Case Name: Copeland Lumber Company, Respondent, v. Oramel Wilkins, Defendant, J. N. Knox et al., Appellants
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1969-05-08
Citations: 75 Wash. 2d 940
Docket Number: No. 39915
Parties: Copeland Lumber Company, Respondent, v. Oramel Wilkins, Defendant, J. N. Knox et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 940–947

Head Matter:
[No. 39915.
En Banc.
May 8, 1969.]
Copeland Lumber Company, Respondent, v. Oramel Wilkins, Defendant, J. N. Knox et al., Appellants.
Brodie, Fristoe & Taylor, for appellants..
O’Leary, Meyer & O’Leary, by Stephen J. Bean, for respondent.
Reported in 454 P.2d 821.

Opinion:
Hunter, C. J.
This case was tried in the superior court upon an agreed statement of facts and issues. It resulted in a judgment determining that the Copeland Lumber Company, respondent, had a lien as against the property of the appellants, J. N. Knox and his wife, owners of property upon which a. single family residence .was being constructed.
The respondent commenced to furnish materials for the construction of the dwelling on May 12, 1964. On May 23, 1964, 11 days later, it caused a notice of intention to claim a lien against the. appellants' property to be mailed to them. Respondents had been paid'for all materials furnished prior to the notice. There remains only the narrow question of whether there is a lien for materials delivered to the contractor, Wilkins, after the notice. Wilkins filed in bankruptcy.
In 1959, Senate Bill No. 63 and Senate Bill No. 64 were enacted into law'. These became chapter 278 and chapter 279, respectively, of the Laws of 1959. Each purported to amend .section 1, chapter 45, Laws , of 1909 as amended by section 1, chapter 214, Laws of 1957, andRCW 60.04.020.
That part -of chapter 278 pertaining to the issue in this case is as follows:
Provided, however, That with respect to materials or supplies.used in,construction,.alteration,or repair of any single family residence or garage such notice must be given not later than ten days after the date of the first delivery of such materials or' supplies. No materialmen's lien shall be enforced unless the provisions of this section have been complied with: Provided, That in the event the notice required by this section is not given within the time specified by this section, any lien or claim of lien shall be enforceable only for materials and supplies delivered subsequent to such notice being given to the owner or reputed owner, and such lien or claim of lien shall be secondary to any lien or claim of lien established where such notice was given within the time limits prescribed by this section.
(Italics ours.)
The second proviso was omitted in chapter 279, section 2, so that the pertinent part read as follows:
Provided, however, That with respect to materials or supplies or equipment used in construction, alteration or repair of any single family residence or garage such notice must be given not later than ten days after the date of the first delivery of such materials or supplies or equipment. No materialmen's lien shall be enforced unless the provisions of this section have been complied with.
(Italics ours.)
Chapter 278 and chapter 279 were filed in the office of the Secretary of State one minute apart, chapter 279 being the later in time. RCW 1.12.025 reads as follows:
If at any session of the legislature there are enacted two or more acts amending the same section of the session laws or of the official code, each act shall be given effect to the extent that the amendments do not conflict in purpose, otherwise the act last filed in the office of the secretary of state in point of time, shall control.
(Italics ours.)
Appellant contends that chapter 279 thus repealed the proviso contained in chapter 278 allowing a hen for materials delivered after the notice in those instances where the 10 day requirement was not complied with.' Respondent takes the position that the amendments "do not conflict in purpose", and therefore this provision of chapter 278 was not repealed. The trial court accepted this latter view, and we are inclined to agree with its decision.
Other than the disputed proviso of chapter 278, the amendment accomplished by chapter 279, section 2 was to include the renting, leasing, or the otherwise supplying of equipment; services which prior thereto had been held to be not included in the statute as lienable. See Willett v. Davis, 30 Wn.2d 622, 193 P.2d 321 (1948); and Sundberg v. Boeing Airplane Co., 52 Wn.2d 734, 328 P.2d 692 (1958).
Chapter 278 likewise is devoted to but one amendment— the lien given for materials delivered after the notice.
It has long been a rule of statutory construction in this state that repeals by implication are not favored. A statute will not be held to have repealed a preceding statute by implication when the two can stand together. Before a legislative enactment can be found to have been impliedly repealed by a subsequent act, the later legislation must evidently be intended to supersede the prior legislation on the subject. Both acts will be allowed to stand unless they are clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to each' other and cannot, by fair and reasonable construction, be reconciled and both given effect. In re Sanford, 10 Wn.2d 686, 118 P.2d 179 (1941); Abel v. Diking & Drainage Improvement Dist. No. 4, 19 Wn.2d 356, 142 P.2d 1017 (1943); Rosenthal v. Tacoma, 31 Wn.2d 32, 195 P.2d 102 (1948); Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wn.2d 94, 204 P.2d 482 (1949); Fransen v. State Bd. of Natural Resources, 66 Wn.2d 672, 404 P.2d 432 (1965); Tardiff v. Shoreline School Dist., 68 Wn.2d 164, 411 P.2d 889 (1966); and State Bd. Against Discrimination v. Board of Directors, Olympia School Dist. No. 1, 68 Wn.2d 262, 412 P.2d 769 (1966). An examination of the bills themselves as they came from the legislature does not reveal that by chapter 279, section 2, the legislature intended to delete any part of chapter 278. Rule 60 of the Senate Rules, and Rule 85 of the Rules of the House, both as in effect in 1959, required any matter intended to be deleted, to be set forth enclosed in double parentheses. Senate Bill No. 64 failed to comply with these rules. The proviso in question was not set forth at all in Senate Bill No. 64.
By chapter 98, Laws of 1965, chapter 278 .and chapter 279, section 2, were amended to continue the language of the proviso. Although such action of a subsequent legisla ture probably cannot be considered to show intent, it does indicate a recognition of the inconsistency of the situation.
We are of the opinion that the two acts did not conflict in purpose. The provision of chapter 278 relative to materials and supplies delivered subsequent to the notice remained in effect. The respondent had an enforceable lien as against the property of the apppellants.
Affirmed.
Hamilton, Hale, and McGovern, JJ., concur.