Case Name: Henry CLARK, Appellant, v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-09-25
Citations: 821 So. 2d 827
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-01697-COA
Parties: Henry CLARK, Appellant, v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe, Appellees.
Judges: Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, and MYERS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 821
Pages: 827–844

Head Matter:
Henry CLARK, Appellant, v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe, Appellees.
No. 1999-CA-01697-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Sept. 25, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 2002.
Certiorari Denied July 18, 2002.
Tylvester Otis Goss, Jackson, Thandi Wade, Attorneys for Appellant.
John David Price, Jackson, Attorney for Appellees..
Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, and MYERS, JJ.

Opinion:
MYERS, J;,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Henry Clark appeals the judgment of the Hinds County Circuit Court granting motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
' 1Í 2. Clark was employed with Luvel Dairy Products for approximately twenty-four years. On January 9, 1996, he was told that James Briscoe, the president of the company, wanted to speak with him. WTien Clark arrived at Briscoe's office, he was told that the company had evidence that he had been stealing inventory and selling it for profit. A saleswoman at a store in Leake .County was claiming -that she had been sold stolen Luvel ice cream by a black man with a deformity in his eye. Briscoe informéd Clark that he could either quit or be fired. Briscoe told Clark that he had lost faith in Clark and that he did not trust Clark anymore. Clark refused to resign, and Briscoe threatened to call the sheriff to investigate the alleged crime. Clark told him to call the sheriff.
¶ 3. When the sheriffs deputy arrived at Luvel, he and Briscoe took Clark's license, along with the licenses of three other employees, to. the store where the stolen ice cream had allegedly been sold. Before they left, Briscoe told Clark that he was fired and to clock out and leave the Luvel premises immediately. When the deputy and Briscoe arrived at the store where Clark had allegedly sold the stolen ice cream, the saleswoman who allegedly bought the ice cream was not there. ' The manager of the store took the licenses to the saleswoman for identification of the person who sold her the ice cream, but the saleswoman said that she could not positively identify the seller. After that, Bris-coe informed the deputy that he would not pursue the matter any further.
¶ 4. Clark subsequently brought this action against Luvel Dairy Products, Inc. and James Briscoe for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, actionable words and false imprisonment. At the close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the issues of actionable words, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The defamation issue was submitted to the jury, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $126,000 in compensatory damages. The defendants then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court granted. In granting such motion, the trial court noted that there was substantial evidence presented that Clark was actually stealing ice cream from Luvel and that there was no evidence presented that Briscoe ever acted with malice toward Clark during the events giving rise to this litigation.
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR ACTIONABLE WORDS, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Actionable Words
¶ 5. In his original. action, Clark alleged a claim against Luvel and Briscoe for actionable words. Mississippi's actionable words statute articulates that "[a]ll words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, shall be actionable." Miss. Code Ann. § 95-1-rl (Rev.2000).
If 6. The trial court held that the words spoken by Briscoe could not reasonably be seen as expected to bring about a breach of the peace. In making this finding, the trial court noted that Briscoe never called Clark a "thief' outright. Rather, he found that Briscoe had told Clark that either Clark was stealing ice cream or knew who was stealing it. No one ever testified that Briscoe actually used the word "thief." Furthermore, Clark admitted on cross-examination that nothing that Briscoe said to him on the day in question led Clark to want to fight Briscoe.
¶ 7. The Mississippi Supréme Court has stated that:
[t]he law guards jealously the right to the enjoyment of a good reputation, but public policy, good morals, the interests of society, and sound business demand that an employer, or his representative, be permitted to discuss freely with an employee, or his chosen representative, charges made against the employee affecting the latter's employment. On such occasions there is a qualified privilege, and statements made within the scope of the privilege, in good faith and without malice, are not actionable. The truth or falsity of the communication is not involved so long as there is no bad faith or malice.
Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, 225 Miss. 84, 91-2, 82 So.2d 648, 650 (1955).
¶ 8. In this case, Briscoe was given information tending to show that Clark was involved in the theft of merchandise. Briscoe then, in good faith, called Clark into his office to discuss the allegations. These actions were necessary to deal with a serious problem within the company. There was no evidence that Briscoe acted with malice or bad faith. The trial court acted correctly in sustaining the motion for directed verdict on the actionable words claim.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
¶ 9. In order to prevail in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is necessary to show that the conduct complained of was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F.Supp. 976, 982 (N.D.Miss.1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. (1965)). Furthermore, "liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities." Lawson v. Heidelberg Eastern, 872 F.Supp. 335, 338 (N.D.Miss.1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. (1965)). Damages for such claims are typically not recoverable in employment disputes. Pegues, 913 F.Supp. at 982. Rather, "[o]nly in the most unusual cases does the conduct move out of the 'realm of an ordinary employment dispute' into the classification of 'extreme and outrageous,' as required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir.1989); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir.1991)).
¶ 10. The trial court found that because Clark was a terminable-at-will employee, and because there was no evidence that Briscoe acted in bad faith, the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress was without merit. The trial court was not swayed by the fact that Briscoe told Clark to leave the Luvel premises and to never come back. As stated above, we see no evidence of bad faith on the part of Briscoe. We And, as the trial court did, that Briscoe's actions did not rise to the level of an attempt to inflict emotional distress. Nor was Briscoe's conduct extreme and outrageous. The record indicates that he did what was necessary to resolve a very serious problem. For these reasons, we find that sustaining the motion for directed verdict on this issue was appropriate.
False Imprisonment
¶ 11. To succeed in' a claim for false imprisonment, "a plaintiff must prove (1) he or she was detained and (2) that the detention was unlawful." Page v. Wiggins, 595 So.2d 1291, 1294 (Miss.1992) (citing Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1205, 1208 (Miss.1987)).
¶ 12. In directing a.verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of false imprisonment, the trial court found that there was no evidence presented indicating that Clark was ever súbjected to forced detention or actual detention. We agree. As noted by the trial court, Clark himself admitted that he stayed at the plant through the completion of the investigation voluntarily. The record contains no evidence that Clark was ever forcibly detained or made to feel that he could not leave if he so desired. Because there is no proof of detention, the claim for false imprisonment fails. Directed verdict on the claim for false imprisonment was therefore appropriate.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEPEN-DANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AS THE FINDING OF THE JURY WAS REASONABLE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISTURBED.
¶ 13. When presented with a motion for JNOV, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, together with all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom. Hammock v. Czaja, 769 So.2d 847, 851 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2000).
¶ 14. As noted above, the trial court stated that it granted the JNOV because there was overwhelming evidence presented which tended to establish that Clark was actually stealing ice cream from Luvel. Once again we find ourselves in accord with the trial court. William Jones, Dominick Roby and Kevin Brunt, former Luvel employees, and Paul Bingham, a current Luvel employee, all testified that they had participated in the theft of Luvel ice cream with Clark. Jimmy Cross and Kelsey Harmon, both former Luvel employees, testified that they personally observed Clark stealing merchandise.
¶ 15. The testimony of these six individuals constituted overwhelming evidence that Clark was, in fact, stealing dairy products from his employer. We reiterate the precedent that "[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a defamation lawsuit in Mississippi." Journal Pub. Co. v. McCullough, 743 So.2d 352, 360 (¶ 26) (Miss.1999).
¶ 16. We also note that one of the essential requirements of a defamation action is unprivileged publication to a third party. Id. at 359 (¶ 22). The only persons to whom Briscoe communicated his belief that Clark was stealing were Clark himself, the deputy sheriff, and essential management personnel. We find that these communications were protected by a qualified privilege. Killebrew, 225 Miss. at 91-2, 82 So.2d at 650. As such, Briscoe can only be found liable for defamation if there is evidence that he acted or spoke in bad faith or with malice. There was no evidence presented to indicate such.
¶ 17. For these reasons, the trial court's rendering of a JNOV on the defamation claim was warranted, and we decline to reverse.
¶ 18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, AND CHANDLER, JJ. CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, P.J. BRANTLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.