Case Name: CATHARINE E. BOWMAN vs. CHARLES A. LITTLE et al., Administrators, and LETTIE E. BOWMAN
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1905-06-21
Citations: 101 Md. 273
Docket Number: 
Parties: CATHARINE E. BOWMAN vs. CHARLES A. LITTLE et al., Administrators, and LETTIE E. BOWMAN.
Judges: The cause was argued before McSherry, C. J., Fowler, Briscoe, Boyd, Pearce and Schmucker, JJ.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 273–320

Head Matter:
CATHARINE E. BOWMAN vs. CHARLES A. LITTLE et al., Administrators, and LETTIE E. BOWMAN.
Presumptions of Marriage and Legitimacy—Strict Proof Requited of Antecedent Marriage When it Invalidates Subsequent Formal Marric ge—Sufficiency of Evidence—Declarations—Marriage Certificate—Proof of Identity—Harmless Errors.
The question whether a formal marriage is valid or not cannot be tried like any other question of fact which is independent of presumptions, for the law will presume in favor of marriage, and this presumption must be met with distinct and satisfactory disproof.
When it is proved that a man was married to a certain woman by a lega ceremony and had issue, and another woman claims that the man had previously been married to her, there must be strict proof of the alleged antecedent marriage as an actual fact, because the presumptions of law are in favor of innocence and legitimacy.
After the death of one G. Walter Bowman of Hagerstown, Md., in 1903, leaving a widow, to whom he had been married by a legal ceremony, and a child, another woman, the plaintiff, alleged that she was the lawful widow of Bowman arid claimed a share of his estate.. To establish her marriage she offered the certificate of a clergyman in Camden, New Jersey, setting forth that in 1887 he had married one George W. Bowman of Hfleystown, Md., to one Catharine McGranagan, alleged to be the plaintiff; also the testimony of plaintiff’s mother that Bowman had told her that he had married her daughter; -that she had visited them for a few days when they were living at a certain house; and also the testimony of a physician that when employed to attend the plaintiff Bowman had stated that she was his wife. Held, that since there is no evidence that the deceased Bowman was the identical person who was married in Camden and that the plaintiff was the woman who was then married, this evidence is legally insufficient, to rebut the presumptions that Bowman did not commit bigamy and that his issue is legitimate and to established by strict proof the fact of the alleged antecedent marriage.
A marriage certificate is not in itself proof that certain parties were married but there must be also evidence that they were the identical parties the question of whose marriage is at issue. Identity cannot be proved by the admissions of one of the parties in a case where it is necessary to rebut the presumptions of innocence and legitimacy.
The fact that a man said that the woman with whom he was cohabiting . was his wife is not sufficient evidence to prove a marriage, when he was subsequently formally married to another woman.
The plaintiff in this case alleged in a suit against an administrator that she had been married to the decedent Held, that the plaintiffis not a competent witness to prove the marriage, either directly or indirectly, under Code, Art. 35, sec. 3, which provides that in proceedings by or against administrators, etc., no party to the cause shall be allowed to testify as to any transaction had with the deceased.
When it is sought to prove that a man and a woman were married by a formal ceremony at a certain time and. place, evidence that these parties were reputed to be married is not admissible.
The rejection of prayers offered by the plaintiff'that were correct, or the admission of incompetent evidence, is not reversible error when upon the whole case it is proper to instruct the jury that the plaintiff’s evidence is legally insufficient to authorize a recovery.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Jones, C. J., and Thomas, J.)
The cause was argued before McSherry, C. J., Fowler, Briscoe, Boyd, Pearce and Schmucker, JJ.
J. Clarence Lane and Francis Neal Parke (with whom was Jas. A. C. Bond on the brief), for the appellant.
Identity may be proved from facts and circumstances, and declarations of a dead husband are admissible for that purpose. The appellant’s case rested upon proof of a ceremonial marriage. The officiating clergyman was dead, the appellant was incompetent to testify as to the marriage ceremony, and the only witness present could recall nothing about this particular marriage because of the number she had witnessed.
The appellant was therefore compelled to show by facts and circumstances the identity of herself and George Walter Bowman with the persons named in the marriage certificate offered by her in evidence. In order to do this, a nephew of Bowman was offered to prove that after 1890 George Walter Bowman looked at a picture belonging to witness and asked the name of the person it represented. Upon being told that his name was “Westwood,” George Walter Bowman said, “that is the name of the clergyman in Camden, New Jersey, who married me.” Here is an admission of marriage and the statement of name of clergyman and the place where the ceremony was celebrated exactly corresponding with the statement of the marriage certificate. This is a most pregnant and significant fact for the jury. Under the circumstances, no testimony could be more impressive. Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524, 533; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 193; Walkup v. Pratt, 5 H. & J. 56; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 301.
And under the second exception it was proposed to show that the family of Bowman knew from 1887 to 1900 that he was married. This is admissible as evidence to go to the jury on the question of identity. And if the lower Court was right in holding, as we shall later see it did, that the circumstances of this case raised a presumption that the first marriage had been terminated by divorce before the second was consummated, the fact that the family knew that this marriage of 1887 was not dissolved before said marriage in 1900, was evidence of the highest importance to the appellant and the Court committed a grievous error in not permitting Furst to tes tify. The members of'the family are now all dead, and their evidence in a question of pedigree (marriage) is always admissible. Craufurd v. Blackburn, 17 Md. 49, 53.
An original party to a contract is not disqualified to testify, where the other party is dead and his administrators are parties to the cause, except and only as to any transaction had with, or statement made by the intestate.
The change made by the Act of 1904, ch. 661, in the law' relating to the competency of witnesses is patent and important. Under the law as it existed prior to 1902, the mere fact that the original party was dead, or his executor or administrator was a party to the proceedings of itself, totally disqualified the other party and prevented him from testifying to anything, except upon the call of the other side. Under the Act of 1904 and as the law was when this case was instituted, there is no total disqualification but only a partial disqualifica-tion. This partial disqualification is limited and confined by the terms of the Act to “any transactions had with, or statements made by the testator, intestate, etc., unless called to testify by the opposite party.” Outside of this limited and partial disqualification, the witness is free to testify. The test that the Court must apply under these exceptions is that prescribed by the Act. If the witness was asked in regard to any transaction had with George Walter Bowman, she was incompetent to testify. Or if the witness had been asked to' narrate any statement made by George Walter Bowman, she w'as incompetent to testify. In all other respects she was as competent to testify as any witness produced in the cause. Graves v. Spedden, 46 Md. 538; Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55 Md. 503.
Now the error of the lower Court was in refusing to seethe sweeping change made in the law'. The witness was not asked to testify as to any transaction had with George Walter Bowman, nor to any statement made by him to her. The appellant knew that she could not on her own offer testify to the marriage between her and George Walter Bowman and to his statements to her; and so no attempt was made to do this. The appellant was asked her present name, the Court declined to allow her to answer. She was asked her maiden name, the Court declined to allow her to reply. She was asked if she had been married prior to 1887; the name of her mother, where she lived in 1887, and her address; the place of her birth, the name of her father, and his residence, and the Court enforced her silence. We do not think the appellant’s maiden name, the name of her father and her mother, and their residences and addresses could be the result of any transaction had with George W. Bowman by the appellant.
The appellant was next asked where she was on July 12th, 1887, and if she had ever met a Rev. John R. Westwood anda Miss Mary Westwood, and what were their residences, théir occupations and when and where she met them. No transaction with George Walter Bowman is here involved. He is not yet on the scene, but the Court refused the witness the opportunity to answer.
We asked the appellant if she ever knew a man by the name of George Walter Bowman, of Hagerstown, Maryland, and if she knew him in July, 1887; and if she had ever been with him in Camden, New Jersey, and where and when. But the Court declined to allow her to say that she knew him, and that she had met him at any time in Camden, New Jersey. With submission, we argue that knowing and meeting a man, and the statement of that fact, are not testimony as to any transaction had with him. Witness was not asked to state what took place at any meeting, nor what Bowman said to her. How then can this evidence be excluded under the Act of 1904? Then we inquired of the plaintiff if she did not have a marriage certificate showing a marriage between herself and (not the George Walter Bowman but) “a man by the name of George Walter Bowman” who had destroyed the original. The Court would not suffer this to have a reply, although even under the law as it formerly stood the Court of Appeals has held the witness competent to answer a similar interrogatory. Ahl v. Ahl, 71 Md. 555, 560.
The appellant is next asked who were Catherine and John McGranagan, and if she had ever lived in Hagerstown, and when and how long and with whom. Upon the objection of the appellee, this testimony was not admitted. Like all the other questions asked the witness, this one did not seek information in regard to a transaction- with George Walter Bowman, or in respect to any statements made by him.
The lower Court did not justify its action on the ground that this evidence was of an inadmissible character, but upon the theory that the appellant was not a competent witness. As we have seen, the language of the Act of 1904, ch. 66i¡ is a complete specific refutation of the Court’s position. Argument on this point is impossible. The lower Court made the mistake of applying a repealed rule of evidence.
All of the evidence sought to be adduced and given by the appellant would have been admissible if given by any one else for the purpose of establishing the identity of the appellant with the person named in the certificate of marriage later offered in evidence by the appellant. This evidence would have shown the correspondence between the statements in the marriage certificate with the actual facts of the appellant’s birth and parentage, name and residence and would have been proper testimony from which they could find that the appellant was one and the same person with the person named in the marriage certificate offered in evidence by Catherine E. Bowman in this case.
The proof offered was neither proof of a marriage nor direct proof of the identity of the parties, but it was only proof of relevant facts from which the jury might infer from the correspondence of names and places that the appellant was the same Catherine E. Bowman named in the marriage certificate.
Where a prior and ceremonial marriage is established the mere fact of a form of second marriage is not admissible, unless accompanied by an offer to show the invalidity of the first or its dissolution.
Despite the difficulties occasioned by time and death, the. appellant was able to establish the ceremonial marriage by uncontroverted and . indisputable evidence. The record évi dence was produced, and shown by the laws of New Jersey offered in evidence as well as by testimony of the New Jersey lawyers to be in conformity with the New Jersey laws and to be the most appropriate evidence of the marriage. Next the name of the appellant was established, it being shown that her name was Catherine II Boyer, her mother afterwards marrying Zimmerman, and that she left home at the age of two or three to be legally adopted by John and Sarah McGranagan, with whom she lived on Second street in Harrisburg. That the maiden name of Sarah McGranagan was Sarah Weaver, and that appellant was twenty-four years of age, being born July nth, 1863, and it was furthermore shown by uncontradicted proof that the intestate was named George W. (Walter) Bowman, whose residence in 1887 was Hagerstown, his age about twenty-seven, and his business that of corfectioner, whose father’s name was George R. Bowman, and whose mother’s maiden name was Catherine B. Greenawalt. After this proof was given, none being offered to contradict it, the correspendence of names, paternity, birth place, residence, occupation and ages with those of the “Marriage Certificate” and “Certificate of Record of Marriage” offered in evidence demonstrate to a certainty that the appellant and' George Walter Bowman, the intestate, were married at Camden, New Jersey, by a ceremonial and religious marriage on July 12th, 1887. No evidence having been given to the contrary, the presumption of identity arising from this proof would be conclusive. But the appellant did not stop here, she proved by her mother that her daughter and the intestate, George Walter Bowman, visited her in July, 1887, and that “When they came to see me in Harrisburg, they professed to come from Camden, New Jersey; and George W. Bowman said they had come from Camden, New Jersey' and he introduced himself as my son-in-law, and said he and my daughter were married in Camden, New Jersey. This witness afterwards visited them in Hagerstown. And Dr. E. A. Wareham, one of Hagerstown’s most reputable and prominent physicians, testifies that he had been Bowman’s physician for about' twenty years, and that Bowman and appellant were living together in Hagerstown, and that he was employed to attend her as Bowman’s wife. Here is evidence of the most direct and positive character and the appellee did not attempt to gainsay it. Nothing could be more conclusive, and it must be taken as established in this case that Bowman and appellant were married by a valid ceremoniq.1 marriage on July 12th, 1887, at Camden, New Jersey. Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 299; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524, 525—528, 533; Bullock v. Hunter, 44 Md. 416, 427; Elliott v. Knott, 14 Md. 121, 135; White v. McClellan, 62 Md. 347, 352; Nelson v. Willey, 97 Md. 373, 381; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2 ed., 918.
The appellant' had made out her case. All subsequent marriages were spurious. A valid ceremonial marriage being shown, neither separation, nor unfaithfulness after marriage nor misconduct before, nor a form of second marriage could be evidence to. annul the first marriage. The first marriage could only be avoided
(a) By proof that the appellant was not the person named in the record offered in evidence; (and of this no proof was offered) or
(b) By death of wife (and of this there was and could be no evidence)/ or
(c) By divorce (and of this no evidence was or could be offered').
Accordingly, the mere evidence of a second marriage unaccompanied by any offer of proof of said facts and circum • stances as would make a second marriage relevant or material was inadmissible; and the Court committed a reversible error in allowing it to be given.
By the plaintiff’s fifteenth prayer, which was rejected the jury were instructed that the similarity of names in the marriage certificate offered in evidence by the plaintiff with the plaintiff in this case, and the decedent, George W. Bowman, late of Washington County, deceased, raises a presumption in law that the persons are the same.
This prayer stated a well-known principle of law, and was especially important for the guidance of the jury. Elliott v. Knott, 14 Md. 135; Bullock v. Hunter, 44 Md. 427; Nelson v. Willey, 97 Md. 381; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524; White v. McClellan, 62 Md. 352; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2 ed., 918, 921; Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 32; 27 L. ed. 647.
(6) If a valid ceremonial marriage be established then nothing can terminate it short of direct proof of its dissolution by divorce or death.
The following is a classification of the cases in which a presumption will arise against a first marriage upon a second marriage being shown:
Class A. Where a second formal or ceremonial marriage is established, a prior marriage will not be presumed from mere repute and cohabitation. Moore v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148; Hull v. Rawls, 27 Miss. 471; Waddingham v. Waddingham, 21 Mo. App. 471; Myatt v. Myatt, 49 Ill. 475. (In the case at bar, the first marriage is a formal or ceremonial one, and so these cases do not apply).
Class B. Where the first wife or husband is not a party to the cause and is not a claimant, and where a third party seeks to escape an obligation by showing that second marriage is invalid by reason of a prior one, the following cases hold a presumption of divorce will arise upon the proof of the second marriage and throw upon the party -seeking to escape, the burden of proof. Railway Co. v. Beardsley, 79 Miss. 417; Lampkin v. Ins. Co., 11 Colo. App. 249; Klein and wife v. Landman, 29 Mo. 259; Erwin v. English, 61 Conn. 502; Linden v. Kelly, 6 W. N. C. (Pa.) 95; United States v. Green, 98 Fed. Rep. 63; Parsons v. G. L. A. O. U. W., 108 Iowa, 1, 8; Boulden v. McIntire, 119 Ind. 574; Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189; Coal Run Co. v. Jones, 127 Ill. 386. (In these cases the question of validity of second marriage is generally a collateral one, and the first wife, not being a party, is not bound. In the case at bar the first wife is a party and is a claimant, and has first proved her ceremonial marriage, and third parties are not contesting, but two women claiming as wives. These facts make the cases in Class B inapplicable, and differentiate them from the present appeal.)
Class C. Hereunder are grouped all the cases that can be regarded as authority for the position of appellee. When examined they will be found not to apply because they are based upon very different state of facts from those presented by the present appeal.
(a) Cases where the party claiming as first wife has herself married a second time during the lifetime of the first husband. Hadley v. Rush, 21 Mont. 170; Nixon v. L. & C. Co., 84 Tex. 412.
(c) McKibbin v. McKibben, 139 Cala. 448, 450; in which the Court stated “there was evidence from which it could be inferred that there had been a divorce between Lake and plaintiff.”
(d) Leach v. Hull, 95 Iowa, 618, was much relied upon below, but it is submitted that this case is grounded upon estoppel and that its facts prevent any application here. “The parties to the second marriage live and cohabit with each other as husband and wife in the locality where the first wife resides. The first and second wives were introduced to each other as the Mrs. Leach. The first Mrs. Leach is introduced to a daughter of the second. All this occurs without any protest or complaint from the first Mrs. Leach.” At tile time of the second marriage Leach claimed he was divorced. See 58 Iowa, 720, 723; 78 Iowa, 499, 502.
(e) In the case of Schmeisseur v. Beatrice, 147 Ill. 210, it is held that the proof of a second marriage threw on the party claiming under the first the burden of showing there had been no divorce. This decision is based upon a dictum in Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, that is only supported by an early Iowa case, later overruled in 78 Iowa, 499; 58 Iowa, 720. But this case of Schmeissenr v. Beatrice was qualified in Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, where it is declared that this burden of proof does not exist when the facts show that the party was not entitled to a divorce. Brown v. Brown, 142 Ill. 409, 423, in conflict with Schmeisseur v. Beatrice.
(f) The cases of Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind. 494; 101 Ind. 129, are not all in point, although relied upon below. The question in these cases was simply whether or not a marriage could be provable by repute and cohabitation, when the relations were shown to have begun before the woman was divorced from her first husband. The Court held a marriage could be so proved.
A. C. Strife and Chas. D. Wagaman (with whom was Chas. E. Fink on the brief), for the appellees.
It appears from the whole record:
1. That although a ceremonial of marriage valid under the laws of New. Jersey may have been performed and fully proved and the identity of the parties fully established, it does not affirmatively appear that the contracting parties were capable of contracting.
2. If capable of contracting, it does not affirmatively appear that it was an earnest, bona fide contract.
3. If capable of contracting and in earnest and bona fide, it does not affirmatively appear that said marriage had not been annulled at sometime during the long years of separation of the said parties.
Where issue may be bastardized as in this case, every presumption of law is in favor of the second marriage. LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 504; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391; United States v. Green, 98 Fed. Rep. 63; Stevens v. Stevens, 56 N. J. Eq. 488; 38 Atl. Rep.; Hull v. Rawle, 27 Miss. 471; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2 ed., p. 1207; and other cases cited on this brief.
And the burden is upon the plaintiff in this case to overcome such presumption by proof, even to the extent of proving a negative if that be necessary. Boulden v. McIntire, 21 N. E. Rep. 445—448 (Ind.); Leech v. Hall, 64 N. W. Rep. 792-95 Ia. 618; Harris v. Harris, 8 Ill. App. 57; U. S. v. Green, 98 Fed. Rep. 63-64. Where a marriage de facto is followed by cohabitation and issue there is not only the ordinary presumption in favor of its validity, but, being assailed upon the ground that a former marriage of the man was still subsisting, the law always presumes against the committing of crime and in favor of innocence. LeBrun & LeBrun, 55 Md. 504; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391; Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84; Greensboro v. Underhill, 2 Vt. 606; Rex v. Twyning, 2 Barn. & Ald. 386; Bishop, on Marrage iand Divorce, sec. 457.
It does not appear in the proof that the plaintiff was competent to enter into the marriage relation with Bowman in July, 1887, and a second marriage having been shown, it will not be presumed that she was competent. It was at least incumbent on the plaintiff to show that at and before the date of her alleged marriage she was single. U. S. v. Green, 98 Fed. Rep. 66. The law will indulge in many presumptions in favor of the second marriage. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 469.
It is a fair deduction from the testimony in this case that if the plaintiff and the decedent were the parties to a ceremonial of marriage in Camden, New Jersey, on July 12th, 1887, they never intended that it should have any binding force. They never treated it as a valid marriage, and the strong probability is that it was actually void under the laws of New Jersey. A simple marriage ceremony will not make a man and woman husband and wife. Capacity and consent are absolutely essential; but celebration only contingently so in New Jersey. McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225; Selah v. Selah, 23 N. J. Eq. 185; Stevens v. Stevens, 56 N. J. Eq. 488; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ills. 388; Thompson v. Thompson, 114 Mass. 566; Merriam v. Wolcott, 61 How. Pr. 377; Rundle v. Pegram, 49 Miss. 751.
The law presumes, under the facts in this case, that either Bowman or his first wife, if validly married, had obtained a divorce before the second marriage, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that no divorce had been granted. Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, 8 N. E. Rep. 869; Johnson v. Johnson, 3 N. E. Rep. 232; Leach v. Hall, 64 N. W. Rep. 792, 95 Iowa, 618; Klein v. Landman, 29 Mo. 259; Blanchard v.Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 331; Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731; Cartwright v. McGown, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105; In re Edwards, 58 Iowa, 451; Squire v. The State, 121 Ill. 388; 46 Ind. 459; Boulden v. McIntire, 21 N. E. Rep. 445 (Ind.); Ellis v. Ellis, 13 N. W. Rep. 65; 58 Iowa, 720; Gilman v. Sheets, 43 N. W. Rep. 299, 78 Iowa, 500; Barnes v. Barnes, 57 N. W. Rep. 851, 90 Iowa, 282; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., p. 1209.
It will be noticed that the application of the aforegoing principles is not limited to cases where a prior marriage by cohabitation and repute is set up; but that they apply with equally as much force to prior, valid, ceremonial marriages. In our own State we refer to the LeBnm case, supra. It is submitted that upon the authorities here cited, the aforegoing propositions of law are good, and it follows that the plaintiff’s prayers were properly rejected.
As to the correctness of the Court’s ruling in rejecting the plaintiff’s 15th prayer, we refer the Court to 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 1200, note and cases cited; LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 505; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 533.

Opinion:
McSherry, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
G. Walter Bowman, late of Washington County, died intestate on March the fourth, nineteen hundred and three. The administrators of his personal estate filed in the Orphans' Court a petition asking that a day be assigned for the distribution of his assets. Due notice of this was given and later on a person claiming that she was the widow of the deceased, to whom she asserted she had been married on July 12th, 1887, at Camden, New Jersey, and giving her name as Catherine E. Bowman, appeared to the proceedings and asked that the share of the estate rightfully belonging to a widow should be turned over to her. Subsequently a certain Lettie E. Bowman, also claiming to be the widow of the deceased to whom she was married on January 18th, 1900, set up a similar claim. After other proceedings were had issues were finally framed and transmitted to the Circuit Court for trial. In the order sending the issues to the law Court, Catherine E. Bowman was made plaintiff and Lettie E. Bowman and the administrators were made defendants. Upon the suggestion and affidavit of the plaintiff the record of the issues was re moved to the Circuit Court for Carroll County where a jury was impanelled and the questions were tried.
The issues were as follows: "1st. Was Catherine E. Bowman at the time of the death of G. Walter Bowman the lawful wife of G. Walter Bowman ? . 2nd. Was Lettie E. Bowman at the time of the death of G. Walter Bowman the lawful wife of G. Walter Bowman ?" During the progress of the trial eighteen-exceptions were reserved—of which seventeen relate to rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and the last concerns the action of the Court on the numerous prayers presented by both sides for instructions to the jury. The verdict was in favor of the defendants; or to be more precise, the jury answered the first issue in the negative; and the second in the affirmative. From the rulings set forth in the bills of exception the plaintiff has appealed.
It is obvious from this, outline of the case that the single question before the jury was; which of these two women is the lawful widow of the decedent ? Around that question all the subordinate inquiries presented by the record revolve. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that Lettie E. Bowman, formerly Lettie E. Eakel, was in a formal manner, married to G. Walter Bowman in January, 1900, by a regularly ordained minister of the gospel. That fact is beyond controversy. The fruit of that marriage is one child, Walter E. Bowman, who, by his guardian, is also a'party to these proceedings.
At the close of the evidence the defendants, amongst other prayers, presented the following :
1st. That the verdict of the jury must be against the plaintiff upon the first issue, and their answer to. said first issue must be "No," because the plaintiff has offered no legally sufficient evidence to prove that George Walter Bowman referred to in the record of a marriage in Camden, New Jersey, offered in evidence, is the same George Walter Bowman upon whose estate letters of administration have been granted to the defendant administrators in this case. .
2nd. That the verdict of the jury must be against the plaintiff upon the first issue, and their answer to said first issue must be "No," because the plaintiff has offered no legally sufficient evidence to prove that the Catharine McGranigan referred to in the record of a marriage in Camden, New jersey, offered in evidence is the same person as the plaintiff in this case.
They were rejected. If they ought to have been granted there is an end of'the plaintiff's case, even though there may have been errors in other rulings found in the record. Proof of the marriage of G. Walter Bowman, the decedent, to the plaintiff at the time and place alleged by her was absolutely indispensable. No one can contravene that proposition. But what kind of evidence is necessary to establish that status or relation, and of what probative value should it be, when the consequences incident to the sustentation of the alleged marriage of July, 1887, must inevitably be the branding of the deceased with the crime of bigamy, and the bastardizing of the innocent off-spring of the marriage of 1900? Let us first see what measure of evidence the law requires in such circumstances and upon what presumptions it relies. In Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Lee, 571, 5 Eng. Ecc. Rep. 454, where two women severally claimed administration of the effects of a decedent as being his widow (which was twice before the Ecclesiastical Court in England) it was said there must be "strict proof' of the alleged antecedent marriage "as an actual fact." And this was cited with approval by this Court in Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 159, and in the same case, 48 Md. 398. The reason upon which the doctrine that there must be "strict proof" of the first marriage, rests is apparent. When the presumption of a lawful marriage is met by a counter presumption of innocence, the former must yield to the force of the latter. After it has been shown that there was an actual marriage solemnized in the method which the law prescribes and followed by the birth of issue; every inference is invoked in support ofits validity and against an alleged antecedent marriage, because the presumptions of the law are always in favor of in nocence and of legitimacy. "The law presumes morality and not immorality, marriage and not concubinage, ' legitimacy and not bastardy." Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, cited in note 3, p. 1202, 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2nd ed.); Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N. J. Eq. 246; Patterson v. Gainse, 6 How. 550. In King v. Inhabitants of Twyning, 2 Bar. & Ald. 386, a very strong illustration of the predominance of the presumption of innocence over other presumptions is furnished. The case involved merely the settlement of a pauper. A woman had married a soldier who soon afterwards left for the East Indies. Within twelve months she married again, and the question turned upon the validity of the second marriage, and it was upheld. ' Bailey, J., said : "The facts of the case are that there is a marriage of the pauper with Francis Burns, which is prima facie valid, but the year before that took place she was the wife of Richard Winter, and if he was alive at the time of the second marriage, it was illegal and she was guilty of bigamy. But are we to presume that Winter was then alive? If the pauper had been indicted for bigamy, it would clearly, not be sufficient. In that case Winter must have been proved to have been alive at the time of the second marriage. It is contended that his death ought to have been proved, but the answer is that the presumption of law is, that he was not alive when the consequence of his being so is, that another person has committed a criminal act." This is quoted with approval and adopted in Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 399, and the case is cited as an authority in Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55 Md. 504. In Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331, it was held that the question of the validity of a marriage cannot be tried like any other question of fact which is independent of presumptions, for the law will presume in favor of marriage, and that this presumption must be met by strong, distinct and satisfactory disproof. It is not.denied that in this country there is some conflict of decisions and of judicial opinion on this subject as was admitted in Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 399; "but it cannot, we think (observed this Court in that case) be said that the preponderance of authority is the other way."' The law in this State is undoubtedly as the Maryland cases above cited have announced it. Now let us see whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff measured up to these requirements and overthrew the presumptions to which we have alluded.
The evidence admitted consists of three distinct items of proof, and that which was offered and rejected comprises two others. These will be separately dealt with. It must not be forgotten that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish by "strictproof " the prior marriage as a ground for the annulment of the second one, which otherwise is confessedly valid. To discharge that burden there were adduced a marriage certificate; the testimony of a witness to certain occurrences in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and the testimony of a witness as to some things which transpired in Hagerstown. As the certificate is the most important feature of the plaintiff's evidence it will now be transcribed.
State of New Jersey.
Marriage Certificate.
Full name of husband, George W. Bowman. Place of res idence Haleystown, Md. (If in the City, give name street and Number; if in a township give name of County.)
Age 25 years, — months, Number of his marriage, First. Occupation, Confectio7ier, Country of birth, U S. A. Name of father, George R. Country of Birth U. S. A. Full maiden name of wife, CatheriTte McGranagan. Country of Birth, U. S. A. Place of-residence, E. Plarrisburg, Pa. (If.in a City give name, street number, if in a township give name and county.) Age nearest birthday, 2‡. If any trade or business so state.) Last name if a widow,--Number
of brides marriage, 1st. Name of father, John ; Country of birth, U S. A. Maiden name of mother, Sarah Weaver, Country of birth, U. S. A. Date (in full) July 12th, 1887. Place, Camden, N. J.
In presence of Mary Westwood.
John R. Westwood.
The certificate shows that George W. Bowman of Haleystown was married to Catharine McGranagan, of E, Hci7'risburg, Pennsylvania; but it does not show that the George W. Bowman therein named was the identical G. Walter Bowman of Ha gerstowu whose estate is involved in this controversy. The certificate shows that George W. Bowman was married to Catharine McGranagan of E. Harrisburg but it does not show that the Catharine McGranagan therein mentioned is the identical Catharine E. Bowman who is the plaintiff in this case. The Certificate does not and could not prove an extrinsic fact, and personal identity is an extrinsic fact. You .may say it is not probable that some one personated Bowman, the deceased, and that some one else personated the plaintiff in the alleged New Jersey marriage. Perhaps that is so; and perhaps, too, it is- not probable that the delineation given in the certificate of the persons mentioned therein would have corresponded so closely with the description of the deceased and of the plaintiff, as it apparently does, if the deceased and the plaintiff were not the real parties who were married in July, 1887, at Camden; but the sum of these probabilities, plus all other probabilities that may be suggested from the record, would still be only á probability. Or, to state the same thing in a more precise way: A conclusion logically drawn from premises which are themselves mere probabilities; must of necessity be only a mere probability also, because a conclusion, to be formal, must always be contained in the premises, and probabilities can never contain a certainty.. There" is not a shred of evidence to establish the identity of the parties named in the certificate. Suppose it be conceded that the certificate proves that some man giving the same name, the same occupation and the samé place of residence as George Walter Bowman had, was married to some woman giving the same name and the same residence as the plaintiff professes "to have had; still, it does not prove that the G. Walter Bowman, now deceased, was that man; or, that the plaintiff was that woman. To justify the conclusion from' the certificate alone that the plaintiff and G. Walter Bowman were then and there married, it must be inferred that G. Walter Bowman now dead was the identical man described in the certificate, although the Bowman mentioned was said to be twenty-five years old and the deceased was then, according to the evidence, twenty-seven years of age; and it must be inferred that the plaintiff is the identical woman named in the same certificate, although her residence was given as East Harrisburg when she actually lived in Hagerstown. Two such improbable inferences must thus take the place of "strict proof " as to personal identity/ and to be availing those same inferences must overcome the counter presumptions of innocence and legitimacy arising from the subsequent marriage of G. Walter Bowman to Lettie E. Eakel—a thing they are powerless to do, because these latter presumptions yield only to evidence which establishes a mental conviction amounting to a moral certainty—and a probability can never produce a moral certainty.
The authorities are clear upon the proposition that there must be evidence of the identity of the parties beyond the mere statements contained in the certificate. "Where the evidence of marriage consists of the certificate, license, or marriage record, the identity of the parties must also be established by satisfactory evidence." 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L.,, (2 ed.) 1200, and cases in note 3. A very apt illustration of the doctrine stated in the text is to be found in the case of Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524. It was shown there from the records of the church where the marriage was solemnized, that Henry Brooke and Margaret A. Ridgely were married on February 29th, 1872. After the death of Brooke a claim was made by Margaret that she was his widow. This was disputed by the executor of the decedent. It was shown by the latter that the parties never lived together as man and wife after the alleged ceremonial marriage, though Brooke did not die until 1879; and the contention was that some one else had personated Brooke at the ceremony. The case for the widow was not permitted to rest upon the mere identity or similarity of the names on the church register, nor upon the testimony of the clergyman that he had joined in wedlock two persons giving the names of the deceased and the claimant; but a photograph of Brooke, proved to be an accurate and genuine one, was produced and was identified by the persons who witnessed the marriage, as the likeness or picture of the man who was actually married to Margaret Ridgely. Upon that evidence it was decreed that she was the widow of Henry Brooke.
It is true, generally speaking, identity of names is prima facie evidence of identity of persons; but the names, of course must be identical, and this involves the identity of the Christian names—the identity of the initials thereof being insufficient. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 418, 919, and cases cited in notes. As already indicated George W. Bowman as named in the certificate is by no means identical with G. Walter Bowman the deceased, and no inference can be drawn that these two designations point out the same individual; especially when that dissimilarity is appealed to as evidencing an identity, which, if established in that way, would overthrow the strong presumptions in favor of innocence and legitimacy.
The next evidence relied on to prove identity is that given by Mrs. Zimmerman, the mother of the plaintiff. This witness testified as follows: "I met and knew George W. Bowman in July, 1887, at my house in Harrisburg, and my daughter, the plaintiff was with him. They stayed with me during the day and at night at the hotel for two or three days; and I afterwards visited them at Hagerstown in the fall of the same year at Walnut street in Hagerstown, where they were living together. No one else lived in the house with them, when they came to see me in Harrisburg they professed to come from Camden, New Jersey; and George W. Bowman said they had come from Camden, New Jersey, and he introduced himself as my son-in-law and he said he and my daughter were married in Camden, New Jersey." It will be perceived, at a glance, that this testimony establishes no independent fact, other than that Bowman and the plaintiff stayed at the house of the witness in Harrisburg during the day and at an hotel during the night, for less than the space of a week; and that when the witness visited them at Walnut street in Hagerstown, the fall of the same year, they were living to gether; but its chief significance lies in the recital of the declarations made by the supposed husband and wife as to their alleged marriage. If by this evidence as to the conduct of the parties it was designed to show that Bowman and the plaintiff cohabited as man and wife—that they were man and wife— and, therefore, were the identical persons who had been married in Camden, New Jersey, the conclusion thus sought to be deduced cannot be accepted as impugning the validity of the marriage to the defendant, Lettie E. Bowman, especially, as the conduct thus relied on was just as consistent with concubinage as with matrimony, when it is remembered that the house on Walnut street was a house of ill-fame and that the plaintiff was a prostitute. "A prior marriage will not be presumed from cohabitation, acknowledgment and reputation, where such presumption will render void a second marriage formally solemnized." 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2 ed.) 1206, and cases in note 4. If, on the other hand, the declarations of the parties have been introduced and are relied on to establish personal identity, they are palpably unavailing and plainly inadmissible for that purpose. In the case of Le Brun v. Le Brun, supra, this Court said : "Marriage has been considered among all civilized nations, as the most important contract into which individuals can enter, as the parent, not the child of civil society. The great basis of human society throughout the civilized world, is founded on marriages and legitimate off-spring; and where an existing marriage is proved, it is not to be exposed to the danger of being set aside by any species of collusion, or by the mere declarations of either of the parties, and should only be brought in question upon the most undisputed proofs. Shelford on Marriage and Divorce, 573; Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland, 481; Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331; Gaines v. Relf, 12 How. 472." The association for the two or three days which Bowman and the plaintiff were together in Harrisburg and their occupancy of the same house in Hagerstown do not prove the fact of their marriage, nor tend to establish the identity of the individuals named in the certificate. Their association for those two or three days or their occupancy of an house of evil repute, is not "undisputed proof" of their marriage, when if such an effect is given to either or both of those facts, the issue of the second mar riage will be bastardized and the crime of bigamy will be imputed to and fastened on the decedent. Whilst this is not a suit for nullity of marriage, the degree of evidence as to identity demanded in this proceeding is no less rigid than in that. "In a suit for nullity of marriage, by reason of a former marriage, strict proof of the identity of the parties is requisite. It is a clear rule that the identity must be proved by other testimony than that of the parties themselves, that is, by witnesses who can speak of the facts from their own personal knowledge." Shelf ord, Mar. & Div., as quoted with approval in Le Brun v. Le Brun. The testimony of Mrs. Zimmerman has therefore no probative value.
The testimony of Dr. Wareham was as follows: "I knew the lady sitting there (indicating the plaintiff) at one time as the wife of George Walter Bowman. I was George Walter Bowman's physician for about twenty years for his first and second wife. At the time I knew plaintiff she was living in Hagerstown on North Walnut street, in a house in which the plaintiff arid George Walter Bowman lived. At this time George Walter Bowman employed me to attend to her as his wife * . . I do not know who owned the house in which I attended her on Walnut street. All I know is that George Walter Bowman employed me to go there' and he was there. I do not know if whether or not he was living there. There was no one else living there to my knowledge, and I saw him there day and night. I cannot tell how often, and he paid me." Leaving but of view the testimony which proved that the house on North Walnut street was a bawdy house and that the -plaintiff was an inmate thereof under the name of Edith Boyer, and that under that name she was arrested and fined for disorderly conduct in April, 1888—more than eight months after-her alleged marriage at Camden—leaving all this out of view, does the testimony of Dr. Ware-ham amount to anything more than his inference or opinion that Bowman and the plaintiff were man and wife—an inference or opinion drawn from or founded on the statements of Bowman ? As -Bowman's own statements would be inadmis sible to prove identity the conclusions of a witness drawn from those same statements are equally incompetent. Hence this testimony furnishes no evidence of identity.
The plaintiff was offered as a' witness but was not allowed to testify. She was not a competent witness to prove the marriage either directly or indirectly, because Bowman was dead. Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 96; Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1198.
The only other evidence proffered on this same subject was the testimony of Clyde B. Burst, a nephew of the deceased, and who would be entitled to one-half of the personal estate left by Bowman if the second marriage were annulled and the first one were upheld. In the first bill of exceptions he was asked to give a conversation had with his uncle, with a view of establishing by the uncle's admissions his identity with the Bowman named in the marriage certificate. The Court was right in excluding the testimony. Identity cannot be proved by the admission of the parties, as has been already pointed out, "Identity must be proved by witnesses who can speak to the facts from their own personal knowledge." In the next exception the same witness was asked, "During this time was it or not known among the family that George Walter Bowman was married?" The question was not allowed to be answered. A marriage solemnized at a particular time and place was set up and relied on, and it was not competent to show by repute that there had been a marriage prior to 1900. It did not serve to identify the parties; and as a ceremonial marriage, alleged to have been performed at a designated time and place, was depended on, the proposed evidence, even if it tended to prove by repute that there had been a marriage at sometime, was irrelevant as reflecting on the one upon which the plaintiff relied. Where a marriage is set up as having been performed at a particular place by a particular form or ceremony, and the evidence fails to support the assertion, the party so alleging such a marriage will not be at liberty to rely on general repute to establish it. Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 28; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251. It was also inadmissible for the reason given in discussing the testimony of Mrs. Zimmerman, 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. L., 1206.
Inasmuch as there is not a shred of evidence in the record to identify the parties named in the New Jersey certificate, or to show that one was the decedent and the other was the plaintiff, the latter's contention must fall to the ground; and it becomes wholly immaterial what were the other rulings in the case.
The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth exceptions were taken to the refusal of the Court to allow the plaintiff to testify in chief, and the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth exceptions were reserved in consequence of the Court excluding the plaintiff as a witness in rebuttal. There was no error committed in any of those rulings. • The evidence sought to be introduced either tended to prove the identity of the plaintiff, or it did not. If it did, it was inadmissible because she was incompetent to prove that identity. If it did not tend to prove her identity it was irrelevant.
The ruling in the tenth exception was right. It merely permitted the- defendant to prove her marriage to Bowman. That was one'of the issues before the jury.
The rulings in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth exceptions admitted evidence adduced to show by what name the plaintiff was formerly known in Hagerstown; what course of life she had led there and upon what charges she had been arrested. If the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not the person named in the certificate, it was unnecessary as she had failed to prove that she was. If it did not do this, it was immaterial. In either event its admission did no injury'in view of the fact that the defendant's first and second prayers ought to have been granted. There is no reversible error assigned in those exceptions,
The' prayers need not be discussed, because if those granted at the instance of the defendants were wrong, they did no injury, inasmuch as the plaintiff had wholly failed to prove the marriage upon which she relied, and as, in that view, she was not entitled to a verdict at all, she could not have been prejudiced by instructions which permitted a verdict to be rendered against her on other and different grounds. If the trial Court was abstractly wrong in rejecting the prayers of the plaintiff, no injury was done, inasmuch as by reason of her failure to furnish adequate proof of identity she had no standing before the jury; and she cannot complain because prayers, which proceeded upon the theory that such proof had been offered, were rejected, when they were rightly rejected for the reason that no such proof had been adduced.
(Decided June 21st, 1905.)
Since the verdict was right as a result of the failure of proof on the point we have indicated, it will not be disturbed; and the rulings will be affirmed without deciding that they would have been, in all respects, free from error under a different state of facts as to the identity of the parties. We are not to be understood as committing ourselves to the accuracy of any of the rulings on the prayers, if the alleged first marriage and the identity of the parties had been satisfactorily proved, or if evidence tending to prove those requisites had been introduced. By affirming those rulings in this case we merely decide that, because the identity was not established, no reversible error has been shown to the prejudice or injury of the appellant. With this explanation the rulings are affirmed and the cause is remanded to the end that the findings of the jury may be certified to the Orphans' Court of Washington County.
Rulings affirmed and cause remanded.