Case Name: Emery et al. v. The Ohio Candle Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1890-05-06
Citations: 47 Ohio St. 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: Emery et al. v. The Ohio Candle Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 47
Pages: 320–323

Head Matter:
Emery et al. v. The Ohio Candle Co.
“ Trusts ” and “ Combinations ” to increase the price of commodities— Contrary to public policy — No standing in a court of justice.
An association organized for the purpose of increasing the price and decreasing the production of a commodity of general use, such as candles, is contrary to public policy; and a claim based upon an enforcement of the agreement by which the association was formed, can receive no aid from a court of justice.
(Decided May 6, 1890.)
Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
In 1880 an unincorporated company was formed, to continue six years, called The Candle Manufacturers’ Association, which included the manufacturers of ninety-five per cent, of the star candles in that part of the United States lying east of the 114° of longitude west of Greenwich, or substantially all the territory east of the western boundary of Utah. Its object was to increase the price and decrease the manufacture of candles in the territory covered by the agreement; and is found, as a fact, to have had that effect during the whole existence of the association. The members composing the association were required to pay into its treasury two and one half cents per pound on every pound of candles disposed of on their own account within the territory. But neither was bound to operate his factory; and whether he did, or did not, he received at stated times his proportion of the profits of the pool, which was based upon the business that had been done by him in previous years; thus making it to the interest of each member'to operate his factory when the price of candles was high, and to remain idle when the price was low.
The receipts of the association were placed in a selected! depository, The First National Bank of Cincinnati, to the credit of an executive committee, consisting of three members, selected by the association, and could only be paid out on a check signed by at least two of them. The claims of all members were adjusted by this committee.
The Ohio Candle Company, incorporated under the laws of this state, joined the association in 1883 and withdrew therefrom in March, 1884. During the month of January of that year it had paid into the association $22.40, but there was due to it, under the terms of the agreement, as- profits for that month, the sum of $2,151.17. The committee agreed to pay the company the sum it had paid in, but refused to pay the sum due as profits, on the ground that by withdrawing before the expiration of the life of the association it had violated the agreement, and was entitled to none of its gains. Thereupon the company brought suit for the amount against the members composing the committee, to which the bank was made a party, asking that the bank be ordered to pay the money to the plaintiff, or that a judgment be rendered in its favor for the amount with interest.
Issues of fact having been made up, the case was tried to the court, and reserved for hearing in general term, which made a finding of facts — the substance of which has been stated — and rendered judgment against the members of the committee, which is sought to be reversed on the ground that it is against the law.
Perry $ Jenny, for plaintiffs in error.
Ramsey, Maxwell $ Ramsey, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
By the Court.
We are of the opinion that the suit cannot be maintained, for the reason that the objects of the association were contrary to public policy, and in no way to be aided by the courts. No recovery can be had except by giving effect to the terms of the agreement. The action is, in substance, a suit against the association to recover a sum due the plaintiff under the terms on which the association was formed. The committee represent the association, and a judgment against them is a judgment against .it. If, as claimed by the defendants, a member could not withdraw from the association until the six years had expired, then the committee, as representing the association, bad a defense on which they might have relied, had the objects of the association been perfectly legitimate. But should a court be called on to consider any defense, so long as the claim itself is based upon an agreement to which it can give no countenance ? It must be observed that the withdrawal of the plaintiff was not at a time, nor under circumstances, that could give to it the merits of repentance. It had passed beyond where it might, by withdrawal, have secured the aid of a court in recovering what it had advanced in furtherance of an illegal object. Its suit is to recover its portion of the ill-gotten gains. The case of Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St. 145, can have no application here, for this is a suit between parties to enforce the terms of the illegal agreement. See, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 6 Southern Reporter, 888, where Broolcs v. Martin, 2 Wall. TO, is accurately distinguished, and shown to have no application to a case such as this.
Judgment reversed, and petition of plaintiff below dismissed.