Case Name: SUSAN W. HORNE et al., Administrators, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1916-01-12
Citations: 170 N.C. 645
Docket Number: 
Parties: SUSAN W. HORNE et al., Administrators, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.
Judges: BeowN, J., concurs in dissenting opinion of Walkeh, J.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 645–662

Head Matter:
SUSAN W. HORNE et al., Administrators, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.
(Filed 12 January, 1916.)
Railroads — Headlights—Trials—Evidence—Nonsuit—Questions for Jury.
On a motion to nonsuit upon the evidence the testimony of the defendant will he considered only when it is in the plaintiff’s favor; and where the evidence tends to show that the plaintiff’s intestate, a section foreman of defendant railroad company, was riding upon a hand-car at night' on defendant’s track, with other employees, where an approaching train with a headlight would have been seen for miles, and the car was struck by defendant’s train coming rapidly upon it without a headlight, and not observed in time for the intestate to have saved himself, and causing his death, it is sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the question of defendant’s actionable negligence. Although the intestate was disobeying the orders of the company at the time, his contributory negligence on the facts in evidence was for the jury.
Clark, C. J., concurring; Hoke, J., concurring in part; Walker, J., dissenting; Brown, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion.
Appeal by plaintiffs from Allen, J., and a jury at April Term, 1915, of CUMBERLAND.
Action to recover damages for wrongful death, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Plaintiffs’ intestate was a section foreman of the defendant. He had been at work at New Berlin, and on the night he was killed he and other employees of the defendant went to Farmers on a hand-car. He was killed on his return, at night, by an engine of the defendant, which, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, had no headlight.
The evidence of the plaintiffs tended to prove that their intestate was a section foreman in the defendant’s employ at New Berlin on 1 September, 1914. On that night he took the lever-car and went to Farmers to attend to some business, as there was no train in that direction, and took with him five or six hands. He did not say whether the business was his or the business of the company. He waited for the passenger train to- pass, and then they put the lever-car on the track and started back to New Berlin. The track was straight at that point for 10 miles, 5 miles in each direction, and, according to plaintiffs’ evidence, they were looking out both front and rear for any approaching train, though there was none scheduled to pass at that hour; they could have seen a headlight 5 miles off. Suddenly, 35 to 40 feet in front of them, out of the darkness there loomed up an engine which was running without any light at all, and at the rate of 50 or 60 miles an hour; that an alarm was given and everybody jumped off but the intestate Horne, who was struck and killed. The engine was going so fast that it went half a mile or at least a third before it stopped. A witness said that he could have seen a headlight on a straight track that night 10 or 12 miles; the witness further said that the lever-car could be seen from the engine at least three-quarteis of a mile off under the glare of an electric headlight. He further testified that there were three public crossings between the station at Farmers and where Horne was killed, and that the engine did not blow at either of these crossings or ring any bell. In going from New Berlin to Farmers they went on the main line 5 miles east in the direction of Wilmington; they started about 7:30 p. m. and got there about 8 :10 p. m., and started back at midnight. The witness further said that some foremen used their lever-cars at night, but it was not an habitual custom. There was no evidence from the plaintiff that it was against the rules of the company to use the lever-cars at night. Several witnesses testified that the night was slightly foggy, but there was no light whatever on the engine, and if there had been they could have seen it; that there was neither headlight nor sidelights; that if the engine had had a headlight the engineer could have seen three-quarters of a mile ahead of him; that the witness had ridden on an engine with an electric headlight many times and kept a lookout, and could see at night three-quarters of a mile ahead under the electric light. That the deceased said that he was going down to Farmers to see the agent,'and tbat bis force bad to move from New Berlin tbe next morning. Tbe witnesses also testified tbat if there bad been an electric beadligbt on tbe engine they could'have seen it 2 or 3 miles down tbe track, in ample time to have gotten tbe car off tbe track, wbicb they could have done in a couple of minutes.
Tbe defendant introduced a rule of tbe company forbidding tbe use of band-cars at nigbt or in foggy weather without tbe permission of tbe roadmaster, and the roadmaster testified tbat be bad not given permission to use tbe car on tbe nigbt tbe intestate was killed.
Tbe defendant also introduced evidence tending to prove tbat tbe engine was properly equipped with lights and tbat signals were sounded at tbe several crossings.
At tbe conclusion of the evidence bis Honor entered judgment of nonsuit, and tbe plaintiffs excepted and appealed.
Cook & Cook, J. ill. Williford and Sinclair, Dye & Bay for plaintiffs.
Rose & Rose for defendant.

Opinion:
AlleN, J.
Tbe evidence for tbe plaintiff, wbicb must be accepted as true for tbe purpose of nonsuit, establishes tbe negligence of tbe defendant in tbat it was running its train in tbe night-time without a bead-ligbt, and it is conceded tbat tbe judgment of nonsuit cannot be sustained except upon tbe ground of contributory negligence.
There are two valid objections to coming to this conclusion.
Tbe first is that, while after much discussion tbe rule was adopted tbat a judgment of nonsuit might be entered if it clearly appeared from tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff tbat be was guilty of contributory negligence, this rule has never been extended so as to permit tbe consideration of evidence offered by tbe defendant tending to prove contributory negligence.
In this case tbe negligence attributed to plaintiffs' intestate is tbat be was upon tbe track in violation of tbe rules of tbe company, and there is nothing in tbe plaintiffs' evidence to show tbat a rule was in existence or tbat tbe intestate was at tbe time of bis death violating any rule.
Tbe burden of tbe issue of contributory negligence was on tbe defendant, and in order to sustain this burden it introduced a rule of tbe company wbicb forbade tbe use of tbe band-car at nigbt without tbe permission of a superior officer, and it also introduced tbe officer to prove tbat be bad not given tbe permission. If this evidence coming from tbe defendant was not believed by the jury, tbe issue of contributory negligence could not have been answered against tbe plaintiff, and tbe jury alone has tbe right to say whether or not tbe evidence is true.
This principle is vital under a system wbicb makes jurors triers of tbe fact, and a departure from it would invest tbe judge with tbe power to pass on tbe weight of tbe evidence and to determine tbe fact.
Tbe second is tbat if it be conceded tbat tbe intestate was guilty of negligence tbe question of proximate cause was for tbe jury, and ought to have been presented to them either under a separate issue or under an instruction tbat although tbe plaintiff was upon tbe track in violation of tbe rules of tbe company, and was therefore negligent, tbat be would be entitled to recover damages if, notwithstanding tbat negligence, tbe jury found as a fact tbat if tbe defendant bad bad a headlight tbe intestate would have been discovered in time to avoid tbe injury, or tbat if tbe headlight bad been present tbe plaintiffs' intestate would have seen it in time to take tbe car from tbe track.
Tbe evidence on tbe part of plaintiffs tends to prove tbat tbe track of tbe defendant in tbe direction from wbicb tbe train was coming was straight for a distance of 5 miles; tbat a headlight could have been seen at tbat distance; tbat those on the band-car were looking in tbat direction for tbe approach of a train; tbat if there bad been a headlight they could and would have seen it in time to take tbe band-car from tbe track; and tbat with a headlight tbe engineer could easily have seen tbe car in time to avert tbe injury.
In Heavener's case, 141 N. C., 245, tbe Court approved an instruction tbaf "If tbe jury should further find from tbe evidence tbat if there bad been a proper light on tbe engine, or if tbe bell bad been ringing, tbe intestate would have bad notice of tbe approaching train in time to escape tbe danger, and if tbe plaintiff by reason of not having such notice or warning was injured, then such failure to have tbe headlight or other proper signal was continuing negligence and would be tbe proximate cause of tbe injury," and this was affirmed in Shepherd v. R. R., 163 N. C., 520.
If tbe plaintiffs' intestate was negligent in violating a rule of tbe company, was bis negligence greater than tbe negligence of a person who is killed while upon tbe track in a state of voluntary drunkenness ? It would seem not, and in Griffin v. R. R., 166 N. C., 626, it was held tbat tbe question of tbe contributory negligence of one killed upon tbe track while intoxicated was for tbe jury, tbe Court saying: "We have tbe facts in evidence tbat tbe engine was without any headlight; furthermore, tbat it ran over and billed tbe intestate. . We have, therefore, in evidence both tbe negligence and tbe injury. . . . It is immaterial whether tbe intestate was a licensee or a mere trespasser. The defendant owed it to him and to all other persons, whether on tbe track rightfully or wrongfully, to have bad a headlight upon its engines in order that tbe engineer might be enabled to discover, not only human beings, but any obstruction upon tbe track. . . . There is evidence in tbe record from which, the jury may find, if they see fit, contributory negligence upon the part of the intestate; but the evidence is not of that character as will justify the Court in any view of it to sustain a motion to nonsuit upon that ground."
This case has an important bearing upon the question before us, because it establishes the principle that although the intestate was negligent, the defendant owed him the duty to have a headlight, "whether on the trade rightfully or wrongfullyand that he could not be declared guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law.
If so, why does not the same rule prevail in this case, as the most that can be said of the conduct of plaintiffs' intestate, if he was violating a rule of the defendant, i.s that he was wrongfully on the track?
In Tyson v. R. R., 167 N. C., 216, the plaintiff's intestate was killed by a train running without a headlight, and the issue of contributory negligence was answered in favor of the defendant.
A recovery of damages was sustained, and Justice Brown says, in discu.ssing the question as to whether there was evidence to support the finding that notwithstanding the negligence of the intestate, the defendant's engineer by the exercise of ordinary care could have avoided the injury: "There is evidence in this case that the engineer, by keeping a watchful lookout, with a good headlight, could have seen the intestate in the position described by the witnesses, and, going up grade, could have stopped his train within 50 yards. There is evidence that he had a very poor oil headlight, and it was about dusk at the time when his train killed the intestate.
"Taking all of these facts together, we think there is sufficient evidence to have gone to the jury for their consideration to the effect that if the engine had been properly equipped with a proper headlight, and the engineer had kept a diligent lookout ahead of him, he could have discovered, by reasonable care, the condition of the intestate, and could have stopped his train in time to have saved his life."
Again, the Court said in Cullifer v. R. R., 168 N. C., 311: "It is well settled in this State that where the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence the defendant must exercise ordinary care and diligence to avoid the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, and if by exercising due care and diligence the defendant can discover the situation of the plaintiff in time to avoid injury, the defendant is liable if it fails to do so."
In McNeill v. R. R., 167 N. C., 390, the Court concludes the opinion with this statement: "The theory upon which recoveries are sustained when a person upon the track is killed or injured by a train running in the night without a headlight, although not apparently helpless, is that the absence of the headlight is negligence, and as its presence would probably give notice of the approach of the train by throwing light on the track and upon the person, the failure to have the light is some evidence of proximate cause."
In other words, if it is admitted that both the defendant and the intestate of the plaintiff were negligent, the negligence of the plaintiffs' intestate does not bar a recovery unless it was the proximate cause of the injury, and the question as to whether it was the proximate cause is for the jury, if two reasonable minds could come to different conclusions upon the question; and here there is evidence that although the intestate was negligent, if the defendant's train had been running with a headlight he would not have been injured, because the headlight would have been seen, if the evidence of the plaintiff is to be believed, in time to take the car from the track, or the engineer could with a headlight have discovered the intestate in time to avoid the injury.
In Boney v. R. R., 155 N. C., 107, the plaintiff's intestate, an engineer, was killed by running into an open switch, and at the time of his death he was violating a rule of the company by running his train at a speed of 30 miles an hour, when the rule required that he should not approach the switch at more than 6 miles an hour. A recovery of damages was sustained upon the ground that although he was negligent, the defendant could have averted the injury by the exercise of ordinary care. The Court said: "If the intestate knew that there was no light at the switch, and was running in excess of 6 miles an hour, he was negligent; but it is not every act of negligence on the part of the plaintiff that is contributory negligence in its legal sense. It is not contributory unless it is the real cause of the injury; nor is it so if the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary care, can avert the injury, notwithstanding the negligence of the plaintiff."
Reversed.