Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Carlos R. POREE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-11-01
Citations: 386 So. 2d 1331
Docket Number: No. 64308
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Carlos R. POREE.
Judges: SUMMERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 386
Pages: 1331–1341

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Carlos R. POREE.
No. 64308.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 1, 1979.
On Rehearing March 3, 1980.
Order March 7, 1980.
See also, 386 So.2d 1341.
Robert J. Zibilich, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
On November 7,1977, within the space of a few hours, Carlos Poree shot ten people. Among the targets of his violence only two individuals, his estranged wife and her father, were known to him; the others were all men he encountered on the streets of New Orleans and in the offices of a brokerage firm. One of his victims died of his wounds, and Poree was indicted for murder in the first degree. Poree entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, in accordance with C.Cr.P. 552(3). A sanity commission, appointed pursuant to C.Cr.P. 650 , found the defendant incompetent to stand trial by reason of present insanity, and he was transferred to the East Louisiana State Mental Hospital for observation and evaluation. Five months later, after a course of psychotropic medication, defendant was determined legally sane and competent to stand trial.
At trial, all of the facts were stipulated by the prosecution and the defense so that Poree's sanity was the only issue for the jury. After hearing evidence on this issue, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. The defense moved for a new trial on two grounds; one, that of jury
misconduct, need not concern us here. The other ground was that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence because there was no evidence to refute the defendant's proof of insanity. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, then took an appeal.
Under the Louisiana statutory scheme governing insanity in criminal cases, a defendant is exempt from criminal responsibility "[i]f the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question . . . " R.S. 14:14. However, R.S. 15:432 establishes a legal presumption that the defendant is sane and responsible for his actions. This statute also provides that the effect of this presumption is to relieve the State of the necessity of any proof of defendant's sanity, but that the presumption of sanity may be destroyed by rebutting evidence on the part of the defendant. Under C.Cr.P. 652, insanity is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
At trial the defendant's evidence of insanity at the time of the offense consisted of the testimony of his wife and his father-in-law, both still suffering the physical effects of his attacks, and of two psychiatrists. Both Mrs. Poree and her father testified that the defendant was a cheerful, peaceful person and an ideal husband and son-in-law until about five months before the shootings. At that time, according to Mrs. Poree, the defendant began to demonstrate a fear of airplanes flying overhead, to shut himself up in the house, to secretively take notes while watching television, to be obsessed with jealousy of his wife, and to engage in outbursts of anger of increas ing frequency and duration. Because of these changes in Poree's behavior, the couple began to consult a psychologist some weeks before the shootings, and Mrs. Poree was forced to return to the home of her parents. Mrs. Poree's father testified that, on the morning of the shootings, the defendant was abnormal in speech, and appearance, that he looked insane, and that he seemed unable to understand what was said to him. Of the psychiatrists who testified for the defense, one had first seen the defendant immediately after the shootings, the other two months later. On the basis of their own examinations of the defendant, defendant's responses to medication, and others' reports of defendant's behavior, both experts stated unequivocally that the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and that at the time of the offense he was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.
The prosecution's evidence on the issue of sanity consisted of the testimony of four employees of the brokerage firm and of the two police officers who arrested the defendant. One employee testified only as to the physical layout of the brokerage office and to the fact that, at the time of the shooting, she had a brief glimpse of a man with a gun; the second employee testified only that the defendant hit her with his hand; the third testified that he saw the defendant stop at the desks at which three employees were working and shoot the two male employees but not the female; the fourth testified that the defendant's motions in shooting him were calm and cool. The content of the police officers' testimony was that, after an initial movement toward his gun, the defendant offered no violent resistance to being taken into custody and that, in response to one officer's spontaneous exclamation of "What the hell is going on here?" the defendant said, "I'm not making any statements until I speak to my attorney." With regard to the latter point, one of the psychiatrists, testifying for the defense earlier in the trial proceedings, stated that this comment by defendant was not incompatible with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and insanity at the time of the offense, but could rather be explained by the defendant's delusion that the police knew what he was doing and were controlling his behavior. It should also be noted that at the time of his arrest, defendant had no attorney and no funds with which to engage one; he was represented at trial by an attorney appointed by the court.
It is clear, then, that defendant's evidence of insanity was uneontroverted, and that his motion for a new trial should have been granted. Under present jurisprudence, however, this court will review the denial of a new trial motion only when the motion is grounded on a claim of no evidence of the crime charged or an essential element thereof. State v. Thompson, 366 So.2d 1291 (La. 1978), State v. Williams, 354 So.2d 152 (La. 1977). Because such a claim presents a question of law, it evokes the appellate jurisdiction of this court, which is limited in criminal cases by Art. V, § 5(C) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and C.Cr.P. 858 to errors of law. When, on the other hand, a new trial motion claims that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence, it has consistently been held that the denial of such a motion presents noth ing for this court to review- State v. Mouton, 366 So.2d 1336 (La. 1978), State v. Edwards, 354 So.2d 1322 (La. 1978).
The rule that appellate review is available on a claim of no evidence functions to protect the defendant against the denial of due process which would occur if a guilty verdict were returned after the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence as to an element of the crime which it is required to prove. This rule is broad enough to assure due process in almost all cases; its deficiency becomes apparent only in a situation like the one now before us, where the trier of fact must make a determination of guilt or innocence on the basis of evidence for which the burdens of production and persuasion are on the defendant, and to which the prosecution need only respond in rebuttal. Due process requires that a defendant in this posture must also have access to review when he claims that he was found guilty of an offense despite the fact that the evidence of his insanity was uncontroverted.
The necessity of such review becomes apparent when we recognize the peculiar position which the determination of sanity or insanity occupies under the current law of this State. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution demands that the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to constitute the offense charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Although it has been held that due process is not violated where insanity is treated as an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), the Patterson court also noted that a majority of jurisdictions have followed the lead of the federal courts in "shoulder(ing) the burden of proving the sanity of the accused;" id. at 203, 97 S.Ct. 2323, 53 L.Ed.2d 287. Louisiana is one of those states in which insanity is still an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of production and persuasion which this allocation of responsibility places on the defendant is not only a weighty one; it is also as crucial, in and of itself, to the fact finder's determination of guilt or innocence as is any one of the elements which the prosecution must prove.
As we have indicated, the presumption of sanity which serves to shift the burden of proving insanity to the defendant is a rebuttable presumption: upon the defendant's production of evidence of insanity, the presumption is destroyed, and if the defendant's evidence outweighs that of the state, the fact finder must find him not guilty by reason of insanity. This system is constitutionally mandated; in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 570 (1979), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged a "premise that has never been doubted in our constitutional system: that a person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend." (Emphasis added). Obviously, the affirmative defense of insanity would be totally devoid of meaning if the trier of fact were free to find the defendant guilty even when he proves insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. And, in a capital case such as the one before us, "[jjuries . . . (would) have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die;" Douglas, J., concurring, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2731, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1972).
The motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence provides one form of relief to a defendant who finds himself in the situation hypothesized above, at the trial court level. If such a motion is denied, however, the defendant may have no access whatsoever to appellate review, even where the prosecution has introduced no evidence proving his sanity. In light of the fact that such review is available when defendant makes a no evidence claim about a fact that the prosecution must prove, it is apparent that the defendant who pleads insanity suffers a double disability: he must not only carry, on a crucial issue, the burdens of production and persuasion which are generally allocated to the state, but he must also do so without any access to appellate review. Yet the right to judicial review is guaranteed by Art. 1, § 19 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the salience of that right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was recently reaffirmed in Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
We therefore hold that, as a matter of law, defendant was denied due process when he was found guilty as charged, despite his uncontroverted evidence of insanity, and that his motion for a new trial should have been granted. •
The conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court.
SUMMERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
CALOGERO, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
BLANCHE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. C.CtP. 650 provides in pertinent part:
"When a defendant enters a combined plea of 'not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,' the court may appoint a sanity commission as provided in Article 644 to make an examination as to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. The court may also order the commission to make an examination as to the defendant's present mental capacity to proceed. . .
. Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. The appeal before us here concerns his second trial.
. C.Cr.P. 851 provides:
The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded.
The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence;
(2) The court's ruling on a written motion, or an objection made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial error;
(3) New and material evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before or during the trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty;
(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment; or
(5)The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal right."
. R.S. 15:432 provides in pertinent part:
"A legal presumption relieves him in whose favor it exists from the necessity of any proof; but may none the less be destroyed by rebutting evidence; such is the presumption attaching to the regularity of judicial proceedings; that the grand jury was legally constituted; that public officers have done their duty; that a relation or subject-matter once established, continues, but not that it pre-existed; that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequence of his act; that the defendant is innocent; that the defendant is sane and responsible for his actions; . . . "
. "The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence." C.Cr.P. 652.
.The status of this "no evidence" standard may be in question in the light of Jackson v. Virginia, which recently held that an applicant for federal habeas corpus who challenges a state criminal conviction will be entitled to such relief "if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 576-577 (1979).
. Art. V, § 5(C) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law."
. "Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court may be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant a new trial, except for error of law." C.Cr.P. 858.
. See note 4, supra, and accompanying text.
. Our awareness of this deficiency is implicit in at least three earlier cases involving the insanity defense. In State v. Craig, 340 So.2d 191 (La. 1976), we noted that the defendant's claim that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence provided nothing for this court to review, but we went on to consider his contention that the verdict was contrary to the psychiatric evidence. In State v. Daigle, 344 So.2d 1380 (La. 1977), defendant's motion for a new trial -on the ground of a verdict contrary to the law and evidence was denied. He then asked this court to order a new trial on the "ends of justice" ground of C.Cr.P. 851(5), supra, note 3, claiming that the evidence preponderated that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong. We held that there was nothing for this court to review because the trial court had not had an opportunity to rule on this new ground, but we also noted that "[w]e believe that defendant makes here a very serious argument," id. at 1388. State v. Rollins, 351 So.2d 470 (La. 1977), also involved the denial of a new trial motion which claimed that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. The specific contention was that psychiatric testimony at trial overwhelmingly showed that the accused was insane at the time of the offense. This court noted that its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law and not to the sufficiency of the evidence, but it reviewed the denial of the new trial motion on the theory that such a determination could be reversed upon a finding of clear abuse of the trial court's discretion.
.According to the analysis presented in Ash-ford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969), this is an assumption, not a presumption. The authors distinguish between a true presumption, which in a criminal case shifts the burden of introducing evidence as to a given issue to the defendant, while the burden of persuasion remains with the prosecution; and an assumption, which imposes upon the defendant not only the burden of introducing evidence but also the burden of persuasion and the risk of non-persuasion. They conclude that when an assumption is in operation, there is a considerable risk that the due process requirement of precision in the guilt determination process will be violated.
. R.S. 15:432, supra, note 4.
. There is dictum in State v. Marmillion, 339 So.2d 788 (La. 1976), to the effect that the state is not required to produce countervailing proof of sanity. This statement is misleading: the presumption of sanity operates to remove the state's burden of proving defendant's sanity in making its case initially; but once this presumption is destroyed by defendant's evidence of insanity, the statutory "preponderance of the evidence" standard clearly envisions a situation in which the fact finder must weigh the evidence of the defendant against the evidence of the state.
.Art. 1, § 19 provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based. . . ."
. See note 6, supra.
. See State v. Sands, 10 Or.App. 438, 499 P.2d 821, 822 (1972), in which the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "[c]onsistent with the approach followed, we believe, by a majority of other courts, we hold the evidence of insanity can be so substantial that the matter should be withdrawn from the trier of fact and decided favorably to the defendant by the trial judge as a matter of law."