Case Name: PEOPLE v. WHEELER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-05-21
Citations: 33 Mich. App. 733
Docket Number: Docket No. 9859
Parties: PEOPLE v. WHEELER
Judges: Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 33
Pages: 733–741

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. WHEELER
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Improper Remarks— Appeal and Error — Failure to Object.
Improper remarks made by the prosecutor do not require reversal where defense counsel failed to object and where the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that the jury could . not arrive at any conclusion other than that the defendant was guilty.
Dissent by Levin, J.
2. Criminal Law — Jury—Duty.
Jurors do not have a duty to support their local police, their duty is to decide fairly between the people and the defendant.
3. Criminal Law — Evidence — Police Officer’s Testimony — Weight.
A conviction based on the testimony of the arresting police officers, such testimony being directly contradicted by the testimony of the accused, is not based on such overwhelming proof of guilt that the jury could not have found the defendant innocent; while jurors may decide that the police officers are more credible than a defendant, there is no rule of law dictating such a decision.
4. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Policemen—Weight.
There is no rule of law that a policeman’s testimony must be given preference over that of an accused.
References for Points in Headnotes
53 Am Jur, Trial § 458 et seq.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 35.
58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 860 et seq.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 505.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 465.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 507.
5. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Prejudicial Remarks— Appeal and Error — Failure to Object.
An assignment of error based on the prosecutor’s improper argument will be considered for the first time on appeal if the appellate court concludes that the impropriety could not have been cured by a cautionary instruction even if timely objection had been made.
6. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Prejudicial Remarks.
Prosecutor’s exhorting the jury to show support for the police by returning a verdict of guilty, and, implicitly threatening that without such support the police might not long continue to provide protection constituted reversible error, because the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks could not have been eliminated by a cautionary instruction, even if one had been requested.
7. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Prejudicial Remarks.
A prosecutor’s saying, in closing argument, “I think it is high time that we look at the situation when they start saying the police, the police, oh my God, they are so, and yet we want them, and yet we need them, how much can they take? Bow much can they take, sometimes we wonder why they remain in their employment trying to do their job under circumstances like this and they have to sit here and listen to this sort of thing. The verdict, ladies and gentlemen, should be guilty as charged.” constitutes reversible error.
8. Criminal Law — Trial—Judge’s Responsibility.
The ultimate responsibility for assuring the defendant a fair trial rests with the trial judge.
9. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Prejudicial Remarks —Judge’s Responsibility.
Where the prosecutor engages im improper and prejudicial remarks, the trial judge should intervene, even though the defendant’s trial lawyer sits idly m his chair; this is especially true where the court is aware that the defendant’s lawyer is court-appointed.
10. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Duty — Fair Trial.
Both the prosecutor and the court have a duty to see that a defendant receives a fair trial.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph E. Maher, J.
Submitted Division 1 March 8, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 9859.)
Decided May 21, 1971.
Leave to appeal denied, 386 Mich 765.
Lorenzo Wheeler was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Gahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Garl Ziemba, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
Danhof, P. J.
Defendant was convicted by jury trial of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. MCLA § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp §28.305). He now appeals.
The defendant raises numerous allegations of error most of which do not merit discussion. The one issue of substance involves allegedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument.
While we do not condone the prosecutor's remarks, we do not believe that a reversal is required. The defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, and therefore, we will not reverse absent a miscarriage of justice. People v. David Smith (1969), 16 Mich App 198. Recently this Court said in People v. Rowls (1970), 28 Mich App 190, 195:
"It is well settled in the case of errors which are curable by a cautionary instruction that a conviction will not be reversed where the defendant has allowed the impact of the prosecutor's remarks to go to the jury without objection. People v. Humphreys (1970), 24 Mich App 411; People v. David Smith (1969), 16 Mich App 198. Since the error here was not so prejudical that it could not have been cured by an instruction, People v. Cipriano (1927), 238 Mich 332, this assignment of error is without merit."
The evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and we do not believe the jury could arrive at any conclusion other than that the defendant was guilty. In People v. Peck (1907), 147 Mich 84, 95, the Supreme Court said:
"We are not disposed to reverse convictions in criminal cases because of the impassioned arguments of the prosecuting officers unless we can clearly see that such arguments were unwarranted by the evidence and probably contributed to the result. The verdict of the jury is the only one they could have honestly rendered upon this record."
Affirmed.
McGregor, J., concurred.