Case Name: Martha Mitchell v. William Runkle et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 132
Docket Number: 
Parties: Martha Mitchell v. William Runkle et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 132–137

Head Matter:
Martha Mitchell v. William Runkle et al.
The 10th sec. of the act of 27th January, 1842, concerning executions, reads as follows: “Should any sheriff, or other officer, fail or refuse to pay over money collected under an execution, when demanded by the person entitled to receive the same, he shall be liable to pay ten per cent, per month on the amount so collected, besides interest and costs, which may be recovered of him and his sureties by motion before the court from which said execution issued, three days’ -previous notice being given.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3781; Hart., Art. 1333; 0. & W., Art. 865.)
When a judgment under this section is produced, the record must show that the court had jurisdiction, and that the defendant had notice.
To give any binding effect to the proceedings of a court, it must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and of the cause or subject-matter.
The want of jurisdiction makes the judgment utterly void, and unavailable for any purpose.
■Proceedings under this section are summary and penal in character, and must be construed strictly.
And those facts which give jurisdiction ought to appear, in order to show that its proceedings are eoramjudice.
The record must show service or notice. (For full notes of the authorities, see Paschal's Annotated Dig., Note 872.)
Appeal from Travis. The case was tried before William M. Walton, Esq., a special judge, chosen under the constitution, because of the interest of Hon. A. W. Ter'rell, one^of the district judges.
Martha Mitchell sued William Runlde and others. She declared as the widow and only heir of Robert Mitchell, deceased. The suit was for an interest in the Gideon Pace half league of land. The defendants plead the general issue. The case seems to have turned upon the bill of exceptions. The record of the justice was as follows :
“ Transcript from justice’s docket in the case of Robert Mitchell v. J. R. Pace: a full copy of all the proceedings on record in the above-entitled cause.
“Robert Mitchell,
v. VMotion continued until next term.
“J. R. Pace. j
“Judgment for the amount of the principal, $75 00, and interest, per month, 10 per cent., and 10 per cent, damages.
“R. L. Redding, J. P.
“December 26, 1840.
“Execution issued April 29, 1841.
“ R. L. Redding, J. P.
“Execution issued 4th September, 1845, to sheriff.
“W. H. Garrett, J. P.
“Execution returned satisfied in fall, this 4th ¡November, A. D. 1845. “ W. H. Garrett, J. P.
“The State of Texas,]
“ County of Bastrop. J
“I, the undersigned authority, dp certify, that I am the successor of the above officers of the- town and county of ¡Bastrop, and that I was duly elected and qualified by the proper authority; and I certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of all the record in the case of Robert Mitchell v. J. R. Pace.
“Witness nay hand and seal, this the 14th of October, A. D. 1857. “ J. 0. Shelling, J. P. [l. s.]”
To the reading of this the defendants objected, for the following reasons:
1. Because the record did not show that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or the person of James R. Pace, at the time of the rendition thereof.
2. Tiiat the judgment appears to have been rendered upon motion, against the defendant, when it does not appear, from the transcript or other evidence, that the defendant was ever served with notice of such motion, or that he appeared in answer thereto, either in person or by attorney.
3. The judgment appears to have been rendered as upon motion, against the defendant as an officer, when there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was an officer of any kind.
4. Because it does not appear that there was any original judgment or process, upon which to base the same.
5. The proceedings appear to be based upon a special statute, and in the nature of a penalty, and the proceedings do not show sufficient compliance with the provisions of law, and because no presumptions can be indulged in in favor of the proceedings of a court of limited jurisdiction, and especially when proceedings are instituted under a particular statute.
Which objections being sustained, the court excluded the said transcript; to which ruling the plaintiff excepted.
The objections were sustained by the court, and the evidence excluded.
The court also excluded the evidence of the successors of the justice, to prove that there was an execution and sale under it, the land having brought two-thirds of its value; and that the execution could not be found, and the sheriff’s deed to prove the sale. Verdict and judgment for the defendants.
Jones Petty, for appellants.
—The first assignment of error is believed to be well taken. It will hardly be denied that the justice’s judgment is, per se, sufficient, or that it contains all the truth that the law requires that it should contain; but it will be insisted, that it ought to appear, in some way, that the justice had acquired jurisdiction over the defendant by reason of service or notice.
Where the judgment does not recite service, it will be presumed. (Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Tex., 256.)
The distinction involved by appellees applies to the subject-matter; this is the extent of its reason, and therefore the limit of its application; for, aside from this, courts of general and limited jurisdiction occupy the same position, and command the same deference for their proceedings, being alike fitted for the administration of justice, according to law, in their respective spheres.
Prima facie, every court has the power to judge of its own jurisdiction; and, where a party pleads to the jurisdiction, the decision even of an inferior court, in favor of its jurisdiction, is generally as conclusive on parties as judgment on matter confessedly in its jurisdiction. The only exception is, where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of its proceedings. (State v. Scott, 1 Baily, 294.)
Chandler Turner, for appellees.
—The execution was from a justice of the peace, and void upon its face, as no facts appeared to authorize the same, being a greater amount than the justice has jurisdiction over, or had at that time. (See Statutes of 1836, p. 143, § 9.)
It does not appear that the justice’s jurisdiction was ever acquired, which must appear affirmatively in courts of limited jurisdiction; in other words, the mode of acquiring jurisdiction must fully appear. (See 1 Hill N. Y. Reg., 139; 17 Wend. N. Y. Rep., 485, 486; 5 Wend. N. Y. Rep., 172, 180; 1 Cowan, 730.)
In courts of inferior jurisdiction nothing will he presumed. (See Hamilton v. Ward, 4 Tex., 356; Moore v. Moore, Dallam, 553.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—The judgment of the justice, which was offered in evidence to support the sheriff's sale, is not such a judgment as the justice could legally render in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction. From the terms in which it is expressed, we suppose it to have been rendered in a proceeding by motion against the defendant, as sheriff, or other officer, for failing or refusing to pay over money collected under an execution, under the provision of sec. 10 of the execution law of 1842. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 865.)
It, however, does not appear, from the record of the justice, that a case was brought before him which brought into exercise his jurisdiction over such a subject-matter, or that the defendant had the notice which the statute prescribed, or, indeed, any notice of the proceeding, or that he made his appearance before the justice.
It is a plain and undeniable principle, that, to give any binding effect to the proceedings of a court,, it must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the cause or subject-matter. The want of jurisdiction makes the judgment utterly void and unavailable for any purpose.
The word " motion," in the transcript of the justice, is all that appears to indicate the nature of the case that was brought before the court, except the terms of the judgment itself, which was rendered by the justice. But, unless it was such as we have supposed, the court could have no authority to render such a judgment. It must be taken, we think, that it was a proceeding against an officer, under the statute to which we have referred, if any proceeding were in fact instituted to bring into exercise the jurisdiction of the justice. It was, then, a summary proceeding, and penal in its character, and is to be construed strictly. (Hamilton v. Ward, 4 Tex., 356.) In Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. R., 128, Chief Justice Marshall said: "In summary proceedings, where the court exercises an extraordinary power, under a special statute prescribing its course, we think that course ought to he exactly observed, and those facts especially which give jurisdiction ought to appear, in order to show that its proceedings are coram judice." There are numerous authorities to the same effect. (Barry v. Patterson, 3 Humph. R., 313; Hamilton v. Burman, 3 Yerg., 355; Bates v. The Bank, 8 Por., 99; Levert v. The Same, Id., 104; Wright v. Warner, 1 Doug. Mich. R., 384.) In such a proceeding it ought certainly to appear by the record that the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the notice which the statute prescribes, or by his appearance, in order to render the judgment of any validity. It does not so appear, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment is void, and the proceedings under it, consequently, invalid and ineffectual to vest title in the plaintiff. The court did not err in excluding the proposed evidence of the judgment of the. justice and the proceedings thereon; and there is no error in the judgment. It is therefore
Affirmed.