Case Name: Adele STROH, personal representative of the Estate of Lillian Mushkin, deceased, Appellant, v. Arthur DUDLEY and Dorothy Dudley, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-08-21
Citations: 476 So. 2d 230
Docket Number: No. 83-2745
Parties: Adele STROH, personal representative of the Estate of Lillian Mushkin, deceased, Appellant, v. Arthur DUDLEY and Dorothy Dudley, Appellees.
Judges: DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 476
Pages: 230–233

Head Matter:
Adele STROH, personal representative of the Estate of Lillian Mushkin, deceased, Appellant, v. Arthur DUDLEY and Dorothy Dudley, Appellees.
No. 83-2745.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 21, 1985.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 29, 1985.
Russell E. Carlisle of Carlisle & LeCates, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Spencer M. Sax of Sachs & Weiss, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees.

Opinion:
PURDY, H. MARK, Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from an Order Dismissing with Prejudice Appellant's Counterclaim.
Lillian Mushkin filed an Affidavit in the Public Records of Palm Beach County which alleged and claimed that she had a beneficial interest in real property, legally titled in the names of Arthur Dudley and Dorothy Dudley, who were her relatives. Briefly, the affidavit claimed that Lillian Mushkin advanced the sum of $31,000.00 as the entire down payment toward a home in Boca Raton, Florida, with the understanding that the premises would be occupied by herself and the Dudleys. It was also alleged that Lillian Mushkin paid one-half of the mortgage and other expenses for a period of time and that the property was to be sold in order to repay her investment with interest in the event she ceased to live there.
Arthur and Dorothy Dudley brought suit against Lillian Mushkin claiming slander of title and seeking equitable relief as a result of the recording of the affidavit. Lillian Mushkin filed her answer, defenses and counterclaim for resulting trust, constructive trust and equitable lien.
Lillian Mushkin died and Adele Stroh was appointed personal representative of the estate. Although a Suggestion of Death was filed in the lower court, no motion was made to substitute the personal representative within the 90 day period of time provided in Rule 1.260 (a)(1) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Outside the 90 day period, Adele Stroh did file a Motion for Substitution of Parties, in response to which the Dudleys moved that the counterclaim be dismissed due to the untimeliness of the Motion for Substitution. In turn, Adele Stroh filed a verified response and moved to enlarge the time for substitution. All of this came before the lower court and one order was entered which denied the Motion for Substitution and Motion for Enlargement of Time and granted the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim. The Order made no findings and cited no basis for the ruling, but it did provide that the dismissal of the counterclaim was with prejudice. Adele Stroh's Motion for Rehearing was denied and this appeal follows.
This Court has reviewed the entire record before it and we concur with counsel that the ruling of the lower court must have been predicated upon one of two theories. First, that the terminology in the rule of the word "shall" makes dismissal mandatory and not discretionary. As a second (and less likely theory from our reading of the record), that the lower court exercised its discretion and in the interests of justice, denied the substitution and ordered dismissal with prejudice. In either event, we reverse.
We hold that Rule 1.260 (a)(1) does not require mandatory, non-discretionary dismissal even in light of the terminology "shall be dismissed as to the deceased party". The law of this State is that this provision should be liberally interpreted and applied to allow substitution after 90 days upon a showing of excusable neglect, inadvertence or mistake. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Lebo, 355 So.2d 195 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), Bono v. Dubree, 350 So.2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Kimbrell, 343 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
The issue before us was recently examined in detail in Somero v. Hendry General Hospital, 467 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). As noted there, the courts of this State have favored liberality in setting aside defaults and resolving controversies on the merits. Dismissal with prejudice is the extreme sanction and is not warranted from our view of the record, applying the principles enumerated and reiterated in Somero, supra.
This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court with instructions to vacate the Order of Dismissal and grant the Appellant's Motion for Substitution of Parties and Motion for Enlargement of Time.
DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Associate Judge, concurs.
DOWNEY, J., dissents, with opinion.