Case Name: K- vs. H-
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1866-01
Citations: 20 Wis. 239
Docket Number: 
Parties: K- vs. H-.
Judges: Dixoít, O. J., dissents.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 239–247

Head Matter:
K- vs. H-.
Complaint in Blander, words spoken in German — Amendment of complaint at or after trial — Reversal of judgment, where came of action is not alleged, hit proven.
1. A complaint for slander, where the words are alleged to have been spoken in German, should also aver that they were understood by those who heard them.
2. In slander for words spoken in German, the complaint set forth the same in German with an English translation. Held, that even if the German words were actionable, yet if those used in the translation are not, the complaint does not show a cause of action.
3. The word “ bitch,” when applied to a woman, though a word of reproach, does not charge the crime of adultery or prostitution, and is not actionable.
4. Words charging a married woman with seating herself upon the lap of a man other than her husband, and desiring him to have carnal interconrse with her, and insisting upon it, do not charge her with the act of adultery', and are not actionableyier se. ' ,
5. The provisions of the statute (sees. 37 and 40, ch. 125, R. S.) in respect to the amendment of a complaint at or after the trial, in case of a variance, do not apply to a case where the complaint does not state a cause of action. Dixon, C. J., dissents. 4
6. A judgment for plaintiff should be reversed where the complaint does not state a cause of action, although the objection was not taken in the court below, and a cause of action was shown by the evidence, admitted witho ut exception. Dixon, C. J., dissents.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Dodge County.
This was an action for slander, brought by V. K,and his wife, 8. K. The complaint, after stating the marriage of the plaintiffs, the good character and reputation of the plaintiff 8. K., &c., alleges “that the defendant, well knowing the premises,-but contriving and maliciously intending” &c. &c. ¡diere follow specifications of time and place, and names of the persons in whose presence the words are alleged to have been spoken], “ did speak, publish and declare in the German language, of and concerning the said plaintiff 8. Kthe false, iniquitous,' scandalous and malicious words, to wit: [Here follow the words in German, with an English translation and inuendoes, the essential parts of which are as follows] : Mrs. K. (the plaintiff 8. K. meaning) took a ride with him (defendant meaning) from ’W’aupun to Ms, farm in a buggy. Mrs. K. (the plaintiff 8. K. meaning) sat in Ms lap, and wanted Mm (defendant meaning) to screw ber (meaning thereby, to bare carnal intercourse witb her). She insisted ujDon it absolutely. He (defendant meaning) could not do it, she stunk so much * * * the redheaded bitch — wMck the said defendant repeated several times; he, the said defendant, meaning thereby that the said plaintiff & K., was guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, and was and is a common prostitute.” The German word translated “ bitch,” is “ Mensch.” The complaint proceeds : “By reason of the speaking, publishing and uttering of which false, scandalous and. malicious words, the said jffaintiff is. K. is greatly prejudiced in her good name, fame, credit, reputation and character, and upon hearing of said false and scandalous report so made by defendant, she became depressed in spirits, mortified, and for a time partially deranged, and unable to enjoy the pleasures of social and domestic life as usual. Wherefore the said plaintiffs say that they have sustained damage,” &c. &c.
The answer admits the marriage of the plaintiffs, but denies the speaking of the words charged, so far as they are important here.
On the trial, the complaint was amended so as to allege that the words charged were understood by the persons in whose presence they were spoken. There was^vidence to sustain the allegations of the complaint. There was also evidence that “ the word £ Mensch ’ signifies, in the German language, a woman of very low character, and may mean a whore or not, depending on the connection in which the word is used.” No actual damages were shown. The court instructed the jury that if they found that the words charged were spoken as alleged, and that the defendant thereby intended to charge and did charge Mrs. K. with being a prostitute or whore, such words are actionable of themselves, and it was not necessary to prove special damage; that no proof of special damage having been made, the plaintiffs could not recover unless the words were actionable per se; that none of said words were actionable of themselves, unless it might be the word “ Mensch,” and whether this were so depended on the sense in which the defendant intended it should be understood; that if they should find from the connection in which the word was used, that the defendant did not intend to charge Mrs. K. with being then a prostitute, but only a woman of lewd manners and disgusting habits, then no recovery could be had; that it was not enough to find that he meant she was guilty of such acts as a prostitute might commit, but the jury must find that he meant to charge and did charge that she was a prostitute.
Yerdict for the plaintiffs for $300 ; motions in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial, overruled; and judgment upon the verdict; from which the defendants appealed.
Billinghurst, Lewis & Fribert, for appellant,
cited 1 Starlde on Slander, 22, 24, 88, 41; R. S., ch. 119, sec. 20; Zeigv. Ort, 8 Chand., 28; Broolcer v. Goffin, 5 Johns., 188; Young v. Miller, 3 Hill, 21; Benaway v. Gonyne, 3 Chand., 214; Montgomery v. Beeley, 3 Yds., 709 ; Chase v. WhitlocJc, 3 Hill, 139 ; Saunder-son.PL, Yol. 2, Pt 2, 902.
Ware & Byce, for respondents,
cited Banger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis., 78 ; 1 Starlde on Slander (Phil. Ed.), 44, 45, 57, 59 ; 3 id., 240. The strict rule of proof formerly applied to this action has been abrogated by the code. R. S., ch. 125, sec. 33. This applies to cases of slander. Yan Santvoord’s PL, 829; 3 Phillips on Ev., 236.

Opinion:
Downer, J.
Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ? The alleged slanderous words were spoken in Herman, and a translation is given in the complaint. In determining whether the complaint is defective or not, we must be governed by the translation into English. If the plaintiff in his translation has rendered a foreign word of an actionable sense, by an English one whose meaning is not ac tionable, tbe complaint is defective, and tbe judgment under tbe former practice would be arrested. Starkie on Slander, vol. 1, p. 412.
It was urged at tbe argument, tbat because it was proved on tbe trial tbat tbe word in German wbicb was translated into English by tbe word "bitch," bad two meanings in German, corresponding to tbe English words "bitch" and "prostitute," and it was left to tbe jury to say in wbicb sense tbe word was used, and they found tbat it was used in tbe sense of prostitute, tbe complaint ought to be considered as good; or if not, tbat it might be now amended. But if tbe rule we have cited from Starkie is correct, tbe complaint must be tested by tbe English translation; and testing it by tbat, it is clear to us tbat tbe word " bitch " has not any such meaning as prostitute. It is used as a term of reproach when applied to a woman, but not to charge tbe crime of prostitution. Nor do we think tbe innuendo wbicb is added to all tbe alleged slanderous words can extend tbe sense of those words so as to make them charge tbe crime of adultery or prostitution, as there are no appropriate introductory averments of wbicb tbe innuendo is explanatory, or to wbicb it refers. 1 Starkie on Slander, 422, 431; Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns., 220. By themselves, without any innuendo, they clearly charge tbe desire on tbe part of Mrs. K. to commit tbe crime of adultery, but not tbe act. Tbe alleged slanderous words, then, charged her with no crime, and tbe complaint does not, therefore, state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Tbe complaint is also defective in not averring tbat tbe words spoken in German were understood by those who beard them. Wormouth v. Cramer, 3 Wend., 394; Zeig v. Ort, 3 Chand., 29. It is obviojis tbat this case is not within tbe provisions of tbe code respecting amendments of tbe complaint in case of variance. Tbat applies only where there is a cause of of action set out in tbe complaint. Here there is none.
If tbe judgment can be affirmed at all, it must be on tbe principle of those New York decisions which hold that however defective the complaint may be, if the evidence makes out a good canse of action, and no exception is taken to its introduction because of the insufficiency of the complaint, and the question of its sufficiency is not raised in the - court below in any other way, the defect cannot be taken advantage of on appeal. See Mosselman v. Caen, 84 Barb., 66; Pope v. Dinsmore, 8 Abb., 429; 6 Barb., 557; Hunt v. Bloomer, 13 N. Y., 341. The construction given to the New York code by these ' decisions appears to be, that questions whether of fact or law can only be reviewed or raised in the appellate court where they have first been raised in the court below, and exceptions have there been taken to the ruling of the court. But this has never been our practice. Both before and since the adoption of the code in this state, this court has reversed judgments of circuit courts for defective declarations or complaints, even when the question of their sufficiency had never been raised at the trial, or at all in the courts below. Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Wis., 135; Thurber v. Jones, 14 Wis., 16. And this practice is clearly recognized and provided for in secs. 11 and 15, chap. 264, Laws of 1860.
By the Court. — -The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, with costs, and the circuit court is directed to dismiss the action.
Dixoít, O. J., dissents.
A motion for a rehearing was denied, and the following opinion filed.