Case Name: Marvin Bryant v. State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1953-06-24
Citations: 159 Tex. Crim. 98
Docket Number: No. 26,496
Parties: Marvin Bryant v. State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 159
Pages: 98–103

Head Matter:
Marvin Bryant v. State.
No. 26,496.
June 24, 1953.
Rehearing Denied October 14, 1953.
Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing Denied October 28, 1953.
Dixie & Ryan, Houston, for appellant.
William H. Scott, Criminal District Attorney, King C. Hay.nie, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Houston, and Wesley Dice, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Judge,
This is a felony conviction for drunk driving, under Art. 802b, Vernon's P. C., with punishment assessed at one year's confinement in jail.
While driving his automobile on a public highway, appellant was involved in a collision with other cars. A witness present, as well as highway patrolmen who arrived shortly therafter, testified that appellant was intoxicated and under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Appellant was arrested by the patrolmen and, following his consent in writing, was taken to a hospital where a sample of his blood was taken for analysis to determine its alcoholic content. The blood so taken was placed in a vial or container and mailed to the Texas Department of Public Safety.
The chemist and toxicologist with the department testified that he made an analysis of the blood sample and that it contained .32 per cent, alcohol. The witness further testified that "anyone with that much alcohol would definitely be intoxicated."
We are constrained to agree that, notwithstanding appellant's denial of intoxication and the corroborating testimony, the state's testimony warranted the jury's conclusion of guilt.
Among the grounds urged by appellant against the admission of the testimony of the highway patrolmen that when they saw appellant, some hour and a half after the collision, he was intoxicated was that it was too remote.
The conclusion is expressed that appellant's objection went more to the weight of the testimony than to its admissibility. Moreover, the opinion of the witnesses was based upon the acts and conduct of the appellant at the time they saw him.
Objection was reserved to the receipt in evidence of the blood analysis, such objection being that the testimony of the chemist and the mode, manner, and method employed in making the analysis were not sufficient to authorize proof of the result.
We do not have, here, an objection, such as was raised in the case of Abrego v. State, 157 Tex. Cr. R. 264, 248 S. W. 2d 490, that the blood sample analyzed was not sufficiently identified as that of the accused, for there is no contest of that proposition in the instant case. Nor is there complaint of the testimony of the chemist that one having the percentage of alcohol found in appellant's blood would be intoxicated.
The basis of appellant's complaint of the admission of the result of the blood examination appears to be that the test was not sufficiently reliable. In support of this contention, appellant relies upon Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Cr. R. 313, 256 S. W. 2d 93.
The Hill case was one involving the breath test for alcohol. The holding there against the admission of testimony showing the result of the test was based, primarily, upon the fact that the mode, manner, and method by which the test was made was so unstable and fraught with liability of mistake and error as to render the test, under such conditions, unsafe and dangerous.
We find no application for that rule in the instant case, for here we are dealing with only the blood analysis. The witness who made the test holds a master's degree in chemistry, with considerable experience in that character of work. He explained in detail the method employed — which was as follows:
"In order to analyze blood for alcohol content, we carefully measure a quantity of four cubic centimeters out of the tube and simply boil it so all the alcohol in the blood is distilled out of it, the alcohol vapor goes through a tube and goes in a orange oxidizing solvent and when the alcohol comes in contact with this solvent a reaction takes place, it causes the solvent to change color, becoming a green color, the more alcohol that comes in contact the greener it becomes, then by simply measuring the amount of green present in the solvent with an electric machine called the P____________you can tell how much is in the blood sample."
There is nothing to indicate that such is not a scientifically approved method of analization of the blood. Certainly, the opportunity of error or mistake is not present here, as was suggested in the Hill case, supra.
We are constrained to conclude, therefore, that the testimony as to the blood analysis was properly admitted in evidence.
Appellant was identified as the person who had been convicted, prior thereto, of the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving, as alleged in the indictment. The affidavit and information, as well as the judgment showing such conviction, were introduced in evidence. The judgment, upon its face, shows that it was in all things final. There was no testimony to the contrary.
We are unable to agree with the appellant that the facts do not show his prior conviction, as alleged.
It is insisted that the jury was guilty of misconduct in that, during deliberation, the fact was discussed that the parole and commutation statutes applicable where a term in the penitentiary is assessed as punishment did not apply to a jail term and, for that reason, a jail term was agreed upon as the punishment in the case.
The discussion obviously related to the penalty to be assessed in the case and was therefore a proper subject for discussion by the jury. Moreover, if such discussion did not relate to the penalty, then it was an attempt to explain the verdict and the process of reasoning by the jurors in reaching such verdict.
A jury cannot impeach its verdict. Supporting authorities are numerous and will be found collated under Note 166 of Art. 753, Vernon's C. C. P.
The case of Denmark v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 254 S. W. 954, appears to be in point here. In that case, a juror was held not to be authorized to impeach the verdict by saying that it was rendered convicting the accused of assault with intent to murder rather than aggravated assault because of the expense to the county that would be occasioned by the accused having to pay the fine imposed for aggravated assault by serving time in jail.
The holding of jury misconduct in the case of Jackson v. State, 157 Tex. Cr. Rep. 323, 248 S. W. 2d 748, was predicated upon the fact that the statements there made in the jury room were incorrect in law. No such statements are shown from the record before us in the instant case. The Jackson case, therefore, is neither here in point nor controlling.
The judgment is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the court.