Case Name: Edward D. KENNEDY, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, etc., et al., Respondent; Edward D. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-04-30
Citations: 599 So. 2d 991
Docket Number: Nos. 79736, 79741
Parties: Edward D. KENNEDY, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, etc., et al., Respondent. Edward D. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 599
Pages: 991–995

Head Matter:
Edward D. KENNEDY, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, etc., et al., Respondent. Edward D. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 79736, 79741.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 30, 1992.
Billy H. Ñolas and Julie D. Naylor, Oca-la, for petitioner/appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent/appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Edward D. Kennedy, a prisoner under sentence of death and the governor's death warrant, petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. He also appeals from a denial of relief sought in the trial court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction over these consolidated cases. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
The facts of Kennedy's crime and the extensive procedural history of this case are recited in the prior opinions of this Court and the federal courts. Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905 (11th Cir.1991) (habeas), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 957, 117 L.Ed.2d 124 (1992); Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912 (Fla.1989) (appeal 3.850); Kennedy v. Wainwright, 483 So.2d 424 (Fla.) (habeas), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 291, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Kennedy v. State, 455 So.2d 351 (Fla.1984) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1197, 105 S.Ct. 981, 83 L.Ed.2d 983 (1985).
Subsequently, Kennedy filed a successive habeas in this Court and a successive motion under Rule 3.850 in the trial court. The latter was summarily denied on April 27, 1992, on grounds of procedural bar and abuse of process. That same day we stayed the pending execution of Kennedy until 5:00 p.m., May 1, 1992, to provide sufficient time for us to review the present petition and appeal, and to receive and consider the State's response. The governor has rescheduled execution for 5:01 p.m., May 1, 1992.
In the appeal from the trial court's denial of relief, Kennedy raises two issues. He first argues that trial counsel was preju-dicially ineffective for failing to investigate and present available mitigating evidence. We find this claim barred as one that was litigated or, to the extent that new facts are alleged, could have been litigated in the earlier direct appeal or collateral challenges. Agan v. State, 560 So.2d 222 (Fla.1990). Second, Kennedy contends that his trial was tainted by the presence of armed, uniformed state troopers in the courtroom during trial. This claim also is procedurally barred because it was raised and rejected in Kennedy's prior appeal from an unfavorable ruling pursuant to Rule 3.850. Id. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of relief is affirmed.
In his habeas petition, Kennedy raises a variety of issues dealing with the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in the trial court. He first contends that error occurred because the trial court failed to instruct the penalty phase jury about the mitigating factor of extreme emotional duress, which counsel had argued in defense and which the trial court expressly found in its order. Our examination of this case reveals that defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's omission, and appellate counsel did not raise the issue on appeal. The claim thus is procedurally barred. In the ensuing collateral challenges, Kennedy has fully litigated his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He therefore cannot raise the issue afresh under the guise of yet another claim of ineffectiveness. See Agan.
Next, Kennedy argues that this Court has erred in its method of analyzing eases, such as this one, in which aggravating factors have been held invalid on appeal. The United States Supreme Court's most recent opinion on this question, Stringer v. Black, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992), self-evidently did not announce a change in the law but merely discussed and applied well-established principles. In any event, Stringer and the cases on which it rests are entirely consistent with the method of analysis we employed on direct appeal in this case. In our opinion on direct appeal, we expressly found the error resulting from consideration of an invalid aggravating factor to be harmless, Kennedy, 455 So.2d at 355, which is all that Stringer requires. Id. 112 S.Ct. at 1137. Even if this claim was not procedurally barred, we would find no error.
Nor are we persuaded that the pendency of Sochor v. Florida, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 436, 116 L.Ed.2d 455 (1991) (granting certiorari), reviewing, 580 So.2d 595 (Fla.1991), has any bearing on this case. So-chor is distinguishable from the present case because in Sochor the defendant is asserting that this Court failed either to conduct harmless-error analysis or reweigh the evidence after striking an invalid aggravating factor. On the other hand, it is clear on the face of our opinion in the instant case that we did engage in a harmless-error analysis. Kennedy, 455 So.2d at 355.
Next, Kennedy argues that allowing consideration of the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel tainted the entire penalty phase, requiring a new sentencing hearing. This claim either has been litigated, or could have been litigated, in the earlier proceedings in this case and thus is procedurally barred. Agan. For the same reason, a procedural bar prohibits consideration of Kennedy's related contention that the factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is facially vague; and that this Court erred in failing to consider these issues on direct appeal although the error was not raised by counsel. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no basis for granting Kennedy the relief he requests. The temporary stay we previously granted shall remain in force until 5:00 p.m., May 1, 1992, but no longer.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion.