Case Name: J. N. BLACK v. THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION FOR GRAND FORKS
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-03-22
Citations: 38 N.D. 105
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. N. BLACK v. THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION FOR GRAND FORKS.
Judges: Birezell, J., being disqualified, did not participate.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 105–132

Head Matter:
J. N. BLACK v. THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION FOR GRAND FORKS.
(164 N. W. 297.)
Pair association grounds — grand stand —cigar and drink privileges — license for — purchaser of license — conditions — takes his own chance on.
The purchaser of a license to sell cigars and drinks in the grand stand of a fair association, takes his own chance on the crowd and the conditions.
Opinion filed March 22, 1917.
On rehearing filed September 24, 1917.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Honorable Chas. M. Cooley, J.
Affirmed.
J. F. T. O'Connor and Sveinhjom Johnson, for appellant.
It is a well-established rule that when a contract, doubtful in meaning as to any of its terms, has been prepared by one party, it shall be construed favorably to the other party and most consistent with the right of the case, and so as to accomplish the objects and purposes the parties had in view and so as not to impair or render nugatory the rights of either party. Wyatt v. Larmer & W. Irrig. Co. 18 Colo. 298, 36 Am. St. Rep. 280, 33 Pac. 144; Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 395, 19 L. ed. 757; Kentzler v. American Mut. Acei. Asso. 88 Wis. 589, 43 Am. St. Rep. 934, 60 N. W. 1002; Christian v. First Nat. Bank, 84 •0. O. A. 53, 155 Fed. 705.
It is presumed that the promisor caused the ambiguity in a contract. Blankenship v. Decker, 34 Mont. 292, 85 Pac. 1035.
A contract should be so construed as to render it operative, reasonable, and lawful. Young v. Metcalf Land Co. 18 N. D. 441, 122 N. W. 1101; Horton v. Rohlff, 69 Neb. 95, 95 N. W. 36; 2 Page, Contr. § 1121.
In ambiguous contracts, parol evidence is admissible not to determine what the parties said, but “to understand what they wrote.” Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 141, 27 N. E. 961; Juilliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 535; Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74, 34 Am. Rep. 512.
If a writing is incomplete, even if the incompleteness does not appear ■on its face from a mere inspection of it, but appears from the attendant circumstances, the subject-matter and the purposes intended to be accomplished. Putnam v. Prouty, 24 N. D. 525, 140 N. W. 93; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 5907, 5908; Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 138, 27 N. E. 061.
Also where some material clause, phrase, or term in the contract is •of doubtful, indefinite, or ambiguous meaning. Phosnix Pub. Co. v. Riverside Clothing Co. 54 Minn. 207, 55 N. W. 912; Cameron Mill •& Elevator Co. v. Charles F. Orthwein’s Sons, 56 O. C. A. 613, 120 Fed. 463; Merica v. Burget, 36 Ind. App. 453, 75 N. E. 1083; Bagley & S. Co. v. Saranac River Pulp & Paper Co. 135 N. Y. 626, 32 N. E. 132; Behrman v. Linde, 47 Hun, 530; Durant v. Henry, 33 Wash. 38, 73 Pac. 775; Thomas v. Scutt, supra; Carstens v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404; Gould v. Boston Excelsior Co. 91 Me. 214, 64 Am. St. Rep. 221, 39 Atl. 554; Black River Lumber Co. v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374, 6 S. W. 210; Windsor v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 37 Wash. 156, 79 Pac. 613, 3 Ann. Cas. 62; Union Special Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lockwood, T10 111. App. 387. •
Also to complete the instrument which the parties did not intend to embrace the entire agreement between them. Halliday v. Mulligan, 113 111. App. 177; Domestic Sewing Mach. Co. v. Anderson, 23 Minn. 57; Beyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co. 49 Minn. 1, 51 N. W. 619; Minnesota Mfg. Co. y. Grant City Lumber & Hardware Co. 81 Mo. App. 255; Casners’ Estate Mills y. Stafford, 86 111. App. 469; Niles v. Sire, 46 Misc. 321, 94 N. T. Supp. 586; Glos v. Bain, 223 111. 343, T'9 N. E. Ill; Reeves & Co. v. Bruening, 13 N. D. 163, 100-N. W. 241; Wigmore, Ev. §§ 2427ff, 2472.
In such cases it may become necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning and intent of the parties in the light of the information thus acquired. Cunningham v. Washburn, 119 Mass. 224; Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. 150; Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 496; Smith v. Eaulkner, 12 Gray, 251.
Where the extrinsic facts concerning an ambiguity are subjects of conflicting testimony, the inferences to be drawn are questions for the jury, and not for the court. Thome & H. Line & C. Co. v. St. Louis Expanded Metal Fire Proofing Co. 77 Mo. App. 21; Rosenthal v. Ogden, 50 Neb. 218, 69 N. W. 779; Alworth v. Gordon, 81 Minn. 445, 84 N. W. 454; First Nat. Bank v. Rothschild, 107 111. App. 133; Mackenzie v. Seeberger, 22 C. C. A. 83, 40 H. S. App. 188, 76 Fed. 108; J. W. Reedy Elevator & Mfg. Co. v. Mertz, 107 Mo. App. 28, 80 S. W. 684; Hix v. Edison Electric Light Co. 27 App. Div. 248, 50 N. T. Supp. 592.
Where the parties have themselves construed and acted upon an ambiguous contract, it is binding upon them and is accepted as controlling by the courts. Such conduct is the best evidence of its meaning. Hubbard City v. Bounds, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 95 S. W. 69; 2 Page, Confer. § 1126; Geithman v. Eichler, 265 111. 579, 107 N. E. 180; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 54, 19 L. ed. 596; Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Stewart, 45 Ind. App. 554, 90 N. E: 384; Sattler v. Halloch, 160 N. T. 291, 46 L.R.A. 679, 73 Am. St. Rep. 693, 54 N. E. 667; Parmelee v. Hambleton, 24 111. 609; Pratt v. Prouty, 104 Iowa, 419, <35 Am. St. Rep. 472, 73 N. W. 1035; Haddock v. Woods, 46 Iowa, 433; Moore v. Beiseker, 77 C. O. A. 545, 147 Fed. 367.
Where the contract is ambiguous and where there is a dispute between the parties as to its meaning, evidence of the terms and nature of provisions, similar contracts between the same parties, and the practical construction thereof, is admissible. Richards v. Millard, 56 N. Y. 574; Gray y. Gannon, 4 Hun, 57.
A contract ambiguous or indefinite in its terms is to be construed in the sense in which the promisor has reason to believe it would be interpreted by the promisee. Imnan Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co. 133 Iowa, 71, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1140, 110 N. W. 287, 12 Ann. Cas. 387; Blankenship v. Decker, 34 Mont. 292, 85 Pac. 1035.
Evidence that defendant construed the contract as plaintiff did, is admissible. Kennedy v. Lee, 147 Cal. 596, 82 Pac. 257; Off- v. J. B. Inderrieden Co. 74 111. App. 105.
• The complaint alleges, and the proof offered but rejected, tended to show, that the agreement to keep the aisles open was a part of the consideration of the contract with defendant, and the principal inducement that led to the execution of the same. First Nat. Bank v. Prior, 10 N. D. 150, 86 N. W. 362; Klemik v. Henricksen Jewelry Co. 128 Minn. 490, 151 N. W. 203; Tylee v. Illinois C. R. Co. 97 Neb. 646, 150 N. W. 1015; Dunnell’s Dig. (Minn.) § 3373, note 87; Hughes, Ev. p. 240; Stephen’s Dig. Ev. art. 90.
Our statute on the admissibility of such evidence embraces the common law on the subject, and goes no further, and the rule has full application only within very narrow limits. Courts are careful to avoid an application of it which will further and protect, rather than prevent, fraud and oppression. Other and collateral agreements relating to the same subject and between the same parties are admissible, and should be received and considered as throwing light upon the situation and as evidencing the intent and purpose of the parties. Comp. Laws 1913, § 5889; Putnam v. Prouty, 24 N. D. 517, 140 N. W-. 93; Juilliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 534; Wigmore, Ev. §§ 2425, 2429.
The trial court ignored and failed to apply the distinction of the highest importance in the law of damages for breach of contract, between uncertainty as to whether or not damages did result from the breach, uncertainty as to the cause, and uncertainty as to amount of damages, when there is no doubt that some damage has been suffered because of the breach. Blagen v. Thompson, 23 Or. 239, 18 L.R.A. 315, 31 Pac. 647; Thayer-Moore Brokerage Co. v. Campbell, 164 Mo. App. 8, 147 S. W. 550; Comp. Laws 1913, § 7146; Needham v. Halverson, 22 N. D. 594, 135 N. W. 203.
Where the value of the benefit which the party is to derive from the performance of the contract may be certain, yet if the benefit be certain, but only uncertain in value or amount, the rule that damages to be recoverable must not be contingent or uncertain does not apply. The court will not refuse redress to a litigant because the problem of solving the amount of damages is difficult, if there is substantial evidence in the record. Blagen v. Thompson, 23 Or. 239, 18 L.B.A. 321, 31 Pac. 647; Bichey v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 140 Wis. 486, 122 N. W. 1030; Blagen v. Thompson, 23 Or. 239, 19 L.B.A. 315, 31 Pac. 647; Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896; Schumacher v. Heinemann, 99 Wis. 251, 74 N. W. 785.
There is ample in the record in this case to enable a jury to arrive at the amount of damages with no less an approximation to exact justice than in the cases of lost limbs, losses by fire, and in other like cases. Tootle v. Kent, 12 Okla. .674, 73 Pac. 310; Gilbert v. Cherry, 57 Ga. 128; Cranmer v. Kohn, 7 S. D. 247, 64 N. W. 125; World’s Pair in Chicago, 1893; World’s Columbian Exposition v. Pasteur-Chamberland Pilter Co. 82 111. App. 94; Nash v. Thousand Island S. B. Co. 123 App. Div. 148, 108 N. Y. Supp. 336; San Antonio v. Boyal, — Tex. —, 16 S. W. 1101.
Clearly plaintiff could and would have made profits on his sales on the two days in question, had he been permitted to carry on his business according to the contract. San Antonio v. Boyal, — Tex. —, 16-S. W. 1101; Cranmer v. Kohn, 7 S. D. 247, 64 N. W. 125; Bryson v. McCone, 121 Cal. 153, 53 Pac. 637; Hayes v. Cooley, 13 N. D. 204, 100 N. W. 250; Schumaker v. Heinemann, 99 Wis. 251, 74 N. W. 785.
In such cases the court should instruct the jury that they are not to conjecture or guess, but to draw reasonable and safe conclusions from the evidence in the case as it has been developed on the trial. Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896; Emerson v. Pacific Coast •& N. Packing Co. 96 Minn. 1, 1 L.B.A.(N.S.) 445, 113 Am. St. Bep. 603, 104 N. W. 573, 6 Ann. Cas. 973; Wakeman v. Wheeler & W. Mfg. Co. 101 N. Y. 205, 54 Am. Bep. 676, 4 N. E. 264; Wells v. National Life Asso. 53 L.B.A. 33, 39 C. C. A. 476, 99 Ped. 222.
A person under the circumstances of this case, who has sold like goods and refreshments to crowds in the open air for thirty years, and for many seasons at the same place, may be permitted to estimate what his sales each day, under normal conditions, would be. World’s Columbian Exposition v. Pasteur-Ohamberland Filter Co. 82 111. App. 94; Wells, v. National Life Asso. 53 L.R.A. 33, 39 C. C. A. 476, 99 Eed. 222; Enlow v. Hawkins, 71 Kan. 633, 81 Pac. 189; Eredonia Gas Co. v. Bailey, 77 Kan. 296, 94 Pac. 258; Brown v. Hadley, 43 Kan. 267, 23 Pac. 492.
George A. Bangs and George B. Bobbins, for respondent.
If defendant, a branch of the state government, engaged in the performance of the functions of the state, or a department, or if it manages,, controls, or operates a department of the state government, it is exempt from suit. A sovereign state cannot be subjected to the process of its. own courts or the courts of a sister state, or, save as permitted by the Constitution, of the courts of the United States. 36 Cyc. 911; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 H. S. 446, 27 L. ed. 992, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609; State ex rel. Mille Lacs County v. Dike, 20 Minn, 363, Gil. 314; Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103, 18 Am. Rep. 330, Gil. 74; State ex rel. Thompson v. Whitcomb, 28 Minn. 50, 8 N. W. 248; Western R. Co. v. DeGraff, 27 Minn. 1, 6 N. W. 341.
So, also, a suit against a department of the state government, a board, or corporation created by the state for governmental purposes, is a suit against the state, and cannot be maintained without its consent. 36-Cyc. 919; Alabama Girls Industrial School v. Reynolds, 143 Ala. 579, 42 So. 115; Alabama Industrial School v. Addler, 144 Ala. 555, 113 Am. St. Rep. 58, 42 So. 116; Moody v. State Prison, 128 N. C. 12, 53 L.R.A. 855, 38 S. E. 131; Oklahoma Agri. & Mechanical College v. Willis, 6 Okla. 593, 40 L.R.A. 677, 52 Pac. 921; State Bkg. Board v. Oklahoma Bankers’ Trust Co. — Okla. —, 151 Pac. 566; Lankford' v. Platte Iron Works Co. 235 H. S. 461, 59 L. ed. 316, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. 213 U. S. 151, 53 L. ed. 742, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Jobe v. Hrquhart, 98 Ark. 525,-136 S. W. 663; State Hospital v. Robertson, 115 Ya. 527, 79 S. E. 1064.
Public corporations are formed or organized for the government of a portion of the state. Comp. Laws 1913, § 4499.
The legislative assembly shall take such steps as may be necessary to promote industrial, scientific, and agricultural improvements. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 1847 et seq.; Const. § 151.
The state fair association is a mere state agency or department ere ated for the purpose of carrying on the business of tbe state imposed: upon it under the Constitution, and it is not subject to suit for acts done by it in connection with tbe performance of this state function. Lane v. Minnesota State Agri. Soc. 62 Minn. 175, 29 L.B.A. 708, 64 N. W. 382; Berman v. Minnesota State Agri. Soc. 93 Minn. 125, 100' N. W. 732; Berman v. Cosgrove, 95 Minn. 353, 104 N. W. 534; George v. University of Minnesota Athletic Asso. 107 Minn. 424, 120 N. W. 750; Hern v. Iowa State Agri. Soc. 91 Iowa, 97, 24 L.B.A. 655, 58 N. W. 1092; Bathe v. Decatur County Agri. Sbc. 73 Iowa, 11, 5 Am. St. Bep. 651, 34 N. W. 484; Minear v. State Bd. of Agri. 259 111. 549, 102 N. E. 1082, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1290; Morrison v. Eisher (Morrison v. MacLaren), 160 Wis. 621, L.B.A.1915E, 469, 152 N. W. 475; Zoeller v. State Bd. of Agri. 163 Xy. 446, 173 S. W. 1143; Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 Pac. 416.
“Agricultural societies are not corporations in tbe ordinary sense of tbe term, but rather agencies of tbe state created for tbe purpose of assisting in promoting our most important industry.” State ex rel. Custer County Agri. Soc. & L. S. Excb. v. Bobinson, 35 Neb. 401, 17 L.B.A. 383, 53 N. W. 213.
“Tbe execution of a contract in writing, whether tbe law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all tbe oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied tbe execution of tbe instrument.” Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 5889, 5938; C. L. 1913; 2; Elliott, Oontr. § 1635, p. 949; Mast v. Pearce, 58 Iowa, 579, 43 Am. St. Bep. 125, 8 N. W. 632, 12 N. W. 597; Nichols v. Wyman, 71 Iowa, 160, 32 N. W. 258; Warbasse v. Card, 74 Iowa, 306, 37 N. W. 383; Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa, 538, 54 N. W. 531; Jolliffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353; Groome v. Ogden City Oorp. 10 Utah, 54, 37 Pac. 90; York' v. Stewart, 21 Mont. 515,. 43 L.B.A. 125, 55 Pac. 29.
Parol evidence is not admissible to add covenants, agreements, or warranties where tbe parties have accepted' a written agreement or statement executed and delivered as embodying tbe terms of tbe agreement. Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1; American Mfg. Co. v. Xlarquist, 47 Minn. 344, 50 N. W. 243; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Thompson, 46 Minn. 15, 48 N. W. 415; Bradford v. Neill, 46 Minn. 347, 49 N. W. 193; Wheaton Boiler Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mfg. Co. 66-Minn. 156, 68 N. W. 854; McNaughton v. Wahl, 99 Minn. 92, 116 Am. St. Rep. 389, 108 N. W. 467; Tietjen v. Snead, 3 Ariz. 195, 24 Pac. 324; DeWitt v. Berry, 134 TJ. S. 306, 33 L. ed. ■896, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 536; Seitz v. Brewers’ Refrigerating Mach. Co. 141 U. S. 510, 35 L. ed. 837, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46; Wilson v. New United States Cattle Ranch Co. 20 C. C. A. 244, 36 U. S. App. 634, 73 Red. 994; Sanford v. Gates, T. & Co. 21 Mont. 277, 53 Pac. 749; Gaffney Mercantile Co. v. Hopkins, 21 Mont. 13, 52 Pac. 561; Pisher v. Briscoe, 10 Mont. 130, 25 Pac. 30; Western Electric Co. v. Baerthel, 127 Iowa, 467, 103 N. W. 475; Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v. Huston, 55 Kan. 104, 28 L.R.A. 53, 39 Pac. 1035; Miller v. Municipal Electric Lighting & P. Co. 133 Mo. 205, 34 S. W. 585; McCray Refrigerator & Cold Storage Co. v. Woods, 99 Mich. 269, 41 Am. St. Rep. 599, 58 N. W. 320; Gardiner v. McDonogh, 147 Cal. 313, 81 Pac. '964; Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 280; Engelhorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 81, 9 L.R.A. 549, 25 N. E. 297; Uihlein v. Matthews, 172 N. Y. 154, 64 N. E. 792; Finnigan v. Shaw, 184 Mass. 112, 68 N. E. 35.
If plaintiff suffered any damage, there is no evidence in the record from which the same can be determined. The evidence does not disclose the cause, nature, or origin of the alleged loss of profits -which is sought to be recovered here. Any attempted computation thereof would be conjectural and speculative. North Star Trading Co. v. Alaska-Yukon-Paeific Exposition, 68 Wash. 457, 123 Pae. 605; Deslandes v. Scales, 187 Ala. 25, 65 So. 393; Hedrick v. Smith, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 146 S. W. 305; Silurian Mineral Springs Co. v. Kuhn, 65 Neb. 646, 91 N. W. 508; Beck v. West & Co. 87 Ala. 213, 6 So. 70; Winston Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells Whitehead Tobacco Co. 141 N. O. 284, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 255, 53 S. E. 885; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718; Atchison, T. & S. P. R. Co. v. Thomas, 70 Kan. 409, 78 Pac. 861; Smuggler-Union Min. Co. v. Kent, 47 Colo. 320, 112 Pac. 223; Lane v. Storke, 10 Cal. App. 347, 101 Pac. 937; Merritt v. Adams County Land & Invest. Co. 29 N. D. 496, 151 N. W. 11.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.:
The plaintiff brings suit to recover $500 damages for the alleged failure of defendant to observe a written concession giving to him exclusive grand-stand privileges during fair days in July 20-24, 1915, to sell eats, drinks, candy,- etc. He appeals to this court from a directed verdict and judgment, and from an order denying a new trial. There is no claim that plaintiff did not have the usual sale privileges of the grand stand, and it appears that he had all he bargained for. But defendant claims that on two of the days of the fair, when the crowds were large and the people very hungry and thirsty, the defendant permitted the aisles to become crowded and filled with people, so that it became difficult or impossible to serve them. And so the plaintiff failed to make a large expected profit. Of course the crowd was just what the plaintiff and the fair association wanted, but it seems there was too much of a good thing. And so it is possible that plaintiff might have made more sales to a smaller crowd. However, it is folly to think of the defendant bargaining to limit sales to the fair grounds or to the grand stand, or that the defendant agreed with plaintiff to police the stand or to aid him in selling his drinks. As the trial court said: "The agreement was simply a license to do business on the grand stand, and Mr. Black was bound to take the conditions there as he found them." The case does not seem to involve any real question of law or of fact. The judgment is clearly right, and is affirmed.
Birezell, J., being disqualified, did not participate.