Case Name: In the Matter of New York City Transit Authority, Appellant, v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2007-02-20
Citations: 8 N.Y.3d 226
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of New York City Transit Authority, Appellant, v New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 226–242

Head Matter:
[864 NE2d 56, 832 NYS2d 132]
In the Matter of New York City Transit Authority, Appellant, v New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al., Respondents.
Argued January 3, 2007;
decided February 20, 2007
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Robert K. Drinan, Brooklyn, and Martin B. Schnabel for appellant.
The Public Employment Relations Board exceeded its jurisdiction by rendering an opinion on a question of pure statutory construction and, in effect, promulgating a rule of general applicability through the adjudicatory process. (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 48 NY2d 398; Matter of West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46; Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434; Matter of Town of Mamaroneck PBA v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 66 NY2d 722; Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 243 AD2d 567, 91 NY2d 812; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 100, 220 AD2d 749; Matter of Sperling v Helsby, 60 AD2d 559.)
Sandra M. Nathan, Albany, and William L. Busier for New York State Public Employment Relations Board, respondent.
I. The Appellate Division’s determination that the Public Employment Relations Board’s decision was permissible and reasonable should be affirmed. (Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42; Matter of Uniondale Union Free School Dist. v Newman, 167 AD2d 475, 77 NY2d 809; Matter of Hoey v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 284 AD2d 633; Matter of City of Newburgh v Newman, 70 AD2d 362; Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School Dist. v Kinsella, 253 AD2d 46, 93 NY2d 810; Matter of State of N.Y. [Div. of State Police] v Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc., 25 AD3d 963; Matter of Fashion Inst. of Tech. v Helsby, 44 AD2d 550; Matter of Suffolk County Legislature v Cuevas, 303 AD2d 415; Matter of County of Monroe v Newman, 125 AD2d 1002; Binghamton Civ. Serv. Forum v City of Binghamton, 44 NY2d 23.) II. The Appellate Division properly deferred to the Public Employment Relations Board’s determination. (Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 48 NY2d 398; Matter of City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 NY2d 73; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660; Matter of Village of Scotia v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 241 AD2d 29; Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42; Matter of Town of Mamaroneck PBA v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 66 NY2d 722; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v Newman, 90 AD2d 114; Matter of Lippman v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 263 AD2d 891; Matter of Town of Southampton v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2 NY3d 513; Matter of State of N.Y. [Div. of State Police] v Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc., 25 AD3d 963.) III. The Court should not consider evidence and a claim that were not before the Public Employment Relations Board. In any event, the claim has no merit. (Matter of Lippman v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 296 AD2d 199, 99 NY2d 503; Matter of Margolin v Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 71 NY2d 844; Matter of Fanelli v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 90 AD2d 756, 58 NY2d 952; Matter of Duamutef v Johnson, 266 AD2d 823, 94 NY2d 759; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 73 NY2d 796; Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 309 AD2d 1118; Matter of Newark Val. Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 83 NY2d 315; Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42; Matter of City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 NY2d 73.) IV. The New York City Transit Authority’s remaining arguments have no merit. (Matter of M. Farbman & Sons v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 62 NY2d 75; Matter of Mantica v New York State Dept. of Health, 94 NY2d 58; Matter of City of Albany v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 57 AD2d 374, 43 NY2d 954; Matter of State of New York [State Univ. of N.Y.] v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 181 AD2d 391; Matter of Village of Scotia v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 241 AD2d 29; Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 128 Misc 2d 628, 125 AD2d 657; Matter of Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 24 AD3d 224; Matter of City of Rochester v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 15 AD3d 922, 4 NY3d 710; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 99 NY2d 1; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660.)
Schwartz, Lichten & Bright, PC., New York City (Stuart Lichten of counsel), for Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, respondent.
The Public Employment Relations Board rationally found that the New York City Transit Authority violated the Taylor Law when it denied an employee union representation during an investigatory interview. (Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 48 NY2d 398; Matter of West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Matter of Village of Scotia v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 241 AD2d 29; NLRB v J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 US 251.)
Nancy E. Hoffman, Albany, William A. Herbert and Jerome Lefkowitz for Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.
The Public Employment Relations Board’s conclusion that the New York City Transit Authority violated the Taylor Law when it denied requested union representation to a public employee during a disciplinary interrogation constituted a reasonable interpretation of the rights guaranteed public employees by Civil Service Law §§ 202, 203 and 209-a (1) (a). (Matter of County of Monroe v Newman, 125 AD2d 1002; NLRB v J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 US 251; Matter of City of Albany v Helsby, 29 NY2d 433; Matter of Village of Scotia v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 241 AD2d 29; National Labor Relations Bd. v Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F2d 584; Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42; Matter of Matt v Larocca, 71 NY2d 154; Matter of Sperling v Helsby, 60 AD2d 559; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660; Anderson v Dolce, 653 F Supp 1556.)
James R. Sandner, New York City, and Stuart I. Lipkind for New York State United Teachers, amicus curiae.
I. The courts below correctly ruled that the right of a public employee under Civil Service Law § 202 to participate in his union entitles him to have a union representative present at investigatory interviews that may lead to discipline. (NLRB v J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 US 251; Matter of Newark Val. Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 83 NY2d 315; Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. of Personnel — Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225; Matter of Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 117 AD2d 156; Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42; Association of Surrogates & Supreme Ct. Reporters within City of N.Y. v State of New York, 78 NY2d 143; Matter of County of Monroe v Newman, 125 AD 2d 1002; Matter of Sperling v Helsby, 60 AD2d 559; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v Mills, 250 AD2d 122.) II. All public employee bargaining jurisdictions — including those states with statutes similar to Civil Service Law § 202— recognize the right of an employee to the presence of a union representative in interviews that may lead to discipline.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Smith, J.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as interpreted in NLRB v J. Weingarten, Inc. (420 US 251 [1975]), gives to an employee of a firm subject to the NLRA the right to have a union representative present with the employee at an investigatory interview, if the employee reasonably believes that the interview might result in disciplinary action — a so-called "Weingarten right." We hold today that the Taylor Law does not give a Weingarten right to New York public employees.
Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of the New York City Transit Authority's interview of one of its employees, Igor Komarnitskiy. The Authority was informed that Komarnitskiy, a car inspector, had become angry when asked to show a pass before entering a train yard and that, in objecting to the request, he had used a racial slur in referring to employees he thought were treated less strictly. The Authority asked Komarnitskiy for a written response to the allegation, and Komarnitskiy provided one that he had prepared with the help of a representative of the Transport Workers Union (TWU). The Authority, suspicious that the TWU representative had influenced or dictated the content of the response, ordered Komarnitskiy to come to a supervisor's office to prepare a new response, and refused to allow TWU representatives to come with him.
The TWU filed an improper practice charge against the Authority, claiming that it had violated Komarnitskiy's Weingarten right. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) upheld the charge, and the Authority brought this CPLR article 78 proceeding against PERB and the TWU, asking that PERB's decision be annulled. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We granted leave to appeal, and now reverse.
Discussion
Weingarten establishes that, if this case were governed by the NLRA, Komarnitskiy would have been entitled to have union representatives present at his interview with his supervisor. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that section 7 of the NLRA "creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his discipline" (420 US at 256). The question here is whether the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art 14), specifically Civil Service Law § 202, gives a similar right to public employees in New York. We decide this issue de novo, without deferring to PERB's interpretation of the statute, because "the question is one of pure statutory construction 'dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent [with] little basis to rely on any special competence' " of PERB (Matter of Rosen v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 42, 47-48 [1988], quoting Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]).
Civil Service Law § 202 provides: "Public employees shall have the right to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any employee organization of their own choosing."
This statutory language is in some ways similar to, but in more relevant ways different from, that of the statute inter preted in Weingarten, section 7 of the NLRA (29 USC § 157). Section 7 provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. . . ."
While some of the rights given by section 7 ("to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing") have close counterparts in section 202 ("to form, join and participate in . . . any employee organization of their own choosing"), those are not the rights that the Supreme Court relied on in Weingarten. Rather, Weingarten upheld the NLRB's decision that the right to "engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection" included a right to have union representatives present at disciplinary interviews (420 US at 260). Since the "mutual aid or protection" language is absent from section 202, Weingarten does not support a holding that section 202 creates a Weingarten right. As we explained in Rosen, the differences between section 202 and section 7 are not mere random variations:
"Unquestionable omissions from the Taylor Law of certain rights explicitly accorded in analogous provisions of the NLRA reflect an effort to advance concerns peculiar to the Taylor Law — such as the promotion of 'harmonious and co-operative relationships between government and its employees' . . . that are inapplicable under the NLRA. Manifestly, the Legislature sought to exclude from a statutory scheme regulating public employment certain rights and advantages conferred upon those in the private sector . . . ." (72 NY2d at 50 [citations omitted], quoting Matter of Zuckerman v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 44 NY2d 336, 342 [1978].)
PERB and the TWU argue that a Weingarten right may be inferred from section 202's provision for "the right to . . . participate in" labor unions. The right to union representation at disciplinary interviews, however, is not inherent in the right to participate in a union. Of course, employees may seek such a right of representation in collective bargaining; in doing so, they are protected by the Taylor Law's provision, in Civil Service Law § 203, that they "shall have the right... to negotiate collectively with their public employers in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment." But nothing in the text of the Taylor Law suggests that a Weingarten right is given by the statute itself.
The text and legislative history of a later-enacted statute strongly support our conclusion that the Taylor Law does not confer a Weingarten right. In 1993, 26 years after the Taylor Law's enactment, and 18 years after Weingarten, the Legislature amended Civil Service Law § 75 (2) — which applies to many, though not all, of the public employees protected by the Taylor Law — to add the following language:
"An employee who at the time of questioning appears to be a potential subject of disciplinary action shall have a right to representation by his or her certified or recognized employee organization under article fourteen of this chapter and shall be notified in advance, in writing, of such right. If representation is requested a reasonable period of time shall be afforded to obtain such representation. If the employee is unable to obtain representation within a reasonable period of time the employer has the right to then question the employee. A hearing officer under this section shall have the power to find that a reasonable period of time was or was not afforded. In the event the hearing officer finds that a reasonable period of time was not afforded then any and all statements obtained from said questioning as well as any evidence or information obtained as a result of said questioning shall be excluded, provided, however, that this subdivision shall not modify or replace any written collective agreement between a public employer and employee organization negotiated pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter." (L 1993, ch 279, § 1.)
Section 75 (2) gives the employees to which it applies a kind of Weingarten right, but one different from the right that PERB and the TWU ask us to find in the Taylor Law. Under section 75 (2), a violation of a Weingarten right results not in an improper practice proceeding before PERB, but in the exclusion from a disciplinary hearing of statements made at the interview and evidence obtained as a result. And the Weingarten right created by section 75 (2), unlike the right given by the Taylor Law to "participate in . . . employee organization^]," may be surrendered in collective bargaining. It would have made no sense to create the section 75 (2) version of the Weingarten right if a more robust version of that right already existed under the Taylor Law.
The history of the 1993 legislation shows clearly that its supporters did not believe that any Weingarten right existed in New York law before 1993. The supporting memorandum of the Senate sponsor of the 1993 legislation says: "New York State public employees do not have the same protection enjoyed by private sector employees during interviews and discussions by their employers," and goes on to defend the idea of creating such a right with language taken from the Supreme Court's Weingarten decision (Senate Introducer Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1993, ch 279, at 22). A letter from a supporter of the legislation, the president of a civil service union, similarly notes that, under existing law, New York public employees lack the protections enjoyed by private sector employees, and adds: "This protection has been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v Weingarten . . . ." (Letter from Joseph E. Mc-Dermott, President of Civ Serv Empls Assn, Mar. 29, 1993, Bill Jacket, L 1993, ch 279, at 49; see also Letter from Stanley Hill, Exec Director, Am Fedn of St, County & Mun Empls, AFL-CIO, Dist Council 37, July 13, 1993, Bill Jacket, L 1993, ch 279, at 59). We see no basis for concluding that the supporters of the 1993 legislation misunderstood the existing law, and were wasting their time in changing it.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the petition granted, PERB's determination of October 2, 2002 annulled, and the improper practice charge dismissed.