Case Name: Commonwealth ex rel. William J. Roney v. Charles F. Warwick, Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, James L. Miles, President of Select Council; Wencel Hartman, President of Common Council, and Messrs. Thomas L. Hicks et al., Members of the Councils of the City of Philadelphia, Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1895-11-08
Citations: 172 Pa. 140
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 39
Parties: Commonwealth ex rel. William J. Roney v. Charles F. Warwick, Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, James L. Miles, President of Select Council; Wencel Hartman, President of Common Council, and Messrs. Thomas L. Hicks et al., Members of the Councils of the City of Philadelphia, Appellants.
Judges: Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 140–150

Head Matter:
Commonwealth ex rel. William J. Roney v. Charles F. Warwick, Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, James L. Miles, President of Select Council; Wencel Hartman, President of Common Council, and Messrs. Thomas L. Hicks et al., Members of the Councils of the City of Philadelphia, Appellants.
Statutes — Expository statutes — Constitutional law — Conflict between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
The legislature cannot pass an expository act to compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a previously enacted statute.
Statutes — Acts of February 2, 1854, see. 46, and April 18,1867 — Receiver of Taxes for the City of Philadelphia — Public officers — Elections—Municipalities.
The act of April 18, 1867, P. L. 1299, which declares that the words “ the next city election” in the act of February 2, 1854, sec. 46, P. L. 44, shall be construed to mean “ the election at which the qualified voters would in accordance with existing laws elect a successor in office had no vacancy occurred therein,” is not within the power of the legislature to enact, inasmuch as it is an attempt upon the part of the legislature to usurp the judicial powers of the court.
Where a vacancy occurs in the office of receiver of taxes for Philadelphia, and the vacancy is filled by councils in accordance with the provision of the act of February 2, 1854, the incumbent cannot hold for the unexpired balance of his predecessor’s term of office, but only until “ the next city election,” even although at such an election the voters would not ordinarily under existing laws vote for a receiver of taxes.
Argued Oct. 23, 1895.
Appeal, No. 39, Jan. T., 1896, by-defendants, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Phila. Co., March T., 1895, No. 1273, for plaintiff on petition for mandamus.
Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Affirmed.
Mitchell, J., dissents.
Petition for mandamus.
From the record it appeared that on February 21, 1893, John Taylor was elected receiver of taxes of the city of Philadelphia for a term of three years, commencing the first Monday of April, 1893. Taylor died on January 5, 1895. On January 9, 1895, the select and common councils, in joint session, elected William J. Roney, the relator, receiver of taxes to fill the vacancy caused by the death of John Taylor. The selection of the said councils was for the unexpired term of John Taylor, until the first Monday of April, 1896. The oath of office was administered to William J. Roney, and his bond was approved as required by law. On February 19, 1895, the electors of the city voted for candidates for the office of receiver of taxes for the full term of three years, beginning with the first Monday of April, 1895. The relator, receiving the highest number of votes, was returned as elected. In pursuance of the said election, on March 20,1895, the relator presented himself before Edwin S. Stuart, mayor of the city, for the purpose of subscribing to the oath of office; the mayor refused to administer the oath on the ground that as the councils of the city had selected William J. Roney receiver of taxes for the unexpired term of John Taylor, deceased, and as that term would not expire until the first Monday of April, 1896, there was no vacancy to be filled by the election held on the 19th day of February, 1895; and as the oath of office for that term had been duly administered to William J. Roney, it was not incumbent upon the mayor to administer another oath to the relator. Subsequently, Charles F. Warwick, mayor of the city, also declined to administer the oath, for similar reasons. The councils of the city also refused to approve the bond of William J. Roney for the full term of three years from the first Monday of April, 1895, because they had already approved the bond of William J. Roney for the unexpired term of John Taylor, deceased, and that term would not expire until the first Monday of April, 1896. Roney, on May 25, 1895, filed his petition in the court of common pleas for Philadelphia county, setting forth these facts and praying for a writ of alternative mandamus against Charles F. Warwick, mayor of the said city, and the select and common councils, directing the said mayor to administer to the said petitioner, W illiam J. Roney, the oath of office as receiver of taxes, and commanding the councils of the said city to approve the bond of the said William J. Roney as receiver of taxes. The writ of alternative mandamus was allowed, returnable the first Monday of June, 1895. On June 13, 1895, the respondents made return to the writ of alternative mandamus, setting forth the reasons why the mayor had not administered the oath of office to William J. Roney, and why the councils of the city refused to approve his bond. On September 28, 1895, after argument upon the said petition and return, the court entered judgment in favor of the relator.
Defendants appealed.
Error assigned was entry of judgment as above.
James Alcorn, assistant city solicitor, F. L. Wayland and John L. Kinsey, city solicitor, with him, for appellants.
— The act of April 18, 1867, P. L. 1299, will be given effect as an amendment or supplement to the 46th section of the act of February 2, 1854, sec. 56: Titusville Iron Co. v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627 ; East Grant Street, 121 Pa. 596.
The act of April 18, 1867, even as an expository or declaratory statute will be given effect as to future oases: O’Conner v. Warner, 4 W. & S. 223; act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 696; act of April 28, 1840, P. L. 474; Lamberton v. Hogan, 2 Pa. 22; Haley v. Phila., 68 Pa. 45; Denny v. West Phila. Saving Fund Assn., 39 Pa. 154; Blackburn’s App., 39 Pa. 160; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 343; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. N. Y. 498 ; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 450; Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10 La. 747; Sutherland on Statutory Constructions, 306; Potter’s Dwarris on Statute and Constitutions, 628.
It will be seen that a distinction is drawn between an expository statute which attempts to interpret the law as it is or was, and those statutes which merely declare or define what the law shall be. The latter are given the force and effect of new enactments. They apply only to future cases and enact what the law, in the future, shall be.
It is suggested that the act of 1867 is within legislative power. It does not direct the judiciary as to how the act of 1854 shall be interpreted, as to past cases, nor does it change the decision of the court as to the meaning of the 46 th section of the act of 1854. It declares that in the future the words “ the next city election” shall receive a certain construction. That does not encroach upon the judicial function; it is legislation acting only on future cases.
The current of authority gives effect to a legislative construe tion, even though plainly contrary to the terms of the act construed, as if it were a new enactment changing the old law. Because the legislature enacted that the words “ the next city election ” should be construed to mean, as the learned judge put it, “ not the next, but the next to one,” he, decides “ that it is beyond the legislative power to thus distort language.” The cases referred to of O’Conner v. Warner, Reiser v. William Tell Saving Fund Association, and Haley v. City of Philadelphia, .are opposed to this view, so far as future eases are concerned.
The term “ existing laws,” in the act of 1867, means the law in existence at the time the act is called into force : Kugler’s App., 55 Pa. 123; In re Vernon Park, 163 Pa. 70.
M. J. O’Callaghan, for appellee.
— That the relator is entitled to a peremptory writ to enable him to perfect his title to this office is well settled: Com. v. Councils of the City of Pittsburg, 34 Pa. 496 ; Com. v. Fitler, 136 Pa. 129.
The act of April 18, 1867, will not be given effect as an amendment or supplement to the 46th section of the act of February 2, 1854, because it violates the constitution and undertakes to perform a judicial duty : In re East Grand Street, 121 Pa. 596.
The act of April 18, 1867, as an expository or declaratory statute, cannot even be given effect to in future cases: Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489; Tell v. Saving Fund Assn., 39 Pa. 137; Hare on Constitutional Law, 846; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 114, 5th ed.; Ordronaux on Constitutional Legislation, 377; Miller in Lectures on Constitution of the United States, 355.
Nov. 8, 1895:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett,
It was unavoidable in their earlier administration that conflict should have arisen between the legislative and judicial branches of our government. The form of government was new, and the exact limitations of duty and power were imperfectly understood. Even their co-ordination of power was doubted by some: Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330; and the feeble resistance offered by the judiciary naturally encouraged encroachments by the legislature. The mischief which resulted became so great that this court was compelled in Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171, and Bolton v. Johns, 5 Pa. 145, to take a stand in assertion of the power which the constitution had conferred. " The functions of the several parts of the government are" said Gibson, C. J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, "thoroughly separated, and distinctly assigned to the principal branches of it, the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, which within their respective departments are equal and co-ordinate," and hence the principle was declared and has become firmly established in a bead-roll of cases that "the legislative direction to perform a judicial function in a particular way would be a direct violation of the constitution: " O'Conner v. Warner, 4 W. & S. 223. Tested by this principle, the act of 1867 is not legislative but expository in its character. It does not purport to amend, alter, or change the language of the act of 1854. It offers no substitutionary clause but declares what that act " shall be construed to mean." It iá, on its face, a legislative mandate to the courts to perform their judicial function in a particular way. The appellant insists that this court has recognized an exception to the rule of expository prohibition in cases of doubtful construction. There are, it is true, dicta to that effect; but no precedents have been cited in which it was made the basis of decision. In O'Conner v. Warner, supra, it was placed on the ground that no injury had been done the parties. In Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. 22; Reiser v. Sav. Fund Assn., 39 Pa. 137; Denny v. Sav. Fund Assn., 39 Pa. 154; Blackburn's App., 39 Pa. 160; Haley v. Phila., 68 Pa. 45, and Titusville Iron Co. v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, certain expository statutes were denied retroactive effect; while, In re East Grant Street, 121 Pa. 596, an act was held invalid so far as it undertook to declare the meaning of a prior act; but, so far as it provided a substitutionary clause, was effective in repeal. Nor is it apparent how an exception can be reconciled with the theory of exclusive legislative and judicial functions. Its existence is an invitation to and has resulted in many attempted encroachments on the province of the latter; and, if it extend to cases like the present, has no limit in its application and puts in the power of the legislature the abrogation of the principle to which it is said to be an exception.
But concede the legislative power to pass expository acts ; its exercise was said in Haley v. Phila., supra, to be limited to statutes wliose construction is "really doubtful." "It would be monstrous " said Mr. Justice Shabswood, " to maintain that where the word and intention of an act were so plain that no court had ever been applied to for the purpose of declaring their meaning, it was therefore in the power of the legislature by a retrospective law to put a construction upon them contrary to their obvious letter and spirit." " The word and intention " of the act of 1854 are so plain that there is no room for construction, and therefore no occasion for the passage of an expository statute existed. It declares, so far as relates to the subject under consideration, that " whenever any elective offi-cer of said city shall die, or become incapable of fulfilling the duties of his office, his place, except where other provision is made for filling the vacancy, shall be filled by a joint vote of the city councils until the next city election and the qualification of the successor in office; Provided, that such vacancy shall exist at least thirty days before the next city election, otherwise such vacancy shall be filled at the next election thereafter ; " while the act of 1867 declares that it " shall be construed to mean," what 'is obviously contrary to its " letter and spirit," that such appointee shall hold during the unexpired term.
It was also contended that " as the constitution prescribed no form or order into which the legislative expression was to be cast," neither form nor order were material, and this court should therefore give effect to the "purpose " of the act of 1867. But the "purpose" of every statute as of all other instruments must be gathered from the language used; and this act undertakes to give a new and final interpretation to the act of 1854, and direct the courts to adopt that interpretation in all cases which come before them. Obedience to this order is an abandonment of a principle which is vital to the preservation of our system of government. " As the legislature cannot," says Judge Cooley in Const. Lim. 114, "set aside the construction of the law already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law which the legislature permits to remain,in force. One of the fundamental principles of all our governments is that the legislative power shall be separate from the judicial. If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be done by a mandate to courts which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not according to the judicial, but to the legislative judgment."
The practical effect of the act of 1867 in the present case would be to compel this court to " construe " the expression, " the next city election," used in the act of 1854, to mean not the "next" but the "next but one." It was clearly beyond the legislative power to thus usurp judicial functions, or to distort language.
Judgment affirmed, and it is now ordered that a writ of peremptory mandamus be issued, as prayed for in the petition, directed to the defendant Charles F. Warwick, maj'ur of the city of Philadelphia, commanding him to administer to the relator, William J. Roney, the oath of office of receiver of taxes for the city of Philadelphia, as required by law, and to the said defendants, members of councils of the city of Philadelphia, commanding them to consider the form and sufficiency of the bond required to be entered by said relator for the city of Philadelphia, and that the costs be paid by the defendants.