Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ronald R. HAUKAAS, III, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1999-03-26
Citations: 172 F.3d 542
Docket Number: No. 98-3294
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ronald R. HAUKAAS, III, Appellant.
Judges: Before FAGG, LAY, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 172
Pages: 542–546

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ronald R. HAUKAAS, III, Appellant.
No. 98-3294.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 12, 1999.
Decided March 26, 1999.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 17, 1999.
Thomas J. Wright, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Pierre, SD, argued, for Appellee.
Lee C. McCahren, Pierre, SD, argued, for Appellant.
Before FAGG, LAY, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Judge McMillian would grant the petition.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
At the conclusion of a long evening and night of drinking with several of his friends in and near Mission, South Dakota, on February 15, 1998, Ronald Haukaas III stabbed one of the passengers in the car in which the group was riding. One of the other passengers also suffered a stab wound as she was attempting to protect the initially intended victim of the attack.
Haukaas was convicted by a jury on one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, on two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and on one count of the lesser-included offense of simple assault. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(5), and 1153. We affirm the convictions.
The government filed a pre-trial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that it intended to introduce testimony from Haukaas's girlfriend, Sundown White Lance, concerning a prior domestic altercation. Haukaas filed an objection, which the district court denied. At trial, over Haukaas's objection, White Lance testified about a domestic incident that had occurred some two years prior to the events giving rise to the present prosecution in which Haukaas had ripped a phone off the wall and attacked her by brandishing a knife, holding it to her throat, and threatening to kill her. Haukaas argues that the district court erred in admitting this testimony.
We review the district court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 277 (8th Cir.1996). Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible "solely to prove the defendant's criminal disposition," United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir.1995), but is admissible to show "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).
The government's primary purpose for offering the evidence was to establish the intent required by the statute under which Haukaas was charged. "Where intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of other acts tending to establish that element is generally admissible." United States v. Weddell, 890 F.2d 106, 107-08 (8th Cir.1989). Haukaas placed the element of intent into issue by contending that he was intoxicated at the time of the stabbing. See United States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257 (8th Cir.1977). Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony for the purpose of establishing the fact that Haukaas had acted with the requisite intent.
Haukaas advanced several other defenses at various stages of the investigation and trial. During the investigation, Haukaas told an FBI agent that the stabbing was an accident. Haukaas then testified at trial that he was holding the knife stationary when the victims thrust themselves on the blade. He later claimed that he acted in self-defense. Thus, the government was entitled to introduce the Rule 404(b) evidence to show an absence of mistake or accident and to rebut the claim of self-defense. See Weddell, 890 F.2d at 108.
Haukaas contends that the district court also erred in failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the Rule 404(b) evidence. The record indicates, however, that Haukaas successfully argued against the government's proposed limiting instruction and offered none of his own. A defendant who makes it clear that he does not want a limiting instruction will not later be heard to complain that the failure to give one constitutes plain error. See United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir.1993).
In any event, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of Haukaas's guilt. See United States v. Johnson, 879 F.2d 331 (8th Cir.1989) (applying the harmless error standard); United States v. Kandiel, 865 F.2d 967 (8th Cir.1989) (same). In addition to attempting to flee from the police, Haukaas offered several inherently inconsistent explanations of the events sur rounding the stabbing. His claim that the victims thrust themselves upon the stationary blade is incredible in light of the nerve injuries that one of the victims suffered, resulting in the permanent, loss of use of her right arm, and the extensive injuries that the other victim suffered. No more credible is his claim of self-defense. His only possible defense was that of intoxication, which a properly instructed jury rejected.
The judgment is affirmed.
. The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.