Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lawrence "Red" BABIN, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-02-24
Citations: 319 So. 2d 367
Docket Number: No. 54608
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lawrence “Red” BABIN, Appellant.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 319
Pages: 367–383

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lawrence “Red” BABIN, Appellant.
No. 54608.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 24, 1975.
On Rehearing July 25, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 5, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion July 30, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Oct. 10, 1975.
Bertrand DeBlanc, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., Ronald E. Dauterive, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant Babin was convicted of armed robbery, La.R.S. 14:64, and sen tenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. On his appeal, he relies upon three bills of exceptions.
By motion to quash, La.C.Cr.P. art. 532(1), the indictment is attacked as charging an offense made punishable by an unconstitutional statute. (Bill No. 1.)
The defendant contends that the armed robbery statute, La.R.S. 14:64, is unconstitutional. The enactment defines the offense and prescribes imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years and for not more than ninety-nine years "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence".
The defendant contends that the italicized prohibition in the penalty clause is in direct conflict with Article V, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 (in effect at the time of the offense). This latter provision confers upon the governor the power to grant reprieves and, upon recommendation of the pardon board, to grant pardons and to commute sentences.
The statute prohibits "parole", "probation", or "suspension of sentence", whereas the constitution empowers the governor to grant "reprieves", "pardons" or to "corn-mute sentences". It is argued that, despite the shades of difference in meaning between these terms, they essentially mean the same thing.
However, the respective terms nevertheless have distinct and separate meanings. When the legislature prohibited "parole", "probation" or "suspension of sentence", it did not intend, and it did not in fact seek, to infringe upon the Governor's power to grant "reprieves" and "pardons" or to "commute sentences".
Notwithstanding that the effect of these different actions is indeed closely related, there are significant differences which permit each to have effect independently of the other. Thus, the Governor may grant reprieves and pardons or he may commute sentences, without contravening the legislative prohibition against granting parole, probation, or suspension of sentence to persons convicted under the statute. The prohibition does not, therefore, infringe upon the Governor's constitutional pardon-reprieve-commutation powers and is not unconstitutional for such contended reason. Cf. State v. Ramsey, 292 So.2d 708 (La. 1974) and State v. Varice, 292 So.2d 703 (La. 1974).
II
Bill No. 2 concerns the alleged denial by the trial court of the defendant's cross-examination (impeachment) rights. A state witness, a police officer, admitted on the stand that his pre-trial written statement was contrary to his own earlier trial testimony. (The witness had previously testified that he was the only policeman who arrested the accused; whereas he now admitted that his own pre-trial written report had stated that another police officer had advised the defendant that he was under arrest.)
It is not denied that the trial testimony of the officer was contrary to his prior written report. By reason of this conflict in a statement material to the case, the defendant arguably was entitled to the use of the police report for cross-examination under the rule as judicially formulated prior to the present decision.
The lead case on the issue in modern times is State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d 305 (1957). There, summarizing and reconciling our previous jurisprudence, the court held that the trial judge should order production of a prior statement of a prosecution witness for use in cross-examination upon proper foundation, such as that the witness's "written statement was contrary in any respect to her testimony given at the trial." 95 So.2d 310. See also Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 686-89 (1975). The subsequent jurisprudence has usually mentioned the inconsistency as the sole basis for a proper foundation for requiring production of the pre-trial statement for use in cross-examination. See, e. g., State v. Adams, 302 So.2d 599, 604 (La.1974) ("A showing . . . that one or more of the material statements therein are contrary to the sworn testimony"). See also State v. Whitfield, 253 La. 679, 219 So.2d 493, 496 (1969) (summarizing later cases ).
Nevertheless, although a literal application of the prior jurisprudential test might require an opposite conclusion, we do not find reversible error presented here by the admitted inconsistency between the pre-trial statement and the actual trial testimony, at least in the light of the abbreviated record before us. For one thing, the actual discrepancy between the trial testimony and the inconsistent pre-trial statement, while concerning a fact material to the decision of the case, does not really concern a critical point at issue or necessarily indicate difference of a substantively significant nature between the pre-trial statement and the trial testimony. Also, it seems anomalous to reverse for failure to produce a document for cross-examination purposes where the witness distinctly admits the conflict between it and his trial testimony, whereas (because of such admission) the statement itself could not be produced as evidence, see La.R.S. 15:493.
III
The defendant pleaded "not guilty" and also "not guilty by reason of insanity". Before submission to the jury, the defendant requested the court to read to the jury Articles 652, 654, and 657 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bill No. 3 was taken to the denial of this request for a special written charge.
The effect of the requested special charge was to inform the jury that, if it found the accused not guilty by reason of insanity, he would not be released upon the streets but would instead be committed to an appropriate state institution, with his release conditioned only upon a subsequent judicial finding that he could be discharged or go on probation without danger to others and to himself.
The defendant contended that this charge was necessary to effectuate jury consideration of his defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Since to the layman "not guilty" connotes release from confinement, the jury may have wished to avoid freeing the defendant in ignorance that a finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity" would continue the confinement of this mental defective.
The insanity defense was founded upon the accused's mental condition. He was a man of 23 with a mental age of five, an IQ of 50. He had been committed to mental institutions from 1961 to 1969 (until released because of lack of welfare funding).
A majority of this court has determined that the trial court did not abuse his discretion by failing to give the requested special charge.
In the majority's view: The procedure, treatment, commitment and discharge of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, though not in the true sense a sentence, is nevertheless not pertinent to the jury's function to determine guilt or innocence of the accused. The various aspects of the post-verdict treatment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity can only serve to complicate and confuse the jury function. The law has delegated the responsibility and authority for administering this post-conviction procedure to the judge, and the jury verdict should not be influenced by this aspect of the case.
The majority therefore does not find merit to this bill. Cf., e. g., State v. Blackwell, 298 So.2d 798 (La.1974).
Decree
The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Affirmed.
SUMMERS, J., concurs in the result.
TATE, J., specially concurs as to Bill No. 2 and assigns reasons in which BAR-HAM and CALOGERO, JJ., concur.
DIXON, J., dissents with written reasons.
BARHAM, J., dissents with written reasons.
. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951), defines these terms as follows :
Parole: " . . . A conditional release; condition being that, if prisoner makes good, he will receive an absolute discharge from balance of sentence, but, if he does not, he will be returned to serve unexpired time. ." (p. 1273) ;
Probation-. " . . .In modern criminal administration, allowing a person convicted of some minor offense particularly juvenile offenders) to go at large, under a suspension of sentence, during good behavior, and generally under the supervision or guardianship of a probation officer. . . An act of grace and clemency which may be granted by the trial court to a seemingly deserving defendant whereby such defendant may escape the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. . . . " (p. 1367) ;
Suspension of sentence: "This term may mean either a withholding or postponing the sentencing of a prisoner after the conviction, or a postponing of the execution of the sentence after it has been pronounced. In the latter case, it may, for reasons addressing themselves to the discretion of the court, be indefinite as to time, or during the good behavior of the prisoner. . . . " (p. 1529);
Reprieve: " . . . The withdrawing of a sentence of death for an interval of time, whereby the execution is suspended. Also, the withdrawing of any sentence for a period of time. . It does no more than stay the execution of a sentence for a time. . . . " (p. 1466) ;
Pardon: "An act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. . . . " (p. 1268) ; and
Commutation: " . . . The change of a punishment from a greater to a less; as from hanging to imprisonment. . . . " (p. 351).
. The Whitfield decision, as did the Weston opinion (95 So.2d 310), recognized that a proper foundation might be shown also by other circumstances, whereby production of the prior statement became essential to a fair trial of the accused. For instance, in State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957), a conviction was reversed for failure to order production of such a statement. The principal prosecution witness admitted under cross-examination that he had made a written statement to the police, but he did not recall whether he had or had not at the time informed the police of incriminating evidence to which he now testified. We held that the trial court had improperly denied production of the statement to refresh the witness's memory under such circumstances. Under such circumstances, opposing counsel is entitled to access to the statement for purposes of cross-examination. See Whitfield at 219 So.2d 496.
. The cited statute permits impeachment by independent proof of the prior inconsistent statement only "if the witness does not distinctly admit making such statement."
. At the age of 12, in 1960 the defendant had been committed to a mental institution upon the following findings: "The major outstanding finding was that this child is severely mentally retarded to the degree that he cannot distinguish right from wrong. Due to his low intelligence, he does not have the mental ability to have developed any moral judgment. He is not responsible for his behavior and he should be in custodial care. . . . Until he can be accepted by that institution, he should receive close supervision from his parent, as he will continue to get into difficulty since he does not have the intelligence to keep him out of trouble."
At the time the child's parent, who had requested help, had been informed that "spanking probably would do no good because Lawrence does not have enough understanding to be able to remember from one time to the next what is right or wrong." Tr. 26. The medical reports indicate that the condition was either congenital or the result of early brain injury.
. Mr. Justices Barham, Dixon, and the writer are not in accord with the majority in this holding.