Case Name: SARAH MACGUFFY WOOD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1989-08-15
Citations: 8 Va. App. 560
Docket Number: No. 1458-87-2
Parties: SARAH MACGUFFY WOOD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 8
Pages: 560–566

Head Matter:
Richmond
SARAH MACGUFFY WOOD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1458-87-2
Decided August 15, 1989
Counsel
Craig S. Cooley (Brown and Cooley, on brief), for appellant.
Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion
BARROW, J.
In this appeal of an extortion conviction, we conclude that the Commonwealth was not required to prove the falsity of an allegation underlying a threat to injure a victim's character. The crime of extortion addresses the malice found in obtaining money or other value by threatening to harm another's character; it is not concerned with whether the accusation, by which the harm is threatened, is true or false.
At trial there was evidence that the defendant attempted to extort money from Kubacki by threatening to claim that he had raped her if he did not give her the money she sought. The defendant and Kubacki had engaged in sexual intercourse at the defendant's apartment late one evening while they were alone. Kubacki contends that it was consensual, but the defendant contends that it was not. The next evening the defendant asked the victim to return to her apartment, and, when he did, Kubacki discovered the defendant in the company of four other individuals. Two of them were men, one armed with a baseball bat, who blocked the door so that Kubacki could not leave. The defendant then accused Kubacki of raping her and told him there was no way he was going to get out of the apartment. When Kubacki asked what he could do in order to leave, the defendant told him that she needed $700. Kubacki was then allowed to leave after he told the defend ant that he did not have the money but would attempt to borrow it.
Kubacki immediately reported the incident to the police. Later, Kubacki returned a telephone call from the defendant while a police detective was listening on an extension. During the telephone conversation, the defendant repeated her demand for $700 and told Kubacki that, if she did not get the money, she would call the police and have him arrested for rape.
The Commonwealth indicted the defendant for threatening "injury to the character" of Kubacki in an attempt to extort money from him. The statutory offense of extortion includes threatening "injury to the character, person, or property of another person." Code § 18.2-59. This is in addition to an offense resulting from accusing a person "of any offense." Id.
The defendant contends that by choosing to indict her for threatening injury to the character of Kubacki rather than for accusing him of "any offense," the Commonwealth had a greater burden of proof. She concedes that had she been charged with extorting money by accusing Kubacki of an "offense" the Commonwealth would not have been required to prove the falsity of the accusation, see Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 856, 862 (1880); however, since the Commonwealth elected to charge her instead with threatening to injure Kubacki's character, she argues that the Commonwealth had to prove that the accusation was false. We disagree and hold that it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that an accusation underlying a threat is false, even though the threatened injury is to the character of a person and does not constitute an accusation of an offense.
The statutory offense with which the defendant was charged contains two elements. The first is either (1) threatening to injure "the character, person or property of another person" or (2) accusing another person "of any offense." Code § 18.2-59. The second element consists of the extortion of any money or other valuable property or benefit from the other person. Id. The offense consists of a threat or accusation coupled with an extortion of money or other benefit.
The decisive element of extortion is obtaining money from a victim through threats. Mitchell, 75 Va. at 862. Public disclo sure or even proposed public disclosure is not extortion unless coupled with an effort to obtain money or other value from the victim. Code § 18.2-59. The character of the victim and, consequently, the truthfulness of the threat are immaterial. Mitchell, 75 Va. at 862. "The law will always hold the shield of its protection over the degraded and the criminal, the base and the lewd, as well as over the virtuous, the honest and the good." Id.
Other courts which have considered whether truth of the threatened disclosure is a defense to extortion or like crimes have also generally concluded that it is not. People v. Fox, 157 Cal. App. 2d 426,_, 321 P.2d 103, 106 (1958); People v. Downey, 120 Ill. App. 456, 460, 458 N.E.2d 160, 163 (1983); Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 500-01, 82 N.E. 1039, 1044-45 (1907); State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 491, 110 N.W. 5, 7 (1906); Wilson v. State, 306 P.2d 717, 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); see also Annot. 39 A.L.R. 4th 1011 (1985). The opinions reaching contrary results are not persuasive. People v. Wightman, 104 N.Y. 598, 602, 11 N.E. 135, 136 (1887); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 963 (N.D.Ill. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
Therefore, we conclude that it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the alleged rape actually did not occur. It was sufficient that the defendant used the threat of disclosing the alleged rape to attempt to obtain money from Kubacki.
The defendant also contends that the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she attempted to extort money from Kubacki. She argues that, instead, the evidence proves that Kubacki attempted to bribe her to refrain from asserting the allegation of rape. Her theory was supported by her testimony and the testimony of two of the four persons in the apartment at the time the money was first discussed. However, Kubacki's testimony supported the Commonwealth's contention that she had attempted to extort money from him.
We may not weigh the evidence as the jury was required to do. Rather, we must "look to the whole evidence and view it with the conflicts . . . and the fair inferences . . . settled as determined by the jury." Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 252, 148 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1966). We are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Higginbot ham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). When viewed in this light the evidence, although conflicting, was sufficient to establish that the defendant attempted to extort money from Kubacki.
For these reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Keenan, J., concurred.