Case Name: CITY OF KANAB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David C. GUSKEY, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1998-02-20
Citations: 965 P.2d 1065
Docket Number: Nos. 960664-CA, 961664-CA
Parties: CITY OF KANAB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David C. GUSKEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 965
Pages: 1065–1069

Head Matter:
CITY OF KANAB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David C. GUSKEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Nos. 960664-CA, 961664-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 20, 1998.
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing July 23, 1998.
Douglas D. Terry, Gary W. Pendleton, St. George, for Defendant and Appellant in No. 961664-CA.
Gary W. Pendleton, St. George, for Defendant and Appellant in No. 960664-CA.
Van Mackelprang, Kanab City Atty., Kan-ab, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Joan C.'Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass’n, Salt Lake City, Amicus Curiae for Defendant and Apppellant in No. 961664-CA.
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Norman E. Plate, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Amicus Curiae for Appellee in No. 961664-CA.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant, David C. Guskey, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Guskey was charged with and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in the Kanab City Justice Court in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp.1994) and Kanab City Revised Ordinances § 11-321 (1978). He then filed a notice of appeal and the case was heard de novo in the Sixth District Court. In both courts, Guskey filed motions to suppress evidence, claiming Officer Jared Hammon of the Kanab City Police had unconstitutionally stopped him. Both courts denied the motion and the district court again found Guskey guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. Guskey then appealed to this court.
Only after briefing and submission of the case and review of the record on appeal did this court learn that the case had originated in the justice court and had been appealed and considered de novo in the district court.
Rule 26(12)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered in the justice court under this rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the district court. The decision of the district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court.
In City of Monticello v. Christensen, this court stated that "in order that the proper, specific constitutional or statutory challenge be preserved, that challenge must clearly have been raised in and presented to the circuit [now district] court." 769 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam). In addition, since the rule requires that a specific statute or ordinance be challenged on constitutional grounds, an "oblique reference on appeal to constitutional rights or the invalidity of defendant's conviction cannot satisfy the statutory requirement.... A mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional rights is insufficient to confer jurisdiction." Id. at 855.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this court's Christensen opinion on certiorari. See 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990) (Christensen II) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841, 111 S.Ct. 120, 112 L.Ed.2d 89 (1990). In Christensen II, the supreme court also held that Rule 26 does not violate the state constitutional guarantee of the right to appeal, concluding that the ability to appeal from justice court decisions through a trial de novo in circuit court satisfies the state constitution. See id. at 518-19.
Subsequently, in a case similar to the one before us, this court dismissed an appeal on jurisdictional grounds where the defendant had been convicted in justice court of driving under the influence and then received a trial de novo in the circuit court. State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah Ct.App.1990). On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed jurisdiction existed because he had claimed a violation of double jeopardy. Id. at 305. This court held that "[e]ven if we assume that [this] issue[ ][was] raised in the justice court because [it was] raised in the circuit court," it nevertheless did not "involve[ ] the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute," and therefore jurisdiction was absent. Id.
In this case, Guskey did not challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance in the district court, nor, so far as we can determine, in the justice court. His claim on appeal to this court, similarly, does not involve the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute. We therefore have no jurisdiction in this matter. Because "[w]hen a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction [we] retain[] only the authority to dismiss the action," Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989), we have no alternative but to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.
. This rule is now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp.1997).