Case Name: PEOPLE v. GRAY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1970-12-30
Citations: 29 Mich. App. 301
Docket Number: Docket No. 6146
Parties: PEOPLE v. GRAY
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Levin and Borradaile, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 29
Pages: 301–308

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty- — Voluntariness—Attorney’s Representation.
Determinations that the defendant’s attorney had not promised the defendant probation and that the defendant’s plea of guilty of a lesser offense was not involuntary because of the alleged promise were not clearly erroneous where the record showed that the defendant and his parents testified that the attorney had promised probation, but the attorney testified that he did not promise probation but told the defendant only that he hoped for probation and that he believed that there was a reasonable chance for probation.
Concurrence by Levin, J.
2. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Voluntariness—Attorney’s Representations.
A lawyer who has conceded that he has made to his client defendant who had then pled guilty some representation, whatever the form of the words used, regarding probation or the length of sentence should have the burden of convincing the court that he told his client everything-that should have been said in order to make true what was said; the lawyer should be required by the court to disclose the basis of his prediction so that its bona fides can be thoroughly scrutinized.
3. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Voluntariness—Representation — Burden of Proof.
The test that should be employed where a defendant claims his plea of guilty was induced by his attorney’s promise of leniency or probation is not whether the defendant establishes the truth of Ms claim by a preponderance of the evidence but whether the judge entertains a reasonable doubt that the plea was encouraged by a false promise of leniency in sentencing.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1-4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § § 485, 486, 492.
4. Criminal Law — -Plea op Guilty — Voluntariness-—Attorney’s Representation.
The true question to be determined where a guilty-pleading defendant seehs to set aside his plea as induced by Ms attorney’s promise of leniency is whether the defendant was led by his lawyer' to believe that he would receive a lenient sentence or probation.
Appeal from Wayne, James Montante, J.
Submitted Division 1 June 4, 1970, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 6146.)
Decided December 30, 1970.
Carl Randall Gray was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of assault with intent to commit rape. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Gahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Garnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Arthur N. Rishop, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Dannemiller, Collins <& Ritchie for defendant.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Levin and Borradaile, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The defendant, Carl Randall Gray, was originally charged with rape. He offered a plea of guilty to an added count of assault with intent to commit rape. His plea was accepted and on February 26, 1968, he was sentenced to serve a term of three to ten years.
Two months later, through a newly retained lawyer, he filed a motion for a new trial which was treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion alleges that defendant's trial lawyer promised that if he pled guilty he would be placed on probation.
On August 2, 1968, a testimonial hearing was held. At the judge's request the trial lawyer attended the hearing and took the stand. He testified that on the day the original charge was scheduled to be tried he negotiated the charge reduction with the prosecutor after first obtaining the defendant's approval. He said that he told the defendant he thought there was a chance he would receive probation since he had no previous record, and that he hoped for probation, but that he did not promise probation.
The defendant then took the stand and testified that his former lawyer told him that if he was convicted of rape he could be sentenced to life in prison, but that if he pled guilty to the reduced charge of assault with intent to commit rape he would be placed on probation.
After oral argument in our Court we entered an order remanding this case to the trial court for the making of a more complete record and of additional findings of fact on that record.
At the hearing on remand on August 31, 1970, the defendant's parents testified and his trial attorney again testified. The defendant's father testified that the trial lawyer promised that if the defendant pled guilty "he would get parole". His mother said that the lawyer had told her that her son would "get probation and possibly a fine".
The attorney testified that, "I told him, naturally, as I had done to dozens and dozens of clients, that I couldn't guarantee anything, that it was up to the court; but I did tell him I hoped to have probation. I felt that his not having any previous record would go toward that end. I told him that I thought there was a reasonable chance for probation."
At the conclusion of the hearing the judge found that the lawyer had not promised probation. He declared that in his opinion the claim of a promise of probation was an afterthought both by the defendant and his parents. He said he had no basis for changing his previous ruling denying the motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea.
We have carefully reviewed the transcript and, having due regard, as the court rule provides, "to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appear before it" (GCR 1963, 517.1), we conclude that the judge's finding that the defendant's trial lawyer did not promise him probation is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
MCLA § 750.520 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.788).
MCLA § 750.85 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.280).