Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Sergio LOPEZ, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-08-24
Citations: 525 Pa. 185
Docket Number: No. 7 E.D. Appeal Docket 1989
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Sergio LOPEZ, Appellant.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDermott, zappala and papadakos, jj.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 525
Pages: 185–198

Head Matter:
579 A.2d 854
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Sergio LOPEZ, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Dec. 12, 1989.
Per Curiam Filed: Aug. 24, 1990.
Amended Sept. 19, 1990.
Opinion in Support of Affirmance Aug. 24, 1990.
Gerald B. Ingram, Gail P. Wilson, John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Div., Leonard N. SosnoV, Asst. Defender, for Amicus-Defender Assn, of Phila.
Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div., Maxine Stotland, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDermott, zappala and papadakos, jj.

Opinion:
AMENDED ORDER OF COURT
PER CURIAM.
The Court being equally divided, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
LARSEN, J., files an opinion in Support of Affirmance joined by McDERMOTT and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a concurring opinion in Support of Affirmance.
NIX, C.J., files an opinion in Support of Reversal joined by FLAHERTY, J.
ZAPPALA, J., files an opinion in Support of Reversal joined by NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J.
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE
LARSEN, Justice.
I would affirm the Superior Court order and in support thereof adopt the Superior Court Memorandum Opinion which is attached hereto.
McDERMOTT and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this opinion in Support of Affirmance.
APPENDIX
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 01702 Philadelphia, 1987
Filed March 7, 1988
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Sergio Lopez,
Appeal from the Order Entered on May 7, 1987, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, at No. 8606-451/452.
Before: WIEAND, KELLY and HESTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
This is a Commonwealth appeal from the May 7, 1987 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which granted appellant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.
The facts are as follows. Relying on a tip that an Hispanic male was selling drugs on the corner of Howard and Somerset Streets in Philadelphia, undercover Police Officer Freddie Chaves went there about 4 p.m. on April 21, 1986. A male later identified as Charlie Garcia approached Chaves and asked him what he wanted. Chaves replied that he wanted a $10.00 bag of cocaine, and Garcia indicated he had to get it.
Garcia walked to 2749 North Howard Street and knocked on the door. Appellant, Sergio Lopez, came to the door, looked toward Officer Chaves, then handed Garcia a clear plastic packet. Garcia gave the packet to Chaves, who gave Garcia a prerecorded $20.00 bill. Garcia returned $10.00 to the officer.
Chaves then drove around the block, notified his back-up that the exchange had occurred, and returned to 2749 North Howard Street. Appellant's back-up, Corporal Murphy and Officer Brosnan arrested Garcia at the corner. Officers Wilbert Kane and Mack McDonald arrested appellant in the house.
Officer Wilbert Kane testified that the house at 2749 North Howard Street had a wooden door and either a screen door or steel grating on the outside. As the officers approached the house, the screen door was ajar and the wooden door was open about a foot. Before entering the premises, the police observed appellant repairing the ceiling while standing on a board balanced between two ladders, and a second man repairing a window. Officer Kane testified that he did not have to open the door any further. The police entered the premises and announced their identity.
Appellant held a hammer and was surrounded by hammers, saws and other tools that could be used as weapons. Officer Kane ordered appellant to climb off of the board while simultaneously clearing the tools from appellant's reach. One of the items cleared away was a brown paper bag which had been folded outward, and which Kane believed to contain nails. As he moved it, however, he noticed it was filled with money. When Kane removed the money, there were clear plastic packets containing white powder underneath. Kane then frisked appellant and removed a wad of money from appellant's pocket. The total money seized was $1,575.00 from the paper bag and $614.00 from appellant's pocket. The prerecorded twenty dollar bill was found in the money taken from appellant's pocket. There were also five Ziploc plastic bags, each containing ten smaller plastic bags, which were filled with white powder. Police also confiscated twelve loose packets which, with the packet purchased by Officer Chaves, totaled sixty-three.
The Commonwealth contends on appeal that the suppression court erred in ruling that police were not presented by exigent circumstances justifying appellant's warrantless arrest. For the reasons which follow, we agree.
Our first inquiry in determining the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest is to ascertain whether probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 406 A.2d 1026 (1979). In the present case, the suppression court found that probable cause did indeed exist, and this determination is not challenged on appeal.
We must next ascertain whether there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify appellant's warrantless arrest. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enumerated the following relevant factors to be considered when determining whether exigent circumstances existed: 1) the gravity of the offense; 2) a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; 3) a clear showing of probable cause; 4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises; 5) likelihood that the suspect will escape if not quickly apprehended; 6) the time of the entry; and 7) whether the entry is peaceable.
The suppression court specifically noted that police "had sufficient information to warrant a reasonable man in the belief that a crime had been committed and the defendant was involved," suppression court opinion at 4, but it did not analyze the factors enumerated in Williams. Instead, it found generally that there were no exigent circumstances present in this case.
Our review of the record compels the conclusion that the application of the Williams factors weighs in favor of finding appellant's warrantless arrest proper. Initially, the gravity of the offense was severe. Possession with intent to deliver is a felony, punishable by imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years or a fine not in excess of $250,-000.00, or both. See Commonwealth v. Miley, 314 Pa.Super. 88, 97, 460 A.2d 778, 783 (1983) ("[T]he gravity of the offense [of possession with intent to deliver] was severe.").
We previously noted that probable cause was shown, thereby satisfying the third factor in Williams. The fourth criterion, a strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises, is clearly present, as appellant was observed by several officers at the residence. Next, the entry was shortly after 4 p.m., in the daylight hours. Further, the entry, and therefore the arrest, followed the commission of the crime by mere minutes. Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra (homicide pre-dated date of arrest by three years, so little need of swift apprehension); Commonwealth v. Wagner, supra (no need of swift apprehension as theft occurred six months earlier).
The second Williams factor, whether or not police held a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed, was not investigated during the suppression hearing. However, we agree with the Commonwealth's observation that experienced narcotics officers may have expected that appellant, engaged as he was in observable drug selling, was indeed armed. The fifth criterion enumerated in Williams, the likelihood of appellant's escape if not quickly apprehended, is certainly present here. Tied with this factor is the likelihood that the drugs and marked government money might disappear.
Finally, Williams requires that we examine the nature of the entry. Officer Kane testified that both the outer and inner doors of the residence were open. He estimated that the inner wooden door was open about a foot, and stated that he did not have to open the door any further. When Kane ordered appellant to climb down from the scaffold, he cooperated; the entry was certainly peaceable.
In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our standard of review is limited to ascertaining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987). It is clear that the suppression court's conclusion, that "the record is absent any facts" which would have allowed the court to conclude that police were presented with exigent circumstances justifying appellant's arrest, is not supported by the record. Further, as appellant's arrest was legal, the officers were lawfully in a position to observe the opened paper bag containing money and drugs. Commonwealth v. Pytak, 278 Pa.Super. 476, 420 A.2d 640 (1980).
The May 7, 1987 order to suppress is reversed and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.