Case Name: Robert G. KRIEG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KRIEG BROTHERS TERRAZZO CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-09-28
Citations: 645 So. 2d 661
Docket Number: No. 93-1065
Parties: Robert G. KRIEG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KRIEG BROTHERS TERRAZZO CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before KNOLL, COOKS and WOODARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 645
Pages: 661–666

Head Matter:
Robert G. KRIEG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KRIEG BROTHERS TERRAZZO CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-1065.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Sept. 28, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1994.
Kenneth Neal Hawkins, Lafayette, for Robert Kreig.
Robert James May, Metairie, for Kreig Bros. Terrazzo Co., Inc.
Before KNOLL, COOKS and WOODARD, JJ.

Opinion:
|1WOODARD, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim for workers' compensation benefits on a peremptory exception of prescription.
FACTS
Prior to his accident, plaintiff, Robert Krieg, was employed as a terrazzo helper by defendants, Krieg Brothers Terrazzo Co., Inc. Plaintiff worked as both a finisher (lighter work) and an installer (heavier work), but he was paid the same wage of $8.90 per hour whether he worked as a finisher or an installer. Defendants routinely paid plaintiff full wages, even for days on which he did not work.
Plaintiff injured his back on August 1,1988 while lifting a 100-pound sack of crushed marble. After his accident, plaintiff continued to work as a terrazzo helper for 2 years and 10 months after his injury, performing both the lighter finishing duties and "at times" the heavier installation work, and defendants continued to pay him even when he did not work. The president and office manager of defendant Krieg Brothers state in their affidavits that plaintiff continued to perform the same duties for the same wage as before his injury.
|2A chiropractor examined plaintiff on August 3, 1988 and diagnosed him with lumbo-sacral sprain, lumbar sublaxation, lumbar in-tervertebral disc syndrome, and lumbar radi-cular neuralgia. Plaintiff received conservative treatment for his injury until a CT scan revealed a right lateral disc herniation at L5-Sl. Plaintiffs condition worsened, and Dr. Bertuccini performed a micro-disectomy on him at the L5-S1 level on June 17, 1991.
Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim against defendants on September 25, 1991, approximately 3 years after his injury, alleging that defendants had failed to pay the compensation benefits and medical expenses due him. He also alleged that they had failed to furnish either proper medical attention or the reports he had requested of the physicians who had examined him on the defendants' behalf.
Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription and moved for summary judgment. The hearing officer sustained the exception and granted the motion for summary judgment on June 21,1993. Plaintiff appeals and assigns as error (1) the administrative hearing officer's finding that the affidavits submitted by the defendants were sufficient to support their Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) the denial of plaintiffs Motion to Compel, (3) the failure to impose sanctions upon the defendants, (4) the grant of the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and (5) the holding that plaintiffs claim had prescribed.
LAW
We consider plaintiffs assignments of error only concerning prescription and sanctions, because our holding as to prescription is dispositive of plaintiff's claim.
I. Third Assignment of Error: Sanctions
Plaintiff assigns as error the failure of the hearing officer to impose sanctions upon the defendants for not complying with the her judgments on plaintiffs motions to compel. The hearing officer found, however, that the defendants had provided plaintiff with all records and information in their possession. Thus, the defendants did not disobey a court brder, and there was therefore no basis for imposing sanctions. Moreover, the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order is discretionary on the part of the court. Castille v. Melancon, 410 So.2d 1224, 1228 |3(LaApp. 3d Cir.1982). There is no indication that the hearing officer abused this discretion, and therefore her decision not to sanction the defendants may not be disturbed on appeal.
II. Fifth Assignment of Error: Prescription
An employee has one year to file a workers' compensation claim for an injury that develops at the time of or immediately following an accident. La.R.S. 23:1209(A). The claimant has two years to file, however, if the injury does not develop within one year after an accident. Id. The purpose of this prescriptive period is to protect employers from the burdensome litigation of stale claims. Dupaquier v. City of New Orleans, 260 La. 728, 257 So.2d 385, 387 (1972). The time period established by section 1209(A) is prescriptive, rather than peremptive. Lester v. Rebel Crane & Servs. Co., 393 So.2d 674 (La.1981).
Plaintiffs injury manifested itself immediately after the accident, and therefore he had one year to file his claim. As with any prescriptive period, however, prescription on workers' compensation claims may be interrupted or suspended. La.C.C. arts. 3462-72; Latino v. Binswanger Glass Co., 532 So.2d 960 (La.App. 5th Cir.1988).
The payment of wages in lieu of compensation interrupts prescription for workers' compensation claims, because such payments lull workers into not filing their claims within the prescriptive period. Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d 46, 52 (1944). Thus, if an employer pays an employee wages in lieu of compensation, the prescriptive period is interrupted and begins anew only upon the last payment. Dupaquier, 257 So.2d at 387.
Wages in lieu of compensation are defined as unearned wages paid to an employee after an injury. Deville v. T.H. Harris Vo-Tech School, 580 So.2d 561 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991). Thus, if the employee actually earned wages paid to him, they are not wages in lieu of compensation and do not interrupt prescription. Maquar v. Transit Mgt. of Southeast La., 580 So.2d 1128, 1129 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991). Whether wages were earned is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. The similarity between and the degree of difficulty involved in the services performed before and after the accident are relevant, though not conclusive. Id.
Plaintiff argues first that he received wages in lieu of compensation because he received the same wage before as after his injury, although his duties were lighter after he was injured. He received the same wage prior to his injury, however, regardless of the duties that he performed, and |4he continued to perform work for defendants as a finisher. "At times" he even performed the heavy work of an installer. Plaintiff therefore earned the wages given to him by defendants after his injury, and they are not wages in lieu of compensation.
Plaintiff also argues that defendants paid him wages in lieu of compensation on the ground that he was paid the same wage even for days when he was absent or performed no labor. Defendants routinely did so even prior to the accident, however. Thus, it is clear that this practice was not intended to prevent plaintiff from filing a worker's compensation claim within the prescriptive period, and the wages so paid are not wages in lieu of compensation.
Finding that prescription on plaintiffs worker's compensation claim was not interrupted, we hold that the prescriptive period for that claim expired on August 1, 1989. Plaintiffs claim, filed in on September 25, 1991, was therefore not timely, and defendants' exception of prescription was properly sustained by the hearing officer.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the administrative hearing officer dismissing plaintiffs claim on the ground that it has prescribed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-appellant.
AFFIRMED.