Case Name: KIMTHON EUGENE SCOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1990-12-26
Citations: 11 Va. App. 516
Docket Number: No. 1180-88-2
Parties: KIMTHON EUGENE SCOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 11
Pages: 516–526

Head Matter:
Richmond
KIMTHON EUGENE SCOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1180-88-2
Decided December 26, 1990
Counsel
Russell C. Williams, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion
BENTON, J.
This appeal by Kimthon Eugene Scott presents the question whether a jury officer's comments to venire members denied Scott the right to trial by an impartial jury. A panel of this Court previously considered Scott's appeal and, in an unpublished memorandum opinion dated May 15, 1990, affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Upon Scott's petition for a rehearing en banc, we reverse.
Scott was tried by a jury for robbery and the use of a firearm in connection with the robbery. After the jury convicted Scott on both charges, his defense counsel discovered that during a jury orientation session a jury officer made improper comments to the prospective jurors assembled for cases pending that day. The jury that convicted Scott was selected from that same group of prospective jurors. Scott' moved to set aside the verdict and requested a new trial because of the jury officer's remarks.
Prior to sentencing Scott, the trial judge heard evidence from three jurors who were called by Scott's counsel to testify concerning the jury officer's comments. The first juror testified that the officer jokingly "said there were a lot of cases tried at Marshall Courts Building. One reason cases were tried here was because a lot of people, well, felt juries were lenient." She also recalled that the officer said "that there were a lot of trials here and that is why [the prospective jurors] would probably end up staying." According to the second juror, the officer "said the courts are more lenient in Richmond than in Chesterfield and Henrico and that they laugh at Richmond." The third testified that the "[o]nly thing that sticks in my mind, or I can remember, is that Richmond jurors were known for being lenient in their verdicts." All three jurors said that the comments did not influence their deliberations on guilt or sentencing.
The trial judge denied Scott's motion to set aside the verdict and reasoned as follows:
I don't see a scintilla of evidence that it [the officer's statement] had had any impact upon the verdicts of the jury and having reviewed the 5 Virginia Appeals case and having heard from the Forelady and two of the jurors I don't feel that you sufficiently carried the burden that you have in regard to this motion to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial and I deny your motion.
The right of an accused to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a fundamental precept in our jurisprudence, protected by both state and federal constitutions. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 445, 271 S.E.2d 123, 129 (1980). The Constitution of Virginia provides "[t]hat in criminal prosecutions [an accused] . . . shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of [the accused's] vicinage . . . ." Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
The Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] guarantees a criminal defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury. No right touches more the heart of fairness in a trial.
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). In Virginia, "[t]hese guarantees require jurors to be impartial not only upon the issue of guilt or innocence but also upon the question of punishment." Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 658, 283 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1981).
Because our juries have the dual responsibility of determining questions of guilt and punishment, "it is not only important that justice should be impartially administered, but it should also flow through channels as free from suspicion as possible." Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879).
Our jury system depends on the public's confidence in its integrity. We must zealously guard against any actions or situations which would raise the slightest suspicion that the jury in a criminal case had been influenced or tampered with so as to be favorable to either the State or the defendant. Any lesser degree of vigilance would foster suspicion and distrust and risk erosion of the public's confidence in the integrity of our jury system.
State v. Wilson, 314 N.C. 653, 656, 336 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1985). On the record before us, we observe, as did the court in Stockton, that "[t]he fact that there was . no threat or inducement, no invasion of the sanctity of jury room deliberations, does not still the sense that something went awry." 852 F.2d at 743.
"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear." Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892). The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), and also addressed allocation of the burden:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial judge expressly stated that Scott failed to meet the burden of proving harmful influence. Scott's proof established, however, that the jury orientation officer made improper remarks to persons who were assembled as prospective jurors, some of whom ultimately served on Scott's jury later that same day. The statements were not innocuous. Coming from a court official charged with orienting and assisting prospective ju rors, the statements were patently improper, were harmful, and posed a potential for prejudice that was not overcome on this record. They were pointed remarks made to the persons summoned to determine guilt and to impose sentence on criminal defendants. The unmistakable message sent was that defendants chose jury trials because juries were lenient and, furthermore, that the juries were considered in a bad light by courts of the surrounding jurisdictions. Both the content of the message and official nature by which the message was conveyed were constitutionally impermissible. Under these circumstances, prejudicial harm is presumed. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. Thus, Scott's showing that the jury officer made these improper comments to the potential jurors was sufficient to.shift a heavy burden upon the Commonwealth to prove that the comments were harmless. Id. The mere fact that three of the twelve jurors said they were not influenced in their deliberations is insufficient, standing alone and in the absence of evidence that they were the only jurors who heard the remarks, to establish harmless error.
This case is distinguishable from cases concerning a juror's individual biases that may be uncovered during voir dire. As the Court wrote in Stockton, where "the danger is not one of juror impairment or predisposition, but rather the effect of an extraneous communication upon the deliberative process of the jury, the defendant's right to an impartial jury requires that the government bear the burden of establishing the nonprejudicial character of the contact." 852 F.2d at 744. Furthermore, it is immaterial whether the jury orientation officer's contact with the jurors occurred before the trial started, during trial, or during actual deliberations. See Stockton, 852 F.2d at 743. To decide otherwise "overlooks the fact that the official character of the bailiff — as an officer of the court as well as the State — beyond question carries great weight with a jury which he had been shepherding." Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966). The orientation, in effect, became a court-sponsored indoctrination against leniency that was impressed upon the jurors' consciousness.
Despite the jurors' professions that the remarks did not influence their deliberations, courts are charged with the responsibility of assuring that the judicial system and its officers are impartial and that they will not use their offices to either overtly or subtly influence the verdict or sentence in a case. See Spear v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 599, 601, 194 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1973); Skipper v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 870, 877-80, 80 S.E.2d 401, 406 (1954). Although difficult to measure or ascertain, the subtle, invidious influences of these communications by an officer of the court cannot be disregarded. We are not required to accept at face value a statement by a juror that he or she did not allow an improper communication to cause him or her to violate that juror's oath and duty. Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 977, 266 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1980); Armistead v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 688, 693 (1841). Jurors cannot be expected to so readily admit that they violated their oaths of office. Armistead, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) at 644. It is significant that one month after the orientation each of the three jurors who testified recalled the jury officer's comments. Jurors should not be placed in a position of feeling or considering that, unless they achieve results similar to their counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions, they will be subjected to criticism or ridicule.
More significantly, however, it remains undisclosed whether the other jurors heard the remarks or were affected by them. "In any event, [Scott] was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors." Parker, 385 U.S. at 366. On the evidence in this record, the Commonwealth has not established that Scott enjoyed this entitlement.
The test in a criminal case is not whether the jurors were actually prejudiced by the extraneous matter, but whether they might have been so prejudiced. If they might have been prejudiced, then the purity of the verdict is open to serious doubt and the verdict should be set aside and a new trial awarded.
Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 207-08, 361 S.E.2d 436, 447 (1987)(quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 715, 70 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1952)).
Because of the heavy burden placed on the Commonwealth to establish harmlessness in cases of improper third-party communication, "a new trial must be granted if there remains a reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was influenced by an improper consideration." Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1537 (4th Cir. 1986). Based on the record before this Court, the evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudicial harm. See id. Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's denial of the motion and grant Scott a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Koontz, C.J., Coleman, J., Keenan, J., and Moon, J., concurred.
We need not decide whether post-trial testimony from jurors even will be sufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice. We note, however, that even the most conscientious juror understandably would be reluctant to admit or even to recognize the full impact of communications such as these and that the compromising effect of such communications is difficult to measure.