Case Name: Duane REIL, Appellant, v. Diane BENJAMIN, Respondent
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1998-10-06
Citations: 584 N.W.2d 442
Docket Number: No. C3-98-609
Parties: Duane REIL, Appellant, v. Diane BENJAMIN, Respondent.
Judges: Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, P.J., SHORT and DAVIES, JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 584
Pages: 442–448

Head Matter:
Duane REIL, Appellant, v. Diane BENJAMIN, Respondent.
No. C3-98-609.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Oct. 6, 1998.
Review Denied Nov. 17, 1998.
Walter E. Sawicki, Sawicki Neese & Phelps P.A., Woodbury, for appellant.
Eric J. Magnuson, Jennifer L. Beens, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, P.J., SHORT and DAVIES, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Respondent Diane Benjamin moved for summary judgement on the grounds that appellant Duane Reil's claim for damages was barred by collateral estoppel. The district court granted Benjamin's motion for summary judgment based on the fact that collateral estoppel prevented Reil from bringing a claim because he was in privity with his employer, All American Mechanical Inc., in the initial law suit. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 16, 1992, Reil and Benjamin were involved in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Reil was an employee of All American. As a result of injuries sustained in the accident, Reil was paid workers' compensation benefits by All American through State Fund Mutual Insurance Co. All American then commenced a suit against Benjamin, seeking subrogation and indemnification for the workers' compensation benefits paid to Reil. All American claimed that Benjamin's negligence was the cause of the accident and, therefore, Benja min was liable as a third party pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5 (1996).
Because of the likelihood of a separate action by Reil, a stipulation to consolidate Reil's claim with the pending subrogation claim was executed on October 4, 1996. The agreement was signed by Benjamin's attorney, All American's attorney, and Reil's attorney on his behalf. The stipulation provides as follows:
[T]he facts in the matter of All American Mechanical, Inc. v. Diane Benjamin, and the facts and legal issues to be resolved in Duane Reil's Complaint against Diane Benjamin are virtually identical, and documentary evidence, witnesses, and legal issues to be resolved are also identical;
judicial economy would be served by consolidating Duane Reil's Complaint against Diane Benjamin with that of All American Mechanical, Inc. v. Diane Benjamin, and the parties seek to avoid unnecessary duplicative discovery to be conducted!;.]
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
1. That Duane Reil, shall be allowed to file and serve his Complaint arising out of the January 16, 1992 auto accident upon defendant by November 15, 1996;
2. That the parties are in agreement that Duane Reil's Complaint should be consolidated with the pending case of All American Mechanical, Inc. v. Diane Benjamin; and
3. That the parties are in agreement that it would be reasonable for the trial, as consolidated, to be continued until February 1, 1997, in order to allow Duane Reil and his attorney to pursue any necessary discovery.
Reil, however, subsequently chose not to consolidate his claim with All American. In late June, All American's case against Benjamin was tried. The jury found Benjamin not negligent in the operation of her vehicle. All American moved for a new trial, which was denied. All American did not appeal.
On August 22, 1997, Reil commenced his own personal injury action against Benjamin. Benjamin > brought a motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Reil argued that collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent suit because he was not a party to the previous action and was not in privity with All American. The district court granted Benjamin's motion. Reil appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting Benjamin's motion for summary judgment based on the fact that Reil's claim for damages was barred by collateral estoppel?
ANALYSIS
Reil claims that the district court erred in precluding him from bringing a separate action, citing Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899 (Minn.1984).
In reviewing a district court's order granting summary judgment, this court must decide whether any issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn.1992) (citing Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988)). The application of collateral estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact; once it is determined that collateral estoppel is available, the decision to apply it is left to the discretion of the trial court. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. Medical Inc., 382 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Minn.App.1986), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1986).
The facts of this case are not in dispute, and the only question is whether Reil's claim is barred by collateral estoppel as a matter of law. Collateral estoppel provides that a legal question or fact issue that has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be relitigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies. Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d at 902 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)). Collateral estoppel bars a subsequent action when the issues to be tried in the second ease are identical to the issues tried in the first ease, the court has entered a final judgment on the merits, the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party in the first case, and the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Bublitz v. Commissioner of Revenue, 545 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn.1996).
There is no dispute that the first two requisites have been met. The issue in both the All American case and Reil's case is negligence. A final determination on the negligence issue was decided by a jury, which found that Benjamin was not negligent. The only issue for appeal is to determine whether Reil was in privity with All American and whether he had an opportunity to be heard.
Privity does not follow one specific definition, but rather expresses the idea that a judgment should also determine the interests of certain non-parties closely connected with the litigation. Brunsoman v. Seitz, 414 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15,1988). In general, privity requires that the estopped party's interests have been sufficiently represented in the first action so that the application of collateral estoppel is not inequitable. Id.
In Kaiser, collateral estoppel did not preclude firefighters from asserting a damages claim because they were not in privity with the city. 353 N.W.2d at 904. Some of the reasons for finding against employer/employee privity turned on the fact that the firefighters had no notice of the summary judgment motion, they had no right to be heard at oral argument on the motion, the former action was not commenced on behalf of the firefighters, and they did not have any control over the proceedings. Id. More importantly, the supreme court pointed out that the application of collateral estoppel would have been unfair because the trial court in the original action failed to make a determination on the issue of liability. Id. at 907. The fact that negligence was never determined was yet another factor that led the court to hold the application of collateral estoppel was not proper.
The facts in this case are markedly different from those in Kaiser. Unlike Kaiser, Reil was aware of the prior trial and the summary judgment motion. He recognized and stipulated to the fact that the legal issues, witnesses, and evidence in both eases were virtually identical. Reil took the witness stand in the subrogation case and gave sworn testimony regarding the facts surrounding the accident. Furthermore, Reil did not merely fail to intervene. The stipulation attests to the fact that he took steps towards consolidating his case with All American's case, even though at the last minute he decided not to follow through. Finally, Reil and All American were operating under the same legal theory — negligence — on which issue the jury made a determination.
Considering all of the facts, we conclude that Reil was in privity with All American in the initial suit. Reil's objectives regarding Benjamin's liability were identical to All American's. He makes no claim that All American was not adequately represented at the trial. Reil is barred from bringing this action. See id. (collateral estoppel works to bar subsequent action where issues previously litigated are identical to issues presently being considered and party bringing claim could have easily joined in prior action to avoid unnecessary relitigation of issues).
DECISION
Collateral estoppel precludes Reil from asserting a damages claim because he was in privity with All American. Unlike Kaiser, Reil's legal interests were sufficiently represented in the subrogation action. The district court did not err as a matter of law in granting Benjamin's motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.