Case Name: Linroy BOTTOSON, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-10-24
Citations: 833 So. 2d 693
Docket Number: No. SC02-1455
Parties: Linroy BOTTOSON, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, etc., Respondent.
Judges: WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 833
Pages: 693–734

Head Matter:
Linroy BOTTOSON, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, etc., Respondent.
No. SC02-1455.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 24, 2002.
William Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — Middle Region, Peter Cannon, Assistant CCRC, and Eric Pin-kard, Assistant CCRC, and Elizabeth A. Williams, Staff Attorney. — Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; Mark E. Olive of Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Timothy K. Ford of MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, and President-elect, The Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Tallahassee, FL; Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spauld-ing, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida; Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL; and Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and George Allen Couture, Assistant Public Defender, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, FL, for The Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
Robert Augustus Harper, Jr. of Robert Augustus Harper Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; and James T. Miller, Chair, Amicus Committee, FACDL, Jacksonville, FL, for Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
Charles T. Canady, General Counsel, and Wendy W. Berger, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor of the State of Florida; and Arthur I. Jacobs, General Counsel, Fernandino Beach, FL, and Raymond L. Marky, Assistant State Attorney, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Florida Prosecuting Attorney Association, Amicus Curiae.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Linroy Bottoson, a prisoner under sentence of death and an active death warrant, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He seeks relief pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, -, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), wherein the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Arizona capital sentencing statute "to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty."
Although Bottoson contends that he is entitled to relief under Ring, we decline to so hold. The United States Supreme Court in February 2002 stayed Bottoson's execution and placed the present case in abeyance while it decided Ring. That Court then in June 2002 issued its decision in Ring, summarily denied Bottoson's petition for certiorari, and lifted the stay without mentioning Ring in the Bottoson order. The Court did not direct the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider Bottoson in light of Ring.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has reviewed and upheld Florida's capital sentencing statute over the past quarter of a century, and although Bottoson contends that there now are areas of "irreconcilable conflict" in that precedent, the Court in Ring did not address this issue. In a comparable situation, the United States Supreme Court held:
If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).
We also reject Bottoson's claim that his rights under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), were violated. We find Atkins inapplicable in light of the fact that Bottoson already was afforded a hearing on the issue of mental retardation and was permitted to introduce expert testimony on the issue. The evidence did not support his claim. See Bottoson v. State, 813 So.2d 31, 33-34 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 2670, 153 L.Ed.2d 844 (2002).
Accordingly, we deny Bottoson's petition for habeas relief. This Court's stay of execution shall terminate at 5 p.m. on the thirtieth day following the filing of this opinion. No motion for rehearing will be allowed.
It is so ordered.
WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs with an opinion.
WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., concur specially with opinions.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result only with opinions.
. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
. See Bottoson v. Florida, 534 U.S. 1121, 122 S.Ct. 981, 151 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002).
. See Bottoson v. Florida, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2670, 153 L.Ed.2d 844 (2002).
. See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).