Case Name: Jose SERNA, Appellant, v. MILANESE, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-09-21
Citations: 643 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: No. 93-487
Parties: Jose SERNA, Appellant, v. MILANESE, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, BASKIN, and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 643
Pages: 36–40

Head Matter:
Jose SERNA, Appellant, v. MILANESE, INC., Appellee.
No. 93-487.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 21, 1994.
Taylor, Brion, Buker & Greene and Arnal-do Velez, Miami, for appellant.
Semet, Lickstein, Morgenstern, Berger, Friend, Brooks & Gordon and Lewis J. Le-vey, Coral Gables, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, BASKIN, and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
NESBITT, Judge.
Jose Serna appeals a final summary judgment in an action filed by Milanese, Inc. (Milanese) to collect on dishonored cheeks. We affirm.
Milanese sold clothing to Jemaros Investments, Inc., d/b/a Natalia Boutique (Jema-ros). Jose Serna, president of Jemaros, paid for the goods by check. Serna signed the checks, which were imprinted with the corporate name, but did not indicate his representative capacity. Following Jemaros' payment for certain merchandise by checks later dishonored, Milanese filed a multi-count action against Jemaros and Serna. The count against Serna sought recovery for the dishonored checks tendered to Milanese. There is no contention that Serna was not authorized to sign the checks.
Milanese sought summary judgment restating the complaint's dishonored check allegations against Jemaros and Serna. In support of its motion, Milanese filed an affidavit of its president stating that Jemaros and Serna issued the dishonored cheeks. The trial court granted Milanese's motion and pursuant to section 68.065, Florida 'Statutes (1991) ordered Serna to pay treble the face amount of the checks.
Section 673.403, Florida Statutes (1991), which was in effect when Serna signed the dishonored checks, provides:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument:
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) Except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the person represented but does show that the representative signed in a-representative capacity.
During the pendency of the suit this statute was repealed and replaced by the legislature with section 673.4021, Florida Statutes (1993), effective January 1, 1993. Section 673.4021 provides in part:
(3) If a representative signs the name of the representative as drawer of a check without indication of the representative status and the check is payable from an account of the represented person who is identified on the cheek, the signer is not liable on the check if the signature is an authorized signature of the represented person.
Serna argues that the newly created statute operates retrospectively to relieve him of personal liability for treble damages under section 68.065. We disagree.
Statutes that create new rights or take away existing rights, as opposed to furthering existing rights, are substantive in nature and may not be applied retroactively. Snellgrove v. Fogazzi, 616 So.2d 527, 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), citing City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla.1961); Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA) review denied, 591 So.2d 180 (Fla.1991). It is well established in Florida that statutory changes which are substantive in nature are presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislature expressly manifests a contrary intention. Meek v. Layne-Western Co., 624 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
In Meek, the court rejected retroactive application of an amended statute that reduced a claimant's wage loss benefits when applied to a wage loss claim that occurred before the amendment. The Meek court reasoned that when substantive legislation changes the amount of relief available under the statute, or creates a new quantum of relief, application of such legislation to an injury that occurred before the amendment will be viewed as retroactive, and thus forbidden.
Section 673.4021 is not merely a procedural section that changes the method by which a payee can enforce his or her rights. Rather, the section substantively alters rights available to the payee, and should be prospectively applied only, absent an express legislative pronouncement that it should be retroactively applied. The legislature did not provide this express intention for section 673.4021 in Chapter 92-82, section 62, at 819, Laws of Florida.
Serna signed the dishonored checks in July and August of 1992. Milanese's substantive right to collect treble damages on the worthless checks under section 673.403(2) arose in September, 1992, when it brought suit to enforce its right. The legislature created section 673.4021, effective January 1, 1993. The final judgment granting treble damages in favor of Milanese was rendered one month later, on February 3, 1993. If the statute were retrospectively applied, all the benefits to which Milanese was entitled under section 673.403 in 1992 would be effectively eradicated mid-litigation in 1993, dramatically reducing Milanese's options for recovering its undisputed damages.
We therefore find section 673.4021 confers substantive rights and thus cannot be retrospectively applied to this case. Retrospective application of section 673.4021(3) would eliminate the substantive right and remedy available to Milanese under sections 68.065 and 673.403(2).
Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.
GERSTEN, J., concurs.
. Sema, as part of the credit application to Milanese, executed an individual guaranty "for any indebtedness incurred by virtue of any and all credit extended" to Jemaros by Milanese. Milanese did not seek recovery for the dishonored checks pursuant to Serna's personal guaranty. The trial court, on a separate count, awarded Milanese damages against Sema, under Serna's personal guarantee, for merchandise for which Jemaros did not remit payment. We affirm that portion of the judgment.
. Section 68.065 provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any civil action brought for the purpose of collecting a check . the payment of which was refused by the drawee because of the lack of funds, and where the maker or drawer fails to pay the amount owing, in cash, to the payee within 30 days following a written demand . the maker or drawer shall be liable to the payee, in addition to the amount owing upon such check . for damages of triple the amount so owing.
. Some courts and commentators differentiate between "retroactive" and "retrospective" applications. The former refers to the application of a new law or case to matured rights, that is, to a case that has gone to final judgment. The latter term refers to application of a new law or case to pending controversies. See Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F.Supp. 872, 874 n. 3 (S.D.Fla.1992). We use the term "retrospective" in this opinion to refer to those non-final controversies concerning pre-amendment conduct.
. The United States Supreme Court by an 8-1 vote recently held that several of the 1991 amendments to the federal civil rights laws do not apply to conduct that occurred before their enactment. The opinions endorse a strong presumption against retroactivity of statutes that impair rights a party possessed when he acted, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994).