Case Name: Lewis Emery, Jr., v. The Common Council of the Village of Three Rivers
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1889-12-28
Citations: 78 Mich. 438
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lewis Emery, Jr., v. The Common Council of the Village of Three Rivers.
Judges: Morse and Long, JJ., concurred with Campbell, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 438–455

Head Matter:
Lewis Emery, Jr., v. The Common Council of the Village of Three Rivers.
Water-power — Deed—Construction.
The owner of a water-power and adjacent lands conveyed a site for a factory, and also an undivided one-eighth of the land flowed and subject to flowage. The deed further provided that if the undivided one-eighth of the water-power which was intended to be conveyed did not amount to 225 inches of water the grantee should have the right to use enough water from the pond to make up that amount, subject to the reservation by the grantor of the first use of a sufficient amount of water properly used to drive certain specified stones and machinery in his grist-mill, — the grantee to have the next use of the water to the amount specified in the grant. The deed further provided that in case of any break in the dam, or necessary repairs thereto, the grantor should pay seven-eighths, and the grantee one-eighth, of the expense, except such repairs as were needed in the separate races and appurtenances of each property, which were to be made by the owners. The grantor reserved the right to raise the dam two feet. In a suit against claimants under the grantee for an alleged improper use of water under the grant, the deed is construed as follows:
a — To convey absolutely one-eighth of all the land flowed, or subject to flowage, including the water on such land.
b — Under said deed the grantor parted absolutely with one-eighth of his water-power, and, if the same did not amount to 225 inches of water, the grantee was entitled to the use of enough of the remaining seven-eighths to make up the deficiency, provided the grantor could spare it without interfering with the use of his grist-mill, as specified in the deed.
c — The reservation of enough water to operate the grantor’s grist-mill referred to the seven-eighths of the water-power not conveyed by the deed.
Error to St. Joseph. (Peck, J., presiding.)
Argued November 13 and 14, 1889.
Decided December 28, 1889.
Case. Defendants bring error.
Reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Howell, Carr & Barnard and B. E. Andrews, for appellants, contended:
1. The plaintiff claims a construction by parties, — a practical construction. But this must be one in which they all agree, or it is of no force; citing Burgess v. Badger, 124 Ill. 288; and the claimed construction was by tenants and subtenants, and is not shown to have been known to the owners.
2. The nature and quantity of interest must be ascertained from the instrument, and evidence of extraneous facts cannot be received to alter it; citing Jacobs v. Miller, 50 Mich. 119-126; Mathews v. Phelps, 61 Id. 332; 3 Washb. Real Prop. (5th ed.) 429, and note; 2 Whart. Ev. §§ 1050-1054; Jackson v. Foster, 12 Johns. 488; but the actual state of the property at the time of the execution of the deed may be shown as bearing upon its construction.
3. A deed is to be construed most strongly against the grantor, and' most favorably to the grantee; citing Shep. Touch. 165; Piper v. True, 36 Cal. 606; and, if' a grant can inure in different-ways, the grantee may take it in such a way as shall'be most, to his advantage; citing Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. 394; Jackson v. Blodget, 16 Id. 172; Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 436; 2 Dev. Deeds, § 848; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 422 (628); Martindale, Conv. 81; and exceptions and reservations are subject to the same r.ule; citing Gould, Waters, § 311; Alton v. Transporta tion Co., 12 Ill. 38, 58; Duryea v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 592; Klaer v. Ridgway, 86 Penn. St. 529; Angell, Wat. §§ 149f, 149h; Garland v. Hodsdon, 46 Me. 511.
4. Whatever was intended to be conveyed was conveyed, — a statement of intention controls; citing Ousby v. Jones, 73 N. Y. 621; Morrison v. Wilson, 30 Cal. 344-348; Bobo v. Wolf, 18 Ohio St. 466, 467; Garland v. Hodsdon, 46 Me. 511; 2 Dev. Deeds, §§ 836-839; Mathews v. Phelps, 61 Mich. 332; which intention was to convey one-eighth of the water-power. The deed conveys one-eighth of the land flowed, and one-eighth of the land subject to be flowed, in fee-simple, and the waterpower being appurtenant to the land, a like interest thereof was conveyed; citing Mandeville v. Comstock, 9 Mich. 558; and the language following the description, viz: “Together with all and singular,” etc., is important in showing that all the grant- or’s interest was conveyed in the land described; citing Dubois v. Campau, 24 Mich. 365, 366; Hoffman v. Harrington, 28 Id. 103, 104.
5. Under the term “appurtenances” only such easements as are necessary to a proper enjoyment of the estate granted will pass; citing Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N. Y. 165.
6. It will be admitted that the eighth conveyed is an -undivided eighth, varying in quantity; that it is an eighth of the entire power and not of the eight-foot head, and that it is appurtenant to the land described in the deed; citing Gould, Waters, §§ 148, 194-197; Baker v. Bessey, 40 Am. Rep. 377; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 412; Hapgood v. Brown, 102 Mass. 452; Curtis v. Norton, 58 Mich. 411; Richardson v Bigelow, 15 Gray, 154
7. It seems beyond question that the deed deals with two things, - an eighth of the whole power, and 225 inches in a portion of the whole power. The one is in fee, appurtenant to land, and the other in gross and a mere license, and as such it could not pass to heirs and assigns; citing 6 Am. & Eng. Encycl. Law, 141, 142.
8. The law favors the perfect estate, and will lessen an imperfect one rather than a perfect one; citing Edwards v. McClurg, 39 Ohio St. 41; Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395; Erickson v. Land & Iron Co., Id. 604; Garland v. Hodsdon, 46 Me. 514, 515; Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315; Wilcoxson v. Sprague, 51 Cal. 640;. Southard v. Railroad Co., 26 N. J. Law, 13.
9. A definite certain description conveyed in fee is not limited by subsequent recitals, covenants, or agreements which can be referred to another and ambiguous description, or to an uncertain estate; citing Hubbard v. Apthorp, 3 Cush. 422; Edwards v. McClurg, 39 Ohio St. 41; Barney v. Miller, 18 Iowa, 460; and when the subsequent provision is repugant to the grant it it will be rejected; citing 3 Washb. Real Prop. 422; Wilcoxson v. Sprague, 51 Cal. 640-642; Canal Co. v. Hewett, 55 Wis. 96; Erickson v. Land & Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604; Knapp v. Wolverton, 48 Id. 292; Smith v. Smith, 71 Id. 633.
Howard & Roos, of counsel, for appellants, contended:
1. That the purpose of construction is to give effect to an instrument; citing Kiefer v. Seminary, 46 Mich. 636; Gould, Waters, § 311, and cases cited.
2. Any restriction placed by a grantor upon a grant, respecting the use of water or rights in and to water, must be clear and ’ unambiguous, and not repugnant to the grant; citing Gould, Waters, § 312, and cases there cited.
Dallas Boudeman and Pealer Bros., for plaintiff, contended:
1. Water cannot be conveyed like realty. There is, in fact, no ownership in it, but only a right to use it. A conveyance of it, however strong it may be drawn, but transfers the grantor’s rights to its use; citing Gould, Waters, §§ 304, 304a.
2. The conveyance of a ferry-way includes the land under it and used with it; citing Gerrish v. Gary, 120 Mass. 132; and the grant of a water-ditch would include another one with which it is fed, and without which it would be useless; citing Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 518, the second ditch being appurtenant to the first.
3. The grant of water easements carries with it by implication, as secondary or subsidiary easements, everything that is beneficially necessary or incident to the grant, whether mentioned or not as “privileges,” “appurtenances,” or the like; citing Gould, Waters, § 306; Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Saunders (Williams), 323 (note 6); Hodgson v. Field, 7 East, 622; Hinchliffe v. Earl of Kinnoul, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 1; Pickering v. Stapler, 5 Serg. & R. 107; U. S. v. Appleton, 1 Sum. 501.
4. As an “appurtenant” can therefore follow the grant of an easement as well as of land, it follows that whether or not the amount actually necessary to create the 225 .inches can be obtained from one-eighth of the water, yet the conveyance is of water sufficient to amount to the 225 inches, and this grant Is independent of the amount of land conveyed; and that the land or the use of it might be appurtenant to the right in the water conveyed, as well as the water might be appurtenant to the land.
5. A grantor may withhold easements or privileges in water, either by way of reservation or exception; citing Mfg. Co. v. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305; Knox v. Silloway, 10 Me. 201; Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. 136; Wade v. Howard, 6 Pick. 492; Barnes v. Lloyd, 112 Mass. 231; Peck v. Conway, 119 Id. 549; and these become binding upon the grantee on his accepting the deed; citing Emerson v. Mooney, 50 N. H. 315; Vickerie v. Buswell, 13 Me. 289; Newell v. Hill, 2 Metc. 180.
6. The words “exceptions” and “reservations” are used indiscriminately, and effect will be given to them according to the intention of the parties, irrespective of the words used; citing Mfg. Co. v. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305; Cutler v. Tufts, 3 Pick. 272; Hill v. Cutting, 107 Mass. 597; Bowman v. Wathen, 2 McLean, 366.
7. What the parties did immediately after the execution of the deed affords a safe criterion of their intention, and of the meaning of the doubtful language in the deed.
8. The situation of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts, as well as the language used in the deed, should have operation in the legal effect and construction of their contract; citing Bird v. Hamilton, Walk. Ch. 361; Paddack v. Pardee, 1 Mich. 421; Newton v. McKay, 29 Id. 1; Stuart v. Worden, 42 Id. 160; McConnell v. Rathbun, 46 Id. 308; Spaulding v. Coon, 50 Id. 622; Ferris v. Wilcox, 51 Id. 105; Mfg. Co. v. Railway Co., 64 Id. 123; Smith v. Smith, 71 Id. 633.
9. Plaintiff is protected in his construction of the deed by a long-continued, uninterrupted, and adverse use of the water-power to the extent now claimed by him, and such an uninterrupted use under a claim of right, for the statutory period applicable to real estate, will ripen into a complete title; citing Gould, Waters, § 329, and cases cited; Angell, Wat. § 200 et seq.; Washb. Eas. §§ 283, 354, 388 et seq.; Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Me. 254; Bucklin v. Truell, 54 N. H. 122; White v. Chapin, 12 Allen, 516; Townsend v. McDonald, 12 N. Y. 381; Law v. McDonald, 9 Hun, 23; Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. Law, 617; Conklin v. Boyd, 46 Mich. 56; Bunce v. Bidwell, 43 Id. 542.

Opinion:
Campbell, J.
Plaintiff sued defendants for using more water than they were entitled to under the title vested in them in the water-power of Rock river. The only important question is whether defendants owned an absolute or only a contingent interest. Plaintiff claims that defendants have no interest which is not subject to his prior claim to use the entire power for his mill, if wanted for the use of the equivalent -of four run of stone. Defendants claim an absolute right .to one-eighth of the power, and a qualified right to still more, if the latter is not needed by plaintiff.
I think the whole question turns on the meaning of the deed, and that it can make no difference what plaintiff has done in enlarging his improvement; and it is equally independent of any supposed policy or expectation of plaintiff or his grantors. There was nothing to prevent them from granting as much of their property as they saw fit, and it can make no difference whether ex post facto wisdom would have prevented the contract, had it been anticipated.
The deed in question was a grant of property needing some power to run it successfully. After conveying the land, it proceeds as follows:
"Together with the undivided one-eighth part of the land flowed, or subject to be flowed, by said pond, for which the parties of the first part have a title in fee-simple, together with the undivided one-eighth of all the interest the parties of the first part have in and to other lands now flowed by said pond; and it is understood and agreed by the parties that if the undivided one-eighth of the Rock-river water-power, which is hereby intended to be conveyed, does not amount to 225 inches of water, then the party of the second part, his heirs and devisees, shall have the right to use enough water from the said pond to make 225 inches, or a stream of water filling an opening 15 inches square, and the same to be used under a head of eight feet, upon the above-described premises, according to the following provisions, that is to say: The parties of the first part, for themselves, their heirs and assigns, reserve a sufficient amount of water, properly used, to drive four run of French buhr mill-stones, with all necessary' machinery, first; and the party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, is to have the next use of the water, to the amount above specified, together with a proper use of the river below the bridge for tail water.'"
The deed proceeded to provide that in case of any break in the dam, or necessary repairs thereto, the grantors should be at seven-eighths, and the grantee at one-eighth, of the expense, except such repairs as are needed in the separate races and appurtenances of each property, which are to be made by the owners. The grantors reserve the right to raise the dam two feet. It will be observed that the liability of the grantee to bear one-eighth of the expense of the repairs is absolute, and not contingent. And if plaintiff's contention is correct, this duty will exist perpetually, although he should continually use all the water in the river, which it needs no testimony to show will always be diminishing, and not increasing.
The question is not one which can be made very much clearer by any reasoning process. There can be no doubt that the deed conveys absolutely one-eighth of all the land flowed, or subject to flowage, which would, according to all rules of construction, include the water on such land. But, to remove any cavil on this head, the deed goes on to speak of the "undivided one-eighth of the Rock-river water-power, which is hereby intended to be conveyed." This language is perfectly jflain, and can bear but one construction, which is that the plaintiff's grantors had parted absolutely with one-eighth of their water-power. The only other provision is one which under certain circumstances allows a qualified use of enough of plaintiff's own retained seven-eighths to make up 225 inches under an 8-foot head, if plaintiff can spare it, without interfering with his own mill. It is not in accordance with the context, or the general rules of language, to make the plaintiff's reservation of enough water to run his mill refer to any more than the water which was charged with the contingent use of the water requisite to make up 225 inches. I do not think that the subsequent demand of plaintiff's mill for more water deserves any more consideration than the needs of the factory, or was any more within the intention of the parties. It appears from the deed itself that seven-eighths of the water would, presumably, supply all plaintiff's .needs, with a possible surplus. It is equally clear that the grant was for a concern requiring some waterpower, for which an absolute provision of one-eighth was made, with a contingent right to use more. It would not be a reasonable inference that this could, under any circumstances, be deprived of water altogether; and it would have been an absurd undertaking to keep property in repair which the plaintiff could prevent defendants from using at all.
I am unable to see any ambiguity in the grant by its terms, or any created by its context. I think defendants were rightfully in the use of the power to the extent of one-eighth, and that the holding otherwise was erroneous.
Morse and Long, JJ., concurred with Campbell, J.