Case Name: OBENLAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-06-29
Citations: 111 N.Y.S. 686
Docket Number: 
Parties: OBENLAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 111
Pages: 686–690

Head Matter:
OBENLAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
June 29, 1908.)
1. Street Railroads—Private Right of Way—Premises—Right to Occupy— Persons Near Track—Injury.
Defendant operated its street cars and trains over a space known as “Railroad Avenue,” which, while not a street, was used as such with defendant’s knowledge. A platform had been built, partly by defendant and partly by plaintiff’s employer, between defendant’s tracks and a brewery, on which plaintiff was accustomed to unload beer barrels, which he was doing at the time of the accident, having first driven his team adjacent to the platform and turned the horse and wagon, as he believed, into a place of safety. Plaintiff was injured by one of defendant’s trains being backed along an adjoining track, by the step of one of the cars striking the hub of one of the wheels of plaintiff’s truck and shoving it- over on him. Held, that plaintiff, in using the space, was not a mere licensee, but a person rightfully there, and to whom defendant owed the duty of ordinary care.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, § 195.]
2. Same—Negligence.
Where defendant’s motorman, while changing a train from one track to another, operated the same backwards over a part of defendant's right of way, -which defendant knew -was used as a public street, and in so doing ran against plaintiff’s truck and injured plaintiff, and if the motorman had been in the front car he would probably have seen the dangerous proximity of plaintiff’s wagon to the track, such facts justified an inference that the motorman was negligent.
3. Same—Contributory Negligence—Error in Judgment.
Plaintiff drove his horse and wagon into a space between a platform and a street railway track to unload, and cramped his wagon so that, as he supposed, -the horse and wagon were in a place of safety. He made no further observations for 10 minutes before the wagon was struck by an approaching car and pushed against plaintiff, causing his injury. Held, that plaintiff’s mistake in judgment, if any, or the fact that a slight movement of the horse brought the wheel too near the track for safety, did not establish plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a matter of law.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 251-257.]
Woodward and Gaynor, J.T., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County.
Action by Charles Obenland against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. From a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint at the close of his evidence, he appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, RICH, MILDER, and GAYNOR, JJ.
Henry Hirschberg, for appellant.
D. A. Marsh, for respondent.

Opinion:
MILLER, J.
I think that the principle involved in Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 92 N. Y. 289, 44 Am. Rep. 377, and in Byrne v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 362, 10 N. E. 539, 55 Am. Rep. 512, is applicable to this case, and that -the case of Keller v. Erie R. R. Co., 183 N. Y. 67, 75 N. E. 965, is not in any respect analogous. The Barry and Byrne Cases, supra, involved accidents at crossings of a steam railroad which the defendant had for many years suffered the public to use. In the case at bar we must assume (the plaintiff was nonsuited) that the accident occurred at a place which was used as a public street to the knowledge of the defendant. The place was known as "Railroad Avenue," and, while the plaintiff's counsel was showing by a witness that the place was used as a thoroughfare, the court interrupted the examination with the statement, "Your client was clearly there by consent." A platform had been built, partly by the defendant and partly by the plaintiff's employer, between the defendant's tracks and the brewery, and the plaintiff's employer had paid the defendant rent for the use of a part of said platform, and I think the evidence warrants the conclusion that he was paying rent for some part thereof at the time of the accident. The plaintiff had been accustomed to use this platform, as he was using it at the time of the accident, for 3 years, and the plaintiff's employer had been in the habit of using it for 13 years. The plaintiff, then, was more than a mere licensee casually upon the defendant's premises. He was rightfully, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant, in a place which in appearance and use was a public street, and where the defendant knew that he or others were likely to be.
There was evidence from which a jury might find that the defendant was negligent. The defendant's motorman was in the motor box on the rear car of a five-car train, where he could not see objects with which his train might collide. The situation is not the same as though the train was being backed up in the defendant's railroad yard. I think, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, Railroad avenue should be regarded as a public street, and the defendant, knowing that people were liable to be upon its tracks, was under a duty to manage its trains with reference to that knowledge. It may be inferred that the motorman would have seen the dangerous proximity of the plaintiff's wagon to the track, had he been in the front car, because a man in the front car perceived the danger of a, collision and unsuccessfully attempted to warn the motorman. The defendant could not assume that people using Railroad avenue would at all times be out of the way of its trains. It was necessary for the plaintiff and his coservants to drive upon the tracks in order to back the wagons around to be unloaded. The defendant knew this, and, of course, knew that a train might suddenly come upon one of the men before he could get his horse and wagon off the track. I do not think the defendant could run its trains through Railroad avenue without any regard whatever to the knowledge which it had of the use of Railroad avenue by the public, and particularly by the plaintiff's employer.
It cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. He had cramped his wagon, so that, as he supposed, the horse and wagon were in a position of safety. The fact that he did not make further observation during the 10 minutes before the accident does not warrant a holding that he was negligent as matter of law. Either the plaintiff was mistaken in judgment, or by a slight movement of the horse the wheel had been turned too near the track for safety; but a mistake in judgment is not negligence, and I do not think that one can be said to be negligent as matter of law for continuing work in a place which, after making observation, he supposed to be safe. It seems to me that on this branch of the case the evidence is much more favorable to the plaintiff than was the evidence in the case of Black v. Staten Island Electric Railroad Co., 40 App. Div. 238, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1112. In that case the plaintiff supposed that his wagon was in a position of safety, but did not look to see; but it was held that the question of his negligence was for the jury. This is not like the case of Volosko v. Interurban St. Ry. Co., 190 N. Y. 206, 82 N. E. 1090. In that case the plaintiff was working where he knew he would be hit by "an approaching car, and made no observation whatever to discover the approach of the car.
We think there was sufficient evidence on both questions to take the case to the jury, and that it was error to nonsuit.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event.
JENKS and RICH, JJ" concur.