Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marlow K. SMULOWITZ, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-01-28
Citations: 482 So. 2d 1388
Docket Number: No. 84-1176
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marlow K. SMULOWITZ, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, NESBITT and BAS-KIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 482
Pages: 1388–1390

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marlow K. SMULOWITZ, Appellee.
No. 84-1176.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 28, 1986.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Robert Hall Martin, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and BAS-KIN, JJ.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
We grant the defendant's motion for rehearing, vacate our prior opinion filed in this cause on July 23, 1985, and affirm the order under review. We reach this result for three reasons.
First, we conclude, contrary to our prior opinion herein, that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the state's appeal. The order appealed from dismisses the crime charged in the information filed below — second degree murder — and reduces the charge to a necessarily included offense — battery—upon a defense motion filed pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). Such an order, in our view, is the functional equivalent of a dismissal of an information or any count thereof and is accordingly appealable by the state under Section 924.-07(1), Florida Statutes (1983), based on the authority of State v. Hankerson, 482 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rendered this date. Hankerson holds, and we agree, that such an order is appealable by the state under the above statute.
Second, we reject the state's basic position on the merits of this appeal that the trial court had no authority under Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) to dismiss the charge of second degree murder in the information herein and thereafter reduce the charge to the necessarily included offense of battery. The court by such an order has, in fact, dismissed a count in an information charging second degree murder which the above rule plainly empowers it to do where, as here, the undisputed material facts in the cause do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. Indeed, to accept the state's appeal under Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1983), as we have done, on the theory that it is an appeal from an order dismissing an information or any count therein — necessarily requires us to reject the state's argument that the order under review is unauthorized under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) because it is not really a dismissal of an information or any count therein.
Third, we reject the state's further arguments on appeal that the motion to dismiss should have been denied because (1) the motion was not properly sworn to, and (2) the state's "traverse/demurrer" put in issue material facts in the case. The motion to dismiss specifically alleges the facts on which the motion is based and is supported by sworn deposition testimony. This procedure fully complies with the requirement that "[t]he facts on which such motion is based should be specifically alleged and the motion sworn to." Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). See State v. McIntyre, 303 So.2d 675, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); see also State v. Torres, 375 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Moreover, the state's "traverse/demurrer" failed to deny any material facts in the case and, accordingly, the trial court was free to rule on the merits of the motion based on the material undisputed facts sworn to below. See State v. Oberholtzer, 411 So.2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA), pet. for review denied, 419 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1982); State v. Merritt, 394 So.2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Ellis v. State, 346 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So.2d 175 (Fla.1977); see also State v. Holliday, 431 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Affirmed.
HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ., concur.