Case Name: WELCH v. FARGO & MOORHEAD STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1913-02-01
Citations: 24 N.D. 463
Docket Number: 
Parties: WELCH v. FARGO & MOORHEAD STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 463–486

Head Matter:
WELCH v. FARGO & MOORHEAD STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation.
(140 N. W. 680.)
Conflict in evidence — negligence — contributory negligence — question ior jury — special verdict — ultimate tacts.
1. Where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, negligence and contributory negligence are ultimate questions of fact for the jury, and not of law for the court. Where, therefore, a special verdict is submitted in a personal injury case, it is not only proper, but necessary, that questions involving such ultimate facts should be submitted and answered.
Sufliciency of evidence to sustain findings.
2. Evidence examined and held to support findings of jury and the judgment of the court.
On Petition for Rehearing.
Negligence — contributory negligence — last clear chance — pleading.
3. The doctrine of discovered peril, or of the last clear chance, may be urged under a general allegation of negligence.
Negligence — contributory negligence — last clear chance — presumptions — street railways.
4. Where a hack driver was driving within a short distance of and parallel to the street railway track, and within the track of the car, though not of the rail, and was overtaken and run down by a rapidly approaching car, which sounded no gong and gave no warning of its approach, and the evidence showed that though he started to turn across the track of said railway just before the accident, he would have been run down whether he had so turned or not, and that the motorman could have seen him during all of the time he was on said street and in the track of said car, and that when first turning upon said street and while about 480 feet from the scene of the accident, he turned to look back for an approaching car and saw none, but did not look again, though he listened for approaching cars, held, that the court will not presume contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that in such a case the doctrine of the last clear chance will be held to apply.
Opinion filed February 1, 1913.
On petition for rehearing March 7, 1913.
Appeal from the District Court for Cass Comity; Pollock, J.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries received by reason •of the alleged negligence of defendant. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s and defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, and also from the judgment entered herein in favor of the respondent. It is a personal injury case. The plaintiff and respondent was a hack driver in the city of Fargo, and had been such for a number of years. He was familiar with the appellant’s system of street cars and was an •experienced driver. On the day of the accident he delivered a passenger .at the Metropole Hotel, and then drove some little distance westwardly, to Broadway, and then south along Broadway and on the west side, to Front Street, thence on the north side of the defendant’s tracks west on Front street. Broadway and Front street intersect at right angles ,a short distance south of the Northern Pacific tracks, which in turn intersect Broadway. The street car line of the defendant and appellant runs along Broadway, and continues in a westerly direction along Front street, which latter street runs east and west. The plaintiff, on reaching Front street, kept on the right side, that is to say, on the north side •of the street car track, and drove along and upon said street at a slow trot, and, according to some of the evidence, at least, within a few in- cb.es of the north rail of the track. It was proved that the street car which occasioned the accident extended over 3 feet beyond such outer rail of the track, so that, according to the weight of the testimony, the plaintiff and respondent was at no time without the area of the street car, though there were times when he was not actually upon the track. It was a rainy morning. As he turned west on front street he looked back as far as the Northern Pacific tracks, north on Broadway a distance of from 150 to 175 feet (though the exact distance is not shown in the evidence, but merely in the arguments of counsel), and saw no car south of such track. He then, as stated, proceeded on Front street with the south wheels of his hack within a few inches of the north rail of the street car track. He was driving at a trot. He continued in this position until about the middle of the block, that is to say, until he was about 180 feet west of the intersection of Broadway and Front street, and, without again looking to the rear, turned suddenly to the south and across the track, and so close to an approaching car that after he turned the car could not possibly have been stopped, and he was struck and injured. The evidence shows, at least there is credible ■evidence which shows, that even before plaintiff turned to the south and directly across the track, and, indeed, all the time that he was on said Front street, he was within a few inches of the north rail of the street car track and within the area of the car, so that the collision would have occurred whether he had turned across the track or not, so that it cannot be said that the turning south across the track was the occasion of the accident. All of the witnesses testify that the motorman applied the brakes and reverse as soon as he saw the hack turn south and across the track. One witness testified that the car was going at an unusual speed. Another witness testified: “It seems to me that the car was running fast, but of course I am no judge.” Another testified that “the car was coming fast.” Another testified, “The speed of the car was 6 to 8 miles per hour.” The jury found that defendant’s car was moving at the time of the accident 14 miles an hour, and that the time which elapsed between the place where plaintiff looked back to see whether a street car was on Broadway, that is to say, the time when he first reached Front street, and .the time of the accident, was one minute. Two witnesses testified positively that the gong was not sounded, — that no gong rang. The respondent and three of his wit nesses testified tbat they heard no gong. Six witnesses, that the gong was sounded. The question of the ringing of the gong, therefore, was one for the jury. The special verdict found that the car at the time of the accident was moving at the rate of 14 miles per hour; that the plaintiff was driving his team at the rate of 3 miles an hour; that no gong was sounded; that the motorman was guilty of lack of ordinary care in the operation of his car at the time of the accident; that such want of ordinary care proximately caused the injury; that plaintiff looked back upon arriving at Front street but not afterwards; that he listened for the approach of the car, however, from the rear; that he could not, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have seen the approaching car in time to avoid the accident; that he was not guilty of any want of ordinary care which contributed to the injury; that after the motorman saw the plaintiff drive on the track he had time to stop the car and avoid the accident; that the plaintiff listened for the approach of the car from the rear; that he went so near the track that the car could not pass him without hitting his wagon; that the motorman, after he saw plaintiff’s danger, did not make a reasonable effort to reduce the car to proper control, nor did he do so when he saw the plaintiff’s vehicle on or near the track; that one minute elapsed between the place where the plaintiff looked back to see whether a ear was on Broadway south of the Northern Pacific track and the time when he was struck by the defendant’s car on Front street; that the plaintiff arrived upon or near the track of the defendant company so near the car in question that the motorman in charge of such car, after seeing him exposed to danger, might have avoided injuring him by the exercise of 'Ordinary or reasonable care; that the motorman did not use ordinary care to reduce the car to control for such purpose. It also found generally the fact of the accident and the injuries, etc.; also that “the car was running at a dangerous rate of speed at the time of the accident.” From a judgment for damages, for injuries to the plaintiff, both to himself, his horses, and his carriage, in the sum of $2,625, with interest, defendant appeals to this court.
Appellant assigns as error that such special verdict was insufficient to sustain the judgment, and that the court erred in refusing to grant its motion for a directed verdict and in entering judgment for the plaintiff thereon. It states that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict in. that it wholly failed to show that the defendant was guilty of any negligence which caused or contributed to the injuries sustained; that it failed to show that the defendant did not exercise due care in the running of the street car; that the gong was not repeatedly sounded ; that the speed of the car was excessive; that the car was not under control, and was not stopped as soon as possible; and defendant maintains that the proof of the plaintiff affirmatively discloses that he was guilty of contributory negligence in that, while driving ahead of defendant’s car in the middle of the block, he turned suddenly south across the track, immediately in front of the street car, and drove up on the track without listening or looking, when the car of the defendant was so near to him that had he listened or had he looked he must have seen it and avoided the accident. Other errors were assigned, but were not urged by counsel either in his brief or oral argument, and may therefore be deemed to have been waived.
Siambaugh & Fowler, for appellant.
The special verdict herein was insufficient to sustain the judgment entered thereon. A special verdict should find the ultimate physical facts put in issue by the pleadings, and will not support a judgment if it merely finds conclusions of law or conclusions of fact. Lee v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. E. Oo. 101 Wis. 352, 77 N. W. TIT; Davis v. Farmington, 42 Wis. 425; Laird v. Otsego, 90 Wis. 25, 62 N. W. 1042; Morrison v. Lee, 13 N. D. 600, 102 N. W. 223; Cleveland, O. O. & St. L. E. Co. v. Hadley, 12 Ind. App. 516, 40 N. E. 160; Gaston v. Bailey, 14 Ind. App. 581, 43 N. E. 254; Pittsburgh, O. & St. L. E. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186, 11 Am. Neg. Eep. 437; Chicago, St. L. &, P. E. Co. v. Burger, 124 Ind. 275, 24 N. E. 981; Louisville, N. A. & C. E. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N. E. 343; 9 Am. Neg. Gas. 288;; Walkup v. May, 9 Ind. App. 409, 36 N. E. 917; Evansville & T. IL E. Oo. v. Taft, 2 Ind. App. 237, 28 N. E. 443, 24 L.E.A.(N.S.) 1„ note, particularly pp. 30-78.
Eight to attack sufficiency of special verdict to support the judgment;, is not waived or lost, by failure to object that other questions are not; submitted, or failure to request them. Where a judgment is based upon a special verdict alone, which fails to determine all the material and controverted facts in issue, there can be no waiver. Sherman v. Meno minee Eiver Lumber Co. 77 Wis. 14, 45 N. W. 1079; Johnson Bros, v. Glaspey, 16 N. D. 335, 113 N. W. 602.
The respondent was guilty of such contributory negligence as to preclude a recovery. lie failed to look and listen. A driver of a vehicle — particularly when crossing track in the middle of a block, and not at a street crossing or intersection — must both look and listen before crossing. 2 Tkomp. Neg. § 1438; 7 Thomp. Neg. § 1438; Nellis, Street E. Acci. Law, 2d ed. p. 947, p. 968.
Such rule has been adopted in the following states: Ala. — Highland Ave. & Belt E. Co. v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425, 20 So. 566; Birmingham E. Light & P. Co. v. Oldham, 141-Ala. 195, 37. So. 452, 3 Ann. Gas. 333; Cal. — Harrington v. Los Angeles E. Co. 140 Cal. 514, 63 L.E.A. 238, 98 Am. St. Eep. 85, 74 Pac. 15; Bailey v. Market Street Cable E. Co. 110 Cal. 320, 42 Pac. 914; Del. — Cox v. Wilmington City E. Co. 4 Penn. (Del.) 162, 53 Atl. 569; Snyder v. People’s E. Co. 4 Penn. (Del.) 145, 53 Atl. 433; Ga. — Cain v. Macon Consol. Street E. Co. 97 Ga. 298, 22 S. E. 918; Ind. — Eobards v. Indianapolis Street E. Co. 32 Ind. App. 297, 66 N. E. 66, 67 N. E. 953; McCoy -y. Kokomo E. & Light Co. 158 Ind. 662, 64 N. E. 92; Young v. Citizens’ Street E. Co. 148 Ind. 54, 44 N. E. 927, 47 N. E. 142, 2 Am. Neg. Eep. 703 ; Iowa — Eeem v. Tama & T. Electric E. & Light Co. 104 Iowa, 563, 73 N. W. 1045; Kan. — Honick v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 66 Kan. 124, 71 Pac. 265; Burns v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 66 Kan. 188, 71 Pac. 244; Metropolitan Street E. Co. v. Agnew, 65 Kan. 478, 70 Pac. 345, 12 Am. Neg. Eep. 599; La. — Schutt v. Shreveport Belt E. Co. 109 La. 500, 33 So. 577; Cowden v. Shreveport Belt E. Co. 106 La. 236, 30 So. 747 ; Snider v. New Orleans & C. E. Co. 48 La. Ann. 1, 18 So. 695.; Md. — Baltimore Traction Co. v. Helms, 84 Md. 515, 36 L.E.A. 215, 36 Atl. 119, 1 Am. Neg. Eep. 63; Me. — Warren v. Bangor, O. & O. T. E. Co. 95 Me. 115, 49 Atl. 609, 10 Am. Neg. Eep. 67; Mass. — Hurley v. West End Street E. Co. 180 Mass. 370, 62 N. E. 263; Bierne v. Lawrence & M. Street E. Co. 197 Mass. 173, 83 N. E. 359; Mich. — McCarthy v. Detroit Citizens’ Street E. Co. 120 Mich. 400, 79 N. W. 631; Mo. — Giardina v. St. Louis & M. Eiver E. Co. 185 Mo. 330, 84 S. W. 928; N. J. — VanNess v. North Jersey Street E. Co. 75 N. J. L. 273, 67 Atl. 1027; Shuler v. North Jersey Street E. Co. 75 N. J. L. 824, 127 Am. St. Eep. 834, 69 Atl. 180; N. T. — Martin v. Third Aye. E. Co. 21 App. Div. 52, 50 N. Y. Supp. 284; McKinley v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 11 App. Div. 256, 19 N. Y. Supp. 213; Eider v. Syracuse Eapid Transit E. Co. Ill N. Y. 139, 58 L.E.A. 125, 63 N. E. 836; Or. — Wolf v. City & Suburban E. Co. 45 Or. 446, 12 Pac. 329, 18 Pac. 668; Pa. — Moser v. Dnion Traction Co.'205 Pa. 481, 55 Atl. 15; E. I. — Price v. Ebode Island E. Co. 28 E. I. 220, 125 Am. St. Eep. 136, 66 Atl. 200; Beerman v. Unión E. Co. 24 E. I. 215, 52 Atl. 1090; Tenn. — Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 115 Tenn. 323, 89 S. W. 319; Tex. — Citizens’ E. Co. v. Holmes, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 46 S. W. 116; Ya. — Portsmouth Street E. Co. v. Peed, 102 Ya. 662, 41 S. E. 850; Wis. — Cawley v. La Crosse City E. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 11 N. W. 119; W. Ya. — Eiedel v. Wheeling Traction E. Co. 63 W. Ya. 522, 16 L.E.A. (N.S.) 1123, 61 S. E. 821.
It is negligence, as a matter of law, for a driver of a vehicle to turn suddenly across a street car track in front of a moving car, without ascertaining whether a car is coming. 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1470 and cases cited.
A clear case of contributory negligence is where the driver suddenly and without warning, and without looking, turns his horse across a street railway track directly in front of an approaching car. Indianapolis Street E. Co. v. Marschke,— Ind. App. —, 10 N. E. 494; Ind-inapolis Street E. Co. v. Schmidt, 35 Ind. App. 202, 11 N. E. 663, 12 N. E. 418; Fairbanks v. Bangor, O. & O. E. Co. 95 Me. 18, 49 Atl. 421; Hannon v. North Jersey Street E. Co. 65 N. J. L. 547, 41 Atl. 803; McHugh v. North Jersey Street E. Co. — N. J. L. —, 46 Atl. 182; Eeichenberg v. Interurhan Street E. Co. 84 N. Y. Supp. 523; Eeed v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 58 App. Div. 81, 68 N. Y. Supp. 539; Fritz v. Detroit Citizens’ Street E. Co. 105 Mich. 50, 62 N. W. 1001; Boerth v. West Side E. Co. 81 Wis. 288, 58 N. W. 316; Cawley v. La Crosse City E. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 11 N. W. 119; Borshall v. Detroit E. Co. 115 Mich. 413, 73 N. W. 551; Moser v. Union Traction Co. 205 Pa. 481, 55 Atl. 15; McGee v. Consolidated Street E. Co. 102 Mich. 101, 26 L.E.A. 300, 41 Am. St. Eep. 507, 60 N. W. 293; Kessler v. Citizens’ Street E. Co. 20 Ind. App. 421, 50 N. E. 891; Davidson v. Denver Tramway Co. 4 Colo. App. 283, 35 Pac. 920; Christensen v. Union Trunk Line, 6 Wash. 15, 32 Pac. 1018; Cicardi v. St. Louis Transit Co. 108 Mo. App. 462, 83 S. W. 980; Seele v. Boston & N. Street E. Co. 187 Mass. 248, 72 N. E. 971; Bntler v. Boekland, T. & C. Street B. Co. 99 Me. 149, 100 Am. St. Bep. 267, 58 Atl. 775; Harris v. Lincoln Traction Co. 78 Neb. 681, 111 N. W. 580; Iinrley v. West End Street B. Co. 180 Mass. 370, 62 N. E. 263; Kelly v. Wakefield & S. Street B. Co. 175 Mass. 331, 56 N. E. 285; Dunn v. Old Colony Street B. Co. 186 Mass. 316, 71 N. E. 557; Biedel v. Wheeling Traction Co. 63 W. Ya. 522, 16 L.B.A.(N.S.) 1123, 61 S. E. 821; ITelber v. Spokane Street B. Co. 22 Wash. 319, 61 Pac. 40.
Where the facts disclose a case wherein the failure to look and listen was such clear negligence that no two minds could -differ in pronouncing it such, the court should rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as to prevent him from recovery. Terien v. St. Paul City B. Co. 70 Minn. 532, 73 N. W. 412; Bussell v. Minneapolis Street B. Co. 83 Minn. 304, 86 N. W. 346; Hickey v. St. Paul City B. Co. 60 Minn. 119, 61 N. W. 893; Donovan v. Lynn & B. B. Co. 185 Mass. 533, .70 N. E. 1029; Seele v. Boston & N. Street B. Co. 187 Mass. 248, 72 N. E. 971; Bobinson v. Boekland, T. & C. Street B. Co. 99 Me. 47, 58 Atl. 57, 16 Am. Neg. Bep. 356; Helliesen v. Seattle Electric Co. 56 Wash. 278, 105 Pac. 458.
The traveler should look and listen both ways attentively, for a coming car, at places where these acts will be reasonably certain to effect their purpose, and this duty is not performed by a traveler who looks when he first enters on a street, but does not thereafter, until he is on the track. 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1444; 7 Thomp. Neg. § 1439; Snider v. New Orleans & O. B. Co. 48 La. Ann. 1, 18 So. 695; Healey v. Brooklyn Heights E. Co. 18 App. Div. 623, 45 N. Y. Supp. 393; Cawley v. La Crosse City B. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 77 N. W. 179 ; McGee v. Consolidated Street B. Co. 102 Mich. 107, 26 L.B.A. 300, 47 Am. St. Bep. 507, 60 N. W. 293; Winch v. Third Ave. B. Co. 12 Mise. 403, 33 N. Y. Supp. 615; Hemingway v. New Orleans City & Lake B. Co. 50 La. Ann. 1087, 23 So. 952; Tesch v. Milwaukee Electric B. & Light Co. 108 Wis. 593, 53 L.B.A. 618, 84 N. W. 823, 9 Am. Neg. Bep. 388; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 90 C. C. A. 459, 164 Fed. 41; Hartv. Northern P. B. Co. 116 C. O. A. 12, 196 Eed. 180.
The doctrine of “last clear chance” does not apply in this case. To take advantage of such rule, it must be properly pleaded. Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co. 192 Mo. 615, 91 S. W. 509; Gront v. Central Electric E. Co. 125 Mo. App. 552, 102 S. W. 1026.
The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove not only negligence on the part of defendant, but that the “last clear chance” doctrine is established. Crenshaw v. Asheville & B. Street E. & Transp. Co. 144 N. C. 314, 56 S. E. 945.
Plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, not only the defendant’s negligence, but that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Ibid; McGauley v. St. Louis Transit Co. 179 Mo. 583, 79 S. W. 461; Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 186 Mo. 350, 69 L.E.A. 389, 85 S. W. 351; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 90 0. C. A. 459, 164 Eed. 43, and cases cited; Alger S. & Co. v. Duluth-Superior Traction Co. 93 Minn. 314, 101 N. W. 298, 17 Am. Neg. Eep. 95; Fellenz v. St. Louis & Suburban E. Co. 106 Mo. App. 154, 80 S. W. 49; Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co. 76 Ohio St. 234, 10 L.E.A.(N.S.) 421, 118 Am. St. Eep. 844, 81 N. E. 326.
The doctrine of “last chance” can only be applied in cases where the negligence of the defendant is proximate, and that of the plaintiff remote. It cannot apply where the negligence of both is concurrent or continuous. State use of Carey v. Cumberland & W. Electric E. Co. 106 Md. 529, 16 L.E.A.(N.S.) 297, 68 Atl. 197; Kelly v. Boston Elev. E. Co. 197 Mass. 420, 15 L.E.A.(N.S.) 282, 83 N. E. 865; Volosko v. Interurban Street E. Co. 190 N. T. 206, 15 L.E.A.(N.S.) 1117, 82 N. E. 1090; Tognazzi v. Milford & U. Street E. Co. 201 Mass. 7, 21 L.E.A.(N.S.) 309, 86 N. E. 799; 1 Thomp. Neg. § 177.
V. B. Lovell, for respondent.
The question whether negligence or contributory negligence exists, except when there is no conflict in the evidence, has always been held by this court to be a question.of fact for the jury. Cameron v. Great Northern E. Co. 8 N. D. 124, 77 N. W. 1016, 5 Am. Neg. Eep. 454; Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N. D. 173, 73 N. W. 427; Mares v. Northern P. E. Co. 3 Dak. 336, 21 N. W. 5 (affirmed in 123 IT. S. 710, 31 L. ed. 296, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 321) ; Boss v. Northern P. E. Co. 5 Dak. 308, 40 N. W. 590; McTavish v. Great Northern E. Co. 8 N. D. 333, 79 N. W. 443; Carr v. Minneapolis. St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 16 N. D. 217, 112 N. W. 972.
Plaintiff is presumed to be in the exercise of ordinary care, and ■contributory negligence is a matter of defense. Mares v. Northern P. R. Co. 3 Dak. 336, 21 N. W. 5; Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151, 46 N. W. 680; Ouverson v. Grafton, 5 N. D. 281, 65 N. W. 676; Gram v. Northern P. R. Co. 1 N. D. 252, 46 N. W. 972; Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co. 18 N. D. 380, 121 N. W. 830; Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co. 8 N. D. 133, 77 N. W. 1016, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 454; Carr v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 16 N. D. 217, 112 N. W. 972.
It is not objectionable that the answer of the jury to a special interrogatory is a conclusion of fact.
If an inference or conclusion from a fact or facts is itself a fact proper to be found by a jury, it may be made the subject of an interrogatory. Ddell v. Citizens’ Street R. Co. 152 Ind. 507, 71 Am. St. Rep. 336, 52 N. E. 799, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 562.
Special verdicts should find the ultimate or constitutive facts, and not. matters which are merely evidentiary in their nature. Russell v. Meyer, 7 N. D. 340, 47 L.R.A. 637, 75 N. W. 262; Lathrop v. Eargo-Morehead Street R. Co. 23 N. D. 246, 136 N. W. 88; Fraser v. Churchman, 43 Ind. App. 200, 86 N. E. 1029.
Evidentiary matters in the verdict are not fatal to the judgment. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Brunker, 128 Ind. 542, 26 N. E. 178; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Berkey, 136 Ind. 181, 35 N. E. 3; Voris v. Star City Bldg. & L. Asso. 20 Ind. App. 630, 50 N. E. 779 ; Miller v. Shackleford, 4 Dana, 264; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N. E. 343, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 288; Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Tapp, 6 Ind. App. 304, 33 N. E. 462; Hogan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 59 Wis. 139, 17 N. W. 632; Eick v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 68 Wis. 469, 60 Am. Rep. 878, 32 N. W. 527; Winchell v. Abbot, 77 Wis. 371, 46 N. W. 665; MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 Wis. 113, 85 N. W. 707; Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Erawley, 110 Ind. 18, 9 N. E. 594; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Flanagan, 113 Ind. 488, 3 Am. St. Rep. 674, 14 N. E. 370; Fraser v. Churchman, 43 Ind. App. 200, 86 N. E. 1029; Locke v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 66 Ind. 353; Healing v. Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529, 39 Am. Rep. 101; Whitcomb v. Smith, 123 Ind. 329, 24 N. E. 109; Railsback v. Railsback, 12 Ind. App. 659, 40 N. E. 276, 1119; Bran-son v. Studabaker, 133 Ind. 147, 33 N. E. 98; Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382, 47 Am. St. Rep. 274, 38 N. E. 812; Nelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 60 Wis. 320, 19 N. W. 52; Rahr v. Manchester E. Assur. Co. 93 Wis. 355, 67 N. W. 725.
Special verdicts are to be fairly and reasonably construed for the purpose of aiding, not obstructing, the business of the court. Clement-son, Special Verdicts, p. 262; Fenske v. Nelson, 74 Minn. 1, 76 N. W. 785.
Questions relating to facts admitted in the pleadings, or as to which there is no controversy, need not be submitted to the jury. Schrubhe v. Connell, 69 Wis. 476, 34 N. W. 503; Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 74 Wis. 239, 42 N. W. 237; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 28; McGonigle v. Gordon, 11 Kan. 167; Eenske v. Nelson, 74 Minn. 1, 76 N. W. 785; Barton v. Ilimrod, 8 N. Y. 485, 59 Am. Dec. 506; Ward v. Busack, 46 Wis. 407, 1 N. W. 107; Miller v. Luco, 80 Cal. 257, 22 Pac. 198.
Form of special verdict must be largely in the discretion of the trial court, and, if questions are reasonably specific, and cover the disputed issues of fact, the appellate court will not interfere. Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 61 Wis. 357, 21 N. W. 227; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356, 46 N. W. 494; Elizabethton Shoe Co. v. Hughes, 123 N. C. 296, 29 S. E. 339; Zimmer v. Fox River Valley Electric R. Co. 118 Wis. 614, 95 N. W. 957; Toledo St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Tapp, 6 Ind. App. 304, 33 N. E. 462; Ward v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 102 Wis. 215, 78 N. W. 444; Alhambra Addition Water Co. v. Richardson, 72 Cal. 598, 14 Pac. 379; Coveny v. Hale, 49 Cal. 552; Miller v. Luco, 80 Cal. 257, 22 Pac. 198; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132, 22 N. E. 15; Severy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 6 Okla. 153, 50 Pac. 162, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 463; Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. 288, 15 L.R.A. 341, 30 N. E. 519; Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203, 68 Am. St. Rep. 293, 76 N. W. 717; Evansville & T. II. R. Co. v. Taft, 2 Ind. App. 237, 28 N. E. 443; Bogan v. Carolina C. R. Co. 129 N. O.- 154, 55 L.R.A. 418, 39 S. E. 808.
One is not required unqualifiedly, to look and listen before cross ing a street railroad; nor is it negligence, as a matter of law, to fail to do so. The question is whether a prudent man, acting prudently, would have thought it necessary to do so. Warren v. Bangor, 0. & 0. T. B. Co. 95 Me. 115, 49 Atl. 609, 10 Am. Neg. Bep. 61, cited by appellant. Portsmouth Street B. Co. v. Peed, 102 Ya. 662, 41 S. E. 850, also cited by appellant.
The general rule is that each party, in the use of the highway, is bound to exercise such caution and care to prevent injury to others, as ordinarily prudent and careful men would exercise, under all the conditions and circumstances surrounding the time and place of the accident. Cox v. Wilmington City B. Co. 4 Penn. (Del.) 162, 53 Atl. 569; 2 Thomp. Neg. p. 1443.
The question of negligence, contributory or otherwise, is necessarily dependent upon the facts surrounding each case. Detroit United B. Co. v. Nichols, 91 C. C. A. 251, 165 Fed. 296; Baltimore Traction Co. v. Helms, 84 Md. 515, 36 L.B.A. 215, 36 Atl. 119, 1 Am. Neg. Bep 63.
The rule that one approaching a railroad crossing upon a highway must look up and down the track before he attempts to cross is not applicable as a hard and fast rule to one who attempts to cross a street car track upon a public street. Shea v. St. Paul City B. Co. 50 Minn. 395, 52 N. W. 902; Bichmond v. Tacoma, B. & P. Co. 61 Wash. 444, — L.B.A.(N.S.) —, 122 Pac. 351; Boberts v. Spokane Street B. Co. 23 Wash. 325, 54 L.B.A. 184, 63 Pac. 506; 36 Cyc. 1539, eases cited in note 13; 36 Cyc. 1554, cases cited in notes 46, 41.
Beasonable care and prudence do not require one to repeatedly or continually look back, before crossing a street car track. Acton v. Fargo & M. Street B. Co. 20 N. D. 434, 129 N. W. 225; Bensiek v. St. Louis Transit Co. 125 Mo. App. 121, 102 S. W. 581; Miller v. Buffalo & L. E. Traction Co. 149 App. Div. 396, 134 N. Y. Supp. 380.
Under our system of code pleading, no reply is proper, except to traverse a counterclaim. Bev. Codes § 6863.
Allegations of contributory negligence or other new matter in the answer not relating to a counterclaim are to be deemed controverted by the adverse party as upon a direct denial or avoidance, as the case may be. Bev. Codes, § 6818; 6 Thomp. Neg. ¶ 1466.
The office of a bill of particulars is to inform tbe opposite party and the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense upon which the pleader relies. 31 Cyc. 565, cases cited in note 21.
The court may allow amendment of a bill of particulars, the same as any other part of the pleading. Baffin v. Shackleford, 39 0. C. A. 102, 98 Fed. 372; Waidner v. Pauly, 141 Ill. 442, 30 N. E. 1025; Lester v. Thompson, 91 Mich. 245, 51 N. W. 893.
A general allegation of negligence is all that is necessary to admit proof of liability by reason of discovered peril, Hanlon v. Missouri P. R. Co. 104 Mo. 381, 16 S. W. 235; Powers v. Des Moines City R. Co. — Iowa, —•, 115 N. W. 494; Bostwick v. Minneapolis & P. R. Co. 2 N. D. 440, 51 N. W. 781.
Damages may be recovered for injury caused by defendant’s negligence, notwithstanding plaintiff’s negligence in exposing his property to injury, if such injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s omission, after becoming aware of the danger of plaintiff’s property, to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding injury. Carr v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 16 N. D. 217, 112 N. W. 972.
Where the jury has made a specific finding, based upon substantial proof, it is not the function of the court to determine the question of preponderance, as to such finding, especially where the trial court has upheld the same, on motion for a new trial. Acton v. Fargo & M. Street R. Co. 20 N. D. 434, 129 N. W. 225; Lowry v. Piper, 20 N. D. 637, 127 N. W. 1046; Corey v. Bank, 20 N. D. 311; Heyrock v. McKenzie, 8 N. D. 601, 80 N. W. 762; Howland v. Ink, 8 N. D. 63, 76 N. W. 992; Flath v. Casselman, 10 N, D. 419, 87 N. W. 988; Black v. Walker, 7 N. D. 414, 75 N. W. 787; Halley v. Folsom, 1 N. D. 325, 48 N. W. 219 ; 2 Nellis, Street Railways, 2d ed. p. 899, note 79, and cases cited in ¶ 401.

Opinion:
Bruce, J.
(after stating the facts as above). We think that there is no merit in the appellant's first proposition, that the judgment should be reversed because certain of the questions propounded to the jury and inserted in the special verdict called for conclusions of law and conclusions of fact, and not ultimate, physical facts. These questions and answers were as follows: "(4) Was the motorman guilty of any want of ordinary care in tbe operation of his car at the time of the accident? Answer: Yes. (5) If you answer the last question, 'yes/ then was such want of ordinary care the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff? Answer: Yes." "(9) Could the plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, have seen the approaching car in time to have avoided the accident? Answer: No. (10) Was the plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care which contributed to-produce the injury complained of? Answer: No. _ (11) After the motorman saw the defendant drive onto the tract, did he, in the exercise of ordinary care, have time to stop the car and avoid the accident ?' Answer: Yes." "(13) After the motorman saw, or, by the exercise of ordinary care might have seen, the plaintiff's danger, did the motorman make a reasonable effort to reduce the car to such control that it might be brought to a standstill, if necessary, without a collision? Answer: No. (14) After the motorman saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care might have seen, the plaintiff's vehicle on or near the track of the defendant street car company and in the line of the progress of said cai*, did the motorman make every effort to place the power which propelled such car under his control for the purpose of avoiding a collision? Answer: No." "(16) Did the plaintiff arrive upon or near the track of the defendant street car company so far ahead of the car in question that the motorman in charge of such car, after seeing him thus exposed to danger, might have avoided injuring him by the exercise of ordinary or reasonable care? Answer: Yes. (17) After the motorman in defendant's street car discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care should have discovered, the plaintiff's vehicle on or near the track of the defendant street car company, and directly in line of the progress of the car and a possible obstacle in the way of such car, did the motorman use ordinary and reasonable care to reduce the car to such control that it might be brought to a standstill if necessary, without colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle? Answer: No." "(28) Was the car of the defendant railway company runing at a dangerous rate of speed, taking into consideration all the circumstances at the time of the accident or collision ? Answer: Yes."
By all of these questions the jury was, in different ways, directed to find whether appellant was guilty of any want of ordinary care, and, if so, whether such want of ordinary care was the proximate cause of respondent's injury. The questions of negligence and contributory negligence are both, according to the former decisions of this court find the overwhelming weight of authority, questions of fact, rather than of law, and only become questions of law when the facts are undisputed. Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co. 8 N. D. 124, 77 N. W. 1016, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 454; Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N. D. 173, 73 N. W. 427; Bishop v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 4 N. D. 536, 62 N. W. 605; Mares v. Northern P. R. Co. 3 Dak. 336, 21 N. W. 5, 123 U. S. 710, 31 L. ed. 296, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; Boss v. Northern P. R. Co. 5 Dak. 308, 40 N. W. 590; Carr v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 16 N. D. 217, 112 N. W. 972; Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co. 91 Wis. 637, 65 N. W. 374; Bagnowski v. A. J. Linderman & H. Co. 93 Wis. 592, 67 N. W. 1131; Davis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 93 Wis. 470, 33 L.R.A. 654, 57 Am. St. Rep. 935, 67 N. W. 16, 1132, 10 Am. Neg. Gas. 507; Klatt v. N. C. Foster Lumber Co. 92 Wis. 622, 66 N. W. 791; Kutchera v. Goodwillie, 93 Wis. 448, 67 N. W. 729; Rysdorp v. George Pankratz Lumber Co. 95 Wis. 622, 70 N. W. 677, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 269; Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 96 Wis. 348, 71 N. W. 372, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 626. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of the terms "negligence," "ordinary care," and "proximate cause," and as to the rights and duties of the traveling public and of street car companies, respectively, upon the public thoroughfares. Where this is done, interrogatories such as those propounded in the case at bar have repeatedly been held not merely proper, but to be necessary to a special verdict in a case such as that before us. Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 96 Wis. 348, 71 N. W. 372, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 626; Sheridan v. Bigelow, 93 Wis. 426, 67 N. W. 732; Groth v. Thomann, 110 Wis. 488, 86 N. W. 178; McGowan v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 91 Wis. 147, 64 N. W. 891. "It being difficult [indeed] to differentiate between conclusions, ultimate facts and evidentiary facts when facts are close to the line dividing the inferential facts from the evidentiary facts, the only safe plan is to incorporate them in the special verdict." Eraser v. Churchman, 43 Ind. App. 200, 86 N. E. 1029. The real things to be avoided are questions which call for a conclusion upon matters which are merely evidentiary in their nature, and which merely tend to show tbe existence of the ultimate facts. If, however, an inference or conclusion from a fact or facts is, itself, a fact proper to be found by the jury, and is in the nature of an ultimate, constitutive fact, which is necessary to support the judgment of the court, such fact or conclusion may be made the proper subject of an interrogatory. Udell v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 152 Ind. 507, 71 Am. St. Rep. 336, 52 N. E. 799, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 562; Russell v. Meyer, 7 N. D. 340, 47 L.R.A. 637, 75 N. W. 262; Lathrop v. Fargo-Moorhead Street R. Co. 23 N.D. 246, 136 N. W. 88.
It is to be remembered, indeed, that special verdicts are to be fairly and reasonably construed, and to be used and treated, not as pitfalls for the litigants, but as aids to the administration of justice. Clementson, Special Verdicts, p. 262; Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 61 Wis. 357, 21 N. W. 227; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356, 46 N. W. 494; Elizabethton Shoe Co. v. Hughes, 122 N. C. 296, 29 S. E. 339; Zimmer v. Fox River Valley Electric R. Co. 118 Wis. 614, 95 N. W. 957. It is also to be borne in mind that only those facts which are in controversy need be submitted. Schrubbe v. Connell, 69 Wis. 476, 34 N. W. 503; Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 74 Wis. 239, 42 N. W. 237; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 28; McGonigle v. Gordon, 11 Kan. 167; Ward v. Busack, 46 Wis. 407, 1 N. W. 107.
The second point of appellant, and to which he has devoted the greater portions of his brief and argument, is that the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as precludes a recovery as a matter of law. All of defendant's argument, however, is based upon the proposition that "respondent turned west on Front street at the Commercial Bank crossing, after looking to the rear about 150 feet to the Northern Pacific tracks, and drove at least 480 feet west to the middle of the block, and without again looking to the rear, turned suddenly across the track immediately in front of the car, in the middle of the block, and so close that the car could not possibly have been stopped, and was struck and injured." He argues, and produces authorities upon the proposition, that when one approaches a street railway track for the purpose of crossing the same, it is his diity to both look and listen, and asserts that the evidence shows that in the case at bar, though the plaintiff may have listened, he totally failed to look before attempting to cross the track. There might be much in this proposition if the uncontradicted evidence supported this contention, and also showed that the crossing of the tracks was (the) a proximate or operative cause of the injury, but it does not. It shows on the other hand, at least much of the testimony goes to prove, that the side of the street car extended 3 feet'beyond the rail of the track itself on each side; that portions of plaintiffs vehicle projected 6 inches outside of the track of its wheels; and that not only just before the accident, but during practically all of the 480 feet journey from the corner of Broadway and Front street and along said Front street, plaintiff was driving with his south wheels within a few inches of the north rail of the car track, in a position of danger unless proper care was used by the street car driver, and within the track of the car, if not of the rails. He did not, therefore, according to this testimony (and it was for the jury to believe whom it chose), strictly speaking, approach the track at all. He, it is true, immediately before the collision, turned across the track to the south, but there is at least some evidence to show that he would have been struck by the car whether he had so turned or not. Such evidence, indeed, shows that he did not move from a position of safety to a position of peril immediately before the collision, or practically at any time after he reached Front street, but that he was, as a matter of fact, on account of his position near the track and the speed of the approaching car of which, according to such testimony, he had no knowledge or warning, in a position of peril all of the time that he was upon the said street. Since, then, there is evidence to show that he looked back at the time, or just before, he turned on Front street and saw no car approaching on Broadway, and that the car was running at a rate of at least 6 miles an hour (one witness testifies from 6 to 8 miles an hour; another, that it was running fast, and the jury found that it was 14 miles) we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that he was guilty of such contributory negligence as would preclude a recovery. We must remember that though there is some' conflicting evidence and much that is merely negative, there is at least some positive testimony that the gong was not sounded at all. We realize, of course, that there is a conflict in the evidence, but we also realize that plaintiff's propositions are sustained by some evidence, at least, and that it was for the jury, and not for the court, to pass upon tbe credibility of the witnesses. Acton v. Fargo & M. Street R. Co. 20 N. D. 434, 129 N. W. 225.
Tbe judgment of tbe District Court is affirmed.
See decision on rehearing p. 4S0.