Case Name: ARNOLD HEYMAN v. A. BABCOCK and A. F. GERARD
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1866-10
Citations: 30 Cal. 367
Docket Number: 
Parties: ARNOLD HEYMAN v. A. BABCOCK and A. F. GERARD.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 367–371

Head Matter:
ARNOLD HEYMAN v. A. BABCOCK and A. F. GERARD.
Sheriff’s Sale under Decree of Foreclosure.—A Sheriff has no authority to make sale of mortgaged premises under a judgment of foreclosure and sale, unless an order of sale is issued upon the judgment and placed in his hands. »
When the Sheriff may make the Sale.— It is the duty of the Sheriff of the county in which any parcel of the mortgaged premises are situated, to execute the order of sale, unless the decree contains special directions in that respect.
Proof of Order of Sale.—The recitáis in a Sheriff’s deed do not prove that an order of sale was issued'on a judgment of foreclosure.
Evidence of Title under Foreclosure Sale.—The purchaser at a Sheriff’s sale, made under a'decree of foreclosure, before he can recover possession must prove the judgment and order of sale, as well as the Sheriff’s deed.
When Sheriff may Sell under Certified Copy of the Decree.—If the judgment of foreclosure gives full directions as to the time, place, terms, and manner of sale of the mortgaged premises, and directs the Sheriff to make the sale, a certified copy of the decree is sufficient authority for the Sheriff to sell.
Appeal from the District Court, Twelfth Judicial., District, City and County of San Francisco.
Ejectment to recover a lot of land in the City of San Francisco, lying in the angle formed by Centre and Valencia streets. Marcus Lowell, and Ellen, his wife, on the 4th day of December, 1855, executed to plaintiff a mortgage on the demanded premises. A judgment was rendered on the 15th day of September, 1856, foreclosing the mortgage and directing a sale of the mortgaged premises. On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence a Sheriff’s deed of the demanded premises, which recited that an order of sale was issued on the judgment of foreclosure on the 15th day of September, 1856, and was delivered to the Sheriff, and that in pursuance of said order the Sheriff levied on, and on the 18th day of October, 1856, sold the premises at public auction according to law, after having given due notice. The referee to whom the case was referred found that Lowell and wife were in possession of the premises from the first day of January, 1855, until July, 1855, when they left, and the premises remained vacant for two years, when defendants entered. The defendants recovered judgment, and on plaintiff’s motion, the Court granted a new trial. Defendants appealed from the order granting a new trial.
The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
John B. Felton, for Appellants,
argued that an execution or order of sale was necessary to authorize the Sheriff to make sale of mortgaged premises; and cited Secs. 209 and 213 of the Practice Act. He contended that a judgment was only a determination of the rights of the parties, and that no judgment could execute itself, and that it was a general principle that a Court had power to issue all process necessary to carry its decrees into effectual execution ; and cited 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 440 ; and 2 Daniel’s Chan. Pleading and Pr. 1,248 ; and Hit-tell’s Laws, Art. 6,852.
M. A. Wheaton, for Respondent,
argued that, as the Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties to the suit, the decree was of itself authority, and contained not only the proper power but the only power that the Sheriff could have to sell the land; and cited Sec. 246 of the Practice Act as it stood in 1856. He also argued that the statute nowhere provided that a certified copy of the decree should be the Sheriff’s authority to sell, or that the Sheriff needed any further authority than the decree itself, and that as the decree of foreclosure must contain an order to sell, and as the Sheriff must make the sale, no intermediate process was necessary.

Opinion:
By the Court, Rhodes, J.:
The first question for consideration is whether it is necessary that an execution or order of sale issue to the Sheriff', to authorize him to make sale of the mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure and sale of the character of the one presented in this case. The only order respecting the sale contained in the decree, is that the mortgaged premises " be sold according to law." No directions are given as to the time, place, terms or manner of sale; nor is the duty of making the sale committed by the decree to the Sheriff.
The Sheriff does not bear such a relation to the Court that he must take notice of its orders and judgments; and without process execute and carry into effect those that require the aid of a ministerial officer. The general rule is that process is the authority of the Sheriff, and no reason is given why in case of a decree of foreclosure, and especially in one that is as devoid of all directions as the one before us, an exception should be found to the rule. When the mortgaged premises consist of parcels of land situated in several counties, it is evident that the rule contended for by the plaintiff could not be worked without producing great confusion and injury.
No express provision is found in the Practice Act prescribing the mode of making sale of the mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure, but the Courts have in a great number and variety of cases, acted upon the assumption that where no special provision is made in the decree, it is the duty of the Sheriff of the county in which any portion of the mortgaged premises are situated, to sell the portion of the premises within his county in the manner that he is required by law to sell real estate under execution against the property of a judgment debtor, and that the Sheriff acts under and by virtue of an order of sale issued upon the decree. The issuing of the order of sale is authorized, it is thought, by section two hundred and thirteen of the Practice Act; but whether it is so or not, it is very evident that the practice we have mentioned has too long been adopted and too uniformly acquiesced in, to be now changed by the Court on the ground that it was not fully authorized by that Act.
The plaintiff insists that the defendants are in error in saying that the referee found that there was no order of sale, etc. The referee did not so find; but when the Sheriff's deed was offered in evidence, objection was made to its introduction on the ground, among others, that there was no order of sale. In the statement on motion for new trial it is stated that the plaintiff introduced in evidence the Sheriff's deed, "and no evidence was given tending to impeach or contradict any of the recitals in said deed or touching the same, unless the facts found by the referee tend thereto." The referee sets out the facts found by him " as the only facts in this actionand there is no finding in respect to the order of sale. We understand from the referee's report and the statement, that there was no evidence introduced respecting an order of sale.
The order of sale (and in many cases a certified copy of the decree will be sufficient for that purpose) is as essential to a recovery, as the decree or the Sheriff's deed ; and the recital in the deed is as incompetent proof of the order of sale as of the decree. (Hihn v. Peck, ante, 280.)
Order granting a new trial reversed.