Case Name: Thomas GOODMAN, Appellant, v. COAST MATERIALS COMPANY, W.C. Fore and Pat Fore a/k/a Pat Fore, III, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-11-04
Citations: 858 So. 2d 923
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01364-COA
Parties: Thomas GOODMAN, Appellant, v. COAST MATERIALS COMPANY, W.C. Fore and Pat Fore a/k/a Pat Fore, III, Appellees.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES and IRVING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 858
Pages: 923–930

Head Matter:
Thomas GOODMAN, Appellant, v. COAST MATERIALS COMPANY, W.C. Fore and Pat Fore a/k/a Pat Fore, III, Appellees.
No. 2002-CA-01364-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Nov. 4, 2003.
Michael W. Crosby, Gulfport, attorney for appellant.
Britt R. Singletary, Gary Dale Thrash, Jackson, Glen K. Till, attorneys for appel-lee.
Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES and IRVING, JJ.

Opinion:
BRIDGES, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Thomas Goodman filed suit against Coast Materials Company, W.C. Fore and Pat Fore a/k/a Pat Fore, III, in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thereby entitling the defendants to judgment as a matter of law. Goodman appeals to this Court from that judgment. We cite verbatim the issue on appeal.
CAN AN EMPLOYEE RECOVER COMMON LAW DAMAGES FROM HIS EMPLOYER OR CO-EMPLOYEE FOR AN INJURY OCCURRING OUT OF A PHYSICAL ATTACK BY THE OWNER/CO-EMPLOYEE IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR A COMPENSABLE INJURY, IF THE INJURED EMPLOYEE FILES FOR AND RECEIVES "SOME" COMPENSATION BY THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION?
FACTS
¶2. While working at Coast Materials Company, Goodman and the owner, W.C. Fore, and Pat Fore, III, an employee and relative of W.C. Fore, got into a dispute over whether Goodman failed to show up for work on a certain day. A fistfight occurred between Goodman and W.C. Fore in which both were injured.
¶ 3. Based on the incident, Goodman filed a report with the Workers' Compensation Commission on August 26,1992, and received benefits for his injuries. However, after receiving approximately seven thousand dollars of workers' compensation benefits, Goodman then filed this common law tort suit against Coast Materials, W.C. Fore, and Pat Fore, III.
¶ 4. A summary judgement motion was filed by the defendants asserting that because Goodman has elected to obtain workers' compensation benefits, an exclusive remedy, Goodman is, therefore, barred from bringing this common law tort. Summary judgment was granted finding no genuine issue of material fact.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5. This Court, examining all the evi-dentiary matters before it — admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc, employs a de novo standard of review of a lower court's grant or denial of a summary judgment. "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion had been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his or her favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied." McMillan v. Rodriguez, 823 So.2d 1173, 1176-77 (¶ 9) (Miss.2002).
ANALYSIS
WHETHER THE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE APPELLEES, ARISING OUT OF AN ALLEGED WORKPLACE ASSAULT AND BATTERY, ARE BARRED AND PREEMPTED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT.
¶ 6. "The Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") was enacted in 1948 in order to provide an assured recovery to injured employees and their dependants." Mullins v. Biglane Operating Company, 778 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Stanley v. McLendon, 220 Miss. 192, 70 So.2d 323 (Miss.1954)). With the passage of the Act, "workers gained the right to make a claim for a job-related injury regardless of fault, but lost the right to sue his employer in a civil tort. Recently, however, in response to a perceived need and in accordance with a nationwide trend, the Mississippi Supreme Court has carved out a narrow exception to this exclusiveness of remedy provision." Id.
¶ 7. In Miller v. McRae's Inc., 444 So.2d 368, 369 (Miss.1984), the court held that an employee of McRae's Department Store who was held and questioned by McRae's security guards on a charge of shoplifting was not barred by the Act from asserting a cause of action against McRae's for false imprisonment. The court agreed with the employee that the facts indicated a willful act, not an accidental injury, and that she was, therefore, not limited to a workers' compensation recovery. Id. at 371. "It was never the intention of the Workers' Compensation Act to bar an employee from pursuing a common law remedy for an injury that is the result of a willful and malicious act." Id.
¶ 8. Until recently, Miller was said to have two different issues to be resolved:
Where exclusivity of remedy is involved one must ask not only whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, but also, whether the injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Id. at 372. In context, it is clear that the court meant that the "injury" must be of a kind that is compensable. Some injuries such as humiliation, deprivation of personal liberty, and embarrassment were not compensable kind of injuries. Id. at 372 & n. 2.
¶ 9. In 2002, the supreme court abandoned part of Miller and rephrased the rest of the test. The court stated that Miller contained "a misinterpretation of the exclusivity test . " Newell v. Southern Jitney Jungle Co., 880 So.2d 621, 624(¶ 12) (Miss.2002). Miller had in one section improperly created a two-part test: "(1) the injury must have been caused by the willful act of another employee acting in the course of employment and in the furtherance of the employee's business; [and/or] (2) the injury must be one that is not compensable under the act." Id. at 624(¶ 13). The correct "inquiry set forth in Miller asks whether the injury is com-pensable under the act." Id. at 625(¶ 14). Compensability is resolved by determining whether the injury is an accidental one as defined in section Tl — 3—3(b). Id. at 624(¶ 15). The statutory definition includes injuries caused by a willful act committed by someone who is a stranger to the employment relationship. From this it is concluded that injuries resulting from willful or intentional acts by fellow employees are not "accidental." They, therefore, are not claims subject to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.
¶ 10. After Newell there is still a recognized right to bring a civil suit against an employer for some intentional torts committed by co-employees. Newell did not reject the concept but only deleted part of the Miller explanation. The focus is now to be on whether there was an accidental injury under the Act. Miller and subsequent cases have held that intentional acts by those who are not strangers to the employment relationship may be the basis for such tort suits. Goodman has brought suit for what he alleges was an intentional assault by his co-employee. We find no argument under the present state of the law to dismiss this suit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEES.
KING P.J., LEE, IRVING, MYERS, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., AND GRIFFIS,. J. THOMAS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.