Case Name: Iliff v. Weymouth
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1883-01
Citations: 40 Ohio St. 101
Docket Number: 
Parties: Iliff v. Weymouth.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 40
Pages: 101–104

Head Matter:
Iliff v. Weymouth.
A surety on a promissory note, within a month after it became due, delivered to the payee and owner thereof, a notice in writing, in which were the words, “ you are hereby required at once to proceed and collect the note you hold, upon which I am surety,” and also the words,- “ I Will stand no longer.” The payee waited more than six years after receiving said notice, before he commenced an action against the principal debtor on said note.
Reid: That under the provisions of the statute for the relief of sureties and bail (S. & S., 741) the said notice by the surety to the creditor was-sufficient.
Error to the District Court of Greene County.
This cause came, on appeal, to the court of common pleas of Greene county, wherein Gregory Weymouth filed his petition against James P. Satterfield and Wesley Iliff, on a promissory note, of which the following is a copy, to wit:
“Xenia, April 17,1872.
“$178.50.
“ Six months after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of Gregory Weymouth, one hundred and seventy-eight ^ dollars, at the First National Bank of Xenia, for value received.
“Jas. P. Satterfield,
Wesley Iliee.”
iliff signed the note described in the petition, as surety only. Within a month after the note became due, Iliff delivered to Weymouth, who was then the owner of the note, a notice in writing, as follows, to wit:
“To Gregory Weymouth: You are hereby required at once to proceed and collect the note you hold dated the 17th of April, 1872, for $178.50, upon which I am surety, and James Satterfield is principal; that I will stand no longer. Wesley Iliee.”
Weymouth neglected to commence an action on the note until January, 1879. He did not call upon Iliff to pay the note, from the time said notice was served, until the eominencement of the action; and whenever he spoke to Iliff about the note being unpaid, on every such occasion, Iliff said he was out of it because of said notice.
A jury was waived in the court of common pleas, and the parties by agreement submitted to the court the issues of law and fact; and upon all the facts, the court found as a matter of law, that said notice was insufficient, and did not comply with the statute, and for that reason rendered judgment against the defendant Wesley Iliff. The district court affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas, and the case is here on petition in error to reverse the judgment of the district court.
Snodgrass £ Schnebly, for plaintiff in error.
Nesbitt cf Martin, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Dickman, J.
We think the notice in writing delivered to Weymouth by Iliff, was sufficient under the statute, to discharge the latter from liability as surety on the promissory note in suit. Under the provisions of the statute for the relief of sureties and bail (S. & S., 741), a person bound as surety on a note, might — if a right of action had accrued thereon — require his creditor by a notice in writing, forthwith to commence an action against the principal debtor on such note. And if the creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time thereafter, he forfeited the right which he would otherwise have had, to demand and receive from such surety the amount due on the note* To' make the written notice sufficient, it was necessary that Iliff, the surety, should comply substantially with the requirements of the statute. This we think he did. The notice given by him was peremptory, unconditional and easily understood. It "required" the payee and owner of the note to proceed and collect, and left it not to his option. He was to act without delay — "at once " or forthwith. He was required to "proceed," or, as the word has been defined, " to commence and carry on a legal process." When required to " collect," the adoption of the commonly known and most effective means of enforcing collection — the commencement of suit — was necessarily implied. The determined language of the surety, "I will stand no longer," taken in connection with the rest of the notice, was suggestive to the creditor, that the surety would expect him to resort at once to the best mode of discharging him from liability as surety on the note, to wit: the commencement of an action forthwith, which would enforce payment of the note by the principal debtor. The judgments of both courts must be reversed.
Judgment accordingly.