Case Name: Ex Parte Redmond
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1919-03
Citations: 120 Miss. 536
Docket Number: No. 20692
Parties: Ex Parte Redmond.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 536–550

Head Matter:
Ex Parte Redmond.
[82 South. 513,
In Banc.
No. 20692.]
1. Attobney and Client. Attorneys as officers of court-
The courts have universally held that an attorney is an officer of court. ' ■
2. Attokney and Client. Disbarment. Reinstatement.
A court which has power to disbar an attorney has power to reinstate him. • ■
3. Attorney. Disbursement and reinstatement. Powers of board of law examiners.
The state board of law examiners, created by Laws 1916, chapter 107, has no jurisdiction as to reinstatement of a disbarred attorney.
4. Attorneys. Disbursement. Reinstatement of disbarred attorney. Power of court. Statutes.
A Court may act on the merits of a petition by a disbarred attorney for reinstatement, and may restore such attorney to his privileges, notwithstanding Code 1906, section 223 (Hemingway’s Code, section 200), provides that a disbarred attorney _shall never afterwards be permitted to act as attorney or. coun-sellor in any court of the state.
Appeal from the circuit court of Hinds county,
Hon. W-. H. Pottee, Judge.
Proceedings by S. D. Redmond for reinstatement as an attorney at law after a judgment of disbarment. A demurrer by tbe county attorney to tbe petition was sustained and petitioner appeals.
Tbe facts are fully stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.
G. G. Lyell, for appellant.
Tbe only question in tbis case raised in tbe lower court, or here, is whether a member of tbe bar of tbe state of Mississippi who has been disbarred from tbe practice can ever be reinstated.
The appellant- contends that the order of disbarment is not final and conclusive for all time to come, bnt that upon a proper showing, based upon a proper petition for reinstatement,'the statute of this state does not preclude reinstatment. The facts are undisputed. The transcript shows the petition in proper form by S. D. Redmond to be reinstated as a member of the- bar of Mississippi. The application is to the court that disbarred him. The law requires this.
There was exhibited with the petition a certified copy of the order of the circuit court of the-first district of Hinds county, Mississippi, in-June, 1915, disbarring him. A demurrer was interposed to the petition 'of appellant for reinstatement, which demurrer was predicated upon the contention that an attorney of this state, once disbarred, is forever disbarred and cannot ever thereafter be reinstated. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed.
The pertinent code section, the construction of which is involved in this case, is section 223 of the Code of 1906, section 200 of Hemingway’s Code, and reads as follows: “Penalty for Misconduct — If any attorney or counsellor at law is in default of record, or otherwise guilty of any deceit, malpractice, or misbehavior, or shall willfully violate his duties, .he shall be stricken from the roll and-disbarred, and his license revoked by any court in which he may practice; and such person shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counsellor in any court in this state.” The section above quoted does not preclude reinstatement. Practically all the law seems to be., found in 6 Corpus Juris, under “Attorney and Client,” as to the operation and effect of disbarment: 6 C. J., page 614, sec. 95. As to reinstatement, see lb. 615, sec. 97. As to procedure, see, lb., sec. 98. No question is raised in the instant case as to the proper procedure, or whether the petition is in proper form, for admittedly, it is.
By section 95, above cited, as to the operation and effect of disbarment, the meaning of certain clauses in our' statute is made obvious. One might think that, a disbarment by one court would operate to disbar an attorney from practicing in any other court, but such is not uniformly held, as is demonstrated by the authorities cited under section 95, supra. It there appears that disbarment in a state court ’ does not, ipso f apto, deprive the attorney of the right to practice in the federal courts. See also Weeks on Attorneys, sec. - 82, page 154, 2 R. C. L., p. 1113, sec. 205.
Our statute provides that for malpractice or misbehavior, etc., the attorney “shall be stricken from the roll and disbarred and his license revokerd in any court in which he may practice; and such person shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counsellor in any court of this state.” The last clause of this statute simply means that so long as the order of disbarment stands, the disbarred attorney cannot, or may not, practice in any Mississippi court. The statute merely states the general rule upon the subject. Just as statutes merely state the common law without it being intended that any different construction shall be given to the particular statute than the common law. See 1 Coke’s Inst. 213', so. holding upon earliest English Statute, Westmiuister, -quoted in 6 Corpus. Juris., page 581, bottom of first column of notes (b) (3 Ed.), 1, ch. 29. -
The provision that the license be revoked, is simply in kéeping with the rest of the statute, and with our privilege tax laws, and with section 230 of the Code of 1906, Section 207, Hemingway’s Code, making it unlawful to practice law without a license. The language of the statute that “such person shall never afterwards be permitted to act as an attorney or counsellor in any court,” simply means that the” courts are closed to him’ as an attorney nntil such time as he may he reinstated; in other words, so long as the fomer order of disbarment remains in force.
See the very recent case decided by the supreme court of Alabama; upholding the contention of the appellant. Ex parte Peters, (1915 Ala.), 70 So. 648. For the disbarment case see Peters v. State, 69 So. 576.
I submit that it is clear that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings upon the petition of appellant.
Earl N. Floyd, for appellee.
This case comes to this court on an appeal from a judgment sustaining the demurrer of the state to the petition of the appellant herein)' ■ The single question presented by the case, is “whether an attorney once disbarred from practicing in the courts of this state can be re-instated by the same or any other court in the state. ’ ’
Section 223 of the Code of 1906, provides as follows: “Penalty for misconduct. — If any attorney or counsellor at law be in default, of record, or otherwise guilty of any deceit, malpractice or misbehavior, or shall willfully violate his duties, he shall be stricken from the roll and disbarred and his license revoked by any court-in which he may practice; and such person shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counsellor in any court in this state.”
From the evolution of this statute, we find an expressed provision at one time for suspension. Looking again to section 23, page 283, Code of 1842, we find another provision for the reinstatement of an attorney by the high court of appeals upon satisfactory evidence of his reformation. Subsequent to the Code of 1842 provision for any reinstatement or suspension lias been omitted, and the law has appeared in the language of section 223, Code of 1906, in the Codes of 1871, 1880 and 1892. Therefore,’the only question’for this court to decide is the meaning of section 223.
It is the contention of the state that the provision that “such person shall never afterwards be permitted to act as an attorney o'r counsellor in any court in this state” consitutes an absolute prohibition against his reinstatement. This view is based on the omission in all codes subsequent to 1842 of any provision for a reinstatement, or supension. It may be conceded that at common law a court disbarring an attorney has the, implied right to reinstate him upon proper showing, but the common law has been changed in this state, first, by changing the method of reinstatement in requiring a petition to the high court of errors and appeals and afterwards by making disbarment absolute. What the legislative intent in so providing was, we are not called upon to answer. The law and constitution of this state forbids anyone guilty of certain crimes from exercising any franchise right, and also forbids a person impeached for malfeasance or misfeasance in office from further holding office in this state.
In our view, this statute was intended to work a light prohibition against anyone found guilty of conduct unbecoming a person who is an officer of the court. If the legislature had intended that he could be-reinstated upon a showing of reformation, it seems more than probable that it would have so provided, but having omitted to so provide, it seems to- us to be the better view that a court is without authority to reinstate, and that the legislature of the state alone can change the statutes of a disbarred attorney.
The learned counsel for the appellant has elaborately argued the law on both sides of the case, and has quoted the law and practice pertaining to the disbarment of attorneys from ancient'days to the present, and shows that in recent years other states have readmitted attorneys after once'disharing them. As stated above, this may he done under the common law when there is no provision whatsoever relative to, the jurisdiction of the court in the premises, or it may he done when the statute expressly so provides. But I submit that the statute in this state has expressly provided the contrary, and the badge'of dishonor attaching to a disbarred attorney can only he removed by the legislature of the state.

Opinion:
Cook, P. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The proceedings in this case originated in the first district of Hinds county. S. D. Redmond, appellant, filed a petition in the circuit court reciting therein that by judgment of said court rendered in June, 1915, upon proper proceedings, he was disbarred and forbidden to further practice law in any of the courts of this state. The petition «alleged that since the • order of the court petitioner's conduct had been above reproach. The petition prayed that the court inquire into the character, conduct, and behavior of petitioner since his disbarment, and for a reinstatement as a practitioner of law.
The county attorney of Hinds county demurred to this petition, assigning these grounds of error, viz.: (1) The court is without jurisdiction in the premises; (2) the court cannot grant the relief prayed; (3) the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed. The demurrer was sustained generally,, and petitioner was granted the right to appeal.
The attorney general and the county attortíey in their brief thus state the question for the court's decision, viz.: "The single question presented by the ease it whether an attorney once disbarred from practicing in the courts of'this state can be reinstated by the same or any other court in this state."
Section 223, Code of 1906 (section 200, Hemingway's Code) is the law of this state touching the disbarment of attorneys át law and is as follows:
"If any attorney or counselor at law be in default of •record, or otherwise guilty of any deceit, malpractice or misbehavior, or shall willfully violate his duties, he shall be stricken from the roll and disbarred, and his license revoked by any court in which he may practice; and such person shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counselor in any court in this state. ' '
Disregarding the verbiage of the statute it gives to any court in which the attorney practices the power to disbar the attorney, and to revoke his license in any court in which he may practice, and the effect of the disbarment is to take from the disbarred attorney the privilege of practicing in any court of this state. The exact language- of the statute is "and such person shall never afterward be permitted to %ct as an attorney or counselor in any court in this state. ' '
We have no statute providing for the reinstatement of a disbarred attorney. The counsel for the state contend that section 223 is exclusive, and in terms provides that an attorney at law once disbarred in for ever disbarred.
It is undoubtelly true that as long as the judgment of disbarment stands, the disbarred attorney cannot practice in any of the courts. It is true also that once disbarred, always disbarred? Does the power reside in any tribunal or authority to suspend the sentence and restore the privileges of the attorney?
The courts have universally held that an attorney is an officr of the court. 1 Thornton on Attorney at Law, section 13; 6 Corpus Juris, p. 568.
It is generally held' that a court which has power to disbar an attorney has power to reinstate him. 2. Thornton on Attorneys, section 902; 6 Corpus Juris, p. 615, section 97. •
In the light of the authorities treating disbarments and reinstatements of disbarred attorneys, we will consider section 223, Code of 1906 (section 200, Hemingway's Code). This statute has to do with disbarment, and does not relate to reinstatement of disbarred attorneys. It provides that disbarment proceedings may be begun in any court of record in which the attorney may practice, and it also provides that when any such court disbars the attorney he will not be permitted to practice in any court of the state. The last clause of the section, if it is to be construed literally, would seem ,to close the door of hope to disbarred attorney. We think, however, that this clause must mean that so long as the judgment remains unchanged the attorney will not be permitted to appear in the courts of the state. However, as we have already noted, the courts have generally held that the court of original jurisdiction may reopen the case and restore to the lawyer his franchise or privilege, if in the opinion of the court the interests of t]h.e court and the public will be best served by a reinstatement.
This is a judicial question. The executive has no power to commute or pardon, nor does the -legislature possess the power to set aside the court's order. If the court can give no relief, however -meritorious may be the application, we have a most, anomalous situation. It has been the proud boast of the common law that whenever there is a wrong there is always a remedy.
It has been suggested Laws 1916, chapter 107, creating a state board of law examiners, may have some effect upon the issue here. A careful reading of this law will, we think, demonstrate that the board there provided has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this appeal..
We have become satisfied- that the learned circuit judge was in error when he ruled that he had no power to consider the merits of this petition. If a mistake was made in the first instance, or if the circuit court should be satisfied that appellant's franchise should be restored, after bearing the evidence, we think he is empowered to act and restore to appellant his privileges as an attorney at law.
The demurrer is overruled, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.