Case Name: ESTILL, guardian, et al. v. ESTILL et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1919-09-27
Citations: 149 Ga. 384
Docket Number: Nos. 1126, 1169
Parties: ESTILL, guardian, et al. v. ESTILL et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, J., disqualified, and Hill, J., dissenting from the ruling in the second headnote.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 149
Pages: 384–395

Head Matter:
ESTILL, guardian, et al. v. ESTILL et al.
Nos. 1126, 1169.
September 27, 1919.
Interpleader. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. July 19, 1918.
John Holbrook Estill died on November 9, 1907, leaving a will the eighth item of which was as follows: “And to the Citizens and Southern Bank of Savannah one sixth part, which it shall hold as trustee upon the following uses and trusts, namely, to pay the income therefrom to my son, Marion W. Estill, during the term of his natural life, for the support of himself and the support and education of his children should he leave any, and after Ms death said income to be applied to the support and education of Mg children, the principal to be equally divided between them when tiie youngest child attains the age of twenty-one years. In the event of the death of either of said children during minority and Avithout leaving issue, the share of the one so dying shall go to the survivor or survivors, children of a deceased child to represent the parent. If, however, my son, Marion W. Estill, should depart this life leaA'ing no child or issue of a child him surviAdng, then the one sixth part shall be equally distributed betAvecn the distributees of the other five sixths in the manner provided in this item.” Marion W. Estill, the son named in the foregoing item of the will, died on December 26, 1915. Marion W. Estill married Elizabeth Pate on October 30, 1902. After the death of Marion AV., Mrs. Elizabeth Pate Estill, as guardian of Marian Virginia Estill, alleged to be the child of Marion W. Estill and Elizabeth Pate Estill, called upon the Citizens and Southern Bank to pay to her the income which she claimed was rightfully due to her as guardian and as next friend of Marian Virginia Estill, under the eighth item of the will of John Holbrook Estill. The bank refused to pay over the income to the guardian, and the guardian filed suit against it in Chatham superior court. The bank filed a petition for inter-pleader, in which it alleged that it had been notified by the other legatees and claimants under the will of John Holbrook Estill that Marion W. Estill died Avithout children or issue or child surAÚving him; that Marian Virginia Estill was not his child, and that she was not entitled to receive the income under the will. The parties at interest were required to interplead. Marian Virginia Estill, by her mother, Elizabeth Estill as guardian and as next friend, filed an answer setting up the claim of the minor to the trust fund, and praying that the trustee be directed to pay the income of the trust property to the guardian. The heirs of John Holbrook Estill, entitled under his will to the property in the event Marion AV Estill died without child or the issue of child surviving him, in their answer alleged that Marian Virginia Estill was not the child of Marion W. Estill, but that the said Marian Virginia Estill was taken as an infant by Marion AV. Estill and his wife, Mrs. Elizabeth Pate Estill, and claimed as their child for the purpose of securing to Elizabeth Pate Estill control of the income from the property in question and for the purpose of depriving the defendants of the same.' The cause came on for trial at the November term, 1916, of Chatham superior court. - The jury returned a verdict in favor of the guardian, and the defendants filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the court. To this grant of a new trial the guardian filed exceptions,, and the judgment of the court was affirmed by the Supreme Court at the October term, 1917. Estill v. Estill, 147 Ga. 358 (94 S. E. 304). In April, 1918, the case was again submitted to a jury in Chatham superior court. The plaintiffs relied upon positive evidence, while some of the evidence for the defendants was negative in character.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
1. Where, upon a material issue in a case, the evidence in behalf of one party is positive and the evidence in behalf of the opposite party is negative, it is error to instruct the jury: "The existence of a fact testified to by one positive witness is to be delieved rather than that such fact did not exist because many witnesses who had the same opportunity of observation swear that they did not see or know of its having transpired. This rule does not apply when, two pai-ties 'having equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing, one swears that it occurred, the other that it did not," without the qualification that the witnesses in other respects are found to be equally credible. Humphries v. State, 100 Ga. 260 (28 S. E. 25); Atlanta Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 105 Ga. 498 (30 S. E. 934); Southern Ry. Co. v. O'Bryan, 115 Ga. 659 (42 S. E. 42); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. O'Neill, 127 Ga. 685 (56 S. E. 986); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Orr, 128 Ga. 76 (57 S. E. 89); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Brock, 139 Ga. 248 (77 S. E. 20); Ware v. House, 141 Ga. 410 (81 S. E. 118); Georgia Railroad &c. Co. v. Radford, 144 Ga. 22 (85 S. E. 1006). Consequently-the trial judge did not err in granting a nev trial on the ground assigning error upon the instruction just quoted.
2. Where the paternity of a child is the issue involved, the declarations of the reputed father, since deceased, are admissible in evidence, under-section 5764 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Pedigree, including descent, relationship, birth, marriage, and death, may be proved either by the declarations of deceased persons related by blood or marriage, or by general repute in the family, or by genealogies, inscriptions, 'family trees,' and similar evidence." The weight to be given the declarations is a matter for the jury.
(a) The case of Mobley v. Pierce, 144 Ga. 327 (87 S. E. 24), differs on its facts from the present case, and does not require a contrary holding.
Judgment on both bills of exceptions affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, J., disqualified, and Hill, J., dissenting from the ruling in the second headnote.
The court, over objection of defendants, admitted in evidence the declarations of Marion W. Estill, made after September 9, 1912, tending to show that Marian Virginia Estill was his child. The ground of objection was that the declarations were made post litem motam. For the most part these declarations were contained in letters written by Marion W. Estill, while absent from his -home, to his wife and to Marian Virginia. At the time the letters were written neither the paternity of the child nor her right to claim under the will of J. IT. Estill had ever been questioned by any member of the Estill family, so far as the record discloses. In his charge the court instructed the jury as follows: "The existence of 'a fact testified to by one positive witness is to be believed rather than that such fact did not exist because many witnesses who had the same opportunity of observation swear that they did not see or know of its having transpired. This rule does not apply when, two parties having equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing, one swears that it occurred, the other that it did not." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants moved for a new trial, which was granted upon the ground that the court erred in giving the above-quoted instruction (30th ground of the motion). The plaintiffs sued out a writ of error, excepting to the judgment granting a new trial. The defendants, by cross-bill, excepted to the refusal of the court to grant them a new trial upon other grounds set out in the motion, and especially upon the grounds assigning error upon the ruling of the court in admitting evidence of the written and oral declárations of Marion W. Estill to the effect that Marian Virginia Estill was his child.
W. B. Stubbs, G. N. Alford, and Oliver & Oliver, for plaintiffs.
Thomas P. Ravenel, Robert L. Golding, and Osborne, Lawrence & Abrahams, for defendants.