Case Name: Charles Jackson v. The People
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1861-11-16
Citations: 9 Mich. 111
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles Jackson v. The People.
Judges: Ohristiancy J. concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 111–131

Head Matter:
Charles Jackson v. The People.
The return to a common law writ of certiorari should sot out the evidence upon which the conviction or other judical act complained of was founded.
The office of a certiorari is not, however, to review questions of fact, but questions of law. And, in examining into the evidence, the appellate court does so, not to determine whether the probabilities preponderate ono way or the other, but simply to determino whether the evidence is such that it will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from the facts proved, whether that inference would or would not have been drawn by the appellate tribunal.
But the appellate court will review the rulings of law upon the admission or ex- elusion of evidence, or other rulings in the proceedings having a bearing upon the result.
On certiorari to the Recorder’s Court of Detroit, to remove the proceedings on conviction for a violation of a city ordinance, the evidence was embodied in the return by the clerk. — Held, to be properly before the court.
Until an alley in the Oity of Detroit 3ms been actually open to the uses for which it was designed, the occupation or obstruction of it cannot properly be punished under city by-laws. In giving power to regulate the use of alloys, and remove obstructions from them, the charter contemplates the preservation of actual, and not theoretical easements, and the protection of the community against actual nuisances which interfere with the accustomed use of the passages.
And when, on complaint in the Recorder’s Court of Detroit, for the obstruction of an alley, it appeared that the alley had never been opened or used as such; that the obstruction complained of existed at the time the ordinance was passed under which the proceeding was had, and that the main point in issue was that of title to the alleged easement, it was held, that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal tribunal, and that the rights of the parties must be settled in the public courts, where ample remedies exist for all parties aggrieved.
Heart'd July 'lih.
Decided November 16th.
Certiorari to the Recorder’s Court of the city of Detroit, where Jackson was convicted on a complaint for obstructing an alley in said city.
In 1 Mich. 432, will be found the report of a trial of Jackson on an information for the obstruction of the same alley. After the decision in that case, the Common Council of said city passed an ordinance “to prohibit and punisli the obstruction of streets and alleys.” The first section of this ordinance provided “that no person shall obstruct any street or alley of said city, by placing or maintaining in the same any incumbrance, article or thing, which in any manner shall impede, interrupt or impair the use of said street or alley for the passage of teams or pedestrians.” The second, provided that “ no person shall build, place or maintain in any street or alley of said city, any fence, building, house, barn, railroad track, shed or construction of any nature.” The third fixed the penalty on conviction in the Recorder’s Court of a violation of this ordinance.
Under this ordinance the present proceedings wore had against the plaintiff in error, and substantially the same evidence was produced to sustain the complaint as is reported in 7 Mich. The testimony being concluded, the plaintiff in error requested the court to charge the jury:
“If the jury are satisfied from the evidence that the alleged obstructions complained of were in the locus in quo long before the passing of said ordinance, and that the defendant has done no act since that time to maintain or keep them there, he is guilty of no offense, and the jury must acquit him.” The court refused so to charge, except with the addition and qualification, that if the jury find the locus in quo to be an alley, the failure to remove the obstruction after the ordinance was passed, was an offense for which the complaint in this case would lie.
The plaintiff in error further requested the court to charge the jury, that '“ simply allowing an obstruction of an alley to stand, without any affirmative act to maintain it, does not authorize a prosecution in the name of the People.” The court refused so to charge, except with the addition and qualification that if the defendant put them there originally, he is liable for allowing them to remain.
The court also charged the jury, that if there was an alley in the place in question, the complainant had a right to have it freed from obstructions by a public prosecution under the ordinance, no matter whether one man only, or many, were incommoded by the obstruction.
In return to the certiorari, the Recorder’s Court, by its clerk and under its seal, transmitted to this court “the whole of the evidence and proceedings in the said prosecution, mentioned and referred to in the writ” of certiorari.
L. Bishop, and JD. G. Holbrook for plaintiff in error:
No public prosecution lies for obstructing the place in question, as it is only a cul de sac, and not a public way: — 7 Mich. 433. It can make no difference that the prosecution is under a city ordinance, as the violation of a city ordinance is a criminal offense: — 2 Doug. Mich. 334.
The ordinance was ex post facto, and therefore void: — 1 Bish. Cr. L. §§ 108, 346; 1 Kent, 450; 3 Dall. 386; 6 Cranch, 138; 1 Blackf. 193; 16 B. Monr. 15; 4 Texas, 470.
But it is said that on the common law writ of certiorari, only the question of jurisdiction will be considered; and that if the Recorder’s Court had jurisdiction of the case, the determination of that court upon all points of law must be final. We are well aware of the general language in the New York cases on this subject. But in these cases the point passed off without discussion or careful consideration. In 25 Wend. 166, Senator Paige reviews the subject more fully. But convictions for penalties formed an exception to the old rule, and in such eases the whole evidence must be returned, that it may be seen whether the court below had authority to convict, as well as jurisdiction to try. The question being whether a party was legally convicted, the whole proceedings and the whole evidence must be set forth in the return: — 2 Str. 996; 1 Yeates, 471; 4 Rawle, 192; 20 Wend. 105. This has been the uniform practice of this State. The following cases have been decided upon the merits, upon a return of the whole evidence and proceedings: — 1 Doug. Mich. 48; Ibid. 178; 2 Doug. Mich. 117; Ibid. 120; Ibid. 334; Ibid. 368; Ibid. 372; Ibid. 374; 1 Mich. 17; 2 Mich. 408; 3 Mich. 18; 7 Mich. 472.
A. Bussell, for the People:
A common law certiorari brings up for review only the record, or written pleadings, orders or entries in the nature of a record, and not testimony or matter in pais. The writ does not command or authorize the making up and authentication of a record, of what passed orally at the trial below, for the sole purpose of the return: Bac. Abr. Tit. “Certiorari." 1 Doug. Mich. 320; 3 Caines, 86; 6 Cow. 555, 556; 7 Cow. 108, 157; 17 Wend. 470; 19 Wend. 42; 25 Wend. 312; 20 Wend. 145; 20 Wend. 103; 25 Wend 168; 2 Hill, 9; 2 Hill, 398; 35 N. H. 521 and cases cited; 4 Jones Law, 309; 13 Ill. 663; 14 Ill. 381; 18 Ill. 324; 3 Wis. 740; 5 Wis. 191; 1 Tidd. Pr. 398; 2 Burr. Pr. 193, 197.
In N. Y. for a series of years, the decisions are unbroken, and N. H., Ill., Wis. and N. C. courts bold the same doctrine, and follow the N. Y. and Eng. cases.
In Morewood v. Hollister, 2 Selden, 315, Pratt J., in his opinion in the S. C. affirms the doctrine, but the court held that the cases in II, 19 and 20 Wend, were erroneous in deciding that the certiorari given by the N. Y. L. & T. acts did not enlarge the powers of the common, law writ.
But this case does not attack the previous decision in respect to that writ: — 4 Seld. 569; 3 Barb. 401; 15 Barb. 186; 24 Barb. 521.
It follows then that this court can not review the merits upon this writ, but merely the question of jurisdiction; because the merits, i. e. the testimony, or mass of facts from which the the fact, always disclosed by the record, as the decision, springs, can be made matter of record only by force of a statute.
And in N. H. by statute they now have a bill in all cases of special inquiry: — 35 N. H. 521.
There is no difference between civil and criminal cases in respect to the review upon certiorari. But if there was, in 1 Mich, the present case was held not to be a criminal case.
But there is one practical difficulty in this case. The clerk has certified the evidence. How can the clerk of a court of record certify what the evidence was at a trial? The judge, if anybody, must so certify; -for in no sense are the judge’s minutes matter that the clerk can certify. They are not of record in the court below. A court, as such, by its clerk can not do this. The magistrate must do it as a person.
The return shows jurisdiction of party and subject matter, and that the proceedings were regular. The charter invests the Council with power to pass the ordinance. The Recorder’s Court is made the tribunal for the trial of breaches of ordinances. The defendant was served with process, put in a plea, demanded and received a jury. That there was some evidence, appears from, the recital of the verdict in the judgment — 7 Mich. 486: and this court will certainly not weigh facts —Ibid.
The complaint alleged an offense over which, if the offense charged was true in fact, the Recorder’s court had jurisdiction: and the jurisdiction can not be made to depend upon the truth or falsity of the facts, or upon the evidence being sufficient or insufficient to establish the corpus delicti brought under investigation. Otherwise the Recorder would be liable to an action for imprisoning Jackson: — 1 Q. B. 66; Ibid. 620; 1 Man. & G. 257; 1 B. & B. 137; 18 Ark. 380; 8 Q. B. 413.
The ordinance is not ex post facto. It does not make the placing of an obstruction before the ordinance criminal, but the continuing it afterwards. The doctrine here is the same as in nuisances; namely: that the mere continuance is a fresh nuisance: —1 Denio, 257, cases cited; 2 Kern. 492; 16 Pick. 175.

Opinion:
Campbell J.:
The first question which arises is, how far are we at liberty to look into the proceedings returned by the Recorder's Court, to ascertain whether the Recorder erred in any respect within our supervisory control.
It is claimed on behalf of the People that, upon a certiorari at common law, the only thing to be determined is whether the court below had jurisdiction; and that if jurisdiction existed, the discretionary power of the court can not be inquired into. And it is further claimed that the jurisdiction depends upon the subject matter of the complaint. Applying this rule to the case before us, it is insisted that the Recorder's Court has jurisdiction of all complaints for obstructing alleys, and that this jurisdiction being called into exercise by such a complaint, its proceedings thenceforth are not examinable unless an unauthorized judgment is given beyond the one allowed by law. As the same immunity from review applies to all special tribunals not acting according to the course of the common law, it becomes very important to ascertain how far this doctrine is correct; for if true it certainly gives them an extent of authority over persons and property not possessed by any of the higher courts.
There are certain classes of questions whi'ch, by the common understanding from time immemorial, belong to the course of judicial inquiry under the laws of the land. The common law, and the various charters and bills of rights, recognized and assured the right to such an inquiry. And the Constitution of this State, in apportioning the judicial power, as well as in affirming the immunity of life liberty and property, has always been understood to guarantee to each citizen the right to have his title to property and other legal privileges determined by the general tribunals of the State. These municipal courts, so far as they act under city by-laws, are not designed to decide between man and man, or to administer general laws. They are ordained to prevent disorder in matters of local convenience, and to regulate the use of public and quasi public easements so as to prevent confusion. If in exercising this power, they can incidentally decide upon the rights of private property so as to determine its enjoyment without review, there would seem to be a practical annihilation of the right to resort to the general tribunals and the common law. The consequences of such a doctrine, whether correct or incorrect, are serious enough to render it our duty to examine very carefully into its foundations.
The power of reviewing upon certiorari judicial pro ceedings of inferior tribunals and bodies not according to the course of the common law, has long been exercised in England, as well as in this country. The power has been jealously maintained, and has been deemed necessary to prevent oppression. It must be apparent to any one that if the superior court could only examine into the right of the inferior one to enter upon an inquiry, without reference to the manner in which that inquiry is conducted, this remedy would be of small account.
In New York, a series of decisions have appeared from time to time, asserting that when certiorari is given by statute, it lies to correct any legal mistakes; blit where issued as at common law, it can only review the jurisdiction of the court below. It is unnecessary to refer particularly to these authorities, inasmuch as in Morewood v. Hollister, 2 Seld. 309, this distinction seems to be regarded as unfounded, and the office of the writ is considered as reaching all errors of law. We have examined with much care all the English authorities within reach, bearing upon this subject, and have found nothing whatever to give color to such a distinction. There are indeed cases where a certiorari lies to examine errors generally, and others where it lies only to inquire into the jurisdiction; but the distinction arises out of very different considerations. This will appear by reference to some of the cases in which questions of jurisdiction have been reviewed.
There are many statutes in England which, not only in large classes of summary convictions, but also in special proceedings for condemning lands, and for other purposes, take away, in express terms or by acknowledged implication, the right to a certiorari, which otherwise existed. In some cases an appeal lies to review the whole proceeding; in others, it is subject to no further examination on the merits. In all these cases it is held, that a statute taking away the right to a certiorari does not deprive the aggrieved party of the right to sue out such a writ where the pro eeeding has been without jurisdiction. And the want of jurisdiction, when arising from matters not appearing in any way on the proceedings, may even be shown aliimde by the affidavits: — Regina v. Manchester & Leeds Railway Co., 8 Ad. & El. 413; Regina v. Sheffield Railway Co., 11 Ad. & El. 194; Rex v. Justices of Somersetshire, 5 B. & C. 816; Rex v. Justices of Kent, 10 B. & C. 477; Rex v. Justices of Middlesex, 5 Ad. & El. 626; Ex parte Carruthers, 2 Man. & Ry. 397; Regina v. South Wales Railway Co., 13 Q. B. 988; Ex parte Hopwood, 15 Q. B. 121; Ex parte Hyde, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 368; Regina v. Justices of St. Albans, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 244; Regina v. Justices of Staffordshire, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 402; In Re Edmondson, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 169; Regina v. Leeds & Bradford Railway Co. 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 484.
If certiorari will lie for want of jurisdiction in cases where the common law remedy of certiorari, in its usual acceptation, is expressly or confessedly taken away, it follows as an unavoidable conclusion that the usual office of the common law writ is to inquire into something more than jurisdiction. This may be made more plain by examining what is required to be returned.
It was held in Rex v. Killett, 4 Burr. 2063, that it is necessary to set out the evidence upon a conviction, that the court may judge whether the justices have done right. And in Rex v. Read, 2 Doug. 486, it was held that a conviction is bad unless it does set forth the evidence. The same doctrine is laid down in Rex v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 220; Rex v. Smith, 8 T. R. 588; Regina v. Tuck, 10 Q. B. 540. And where the evidence set out is not sufficient to justify a conviction, or other judicial act copiplained of, it will be quashed on certiorari: — Rex v. Smith, 8 T. R. 588; Rex v. Dove, 3 B. & Ald. 596; Rex v. Taylor, 2 Chit. R. 578; Rex v. Hall, Cowp. 728; Rex v. Daman, 2 B. & Ald. 378; Rex v. Davis, 6 T. R. 177; Rex v. Inhabitants of Great Wishford, 4 Ad. & El. 216; Rex v. Inhabitants of Woolpit, 4 Ad. & El. 205; Regina v. Inhabitants of High Beckington, 3 Q. B. 790.
The office of a certiorari is not however to review questions of fact, hut questions of law. And in examining into the evidence the appellate court does so not to determine whether the probabilities preponderate one way or the other, but simply to determine whether the evidence is such that it will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from the facts proved, whether that inference would or would not have been drawn by the appellate tribunal. It is said in The King v. Daman, 2 B. & Ald. 378, that " all the facts necessary to subject the party to the penalty imposed by the act of Parliament must appear upon the information, and be established by proof." And in The King v. Davis, 6 T. R. 177, it is said "it is sufficient in convictions if there were such evidence before the magistrates as in an action wotcld be sufficient to be left to a jury" The same principles are recognized in the other cases above cited. Also in Rex v. Glossop, 4 B. & Ald. 616; Regina v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 67.
Wbere facts exist which, if apparent, would have ousted the jurisdiction, they have been allowed to be set forth in the affidavits of the relator, and a response required. Instances of this occur where the magistrate acting was disqualified by interest or other similar cause: — Regina v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 67; Regina v. Cheltenham Com'rs, 1 Q. B. 467; Regina v. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Q. B. 753. And in Regina v. Gillyard, 12 Q. B. 527, a conviction was quashed, although perfectly regular, because it was made to appear that it was obtained fraudulently.
The same principles which require a conviction to be quashed when upon the facts and the law applicable to them the case is insufficient to justify it, would seem to require that rulings of law upon the admission or exclusion of evidence should be reviewed. And such we find to have been the practice. In the ease of Regina v. Chel tenham Com'rs, 1 Q. B. 467, the rate complained of was quashed because certain interested magistrates voted upon the admission of evidence, the court holding this a decision which might have had an important influence upon' the result, and therefore suflicient to avoid the whole action, whether the interested magistrates took any further part or not. And. in this case the statute had expressly taken away the writ of certiorari; and it was issued and the case decided, on the ground that the question from its bearing became one of jurisdiction. An in Regina v. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Q. B. 754, the proceedings were quashed because an interested magistrate had sat during a portion of them, although he withdrew before they were completed. The questions of law arising either upon the admission of evidence, or the other rulings in the proceedings, must always have a bearing on the result, and the appellate court can not, generally, at least, assume that any of them have not contributed to it. In Regina v. Justices of Staffordshire, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 402, where certiorari was expressly taken away by statute, a writ was allowed, and a conviction under a local by-law quashed because the justices had ruled that an approval of the by-law by the 'Secretary of State made it binding, and therefore refused to consider its validity. The court of Q. B. held the by-law invalid, and so quashed the conviction.
We are therefore of opinion, that the return to the certiorari is all properly before us, and that the law contemplates that it shall be full, both upon the evidence and upon the decisions and rulings.
Whether the information is sufficiently full to be sustainable, we do not propose to consider, as in our view the proceedings in the Recorder's Court are entirely unau-' thorized. The charter not providing any remedy upon the obstruction of an alley, no offense exists, and therefore no complaint can be made,, until a by-law is adopted, coming within the powers given by the charter. In the case before us, it appears, without any conflict of testimony, that the alleged alley in controversy was never actually opened and used as such at all. It also appears that portions of it have been occupied under claim of freehold ' title under conveyances, and that the erections upon it now complained of were upon it when the by-law in question was passed. Without basing our decision merely upon the ex post facto character of this by-law, we are of opinion that until an alley has become actually open to the uses for which it is designed, the occupation or obstruction of it can not properly be punished under city by - laws. In giving power to regulate the use of these passages, and remove obstructions from them, the charter contemplates the preservation of actual and not theoretical easements, and the protection of the community against actual nuisances which interfere with the accustomed use of the p>assag'es- This is the species of offense set forth in the information, which alleges the interruption of an accustomed passage. Until the premises have been brought into actual enjoyment, so that their obstruction interferes with an existing user, there would be no propriety in permitting the municipal authorities to legislate upon it; and we do not -regard the charter as intending it. Questions of title may possibly come up incidentally without objection in many summary proceedings. We give no opinion upon this abstract question, But where it appears on the face of the prosecution that the question of title is not incidental, but is the main point in issue, we think the case falls beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal tribunal, and the rights of the parties must be settled in the public courts, where ample remedies exist for all parties aggrieved.
We think the conviction wrong, for these reasons, and it must be quashed.
Ohristiancy J. concurred.
Martin Ch. J. concurred in the result.