Case Name: Josiah A. Colcord versus Crawford S. Fletcher
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1862
Citations: 50 Me. 398
Docket Number: 
Parties: Josiah A. Colcord versus Crawford S. Fletcher.
Judges: Appleton, C. J., Cutting, Davis and Walton, JJ., concuri’ed.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 398–402

Head Matter:
Josiah A. Colcord versus Crawford S. Fletcher.
When two parties submit a matter in controversy to arbitrators, although in terms somewhat vague and indefinite, they have power to determine both the validity and the amount of the claim in dispute, unless restricted by the terms of the submission.
But the award of arbitrators, being in the nature of a judgment, in order to be valid, must ascertain and decide as to the matters submitted, so that it shall not be the cause in itself of a new controversy.
Thus where, in case of a claim by one part owner of a vessel against another part owner, for insurance collected by the latter, the award was, that “ there is due to C. the amount collected on policy of insurance held by F., for his, (C.’s) sixteenth part of barque S.,” it was held to be invalid, as not determining that F. had received any money on the policy, nor, if any, how much.
Assumpsit on an award, with counts for the original causes of action.
The plaintiff and defendant were part owners of the barque Spirit of the Sea. It was in evidence that the defendant had obtained policies of insurance on five-eighths of said barque in three companies, and had received and collected money from each for losses, amounting to $8871,86;• that the plaintiff claimed to recover of the defendant the amount received by him for insurance of one-sixteenth; and that they had mutually referred this claim to Ira Blanchard and Henry McGllvery, who heard the parties, and made a written award, that " there is due Capt. Josiah A. Colcord the amount collected on policy of insurance, as held by C. Si Eletcher for his, J. A. Colcord’s, one-sixteenth of barque Spirit of the Sea.”
The case was taken from the jury, and referred to the full Court, to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the award; if so, the defendant to be defaulted,, but, if not, the case to stand for trial.
J. G. Dickerson, for the plaintiff,
argued that it .is the policy of the law to construe awards liberally, so as to give effect to the intention of parties, and prevent protracted litigation. The award is certain to a common intent. The matter referred was a "claim for insurance collected.” It was a question of right to the money collected, and not of the amount, which could be ascertained at the insurance offices. In law, that is certain which can be made certain. The ease shows that, on the insurance of five-eighths, the amount collected"'was $8871,86. The plaintiff, on one-sixteenth, would be entitled to $887,18..
On a submission respecting the title to a yoke of oxen, an award that one party should pay the other so much money, without determining in terms the title to the oxen, has been held good. Hanson v. Webber, 40 Maine, 194.
Jewett & Ghase, for the defendant.
1. The award does not decide the issue presented in the submission. The controversy was as to the amount, if anything, of insurance collected by the defendant for the plaintiff. The award is silent as to the amount.
2. The award is uncertain. An award must leave no reasonable doubt as to its meaning or effect, or the rights and duties of the parties under it. 2 Parsons on Cont., 204; Schuyler v. Van Der Veer, 2 Caines, 235. The testimony presented, if admissible, does not show the amount awarded, so that it can be ascertained. If the plaintiff can be admitted to show what the defendant received from the companies, the defendant may adduce evidence to prove that no part of it belonged to the plaintiff, or a less part than the plaintiff claims. An award is not to be the cause of a new controversy. Lincoln v. Whittenton, 12 Met., 31; Waite v. Barry, 12 Wend., 377.
3. The declaration is not sustained by the proof. The submission declared on is oral; the one proved, is in writing.
If the defendant has any of the plaintiff’s money, the plaintiff can recover it on a trial of this suit, on his money counts, without giving effect to this defective award.
W. G. Crosby, for the plaintiff, in reply.
1. The award conforms substantially to the submission. In interpreting a submission, regard is to be had mainly to the intention of the parties. Caldwell on Arbitration, 25.
It was the- validity, and not the amount, of the plaintiff’s claim which was submitted. This is shown by the language of the submission. The referees have determined that the claim is valid.
2. The award is so expressed that no reasonable doubt can be entertained as to its meaning or effect, or the rights and duties of the parties. It decides that the plaintiff’s claim is valid. That was the question submitted, and it is the one determined by the arbitrators.
And it is sufficiently certain as to the amount of the claim. It awards to the plaintiff the amount of insurance collected by the defendant on the plaintiff’s sixteenth. The amount so collected was a fixed fact. The award contains a standard or rule by which the plaintiff’s proportion can be ascertained, the proportion of one-sixteenth to the five-eighths insured.
3. Nor is the objection well founded, that the award was not final. The point submitted, the validity of the claim, was fully and finally decided. When the words of the award are less comprehensive than the submission, it is to be understood that what is omitted was not controverted, unless the contrary is shown. 2 Parsons on Cont., 211.
4. The declaration sets forth the award substantially. But, if there is any technical defect in this respect, it may be amended-, so that the substantial rights of parties may not be sacrificed to forms.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
Kent, J.
The first question in this case, is, what was referred under the submission ? It is contended by the plaintiff that the only matter submitted was the validity of his claim, and not the amount. We cannot concur in this view. It is apparent that the parties intended to refer for final determination and adjustment a claim, which plaintiff made against the defendant for money which he had received for insurance, and not merely the abstract question, whether there was any indebtedness, leaving the amount to be otherwise determined. When " a claim " is submitted to any judicial tribunal, it involve^ necessarily the determination of the legality and the amount, unless there is an express limitation of the power to adjudicate.
The defendant insists that the award cannot be made the basis of an action, because it does not conform to the submission, and is not final,between the parties.
It is well settled, that it is essential to the validity of an award that it should make a final disposition of the matters embraced in the submission. What is a final disposition? It is such a disposition that nothing further remains to fix the rights and obligations of the parties, and no further controversy or litigation is required or can arise on the matter. It is such an award that the party against whom it is made can perform or pay it, without any further ascertainment of rights or duties. It is not absolutely necessary that the award should state in figures the exact amount to be paid. It is sufficient if there is such reference in the award to documents or other matters, that nothing remains but mere arithmetical computation, to render the award final and conclusive. Waite v. Barry, 12 Wend., 377; Lincoln v. Whittenton Mills, 12 Met., 31.
The award is in writing, and is as follows : — " that there is due Capt. J. A. Colcord, (plaintiff,) the amount collected on policy of insurance as held by C. S. Fletcher, (defendant,) for his, J. A. Colcord's, one-sixteenth of barque Spirit of the Sea."
The defendant contends that the award does not, in its terms, decide that the plaintiff had, in fact, collected any sum for the defendant's one-sixteenth — that it, at most, decides that there is due from defendant whatever amount he has in fact' received or collected for the one-sixteenth belonging to plaintiff, without affirming that he has collected anything to which plaintiff is entitled.
It is apparent that the principal question between the par ties was, whether the insurance that the defendant obtained on five-eighths of the vessel, included the plaintiff's one-sixteenth, or any part of it. The award does not very clearly determine this preliminary question. It holds the defendant responsible for the amount collected for the plaintiff's portion, but does not in terms affirm that the defendant had collected any money for that one-sixteenth, which was the question in dispute.
But the fatal defect in the award, taken in its most favorable aspect for the plaintiff, is, that it does not make a final disposition of the matters referred, within the rules before stated. "An award is in the_nature of a judgment, and, to be valid, must be certain and decisive as to the matters submitted, so that it shall not be a cause of a new controversy." 12 Met., before cited.
It is clear that no final judgment could be rendered on this award, without further examination and trial. No amount is stated, and none could be fixed without proof of matters not stated or referred to in the award. The question of amount presents a disputable fact, even if it is admitted that the award is sufficiently clear as to the general fact of indebtedness. In this case, plaintiff did not, and could.not safely rely upon the .submission and award, but called witnesses to prove the x-eceipt of money from several insurance offices. Whether a portion of all these sxxms or only of a part was received for plaintiff's use, was oxxe question to be determined, and it could be determined only by further litigation. A verdict coxxld not be found for plaintiff on the. submission and awai'd alone, as the awax'd makes no reference to any fact or document, from which a judgment could be made up. Schuyler v. Van Der Veer, 2 Caines, 235. The awax'd is invalid. According to agreement of the parties, the case must stand for trial upon the counts, other than the one upon the submission and award.
Appleton, C. J., Cutting, Davis and Walton, JJ., concuri'ed.