Case Name: Mack Arthur KING v. Morris THIGPEN, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1983-12-14
Citations: 441 So. 2d 1365
Docket Number: No. 53027
Parties: Mack Arthur KING v. Morris THIGPEN, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al.
Judges: BROOM, P.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 441
Pages: 1365–1372

Head Matter:
Mack Arthur KING v. Morris THIGPEN, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al.
No. 53027.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 14, 1983.
Wilbur 0. Colom, Colom, Mitchell & Co-lom, Columbus, James E. Rocap, III, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Carolyn B. Mills, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellees.

Opinion:
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
EN BANC.
WALKER, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
On December 4-5, 1980, Mack Arthur King was tried, convicted and sentenced to suffer death in the manner provided by law in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi. On October 27, 1982, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence. King v. State, 421 So.2d 1009 (Miss.1982). On December 1, 1982, the Supreme Court of Mississippi denied petitioner's petition for rehearing. On January 81,1988, petitioner's family filed in the United States Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. On May 2, 1983, that petition was denied. Petitioner's execution date was scheduled for July 13, 1983, but was stayed pending disposition of this application for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi.
King's application for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis asserts that it should be granted for the following reasons:
A.
THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT COULD IMPOSE A LIFE SENTENCE EVEN IF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGHED THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
This proposition was presented in part by appellant's proposition three of appellant's brief on direct appeal to this Court from his conviction and sentence and the Court found no merit to the contention as presented. Thereafter, his petition for rehearing was denied.
To the extent that said issue was presented on direct appeal and ruled on by this Court after consideration on the merits, it may not be relitigated again on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So.2d 486 (Miss.1983).
Further, to the extent that his present contention was not alleged as error and briefed on direct appeal, the issue may not now be raised for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis as it is procedurally barred. Wheat, supra.
B.
THE SENTENCING INSTRUCTION IM-PERMISSIBLY SUBJECTED PETITIONER TO A MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
This proposition may not now be raised on petition for error coram nobis for the same reasons stated in Section A above.
C.
THE SENTENCING INSTRUCTION IM-PERMISSIBLY FAILED TO INSURE THAT, IF THE DEATH SENTENCE WERE IMPOSED, IT WOULD BE IMPOSED BY A JURY THAT HAD DECIDED THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES — WHEN DISCOUNTED BY THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES — WERE STILL SUFFICIENT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY.
This proposition may not now be raised on petition for writ of error coram nobis for the same reasons stated in Section A above.
D.
THE SENTENCING INSTRUCTION IM-PERMISSIBLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO THE PETITIONER TO PROVE THAT THE DEATH PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED.
This proposition may not now be raised on petition for writ of error coram nobis for the same reasons stated in Section A above.
E.
THE FINDING BY THE JURY OF THE "ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS OR CRUEL" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
This proposition was not presented on direct appeal. Therefore, it is now procedurally barred and may not be raised for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
F.
THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE VIOLATED STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
The petitioner did not raise this proposition on his direct appeal. Therefore, it is now procedurally barred from being raised for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis.
G.
THE FAILURE TO TRANSCRIBE CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AT THE SENTENCING PHASE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS.
The petitioner did not raise this proposition on his direct appeal. He is now procedurally barred from raising it for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
H.
THE PROSECUTOR'S INFLAMMATORY EXHORTATIONS AT SENTENCING WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE.
The petitioner did not raise this proposition on direct appeal. He is procedurally barred from raising it now for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
I.
THE FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE JURY TO FIND THAT PETITIONER POSSESSED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO KILL THE VICTIM VIOLATES PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
This proposition was not raised on direct appeal. It is therefore procedurally barred from being raised for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
J.
USE OF THE "COURSE OF A FELONY" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
This proposition was not raised on direct appeal. Petitioner is now barred from raising it for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
K.
THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT BECAUSE THE COURT COMPARED PETITIONER'S CASE ONLY TO OTHER CASES WHERE THE DEATH PENALTY HAD BEEN IMPOSED.
The petitioner failed to raise this proposition on direct appeal. He is now proeedurally barred from raising it for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
L.
THE PROSECUTOR'S USE OF HIS PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES TO STRIKE ALL POTENTIAL BLACK JURORS WAS PART OF A SYSTEMATIC, REGULAR PRACTICE RESULTING IN EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION OF BLACKS FROM PETIT JURIES.
The petitioner failed to raise this proposition on direct appeal. He is now procedurally barred from raising it for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
M.
THE RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MISSISSIPPI VIOLATES PETITIONER'S RIGHTS ON THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
The petitioner failed to raise this proposition on direct appeal. He is now procedurally barred from raising it for the first time on this petition for writ of error coram nobis. Wheat, supra.
N.
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The petitioner has asserted fourteen points (A through N) on which he relies in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Collectively, the allegations contained assertions of facts and factual conclusions which are unsupported by affidavits except the affidavits of Mack Arthur King and counsel which were made on information and belief except as to those things shown by the record. This does not comply with Rule 38 of the Supreme Court Rules of Mississippi. Riley v. State, 254 Miss. 487, 182 So.2d 397 (1966).
In the case of Willie Albert Smith v. State of Mississippi (Petition for writ of error coram nobis), 434 So.2d 212 (Miss.1983), after restating the substantive test to be employed in analyzing an ineffective assistance counsel claim, to-wit: (A) Whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance; and (B) Whether counsel in fact rendered effective assistance, we reiterated that a petitioner shoulders the burden of showing that in fact such assistance was not rendered and that a defendant was actually prejudiced by such failure. See Callahan v. State, 426 So.2d 801 (Miss.1983). We also recognized that the failure to assign the lack of effective assistance of counsel at trial would not constitute a procedural bar to subsequently raising the question either on appeal or in post-conviction relief proceedings such as this.
In Smith, supra, it was stated:
If, after affirmance on direct appeal, a defendant wishes to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he may file an appropriate post-conviction proceeding raising this question. See Read, slip opinion at 19. We held that, assuming that the petitioner's claim stated a prima facie case, he would then be entitled to an evidentiary hearing at the trial court on this question. We also specifically held that "a petitioner desiring such a hearing must tender two tickets at the door: (a) a pleading complying with Rule 38, Mississippi Supreme Court Rules, and (b) a pleading stating facts which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief."
In other words, one seeking to maintain the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must comply with procedures set forth in Rule 38 of the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules and must state with specificity facts which, if proved at a hearing by clear and convincing evidence, would satisfy the substantive requirements which we set forth in Callahan. Stated differently, he must specifically allege facts showing that effective assistance of counsel was not in fact rendered, and he must allege with specificity the fact that but for such purported actions by ineffective counsel, the results of the trial court decision would have been different. Petitioner Smith has failed to comply with these requirements. He has pointed to several instances of alleged examples of ineffective counsel, but he has failed to allege with specificity that such "shortcomings were not the result of trial tactics or strategy but were indeed indicia of the fact that petitioner Smith was denied effective assistance of counsel. Likewise, he has not specifically alleged that he was actually prejudiced by such purported ineffectiveness. Under our rule set out in the Callahan case, a petitioner must allege and prove that but for the specific alleged facts set out in his petition, the result of the trial would have been different.
These requirements, although somewhat technical, are matters of substance and are vitally important both for this Court and for a lower court to be adequately apprised of the specific nature of a petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.... In pointing to specific alleged examples of ineffective counsel, petitioner Smith goes no farther than the record. He makes no allegations of facts outside the record which he intends to use in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.... Likewise, no affidavits (except Smith's) are attached as to his charge that trial counsel failed to make proper objections, failed to call proper rebuttal witnesses, failed to make "necessary investigations" and prepare for trial....
We are compelled to note that in the instant case, as is all too often the case in similar post-conviction relief efforts which come before this Court, the petitioner is in actuality merely seeking to relitigate his case. Such is not the proper function of post-conviction relief proceedings in Mississippi. The fair and orderly administration of justice dictates that a person accused of a crime be afforded the opportunity to present his claims before a fair and impartial tribunal. It does not require that he be given multiple opportunities to "take a bite at the apple." Likewise, the orderly administration of justice does not require this Court to "lead a defendant by the hand" through the criminal justice system. It is this Court's responsibility to provide a meaningful opportunity for defendant to raise his claims and have them adjudicated.
Smith neither subscribed nor swore to this petition as it was originally filed, as is required by Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 38. The only affidavit attached to the petition and brief in support thereof was made by Smith's present attorney, who made his affidavit upon "information and belief," not upon facts within his personal knowledge as required by Rule 38. (Emphasis theirs).
434 So.2d at 218-220.
Rule 38 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Mississippi adopted through January 1983 and not otherwise amended, prescribes the procedure to be followed in applications for leave to file petitions for writ of error coram nobis under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-35-145 (1972). That rule is as follows:
Every application for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the lower court shall have attached thereto the original and two executed counter parts of the petition proposed to be filed in the lower court, which shall be sworn to by petitioner. Petitioner's affidavit shall designate specifically what facts, if any, 'alleged in the petition are within the personal knowledge of petitioner. When the petition contains allegations of fact not within the personal knowledge of petitioner, it shall have attached affidavit or affidavits of some other person or persons having knowledge of the facts which are not within the personal knowledge of petitioner. The failure to attach such affidavits of persons other than petitioner may be excused upon good cause shown. The petition shall state when the facts relied upon for issuance of the writ came to petitioner's knowledge, and shall state sufficient facts to show that there was no want of reasonable diligence on the part of petitioner or his counsel. The petition shall be endorsed by a statement by petitioner's counsel, if any, that he believes the petition for writ of error coram nobis is well taken, and should be issued. The application shall be supported by brief, and failure to file a sup porting brief may be ground for dismissal. In the event leave is granted to file the petition, the original and one executed counterpart of the petition shall be withdrawn and filed in- the lower court. (July 28, 1975). (Emphasis added).
As in Smith, supra, we are unable to say from a reading of this record that trial counsel did not render effective assistance to King at the trial of this cause. Also as in Smith, counsel on appeal has made numerous allegations with reference to the availability of proof to support his fourteen (A-N) charges that trial counsel was ineffective. However, other than the affidavits of appellate counsel and the appellant himself, which were made on information and belief, except as to matters that appear in the record, there are no affidavits as required under Supreme Court Rule 38 of persons having knowledge of the facts and the details thereof upon which the appellant predicates his challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel.
We are therefore of the opinion that the petition for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis should be denied.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR COR-AM NOBIS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOWNDES COUNTY IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BROOM, P.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., PATTERSON, C.J., and HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ., dissent.
. We address each issue raised on this petition because several of our orders disposing of post-conviction relief petitions which were denied without opinions have been erroneously interpreted to be decisions on the merits. Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir.1983); Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F.Supp. 870 (S.D.Miss.1983). In those cases, more or less routine orders were entered on the minutes by the Clerk of this Court. We do not consider those orders to be opinions of this Court and they do not mean that each issue raised was considered on the merits. In fact, the issues raised were, for the most part, procedurally barred. Such routine orders heretofore or hereafter entered by the Clerk of this Court would more appropriately be reviewed under the guidelines of Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1983), and not under Miller v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.1982).
Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832 (Miss.1983).