Case Name: The administrator of Abbot, (W. Cummins,) v. Luke Williams
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1806-04
Citations: 2 Brev. 38
Docket Number: 
Parties: The administrator of Abbot, (W. Cummins,) v. Luke Williams.
Judges: (Grmike, Waties, Bay, Trezevaht, and Wilds, Justices.)
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 38–40

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
APRIL, 1806.
The administrator of Abbot, (W. Cummins,) v. Luke Williams.
A deed of gift, of personal property, may be made to take effect, and vest the property in possession upon a future contingency.
Motion for a new trial. Trover; tried in Abbeville district, before Beevaed, J. The defendant, of whom the chattels in question had been demanded, and who had refused to deliver them up to the plaintiff, (who claimed them as administrator of James Abbot, as property unadministered of his intestate,) claimed the same as his own right and property, under an instrument of writing under seal, signed by James Abbot, the intestate, purporting to be an agreement between the said James Abbot and the defendant, of the following tenor and effect: “ The said James Abbot, in consideration that the said Luke Williams find the said Abbot, and Sarah, his wife, a good and sufficient maintenance, such as a house to live in, and a field sufficient for the said Abbot to work, and a horse to plough said field, if required; also, sufficient diet, lodging and appa- iel, with other necessaries and conveniences of life suitable to their situation, and in no case let them suffer for the necessaries of life, he, the said Abbot, agrees to lend and deliver into the possession of the said Luke Williams, the tract of land on which said Abbot lives, together with the plantation, and all the profits thereof, to the use and benefit of the said Luke Williams, together with all the horses, cows, hogs, and plantation tools, household and kitchen furniture, (except a choice cow, and a choice sow, and a rifle gun,) with every other kind of property lawfully belonging to the said Abbot: which property, and the profits thereof, the said Luke Williams is to receive and enjoy, and make use of as his own ; only, he is not to sell, or convey the said property, or any part thereof, to any person, without the consent of the said James Abbot: And upon the said Luke Williams’ complying with the above contract, or covenant, on his part, the said James Abbot doth agree, and doth hereby bind himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, that at the death of said Abbot, the right of the above property shall be fully and completely vested in said Luke Williams, his heirs and assigns forever, as though they were conveyed by deed, or indenture of any kind.
- The above agreement was proved to have been fairly executed by Abbot, without any imputation or circumvention on the part of Williams. It was also proved, that Abbot, as long as he lived, appeared to be entirely satisfied with the conduct and treatment of Williams towards him ; and that he always expressed an intention to leave his estate to Williams at his death, and that the agreement above stated, was made pursuant to that intention. That Abbot’s widow still lived with the defendant, and was-kindly treated by him.
Brevard, J., in charging the jury, considered the deed under which the defendant claimed the property in question, as evidence of an agreement, or contract, to transfer the property, upon the performance of certain conditions to be precedently performed by the defendant, and not as evidence of an immediate transfer of property, which, by the contract of the parties, was not to take place until the death of Abbot, and not at all, unless the conditions stipulated to be performed on the part of Williams should be performed ; and therefore, although the agreement might be perlormed on Williams» part, yet this could not change the nature of the contract, and vest property which by the agreement did not vest; but that the property still remained in Abbot until his death, and at his death, descended to his personal representative: And notwithstanding Williams might recover a full satisfaction, if the agreement should not be fully complied with on the part of Abbot, or his representative, yet he was not indtled to recover the specific property in dispute, or da-jnageg for detaining it or converting it; and therefore, was not legaily authorized to detain, or convert it himself, against the will of Abbot’s representative, who was indtled to recover the same, as the property of Abbot’s estate. The jury accordingly found for the defendant.
Note. Grants or gifts of chattels personal, are the act of transferring the right and the possession of them, whereby one man renounces, and another man immediately acquires, all title and interest therein: which may be done either in writing, or by word of mouth, attested by sufficient evidence, of which the delivery of possession is the strongest and most essential. A proper gift or grant, is accompanied with deliveiy of possession, and takes effect immediately. Where this is not the case, it is not properly a, gift or giant, but a contract. See % Bl. Com, e. 13.
Bowie, in support of the motion,
contended, that the jury had been misdirected as to the law on the subject; because it was clearly the intention of the parties, by their agreement, that the property should absolutely be vested in 'Williams at Abbot’s death, if the con. , ditions should be complied with, and it was proved that the conditions had been complied with. Cited Hayw. Rep. 259.
Lesley, on the other side.
The deed is extremely questionable. The consideration expressed cannot be considered sufficient. Williams was not a relation of Abbot. All Abbot’s property, land and all, was made over on condition that Williams would give him and his wife a bare support out of it! But the deed is only conditional. The articles are only lent during Abbot’s life. At his decease, he agrees that the property shall vest in Williams. The intention of Abbot then clearly was, that the property should not vest in Williams until after his, Abbot’s death. Could the property vest on a future contingency? Tow. on Contr. It is an executory contract, not consummate. The property was agreed to be transferred, and was not actually transferred by the contract. The defendant was expressly prohibited to convey or dispose of the property, by the very terms of the contract, during Abbot’s life. Suppose Abbot had contracted debts, would not this property be liable to discharge them. Suppose Williams had not performed the conditions?

Opinion:
Trezevant, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court,
(Grmike, Waties, Bay, Trezevaht, and Wilds, Justices.)
The deed imports a sufficient consideration. By the terms of the deed, the property was to pass into the possession of Williams immediately. Here then was an actual delivery ; and although the property did not vest absolutely in the life time of Abbot, yet it vested at his death, the conditions being performed.
Verdict set aside, and new trial granted.