Case Name: PAFFORD v. BIOMET et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1994-09-19
Citations: 264 Ga. 540
Docket Number: S94G0154
Parties: PAFFORD v. BIOMET et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hunt, C. J., and Fletcher, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 540–547

Head Matter:
S94G0154.
PAFFORD v. BIOMET et al.
(448 SE2d 347)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
In a surgical procedure performed at South Georgia Medical Center (Hospital) in 1988, a metal plate was installed in appellant-plaintiff's back in an effort to stabilize his spine. Some months later, the plate broke and was removed from appellant's back in a second operation.
After this second surgery, appellant became disabled. Relying upon OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), appellant filed the instant tort action against appellee-defendants Biomet and Pfizer Hospital Products Group, Inc. in 1990. According to the allegations of appellant's complaint, the plate had broken because it was defective and his ensuing disability had been caused by the breaking of the defective plate.
The trial court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed on two grounds: Appellant's claim was barred by the applicable ten-year statute of repose; and, in any event, appellant had failed to prove that either of the appellees was the manufacturer of the plate. Pafford v. Biomet, 210 Ga. App. 486 (436 SE2d 504) (1993). This court granted certiorari to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
1. OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) provides:
No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.
(Emphasis supplied.) However, no specific statutory definition of "first sale for use or consumption" is provided and, heretofore, our appellate courts have had no occasion to construe that phrase. The proper construction of "first sale for use or consumption" as employed in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) is, therefore, a question of first impression in Georgia.
Appellees urge, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the applicable period of repose began to run more than ten years prior to appellant's commencement of the instant action, when the plate was first placed in the stream of commerce by its initial sale to the Hospital for the Hospital's ultimate sale to a patient. Pafford v. Biomet, supra at 487 (2). Chronologically, the Hospital's initial purchase of the plate was certainly the "first sale" of the plate by its manufacturer. However, OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) does not provide that the period of repose commences on the date of the "first sale" of a product by its manufacturer. It provides that the period of repose commences on the date of the "first sale for use or consumption." Accordingly, unless the plate had been sold to the Hospital for the Hospital's "use or consumption," the period of repose did not commence on the date that the plate was initially purchased by the Hospital.
Other state statutes of repose begin their limitations period as of "the date of first sale, lease or delivery" of the product, [cit.], or "the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product," [cit.], giving manufacturers con trol over when the limitations period begins. Our legislature, however, chose to begin the limitations period at the date of "[first sale] for use [or consumption]," not landmarks such as those chosen by [other] legislatures.
(Emphasis in original.) Chicopee, Inc. v. Sims Metal Works, 391 SE2d 211, 215 (N.C. App. 1990).
Appellant urges that the applicable period of repose did not begin to run until two years prior to his commencement of the instant action, when the plate was eventually sold by the Hospital to him for the intended purpose of its placement in his back. This construction of "first sale for use or consumption" is entirely consistent with the concepts of "use" and "consumption" as employed in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b). Subsection (b) (1) of that statute recognizes a distinction between the individual who initially purchased a manufactured product for mere static retention in his inventory and that individual whose actual employment of the product was ultimately intended and, as that distinction is expressed therein, the first "use or consumption" of the product would be by the latter, rather than the former, individual:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase "first sale for use or consumption" as employed in subsection (b) (2) of OCGA § 51-1-11 must be construed in pari materia with the concepts of "use" and "consumption" as employed in the other subsections of that statutory provision.
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes "in pari materia," are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.
Ryan v. Commrs. of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730, 731-732 (1) (48 SE2d 86) (1948). Accordingly, by purchasing the plate for mere static retention in its inventory, the Hospital was not functioning as an active "user or consumer" thereof, but only as "a dealer or any other person" through whom the plate would ultimately be sold for its intended purpose of placement in the back of a patient. Wilson v. Stu debaker-Worthington, Inc., 699 FSupp. 711, 718 (S.D. Ind. 1987). See also Border v. Indian Head Indus., 792 P2d 111, 112 (Or. App. 1990); Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 362 NW2d 35 (Neb. 1985); Weeks v. Remington Arms Co., 733 F2d 1485, 1488, fn. 3 (11th Cir. 1984). The "first sale for use or consumption" did not occur until it was removed from the Hospital's inventory and sold to appellant for its actual intended purpose of placement in his back.
Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, this construction of the statutory language does not "create an absolute liability on the manufacturer." Pafford v. Biomet, supra at 488 (2). Liability is not imposed upon a manufacturer by the provisions of OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), but by the provisions of OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1). Subsection (b) (2) merely "sets an ultimate limit on which injuries shall be actionable." Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357 (2) (367 SE2d 128) (1988). Accordingly, in order to recover, appellant must still prove that the plate, "when sold by the manufacturer[,] was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1). Thus, if the plate was not defective when it was initially sold to the Hospital and subsequently became defective only as the result of remaining in the Hospital's inventory for more than ten years, appellant has no viable claim against the manufacturer. If, however, the plate was defective when sold to the Hospital, the manufacturer cannot escape potential liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1) by invoking the statute of repose defense created by subsection (b) (2) of that statute unless appellant was injured more than ten years after the defective plate had been sold to him for his "use or consumption." "A statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs [within] that period, it is . . . actionable. [Cit.]" Hill v. Fordham, supra at 357 (2).
"Any unfairness to defendants in requiring them to defend against unavoidably delayed actions is more than balanced by the intrinsic injustice of barring plaintiff's action before it can reasonably be brought." [Cit.]
Whittaker v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 466 NE2d 480, 484 (Ind. App. 1984). See also Wilson v. Studebaker-Worthington, supra at 717-718.
Appellant's action was initiated within ten years of the date of the "first sale for use or consumption" of the allegedly defective plate and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
2. Contrary to the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals, appellant did not have to "produce specific conclusive evidence that a particular defendant produced the plate. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Pafford v. Biomet, supra at 487 (1). If each appellee produced evidence showing that it had not manufactured the plate, appellant would then be required only to "point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue [as to each appellee's status as the manufacturer]. [Cit.]" Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).
"[T]he fact that the evidence adduced by ([appellant]) in his response to the motion for summary judgment does not prove definitively [that one] of the two manufacturers supplied the ([plate]) involved in the instant case . is of no significance to the trial court's deliberations as to whether or not to grant summary judgment. [Cits.]"
(Emphasis supplied.) Collins v. Newman Machine Co., 190 Ga. App. 879, 883 (3) (380 SE2d 314) (1989). See also Scott v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 19, 22 (3) (325 SE2d 402) (1984).
(a) In support of its motion, appellee Biomet produced evidence that the chemical composition of the plate which had been placed in appellant's back differed from the specifications for any such plate ever manufactured by it or its predecessor. However, this evidence does not necessarily negate appellant's allegation that appellee Biomet is the manufacturer of the plate. Instead, such evidence is entirely consistent with appellant's allegation that the plate was defectively manufactured by appellee Biomet, the defect in manufacture being the chemical composition of the plate. Moreover, in opposition to the motion, appellant produced evidence that the instrumentation used to install the plate in his back bears the marking of Biomet's predecessor and that such instrumentation is not interchangeable for use in installing plates made by other manufacturers. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellee Biomet.
(b) In support of appellee Pfizer's motion, however, uncontroverted evidence was introduced to show that it was only the distributor of plates which had been manufactured by Biomet's predecessor and that it had distributed those plates only in Europe. Appellant's mere speculations to the contrary did not give rise to a genuine issue as to appellee Pfizer's status as the manufacturer of the plate. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Pfizer.
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to its affirmance of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Pfizer and is reversed as to its affirmance of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Biomet.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
All the Justices concur, except Hunt, C. J., and Fletcher, J., who dissent.