Case Name: Lessee of Thomas E. Boswell and others vs. Sharp & Leppelman
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 15 Ohio 447
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lessee of Thomas E. Boswell and others vs. Sharp & Leppelman.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 15
Pages: 447–467

Head Matter:
Lessee of Thomas E. Boswell and others vs. Sharp & Leppelman.
If a bill in chancery be filed against nonresidents, in the county where the land lies, to enforce a specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of the same, and for an account for money expended and labor performed in improving the land, and the Court render a decree merely for the payment of money, the decree, if erroneous, can only be corrected by bill of review, and cannot be impeached, collaterally, in an action of ejectment.
A purchaser at a sale made under such decree, acquires a good title.
The subject matter of the suit being within the jurisdiction of-the Court, the defendants may be made parties by publication, and, if notice be thus given, and the Court ‘ pass upon the sufficiency of the notice, the same cannot be questioned collaterally,-
This is a Writ or Error to the Court of Common Pleas of '' Sandusky County. .
■ The original action was ejectment, to recover a tract of land on which a portion of the town' of Lower Sandusky is. situated..
In Bank.
Dec. Term, 1846.
On the trial, the plaintiff having established a clear right to recover, the defendants offered, in evidence, the record of a judicial proceeding, a decree and sale of the land in controversy, which was objected to by plaintiff’s counsel, but admitted by the Court, and this is assigned for error.
The substance of the facts, as disclosed by the bill of exceptions and agreed facts, is as follows:
From the 1st day of May, 1825, up to the 1st day of August, 1826, neither Thomas E. Boswell nor William T. Barry were within the State of Ohio, and were resident citizens of the State of Kentucky. That said. William T. Barry died in 1837, and that plaintiff’s lessors (other than said Boswell,) are his heirs at law, and that the legal title to the premises in controversy is in said'Boswell and the other lessors of the plaintiff, as tenants in common, unless it passed to Thomas L. Hawkins at a sale made to him by the sheriff, under certain proceedings had on the chancery side of the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky county, at the suit of said Hawkins against said Boswell and Barry and one William Whitimore, which proceedings said defendants gave in evidence as the foundation of their title, and to which the plaintiff objected, which objection was overruled by the Court, and said proceedings, execution and sheriff’s deed were received in evidence, and judgment given for the defendants.
Copy of the Bill in Chancery.
“ Plumbly complaining, showeth unto your honors, your orac tor, Thomas L. Hawkins, that some time in the year 1816, £ Thomas E. Boswell, then and now of the State of Kentucky, £ your orator, one Reed, and, also, one Owings, engaged in £ building a sawmill at the town of Lower Sandusky, with a £ view and intent of purchasing of the government, eventually, £ the land where said mill was to be erected. Orator further ‘ shows, that said Boswell advanced a part of the expenses ne- £ cessary to the comencement of said mill, how much orator £ does not now remember, Owings about two hundred dollars, ‘ and Reed nothing.
“ Orator further says, that all parties interested agreed that £ orator should be the acting agent in erecting said mill, and ‘ should advance his-- of expense in said mill by labor, ‘ and if ho advanced more than his share, the other parties £ to refund. . That orator went on and expended his time, £ labor and money, from 1816 until the land at Sandusky Res- ‘ ervation was sold by government, at Wooster, in 1818, when 1 Reed and Owings abandoned the purchase of land on which ‘ said mill was commenced, or to proceed with said mill any ‘ further. It was then agreed by Boswell, William T. Barry ‘ of Kentucky, and William Whitimore of Boston, (all three £ of whom orator prays may be made defendants to this bill,) £ and orator, to go on and purchase lot number nine in said ‘ reservation, or a large part of it, and the same on which said ‘ mill was commenced. That said purchase was made, and £ purchasers agreed that orator should advance his share of pur- ‘ chase money in labor on said mill and the improvements of £ said land; and, further, that said orator should be the acting ‘ agent of said Boswell, Barry and Whitimore — should go on c and make contracts for the erection of said mill. Orator fur- £ ther says, he did go on and superintend the building of said ‘ mill, and continued to labor upon the same until 1823, and £ laid out for himself and others interested in said mill, about £ $5,000 — about $2,600 thereof, orator advanced himself, be- £ sides his own time. That orator believed, that said Whiti- £ more, Boswell and Barry would convey to him one equal share £ of the land in said lot, that is, one-fourth of all that they £ should obtain a legal title to, of said land. Orator further £ says, that said defendants have obtained a legal title to twqc thirds of said lot, and now refuse to convey to orator any part ‘ of said land, or to account and refund to him the money he £ has laid out, more than his share, on said mill, or pay him for £ his time expended, for his agency, &c.; all which actions and £ doings are contrary to equity and good conscience, in tender £ consideration whereof, and inasmuch as orator is remediless, £ by the strict rales of common law, and can only be relieved ‘ by this Court, sitting as a Court of Equity.
££ To the end, therefore, that said Boswell, Barry and Whitic more may, upon their corporeal oaths, true answers make to £ all matters herein charged, and, on the final hearing of this £ cause, your Honors will decree that said defendants convey £ one-fourth of the said land to which they have obtained a le- ‘ gal title, and also, to account to your orator for the money £ and time he has expended, more than his share, on said mill, £ and the improvements of said land, and that notice be given £ defendants,” &c. ££ O. Parrish, Sol. for Compl.”
Journal Entry, and which was published as notice, made at the May Term, (25th May,) 1825.
“The complainant, by Orris Parrish, his solicitor, came and £ filed his bill, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court £ that the defendants are nonresidents of this State, but reside £ in the States of Kentucky and Massachusetts, it is therefore £ ordered, that notice of the pendency of this suit be published £ in the Western Statesman, a newspaper printed in the town £ of Columbus, Ohio, for the term of nine weeks, successively, £ before the next term of this court; and, that unless the said £ defendants appear at the October term of this Court, and £ plead, answer or demur to said bill, that the matters and £ things therein set forth and charged will be taken as confessed £ against them accordingly; and this cause is continued.”
Journal Entry made at the October Term, 1825.
“ Publication proved. This day came the complainant, by £ O. Parrish, his counsel, and on motion, leave is given by the ‘ Court to amend his bill, and this cause is continued; and, at £ the date last aforesaid, the said complainant filed in the office £ of the clerk aforesaid, an exhibit, in the words and figures £ following, to wit: T. L. Hawkins v. Barry and Boswell. ‘ In chancery. Personally appeared in open court, O. Parrish, £ one of the editors of the Western Statesman, published at £ Columbus, Ohio, and made oath that the order in this case, ‘ made at the last term of the Court, to give defendants notice, £ &c., has been published in said paper nine weeks succes- £ sively, since the last term aforesaid. O. Parrish. Sworn and ‘ subscribed in open Court. Jas. A. Schranton, Clerk.”
Journal Entry made May Term, 1826.
££ This day came the complainant, by his counsel, and the 1 defendants still failing to appear and plead, answer or demur £ to complainant’s bill. On motion of said complainant’s counc sel, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the matters and ‘ things in said bill set forth and charged, be taken as confessed £ by defendants. And it is further ordered, that James A. ‘ Schranton be appointed Special Master Commissioner, to take £ an account between the parties, and report to this Court the £ amount due from defendants to complainant, for money ad- £ vanced and labor done in erecting and building the mill in bill ‘ mentioned, more than his share of the expenditures in build- £ ing said mill, and report the evidences on which his report £ shall be made. All other questions relative to this cause are £ open and continued till final decree.”
Master’s Report, made to the July Term oe said Court, A. D., 1826.
Divers small sums are set -out, amounting to the gross sum of...........,.. ................§2,016 86
Book account; charges made by complainant for cash paid out, labor done, and materials furnished, 2,417 67
Five years’ services by complainant, from the year 1817 until 1821, at §220 pear year.......... 1,100 00
§5,534 53
Deduct from the above, one-fourth, complainant’s share................................ .... 1,374 64
§4,15.9 89
Amount received by complainant, of defendants, in money, labor, materials, rents, sales, &c.................. $3,090 56
One-fourth to be deducted as complainant’s part...................... 775 14
■$2,315 42
$1,844 47
Final Decree, made at the July Term, A. D. 1826.
££ And now, at this day, came the complainant, by his solici- ‘ tor, and this cause came on for final hearing, upon the decree £- pro confesso aforesaid; and the bill and exhibits filed in this ‘ cause, and upon the report of James A. Schranton, the Spe- ‘ cial Master Commissioner in Chancery, to whom the same £ was referred; and the said Master having reported to this £ Court, in pursuance of their said order, that there was due £ complainant from the defendants the sum of $1,844.17, for £ his disbursements, advances and services; the account having £ been received and inspected, the said report is accepted and £ confirmed by the said Court, and find the said sum of £ $1,844.17 to be due from the defendants to the complain-c ant. And thereupon the Court do order, adjudge, and de- £ cree, that the complainant do recover of the said defendants £ the said sum of $1,844.17, and his costs by him in this be- £ half expended. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, £ that this decree shall, from the time of its being pronounced, £ have the force, operation, and effect of a judgment at law, £ and shall be a lien upon all the town lots of the defendants £ within said county, and also on all other real estate of the ‘ said defendants, within said county of Sandusky, as security 1 for the satisfaction of said decree. And it is further ordered, ‘ adjudged, and decreed, that if the above sum of $1,844.17 1 be not paid within thirty days from the date of this decree, 1 upon a precipe being filed with the Clerk of’this Court, by c the complainant or his solicitor, execution shall issue against ‘ the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of the defendants, ‘ which shall be taken in execution, and sold in like manner as ‘ though said execution issued on a judgment rendered in a ‘ court of law. And all further proceedings in this'cause to be ‘ continued until next term.”
No further action of the Court was ever had in the case; but on the eighth day of August, A. D. 1826, an execution was issued on this decree, on the twelfth it was levied on the lot in question, and on the twenty-fifth of September, A. D. 1826, -it was sold by the sheriff, and bid off by said Hawkins, and the defendants in this suit hold whatever passed at said sale.
Bartlett fy Watson, for Plaintiff in Error.
It is insisted by the plaintiff, that the legal title to the land in controversy remains unaffected by the proceedings in chancery—
First: Because jurisdiction was not conferred upon the Court, by the publication of notice, over the subject matter upon which the decree is based.
All demands of a personal character attach themselves to the person of the party, and follow him wherever he goes; and their enforcement depends upon the laws of the country, where the party is found.
At common law, bills, to enforce the specific execution of contracts for the conveyance of land, could only be prosecuted where the party could be personally served with process. Mas- . sie v. Watts, 2 U. S. Cond. Rep. 332; Story’s Eq. PI. 482.
Hence, it is by virtue of statutory provisions that a Court has jurisdiction over a thing, when the person cannot be reached, and the party must bring his case within its provisions. Ra-burn v. Shortridge, 2 Blackf. Rep. 109.
Courts, when proceeding under notice by publication, are courts of special and limited jurisdiction, and cannot extend their decree beyond the provisions of the statute, even when the proceeding is strictly in' rem. Hollingsworth v. Barbour 4 Peters’ Rep. 466; Düvál v. Duval,- 13; Mass. Rep. 263. '
Second : The'Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction^of the case, for the reason,'that the prescribed publication was not made. The law required that the notice should “ set forth the ,£ pendency of such petition, and the substance of the prayer ‘thereof.” The proof was, that the. order .of-the Court had been published. This, certainly, was not'a substantial complianee with'the ’law; without which the Court had not jurisdiction. Dunning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. Repi 647;’ Thatcher v, Powell; 6 Wheat,- Rep, 1T9; Jackspn v. Esty, 7 Wend. Rep. 14?. ‘
The-principle for which we are conténding is also-recognized and enforced in the following-cases: 'Warner v.- Webster, 13 Ohio Rep. 506;. Humphrey v, Wood, Wright’s Rep, 566; Bennett’s Lessee v. Williams, 5 Ohio Cond. Rep. 293; Campbell' v. Cpwden et al., Wright’s Rep/'484;' Taylor v. Kelson, 1 Blackf. Rep. 215; Lessee of Adams v. Jeffries, 12 Ohio Rep. 271; 6 Har. & Johns. Rep. 130; 6 Wheat. Rep. 119 ;- Í1 Wend. Rep. 647 ; 12 Wend. Rep. 9.
.. Third:' The .proceedings are void • for want of a pertinent description of -the land. Lessee of Massie’s Heirs v. Long, 2 Ohio Rep. 287; Treoú’s Lessee v, Emerick, 6 Ohio Rep. 391; Pellón v. Platner, 13 Ohio Rep. 219.
Fourth: If jurisdiction was acquired for any purpose, it 'was such only as authorized a proceeding in rem, and the Court transcended its authority in making a personal decree. It acquired jurisdiction only for a specific purpose; beyond that it had no power. Story on Con. of Laws, 461; Bates v. Deldr van, 5 Paige’s Rep. -299,; Bissell v. Briggs, 5 Mass. Rep. 468; Kibby v. Kibby, Kirby’s Rep. 119; Mitchell’s Lessee v. Eyster, 7 Ohio Rep. 384.
The statute, giving the Court of Chancery power over land, within the county, did not attempt to confer upon it a jurisdiction in personam against nonresidents; neither had , the Legislature power to confer upon the courts such an act of sovereignty. 3 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill’s notes) 908; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East’s Rep. 192; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean’s Rep. 482; Mills v. Burgee, 7 Cranch Rep. 482; Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason’s Rep. 35; Lockwood v. Wild-man, 13 Ohio Rep. 450; 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 1.
If the defendant is not served with process within the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not appear to the suit, a valid personal judgment or decree cannot be taken against him., To sustain this position, there is a strong and unbroken current of authorities. 5 Johns. Rep. 37; 8 Johns. Rep. 195; 6 Wend. Rep. 447; 13 Wend. Rep. 407; 2 Blackf. Rep. 82; 4 Conn. Rep. 380; 3 Wils. Rep. 197; 10 Serg. & Rawle’s Rep. 240; 7 Ohio Rep. 273; 13 Ohio Rep. 209; 1 Kent’s Com. 261, note b.
Buckland, Hays and Lane, for Defendants.
The plaintiffs’ title is shown by a patent.
The defendants’ title depends upon the validity of a judicial sale, under the proceedings of the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky county, in the case of Hawkins v. Boswell et al. The plaintiffs are expected to publish the records in their brief. If not, an exemplified copy will be found among the papers, it being a part of the bill of exceptions.
It is understood, the strongest objection to the title, is, the want of sufficient notice. The statute of 1824, (XXII, 75,) was in force at the time of these proceedings. The 12th section provides:
“ That in all cases properly cognizable in a court of equity, ‘ when either the title to or boundaries of land may come in question, or when a suit in chancery becomes necessary in or- ‘ der to obtain the rescission of a contract for the conveyance ‘ of land, or to compel a specific execution of such contract, ‘ and the defendant or defendants against whom a decree is ‘ sought is or are not resident within the State, it shall be com- < petent for the complainant to 'file his or her petition in the £ proper court of the county in which such lands may be situ4 ate, and such court is hereby authorized to take cognizance 4 thereof, and direct either personal notice or notice by publica4 tion, of its pendency, to be given as in this act provided, and 4 on proof of such notice having been given, to proceed as in 4.other cases.”
Sec. 7. 44 That if any person shall file a petition in chance-4 ry against any defendant residing within this State, in which 4 it shall be proper or necessary to join any other defendant re-4 siding out of the State, whether in the United States or any 4 other country, the complainant may cause personal service to 4 be made on such absent defendant by a written notice, setting ’4 forth the pendency of such petition, and the substance of the 4 prayer thereof, or he shall cause publication to be made of 4 such notice for nine weeks successively in some newspaper 4 print (1 in this State, and having general circulation in the 4 county where such suit shall be pending, and on due proof 4 that such notice has been given, such defendant shall be con-4 sidered in court, and be thereupon proceeded against in the 4 same manner as if he had been regularly served with a sub-4 poena in the cause.”
The notice actually published is as follows:
“ The State of Ohio, Sandusky Common Pleas, May term, 4 A. D. 1825. Thomas L. Hawkins v. William T. Barry, 4 Thomas E. Boswell and William Whitimore. This day 4 came the complainant, by Orris Parrish, his solicitor, and filed 4 the bill, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the 4 defendants are not.residents of this State, but reside in the 4 States of Kentucky and Massachusetts, it is therefore ordered, 4 that notice of the pendency of this suit be published in the 4 Western Statesman, a newspaper printed in the town of 4 Columbus, Ohio, fo.r the term of nine weeks successively, be-4 fore the next term of this Court, that unless said defendants 4 appear at the October term of this Court, and plead, answer 4 and demur to said bill, that the matters and things therein set ‘forth and charged will be taken as confessed, and, a de- ‘ cree rendered against them accordingly. A true copy. Jas. ‘ A. Scranton, Clerk.”
It is assumed by the plaintiff, that the Court only acquires jurisdiction by the publication of a notice which specifies “ the ‘ pendency of the petition and the substance of the prayer ‘ thereof,” and that these proceedings are void because there was no sufficient compliance with the last condition. The defendants will attempt to show, the validity of the sale does not depend upon such a strict and literal fulfillment of these requirements.
The defendants do not claim that a judgment or decree is binding upon a party who has had ho day in court, or that a judgment is good without some equivalent to the service of process. For present purposes, they do not deny that a court of special jurisdiction, or a court of general jurisdiction, while exercising special powers, must show the condition upon whose existence its jurisdiction depends; but they claim, that the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction, while exercising their ordinary functions, shall be supported by every reasonable intendment, and they claim the benefit of the most favorable presumptions arising from the nature of chancery tribunals to sustain the force of their acts.
First: It is submitted, that the fair construction of the 12th section requires no other notice than a notice of pendency. The notice of the 7th section must set forth the pendency of the suit and the substance of the prayer. The 12th section carefully omits the requirement of the substance of the prayer. Its language is: “a notice, by publication, of its pendency, to ‘ be given as in this act is provided; and, on proof of such ‘ notice having been given, to proceed as in other cases.” Not such a notice as the 7th section requires, but “ notice of its pendency.” The phrase, “ to be given,” relates, not to the form of the notice, but to the communication of it to the party, viz: to the manner of publication; that is, “ notice ” “ of the pendency of the suit ” “ is to be given ” “ for nine weeks ' successively in some newspaper,” &c., and the words “such notice,” in the last clause,- by the common rules of interpretation, relate to the last-antecedent —not such notice as-the 7 th section demands, buhsueh a notice as is ,designated in the same sentence. . ■ ■' , , •
Second: Admitting, for the sakqpf argument, that the notice must contain the substance of the. prayer, is not this reqrii- , sition satisfied when. it actually contains the demand ,of.a decree ? Is it not thé whole substance of the bill, to obtain an answer or a d'ecree ? • If it be held. that' the 12th; section requires the Substance of the prayer, we again recur with confi-' dence tó the practice of the day, which sufficiently manifests . that courts and.partitioners .regarded- such a notice a sufficient compliance with its dernands.
•; Third: But who can doubt that actual jurisdiction lawfully • attached, and has been rightfully exercised between the parties, to this record,’ Conceding that, the-case was regulated, by the .’ J2.th section, “it .was competent for the complainant to file his f petition in the'proper'courts where the-lands are,situate,, arid “s.Uch court is hereby authorized to take cognizance thereof, A’ahd.;4ir¡ect Now, it may well be contended,, that complete .jurisdiction is conferred'by the simple words, “take cognizance,” when a bill is filed in the county where the land lies, which-is, to he affected by the decree, and that all after proceedings can be erroneous only. But our argument has stronger cogency; for the authority to take cognizance and direct notice' confers, expressly, the jurisdiction to make the order, and involved the right of adjudicating whether such, order has' been complied-with, so that complete jurisdiction over those parties, to some purposes, has become vested in the Court, which, once' acquired, enables- them to go on and dó complete justice between them.; , 11 Ohio Rep. 462; 12 Ohio Rep,368., For where; jurisdiction once attached; all subsequent acts, however erroneous, áre not vqid.
, No language can more plainly define jurisdiction, than'..that employed .by-.the. Supreme Court at Washington.:. “.The power * to. hear' and determine a cause, is. jurisdiction. It is coram ‘.■jfidic’e,-whenever, a case is presented- which brings their power. 4 into action. ’ If the petitioner states such a case in his peti» 4 tion, that, on demurrer, the Court would render judgment in 4 his favor, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction. Whether, 4 on an answer denying and putting In issue the allegations of the •4 petition, the petitioner makes out his case; is the exercise of 4 jurisdiction conferred by the filing of a petition containing the 4 requisites, and in. the manner prescribed by law.’? ‘ 6 Pet.. Eep- 709.'
On a. motion to dismissj . Judge Baldwin" employs more for» cible illustrations: ■44 Any movement, (by a Court) is necessarily 4 the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear 4 and determine the subject of controversy between the parties 4 td a.suit-; to adjudicate Or exercise any judicial pbw.er over "4 them.- The question is,.whether,- on the case before the Court, "‘"their action is' judicial or extra-judicial, with' or without the 4 authority of law to render a judgment of "decree upon, the 4 rights of the .litigant parties ? If the law confers the power to 4 render "'a judgment .or decree, then the Court has jurisdiction 5 ‘.wh'at-"shall be adjudged or decreed between .the parties, and 4 with whom shall be'thé’right of the cáse, is judicial action, by 4 hearing and determining it.” 12 Peters5 Rep. 718.
On another occasion, Judge Baldwin says:
' 44 If the validity of a sale under its process can be questioned 4 for any irregularity preceding the .judgment, the Court which 4 assumes such power places itself in the position of that which 4 rendered it, and deprives it of all power of regulating its own 4 practice or modes of proceeding, in the progress of a -cause to' ‘judgment. If, after rendition, it is declared void for any 4 matter which can be assigned for errof only, on a writ of error 4 or appeal, then such Court not only usurps the jurisdiction of 4 an appellate court, but collaterally nullifies what such Court 4 is prohibited,. by express statute law, from ever reversing.
44 The line which separates , error, in judgment, from the usur4 pations of power, is very definite; and is precisely that which 4 denotes the cases, when a judgment or décree is reversible only by an appellate court, or may be declared a nullity collaterally, when it is offered in evidence in an action concerning the matter adjudicated, or purporting to have been so. In the one case, it is a record importing absolute verity; in the other, mere waste paper: there can be no middle character assigned to judicial proceedings, which are reversible for error. Such is their effect between the parties to the suit; and such are the immunities which the law affords to a plaintiff who has obtained an erroneous judgment or execution. It would be a well merited reproach to our jurisprudence, if an innocent purchaser, no party to the suit, who had paid his money on the faith of an order of Court, should not have the same protection, under an erroneous proceeding, as the party who derived the benefit accruing from it. A purchaser, unc der judicial process, pays the plaintiff his demand on the £ property sold; to the extent of the purchase money, he disc charges'the defendant from his adjudged obligation. Time c has given an inviolable sanctity to every act of the Court ‘ preceding the sale, which precludes the defendant from con- £ troverting the absolute right of the plaintiff to the full benefit ‘ of his judgment; and it shall not be permitted that the pur- ‘ chaser shall be answerable for defects in the record, from the £ consequence-of which the plaintiff is absolved. Such flagrant ‘ injustice is imputable neither to the common nor statute law of £ the land. If a judgment is reversed for error, it is a settled c principle of the common law, coeval with its existence; that £ the defendant shall have restitution only of the money — the c purchaser shall hold the property sold; and there are few, if { any, States in the Union who have not consecrated this prin- £ ciple by statute.
“ Acts of limitation become useless if a defendant is allowed c to evade them, by avoiding judgments or executions, or the ‘ suggestions of defects or omissions in the records, which can £ be avoided 'only by an appellate court; a direct premium is £ held out for delaying the resort to the mode pointed out by £ law for correcting the errors of judicial proceedings. His debt 4 is paid by the purchaser; the property purchased is restored 4 to the defendant, without any obligation to refund; and that * which was, when sold, of little value, and bought at its full * price paid to the defendant’s use, becomes his rightful estate 4 when the remote out-lot has become a mart for commerce ' and covered with valuable improvements.
“ The principles which must govern this, and all other sales ‘ by judicial process, are general ones, and adopted for the ‘ security of titles, the repose of possession, and the enjoyment 4 of property by innocent purchasers, who are the favorites of ‘ the law in every court and by every code. * * * * If 4 the jurisdiction was improvidently exercised, or in a manner 4 not warranted by the evidence before it, it is not to be cor-4 rected at the expense of the purchaser, who had a right to ‘ rely upon the order of the Court, as an authority emanating 4 from a competent jurisdiction.” 2 Peters’ Rep. 163, 168.
“ When a Court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide 4 every question that arises in the cause; and whether the 4 decision be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is 4 regarded as binding in every other Court.” Elliot v. Pierrel, 1 Peters’ Rep. 340; 2 Peters’ Rep. 169; 10 Peters’ Rep. 474.
It is needless to multiply these quotations. It cannot be necessary to remind the Court of the cases, where the finding, even by implication, by a Court of limited jurisdiction, of a fact, whose existence is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon it, is itself an exercise of jurisdiction sufficient to establish its authority, and conclusive upon all interests. Whenever a subject exists admitting any such exercise of judicial power, any action of the Court upon it is conclusive. 2 Howard’s Rep. 339.
Fourth: The defendants have to submit one other view of this question. Admitting that the 12th section required the notice to contain substance of the prayer in certain cases, is this case among them ? That section points out four cases in which the Court have a right to direct publication, namely — to settle land titles or boundaries, to rescind, or to execute contracts. This enumeration omits large subjects of Chancery interference,, as. mortgages, liens, judgments, trusts,,- &c. &c. Now," hence arises the alternative, that, during the-seven years when- this statuté was in ■■ force, either Ohio Courts of. Chancery had no jurisdiction over nonresidents’ property,-except in the .enumerated cases, or they had jurisdiction-in some cases where the form .of notice was. not prescribed. The first member of .-this ■ alternativé proposition .will ‘ hardly be maintained. . “ It were a brave thing: indeed,” if there ever was a time when Ohio Courts cóüld'.nbt- fprecí’ósé, a nonresident mortgage,, of cbuld ‘ fáil. to find -means .to subject to the satisfaction-.of a-judgment or . decree,- the .property of a stranger, .which lay within, its power. . The. latter,alternative'is- therefore true,-and-Ohio Courts could acquire jurisdiction .in nonenUmerated-cases, by such process’as conforms .'to. .the analogies of similar proceedings. If, then, a plaintiff were about to.pursue a lien upon partnership property, a nonehuffierated -,case,’.but one of undoubted jurisdiction, and the process employed' answers every objefct of'giving nqtice, • and precisely conforms- to the existing- arid well established práctico, there is no difficulty in sustaining-the jurisdiction of the Court.' Now this precise case • is shown -in these proceedings. The bill was filed for two objects;. one, to .obtain a title to his share of-the land, the other, to extend the. lien for his advancements over partnership property. One was amorig the .enumerated objects,'the other was not. . The enumerated .cause ' of action was .never pursued, but abandoned without an effort to maintain it; the nonenumerated subject was' pursued to decree. The case, therefore, as made, and pursued, was one iri which the Court could acquire jurisdiction, by its own forms of notice, without being restricted by the provisions applicable to the' enumerated grounds of- equitable bills. -
Fifth: Should all these -positions fail,.the defendants do not' yetdespair-of sustaining the authority of the Court;.' Where either person or property are'found.within the jurisdiction of a-given forum, which is competent to' investigate' a wrong,-.arid, whose' forms of actio:ti-:furnisli appropriate relief, its.-jurisdiction is' complete, and- it will -so shape .its proceedings ;as ¡to render its interposition effectual :■ Story’s Conflict,-: sec. ,539; -5 Littel,
49, ‘ .It is among the rights, privileges and. duties óf Chancery, where relief--for an injury depends upon -a relation to the pro-.petty of.-nonresidents-, within1 its jurisdiction, to prescribe its . own terms for.the service of pfocess to prevent a'failure of justice." This- power .is- exercised in every casé of ■ what is called “'substituted service:” It is the course of the Court, where . ordinary' process cannot reach the defendant, to prescribe, by1 order, some form of service-which the Court will regard equi.va- . lent to it. TJsually, it is the service upon the attorney, solicitor, or agehtj or.'even 'by. leaving subpoena at the last place of abodé -of a defendant not withín-.thé government: I Barbour’s. Practice, 52. Where'defendant-is absent, service at his-store on; his servant, may' be good service: 11- Paige, 288; ’ 20 Wend. 57.0. So, service.óh a guardian of an infant,.a lunatic, may, by order, be made good service on the vyard r' 9 Yes; 357. Orders for substituted service are granted now with'more caution than formerly; but-they are still granted ,in proper cases,, and they establish our present position, viz! That every Court, of Chancery having' jurisdiction over the subject, has an inherent. power, not arising from statute, but from the yery.nature of the Court, (which relieves, beyond the ordinary forms of law,), of. adopting such: process as, in its judgment, will- afford -dire relief. But if the power be'admitted ,to exist in airy case, it must exist in all; and.it affords a just basis for the principle we. maintain, that Chancery-, this, extraordinary., tribunal,-.exercising powers beyond the ordinary courts of law,'and adapting'remedies ,tp all ■ exigencies,'■ does possess'.authority where property is found amenable to it’s process, to subject to its adjudications the rights of Its.owners,' and'-this principle will sustai'a the válidity pf the present record. v
-Either of these positions seems tó ús suffieient-tb support the .jurisdiction of the Court,and establish thevalidity.of there? .córd.' V '''• ■' "

Opinion:
Read, J.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel, that the defendants derive no title by the purchase at judicial sale, because the decree under which the sale was had was void, for want of jurisdiction in,the Court pronouncing it:
First: Because the respondents were nonresidents, and the demand personal.
Second: That if the subject matter of the suit lay within the jurisdiction of the Court, the requisite notice by publication was not given to make respondents parties.
Third: That the description of the land in the bill was too vague to constitute it a suit concerning lands, contemplated and authorized by the statute.
The distinction between void and voidable judgments and decrees, is assuming, in the State of Ohio, a very high importance, as affecting titles to lands derived through judicial sales. If the judgment or decree is void, the land itself sold to satisfy it may be recovered back; and such proceeding may be impeached collaterally. The result or consequence, in such case, is precisely as though no such judgment or decree had ever been rendered or pronounced. If the judgment or decree be not void, but simply erroneous, subject to reversal upon writ of error or review, the consequences are wholly different. They must be impeached directly, and cannot be questioned collaterally ; and when reversed; the defendant shall have restitution in money against the plaintiff, and purchasers hold the land or property acquired by the sale had under such judgment or decree, undisturbed.
Such, in many instances, has been the rapid and great rise in the value of property in Ohio, from the springing up of towns, and other causes, that property which a few years ago was sold, even at its full value, to satisfy a small debt, would now, if it could be recovered back, constitute a large fortune. The greatest possible efforts will therefore be made to recover the land itself, when the mere reversal of the judgment or decree, and a moneyed restitution, would be scarcely worth the contest. Hence it is not surprising that able and experienced counsel should, in such cases, put forward the most ingenious and subtle arguments, to show that every defect looks directly to the jurisdiction of the Court. We shall adhere to those salutary and long established principles, which have been adopted from right and necessity, to give confidence to the judicial action of the country, and protect those who have made purchases upon the faith of judicial sales.
It is admitted, that if the Court had jurisdiction and authority to pronounce the decree under which defendants derive title, the plaintiff must fail.
It is said, in this case, that the demand was simply personal, and that without service upon the respondents, who reside in another State, the decree was pronounced against them. If this were so, the objection to the jurisdiction would have been well taken ; but the fact that the decree was for money only, does not establish that fact. The Court pronouncing this decree was a Court of general jurisdiction, and it is not disputed but that it had jurisdiction over cases of this sort.
The bill upon which the decree was pronounced, set up that complainant and respondents had entered into a contract with each other to build a mill, some to furnish money, and some to contribute labor, for which a compensation was to be estimated in money; and that, finally, on acquiring title to the land, which was, at the time of the contract, in the government, the complainant was to have a certain portion of it; that respondents obtained the title, and refused, in any sense, to comply with the contract; and the complainant sought relief by a specific execution of the contract, and by an account for money more than his share expended, and for improvements put upon the land.
Now, the contract set up in the bill is mixed' — a contract for title to real estate, dependent upon the payment of money and the performance of labor, connected with the land and the contemplated improvements. Before the Court could decree a conveyance of the land, it would be necessary to determine whether the complainant had complied with his agreement. The contract- was an entire thing. So .far as the;.title-to the real estate was concerned, as thé land was within -the' jurisdicti'oii of the Court, it is admitted that that was the' place where • the suit should have been commenced.1 It is ;not contended ' that the complainant could, enforce- that contract, specifically, 'elsewhere! - - ,
It is not disputed but the Court had jurisdiction ovér contracts affecting realty. .'This power-is'expressly' conferred by the T2th section of the act of 1824. • • . . '
.' The Court,- then, had' a case before them, as presented by the, bill,'over which'they hád jurisdiction,'and were competent to decree. - But what -is the error' complained o'f?- . That the. Court, thus- having . ai.proper cáse before them, pronounced a wrong decree; thát' the Court should have decreed a conveyanee of the land; that- the money and services, expended and performed by the complainant, .should'have been treated' as payment, by.him,'For the land. But the-.Court, insteád'of this, •simply decreed him a compensation in money. 'It is contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to do this. If it was wrong, what is i.t more than error ? It is-.the case of a: Court pronouncing a wrong judgment or decree, in a case properly before it. This, on that hypothesis, is precisely a case for a bill of review.; such error does n.ot go to the jurisdiction , of the Court. '
In this view of the case, then,-there is no lack of jurisdiction in'the Court.-'
But it.is said the Court had no jurisdiction, because there Was, not sufficient notice to respondent's of the pendency of the suit, by publication., '
The-objection-taken, is not'that no notice was published, but. that-the 'notice published vvas not full-enough. •
It is claimed that -the statute required notice to be given-, by' publication, of -the pendency of the bill,- and of the substance and the prayet thereof. . ' '" ,
The notice actually given, was,' that a bill m chancery was pending, and a- prayer for a decree. The Court had directed the notice, in pursuance of the'7th and-12th sections of the act of 1824. The Court regarded-this, publication as a compliance ' with the order made under the statute. The publication made was in the'common of usual form adopted at that day, or, at least, in a form quite common. l-
Now, if there had. been' no notice at all, the objection would have been well taken. But as there'.was notice, adjudged to he sufficient,- by the Court ordering it, we will not disturb it collaterally. .,
The description of the .land, in the bill, -is' not véry certain, but. the bill seeks tp reach land- under a contract, and this .is . sufficient to" bring the case within the statute. The'fact that a bill, seeking..to. enforce.a-contract concerning land, dpes not describe very' definitely-the.-land embraced, does not go to the jurisdiction of the Court. -'We find no error which would authorise us to disturb-'the judgment. . .
Judgment Affirmed: