Case Name: McAULIFF v. HUGHES et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-10-02
Citations: 112 N.Y.S. 486
Docket Number: 
Parties: McAULIFF v. HUGHES et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 112
Pages: 486–492

Head Matter:
McAULIFF v. HUGHES et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
October 2, 1908.)
1. Names—Identity.
It will be assumed, in a suit involving title to land, that “Claude E.” W., son of ft. W., and one of the three owners of the land at the time of an action to partition it, was also known as “Glody” W., and that he was the one named and served in the partition action under that name; the proof before the referee in that action being that “Olody” W. was one of the children of R. W., and the report of such referee finding such to be the fact.
2. Judgment—Collateral Attack—Proof of Service.
It is not ground for attack on the judgment in a partition action that an affidavit of M., an attorney therein, showing service of the summons and complaint on C., was not verified; M. having later, on May 22d, made an affidavit in due form, on which he applied for judgment, stating that the summons and complaint were duly served on all the defendants, as appeared by the affidavits of M. and D. thereto attached, and that more than 20 days had elapsed since said service was made and completed, and the second affidavit practically showing that the service was made as stated in the former affidavit, and the judgment reciting proof of personal service on all the defendants by the affidavit of M. of May 22d and the affidavit of D.
3. Same.
It being shown that the summons and complaint in a partition action were duly served, the recital in the affidavit of service that the service on C., a defendant therein, was on a certain day, which was before the issue of the summons and complaint, is an irregularity, but not jurisdictional, and will be treated as a clerical mistake, and as though the date of service was left blank, and only showed the service was after such issue and more than 20 days before the affidavit for judgment; the judgment being attacked only by one to whom C., 10 years after the partition sale, gave a quitclaim for $10, and the purchaser at the partition sale being then in possession.
4. Champerty and Maintenance—Grant of Lands Held Adversely.
The deed of the purchaser at the sale in a partition action is a title adverse to every person interested in the property at the time, and her possession under the deed is adverse to them; so that deeds given to another during such possession, one by a person who was a party to such action, and another by a person not a party thereto, but who then had an interest in the land under a recorded deed, are within the champerty act (Real Property Law, Laws 1896, p. 603, c. 547, § 225), declaring void a grant of real estate if at its delivery the property is in the actual possession of a person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 9, Champerty and Maintenance, §§ 52-110.]
Cochrane, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Clinton County.
_ Action by John McAuliff against Mary Hughes and others for partition. From an interlocutory judgment, determining that defendant Elizabeth Elliott had no substantial interest in the property, she appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
Patrick J. Tierney, for appellant.
Adelbert W. Boynton, for respondent.

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
The appellant claims to be the owner of the premises and that the conveyances upon which the plaintiff claims title were made at a time when she was in the actual possession of said premises, claiming under an adverse title. Both the respondent and the appellant claim to derive their interest in said premises from the heirs of Rose Welcome, a former owner, who died intestate. In 1892 Jane Lasher, Claude E. Welcome, and Frances Helen Welcome were the owners of the premises as heirs of said Rose Welcome. In April, 1896, Jane Lasher conveyed her interest to Martin H. O'Brien, who in 1907 conveyed such interest to the plaintiff. In April, 1892, Frances Helen Welcome, by the name of F. Helena Welcome, conveyed her interest in said premises to one. Holcombe, who brought an action in the Supreme Court against Clody Welcome, Jane Lasher, Alexander Welcome, and Benjamin Elliott for the partition of said premises; and Sidney E. Maders, as referee in such action, conveyed said premises in August, 1897, to one Tyndale. Elliott bid off the property at the sale, but Tyndale advanced the money and took title, and in December, 1902, conveyed the same to the appellant. The deeds are regular in form. The proceedings in the partition action were very irregular, and it was very carelessly conducted. The complaint and lis pendens were filed in the county clerk's office. The referee's deed was duly recorded. The other proceedings could not be found at the time of the first hearing in this case, but subsequently were found, and the judgment roll and other papers put in evidence. It does not, however, definitely appear whether they were found in the clerk's office, or where.
It is conceded that Claude E. Welcome was a son of Rose Welcome, and at one time was the owner of a third interest in the premises. He is named in the partition action as "Clody" Welcome, and the proof of service shows service upon "Clody" Welcome. The proof before the referee in that action showed that "Clody" Welcome was one of the children of Rose Welcome, deceased, and the report of the referee finds such to be the fact. From the similarity of the names, "Clody" Welcome and' Claude E. Welcome, and from the proceedings in the partition case, we must assume that Claude' E. Welcome was also known as "Clody" Welcome, and that he was named and served in the partition action under the latter name.
Criticism is made that the alleged affidavit of B. B. Mason, showing service of the summons and complaint on "Clody" Welcome, is not sworn to; but this criticism is purely technical, for on the 22d day of May, 1897, the said B. B. Mason, who was the attorney in the action, made an affidavit in due form, upon which he applied for judgment, and in which he swears that the summons and complaint were duly served upon all the defendants, as appears by the affidavits of B. B. Mason and Earl Daniels hereto attached, and that more than 20 days have elapsed since- the said service was made and completed. This second affidavit practically shows that service was made as stated in the former affidavit. The judgment recites proof of personal service upon all the defendants by the affidavits of B. B. Mason, dated May 22, 1897, and Earl A. Daniels, dated March 8, 1897. It thus appears that the service was made upon "Clody" Welcome at least 20 days before May 22, 1897, and, of course, the service must have been made after the summons and complaint was issued. The court, therefore, had complete jurisdiction of the person of "Clody" Welcome.
The unsworn affidavit states that service was made February 2, 1897. That is evidently a clerical error, and does not vitiate the fact that service was made after the issue of the summons and complaint, and more than 20 days before judgment was applied for. It was an irregularity, but not jurisdictional. It should therefore be treated as if the date of service was left blank, and only showed that service was made after March 6th, the day the complaint was verified, and on or before May 1, 1897. Ten years after judgment and the sale in partition thereon the title acquired by a purchaser in good faith, which has . remained unquestioned all that time, cannot be declared void for an error in the affidavit of service of a summons and complaint which are shown to have been duly served, and which service is not denied. The person making the service is dead, and the defendant "Clody" Welcome never has denied or questioned the regularity of the service, and he probably participated in the division of the proceeds of sale. He was served in the little village where the property is situate and where the sale was held. That Claude E- Welcome's interest was sold upon the sale is questioned now for the first time, not by him or by evidence, but by an objection only from the plaintiff, who was present at the sale and a bidder for the property, and who 10 years afterwards takes a quitclaim from him for $10; the premises then being in the possession of the purchaser at the partition sale.
In the partition action the fact was overlooked that Jane Lasher had previously conveyed her interest in said premises to O'Brien by deed duly recorded, so that the proceedings in partition gave no title to the one-third interest owned by O'Brien.
While the proceedings were irregular, for the purposes of this action they are sufficient, as against the plaintiff to give the appellant title to the interest formerly owned by Claude E. Welcome and Frances Helen Welcome, now known in this action as Mary F. Hughes, and the appellant has been in possession of the premises ever since her deed, which was duly recorded, holding under such deed. The plaintiff received a deed from O'Brien of his interest in said premises May 12, 1907, for an expressed consideration of $1, and a deed from Claude E. Welcome of his interest in said premises May 31, 1907, for the expressed consideration of $10. In his complaint in this action he alleges:
"That the defendant Elizabeth Elliott claims to be the owner of some interest in the premises, which claim the plaintiff denies, and alleges that she has no legal title to any interest in said premises, and that she is a squatter thereon."
He therefore knew that she was holding the premises under an adverse claim of title. It is not pretended that she has claimed any title, since the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff which she did not claim before. The proof in the partition action showed that the property in question is a small village lot in the little hamlet of Clinton-ville, Clinton county, with a shop covering the whole frontage, or nearly so, on the street, and that the lot would be of no value whatever, except as a location for said shop. Elizabeth Elliott swears in this action:
"I occupy these premises now. The buildings on the premises are a blacksmith shop and wheelwright shop. I occupy both. " I have occupied and used the building as a blacksmith shop for over 17 years. There is a garden on the premises. I work and keep the garden. In May, 1907, we plowed the garden, and planted it, and used the shop."
This action was brought in June, 1907.
All parties interested in the title to real estate sought to be partitioned are necessary parties to the action, and a partition sale, therefore, purports to convey the entire fee in the property.. The appellant did not purchase any interest from Frances Helen Welcome, or from any other of the heirs of Rose Welcome; but she purchased from an officer of the court the title in partition, and is therefore presumed to have purchased and claimed the entire property. Her deed, therefore, was a title adverse to every party interested in the property at the time, and her possession under the deed is a possession adverse to them. Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16, 25 N. E. 312, 10 L. R. A. 387; Sweetland v. Buell, 89 Hun, 543, 35 N. Y. Supp. 346.
The deeds to plaintiff are fairly within the letter and spirit of the champerty act. The appellant had been many years in actual possession under a deed which purported to convey the whole title. The plaintiff was present at the sale and knew the facts, and afterwards purchased from one party a one-third interest for $1 and of another party a one-third interest for $10. He has bought for a nominal con sideration a claim to real estate from a party out of possession, and promptly has brought action thereon. Within Pearce v. Moore, 114 N. Y. 256, 21 N. E. 419, Christie v. Gage, 71 N. Y. 189, Dever v. Hagerty, 169 N. Y. 481, 62 N. E. 586, and section 225, c. 547, p. 603, Laws of 1896, the conveyance to the plaintiff was void.
The trial court was not justified in disregarding the proceedings in the former partition action and the referee's deed given therein, and was not justified in assuming that the deed given to Holcombe by E. Helena Welcome did not convey the interest which it is conceded Frances Helen Welcome inherited from her mother. The appellant is therefore the owner, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, of a two-thirds interest in the real estate sought to be partitioned. The deed to the plaintiff of the other third from O'Brien is invalid for the reasons before stated.
The judgment should therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.