Case Name: DODGE v. FINDLAY; SAME v. CORNELIUS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1899-04-25
Citations: 57 N.Y.S. 791
Docket Number: 
Parties: DODGE v. FINDLAY. SAME v. CORNELIUS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 57
Pages: 791–794

Head Matter:
DODGE v. FINDLAY. SAME v. CORNELIUS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
April 25, 1899.)
Wills—Addresses of Subscribing Witnesses—Penalty—Limitation of Actions.
Limitations commence to run against the right of action for the penalty provided by 2 Rev. St. (9th Ed.) p 1877, § 41, for failure of a subscribing witness to a will to write his address opposite his name, from the date of signing, and not from the date when the will is presented for probate.
Woodward and Bartlett, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Queens county.
Actions by George T. Dodge against John J. Findlay and by the same plaintiff against George W. Cornelius. Judgments were for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and WOODWARD, JJ.
John Lyon, for appellants.
James H. Seaman, for respondent.

Opinion:
GOODRICH, P. J.
The plaintiff sues to recover $50 in each of these actions, under section 41, 2 Rev. St. (9th Ed.) p. 1877, which reads:
"The witnesses to any will shall write opposite to their names their respective places of residence. Whoever shall neglect to comply with either of these provisions, shall forfeit fifty dollars, to be recovered by any person interested in the property devised or bequeathed, who will sue for the same.''
The only question necessary to be considered is whether the statute of limitations is a bar to the action. The defendants were subscribing witnesses to the will of George Duryea, which was executed on April 22, 1895. Duryea died on December 14, 1897, and the will was admitted to probate on March 4, 1898. These actions were commenced on May 20, 1898. Section 383, subd. 3, Code Civ. Proc., provides that an action for a penalty or forfeiture must be commenced within three years. The plaintiff contends that the statute did not begin to run until the neglect to comply with the statute was discovered. The defendants contend that it began to run from the moment the subscribing witnesses affixed their signatures. ,
The statute upon which this action is based must be reasonably construed." Its object was to enable parties interested to locate the witnesses. It was not intended to enable an aggrieved party to recover absolute indemnity; otherwise, it would not have named an arbitrary sum, not at all commensurate with the damage which might result from the neglect. It may be a violent presumption that every one is presumed to know the law, yet we must assume that the witnesses to any will know the requirement of the statute and wall obey it. The penalty is intended to compel obedience to a reasonable provision. It is clearly designed as a punishment for failure to comply with the statute, although the right to recover is conferred alone upon persons interested in the property. It may be assumed that ordinarily the only person "interested in the property" who would be cognizant of the neglect would be the testator. It is not our province to be influenced by the difficulties of discovering the neglect, and thus enforcing the statute, or to enlarge on the fact that unless a testator die, and his will be offered for probate, within the three years after its execution, there is no possibility that any person interested other than the testator is likely to acquire knowledge of the neglect. The statute of limitations' is a statute of rest, and the only exceptions to its running are in certain cases of disabilities, and in the cases mentioned in subdivision 5 of section 882 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that in certain cases of fraud the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud. There are many other cases where a state of facts affording a cause of action may not be readily discoverable. For instance, a written, contract enforceable under Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, might be executed and not come to the knowledge of a person having a right to enforce its provisions within the period limited by the statute; nevertheless the statute would run.against it. Or a person might be assaulted by a person whose identity was unknown to him, and not discovered till the time within which action could have been brought had expired, and yet the statute would begin to run immediately after the assault.. The question might be illustrated by many similar cases, but these are enough. To hold the doctrine for which the plaintiff contends would destroy the long-accepted doctrine that the statute of limitations, as already stated, is a statute ®f rest. No serious public interest is likely to suffer by our decision. No similar action is cited as ever occurring in the courts of this or any other state. We are clearly of the opinion that the statute begins to run when the witnesses sign a will, and not when the testator dies, or the will is published or presented for probate.
- The judgments must be reversed, with costs. All concur, except WOODWARD and BARTLETT, JJ., dissenting.