for an additional weék without the issuing of a new venire." The amendatory Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 420, allows the court to hold over the grand jury summoned for any term during the interim until the grand jury of the next succeeding term is as: sembled, with power to dispose of any business properly laid before a grand jury at a regular term.
If a regular grand jury conducting an investigation has not completed its work before the next grand jury is convened, it may be held over for a reasonable period of time to terminate its labors. (Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382.)
The glaring infirmity in this entire proceeding was the failure of the Criminal Courts of Philadelphia County to utilize the machinery already in existence. The order of July 11th not only ignored the time-honored, well-functioning constitutional institutions in the judicial department of government but set up an establishment which would compete with, interfere with, and eventually probably clash with the orderly administration of the law in Philadelphia County.
The order of July 11th directed an investigation which was unlimited in scope, timeless in duration, and responsible to but one person. Unlimited power of that character is incongruous anywhere in America, bnt particularly in Philadelphia, the birthplace of the American Republic. The order of July 11th directed the Special Grand Jury "to investigate and inquire into all matters set forth in the said petition a,nd any other matters which may properly come before it, including the investigation of any other unlawful conduct on the part of any public official or person within our jurisdiction "
This would mean that every person in the County of Philadelphia would be subject to the inquisitorial powers of this body; it would mean that every act in the whole catalogue of "unlawful conduct" ranging through the most trivial infractions of traffic regulations, assault and battery, larceny, misdemeanors of all types, and felonies up to and including murder, could be investigated ; it would mean that preliminary proceedings in Magistrates' courts could be suspended while preliminary investigations were being made by the special grand jury. And then, not only did the order of July 11th make the whole world of crime, suspected crime, and suspicious circumstances the subject of investigation, it placed no limit on the period of time that this boundless probing, questing, hunting and investigating could go on. In the absence of threatened national disaster no such perpetuity or infinite powers are lodged in any branch of representative government. Justice, later Chief Justice, Stern, trenchantly warned in the case of Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 388: "A tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury is repugnant to our scheme of government and subversive of individual rights."
In addition, there could be no assurance that, even with the best of intentions, the investigation authorized by the order of July 11th would not cross the boundaries of democratic limitations and become an engine of oppression, especially in view of the fact that the limits of the investigation were not marked by wall, fence, hedge or even a painted line. The history of the rigors of overzestful inquisitors, the excesses of inquests having no limit in time and scope, the injustices which can result from searches that are not confined to a particular subject, is etched too deeply into the conscience of the American people for a free country to allow a resumption of a practice so fraught with tyrannical threat, and emancipation from which a bloody war was fought to attain. The fact that no such usurpation of the rights of the people was intended does not guarantee that abuses could not result. Good intentions in releasing a juggernaut will not heal the wounds of those crushed beneath its remorseless wheels.
The ever-building omnibus character of the scope of the Special Grand Jury investigation was made particularly manifest by the fact that on August 10th, Francis R. Smith, Treasurer of the Democratic County Executive Committee, filed a petition requesting that Judge Alessandkoni include in his charge to the Special Grand Jury the direction that it "investigate and inquire into the matter of unlawful and unreported contributions and expenditures by the Republican Alliance during the 1961 election."
On August 20th Judge Alessandkoni granted this petition stating "that the public interest requires the inclusion of this subject matter within the scope of the investigation and added that the investigation would not be limited to the activities of any one political party or committee, but will be applicable to the activities of all political parties or committees of political parties or other persons within the jurisdiction of the Court"
The original purpose of the investigation was to inquire into charges of municipal illegalities. By now specifically including the "activities" of any "political party or committee," and all persons "within the jurisdiction of the Court" (meaning, of course, every sec tion, district, and far-flung area of the whole City and County of Philadelphia), the investigation could search into almost any type of activity of any individual. Such universality of probing, such unrestrained delving into the affairs of the whole community and unlimited questioning into the private business and matters of the people would be a direct menace to the peace, security, and tranquillity of every family in Philadelphia and could set aside regular constitutional government. Such absolute authority is alien to the free institutions of this country, and this Court will not permit it to take hold.
Sir William Blaekstone, the imperishably great expounder of the Common Law, said in his Commentaries, which are accepted by every American lawyer as the basis of all ordered law in English-speaking countries, that: "the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of every individual's private rights." (1 Bl. Comm. 139)
An illustration of how one abuse of power may lead to another is to be observed in the 33rd Finding of Fact by Court of Common Pleas No. 6, which stated that the City Council of Philadelphia appropriated $112,000 for the Special Grand Jury investigation, "at the special instance and request of Judge Alessandroni."
Here we do not have a request from the Board of Judges; we do not find a requisition submitted in the name of a general judicial authority; what is revealed here is an importunity on the legislative branch of the government by a single member of the judicial branch. Judge Alessandroni personally appeared before the Finance Committee of the City Council in behalf of the appropriation. That he unquestionably made the request in a most courteous manner and that Council acceded to his request graciously does not detract from the peril of the encroachment of one government department on the authority of another.
Once regular procedure is ignored, irregularities follow quickly and without trammel. On July 18th Judge Alessandroni issued the following order: "pursuant to the order of the court dated the 11th day of July, 1962, W. Wilson White, Esquire, is hereby appointed Special Prosecutor in connection with the Special Grand Jury to be convened as set forth in said order. He is accordingly authorized and directed to perform all of the duties lawfully incumbent upon him as Special Prosecutor and to investigate and inquire into all matters that may properly come before the said Special Grand Jury, including the investigation of any unlawful conduct on the part of any public official or person within our jurisdiction and to aid the Special Grand Jury in the making of proper presentment or presentments to the court as the ends of justice may require."
As already stated, there is no public office in Pennsylvania known as Special Prosecutor. In his Concurring Opinion in Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, Justice Cohen listed 21 reported cases involving grand jury investigations, either requested or accomplished. In not one of them was there an official of any kind with duties even distantly approximating those assigned to W. Wilson White by Judge Alessandroni.
Not only does the office of Special Prosecutor not exist in Pennsylvania but there is no person in Pennsylvania on whom Judge Alessandroni, or even the Pennsylvania Legislature, could bestow the unconstitutional powers and the concomitant unconstitutional immunities implicit in the learned judge's order. Under the provisions of that order, W. Wilson White would be empowered to investigate the "unlawful conduct" of any person within the vast geographical domains of metropolitan Philadelphia.
Whether conduct is or is not unlawful can only be determined through judicial process, but by means of this amazing document, which is without precedent or parallel in the history of Pennsylvania's courts, W. Wilson White could investigate, quiz, harass, harry, annoy, badger, command and worry any number of two million inhabitants on any subject which, according to his own unrestricted judgment, came within the purview of "unlawful conduct."
And in the exercise of this incredible authority Mr. White would not be answerable to anyone for misbehavior or usurpations. Not holding a constitutional office he would not be subject to impeachment; being clothed with judicial sanction he would be immune from criminal prosecution; engaged in governmental business he could not be sued civilly. No person in the United States may constitutionally wear such impenetrable armor against responsibility for possible illegal performance. The clanking of such armor would be an incongruous sound anywhere, but particularly so in Philadelphia which heard the music of the Liberty Bell proclaiming "Liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." One of the reasons why Americans rebelled against the tyrannical King George III was described by Thomas Jefferson: "He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their substance."
The order of July 11th and those which followed created new offices having no responsibility to anyone except their appointer. On July 25th Judge AlessanI'RONi appointed F. Hastings Griffin, who is not even a resident of Philadelphia, as assistant to the Special Prosecutor. Of course, in point of law, his office could have no authority whatever since there can be no assistant to a myth.
On August 15th Judge Alessandroni ordered that space be obtained beyond the courthouse, specifically in the Widener Building, for the quartering of the Special Grand Jury. The order specifically stated that access to the Grand Jury Boom was to be "by means of room known as No. 630." Room 630 happens to be the very office of F. Hastings Griffin, the assistant Special Prosecutor. It is almost shocking to contemplate that a prosecutor who, after all, is an advocate, should be allowed to have intimate contact with the members of the tribunal who are to pass on matters he brings before that tribunal — a tribunal which is the safeguard of the liberties of the citizens of Philadelphia. This is but another illustration of the danger of turning strictly governmental responsibility over to private individuals who bring to the job the atmosphere of a personal, partisan pursuit rather than investing it with all the dignity and solemnity of unyielding neutrality.
Almost with the appurtenances and appearance of an occupying expeditionary force, W. Wilson White, at a salary of $20,000 a year and F. Hastings Griffin, at a salary of $17,500 a year, moved into the Widener Building with staff made up of attorneys, investigators, detectives, stenographers and clerks, together with desks, filing cabinets and other furniture. All this in spite of the fact that there already exist a grand jury, district attorney, detectives, clerks, stenographers, and quarters to house them, together with all appropriate equipment and furniture to accomplish the work involved in an orderly constitutional grand jury investi gation. Nowhere in the opinion of the lower court or in the orders issued by it is there any explanation as to the reason for this costly duplication of effort, a very costly enterprise indeed. City Solicitor David Berger, in his argument in Court of Common Pleas No. 6, said: "We need not be naive about this, and I think as judges and lawyers, we need not be blind to facts we know as men; the $112,000 is a drop in the bucket and it is only the first installment on this million dollar bill." The Court very aptly said that the Smith suit was "in the taxpayers' interest."
The order of July 18th not only constitutes an invasion of constitutional liberties as pointed out, but it would perpetrate another unconstitutional mischief. It would disfranchise the people of Philadelphia in the realm of their freedom to select a district attorney of their own choice. James C. Crumlish, Jr., was elected in accordance with the Constitution and the election laws of Pennsylvania. The learned judge who signed the order of July 18th summarily dismissed the District Attorney from all phases of the contemplated grand jury investigation. One of the duties of the District Attorney is to "attend upon a grand jury, lay before them all matters upon which they are to pass, aid them in the examination of witnesses and give general instructions as may be required." (Com. v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 113.)
The learned judge forbade him to do this. An appellate court should not have to spend time expatiating on the patent illegality of such an interdiction. The District Attorney may not be removed from his office except by impeachment. No judge may dictatorially order him to refrain from doing his work.
As stated earlier in this opinion, the learned Judge refused to consider the District Attorney's reply to the charges made against him in the Leonard petition. This refusal spells denial of due process and is there fore condemned completely. The whole evil in this entire proceeding is no more tellingly illustrated than by this arbitrary dismissal of a district attorney who has been elected by the people and putting in his place a person whose qualifications have not been passed upon by the people, to discharge serious and solemn duties which involve the liberties and securities of the people. The learned judge cited no authority for his unprecedented action. Nothing can more speedily demolish the rights of a citizen than to deny him defense against accusation; nothing could bring law into contempt more quickly than the announcement by word or example that there can be no opportunity to bring forth evidence of innocence against charges of misdeeds.
The purported Special Prosecutor and his assistant attempt to supply the deficiency in the judge's pronouncement by arguing, as they did in connection with the ordering of a Special Grand Jury, that the courts have "inherent power to make such appointments." In support of this assertion they cite Com. v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107. The facts in that case are wholly different from the ones at Bar. There, the District Attorney, who was conducting a grand jury investigation and who was not disturbed in the exercise of his constitutional power, petitioned the court for the appointment of several additional assistant district attorneys because of the unusual amount of labor involved in making his investigation and preparing for the submission of matters to the grand jury. Upon this presentation by the District Attorney, the President Judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County authorized the appointment of the assistants prayed for. In the case at bar the District Attorney, did not ask for any assistant district attorneys and he certainly did not ask to have himself displaced. The Brownmiller case established, as indicated, that a judge may authorize appointments upon suitable representa tion by the District Attorney, but the judge may not of his own volition order appointment of prosecuting personnel, nor may he order the District Attorney to appoint any particular person or persons. The judge must always remain the arbiter and not the prosecutor, he must decide and not advocate, he must adjudicate and not champion either side. The accused has as much right to ask the judge for a shield as the prosecution has the right to ask for a sword.
The facts in the case of Com. ex rel. Shumaker v. N. Y. and Pa. Co., 378 Pa. 359, also cited by Mr. White and Mr. Griffin, do not even in candlelight resemble the circumstances in the instant case. In the Shumaker case the District Attorneys of Butler and Clarion Counties ordered several attorneys to "prosecute, negotiate, settle and superintend" a suit in equity to restrain as a public nuisance the alleged pollution of a river. This Court held that such delegation of power was illegal.
From the Brownmiller case the respondent-prosecutors quote the sentence: "[Courts] may do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction." They urge this quotation in support of both the ordering of the special grand jury and the appointment of the prosecutors, but it must be noted that the sentence in question contains the very vital limitation "within the scope of their jurisdiction." The judicial actions of Judge Alessandroni went beyond the scope of his jurisdiction, as already demonstrated.
No Court may remove a district attorney of its own volition, nor may it, by appointing someone else to act in his place, accomplish the same result of removal. We said in Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 288, that: "Where the Constitution or statute points out a method for the removal of a public officer, that is exclusive of other methods."
The respondent-prosecutors then argue that they are de facto officers and that their right to hold their respective offices can be attacked only in a quo warranto proceeding, but here again they deal in suggestions and shadows without bringing the issue into authoritative relief. They say: "There is no doubt that the special prosecutor, appointed by court order on July 18, 1962, as well as the assistant prosecutor, appointed July 25, 1962, are discharging their duties on behalf of the public under appointments giving them color of title. As such, they are de facto officers whose authority can be attacked only in a direct proceeding for that purpose."
This statement is mere ipse dixit. Mr. White and Mr. Griffin cannot be de facto officers when they hold forth in a post which does not exist, and they challenge a constitutional official who is in possession of his office by election, and currently exercising the rights, privileges and prerogatives of that office. James O. Crumlish, Jr., is the District Attorney de jure of Philadelphia County. (People v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472).
The appointment of W. Wilson White to take the place of the District Attorney James C. Crumlish was additionally illegal because Paul M. Chalfin, Esq., was First Assistant District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, and, in accordance with the Act of June 3, 1919, P. L. 370, §2 (16 P.S. §7723), was empowered to act as District Attorney in the event, for any reason, the District Attorney was unable to act.
If Judge Alessandroni or any judge can displace a duly elected district attorney by fiat (because the order of July 18th cannot be regarded otherwise), he can find some reason or lack of reason to displace the elected Clerk of Courts; if he can displace the Clerk of Courts he can go on to displace the elected Prothonotary and then the elected Sheriff, so that in time the courthouse would be under one-judge rule.
It is asserted by the respondent-prosecutors that the District Attorney acquiesced in the appointment of a Special Prosecutor. The District Attorney explains that it was his understanding that the person to be appointed would be some one legally qualified, that is, one taken from the District Attorney's office. However, regardless of that modification, the District Attorney could not agree constitutionally to divest himself of any duty attendant upon his office as an elected district attorney. (Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. N. Y. & Pa. Co., 378 Pa. 359).
The order of July 18th, aside from its illegality, was a blow at self-government and an infringement of the rights of the people. No amount of good intention on the part of the judges who signed the order, no amount of good will or even assumption of doing one's duty, can justify so autocratic, unwarranted, and illegal a procedure. Americans do not take kindly to despotism whether it wear the cloak of officialdom or thunders at the door at night.
In supporting the orders of July 18th and July 25th appointing them respectively, as Special Prosecutor and Assistant Special Prosecutor, Mr. White and Mr. Griffin assert: "Just as the power to convene a special grand jury is an inherent, constitutional, judicial power, so the power to implement and supplement by the appointment of special assistants to the court is inherent as part of the judicial function."
Here they attempt to uphold two fallacious theses by thrusting one under the other. But a scaffolding that is too weak to uphold itself cannot sustain anything else. The power to convene a special grand jury is not an inherent judicial power and therefore cannot support the appointment of special prosecutors as part of the judicial function.
In his brief Mr. White argues that he is "an arm of the court enabling the court better to perform the court's undertaking to see that a special grand jury investigation is conducted." (Emphasis in original.)
A Court has no arm beyond its own judicial anatomy; it cannot delegate judicial power.
The respondent-prosecutors reveal a serious misapprehension of judicial duties, power and authority. They speak of the grand jury investigation they proposed to carry out as if it were a personal project of Judge Alessandroni's. They say: "Just because other courts saw fit in the exercise of their judicial discretion to have the usual law enforcement officials participate in the court's investigation does not mean that Judge Alessandroni had to do it that way." (Emphasis in original).
But Judge Alessandroni must follow, as of course he unquestionably desires to do, the procedures authorized and directed by established law. John Adams, one of the immortal builders of our Republic, declared that our government is one "of laws, and not of men."
As a matter of fact, even if the special grand jury investigation were legal, it was not legally established that Judge Alessandroni was the judge to preside over it. It is an astonishing phenomenon that in all the orders, opinions and memoranda filed in this case there is not one statement authorizing Judge Alessandroni's presidency over the assumed investigation. Not only is there no authorization from the Board of Judges, not only is there no schedule which even suggests he should conduct a grand jury investigation, but there is not the slightest intimation from any one of the other twenty judges potentially available for presiding that Judge Alessandroni was the one to preside. Through a series of chance and forced events wholly unrelated to order, system, control and official responsibility, it has been assumed that because, through an enigmatic misdirection, the Leonard petition came into Judge Alessandroni's hands, he and he alone possessed the power to call a grand jury investigation, appoint the attorneys to run it, arrange for financing it, and dictate its scope and duration. Such judicial usurpation by suggestion, atmosphere and circumstance is not consistent with orderly judicial process and must be condemned. A judge is not permitted to exercise any type of jurisdiction or control which his personal inclinations dictate or his imagination may encompass.
Pursuing their erroneous concept of judicial power, the respondent-prosecutors say: "It is perfectly clear that to achieve the ends of justice in certain cases the existence of the inherent power in the courts to appoint assistants is fundamental. Where the circumstances are such that the judge convening the special grand jury is not satisfied to call upon the District Attorney or Attorney General the power must lie in the court to conduct its own business in its own way."
They say further that Judge Alkssandroni had the right "to approve professional help of his own choosing," that he has the right to "pursue justice as he sees it," and that, with regard to the Special Grand Jury, he has "the right to conduct it his way." The powers which the respondent-prosecutors would confer upon a judge are the powers of absolutism, the powers of a Star Chamber Judge, the powers of a Lord George Jeffreys.
Nothing could be more destructive of judicial responsibility, nothing could more quickly destroy faith in the courts, nothing could more easily weaken the very foundations of democratic government than for a judge to have the autocratic, unlimited power, when he is "not satisfied" with constitutional officers, to dismiss them at his own pleasure and to conduct the business of the court in his "own way." While, of course, a judge operates within an extensive latitude of discretion when it comes to rendering decisions, he is still bound by the Constitution and the laws of the land as much as the lawyer, the litigant and the tipstaff.
The respondent-prosecutors cite the case of Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 178 Pa. 409, as a precedent for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor. There is not the slightest similarity between the facts in that case and those before us. There the district attorney called two members of the bar to assist him in the trial of a murder case because he had just recently come into office and, in addition, he was to be a witness. Moreover, the trial occurred in 1896, long before the Super-session Act.
The respondent-prosecutors argue further that "Judicial functions must be carried on independently and without interference from either the legislative or the executive branch of government." Obeying the laws enacted by the representatives of the people can in no manner of meaning be interpreted as interference by the Legislature.
Once the Gargantuan wheel of unconstitutional appointment started down the hill of unrestrained authority, it was inevitable that it would collide with other authorities and further confusion would be added to the already mixed-up situation which began when the Leonard petition was unaccountably not filed with the judge in charge of the Grand Jury for the month of March.
After Mr. White and Mr. Griffin began to operate under the orders discussed, the City Council took up for consideration the question as to whether P. Hastings Griffin, Jr., who was to be paid $17,500 per year out of the funds appropriated by City Council for the grand jury investigation, possessed the detachment and the impartiality required to conduct an impartial investigation. As a result of this consideration, City Council on August 23rd enacted a resolution appointing a committee of five councilmen to conduct an inquiry and to hold hearings "concerning charges against F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., Esq., made by Councilman William A. Dwyer, Jr., of the Sixth Councilmanic District."
On the following day Mr. Griffin retained Attorney Robert M. Landis to represent him in the councilmanic proceedings.
With the written approval of City Solicitor David Berger, Council appointed Abraham E. Freedman, Esq., as special counsel to conduct the councilmanic inquiry. The first public hearing was scheduled for August 29th.
On August 27th the City Council issued a subpoena, over the signature of Paul D'Ortona, President Pro Tempore of the City Council, commanding Mr. Griffin to appear at the August 29th hearing. According to a sworn statement made by City Solicitor Berger, Mr. Griffin, on learning of the subpoena, publicly declared that he was willing to appear as a witness at the inquiry and that he looked forward to the opportunity of cross-examining witnesses, including but not limited to Councilmen Paul D'Ortona and William Dwyer, "whom he publicly stated he would 'tear into shreds.' "
As Attorney for Mr. Griffin, Mr. Landis on August 27th wrote Council President Pro Tempore D'Ortona asking to be informed regarding the purposes of the councilmanic inquiry. On that same day, without informing City Solicitor David Berger of his intention to do so, Mr. Landis called on Judge Alkssadroni and informed him that he (Mr. Landis) had advised Mr. Griffin not to appear before Council.
On August 28th Mr. Berger replied to Landis's inquiry regarding the purposes of the hearing scheduled for the next day, stating, inter alia: "The purpose of the councilmanic inquiry is to determine whether or not the monies appropriated by City Council toward the cost of conducting a Special Grand Jury Investigation ordered by Judge Alessandroni are being properly expended. This investigation takes on added significance due to the obvious fact that the $112,000 ap propriated may only defray part of the expenses of the Special Grand Jury Investigation. A request for additional appropriations will then have to be made to City Council.
"The expenditure of these public monies is justifiable and appropriate only if they are used to conduct a proper investigation, i.e., one free from political or other bias and one which will be impartial, calm and based on a dispassionate study of the facts and law.
"Since the councilmanic appropriation, public statements have been made which the Council believes indicate grave doubt as to whether F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., Esquire is qualified to conduct a proper investigation free from political or other bias and one which will be impartial, calm and based on a dispassionate study of the facts and law."
Between 8:30 and 9 o'clock of that same evening, again without informing the City Solicitor that he intended to do so, Mr. Landis called on Judge Alessandroni and presented a petition in the name of F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., Esquire and W. Wilson White, Esquire, for a rule upon Council President Pro Tempore D'Ortona and the other members of the named Councilmanic Committee, plus the City Solicitor and the special counsel Abraham E. Freedman, to show cause why the Griffin subpoena should not be quashed and the Committee restrained from conducting the investigation into Mr. Griffin's fitness as an investigator and assistant Special Prosecutor in the Special Grand Jury Investigation. That same evening Judge Alessandroni signed an order making the rule returnable on August 31st, but in the meantime restraining the respondents from conducting the hearing.
The restraining order was not served on the named councilmen, the City Solicitor and Special Counsel Freedman until the next morning a few minutes before the councilmanic hearing was to begin. On August 31st argument was heard before Judge Alessandroni, together with Judges Weinrott and Reimel, on the rule. Judge Alessandroni refused to lift the restraining order, and Council President Pro Tempore D'Ortona with the others listed as respondents, appealed to this Court.
The appellant Councilmen and Special Counsel Freedman in this particular appeal contend that the restraining order signed by Judge Alessandroni was null and void because (1) the court, sitting as a court of quarter sessions, was without jurisdiction to issue an order which was in the nature of an injunction and therefore strictly within the jurisdiction of equity alone; (2) that the order issued without bond being filed and (3) that, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it constituted an unconstitutional interference with the legislative department of government.
The appellees contend, on the other hand, that the action of City Council in ordering the Griffin inquiry was (1) an attempted invasion of judicial powers; (2) an unlawful interference with the Special Grand Jury investigation; (3) and an invalid extension of the Council's powers under the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.
A discussion of this feature of the four cases on appeal warrants emphasizing once again that if the original Leonard petition had been properly handled at the beginning, all these subsequent proceedings would not have been necessary and they could not have blundered into the many labyrinthian passages here recounted (plus others not mentioned) resulting in a multiplicity of actions, hearings, arguments and extraordinary legal-procedural entanglements in what had been from the inception a simple, uncomplicated matter. But since the Gordian knot is here, the appellate blade must function.
To begin with, there can be no question that a legislative body has the right to conduct any investigation which will disclose data, facts and other information needed to guide proper and enlightened consideration of a legislative project. As late as 1960, this Court said in McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 320: "The right to investigate in order to acquire factual knowledge concerning particular subjects which will, or may, aid the legislators in their efforts to determine if, or in what manner, they should exercise their powers, is an inherent right of a legislative body, ancillary to, but distinct from, such powers."
Nor can there be any question that City Council is authorized by Section 2-400 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter to conduct investigations: "The Council shall have power by resolution to authorize inquiries and investigations to be conducted by the entire body or by any of its committees in aid of its legislative powers and functions."
The appellees argue that since Mr. Griffin was selected by the Court to investigate matters which involved City Council itself, it was improper for City Council to investigate the investigator. That he was chosen by Judge Alessandroni an assistant to the purported Special Prosecutor, was, insofar as this litigation is concerned, a coincidence; and that he was eventually to inquire into the affairs of City Council was a fortuitous sequel to that coincidence. The essential ingredient in this procedural potpourri is that Mr. Griffin was being paid by City Council to do a job. Was he qualified to do that job? Whether his job was that of investigator, lawyer, architect or carpenter was immaterial, the City Council owed it to the citizenry of Philadelphia to ascertain whether it was properly withdrawing funds from the public purse. Certainly, to use an extreme illustration, if the person who was the subject of investigation, could not speak English, no one could question the right of Council to inquire as to whether $17,500 of the taxpayers' funds should be turned over to one so obviously disqualified for the job in question. Deficiency in language is no more an impediment in conducting an impartial and proper investigation than deficiency in a respect for impartiality.
It was charged that Mr. Griffin had represented certain clients whose interests could be affected by the investigation and that he was a member of a law firm in such a manner as to present a conflict of interests. Under these circumstances Council would have been remiss in not making appropriate inquiry regarding Mr. Griffin's qualifications for the serious employment he was to undertake. The $112,000 appropriated by Council for the grand jury investigation was admitted by all to be only the first installment in what was to become a very expensive undertaking. Assuming arguendo that Council had lost its chance to inquire into Griffin's qualifications so far as the first $112,000 was concerned since the appropriation was now a fait accompli, it cannot possibly be questioned that it would have the right to determine if Griffin should receive any part of the additional stream of money which was to pour from the City treasury. To deny to any tax-making body the right to inquire as to how tax monies are to be spent is to embark on a sea of financial anarchy.
The Supreme Court of the United States said in the case of East St. Louis v. United States, 110 U. S. 321, 324, that "the question what expenditures are proper and necessary for the municipal administration, is not judicial; it is confided by law to the discretion of the municipal authorities. No court has the right to control that discretion, much less to usurp and supersede it."
Judge Alessandroni's action, therefore, aimed at quashing the Griffin subpoena and restraining the City Council was not only untimely but constituted an unwarranted interference with the orderly functioning of the legislative branch of the City government. The intervention on August 31st of the three-judge court, made up of Judges Alessandroni, Weinrott and Reimel was even more unwarranted and unauthorized in law. This anomalous proceeding emphasizes the loose, uncoordinating, acephalous administration of the Criminal Courts of Philadelphia County insofar as it has been placed in disconcerting relief in this case. Not one of the three enumerated judges was on assignment in criminal court. Yet they sat as a purported court en banc in quarter sessions, they heard arguments, deliberated and finally, under the heading of the court of quarter sessions, put into effect what amounted to a decree in equity. If, for no other purpose than to recount this judicial jumble, so that steps may be taken to avoid similar conduct in the future, it has been necessary to discuss this feature of the case, even though in the eventual decision on the Special Grand Jury, the issue over the subpoena and restraining order is really moot.
The appellees deprecate and degrade the City Council as a legislative body, stating that it "cannot pretend to exercise constitutional legislative powers. It operates as an arm of local municipal self-government, only by sufference of the legislature of the State, only on hand-me-down powers doled out to it by the legislature through the First Class City Home Rule Act."
This derogatory language finds no confirmation in decisions of this Court on the authority, the dignity and the powers of Philadelphia's home rule government. The government of Philadelphia is one established by the sovereign power of the people through a constitutional plebiscite ordered, supervised and di rected by the General Assembly representing all the people of Pennsylvania. In the Addison Case, 385 Pa. 48, 57, this Court said: "That the Charter constituted legislation no less than does a statute of the legislature to like end is too plain for even cavil. Whether a municipal charter comes into being by direct statutory grant of the legislature or by adoption by the constituent electorate in the exercise of power constitutionally reposed, it is as much legislative in the one instance as in the other and has equal legal force and standing in both. Indeed, a constitutionally permissible adoption of a municipal charter by the electorate is not one whit less in dignity than a statute of the legislature granting a charter . . . Specifically, therefore, Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter constitutes legislation (i.e., the adoption or enactment of a law by a competent body), just as much as did the City's Charter of 1919 which the legislature itself enacted. Wherefore, upon its due adoption, Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter tooh on the force and status of a legislative enactment."
The appellees point out that city governments are creatures of the Legislature, and that "they have only such powers and authority in the exercise of local self-government as may be delegated to them by the legislature, within the restrictions, limitations and regulations imposed by the legislature itself."
This is true but it does not follow that where the legislature does give city governments complete power to exercise self-government, that that power to operate is to be regarded as of an inferior character and that it can be ignored and even trampled upon with impunity by the judicial branch or any other branch of government. City Council is made up of persons who have been chosen through the democratic processes of popular election, and, as representatives of the people they are entitled to the respect and consideration their offices demand.
There has been a noticeable and regrettable tendency in oral argument and written brief in this case to treat slightingly and even with some disdain the officials who hold office by election and who have figured in this case in one way or another. It is even suggested that simply because they are the choice of the people that in some manner this fact impairs their usefulness as responsible agents of government. Of course, it does not need to be said that a person who presents himself as a candidate for any office and is placed in office by the majority of the people is presumed to have the qualifications for that particular office and to possess the moral fortitude to discharge the duties of that office in accordance with the oath he takes to accomplish those duties and to act conscientiously and in strict accordance with the law. If an official fails to meet the high requirements of his office, the people have the opportunity to register their disapproval at the polls, but until there has been misconduct which calls for removal through regular procedures definitively established and admitting of no deviation, an official is entitled to the respect and the cooperation of all other law-abiding persons.
Thus, the statement in appellees' brief that the City Council "stands on a lower level of governmental power from the constitutional power exercised by the court below" is not correct. When persons or bodies in government exercise the power granted to them constitutionally and in accordance with the law of the land they do not stand beneath any other person or body. Their acts may be reviewed but, in dignity and within the limits of their jurisdiction, a justice of the peace is entitled to as much respect as a Justice of the Supreme Court and a city councilman as much as a senator.
The appellees say in their brief that "no subordinate municipal legislative subcommittee can thus encroach upon the constitutional powers of the judiciary." It is no more encroachment upon the constitutional powers of the judiciary for the legislature of the city to determine whether an employee they must pay is qualified to perform his duties than for Council, as it does regularly, pass upon the payment of salaries for judges' law clerks and stenographers. If Council decides to pay less or more salary for a judge's law clerk, it is not constituting itself a "kangaroo court", as the appellees have improperly characterized City Council for determining what amount, if any at all, it should pay Griffin.
The brief of the appellees charges City Council with " 'an arrogant invasion of judicial power' and 'a deliberate desecration of the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers by this subordinate municipal CoTincil committee.' "
The record is bare of any evidence to warrant so extreme a statement.
We have discussed at some length the question presented in this feature of the appeal because of the important issue of governmental powers, but we do not in the end resolve that either side is free of error. The restraining order was illegal and of no effect because of the constitution of the Court, its lack of jurisdiction and for the other reasons we have enumerated; the City Council could not have proceeded with its announced investigation because the resolution under which it was operating failed to announce any legislative purpose. Mr. Berger's letter to Mr. Landis supplied that purpose but it was not made a part of the resolution.
During the argument before this Court, the City Solicitor of Philadelphia asked the Court for directions on the subject of grand jury investigations. The matter of grand jury investigations is decided factually at the level of ascertainable facts, to the end that any necessary corrective action, in keeping with the requirements of law and justice, may be taken.
Perhaps the most recent and succinctly worded exposition on grand jury investigations in Pennsylvania was made by Chief Justice Kephart in McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, which can profitably be consulted at all times by judges, district attorneys and public officials, as well as all those who wish to see crime detected, fault remedied, law violators suppressed, and the innocent saved from unjust accusation and unfair censure.
Prom the foregoing, this Court concludes and orders:
1. The decree of the Court of Common Pleas No. 6, here appealed from, is affirmed, with the exception of its finding that Judge Alessandroni was acting within his jurisdiction when he signed the Order of July 11, 1962, which finding is negatived.
2. The order signed by President Judge Alessandroni, dated July 11, 1962, was without authority of law, and is therefore null and void.
3. The orders dated July 18, July 25, August 2, August 15, August 20, August 21, and all other orders appertaining to the Special Grand Jury and the Special Prosecutor and the Assistant Special Prosecutor, whether communicated orally or in writing, were without authority of law and are therefore null and void.
4. The restraining order of August 28 on members of the Council of the City of Philadelphia and attorneys, supplemented orally and otherwise by Judge Alessandroni or anyone acting under his direction, was illegally made and is therefore null and void.
5. The resolution of the Council of the City of Philadelphia, numbered 264 and dated August 23, 1962, did not sufficiently describe its purpose and is therefore null and void.
6. The petition for writ of prohibition on behalf of James C. Crumlish, Jr., District Attorney of Philadelphia, directed to Judge Alessandroni and W. Wilson White, Esq., is ordered to issue as prayed for.
7. The application of W. Wilson White, plaintiff, for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Judges Gold, Blanc and Kelley, is denied.
Comment on Dissenting and Concurring Opinion
The dissenting and concurring opinion or Minority Opinion, as it will hereinafter be referred to, makes frequent reference to "guilty persons" and "criminals." Nothing is more fundamental in every land of liberty and justice than that no person is presumed guilty until found so by a jury of peers. Every person under the flag of the United States is presumed innocent until proved guilty.
The Minority Opinion says: "District Attorney Crumlish is disqualified from conducting any grand jury investigation into the aforesaid alleged widespread corruption and crime."
There was never any adjudication to this effect so that this statement in the Minority Opinion is not only unfair and unjust but utterly ignores the record. As stated in the Majority Opinion, Judge Alessandroni in utter disregard of proper procedure ignored a sworn pleading filed by the District Attorney. The Minority Opinion does the same.
The Minority Opinion says that W. Wilson White should have been added as an indispensable party in the proceedings before Court of Common Pleas No. 6. The only reason he was not so included is that he refused to be included. City Solicitor David Berger, in addressing Justice Jones of this Court at the night session in Wilkes-Barre on August 29th, said in the presence of Mr. White: "He [Mr. White] was asked in my presence to become a party, and he summarily re jected the invitation. Judge Gold said, 'I am going to invite Mr. White, the Crime Commission, the Committee of Seventy, the Republican Alliance which filed the original petition which was heard by Judge AlesSANdkoni, the Attorney General.' And he said, 'I will invite all these people in; do you, Mr. Berger, and do you, Mr. Lipschitz object?' And Mr. Lipschitz said 'No.' 'And do you, Mr. Berger, object?' I said, 'No. I welcome all these people in.' And Mr. White summarily rejected the invitation. He said he is not and will not become a party to this proceeding
It can be a question as to whether Mr. White, in spite of his refusal to formally become a party, did not in fact enter full-fledgedly into the litigation. After Mr. Berger completed his argument before Justice Jones of this Court in the night session referred to, Mr. White replied. He said: "My standing is this: I have been directed by the order appointing me to carry forward this investigation, to get ready as soon as we possibly can for the grand jury investigation proceedings, which in the order appointing the grand jury the court found so urgently required. Should this taxpayers' suit be successful I would be wholly unable to perform my duties."
Mr. White not only replied to Mr. Berger, he made a full length argument, he cited and analyzed cases, he presented a brief. It would be difficult to conceive a more complete involvement, entirely voluntarily, in a lawsuit than Mr. White's participation. And there can be little merit to any assumption that the case in Court of Common Pleas No. 6 was somehow proceeded with and disposed of by denying to Mr. White the fullest opportunity to be heard.
The Minority Opinion then says that the suit in Court of Common Pleas No. 6 should have named as party defendants also "all other members of the investigating staff." If Miss Smith had to name all members of the investigating staff, she would have had to include also the names of all stenographers, typists, file clerics, messengers, janitors, and every one who could conceivably ha/ve been affected by the eventual decision. Obviously such a multitudinous inclusion was not only not necessary but it would have been decidedly improper to have named them, since they were merely corks bobbing on the sea of litigation. Lawsuits deal with the ships and their courses of action, not the wake of each vessel as it pursues its way toward its destined port.
The indispensable parties in this case were those who were ordered by the City Council of Philadelphia to pay out taxpayers' money. The finance officers of the City and the Courts were the ones to be sued and they were duly sued, and they were duly served and duly litigated. Miss Smith's action was aimed at tying up the purse strings of the City Treasury which had been, she claimed, improperly loosened. Her case was duly litigated and the purse strings were duly tied.
The Minority Opinion says that "The net result was that there was no person or lawyer to oppose the taxpayer's suit or to protect any of the parties who had a direct, immediate and pecuniary interest in the suit." The record shows that at the hearing in the Court of Common Pleas No. 6, the following attorneys spoke in opposition to the taxpayer's suit, namely, Edward E. Russell, Esq., for the "Committee of Seventy"; Herbert A. Fogel, Esq., for the Republican Alliance; Daniel B. Michie, Jr., for the Crime Commission. If Mr. White did not speak at this particular hearing, it would seem to have been because of the plan he had mapped out to participate in the battle to the extent of opposition but to make himself a non-combatant with regard to any decision which might be hurtful to his position. We have seen to what extent he acknowledged the common pleas action in that he petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus to transfer the cause to Judge Alessandroni's court. If he were not a party litigant, on what possible basis could he ask for the transfer of a case from one court to another?
However, even if the matter is to be disposed of on a technicality, it can be seen easily that the cases cited by the Minority Opinion in no way support the proposition advanced by the Minority as to indispensable parties. The Minority quotes from Hartley v. Langkamp & Elder, 243 Pa. 550: . . 'A party is indispensable when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made without affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.' "
This, of course, is hornbook law. The question is: What makes a party indispensable to the extent that he must be named and served as a party?
The Minority Opinion states that the District Attorney contends that since the District Attorney is a constitutionally ordained officer who is elected by the people he can never be superseded as to any of his functions. The District Attorney makes no such contention. Obviously he is bound by Acts of the Legislature and therefore can be superseded under conditions announced by the Legislature. What he contends, and rightly so, is that he may not be superseded simply on the ipse dixit of a judge. Nor is there a single case (to say nothing of a statute) in the whole library of Pennsylvania law which empowers a judge to so act. The Minority Opinion, in attempted support of its position, quotes from the case of Commonwealth v. Mc Hale, 97 Pa. 397, but the very quotation carries its own eraser wiping out completely what is contended for it by the Minority, namely, "It was urged, however, that the indictments were properly quashed because not signed by the district attorney. They were signed by Guy E. Parquhar, Esq., who was specially appointed by the court to try these cases, under the Act of 12th March 1866, Pamph. L. 85. The appointment appears to have been regularly made in accordance with the provisions of said act . . ."
That case involved election frauds in an election where the district attorney was a candidate. Moreover, it is to be noted that this case occurred in 1881, prior to the Act of Supersession which is now part of the Administrative Code and, therefore, controlling.
Then the Minority Opinion says: "Even more astonishing is the present contention of the District Attorney and others that an Attorney General, unless specifically authorized by statute, has no power to supersede a District Attorney."
This question is not involved in the present case nor is it raised by anyone. What powers the Attorney General may have over district attorneys under common law is a subject for discussion since there were no district attorneys at common law, but that discussion has no place here since our issue is whether a judge on his own initiative may oust a district attorney from the performance of his duties. In any event, the powers of a single judge cannot be equated with those of the Attorney General where supersession is involved, since the judge lacks any statute, common law or decisional authority to act in a supersessional capacity.
Mr. Justice Benjamin R. Jones and Mr. Justice O'Brien concur in the result.
For convenience, the phrase "Criminal Courts" is sometimes used instead of the long formal title: Courts of Oyer and Terminer, Quarter Sessions of the Peace and General Jail Delivery.
It is not suggested that Judge Guerin, able and conscientious judge, had any ulterior purpose in the actions here discussed.
All italics supplied unless otherwise indicated.
The Court of Common Pleas No. 6, in its adjudication in tlie Smith v. Gallagher case, said: "Judge Alessandkoni needs no testimonial from us concerning Ais love for the law and the legal traditions which he cherishes. We need not vouch for his probity and integrity. We regard him affectionately and warmly as the dean of the Philadelphia judiciary."
Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382.
The reference to Philadelphia County Grand. Jury Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, was unauthoritative. That case involved a proposed investigation by a regular grand jury, which, incidentally, was prohibited by this Court.
Philadelphia Home Buie Charter, §6-106; 6-400.
The Court found that Judge ArtessANDBorri was within his jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 11th, but that the order itself was illegal. This Court reverses the first finding and affirms the second.
On the same day, argument was also heard on an appeal (to he discussed later) from an order of Judge Atjessandboni restraining the City Council of Philadelphia from conducting a hearing inquiring into the qualifications of F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., as Assistant Special Prosecutor.
See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341; Irwin Borough School District v. North Huntingdon School District, 374 Pa. 135; Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545; Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, §13(V.), 17 P.S. §282.
Distinguished counsel former Justice Thomas D. McBride, Attorney Louis Lipschitz, Attorney Edwin P. Rome and Attorney Herbert S. Levin declared in their brief: "It is stated, however, that there are a number of instances wherein 'special grand juries' were utilized. An examination of all cases in which any such case could be even remotely authoritative in the present case discloses: (1) that no 'special grand juries have been utilized in Philadelphia ; (2) that in none of the cases were the questions argued here raised; and (3) that in none of the cases in which a 'special grand jury' was impanelled was there a regular grand jury functioning and competent to investigate." Independent research would confirm this statement.
There is no indication, and it is not suggested, that W. Wilson White, who is an estimable member of the bar, would consciously lend himself to the infringement of the rights of others, but absolute power, especially when delegated to subordinates, is a high powered tension wire which must be insulated with constitutional safeguards if democracy is to remain safe.
In Ms affidavit of August 28th, Mr. Griffin states that his offices are "at Room 630 Widener Building."
David Berger's name was struck off as a respondent in the proceedings since he was counsel for the Oity.
The Minority Opinion says that the numerous actions filed in this case "reflected no credit on the bar." Lawyers are hired to present clients and it is their duty to do so. There is no indication that the lawyers in this case have not conducted themselves properly and ethically.