Case Name: Mary, f. w. c., et al. v. Daniel L. Brown
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1850-04
Citations: 5 La. 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary, f. w. c., et al. v. Daniel L. Brown.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 269–270

Head Matter:
Mary, f. w. c., et al. v. Daniel L. Brown.
A. being- domiciliated in the State of Mississippi tools one of his slaves to Ohio, and after having there emancipated her, returned with her to his domicil in the State of Mississippi. Held: That the status of the slave must he determined by the laws of Mississippi, under which the emancipation was invalid.
APPEAL from the District Court of Concordia, Farrar, J.
A. N, Ogden, for plaintiffs,
contended : The exception pleaded that the petitioners are held in slavery by the administrator of Read's estate in Mississippi, and that the courts in this State have no jurisdiction to decide on their claim to freedom, has no weight whatever. The right to freedom is a vested personal right which exists and may be asserted wherever the person is, or wherever he goes. See case of Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall’s Rep. 467. Wheeler, Law of Slavery, 389.
The administrator has no claim to the petitioners as assets in his hands, because the emancipation being effectual against James Read, whose estate he administers, it is equally so against his heirs and representatives. Ferguson et al. v.-Sarah, 4 J. J. Marshall’s Rep. 103. Wheeler, Law of Slavery, 280.
That the petitioners were voluntarily taken to Ohio by their former master, and that slavery is not tolerated there, and that this was done with the intention, coupled with the fact, of giving them their freedom, is fully proved; they became ipso facto free and could not again be reduced to slavery. Marie Louise v. Mariot, 8 L. R. 475. If the owner of a slave remove him from a slave State to a State where slavery is not tolerated, animo morandi, the slave becomes ipso facto free. Lunsford v. CoquiUion 2 M. R., N. S., 401. A fortiori, this effect is produced if, while there, he expressly emancipates the slave.
All presumptions in favor of personal liberty ought to be made. Oatfield v. Waring, 14 John’s Rep. 188.
The administrator and heirs of Read are estopped to deny the plaintiffs’ claim to liberty. See case of Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall’s Ky. Rep. 467. The emancipation having taken place in the State of Ohio, there is no principle of courts which requires the court to regal'd the statute of Mississippi on the subject.
Stacy and Sparrow, for the defendant,
contended : The defendant introduced in evidence the 47th section of chapter 11, on p. 166 ofHoward and Hutchison’s Digest of the Laws of Mississippi, which provides, in substance, that no act of emancipation, whether mortis causa or inter vivos, shall be lawful, or have effect, unless the person or persons passing the act shall prove to the satisfaction of the General Assembly, (Legislature,) that such slave or slaves have done and performed some meritorious act for the benefit of such owner or owners, or some distinguished service for the benefit of this (the) State, and the last will and testament or other instrument in writing, shall not have validity until the same shall be sanctioned by an act of the General Assembly,” &c.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, overruling the exception of the defendant, and on the merits declaring the plaintiff to have been legally emancipated, and to be free.
In the first place, neither the act of emancipation passed in Adams county, Mississippi nor that in Cincinnati, even recites any meritorious act. done by the slave for the owner, nor any distinguished service rendered to the Stale. In the second place, no such fact was ever proved to the satisfaction of the General Assembly; and thirdly, the act of emancipation, nor either of them, has ever been sanctioned by the Legislature (General Assembly..) How then can it be pretended that the act of emancipation is valid ?
The emancipation took place in Ohio. It is to be observed, that Read and the slaves where then all residents of the State of Mississippi, and they were in his possession. He removed them from the State with the express and avowed intention of emancipating them and bringing them back; in other words, of evading and defrauding the laws of the State of Mississippi. He did pass an act of emancipation of them in the State of Ohio, and brought them back with him to Mississippi in five or six weeks’ time after he left it. The case of Hinds et al. v. Breazeale et al., 2 Howard’s Miss. Rep. 841, is in every respect applicable to the present, and decides it. Nomine mulato, de te fábula narralur. In that case there was, in addition, a will of the deceased, recognising and confirming the emancipation made in Ohio. In this case, as in that, the negroes were slaves in Mississippi; they and their owners were residents of that State. In both, they removed them from the State to Ohio, for the purpose of emancipating them there and bringing them back. In both cases they did emancipate them there, and immediately bring them back to Mississippi.
If they had never ceased to be slaves under the laws and jurisprudence of Mississippi, we must be pardoned if we confess our inability to understand how their being hired by the administrator of Read, in Mississippi, in 1848, to a citizen of Louisiana, orto be employed in Louisiana, could give them their freedom. Yet it is understood that this is the ground on which the judgment of the district court is based.
The judgment of the district court is asked to be reversed with costs, and one given for the defendant, placing the plaintiffs in his possession as slaves belonging to the succession of James Read.

Opinion:
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
Eustis, C. J.
This is a suit in which the plaintiff, a woman of color, sues for her freedom and that of her four children.
The defendant, who is the administrator of the estate of James Read, late of Adams county, Mississippi, hired out the plaintiffs to A. S. Britton, in the State of Mississippi, to be employed at labor in the parish of Concordia in this State.
The freedom of the plaintiffs is claimed under an act of emancipation executed by their former master, James Read, in the State of Ohio, in the year 1846. The district court decided in favor of the plaintiffs; and from this judgment the defendant has appealed.
The domicil of James Read was in Adams county, Mississippi, where his succession was opened, and the status of the plaintiffs under the state of facts exhibited, can be determined under no other laws than those of Mississippi. They were born slaves, and it is in evidence that Read took them from his domicil in Mississippi to Ohio, for the purpose of liberating them from slavery, and, after having executed the act of emancipation in Ohio, returned with them to his place of residence in Mississippi. Was the status of the plaintiffs changed by this fact, according to the laws of Mississippi ?
In the case of Hinds v. Brazeale, 2 Howard's Rep. 837, a principle is settled which controls this case. B. left the State of Mississippi for Ohio, and took with him a slave woman and her son for the purpose of emancipating them, and with the intention to bring them back; after having executed the act of emancipation, he returned with the slaves to the State where he resided until the time of his death. In his will he recited the act of emancipation, and declared his intention to ratify it; he devised his property to the emancipated son of the woman, whom he stated to be his own son. It was held, that the deed of emancipation was void, being a contract made in Ohio, in violation and fraud of the laws of Mississippi, and calculated to injure the State and its citizens, and set a dangerous example, since no owner could emancipate his slave, except by proper deed or will, and proof of meritorious services to the Legislature, which must ratify the emancipation. See the case of Cole v. Lucas, 2d Ann. 953. Judgment of Sir William Scott, in the case of the slave Grace, 2Hazzard Rep. 94.
The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and judgment rendered for the defendant, with costs in both courts.