Case Name: In re Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company. In re Petition of Chalmers-Detroit Motor Car Co. In re Petition of Locomobile Company of America. In re Petition of Pope Manufacturing Company
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1910-10-04
Citations: 143 Wis. 282
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company. In re Petition of Chalmers-Detroit Motor Car Co. In re Petition of Locomobile Company of America. In re Petition of Pope Manufacturing Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 143
Pages: 282–294

Head Matter:
In re Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company. In re Petition of Chalmers-Detroit Motor Car Co. In re Petition of Locomobile Company of America. In re Petition of Pope Manufacturing Company.
September 13 —
October 4, 1910.
Supreme court: Superintending control: Jurisdiction, when exercisedr Writ of prohibition: Foreign corporations: Service of summons on agent: Contract of sale or of agency? Conspiracy: Where-cause of action arises: Appeal.
1. Tiie jurisdiction of the supreme court in respect to its superintending control over inferior courts is not to he exercised upon light occasion, hut only upon some grave exigency; the writs hy which it is exercised will not be used to perform the ordinary functions of an appeal or writ of error; the duty of the court below must he plain and the actual or threatened violation thereof clear; the results must not only be prejudicial hut must, involve extraordinary hardship; the remedy by appeal or writ of error must he utterly inadequate; and the application for the exercise of the power'of superintending control must he speedy and prompt.
2. In order that the duty of the court may be plain within the foregoing rule, the situation must he such that hardly more than a. statement of the facts is necessary to convince the legal mind, as to what that duty is. Where questions of law or fact are involved of such difficulty that a judge may reasonably, proceed ing considerately, commit judicial error, the power of superintending control will not he exercised, but the parties will be-left to their remedy by appeal.
3. Where an application to vacate the service of process upon a foreign corporation, in an action where the cause of action arises, within this state, involves the consideration of a long written contract between the corporation and the person upon whom-, service is made, relating to sales to and by the latter, from which it appears that, although the term “agent” is not used, it is a serious question whether an agency in fact is not thereby created, it cannot be said that the duty of the court to set aside* the service is plain, within the meaning of the rule above stated.
4. In such a case the facts that an order denying the application is. not appealable and that to obtain a review of the question on appeal defendant must permit the entry of a judgment by default against it for heavy damages, do not make a case of such exceptional hardship that the supreme court should intervene-in the exercise of its power of superintending control. Timlin,. Siebecker, and Kerwin, JJ., dissenting, are of the opinion that, refusal to exercise the supervisory power in such a case amounts, to a denial of due process of law.
6. Where a complaint by one foreign corporation against other foreign corporations for a conspiracy to ruin' its business, charges-one of the principal overt acts of the conspiracy, from which great damage is alleged to have resulted, to have been committed within this state, a substantial part at least of the cause of' action arises within this state and, under subd. 15, sec. 2637, Stats. (1898), the summons may be se'rved upon any agent of a. defendant corporation having charge of or conducting any business for it in the state. Timlin, Siebecker, and Kerwin, JJ.,. dissenting, are of the opinion that, the gist of an action for conspiracy being not the combination but the damage done, the-plaintiff corporation is damaged, if'at all, where it exists and has its property, business, and good will.
6. Whether or not an agency was in fact created by a contract between a foreign automobile company and an individual or corporation within this state, which does not in terms designate-the latter as agent, but provides for the sale to him or it of a certain number of automobiles at specified prices, prescribes, certain territory within which such party shall have the exclusive right of sale, and contains other stipulations in regard’ to credits on repairs ordered, the supply of advertising matter,, diligence on the part of the dealer in furthering sales, non-contest of patents, etc., so that service upon such dealer would bind the foreign corporation, not decided. Timlin, Siebecker, and Kerwin, JJ., in dissenting opinion, take the view that such a contract is one of sale and not of agency.
1. An order denying an application to vacate the service of a summons on a foreign corporation on the ground that the person served was not an agent upon whom service was authorized, is not appealable, nor is it reviewable upon appeal from the final judgment if the defendant appears and defends upon the merits.
'ApplioatioNS for writs of prohibition to restrain tbe further prosecution of an action in tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county, on tbe ground that tbe summons bad not been properly served on petitioners.
Petitions denied.
Tbe facts of tbe case and tbe allegations of tbe petitions are fully set forth in tbe opinion of tbe court and tbe dissenting •opinion.
Eor tbe petitioners there was a brief by Quarles, Spence & •Quarles, and oral argument by T. PL. Spence.
In opposition there was a brief by Bloodgood, Kemper & Bloodgood, attorneys, and Jackson B. Kemper, of counsel, .and oral argument by J. B. Kemper.

Opinion:
Winslow, O. ¡T.
Those are four separate petitions for writs of prohibition.- Tbe petitioners are all foreign manufacturing corporations and were joined as defendants with a large number of other foreign and domestic corporations in an action brought in tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county by tbe Yelie Motor Vehicle Company, a foreign corporation, •charging conspiracy to ruin its business and alleging damage to tbe amount of $500,000. Tbe summons and complaint in •said action were attempted to be served on tbe petitioners by service upon certain persons and domestic corporations alleged to be agents of tbe respective petitioners transacting business for them in this state. Tbe petitioners separately moved in tbe circuit court,® upon affidavits showing tbe con"tract relations between themselves respectively and tbe alleged agents upon whom service was attempted to be made, for orders setting aside tbe service in eacb case upon tbe ground tbat tbe persons and corporations upon whom service-was made were not agents of tbe petitioners witbin tbe meaning of tbe statute. These motions were denied, and tbe petitioners now ask tbis court to exercise -its power of superintending control and issue writs of prohibition to tbe circuit court and its judge, commanding tbat no further proceedings be taken in tbat action and tbat tbe motions to set aside tbe attempted service be granted.
Tbe power of "a general superintending control over all inferior courts" which tbe constitution (art. VII, sec. 3) grants to tbis court was first extensively considered and its limits defined in tbe case of State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W. 1081. Tbe subject has-been discussed in a number of cases since tbat time, but no attempt has been made either to vary or enlarge tbe general principles laid down in tbe first named case, but, on tbe other band, in all of tbe subsequent eases those principles have been either literally or in substance approved and applied.
Those principles in substance are tbat tbis jurisdiction is not to be exercised upon light occasion, but only upon some grave exigency; tbat tbe writs by which it is exercised will not be used to perform tbe ordinary functions of an appeal or writ of error; tbat tbe duty of tbe court below must be plain; its refusal to proceed witbin tbe line of such duty or, on the other band, its intent to proceed in violation of such duty must be clear; tbe results must be not only prejudicial but must involve extraordinary hardship; tbe remedy by appeal or writ of error must be utterly inadequate; and tbe application for the exercise of the power of superintending control must be speedy and prompt. State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, supra; State ex rel. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Circuit Court, 133 Wis. 442, 113 N. W. 722; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 82 N. W. 158; State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N. W. 158.
Does the present case come within these principles ? We think not. One of the cardinal rules is that the duty of the court below must be plain. The situation must be such that hardly more than a statement of the facts is necessary to convince the- legal mind as to the duty of the court. Where there is no such clear and obvious duty based either upon common-law principles or upon express statute, but where questions of law or fact, or both, are involved of such difficulty that "a judge may reasonably, proceeding considerately, commit judicial error," the court will refuse to intervene under its power of superintending control, but will leave the parties to their remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Circuit Court, 134 Wis. 301, 114 N. W. 455. The duty of the court cannot be said to be plain in the present case: difficult questions were presented to the trial court upon the motions to vacate the service; questions in the solving of which there was ample room for the ablest trial judge, after mature consideration, to commit error.
The complaint alleged conspiracy to ruin the plaintiff's business. One of the principal overt acts of this conspiracy from which great damage is alleged to have resulted is charged to have been committed in the state of Wisconsin. The damages caused by the overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy form the gist of the action, hence it would seem that a substantial part at least of the cause of action arose within this state. In a case where the cause of action arises within this state service may bo made upon the agent of a foreign corporation "having charge of or conducting any business therefor in this state." Subd. 13, sec. 2631, Stats. (1898). The affidavits submitted upon the motions to vacate the service disclosed that all of the persons and corporations served on as agents were purchasing automobiles of their respective principals and selling the same under long written contracts prescribing prices, time of payment, territory in which to sell, and many other things. The contracts are very carefully drawn and do not use tbe word agent, but it is a very serious question, to say tbe least, whether agencies in fact are not created by all of them. We do not now say that such agencies were created, but simply that tbe question is not one that can be answered with confidence at once either way. It is worthy the considerate and careful attention of any court and may well admit of different opinions by equally able legal minds. One of the conditions essential to the successful invoking of the power of superintending control is therefore wanting.
It is urged that the case is one of such exceptional hardship that this court should intervene and stop the proceedings in the court below notwithstanding the duty may not be plain. The argument runs thus: The order denying the motion to vacate the service is not appealable, nor can it be reviewed on appeal from final judgment if the defendants appear and defend the case on the merits, because by such appearance they waive the question of jurisdiction (Corbett v. Physicians' C. Asso. 135 Wis. 505, 115 N. W. 365); hence they can only raise the question 'by staying out of court, allowing judgment by default for an immense- sum perhaps to be taken against them, which judgment will stand as a menace to their credit for months until they can bring their appeal to a hearing.
The argument is not without its weight, but we cannot admit its conclusiveness. Logically followed out, it would mean that in every case where large damages are claimed this •court may be called upon to investigate and decide any question as to the sufficiency of the service of the summons before another forward step is taken in the trial court. The result would be that mandamus, prohibition, and procedendo would gradually but surely be used to perform the ordinary functions of an appeal, which this court has- declared is not the proper function of those writs.
By the Court — Motion denied in each ease with $10 costs.