Case Name: John T. REED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. D. HENDERSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1972-06-05
Citations: 463 F.2d 485
Docket Number: No. 72-1485
Parties: John T. REED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. D. HENDERSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 463
Pages: 485–488

Head Matter:
John T. REED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. D. HENDERSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 72-1485
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 5, 1972.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc July 25, 1972.
John Timothy Reed, pro se.
John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., P. Bruce Kirwan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Before THORNBERRY, COLEMAN and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.
[1] Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, Circuit Judge:
This appeal by a federal prisoner from dismissal of an application for habeas corpus relief is directed against a state detainer warrant lodged against him and not against his federal sentence.
Appellant was convicted in the federal district court for the District of Connecticut for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and is presently confined in a federal penitentiary located within the Northern District of Georgia. While serving a federal sentence he was convicted by the State of Connecticut of murder in the second degree and a detainer warrant against him was lodged with the federal penitentiary.
Appellant sought habeas corpus relief from the federal district court in Connecticut. While it is unclear whether that court denied relief based on the Connecticut detainer, it stated :
"Even assuming, however, that there is a detainer placed against [appellant] at the Atlanta Prison, he must seek redress for any claimed grievance in the United States District Court, District of Georgia."
Compare George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir., 1969), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1970).
Appellant then made application to the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, the district wherein he was confined. The district court denied relief, holding that the Connecticut court was the proper forum, and that it was without subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) to consider the merits of appellant's claim against the Connecticut detainer. Compare Word v. State of North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir., 1969), en banc.
We affirm the district court but for slightly different reasons.
Judge Haynsworth writing for the en banc court in Word, supra, persuasively argues that jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus attacks on the validity of state detainer warrants lies with the district of sentencing.
The Second Circuit has taken the view in these cases that the districts of sentencing and confinement may exercise concurrent jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir., 1970). The Second Circuit recently summarized its Meadows case as follows:
"This court in [Meadows] concluded that the district of sentencing may be the preferable forum where the petition alleges prejudicial effects in the district of confinement." Dodd v. United States Marshal, 439 F.2d 774, 775 at n.3. (2nd Cir., 1971).
The Third and Ninth Circuits in the eases of United States ex rel. Van Scoten v. Pennsylvania, 404 F.2d 767 (3rd Cir., 1969), and George v. Nelson, supra took a contrary view that a sentencing district does not have jurisdiction.
We agree with the view expressed by Judge Haynsworth in Word. The districts containing federal penal institutions should no more be compelled to shoulder the entire docket of collateral attack on state detainers than should it be called upon to undertake all of the habeas corpus petitions arising from the institution. That Congress intended to spread this docket is clear from the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2255:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
. Were appellant to attack bis federal sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding (28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq.), he would face a heavy burden of demonstrating that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was then unavailable. Owensby v. Clark, 451 F.2d 206 (5th Cir., 1971) ; Accardi v. Blackwell, 412 F.2d 911 (5th Cir., 1969).