Case Name: HARRIS v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1949-06-27
Citations: 338 U.S. 68
Docket Number: No. 76
Parties: HARRIS v. SOUTH CAROLINA.
Judges: Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge join.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 338
Pages: 68–73

Head Matter:
HARRIS v. SOUTH CAROLINA.
No. 76.
Argued November 16, 1948.
Decided June 27, 1949.
Julian B. Salley, Jr. and Leonard A. Williamson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
B. D. Carter argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John M. Daniel, Attorney General of South Carolina.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which
Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge join.
On Sunday morning, April 28, 1946, Edward L. Bennett and his wife were killed in their store in Aiken County, South Carolina. Bennett's last words were, "A big negro shot me and robbed me." Petitioner, Harris, age twenty-five, a slightly built Negro, was subsequently indicted in the Court of General Sessions for Aiken County and found guilty of the murder of the Bennetts. The jury's verdict required imposition of the death sentence. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the claim that a confession introduced at the trial was obtained under circumstances which precluded its admission under the Due Process Clause and sustained the conviction, 212 S. C. 124, 46 S. E. 2d 682, by a 3-2 vote, two judges dissenting on the ground that the facts show that the confession "was not freely and voluntarily made." We brought the case here to consider the validity of this claim. 334 U. S. 837.
When the disputed testimony is resolved in favor of the State, the following facts emerge:
The police of Aiken County spent two and a half months in fruitless investigation of the murders. Many suspects had been held for interrogation and then released. Suspicion was finally directed toward petitioner by reports that he possessed a pistol and had left for Nashville, Tennessee, soon after the murders. The Sheriff of Aiken County then obtained a warrant, ostensibly for the purpose of arresting petitioner for the theft of his aunt's pistol but actually to secure his return from Nashville. He was taken into custody there on Friday, July 12, 1946. No warrant was read to him and he was not informed of the charge against him. He was brought back to Aiken County and lodged in its jail on Sunday afternoon at about four o'clock. He first learned that he was suspected of the murder of Bennett on Monday afternoon. He denied the accusation. At that time he was briefly interrogated by the sheriff and the jailer.
On Monday night questioning began in earnest. At least five officers worked in relays, relieving each other from time to time to permit respite from the stifling heat of the cubicle in which the interrogation was conducted. Throughout the evening petitioner denied that he had killed the Bennetts. On Tuesday the questioning continued under the same conditions from 1:30 in the afternoon until past one the following morning with only an hour's interval at 5:30. On Wednesday afternoon the Chief of the State Constabulary, with half a dozen of his men, questioned petitioner for about an hour, and the local authorities carried on the interrogation for three and a half hours longer. At 6:30 that evening the examination resumed. Petitioner continued to deny implication in the killings. The sheriff then threatened to arrest petitioner's mother for handling stolen property. Petitioner replied, "Don't get my mother mixed up in it and I will tell you the truth." Petitioner then stated in substance what appears in the confession introduced at the trial. The session ended at midnight.
Petitioner was not informed of his rights under South Carolina law, such as the right to secure a lawyer, the right to request a preliminary hearing, or the right to remain silent. No preliminary hearing was ever given and his confession does not even contain the usual statement that he was told that what he said might be used against him. During the whole period of interrogation he was denied the benefit of consultation with family and friends and was surrounded by as many as a dozen members of a dominant group in positions of authority. It is relevant to note that Harris was an illiterate.
The trial judge in his charge told the jury that without the confession there was no evidence which would support a conviction and instructed them that they could consider the confession only if they found it to have been "voluntary." Upon appeal, the highest court of the State made a conscientious effort to measure the circumstances under which petitioner's confession was made against the circumstances surrounding confessions which we have held to be the product of undue pressure. It concluded that this confession was not so tainted. We are constrained to disagree. The systematic persistence of interrogation, the length of the periods of questioning, the failure to advise the petitioner of his rights, the absence of friends or disinterested persons, and the character of the defendant constitute a complex of circumstances which invokes the same considerations which compelled our decisions in Watts v. Indiana, ante, p. 49, and Turner v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 62. The judgment is accordingly
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment on the authority of Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143.
On the record before us and in view of the consideration given to the evidence by the state courts and the conclusion reached, The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Burton believe that the judgment should be affirmed.
[See ante, p. 57, for opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in No. 610, Watts v. Indiana, ante, p. 49, and dissenting in this case and in No. 107, Turner v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 62.]