Case Name: Eldred L. TUGGLE and Catherine Tuggle, his wife, Petitioners, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1968-01-31
Citations: 207 So. 2d 674
Docket Number: No. 35435
Parties: Eldred L. TUGGLE and Catherine Tuggle, his wife, Petitioners, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Respondent.
Judges: ROBERTS, THORNAL and ERVIN, JJ-, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 207
Pages: 674–681

Head Matter:
Eldred L. TUGGLE and Catherine Tuggle, his wife, Petitioners, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Respondent.
No. 35435.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 31, 1968.
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1968.
Alfred D. Bieley and Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Miami, for petitioners.
Dixon, Dejarnette, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell and Paul A. Carlson, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
Petitioner in this case controverts a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 185 So.2d 487. The appellate court held that an automobile insurance policy issued by respondent, providing for uninsured motorist coverage to be subject to set-off for "separately contracted for medical payments coverage" also provided by respondent, did not violate the minimum coverage prescription of F.S. Sec. 627.0851, F.S.A.
Certiorari has been granted on the basis of conflict with the decision of this Court in Sellers v. United States F. & G. Co., that the statute "does not permit 'other insurance' clauses in the policy which are contrary to the statutorily limited amounts of coverage." While the opinion in Sellers expressly excludes any intent that a claimant might pyramid coverages to obtain double recovery, or more than actual damages, that decision and others recently rendered clearly hold the statute to be designed to make each policy providing uninsured motorist coverage enforceable to the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent that a policyholder would be legally entitled to recover damages from the third party tortfeasor.
The decision in this case (Tuggle) has been previously considered briefly by this Court, in connection with an order dismissing a petition for certiorari here on conflict, Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Gavin. The writ in that case was properly discharged for lack of direct conflict between the cases, because of factual variance. Determination of the merits of the decision now presented, however, was not essential to the jurisdictional disposition, and we find that the opinion erroneously included the Tuggle decision in its pronouncement that "the legal conclusions in each decision are consonant with statutory requirements."
In view of the fact that the two classes of coverage involved in the policy under consideration were contracted separately, with independent premiums, we are unable to distinguish this situation from that in Sellers, relating to multiple carriers. Nor does there appear to be any basis for treating the set-off provision as amounting only to a contractual reduction of medical benefits, contrary to the actual language of the policy stating in the provision for uninsured motorist coverage that the company shall not be obligated to pay any part of such liability which represents expense "payable" by the insurer under its medical benefits coverage. The clause on its face is one to decrease uninsured motorist coverage beneath the statutory minimum, and one which means that under certain conditions (medical benefits in excess of $10,000) there will be no uninsured motorist coverage whatever.
We conclude again that the requirement, in a policy of this nature, of "a showing of unreimbursed loss rather than legal damages within the minimum amount, is in conflict with both express and implied requirements of the law." Nor does respondent's right of subrogation under the statute, F.S. Sec. 627.0851(4), F.S. A., as construed in Sellers, supra, support the claim of set-off in the circumstances of this case.
The decision of the appellate court herein is therefore quashed and the cause remanded for disposition in accordance with this opinion, with directions that attorney's fees be awarded in accordance with petitioners' contentions on this point.
ROBERTS, THORNAL and ERVIN, JJ-, concur.
BARNS, J. (Retired), dissents with opinion.
CALDWELL, C. J., dissents and agrees with BARNS, J. (Retired).
.
"627.0851 Automobile liability insurance; uninsured vehicle coverage; insolvent insurer protection.-1—
"(1) No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the ownership, mairitenance, or use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state un less coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; ."
"324.021 Definitions; minimum insurance required. — The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for the purpose of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates a different meaning.
"(7) PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. ' That proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, in the amount of Ten Thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and subject to said limits for one person, in the amount of twenty thousand dollars because of the bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the amount of five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident."
. Fla.1966, 185 So.2d 689. (Certiorari was denied in a second appearance of this case here but on a point unrelated to that now presented. See United States F. & G. Co. v. Sellers, Fla., 204 So.2d 211, certiorari denied September 18, 1967.)
. Ibid. 692.
. Southeast Title and Insurance Co. v. Austin, Fla.1967, 202 So.2d 179.
. Fla.1967, 196 So.2d 440.
. Accord, the Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid et ux., Fla.App., 1st Dist., June 13, 1967, 199 So.2d 770; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Carrico, Fla.App.4th 1967, 200 So.2d 265.
. Note 4, supra, 202 So.2d 179, at pp. 180-181.