Case Name: Joe G. Light, appellee, v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, appellant
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1958-04-25
Citations: 166 Neb. 540
Docket Number: No. 34380
Parties: Joe G. Light, appellee, v. Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Court, appellant.
Judges: Heard before Simmons, C. J., Carter, Messmore, Yeager, Chappell, Wenke, and Boslaugh, JJ.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 166
Pages: 540–548

Head Matter:
Joe G. Light, appellee, v. Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Court, appellant.
89 N. W. 2d 833
Filed April 25, 1958.
No. 34380.
Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, and Richard H. Williams, for appellant.
Johnston & Grossman, for appellee.
Heard before Simmons, C. J., Carter, Messmore, Yeager, Chappell, Wenke, and Boslaugh, JJ.

Opinion:
Simmons, C. J.
The district court granted a writ of prohibition preventing the workmen's compensation court sitting en banc from proceeding in a workmen's compensation case. The workmen's compensation court appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions to dismiss the petition for the writ.
Herein we will refer to the plaintiff before the compensation court as the plaintiff and the defendants before the compensation court as the defendants.
The matter was submitted to the trial court on a general demurrer to the petition for the writ. It was overruled and the compensation court elected to stand on its demurrer. The writ issued.
The record shows these material facts:
Plaintiff filed his petition in the compensation court alleging an accident and a compensable injury. Issues were made and hearing was had before one judge of the compensation court pursuant to the provisions of section 48-177, R. R. S. 1943.
The result of that hearing was a finding "assuming, but specifically not so finding, that the plaintiff did suffer an accident as he has alleged ; that there is insufficient evidence to show any causal connection between plaintiff's back difficulties and the alleged accident; therefore, plaintiff's petition should be dismissed." It was therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the petition "is dismissed."
Five days later plaintiff filed a waiver of rehearing before the compensation court en banc as provided by section 48-181, R. R. S. 1943, and filed his petition on appeal in the district court. Under that procedure, if effective, plaintiff would have the right to a trial de novo in the district court as provided in the act.
Twelve days after the dismissal above recited, defendants filed a refusal to accept the order of dismissal and requested a rehearing before the compensation court en banc as provided in section 48-179, R. R. S. 1943, where the statute provides for a hearing de novo. They recited in their application for rehearing the contentions that the award failed to find that plaintiff did not suffer an accident within the course of his employment and that the failure to so find was contrary to law and the evidence.
Thereafter the compensation court and the district court each proceeded with the cause, claiming jurisdiction. The intermediate procedural steps need not be recited. Plaintiff then petitioned for and secured the writ of prohibition.
Plaintiff contends here that defendants by the order of dismissal secured all that they sought, were not prejudiced, and hence had no right to petition for a rehearing.
Defendants contend that their right to a rehearing before the compensation court en banc was a right paramount to the right of the plaintiff to waive rehearing and to appeal.
There is argument here that the award above recited would be res judicata of any subsequent claim by the plaintiff. When plaintiff elected to waive a rehearing and appeal to the district court, defendants were not then confronted with the question of allowing the award to become final and testing its sufficiency as a determination of the issues presented. They were presented with the question of whether to elect to have a hearing de novo before the compensation court en banc or a trial de novo in the district court. They elected a hearing de novo before the compensation court and took the requisite steps to secure it.
The question, then, becomes that of whether the compensation court or the district court has jurisdiction of the cause.
The statute itself answers the question in this language: "Either party at interest who refuses to accept the findings, order, award, or judgment of the court on the original hearing may, within fourteen days after the date thereof, file with the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court an application for a rehearing before the court sitting en banc, plainly stating the errors on which such party relies for reversal or modification." § 48-179, R. R. S. 1943. However, section 48-181, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: "In any such case, any party thereto may serve notice upon and waive rehearing before the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court. In such case any appeal shall be directly to the district court of the county in which the accident occurred; 55
Section 48-171, R. R. S. 1943, provides: "The words 'order,' 'award,' and 'judgment,' as used in section 48-101 to 48-190, are used interchangeably and are deemed to have the same meaning." The Legislature obviously recognized a distinction between "findings" and "order, award or judgment."
There is nothing in the language of the statute that negatives the right of "either party at interest" to refuse to accept the "findings" and request a rehearing before the court en banc if he desires to do so. It need not be demonstrated that defendants are parties "at interest."
These statutes were exhaustively considered by us in City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 133 Neb. 225, 274 N. W. 576. We there recognized that there was some conflict in the provisions. The statutes were construed to determine the legislative intent. It was there held that the right of either party to a workmen's compensation proceeding to waive a rehearing and appeal to the district court under the provisions of section 48-181, R. R. S. 1943, is an optional right and does not negative the right of the opposing party to a rehearing before the workmen's compensation court en banc. The ultimate holding was: The right of either party to a workmen's compensation proceeding to refuse to accept the findings, order, award, or judgment of the judge of the workmen's compensation court who is assigned to hear the same, and to secure in the manner provided by law a rehearing or retrial thereof by such compensation court and a determination by a majority of the members thereof, is paramount to and exclusive of the right of appeal from such original decision; or as stated in the body of the opinion, " this right is in no manner subject to modification by exercise of the powers defined by the terms of the proviso under consideration, and that the right to a rehearing by the court as such, in due course of administration of its powers, is preeminent, and the rights of appeal provided by the terms of the proviso exist only in subordination thereto."
This decision was approved in Mook v. City of Lincoln, 143 Neb. 254, 9 N. W. 2d 184. We there held: " '!' it is the failure to make application for rehearing in the manner provided by statute that defeats the right to a rehearing."
One further contention of the plaintiff requires mention. Section 48-180, R. R. S. 1943, provides: "The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court may, on its own motion, modify or change its findings, order, award or judgment at any time before appeal and within ten days from the date of such findings, order, award or judgment for the purpose of correcting any ambiguity or clerical error."
Plaintiff contends that the defendants failed to proceed to secure a correction of the findings within the 10 days and hence is barred from a rehearing.
Obviously that statute has no application here. It refers to the power of the compensation court to correct ambiguity or clerical error "on its own motion." That action the compensation court may take within 10 days from the date of the findings or award.
It follows that the workmen's compensation court at all times possessed exclusive jurisdiction of the compensation litigation. The judgment of the district court granting the writ of prohibition was erroneous.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the petition for the writ of prohibition.
Reversed and remanded with directions.