Case Name: GOODYEAR v. H. J. KOEHLER SPORTING GOODS CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-11-14
Citations: 143 N.Y.S. 1046
Docket Number: 
Parties: GOODYEAR v. H. J. KOEHLER SPORTING GOODS CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 143
Pages: 1046–1049

Head Matter:
GOODYEAR v. H. J. KOEHLER SPORTING GOODS CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 14, 1913.)
Contracts ( §10*)—Requisites—Mutuality—Sales.
A contract, whereby plaintiff agreed to purchase from defendant a specified number of automobiles, depositing money as part payment in advance on each automobile accepted, but in which defendant nowhere
, agreed to sell and deliver them, but which gave it the option of delivering, subject to no penalty or damages on refusal to deliver, was void for want of mutuality, and was not cured by the appointment of plaintiff as defendant’s agent.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 21r-40; Dec. Dig. § 10. ]
Ingraham, P. J., and Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Appellate Term, First Department.
Action by Frank C. Goodyear against the H. J. Koehler Sporting Goods Company. From a determination of the Appellate Term affirming a judgment of the Municipal Court, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
See, also, 155 App. Div. 947, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1121.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, SCOTT, DOWLING, and HOTCHKISS, JJ.
Martin L. Stover, of New York City, for appellant.
Edward L. Dennis, of New York City, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The sole question in this case is whether or not the contract between the parties was void for lack of mutuality. Such a lack exists where one is bound and the other is not.
In the present case the plaintiff agreed to purchase and accept from the defendant a specified .number of automobiles, depositing a sum of money to be credited as part payment, in advance, of $35 on each automobile accepted. Nowhere in the contract does the defendant agree to sell and deliver the automobiles, or any of them, unless a schedule of delivery dates may be considered such an agreement. If it may be, however, its force is entirely destroyed by the following clause, which provides as follows:
"In the event that the company shall fail to deliver any one or more automobiles in accordance with the foregoing schedule, it may at its option return the agent's deposit on such car or cars, or deliver such car or cars as soon thereafter as it reasonably can; it being distinctly understood and agreed, however, that no liability whatsoever shall attach to or be asserted against the company in case of its failure to deliver any of said automobiles for any cause whatsoever."
By this clause it was left entirely optional with defendant whether or not it would deliver any automobiles at all, and if it refused to deliver any it became subject to no penalty or damages. It seems to me that it would be difficult to find a clearer case of a contract imposing an obligation on one party, and no obligation whatever on the other.
I am unable to see that the appointment of plaintiff as defendant's agent cured the lack of mutuality, because the position of agent to sell automobiles was an empty thing, unless backed up by an enforceable agreement on defendant's part to deliver such automobiles as plaintiff might be able to sell.
The determination of the Appellate Term should be affirmed, with costs.
DOWLING and HOTCHKISS, JJ., concur.