Case Name: SPEARMAN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-10-16
Citations: 152 S.W. 915
Docket Number: 
Parties: SPEARMAN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 152
Pages: 915–925

Head Matter:
SPEARMAN v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 16, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 22, 1913.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Bill or Exceptions— Sufficiency.
A bill of exceptions which does not point out any specific part of documentary evidence as objectionable^ and which does not present the question of its admission, so that the court can know its bearing in the case, is insufficient.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
2. Cbiminal Law (§ 429 ) — Documentary Evidence — Perjury.
In a trial for perjury in an action by defendant’s former wife to vacate a divorce obtained by him, and for a divorce, the wife’s petition therein, the answer thereto, and the decree obtained by defendant in his action were admissible to show the issues in the wife’s action.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1018, 1020; Dec. Dig. § 429. ]
3. Perjury (§ 32 ) — Prosecution — Admissibility of Evidence — Falsity of Assertion.
In a prosecution for perjury for having testified falsely in his wife’s action for divorce that he had not had intercourse with his wife before marriage, the wife’s testimony as to such intercourse was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Perjury, Cent. Dig. §§ 108-116; Dec. Dig. § 32. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency — Admission of Evidence.
A bill of exceptions in a prosecution for perjury for having testified in his wife’s action to set aside a divorce obtained by him and for a divorce that he had not had intercourse with her before their marriage, stating that the wife testified that, while in another state after the decree in his divorce action,' defendant met her, and told her that the court had granted him the divorce, and that, if it was valid, he would remarry her, and objecting thereto on the ground that the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant, that his divorce was set aside for fraud, and that any such conversation was privileged as a. communication between husband and wife, was insufficient to require consideration of such objections.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
5. Witnesses (§ 340 ) — Impeachment—Reputation at Time of Trial.
In a prosecution for perjury for having testified in his wife’s action for a divorce that he had not had intercourse with her before their marriage, in which the former wife had testified as to such intercourse, evidence that at the time of the trial her general reputation for chastity where she had formerly lived was bad was inadmissible to impeach her testimony.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1116, 1117, 1119, 1121; Dec. Dig.. § 340. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency—Admissibility of Evidence.
A bill of exceptions after conviction for perjury in having falsely testified in his wife’s action for divorce that he had not had intercourse with her before their marriage, showing that the former wife had testified for the state, and explained why she gave false answers in her deposition filed by defendant in his original suit against her for divorce, and objecting thereto for irrelevancy and on the gfound of a confidential communication between husband and wife, was insufficient to require consideration of such objections.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
7. Witnesses (§ 387 ) — Cross-examination-Explanation of Matter Brought Out on' Examination.
In a prosecution for perjury for having testified in his wife’s action to set aside a divorce obtained by him and for a divorce that he had not had intercourse with her before their marriage, defendant, after the state had rested, introduced depositions of his wife filed in his action for divorce falsely stating that there had been no intercourse between them before their marriage. Held that, as defendant had introduced such depositions containing material evidence in his favor, the state had the right to cross-examine her to explain why she gave such answers in her depositions.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent Dig. §§ 1228-1232; Dec. Dig. § 387. ]
8. Perjury (§ 32 ) — Prosecution—Admissibility of Evidence — Joinder of Issue.
In a. prosecution for perjury in an action by his wife for a divorce, it was proper to show the pendency of that action, and whether or not issue was joined therein.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Perjury, Cent. Dig. §§ 108-116; Dec. Dig. § 32. ]
9. Perjury (§ 36 ) — Prosecution—Question for Jury.
In a prosecution for perjury, where the pleadings showed the pendency of the judicial proceeding in which the alleged false testimony was given, and the joinder of issue therein, the questions as to pendency and joinder of issue became matters of law, and not of fact, and it was not necessary that they should be submitted for a jury finding.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Perjury, Cent. Dig. § 133; Dee. Dig. § 36. ]
10. Criminal Law (§§ 763, 761 ) — Instructions — Weight of Evidence.
A charge in a prosecution for perjury as to why the pleadings and judgment in the action in which the perjury was charged to have been committed were introduced, and the purpose for which they could be considered, was not objectionable as a charge upon the weight of the evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731-1748, 1752, 1768, 1770; Dec. Dig. §§ 763, 764. ]
11. Criminal Law (§ 954 ) — Motion for New Trial — Sufficiency—Instructions.
A motion for a new trial complaining only that the court erred in failing to give special charge No. -, filling the blank with the re-
spective numbers of the charges, and stating no reason why the requested charges should have been given, was too general to require its consideration.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2363-2367; Dec. Dig. § 954. ]
12. Criminal Law (§ 829 ) — Triaj>-Request for Instructions — Refusal.
Requested charges, covered so far as material by the court’s main charge, are properly refused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Titus County; P. A. Turner, Judge.
J. W. Spearman was convicted of perjury, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Rolston & "Ward, of Mt. Pleasant, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
Appellant was convicted of perjury, and his penalty fixed at three years in the penitentiary.
At the March term, 1908, of the district court for Titus county, Mrs. Stella Spear-man brought suit against J. W. Spearman, appellant, for divorce and to set aside the judgment theretofore, October 10, 1907, procured by him against her in said same court then and there decreeing him a divorce against her. The record discloses that the said suit by Stella Spearman against appellant was tried in said court regularly before the district judge thereof at the October term, October 8, 1908. In that trial, appellant, in the indictment herein, among other things, is charged to have testified falsely and committed perjury, in that he testified on said' trial October 8, 1908, that he had never had carnal intercourse with Stella Cul-peper, then Stella Spearman, before he married her. He married her on July 29, 1907. There is a good deal of evidence in the case which it is unnecessary for us to here state. Among other things, appellant testified in this case that on the trial of said case, October 8, 1908, he had testified as charged in the indictment, but he claimed his testimony in that respect was true.
From all of the evidence in the record the jury were clearly and fully authorized to believe this state of facts:
•Stella Culpeper in February and March, 1907, was a young country girl, uneducated, having attended school very little, was altogether inexperienced in the world, and had not been about much. Appellant at that time was a matured man, perhaps 30 years of age, and was a school teacher, teaching in the country about 10 miles from where Stella and her parents then lived. He was somewhat related to her father. Shortly prior to February, 1907, appellant was at her father's, and induced her parents to let her board in the community near his school, and attend his school as a pupil. They thereupon sent her to a countryman's to board, who lived about one mile from the school building, about the middle of February, 1907,-for the purpose of her attending appellant's school. From this boarding house she did attend his school continuously perhaps as much as six weeks until the term closed the latter part of March, 1907. She was 15 years of age February 29, 1907; was not fifteen years of age at the time she began attending his school. She, with other children, and appellant himself, it seems, took their noon lunches to school with them, and remained at the schoolhouse and on the grounds thereabouts at the noon recess, which was usually about an hour. Soon after Stella began attending his school, appellant began to make love to her, professing to love her, etc., and in the early part of March began to solicit and try to induce her to permit him to have sexual intercourse with her. She at first would not consent, but after further solicitation on his part and his promise to her that, if she became pregnant, he would marry her, she yielded to his embrace, and during that month he had sexual intercourse with her three several times, from which and by whom she became pregnant, and a child was born to her December 22, 1907.
Stella missed her menses in April, having been regular for some time before then up to the March period which she had. Appellant repeatedly after March had talks with her thereabouts. 'She told him that she had missed since March, and he became very uneasy thereabouts. They repeatedly and from time to time from March until July 29, 1907, when they married, talked about her pregnant condition, and he continued to be very uneasy thereabouts. Shortly before their marriage he brought Stella from her home to Mt. Pleasant, the county seat of Titus county, to a boarding house. Even before then he had consulted with a physician at Mt. Pleasant, telling him that in March preceding he had had sexual intercourse with •Stella three several times, and was very anxious to know from him whether she was pregnant thereby. While she was at this boarding bouse be bad tbe physician to pass by it, be to bave ber out where the doctor could see her, and give appellant bis opinion of whether or not she was then pregnant. In this way, without her knowledge, be had tbe doctor to surreptitiously appear at this boarding bouse and see ber. After tbe doctor saw ber, be saw tbe doctor, and was very anxious to know what tbe doctor's opinion was.' Tbe doctor could not then tell him, and, while be bad told tbe doctor that she bad missed ber monthly periods from March up to that time, the latter part of July, 1907, from that fact alone and her then appearance, the doctor could not tell him whether she was then pregnant. At any rate, he then concluded to, and in a few days after this did, marry Stella, and lived with ber as bis wife from that time to October 10, 1907, tbe very day on which be procured tbe said decree of divorce against her. Just before or just after he married tbe girl be talked to another doctor, and asked him what was good to produce an abortion.
Shortly before the term of the said district court in October, 1907, while appellant was living with Stella as bis wife, in tbe town of iMt. Pleasant, Tex., be brought a suit for divorce against ber in said court, bad ber properly served with citation prior to tbe term, and on September 25, 1907, bad tbe district clerk of said court, with his attorney, go to bis residence and take her depositions. He had ber therein in answer to bis interrogatories to swear that, when she ¡married him, she had been pregnant about four months; that, so far as she knew, be knew nobbing of ber being pregnant when she married him; that he bad never bad intercourse with ber prior to bis marriage to ber, and be was not tbe cause of ber pregnancy. He also bad her therein to refuse to answer who was tbe cause of ber pregnant condition; that she knew she was pregnant when she married him, and did not tell him that she was, and that she, that morning, tbe day she answered the interrogatorj.es, admitted to him ber said condition; that she bad theretofore denied it to him; that all this testimony by ber in answer to these interrogatories was as a matter of fact untrue; that in March, .1907, be bad intercourse with ber three times, from which and by whom she became pregnant, and that he knew it; that they frequently discussed it, both before and after their marriage; that be instigated ber to give this false testimony in bis divorce suit against ber by representing to ber that her pregnancy would soon become publicly known; that she would bave a child, all of which, if it became known, would result in the grand jury indicting him and his being sent to tbe penitentiary because of his having intercourse with ber in March, 1907; that she believed his representations in this respect, and gave said false answers to . said interrogatories at his instigation and to save him from the penitentiary; that he told ber what answers to give to each interrogatory, and she answered as be instructed her; that sbe loved him, be was to be the father of her child, and she did not want him sent to the penitentiary.
Notwithstanding she answered said interrogatories as stated above and they were at once filed in the court, he continued to live with her as his wife from then until the very morning that he got his divorce, October 10,
1907. On the very early morning of that day he shipped her off to Oklahoma to prevent her from, appearing before the grand jury, and avoid any indictment against him for having had sexual intercourse with her before he married her. When she had been in Oklahoma about a month after the grand jury had adjourned, he wrote to her to come back, but not to come to Mt. Pleasant, but stop at Omaha, in (Morris county, a small place on the railroad, where he would meet her. She complied with his instructions, stopped at Omaha where he did meet her and took her from there to a neighbor's to stay all night, thence to her uncle's the next day; he paying her hotel bill, etc. When she reached Omaha, and met him on this occasion, he told her he supposed that they had divorced him; that the clerk had thrown the books open, and the judge had seen her depositions and granted a divorce. She then told him that he had promised her he would get no divorce, but that he simply wanted her depositions, to the effect' that she had given them, in order to keep him from going to the penitentiary. He said the divorce made no difference, that he would remarry her and live with her. He had nothing whatever to do with her after he first got his divorce from her. She . was remarried to a Mr. Simms of Dallas in October, 1910, and at the time of this trial %a's the wife of Simms. As' soon as the case was tried, October 8,
1908, appellant was arrested on complaint for perjury. He gave bond, then fled, and, although diligently sought by the sheriff for two years, could not be found. After two years and five days, he voluntarily surrendered.
In order to show the matter at issue in the •divorce suit by Stella against appellant in 1908, the state introduced her petition in that case, his answer, and his divorce decree against her of October 10, 1907., This petition is some seven pages of typewritten matter.
Other than a copy of it in the bill, the bill is very meager, and does' not state the matter so that this court cán know therefrom the status of the case and the bearing thereof. Appellant's objections thereto were general. He in no way pointed out any special portion thereof that was objectionable, but his objections went to the introduction of it for any purpose whatever. What we have said, about this bill equally applies to appellant's bill objecting to the introduction of his said answer, and the same is true of his third bill to the copy of said judgment.
Certainly all of these papers were clearly admissible for the purpose for which the state introduced them. Even if .there should have been any particular allegation or other matter in any of these papers that was objectionable, that .particular item should have been objected to, and pointed out to -itself. A mere objection to the introduction of the whole thing would not reach any such .matter. The court stated to the jury in his charge that said petition, answer, and judgment were introduced to show that a civil judicial proceeding was pending in the district court of Titus county, and that that court had jurisdiction, and that issue was formed therein, and told them that they could not consider such evidence for any other purpose, and that such evidence was not corroborative, and could not be considered by them to show perjury.
A material question in the case was whether or not appellant had had sexual intercourse with Stella in March, 1907, before he married her, and whether his testimony denying such intercourse was true or false. It was therefore material and proper that the court should permit her to testify in detail to these acts of intercourse. Appellant's bill on this question is so meager as not to apprise this court of the surrounding circumstances as to whether or not this testimony was inadmissible. His objection to it was that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant. In our opinion it was both material and relevant, ánd the court did not err in admitting it.
The next bill merely shows that while Mrs. Stella Simms was on the stand testifying she was asked, "Where were you on October 10, 1907?" She answered, "In Oklahoma." Then she was asked how long she stayed there. She replied she did not know exactly, that she went to stay 20 days. Appellant objected to this because it was immaterial and irrelevant. The bill shows no error whatever.
The next bill is as meager, if not more so than any of the others, and is wholly insufficient, under the long established rules of this court, to require or authorize this court to consider it. Briefly, it states that while Mrs. Stella Simms was on the witness stand the state was permitted to prove, over his objections, that while she was in Oklahoma appellant wrote to her to come- home and stop at Omaha, and that he would meet her there; that in response to his request she did come, and he met her and took her in a buggy to her uncle's; that he then told her that while the court was in session some one had permitted the books to get open, and the judge saw her depositions, and granted him a divorce, but he did not think it amounted to .anything, and he - could not tell until he saw the papers, and that, even if he had been granted a divorce, he would! take her, remarry her, and they would live together.. The appellant's objections to this evidence-was that it was immaterial and irrelevant;, that the divorce was granted, and afterwards-suit was brought to set it aside and reinstate-the relations of husband and wife-; and that divorce judgment was obtained through fraud*, and was set aside on that ground, and any testimony as to any conversation between, the-witness and appellant after they were married until the divorce was finally granted to-her in 1910 was in contravention of the statute ; that the divorce granted to appellant in. October, 1907, was void. This is the- substance in full of this bill. It is clearly insufficient to authorize, or require, us to pass-on the questions attempted to be raised. See section 857, p. 557, and section 1123, p. 732,. of White's Ann. O. O. P., for a collation of some of the authorities on the insufficiency of such a bill. Even if we could consider the matter at all, the bill clearly shows that these statements testified to by Mrs. Simms were ma-de to her by appellant at least three-weeks after he had procured a divorce against her, and that they were not then and never afterwards husband and wife.
Appellant has several bills of exceptions showing that he offered to prove by some five witnesses that at the time of this trial Mrs. Simms' general reputation where she formerly lived in Titus county for chastity was bad for the purpose of impeaching her testimony in this case. Clearly under the authorities such testimony was inadmissible as the lower court properly held.
The only other bill of appellant's shows that, while Mrs. Simms was a witness for the state, the state was permitted to ask her why, and to explain why, she gave the answers she did to the said interrogatories of appellant in his suit against her for divorce; that appellant objected to this because it was immaterial, irrelevant, and a confidential communication between husband and wife during their coverture, was a violation of the statute, and the witness could not be required to testify to any communication made to her by her husband during coverture; that in answer to these questions she stated substantially what is shown on the subject in the preliminary statement above of the proof in this case. The court explained the bill briefly by showing that appellant filed suit against his wife for a divorce; that she testified by depositions in substance as above shown; that she was asked to explain why she testified in answers as above set forth. What we have said about the bills above is equally applicable to this. It is wholly insufficient to require us to pass upon the questions attempted to be raised.
However, if we could go to the record to ascertain the facts, we would find that the state did not have Mrs. Stella Simms— formerly Spearman—to testify to any communication whatever between appellant and her while she .was his wife, but that, after the state had introduced its proof and rested, appellant himself introduced said depositions of his wife showing what she had testified in his divorce suit against her and upon which he got his divorce, thereby, in effect, making her his witness. The state then, in cross-examination, after he had thus introduced her and had her to testify, merely asked her what is stated in the bill, and she then explained why she had so testified in appellant's divorce suit against her. Clearly, the appellant having introduced her and proved by her material testimony for himself, the state had the right to cross her to show the circumtances of why and how she came to so testify. Johnson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 17, 11 S. W. 667; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 87, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 638, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719; Gaines v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 42 S. W. 385; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 45 S. W. 21, and many other cases.
Complaint is made of certain paragraphs of the court's charge, among them, because the court did not submit to the jury for its finding whether or not a civil judicial proceeding was pending in said court, and whether or not issue was joined therein by Stella Spearman and appellant. While it is proper to show these matters, when shown, as in this case, by the pleadings introduced in evidence, it becomes a matter of law and not of fact, and it was not necessary that they should be submitted to the jury for a finding. Foster v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 39, 22 S. W. 21; Washington v. State, 23 Tex. App. 336, 5 S. W. 119; Jackson v. State, 15 Tex. App. 579.
It was entirely proper for the court to state to the jury in its charge, as it did as stated above, why the said pleadings and judgment were introduced, and to tell the jury for what they could be considered and what not, and such charge is not subject to the objection that it was upon the weight of the testimony.
Complaint is made to the charge of the court, among other grounds, that it did not submit to the jury whether appellant's testimony to the effect that he had not had sexual intercourse with Stella Culpepper before he married her was in fact false. An inspection of the charge shows that the court did submit this question to the jury, and required them to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that such testimony was false before they could convict appellant. It may be that the charge is not very happily expressed, but it did require the jury to believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before they could convict him, that the falsity of his said statement had been established by the testimony of two credible witnesses, or by one credible witness strongly corroborated by other evidence, and that said false statement by him was made willfully and deliberately.
The record shows that several special charges were requested by appellant and refused. No rea'son whatever is given in the requested charge or in the ground of the motion for new trial complaining of the refusal to give them why they should be given. In the motion for new trial the only complaint is that the court erred in failing to give to the jury his special charge No. -, filling the blank with the respective numbers of the charges. This is entirely too general to require this court to pass upon the question.
However, we have examined these special charges, and, so far as the questions stated by any of them were material to have been given, they were in substance embraced, and given in the main charge of the court.
There being no reversible error pointed out, the judgment will be affirmed.