Case Name: CHANDLER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-05-11
Citations: 231 S.W. 107
Docket Number: No. 6263
Parties: CHANDLER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 231
Pages: 107–108

Head Matter:
CHANDLER v. STATE.
(No. 6263.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 11, 1921.)
I.Criminal law @=>507(1)— Purchaser of liquor will be deemed an “accomplice” if prosecution is for unlawful possession.
In a prosecution for possession of intoxicating liquor not for medicinal, mechanical, scientific, or sacramental purposes, a purchaser of liquor will, under the Dean Law, be deemed an “accomplice,” and a conviction cannot be had on his uncorroborated testimony, for the term “accomplice,” as used in Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 3916, art. 801, is used in a different sense from the term as used in Pen. Code 1911, art. 79, and includes any person connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission transpiring either before, at, or after the commission of the offense, and under such definition purchaser is an accomplice.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accomplice.]
2. Criminal law @=>507(1) — -For evidential purposes, an accomplice is any one connected « with the offense.
For evidential purposes, within Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 801, any person connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission either before, at, or after the offense is an accomplice, the term including principals and accessories alike.
3. Criminal law @=3507(5) — Purchaser of stolen goods is an accomplice.
One who receives or conceals property theretofore stolen by another, knowing it to have been so acquired, is an accomplice, within Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proc. 1916, art. 801, though the offense was complete before the guilty connection of the receiver began.
Appeal from District Court, Kaufman County; Joel R. Bond, Judge.
John Chandler was convicted of having in his possession intoxicating liquor not for medicinal, mechanical, scientific, or sacramental purposes, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Wynne & Wynne, of Kaufman, Miller- & Miller, of Athens, and Ross Huffmaster, of Kaufman, for appellant.
R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Kaufman county of having in his possession intoxicating liquor, not for medicinal, mechanical, scientific, or sacramental purposes, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of one year.
The conviction rested upon the testimony of two witnesses who bought liquor from the appellant in Kaufman county at or about the time alleged in the indictment, and the testimony of a man who helped appellant make and manufacture whisky about that time. Appellant contends that the judgment is without support, because based entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. It is well settled that, under the provisions of what is known as the Dean Law, forbidding the manufacture, possession, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquor (Acts Second Called Session, Thirty-Sixth Legislature, p. 228), that the purchaser of intoxicating liquor is an accomplice to the sale. It is insisted, however, in this ease by the state, that, inasmuch as the possession of such liquor is complete and severable from its sale, therefore the purchaser of such liquor is not, 'in- law, an accomplice to the fact of possession, and that a conviction resting upon the uncorroborated testimony of a purchaser may therefore be legally sustained. We regret that we cannot agree with this contention of the state. Without discussing the proposition that a conviction cannot be sustained when had upon the uncorroborated testimony of ,an accomplice, or any number of accomplices, we refer to pages 732 et seq., Vernon's 0. O. P., and observe that authorities almost without number are cited in support of the proposition that the word "accomplice," as used in article 801 of said Code of Criminal Procedure, is used in a different sense from the technical meaning given to the word "accomplice" in article 70 of the Penal,Code, and that, as used, referring to one who is a witness, or to the evidence of $uch person, it includes principals and accessories, and all persons who are particeps criminis. It means a person who either, as principal, engaged in the actual commission of the offense, or who, prior to the actual commission of the offense, does those acts which would make him an accomplice, or to a person who, after the actual commission of an offense, is so connected therewith as to make him an accessory. So that, in an evidential sense the expression '"accomplice" includes all persons who are connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission, transpiring either before, at the time of, or after the commission of the offense, whether such person be participating in the actual commission of the offense or not.
We do not need to review these authorities to show their application to the instant case. It would not be necessary to argue that if one who came upon the scene where a murder had just been committed, after the death of the injured party, and who connected himself with the transaction in a guilty manner by assisting in the flight or escape of the murderer, would be an accomplice to the crime, and that his testimony would need to be corroborated before a conviction could be sustained. In the instant case, the entire connection' of the purchasers with said intoxicating liquor was one which is made penal under our statute, and we are unable to escape the conclusion that they were accomplices within the meaning of our law.
It is well settled that one who receives or conceals property theretofore stolen by another, knowing it to have been so acquired, is an accomplice, though the offense of the taker is complete before the guilty connection of the receiver begins. We do not think the proposition needs further argument. See article 801, Vernon's O. O. P., and authorities collated thereunder.
For the reason that the judgment in this case is supported only by the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, it must be reversed and remanded; and it is so ordered.
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