Case Name: J. R. Morris v. W. A. Owens
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1848-11
Citations: 3 Strob. 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. R. Morris v. W. A. Owens.
Judges: Evans, J. — Frost, J. — and Withers, J. — concurred. •
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 199–207

Head Matter:
J. R. Morris v. W. A. Owens.
In a deed conveying land, the descriptive part ascertained a whole tract, declared that part of it was claimed by Goode, and specified that the grantor “ only conveys two hundred acresthat he does not convey the part claimed by Goode, but if it should be found that besides the part so claimed, there is more titan two hundred acres, the grantee shall have it: general warranty of the premises added. It was found that Goode’s claim covered all but one hundred and forty-two acres, and the grantee sued in covenant, alleging a warranty of two hundred acres, and a breach by reason of Goode’s claim — AeMthat a proper construction of the deed, disclosed a stipulation that Goode’s claim should not cover more of the tract than the excess over two hundred acres: that there was, in effect, a covenant warranting that quantity, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of fifty-eight acres. .
Before Frost, J. at Barnwell, Extra Term, July, 1848.
This was an action of covenant on a deed of release, whereby the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff all that tract, &c., situate, &c., “ said land was granted to John A. Owens, December 5th, 1825, for two hundred and seventy acres ; but a part thereof is claimed by the estate of Robert Goode; the said W. A. Owens only conveys two hundred acres ; that part claimed by the estate of Goode is not conveyed ; and if it should be found that there is more than two hundred acres, besides that claimed by Goode’s estate, the said John R. Morris is to be entitled to it.” The deed was dated April 2d, 1846. On a resurvey, it was ascertained that the Owens’s grant, .exclusive of the claim of Goode’s estate, contained only one hundred and forty-two acres. Hext testified that, about three years ago, he had made a survey of the lands of the estate of Goode for partition, and had run out the part of the Owens grant, claimed by the estate. It was marked on the ground by two corner stakes, on the line of the old survey, and-by a corner stake, in the body of the grant. This survey and location was made before Owens sold to the plaintiff.
The jury were instructed that the effect of the covenant was to warrant the quantity of two hundred acres ; that, by the deed, the defendant admitted a legal claim of the estate of Goode to part of the Owens grant, and- exclusive of that claim conveyed to the plaintiff two hundred acres. Respecting the extent of the Goode claim, they were instructed that the stakes which were put down, to indicate the extent of Goode’s claim, by Hext, were evidence of the location of it, in the same manner as a ditch or hedge or other marked line would be, and that if the defendant, at the time the deed was executed, had notice of the puting down of the stakes, that would be evidence of his admission of the extent of Goode’s claim. The jury found for the plaintiff the value of the fifty-eight acres which were deficient.
The declaration set out a release by the defendant to the plaintiff of “ that tract of land, containing two hundred acres,” and the covenant of the defendant to warrant and defend the said premises to the plaintiff; and set out substantially, though informally, a breach, in that the defendant was not lawfully seized, &c. of the said tract, but the heirs of Goode claimed it, and the defendant refused to warrant and defend the said tract of land against the claim of the Goodes.
.The defendant craves Oyer, and sets forth the deed; ánd pleads, secondly, that the plaintiff ought not to have his action, beause “ that, by the said deed of covenant, the said t defendant did not warrant any part or portion of the land which was claimed by the heirs of Robert Goode.” The replication to this plea is that the defendant, “ by his deed of covenant, did warrant to the plaintiff the said land, a part of which was claimed by the heirs of Robert Goodeand tenders issue to the country, which is joined.
The third plea avers that the defendant, “at the time of the execution of the said deed of covenant, was lawfully seized in fee and possessed of all the tract of land, and every part thereof which he, the said defendant, did covenant to warrant and defend to the plaintiffand tenders issue, which is joined.
The fourth plea avers that the defendant, “ from the time of the execution of the said deed of covenant, hath always hitherto warranted and defended to the said plaintiff the said tract of land, and every part thereof, which he, the defendant, did covenant to warrant to the plaintiffand tenders issue, which is joined.
It was held that the issues, presented by the third and fourth pleas, were pertinent and material, and sufficient to support a verdict on the count in the declaration.
The defendant appealed, 1. Because his Honor erred in charging the jury that the deed of covenant sued on was a warranty of the number of acres; whereas it is submitted that the number of acres was merely stated in the deed as matter of description.
2. Because the breach assigned in the declaration was not sustained by the evidence.
3. Because, under the pleadings, and the issues made thereby, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s action.
4. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
ARGUMENT.
Bellinger, for the motion,
said defendant had a right that the plaintiff should show an eviction, or a paramount title in some other, to the two hundred acres. — Cited Lamick v. Hawkins, 1 Rich. 417; Bond v. Quattlebum, 1 M’Cord, 584.
Poeples, contra,
said defendant was precluded by his own deed, and bound by the recitals therein, making a show of paramount title, &c. unnecessary — Cited 1 Grlf. Ev. 26, 27 and 25; Talbert v. Mason, 2 M’C. 440; Peay v. Briggs, 2 N. and M’C. 184, and 2 Mills, 98 — said this was a covenant of seisin, as well as of titles, <fcc. — that the two hundred acres were granted, not more or less, but two hundred acres; and that it was a part of the covenant, and not a matter of description.
'Deed of Conveyance.
State op South-Carolina, i Barnwell District.
Know all men by these presents, that I, William A. Owens, of Barnwell Distiict, in the aforesaid State, in consideration of three hundred dollars, to me paid, by John R. Morris, of said District, in the State aforesaid, have granted, bargained, sold, and released, and by these presents do bargain, sell, and release unto the said John R. Morris, all that plantation or parcel of land situate in said District, on the waters of Jackson's branch, near Coodes's mills, adjoining lands of Joseph Allen, estate of R. Goode, Elizcibeth Thomas, and others. Said land was granted to John A. Owens, thé 5th day of December, 1825, for two hundred and seventy acres, but a part thereof is claimed by the estate of Robert Goode; the said W. A. Owens only conveys two hundred acres; that part claimed by the estate of Goode is not conveyed ; and ifit should be found that there is more than two hundred acres, besides that claimed by Goodes’s estate, the said John R. Morris is to be entitled to it. Together with all and singular, &c.

Opinion:
Wardlaw, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case depends upon the construction that shall be given to the words that were employed, by the grantor, in describing the subject of his conveyance and covenant. It is one of the many cases that are perplexed by the unskilfulness of those who sometimes undertake the business of conveyancing. Our familiar forms are easily copied in all those parts which are common to all ordinary conveyances; hut the description of the subject must always be adapted to the particular instance, and, therefore, in this, one of the most important parts of every conveyance, blundering and miscarriage most frequently occur.
By paraphrase of the descriptive part of the deed before us, it will be seen that it first loosely mentions some of the boundaries of a whole tract; second, defines the whole tract by specifying to whom and \vhen it was granted for a certain number of acres ; third, makes known that part of it is claimed by the heirs of Robert Goode; fourth, declares that only two hundred acres are conveyed; fifth, declares that the parcel claimed as aforesaid is not conveyed, but all the excess over that claim is; and sixth, provides that the excess over the claim shall belong to the grantee, even if it should be found to be more than 200 acres. The substance is the same as if the description had been written thus: " Two hundred acres of a tract of land which was granted to John A. Owens, together with whatever more there may be found to be (if any more there be) of the said tract, which is not claimed by the heirs of Goode." Or thus: " All the tract grantéd to t Owens, except the part claimed by Goode, which exceptionv shall not reduce the tract below two hundred acres."
2 M'C. 440.
1 M'C. 584. 2 sPear>68•
5 Mass. 355.
19 Johns. 97.
The declaration that the grantor conveys only 200 acres, is equivalent to a declaration that he does convey 200 acres: the reference to the claim of Goode, as a thing whose extent is to be found, coupled with the conveyance of 200 acres, is a representation that, at least, 200 acres will remain after satisfaction of that claim ; and the provision for the grantee's right, in case that more than 200 acres should remain, with entire silence as to the case of less remaining, and the omission of the words " more or less," or any words expressive of uncertainty, show that quantity was in the contemplation of the parties, and that the number of acres was an essential part of the contract, and not a mere circumstance added to a description already precise. The intention from the whole appears to have been to create a stipulation, that the part conveyed should be at least two hundred acres.
The intention to stipulate as to quantity, seems, in this case, stronger than in the case of Talbert v. Mason, for there was the description of a tract whose general situation was specified, containing 360 acres, bounded by lands of M. W. p. and others. The only circumstances giving force to the mention of quantity, were, the indefiniteness introduced by the word others, and the omission of more or less ; and the case is a dangerous one, which should be carefully considered, when its principles are to be at all extended. The decision, now made, does not impugn the authority of Bond v. Quattlebum, Bauskett v. Jones, or any other case which decides that where, by a plat, a reference to monuments and boundaries, or other certain description, a tract of land is ascertained, the number of acres mentioned in the description is not essential.
Other cases have been strong pressed upon the majority of the Court, in opposition to the view which they have taken ; but it is believed that none of them will, when fully exam-ed, be found to be at all in conflict with this opinion. A detail here of what may be easily referred to elsewhere is useless, and, therefore, those cases will be hastily passed over.
Powell v. Clark, recognizing fully that the contract, in such cases, depends upon the intention to be collected from the deed, decides only (as our cases last above mentioned do) that when the description is otherwise certain, the quantity expressed is immaterial.
In Whallon v. Kauffman, turning also upon intention and construction, there was a conveyance of one-half of a tract, whose limits were ascertained, except parcels which had been sold to S. II. and M. — " the said half, over and above the exceptions, containing, by estimation, 600 acres, but warranted to contain at least 500 acres" — and general covenants were added. The grantee enjoyed more than 500 acres— but other parts, beyond the exceptions, were taken away by paramount title. It was held that the general covenants were restrained by the special one, so that there was no right of complaint, so long as 500 acres were held under the deed. The case before us is the converse of that: it is as if complaint had, there, been made that the half tract was reduced below 500 acres. If a general covenant is restrained, by a particular one, so it may be confirmed and explained, by a particular one; and here the general warranty is aided by the stipulation, (which a construction of the deed discloses,) that the quantity should be at least 200 acres.
3d vol. MSS. Columbia, p. 386, 503.
The case of Waters v. Caldwell, which was twice in the Court of Appeals, and never reported, is of very little value; for it presented merely a question of fact, whether a line had, by agreement, been established between two parties, who claimed under deeds made, at different times, by the same grantor. In the last opinion, Judge Colcock refers to 5 Mass. 355, and distinguishes the case, then on hand, from Talbert v. Mason, (perhaps confounding the two in his statement of them) — but he decides, only, that the Court would not disturb a verdict found upon doubtful evidence.
To return to our case; the stipulation as to quantity, taken in connexion with the words which were used concerning Goodes's claim, amounts, in effect, to a covenant that that claim does not cover more of the grant than the excess over 200 acres. The breach assigned in the declaration is substantially a breach of the covenant thus expressed; and although we see enough to believe that the pleadings have not been very formal, we are of opinion that the result which has been attained, may be allowed to stand. It is conformable to our view of the rights of the parties, under the deed ; is supported, as we must presume, by just conclusions, drawn by the jury, from the evidence; and is such as correct pleading would have reached. So far as we are enabled to perceive, the pleading which has been had may suffice to sustain it.
The motion is dismissed.
Evans, J. — Frost, J. — and Withers, J. — concurred. •
Motion refused.