Case Name: OCE JONES v. STATE
Court: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1913-12-20
Citations: 10 Okla. Crim. 216
Docket Number: No. A-1717
Parties: OCE JONES v. STATE.
Judges: DOYLE, J., concurs. FURMAN, J., absent, and not participating.
Reporter: Oklahoma Criminal Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 216–233

Head Matter:
OCE JONES v. STATE.
No. A-1717.
Opinion Filed November 1, 1913.
Rehearing Opinion December 20, 1913.
(136 Pac. 182.)
(137 Pac. 121.)
1. APPEAL — Review — Verdict — -Conflicting Evidence. Under the law in this state issues of fact arising in the trial of a criminal action are for the jury, and when there is a clear conflict in the testimony their finding thereon will not be disturbed by this court.
2. STATUTES — Repeal of Penal Statute — Effect — Continuance of Prosecution. Under the common law the repeal of a penal statute operated as a remission of all penalties for violations thereof committed before its repeal, unless the repealing statute contained a provision expressly reserving the right to the state to continue suet prosecution, but under the Constitution and laws of our state this rule is abrogated; there being a constitutional provision and a general statute reserving this right to the state.
3. WORDS AND PHRASES — “Penalty”—“Liability”—“Forfeit-' ure” — “Punishment.” The words “penalty,” “liability,” and “forfeiture” are frequently treated as synonymous with the word “punishment,” in connection with crimes of the highest grade.
On REHEARING.
1. APPEAL — Harmless Error — “Technicality”—Record — Presumption of Regularity, (a) It amounts to a miscarriage of justice for an appellate court to reverse a conviction upon purely technical objections.
(b) A technicality, within the meaning of section “a” of this syllabus, is a proposition of law which in the abstract is correct, but which does not involve the jurisdiction of the court or the substantial rights of the defendant.
(e) If a principal of law has been violated during a trial, which involves the jurisdiction of the court, or which affeets the substantial rights of the defendant, it will not constitute a technicality under section “a” of this syllabus, but will be reversible error.
(d) The burden is on an appellant to show that the law was violated upon his trial in such a manner as to involve the jurisdiction of the court or to deprive him of a substantial right; unless this affirmatively appears from the record, where the evidence shows that a defendant is guilty, the appellate court has not the legal right or power to reverse a conviction.
(e) There must be an end to litigation; every presumption must be indulged in favor of the regularity of proceedings in courts of record and in support of the verdicts of juries; and they will not be disturbed unless it affirmatively appears from, the record that they are erroneous and that the defendant was injured thereby.
2. SAME — Petition for Rehearing — Essentials. In a petition for rehearing the grounds upon which it is sought must be distinctly and particularly set forth.
3. EVIDENCE — Rebuttal. Where a defendant places a witness upon the stand who testified in his behalf that a certain man was at a given place upon a given day, and the presence of said man at said place is material, the state on cross-examination or by direct evidence may show why said man was there.
4. LARCENY — Harmless Error — Evidence—Ownership of Premises— Statements of Coconspirators. (a) Where a defendant is charged with larceny, and the ownership or control of a certain pasture, in which the stolen property was found, is in question, it is competent for the state to show that a year before the larceny was committed the defendant had used the said pasture or exercised control over it. The length of time which had elapsed would go to the weight of the evidence and would not affect its admissibility.
(b) Where the evidence tends to establish a conspiracy to steal cattle and horses, conversations with, or statements to or by, persons who are connected with this conspiracy, and during its continuance, are admissible in evidence against any of the co-conspirators upon trial for larceny.
(e) If upon a trial for larceny a witness is erroneously permitted to testify to a statement made by him to a third party and further testifies that such statement was true, and it appears from the record that this statement was material to the issue of guilt or innocence, such positive and direct testimony given in court would cause the error, in allowing the witness to tell what he had said to the third'party, to become harmless.
5. WITNESSES — Defense — Evidence — Self-Serving Declaration — Cross-Examination — Wife of Accused, (a) AVhere the wife of a defendant takes the stand for the purpose of proving an alibi in his behalf and testifies that he was at home with his family at the time of the commission of the crime but left home early on the following morning, it is competent for the state on cross-examination to ask said witness how long it was after the commission of said crime before defendant returned home.
(b) Where a defendant is charged with the commission of a crime and leaves the country and is gone for seven months, or any length of time, it is not competent for him to prove when he returned home or use in evidence any statements which he may have made as to where he had been, and what he had been doing in such absence, as such statements would clearly be self-serving declarations.
6. EVIDENCE — Accomplices — Corroboration — Instructions. Eor a correct instruction as to the testimony of an accomplice, see opinion.
(b) The law does not require the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the testimony of an accomplice has been corroborated. All that is necessary is that there must be some other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged against him.
(c) Jurors are presumed to be men of ordinary intelligence and to understand the English language. It is therefore not necessary for the court in its instructions to define the meaning of the words, “connect the defendant with the crime charged against him. ’ ’
7. APPEAL — Reduction of Sentence — Sufficiency of Evidence, (a) While this court has the power to modify a judgment and reduce a sentence inflicted by the jury or trial court, this power cannot be arbitrarily used, but can only be exercised where it appears from the record that an injustice has been done in assessing the punishment upon him.
(b) Eor circumstances which justified and required the infliction of the maximum punishment in a case of larceny, see opinion.
■Appeal from District Court, Carter County; S. H. Russell, Judge.
Oce Jones was convicted of larceny of animals, and appeals.
Affirmed.
Johnson & McGill and Cruce & Potter, for plaintiff in error.
Smith C. Matson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
ARMSTRONG, P. J.
The plaintiff in error, Oce Jones, was convicted at the November, 1911, term of the district court of Carter county on a charge of larceny of domestic animals, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of ten years. To review the judgment of conviction he has brought this appeal. The prosecuting witness, W. R. Cypert, and the accused were near neighbors, living in Carter county, Okla. On the night of January 18, 1911, four horses and one mule were stolen from Cypert, and were later found in the Arbuclde Mountains, in a pasture used by the accused. Warren Yell and Bryant Ballew were jointly charged with the offense. They testified against the accused that on the evening of the larceny he gave them $10 each to help him move the horses up into the Arbuckle Mountains to his pasture; that he told them he would see that they did not get into trouble. The accused bought some carbolic acid at Heflin's drug store just before the trip. This fact is testified to 'by witness Coffee and by the druggist Heflin. The three left Jones' house on horseback, the accused riding a large, brown bay horse, the property of Yell, the other two' riding smaller horses; each horse being shod all round. They rode north to the pasture of prosecuting witness, and there found the horses and mule. The accused cut the wire fence with clippers, and they took four horses and one mule. They had some trouble catching the horses, and left one they could not get hold of. They left the field and traveled south along what the accused told his associates was the Ardmore road, for the purpose of turning people off their track and leaving the impression that the horses had gone south. After going 'some distance they doubled back on an old road, and went back north to the Arbuckle Mountains, to a pasture commonly known as "No Mans" pasture, in which the accused had been keeping stock. It appears that this pasture is on top of the Arbuckles, and is made by adjoining landowners fencing their lands on all sides of it. No one seems to have any legitimate claim to the tract of land constituting this pasture. This is apparently a place scarcely ever visited, and practically impossible of being found except by those being very familiar with the surrounding country and its particular location. This place was reached early in the morning of January 19th, and is apparently about fifteen miles from where the horses were taken. After reaching the pasture the stock were rebranded with the carbolic acid purchased the day before at Heflin's drug store in Lone Grove. Three or four days later, when the horses were found, there were fresh brands on them which had the appearance of having been made by acid and bore the odor of carbolic acid. There was a leather halter on the mule, which was taken off and hidden under a rock. One of the accomplices told the officers where this halter could be found, and later took the officers to this place and the halter was so found. After branding the stock the parties separated; Jones going one directiqn, Yell and Ballew in another. It appears that the horse the accused rode on the night of the larceny belonged to accomplice Yell; that he recovered the same about a month later from a brother-in-law of the accused. Yell and Ballew were arrested a short time after the larceny. The accused was not located for six or seven months, and not until he came into Ardmore and surrendered to the officers. His family, however, continued to live at Lone Grove and near the town of Dixie.
The accused entered a plea of not guilty and undertook to establish an alibi. The principal witnesses testifying thereto were two brothers, and from a reading of the record it is not surprising that the jury found against him, as the testimony of these witnesses is thoroughly impeached by the state, and their stories are most unlikely. In fact there is very little straightforward, reasonable, convincing testimony on behalf of the accused. There are many other corroborating circumstances supporting the stories told by the accomplices, entirely sufficient in our judgment to warrant the finding of the jury. With this in view this court will not reverse this judgment, in the absence of substantial errors of law.
The only material law point raised by counsel for plaintiff in error is based on the contention that the crime was committed on the 18th of January, 1911, and that the prosecution was not begun until August 31, 1911; that during this interim the Legislature repealed the statute under which the crime was prosecuted.
The statute on which the prosecution was based reads as follows:
"Any person in this state who shall steal any horse, cow or hog shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than ten years; provided that where the horse or horses stolen are proven to be work stock the punishment shall be not less than three years nor more than ten years. The word 'horse' as used in this act shall include all animals of the equine species, and the word 'cow' shall include all animals of the bovine species." (Sess. Laws 1910, c. 98.)
The amendment which counsel contend repealed that statute is as follows:
"Section 1. That section 1, chapter 98, 1910, Session Laws of Oklahoma, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
. "Section 1. Any person in this state who shall steal any horse, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than five years nor more than ten years; and any person in this state who shall steal any cow, or hog shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than two '(2) years, nor more than ten years. The word 'horse' as used in this act, shall include all animals of the equine species, and the word 'cow' shall include all animals of the bovine species." (Sess. Laws 1911, c. 92.)
There are two reasons why this contention is not well founded, only one of which we will discuss.
Section 54 of article 5 of our Constitution is as follows:
"The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any ac crued right, or penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute."
Section 2972, Comp. Raws 1909, provides:
"The repeal of any statute by the Legislative Assembly shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability."
The construction of an identical statute was before the United States Supreme Court in the case of U. S. v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 401, 9 Sup. Ct. 100, 32 L. Ed. 480, in which the court said:
"It is conceded that, under the general principles of the common law, the repeal of the jjenal statute operates as a remission of all penalties for violations of it committed before its repeal, and a release from prosecution therefor after said repeal, unless there be either a clause in the repealing statute, or a provision of some other statute, expressly authorizing such prosecution. In this case the court is of the opinion that section 13, Rev. Stat., contains such provision. It reads as follows: 'The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide; and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.' This section, we think, clearly excepts offenses committed before the passage of the repealing act of 1884. To show this, it is only necessary to read the act of 1884 in connection with section 13, Rev. Stat., as one act. It would then be read substantially as follows: 'Be it enacted,' etc., 'that the act entitled "An act relating to claim agents and attorneys in pension cases," approved June 20th, 1878, is hereby repealed: Provided, that said repeal shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred thereunder, and that the same shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty or liability.' The only ground upon which the correctness of this interpretation may be doubted is that the words 'penalty,' 'liability,' and 'forfeiture' do not apply to crimes and the punishment therefor, such as we are now considering. We cannot assent to this. These words have been used by the great masters of crown law and the elementary writers as synonymous with the word 'punishment/ in connection with crimes of the highest grade. Thus, Blackstone speaks of criminal law as that 'branch of jurisprudence which teaches of the nature, extent, and degrees of every crime, and adjusts to it its adequate and necessary penalty.' Alluding to the importance of this department of legal science, he says: 'The enacting of penalties to which a whole nation shall be subject should be calmly and maturely considered.' Referring to the unwise policy of inflicting capital punishment for certain comparatively slight offenses, he speaks of them as 'these outrageous penalties/ and repeatedly refers to laws that inflict the 'penalty of death.' He refers to the other acts prescribing certain punishments for treason as 'acts of pains and penalties.' That the Legislature intended that this thirteenth section should apply to all offenses is shown by section 5598,- Rev. Stat., under the title of 'Repeal Provisions/ which is as follows: 'All offenses committed and all penalties .or forfeitures incurred under any statute embraced in said Revision prior to said repeal, may be prosecuted and punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if said repeal had not been made.' "
Even though this view of the law had not been enunciated by the highest court of our land, we would feel inclined to announce the doctrine ourselves, in view of the fact that in this state our criminal laws, by legislative enactment, are entitled to a liberal construction, and without doubt the legislative enactment and provision of the article of the Constitution, supra, were intended for this very purpose. It follows that the court committed no error in overruling the demurrer.
A careful examination of the entire record discloses no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error. The judgment of the trial court is therefore in all things affirmed.
DOYLE, J., concurs. FURMAN, J., absent, and not participating.