Case Name: Nelson Yudini GUADRON, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-03-05
Citations: 714 F. App'x 744
Docket Number: No. 16-72894
Parties: Nelson Yudini GUADRON, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: McKEOWN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and DONATO, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 714
Pages: 744–745

Head Matter:
Nelson Yudini GUADRON, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 16-72894
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted February 14, 2018 Pasadena, California
Filed March 5, 2018
Guadalupe T. Garcia, Attorney, Law Offices of Guadalupe T. Garcia, West Covina, CA, for Petitioner
Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Neelam Ihsanullah, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
Before: McKEOWN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and DONATO, District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2),
The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation,

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Nelson Yudini Guadron, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which denied his motion to reopen his claims for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
Guadron's motion to reopen was subject to a 90-day deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 2014), but was not filed until almost three years after the Board's decision. To excuse this untimeliness, Gua-dron seeks to rely on the exception in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), which provides that "[tjhere is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen" if the motion is "based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
The Board concluded that Guadron "has not demonstrated a change in country conditions material to his claim for relief' and that he "has not established a material change in conditions in El Salvador," and consequently denied Guadron's motion to reopen as "untimely." We review this denial for abuse of discretion, and may reverse the Board's decision only if it is "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law." Go,' 744 F.3d at 609 (quoting Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2008)).
We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion. The record indicates that the Board properly considered all pertinent factors, both favorable and unfavorable, in determining whether to grant the motion. It properly concluded within the bounds of its discretion that the newly submitted evidence showed that ongoing and substantially similar conditions of violence related to gangs had existed at the time of the applicant's hearing. With respect to police involvement in, and the government's awareness and condoning of, extrajudicial killing of gang members in El Salvador, the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence was not definitive. Finally, the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gua-dron had not alleged receiving any new, specific threats to him as an individual.
The Board consequently acted within the "broad discretion" it has in deciding a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). While both sides have briefed at some length Guadron's additional arguments about his prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal and his counsel's failure to challenge the Immigration Judge's prior conclusion that Guadron is ineligible for that relief because he was convicted of a "particularly serious crime," we need not, and decline to, reach those arguments. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Board may deny a motion to reopen for failing to meet any of four burdens, which include prima facie eligibility, need to produce evidence of changed conditions, and that the evidence is "material").
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
ipjjjg disposition, is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,