Case Name: Pauletta GEDWARD, Individually and as Tutrix of her minor child, Kodi Sonnier, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronnie SONNIER, Acceptance Insurance Company, Glenn Jolivette and Bobby Sonnier, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-05-20
Citations: 713 So. 2d 770
Docket Number: No. 97-1068
Parties: Pauletta GEDWARD, Individually and as Tutrix of her minor child, Kodi Sonnier, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Ronnie SONNIER, Acceptance Insurance Company, Glenn Jolivette and Bobby Sonnier, Defendants—Appellees.
Judges: Before THIBODEAUX, COOKS, SAUNDERS, GREMILLION and PICKETT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 713
Pages: 770–781

Head Matter:
Pauletta GEDWARD, Individually and as Tutrix of her minor child, Kodi Sonnier, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Ronnie SONNIER, Acceptance Insurance Company, Glenn Jolivette and Bobby Sonnier, Defendants—Appellees.
No. 97-1068.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 20, 1998.
Anthony F. Whitford, Lafayette, Chris Vil-lemarette, Alexandria, Craig A. Davis, Lafayette, for Pauletta Gedward, et al.
Edwin Gustav Preis, Jr., Lafayette, Earl F. Sundmaker, New Orleans, for Ronnie Son-nier, et al.
Glenn Jolivette, pro se.
Robert Murray Mahony, Lafayette, for Acceptance Insurance Co.
Archie Paul Joseph, Breaux Bridge, for Bobby Sonnier.
Before THIBODEAUX, COOKS, SAUNDERS, GREMILLION and PICKETT, JJ.

Opinion:
THIBODEAUX, Judge.
Pauletta Gedward seeks review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Acceptance Insurance Company (AIC). Gedward's minor son, Kodi Sonnier, was injured when he was thrown from a four-wheeled, all-terrain vehicle (ATV) while riding it on the property of his father, Ronnie Sonnier. Gedward frsued individually and as tutrix of her minor son, for damages sustained as a result of the accident. The named defendants which are relevant to this appeal are Ronnie Sonnier and AIC, the homeowner insurer. Sonnier and AIC subsequently filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment on the issue of coverage for Gedward's claims. AIC's motion was granted, thereby dismissing all claims against it, and Gedward appealed.
We find that the trial court erred in granting AIC's Motion for Summary Judgment because AIC failed to establish the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to Gedward's claim against it. Therefore, we reverse and, as a matter of law, find that the liability and medical provisions of the policy apply.
I.
ISSUES.
We must decide:
1. whether the trial court erred in finding that Kodi Sonnier was injured on a motor vehicle and was therefore excluded from liability coverage pursuant to the policy's motor vehicle exclusion; and,
2. whether the trial court erred in finding that Kodi was a resident of his father's home on the date of the accident and, therefore, excluded from medical payments coverage.
II.
FACTS
Ten-year old Kodi Sonnier suffered severe head injuries as a result of being thrown from a four-wheeled, ATV on June 8, 1995. On the date of the accident, Kodi and two of his siblings were spending the weekend with their father, Ronnie Sonnier, at his home. Sonnier shared joint custody of the children with | gPauIetta Gedward, and was exercising his weekend visitation pursuant to the custody agreement in effect at the time. He was to return them to their mother and domiciliary parent, Gedward, on Sunday, June 4, 1995.
On the day of the accident, Glenn Jolivette, Sonnier's adult, half-brother, arrived at the house driving the ATV. The ATV did not belong to Jolivette or Sonnier, but instead belonged to their brother, Bobby Sonnier. Bobby Sonnier had taken the ATV to a friend to have maintenance work done, and was working offshore on the weekend of the accident. Jolivette took the ATV from this friend's house without his brother's permission.
Sonnier and the children were inside of the house watching TV when Jolivette arrived, but ventured outside upon hearing the ATV pull into the yard. Jolivette had been there the day before with the ATV and had given the children rides on it. Sonnier never rode the ATV and did not know how to operate it.
Apparently, shortly after arriving, Joli-vette realized that it was getting late and that he needed to return home so that he could prepare for church. He lived two or three miles away and asked Sonnier to give him a ride home. He said that he was leaving the ATV there, and told Sonnier that he could give his children rides on it later if he wanted to, while quickly pointing out how to start the vehicle and place it in motion. Sonnier testified in his deposition that his response was, "Okay, I'm going to go in the house and get my keys."
Approximately five minutes later, while Sonnier was still inside looking for his keys, he heard that the ATV was "really geared or revved up." He looked out of the window and saw Kodi riding it alone on the back of his property. Sonnier knew that Kodi did not know how to drive or handle the ATV, especially at the speed he was going, so he ran outside to stop him. However, when he made it to the scene, |4he found Kodi lying on the ground. He picked him up, noticed that he had a laceration on his head that was bleeding, and ran to a neighbor's house and waited underneath the carport for the ambulance that had been called.
Kodi lapsed into a coma in the ambulance as he was being taken to Lafayette General Hospital. It was discovered that Kodi was leaking brain fluid and had a fractured skull. The fracture resulted in bone emerging into Kodi's head, causing his brain to swell, and he was not given a good prognosis for survival. Fortunately, he underwent a successful operation and began awakening from the coma on Monday night. Kodi remained in the hospital for five weeks and underwent extensive physical therapy. As a result of the accident, his left hand and leg have remained very weak, and he has a permanent, large scar on the back of his head.
Gedward filed suit, naming Sonnier, Joli-vette, Bobby Sonnier, and AIC as defendants. She alleged that Sonnier was "at fault for failing to supervise his minor child, Kodi, while Kodi was on his premises," thus permitting Kodi unrestricted access to the ATV. She also alleged that AIC was liable in solido with the other defendants "by virtue of the terms of the policy of liability insurance it issued to Ronnie Sonnier covering his premises located at 229 Mr. Cliff Road in Lafayette."
AIC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on June 5,1997 and a hearing was held on July 7, 1997. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing AIC from the suit. The court gave oral reasons for its decision, stating that it found Kodi Sonnier to have been a resident of his father's dwelling on the date of the accident, and that the ATV qualified as a "motor vehicle" under the terms of AIC's policy and, therefore, the policy did not provide coverage. Gedward perfected this appeal.
JbIII.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Gedward argues that the liability exclusions of the policy relied upon by the trial court to deny coverage and to grant the summary judgment in favor of AIC were not applicable. The provision relied upon states:
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS
A. COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY AND
B. COVERAGE F — MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO OTHERS
1. Coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
e. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use loading, or unloading of;
(2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to YOU.
Further, the policy provides this definition of "motor vehicle" upon which the court relied to grant the summary judgment:
E. "motor vehicle" means:
3. a motorized golf cart, snowmobile or other motorized land vehicle owned by an insured. It must be designed for recreational use off public roads and off an insured location. A motorized golf cart while used for golfing purposes is not a motor vehicle;
(Emphasis added).
Gedward asserts that: (1) the duty of Son-nier to properly supervise his minor child arose independently of any ownership, maintenance, or use of the fourwheeled ATV; (2) the ATV did not qualify as a "motor vehicle" under the exclusionary language of the policy because it was not "owned" by the insured and was not designed for use off an insured location; and, (3) alternatively, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ATV was, in fact, loaned to Sonnier 16and consequently whether it was subject to the liability exclusion. Finally, Gedward asserts that the trial court incorrectly found that Kodi was a resident of his father's home, and therefore not eligible to receive medical payments coverage.
AIC disagrees and contends that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor based on the exclusions in the homeowner's policy issued to Sonnier. AIC argues that the alleged duty of Ronnie Sonnier to supervise Kodi arose from the use of the ATV which was loaned to Sonnier by Jolivette before the accident occurred. Further, it contends that the ATV is, in fact, a motor vehicle according to the definition provided in the policy and, therefore, the motor vehicle use exclusion of the policy precludes coverage for liability.
In addition, it asserts that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Kodi was a resident of his father's home on the date of the accident and, therefore, the medical payments provision of the policy does not provide coverage for him. The applicable provision states:
SECTION II LIABILITY COVERAGES
B. COVERAGE F — PERSONAL MEDICAL PAYMENTS
We will pay . for the necessary medical expenses incurred or medically determined within one year from the date of an accident causing bodily injury_ This coverage does not apply to YOU or a resident of YOUR dwelling.
(Emphasis added).
Appellate courts undertake a de novo review of motions for summary judgment. Potter v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 615 So.2d 318 (La.1993). In this case, while applying the requisite standard, we must keep in mind the mandates of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2), which requires the granting of summary judgment if a movant, who does not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is the subject of the motion, shows the absence of factual support for one or more of the elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action or defense, and the opposing party fails thereafter, to produce factual support that will establish his ability to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. See also Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/96); 685 So.2d 691, writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97); 690 So.2d 41.
Liability Coverage
First, we will address Gedward's contention that the summary judgment was improperly granted to AIC because Sonnier's failure to properly supervise Kodi arose independently of any ownership, maintenance, or use of the ATV. Gedward asserts as support for her theory, Frazier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 347 So.2d 1275 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 351 So.2d 165 (La.1977); LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So.2d 471 (La.1978); and Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 532 So.2d 1171 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988).
In Frazier, 347 So.2d 1275, the defendant's car was being driven by her daughter when the vehicle struck and injured a small child who had been left in the defendant's care. The first circuit held that although the defendant's homeowner's policy contained an exclusion for the operation of a motor vehicle, the cause of action against the defendant was the improper supervision by the defendant of the child who was entrusted to her care. Id. Thus, coverage was applicable because the cause-in-fact negligence was in the failure to supervise the child and not in the operation of the vehicle. Id.
In LeJeune, 865 So.2d 471, the plaintiff sought to recover for the wrongful death of the decedent who was killed at an intersection while riding as a passenger in a hearse in a funeral procession that was being led by a deputy sheriff. Despite a flashing red light, the driver of the hearse continued through the intersection without stopping and was hit by a speeding driver on the favored Ighighway. The deputy sheriff had failed to secure the intersection so that the vehicles in the procession could proceed through it without stopping, despite the flashing red light. The supreme court held that the department's general professional liability policy provided coverage for a deputy sheriffs negligent acts, unless the officer's negligence was precluded by the automobile use exclusion which denied coverage for "bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, or use, loading or unloading, of land motor vehicles." Id. The court held that the exclusion was inapplicable:
An exclusion clause in a liability policy is strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage, if more than one interpretation is possible. Consonant with this principle, the decisions we could find hold that, where the automobile use exclusion clause is sought to be applied so as to avoid coverage for injuries otherwise covered by a general liability policy, the exclusion clause does not apply where the insured's act is a result of negligence independent of, even though concurring with, his use of an automobile.
Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
This issue was addressed again in Smith, 532 So.2d 1171. Minors were injured on two Honda four-wheel vehicles owned by the defendants, when they collided while riding on the defendants' property. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for negligent supervision of the minors. Our fourth circuit brethren relied upon Frazier and LeJeune and held that the homeowner's policy did provide liability coverage, despite its motor vehicle use exclusion, because the asserted negligence or cause-in-fact of the injuries, was the defendants' failure to supervise the minors who were operating the vehicles and not the negligent operation of the vehicles. Id.
AIC, however, asks this court to consider Mahlum v. Baker, 52,876 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/94); 639 So.2d 820. The defendant in this wrongful death action reconvened against the plaintiffs, and asserted that they were independently negligent bin the death of their child, for failing to properly supervise him while he operated a trail bike he was riding when he was struck by the defendant's vehicle. At issue was whether the plaintiffs' mobile home insurance policy precluded coverage because of its exclusion for motor vehicle operation or use of motor vehicles while away from the premises or ways immediately adjoining the premises. After finding that the plaintiffs did in fact breach their duty to supervise their child, the court addressed the issue of whether the operation or use of the motor vehicle was essential to the breach of that specific duty. To answer this question, the court employed the "common sense" approach suggested by Messrs. McKenzie and Johnson in their treatise on insurance law. See William Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, III, 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Insurance Law and Practice § 72, at 186 (1986). The second circuit stated:
Under this approach, most accidents resulting from the movement of a vehicle by an underaged child, either intentionally or accidentally, should be classified as arising out of "use" of the vehicle. Furthermore, any breach by the child's parents to prevent or supervise such a "use," will also be deemed to have arisen therefrom. However, this general rule should not be without exception. Each decision regarding whether the "use" of the automobile is an essential ingredient of the duty breached by the parents should be tempered by "common sense."
Mahlum, 639 So.2d at 825 (citations omitted).
The fourth circuit's Smith decision, 532 So.2d 1171, was specifically rejected. Instead, the Mahlum court held that the injured child was operating or using the trail bike when the accident occurred and the plaintiffs' alleged negligence was firmly grounded in the supervision of their child's use or operation of the bike. Mahlum, 639 So.2d 820. The court further stated, "To find otherwise . would effectively create an automobile insurance contract out of a mobile home insurance Impolicy that was designed and intended to cover liability resulting from incidents occurring on the insureds' premises." Id. at 827.
We do not agree with the second circuit's reasoning on this issue. We follow the reasoning espoused by our supreme court and the first and fourth circuits on this issue of whether an insured's failure to supervise arose independently of the maintenance, use or operation of a vehicle, for purposes' of determining the applicability of an automobile use exclusion. We did, however, give consideration to the "common sense" approach employed in Mahlum, 639 So.2d 820, but found it more reasonable to conclude that the circumstance of Kodi being injured while using the ATV was incidental to Sonnier's alleged breach of duty. Our common sense tells us that the damages to Kodi arose out of Sonnier's alleged breach of his duty to supervise his child, and the "use" of the ATV was not essential to the breach of that duty.
Further, we find that the summary judgment was also erroneously granted because the provisions relied upon to deny liability coverage are ambiguous. Exclusion clauses in liability policies are to be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage if more than one reasonable interpretation is possible. LeJeune, 365 So.2d 471. As stated above, AIC's policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of the use of a "motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to [an insured]." However, the policy defines motor vehicle as "a motorized golf cart, snowmobile or other motorized land vehicle owned by an insured. It must be designed for recreational use off public roads and off an insured location."
The defendant, AIC, argues that the language is not ambiguous in that the exclusion relied upon to deny coverage expressly provides that the motor vehicle can be either "owned OR operated by OR rented OR loaned to" [the insured]; in lnessenee, it argues that the exclusion specifically redefines and broadens the term "motor vehicle." Nevertheless, we believe that it would be reasonable for an insured to conclude that the appropriate definition of motor vehicle is that which is specifically provided in the policy's section entitled "Definitions," which describes "motor vehicle," in relevant part, only as that which is owned by an insured. As a result, we find that the language in the two sections of the policy results in an ambiguity and, therefore, the language must be interpreted in favor of coverage. See Garcia v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 576 So.2d 975 (La.1991); La.Civ.Code art.2056. Consequently, we need not reach the issue of whether the ATV was "loaned" to Sonnier on the date of the accident.
Medical Payments Coverage
The second issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in finding that the policy precluded medical payments coverage based upon the residency status of Kodi. Under Section II—Liability Coverages, Coverage F—Personal Medical Payments, the policy provides for the payment of necessary medical expenses incurred or medically determined within one year of the date of the accident causing bodily injury. However, "[t]his coverage does not apply to [an insured] or a resident of [an insured's] dwelling other than residence employees." AIC asserts that the trial court correctly denied this coverage to Kodi because at the time of the accident he was a resident of his father's dwelling.
Whether a person is a resident of a household is a mixed question of law and fact that is determined on a case-by-case basis. Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 407 So.2d 401 (La.1981); Prudhomme v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 95-1502 (La.App. 3 Cir.); 671 So.2d 1116, writ granted in part, denied in part, 96-1030 (La.6/7/96); 674 So.2d 987; Chapman v. Poirrier, 96-977 (La.App. 3 Cir.); 689 So.2d 623, writ denied, 97-1164 (La.6/20/97); 695 So.2d 1358. Although there is no single manner of interpretation that.applies to determining who is in f^ct a resident of a household for purposes of insurance coverage, our supreme court articulated a formula that focuses inquiry upon the existence of membership in a group, rather than attachment to a building, and intent to remain and choice, rather than location. Bearden v. Rucker, 437 So.2d 1116 (La.1983). The facts, circumstances, and distinctions of each case is of considerable importance in making this inquiry. Hidalgo v. Boudreaux, 69-1607 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/16/97); 693 So.2d 216.
This case involves a determination of the residency of a child of a divorced couple who share joint custody. Medical payments coverage turns on whether Kodi is a resident of his father's home, although his mother is the domiciliary parent. It is an elementary principle that a person may have many residences but only one domicile. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 La. 246, 178 So.2d 238 (1965). In addition, it is also well-settled that residency does not have a minimal time requirement. In re Booty, 95-828 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/95); 665 So.2d 444. Residence is formally defined as the "[p]lace where one actually lives or has his home; a person's dwelling place or place of habitation; an abode with no present intention of definite and early removal and with purpose to remain for an undetermined period, not infrequently, but not necessarily combined with design to stay permanently." Black's Law Dictionary 907 (6th ed.1991). Moreover, it is important to consider:
Generally, the construction or signification of the term is governed by the connection in which it is used, and depends on the context, the subject matter, and the object, purpose, or result designed to be accomplished by its use, and its meaning is to be determined from the facts and circumstances taken together in each particular case.
Bearden, 437 So.2d at 1120, quoting Mathis v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 399 So.2d 273 (Ala.1981).
In Mobley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 28,357 (La.App. 2 Cir.); 674 So.2d 1117, unit denied, 96-1402 (La.9/20/96); 679 So.2d 433, that court was faced with the issue of determining who a minor child "lived with" ip order to determine whether the insurance policy at issue provided coverage for her. The court stated:
We find that some of the factor's that determine whether a child lives with the named insured include, but are not limited to (1) where the child spends his time when not employed or at school; (2) where the child keeps his or her clothing or other personal belongings; (3) where the child receives his or her mail, including official notices and mail from friends; and (4) whether the child has a bedroom in the parent's house. Of course these factors are not exclusive, nor is any one factor more determinative than another. Consideration should also be given to the fact that a child may "live with" each separated or divorced parent under a joint custody plan.
Id. at 1121.
Although the court in Mobley distinguished between making a determination of whether a child "fives with" a parent and "resides" with a parent, it did note the similarities between the two concepts, and held that Bearden, 437 So.2d 1116, although not controlling, was still persuasive. We too, find that the terms, in this context, are similarly situated, and believe the factors espoused in Mobley are useful to our determination.
It is clear from the record that when Kodi is not at school, he spends the majority of his time with his mother. His clothing and other personal belongings are kept at his mother's home. His mother's home is also where he receives any mail or official notices and is also the place where he has his own bedroom. Sonnier, Gedward and Kodi agree that Kodi resides with his mother, whieh is also evi-dencedjuby the fact that Kodi did not have a personal bedroom at his father's- home, nor did he keep personal belongings there. In addition, it was never mutually intended by Kodi's parents that he would remain at his father's home for any extended period of time.
Although these factors and the principles fisted above assist in clarifying this nebulous term, in this case it is also necessary to consider the residence of the parents because a child's residence is irrevocably tied to the intention or residency of the parents. See In re Booty, 665 So.2d 444. Kodi's parents shared joint custody; nevertheless, we find the "state of mind" or intention of the parents regarding Kodi's residence, as well as the findings stated above, to be persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that Kodi was not a "resident" of Sonnier's household on the date of the accident and, therefore, he is not precluded from receiving medical payments coverage by the policy exclusion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The trial court incorrectly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of AIC. The defendant, AIC, did not establish that Gedward would be unable to establish an element of its claim against it and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rather, the motor vehicle use exclusion relied upon failed to limit liability coverage because the cause of action arose out of the insured's failure to supervise his minor son, and not out of the "use" of the ATV. In addition, the term "motor vehicle" was ambiguous requiring that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of coverage. Further, medical payments coverage was incorrectly denied based on a finding that Kodi was a resident of the insured's household on the date of the accident. It is well-settled that a determination of the ambiguous term "residence" 1 i5is a mixed question of law and fact that is to be decided on a case-by-ease basis pursuant to a fact-intensive evaluation of the circumstances. Bearden, 437 So.2d 1116. Consequently, our de novo review of the record led us to conclude that Kodi was not a resident of his father's household on the date of the accident and, therefore, was eligible for medical payments coverage.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The costs of this appeal are assessed to defendant-appellee, Acceptance Insurance Company.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
GREMILLION, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.