Case Name: HUMBERT, Petitioner on Review, v. SELLARS et al, Respondents on Review
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1985-10-15
Citations: 300 Or. 113
Docket Number: CA A27258; SC S30581
Parties: HUMBERT, Petitioner on Review, v. SELLARS et al, Respondents on Review.
Judges: PETERSON, C. J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 300
Pages: 113–132

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted September 5, 1984,
reassigned July 3,
reassigned September 17,
reversed and remanded October 15, 1985
HUMBERT, Petitioner on Review, v. SELLARS et al, Respondents on Review.
(CA A27258; SC S30581)
708 P2d 344
Wesley S. Johnson, John Day, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner on review.
J. C. Van Voorhees, of Minturn, Van Voorhees, Larson & Dixon, Prineville, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review.
PETERSON, C. J.
Carson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Lent, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
Campbell, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Opinion:
PETERSON, C. J.
Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet patio while visiting a friend's apartment. She sought damages for injuries from the owners and manager of the apartment complex. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Humbert v. Sellars, 67 Or App 176,180,677 P2d 760,762 (1984). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
In the' trial court defendants stated that they relied on the common-law principle that "a landlord is not subject to Usability to a tenant or a tenant's invitees or guests for injury incurred on the premises caused by dangerous conditions which existed when the tenant took possession of the rented premises." The plaintiff asserted in response that even if she could not recover under the common law, she was entitled to recover under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, ORS 91.700 to 91.895, specifically ORS 91.770(l)(h), which provides that "a dwelling unit shall be considered unhabitable if it substantially lacks: (h) Floors maintained in good repair." The trial court rejected plaintiffs contentions, stating:
"I rule that the Landlord-Tenant Law is not applicable to this situation, because it was not the intent of the legislature to make it so. The Landlord-Tenant Law was intended to impose a duty upon the landlord that was concurrent with the duty of the tenant to pay rent. The landlord's duty was to maintain the premises in a habitable condition, the measure of the damages being the difference between the fair market value of the premises as they had been rented and the value of the premises during the period of breach as they actually existed. That quotation comes from the case of Lane v. Kelley, 57 Or App 197, 1982 Court of Appeals case. I can find no authority when there is no evidence of any intent on the part of the legislature to extend the requirements of this act to a guest of a tenant who is injured on the premises, thereby modifying common law in this matter.
"Because plaintiff has not made out a case under any of the exceptions of the Restatement and because there has been no other demonstration of a duty imposed upon the landlord under the facts of this case, [the defendants are] entitled to summary judgment. "
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Concerning the common-law rule, the Court of Appeals held that "with certain [inapplicable] exceptions, a lessor of land is not liable to his lessee or others on the land for harm caused by any dangerous condition which existed when the lessee took possession." 67 Or App at 179, 677 P2d at 761. Considering ORS 91.770(1), the court stated:
"Plaintiff fails to point out or allege in her complaint which subsection of ORS 91.770 she contends was violated by the water accumulation on the patio. Although we agree that a landlord's duty to a guest is the same as that owed to a tenant, Lyons v. Lich, 145 Or 606, 612, 28 P2d 872 (1934), we do not agree that the water on the patio falls within the statutory guidelines defining which defects amount to unhabitable premises. Plaintiffs basic argument that a guest might state a claim under ORS 91.770 may not be entirely untenable. See Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 452, 600 P2d 398 (1979). However, without an additional assertion that defendants failed to provide one of the specifically-enumerated services mandated by ORS 91.770, the argument is irrelevant. We therefore reject plaintiffs argument that the trial court erroneously dismissed her complaint because ORS 91.770 impliedly permits her to state a claim for defendants' breach of their duty to maintain the tenant's premises in a habitable condition." 67 Or App at 180, 677 P2d at 762.
I
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was based on evidence contained in depositions of plaintiff and of defendant Taylor, who managed the property for the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Sellars. According to the evidence, the property was an apartment complex operated for low income elderly tenants under standards set by the State Housing Authority and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. Plaintiff occupied one of the other apartments in the complex.
On the day she was injured, the plaintiff visited her neighbor in the adjoining apartment. In front of the neighbor's apartment was a patio, enclosed by a fence. The evidence suggests that the patio was within the premises leased to the neighbor. It had been raining, and there was standing water on the patio in front of the entry to the neighbor's apartment. The water was as deep as plaintiffs oxford shoes, reaching up to a cement step in front of the door. She successfully entered the apartment, but on the return trip she slipped in the water and fell, causing her injuries. Some kind of board had been placed on the patio for the purpose of stepping above standing water, but it was some distance away from the cement step and plaintiff did not recall stepping on it.
An affidavit executed by the host neighbor stated that she had had a water problem on the patio since 1978, some three years before the incident. Defendant Taylor, who managed the apartments for the other defendants, testified that he began managing the property in February, 1980, and that the previous property manager told him of the problem. The accident happened in July, 1981.
II
In her petition for review, the plaintiff urges that we should "abolish the immunity afforded to landlords and apply general negligence principles to the relationship between landlords and tenants." We need not reach that question because we hold that there is evidence showing a violation of ORS 91.770, and defendant therefore was not entitled to summary judgment. ORCP 47C.
Minimum standards of safety and fitness for human habitation have not been left to private ordering and the inventiveness of common-law courts; they have long been imposed by state and local lawmakers. A landlord's duties under housing codes and the more recent landlord-tenant acts generally are enforceable by public officials or by special civil remedies accorded the tenant. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 Wis L Rev 19, 42-48. Some acts spell out the consequences if a landlord's noncompliance results in personal injuries, but many do not. Courts nevertheless have held landlords liable for injuries caused by breaches of such statutory duties as in the case of other safety laws. The point was first made by Cardozo, J., in Altz v. Leiberson, 233 NY 16, 134 NE 703 (1922), when a tenant was injured in her room by a falling ceiling, which the landlord failed to repair after notice:
"At common law there was no duty resting on the landlord of an apartment house to repair the rooms demised. His duty of repair was limited to those parts of the building which the occupants enjoyed in common. The Tenement House Law has changed the measure of his burden.
[The law provided: 'Every tenement house and all the parts thereof shall be kept in good repair.']
The command of the statute, directed, as it plainly is, against the owner has thus changed the ancient rule. The meaning is that the premises shall not be suffered to fall into decay. The duty to prevent this, which, in part at least, once rested upon the tenant, is now cast upon another.
"A narrower construction ignores, not only the letter of the statute, but the evil to be cured. We may be sure that the framers of this statute, when regulating tenement life, had uppermost in thought the care of those who are unable to care for themselves. The legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by any one. The duty imposed became commensurate with the need. The right to seek redress is not limited to the city or its officers. The right extends to all whom there was a purpose to protect."
Altz v. Leiberson, supra, 233 NY at 17-19, 134 NE at 703-04 (citations omitted). Tort liability for violations of housing laws has been implied in California, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio.
Oregon's Residential Landlord and Tenant Act extends the landlord's liability to others besides the tenant. ORS 91.725 states that the remedies provided in the act "shall be so administered that an aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages." In Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 441, 600 P2d 398, 403 (1979), we quoted the comment to the corresponding section of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7A Uniform Laws Annotated section 1.105(a): "The use of the words 'aggrieved party' is intended to indicate that in appropriate circumstances rights and remedies may extend to third persons under this Act or supplementary principles of law
An aggrieved party includes a tenant's guest who is injured by a landlord's failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition, if the tenant herself could recover damages for the same injury. The measure of a "habitable condition" may be what is habitable by those who reside in the premises, but when the measure is breached, ORS 91.725 recognizes that others may suffer the consequences. The plaintiff therefore has a cause of action if she is injured because of the defendants' breach of the act.
Ill
The drafters of ORS 91.770 aimed to establish minimum standards of health, safety, comfort and convenience that rental units must meet in order to be "habitable."
ORS 91.770 provides:
"(1) A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. For purposes of this section, a dwelling unit shall be considered unhabitable if it substantially lacks:

"(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair;
<<***>>
"Floors" is not specifically defined in ORS chapter 91. While one definition of "floor" might include only the part of a room upon which one stands, we believe that the legislature likely intended the term to include all floors in the dwelling unit, including an enclosed patio within the tenant's exclusive control. Other subsections of ORS 91.770(1) refer to areas or things such as "roof and exterior walls" (section (l)(a)), and "[b]uilding, grounds and appurtenances" (section (l)(e)).
The specific inclusion, in ORS 91.770(1) (f) of the words "[bjuilding, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement of the rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin" suggest that the term "dwelling unit" would include a patio floor such as is involved in this case. Section (l)(h) requires "[fjloors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings [to be] maintained in good repair." There is no suggestion that floors, stairs and railings include only interior floors, stairs and railings. We hold that the surface upon which the plaintiff was walking was a "floor" within the definition of ORS 91.770(l)(h), and that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals is reversed. Remanded to the trial court.
Defendants cited Jensen v. Meyers, 250 Or 360, 441 P2d 604 (1968), Macomber v. Cox, 249 Or 61, 435 P2d 215 (1968); Staples v. Senders, 164 Or 244, 96 P2d 215, 101 P2d 232 (1940), and Restatement (Second) Torts, section 356 (1965).
She cites Young v. Garwicki, 380 Mass 162, 402 NE2d 1045 (1980), Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis 2d 734, 284 NW2d 55 (1979), Sargent v. Ross, 113 NH 388, 308 A2d 528 (1973), and Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz App 176, 501 P2d 17 (1972).
Professor Browder lists different state provisions dealing with tort liability for breach of the landlord's duties. See Browder, The Taming of a Duty — The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 Mich L Rev 99,115-16 (1982).
McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal App 2d 871, 14 Cal Rptr 260 (1961); Rietze v. Williams, 458 SW2d 613 (Ky 1970); Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich 541, 40 NW2d 719 (1950); Daniels v. Brunton, 9 NJ Super 294, 76 A2d 73 (1950), aff'd 7 NJ 102, 80 A2d 547 (1951); McLain v. Haley, 53 NM 327, 207 P2d 1013 (1949); Dostev v. Murr, 57 Ohio App 157, 12 NE2d 781 (1937).
In its entirety, ORS 91.770(1) provides:
"(1) A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. For purposes of this section, a dwelling unit shall be considered unhabitable if it substantially lacks:
"(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls, including windows and doors;
"(b) Plumbing facilities which conform to applicable law in effect at the time of installation, and maintained in good working order;
"(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:
"(A) Under the control of the tenant or landlord and is capable of producing hot and cold running water;
"(B) Furnished to appropriate fixtures; and
"(C) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and maintained in good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the landlord;
"(d) Adequate heating facilities which conform to applicable law at the time of installation and maintained in good working order;
"(e) Electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment which conform to applicable law at the time of installation and maintained in good working order;
"(f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement of the rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin, and all areas under control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin;
"(g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish in clean condition and good repair at the time of the commencement of the lease or rental agreement, and the landlord shall provide and maintain appropriate serviceable receptacles thereafter and arrange for their removal unless the parties by written agreement provide otherwise;
"(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair;
"(i) Ventilating, air conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, maintained in good repair if supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord;
"(j) Safety from the hazards of fire; or
"(k) Working locks for all dwelling entrance doors, and, unless contrary to applicable law, latches for all windows, by which access may be had to that portion of the premises which the tenant is entitled under the rental agreement to occupy to the exclusion of others and keys for such locks which require keys.
"(2) The landlord and tenant may agree in writing that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks and minor remodeling only if:
"(a) The agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord;
"(b) The agreement does not diminish the obligations of the landlord to other tenants in the premises; and
"(c) The terms and conditions of the agreement are clearly and fairly disclosed and adequate consideration for the agreement is specifically stated."
ORS 91.705(3):
" 'Dwelling unit' means a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household. 'Dwelling unit' regarding a person who rents a space for a mobile home, as defined in ORS 91.873, or who rents moorage space for a floating home, as defined in ORS 488.705, but does not rent the home, means the space rented and not the mobile or floating home itself."
The dissent accuses us of using an "end run" to reach this question. The plaintiff has relied on the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act at every stage of this case. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleged that her injuries were due to defendants' "negligence" in failing to provide proper drainage, in failing to build up the walkway outside the front door, in failing to provide a nonslip surface on the walkway, in failing to take other measures to prevent water from collecting and to secure tenants and their visitors against slipping in front of the entrance.
The Restatement (Second) Torts § 285 (1965), uses the word "negligence" to refer to conduct that falls below statutory as well as common-law standards of responsibility. A complaint need only allege facts bringing the case within the terms of the statute. We recently drew attention to the distinction between regulatory laws as sources of standards for negligence and as sources of liability independent of negligence. Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Company, Inc., 298 Or 598, 695 P2d 897 (1985).
Defendants do not claim to have been misled or otherwise affected by the reference to "negligence" or the lack of reference to ORS 91.770 in plaintiffs complaint. The relationship of the statute to a landlord's liability for physical injuries to tenants or their visitors was presented and debated before the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. Under the law as set forth in this opinion there was no basis to dismiss the complaint or to grant summary judgment to defendants. See ORCP 12 and ORCP 18.