Case Name: Alexander McConnell v. Simon Kenton
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1799-10
Citations: 1 Hughes 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: Alexander McConnell v. Simon Kenton.
Judges: 
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 257–322

Head Matter:
Alexander McConnell v. Simon Kenton.
In Chancery.
Simon Kenton, on the 20th day of December, 1779, obtained from the commissioners the following certificate, to-wit:
“Simon Kenton this day claimed a settlement and pre-emption to a tract of land in the district of Kentucky, lying on Elkhorn, joining Col. Preston’s survey at the Cave spring, on the southwest side, by improving the same and residing in the country ever since the year 1775. Satisfactory proof being made to the court, they áre of opinion that the said Butler has a right to a settlement of 400 acres of land, including the said improvement, and the pre-emption of 1,000 acres adjoining, and that a certificate issue accordingly.”
And on the 3d day of February, in the year 1780, he entered his certificate with the county surveyor in the following words, to-wit:
“Simon Kenton enters 400 acres by certificate, lying on Elkhorn, in the corner between Col. Preston’s survey at the Cave spring and Douglass’ line.”
And having obtained a pre-emption warrant, and entered the same, and complied with the rules and: regulations prescribed by law, obtained a patent for both settlement and pre-emption.
Alexander McConnell having, on the 3d day of January, in the year 1780, as heir-at-law of Francis'McConnell, deceased, obtained the following certificate, to-wit:
“ Alexander McConnell, heir-at-law to Francis McConnell, deceased, this day claimed a settlement and pre-emption to a tract of land in the district of Kentucky, lying on the water's of the south fork of Elkhorn, waters of Kentucky; to include-the said decedent’s improvement; by the said decedent’s raising a crop of corn in the country in the year 1776. Satisfactory proof being made to the court, they are of opinion that the said McC.onnell has a right to a settlement of 400 acres of land, to in- elude the said improvement, and the pre-emption of 1,000 acres adjoining, and that a certificate issue accordingly.”
On the 3d day of February, in the year 1780, entered his said certificate with the county surveyor, in the following words, to-wit:
“ Alexander McConnell, heir-at-law to Francis McConnell, deceased, enters 400 acres in Kentucky, by virtue of a certificate, etc., lying on the waters of the South fork of Blkhorn, to include the said deceased’s improvement.”
And having surveyed the said 400 acres, so as to, interfere with the settlement of the said Simon Kenton, obtained a patent of elder date than that of the said Kenton, and sold and conveyed part of the land to Francis Keene.
This suit was brought in the supreme court for the district of Kentucky, and on the erection of the district into the State of Kentucky, was removed to the court of appeals : and although brought in the name of Kenton, was brought for the use of Joseph Frazier, to whom he had sold.
The annexed connected plat, No. 35, was returned in this cause, of which the following is an explanation:
AB CD, Kenton’s settlement as surveyed. A F G- H, McConnell’s settlement as surveyed. E, shown by McConnell as a corner of his settlement, but no corner found, abed, Kenton’s settlement, by direction of the defendant. 9 10 11 12, McConnell’s settlement, by direction-of the complainant, including the pond in the center. The dotted lines, and from 4 to E, part of McConnell’s pre-emption, according to survey. 1, the Blue spring. 2, Lyon’s spring. 3, Francis Keene’s spring, e to A and A to 7 8, part of Preston’s military survey. 4 to 5, a line of Ward’s military survey, surveyed by Douglass. 4 to G-, a line of Mary Frazier’s military survey.
The following is the pre-emption entry of the defendant, to-wit:
April 29, 1780. “Alexander McConnell, heir-at-law to Francis McConnell, enters 1,000 acres of-land upon'a pre-emption warrant, bounded by his settlement on the west, Douglass’ line on the south, and John Maxwell on the east, to include, the quantity.”
It was in proof in the cause, that Kenton had improved at Lyon’s spring, and had purchased that and the Blue spring.
And that Francis McConnell built a cabin, in the year 1776, at the pond, and that Alexander McConnell, the defendant, had chosen that improvement to lay the claim in for before the commissioners; and that the discovery that the pond was in a military survey, was not made until after the certificate had been obtained. It was also proved that the defendant Keene, before he completed his purchase, had notice of the complainant’s claim.
This cause was first argued in the court of appeals at the October term, in the year 1793.
Hughes for the complainant.
It is not material whether the certificate granted to the complainant is for an. actual settlement, or a village right; if only for the last, it is elder than the defendant McConnell’s, and his being a village right also, it is superior to his; for such claims can only take date from the location.
By the decision of the late supreme court for the district of Kentucky, in the case of Gonsilla v. Briscoe, the certificate of the commissioners and the entry with the surveyor are to be taken together.
Using this rule of construction, the complainant’s location will read thus:
“ On ELkhorn to ajjoin Col. Prestop’s survey at the Cave spring, on the south-west side, in the corner between Preston’s survey and Douglas’s line, to include his improvement.”
First. Call on Elkhorn. It is on the waters of Elkhorn, but although this call might be uncertain by itself, it is sufficiently explained by the second call, to-wit: to adjoin Preston’s survey on the south-west side, which it does.. The third call is to lie on the corner, between Preston’s survey and Douglass’ line ; Ward’s military survey was made by Douglass, and the line marked on the plat as Ward’s, was known by the name of Douglass’ line; and the defendant McConnell calls for it in his pre-emption by that name. It appears that Douglass’ line and Preston’s do not join or intersect, and therefore strictly speaking they form no corner, but Kenton must have supposed they did, and this call can certainly be only construed to mean that the complainant’s settlement should be run along Preston’s military line south-castwardly to the end, where the corners would have been, if the two lines had intersected. He could not have intended to run further to the south-east, for he calls to lie on the south-west side of Preston; and because the last call is to include his improvement. This is Lyon’s spring, and although the certificate shall be considered only as having granted a village right, still this is a material object of description.
The defendant’s certificate is like the complainant’s, for a village right, and was granted after the complainant’s. It is therefore inferior. Besides it was not granted for the land now in contest; the Pond spring being the improvement it calls to include. The defendant Keene, if the purchaser of one claim without notice of a distinct and independent claim to the same spot, could shelter himself by the want of notice, can not in this case be protected, for notice of Kenton’s claim is proved before he completed his title.
Nicholas for the defendant.
I will consider this case :
First. Upon the merits of the two claims.
Second. As far as the defendant Keene is interested in the dispute.
First. Upon the merits of the two claims.
Kenton obtained a certificate for a settlement and pre-emption, lying on Elkhorn, joining Preston’s survey, at the Cave spring, on the south-west side, by improving the same and residing in the country ever since the year 1775 ; has a right to a settlement of 400 acres, including the said improvement, and a pre-emption of 1,000 acres adjoining.
I will consider :
First. The'fóundation of the claim.
Second. The location of it. And •
Third. The manner in which it has been surveyed.
First. The foundation of the claim. How far it is inquirable into.
■ The commissioners acted in a double capacity, as judges and as agents for the commonwealth.
In granting certificates to the prejudice of others, they acted as a court; and so far may their proceedings bo inquired to.
In granting lands to which no other person had a right, they acted as agents for the commonwealth, and in this case their certificate must be final, for the commonwealth by receiving the consideration has confirmed their acts.
As a court, the commissioners were a court of limited and special jurisdiction, and the powers of'such courts shall be construed strictly. 3 Black. Com. 85 ; 2-Ins. 584; 1 Yes. 471; 1 Morg. Ess. 174; 1 Durnf. 776 ; 1 Black. Rep. 25 ; Cowj). 29.
A special authority must be strictly pursued, and appear to be so on.the face of the proceedings. 1 Stra. 8, 26; 1 Durnf. 151; Cowp. 29.
Although the certificate of the commissioners may be conclusive evidence as to what was within their jurisdiction, yet it is not so as to what was not within their jurisdiction. 1 Moi’g. Ess. 174 ; 2 Durnf. 209 ; Amb. 164, 294; Hard. Ca. 186-7; Burr, 23, 28; Bull N. P. 173; 1 Esp. 284.
Although by the constitution of a court, their decisions are final, yet if they exceed their jurisdiction, their determinations may be set aside. 2 Black. 1331-2; 2 Wils. 384-5 ; Burr, 1044, 1458,1460"; Gilb. Rep. 247.
It appears by the act of assembly of 1784, p. 23, which is a declaratory act, that it was the intention of the legislature that the courts should inquire into the legality of certificates.
Kenton’s certificate is granted him for improving the land, and residing in the country ever since 1775.
No settlements and pre-emptions could bo legally granted for improving, land; they were given by law for different services, and the act, in a subsequent clauso, takes up the subject of improvements, and gives the person making such improvement a right to a pre-emption only.
The improving the land, then, being no legal foundation for a claim to a settlement and pre-emption, that part of the certificate may be laid out of the question.
“Residing in the country ever since 1775,” the law after having declared that settlers should be entitled to a settlement and preemption, supposing that the description which had been given of those who were to be considered as settlers was too vague, it adds: “ and to prevent doubts concerning settlements, it is hereby declared that no family shall be entitled to the allowance granted to settlers by this act, unless they have made a crop of corn in the country, or resided there at least one year since the time of their settlement.” This being the parliamentary exposition, the court is bound by it, and can not give a different one. 3 P. "Wins. 491; 2 Burr, 1151, 2104; 2 Black. Rep. 717, 718; Salk. 534.
So that unless a man had raised corn in the country, he must have made a settlement in it, and resided in the country one year since that settlement. But nothing of this appears from the certificate; it is only “for residing in the country ever since 1775,” as residing without settlement preceding it, could not give a right to a settlement and pre-emption, this certificate was given without legal authority, and is therefore void.
There is but one possible construction which can make the certificate good, that is “ by improving the same,” was meant a settlement made by Kenton on this land. But this construction will be in the teeth of the words of the law; because the law clearly distinguishes between improvements made by improvers, and settlements made by settlers, and gives a greater proportion of land to the one than to the other.
To say, therefore, that when a man improved land, he shall be considered as having made a settlement; and that a person for improving shall be entitled to the reward given only to those making settlements, is doing away the distinction established by law, and confounding together those things which it meant to be kept separate and distinct.
If I am right, then, in this construction of law, the commissioners in granting a certificate for a settlement and pre-emption, for residing in the country ever since 1775, exceeded their authority, and having done so their certificate is void, and could give Kenton no right.
But supposing the court can support the certificate, by construing the words “ by improving the same,” to mean a settlement made by Kenton on the land, it must follow as a necessary conse quence, that this settlement must have been made by him on the land claimed by him more than one year prior to the granting his certificate, which was granted on the 20th of December, 1779; because the law says : “ or resided there at least one year since the time of their settlementthe certificate then with this construction, will amount to this: that Kenton’s claim was put in and allowed, for his having made a.settlement on the land claimed by him, and his having resided in the country twelve months since that settlement, and that his settlement of 400 acres was to include the settlement so made by him; whereas it appears by the evidence that he made no improvement there till the last of December, 1779.
Secondly. The location of Kenton’s right.
First. With the commissioners “ laying on Elkhorn this would carry us to the main creek, and not to one of its forks ; the distinction was then known as well as now, as appears by Frazier’s pre-emption entry, McConnell’s certificate and settlement entry, all of which call for the South fork of Elkhorn ; therefore this call contradicts his survey.
“Joining Preston’s survey at the Cave sprung on the south-west side;” this gives the claim some degree of specialty, as it fixes the side of Preston’s survey on which it was to lie. But as Preston’s line is 490 poles long, it is altogether uncertain on what part of it Kenton’s claim was laid, therefore any person who located a subsequent claim, had a right to locate any part of Pfeston’s line; provided they left Kenton as much of it as would let him have his survey in a reasonable form; this McConnell has done fully; because it is from the corner of his settlement to Preston’s north-west corner 282 poles. Whereas 253 poles in that line would have been sufficient to give Kenton his 400 acres in a square, which would be the most disadvantageous form it could be placed in for McConnell; and this would have placed both of his improvements nearer the center of his claim than they stand now.
This principle has already been established and acted upon in the cases of pre-emptions, which call generally to adjoin settlements.
And McConnell having surveyed first, and Kenton having notice of his survey before he made his own, he was bound to take notice of it in making his survey, as his own entry was vague, and ground enough was left for him.
Therefore from this call (which from the proof will appear to be the only special one) Kenton has no right to complain of the manner in which McConnell has surveyed, or to take one foot of the land included in his settlement.
“Has a right to á settlement of 400 acres, including said improvement.” This evidently means to include the improvement made by Kenton on the land, for the making of which his certificate was granted to him.
■ To make, this call for Kenton’s improvement have any effect on his claim against McConnell, he must come forward with full and sufficient proof of an improvement made by him on the land which, he now claims, at least one year prior to the date of his certificate.
The bill does not state that he has included any such improvement. No proof is brought that he has included any such improvement ; therefore as his certificate was illegal except it was given to him in consequence of a settlement made on this land, and as it was necessary for him to show an improvement made by him on this land, to prove that it was the spot granted him by the commissioners, the entire want of such proof must destroy his claim.
To this it may be said, that it appears from the evidence that he had purchased two springs and one improvement from William McConnell, the one at the Blue spring, the other at Lyon’s spring, before he obtained his certificate. Two replies may be made to this. First, That the purchasing an improvement and residing in the country since 1775, would not give a right to a certificate for a settlement and pre-emption. Secondly, That if it would have been sufficient for the commissioners to grant such a certificate it is improper evidence in this case; because the certificate does not state that it was granted on such foundation, but for Kenton’s improving the lands; and because the bill does not state any such purchase, but only refers to the certificate; therefore his claim by purchase not being put in issue or made any part of his case, no testimony can be admitted to show such purchase. Rule of Court; 2 Ld. Raym. 1101; 2 Atk. 333 to 40 ; 2 Stra. 1221; 1 Morg. Ess. 4; 3 Black. Com. 367; Bun*, 304: Bunb. 321; 1 Yern. 86. And even if this was the improvement, and he had a right to include it, the mode of surveying I contend for would include it in a more proper manner than ho has done.
The only testimony which has been brought to show that Kenton ever made any improvement on this land is Samuel Johnston’s, who says Kenton was improving at Lyon’s spring, the last of January, or first of February, 1780; and William Stephenson a few days before Christmas, 1779, but either of these days was subsequent to the'lst of January, 1778, and to the 20th of December, 1779, when his certificate was granted (instead of twelve months at least prior to it) ; and therefore any improvement made by him at that time can -not support his claim.'
But admitting for a moment that this claim can be supported, I will
Secondly. Examine Kenton’s location with the surveyor.
This entry being subsequent to McConnell’s certificate can give him no right against McConnell, although it may give up land to which Kenton would have had a right tinder his certificate. “Lying on Elkhorn in the'corner, between Preston’s survey at the Cave spring and Douglass’ line.”
From this call it was evidently the intention of the locator that it should join Douglass’ line as well as Preston’s survey.
To make it do so the settlement should be surveyed in the same figure that Kenton- has surveyed it, only extending from Preston’s line the course continued until it intersected. Douglass’ line, and laying in the corner between the two.
So that if he is confined to his location with the commissioners, he will not interfere at all with McConnell’s settlement, and if he is allowed to change his ground by his entry with the surveyor, which can not be against a claim in existence prior to that entry, you may put him in the corner, and a survey three times as long as wide would include his improvement. This shows he has surveyed wrong, even according to his entry with the surveyor. But even if had surveyed right according to that entry, it could not avail him against McConnell.
I will now consider McConnell’s claim. The certificate was granted the 3d of January, 1780, for raising a crop of corn in 1776, “lying on-the south fork of Elkhorn, to include Francis McConnell’s improvement.”
The entry with the surveyor the 3d of February, 1780, was in the same words, so that it may be laid aside.
The foundation of this certificate, “raising a crop of corn in 1776,” was clearly a legal one. It is declared to be so by parliamentary exposition, and nothing shall contradict it. 3 P. Wms. 491; 2 Burr, 1151, 2104; 2 Black. Bep. 717-18 ; Salk. 53-4.
The land does lie on the waters of the South fork, and, in this, much greater precision is used than in Kenton’s, and it does include Francis McConnell’s improvement.
I will no'w consider the manner in which McConnell has surveyed his claim. From William McConnell’s deposition, the improvement he sold Kenton was at the Blue spring, and although he says he intended Lyon’s spring should go with it, there was no improvement there, and the certificate and entry call but for one; therefore, it must be that at the Blue spring.
McConnell has surveyed so as to leave him considerably more than half way between Keene’s and Lyon’s, and three-fourths between Keene’s and the Blue spring.
If Kenton’s claim is a good one, and he has a right to survey here from his locations with the commissioners and the surveyor, the distance ought to be divided between the improvements.
First. From the custom of the country and former decisions.
Secondly. From the agreements between William McConnell and Francis McConnell, of which William McConnell informed Kenton before he purchased.
The propriety of dividing the distance between improvements is admitted by the bill, and there is proof of an agreement in the company, of which Kenton had notice.
If this division between the improvements was proper, either from the general custom or the special agreement, Kenton has no claim, and his bill must be dismissed. From the superior equity of Francis McConnell’s claim, he must prevail. From the improvements made by him on the land, and the corn l’aised by him adjoining it, he was clearly entitled to an actual settlement. See the case of Grow v. Dougherty.
Our case is much stronger than that. Crow raised corn in a station. McConnell raised corn on what he then considered as a part of his claim, though he discovered it was afterward Preston’s ; he raised the corn at one of many improvements adjoining, and all intended to secure the land for himself.
Although the certificate does not mention it, it is proper for us to give evidence of it; because Kenton can not support any claim, but by parole proof dehors his certificate. Because McConnell, having the legal title in him, and Kenton coming forward with an equitable claim only, parole proof is proper to rebut his equity, and to show that McConnell has a superior equitable right to this land. 2 Tern. 253-4, 593-4; Talb. 80, 242; 2 Yes. 28; 1 Yes. 323; 2 Atk. 99; Grow v. Dougherty.
From all these considerations, the court would decide against Kenton, if the question was between him and McConnell only.
I will now consider the question as far as the defendant Keene is interested in the dispute, 'and show that if Kenton could prevail against McConnell, Keene must prevail against Kenton; because,
First. Keene is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice.
Secondly. Because Kenton has been guilty of such neglect as shall bar his right against a subsequent purchaser; and
Thirdly. His now setting up his claim against Keene, after suffering him to purchase without giving him notice of his claim, and after delivering him possession under his purchase from McConnell, and after Keene had made such valuable improvements under that possession, is such a fraud as will bar his remedy in equity against Keene.
His claim is that of a bona fide purchaser without notice, etc. 2 Yes. 463, 600, 704; Amb. 766, 153, 284; 3 Atk. 304; 2 Ca. in Chan. 73, 208; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 195; Durnf. ,762-75 ; 1 Ycrn. 27, 542.
From these authorities, it must be-decided in Keene’s favor as a purchaser, etc. But if there is doubt on that head, I rely,
Secondly. Upon this, that Kenton has been guilty of such neglect as will be a sufficient bar of any equity he might have, even against McConnell, but, at all events, ag'ainst Keene as a subsequent purchaser, etc.
It appears from the proofs that McConnell surveyed his settlement the 10th February, 1783. That his patent is dated the 10th January, 1785, and McConnell’s'deed to Keene is dated the 10th August, 1786. That Frazier became the real proprietor of this settlement and pre-emption in February, 1780. That in 1782 he appointed Johnston as his agent; that Johnston had notice of McConnell’s survey the 11th of February, 1783, the very day after it was made, and that the first step taken by Frazier to assort his claim was the bringing of this suit, which was brought on the 24th October, 1788.
Upon these facts I infer, that notice to Frazier’s agent, being as effectual as notice to Frazier himself (see 1 Yes. 62; 3 Atk. 36; 1 Brown. 351; Cas. in Chan. 38; Amb. 426-7; Treat, of Eq. 69, 70; 2 Yern. 610), it was his duty to have" entered a caveat against issuing of a patent to McConnell.
That although chancery will give relief against a patent in extraordinary cases, yet it will not at the instance of a party who had sufficient notice to have stopped it. See Chan. Eev. p. 94, sec. 9, p. 96, 132; Pre. Chan. 198; 1 .P. Wms. 495; Harrod v. Givens, in the old supreme court; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 246; Talb. 173-4.
That the not entering the caveat was doing injustice both to McConnell and Keene. To McConnell, as it put him to the expense of patenting the land, and deprived him of the chance which he would then have had of getting other land. See Chan. Eev. 96, 169. To Keene, as it prevented him from knowing that there was a-dispute in the title, which the caveat would have given him notice of, and gave'him a false confidence in McConnell’s right from his having a patent; therefore, it brings this case fully within those rules of equity which, declare, that a plaintiff to be entitled to success in that court must come from a pure fountain, and have been guilty of no fraud or neglect which operates to the prejudice of the other side. See 2 Yes. 107, 371; Prin. Eq. 34; Treat, of Eq. 15, 16 ; 2 Yern. 696-7 ; Ambler, 647; 1 P. Wms. 264 ; 2 Ibid, 281.
“ Yigilantibus non dormientibus servit lex.” Yigilantibus jurce' sub - veniunt, the case of Harrod v. Givens, March, 1789, comes fully up to this — there was no purchase there.
Therefore, I conclude that as Frazier has been guilty of gross neglect, -which has been prejudicial to both McConnell and Keene, it shall be a bar to his remedy against both, and more especially against Keene as a purchaser, etc. But supposing that such neglect would not, in the .general, be a bar to a relief in equity against a patentee, or a subsequent purchaser from him without notice, yet I contend:
That Frazier’s conduct in this particular case ought to be a bar to his remedy against Keene.
Frazier was at that time living at Lyon’s spring. It is highly improbable, if not impossible, that the purchase could have been made without his knowledge; if he did know of it, his not informing Keene is a sufficient bar to his claim. See 2 Atk. 49; Cas. in Chan. 47-8; 1 P. Wms. 394; 2 Eq. Cas. 610, 618; 2 Atk. 49; 1 Yes. 96 ; Brown, 357.
But his conduct as to the possession can admit of no doubt, and receive no palliation, though Keene had then bought and paid for land without knowing of his claim; it was all in the woods; if he had then insisted on his title, Keene would have foreborne to improve on it, but his giving up possession then, attended with the circumstances it was, was a waiver of his right, an acknowledgment of the goodness of McConnell’s claim, an inducement to Keene to expend his money and labor on the place, and though not a bar to a legal title, is a strong circumstance to rebut an equitable claim, as the setting up such a claim at a future day against Keene must be considered as a fraud, and therefore not entitled to relief in chancery.
See cases where a man stands still and encourages another to purchase. Where relief is frequently refused to a plaintiff on grounds which would not be sufficient to decree against him if he was a defendant. See 3 P. Wms. 12, 275; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 113 ; 1 P. Wms. 458-9; Cas. in Eq. 92, 96-7; 1 Durnf. 154; Prin. Eq. 25, 549.
Hughes, in reply.
As it is not my business to widen the inquiry, I shall not inquire into the propriety of the distinction taken by Col. Nicholas between the powers of the commissioners as a court and as agents of the commonwealth.
As agents, he admits their decisions to be final. As a court, he says it was their province to determine between contending claims. As agents, after the determination to grant a certificate.
Then, by his own doctrine, so far only as they adjudge the right, is the question open; but in whatever relates to the mode of expressing the certificate, their act is final. The dispute in this case before the commissioners was between Kenton and McConnell respecting the pond, and so far, according to the gentleman’s doctrine, the question is open to inquiry.
But ho goes on to inquire what right Kenton has under the commonwealth. The light in which,I view this business is this : the commissioners were, in all'cases, to give an adjudication on claims submitted to them, but in one case they were to issue a summons. The object of that summons was to enable one party claiming a right to a certain spot, to compel another setting up a right to the same spot to come in and submit his claim to the decision of the commissioners.
But this is no proof that a certificate granted by the commissioners was to be of no validity, because no summons had been applied for; for, in all cases, public notice of the time and place of the sitting of the commissioners was given, in order to enable claimants to lay before them the merits of their claims.
I should suppose the court of chancery here would do as the court in England did in the case reported in 2 Yern. 76.
The court there would not inquire into the probate, but refused relief on account of the fraud of the complainant; so, although the commissioners, in the exercise of their jurisdiction to hear and. determine the rights of claimants for particular services, may have given the law- a different construction from that which this court would now give it, had it never been in operation, I should suppose the court would refuse to inquire into the propriety of such adjudication, and would refuse its aid to perfect the title only where it was apparent a certificate had been obtained from the commissioners by imposition and deceit.
I confess I do not see. the propriety of the distinction between the right of those to inquire into the certificates who had existing claims and those whose claims have since originated.
The certificate obtained without fraud must, I should suppose, either be received as a proof of what appears on the face of it or not.
Col. Nicholas resorts to the law of 1784, p. 23, to prove that the services for which the certificate was granted may be inquired into ; I think it proves the reverse. He calls it a declaratory; I consider it as an explanatory amendatory law.
A declaratory act is an act declaring what was the law, but this law is not even declaratory, explanatory, or amendatory of the act of 1779 ; this is proved by the title. It is “An act to explain and amend an act entitled an act to amend an act,” and the act to amend an act was the act of 1781, which gave the power formerly possessed by the commissioners to the county courts.
Let us expound this act of 1784 by rule:
First. What was the common law.
Second. The mischief.
Third. The remedy. And,
Fourth. The true reason of the remedy.
First. The common law has nothing to do with the question. The right was confirmed by statute; the tribunal created by statute.
Second. The mischief was, that after the jurisdiction was transferred to the county courts from the commissioners, the legality of a certificate could not be contested, although there was neither general or special notice of the application for it.
Third. The remedy: the right to contest, sub modo.
Fourth, The true reason of the remedy: I think three reasons may be given why, in the manner directed by the act, this inquiry might be made as to the certificates granted by the county courts which do not apply to the case of those granted by the commissioners.
First. By the act of 1779, the commissioners to be appointed in each district were not to be inhabitants of the said district.
This was well calculated to prevent partiality, and although the danger in the county courts was greater, no such provision of course could exist, as the power was given to the magistrates of the county.
Second. The commissioner’s formed a court for one special purpose only, and sat for a particular time, and beside were directed to give twenty days’ previous notice of their sitting.
The county court, on the contrary, sat every month to do their ordinary business, and there is nothing which would lead a man to attend their sittings to save his claim, unless he had express notice, and that was not required by law.
Third. The remedy is only given in caveats, a summary proceeding prior to the emanation of a grant, the decisions in which it was supposed by the law (whatever may be the case in practice) would be speedy; and it might, as given, be given with more safety than if extended to the certificates granted by the commissioners. Because it relates to a certificate granted at a later period, and because it provides that the testimony of the court or officer present when the certificate was granted shall be received; surely, if it had been intended to extend the provisions of this law to the case of certificates granted by the commissioners, some provision also would have been made in such cases as to the testimony lost by death, etc.
I do not agree with Col. Nicholas, that the court of commissioners was a court of limited and special jurisdiction. They formed a court of special, but not of limited jurisdiction. The cases cited are of particular jurisdictions, derogating from the general jurisdiction of the courts of common law.
In our case there is nothing to attach the jurisdiction, either of a court of common law or chancery, until the certificate is granted.
So far as the commissioners heard and determined disputes for settlement or improvement, they kept within the bounds of their jurisdiction. If they had undertaken to adjudge on the right of the owner of a military survey, it would have been coram non judice.
The case from G-ilbert’s Reports, 247, which was cited to show that if a court of limited and special jurisdiction, whose determination is final when within its jurisdiction, exceeds its jurisdiction, its judgment may be set aside,-is a strong one on principles of policy and general safety to support the decisions of the commissioners.
It was the case of the 'forfeited Irish lands, the disputed claims to which were settled by commissioners appointed for that purpose. The question was, whether a disposition of the land by .the commissioners was not coram non judice. The court said it was the intention of the act to provide for the settlement of those interested, and also for the peace and quiet of the kingdom, and if they adjudged the certificate to be void, no man could foresee how many other certificates and patents might be found contrary to the directions of the act.
Col. Nicholas contends that no certificate for a settlement and pre-emption could be granted for improving land. This I admit, provided the improving was not accompanied with a year’s residence or raising a crop of corn.
It is true the certificate only states the evidence of the fact, instead of the fact itself; but that evidence is conclusive when the certificate is found to express, in another part of it, that Kenton had resided in the country from the year 1775 to the time' the certificate was granted; for, it is certainly conclusive evidence that a man was a settler who made an improvement and resided five years.
The law required no particular form or technical nicety in wording the certificates; they were almost all worded as this is. You can collect the date of McConnell’s settlement in no other way but from the time of his having had a crop of corn made.
He says, also, that Kenton having called for his improvement ought to prove that he had made it. It is only called for as an object of description, and does answer the description; it was Kenton’s in 1779, and was known as his.
It is also contended that we ought to adjoin Douglass’ line as we call for the corner. These entries taken together, as in Consilla v. Briscoe, that is the certificate and entry, read thus: “ To adjoin ¿Preston on the south-west, and to lie in the corner between Preston and Douglass.” The first call gives the base, but as Preston’s line was a long one, it was necessary to say on what part Kenton’s settlement should lay.
This is as well explained by the call as if a corner was actually formed by the intersection of Preston’s and Douglass’ lines, for the locator’s intention is evident to include his improvement, and to bind on Preston’s south-west line, to the corner where Douglass’ line was supposed by him to be.
There is nothing in McConnell’s certificate which describes any particular place, but the call for his improvement. Ilis chief improvement, it is proved, was at the Pond spring, and it is proved also that it was after 'he had obtained his certificate that the pond was discovered to be in Mary Frazier’s military survey.
There is also, if it should be considered necessary, sufficient proof of notice to Keene.
Breckenridge for complainant.
It has surprised me to hear what a number of cases from the English books have been cited in the course of this lengthy 'argument. Cited in a ease which I have considered as depending solely on an act of the assembly of Yirginia.
One of two things must be evident, either that this ease is very plain, that it may be seen at the first view, or so very abstracted that all these eases are necessary for the combat.
The complainant must show a complete claim in himself. Although these claims are equal-on principles equal in point of merit, the complainant’s is paramount in legality, prior in occupancy, paramount in law, because, it contains precision and certainty.
“ To adjoin Preston’s survey at the Cavé spring, on the southwest side.”
This is the only survey Preston had on Elkhorn, and was well known to Francis and William McConnell. This survey had a side and an end, and Kenton calls for the side.
If there is any defect in this call it is the length of Preston’s line, but this is cured by the entry with the surveyor, which, with the certificate, makes one entry. The requisites of a good entry are either that the entry itself will lead you to the place, or to.' some object which will lead you to it.
But I will not only show a good title in the complainant, but that it is paramount to the defendant’s in legal precision. ■
McConnell has obtained a certificate as assignee of Francis, for the said Francis’ having raised a crop of corn, to include the decedent’s improvement.
No place is ascertained by the raising corn, and the proof of the improvement is at another place; therefore, the claim depends on the call for the waters of. the South fork of Elkhorn, and is vague.
Let us now consider the legal objections to- Kenton’s claim. The point has perhaps never yet bpen settled hoiy fer the courts have a right to investigate the proceedings of the commissioners, but the arguments are strong against it.
Certificates are conclusive records of what they speak, and of the facts they state.
If a certificate states that A made an improvement in 1775, etc., the certificate is to be taken as conclusive evidence that he did make it before, and that he did make it then. (See the ease of Consilla v. Briscoe.)
The commissioners were sent'out to settle questions of law and of fact, depending upon testimony; the object was to receive the testimony before it was lost, to save expense and to quiet claims; and none of these objects would be attained if the decisions of the commissioners were not to be considered as final.
Either in England or America, a fact established by a court having competent jurisdiction is conclusive against the universe.
There must be a reason for all second adjudications. What, then, is the reason' that this fact is to be rejudged? If Kenton is now compelled to prove that which he was required to prove before the commissioners, he is entrapped, because he had no notice that, having then proved the fact, it would ever be necessary to prove it again. Could an appeal have been taken by McConnell from this decision ? He could have proceeded by caveat only, and that only in one instance provided for by law.
The distinction taken of the double capacity of the commissioners is too subtle and refined for mo.
The commissioners, in all cases, were to resort to evidence and to judge from the testimony. Where, then, is their double power ?
And if, after an adjudication in favor of' an individual, after he has obtained his certificate and paid the state the consideration, the propriety of granting it is to be inquired into, the holder of the certificate is completely duped.
The áct of 1781 is an explanatory law, and the judges are bound by it. But it only proves that, for evident reasons, on a caveat, the owner of a treasury warrant might go into the inquiry for what services a certificate had been granted by the county court.
It is not necessary to examine the gentleman’s authorities about limited jurisdictions, for we dispute with him at the very thresh-hold; we deny the power of any tribunal to examine into the decisions of the commissioners.
There are very few of the certificates which are to be found on the commissioners’ books which are worded alike.
I will refer the court to some of them.
William Combs obtained a certificate for a settlement and preemption, for residing twelve months before the year 1778. Host of the certificates for village rights state, that A this day claimed a right to a settlement and pre-emption in the district of Kentucky. In the following it is omitted, that is, John Clark’s, and in that the time of improving is mentioned. Benjamin Lynn’s is the same as Kenton’s.
Elizabeth Stevens, for residing from 1776.
James McCauley, improving the same and residing ever since 1776.
Margaret Pendergrass, improving the same and residing twelve months since her settlement.
George Holeman, by improving and residing in the country ever since 1776.
It is contended that Kenton’s certificate is neither for an actual settlement or a village right. This can not be. It must be either the one or the other.
Let us go back to first principles.
Are not all the claims granted by the law to settlors or improvers founded on different grades of occupancy?
To the actual, settler, who displayed not only his prowess by settling on the land, but the animus residendi. The land itself was given in preference to a pre-emptioner who might before have improved it, because this was the highest evidence of occupancy.
So the actual ^settler after 1778 is postponed to the 1,000 acre pre-emptioner, because his settlement is posterior in time. And the villager is also postponed, because the villager only evidences an intention to become an occupant.^
But as the commissioners were authorized to grant only two sorts of settlements and pre-emptions, if their certificate doe.s not express the claim they grant to have been granted for an actual settlement on the land, it could only give a right to land to which no other person had the right of pre-emption.
The case of Gonsüla v. Briscoe has determined the validity of the certificates, and it only remains for the holder to show the land.
Kenton has surveyed agreeably to his certificate and entry taken together, and McOonnell ought not to complain of the change he mad^ by his entry with the surveyor, for it is to his advantage

Opinion:
At the October term, in the year 1794, the following decree was pronounced:
By the Court.
On considering this cause, three questions arise :
Firstly. Whether the services as stated in the complainant's certificate entitled him, under the law, to a settlement and preemption; if not:
Secondly. Whether, as it appears on the face of the certificate itself, that it was granted illegally, this court has not a right to declare the certificate void in case of a contest with any other person holding a legal certificate.
Thirdly. If this court would not have a right to do so in the general, would it not be their duty to do so in this case, where the person claiming under the illegal certificate is complainant, and is demanding from the defendant, who has a legal right, land to which the complainant, from his own showing, has no claim built on any legal foundation.
As to the first question, the court, after examining the law, finds that there are two descriptions of persons only to whom the legislature has given the right of settlement and pre-emption. The first are the actual settlers, who at any time before the first day of January, 1778, had really and bona fide settled themselves or their families, or at his, her, or their charge had settled others, upon any waste or unappropriated lands on the western waters, to which no other person had any legal right or claim; to each and every family so settled the legislature has given 400 acres of land, to include the settlement.
The second are the villagers, who, for their greater safety, had settled themselves in villages and townships, under some agreement between them of laying off the same into town lots, to be divided among them, and had from necessity cultivated a piece of ground adjoining thereto in common.
To every such family the legislature, in consideration of their settlement, allowed the like quantity of land as was allowed to the actual settlers, adjacent or convenient to their respective village or town, and to which no other person had any right of preemption. The law then goes on to give the pre-emption of 1,000 acres to each kind of settler on the same terms and conditions, and to prevent dpubts concerning settlements the law declares that no family shall be entitled to the allowance granted to settlers unless they have made a crop of corn in the country, or resided in it at least one year since the time of their settlement.
Now, as there are only two descriptions of persons to whom the legislature has given the right of settlement and pre-emption, to-wit: the actual settler and villager, the explanatory clause evidently refers to those two only, by expressions peculiarly adapted to their respective situations, making the raising a crop of corn in the country by the villager, who bad been engaged in the cultiva-. tion of a piece of ground in common with his brother villagers the criterion of his merit, and one year's residence, at -least, of the actual settler, from the time of his settlement, as the criterion of his. That residence alone can give no right, is plain from .this consideration: that the claim of a settler in -consideration of settlement must include his settlement, and the claim of a villager can only.be for raising a crop of corn in the country; one or the other of which -being indispensably necessary under -the law to entitle a person to a settlement and pre-emption, excludes altogether the idea of .a person's being entitled for improving, residence, or any other services but those expressly mentioned in the law.
Therefore, the court is of opinion that the service, as stated in the commissioners' certificate, can -not, -under the law, .entitle the complainant to a settlement and pre-emption.
Secondly. "Whether, as it .appears bn the face -of the certificate itself, -that it was granted illegally, -this co.ur-t has not a right to .declare the -certificate void in case of a contest with any person holding a legal certificate.
It appears from the law-and the nature of the case that the .court of commissioners was a court of special and limited jurisdiction ; if so, then it is a principle in law that whenever a court .of special and limited jurisdiction exceeds its powers, -and appears to have done so on the face of their proceedings, that a judgment given by them in such a case may be set aside at ,any-subsequent time.
Therefore, a certificate which, on the face of it, .appears to have been given for servioos which the law did not authorize a certificate to be granted for, must be void ; because the -commissioners, by their own showing, hav.e exceeded their jurisdiction, and as far as they have done so their judgment'can never-be opposed to a legal-right, as then the commissioners had -no jurisdiction to grant a certificate but in the cases specified in the law; and as in the present-case it appears on the face of the certificate that the commissioners have exceeded their jurisdiction in granting a certificate of a right of settlement and pre-emption for services not enumerated -in the ,law.
The court is of opinion that it has a right to declare such illegal certificate void in case of a contest with any person holding a legal certificate. ' But,
Thirdly. Admitting that this court had not a right in the general to declare such illegal certificate void when contending with a legal one, has it not a right, and is it not their duty to do so in this case, where the person claiming under the illegal certificate is complainant, and is demanding, from a man having a legal right, the land to which, from his own showing, he has no claim built on any legal foundation.
The court, upon examining the authorities cited upon this head, find that chancery frequently makes a great distinción in her determinations, according to the situation of the person to be affected by her decisions, and an objection is often held to be sufficient to prevent a plaintiff from getting a decree, which would not be sufficient to found a decree upon against a defendant. In consequence of this principle in equity, it has frequently been determined that, notwithstanding the judgment of a court having competent jurisdiction was so far out of the reach of a court of chancery as to j>re-vent her from interfering to set aside that judgment upon a suit brought for that purpose; yet, if application was made to enforce that judgment, chancery would not aid it by its decree without examining into the foundation and equity of the judgment, and if, upon examination, it was found to have been obtained either illegally or unjustly, would altogether refuse her assistance to enforce such judgment.
If, then, these certificates, when illegally granted, could not be set aside by a suit in chancery brought for that purpose, yet, upon a suit brought to enforce one of them obtained contrary to law, and to the prejudice of a man having a real claim under the law, chancery will refuse to enforce and give her sanction to a certificate both illegally and unjustly obtained. Inasmuch, therefore, as the complainant's certificate was illegally obtained from the commissioners, as appears upon the face of it, and the court should not in the general have a right to declare such illegal certificate to be void when contending with a legal one, yet, in the present case, where the person claiming under the illegal one is complainant, and is demanding from the defendant, who has a legal right, land to which, from the complainant's own showing, he has no claim built on any legal foundation. This court, agreeably to the principles above stated, conceive it to be their duty not only to re fuse their aid to the complainant, but to pronounce his certificate void, so far, at least, as respects the present contest.
It is, therefore, considered by the court that the complainant's bill be dismissed, and that the complainant pay to the defendants their costs in this behalf expended, etc.