Case Name: State Bank of Chicago v. A. Boyesen et al.
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1900-01-20
Citations: 87 Ill. App. 539
Docket Number: 
Parties: State Bank of Chicago v. A. Boyesen et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 539–548

Head Matter:
State Bank of Chicago v. A. Boyesen et al.
1. Garnishment—Nature of the Proceeding.—Garnishment is a proceeding at law in which the garnishor is not entitled' to recover unless the judgment debtor could recover a judgment against the garnishee in a suit at law prosecuted by him personally, and in his own right.
2. Jurisdiction—Of the Appellate Court When a Jury Has Been Waived.—The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to review a case upon the merits when a jury was waived and the cause submitted to the court below for trial, although no propositions of law were submitted to the trial court for its holdings thereon.
Garnishment.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1899.
Reversed and remanded.
Opinion filed January 20, 1900.
Rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Freeman dissenting.
Statement.—Appellant was summoned as garnishee in an attachment proceeding by appellee against one J. G. Thweatt, a resident of Arkansas.
On or about the 14th or 15th of July, 1896, appellant received the following letter :
“ Duvalls Bluff, Prairie County, Arkansas.
July 11, 1896.”
“ State Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
“ Gents : Enclosed find two notes signed by myself and mortgage executed by myself & wf. to W. B. Williams, trustee, Anna A. Jones, beneficiary, conveying lot of lands in Lee Co., this State. Let Mr. Williams inspect the notes and mortgage. Mr. Williams will likely place in your hands for inspection and collection a deed from Anna A. Jones to me to lands embraced in mortgage. When he does, notify at once Mess. Ferguson & Goodnow, 84 LaSalle St., and let them inspect it. If O. K. I will wire you where to present the deed for payment of purchase money, to be paid cash. This and the notes and mortgage you will turn over to Mr. Williams or party presenting deed. Messrs. F. & G. will wire me if deed is O. K. Acknowledge receipt, please.
Tours,
J. G. Thweatt.”
This letter contained inclosures as follows :
Two notes, both bearing date July 6, 1896, signed by J. G. Thweatt, and payable to Anna A. Jones or order, each for $3,852.20, and due one in twelve and the other in twenty-four months from date thereof, with interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum from date until paid. Also a trust deed signed by said Thweatt and wife, conveying 3,852.21 acres of land in Lee county, Arkansas, to W. B. Williams in trust, to secure the payment of the two above described notes, which said trust deed was acknowledged before a notary public of Prairie county, Arkansas, but not recorded.
A few days thereafter appellant received the following letter:
“July 20, 1896.
“ Cashier, State Bank of Chicago,
“ Chicago, Ill.
“ Dear Sir : I hereby hand vou my check for the sum of $3,582, to be used as a cash payment on 3,581 acres of land in sections 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13,14,15 and 23, in township number 3 north of range number 1 of the fifth principal meridian, in Lee county, State of Arkansas. This money to be paid to W. B. Williams, of number 7 Board of Trade, Chicago, upon the delivery to you of a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying said lands, executed by Anna A. Jones to J. G. Thweatt, according to the statutes of the State of Arkansas, reserving the right to examine said deed before money is paid to said W. B. Williams, and in case of failure on the part of said Williams to deliver said deed, then the money to be placed to my credit. In this same transaction, I am advised by J. G. Thweatt, of Devall’s Bluff, Arkansas, that he has forwarded to your bank mortgages and notes for the balance of the purchase money on said lands.
Tours truly,
L. Johnson.”
The check inclosed was as follows :
“No. 213. Chicago, July 15, 1896.
“ State Bank of Chicago, pay to order of yourselves $3,582, thirty-five hundred and eighty-two dollars.
L. Johnson.”
There was money to meet this check to the credit of said Johnson in the appellant bank, and upon service of the writ the bank certified the check and filed it away with the garnishment papers relating to this case.
The same day the above letter from Johnson was received the cashier of appellant sent the following letter :
“ Chicago, July 20, 1896.
“ W. B. Williams, Esq.,
Humber 7 Board of Trade, Chicago.
“Dear Sir: We are in receipt of certain papers from Mr. J. G-. Thweatt of Devall’s Bluff, Arkansas, consisting of mortgage deed and two notes of $3,852, together with cash to the amount of $3,582, all of which we are instructed to deliver to you upon the receipt by us of a good and sufficient warranty deed to the land described in said mortgage. We stand ready to pay the above amount to you or your representative upon the receipt of the above described deed.
“ Please send it to us at your earliest convenience, or advise us when it will be convenient for you to have our messenger call upon you, as we wish this matter settled up as soon as possible.
“Awaiting your early reply, we remain
Yours truly,
John It. Lindgren,
Cashier.”
Deneen & Hamill and Edwin White Moore, attorneys for appellant.
Daniel V. Samuels, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Presiding Justice Horton
delivered the opinion of the court.
There is no testimony in this case showing when the money standing to the credit of said Johnson in appellant bank was deposited there or from whom or what source it came. Therefore, so far as appears from this record, that money belonged to said Johnson. By his said check he authorized the payment or appropriation of the amount named therein for the purpose and in the manner stated in his letter inclosing said check to appellant. Said Thweatt was not served personally with process in said garnishee proceeding, neither was his appearance entered in the case. There is no judgment against him in personam. It is urged that the declaration does not state a cause of action. The court had jurisdiction and it is therefore not for appellant to question the judgment. Said Johnson is not a party to this proceeding and can not therefore be bound by the judgment. The testimony fails utterly to show his interest, if any, in the lands, the purchase of which, from said Williams, was contemplated. It is just as reasonable to suppose or imagine that said Johnson was jointly interested in such purchase as to suppose or imagine, as it is urged, that the money represented by said check belonged to said Thweatt. We can not rest a decision upon a theory based upon imagination of what is not proven.
That letter states that said money is to be paid to one Williams upon the delivery to appellant of a certain warranty deed. There is no testimony tending to show that such deed was ever delivered to appellant, or that there was ever any offer to deliver the same or any tender thereof.
As we understand this case it is simply this: Mr. Johnson put $3,582 of his own money into the hands of appellant with direction to appellant to pay the same to Mr. Williams upon the delivery by said Williams to appellant of a certain warranty deed (the right being reserved to examine said deed before the money is paid). We are unable to discover any theory upon which it may be correctly held that such money can be appropriated to pay a debt due from said Thweatt.
Assume it to be true, as contended by appellee, that the letter signed by the cashier of appellant (although written by the collection clerk) stated to Mr. Williams that said money was received from said Thweatt; that does not change the legal rights of the parties to this suit. Mr. Williams is not claiming anything here against appellant. If he had done or suffered anything on account of that letter, appellant' might be estopped as against him, from claiming that said money was not in fact received from said Thweatt. But there is no testimony tending to show that appellee did or suffered anything by reason of said letter. Appellant is not, therefore, estopped by said letter from asserting in this case, and as against appellee, that the statement in said letter that the money came from Thweatt was incorrect.
The letter from Thweatt to appellant states in substance that when the warranty deed therein mentioned is placed in the hands of appellant, notice is to be given to attorneys therein named, who would examine the same, and that if said attorneys wired him (Thweatt) that the " deed is O. K." that he (Thweatt) would wire appellant " where to present the deed for payment of purchase money to be paid in cash." No deed was placed in the hands of appellant as contemplated by said letter. Hence, and of course, no examination of the deed referred to could be made by the attorneys, and said Thweatt never wired appellant where to present said deed for the payment of purchase money. So far as this record shows, there was never any interview between said Thweatt, or any one acting for him, and any one representing appellant, and never any other letter from him received by appellant.
The letter from Thweatt and the one from Johnson both mention the same names as parties to the warranty deed, and it may be assumed that they both refer to the same transaction. But it does not follow that the money in bank to Johnson's credit belonged to Thweatt. Counsel for appellee in their printed argument said that " Johnson was the confidential agent of Thweatt, who sent the money to him (Johnson) for delivery to the bank." Counsel make no reference to any testimony to support this statement, nor have we noticed any such testimony. Neither is there any testimony to warrant the serious imputation contained in said printed argument, when it is there said that " We may surmise that Johnson could not be induced to perjure himself for the benefit of Thweatt or the bank." When there is no reliable testimony upon which to base such an imputation it should not be made.
This is a proceeding at law, and the appellee is not entitled to recover in this suit unless said Thweatt could maintain a judgment against appellant in a suit at law prosecuted by him personally and in his own right. The testimony in this record would not warrant a recovery' by Thweatt against appellant for the money represented by said check drawn by said Johnson. Therefore appellee can not sustain such a recovery. Webster v. Steele, 75 Ill. 544.
This court has jurisdiction to review a case upon the merits when a jury was waixrnd and the cause submitted to the court for trial, although no propositions of law were submitted to the court for its holdings thereon. Flood v. Leonard, 44 Ill. App. 113; Armstrong v. Barrett, 46 Ill. App. 194; Hollenberg v. Tompkins, 49 Ill. App. 325.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded.