Case Name: The ATWOOD AGENCY, d/b/a Atwood Vacations and d/b/a RE/MAX Lowcountry Realty, Respondent, v. John T. BLACK, Jr., David Lybrand, Elaine Shaw, and Edisto Sales and Rental Realty, Inc., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2007-06-25
Citations: 374 S.C. 68
Docket Number: No. 26348
Parties: The ATWOOD AGENCY, d/b/a Atwood Vacations and d/b/a RE/MAX Lowcountry Realty, Respondent, v. John T. BLACK, Jr., David Lybrand, Elaine Shaw, and Edisto Sales and Rental Realty, Inc., Appellants.
Judges: TOAL, C.J., and Acting Justice EDWARD B. COTTINGHAM, concur. PLEICONES, J., concurring in part in a separate opinion in which BURNETT, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 374
Pages: 68–75

Head Matter:
646 S.E.2d 882
The ATWOOD AGENCY, d/b/a Atwood Vacations and d/b/a RE/MAX Lowcountry Realty, Respondent, v. John T. BLACK, Jr., David Lybrand, Elaine Shaw, and Edisto Sales and Rental Realty, Inc., Appellants.
No. 26348.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard March 6, 2007.
Decided June 25, 2007.
Rehearing Denied July 26, 2007.
M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., and John A. Jones, both of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of Charleston, for appellants.
Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., and David K. Haller, both of Richter & Haller, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for respondent.

Opinion:
Justice MOORE:
This appeal is from a temporary injunction issued in an action brought by respondent Atwood Agency (Atwood) alleging that appellant Elaine Shaw misappropriated trade secrets when she left its employ. We reverse.
FACTS
Atwood is a vacation rental business on Edisto Islánd that matches homeowners (rental property owners) with renters (those seeking vacation accommodations). Shaw worked for Atwood as a property manager from 1990 until August 26, 2005, when she left and began work for another vacation rental agency, Edisto Sales and Rental Realty, Inc. (Edisto Sales). Shaw's job as a property manager involved overseeing the rental of vacation homes in Edisto Beach, including contact with both renters and rental property homeowners.
After Shaw left its employ, Atwood commenced the underlying action alleging Shaw had misappropriated its homeowners list and its renters list and was using them to take business from Atwood to Edisto Sales. Atwood claimed it had lost more than fifty rental homes causing damages amounting to "hundreds of thousands of dollars" in revenue. It alleged, among other causes of action, a violation of the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 39-8-10 et seq.
On December 1, 2005, the circuit court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order based on the affidavit of Mark Steedley, Atwood's president, restraining Shaw and the other appellants employed at Edisto Sales from "contacting and contracting with" any vacation renter or homeowner of Atwood's. Bond was set at $250. After a hearing, the circuit court issued an order granting Atwood's motion for a temporary injunction. The court found Atwood's renter list and homeowners list were trade secrets and reiterated the terms of the temporary restraining order. The circuit court refused to grant a supersedeas pending appeal.
ISSUE
1. Does the information regarding homeowners and renters qualify as a trade secret?
2. Is the amount of bond insufficient?
DISCUSSION
1. Temporary injunction
Appellants contend the circuit court erred in finding Shaw misappropriated trade secrets. They claim the information regarding renters and homeowners is not "secret" because it is available from other sources. We agree.
The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act authorizes an injunction against misappropriating a trade secret. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-8-30(0) (Supp.2006). A "trade secret" is defined as information, including a compilation, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other person who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
S.C.Code Ann. § 39-8-20(5) (Supp.2006).
Temporary injunctive relief rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned unless the order is clearly erroneous. Gilley v. Gilley, 327 S.C. 8, 488 S.E.2d 310 (1997); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Porter, 252 S.C. 478, 167 S.E.2d 313 (1969). The facts alleged must be sufficient to support a temporary injunction and the injunction must be reasonably necessary to protect the rights of the moving party. Transcontinental, supra. The merits of the underlying ease are to be considered only to the extent necessary to determine whether there has been a prima facie showing to support a temporary injunction. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001).
Here, the information that is the subject of the temporary injunction is readily ascertainable from other sources and therefore does not qualify for protection under § 39-8-20(5). It is undisputed that a list of all the homeowners in E disto Beach and their contact information is a matter of public record available at Town Hall. The record also indicates the names of renters were available to Shaw through other proper means. According to Shaw, she was contacted directly by Atwood renters after Atwood sent out an announcement of her departure. In addition, although by contract Atwood attempted to restrict homeowners' personal contact with renters, there is evidence that homeowners sometimes knew their renters or kept a guestbook where renters provided personal contact information.
Because the information Atwood seeks to protect is available through other proper means, it is not protected as a trade secret. Accordingly, we find the temporary injunction re straining appellants from contacting or contracting with Atwood clients clearly erroneous.
2. Security Bond
The circuit court ordered a security bond in the amount of $250 reasoning that "since [appellants] have no right to the Atwood trade secrets, the damage which may be sustained by them as a result of this injunction is minimal." Appellants contend this amount of bond is inadequate. We agree.
Rule 65(c), SCRCP, provides that:
no restraining order or temporary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
The circuit court's order requiring only a nominal security bond does not satisfy Rule 65(c) because it erroneously assumes the injunction is proper instead of providing an amount sufficient to protect appellants in the event the injunction is ultimately deemed improper. In light of our finding that appellants were improperly enjoined, we remand to the circuit court to award the appropriate amount of costs and damages incurred as a result of the temporary injunction.
REVERSED.
TOAL, C.J., and Acting Justice EDWARD B. COTTINGHAM, concur. PLEICONES, J., concurring in part in a separate opinion in which BURNETT, J., concurs.
. An order granting a temporary injunction is directly appealable. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001).