Case Name: Jerry FITCH, Sr. v. Johnny VALENTINE
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-04-19
Citations: 959 So. 2d 1012
Docket Number: No. 2005-CA-01800-SCT
Parties: Jerry FITCH, Sr. v. Johnny VALENTINE.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB P.JJ., DIAZ AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY GRAVES, J. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 959
Pages: 1012–1044

Head Matter:
Jerry FITCH, Sr. v. Johnny VALENTINE.
No. 2005-CA-01800-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 19, 2007.
Rehearing Denied July 26, 2007.
Dion Jeffery Shanley, S. Duke Goza, Oxford, attorneys for appellant.
Michael Alfred Jacob, Ralph Edwin Chapman, Clarksdale, attorneys for appel-lee.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Before this Court today is a classic "he said"/"she said"/"the paramour said" case. It commenced when Johnny Valentine ("Valentine") filed a civil complaint against Jerry Fitch, Sr. ("Fitch") in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, Mississippi, averring various causes of action, including alienation of affections. Valentine is a plumber, Fitch is a millionaire who owns various businesses, primarily involving oil and real estate. At the conclusion of a trial on the merits, a jury unanimously rendered a verdict against Fitch and awarded Valentine $642,000 in actual damages and $112,500 in punitive damages. Thereafter, Fitch filed a consolidated motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur, which the circuit court denied. Fitch has filed this appeal.
FACTS
¶ 2. The record reflects that Valentine and Sandra Day ("Sandra") were married on February 12, 1993. In 1995, the couple had a son together, J.V. In the spring of 1997, Sandra began working as a realtor for the Fitch Realty division of Fitch Oil Company and earned around $400 a week in cash, based upon her commissions, according to Fitch. Sandra testified that the adulterous affair with Fitch began in late 1997 or early 1998. According to Fitch, the relationship commenced in 1998. Fitch testified to knowing that Sandra was married to Valentine and that the couple had a child together. It was established at trial that Fitch testified at his deposition that he did not care if his affair with Sandra might affect her marriage to Valentine.
¶ 3. Valentine testified that his marriage to Sandra was "normal" prior to late 1998 and early 1999. The couple shared a joint checking account, ate meals together, and engaged in sexual relations "[l]ike normal couples" until that time. In June of 1998, Sandra became pregnant. During the fall of 1998, Valentine suspected Sandra was having an affair, but she denied any such wrongdoing. In February 1999, a daughter, K.V., was presumptively born to the marital union. Valentine testified that, at that time, he believed K.V. was his child. He was present at the hospital for K.V.'s delivery and was listed as KV.'s father on her birth certificate; and he loved and cared for K.V. According to Valentine, "a few weeks after [K.V.] was born" he began to notice changes in Sandra.
¶ 4. At trial, Fitch testified that he was aware that K.V. was his child "a month or two after she was born[,]" even though in the divorce proceedings from his wife of thirty-five years, he admitted he knew K.V. was his child three or four days after her birth.
¶5. One night in August 1999, Sandra was not home by 10:30 p.m., and Valentine drove toward Fitch's cabin looking for her. After observing Sandra driving on Highway 4, Valentine flagged her down. Valentine testified that upon being confronted about an affair, Sandra once again denied any wrongdoing and came home with him. Thereafter, Valentine repeatedly requested that Sandra quit her job at Fitch Realty, but she consistently refused to do so. During this time frame, Valentine testified to finding "[t]wo or three hundred here and three or four hundred there, a thousand, $1,100 in different places" around their home. Sandra claimed she made this money at work. Valentine testified that the cash was more than he had previously observed her earning. Sandra's co-worker Susan Fleming testified that, prior to the divorce, Sandra told her that Fitch had given her $8,000 to buy a new Jeep Cherokee, which she acquired soon thereafter. Fleming also testified that shortly after K.V. was born, Sandra told her that Fitch had purchased a baby bed, high chair, baby seat, baby clothes and other baby items for K.V. Fitch readily admitted to giving money to Sandra between February 1999 and August 1999. Fitch, however, testified that he never paid Sandra to date or marry him, or to entice her away from Valentine.
¶ 6. On August 28, 1999, Valentine and Sandra separated. In September 1999, DNA testing conclusively excluded Valentine as KV.'s biological father. Nonetheless, Valentine still offered to raise K.V. as his own child if Sandra would end the adulterous affair with Fitch. Sandra refused.
¶ 7. Valentine filed for divorce on October 28, 1999, and the divorce decree was entered on November 23, 1999. The decree specifically stated that "[t]he evidence presented in open [cjourt clearly establishes that [Valentine] is entitled to a divorce on the grounds of adultery." (Emphasis added). Prior to the divorce, Valentine testified that Sandra never told him that she did not love him or that she wanted a divorce. He further testified that the marriage failed because Sandra "couldn't resist all the money[,]" and that absent Fitch's interference, the marriage would have remained intact.
¶ 8. As can be expected, Sandra denied "selling [her] affections" and testified that her affections for Valentine were absent before the adulterous affair with Fitch commenced. According to her testimony, she loved Valentine when they first married. By the time J.V. was born, however, Sandra said the marriage was only "okay." She stated:
[bjefore his gambling problem, Johnny loved to be with his buddies. He would not come home from work. He would drink. There's been occasions where I've gone looking for Johnny when he was with his buddies, and his remark was, I embarrassed him by coming to where he was to try to get him to come home to be the husband that he should be.[ ]
Sandra further testified that, at that time, she "was still, obviously, in love with him. I tried to get him to change and be different, but . he didn't." Sandra said the breaking point came in January 1996, when she went to a casino looking for Valentine. She claims to have told him that if he did not leave the casino at that moment then their marriage was over. When he did not leave, Sandra states that "I didn't care if he went every night, and that's when our marriage was over[,]" although she further testified that their sexual relationship did not effectively end until 1997 or 1998. According to Sandra, the couple "separated [on] several occasions about [gambling], and he would promise that he would get help, and he didn't...." Valentine denied having a gambling problem or that the couple ever separated.
¶ 9. Sandra asserted that the adulterous relationship with Fitch, which she claims to have initiated, was caused by her unhappy marriage to Valentine. Furthermore, while she and Fitch engaged in sex two or three times a week, she maintained that the adulterous sexual activity had no effect on her alleged nonexistent desire to have sex with Valentine.
¶ 10. On December 21, 1999, Valentine filed suit against Fitch alleging various causes of action, including alienation of affections. In Fitch's answer, response to Valentine's first set of interrogatories, and response to Valentine's first set of requests for admission, filed when K.V. was more than one year old, Fitch denied having had sexual relations with Sandra, being the father of K.V., or giving Sandra any monetary support beyond her salary.
¶ 11. Following trial, the jury unanimously found for Valentine and awarded him $642,000 in actual damages and $112,500 in punitive damages against Fitch. On April 12, 2005, the circuit court entered judgment against Fitch and in favor of Valentine "for the total sum of $754,500 and interest thereon in the amount of. 8% per annum and all costs.... " Thereafter, Fitch filed his consolidated motion for judgment notwith standing the jury verdict ("JNOV"), new trial, and remittitur. Following Valentine's response, Fitch's reply for the first time requested the circuit court to abolish the tort of alienation of affections. Following a hearing, the circuit court concluded that:
[t]he jury's verdict . seemed to be a lot of money to me; but if I correctly instructed the jury on the elements of their damages and if the jury was entitled to consider once they arrived at a conclusion about liability, considered the elements that I instructed them on, I can't second-guess them, don't have the authority to do so, don't want to do so. It's the jury's job to establish the value of the loss and they've done so and I cannot say the amount of the verdict is such to justify the Court granting the motion to remit the verdict. The Court is going to deny all motions.
(Emphasis added). On September 16, 2005, Fitch filed his notice of appeal.
ISSUES
¶ 12. This Court will consider:
(1) Whether the tort of alienation of affections should be abolished on public policy grounds.
(2) Whether the circuit court committed evidentiary errors.
(3) Whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury.
(4) Whether the jury verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
(5) Whether the punitive damages award violates due process.
(6) Whether this Court should order a remittitur of the award in this case.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the tort of alienation of affections should be abolished on public policy grounds.
¶ 13. Fitch argues that this Court should abolish the tort of alienation of affections as a matter of public policy. Fitch states:
[t]he adversarial positions taken in this litigation over the intensely personal and private matters of [Valentine] and Sandra certainly does not serve as a shining example to the citizens of Marshall County that marriage as an institution must be preserved.
Fitch frames the trial as a "classic morality play" with "[t]he hapless victim; his wife's virtue stolen by the rich villain." Fitch contends that since the divorce rate continues to escalate in Mississippi, the institution of marriage has already been devalued and the justification for this tort's continued existence is outdated and discredited.
¶ 14. To the contrary, Valentine asserts that this Court "should continue to allow alienation of affection cases against third parties who cause the destruction and breakdown of the marital bond and family relationship." Valentine further contends that "[t]he focus of this Court should be to continue to allow the viability of the tort which imposes liability . [and deters third parties] from intentionally interfering with a marriage."
¶ 15. The tort of alienation of affections was recognized in Mississippi as early as 1926 in McRae v. Robinson, 145 Miss. 191, 110 So. 504 (1926). In Camp v. Roberts, 462 So.2d 726, 727 (Miss.1985), this Court held "[w]here a husband [wife][ ] 103 is wrongfully deprived of his rights to the 'services and companionship and consortium of his [her] wife [husband],' he [she] has a cause of action 'against one who has interfered with his [her] domestic relations.' " Id. at 727 (citing Walter v. Wilson, 228 So.2d 597, 598 (Miss.1969), overruled in pant on other grounds; Saunders v. Alford, 607 So.2d 1214, 1219 (Miss.1992)). Without question, Mississippi's recognition of the tort of alienation of affections places it among the minority of states. See Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Mo.2003) (Benton, J., dissenting) (the other states are Illinois, Hawaii, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah). However, in his special concurrence in Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414 (Miss.1999), Chief Justice (then Justice) Smith wisely responded to the "everybody else is doing it, so should I" view, by stating:
[w]hile I agree that it appears society's moral values have changed during modern times, I do not believe Mississippi should get aboard this runaway train. I would also not take away an offended spouse's only legal means to seek redress in our courts for the wrongful conduct of a third party who wilfully and intentionally interferes in and aids in destroying a marriage.
Id. at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring).
¶ 16. In retaining the tort, this Court has stated that "the purpose of a cause of action for alienation of affection is the 'protection of the love, society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage....'" Id. at 417 (quoting Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215). "The right sought to be protected is that of consortium." Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215. Justice Smith's special concurrence in Bland explained the justification and need for continued recognition of the tort of alienation of affections, stating:
[s]hould an individual be allowed to intrude upon a marriage to such an extent as to cause it to come to an end? Does a spouse have a valuable interest in a marriage that is worthy of protection from the intruding third party? In my view, the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. The traditional family is under such attack both locally and nationally these days that this Court should not retreat now from the sound view of the tort of alienation of affections espoused by this Court in Saunders as entitling a spouse to "protection of the love, society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage." [Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215] (quoting Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991)); see also Horner v. Byrnett, [132 N.C.App. 323,] 511 S.E.2d 342 (N.C.Ct.App.1999). I do not believe that under the compelling facts of this particular case this Court should hold that the doctrine of alienation of affections has outlived its usefulness as a deterrent protecting the marital relationship of a husband and wife in cases where the facts clearly warrant.
Bland, 735 So.2d at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). In addition to protecting the marriage relationship and its sanctity, see id. at 418, the tort of alienation of affections also provides an appropriate remedy for intentional conduct which causes a loss of consortium. The dissenting opinion in Helsel summarized this position, stating:
[i]n tort cases where a spouse is injured, the other spouse often has a separate claim for loss of consortium. Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo. banc 1992). Most of these losses are caused by a defendant's negligence. In alienation of affection — an intentional tort — a defendant's intentional conduct causes the loss. See Gibson [v. Frowein,] 400 S.W.2d [418,] 421 [ (Mo. banc 1966) ]. It is inconsistent [if] the law compensates for negligent conduct causing a loss of consortium, but . does not compensate for intentional conduct causing the same loss.
Helsel, 107 S.W.3d at 234 (Benton, J., dissenting). See also Bland, 735 So.2d at 421 (Smith, J., specially concurring) ("there is no point in abolishing an otherwise valid common law tort, especially now that we have leveled the playing field in Kirk. Would the dissent strike down consortium next?"). Therefore, in the interest of protecting the marriage relationship and providing a remedy for intentional conduct which causes a loss of consortium, this Court declines the invitation to abolish the common law tort of alienation of affections in Mississippi. Alienation of affections is the only available avenue to provide redress for a spouse who has suffered loss and injury to his or her marital relationship against the third party who, through persuasion, enticement, or inducement, caused or contributed to the abandonment of the marriage and/or the loss of affections by active interference.
II. Whether the circuit court committed evidentiary errors.
(A) The use of Fitch's prior inconsistent statements, set forth in the pleadings, during Valentine's opening statement.
¶ 17. In Valentine's opening statement, his counsel discussed the charges contained in the complaint and Fitch's various responses found in his answer, answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for admissions which set forth Fitch's repeated denials of having sexual relations with Sandra or being the father of K.V. Counsel for Fitch objected to the pleadings being referenced in Valentine's opening statement, arguing "they are not proof or evidence." The circuit judge overruled Fitch's objection.
¶ 18. Fitch now contends that the circuit court erred, maintaining that "argument and comments upon the credibility of witnesses are improper when made in opening statement." In support thereof, he cites Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 749-50 (Miss.1992), for the proposition that "before there can be impeachment, there must be testimony which is impeachable." According to Fitch, Valentine:
proceeded to publish to the jury what he obviously considered passed for a predi cate from which impeachment may commence: unsworn allegations of the [c]omplaint, unsworn denials in the [answer. From here, [Valentine] proceeded with the 'testimony' — answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, and responses to request for admissions.... [Fitch] had not taken the stand.
In Fitch's estimation, "the unsworn allegations were blown up and published to the jury obviously disproportionate to their significance . in light of the fact that many claims were abandoned in subsequent testimony." As such, Fitch contends that this error warrants a new trial.
¶ 19. In response, Valentine first submits that Fitch has waived this issue as he "only objected to [Valentine's] use of the unsworn pleadings on the basis for use as evidence[,]" but never objected "to the use of the unsworn pleadings on the basis of impeachment, which is the issue [Fitch] is raising on appeal." See Johnson v. Alcorn State Univ., 929 So.2d 398, 407 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) ("[a]ppellate courts may not rule upon material matters which the trial judge did not have the opportunity to judge. Ditto v. Hinds County, Miss., 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss.1995). Issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal. Southern v. Mississippi State Hosp., 853 So.2d 1212 (Miss.2003).").
¶ 20. Notwithstanding the alleged procedural bar, Valentine maintains that the prior inconsistent statements:
were not being introduced during [Valentine's] opening statement as substantive evidence nor were they being 'offered for the truth of the matter asserted' but the pleadings were being used merely to define the issues the jury would decide and show [Fitch] made the statements and as such it is relevant regardless of its truth and it does not matter that the trier of fact is unable to ascertain [Fitch's] credibility.
In support of this position, Valentine notes that both his counsel and the circuit court informed the jury that the substance of the opening statement did not constitute evidence. Moreover, Valentine asserts that the pleadings "were used as demonstrative aids only . to describe the issues that the jury would decide, [Fitch's] defenses and that [Fitch] had made prior inconsistent statements." In Haggerty v. Foster, 838 So.2d 948 (Miss.2002), this Court stated:
[demonstrative evidence may be admitted at the trial court's discretion, if such evidence was reasonably necessary and material, Murriel v. State, 515 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1987), and appropriate and relevant. Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Miss.1979). Furthermore, where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court "will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party." In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859....
Haggerty, 838 So.2d at 958. Valentine argues that "this evidence was necessary, material, appropriate, and relevant since [Fitch] testified that he provided information to his counsel to be used in answering the [c]omplaint." Finally, Valentine insists that "this reference was cumulative of other and later similar denials, under oath, in response to both interrogatories and requests for admissions (which were also sworn) and if error at all, it was harmless."
¶ 21. The circuit judge's decision to overrule Fitch's objection is reviewed by this Court under an "abuse of discretion" standard. See id. This Court finds that the use of Fitch's prior inconsistent statements in Valentine's opening statement was permissible and the circuit court's decision to overrule Fitch's objection was not an abuse of discretion. Not only was the jury repeatedly informed that the content of the opening statements were not evidence, but Fitch's prior inconsistent statements in these pleadings were developed during his testimony at trial. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
(B) Evidence of Valentine's conduct prior to and after his marriage to Sandra.
¶ 22. Fitch sought to solicit testimony regarding Valentine's adulterous conduct with Sandra at the inception of their relationship. Valentine filed a motion in limine to prevent Fitch from introducing any such evidence. The circuit judge granted Valentine's motion in limine. In support of that position, the circuit judge stated that "if you have any evidence of . relevant marital misconduct on his part while he's married to [Sandra], that's one thing. Proof beforehand is something else." (Emphasis added).
¶ 23. "[T]he standard of review regarding Rule 403 determinations is an 'abuse of discretion.' " Baldwin v. State, 784 So.2d 148, 160 (Miss.2001). Applying that deferential standard of review, this Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Valentine's motion in limine. Fitch's wrongful conduct was the issue in this case. The presence of a marriage relationship is necessary for the tort of alienation of affections to apply. Therefore, the time frame in which Valentine and Sandra were married, not their pre-marriage conduct, was key. The meager probative value of evidence on the beginning of Valentine's relationship with Sandra was found to be outweighed by the undue prejudice it would create. As such, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Valentine's motion in li-mine, and this issue is without merit.
¶ 24. At trial, Valentine objected to Fitch mentioning another child born to Valentine following his divorce from Sandra. The circuit court precluded the introduction of such evidence, finding that "you should not inquire as to any after born children, if that's a correct term for it because that, in the Court's opinion, is unduly prejudicial and of limited or no probative value." (Emphasis added).
¶ 25. Once again, this Court applies the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, see id., and finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the introduction of evidence regarding the child born to Valentine following his divorce from Sandra. The key time frame for the tort of alienation of affections is that of the marriage, within which this evidence clearly does not fit. Moreover, the circuit court found this evidence to be "unduly prejudicial and of limited or no probative value." As the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in so finding, this issue is without merit.
III. Whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury.
(A) Instructions P-5 and D-8.
¶ 26. Instruction P-5 was given to the jury by the circuit court and provided:
[i]n order for your verdict to be for [Valentine] and against [Fitch], you must find the following:
1. That the conduct of [Fitch] was wrongful;
2. A loss of affection or consortium was suffered by [Valentine]; and
3. That this wrongful conduct caused the loss of affection or consortium.
If you determine the above statements to be true, yo[u] must return a verdict for [Valentine] and award him damages in accordance with the Court's instructions.
If [Valentine] fails to prove any one or more of these elements by a preponder- anee of the evidence, then your verdict must be for [Fitch].
Instruction D-8, which was rejected by the circuit court as "repetitive," stated "[y]ou are instructed that in determining the cause of the loss of Sandra's affections [Valentine] must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Fitch's] direct interference in his marriage caused Sandra to lose affections for him."
¶ 27. While conceding that Mississippi law has commonly listed the elements of the tort of alienation of affections just as in Instruction P-5, see Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215, Fitch argues that:
as far back as Stanton v. Cox, [162 Miss. 438,] 139 So. 458, 461 (1932), it is settled law that [Valentine] must prove [his] loss was occasioned by the direct interference of [Fitch], Because the lower court's instruction allowed the jury to find liability without the predicate finding of proximate cause specific to this tort, the matter should be reversed for a new trial....
¶ 28. In response, Valentine initially contends that Fitch waived this argument because "[t]o preserve an objection to a jury instruction, the specific ground for the objection must be stated in the original objection. The issue raised on appeal may not be based on a different legal theory." See Shields v. Easterling, 676 So.2d 293, 296 (Miss.1996) ("Shields did not put this objection to the trial court in any specific meaningful manner. Thus, the trial judge had no opportunity to rule on it.... Thus, this Court is barred from reviewing this issue.") (emphasis added). At trial, Fitch objected to Instruction P-5 initially because he perceived the wording to be "cumbersome." Once the language was rephrased, Fitch raised no further objection. As to Instruction D-8, the circuit judge refused the instruction "because i[t] becomes somewhat repetitive." According to Valentine, Fitch has failed to show that Instruction D-8 "properly stated the law and was necessary to fully inform the jury of the law considering the totality of the instructions^]"
¶ 29. This Court has stated that it "[i]f other instructions granted adequately instruct the jury, a party may not complain of a refused instruction on appeal. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Moak, 575 So.2d 993, 996 (Miss.1990).... [T]he trial court has considerable discretion in instructing the jury." Southland Enter. v. Newton County, 838 So.2d 286, 289 (Miss.2003). This Court first finds this argument to be procedurally barred as Fitch failed to object after Instruction P-5 was rephrased and therefore failed to properly preserve for appeal his Instruction D-8 argument. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court concludes that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in finding Instruction D-8 "repetitive" of Instruction P-5. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
(B) Instruction P-8
¶ 30. Instruction P-8 was given to the jury by the circuit court and provided:
[y]ou are instructed that just compensation is a decision to be made by the jury. Your discretion as to the measure of damages is wide, but not unlimited, and you may not act arbitrarily. Exercise your discretion as to the amount of damages reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence of the case and the Court's instructions. The damages cannot be assessed by an fixed rule, but you are the sole judges as to the measure of damages in this case.
Should you find for [Valentine] then you must determine the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for the value of the consortium he has lost. You should consider the following, elements of damage as have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in this case:
a. The loss of society, companionship, love and affection;
b. The loss of aide, services, and physical assistance provided by [Sandra];
c. The loss of sexual relations;
d. The loss of participation together in the activities, duties and responsibilities of making a home;
e. Any mental and emotional, distress proximately resulting from [Fitch's] conduct; and
f. Any other damages proven to have proximately resulted from any wrongful act of [Fitch],
¶ 31. Fitch cites Cousar v. State, 855 So.2d 993 (Miss.2003); for the proposition that "[granting instructions not supported by evidence is error." Id. at 997 (citing Haggerty, 838 So.2d at 955). Fitch then argues that the circuit court erred by approving "an instruction on damages which the evidence did not support, specifically allowing the jury to consider an award for any damage the jury thought appropriate despite the fact that [Valentine], on eviden-tiary grounds, abandoned all damages beyond the consortium lost with his wife and child." Furthermore, Fitch contends that "[t]here is no temporal restrictions placed on the instruction.... These questions were significant insofar as [Valentine] continually prevented [Fitch] from going into matters that preceded or followed the marriage."
¶ 32. In response, Valentine maintains that:
[t]emporal restrictions were placed both on types of damages recoverable and as to what period of time the jury should consider since the jury was instructed to only award damages proven during the course of the trial to have proximately resulted from the wrongful acts of [Fitch]. The jury heard the evidence presented and unanimously determined the amount of damages that were proximately caused by [Fitch's] wrongful acts.
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, Valentine notes that "[t]he instructions must be read as a whole[,]" Phillips v. Dow Chemical Co., 247 Miss. 293, 304, 151 So.2d 199, 203 (1963); Court Instruction No. 4 provided that any damages were to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence; and "it is and should be presumed that the jury followed the law."
¶ 33. This Court "must view the instruction in light of all the other instructions which were given to determine whether the jury was properly instructed. Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Miss.1992).... [T]he trial court has considerable discretion in instructing the jury." Southland Enter., 838 So.2d at 289. Instruction P-8 stated "[y]ou should consider the following elements of damages as have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in this case[.]" (Emphasis added). As such, the damages awarded were limited to those proximately resulting from Fitch's wrongful acts during Valentine and Sandra's marriage. Granting such an instruction was proper and well within the circuit judge's discretion. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
IV. Whether the jury verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶34. At the hearing on his post-trial motion for JNOV, Fitch argued that:
because the plaintiff had not established the second element of the tort of alienation of affection [loss of affection or consortium] or a causal connection . between the defendant, [Fitch], as conduct and the disintegration of this marriage, a jury issue was not presented and we would contend that a directed verdict should have been granted.
In response, Valentine maintained that:
[w]hile they have one set of facts and proof, we had another. The jury chose to believe our facts. It was a classic case of where the jury made a decision and in this case they made it unanimously. There was proof on both sides of it. We proved wrongful conduct. We proved loss of affection. We proved the causal connection. We proved loss of love and affection through our client.
(Emphasis added). After hearing argument from both parties, the learned circuit judge denied the JNOV motion.
¶ 35. A trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV is reviewed de novo by this Court. Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 726 (Miss.2005) (citing Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 883 So.2d 56, 64 (Miss.2004)). "The trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and look only to the sufficiency, and not the weight, of that evidence." Poole, 908 So.2d at 726 (emphasis added). "When determining whether the evidence was sufficient, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence is of such quality that reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Id. (citing Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So.2d 706, 713-14 (Miss.1984) (Robertson, J., specially concurring)) (emphasis added). See also Irby v. Travis, 935 So.2d 884, 888-89 (Miss.2006).
¶ 36. The commonly stated elements of the tort of alienation of affections are "(1) wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consortium; [ ] and (3) causal connection between such conduct and loss." Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215. See also Camp, 462 So.2d at 727 ("where a husband [wife] is wrongfully deprived of his [her] rights to the 'services and companionship and consortium of his [her] wife [husband],' he [she] has a cause of action 'against the one who has interfered with his [her] domestic relations.' . The husband [wife] might then sue for . alienation of affection_"). This Court has recognized that persuasion, enticement, or inducement which causes or contributes to the abandonment is a necessary component of "wrongful conduct." Justice Dickinson recognized in Children's Medical Group v. Phillips, 940 So.2d 931 (Miss.2006) that in order "to maintain this action it must be established that the husband [wife] was induced to abandon the wife [husband] by some active interference on the part of the defendant." Id. at 934 (quoting Stanton, 139 So. at 460) (emphasis added). In recognizing this he identified pre-Stanton language requiring persuasion. See McRae, 145 Miss. at 205, 110 So. at 508. Thus, to determine whether this standard was met, following denial of the JNOV motion, this Court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[,]" Poole, 908 So.2d at 726, and it must be determined if "reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions^]" id., as to that evidence.
¶ 37. As a preliminary matter, the credibility of a witness is to be judged by the jury. See Bland, 735 So.2d at 419. Viewing the credibility evidence regarding Fitch and Sandra "in the light most favorable," Poole, 908 So.2d at 726, to Valentine, it is clear that a reasonable juror could reject or discount their testimony.
¶ 38. Under oath and in response to Valentine's first set of interrogatories and requests for admission, Fitch denied both that he fathered K.V. and that he had any sexual relations with Sandra. At the time of this response, K.V. was more than one year old. At trial, Fitch testified that he knew the child was his "a month or two after she was born." At the time he responded under oath to Valentine, Fitch was well aware that K.V. was his child. In spite of this, Fitch denied being KV.'s father and having any sexual relations with Sandra.
¶ 39. As to Sandra, when she was pregnant with K.V. in the fall of 1998, during her second trimester of pregnancy, she falsely denied to Valentine that she was having an affair with Fitch. At trial, she stated that her affair with Fitch commenced in late 1997 or early 1998. Furthermore, Sandra subsequently married Fitch, and, as Fitch's wife, her testimony at trial in support of Fitch's position could justifiably be questioned.
¶ 40. Furthermore, viewing the testimony and evidence presented at trial "in the light most favorable," id., to Valentine, a reasonable juror could conclude that all elements of the tort of alienation of affections were met. The "wrongful conduct of the defendant," Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215, when viewed "in the light most favorable," Poole, 908 So.2d at 726, to Valentine, was satisfied by introduction of evidence supporting a finding that Fitch's acts of persuasion, enticement, or inducement caused or contributed to an adulterous relationship between Fitch and Sandra, which subsequently was admitted. The judgment of divorce provided that "[t]he evidence presented in open [c]ourt clearly establishes that [Valentine] is entitled to a divorce on the grounds of adultery." Furthermore, Valentine testified that after K.V. was born he began finding large sums of money throughout the home, which Sandra claimed to have made at work. The amount of cash he found far exceeded what he had previously observed Sandra earning. Fitch testified to giving Sandra money between February 1999 and August 1999. Moreover, Fleming testified that Sandra told her she was given $8,000 by Fitch with which to buy a new Jeep Cherokee. Soon thereafter, Sandra acquired a new Jeep Cherokee. Finally, Fleming testified that Sandra told her "that if she did quit [working for Fitch], she was afraid that Mr. Fitch would have [the child] taken away from her." Valentine testified his marriage failed because Sandra "couldn't resist all the money[,]" and, absent Fitch, his marriage would have remained intact. This satisfies the additional element of persuasion, enticement, or inducement, when viewed "in the light most favorable," to Valentine. Poole, 908 So.2d at 726. The key issue is the "causal connection between such conduct and loss." Id. In short, when did the loss of society, companionship, aid, sendees, support, and the remaining components of loss of affection and consortium occur? See Kirk, 607 So.2d at 1224. Was it before or after Sandra became involved with Fitch? If after, did Fitch's wrongful conduct lead to Sandra's loss of affection or consortium? Again, the testimony must be viewed "in the light most favorable," to Valentine. Poole, 908 So.2d at 726. Even though the marriage may have been "on the rocks," there is no proof that aid, services, support, or the right to live in the same house and eat at the same table had been lost until after the wrongful conduct, even though Sandra asserted that she lost affection for Valentine in January of 1996. Around that time, she allegedly went to the casino, told Valentine that if he did not leave with her their marriage was over, and he did not leave. From that point on, which predated her introduction to Fitch, she claims not to have "care[d] if he went every night, and that's when our marriage was over." However, Valentine testified that, prior to K.V.'s birth, his marriage to Sandra, while not perfect, was "normal." He stated that they had regular sexual relations prior to KV.'s birth, shared a joint checking account, ate meals together, never separated, and that he loved Sandra. Only after K.V. was born did Valentine begin to notice changes in Sandra. The "loss of affection or consortium," id., was unquestionably present.
¶ 41. After considering the evidence, the jury unanimously found for Valentine in the amount of $642,000 in actual damages and, thereafter, for $112,500 in punitive damages. In light of the credibility issues surrounding both Fitch's and Sandra's testimony and the standard of review which mandates viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable," to Valentine, "reasonable and fairminded jurors . exercising] . fair and impartial judgment," could (and unanimously did) find Fitch liable for the tort of alienation of affections. Id. Out of respect for the judgments of both the jury and circuit judge, this Court concludes that "[c]onflicting evidence exists which could cause fair-minded jurors to reach different conclusions and thus, granting this motion would have been improper. Therefore, this issue is without merit." Id.
V. Whether the punitive damage award violates due process.
¶ 42. Fitch concedes that "[u]n-der the current state of jurisprudence in Mississippi, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the institution of marriage" and the love that forms its foundation. Nonetheless, he argues that such interest ends "when one is punished for engaging in action protected by the Constitution that incidentally may also cause the transfer of affections to one outside the marriage." Therefore, he maintains that "the penal component of the award below . offends substantive due process insofar as it sanctions punishment for constitutionally permissive conduct."
¶43. In reply, Valentine first argues that Fitch waived this argument by only generally objecting to punitive damages at trial and not seeking remittance of the punitive damage award in post-trial motions. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Valentine notes that this Court "has recognized punitive damages as proper relief in alienation of affection cases since Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So. 36 (1928).... " Moreover, he asserts that because adultery constitutes malice, see Walter, 228 So.2d at 598 ("on the issue of adultery with the wife of another . malice is presumed."), then Miss.Code Ann. Section ll-l-65(l)(a) is satisfied and "[t]he necessary elements were present for the jury to determine whether or not to grant punitive damages in this case." In total, Valentine maintains that:
[tjhis malicious act of adultery was . admitted on the stand. Further, other aggravating circumstances also existed in the case sub judice: i.e., by the continuing acts of adultery occurring two to three times a week during work and occasionally at night over an extended period of time; by a child fathered by [Fitch] during Sandra's marriage to [Valentine]; and by the exorbitant and lavish sums of money, gifts, and benefits which [Fitch] gave to Sandra, his employee, during her marriage to [Valentine].
¶ 44. As an initial matter, this Court finds that this issue is procedurally barred as no due process challenge to the punitive damage award was raised before the circuit court. See Johnson, 929 So.2d at 407. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court has consistently recognized punitive damages as a legitimate form of relief in alienation of affections cases. See Brister, 115 So. at 36. Moreover, the punitive damages awarded in the case sub judice were only a fraction of compensatory damages awarded, hardly rising to the level of gross excess. In total, this issue is without merit.
VI. Whether this Court should order a remittitur of the award in this case.
¶ 45. As to damages, Circuit Judge Ho-worth considered a motion to remit the verdict and concluded:
[t]he jury's verdict . seemed to be a lot of money to me; but if I correctly instructed the jury on the elements of their damages and if the jury was entitled to consider once they arrived at a conclusion about liability, considered the elements that I instructed them on, I can't second-guess them, don't have the authority to do so, don't want to do so. It's the jury's job to establish the value of the loss and they've done so and I cannot say the amount of the verdict is such to justify the Court granting the motion to remit the verdict.
(Emphasis added).
¶ 46. Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-1-55 states, in part:
[t]he supreme court or any other court of record in a case in which money damages were awarded may overrule a motion for new trial or affirm on direct or cross appeal, upon condition of an addi-tur or remittitur, if the court finds that the damages are excessive or inadequate for the reason that the jury or trier of facts was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion, or that the damages awarded were contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence.
Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-1-55 (Rev. 2002). This Court has stated that "[a]b-sent either of these findings, the trial court abuses its discretion^]" in ordering a re-mittitur. State Highway Commission of Miss. v. Warren, 530 So.2d 704, 707 (Miss.1988) (quoting McIntosh v. Deas, 501 So.2d 367, 369-70 (Miss.1987)).
¶ 47. Fitch initially admits that "the verdict was based on [Valentine's] testimony concerning the distress caused by the breakup of his marriage and . that expert testimony is not required to prove such elements." (Emphasis added). Nonetheless, he argues that:
[Valentine] suffered no economic loss in this case that was quantified with certainty sufficient to support the award.... Such a verdict is so obviously excessive as to demonstrate without further argument, bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The verdict should be set aside....
¶ 48. Valentine responds that the jury verdict was unanimous and that "[t]he evidence presented by [Valentine] supported the jury's finding that [he] suffered a loss of consortium and affection, and mental and emotional distress because of [Fitch's] wrongful acts." Specifically, he argues that:
[t]he proof established that [Valentine] suffered not only from the alienation of Sandra's affection, but the damages and losses he sustained as a result of his marital household divided. [Valentine] continues to suffer from the effects of not only losing the affection of Sandra, but also from the effects of losing [K.V.] who he thought was his daughter and who he raised as his daughter and from losing his right to be a full time father of his son, [J.V.], all as a result of [Fitch's] wrongful and intentional acts.
Furthermore, "[i]f there was bias or prejudice, the punitive verdict would have been much larger, particularly when [Fitch's] list of assets reflected aggregate assets of at least [$18,639,750]."
¶ 49. The trial judge's decision on the denial or acceptance of an additur or remittitur is reviewed by this Court for abuse of discretion. Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, 672 So.2d 1188, 1193-94 (Miss.1996). The evidence in this case, viewed "in the light most favorable," Poole, 908 So.2d at 726, to Valentine establishes that Valentine lost: his home; physical custody of J.V.; his marriage and the society, companionship, aid, services, support and other components of affection and consortium attached thereto; and K.V., the child he believed to be, and raised as, his daughter. As the circuit judge found, the jury establishes the value of the loss suffered by Valentine. They determined he was entitled to $642,000 in actual damages and $112,500 in punitive damages, and the judge concluded that the amount of the verdict did not justify remit-titur. There being no evidence that either "(1) the jury or trier of fact was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion, or (2) the . damages were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence^]" Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1058 (Miss.2003), this Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying remittitur and the jury verdict should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
¶ 50. Based upon the aforementioned analysis, this Court affirms the judgment of the Circuit Court of Marshall County entered against Fitch and in favor of Valentine "for the total sum of $754,500 and interest thereon in the amount of 8% per annum and all costs.... "
¶ 51. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB P.JJ., DIAZ AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY GRAVES, J. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
. An April 29, 1998, financial statement of Fitch revealed a net worth of nearly $22 million.
. Now Sandra Fitch, having married Fitch subsequent to her divorce from Valentine.
.Co-worker Susan Fleming, who was also a personal friend of Sandra and the former bookkeeper at Fitch Oil Company, testified that Sandra claimed she received only $500 a month in cash for her work.
. Conversely, Sandra testified that Valentine knew of her affair with Fitch at this time and knew that the child may have been Fitch's.
. Valentine testified that Sandra came home with a new Jeep Cherokee and he had no idea where she obtained the funds to purchase it.
. Valentine denied drinking to an extent that it interfered with his marriage or job, and further testified that he did not recall Sandra confronting him about going out with his friends.
. Valentine testified that he did not recall Sandra confronting him about gambling in this, or any other, instance. Despite the claim that Valentine's gambling instigated Sandra's loss of affection, she failed to offer any evidence of gambling debts.
.In amended responses filed six months later, on the day before his deposition, Fitch admitted to having sexual relations with Sandra and being the father of K.V.
. Valentine filed a motion to strike the portion of Fitch's reply addressing the abolition of the tort of alienation of affections. The circuit court granted Valentine's motion to strike.
. The tort of alienation of affections is equally applicable to women as men, avoiding any archaic notion that a wife is the property of her husband. See Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Miss.1992).
. I cannot adopt the position of a majority of states and minimize this activity which the legislature has defined as a crime against public morals and decency, and declared its penalty comparable to similar conduct between a teacher and pupil or a guardian and ward. Sec Miss.Code Ann. § 97-29-1 et seq. The Legislature has not seen fit to join the throngs who say these are only "affairs of the heart," "flings," or "stepping out," as a means of attaching validity to such conduct.
. One dissent suggests that "these suits inevitably do more to hurt families than to help them." I find more persuasive the counterargument that damage actually arises from the adulterous conduct which first violates, and then destroys, the trust of not only the participants, but also of their respective families. To minimize and cast as theoretical the obvious negative consequences, such as the erosion of the marital relationship and the disruption to family unity ignores these empirical truths. The dissent's fatalistic presupposition that marriages experiencing affairs will "crash and burn," fails to recognize the reality of forgiveness and reconciliation.
. Fitch replies that '[i]f the trial court was correct in finding D-8 repetitive of P-5 . [then Fitch] loses this point on the merits, not on a point of procedure."
. Fitch alleges that Valentine did this "to prevent examination of [himself] on issues relating to his adventures after his marriage to Sandra ended."
. Regarding loss of consortium:
[t]he interest sought to be protected is personal to the wife [husband] and arises out of the marriage relation. She [He] is entitled to society, companionship, love, affection, aid, services, support, sexual relations and the comfort of her husband [his wife] as special rights and duties growing out of the marriage covenant. To these may be added the right to live together in the same house, to eat at the same table, and to participate together in the activities, duties and responsibilities necessary to make a home. All of these are included in the broad term, 'conjugal rights.' The loss of consortium is the loss of any or all of these rights....
Kirk, 607 So.2d at 1224 (citing Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So.2d 13, 16 (Miss.1974)).
. As well as in his answer.
. At trial, Sandra admitted to discussing the lawsuit with Fitch. Regarding potential motive, counsel for Valentine stated, "they eat out of the same trough."
.Furthermore, Sandra admitted at trial that she committed adultery with Fitch.
. "Like normal couples."
. Sandra further testified that she never filed for divorce from Valentine.
. Specifically, Valentine argues that Fitch "only objected to the jury instruction on punitive damages to the extent it had a presumption of malice. This presumption was redacted from the instruction. [Fitch] then only made a general objection to punitive damages." While Fitch admits that he "did not urge a First Amendment-based theory of relief against the punitive damage award[,]" he still maintains that he raised due process claims in the circuit court regarding "the 'excessiveness of the verdict' as well as the cumulative errors...."
. Which states "[p]unitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." (Emphasis added).
.The punitive damage award constituted less than 15% of the total award. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process." State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).
. He sold his interest in the house to Sandra "because [he] wanted a place for [J.V.] to live."
. He gave Sandra physical custody of J.V. because "[he] loved [K.V.], I was not going to split them up and do that to him."