Case Name: PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST, Richard Auclair, M.D., and Glenn Salkind, M.D., Appellants, v. Susan BROWN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-10-07
Citations: 388 So. 2d 1084
Docket Number: No. 79-2069
Parties: PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST, Richard Auclair, M.D., and Glenn Salkind, M.D., Appellants, v. Susan BROWN, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 388
Pages: 1084–1087

Head Matter:
PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST, Richard Auclair, M.D., and Glenn Salkind, M.D., Appellants, v. Susan BROWN, Appellee.
No. 79-2069.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 7, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1980.
Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot and Henry Burnett, Miami, for appellants.
Mandina & Lipsky and Michael A. Lipsky, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHWARTZ, Judge.
This case of first impression in the Florida appellate courts presents the fascinating question of whether the cost of raising a previously unwanted but healthy and normal child is a recoverable element of damages in a so-called "wrongful birth" case. We conclude that it is not.
The issue comes to us in a pristine legal form, uncluttered by any procedural or factual complexity. A jury found that physician-employees of Jackson Memorial Hospi tal had negligently performed a tubal ligation on Susan Brown, with the result that she became pregnant and delivered her sixth child, Lamont. She was awarded $10,837 for the medical expenses, lost wages and pain and suffering caused by the undesired pregnancy and the process of childbirth. The appellants challenge neither the liability finding nor the award of these items of damages. Their sole appellate point concerns the inclusion in the final judgment of $19,500 which, in a special verdict, was assessed for the past and discounted future
"reasonable costs of raising Lamont Brov/n to age 18, offset by the value of his love and affection, companionship and the other mother-child relationships."
In holding that such a claim should not be recognized, we align ourselves with a clear majority of courts in other jurisdictions which have decided the identical question. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.App.3rd 51, 29 Ill.Dec. 216, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Berma n v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); see, Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11 Pa.D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964); contra, Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.App.3d 698, 127 Cal.Rptr. 652 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303, 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn.Sup. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (relying on Delaware lower court decision reversed in Coleman v. Garrison, supra); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.1977); but see, Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.W.Va.1967); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). See generally, Annot., Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978); ' Comment, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for Bringing up Baby?, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 418 (1978); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U.Miami L.Rev. 1409 (1977).
There is no purpose to restating here the panoply of reasons which have been assigned by the courts which follow the majority rule. See especially the comprehensive discussions in Wilczynski v. Goodman, supra and Berman v. Allan, supra. In our view, however, its basic soundness lies in the simple proposition that a parent cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child. Even the courts in the minority recognize, as the jury was instructed in this case, that the costs of providing for a child must be offset by the benefits supplied by his very existence. Stills v. Gratton, supra; Anonymous v. Hospital, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1979). But it is a matter of universally-shared emotion and sentiment that the intangible but all-important, incalculable but invaluable "benefits" of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens involved. See, Shaheen v. Knight, supra; Terrell v. Garcia, supra. Speaking legally, this may be deemed conclusively presumed by the fact that a prospective parent does not abort or subsequently place the "unwanted" child for adoption. See, e. g., Sha-heen v. Knight, supra; Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., supra. On a more practical level, the validity of the principle may be tested simply by asking any parent the purchase price for that particular youngster. Since this is the rule of experience, it should be, and we therefore hold that it is, the appropriate rule of law. It is a rare but happy instance in which a specific judicial decision can be based solely upon a reflection of one of the humane ideals which form the foundation of our entire legal system. This, we believe, is just such a case.
The judgment under review is reduced by $19,500 and, as so modified, is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
. The damage issue was specifically reserved in Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla.2d DCA 1970), which was the first Florida decision to recognize the right to recover for a negligent sterilization which does not achieve the desired result. Cf., Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So.2d 418 (Fla.2d DCA 1974) (no cause of action in siblings of "wrongfully bom" child). In Bradian v. Baliton, 48 Fla.Supp. 201 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1979), a Florida trial court struck the damage element involved in this case.
. Mrs. Brown stated that Lamont, who was almost two at the time of trial, was a fine and healthy little boy whom she loved very much-just as she did her other children. While she had considered an abortion, she was glad that she had decided against it.
. Because the issue is not before us, we do not decide nor intimate a view as to the recovera-bility of the costs involved in treating and raising an abnormal or unhealthy child. Compare, Sala v. Tomlinson, supra (no recovery for healthy child); Shaheen v. Knight, supra (same); Terrell v. Garcia, supra (same); and Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., supra (same); with Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (recovery permitted for costs required for abnormal child); Speck v. Finegold, - Pa.Super. -, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (same); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (same); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (same); and Berman v. Allan, supra (no recovery for raising either healthy or abnormal child); with Bowman v. Davis, supra (recovery permitted for raising both healthy and abnormal child).
. We note that, under the contrary view, an unhandsome, colicky or otherwise "undesirable" child would provide fewer offsetting benefits, and would therefore presumably be worth more monetarily in a "wrongful birth" case. The adoption of that rule would thus engender the unseemly spectacle of parents disparaging the "value" of their children or the degree of their affection for them in open court. It is obvious, whether the conclusion is phrased in terms of "public policy," see, Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla.1979), or otherwise, that such a result cannot be countenanced.