Case Name: Charles E. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-12-20
Citations: 784 So. 2d 460
Docket Number: No. 4D00-2876
Parties: Charles E. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, C.J., STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 784
Pages: 460–462

Head Matter:
Charles E. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D00-2876.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 20, 2000.
Opinion Denying Rehearing March 28, 2001.
Charles E. Smith, Arcadia, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Charles E. Smith (Appellant) appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We reverse and remand.
Appellant alleged that on April 18, 1994, he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to four days time served for aggravated battery, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and battery. There was no direct appeal. In his postconviction motion filed on March 27, 2000, nearly six years later, he claimed his'plea was involuntarily induced by ineffective assistance of defense counsel, who misadvised him, when he asked whether the charges could be used against him as a prior conviction in federal or state court, that they could not be, and that if it were not for such misadvice, he would have proceeded to trial. At the time, he was being investigated on other charges, which he discussed with counsel. Six months later, the other charges were filed, and following a jury trial on those other charges, he was found guilty. The aggravated battery charge in the instant case was used to enhance his sentence in the later case, so that he was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender. In filing the motion to vacate the instant conviction and sentence, he argued that his motion was timely filed pursuant to Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592 (Fla.1999)(providing that all defendants previously adjudicated would have two years from issuance date of May 27, 1999, in which to file rule 3.850 motions raising claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis). The trial court summarily denied the motion based on the State's response, which was that the motion was untimely as Appellant had learned shortly after entering his plea that counsel's advice was wrong and could have filed his motion within two years of his conviction.
However, Appellant was not in custody on the conviction he now challenges when he learned that counsel's advice was wrong, and so relief was not available to him under rule 3.850, as it contained a requirement, until the issuance of Wood, that the movant be in custody.
The State now argues that Appellant is not entitled to the extended time limit available under Wood because that decision was limited to "claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis." Id. at 595. However, as Appellant points out in his reply, the claim raised by the movant in Wood was that his defense counsel failed to tell him at the time he entered his plea that it could be used against him as a prior offense in federal court. If such a claim was considered sufficiently cognizable under coram nobis for the supreme court to find that Wood's motion was timely, then Appellant's motion also must be considered as timely.
Accordingly, the order summarily denying Appellant's motion is reversed and the case is remanded for further consideration.
WARNER, C.J., STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.