Case Name: COLUMBIA CITY LAND CO. v. BUHL
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1914-04-21
Citations: 70 Or. 246
Docket Number: 
Parties: COLUMBIA CITY LAND CO. v. BUHL.
Judges: Me. Chief Justice McBeide took no part in the consideration of this motion.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 246–261

Head Matter:
Motion to dismiss denied September 9, 1913.
Argued Mareb 31,
affirmed April 21, 1914.
COLUMBIA CITY LAND CO. v. BUHL.
(134 Pac. 1035; 141 Pac. 208.)
Appeal .and Error—Decisions Reviewable—Final Decree—Determination of Controversy.
1. A decree ascertaining the boundary between contiguous lands by course and distance from a given point, and appointing commissioners to mark the line thus ascertained upon the ground, is a final order, from which an appeal may be taken under Section 548, L. O. L., allowing appeals from judgments or decrees or orders which, in effect, determine the action, since the commissioners have only a ministerial duty to perform.
Appeal and Error—Time for Appeal—Statutory Provisions.
2. Under Laws of 1913, page 617, reducing the time within which an appeal might be taken from 6 months to 60 days, but providing that where the-right to appeal existed at the time the act went into effect (June 3, 1913), the time for taking sueh appeal should be extended for 60 days thereafter, a right of appeal which would expire on June 18th was extended by the provisions of the act, even though on .June 2d the appellant had filed a notice of appeal, which he failed to perfect by filing his bond in the time required.
Appeal and Error—Effect of Appeal—Subsequent Appeals.
3. Where a party to a judgment or decree has perfected an appeal, under Section 550, L. O. L., providing that after the time allowed the respondent to except to the sureties on the appeal bond the appeal shall be deemed perfected, the right of appeal is exhausted, and the party eanñot thereafter take another appeal in the same cause.
Appeal and Error—Effect of Appeal—Irregular Proceedings.
4. Where a party attempts to appeal, but because of some irregularity the appeal is not perfected, that endeavor to have the judgment or decree reviewed may be abandoned, and the right of appeal will remain.
ON THE MERITS.
Deeds—Construction and Operation—Construction as a Whole.
5. The entire description in a deed should be considered in determining the identity of the land, and every part ought, if possible, to take effect and be operative.
[As to the construction of deeds, see notes in 22 Am. St. Rep. 84; 30 Am. St. Rep. 453. As to construction of repugnant clauses in a deed, see note in 111 Am. St. Rep. 770.]
Boundaries—Description—Natural Objects.
6. Where a deed conveys land upon a certain hill, extending from the foot of the bluff or roeky hill westward, bounded on the easterly side by the foot of the bluff, and the eastern boundary of the hill is described in the evidence as a perpendicular bluff of asphaltic rock with one or two “sags” that are not perpendicular, the bluff being easily distinguishable, the eastern boundary of the land is the foot of the bluff, and not a fence erected after the conveyance by the adjoining eastern owner 110 feet east of the foot of the bluff, though there is testimony that this was done by agreement with the owner of the land conveyed, but not that the parties agreed that it was the line between their lands.
[As to rules governing inconsistent or uncertain boundaries, see note in 30 Am. Dec. 734; 129 Am. St. Rep. 990.]
Words and Phrases—“Bluff.”
7. A “bluff” is defined as a high, steep bank, as by a river, the sea, a ravine, or a plain, or a bank or headland with a broad, steep face.
Words and Phrases—“Hill.”
8. A “hill” is defined as a natural elevation of land of local area and well-defined outline; a more or less rounded elevation, as contrasted with a peaked or precipitous one.
Boundaries—Ascertainment—Nature and Form of Remédy—Suit in Equity.
9. Under the express provisions of Section 518, L. O. L., a court of equity has jurisdiction to determine a controversy between the owners of adjacent tracts of land as to the boundary line between them.
[As to equity jurisdiction in case of confusion of boundaries, see note in 15 Am. Dec. 745.]
From Columbia: James A. Eakin, Judge.
This is a suit in equity by the Columbia City Land Company against Charles S. Ruhl to declare, determine and establish a boundary line between the lands of plaintiff and defendant. The Circuit Court rendered a decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Respondent now moves to dismiss the appeal.
Denied.
Messrs. Dillard & Day, for the motion.
Mr. Loring K. Adams and Mr. George M. McBride, contra.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Moore
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal. A decree was rendered in this cause December 18, 1912, establishing a boundary between contiguous lands of the parties hereto, and appointing commissioners to mark upon the ground the dividing line thus ascertained. Desiring to review such determination, the plaintiff on June 2, 1913, caused to be served and filed a notice of appeal but did not serve or file an undertaking therefor until the 13th of that month. Attempting to abandon the experiment undertaken to secure a reversal of the decree, the plaintiff on June 21, 1913, caused to be served and filed another notice of appeal and an undertaking thereon. The transcript having been filed with our clerk, this motion was interposed, based on the grounds, inter alia, that the order appealed from is not final, and that the attempt to take a second appeal was not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed.
Considering these reasons in the order stated, the decree complained of ascertained the location of the boundary by course and distance from a given point, and left to the commissioners the exercise of no discretion or judgment, but required of them the performance of a ministerial duty only, by indicating, by proper monuments, where the dividing line was thus ascertained to be. The decree sought to be reviewed was a final determination of the issues involved, within •the meaning of Section 548, L. O. L.: Marquam v. Ross, 47 Or. 374 (78 Pac. 698, 83 Pac. 852, 86 Pac. 1).
No appeal in this cause having been taken when the decree was rendered, six months from the entry thereof were originally allowed in which to take an appeal: Section 550, subd. 5, L. O. L. This statute was amended by abridging the six months, thus permitted to initiate a review of a judgment or decree, to 60 days; Laws Or. 1913, c. 319. The amendment referred to contains a clause as follows:
"Provided, that in all cases where the right to an appeal to the Supreme Court shall exist at the time this act shall come into force, the time for taking such appeal is hereby extended for the period of sixty (60) days thereafter."
This later enactment contained no emergency clause, and took effect 90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed: Article IY, Section 28, of the Constitution. The session of the legislative assembly at which the amendment was passed ended March 4, 1913 (Laws Or. 1913, p. 866), and hence the act went into effect June 3d following.
It is argued by defendant's counsel that as the first notice of appeal was served and filed prior to June 3, 1913, and as the attempt to abandon such undertaking to review the decree was not made until June 21,1913, the right to appeal did not exist when the amendment referred to took effect, and hence the enactment did not extend the time for taking the appeal, which limit expired six months after the entry of the decree, or on June 18, 1913. An appeal is taken by a party to a judgment or decree by giving in open court, at the time the determination is entered, an oral notice of appeal, or by serving upon the adverse party or his attorney, and filing with the clerk of the trial court at any time within six months from the entry of the decree or judgment, a written notice of appeal. An appeal is perfected by serving and filing, within 10 days from the giving of such notice, an undertaking on appeal. The adverse party is allowed five days within which to except to the sufficiency of the sureties on the undertaking: "From the expiration of the time allowed to except to the sureties in the undertaking, or from the justification thereof if excepted to, the appeal shall be deemed perfected": Section 550, L. O. L.
Where a party to a judgment or decree has taken and perfected an appeal, his right to have the determination of the trial court reviewed is exhausted, and he cannot thereafter take another appeal in the same cause: Schmeer v. Schmeer, 16 Or. 243 (17 Pac. 864); McCarty v. Wintler, 17 Or. 391 (21 Pac. 195); Nestucca Wagon Road Co. v. Landingham, 24 Or. 439 (33 Pac. 983); Harrington v. Snyder, 53 Or. 573 (101 Pae. 392); Hanley v. Stewart, 54 Or. 38 (102 Pac. 2); Moon v. Richelderfer, 56 Or. 246 (108 Pac. 178).
Where, however, such party attempts to appeal, but in consequence of some irregularity the appeal is not perfected, the endeavor to have the decree or judgment reviewed may he abandond, since the right to appeal still remains: Holladay v. Elliott, 7 Or. 483; Van Auken v. Dammeier, 27 Or. 150 (40 Pac. 89); Newberg Orchard Assn. v. Osborn, 39 Or. 370 (65 Pac. 81); Osborn v. Logus, 28 Or. 302 (37 Pac. 456, 38 Pac. 190, 42 Pac. 997); Fisher v. Tomlinson, 40 Or. 111 (60 Pac. 390, 66 Pac. 696); In re Skinner's Will, 40 Or. 571 (62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951).
In the case at bar as the first undertaking was not filed within the time limited, the appeal was not perfected, whereupon plaintiff's counsel properly abandoned the attempt and took another appeal, and "the right to an appeal to the Supreme Court" within the meaning of the amendment of February 28, 1913, existed until the latter effort to appeal was perfected; the extension granted by the statute not haying elasped in the meantime.
It follows that the motion should be denied, and it is so ordered. • Motion Denied.
Me. Chief Justice McBeide took no part in the consideration of this motion.