Case Name: Nelson G. GRILLS, Plaintiff, Dorothy C. Duddleston, John P. Gallagher, Miles H. Marshall, Louis Y. Mundy, Joseph W. Summers, Intervening Plaintiffs, v. Roger D. BRANIGIN, Edwin M. S. Steers, Thurman M. DeMoss, as Members of the State Election Board of Indiana, Defendants, United States of America, Intervenor
Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1968-02-14
Citations: 284 F. Supp. 176
Docket Number: No. IP 64-C-101
Parties: Nelson G. GRILLS, Plaintiff, Dorothy C. Duddleston, John P. Gallagher, Miles H. Marshall, Louis Y. Mundy, Joseph W. Summers, Intervening Plaintiffs, v. Roger D. BRANIGIN, Edwin M. S. Steers, Thurman M. DeMoss, as Members of the State Election Board of Indiana, Defendants, United States of America, Intervenor.
Judges: Before ENOCH, Circuit Judge, and HOLDER, and DILLIN, District Judges.
Reporter: Federal Supplement
Volume: 284
Pages: 176–202

Head Matter:
Nelson G. GRILLS, Plaintiff, Dorothy C. Duddleston, John P. Gallagher, Miles H. Marshall, Louis Y. Mundy, Joseph W. Summers, Intervening Plaintiffs, v. Roger D. BRANIGIN, Edwin M. S. Steers, Thurman M. DeMoss, as Members of the State Election Board of Indiana, Defendants, United States of America, Intervenor.
No. IP 64-C-101.
United States District Court S. D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
Feb. 14, 1968.
Judgment Affirmed May 20, 1968.
See 88 S.Ct. 1666.
Nelson G. Grills, pro se.
Beuna Chaney and Hansford C. Mann, Terre Haute, Ind., Leslie Duvall and William H. Sparrenberger, Indianapolis, Ind., for Dorothy Duddleston, John P. Gallagher, Miles H. Marshall and Louis Y. Mundy, intervening plaintiffs.
Marshall F. Kizer, Plymouth, Ind., Patrick E. Chavis, Jr., John O. Moss, Indianapolis, Ind., for Joseph W. Summers, intervening plaintiff.
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., of the State of Indiana, and Charles S. White, Chief Counsel, Staff, Indianapolis, Ind., for Roger D. Branigin, Edwin M. S. Steers, Thurman M. DeMoss, as members of the State Election Board of Indiana, defendants.
Edwin L. Weisel, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., K. Edwin Applegate, U. S. Dist. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for the United States.
Before ENOCH, Circuit Judge, and HOLDER, and DILLIN, District Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REMAND
PER CURIAM.
The previous history of the above entitled action in this Court is set out in the opinion of the Court filed February 17, 1966, reported as Grills v. Brani gin, D. C., 255 F.Supp. 155. Such previous opinion held, Judge Holder dissenting, that Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1965, enacted by the General Assembly of Indiana and reapportioning Indiana's eleven congressional districts, was constitutional within the provisions of Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
The intervening plaintiffs, Dorothy C. Duddleston, et al., thereafter appealed such decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 9, 1967, that Court announced its opinion, Duddleston et al. v. Grills et al., 385 U.S. 455, 87 S.Ct. 611, 17 L.Ed.2d 508, vacating the judgment and remanding the case for further consideration in light of Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, decided the same day, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481, and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506. No timely petition for rehearing was filed, and the mandate of the Court has now been issued.
This Court, having given further consideration to the ease in the light of such mandate and of the authorities cited therein, is now of the opinion and therefore finds that said Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1965 is unconstitutional and void by reason of excessive population variances between the congressional districts therein constituted.
A fortiori the Court further finds that Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1941, enacted by the General Assembly of Indiana and being the congressional apportionment act in existence immediately prior to the enactment of said Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1965, is likewise unconstitutional and void.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Thurman M. DeMoss has replaced James E. Noland as a member of the State Election Board of Indiana, and that the said Thurman M. DeMoss, Roger D. Branigin and Edwin M. S. Steers now comprise the membership of such Board. The Court therefore, on its own motion, now substitutes the said Thurman M. DeMoss for the said James E. Noland as a party defendant herein.
The General Assembly of Indiana, now meeting in regular session, has adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. 6, and has caused a copy of the same to be forwarded to the Court in an informal manner. The resolution requests this Court to supply the General Assembly with "definitive guidelines by which said body can accurately interpret the intent of Article 1 Section 1 of the United States Constitution." We mention such resolution, despite the fact that it is not and could not properly become a part of the record in this case, as a courtesy due the legislative branch of government of the State of Indiana. We are unable to comply with the resolution for the reason that the federal courts have consistently declined to give advisory opinions since the beginning of the Republic. Hayburn's Case, 1796, 2 Dali. 409, 1 L.Ed. 436.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that elections were conducted in November, 1966, in each of the eleven congressional districts established by Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1965, and that the congressmen elected at such election were duly seated and are now serving in the Congress of the United States. Nothing herein contained should be construed as casting any doubt upon the validity of their respective elections, nor upon their right to serve out the terms for which they were elected.
In view of the findings herein made, it is considered and ordered that the defendants Roger D. Branigin, Edwin M. S. Steers and Thurman M. DeMoss, as members of the State Election Board of Indiana, and their successors in office, be, and they are hereby restrained and enjoined from conducting any further elections pursuant to said Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1965, or Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1941, or any previous Act of the General Assembly of In diana purporting to establish districts for the election of congressmen from such State.
The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for the purpose of passing upon any future claims of unconstitutionality made by plaintiffs against any future congressional apportionment adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, if any, and for such other action in the premises as may be necessary.
Supplemental Opinion
This- action was commenced March 2, 1964 by Nelson G. "Grills contesting the constitutionality of the congressional apportionment in Indiana by the Indiana General Assembly. The statute challenged was Chapter 174 of the 1941 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly.
The second phase of the action commenced with the enactment into law of Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly pending Mr. Grills' action. Chapter 205 created new congressional districts. Thereafter, the intervening petitioners entered the pending action and challenged the constitutionality of the new law. This Court adjudged the intervening petitioners were wrong and upheld the constitutionality of the law. Grills v. Branigin, D. C., 255 F. Supp. 155. This ruling was vacated by this Court after the United States Supreme Court on January 9, 1967 remanded the case to this Court for further consideration upon the intervening petitioners appealing this Court's ruling. Duddleston et al. v. Grills et al., 385 U.S. 455, 87 S.Ct. 611, 17 L.Ed.2d 508.
This Court in February of 1967 entered its judgment. Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly was held unconstitutional and void by reason of excessive population variances between the congressional districts therein constituted. Chapter 174 of the 1941 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly was also found unconstitutional and void. The defendants and their successors in office were enjoined from conducting elections pursuant to the voided Acts, or any previous Act of the Indiana General Assembly purporting to establish congressional districts for Indiana. The Court retained jurisdiction of the action for the purpose of passing upon any future claims of unconstitutionality made by plaintiffs against any future congressional apportionment adopted by the Indiana General Assembly, if any, and for such other action in the premises as may be necessary.
The Indiana General Assembly was in its regular session at the time of this judgment. It adjourned sine die and no congressional districting law was enacted although bills were offered, considered and failed to pass. That since the adjournment there has been no further session of said Assembly, nor has the Governor of Indiana issued any call for any special session of said Assembly, nor does he at this time intend to issue any call for any special session. It is highly improbable that said Assembly, if called into session, could agree on any constitutional plan for dividing the State of Indiana into congressional districts. There are vacancies by reason of death and resignation of members of the said Assembly and the Governor of Indiana has not issued writs of election to fill vacancies as provided by Article 5, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. If a special session was called, the counties and citizens of those counties in this class action would be unrepresented in the said Assembly session in the creation of congresional districts. Without such representation, their right to petition the said Assembly in session under the Indiana Constitution is impaired and less effective than the citizens of other counties with representation in the said Assembly. It appears impossible for the State of Indiana to enact constitutional legislation creating congressional districts in time for the general election of 1968. The time table under the election laws of Indiana for the declaration of candidacy for the nomination for the office of Representative for Congress by districts provides for the filing on February 27, 1968 and within the succeeding thirty (30) days in order for such candidate to be voted upon in the primary on May 7, 1968.
This Court's Judgment of February 1967 enjoined the defendants from conducting any further elections pursuant to Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly and under any prior congressional districting law, and the Court retained jurisdiction of the action for such other action in the premises as may be necessary. The retention of jurisdiction was in accordance with the requests of the plaintiff and original intervening plaintiffs that they be given all such other, further and different remedies as the Court may deem just and •necessary in the premises.
The original intervening plaintiffs first noticed the Court of the impasse in the Indiana 1968 election on November 8, 1967 and requested this Court to apportion the congressional districts. Thereafter, they filed supplemental petitions to the same effect together with a motion to advance the cause. The original intervening plaintiffs also requested that the December 14, 1967, Public Law 90-196 of the United States Congress (81 Stat. 581, 55 Stat. 761, 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a) requiring Indiana to conduct elections by districts and not at large be declared unconstitutional which request is joined in by the original plaintiff. The defendants support the constitutionality of the law. The recent intervenor requests that the elections not be at large. The defendants merely seek instructions of the Court as to what modifications should be made to the void districts of Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly. The defendants do not ask this Court to apportion and do not allege they have the power to do so. The original plaintiff asks that the Court authorize the defendants to apportion Indiana.
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution clearly does not authorize the defendants, as members of the Election Board of Indiana, to create congressional districts. This power is granted to the Indiana General Assembly and the Election Board does not possess the legislative power under the Indiana Constitution nor does it possess judicial power under the Indiana Constitution. In the case of Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795, it was held that Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution's reference to the legislature of the several states required complete legislative treatment of a Districting Act which included the approval of the Governor. The legislature of Minnesota had passed a Districting Act which was vetoed by the Governor of that state and the districting of the state by that Act was held not to be in compliance with the United States Constitution which specifically empowered the legislature to create districts.
It is unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of constitutionality of Public Law 90-196 approved December 14, 1967 and the requested at large election as Section 1 of Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly is in force and effect and requires districting.
We find that the correct basis for the apportionment of the State of Indiana should be upon the United States Decennial Census of 1960 which is judicially noticed even though it may be a fact that the census is outdated and the communities of the state have grown disproportionately in population. The eleven (11) congressmen apportioned by Congress to the State of Indiana is based on the census conducted by the United States and not upon any other governmental or private census and cannot be changed until the next United States Census. We think the Census of 1960 must be tolerated until the next official census in order to maintain relative political stability.
The citizens of Indiana are entitled to immediate relief, and we undertake in the order to follow the appor tioning of the eleven (11) congressional districts geographically among the counties and township units of government in Indiana with a minimal variance in population between such districts. The variance is so minimal that it is not deemed practicable, necessary or advisable to sever the county units except in the metropolitan counties of Lake and Marion as each have more population than would be tolerated in a district. The population of Indiana is 4,662,498 and perfect apportionment would require a district population of 423,863. The districts apportioned have the following population and variances:
District Population Pop. Variance Per Cent Variance
1 427,267 +3,404 +.0080
2 423,227 — 636 -.0015
3 418,220 -5,643 -.0133
4 423,824 — 39 -.00009
5 419,765 —4,098 —.0096
6 428,197 +4,334 +.0102
7 426,620 +2,757 +.0065
8 424,760 + 897 +.0021
9 425,360 +1,497 +.0035
10 417,158 -6,705 -.0158
11 428,100 +4,237 +.0099
The population overages of the First and Eleventh Districts total 7,641 and reduce the possibility of a perfect district for the other nine districts by 849 from 423,-863 to 423,024. The gross percentage variance based on the perfect district of 423,863 population is computed from the Sixth and Tenth Districts for a total of .0260 per cent. The districts as created are compact and so far as possible follow traditional geographic and congressional districting. It was impossible to retain the composition of the previous districts intact because of the effect of the high variances from the perfect district upon other districts. For example, the Eleventh District was previously comprised of Center Township of Marion County which has a population of 333,351 and Wayne Township of Marion County which has a population of 99,722 for a total district population of 433,073 and an overage of +9,210 and a percentage of +.0217. The new Eleventh District retains Center Township, removes Wayne Township from the district and adds the less populated contiguous Townships of Lawrence and Warren in Marion County reducing the variance to +4,237 for a percentage variance from a perfect district of +.0099.
The Court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of the action,
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that all members of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress from the State of Indiana hereafter to be nominated and elected under the election laws of the United States and of the State of Indiana, including any special election, shall be nominated and elected from districts in accordance with Section 1 of Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly. This Court's Judgment of February 9, 1967, declaring Chapter 205 of the 1965 Acts of the Indiana General Assembly to be unconstitutional, was intended only to void Sections 2 through 13 of that Act and insofar as that Judgment of February 9, 1967 may be construed to void Section 1 of that Act it is hereby vacated and set aside.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the limits of each district and the territory included therein shall be as hereinafter provided until the Indiana General Assembly shall otherwise provide for districts:
First District. The Townships of Calumet, North and St. John, in the County of Lake, as those townships existed and their respective geographical boundaries were established and fixed on January 1, 1965 shall be and constitute the First Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Second District. The Townships of Hobart, Ross, Hanover, Center, Winfield, West Creek, Cedar Creek and Eagle Creek, in the County of Lake, as those townships existed and their respective geographical boundaries were established and fixed on January 1, 1965 and the Counties of Porter, LaPorte, Starke, Newton, Jasper, Pulaski, White, Tippecanoe and Benton shall be and constitute the Second Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Third District. The Counties of St. Joseph, Elkhart, Marshall and Kosciusko shall be and constitute the Third Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Fourth District. The Counties of La-Grange, Steuben, Noble, DeKalb, Whitley, Allen, Adams, Wells and Huntington shall be and constitute the Fourth Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Fifth District. The Counties of Fulton, Cass, Miami, Wabash, Howard, Grant, Blackford, Clinton, Tipton, Boone, Hamilton and Carroll shall be and constitute the Fifth Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Sixth District. The Townships of Washington, Pike, Wayne, Decatur, Perry and Franklin, in the County of Marion, as those townships existed and their respective geographical boundaries were established and fixed on January 1, 1965, and the Counties of Morgan, Johnson, Shelby, Rush and Hancock shall be and constitute the Sixth Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Seventh District. The Counties of Warren, Fountain, Montgomery, Hendricks, Putnam, Parke, Vermillion, Vigo, Clay, Owen, Monroe, Greene, Sullivan, Martin and Brown shall be and constitute the Seventh Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Eighth District. The Counties of Knox, Daviess, Gibson, Posey, Vanderburgh, Warrick, Pike, Dubois, Spencer, Perry, Crawford, Orange and Harrison shall be and constitute the Eighth Congressional District of the State of Indi- ana.
Ninth District. The Counties of Floyd, Clark, Washington, Lawrence, Jackson, Bartholomew, Jennings, Scott, Jefferson, Switzerland, Ohio, Dearborn, Ripley, Franklin, Fayette and Decatur shall be and constitute the Ninth Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Tenth District. The Counties of Madison, Delaware, Randolph, Wayne, Henry, Jay and Union shall be and constitute the Tenth Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
Eleventh District. The Townships of Center, Warren and Lawrence, in the County of Marion, as those townships existed and their respective geographical boundaries were established and fixed on January 1, 1965 shall be and constitute the Eleventh Congressional District of the State of Indiana.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants, the Secretary of State of the State of Indiana and all election officials of the State of Indiana under the Election Code of Indiana are mandated to conduct all primary, general and special elections for the office of Representative to the United States Congress in accordance with this judgment in the districts created by this judgment.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants, the Secretary of State of the State of Indiana and all election officials of the State of Indiana under the Election Code of Indiana be and they are hereby enjoined from conducting any primary, general and special elections for the office of Representative to the United States Congress by the use of districts other than those created by this judgment and by the use of an at large district.
The dissent of our colleague inadvertently would sacrifice factors of judicial apportionment and include factors prevalent in a legislative apportionment which include objectives of retention or elimination of incumbent congressmen, splitting counties of one political hue or another, and other considerations inherent in the unconstitutional 1965 legislative apportionment which was accomplished by that Act.
The majority's apportioned districts achieve the requirements of equality laid down in the Supreme Court Decisions without doing unnecessary violence to the heart of traditional districts, county lines and township lines, including the 1965 Act. Chapter 205 of the 1965 Act of the Indiana General Assembly created only two (2) of the eleven (11) districts within tolerable limits of population. The other nine (9) districts were grossly violative of the tolerable limits of population and necessitated changes. The 1965 Act made gross population shifts from the previous districts established in the 1941 session of the Indiana General Assembly. Some of the districts created by the 1965 Act were not compact. The 1965 Act divided the homogeneous Counties of Floyd and Clark and placed them into two (2) separate districts and the same occurred with respect to the Counties of Elkhart and St. Joseph. A new legislature has been elected since the 1965 legislature and in their regular session they failed to agree that simple adjustments could be made to the districts created by the 1965 Act of the previous legislature. The present unconstitutional districts of 1965 are not sacrosanct, nor are they steeped in tradition. The United States Census of Population for 1960 presents the additional information that there are nine (9) Metropolitan Statistical Areas. They are the adjoining Counties of Clark and Floyd area, the Vanderburgh County area, Vigo County area, Marion County area, Delaware County area, Lake County area, Porter County area, St. Joseph County area, and the Fort Wayne County area. The Lake and Marion County areas respectively contain substantial population in excess of a would be perfect district and must be and are divided. The practical effect of these metropolitan centers of population and their homogeneous influence is that they will be and are the heart of any plan of districting.
We have considered the many prior patterns of legislative districts in Indiana which were established in times when the General Assembly of Indiana was not faced with the fundamentals that are now factors of districting. The traditional heart of every district is retained by this Court's districts, however the accretions and separation of some counties from some districts is necessary to meet the present day factors. For example, the Third District as created by the 1941 Act of the Indiana General Assembly was composed of the Counties of LaPorte, St. Joseph, Elkhart and Marshall. In the 1965 session of the Indiana General Assembly, the Third District was composed of the Counties of LaPorte, St. Joseph, Marshall and Starke with a total population based on the 1960 Census of 384,079 or 39,784 less population than a would be perfect district of 423,863 which was not tolerable. This Court's Third District uses the traditional three (3) Counties of St. Joseph, Elkhart and Marshall and adds the County of Kosciusko. Kosciusko County was a part of the Second District and of necessity had to be separated from the Second District with its accretion of Hobart Township in Lake County and such separation contributes to the compactness of both the Second and Third Districts as constituted by this Court.
The Court does not have the simple facts before it that were present in the case of Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F.Supp. 537 (D.C.Ariz.1966).
The Arizona Three-Judge District Court merely readjusted the formerly unequal legislatively created congressional districts without disturbing the boundary of one (1) apportioned district, which is wholly unlike the facts before us. The Court there was dealing only with the three (3) congressional legislative created districts of Arizona. District Two was near perfect and Districts One and Three were adjacent to each other. The Court found that because the latter two (2) districts were "adjacent to each other, it is feasible to adjust the malapportionment between such two districts by moving a portion of Maricopa County, which is District No. 1, into and making the same a part of district No. 3". In Indiana, the Court is faced with a far different situation wherein only two (2) of the states eleven (11) congressional districts as heretofore constituted were within constitutionally tolerable population limits. (Districts Five and Nine). The other nine (9) were not within such limits, and, of course, could not all be adjacent to one another. Thus, the Court is faced with a far different problem than merely shifting one (1) county between two (2) adjacent districts. In addition, a new legislature was convened and refused to accept the pattern of the 1965 districting. The adjustments of the 1965 pattern of noncompact districts required the substantial deletion of population from the following districts:
First District overage from perfect district of +30,345
Second District overage from perfect district of + 7,201
Fourth District overage from perfect district of +27,074
Sixth District overage from perfect district of +15,098
Eighth District overage from perfect district of +19,389
Eleventh District overage from perfect district of + 9,210
and the substantial addition of population to the following districts:
Third District underage from perfect district of —39,784
Seventh District underage from perfect district of —54,200
Tenth District underage from perfect district of —17,645
The results of necessarily moving approximately 27,000 population out of the First District as established in 1965 to the Second District (and there was no other place they could go) with an overage of approximately 7000 population as established in 1965 makes the Second District with an overage of approximately 33,000 population and some population had to be removed therefrom to another. The problem was multiplied nine (9) times as the above underages and overages of the 1965 districts disclose. The net result of developing the districts is similar to the example of the domino game when one (1) standing domino falls many more are affected by the tumbling domino. In addition counties are not composed of uniform population and vary greatly.
We cannot agree with our colleague in dissent in his attempted adherence to the 1965 pattern of districts. The majority chooses to adhere to the traditional heart of the districting pattern of Indiana insofar as it is reasonable and effects practical homogeneous compactness and as it relates to the Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the 1960 Census. Any other consideration includes the forbidden factor of entering the political thicket of which Justice Frankfurter warned in the case of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946). Unlike the unconstitutional apportionment of the 1965 Act of the Indiana General Assembly, the majority's apportionment does not pit an incumbent congressman against another of the same political party and does not indulge in grotesque geographical alignment of counties to accomplish such a result. The unplanned result of the majority's districts which adhere to Indiana's historical patterns, tolerable population variances and compactness of a judicial apportionment has resulted in the avoidance of such inference in that no incumbent congressman is pitted against another of the same political party and in only one (1) instance is an incumbent congressman of one (1) party pitted against another of the opposite party. The majority believes Indiana will be best served with the compactness of the districts created.
The dissent's reference to the summary total of the relocated population of all of the eleven (11) districts of the majority's districting is eye catching but is not based upon any constitutional or legal principle any more than the summary of the total variances of the eleven (11) districts from a perfect district would be. No legislative apportionment has been rendered unconstitutional by the addition of the variances of all districts in a state, nor by the relocation of population. The statistics of necessary population shifts are further exampled by the absolute necessity of moving the entire population of Hobart Township in Lake County (consisting of 39,223) out of the First District into the Second District as created by the 1965 Act of the Indiana General Assembly and moving the entire population of St. John Township of Lake County (consisting of 12,282) out of the Second District into the First District for a total population change of 51,505 to rehabilitate the invalid apportioned First District. This overloaded the Second District by approximately 33,000 population (now we have approximately 84,505 relocations) and it was surrounded by the Third and Seventh Districts with substantial underages in population totaling 93,984; the Fourth District with an overage of 27,074; the Fifth District with an overage of 2,245; and the Sixth District with an overage of 15,098. What county or counties from the perimeter of the Second District containing 33,000 population can be moved to the Third or Seventh Districts? We found no such simple solution. Bordering these districts a similar problem existed. Another example is the Eleventh District as created in 1965 with an overage in population of 9,210 and to diminish this overage one of two (2) townships (Wayne containing 99,722) of the two (2) township districts had to be moved to another district. Hence the computation of relocated population is of no legal significance. The 1965 legislative apportionment was conceived in violation of the law, the districts were so grossly apportioned and so geographically grotesque, that the argument of relocation of population is laid upon an unsound base.