Case Name: RICHARDS ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellant, v. Herbert R. SWOFFORD, and Herbert R. Swofford, P.A., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-10-02
Citations: 495 So. 2d 1210
Docket Number: No. 85-1248
Parties: RICHARDS ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellant, v. Herbert R. SWOFFORD, and Herbert R. Swofford, P.A., Appellees.
Judges: SHARP, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 495
Pages: 1210–1218

Head Matter:
RICHARDS ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellant, v. Herbert R. SWOFFORD, and Herbert R. Swofford, P.A., Appellees.
No. 85-1248.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 2, 1986.
Jeffrey A. Icardi, of Icardi Law Offices, P.A., Winter Park, for appellant.
Herbert R. Swofford, Orlando, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
UPCHURCH, Chief Judge.
Richards Enterprises, Inc., appeals an order dismissing its cause of action against attorney Herbert Swofford and Herbert Swofford, P.A. Richards argues that the trial court erred in holding that its claim for legal malpractice was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. We agree and reverse.
Swofford was retained to represent Richards and to prepare closing documents which included a note and mortgage in a real property transaction. He was also retained to foreclose the mortgage. The foreclosure was decided adversely to Richards, the trial court finding that the original transaction was fraudulently induced. Richards obtained substitute counsel who filed a motion for new trial. On December 22,1981, the motion was denied. The order was affirmed on appeal by this court on April 20, 1983.
On April 19, 1985, Richards filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Swof-ford. Swofford moved to dismiss, contending in part that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was granted and the case dismissed by the trial court on the basis that the statute of limitations began to run on December 22, 1981, the date of the denial of the motion for new trial in the mortgage foreclosure action as that was the date any cause of action was "discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." See Birnkolz v. Blake, 399 So.2d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
In Adams v. Sommers, 475 So.2d 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), we reversed a summary final judgment in favor of an attorney in a legal malpractice action. There we held that the two year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the decision adverse to the client (which was the subject of the malpractice action) was appealed to this court, a decision was rendered and no further action was taken. Our decision was based on the premise that had the lower court's ruling been reversed, the client would not have had a cause of action for malpractice on that ground.
In the present case, Richards' motion for new trial was denied on December 22,1981. However, that decision was appealed and had this court reversed that decision, Richards' mortgage foreclosure claim would have been viable and Richards would not have had a malpractice action based on that ground.
In Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County, 435 So.2d 804 (Fla.1983), a case relied on by the dissent, the defective roof was apparent. There the Florida Supreme Court held that the efforts of the architect and the contractor to repair or cure the defects did not toll the statute. Here, unlike Kelley, Swofford had been retained to prepare and subsequently to foreclose a mortgage. There was no "leaking water" to reveal the defect. The validity or invalidity of the mortgage and Swofford's work in preparing it were to be tested by its enforceability. If the appellate court had found that the court erred in refusing foreclosure, Swofford would not have been negligent. Hence, no cause of action for malpractice existed at the time of the judgment denying foreclosure and the statute of limitations did not begin to run from December 22, 1981.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
SHARP, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.