Case Name: Commonwealth vs. Milo A. Taylor
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1850-09
Citations: 5 Cush. 605
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth vs. Milo A. Taylor.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 59
Pages: 605–610

Head Matter:
Commonwealth vs. Milo A. Taylor.
The number and check letter of a forged bank-bill, and the words in the margin, need not be set forth in an indictment for uttering and passing it as true.
Dn a trial at Northampton, for uttering as true a forged bank-bill, purporting to be a bill of a bank at Worcester, a witness having testified that he knew the president of that bank; that when the witness last saw him, which was something less than a year before, he lived in Worcester; and that he then told the witness that his wife had bought a place in Oxford, in this state, and his family were going there to reside; it was held, that upon this evidence, the testimony of the president might be dispensed with, and the forgery of his signature allowed to be proved by other witnesses, within the Rev. Sts. c. 127, § 10.
A confession or admission by one under arrest on a criminal charge, to the officer having him in custody, made the day after the party had been told by the officer, that “ he could make him no promises, but if he made any disclosures that would be of benefit to the government, the officer would use his influence to have it go in his favor," is not admissible in evidence against such party; although the officer testifies, that he thought the statement was voluntary, and would have been made, if the inducements of the day before had not been held out; and although the judge instructed the jury, that if the statement was not< made freely and voluntarily, or if it was induced by the previous promises, they should exclude it altogether.
The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted in the court of common pleas, for having uttered and passed as true a counterfeit three dollar bill of the Mechanics Bank of Worcester, alleged in the indictment to be of the following tenor: “ The President, Directors, and Company of the Mechanics Bank promise to pay Three Dollars on demand to A. Hay, or bearer. Worcester, Mass., Nov. 1, 1849. Parley Hammond, Cash. Alex. De Witt, Presdt; ” knowing the same to be forged and counterfeit,
The district attorney offered in evidence, in support of the indictment, a bill purporting to be a bank-bill of the Mechanics bank of Worcester, which was passed by the defendant, and which corresponded in all respects with the description in the indictment, except in having, at the top, the words “ Three Dollars,” “ Mass.” “ Three Dollars,” and at the bottom, the words “ Three Dollars,” “ Three Dollars ” ; and on the body, a check letter “ B” and “ No. 249 ”; which words and figures were not set forth in the indictment.
The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence, on the ground of a variance between the bill set forth in the indictment and the bill offered in evidence, but the presiding judge, Byington, J., overruled the objection, and admitted the bill in evidence.
To show that the signature of the president, Alexander De Witt, was forged, the district attorney called as a witness John Clarke, president of the Holyoke bank, who testified that he knew the president and cashier of the Mechanics bank of Worcester; that Alexander De Witt was president, and Parley Hammond cashier; that the Mechanics bank was organized and doing business in Worcester, where Hammond, the cashier, lived; that when he last saw De Witt, which was something less than a year previously, he knew of his residing shortly before that time at Worcester; that De Witt then told him his wife had bought a place at Oxford, in this state, and his family were going there to live. Clarke further testified, that he knew the handwriting of De Witt; had seen him write; and had received letters from him almost every day.
Upon this evidence, the presiding judge admitted Clarke to testify, and he testified that the signature of De Witt to the bill offered in evidence was a counterfeit. To the admission of this evidence, the defendant excepted.
The defendant, as one ground of his defence, offered to show that the counterfeit bill, for passing which he was on trial, was received by him from one Cady, in good faith, for valuable consideration, and in ignorance that it was counterfeit.
In reply to this, the district attorney called George F. Wright, a deputy sheriff of Hampshire, to prove certain conversations which he had had with the defendant, tending to show that the defendant did nof receive the bill in good faith, and in ignorance that it was counterfeit.
The defendant thereupon objected, that these conversations tended to show certain admissions made by him under promises of favor, and under such circumstances that they could not be received in evidence. Wright was then examined by the judge, on this point, and testified, that Taylor was arrested in Boston by Starkweather, a police officer, and was in the marshal’s office on the 16th of May last; that constables Starkweather and Clapp and said Wright were present; and that the defendant was then under arrest. Taylor, addressing himself to Starkweather and Clapp, said it would be no object to break him down; he might make disclosures that would be of benefit to the government. Starkweather and Clapp said they could make him no promises, but that if he should make any disclosure that would be of benefit to the government, they would use their influence to have it go in his favor. The defendant also asked Wright if he would use his influence; and he fell in with what Starkweather and Clapp had said. This was about four or five o’clock in the afternoon, and the defendant made no disclosure at that time. He was lodged in the jail in Boston that night, and the next morning started in the cars for Northampton, in the custody of Wright and Starkweather. On the way from Boston, between Worcester and Springfield, or just before they arrived at Worcester, Wright testified, that he had the conversation hereinafter stated with Taylor, Starkweather not being present, but in another part of the car; and that no promises or inducements were made to the defendant to confess or make disclosures on the way, or on that day.
The conversation was as follows: Wright asked the defendant how he received the money of Cady; whether he bought it of him, or received it on commission, or on joint stock. The defendant said he bought it. Wright asked him how much he gave for it, and further if he gave twenty-five per cent. The defendant waited a minute, and said, “ Yes, twenty-five per cent — twenty-five cents on a dollar.” Nothing was said of the use to be made of the money afterwards.
The witness testified, that he supposed that the defendant, m making this statement, was acting under the influence of what had been said to him the day before ; that he thought the statement was voluntary on the defendant’s part, and would have been made, if promises had not been held out to him ; and that he supposed the defendant made the statement, thinking the government would favor him, if he told what he knew.
The defendant objected to the admissiori'of this statement in evidence, but the presiding judge admitted it, and instructed the jury, thereupon, that if they were not satisfied, that the defendant made the statement freely and voluntarily, but was induced to make it by any promises or assurances held out by Clapp, Starkweather, and Wright, or either of them, they should reject the evidence altogether.
To all the above rulings the defendant excepted. The de fendant also moved in arrest of judgment in the court of common pleas, for certain alleged defects in the indictment, which were not considered by this court, and are therefore omitted.
C. Delano, for the defendant.
(Clifford, attorney-general, for the commonwealth.

Opinion:
Dewey, J.
The objection of variance between the bill offered in evidence and that set out in the indictment, cannot avail. As to the omissions of the figures, letters, and numbers in the margin, the case clearly falls within the eases of Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1 Mass. 62, and Commonwealth v. Stevens, 1 Mass. 203, and the omission to recite them does not vitiate the indictment.
2. Nor do we perceive any objection to the competency of the testimony offered to prove that the signature of De Witt, the president of the bank, was forged and not genuine. This evidence was offered under the provisions of the Rev. Sts. c. 127, § 10, dispensing with the testimony of the president and cashier of a bank, in prosecutions for uttering any forged or counterfeit bill of such bank, if their place of residence shall be out of the state, or more than forty miles from the place of trial.
The objection, as understood to be raised, is the insufficiency of the evidence offered upon the preliminary inquiry, as to the place of residence of the president of the bank. This evidence tended to show, that the president of the bank had resided at Worcester; and the only circumstance disclosed, which raised a doubt as to his continuing to reside there, was the declaration of the president himself to the witness, as to the contemplated removal of his family to Oxford. This latter place being more distant, it is quite immaterial, whether he resided at the one place or the other. But his residence being once established at Worcester is to be presumed so to continue, until the contrary shall appear. Supposing that this question, which was a preliminary one, and to be passed upon by the presiding judge, was open to exceptions, upon which we express no opinion, we should have no doubt of the correctness of the ruling upon this point.
3. The next objection taken is to the competency of the testimony of George F. Wright, as to certain confessions made to him by the defendant, while in his custody under an arrest for this offence.
Confessions, to be admissible, must be free and voluntary. They are not considered voluntary, when obtained by any direct or implied promises of fa.vor or benefit, to be gained thereby. If such promise of favor or benefit is held out by a person having the prisoner in custody, as an officer, and a confession is afterwards made, it is inadmissible.
In the present case, the promises were such, as might excite hopes in the mind of the prisoner, that he should be materially benefited by making disclosures. He was in the hands of the police officer Starkweather, and Wright, a deputy-sheriff, and he was told by them that if he should make disclosures that would be of benefit to the government, they would use their influence to have them go in his favor. This was between four and five o'clock in the afternoon. He did not then make any'disclosures; but the next morning, being in the custody of Wright, and without any further inducements, he made the admissions now offered to be proved. The case seems to us to fall within the rule, excluding confessions obtained under the influence of inducements held out by an officer having the prisoner in his custody, and for that reason the testimony of Wright ought to have been excluded. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 219; 2 Russ, on Cr. 645. Upon this point, the exceptions are sustained, and the verdict is to be set aside, and a new trial granted.
In the present aspect of the case, the court have not found it necessary to form or express any opinion upon the formal objections taken to the indictment, and argued in connection with this bill of exceptions, uncir the motion in arrest of judgment. Exceptions sustained.