Case Name: Joel K. JONES, Admr., of the estate of Joe Jones, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1968-09-09
Citations: 251 S.C. 446
Docket Number: 18824
Parties: Joel K. JONES, Admr., of the estate of Joe Jones, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 251
Pages: 446–456

Head Matter:
18824
Joel K. JONES, Admr., of the estate of Joe Jones, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent.
(163 S. E. (2d) 306)
Messrs. Saleeby, Saleeby •& Herring, of Hartsville, for Appellant,
Messrs. Weinberg ■& Weinberg, of Sumter, for Respondent,
September 9, 1968.

Opinion:
Littlejohn, Justice.
Plaintiff appeals this action to this court, challenging the correctness of the ruling of Honorable W. T. McGowan, Jr., Judge of the Civil Court of Florence.
The facts and issues are properly stated in the order. The law applied and the conclusions reached by the trial judge below properly dispose of all issues.
Let the order of Judge McGowan be printed as a part of this opinion and serve as the directive of this court.
In the third from the last paragraph of such order the Judge inserted the year 1963, which is the year of the amendment to the Uninsured Motorist Act; this is an obvious inadvertence and in the reproduction of the order the same shall be changed to. 1959, which is the year the Uninsured Motorist Act law was first enacted.
Affirmed.
Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Bussey, J., dissents.
The order of Judge McGowan follows:
This case was tried before the Court without a jury. The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff's intestate died as a result of injuries arising out of an automobile and truck collision occurring in Florence County on September 22nd, 1964. The Plaintiff's intestate was operating his own automobile and had in effect an automobile liability insurance policy with the Defendant. The other vehicle was a truck owned by the County of Florence, a political subdivision of the State of South Carolina. Subsequent to the death of Plaintiff's intestate, the County of Florence paid, in consideration for a Covenant Not to Sue executed by the Plaintiff herein, the Estate of Dewey Jones, Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars, which sum represents the statutory limits of the liability of a co.unty in the State of South Carolina for a claim for personal injury or death arising out of an accident such as that which caused the death of Plaintiff's intestate.
No settlement or payment has been made by or on behalf of Levern Marlowe, the driver of the county vehicle, and it is alleged in the Complaint that a claim is now pending against him as a result of the death of Plaintiff's intestate. Florence County did not have in effect any liability insurance on its truck which was being operated by the said Levern Marlowe. Plaintiff's contention is that the truck being operated by Levern Marlowe was an uninsured vehicle as described by Section 46-702(16) and Section 46-750.31(3) of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, as amended. The Complaint seeks relief in the form of a judgment declaring the Defendant obligated to undertake the defense of Levern Marlowe in any litigation arising out of the collision causing the death of Plaintiff's intestate and to answer judgment which might be entered against him up to the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars.
It is admitted that the policy of insurance which was carried by Plaintiff's intestate with the Defendant contained the following exclusion:
That the term "uninsured automobile" shall not include "an automobile which is owned by the United States of America, Canada, a State, a political sub-division of such Government, or any agency of any of the foregoing."
It is clear that this exclusion was included in this policy in reliance upon the provisions of Section 46-704 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, which is one of the Sections of Article I of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. This Section was included in this Act when it was originally enacted in 1952 and the pertinent portion reads as follows:
"This Chapter shall not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the United States, this State or any political sub-division of this State or any municipality therein."
The principal contention of the Plaintiff is that the foregoing statutory exclusion applied to the provisions contained in the Act as it was enacted ip 1952. Those provisions of the Act which provide protection against operators of uninsured motor vehicles were not enacted until 1959. The Section of this enactment which defines the term "uninsured motor vehicles" does not contain or refer to the exclusions contained in Section 46-704 of the Act. On this basis, Plaintiff urges that these statutory exclusions do not apply to the more recent legislation providing for uninsured motorists' protection.
It is my conclusion that the provisions of Section 46-704 apply to all the provisions contained in the entire Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which provisions constitute Chapter 8 of Title 46 of the 1962 Code, as amended. This is clear from the wording of the Section itself. The title of the Section states: "Chapter Inapplicable to Certain Motor Vehicles." The text of the Section begins with the following: "This Chapter shall not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by" the designated political entities.
Having concluded that the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act contains no requirement that a policy of automobile liability insurance issued in this State contain protection as to injury or damage caused by the operator of a motor vehicle owned by the County of Florence, a political sub-division of this State, the Complaint in this action must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.