Case Name: William Custard v. William Custard, Jr., et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 49
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Custard v. William Custard, Jr., et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 49–56

Head Matter:
William Custard v. William Custard, Jr., et al.
Equity will not relieve a party against his voluntary conveyance, on the ground simply of his own indiscretion and improvidence in making it; neither will it set aside such conveyance on the ground of mistake or ignorance of law and fact, where the facts, of which he avers his ignorance, were such as ought to have been peculiarly within his own knowledge, and his ignorance of them imputable only to his improvidence or inattention to. the state of his own affairs.
Where the father made a voluntary conveyance of community property to his minor children, and sought to obtain a decree of the District Court to sell the property for the payment of community debts, or the maintenance' and education of the children: Held, that ordinarily the Probate Court has cognizance of the subject, and has the power to appoint a guardian for the children, and order the sale of their property, if necessary; and, therefore, the District Court will not entertain jurisdiction of the matter. The facts of this case, as set forth in the petition, are not such as have been held to authorize the District Court to take cognizance of cases within the general grant of power and jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Appeal from Travis. Tried below before. Hon. A. W„ Terrell, one of the district judges.
This suit was brought by William Custard against William Custard, Jr., Mary Custard, and Walter Custard, his minor children, to set aside a conveyance by him made to them of certain property; or, in the alternative, to obtain a decree of the District Court, where the suit was instituted,, to sell said "property to pay certain of Ms debts, and such, other decree, for the support and maintenance of the children, as the court might deem proper.
The plaintiff’s petition alleged, that he and his wife, Mary A. Custard, were domiciliated in Travis county about the 1st of October, 1854, when she died, leaving surviving her, their children, the defendants above named; that she left no separate property; and that they Were owners in community of 6J lots in the city of Austin, 2 tracts of land in Travis county, the one containing 438 acres, and the other containing 37-|- acres, (all of which real estate is described particularly in said petition;) 2 horses and a wagon, of the value of $375; 1 pony, worth $60; 100 head of hogs, worth $300; a crop of corn, worth $400; and household furniture, worth $150; that the community was then indebted to sundry persons, amounting in the aggregate to $1,824 87, bearing interest; that petitioner was security upon a certain bond, upon which he will be compelled to sustain a loss of $300 or a larger sum.
The petition further alleged, that, at and after the death of his said wife, petitioner was ignorant of the amount of said debts, owing to the fact that he kept no books, and tliat the amounts of some of them depended upon unsettled litigation, and that he expected to settle others of them with off-sets which proved to be unavailable; that he was likewise ignorant of the true nature of community interests, and of the fact that all of said property was chargeable with community debts; that afterwards, on the 17th day of May, 1855, petitioner being about to form a second marriage, and never having administered upon his wife’s estate, he conveyed to his said children the aforesaid city lots and the aforesaid tract of 438 acres of land; that he afterwards established his residence on said town property, and made improvements of the value of $600, and also made improvements on -the tract of land last aforesaid of the value of $300; that the aforesaid debts and costs fell unexpectedly upon him, and owing to the entire failure of crops, the birth of three children by his last wife, and the expense of supporting and educating the defendants, he has found it difficult to keep together and1 support his family, the expense of maintaining, clothing, and schooling of the defendants costing the plaintiff, for each of them, at least $150 per annum; that he has no slaves, nor any one to assist him to work; that his children are unable to render him much assistance; that the remainder of his means not conveyed to them by him are well-nigh exhausted, and that certain of the aforesaid debts and costs are yet unpaid; that petitioner is getting old, and is unable to pay said debts and support his family, including said defendants, without resorting to the property so conveyed to said children; that the property referred to embraces much more than half of said community estate, exclusive even of debts, and that the conveyance included much more -than their inheritable share of said defendants in them deceased mother’s estate; that, therefore, he is under the necessity of disposing of a portion of said property for the payment of debts and the support of said children; that letters of administration upon the estate of his wife, or of guardianship of said children, would be useless; and that proper relief can only be granted by the exercise of the equitable powers of the District Court.
The petition prayed for the appointment of an auditor, and that an account be taken of the community estate between himself and the estate of his deceased wife, as well as of the debts, expenses, cost of education, and support of said children. Also, for a decree, that the partition which petitioner attempted to make may be so reformed, that the children be decreed to have one-half of the community property, after the payment of debts; that the deed may be regarded as only a trust-deed, for the use and benefit of the community estate; that it may be either cancelled, or so reformed as to accomplish ■ an equitable partition; that a decree maybe rendered for the sale of so much of said property as may be necessary to .pay the debts; that petitioner may be placed, as near as possible, in the same condition in which he would have been had he administered upon the estate of his deceased wife, and had never made the conveyance aforesaid; and that such decree may be made, in regard to the support and maintenance of the children, as may be just in the premises.
To this petition was filed a general' demurrer, which was by the court sustained; the appellant assigned as error the aforesaid ruling.
I. A. $ Geo. W. Paschal, for appellant.
—The case is'a hard one, and if there be any ground upon which equitable relief can be based, it will be granted. It cannot be denied that the right of the children to inherit through the mother was with the burden of the community debts and the life-estate of the father in one-third. The father, as he alleges, for the purpose of securing to the children the inheritance from their mother, conveyed to them not the half, but nearly all of the community property. This was before the extent of the debts was known, and, as he alleges, under a legal mistake as to his and their rights.
The first question is, whether such a deed, made by the father to the children, is an absolute estoppel upon him ? or is it taken as a trust by the children, as tenants in common with the father, and held subject to the debts and the rights of partition? ¡Natural justice would answer that the latter was the case. Equity would say that the deeds were void as against the creditors of the community interest. But those community debts, and the support of the family, as necessary for the children as the father, have exhausted him. And the question is, whether the deed is such an iron barrier, against the father, as to prevent the use of the property for the purposes to which the law dedicated it? •
That the deed could not operate in law to convey to the children the mother’s interest is clear: they took by inheritance, and not by purchase. The status of that half was not, therefore, changed. There would be no estoppel as to that. The tenant in common was at most conveying to his co-tenants his" undivided interest in the estate. The mother’s interest certainly remained incumbered with the debts of the community, and, we think, the father’s also, for the purposes of the debts and the support of the family. It was a change of the legal ownership of the common property, which' did not affect the existing equities between the creditors and coparceners.
We think a court of equity has. jurisdiction to reform such a family arrangement.
In Texas the rights of the surviving husband are not to be governed by strict law. For if they were, then all society would be upset, and the peace of families disturbed. In every case the court must look to the strict equities between the parents and children.
The general doctrines of mistakes have been so fully discussed by the counsel in the case of Harrell v. de Normandie, 26 Tex., 126, that citation of authorities would seem to be superfluous. These general propositions seem to be clear: the courts will relieve for mistake of facts, as a general rule, wherever equity ought to relieve; and they will also relieve for a mistake of law in some exceptional cases. They will relieve for a mistake of facts, as the general rule; the exceptions are peculiar cases. They will not relieve for a mistake of law, as a general rule. The exceptions are where some other ingredient .enters into the matter besides the mere mistake. Perhaps this is stating the rule as nearly as possible.
The case of Trigg v. Ried, 5 Hump., 529, exhausts the authorities, and establishes the above proposition.
The case of Moreland v. Atchison, 19 Tex., 308, recognizes as authority some cases which would certainly lead to the conclusion that such mistakes as are urged by the plaintiff may be the subject of equitable relief.
But whether the party is entitled to the relief sought on the ground of mistake or not, he certainly is entitled to have an account taken, and the property subjected to the sale, for payment of debts and for the support of his children.
Bo administration has been had upon the mother’s estate; no guardian has been appointed for the children; he has exhausted himself paying the community debts, and is not through; he finds himself unable to support the children, and he asks that the property of his children may be used for these objects. Can it not be done?
The 15th section of the 4th article of our State constitution does not give the “inferior tribunal” exclusive jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons; but expressly gives “original jurisdiction” to the District Court. And, we think, in the case of Smith v. Smith, 11 Tex., 102, and in many other cases, the court has recognized the general principle, that whenever equitable powers are to be exercised, the District Court should be appealed to in the first instance.
Judge Lipscomb reviews the previous decisions, and shows that in all cases of fraud and trusts, or where equitable relief proper is to be had, the appeal is properly made to the District Court. Surely trusts and mistakes come under this classification. And there having been no administration rip on the wife’s estate, no other tribunal can hear proof of the justice of the accounts yet remaining unpaid. The fact of another marriage having been contracted, other children having been born, and the father old, are strong grounds for equitable interposition.
(The cases as to the equitable powers of the court are collected in Paschal’s Annotated Digest, p. 57, note 182.— Reporter.)
|PHancock $ West, for defendant.
—This suit cannot be maintained against the heirs of Mrs. Custard, deceased. There should have been an administration.
The following authorities determine the point: Patton v. Gregory, 21 Tex.; opinion by Judge Roberts: case hot recollected, (Tyler Term, 1859.) Rone of the exceptions in the law, in which heirs can sue or be sued, relieve the appellant. (Authorities cited in Patton v. Gregory, 21 Tex., supra.)
The petition, however, discloses no cause of action.
The appellant is estopped by his own deed to his children.
It is not necessary to discuss the question as to whether or not creditors could attack the deed. It is sufficient to say that no creditors are complaining here. The ominous date of the deed, only eight days before his second marriage, would suggest the idea, that possibly the appellant was attempting to perpetrate a fraud on his second wife.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—We are of opinion that the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer. The plaintiff seeks to set aside his deed, on the ground of mistake or ignorance of law and fact. But the facts, of which he avers his ignorance, were such as ought to have been peculiarly within his own knowledge. If he were ignorant of them, he has shown no other cause to which his ignorance can be imputed than his own improvidence or inattention to the state of his own affairs. Ro such ignorance or mistake of fact or law is shown, it is believed, as has been considered a ground for affording equitable relief. The plaintiff may have acted very indiscreetly and improvidently in making the disposition of his property against which he now seeks to be relieved; but it appears to be a case of improvidence simply, which, in itself, is not a ground for relief in equity.
Ror do we think 'the plaintiff entitled to the alternate relief he seeks, of having the property sold by the decree of the court for the payment of debts or the maintenance and education of Ms cMldren. If tMs be necessary, recourse should be had to the Probate Court, to which the cognizance of that subject properly belongs, and which has the power to appoint a guardian for the children and order the sale of their property, if necessary. It is not perceived that the case is attended by any of the circumstances which have been held to authorize the District Court to take cognizance of cases within the general grant of power and jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
It appears to have been the intention of the plaintiff to vest in his children the title and beneficial interest in the property. There is, therefore, no resulting trust in his favor. It is not a proceeding on behalf of-creditors to. obtain satisfaction of their demands, for which the property may be liable. But it is a proceeding to avoid the plaintiff's own voluntary conveyance, 'because improvidently made; or to obtain a sale of the property of his children, by order of the District Court, to -pay debts and provide for their support and maintenance. We are of opinion that such a proceeding cannot be maintained for either of the purposes proposed; and that the' demurrer was rightly sustained. The judgment is, therefore,
Affirmed.