Case Name: ZMIJA v. BARON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-09-21
Citations: 119 Mich. App. 524
Docket Number: Docket No. 52877
Parties: ZMIJA v BARON
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and D. F. Walsh and D. C. Riley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 119
Pages: 524–545

Head Matter:
ZMIJA v BARON
Docket No. 52877.
Submitted November 10, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided September 21, 1982.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Plaintiff, John Zmija, brought an action against defendants, J. Baron, H. Chylinski, D. Misiak, and L. Pietrzak, Hamtramck police officers, for assault and battery, false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. Defendants, J. Sitek, Acting Chief of the Hamtramck Police Department, and D. Rojek, were thereafter joined as defendants in the conspiracy count. The City of Hamtramck was also added as a defendant under theories of respondeat superior and affirmative negligence. The jury in the Wayne Circuit Court, Thomas Roumell, J., found in favor of the plaintiff on each count as to each defendant. The jury returned special verdicts under each theory, with a breakdown of damages due plaintiff from each defendant. These amounts were aggregated and a general verdict was entered in the amount of $28,000. Defendants appeal the judgment entered pursuant to this verdict. Defendants also appeal the award to plaintiff of attorney fees in the amount of $8,231.66. On appeal, the defendant city argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs respondeat superior theory. The city also challenges the jury’s finding that the city was liable to plaintiff under 42 USC 1983. Defendants Sitek and Rojek each challenge the trial court’s denial of their motions for a directed verdict on the conspiracy allegation against them. Defendants also allege errors in the trial court’s refusal to give a requested standard jury instruction and several other instructional errors. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[I] 57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 90, 246.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 17, 26.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 250.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 16,17.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 886.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 482, 483.
16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy §§ 50, 68.
16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy § 63.
60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 75.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 610.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 891.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 908.
52 Am Jur 2d, Malicious Prosecution §§ 94,104.
[II] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 943.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 15.
20 Am Jur 2d, Costs § 82.
16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy § 49.
1. The trial court did not err in denying defendant city’s motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs respondeat superior theory. An intentional tort by the city’s police officers is not committed in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function within the meaning of the governmental tort liability act.
2. The jury instructions did not reflect the appropriate "deliberate indifference” standard of liability but permitted a recovery against the defendant city under 42 USC 1983 based on a finding of simple negligence. The $5,000 "affirmative negligence” award against the city is, therefore, vacated.
3. Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 USC 1983.
4. The trial court did not err in denying defendant Sitak’s motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy allegation against him since reasonable minds could differ as to plaintiffs claim that Sitek was involved in a conspiracy to obstruct justice. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a conspiratorial design.
5. The trial court erred in denying defendant Rojek’s motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy allegation against him. The Court of Appeals, therefore, ordered entry of a directed verdict of no cause of action as to him. Since he was added as a defendant solely because of his deposition testimony, for which he was immune, and since there is no claim or evidence that he was in any way involved in the alleged conspiracy prior to the giving of his deposition testimony, he should have been dismissed.
6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a requested standard jury instruction with reference to the plaintiffs failure to produce the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined plaintiff at the request of his trial counsel. Plaintiffs proper assertion of his attorney-client privilege constituted a reasonable excuse for failure to present the testimony.
7. The jury was improperly permitted to include "exemplary” damages in its initial assessment of malicious prosecution damages and to treble the entire actual (including "exemplary”) damage determination, thus improperly awarding double "exemplary” damages. The four $1,500 jury awards against each of the malicious prosecution defendants are, therefore, vacated. On remand to the circuit court, plaintiff shall have the option of electing to proceed to a new trial on the malicious prosecution count, but limited only to the issue of damages, or of filing a written consent to a judgment in the amount of $500 as to each of the four malicious prosecution defendants. Plaintiff’s consent to the remittiturs shall be filed within ten days of the effective date of this opinion.
8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff. However, since the 42 USC 1983 award against the city is vacated, this Court remands to the circuit court for a recalculation. The fact that plaintiff’s § 1983 success was only partial does not automatically preclude an assessment in his favor against those defendants found liable to him under § 1983. If plaintiff elects to retry his § 1983 claim against the city and he prevails, he may petition the circuit court for an additional allowance of reasonable attorney fees under 42 USC 1988.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
D. F. Walsh, J., concurred with the majority but dissented from their conclusion that the denial of defendant Sitek’s motion for a directed verdict was proper. He would hold that the circumstances proven by plaintiff did not naturally tend to support both of the necessary inferences which he sought to have the jury infer, first, that Sitek told an Identification Bureau officer to destroy the photo that Sitek had been requested to preserve and, second, that he did so as part of a preconceived concerted plan to prejudice plaintiff’s rights. He would reverse the trial court’s ruling as to defendant Sitek and enter a directed verdict of no cause of action as to him.
Opinion op the Court
1. Governmental Immunity — Intentional Torts.
An intentional tort committed by police officers while employed by a city is not committed in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function within the meaning of the govermental tort liability act and the city, therefore, is not immune and may be held liable for the officer’s intentional torts.
2. Torts — Local Governments — Persons — Respondeat Superior — Civil Rights — United States Code.
Local governments are "persons” for purposes of 42 USC 1983 actions; while a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, the governmental body may be sued directly under that statute where the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional or illegal implements or executes a policy or custom of that government (42 USC 1983).
3. Torts — Civil Rights — Local Governments — Police — Deliberate Indifference — United States Code.
Although a city cannot be held liable for the simple negligent training of its police force, a city’s citizens do not have to endure a "pattern” of past police misconduct before they can sue the city under the federal statute governing civil actions for deprivation of rights; if a municipality completely fails to train its police force, or trains its officers in a reckless or grossly negligent manner so that future police misconduct is almost inevitable, the municipality exhibits a "deliberate indifference” to resulting violations of a citizen’s constitutional rights; in such a case, the municipality may fairly be termed as acquiescing in and implicitly authorizing such violations (42 USC 1983).
4. Torts — Municipalities — Punitive Damages — Civil Rights — United States Code.
Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under the federal statute governing civil actions for the deprivation of civil rights (42 USC 1983).
5. Appeal — Directed Verdicts.
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the granting of a motion for a directed verdict, is required to view the evidence, and all legitimate inferences emanating from that evidence, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party; the motion is correctly granted if reasonable minds could not differ on the meaning of the evidence.
6. Conspiracy —-Evidence.
A conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be based on inference; direct proof of an agreement is not required nor is it necessary that a formal agreement be proven, since it is sufficient if the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties establish an agreement in fact.
7. Actions — Perjury — Torts.
There is no civil cause of action for the giving of perjured testimony in judicial proceedings, including deposition testimony, or for a conspiracy to give or procure false testimony; in order to recover for a civil conspiracy, it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.
8. Trial — Jury Instructions — Standard Jury Instructions.
Standard jury instructions are required to be given when requested where they are applicable and accurate; the determination of whether a requested standard instruction is applicable and accurately states the law is addressed to the trial court’s discretion.
9. Appeal — Jury Instructions — Preserving Questions — Court Rules.
Failure to object at trial to a jury instruction generally precludes appellate review of that instruction; however, in limited circumstances, the Court of Appeals will review unobjected-to instructional errors in order to prevent manifest injustice (GCR 1963, 516.2).
10. Damages — Malicious Prosecution — General Verdict — Exemplary Damages.
A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must elect to have the jury include within its actual damages determination the amount of "exemplary” damages suffered by the plaintiff and return a single general verdict, in which case the statutory trebling provision would not apply, or the plaintiff may choose to have the trebling of "non-exemplary” actual damages compensate for his "exemplary” damages in accordance with the trebling provision (MCL 600.2907; MSA 27A.2907).
11. Appeal — Damages — Judgments — New Trial — Option — Remittitur.
The Court of Appeals, where it finds that damages were erroneously determined, may remand to a circuit court and allow a plaintiff the option of proceeding to a new trial limited to the question of damages alone, or of filing a written consent to a remittitur of an amount determined by the Court of Appeals within ten days of the effective date of the Court of Appeals decision (GCR 1963, 527.6).
12. Actions — Attorney Fees — Civil Rights Actions — United States Code.
A trial court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs in an action to enforce the federal statute governing civil actions for the deprivation of civil rights; the fact that the party’s success was only partial does not automatically preclude the assessment of attorney fees against those defendants found liable to him (42 USC 1983,1988).
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by D. P. Walsh, J.
13. Conspiracy — Words and Phrases.
A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.
14. Conspiracy — Circumstantial Evidence.
Proof of a conspiracy is generally circumstantial, however, the circumstances must naturally tend to prove the common design and must be sufficient in themselves to satisfy the trier of fact of the existence of such common design; the circumstances must do more than create a mere suspicion of the existence of a conspiracy; the evidence must support a reasonable inference that the defendant acted with at least one other person to accomplish an unlawful end; circumstantial evidence is insufficient if the inference of a conspiratorial design is not reasonable, probable, and unstrained.
Patrick J. Bruetsch, for plaintiff.
Tyler & Canham, P.C. (by David M. Tyler and Michael J. Walter), for defendants.
Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and D. F. Walsh and D. C. Riley, JJ.

Opinion:
D. C. Riley, J.
The facts in this case are adequately set forth in Judge Walsh's opinion. For the reasons stated in that opinion we concur in the resolution of all issues presented except the issue relating to the propriety of the trial court's denial of defendant Sitek's motion for a directed verdict. As to that issue we disagree with Judge Walsh and find no error in the denial of that motion. In a recent case, a panel of this Court accurately and succinctly set forth the standard for reviewing a motion for a directed verdict.
"In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, this Court is required to view the evidence, and all legitimate inferences emanating from that evidence, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If reasonable minds could not differ on the meaning of the evidence the motion is correctly granted." Miller v Great Lakes Steel Corp, 112 Mich App 122, 125; 315 NW2d 558 (1982), citing Bosca v J A Ferguson Construction Co, 79 Mich App 177; 261 NW2d 249 (1977).
Thus, the question becomes whether reasonable minds could differ as to plaintiff's claim that Sitek was involved in a conspiracy to obstruct justice.
Plaintiff presented evidence at trial establishing that plaintiff's attorney wrote to Sitek, Acting Chief of Police, requesting that plaintiff's mug shot be removed from the file and either placed in the department's nonpublic file or sent to the attorney's office. The letter specifically requested that Sitek not destroy the photo because it was needed for impending litigation. Despite Sitek's having received this letter, the photo was destroyed. In addition, there is testimony that Sitek had a discussion with an officer at the Identification Bureau concerning plaintiff's request.
Based upon this evidence, it would seem that reasonable persons could honestly reach different conclusions as to whether the photograph was destroyed accidentally or with the. purpose of destroying evidence which plaintiff had expressly stated he intended to use at trial. One could reasonably infer, based on the circumstantial evidence, that it had been something more than an accident. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant Sitek's motion for a directed verdict.
Finally, it is of no consequence that the evidence against Sitek was largely circumstantial. It must be kept in mind that proof of a conspiracy is generally circumstantial in nature. Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery, 365 Mich 415, 421; 112 NW2d 463 (1961). In our recent decision in Vincent v Raglin, 114 Mich App 242, 250; 318 NW2d 629 (1982), we quoted, with approval, the following language from People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 311; 220 NW2d 465 (1974):
"Direct proof of agreement is not required, nor is it necessary that a formal agreement be proven. It is sufficient if the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties establish an agreement in fact.
"Furthermore, conspiracy may be established, and frequently is established by circumstantial evidence, and may be based on inference." (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of a conspiratorial design. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant Sitek's motion for a directed verdict.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. We retain no jurisdiction. No costs, neither party having prevailed in full.
R. M. Maher, P.J., concurred.