Case Name: The President, Directors, and Company, of the Portland Bank versus The President, Directors, and Company, of the Maine Bank
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1814-05
Citations: 10 Tyng 204
Docket Number: 
Parties: The President, Directors, and Company, of the Portland Bank versus The President, Directors, and Company, of the Maine Bank.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 190–191

Head Matter:
The President, Directors, and Company, of the Portland Bank versus The President, Directors, and Company, of the Maine Bank.
In computing the thirty days, from a judgment during which property attached on mesne process is holden, the day after the last day of the term is the first of the thirty.
This was an action of ejectment, submitted to the decision oí the Court upon the following agreement: —
In this case, the parties agree that the plaintiffs claim- the land demanded by virtue of a deed from Woodbury Storer, for a valuable consideration, made, executed, and duly * recorded, on the 16th of July, 1811, conveying the same to them.
The defendants claim under the levy of an execution made June 29, 1812; which execution issued upon a judgment recovered by them against said Storer. The said levy was regularly made and returned, and recorded within three months. The demanded premises had been attached on the original writ in the same action, before the conveyance by Storer to the plaintiffs. The Court at which the said judgment was recovered adjourned without day on the 30th of May, 1812, being the fifth day of its session at that term; and the judgment was entered in said action on the said 30th of May.
The parties agree that the Court shall enter such judgment as shall be conformable to law upon the foregoing statement, upon nonsuit or default.
Whitman, for the plaintiffs.
The question in this case is, whether the day on which the judgment was rendered is to be taken as part of the thirty days during which an attachment binds the estate attached. The general rule of law is, that, when computation is to be made from an act done, the day in which the act is done must be included, with the exception of bills of exchange. This is the rule of law in computing a widow’s quarantine.
Longfellow, for the demandants.
All the English authorities will be found to apply to criminal cases only, and to actions of trespass; the calculation being so made to excuse from a penalty. So was the case of The King vs. Adderley, cited from Douglas, which is the leading case upon the point.
Chitty on Bills, 138, cites 2 Vent. 308, 310, Clayton s case. — 3 D. & E. 623 — See, also, 3 East, 407, Glassington vs. Rawlins. — 1 Lord Raym. 280, 480. — Doug 164, Rex vs. Adderley.
Bac. Abr., Dower, B, 1.
8 Mass. Rep. 113, Herring vs. Polly.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The law knows no division of a day. By our practice, the last day of a term is considered the day on which all judgments are rendered, unless it appears otherwise from the record. Executions are not by law to issue until twenty-four hours after judgment is entered up. The whole of the last day of a term is therefore necessarily excluded, in computing the thirty days during which property * attached on the original [ * 206 ] writ is holden to respond the judgment. The day after the adjournment is the first of the thirty days,
Plaintiffs nonsuit.
Alderman vs. Phelps, 15 Mass. Rep. 225. — Davis vs. Blunt, 6 Mass. Rep. 487 — Heywood vs. Hildreth, 9 Mass. Rep. 393.