Case Name: WALLACE, Respondent, v. THE HELENA ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Applicant
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1890-07
Citations: 10 Mont. 24
Docket Number: 
Parties: WALLACE, Respondent, v. THE HELENA ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Applicant.
Judges: Blake, C. J., and He Witt, J., concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 24–57

Head Matter:
WALLACE, Respondent, v. THE HELENA ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Applicant.
Imams — Jurisdiction—Constitutional law — Injunction.—Section 12, article viii. of the Constitution, providing that “any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge,” does not, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provision giving district judges concurrent jurisdiction, empower a judge, acting for another, to exercise out of court the judicial power of the judge whose court he is holding, and an order of injunction issued by such judge in chambers is void. (De Win, J., dissenting on rehearing.)
In the matter of the application of Frank Langford for a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clarke County, whereby he was found guilty of contempt for violation of an order of injunction issued by Hon. T. J. Galbraith, presiding judge, who was holding court for Hon. William FI. Hunt, judge of said district.
McQutcheon & Mclntire, for Applicant.
If any contempt has been committed in this case it is that provided for by subdivision 5, of section 584, page 210, of the Compiled Statutes. This presupposes the existence of a valid writ, or process. The paper purporting to be an injunction in this case is neither a writ nor an order. It purports to be a writ, but lacks the essential features of all writs, viz., the attestation by the clerk of the court with the seal of the court. Nor can it be upheld as an order in that it is not signed by the judge of the court whence it purports to emanate.
This court will take judicial notice of the fact that the judge of the First Judicial District is Hon. William H. Hunt. This is also presumed to be known by all persons resident within that district. We submit that when, as in this case, a paper purporting to be signed by the judge of the District Court has not the signature of such judge, but that of another person who is known not to be the judge, that it is not lawful process within the meaning of the above statute. By section 12 of article viii. of the Constitution, it is provided that a judge of the District Court shall be elected in each district; and also “any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge.” In view of another provision of the Constitution, article iv., section 29, that the provisions of the Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether any other than strictly court work can be done by one district judge for another. Expressio unius, etc. It will be noted that no pretense is made in this cause that the alleged injunction was issued while court was in session. We submit further, that the quoted words from article viii., section 12, cannot mean more than that one district judge may act for another, either on request or when the proper judge is absent or otherwise unable to act. The district judges are not judges of the entire State, but only of their respective districts. It cannot be that while traveling around the State they carry with them as an invisible train, the might and power they possess in their respective districts, for if they do, then it would seem that there is nothing to prevent the spectacle of eight judges holding eight District Courts in the same district at the same time. It should be noted that said injunction is signed “T. J. Galbraith, judge of the District Court,” and that it omits any reference to the fact that he was presiding over the first district, or that for any reason he had the right to issue it. The invalidity of this process is clearly apparent on its face. (People v. O’Neil, 47 Cal. 110; Klaise v. State, 27 Wis. 463; Owens v. State, 27 Wis. 456; American Loan & Trust Co. v. Last & West My. Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 182.) The power of the district judges is not the same as that formerly exercised by the territorial judges. These latter were appointed for the Territory, and not for. a particular district, and hence could act anywhere in the Territory. But even under the old practice when one district judge issued a restraining order for another, the reason why he did so was stated in the order; a fortiori should this be done under the present system.
McConnell & Clayberg, for Respondent.
Did Judge Galbraith have jurisdiction to issue the injunction? Under the Constitution “any judge of a District Court may hold court for any other judge, and shall do so when required by law.” (Art. viii. § 12.) The schedule to the Constitution provides that all the laws of the Territory of Montana shall be and remain in full force except where inconsistent with the Constitution. There can be no question but that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the judge of one District Court could issue injunctions in suits pending in other districts. The statute allowed it and nothing prohibited it. Section 172, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that an injunction may be granted by the court in which the action is pending, or “a judge,” not “the judge.” This seems to indicate that more than one judge should have the right to act, otherwise the statute would have said “the judge.” This is made conclusive by sections 551 and 552, which provide that if a party make application to one judge for a writ, which is denied in whole or in part, he shall be in contempt if he apply to another judge for the same writ, except when the first application was refused because of irregularity. This has been the practice for years in the Territory, and the Constitution does not change it, nor are its provisions inconsistent with the statutes above quoted. Any other doctrine would in many cases be a denial of justice. Injunctions, to be useful, must be promptly issued, and unless the power contended for exists, no injunction could possibly be issued in any district where the judge thereof was disqualified, or out of the State, or where there was a vacancy in the office. The case presented here is even stronger than a case of absence or disqualification of the judge. Judge Galbraith was holding the District Court in Lewis and Clarke County at the request of Judge Hunt, under the provisions of the Constitution. He was therefore the judge of this district pro hac vice, and could exercise all the jurisdiction which was vested in Judge Hunt. It cannot be necessary that the authority should appear upon each order. If so, it must appear with every judicial act by him performed. This would violate the presumption of jurisdiction in a court of record, which always obtains. The following cases bear upon the points above urged: Bear v. Cohen, 65 N. C. 511; Clark v. Rugg, 20 Fla. 861; Eureka, etc. Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 311; People v. McCauley, 1 Cal. 379; Wyers v. State, 21 Tex. App. 448; In re Angus, 28 Tex. App. 293; Empire Land & Canal Co. v. Engley, 14 Colo. 289. We submit that the foregoing eases are conclusive of the proposition that Judge Galbraith had jurisdiction to issue the order.

Opinion:
Harwood, J.
It appears from the record, that on the twenty-first day of June, 1890, Franklin E. Wallace, plaintiff, brought an action in the District Court of the First Judicial District against the Helena Electric Eail way Company, defendant, to obtain an order of injunction requiring said defendant to desist and refrain from laying a street railway in a certain portion of Main Street in the city of Helena, Lewis and Clarke County. The complaint and undertaking was filed in the office of the clerk of said District Court on said twenty-first day of June; that during said day Hon. Thomas J. Galbraith, judge of the Fifth Judicial District, was the presiding judge, holding court for Hon. William H. Hunt, judge of the First Judicial District, in the trial of an action at the City of Helena in the First District; that at five o'clock in the evening of June 21st, after court had adjourned until the succeeding Monday, application was made to Judge Galbraith in chambers, by plaintiff's counsel, for an order of injunction in said action to restrain defendant from laying said street railway, which application was heard and an order of injunction was thereupon granted by Judge Galbraith. It further appears from the record, that at the time of granting said order of injunction, Hon. William H. Hunt, judge of the first district, was present in the city of Helena, the county seat of Lewis and Clarke County, which county is the First Judicial District. That on the twenty-third day of June Judge Hunt presided in his court during the morning hour in hearing motions and demurrers, that being motion day, and on the same day Judge Galbraith proceeded with the hearing of the same case which had been on trial in said court before him on the 21st of June, and both said judges signed the minutes of the said court for June 23d. Following the issuance of said order of injunction certain proceedings were had against one Frank Langford, in said First District Court, for the alleged violation of said order, which resulted in the court finding him guilty of contempt, and assessing a fine of five hundred dollars against him as punishment therefor. Whereupon Langford was granted a writ of certiorari from this court to bring up said proceedings, whereby he was found guilty of contempt, for review.
The learned counsel, on behalf of the relator Langford, urges several points of objection touching the jurisdiction of the judge who issued said order of injunction. The first, and as we consider the most important objection, being that Judge Galbraith, the judge of the Fifth Judicial District, while holding court in the first district under the constitutional provision that "any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge," had no power to discharge the other duties, and exercise the other functions of the judge of the first \district; such as issuing an order of injunction in chambers.
Jurisdiction and judicial power must be conferred by law. The judicial districts of the State, and the organization of the District Courts, as now established, rest wholly upon the provisions of the Constitution. The legislature is given power to make changes in the districts, and to increase or decrease the number of judges in any judicial district, but so far this legislative power has not been exercised.
Section 11 of article viii. of our Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the District Courts, and also provides in the latter part of said section as follows: "Said courts and the judges thereof shall have power also to issue, hear, and determine writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, injunction, and other original and remedial writs, and also all writs of habeas corpus on petition by, or on behalf of any person held in actual custody in their respective districts."
Section 12 of article viii. provides as follows: "The State shall be divided into judicial districts, in each of which there shall be elected by the electors thereof one judge of the District Court, whose term of office shall be four years, except that the district judges first elected shall hold their offices only until the general election in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-two (1892), and until their successors are elected and qualified. Any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge, and shall do so when required by law."
Section 13 of article viii. defines the limits of each judicial district of the State. It will be observed that the Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the District Courts and of the judges thereof, and provides for one judge in each district to exercise these judicial powers, in holding court and otherwise, as prescribed by the Constitution. The judicial powers of the district judge for each district are committed to one chosen person, with the provision that "any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge." Under that provision it is clear that any district judge may go into another district and hold court for another judge. It is equally clear, also, that without a provision of law authorizing it, a district judge would not have authority to go into another district and exercise his judicial functions. The jurisdiction must be conferred by law.
The learned counsel for respondent contends that under the clause of section 12 of the Constitution above mentioned, the district judge who goes into another district to "hold court for any other district judge," may exercise all the powers of the judge of the latter district. When first announced the proposition seemed tenable, but upon mature consideration of the provisions of the Constitution we are inclined to conclude otherwise. There are many powers by law committed to a district judge to be exercised otherwise and at other times than in holding court; and moreover, these powers are as well defined in law as the powers of the court. The provision of the Constitution is that "any judge of the District Court may hold court for any other district judge." This provision is limited. Is it implied in this clause that the district judge acting for another under it may exercise out of court all the powers of the judge whose court he is holding? It seems to us that there is no room for such implication. Under this provision of the Constitution any judge of the District Court may be called into another district to hold court for another judge. Such holding of court by the judge going into another district may be for one hour, or one day or more, or for the trial of one cause or more, according to the exigency which prompted the call. The judge of the district may be in his district exercising his official powers in all matters except the special matters committed to the judge called in to hold court. There is at present no provision of law giving to the district judges concurrent jurisdiction in any district. Neither the Constitution nor the legislature has made any provision to that effect. The Constitution has defined the limits of each judicial district, and provided for one judge for each judicial district. When a judge goes out of his district to hold court in another, he holds court "for" another district judge, not concurrently with another district judge, but "for" him.
If, then, there is no provision of law authorizing two judges to exercise their judicial power concurrently in the same district, and as contended by counsel for respondent, Judge Galbraith was empowered, while holding court in the first district, to exercise all the powers of judge of that district, in chambers as well as in holding court, we are confronted with a grave and pertinent question, namely: Was the judicial powers of Judge Hunt suspended while Judge Galbraith was temporarily holding court for him in the first district? We find no provisions of law to warrant us in affirming that proposition. It must follow then, that Judge Galbraith possessed only a special jurisdiction to hold court for the judge of the first district, and was not authorized to exercise his judicial powers in said district, in matters not properly brought before him while holding said court.
This interesting question might be illustrated by a further suggestion. Certain judicial districts in this State comprise three counties. The jurisdiction of the judges of such districts is of course co-extensive with the judicial district. The Constitution provides that terms of court shall be held in each county at stated times. Suppose the judge of a district, comprising three counties, should call in a judge of another district to hold court for him in one of his counties for the trial of one action, can it be affirmed that this special jurisdiction to preside in the court of one county in the district for a limited purpose conferred a jurisdiction to make an order out of court, in a case pending in another county in said district? It is essential that the judicial powers, whether exercised by the courts or the judges thereof, should repose upon clear provisions of law.
McCutcheon & Mclntire, for Applicant.
McConnell & Clayberg, for Bespondent.
For the reasons herein expressed we hold that the judge issuing said order of injunction exceeded his jurisdiction, and therefore the proceedings set forth by the return of said writ of certiorari, whereby said Frank Langford was found guilty of contempt for violating said order of injunction, must be set-aside, and that no further proceedings be had thereunder, and it is so ordered. i
Blake, C. J., and He Witt, J., concur.