Case Name: Mona BAIRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-01-30
Citations: 458 F. App'x 39
Docket Number: No. 10-4179-cv
Parties: Mona BAIRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 458
Pages: 39–40

Head Matter:
Mona BAIRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-4179-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 30, 2012.
Charles G. Fiore, Lewis & Fiore, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sean K. McMahan (Patrick C. DiCarlo, of counsel), Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant Mona Baird appeals from a judgment of the District Court entered September 27, 2010, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-ap-pellee The Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") on Baird's claim seeking reinstatement of long-term disability ("LTD") benefits for her bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome pursuant to Section 502(e)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the factual history and proceedings below. On appeal, Baird argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Prudential because Prudential's conclusion that she was no longer "disabled," which precipitated its termination of her LTD benefits, was not supported by substantial evidence, and was the result of Prudential's failure to consider the duties of her regular occupation in a meaningful way.
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003). Nevertheless, "conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).
Following our de novo review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for substantially the reasons stated in its Memorandum Opinion entered September 24, 2010. See Baird v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 09 Civ. 7898, 2010 WL 3743839 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.24, 2010). In this case, "Baird's arguments amount to nothing more than a disagreement about how [Prudential] should have evaluated the medical evidence." Id. at *5. As the District Court accurately noted, where, as here, the terms of an employee benefit plan grants the claim administrator discretion to determine eligibility for benefits, "such arguments do not provide a basis for overturning a benefit determination." Id.; see also Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.2009) ("[We] will not disturb the administrator's ultimate conclusion unless it was arbitrary and capricious." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of Baird's arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.