Case Name: Thomas Garrett v. P. M. Butler
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1847-12
Citations: 2 Strob. 193
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas Garrett v. P. M. Butler.
Judges: Richardson, J. O’Neall, J. Evans, J. Wardlaw, J. and Frost, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 193–195

Head Matter:
Thomas Garrett v. P. M. Butler.
Less certainty is required in stating the subject matter of an executed consideration, than one that is executory; but the whole consideration of the defendant’s contract must in either case be stated, and if this consist of several things, and especially of something to be done by the plaintiff", none can be omitted, unless frivolous or void.
A party who endorses his name upon a note after it is due, cannot be held to be the maker or drawer of the note.
Before Mr. Justice Evans, at Sumter, Fall Term, 1847.
This was Sum. Pro. brought against the defendant, under the following circumstances, viz: One David Garrett made a note payable to one It. S. Gerald, or bearer. This note, after it was due, was transferred to the plaintiff, as was admitted, for valuable consideration. At the time of the transfer, the defendant wrote his name on the back of the note, and verbally agreed to be responsible for the amount of it. Defendant told the plaintiff, at the time, he must sue at the first Court, which he agreed to do.
The Circuit Judge was of opinion, as the defendant was not a party to the original agreement, that he could not be charged as maker: his writing his name on the back could not make him a joint or several maker of a note already past due.
Nor could he be charged as a drawer of a bill of exchange payable at sight, because no demand or notice was proved. The insolvency of the maker of the note does not dispense with demand and notice; but in this case it was not clear that he was insolvent. The Sheriff said D. Garrett was a poor man, and he never heard he was worth any thing; but another witness said he was an overseer at the time. He had horses which he traded as his own, and that $20, the amount of the note, might have been made out of him. He was also of opinion that the defendant .could not be charged as guarantor, as the plaintiff had not sued the note, as he was directed, and promised to do, according to contract. He did sue it" afterwards, and nothing was collected.
He decreed for defendant.
The plaintiff appealed, on the grounds—
I. Because the defendant is to be regarded as the drawer of the note.
• 2. Because, if he is to be regarded as the drawer of a bill of exchange, demand and notice were not necessary, as the drawee (David Garrett) was insolvent.
J. S. G. Richardson, for the motion.
Moses, contra.

Opinion:
Withers, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon looking into the record, we observe that the plaintiff charges the defendant — 1st, That at a time stated, (May, 1838,) the defendant, in consideration of a .horse sold to him by plaintiff, transferred the note, described in the report, to plaintiff, in part payment — and, for the consideration stated, promised to pay to him the said note, in case the plaintiff should be unable to collect the same from D. Garrett, the maker: alleging that he had been unable to collect, and so forth. 2d, That the defendant owes the plaintiff twenty dollars for a horse sold, «fee. 3d. Charging defendant as the maker of the note.
It will be observed, from the report, that there was a special contract between the parties, which it was the purpose of the plaintiff to set forth in the first count. A material ingredient of it was, that he should sue Garrett, the drawer of the note, to the next succeeding Court. This was not done. Suppose, then, we consider Butler to be a guarantor; yet he was a special guarantor, and a material condition upon which his liability was to accrue has not been alleged or complied with, or explained to have been dispensed with or to-have become impossible. No difficulty aiises from the rule that verbal agreements shall not be admitted to vary or contradict a written undertaking; for besides that the circumstances of the case exclude that question, the plaintiff has himself undertaken to rely upon a statement of the special parol agreement. The consideration upon which the liability of the defendant rested was not only the horse delivered to him, but the further act of the plaintiff in suing Garrett to the next succeeding term — so that there was an ingredient in the consideration for the defendant's promise, executory on the part of the plaintiff. It has been urged here that this circumstance was immaterial, as there was proof that Garrett was insolvent. But non constat that it was indifferent to Butler whether Garrett was sued to the next term. He thought it worth while to stipulate for it, and the plaintiff promised.
Less certainty is required in stating the subject matter of an executed consideration than one that is executory. (Vide Chitty Pl. 1, 297.) But the whole consideration of the defendant's contract must in either case be stated, and if this consist of several things, and especially of something to be done by the plaintiff, none can be omitted, unless frivolous or void. Admitting, therefore, that Garrett was proved to be insolvent, yet the plaintiff would fail upon his first count. Where the contract was stated to be "that the defendant should deliver to the plaintiff all his tallow, at 4 shillings per stone, and that proved, was, that defendant should deliver it at 4 shillings per stone, and so much more as the plaintiff paid to any other person" the plaintiff failed.—Churchill v. Wilkins, 1 T. R. 447. In covenant to repair, omitting an exception in the covenant "of fire and all other casualties," is fatal on the general issue.
It is not necessary to say any thing on the second count.
3. The defendant cannot be held as a drawer or maker of the note. His name was endorsed upon it after it was due, and he could not, therefore, have promised to pay, as maker, according to its terms. He was no party to the note at its inception. And this constitutes a glaring distinction between this case and those of Stoney v. Beaubien, 2 McM. 313, and of Cockrell v. Milling, 1 Strob. 444. Where a party merely puts his name on the back of a note at the time it is executed, and doing this act is part and parcel of the contract with the payee, as was the fact in the two cases last cited, the Court will give effect to the obvious intention of the party to incur a liability to pay the note, in any form which .the law will sanction. But how can we hold a party a maker of the note in the present case? The tiin'e when the transaction took place is enough to forbid that — and when we add the proof that there'was a special contract, whereby the party was to become liable, not absolutely, but upon a condition, the point seéms to be concluded.
We shall not volunteer to lay down any doctrine upon the question, somewhat mooted in argument, whether demand and refusal and notice were matters to be established by the plaintiff — for .such questions are pertinent to a character in which the defendant is not sued. There are no counts against him as endorser or drawer of a bill of exchange, and hence we need not consider whether (the special contract being out of the question¡I he could be viewed in either of those characters, and what legal obligations might thereupon rest upon each party. The motion is refused.
Richardson, J. O'Neall, J. Evans, J. Wardlaw, J. and Frost, J. concurred.
Motion refused.