Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Johnny TAYLOR, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-08-25
Citations: 799 F.2d 126
Docket Number: No. 85-5224
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Johnny TAYLOR, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 799
Pages: 126–131

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Johnny TAYLOR, Appellant.
No. 85-5224.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 10, 1986.
Decided Aug. 25, 1986.
John F. Hardaway, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, S.C., for appellant.
Dale L. DuTremble, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Vinton L. Lide, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C. on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and HALL and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Johnny Taylor appeals from his conviction by jury of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and 2. We affirm.
I.
The Ridgeland, South Carolina, office of the Southern Bank and Trust Company was robbed of $1,040.00 by two black males on March 20, 1985. In addition to the money, the bank tellers also gave the robbers bait money and an exploding dye pack. After the robbers left the bank, they got into a, red Thunderbird with a white top. At that time, the dye pack exploded.
The robbers travelled down Interstate 95 heading from Ridgeland to Savannah, Georgia. Members of the Hardeeville, South Carolina, police department pursued the robbers on the interstate until the Thunderbird crashed along the side of the roadway. The driver of the Thunderbird leaped from the car, jumped the fence next to the interstate, and fled into the woods. The police then removed the passenger, Stephen Savage, from the car.
Thereafter, the police and Denny March, a Special Agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, found Taylor hiding in the woods. When he was apprehended, Taylor was wearing clothing similar to that which the bank robber had been described as wearing. In addition, his clothing had dye stains on it of the type caused by the exploding dye pack.
Taylor and Savage were indicted on charges of armed robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and 2. Savage entered a guilty plea. Counsel was appointed for Taylor, who entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury on June 11, 1985.
At trial, Richard Morrison, a Hardeeville, South Carolina, policeman, testified that at the time of his arrest, Taylor had given a false name. Special Agent March also testified and stated that Taylor had identified himself as two different people when he was arrested. According to March, Taylor first identified himself as Ronald West, also known as "Snake," and then he later gave the agent his real name. The government stipulated that before Taylor gave the arresting officers any identifying information, he had been advised of his Miranda rights and had requested counsel. Over Taylor's objection, the trial court admitted the testimony of both Officer Morrison and Agent March concerning the fact that Taylor had given a false name.
Taylor and Savage also testified at Taylor's trial. Taylor testified that he was in a field planting marijuana when a man came along and forced him at gunpoint to remove his clothes and put on the clothes of the other man. According to Taylor, he was told to remain still or he would be harmed, and he stayed where he was until approximately fifteen minutes later when some dogs approached him and the police arrested him. Savage testified that he and someone other than Taylor, someone named "Snake," robbed the bank.
The government cross-examined Taylor about the fact that he had given the arresting officers a false name, and it made reference to Agent March's testimony that Taylor had identified himself as "Snake" during its closing argument to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that a person's assumption of a false name may be considered as evidence of a guilty conscience. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Taylor, and this appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Taylor contends that the officers' testimony concerning his false identification of himself was inadmissible. According to appellant, because he had invoked his right to counsel, the questioning of him concerning his identity constituted an interrogation which was improper under Miranda.
In United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 237 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230, 104 S.Ct. 2689, 81 L.Ed.2d 883 (1984), we held that the taking of basic personal information such as name, age, and place of birth is a ministerial duty incident to arrest and custody which does not constitute "interrogation or its functional equivalent, 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.' " (Quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). Likekise, in United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 946-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 2955, 53 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1977), we held that the taking of standard identification information does not violate Miranda.
Appellant argues that Morrow and Grant are not dispositive because the incriminating information obtained by the authorities in those cases was extraneous material and not truly responsive to the questions asked. In this case, however, the officers asked for a name and were given one. It was Taylor's identification of himself as "Snake," when considered in conjunction with Savage's statement that Savage had robbed the bank with a man by that name, which proved to be incriminating. Taylor suggests that this factual distinction requires a different rule than that set forth in Morrow and Grant. We disagree.
In the instant case, the arresting officers advised appellant of his Miranda rights. Although Taylor invoked his right to counsel, the officers' subsequent questioning of him concerning his identity did not amount to an interrogation prohibited by Miranda. The fact that Taylor's response later proved to be incriminating does not require that it be suppressed, as the officers had no reasonable expectation that their questions would be likely to elicit such information.
We are not persuaded by the dissent's view that further fact-finding is required to determine whether the police were conducting investigatory questioning rather than routine, ministerial questioning. Ordinarily, the request for identifying information, however phrased, is inherently ministerial and does not violate Miranda. The dissent's view would encourage judicial inspection of every routine, ministerial question, and impede the operation of necessary police booking procedures while not significantly increasing the level of protection against improper interrogation. Accordingly, we conclude that the testimony regarding appellant's identification of himself was admissible and the judgment below is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).