Case Name: SMITH et al. v. TIPPS
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-12-08
Citations: 191 S.W. 392
Docket Number: No. 1677
Parties: SMITH et al. v. TIPPS.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 191
Pages: 392–397

Head Matter:
SMITH et al. v. TIPPS.
(No. 1677.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Dec. 8, 1916.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1916.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 8, 1917.)
1. Limitation oe Actions ⅛=123 — Suit fob Land — Commencement oe Action — Statute.
Under Act April 3, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 123 [Vernon’s'Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5693-5695]), effective July 1, 1913, providing that owners of the superior title to land retained in any deeds or their transferees shall have 12 months after the act becomes effective within which to sue for the land, and that otherwise such suit shall be barred, a suit for land was commenced July 7, 1913, when the first amended petition was filed seeking a recovery on a vendor’s lien note and a foreclosure of the lien and to have title to tbe land or a part of it decreed to him, or by the second amended petition filed January 8, Í914, asking that title to the land be declared to be in plaintiff, so that, though a third amended petition in trespass to try title was filed June'11, 1915, after a reversal and remand, the suit was not barred.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 539; Dec. Dig. <S=>123.]
2. Limitation oe Actions <g=»123 — Commencement oe Action — Pleading Bad on Demurrer.
A pleading bad on demurrer may be sufficient to stop the running of the statute.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 539; Dec. Dig. ®=ol23.]
3. Vendor and Purchaser <S=»252 — Unpaid Notes — Title.
The title remaining in the vendor is held by him for the benefit alone of the holder of the purchase-money notes so long as they remain unpaid.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 636; Dec. Dig. <S=>252.]
4. Vendor and Purchaser <®^296 — Unpaid Notes — Suit by Assignee — Title.
Where plaintiff, as the assignee of vendor’s lien notes, was also transferee of the title of one of the vendors, he could recover title and divest the title of the other vendor, who disclaimed any right or title to the land.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 882; Dec. Dig. <S=^296.]
Hodges, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Husk County; W. C. Burford, Judge.
Suit by John M. Tipps against Clem Smith and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Smith appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 171 S. W. 816.
By their deed dated November 1, 1906, R. H. Hightower and J. E. Watkins' conveyed the land in controversy to appellant, Smith, in consideration of the execution and delivery to them by Smith of his three promissory notes for $100, interest and attorney’s fees each, payable, respectively, Nov. 1, 1907, 1908, and 1909. By the terms of both the deed and the notes the vendor’s lien was retained on the land to secure the payment of the latter. November 7, 1908, the notes by an indorsement thereon were assigned to B. K. Johnson, who on December 14, 1912, joined by one T. C. Moore, assigned them to appellee, Tipps. Except $10 paid October 15, 1908, and $80 paid October 22, 1909, nothing seems ever to have been paid on the notes. By an instrument dated January 25, 1913, Hightower “sold, released, and forever quit-claimed all his title, rights, and claims of every kind” to the land to said Tipps. This suit was commenced by said Tipps by a petition filed May 1, 1913. As so commenced it was against said Smith, Johnson, and Moore to recover on the notes and to foreclose the vendor’s lien retained to secure their payment. Johnson and Moore, it seems, did not answer the petition. Smith answered, setting up as a bar to the recovery sought against him the statute of limitations of four years. Tipps thereupon, on, to wit, July 7, 1913, filed his “first amended petition,” in which he “adopted each and every allegation” in his original petition, conceded that two of the three notes sued on were barred by the statute of limitations, but denied that- the one maturing November 1, 1909, was so barred, and then alleged that Hightower and Watkins bought the land with money furnished by the former, that Hightower had conveyed to him, Tipps, the superior title in him as one of the vendors to Smith, but that Watkins had refused to do so. Tipps then alleged that effect of the conveyance made to him by Hightower was to pass to him the superior title remaining in Hightower, and Watkins as the vendors of the land, and prayed—
“as in his original petition, for a foreclosure of his vendor’s lien, and for a sale of said property to satisfy same; and if the court should hold that the notes due November 1, 1907, and November 1, 1908, are barred by the statute of limitations, then the plaintiff prays that he have judgment against the defendants as prayed for in his original petition on the $100 note due November 1, 1909, with all interest and attorney’s fees thereon due according to the specifications in said note, and that after the satisfaction of said note that the balance of - said premises be appropriated and the title to same be declared in this plaintiff, or so much thereof .as the court might hold plaintiff is justly entitled to, and for attorney’s fees and interest on the $100 note dated November 1, 1906, and due November 1, 1909, with a vendor’s lien on the 80 acres of land described in plaintiff’s original petition, to which reference is here made, and that plaintiff would further ask that the title to the entire said 80 acres of land described in plaintiff’s original petition be declared to be in plaintiff herein, or so much thereof as the court may see proper to render, and that plaintiff have judgment against the defendants and each of them for his debt, for the possession of said land, and premises, interest and attorney’s fees, as prayed for in his original petition.”
January 5, 1914, Tipps filed a pleading, which he denominated his “second amended petition,” in which he asked that the deed from Hightower and Watkins to Smith be canceled, and that the title to the land be declared to be in him (Tipps). He did not in this amendment state any facts or assign any reason entitling him to such relief.
On the case made by the pleadings specified and evidence heard in support of same, a judgment was rendered awarding the land to Tipps. That judgment on an appeal prosecuted to this court by Smith was reversed because without support in Tipps’ pleadings. 171 S. W. 816.
After the cause was remanded to the court below, on, to wit, June 11, 1915, Tipps filed his third amended petition, by which he changed his suit to a statutory one of trespass to try title with Smith and Watkins as defendants. Watkins answered, disclaiming any claim of right or title in himself to the land. Smith answered by a plea of not guilty by pleas of the three and five year statute of limitations, and by a plea setting up that Tipps’ right to recover the land because of the nonpayment by him (Smith) of the purchase money was barred because:
“More than 12 months has elapsed before the commencement of this suit for the possession of said land under the superior title claim and the time given persons holding such claim to file suit for the possession of lands claimed by them as set up in plaintiff’s third amended petition filed' herein on the 11th day of June, 1915.”
The trial was before the court without a jury. He found as facts the following: That in 1902 one Hightower and one. Watkins as partners purchased the land in controversy; that Hightower furnished the money with which to pay for it; that on November 1, 1906, Hightower and Watkins by their joint warranty deed conveyed the land to appellant Smith, the consideration to them being: Smith’s three notes of that date for IIOO,. interest and attorney’s fees each, due, respectively, November 1, 1907, 1908, and 1909;’ that a vendor’s lien to secure the payment of the notes was retained; that on November 7, 1908, the notfes were assigned by Hightower and Watkins to one Johnson, who, joined by one Moore, on December 14, 1912, assigned same to appellee; that, except the sum of $10 paid October 15, 1908, and the sum of $30 paid October 22, 1909, nothing was ever paid on the notes; that by a petition filed May 1, 1913, appellee sought a recovery against Smith of the amount of the notes and a foreclosure of the vendor's lien on the land; that in defense against the recovery sought Smith set up the statute of limitations of four years as a bar; that in the suit so commenced appellee on February 6, 1914, recovered judgment against Smith for the land; that the mandate reversing that judgment on appeal was filed in the trial court February 5, 1915; that appellee, after the filing of said mandate, to wit, on June 11, 1915, filed his third amended petition, and on that date had Smith, and on June 15, 1915, had Watkins, served with a citation issued on same; that Watkins answered disclaiming any claim of right or title in himself to the land; and that on January 25, 1913, Hightower conveyed the superior title remaining in him as a vendor of the land to appellee. On the facts as found by him the trial court concluded as matter of law that Hightower and Watkins were the common source of title, and that appellee, as the holder of the notes and of the superior title in Hightower as a vendor of the land, the notes being .unpaid, had a right to sue for and recover the land of Smith.
The appeal is again by Smith from a judgment awarding Tipps a recovery of the land.
T. J. Arnold, of Henderson, for appellant. R. T. Brown and J. X. Gray, both of Henderson, for appellee.

Opinion:
WIEESON, O. J.
(after stating the facts as above). The theory upon which appellee was awarded the relief he sought was that, as the owner of the unpaid purchase-money notes and transferee of the legal title remaining in Hightower as one of Smith's vendors, he was entitled on Smith's failure to pay the notes to recover the land. That appellee was entitled to recover at least a part of the land is clear, unless his suit therefor was barred by force of a provision in the act of April 3, 1913 (General Laws, p. 250; articles 5693, 5694, 5695, Vernon's Statutes), as follows:
"Those owning the superior title to land retained in any deed of conveyance, or his transferee and those subsequently acquiring such superior title by transfer, shall have twelve months after this act takes effect within which to bring suit for the land if their claim to the land is not otherwise invalid and unless such suit is brought within twelve months after-this act takes effect, they shall be forever barred from bringing suit to recover the same." Article 5695.
The act took effect July 1, 1913. Ap-pellee's third amended petition, as shown in the statement above, was not filed until June 11, 1915, nearly two years after the time when the act became effective. It is plain, therefore, if the filing of this petition was the commencement of appellee's suit for the land, it was barred when commenced. We are of opinion, however, appellee's suit for the land was commenced by the filing, July 7, 1913, of his first amended petition, in which, while seeking a recovery on the note due November 1, 1909, and a foreclosure of the lien retained to secure it, he also sought to have the title to the land, or a part thereof sufficient to satisfy the amount unpaid of the other two notes, decreed to be in him, or, if not, then by the filing, January 5, 1914, of his second amended petition, in which he asked that the title to the land be declared to be in him. While we did not think when the cause was before us on the first appeal (171 S. W. 816), and do not now, that the pleadings of appellee authorized the judgment obtained by him, we think they sufficiently showed the commencement of a suit for the land so as to stop the running of the statute of limitations. It has been repeatedly held that pleadings bad on general demurrer may be sufficient to stop the running of the statute. Killebrew v. Stockdale, 51 Tex. 529; Kauffman v. Wooters, 79 Tex. 205, 214, 13 S. W. 549; Day v. Van Horn Trading Co., 183 S. W. 85, 87.
Whether appellee, as the transferee of only one of Smith's two vendors, 'was entitled as against Smith to recover all the land, or only an undivided half of it, is a more difficult question to answer. In view of the holding that the title remaining in the vendor is held by him for the benefit alone of the holder of purchase-money notes so long as they remain unpaid, we would not hesitate to say that the recovery had by appellee against Watkins on his disclaimer of any claim of right or title to the land operated to pass to appellee the title held by Watkins in trust for him, but for the further holding that the assignee of such notes cannot by suit against the vendor have the title remaining in him devested. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Beckley, 93 Tex. 267, 54 S. W. 1030; Douglass v. Blount, 95 Tex. 369, 67 S. W. 489, 58 L. R. A. 699; Atterberry v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 118, 113 S. W. 528; White v. Cole, 87 Tex. 500, 29 S. W. 759. As, however, the latter holding was on the theory that the assignee as such has no interest in the land, we have concluded it should not be allowed to control in this case; for Tipps, as the transferee of the title in Hightower, did have such an interest. The conclusion reached is, we think, authorized by the ruling made in Anderson v. Silliman, 92 Tex. 560, 50 S. W. 579, where Judge Gaines said:
"We are also of the opinion that the legal title remained in the vendors, to wit, Anderson, Mrs. Snider, and Williams, and that the acquisition by Silliman,. the holder of the purchase-money note, of the legal title of Williams and Mrs. Snider, was sufficient, upon default in the payment of the note, to enable Silliman or his executrix to sue Anderson for the recovery of the land. White v. Cole, 87 Tex. 500 [29 S. W. 759]. Anderson had parted with his interest in the note, and he had no interest in the land, save the naked legal title. Silliman, if not entitled to claim the whole of the land, was entitled to an undivided interest, and, as a tenant in common, had the right to recover against one holding merely the legal title."
The judgment is affirmed.
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