Case Name: Francis W. Hunnewell et al., Resp'ts, v. Ira Shafer, App'lt
Court: New York City Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-04-30
Citations: 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 831
Docket Number: 
Parties: Francis W. Hunnewell et al., Resp’ts, v. Ira Shafer, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 30
Pages: 831–831

Head Matter:
Francis W. Hunnewell et al., Resp’ts, v. Ira Shafer, App’lt.
(City Court of New York,
General Term,
Filed April 30, 1890.)
1. Calendar—Power of court to regulate.
Independently of the rules of practice every court has power to regulate its own calendar, and may determine what cause shall he tried first.
3. Same.
Where additional pleadings are allowed to he served, the court has power to change the date of filing the note of issue to the final joining of issue, instead of requiring a new note and payment of an additional fee, and can afterwards exercise such power nunc pro tune.
Appeal from order regulating position of cause on calendar.
Ira Shafer, for app’lt; J. StriJceman, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Per Curiair.
The appellant correctly states the general rules of practice on his brief. But independently of these, every court has the power to regulate (within reasonable bounds) its own calendar, and may, independently of the statutes, determine what cause shall be tried first. In other words, it may regulate the order of business. It cannot decline to prefer a cause entitled to preference by the statute or general rules of practice. It cannot dispense with the statutory notice of trial, except as a condition of granting a favor, but it may, in the exercise of a wise discretion and in an orderly manner, do many things not inhibited. The note of issue was filed June 24,1889. The reply was served by leave of the court August 26, 1889. The cause was then re-noticed for trial. The court had the power then to change the date of filing the note of issue to August 26, 1889, instead of requiring a new mote and the payment of an additional fee. Having the power then, it could exercise it afterward nunc pro tunc, and this is practically what was done by the order appealed from. The court, in the exercise of its discretion, possessed the power and it was not abused in this instance. Ko one was misled or prejudiced by what was done. It follows that the order appealed from must be affirmed, but as the point is probably new, the affirmance will be without costs.
McAdam, Oh. J., and Ehrlich, J., concur.