Case Name: Jose I. SOLER; Resol, Inc., a Florida corporation and Primary Holdings, Inc., a Florida corporation, by and through its shareholder, Jose I. Soler, Appellants, v. SECONDARY HOLDINGS, INC., a Florida corporation, Shores Developments, Inc., a Florida corporation, Wayne Rose, Michael Latterner, and Budd Laurance, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-10-25
Citations: 771 So. 2d 62
Docket Number: No. 3D99-1064
Parties: Jose I. SOLER; Resol, Inc., a Florida corporation and Primary Holdings, Inc., a Florida corporation, by and through its shareholder, Jose I. Soler, Appellants, v. SECONDARY HOLDINGS, INC., a Florida corporation, Shores Developments, Inc., a Florida corporation, Wayne Rose, Michael Latterner, and Budd Laurance, Appellees.
Judges: Before COPE, GREEN, and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 771
Pages: 62–77

Head Matter:
Jose I. SOLER; Resol, Inc., a Florida corporation and Primary Holdings, Inc., a Florida corporation, by and through its shareholder, Jose I. Soler, Appellants, v. SECONDARY HOLDINGS, INC., a Florida corporation, Shores Developments, Inc., a Florida corporation, Wayne Rose, Michael Latterner, and Budd Laurance, Appellees.
No. 3D99-1064.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 25, 2000.
Rodriguez & Angelo, P.A. and Jorge L. Guerra and Paulino A. Nunez, Jr., Miami, for appellants.
Robert J. Bryan; Podhurst, Orseck, Jo-sefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A. and Joel S. Perwin, Miami, for appel-lees.
Before COPE, GREEN, and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
GREEN, J.
This is an appeal from the entry of final summary judgments in favor of the appel-lees, Secondary Holdings, Inc. ("Secondary"), Shores Development, Inc. ("Shores"), Wayne Rosen, Michael Latter-ner and Budd Laurence [collectively referred to as "appellees"], in a cause of action based on two alleged real estate deals that had supposedly gone awry. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jose Soler and Resol, Inc., an engineering contracting company owned and operated by Soler and his father, brought a 17-count complaint, which was subsequently amended, against the appellees claiming fraud, breach of contract, recission, securities violations and unjust enrichment arising out of the real estate deals. The complaint also sought an accounting. Specifically, the complaint alleged that in 1993, Soler verbally entered into a joint venture with Latterner and Rosen to purchase and develop two groups of land parcels: "Spanish Lakes," eighty-five (85) acres of land in the Miami Country Club area; and "Doral Estates," one-hundred (100) acres in the Doral area. The developed lots were to be sold to residential builders, most likely Lennar Corp., with whom Latterner had a longstanding working relationship. These three men allegedly agreed that: (1) each would share equally in the profits and losses resulting from the sale of the developed lots; (2) they would develop the parcels in a combined effort; and (3) Resol would do the site work, as long as it met any competing bid and posted a guarantee/performance bond.
Soler also alleged that he and Latterner formed Primary Holdings, Inc. ("Primary Holdings"), in order to take title to the Spanish Lakes property; that Laurence purchased the Spanish Lakes lots and financed the property's purchase through Primary Holdings; and that Primary Holdings "hired" Resol to do the site development work on Spanish Lakes. With regard to Doral Estates, Soler claimed that as part of the joint venture he personally placed deposits on 15 parcels of property in Doral Estates, that the appellees developed these lots without his knowledge, and that as a result he was deprived of his share of the profits. The appellees never answered Soler's amended complaint.
In Laurence v. Soler, 706 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)("SbZer I "), this court issued a writ of certiorari, abating the actions at law regarding the alleged partnership transactions until a determination was made as to whether a partnership/joint venture actually existed. If the court found the existence of a partnership/joint venture, then an accounting was to be held. On remand, the parties proceeded with discovery, to determine whether a partnership/joint venture existed regarding Spanish Lakes and/or Doral Estates.
In the summer of 1998, the parties agreed to resolve the merits of their disputes' — -those of this litigation and two other cases between them — by arbitration be fore a single arbitrator, Stanley Price. The arbitration agreement left the circuit court with a limited amount of jurisdiction. Specifically, the agreement provided in pertinent part:
10. In order to place the Litigations "at issue," as that term is defined in Rule 1.440 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties will continue to submit all pleading-related, pre-answer motions to the circuit court, (footnote added).
One of the companion cases was arbitrated in the summer/fall of 1998. This arbitration did not bode well for the appellees. In fact, they lost on virtually every issue of fact and law. Consequently, the appellees moved to vacate the arbitration award and to disqualify the arbitrator from all subsequent proceedings. The circuit court denied the motions and confirmed the arbitration award.
Subsequently, in this case the appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that Soler had compromised any interest that he may have had in Primary Holdings and Spanish Lakes when he signed a memorandum "relinquish[ing] any interest he had in Primary Holdings" and when he signed a general release six weeks later, accepting $550,000 in full and complete settlement of all claims associated with Spanish Lakes. The appellees also sought summary judgment on the ground that Soler had never entered into a joint venture with the appellees regarding Doral Estates, and that if there had been a joint venture, it ended when Soler requested and received the return of the deposits that he had placed on the Doral Estates parcels.
Soler moved to strike the summary judgment motion, to stay the litigation, and to compel arbitration on the ground that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Soler's motion to strike, ruling that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate any pre-trial motions. Moreover, the trial court held that the summary judgment motion was a "pre-answer motion" pursuant to paragraph 10 of the arbitration agreement, was excluded from arbitration.
Soler thereafter opposed the motion for summary judgment on grounds that there were issues of fact regarding whether the settlement agreement and release actually extinguished Soler's interest in Primary Holdings; whether the release had been procured by fraud; whether the release and the $550,000 payment was made in settlement of all of Soler's claims regarding Primary Holdings or only of Resol's claims as the site developer of Spanish Lakes; whether the partnership/joint venture included Doral Estates; whether Sol-er had placed deposits on the Doral Estate parcels for his personal interest or in furtherance of a joint venture; and whether the return of his deposits extinguished Sol-er's interest in Doral Estates.
The trial court granted the summary judgment, in total, without specifying its basis. Soler appeals.
Soler raises three primary issues on this appeal, each of which will be discussed separately. Initially, Soler contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion for summary judgment because of the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes. Alternatively, Soler argues that if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Spanish Lakes issue because the release signed by Soler could not bar his claim based upon his allegation that it was procured by the appellees' fraudulent concealment. Soler further argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with regards to Doral Estates because there is substantial record evidence which shows a genuine issue of material fact.
A. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court to Entertain the Summary Judgment Motion.
It is undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes, including the case at issue here. Indeed, the parties signed an arbitration agreement which provided in pertinent part that:
The Aristotle Litigation, the Spanish Lakes Litigation and the Latterner Litigation will be referred to collectively, as the "Litigations." The Litigations include all claims, counterclaims, third party claims, cross claims or ancillary claims for relief which could have been brought in connection with any of the aforementioned disputes by any party
1. This Agreement provides for a private, binding and final arbitration of all disputes between the parties, as listed above.
2. It is the intention of the parties that the arbitration provided for in this Agreement constitutes the mechanism for resolution of all remaining differences between the parties with respect to the claims and defenses in or related to the Litigations.
10. In order to place the Litigations "at issue," as that term is defined in Rule 1.440 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties will continue to submit all pleading-related, pre-answer motions to the circuit court.

16. It is the parties' intent that the arbitration fully and finally determine all issues which have been, or which could have been, raised in the Litigations. The arbitration award shall be final and binding upon the parties, and may be challenged only upon the grounds specified in Florida Statute § 682.13.
Soler argues that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to rule on the appellees' motion for summary judgment, because the parties agreed to arbitrate this entire dispute; that the arbitration agreement clearly provides that "all remaining differences" were to be resolved by arbitration; and that all doubts had to be resolved in favor of arbitration, citing, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Middleton, 648 So.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(Florida has a preference for the resolution of conflicts through extra-judicial means, "especially arbitration, for which the parties have themselves contracted."). Moreover, Soler contends that paragraph 10 of the arbitration agreement prohibited the trial court from hearing anything regarding this case, except "defensive motions attacking pleadings." We disagree.
A large portion of the appellees' motion for summary judgment asserts that all of the issues regarding Spanish Lakes have been disposed of by a settlement agreement between the parties. As the trial court noted, this portion of the summary judgment motion was clearly "pleading-related" and a "pre-answer motion," as required by paragraph 10 of the arbitration agreement. Thus, despite Soler's contention otherwise, we find that the question of whether or not the Spanish Lakes controversy was settled was within the realm of the trial court's jurisdiction, because if the matter was settled, there would be. nothing to litigate, or arbitrate, in this regard.
In addition to the language of paragraph 10, the trial court observed that the entire arbitration agreement "talks totally about trying cases and trying the issues and what you're going to submit to [the arbitrator]." Thus, the trial court correctly found that the arbitration agreement, as a whole, demonstrated that the parties only intended to try substantive issues, not the threshold issue of whether or not there was an arbitrable issue in the first place. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999)(determination of whether arbitration is required for a particular dispute is a matter of contract interpretation); Thomas W. Ward & Assoc., Inc. v. Spinks, 574 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(stating that: "[w]hether or not a dispute should be submitted to arbitration is a question for the court to determine from the contract of the parties."). Because we believe that the trial court's finding was not erroneous, we affirm the court's jurisdiction to consider the Spanish Lakes summary judgment motion. See McTeague v. Treibits, 388 So.2d 309, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)(on appeal, construction placed upon a contract by trial court should be affirmed unless clearly erroneous).
The dissent's assertion that the trial court erred in ruling on the summary judgment because to do so, runs contrary to State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Licea, 685 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1996) and Paradise Plaza Condominium Association, Incorporated v. Reinsurance Corporation, 685 So.2d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(en banc), with all due respect, is simply wrong. To begin with, Licea held that an appraisal provision in a homeowner's insurance policy was not void for lack of mutuality simply because it contained a clause under which the insurer retained its right to deny coverage. Licea, 685 So.2d at 1288. Thus, its holding has no bearing on the matters at issue here. The dissent, however, uses Licea to support its position that "any interpretation of a contract or term which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." Dissent at 73. We believe that finding that "all means all," as the dissent suggests, would leave paragraph 10 of the arbitration agreement with no effect, and thus is not the preferred manner in which to interpret that agreement. Moreover, in Paradise Plaza, which like Licea, found that an insurer had a right to contest insurance coverage under an appraisal clause, this court held that the decision of the order in which the issues of damages and coverage are to be determined is left solely to the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, analogously, in this case, the determination as to whether there is an arbitrable issue should also, as we have found, be left to the discretion of the trial court.
Further, the dissent's argument that the case of Dadeland Square, Limited v. Gould, 763 So.2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) is analogous to this case is, we think, a far stretch at best. In Gould, the parties had already been to arbitration for their case, when Dadeland moved to vacate the arbitration award based on the arbitrator's relationship to the parties. Arbitration in the case here has not yet taken place. Thus, there is no "post-loss gambit" here, as suggested by the dissent. Dissent p. 74. Accordingly, there was no waiver of appellee's position, that the Spanish Lakes controversy was not an issue and certainly not an arbitrable issue, and the trial court clearly had the discretion to rule on appel-lee's motion for summary judgment. That said, we now address the merits of the motion as to both the Spanish Lakes and Doral Estates properties, respectively.
SPANISH LAKES
The undisputed facts regarding Spanish Lakes, taken in the light most favorable to Soler, the non-moving party, show that on or about May 2, 1994, the parties formed Primary Holdings, in part, to hold title to the Spanish Lakes property. Rosen chose to have his interest held through his father's corporation, Shores, so Latterner and Soler were each allotted fifty-percent (50%) of the stock of Primary Holdings. Profits were to be split two-thirds (%) to Primary Holdings and ($) to Shores, consistent with the parties' ultimate interest in the venture.
Primary Holdings hired Resol to develop "Phase I" of Spanish Lakes. By contract, Resol was to complete the specified work within six months from receipt of the last of the permits. The last permit was obtained May 1995. Thus, pursuant to its contract with Primary Holdings, Resol was required to have the Spanish Lakes site work completed by November 1995. A business associate of Latterner, Laurence, purchased the Spanish Lakes property and resold it to Primary Holdings, taking a note and mortgage that were to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of developed lots. Thereafter, Primary Holdings contracted to sell the developed Spanish Lakes lots to Lennar. The Lennar contract with Primary Holdings called for the first phase of Spanish Lakes to be completed by May 15, 1995. Obviously, Resol missed Lennar's deadline. Primary Holdings then began to experience financial pressures.
In or about mid-August 1995, Ro-sen/Shores resigned from the Spanish Lakes project, leaving Soler, Latterner, and Primary Holdings, as the remaining partners. Rosen, however, continued to work on the project. At about this time, Latterner made a "capital call" (i.e. a request for payment on the loan) to Soler, in a letter which stated:
Pursuant to the contract executed between Primary Holdings, Inc. and Budd Laurence for the purchase of Spanish Lakes an interest payment is due Mr. Laurence for the period of June 15th through August 15th, 1995. Additionally, as you are aware, interest payments will also soon be due for the period running from August 15th through September 15th. These interest payments are mandated by the contract for the sale and purchase of the property as well as the promissory notes given in connection with this transaction. I believe you are in possession of these documents but if. you are not please contact me and I will provide them to you. Like payment are due monthly pursuant to these documents.
Your respective share of the interest owed at present is $94,472.09. Additionally, you will soon be obligated for your respective share in the amounts due on or before, September 15, 1995, which is $31,490.70 and any further amounts until closing.

I am ready, willing and able to pay my proportionate share of the interest when due. I am certain that you will likewise comply with this as one of your obligations as a partner in this deal. Please provide me with a draft in the amount of $94,472.09 made payable to Budd Laurence within 48 hours.

P.S. I've increased your share to 50% since Wayne [Rosen] is out of the deal.
The closing date for Phase I was then tentatively scheduled for September 15, 1995. By that time, the project owed Re-sol more than $700,000 for site work that had been performed on the property.
On September 13, 1995, Soler was summoned to a meeting attended by Laurence, Latterner and Rosen. At this meeting, the appellees accused Soler and Resol of rendering the Spanish Lakes project unprofitable. They threatened that if Soler did not relinquish his interest in Primary Holdings, Laurence would conduct a "friendly foreclosure" against Primary Holdings. This proceeding could take Primary Holdings' only asset (i.e., the Spanish Lakes property) and leave Resol with no source of payment of the $700,000 it was owed for the site work. Moreover, Soler was told that the only way that he could prevent foreclosure was to cooperate and relinquish his interest in Primary Holdings. Appellees handed Soler a three-paragraph memorandum, which Soler signed relinquishing his fifty percent (50%) interest in Primary Holdings. Specifically, this memorandum provided that:
#1 JOE SOLER agrees this date to relinquish any claim, position and/or stock in PRIMARY HOLDINGS, INC.
# 2 JOE SOLER will finish PHASE I within SPANISH LAKES SUBDIVISION for TWO DOLLARS AND 60/ioo ($2.50) per cubic yard. Approximately 210,000 cubic yards which will be cross sectioned at completion and computed at $2.50 per cubic yard.
# 3 Budd Laurence, Wayne Rosen, and Joe Soler will each get one competitive bid for the sewer, water, paving and drainage of the First Phase. Predicated on those bids an average will be taken to determine the settlement price with RESOL INC. to make the final payment due to RE-SOL INC. on PHASE I.
Two days after Soler's resignation from Primary Holdings, the sale of Phase I of Spanish Lakes to Lennar, closed. The closing netted Primary Holdings 3.6 million dollars.
The September 13, 1995 memorandum was subsequently executed on October 30, 1995, when Soler signed a general release, prepared by his attorney, which provided in pertinent part:
That Resol, Inc., ., Esteban Soler and Jose I Soler, ., jointly and severally (collectively the "Resol Group"), for and in consideration of a General Release and other considerations received from or on behalf of Primary Holdings, Inc., .,Shores Development, Inc., ., Michael Latterner, Budd Lawrence(sic), . and Wayne Rosen (collectively the "Primary Group"), the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged;
HEREBY remise, release, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge the Primary Group, ., jointly and severally, from any and all manner of action and causes of action, ., and demands whatsoever, on any basis, in law or equity, which the Resol Group, jointly or severally, ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall, or may have against the Primary Group for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever (including, without limitation, any construction, or development activities), from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents arising from, in connection with, or in any way related to all or any portion of that certain real property located in Dade County and more particu larly described as [Spanish Lakes, Phase I].
Upon the signing of this release, Resol was paid $550,000.
Soler contends that the September 13 memorandum and the October 30 release are void on grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation and/or concealment. Specifically, Soler claims that he would not have signed either the September 13 memorandum or the October 30 release had he known that the sale of the Spanish Lakes property would close, or had closed, on September 15, 1995. Thus, Soler contends that the appellees' concealment of the Spanish Lakes closing constitutes fraudulent concealment, and as such, he should be allowed to rescind both the memorandum and release.
The law, however, is clear that a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation and/or concealment requires proof of detrimental reliance on a material misrepresentation. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla.1985); see also Tourismart of America, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 498 So.2d 469, 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)(a cause of action for fraud requires a showing of a representation made by the defendant with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act, that the representation was false, that the defendant knew the representation to be false, and the plaintiff relied on the representation to his injury). Here, Soler unequivocally testified at his July 10, 1997 deposition that even if he had known about the Spanish Lakes closing he still would have signed the general release. Specifically, Soler testified to the following:
Q. Had you known that on September 15th, 1995 there had been a closing where Lennar closed on Phase 1, would you have signed Exhibit 2 [the general release]?
A. I would have signed it, I could have signed it.
Q. You would have?
A. Yes.
Q. So the [Lennar] closing of the 15th was not a determinative factor in your executing this release, correct?
A. Correct.
Despite his unequivocal testimony on this issue, Soler subsequently asserted that had he known on October 30, 1995 that there had been a closing with Lennar on September 15th, he would not have signed the release. In support of his position, Soler cites to his contrary testimony given at a July 21, 1997 hearing, and his affidavit attached in response to appellees' motion for summary judgment. He explained the discrepancy in his testimony by stating that he was confused and/or intimidated at his July 10,1997 deposition.
It is well settled that where there is no credible explanation for discrepancies between earlier unequivocal testimony and later inconsistent testimony, that the later testimony will be stricken. See Elison v. Goodman, 395 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also Arnold v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 632 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)(party to lawsuit will not be allowed to repudiate his or her prior deposition testimony by affidavit executed by that party or by another person, without a credible explanation given in the affidavit or in record itself); Cary v. Keene Corp., 472 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)(stating that: "[a]n unsubstantiated assertion is not sufficient to overcome the effect of . prior testimony"). Here, the trial court found nothing to support Soler's assertions at the summary judgment hearing that he was "confused" and/or "intimidated" at his earlier July 10, 1997 deposition. Since the trial court didn't have to accept Soler's explanation for the discrepancy in his sworn testimony, we find that Soler's later testimony was properly disregarded by the trial court. See, e.g., Elison v. Goodman, 395 So.2d at 1202; Ondo v. F. Gary Gieseke, P.A., 697 So.2d 921, 924 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Thus, since Soler's unequivocal testimony makes clear that he did not detrimentally rely on appellees' alleged concealment of the Spanish Lakes closing, the trial court correctly found that no fraud existed as a matter of law. Given Soler's personal execution of the memorandum and subsequent release of the appellees , we find that summary judgment was proper with regards to Spanish Lakes, and therefore affirm. See Tarr v. Cooper, 708 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 3d DCA)(summary judgment is proper where there is no admissible evidence to support an essential element of a claim), rev. denied, 722 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1998).
THE DORAL ESTATES
We find the procedural posture of this case to be somewhat different where Doral Estates is concerned. To begin with, there is no release between the parties regarding this property. Secondly, our holding in Soler I mandated that this cause be abated and remanded for a determination as to whether a partnership/joint venture had ever been formed. Soler I, 706 So.2d at 897. The parties in this case agreed to arbitrate that precise question. Thus, the trial court's entry of summary judgment based upon its conclusion that no joint venture existed between Soler and the appellees with regard to Doral Estates was beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.
Moreover, viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to Soler regarding the Doral Estates property, we conclude that genuine issues of material facts abound to preclude a disposition of this matter by way of a summary judgment. Thus, summary judgment was improper and we reverse. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985)(in passing on summary judgment motion the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non moving party); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla.1966)(moving party for summary judgment must prove the lack of genuine issues of material fact).
Based on the foregoing, we hold that summary judgment in favor of the appel-lees regarding the Spanish Lakes property was proper and therefore is affirmed. However, with regard to the Doral Estates property we find that the trial court's entry of summary judgment exceeded its limited jurisdiction pursuant to the arbitration agreement, and we therefore reverse that portion of the final summary judgment and remand for arbitration.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
. Summary judgment in favor of Secondary, Shores, Rosen and Latterner was granted March 24, 1999. A second summary judgment, on the same grounds, was granted March 25, 1999, in Laurence's favor. Final Judgment in favor of Secondary, Shores, Ro-sen and Latterner was entered May 24, 1999. These orders will be discussed collectively.
. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440 provides in pertinent part:
(a) When at Issue. An action is at issue after any motions directed to the last pleading served have been disposed of or, if no such motions are served, 20 days after service of the last pleading. The party entitled to serve motions directed to the last pleading may waive the right to do so by filing a notice for trial at anytime after the last pleading is served.... Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.440(a).
. The term "Spanish Lakes Litigation" refers specifically to this proceeding, and all claims asserted in Soler's complaint, including the Doral Estates claim.
. Appellees' motion for summary judgment specifically addresses the validity of several counts in Soler's amended complaint. If as the appellees contended, a valid release was executed with regard to the Spanish Lakes property, then said counts would have been extinguished. Clearly, the motion for summary judgement was "pleading-related." Moreover, whether Soler's claims regarding Spanish Lakes were extinguished could only be addressed by a motion for summary judgment, since the release and Soler's deposition testimony were not attached, or contained within, the four corners of the complaint. This procedure, however, is clearly within our rules. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) (A party against whom a claim . is asserted . may move for a summary judgment in that party's favor as to all or any part thereof at any time with or without supporting affidavit.). See also Coral Ridge Props., Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Assoc., Inc., 505 So.2d 414, 417 (Fla. 1987) (McDonald, C.J. concurring)(defendant is not precluded from obtaining summary judgment prior to answering).
Obviously, since an answer has not been filed in this case, the summary judgment motion was also a "pre-answer motion."
. Respectfully, the dissent's proposition that "all means all" and therefore no dispute should be resolved by the trial court, totally vitiates the language and purpose of paragraph 10 of the arbitration agreement.
. The only arbitration that has taken place is in the "Aristotle Litigation" which does not involve the Spanish Lakes property and has no bearing to the issues in this case.
. A reciprocal release was executed by the appellees lo Soler, his father and Resol.
. "Where language of a release is clear and unambiguous a court cannot entertain evidence contrary to its plain meaning." Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 679 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Fla.1996).
. Regarding Spanish Lakes, Soler has identified numerous issues of fact concerning the parties' relationship — issues which the appel-lees do not deny. These issues, however, are irrelevant, given Soler's personal total release of the appellees.
.The burden is even higher where, as in this case, the summary judgment motion is filed before the defendants have filed an answer. See Lakes of the Meadow v. Arvida/JMB Partners, L.P., 714 So.2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(stating that: "[t]he movant's burden is especially heavy where, as here, the pleadings are not closed... .The . moving party is not entitled to summary judgment unless the developer can show that no issue of material fact can be presented").