Case Name: A. A. HOME IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas C. IRWIN
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1967-11-06
Citations: 203 So. 2d 888
Docket Number: No. 2741
Parties: A. A. HOME IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas C. IRWIN.
Judges: Before McBRIDE, REGAN and BAR-NETTE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 203
Pages: 888–892

Head Matter:
A. A. HOME IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas C. IRWIN.
No. 2741.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 6, 1967.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1967.
Edward K. Pinner, Sr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cabibi & Cabibi, Charles E. Cabibi, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
Before McBRIDE, REGAN and BAR-NETTE, JJ.

Opinion:
REGAN, Judge.
The plaintiff, A. A. Home Improvement Company, Inc., filed this suit against the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas C. Irwin, endeavoring to recover the sum of $303.00, together with interest and attorney's fees. The plaintiff's suit is predicated upon a written contract wherein it agreed to furnish and install several windows to enclose the rear porch of the defendants' premises located in 8319-21 Zimple Street, in the City of New Orleans.
The defendants answered and asserted therein that the plaintiff breached its contract when it failed to perform in conformity with its terms, and by installing improper windows which were in a defective and damaged condition.
The lower court concluded from the composition of the record that it could not decide the case on its merits. Consequently, it dismissed the suit without prejudice, and the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.
The record discloses that on December 5, 1963, the plaintiff, acting through its president, Irwin J. Smitt, entered into a contract with the defendants wherein it agreed to furnish and install four 6X4 foot slider hung windows and two 5X4 foot sliding windows. The agreement further provided for two wooden mullions which act as dividers between the windows and two bumper type thresholds. The price therefor was to be $333.60; a down payment of $33.60 was required, and the balance was payable in three monthly installments. Shortly after the work had begun, the parties agreed to replace a small piece of flooring for the price of $3.00. Therefore, the balance due the plaintiff under the contract amounted to $303.00.
The defendants; as we said, wanted the foregoing windows installed for the purpose of enclosing a rear porch which was already partially enclosed by a weatherboard wainscoting approximately half the distance from the floor to the ceiling. Therefore, the windows would complete the enclosure thereof. The record indicates that there was some discussion as to the type of window to be hung, but the contract contains no specification as to what brand thereof was to be installed.
When the work was completed, the defendant requested the plaintiffs to move the window frames out one fourth of an inch, so that the outside edge of the aluminum sill would be one quarter inch beyond the end of the wooden sill upon which it sat, and a quarter inch beyond the outside face of the weatherboards. The plaintiff's carpenter returned to the defendants' premises,' unscrewed the six windows, moved them out a quarter inch, rescrewed them properly and caulked them inside and outside. Mrs. Irwin then signed her name across the face of the contract to indicate that the work had been done to her satisfaction. In any event, the defendants refused to make any payment on account of the agreement insisting that the wrong brand of windows were installed and that the carpenter had removed some part of the windows before installation, which caused them to leak when it rained. Hence this suit.
The witnesses for the plaintiff explained that there was no agreement as to the type of windows which were to be installed. In addition, they contend that the only parts removed from the windows prior to installation were masonry trim fins, which are placed on aluminum window frames in the event that they should be installed in a brick veneer home. These fins, which are approximately two inches back from the leading edge of the window, are nailed to the wooden supports of the house, so that they aligned almost even with the face of the brick veneer finish. However, when these windows are installed in a frame house, they are removed by the tearing thereof along a perforated line which was contemplated by the manufacturer when the windows would be used for this purpose. The plaintiff's witnesses further explained that these fins are not intended to serve as flashing in order to prevent the entry of water, since they are, to reiterate, perforated and therefore contain innumerable holes.
The printed portion of the plaintiff's contract stipulates that it will do the work in a workmanlike manner in accordance with standard practices. When asked by counsel for the defendants whether he had complied with this portion of the contract, the plaintiff's witnesses readily admitted that the work was not performed completely in accordance with "standard practices", since the method of construction requested by the defendant was, of itself, not a standard practice. To the contrary, they simply explained that in order to obtain the job it was necessary for them to perform the work in conformity with the requests and desires of the person employing them.
In any event, we are convinced that the solution hereof emanates from an analysis of the testimony of the defendants' witness, Joseph Ridolfo, who qualified as an expert in the construction business. He stated unequivocally that the plaintiff had rendered the defendant substantial performance of their building contract. On the other hand, he vaguely recalls some minor defects in the work, such as poor methods of nailing, which he considered to be unworkmanlike. He also pointed out that it is not a standard practice to install aluminum frame windows with wooden mullions. However, he recanted when it was pointed out to him that the contract actually called for wooden mullions as opposed to the standard aluminum mullions.
The law applicable to building and construction contracts such as this is covered by the rationale emanating from Civil Code Article 2769, which reads:
"If an undertaker fails to do the work he has contracted to do, or if he does not execute it in the manner and at the time he has agreed to do it, he shall be liable in damages for the losses that may ensue from his non-compliance with his contract."
As pointed out in the case of Loeb v. Neilson, the law governing building and construction contracts is different from that which generally governs commutative contracts, where there can be no recovery in the absence of full and complete performance. However, the doctrine of substantial compliance is sufficient to justify recovery of the contract price by the plaintiff. The owner's remedy in the presence of a substantial compliance or performance of the contract is to allege and prove the nature and extent of the unfinished or defective work, so as to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's judgment by the amount of the cost required to correct the defective work. The burden of proof in a case of this nature as to the defects and omissions on the part of the contractor and the cost of repairing and finishing them lies squarely upon the owners who claim that defective work exists.
In this case, the defendants have obviously mistaken their remedy, and contend that they are not obliged to pay the plaintiff anything in the absence of complete and perfect construction. Nowhere in the record is there a distinct evaluation of exactly what work the plaintiff failed to perform, and the cost of remedying any defect, if one or more actually existed. The defendants' own expert witness failed to discuss specific details regarding the nature of any defects, and the cost or repairing such defects was not even mentioned. Therefore, we have no way of knowing how much it would cost to have the alleged defects repaired, and we cannot estimate the diminution in price to which the defendants might be entitled. For this reason, we find it necessary to remand the case to the lower court in order that the defendants may sustain their burden of proof in establishing the defects in the plaintiff's work and the cost of the repair thereof.
The lower court accorded some consideration to the fact that after the work was performed, the windows together with other portions of the porch which they enclosed, were damaged or destroyed by Hurricane "Betsy" in 1965, and that the defendants collected insurance for the repair thereof. Since this occurred after the installation of the windows by the plaintiff, this destruction and consequent recovery of insurance therefor is of no relevance to this litigation, and it should not be considered by the trial court in arriving at a determination of the amount due the plaintiff.
The record clearly discloses that the plaintiff substantially performed the contract. The burden of proof has now shifted to the defendants to show that the work was defective and to establish the cost of repairing any defect. Since the contract calls for 25% attorney's fees in the event suit is necessary for collection of the amount thereof, the final award made by the lower court is subject to this provision, and 25,% thereof should be added to the judgment in conformity with the contract.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and this case is now remanded for such additional proceedings as its nature may require and in conformity with the rationale expressed hereinabove.
The defendants are to pay all costs hereof.
Reversed and remanded.
BARNETTE, J., dissents with written reasons.
. 128 So.2d 447 (La.App., 1961).
. See Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So.2d 389 (La.App., 1945).
. See La.C.C.P. Art. 2164 and Comment (c) thereto.