Case Name: Treva D. BROWN, Appellant, v. Robert E. BROWN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-05-22
Citations: 714 So. 2d 475
Docket Number: No. 97-1295
Parties: Treva D. BROWN, Appellant, v. Robert E. BROWN, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 714
Pages: 475–479

Head Matter:
Treva D. BROWN, Appellant, v. Robert E. BROWN, Appellee.
No. 97-1295.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 22, 1998.
Rehearing Stricken July 7, 1998.
Dorothy J. McMichen of Dorothy J. McMi-chen, P.A., and Sónica J. Rhodes, Orlando, for Appellant.
Thomas D. Marks of Marks & Chong, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
Treva Brown appeals from a final judgment dismissing her complaint seeking child support for her mentally disabled adult daughter.
Treva Brown (mother) and Robert Brown (father) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1970. The couple had one child, Robin, d/o/b August 5, 1968. The couple entered into a separation and property settlement agreement which was incorporated into the divorce decree. The agreement provided that the father was to pay child support for Robin until the child either marries, reaches the age of 21, dies or becomes self-sufficient.
In 1995, the mother petitioned for modification of the divorce decree seeking child support from the father for Robin, who was then 26 years old. The petition alleges that:
said child is mentally handicapped in that said child has an approximate mental age of a six year old child. The dependent child was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and mental retardation prior to the entry of the Final Judgment of Divorce entered on December 10, 1970. Permanent care, custody and control of Robin Dawn Brown was given to the Petitioner/Wife pursuant to the Final Judgment of Divorce....
The trial court dismissed the petition, stating as follows:
1. The child of the parties, Robin Dawn Brown, born August 5, 1968, is an adult child with an approximate mental age of six years old and is physically and mentally unable to care for herself.
2. Said disability occurred prior to the Final Judgment of Divorce dated December 10,1970.
3. Florida Statutes § 743.07(2) and (3) applies in the instant case.
4. A Marital Settlement Agreement (contract) was entered into between the parties which expired by its own terms on August 5,1989, when the minor child, Robin Dawn Brown, reached the age of majority (21 years old) with no reservation of jurisdiction for child support beyond the age of majority. Said contract can only be altered, modified or extended under its own terms.
5. In order to have jurisdiction to extend child support beyond the age of majority because of mental or physical incapacity which began prior to the child reaching majority, application for the extension of child support beyond the age of majority must be made prior to the child reaching majority or jurisdiction to extend child support beyond majority expires.
6. This Court does not have jurisdiction to modify or extend rights and obligations which expired more than seven years ago.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
A. Jurisdiction having expired as of August 5, 1989, this Court does not have jurisdiction to set child support for Robin Dawn Brown.
B. The Former Wife's Petition for Modification of Child Support filed in the above-styled cause of action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
We affirm the dismissal of the mother's petition for modification. The trial court correctly ruled that jurisdiction to modify the father's support obligation as contained in the 1970 divorce decree ended when the child reached 21 years of age. However, to the extent that the final judgment of dismissal recites that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to set support for Robin Dawn Brown, it is erroneous.
Both the common law and statutory law impose upon a parent a duty of support for an adult dependent child who, because of mental or physical incapacity beginning prior to the child reaching majority, is unable to support herself. See § 743.07(2), Fla. Stat; Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla.1952); Fincham v. Levin, 155 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). See also Monitzer v. Monitzer, 600 So.2d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Where, as here, the father has fulfilled his child support obligation as adjudicated in the divorce decree, an independent action must be brought to adjudicate the father's support obligation for an adult dependent child. See Cronebaugh v. Van Dyke, 415 So.2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 426 So.2d 25 (Fla.1983); Kern v. Kern, 360 So.2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The circuit court is the proper court for such adjudication. Such cause of action belongs not, as the dissent herein suggests, to the mother (by way of a modification action) but rather belongs to the dependent person, who may bring the action in accordance with Rule 1.210(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Holland, 602 So.2d 652, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Indeed, the mother, as well as the father, is a potential defendant in the support action.
We therefore affirm the dismissal of the mother's petition for modification without prejudice to the filing of an independent action for support against the father and/or the mother by the adult dependent child.
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. We have considered and reject the mother's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the clerk's default entered against the father at an early stage of the litigation.
. The dissolution court is a proper forum to enforce or modify a child support order for an adult dependent child where the dissolution court, in the original divorce decree, adjudicated support for the child to extend beyond the age of majority. See Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); George v. George, 360 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). That is not what occurred in this case.