Case Name: Ex parte Clifton AXEL, Jr.
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1988-09-14
Citations: 757 S.W.2d 369
Docket Number: No. 69808
Parties: Ex parte Clifton AXEL, Jr.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 757
Pages: 369–381

Head Matter:
Ex parte Clifton AXEL, Jr.
No. 69808.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Sept. 14, 1988.
Clifton Axel, Jr., pro se.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Calvin A. Hartmann and Deborah S. Williams, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Hut-tash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
CLINTON, Judge.
This a post conviction habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Article 11.07, Y.A.C. C.P., seeking relief in cause number 309325 in the 174th Judicial District Court of Harris County.
Essentially applicant contends that he was deprived of his right to appeal from a judgment of conviction in that his retained attorney failed to give notice of appeal or to file and present to the trial court a motion to withdraw from further representation of applicant. We ordered the cause filed and set in order to determine where lies the burden of counseling a defendant on his appellate rights. Rejecting the notion that it is on the judge of a trial court, and concluding that such responsibilities rest upon counsel unless and until he is granted leave to withdraw, we will grant relief.
"A lawyer's time and advice are his stock in trade." That classic axiom attributed to Abraham Lincoln provides guidance in our resolving the recurring problem presented by applicant
The facts are that on or about March 18, 1980, after a jury found him guilty of aggravated robbery and the trial judge assessed punishment at confinement for a term of thirty-five years, applicant, by now an indigent he alleges, made known to his retained counsel that he desired to appeal and requested counsel to continue to represent him; applicant asserts that the trial judge asked his attorney whether he intended to take an appeal and counsel said he would; however, counsel testified that "[t]o the best of my recollection" he did not state in open court that he would represent applicant on appeal because "that would have been tantamount to telling the Court . that we were asking for an appeal;" having explained to applicant the process of an appeal and that it was so costly that counsel "was not financially able to support an appeal," he did not give notice of appeal after sentencing on May 1 since "I never intended to appeal;" there was "no need to file a motion to withdraw because I had concluded the case;" applicant, still in confinement, says he made attempts to contact counsel about his appeal but "received no reply."
The judge of the convicting court found applicant was not deprived of his right to appeal in that "counsel did not tell him he would appeal his case." But that negative finding does not serve "to correct the ambiguity of representation which all too often follows a conviction," Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794, at 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
While such ambiguity of representation may not be created by "the conscious indifference of any particular party," ibid, appellate courts are well acquainted with the resultant confusion at the very point in the appellate process when certainty is imperative. See, e.g., Shead v. State, 711 S.W.2d 345, at 346 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986) no PDR, and Robinson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 279, at 283 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983) no PDR. The right to a meaningful appeal is too valuable to be lost to inertia within the criminal justice system.
A solution to the problem proposed in some quarters is "to place the responsibility on the trial judge to advise the defendant at the proper time of his appellate rights, whether he be represented by retained or court appointed counsel. Teag-ue, J., dissenting in Ward v. State, supra, at 803, in agreement with Justice Countiss, concurring in Ward v. State, 704 S.W. 2d 903, at 905 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1986), who in turn drew on Robinson v. State, supra, viz:
"... The trial judge should explain these [appellate] rights to the defendant in open court and the record should so reflect. If counsel does not give notice of appeal in open court at the time of sentencing, the trial court should explain to the defendant that notice of appeal must be given within fifteen days of sentencing. The trial court should admonish the defendant of the importance of meeting the appellate deadlines."
Robinson, supra, at 283.
In addition, Justice Countiss would have the trial judge tell defendant of his right to appointed counsel if indigent and when material to be included in the appellate record must be designated. Further, he suggested this Court by rule, or the Legislature by statute, "require the giving of that information." With that, he concluded, "Then we can, with assurance, tell a defendant that the incomplete record is his mistake, from which there is no relief." Ward, 704 S.W.2d, at 905.
The solution thus proposed is derived, at least in part, from Fed.R.Cr.Pro. 32(a)(2). Teague, J., dissenting in Ward v. State, supra, at 803. As pertinent here, it provides:
"(2) Notification of Right to Appeal. After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal, and the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis_ If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant."
As adopted in 1966, the rule substantially revised former rule 37(a)(2), which was conditioned on a defendant's being then unrepresented by counsel. According to Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules following Rule 32, the rationale for removing that condition includes certain considerations, viz:
"The court is required to advise the defendant of his right to appeal . because situations arise in which a defendant . is not adequately advised by such counsel of his right to appeal. Trial counsel may not regard his responsibility as extending beyond the time of imposition of sentence. The defendant may be removed from the courtroom immediately upon sentence and held in custody under circumstances which make it difficult for counsel to advise him."
At the time of sentencing in the instant cause applicant had ten days after it was pronounced in which to give or file notice of appeal. Former article 44.08(c). From the record before us it appears that after his arrest applicant was confined without bail; but that he remained in custody upon being found guilty did not hamper counsel in explaining to applicant "the process of appeal," and during this period trial counsel and applicant had discussions, albeit briefly, about taking an appeal. Thus the first and third considerations for Federal Rule 32(a)(2) are not relevant here.
The attorney-client relationship continued. Ward v. State, supra, at 796-797. However, having informed applicant that an appeal is costly and he could not financially support one, counsel certainly regarded his responsibility did not extend to representing applicant for appellate purposes. Yet he did not inform the trial judge or seek leave to withdraw. So, to some degree the second reason for Federal Rule 32(a)(2) may be at work here.
Nevertheless, that the Federal authorities opted to transfer a duty or responsibility of an attorney to his client over to a trial judge is not sufficient reason for this Court to dictate the same requirement by rule of decision, especially when the Legislature has only recently provided otherwise. See note 3, ante. Rather than impose a state counterpart, our concentration should be on restating the role of a criminal defense lawyer in this kind of situation.
Precise obligations are laid out in ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Justice ("Standards"), The Defense Function, Part VIII. After Conviction. After sentencing, the lawyer explains to defendant "meaning and consequences" of the judgment and "his right to appeal." He expresses his professional opinion as to "meritorious grounds for appeal and as to probable results of an appeal," as well as its "advantages and disadvantages." "The decision whether to appeal must be the defendant's_" The lawyer "should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the defendant's right of appeal." § 8.2 Appeal, Standards, at 135.
In Criminal Appeals, Part II. Transition from Trial Court to Appellate Court, 2.1 The Notice of Appeal, is written:
(b) It is appropriate for courts imposing sentence in contested cases to assume the burden of advising the defendant that he has the right of review, that it must be exercised within a specified time, and that he should promptly consult counsel in that regard."
Standards, at 435.
Certainly, as we all recognize, for an unknowing defendant to learn of his appellate rights someone must advise him of them. But we are not persuaded that "in order to eliminate any question about whether the defendant received such advice . the trial judge is best equipped to give that advice[.]" Teague, J., dissenting in Ward v. State, supra, at 802-803. Indeed, we are convinced that trial counsel is not only the best source of such advice but also that it is his duty as an attorney to give it, to the end that his client gains a full understanding of relevant considerations in determining whether to pursue an appeal, as well as procedural requisites for giving notice of appeal and the like. Ward v. State, supra, at 797.
Representation by trial counsel does not terminate at end of trial — if that means when a jury has returned its final verdict on punishment. The sentencing proceeding is a critical part of trial, requiring assistance from trial counsel, and similarly thereafter the determination to give notice of appeal. Informing a defendant of his right to appeal is part and parcel of also further advising him along lines of the Standards, ante, at 373, in order to make a decision whether to take an appeal. Surely a judge is precluded from giving that kind of advice, and who better than an attorney who tried the case is qualified to assay and advise his client of probabilities of error? We indicated the answer in Ward, supra, and the Court answered that question and more in Dyches v. State, 382 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), viz:
"We are in accord with the view . that trial counsel, having participated in the trial itself, is best qualified to prosecute an appeal and should not, without good cause, be permitted to withdraw from the case before the record on appeal has been perfected, if then."
Id., at 929; accord: Steward v. State, 422 S.W.2d 733, at 737 and 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
Counsel is performing his duties in the trial court at the trial stage and in post conviction proceedings, including a motion for new trial, to notice of appeal. We have found it is not an amiable fiction that by giving notice of appeal trial counsel voluntarily becomes appellate counsel, emphasizing that "appointed trial counsel remains as the defendant's attorney for all pur poses until he is expressly permitted to withdraw, even if the appointment was for the trial only." Ward v. State, supra, at 798. The Court said much the same for retained counsel in Steel v. State, 453 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1970):
"When private counsel is engaged, no duty devolves upon the court to appoint counsel in criminal prosecutions. However, retained counsel, even one who has not been fully compensated for past services or compensated for future service, cannot bow out without notice co the court and the accused and 'frustrate forever accused's rights to protect his vital interests.' Atilus v. United States (5 Cir.) 406 F.2d 694)."
Accordingly, we hold that at sentencing the judge of trial court has discretion, but not a duty or responsibility, to inform a defendant of his right to appeal and of other appellate matters to the extent deemed appropriate in the premises.
We also hold that trial counsel, retained or appointed, has the duty, obligation and responsibility to consult with and fully to advise his client concerning meaning and effect of the judgment rendered by the court, his right to appeal from that judgment, the necessity of giving notice of appeal and taking other steps to pursue an appeal, as well as expressing his professional judgment as to possible grounds for appeal and their merit, and delineating advantages and disadvantages of appeal. The decision to appeal belongs to the client.
While the former practice was orally to give notice of appeal in open court, it was permissible then — and now is mandatory under Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 40(b)(1) — that notice be given in writing filed with the clerk of the trial court. But it was not then, and is not now, required that written notice of appeal be made by trial counsel, and thus "volunteer" to become attorney of record on appeal. "Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order," ibid; cf. former article 44.08(a). A written notice of appeal signed solely by defendant is an indication that trial counsel "does not wish to pursue his client's appeal;" when complemented by a contemporaneously presented motion to withdraw showing good cause, and along the lines of DR 2-110(A), Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, and Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 7, "the trial court is immediately placed on notice that appellate counsel must be appointed," Ward v. State, supra, at 797-798 —unless, of course, defendant has retained another attorney.
In the instant cause, that retained counsel did not intend to handle the resultant appeal does not justify his failing to assist his allegedly indigent client in giving notice of appeal. Contrary to his assertion at the evidentiary hearing, "that ended my period of time with him," counsel did need to file a motion to withdraw because, knowing that applicant did indeed desire to appeal, in truth he had not "concluded the case." As we said in Ward, supra, at 799:
"In the present case, the arguable limitation of representation for trial purposes only is not dispositive. Since appellant's trial counsel did not affirmatively withdraw, he remained appellant's counsel on appeal."
We find that in reality this presumptively indigent applicant did not receive any practical assistance of counsel in protecting and preserving his appellate rights. Thus he has been denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his due course rights un der Article I, § 10, of our own Bill of Rights. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Ex parte Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); see Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, at 783 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases cited therein; see also generally, Polk v. State, 676 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Concurring opinion, at 413-414).
Therefore, appellant is entitled to an out of time appeal, and that relief is granted.
The judgment in cause number 309325 in the 174th Judicial District Court of Harris County is vacated and the cause is remanded to that court with instructions to assure that applicant is represented by counsel and to permit applicant to give and file written notice of appeal, after which all further proceedings will be not inconsistent with this opinion, and applicable time limits prescribed by Texas Rules of Appellant Procedure shall be calculated from the day notice of appeal is filed.
It is so ordered.
. In its September 3, 1986, answer and reply to this application the State requested the judge of convicting court to order trial counsel "to file an affidavit . responding to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel contained in the application." The judge entered such an order September 22, 1986, and the clerk immediately mailed it to counsel. Then followed seriatim: an October 28 motion by applicant "for default judgment" against counsel, which the court denied November 3; a December 17 show cause order that counsel appear January 8, 1987, with the affidavit previously ordered or show why he did not produce it; a precept directing an officer to serve that order; a second show cause order dated January 20, with precept, to appear January 23, 1987. Finally, on January 28, counsel testified in open court.
. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
. This Court has not acted; the Legislature has, towit:
"An attorney appointed under this subsection shall represent the defendant until charges are dismissed, the defendant is acquitted, appeals are exhausted, or the attorney is relieved of his duties by the court or replaced by other counsel."
Article 26.04(a), V.A.C.C.P., as amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., Ch. 979, § 2, Vernon's Texas Session Law Service 6674.
. Under our new appellate rules, within thirty days after sentence is imposed defendant may file a motion for new trial or must file a written notice of appeal.
. Formerly, § 8.3 Counsel on Appeal, provided: "Trial counsel... should conduct the appeal . unless new counsel is substituted by the defendant or the appropriate court." That language was later deleted because of 'considerable disagreement" as to "the wisdom of this policy," in favor of a provision in 5-5.2 that counsel "continue throughout the trial court proceedings." Standards (Second Edition) Vol. 1 1986 Supplement 4.108, 5.53.
. The Court further noted that in Atilus the Fifth Circuit held that failure of retained counsel in a criminal case to perfect an appeal, when requested to do so by accused, "violated the requirement that the accused be afforded 'effective aid' at such vital or critical stage of the proceedings, in violation of the accused's constitutional rights." Steel, at 487.
. Should there be an issue as to indigency, the judge may require withdrawing trial counsel to continue to serve through such indigency proceeding, and withhold signing an order granting leave to withdraw until that bit of business is done.