Case Name: SCRASE v. BANTLE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-08-13
Citations: 99 Mich. App. 432
Docket Number: Docket No. 45564
Parties: SCRASE v BANTLE
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and R. M. Maher and Cynar, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 99
Pages: 432–438

Head Matter:
SCRASE v BANTLE
Docket No. 45564.
Submitted March 5, 1980, at Detroit.
Decided August 13, 1980.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Laurie E. Scrase, administratrix of the estate of Steven J. Scrase, deceased, brought a wrongful death action against Roxann Bantle and Michael J. Aiello arising out of an automobile accident in the State of Florida in which plaintiffs decedent was killed. The first hearing of the case resulted in a mistrial, and, after the matter was again noticed for trial and further adjournments occurred, the trial judge, on his own motion, directed mediation, which resulted in an award for plaintiff which defendants accepted, but which was rejected by plaintiff. A mandatory settlement conference was then scheduled, pursuant to local court rule, and trial was noticed. However, upon failure to hold the settlement conference on the date scheduled, the court informed the parties that the conference would be held on the date originally set for trial. No settlement was subsequently reached, and the court directed the parties to return the following day, at which time defendants increased their offer to plaintiff, which was rejected. The Macomb Circuit Court, George R. Deneweth, J., upon being informed that additional authority would have to be obtained from a review committee at the home office of defendants’ insurer prior to raising the settlement offer, ordered the insurer to provide someone with authority to settle to appear in court the same day, and, upon failure of defendants’ insurer to so provide, entered a default judgment for plaintiff. After proofs on damages were taken, damages and interest were awarded to plaintiff. Defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment was denied. Defendants appeal, alleging the trial court’s granting of a default judgment was an abuse of discretion. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 69, 79.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 18, 682, 1158, 1180.
Opening default or default judgment claimed to have been obtained because of attorney’s mistake as to time or place of appearances, trial, or filing of necessary papers. 21 ALR3d 1255.
[3] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 682.
[4] 22 Am Jur 2d, Death §2 et seq.
The trial court relied on Kiefer v The Great Atlantic & Paciñc Tea Co, Inc, 80 Mich App 590 (1978), which held that a court does not abuse its discretion where it enters a default judgment for nonappearance pursuant to a local court rule. The rule in question provided that a representative of the defendant with authority to settle must be present at a scheduled settlement conference, but defendant did not comply. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting default judgment.
Affirmed.
Cynar, J., dissented. He would hold that Kiefer, which held that deliberate efforts to avoid mandatory proceedings will result in the harsh consequences of a default judgment, is distinguishable from the case at bar, since a representative of defendants’ insurer with actual authority to settle the claim up to a specified limit was available for immediate appearance. In addition, insurance representatives were present for prior settlement conferences on several occasions, but were not consulted. Thus, there was no deliberate effort to avoid the settlement conference, and it was error for the trial court to enter a default judgment, since, if settlement was not possible, either side had a right to have the matter tried on the merits. He would reverse.
Opinion of the Court
1. Judgments — Default Judgment — Judicial Discretion — Local Court Rules.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion where it enters a default judgment for nonappearance of a representative of a party with authority to settle at a mandatory settlement conference as required by a local court rule.
Dissent by Cynar, J.
2. Judgments — Default Judgment — Judicial Discretion — Local Court Rules.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion where it enters a default judgment upon the failure of a representative of a party with authority to settle at a mandatory settlement conference as required by a local court rule.
3. Judgments — Default Judgment — Error — Reduction of Claim.
It would be error to enter a judgment of a default against a plaintiff for not reducing his demand for settlement in a wrongful death action.
4. Actions — Wrongful Death — Right to Trial.
A party to a wrongful death action has a right to have the matter tried on the merits where settlement is not possible.
Lopatin, Miller, Bindes, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich & Rosen (by Steven G. Silverman), for plaintiff.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen, P.C. (by Mark D. Shorys), for defendant on appeal.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and R. M. Maher and Cynar, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff sued defendants in a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile accident in the State of Florida, in which plaintiffs decedent was killed. Defendants appeal as of right from a default judgment entered against them.
In granting default judgment against defendants the trial court relied upon Kiefer v The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 80 Mich App 590; 264 NW2d 71 (1978). An examination of the record and briefs indicates that Kiefer, supra, was properly applied to the facts in this case and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting default judgment.
Affirmed.