Case Name: Miner vs. Clark
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1836-07
Citations: 15 Wend. 425
Docket Number: 
Parties: Miner vs. Clark.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wendell's Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 425–430

Head Matter:
Miner vs. Clark.
In an action pn a covenant of warranty in a deed ef lands from which the grantee has been evicted, parol notice to the grantor of the commencement of the ejectment suit is sufficient; the notice need not be in writing. .So held by the Court: Mr. Justice Bronson dissenting.
It seems that though notice alone is sufficient to cast the defence upon the grantor, it is well also to put in a plea.
The reading of a deed of lands in evidence cannot be objected to ,on the ground of variance between it and the oyer served, for the cause that the certificate of acknowledgment is not endorsed on the oyer—such ceprtifi. cate forms no part of the deed.
This was an action ,on a covenant of warranty of title in a deed of lands from which the plaintiff was evicted, tried at the Tompkins circuit in November, 1833, before the Hon, Robert Monell, one of the circuit judges.
On the trial the following questions arose: I. The plaintiff proved that when the ejectment suit was commenced against him, by virtue of which he was evicted, he gave verbal notice of the suit'to his grantor, and requested him to attend to the defence. The defendant in the present suit objected to the sufficiency of such notice, insisting that it should have been - writing. The objection was overruled. 2. He objected to the deed produced on the trial being read in evidence, on the ground of variance between it and the oyer delivered in the case, the deed having on it a certificate of acknowledgment, and the oyer not having a copy of such certificate. This objection was also overruled. 3. The defendant having been permitted to give evidence to show that there.ought not to have been a recovery by the plaintiff in the action of ejectment, the plaintiff in that action (Samuel Baker) was called by the plaintiff in this suit, and sworn as a witness, to rebut the evidence on the part of the defendant. He was objected tó as interested, but the objection was overruled. There was also evidence given to show collusion between the plaintiff in the ejectment suit and the present plaintiff, which was submitted by the ■ judge to the consideration of the jury. The plaintiff obtained a verdict, which the defendant moves to set afeide.
S. Stevens, for the defendant,
insisted that the notice of the commencement of the ejectment ought to have been in wri~ ting, and cited, in support of this position,- 3 Johns. Cas. 109, and 15 Johns. R. 533.
A. J. Parker, for the plaintiff,
insisted that a verbal notice was sufficient. It was not a proceeding in a suit, and therefore not governed by the ordinary practice of courts requiring notice in suits to be in writing; nor is it required by statute. When a statute requires a notice preliminary to the commencement of a suit to- be in writing, the notice must be in writing; otherwise a verbal notice is sufficient.

Opinion:
The Opinion of the Court was delivered by the Chief Justice as follows: It was objected, on the trial, that the deed from the defendant to the plaintiff should not be given in evidence, because oyer had not been given of the certificate of acknowledgment endorsed upon it. The objection was properly overruled. The certificate of acknowledgment or proof of the instrument constitutes no part of the deed itself.
A more important question is whether parol notice to the defendant of the commencement of the ejectment suit was sufficient The object of the notice is to inform the grantor that a suit has been brought against his grantee; the grantor is supposed to be better able to defend such a suit, and by his covenant he has undertaken to warrant and defend the grantee against the claims of all persons. A parol notice gives the information to the grantor.quite as well as a written one; and as there is no technical rule requiring such a notice to be in writing, no writing is necessary. The party making this objection should have produced some authority to sustain it; none has been produced, and probably because none can be found. I have already remarked, that the object of giving notice is to inform the grantor of the assertion of a claim against which he has covenanted that he will warrant and defend his granted. If we regard the plain import of the language used, it is the grantor who is to defend, and not the grantee; and if we regard the reason and propriety of the case, we come to the conclusion that the grantor must defend or not at his peril after notice. Such it is believed is the common sense of the case. The first case in our courts on the subject of notice is Blaisdell v.Babcock,1 Johns. R. 517. The plaintiff bought a horse of the defendant, which was claimed by one Snow. An action of trover was brought by Snow, of which the plaintiff gave the defendant notice. It does not appear whether a written notice was given; the point was not raised. The defendant attended one term of the court, with witnesses to defend the title to the horse which he had sold to the plaintiff, but did not attend when the cause wás tried. The record of Snow's recovery was received in evidence, though the judge told the jury it was not conclusive. On a motion for a new trial, the court said that the record was proper evidence, because without it an eviction could not have been shown; that the first notice given to the defendant was sufficient, and that he was bound to take notice of the subsequent proceedings. The same, point was recently decided in error, in the case of Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wendell, 123. The case of Stone v. Hooker, 9 Cowen 154, was an action upon an agreement to indemnify. A suit was brought against the plaintiff: he gave notice of it to the defendant and requested him t«$ attend, but he did not. The plaintiff recovered the amount of a judgment against himself in favor of others who he had! agreed to indemnify upon the strength of the defendant's promise to him, even though one of those judgments was obtained by confession. It appeared, however, that there were several suits, and after one suit had been tried it would have been useless to have contested the dthers. Mr. Justice Wood-worth remarks, that having given a cognovit, he was bound to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by it, which in that case he did do. The cáse of Jackson v. Marsh, 5 Wendell, 44, goes farther, and states that after notice to the grantor of suit brought, and a refusal by him to defend, the grantee is not bound to defend. At all events, I apprehend enough was done in this case. A plea was put in, as was stated by counsel; and though the record states that judgment was obtained by default, it is inferrible from the case that such de-' fault was at the circuit, and of course a plea must have been put in. If notice of the suit had not been given to the defendant, it would have behooved the plaintiff to have shown that a full defence was-made, and that the defendant, if notice had been given, could not have defeated á recovery. In the present case the defendant has nb just ground of complaint. He was permitted and attempted to show that there was no ground for the recovery against the plaintiff, but in that he failed.
Baker was a competent witness. He had no interest in "this cause; his credibility was before the jury. The jury were satisfied that there was no collusion betwen him and the plaintiff, and I cannbt say that their verdict is against evidence. That was a question for the jury, and their decision Should not be disturbed fexcept in a clear case.
New trial denied-.
The following dissénting opinion was delivered by Mn Justice BronsOn :