Case Name: SPARKS v. STATE ex rel. SALTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1930-04-18
Citations: 27 S.W.2d 918
Docket Number: No. 3848
Parties: SPARKS v. STATE ex rel. SALTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 27
Pages: 918–921

Head Matter:
SPARKS v. STATE ex rel. SALTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.
No. 3848.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
April 18, 1930.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1930.
J. K. Brim, of Sulphur Springs, for appellant.
Ramey & Davidson, of Sulphur Springs, for appellee.

Opinion:
HODGES, J.
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the Saltillo independent school district against the appellant for taxes due the district for the year 1927. While a number of defenses were pleaded, that mainly relied on (is that appellant's property had been assessed 'at too high a valuation as compared to other taxable property situated in that school district. It was alleged that the, trustees entered into a conspiracy to fix upon appellant's property a greater valuation than that placed upon other property of the same kind. In answer to special issues the jury found that the valuation placed upon appellant's property was not in excess of its actual value, and that the board of equalization did not adopt any fixed or arbitrary rule in valuing property of the district for taxation. The proof showed that appellant's property, which consisted of about 400 acres of land and some personalty, was assessed for taxes for that year. ,The land was valued at $5,-684, and his personal property at $2,250. The taxes due the district upon that valuation amounted to $79.34. Appellant appeared before the board of equalization that year, and objected to the valuation placed upon his land, but offered no testimony as to what the property was worth, or what value should, be placed upon it; nor did he object to the amount assessed against him on the ground that any portion of his property taxes was situated outside of the district. When the time for the payment of taxes arrived, appellant appeared and tendered what he regarded as the amount of taxes he should pay upon a fair valuation of his property, which was less than the amount charged against him on the tax rolls. The tender was refused by the collector, and the appellant did not pay any district school taxes for that year.
Appellant complains of the manner in which the amount of his taxes and the amount delinquent was proved in the trial of the case. It appeared from the evidence that the collector had been furnished with a tax roll duly certified, and from that roll had prepared 'a delinquent tax roll, which had been kept in the office of the collector. Eor some reason this delinquent roll had been lost and could not be produced on the trial. The collector was then permitted, over appellant's objection, to use the original roll from which the delinquent roll .had been made in testifying as to the amount of appellant's taxes and the amount unpaid for the year 1927.
There was in fact no real controversy in the trial court as to the amount of taxes with which appellant was charged on the rolls, or the amount unpaid. While on the stand appellant admitted that he had not paid his taxes for that year, and did not claim tlrat he was sued for more than was charged against him on the tax rolls. The evidence was ample to support a finding that the valuation of the property was fairly made by the board of equalization, that there was no fraud or intentional discrimination against the appellant, or that any arbitrary scheme for valuation of property in the district had been adopted by the board in equalizing values.
There was some evidence introduced to show that the Gulf Pipe Line Company owned 112 acres of land situated in that school district, and that this land had been rendered at a rate below that fixed on appellant's land; but the evidence also showed that the board of equalization endeavored to ascertain the true value of that property, and made a bona fide effort to place it upon an equality with other similar property in the district. Appellant requested the court to submit the following special issue: "What do you find was the reasonable cash market value of the 112 acres of land, with the improvements thereon situated, belonging to the Gulf Pipe Line Company on January 1st, 1927, situated within the metes and bounds of the Saltillo Independent School District?"
If the court had submitted that issue and the jury had found that the value was considerably more than that fixed by the board of equalization, that fact alone would not have required a judgment in appellant's favor. The valuation fixed by a board of equalization in such instances will not' be disturbed, even though there is an inequality, when there is no proof of fraud or intentional discrimination or the adoption of some arbitrary scheme of valuation which results in inequality. Rowland v. City of Tyler (Tex. Com. App.) 5 S.W.(2d) 756; Druesdow v. Baker (Tex. Com. App.) 229 S. W. 493.
In the trial appellant testified that 45 head of his cattle assessed in the Saltillo district were actually outside of that district on the 1st day of January of that year.' He asked the court to submit the following special issue: "Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the' defendant's 45 head of cattle assessed against him for taxes in the Saltillo Independent School District for the year 1927 were not within the metes and bounds of the Saltillo Independent School District on January the 1st, 1927?" That 'request was refpsed. Appellant does not in his pleadings allege that this or any of his property assessed for taxes was outside the limits of the school district, nor did he complain of that fact at the time he appeared before the board of equalization. The mere fact that some live stock was outside of the territory for which the tax is levied does not under all circumstances render the property exempt from taxation at the domicile of the owner. It may have been only a temporary removal of the property, or for the purpose of evading taxation in the territory of the owner's domicile. But there was no pleading setting up that defense.
We are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.