Case Name: Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-11-07
Citations: 20 N.Y.S. 691
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 20
Pages: 691–693

Head Matter:
Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.
November 7, 1892.)
Street Railroads—Injuries to Persons on Street—Question for Jury.
Plaintiff, in crossing the street, was passing behind defendant’s street car, which had stopped on an up grade to let a passenger off, when the driver released the brakes, and the car gravitated backwards, and injured plaintiff. No one was on or near the rear platform to caution plaintiff against crossing near the car. Held, that it was error to grant a nonsuit, since the jury might have concluded that the driver could have started the car without any retrograde movement, or that ordinary care required him to caution persons in the way of probable injury. Bisohoff, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term.
Action by Elizabeth E. Lundy against the Second Avenue Railroad Company for damages for injuries sustained by her through collision with the defendant’s street car. Erom the judgment dismissing the complaint, and from the order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before Daly, C. J., and Bischoff and Pryor, JJ.
George W. Wilson, for appellant. Merrill & Rogers, (Payson Merrill, of counsel,) for respondent.

Opinion:
Pryor, J.
If upon any construction of the evidence it be sufficient to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, the dismissal of the complaint was error. Stackus v. Railroad Co., 79 N. Y. 464; Clemence v. City, 66 N. Y. 334, 338. Hence, if the inferences from the evidence be not certain and incontrovertible, the question of negligence is for determination by the jury. Hart v. Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 622. Upon the evidence before us the jury would have been warranted in the conclusion that the driver might have so started the car as to arrest its retrograde movement; or, if this were impossible, that ordinary care required him to'give notice to persons in the way of probable injury. "To justify a nonsuit, on the ground of contributory negligence, the undisputed facts must show the omission or commission of some act which the law adjudges negligence." Stackus v. Railroad Co., supra. Clearly, no act of the plaintiff can be held to be negligence, as matter of law. Conlin v. Rodgers, (Com. Pl. N. Y.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 782, is authority only for the proposition that, in the absence of any evidence as to the occasion of the injury,—in other words, in the absence of evidence on the issue of negligence, —a nonsuit is inevitable. Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188, 23 N. E. Rep. 537. Here, the cause of the injury was demonstrated; and we are unable to affirm that it is equally consistent with inferences fatal and favorable to the plaintiff's case. The conclusion is that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.
Daly, C. J., concurs.