Case Name: William Moores v. John Townshend and Charles Lehman
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-02-15
Citations: 10 N.Y. St. Rep. 463
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Moores v. John Townshend and Charles Lehman.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 10
Pages: 463–466

Head Matter:
William Moores v. John Townshend and Charles Lehman.
(New York Superior Court, General Term,
Filed February 15, 1887.)
1, Taxes and assessments—Tax sales—Possession under—Ejectment.
On the trial of an action of ejectment the plaintiff showed an apparently good record title, but no possession in himself, or in anyone of his predecessors in title, W'hile the defendant showed actual possession, founded upon a sale by the corporation of the city of New York for an unpaid assessment, and that this possession, under some authority derived from said corporation, commenced before the plaintiff acquired title. There being no proof showing the invalidity of the proceedings under which defendant claimed the right of possession, or otherwise showing that he took possession unlawfully, and no proof that the plaintiff or one of his predecessors in title ever was in possession. Held, that the plaintiff had not established arighttoimmediatepossessionsuperior to defendant’s claim. Ingraham, J., dissenting,
8. Same—Presumption op lease.
The case showed that defendant had been in possession of the land in question for about five years and built a house thereon; that possession being founded on a sale of said premises for unpaid assessments to him, hut the conveyance was not given in proof. Held, that under the circumstances of the case it would he inferred that the defendant did take possession under a lease from the corporation. Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Application for judgment on a verdict for the defendants directed by the court below, subject to the opinion of the court at general term.
L. A. Gould, attorney, and Robert L. Wensley, of counsel for plaintiff; John Townshend, for defendants.

Opinion:
Freedman, J.
The plaintiff, in order to maintain ejectment, relies upon a record title resting upon a judgment in partition. Such a judgment is conclusive upon alT persons specified in sections 1577 and 1557 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but defendants in this action, who were not made parties to that suit, are not among the persons so specified. Before the partition suit was commenced, Townshend had given a lease to Breen, and Breen had gone into possession. Breen also built a house on the lot in question. He and his successors in interest have been in possession of said lot ever since, as tenants of Townshend. Whether that was rightful or wrongful as against the plaintiff, it was a claim by the defendants, of which they could not be deprived without a hearing. The present action furnished to them' the first oportunity of being heard.
The case shows that Townshend is, and since April 22, 1879, has been, in possession of the lot by his tenants, and that his possession is founded upon a sale of the premises for an unpaid assessment, which sale was made to him in September, 1871, for the period of ninety years.
From another litigation between the same plaintiff and Townshend, reported in 102 N. Y., 387; 2 N. Y. State Rep., 440, it appears that the sale for the assessment was actually followed up by a conveyance by the comptroller to Townshend, dated September 19, 1873. This conveyance, if it had been given in proof here, would estabhsh, prima facie, the regularity of the proceedings which led up to it, and the rightfulness of Townshend's possession. But this was not done. The case is, therefore, to be treated as without direct proof of the existence of a conveyance. Nevertheless, as the law never presumes a wrong, it may, under the exceptional circumstances of this case, be inferred that Townshend did take possession under a lease from the corporation. '
The case, then, comes down to this. The plaintiff, at the trial, showed an apparently good record title, but no possession in himself, or in some one of his predecessors in title, while the defendant Townshend showed actual possession, founded upon a sale by the corporation of the city of New York for an unpaid assessment, and that this possession, under some authority derived from said corporation, commenced before the plaintiff acquired title.
Now, it was held by the court of appeals, m Bedell v. Shaw (59 N. Y., 46), that possession and claim for over twenty years, made a lease for a term of years executed by a municipal corporation upon a sale for unpaid assessments, not adverse to, but consistent with, the title of the owner in fee, and that they are not in hostility to such title, but in accord with it.
Under this doctrine, reaffirmed by the court of appeals in 62 N. Y., 632, Townshend, even if he had made full proof of a lease to himself, could not insist that his possession was adverse to plaintiff's title.
But, on the other hand, the application of said doctrine does not, upon the meagre state of facts disclosed by the record, entitle the plaintiff to a judgment in ejectment.
To recover, in this action, the plaintiff, although this record title is good, must establish immediate right of possession, and, as the defendant is in actual possession, under at least a claim of right for a term of years, and under circumstances which do not of themselves show that his claim is unfounded, the plaintiff must show a right to immediate possession superior to Townshend's claim.
There being no proof showing invalidity of the proceedings under which Townshend claims the right of possession, or otherwise showing that Townshend took possession unlawfully, and no proof that the plaintiff, or one of his predecessors in title, ever was in possession, the plaintiff has not established a right to immediate possession superior to Townshend's claim.
The defendants are entitled to final judgment upon the verdict ordered, with costs.
Sedgwick, Oh. J., concurs.