Case Name: BLAND v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1954-10-13
Citations: 211 Ga. 178
Docket Number: 18740
Parties: BLAND v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., and Head and Mobley, JJ., who dissent. Almand, J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 211
Pages: 178–185

Head Matter:
18740.
BLAND v. THE STATE.
Submitted September 16, 1954
Decided October 13, 1954
Rehearing denied November 10, 1954.
Robert J. Duffy, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Ryan, Solicitor-General, Sylvan A. Garfunkel, Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Assistant Solicitors-General, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Rubye G. Jackson, contra.

Opinion:
Duckworth, Chief Justice.
Since the evidence amply supports the verdict and there is no merit in the second special ground of the amended motion for new trial, the fate of this case rests entirely upon the first special ground, which complains because, in response to a request by the jury after it had deliberated some time, the judge read and discussed some of the published rules and regulations of the Pardon and Parole Board concerning the granting of paroles and pardons by the board.
Unfortunately, this court has heretofore been unable to render a unanimous decision on this precise question. McRae v. State, 181 Ga. 68 (181 S. E. 571); Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416 (47 S. E. 2d 54); Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65 (70 S. E. 2d 710). But we have unanimously decided another and similar question, to wit: The prosecuting attorney can lawfully argue these rules and the possibility of a pardon or parole. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 63 (52 S. E. 2d 294). See cases therein cited and also Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 675 (75 S. E. 2d 6). If, as held, the solicitor-general is allowed to discuss the law pertaining to pardons and paroles, and we are all bound by the full bench decision so holding, is it not paradoxical to hold that the judge can not explain that law to the jury in a non-partisan and fair manner?. Do we stand for concealing law, bearing directly upon punishment for crime, from the jury which must fix the punishment? Is it to be the policy of judicially silencing the trial judge on that matter while it is freely tossed around by a partisan counsel? Finally, can it be seriously contended that the members of society, the relations of the slain, and even the jurors themselves, are not entitled to have the jury correctly informed of the true meaning of their verdict containing a recommendation to mercy which they can make, arbitrarily and without reason, before they take such far-reaching action? How can the law claim to be just, fair, and right while it demands that jurors act blindly on that matter? What would those who see virtue in such concealment have had the judge to have done in this case? The jury on its own motion asked for information on pardons and paroles. Should they have been told that it was none of their business? Had that been done after they showed that they were thinking about it, is it not perfectly indicated that, having failed to learn that the accused could not soon escape life imprisonment by pardon or parole, they would have returned a verdict without a recommendation? Judges ought to abandon the old erroneous ideas that jurors are robots, motionless when left to their own resources. The jurors here demonstrate their thinking powers, their independence, and their dependability, and judges should try to keep up with jurors instead of continuing to tie and trip them. The accused remained silent when the judge answered the jury's questions and thus waived any objection by so doing. Gravett v. State, 74 Ga. 191. It follows that the court did not err in refusing to grant the motion for new trial, as amended, as there is no merit in any of the grounds thereof.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., and Head and Mobley, JJ., who dissent. Almand, J., concurs specially.