Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. KUNZ, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1887-08-31
Citations: 73 Cal. 313
Docket Number: No. 20292
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. KUNZ, Appellant.
Judges: Searls, 0. J., McKinstry, J., Thornton, J., and Sharpstein, J., concurred.
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 73
Pages: 313–317

Head Matter:
[No. 20292.
In Bank.
August 31, 1887.]
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. KUNZ, Appellant.
Criminal Law—Examination of Juror—Opinion Adverse to Defendant— Challenge for Actual Bias.—In a criminal prosecution, a juror who had stated on his preliminary examination that he had a decided opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but that he thought he could give him a fair and impartial trial, was asked by the defendant, upon a challenge for actual bias, whether the opinion was adverse to the defendant. The court refused to permit the question, whereupon the defendant peremptorily challenged the juror, and exhausted all his peremptory challenges before the panel was completed. Held, that the refusal to allow the question was error.
Id.—Review of Ruling on Challenge — Exception.—In such a case, the action of the court in sustaining a challenge to a juror on the ground of actual bias will not be reviewed on appeal, when no exception was taken to the rulings of the court upon the admission or rejection of testimony given on the voir dire examination of the juror.
Id. — Evidence of Accomplice — Corroboration — Conviction. — The rule prohibiting a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice does not require that every fact testified to by the accomplice shall be specifically corroborated in order to warrant a conviction.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Trinity County, and from an order refusing a new trial.
The defendant, together with several other persons, was charged by information with the murder of one George Erickson. The persons accused all asked for separate trials, which being granted, the defendant was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree. At the trial, the district attorney dismissed the charge against two of the persons accused, and used them as witnesses for the people against the defendant; and "it was solely upon their testimony, as the defendant claimed, that the conviction was had. The further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Grove L. Johnson, D. G. Reid, and J. N. Gillett, for Appellant.
Attorney-General Johnson, J. W. Bartlett, and J. W. Turner, for Respondent.

Opinion:
Temple, J.
This case must be reversed on the authority of People v. Brown, 72 Cal. 390. On the preliminary examination of the jurors, three of them announced, in response to proper questions, that they each had decided opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but thought they could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Each was challenged for actual bias by the defendant, who then, to further show the nature of the bias, asked whether the opinion was adverse to the defendant. This question was in each case objected to, the objection sustained, and an exception noted. The defendant challenged the jurors peremptorily, and before the panel was completed exhausted all his peremptory challenges.
The question was so recently before us in the case above cited that further discussion of the point is unnecessary. Such evidence has always been held admissible in this state upon a challenge for actual bias, and there are no decisions in which a contrary opinion is intimated.
One Kerlin was called and examined on voir dire as to his qualifications to serve as a juror. He was challenged by the district attorney for actual bias. There is no exception to any ruling of the court upon the admission or rejection of testimony, and this court cannot review the action of the court in sustaining the challenge.
We understand that the corroborative evidence goes much beyond proof of mere threats on the part of the defendant. There was evidence outside of that of the accomplice of a conspiracy to procure the murder of deceased. We are not prepared to say that this does not constitute some evidence corroborating the testimony of the accomplice, which of itself, and without the aid of .the evidence of the accomplice, tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The sufficiency of that evidence was properly left to the jury.
The rule does not require that every fact testified to by the accomplice shall be specifically corroborated.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
Searls, 0. J., McKinstry, J., Thornton, J., and Sharpstein, J., concurred.