Case Name: Den, ex dem. Moses B. Martin, vs. William Carron
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1857-06
Citations: 26 N.J.L. 228
Docket Number: 
Parties: Den, ex dem. Moses B. Martin, vs. William Carron.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 228–236

Head Matter:
Den, ex dem. Moses B. Martin, vs. William Carron.
1. The 34th section of the charter of the city of Newark declares that it shall be lawful, upon default of payment of the assessment, to levy the same by distress and sale of the goods of the owner or occupant of the lot assessed. The 35th section provides that if default be made in the payment of the assessment, it shall be lawful to cause the real estate assessed to be sold at auction for a term of years to satisfy the assessment. Held, that it was not necessary that the goods and chattels of the owner, or the occupant of the lot, should be exhausted before proceeding against the land.
2. If more land is taxed to a person than he owns, and his assessment thereby becomes higher than it should be, it does not constitute any objection to the validity of a sale of the land for such a lax.
3. Where a tax is assessed upon land for opening or widening a street, and the land is'sold for such tax, the title acquired by the sale will not be affected by irregularity of the proceedings of the proper authorities in opening or widening the street or in levying the tax.
Moses B. Martin brought an action of ejectment in this court against William Carrón, the tenant in possession, to recover the possession of a house and lot in the city of Newark.
The case was tried at the Essex Circuit, before a jury, at' May Term, 1855.
A special verdict was taken, by which the following facts were found :
The plaintiff claimed title to the premises in question, by virtue of a sale of the same for the term of thirty years, made November 30th, 1852, by the treasurer of the city of Newark, to raise and pay the sum of three dollars and twenty cents, the amount of an assessment (with costs and' expenses thereon) made against William Mu-lock, the then owner of the said premises, ás and for his proportion, as such owner, of the expenses incurred by the common council of the city of Newark in laying out ánd opening a certain street in said city, by virtue of a resolution of said common council, passed August 1st, 1851.
By this resolution, common council resolved to lay out and open a street, to be called Quarry street, and instructed the committee on streets to give notice thereof to the owners of land, and also instructed the committee to treat with' such owners, in behalf of the city, for their lands, for the purpose aforesaid.
The committee subsequently reported that, they bad treated with the owners of land necessary to be taken for said street, and the city treasurer was instructed to pay the owners therefor. Commissioners were appointed to assess the amount paid to owners of land taken for the opening of said street, upon the owners of all houses and lots intended to be benefited by the opening and laying out of said street.
The commissioners made the assessment, and reported the same to common council. The report, was ratified, and the city treasurer was authorized to demand and receive such assessments from the parties against whom they were made; and in case such parties tailed to comply with such demand, he was directed to take the proceedings for that purpose prescribed in the 35th section of the original charter of the city of Newark.
Payment of the amount assessed against William Mulock was demanded, and not being paid, the treasurer sold the premises in question to satisfy the assessment and costs, and under this sale the plaintiff claimed title.
At the time of the said assessment, demand of payment,, and sale, the said William Mulock resided in the city of Newark aforesaid, and had sufficient goods and- chattels in the said city whereof the amount of the said assessment, with all costs and expenses thereon, might have been levied by distress and sale.
It further appeared, by said verdict, that the street directed to be laid out, as above stated, was a street or highway which had before then been laid out, opened, and used as such, and by the above-staled proceedings it had been merely altered.
The only petition upon which the said proceedings above mentioned were based, was one purporting to be a petition for the extension of Quarry street east from Broad street to the Passaic river, also west from Nesbit street to the Orange road. The petition was not signed by three-fourths of the owners of property on said road or street.
Upon this special verdict the plaintiff moved for judgment.
The cause was argued at February Term, 1857, before the Chief Justice, and Justices Ogden, Potts, and Vredenburgh.
C. Parker, for plaintiff.
Pennington and Bradley, for defendant.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The Chief Justice.
The plaintiff claims title to the premises in question, by virtue of a sale thereof for a term of years, made by the treasurer of the city of Newark to raise and pay the amount of an assessment made against the owner of the premises, as and for his proportion of the expenses incurred by the common council, in laying out and opening a street in said city. It is found, by the special verdict, that at the time of the assessment and of the sale of the lot, Mulock, the then owner, resided in the city of Newark, and had sufficient goods and chattels within said city whereof the assessment against him, with the costs and expenses thereon, might have been levied by distress and sale.
The first objection to the validitj' of the title is, that by the charter, the city was bound to resort first to the goods and chattels of the party assessed, and could only make sale of the land in case sufficient goods and chattels for that purpose could not be found. But the language of the charter does not seem to warrant such construction. The 34th section declares that it shall be lawful, upon default of payment of the assessment, to levy the same by distress and sale of the goods of the owner or oooupant of the lot assessed. The 35th section provides that if default be made in the payment of the assessment, it shall be lawful to cause the real estate assessed to be sold at auction for a term of years to satisfy the assessment. It is, by the terms of the charter, optional with the city to resort, in the first, instance, either to the goods and chattels of the owner or of the oooupant or to the lot itself, to satisfy the assessment. The remedies are co-ordinate. It is not necessary that the goods and chattels of the owner, or the occupant of the lot, be exhausted before proceeding against the land.
The second objection to the validity of the plaintiff's title is, that more laud was taxed to the plaintiff than lie owned, so that the assessment was higher than it should have been. This constitutes no objection to the validity of the sale. The assessment was in its nature a judicial act. 1 Dutcher 412. If erroneous, the remedy of the party aggrieved was by appeal. It cannot be impeached collaterally.
The last objection to the validity of the plaintiff's title is, that the proceedings of common council to open the street for which the assessment was made are null and void, having been adopted without the requisite application of the land-owners for that purpose. It was held by this court, in the case of The Treasurer of Camden v. Mulford, ante 49, that the city ordinances directing new streets to be opened or altered were in their .nature judicial ; and if the city council had the power of opening or altering streets, the ordinance was not void, and could not be impeached collaterally, however irregular the proceeding may have been. This case falls within the principle of that decision. It is attempted to distinguish this case from that of The Treasurer of Camden v. Mulford on the ground that, in this ease, there was no application to widen the street, and consequently the proceedings were eoram non judiee and void. The distinction, though plausisible, is not substantial. If the application be not signed by the requisite number of land-holders, there is, in judgment of law, no application, as required by the charter. The cases do not differ in principle. The whole action of council proceeds on the ground that they were opening a new street, not widening an old .road or street; though it appears, by the special verdict, that there was an old road where this street is now opened. Council have power both to widen and alter existing streets and to open new ones. The proceedings in both cases are the same, except when a street is to be widened, an application for that purpose from three-fourths of the land-holders is necessary. There was no want of jurisdiction or power in council. The extent of the objection is, that the proceeding was irregular and voidable, not void.
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
Justices Ogden and VredenbtthGH concurred.