Case Name: LUSK et al. v. WHITE, County Treasurer
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1916-04-11
Citations: 68 Okla. 316
Docket Number: No. 7320
Parties: LUSK et al. v. WHITE, County Treasurer.
Judges: All the Justices concur,
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 316–320

Head Matter:
LUSK et al. v. WHITE, County Treasurer.
No. 7320
Opinion Filed April 11, 1916.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 12, 1918.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1918.
Second Petition for Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1918.
(173 Pac. 1128.)
(Syllabus.)
1. Separate Schools — Constitutional Provisions.
Section 3. art. 13, Williams’ Constitution, provides separate schools for white and colored children with like accommodations shall be provided by the Legislature and impartially maintained.
2. Separate Schools — Statutory Provision.
■ Section 8, art. 15, c. 219, Sess. Laws, 1918, provides: “In all counties where county separate schools for white and colored children are maintained, the county excise board shall annually levy a tax on all taxable property in their respective counties sufficient to maintain such separate schools, as hereinafter provided. Upon an estimate made by the county commissioners, said taxes shall be estimated, published, levied and collected, in the same manner as other taxes for county purposes. * ...
3. Schools and School Districts — Separate Schools — Taxation by County — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.
Tbe trial court held that the excise boards of counties where separate schools are maintained, are authorized by section 3, art. 18, Williams’ Constitution, and section 8. art. 15, c. 219, Sess. Laws 1913, to levy a tax of 1 mill on all taxable property in their respective counties “for separate schools,” so long as the total levy for county purposes did not exceed the limitation upon county levies contained in section 9. art. 10, Williams’ Constitution, to wit, 8 mills, exclusive of aid to the common schools. Held, not error.
Sharp, C. J., and Turner, J., dissenting.
Enor from District Court, MeCurtain County; O. E. Dudley, Judge.
Action by James W. Lusk and others, as receivers of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, and the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company against ' Leon A. White, County Treasurer of MeCurtain County, Oklahoma. Judgment for defendant for costs, and plaintiffs bring error.
Affirmed.
W. F. Evans, R. A. Kleinsehmidt, and Fred E. Suits, for plaintiffs in error.
E. G-. Nelson, Co. Atty., for defendant in error.

Opinion:
KANE, C. J.
This was an action to recover from the county treasurer of McOur-ain county a certain sum of money, which it was alleged was paid to him under protest upon an illegal levy of taxes for county purposes by the excise board of said county. Upon trial to the court there was judgment for the defendant for costs, and the plaintiff in error, being dissatisfied therewith, commenced this proceeding in error for the purpose of reviewing the action of the trial court. By agreement of counsel, the only question of law presented for our consideration involves the right of the excise board to make a county levy of 1 mill "for separate schools" in addition to a levy of 1 mill "for common schools." For the purpose of presenting this question, it was further agreed that the levy made for said MeCurtain county for said year is the total of the following named county lgvies, to wit: For g'eneral county purposes, 5 mills; for sinking fund, 1.6 mills; for common schools, 1 mill; for separate schools, 1 mill.
It is the last item to 'which plaintiff takes exception. If we. understood counsel, they base their contention that this item is illegal upon the assumption that this levy is regugnant to that part of section 9, art: 10, Williams' Constitution, which limits the county levy to not more than 8 mills, and further provides that any county may levy not exceeding 2 mills additional for county high school and aid to the common schools of the county, not over 1 mill of which shall be for such high school, and the aid of said common schools, and shall be apportioned as provided by law. They say that this proviso does not authorize the county excise board to make a county levy "for separate schools." In our judgment, there is nothing in the record which indicates that it was the intention of the excise hoard that the item to which exception was taken should be levied as "aid to the common schools of the county," or that they were of the opinion that they derive such authority from the foregoing constitutional provision. Section 3, art. 13, Williams' Constitution provides:
"Separate schools for white and colored children with like accommodation shall be provided by the Legislature and impartially maintained."
In pursuance of this constitutional mandate, section S, art. 15, c. 219, Session Laws 1913. was enacted, which provides:
"In all counties where county separate schools for white and colored children are maintained, the county excise board shall annually levy a tax on all taxable property in their respective counties sufficient to maintain such separate schools, as hereinafter provided. Upon an estimate inade by the county commissioners, said taxes shall be estimated, published, levied and collected, in the same manner as other taxes for county purposes. "
Tlie foregoing provisions, it seems to us, specifically clothe the excise board of Me-Ourtain county, it being a county where separate schools are maintained, with authority to make the levy complained of. The trial court held that, so long as the amount of the total levy for county purposes did not exceed the limitations upon the "county levy" contained in section 9, art. 10, Williams' Constitution, to wit, 8 mills, it could not be held to be illegal. We are of the opinion that this much, at least, may be said with perfect safety. Counsel for defendant contends that, inasmuch as the Constitution makes it mandatory upon the Legislature that separate schools for white and colored children shall be provided with like accommodations and impartially maintained, there need be no limit upon the power placed in the county authorities to furnish the necessary funds by taxation to carry out this mandate. As the county levy herein does not exceed the constitutional limitation for county purposes, there is no necessity at this time for going any further than the trial court did.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.
All the Justices concur,
except