Case Name: KLEIN v. DUDLEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-03-12
Citations: 59 Mich. App. 515
Docket Number: Docket No. 19763
Parties: KLEIN v DUDLEY
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and Quinn and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 59
Pages: 515–524

Head Matter:
KLEIN v DUDLEY
Opinion of the Court
1. Dedication — Townships—Easements—Right-of-Way—Highways —Statutes—Definiteness.
A deed for a right-of-way that had been given to a township was an absolute grant and was enforceable where the right-of-way could be utilized without violating a statutory plan for maintenance of highways, the description in the deed was sufficiently definite, and any prohibited use of the property may be restrained when and if it occurs.
Dissent by T. M. Burns, P. J.
2. Dedication — Easements—Right-of-Way—Highways—Townships —Counties—Jurisdiction—Statutes—Standing—Quieting Title — Intervening.
The acquisition of a right-of-way for road purposes was an action beyond the jurisdiction of a township in 1937 because all township roads had become county roads by April of 1936, pursuant to statute; therefore, a township which had exceeded its jurisdiction by accepting a right-of-way did not have standing to intervene in a suit to quiet title to the land which was subject to the right-of-way (MCLA 247.1 et seq.X
3. Dedication — Highways—Easements—Right-of-Way—Enforceability-Vagueness — Description.
A deed granting a right-of-way for a road was too vague to be enforced where the deed did not define the precise route the roadway would take, but left the description to a future agreement which was never made.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 23 Am Jur 2d, Dedication §§ 6, 10.
[4] 23 Am Jur 2d, Dedication §§ 42, 50-52, 59.
[5] 23 Am Jur 2d, Dedication §§ 24, 43, 44, 59, 61.
Sale of lots with reference to plat as conferring, in absence of effective dedication to public, rights upon others than to lot owners in respect to streets shown by plats. 172 ALR 167.
4. Dedication — Highways—Acceptance—Formal—Informal—Expenditure of Funds — Maintenance—Exercise of Control— Reasonable Inference.
Acceptance of land dedicated to the public may be either formal or informal; the type of land dedicated dictates different standards for acceptance of the land; streets and highways require maintenance by public authorities, and, if there is to be an acceptance of a public way it must be by continued use by the public and such exercise of control over it by authorities from which an acceptance can reasonably be inferred.
5. Dedication — Highways—Plat Dedication — Acceptance—Formal —Informal—Public Expenditures — Maintenance.
Acceptance of a deeded roadway must be accomplished in the same manner as an acceptance of a plat dedication; either by formal acceptance or informally, by public expenditure and maintenance.
Appeal from Mason, Charles A. Wickens, J.
Submitted Division 3 December 4, 1974, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 19763.)
Decided March 12, 1975.
Complaint by Anna Klein, Louis Klein, and Helen Klein against Gordon S. Dudley, and others, to quiet title. Summit Township intervened as a defendant. A default judgment for plaintiffs was set aside as to Summit Township, and judgment was entered for the township holding it held an easement across plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Landman, Hathaway, Latimer, Clink & Robb (by William M. Newman), for plaintiffs.
Leonard J. Gavigan, for defendant Summit Township.
Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and Quinn and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
We accept in its entirety Judge T. M. Burns' recitation of facts and his recitation of the procedural sequence in this case.
We are, however, in respectful disagreement with his legal conclusions.
The deed to the township is for a right-of-way for foot or vehicular traffic. Thus there is no reason why the township could not utilize the realty for a park trail or other public purpose which would in no wise contravene the McNitt act.
Second, we disagree that the limitation of the deed, to wit, "extending from the intersection of Avenue 'A' and Lenox Avenue southeasterly across Lots 1, 2, 3, and 34 of Block 1, of Bass Lake Park to the shoreline of Bass Lake" is sufficiently lacking in definiteness to meet the test of certainty of description.
We agree with the trial court that the indenture was an absolute grant and enforceable as such. There is plenty of time to restrain any prohibited use of the property by the township if and when it ever occurs.
We would affirm the trial judge, subject to the foregoing limitations.
Quinn, J., concurred.
MCLA 247.1 et seq.; MSA 9.141 et seq. The subsequent repeal by 1951 PA 51 has no effect on the instant case.