Case Name: The BELK DEPARTMENT STORES, Respondent, v. Frank L. TAYLOR, Sr., et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1972-07-31
Citations: 259 S.C. 174
Docket Number: 19459
Parties: The BELK DEPARTMENT STORES, Respondent, v. Frank L. TAYLOR, Sr., et al., Appellants.
Judges: Moss C. J., and Littlejohn, J., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 259
Pages: 174–185

Head Matter:
19459
The BELK DEPARTMENT STORES, Respondent, v. Frank L. TAYLOR, Sr., et al., Appellants.
(191 S. E. (2d) 144)
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Joe L. Allen, Jr., and G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, for Appellants,
Messrs. William L. Pope, of Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope, Columbia, and David M. McConnell, Charlotte, N. C. for Respondent,
July 31, 1972.

Opinion:
Lewis, Justice:
The issues concern the inventory value of respondent's stock of merchandise for tax purposes for the 1970 tax year, admittedly to be determined as of December 31, 1969, the end of respondent's accounting year.
The test for determing value of the inventory for taxation is the "actual value of the property taxed," Article III, Section 29, Constitution of South Carolina, which has been defined in Section 65-1648, 1962 Code Supplement, as "its true value in money which in all cases shall be held to be the price which the property would bring following reasonable exposure to the market, where both the seller and the buyer are willing, are not acting under compulsion, and are reasonably well informed as to the uses and purposes for which it is adapted and for which it is capable of being used." The duty of determining the value of inventories is placed by law upon the appellant, South Carolina Tax Commission. Section 65-1669, 1962 Code Supplement.
As required by Section 65-1647.1, 1962 Code Supplement, respondent filed with the Tax Commission tax returns covering the inventory for each of its sixty-four separate stores. These returns included respondent's valuation upon the merchandise on hand on December 31, 1969. The method used by respondent in so valuing its inventory was that commonly known as the "lower of cost or market."
In different values upon its inventory, respondent divided its merchandise into four different classifications, types N, A, B, and C. Type N included new season merchandise, and type A basic merchandise, in good condition and reordered regularly year round. These classifications are shown in respondent's tax return at original cost and were not questioned by the Tax Commission. Types B and C merchandise included items which, for various reasons, are considered obsolete and depreciated in value. The present controversy concerns the proper valuation to be placed on the latter two types of merchandise.
The values placed by respondent on types B and C merchandise were determined by each of respondent's stores upon the basis of guides formulated by a team of its employees selected by it each year for that purpose. These employees visit the New York market and make their determination as to the wholesale price of similar merchandise on the inventory date. On that basis price guides are formulated to be used by the individual stores in returning inventory for tax purposes.
The Tax Commission rejected the valuation placed by respondent on the B and C classifications and determined that the fair market value of the inventory for tax purposes was the cost of the merchandise. This resulted in an increase in the inventory valuation from $9,036,555.20 to $17,040,-788.67.
All agree that the Tax Commission was required to assess respondent's inventory of merchandise at its value on December 31, 1969-that is, what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, both acting with full knowledge of the uses and purposes for which the property is adapted.
All also agree that, in this proceeding, the factual findings of the Tax Commission, concurred in by the Tax Board of Review, are binding on appeal unless such findings are wholly unsupported by any competent evidence.
The question for decision then is whether there was any competent evidence to sustain the findings of the Tax Com mission relative to the value for tax purposes of respondent's inventory on December 31, 1969.
Much of the record is devoted to the treatment of the question of the allowance for obsolesence and depreciation in determining market value. There is apparently no disagreement between the parties as to whether such factors are properly to be considered. Neither do the issues require a determination of what formula should be used in determining value for tax purposes, since it is agreed that the Tax Commission properly assesses upon the basis of actual cost unless the required showing is made to establish that the actual value is below cost on the inventory date.
The Tax Commission makes allowance for depreciation and obsolescence, but does so only upon a showing by the taxpayer that at the inventory date the depreciated merchandise was being offered for sale at a price less than original cost, in which event the Commission accepts the reduced retail price as the value. If such merchandise was not being offered at retail at less than original cost on the inventory date, the Commission determined its value for tax purposes at original cost. The present valuation by appellant resulted from notice by respondent that records of retail prices at less than cost were not available.
The Tax Commission was not required to accept the valuation placed upon the inventories by respondent and acted within its lawful powers when it made its own independent determination of value.
When respondent contested the assessment made by the Tax Commission, the burden was upon it to show that the valuation placed upon the inventories by the Commission was incorrect. Specifically, the burden was upon respondent to show that its B and C classified merchandise had depreciated in value below the original cost; for, admittedly, if such merchandise had not so depreciated in value, original cost was the accepted measure of actual value for tax purposes.
The Commission had before it the original cost of the merchandise. While other circumstances may affect the question, the cost of an article is ordinarily some evidence of its value for tax purposes. As stated in 84 C. J. S. Taxation § 576c, pp. 1147, 1148, "evidence of the purchase price of the assessed property while not conclusive is to be accorded substantial weight on the issue of 'fair market value.' "
Respondent's experts testified that in their opinion the value of the merchandise in question was less than original cost on the inventory date. However, respondent's assistant controller testified that this merchandise was not being offered for sale at the values placed by respondent's experts because to do so would mean that it would have to go out of business. It is inferable from this testimony that, while contending for a lower valuation, respondent was unwilling to sell the merchandise below original cost.
In addition, the testimony of a field auditor for the Tax Commission was to the effect that an examination by him of the records of five of respondent's sixty-four stores revealed that in most cases types B and C merchandise were being offered for sale at these stores on December 31, 1969, at a price of roughly 35% in excess of cost.
The Commission therefore had before it the figures as to the original cost, together with the fact that respondent was unwilling to sell the,types B and C merchandise in the aggregate at a price less than original cost and was, in fact, at some of its stores, offering such merchandise, in most instances, for sale on the inventory date at prices above cost. These facts were properly considered by the Commission in making the assessment, and constituted evidentiary support for its findings.
Clearly our prior decision in Wasson v. Mayes, et al., 252 S. C. 503, 167 S. E. (2d) 307, is not dispositive of the issues here involved.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the findings and order of the Tax Commission and the Tax Board of Review are reinstated.
Moss C. J., and Littlejohn, J., concur.
Bussey and Brailsford, JJ., dissent.