Case Name: Jose A. COLLAZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-09-05
Citations: 966 So. 2d 429
Docket Number: No. 4D06-4762
Parties: Jose A. COLLAZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHAHOOD, C.J., STONE, WARNER, KLEIN, STEVENSON, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 966
Pages: 429–434

Head Matter:
Jose A. COLLAZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D06-4762.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 5, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 2007.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elisabeth Porter, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Thomas A. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Jose Collazo, appeals from the sentence imposed upon re-sentencing by the trial court as directed by this court in Collazo v. State, 936 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (Collazo I). We reverse for re-sentencing.
Appellant was convicted of third-degree murder with a firearm and the trial court imposed a thirty-year mandatory sentence for a first-degree felony under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2004). In Collazo I, this court determined that the trial court erroneously reclassified appellant's offense as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) and remanded for the trial court to properly classify the conviction as a second-degree felony and to re-sentence appellant based on section 775.087(2)(a)3. This court held:
Notwithstanding that the trial court in this case imposed the thirty year sentence based on the erroneous reclassification of the conviction to a first-degree felony, we recognize that this sentence would have also been appropriate under section 775.087(2)(a)3., as a permissible discretionary sentence between twenty-five years to life. Therefore, on remand, the trial court is not restricted from reimposing a thirty year sentence.
Id. at 784.
Upon re-sentencing, the trial court properly reclassified appellant's conviction as a second-degree felony and sentenced appellant to thirty years with a mandatory minimum of thirty years. At the hearing, appellant's counsel objected to this mandatory minimum for a second degree felony under section 775.087, arguing that it could not exceed twenty-five years because the sentence already exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen years for a second-degree felony. We agree and hereby recede from the above quoted language of this court's opinion in Collazo I.
Section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2004), provides in pertinent part:
(2)(a)l. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for: a. Murder;
3. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)l.a.-q., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such' person discharged a "firearm" or "destructive device" as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison, (b) Subparagraph (a)l., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not prevent a court from imposing a longer sentence of incarceration as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence, or from imposing a sentence of death pursuant to other apr plicable law. Subparagraph (a)l., sub-paragraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does.not authorize a court to impose a lesser sentence than otherwise required bylaw.
(c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court 'must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section.
This court explained the application of section 775.087 in Inmon v. State, 932 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), as follows:
Section 775.087 is a comprehensive sentencing enactment on the subject of weapons involved in the commission of felonies and certain resulting enhancements depending on the specific role of the firearm in the offense. The first subdivision addresses the "presence" of a firearm in all felonies. § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). It applies to the possession, use, display, threat to use and actual use of a firearm in any felony. Id. If a firearm is present in the commission of any felony, the offense is stepped up a single grade (e.g., a first degree felony becomes a life felony, and so on). Id.
Section 775.087(2), the second subdivision of this statute (the one involved in this case), addresses distinctly different applications of a firearm but only in the commission of several enumerated violent or serious felonies. Subsection (2) has several parts, each subdivided from the others for ease of reference. One of them makes the actual possession of a firearm subject to a minimum mandatory enhancement period of 10 years. § 775.087(2)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another makes the actual discharge of the firearm subject to a minimum mandatory enhancement period of 20 years. § 775.087(2)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (2005). Still another makes the actual discharge of a firearm resulting ih death or great bodily harm subject to a minimum mandatory enhancement period of not less than 25 years up to a maximum of life in prison. § 775.087(2)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (2005).
In addition to the specified enhancements, section 775.087(2) makes clear that the imposition of the minimum mandatory provisions does not prevent even longer sentences within the statutory máximums. § 775.087(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). In fact it provides that if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum, .then the maximum is thereby increased and the court must impose the minimum mandatory. _
Id. at 519-20.
Appellant's conviction was based upon his discharge of a firearm which resulted in the victim's death. He was convicted of a second degree felony and under section 775.082(3)(c), the statutory maximum sentence is fifteen years. Section 775.087(2)(a)3, which is applicable to appellant, subjects him to a minimum mandatory enhancement of twenty-five years to life. However, because the statutory 'maximum applicable to appellant is less than the minimum mandatory of twenty-five years, the court may only impose that minimum mandatory. § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).
We reverse and remand for re-sentencing. We recede from that language in Collazo v. State, 936 So.2d 782, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which held that the trial court had the discretion to sentence appellant to more than twenty-five years.
Reversed and Remanded for Re-sentencing.
SHAHOOD, C.J., STONE, WARNER, KLEIN, STEVENSON, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
MAY, J., concurs specially with opinion, in which GROSS, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion, in which GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.