Case Name: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOOD GUYS FOR FASI, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1974-11-25
Citations: 56 Haw. 88
Docket Number: NO. 5521
Parties: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOOD GUYS FOR FASI, Defendant-Appellee
Judges: RICHARDSON, C.J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA AND MENOR, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE HAYASHI IN PLACE OF LEVINSON, J„ DISQUALIFIED
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 88–95

Head Matter:
STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOOD GUYS FOR FASI, Defendant-Appellee
NO. 5521
NOVEMBER 25, 1974
RICHARDSON, C.J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA AND MENOR, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE HAYASHI IN PLACE OF LEVINSON, J„ DISQUALIFIED

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
KOBAYASHI, J.
This is an appeal by the State of Hawaii from an order of the district judge dismissing the Information against "Good Guys for Fasi." We affirm.
On May 11, 1973, the Attorney General of Hawaii, on behalf of the State, filed an Information which alleged that "Good Guys for Fasi," an unincorporated "campaign committee expending money in behalf of Frank F. Fasi," did wilfully fail to report contributions in excess of $500 toward the election of Frank Fasi in the primary election for Mayor held on October 7, 1972 and the'general election for Mayor held on November 7, 1972 as required by HRS § 11-193 [Supp. 1972] and thereby violated HRS § 19-6(13) [Supp. 1972].
A penal summons commanding "Good Guys for Fasi" to appear in court was served upon one Shiro Aoki (presumably the alleged agent of "Good Guys for Fasi"), notwithstanding the only named defendant cited in the information was "Good Guys for Fasi."
Mr. Aoki filed a motion to quash the summons.
At a hearing on the motion to quash, the district judge held: the information "is defective because the only defendant named is an unincorporated association", and summarily quashed the information.
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that unincorporated associations are not criminally liable pursuant to HRS § 11-193 and 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972).
HRS § 11-193 (Supp. 1972) provides that:
§ 11-193 Filing of expense statement. Each party, committee, including presidential committees, and each candidate for a state or national office, excepting presidential candidates not residing within the State, shall file with the chief election officer, and each party, committee, and each candidate for a county office shall file with the clerk of the county, an itemized statement of his or their expense, by, for, or on behalf of a party, candidate for election, or question or issue at the election showing each amount expended, the purpose or object for which each expenditure was made, and the person or persons to whom made. The itemized statement shall also contain the amount contributed and the name and address of each contributor who has contributed in excess of $500 toward the election of the candidates or to a party or committee. The statements shall be sworn to by each candidate or an authorized person for a party or committee making the expenditures and shall be open to public inspection.
HRS § 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) provides that the following persons shall be guilty of misdemeanors:
(13) Every person who wilfully violates or fails to obey any of the provisions of law, punishment for which is not otherwise in this chapter specially provided for.
The appellant argues that "Good Guys for Fasi" failed to file the itemized statement as required by HRS § 11-193 (Supp. 1972) and is thus guilty of a misdemeanor pursuant to HRS § 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972). The crux of appellant's argument is that the term "person" as used in HRS § 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) is undefined and thus should be controlled by the general definitional statute HRS § 1-19 which provides:
§ 1-19 "Person," "others," "any," etc. The word "person," or words importing persons, for instance, "another," "others," "any," "anyone," "anybody," and the like, signify hot only individuals, but corporations, firms, associations, societies, communities, assemblies, inhabitants of a district, or neighborhood, or persons known or unknown, and the public generally, where it appears, from the subject matter, the sense and connection in which such words are used, that such construction is intended.
Appellant then contends that since HRS § 1-19 defines "persons" to include "associations", the construction of HRS § 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) in connection with HRS § 1-19 results in "Good Guys for Fasi" being criminally liable. We disagree.
We are of the opinion that appellant's contention cannot be sustained because —
1. Notwithstanding the provision in HRS § 11-193 (Supp. 1972) that ". . . a committee . . .shall file. . .an itemized statement .,"§ 11-193 (Supp. 1972) actually places the onus of filing a sworn statement as follows: "The statements shall be sworn to by each candidate or an authorized person for a party or committee making the expenditures . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
2. HRS § 19-6(10) (Supp. 1972) provides that the following shall be guilty of misdemeanors:
(10) Every person who, being a candidate for election, or an agent of any candidate, or a member of any committee acting for or on behalf of any candidate, or in charge of any committee or political party to which money is contributed during an election or which spends money in any election, fails to file the statement of expenses or of lack of expenses, as required by law.
In our opinion, the prosecution of a violation of HRS § 11-193 (Supp. 1972) is specifically limited, without ambiguity, by HRS § 19-6(10) (Supp. 1972) to a ". . . person who, being a candidate for election, or an agent of any candidate, or a member of any committee acting for or on behalf of any candidate or in charge of any committee or political party . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the legislature did not impose the above criminal penalty against the campaign committee itself. It is elementary that a criminal statute be construed strictly. Coray v. Ariyoshi, 54 Haw. 254, 261, 506 P.2d 13, 17 (1973). Moreover, where the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction. State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 345, 347, 379 P.2d 592, 593 (1963).
Assuming arguendo that a construction of the pertinent statutes is necessary, a review of the Hawaii Revised Statutes shows that HRS § 11-193 (Supp. 1972) is part of a chapter exclusively on elections generally, while HRS § 19-6(10) and 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) are both in the same section of a chapter dealing specifically in election offenses.
Even a cursory reading of HRS § 11-193, 19-6(10) and 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) shows that they are in pari materia or deal with the same subject matter. And upon construing HRS § 19-6(13) (Supp. 1972) with reference to HRS § 19-6(10) (Supp. 1972), the reliance of appellant on HRS § 1-19 becomes wholly unnecessary and improper.
E.John McConnell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General^George Pai, Attorney General, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellant.
Leland H. Spencer (Jack H. Mizuha and Kelso, Spencer, Snyder & Stirling of counsel) for defendant-appellee Shiro Aoki.
Sec. however. S.L.H. 1973. Act 185.
HRS § 1-16 reads:
§ 1-16 La us in pari materia. Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may he called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.