Case Name: HASS et al. v. BRADY
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-01-08
Citations: 96 N.Y.S. 449
Docket Number: 
Parties: HASS et al. v. BRADY.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 96
Pages: 449–452

Head Matter:
(49 Misc. Rep. 235)
HASS et al. v. BRADY.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
January 8, 1906.)
1. Husband and Wife—Credit of Husband—Right of Wife to Pledge.
The authority of a wife to pledge her husband’s credit for the purchase of clothing, cannot be presumed where she and her husband are separated, it not appearing that he had neglected to supply her with such clothing and other necessaries as were within his means, and reasonably suitable to the station in life wherein the parties were situated.
FEd. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 26, Cent. Dig. Husband and Wife, § 123.]
2. Same—Liabilty of Husband.
Where a husband and wife separated, and there was no evidence that the husband had neglected to supply her with such clothing and other necessaries as were within Ms means, and reasonably suitable to the station in lite wherein the patties were situated, the tact that, by the wife’s direction, the bill for clothing sold her was sent to her husband, did not make the transaction a sale to' the latter, or release the wife from liability to the vendors.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 26, Cent. Dig. Husband and Wife, § 123.]
MacLean, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.
Action by Samuel Hass and another against Sadie V. Brady. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and BISCHOFF and MacDEAN, JJ.
Adam Wiener, for appellants.
Spencer, Ordway & Wierum, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, P. J.
In November, 1904, the defendant, 'a married woman of large independent means, living apart from her husband, ordered from plaintiffs two costumes aggregating in value $238, which she directed should be sent, when completed, to her at an hotel at which she then resided, and at the same time directed that the bill should be sent to her husband. She had no direct authority to pledge her husband's credit for the purchase; her authority to do so cannot be presumed from the fact of cohabitation, for she and her husband were separated, and there is not the slightest evidence that the husband had neglected or refused to supply her with such clothing and other necessaries as were within his means, and reasonably suitable to the station in life in which the parties were sitúated. Upon the. evidence there was a total lack of everything necessary to show that defendant had any right to attempt to make her husband liable for these particular clothes either upon the ground of implied agency, or in the fulfillment of his marital duty to supply his wife with necessaries. Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135, 65 L. R. A. 529, 98 Am. St. Rep. 621 ; Hatch v. Leonard, 165 N. Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270.
It is futile to urge, as the respondent does, that the question of the husband's liability is not involved in this appeal. It is very directly involved. The defendant purchased and received the clothes for her own use. Pier contract and her consequent liability was complete, unless her husband wag liable. She may not escape liability because, by her direction, the bill was sent to her husband. This certainly did not make the transaction a sale to the husband, did not create any liability on his part, and does not show or even tend to show that plaintiffs extended the credit to the husband, to the exclusion of the wife. They simply complied with her order. If she had directed the bill to be sent to her bank, and the bank, for lack of funds to her credit, had refused to pay, it is certain that the defendant could hot have thus escaped liability. Upon the same principle she cannot escape now. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny the plaintiffs all relief, simply because they relied upon defendant's erroneous representation that her husband would pay the bill. And yet, if the husband is not liable, this judgment would work just such a miscarriage.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellants to abide the event.
BISCHOFE, J., concurs.