Case Name: Edith Louise Schmidt v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1973-08-22
Citations: 261 Ind. 81
Docket Number: No. 372S35
Parties: Edith Louise Schmidt v. State of Indiana.
Judges: Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; Givan, J., dissents with opinion in which Arterburn, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 261
Pages: 81–85

Head Matter:
Edith Louise Schmidt v. State of Indiana.
[No. 372S35.
Filed August 22, 1973.
Rehearing denied October 16, 1973.]
Patrick N. Ryan, Jack B. Welchons, Ryan & Welchons, of Marion, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
DeBruler, J.
This is an appeal from the denial of a Post-Conviction Remedy Petition after a hearing in the Jay Circuit Court, the Honorable Ralph Rector, Special Judge. Petitioner alleged that her conviction as an accessory to first degree murder cannot stand since the only possible principal to the crime was convicted only of manslaughter.
The evidence introduced at the hearing revealed that the petitioner and one Glenn Everett Stewart were jointly charged by indictment with the crime of first degree murder in the death of petitioner's husband, Larry Lee Schmidt. In March of 1967, Stewart was found to be incompetent to stand trial at that time and was committed to Norman Beatty Hospital where he remained until May of 1969. Petitioner, however, proceeded to trial on the charge and in April of 1967, was found guilty by a jury as an accessory to first degree murder. She was subsequently sentenced to life in prison. This Court affirmed her conviction as an accessory to first degree murder in our opinion found at Schmidt v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 443, 265 N. E. 2d 219.
After being released from Norman Beatty Hospital, Stewart was found competent to stand trial. He entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the case was submitted to trial by jury. The resulting jury verdict acquitted Stewart of first degree murder and all degrees of homicide, and found him guilty instead of only the offense of accessory after the fact to manslaughter in the death of Larry Lee Schmidt, and he was sentenced to not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.
Petitioner now contends that since the only other party to the death of Larry Lee Schmidt, and the only possible principal to the crime, was convicted only of what amounts to manslaughter, her conviction as an accessory to first degree murder cannot stand because of the legal contradiction of an accessory being convicted of a greater crime than the principal.
In our recent decision of Combs v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 294, 295 N. E. 2d 366, we recognized the doctrine of mandated consistency between the convictions of principals and accessories, in certain situations. While the law in this area does not require that an accessory's conviction must always be irrevocably tied to his principal's we held that in a situation "where there has [sic] been two separate judicial determinations on the merits of the respective cases, and where they are contradictory, the law will impose a consistency to their findings." Combs v. State, supra. See also McCarty v. State (1873), 44 Ind. 214.
In this case both petitioner and the principal to the crime were convicted after separate jury trials on the merits. Both were charged and tried for the offense of first degree murder. The underlying crime in the case of the accessory, the petitioner here, was established as murder, while in the case of the principal, it was found to be manslaughter. This is the legally contradictory situation which was considered in Combs, supra, and in which we must impose a consistency on the findings of the respective trials.
We therefore hold that since there has been a determination on the merits of the degree of guilt of both the accessory and the principal to this crime and since they are contradictory, the petitioner is entitled to have her conviction and sentence reduced accordingly to conform to that of the principal. We reverse the decision of the Jay Circuit Court with instructions to grant petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, and to vacate her conviction and enter a finding of guilty of manslaughter and sentence of not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.
Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; Givan, J., dissents with opinion in which Arterburn, C.J., concurs.