Case Name: Jack W. FILMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-06-23
Citations: 336 So. 2d 586
Docket Number: No. 47369
Parties: Jack W. FILMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 336
Pages: 586–598

Head Matter:
Jack W. FILMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47369.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 23, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1976.
David A. Demers, Law Offices of Robert W. Pope, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
SUNDBERG, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction of manslaughter by culpable negligence in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County. Our jurisdiction vests under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, because the trial court passed upon the validity of Section 322.261, Florida Statutes, relative to blood alcohol tests for intoxication.
On the evening of August 31, 1973, the automobile driven by appellant Filmon collided with another vehicle at the intersection of 54th Avenue and 34th Street South, in the City of St. Petersburg, Florida. Fil-mon's car had been heading north on 34th Street South while the other automobile had been going south on the same street and was attempting to make a left turn at the intersection of 54th Avenue South at the time of the collision. Subsequent to the accident six injured persons — four in Fil-mon's car and two in the other vehicle— were dispatched- by ambulance to the Bay-front Medical Center in St. Petersburg. A police officer who had learned of the accident over his car radio proceeded to the hospital and caused blood alcohol tests to be administered to five individuals, the sixth (a passenger in the car which had been attempting a left turn) having died previous to arrival at the hospital. Later that night, the other occupant of the car struck by appellant's auto also died as a result of injuries received in the accident.
At trial there was conflicting evidence adduced as to appellant's drinking prior to the collision and as to the speed of his car shortly before the accident. Testimony as to the former issue ranged from "one or two beers" to an admission that the four people in his car had completed nearly an entire case of beer. At the hospital, the defendant's blood alcohol level was tested at .165%. (The deceased driver had a blood alcohol level of .105%.) Taking the evidence most favorable to the State (as we must do for our purposes here), appellant was traveling between 70 and 90 miles per hour into a controlled intersection in a metropolitan area where the speed limit in the locality of the accident was 55 miles per hour. Traffic at the time and in the vicinity of the accident was described as "fairly heavy". There was no evidence of bad weather or other hazardous road conditions. Although there was conflicting evidence on the point, a witness for the State testified that preceding the accident Filmon had driven erratically, changing lanes frequently and abruptly; that in the process of lane changes he had pulled behind a series of automobiles, applying his brakes sharply. The accident occurred at approximately 8:00 p. m. and darkness had fallen to such a degree that motorists were driving with their headlights illuminated. Although there is also a conflict on this point, viewed in a light most favorable to the State the evidence is that Filmon had an amber or orange light as he proceeded into the intersection where the accident occurred.
Appellant was charged in two Informa-tions with the deaths of the occupants of the automobile struck by the automobile driven by him. Each Information contained two counts — (i) causing the death of another by operating a motor vehicle with culpable negligence in violation of Section 782.07, Florida Statutes, and (ii) causing the death of another through the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Subsection 860.01(2), Florida Statutes. Appellant moved to suppress several items of evidence including, inter alia, the results of the blood alcohol test performed on him at the hospital by personnel enumerated in Subsection 322.261(1), Florida Statutes 1973.
At the hearing before the trial judge the following facts were stipulated: (1) Mr. Fil-mon had not been arrested at the time the blood was drawn; (2) no conseht was obtained from him to secure the blood sample; (3) a blood sample was taken from everyone involved in the accident; (4) no search warrant was obtained to take the blood of anyone involved in the accident; (5) the appellant was never cited for driving while intoxicated; (6) the officer who directed that the blood be drawn from the people was not present at the scene of the accident; (7) the blood test was taken about an hour after the accident; (8) there were three people other than the appellant in the vehicle at the time of the collision. In addition to these stipulations, testimony was elicited from the officer who directed that the sample be taken. He stated that no one ever attempted to secure a sample for purposes of alcohol analysis through any method other than extraction of blood. Mr. Filmon was also conscious, he had to be physically restrained, he smelled of alcohol at the hospital, and he was belligerent with the nurses. The officer also stated that he did not know who was driving the vehicle at the time that he ordered that the blood test be performed.
Based on the foregoing stipulations and evidence, the court denied appellant's motion and held that the procedure utilized to secure the blood test did not deny appellant equal protection of the law as secured by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Florida.
The State introduced in evidence at trial the results of the blood alcohol test; however, no testimony was introduced relating those results to any degree of intoxication. The court, therefore, directed a verdict as to the second count of each Information. The court denied a requested directed verdict on the first count of each Information. Appellant was convicted by the jury of the crime charged in the first count of each Information.
Apart from the constitutional question which vests this Court with jurisdiction, appellant raises two other points which merit our consideration, i. e., that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of guilt of culpable negligence and that the trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's requested jury instruction relating to execution of a left turn as prescribed by Section 316.122, Florida Statutes.
Concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant asserts the proposition enunciated in Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939), that excessive speed alone is not sufficient to support a conviction under the manslaughter by culpable negligence statute. It should be noted that in the Russ case, supra, there was no evidence of consumption of alcohol by the defendant. This question concerning the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 782.07, Florida Statutes, and its predecessors, has been considered by this Court and the District Courts of Appeal of Florida on numerous occasions. Different results have obtained depending on the facts of each particular case. See Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926); Preston v. State, 56 So.2d 543 (Fla.1952); Smith v. State, 65 So.2d 303 (Fla.1953); Miller v. State, 75 So.2d 312 (Fla.1954); Hunt v. State, 87 So.2d 584 (Fla.1956); Johnson v. State, 92 So.2d 651 (Fla.1957); and Jackson v. State, 100 So.2d 839 (Fla. App.1st, 1958).
The recent case of Peel v. State, 291 So.2d 226 (Fla.App.1st, 1974), is relied upon heavily by appellant to support his assertion that the evidence in the case at bar was insufficient to support the convictions. Briefly stated, the facts in the Peel case disclose that the defendant was traveling at 40 to 50 miles per hour as he approached an intersection controlled by a stop sign; he did not stop or slow down upon entering the intersection; and as he made a right turn at the intersection he collided with the decedents' car which was traveling on the intersecting road at right angles to the defendant. Although there was evidence that the defendant in the Peel case had been consuming alcohol there was no evidence in the record that he was exceeding the speed limit. The District Court of Appeal concluded that the conduct of the defendant did not constitute that high degree of negligence required for conviction of manslaughter and, relying upon Preston v. State, supra, determined that the additional factor of evidence of intoxication on the part of the defendant was not sufficient to convert the defendant's conduct into the category of culpable negligence. As in the case at bar, the defendant in the Peel case was charged with two intoxication counts as well as two culpable negligence counts, but he was acquitted by the jury on the two intoxication counts.
A clear statement of the conduct necessary to constitute culpable negligence under the statute is enunciated by Mr. Justice Drew in Miller v. State, supra, at 313, 314, where it is stated:
"The culpable conduct necessary to sustain proof of manslaughter under Section 782.07, supra, 'must be of "a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them." ' "
However, in applying the foregoing standard every case of manslaughter by culpable negligence must be determined upon the facts and circumstance peculiar to that case. Scarborough v. State, 188 So.2d 877 (Fla.App.2nd, 1966). It cannot be controverted that Russ v. State, supra, and its progeny, cited heretofore and concluding with Peel v. State, supra, stand for the proposition that excessive speed alone, or, in the case of Peel, running a stop sign at an intersection, coupled with evidence of intoxication, is not sufficient to constitute culpable negligence under our criminal statute. However, are we presented in the case at bar merely with evidence of speed and intoxication? An examination of the evidence in a light most favorable to the State discloses that the appellant:
(1) operated his vehicle into the intersection at a speed of from 70 to 90 miles per hour;
(2) did not reduce his speed as he entered the intersection located in a metropolitan area;
(3) entered the intersection at the time the traffic light was amber or orange for traffic proceeding in the direction in which he was proceeding;
(4) alternately changed from one lane of traffic to another, stopping abruptly to the rear of other vehicles as he changed lanes while approaching the intersection; and
(5) took these actions during that time of day when darkness was falling, with consequent impairment of visibility.
Coupled with the foregoing conduct, the jury had before it evidence that the appellant had imbibed significantly immediately preceding the tragic incident. Although the trial court ruled that the evidence was not sufficient to support the charge that appellant was intoxicated for purposes of conviction under Subsection 860.01(2), Florida Statutes, (presumably because the test result was not related to any degree of intoxication), it could be considered by the jury along with the above-stated acts of negligence. It is properly to be considered not as a circumstance which renders acts wanton and reckless which are not otherwise so, but upon the theory that persons under the influence of alcohol to any considerable degree, though not actually intoxicated, are more apt to be heedless, reckless, and daring than when free from such influence. See Smith v. State and Jackson v. State, supra. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident, we believe, was sufficient to take the case to the jury for application by it of the standard enunciated in Miller v. State, supra, to such circumstances.
Appellant next asserts the unconstitutionality of Subsection 322.261(1), Florida Statutes 1973. His assault is twofold: (i) It violates the Fourth Amendment because it does not require arrest prior to administration of the blood alcohol test; and (ii) it violates the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions by treating unconscious persons differently from conscious individuals, who have the option of withholding their consent to administration of the test. Thus it is argued that the statute authorizes both discriminatory enforcement of statutory penalties and unreasonable searches and seizures.
In State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla.1971), this Court held squarely that a prior arrest was not a constitutional prerequisite of taking a blood alcohol sample. Authority for this proposition was found in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Mitchell also alluded to the equal protection issue in the following manner:
"We are of the opinion that the Legislature foresaw the difficulty and inutility of attempting to arrest an unconscious person or one in shock or on the operating table of a hospital. (Footnote omitted) It should be pointed out that the blood test, as provided for use in these particular situations, can exonerate the person tested. It will often be to the benefit of the unconscious or otherwise incapacitated person to be tested as soon after the accident as possible."
On facts similar to those found in the case at bar, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), expressly approved the withdrawal of blood without conscious consent from an automobile accident victim later charged with involuntary manslaughter. It was contended on behalf of petitioner in that case that this procedure violated Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe the relevant portion of Brei-thaupt still to be controlling.
Appellant contends that the holding in Schmerber, supra, was clarified in U. S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), to require a lawful arrest as a condition precedent to administration of a blood alcohol test. We conclude that Dioni-sio is ambiguous in this regard and reject appellant's interpretation of that case. Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Mitchell, supra, that Subsection 322.261(1), Florida Statutes 1973, does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and hold, additionally, that it does not violate the Equal Protection clauses of the Federal and Florida Constitutions. We are supported in this view by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico. See State v. Trujillo, 85 N.M. 208, 510 P.2d 1079 (1973).
We reject appellant's assertion that the conduct of the police officer at the hospital where the five remaining accident victims were present constituted a dragnet technique because he had all five tested. The officer had reasonable cause to believe that one or more of that limited group of five individuals had been driving a motor vehicle within the state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
The remaining point for our consideration involves refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning the provisions of Section 316.122, Florida Statutes, dealing with execution of a left turn by a motorist. Appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to give the requested instruction on the premise that the jury should have considered the conduct of the driver of the vehicle in which the decedents were riding as bearing upon proximate causation. Essentially, his argument is that with the aid of such instruction the jury could have concluded that appellant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the decedents' deaths. The error in appellant's argument is that the conduct of the decedents or the decedents' driver could only be controlling if it were the sole proximate cause of the accident. This is borne out in the Peel case, supra, wherein it was held to be error for the trial judge to refuse to give a tendered instruction on Section 317.-301(l)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides that no vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection. As pointed out by the court, the instruction should have been given in that case because, had the jury believed that the defendant had stopped before entering the intersection and then turned right but found decedents' automobile in the south lane of the thoroughfare into which he was turning, there would have been no negligence on the part of the defendant, and the sole cause of the accident would have been the decedents' negligence in running through the intersection on the wrong side of the road. In the instant case, there is no view of the evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the decedents' asserted act of failing to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Appellant's additional contention that the conduct of the decedent somehow bears upon the wantonness or recklessness of his acts is not persuasive.' The acts of the decedent can neither add to nor detract from the quality of appellant's conduct. Consequently, we find no error in the trial court's failure to grant the requested instructions.
The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
HATCHETT, J., dissents with an opinion.
ADKINS, J., dissents and concurs with HATCHETT, J.