Case Name: Charles W. SMITH and Emma L. Smith, his wife, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF the STATE of Florida; J.R. Reddish, individually, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-04-27
Citations: 432 So. 2d 1338
Docket Number: No. AL-39
Parties: Charles W. SMITH and Emma L. Smith, his wife, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF the STATE of Florida; J.R. Reddish, individually, Appellees.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 432
Pages: 1338–1343

Head Matter:
Charles W. SMITH and Emma L. Smith, his wife, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF the STATE of Florida; J.R. Reddish, individually, Appellees.
No. AL-39.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 27, 1983.
As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing June 17, 1983.
Steven E. Rohan of Vickers & Rohan, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellants.
Richard L. Randle of Slater & Randle, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellees.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
Smith appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his second amended complaint. We reverse.
Once again we are faced with the application of the operational/judgmental dichotomy announced in Commercial Carrier v. Indian River, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979). The facts must be taken as alleged by Smith.
In February 1973, Prince was convicted of first degree murder and given a life sentence. His parole from a 20-year sentence for armed robbery was revoked.
In October 1974, Prince was classified as a minimum custody inmate and transferred to Clay County Vocational Center. He escaped that day.
Twelve days later he was recaptured in Jacksonville suffering from unexplained gunshot wounds. He subsequently pled guilty to escape and received a one-year sentence. He was returned to Lake Butler in maximum custody.
In May 1976, J.R. Reddish, a Department of Corrections (DOC) employee, caused Prince to be reclassified to minimum custody status. In October 1976, Reddish was transferred to Union Correctional Institute and Prince was also transferred. During this time Reddish used Prince as a "houseboy."
In August 1977, Reddish prevailed upon DOC transfer authorities and the warden at Lawtey Correctional Institute to transfer Prince to Lawtey. In October 1977, Prince was transferred and held in minimum custody. In March 1978, Prince escaped and returned to Jacksonville.
In June 1978, Prince, in the course of an armed robbery, abducted and shot Smith, causing damage to Smith and his wife. Smith has brought suit against DOC and Reddish.
The trial court dismissed with prejudice Smith's second amended complaint based upon holdings that inmate classification was a discretionary rather than operational function, thus, immune from tort liability and, alternatively, that elapsed time between reclassification and escape and further elapsed time before Smith's injury rendered Smith's injury unforeseeable.
We easily dispose of the alternative holding. Prince's lengthy history of violence coupled with his escape record creates a jury question on the issue of foreseeability. A jury could reasonably conclude that violence to third parties was a foreseeable consequence of placing Prince in minimum custody. The period of time between Prince's transfer to Lawtey and his escape and the shooting of Smith is not enough to justify taking this issue from the jury.
Sovereign immunity presents a more difficult question. Commercial Carrier is the starting point of any analysis in this area. There the Supreme Court found immunity for judgmental planning level functions but no immunity for operational level functions.
To aid in classification, the Supreme Court adopted a four-prong test. We have examined the four questions and have concluded that not all of them may be clearly answered affirmatively. In particular, while inmate classification is necessary to the maintenance of a prison system, this inmate's reclassification appears to have been made for reasons unrelated to the functioning of the prison system and without use of agency expertise. Further inquiry is required.
In Bellavance v. State, 390 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), this court found no immunity when a state mental hospital negligently released a violent patient who injured a third party.
In Kirkland v. State, 424 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), this Court remanded for further amendments a complaint alleging negligent supervision of a mental patient. In Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.1981), the decision to parole a homicidal psychotic was held not discretionary under the Federal Tort Claims Act and therefore actionable. On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit held the parole decision discretionary but further held the Bureau of Prison's failure to maintain proper records or forward them to the parole authorities actionable. 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.1982). However, in dicta, the Second District Court of Appeal recently observed that post-sentence decisions were largely discretionary, Everton v. Willard, 426 So.2d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
After consideration of these cases, we conclude that there is no sovereign immunity when an inmate is negligently given preferential treatment and placed in inadequately supervised confinement. The fact that prison officials have some discretion in assignments of inmates does not require immunity, Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla.1982).
The dismissal of the Smith's second amended complaint is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with opinion.