Case Name: Ron WALES, d/b/a Video, U.S.A., Appellant (Defendant), v. Ross M. ROLL and Vicki Franke, a Wyoming Partnership, d/b/a RV Enterprises, Appellees (Plaintiffs)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1989-02-24
Citations: 769 P.2d 899
Docket Number: No. 88-166
Parties: Ron WALES, d/b/a Video, U.S.A., Appellant (Defendant), v. Ross M. ROLL and Vicki Franke, a Wyoming Partnership, d/b/a RV Enterprises, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
Judges: Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 769
Pages: 899–908

Head Matter:
Ron WALES, d/b/a Video, U.S.A., Appellant (Defendant), v. Ross M. ROLL and Vicki Franke, a Wyoming Partnership, d/b/a RV Enterprises, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
No. 88-166.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Feb. 24, 1989.
John C. Hoard, Casper, for appellant (defendant).
J. Stan Wolfe, Gillette, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.
. Rule 302(2) of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming provides in part: "At the time of filing a motion for summary judgment the movant shall designate and file relevant portions of the discovery documents relied upon."

Opinion:
MACY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a replevin action ordering appellant Ron Wales, d/b/a Video, U.S.A., to deliver business properties to appellees Ross M. Roll and Vicki Franke, d/b/a RV Enterprises, upon a finding that Roll and Franke had a continuing security interest notwithstanding a subsequent sale of the property by the debtor to Wales.
We affirm.
Wales generically states his issue to be:
Did the District Court err in granting Appellees' Motion For Summary Judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed and the Appellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
Specifically, Wales questions whether it was error for the court to permit Roll and Franke to support their motion for summary judgment with untimely filed depositions and whether the acts of one partner caused Roll's and Franke's security interest to become unenforceable against Wales' posses-sory rights to business properties. These are questions of law, the answers to which depend upon the facts of this case. The material facts in this case are not in dispute.
Roll and Franke were the two members of a partnership known as RV Enterprises which owned and operated a video rental agency in Gillette, Wyoming. During the month of June 1986, RV Enterprises listed the video business for sale with Century 21 Sun Agency of Gillette, Wyoming. Wales made an offer to purchase the business for $85,000. Roll said he would give his consent to sell the business for the price offered if Century 21 would accept a $2,500 commission rather than a commission of seven percent of the selling price. Century 21 refused to take a lesser commission.
Franke, Monte G. Schulte (a defendant below), and Wales reasoned that they could satisfy Roll's minimum cash price by structuring a sale to Schulte since they believed this sale would not generate an entitlement to a real estate commission. To facilitate this plan, Schulte entered into a written contract with RV Enterprises on December 31, 1986, to purchase the business for $86,-850 by paying $50,000 in cash down and the $36,850 balance plus ten percent interest thereon on or before March 6, 1987. Concurrent with signing the purchase agreement, Schulte signed a security agreement granting RV Enterprises a security interest in the business assets to secure the balance of the purchase price. Wales provided Schulte with the down payment but was unable to obtain a bank loan to pay the balance of the purchase price.
On February 23, 1987, Wales entered into a written agreement with Schulte to purchase the business for $90,000 by paying $55,000 in cash and thirty-six monthly payments of $1,000 each. The additional $1,000 payment was Schulte's fee for acting as the straw man. Franke prepared this contract and signed it to evidence her responsibility for it. Roll first became aware that Franke, Schulte, and Wales had engaged in the straw man transaction after Schulte failed to pay the balance due under the RV Enterprises/Schulte contract.
On July 17, 1987, RV Enterprises filed a complaint against Schulte and Wales, alleging the existence of the two contracts, the security agreements, and the default and praying that RV Enterprises' security interest in the property be declared superior to the contracts, that the property be assembled, delivered, and sold, and that judgment be entered against Schulte for any deficiency remaining after sale. Wales timely filed his answer alleging a plethora of affirmative defenses which included fraud on the part of RV Enterprises by conspiring with Schulte to induce Wales to buy the business so that they could keep Wales' $50,000 after Schulte intentionally failed to make the balloon payment pursuant to the terms of the RV Enterprises contract. Schulte failed to answer, and default was entered against him.
After the action progressed through the court's case management schedule, the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment stating that they would rely upon the depositions of Wales, Roll, and Franke. On March 8, 1988, the court filed its order allowing RV Enterprises to file these depositions. On April 26, 1988, the court also signed a similar order which was filed April 27, 1988.
On April 26, 1988, immediately prior to the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, Wales objected to the use of unfiled depositions by RV Enterprises in support of or in opposition to the motions. The following colloquy took place:
MR. WOLPE: I have a motion in my file that has been filed, motion for filing discovery depositions, and I filed this on March 4th, which asks for the filing of the depositions of Wales, Franke and Roll.
THE COURT: You're right; that was filed.
MR. WOLFE: I would renew that motion at this time and present the court with copies of their depositions.
MR. O'NEIL: Your Honor, that's exactly what I was talking about.
I'm in receipt of a copy of that motion. I would stipulate on that to the court, but Rule, Uniform Rule # 302(b) says at the time of filing of the motion. If the court ruled on that motion later or today, that's not sufficient under the Uniform Rules.
THE COURT: Well, the court should have ruled on that earlier, and that's my fault for not doing that.
Are you claiming some sort of surprise, Mr. O'Neil, by the use of those depositions, noting, of course, that you used part of those depositions in your motion?
Because, if you are, we'll simply put off hearing this motion until you've had sufficient time to make any responses you think are appropriate and proceed at that time.
But I can see no reason why the court should not consider those depositions. The appropriate motion was made, and the court simply failed to rule on it through oversight, or whatever.
But we can either go ahead and use them now, or, if you don't wish to do that, we'll simply reset this hearing at a time so that we're in compliance, strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
MR. O'NEIL: Well, Your Honor, I can't claim surprise in that in the motion it is mentioned that he's going to use the depositions in reliance.
I guess my problem is using the entire depositions. I'm not — really haven't been given notice of exactly what portions of the depositions are going to be used or the basis of the argument.
But I'm familiar with the depositions, Your Honor, all three of them.
THE COURT: Well, if you are familiar with all three of them we're simply going to proceed today then.
And at the close of this, if there is any need for you to make further response, I will allow you the additional time to do that.
You may proceed with your argument, Mr. Wolfe.
Wales and RV Enterprises, through their attorneys, then extensively referred to the depositions to support their respective motions.
On April 27, 1988, the court filed its order granting RV Enterprises' motion for summary judgment and denying Wales' motion upon findings that:
9. In accordance with W.S. § 34-21-935(b), a security interest in collateral continues notwithstanding its sale, exchange or disposition, unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party.
10. There is no evidence of RV Enterprises authorizing Schulte to sell the subject property to Wales unencumbered by the security interest.
On May 6, 1988, the court filed its judgment in which it incorporated by reference the April 27, 1988, order and in which it ordered Wales to assemble and deliver the business assets to RV Enterprises. It is from this judgment that this appeal has been taken.
FILING DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS
The purpose behind the requirement for filing discovery documents concurrently with filing a motion for summary judgment is to afford a responding party a meaningful opportunity to challenge the documents submitted. Macaraeg v. Wil son, 749 P.2d 272 (Wyo.1988). We recently held, however, in Atlas Construction Company v. Slater, 746 P.2d 352 (Wyo. 1987), that the failure to file depositions at the time of filing a motion for summary judgment is not reversible error unless it affects a substantial right.
Wales has failed to demonstrate to this Court how he was prejudiced by RV Enterprises' failure to timely file the depositions it used to support its motion for summary judgment. The record, however, reflects that, in addition to the court entering two orders allowing RV Enterprises to use the subject depositions, the court offered to vacate and reset the hearing if Wales was in any way surprised by their use. Wales not only disclaimed surprise or unfamiliarity, he used the same depositions to support his motion for summary judgment without having filed them at the time he filed his motion.
The depositions were before the court when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment and, like in Atlas Construction Company, the failure of RV Enterprises to timely file the depositions was a technical imperfection which did not affect a substantial right of Wales and was not reversible error.
VALIDITY OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Wyo.Stat. § 34-21-935(b) (1977) provides:
Except where this article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
Wales attempts to avoid the effect of this statute by reasoning that Franke's participation in what he characterizes as fraudulent transactions should cause the RV Enterprises/Schulte contract and security agreement to be unenforceable. We do not agree. Assuming arguen-do that Franke's actions are either fraudulent, unlawful, or against public policy, there is no basis for imputing such actions to RV Enterprises.
Wyo.Stat. § 17-13-301(b) (1977) provides:
An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other partners.
Although Franke was authorized to carry on the video rental business in the usual way, she did not have the authority to sell the business assets of RV Enterprises without the consent of Roll. Her conduct with Schulte in their dealings with Wales was "not apparently for the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way." Thus, her conduct did not bind the partnership "unless authorized by the other partners." It is undisputed that Roll did not consent to, or have prior knowledge of, the sale of the business property to Wales through Schulte as a straw man, or otherwise. Since Roll did not authorize Franke's conduct, her conduct did not bind the partnership.
We hold as a matter of law that it was not error, under the circumstances of this case, for the district court to permit RV Enterprises to use unfiled depositions to support its motion for summary judgment and that the alleged acts of Franke did not undermine RV Enterprises' security interest in the property sold to Schulte, notwithstanding the subsequent sale to Wales.
AFFIRMED.
URBIGKIT, J.,
files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.