Case Name: Robert M. AKEY, et al., known as Watson Clinic, a medical partnership, Appellants, v. Frank P. MURPHY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-12-12
Citations: 229 So. 2d 276
Docket Number: No. 68-60
Parties: Robert M. AKEY, et al., known as Watson Clinic, a medical partnership, Appellants, v. Frank P. MURPHY, Appellee.
Judges: PIERCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 229
Pages: 276–281

Head Matter:
Robert M. AKEY, et al., known as Watson Clinic, a medical partnership, Appellants, v. Frank P. MURPHY, Appellee.
No. 68-60.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
Dec. 12, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1970.
William O. E. Henry, of Holland & Knight, Lakeland, for appellants.
Robert L. Trohn, of Langston, Massey, Trohn & Williams, Lakeland, for appellee.

Opinion:
HOBSON, Chief Judge.
Appellants were plaintiffs below and are practicing physicians who formed a partnership known as Watson Clinic, located in Lakeland, Florida. Hereafter, appellants will be referred to as Watson Clinic. Ap-pellee is a medical doctor who was, prior to the filing of the suit below, a partner in Watson Clinic.
Appellee voluntarily withdrew as a partner of Watson Clinic on July 4, 1967. Prior to his withdrawal he had entered into a written agreement with Watson Clinic to the effect that if he withdrew as a partner he would not practice medicine within 30 miles of Lakeland, Florida for a period of two years.
On July 7, 1967, Watson Clinic filed suit to enforce the aforementioned agreement. After taking extensive testimony the trial court entered final judgment which is the subject of this appeal and found therein that the agreement was reasonable in all respects; however, the court in exercising its discretion reduced the ' period of time contained in the agreement from two years to a period of 30 days from the date of the final judgment. The court gave as the reason for such reduction in period of time the fact that the appellee withdrew from the partnership for reasons of his health.
Watson Clinic appeals the final judgment and contends that the trial court, by reducing the two-year period to only 30 days, abused its discretion to such an extent that the object of Section 542.12, Fla. Stat.1967, F.S.A., was nullified.
Appellee filed cross-assignments of error and argues that the written agreement between appellee and Watson Clinic is void and unenforceable under Section 542.12, Fla.Stat.1967, F.S.A.
In support of appellee's contention he cites the case of Bergh v. Stephens, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 787.
Section 542.12, Fla.Stats.1967, F.S.A., reads as follows:
"Contracts in restraint of trade invalid; exceptions.—
"(1) Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided by subsections (2) and (3) hereof,- is to that extent void.
"(2) One who sells the good will of a business, or any shareholder of a corporation selling or otherwise disposing of all of his shares in said corporation, may agree with the buyer, and one who is employed as an agent or employee may agree with his employer, to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a reasonably limited time and area, so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the good will from him, and so long as such employer continues to carry on a like business therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction be enforced by injunction.
"(3) Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership, agree that all or some of them will not carry on a similar business within a reasonably limited time and area.
"(4) This section does not apply to any litigation which may be pending, or to any cause of action which may have accrued, prior to May 27, 1953."
The agreement between appellee and Watson Clinic falls within subsection (1) of the quoted statute and is void unless it comes within the exception set out in subsection (3). In the Bergh case, supra, the distinguished Judge Donald K. Carroll held at page 789 that:
"In our opinion, the restrictive provisions in the said contracts, purporting to restrict the plaintiff from engaging in the 'competitive practice of medicine for a period of five years within a distance of ten miles of the Pureal Hospital,' are null and void under subsection (1) of Section 542.12 and are not excepted from the effect of that subsection by virtue of either subsection (2) or subsection (3)."
The facts in the Bergh case, supra, concerned an agreement whereby an employee in the practice of medicine for his employer agreed that upon the completion of his association with his employer he would not engage in the competitive practice of medicine for a period of five years within a distance of 10 miles of the Pureal Hospital. As this agreement concerned an employee-employer relationship the exception in which the contract in restraint of trade fell was subsection (2).
In the Bergh case, supra, it was held on pages 789-790:
"It will be noted in Section 542.12, quoted above, that subsection (1) thereof declares void any contractual provision by which anyone is restrained from exercising 'a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind,' other than as is provided by subsections (2) and (3). On the other hand, subsection (2) mentions the word 'business' three times but does not once mention the word 'profession' or, for that matter, the word 'trade.' The portion of that subsection relied on by the appellant here is expressly connected with the operation of a business— such portion providing that an employee may, under certain specified circumstances, agree with his employer 'to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business .'
"Inasmuch as subsection (1) of Section 542.12 is made expressly applicable to a lawful 'profession, trade or business' and subsection (2) thereof mentions only the word 'business' in referring to the occupation to which the exception applies, we must construe the said statutory provisions with the aid of the cardinal rule of statutory construction traditionally referred to as 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius.' "
" [W]e hold in the present appeal that the Legislature's express mention of business above in subsection (2) of Section 542.12 is the exclusion of profession, as well as trade, which two terms are linked with business in subsection (1) in the enumeration of the occupations covered by the said subsection (1), unless provision is otherwise made in subsections (2) and (3). This construction is made more logical and natural by considering the fact that the Legislature enacted subsections (1) and (2) of Section 542.12 at the same time (both being provisions in Chapter 28048, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953), so that the Legislature, by omitting from subsection (2) the word 'profession,' which had been a key word in subsection (1), clearly intended to omit contracts restraining the exercise of a profession from the effect of subsection (2)."
In the instant case the learned trial judge held that the Bergh case, supra, was not applicable but did not give his reasons for so holding. We can only assume that he thought the Bergh case not applicable because it dealt with subsection (2) and we are herein concerned with subsection (3). We are unable to make any distinction between subsection (3) and subsection (2) in any respect when applying the rule of law laid down in Bergh. Therefore, agreeing with the law of the Bergh case, we hold the written agreement involved herein to be void as far as it purports to restrain the appellee from exercising the lawful profession of medicine and that the final judgment should be and it is
Reversed.
PIERCE, J., concurs.
MANN, J., dissents with opinion.