Case Name: Hershel WILBOURN v. Peggy HOBSON
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1992-07-29
Citations: 608 So. 2d 1187
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-0325
Parties: Hershel WILBOURN v. Peggy HOBSON.
Judges: PRATHER, ROBERTSON, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 608
Pages: 1187–1205

Head Matter:
Hershel WILBOURN v. Peggy HOBSON.
No. 92-CA-0325.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
July 29, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1992.
Natie P. Caraway, Olen M. Bailey, Jr., Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Michael S. Allred, Allred & Donaldson, Jackson, for appellant.
Tyree Irving, Greenwood, John L. Walker, Jr., Walker Walker & Green, Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
McRAE, Justice,
for the Court:
In this appeal from an order entered by the Hinds County Circuit Court on April 3, 1992, we are asked to put to rest the issues raised in the hotly contested November 5, 1991, election for the District 3 seat on the Hinds County Board of Supervisors. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the appellee, Peggy Hobson, on the le gality of twenty-seven (27) uninitialed affidavit ballots and six (6) affidavit ballots opened by poll workers. Adding these ballots to the totals certified by the Hinds County Election Commission, the Circuit Court declared Hobson the victor in the election by two votes. Limited by the narrow issues raised by the appellant and by the stipulation of facts agreed upon by Wilbourn, Hobson, and their attorneys, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.
FACTS
By a narrow margin, the Hinds County Election Commission certified Hershel Wilbourn as the winner of a seat on the Board of Supervisors in the November 5, 1991, general election. In the legal battles which followed, attention focused on the legality of certain affidavit ballots, those which are issued to individuals whose names do not appear on the pollbooks but who aver in writing that they are eligible to vote in that precinct. The more than ten thousand votes which were cast electronically are not at issue.
Peggy Hobson filed an election contest in the Hinds County Circuit Court pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-951 (1972). See In re Wilbourn, 590 So.2d 1381 (Miss. 1991). Over a period of just seven months, there ensued a complicated history of legal maneuvering through mine fields set by each party for the other in the chancery court, in the circuit court, and, ultimately, up to this Court by means of petitions for interlocutory appeals and extraordinary relief. We do not address these myriad manipulations; rather, we look only at the appeal raised directly from the Circuit Court decision.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and stipulated that Judge Graves could hear the case as a jury. They waived any technical errors involving the summary judgment. In support of their motions, the parties filed a joint Stipulation of Facts. In pertinent part, Wilbourn and Hobson stipulated or agreed that the following facts were true:
—The Hinds County Election Commission certified Hershel Wilbourn the winner of the District 3 Supervisors election by these vote totals: Hobson, 5,321 and Wilbourn, 5,352.
—Not included in that certification were the following:
(a) 27 uninitialed affidavit ballots for
Hobson;
(b) 1 uninitialed affidavit ballot for
Wilbourn;
(c) 1 curbside ballot for Hobson;
(d) 6 affidavit ballots for Hobson
opened by the poll workers.
—The curbside ballot, (c) above, is legal and should be added to Hobson's total.
—There is no question as to the integrity of the ballots set forth in (a), (b), and (d) above. The legality of the ballots set forth in (a), (b), and (d) above is unquestioned as to everything except that 28 ballots, set forth in (a) and (b) above, were not initialed on the back, and the envelopes containing the six ballots set forth in (d) above, were opened by the poll workers at the close of the polls and the ballots counted by the poll workers who then returned the ballots to their envelopes and delivered them, along with their other election materials, to the Hinds County Election Commission.
—All persons who cast the 6 affidavit ballots, (d) above, were qualified voters of Hinds County Supervisor District 3, a fact verified by the Hinds County Election Commission upon their delivery to them.
—If the ballots set forth in (a), (b), and (d) are declared legal, they should be added to the appropriate party's vote total.
—Based upon this stipulation, if Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, the ruling would be dispositive of the case and would be a final, appeal-able judgment pursuant to MRCP 54.
—The parties waive any objection to the court and not the jury declaring a winner in this election contest based upon the court's ruling on the motions for summary judgment.
—This stipulation is in support of both the defendant's and plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment, which are to be treated as motions for summary judgment rather than for partial summary judgment.
The Circuit Court found that the twenty-seven uninitialed affidavit ballots were valid pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-573 (Supp.1990), which deals specifically with the casting of affidavit ballots. The statute is silent as to any requirement that such ballots be initialed. The Circuit Court further found that Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-541 (Supp.1990), which requires generally that paper ballots must be initialed by an "initialing manager" or "alternative initialing manager," was not applicable to affidavit ballots. In so determining, he applied the rule of statutory construction that a specific statute such as § 23-15-573 controls over a general statute.
The Circuit Court further determined that because the integrity of the six ballots, which had been opened by poll workers in an open forum after the polls had closed, and returned to their envelopes prior to being delivered to the Election Commission, was uncontroverted pursuant to the Stipulation, that to declare them illegal because of the poll workers' actions would result in an unwarranted and unreasonable disenfranchisement of the six voters. On the basis of the Stipulation, the Circuit Court also found that the lone curbside ballot was legal.
Based on its determinations, the Circuit Court tallied the twenty-seven (27) unini-tialed affidavit ballots, the six (6) affidavit ballots which had been opened by the poll workers, and one (1) curbside ballot with the 5,321 votes for Hobson which had been certified by the Election Commission. This gave her a total of 5,355 votes. One (1) uninitialed affidavit was added to Wil-bourn's 5,352 certified votes, giving him a total of 5,353.
Hobson thus was declared the winner of the contested seat by two votes. The Circuit Court ordered the Clerk of the Court to issue a Certificate of Election to Hobson pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-951 (Supp.1990). She was sworn in as Supervisor for Hinds County, District 3 on April 3, 1992.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, we emphasize that the parties have laid before us two very narrow issues. The case is (and can only be) decided on those two points alone. Wil-bourn and Hobson have stipulated virtually all the relevant facts. A synopsis of their stipulations includes the following:
(1) the Hinds County Election Commission certified Hershel Wilboum the winner of the November 5, 1991, election;
(2) the vote totals certified by the Hinds County Election Commission did not include the contested affidavit ballots;
(3) the contested affidavit ballots, if declared legal, should be added to the parties' respective vote totals;
(4) there is no evidence questioning the integrity of the contested ballots; and
(5) the ballots are legal in every respect apart from the two issues addressed on this appeal.
A stipulated fact is one which both parties agree is true. Where the parties file and gain court approval of a formal stipulation agreement as Wilboum and Hobson have done, the factual issues addressed in the agreement are forever settled and excluded from controversy. Neither party can later change positions. Johnston v. Stinson, 434 So.2d 715 (Miss. 1983); Vance v. Vance, 216 Miss. 816, 63 So.2d 214 (1953); Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So.2d 184 (Miss.1949). Furthermore, factual stipulations set boundaries beyond which this Court cannot stray. As stated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
In the absence of grounds which will authorize a party to a stipulation to rescind or withdraw from it, . the courts, both trial and appellate, . are bound by stipulations in respect of matters which may validly be made the subject matter of stipulations. Courts are bound to enforce stipulations which parties may validly make, where they are not unreasonable or against good morals or sound public policy. Ordinarily they have no power to . go beyond the terms [of such stipulations] . or to make find ings contrary to the terms of a stipulation, or render a judgment not authorized by its terms.
83 C.J.S. Stipulations § 17 (1953); see also Roberts v. Robertson, 232 Miss. 796, 100 So.2d 586 (1958) (court cannot look behind stipulation of parties). In reviewing this case, we are thus constrained to abide by Wilbourn's and Hobson's stipulations of fact. We must assume that the contested ballots are not tainted by fraud or malfeasance of any kind; we must assume that the ballots conform to all legal requirements outside the two specific issues raised on appeal. Stated simply, Wilbourn and his attorney have stipulated away every point of fact that might otherwise have had a bearing on our decision. We are therefore left with two sterile questions of law on which Wilbourn's claim to elected office must stand or fall. We now turn to the merits of those two issues.
I.
ARE THE TWENTY-EIGHT UNINI-TIALED AFFIDAVIT BALLOTS ILLEGAL AND VOID?
Twenty-eight affidavit ballots cast in the District 3 Supervisor election were not initialed by the initialing manager. Twenty-seven of these ballots were cast for Hobson; one was cast for Wilbourn. According to Wilbourn, the law requires that all paper ballots be initialed. Since these were not, he argues, they are void and should not be counted.
The issue turns largely on the wording of two statutes: one, a statute of general application that provides for the initialing of paper ballots; the other, a statute specifically governing affidavit ballots that does not require initialing. The general statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-541 (Supp.1990), is codified under the "Subarticle A. General Provisions" of our election code. It provides in relevant part:
When any person entitled to vote shall appear to vote, he shall first sign his name in a receipt book or booklet provided for that purpose and to be used at that election only and said receipt book or booklet shall be used in lieu of the list of voters who have voted formerly made by the managers or clerks; whereupon and not before, the initialing manager or, in his absence, the alternate initialing manager shall indorse his initials on the back of an official blank ballot, prepared in accordance with law, and at such place on the back of the ballot that the initials may be seen after the ballot has been marked and folded, and when so indorsed he shall deliver it to the voter, which ballot the voter shall mark in the manner provided by law, which when done the voter shall deliver the same to the initialing manager or, in his absence, to the alternate initialing manager, in the presence of the others, and the manager shall see that the ballot so delivered bears on the back thereof the genuine initials of the initialing manager, or alternate initialing manager, and if so, but not otherwise, the ballot shall be put into the ballot box; and when so done one (1) of the managers or a duly appointed clerk shall make the proper entry on the poll-book. If the voter is unable to write his name on the receipt book, a manager or clerk shall note on the back of the ballot that it was receipted for by his assistance.
Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-573 (Supp.1990), codified under "Subarticle B. Affidavit Ballots and Challenged Ballots," sets out the procedure for voting by affidavit ballot:
No person whose name does not appear upon the pollbooks shall be permitted to vote in an election; but if any person offering to vote in any election whose name does not appear upon the pollbook shall make affidavit before one (1) of the managers of election in writing that he is entitled to vote, or that he has been illegally denied registration, his vote may be prepared by him and handed to the proper election officer who shall enclose the same in an envelope with the written affidavit of the voter and seal it and mark plainly upon it the name of the person offering to vote. In canvassing the returns of the election, the executive committee in primary elections, or in a general election the election commission ers, shall examine the records and allow the ballot to be counted, or not, as shall appear to be legal.
The crucial question is whether the initialing requirement found in § 23-15-541 applies to affidavit ballots despite § 23-15-573's silence on the subject of initialing. We hold that it does not.
It is well settled that when construing two statutes that encompass the same subject matter, a specific statute will control over a general one. Andrews v. Waste Control, Inc., 409 So.2d 707, 713 (Miss. 1982); see Benoit v. United Companies Mortgage of Mississippi, 504 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss.1987); Martin v. State, 501 So.2d 1124, 1127 (Miss.1987); State ex rel. Pair v. Burroughs, 487 So.2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1986); Carleton v. State, 438 So.2d 278, 279 (Miss.1983); Burress v. State, 431 So.2d 1117, 1118 (Miss.1983); Bence v. State, 240 So.2d 630, 631 (Miss.1970); McCaffrey's Food Market, Inc. v. Mississippi Milk Comm'n, 227 So.2d 459, 463 (Miss.1969); McCrory v. State, 210 So.2d 877, 877 (Miss.1968); see also 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 2022 (3d ed. 1943). There is no question in the instant case but that § 23-15-541 is of general scope while § 23-15-573 is specific. Section 23-15-541 prescribes the procedure for handling paper ballots generally; § 23-15-573 establishes the procedure for managing affidavit ballots in particular. Although paper ballots, as a general rule, must be initialed, the specific statute governing affidavit ballots does not require it. The specific statute controls.
A second axiom of statutory construction holds that when two statutes pertain to the same subject, they must be read together in light of legislative intent. In McCaf-frey's Food Market, 227 So.2d at 463, we stated:
It is . a rule of law that in its effort to construe a statute the courts must seek to ascertain the legislative intent of the statute in question as a whole, taking into consideration each provision of the statute on the entire subject.
Accord Calhoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Grenada Bank, 543 So.2d 138, 144-45 (Miss.1988); Martin, 501 So.2d at 1127; Roberts v. Mississippi Republican Party, 465 So.2d 1050, 1052 (Miss.1985); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So.2d 402, 411 (Miss.1985); Mississippi Public Serv. Comm'n v. Municipal Energy Agency, 463 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Miss.1985); Andrews, 409 So.2d at 713; Burroughs, 487 So.2d at 226; see also 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 40 ("Statutes or statutory sections which relate to the same subject matter or are in pari materia must be read together to determine the mind of the legislature.").
Wilbourn argues that this rule of construction favors his position. According to him, when § 23-15-541 and 23-15-573 are read together, § 23-15-541 supplies the initialing requirement that § 23-15-573 omits. This argument may have some superficial appeal, but a closer scrutiny of the two statutes reveals that even when reading them together, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to impose an initialing requirement for affidavit ballots.
First, a requirement that affidavit ballots be initialed is incompatible with other provisions in § 23-15-541. Section 23-15-541 provides that when a person "entitled to vote shall appear to vote, he shall first sign his name in a receipt book; whereupon and not before, the initialing manager . shall indorse his initials on the back of an official blank ballot." (Emphasis added). Affidavit ballots are used because the prospective voter is being challenged as to his qualifications to vote, namely, people whose names do not appear on the poll-books and who are therefore ineligible to sign the receipt book. Since the initialing manager is expressly prohibited from initialing the ballot before the voter signs the receipt book, it is not logically possible for the initialing manager to comply with the law if § 23-15-573 implicitly incorporates an initialing requirement. Section 23-15-541 also provides that after the initialing manager endorses the ballot, "he shall deliver it to the voter, which ballot the voter shall mark in the manner provided by law, which when done the voter shall deliver the same to the initialing manager." Section 23-15-573, on the other hand, provides that once an affidavit voter makes his written affidavit, "his vote may be prepared by him and handed to the proper election officer." (Emphasis added). In the presence of the voter, the election officer seals the affidavit envelope and signs his/her name as manager. [See Appendix A ] The phrase "may be prepared by him" refers to the voter.
The very fact that an initialing requirement appears in § 23-15-541 and not in § 23-15-573 is itself indicative of legislative intent. There is a very good reason for exempting affidavit ballots from the initialing requirement — affidavit ballots are not so amenable to fraud as are ordinary paper ballots. It is obvious that the initialing requirement was primarily meant to avoid the practice of stuffing the ballot boxes. Initialing provides a security measure to help election officials detect and protect against counterfeit ballots. In this view, the distinction between the handling of a regular voter's (paper) ballot and that of one voting by affidavit ballot becomes crucial. Where the voter's name appears on the poll book, he is handed a ballot and may retire to the voting booth and then emerge and, if not watched carefully, slip more than one marked ballot into the box. And once his vote(s) are in the box, the chances of detection are slight. Not so with the affidavit ballot. It may well be that in secret the voter may mark or prepare two or more ballots, but if he places them in the sealed envelope required by § 23-15-573, his scheme will be found out when the envelope is opened.
Of course, even affidavit ballots were once susceptible to the unscrupulous practice called the "Tasmanian dodge." This device was described in Allen v. Snowden, 441 So.2d 553 (Miss.1983). To carry out a "Tasmanian dodge,"
a blank ballot was passed to a dishonest politician who premarked it and paid a corrupt voter to take it to the poll to vote. The corrupt voter received his ballot, but put the premarked ballot in the ballot box. He then took the blank ballot he received at the poll to the dishonest politician who again premarked it and paid the second corrupt voter to vote the ballot. This process continued throughout election day.
Allen, 441 So.2d at 555. Modern election techniques have rendered the "Tasmanian dodge" impractical if not impossible in most precincts. Today, elections are by and large conducted by machine voting. Where voting machines are used, affidavit and absentee ballots are the only ones available on paper. To accomplish a "tas-manian dodge" through the use of affidavit ballots, the perpetrator would have to locate a sizable number of voters who are registered and legally entitled to vote but who, for whatever reason, do not appear in the pollbooks. Further, the perpetrator would have to persuade this limited pool of potential accomplices to participate in his scheme. The likelihood that a "tasmanian dodge" could successfully occur under these circumstances is infinitesimally small.
Since the practice of initialing ballots helps prevent the fraudulent use of ordinary paper ballots, the legislative intent behind the § 23-15-541 initialing requirement is apparent. By the same token, it is also apparent why the legislature did not include an initialing requirement in § 23-15-573: The anti-fraud rationale does not extend to paper ballots cast by affidavit. It is important to note that the election at issue here was conducted by machine voting. Had it not been, the parties have nevertheless stipulated that no evidence of fraud exists.
If we read § 23-15-573 as requiring the initialing of affidavit ballots, there would still be no reason to invalidate the twenty-eight ballots at issue here, for the initialing provision would be directory as to that statute. We have on many occasions held that technical irregularities will not vitiate an election where there is no evidence of fraud or intentional wrong. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Bizzell, 530 So.2d 121, 126-27 (Miss.1988); Fouche v. Ragland, 424 So.2d 559 (Miss.1982). Chinn v. Cousins, 201 Miss. 1, 8, 27 So.2d 882, 883 (1946), admits as much:
We have had frequent occasion to appraise the effect of non-conformity with this statute. We have been alert to the danger of rendering inefficient the machinery of nomination by a blind insistence upon absolute and ritualistic conformity with minute detail. A sane and practical relaxation indulged under circumstances where, despite trivial lapses, the voters have expressed their will by lawful ballot is not inconsistent with a rigid requirement that such ballot be lawful.
Long ago in Guice v. McGehee, 155 Miss. 858, 124 So. 643, 644 (1929), we held:
In determining the effect of irregularities through mistakes of voters and election officials, all statutes limiting the voter in the exercise of his right of suffrage are construed liberally in his favor, in order to ascertain the will of the majority of the voters.
This principle is still sound. If the integrity of a ballot is unquestioned, there is no good reason to disenfranchise a voter for some technical aberration beyond his control.
In the instant case, twenty-eight people cast twenty-eight uninitialed affidavit ballots, presumably for the candidate of their choice. Despite the lack of initialing, those ballots fully reflect the will of the voters who cast them. Of course, if there had been even a hint of unseemliness associated with the ballots at issue, then even a technical irregularity might have rendered them void. We again emphasize, however, that Wilbourn has stipulated away even the possibility of impropriety. The burden of proving fraud rests on the party seeking to invalidate the ballots. Wilbourn has not only failed to meet his burden, he and his attorney have passed up the opportunity to do so. As it stands, the absence of initials on the twenty-eight contested ballots do not render the ballots invalid under our election code. Peggy Hobson is entitled to claim twenty-seven of those votes as her own.
II.
ARE THE SIX AFFIDAVIT BALLOTS OPENED BY POLL WORKERS VOID?
We further reject Wilbourn's proposition that the six affidavit ballots opened by poll workers at one precinct were void. Again, we turn to the statute for guidance. Once the offer to vote has been placed in a sealed envelope, Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-573 (1972) specifies only that:
In canvassing the returns of the election, the executive committee in primary elections, or in a general election the election commissioners, shall examine the records and allow the ballot to be counted, or not, as shall appear to be legal.
The statute clearly indicates that ballots shall be counted by the election commissioners in a general election. However, the statute is silent as to when, where and by whom the ballots may or shall be opened. Even if we were to read into the statute a requirement that election workers not open affidavit ballots at the polls, we would still need to answer the question of whether it would be merely directory and not mandatory.
Eight affidavit ballots were opened at the precinct by election officials who were sworn to fidelity and trust in holding the election. They were opened after the polls had closed and after voters had left the precinct. Those ballots were duly returned to their envelopes and delivered to the Hinds County Election Commission. They were kept separate and apart from other election materials so that the registration status of the voters could be independently verified by the Election Commission. Two of the eight affidavit ballots were found by the Election Commissioners to have been cast by unregistered voters and thus were not counted.
As with the uninitialed affidavit ballots, the parties and their attorneys stipulated that there was no question about the integrity of the ballots opened by the poll workers. It was further stipulated that the legality of the ballots was unquestioned except for the manner in which they were opened. By so stipulating, Wilbourn and his attorney have again vitiated the argument now before us. Absent evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing, we have held that technical irregularities will not void the ballots cast. Rizzo v. Bizzell, 530 So.2d 121, 126-127 (Miss.1988); Fouche v. Ragland, 424 So.2d 559 (Miss.1982). Notwithstanding the stipulation, we find no evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing in the record.
We are unmoved by Wilboum's passionate argument that the opening of the affidavit ballots by the poll workers violates the sanctity of the secret ballot. Rather, we focus our concern on the potential disenfranchisement of six voters by a procedure which violated no statute and caused no harm. In considering whether the accidental exposure of the signatures on absentee ballots would serve to invalidate those ballots, the Kentucky court wrote in Stabile v. Osborne, 217 S.W.2d 980, 982, 984 (Ky.1949):
The allegation is that the election officers disregarded the rules laid down in the statute for preserving the secrecy of the ballot. But the statute does not say that this dereliction of duty shall result in disfranchisement of innocent voters. ⅜ ⅜ # # # *
It would be a dangerous thing and put a premium upon misconduct to declare that an election officer by his dereliction in performing a duty, such as preserving the secrecy of individual ballots, may disenfranchise the electorate in part or in whole and perhaps swing an election from one candidate to another.... There is a difference where there was a deliberate destruction of the secret quality of an election during the course of holding it or other fraud or such gross misconduct that it cannot be said that the results do not reflect the free and unhampered will of the people.
We find no violation of the statute. The parties and their attorneys have stipulated that there was no evidence to challenge the integrity of the disputed ballots. We see no reason to disenfranchise innocent voters because of a technical irregularity which occurred long after their votes were cast. Accordingly, Peggy Hobson is also entitled to claim these six votes as her own.
Both Wilbourn and Hobson stipulated that there were no questions about the integrity of the twenty-seven (27) unini-tialed affidavit ballots and the six (6) affidavit ballots opened by poll workers. They further agreed that except for the issues raised in this appeal, there was no question as to the legality of the affidavit ballots. In effect, Wilbourn has stipulated himself out of court. Given the constraints of our scope of review, the narrowness of the issues before us and the limitations of the stipulated facts, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
AFFIRMED.
PRATHER, ROBERTSON, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs in part I, but dissents as to part II.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs with separate written opinion, joined by PRATHER and BANKS, JJ.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion, joined by HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ.
SULLIVAN, J., joins part II of ROY NOBLE LEE's dissent.
HAWKINS, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion, joined by ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and DAN M. LEE, P.J.
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