Case Name: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Glenn E. Rogers, Jr., Appellant, v. Alfred M. Stanley, as Director of Rockland State Hospital, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1966-05-05
Citations: 17 N.Y.2d 256
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Glenn E. Rogers, Jr., Appellant, v. Alfred M. Stanley, as Director of Rockland State Hospital, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 256–264

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York ex rel. Glenn E. Rogers, Jr., Appellant, v. Alfred M. Stanley, as Director of Rockland State Hospital, Respondent.
Argued February 15, 1966;
decided May 5, 1966.
Herbert Monte Levy for appellant.
I. The denial of appointed counsel to the indigent appellant, in a habeas corpus proceeding seeking release from incarceration in a mental institution, deprived him of the equal protection of the laws, and of liberty and property without the due process of law, required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and sections 6 and 11 of article I of the New York State Constitution. (Howard v. Overholser, 130 F. 2d 429; Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F. 2d 825 ; People v. Witenski, 15 N Y 2d 392.) II. The principal underlying the requirement of appointed counsel for indigents in criminal cases — inability to be assured of a fair hearing otherwise — requires that indigents in judicial discharge proceedings have appointed counsel. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Minnesota v. Probate Ct., 309 U. S. 270; Matter of Coates, 9 N Y 2d 242; United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F. 2d 707.) III. Since a patient’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not a collateral proceeding but is a review ah initio, those cases denying existence of a right to appointed counsel in collateral habeas corpus proceedings are inapplicable. Moreover, the right to appointed counsel would exist even were this a collateral proceeding, inasmuch as otherwise petitioner would never have an opportunity to litigate fully the questions of mental illness and the propriety of the commitment. (People ex rel. Simpkins v. Director of Pilgrim State Hosp., 22 A D 2d 699; Dillon v. United States, 307 F. 2d 445; People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455.) IY. Even if there be no absolute right to court-appointed counsel in judicial discharge proceedings, the absence of counsel here so seriously prejudiced appellant as to warrant a ruling that he was entitled to court-appointed counsel, having been denied a fair and meaningful hearing protecting his substantive and procedural rights. V. Rogers was entitled to appointment of counsel as a poor person bringing a special proceeding, under the statutes then and now existing. Any procedural difficulties involved in obtaining a certificate of counsel could have been remedied by the appointment of a guardian ad litem. (People ex rel. Curtis v. Kidney, 225 N. Y. 299; People ex rel. Maconi v. Murphy, 11 A D 2d 1095.) VI. Special Term erred in admitting hospital records into evidence containing a letter and statement of appellant’s father as to appellant’s mental condition, and in finding appellant mentally ill by reason of psychiatric testimony which was based upon such records, what the psychiatrists knew about the patient and their own examinations, all the while excluding evidence as to the facts surrounding the original commitment reflected in the hospital records. (People v. Samuels, 302 N. Y. 163; People v. Faber, 199 N. Y. 256.)
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Winifred C. Stanley and Ruth Kessler Toch of counsel), for respondent.
I. Assignment of counsel to represent relator, an indigent person, in a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain his release from a mental institution was discretionary with the court. He was not entitled, as a matter of right, to assigned counsel, pursuant either to the statutes then existing, or presently in effect. (Rosetano v. State of New York, 208 Misc. 352; Robertson v. Schoonmaker, 249 App. Div. 657; People ex rel. Curtis v. Kidney, 225 N. Y. 299; People ex rel. Maconi v. Murphy, 11 A D 2d 1095.) II. The court’s denial, within its discretion, of relator’s request for counsel, did not violate his constitutional rights. An absolute right to assignment of counsel is not a requirement of due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, or the New York State Constitution (art. I, §§ 6, 11) in a habeas corpus proceeding, brought by an indigent person seeking release from a mental institution. (United States v. Wilkins, 281 F. 2d 707; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; People v. Hughes, 15 N Y 2d 172; Dillon v. United States, 307 F. 2d 445; United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F. 2d 705; People ex rel. Simpkins v. Director of Pilgrim State Hosp., 22 A D 2d 699; People ex rel. Baxstrom v. Herold, 21 A D 2d 754,14 N Y 2d 490, 381 U. S. 949; Howard v. Overholser, 130 F. 2d 429; Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F. 2d 825; People ex rel. Kamisaroff v. Johnston, 13 N Y 2d 66.) III. The court at Special Term acted properly in receiving in evidence relator’s hospital records and history (Mental Hygiene Law, former § 204, now § 426), and in permitting psychiatrists to testify in relation to such records. At the hearing, the court properly limited the issues to the relator’s sanity, and to the commitment pursuant to which he was being held. (People v. Faber, 199 N. Y. 256; People v. Samuels, 302 N. Y. 163; Matter of Maralian, 181 Misc. 1065.)
Allen Harris for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiæ.
I. An indigent petitioner, in a habeas corpus proceeding who seeks to be released from incarceration in a mental institution, has a constitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 11 of article I of the New York State Constitution. II. Appellant was denied the assistance of counsel at the hearing on the habeas corpus writ solely because he was indigent. III. The denial of appointed counsel to' indigent persons in proceedings such as a probation revocation hearing, a coram nobis application, and in an appeal as of right in a criminal matter, has been held to violate constitutional equal protection guarantees. This court should extend this concept and state that the denial of appointed counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding to an indigent person seeking release from incarceration in a mental institution violates the equal protection of the laws. (Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353; People v. Witenski, 15 N Y 2d 392.) IV. The denial of the assistance of counsel to an indigent petitioner, in a habeas corpus proceeding in which he seeks to be released from a mental institution, deprives him of liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and section 6 of article I of the New York State Constitution. (Minnesota v. Probate Ct., 309 U. S. 270; Matter of Coates, 9 N Y 2d 242.) V. Appellant was the only person at the habeas corpus hearing who was not represented by counsel. VI. The habeas corpus hearing was conducted as an adversary proceeding and the failure of the court to appoint counsel in such a proceeding denied appellant due process of law.

Opinion:
Memorándum.
Order reversed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: In our view, the principle of Baxstrom v. Herold (383 U. S. 107); Gideon v. Wainwright (372 U. S. 335); Douglas v. California (372 U. S. 353); Lane v. Brown (372 U. S. 477); Griffin v. Illinois (351 U. S. 12), and of similar cases, demonstrates that an indigent mental patient, who is committed to an institution, is entitled, in a habeas corpus proceeding (brought to establish his sanity), to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitutional right.