Case Name: The State of Washington, on the Relation of Charles E. Coon, Plaintiff, v. M. E. Hay, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1909-02-06
Citations: 51 Wash. 576
Docket Number: No. 7848
Parties: The State of Washington, on the Relation of Charles E. Coon, Plaintiff, v. M. E. Hay, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 576–590

Head Matter:
[No. 7848.
Decided February 6, 1909.]
The State of Washington, on the Relation of Charles E. Coon, Plaintiff, v. M. E. Hay, Respondent.
Elections — Nominations — Peimaby Elections — Disqualification of Candidate — Advebtising—Statutes—Constbuction. Laws 1907, p. 472, § 28, disqualifying any candidate for office who pays for "any article or published statement in a newspaper wherein the electors are advised or counseled to vote for such candidate, or his fitness or qualifications for office are set forth, or his photograph or biography is published” does not disqualify one who paid for the publication of his photograph, over a statement of his name and candidacy, and marked “Paid Advertisement”; in view of the severity of the penalty and of the obscurity in this and the next section, wherein it is made a misdemeanor for publishers of newspapers to publish for pay, articles advocating a candidacy, except when appearing and designated as a “Paid Advertisement; ” and since the same is not an article or published statement wherein the electors are advised to vote for him or wherein his fitness is discussed (Rudkin, C. J., Fullebton, and Chadwick, JJ., dissenting).
Application for a writ of quo warranto to the Lieutenant Governor, filed in the supreme court January 13, 1909, heard upon demurrer to the petition.
Writ denied.
Reynolds, Ballinger & Hutson, for relator,
contended that an information in the nature of quo warranto is the proper method by which to try title to public office. Bal. Code, § 5780 et seq; State ex rel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495; People ex rel. Barton v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303, 22 Pac. 764, 6 L. R. A. 444; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 798. The clause in art 3, § 4, of the constitution providing that “contested elections for office shall be decided by the legislature in such manner as shall be decided by law” is not self-executing', since no such law has been enacted. Western American Co. v. St. Ann Co., 22 Wash. 158, 60 Pac. 158; Northwestern Warehouse Co. v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 32 Wash. 218, 73 Pac. 388; 8 Cyc. 752-3, and notes; People ex rel. Barton v. Londoner, supra. The conflict between the claims of Coon and Hay is not a contest within the meaning of that clause, but refers to contests between candidates at an election involving the respective numbers of votes received by each. 15 Cyc. 396; Magruder v. Swann, 25 Md. 173, 204; People ex rel. Barton v. Londoner, supra. Conceding the application of § 4, article 3, of the state constitution, it furnishes an accumulative remedy only. 17 Ency. Plead & Prac., 423-4, 825-6; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), p. 800; 15 Cyc. 395-6, and cases cited; McCrary, Elections (4th ed.), §§ 380, 382; 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed.), 1776; Throop, Public Officers, § 397; State ex rel. Blake v. Morris, 14 Wash. 262, 44 Pac. 266; State ex rel. Hyland v. Peter, 21 Wash. 243, 57 Pac. 814; State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N. W. 739, 51 N. W. 602; People ex rel. Barton v. Londoner, supra; People ex rel. Swift v. Bingham, 82 Cal. 238, 22 Pac. 1039; People ex rel. Hatzel v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; McVeany v. Mayor etc. of New York, 80 N. Y. 185, 36 Am. Rep. 600; State v. Gates, 35 Minn. 385, 28 N. W. 927; State v. Kempf, 69 Wis. 470, 34 N. W. 226, 2 Am. St. 753. The only exception to this rule is found in the exclusive right of each house of the legislature to judge the qualifications and elections of its own members. This is an exception arising from public policy. Throop, Public Officers, § 397. A lieutenant governor is not a member of the senate. The constitution prescribes the membership. Const., art. 2, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7. “Legislature” and “law making power” are not identical. The latter includes governor, the former does not. Brooks v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173, 21 Pac. 652, 4 L. R. A. 429. The legislature has concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme court in quo warranto proceedings, and the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction holds it. McVeany v. Mayor etc. of New York, supra. The terms “legally qualified” and “eligible” are synonymous. Kirkpatrick v. Brownfield, 97 Ky. 558, 31 S. W. 137, 53 Am. St. 422, 29 L. R. A. 703. If the candidate receiving the highest number of votes is ineligible, there is no election. 15 Cyc. 391; Throop, Public Officers, §§ 160-3; McCrary, Elections (4th ed.), §§ 327, 329, 330, 349; State ex rel. Goodell v. McGeary, 69 Vt. 461, 38 Atl. 165, 44 L. R. A. 446; State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, supra. The election of an ineligible person is void and confers no right to office. 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 338. The relator has sufficient interest in the office to warrant the maintenance by him of a proceeding to contest the eligibility of his successor. 15 Cyc. 403-4; Bal. Code, § 5780 et seq.; Taylor v. Sullivan, 45 Minn. 309, 47 N. W. 802, 22 Am. St. 729, 11 L. R. A. 272; State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, supra; Roane v. Matthews, 75 Miss. 94. The certificate of the canvassing board is prima facie proof of claimant’s election and eligibility, and he thereby becomes a de facto officer and is entitled to assume and hold the office until his ineligibility is determined. State ex rel. King v. Trimbell, 12 Wash. 440, 41 Pac. 183. But such certificate is only prima facie proof and may be overcome in quo warranto proceedings by proof of ineligibility. 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed.), § 1876; McCrary, Elections (4th ed.), §§ 319, 418; State ex rel. Blake v. Morris and State ex rel. Hyland v. Peter, supra. The returning officer cannot pass upon the eligibility of the candidate, but must declare the result from the returns placed in his hands. Mechem, Public Officers, §§ 207-9; McCrary, Elections (4th ed.), §§ 263, 385, 411; Throop, Public Officers, § 156; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 746-7, and notes; 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed.), § 1563; People ex rel. Sherwood v. State Board of Canvassers, 129 N. Y. 360, 29 N. E. 345, 14 L. R. A. 646; State ex rel. King v. Trimbell, 12 Wash. 440, 41 Pac. 183. The legislature may prescribe reasonable qualifications for holding office. State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 18 S. E. 770, 24 L. R. A. 343; Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417, 8 Pac. 661; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Mechem, Public Officers, §§ 73-74. Although the legislature may not add to the constitutional qualifications imposed upon the voter in granting the right of suffrage, laws are upheld which disfranchise the voter for wilful violation of reasonable regulations of the exercise of the right of suffrage. State ex rel. Orr v. Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49 Pac. 346; Moyer v. Van de Vanter, 12 Wash. 277, 41 Pac. 60, 50 Am. St. 900, 29 L. R. A. 670. Disqualification to hold office may be prescribed as a punishment for crime. Barker v. People, 3 Cowen 686, 704 et seq. Section 28 of the primary law does not infringe constitutional provisions guaranteeing the liberty of the press. 8 Cyc. 892. The quo warranto proceeding may be brought by a private individual without permission of court. Bal. Code, § 5780 et seq; Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 Pac. 560; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946, 70 Pac. 114. It cannot be instituted until the commencement of the term and some intrusion by the defendant; but taking office is such intrusion. 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 798; 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed.), § 1784; 17 Ency. Plead. & Prac., 407, note 2; Mechem, Public Officers, § 482; Throop, Public Officers, § 784. Where the ineligibility arises from prior misfeasance, there need not be any previous prosecution therefor, as a prerequisite to the institution of quo warranto, but the fact of such misfeasance may be inquired into fully in such proceeding. 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed.), § 1789. The information is in the same form as an ordinary complaint except that it is entitled in the name of the state •on the relation of the claimant. State ex rel. Heilbron v. Van Brocklin, and State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., supra.
Merritt, Oswald & Merritt, for respondent,
contended that the constitution gives the legislature exclusive jurisdiction to determine contests, the only contests provided for by .•statute being those relating to precinct and county officers. State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 45 Pac. 23, 33 L. R. A. 674; Parmeter v. Bourne, 8 Wash. 45, 35 Pac. 586, 757. Article 3, § 3, of the constitution providing that the lieutenant governor shall serve for a term of four years and until his successor is elected and “qualified” was intended to obviate any inconveniences that might attend vacancies occurring between the expiration of the term of the incumbent and the qualification of his successor. Stevens v. Wyatt, 55 Ky. 542. The title of the act is insufficient to include the disqualifying provisions contained in section 28 of the primary law. State ex rel. Nettleton v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 81 Pac. 554, 109 Am. St. 874, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152; State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375, 98 Am. St. 854; State v. Poole, 42 Wash. 192, 84 Pac. 727; State ex rel. Matson v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264.
Reported in 99 Pac. 748.

Opinion:
Mount, J.
— This is an application to this court for a writ of quo warranto to oust the respondent from the office of lieutenant governor. The relator alleges, that the respondent was elected to the office of lieutenant governor at the general election held in November, 1908; that the votes were canvassed by the legislature as required by law, and respondent was declared duly elected, and on the second Monday of January, 1909, he duly qualified and is now holding the said office; that the respondent is incompetent to qualify or hold that office by reason of the fact that, prior to the primary election held' on September 8, 1908, at which he was a candidate for the nomination of lieutenant governor on the republican ticket, he solicited and caused certain named newspapers to publish a statement consisting of the words " 'Paid Advertisement,' followed by a photograph of said M. E. Hay, said photograph being followed by the words 'M. E. Play, candidate for the republican nomination for the office of lieutenant governor,' " and promised and agreed to pay, and did pay, such newspapers for such publications.
Respondent in opposing the writ presents several constitu tional questions, which need not be considered, in view of the construction which we place upon the statute relating to primary elections. Section 28 of the primary election law, Laws of 1907, page 472, upon which the relator relies, provides:
"No person shall be' competent to qualify for any public office, who shall have, prior to the holding of any primary election, paid, or promised or agreed to pay, either directly or through another, or in any manner whatsoever, to the owner, publisher, manager or representative of any newspaper, any sum of money or other thing of value, for any article or published statement in a newspaper, wherein the electors are advised or counseled to vote for such candidate, or his fitness or qualifications for office are set forth, or his photograph or biography is published."
The language here is somewhat involved, and is no doubt susceptible of the construction urged by the relator, to the effect that the mere- publication of a photograph with a statement telling whose .photograph it is disqualifies a candidate from holding office. It may also be construed as contended for by respondent, viz., as prohibiting payment for the-publication of "Any article or published statement in a newspaper wherein the electors are advised - or counseled to vote for srfch candidate or his fitness of qualifications-for office are set forth, or his photograph or biography is published." In other words, the photograph must be published in connection with the published article or statement where the voters are advised to vote for such candidate or his fitness or qualification for office is set forth. We think this construction must be adopted. The mere statement whom the photograph represents is not such an article or statement as is prohibited by the provisions above named.
The penalty for violating this statute is severe. It should not attach unless the meaning of the language is plain and the violation is clear. The attorney general, whose duty it is to advise public officers, gave an opinion on April 18, 1908, construing the section of the primary law under consideration, in which opinion that officer said:
"That payment of money to a newspaper in the manner and for the purpose specified above, to wit: Publication of announcement of candidacy (with or without accompanying photograph) over the signature of the candidate, but without newspaper comment, does not render that candidate incompetent for public office." Report Attorney General, 1908, p. 446, Opinion No. 343.
We do not cite this opinion as controlling upon this court, but merely to show that § 28 does not clearly make the publication of a photograph a disqualification for office. It also shows that the respondent acted in good faith. Under these conditions, where the statute is construed by an officer whose duty it is to advise public officers, and where persons advised or with knowledge of such advice follow the same, the statute should not be construed otherwise unless the language is clear and unambiguous. The following section of the statute, viz., §' 29, makes it a misdemeanor for any newspaper or other publication to accept money for advocating the election or defeat of any candidate, and then provides:
"Nothing herein shall prevent any person or persons, firm or corporation engaged in the publication of any newspaper, magazine or periodical from receiving for publication and publishing any matter, article or articles advocating the election or defeat of any candidate or candidates and receiving a consideration therefor, if such articles so published or printed have placed at the beginning thereof in plain type of black-faced Roman capitals in a conspicuous place, the statement 'Paid Advertisement.' But this section shall not be construed as permitting the payment for any publication prohibited by section 28 of this act."
The word"publication" here used refers clearly to the words "article or published statement" used in § 28. The object of § 29 is to prevent the newspapers named from advocating for secret hire the election or defeat of any candidate, but newspapers are authorized to openly sell their space where the readers are advised of the fact that the matter used is an advertisement merely. The last clause of § 29 makes it clear that candidates themselves may not advocate their own election in newspapers by articles or statements which advise voters to vote for them, or where such articles set out their qualifications for office. But we think these sections are not intended to disqualify a candidate who merely publishes his picture with the statement whom the picture represents.
With this construction of the statute, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions presented. The writ must therefore be denied.
Crow, J., concurs.