Case Name: PEOPLE v. HEATWOLE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-06-05
Citations: 83 Mich. App. 732
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-1565
Parties: PEOPLE v HEATWOLE
Judges: Before: Beasley, P. J., and Bashara and D. C. Riley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 83
Pages: 732–739

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HEATWOLE
Docket No. 77-1565.
Submitted February 22, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided June 5, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Harold R. Heatwole was convicted of armed robbery in Wayne Circuit Court, Joseph A. Moynihan, Jr., J. Defendant had filed written requests for jury instructions asking the trial court to give the standard instruction on alibi. These requests were denied. On appeal, defendant claims error because of the failure to instruct the jury on alibi. Held:
A defendant’s specific testimony regarding his whereabouts at the time a crime was committed is alibi testimony just as if another witness had given the testimony, and the defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case where his testimony and argument to the jury was an attempt to show that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred.
Reversed.
Beasley, P. J., dissents and would not set aside defendant’s conviction for failure to give a requested alibi instruction because the instructions given clearly explained the prosecutor’s burden of proof as to every element of the crime and his duty to identify defendant as the person who committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant was presumed innocent; the entire instructions lead to the conclusion that defendant had a fair trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law—Alibi—Alibi Defense—Alibi Testimony—Instructions to Jury.
A defendant’s general denial of the charges against him does not constitute an alibi defense, but if a defendant gives specific testimony regarding his whereabouts at the time in question, it is alibi testimony just as if another witness had given the testimony; a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case where his testimony and argument to the jury clearly showed that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred.
References for Points in Headnotes
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 157.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1178.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 643.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 734.
Dissent by Beasley, P. J.
2. Criminal Law—Alibi—Instructions to Jury—Fair Trial—Appeal and Error.
A guilty verdict should not be set aside for failure to give a requested alibi instruction where the jury was instructed that the prosecutor had the burden of proof to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the duty to identify defendant as the person who committed the crime, that the defendant was presumed to be innocent, and where a reading of the entire jury instruction leads to the conclusion that defendant had a fair trial.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Rita Chasting, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen, P. C. (by Paul Hynes), for defendant on appeal.
Before: Beasley, P. J., and Bashara and D. C. Riley, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
The majority adopts the statement of facts of the dissent. I hold for reversal in the full knowledge that Judge Beasley's dissent is entirely logical and eminently sound.
However, unlike the dissent, we cannot differentiate the facts of the instant case from People v McGinnis, 402 Mich 343; 262 NW2d 669 (1978). Frankly, I respectfully question the rationale of McGinnis. Nonetheless, I feel bound to observe the command of our state's highest court.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
D. C. Riley, J., concurs in the result reached by Judge Bashara.