Case Name: CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. HARRELL
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1943-03-12
Citations: 134 F.2d 399
Docket Number: No. 10385
Parties: CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. HARRELL.
Judges: Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 134
Pages: 399–402

Head Matter:
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. HARRELL.
No. 10385.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 12, 1943.
Francis P. Burns, City Atty., and William Boizelle, Asst. City Atty., both of New Orleans, La., for appellant.
Jno. W. Harrell and James N. Brittingham, Jr., both, of New Orleans, La., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
The City of New Orleans claims the status in bankruptcy of a secured creditor by reason of an alleged lien for taxes on movables. It asserts that said lien is prior to a chattel mortgage lien under the constitution and laws of Louisiana, citing Liquid Carbonic Corporation v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 422. Appellee cites Tropical Printing Co. v. Union Title Guarantee Co., 180 La. 702, 731, 157 So. 534, 543. The court below held that no such lien existed prior to seizure, and postponed payment of said taxes as provided in Section 67, sub. c of the Act of June 22, 1938.
The questions presented by this appeal arose below on the petition of appellant to review an order of the referee Jn bankruptcy sustaining the trustee's account, ranking his proposed disbursements to creditors. The account showed total receipts of $1056.17, which included $432.50 that represented the proceeds of sale of one International truck subject to a chattel mortgage for a larger balance due for the purchase price, and $140 that represented the proceeds of sale of one G. M. C. truck also covered by a chattel mortgage for a larger balance due for the purchase price. The account proposed to pay, first, each mortgage creditor the sale proceeds of the truck covered by his mortgage, minus only the estimated cost of foreclosing his mortgage in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction, and, second, to disburse the entire balance in payment of bankruptcy costs of administration. According to such ranking, there were not sufficient funds to pay the entire costs of administration or to pay any part of wage claims entitled to priority or to pay any part of numerous city, state, and federal tax claims, totalling $1825.69.
There was no appeal from the judgment below sustaining the order of the referee, except that taken by the City of New Orleans. It appealéd on the ground that its claim for personal property taxes primed the chattel mortgage claims by virtue of an alleged lien and privilege status under the constitution and laws of Louisiana.
The validity of the chattel mortgage liens is undisputed, and it is well settled that when, property so encumberéd is sold in a bankruptcy proceeding for an amount not exceeding the balance of the mortgage debt, the creditor holding such lien, provided it is a first lien, is entitled to the entire proceeds of the sale, less only the estimated costs of foreclosure under the state law.
It is not necessary for us to decide whether appellant has a privilege status under state law for the collection of its taxes, because it is clear that it has no specific lien on movables prior to seizure, and there was no seizure for taxes of the bankrupt's property in this case. Conceding, without deciding, that before bankruptcy the City had an inchoate lien for taxes on movables of the bankrupt, the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, followed by adjudication, prevented the completion of the lien by seizure,. and left appellant with its remedies under Section 67 subs, b and c of the Act of June 22, 1938. If an inchoate lien for taxes be perfected under said Section 67, sub. b, the debt secured by said lien is nevertheless postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of Section 64 of said Act of June 22, 1938. This enactment by Congress suspended the operation of state insolvency laws from the time of such enactment, subject only to such limitations as were or may be prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act; and Section 8435.1 of Dart's La. Gen. Stats. (La.Act 47 of 1936), has no application to the facts of this case, because it conflicts with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act above cited.
Briefly to summarize: The nature and effect of a lien, within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, is governed by the law of the state where the bankrupt's property is situated. Prior to said Act of June 22, 1938, statutory liens that were inchoate or incomplete, and had to be perfected by seizure, did not survive in bankruptcy unless the seizure took place before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Section 67, sub. b of said Act now permits such liens to be perfected by filing notice thereof with the bankruptcy court; this notice was not given in the case before us; but, if it had been, the result would be the same, because by subdivision c thereof the lienor would be placed in a special class of secured creditors whose claims are postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of Section 64, sub. a of said Act.
The court below did not err in sustaining the action of the referee, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
11 U.S.C.A. § 107, subs. b and c, 52 Stat., pp. 876, 877.
Gugel v. New Orleans Nat. Bank, 5 Cir., 1917, 239 F. 676, 39 A.B.R. 160; Lerner Stores Corp. v. Electric Maid Bake Shops, 5 Cir, 1928, 24 F.2d 780, 11 A.B.R.,N.S., 704; L. Maxcy, Inc., v. Walker, 5 Cir., 1941, 119 F.2d 535, 45 A.B.R.,N.S., 793.
11 U.S.C.A, § 107, subs, b and c, 52 Stat. pp. 876 and 877.
11 U.S.C.A. § 104, sub. a, 52 Stat. p. 874.
Tua v. Carriere et al., 117 U.S. 201, 210, 6 S.Ct. 565, 29 L.Ed. 855; Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303, 314, 13 S.Ct. 84, 36 L.Ed. 981; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 49 S.Ct. 108, 73 L.Ed. 318; Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 5 Cir., 113 F. 483, 51 C.C.A. 1.
In re Chandron & Peyton, D.C., 180 F. 841, 24 A.B.R. 811, 820; Southern Ry. Co. v. Wilder, 5 Cir., 231 F. 933, 36 A.B.R. 747; Preetorius v. Anderson, 5 Cir., 236 F. 723, 38 A.B.R. 93; Hay v. Patrick, 3 Cir., 79 F.2d 407; In re Brannon, 5 Cir., 62 F.2d 959; In re Netter & Meyer, D.C., 6 F.Supp. 918.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., v. Wayne, 5 Cir., 101 F.2d 823, cited by appellant is easily distinguished, because it was not the owner but the contractor that was a bankrupt. The owner was the debtor, the lienee; and his property, charged with the lien, did not pass to the trustee. The contractor was the creditor of the owner (though the debtor of the materialmen), and had a special lien for his debt on the owner's building under the state statute that gave a lien to the materialmen. To make good his lien under the statute, each was required to comply with certain provisions relating to recording his claim and commencing an action within stated periods. The rights of the contractor passed to the trustee as of July 14, 1937, when the petition in bankruptcy w as filed. In addition, the trustee was claiming the rights of a judgment creditor under the Bankruptcy Act, and was disputing the special lien of the materialmen.
As between the trustee and the materialmen, the owner was a disinterested stakeholder, and, with the consent of the bankruptcy court, might have been sued by both parties; nor was there anything to prevent the contractor, prior to his discharge and with the consent of the court, being sued by the materialmen to establish their debts. In these circumstances, the debts due the materialmen by the contractor being undisputed, the owner paid to the trustee the amounts due the materialmen, under an order entered pursuant to an agreement between the trustee and materialmen. The order provided that the alleged lien on the property should be transferred to the fund, and that the owner should be released entirely. Each of the parties agreed to litigate in the bankruptcy court all claims with respect to said fund, and the trustee agreed "not to object to any of said proceedings on the ground that they should have been brought in the slate courts, or in any court other than this court." See transcript of record, p. 21.
In its opinion this court said, p. 825: "Bankruptcy does not discharge valid liens any more when, though inchoate and in the process of completion, they are in good standing when bankruptcy comes,, than when every required stop has already been taken."
This language is entirely too broad and-must be construed to apply only to liens on property of persons other than the bankrupt, because the liens on the owner's property were the only liens in controversy in the case, and the owner was not the bankrupt. This is indicated by the next sentence, which says that there was still time to take the necessary steps to complete the inchoate liens. If not so limited, similar questions as to the bankrupt's property are now sot at rest by Section 67, subs. b and c of the said Act of June 22, 1938. 52 Stat. 876, 877, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107, subs. b and c.
11 U.S.C.A. § 104, sub. a, 52 Stat. p. 874; Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., Vol. 4, pp. 228, 234 et seq. Cf. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 62 S.Ct. 350, 86 L.Ed. 356.