Case Name: Harold C. HUBBARD, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-07-10
Citations: 411 So. 2d 1312
Docket Number: No. VV-439
Parties: Harold C. HUBBARD, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and LARRY G. SMITH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 411
Pages: 1312–1317

Head Matter:
Harold C. HUBBARD, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. VV-439.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
July 10, 1981.
On Rehearing Feb. 23, 1982.
Rehearing Denied April 29, 1982.
Michael Allen, Public Defender, and Nancy A. Daniels, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the appellant's conviction for the knifepoint robbery of a convenience store. Of Hubbard's seven points on appeal, two require comment.
Hubbard was seventeen years old and subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system when the crime occurred on July 18,1977. Section 39.01(4), 39.02, Florida Statutes (1977). At the time, a juvenile could be involuntarily transferred into the adult criminal justice system in two ways: pursuant to a waiver hearing conducted by a judge, or upon indictment by the Grand Jury for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. Section 39.02(5)(a), (c), Florida Statutes (1977). In 1978, the legislature enacted 39.04(2)(e)4 which permits state attorneys to charge sixteen and seventeen year old juveniles as adults by filing infor-mations directly in circuit court, thereby bypassing the juvenile system. After this provision took effect, the state attorney filed an information charging Hubbard with the 1977 robbery with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Hubbard argues that because the "direct file" statute was not in effect at the time of the crime, the prosecutor's procedure was an impermissible ex post facto application of law.
Under the circumstances of this case we disagree because application of the direct file statute did not substantively alter Hubbard's situation to his disadvantage. See Prince v. State, 398 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Robbery with a deadly weapon is a crime punishable by life imprisonment, Section 812.13(2)(a), so the state attorney at the time of the commission of the crime could have initiated indictment proceedings to have the defendant tried as an adult. In the context of waiving juvenile jurisdiction, the difference between indictment and information is procedural, not substantive. State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1980). Therefore, Hubbard's motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The appellant also urges reversible error in the trial court's denial of his request for a jury instruction on minimum and maximum penalties. See Tascano v. State, 393 So.2d 540 (Fla.1980), reh. denied February 27, 1981. However, Hubbard did not object to the judge's failure to give such an instruction, so this point is not preserved for our determination. Holland v. State, 400 So.2d 767, No. WW-55 (Fla. 1st DCA opinion filed April 10, 1981) [1981 F.L.W. 860], But see Williams v. State, 399 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), n. 6; Saulsberry v. State, 398 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Accordingly, judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and LARRY G. SMITH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
. The prohibitions against ex post facto laws, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, Fla.Const. Art. I, § 10, require that an otherwise valid law may not be applied to a defendant against whom it would have an ex post facto effect. E. g., Greene v. State, 238 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1970).
. "We do not see how a state attorney's decision to seek an indictment against a juvenile . is distinguishable from a state attorney's decision to file an information against a juvenile. In either case the legislature has . returned to the state attorney his traditional prerogative of deciding who to criminally charge with what offense. Moreover, the requirement of a grand jury indictment only ensures that there is probable cause for the charge — it does not determine the propriety of prosecuting a juvenile as an adult." 381 So.2d at 1364-65.
In a broader context, other jurisdictions have found the difference between indictment and information to be procedural, and therefore not subject to ex post facto challenge. See State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 65 S.W. 763 (1901) and cases cited therein.
.The direct file statute includes a mechanism to return the cause to the auspices of juvenile court upon motion for transfer, supported by a showing that the defendant has not previously committed two delinquent acts, one a felony. Here, the defendant apparently chose not to move for such a transfer but moved instead to dismiss the information.