Case Name: Craig Anthony CARRINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee; Robert Charles Tillitz, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-09-11
Citations: 503 F.3d 888
Docket Number: Nos. 05-36143, 05-36144
Parties: Craig Anthony CARRINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. Robert Charles Tillitz, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: HARRY PREGERSON, JOHN T. NOONAN, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 503
Pages: 888–903

Head Matter:
Craig Anthony CARRINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. Robert Charles Tillitz, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee.
Nos. 05-36143, 05-36144.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 14, 2006.
Filed Sept. 11, 2007.
Russell V. Leonard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tacoma, WA, for petitioner-appellant Robert Charles Tillitz.
Carol A. Elewski, Tumwater, WA, for petitioner-appellant Craig Anthony Car-rington.
Helen J. Brunner, Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle, WA, for the respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. CV-05-05286-RJB, CR-89-00088-RJB, CV-05-05144-RJB CR-94-05074-RJB.
Before: HARRY PREGERSON, JOHN T. NOONAN, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion by Judge CALLAHAN; Concurrence by Judge NOONAN; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge PREGERSON.
ORDER
The opinion filed on December 13, 2006, is hereby withdrawn. A Superseding Opinion is filed simultaneously with this order.
OPINION
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
In these sentencing cases Robert Tillitz and Craig Carrington (petitioners) assert a number of creative arguments in an attempt to have their final sentences reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We conclude that petitioners have not presented exceptional circumstances sufficient to support a grant of extraordinary relief such as the recall of our prior mandates.
I.
On May 14, 1990, Craig Carrington pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 841(b)(1)(B). The district court, Judge Robert Bryan, held a two-day sentencing hearing on October 22-23, 1990. During that hearing, Judge Bryan expressed his frustration with mandatory sentencing guidelines and sentenced Carrington to 324 months in prison, the low end of the applicable range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Carrington's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct and collateral appeals.
On April 27, 1998, Robert Tillitz was convicted by a jury for conspiracy to import hashish, conspiracy to distribute hashish, importation of hashish, possession of hashish with intent to distribute, and interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering enterprises. On August 14, 1998, Tillitz appeared pro se before Judge Bryan for sentencing. Tillitz argued, inter alia, that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. In response, Judge Bryan indicated that while he might agree, the issue had been laid to rest by the United States Supreme Court. Judge Bryan then sentenced Tillitz to a 360-month term of imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. Tillitz's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct and collateral reviews.
On March 2, 2005, Tillitz filed a writ of audita querela "for relief from an unconstitutional sentence" based on Booker. A month later, Carrington filed a motion for modification of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Judge Bryan appointed counsel for both Tillitz and Carrington. In September 2005, Judge Bryan consolidated the cases because of their substantial similarities. Thereafter, both argued that their sentences were unconstitutional and also should be modified under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
On November 3, 2005, Judge Bryan denied relief on the grounds raised by the parties. He noted, however, that in United States v. Crawford, 422 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir.2005), the Ninth Circuit had recalled its mandate in a sentencing case that involved "extraordinary circumstances." Judge Bryan observed that although neither petitioner had filed a motion to recall the mandate, this distinction "may be more form rather than substance" and the availability of such relief was "for the Ninth Circuit to decide." These appeals followed.
II.
The district court properly concluded that the grounds for relief raised by petitioners in their initial motions are foreclosed by our case law. A writ of audita querela is not an available remedy where the claims raised would be cognizable in a § 2255 habeas petition. See United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir.2001). Rather, common law writs such as audita querela and coram nobis survive "only to the extent that they fill 'gaps' in the current systems of postconviction relief." Id. at 1079.
Petitioners argue that there is a gap in post-conviction relief. They contend that the numerical limits on filing habeas petitions preclude them from raising a claim based on Booker through a § 2255 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 2244(b)(3). We have previously held, however, that the statutory limits on second or successive habeas petitions do not create a "gap" in the post-conviction landscape that can be filled with the common law writs. See Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d at 1080. Moreover, even if petitioners had been granted permission to file second or successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), we have held that Booker does not apply to cases on collateral review. See United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam). Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to relief on collateral review, however it is labeled.
Similarly, the district court properly found that it could not modify petitioners' sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) allows the district court to modify a sentence where the applicable sentencing range has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission subsequent to the imposition of the sen tence. Booker did not lower sentencing ranges, nor was Booker an action "by the Sentencing Commission"; therefore § 3582(c)(2), by its own terms, does not apply here. See United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (11th Cir.2005). To accept petitioners' construction of § 3582(c)(2) would be to stretch that provision beyond what its language can bear. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied petitioners relief.
III.
The district court speculated that this court might be able to grant petitioners relief by recalling its mandates, and petitioners press that argument on appeal. We conclude, however, that to the extent that such relief is not barred by our opinions in Cruz, 423 F.3d at 1121, and United States v. King, 419 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.2005), petitioners have not presented the exceptional circumstances and equities necessary for a grant of extraordinary relief.
We have the inherent power to recall our mandate in order to protect the integrity of our processes, but should only do so in exceptional circumstances. Zipfel v. Halliburton, Co., 861 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1988). In Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549-50, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998), the Supreme Court affirmed our inherent power to recall our mandate. The Court, however, held that recalling the mandate in that case was "a grave abuse of discretion." Id. at 541, 118 S.Ct. 1489. The Court noted:
In light of "the profound interests in repose" attaching to the mandate of a court of appeals, however, the power can be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances. 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3938, p. 712 (2d ed.1996). The sparing use of the power demonstrates it is one of last resort, to be held in reserve against grave, unforeseen contingencies.
Id. at 550, 118 S.Ct. 1489. The question then becomes whether petitioners have presented "grave, unforeseen contingencies" that will support the extraordinary relief of a recall of mandate.
The essence of petitioners' claim is that they are entitled to relief in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Booker. We, however, have held that Booker is not retroactive and is not by itself sufficient to justify a recall of the mandate in cases finalized before Booker was decided. King, 419 F.3d at 1036.
An argument, however, has been made that this case presents the type of extraordinary circumstances that led us to recall our mandate in United States v. Crawford, 422 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir.2005). There we found "extraordinary circumstances" to recall the mandate because (1) "the sentencing judge had expressed explicit reservations on the record about the sentence required under the previously mandatory Sentencing Guidelines," and (2) "the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, [542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] . foreshadowing its holding in . Booker . was rendered before the mandate issued." Crawford, 422 F.3d at 1145-46.
Neither of the two factors that supported relief in Crawford are present here. First, although Judge Bryan readily expressed his disapproval of mandatory sentences, his statements do not suggest that there are any exceptional circumstances that distinguish either petitioner from other persons sentenced under the Guidelines prior to Booker. Indeed, in his November 2005 order Judge Bryan observed neutrally that the "sentences may have been appropriate at the time they were imposed, or they may not have been."
Second, Crawford presented a unique question of timing that favored equitable relief. The panel had just decided Crawford's direct appeal, when it recalled its own mandate. In fact, the motion to recall the mandate was made less than a month after the panel issued its memorandum disposition and within weeks of the issu-anee of the court's mandate. Thus, although the mandate had issued, Crawford's direct challenge to his conviction and sentence had not become "final" because the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari had not expired. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (allowing 90 days from a circuit court's decision for the filing of a petition for certiorari).
The particular timing in Crawford indicates that it was, at most, a minimal extension of our policy allowing for limited remands on direct appeals to consider Booker claims. See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.2005), and United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278 (9th Cir.2006). Moreover, as the time for filing a petition for certiorari had not run, Crawford did not conflict with our holding in Cruz that Booker "does not apply retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its publication." Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119.
In contrast, here, petitioners do not seek the recall of the mandate of a case that is still subject to the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Instead, in order for the recalls of mandate to provide the district court with authority to modify petitioners' sentences, we would have to recall the mandates that issued in petitioners' direct appeals from their con victions and sentences. However, we affirmed Carrington's conviction and sentence on direct appeal in 1996, and Tillitz's conviction and sentence were affirmed before 2001.
The recognition that petitioners seek the recall of the mandates in their direct appeals — which have been final for years— reveals that they are in essence arguing for the retroactive application of Booker. As a three-judge panel we are constrained from adopting their argument by our holding in Cruz that "Booker is not retroactive, and does not apply to eases on collateral review where the conviction was final as of the date of Booker's publication." 423 F.3d at 1121. See also King, 419 F.3d at 1036. Moreover, our rejection of petitioners' request for the recall of our mandates is consistent with the positions adopted by our sister circuits. See United States v. Saikaly, 424 F.3d 514 (6th Cir.2005) (denying motion to recall mandate based on Booker and noting similar decisions by other circuits); United States v. Fraser, 407 F.3d 9, 10-11 (1st Cir.2005) (denying a petition for rehearing and noting that if a "mandate could be recalled merely based on Booker, that result would provide an avenue to escape the restrictions Congress has imposed on habeas review").
We understand the argument that declining to recall our mandates amounts to denying relief under Booker to defendants whose direct appeals were final at the time that decision was rendered. We agree, however, with the Sixth Circuit's response that "[ajlthough the defendant may argue that there is an element of unfairness in this result, it is the same element found in any Supreme Court decision which announces a new rule applicable to criminal defendants with pending prosecutions or appeals, but which is not made retroactive to defendants whose cases are final." Saikaly, 424 F.3d at 518. We read our Ninth Circuit case law as being in accord with the Sixth Circuit's perspective that the "incremental change in the law as evidenced by Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker simply is not the type of unforeseen contingency which warrants recall of the mandate to permit yet another round of appellate review." Id.
Finally, we do not hold that relief would not be available in a particular case upon a showing of truly extraordinary circumstances and equities, but only that this is not such a case. Petitioners have not proffered any evidence that they were uniquely impacted by the Guidelines or that there are any equities that distinguish them from other defendants sentenced before Booker. Rather, they point only to the trial judge's expressions of his displeasure with mandatory guidelines. The trial judge's perspective may have been somewhat vindicated by Booker, but it would be unfair to countless defendants and to numerous judges to base the retroactive application of a Supreme Court opinion on the degree to which a trial judge grumbled while enforcing the extant law.
IV.
We affirm the district court's determinations that issuance of a writ of audita querela is not an available remedy in light of our opinion in Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d at 1080, and that petitioners are not entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because the applicable sentencing range has not been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. We reject, however, the district court's suggestion that we might re call our mandates, thus allowing petitioners to seek resentencing in light of Booker. We have previously held that Booker is not retroactive, Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, and petitioners have failed to make the type of individualized showing of extraordinary circumstances that might arguably distinguish them from other defendants sentenced under mandatory guidelines. The district court's denials of relief are AFFIRMED.
. Although the district court purported to transfer petitioners' motions to the Ninth Circuit, its order did not indicate the statutory basis for such a transfer. However, both petitioners then filed timely notices of appeal and on December 2, 2005, the district court granted petitioners Certificates of Appealability as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
. Audita querela, literally "the complaint having been heard," is a common law writ used to attack a judgment that was correct when rendered, but that later became incorrect because of circumstances that arose after the judgment was issued. See Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200, 203 n. 4 (9th Cir.1997).
. In his dissent, Justice Souter agreed with the majority's description of the restricted availability of recalling a mandate. He commented:
To be sure, there lurks in the background the faint specters of overuse and misuse of the recall power. All would agree that the power to recall a mandate must be reserved for "exceptional circumstances," 120 F.3d, at 1048; 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3938, pp. 716-717, n. 14 (1996) (citing cases from the various Courts of Appeals recognizing that the power must be used sparingly), in the interests of stable adjudication and judicial administrative efficiency, on which growing caseloads place a growing premium. All would agree, too, that the sua sponte recall of mandates could not be condoned as a mechanism to frustrate the limitations on second and successive habeas petitions, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If there were reason to suppose that the sua sponte recall would be overused or abused in either respect, we might well see its use as unreasonable in a given case simply to deter resort to it in too many cases.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 569-70, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (footnote omitted).
. Crawford further stated:
[i]n stressing that our decision here rests on both the sentencing judge's expressed misgivings about the sentence required by the mandatory Guidelines as well as the relative timing of the Supreme Court's Blakely decision and the termination of our appellate jurisdiction, we do not suggest that these same elements must always be present in order for a mandate to be recalled.
Id. at 1146 n. 2. We are not called upon to consider the limits of this statement because appellants have only argued the district court's alleged misgivings and that timing is irrelevant. They do not assert any element not present in Crawford.
. United States v. Crawford, 102 Fed.Appx. 91 (9th Cir.2004).
. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 provides that unless time is shortened or extended, a petition for rehearing should be filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 states that the mandate should issue seven calendar days after the time for filing a petition for rehearing expires. Although Rule 41 allows a party to seek a stay of the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, there is no indication that a party is required to seek a stay pending certiorari.
. The recall of our mandates in any of petitioners' appeals from the denials of their post-conviction motions would only give the district court jurisdiction to reconsider its denials of those motions. Petitioners in their present appeal do not challenge the denials of those motions, rather they argue that their initial sentences are invalid.