Case Name: CRAIG v. OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2002-02-01
Citations: 249 Mich. App. 534
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 206642, 206859, 206951
Parties: CRAIG v OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Judges: Before: Cooper, P.J., and Sawyer and Owens, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 249
Pages: 534–579

Head Matter:
CRAIG v OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Docket Nos. 206642, 206859, 206951.
Submitted October 8, 2001, at Detroit.
Decided February 1, 2002, at 9:15 am.
Leave to appeal sought.
Antonio Craig, a minor afflicted with cerebral palsy and severe mental retardation, by his next friend and mother, Kimberly Craig, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Oakwood Hospital, Associated Physicians, P.C., Elias G. Gennaoui, M.D., Ajit Kittur, M.D., and Henry Ford Hospital, alleging and seeking damages for medical malpractice relating to the plaintiff’s birth. The plaintiffs mother delivered the plaintiff at Oakwood Hospital while attended by Dr. Kittur and Dr. Gennaoui, who were both employed by Associated Physicians, P.C., which has since been dissolved. The plaintiff alleged that Henry Ford Hospital is liable as the successor of Associated Physicians, P.C. The successor liability claim against Henry Ford Hospital was severed from the malpractice claims against the other defendants. A jury returned a verdict and award of damages against the malpractice defendants, except for Dr. Kittur. The court, Carole F. Youngblood, J., conducted a bench trial on the issue of Henry Ford Hospital’s successor liability and found it liable. The court entered a judgment consistent with its verdict and the jury’s verdict. The defendants who were found liable appealed, and their appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeals held-.
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of a neurologist offered by the plaintiff and challenged by Oakwood Hospital. In the absence of a showing by Oak-wood Hospital that the disputed testimony was based on novel scientific evidence, the trial court, contrary to Oakwood Hospital’s contention, was not required to conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence was generally accepted in the scientific community.
2. The trial court did not err in denying Oakwood Hospital’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in which the hospital asserted that there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiffs mother received an overdose of Pitocin or suffered severe and prolonged contractions during labor. The evidence presented at trial regarding appropriate Pitocin dosage and the nature of the contractions was contradictory, thus precluding a grant of Oak-wood Hospital’s motion.
3. The trial court did not err in denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict brought by Dr. Gennaoui, Associated Physicians, P.C., and Oakwood Hospital. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, does not support these defendants’ contention that the plaintiff’s expert witnesses provided conflicting testimony regarding causation. Both of the plaintiffs expert witnesses opined that reduced oxygen flow to the plaintiffs brain during his mother’s labor, aggravated by the misuse of Pitocin, caused the plaintiff’s injury, although one expert indicated that the plaintiffs brain also sustained injury torn trauma to his head while in his mother’s pelvic rim. Oakwood Hospital’s additional arguments in support of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are without merit. The testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses was not contrary to the facts established by eyewitnesses to the labor and delivery. Despite Oakwood Hospital’s contention that it could not have breached the standard of care by not having an internal uterine pressure catheter available in light of Dr. Gennaoui’s nonuse of the device, expert testimony regarding the standard of practice applicable to teaching hospitals such as Oakwood Hospital with respect to making such a device available created a question of fact for the jury.
4 The defendants were not denied a fair and impartial trial by alleged misconduct by the plaintiff’s counsel at trial. Counsel’s comments about the plaintiff’s race, racial discrimination, and the plaintiff’s skin color at birth do not indicate a studied purpose to inflame or prejudice the jury or deflect the jury’s attention from the issues involved. Oakwood Hospital’s claim—that the suggestion by plaintiff’s counsel that medical records had been altered deprived Oakwood Hospital of a fair trial—is without merit. Oakwood Hospital failed to show that counsel’s single question during voir dire about alteration of medical records and questions posed to witnesses about alteration of medical records stated anything improper to the jury or made the jury likely to believe that medical records had been altered. The comment by plaintiffs counsel during closing argument that the Food and Drug Administration (fda) had removed Pitocin from the market did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial. The medical witnesses gave conflicting testimony regarding continued fda approval of Pitocin. However, any errors relating to counsel’s statement about fda approval of Pitocin were sufficiently cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it should not consider statements by counsel to be evidence.
5. The trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for a mistrial based on the trial judge’s alleged partiality to the plaintiff. The defendants failed to identify any objective conduct or comments by the trial judge that served to deprive them of a fair trial and, therefore, have not overcome the presumption that the trial judge was impartial.
6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence material from medical treatises and textbooks. The material was properly admitted pursuant to MRE 707, which allows the use of a learned treatise for impeachment of an expert witness during cross-examination and for the rehabilitation of the expert during redirect examination on subjects or issues related to the treatise that was used to impeach the witness during cross-examination.
7. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Oak-wood Hospital’s motion for remittitur of the jury award for future noneconomic damages inasmuch as the award was within the range of the evidence presented and was not the result of prejudice, passion, or sympathy. The trial court did abuse its discretion by denying Oakwood Hospital’s motion for remittitur of the jury award for lost earning capacity. The evidence did not support the amount awarded by the jury.
8. Remand is not required with respect to the trial court’s award of costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff, or with respect to the reduction of future damages to present value. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the reasonableness of the attorney fees, and, consistent with the method prescribed by the Supreme Court, the trial court used a simple interest rate to reduce future damages to present value.
9. The trial court did not err in finding that Henry Ford Hospital, as the successor of Associated Physicians, P.C., was vicariously liable under respondeat superior for Dr. Gennaoui’s negligence. When Dr. Gennaoui attended the plaintiffs mother during her labor and delivery, Dr. Gennaoui was employed by Associated Physicians, P.C. The shareholders of Associated Physicians, P.C., converted the professional corporation into a business corporation, Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc. Henry Ford Hospital purchased all the outstanding shares of the business corporation and installed Henry Ford Hospital employees as officers of the business corporation. Additionally, most of the physician shareholders of Associated Physicians, P.C., along with other physicians, created a new professional corporation, APMC, P.C., and entered into a service agree ment with Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc. The clinic maintained the same location, operating under the name Associated Physicians Medical Center in association with Henry Ford Health Care Corporation. The trial court correctly found that the conditions for holding Henry Ford Hospital liable as successor of Associated Physicians, P.C., had been met.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of an order of remittitur.
Cooper, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that the award for lost earning capacity fell reasonably within the range of the evidence and within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in all respects.
1. Evidence — Scientific Testimony.
A court that admits scientific testimony into evidence must ensure that it is relevant and reliable.
2. Motions and Orders — Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only where there was insufficient evidence presented to create an issue for the jury; the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the facts presented preclude judgment for the nonmoving party as a matter of law; if reasonable minds could differ regarding the evidence, the question is for the jury and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper.
3. Negligence — Medical Malpractice — Causation — Circumstantial Proof.
Causation, as an element of a medical malpractice claim, may be established with circumstantial evidence; such evidence must enable a jury to reasonably infer that more likely than not, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred.
4. Trial — Jury Trial — Attorney Misconduct.
An attorney’s comments at a jury trial usually will not be cause for reversal unless they indicate a deliberate course of conduct aimed at preventing a fair and impartial trial; reversal is required only where the prejudicial statements of an attorney reflect a studied purpose to inflame or prejudice the jury or deflect the jury’s attention from the issues involved.
5. Courts — Jury Trial — Impartiality.
A trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality where the conduct or comments unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive a party of a fair and impartial trial; a party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.
6. Witnesses — Impeachment — Rehabilitation — Learned Treatises.
A learned treatise can be used to impeach an expert witness during cross-examination and to rehabilitate that same expert during redirect examination on subjects or issues related to the treatise that was used to impeach that expert during cross-examination (MRE 707).
7. Motions and Orders — Remittitur — Appeal
A trial court may grant a defendant’s motion for remittitur if the jury verdict is excessive, that is, greater than the highest amount that the evidence will support; an appellate court may not disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for remittitur unless it determines that there has been an abuse of discretion (MCR 2.611[E][1]).
8. Motions and Orders — Remittitur.
A trial court, in deciding a motion for remittitur, considers whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact, whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the ipjuiy sustained, and whether the amount actually awarded is comparable to awards within the state and in other jurisdictions (MCR 2.611[E][1]).
Mark L. Silverman, for Antonio Craig.
Saurbier, Paradiso & Davis, P.C. (by Scott A. Saurbier) (Gross, Nemeth & Silverman, P.L.C. by James G. Gross, of Counsel), for Oakwood Hospital.
Kitch Drutchas Wagner DeNardis & Valitutti (by Susan Healy Zitterman) and Kallas & Henk, PC. (by Leonard A. Henk), for Henry Ford Hospital.
O’Leary, O’Leary, Jacobs, Mattson, Perry & Mason, P.C. (by John P. Jacobs), for Associated Physicians, P.C., and Elias G. Gennaoui.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Sawyer and Owens, JJ.

Opinion:
Owens, J.
We agree with Judge Cooper's opinion in all respects except for portions of section vn. Specifically, we disagree with the rejection of defendant Oakwood Hospital's challenge to the trial court's denial of its motion for remittitur based on the jury's damages award for plaintiff's lost earning capacity. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Generally, a trial court may grant a defendant's motion for remittitur if the jury verdict is "excessive," that is, greater than the highest amount that the evidence will support. MCR 2.611(E)(1). An appellate court may not disturb a trial court's decision to deny a motion for remittitur unless it determines that there has been an abuse of discretion. Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 533; 443 NW2d 354 (1989).
Here, the jury awarded plaintiff, who was bom in 1980, $52,000 for lost earning capacity for 1998. In addition, to calculate plaintiff's lost earning capacity for each subsequent year through 2041, the jury added three percent to the previous year's figure to account for inflation. Ultimately, as with any future damages award, the trial court reduced plaintiff's lost earning capacity damages award to its present value: $1,992,138.41.
Defendant Oakwood Hospital moved for remittitur, arguing that the lost earning capacity award should have been reduced to a present value of $967,045 because that was the highest amount supported by the evidence. The $967,045 figure was based on the following testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Robert Ancell:
I looked at certain data that's available to us, government data. It's national data and it's related to race, sex, and also education and from that data I indicated and felt that his previous earning capacity was in the area of nineteen thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight dollars a year [$19,938] to approximately twenty-two thousand seven hundred fifty-four dollars per year [$22,754].
Dr. Ancell opined that "one could reasonably expect him to have an earning capacity of a high school graduate or maybe a little bit more than a high school graduate, based on the educational achievements of his biological parents."
Dr. Ancell also testified that the 1997 starting salary at automobile manufacturing companies in Michigan was about twenty dollars an hour, or approximately $40,000 a year, plus benefits. Dr. Ancell noted that a high school education has become a minimum requirement for obtaining this employment. On the other hand, Dr. Ancell testified that "not everybody that wants" these manufacturing jobs get them because of the competition. Dr. Ancell's testimony was supplemented by the expert testimony of a certified public accountant, Marvin Weinstein, that national data indicated that the value of a benefits package was approximately 31.4 percent of the compensation. Thus, Weinstein opined that the benefits package on the $40,000 a year manufacturing job suggested by Dr. Ancell, would be worth approximately $12,560 a year. As noted above, the jury awarded plaintiff $52,000 for lost earning capacity for 1998.
In denying defendant Oakwood Hospital's motion for remittitur, the trial court opined as follows:
There is no evidence this jury was fueled by bias, prejudice or passion. These jurors were all working people and at least one of them was a nurse. They were experienced people who would have a normal understanding of life's problems and blessings.
They sat patiently through a five-week trial which they had been told would only last for two weeks.
The Plaintiffs case took only four or five trial days and the defense spent more than three times that many days putting on their case .
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This Court will not upset the carefully considered decision of the jury and because I believe reasonable minds could find Antonio's life and the ability to live that life could have a reasonable value of $20.9 million. It is important to note that the jury was not required to find that Antonio could only have achieved the minimum income level stream projected by Dr. Ancell. The jury was free to find that Antonio would go beyond a high school education, complete college, and have a professional working life where he earned many times more money than that projected by Dr. Ancell. The projections were the minimum amounts, not the maximum amounts.
As noted above, the trial court's denial of the remittitur motion is challenged on appeal.
It should initially be noted that the length of the trial is not relevant to a determination that the jury award was not excessive. In fact, the trial court's observation that the jury had to sit for three more weeks than they were originally told the trial would take, and that it was the defendants who caused the trial to be so lengthy, would, if anything, give rise to a concern that the jurors could have become biased against the defendants for the inconvenience defendants caused them. Further, contrary to the trial court's suggestion, no evidence was presented indicating that it was reasonable to conclude that plaintiff would have completed college or pursued a professional career.
Moreover, the trial court erroneously characterized Dr. Ancell's figures as the "minimum" income level stream. Dr. Ancell's testimony suggested that the income range he arrived at for plaintiff was based on national averages under the reasonable assumption that plaintiff would graduate from high school, and did not correspond to a minimum earning potential. Indeed, the minimum earning capacity for someone with a high school education would be $0, if that person were unwilling or unable to find employment, or perhaps the national minimum wage extrapolated to a full-time work schedule. Presumably, the national data cited by Dr. Ancell included high school graduates who were unemployed and underemployed, as well as those who aspired, successfully, to obtain desirable employment in the automobile-manufacturing sector.
Regardless, Dr. Ancell's testimony was that, in his opinion, plaintiff's lost earning capacity was $19,938 to $22,754 dollars a year. He did not testify that it would be reasonable to assume that plaintiff would gain employment in the automobile-manufacturing sector. Instead, Dr. Ancell's testimony indicated that demand for these jobs exceeds the supply, assuming, of course, that plaintiff would have even wanted to pursue this career path. Dr. Ancell's testimony regarding the automobile-manufacturing jobs was, at most, illustrative of what one specific job might pay a high school graduate. In sum, the evidence was insufficient to support a reasonable factual finding that plaintiff's lost earning capacity for 1998 was $52,000.
However, in the instant matter, there was testimony that it was reasonable to conclude that plaintiff would have graduated from high school. In addition, Dr. Ancell's testimony also suggested that plaintiff may have gone "a little bit" beyond high school. Dr. Ancell, however, did not offer any testimony regarding the earning capacity, if any, for this additional education. Nevertheless, the evidence was certainly sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff's lost earning capacity was at the highest end of Dr. Ancell's earning capacity range for high school graduates. Accordingly, the maximum lost earning capacity award actually supported by the evidence for 1998 was $22,750, plus $7,143.50 (31.4 percent, based on Weinstein's testimony) for benefits, or $29,893.50.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the actual jury award for lost earning capacity was not "excessive" pursuant to MCR 2.611(A) and (E), and by denying defendant Oakwood Hospital's motion for remittitur. We remand for an order remitting plaintiff's lost earning capacity for 1998 to $29,893.50.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Sawyer, J., concurred.
In addition, defendants Dr. Elias G. Gennaoui and Associated Physicians, P.C., moved for a new trial, contending that only a new trial would do justice because the jury's verdict could not possibly be satisfied. The trial court denied this motion. A new trial may be granted where the damages award is excessive. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(c) and (d). However, a defendant's ability or inability to satisfy a judgment award is not a proper indicator of excessiveness. See Palenkas, supra at 531-533. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying these defendants' motion for a new trial.
Unfortunately, when an individual is injured at birth, it is impossible to reliably predict what career path the individual would have followed "but for" the injury. In contrast, it is relatively straightforward to calculate lost earnings when an individual is already employed in a career. Similarly, when an individual is pursuing a specific career or vocation, it may be reasonable to assume that the individual would complete that career path. Even performance in school may be a reasonable indicator that an injured person would have pursued a college education, but for an injury. In other words, as the date of injury moves toward birth along a continuum between birth and employment in a desired career path, it necessarily becomes more difficult to reasonably estimate lost earning capacity.
Indeed, it is certainly possible that any newborn child will overachieve relative to the child's family history and other objective considerations, but it is also possible that any newborn child will go on to underachieve relative to those same factors. Although it is possible that an injured person would have become a highly compensated professional athlete, it is also possible that the injured person would have chosen a career path leading to intangible rewards, rather than a career based solely on financial reward. Ultimately, to conclude that a person injured at birth would have followed any particular career path "but for" the injury is the hallmark of "speculation," and it is well established that a plaintiff may not recover tort damages that are speculative or contingent. Theisen v Knake, 236 Mich App 249, 258; 599 NW2d 777 (1999).
The evidence supported the addition of three percent a year to plaintiffs lost earning capacity to account for inflation, subject, ultimately, to a proper reduction to present value.