Case Name: The People, ex rel., A. W. Tennant v. Delos Parker
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1872-02
Citations: 3 Neb. 409
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People, ex rel., A. W. Tennant v. Delos Parker.
Judges: This conclusion being also concurred in by my brother Crounse, it is so ordered.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 409–437

Head Matter:
The People, ex rel., A. W. Tennant v. Delos Parker.
Constitutional law: convening the legislature by proclamation. A proclamation by the executive calling for a convention of the legislature, issued under section nine, title “ Executive " of the Constitution, may be revoked by a second one promulgated for that purpose, and any attempt on the part of members to assemble in pursuance of the first call, is without authority, and every act done by them as a legislative body is void.
-:. Mason, Ch. J„ dissented.
In this case a writ of habeas corpus issued out of this court, directed to the defendant, Parker, the purpose of which was to test his authority to hold the relator, A. ~W. Tennant. The facts necessary to the understanding of the case are these:
The Governor of Nebraska having been impeached and removed from office, W. H. James, who was elected Secretary of State at the same time and for a like term with the Governor, became, and during the time hereinafter mentioned, was Acting Governor of the state. During the same time Isaac S. Haseall was a State Senator, and at an adjourned session of the legislature was elected President of the Senate.
Acting Governor James left in February, 1872, to attend to business of the state at Washington. Haseall, who resided in Omaha, learning of James’ absence, went at once to Lincoln, the capital, and under pretense that the dpeument was one certifying that some person was a notary public, obtained from James’ private secretary the Great Seal long enough to get its impress to a paper of which the following is a copy, and which was published in some of the papers of the state:
PROCLAMATION NOR CONVENING THE LEGISLATURE.
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, and by virtue of the authority vested in the Governor to convene the Legislature by proclamation on extraordinary occasions, and as the occasion contemplated by the Constitution now exists, it being necessary to have immediate legislation to encourage and promote immigration, to improve the finances of the state, and for other purposes that more fully appear in the subjects of legislation hereinafter contained, I, Isaac S. Haseall, President of the Senate and Acting Governor of the State of Nebraska — a vacancy existing in the office of Governor, and the Secretary of State being absent from the state, — do hereby convene the Legislature, and call upon the members thereof to meet at the capitol, in the city of Lincoln, on Thursday, the fifteenth day of February, A. D. 1872, at 3 o’clock p. m., for the purpose of taking action upon the following subjects of legislation:
1st. The encouragement of immigration, and the appropriation of money for that purpose:
2d. The issuance of fifty thousand dollars in state bonds, the sale and disposition of the same, the funding of the state indebtedness, and the improvement of the finances of the state.
3d. To declare the cases in which any office shall be deemed vacant, and also the manner of filling the vacancy where no provision is made for that purpose in the Constitution.
4th. The investigation of the official conduct of any state officer, and if deemed expedient, the impeachment of any such officer for any misdemeanor in office.
5th. The common schools of the state, and the amendment or repeal of any laws relating thereto, or to the funds for the support of the same.
6th. The amendment of any law relating to cities and towns.
7th. The defining of the boundaries of counties in the unorganized territory of this state, and providing for the organization of the same.
8th. The appropriation of any money that may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the state.
9th. To provide for the better securing and safe keeping of state prisoners.
10th. To provide for increasing the jurisdiction of probate judges in civil cases.
11th. The correction and approval of the journals of the last regular session of the Legislature.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the State of Nebraska,
[seal.] this eighth day of February, A. D. 1872.
ISAAC S. HASOALL, Acting Governor of the State of Nebraska.
Acting Governor James being advised of what had been done by Hascall, returned at once to the state, and put forth his proclamation, of which the following is a copy:
PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, on the eighth day of February, A. D. 1872, Isaac S. Hascall, President of the Senate, did issue a call convening the Legislature of the State of Nebraska, at Lincoln, on the fifteenth day of February, A. D. 1872.
And, Whereas, such action on the part of said President of the Senate was and is null and void, no extraordinary occasion having arisen for the assembling of the said Legislature, the state not being threatened with foreign aggressions, depredations, nor direct hostilities; nor has occasion arisen rendering adequate provisions necessary to overcome unexpected calamities, nor to suppress insurrection, nor other important exigencies arising out of the internal intercourse between the states;
And, Whereas, the occasion for the exercise of the authority vested in the President of the Senate, by the seventeenth section of the executive article of the constitution, has not arisen, — my absence from the state not having been of that character for which provision is made in the constitution;
And, Whereas, the people have been burthened with the accumulated cost of long and repeated sittings of this Legislature, the said Legislature having recently been in session, and having had all and the several subjects mentioned in said call, under consideration, and having refused to legislate upon the several matters and subjects,
Now, therefore, I, William II. James, Secretary of State, and Acting Governor of the State of Nebraska, do hereby revoke, rescind, and annul the said proclamation of the said President of the Senate, and do hereby request and enjoin the members of the Legislature that they do not meet at the Capitol in pursuance of said call on the 15th day of February, A. D. 1872.
Done at the city of Lincoln, this thirteenth day of February, A. D. 1872, 'in the fifth year of the State of Nebraska, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-sixth year. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name, and caused to be [seal. ] affixed the great seal of the State of Nebraska.
WILLIAM H. JAMES.
(By the Acting Governor).
William H. James, Secretary of State.
The sections of the constitution upon which it was presumed to base these several proceedings, are found under the title of Executive, and are as follows:
“ Seo. 9. He, (the Governor,) may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature by proclamation, and shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been convened.”
“ Sec. 16. In case of the impeachment of the Governor, his removal from office, death, resignation, or absence from the state, the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon the Secretary of State, until such disability shall cease, or the vacancy be filled.”
“Seo. 17. If during the vacancy of the office of Governor, the Secretary of State shall be impeached, displaced, resign, die, or be. absent from the state, the powers and duties of the office of Governor, shall devolve upon the President of the Senate, and should a vacancy occur by impeachment, death, resignation, or absence from the state, of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Kepresentatives shall act as Governor till the vacancy be filled.”
At the time fixed by the first proclamation, several members met at Lincoln. More remained away, disclaiming any authority to meet as a legislative body. Those who gathered were discountenanced by Acting Governor James, who refused them admission into the legislative halls. They, however, overcame his resistance, and, taking possession, proceeded to organize. Parker was appointed, among others, as a sergeant-at-arms, for the Senate, and ordered to arrest and bring in absentees. Under this order he claimed to hold the relator, Tennant.
M. U. Sessions, for the relator.
I. It is a maxim in the law that it requires the same' strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. .1 Black. Com., 144.
II. If power is given to create a tlwng, it implies a power to preserve it; and of necessity the control of the thing created. Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, 671.
III. The doctrine that the decision of an executive, as to the convening the legislature by proclamation, when once made is final, may, for the sake of the argument, be conceded. The question is, in what does the finality consist? It is not that he who issued it cannot, upon reflection reconsider his own judgment, and action, and recall and revoke the same. Its finality is simply this, that no other officer or department of government can interfere or control Ms discretion or judgment in the matter when once exercised. Cooley’s Con. Linn., 39,40, 42. Brightly’s Federal Digest, 74. 2 Bacon’s Abridg., 655, 675. The People, ex rel., v. Hatch, 19 III., 283.
IY. Again it is contended, and the proofs show that Hascall has never in good faith entered upon, or assumed the duties of executive of this state, but has only attempted to perform one official act as governor, and that in a clandestine and fraudulent manner. Supposing that Haseall instead of issuing a proclamation as he did, had issued a pardon for every convict in the penitentiary, and sent the same to the Warden, and thereupon they had been released from prison, but that upon finding out the true state of the case, the Warden recaptures them. The prisoners bring Jiabeus corpus to be released from their imprisonment, upon the ground that they had been pardoned out. Can there be any doubt about the court holding that he had not in good faith entered upon the duties of acting governor, and the pardon fraudulent, and if so void, and the recapture legal? Oommormealth v. Halloway, 2 Vol. A. L. Begister, 474.
If fraudulent in the supposed case, it would be in the case at bar, and the proclamation issued a nullity.
E. Wákeley, for the relator,
presented by oral argument the following points in substance:
I. The court must take judicial notice whether the legislature is, or is not in session.
If a majority of the members assemble at a time when they have no constitutional right to do so; or a time not appointed by law, and when they had not been convened by the governor’s proclamation, they are not a legislature, and courts cannot so regard them.
Tfie constitution makes each house the exclusive judge of the qualifications of its members. But it does not make either house, or both houses exclusive judges as to whether they are or are not lawfully sitting.
The constitution provides that all regular sessions of the legislature after the first, shall commence on the first Thursday, after the first Monday in January.
It would be absurd to claim that if a majority should assemble the first Monday of December, and organize in form, a court would be compelled to recognize them as lawfully in session.
Courts take judicial notice of executive proclamations, and must know judicially whether or not there is or has been, a proclamation under which the session can be held. And, if a proclamation once made can be, and has been lawfully revoked, courts take the same judicial notice thereof, as of the proclamation.
II. It is very doubtful if the absence of acting governor James under the circumstances shown, was such an absence as devolved the duties of the office on Hascall. He was absent temporarily, and on official business. It is not a fair construction of the constitution that the moment the governor crosses the state line, the secretary may step into the governor’s office and issue a pardon or convene a legislature. In the case at bar, Hascall glided in with the stealth of an Indian; clandestinely affixed the seal to his prepared document; and vanished like an apparition. It is a more reasonable construction that the absence must be such as to make it necessary for the secretary to take possession of the executive office and clothe himself with its i/ndiaia.
III. Granting that the proclamation was lawfully and constitutionally issued, it could be, and was, lawfully and constitutionally revoked.
The power of the governor is to “ convene ” the legislature — not merely to issue a proclamation to that end. Convening a body, is bringing its members together.. The power to convene is. a continuing power until the purpose is accomplished.
The object of the constitution must be considered, in order correctly to interpret its provisions. The power to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions is conferred on the governor to provide for unexpected emer geneies. He is the sole judge of the necessity or expediency of exercising it. The necessity may exist when the proclamation is issued, and utterly pass away • before the time when the legislature is to meet. "Why should not the governor’s discretion continue to that time?
By the terms of the constitution he “ shall state to both houses when assembled, the purpose for which they have been convened.” “ And when so convened (the legislature) shall transact no business except such as relates to the objects for which they were so convened, to be stated in the proclamation of the governor.” If the reason no longer exists, and there is no further object to be accomplished by the meeting, why should the governor, who is made by the constitution the sole judge of the .necessity of asking the legislature to assemble, and has the sole power of prescribing the subjects on which it shall legislate, be denied the power to recall his request, or mandate? Constitutions can be changed; laws may be repealed. Shall a governor’s proclamation be held irrevocable? Does it go forth like a planet hurled into space to move forever?
Can it be doubted that if the governor should find reasons to change the time named for the meeting he could do so? Might he not extend it if satisfied that a quorum could not assemble in time? Might he not shorten it, if satisfied that the emergency required it?
The sole argument against the power to revoke is that it is not given in terms. But in constitutions, as in laws, powers may be implied from the necessity, or reason of the case.
A familiar instance is the implied power of the President of the United States to remove officers appointed by himself. If the office is filled he cannot effectively appoint an officer to hold it without removing the incumbent. Hence, it has been held, from the beginning, that he could remove without an express power to do so.
The power to convene a body implies a power to prevent its convention, before this is accomplished. The power is not executed fully until the convention has taken place. Until fully executed it may be withheld. If the power in question was only to issue a proclamation, I grant that when once issued, the power would be exhausted. But this narrow and word-catching construction of the constitution cannot stand against the palpable ■object and purpose of the provision.
(Counsel also cited instances in the parliamentary history of Great Britain, where proclamations convening the houses of parliament had been recalled before the meeting.)
E. E. Brown, Seth Boimson, a/nd Isaac S. EascaZl, contra.
Decided February term, 1872.

Opinion:
Crounse, J.
In the few hours given the court for the determination of the grave questions involved in this case, I cannot undertake to review the history of the several proceedings out of which they have arisen. In fact, I choose to avoid any further publication of the disgraceful transactions that have attended the administration of our state government — transactions which have made the character of the state the subject of jeer abroad, and occasioned every good citizen to blush to acknowledge that he is a member of it.
Whether the first proclamation was legally issued, and of any validity, I will not at this time, stop to enquire. Upon that point I may express myself hereafter. But as a majority of the court are agreed upon the effect of the second one, I will briefly state my views thereon.
Under the theory of our government, the people ai'e sovereign. The exercise of acts of sovereignty are given to the several branches of government whose duties and limits are prescribed in the organic law adopted by the people. To the legislature is given the power, and upon it is imposed the duty of making all laws, subject to the constitution. Inasmuch as the people cannot undertake to create legislatures and set them at work at such times as legislation might be proper and necessary, they have directed that such legislature meet every two years, on a day fixed, for purposes of general legislation.
But emergencies may arise when it might, for the welfare or safety of the state, become necessary to have legislation at other times than those provided as above. The determination of the question as to when such an occasion has arisen, resides with the people, of course, for whom this legislation is to be made. It is impracticable, and in fact impossible, to collect the sense of the people in any way in time to make the action of the legislature available. They, therefore, have chosen to commit the exercise of this judgment to the governor of the state. In this he stands in the place of the people.
Did the people see that they were threatened with invasion, or that any exigency had arisen demanding the convening of the legislature, they might command, and it would be the duty of the legislature to obey.
After having commanded, and before such convention, if the exigency had passed away, the people might countermand the order so given, and it would be the duty of the legislature to respect and obey such command.
Does any other reasoning obtain where the governor, for this purpose stands in the place of the people? I think not.
The governor is constituted the sole judge of the necessity for calling the legislature, and he must, like the people, be the sole judge as to when such necessity has passed away. His judgment is not like a judicial decree, based on certain fixed facts upon which the law attaches its judgment. In that case the judgment is final as far as the tribunal pronouncing it is concerned.
But the governor's decision is a political one, exercised for the well-being of the state. He may conceive a- danger to exist which does not exist in fact, or the threatened danger may have passed away. His judgment is, that the facts exist which demand an assembling of the legislature. If he should find that he was mistaken as to the facts, or the emergency had passed away, his judgment is changed. He is none the less the representative of the people for this purpose, and the judge of the necessity of a meeting of the legislature, after he has issued his proclamation, than he was at the time he issued it.
His proclamation is no deed or instrument conveying any right to the legislators which when once issued, is irrevocable; neither can I see any ground for assuming that its issuance involves any trick or technicality which should override the broad reason on which it is founded.
The proclamation is but a command. This command is based on the judgment of the governor, acting for the people, who assumes that an emergency exists, demanding a meeting of the legislature. If the emergency does not exist, this judgment is erroneoxis, and is changed, and the expression of this change is communicated through the revocation.
The several proclamations are but the expressions or announcements of these different conditions of affairs, and are binding on the legislature.
The different proclamations may be treated as issued by one and the same person. The court is dealing with the officer, rather than with any individual. The proclamation issued first, being the only warrant under which a legislature could convene, having been revoked and annulled, there exists no authority under which a legis lature can be legally assembled at this time. This being so, there can no authority issue from the pretended legislature to hold Mr. Tennant, and he must be released.
Lake, J.
This case presents at least two important questions for the consideration of the court. They are not only important, but so novel in their character, that ordinary sources of legal information afford us but a 'dim light to direct us in our investigation.
So true is this, that even the learned counsel upon both sides, who have argued the case with their customary ability, and who usually fortify their positions with apt adjudged cases, have been compelled to admit their inability to find in the books of reports a single case wherein these precise questions or even those strongly analagous thereto have been determined by the courts.
The questions to be considered are, first, was Isaac S. Hascall, as President of the Senate, authorized to issue his proclamation for the convening of the legislature, and second, if he was so authorized, could Secretary James, in the exercise of his functions as acting Governor of the state, revoke such proclamation and thereby prevent the convening of that body in legal session? If the court shall consider either, that, under all the circumstances, the president of the senate had no authority to act in the premises, or being authorized to act, what he did may be annulled, the imprisonment of the relator is illegal and he must be released therefrom.
Upon the first proposition my own mind is not clear. I can say, however, when the question was first presented to me I was strongly inclined to the opinion insisted upon for the respondent, that so soon as the governor sets his foot beyond the limits of our state, the officer next in succession therein, may at once assume all the authority, and exercise all or any of the duties pertaining to the executive department of government. But when I reflect upon the possible consequences of such a construction of the constitution, upon the disgraceful tricks, strifes and exhibitions, which might be entailed upon the people of the state, of which our present attitude presents a sad and humiliating commentary, I am induced to hesitate and cast about me for a more salutary rule, one which, while it will insure the efficient administration of the affairs of state during a brief temporary absence of the executive, will at the same time protect this department of the government against unnecessary and ill-advised intrusion.
The conclusion to which a majority of the court have arrived on the second question will enable us to decide the case before us, without further notice of this one. I shall take occasion hereafter, however, to examine it more at length. '
Admitting, however, that the exigency existed, by the temporary absence of the then acting governor from the state, for the assumption of executive authority by the president of the senate, and that in pursuance of the provisions of the constitution he duly issued his proclamation for the convening of the legislature in extra session, is the issuance thereof of such an act when done, entirely beyond executive control?
The constitution provides for the regular sessions of the legislature. These can be held at no other time. But the necessity and propriety of their assembling oftener than at these stated periods, is left by the constitution entirely to executive discretion.
This discretion is wisely lodged in the governor of the state, who is presumed to be well advised when an extraordinary occasion has arisen which 'demands prompt legislative action.
"With the exercise of this discretion up to 'the time of convening the legislature no one can interfere. The whole matter is left entirely to the will of him who for the time being, is invested with the executive authority of the state.
But if, for any good and sufficient reason, the executive shall become satisfied that the necessity which induced the call has passed, or that it was unadvisedly made, it is not only his right, but his duty to revoke the same, that the people may be saved the expense which would otherwise be laid upon them.
Nor does it matter whether the revocation be by the same person who issued the proclamation or not, so long as he is for the time being in the legitimate exercise of the executive functions of the government.
It is not the act of the individual strictly speaking, but of the executive, in which there is, in one sense, no vnterregnum.
In this case it is shown that the secretary of state, in the legitimate exercise of the authority invested "in that officer, has declared that the proclamation theretofore issued for the convening of the legislature was ill-advised ; that in fact no extraordinary occasion had arisen rendering it necessary for the legislature to assemble in extra session, and therefore he revoked the same.
I am clearly of the opinion that the legislature is not now in legal session, and has no authority to compel the attendance of absent members; that all and every act done at this time, as a legislative body, is without the shadow of authority and absolutely void, and that, therefore, the relator should be released from custody.
This conclusion being also concurred in by my brother Crounse, it is so ordered.