Case Name: Solomon WEBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-04-14
Citations: 433 So. 2d 496
Docket Number: No. 58306
Parties: Solomon WEBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ALDERMAN, C.J., and OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 433
Pages: 496–501

Head Matter:
Solomon WEBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 58306.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 14, 1983.
Rehearing Denied July 12, 1983.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender; Craig S. Barnard, Chief Asst. Public Defender and Tatjana Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Russell S. Bohn and Mark Horn, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
We have before us a direct appeal from a judgment imposing the death sentence upon Solomon Webb. Jurisdiction is pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Webb (hereinafter appellant) was adjudged guilty of first-degree murder in the shooting death of John Krasner, an alleged "porno king." At about 11:30 p.m., February 5,1979, Krasner was shot in the parking lot of the Fort Lauderdale Motel. Kras-ner's son and daughter-in-law saw him lying in the parking lot, still alive. Krasner said he had been shot and robbed. He subsequently died as a result of a gunshot wound to the abdomen.
Witnesses testified that they had seen a black man of appellant's general description wearing dark clothes and white shoes in the parking lot area of the motel around the time Krasner was shot.
Appellant's wife testified that appellant was with her on the night of the shooting until about 11:00 p.m., that he left for a short while, and that when he returned he was upset. She also testified that he was wearing a green shirt, black pants, and white sneakers.
Another witness (one of appellant's cellmates) testified that on the day of appellant's arrest he overheard appellant say that he had "robbed a guy on the beach" and that he "had to blow his brains out."
Finally, an eye witness testified that he saw appellant shoot Krasner three times.
After appellant's adjudication of guilt by the trial court the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court, having reviewed the presentence investigation report along with the jury's recommendation, sentenced appellant to death.
Appellant takes issue with his conviction and sentence of death.
With respect to the conviction appellant raises four issues. Appellant first contends that the joint representation by the public defender of him in his murder trial and of his wife in her contempt proceeding constituted a clear conflict of interest which effectively denied him his right to counsel.
Appellant and his wife were not co-defendants in either of their respective cases, nor were their interests adverse or hostile to each other. Additionally, as defendants, neither appellant nor his wife had an interest in the outcome of the other's proceeding such as would render the public defender incapable of advising and representing either client adequately.
We agree with the Fifth Circuit's definition of "conflict of interest" set forth in Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1975). A conflict of interest arises when "... one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to the cause of a code-fendant whom counsel is also representing." 516 F.2d at 1076.
Because of the divergent nature of the proceedings and the absence of common interests between appellant and his wife, we find no conflict in the facts before us.
Appellant next argues that his incul-patory statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were elicited unlawfully. We will address this argument in the interest of justice, notwithstanding appellee's contention that the issue had not been properly preserved for appellate review.
After a careful review of the record we find that appellant's statements were made voluntarily and were therefore admissible. There were no forces exerted upon -the appellant to cause his statements to be invalidated. See Burch v. State, 343 So.2d 831 (Fla.1977).
Appellant's third argument is that his right to a fair trial was violated because of the admission by the trial court of the testimony of Bruce Sapp, an eye witness to the crime. Appellant contends that Sapp's testimony was the product of a delay by the prosecutor in complying with the discovery rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(a)(l)(i). This discovery violation, argues appellant, warrants a reversal of his conviction.
We disagree. The record makes clear that the trial judge was aware of the difficult position defense counsel was in, having to talk to Sapp on such short notice. To accommodate defense counsel the trial judge agreed to recess the trial for the day each day at the noon hour to provide defense counsel with time to depose and otherwise question Sapp. This was done in conjunction with the prosecutor's representation that he would not call Sapp as a witness before the third day of trial.
Defense counsel objected to Sapp's testimony a second time, again moving for a continuance, immediately prior to Sapp's being called as a witness. At this time he gave no specific indication that the time granted him by the trial judge was inadequate for his investigation of Sapp. He did not indicate that he was unable to depose Sapp in the allotted time or that any specific problems arose which required additional time to investigate. Defense counsel merely voiced his general objection that there was a discovery violation and that he therefore needed more time. Once again the trial judge denied the motion for continuance.
The law is settled that an application for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. A denial of a continuance will not be reversed unless there has been a clear showing of a palpable abuse of this judicial discretion. See Acree v. State, 153 Fla. 561, 15 So.2d 262 (Fla.1943); Matera v. State, 218 So.2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA) cert. denied, 225 So.2d 529 (Fla.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 955, 90 S.Ct. 424, 24 L.Ed.2d 420 (1969).
We find in the record before us no palpable abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the motion for a continuance.
Appellant's argument that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight is without merit. The record supports the trial judge's inclusion of this instruction.
We turn now to a consideration of appellant's argument that the trial court erred in imposing the death sentence in spite of the jury s recommendation that appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment.
It is now well established that a jury recommendation under our death penalty statute should be given great weight. We held in Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975), that "[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." That is not the situation here.
The facts of this case do not justify an over-ride of the jury recommendation.
Appellant's conviction is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated. This case is remanded, however, with instructions that the trial judge impose a life sentence with no possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.