Case Name: Richard Franklin ANDERSON v. Robin Annette ANDERSON (Prault)
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1993-10-27
Citations: 43 Ark. App. 194
Docket Number: CA 93-65
Parties: Richard Franklin ANDERSON v. Robin Annette ANDERSON (Prault)
Judges: Jennings, C.J., Pittman and Robbins, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 194–202

Head Matter:
Richard Franklin ANDERSON v. Robin Annette ANDERSON (Prault)
CA 93-65
863 S.W.2d 325
Court of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc
Opinion delivered October 27, 1993
Michael Knollmeyer, for appellant.
Richard Garnett, for appellee.

Opinion:
Melvin Mayfield, Judge.
This is an appeal from the chancellor's order denying appellant's petition for a change in custody.
Appellant Richard Franklin Anderson and appellee Robin Annette Anderson (Prault) were divorced on March 14, 1991. Custody of the parties' minor child Tamara Anderson, born February 3, 1989, was awarded to the appellee. On May 27, 1992, the appellant filed a motion for change of custody alleging Tamara had been in the custody of Brenda Calva, her maternal grandmother, since May 1991 and that appellee is mentally and financially unstable. On September 30, 1992, the chancellor entered a decree which, among other things, continued custody with the appellee and ordered appellee and her present husband, Mr. Prault, to attend counseling.
Appellant first argues that the chancellor's decision is against the preponderance of the evidence and is clearly erroneous. He says the choice was between awarding custody to a man who was an excellent father, and awarding custody to a woman who had lived a life that was unsuitable for the raising of children, and who would not be a suitable person to have custody if she continued to live as she had in the past.
At the hearing on appellant's motion for change of custody there was evidence that the parties' two sons, who were not mentioned in the divorce but who live with the appellant, are happy and well adjusted; that the appellant's house is nice and clean; that he has a stable job; that Tamara loves him; and that he has no current drug or alcohol problems.
There was also evidence that the appellee had three children in addition to Tamara, that she maintained very little contact with her other children, had given up guardianship of Tamara, had twice attempted to commit suicide, could not hold a job, was promiscuous, had a somewhat violent nature, was emotionally unstable, and was married to a man who had assaulted his former wife and who had been awarded only supervised visitation with his own child.
But, Barbara Bunton, a licensed clinical social worker, testified she had done a home study of appellee and found the physical environment adequate and that she had no concerns about placing Tamara with the appellee and Mr. Prault. On cross-examination Ms. Bunton testified she was not aware that Mr. Prault was convicted of third degree battery in 1991, that he had attempted to commit suicide in the near past, or that appellee had also attempted to commit suicide. After reviewing some confidential court records, Ms. Bunton testified that both suicide gestures appeared to be "just that, gestures, reactive depression," — his following a divorce with his wife and frustration over visitation problems and hers after a "big blowout" with her mother — and that if the court were to order family counseling she would have no qualms about placing Tamara with them.
Moreover, the evidence showed that Brenda Calva, appel-lee's mother, obtained guardianship over Tamara because Mrs. Calva was concerned about obtaining medical care for Tamara. Appellee agreed to the guardianship, but it was part of their agreement that when appellee became able to take care of Tamara, Mrs. Calva would return her. Shortly before filing the motion for change in custody, the appellee filed a petition to set aside the guardianship, but the guardianship continued until the hearing on the motion to change custody.
Finally, we note that during the testimony the chancellor stated:
[S]he was granted custody of this child in March of 1991. Nobody in her family, her husband at the time, her mother or her sister or anybody else came forward to tell this Court that this was a bad deal and that this child was in danger or at risk.
Now, the law says for me to — I've listened to so much today that my mind is beginning to kind of get boggled with it. I want to know how the circumstances have changed, and if so, how significant it is since March 14, 1991.
I have really been patient of listening to stuff back twelve and fourteen years ago and even seven and eight years ago. I want to know how things have changed since March 14,1991, and I'm going to restrict everybody from that day forward to that.
A change in custody cannot be made without showing a change in circumstances from those existing at the time the original order was made as the original decree constitutes a final adjudication of the issue. Carter v. Carter, 19 Ark. App. 242, 719 S.W.2d 704 (1986). The primary consideration in awarding the custody of children is the welfare and best interests of the children involved; other considerations are secondary. Scherm v. Scherm, 12 Ark. App. 207, 671 S.W.2d 224 (1984). Moreover, in a child custody case, the chancellor's findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ketron v. Ketron, 15 Ark. App. 325, 692 S.W.2d 261 (1985). In Calhoun v. Calhoun, 3 Ark. App. 270, 625 S.W.2d 545 (1981), we said:
In cases involving child custody a heavier burden is cast upon the chancellor to utilize to the fullest extent all of his powers of perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony and the child's best interest. This court has no such opportunity. We know of no case in which the superior position, ability and opportunity of the chancellor to observe the parties carry as great weight as one involving minor children.
3 Ark. App. at 273.
After careful consideration of the record in this case, we cannot say that the decision of the chancellor was clearly against a preponderance of the evidence or clearly erroneous.
Appellant also argues the chancellor erred in not basing his decision on the best interest of the child. He contends the court did not base its decision on the best interest of the child, but rather sought to give the appellee one last chance to be a mother. We do not agree.
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge stated "the hardest thing any judge can do, is to decide who is — what would be in the best interest of a child when more than one party wants custody of a child." He said he has "to do what's in the best interest of the child within the best of my ability." The chancellor stated that Tamara deserves to know her mother and he is going to give the appellee the chance to give Tamara the nurture and the love and upbringing Tamara deserves, needs, and is entitled to. The judge also noted that the appellant and appellee both have had "a bad, stormy past." He said the appellant had admitted to drug habits in the past, although he appears to be an excellent father now. The judge also said he was requiring the appellee and her present husband to seek counseling and he wanted a report from the counseling center every three months.
We cannot say the trial judge did not consider the child's best interest or that his decision in that regard was clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Jennings, C.J., Pittman and Robbins, JJ., dissent.