Case Name: WILLIAMS and another, Supervisors of Loyalsock Township, against LANDON
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1826-07-08
Citations: 14 Serg. & Rawle 338
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAMS and another, Supervisors of Loyalsock Township, against LANDON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 14
Pages: 338–339

Head Matter:
[Sunbury,
July 8, 1826.]
WILLIAMS and another, Supervisors of Loyalsock Township, against LANDON.
IN ERROR.
In an action against the commissioners of a township, an award of arbitrators, that the defendants shall pay to the plaintiff a certain sum, “ as soon as the defendants should be in possession of the township funds to do so,” is uncertain and bad.
ON a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lyco-ming county, if appeared that Daniel Landon, the plaintiff below and defendant in error, brought this action on the case against Joseph Williams and William Fulmer, supervisors of Loyalsock township, for the recovery of one hundred and forty-five dollars and sixty-two cents, due to him as a former supervisor of the same township. His account had been settled by auditors appointed according to law, who gave an order on the defendants, the present supervisors, to pay this sum to the plaintiff. This cause was submitted to arbitrators, who awarded, “that the defendants should pay to the plaintiff' the sum of one hundred and eighteen dollars and thirty-three cents, as soon as the defendants should be in possession of tlietownship funds to do so.” The plaintiff issued a fieri facias on this award, and levied on two horses, the property of Joseph Williams, one of the defendants.
The defendants thereupon took out a writ of error; and thé record being returned,
Campbell, for the plaintiffs in error,
contended, 1. That the Court of-Common Pleas had no jurisdiction of the cause, the act of assembly of the 6th of Jlpril, 1802, sect. 4, 12, Purd. Dig. 719, •having given a remedy which ought to have been pursued. The case, he said, was not within the words, but the spirit of the act. 1 Serg.-Sr Rawle, 505. Lyon v. The Commissioners of Cumberland county, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 443.
2. That the award, not’being positive, but that the defendants shall pay upon a contingency, which may never happen, was void for uncerainty. Shoemaker v. Meyer, 4 Serg, & Rawle, 452.
Vanhorn, for the defendant in error,
insisted, that the award was sufficiently certain, and cited, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 167. White v. Jones, S Serg. & Rawle, 349. 2 Dali. 211. 1 Dali. 174, 378. 6 Binn. 34.

Opinion:
Pek Curiam.
On the part of the plaintiffs in error, it was contended, that the award in this case was erroneous, because the defendant was not to pay the money immediately, or certainly^ but at a future time and on an uncertain event.
The act of assembly which gives to the report of arbitrators the effect of a judgment, must have intended such a judgment as would authorize the plaintiff to take out an execution. But no execution could be taken oii this award,, because the money was to be paid in futuro, and upon a contingency. It might be, that the defendants would never be in possession of the township funds sufficient to discharge the judgment. They might both die before funds came to their hands. If the award had been, that the defendants should pay to the plaintiff a certain sum, with stay of execution till a certain time, it would have been good, because then. it would have operated as a judgment for that sum, absolutely and immediately. It is very common for judgments to be entered in the courts of common law, with stay of execution; and such a judgment as might be rendered in a court of common law in Pennsylvania, may be rendered by the report of arbitrators. We think the principle which must govern the case before us, was decided in Shoemaker v. Meyer, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 452. There, the arbitrators awarded, that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff the sum of one thousand six hundred and thirty-five pounds and twelve shillings, "in twelve annual payments, commencing on the 1st of •April, 1815." That case, indeed, was stronger than the present, because there was no contingency. The only objection was, that the payments were to be in futuro. It is the opinion of the court, therefore, that the report in the present case was erroneous, and the judgment should be reversed, — of course the execution must follow the fate of the judgment. The record is to be remitted to the Court of Common Pleas, to be further proceeded in according to law.
Judgment reversed, and record remitted, &c.