Case Name: John Jones v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-04-18
Citations: 95 Tex. Crim. 574
Docket Number: No. 7660
Parties: John Jones v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 574–581

Head Matter:
John Jones v. The State.
No. 7660.
Decided April 18, 1923.
Rehearing Denied October 31, 1923.
1. — Selling Intoxicating Liquor — Bills of Exception — Filing.
This court has always held that the trial court is without power to make an order extending the time for the filing of bills of exception, after the expiration of the time originally granted for the filing of such bills of exception. However, it appearing from the caption of the transcript that the filing was within the sixty-day period allowed, the court will hear the case upon its merits, but again calls attention to the burden that is unnecessarily imposed upon this court by errors which cause two examinations of the record, etc.
2. —Same—Practice in Trial Court — Communications by Jury.
Where it was complained that the trial court was guilty of certain misconduct, in that the jury communicated to the judge their desire to have read to them a part of the testimony introduced upon trial, and that the court declined to have same introduced, and that this transpired out of the presence and hearing of the defendant, but it appeared that appellant was under bond at the time, and that it was impracticable to grant the request of the jury on' account of the court reporter being absent, and that the testimony was of little materiality, etc., there is no reversible error.
3. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of selling intoxicating liquor, the testimony, is sufficient to sustain the conviction, there is no reversible error.
4. —Same—Evidence—Marked Money — Presence of Defendant.
Where it is made to appear on appeal that the officers before going to defendant’s house on the night of his arrest on the charge of selling liquor, marked certain money and delivered same to the State witness, by which the sale of the liquor was afterwards proved, there was - no reversible error although this transpired out of the presence of the defendant, as these were acts of preparation connected with and explanatory of the case.
5. —Same—Intoxicant—Requested Charge.
Where there was no evidence calling for a requested charge that the jury must believe that the liquor contained in excess of one per cent of alcohol by volume at the time it came.into the possession of the State’s witness, there was no reversible error to refuse said requested charge.
C. — Same—Defensive Theory — Requested Charge.
Where the defensive theory that defendant had nothing to do with the liquor, but only showed the parties where it was, was amply covered by' the main charge, there was no error in refusing the requested charge.
7. —Same—Title to Liquor — Requested Charge.
It is not necessary to make one guilty of a violation of the liquor laws by selling such liquor that the title to the liquor be in him, and the requested charge thereon was correctly refused.
8. —Same—Purchaser—Accomplice—Charge of Court.
The charge of the court was not erroneous to tell the jury that the purchaser is expressly exempted from the character of an accomplice.
9. —Same—Declarations and Acts of Defendant — Res Gestae.
The acts of the defendant in secreting the money or throwing the same under the house, or in making motions with his hands which might result in the conclusion that he threw the money under the house, was a part of the transaction and res gestae, and therefore not open to the objection that defendant was under arrest at the time. Following Pratt v. State, 53 Texas Crim. Rep., 285, and other cases.
10. —Same—Evidence—Other Offenses..
Where complaint was made of testimony that appellant had heretofore been indicted for felony, he having taken the witness stand in his own behalf, there is no reversible error. Following Jackson v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 286, and other eases.
11. — Same—Bills of Exception — Practice on Appeal.
Where certain bills of exception were so qualified by the trial court as that in noi event they could be held to present any error, there is no reversible error.
Appeal from the District Court of Palls. Tried below before the Honorable Prentice Oltorf.
Appeal from a conviction of selling intoxicating liquor; penalty, one year imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Ben H. Rice, Jr., for appellant.
On question of misconduct of court in not granting the request of jury to have evidence read, Booth v. State, 145 S. W. Rep., 923; Cowart v. State, 145 id., 341; Wesley v. State, 150 id., 197.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
— Appellant was convicted in the district court of Palls County of selling liquor containing more than one per cent of alcohol by volume, and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
The State moves to strike out all of appellant's bills of exception except that which is No. 1, for the reason that the order extending the time in which to file said bills of exception was entered after the expiration of the time allowed in the original order made by the trial court for such filing. An inspection of the record shows that on October 28, 1922, appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled and the court made an order allowing sixty days "from this date" in which to file statement of facts and bills of exception. Computation discloses that from October 28th to December 29th, the latter being the date on which the court made an order of extension, is sixty-two days. This court has always held that- the trial court is without power to make an order extending the time for the filing of bills of exception, in vacation or at a subsequent term of the court, after the expiration of the time originally granted for the filing of such bills of exception. Sanders v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 34; Griffin v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 424; Palmer v. State, 92 Texas Crim. Rep., 640, 245 S. W. Rep., 238. The bills of exception, save No. 1, were filed too late.
Appellant's bill of exceptions No. 1 complains of misconduct on the part of the trial court, it being alleged that the jury communicated to the judge their desire to have read to them a part of the testimony introduced upon the trial, and that the court declined to have same introduced, it being alleged that this transpired out of the presence and hearing of the defendant. Appellant was on bond at the time of trial and was free to go where he pleased. He says that he saw the learned trial court speak to one of the jurors who stood in the jury room door after supper on the night of his trial but that he could not tell what the judge or the juror said. He denied being present before supper in the District Court room when the jury came in and asked the judge to have testimony read to it. The statement of the trial court appears also in the bill of exceptions. He states that some time after the jury had retired they came into the courtroom in charge of the deputy sheriff and their foreman stated that some of the jurors would like to have the court stenographer read his notes showing what, if anything, the defendant had stated about the money alleged to have been paid to him for the whisky in question. The judge further states that lie did not know before they came into the courtroom that they were gping to make any request for the reading of the testimony. When the foreman stated to the court what was wanted, he replied that the reporter who took the testimony was not the regular court reporter but was Mr. Davis, a reporter of the Hillsboro District Court who was temporarily supplying, and that he felt quite sure that the reporter had left for Hillsboro and had taken his note books with him. It is further stated by the court that neither of appellant's counsel was present nor were they sent for by him. It is further shown that the court had been informed by one of appellant's counsel that if the jury came in with a verdict, the court might receive same without calling him. This was not true of the other of appellant's attorneys. After informing the jury that the court stenographer had gone home, the court further told the jury they could go to supper. The court then further states that when he left the courtroom to go to supper himself he passed by appellant who was sitting in the courtroom, and told him that he need not wait any longer but he could go to supper himself and come back about 7:30 or 8 o 'clock. The trial judge says he is not able to state positively that appellant was in the court room at the time the jury came in in charge of the deputy sheriff and made the request and received the reply above referred to, but it is his best recollection and belief that appellant was in the court room at the time. The court further certifies" that the substitute court reporter had in fact left Marlin and gone to his home in Hillsboro. After supper the judge returned to the court room and found the defendant sitting there waiting for the jury's report. Later the court called one of the jurors to the'door to find out whether they desired him to wait upon them any longer and being advised by the foreman that they did not expect to report that night, the judge went home.
It is urged that this was in violation of the statute and of the rights of the appellant. In Washington v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 195, this court stated that where the jury came into the courtroom in the absence of the defendant and asked to be discharged, and the court declined to grant their request, stating to them that he had to leave town the following day, this conduct constituted no such violation of Article 753-756, C. C. P., as would call for a reversal of the case. ¥e are not quite clear as to whether appellant's main contention in this regard is based on the fact that he was not present at the time the jury came in, or upon the fact that the trial court did not communicate to the attorneys the wish of the jury and make some effort to obtain the stenographer's report of the defendant's testimony. We would not deem the latter contention of any merit inasmuch as it is stated by the court without contradiction that the court reporter had gone to his home at Hillsboro. The request of the jury was not made in writing, and as far as we may ascertain of what same consisted from said bill of exceptions, the matter upon which they desired defendant's testimony repeated would seem to be of little materiality. We do not think that the complaint contained in this bill of exceptions of that grave character from which an injury could be inferred, nor that the violation of the statute is any more serious than that decided adversely to the accused in the case of Washington v. State, supra.
The evidence in the case is ample to support the judgment of guilty. ' The State's testimony showed a sale of a jug of whisky shown by analysis to contain fifty-three per cent alcohol, by appellant to a State witness. Officers testified that they had furnished this witness with marked money and after he returned with the liquor which he had bought, they went to appellant's home and there found the marked money. A witness testified to conversations had by him with appellant while on bond in which appellant stated that a certain party had furnished him with liquor and had told him that if anybody wanted it for him to let them have it.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.