Case Name: EDWARD WEISSNER vs. DANIEL WELLS, Jr., and ABNER KIRBY, impleaded with MARCIA WELLS, LETITIA R. KIRBY and AUGTSTUS W. GOETS, Appellants
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1859-11-15
Citations: 9 Wis. 471
Docket Number: 
Parties: EDWARD WEISSNER vs. DANIEL WELLS, Jr., and ABNER KIRBY, impleaded with MARCIA WELLS, LETITIA R. KIRBY and AUGTSTUS W. GOETS, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 471–476

Head Matter:
EDWARD WEISSNER vs. DANIEL WELLS, Jr., and ABNER KIRBY, impleaded with MARCIA WELLS, LETITIA R. KIRBY and AUGTSTUS W. GOETS, Appellants.
APPEAL PROM CIRCUIT COURT, MILWAUKEE COUNTY.
Heard October 26.]
[Decided November 15, 1859.
Mortgage — Sale of Mortgaged Premises.
The act extending the time of advertising the sale of mortgaged premises did not apply to a canse commenced before, and pending for trial at the time of the passage of the act. Cole, J., dissenting.
The case of Ogden vs. Glidden et al., sup a, 46, considered and approved.
This was an action to foreclose a mortgage made by Wells & Kirby on the 6 th of February, 1853,payable to Weissner, for $1506,67, in four years, according to their note. The complaint was served May 14, 1858. The answer set up an extension of the time of payment until February, 1859; and on that point the trial proceeded, and the finding which was made on the 24th of July, 1858, was against the answer. The appellants excepted to the finding and judgment of the court, which orders and directs “ that the mortgaged premises described in the complaint in said action, and in said judgment set forth, be sold at public auction, in the county of Milwaukee, by the sheriff of said county; that the said sheriff give public notice of the time and place of such sale, by advertising the same for six weeks successively, at least once in each week, and at least twice in each week, during the last three weeks of such advertisement.” And they appealed from the judgment of this court.
Wells & Brigham, for the appellants.
Palmer & Stark, for the respondent.

Opinion:
By the Court,
Paine, J.
• The decision of this appeal depends entirely on the question whether the act commonly called the mortgage stay law, was applicable to suits pending at the time of its passage, which the majority of the court, in the case of Ogden vs. Lockwood & Glidden, have at the present term decided in the negative. The point was re-argued in this case, but our view remains unchanged. We think the language of the act clearly includes only actions thereafter commenced, and those in which judgment had theretofore been rendered. And although including the latter indicates that the legislature would have included actions then pending if their attention had been called to it; yet as the legislation is retroactive in its character, we do not feel warranted in extending it by construction beyond the clear intent of the act, as shown by the language used.
The judgment is affirmed with costs.