Case Name: George L. DOSS v. AMERICAN VENTURES, INC., and Travelers Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-03-03
Citations: 224 So. 2d 470
Docket Number: No. 3299
Parties: George L. DOSS v. AMERICAN VENTURES, INC., and Travelers Insurance Company.
Judges: Before REDMANN, BARNETTE and GARDINER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 224
Pages: 470–479

Head Matter:
George L. DOSS v. AMERICAN VENTURES, INC., and Travelers Insurance Company.
No. 3299.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.
March 3, 1969.
On Rehearing June 2, 1969.
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1969.
Sessions, Fishman, Rosenson, Snellings & Boisfontaine, Robert E. Winn, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Ignatz G. Kiefer, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before REDMANN, BARNETTE and GARDINER, JJ.

Opinion:
GARDINER, Judge.
Plaintiff, George L. Doss, alleging that he was employed by an independent contractor-painter who was hired by defendant, American Ventures, Inc., to paint a commercial building owned by the corporation, instituted this suit against the defendant corporation and its compensation insurer to recover maximum benefits and statutory penalties and attorney's fees under the Louisiana Compensation Act. From the judgment in plaintiff's favor for total and permanent disability, defendants have appealed. Plaintiff answered the appeal praying that the judgment be amended so as to award penalties and attorney's fees.
On November 17, 1965, while plaintiff was in the discharge of his duties as a painter, the scaffold upon which he was standing collapsed and he fell sustaining serious injuries to his foot and ankle. As a result of the injuries plaintiff asserts that he is permanently and totally disabled.
It is conceded that plaintiff's injury occurred while he was working as a painter in the course of his employment with the contractor on a building owned by defendant corporation; that offices, shops and stores in the building were leased by defendant corporation and it collected rents from its tenants under leases executed by it. The building was damaged in Hurricane Betsy of 1965, and had to be repaired and both the interior and exterior painted.
Defendants maintain that the trial judge erred in finding that (1) plaintiff was injured while working in the regular trade, business and occupation of defendant American Ventures, Inc., (2) certain writ ten medical reports objected to as hearsay evidence were admissible, and (3) plaintiff had proven his total and permanent disability as a result of the accident.
Under its charter, the defendant corporation is engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate, and from the evidence in the record, it owns and manages this one piece of real estate, located on Green Acres Road in the Parish of Jefferson. The building contains offices for doctors and dentists, a beauty parlor, a barber shop and a coin operated laundry. As we have stated, after Hurricane Betsy damaged the building the defendant corporation contracted with a Mr. Gould to paint it. Plaintiff was the exclusive employee of the contractor and his work was not supervised by the defendant corporation's officers.
Defendants' argument under its first contention is that the corporation is not engaged in construction, masonry or painting work, its regular business, trade or occupation being merely the collecting of the rents owed by its tenants who occupied its building. Therefore, they insist that under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1035 plaintiff's injury did not occur within the scope of defendant corporation's regular business, trade or occupation and hence defendants are not liable to plaintiff.
The defendant corporation is composed of four brothers, one of whom, as its secretary-treasurer, testified as to its business, trade or occupation. While he insisted that this was "strictly collecting rents" from its tenants, at the time of plaintiff's injury "repair work was being done as a result of the hurricane"; otherwise "the tenants take care of their own problems, unless it's something major, of course."
From the foregoing, we think there can be no doubt that the owner and lessor corporation which manages a commercial building in order to lease or rent it as offices, stores and shops, as a necessary incident to rental, must also repair, maintain and paint the property. It is engaged, therefore, in the construction, repair, and painting of the building incidental to its business, trade or occupation, and that feature of its business being hazardous, the plaintiff, having been injured while performing services incident thereto for the contractor of defendant corporation is entitled to recover workmen's compensation.
A strikingly similar factual situation was presented to us in the recent consolidated cases of Stephney v. Robertson and Werner, and Stephney v. W. R. C. Construction Company, Inc., 219 So.2d 9. The opinion of this court was handed down on February 3, 1969. Stephney was employed as a painter and carpenter and in the course of his employment fell from a ladder and sustained injuries. The defendants, Robertson and Werner, owned rental properties which they personally managed and maintained. They were also licensed real estate brokers and managed rental property for the account of other owners. The defendant corporation was organized by them and its purpose was to deal in, lease, rent and manage real estate for its own account and as agent or broker. It could also remodel, repair and maintain property. As in the present suit, repairs in that case were made necessary by Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and plaintiff was employed in making such repairs. We held in the Stephney case that "the rental and maintenance of a substantial number of rental houses was a major part of the regular business of defendants Robertson and Werner." This court discussed and referred to the case of Richard v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 247 La. 943, 175 So.2d 277, in which the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and held that at the time of the accident the plaintiff's employer, Landreneau Enterprises, was not carrying on a separate rental business and whatever rental business existed was a part of the total Landreneau Enterprises. The Supreme Court concluded that if the rental of houses was only one of the many endeavors of that company, then they were in the business of repairing houses and that plaintiff was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits irrespective of the nonhazardous nature of the rental business, and said:
"Our jurisprudence has held that the rental of houses may not of itself be a hazardous business, but if the employer's business has hazardous features, the nonhazardous phase does not preclude amenability to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. "
This court held in Stephney v. Robertson and Werner, supra, that plaintiff's climbing upon roofs and ladders in the performance of duties essential to his job as repairman was a hazardous feature of defendants' real estate business and that they were engaged in a hazardous business so as to allow recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, notwithstanding the nonhazardous features of their real estate and rental business. We are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by us in that case is applicable here.
We have read the cases cited by counsel for defendants to support their position, and find that those decisions were rendered prior to Richard v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, and Stephney v. Robertson and Werner, supra.
While the facts are undisputed that plaintiff was hired by an independent painting contractor to paint the building owned by the defendant corporation and his work was not supervised by it, it is nevertheless liable for workmen's compensation benefits to the contractor's employee if the employee is injured in the performance of such work. LSA-R.S. 23:1061; Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Company, La.App., 193 So.2d 807; Wynn v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, La.App., 85 So.2d 315.
Plaintiff testified that after the accident he was admitted to Touro Infirmary by Dr. James T. Williams, then a member of a New Orleans group of orthopedic surgeons. X-rays were made of plaintiff's ankle. The verified hospital reports are in the record and show that plaintiff sustained a "markedly comminuted fracture of the distal tibia with involvement of the distal articular end of the tibia, with marked impaction." Dr. Williams applied a long leg cast and plaintiff remained in Touro Infirmary for eight days. He was seen on two subsequent occasions by Dr. Williams, the last visit being on December 6, 1965, when the cast was changed for another of the same type. Plaintiff returned to his home in Marshall, Texas. He could not get orthopedic treatment at the'Veterans Hospital in Shreveport and was sent to Houston, Texas. At the hospital there an X-ray was taken of the ankle and a new cast applied after which he received outpatient care for six weeks when a shorter cast was placed on his leg. Next plaintiff journeyed to Dallas to the Veterans Hospital in which hospital the cast was removed and another applied. The cast was finally removed in June, 1966. Plaintiff continued to use crutches and later a walking stick and he testified that he experienced soreness and swelling in the ankle and for a considerable period of time walked with a limp. He was examined on November 15, 1966, by Dr. G. M. Hilliard, who was defendant insurer's doctor, at his orthopedic clinic in Longview, Texas. Dr. Hilliard X-rayed his ankle and made his report to the insurer on November 22, 1966. Dr. Williams made his report on November 14, 1966, addressed to plaintiff's former attorney. The reports of these two doctors were "interchanged" by counsel either before or at the trial. Dr. Williams did not testify and while counsel for plaintiff has not explained his absence at the trial, in oral argument the court was advised that Dr. Williams was serving in the United States Army. No explanation was given by counsel for defendants as to the reason why no depositions of Dr. Hilliard were taken on defendants' behalf since he did not testify. Both reports of the two doctors were offered in evidence by plaintiff.
When plaintiff offered the reports defendants objected to' their admission as hearsay. We think the trial judge correctly admitted the reports only as prima facie evidence of their contents under LSA-R.S. 23:1122. Under LSA-R.S. 23:-1122, if there is any dispute as to the condition of the employee after the employer has had him examined, and the court appoints a specialist to examine the injured employee, he "shall report his conclusions from the examination to the Court, and such report shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." Dees v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, La.App., 162 So. 597; Stroud v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 772.
In Cade v. Tafaro, La.App., 34 So.2d 72, we held that the trial court properly admitted the report of plaintiff's physician over the same objection as that made here. In that case, which was a tort action, there had been an agreement that the parties would furnish the other with a copy of its physician's report and copies were interchanged as agreed.
Moreover, the court shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence in a workmen's compensation suit. The jurisprudence of this state in such cases is to the effect that hearsay evidence, within discretionary limits, is admissible. LSA-R.S. 23:1317. Manues v. Ships & Power, Inc., D.C., 180 F.Supp. 850; Clifton v. Arnold, La.App., 87 So.2d 386; Kilman v. Smith, La.App., 28 So.2d 499; Arrington v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., La.App., 16 So.2d 145.
Defendants rely upon the case of Hoffpauir v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company, La.App., 192 So.2d 588, in support of their contention that the doctor's reports in this case were hearsay. It is true that the court states that the "valuable portions" of doctors' reports, that is, their opinions as to disability, are "in all probability inadmissible" under LSA-R.S. 23 :- 1122. To the extent that the Hoffpauir case questions the admissibility of disability opinion reports under section 1122 as constituting proof of the disability, we agree that this is not the intent of the statute. However, we believe such statements of opinion are admissible to prove prima facie the fact that the doctor is of such opinion. This is similar to the usual stipulation of counsel for admission of a doctor's report which is not that the doctor's findings and opinions are correct, but merely that the doctor would testify that these are his findings and opinions.
The disputed portion of the report of defendants' doctor after his examination of plaintiff is as follows:
"This man's ankle symptoms are the result of post traumatic arthritis. I doubt that there will be much in the way of spontaneous improvement from now on. In fact, he may experience gradual increase in his symptoms of left ankle pain and stiffness as time goes on. At the present time his symptoms are such that no further definitive treatment seems indicated. In the future, however, if he should experience a gradual increase in the severity of his ankle symptoms to the point where they are intolerable an arthrodesis (fusion) of the ankle joint will be indicated. For the present time, he should avoid work which involves prolonged standing, walking, stooping, squatting, etc., to the foot."
Dr. Williams, plaintiff's doctor, in his report giving his history, physical and X-ray examination and treatment, concluded as follows:
"It was my opinion that the patient had sustained a very severely comminuted fracture of the left distal tibia which extended into the distal articular surface of the tibia. Although it was possible to realign the multiple fracture fragment into a satisfactory position and alignment, the prognosis was guarded. Fractures which extend into an articular surface not uncommonly result in post-traumatic arthritis of the involved joint. This possibility could not be ruled out in this case."
Plaintiff testified that his left ankle "gets stiff, and it's stiff to a certain degree now. I can't move it but just a little. I can't get around as good as I used to." He also testified that he did not work until the fall of 1966 and then drove a truck and was a dog catcher for short periods of time, but he could only do some painting from a stepladder. He says that he cannot climb up and down on extension ladders or do any "high work" and that, as a consequence thereof, his ability to perform his regular painting work has been substantially reduced. When asked on cross-examination if any doctor ever told him that he could not do high painting work, he answered:
"Well, Dr. Williams told me that I probably never would be able to do any climbing no more; but every orthopedic I went to at the V. A. and also the insurance [company's doctor] told me that leg would always bother me and would be stiff, and said eventually I'd have to have that ankle fused and make it stiff."
As there is no contradictory evidence, plaintiff's statement must be accepted as the truth. Barbara v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, La.App., 137 So.2d 466.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in this record is sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial judge that at the time of the trial plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled.
Plaintiff's claim for penalties and attorney's fees, which were rejected by the District Court, cannot be allowed. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to show that the defendant insurer acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
For the above reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.