Case Name: SPENCER PEST CONTROL COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Lewis E. SMITH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-04-29
Citations: 637 So. 2d 292
Docket Number: No. 93-2368
Parties: SPENCER PEST CONTROL COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Lewis E. SMITH, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 637
Pages: 292–295

Head Matter:
SPENCER PEST CONTROL COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Lewis E. SMITH, Appellee.
No. 93-2368.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 29, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 8, 1994.
Vincent G. Torpy, Jr., Frese, Nash & Tor-py, P.A., Melbourne, for appellant.
Timothy R. Askew, Jr., Sanford, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Chief Judge.
Spencer Pest Control Company sued for a temporary (and permanent) injunction to restrain Lewis E. Smith, its former manager, from violating a noncompete agreement when Smith resigned from Spencer and accepted employment as a pest control technician with a competing company. The trial court found that there had been no showing of irreparable injury and denied the temporary injunction. We affirm.
Section 542.33(1), Florida Statutes (1993) makes all contracts which restrain one from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business void unless such restraint is expressly permitted by section 542.33(2) or section 542.33(3). See Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic v. White, P.A., 629 So.2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
Section 542.33(3) is inapplicable because it relates only to partners. Section 542.33(2) permits an employee to contract "to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business . within a reasonably limited time and area." Even assuming that becoming a mere employee (as opposed to a stockholder, manager or supervisor) of a competing company fits under the legislative intent of "carrying on or engaging in a similar business," enforcement by injunction of even a valid restraint agreement is expressly limited to those situations in which there is a "showing of irreparable injury." Section 542.33(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993).
Although courts often will accept a stipulation in lieu of proof, it is not proof. And while a stipulation might be construed as the employee's waiver of the employer's statutory obligation to show irreparable injury, it is not itself a showing of irreparable injury. It is probable that an employer who has the economic leverage to require a non-compete agreement can also require a stipulation of irreparable injury. Because the legislature created a strong public policy against restraint of trade agreements except under a very limited set of circumstances, we find that its requirement of a showing of irreparable injury cannot be stipulated away by an employee. The parties may not contract in violation of public policy.
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN, J., concurs.
COBB, J., dissents, with opinion.