Case Name: STATE, Plaintiff, v. CARLSON et al, Defendants
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1916-05-01
Citations: 37 S.D. 231
Docket Number: File No. 3999
Parties: STATE, Plaintiff, v. CARLSON et al, Defendants.
Judges: S-MITH, J., -concurs in ¡the views of Justice GATES.
Reporter: South Dakota Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 231–239

Head Matter:
STATE, Plaintiff, v. CARLSON et al, Defendants.
(157 N. W. 657.)
(File No. 3999.
Opinion filed May 1, 1916.)
1. Appeals — Appeal from Judgment Enjoining Nuisance and Prohibiting Licensed Liquor Sales — Supersedeas Bond, Application to Supreme Court for — Supersedeas Statute., Application of to Prohibitive Injunction.
Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 467, provides that when the trial court shall neglect or refuse to. mate an order staying proceedings upon an appeal, the Supreme .Court shall make such order; Sec. 451 provides that, if the judgment appealed from direct ¡the abatement, or restraint of the continuance 'of a nuisance, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed by the appeal unless an undertaking be given conditioned that appellant will ■pay all damages the opposite party may sustain by continuance of the unisance. Held, upon application by defendants for an order fixing ;the amount .of an undertaking on appeal to stay the enforcement of a judgment of the -trial court, in a civil action, declaring certain premises and the business of selling intoxicating liquors at retail therein to be a .public and common nuisance, and directing the sheriff to abate such nuisance by removing the liquors, unless defendants should remove them, and restraining defendants from permitting ¡any liquors on the premises, and from selling or offering for sale any such liquors thereon, and -perpetually enjoining and -prohibiting defendants from continuing or engaging in any business requiring payment of a liquor license, that section 451 does not apply to prohibitive injunctions, and that the undertaking applied for, while it would in effect stay the mandatory provisions of the judgment, would not affect the prohibitive provisions therein.
Gates, J., and Smith, J., dissenting.
2. Statutes — Construction of — -Former Law Modified, by Compilers— Construction in Absence of Ambiguity.
Where there is no ambiguity in a section of the present statute as it now reads, its construction cannot be controlled by the wording of such section as it read before the unauthorized change therein by the compilers of the Compiled Laws had been made. So held,-in construing Code Civ. Proe., Sec. 451, wherein it reads: “If the judgment appealed from direct :the abatement, or restraint of the continuance of a nuisance,” etc., sec. 5225, -Comp. Laws 1887, before being so changed, containing the phrase “direct the abatement or the restraint of the continuance of a nuisance.”
Original proceeding in Supreme Court by way of application, under Sec. 457, Code C'iv. P'roc., for an- order fixing the amount of an undertaking on an uncompleted appeal' to the Supreme Court, which, shall operate -as a supersedeas, in a civil action, by the State of South- Dakota against Chris Carlson and another, wherein a judgment was entered by the trial court against -defendants-, declaring certain premises and the business of selling intoxicating liquors at retail therein to be a public nuisance, -directing the sheriff to’ abate it, and- restraining the defendants from allowing any liquors upon -the premises, or from Selling any liquor therefrom’, -and perpetually enjoining and pro'-hibting them -from’ 'continuing -any- business requiring payment of a liquor -license; said defendants having applied for said' order. Amount of stay undertaking fixed at the sum of $500 with sureties, and restraining order issued by Supreme Court continued in force for ten -days.
R. A. Dunham, and G. R. Sherwood, for plaintiff.
Planten & Hcunten, and Perrett P. Gault, for defendants.
Plaintiff cited: Code Civ. P-roe., Secs. 451, 453; Sec. 1410, page 1289; 3 Corpus Juris, and- cases cited; Section- 2361, Civil Code.
Plaintiff submitted That: A stay of proceedings granted on supercedteas bond does not, and should not interfere with the injunctional- order contained in the judgment; and cited: Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., v. Gilbert E.. R. R. Co. 71 N. Y. 430; State ex rel A. S. Gibson et al v. Superior Court, Vbl. 4, Am. and Eng. Ann. Ca-ses, 229; Lindsay v. Dist. Court of Clayton Co., 39 N. W. 817.
Defendant cited: Code- Civ. Proe. Secs. 457, 451, 446, 449, 4S°> 452> 459 5 3 Corpus Juris, page 1286, 1397, 1410; In re Taber, 13 iS. D. 62; 22 Cyc. 970.

Opinion:
WHITING, J.
This is an 'original proceeding in 'this court. It is an application, under the provisions of section. 457, C. C. P., for an order fixing the amount of an undertaking on appeal for the purpose of staying the enforcement of the judgment of a trial court. The application i® based upon a showing that the trial court has refused and neglected to fix the amount 'of a stay undertaking upon an appeal to this court which the defendants desire to take. In the case of the above title, a civil action pending in the circuit court of the Third judicial circuit within and for Clark county, a judgment was entered on March 14, 1916, declaring certain premises in the town of Vienna and the business of selling intoxicating liquors at 'retail therein to be' a public and common nuisance; directing the sheriff to abate such nuisance by removing from: such premises all spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented, or vinous liquors, unless the defendants caused the same ito be done within three days; restraining the defendants, their agents, servants1, etc., from, permitting or allowing in or upon said premises any such- liquors, and from selling or offering for sale therein any of such liquors; enjoining and prohibiting defendants- perpetually from continuing or engaging in any business requiring the payment of a license under the provisions of article 6, .c. 27, Pol. Code, as amended; and for costs.
It will he noticed that some of -the provisions of such judgment are mandatory or affirmative in nature, while others are prohibitive or negative. The applicants contend that they have a right to give a bond on appeal, and that the effect of such bond will he, not only to stay the mandatory provisions of such judgment, but also to. suspend the prohibitory provisions thereof. It must be conceded that, under the decisions of practically every court in our land, the prohibitive provisions of an injunotional judgment cannot be suspended by an appeal, at least without some order to that effect. State v. Superior Court, 39 Wash. 115, 80 Pac. 1108, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 554, 109 Am. St. Rep. 862; 4 Ann. Cas. 229, and authorities cited in notes 4 Ann. Cas. 231. In Lindsay v. Dist. Court, 75 Iowa, 509, 39 N. W. 817, a case on all fours with this one so far as the -nature of the judgment is concerned, the -court said:
"It will 'be observed -that the validity or -effect of the judg- .meat is in no manner affected by tíre -appeal. It remains in fiill force, but process thereon is suspended until -the a-ppeal is determined. Tlte judgment cannot be enforced) by process, but a different rule prevails if the judgment is self-enforcing. Jayne v. Dronbaugh, 63 Iowa, 711, 17 N. W. 433. In the case at bar the nuisance cannot be abated. until the appeal is determined. The effect of the supersedeas is to preserve the existing state of the matter, whatever it,may be. It amounts to a suspension; and the relief obtained thereby is of a negative, and not of an affirmative, character. The injunction remains in full force, and the appeal and1 supersedeas dio not affirm or give the party enjoined the right to violate it. If so, then, where a person is enjoined from committing waste on- real estate, he may, pending an appeal, do- irreparable injury to- the estate; as when he is enjoined from removing heirlooms, or destroying them, which possibly have -little- or no money value. So, too, when one is enjoined from polluting -a stream of water, thereby endangering the health of large numbers of people. In such, -cases the terms, conditions of, and liability on the -supersedeas bond do not afford any adequate relief, or indemnhy, and1 certainly this is so- in the case at bar."
But -the applicants contend that, owing to the peculiar wording of section 451, C. C. P., the rule isi different -in' this state. Such- section reads :
"If the judgment appealed from direct the abatement or restraint of the -continuance of a nuisance, either -public or private, the execution of the judgment sh-a-ll not be staj^ed 'by the appeal unless an undertaking be -entered into -on the part of -the- appellant, by at least two- sureties', in -such sum as the court, or presiding judge thereof, shall -direct, to- the effect that the appellant- will p-ay all damages which the opposite party may sustain by the -continuance -of such nuisance."
We -can find nothing in -such, section applying to prohibitive injunctions; in so far as a judgment may "direct'the abatement -®-r restraint of the continuance of -a nuisance" it is affirmative • or • -mandatory, and- is not self-executing. But it has been suggested- that this- section should be construed exactly as section 12, c. 20, Laws 1887, would have ¡been construed Tracing the history of such former section, there is disclosed an unauthorized change by the compiler's of .the 1887 Compiled Laws. See C. L. § 522.5. It is suggested that it was. the legislative intent that our present section 'should be construed 'exactly as that section would have been. We can see no merit in this contention. If there was any ambiguity in the .present section, we might be justified in examining its predecessors to the end that we might 'determine the intention of those enacting such present section. But there is no ambiguity in the section at it now reads, and its construction cannot 'be controlled by the - wording' of such former sections.
With the prohibitive -provisions of this injunction in full force, little, if any, damage can result-from a stay of the other provisions thereof. The amount of the stay undertaking upon appeal is therefore fixed at the sum of $500, w-ith sureties (or -a surety -company) to be approved by the judge of the trial court. Tire restraining order heretofore issued 'by this court is continued in force for a -period of ten days to allow time for applicants to- prepare, have- -approved, -serve, and file s-u-ch stay undertaking upon appeal.