Case Name: JOHN F. KANABLE, Appellant, v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1920-06-07
Citations: 45 N.D. 619
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN F. KANABLE, Appellant, v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Christianson, Ch. J., and Birdzell, J., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 619–626

Head Matter:
JOHN F. KANABLE, Appellant, v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent.
(178 N. W. 999.)
Limitations of actions — amendment in action under Federal Employers’ Liability Act properly denied.
1. Except in actions which are duly prosecuted under the Employers’ Liability Acts, and within the time limits of those acts, “an employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in the same general business.” Comp. Laws, § 6107.
Appeal and error — no appeal from denial of new trial, unless statement is settled and made a part of the record.
2. A motion for a new trial must specify the grounds of the motion, and, when it is made on the minutes of the court, the moving party cannot successfully appeal from an order denying the motion, without first causing a statement of the case to be settled and made a part of the record so the appellate court may examine and consider “the minutes of the court.”
Opinion filed June 7, 1920.
Rehearing denied September 4, 1920.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Honorable M. J. Hnglert, Judge.
From an order denying motion for new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
M, ,A. Hildreth, for appellant.
There was but one cause of action, and that was for the tort or wrong. Friedrickson v. Renard, 247 H. S. 207-213; Nash v. Myls. St. L. R, Co. (Minn.) 169 N. W. 540; Tudor v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (Minn.) 155 N. W. 200.
“An amendment to the effect that plaintiff sues as personal representative on the same cause of action under the Federal statute, instead of as sole beneficiary of the deceased under the state statute, is not equivalent to the commencement of a new action, and is not subject to the Statute of Limitations.” Union P. R. Co. v. "Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, distinguished; Washington R. & Electric Co. v. Scala, 244 U. S. 630; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593.
Plaintiff is not prejudiced because he predicated his cause of action under the Employers Liability Act. Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1153, and note; Clark v. Heath, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 145; and note; See notes under the head of Pleading & Practice in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, and citation authorities in L.R.A.1915C, 79— 81; Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86; Bravis v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co. 217 Fed. 234; Fernette v. Pierre Marquette R. Co. 141 N. W. 1084, 144 N. W. 834; Pelton v. Illinois C. R. Co. 150 N: W. 236; see also extensive note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 79, 80, 81.
Murphy & Toner, for respondent.
The specification of errors required to be served with notice of appeal under § 4 of chapter 131 need not be served in cases where reversal is asked upon some ground other than error of law occurring on the trial. Leu v. Montgomery, 31 N. D. 1, 148 N. W. 662; Wilson v. Kryger, 29 N. D. 29, 149 N. W. 721.
Trial court had no jurisdiction to grant new trial upon the application made. A new trial can be granted upon certain statutory grounds only. Comp. Laws, § 7660.
Theory of case below controls in this court, and appellant is estopped to question legality of procedure consented to by him. “He who consents to an act is not wronged by it.” Comp. Laws, § 7249.
“Acquiescence in error takes away the right of objecting to it.” Comp. Laws § 7250; Lindeberg v. Barton (N. D.) 117 N. W. 616.
“Acquiescence in error takes away the right of objecting to it. And where a party consents to a certain procedure, and stipulates that certain evidence may be admitted, he is estopped from asserting in the appellate court that the procedure was erroneous and the evidence inadmissible.” Walton v. Olson (N. D.) 170 N. W. 107; Yannett v. Co. <N. D.) 173 N. W. 466.
Where plaintiff predicates his right of recovery upon a specific law, he cannot recover unless the evidence establishes a state of facts arising under that law. Moliter v. By. Co. 168 S. W. 250; Creteau v. By. Co. 129 N. W. 855; Lauer v. By. Co. 145 Pac. 606; McAdow v. By. Co. 164 S. W. 188; L. & N. By. Co. v. Strange, 161 S. W. 239; South Covington B. Co. v. Finan, 155 S. W. 742; Anbruster v. By. Co. 147 N. W. 337.
Under §§ 7482 and 7483, Comp. Laws, the granting of such an amendment was in the sound discretion of the trial court, and there was no abuse of that discretion under the facts as disclosed by the record. Kurtz v. Paulson, 33 N. D. 400,157 N. W. 305; Ennis v. Ins. Co. 33 N. D. 20, 156 N. W. 234.

Opinion:
Bobinson, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial. This is a personal injury suit to recover $10,000 under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which is the same as the State Employers' Liability Act. Under either act the action must be commenced within two years.
The complaint avers that in June, 1917, at Fargo, North Dakota, the plaintiff and other employees of the defendant undertook to load a heavy gravestone onto a car of defendant; that the stone was to be shipped from Fargo to some point in Montana, and in loading the stone the defendant, by its servants, so negligently used a freight truck that the plaintiff was thrown with great force against the side of the freight car, breaking the drum of his right ear and crushing the joint of his large toe on the right foot, to his damage, $10,000. On petition of the defendant the case was transferred to the Federal court, and on motion of the plaintiff it was remanded to the state court. In February, 1920, more than two and one half years after the injury, the case was tried and the jury found a general verdict for defendant, and found specially that the shipment of the stone was from Fargo to Walhalla, North Dakota. In March, 1920, the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial and for leave to strike from his complaint the averments relating to interstate commerce and the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The motion was denied. It was made on the complaint, the answer, the special findings and verdict, the charge of the court, and the minutes of the court. The motion for a new trial was not made for either of the several causes specified by statute. § 7660. It did not specify any ground or cause whatever. Nor was it accompanied by a statement of the errors of which plaintiff complained. The statute provides:
"A party desiring to make a motion for new trial . . . shall serve with the notice of motion a concise statement of the errors of law he complains of, and if he claims the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict or that the evidence is of that character that the verdict should be set aside as a matter of discretion, he shall so specify." Comp. Laws 1913, § 7656.
The rule is that "grounds not stated in the motion or written statement will not be considered at the hearing by the trial court. And similarly it is held that on appeal the reviewing court will not consider any grounds other than those specified in the motion. A party making a motion for new trial is bound by the reasons assigned therein and can urge no other on appeal." 20 Cyc. 944. However, the most fatal defect is that the plaintiff has not caused a statement of the case to be settled. The record is here without anything purporting to be a statement of the case. As there is no evidence before the court, it is in no position to review the evidence and declare that in denying the motion there was any abuse of discretion. The presumptions are all in favor of the judgment and the order.
On a proper notice a motion for a new trial may be made for either of the several causes specified by statute, and it may be made on a statement of the case or on the minutes of the court. The minutes contain the evidence, the objections and exceptions, and all the procedure from the commencement to the end of the trial. The district judge may take official notice of his minutes, and-may refresh his memory by hearing the stenographer read the same to him; but on appeal the minutes can not be considered unless they are copied, certified, and made a part of the record. As provided by statute.
"In ease a motion for a new trial is made on the minutes of the court, either party desiring a review of the decision of the court on such motion may proceed to have settled a statement of the case." Comp. Laws 1913, § 7661.
It now seems quite certain that the action should have been brought in the state court under the Fellow Servant and Contributory Negligence Acts of 1907 and the Act of 1915, chap. 207. In actions to recover for personal injuries under those acts, the fact that the employee has been guilty of contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery, but the damages are diminished in proportion to the negligence attributable to the employee. Under the first statute the action must be commenced within one year, and under the second statute, two years. The short-time limit for commencing actions against common carriers by railways for personal injuries is based on good reasons. The persons who witness such injuries and accidents are commonly transients, who go and come, and forget all about matters which do not concern them. Hence, it is in furtherance of justice that such actions should be commenced and brought to trial while the facts are fresh in the memory 'of disinterested witnesses. But the purpose of plaintiff's motion is, in effect, that now, after the lapse of three years, he be permitted to commence and maintain such an action. Were the motion granted, the amendments allowed, and a trial had on new pleadings, — the plaintiff first paying the costs of this action, — it would be virtually the same as the commencement of a new action without any showing that it would be in furtherance of justice.
Christianson, Ch. J., and Birdzell, J., concur.
Bronson, J. I concur in the result.