Case Name: John J. Rohrbacher vs. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Jackson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1875-10
Citations: 51 Miss. 735
Docket Number: 
Parties: John J. Rohrbacher vs. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Jackson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 735–782

Head Matter:
John J. Rohrbacher vs. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Jackson.
1. Retailing: Restriction. Power of the legislature. Act of 1874.
The legislature has the power to regulate the retail dealing in, and sale of, intoxicating liquors. All of the states have legislated upon the subject, some by total prohibition, and others by dealing with the subject under rules and regulations, in the interest of morals, sobriety, industry and good order. The state may regulate it, or it may absolutely prohibit it.
2. Same : Same : Application by petition of males over 21, and females over 18 years of age.
The statute of 1874 requires that the application must be supported by a petition of a majority of the male citizens over twenty-one years, and a majority of the female citizens over eighteen years of age, resident, etc. It can be no objection that the females are not voters. The legislature might require the signature of a majority of freeholders, some of whom might not be voters, and some of whom might be females; or the legislature might, in their wisdom, refer the whole question to the discretion of the board.
3. Same: Same: No judicial power can regulate the requirements for license to retail.
The judiciary cannot interpose and pronounce judgment upon the expediency and fitness of rules, which are exclusively committed to legislative choice and discretion. Before the court can declare a statute inoperative, it must be pointed to some provision of the constitution which it violates. The policy of the legislation in adopting rules and regulations for the granting of the license, is wisely left with the law making department.
4 Same : Optional law.
The act of 1874 is not an optional law. It does not propose to leave to a vote the question of the issuance of license. The power of the board of supervisors, or mayor and aldermen, is not made dependent upon a vote in favor of its exercise. The application of one person may be sustained whilst the application of another may fail.
Per Tarbell, J., dissenting.
5. Necesswry to the passage of an act of the legislature.
It is fundamental to the validity of every act of legislation: 1. The presence of a majority of either house of the legislature; and, 3. The act must have “ passed ” both houses. Any act appearing in the published laws is a nullity, if it is obnoxious to either of these conditions.
6. Certificate of passage is only prima facie evidence.
The certificate of the secretary of state to laws filed in his office is only prima facie evidence of their validity.
7. Journals are not records under our constitution and laws.
Legislative journals are not “records” importing absolute verity unless made so by constitutional or statutory provision, which has not been done in this state.
8. Same: English practice.
In the English practice there is a legislation “Journal Book,” and a “Parliament Roll.” The latter is called then a “ high record,” and imports absolute verity, while the former is merely a book of “remembrances ” for forms of proceedings to the “ record.” Hobart says, “journals are no records, but remembrances for forms of proceedings to the record; * * the journal is good use for the observation of the generalty and materiality of proceedings, and deliberations as to the three readings of any bill, the intercourses between the two houses and the title; but where the act is passed; the journal is expired. * * General acts are always enrolled by the clerk of the parliament, and delivered over in to the chancery; which enrollment in the chancery makes them the original record,” or “ high record,” importing absolute verity.
9. Acts do not denote absolute verity.
With us, legislative acts, when certified and approved, are filed in the office of secretary of state, but by no law or rule do they then become an “ original record,” “ high record,” “ parliament roll ” or such record as denotes absolute verity.
10. Same: Impeachment for fraud.
Conceding legislative journals to possess the character of absolute verity, they are no more sacred than the judgment of a court of record, which may be impeached for fraud, and this is the proposition at bar, a question never before presented to any court. In all the adjudications, the question has simply been as to the right of the courts to test the validity or accuracy of acts by reference to the legislative journals. The courts have never been asked to go further.
11. JSnglish rule does not obtain in this country.
Popular liberty in America protests against the adoption of the English rule on the subject under consideration, and demands that the proposition involved shall be confided to the judiciary, which in this country has ever been the faithful guardian of the true principles of the constitution.
12. The law reaches the legislative branch.
We live under a government of laws, reaching as well to the legislative as to the other branches of the government, and if we wish to uphold and perpetuate free institutions, we must maintain a vigilant watch against all encroachments of power, whether arising from mistake or design, and from whatever source they may proceed,
13. Courts will take jurisdiction.
There is no more delicacy or danger in the courts taking jurisdiction of cases of this character, and should be no more hesitation than in any involving the validity or constitutionality of statutes for any cause. The danger lies in refusing their jurisdiction.
II.
14. Incense to retail contingent.
A statute empowering local authorities to grant or refuse a license for the retail of spirituous liquors is the delegation of legislative power, and it is legislation dependent upon a contingency. The license law is lifeless until vitality is infused into it by the will of those upon whose consent it is contingent.
15. Same : Will of the people.
It is immaterial by what mode the will of the people is obtained, whether by an election or by petition.
16. Same : The contingency must not be arbitrary.
The contingency upon which a law may be made dependent must be equal and fair, moral and legal, not opposed to sound policy, nor merely idle and arbitrary. The requirement as a condition to the grant of a license of the consent of a majority of females over 18 years of age, while a majority of males over 21 years of age only is required, is unfair and une qual, while the enforced interposition of the mass of females is opposed to sound policy; in its results, immoral and illegal, and a mere idle and arbitrary regulation. Hence, is unconstitutional.
17. Same i Legislation restricted.
It cannot be questioned that there is a limit to the restrictions which legislation may impose as the condition of a license. If there is no limit, the grant may be made to depend upon the females of a particular church, or color, or any other idle and arbitrary condition.
IS^Right of a female to pa/rtiaipate in our civil affairs.
Looking to the origin, or organization of our institutions, males, by prescription only, have the right to participate in the management of our civil and political administration, and until such privilege is conferred by constitutional amendment, this right cannot be conferred upon females by legislation.
19. Same: Same: Same.
The right of entire prohibition is too well settled to be questioned, confined to voters and heads of families, including female heads of families; the law may impose the consent of any portion of these as the condition of a license, but the participation of the mass of females in the administration of this law is obnoxious to the constitution as it now stands.
20. Present policy demoralizing.
; As a policy, the present statute regulating the license system is improvident and pernicious, and demoralizing, as conceded by the friends of temperance.
[Note. — The syllabus to the dissenting opinion was prepared by Judge Tarbell, and published as prepared, at his request. — Reporters.]
Error to tbe Circuit Court of Hinds County.
Hon. G-eo. E. Brown, Judge.
Tbis was a proceeding by mandamus in tbe circuit court to ob. tain a peremptory writ of mandamus against respondents, commanding them to grant to petitioner a license to retail vinous and spirituous liquors in tbe city of Jackson. Petitioner alleges that be bad complied with tbe law (Code of 1871) by procuring to bis petition tbe signatures of a majority of tbe male voters of tbe city, but that be bad not tbe names of any females on bis petition as required by act of tbe legislature, approved April 6, 1874.
Tbe petition avers that tbe pretended act of April 6, 1874, was never passed and approved as required by law; that the same was never enrolled by any authorized person ; that at the moment of the adjournment of the legislature sine die, pursuant to a joint resolution of both houses, the bill was under discussion on a motion to amend and a motion to table that proposition; that the bill was enrolled by some private person having no authority, and hurried to the governor by the friends of the measure, and signed by him and reported to the house as signed whilst a member occupied the floor debating that pending proposition.
Respondents appeared and filed an answer, in which they concede that the petition contained the names of a majority of the male voters of the city; but set up the recent act above referred to in avoidance of the duty of the board to issue license as prayed for, averring that said act was duly passed according to law, and that the same is valid and constitutional. The court below rejected all proof as to those facts, and made an order refusing a peremptory mandamus, and dismissed the petition at the cost of the petitioner; and the case comes to this court on appeal.
The following errors are assigned :
1. The court below erred in refusing to receive and consider the evidence offered on the part of the defendant.
2. The court below erred in rejecting the prayer of appellant, and refusing the relief prayed for.
3. And for other errors to be stated on the hearing.
Frank Johnston, for appellants :
The constitution of Mississippi restricts the right of voting to male citizens of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, etc. Const., art. YII, secs. 1, 2. The act of April 6,1874, extends the right of voting, in substance, to females of the age of eighteen and upwards. This act gives to females (minor females) the right of voting, and violates the constitution. It gives them a controlling voice in this great question of domestic policy, though that power is exerted through the mere medium of a written petition, the effect is the same as though it were by ballot. 1 Bur. L. Die., 536; Bouv. L. Dio., 611. The act of April 6, 1874, should be considered according to its substance. The act was a fraud on legislation. It was not passed in the constitutional mode. Const., art. IV, sec. 23. And otherwise it cannot become a law. We are aware that an act of parliament duly enrolled, signed and deposited in the archives, purports absolute verity, and that the same rigid rule was followed in Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss., 268. But see Brady v. West, 50 Miss., 68, in which that rigid doctrine is overruled. See Dwarris, pp. 64, 65, 66, 67, 325.
Morris & Furlong, on same side :
The act of February 17, 1854, p. 137, was in substance brought down to the codes of 1857 and 1871, delegating legislative power to the “legal voters ” on this question, and has never been decided in this state ; but similar acts have been decided in other states. Bice v. Foster, 4 Harrington (Del.), 479; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St., 507 ; Commonwealth v. M’Williams, 11 id., 61; State v. Field, 17 Mo., 529 ; State v. Copeland, 3 B. I., 33; Geebrick v. The State, 5 Iowa, 495 ; Maize v. State, 4 Ind., 343 ; Meshmeier v. State, 11 id., 484; Cooley Con. Lim. (2 ed.), 124. In all these cases, the statutes under consideration conferred power on a “legal voter,” and yet they are held unconstitutional. All law making power is vested in the legislature (Const., art. IV, sec. 1), and none is delegated.
Geo. L. Potter, for appellees :
Can even the legislative journals be introduced to impeach a statute ? - See Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss., 268 ; Green v. Weller, 32 id., 650. As to the petition for license, the act of 1872 required an applicant for license to keep a tavern to produce a recommendation of six respectable freeholders, or housekeepers, to his good reputation, etc.; but this did not entitle the applicant to demand a license. H. C., p. 264, art. II, sec. 2. The act of 1842 makes the recommendation a prerequisite to the grant of license. H C., p. 271, § 6. These laws were not mandatory, but merely authorized the grant. The code of 1857 gave power to grant license upon a petition of “a majority of legal voters ” (Code, 1857, p. 197, § 4), and counter petitions were allowed. The power of the legislature to prohibit or to regulate the traffic is séttled. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 181. As to the power to prohibit and require petitions, etc., see House v. The State, 41 Miss., 787. The Code of 1871 adopted the policy of the Code of 1857. See §§ 2456-59. This act was permissive and not mandatory. The power to grant license is a discretion to be exercised for the public good. Mayor, etc., v. Bowman, 89 Miss., 671. The act of 1874, pp. 29, 30, adheres to the policy adopted since 1822. The applicant must be “recommended,” not by six freeholders, etc., as by act of 1822, not by majority of legal voters as by acts of 1857 and 1871, but it goes a little further, and requires a majority of the male citizens of twenty-one years of age, and a majority of the female citizens of eighteen years of age. The aet is constitutional. See 38 Miss., 652; 26 Vt, 356; 26 Wis., 291; Cooley Con. Lim., 117.

Opinion:
Simrall, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.-
The only question seriously pressed is as to the validity of the " aet " of 1874 to amend section 2459 of the Code of 1871, regulating the sale of vinous and spirituous liquors, etc. The act to which this statute is an amendment is chap. 56, Code 1871, none of which is affected by the legislation in question except sec. 2459. The first seetion of the chapter declares " it shall not be lawful for any person, except druggists and physicians under the restrictions hereinafter named, to sell vinous and spirituous liquors in a less quantity than one gallon without first having obtained a lieense therefor." The prohibition is to sell by the retail (less than a gallon), the privilege so to do, however, may be obtained on certain conditions.
The subject of retailing liquor has, from the earliest time, been subject to regulation. A compilation of the earlier statutes was made June 29, 1822. Hut. Code, pp. 264, 265, 266. The seeond section has the feature of requiring the applicant to be recommended by at least six respectable freeholders (in some casesj householders), and the third section exacts a bond. For cause, the license may be revoked. This was followed by the act of 1837, commonly called the gallon law, which repealed the former license laws and prohibited the sale altogether in less quantities than one gallon. In 1842 the legislature restored the license system, prohibiting all not licensed from selling in less quantities than a gallon, and requiring the applicant to be endorsed as a respectable person by five freeholders, and bond to be given. Hut. Code, 270, 271. This statute was substantially incorporated into the revision of 1857, with additions and alterations. Among others, the applicant shall produce to the board of supervisors, or the town or city authorities, a petition signed by a majority of the voters resident in the police district or in the incorporated city or town which, with the counter petition, shall lay over one month, and if a majority of voters shall petition against such license, it shall not be granted for twelve months after such petition is so presented. Art. IV., pp. 197, 198. The license may be revoked if the party shall become an unfit person, or shall violate the provisions of the act. Art. VII, p. 198. Bond must be given that gaming, drunkenness, or disorderly conduct will not be allowed, but an orderly, peaceable house will be kept. Chapter 56 of the present code is in substance the same.
This review of the legislation indicates that the policy of the state has been to prohibit, in general, the sale of intoxicating liquors by the glass, except that the special privilege was authorized to be granted to applicants who supported their claim by proper vouchers of being respectable persons, and who gave bond that they would not violate the statute, nor suffer disorder or drunkenness on the premises. The assumption in all this legislation has been that it would be unwise and detrimental to permit the promiscuous, unrestricted sale of vinous and spirituous liquors by the small or the drink, and that the privilege should only be granted to the discreet and reputable, and that, too, under the security of bonds and subject to revocation for good cause.
Art. 2459, like a corresponding section in the statute of 1857, demanded that the petitioner for license should support his claim with a recommendation signed by a majority of tbe legal voters of the police district, or of the incorporated city or town that the applicant is of good reputation, and a sober and suitable person to receive a license. Opportunity is given of fully canvassing the matter by allowing counter petitions, etc. Except when the sale by the glass was totally prohibited by the act of 1839, the law from 1822, forward, has always insisted that the privilege should only be granted to a fit person, and the evidence of that under the older statutes should be furnished by six freeholders, or five freeholders, and under the later statutes by a majority of the legal voters of the locality, and under the last amendment of 1874, by a still larger number of persons residing in the district, town, or city, those more immediately affected by it. It would seem that it ought hardly to be questioned at this day that it belongs to the police power of the state to regulate the retail dealing in, and sale of intoxicating liquors. Perhaps all the states have legislated on the subject; some by total prohibition, and others by dealing with the subject under rules and regulations. Such legislation rests on the popular conviction that it is to the interest of morals, sobriety, industry and good order that the state should hold tbe traffic under surveillance.
The state may deal with the subject by absolute prohibition, or by regulations. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129; License Cases, 5 How. (S. C.), 504; Cooley Const. Lim., 581-2-3. The police power extends to wholesome restrictions on property and individuals, in order to secure the general health, comfort and prosperity of the state. The power of the legislature cannot be questioned. Thorpe v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 149; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush., 84. If the state may require the recommendation of five or six freeholders, it may enlarge the number to. ten or fifty. In a word, it may, in its discretion, lay down the terms upon which the license may issue. During all the years that these several statutes have been in force, with the many indictments and litigation that have grown out of them, we have been referred to no case that throws doubt or suspicion on their validity. In House v. State, 41 Miss., 737, so far from casting suspicion on art. IV., p. 197-8 of the code of 1857, which is the original of section 2459 of the present code, it was expressly held, that the grant of license "without the petition of a majority of the legal voters resident within the city is null and void. The court says (pp. 742, 743) that the instruction of the circuit court, which embodied that idea, announced a correct principle of law. It will be observed that the statute of 1857 applied more stringent terms to the applicant for license than the former laws, nor was it debated at the bar, or alluded to by the court that it was not as completely in the competency of the legislature to require the petitioner for license to be supported by a majority of voters, as by the few householders, or freeholders under the prior laws.
The statute of 1874 makes a further enlargement of the countenance and support which the applicant must have. He must produce a petition, signed by a majority of the male citizens over twenty-one years, and a majority of the female citizens over eighteen years of age, resident, etc. It would not be controverted if the legislature might require a majority of the legal .voters. It could, in its discretion, have increased the number to two-thirds or three-fourths, or it might have returned to the old statutes and have insisted upon the consent of two-thirds, or a majority of the freeholders or householders. If that be true, upon what rule of constitutional law shall it not be allowed to demand, as in this statute, the consent of a majority of male citizens over twenty-one, and of females over eighteen years of age.
Whether the recommendation and consent of any person resident in the district or town or city shall be obtained or not, or whether the whole matter shall be referred to the judgment of the board of supervisors, or town or city authorities, is purely a matter for the wisdom of the legislature.
However the question may be elaborated, it comes to this complexion at last: Has the legislature the power to regulate the sale of vinous and spirituous liquors ? The answer is, that it has done so from the beginning until now, and no decision has been re ferred to which so much as doubts the power. These rules and regulations have been variously changed from time to time, at the pleasure of the representative body. Can the judiciary interfere and pronounce judgment on the expediency and fitness of rules which are exclusively committed to the legislative choice and discretion ? A court must be pointed to some provision of the constitution which a statute violates, before it can declare it inoperative. " As to the policy of legislation, the judiciary have nothing to do; that is wisely left to the lawmaking department. A court only consults the policy of a law, as an aid to attain the legislative meaning and intent." If a law is touching a subject not given up to the national government, nor prohibited by the federal constitution, nor excepted out of the legislative power in the state constitution, can the judiciary listen to argument founded upon its supposed inutility and inexpediency ? It involves the inadmissible proposition of the judiciary sitting in review upon legislative wisdom and discretion. Donnell v. State, 48 Miss., 679. The premise is that the legislative control over the subject is plenary. If terms are imposed which are harsh and unwisely chosen, the courts cannot interfere to cure or correct legislative indiscretion, nor has it the right or power to suggest other regulations deemed more suitable. The People v. Simeon Draper, 15 N. Y., 545. " If a particular act of legislation does not conflict with any of the limitations or restrictions of the constitution, it is not in the power of the courts to arrest its execution, however unwise its provisions may be, or whatever the motives that led to its enactment. The remedy for bad legislation is better afforded by frequent removals of the legislative body, than any that can be given by the courts. "
" The representative body is entrusted with the responsibility of consulting the public interest and carrying out public policy by the enactment of laws. The power to review their fitness and wisdom does not belong to the courts. In 1857, the legislature said a majority of the voters must petition for the license. In 1874, it has said more than that. The question before the court is not as to the fitness and expediency of the law, but whether the legislature was competent to pass it. The argument made against the validity of the statute of 1874 is, that it submits the question of license or no license to a vote, which, it is urged, involves an abnegation of legislative power, and a devolution of it upon electors, which cannot be done; and, more than that, it authorizes females, some of whom are minors, to have a voice in the election. Is the law fairly obnoxious to that criticism ? It is much freer of that objection than the statute of 1857, under which House's Case was decided. " All male citizens over twenty-one " is a larger denomination than "voters." It embraces all voters, and many more besides. The inclusion of females over eighteen shows conclusively that the petition for license was not meant to be limited to " voters," and that the idea of an "election " by the class entitled to " vote" was not in the mind of the legislature. The principle upon which the law rests is, that the license shall not issue unless a majority of the community, who have reached that maturity of mind that qualifies them to judge of the quality of the act and its effects, shall petition for it. Females who participate have attained a marriageable age, and are profoundly concerned that those with whom their future may be linked should be surrounded with influences that contribute to sobriety, thrift and prosperity. That may have been one of the motives of associating them with the males over twenty-one in the right to petition for or against the license. "We are not called upon to say that the conditions are unreasonable. This statute is not framed upon the theory of what are called optional laws. It does not propose to submit the " question " to a vote, whether license shall or shall not be granted in the county, or incorporated city or town. The power in the board of supervisors, or the mayor and aldermen, is not made dependent upon a vote in favor of its exercise. The statute grants to these municipal bodies authority to issue license to those applicants who present a petition or recommendation signed by the number of persons named. The application of one person may be thus sustained, whilst another may not be. Just as under the earlier statutes, one person might procure the recommendation of the freeholders and householders, and another might not. As, under the act of 1857, one person might be recommended by the majority of the voters, whilst others might altogether fail. So, too, under any one of these statutes, there might be the requisite recommendation signed; but the party might fail of his license from inability to give the bond.
The parallel of the statutes of 1857, of 1871, and the amendment of 1874, is found in the act of 1833, in reference to the leasing of the sixteenth section (the school lands') leases for ninety-nine years which should be granted by the township trustees, on a request of " a majority of the resident heads of families " (minors not excepted). Here the act could be done on " consent obtained " of heads of families, including minors, Some of these heads of families might be females, aliens.
Under the statute of 1822, and the early amendments, the freeholders or householders who vouched for the petitioner for license might be females, adults or minors. The statutory qualification was "freeholders" or "householders."
Legislation on this subject has been tested in various forms. Perhaps experience has shown that the police power of the state, whether put forth in the form of prohibitory laws, or in subjecting the retail traffic to regulations and restrictions, has not been able to suppress intemperance.
The general policy has been to entrust the sale of intoxicating liquors by the drink to those only who could procure evidence of good reputation, and then to put them under bonds, and surround them with such checks as would best provide against excesses and abuses.
A wisely regulated license system is perhaps the best that the state can do.
Whether the existing law is of that character is not our province to say. The rest may be left to those religious and moral influences which continually advance and improve our civilization.
There is no error in the judgment; let it be affirmed.