Case Name: WHITE PINE HUNTING CLUB v. SCHALKOFSKI
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-10-14
Citations: 65 Mich. App. 147
Docket Number: Docket No. 21624
Parties: WHITE PINE HUNTING CLUB v SCHALKOFSKI
Judges: Before: McGregor, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 65
Pages: 147–154

Head Matter:
WHITE PINE HUNTING CLUB v SCHALKOFSKI
Opinion op the Court
1. Eminent Domain — States—Taking of Property — Private Use— Constitutional Law.
The state does not have power to authorize the taking of the property of an individual without his consent for the private use of another, even on the payment of full compensation.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, J.
2. Eminent Domain — Statutes—Property—Private Taking — Applicability op Doctrine.
A statute which provides procedures whereby property of one individual may, without his actual consent, be taken for the private use of another individual, does not derive from the eminent domain power of the state; the doctrine of eminent domain applies where property is taken for public use (MCLA 229.1).
3. Statutes — Construction—Property—Roads—Private Taking— Necessity — Township Supervisor.
The right of an individual to have a township supervisor declare a private road is based upon the absolute necessity for such road by the applicant; the right to use the road ceases when the necessity ceases (MCLA 229.1 et seq.)
4. Constitutional Law — Statutes—Property—Roads—Private Taking.
The statute which provides that a person seeking to establish a private road may make an application to the township supervisor who will then give notice to the owner of the land over which the road is proposed to be laid out, and that pursuant to such notice a meeting is held for the purpose of striking a jury which shall determine the necessity of the road, which statute was in force at the time of adoption of the constitution of1963, is not repugnant to the constitution, and is therefore constitutional (Const 1963, art 3, § 7; MCLA 229.1).
References por Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 1.
[3, 4] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 209.
Appeal from Alpena, Joseph P. Swallow, J.
Submitted June 4, 1975, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 21624.)
Decided October 14, 1975.
Complaint by White Pine Hunting Club against Leonard Schalkofski, a supervisor of Ossinecke Township, for a declaratory judgment that a statute providing a procedure for establishment of private roads is unconstitutional. Cecil W. James, Ruth James, Elaine Jacobs, Beulah Auker, Gran-ville Auker, Harry and Helen Graves, and Marion Greenfield intervened as parties defendant. Judgment dismissing action. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Robert D. Mandenberg, for plaintiff.
Gillard, Bauer & Mazrum, for defendants Cecil W. James, Ruth James, Elaine Jacobs, Beulah Auker and Granville Auker.
Charles L. McCarter, for defendants Harry and Helen Graves and Marion Greenfield.
Before: McGregor, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
McGregor, P. J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an August 30, 1974, judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action which had alleged that MCLA 229.1; MSA 9.281 was unconstitutional.
The statute in question basically provides that the person seeking to establish a private road may make an application to the township supervisor who will then give notice to the owner of the land over which the road is proposed to be constructed. Pursuant to such notice, a meeting is held for the purpose of striking a jury which shall determine the necessity for the road. The following sections of the statute deal with formation of the jury, assessment of damages, payment thereof, and the actual construction of the road. The statute has been virtually unchanged since its enactment nearly a hundred years ago.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the statute in question is constitutional. The trial court held that it was. We disagree.
We find MCLA 229.1 et seq.; MSA 9.281 et seq. to be repugnant to Const 1963, art 10, § 2.
In Shizas v Detroit, 333 Mich 44, 50; 52 NW2d 589 (1952), our Supreme Court expressed its approval of the following quotation from 18 Am Jur, Eminent Domain, § 34, pp 657, 658:
"It is to be noted that few, if any, of the state Constitutions in terms prohibit the taking of property by authority of the state for uses that are not public. The characteristic provision found in the Constitutions of the several states, and in that of the United States as well, is to the effect that property shall not be taken for the public use without just compensation. Nevertheless, while the courts have not been in agreement on the precise meaning of the term 'public use, ' it has been held, without a single dissenting voice, that the state does not have power to authorize the taking of the property of an individual without his consent for the private use of another, even on the payment of full compensation."(Emphasis added.)
Finding no "public use" to support the statute before us, we therefore must conclude that the deletion of the constitutional sanction was fatal to its continued validity.
Reversed.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.