Case Name: DETROIT EDISON COMPANY v. CITY OF WIXOM
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-12-01
Citations: 382 Mich. 673
Docket Number: Calendar No. 25, Docket No. 51,983
Parties: DETROIT EDISON COMPANY v. CITY OF WIXOM.
Judges: Kelly, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 382
Pages: 673–695

Head Matter:
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY v. CITY OF WIXOM.
Opinion op the Court.
1. Public Service Commissions — Plenary Power — Regulations— Zoning Ordinances.
The principle of plenary supremacy of the public service commission over electric service utilities within the State is not controlling where the commission requires towers for a proposed electric line to average 132 feet high, but a city ordinance of the municipality through which the proposed line is to pass limits tower height to 100 feet.
2. Same — Transmission op Electricity — Regulation—Interest— Zoning Ordinance' — Land Use.
The public service commission has an interest in height regulations for eleetrie line towers only as it relates to the safety of the proposed line, the capacity of the line, the need for the line, and its total relation to the maintenance of electrical service to the people of the multi-county area, while a city has an interest in location and route of high tension power lines as it involves a specific land use which is not compatible with other land uses and characterizes the neighborhood and influences the development of adjacent real estate.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, A-7,18, 21] 43 Am Jur, Public Utilities and Services § 193 et seq.
'3] 43 Am Jur, Public Utilities and Services § 218.
8] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 822.
9] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 14.
10] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 146 et seq.
'll, 14] 58 Am Jur, Zoning §§ 2, 19.
12] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 144 et seq.
'13] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 147.
[15] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
[16] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 18.
[17] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § § 21, 22.
[19] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 149.
[20] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 30.
3. Same — Transmission oe Electricity — Regulations—Constitutional Law — Due Process' — Hearings.
Determination of height regulations for high tension electrieal power lines by the public service commission which would be binding on local units of government would suggest due process shortcomings in absence of public hearings and notification to affected municipalities.
4. Municipal Corporations — Transmission oe Electricity — Zoning Ordinance.'
A city cannot prevent the construction of all high tension electric lines any -more than it can bar the conduct of any other legitimate enterprise. . .
5. Public, Service Commissions — Statutes — Public Utilities — ■ Transmission, oe Electricity — Regulation. - ,
Public service commission is vested with complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the State, - except as otherwise restricted by law, but is not vested with authority to determine routes of high tension lines except as those routes bear upon rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, and conditions of service or formation, operation, or duration of such public utilities (CLS 1961, § 460.1 et seq.).
6. Same — Public Utility — Municipal Corporations — Electricity-Route Determination — Arbitration.
■ The public service commission is not empowered to assume the role of arbiter between a utility and a city in a dispute over the route for high tension electric power lines, for the utility company’s cost-conscious approach to route selection and the commission’s rate-and-service-conseious evaluation of the selected route are too closely aligned.
7. Zoning — Municipal Corporations — Public Service Commissions •— Electricity — Public Policy.
The zoning law empowers cities to make reasonable regulations which apply to eleetric utilities, for even though the public service commission represents all people in their capacity as users of eleeti-icity, piblie policy is broader than the public interest in adequate electric service and the city represents people in their multiple concerns as members of a local community (CL 1948, § 12R.581 et seq.).
Separate Opinion. •
T. E. Brennan, 0. J., and Kelly, J.
8. Courts — Equity—Record.
The Supreme Court has clear authority ■ to decide an equitable action upon the record made in lower courts (GCH 1968, 865.1[7]).
9. Zoning — Ordinances—Constitutional Law — Application.
A city zoning ordinance, although valid on its face, may be constitutionally inprm as it applies to specific land.
10. Same — Continuance of Nonconforming Uses.
Continuance of lawful nonconforming uses of land may be provided for as exceptions to a municipal zoning ordinance (CL 1948, § l%5.588a).
11. Same — Vested Interests in Land.
Zoning laws may not deprive owners of land of vested interests therein without just compensation (US Const, Ams 5, 14; Mich Const 1968, art 1, § 17).
12. Statutes — Construction—Constitutional Law.
The Supreme Court always interprets a statute to be constitutional if it admits of a constitutional interpretation.
13. Zoning — Continuance of Nonconforming Use — Construction of Statutes.
Use of land exactly as such existed, as term is used in' provision of statute permitting continuance of nonconforming use as an exception to zoning ordinance, is not in. conflict with constitutional principle that .owners of vested rights in land may not be deprived of such rights without just compensation (US Const, Ams 5, 1.4; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 17; CL 1948, § m.583a).
14. Same — Nonconforming Use — Vested Rights.
Mere investment in the acquisition of- land for an intended nonconforming use under zoning ordinance is not sufficient to create a vested right, but where the acquisition is an integral part of a contiguous land use, such as a right-of-way for a high tension electric line, the investment is substantial, made in good faith, and there is partial eonstruction, the owner will be protected by injunction against subsequent prohibition of the use (US Const, Ams 5, 14; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 17).
Opinion of the Court.
15. Costs — Public Question — Injunction •— Public Utility — Municipal Corporations — Zoning.
No costs are allowed upon remand to circuit court for entry of an injunction against enforcement of a city zoning ordinance passed to prevent plaintiff power company from constructing high tension towers through defendant city, a public question being involved.
16. Zoning — Public Welfare — Police Power — Ordinances — Reasonableness.
Zoning ordinances related to public health, morals, safety, or general welfare are a valid exereise of police power, provided such ordinances satisfy the legal test of reasonableness.
17. Same — Ordinances—Validity—Reasonableness.
Reasonableness of a zoning ordinance and its consequent validity or invalidity must be determined on its own facts and • surrounding circumstances.
18. Same — Ordinance—Public Utility — Retroactive Ordinance— Vested Property Richts.
Hurriedly adopted amendment of city’s zoning ordinance prohibiting structures within the city in excess of 100 feet in height, thereby restricting plaintiff electric company to use of a 120 kv electric system in that city, held, invalid as being' retroactive in that plaintiff had purchased land, made commitments for the purchase of towers, lines, and station equipment, and secured approval of the public service commission for construction of a 345 kv electric system through defendant city before adoption of the amendatory ordinance.
19. Same — Ordinance—Property Rights.
Amendatory zoning ordinance of a city prohibiting structures in excess of 100 feet in height, thus forcing plaintiff electric company to abandon its proposed 345 kv electric system which would require 130-foot towers and for which plaintiff had already acquired property which was not adaptable to any other system, held, invalid, as zoning ordinances which render property almost worthless are unreasonable and confiscatory.
20. Same — Ordinance — Public Welfare — Aesthetic Consideration.
Zoning ordinance which bears no substantial relationship to present public health, safety and morals, or general welfare but is adopted purely for aesthetic reasons or unsupported fears of city planners is invalid, though aesthetics may be a valid consideration, where not the moving factor but merely incidental to enactment of the ordinance.
See headnote 15.
Separate Opinion.
Black, J.
21. Public Service Commissions — Transmission of Electricity— Route Approval — Zoning Ordinances — Administrative Authority.
Public service commission’s approval of electric company’s plans and specifications for construction of transmission lines, worded in the language of a statutorily authorized regulation of the commission which is broad enough to exact compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements pertaining to local franchises as well as requirements of a legal nature, including all validly applicable zoning regulations, indicate the commission ehose to limit its exclusive authority to regulate construction and maintenance of electric transmission lines and thus not pre-empt local ordinances (Const 1963, art 7, §§19, 25, 29, SO; CLS 1961, § 460.1 et seq.).
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 2, T. G. Kavanagh, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and McGregor, JJ., reversing and remanding Oakland, Adams (Clark J.), J.
Submitted December 4, 1968.
(Calendar No. 25, Docket No. 51,983.)
Decided December 1, 1969.
10 Mich App 218, reversed.
Complaint by Detroit Edison Company, a foreign corporation, against City of Wixom, to enjoin enforcement of zoning ordinance and to have it declared void. Injunction granted. Defendant appealed to Court of Appeals.
Reversed and remanded. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for issuance of injunction,
Fischer, Sprague, Franklin & Ford (Leon R. Jones and Ralph H. Houghton, Jr., of counsel), for plaintiff.
Schnels <& Bulgarelli (Louis C. Andrews, Jr., of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
T. E. Brénnan, C. J.
The Case.
This is not an easy case to state. It involves the growing conflict between the needs of a sprawling megalopolis and. the rights of a single community.
It represents one facet of the late-20th century dilemma: How to balance the demands of vast new urbanization and the demands of people for local determination of their own environment.
Recently, this' Court ended a decade of controversy over the location of an interstate highway. In this case of Wixom and the Detroit Edison Company, we decide another "routing" controversy. The history of the lawsuit is in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The Facts.
The plaintiff, Detroit Edison Company, is a public utility engaged in generating and supplying electric energy throughout southeastern Michigan. It is substantially the only source of electricity for an area of 7,600 square miles, containing more than half the population of the State. Its electricity is generated principally at a series of power plants along the Detroit and St. Clair rivers, and is supplied to the area by a system of transmission lines.
Defendant, city of Wixom, is a home-rule city. Its area is about eight square miles. The 1960 census showed a population of 1,531. Today, there are about 2,500 inhabitants.
Every square foot of the area served by Detroit Edison is part of some municipal corporation'— about 250 townships and 500 cities and villages. Each local community has authority to adopt zoning ordinances.
For several years before the filing' of this action, the demand for electrical energy in southeastern Michigan had been increasing. Edison had been expanding its facilities. Before 1956, Edison determined to add to its capabilities by constructing an extra high voltage transmission line from its St. Clair plant to its Monroe plant. The line is described as the future backbone of southeast Michigan's electrical system, tying into the Canadian system at the north, and the Ohio-Indiana system on the south. Under safety regulations adopted by the Michigan public service commission, the towers supporting these lines must be 130 feet high, or higher.
Before the construction of the Ford Motor Company's Wixom plant, the area was part of Novi township. In 1957, Wixom became a village. Fifteen months later, it became a city. Rapid growth was predicted. A planning consultant was employed, a master plan adopted, a zoning ordinance passed.
But Wixom's population explosion has failed to materialize. For one thing, large areas of the city have poor soil conditions. Sewers are needed, before housing can be constructed. Thoroughfares and rail lines virtually divide the city into small land pockets.
The actual selection of the route was made by Edison in 1955 and 1956. The route was chosen by an Edison employee, after aerial photographs disclosed pertinent population conditions and topographical factors.
Most of the route selected passes over rural property, but the northerly mile of the line splits the city's only residential subdivision, and spans Loon Lake, its only sizeable body of water.
Edison did not consult Novi township before deciding on its route, or before proceeding to acquire its right-of-way. Neither did Edison consult the city of Wixom after its incorporation. Edison did apply to the Michigan public service commission for commission approval of the project. This was in October of 1964. Edison's right-of-way through Wixom is four miles long, 200 feet wide. It was acquired at a cost of $273,000.
Wixom was not notified of the pending application. No hearing was held. On November 13, 1964, the commission approved Edison's plans to construct the power line.
The approval pertained only to the character of the construction and did not confer any rights to carry out construction until all necessary local franchises, permits, and authorizations were secured.
On June 8, 1965, the Wixom city council amended the city's zoning ordinance to prohibit utility towers in excess of 100 feet high. The amendment also prohibited all overhead and underground lines intended primarily to service areas outside the city. The city's zoning board of appeals was empowered to approve such installations only after considering the injurious effects of such installations on abutting property and on the orderly appearance of the city.
The ordinance amendment was declared to be an emergency amendment and was given immediate effect. The amendment was intended to control the location of high tension power lines of the type involved here. The trial judge found, and the record supports the finding, that the amendment was aimed at halting the construction of this particular high tension line through the city of Wixom.
A substantial portion of the line was already completed when the ordinance was amended on June 8,1965. Edison has expended in excess of $2,400,000 on the St. Clair-to-Monroe line. It began buying-land in Wixom around 1956 and was still acquiring-real estate there in 1959 and 1960.
Prior to June 8, 1965, the construction of an ultra-high-voltage line on the Wixom property was not prohibited. Even in the residential zones, such facilities were permitted.
This action was commenced 15 days after the adoption of the ordinance amendment. Edison made no application to the zoning board of appeals for a permitted variance.
First Issue : Pre-emption.
Edison argues that it cannot serve two masters. Because of the size and capacity of the proposed line, the Michigan public service commission requires towers averaging 132 feet high. By its ordinance, the city limits tower height to 100 feet. Citing Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission (1962), 367 Mich 104, Edison argues the principle of plenary supremacy of public service commission control over Michigan electric service utilities.
The principle which controlled that Edison Case does not apply to this one. That case involved the question of whether certain reserves for income taxes were appropriately regarded as surplus. We held that surplus for rate-base purposes and surplus for tax-base purposes could not be distinguished; that the case presented a picture of administrative whipsaw; and that the Michigan public service commission determination was controlling.
In this case, there is a difference between the functions of the height regulations of the public service commission and the height regulations of the city. The commission's interest is in "the character of the construction" as it relates to the safety of the proposed line, the capacity of the line, the need for the line, and its total relation to the maintenance of electric service to the people of southeastern Michigan.
The commission is not interested — nor should it be — in the effect which the construction will have on the development of the communities through which it passes. If its determination were to be binding upon local units of government, the absence of public hearings and notification to affected municipalities would suggest due process shortcomings.
The city, on the other hand, has a legitimate though narrow area of concern. It cannot prevent the construction of all high tension lines, any more than it can bar the conduct of any other legitimate enterprise. Gust v. Township of Canton (1955), 342 Mich 436.
But a city does have an interest in the location and route of a high tension electric power line. It is a specific land use which is not compatible with other land uses. It is a land use which characterizes the neighborhood and influences the development of adjacent real estate.
The public service commission statute does not vest the commission with authority to determine the routes of high tension lines except as those routes bear upon "rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of servicé" or the "formation, operation or direction of such public utilities." CLS 1961, § 460.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 22.13[1] et seq.). The first sentence'of CLS 1961, § 460.6 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Snpp § 22.13 [6]), vests the commission "with complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state except as otherwise restricted by law."
The commission is not empowered to assume the role of arbiter between the utility and the city. The company's cost-conscious approach to route selection and the commission's rate-and-service-conscions evaluation of the selected route are too closely aligned.
Public policy is broader than the public's interest in adequate electric service. The commission represents all of the people in their capacity as users of electricity; the city represents some of the people in their multiple concerns as members of a local community.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the pre-emption argument, and concluded that the zoning law (CL 1948, § 125.581 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 5.2931 et seq.)) empowers cities to make reasonable regulations which apply to electric utilities.
Second Issue: Validity of the Ordinance.
Since the trial judge found for Edison on the issue of pre-emption, he did not discuss the wider question of the constitutional validity of the ordinance as it applies to the property of the Edison Company.
The Court of Appeals chose to remand the issue.
We do not. This litigation has been too long in the courts, and our authority to decide this equitable action upon the record made below is too clear. GCR 1963, 865.1(7); Hungerford v. Township of Dearborn (1960), 362 Mich 126,132; Keller v. Township of Farmington (1959), 358 Mich 106, 111.
An ordinance although valid on its face may be constitutionally infirm as it applies to specific land.
For the purpose of constructing its high tension line Edison acquired about 40 miles of right-of-way from St. Clair to Pontiac and constructed 264 towers and installed 250 miles of conductors at a cost of over $3,600,000. Further, Edison acquired about 44 miles of right-of-way from its Wayne station to Pontiac, including the 4 miles in the city of Wixom. The cost of this 44-mile segment was over $2,400,000.
It is difficult to consider or treat the 4-mile-long, 200-foot-wide Edison right-of-way in Wixom as an isolated parcel of land. This tract is inextricably tied to the entire right-of-way.
Without the Wixom land, the use of the balance of the right-of-way is frustrated. Only with the Wixom land can the entire right-of-way be used.
Our zoning law provides an exception for nonconforming uses (CL 1948, § 125.583a [MCLA § 125.583a, Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 5.2933(1)]):
"Sec. 3a. The lawful use of land or a structure exactly as such existed at the time of the enactment of the ordinance affecting them, may be continued, except as hereinafter provided, although such use or structure does not conform with the provisions of such ordinance."
This statute as originally enacted, PA 1921, No 207, provided for removal of nonconforming uses, without compensation to the owners. It was constitutionally invalid. OAG 1947-1948, No 146, p 217.
Zoning laws may not deprive owners of land of vested interests therein without just compensation, US Const, Am 5, and Am 14 § 1; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
The statute quoted above must be read in the light of constitutional mandates, and this Court always interprets a statute to be constitutionál if.it admits of a constitutional interpretation. Cady v. City of Detroit (1939), 289 Mich 499.
Therefore, the statutory phrase "exactly as such existed" cannot be held to conflict with the constitutional principle concerning vested rights.
Thus there is a body of case precedent in which nonconforming uses are found to exist based upon the investment of money and the change of a proprietor's position in reliance upon existing regulations or nonregulation. Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co. (1928), 245 Mich 261.
Mere investment in the acquisition of the land for an intended use is not sufficient to create a vested right. But where, as here, the acquisition is an integral part of a contiguous land use (here a right-of-way), and substantial investment (here over $6,000,000), in a total, unitary usage has been made in good faith, including partial construction thereof (here a partly completed high tension line), -then the rights of the owner are vested, and will be protected against a subsequent prohibition of the use.
Cases like Patchak v. Township of Lansing (1960), 361 Mich 489, are to be distinguished. In Patchak, there was a trailer park established for many years upon 5 acres of a 15-acre tract. Extension of the nonconforming use to the balance of the tract was prohibited. There the trailer park was'- & complete and operative use on the 5 acres. The ad ditional 10 acres were requested for an extension of the smaller, original use.
In this case of Edison, there is no smaller original use, complete and operative on adjoining land. There is only the single contemporaneous use as a high tension line, stretching from Monroe to St. Clair.
The operation of the line in the 40-mile segment from St. Clair to Pontiac is not a use which is complete in and of itself. It is analogous to the occupancy of the first floor of a multifloor apartment which is still under construction. The high tension line here is a continuous use of land, to which Edison's right of use was vested before June 8, 1965, the date of the binding ordinance.
The Court of Appeals is reversed to this extent: that upon remand the circuit court shall enter an injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff in accordance with this opinion.
No costs, a public question being involved.
Kelly, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, C. J.
City of Pleasant Ridge v. Governor (Di Matteo v. State Highway Commission, City of Lathrup Village v. Department of State Highways), 382 Mich 225.
Detroit Edison Company v. City of Wixom (1968), 10 Mich App 218 (74 PUR3d 189).
See, also, Expert Steel Company v. City of Clawson (1962), 368 Mich 619; De Mull v. City of Lowell (1962), 368 Mich 242; City of Coldwater v. Williams Oil Co. (1939), 288 Mich 140; Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co. (1930), 249 Mich 372; Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan (1962), 39 NJ 1 (186 A2d 489).