Case Name: The People ex rel. William K. Churchyard, Resp't, v. The Board of Councilmen of the City of Buffalo, App'lt
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-08-03
Citations: 47 N.Y. St. Rep. 149
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. William K. Churchyard, Resp’t, v. The Board of Councilmen of the City of Buffalo, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 47
Pages: 149–161

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. William K. Churchyard, Resp’t, v. The Board of Councilmen of the City of Buffalo, App’lt.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term,
Filed August 3, 1892.)
Municipal corporations—Buffalo—Salaries of police commissioners —Laws 1892, Chap. 879.
Under the charter of the city of Buffalo passed in 1891 the common council was composed of the board of aldermen and the board of councilmen, and it was required to fix the salaries of appointive officers by ordinance, which was to be presented to the mayor, and if vetoed was to be returned to the board of aldermen for further action. Provision was made for joint sessions in certain cases, but the acts of such sessions were not subject to review by the mayor. By chapter 379, Laws of 1892, it was provided that the police commissioners should receive such annual salary as might be fixed by the common council at a joint session, and that the said council should immediately determine the amount of such salary. Held, that the action of such joint session was not subject to review and that the mayor had no power to veto the same. •
(Titus, Oh. J., dissents.)
Appeal from an order directing a peremptory writ of mandamus to issue, requiring defendant to approve of certain warrants drawn in favor of the relators in payment of salary as police commissioners of the city of Buffalo.
The following is the opinion at special term:
White, J.—The petitioners are the police commissioners of the city of Buffalo, and have instituted this proceeding to compel the board of councilmen to approve a resolution adopted by the board of aldermen on the 23d day of May, 1892, directing warrants drawn in favor of the petitioners for their salaries at the rate of $3.000 per annum each, from and after May 6, 1892.
So far as the questions involved in this proceeding are concerned, the present charter of the' city of Buffalo (except as to the amendment passed by the legislature in 1892, which forms the basis oí the claim herein made by the petitioners and which will be more particularly referred to hereafter), became of force on March 27, 1891. The charter provides (as originally enacted), that the legislative power of the city shall be vested in a common council composed of a board of twenty-five aldermen and a board of nine councilmen; that no action of the common council shall be of force unless it originated in the board of aldermen and be approved by the board of councilmen; that a majority of all the aldermen elected shall constitute a quorum of the board of aldermen, and that six councilmen shall constitute a quorum of the board of councilmen; that a vote of the common council when prescribed by the charter requires such vote in each board that the common council shall fix the salaries of all appointive officers, not therein otherwise fixed or provided for, by ordinance; that such salaries shall be fi.xed before the appointment of such officers and that no change shall be made in such salaries during their term of service; that any ordinance or resolution of the common council fixing salaries of such officers must be presented to the mayor for his action thereupon before it shall be of force; that if he approves it he shall sign it; if he disapproves, he shall return it to the board of aldermen, where it originated, with his objections thereto; and that if the ordinance or resolution objected to by the mayor be again passed by the two boards by the requisite number of votes in each, it becomes of force, otherwise the veto of the mayor defeats it. By the terms of the charter (as originally enacted) .it is further provided that commissioners of police shall thereafter be appointed by the mayor for terms of six years.
The petitioners were the police commissioners of the city of Buffalo in office at the time when the present charter was adopted, having been appointed to' those offices under and by virtue of chapter 436 of the Laws of 1880, as amended by chapter 359 of the Laws of 1883, which established a police department in Buffalo. They had, at the time the present charter took effect, a fixed and limited term of service under the statutes of 1880 and 1883, and by the terms of the charter were continued in office for their unexpired terms, and were to continue to receive the same salaries as by law they were then entitled to receive under the prior statutes, which, as fixed by the statutes, was $1,500 each per annum. The petitioner Illig was appointed for a full term of six years, May 7, 1889, and his term of service will, therefore, expire May 7, 1895. The petitioner Churchyard was appointed December 30, 1889, to fill a vacancy for the unexpired term of his predecessor, which will expire May 7, 1893. The statutes of 1880 and 1883 continued to be law governing the compensation of the petitioners until the enactment by the legislature of the present charter of the city. On February 8, 1892, an ordinance was adopted in the manner prescribed by the charter as it then existed, fixing the annual salaries of the petitioners at the sum of $1,500 each.
While it is apparent that the charter, as originally enacted, contemplates joint sessions of the two boards constituting the com mon council, and that the common council thus organized shall exercise such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the charter, and such others as are necessary to the performance of its corporate duties and essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, whether conferred in terms or not, it is equally plain that the intention of the legislature was to require that all legislation by the common council concerning salaries of appointive officers should originate' in the lower or board of aldermen, and nowhere else, and that all such legislation should be subject to th,e consideration of the board of councilmen, ,and to the right of veto by the mayor.
On April 27, 1892, the legislature passed chapter 379 of the Laws of 1892, as an amendment to the charter. The effect, and the only effect, of this amendment was to change the mode or plan of fixing the salaries of the petitioners and their successors in office, and to require that immediately upon the passage of this amendment the two bodies composing the common council should meet in joint session and determine the amount of salaries which should be thereafter paid to the petitioners and their successors in office. Pursuant to this amendment, the common council met in joint session on the 6th day of May, 1892, with eight councilmen and twenty-two aldermen, present, and by a vote of two councilmen and fifteen aldermen adopted a resolution fixing the salaries of the petitioners at $3,000 each. This action of the common council in joint session was presented to the mayor, who disapproved and returned the same in due time to the city clerk, with his objections thereto. The city clerk laid said resolution with' the objections of the mayor thereto before the board of aldermen at its next regular meeting thereafter. The board of aldermen thereupon declined to take any action on the resolution so returned to it, on the ground that the action of the common council fixing and determining the salaries of the petitioners at $3,000 each was conclusive upon the mayor, and that he had no right or power to veto the same, and then proceeded to direct warrants drawn in favor of the petitioners in payment of their respective salaries at the rate of $3,000 from May 6, 1892. This action of the board of aldermen was presented to the board of councilmen, and it thereupon disapproved of the action of the board of aider-men in directing warrants to be drawn.
It may appear from the face of the record before us that the board of aldermen, by its action, intended to fix the salaries of the petitioners at $3,000 from January 1, 1892, but such was not the intention. It is conceded by both parties that the intention was, and this proceeding is to be disposed of on the assumption, that increased compensation is sought and to be made, if at all, from May 6, 1892, only.
The first question presented for our solution is whether or not the action of the common council in determining the salaries of the petitioners is subject to the right of veto by the mayor.
The only right of veto possessed by the mayor is such as he derives from the provisions of the charter. As the charter stood before the amendment of 1892, the right was fully recognized and the mode or manner of exercising it was carefully provided for and prescribed in a case like the one before us. The compensation of appointive officers not otherwise provided for in the charter itself was to be fixed in the first instance by the adoption of an ordinance in the board of aldermen, which ordinance must be presented to the board of councilmen for consideration by it, and was also subject to veto by the mayor, and in case of his dis- ' approval it was to be reconsidered by both boards with a view to acquiescence in or override the objections.
The amendment of 1892 simply and arbitrarily requires- that the common council shall meet in joint session, and at such session determine, that is, come to a definite and final conclusion, in the manner therein prescribed, as to what salaries shall thereafter be paid to the petitioners, and this to my mind excludes the idea of a revision or rejection by any other body or by any person. The determination was made strictly in the manner prescribed by the amendment. The action of the common council in joint session cannot be said to have originated in either board; it could not, thereafter, be lawfully considered by either of the boards separately, for the reason that no provision is made therefor. Section 18 of the charter has no application, because the return by the mayor of an ordinance or resolution disapproved by him to the board of aldermen pursuant to the provisions of that section is contemplated only in cases where such ordinance or resolution originated in that board. In fact there is no provision of law for the reconsideration anywhere of an ordinance or resolution adopted or passed by the common council in joint session of its two boards, nor is there any provision of law conferring the right to veto in such cases; no such right is necessarily implied, and therefore it does not exist. Ho such thing as an absolute unqualified right of veto exists in the executive head of any municipal corporation in this country; constitutional restrictions always accompany and control its exercise. If it were true that §§ 5 and 18 of the charter were applicable to the petitioners (which I think is not the case), then clearly there would be a clear and manifest repugnance between the amendment of 1892 and those sections of the charter as to the manner of fixing and determining the salaries of the petitioners; they cannot be reconciled, and as to the question we are now considering, the later act or the amendment must prevail. It seems to me that to hold in. this case that because the resolution adopted by the common council in joint session was a resolution of the common council, it must be presented to the mayor under § 18 of the charter, would be in violation of the maxim that the law never enacts the perfermance of an idle ceremony.
The language of the charter conferring the right of veto on the mayor is of - the same import as that used to confer the same right on the president of the United States, governors of states and mayors of cities generally, and that is the only sense in which it can be claimed to be organic. The right of veto is not inherent in the executive head of a municipality like the city of Buffalo.
The petitioners were originally appointed under chap. 436 of the Laws of 1880, as amended by chap. 359 of the Laws of 1883, which was repealed or superseded by our present charter, except as to the salaries of the petitioners. By these statutes, the salary of police commissioners was fixed at $1,500, payable monthly. The petitioners were continued in office by the charter for their unexpired terms, which are not yet ended, and it provides in terms that they shall continue to receive the same salaries which they were entitled to receive by virtue of the statute of 1880 during the remainder of their respective terms.
By the charter the common council is authorized to fix by ordinance the salaries of officers not otherwise therein fixed or provided for. The salaries of the petitioners were otherwise therein fixed or provided for, and therefore any ordinance or resolution which the council may or could have passed concerning the compensation of the petitioners would be void, because no ordinance can enlarge, diminish or vary the power of the common council as derived from the charter. The common council has not, and has never had, any authority to fix or determine the salaries of these petitioners, except that conferred by chapter 379 of the Laws of 1892, for the reason that those salaries were fixed and determined by the legislature itself in and by the statutes of 1880 and 1883, and so much of those statutes as fixed and determined those salaries was not repealed or superseded by, but was incorporated into and made a part of the charter as originally enacted, and as has before been said, by the express terms of the charter the power of the common council was limited and restricted to fixing such salaries as were not therein otherwise provided for.
It is urged by the counsel for the board of councilmen that the legislature has no power to authorize an increase or decrease in the salaries of the petitioners during their term of service, because by the charter it is provided that no change shall be made in the salary of any officer during his term of service, and further, that all appointive officers having a fixed and limited term of service, and holding office when the charter went into effect, shall continue to receive the same salary to which they were entitled.
These provisions of the charter are subject to repeal, change or modification at the will of the legislature, unless they are within some constitutional prohibition, and they are not. People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y., 269; Mangam v. City of Brooklyn, 98 id., 585.
The language of the amendment of 1892 is mandatory, and requires that the salaries of the petitioners, immediately upon the passage of that act, be determined; that is, finally and conclusively fixed and settled by the common council in joint session, and the common council has performed the duty enjoined by the legislature.
As no question is made by the board of councilmen touching the amount of salary to be paid if the court shall find the increase made to be lawful, or as to the propriety of requiring the war rants to be drawn therefor at this time, the writs of peremptory mandamus applied for should be granted.
Philip A. Laing, for app’lt; Frank G. Laughlin, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Hatch, J.
—The relator is one of the police commissioners of the city of Buffalo; his salary was fixed under and in pursuance of chapter 379, Laws of 1892, adopted by the legislature and approved by the governor of the state April 27, 1892. This act provides that: " The commissioners of police shall receive such annual salary as may be fixed by the common council at a joint session thereof, and the said common council shall, immediately upon the passage of this act, determine the amount of such salary." This act is an amendment of § 184, Laws of 1891, approved by the governor March 27, 1891, commonly known as " The revised charter of the city of Buffalo." The council met in joint session and determined that the salaries of the commissioners be fixed at the rate of $8.000 per annum, .beginning May 6, 1892, the date of the joint session. After its action, said determination was presented to the mayor of the city for his approval, and was by him returned to the board of aldermen without approval, accompanied by a veto message reciting his objections thereto. The board of aldermen declined to take action thereon and adopted a resolution directing that a warrant for the payment of relator's salary be drawn in accordance with the determination of the joint session. When this action was reported to defendant it adopted a resolution disapproving of said action and refused assent to the warrants so drawn ; this refusal led to the making of the order-appealed from. By stipulation the questions presented by this appeal are limited to three. The opinion delivered by the learned judge at special term, to my mind, satisfactorily answers all the objections raised, and, ordinarily, further discussion would be-deemed unnecessary, but as one question is pertinaciously and confidently argued on this appeal, a further discussion of it is not deemed out of place. It is formulated in these words: " That the action of the joint session of the common council in fixing the salaries in question was subject to the veto power of the mayor."
In disposing of this question a consideration of the veto power, its history, purpose and growth, may aid us in arriving at a correct solution. The word " veto " is of Latin extraction, and literally translated reads >" I forbid," or " I deny." These words have-a singularly ominous sound when they are applied in a democratic government, and at once call attention to the fact, and challenge-the authority,
There are, in constitutional governments, two fundamental theories upon which the grant of the power of veto rests; first,, to preserve the integrity of that branchxof government in which-the vetoing power is vested, and thus maintain an equilibrium of governmental powers; second, to act as a check upon corrupt or hasty and ill-considered legislation. These theories have entered into all debates touching the power. The right, when given at all, is usually lodged in the .executive branch of government. Borne vested it in the Tribunes, and the salutation, " I forbid," pronounced by a tribune, stationed at the door of the Boman senate, meeting a bill, nullified it. The crown, in England, possesses the same power. French philosophers exhausted their learning and ingenuity upon the Constitution of 1791, and saw it fall apart for the reason, among others, that the king possessed the power of suspension of legislation, unless adopted by three successive assemblys. The Spanish king might twice refuse his sanction to the action of the cartes before it could find a place in the law, under the Constitution of 1812, and the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 was like it in this respect. The early colonial legislatures felt the same power, both from crown and governor, for it was the practice of the latter to have money orders in his favor injected into or accompany bills to be signed, so that he might receive the former at the time or before he signed the latter, accompaniment was much preferred; while the grievance against the crown found expression in the declaration : " He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessaVy for the public good." It was thought by Blackstone that this absolute power of veto was needful for equilibrium, and so he wrote: 11 Here, then, is lodged the sovereignty of the British Constitution ; and lodged as beneficially as is possible for society. For in no other shape could we be so certain of finding the three great qualities of government so well and so happily united. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either absolute monarchy, aristocracy or democracy; and so want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wisdom or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for instance, in the king and house of lords, our laws might be providently made and well executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view; if lodged in the king and commons, we should want that circumspection and mediatory caution which the wisdom of the peers is to afford; if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only, and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the strength of the executive power. But the constitutional government of this island is so admirably tempered and compounded that nothing can endanger or hurt it but destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest." Blackstone's Commentaries (Chase), 17.
It is to be noticed in this connection that the British constitution makes the crown a constituent part of the legislature which does not find place in this government. The truth of the statement that one generation has not foresight sufficient to legislate for the next finds vivid confirmation from this quotation, for it remains as the fact that since 1692 the right of veto by the crown has not been exercised, and it is asserted by some writers that its exercise at this day would lead to a revolution.
The veto power was' regarded with great distrust and disfavor by the framers of our government, both state and national, and . its right of exercise is by no means universal now. Only one of the original state constitutions, Massachusetts, gave even a qualified veto, while the articles of confederation withheld it entirely,,reaching the other extreme of requiring the assent of nine states to important acts of legislation, thus giving to a minority of five states an absolute right of veto. The happy solution of this ques- tian by the framers of the Federal constitution had for its basis the integrity of the executive branch of the government, and very little consideration was given to the theory of a check upon ill-considered and hasty legislation. As late as 1884, and, so far as I possess information, at this date, Delaware, North Carolina, Ohio- and Bhode Island still withheld the veto power .from the executive, while in eight others a majority vote of the whole number of members elected to the legislature constitutes all that is required to override a veto. By the constitution of 1871, the German Empire vests its legislative power in the Federal Council and Imperial Diet; no mention is made of the Emperor, but in certain specified bills concerning the army, taxes, etc., the proposal of the-Federal council only is accepted, and this gives to the Emperor, as King of Prussia, the right of veto against its action. The-Swiss Federal constitution gives the president no veto power, but in certain cantons the right rests with the voters. In the Kingdom of Poland the objection of a single deputy was sufficient to-i nullify the bill.
This history, and these illustrations, serve to show that the people of all constitutional governments are extremly solicitous and jealous of this power, and' have at all times hedged it about by carefully expressed limitations. Consequently it follows that the right of its exercise by an executive must always be supported by plain and undoubted authority. It has, of recent date, been the gradual and growing belief that this power is wisely placed in-the executive head of municipal authority, not as essential to preserve an equilibrium of governmental powers, but for, almost, the-sole purpose of a check upon corrupt and hasty action and ill-considered legislation. This is not a new idea, but it was not accepted until experience has shown it to be, usually, for the best interests of the people in the government of cities. Franklin long ago-stated, one reason for the lodgment of this power in an executive, "A single man may be afraid or ashamed of doing injustice; a body is never either one or the other, if it is strong enough. It. cannot apprehend assassination, and by dividing the shame among them it is so little apiece that no one minds it."
While, for these and other reasons, it is doubtless the tendency of modern legislation to bestow this power upon the executive head of municipal government with "much liberality, yet it is equally true, and always to be borne in mind, that the power must be express or necessarily implied, and without it, it does not exist. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4 ed., § 208-331; Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., 413; National Bank of Commerce v. Town of Grenada, 41 Fed. Rep., 91; MacKenzie v. Tax Collector, 39 La. Ann., 949.
This brings us to an examination of the statute under which the power here exercised is claimed to exist. The charter of Buffalo is an entire scheme for the government of this city; it was. carefully digested and its authors conceived and carried out, so far as they possessed the ability, a complete and connected scheme. The legislative power is vested in a common council consisting of two branches; the mayor is not a constituent part of such legislature. In nearly all .matters this council acts as separate bodies; they act jointly in certain specified cases. Before the amendment which is the subject of examination here, there were two cases which called for joint sessions, one for the election of a city clerk, § 33, the other to fill vacancies in certain elective offices, § 374; but in neither case had the mayor any control over its-action; the action was final. So far as the present amendment is-concerned, there is nothing expressed therein which gives the power of veto to the mayor in terms; it must, therefore, rest, if at all, in implication.
It seems quite clear that the scheme contemplated by this charter was that original action should be taken by the board of aider-men, and then be passed upon by the board of councilmen, which, action was to be subject to review by the mayor, and the scheme, therefore, provides for this and nothing more. Where acts are passed upon by the mayor following this course, definite and precise provisions provide to whom such action shall go, and if adverse to the council's action, how the objection shall be specified and what action they shall proceed to take and what vote is essential to override the veto.
It is conceded that there is no provision of law which in terms provides for a review of a joint action. But two claims are urged by appellant in answer to this defect: First, that the amendment-is to be treated as an original act, and must be construed in view of the original statute; that as the amendment does not in terms take away the right of veto, and, as it existed before the mayor-had such right, therefore he possesses it now. Second, that even though there be no specific provision for the review of the veto, yet the power is not for that reason taken away.
I am of opinion that the first view is not tenable; that - it places a much too limited significance upon the word " determine." This amendment is mandatory. It reads, " shall immediately determine the amount of such salary." They could be compelled by mandamus to assemble and act, and no provision is made, so far as I can find, for a review ; on the contrary, I think the construction must be that it is alone the determination of the joint session which is contemplated and commanded ; that as the charter provides, as we have seen, for a review of separate action, and none for a joint action before this amendment, that when the amendment'was made the legislature contemplated a change of the system in fixing these salaries so "as to conform to the theory of joint sessions as then existing in the charter, and as no provision was made or contemplated for a review of joint action, and as the amendment does not provide for it, therefore it does not exist.
Under the conditions here adverted to I think the correct construction to be that " When a general intention is expressed and- also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception.'' Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y., 138; 41 St. Rep., 181; Bork v. City of Buffalo, 127 N. Y., 64; 37 St. Rep., 332. And that such rule is to be applied here.
These salaries can be fixed without the affirmative. vote of a single councilman. Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend., 634; Cushing's Law & Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 412-414.
If the construction contended for is to obtain, it would not be possible with a veto to work such a result.
I am also of opinion that the second objection is equally unsound ; for if there be still left the power of veto and no power of review, it follows that the veto is absolute and the action is nullified. This result carries ns far beyond any veto power granted by the charter to the mayor upon any act of the council.; for, at the most, he has only a suspensory power which may be overridden. If now we say that the power is imposed by reason of a prior grant of it, we find ourselves confronted with the condition that while the actual grant is limited, the implied power is absolute. It is needless to add that such implication ought never to be reached by any proper construction of power.
I am therefore led to the conclusion.that the mayor possessed no power of veto of this action, and that the order appealed from must be.affirmed, with costs.
Like order in the case of Illig.