Case Name: George Shaver, Appellant, v. The Western Union Telegraph Company, Respondent
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-05
Citations: 57 N.Y. 459
Docket Number: 
Parties: George Shaver, Appellant, v. The Western Union Telegraph Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 459–473

Head Matter:
George Shaver, Appellant, v. The Western Union Telegraph Company, Respondent.
(Argued January 16, 1874;
decided May term, 1874.)
Defendant’s president wrote a letter stating, in substance, that if B., a person in its employ, would make an order on its treasurer for any portion of his salary, and the person in whose favor the order was drawn should file it with the treasurer, the sum named would be paid monthly so long as B. remained in the employ of the company and the order “remained unrevoked.” Thereupon B. drew an order directing the treasurer to pay N. §300 in monthly payments of fifty dollars, and charge the same to his salary account The order and letter for a valuable consideration were delivered to N., who presented the same to the defendant’s treasurer, and by his direction filed them with the cashier. B. subsequently wrote the treasurer stating that, “ if not accepted,” he countermanded the order. He remained in the employ of defendant six months thereafter at a salary of §118 per month. Defendant refused to pay anything under the order. In an action to recover the amount thereby directed to be paid, held (Dwight, 0., dissenting), that plaintiff could not recover; that treating the order as a bill of exchange the letter was not equivalent to an actual acceptance as it was conditional (1 R. S., 768, § 8); that the transaction did not operate as an equitable assignment, as the order was not a requirement to pay out of a designated fund or from a particular source; and that, as the promise to pay was upon the condition that the order remained unrevoked, thus leaving it subject to the control of B., his subsequent letter was a revocation and rendered the conditional acceptance inoperative,
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered on the report of a referee.
This was a consolidated action embracing three suits brought to recover installments alleged to be due upon an order accepted by defendant.
In February, 1868, one J. A. Borst was an employe of the defendant at a monthly salary of $118, payable at the end of each month, and the defendant caused to be delivered to W. W. Borst, a brother of the said J. A. Borst, the following reply to a note previously received from him, viz.:
“ Mr. W. W. Borst :
“ Dear Sir.—Replying to your note of this date I have to say that if your brother makes an order on O. TI. Palmer, treasurer of this company, for any portion of his salary, and the person to whose favor the order is made will file it with Judge Palmer, whatever sum is named therein will be paid monthly to the party in whose favor it is drawn, so long as your brother continues in our service and the order remains unrevoked.
“ Very respectfully,
“WILLIAM ORTOR,
“ President.”
On February 27, 1868, W. W. Borst exhibited this letter to J. A. Borst, who, thereupon, drew and delivered to said W. W. Borst the following order :
“ 0. H. Palmer, Esq.,
“ Treasurer Western Union Telegraph Co.:
“ Please pay to Mr. D. L. Royes fifty dollars, monthly, on the last day of each and every month, commencing March 31, 1868, until the sum of three hundred dollars is paid, and charge the same to my salary account.
“J. A. BORST.
“ Rew Tore, February 27, 1868.”
The same day W. W. Borst took this order and defendant’s letter to one D. L. Noyes and delivered them both to said Noyes, receiving from him a valuable consideration therefor. Noyes, on the same day, took said order and letter to the office of the defendant and notified defendant that he held the same, and delivered to and left them with John Horner, its cashier, by direction of Palmer, its treasurer.
On the thirtieth day of March, the day before the first payment became due by the terms of the order, J. A. Borst sent to defendant the following notice:
“ New York, March 30, 1868.
“ Dear Sir. — If not accepted I hereby countermand the order given to D. L. Noyes. Please return to him, unpaid.
“ Respectfully yours,
“J. A. BORST.
“ Hon. O. H. Palmer,
“ Treasurer Western Union Telegraph Co.”
J. A. Borst continued in the employment of the defendant during, the months of March, April, May, June, July and August, 1868, at the said salary, and there was due and payable to him, at the end of each of said months, the sum of §118 on account thereof.
Noyes demanded payment from the defendant of the sum of fifty dollars that became payable on the last day of March, 1868, but it was refused. He then, on the 24th day of April, 1868, sold, and by an instrument in writing assigned and transferred to the plaintiff all his right, title and interest in the said order, and all rights acquired thereby, and all claims he then had against the defendant, and the plaintiff thereafter demanded payment of the other sums of fifty dollars that were payable under the said order of the defendant, but it refused to pay any or either of them and paid all of them to Borst.
Upon the facts above set forth the referee found, as a conelusion of law,, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover,, and directed judgment to be entered for the defendant. Judgment Was entered accordingly.
Nathaniel C. Moak for the appellant.
Defendant haying notice of the assignment of the order and letter was bound to pay without any written acceptance, provided Borst continued in its employment. (Shuttleworth v. Bruce, 7 Rob., 161-163; Hall v. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes, 193; Lewis v. Berry, 64 Barb., 593, 597, 598; Field v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 6 N. Y., 179; Parker v. City of Syracuse, 31 id., 376; Lowry v. Steward, 25 id., 239; S. C., 3 Bosw., 505; Richardson v. Carpenter, 46 N. Y., 660; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Yeates v. Graves, 1 Ves., Jr., 281; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim., 607; Ex parte Alderson, 1 Madd., 53; Hutter v. Ellwanger, 4 Lans., 12, 13.) Borst having received value for the order had no power to revoke it, and such revocation did not protect defendant. (Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Field v. Mayor, etc., 6 N. Y., 179; Hall v. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes, 193; Houghtaling v. Marvin, 7 Barb., 412; Canfield v. Monger, 12 J. R., 446; Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 8 Wheat., 174; 1 Story’s Eq. Jur., §§ 169, 170, 1043, 1044, 1047.)
G. P. Lowery for the respondent.
The instrument drawn by Borst was a bill of exchange. (Chitty on Bills, 55; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow., 108; Marine Bk. v. Jauncey, 8 Sandf., 260; Nelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Edwds. on Bills, 144; McLeod v. Snee, 2 Strange, 762; Hoyt v. Lynch, 3 Sandf., 328; Pope v. Luff, 5 Hill, 413; affirmed, 7 id., 577.) Defendant could not be charged upon the instrument without proof that it accepted it in writing. (2 R. S., 768, §§ 6, 8; N. Y. and V. Bk. v. Gibson, 5 Duer, 574, 584.) The instrument being a bill of exchange could not operate as an assignment either in law or equity. (Marine Bk. v. Jauncey, 3 Sandf., 260; Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y., 243; Winter v. Drury, 1 Seld., 530; Watson v. Duke of Wellington, 1 R. & M., 602; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 M. & C., 702; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw. Ch., 108; Lowrey v. Steward, 25 N. Y., 239; Parks v. Syracuse, 31 id., 376; Hall v. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes, 193; Shuttleworth v. Bruce, 7 Robt., 161.) An equitable assignment must transfer some specific thing absolutely and unconditionally, and must remove the thing assigned from all control of the assignor. (2 H. & W. Lead. Cas. in Eq.) The action cannot be maintained, because there was no valuable consideration for the draft as between Noyes and J. A. Borst. (2 Lead. Cas. in Eq., 233; Prescott v. Hill, 17 J. R., 293; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9 Cow., 39.) The partial assignment of a debt not assented to by the debtor will not bind the latter to payment, either at law or in equity, without his assent. (5 Wheat., 297; 20 Pick., 15; 4 Md. Ch., 75.)

Opinion:
Lott, Ch. C.
There is no ground for the reversal of the judgment in' this case.
The allegations of the plaintiff, in his complaint, show that he construed and claimed the order of J. A. Borst, on the defendant, to be a bill of exchange. After setting it forth, verbatim, he alleges that it was sold, transferred and delivered to D. L. Noyes for value; and that he, immediately thereafter, presented it to the defendant, who accepted the same in writing, .on condition that said Borst continued in the employment of the defendant, and, it is then averred, that he did so continue till the commencement of this action. Assuming that construction of the order to be correct, it is clear that the referee correctly decided that the plaintiff could not recover. There was no acceptance of it shown after it was drawn, and the letter of the defendant's president, previously delivered to the brother of J. A. Borst, was subject to two conditions: one that J. A. Borst should continue in its employment; and the other, that the order should remain unrevoked. It could, consequently, not be deemed an actual acceptance within the provisions of the Revised Statutes, which require it to be unconditional. (See 1 R. S., 768, § 8.)
It is now, however, insisted on behalf of the plaintiff, that " the order and letter being given to Noyes for a valuable consideration, by J. A. Borst, operated as an equitable assignment of a portion of Borst's salary; and, the defendant, having notice of said assignment, was bound to pay, accordingly, without any written acceptance, provided Borst continued in its employment." Such a construction cannot be given to the transaction. The order does not, in terms, direct the payment of the salary or wages or any part thereof to Noyes. It is a request, or at most a direction, by Borst, to pay certain specified sums of money, generally, for a certain period and on particular days, without the designation therein of any claim for a debt due or to become due to him, unless it is contained in the further direction to charge the amounts paid to his salary account. This, it is true, recognizes the fact that there was a relation between the parties at the time which entitled Borst to a credit for services rendered by him, and for which a salary was payable, but the direction would have been as proper if the sums thus to be charged were for moneys lent and advanced previous to the earning of the salary, as for a salary actually earned, and for which an indebtedness had accrued. It was not a requirement that the payment should- be made out of a designated fund, or from a particular source, but it was a provision made for the reimbursement of what should be paid in compliance with the request or direction. (See Kelley v. The Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 264.)
The letter does not give any color to such a construction or claim. It is a short and clear expression of what the defendant was willing to do, as an accommodation to Borst, its employe. It is fairly to be inferred, from what is stated therein, that he wished to obtain or realize funds before he could obtain them from his salary, and that such desire was made known to the defendant. While there was a willingness on its part to accord to his wishes as far as it could with entire safety, it, by the terms of the letter, carefully avoided an absolute promise or undertaking on its part, to pay the amounts requested to the- party named in the order, even if the employment should continue and a salary or compensation should become payable therefor, and inserted, as a condition of its agreement to make the payment, that the order remained unrevoked. ¡Notice was thereby given to the party who advanced money on the faith of the order, that it was not to be considered an absolute assignment of the sums that should become payable at the end of each month, but that it was taken subject to the right of Borst to revoke it. There was a clear and Unequivocal declaration, on its part, that it only agreed to make the appropriation of the money at the time it should become due, as the property of Borst, according to his direction as manifested by an order then recognized by him, and it was entirely inconsistent with the theory that his salary should not at all times be subject to his own control and direction. The whole tenor of the letter shows that .the defendant did not assume an absolute obligation to pay the moneys referred to in the" order to the party receiving it, if the service of Borst should be continued, but qualified the liability assumed or promise given by the reservation of Borst's right to revoke or countermand it, and any and every person taking it took it subject to the exercise of that right.
• The question remaining to be considered is, whether there was a revocation of the order by Borst, That is to be determined by the effect of his letter of March 30, 1868, to the treasurer of the defendant, in which he wrote as follows: " Dear Sir: If not accepted, I hereby countermand the order given to D. L. Hoyes. Please return to him unpaid." The acceptance there referred to by him, evidently, was intended to apply to one made after the delivery of the order to Hoyes. He knew what was contained in the letter of the defendant's president previous to such delivery, and what the effect of it was. When, therefore, he says "if not accepted," he cannot be understood as applying these terms to what had been done before that order by him was given. They, evidently, contemplated a subsequent acceptance, and as it is not claimed that there was such ever made or given, there was no qualification of the revocation, and it must be construed as an absolute countermand of the order. It, therefore, did not " remain unrevoked " when the portions of the salary thereby ordered to be paid became due, and by reason of that fact, the conditional acceptance became inoperative. There was, consequently, no right by .Noyes or his assignee (the present plaintiff) to demand the sums sued for by the plaintiff.
It follows that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.