Case Name: Sims v. Sims
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1920-03
Citations: 122 Miss. 745
Docket Number: No. 21145
Parties: Sims v. Sims.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 745–766

Head Matter:
Sims v. Sims.
[85 South. 73,
In Banc.
No. 21145.]
1. Makkiage. In suit to annul defendant wife not entitled to temporary alimony unless marriage prima facie valid.
In a suit by the husband to annul an alleged void marriage, the wife is not entitled to temporary alimony unless it appears at least prima facie that the marriage is valid.
2. Marriage. Validity of “common-law marriage” is recognized by statute.
Under section 3249, Code 1906 (Hemingway’s Code, section 2556), which provides that a license'shall be essential to the validity of a marriage, but that the section shall not be construed so as to invalidate any marriage that is good at common law, a marriage results from an agreement between a man and woman, qualified for entry into such relation, to become husband and wife, followed by cohabitation, although no license was obtained therefor.
3. Marriage. Void marriage contracted in good faith becomes valid 'on removal of impediment; new agreement not necessary.
Where a marriage between a man and woman contracted in good faith is void because of an impediment thereto, they become husband and wife if after the removal of the impediment they continue to occupy that relation in fact, although a new marriage agreement was not made by them after the removal of the impediment. And such persons must be deemed husband and wife in this state although the void marriage occurred in another state, provided that after the removal of the impediment they take up their permanent residence in this state and continue to live together openly as husband and wife; such conduct towards each other, taken in connection with their former association, being equivalent in law to a declaration by each of them that they did and were thereafter to occupy the relation of husband and wife.
Appeal from chancery court of Lauderdale county.
Hon. G. C. Tann, Chancellor.
Suit by O. B. Sims against Mrs. Henrietta M. Sims to annul a marriage, or in the alternative, for a divorce. From an interlocutory decree awarding defendant alimony pendente lite, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed and remanded.
W. G. Sams, for appellant.
The marriage between appellant and appellee was void absolutely and not merely voidable. The relation existing between the appellant and the appellee after their attempted marriage in 1893 up until time of separation in 1918 was not a marital relation hut was a. meretricious relation, the marriage having been void from its beginning.
If there was no marital relation, then there never could have been any marital obligation from the appellant to the' appellee. Reed v. Reed, 851 Miss. 127 and 128; McFarland v. McFarland, 64 Miss. 449'.
No marital relation exists or ever has existed between the appellant and the appellee; and no marital obligation has ever been due from appellant to appellee. It should not be necessary to cite the authorities from other states in order to secure a reversal in this case. As stated above, it seems to me that the case of Reed.. v. Reed, in 85 Miss., page 126, is conclusive of the whole matter, but there are abundant authorities from other states holding the same rule and I shall call attention to some of them as follows: Fee Parte Jones (Alabama case), 53 So. 261, et. seq.; Arendall v. Arendall (Florida case), 54 So. 957; Cartwright *v. McOown, 3' Am. Buling Cases Annotated, 287-294
The only foundation for an order for alimony, suit money, and counsel fees pendente lite is the fact of marriage between the parties. Citing, Banks v. Banks, 42 Florida, 362, 29 So. 318; Bundle v. Pegram, 49 Miss. 751.
“Nor can sexual intercourse, which the parties know to be contrary to law, form even an element of mlarriage.” Citing Peck v. Peck, 12! B. I. 485. Most probably, the appellee will contend that the pretended marriage between appellant and appellee was ratified by appellant because of the fact that appellant and appellee lived together for many years, from 1893 to 1918; but such view is untenable and unsound and contrary to the law as it exists in Mississippi. This contention is completely answered by the case of Blanks v. Southern Railway Co., 82 Miss. 703-709.
A married woman cannot contract a common-law marriage ; also, cohabitation however long continued between a married woman and an unmarried man will not ripen into a valid common-law marriage. Blanks v. Southern. Railway Go., 82' Miss. 703, et seq.
It is. seen that the relation between appellant and appellee was unlawful when it commenced, and continued to be so. If the relation was unlawful or meretrious it was not marital, then there could not and cannot be any marital obligation on the part of the appellant to pay alimony or attorney’s fees. See Reed v. Reed, 85 Miss. 126; McFarland v. McFarland, 64 Miss. 449; Carhvright v. McGoic^n, 3 American Ruling Cases, Annotated, page 288> et seq.; Ex Parte Jdnes, 53 So. 261; Arendall v. Arendall, 54 So. 958; First Col. Banks v. Banks, 29 So. 318. ' '
The Mississippi authorities and authorities from other states above cited, conclusively show that the learned chancellor -below committed grave error by granting to appellee temporary alimony and solicitor’s fee, but in order to show the unbroken line of authority in Mississippi in support of the contention of the appellant that no alimony and solicitor’s fee should have been allowed by trial court, I wish to cite three other cases decided by the supreme court of Mississippi as follows: Robinson v. Robinson, 112. Miss. 224; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 116! Miss. 396 and 397; Clark v. Clark,. 115 Miss. 726 and 729'; Railway Co. v. Beardsley, 79 Miss. 417, 3 So. 660; Knights of Pythias v. Tucker, 92 Miss. 505, 46 So. 51; Bennett v. State, 100' Miiss. 684, 56' So. 777.
I commend to the court and invite their careful reading of the last three cases cited, as well as Reed v. Reed; and when the law as expressed in these opinions shall be applied to the facts as shown by record, in my humble* opinion, the decree of the lower court will be reversed and proceedings as to alimony and attorney’s fee dismissed. This I earnestly and respectfully ask.
T. V. Brahan and Wallace Walker, for appellee.
We announce as propositions of law and equity, if Sims did know in 1902, that Mrs. Sims was advised, and did obtain a divorce from Perrin at that time, or could, by proper diligence have known it, he condoned her previous conduct up to that time (See 32 Mississippi, page 329), and his continuing to live with her from 1902, to the date of filing this bill, equitably estops him from getting a divorce. (See section 3249, Code of 1906.)
In the foregoing respects, the instant case is differentiated from Reed v. Reed in the 85th Mississippi, page 126, et seq., and the Aldridge v. Aldridge case in 116 Mississippi, page 396, et seq., and while we approve these eases, we earnestly contend that they have no application to the facts of the instant case, neither do the cases cited by counsel in his brief from Alabama, Florida, and other states.
We are glad counsel has cited the Aldridge case by Smith, C. J., in 116 Mississippi, pages 306 and 397, and which we agree with, as approving the Feed case, for the reason that Judge Smith'says: “We are not here called upon to determine whether or not this rule (Feed case) would apply in view of the provisions of section 1673, Code of 1906, in event appellee had married appellant without knowledge of- the facts that renders marriage void,” which we contend and which the chancellor believed, the appellee in the instant case was without knowledge at the time of her marriage with appellant of the facts that would render the marriage-void, because she thought she was divorced and she told the appellant and gave him sufficient information to have put him upon inquiry at least, and by his conduct he has. condoned the marriage, and after living with her for sixteen years is estopped from casting her off. Sims swears that he never knew she was not divorced until 1919, but when asked why he did not investigate, after she had told him in 189131 and 1902, about her divorce, says he did not believe what she told him, etc.; see his testimony at page 19;
W;'e have investigated the law of the instant case very exhaustively and have found a case identical with it in 46 American State Beports, beginning at page 791, et seq., styled Bardin v. Bardin, which in our opinion as well as the opinion of the learned Chancellor controls this case. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 194, 10 Am. Bep. —.
Marriage and Divorce — Alimony—For the purpose of an application for temporary alimony, etc., the fact of marriage need not be so conclusively established as is required for obtaining permanent alimony. If the plaintiff makes a reasonably plain case of the existence of a marriage, although it is denied by the defendant, she should be furnished with the means of temporary support and of conducting the suit until tbe truth or falsity of her allegations can be ascertained by the proof formally taken in the case. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184, 10 Am. Bep; 460. She is also entitled to temporary alimony where the husband ifiles¡ a bill against her admitting a marriage, but alleging it to have been illegal and void, and she denies the facts upon which the supposed illegality is founded. North v. North, 1 Barb-Ch. 241, 43 Am. Dec. 778. When the facts undisputed are such as that from them a presumption arises that the parties were married so that the affirmative rests upon the defendant to repel that presumption, the court has jurisdiction and power to grant temporary alimony and expenses, although marriage in fact is denied, and the opposing papers show facts irreconcilable with the existence thereof, or of matrimonial cohabitation. Brinkley v Brinkley, 50 M Y. 184, 10’ Am. Bep; 460. While a valid marriage is necessary to the grant of permanent alimony, temporary alimony will be awarded as a matter of course upon making out a prima-facie ease. TJpon this question the court will not go into the merits of the case, and try the cause upon conflicting affidavits. See Monographic note to Methvin v. Methvin, 60 Am. Dec. 669, 674, on Alimony.
A presumption of the death of a prior husband will be indulged to sustain a second marriage; and where a person, whose husband or wife has been absent for five years, without being known to such person to be living during that time, marries, such marriage is valid, though the other husband or wife be living. Note to Sneathen v. Sneathen, 24 Eep. 331. The judgment of the court with respect to the allowance or the amount of alimony pendente lite is discretionary, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has: been a clear and flagrant abuse of discretion. See Monographic Note to Methvin v. Methvin, 60 Am. Dec. 679.”
So we most earnestly submit to this honorable court, that the learned chancellor’s decree was eminently proper, and should be affirmed on the allowances, as well as his refusal to grant the appeal with supersedeas, which we do not believe this court would have granted, except on the ex parte showing, and had it been fully advised as to this record; and, we further ask. this court to make Mrs. Sims a. further reasonable allowance in addition tó that allowed by the chancellor for her attorney’s services in this appeal. See Hall v. Hall, 77 Miss. 741, and on a final hearing on affirming and remand of the case, we believe the ''Chancellor should dismiss the bill and allow Mrs. Sims permanent alimony, etc.

Opinion:
Smith, C-. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit begun by the appellant, the husband,- for the purpose of having his marriage with the appellee declared void, or, if that cannot be done, for a divorce, and the appeal is from an interlocutory decree awarding the appellee, the wife, alimony pendente lite.
The bill of complaint alleges that the marriage of the appellant to the appellee is void for the reason that at the' time it was solemnized the appellee had a living husband. The appellee's motion for alimony pendente lite was heard by the court below on the testimony of herself alone in support thereof and on the testimony of the appellant alone in opposition thereto. From their testimony it appears that they agree upon the following facts: They were married at Orownpoint, Ind., in October, 189®, and that the appellee had been formerly married to one Perrin, who was then living; that in 1902 the appellee sued for and obtained a divorce from Perrin in the city of Chicago on the ground of desertion; that the appellant and the appellee lived together as, and were considered by themselves and the public to be, husband and wife for about twenty-five years, twelve of which, immediately preceding the year 1918', were spent by them in the state of Mississippi; that in October, 1918, this suit was begun by the appellant. It does not appear where the appellant and the appellee lived after their marriage at Crownpoint; Ind., until they came to 'Mississippi. The validity of the divorce granted the appellee in Chicago is not questioned by tbe appellant, but, on the contrary, he alleges it in his bill of complaint and filed a copy of it as an exhibit thereto.
The appellee testified that after Perrin deserted her Jae wrote to her, stating that he had obtained a divorce, and that she could marry again if she so desired; that she believed this to be true and informed the appellant prior to their marriage that she had been divorced from her former husband; that in 1902 Perrin came to see her and suggested that they obtain a divorce, the expense of which would be defrayed by him; that she informed the appellant thereof, and that he raised no objection thereto, only inquiring who was going to pay the expense of the proceeding; that after the divorce was granted sire asked the appellant "if he' didn't think that we had better remarry, but he said that everything would be O. K."; that some time in 191,8 the appellant forced her to leave .him and then brought this suit.
The appellant testified that the appellee told him at the time of their marriage that her former husband was dead, but that some months thereafter, he having become suspicious of the truth of that statement, she told him that she had been divorced from Perrin; that he did not discover that this was not-true and that the appellee obtained a divorce from Perrin in 1902 until some time during the year 1918. On cross-examination he admitted that she might have told him in 1902 of her intention to obtain a divorce from Perrin; that he did not recall her having told him, but would not swear that she had not. In answer to the question, "You won't say that you did not have that information?" he replied, "I might have; you understand one is information and one is knowledge."
Marriage being the foundation of the husband's obligation to support his wife (McFarland v. McFarland, 64 Miss. 449, 1 So. 508), the correctness vel non of the decree of the court below awarding the appellee alimony pendente lite depends upon whether or not it appears from the testimony, at least prima facie, that the appellee is the lawful wife of the appellant (Reed v. Reed, 85 Miss. 126, 37 So. 642).
The marriage of the appellee to the appellant in 1893 at Crownpoint, Ind., being void for the reason that she was then the wife of another, the question for decision is whether or not their relations after the appellee obtained the divorce from Perrin in 1903 has resulted in a common-law marriage. _
Judges Stevens, Cook, and Smith are of the opinion that the decree of the court below should be affirmed, but Judges Ethridge, Sykes;, and Holden are of the opinion that it should be reversed. Consequently, because of the equal division of the Judges on the question of the correctness vel non of the decree of the court below and in obedience to the maxim. "Semper prcesumitur pro negante," the decree of the court below must be affirmed.
Proceeding now to set forth the reasons for the opinion of Judges Stevens, Cook, and Smith, two questions arise. First, is a common-law marriage valid in Mississippi? and, second, does the evidence- disclose a common-law marriage between the parties hereto?
Prior to the Code of 1802 a common-law marriage was undoubtedly valid in this state, and such a marriage is expressly recognized by section 3249, Code of 1906 (section 2556, Hemingway's Code). As this statute appears in the Code of 1892:, as section 2864 thereof* it is as follows:
"A marriage shall not be contracted or solemnized unless a license therefor shall first have been duly issued, and such license shall be essential to the validity of a marriage."
But when brought forward in the Code of 1906 as section 32491 (Hemingway's Code, section 2556), the following language was added thereto:
"But no irregularity in the issuance of or omission in the license shall invalidate any marriage, nor shall this section be construed so as to invalidate any marriage that is good at common law."
The two provisions of this statute seem to be in conflict, but, if the two methods therein dealt with by which the bonds of matrimony may be entered into are kept in mind the seeming conflict will disappear. The first of these methods is a ceremonial marriage solemnized pursuant to a license obtained therefor, which marriage will be valid and binding, although not followed by co habitation. The second is that prescribed by the common law, which is an agreement between a man and woman to then and there become husband and wife followed by cohabitation. Taylor v. State, 52 Miss. 84; Floyd v. Denny Calvert, 53 Miss. 37; Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490, 5 Sup. Ct. 278, 28 L. Ed. 822; Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885, L. R. A. 1916B, 1243; Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915E, 1 Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1011.
In most of the states where a common-law marriage is recognized such a marriage may be formed merely by the the use of words of present assent, per verba prcesenti, though not followed by cohabitation, but the common-law marriage referred to in the statute here in question must, of course, be held to be suich as this court had recognized prior to the statute's enactment; in other words, the statute deals with the common law of the state of Mississippi.
This court has not heretofore expressly decided that' a common-law marriage is authorized by the statute hereinbefore set forth, but that such a marriage is so authorized seems to have been assumed in Thompson v. Clay, 120 Miss. 190, 82 So. 1, and to hold otherwise would be in effect to rewrite the statute under the guise of judicial construction and to eliminate therefrom the provision recognizing common-law marriages, which provision the legislature manifestly intended to be effective.
It is not clear, or at least we will assume that it is not, from the appellee's testimony, that she and the appellant entered into a new marriage agreement after she obtained the divorce from Perrin, but no such new agreement was necessary, for the reason that her marriage with the appellant in Indiana was entered into by both of them, according to her testimony, which the court evidently accepted as true, in good faith, under the belief that her marriage with Perrin had been dissolved, and after its dissolution in 1902 they, the appellant and tlie appellee, continued in good faith to live together as, and considered themselves to be, husband and wife.
"Their conduct towards each other in the eye of the public (after the removal of the impediment to their marriage taken in connection with their previous association, was equivalent! in law to a declaration by each that they did, and during their joint lives were to, occupy the relation of husband and wife." Traverse v. Reinhardt, 205, U. S. 423, 27 Sup. Ct. 563, 51 L. Ed. 865.
^There has been considerable discussion as to whether a new marriage agreement must be entered into upon the removal of an impediment to a valid marriage of persons cohabiting as husband and wife. The cases dealing therewith seem to be divided into three classes, as will appear from a collation thereof in note to Turner v. Williams, 3 A. R. C. 165, and 18 R. C. L. 436. The first class, which seems to be in the majority, holding that no such new agreement is necessary in any case; the second, that no such new agreement is necessary where the marriage void because of an impediment thereto was contracted in good faith; and the third, and this class seems to be in the minority, that such new agreement is necessary in all cases
The majority rule is thus aptly and concisely set forth in 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, 422:
"If the parties desire marriage, and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, yet one of them is under a disability, as where there is a ipxior marriage undissolved, their cohabitation, thus matrimonially meant, will in matter of law make them husband and wife from the moment when the disability is removed; and it is immaterial whether they knew of its existence, or its removal, or not."
The principle underlying the decision of Howard v. Kelly, 111 Miss. 285, 71 So. 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1230, would seem to require this court to align itself with those courts deciding the first of these classes of cases,, but the case of Thompson v. Clay, 120 Miss. 190, 82 So. 1, clearly belongs to the second of these classes; for, while it was therein held that such a new agreement was necessary, it was also specifically pointed ont that both of the parties to the void marriage knew of the impediment thereto, from which it necessarily follows that it was not entered into by them in good faith.
That it does not appear from the evidence where the parties hereto lived after the rendition of the decree divorcing the appellee from Perrin until they came to Mississippi, which seems to have been in the year 1906, is of no consequence, for the reason that, whether or not their relations resulted in a valid marriage in any state in which they may have lived after the rendition of the Perrin divorce decree and 'before they came to Mississippi their conduct towards each other here, "taken in connection with their previous association, was equivalent in law to a declaration by each that they did, and during their joint lives were to, occupy the relation of husband and wife." Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 27 Sup. Ct. 563, 51 L. Ed. 865.
Affirmed and remanded.