Case Name: GROVER MacLEOD, Appellant, v. TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1959-08-03
Citations: 52 Cal. 2d 536
Docket Number: S. F. No. 20123
Parties: GROVER MacLEOD, Appellant, v. TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 536–567

Head Matter:
[S. F. No. 20123.
In Bank.
Aug. 3, 1959.]
GROVER MacLEOD, Appellant, v. TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.
Graves, Hove & MacLeod and Donald MacLeod for Appellant.
Price, Macdonald & Knox, Harry L. Price and John Charles Houlihan for Respondent.
Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, J. Hart Clinton, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Herbert E. Hall, John D. Gallaher, Cooper, White & Cooper, John J. Hamlyn, Flint & MacKay and Mclnerney & Jacobs as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

Opinion:
TRAYNOR, J.
This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal entered after defendant's special and general demurrer to plaintiff's original complaint for libel was sustained without leave to amend. Accordingly, the issues presented are whether the complaint states a cause of action, and if not, whether there is a reasonable possibility that it could be amended to do so. (See Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo, 46 Cal.2d 659, 664 [297 P.2d 638]; 2 Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading, § 505, pp. 1496-1497.)
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that he is a doctor of dental surgery practicing in Oakland and that he enjoyed a good name and reputation in his profession and occupation. On April 19, 1955, defendant printed, published, and circulated in its newspaper, the Oakland Tribune, "on the front page thereof, an article or statement in writing in which, said" defendant "falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure, disgrace and defame plaintiff, used and published the following language of and concerning the plaintiff:
" 'Red Paper Issues Election Extra
" 'The San Francisco People's World, recognized throughout the state as the mouthpiece of the communist party, distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland yesterday, on the eve of the city election.
" 'It verified reports that the paper is showing unusilial interest in Oakland and its city election. I
" 'The Communist-line paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics in Oakland and printed a list of recommendations which included the names of council candidates John F. Quinn, John W. Holmdahl, and Dr. Grover H. MacLeod. It also listed recommendations against police reorganization measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County Grand Jury following its recent investigation.
" 'The polls are open until 7 p.m. today.' "
Defendant "by said publication intended to be understood by the general public and readers, and it was so understood by them, as charging, asserting, and imputing that this plaintiff was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler, and that this plaintiff had received a recommendation from 'The San Francisco People's World,' and that the said San Francisco People's World had 'distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland' which allegedly contained the recommendation as aforesaid, (when in truth and in fact the San Francisco People's World did not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article), and all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy, causing him to be shunned and avoided, and proximately caused him to sustain a severe and continuing nervous shock and strain and to suffer great mental anguish, mortification, humiliation, and shame; all to his damage in the sum of $200,000.00." Plaintiff also suffered pecuniary loss in his profession as a dentist.
Plaintiff served a demand for a correction upon defendant pursuant to section 48a of the Civil Code, but no correction was made. He prayed for special, general, and exemplary damages and the costs of suit.
"Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ. Code, § 45.)
Defendant contends that plaintiff has not adequately alleged that its statement was false and that he conceded in oral argument before the trial court that he could not do so. It points out that the complaint refers to an article in the People's World, that it may be inferred that plaintiff was named therein, and that plaintiff admitted in the trial court that the People's World printed a list of recommendations that included his name. The transcript of the oral proceedings before the trial court is not before us, however, and plaintiff's alleged admission appears only in what purports to be a brief excerpt of that transcript quoted in defendant's brief in the trial court. Even if we assume that under these circumstances plaintiff's alleged admission may be considered on appeal, that admission is not a concession that the allegations of the complaint are untrue. The sting of the alleged libel is that the People's World, a communist-line paper, endorsed and recommended plaintiff for election and that therefore he was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. We agree with defendant, that standing alone the admission that the paper printed a list of recommendations would convey the idea that the paper recommended those listed. Plaintiff expressly alleged in his complaint, however, that "in truth and in fact the San Francisco People's World did not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article" and that "all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations [of defendant's article] were false." In the light of these allegations, plaintiff's admission cannot be interpreted as meaning that the People's World itself recommended him, for his allegations, admitted by defendant's demurrer, preclude giving his admission that interpretation.
The only reasonable interpretation of defendant's article, however, is that the People's World itself recommended plaintiff for election. The article dealt specifically with the interest being shown by the People's World in the Oakland election, it expressly pointed out that that paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics, and it contained no hint that the printed recommendations were not those of the paper itself. Defendant was reporting news, and the news value of its article lay, not in the fact that a person or persons unnamed recommended plaintiff, but in the fact that the People's World did so. Certainly no reader would reasonably assume that defendant meant no more than that the People's World had printed the recommendations of unnamed third persons or carried a political advertisement in its columns. Accordingly, the question presented is whether it is libelous falsely to charge that a candidate for city council has been recommended by a communist-line paper or the mouthpiece of the Communist Party.
This question cannot be avoided, as defendant contends, on the ground that plaintiff has denied that the People's "World is a communist paper. Defendant states that plaintiff has pleaded that all of the charges in defendant's article are false. It contends that he has therefore taken the position that the People's World is not a communist paper and points out that it is not libelous to state that a person has been recommended by a noncommunist paper. This contention is patently absurd. Whether or not the People's World is "the mouthpiece of the communist party" and a "Communist-line paper," defendant so characterized it and thus informed its readers that plaintiff had communist support. The sting of this charge is present whether or not the People's World is in fact a communist paper, and accordingly, even if plaintiff has taken the position in his complaint that it is not a communist paper, he has not pleaded that defendant's article was nondefamatory. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations of falsity may reasonably be interpreted as denying only the charges as they pertained to him by imputing to him communist support and therefore communist sympathies. Although defendant may be entitled to have the complaint clarified to determine whether it must meet the issue of the character of the People's World as well as the issue whether or not it recommended plaintiff, it is obvious that an appropriate amendment would serve that purpose, and that even if plaintiff elects to allege specifically that the People's World is not a communist paper, he will not allege himself out of court. It is just as defamatory to state that a paper that has recommended a candidate is a communist paper when it is not as to state that an admittedly communist paper recommended a candidate when it did not.
Whatever the rule may have been when anticommunist sentiment was less crystallized than it is today (see Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 340, 348 [121 P.2d 761] ; Gallagher v. Chevalas, 48 Cal.App.2d 52, 59 [119 P.2d 408]), it is now settled that a charge of membership in the Communist Party or communist affiliation or sympathy is libelous on its face. (Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal.App.2d 36, 48 [281 P.2d 372] ; Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers U.S. Corp., 198 F.2d 20, 23; Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 734; see also Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43.Cal.2d 788, 800 [278 P.2d 905] ; Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 578; Yankwich, Certainty in the Law of Defamation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 163, 168; note, 33 A.L.R.2d 1196, 1212.) Plaintiff alleged that defendant's article was intended to be and was understood as charging that he was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. Whether or not the article is reasonably susceptible of this interpretation is a question for the court and, if so, whether or not it was so understood is a question for the jury. (Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 278 [263 P. 812] ; Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co., 167 Cal. 587, 593 [140 P. 277, Ann.Cas. 1915C 766]; Keenan v. Dean, 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [285 P.2d 300] ; Gallagher v. Chevalas, 48 Cal.App.2d 52, 58 [119 P.2d 408].)
" The code definition of libel is very broad and has been held to include almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation, either generally, or with respect to his occupation. (Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224 [64 P. 290]; Stevens v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62 [214 P. 968] ; Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 272 [46 P.103].) In the determination of this question, the alleged libelous publication is to be construed 'as well from the expressions used, as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer. ' (Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 334 [216 P. 371, 373]; Bettner v. Holt, 70 Cal. 270 [11 P. 713, 715].) The ease last above cited states that 'not only is the language employed to be regarded with reference to the actual words used, but according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published. So that in such eases the language is uniformly to be regarded with what has been its effect, actual or presumed, and its sense is to be arrived at with the help of the cause and the occasion of its publication. And in passing upon the sufficiency of such language as stating a cause of action, a court is to place itself in the situation of the hearer or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of the language of the complaint for libelous publication according to its natural and popular construction.' That is to say, the' publication is to be measured not so much by its effect when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, but by the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader. A defendant is liable for what is insinuated, as well as for what is stated explicitly. (Schomberg v. Walker, supra, p. 227.) " (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 441-442 [2 P.2d 383].)
Measured by the foregoing tests, defendant's article may reasonably be interpreted as charging that plaintiff was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. It is true that Communists may support those who do not sympathize with them. They may even support openly those they secretly oppose for the very purpose of tainting their opponents with their own unpopularity and thus aiding in their defeat. Ordinarily, however, persons, groups, or parties support candidates who are in sympathy with their objectives, and candidates are judged at least in part by those who support them. Indeed the relevance of plaintiff's supporters to his fitness for public office is basic to defendant's contention, discussed later, that its article was privileged. Its article was published on the day of the election and pointed out that the polls were yet to close. It contained no hint or suggestion that the communist recommendations were not to be taken or should not be taken to mean that communist support reflected communist sympathies of those supported. Certainly few if any of defendant's readers would conclude that defendant printed the article to assist plaintiff's election, nor would they be likely to view it as a purely neutral gesture. Under the circumstances they might reasonably infer that defendant intended to charge that plaintiff was unworthy of public office because he was a communist sympathizer. A reasonable jury could find that defendant clearly so insinuated.
Defendant contends, however, that since its article is also susceptible of an innocent interpretation, it is not libelous on its face, that therefore an allegation of special damages is essential, and that plaintiff's allegations of special damages are insufficient. (See Civ. Code, §45a.)
Section 48a of the Civil Code provides that special damages "are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of the alleged libel, and no other; ." Plaintiff alleged that as a result of the libel he "has suffered pecuniary loss in his profession as a dentist" in that an "unusually large percentage of old and established patients have been cancelling appointments," and there "has been a sharp decline in the number of new patients normally to be expected. Plaintiff does not at this time know the exact extent of pecuniary loss resulting from the foregoing, but is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that said loss is a continuing one, and that the amount of said loss will be in the sum of $5,000.00 or more ; and plaintiff prays leave of Court to amend this allegation to insert the true amount of said loss when the same becomes known to him." These allegations are sufficient. The losses stated are included in the statutory definition, they are described with sufficient particularity to enable defendant to prepare its defense, and under the circumstances stated the extent of the loss may be alleged on information and belief. (Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal.2d 788, 792-793 [228 P. 2d 6].)
In any event, defendant's article is libelous on its face even if it is susceptible of the innocent interpretation that communist support does not reflect communist sympathy on the part of the person supported. At common law any written defamation or libel was actionable without proof of special damages (see Rest., Torts, § 569; Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 587). In Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266 [46 P. 103], however, this court recognized a limitation on the common-law rule when the defamatory meaning of the language used is not apparent on its face. "It is only when the libelous meaning of the publication is covert—not apparent on the face of the language used—that averment, and proof of special damage is required." (114 Cal. at p. 271.) The limitation was further elucidated in Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 227-228 [64 P. 290]. "To constitute a libel it is not necessary that there be, a direct and specific allegation of improper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge may be either expressly stated or implied; and in the latter ease the implication may be either apparent from the language used, or of such a character as to require the statement and proof of extrinsic facts (inducement, colloquium, and innuendo) to show its meaning. In the last case, proper allegations and proofs of the facts necessary to make the meaning of the language apparent will be required. Otherwise, whether the charge be directly made or merely implied, the publication—without averment, colloquium, or innuendo—will, in itself, constitute a libel. 'The construction which it behooves a court of justice to put on a publication which is alleged to be libelous is to be derived as well as from the expressions used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.' (Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 358.) Thus in the case cited, the charge was not 'made in an open and direct manner'; 'but,' it was said by the court, 'an imputation made in that form is not the less actionable.' "
In 1945 the Legislature codified the rule of the Tonini and Schomberg cases by enacting section 45a of the Civil Code, which provides:
"A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damages is defined in section 48a of this code."
When section 45a is read in the light of the Schomberg ease it is clear that language may be libelous on its face even though it may also be susceptible of an innocent interpretation. The test is whether a defamatory meaning appears from the language itself without the necessity of explanation or the pleading of extrinsic facts. If it does, "whether the charge be directly made or merely implied, the publication— without averment, colloquium, or innuendo—will, in itself, constitute a libel."
The fact that an implied defamatory charge or insinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not appear from the language itself. The language used may give rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but when it is addressed to the public at large, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the readers will take it in its defamatory sense. (See Spiegel, Defamation by Implication, 29 So.Cal.L.Rev. 306, 312.) In Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal.App.2d 581 [126 P.2d 668], however, the court overlooked this fact. In that case the defendant printed the statement that "Eddie Peabody's divorcing wife, ten years his senior, is also his aunt!" The plaintiff was Eddie Peabody's "divorcing wife," and she contended that the language charged her with incest. Although more charitably minded readers might assume that the plaintiff was the widow of Eddie's deceased uncle and not a blood relative, certainly a jury could reasonably infer from the publication of the language itself that many readers would understand it in a defamatory sense. Nevertheless, the court held that because of the possible innocent meaning of the language used, it was not defamatory on its face and that therefore proof of special damages was essential. The Schomberg case was not cited.
The purpose of the rule requiring proof of special damages when the defamatory meaning does not appear on the face of the language used is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in themselves that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts known to the reader. For example, a newspaper might erroneously report that "Mrs. A gave birth to a child last night." Mrs. A has been married only a month. The language used will take on a defamatory meaning only to those who know when Mrs. A was married, and many of them will also know that the paper made a mistake. In such a case, general damages for loss of reputation may be trivial, and the paper's mistake may have been innocent, for the content of its report would not alert it to the possibility of defamation. It is not unreasonable therefore to require proof of special damages to establish a cause of action. The case would be entirely different, however, if the paper reported that "Mrs. A, who was married last month, gave birth to a child last night." A charge of immoral conduct is apparent to all from the language used, and the paper knows and is fully warned of the defamatory implication. Under the rule of the Peabody case, however, it would escape liability unless special damages are proved, for the language used does not exclude the innocent possibility that Mrs. A was widowed or divorced a few months before her recent marriage and that the child is that of her former husband.
Such hair-splitting analysis of language has no place in the law of defamation, dealing as it does with the impact of communications between ordinary human beings. It is inconsistent with the rule that "the publication is to be measured not so much by its effect when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, but by the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader.'' (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 442 [2 P.2d 383].) It protects, not the innocent defamer whose words are libelous only because of facts unknown to him, but the clever writer versed in the law of defamation who deliberately casts a grossly defamatory imputation in ambiguous language. It not only finds no support in, but is contrary to, the provisions of section 45a, which define, not language susceptible of only one meaning, but language that carries a defamatory meaning on its face. It would be a reproach to the law to hold that a defendant intent on destroying the reputation of a political opponent by falsely labeling him a Communist or communist sympathizer could achieve his purpose without liability by casting his defamatory language in the form of an insinuation that left room for an unintended innocent meaning. When as in this ease, it can be reasonably inferred from the language used that defendant intended to charge plaintiff with communist sympathies and that many readers so interpreted its article, and defendant has admitted by demurring that such was its intent and the meaning placed on its article, it ill befits defendant to contend that it should escape liability on the ground that owing to a possible innocent meaning some of its readers did not draw the defamatory inference it intended that they should.
The possible-innoeent-meaning rule of the Peabody case was repeated in a dictum in Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822, 828 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R 1338], and it has been followed or repeated in subsequent District Courts of Appeal decisions. (See Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 538 [186 P.2d 737] ; Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal.App.2d 486, 493 [284 P.2d 194] ; Menefee v. Codman, 155 Cal.App.2d 396, 405 [317 P.2d 1032]; Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, 162 Cal.App.2d 717, 730 [328 P.2d 1030].) To the extent these eases are inconsistent with our conclusion herein they are disapproved.
Since it appears from the complaint that plaintiff was a candidate for public office and that defendant's article reported facts relevant to his qualifications, defendant contends that the article was privileged (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 3 ; Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 571 [198 P.
1]) and that plaintiff's allegations of malice are insufficient to defeat the privilege. (See Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 [61 P.2d 922]; Harnish v. Smith, 138 Cal.App.2d 307, 310 [291 P.2d 532]; Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal.App.2d 649, 660-661 [171 P.2d 118] ; Irwin v. Newby, 102 Cal.App. 110, 113 [282 P. 810, 283 P. 370].) Plaintiff alleged that defendant published the article "falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame plaintiff," and that "all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy." Similar-allegations of malice have been held sufficient when coupled with allegations that defendant published its article with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest belief in its truth. (Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822, 831 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338] ; Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal.App.2d 284, 289 [40 P.2d 940]; see also Tingley v. Times Mirror, 151 Cal. 1, 14 [89 P. 1097].) The privilege is also lost if defendant had no reasonable grounds for believing his statement to be true. (Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [197 P.2d 713] ; Emde v. San Joaquin etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 [143 P.2d 20,150 A.L.R. 916] ; Miles v. Rosenthal, 90 Cal.App. 390, 407 [266 P. 320] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 601; Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 628.) Although plaintiff has" not specifically alleged that defendant knew that its article was false, had no honest belief in its truth, or had no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, under the circumstances of this case one or more of these grounds for defeating the qualified privilege are implicit in the allegation that defendant's article was false. Thus, with a copy of the People's World election extra before it or readily available, defendant should have had no difficulty in accurately reporting the extra's recommendations. Defendant's failure to do so indicates at least a lack of reasonable grounds for its report. Such failure is also consistent with a lack of honest belief or intentional falsehood on defendant's part. Any defect in failing expressly to plead one or more of these bases for defeating the qualified privilege could easily he cured by amendment.
Section 48a of the Civil Code provides in part:
"In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. ."
Defendant contends that plaintiff's demand for a correction was insufficient and that therefore he has not stated a cause of action for general or exemplary damages. Plaintiff wrote defendant's publisher as follows:
"I wish to call your attention to a purported news report which appeared in the Oakland Tribune on Tuesday, April 19, 1955, in all editions on Page 1 of your publication. The article reads as follows:
"[Entire article set out in 17 typewritten lines.]
"This article is grossly libelous and I therefore demand that the same be corrected or retracted as provided in Section 48(a) of the Civil Code of the State of California."
Defendant contends that plaintiff did not adequately specify "the statements claimed to be libelous" so as to permit it intelligently to comply with his demand. It relies on Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co., 120 F.Supp. 850. In that case, however, defendant published a lengthy article of three columns by ten inches in which there were eight references to the plaintiff. His demand for correction stated that "Your issue of November 24th, 1952, carried, under the by-line of Westbrook Pegler, certain statements regarding me which are untrue, libelous and damaging. ." The demand for retraction was held insufficient on the ground that plaintiff had failed to specify which of the "certain statements" he deemed libelous. In the present case, on the contrary, the article was short, it was set out in plaintiff's demand, and it made only one reference to him. By stating that the article was "grossly libelous" and demanding a correction or retraction pursuant to section 48a, plaintiff made clear that he was objecting to the statement that referred to him, namely, that a communist-line paper had printed a list of recommendations including his name. Moreover, that statement was libelous on its face. We cannot believe that defendant was so unaware of the significance of what it printed that- it did not realize what language plaintiff objected to and wished corrected. Plaintiff gave defendant fair notice and adequately specified "the statements claimed to be libelous." (Civ. Code, § 48a; Uhlman v. Farm Stock & Home Co., 126 Minn. 239, 242 [148 N.W. 102, Ann.Cas. 1915D 888].)
For the reasons stated the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. As indicated in our discussion, however,' there are certain allegations that could be clarified or more explicitly stated. Moreover, the complaint may be subject to other grounds stated in the special demurrer but not urged on appeal. The trial court may in its discretion require clarification of any uncertainties or ambiguities. (Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. Sch. of Med., 20 Cal.2d 713, 720 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L.R 1358].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Dooling, J. pro tem., concurred.
" ' The Court: In other words, do I understand that you deny that the paper printed a list of recommendations which included the name of the Plaintiff?
" 'Mr. MacLeod [Plaintiff's counsel]: We do not deny that, your Honor.' "
We, of course, intend to express no opinion as to whether or not the People's World is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party and a communist-line paper. Defendant in its article stated that it is, but as it interprets plaintiff's complaint, it has admitted by demurring that it is not for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint. Unless it may be judicially noticed that the People's World is a communist paper, if a cause of action is otherwise stated, plaintiff is entitled to put the character of the People's World in issue. He may plead falsity either in the characterization of the paper, the statement of whom it recommended, or both. If it were judicially noticed, however, that the People's World is a communist paper, any allegation in the complaint to the contrary would have to be disregarded (see 2 Within, California Procedure, Pleading, §208, pp. 1185-1186), and the whole basis of defendant's untenable contention that plaintiff has pleaded that the article was innocent because he pleaded that the People's World is not a communist paper would collapse.
We assume in making these comments that the People's World printed an election extra, and that plaintiff only intended to plead that the paper did not endorse him. Of course, if we interpret his complaint as denying the truth of all of the facts stated in defendant's article, as alleging, in effect, that the article was entirely fabricated, an inferential allegation of bad faith or intentional falsehood would be inescapable.
Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.