Case Name: BOUBEL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-03-31
Citations: 221 S.W. 290
Docket Number: No. 5750
Parties: BOUBEL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 221
Pages: 290–293

Head Matter:
BOUBEL v. STATE.
(No. 5750.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 31, 1920.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 12, 1920.)
1. Indictment and information <@=011(1) — Information for hunting in pasture should negative consent by ail persons named in statute.
In a prosecution for hunting within pastures of 2,000 acres or less as defined by the statute, an information should expressly negative consent of all the parties named in the statute, and a general statement, negativing consent of the owner or lessee, proprietor, agent, or any other person, without alleging the names of the agent, etc., is insufficient.
2. Trespass <@=>87 — Information alleging want of consent by lessee held insufficient.
An information, alleging that a certain nam-. ed person was the lessee of the pasture on which defendant hunted, and negativing consent by the owner, lessee, proprietor, and agent in charge, cannot be sustained on the theory that the named lessee was intended by all those terms.
3. Trespass <&wkey;87 — Information for hunting in pasture should show under which of two statutes it was brought.
An information for hunting in a pasture without consent should inform .the accused whether the prosecution is brought under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1255a, prohibiting hunting in pastures of more than 2,000 acres, or under article 1255, applying to pastures of 2,000 acres or less.
4. Trespass <&wkey;87 — Information alleging possession and want of consent by lessee not supported by 'proof of possession by agent.
An information, alleging that the pasture on which accused was hunting had been leased to a named individual, who did not consent to the hunting, is not supported by proof that the pasture was under the charge or management of one of two agents of the lessee who were not named in the information.
Appeal from Maverick County Court; W. A. Bonnet, Judge.
Robert Boubel was convicted of bunting with firearms upon an inclosed and posted pasture, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Ben V. King, of Eagle Pass, for appellant.
Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
The charging part of the complaint and information is as follows:
That appellant "did then and there unlawfully and knowingly hunt with firearms upon the inclosed and posted lands of the J. M. Chittim estate, said inclosed land then and there being leased from said J. M. Chittim estate by G. Davidson without the consent of the owner, lessee, proprietor, agent in charge thereof, or any other person, such' inclosed lands then and there being used for grazing purposes, having cattle grazing thereon."
Exception was reserved to the pleading, which was overruled by the court. It is not alleged who was in charge of the Chittim estate, or alleged to be the owner of the property leased to G. Davidson; nor does it undertake to allege the want of consent of whoever was the owner of the Chittim estate by reason of having control and possession of it. Except in the most general way it does not allege want of consent of G. Davidson, if he was the lessee or proprietor; nor does it allege any agent of Davidson who may have been in possession of the property or in charge of it, or want of consent of any one in actual possession. Under our statute and decisions it would seem to be necessary to charge, where there is a special ownership, the name of such owner, and whatever is nec-essary to be charged in connection with that ownership. This prosecution was filed under article 1255a, 1 Vernon's Ann. Statutes, and section 2278, Branch's Ann. P. C. It is always necessary to charge in the pleading sufficient allegations to meet the proof to be had upon the trial. Under the cases in Texas the pleadings are insufficient. It may be further noticed that the evidence shows the property did belong to the Chittim estate, but it does not show who was in control and in charge of the Chittim estate. Williams testified that at the time of the trial he was sheriff and tax collector of Maverick county, and that prior to his election to said office he was manager of the Chittim ranch interests in Maverick county; that these are the same lands now owned by the heirs of J. M. Chit-tim, and the land was inclosed in quite a number of different pastures (the witness sets out the names of several, of the pastures), and that each pasture contains land in excess of 2,009 acres, and were all fenced under different fences, and that the whole number of acres that belong to the Chittim estate and as leased by G. Davidson amount to over 170,000 acres. Singleton testified for the state that he was foreman of the G. Davidson, rapeh interests in i Maverick county, and had been so for 14 or 15 years. He also testified that G. Davidson is the lessee of all the J. M. Chittim estate lands in Maverick county, including ' the Indio pasture; that these lands were used for grazing purposes.
The state relied upon the fact that appellant was hunting in the Indio pasture. Davidson did not testify; therefore his want of consent was not shown. Singleton testified he did not give his consent. Singleton's name is not mentioned in the complaint or information as having charge of the property; therefore his want of consent does not assist the state's case. It would have been necessary, if they relied upon possession of Davidson, to allege his possession and show that he did not give his consent to hunt on the premises. If Davidson was not in possession, but Singleton was, as special owner, it would be necessary to charge in the complaint and information such fact and negative want of consent of Singleton. The witness 'Salinas testified he was in charge of the Indio pasture as its' manager. This is the pasture where the hunting was supposed to have occurred, and that he did not give his consent for appellant to hunt in this pasture, but his name is not mentioned in the information or complaint. So whether we view it from the standpoint of the sufficiency of the complaint and information to charge the offense, or view it from the testimony supporting the case as charged, this record does not authorize an affirmance. We are of opinion that the complaint and information are insufficient, and that the evidence does not sustain such allegations as are made. From any viewpoint of the record this judg-
ment must be reversed, and the cause remanded; and it is accordingly so ordered.
©=>For other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
«gssKor other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and'Indexes