Case Name: Johnson v. Johnson
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-01-28
Citations: 4 N.Y.S. 224
Docket Number: 
Parties: Johnson v. Johnson.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 4
Pages: 224–226

Head Matter:
Johnson v. Johnson.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
January 28, 1889.)
Appeal—Review—Reference in Divorce Cases—Justice at Chambers.
The action of the special term, sitting at chambers, in refusing an application to confirm the report of a referee appointed to take testimony in divorce proceedings and report, will not be disturbed, it being the practice to require applications for judgments in divorce cases to be made at the special term for the trial of issues, although the court erroneously assigned as the reason for such refusal that it did not have jurisdiction at chambers to grant such application. Daniels, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Hew York county.
Action by Robert W. Johnson against Ellen 0. Johnson, to obtain a divorce. An application was made to the special term, sitting at chambers, to confirm the report of the referee appointed to take testimony in the case, and who found that the material allegations of the complaint- were true. From the refusal to grant such application the plaintiff appeals.
Argued before Van Brunt, P. J„ and Bartlett and Daniels, JJ.
Chas. M. Stabler, for appellant. Roger A. Pryor, for respondent.

Opinion:
"Van Brunt, P. J.
The court, at any special term, had undoubtedly the power to entertain the application, but in the regulation of the business in this district it has always been the practice to require applications for judgment in divorce cases, unless ex parte, to be made at the special term for the hearing of enumerated motions, and not at the special term for the hearing of non-enumerated motions. Therefore the justice was right in refusing to hear the motion. If he assigned an erroneous reason for his refusal, this fact forms no ground for requiring him to violate the rules which the judges of this district have adopted for the regulation of the business of the court. If the plaintiff in this case has a right to have his application heard at the special term for the hearing of motions, then any suitor has a right to bring any action to trial there. Such a ruling would be subversive of all power in the court to regulate its business. It seems to me that the appeal is utterly without merit, and such appeals should not be successful. The order should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements.
Bartlett, J., concurs.