Case Name: City of Greenville v. Addie Harvie
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1901-10
Citations: 79 Miss. 754
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Greenville v. Addie Harvie.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 754–761

Head Matter:
City of Greenville v. Addie Harvie.
Municipalities. Special improvements and assessments. Expense. Abutting owner. Code 1893, §§ 3011, 3013.
A “special assessment” for the cost of constructing-a sidewalk is not chargeable upon abutting property, under § 3013, code 1893, when the resolution of the municipal uathorities declaring it necessary,-etc., under §3011, in relation to “special improvements,” gives notice that the walks will be constructed by the city, and indicates in no way that abutting property owners are to bear any part of the expense.
[Whitfield, C. J., concurred in the conclusion reached by a majority of the court on the ground of want of sufficient notice, but dissented from the view expressed in the opinion of the court, being of opinion that the term “special assessment” always imported, when used in connection with special street improvements, that the owners of the abutting property should bear the expense of the improvement; and that since the resolution in question was passed in pursuance of § 3011, code 1893, regarded as having reference only to special improvements, the cost of which are chargeable against abutting property, it must be construed as imposing the whole cost upon the owners of such property. Nugent v. City of Jackson, 73 Miss., 1040, cited.]
From the chancery court of Washington county.
HoN. J. McC. Kimbrough, Chancellor.
The city of Greenville, appellant, was complainant, and Mrs. Harvie, appellee, defendant in the court below. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The nature of the code provisions reviewed in this case fully appears in the opinion of Chief Justice Whitfield.
William Griffin, for appellant.
The sidewalk ordinances were prepared under the authority of Nugent v. City of Jachson, 72 Miss., 1040, and are identical with, those construed in that case, wbicb should be conclusive of this.
Thomas & Bose, for appellee.
Complainant did not allege and prove a strict compliance with every provision of the code sections, and otherwise the city had no authority to act. This court has uniformly held that such a body as the city council of Greenville is a court of limited jurisdiction. Goleman v. Bolivar County, 71 Miss., 332; Lester v. Miller, 76 Miss., 309.
Before the council could proceed in this matter there was a fact for it to judicially ascertain, to wit: The necessity for the improvement. After this fact had been ascertained, it should have judicially declared the ascertainment of the fact, by resolution, and the resolution should have been published as an ordinance. The resolution should have shown, moreover, that the abutting property owners were to bear the expense.
The bill alleges in the first paragraph that the ordinance was passed requiring property owners to build sidewalks, but does not allege, and the record does not show, that the board did, before or after passing the ordinance, ascertain judicially the necessity for this improvement, and declare by resolution such improvement, describing it necessary, and publish the resolution ; without this the board was without power or authority to act, and the demurrer was properly sustained. The court will readily see the necessity for the adoption and publication of the resolution as provided for.
Tinder the scheme deducible from the section above cited, the majority of the resident owners of property on said street, etc., can put a stop to the improvement by filing with the court their protest. Suppose no resolution is published, what notice have they of the contemplated improvement, and how is the majority to get into court ? Certainly the court intended to hold in Nugent v. Jachson, 72 Miss., 1040, that unless the law had provided for proper notice, it would have been unconstitutional in that there would be no due process of law.
The notice served by the street commissioner contains nothing about the necessity for the improvement, and there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that the city council of Greenville at any time made an order directing the street commissioner to give such notice, and unless such an order was adopted by the council, and appears on its minutes, the street commissioner had no authority to act, and the notice, if it was proper in form, and was a proper notice otherwise, would be void. And without proper notice to defendant, the complainant had no power or authority to act in the premises, and the court below properly sustained the demurrer, and its decision should be affirmed.

Opinion:
Terral, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
Tt appears from the record in this case that appellee, a citizen of Greenville, owned a lot in said city, namely, lot 15, on the west side of Walnut street, between Main street and Central avenue; that on the lOth day of October, 1895, the city council of Greenville, in pursuance of § 3011, aim. code 1892, by resolution declared that "the hereinafter mentioned and described improvements and repairs of sidewalks in said city are necessary, and to this end notice is hereby given that the city council will cause to be constructed or repaired the sidewalks of said city, and that said improvements or repairs shall be made on Walnut street, on west side, from Main street to Central, of brick or concrete, nine feet wide." In February, Í897, the street supervisor of said city notified Mrs. TIarvie to build said sidewalk. Thereafter, in 1898, Mrs. TIarvie having declined to make said sidewall!;, the city constructed the same at a cost of $120.25. Thereafter, in August, 1899, the city council of Greenville ordained that said lot 15 be assessed for said $120.25, and declared a lien on said lot to exist in • favor of said city for said sum of money, and directed the city attorney to enforce said lien for the collection of said debt. The city, setting out in its bill the above facts, impleaded Mrs. TTarvie in the chancery court of Washington county,- and 'demanded a decree for said $120.25, and for a condemnation of said lot 15 for the satisfaction thereof. Mrs. ITarvie demurred to said bill. The demurrer was sustained, and the city appealed.
The objection we find to the proceeding of the city of Green-ville is," that the city council did not specify, in advance of the work being done, that the owners of the lots abutting on Walnut street should bear the whole expense of building said sidewalk. In fact, to our apprehension of the matter, the city, by its ordinance, indicated its purpose to construct this sidewalk at the sole expense of the city. In Nugent v. City of Jackon, 72 Miss., 1040 (18 So. Rep., 493), the ordinance there upheld expressly declared that the owners of the property abutting on the street should bear the entire expense of building the sidewalk. No such purpose, as we think, was inferable from the ordinance in this case. On the contrary, we think the fair inference is that the city of Greenville will make the sidewalk upon its sole credit. If the terms "special improvements" of themselves import that the owners of abutting lots shall bear the whole expense of building.sidewalks, then the question is settled. We know of no dictionary or book of definitions of any sort that defines the phrase "special improvements" as meaning that the entire expense of making sidewalks shall be borne by the proprietors of lots along which they are constructed. The contrary is manifest from 2 Dill, Mun. Oorp., sec. 752 et seq.; Cooley, Tax'n (2d ed.), 637 ei seq. If the tax is to be levied upon abutting lot owners, we think that it should be so determined at the very beginning of the proceeding, so that the property owners may have opportunity to protest against the improvement, and so protect themselves against the expense. They would have no occasion, or at least reason, to protest if the cost was to be borne only in part by themselves. Nor these reasons Mr. Justice Calhoon and I are of opinion that the decree of the court below should be affirmed, no't merely because five days' notice is not averred to have been given, for evidently that was not the ground of the decree, but because the ordinance of October 10, 1895, is fatally and irremediably defective.
Affirmed.