Case Name: SHANE v. MOUW
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-06-08
Citations: 116 Mich. App. 737
Docket Number: Docket No. 52651
Parties: SHANE v MOUW
Judges: Before: D. F. Walsh, P.J., and Mackenzie and J. R. Ernst, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 116
Pages: 737–744

Head Matter:
SHANE v MOUW
Docket No. 52651.
Submitted June 10, 1981, at Grand Rapids.
Decided June 8, 1982.
Bernice Shane was treated for an arthritic condition by Dirk Mouw, a medical doctor, from 1961 to 1977. Her last office visit was in July, 1977. On August 7, 1977, Shane’s son made a telephone call to Mouw seeking to have Mrs. Shane admitted to a hospital for treatment of what Mouw had diagnosed and treated as arthritis. Mouw refused to hospitalize Mrs. Shane but offered to prescribe additional medication for her. Mrs. Shane was admitted to a hospital, where another doctor diagnosed her condition as gout. On August 2, 1979, Mrs. Shane filed a medical malpractice action against Mouw in Kent Circuit Court. The court, John T. Letts, J., granted defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
There is no evidence that the physician-patient relationship between defendant and plaintiff had ceased prior to August 7, 1977, nor that the telephone call made that day on behalf of plaintiff was intended as a device for prolonging the period of limitations. A telephone communication between a physician and patient which takes place after the last examination of the patient may constitute "treating or otherwise serving” the patient as provided in the malpractice statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s action was filed within two years of the August 7, 1977, telephone call. The trial court erred in granting accelerated judgment in favor of defendant.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Mackenzie, J., dissented. She would affirm the lower court’s grant of accelerated judgment based on the facts of this case. Plaintiff’s refusal to accept defendant’s proffered treatment on August 7, 1977, does not constitute "treating and otherwise serving the plaintiff’ within the meaning of the malpractice statute of limitations. Thus, plaintiffs last treatment by defendant was in July, 1977, more than two years before plaintiffs action was filed. Accelerated judgment was properly granted.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 5] 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons § 320.
When statute of limitations commences to run against malpractice action against physician, surgeon, dentist, or similar practitioner. 80 ALR2d 368.
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions § 470.
Opinion op the Court
1. Physicians and Surgeons — Medical Malpractice — Limitation op Actions.
A telephone conversation between a plaintiff and his physician subsequent to treatment may constitute part of the treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff necessary to provide a basis for a claim for medical malpractice for purposes of determining the running of the period of limitation of such actions (MCL 600.5838[1]; MSA 27A.5838[1]).
2. Physicians and Surgeons — Medical Malpractice — Limitation op Actions.
A trial court erred in granting accelerated judgment in favor of a defendant doctor in a medical malpractice action on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs action where a telephone call was made to the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff within the slightly more than two-year period between plaintiffs last office visit and the filing of her case and the defendant offered to prescribe medication for plaintiffs condition, which he had been treating for 16 years, and there was no evidence that the physician-patient relationship had ceased prior to the making of the telephone call nor that the telephone call was intended as a device for prolonging the period of limitations.
Dissent by Mackenzie, J.
3. Limitation op Actions — Accelerated Judgments — Court Rules.
Accelerated judgment grounded on the statute of limitations is improper where disputed questions of material fact exist (GCR 1963, 116.1[5], 116.3).
4. Physicians and Surgeons — Medical Malpractice — Limitation op Actions.
Whether a telephone conversation between a plaintiff and his physician subsequent to treatment constitutes "treatment or other services” necessary to provide a basis for a claim for medical malpractice for purposes of determining the running of the period of limitation of such actions depends on the nature of the conversation (MCL 600.5838[1]; MSA 27A.5838[1]).
5. Physicians and Surgeons — Medical Malpractice — Limitation of Actions.
Neither a doctor’s refusal to treat a patient nor a patient’s refusal to accept proffered treatment from a doctor is "treatment" within the meaning of the statute limiting the time in which an action for malpractice may be maintained (MCL 600.5838[1]; MSA 27A.5838[1]).
Frank S. Spies, for plaintiff.
Baxter & Hammond (by Joel M. Boyden and Phillip J. Nelson), for defendant on appeal.
Before: D. F. Walsh, P.J., and Mackenzie and J. R. Ernst, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
J. R. Ernst, J.
The essential facts of this case are accurately set forth in Judge Mackenzie's dissenting opinion.
Accepting plaintiffs version of the facts as correct for purposes of this appeal, it appears the parties commenced a physician-patient relationship in 1961 which continued into 1977. GCR 1963, 116.3. Between 1965 and May, 1977, plaintiff visited defendant's office 63 times, and defendant regularly prescribed medication for plaintiffs condition.
Plaintiff further claims that she last visited defendant's office in July, 1977. At that time, she asserts, it was necessary for her to use a walker because her "arthritis" had crippled her.
After hospitalizing plaintiff on August 7, 1977, another physician diagnosed plaintiff's condition as gout.
In DeGrazia v Johnson, 105 Mich App 356; 306 NW2d 512 (1981), it was held that under some circumstances a telephone conversation between a physician and patient which takes place after the last examination of the patient may constitute "treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff' pursuant to MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1).
We agree with the applicability of the rule as stated by the dissent to the present case, but differ in the conclusion to be drawn from the given facts.
Plaintiff and defendant enjoyed a patient-physician relationship for 16 years. Over this period, defendant diagnosed and treated plaintiff for an arthritic condition.
Plaintiff continued to seek treatment from defendant for this medical problem through her son's telephone call on her behalf on August 7, 1977, when her condition had further deteriorated. Defendant refused to hospitalize plaintiff as requested and instead offered to prescribe medication. It was only after this telephone conversation that plaintiff sought the services of another physician.
There is nothing to indicate that the telephone call of August 7, 1977, was intended as a device for prolonging the statute of limitations. On the contrary, it bears all the indicia of a call on behalf of a patient in distress to her long-time personal physician. Similarly, it may be reasonably inferred from defendant's alleged response that an evaluation of plaintiffs condition was made based on past observation and treatment plus information as to the current condition and that defendant then determined a course of treatment including prescribing medication and rejecting hospitalization.
As observed in the dissenting opinion, the physician-patient relationship is consensual; it may be established by a request for treatment and treat ment being furnished in response to such request. Moreover, the relationship may be of a continuing nature, as it was between the present parties.
There is no evidence of any occurrence between the parties prior to August 7, 1977, which would indicate that defendant intended to discontinue treating or otherwise serving plaintiff before that date. More significantly, prior to August 7, 1977, there is evidence of nothing which would have alerted plaintiff that her long-standing physician-patient relationship with defendant had ended and that the statutory period of limitations had started to run. In fact, the phone.call of August 7, 1977, certainly appears to have been an attempt by defendant to continue treating plaintiff's condition.
Reversed and remanded for trial. Costs to plaintiff.
D. F. Walsh, P.J., concurred.