Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ralph CRAIG, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-06-17
Citations: 237 So. 2d 737
Docket Number: No. 38179
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ralph CRAIG, Respondent.
Judges: DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 237
Pages: 737–745

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Ralph CRAIG, Respondent.
No. 38179.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 17, 1970.
Rehearing Denied July 17, 1970.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
L. B. Vocelle, Vero Beach, and C. Wendell Harris, Merritt Island, for respondent.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
This cause is before the Court for review on conflict certiorari of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported in Craig v. State, 216 So.2d 19.
The defendant was charged by an indictment with murder in the first degree and the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the second degrée. During the trial a statement made by the defendant was admitted into evidence. The District Court held that sufficient pre-interrogation warnings were not given defendant and the record failed to show that defendant waived his right to counsel because during the interrogation he stated that "in a way" he would like to have an attorney but concluded that he did not "see how it can help me."
At about noon on Saturday, the day after the homicide, defendant voluntarily surrendered to Deputy McCants, who immediately advised him not to make any statements. The defendant insisted upon talking and made inquiry as to the condition of the victim. He was told that the victim had died.
After the defendant was transported to the jail, Inspector Pease orally warned him of his rights to have an attorney and to remain silent. Defendant was also warned that anything said could be and would be used against him in court. Inspector Pease put these warnings in writing, explaining each of them as they were being written. This procedure continued for 30 or 45 minutes. The defendant signed his name by each written warning as it was explained to him. The result was the following:
"1. T have been advised of my rights to an attorney.' (signed) Ralph Craig,
"2. T have been advised that if I cannot afford an attorney the Court will furnish me with one.' (signed) Ralph Craig,
"5. T have been advised, that if I wish to have anyone else present while I make a statement, that I may do so and that if I wish to talk to any one before I make a statement, I am free to do so.' (signed) Ralph Craig,
"6. 'I fully understand the above and I wish to waiver my above rights and make a free and voluntary statement concerning the charge against me.' (signed) Ralph Craig."
In the meantime, the family of defendant had secured counsel for him and had notified a deputy that the defendant had an attorney. Before Inspector Pease began his explanation of defendant's rights, the defendant was given an opportunity to make telephone calls and to communicate with any person outside the jail. The defendant refused to make any telephone calls and expressed no desire to communicate with anyone. This opportunity was available to the defendant Saturday afternoon and Saturday night.
On Sunday morning an Assistant State Attorney came to the jail with the official court reporter and an investigator for the purpose of interrogating the defendant. Once again the defendant was warned in the following manner:
"Q You signed your name to a bunch of questions here which were witnessed by someone else, concerning your rights, and do you recall doing that?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q O.K. Let me go ahead and warn you again, and just so it will be down. Now, the way I am doing it, I know you can't read, so you don't have to read anything. You are just talking, and so nothing can be changed by somebody writing. And let me advise you first that you have a right to a lawyer, and you have a right to a lawyer even if you can't afford one, and if you can't afford one at this time, or at any other time in the future, the Court will appoint one for you whether you can afford one or not. Now, do you understand that?
"A Uh, huh.
"Q O.K. Tell me, just tell us you understand it.
"A All right.
"Q Do you understand that? Just say you do.
"A I do." (Emphasis supplied)
The Assistant . State Attorney then advised defendant that anything he said could be used against him and would be used against him in Court. Defendant was advised that a charge of first degree murder was pending against him and he was being held on this charge. The defendant admitted that no one had threatened him or made any promises to him. In fapt, defendant said "they have treated me as good as anybody ever treated me." The following then occurred :
"Q O.K. And do you wish to waive your right to an attorney and make a statement now?
"A I will make a statement, but I ain't anxious to get no lawyer because I don't think it will help.
"Q O.K. Do you want to just say you waive your right to have one right now? Just say that if you do.
"A Well, I would like to have one in a way, but I don't see how it can help me.
"Q O.K. Do you want to make a statement now ?
"A Well, I was going to make one to him.
"Q O.K. That is what I mean. In your own words, tell me.
"A What happened, I was going to make one.
"Q What?
"A What happened and how it happened.
"Q That is what I mean. Just tell me in your own words what happened."
When the above factual situation is considered, it is apparent that the decision of the District Court conflicts with Ortiz v. State, 212 So.2d 57 (Fla.App. 3d Dist. 1968) as well as Key v. State, 194 So.2d 664 (Fla.App.1967). We have jurisdiction.
Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), sets out the standards required in advising defendant of his constitutional rights, but does not require the officer to give these standards verbatim as set forth in the opinion of the Court. The Miranda decision only requires that the defendant be adequately and fully informed of these rights prior to the time any interrogation takes place.
In the case sub judice the defendant voluntarily surrendered himself to the officer and admitted that he was treated well while in custody. From the very beginning he was advised to remain silent. He was adequately advised as to all of his rights under the Miranda decision on Saturday afternoon and again on Sunday morning, and he was not prevented from securing counsel. Finally, defendant said he was not anxious to get a lawyer because he didn't think it would help him.
If the defendant felt that his welfare would best be served without an attorney, he certainly had the right to proceed with the statement in the absence of counsel. When defendant expressed the opinion that an attorney could not help him, the interrogator was not required to convince the defendant that he needed counsel. The Miranda decision does not require the interrogator to give legal advice, but only that defendant is told his constitutional rights and makes an intelligent waiver of counsel. The determination for need of counsel is the defendant's prerogative.
In Brisbon v. State, 201 So.2d 832 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1967), the Court said:
"Miranda v. State of Arizona, requires that a waiver of defendant's right to counsel be made knowingly and intelligently. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking in reference to the Miranda decision, in Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5 Cir. 1966), has said:
" 'Thus the cases in which it is clear that the warnings have been given must be considered on their own facts in order to determine the question of waiver.'
"While it is true that mere silence on the part of the defendant cannot be presumed to be a waiver, it is also true that the defendant need not make the express statement, 'I do not wish to be represented by counsel' before a waiver can occur. People v. Salcido, Cal.App. 1966, [246 Cal.Rptr.2d 450] 54 Cal.Rptr. 820. To require such statement would be to require form without substance. The only test is whether the defendant, after being warned of his rights, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
"The record before us indicates that in response to the question, 'knowing your rights as they have been related to you, are you now willing to answer questions without having an attorney present ? ', the defendant answered, 'Yes' and proceeded to answer the questions put to him by the police officer."
In discussing the strong presumption against waivers and the standards of proof needed to overcome the presumption, the Court in the Miranda decision relied upon Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), in which the .Court unequivocally stated:
"The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967).
The Miranda decision never contemplated that waiver of counsel could be accomplished only by the use of the words, "I am willing to answer questions without the services of a lawyer." There is no magic in these words. Any clear and unambiguous conduct by a person who has been advised of his rights which indicates his willingness to answer questions without a lawyer is surely sufficient. A verbal acknowledgment of understanding and willingness to talk, followed by conduct which is consistent only with a waiver of his right to have a lawyer present, by one who has been advised of his rights, constitutes an effective waiver of his right to counsel at that stage of the proceeding.
In determining whether proper warnings with respect to right to counsel and right to remain silent have been given to a suspect, factors to be considered are whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had a right to counsel before and while doing so if he wished.
A statement by the accused that he fully understands and waives his rights is not an essential link in the chain of proof. Waiver may be shown by attendant circumstances. United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), certiorari denied, 390 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 1250, 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968).
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause is remanded with directions that the judgment and sentence of the trial court be affirmed.
DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.
MANN, District Court Judge, dissents with opinion.