Case Name: PEOPLE v. THOMPSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-12-18
Citations: 94 Mich. App. 315
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-3073
Parties: PEOPLE v THOMPSON
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and N. J. Kaufman and D. C. Riley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 94
Pages: 315–322

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v THOMPSON
Docket No. 78-3073.
Submitted October 19, 1979, at Detroit.
Decided December 18, 1979.
Leave to appeal applied for.
James E. Thompson, III, was charged with armed robbery and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. During the course of the trial there was testimony that the automobile in which the defendant fled the scene of the crime had been stolen previously. The defendant in his own testimony freely admitted receiving the stolen vehicle, and made no objection when a prosecution motion was made to add a count of receiving or concealing stolen property and the trial court allowed joinder of the additional charge. The defendant was found guilty on all three charges, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Patricia J. Boyle, J. Defendant appeals, alleging that the felony-firearm statute is unconstitutional, that the prosecutor improperly enlisted the sympathy of the jury in regard to the complaining witness, and that the conviction of receiving or concealing stolen property is infirm because the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense by evidence other than the defendant’s in-court admission. Held:
1. The felony-firearm statute is constitutional.
2. The prosecutor’s argument regarding the reliability of the complaining witness was related to the evidence and relevant to the witness’s credibility, which was an issue at trial. The argument was not improper.
3. The charge of receiving or concealing stolen property was improperly joined. That felony occurred on another day and was unrelated to the armed robbery and felony firearm charges.
The armed robbery and felony-firearm convictions are af firmed; the receiving or concealing stolen property conviction is reversed.
References for Points in Headnotes
41 Am Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations § 224.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 306.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 518.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 615.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1134, 1142.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 599.
Danhof, C.J., dissented from the reversal of the conviction of receiving or concealing stolen property. The defendant’s only assertion of error regarding that conviction was that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti by evidence independent of the defendant’s statements. However, the corpus delicti rule does not apply to confessions freely made from the witness stand. As to the improper joinder, the defendant does not appeal on that ground, no objection to the joinder was made at trial, and the defendant utilized the added charge in his defense strategy, hoping the jury would convict him of the lesser offense and acquit him of the armed robbery. Under these circumstances the Court of Appeals should not reverse the conviction of receiving or concealing stolen property on the basis of improper joinder. Judge Danhof would affirm all three convictions.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Joinder — Separate Felonies.
Joinder of an additional felony charge against a defendant who is on trial for another felony is improper, despite the defendant’s failure to object, where the two offenses occurred on different days and had no connection with each other.
Dissent in Part, Concurrence in Part by Danhof, C.J.
2. Criminal Law — Prosecutors — Inferences.
A prosecutor may properly argue that the evidence that has been presented in a trial justifies an inference regarding the reliability of a witness.
3. Criminal Law — Corpus Delicti — Confessions.
The rule that the prosecution must establish the corpus delicti of a charged offense with evidence other than the defendant’s admission does not apply to confessions freely made from the witness stand; such a statement is in the nature of a plea of guilty.
4. Criminal Law — Joinder — Appeal and Error — Unrelated Felonies.
Joinder of an additional unrelated felony charge during the trial of a defendant on another felony charge, based upon the defendant’s admission at trial of the additional felony, was not improper where the defendant did not object to the joinder and based his defense strategy on the existence of the additional charge; the Court of Appeals should not reverse a defendant’s conviction on an added charge on the basis of improper joinder where the defendant has not raised the issue on appeal.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Jerome S. O’Connor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Michael S. Surnow, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and N. J. Kaufman and D. C. Riley, JJ.

Opinion:
N. J. Kaufman, J.
We agree with and adopt the facts presented in the dissenting opinion, but do not agree with the conviction of receiving or concealing stolen property over the value of $100, MCL 750.535; MSA 28.803, for the reasons stated in People v Ritchie, 85 Mich App 463; 271 NW2d 276 (1978).
The two cases are almost identical with the exception that, in the case at hand, defendant's reference to the stolen automobile was a strategic move to explain why he fled the scene of the alleged robbery. Thus, he entered no objection to the addition of the receiving or concealing count, as he undoubtedly was hoping that the jury would find him guilty of receiving or concealing, and not guilty of robbery armed. Despite defendant's failure to object,, it must be noted that the two offenses occurred on different days and had no connection with each other. They should not have been joined, especially after the trial was in progress. See People v Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 303; 17 NW2d 187 (1945), where it is stated:
" ' But when the object and purpose is appar ent[ly] to prosecute the respondent for separate felonies by means of one information or indictment, the court will not permit it to be done. "' (Emphasis in original.)
Although this issue was not raised on appeal, since the function of this Court is to dispense justice it has limited power to raise questions on its own. People v Noel, 88 Mich App 752, 754; 279 NW2d 305 (1979).
In Ormsby, supra, a general verdict of guilty was entered upon an indictment charging distinct and separate offenses in separate counts. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding the verdict invalid. That problem does not exist in this case, however, as the jury came in with separate verdicts of guilty of (1) robbery armed, (2) felony-firearm, and (3) receiving or concealing. Nevertheless, the instant verdicts are still infirm due to the improper joinder.
Although we agree with the general legal propositions the dissent raises, we must note that it was the prosecution who created the error by making the motion to add the receiving or concealing count. Thus, even though the defendant utilized the addition of this count as part of his defense strategy, it cannot be said that he created the error.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's robbery armed and felony-firearm convictions, but reverse his receiving or concealing conviction. In view of this decision, the question of corpus delicti in the receiving count need not be decided.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
D. C. Riley, J., concurred.