Case Name: Mrs. Lillian Schon SMALL v. S. (Samuel) Sanford LEVY, presently sitting as Judge, Division "D", of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-02-27
Citations: 355 So. 2d 643
Docket Number: No. 8989
Parties: Mrs. Lillian Schon SMALL v. S. (Samuel) Sanford LEVY, presently sitting as Judge, Division “D”, of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOUTALL, SCHOTT, BEER and HUFFT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 355
Pages: 643–654

Head Matter:
Mrs. Lillian Schon SMALL v. S. (Samuel) Sanford LEVY, presently sitting as Judge, Division “D”, of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
No. 8989.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 27, 1978.
Rehearing Denied March 1, 1978.
Writ Refused May 5, 1978.
Glenn L. Morgan, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Darleen M. Jacobs, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOUTALL, SCHOTT, BEER and HUFFT, JJ.

Opinion:
PRESTON H. HUFFT, Judge ad hoc.
Plaintiff, appearing alone and solely in her capacity as a citizen and not as a claimant to the office, brought this application for a Writ of Quo Warranto under LSA-C. C.P. Art. 3901 to direct the defendant, a duly elected and sitting judge of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, to show by what authority he was holding public office. Plaintiff alleged the defendant was past the age of 75 and Article 7, § 8 of the Constitution of 1921, which was controlling with respect to the defendant, provided for compulsory retirement at the age of 75. The defendant filed an exception of no right of action contending the plaintiff did not have the right to bring the action alone and solely in her capacity as a citizen. On the merits, the defendant admitted he was past the age of 75 but contended that the provisions of Article 7, § 8 of the Constitution of 1921 permitted him to serve until he reached the age of 80.
The district court referred the exception of no right of action to the merits and on the merits found that the defendant was permitted to serve until he reached the age of 80 under paragraph (b) of Article 7, § 8 and dismissed the Writ of Quo Warranto. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.
During oral argument before this court, counsel for the defendant waived the exception of no right of action and expressed the defendant's desire to have this court decide the issue on the merits. Assuming this oral request constituted a waiver of the exception of no right of action, this court on its own motion under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 927 raises the right of the plaintiff to bring this action. We recognize that the defendant wishes to have the matter decided in this proceeding on the merits, since his right to hold office is under attack but for this court to permit a litigant, who does not possess the right, to bring an action such as this against a public officer would in the future place every public officer, who put at issue the right of a plaintiff to bring such an action, in the position of appearing reluctant and hesitant to defend his right to office on the merits. No public officer should be put in that position. If the litigant does not possess the right to bring the action, he should not be permitted to do so. This brings us to the threshold issue in this case — does the plaintiff possess the right to bring the action?
This exact question was presented to this court in Lelong v. Sutherland, La.App., 134 So.2d 627 (1961), and the court in the following language, on pages 629 and 630, held that a litigant appearing alone and solely as a citizen did not possess the right to bring an action testing the right of a public officer to hold office:
"Defendants first challenge plaintiff's right, solely as a taxpayer or citizen, to institute this suit, contending that the right to try title to public office is governed exclusively by LSA-R.S. 42:77, as follows:
LSA-R.S. 42:76
'An action shall be brought in the name of the state in any of the following cases;
'(1) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises or attempts to remain in possession of any public office or franchise within this state.
sfc ‡ *
'This action shall be brought by the attorney general of the state or by the parish district attorney of the parish in which the case arises against the offender, and the suit shall be filed in the district court of that parish.
'The action may also be brought by the governor appearing in proper person or through the attorney general of the state or other counsel he may select.'
LSA-R.S. 42:77
'In the cases provided in R.S. 42:76(1) and 42:76(2), the action may be brought by any person demanding possession of the office against any person claiming or exercising the functions of the office.'
On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff urges that LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901, Chapter 4, verbo 'Quo Warranto,' which reads as follows, authorizes this proceeding:
'Quo warranto is a writ directing an individual to show by what authority he claims or holds public office, or office in a corporation, or directing a corporation to show by what authority it exercises certain powers. Its purpose is to prevent usurpation of office or of powers.'
j}s *
The Intrusion into Office Statute makes it clear that a taxpayer, as such has no standing to challenge the right of an incumbent to hold and perform the duties of such public office. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901, Chapter 4, under 'Quo Warran-to,' might appear to give such authority. While there is nothing in the text of Art. 3901 to justify such conclusion, the editorial comment under the Article (par. b), explains that the provision referring to 'public office' was incorporated on the theory that the Intrusion into Office Act does not give an individual the right to file suit except when he is claiming the office.
# sfi # #
The Intrusion into Office Statute is a special statute, limiting to those named the right to challenge incumbents of public office to hold and exercise the duties of such office. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3901 is a general procedural statute defining the character of a writ of 'Quo Warranto,' and establishes an immediate, direct, adequate and speedy remedy only for those who, by substantive law, have the right to challenge public and private corporate officers in their right to hold and perform the duties of such office.
Where there is an apparent conflict between a general law and a special law on the same subject, the special law must prevail in the particular matter to which it applies, and even though the general law has been enacted subsequent to the enactment of the special law, the special law is not thereby repealed by implication; and is only affected if reference is made to it expressly. Hewitt v. Webster, La.App., 118 So.2d 688, and authorities therein cited.
Plaintiff, then, appearing as a taxpayer only, without any claim to the office challenged, has no right to remedy; hence, has no right of action herein."
Under Lelong, it is clear that the plaintiff has no right of action herein. However, plaintiff, in her brief and in oral argument, urged this court to overrule Lelong for the following reasons:
(1) that the Lelong court in arriving at its decision did not consider the holding of the Supreme Court in Slater v. Blaize, 204 La. 21, 14 So.2d 872 (1943);
(2) that the Lelong court was not aware of the legislative history of quo warranto in general and the quo warranto provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure in particular;
(3) that in Aucion v. Spencer, 135 So.2d 105, La.App., (1961), and Tabor v. Siracusa, La.App., 135 So.2d 121 (1961), which were decided about the same time as Lelong, quo warranto was recognized as a proper procedure to test the right of a public officer to hold or exercise office;
(4) that the Lelong decision denied a citizen access to the courts and violated his right to due process under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Because some members of this court feel to the contrary with respect to Lelong, we will consider the foregoing contentions:
(1) Slater v. Blaize, supra, had no bearing on the decision reached in Lelong. The Slater decision — although refusing the application as being moot since the injunction proceeding was dismissed prior to the filing of the application — contained the following language:
"Under the express provision of our law, the proper procedure in cases where the person claiming title to an office is not in actual possession thereof is by quo war-ranto or intrusion-into-office proceedings (Article 867, etc. of the Code of Practice and Section 2593, etc., of the Revised Statutes, as amended by Act No. 102 of 1928) 14 So.2d at p. 872. (emphasis ours).
Before C.C.P. Art. 3901 an individual claiming title to "an office" had a right to bring either a quo warranto or an intrusion into office proceeding depending on the nature of "the office". Articles 867 and 868 of the Code of Practice of 1870 pertaining to Quo Warranto provided as follows:
"This is an order rendered in the name of the State by a competent court, and directed to a person who claims or usurps an office in a corporation, inquiring by what authority he claims or holds such office." Art. 867.
"This mandate is only issued for the decision of disputes between parties in relation to the offices in corporations, as when a person usurps the character of Mayor of a city, and such like.
With regard to offices of a public nature, that is, which are conferred in the name of the State by the Governor, with or without the consent of the Senate, or by election, the usurpations of them are prevented and punished in the manner directed by special laws." Art. 868.
Lelong is in agreement with Slater and further recognizes that since C.C.P. Art. 3901 a person claiming title to a "public office" may bring either a quo warranto or an intrusion into office proceeding — such a person possesses the substantive right to bring the action and may select the procedural device he wishes.
(2) The Lelong decision recognized the history of the common law writ of quo warranto and the presence of the writ in the Codes of 1825 and 1870 but it recognized also that since Act 156 of 1868 there has been in existence a "special law" relative to the testing of the right of an individual to hold or exercise a public office — the Intrusion Into Office Statute. Section 11 of Act 156 provided as follows:
"That all laws or parts of laws in this State touching on the subject of quo war-ranto, conflicting directly or indirectly with any of the provisions of this act, be and the same are hereby repealed."
Act 156 became Sections 2593-2605 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 and has remained unchanged to the present except for its amendment by Act 102 of 1928, which, if anything, made the statute even more special in nature. Prior to the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts consistently recognized that the testing of the right of an individual to hold or exercise a "public office" was governed by the Intrusion Into Office Statute.
For the very first time, Art. 3901, in very general terms, defined quo warranto as a writ directing an individual to show by what authority he claimed or was holding "public office". Art. 3901 provided another procedural device for testing the right to hold "public office" — either the ordinary proceedings of the Intrusion Into Office Statute or the summary proceedings of Quo Warranto. Lelong merely held that either of these two procedures would be available provided the individual bringing the action possessed the substantive right to so proceed. The general provisions of Art. 3901 cannot be construed as repealing the special provisions of the Intrusion Into Office Statute. While the Lelong court recognized that the official Law Institute Comments may be used in interpreting and construing the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, see Emmons v. Agricultural Insurance Company, 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594 (1963) and State v. Gremillion, La.App., 168 So.2d 270 (1964), it did not hold that an official comment may be considered as positive legislation repealing a special statute that has been a part of the statutory law of Louisiana for 100 years. Neither do we.
(3) The Court in Aucion and Tabor did not make any comment whatsoever as to the right of an individual acting alone and in his capacity as a citizen to bring a summary procedure under Art. 3901 to test the right of a public officer to hold and exercise public office — in fact, Art. 3901 is not specifically mentioned or referred to in either decision. Each case was a quo warranto proceeding but the issue never arose as to the substantive right to bring such an action. In Tabor no question was raised as to the right of the individual to bring the action and in Aucion the plaintiff filed an Exception of No Right or Cause of Action but it was referred to the merits by the District Court and was not discussed in any way in the decision handed down. Tabor and Aucion merely hold that if the substantive right to bring an action to test the right of a public officer to hold and exercise public office is not pursued by the defendant and the exception is not raised by the court on its own motion, the court may decide the- matter on the merits. This does not do violence to Lelong and in fact, in the instance before this court, if the court did not raise the right of the plaintiff to bring the action, we would proceed to decide the case on the merits.
(4) Lelong does not violate the dué process provisions of the 14th Amendment. In its wisdom, the Legislature has granted the substantive right to test the right of a public officer to hold public office to the Attorney General, the District Attorney of the parish where the case arises, the Governor appearing in proper person or through the Attorney General or other counsel he may select or an individual who is claiming the office. The limitation of the substantive right, as enunciated above, prevents a citizen from rushing to the courthouse to file an action testing the public officer's right to hold public office, every time the citizen is aggrieved by a decision made by the public officer in the performance of his duties. However, this does not deny the individual citizen access to the courts to test the right of a public officer to hold office. An individual, acting alone and in his capacity as a citizen, may file a mandamus proceeding against the Attorney General or the appropriate District Attorney to compel said officer to file the action to test in accordance with his responsibility under the Intrusion Into Office Statute. These legal officers represent the interest of all citizens with regard to the right of a public officer to hold office and under the proper circumstances, mandamus will lie. Thomas v. Fuller, 166 La. 847, 118 So. 42 (1928) and State ex rel Kilbourne v. Dugas, La.App., 180 So.2d 440 (1965).
For the reasons assigned, we hold the plaintiff has no right of action and, accordingly, her suit is dismissed. Plaintiff is to pay costs in both courts.
AFFIRMED.
GULOTTA, BOUTALL and BEER, JJ., concur with written reasons.
STOULIG, J., would dismiss appeal and assigns written reasons.