Case Name: AMERICAN ELECTRICAL STEEL COMPANY v. SCARPACE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-02-09
Citations: 67 Mich. App. 189
Docket Number: Docket No. 21198
Parties: AMERICAN ELECTRICAL STEEL COMPANY v SCARPACE
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Bronson and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 67
Pages: 189–197

Head Matter:
AMERICAN ELECTRICAL STEEL COMPANY v SCARPACE
Opinion op the Court
1. Vendor and Purchaser — Contracts—Sale of Land — Tenants by the Entireties — Power of Attorney.
A contract for the sale of land cannot be enforced where the land was owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties and the wife signed the contract for her husband under a power of attorney which was invalid because the husband was suffering from mental illness at the time he signed the power of attorney.
2. Estoppel — Promissory Estoppel — Avoiding Injustice.
In order for the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be invoked the promisee must demonstrate that the promise was made in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.
3. Estoppel — Equitable Estoppel — Prejudice.
Equitable estoppel requires the complaining party to show that he will be prejudiced in some way unless the other party is estopped to deny something.
4. Estoppel — Vendor and Purchaser — Sale of Land — Specific Performance — Compensation for Expenses.
Estoppel is not a proper basis for an action to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate where there is no indication that the plaintiff buyer will suffer any injury if the land is not conveyed; although specific performance is not called for, the plaintiff should be compensated for the expenses incurred in preparing to purchase the defendant’s property.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 165.
[2] 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver §§ 48, 49,
[3, 7, 8] 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 26 et seq.
[4] 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 238.
[5, 6] 71 Am Jur 2d, Specific Performance §§ 83, 84.
Change of conditions after execution of contract or option for sale of real property as affecting right to specific performance. 11 ALR2d 390.
[9] 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 210 et seq.
5. Specific Performance — Laches—Contracts—Value of Land.
An action for specific enforcement of a contract to sell land is barred by laches where the plaintiff purchaser did nothing to enforce the contract for more than three years after the defendant seller breached the agreement, during which time the value of the land greatly increased.
Dissent by J. H. Gillis, P. J.
6. Vendor and Purchaser — Contracts—Laches—Appeal and Error — Findings of Fact — Record Support.
The Court of Appeals cannot sua sponte invoke the doctrine of laches to prevent a plaintiff purchaser from enforcing a contract for the sale of land where neither party raised the issue in the lower court nor mentioned it on appeal, and where a ñnding that the plaintiff did nothing to enforce the contract for three years is not supported by the record.
7. Estoppel — Elements of Estoppel — Conduct of Parties.
Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying the truth of a fact which has in contemplation of law become settled by the act of the party himself, express or implied; if one party’s conduct induces another to believe in the existence of certain facts, and the other party acts thereon to his prejudice, the former party is estopped to deny that the state of facts does in truth exist.
8. Estoppel — Estoppel in Pais — Sale of Land — Power of Attorney —Validity of Contract.
The doctrine of estoppel in pais prohibits a defendant wife from attempting to question the validity of a power of attorney in order to invalidate an agreement to sell land where she has previously represented that the power of attorney, executed by her husband, was valid.
9. Vendor and Purchaser — Contracts—Sale of Land — Breach of Contract — Harm Suffered — Land as Unique Commodity.
Land is thought to be a unique commodity under our legal system; therefore, a plaintiff corporation was harmed by the breach by a defendant of an agreement to sell land to the plaintiff where the plaintiff had secured the rezoning of the defendant’s property and later had to purchase other property.
Appeal from Wayne, George T. Martin, J.
Submitted October 7, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 21198.)
Decided February 9, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by American Electrical Steel Company against Olga Scarpace for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of land. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Kahn & Kahn (by Kenneth F Kahn and Larry E. Powe), for plaintiff.
Gerald Curtis, for defendant.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Bronson and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, J.
Plaintiff seeks specific performance of a land sales contract.
Defendant and her husband owned as tenants by the entireties certain land in Taylor, Michigan. Needing to raise money to pay an assessment made by the IRS for a tax deficiency, Mrs. Scar-pace put the land up for sale. In 1969, Mrs. Scar-pace and plaintiff entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff would purchase and defendant would sell the real estate. Mrs. Scarpace signed the agreement in her own capacity and for her husband under a power of attorney executed several months before. Defendant later refused to consummate the transaction.
More than three years later, plaintiff brought this suit for specific performance. The trial judge denied the relief ruling that the power of attorney executed by the husband did not include the power to sell jointly held property. Plaintiff appeals.
1. There is no valid contract which we can order to be enforced because the power of attorney was invalid. Mr. Scarpace was hospitalized with brain atrophy early in 1967, before the power of attorney was executed. He was unable to manage his business, and after the power was signed by him, Mr. Scarpace was adjudicated mentally incompetent. The record indicates that Mr. Scarpace was suffering from mental illness at the time the document was signed. It was thus invalid.
2. It is claimed that by the death of her husband, Mrs. Scarpace became the sole owner of the real estate, and that she should be estopped from denying her agreement to sell the land. Under the facts of this case, estoppel is not a proper theory. For the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be invoked, the promisee must demonstrate that the promise was made in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. In re Timko Estate, 51 Mich App 662; 215 NW2d 750 (1974). For equitable estoppel, the complaining party must show that he will be prejudiced in some way unless the other party is estopped to deny something. Kole v Lampen, 191 Mich 156; 157 NW 392 (1916). There is no indication in the case at bar that plaintiff will suffer any injury if the land is not conveyed to it. Indeed, it appears that such a result would be a windfall. The corporation has obtained the use of other property for the purpose for which it sought defendant's land. There is no indication that the present facilities are less to plaintiffs liking or less suitable for its needs. Surely plaintiff should be compensated for the expenses it incurred in preparing to purchase defendant's property, but specific performance of the agreement to sell the property is uncalled for.
3. Plaintiffs action for specific performance is barred by laches. The invalid agreement to sell the land was breached in 1969. Between that time and the date this suit was commenced below, a period of three years, plaintiff did nothing to enforce the contract. While plaintiff sat on its rights, the value of the defendant's land greatly increased. Plaintiff now asks this Court to force defendant to sell her land to plaintiff at the price agreed upon six years ago. To accept plaintiff's plea would be an unconscionable act.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., concurred.