Case Name: EDWARD P. FERRY, Respondent, v. JOHN L. STREET, Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1886-06
Citations: 4 Utah 521
Docket Number: 
Parties: EDWARD P. FERRY, Respondent, v. JOHN L. STREET, Appellant.
Judges: Zane, C. J., and Twiss, J., concurred.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 521–537

Head Matter:
EDWARD P. FERRY, Respondent, v. JOHN L. STREET, Appellant.
Sohopl Sections — When Reserved. — Sections sixteen and thirty-six of the several townships of Utah Territory are not reserved from sale under the general land laws of the United States until such sections have been officially surveyed.
Decision of Department — Conclusive in Ejectment. — The decision of the land department of the United States that land is non-mineral, or is unoccupied, is conclusive on the courts when a patent, issued in pursuance of such decision is collaterally attacked.
Unappropriated — Squatters not Seeking Title. — The public lands of the United States are not appropriated simply by virtue of being occupied by squatters not seeking to obtain the Government title.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court of the third district, and from an order refusing a new trial. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court on the rehearing.
Mr. Presley Denny, for appellant.
As to the first: Sections numbered 16 and 36 in each of the territories, etc., “Shall be reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools in the several territories, and in the states hereafter to he erected out of the same:” Sec. 1946, Revised Statutes, Comp. Laws, p. 48.
In the Organic Act the language is, “it shall be, and the same are hereby reserved, for the purposes, etc.” Sec. 13, Organic Act, p. 34.
In this case the patent being for lands on section 16, which were reserved from sale, and appropriated, was issued without authority of- law, and the officers had no authority to issue the same.
It has always been the policy of the government to set aside sec. 16 of every township for the maintenance of public schools. The ordinaxrce of 1787 being the first enactment: Cooper v. Robería, 18 How., 177.
This suit was in ejectment for a part of section 16. The court say, plaintiffs case affirms, that this section had been appropriated to the State of Michigan for the use of schools: p. 176.
The appropriation of public lands, for that object, became a fundamental principle by the ordinance of 1787, which settled the terms of compact between the people and states of the northwestern territory, and the original states, unalterable except by consent: 18 How., 177; 21 Wal., 660, 670.
In Ham v. State of Missouri, 18 How., 126, the court in commenting upon the acts of March 6th, 1820, and July 19th, 1820, says, “that it amounts not merely to a grant for the use of schools, of the 16th section, but to a positive condition or mandate, so far as Congress can make it, for the dedication of those sections to that object:” p. 131.
“Such lands were appropriated to a specific and permanent pitrpose, and as to these lands, sales, and every other disposition, inconsistent with such dedication, were expressly inhibited:'’ Id., 131, 132.
The instructions, given and refused in that case (p. 130), which the supreme court say, were correct, decide, that the various acts of Congress with reference to sec. 16, operate as a grant, for the use of schools, and that such reservation, attaches to private land claims which had previous to such donation, been claimed by individuals: See also Kissel v. St. Louis Public Schools, 18 How., 19; Minnesota M. Co. v. The National M. Co., 11 Mich., 186; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; Caines v. Nicholson,• 9 How., 539.
In 11th Mich, above, the plaintiff who claimed a U. S. patent and selection made in 1845, insisted, that until the 16th section had been identified by survey of public lands, the Federal Government had power to dispose o£ such lands.
The survey was not made until 1847. Brit the court says, “from the policy of the government it was never intended to authorize the sale by the United States of any lands, which might fall ‘within sec. 16.”
In Kissel v. St. Louis Schools, the act reserving certain lands was passed in 1812, they were not surveyed until 1840. The school lands were not designated until 1843, an entry was made in 1836, under the pre-emption laws of 1814 and 1816, yet the court held that such lands were appropriated and not subject to sale or entry: p. 27.
In the United States v. Carpenter, 111 U. S., 349. “The lands were reserved, the entry void. It matters not whether the'lands had been surveyed or not.”
But these lands were surveyed and section 16 known when located with the scrip. The northern line of section 16 had been run officially. Section 9 and the tier of sections north, in the same township, had been surveyed and returned to the land office officially, and the whole section surveyed prior to location.
Where the United States agreed to grant a certain quantity of lands to be selected after the lands had been surveyed, but before they were surveyed or selected, the re-servee deeded his interest, it was held, his title passed: Loe v. Wilson, 23 How., 457.
The language of the acts reserving sections 16 and 36 to the territory, effectually withdrew said lands from sale, and on the admission of the territory, it would become the owner absolutely: Higging v. Houghton, 25 Gal., 260; Thompson v. True, 48 Cal., 601.
The patent being for land reserved, was issued without authority of law, and void. The officer had no authority to grant it: Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat., 380; United-States v. Stone, 3 Wall, 535; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How., 318; Parker v. Duff, 47 Gal., 554, 562.
And it is competent for the defendant, in an action of ejectment to attack the validity of the patent, on the ground that the land was excepted from the grant: McLaughlin v. Heid, 63 Cal., 208.
In the above case the defendant had not even preempted or filed upon the land, but as he had tried to, the supreme court said, he had sufficient interest to attack a patent.
It can be shown that lands are swamp in suits for possession, why not then that they are mineral lands: Thorn-ion v. Thurston, 28 Cal., 603; Kyles v. Tibbs, 23 Cal., 432; Robinson v. Forrest, 29 Cal., 320.
The validity of a patent purporting to grant lands which the officers had no authority, may be controverted in any action directly or indirectly. The patent is void and defendant in ejectment may prove the facts showing its invalidity: Carr v. Quiqley, 57 Cal., 394; McLaughlin v. Heid, 63 Cal., 208.
Messrs. Sutherland & McBride, and Mr. Arthur Brown, for respondent.
A patent not void on its face is evidence of a valid grant without further proof: Bagnels v. Broderick, 13 Pet., 450; Grant, v. Smith, 26 Mich., 204; Polk v. Wendel, 9 Cranch, 87; Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich., 372; Winter'v. Cromelin, 18 How., 88; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S.,' 639; Darfer v. Plaisied, 38 Cal., 80; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S., 454; Parleys Park M. Co. v. Kerr, 3 Utah, p. 235.
It is conclusive against intruders, that is, against all persons who do not connect themselves with that source of title: Smelting Go. v. Kemp, 104 U. S., 640, 641.
A person who but for the patent is shown to own the land, may at law attack the patent on the ground that the officer making it had no power: Sherman v. Buick, 93 U. S., 216; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S., 646-7.
The defendant does not connect himself with the source of title, nor did he show, or offer to show any fact to affect the authority of the officers who issued the patent.
■ The act under which the patent issued is brought before the court by the reference to it in the patent. It authorized the location of the scrip on any vacant unappropriated land of the United States, not mineral, whether surveyed or unsurveyed.
The non-mineral character was a' fact to be determined by the Land Department, and the determination is conclusive like a judgment: Smelfiny Co. v. Kemp, supra.
The only claim of the appellant in respect to a prior appropriation is the provision in the territorial acts of Congress looking to a future dedication of sections 16 and 36 to school purposes.
No present reservation or appropriation is declared: Sec. 15, Organic Act; sec. 1946, C. L. Utah, pp. 34, 48; Heydenfeldt v. Gold etc. Co., 93 U. #>., 634; Copp. Min. L., 105 et seq.
Until survey no such sections could be recognized iu the Land Office.' This scrip was located on this land while unsurveyed.

Opinion:
Emerson, J.:
The form of this action is one for the possession of real estate, situated in the town of Park City. The plaintiff claims title under the patent of the United States, and by mesne conveyances to the plaintiff from the patentee. No question is made as to the existence of the patent, or the title deraigned therefrom in plaintiff; but in this action at law, for the recovery of possession, the defendant seeks to assail that patent, on the following grounds:
First. The premises, in truth, did describe a part of section 16, and that, therefore, they were not ojien to settlement, and the plaintiff and his grantor had no right to patent the same, for the reason that it was a school section, and the authorities were forbidden to patent the same to settlers.
Second. That the said lands were mineral lands, and, therefore, not open to claims of settlers.
Third. That the lands were occupied by people squatted thereon, and claiming to be a city, to-wit: Park City.
We will determine these three objections in their order. The plaintiff procures his title under the scrip known as Yalentine scrip. The authority for the issuing of which is to be found under an act of Congress approved April 5, 1872, which authorizes the holders of such scrip to enter unappropriated lands of the United States, and tlie first question involves the inquiry as to wliat is the meaning of appropriated or unappropriated. It is complained by the appellant that lands which may possibly fall in section 16 or 86, although not then surveyed, are appropriated. On the other hand, it is contended that the only appropriation of the lands which fall within sections 36 and 16, is when they are surveyed and found to be such sections by official survey; and until such survey, the lands are open for any appropriator, and a person seeking to pre-empt or fto homestead on such lands has always to be recognized as one entitled to enter thereon, and his right has to be protected, although afterward the number of this section turned out to be 16 or 36. The Valentine scrip was not more limited. The holder of it had the right to enter upon any lands which had not been actually designated and set aside for the use of schools, or for the use of actual appropriates. These pre-emptors or people were not holding under home, stead claims. These lands had never been pre-empted or made subject to homestead claims, nor had they been surveyed at the time when this patent was applied for. If under any assumed state of circumstances a patent can be valid, then it cannot be attacked in any collateral proceeding or iu any manner except by direct action to set aside the deed indicated either by the United States, or the persons who have succeeded to its right. It is apparent that this patent not only could have been, but under the existing circumstances, was valid. It was.not in the power of the defendant or appellant to attack that patent in a court of law on tlie ground that it included school lands. The law upon this subject is fully stated in the case of Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S., 454. "So with a patent for land of the United States, which is the result of the judgment upon the right of the patentee by that department of the government, to which the alienation of the public lands is confided, the remedy of the aggrieved party must bo sought by him in a court of equity if he possesses such an equitable right to the premises as would give him the title if the patent were out of tlie way. If he occupy with respect to tlie land no such position as this, he can only apply to tbe officers of tbe government to take measures in its name to vacate tbe patent or limit its operation. It cannot be vacated or limited in proceedings when it comes collaterally in question; it cannot be vacated or limited by tbe officers themselves.
Tlieir power over tbe land is ended wben tbe patent is issued and placed on tbe records of the department. The other cases cited on both sides are in conformity with this riding. Tbe determination of this first question decides tbe other also. If these premises .were mineral lands as claimed by tbe appellant, and tbe appellant bad any right therein, it was bis duty to have applied for a patent and assert bis right before tbe department. An adjudication of tbe department of tbe land office upon the subject is conclusive and final. It would be a strange doctrine, if after tbe United States Government has patented land away and minerals should be discovered in tbe lands, within bis patent or deed, that some outside discoverer could say tbe patent was void. Such was not the intention of tbe law. If it bad been true that any mineral entries bad been made at tbe land office at the time this patent was applied for, then such owners and tbe defendant among them, if he were one, must have bad notice of the procedure, and tbe law assumes and presumes be did have notice. If after inquiry tbe land office determined tbe plaintiff bad or his grantors bad, a right to a patent, that decision was binding upon tbe court. Tbe same result must follow if no inquiry was entered into. Tbe land office had jurisdiction in tbe matter; its determination was final.
Precisely the same views control tbe third point. Tbe defendant offers to prove that there were, at the time of tbe application of this Yalentine scrip to tbe premises in question, a few hundred squatters within tbe land conveyed. Those squatters bad taken no measures or steps to procure title under tbe towm site law, filed no papers in any tribunal entitling them to actas such. If it was desired and within tbe law to plat a towm site entry they bad ample opportunity. Until they did so they were trespassers, and tbe lands were unappropriated, and it was open for tbe gov- eminent to eject them: Yosemite Case, 15 Wall., 77. Until suoli act on the part of squatters, any person having the authority of the United States Government could deed the same. The grantor of the plaintiff holding the Valentine scrip had the authority of the United States Government. These lands at the time had been unappropriated in every sense of the term. They had not been even surveyed, and until they were surveyed no appropriation whatsoever had been made of them. The court concurs in the findings and the opinion of the court below.
Zane, C. J., and Twiss, J., concurred.