Case Name: Mary L. Hayes, Administratrix, vs. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1917-01-25
Citations: 91 Conn. 301
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary L. Hayes, Administratrix, vs. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 301–315

Head Matter:
Mary L. Hayes, Administratrix, vs. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company.
First Judicial District, Hartford,
October Term, 1916.
Prentice, C. J., Thayer, Roraback, Wheeler and Beach, Js.
A recovery must be confined to the ground alleged in the complaint.
Upon appeal from a directed verdict, this court must assume the truth of the appellant’s testimony, although contradicted, if the jury could reasonably have found the fact or facts which such evidence tended to prove.
An invitation by a railroad flagman to proceed over a dangerous grade-crossing, does not relieve the highway traveler of all responsibility for the outcome; he is still bound to act with common prudence in view of all the circumstances.
The evidence in the present case reviewed and held to lead necessarily to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of his automobile in approaching the crossing, and therefore that no error was committed in directing a verdict for the defendant. (Two judges dissenting.)
Argued October 3d, 1916—
decided January 25th, 1917.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.
No error.
The plaintiff’s intestate, Edward L. Hayes, while driving his automobile southerly on the main road between Hartford and New Haven, received injuries which caused his death by being struck by a train coming from the east as he was attempting to pass over a grade-crossing in the town of Berlin. The crossing was a dangerous one, and especially so for travelers approaching it from the north, by reason of the view of the railroad tracks to the east being shut off for a considerable distance by buildings of the American Brick Company. These buildings consist chiefly of a long narrow brick kiln shed, forty feet in' height, running parallel to the railroad tracks and not far distant therefrom, having its westerly end two hundred feet from the highway, and a two-story office building, eighteen feet wide in front, standing abo'ut twenty-five feet from the highway and back from the crossing one hundred and thirty-nine feet. As a result of the presence of these buildings, a southbound traveler’s view of the tracks east of the crossing is obstructed for a considerable distance until he arrives opposite the office, where, at a distance of one hundred and sixty-four feet from the middle of the tracks, there is an open view of them for two hundred and sixty-five feet. From that point, continuing southerly, the unobstructed view gradually increases until at sixty-five feet from the crossing it extends up the tracks four hundred and seventy feet, at fifty feet, to five hundred and thirty feet or more, and at forty feet to twelve hundred feet. Across the highway north of the main line there is a siding for the use of the brick company, extending upon the company’s premises up to and into the brick kiln building. Between the southerly rail of this siding and the northerly rail of the main line, the distance at the crossing is twenty-seven feet.
Evidence was offered on behalf of the plaintiff, that at the time of the accident there were two box- freight-cars standing on this siding on the brick company’s premises, one end of the two cars being close to the shed and the other about fifty feet east of the highway. The presence of these cars would considerably lessen the distance on the highway from the main tracks that unobstructed views of them could be had for a given distance. Under such conditions the range of vision easterly along the tracks at a point in the middle of the highway in front of the office would be slight. At one hundred and thirty-five feet northerly of the north rail of the main line it would be reduced, by the presence of the freight cars, to seventy feet; at one hundred feet, to ninety feet; at eighty feet, to one hundred and ten feet; at seventy feet, to one hundred and thirty feet; and at fifty feet, to two hundred and sixty feet. At a distance of thirty-five feet, twelve hundred and eighty feet of the tracks were in full view.
The highway at this point, at the time of the accident, was an improved road, in good condition, with a slightly descending grade toward the south.
The testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, relating to the circumstances immediately attending the accident, was confined to that of two witnesses, one of them a man named Gilman who was riding with and beside Hayes at the time. Their testimony, denied in important respects by the defendant’s testimony, was to the following effect:—
Hayes was unfamiliar with the crossing. He saw it as he approached going something like twenty-five miles an hour, when he was about at a crossroad some six hundred feet away. He thereupon threw out the clutch, put on the brakes and gradually slackened his speed until he almost stopped, and was going not over ten miles an hour when he reached a point about opposite the office. At that time a man, standing at the crossing without a flag, but in fact the flagman in the defendant’s employ, beckoned to him to cross, as the man had just previously done to a van which had crossed. Hayes then released the brakes, threw in the clutch and at a constantly increasing speed proceeded on his way. When his front wheels were about at the siding crossing, Gilman, who was sitting at Hayes’ right, heard the train and glancing to the east back of Hayes saw it coming and immediately jumped to the ground, landing not far from the north rail. Hayes went on, his speed at the time being about twenty miles an hour, and was struck by the train when partly over the crossing. There was no testimony that he looked, listened or took other precautions for his safety.
At the conclusion of the oral testimony, the court and jury, upon the agreement of counsel, visited and viewed the scene of the accident.
Herbert O. Bowers, for the appellant (plaintiff).
William L. Barnett, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion:
Prentice, C. J.
The complaint charges the defendant with negligent conduct causing personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate and nothing more, and avers the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the latter. The action is, therefore, one founded upon-negligence, and recovery upon any other ground was not permissible. Pitkin v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 64 Conn. 482, 490, 30 Atl. 772; Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 507, 77 Atl. 950. Plaintiff's counsel do not claim otherwise.
The only evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the defendant was that given on the plaintiff's behalf, to the effect that the flagman stationed at the crossing, its employee, beckoned to Hayes as he approached the crossing to proceed. Although this testimony was denied by the defendant's witnesses, the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury upon the issue of the defendant's negligence, and for our purpose we are required to assume that the invitation to cross was given as testified.
The invitation thus given was one which Hayes had a right to rely upon to some extent, but not to such an extent that he was thereby excused from making some use of his senses and taking some precautions for his safety. "A railroad crossing is . . . a dangerous place, and the man who knowing it to be a railroad crossing approaches it, is careless unless he approaches it as if it were dangerous." Borglum v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 90 Conn. 52, 55, 96 Atl. 174. One who is invited to cross by the conduct of the railroad company, or of its employees or agents, or even directly by such employee or agent, is not justified in acting as though it were not dangerous, and will not be permitted to throw off from himself all responsibility for the outcome. He is still bound to act with common prudence in view of the dangers of the place as well as of the invitation. Cottle v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 142, 144, 72 Atl. 727; Dundon v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 67 Conn. 266, 272, 34 Atl. 1041; Ellis v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 169 Mass. 600, 602, 48 N. E. 839; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rosewater, 84 C. C. A. 616, 619, 622, 157 Fed. Rep. 168, 171, 174.
The question before the jury, on this aspect of the case, thus became resolved into one as to whether Hayes did exercise the common prudence of one who, cognizant of the dangerous conditions surrounding the crossing, had received an invitation from the flagman to cross. In this connection it is not without significance to observe that Hayes did not know that the man who beckoned to him was a flagman or employee of the company. He carried no flag, it is said, or other indication of his position or employment. All that Hayes knew was that the man was standing beside the crossing and was beckoning to him as he had to another car preceding his. This is not important as bearing upon the defendant's responsibility for the acts of the flagman, but it does possess significance in judging of the measure of prudence characterizing Hayes' conduct in relying upon the signal of one who was a stranger to him and in throwing precaution to the winds.
But that feature of the case may be dismissed, and full effect given to the signal of the flagman as a known servant of the company. The evidence, upon which the plaintiff relies and must rely for recovery, discloses that Hayes received the invitation when, with clutch out and brakes on, he was proceeding slowly, and with his car under full control, along the highway some one hundred and fifty feet from the crossing where his view of the tracks to the east was practically cut off, and that he thereupon, without further inquiry or means of information, released the brakes, threw in the clutch, applied the power and proceeded with ever increasing speed down the grade toward the crossing. His increase of speed was such that it went up from ten miles or less an hour to about twenty in the short intervening space traveled. There is no evidence tending to show that he looked or listened for the approaching train. The plain indications are that he did not look, else he would have seen it a sufficient distance from the crossing to have enabled him to stop in safety, unless, indeed, his speed was too great. When he had proceeded but half way to the crossing and was seventy feet from it he could have seen up the tracks one hundred and thirty feet, and the train must have been within that distance at the time. If not, there can be no question that it was in full view when Hayes reached the fifty foot point, where two hundred and sixty feet of the tracks could be plainly seen. Gilman saw the train before the siding was reached, and took measures of escape. Hayes may also have seen, but by reason of his speed either did not dare to attempt to stop or thought that he could succeed in crossing. As to this we may not know what the fact was: but one thing is certain, and that is that a reasonably careful approach at a moderate speed and with the ear under proper control was all that was necessary for Hayes' safety. The situation is explainable only upon one of four assumptions: (1) that he did not look; (2) that he was going so fast and had so little control of his car that he could not stop after, by looking, he was able to see the tracks; (3) that he both failed to look, and was going at too great a speed; or (4) that he was going at such speed when the train was seen that he chose to venture to cross rather than to stop when he might.
His outstanding fault, assuming that he was not foolhardy in attempting to beat the train in passing the crossing, which the plaintiff's evidence establishes and for which no shadow of excuse is shown, lay in his operation of his car. When about one hundred and fifty feet from the crossing he was going slowly and had his car under control, instead of continuing at that or approximately that low speed and with that control for the short distance to the crossing, he rushed ahead upon receipt of the signal. The conditions which made the crossing especially dangerous were apparent and must have been appreciated by him, and yet he put himself, by his increase of speed, into a position where he could not help himself if suddenly danger arose. Had he proceeded at a lower speed and with his car under better control, he could readily have stopped it after he had an opportunity to discover the threatening presence of the train. Knowing, as even a casual observer must, the obstructions to his view, he, although an invitee, was bound in the exercise of ordinary prudence to use more care than the evidence, upon any view of it, shows that he exercised..
We are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in holding that the jury could not reasonably have found otherwise upon the evidence, and in directing a verdict for the defendant.
There is no error.
In this opinion Thayer and Beach, Js., concurred.