Case Name: Porter and others against Turner and others
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1817
Citations: 3 Serg. & Rawl. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: Porter and others against Turner and others.
Judges: Gibson J. concurred.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 3
Pages: 108–116

Head Matter:
Porter and others against Turner and others.
A power ■was given to A,b> will, to dispose of a portion of the testator’s estate among such of the testator’s granri-childree as A, thought propev,'lt by ail) writing under her hand and seal, executed in the presence of two or more ere-: diblc witnesses.” A, made a testamentary writing in the < form of a letter disposing thereof, signed , but not sealed nor attested. She afterwards acknowledged it to be her will, and procured a codicil to be written to it, on a separate paper, relative to her own property, which codicil she signed opposite a seal, and acknowledged both papers at tlie same time, in the presence of three witnesses. Held, that it was a good execution of the power.
CASE STATED.
Catherine Dupuy, deceased, was authorised by the will of her father John Dowers, to dispose of one-fifth part of his estate, among such of his grand-children as she thought proper, “ by any writing under hand and seal, executed in the “ presence of two or more credible witnesses ;” and in case no such disposition should be made, the property was to be equally' divided among all the testator’s grand-children. Catherine Dupuy on the 3d June, 1816, disposed of this property in favour of two of the grand-children, as well as of other property of her own, by a testamentary writing in the form of a letter directed to captain Davidson, This writing was signed by Mrs. Dupuy, but not attested at the time of its date by any witnesses. On the 12th of the same month, she requested a person who was attending her to un lock a box, and band her a paper that was therein. On receiving the paper, she observed, “ that it was her will,” and requested Thomas Sim, her physician, to add a codicil thereto, dictating to him what to write. The codicil being written on another paper, she subscribed her name opposite to a seal affixed thereto ; immediately after which, three witnesses subscribed their names both to the will and codicil; doctor Sim, who had both papers in his hand, having first asked the testatrix, whether she acknowledged the same to be her last will and codicil, and she having declared that she did. The codicil related only to some personal estate of the testatrix, and made no mention of her father’s estate. The question was, whether this was a good appointment under the power given to Catherine Dupuy, by the will of John Dowers.
Rawle, for the plaintiff.
This case is brought before the Court amicably, with a view to obtain their opinion for the regulation of the conduct of the executors. . The single question is, whether the power given to Catherine Dupuy by the will of John Dowers has been executed. A strict execution of powers is requisite where a disposition is made in favour of strangers and volunteers. Powell on Powers, 130. 148. 150. Bath v. Montague. Where there is a power to charge land by writing under seal, a will without a seal is not a good execution. Dormer v. Freeland. Ross v. Ewell. So a power to do a thing by deed is not well executed by will under seal. Darlington v. Pulteny. So where three witnesses are required, two are not sufficient between volunteers. 2 P. Wms. 682. Amb. 684. A power to raise portions for daughters must be substantially followed. Mills v. Banks. Ivy v, Gilbert .
Binney, for the defendant, contended,
1. That an equity existed in the defendants. 2. That all the writings on this subject are to be considered as one.
1. The appointees under this will are a child of John Dowers, jun. and a child' of Edward Dowers. They are not so well provided for by the will of their grand-father, John Dowers, as the plaintiffs, who are likewise grand-children. Now the rule is, that chancery will supply a defect of execution in favour of any equity. Powell on Powers, 160, as creditors. 1 Ch. Cas. 10, or wife. 2 Freem. 256. Toilet v Toilet, 2 P. Wms. 623. Or younger children against the heir at law and against those for whom provision has been already made. Garth v. Lady Blanfrey Wilmer v. Kendal, Where persons are unequally provided for by one who creates a power, that circumstance will be considered in supplying a defect of .execution. Harvey v. Harvey, 6 Vin. Ab. 55. pl. 13. In the cases cited for the plaintiffs there was not the least equity in favour of the appointees ; and in some of them the appointment was adverse to persons favoured in law, such as husband, &c. He also cited Hob. 277. 312.
2. Several assurances relating to each other and to the same subject, are considered as one, and are held a good execution of the power, although separately they are not a good execution, agreeably to the maxim, qua; non valent singula, unit a pro sunt. Earl of Leicester’’s case. Moor, 615. Herring v. Brown. Stapleton v. Stapleton. The will and codicil in this , case may be considered as parts of the same instrument. They were acknowledged at the same time, and witnessed at the same time and by the same persons. The will was in the form of a letter not published, and perhaps the mind of the testatrix was not quite made up. When the publication was made, she sealed the codicil and acknowledged both. There was no occasion to put a seal to both instruments. The seal to the last gave sanction to the whole. A will and codicil are one; the codicil is part of the will. 1 Swinb. 30. 32. Willet v. Sandford. Hill v. Chapman.
Rawle, in reply.
My position has hot been shaken, that powers must be strictly executed, when the appointment is in favour of volunteers. And even where children are concerned, thought equity will supply a defect which would leave them withou provision, yet it will not interfere where the question is about the quantum of provision given to each child. This appears in the case of Cook v. Arnham. The question here is between grand-children, and it is a question of quantum, in which case relief will not be given. At all' events this is not the case of grand-children unprovided for.
The cases cited on behalf of the defendant in the second point are not applicable. In them all, the writings had the same intent, viz. to execute the power; but that was not the case here. The codicil was by no means meant as an execution of the power. The will is the execution of the power, the codicil relates to other subjects. The codicil is considered part of a will, as relates to property, but as an. execution of a power they are distinct.
3 CL Cas. 107,108.
2 P. Wms. 506.
e) 3 Mt. 156.
Cowp. 268.
3 P. Wms. 1.
2 P. Wms. 13.
2 P. Wms. 489.
Gilb. Eq. Pep. 166.
1 Ch. Cas. 161.
1 Ath. 569.
1 Tent. 278.
) 2 Shots. 185.
1 Atk. 7.
1 Ves. 186.
1 Ves. M7.
Cas. Temp. Talb. 35.

Opinion:
Tilghman C.
J. (After stating the case.) There are cases, where equity will aid the defective execution of a power; relief will be given, in favour of creditors, or of a wife, or children. But this is not one of those cases. The appointment, it is true, is in favour of grand-children. But even supposing, for argument's sake, that grand-children fall under the same rule as children, there would be no reason for an interposition here; because in default of an appointment, the estate would go to grand-children; so that the equity of the contending parties would be equal. The solemnity of a seal, is. not considered with the same veneration, now, as formerly. Still, this Court has no power to dispense with a seal, where the party creating a power, has required one. The question is, therefore, reduced to a single point, viz. whether this was an appointment under the seal of Mrs. Dupuy. That she intended to make an appointment under her father's will, is certain; and as that will required a seal, we must suppose that she intended the will, and codicil, to operate as one instrument, because otherwise, the appointment would be invalid. When she wrote the letter, intended for a will, she made no publication of it, but kept it locked up, until nine days after. Then, for the first time, she published it, and had it attested as her will, but not until she had signed and sealed the codicil ; the publication of both, was simultaneous, and may be considered as the same act. Is there any principle of law then, which intervenes, and frustrates the intent of the testatrix ? It is contended, that there is ; that the will, and codicil, are different instruments, and consequently the seal affixed to the latter, can have no effect on the former. Let us exa mine this position. There is an intimate connexion between a will and codicil. In the case of Willet v. Sandford, (1 Ves. 187), it is said by Lord Hardwicke, that " a codicil, made " after a will, and directed to be annexed thereto, is consi- " dered, both in our law and in the civil law, (from which " we borrow ours, with respect to wills) as part of the will?' and he cites Swinb. in support of this principle. In the present case there is no direction, that the codicil shall be annexed to the will; but I do not conceive that to be material. The nature of the thing requires that it should be annexed to. it, or rather that the codicil should be considered as incorporated with the will. If ever there was a case, in which it must be presumed, that the testatrix intended, as far as law would permit, to incorporate a codicil with a will, it is the present, where the most material part of the will is void, unless the codicil' and will are united. Neither do I think it material, that the two writings are on different papers, for that makes no difference in their natures. The case of Acherly v. Vernon, (Comyn. Rep. 381) is strong on this point. A testator made a will, by which he devised all his lands and estate ; he afterwards purchased other lands, and rents, and then made and executed a codicil, in presence of three witnesses, who subscribed it. There was no express republication of the will, yet it was held by Ld. Ch. Macclesfield, and affirmed in the house of lords, that the will was virtually republished, so that the after purchased real estate would pass by it. ' The codicil was a separate and distinct instrument, made years after the will; but, in the words of Lord Macclesfield, " both together made but one " will." There has been some diversity of opinion, since the case of Acherly v. Vernon, concerning an implied republication of a will, by the act of making a codicil. Some have thought, that if the codicil related to personal estate only, there would not be an implied repuhlication of the will, so as to pass after purchased lands, although the codicil was attested by three witnesses. But the later cases, incline to an implied republication, where there are circumstances from which the intent of the testator may be presumed. The present case falls directly within that principle. It may be fairly presumed, that Mrs. Dupuy knew that her father's will required her appointment to be under seal; she knew then, that unless the seal of the codicil, operated on the will. her appointment was void. It is impossible to imagine a stronger case for presumption of intent. Add to this, the manner of publication; both instruments at the same moment, and I cannot hesitate to consider the two, as making one whole. I am, therefore', of opinion, that the appointment was good, and consequently the plaintiffs (the other grandchildren), are entitled to nó part of the property in dispute.
Gibson J. concurred.