Case Name: Patricia K. BASSETT, and Kenneth Hopkinson, joined by Mrs. Crutcher Harrison, Appellants, v. G. Holmes BRADDOCK et al., Appellees, v. DADE COUNTY CLASSROOM TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, Inc., Intervenor Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-05-17
Citations: 262 So. 2d 425
Docket Number: No. 41315
Parties: Patricia K. BASSETT, and Kenneth Hopkinson, joined by Mrs. Crutcher Harrison, Appellants, v. G. Holmes BRADDOCK et al., Appellees, v. DADE COUNTY CLASSROOM TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION, Inc., Intervenor Appellee.
Judges: CARLTON and McCAIN, JJ., and DREW, J. (Retired), concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 262
Pages: 425–431

Head Matter:
Patricia K. BASSETT, and Kenneth Hopkinson, joined by Mrs. Crutcher Harrison, Appellants, v. G. Holmes BRADDOCK et al., Appellees, v. DADE COUNTY CLASSROOM TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION, Inc., Intervenor Appellee.
No. 41315.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 17, 1972.
William S. Frates, Larry S. Stewart and Jon I. Gordon, of Frates, Floyd, Pearson & Stewart, Miami, for appellants.
Frank A. Howard, Jr., Miami, for appel-lees.
Tobias Simon and Elizabeth J. duFresne, Miami, for intervenor appellee.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Daniel S. Dearing, Chief Trial Counsel, Tallahassee, as amici curiae.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
We affirm on this direct appeal the findings and judgments of the learned chancellor. An injunction was sought by certain Dade County citizens as plaintiffs (appellants) against Appellees-Dade County School Board for alleged failure to comply with the so-called "Government in the Sunshine" law. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Assoc., Inc., was intervenor upon counterclaim for declaratory decree as to teachers' "collective bargaining" rights. The injunction was properly denied; the declaratory decree was correct as to "bargaining rights."
The principal issues are framed as follows :
1. Whether labor negotiators employed by the Board in preliminary or tentative teacher contract negotiations with the teachers' representatives may negotiate outside of public meetings without being in violation of the "Sunshine Law"?
2. Whether the Board may instruct and consult with its labor negotiators in private without such violation?
The appeal is from the chancellor's affirmative answers to these queries. We affirm.
The constitutional question vesting jurisdiction in this Court (Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2)), F.S.A. relates to Fla.Const. art. I, § 6, which guarantees collective bargaining for employees. See also this Court's expression thereon in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Assoc., Inc. v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903 (Fla.1969).
Implementing legislation unfortunately has not yet been passed to give guidance and meaning to this vital constitutional protection. Public employees are also entitled to their place in the "sunshine". At the 1972 regular legislative session, which is the third since passage of this 1968 provision, proposals in this regard have again been considered without passage. It is to be hoped that this will in time reach fruition. Meanwile, however, this Court remains hesitant to allow itself to be propelled into "judicial implementation." For purposes of this appeal, therefore, we merely affirm the lower court's action in these respects. To do otherwise could well deny the public employees' rights to "bargain collectively" as guaranteed by Fla.Const. art. I, § 6. Such "intensity" of the "sunrays" under the statute, as urged by this appeal, could cause a damaging case of "sunburn" to these employees or to the public which elected the Board. It quite possibly would conflict with the protective umbrella of the constitutional guarantee of § 6.
Here we have a literal constitutional exception expressly provided within the Sunshine Law which states: " . . . except as otherwise provided in the constitution . . " (emphasis ours) The "sunshine" of the statute is still afforded in the debate and adoption of the ultimate employment contract at a public meeting but with the constitutional polaroid filter from the damaging "ultra violet rays" of preliminary skirmishing.
The able chancellor's finding as to bargaining negotiations was based on impressive, uncontroverted testimony by respectable national authorities in the field, that meaningful collective bargaining in the circumstances here would be destroyed if full publicity were accorded at each step of the negotiations. It would pit the public body as a virtual "David" without benefit of "sling" against the Goliath champion (negotiators) for 7,500 employees in this immediate case and over 200,000 employees who could be ultimately involved.
The public's representatives must be afforded at least an equal position with that enjoyed by those with whom they deal. The public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist view of open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and decisions are public and the "official acts" and "formal action" specified by the statute are taken in open "public meetings." This affords the adequate and effective protection to the public on the side of the "right to know" which was intended.
The Board's employed attorney for the negotiations ("negotiator") was employed in public; he had no authority to bind the Board (and in fact his recommendations were later modified by the Board in open meetings) ; he made his report to the Board in public where the discussions were spirited and the ultimate vote was 4 to 3! Full consideration of the recommendations of the Board's negotiator was accordingly had in a public meeting and aired and voted upon in public. Those recommendations were in a sense simply the acorn from which the final contract grew — in the sunshine. There is no violation.
Appellants urge that the Act and our prior decisions compel public meetings for "not only formal acts, but also acts of deliberation, discussion and deciding, occurring, prior to and leading up to affirmative formal action." While conceding that our opinions have been as broad as possible to let in the sunshine under the Legislature's enactment, nevertheless a careful rereading of our opinions and the Act fail to support the foregoing contention. It was not specifically involved in our prior decisions which have dealt principally with "meetings" (some informal) of a board. We have in earlier opinions referred to "matters on which foreseeable action will be taken by the Board" and "any discussions on matters pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Public Instruction of Broward County." These are broad considerations but they still do not invade the areas of deliberation here involved, for it will be noted that in all of these observations by the Court, they are predicated upon a "meeting." Here the required action under the statutes mas taken in a public meeting; changes were made and voting had, all in public. The discussions and deliberations, however, in an executive process often take place beyond the veil of actual "meetings" of the body involved. It is only in those "meetings" that official action is taken. Preliminary "discussions" may never result in any action taken. There may be numerous informal exchanges of ideas and possibilities, either among members or with others (at the coke machine, in a foyer, etc.) when there is no relationship at all to any meeting at which any foreseeable action is contemplated. Such things germinate gradually and often without really knowing whether any action or meeting will grow out of the exchanges or thinking.
Every action emanates from thoughts and creations of the mind and exchanges with others. These are perhaps "deliberations" in a sense but hardly demanded to be brought forward in the spoken word at a public meeting. To carry matters to such an extreme approaches the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive process of government. One must maintain perspective on a broad provision such as this legislative enactment, in its application to the actual workings of an active Board fraught with many and varied problems and demands.
As to the second issue — the Board instructing its negotiator in private — it likewise follows that this is authorized on the same grounds and reasoning above. The "other side" (teachers' negotiator) is being "coached" and given advices privately and from time to time during the bargaining period; it is only common sense and fair play that "our team" have the same advantage in order to be effective in his efforts. It might be noted that in a case like the present where the negotiator is an attorney that certainly he is entitled to consult with the Board on matters regarding preliminary advices. He is also thereby guided toward an effective result. It is not that appellees are "hiding" anything but simply trying to get the best "bargain" available for the public schools and not to be placed at a disadvantage in their efforts. It therefore follows that this is not in violation of the "Sunshine Law" for the Board to instruct and to consult with its labor negotiator in private without it being a violation of § 286.011.
We affirm also on the Board's cross-appeal, the final judgment that the election of the chairman and vice-chairman of the Dade County School Board was valid in the particular circumstances here. It was first by secret written ballot but was then unanimously by election upon motion and vote in open meeting. In this particular instance, any initial violation by .secret written ballot was cured and rendered "sunshine bright" by the corrective open, public vote which followed.
Affirmed.
CARLTON and McCAIN, JJ., and DREW, J. (Retired), concur.
ROBERTS, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.
ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion.
BOYD, J., dissents and agrees with ADKINS, J.
. Fla.Stat. § 286.011, F.S.A.: "Public meetings and records; public inspection; penalties. — (1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting. (2) The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of any such state agency or authority shall be promptly recorded and such records shall be open to public inspection. The circuit courts of this state shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by any citizens of this state." (emphasis ours)
. "Section 6. Right to Work. — The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike."
. We urged this in Dade Classroom Teachers' Ass'n., Inc. v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903 (Fla.1969).
. We quote with interest from "On Prior Restraint" by Paul A. Freund '31, published in the Harvard Law School Bulletin of August, 1971:
"The framers of the Constitution scrupulously maintained the secrecy of their deliberations in the convention of 1787. Madison's notes, the best record, were not published until his death, forty years later. Secrecy, it is fair to suppose, promoted free and candid debate within the con vention, and vitally encouraged the shifts in voting, the great compromises, calculated ambiguities and deliberate lacunae that made possible in the end a masterful charter. ."
"The original Constitution contained no guarantee of freedom of speech, save for members of Congress, and none for the press. When the first Congress proposed the First Amendment, the Senate, it is worth remembering, sat in secrecy. For five years the Senate held its debates behind closed doors. Believing in the liberty of the press, at the same time the members believed it right to shield their own discussions from the public and disclose only the final actions taken."
. I Samuel 17:39-40.
. Fla.Stat. § 286.011.
. Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693 (Fla.1969); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla.1971).
. Id.
. Massachusetts has a "right-to-know" law. Massachusetts General Laws, Annot. Ch. 39, § 23A (Supp.1969). An Attorney General opinion has held this law to be inapplicable to collective bargaining sessions conducted between negotiators.
"After careful considerations, X have concluded that this statute does not apply to collective bargaining sessions with school employees. The decisive point is that such sessions are not 'meetings' within the meaning of that term in the statute. The meetings to which the statute refers are rather those in which the internal discussions, deliberations and voting of an agency are of public concern. A collective bargaining session, on the other hand, is a meeting at which the employer and employees are engaged in a process of an interchange and analysis of each other's proposals and coun-terproposals. This' is a different kind of process from that involved in the conduct of an agency's internal deliberations or the making of its official decisions." Letter from State Attorney General to Commissioner of Education, Owen B. Kiernan, Sept. 12, 1967, p. 3. • — -As quoted from The Law and Practice of Teacher Negotiations by Wollett and Chanin, p. 4:2.
This is also the view of the Attorney General of Wisconsin, where the statute provides that no formal action of any kind may be introduced, deliberated upon, or adopted at any closed meeting of the school board. The Attorney General's informal opinion reads as follows:
"I believe it may be broadly stated that preliminary negotiations between a representative of a municipal employer and a representative of its employees are not subject to requirements of Sec. 14.90, Stats., (Anti-Secrecy Law), but that deliberations and adoption of any specific recommendation on the part of the municipality must comply with that statute. 'School Board and Teacher Negotiations in Wisconsin Public Schools' at pp. 11-12, Wisconsin Assn, of School Boards, Winneconne, Wisconsin (1967) — as stated in Wollett and Chanin, supra."
. The Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. The Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 69 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1968). cf. Times Publ. Co. v. Williams, 222 So.2d 470, 475-476 (2d DCA Fla.1969).