Case Name: Evan P. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1967-05-24
Citations: 19 Utah 2d 169
Docket Number: No. 10622
Parties: Evan P. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: HENRIOD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 19
Pages: 169–173

Head Matter:
428 P.2d 160
Evan P. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 10622.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 24, 1967.
Theodore S. Perry, Logan, for appellant.
H. Preston Thomas, Logan, for respondent.

Opinion:
TUCKETT, Justice:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff wherein he seeks to restrain Logan City from destroying- a home owned by him. The City's Board of Condemnation, after a hearing and inspection of the building in question, made findings that the building owned by the plaintiff constituted a menace to public safety and further found that the building should be demolished.
The court below found that the ordinances of Logan City providing for a Board of Condemnation and giving to that Board the power to determine whether any building or structure constitutes a menace to public health or public safety were valid. The plaintiff is here challenging the findings of the trial court that the ordinances of the City are valid.
The plaintiff was the owner of a home which had been constructed more than 60 years ago. The home was located on a block where there were similar homes, constructed about the same time and of the same material as that of plaintiff's house. Prior to June 2, 1965, the Chairman of the Logan City Board of Condemnation investigated the home owned by the plaintiff. The Chairman determined that the condition of the house owned by the plaintiff was such that a hearing should be held by the Logan City Board of Condemnation. After hearing, the Board determined that the home in question was a menace to public safety and should be demolished.
Pursuant to the grant of power contained in Section 10-8-60, U.C.A.1953, Logan City had adopted ordinances Nos. 120 through 125. The statute above referred to provides as follows:
Nuisances. — They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
The City's ordinance No. 120 provides in part as follows;
Power of the Board. Notice of Hearing. Said Board of Condemnation is hereby granted the power, after notice of hearing, to find and determine whether any building, or other structure constitutes a menace to public health or public safety. (The remaining portion of the ordinance deals with notice and the hearing.)
Ordinance No. 123 provides in part as follows:
Every building constituting a menace to public health or public safety as the same is defined in this chapter, is hereby declared to be a public nuisance.
While the statute above mentioned grants to cities the power to declare what shall be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact define what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which grants to the Board of Condemnation the right to determine whether any building constitutes a menace to public health or public safety does not provide standards on which the Board can base its finding as to what is or what is not a menace to public health or public safety. It would appear that the ordinance imposes upon the Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial functions without standards or guidelines to govern the Board in its determination. We are of the opinion that the ordinance attempts to make an unlawful delegation of power to the City's Board of Condemnation. We are of the opinion that by reason of the delegation of powers by the City Commission the ordinance above referred to is invalid. It may also be observed that the other ordinances before us do not supply this deficiency.
We should observe in passing that the defendant Logan City did not pursue its contentions in this court either by oral argument or filing a brief.
The judgment of the court below is reversed. Costs to the plaintiff.
HENRIOD, J., concurs.
. People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N.E. 377, 378; State v. Keller, 108 Neb. 742, 189 N.W. 374, 25 A.L.R. 115; Rowland v. State ex rel. Martin, 129 Fla. 662, 176 So. 545, 114 A.L.R. 443 and annotations p. 446.
. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P.2d 120, 107 A.L.R. 1477.