Case Name: James Walker vs. Lide & McLauchlin
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1845-01
Citations: 1 Rich. 249
Docket Number: 
Parties: James Walker vs. Lide & McLauchlin.
Judges: The whole court concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 249–252

Head Matter:
James Walker vs. Lide & McLauchlin.
A verbal acceptance of a bill, is sufficient to bind the acceptor, but the words from which such acceptance is to be inferred, must not be equivocal.
If the promise be conditional, and the condition be performed, semble, the promise will be binding.
Before Frost, J. at Charleston, Fall Term, 1844.
This was a summary process upon a verbal acceptance of an order for thirty-three dollars.
It was proved, by a clerk of the plaintiff, that Lide, one of the defendants, called at the store of plaintiff, when plaintiff said to him, I have a small order on you, for stores supplied to the steamer Congaree. Witness thought the order was shewn at the time to Lide, but was not positive that it was shewn, or the amount stated. Plaintiff had no other order than that sued on in this case. Lide said, call down, and I will pay it, or call in at any time, as you pass our store, and I will pay it. It appeared, from statements made by defendants’s counsel, that defendants had, at the time, funds on account of the Congaree, but had paid them over before a demand was made for payment of the order. It was further proved that, within a mouth, plaintiff took the order out with him for payment, and returned with it unpaid.
The presiding judge decreed for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, and now moved for a new trial, on the following grounds.
1. That the order was not presented either for payment or acceptance; and, therefore, the loose conversation in relation to it, could not amount fo an acceptance, legally binding on the defendants.
2. That the order was neither exhibited, nor the amount stated; and, therefore, if there had been an acceptance in the most explicit terms, it would be unavailing, as there could be no ground to refer it to the particular order now sued on.
3. That the defendants’s promise to pay, amounted, under the circumstances, to nothing more than to give due attention to the order when it should be presented.
4. That if there were any acceptance, or promise to accept, it was conditional only, and upon the condition that the order should be presented for payment or acceptance, within a reasonable time ; and there was no evidence that it was ever presented before action brought.
Bailey, Attorney General, for the motion.
The practice of allowing verbal acceptances is so dangerous, that in England a statute was passed requiring all acceptances of inland bills to be in writing. In this country,' where a different rule prevails, good policy requires that the evidence of the acceptance should be clear and explicit.
The custom of merchants requires that the holder should present the bill, that is, exhibit it, for payment at the place of business of the drawee; Ch. on Bills, 163-4, 499, 501; Story on Bills, 259, 260. Would such a presentment as was made in this case, in case of refusal, authorize a protest ? If not, how could the supposed acceptor be held liable ?
If the import of the language used be equivocal, there is no acceptance ; Story on Bills, sects. 239, 240, 244. If the promise is conditional, plaintiif must shew that the condition was performed ; 3 Camp. 179 ; 1 East, 98 ; 4 lb. 57 ; 5 lb. 514 ; 1 Esp. 17.
Phillips, contra,
cited 2 Mill, 133.- The true enquiry is, was the promise sufficient to authorize the plaintiff to repose faith and credit in the acceptors 1 If so, defendants are liable.
The proper place to present a bill is, where the drawee is found. When it is said that the >bill must be presented at the place of business, it is meant, the city, town or village in which the drawee resides; 3 Kent, 85; Story on Bills, 273.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Evans, J.
There is no doubt that a verbal acceptance is sufficient to bind the acceptor, but the words from which such acceptance is to be inferred, must be neither equivocal or conditional. It is said in Story on Bills, sec. 244, "if the import of the language used be equivocal, as if it merely state, 'your bill shall have attention,' there it will not be held to be an acceptance; and in the case of Anderson vs. Hick, 3 Camp. 179, the words of acceptance were, "send the bill to my counting house, and I will give directions for its acceptance." This was held to be an acceptance, provided "the bill was sent." By the acceptance, the acceptor becomes a party to the contract, and is bound to pay the bill. It would seem there should be in this, as in other contracts, a clear evidence of an intention to do a binding act. It would be attended with the most mischievous consequences, if every loose conversation should be construed into a binding contract. In this case, there is no satisfactory evidence that the bill was shown to Lide, or that he knew the amount. It was a casual conversation at the plaintiff's store, in which he informed Lide he had a small bill on him, for stores furnished the Congaree Steamer, to which Lide replied, call down and I will pay it — or call at any time as you pass our store, and I will pay. If he had called whilst the defendants were in funds, he, no doubt, would have been paid. If the words import any acceptance at all, it is only a conditional one, that the bill should be paid, if sent for payment within a reasonable time, as whilst the defendants had funds in their hands belonging to the Steamer Congaree ; which was not done. The motion is granted.
The whole court concurred.