Case Name: Elroy L. WABASHA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Walter LEAPLEY, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Appellee
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1992-11-10
Citations: 492 N.W.2d 610
Docket Number: Nos. 17696, 17753
Parties: Elroy L. WABASHA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Walter LEAPLEY, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Appellee.
Judges: MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 492
Pages: 610–615

Head Matter:
Elroy L. WABASHA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Walter LEAPLEY, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Appellee.
Nos. 17696, 17753.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs May 28, 1992.
Decided Nov. 10, 1992.
William Taylor and James Moore of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for petitioner and appellant.
Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Geaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge.
In this consolidated appeal Elroy Waba-sha (Wabasha) appeals from the July 24, 1991, order of the circuit court denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus and the September 19, 1991, order of the circuit court denying his motion to reconsider the previous order and to grant leave to file an amended application for a writ of habeas corpus. On September 30, 1991, the circuit court issued a certificate of probable cause, pursuant to SDCL 21-27-18.1, limited to the procedural question of whether the circuit court properly denied Wabasha's application for a writ of habeas corpus following court appointed counsel's motion to withdraw without granting Wabasha a hearing. Wabasha then applied to this court for a certificate of probable cause. It was granted November 22, 1991, at which time the procedural issue for which the circuit court granted the certificate of probable cause became moot.
Habeas corpus is in the nature of a collateral attack upon a final judgment. As such, the scope of review is limited to: "1) whether the court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; 2) whether the sentence was authorized by law; and 3) in certain cases, whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights." Gross v. Solem, 446 N.W.2d 49, 50 (S.D.1989); Goodroad v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1987).
On May 17, 1988, Wabasha pled guilty to a charge of first degree robbery in violation of SDCL 22-30-6. Wabasha was sentenced to fifteen years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. Wabasha's claim is two-fold. First, he claims that the sentence imposed by the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution because the trial court based Waba-sha's sentence upon a misunderstanding of his prior convictions. Second, he argues that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the comments concerning Wabasha's alleged involvement in another crime.
WAS WABASHA DENIED DUE PROCESS?
Questions of constitutional magnitude involving due process are reached when a defendant is sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which are materially untrue. State v. Ellefson, 287 N.W.2d 493, 496 (S.D.1980). Sentences based upon material misinformation or erroneous assumptions violate due process. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591-92, 30 L.Ed.2d 592, 596 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948); United States v. Collins Spencer Catch The Bear, 727 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir.1984); State v. Ellefson, 287 N.W.2d at 496; Crowe v. State, 86 S.D. 264, 194 N.W.2d 234, 246 (S.D.1972).
At the sentencing hearing there was some discussion concerning Wabasha's two prior convictions which had been vacated. The record clearly indicates that the trial judge was aware of the vacated convictions and did not misunderstand or rely on any misinformation concerning Wabasha's prior criminal record.
WAS WABASHA DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
Before a petitioner may succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim he must fulfill the two-prong test stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and prove that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced petitioner's defense. Strickland v. Washington, supra; Boykin v. Leapley, 471 N.W.2d 165, 167 (S.D.1991); Gross v. Solem, supra; Roden v. Solem, 431 N.W.2d 665 (S.D.1988); Luna v. Solem, 411 N.W.2d 656 (S.D.1987); Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781 (S.D.1984).
There is a presumption that counsel was competent until the petitioner proves otherwise. Gross v. Solem, supra. Further, "it is not our function to second guess the decisions of experienced trial attorneys regarding matters of trial tactics." Roden v. Solem, supra, 431 N.W.2d at 667, quoting, State v. Walker, 287 N.W.2d 705, 707 (S.D.1980).
Wabasha argues that trial counsel's representation was deficient when trial counsel failed to object to the comments of the state and the trial court regarding a crime for which he had neither been convicted nor arrested. Our scope of inquiry is stated in Roden v. Solem, 431 N.W.2d at 667:
Generally, the making or failure to make motions and objections are trial decisions within the discretion of trial counsel. State v. Anderson, 387 N.W.2d 544 (S.D.1986); State v. Tchida, 347 N.W.2d 338 (S.D.1984). This general rule will not apply, however, where trial counsel's actions cannot reasonably relate to any strategic decision and are clearly contrary to the actions of competent counsel in similar circumstances, (footnote omitted).
Due process requires a defendant who contests the accuracy of factual information relied upon by a sentencing court be given an opportunity to rebut or explain that information. United States v. Collins Spencer Catch The Bear, supra, 727 F.2d at 761; United States v. Papajohn, 701 F.2d 760 (8th Cir.1983). Disclosure during sentencing of information on which the sentencing court relies is generally sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of due process. Orner v. United States, 578 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir.1978).
Trial counsel did not object to the state's comments during sentencing relating to the gun shop theft. Trial counsel also did not object when the trial court commented upon the same crime. Waba-sha had not been charged with the crime. However, given the facts that the trial court had presided over and heard the evidence of the jury trial in the gun shop case and drew its own conclusions to the sworn testimony of the witnesses there, was it unreasonable that counsel did not object to the state's and the court's comments? That objection would have caused the trial court to delve farther into the circumstances surrounding a robbery for which Wabasha may or may not have been involved. Wabasha was given an opportunity to speak and made a lengthy statement to the court. He chose not to comment on or contest the state's or the sentencing court's comments concerning the gun shop theft.
It is well settled that a sentencing court has wide discretion in what it may consider, "largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come." United States v. Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. at 446, 92 S.Ct. at 591, 30 L.Ed.2d at 596; accord, United States v. Papajohn, supra, 701 F.2d at 763 (information which a sentenc ing court may consider includes criminal activity for which the defendant has not been prosecuted); State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 509 (S.D.1986); State v. Ellefson, supra, 287 N.W.2d at 496; State v. Carsten, 264 N.W.2d 707, 711 (S.D.1978). Factual information relied upon by the sentencing court must have an indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation. United States v. Collins Spencer Catch The Bear, supra, 727 F.2d at 761; State v. Grosh, supra, 387 N.W.2d at 509 (out of court statements must be consistent with the truth). There are few sources more reliable than a jury trial.
Wabasha did not receive the maximum sentence of twenty-five years which the state recommended. Instead he was sentenced to fifteen years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. When the sentencing court made reference to the gun shop theft, it did so only in passing. The record shows that the bulk of the reasoning for the sentence came from other factors which were considered by the court.
We hold that based on the record, counsel's failure to object to the comments of the trial court and the state was not unreasonable, and therefore do not reach the second prong of the test under Strickland v. Washington.
Affirmed.
MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.
DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, for AMUNDSON, J., disqualified.
. The trial court states, in part:
Looking strictly at his background, in terms of his prior convictions, and in terms of those cases, which were ultimately set aside, the State is right. Might as well give him the maximum. But looking at the nature of the offense of which he is convicted here — in other words, the circumstances of it, there was no weapon used, there was no injury inflicted, other that the emotional trauma, the amount of money obtained, (emphasis added).
. The sentencing transcript reads, in part,
MR. REEDSTROM: I just want to briefly touch upon another case that the State feels that this defendant was involved in. That is the Gary's Gun Shop case with Donald Stacker. That offense was committed several days after this offense. And the car that was involved in that Gary's Gun Shop case was also the car used in this case. Belong's to Donald Stacker's girl friend. The facts show in the Gary's Gun Shop case that there were two other people with Donald Stacker at the time that they were arrested — and he was arrested four hours after the Gary's Gun Shop robbery. Two people were never apprehended. The State feels one of those people was the defendant, Elroy Wabasha.
. The trial court states, in part,
I, however, am familiar with his record. And I am also familiar with evidence involved in the gun shop theft. I sat on the jury trial on that case. And I km of the strong opinion that this defendant, to some extent at least, was probably involved in that offense. And probably was greatly involved in it.