Case Name: John BADEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harvey COX, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1991-04-25
Citations: 931 F.2d 573
Docket Number: No. 89-55638
Parties: John BADEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harvey COX, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before PREGERSON, REINHARDT and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 931
Pages: 573–578

Head Matter:
John BADEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harvey COX, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-55638.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 5, 1990.
Decided April 25, 1991.
John Badea, in pro per.
Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., and Katherine M. Lunsford, Asst. U.S. Attys., Los Ange-les, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before PREGERSON, REINHARDT and HALL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Badea, a former inmate of the Federal Prison Camp at Lompoc, California, brought a civil rights action against the warden and two prison officials for their denial of his repeated requests for placement in a community treatment center. His complaint sought declaratory and in-junctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. The district court referred Badea's case to a magistrate, who concluded that Badea could properly raise his claims only through a habeas corpus proceeding and not through a civil rights action. The magistrate recommended dismissing the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and dismissed the case.
Badea raises several claims of error. He argues first that the district court erred in refusing to transfer his case to another judge who had recently presided over a similar case. He then argues that the district court inadequately considered his objections to the magistrate's report and erred in failing to provide him with a statement of his complaint's deficiencies before dismissing the case. Next he appeals the district court's conclusion that his proper avenue of relief was through habeas corpus. Finally, he argues that the facts are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We reverse because, regardless whether Badea initially should have filed a habeas petition rather than a civil rights action, his subsequent parole from prison makes his pursuit of a civil rights action proper.
I.
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "legality or duration" of confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). A civil rights action, in contrast, is the proper method of challenging "conditions of . confinement." Id. at 498-99, 93 S.Ct. at 1840-41. The parties dispute whether a transfer to a community treatment center would have constituted a change in length of confinement or conditions of confinement, and therefore whether Badea should have sought relief through a habeas petition or a civil rights complaint. See Braun v. Scott, 927 F.2d 1516 (9th Cir.1991) (ordering rehearing en banc); Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.1990). Because of the passage of time, we need not resolve that issue.
Prior to the time that his appeal was heard, Badea was released on parole. Accordingly, he no longer seeks a transfer to a community treatment center. Any request for relief relating to an actual change in the duration or conditions of his confinement is now moot, and the claims that remain are properly asserted in a civil rights suit. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Were we to affirm the district court, Badea would be unable to file a habeas petition to obtain the relief he is now seeking — monetary damages. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the district court to consider the merits of Ba-dea's civil rights claim.
II.
Badea argues that the district court should have transferred his case to another judge who had heard a factually similar case involving different parties. This argument is without basis in the law. District court judges have "broad discretion" regarding the assignment or reassignment of cases. See United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990); United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir.1982). "We do not review independently a district court's determination of the scope and application of local rules and general orders because we give district courts broad discretion in interpreting, applying, and determining the requirements of their own local rules and general orders." Gray, 876 F.2d at 1414. This case is therefore remanded to the same district judge for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
. Badea alleged that the appellees violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, as well as his right under 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 not to be discriminated against because of national origin.
. Our dissenting colleague would affirm the district court on the ground that the merits of Badea's case cannot survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As she recognizes, the district court never considered the merits of this issue. Nevertheless, the dissent would have us rule on the validity of Badea's constitutional and regulatory claims as an exercise of our power to affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record.
Although it is clear that we have the power to affirm on an alternate basis, we need not do so and "as a prudential matter" can properly remand to the district court. See Golden Nugget, Inc. v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir.1987). While the issue on which our colleague would have us decide the case is purely one of law, the government has not yet briefed the question and has requested that the issue not be decided until it has had an opportunity to do so. In this case, we see no reason to decide ab initio issues that the district court has not had an opportunity to consider and that present questions of first impression in our circuit. There may well be valid reasons for our considering issues initially on appeal in other cases but none has been suggested here. Accordingly, we remand for the purpose of allowing the district court to address the merits in the first instance.