Case Name: Donald GOODSON, Respondent v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, Appellant
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1988-05-09
Citations: 295 S.C. 400
Docket Number: 1155
Parties: Donald GOODSON, Respondent v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, Appellant.
Judges: Cureton, J., concurs and dissents in separate opinion.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 295
Pages: 400–408

Head Matter:
1155
Donald GOODSON, Respondent v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, Appellant.
(368 S. E. (2d) 687)
Court of Appeals
Robert T. Williams, of Williams & Brink, Lexington, for appellant.
John A. Mason, Columbia, for respondent.
Heard March 22, 1988.
Decided May 9, 1988.

Opinion:
Shaw, Judge:
Donald Goodson commenced an action against appellant, American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, hereinafter American. From a denial of a motion to set aside the judgment, American appeals. We affirm.
American, through its agents, Rick and Sharon O'Rear, posted an appearance recognizance bond for Goodson. In exchange, Goodson agreed to pay American a certain sum, and as security for the debt, Goodson permitted the O'Rears to hold his truck. The O'Rears subsequently sold the truck although Goodson claimed to have paid and worked off the debt owed. As a result, Goodson sued American on various theories.
Goodson's summons and complaint were served on the South Carolina Department of Insurance which accepted service and forwarded these documents to Norman I. Weil, an attorney for American. A timely answer was served and filed, signed by Ms. O'Rear as agent for American. However, the answer did not state an address. In April of 1986, Good-son's attorney sent requests for admissions and interrogatories to both Ms. O'Rear and Mr. Weil which apparently were never answered. The record also reflects a letter was sent to Ms. O'Rear and Mr. Weil in September of 1986 informing them the case would be coming to trial soon. On October 2, 1986, the case was heard before a jury. American did not appear at the trial and was not represented by counsel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Goodson for $34,800 actual damages and $15,200 punitive damages.
I.
American contends the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside the judgment for excusable neglect under Rule 60 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure claiming it received no notice of the trial. Rule 60(b)(1) S.C.R.C.P. provides as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect .
Although most often used when relief is sought from a judgment by default, Rule 60(b)(1) applies to any final judgment. See H. Lightsey, J. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure, 398-399 (2nd Ed. 1985). Relief under this section is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. at 399. Such an abuse arises when the judge issuing the order was controlled by an error of law or when the order, based upon factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. Id. (See also Ledford v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 267 S. C. 671, 230 S. E. (2d) 900 (1976) and Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S. C. 372, 360 S. E. (2d) 535 (Ct. App. 1987). While these cases deal with the trial court's discretion in setting aside default judgments, the principles are equally applicable to motions for relief from any final judgment.)
American points to no error of law by the trial judge. Rather, it contends the trial judge abused his discretion in finding there was no excusable neglect which would warrant setting aside the judgment. We disagree.
Whether American received notice of the impending trial is not clear. Goodson claims to have sent notice. American claims it never received any. However, it is clear that American's own neglect was the cause of any such problem. First, the answer was signed by Ms. O'Rear and not an attorney. Contrary to Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. O'Rear did not give an address on the answer. Secondly, a party has a duty to monitor the progress of his case. Lack of familiarity with legal proceedings is unacceptable and the court will not hold a layman to any lesser standard than is applied to an attorney. (See H. Lightsey, J. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure, 400 (2nd Ed. 1985) and McCall v. A-T-O, Inc., 276 S. C. 143, 276 S. E. (2d) 529 (1981)). Any neglect resulted from American using Ms. O'Rear, a layman, in defending the case. In our opinion, the facts of this case do not amount to excusable neglect.
II.
American next contends the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside the judgment, as the verdict rendered by the jury was excessive. American asserts the actual damages were limited to $8,820, the amount prayed for by Goodson, yet the jury returned a verdict of $34,800 in actual damages. It bases this contention on two arguments.
A. American claims under Rule 55(b)0J of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, it was entitled to be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing and it received no such notice. American summarily claims its nonappearance at trial constituted a default situation. We disagree.
Rule 55(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states, "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend . the clerk shall enter his default upon the calendar." (emphasis added). In the instant case, American had not "failed to plead" and no default was entered by the clerk.
Further, Rule 55(b) provides for written notification where there has been an application for judgment by default. There was no such application. The case went before a jury and a full trial was held on the matter.
B. In finding the judgment should not be set aside for an excessive verdict, the trial judge correctly relied on Rule 54(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides:
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
American argues, while the trial judge was correct on the law, he was incorrect in his finding that Goodson was entitled to such relief. The trial judge stated, "It appears from the testimony presented at the trial, and I so find and rule, that the damages awarded by the jury are consistent with the case presented by the plaintiff, and are in accord with the relief to which plaintiff was entitled under the evidence." We do not have the transcript of the trial before us and, therefore, cannot second guess the finding of the trial judge. The appellant is responsible for compiling an adequate record from which this court can make an intelligent review. We will not consider facts that do not appear in the transcript of record. Windham v. Honeycutt, 290 S. C. 60, 348 S. E. (2d) 185 (Ct. App. 1986).
Affirmed.
Cureton, J., concurs and dissents in separate opinion.
Goolsby, J., concurs in separate opinion.
A letter from Mr. Weil to a Mr. Nowosad of American indicates Mr. Weil had notified American of the suit but had not been retained to handle it.
S.C.R.C.P. 11 provides in part, "A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address."