Case Name: Maud v. Maud
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1877-12
Citations: 33 Ohio St. 147
Docket Number: 
Parties: Maud v. Maud.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 33
Pages: 147–150

Head Matter:
Maud v. Maud.
1. To authorize a decree for specific performance, on the ground that the party seeking it had contributed to the purchase-money, such contribution must be a definitely ascertainable portion thereof, and the contract, specific performance of which is sought, must so far describe the premises claimed, as that the court may be able to ascertain what they are.
2. The decree of the court below is against the evidence, inasmuch as the plaintiff, upon his own ease, shows that the action is premature, and that he is not now entitled to the relief sought.
Error to the District Court of Butler county.
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler county, ¥m. Maud filed his petition against John and Hannah Maud, who were his parents. In substance he alleges, that after he became of age, he labored upon a farm, with his parents and a brother, with an agreement among the parties that the proceeds of their labor should be invested in farms, several of which, in a long course of years, were thus purchased. He says he has an equitable interest in all the land thus acquired, to the extent of the value of that labor, and asks that the court will ascertain and define the value of that interest, and that defendants may convey to him one of the tracts owned as above by them. Other matters are stated, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this decision.
The answer denies the allegations of the petition.
John Maud, the brother said to have been party to the .alleged agreement, is subsequently made defendant, and answers, also, denying the existence of any such agreement.
From the evidence, it appears that the Maud family came Fere from England, without property of consequence, and began farming. By thrift and industry, they were successful in the pursuit of wealth, and by slow accumulations purchased first one tract of land, and subsequently others. Sons and daughters, while they lived at home, contributed; by their daily labor to the common stock. The deeds of‘ the various farms were taken in the name of the mother,. Hannah Maud, who seems to have been a woman of energy and force of character sufficient to manage affairs of importance.
¥m. Maud, plaintiff below, was the oldest son, and. seems to have been faithful in his capacity of farm-hand, and now claims that there was an undei’standing by which he was to have an interest in the lands held in his mother’s name as a reward for the services he had rendered, and he claims that one of the farms be conveyed to him.
The court of common pleas dismissed the petition of ¥m. Maud. On appeal, the district court found in favor of ¥m. Maud, decreeing him compensation in the sum of $7,566.66. There are other findings not necessary to be recapitulated.
Harmon $ Maxwell, for plaintiff in error.
Israel Williams and Thomas Millikin, for defendant in-error.

Opinion:
Wright, J.
Counsel for defendant in error, ¥m. Maud, appear to concede that no case is made for specific performance ; and if it were not so, we are at loss to see upon what grounds a judgment of that nature could be based. The alleged contract on which the action is based is quite indefinite, and no land at all is described in it upon which a court could lay hold 'to order a conveyance. This is the contract, as Wm. Maud states it: "We agreed to work altogether, and lay out in land, or the best way we could,, till we all got a farm apiece (John and me), and title to-land to be taken in mother's name, I believe." Under such a contract, if proved, it would be difficult for a court to determine what particular farm or tract of land Wm. Maud claimed or was entitled to, and it would be quite as difficult to determine what metes and bounds could be put in a de •cree for specific performance. Ery on Specific Performance, 157.
And, again, in order to authorize specific performance, on the ground that the party asking such performance has contributed to the purchase-money, he must show that the amount so contributed was a definitely ascertainable portion, as is held in Reynolds v. Morris, 17 Ohio St. 510. ¥m. Maud's alleged services can not be considered such definitely ascertainable portion.
Although ¥m. Maud testifies that there was this agreement, he is directly contradicted by his mother and brother John, and, without entering into a discussion as to the weight of evidence, it seems to us that the upshot of the matter is that parents and children all lived together, engaged in earning a common support, and accumulating a common property, with a sort of general understanding that, after the death of the father and mother, the children would succeed to the inheritance as a reward to their joint industry, but without any specific contract even to that effect. But, passing this by, ¥m. Maud, upon his own testimony, can not prevail in this action. "We have referred to the agreement which he claims as the foundation of his rights, in regard to which, in cross-examination, he says : " I supposed I was to get my share of the property at mother's death, and it would have been so if it had not been for this trouble. She promised to let me have the Johns farm " (which is the one he now claims) " after she was dead. She said she wanted the reins in her own hands as long as she lived, and I would have lived according to the contract but for this fuss."
It is his own sho vying, therefore, that, if he was entitled to .any share, his right to it did not arise till upon his mother's death. Ilis suit, therefore, is premature.
Nor can it be, as his counsel claim, that, because his mother repudiated the contract, as he claims she did, he can have his action upon the principle that a renunciation of a .contract, before the time for its performance, amounts to a breach, so as to entitle a party to sue by way of anticipation.
The mother has not denied but that the son may be entitled to his share at her death. She only insists, and for the purposes of this suit, that he is not entitled to it now.
Judgment reversed.