Case Name: Carlos Javier MARULANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE; Jay Mason, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-01-25
Citations: 467 F. App'x 590
Docket Number: No. 10-16639
Parties: Carlos Javier MARULANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE; Jay Mason, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 467
Pages: 590–591

Head Matter:
Carlos Javier MARULANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE; Jay Mason, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 10-16639.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 17, 2012.
Filed Jan. 25, 2012.
Carlos Javier Marulanda, Coleman, FL, pro se.
Suzanne M. Chynoweth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USPX-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
The Honorable H. Russel Holland, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Federal prisoner Carlos Javier Marulanda appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment due process rights in connection with the destruction of his personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because there is no due process violation when Congress has provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the unauthorized acts of a federal employee. See 31 U.S.C. § 3724(a) (allowing the Attorney General to settle claims for losses caused by law enforcement personnel); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (due process was not violated by government official's intentional deprivation of property, provided that a meaningful post-deprivation remedy was available).
Marulanda's remaining contentions, including those concerning the law of the case doctrine, are unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.