Case Name: Armantine M. SMITH v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-07-16
Citations: 418 So. 2d 689
Docket Number: No. 11819
Parties: Armantine M. SMITH v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, GARRISON and BAILES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 689–698

Head Matter:
Armantine M. SMITH v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
No. 11819.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
July 16, 1982.
Writ Granted Oct. 18, 1982.
Theodore A. Mars, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, Mark B. Meyers and Jesse R. Adams, Jr., New Orleans, for Arthur Henry Chester, Underwriters at Lloyds of London and excess underwriters, defendant-appellee.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, John J. Weigel and Madeleine Fisher, New Orleans, for Travelers Ins. Co. and Jerry Krushin, defendants-appellees.
Before SAMUEL, GARRISON and BAILES, JJ.

Opinion:
SAMUEL, Judge.
This is a tort action for very serious personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a one-vehicle automobile accident. The car had entered into a parking area where it stopped and then proceeded to move backward in reverse gear in order to turn around. During that time plaintiff opened the car door to leave the vehicle. Primarily at issue is whether the driver knew, or should have known, plaintiff intended to leave the vehicle and was proceeding to do so. She fell and was struck by the open door which traveled across her back, "popping" her spine.
The originally named defendants are Jerry Krushin (defendant driver), Kemper Insurance Company, Travelers Insurance Company, public liability insurer of Krush-in, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, plaintiff's liability insurer. Kemper, Lumbermens and State Farm subsequently were dismissed without prejudice and those insurers are not before us in this appeal. The matter proceeded to trial against Krushin, Travelers and tfre Underwriters at Lloyds of London, the latter being excess insurers made defendants by supplemental and amended petition.
The matter was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, dismissing plaintiff's suit, and that verdict was made the judgment of the court.
Plaintiff has appealed. In this court she assigns as error the trial court's refusal to:
1) order the defendants to make available statements taken by them from the driver and a guest passenger, Revonda Sur-ratt, shortly after the accident; 2) grant plaintiff's pre-trial motion to exclude testimony relative to the use of marijuana by the plaintiff on the evening of the accident; 3) grant plaintiff's pretrial motion to exclude testimony of a defendant witness concerning cost of payment for an annuity which allegedly would provide a monthly income to plaintiff; and 4) admit certain plaintiff proffers.
Appellant further contends: 5) the trial court erred in giving certain allegedly incorrect and erroneous charges to the jury regarding proximate cause (instead of cause in fact), assumption of the risk, last clear chance, the duties of the driver of the vehicle, and the "non-existent" duty of a guest passenger to notify the driver of her intention to alight from a "parked" vehicle. Finally, she contends: 6) the jury verdict was manifestly erroneous and clearly contrary to the law and the evidence.
Relative to appellant's first assignment of error, she argues there was "good cause" for the trial court to order the production of the statements of the only two people, other than plaintiff herself, who were witnesses to the occurrence of the accident, because she was thrown to the ground and sustained a blow on the head, rendering her recollection of facts and circumstances not as clear as was the recollection of those other two witnesses. The trial judge refused to order the production of the statements.
The accident occurred in late December, 1978, and the statements of the defendant driver and that of Ms. Surratt were taken, respectively, on February 8, 1979 and February 19, 1979. Defendants contend the statements were taken in anticipation of litigation, and that plaintiff has not demonstrated undue prejudice.
Initially, plaintiff did not file a request for production of the statements; she filed only a motion to compel production. When the matter was heard the trial court denied the motion without prejudice so that plaintiff could reurge the motion after the depositions of those persons had been taken. Following the taking of the depositions, plaintiff filed a request for production, which the insurer refused, reurging its position that the statements were taken in anticipation of litigation and no prejudice had been demonstrated. No further action was taken by plaintiff to obtain the statements.
In pertinent part, Code of Civil Procedure Article 1424 reads:
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, expert, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice."
The article contemplates a twofold inquiry: (1) Were the items sought to be discovered obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation?; if so, (2) will the party seeking the production be unfairly prejudiced or subjected to undue hardship or injustice by the denial? The burden on the first inquiry rests with the party holding the statements. If carried, the burden to prove prejudice, hardship or injustice shifts to the party seeking production. The applicable principles are discussed in Sonier v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., La.App., 272 So.2d 32, Bordelon v. Phoenix Insurance Company, La.App., 244 So.2d 919, and Self v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., La.App., 90 So.2d 547.
That the statements of Krushin and Surratt were taken in anticipation of litigation is not seriously contested. Plaintiff argues only that she demonstrated good cause to overcome the exception. She relies on the case of Ogea v. Jacobs, La., 344 So.2d 953, for the proposition that statements taken shortly after the accident are of unique value for discovery purposes. In Oge a, the statement was taken several days after the accident. In the instant case, they were taken six to eight weeks after the accident. We note also that Ogea limited its holding to the facts in that case and the court declined to adopt a strictly time-keyed rule.
In this case depositions were taken. Plaintiff claims they were filled with "I don't recall, and I don't remember". While we are not cited to specific instances, we do note that Surratt was a plaintiff witness.
Plaintiff further complains that a matter of lighting was brought out at the trial but not at the deposition. If the question was not asked at the deposition, plaintiff cannot complain that such information was not volunteered at that time.
As has been said, although plaintiff filed a motion to produce the statements after the depositions were taken, she did not file a rule to compel which would have given the trial court the opportunity to pass upon the objection in the light of the depositions. Since this was not done, the original ruling was still in effect. Regardless of these facts, in our view the trial court ruling was correct. The record before us does not establish that denial of production or inspection of the statements unfairly prejudiced plaintiff or caused her undue hardship or injustice.
Regarding appellant's second contention, the trial court ruled that testimony relative to marijuana use prior to the accident was relevant and could be presented to the jury. In our opinion, to have concealed that fact would have been improper, just as it would have been to exclude testimony relative to the use of alcohol prior to the accident. The jury was instructed to draw reasonable inferences based on native intelligence and reach its own conclusion, taking into account common knowledge and human experience. We find no error in this instance.
Appellant's third assignment of error is directed to testimony regarding cost of an annuity allegedly sufficient to provide a monthly income to plaintiff, and thus was concerned solely with quantum, i.e., the amount of damages which could be awarded in the event of a judgment in favor of plaintiff. Since the jury decided the issue of liability against the plaintiff, the trial court ruling relative to this testimony was inconsequential; it could not have influenced the jury one way or another and does not constitute reversible error. Olivier v. Ourso, La.App., 308 So.2d 811.
Relative to the fourth assignment of error, the evidence plaintiff sought to introduce in evidence, but was refused, consists of computer printouts regarding plaintiff's life expectancy as it affects health care costs. The printouts are before us by means of a proffer. The witness testified to the future cost of plaintiff's health care and showed the printouts, including calculations showing the cost of a homemaker at three days per week, 8 hours per day, and such calculations without including the cost of a homemaker. These were gross figures and not discounted to present value. The trial court permitted the testimony and allowed the jury to see the printouts, but refused their introduction in evidence on the ground that the figures on the printouts had been testified to in full by the witness and therefore such documentary evidence would add nothing to the testimony.
Since the jury never reached the issue of damages, the ruling on this proffer also is inconsequential. Olivier v. Ourso, supra.
We do not consider in detail the fifth assignment of error, which is concerned with alleged incorrect and erroneous jury charges given by the court. The rule enunciated in Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, La., 320 So.2d 163, is that when an appellate court has all the facts before it, a trial judge's erroneous instruction to the jury does not warrant a remand; under such circumstances the appellate court must review the trial record and reach a decision on the merits. In this case all of the facts are before us, we have thoroughly reviewed the record, and we have concluded that the jury verdict and the judgment appealed from are correct. Thus, there is no need to consider each alleged erroneous charge in detail because, under Gonzales, even if one or more of the charges were both erroneous and consequential, we could not remand and we would be required to do what we already have done, review the record and reach a decision on the merits.
We find the following facts:
The accident occurred in late December, 1978. Plaintiff, Armantine Smith, her friend, Revonda Surratt, and Jerry Krushin, the defendant driver, had gone Christmas shopping. After the stores closed about 9 or 9:30 p.m., the three drove to a bar where they each consumed four or five alcoholic drinks between the time they arrived and the time they left at about 12:30 a.m. Krushin was seated in a chair near the end of the bar during all or most of that time, but the ladies circulated during the evening and, on one occasion, went outside with two other men to the latters' car, where each took four or five puffs from a marijuana cigarette. Krushin was invited, but did nof join that group.-
Plaintiff, Krushin and Surratt left the bar for the purpose of returning to the apartment complex where the latter two resided. The three occupied the front seat of the car with Krushin driving, Surrat in the middle, and plaintiff seated to the extreme right next to the door. As they approached the entrance to the complex, they heard a favorite song on the radio and either Krushin or Surratt turned up the volume well above normal. Krushin decided to drive around until the song was finished before stopping at the apartment, and the ladies knew this.
Accordingly, after entering the main gate of the complex, Krushin turned to the right instead of to the left (the latter being the way to his apartment). At this time the two ladies were chatting with each other. They saw swings and a children's play area with which plaintiff was unfamiliar. Sur-ratt explained this was the area for couples with children, as opposed to the adults' area where she and Krushin lived. The ladies decided to go to the play area and try out the swings. They did not inform Krushin of this decision and he did not hear their conversation due to the loud music and the fact that the ladies faced each other while they conversed.
Intending to turn around and head back to his apartment, Krushin drove into a parking area adjacent to the playground, stopped momentarily and put his car in reverse. He did not drive directly into the space of one of the parking bays; the vehicle crossed the right parking line of a bay. There were about three open bays between his car and the vehicle parked to his right. The car parked to his left was about one to one and one-half bays from his vehicle. Preparatory to backing up and as he began backing up, he looked to his left front and then over his left shoulder to his left rear. At this point, either when the car was moving or when it was momentarily stopped prior to putting the car in reverse (the vehicle had automatic transmission and the motor was never turned off), plaintiff opened the door and either stepped or tripped out of the vehicle and fell to the ground. Surratt screamed and Krushin immediately stopped the car after it had trav-elled backwards only one to one and one-half feet. However, plaintiff was struck by the car door and has been paralyzed since that time as a result of the accident.
It is clear that the conversation between the ladies about getting out of the automobile came up only seconds before plaintiff actually opened the door to get out. Accordingly, plaintiff knew, or should have known, that when Krushin began to turn into the parking bays he was not doing so with the intention of letting her get out to play on the swings. She knew the radio was blaring and she had no reason to anticipate Krushin could hear her conversation with Surratt over the loud music. Further, she knew the reason for driving around the complex was to hear the song and that they were, in fact, going to return to Krushin's apartment.
Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the incident happened too quickly for Krushin to stop before it occurred. Accordingly, we find no negligence on the part of the defendant driver.
Regarding the sixth and last assignment of error, that the jury verdict was manifestly erroneous and clearly contrary to the law and the evidence, as shown by our above discussion of our review of the record and our conclusions regarding the same, and as stated above, we are of the opinion that the jury verdict dismissing plaintiff's suit was both factually and legally correct.
Finally, we note that the rule relative to our independent review of the record inso far as the alleged jury charges are concerned (under Gonzales and discussed above in our consideration of the fifth assignment of error) probably also is applicable to the second, third and fourth assignments of error regarding alleged erroneous rulings on the exclusion or admission of evidence. However, because of the severity of the injury here involved, we have given a more detailed consideration to those assignments of error.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
GARRISON, J., dissented with written reasons.
. Properly Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company.
. American Mark Distrib. Corp. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., La.App., 180 So.2d 869.
. "We cannot conclude that in every case, because of the lapse of time in itself, a party denied production of a statement taken near the time of the event will be unfairly prejudiced in the preparation of his case or caused undue hardship or injustice." (at page 959).
. Ragas v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co., La., 388 So.2d 707; and prior cases to the same effect cited in Gonzales.