Case Name: CASON v. UNITED REALTY & AUCTION CO. et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1924-07-19
Citations: 158 Ga. 584
Docket Number: No. 4198
Parties: CASON v. UNITED REALTY & AUCTION CO. et al.
Judges: Beclc, P. J., disqualified. The other Justices concur, except Gilbert and Hines, JJ., dissenting from the ruling in the fifth division.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 584–590

Head Matter:
CASON v. UNITED REALTY & AUCTION CO. et al.
1. “A defect in a petition, resulting from tlie nonjoinder of proper parties, cannot be taken advantage of by a general demurrer.” Sunt v. Boyal, 128 Ga. 416 (3) (57 S. E. 489). There was no special demurrer to the ' petition specifically pointing out the omission to make the sheriff a party. Whether or not the sheriff is a necessary party to an action seeking to cancel the sheriff’s deed, that objection cannot be raised for the first time after verdict. Groover v. Wilkes, 148 Ga. 794 (98 S. E. 503).. The sheriff acted merely as an instrument of the law, and had no interest in the matter other than to perform his official duty.
2. Error is assigned on the judgment of the court allowing the intervention of Mrs." Madge Pogue, executrix of the estate of J. Wood Pogue. The record shows a judgment allowing this. intervention, and exception pendente lite to the judgment. The charge of the court does not mention the intervention, nor submit any issue in behalf of such intervenor; no evidence was introduced and no finding was made by the jury in behalf of the intervenor. The ease obviously was tried on the theory that the intervenor had in some manner dropped out of the case. In these circumstances, even if the court erred in allowing the intervention, such error was not harmful to the plaintiff in error and will not require a new trial. In compliance with an order of this court, the clerk of Habersham superior court transmitted, and there is now of file in this court, the following order: “G. H. Cason v. United Realty & Auction Co. et al. On motion of defendant’s counsel the within intervention is hereby dismissed as to defendants, for want of a cause of action, not being germane to the issue in the main, lacking mutuality and equity, and a misjoinder of parties. Dismissed as to defendants in open court, and .the defendants' is hereby authorized to enter up judgment for cost. This March 9, 1922.” The order is unsigned, but the clerk certifies “that the above order in blank (that is, not signed by the judge) is true and correct as the same appears of file and record in this office.” Whether the judge duly signed the minutes which included the aforesaid order does not affirmatively appear; but without deciding that the order is a valid judgment we hold that the filing and record of the same is sufficient, in connection with the facts stated above, to show that the intervenor, Mrs. Pogue, was not a party to the case- as tried.
3. It is insisted that a new trial should be granted because it was neither alleged nor proved by the petitioner that he was in possession of the .land, and therefore that a verdict cancelling the sheriff’s deed to the defendant was unauthorized and contrary to law. There was no special demurrer to the petition on this point, and hence the exception pendente lite to the overruling of defendant’s demurrer does not raise this question. Even if, as contended, a court of equity will not decree the cancellation of a deed where the petition does not allege that the grantor is in possession, a new trial is not required in this case, because the petition contained allegations and prayers authorizing other relief besides that of the cancellation of the sheriff’s deed, and cancellation of such deed is not essential to appropriate and complete relief under the pleadings and the evidence.
4. The court did not err in overruling the defendant’s demurrer to the petition of the plaintiff.
5. The only special ground of the motion for a new trial complains that the court erred in instructing the jury as follows: “Now, remember, a sale by an officer for taxes is never a completed thing until the purchase-price bid by the bidder or transferee of the bidder, until that has been completed by the payment and a deed made. You have got twelve months from then in which to redeem.” This charge was not error. The period of limitation begins to run from the date of the payment of the purchase-money and the execution and delivery of the deed.
No. 4198.
July 19, 1924.
Equitable petition. Before Judge J. B. Jones. Habersham superior court. November 17, 1923.
J. G. Edwards and H. E. Edwards, for plaintiff in error.
J. II. Sullon, Egbert Beall, and Brother Roberts, contra.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Headnotes one to four, inclusive, do not require elaboration.
"Where real estate has been sold under any State, city, county, or school tax fi. fa., the same may be redeemed at any time* within twelve months after the sale, by the defendant in tax fi. fa.," etc. Civil Code (1910), §1169. The power to sell property for unpaid taxes is derived from the statutes. If there is failure in respect to any of the requirements, it is fatal and the sale is invalid. "It is therefore accepted as an axiom, when tax sales are under consideration, that a fundamental condition of their validity is that there should have been a substantial compliance with the law in all proceedings of which the sale was the culmination. This would be the general rule in all cases in which a man is to be divested of his freehold by adversary proceedings; but special reasons make it peculiarly applicable to the case of tax sales." 3 Cooley on Taxation, 2726, § 1382; Brown v. Powell, 85 Ga. 603, 606 (11 S. E. 866); Norris v. Coley, 100 Ga. 547, 552 (28 S. E. 222); Bennett v. Southern Pine Co., 123 Ga. 618, 620 (51 S. E. 654). In Wood v. Henry, 107 Ga. 389 (33 S. E. 410), which was a case dealing with a sheriff's sale for State and county taxes, it was said, in part: "When perfected by the payment of the money and the execution of the deed, the transaction relates back and makes the sale effectual from sale day; but relatively to the right of the owner to redeem the land, the sale will not be considered as complete until payment of the purchase-money by the bidder, and the owner has twelve months from the time of such payment within which to tender the money to the purchaser for the purpose of redemption." In our opinion the ruling in the above-stated case is controlling in this case. The tax sale is not complete in contemplation of law until the purchase-money is paid and the deed is executed and delivered in accordance with' the terms of the sale, and until that time the limitation for redemption stated in Civil Code (1910), § 1169, does not begin to run.
Judgment affirmed.
Beclc, P. J., disqualified. The other Justices concur, except Gilbert and Hines, JJ., dissenting from the ruling in the fifth division.