Case Name: Johnny L. JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-02-26
Citations: 466 So. 2d 293
Docket Number: No. 81-2175
Parties: Johnny L. JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 466
Pages: 293–301

Head Matter:
Johnny L. JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 81-2175.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 26, 1985.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1985.
James McGuirk, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Janet Reno, State Atty. and Ira N. Loewy, Asst. State Atty., for appellee.
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appealing his convictions for solicitation to commit perjury and for witness tampering, defendant Jones maintains that the trial court committed reversible error. We disagree and affirm.
With regard to the offense of solicitation to commit perjury Jones's first point is that the charge was unconstitutionally vague and that he was entitled either to dismissal or to a statement of particulars.
Count II of the information charges:
And, JANET RENO, State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, prosecuting for the State of Florida, in the County of Dade, under oath, information makes that JOHNNY L. JONES on the 19th day of March, 1980, in the County and State aforesaid, did solicit David L. Rouen to commit perjury in an Official Proceeding, an offense prohibited by Section 837.02, Florida Statutes, that is to say, JOHNNY L. JONES did encourage or request David L. Rouen to falsely state under oath before The State Attorney or any Assistant State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in an Official Investigation into unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior given by David L. Rouen to JOHNNY L. JONES in which negotiable bearer bond coupons were a portion of the unlawful compensation,and a material matter in the investigation, that he, David L. Rouen, did not remember about the said negotiable bearer bond coupons, which statement JOHNNY L. JONES and David L. Rouen both did not believe to be true, being in violation of Section 777.04, Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.
Jones was charged not with perjury but with solicitation to commit perjury. The charge included all of the elements necessary to establish the offense of solicitation. See State v. Gaines, 431 So.2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (crime of solicitation is completed when the actor with intent that another person commit a crime, has enticed, advised, incited, ordered or otherwise encouraged that person to commit a crime; crime solicited need not be committed [citing W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 58]); Miller v. State, 430 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (the gist of solicitation is enticement [citing Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) ]); State v. Keen, 25 N.C.App. 567, 214 S.E.2d 242 (1975) (crime of solicitation complete with solicitation, even though there could never have been acquiescence in scheme by one solicited). It is irrelevant that Rouen did not commit perjury or even intend to commit perjury. See Wharton, Criminal Law, § 718 (14th Ed.1981) (if solicitee refuses, or for some reason fails, to commit the crime solicited, the solicitor is nevertheless guilty of solicitation).
According to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(o):
Defects and Variances. No indictment or information, or any count thereof, shall be dismissed or judgment arrested, or new trial granted on account of any defect in the form of the indictment or information or of misjoinder of offenses or for any cause whatsoever, unless the court shall be of the opinion that the indictment or information is so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense.
The information informed Jones of the charge for which he was to be tried; it did not mislead or embarrass him in the preparation of his defense. See Winslow v. State, 45 So,2d 339 (Fla.1949). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for statement of particulars and no error in the court's refusal to dismiss the charge.
Jones next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the charge of solicitation because the state failed to prove the existence of an official proceeding. The record discloses that Rouen told Jones that his bank records had been subpoenaed and that he expected to be served with a subpoena to appear in Dade County before a court reporter and to testify under a grant of immunity. Jones replied:
Well, then you have to always say something. That's always the answer from what I've been told. Just don't remember. Don't remember. There's nothing wrong with amnesia.
Section 837.011(1), Florida Statutes (1979), defines an official proceeding:
"Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath, including any referee, master in chancery, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or a deposition in connection with any such proceeding.
Jones's statements are sufficient to justify a conviction of solicitation to commit perjury within the definition of section 837.-011(1).
Jones raises no other challenge to the offense of solicitation to commit perjury and no fundamental error appears sufficient to entitle him to reversal on matters not raised on appeal.
Next, Jones challenges his conviction for witness tampering. In light of the recent decision of the supreme court in State v. Gray, 435 So.2d 816 (Fla.1983), we are compelled to reject his argument.
Jones also argues that reversal is required because of prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutors during closing argument. Only after the jury retired for deliberations did Jones's counsel request a mistrial. His conduct was insufficient to preserve any error. In State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1980), the court held:
To avoid interruption in the continuity of the closing argument and more particularly to afford defendant an opportunity to evaluate the prejudicial nature of the objectionable comments in the context of the total closing argument, we do not impose a strict rule requiring that a motion for mistrial be made in the next breath following the objection to the remark. Here, Cumbie objected to the prosecutor's comment, and the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard this remark. If Cumbie felt that the judge's admonition was inadequate, he should have informed the judge of this fact at the time of his objection or, at the latest, at the end of the prosecutor's closing argument. The judge then may have been able to give additional curative instructions which may have remedied Cumbie's objection. The motion for mistrial in the present case, made after jury instructions and retirement of the jury for deliberation, however, came too late to preserve Cumbie's objection for appeal, (emphasis added)
Id. at 1033-34. Here, as in Cumbie, the motion came too late to preserve the error. Furthermore, we do not believe that the remarks complained of constitute fundamental error. Cf. Barnes v. State, 58 So.2d 157 (Fla.1952); Peterson v. State, 376 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 642 (Fla.1980).
Jones's remaining points lack merit.
Affirmed.