Case Name: JACKSON v. MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1958-04-23
Citations: 97 Ga. App. 658
Docket Number: 37092
Parties: JACKSON v. MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION.
Judges: Gardner, P. J., Carlisle and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., and Townsend, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 658–662

Head Matter:
37092.
JACKSON v. MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION.
Decided April 23, 1958
Rehearing denied May 26, 1958.
O. Frank Brant, for plaintiff in error.
Anderson & Trapnell, Howard & Hunter, contra.

Opinion:
Nichols, Judge.
1. At first glance it would appear that the plaintiff is excepting to the first grant of a new trial, which judgment would not be disturbed; however, upon an examination of the defendant's amended motion for new trial, which was approved by the trial court, it definitely appears that the trial on October 14, 1957 was the second trial of the case, and that the trial court had previously granted the defendant a new trial after the plaintiff had refused to write off the penalty and attorney's fees found for him by the jury. Therefore, the exception is to the second grant of a new trial for the defendant.
2. In Ansley v. A. C. L. R. Co., 86 Ga. App. 152, 155 (71 S. E. 2d 434), in considering the duty, of the appellate courts in reviewing the grant of -a second or third new trial to the same party, Judge Townsend sai.d: "The reviewing court must carefully investigate to determine if the discretion to grant a second or third new trial has been justly, wisely, and prudently exercised, for, while the trial judge may still exercise some discretion to set aside a second verdict in favor of the same party where the evidence is weak and unsatisfactory, or where it largely preponderates in favor of the losing party, he may no longer set aside the verdict merely because of conflicts in the evidence or beause he considers the issue a close and doubtful one." See also cases cited therein.
The judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion for new trial, if the plaintiff failed to write off the penalty and attorney's fees, is not based on the theory that the verdict in the principal amount sued for was unauthorized but, on the contrary, it states that such portion of the verdict was supported by the evidence. No exception was taken to this part of the judgment and the same will not be considered in detail. Therefore, the controlling .question for decision is whether under the evidence adduced on the second trial, the trial held on October 14, 1957, the penalty and attorney's fees awarded the plaintiff by the jury were authorized by the evidence.
In support of its contention that there was no, or insufficient, evidence .to support 'these items of recovery, the defendant, in its amended motion for new trial, relies on alleged differences in the evidence adduced on the first trial and that adduced on the second trial, '.plus the fact that, without any prior notice being given it by the plaintiff, the plaintiff relied on a purported oral demand made to one 'of its employees who was not present at the trial, and presumably contends that, if it had had prior knowledge that the plaintiff was going to rely on such purported oral demand, it could have had this person available to testify that ho such demand was made. There is no contention that the testimony of this person is' newly discovered evidence, but as shown above it appears that the contention of the defendant is that it was surprised by the plaintiff's evidence and did not expect to need the testimony of this person, that such person was approximately 65 miles away from the site of the trial when the evidence which he could have disputed was.presented, and that, if it had known that the testimony given was to be presented, it could have had the person present to refute it. Accordingly, since this does not present any question for decision, the sole remaining question is still whether the evidence adduced on the trial of the case authorized the verdict for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff presented evidence that the fire loss occurred a day or two prior to August 29, 1956, that a proof of loss was filed on August 29, 1956, and that on September 29 or 30, 1956, an oral demand for payment was made on the defendant, and that the action was not filed until December 11, 1956. Therefore, the evidence met the first requisites of Code § 56-706. If the jury was authorized to find that the defendant's refusal to pay the plaintiff's claim was in bad faith then the trial court erred in rendering the judgment granting the defendant a second new trial should the plaintiff refuse to xorite O'ff the penalty and attorney's fees. In cases where the evidence demands a finding that the insurance company did not act in bad faith in refusing to pay the claim, it is proper to unite off that-part of the verdict awarding a penalty and attorney's fees where the verdict is otherwise supported by the evidence. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Owen, 90 Ga. App. 200 (82 S. E. 2d 742); Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ga. App. 287 (82 S. E. 2d 885).
The defendant contended on the trial of the case, and presented evidence to the effect, that it had attempted to settle the case, but because the plaintiff's demands were so excessive it was under a duty to resist them. The evidence on this point was in sharp conflict. The plaintiff testified that, shortly after he had filed his proof of loss, the adjuster for the defendant advised him that the defendant would pay him "not one cent," while the defendant presented evidence that it would have settled the claim for what would have amounted to 75 cents on the dollar of the loss as contended for by the plaintiff, and as found by the jury. It cannot be said that the- jury was not authorized to find that the amount purportedly offered by the defendant to settle the claim was so small as to constitute bad faith, if it believed that such amount was offered, since it was undisputed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the policy of insurance. At most the evidence on this point was conflicting.
Therefore, since it is generally-a question for the jury as to whether an insurer's refusal to pay the claim due on an insurance policy is in bad faith (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 53 Ga. App. 28, 184 S. E. 755, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. A. C. L. R. Co., 66 Ga. App. 826, 834, 19 S. E. 2d 377, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lathan, 77 Ga. App. 6, 47 S. E. 2d 596, and National Life &c. Ins. Co. Moore, 86 Ga. App. 618, 72 S. E. 2d 141), the judgment of the trial court requiring the penalty and attorney's fees to be written off or a new trial granted must be reversed, this being the second grant of a new trial for the defendant on the same ground.
Judgment reversed.
Gardner, P. J., Carlisle and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., and Townsend, J., dissent.