Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Louis H. Feldman, Plaintiff in Error
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1915-06-17
Citations: 194 Ill. App. 328
Docket Number: Gen. No. 20,418
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Louis H. Feldman, Plaintiff in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 194
Pages: 328–331

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Louis H. Feldman, Plaintiff in Error.
Gen. No. 20,418.
(Not to he reported in full.)
Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Walker, Judge, presiding.
Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1914.
Reversed and remanded.
Opinion filed June 17, 1915.
Statement of the Case.
. Prosecution by the People of the State of Illinois against Louis H. Feldman for receiving stolen property. From a judgment of guilty, defendant appeals.
The only witness who testified to facts of any importance was the alleged accomplice, Mike Stenzen. He testified in substance, as follows: That he was a tailor and was employed in the “stock room” of a wholesale clothier named Strauss; that he knew the defendant, who with his three brothers, kept a dry-goods and clothing store on Twelfth street, near Halsted, in Chicago; that on the last Sunday in June, 1913, he went to Feldman’s store with a friend, who was “going to the old country,” to buy the latter a suit of clothes; that defendant waited on them; that “during the buying,” Stenzen told the defendant that he was a tailor and worked in the stock room “over at Strauss’;” that defendant then took him aside and said to him: “Can’t you bring me some goods? I could pay you and you could make extra money, besides your wages; ’ ’ that defendant also said that he would pay “$3 for each suit;” that Stenzen “didn’t promise to bring him,” but went home thinking about it, and on Sunday, July 13, 1913, he stole from the stock room seven yards of blue serge, in two pieces of three and one-half yards each, worth $3.50 or $4 a yard; that he took these pieces to the store of Feldman Brothers, where he met the defendant, who said: “Youbrought something? Come in;” that defendant took him into the cutting room on the second floor, where they met the defendant’s brother, Morris Feldman; that after talking a moment with his brother, the defendant said: “Give me the package,” opened it and looked at the goods; that Morris Feldman said: “How much do you want;” that Stenzen replied: “Louis Feldman, he offered me $3 for each three and a half yard;” that Morris replied: “I won’t pay $3 for three yards and a half, because I know the goods is stolen;” that finally they paid him $5 for the seven yards, or $2.50 for each suit; that on July 31, 1913, he stole another piece of blue serge of the same size—three and a half yards—worth $3 a yard, from the cutting room of Strauss, and sold it to the defendant for $3; that in each of these cases, the defendant paid him by check; that when he and the defendant were arrested, on August 5, 1913, the police officers asked the defendant if he knew Stenzen, and defendant replied that he never saw him before, whereupon Stenzen told the officers to look at defendant’s check books, which they did and found the stubs of two checks for $3 each, payable to Stenzen. The other two witnesses called by the State merely testified that when defendant was arrested, he at first denied any acquaintance with Stenzen, but when shown the stubs in the check book, admitted (as one witness testified) that he “might have bought goods from him,” or (as the other testified) that he “might have paid him those checks. ’ ’
The evidence of these three witnesses constituted the whole case for the prosecution. The defendant called eighteen witnesses, of whom eight testified that defendant had always borne a good reputation. The defendant testified positively that he never saw Stenzen until the day he was arrested; that he never had acquaintance with Stenzen, and that Stenzen had never sold him any goods. The defendant’s brother Morris Feld man, testified that he was the buyer for the firm of Feldman Brothers; that he bought the goods in question from Stenzen; that Stenzen introduced himself as a jobber, presenting his business card which was offered in evidence, and which read: “M. Stenzen, Jobber in Woolens & Tailors Trimmings, 822 E. 63rd Street, Chicago;” that Stenzen represented that he had for sale three bolts of cloth, containing one hundred and forty or one hundred and fifty yards in all, of which he had a sample with him, containing a little over three yards; that the cloth was worth $1.40 to $1.50 a yard, subject to a discount of “ten per cent, thirty days;” that the defendant, Louis Feldman, was not present at the time; that he (Morris) agreed to buy the cloth at $1.22% per yard and Stenzen agreed to deliver the same in two days; that he also bought the sample for $3; that a piece of that size is worth less than in the bolt; that he directed the cashier to give Stenzen a check for the $3, which was done, whereupon Stenzen asked for the money, and it was given Trim upon his indorsing the check. The testimony of Morris Feldman as to the business card and the check was fully corroborated by the cashier. The evidence of the other witnesses tended to contradict Stenzen’s evidence in several minor details.
Abstract of the Decision.
1. Cbiminal law, § 174 —what weight given testimony of accomplice. A conviction may be sustained upon the unsupported testi mony of an accomplice, but such evidence is of doubtful integrity, and must be received with extreme caution.
Daniel L. Cruice and A. S. Langille, for plaintiff in error; Daniel L. Cruice, of counsel.
Maclay Hoyne, for defendant in error.
See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Opinion:
Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch
delivered the opinion of the court.
2. Receiving stolen goods, § 9 —when conviction not sustained. The guilt of a defendant who had been charged with receiving stolen property, held not to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.