Case Name: Ferris Pell and wife and Catharine S. Barclay vs. Elias O. Ball and T. Waring, Executors of Hugh Swinton Ball, and others
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1840-02
Citations: 1 Chev. Eq. 99
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ferris Pell and wife and Catharine S. Barclay vs. Elias O. Ball and T. Waring, Executors of Hugh Swinton Ball, and others.
Judges: Harper and Dunicin, Ch., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 99–129

Head Matter:
Ferris Pell and wife and Catharine S. Barclay vs. Elias O. Ball and T. Waring, Executors of Hugh Swinton Ball, and others.
B. and his wife peiished, on board of a steamboat, at sea, by the explosion of 'one of the boilers, which shattered the vessel and caused it to fall tó pieces and sink in about half an hour. Upon evidence that Mrs. B. was seen, and was heard td call loudly for her husband, immediately aftei the disaster, and that he was not heard to answer, nor was heard or seen at any tiirie after the explosion ; Held, that Mrs. B. had survived her husband.
Such general considerations as age, health, &e., may be resorted to, to aid conjecture: “But where there is any evidence whatever, even though it be but a shadow, it must govern in the decision of the fact.”
It seems, where the benefits of survivorship were not mutual, the burthen Of proof rests on the side of the party to whom the survivorship would have been beneficial.
Where one bequeathed to his wife all the property real and personal which he had received by his marriage, and also devised to her, specially, a certain tenement and lands, on which a portion of the money received by marriage had been expended; it seems that the wife would be entitled to both without any deduction.
Heard before his Honor Oh. Johnston, at Charleston, January, 1839.
Hugh Swinton Ball, with his wife and his adopted daughter, Emma, embarked at Charleston, on board the Steamer Pulaski, on the 14th June 1838. The vessel was destroyed, on that night, by the explosion of one of her boilers, and the greater part of the passengers perished ; among them, Mr. and Mrs. Ball.
Mr. Ball had left a will, and, in the disposition of his estate according to its provisions, it became a question whether Mrs. Ball had survived her husband.
The voluminous evidence to this point is so accurately and luminously digested by the Hon. Chancellor who delivered the following decree, upon the circuit, that a further detail of it would be only a needless repetition.
The admirable preparation and argument of this cause have enabled the Court to form a judgment, satisfactory to itself, at an early day; which, at the earnest solicitation of the parties, it hastens to announce; although, for itself, in a matter so important, it would have desired further time, and better opportunities than the hurry of term time admits of, for assigning the reasons of its decision.
The case belongs to a highly interesting head of law, upon which there is, as yet, very little of positive decision; particularly in the common law courts. I refer to eases where some right is made to depend upon the question, which wag the survivor oí two of more persons, who have perished by the same calamity.
Much, I may say, every thing, depends, in my conception, upon two considerations : First, is it open to observation and evidence; or is it withdrawn from all scrutiny, and consigned to conjecture 1 Second, the nature of the right dependant upon the survivorship: is it mutual, or is it of such a nature that if one of the parties happens to be the survivor, he derives nothing from the other, but simply retains what belonged to him; whereas, if the other had been the survivor, he would have had an accession from the deceased!
Where the nature of the calamity is entirely unknown, it would seem, at first view, that there are no rules of reason, or £»f law, by which the case can be decided; and yet, as there ate cages of this description, in which there must be a decision: in which a refusal to decide, would be a decision; so there ard rules; applicable to some of them, very well known, particularly to the common law, by which a decision, entirely consistent with reason, can be made. I allude to the rule which must, without contest, be applied to a case where the persons, upon whom the right depends, may have gone abroad, and have not been heard of for such a length of time, as to faise the presumption of their death. The circumstances un der which they perished are wholly unknown, but the rule is well settled, that the last seen or heard of shall be adjudged the survivor.
Yet there may be cases of absentees, in which the rule mentioned cannot be applied: as where both partias emigrated together, were last seen together, or were last heard from at the same time. This would reduce them fvithin what, in the argument, has been called the conjectural class. There are other conceivable cases: not only conceivable, but which, indeed, not unfrequently occur, where, although the nature of the calamity is inferred with a high degree of probability, yet the priority of death, among the victims, is conjectural: as where they have sailed in the same vessel, which is known to have been lost, leaving no surviving witnesses, or has never been heard of. There are other cases, still, where the nature of the calamity is well known, where, indeed; the catastrophe has happened within the view of many witnesses — where the survivorship must be left to conjecture; as where the victims were inclosed within a house, and perished by a sudden explosion.
Now, it is admitted, that within this category, the English and American courts have hitherto carefully avoided the adoption of any rule of decision. The cases have gone off on compromise, or were decided upon a rule adapted to the nature of the question before the court, and not to the question of right, as transmitted by survivorship. Thus, Rex vs. Dr. Hay, (1 W. Black. Rep. 640,) where General Stanwix, with his wife and a daughter, by a former marriage, sailed from Dublin to England, in the same vessel, which was never after-wards heard of, the question was, who was entitled to the administration of the General’s estate — his next of kin, or the maternal uncle of the daughter who had perished 1 For the maternal uncle,- it was contended, that, in analogy to the civil law, it should be presumed that the daughter survived the fa ther. But the court held that the question before it, concerned the right of administration only, and not the right of distribution, and decreed in favor of the next of kin of the father. So, in Taylor vs. Diplock, (2 Philim: 361 — 1st Eccles : Rep. 250,) where a husband appointed his wife executrix, and residuary legatee, and both were subsequently shipwrecked together, and drowned, and the contest was for the administration, between the next of kin of the husband, and the next of kin of the wife. The evidence left it doubtful which of the parties survived, upon which the Judge granted administration to the next of kin of the husband; remarking: “I am not deciding that the husband survived the wife.” There are some observations, in the opinion of the Court, which do bear upon the question of survivorship, and intimate that, as the wife’s kindred claimed the administration on the score of her survi-vorship, they were bound to prove it. But the closing remark of the Judge shews, I think, that in questions of administration, the Court does not feel itself called upon to undertake a very exact decision of the fact of survivorship; the right of distribution being always left open. So, also, in Wright vs. Sar-muda, (2 Phillim. 266, [note] S. C. 1 Eccles. Rep., 253,) reported also under the style Wright vs. Netherwood, (2 Salk. 593,) [note] where the subject of survivorship was somewhat considered, the judgment was given on the real question before the court, which was, whether a will, made bv Netherwood, was, under the circumstances, revoked by his subsequent marriage, and the birth of issue. In the case of Selwyn, (3 Hag. 748; 5 Eccles. Rep. 254,) where the court treats somewhat of the same subject of survivorship, in conjectural cases, the question was, as to the right of administration: and it was granted to the applicants without objection.
I think I may safely conclude, that (as observed by Chancellor Kent, 2 Com. 350, part 5, Lect. 37,) “the English law has hitherto waived the question.” I am not, however, pre pared to abandon, as delusive, all efforts to attain rules capable of deciding the fact of survivorship, even in cases denominated conjectural. I have said, that there are cases where, owing to the quality of the right, depending on the survivorship, the exigencies of society demand a decision, and will take no denial. Where the right .is not mutual, it may be safest, and perhaps, in such instances, the rule should be, as stated in some of the cases to which I have referred, to abstain from any thing approaching to conjecture, and leave the right untouched, unless it can be shewn, by reasonable evidence, that the party who is to take derivately, was the survivor. But there are instances, suchas cross remainders, and partnerships, and such as would have arisen on joint tenancies before the abolition of the jus accrescendi, (as in Rroughton vs. Randal, Cro. Eliz. 502,) where there must be a decision, and to which the rule just mentioned cannot be applied, without in fact deciding for one of the parties, and against the other, by refusing to decide at all; and where indeed that may not be the only consequence. I should, therefore, be loth to admit, that our law is not capable of reaching and deciding these the cases, and all others, which the peace and order of society required to be determined. And, indeed, there will generally be found something in the condition of the parties, their age, strength, health, and habits, which will, in some degree at least, rescue the decision from the imputation of rash conjecture, and place it rather upon the foundation of evidence and probability, than tremulous presumption.
But where there is any evidence whatever, even though it be but a shadow, it must govern in the decision of the fact. There is nothing which more distinguishes the common law, than the preference which it constantly gives to evidence, over all artificial presumptions, unless it be those which are essential to the judicial institution itself, and to the preservation of social order. The common law encourages a resort to every fountain from which truth can be drawn; it listens to witnesses; it looks into the internal evidence of things; it contemplates the whole of the circumstances, and then draws its conclusions, according to the preponderating probability.
This is the rule of reason, which has a place, and is of the essence of every code, in every country. Thus in the Code Civil, (liv. 3. tit. 2, no. 720,) it is provided that if several persons entitled to inherit from each other, happen to perish in the same event, (to which the Louisiana code adds, by way of illustration, “such as shipwreck, or battle, or conflagration,” p. 298, chap. 4, art. 930) without the possibility of knowing which died first, (here is the primary proof) the presumption of survivorship is determined by the circumstances of the fact; (here is the secondary proof,) and in default of these (the internal circumstance or circumstances of the fact,) lastly, by rules enacted in the code, as applicable to cases of a mere conjectural character.
If the case is divested of proof and the exigency demands it, resort should be had to extraneous circumstances. If it contains internal evidence and no more, that must be resorted to. But if, to this, witnesses can be added, bearing positive testimony, or detailing facts from which reasonable inferences can be drawn, these furnish the most satisfactory proof.
In what I have said hitherto, I have contemplated a case, where the cause of deathjconsisted of one disaster, whether of more rapid or of slower operation. But where the danger-consisted of a series of successive operations, separated from each other, and each capable of inflicting death upon the victims according to the degree of the exposure to it, there is certainly more scope for testimony, and for inference, from circumstances, than in other cases.
Let us now turn to the case of Mr. and Mrs. Ball, and see, if, from the mournful circumstances of their fate, we can ex tract any thing to solve the important question, to Which it has given rise.
The Pulaski, according to the testimony, left Savannah on Wednesday the 13th of June 1838, with many passengers, and arrived at Charleston that evening. The next morning, Mr: and Mrs. Ball, their adopted daughter, Emma, and servant; having gone on board at Charleston, she departed for the north, and pursued her course, until about 11 o’clock of that night, when, most of the passengers having retired to their berths, the starboard boiler exploded. By the explosion, áft extensive breach Vvas made on the starboard side of the vessel. Her main deck was blown off; particularly on the starboard side, thus destroying the communication between the forward and after part of the steamer. The forward part of the upper deck, (called the hurricane deck, in contradistinction to the after part, which is called the promenade deck,) was blown off, carrying with it the wheel house, in which the commander of the boat, Capt. Dubois, was sleeping at the time. The gentlemen’s forward cabin was much torn; its floor ripped up, and its bulk head driven in ; and Major Twiggs, whose berth was there, gives us reason to suppose, that many perished, in that part of the vessel, by the explosion. The gentlemen’s after cabin (which was under the main deck, and immediately beneath the ladies’ cabin, which was on that deck) was also injured. Some part of the floor was ripped up, the bulk head partly driven in, and the stairs communicating with the deck, more or less shattered. The vessel was careened to the larboard, and as she dipped, began to fill with water. In a very short time the hold Was filled, and the water gained to the level of the floors of the gentlemen’s' cabins.. It rose higher with great rapidity> the vessel settled to the centre, where the breach was; and all hope that she could hold together was abandoned. She parted amidships, and the forward and after parts pitched into the water, towards the Centre,- at an angle of nearly thirty degrees. The gentlemen's after cabin was now entirely filled, and the forward cabin was certainly in as bad a condition. There were some persons on the forward part of the vessel, nearly all of whom speedily perished; but the greater portion were in the after part, including one or two who had passed, by swimming fr&m the forward to the after part. Of those on the after part, as many as coaid climbed to the promenade deck, but there were many, mostly ladies, among whom was Mrs. Bali, who remained on the main deek. These, as that deck sank deeper and deeper, retreated along the gang-ways, by the ladies’ cabin, towards tfie stern. The promenade deck, by the action of the Waves, was burst from the top of the boat, and was submerged with all that were on it. Whether the stern of the boat was submerged at, or after this time, is uncertain. Some of the witnesses think it was submerged even before the promenade deck, others that it was not submerged at all. All these events had taken place, according to most of the witnesses, in about from forty to fifty minutes; according to others, in less time.
Some few escaped in the boats, others on parts of the wreck, and others on rafts constructed by them as they could, amid the horrors of the impending destruction.
Of Mrs. Ball, nothing is known, after the submerging of the promenade deck, nor for some time before. Before that event, lief cfies were heard by onq witness, who had gained the promenade deck, as they proceeded from the place she still occupied' on the deck below. No witness speaks of her after-wards.
Within a few minutes after the explosion, according to one witness who knew her, she came out of the ladies’ cabin, and began to call upon her husband. The scene was one of terror, as may be' supposed, but although a crowd was instantly gathered at that part of the vessel, there was not much noise. The surrounding horrors seem to have subdued the sufferers, and in mute astonishment they contemplated the fate which awaited them. Even the wheels had stopped. Nothing but the sound of the waters, which were somewhat disturbed, and the hasty exclamations of friends, as they souught each other out, and the noise occasioned by such preparations as the more active and prudent felt themselves called upon to make, for themselves and others under their charge, were heard. But the voice of Mrs. Ball was heard above all others, calling upon her husband. She ran forward to the chasm caused by the explosion; retraced her steps, and continued to traverse the starboard gangway in search ot him, uttering his name in tones so elevated by her agony, that they reached most parts of the vessel, and seem to have made an indelible impression upon all who heard them. Her cry, according to one witness, was a cry of bitter despair and anxious enquiry; and, according to all, it was lifted in shrill tones, carrying an irresistable appeal to all hearts.
Mr. Ball was neither seen nor heard. Mrs. Ball was heard and seen by many, but no response was heard to her cries, nor was any one seen to approach her, for her protection or consolation. Two witnesses, who knew Mrs. Ball, saw her, but did not see him. One of them passed and repassed her, in hurried manner to be sure, but did not discover him.
He was neither seen nor heard after the explosion, unless he was the person referred to by two -witnesses, who state the following circumstance. Very shortly after the explosion, a boat was let down on the starboard side of the steamer, into which some persons descended As the boat was lying below, a gentleman came to that side of the deck, and throwing a coat into the boat called to those in it to hold fast a moment, and instantly disappeared. Hepever re-appeared, but, the next day, the coat was found to be a black dress coat of a large size, (such was the size of Mr. Ball,) and in one of the pockets was discovered a shirt collar, on which was written the name of Ball, with some initials, which the witnesses have forgotten.
Now, these are the circumstances of the case. It is not a case of an unknown calamity, nor of one withdrawn from observation; nor is it a case where the calamity' was of instantaneous operation. It is a case for testimony, and to be decided on testimony.
I incline too, to the opinion, that as the right, on the part of Mrs. Ball, was derivative, and without mutualiiy, the burden is upon the plaintiffs, who claim through her, to prove that her right vesied — that she was the survivor. Without considering it necessary to decide that this is the proper rule here, I shall .undertake to be governed by it. No conjectural inference, no inference except from evidence, will be drawn on behalf of the plaintiffs. They must make out their case, or the rights of Mi'- Ball will be permitted to remain as they were. But because the plaintiffs are to prove the fact of survivorship, it does not follow that they are to prove it to demonstration. All reasonable inferences will be drawn from the best evidence, suggested by the case; and although at last we may be far frorp arriving at any thing like certainty, although, indeed, there may remain much obscurity and doubt, yet if we have evidence only sufficient, to lead us out of the regions of conjecture, we must follow it.
1 shall not, (because it is unnecessary) resort to the bare fact, that Mrs. Ball was the last person seen, or determine whether that fact, alone, is not sufficient to raise a presumption, in analogy to the doctrine which prevails in cases of absence. I incline, however, very strongly to the opinion, that where the evidence has traced the parties into a common danger, which proved fafal to both, the last one seen or heard within .the operation of'the cause of death, must be adjudged $he survivor, unless there be something, in the nature of the circumstances, to rebut the presumption, or render it inapplicable. The analogy to cases of absence is very strong. The proof, here, that the death has occurred, stands in the place of lapse of time; which is employed only as proof that the parties have died. When they died, relatively, may be judged of, in this case, as in that, by considering which was last known to be alive.
1 prefer, however, to put the case upon the ground of probability, arising from the evidence; upon a belief engendered by a combination of the circumstances; and upon the superiority of positive proof over conjecture or even probability.
It will be remembered, that the explosion produced its most fatal effects in the gentlemen’s forward cabin, and that was the first part of the vessel which submerged. That the after cabin was also much injured. That from the forward cabin many persons never escaped. From the after cabin, so far as we know from the evidence, all did escape except Judge Cameron, an infirm old man. But, from the description given of its condition, it is possible that some others may have been detained, either from being hurt, or otherwise, until the cabin filled.
It is certain that Mrs. Ball escaped the explosion. Is it certain that Mr. Ball did ?
Mr. Ball engaged a berth in the after cabin. The probability is that he got it, but this is far from certain. The boat came with many passengers from Savannah, which may have occasioned Mr. Ball to be displaced and transferred forward. I think, however, it is not probable he was so transferred, because, by an arrangement between the agents in Savannah and at Charleston, they were entitled to let the berths in alternate order, throughout the boat; and we know that some of the passengers, who came from Savannah, had not the advantage of pre-occupying the after cabin, and that some of the Charleston passengers were let into the cabin; Mr. Ball, therefore, was probably in that cabin. But there is a probability that he was in the forward cabin, and if so, in the greatest danger, from the explosion. Mrs Ball was clear from that danger certainly, Mr. Ball only probably. Here was one chance for his destruction, from which she was exempt.
Supposing that Mr. Ball was in the after cabin. The probability is that he was not killed by the explosion. The certainty is that Mrs. Ball was not. But the condition of that cabin, as described by some of the witnesses, coupled with the fact, that at least one man was not able to escape from it, before it filled, renders the destruction of Mr. Ball in that place, by no means a visiohary supposition.
Here was another chance for Mr. Ball’s destruction, from which his wife was certainly free.
On the deck. We know that Mrs. Ball was there, as yet uninjured by the explosion, the filling of the cabins, and all preceding dangers, from which many had already perished. This is certain. Is it certain that Mr. Ball had hitherto escaped, and was the person who threw the coat into the boat? It may be that he was the man. I think it hardly probable. I should have thought that he was the man, if he had been seen at any time near his wife, or had answered to her heart rending calls. But it is more probable, that some one else, in the hurry of the moment, may have mistaken Mr. Ball’s coat for his own, and thrown it into the boat, than that an affectionate husband and brave man, as Mr. Ball is proved to have been, should have heard such appeals as were made to him, by his wife, and should, at such a time as that, have failed in his duty to her.
We are sure that she was there. I think it was not probable that he was.
We have indubitable evidence that she had so far escaped: the same evidence, with a moral force which cannot be resist ed, convinces us that he must have already perished, or he would have been at her side.
Here are circumstances, some of which, until our nature shall be utterly changed, cannot well deceive. Here is a combination of circumstances, all tending to the same conclusion: and although some of them, by themselves, are not very forcible, yet, when it is seen that they all harmonize, the effect must be to beget belief.
I have, from all these considerations, formed the opinion, that Mrs. Ball survived her husband.
■ It remains to consider the effect of this fact üpdn the distribution of the property, under the will, and by operation of law.
The legacies must be disposed of, as provided for in the contingency, which has happened, of the testator’sdeath without leaving issue. Such as have lapsed must be distributed, (for want of a residuary clause in the will) as intestate property between Mr. Ball’s wife, and mother, according to the construction put upon the acts of 1791 and 1797, in the case of Trapp vs. Billings, (2 M’C. Ch. R. 403.) .
The legacy to the adopted daughter, Emma, clearly lapsed; and is so distributable.
The interest in the crops, as defined in the will, given to Alwyn Ball, in conjunction with Elias O. Ball, does not lapse by the pre-decease of Alwyn, but vested, (according to the case of Percival vs. Thontas, recently decided, Supra, p. 21,) in Elias O. Ball, as survivcfr.
A question has been raised, though not argued, whether the half of the crops, as defined in the will, given to the wife, and in the event which has happened, of her dying before Nonus’ majority, limited over to the brothers of the testator, until another event in the will described, is to be bonsidered lapsed and intestate, after that time. The impression of the Court is, that it does not lapse, but that there is evidence of a strong in tention on the face of the will, that this half should follow the disposition made of the other half.
Another question was suggested : whether, if it should turn out that the testator devoted any portion of the money acquired by him, in consequence of his marriage, in the purchase and improvement of other property, specifically bequeathed by him to his wife, (Mepshew and its pleasure grounds, for instance) the amount so expended, should not be deducted from the amount to which she would have been entitled as having come to Mr. Ball through her. As the point was not argued, 1 can only say, that I cannot call to my mind any authority or principle upon which Mrs, Ball would not be entitled to the whole.
It must be referred to the commissioner to take the accounts, and to report a proper mode of making a settlement upon Mrs. Taveau, of what she may recover in this case, according to the prayer preferred in her answer.
In closing this judgment, I cannot sufficiently testify my respect for the honorable disposition manifested by all parties. An appeal to the law was made, only because the minority of some of them rendered a compromise difficult, if not impossible. It is not a case for costs. Let the costs be paid out of the estate before distribution, and deducted, from the amounts coming to the parties, rateably.
The defendants appealed on the grounds,
That it was not sufficiently proved that Mrs, Ball survived her husband.
That the representatives of Mrs. Ball should have been put to their election, either to relinquish the devise of the Mep-shew House [specifically bequeathed] and receive the amount expended, from her funds, thereon; or, accepting the devise, to release their claim to the money expended.
That the bequest of the cfdps was hot to Alwyn & Elias 0. Ball, jointly; but to each, severally; and therefore, Elias' could not take by survivorship.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Johnston, Ch.
The fact, that the counsel in' the Circuit Court atteiided exclusively to the question of sur-vivorship, which was the leading one in the case, must be my apology for two palpable errors into which I fell, in delivering-my judgment. It certainly was a strange misconception to suppose, as I did, that the bequest of otíe half the crops was to Alwyn & Elias 0; Ball, conjointly, whereas the will expressly directs that it "be equally divided between my brothers,-Alwyn & Elias' Octavus, until my nephew*' Elias Nonus, is of age;" and then to him, &c.
The cases quoted, in Percival vs. Thomas, ai'e an unbroken current of authority that the direction, to' divide equally between the two' brothers, created a several,an d not joint interest in them. The consequence is that, upon the death of Al-wyn, in the life time of the testator, his interest in this legacy lapsed, and for want of a residuary clause, became devisable between the testator's wife and mother.
The other error relates to'the half of the crops given to' Mrs. ílall. This half is given to her during her life, and if she should die during the minority of Elias Nonus, then the income, from the time of her decease until Nonus shall attain majority, is to be divided between Alwyn and Elias Octavus. But there is no bequest of this part of the crops beyond the time of Nonus' majority, either to Nonus, himself, or to any other person. Mrs! Ball died during the minority of Nonus, by which event one moiety of this half of the crops vested in Elias Octavus Ball until the majority of Nonus, at which time it becomes intestate and distributable between the representatives of Mrs. Ball and the mother of Mr. Ball. The other moiety, which would have gone to Alwyn, lapses inprcesenti, in consequence of his death, and is distributable, as intestate-between the same persons.
To this extent the decree must be reformed. In other respects- the Court is satisfied with its correctness and it must be affirmed.
Upon the leading; question, of survivorship, the decree does not proceed on any principles df law, either new,, or speculative. It assumes that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs and that they must produce convincing evidence. What more could the appellant desire? The more I have considered the testimony, the more am I satisfied with the conclusion adopted in the circuit decree. The form of a decree was proposed here for the purpose of carrying the circuit decree into effect.. It should have been proposed to the Circuit Court,, and has been mislaid..
Bnt leave is given to apply to the Circuit Court for any decree, or direction necessary to cany its decision, as now modified, into effect
Harper and Dunicin, Ch., concurred.