Case Name: Eloise Roman, Devisee and Executrix of J. Philip Roman vs. Hippolyte Mali
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1875-06-08
Citations: 42 Md. 513
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eloise Roman, Devisee and Executrix of J. Philip Roman vs. Hippolyte Mali.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Bowie, Brent, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 513–562

Head Matter:
Eloise Roman, Devisee and Executrix of J. Philip Roman vs. Hippolyte Mali.
Parties in Pari Delicio — Different degrees of Guilt as between the Parties to a Fraudulent transaction — Relation of Attorney and Client existing between Parties in Pari delicto — Transactions between Attorney and Client to be rigidly scrutinised— What is required of a Party seeking the Aid of a, Court of Equity— When the Re-argument of a Case will be allowed.
A bill was filed against a devisee to compel her to convey to the complainant certain real property, the legal title to which was held by her testator at the time of his death. The bill alleged in substance, that the testator acquired the title to the property in the capacity of agent and legal adviser of the complainant, and that he paid for it with the money of the complainant and held it as his agent and trustee from the time of the purchase until his death. The evidence in the case, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, showed that in the transfer and concealment of the property of the complainant in the name and apparent ownership of the testator, a gross fraud was perpetrated upon the creditors of the former; that the whole transaction was the joint scheme of the two — the one co-operating with the other and both being equally gnilty — to withdraw and conceal the complainant’s property from the pursuit of his creditors; that the object was accomplished, and the complainant got rid of his creditors by a composition founded upon his fraud and deception. Held :
That the complainant could not obtain the aid of a Court of Equity to have the property restored to him.
There may be different degrees of guilt as between the parties to a fraudulent or illegal transaction; and if one party act under circumstances of oppression, imposition, undue influence, or at great disadvantage with the other party concerned, so that it appears that his guilt is subordinate to that of the defendant, the Court, in such case, will relieve.
Where the parties to a fraudulent or illegal transaction are in pari delicto, the simple fact, that at the time of such transaction, the relation of client and attorney exists between them, will give the former no claim to the aid of a Court of Equity to have restored to him the property of which the latter has become possessed by their joint fraud. Such relation alone will not except the case from the general rule, in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis, aut defendentis.
An attorney is under no actual incapacity to deal with or purchase from his client. All that can be required is, that there has been no abuse of the confidence reposed; no imposition or undue influence practiced, nor any unconscionable advantage taken by the altorney of the client. When a transaction between parties occupying such relation to each other is brought in question, the onus of the case is cast upon the attorney of showing that nothing has happened in the course of the dealing which might not have happened had no such connection subsisted, and that the transaction has been fair in all respects. If the Court be satisfied that the party holding the relation of client performed the act or entered into the transaction voluntarily, deliberately and advisedly, knowing its nature and effect, and that no concealment or undue means were used to obtain his consent to what was done, the transaction will be maintained.
He who comes into equity must come with clean hands; and if a party seek to cancel or set aside an instrument, or be relieved of a transaction, or recover property, on the ground of fraud, and he himself has been guilty of a wilful participation in the fraud, equity will not interpose in his behalf.
No re-argument will be granted unless’ some member of the Court who concurred in the judgment, doubts the correctness of his opinion, and desires a further argument on the subject, and not then unless the proposition receives the support of a majority of the Judges who heard the case; and when that happens, the Court will of its own accord, apprise the counsel of its wishes, and if it does not desire to hear further argument on the whole case, will designate the points on which it desires to hear them.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the appellee on the 23rd of June, 181?!, against the appellant. The opinions in the case, together with the argument of the appellant’s counsel, furnish, it is thought, a statement of the case sufficient to illustrate the points decided by the Court. The Court below (Pinkney, J.,) being of opinion that the complainant was entitled to the relief as prayed, decreed on the 20th of February, 1874, that J. Philip Roman, deceased, held the property situated at Locust Point, in the city of Baltimore, in “trust for the use and benefit of the complainant, from the date of its sale by George H. Williams, Esq., on the 13th of March, 1855, until the death of said Roman, and that since his death, the defendant hath held and now holds the said property in like manner, in trust for the use and benefit of the said complainant, subject, however, to the result of the account to be hereafter taken.” It was further decreed that “the cause he referred to the auditor of the Court to state an account between the parties in accordance with the principles established and declared in the opinion of the Court, of and concerning all moneys of the complainant used by the said J. Philip Roman, in the purchase and improvement of said property, and in paying the expenses incident to the possession and management thereof, and of and concerning any of his proper fees, charges or other compensation for professional or other services rendered by him in respect to or in connection with the said property and trust, and all rents and profits of said property received by said Roman, in his life-time, and by the defendant since -his death, and of and concerning all payments and disbursements made by said Roman, in his life-time, and by said defendant, since his death, for and on account of the rents, issues and profits thereof.”
It was “further ordered, that the balance (if any) found to be due to the defendant, as executrix, or in her own right, upon the statement of said account, should constitute a lien upon said property and upon the rents, issues and profits of the same in the hands of the Receivers hereinafter appointed.” William A. Eisher and George H. Williams, Esquires, were appointed Receivers to take charge of the property and receive and collect the rents, issues and profits thereof, &c.
By the decree the defendant, her servants, agents and attorneys were enjoined and prohibited from interfering, in any way, from and after the appointment and qualification of the Receivers, with said property or with the rents, issues and profits thereof, until the further order of the Court.
From this decree the defendant appealed.
The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Bowie, Brent, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
George H. Williams and I. Nevett Steele, for the appellant. '
The case of the complainant is claimed to be founded on a resulting trust in bis favor, arising from the alleged payment by him of the purchase money for the property in controversy. It is well settled that such a trust can only result from the fact of the payment of the purchase money by the party claiming, or with his money, and from no other facts. For the safety of recorded titles, to prevent the evasion of the Statute of Frauds, and to avoid the risk of perjury, Courts of Equity have laid down stringent rules as to the proof which they will require for the establishment of the fact of such payment. The evidence must be clear and certain, so that no reasonable doubt as to the fact can remain in the mind of the Court; it must go directly and distinctly to the fact, and is insufficient, if it be contradictory or conflicting. Dorsey vs. Clarke, 4 H. & J., 551-6-7; Faringer vs. Ramsay, 2 Md., 365, 374-5; Hollida vs. Shoop, 4 Md., 474-5; Greer vs. Baughman, 13 Md., 257, 268-9; Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Deale, 18 Md., 26, 46; Purdy vs. Purdy, 3 Md. Ch. Dec., 547; Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheaton, 498; Hill on Trustees, 94, 105.
The rules established by these cases apply with special force and strictness to resulting trusts and alleged frauds, sought to be made the ground of claim after long lapse of time, and after the death of the person upon whose acts the claim is founded. In this case, not only do we find these circumstances, hut it is to be observed that here the Court is called upon to establish and set up a resulting trust against the record title, when it can do so only by disregarding and setting aside papers executed under the hand and seal of the complainant, and which are admitted to be in all respects what he meant they should be — by annulling the action of the Superior Court sitting in Equity, in a case in which the complainant and J. P. Roman were parties, — and by setting up a trust in favor of complainant, when he himself in a judicial proceeding has sworn that there was no such trust.
The .complainant having been a party defendant in the case in the Superior Court, for the sale of the Locust Point property; the sale made in that case to J. P. Roman and J. D. Roman, having been ratified by the Court — the bill having alleged that Roman, the complainant in that cause, was the owner of the mortgage notes of Jewett to the .Ellicotts, and Mali having admitted the fact by his answer ; Mali having also assented to the ratification of the auditor’s account, in which these notes and the mortgage notes of Jewett to Mali were audited to Roman — and the latter notes having been so audited on the oath of Mali himself, that he had transferred them for valuable consideration to Roman, Mali is estopped from averring anything in contradiction of the record in that case ; on the ordinary principle of res judicata, he could not again open and deny matters settled by that record, and much less can he do so, when the foundation of the Court’s action was his own admission on his own oath. Wilson vs. Watts, 9 Md., 356; Railroad vs. Howard, 13 Howard, 336-7.
The evidence relied upon to prove the payment of the §46,000 purchase money, by Mali or with his money, is utterly insufficient under the rules on that subject already referred to. It not only does not prove that fact clearly and certainly, but does not prove it at all. The evidence consists of correspondence and parol testimony by the witnesses, Spates, O. P. Jewett and Clarence Jewett, as to the declarations of Roman, save the alleged accord of figures in Roman’s books, which will be specially and separately considered. These declarations are excepted to, and are believed not to be admissible, but taking all the evidence together, it'is contradictory, conflicting, vague and uncertain.
Admissions of Roman as to the fact of the payment of the $46,000 with Mali’s money, going directly and distinctly to that fact, might be properly considered by the Court, but the declarations offered in evidence are not of that character. Statements that the property was bought on account of or for Mali, or that it was Mali’s, would go to prove a conventional trust by parol, and are not admissible or to be considered, for the purpose of inferring from them such payment of the purchase money.
It will be found, that so far as the correspondence offered in evidence by the complainant is concerned, it proves nothing, except great intimacy between Roman and Mali, and connection of some kind between them in some business matters.
If it be sought on the part of the complainant, to rely on the so-called admissions of Mr. Roman, the defendant may well and exclusively rely on the express admissions of the complainant, solemnly made under oath in judicial proceedings.
So far as the parol evidence refers at all to the use of Mali’s money in connection with this property, it would rather go to show that his money, if used at all, was used in the extinguishment of liens on the property, and intended in that way to be concealed and put beyond the discovery or reach of the creditors of Mali. No witness states that Roman admitted that the purchase money was paid with Mali’s money, and it is to be observed that the bill itself does not make any such distinct allegation, but alleges that if money, was advanced hy Roman, it was afterwards refunded.
The question whether there was money of Mali’s in Roman’s hands, is secondary, and only important, if followed up by proof, that such money was used to pay the purchase money of the Locust Point property ; hut in fact, the evidence no where shows money of Mali’s in Roman’s hands, prior to the institution of the Equity proceedings in the Superior Court; and the mortgage notes of Jewett to Ellicott were then already purchased hy Roman. On the contrary, the money that was to come to Roman’s hands, according to Spates’ testimony, was not to he received until after the purchase had been made.
Whether the purchase money was paid in cash as the decree required, or was paid by the credits to Roman in the auditor’s account, there is no proof that it was Mali’s money.
All the papers in the case executed hy Mali — his admissions and affidavit in the Superior Court case — his sworn answer in the New York Equity proceedings — his answer to searching interrogatories propounded to him in a judicial proceeding in New York — all conclusively negative the idea, that Mali had any interest at that time in the Locust Point property.
It is submitted, with confidence, that the foundational fact — the payment of the purchase money by Mali, or bis money — has not been established at all, and certainly not proved with the clearness, certainty, distinctness and precision which the law requires.
The party seeking to recover on the ground of an alleged fraud, must himself come into Court with clean hands. Are the hands of the suitor clean, who can only become entitled to relief, hy holding him to have been guilty of perjury ? In this case the property was not Mali’s at the time of the sale and purchase ; as owner, he then had no interest in it; the only interest he ever had as owner was one-half, and that interest is now conceded to him. As to the purchase of the other half, Mali cannot claim it on any other ground, than that Roman bought it and paid for it with Mali’s money.
It seems to be clear that the money of Mali’s which it is alleged was to come into Roman’s hands, was to come there for the purpose of delaying and hindering the creditors of Mali. Mrs. Roman consenting to let Mali have one-half the property, in accordance with the testamentary letter left bj»- her husband, has under all circumstances of this case thought it proper to rely on the defence, that Mali can not recover the other half of the property ; because his money, if put in Roman’s hands, was put there to defraud his creditors.
The cases in Maryland fully establish the public policy on which this defence is founded. In this case the very object of the bill, is to get the Court to carry into effect the alleged occult fraudulent agreement, and is therefore the very case to which the defence is rigorously aj^lied.
It is said that the defence cannot be- maintained in the case, because in this matter Roman was the counsel or attorney of Mali. It is believed that the evidence does not establish this. The truth is, Mali is the person who was to be benefited by the concealment of his property ; he, according to the evidence of Spates, was apprehensive that his creditors might get at his property, while Roman was always of opinion that the creditors could not get judgment, and Mali selected Roman as the person to hold and invest his money, not as an attorney, or because he was an attorney, but as his, Mali’s friend, in whom he had confidence. In all cases where this defence has been maintained, this same confidence will be found to have existed. Even if this relation of attorney and client did exist in this case, and the law in such case would not permit the attorney to make this defence, if there were nothing more in the case; yet it is submitted., that whereas, in this case, the complainant has maintained his fraudulent arrangement, and obtained the benefit of it, by his own perjury, public policy emphatically requires that the defence should be maintained ; otherwise the Courts would be holding out a premium for perjury. Freeman vs. Sedwich, 6 Gill, 28; Stewart vs. Iglehart, 7 G. & J., 132; Bayne vs. Suit, 1 Md., 86; Cushwa vs. Cushwa, 5 Md., 44; Wilson vs. Watts, 9 Md., 356; 1 Story’s Eq. Juris., see. 298.
But to affix Roman with an implied trust, it is vital to show, that at the time of the purchase he had Mali’s money wherewith the payments were made. How had he any such money at that time?
It appears from Ledger Ho. 1, now in evidence, and by other evidence in the cause, that the amount of money, paid out by Roman for Mali, far exceeded the amount received. And it further appears that at the time when the entry of $94,000 (round numbers) was made in or about the year 1859, $55,000 (round numbers) of the $101,000 had been already expended for Mali, leaving in the hands of Roman but about the forty-six thousand dollars of Mali’s money to pay for Locust Point, and to meet the other very heavy advances made by Roman from time to time.
And it is of course to be observed that this entry of $94,000, which is relied upon bjr the other side, and which is the first entry if it be taken to refer to Locust Point, which makes any charge against Mali, for that property, is not made until four years after Locust Point had been purchased, and was made at a time when Roman had not enough of Mali’s money to pay one-half of that amount. i
It is therefore clear from the entry itself, as found in the book, that Mali’s money could not at most have paid for more than half of Locust Point. But if it could be shown that Roman had enough of Mali’s money to buy for him half of Locust Point, that does not prove he did it or agreed to do it.
Now as to the accord of figures. The learned Judge in the Court below has said that after the introduction of Roman’s books it “has made the existence of the trust too plain for controversy.” This opinion is based upon the fact that in Roman’s Ledger he has charged Mali with an item of figures, which exactly accord in amount with the aggregate of the charges made up to that date in the same book by Roman against Locust Point, and because of this exact accord it is argued that an irresistible inference arises that they mean one and the same thing, and that the establishment of the trust thereby is “'too plain for controversy.”
That this accord is a strange coincidence, and that upon it the complainant can found a strong argument is not to be denied, and nothing herein stated is designed to deny the fairness or strength of this argument, unless this accord can be fully explained by other and undoubted figures in the proof. ,
This accord was discovered late in the progress of the cause, and at the hearing the surprise was such to the defendant’s counsel that they were not prepared at the moment to explain it as they now do.
In the inner column of the entry on the Ledger will be found the figures $89,754.59; these seem to have been formerly extended for that amount, and then erased, and then extended as $94,443.77. The debits against Locust Point exactly add up $94,443.77, hence the accord and “ the irresistible inference.”
Now whatever strength there may be in this accord the other item of $89,754.59 accompanies it, and was originally intended for it. What explains the one should explain and show a connection with the other; if this cannot be done then there goes an element of weakness with this strength, and destroys in great part, if not in whole, the effect of this accord. And on the other hand, if other and different figures in the case, referring to other matters, explain the accord, or rather in like manner accord not only with the one set of figures, but the other set also, then this irresistible inference which makes the trust “ too plain for controversy,” melts away. How no connection or explanation can be given of the $89,154.59 by any additions on Roman’s Ledger.
What ascertains the accord of $94,443.11 by that Ledger sheds no light on its companion $89,154.59, for which it has been manifestly substituted, and the irresistible inference is clogged with this diminution of its strength as proof; they cannot be separated, and what so perfectly establishes the one, as is supposed of necessity should be shown at least to have some connection wdth the other. That this Ledger on the complainant’s theory will show any connection whatever between these two sums will not be pretended.
Attention is now solicited to the following undisputed figures in the cause :
Cash for the one-ninth of the Totten estate......$ 2,960 00
Cash for the 1st Totten bond........................ 11,159 02
Cash on the 2nd Totten bond...................... 34,819 15
Cash on notes P. Y. Co., assigned to Roman... 11,150 00 Cash on notes endorsed by H. M. to J. P. R... 21,156 60
$94,445 31
Omit the 60 cents, and with an error of a dollar in addition.................,.................. 1 60
And you have the exact accord.....................$94,443 11
Then—
Cash on 1st Totten bond............................ 17,020 10
Cash on 2nd Totten bond............................ 34,819 75
Cash for note assigned by H. M. to R........... 20,156 60
Cash for note assigned by H. M. to R........... 17,750 00
Cash on the $2,960 cheque was given for a protested draft, (protest and interest increased 4 it to $2,960,) and it must have been less by 8 89
89,755 34
Omitting the 75 cents in the amount, $34,819.75 75
The exact accord with the remaning item as erased.............................................$89,754 59
Now, whether these debits were correctly made by Roman as proper charges is not the question, we are not just here justifying the propriety of charges. We are explaining an accord of figures in Roman’s books, made by him for his private use, and composed of items as he chose to charge them. Right or wrong he made them, and careless and rough as he seems to be in figures the question is, do they not explain away these supposed irresistible inferences ?
But it is submitted that the complainant, if he relies upon the book at all, must take it as a whole and as he finds it. He cannot use as much as suits his purpose and ignore the residue. What then is to be done with those pages which set forth Roman’s investments, among which his investment in Locust Point is registered so prominently; all the pages must be taken together ; you cannot read and rely upon one page and ignore all others; and so Roman went to his grave, without contradiction by the complainant in his life-time, with this investment in Locust Point, set down with his other investments.
Was Roman the solicitor or counsel of Mali at any time, save in the one case in 1854 ? There is no proof of fee paid or charge for professional services. Mali had seven lawyers in New York, and not one was produced to show that Roman was at any time their colleague, or that he ever opened his lips to them — nay, it is proved that, though present at the trial of one of Mali’s suits, he did not go to the trial table, and such references as he casually found, to authorities he gives to Mali, and does not have any intercourse with any" of the counsel there present, so far as the proof shows ; Spates, who assumes to bo the great manager of these suits, could not say, when asked, that Roman ever had a consulting interview with any of these counsel. And yet these were the important suits, so tremendous in their consequences to Mali and his confrere, Jewett.
Roman was a director in the Parker Vein Co., and its attorney at the time of the matters complained of, and probably a good witness, but where is the proof that he acted as the solicitor or counsel? If even the recognized adviser of Mali, to any extent, why does he thus write to Mali, “but perhaps, my dear friend, I am going top far in advising you.” If legal adviser, in any sense, would or could he have so written? We submit that friend he was, but legal adviser never. And this agrees with the New York evidence, which at least is true to the extent that Roman was proved not his legal adviser — however it may be as to other matters — but can this question, in the face of that proof, be considered?
Will a Court of Equity, at the instance of Mali, indulge him by saying the relation of counsel and client existed between them when Mali has repeatedly sworn in another Court, that this relation did not exist between them ? Will it gratify him in his demands, and consummate the purpose for which all this false swearing is supposed to have been given, and so reward a man for swearing falsely" in a Court of Justice to accomplish the nefarious end of concealing his property from his creditors ?
Charles Marshall and 8. Teaclde Wallis, for the appellee.
The evidence in this case clearly establishes the fact, that Roman bought and held the Locust Point property for Mali. And this being established, we may consider the final issue, and in fact, the only issue in the case. That issue is as follows :
The respondent pleads that her husband bought and Held Locust Point for Mali, under an illegal arrangement between them to defeat the suits of certain persons in New York against Mali, and invokes for her protection in holding the property, the rule of law that as between parties to an illegal arrangement of this kind, standing in pari delicto, the Court will refuse relief. This defence admits all that we claim as to the purchase and holding of the property by Roman for Mali.
We reply to this defence as follows :
1st. That whatever illegality there was in the transaction, Roman was the counsel and adviser of Mali, and all that was, done, was done under Roman’s advice as counsel.
2nd. That Roman constantly advised Mali that the claims of the New York suitors were unfounded, and could never he established, that the suits were intended only to levy black-mail, and that if Mali would put himself and his property in his (Roman’s) hands, he would protect him and his property, and secure him against these unjust and unfounded demands.
3rd. That Mali confided in this advice, and did put himself and his property and affairs, without reserve, in Roman’s hands, as his counsel and legal adviser, believing, under the advice he had received, that he had the right to resist and defeat these demands in the way suggested by Roman, and implicitly obeyed all directions of Roman.
4th. That Roman, as Mali’s counsel, assumed the direction of the suits against Mali, and took charge of all his property and affairs.
5th. That under Roman’s management, the suits resulted in judgments against Mali, and thus furnished Roman with the means of setting up the defence of illegality in order to retain Mali’s property.
6th. That Roman colluded with the parties who sued Mali in order to provide this very defence for himself, and thereby acquire all of Mali’s property, and that in all that Roman advised Mali to do, his design was to lead him into a position which would enable Roman to hold on to the property on this infamous plea.
7th. That while conceding the truth of the general principle, that as between parties in pari delicto, no relief will be given by the Courts, that rule has no application to a case where the party, seeking to avail himself of it, stands in the relation of counsel and legal adviser of the other party. That when a lawyer advises his client to do an illegal act, by which the lawyer gets possession of his client’s property, a higher and more imperative rule of public policy demands that the Court shall not sanction the infamous act of one of its own officers.
To meet this answer to her plea of the illegality of the arrangement between Roman and Mali, the respondent utterly denied that in all these transactions, the relation of counsel and client existed between Roman and Mali.
That Roman was the counsel of Mali in the proceedings which resulted in the acquisition by the former, of the title to the Locust Point property, is abundantly established by the evidence. There can he hut little doubt that the case must depend upon the answer which the Court will give to this question :
Can a lawyer, a member of the Maryland bar, persistently advise his client dishonestly for years ; can he lead him into devious paths; can he assume' complete control of all his affairs, and by his advice and influence acquire all his property, in fraud of his client’s creditors, and in fraud of his client, and when called to account for it, can he shelter himself behind his own falsehood and treachery by pleading the illegality of acts done under his own advice and professional direction?
The truth of the maxim of law invoked by the appellant — “ In pari delicto, potior est conditio defendentis, aut possidentis,” is conceded ; and in a case where the parties to such a transaction as is disclosed in this case stand in pari delicto, that rule should be applied. But Courts of Equity and of Law do not apply this rule invariably, but the parties must be strictly in pari delicto. The Court will weigh the degrees of guilt, and will give relief when the party seeking it .is less to blame than the other, or when it appears that one party may have acted under circumstances of oppression, imposition, undue influence, or great inequality of condition, so that his guilt may he far less than that of his associate in the offence.
Apart from Roman’s position as the trusted friend and legal adviser of Mali, the evidence shows that he actually^ possessed unbounded influence over him.
The power of an attorney over his client in Maryland is almost unlimited. He can bind him as to third parties, and the client has no relief except against the attorney, if the latter injure him. Bethel Church vs. Carmack, 2 Md. Ch. Dec., 143.
The advice of an attorney, honestly followed by his client, will protect the latter in a suit for malicious prosecution, although the advice may be erroneous.
It is surely against public policy that a man be arrested and prosecuted for an offence of which he is innocent, and yet so sacred is the relation between counsel and client, and so essential is it for the public good, that clients may confide in and follow the advice of their counsel, that even in a case of false imprisonment, a higher and more imperative rule of public policy demands that they shall be protected, even when they have wrongfully arrested and prosecuted an innocent man. This Court has laid down the rule of policy applicable to persons standing in relations of confidence to each other, in the strongest terms. Todd vs. Grove, 33 Md., 143; Story’s Eq. Ju., secs. 310 to 312; Perry on Trusts, secs. 202, 203, 205 and 846; Story on Agency, sec. 302.
Eor the honor of our profession, we claim that in this case there is no room for the application of the rule invoiced by the respondent, to enable her to retain property to which her husband certainly had no right. See the following authorities: Hill on Trustees, 164 ; 1 Story’s Eq. Ju., secs. 298 — 308 inclusive', Perry on Trusts, secs. 202, 214; 1 Fonblanque’s Eq., book 1, ch. 4, sec. 4, note 7; Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank, 33 Md., 558; Freeman vs. Sedwick, 6 Gill, 29; Kerr on Injunctions, 51, 52, top; Williams vs. Bailey, 1 Law Rep., H. of L., 200, 212; Smith vs. Bromley, Douglas, 696; Browning vs. Morris, Cowper, 790; Osborne vs. Williams, 18 Vesey, 379; Morris vs. MacCullock, 2 Eden, 191, 192; Law vs. Law, 3 P. W., 392; Hatch vs. Hatch, 9 Vesey, 295; Roche vs. O’Brien, 1 Ball & Beatty, 358; St. John vs. St. John, 11 Vesey, 535 and 536; Reynell vs. Sprye, 1 DeG. Man. & G., 660; Smith vs. Bruning, 2 Vernon, 392.
See also the following cases in the Supreme Conrt of the United States : Harris vs. Runnels, 12 Howard, 79; Walworth vs. Kneeland, 15 Howard, 353-4; Udell vs. Davidson, 7 Howard, 769.
These latter cases show that the party who endeavors to retain property or to defend himself when sued, by the plea that the transaction is against public policy, has no right of Ms own, which is protected like rights resting on contract, but only enjoys immimity by reason of the disability to sue, which the policy of the lato imposes on his adversary. If the policy of the law require that the defendant shall be punished, the Courts will punish him, although by so doing they may confer an advantage upon a less guilty party. But the precise question in this case has been decided by the Court of Appeals of New York. Ford vs. Harrington, 16 N. Y., 285. This case was followed by Freelove vs. Cole, 41 Barbour, 318, and by the very recent case of Goodenough vs. Spencer, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep., 508, which is a case in which the client, as in this case, had been examined under proceedings supplementary to judgment, and had answered as in this case Mali did. See also Bulkley vs. Wilford, 2 Cl. & Fin., 177, and 8 Bligh, N. S., 11.
Another principle is applicable to this case. It is settled that in cases where the defence of illegality is taken by a party to the illegal transaction, “if the foundation of the suit be something collateral to-the illegal contractor transaction, and the plaintiff is not obliged to resort to this in order to maintain the suit, or to derive any aid from it, then the illegality of the original transaction is not a defence to the suit.” State vs. the B. & O. R. R. Co., 34 Md., 364; Kerr on Injunctions, 52, top page; McBlair vs. Gibbes, 17 Howard, 232; Watts vs. Brooks, 3 Vesey, 612; Brooks vs. Martin, 2 Wallace, 70.
In the present case, the original arrangement by which Roman got Locust Point, was fully consummated before the claims against Mali had been established, and while Mali was acting under the belief, inspired by Roman’s advice, that those claims were void. The arrangement only became illegal so far as Mali is concerned, by the use made of Roman’s ownership, after the judgments had been recovered, and Roman's advice shown to be erroneous.
We seek to recover upon Mali’s rights as a party to the ■original transaction, which was legal so far as he was concerned, and not on the basis of the fraudulent use subsequently made of that arrangement, to which we need not resort to support our claim. With reference to all the pretended claims against Mali brought forward by the respondent without proof, we say that having established the relations of counsel and client between Roman and Mali, all benefits claimed by Roman from his client, must be shown to have been fairly and honestly obtained, and the presumption is against their validity.
This principle will dispose of the argument attempted to be made to show that Roman had acquired half of Locust Point. If he had a deed for it, it would be prima facie void. Kerr on Injunctions, 45 and 46, top; Perry on Trusts, secs. 202-3-5, and 846; Howell vs. Ransom, 11 Paige, 538; Evans vs. Ellis, 5 Denio, 640; Todd vs. Grove, 33 Md., 143.
There was a resulting trust in favor of Mali, arising from the payment of the purchase money of the property in question. Hill on Trustees, 91, margin; Lewin on Trusts, 130; Harrisburg Bank vs. Tyler, 3 W. & S., 373; Unitarian Society vs. Woodbury, 14 Maine, 281; Harder vs. Harder, 2 Sanford Ch. R., 17; Depeyster, et al. vs. Gould, et al, 2 Green Ch., 474; 2 Story’s Eg. Ju., 1201; Dryden vs. Hanway, 31 Md., 254; Perry on Trusts, sec. 133.
The proof of the existence of an account in Roman’s books, in which Mali is charged with the purchase money of the property, against credits of money received by Roman for him, is a sufficient memorandum within the Statute of Frauds to establish the trust. Cripps vs. Jee, 4 Bro. C. C., 472; Prevost vs. Gratz, 1 Peters’ C. C. R., 366; McCubbin vs. Cromwell’s Ex’or, 7 G. & J., 157; Perry on Trusts, 82, 133, and cases cited.

Opinion:
Alvey, J.,
delivered the following opinion, which was concurred in by Judges Bowre and Brent:
A careful examination of the record in this case cannot fail for a moment to convince any one that, in the transfer and concealment of the property of Mali, in the name and apparent ownership of Roman, a gross fraud was perpetrated upon the creditors of the former. But, in the view of a majority of this Court, Mali was not less guilty in the intent-and practice of that fraud than Roman; they were clearly, according to our apprehension, in pari delicto. And as this suit is in effect an application to a Court of conscience, hy one of the guilty parties, to have enforced the fraudulent and corrupt agreements, whereby he has succeeded in cheating and defrauding his creditors, we are decidedly of opinion that the Court should withhold its aid.
We are not unmindful of the fact, that there are exceptions to the general rule, that Courts of Justice will not actively interpose for the relief of a party who has been particeps criminis in an illegal or fraudulent transaction ; and that one of the exceptions is, where the party suing, although paticeps criminis, is not in pari delido with the adverse party. There may be different degrees of guilt as between the parties to the fraudulent or illegal transaction ; and if one party act under circumstances of oppres-. sion, imposition, undue influence, or at great disadvantage with the other party concerned, so that it appears that his guilt is subordinate to that of the defendant, the Court, in such case, will relieve. But we have examined the record in this case in vain to find any evidence whatever of those circumstances that should entitle Mali to the benefit of the exception to-the general rule. On the contrary, it is most fully and clearly shown that he was a man of intelligence, of large business habits and experience, and of considerable pretensions in the world, and by no means such a person as would be liable or likely to be inveigled, misled, or unduly influenced, by the fraudulent suggestions and advice of Roman. The whole transaction, from the beginning to the end, was the joint scheme of the two, the one co-operating with the other, and both being equally guilty, to withdraw and conceal Mali's property from the pursuit of his creditors; and having accomplished that object, and gotten rid of his creditors hy a composition founded upon his fraud and deception, Mali now seeks to have the property restored to him, through the instrumentality of a Court of Equity; and that too after the lapse of sixteen or seventeen years from, the time of the original perpetration of the fraud, and after the death of his confederate in the transaction.
Whether the relation of client and attorney, in its full and proper sense, existed between Mali and Roman at the time of the concoction of the fraud, admits of great doubt, whatever may have been their relation afterwards. Mali has sworn that no such relation did exist, and that Roman held no property in which he, Mali, was interested; and we think he should be forever estopped to deny the truth of his sworn testimony upon the subject. But oven conceding that the relation of client and attorney did exist, we think there is no well established rule of law that requires, under the facts disclosed in this case, that the Court should allow such effect to that relation as to form an exception to the general rule before stated. By so doing the attorneys would form a special class from which assignees would be sought in all cases where parties desired to cheat and defraud their creditors, by the assignment of their property. The general rule, by which all relief is withheld, might deter a party from conveying his property to an unprofessional person, but under the exception to that general rule, sought to be established in this case, if an unprincipled and fraudulent attorney could be found, the party could deal with him with impunity, being secure in the full protection of all the remedies administered by the Courts, for the restoration of the property after the fraudulent object had been accomplished.
The general rule to which wc have referred is most salutary and conservative, as a means of suppressing illegal and fraudulent contracts, and nothing should be done by the Courts to weaken its force and operation. The suppression of such illegal and fraudulent transactions is far more likely, in general, to be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each other, and thus introducing a preventive check, than by enforcing them at the instance of one of the parties to the fraud; and no where .has this doctrine been more unqualifiedly adopted than in this State. Stewart vs. Iglehart, 7 Gill & John., 132; Freeman & Sedwick vs. Sedwick, 6 Gill, 28. Public morals, public justice, and the well established principles of judicial tribunals, alike forbid the interposition of the Court to aid in the enforcement of a transaction like the present. The law leaves the parties to such transactions as it found them -, and if either has sustained loss by the bad faith of a particeps crimihis, it is but a just infliction for premeditated and deeply practiced fraud, which, when detected, should deprive him of all anticipated benefit, or subject him to irrecoverable loss. Bartle vs. Coleman, 4 Pet., 187.
(Decided 8th June, 1875.)
Whether, the confidential letter of Roman to his wife, exhibited in the record, contains such a declaration of trust in favor of Mali as may be enforced, we are not now called- upon to decide, and in regard to which we intimate no opinion whatever ; but the present bill will be dismissed without prejudice to any right that the appellee may have in that behalf.
Decree reversed, and hill dismissed.