Case Name: Rick Francis CRADDUCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick COURSEY, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-05-20
Citations: 573 F. App'x 671
Docket Number: No. 12-35983
Parties: Rick Francis CRADDUCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick COURSEY, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: ALARCÓN, TASHIMA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 573
Pages: 671–672

Head Matter:
Rick Francis CRADDUCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick COURSEY, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 12-35983.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted May 14, 2014.
Filed May 20, 2014.
Nell Brown, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDOR-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Portland, OR, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Carolyn Alexander, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Shannon Terry Reel, Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, OR, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: ALARCÓN, TASHIMA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Rick Francis Cradduck appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
1. The state trial court did not err in accepting Cradduck's pre-trial waiver of his right to counsel. The trial court fully informed Cradduck of the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties he faced, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Despite the trial court's emphatic recommendation to retain counsel, Cradduck insisted on proceeding pro se. The trial court's conclusion that Cradduck's waiver was knowing and intelligent was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (holding that waiver was valid where defendant unequivocally declared his desire to waive his right to counsel, and the record indicated that defendant was literate, understanding, and "voluntarily exercising his informed free will").
2. Cradduck's claim that the denial of a continuance violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is procedurally barred because Cradduck did not fairly present the operative facts of this claim to the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992- 93 (9th Cir.2013). We therefore do not reach its merits.
The judgment of the district court denying Cradduck's petition for a writ of habe-as corpus is
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. We need not consider whether the trial court's denial of a continuance violated Crad-duck's right to due process because Cradduck has not pursued that claim on appeal.