Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LUCKETT
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-10-01
Citations: 327 So. 2d 365
Docket Number: No. 56289
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LUCKETT.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 327
Pages: 365–374

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LUCKETT.
No. 56289.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 1, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Nov. 21, 1975.
On Rehearing Feb. 23, 1976.
Leo A. Miller, Jr., McIntosh, Fox & Miller, Lake Providence, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thompson L. Clarke, Dist. Atty., C. R. Brackin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice.
Defendant, Eddie Luckett, was charged by bill of information with simple robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:65. He was convicted after trial by jury and was sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections.
On appeal, defendant presents six assignments of error for our review. We find merit in defendant's assignment of error no. 3 and accordingly reverse the conviction and sentence.
In abbreviated form the facts are that the accused, a friend of his by the name of Diane Phenix, and one Quitman Wayne Ainsworth were riding along Louisiana Highway No. 134 on the evening of February 25, 1975 in a vehicle driven by the defendant, when the defendant stopped his automobile. After Ainsworth got out to check for a low tire, an altercation outside of the car took place between Ainsworth and the defendant. Defendant purportedly beat Ainsworth with his fists and allegedly during the beating took various items, including a blue Cricket cigarette lighter, a wallet containing about $3.00, and a pocket knife, from Ainsworth.
At trial defendant admitted fighting with Ainsworth, explaining that he had bought a tape 'player from Ainsworth two weeks prior to the incident and was actually seeking to get his money back because the tape player did not work. He denied taking anything from Ainsworth although at the time of the arrest, he was in possession of a blue Cricket cigarette lighter allegedly belonging to Ainsworth. His explanation was that he had found the lighter in the back seat of his car where Ainsworth had earlier been seated.
The reversible error which we find occurred took place during the state's cross-examination of defendant. In this non narcotic offense of simple robbery, without any evidence that the defendant had ever been convicted of the crime of possession of marijuana, the district attorney quizzed defendant on whether he had, on the night in question, any marijuana in the back seat of his car and whether he had been smoking marijuana that night. While the court originally sustained an objection to the original question concerning marijuana in the back seat of the car, the court nonetheless changed its ruling upon the state's pointing out that defendant was under cross-examination and that his credibility was at issue. Following the court's overruling of the objection, the state succeeded in eliciting from the defendant the incriminating response that he had not been smoking marijuana "that night," with the obvious inference that he had perhaps smoked marijuana on other occasions. Indicative that the prosecutor's objective was to obtain an oral admission of an incriminating nature from the irrelevant and prejudicial questioning, and that the prosecutor had no evidence that the defendant had any prior conviction (s), is the fact that after securing the incriminating statement he turned his questioning to other matters.
Defendant's credibility was at issue inasmuch as he had taken the stand in his own defense, but under our law defendant's credibility may be attacked only by having him admit or deny whether he had been convicted of a crime, and only if he denied a previous conviction could the state produce evidence that he had indeed been so convicted. See R.S. 15:495. That statute is also express in mandating that only convictions may be used to impeach a witness' credibility; the state may not even inquire into arrests or indictments. The pertinent questions here were obviously not permissible under that statute.
Evidence of the commission of prior crimes was likewise not admissible to prove the defendant's bad moral character, as the state may introduce testimony of the bad character of the accused only to rebut evidence introduced by him to show good character, and even then such rebuttal evidence as limited to general reputation in the community. La.R.S. 15:481, State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So.2d 847 (1971); State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 873, 116 So. 374 (1928). Defendant here had not put his character in issue.
Evidence of other crimes is admissible only under the provisions of R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, where it is introduced to establish knowledge, system or intent where such knowledge, system or intent is relevant. Even then such evidence of other crimes is permissible only if the state has followed the requisite guidelines outlined in State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973). Furthermore, compliance with the statute and the Prieur guidelines is necessary regardless of the stage of the trial at which other crimes evidence is offered, including cross-examination of the defendant. State v. Ghoram, 290 So.2d 850 (La.1974). In this case, the state does not even argue the admissibility of the other crimes evidence on the basis of R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, much less compliance with the notice required by Prieur.
The state in brief points to State v. White, 301 So.2d 321 (La.1974) for the proposition that evidence of prior crimes is admissible to question defendant's credibility when he chooses to testify in his own behalf. Unlike the case at hand, State v. White involved interrogation of a defendant relative to convictions of several crimes, and the evidence was therefore admissible under R.S. 15:495.
We find that the court's ruling which allowed the state to have defendant inferentially admit that he smoked marijuana on another occasion than the night in question was both a substantial violation of a statutory right and was extremely prejudicial to the accused, as a consequence of which we have no alternative but to reverse this conviction. See Art. 921, La.C.Cr.P.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the defendant are reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.
Reversed.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
DIXON and MARCUS, JJ., dissented.
. The pertinent portion of the transcript is the following:
BY MR. BRACKIN
Q. Mr. Luckett, this is all, uh
very convenient for you to look back and find that blue cricket lighter back there in the back seat wasn't it?
A. Well I was getting some papers, uh . . . if the officer will correct me they'll show him . . . he'll testify that there was some paper in the back seat. Which I . he didn't know if I used it or not but I used it to wipe off the mud off my pants . . . and my shoes as much as I could.
Q. What else did you have in the back seat of your car Mr. Luckett?
A. Uh . I had a letter back there and some of my copies.
Q. And the marijuana in the back seat?
MR. MILLER: Objection.
A. I didn't have any.
JUDGE SMITH: Sustained.
MR. BRACKIN: This is cross examination, Tour Honor.
JUDGE SMITH: That's right, then the objection is overruled.
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, what .
JUDGE SMITH: The objection is overruled Mr. Miller he's now in cross examination.
Q. Didn't you have some marijuana in the back seat of your car?
A. No I did not.
Q. Had you been smoking marijuana that night?
A. Not that night.
MR. MILLER: Well let him answer. Gee whiz. I just think his inflammatory Your Honor, I object this whole line of questioning it's utterly inflammatory. I don't know what .
JUDGE SMITH: Mr. Miller, if inflammatory he's under cross-examination. He's submitted himself to cross-examination. And as the ruling of the Court and further argument on that issue will not be entertained.
MR. MILLER: I object to the ruling of the Court, Your Honor, and I'd like for my objection to be noted of record.
JUDGE SMITH: The objection is noted.
. In White, the defendant admitted his prior convictions. The bill of exception was taken when the prosecutor in rebuttal argument referred to defendant's admitted prior convictions. We found no reversible error because after defense objection the judge immediately admonished the jury that evidence of other convictions could only be considered in weighing the credibility of the accused and could not be considered on the question of guilt or innocence.