Case Name: STATE EX REL. v. DOWNING
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1901-12-16
Citations: 40 Or. 309
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE EX REL. v. DOWNING.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 309–326

Head Matter:
Decided 16 December, 1901.
STATE EX REL. v. DOWNING.
[58 Pac. 863; 66 Pac. 917.]
Appealable Oedee.
1. Where a court intends to finally pass upon all the questions at issue in a pending case, and make a concluding adjudication respecting them, without intending to hold the matter under further consideration, the order thus entered is a “final order,” within the meaning of Section 535 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, from which an appeal may be taken: Harvey’s Heirs v. Wait, 10 Or. 117, applied. Thus, an order adjudging a person guilty of contempt and fixing his punishment is a final and appealable order, notwithstanding an additional clause that further proceedings be stayed until the further order of court, and that defendant have a stated time within which to prepare a bill of exceptions, the effect of this last clause being only to stay the enforcement of the order.
Judgment oe Contempt — Necessity oe Wabeant.
2. A judgment of contempt is not self-executing under the statutes of Oregon, but must be enforced by means of a warrant of commitment, which is to issue at the order of the court.
Supplemental Peoceedings — Poweb to Make Final Oedee.
3. Under Section 308 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, providing that after the issuing of an execution, and on proof to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof that the judgment debtor has property liable to execution which he refuses to apply toward the satisfaction of the judgment, such court or judge may by an order require the judgment debtor to appear and answei; under oath concerning the same; and section 309, providing that if it appears by the examination of witnesses that the judgment debtor has any property liable •to execution, the court or judge shall make an order requiring the judgment debtor to apply the same in satisfaction of the judgment; the preliminary order for the examination of the judgment debtor may be made by the judge, and the final order requiring the satisfaction of the judgment may be made by the court.
Eppect op Failuee op Debtoe to Appeae Bepoee Kepeeee.
4. The failure or refusal of the judgment debtor to appear before a referee for examination regarding property that he may have liable to execution, pursuant to an order issued under the authority conferred by Section 308 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, does not affect the validity of any order that such referee may make under section 309.
Supplemental Peoceedings — Levy on Tangible Peopeety.
5. A judgment creditor is not required to levy on and sell tangible property of the judgment debtor before invoking the aid of supplemental proceedings under Section 308 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, as the statute authorizes such proceedings on the issuing of an execution and proof that the judgment debtor has property subject to execution which he refuses to apply toward the satisfaction of the judgment.
Necessity poe Peioe Sale op Attached Peopeety.
6. The statement in the affidavit in proceedings supplemental to execution that the judgment debtor had property liable to execution which he refused to apply toward the satisfaction of the judgment, if believed by the court or judge, is sufficient to authorize the issuance of an order requiring the judgment debtor to appear for examination and to satisfy the judgment, notwithstanding an attachment of tangible property without levy of execution thereon.
Foece op Voidable Oedee — Contempt.
7. While it is true that one cannot properly be punished for disobeying a void order, it is also true that one can and ought to be punished for disobeying a voidable order; for voidable orders are in force until they are set aside in a proper proceeding: thus, if it be admitted that an order directing a judgment debtor to appear for examination in supplemental proceedings is voidable, that will not relieve him from contempt proceedings for a failure to comply therewith, where the court had jurisdiction of the proceedings at their Inception.
Title op Civil Contempt Case — Amending Title.
8. Under Section 655 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, a contempt proceeding in a case not of public interest should be conducted in the name of the state on the relation of the party interested, and where such a proceeding has not been so entitled, it is discretionary with the trial court, under Section 101 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, to allow an amendment before trial changing the title by substituting the State ex rel. as plaintiff.
Supplemental Peoceedings — Appeal—Staying Execution.
9. An appeal from an order in supplemental proceedings requiring the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment will not operate as a stay of such proceedings, in the absence of an undertaking by the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of so much of the order as may be affirmed, since the order is so closely connected with the judgment as to be a part thereof, and fall within the meaning of Hill’s Ann. Laws, § 538, subd. 1, which requires that in order to stay proceedings on a money judgment, there must be an appeal supported by an undertaking to satisfy the judgment if affirmed.
Contempt — Contents op Affidavit — Aider by Answer.
10. An affidavit filed as the basis of a proceeding for a contempt not committed in the presence of the court should show the facts constituting the contempt, that the order that has been disobeyed had been served on the defendant or that he had personal knowledge or notice of it, and that a demand to comply with such order had been made by some person authorized to require such compliance; but the want of some of or all these allegations may be supplied by the answer, in which case the defect is cured.
Negative Pregnant Evidence.
11. The negative pregnant rule is as applicable to evidence as to pleading, and the same result follows its enforcement; thus, where the point in issue was the ability of a person to pay a judgment for $7,817, his evidence that he had not had and had not at the time of testifying $10,000 in lawful money, was an admission that he had a less sum, and justified a finding that he could pay the judgment if he would.
Contempt — Effect of Reversing Disobeyed Order.
12. The effect of a reversal of an order for disobedience of which a person has been adjudged guilty of contempt is to relieve such person from the duty of obeying the order, but it does not remit any fine that may have been imposed.
From Multnomah: Alfred F. Sears, Jr., Judge.
A contempt proceeding having been instituted against F. O. Downing for not obeying an order of court, he was adjudged guilty, and from this order he appeals. Further facts appear in the opinions. A motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled, opinion by Judge 'Wolverton, and the case was heard on its merits and affirmed, opinion by Judge Moore.
Affirmed.
Decided 6 November, 1899.
Messrs. Coovert & Stapleton, and Watson & Beelman, for the motion.
Messrs. Woodward & Palmer, contra.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Mr. Chief Justice Wolverton
delivered the opinion.
On October 7, 1897, the relator, Thomas J. Hammer, obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Multnomah County against the appellant, F. O. Downing, and one F. H. Hopkins, as partners under the firm name of Downing, Hopkins & Company, for $7,817.50, with accruing interest and costs. On April 4, 1898, it appearing in a proceeding supplemental to execution that Downing had $10,000 in his possession and under his control liable to execution upon said judgment, which he unjustly refused to apply towards the payment of the same, the court made an order directing him to pay over a sufficient amount thereof to satisfy said judgment, from which order and judgment he appealed to this court, but proceedings for their enforcement were not thereby stayed. Subsequently, on June 30, 1898, a proceeding for contempt of court in refusing to comply with the said order of April 4, 1898, was instituted against him, wherein the court made findings, and entered thereupon the following order and judgment, viz.: "It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the defendant, F. O. Downing, is guilty of contempt of this court, as charged in said affidavit of Thomas J. Hammer, the relator herein, and is now in contempt of this court for disobedience to its said order of the fourth day of April, A. D. 1898, and that it is in his power to comply therewith; and that said defendant, F. O. Downing, pay a fine of twenty-five dollars and costs of this proceeding, and be imprisoned in the county jail of Multnomah County, State of Oregon, until he shall have complied with said order of the fourth day of April, A. D. 1898, by applying a sufficient portion of said sum of ten thousand dollars upon said judgment in favor of said Thomas J. Hammer, mentioned in said order, to satisfy the same, namely, the sum of $7,817.50, with interest thereon from July 15, 1897, at the rate of eight per cent, per annum, and until said fine is paid. And on the motion of said defendant, F. O. Downing, it is further ordered that all further proceedings herein be stayed until the further order of the court, and that said defendant have sixty days to file a bill of exceptions. ' ' The defendant, Downing, having appealed from the judgment without attempting to have the proceedings stayed, the relator moves to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the order or judgment is not final, and therefore not appealable.
It is maintained by the relator that the latter clause of the judgment, which directs that all further proceedings be stayed until the further order of the court, retains the cause within the breast of the court below, so that it is empowered to modify or set aside and annul the judgment at any time upon further hearing, and, therefore, that the judgment is not final in its nature and purpose, so that an appeal' would lie therefrom. On the other hand, it is contended that the subjoined clause is effective only for the purpose of staying the issuance of a commitment and the enforcement of the judgment under and by virtue thereof; that it is rather in the nature of a stay of execution than a withholding of a final conclusion and adjudication upon the matters in controversy. The proceeding for contempt is one regulated entirely by statute, which provides — omitting a statement of the specific mode of procedure prescribed — that, upon the evidence taken as contemplated, the court or judicial officer shall determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of the contempt charged, and, if it be determined that he is guilty, he shall be sentenced to be punished as provided by such statute; and further, that, when the contempt consists in the omission or refusal to. perform an act in the power of the defendant to perform, he may be imprisoned until he shall have performed it, and in such case the act must be specified in the warrant of commitment. From the judgment thus given and entered either parly thereto may appeal "in like manner and with like effect as from the judgment in ah action": Hill's Ann. Laws, § 651, 659, 661, 664. Now, the judgment in the case at bar has determined that the defendant was guilty of contempt, and it specifies in what particular it consists. It is further adjudged that he pay a fine and the costs of the proceeding, and that he be imprisoned in the county jail until he shall have complied with the previous order of the court. This judgment conforms to every requirement of the statute, and without the latter clause no one would question that it was final in its nature and effect. The rule seems to be that, where it is the purpose of the court to pass upon all the questions at issue, and to finally consider •and determine concerning them, and make and enter a concluding order respecting them, without any intention of holding the matter in abeyance so that it may subsequently modify or revoke the order, the judgment so entered will be deemed to be final: Harvey's Heirs v. Wait, 10 Or. 117. And this is just what the court in the present case undertook and intended to do. It was its purpose, undoubtedly, to dispose of the ease absolutely, so far as adjudging the defendant in contempt is concerned; and when it had entered the judgment in this regard that ended its jurisdiction to modify or vacate the same, unless for good cause shown within the statutory provisions. The purpose of the subjoined clause, about which the contention centers, was, no doubt, to stay the execution of the judgment only, and not to reserve judgment.
Decided 16 December, 1901.
The act establishing the proceeding contemplates that the judgment shall be enforced by means of a warrant of commitment, which stands in the stead of an execution upon the ordinary judgment. The defendant cannot be committed except by authority of a warrant. The judgment is not self-executing; hence the order staying further proceedings is one in effect staying the enforcement of the judgment by withholding the warrant of commitment. This view of the law supports the appellant's right to appeal, and the motion to dismiss is therefore denied. Motion Overruled.