Case Name: USRY et al. v. FARR et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2001-10-01
Citations: 274 Ga. 438
Docket Number: S01A0784
Parties: USRY et al. v. FARR et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Thompson, J, who concurs in the judgment only, and Benham, Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 438–444

Head Matter:
S01A0784.
USRY et al. v. FARR et al.
(553 SE2d 789)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Chief Justice.
At issue in this appeal is when title to the remainder interest under the will of Watson Usry vested. On summary judgment, the trial court held that the remainder vested at the time of Usry's death and not at the death of the life tenant. Because Usry's will expressed the intention of providing for those who survive him and all five grandchildren survived him, we affirm.
Watson Usry died in 1967. The relevant clause of Usry's will provided successive life estates in his lands, first to his wife Lucille and then to their children, with the remainder to his grandchildren. Usry had three children, the last of whom died in 2000. There are five appellants: the four children of Usry's son Jack, and Jack's widow, Evelyn. Usry's fifth grandson, Hoyt, died in 1970 leaving three young children, all of whom were alive at the time of Usry's death. Hoyt's three children are the appellees. Appellants claim that the remainder vested upon the death of the last life tenant and not upon the death of Usry. Therefore, because they are the only grandchildren who survived the life tenants, they take all lands under the will. Appellees contend that the remainder vested upon Usry's death, and that Hoyt, who survived Usry, had a vested interest under the will, and therefore his children stand in his shoes and take under the will along with appellants.
1. The construction of a will is a question of law for the court. The cardinal rule for construing wills is to ascertain and give effect to the testator's intent. Item Three of the will provided,
I will, bequeath and devise all of the land, with improvements thereon, which I may own at my death to my Wife, LUCILLE, to be hers for and during her lifetime, and at her death same is to go to my children who may survive my wife, and to my grandchildren with restrictions as follows: Any of my children taking land under this Item shall have a life interest therein, share and share alike, with any grandchildren who take hereunder taking the part which their father or mother would have taken. Upon the death of my last surviving child title in fee simple to said lands shall vest in my grandchildren, per stirpes and not per capita.
The first sentence of Item Three establishes a life estate first in Usry's wife Lucille and then in the children who survive Lucille. This sentence imposes a requirement that the children survive Lucille before taking under Item Three. In contrast, no requirement that the grandchildren survive the life tenants is imposed. Therefore, at Usry's death, fee simple title vested in his five grandchildren, who were all alive at that time. The possessory interest vested when Usry's son Ned, the last life tenant, died in April 2000. At that time, the grandchildren were entitled to take possession, with the appel-lees taking the share that had vested in Hoyt.
The testator's intention that the only survivorship, requirement apply to his life appears expressly in Item Eight of the will. In that provision, Usry declared that "my entire plan of disposition is the result of a conscientious effort to provide for the welfare of my loved ones who survive me, and to fairly divide and distribute the worldly goods for which I have worked so hard." Because we must construe the will as a whole, we must consider this clause in construing the remainder of the will. Usry's stated intention of providing for those who survive him is fatal to the claim of appellants who would defer vesting well beyond the death of Usry until the conclusion of the life estates.
The dissent's concern that this construction provides an anomalous result is not well-founded. The testator himself decided to leave successive life estates to his widow and children. Obviously, if his children were to enjoy a life estate that followed their mother's life estate, the children had to survive their mother. Because the testator decided that his children were to enjoy only a life estate, there is nothing unusual about his further providing for title to vest in his loved ones who survive him.
2. Usry's express intention with regard to a survivorship requirement is consistent with the statutory rule in Georgia favoring vesting of title as of the time of the testator's death. Appellants contend that the last sentence of Item Three demonstrates an intention that the remainder vest, not at the testator's death, but at the conclusion of the life estates. However, this Court has repeatedly held that virtually identical language is not sufficient to divest the remainder share from one who survives the testator but predeceases the life tenant. In view of the strong preference in Georgia for early vesting, the language required to render a remainder contingent upon surviving the life tenant must be clear and unambiguous. The last sentence of Item Three fails to meet this standard when considered along with Item Eight. To the extent that this sentence would permit a construction favoring a contingent remainder, it must give way to the construction favoring a vested remainder, where both constructions are possible.
We construe the final sentence of Item Three, and similar language in Item Five, to refer to the time the grandchildren take possession in the land and become entitled to enjoy the title to the remainder, which had vested at Usry's death. This construction is consistent with our case law that recognizes that a vested remainder will have both a vesting of title and a vesting of possession.
3. Appellants also rely on a deed of assent executed by Usry's widow as executrix in 1968. That deed refers to property devised in Usry's will as being left to "the living grandchildren of Watson Usry." The deed of assent, prepared after the testator's death, is irrelevant to determining the testator's intent.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Thompson, J, who concurs in the judgment only, and Benham, Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.
Appendix.
Watson Usry - Lucille
(d. 1967) (d. 1988)
Jack - Evelyn Ned Katherine - Hoyt Farr
(d. 1962) (d. 4/00) (d. 3/00)
Daniel David Jaclyn Kathleen Hoyt, Jr. -
(d. 1970).
Jennifer Gregory Natalie
(b. 1962) (b. 1965) (b. 1967)
A family tree is attached as an appendix.
Timberlake v. Munford, 267 Ga. 631, 632 (481 SE2d 217) (1997).
OCGA § 53-4-55; Timberlake, 267 Ga. at 632.
Timberlake, 267 Ga. at 632 (courts must consider will as a whole).
OCGA § 44-6-66.
Witcher v. Witcher, 231 Ga. 49 (200 SE2d 110) (1973); see also Vemer F. Chaffin, Studies in the Georgia Law of Decedents' Estates and Future Interests, 350-356 (1978).
Britt v. Fincher, 202 Ga. 661, 664 (44 SE2d 372) (1947); Mary F. Radford, Redfearn Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 13-13 (6th ed. 2000).
Miller v. Brown, 215 Ga. 148, 151 (109 SE2d 741) (1959).
"If my daughter-in-law, EVELYN, has not married again by the time the title to my land vests in my grand-children, as per Item Three of this Will, then I desire that she take a child's part. . . ."
Crawley v. Kendrick, 122 Ga. 183, 184 (50 SE 41) (1905).
Young v. Young, 202 Ga. 694, 702 (44 SE2d 659) (1947) (testator's intention must be ascertained from four corners of the will).