Case Name: Jan REITSMA et al. v. PASCOAG RESERVOIR & DAM, LLC
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 2001-06-20
Citations: 774 A.2d 826
Docket Number: No. 2000-306-Appeal
Parties: Jan REITSMA et al. v. PASCOAG RESERVOIR & DAM, LLC.
Judges: Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 774
Pages: 826–847

Head Matter:
Jan REITSMA et al. v. PASCOAG RESERVOIR & DAM, LLC.
No. 2000-306-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
June 20, 2001.
Michael L. Rubin, Alan Shoer, Providence, Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., for Plaintiff.
Barry J. Kusinitz, John B. Webster, Warwick, for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
FLANDERS, Justice.
Can the state government involuntarily divest owners of private property other than by eminent domain or by condemnation? Yes, we hold, because, like private parties, the government itself can acquire an easement by prescription or title by adverse possession over property that was otherwise privately owned during the period of the taking. To do so, it must establish actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous use of the property under a claim of right for ten years, as required by G.L.1956 § 34-7-1. See, e.g., Talbot v. Town of Little Compton, 52 R.I. 280, 286, 160 A. 466, 469 (1982) (holding that municipality, on behalf of the public, "openly, notoriously and uninterruptedly used the entire tract [of a beach] under a claim of right for a length of time far in excess of the statutory period for obtaining title by adverse uses").
In this case, acting through an executive department now known as the Department of Environmental Management, the state built a boat ramp in 1965 on a waterfront lot that it acquired in 1964. The property and the boat ramp abutted an artificially created body of water called Echo Lake in Glocester. Although the record does not reveal exactly when it did so, the state also erected and maintained signs near the boat ramp that purported to regulate the public's use of the lot, the ramp, and the lake. At all times material to this case, the defendant corporation, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLG (corporation) — or one of its predecessors in title — has been Echo Lake's owner of record. For thirty-two years, from 1965 through 1997, the state maintained and operated its lakeside property so that members of the public could park their vehicles there and then use the ramp as a point of access to the lake for various recreational activities, including boating and fishing. Over that period, innumerable members of the public and other lakeside property owners have used the ramp as a means of access to the lake for such purposes — without interruption, objection, or interference by the corporation or by any of its predecessors in title. Not until 1997 — when it posted a "NO TRESPASSING" sign — did the corporation — or, for that matter, any of the lake's previous owners — communicate any objection to the state's or to the public's use of this boat ramp as a means for boats to access the lake for recreational purposes.
Nevertheless, a Superior Court trial justice — after reviewing the evidence in a nonjury trial — rejected the state's claim to having adversely possessed the lake-bottom property beneath the boat ramp and to having acquired, on behalf of the public, a prescriptive easement to the use of the ramp for lake access. The court concluded that the state's placement of a substantial portion of the ramp on the bottom of the lake and the public's use thereof had been merely permissive. More specifically, the trial justice found that the state had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the collective or individual use of the ramp for access to the lake had been pursued under a claim of right or that it was in any way hostile, open, notorious, or adverse to the interests of the lake owners. For the reasons prescribed below, these conclusions, we hold, were clearly erroneous and, therefore, must be reversed.
Facts and Travel
We reproduce, in pertinent part, the facts and travel of the case, as found by the trial justice and included in his decision of the case:
"The following facts are generally not in dispute. Pascoag Reservoir, also known as Echo Lake, is an artificially created body of water and is located in the towns of Burrillville and Glocester, Rhode Island. The lake covers between 355 and 387 acres of water surface and is over two miles in length and has over ten miles of shoreline.
"The lake is ringed by approximately 300 private homes, two for-profit businesses and two camps for children operated by religious organizations.
"In 1964, the state purchased a lot abutting the lake of approximately one and three quarter acres. In 1965 the State constructed a boat ramp facility to permit members of the public to launch boats from the ramp onto the lake.
"The State has continuously owned and maintained this boat ramp facility to the present day.
"The boat ramp itself is 30 feet wide with a 12 foot traction surface. It is 48 feet long, 38 feet of which is submerged at ordinary high water. There is also a 'prop-wash zone,' an additional area which extends 6 feet outward from the submerged end of the traction surface and which lies on the lake bed under water.
"The defendant Corporation has claimed ownership of the lake since 1983. The Corporation's predecessors in title who created the lake, did so in 1860 upon lands purchased or owned by the Corporation's predecessors in title and flooded by a dam to create the lake.
"Said predecessors in title were an association of mill owners who created the lake to provide power to its mill interests in the area.
"These predecessors in title maintained the dam, # 016, and controlled the level of the lake uninterruptedly from the lake's creation to its sale to the Corporation in 1983, lowering the lake in winter and raising the lake in summer.
"Since 1983 the Corporation has been assessed real property taxes on the lake by both the towns of Burrillville and Glocester.
"Since 1983 the Corporation has continually paid the taxes levied by both towns and has conducted the maintenance and upkeep of the lake since its purported ownership in 1983.
"Lakefront property owners have been using the lake for swimming, boating and fishing for a substantial period of time.
"Members of the general public, as well as lakefront land owners, have accessed the lake via the State owned and maintained boat ramp since its construction in 1965.
"The State owned boat ramp facility provides the only public access venue for the public to access the lake for boating, fishing, and swimming — and is utilized in summer — and to a lesser degree, in winter for winter related activities.
"On or about July 28,1997, the Corporation erected a 'no trespassing' sign in the vicinity of the State's boat ramp. In a letter dated July 30, 1997, the Corporation notified the State that it was "withdrawing any express or implied permission to use the reservoir. No further access by the general public should be permitted through the boat ramp.'
"Other issues arose during this time frame which caused a justice of this Court to issue an order temporarily restraining the Corporation from altering the water levels of the lake without permission from the State's Department of Environmental Management."
In addition, the trial court found as follows:
"In support of its claim that the general public has gained a prescriptive easement for the recreational use of the lake for boating, swimming, and fishing; the State produced at least twelve witnesses to testify at trial from its total of 21 witnesses called. These witnesses testified to years of unfettered access to the lake both prior to and subsequent to the construction of the boat ramp. The witnesses came from the ranks of waterfront lot owners, persons who operated for-profit businesses on, or dependent upon the lake, persons who operated profit and nonprofit campgrounds along the shores of the lake and other members of the general public who came from afar who testified to their use of the boat ramp and the lake itself for fishing, swimming, and the like.
"The witnesses collectively testified that they never sought nor received permission to use the lake or were in any way prohibited or limited in their use of the lake for the recreational purposes customarily engaged in on a lake of this type. The witnesses testified to long years of usage and familiarity as well as shorter more infrequent uses. Many lakefront dwellers testified that the boat ramp was their only means of access to the lake either because of the configuration of their lots or the size of their boats. The State also provided testimony that the value of the lakefront lots, including those sold by the Corporation over the years, was enhanced by the accessibility of the lake either via the boat ramp or the waterfront lots."
After the corporation posted its no-trespassing sign in 1997, the state filed a complaint and petition for injunctive relief against the defendant corporation. The state alleged violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act, G.L.1956 § 2-1-18 through 2-1-24, and asserted that it had acquired an easement to the lake by virtue of, inter alia, the doctrines of easement by prescription and adverse possession. The corporation soon answered and filed a counterclaim alleging inverse condemnation, trespass, and violations of its substantive due process rights pursuant to the federal and state constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Over the corporation's objection and in response to the state's motion to do so, the court severed the state's allegations pertaining to the violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the rest of this case. The trial justice also voluntarily dismissed the corporation's inverse condemnation claim, without prejudice. Thereafter, at the conclusion of the trial, it entered a partial final judgment in favor of the corporation under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The state has appealed from this judgment.
Analysis
We have long recognized that "one who claims an easement by prescription has the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous use under a claim of right for ten years as required by § 34-7-1." Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I.1999) (quoting Palisades Sales Corp. v. Walsh, 459 A.2d 933, 936 (R.I.1983)). "Furthermore, although each element must be established by clear and convincing evidence, '[n]o particular act to establish an intention to claim ownership is required. It is sufficient if one goes upon the land openly and uses it adversely to the true owner, the owner being chargeable with knowledge of what is done openly on his land.' " Id. (quoting Greenwood v. Rahill, 122 R.I. 759, 763, 412 A.2d 228, 230 (1980)); see also Talbot, 52 R.I. at 286, 160 A. at 469 (explaining that where use "was so [substantial] and so regular and for such a long period of time that any person having a claim of title, if he gave any attention whatever to the matter, would have known the use was hostile and under a claim of right").
In other words, a claim of right to own or use property will arise by implication through objective acts of ownership that are adverse to the true owner's rights, one of which is to exclude or to prevent such use. When confronted with such an open, unsolicited, and long-continued use of the property, the true owner must affirmatively communicate either objection or permission to stop the statutory prescriptive period from running. Mere acquiescence or silence, however, in the face of uses that are inconsistent with the true owner's property rights, does not constitute permission. Thus, in Burke-Tarr, we reversed this same trial justice's attempt to rely upon the true owner's alleged silent permission for the laying of a pipeline across the property to defeat a prescriptive easement. There we held that:
"an inference of permissive use, which would defeat the element of hostile use, cannot properly be drawn from the lone fact that the parties entered into a written lease [for a portion of the area that did not include the area over which a prescriptive easement was claimed.]. Moreover, we have found no evidence that [the property owner] objected to [the claimant's] installation [of a pipe], or its continuous use, at any point prior to the expiration of the lease. [W]e conclude that there is no suggestion that this pipe, although installed in full view of [the property owner], was done so with her permission." Burke-Tarr Co., 724 A.2d at 1019-20.
The facts in this case supporting the existence of a prescriptive easement are even stronger than they were in Burke-Tarr. In contrast to Burke-Tarr, here the state did not possess a written lease giving it permission to install a boat ramp on any portion of the privately owned lake, nor was there any agreement between the state and the owner that would have allowed the public to obtain access to and to use the lake from the state's boat ramp for any purpose. Thus, no inference of permission from the lake owner could be drawn from the mere fact that it allowed the use to continue. On the other hand, as in Burke-Tarr, no evidence indicated that any owner ever had affirmatively granted permission to the state to use the property in the manner that it was used. Moreover, no evidence showed that any lake owner ever had objected either to the state's installation of the boat ramp or to the continuous use thereof by the public to access the lake — at least not any point before the running of the prescriptive period in 1975 or at any time thereafter until 1997. Thus, following Burke-Tarr, we conclude that there is no evidentiary support for the trial justice's finding that this ramp and the public's access to the lake therefrom, "although installed in full view of [the property owner], was done so with [its] permission." Id., 724 A.2d at 1020.
Other state courts have employed similar reasoning to find that the government has acquired property prescriptively. For example, in Garrett v. Gray, 258 Md. 363, 266 A.2d 21 (1970), a state appellate court reversed a trial court ruling against the public in a prescriptive-easement case, holding that:
"The chancellor dismissed the user by the many witnesses who testified below as 'permissive use.' However, we think the use would more appropriately be characterized as use by 'acquiescence.' 'Mere failure .to protest is not permission but acquiescence.' 'Acquiescence is the inactive status of quiescence or unqualified submission to the hostile claim of another, and is not to be confused with permission, which denotes a grant of permission in fact or a license.'" Id. at 27-28. (Emphasis added.)
See also Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 303-04 (Alaska 1985) ("The sort of permission which would negate the claim of an adverse user is not mere acquiescence because: [T]he whole doctrine of title by adverse possession rests upon the acquiescence of the owner in the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession."); Davis v. Wilkinson, 140 Va. 672, 125 S.E. 700, 702 (Ct.Spec.App.1924) (explaining that acquiescence does not constitute "legal permission"; "[f]ailure to object to the use" constitutes acquiescence, not permission).
Although the public can itself acquire a prescriptive easement by open and continuous adverse use, see, e.g., Swift, 706 P.2d at 305 ("[A] public easement may be acquired by prescription."); Opinion of the Justices, 139 N.H. 82, 649 A.2d 604, 610 (1994) (stating that general public may acquire easement by prescription to coastal beach land), a state or municipal government, or one of its subdivisions, also can acquire a prescriptive easement over otherwise private property, on behalf of the public, whether or not the public alone could do so. See Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v. National Park Service, 558 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that public may obtain prescriptive easement to use private stream); Talbot, 52 R.I. at 286, 160 A. at 469; City of Jacksonville v. Horn, 496 So.2d 204, 209 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) ("[Illegally organized or political entities, as distinguished from the unorganized general public, may acquire an easement by prescription or title by adverse possession. [A] city or county represents the public in the establishment of such an easement."); Hollywood, Inc. v. Zinkil, 403 So.2d 528, 535 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upholding municipal prescription of beach on behalf of public); Daley v. Town of Swampscott, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 822, 421 N.E.2d 78, 82 (1981) ("There is no doubt that a municipality may acquire an easement by prescription to use land located within its limits for a specific public purpose."); Granite County v. Komberec, 245 Mont. 252, 800 P.2d 166, 171 (1990) (finding that "County has a prescriptive right to the road" on behalf of public); Beach v. City of Fairbury, 207 Neb. 836, 301 N.W.2d 584, 586 (1981) (finding that city acquired prescriptive sewer easement); Nice v. City of Marysville, 82 Ohio App.3d 109, 611 N.E.2d 468, 470 (1992) ("A municipal corporation or city may acquire title by adverse possession."); Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wyo.1987) (holding that governmental body could acquire title to land by adverse possession or right to use land by prescription); State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 246 Kan. 99, 785 P.2d 1356, 1363 (1990) (stating that doctrine of prescriptive easements for public highways extends to streams and rivers, and stressing that official action is required for public to obtain prescriptive easement for recreational purposes).
In Talbot, a town, on behalf of the public, claimed the right to a contested beach area. The beach owner in Talbot, like the lake owners here, possessed paper title to the land in dispute (in that case, an extended beach area). As here, the property owner in Talbot never attempted during the prescriptive period to exclude the public from freely using the privately owned property in question. 52 R.I. at 283, 160 A. at 467. The town and farmers residing in the town openly carted gravel from the beach, removing many loads over a period of years. As here, neither the government nor the public believed they were trespassing in their use of the property. Like the use of the lake through the boat ramp, the beach and its store of gravel in Talbot were "openly, notoriously and uninterruptedly used under a claim of right for a length of time far in excess of the statutory period Id. at 286, 160 A. at 468-69. Moreover, in both Talbot and in this case, the public's right to use the property stemmed from ostensible governmental authorization to do so. In Talbot the public used a beach for recreation that was maintained by the government; here, the public used a boat ramp that had been built and maintained by the state for the public to obtain access to and use the lake for recreation.
Given the factual findings of the trial justice and the above-referenced law, we are constrained to conclude that the state's 1965 construction of the boat ramp (a substantial portion of which was located upon and in the lake bed) and its subsequent maintenance of this structure during its uninterrupted use by the public over the next thirty-two years — was open, actual, notorious, hostile, adverse, continuous, and — given the state's objective acts of ownership and the public's highly visible use of the ramp to obtain access to the lake — accomplished under a claim of right as a matter of law. Indeed, there was no evidence whatsoever at trial that any owner of the lake' ever had objected to the construction, maintenance, or public use of the ramp until 1997. Permission to engage in such a use of the lake was never sought by the state; and permission, express or implied, was never given for it to build or maintain the physical boat-ramp structure that rested in large part on the owner's lake bed. As such, the state's thirty-two year maintenance of a portion of its boat ramp upon the lake bed amounts to a classic case of adverse possession. See, e.g., DelSesto v. Lewis, 754 A.2d 91, 94-95 (R.I.2000) (explaining the doctrine and its application); Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 897-98 (R.I.1996) (same); Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 367-68 (R.I.1982) (same).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it found that .the "record is devoid of any evidence provided by the state to indicate that the construction of said ramp was hostile, notorious or adverse or constructed under claim of right to the portion of the lake bed occupied by the submerged portion of the boat ramp." The court erred by failing to find that the very act of openly placing a permanent physical structure on another's property without the true owner's permission and maintaining it there for more than ten years is itself an action that is so inconsistent with the trae ownership of that property that it is therefore notorious, adverse, hostile, and under claim of right as a matter of law. See Anthony, 681 A.2d at 897-98 (finding adverse possession by placement of physical structures on disputed property and open use of structures); Gammons, 447 A.2d at 367-68 (explaining that ultimate fact to be proved in adverse possession case is whether the claimant has acted toward the land in question as would an average owner); Greenwood, 122 R.I. at 763, 412 A.2d at 230 (finding prescriptive easement in favor of the state for water flowing over another's property).
We hold that in the absence of evidence of a knowing trespass or of express permission from any owner, the construction and maintenance of a physical structure on another's property will be deemed to be accomplished under a claim of right because "[n]o particular act to establish an intention to claim ownership is required. It is sufficient if one goes upon the land openly and uses it adversely to the true owner, the owner being chargeable with knowledge of what is done openly on his land." Greenwood, 122 R.L at 763, 412 A.2d at 230 (finding no permission and no objection until after ten years); see Anthony, 681 A.2d at 898 (using and cultivating land and erecting structures for statutory period sufficient for finding of adverse possession); Gammons, 447 A.2d at 368 (finding claim of right through mere use and improvement of disputed land).
Indeed, adverseness and hostility have been inferred from the mere use of another's property without that owner's communicated permission to do so. See, e.g., Taffinder v. Thomas, 119 R.I. 545, 551-52, 381 A.2d 519, 522-23 (1977) (finding use of property over boundary line for statutory period sufficient for adverse possession); LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51, 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) (holding that mistaken use of another's property for statutory period sufficient for adverse possession); Talbot, 52 R.I. at 286, 160 A. at 469 (deeming use of beach adverse and hostile). Here, for thirty-two years the state's boat ramp served as the public point of access to the surface of the lake for many recreational activities by an innumerable multitude of persons. Thus, the trial court's holding that the state did not, through adverse possession, acquire the right to keep and maintain the boat ramp for public use of the lake must be reversed.
Further, the public's use of the lake through the state boat ramp was continuous from its inception to well past the ten-year prescriptive period. Indeed, it had been continuous even through to the filing of the present lawsuit. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the evidence of continuous use was insufficient. Thus, the trial justice stated that "the evidence produced gives this Court no indication of how many people actually use or used the ramp to gain access and with what frequency. It isn't clear whether 2 or 200 citizens utilized the ramp to gain access and with what frequency. There is no record of daily, weekly or monthly use." But "[t]he test is not the number of persons actually using it, but the character of the use,— that is, whether or not the public, generally, had the free and unrestricted right to use the road." Feldker v. Crook, 208 Ill. App.3d 1012, 153 Ill.Dec. 888, 567 N.E.2d 1115, 1124-25 (1991). Here, the undisputed evidence established that, since the installation of the state's boat ramp, the public's use of it to obtain access to the lake was "unfettered" and continuous, such that it could not be characterized as haphazard or casual. Cf. Talbot, 52 R.I. at 286, 160 A. at 469 (holding that the town's use was so substantial and regular as to support adverse possession); Catalano v. Town of Windham, 133 N.H. 504, 578 A.2d 858, 862 (N.H.1990) (holding intermittent use sufficient to establish prescriptive rights to general public when consistent with character of easement claimed); Luevano v. Maestas, 117 N.M. 580, 874 P.2d 788, 793-94 (Ct.App.1994) ("[F]requency of use or number of users is unimportant, it being enough if use of the road in question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a public highway.") (quoting Discher v. Klapp, 124 Ind.App. 563, 117 N.E.2d 753, 757 (1954)); Town of Sparta v. Hamm, 97 N.C.App. 82, 387 S.E.2d 173, 176-77 (1990) (holding that continuous use of road by public, even though slight, and maintenance of road by town, however poorly, for prescriptive period was by claim of right and sufficiently hostile for town to establish a public prescriptive easement).
The trial court itself found that "Members of the general public, as well as lakefront land owners, have accessed the lake via the State owned and maintained boat ramp since its construction in 1965. The State owned boat ramp facility provides the only access venue for the public to access the lake for boating, fishing, and swimming — and is utilized in summer— and to a lesser degree, in winter for winter related activities." Indeed, the trial court noted that multiple
"witnesses testified to years of unfettered access to the lake both prior to and subsequent to the construction of the boat ramp. The witnesses came from the ranks of waterfront lot owners, persons who operated for-profit businesses on, or dependent upon the lake, persons who operated profit and nonprofit campgrounds along the shores of the lake and other members of the general public who came from afar who testified to their use of the boat ramp and the lake itself for fishing, swimming, and the like." (Emphases added.)
The court further acknowledged that "[mjany lakefront dwellers testified that the boat ramp was their only means of access to the lake either because of the configuration of their lots or the size of their boats." Given these factual findings, it matters not that the state was unable to establish precisely the exact number of lake users or the exact frequency of their use of the boat ramp to obtain access to the lake.
In sum, the evidence clearly established that (allowing for seasonal variations) untold numbers of the public, including lakefront residents, had used the state's boat ramp facility continuously from 1965 to 1997 to launch boats into Echo Lake and then used the lake itself for fishing, water-skiing, swimming, and related recreational activities. Indeed, it was the only facility on this lake affording such public access. Moreover, the extent of the public's "years of unfettered access to the lake" certainly was not haphazard or casual.
Thus, the trial court erred when it found that the public's use of the lake "has been permissive through the assent of both the defendant corporation and its predecessors in title." Other than the owners' silent acquiescence, no evidence of this permission existed and none was communicated to the state or to any user. For example, no user of the ramp testified to any permission to use the lake received from any lake owner or from any of its predecessors. Even the trial court acknowledged that the "witnesses collectively testified that they never sought permission to use the lake Yet the Court's decision states that, "[i]n support of the claim that the Corporation had allowed permissive use of the lake for recreational and other purposes and retained in itself all aspects and rights of ownership in the lake bed and upon the water of the lake, the defense, through Mr. Mesolella, introduced a number of documents It further notes that "[a] series of letters from the Corporation's predecessor in title to various lakefront landowners, businesses, and organizations were introduced as exhibits to attempt to establish a record of continuous active and affirmative control of the lake from 1937 through 1983 when the Corporation came on the scene, and from 1983 to the present day The trial court concluded that these documents proved that the lake owner had given permission to the users, thereby defeating the State's claim.
But none of these letters related in any way to the state boat ramp itself or to the public's use of it to obtain access to the lake. Indeed, none of the letters even mentioned the boat ramp. Moreover, only two of the letters were directed to the state, and those two exceptions were dated before the state acquired the boat-ramp lot. After examining the evidence in the record, we are persuaded that the trial court's permissive-use conclusion was totally unsupported by the evidence. Thus, we conclude, it constituted clear legal error and must be reversed.
Finally, although the corporation voluntarily dismissed its inverse condemnation claim without prejudice, it still complains on appeal that the state's conduct in this case constitutes a "first step in a land grab unrivaled within recent jurisprudence." It then urges this Court to prevent the state from acquiring private property in this manner without first invoking its eminent domain power and without paying the owners the just compensation required by the federal and state constitutions for such takings of private property. But our conclusions concerning the state's adverse possession of the lake bed and its acquisition of a prescriptive easement to obtain access to the lake on behalf of the public, are not meant to condone or to condemn the state's conduct in this regard. Indeed, we express no opinion on the propriety of its actions vis-a-vis its initial construction of the boat ramp and, thereafter, its maintenance thereof so that the public could obtain access to the lake via the ramp. Nor do we determine whether it could have been required to pay just compensation to the owners for any such taking that may have occurred.
Nevertheless, even assuming, without deciding, that the corporation and/or its predecessors in title would have possessed viable just compensation and/or trespass claims in response to the state's actions in constructing the boat ramp and in allowing the public to obtain access to the lake via that ramp, such claims long ago would have lapsed because of the owners' failure to initiate a timely action asserting such claims and because of their failure otherwise to interpose a timely objection to the state's conduct before the prescriptive ten-year period expired (or, for that matter during any potentially applicable limitations period thereafter). See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 1385, 91 L.Ed. 1789, 1794 (1947) (applying six-year statute of limitations to an inverse condemnation suit arising out of government-flooded property and holding that the statute of limitations on the takings claim began to run when "the consequences of [the] inun dation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck").
"Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of time." Id. at 748, 67 S.Ct. at 1385, 91 L.Ed. at 1794.
Thus, the corporation's arguments concerning an alleged unconstitutional "taking" ultimately rest upon the premise that no statute of limitations bars the constitutional right of every property owner to obtain just compensation for the government's taking of the owner's property. But this argument garners no support from the relevant cases of the United States Supreme Court on this subject. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530, 102 S.Ct. 781, 792-93, 70 L.Ed.2d 738, 751-52 (1982) ("[T]his Court has never required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect. It is the owner's failure to make any use of the property — and not the action of the State — that causes the lapse of the property right; there is no 'taking' that requires compensation."); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 271, 77 S.Ct. 269, 270, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 308 (1957) (applying six-year statute of limitations in inverse condemnation suit); accord, Dickinson, supra.
Furthermore, other states that have addressed this issue have adopted each state's statutory period for adverse possession as a statute of limitations for inverse condemnation. actions. See Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691, 695 (1977) (adopting ten-year adverse-possession statute of limitations); Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99, 109-10 (1961) (adopting ten-year adverse possession statute of limitations); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664, 667 (1960) ("[A]n action for constitutional taking may be brought at any time before title to the property taken is acquired by prescription.").
In sum, even if the state's conduct from 1965 to 1975 had been unlawful and amounted to an improper taking of the lake owner's property without paying just compensation, and even if the lake owner's property had not been taken in the constitutional sense until the prescriptive period ended in 1975 — issues that we have no need to decide in this case — the corporation and its predecessors failed to assert any takings claim in a timely manner. Thus, they are barred from asserting them now under any statute of limitations that possibly could apply to such claims — even if, arguendo, they did not begin to accrue in this case until the prescriptive period in question ended in 1975.
Conclusion
We hold that, consistent with controlling case law, and by clear and convincing evidence, the state proved its case at trial, showing that it had acquired a portion of the lake bottom by adverse possession and that it had acquired, on behalf of the public, a prescriptive easement to use the boat ramp to obtain access to the lake for boating, fishing, swimming, and for other recreational purposes. Hence, we sustain the appeal, vacate the Superior Court's judgment, and remand the papers in this case to that court with instructions to enter judgment for the state consistent with this opinion. Given our disposition of this case, we have no need to pass upon the state's alternative estoppel theory, and, therefore, we decline to do so.
. Throughout this opinion, we shall refer collectively to the named plaintiffs herein — Jan Reitsma, in his capacity as director, Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, and Sheldon Whitehouse, Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island — as "the state."
. The trial court attempted to distinguish Talbot on the ground that the underlying record ownership of the property in that case was in question, whereas, in this case, the lake owners always held clear record title to the lake bed. This issue, however, was neither critical nor even relevant in deciding that case. Indeed, Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (1982), expressly relied upon Talbot v. Town of Little Compton, 52 R.I. 280, 160 A. 466 (1932) in upholding a municipality's right to continue public use of a beach. In Roche, there was no question concerning the record ownership of the property. The private party had an undisputed chain of title dating to the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Connecticut court, citing Talbot, ruled in favor of the municipality's claim based upon adverse use. Roche, 442 A.2d at 917. Thus, the existence of a clear record title with respect to the servient estate is irrelevant to the adverse user doctrine.
. The applicable period for adverse possession or prescriptive easement is ten years. See G.L.1956 § 34-7-1; see also Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I.1999); Jerry Brown Farm Association, Inc. v. Kenyon, 119 R.I. 43, 48-49, 375 A.2d 964, 967 (1977).
. In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51, 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243, 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner's property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another's ownership interest.