Case Name: DIVERSIFIED PRODUCT INDUSTRIES, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SKYLINE STEEL, LLC, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-12-28
Citations: 464 F. App'x 613
Docket Number: No. 10-55520
Parties: DIVERSIFIED PRODUCT INDUSTRIES, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SKYLINE STEEL, LLC, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 464
Pages: 613–614

Head Matter:
DIVERSIFIED PRODUCT INDUSTRIES, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SKYLINE STEEL, LLC, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-55520.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 17, 2011.
Filed Dec. 28, 2011.
Steven Berkowitz, Glassman, Browning & Salstman, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Neil Michael Soltman, Esquire, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GOODWIN, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Appellant Skyline Steel, LLC, (Skyline) challenges the district court's denial of Skyline's motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment. Our recent precedent noted the importance of deciding cases on the merits and established that denial of relief from a default judgment is appropriate only in "extreme circumstances." United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle (Mesle), 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing default judgment as "a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances ." and noting that "[d]ue to the policy of favoring judgments on the merits, a glaring abuse of discretion is not required for reversal of a court's refusal to relieve a party of the harsh sanction of default") (citation omitted). Mesle was decided after the district court's decision in this case, and the district court did not have the benefit of our reasoning as expressed in Mesle.
Because we are persuaded that Mesle compels a different outcome, we reverse the district court's denial of Skyline's motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.