Case Name: Mary Dreger, as Executrix, etc., of John F. Dreger, Deceased, Respondent, v. International Railway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-01-21
Citations: 190 A.D. 570
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary Dreger, as Executrix, etc., of John F. Dreger, Deceased, Respondent, v. International Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 190
Pages: 570–575

Head Matter:
Mary Dreger, as Executrix, etc., of John F. Dreger, Deceased, Respondent, v. International Railway Company, Appellant.
Fourth Department,
January 21, 1920.
Street railroad — negligence — collision between automobile truck on which plaintiff’s intestate was riding and electric train — contributory negligence — evidence.
In an action for the death of plaintiff’s husband resulting from the collision, at a signal crossing, between an automobile truck on which he was riding and defendant’s electric train, it was alleged that the defendant was guilty of negligence in operating its train at a high rate of speed across a road in a city in violation of a city ordinance limiting the speed of street railway trains to twelve miles an hour. It appeared that although both the driver and the decedent saw the train approaching at a speed of from twenty-five to fifty miles an hour when they were approximately 900 feet from the crossing the driver immediately accelerated his speed to from twelve to twenty-five miles an hour and so continued until he was practically at the crossing; that there was an unobstructed view of defendant’s railroad for approximately 1,700 feet from the crossing; that a station-stop whistle was blown when the train was 1,000 feet and several sharp blasts when it was from 75 to 100 feet from the crossing; that no passengers were waiting for the train at said crossing and it had not been signaled to stop, and that the driver, although seeing other automobiles' which had presumably stopped about 50 feet from the crossing to let the train pass, drove upon the track.
Held, that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding against the defendant upon the question of negligence; but in view of the rule that in a death ease the burden of proof is imposed upon the defendant to establish contributory negligence it cannot be held as a matter of law that the deceased was guilty of such negligence.
Whether the deceased could have done anything to prevent the accident after it became apparent that there was danger in crossing was a question of fact for the jury.
Clark and Lambert, JJ., dissent, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, International Railway Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 20th day of June, 1919, upon the verdict of a jury for $4,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 23d day of June, 1919, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
Cohn, Chormann & Franchot [Clarence R. Runals of counsel], for the appellant.
Sullivan, Bagley & Wechter [Joseph A. Wechter of counsel], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Kruse, P. J.:
I concur with Mr. Justice Clark in his opinion upon the question of the defendant's negligence, holding the evidence sufficient to warrant a finding against the defendant upon that question. But, in view of the rule that in a death case like this the burden of proof is imposed upon the defendant to establish contributory negligence, I think we cannot hold as a matter of law that the deceased was guilty of such negligence.
This is not a case of failure to look and listen for trains approaching a highway crossing. The deceased, as well as the driver, saw the street car approaching. The fact that no one was waiting at the usual stopping place to take the car did not indicate that none would get off there. The usual stop signal had been given and the city ordinance required the street car to slow down to twelve miles an hour in passing over the crossing. Whether the deceased could have done anything to prevent the accident after it became apparent that there was danger in crossing, was, I think, a question of fact for a jury. (Ward v. Clark, 189 App. Div. 344.)
I am of the opinion that the case was properly submitted to the jury upon the question of contributory negligence, as well as the negligence of the defendant, and that the judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Lambert and Clark, JJ., who dissent in an opinion by Clark, J.