Case Name: John W. BRINK, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as successor by merger to NationsBank Corporation, as successor by merger to Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-03-01
Citations: 811 So. 2d 751
Docket Number: No. 1D01-0332
Parties: John W. BRINK, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as successor by merger to NationsBank Corporation, as successor by merger to Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellee.
Judges: BENTON, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 811
Pages: 751–756

Head Matter:
John W. BRINK, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as successor by merger to NationsBank Corporation, as successor by merger to Barnett Banks, Inc., Appellee.
No. 1D01-0332.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 1, 2002.
Rehearing Denied April 4, 2002.
Richard R. Thames, Stutsman & Thames, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Robert T. Kofman and Annette Torres, Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alha-deff, and Sitterson, P A., Miami, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
POLSTON, J.
Appellant John W. Brink challenges the trial court's final judgment awarding him $1,331,103 for termination payments and benefits pursuant to his July 1, 1997 Employment Agreement with Barnett Banks, Inc. Brink, Chairman & CEO of Barnett Credit Corporation with particular expertise in manufactured housing finance, had an Employment Agreement that provided golden parachute termination payments and benefits in the event that there was a defined change of control of Barnett. Subsequently, Barnett merged with Nations-Bank Corporation, which later merged with BankAmeriea, resulting in the entity Bank of America, N.A.
Brink contends that, pursuant to Section 7 of his Barnett Employment Agreement, he is entitled to additional benefits provided in his March 18, 1998 Special Incentive Agreement with NationsBank Corporation. Alternatively, Brink argues that he is entitled to additional damages under the "commercial frustration doctrine" as a result of the bank's unexpected sale of NationsCre-dit Manufactured Housing Corporation's business during the term of the Special Incentive Agreement. Brink also argues that there was a disputed issue of fact regarding the applicable "gross-up" figure calculated pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Employment Agreement.
We agree with the trial court's rulings, and therefore affirm.
Special Incentive Agreement
The trial court properly ruled that the Employment Agreement and the Special Incentive Agreement are separate contracts. The Special Incentive Agreement specifically provided that Brink would not qualify for incentive benefits unless he was employed as of December 31, 2000, and that if employment was terminated for any reason whatsoever (either by NationsBank or the participant) prior to the receipt of an incentive payment, Brink would not be eligible to receive an award. In September 1998, NationsBank merged with Ban-kAmerica, resulting in the entity Bank of America. Bank of America sold its manufactured housing financing business and discharged Brink on or about December 7, 1998.
Because Brink was not employed as of December 31, 2000, he was not a participant in the Special Incentive Program by its express terms and is not entitled to additional benefits. To the extent that paragraph 7(2) of the Employment Agreement may be read to require additional payments arising from the Special Incentive Program because Brink ceased to be an employee, it expressly contradicts the specific language in the Special Incentive Agreement. Because the language in the Special Incentive Agreement is later in time, it controls over the Employment Agreement. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 315 at 338 (1999)("[I]f there is a plain repugnancy between the provisions of an original contract and those of a supplemental one between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter, the earlier contract must yield to the later as far as the repugnancy extends.").
We agree with the trial court that Brink's termination due to the merger of the bank and sale of the manufactured housing financing business was foreseeable. Accordingly, Brink's alternative argument of commercial frustration is without merit. See Hilton Oil Transport v. Oil Transport Co., S.A., 659 So.2d 1141, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)("[T]he doctrine of commercial frustration is predicated upon the premise of giving relief in a situation where the parties could not provide themselves by the terms of the contract against the happening of subsequent events, but it does not apply where the intervening event was reasonably foreseeable and could and should have been controlled by provisions of such contract.").
Gross-Up Factor
Paragraph 8 of the Employment Agreement requires that Brink's termination payments be "grossed-up" so that he receives an additional amount "equal to all Withholding Taxes [defined as all applicable federal, state and local taxes] payable by or on behalf of the Executive in respect of the Termination Payments, including any Withholding Taxes as may be due in respect of such additional amounts to be paid pursuant to this sentence as will result in the Executive actually retaining an amount equal to the Net Termination Payments."
At the summary judgment hearing, the bank presented an affidavit from a Price-waterhouseCoopers accountant, who provided a precise mathematical calculation pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Employment Agreement showing how the 73.124% gross-up factor used by the bank was derived. The bank also filed the deposition transcript of Steven Carpenter, Senior Vice President of Compensation. Mr. Carpenter testified that Brink was offered a settlement using an enhanced gross-up factor of 84.48% (rejected by Brink), but his contractual gross-up factor was contained in his worksheet at approximately 73%.
Brink did not present any contrary evidence at anytime showing how he would calculate the gross-up factor. Instead, he relied on an expert's affidavit that merely indicated the dollar amounts that Brink was entitled to in the event that either a grossup factor of 73.124% or 84.48% was used.
After the' trial court ruled in the bank's favor, Brink filed a motion for rehearing based on two additional documents obtained from nonparties, and argued that these supported use of a gross-up factor of 84.48%, thereby creating a disputed issue of fact precluding summary judgment. The first document is a worksheet prepared by the bank for another employee. Because the worksheet relates to a different employee, it does not create a disputed issue of fact. The second document purports to be an exhibit to the merger agreement between Barnett and NationsBank in which the two banks stated their respective positions regarding the payment of severance benefits to departing employees. Brink stated in his motion for rehearing that "both NationsBank and Barnett calculated severance benefits utilizing a .8448 gross-up factor." However, the .8448 gross-up factor does not appear on the attached exhibit and does not otherwise purport to compute the amount pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Employment Agreement. The trial court properly denied Brink's motion for rehearing.
Conclusion
Brink is not entitled to additional benefits- as provided in the Special Incentive Agreement, and the trial court did not err by determining that there were no disputed issues of fact relating to the gross-up factor under paragraph 8 of the Employment Agreement.
AFFIRMED.
BENTON, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.
. The parties represented at oral argument that the issues relating to attorney's fees have been resolved.