Case Name: John P. Sanderson, Appellant, vs. Elizabeth S. L. Jones, Trustee, &c., Mary M. E. Harrison et al, Appelees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1855-04
Citations: 6 Fla. 430
Docket Number: 
Parties: John P. Sanderson, Appellant, vs. Elizabeth S. L. Jones, Trustee, &c., Mary M. E. Harrison et al, Appelees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 430–482

Head Matter:
John P. Sanderson, Appellant, vs. Elizabeth S. L. Jones, Trustee, &c., Mary M. E. Harrison et al, Appelees.
1. Where a marriage settlement is made by husband and wife in trust to the tfse and behoof of husband and wife during their natural lives, it is by no means clear that a separate estate is created for the wife,
2. The husband is entitled during his life to the income of property settled upon himself and wife jointly, as a compensation for his liability to maintain her; he is entitled to the whole’ of the profits of the trust estate when supporting the expenses of the household.
3. The right of alienation is incident to the ownership of property, and a restriction supposes incapacity, and is inapplicable to the ease of a man.
4. Trusts are alienable, and a husband may sell and dispose of his life interest in such property.
5. A sale of personal property by a husband, under a marriage settlement as aforesaid, held good as to a daughter to the extent of the interest of the father, especially where there is no allegation that the husband has not property to maintain, the wife, and does not maintain her.
fi. The decree of the Coprt in fayor of the husband of the daughter against the father and grantor in the settlement,, settled as aforesaid, conclusive as to his. life interest, light of possession and power of alienation.
?, If the remainder-men, the children provided for after the termination of the-life estate, have a fear that the property is in danger of being diverted and. squandered, and they have such interest against the purchaser f. om the father, their remedy is by bill quia timet.
Appeal from, a decree of the Circuit Court for Duval county.
The bill in this case was filed by Elizabeth S. L. Jones,, as Trustee,. &c., under the marriage settlement hereinafter set (forth, ánd Mary M. E. Harrison, wife of Robert Harririson,. Senior, by her next friend, Charles P. Cooper,, who. claims as cestui que trust under said settlement, and Robert Harrison, Junior, and others, children of said Robert Harrison and Mary M. E. Harrison, who claim as remainder-men under said settlement, complainants against Robert Harrison, Sr., and John P. Sanderson.
In the year 1813, in anticipation of a marriage between said Robert Harrison, Senior, and said Mary M. E. Harrison, then Mary M. E. Cooper, a deed of marriage settlement was executed by said Harrison and said Mary and the trustees therein named, of which the following is a copy:
Georgia:—
This indenture, tripartite, made the ninth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, and of American independence the thirty-eighth, between Robert Harrison, Esq., of the first, Mary Magdalene Cooper, (spinister) of the county of McIntosh, the daughter of Col. John Cooper, of said County and State, of the second part, and Samuel Harrison', Jr., James Nephew, of the county of McIntosh, and William Anderson and Joseph Jones, of the county of Liberty, Esquires, of the third part. Whereas, by God’s permission, a marriage is intended to be had and solemnized by and between the said Robert Harrison and Mary Magdalene Cooper. Now, this indenture witnesseth that in consideration of the said intended marriage and for securing and providing a maintenance and support for the said Mary Magdalene Cooper in case of casualties ; also, in consideration of the" sum of one dollar to him, the said Robert Harrison, in hand, well and truly paid at and before the sealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. Hath, and by these presents doth bargain, sell, convey, assign, transfer and set over unto the said Samuel Harrison, James Nephew, William Anderson and Joseph Jones, and the survivor of them and to the heirs, executors and administrators of such survivor, all those certain sixteen Negro Slaves named as follows: Esau, Lydia and her child Mary, Tom, Alexander, Abraham, Drummond, Jacob, Boatswain, Stephen and Prince, Patty and her two children James and Sarah, Henry and Flood, with the issue and increase of the females.
To have and to hold all and every the said Negro Slaves as named, with the issue and increase of the females unto them, the said Samuel Harrison, James Nephew, William Anderson and Joseph Jones, and the survivors of them, their heirs, executors oí administrators : Whereas to and for the uses, intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned, expressed and declared of, for or touching or concerning the same or any part thereof, and to and for no other use, intent or purpose whatsoever: that is to say, whereas, for the use and benefit and behoof of the said Robert Harrison, his heirs and assigns until the said intended marriage shall take effect and be solemnized, and from and immediately after the solemnization of the said intended marriage, 1,o the use and behoof of the said Robert Harrison and Mary Magdalene Cooper, his intended wife for and during their natural lives, without any manner of waste or impeachment of waste to be had, done, made or committed, and after the determination of that estate, to the said Samuel Harrison, James Nephew, William Anderson and Joseph Jones, and the survivors and survivor of them in trust to and for the following uses, that is to say, to and for the use and benefit and behoof of the child or children of them, the said Robert Harrison and Mary Magdalene Cooper, his intended wife, share and share alike to them, their heirs and assigns, for ever ; and after the determination of that estate, to the said Samuel Harrison, James Nephew, William Anderson and Joseph Jones, and the survivors and the survivor of them in trust, that is to say, should there be no issue living by and between the said Robert Harrison and the said Mary Magdalene Cooper, his intended wife at the decease of either of them, said Robert Harrison or the said Mary Magdalene Cooper, his intended wife, that then and in such case the said estate so made over, transferred, and assigned in trust as aforesaid, shall go to the longest liver, and be to the sole use and be the right and property of the survivor, to his or her use, benefit and behoof forever, anything to the contrary notwithstanding; and whereas, the said Mary Magdalene Cooper is and will be well and sufficiently entitled of, in and to a certain estate to be hereinafter ascertained; now by these presents it is agreed upon and fully understood and hereby covenanted by and between the parties to these presents, that when such estate can and may be ascertained, that a schedule of the same shall be hereinafter annexed, attested by two or more credible witnesses, which said estate, real or personal, shall be subject to all and every the covenants, conditions, premises, trusts and limitations, as hereinbefore expressed and contained, or that may hereafter be further expressed, covenanted, limited and declared, and that the said schedule so to be annexed shall be taken and considered as part and parcel of this Deed of Settlement, anything to the contrary notwithstanding; and by these presents it is agreed upon, fully understood and covenanted by and between the said parties to these presents, that the said bargained, sold, conveyed, assigned and set over estate or estates, with every the rights thereto appertaining or belonging, both as real or personal or otherwise in manner and form as aforesaid, that the same, nor shall any part ■or parcel thereof, at any tim'e or times hereafter, be subject or liable to the payment of any debt, judgment, execution or account, or demand otherwise, now due or owing by the said Robert Harrison for, or by reason of any matter or thing whatsoever, or that may hereafter become due owing or be contracted, anything to the contrary notwithstanding ; and it is hereby provided, covenanted and agreed by and between all the parties to these presents, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Robert Harrison and Mary Magdalene Cooper, his intended wife, with the approbation and assent of the said trustees or the survivors or survivor of them, at any time or times hereafter, by any writing, or writings under their respective hands, .and attested by two or more credible witnesses to revoke and make void, alter or change all and every of, or any of the uses, trusts or estates hereinbefore limited and declared of and concerning or touching the premises or any part or parcel thereof, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding; and lastly, the said parties and each and every of them do hereby covenant, grant and agree to and with each other that the present Deed of Settlement, and every article, matter and thing therein contained, shall be carried into effect according to the true intent and meaning of the same, and according to the most natural and obvious construction of the words, and agree able to what shall appeal- to have been the sense and meaning of the parties at the time of executing the same, anything to the contrary notwithstanding.
“In witness whereof the said parties to these presents have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written, 1813.”
ROBERT HARRISON, [seal.]
MARY M. COOPER, [seal.]
JAMES NEPHEW, [seal.]
WM. ANDERSON, [seal.]
JOSEPH JONES, [seal.]
“Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of
John Gignitlant,
James Pelot.
Recorded 2d July, 1822.
JOHN P. BALLARD, Clerk.”
The marriage anticipated, was shortly after solemnized and the parties subsequently removed to Florida whilst the latter was a provence of Spain. On the fourth day of January 1844 the said Robert Harrison senior executed a deed of trust for the benefit of Mary E. Sanderson, a daughter of the said Robert Harrison senior and Mary M. E. Harrison his wife, who had intermarried with John P. Sander-son, of which the following is a copy.
“This Indenture made and entered into this fourth day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty four, by and between Robert Harrison of Nassau County and Territory of Florida of the first part, and Harrison Starrett of the ■ County and Territory aforesaid of the second part, Witnesseth that whereas the said party of the first part in order to guard his daughter M'ary E. Sanderson as much as may be against the casualties and misfortunes of life, and provide for her a suitable and separate maintainance and support, and which will not be subject to the fate of her husband’s misfortunes or enterprises in business, hath proposedforthat purpose to convey the property hereinafter described, to a trustee to and for the separate use of his daughter Mary E. Sanderson, and the said Harrison Starret party of the second part having consented to act as trustee, and the said Mary E. Sanderson having also consented to the samé: Now Therefore to carry into effect the said intention and to make the said conveyance Effectual in Law.”
“This Indenture witnesseth thatthe said party of the first part in consideration of the sum of ten dollars good and lawful money to him in hand paid by the said party of the second part, at and before the sealing, and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged hath granted, given, bargained, sold, delivered and confirmed unto the said party of the second part, his executors, administrators or assigns, all his right title and interest of, to or in the Negro Slaves following to wit:
1. Mitchell, male, aged 35, 4 Edgar male, aged 2
2. Daniel “ 21, 5 Rodger 5
3. Richard “ “ 20, 6 Will 9
7. Sarah female, “ 31.
8. Nancy “ ■ “ 18.
9. Betsey “ “ 17.
10. Fanny “ “ 2.
11. Harriet “ “ 35.
“To have and to hold the said Negro Slaves all and singular-, together with the future increase thereof hereby, given, granted, bargained, sold, delivered and confirmed unto tbe said Harrison Starrett, party of the second part, his executors administrators and assigns, by as full and ample title as the same is owned by the said party of the first part, subject nevertheless to the said trusts, limitations, provisions and restrictions hereinafter contained, that is to say. In trust nevertheless, and these presents are upon the express condition that the above (Inscribed property is to be owned and held by the said party of the second part, to and for the only proper use, benefit and behoof of the said Mary E. Sanderson daughter of th e said party of the first part, and the heirs of her body. And the said Harrison Starrett shall have and hold the said above descrided property, for the uses and trusts aforesaid, and for none other whatsoever, and upon the further condition that the said Negro Slaves above given, granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, shall be and remain in the possession of the said Mary E. Sanderson, and her heirs aforesaid, free and secure from all debts and claims whatsoever, now subsisting, or which may hereafter subsist against the said party of the first part. And the said party of the second part, by these presents for himself his execur tors, administrators, and assigns acknowledges and accepts, ratifies and confirms the aforesaid uses and trusts subject to all the condtions, provisions, limitations, and restrictions hereinafter expressed, and it is farther expressly conditioned and agreed by the parties hereunto, that the said Harrison Starrett his executors, administrators and assigns shall and will at any time or times hereafter sell and convey the same, and at the proper expenses of the said Mary E. Sanderson, or her said heirs, make execute and deliver title or titles to the said property mentioned, or any part or parcel of the same, whereon and in the manner and form, and to such person or persons as the said Harrison Starrett Trustee or his executors, administrators or assigns shall be requested or directed to do, by writing under the hands and seals of the. said party of the first part and Mary E. Sanderson his daughter or her aforesaid heirs, and the said Harrison Starrett trustee, his executors, administrators, or assigns, shall upon, request in manner and form aforesaid, again reinvest the mpney arising from the sale of any of the property aforesaid, subject nevertheless in every respect to all the provisions, uses, trusts, and conditions as those by him sold and conveyed, and the said Robert Harrison, party of the first part for himself, his heirs, executors, administratros or assigns, will warrant and defend forever the said given granted, sold and conveyed negro Slaves with the future increase thereof unto the said Harrison Starrett trustee, his' executors, administrators, or assigns for the uses and purposes aforesaid against all persons whatsoever.
“ Signed sealed and delivered the day and year first above written.”
In presence of
E. Harrison.
Robt. M. Pease,
Robt. Harrison.
ROBERT HARRISON, [seal.]
HARRISON STARRETT. [seal.]
Subsequently to the execution of thisdeedofl844,MaryE. Sanderson, the qestui que trust, therein died without leaving 'any children, apfi John P. Sanderson, her husband,.became administrator of her estate. As snch administrator, John P. Sanderson filed a bill against Robert Harrison, Sen., and H. Starrett, Trustee, under the deed of 1844, fQr the possession of the slaves therein conveyed. The bill having been taken for confessed for want of answer, it was afterwards decreed 'that said Robert Harrison, Sen., had no right, title or interest in or to the estate of said Mary E, Sanderson, deceased, and the possession of the said slaves, was directed to be delivered to the said John p. Sander-son.
The bill in this case was filed after the decree aforesaid, and it alleges that none of the parties complainant herein, were made parties to the bill filed by Sanderson, as aforesaid ; that they had no day in Court, although serious'ly prejudiced by said decree, and are consequently not bound by the same. Mary M. E. Harrison, claims that under the deed of marriage settlement of 1813, she has an interest separate and distinct from her husband, in the property decreed to Sanderson under the deed of trust of 1844, of which she could not be divested by the act of her husband, and asserts that the existence of the deed of 1844, was not known to her until after the removal of the negroes therein attempted to be conveyed, from the plantation in Nassau County, where Robert Harrison Sen., and his family resided.
The bill further charges that of the negroes attempted to be conveyed by the deed of trust of 1844, two were of those conveyed by the marriage settlement of 1813; six were derived to her as an heir at law of her father, and included in the trust of 1813, as part of the estate to which she is therein declared to be “ well and sufficiently entitled do,” and nine were purchased or are descended from these purchased, subsequently to the deed of 1813, with the proceeds and income of the property therein conveyed;
Robert Harrison, Junior, and others, children of the said Robert Harrison, Senior, and Mary M. E. Harrison, also complainants to the bill, allege that the3r are entitled to an interest in remainder in said property, to take effect after the death of their parents, and charge that if the negroes are yielded up to' Sanderson,' under the decree rendered in the case against Robert Harrison and Starrett, their rights and interests will be jeoparded, if not wholly lost, and ask the intervention of the Court to protect their lights in the premises.
Elizabeth S. L. Jones, is the executrix of Joseph Jones the last survivor of the Trustees named jn the marriage settlement of 1813, and as such claims to be Trustee under the said marriage settlement.
John P. Sanderson demurred to the bill of complainant, and sets forth the following as causes of demurrer, viz :
“That the complainant’s said bill (in case the allegations thereto were true, which this defendant doth in no wise admit,) contains not any manner of equity whereon he can ground any decree or give the complainants any relief or assistance as against him this defendant.
“And for further and other causes of demurrer to the said complainant’s bill of complaint, this defendant, John P. Sanderson, saith that it appears by the marriage settlement referred to by complainant’s bill, exhibited A, and which is by the said complainants referred to and made a part of said bill of complaint, that the heirs, executors and administrators of the said surviving trustee, Joseph Jones are necessary parties to said bill, inasmuch as it is therein stated that the said Robert Harrison did bargain, sell, convey, assign, transfer and set over the property mentioned in the marriage settlement, (referred to in said bill as exhibit A) to Samuel Harrison, James Nephew, William Anderson and Joseph Jones, and the survivor of them, and to the heirs, executors and administrators of such survivor, and that the said complainants have not made the said heirs of the said survivor, Joseph Jones, trustee, a party to this bill.
“And for further and other causes of demurrer to the said complainant’s bill of complaint, this defendant, John P. Sanderson, saith that it appears by the said -bill of complaint, that Elizabeth S. L. Jones became and is trustee in the place and stead of the originad trustees named in the marriage ■ settlement referred to and named in said bill of Mary M. E. Harrison, wife of Robert Harrison, Senior, and it also appears in and by said bill that the said Elizabeth S. L. Jones, trustee of Mary M. E. Plarrison, is joined ás a complainant with Chas. P. Cooper as next friend of the said Mary M. E. Plarrison, and that the said Mary M. E. Harrison sues not only by the said trustee but by her next friend the said Chas. P. Cooper.
“And for further and other causes of demurrer this defendant, John P. Sanderson, saith that it appears by the said bill the same is exhibited by the said complainants against this defendant and one Robert Plarrison, Senior, as defendants thereto, for several distinct matters and causes, in many whereof, as appears by the said bill, this defendant is in no way interested:
■ And for further and other causes of demurrer to the said bill of complaint, this defendant saith that it appears by the said bill that the same is exhibited against this defen fendant by the said Mary M. E. Harrison, by her trustee and next friend and by Robert Harrison, Junior, in his own right and as next friend of Evelyn A. Harrison and Marion S. Harrison, as complainants thereto, for several distinct matters and causes, in many whereof, as appears by the said bill, this defendant is in no way interested, and by reason of such distinct matters.the said bill is drawn out to a considerable length, and this defendant is compelled to take a copy of the whole thereof, and by joining distinct matters together which do not depend on each other, the proceedings in the progress of the said suit will be intricate and prolix, and thus this defendant put to unnecessary charges and expenses in matters which in no way relate to or concern him.
“Wherefore and for divers and other causes of demurrer this defendant demands the judgment of this honorable Court.”
The demurrer being overruled, Sanderson appealed.
G. W. Call, Jr., for appellant.
Philip Fraser and C. P. Cooper for appellees-.

Opinion:
BALTZELL C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case depends upon the power of a husband, under a marriage settlement, to convey an interest in certain slaves, part of the property settled. Robert Harrison, Sr., previous to his intermarriage with his present wife, then Miss Mary M. Cooper, in connection with his intended wife, conveyed to trustees a large number of slaves, his own property, and also other property of hers " in trust to the use and behoof of himself and his wife for and during their natural lives, and after the determination of that estate, in trust for the use, benefit and behoof of the child of children of them, the said Harrison and wife, share and, share alike to them, their heirs apd assigns forever." This was dated 9th June, 1813.
After the intermarriage of his daughter Mary with John Sanderson, he conveyed on the 4th of January, 1844, eleven negroes to a trustee for the only proper use, benefit and behoof of his said daughter'.
Mrs. Sanderson having died, her husband filed his bill asserting title to the property under the conveyance aforesaid, and by virtue of his marital rights, against Robert Harrison, Sr., and the trustee of his wife, and after hearing and argument of counsel, a decree was rendered by the Circuit Court of Duval county "that Robert Harrison, Sr., is not heir or distributee of the said Mary Sanderson, and has no right, title or interest in and to the estate of the said Mary Sanderson in remainder, reversion or otherwise and that the complainant Sanderson is entitled to the possession of said slaves," and an order was passed for their delivery to him by said Harrison.
The present bill is filed by Mrs. Harrison, wife of Robert Harrison, through the executor of the surviving trustee, and by her other children, claiming that the conveyance to Mrs. Sanderson was invalid and carried no interest to her nor to her husband, Sanderson.
This, of course, involves an inquiry into the marriage, settlement between Harrison and his wife, and the nature, and extent of the interest of the parties to it. It has been assumed that a separate estate is created by it for Mrs. Harrison, which we think by no means clear. The property is not settled to her sole or separate use ; the words, are, " to the use, benefit and behoof of himself and wife."' Undoubtedly, such words, applied to the wife, will not create a separate estate. Can the addition of the husband and the connection of his name make a difference ?
The books are not silent as to this subject. In an elaborate opinion delivered by C. J. Saffold, of Alabama, the Supreme Court of that State say, "the property (slaves) is declared to be for the joint use and support of husband and wife and subject to their joint possession. Was any case cited in argument where, by construction, so much violence was done to the language of the deed as to maintain that a clause expressly creating an estate for the joint use and support of two was intended to create a separate property for the sole use of one ?" Clancy, (p. 269) after a very learned investigation of the whole subject and a review of the cases, says: " All these cases clearly prove that there must be a manifest intention evinced by the language of the donor that the wife shall ha-ve the exclusive property in the gift, without which Courts of Equity will not suffer the legal rights of the husband to be superseded." They then say, "they come to the conclusion that this gift cannot enure to the separate usé of the wife and child or either, and that the marital rights of the husband have not been excluded." Haskins vs. Coalter, 2 Porter, 473; see also Wardell vs. Chastain, 17 Con. Eng. Ch., 225; Ibid., 9 Simon 525.
A reference is given in a note to Hill's work on Trusts, p. 420, n. by Wh. to Bender vs. Reynolds, 12 Ala., 441 and Geyer vs. Br. Bank, 21 Ala., 414, but we have not been able to procure them. 4 Ired. Eq. 241.
It may be proper to remark that more stringent expressions would seem to be required by the later authorities to create a separate estate, than once were considered sufficient. Hill on Trusts by Wh., 611,
Even if the wife have a separate estate the inquiry arises, as to the interest of the husband, Robert Harrison in the property conveyed, and the broad ground has been assumed that he had none that he could convey. It is very clear that he has an interest if she has one, and .if he has none she is in the same condition. The- authorities as to the relative rights of the two parties will be found to be as follows: " Where property belonging to the husband and of which he is the purchaser, by settlement is vested in trustees in trust, to pay the income to the husband and wife jointly during their joint lives, the husband alone will be entitled to receive the whole income." Hill on Trusts, 427; Duncan vs. Campbell, 12 Simons 616.
" A husband in equity as well as at law is entitled to the receipt of the income ofhis wife's property as a compensation for his liability to maintian her." Hill on trusts 410 n. 3 Simons 370; 1 Roper Hus. and Wife, 273.
"Consequently he will be entitled to the uncontrolled beneficial enjoyment of her life interest unless he deserts her." Hill 410.
In Jones vs. Mayrant the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, say " it was decided in Barrett vs. Barrett, that the husband supporting the expenses of the household, was entitled to the whole of the profits of the trust estate settled jointly on the husband and his wife. Under such a settlement the creditors of the wife would not be allowed to deprive the wife of her maintainance." 4 Dess. 602. In the case of Napier vs. Wightman the same Court gay "this settlement provides that the defendant Wm. J. and his wife shall have the whole of this estate (slaves &c.) during their joint lives without assigning any part to. her separate use, and if it be true, and that will not be controverted that all the chattle interests of the wife, belong to tfte husband, he is entitled to the whole income of this estate so long as they both live, and if arrested on a Ga- Sa. from a Court of law would be required to assign." I Spears Eq. 369.
The terms of the deed were to trustees in trust for the joint use of.husband and wife, during their joint lives, then to the use of survivor during life &c. The same Court says farther in the same case: " I shall not stop here to enquire whether under the Statutes of uses the defendant Wight-man has not a vested interest in the whole of the real estate during life. It is very clear that under the provision in the settlement, he i¡s entitled to the income of the whole estate real and personal, for the joint lives of himself and wife, and during his life if he survives, with power of disposition as to one half absolutely. Ibid. p. 370.
Whilst then we have seen that Harrison had and interest in the trust estate, the question yet arises as to his power to convey, which also has been earnestly and seriously denied and questioned. In the case of Shomo vs. Bobe decided at the present term, we had occasion to express our views on the subject of alienation in general, and we desire to refer to them in connection with this case.
On this subject before referring to authorities more directly in point, it may be well to refer to the general law as well as to the reasons for its existence. " A conveyance toB. in trust or for the use of C., or where, only the equitable title passes as in case of a, conveyance, to B. to the use of C. in trust for D. The trust in this last case is exectu ted in D. though he has not the legal estate." 4 Kent 305.
Our own Legislature in the law passed to secure the rights of married women gives the right of disposal to the man and wife. We will add that in speaking of the power of alienation, Blackstone says: "we must consider rather the incapacity than capacity of the several parties, for all persons in possession are prima facie capable of conveying and purchasing, unless thé law has laid them under peculiar disabilities," &c. and among these he enumerates persons attainted of treason, idiots, &c. &c. 2. Black. Com. 290.
Whilst such is the general rule, we shall find no diversity as to the particular subject of inquiry. "A perpetuity will no more be tolerated when it is covered With a trust, than when it displays itself undisguised in a settlement of the legal estate." 1 Lewis on Trust, 138.
"It is absolutely against the constant course of Chancery to.decree a perpetuity, or give any relief in that' case. 1 Chan. Reports, 144 ; 5 Jac. Law Dic., 143.
Blackstone in his Commentaries, speaking of the changes made by Courts of Equity in the 'doctrine of uses, says: " They have raised a new system of national jurisprudence, by which trusts are made to answer in general, all the beneficial ends of uses, Without their inconvenience and frauds.' The trust will descend, may be alienable, is lia-: blé to debts, to executions on judgments, &c." 2 Black. Coms., 337.
"Th e prima facie rule of trusts, is that the intention of the Settler shall be carried into effect;, but the intention cannot be pursued when it contravenes the public policy of the law." " So ti'usts cannot be created with a proviso that the interest of the cestui que trust shall not be aliened, or shall not be subject to the claims of creditors. If it can only be ascertained that the cestui que irust, was intended to take a vested interest, the mode in which, or the time when the cestui que trust Was to reap the benefit, is pefectly immetarial, the entire interest may either be disposed of by the act of the cestui qUe trust, or may become Vestedin his assignees by operation of law." Lewis on Trusts, 137-8; 6 Simon, 524 ; 1 R. and W., 395; 1 Simon, 66; 18 Vesey, 429.
In one of these cases, the Lord Chancellor says, "there is no doubt, generally speaking, that if property is given to a man for his life, the donor cannot take away the incident to a life estate. Equity.making a feme the owner of it, and enabling her as a married woman to alien, might limit her power over it, but the case of a disposition to a man, who if he has the property has the power of aliening, is quite different." 6 Simon, 434.
" A trust is assignable. An equitable interest may be assigned, though it be a mere possibility, and either with or without the intervention of the trustee, and the assignee of the cestui que trust may call upon the trustee to convey to him, and on his refusal may file a bill to compel a conveyance without making the assignor a party," Lewin on Trusts, 499; Philips vs. Bridges, 3 Vesey, 127; Goodear vs. Ellison, 3 Russ. 583.
In Lady Arundel vs. Phipps, which was a settlement to the use of Lord and Lady Arundel for their lives and the life of the survivor, Lady Arundel became equitable owner of goods and chattels, and she became so under a contract of purchase which she insisted she was entitled to make with her husband himself, and her purchase was sustained against the creditors of the husband. 10 Vesey, 140-7-8.
In Ford, trustee, vs. Caldwell, the deed conveyed to the joint use of husband and wife for life, not subject to their debts, and after the death of either, to the use of the survivor for life, and after the death of the survivor to the use of the children of the marriage. Speaking of this state of facts, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Judge O'Neill pronouncing the opinion of the Court, says: " I hold, the trust was executed in the husband, at least for his life. For, according to the deed, he was entitled to the possession of the slaves; having this, he had both the legal and equitable estate for his life. For the trustee had nothing to do with it during this time, he had delivered the slave to one who was under no legal disabilities; this was equivalent to a conveyance to him for the time he was to possess it. For' the condition annexed to the trust, not to be subject to the debts or contracts of the husband and wife, is void. The husband having both the legal and equitable estate could! transfer it, which he did, to Chur." The general property was in Ford, trustee, but he had parted with the right to-possess it to the cestui que trusts, Swift and wife, for life. At law, the wife's being and rights are merged in the husband, and hence his possession for the joint use of himself and wife for life, made the property for that time his entire qualified legal estate." This was a suit at law instituted-by trustee against the purchaser. 3 Hill, 249.
In Love vs. Hodges, which was to a trustee for husband and wife, the same Court quote the same case as: follows: "In personal estate the legal estate remains in the trustee until he executes the trust by delivering the possession to one capable of holding in himself a legal es-estate in the prop'erty to the extent of the interest intended to be conferred by the deed. In this case the trustee had nothing to do with the property during the life of the bus1band. He had delivered the slave to one who was under ho legal disability. This was equivalent to a conveyance to him for the time he was to possess it." 1 Spears, 596t
An idea prevails that though the income and profits may be assigned, yet the body, the corpus of the estate, may not be. If this be the case, we have not perceived it in the general rule stated nor in the particular cases cited.
There is another aspect of the case worthy of consideration. Suppose a decree made in favor of Mrs. Harrison* as contended for, and the property restored, who would take the possession, Who be entitled to the income during the life of Harrison ? The answer is not a difficult one, the husband, Harrison himself, and no other person, so that the suit may be regarded, and properly cannot be regarded in any other light, than as one instituted by him and for his benefit against his own assignee.
Were these authorities less clear and satisfactory than they seem to us to be, we yet think the decree in favor of Sanderson against Harrison conclusive as far as his possession of the property, his interest in it and his power of alienation are concerned. It was the decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction as to these issues on the subject itself, and whether erroneous or not it constitutes the law of the case. We shall not undertake to say that this'decision is conclusive on Mrs; Harrison in evéry possible aspect of the case. It is sufficient that the facts presented by the record do not remove such conclusion. As far as the facts of this case are concerned, we have possession by the husband of the trust property for near forty years to the present time—thirty years prior to the transfer to Mrs. Sanderson, with receipt by him of the income, profits, &c., without interference by the trustees, alienation by the father and husband so possessed to his daughter, possession by the latter and the right of her husband confirmed and established by decree of the Court.
As far as the law is concerned, we find Robert Harrison, the husband, rightly entitled to the possession of the property, to the income and profits arising from it,—that he had a right to sell to the extent of his interest, and his assignee to hold it.
We have not referred to the fact that the assignment to Mrs. Sanderson does not conflict with the main design of the deed of trust, but is merely in advance of it. The children of the marriage are expressly provided for in the settlement. Nor is the case altered by the fact, that by the dispensation of Providence the husband, rather than the wife, is before us claiming the benefit of the last settlement. He has been decided to be entitled to her rights and interests, and is entitled to the same favorable consideration that she would be if contending for the property herself.
It remains to dispose of the case as far as the children of Mrs. Harrison are concerned, who claim the remaining interest after the termination of the life estate. The question of their interest can only be before us for one purpose, and that is for the protection of the property, so that they may assert their interest when it comes into existence. This they may be entitled to obtain from the Court, on a proper showing by a bill quia timet. If the property is in danger of being diverted and squandered, and they have the interest contended for as against Sanderson, they may obtain relief from the Court. 1 Story Eq., §827. Osborne vs. VanHorn, 2 Fla. 361.
We have not considered whether, if Robert Harrison, by any casualty should become unable to support his wife, she might not have a right to call upon Sanderson to contribute to the extent of his interest. Such case has not been presented by the proof nor the pleadings, nor have we thought proper to determine the question of her right in the event of his death and her surviving. These questions will be appropriately decided when properly presented.
The decree of the Circuit Court overruling the demurrer will be reversed and set aside, and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint and dissolve the injunction without prejudice to other rights and interests than those now determined.
DuPONT, J.
Delivered the following