Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl WILLIAMS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-06-21
Citations: 418 So. 2d 562
Docket Number: No. 80-KA-2662
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl WILLIAMS.
Judges: LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 562–570

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl WILLIAMS.
No. 80-KA-2662.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 21, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 3, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Jeffrey Hollingsworth, Ralph Roy and Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. At-tys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Vincent Wilkins, Jrs., M. Michele Fournet, Asst. Public Defenders, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
Darryl Williams and Robert Smith were charged in the same information with the armed robbery of Diana Phillips on August 23, 1979 in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 (count one). Williams was also charged in that information in a separate count with the armed robbery of the same victim, Diana Phillips, on August 13, 1979 (count two). After a joint trial by jury, Williams was found guilty as charged on both counts while Smith was found not guilty on the one count on which he was charged. Thereafter, Williams was sentenced to serve thirty-five years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence on count one and fifteen years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence on count two. The court expressly directed that the sentences be served consecutively.
Williams designated four errors to be urged on appeal. However, Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were neither briefed nor argued; therefore, we consider them to have been abandoned. In the sole remaining assigned error (Assignment of Error No. 2), defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a severance of offenses. He argues that he was prejudiced by the joinder for trial of the two armed robberies.
The first robbery occurred on August 13, 1979. Diana Phillips was working alone at the Dairy Queen located at 3344 Highland Road in Baton Rouge. A black male came in between 8:30 and 8:45 p.m. and bought a coke. He then walked to the rear of the store, but soon returned to the counter and asked for change for the juke box. Ms. Phillips advised him that the machine would make change. He walked away but returned again and stated that he had lost his money in the juke box. When Ms. Phillips opened the cash register to refund his money, the man pulled out a gun and ordered her to give him all the money. Too frightened to comply, she backed up and watched the man take approximately $200 from the cash register.
The second armed robbery occurred on August 23, 1979 (ten days later). At about 8:30 p.m., two black males entered the same Dairy Queen. Diana Phillips was working again that night. One of the men purchased a coke and . then walked to the rear of the store. Before Ms. Phillips could close the cash register, the other man pulled out a gun. He then reached into the cash register and took about $200. Ms. Phillips recognized him as the same man who had robbed her ten days before. Meanwhile, the man who purchased the coke entered the store's office and took a bank deposit bag containing approximately $145. The men then left together.
Diana Phillips was the victim and only witness to these two crimes. At a photographic lineup conducted on August 28, 1979, she identified Darryl Williams as the person who had robbed her twice. At a physical lineup conducted on September 14, 1979, Ms. Phillips again identified defendant.
Prior to trial, defendant moved for a severance of the two offenses. The trial judge denied the motion considering that defendant would not be prejudiced by the joinder of the two armed robberies of the same victim at the same place ten days apart.
Two or more offenses may be joined in the same information in a separate count for each offense under La.Code Crim.P. art. 493 if the offenses charged
are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of trial.
In the instant case, the offenses charged, two counts of armed robbery, are of the same or similar character. Moreover, since the punishment for each offense is necessarily confinement at hard labor, the mode of trial (jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict) is the same. La.Code Crim.P. art. 782. Hence, the offenses were properly joined in the same information. La.Code Crim.P. art. 493.
When an accused has been charged in the same information with two or more offenses pursuant to art. 493, he may apply for severance of offenses under La.Code Crim.P. art. 495.1, which provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment or bill of information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order separate trials, grant a severance of offenses, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Washington, 386 So.2d 1368 (La.1980). Considerations for the trial court in determining whether prejudice may result from joinder include, according to Washington,
whether the jury would be confused by the various counts; whether the jury would be able to segregate the various charges and evidence; whether the defendant could be confounded in presenting his various defenses; whether the crimes charged would be used by the jury to infer a criminal disposition and finally, whether, especially considering the nature of the charges, the charging of several crimes would make the jury hostile.
In State v. Carter, 352 So.2d 607 (La.1977), we held that art. 495.1, as it read at that time, normally required severance when the offenses were joined solely because they were of the "same or similar" character unless evidence of each offense would have been respectively admissible at the separate trial of the other. In Washington, we held that Carter still remained viable as a criterion for judging when there is a strong possibility of prejudice, even though art. 495.1 had been amended. However, under the new article, a severance need not be granted if the prejudice could be effectively avoided by other safeguards. Thus, a severance is not mandated simply because the offenses would not be admissible at separate trials if the defendant is not "prejudiced" by the joinder. We have held that there is no prejudicial effect from the joinder of two or more offenses when the evidence of each offense is relatively simple and distinct, even though such evidence might not have been admissible in separate trials of the offenses because, with a proper charge, the jury can easily keep the evidence of each offense separate in its deliberations. State v. Washington, supra; State v. Robinson, 404 So.2d 907 (La.1981).
In Washington, the defendant was charged with four counts of attempted aggravated rape. After trial by jury, he was found guilty on all counts. We held that, although the evidence of each crime was simple, the trial court's instruction offered little guidance to the jury in order to prevent it from cumulating the evidence. Thus, we reversed defendant's convictions. In Robinson, the defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery of different victims at the same store on separate occasions. After trial by jury, he was found guilty on both counts. We held that the defendant was not prejudiced by a single trial of the two offenses because the jury was instructed that defendant was charged with separate offenses requiring separate verdicts as to each offense and that in deliberating it should consider "defendant's guilt or innocence as to each individual count independently and separately of all other counts of the indictment."
In the instant case, the two armed robberies, although of the same victim at the same location some ten days apart and although identity was a genuine issue at trial, the offenses were not so unique as to qualify as "signature crimes." Thus, the offenses would most probably not have been admissible under the Prieur rationale. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the jury knew that defendant was charged with separate offenses requiring separate verdicts as to each offense and that the evidence of one offense could not be considered as evidence of the other offense. The jury was properly instructed that defendant was charged with two separate armed robberies and was furnished a verdict form setting forth the two counts of armed robbery with their respective dates and requiring the rendition of separate verdicts as to each offense. A separate verdict form was furnished as to Robert Smith. Admittedly, the trial judge did not instruct the jury that the evidence of one crime could not be used in determining defendant's guilt of the other; however, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of such an instruction. The evidence presented as to defendant's guilt of the two offenses was extremely simple and consisted of only the out-of-court identification of defendant by Diana Phillips made after both robberies had occurred. Consequently, there was no evidence for the jury to improperly cumu- late. Hence, no jury instruction to that effect was needed in this case. Moreover, the acquittal of Robert Smith, who was charged along with defendant for the August 23 armed robbery (but not the August 13 robbery), indicates that the jury was capable of considering multiple offenses without inferring a criminal disposition or becoming hostile.
We are convinced that defendant was not prejudiced by the joinder of these offenses for trial. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion for severance.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
. State v. Blanton, 325 So.2d 586 (La.1976); State v. Carlisle, 315 So.2d 675 (La.1975).
. A second clerk was working during the August 23rd robbery but was in the restroom while the robbery was in progress. She did not see the two men.
. La.Code Crim.P. art. 495.1 provided prior to its amendment by Acts 1978, No. 466, § 1:
The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of the defendant shall grant a severance of offenses whenever:
(a) if before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or
(b) if during the trial upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. The Court shall consider whether, in view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.
. State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973).