Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Garle A. WHITSON, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-06-22
Citations: 587 F.2d 948
Docket Number: No. 77-2193
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Garle A. WHITSON, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 587
Pages: 948–956

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Garle A. WHITSON, Appellant.
No. 77-2193.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 22, 1978.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 15, 1978.
Fred L. Baker (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Robert E. Carey, Jr. (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before KILKENNY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and MURRAY , District Judge.
The Honorable William D. Murray, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Whitson was convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), possession of an unregistered firearm (a destructive device), and 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), destruction of a vehicle used in interstate commerce. He appeals.
Whitson was due to appear in court in Los Angeles on Monday, September 16, 1974, on charges related to his amphetamine business. Early that morning his van was blown up on a lonely road in the Big Sur area south of Monterey, California. The debris included expired credit cards and other items identified with Whitson.
Highway Patrol officers had stopped Whitson and his sister-in-law for speeding near Marina, California, a little over two hours before the explosion. Marina is about fifty miles and an hour's drive from the site of the explosion. At the time of the stop, Whitson was driving the van and his sister-in-law was following in another car.
The government's theory was that Whit-son intended to create the illusion that he had died in the explosion to explain his planned absence from the Los Angeles prosecution. Whitson testified that he left his van in a restaurant parking lot, and learned of the explosion from news broadcasts. He said he then decided not to return to Los Angeles. Both sides agree that Whitson remained a fugitive until his capture in August 1976.
His sister-in-law's activities also inspired various explanations. The government theory was that she was to drive Whitson away from the planned explosion. Whitson said she had accompanied him to take back papers he expected to receive at a meeting with two men in Marina. She said her purpose was merely to enjoy another episode in their continuing romantic affair, but that she turned around and returned home soon after receiving the traffic ticket.
Whitson's possession of bombs and knowledge of their construction were relevant to the government's case. According to Sergeant Lawrence Gandsey of the Los Ange-les County Sheriff's Department, Whitson had said during a search of his office in April 1973 that he had been "in ordnance" while he was in the army. Gandsey also said that he saw an army ordnance publication in Whitson's office. The trial court ordered this evidence suppressed on the theory that Whitson's interview violated his Miranda right to silence. Without the challenged statements, the court thought that Gandsey's testimony about the army publication was too remote for admission. Whether or not that ruling was correct, the evidence was not admitted during the prosecution's case.
On direct examination, after the government had rested, Whitson answered his attorney's carefully limited questions. He denied destroying his truck or possessing a bomb or destructive device for the purpose of destroying his truck.
On cross-examination, the government, over defense objections asked Whitson about his knowledge of explosives and about his encounter with Gandsey. Whit-son denied any knowledge of explosives, denied telling Gandsey that he had been in the ordnance branch of the army, and denied possessing the army manual. The government then put Gandsey on the stand to impeach Whitson's cross-examination testimony. Gandsey gave his version of the encounter, which earlier had been excluded.
Whitson challenges the receipt of Gand-sey's evidence on two grounds: (1) it impeached cross-examination that had gone beyond the scope of the direct examination; and (2) a Miranda-barred statement is not admissible to impeach defense testimony elicited only on cross-examination.
The first ground reveals no error. The extent of cross-examination is left largely to the trial court's discretion, and this court monitors that discretion with deference to the trial court's role in deciding what is relevant. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976). After Whitson had denied possessing a bomb for the purpose of destroying his van, searching cross-examination on Whitson's general knowledge of explosives was no abuse of discretion.
A question of a different kind, however, arises from the government's impeachment strategy of setting Whitson up. The government asked Whitson about his statements to Gandsey knowing that Gandsey's contradictory testimony had been Miranda-barred.
To determine whether this particular impeachment was error, we look to the Supreme Court's discussion of impeachment by illegally obtained evidence and then examine our own and other courts' responses to the Supreme Court's teaching.
We begin with the basic proposition that illegally obtained evidence may not be used in a criminal trial. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). There are, of course, exceptions.
In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), the Court allowed the use of illegally seized evidence for impeachment. On direct examination, the defendant had denied any prior contact with the narcotics trade. The Court distinguished Agnello and held that, in opening the door on direct, Walder subjected himself to impeachment by evidence of an illegally seized heroin capsule. The Court emphasized that the defendant had made his statements of his own accord, and pointed out that in Agnello it was the government that had insinuated the impeachment foundation into the cross-examination. 347 U.S. at 66, 74 S.Ct. 354.
The distinction between affirmative and defensive use of the exclusionary rule was next considered in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The prosecution in Harris on cross-examination used Miranda -barred statements to contradict the defendant's direct testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of Walder. The deterrent effect of the Miranda rules on police practices would not be significantly affected, the Supreme Court said, by the Walder use of noncomplying statements, and defendants would not be encouraged to resort to perjury affirmatively as a defense. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975), the government also used the Miranda -barred statements to impeach a defendant's affirmative presentation made on direct examination.
This court in United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 143-46 (9th Cir. 1974), considered the impact of Agnello, Walder, and Harris on the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach a defendant's statements when offered on cross-examination. Relying on the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Taylor, 8 Cal.3d 174, 104 Cal.Rptr. 350, 501 P.2d 918 (1972), we said that impeachment by illegally seized evidence was error, although in the circumstances of the Trejo case it did not require reversal. We thought that the distinction in Walder between the defendant's statements on direct and on cross survived Harris. As we quoted the California court:
" [T]he defendant on direct examination offered no elaborate justification of his conduct, and the prior illegally obtained evidence was therefore not 'inconsistent' or 'conflicting' with that testimony. Defendant did not rely on the illegality of the impeaching evidence as a sword to commit perjury, but simply as a shield against the consequences of con-cededly improper police practices." United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d at 145, quoting People v. Taylor, 8 Cal.3d at 185, 501 P.2d at 925, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 357.
The Trejo reasoning applies here. Whitson on direct examination simply denied destroying his van or possessing a bomb for that purpose. He did not raise an issue of his knowledge about explosives. It was, therefore, inconsistent with Trejo to allow the government to question him about, or to present extrinsic evidence of, his earlier Miranda -barred statements to Gandsey. The Trejo problem was compounded when the government argued the impeaching evidence to the jury as substantive evidence of Whitson's knowledge rather than simply using it for its ostensible purpose of attacking his testimonial credibility. However, Whitson did not object to this line of argument, nor does he raise the issue on appeal. Indeed, his attorney followed the prosecutor's cue and also argued the substantive weight of the evidence to the jury. We assume that counsel made a tactical decision to make the best of a bad situation. Counsel may have thought it unlikely that the jury would in fact limit its use of the evidence to impeachment. The jury had the evidence before it, and some juries are not overly sympathetic to legal technicalities. In these circumstances, there was no "plain error" in the prosecution's argument.
The weight of authority from other jurisdictions teaches that it is error to permit the prosecution to use illegally obtained evidence for impeachment on a matter not opened by the defendant. New York, which created the Harris rule when most federal and state courts refused to allow any use of Miranda -barred statements for impeachment, requires that the defendant open the door to the impeaching evidence by testifying to the point on direct. The prosecutor may not range beyond the direct examination in order to lay a foundation for the tainted evidence as rebuttal. People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 311 N.Y.S.2d 292, 259 N.E.2d 727 (1970).
A recent and thorough discussion of this problem is found in State v. Kida, 375 A.2d 1105 (Md.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct. 646, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). The Maryland court limited the use of Miranda -barred statements to impeaching a defendant's "specific credibility arising from a realistic contradiction between the issues he initiated on direct examination and the impeaching statement." 375 A.2d at 1115.
Commentators take a similar position. 3 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Evidence f 607(09), at 607-89 to 607 — 90; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 73 Colum.L. Rev. 1476, 1484-85 (1973). The Second Circuit treats illegally obtained evidence in the same way we did in Trejo. United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1976).
When the defendant presents his or her case on direct without raising issues that are open to impeachment, and the government cross-examines to elicit impeachable statements, the government must be prepared to use legitimate evidence. It is error to permit the govern ment to proceed to impeach its own induced statements with inadmissible evidence.
All the government accomplishes by the tactic is an attack on the credibility of something the defendant would not have said but for the government's asking. At best, the prosecution will have introduced no evidence at all (if the jury decides not to believe the impeached statement). At worst, the prosecution will have produced evidence harmful to the government (if the jury decides to believe the defendant's testimony despite the impeachment).
In no case is it permissible for the jury to use the impeaching evidence in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence, as government counsel incorrectly urged it to do here. Logically, therefore, the strategem is of questionable relevance to the trial, and the government has advanced no good reason to permit it in the face of strong reasons against it. See United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977).
The admission of the evidence concerning Whitson's statements to Gandsey was error. The error was of constitutional dimensions, so it requires reversal unless we can say that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot do so here. United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1977), United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 14 n.8 (9th Cir. 1970).
While the error was not harmless, it was also unnecessary. In light of the government's other evidence and Whitson's own story, the jury had little choice but to believe that Whitson had blown up his van. The error was the kind of mindless overkill into which prosecutors sometimes blunder.
Whitson's other contentions raise a question that may recur on another trial. The trial court admitted evidence of a bomb found at Whitson's business a year before the van blew up. Other persons had access to the place where the bomb was found. Except for the location, there was no other direct connection with Whitson. There was some evidence that the bomb which destroyed the van may have been similar to the earlier bomb. The court overruled an objection on the ground of irrelevance to evidence of the earlier bomb. The court did not abuse its discretion. The weakness or strength of the evidence was a matter for the jury's consideration.
Because of the error in receiving the Miranda-barred evidence to impeach testimony brought out by the government only, we must reverse the judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
. United States v. Whitson, was affirmed in most respects in an unpublished memorandum. 568 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1978).
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. At the time the prosecutor first attempted to ask Whitson about his encounter with Gand-sey, Whitson's counsel objected, primarily on relevance grounds; when the prosecutor cited Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), counsel agreed that Harris seemed to control. A strict view of waiver could militate against reaching this point. However, it does not seem realistic to expect counsel to come up with the direct/cross distinction on his feet at a time when there was no federal authority for it as it related to statements. On appeal he does make this argument.
. The government also introduced in its case in chief, similar statements which Whitson made at his Los Angeles trial. He had also made those statements on cross-examination.
. Some cases deal with the use of illegally obtained physical evidence, others with illegally obtained statements. While different constitutional considerations are at work both these situations are governed by the same standards. If a substantive difference is called for, the standards for admitting illegally obtained statements should be more strict because of the trustworthiness implications of the Fifth Amendment as distinguished from the security implications of the Fourth Amendment. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
. The trial court should exercise its discretion in controlling the scope of cross-examination carefully in a case where the prosecution can support the inferences raised only by reference to inadmissible evidence. If the impeaching evidence cannot be introduced because it was illegally obtained, trial courts should be careful not to permit damaging inferences to be raised during cross-examination. When the prosecution begins to cross-examine into questionable areas, the trial court should immediately determine what evidence can support the inquiry. If the only available evidence is inadmissible, the court should not permit the cross-examination.