Case Name: Esther ASH, Appellant, v. John CAMPION, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-02-05
Citations: 247 So. 3d 581
Docket Number: No. 1D15–4165
Parties: Esther ASH, Appellant,
v.
John CAMPION, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 247
Pages: 581–586

Head Matter:
Esther ASH, Appellant,
v.
John CAMPION, Appellee.
No. 1D15-4165
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
February 5, 2018
Esther Ash, pro se, Appellant.
Michael J. Korn of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, and Harold E. Patricoff of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Miami, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Winsor, J.
During a long and contentious divorce battle, the circuit court held Esther Ash in contempt and ordered her to pay $100,000 to her former husband, John Campion. Ash appeals, contending the sanctions order was unlawful.
Ash and Campion lived as a married couple for several years before separating in 2012. Campion initiated divorce proceedings, and the trial court entered a mutual injunction prohibiting each party from "physically or verbally harass[ing], molest[ing], or disturb[ing] the other" by phone or text message. The couple finalized the dissolution, but animosities persisted, culminating with Ash's sending Campion a slew of vitriolic text and voicemail messages. Some of Ash's less outrageous texts called Campion an "evil, sick person," who "alienate[d] a child from [his] father" and who deserves to "rot in federal prison." Other messages-unfit for print here-said far worse.
Concerned that Ash would continue sending incendiary messages, Campion sought an order enforcing the mutual injunction. After a hearing, the trial court found Ash in contempt and ordered her to pay Campion $100,000.
On appeal, Ash does not defend her conduct. She does not claim her messages were anything but harassment or that they were permissible under the injunction. Instead, she argues that we must reverse the contempt order because the trial court did not satisfy necessary prerequisites.
"Contempt sanctions are broadly categorized as criminal or civil contempt." Parisi v. Broward County , 769 So.2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2000). The distinction is critical because those facing criminal-contempt sanctions are entitled to protections not offered to those facing civil-contempt sanctions. Id. ; see also Pugliese v. Pugliese , 347 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1977) ("[A] determination of whether an order is civil or criminal must be made."). In fact, those facing charges of criminal contempt-"a crime in the ordinary sense"-are entitled to the same protections as other criminal defendants. Parisi , 769 So.2d at 363 (quoting Int'lUnion, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell , 512 U.S. 821, 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) ). The Constitution provides some of those rights (right to counsel, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.), id. , and our rules of criminal procedure provide still more, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840.
There is no question that the trial court fell short of affording Ash the requisite protections for a criminal-contempt order. And there is no question that if the contempt order was criminal in nature, we therefore must reverse. See Wendel v. Wendel , 958 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Noncompliance with rule 3.840 constitutes fundamental error."). Indeed, Campion makes no effort to defend the order as a lawful criminal-contempt sanction, arguing instead that it was a valid civil -contempt order. But we cannot accept that argument.
We can consider a contempt fine civil only if it coerces the defendant into compliance with the court's order or compensates the other party for sustained losses. See Parisi , 769 So.2d at 366 ; see also Bagwell , 512 U.S. at 829, 114 S.Ct. 2552. We cannot consider this fine a coercive sanction because it includes no purge provision: there was nothing Ash could do to avoid the fine after the trial court imposed it. See Parisi , 769 So.2d at 366. A punishment (like a $100,000 penalty) might deter future noncompliance (just as prison terms might deter future crimes), but that does not make it a coercive civil sanction. Regardless, any valid coercive civil sanction order must include a purge provision.
See id. ("[I]n order to impose a valid coercive sanction, the trial court must . include a purge provision."). "Without this critical protection, there is a danger that the contempt sanction could be transformed from a civil to a criminal contempt sanction without any other underlying procedural protections attendant to criminal proceedings." Id. at 365.
Nor can we view this fine as a compensatory award. A contempt order designed to compensate must turn on "the injured party's actual loss." Id. at 366 (quoting Johnson v. Bednar , 573 So.2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1991) ). Campion argues here that the award sought to compensate him for emotional distress, but the record does not support that argument. There was no argument about loss below, there was no evidence about the value of any loss below, and the trial court made no findings about loss below. Campion himself testified that he didn't want compensation (insisting he'd give any award to charity anyway)-he "just want[ed] it to stop." Moreover, the court's announced purpose was to deter Ash from engaging in "unacceptable conduct," and it chose $100,000 only after Campion argued "it's going to take a lot to get her attention." This was not a compensatory order.
Rather than serve any remedial or compensatory purpose, the trial court's order "simply imposes a flat and unconditional fine," meaning it must be "considered a criminal sanction." J-II Invs., Inc. v. Leon County , 21 So.3d 86, 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ; accord Wendel , 958 So.2d at 1040. And because the trial court imposed a criminal sanction without complying with rule 3.840, our precedent requires us to find fundamental error. Wendel , 958 So.2d at 1040 ("Noncompliance with rule 3.840 constitutes fundamental error."); Hunt v. State , 659 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting "unequivocal authority holding that noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 3.840 constitutes fundamental error").
REVERSED .
Lewis, J., concurs; Makar, J., dissents with opinion.
The record shows that the court considered Ash's substantial wealth in determining the sanction. Ash's ability to pay is irrelevant in measuring Campion's actual losses.
Because we reverse on these grounds, we do not address Ash's separate argument that the court should have granted her a continuance before the contempt hearing.