Case Name: Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Curtis Drown, Respondent; Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Pat Smith et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2007-11-27
Citations: 9 N.Y.3d 481
Docket Number: Action No. 1; Action No. 2
Parties: Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Curtis Drown, Respondent. Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Pat Smith et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 481–500

Head Matter:
[881 NE2d 180, 851 NYS2d 84]
Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Curtis Drown, Respondent. Keith Haywood, Appellant, v Pat Smith et al., Respondents.
(Action No. 1.)
(Action No. 2.)
Argued October 17, 2007;
decided November 27, 2007
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Dechert LLP (Jason E. Murtagh, of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel) and Dechert LLP, New York City (Gary J. Mennitt of counsel), for appellant.
I. Correction Law § 24’s alleged bar of 42 USC § 1983 claims in state courts would violate the Supremacy Clause. (Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d 852; Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356; Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399; Felder v Casey, 487 US 131; Martinez v California, 444 US 277; Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158; Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247; Smith v Wade, 461 US 30.) II. The courts below misinterpreted Correction Law § 24, an indemnification statute not designed to eliminate 42 USC § 1983 damages claims from state court.
Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb, Barbara D. Underwood and Nancy A. Spiegel of counsel), for respondents.
I. Correction Law § 24, by circumscribing the jurisdiction of the state courts over claims for damages against the New York State Department of Correctional Services personnel, does not violate the Supremacy Clause. (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212; Cepeda v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 995, 70 NY2d 602; Matter of McGee v Korman, 70 NY2d 225; LaValle v Hayden, 98 NY2d 155; People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769, 522 US 918; Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58; Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1; National Private Truck Council, Inc. v Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 US 582; Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356; Brown v Gerdes, 321 US 178.) II. Correction Law § 24 is not an indemnification statute. (Matter of Barbara C., 64 NY2d 866; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577.)
Susan Johnson, Ithaca, Karen Murtagh-Monks, Patricia Warth, Betsy Hutchings, Steven Banks, New York City, John Boston and Alfred O’Connor, Albany, for Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York and others, amici curiae.
I. Correction Law § 24, as interpreted by the court below, violates the Supremacy Clause because it is preempted by federal law. (Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658; Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356; Claflin v Houseman, 93 US 130; Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1; Martinez v California, 444 US 277; Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d 852; Cepeda v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 995; Baker v Coughlin, 77 F3d 12; Brown v Coughlin, 869 F Supp 196; Degrafinreid v Ricks, 452 F Supp 2d 328.) II. Correction Law § 24, as interpreted by the court below, violates the Supremacy Clause because it burdens the litigation of 42 USC 1983 claims. (Felder v Casey, 487 US 131; Cepeda v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 995; Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d 852; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172; Cavanaugh v Doherty, 243 AD2d 92; Wright v Coughlin, 31 F Supp 2d 301, 225 F3d 647; Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297; Murray v Reif, 36 AD3d 1167; Bouffard v Lewis, 139 Misc 2d 786.) III. Correction Law § 24, as interpreted by the court below, violates the Supremacy Clause because it discriminates against a federal right. (Testa v Katt, 330 US 386; Claflin v Houseman, 93 US 130; Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 US 1; Douglas v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 US 377; McKnett v St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 292 US 230; Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356; Bradley v County of Albany, 161 AD2d 1050; Mann v Alvarez, 242 AD2d 318; Cooper Industries, Inc. v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 US 424.) TV Correction Law § 24 violates the Supremacy Clause because it offends principles of federalism by ousting the state courts from a significant area of federal constitutional adjudication. (Immuno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235; Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch [5 US] 137.) V If Correction Law § 24 is interpreted as the Legislature intended—to simply indemnify the New York State Department of Correctional Services employees—then the statute need not be struck as unconstitutional. (People v Dietze, 75 NY2d 47; People v Barber, 289 NY 378; Brown v Coughlin, 869 F Supp 196; Matter of Burrows v Board of Assessors for Town of Chatham, 98 AD2d 250.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Graffeo, J.
Pursuant to Correction Law § 24, New York courts lack jurisdiction under state or federal law to entertain civil actions seeking money damages against correction officers. The issue in this case is whether section 24 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because state courts cannot adjudicate federal 42 USC § 1983 causes of action alleging violations of civil rights. We hold that the statute is not unconstitutional.
I
Plaintiff Keith Haywood was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to a 15-to-30-year term of imprisonment after being convicted in 1990 of escape in the first degree and eight counts of robbery in the first degree. While incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility, plaintiff was the subject of two misbehavior reports in June 2003, one for assaulting a correction officer and the other for failing a urinalysis test. After separate administrative hearings, plaintiff was found guilty of both disciplinary charges. About a year later, another misbehavior report was issued charging plaintiff with improper mail solicitation. A hearing officer determined that plaintiff was guilty of that charge.
In the aftermath of these disciplinary findings, plaintiff commenced two unrelated, pro se civil actions in state Supreme Court premised on 42 USC § 1983 against employees of the state Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). The first complaint alleged that defendant Curtis Drown, the DOCS hearing officer who found plaintiff guilty of improper mail solicitation, failed to conduct a fair and impartial hearing, that his determination was based on insufficient evidence and that the penalty imposed was intended to censor plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment. Asserting that his federal civil rights had been impaired, plaintiff sought expungement of the misbehavior charge, punitive damages and attorneys' fees under 42 USC § 1983.
Plaintiff's second lawsuit was filed against defendant Pat Smith, a DOCS hearing officer, two correction officers and two of their superior officers. According to plaintiff, he had been grabbed from behind without justification by one of the correction officers and sustained a "minor injury to his left pinkie finger." He claimed that the correction officer involved in the incident had conspired with his superiors to fabricate the facts set forth in his June 2003 misbehavior report. Plaintiff further alleged that the urinalysis test conducted in June 2003 had been tampered with by DOCS employees. The complaint, relying on 42 USC § 1983, accused defendants of conspiring to violate plaintiffs federal civil rights by assaulting him without cause, creating a false misbehavior report, tampering with his urinalysis test and denying him a fair and impartial hearing.3
The defendants in both actions, represented by the Office of the Attorney General pursuant to Public Officers Law § 17, moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground that plaintiffs claims—both state and federal—were barred by Correction Law § 24. This statute provides, in pertinent part:
"1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the department [of correctional services], in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.
"2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties of any officer or employee of the department shall be brought and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state."
Supreme Court dismissed both complaints on this statutory basis, citing Woodward v State of New York (23 AD3d 852 [3d Dept 2005], Iv dismissed 6 NY3d 807 [2006]). The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that section 24 did not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff appeals as of right and we now affirm.
II
Plaintiff contends that when Congress enacted 42 USC § 1983, it imposed a national policy that was intended to allow persons who are injured by others acting under color of law to seek judicial redress. He claims that by prohibiting section 1983 actions for money damages, Correction Law § 24 impermissibly discriminates against the federal cause of action contrary to the purpose of the Supremacy Clause. Defendants submit that there is no constitutional violation because the states are free to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of their courts. They maintain that section 24 treats all state and federal monetary claims identically since none can be brought against a correction officer personally and, therefore, section 24 does not discriminate against a federal cause of action in favor of a state cause of action.
The Supremacy Clause declares that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding" (US Const art VI [2]).
In the event of a conflict between federal and state law, the Supremacy Clause preempts operation of state law because when Congress adopts an act it speaks " 'for all the people and all the States, and thereby established] a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the State] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State' " (Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356, 371 [1990], quoting Mondou v New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 US 1, 57 [1912]; see e.g. Testa v Katt, 330 US 386, 393 [1947]). Thus, under the Supremacy Clause, "[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law" (Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 138 [1988] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The alleged conflict between federal and state law in this case arises from the fact that, although a claim based on 42 USC § 1983 for monetary damages against government officials in their personal capacity can generally be asserted in a New York court (see generally Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 66 [1989]), Correction Law § 24 restricts a state court from exercising jurisdiction over such a cause of action if it involves DOCS employees. At first glance, this prohibition appears questionable under the Supremacy Clause since the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law" and that a "construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise" (Martinez v California, 444 US 277, 284 n 8 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the Supremacy Clause imposes no constitutional impediment to the operation of Correction Law § 24. The Supremacy Clause gives states the power to deny enforcement of a federal right if they have a " 'valid excuse' " for doing so (Howlett, 496 US at 369, quoting Douglas v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 US 377, 388 [1929]). One permissible exception is when a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a "neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts" (Howlett, 496 US at 372). The Supreme Court has explained that states "have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts" and that Congress must "take[ ] the state courts as it finds them" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Brown v Gerdes, 321 US 178, 189 [1944, Frankfurter, J., concurring] ["(t)he Constitution does not require New York to give jurisdiction to its courts against its will"]; National Private Truck Council, Inc. v Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 US 582, 587 n 4 [1995]).
A corollary to this principle is that a state rule will be deemed "neutral" and "valid" if it does not discriminate against federal claims in favor of analogous state claims (see McKnett v St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 292 US 230, 233-234 [1934]). In other words, if the same type of claim, "arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim" (Martinez v California, 444 US at 283-284 n 7). Ultimately, what the Supremacy Clause prohibits is refusal by a state court to entertain a suit for the sole reason that the cause of action arises under federal law (see Howlett, 496 US at 373, citing McKnett, 292 US at 233-234; Murnan v Wabash Ry. Co., 246 NY 244, 247 [1927]).
Thus, the policy underlying the Supremacy Clause is to maintain an equilibrium between state and federal causes of action: if a state court opens its doors to a state cause of action, it must also allow related federal claims to be heard; but if the state does not hear a particular state claim, it may also decline to consider related federal causes of action in its state courts (see generally Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v Mayfield, 340 US 1, 4 [1950]). As a result, if a state permits a litigant to assert a state cause of action, it cannot use a sovereign immunity defense to defeat a section 1983 action premised on the same offending conduct (see Howlett, 496 US at 379-381). But if a state does not extend jurisdiction to its courts to litigate a certain type of claim, it may deprive those courts of jurisdiction over a related federal claim. In that situation, there is no Supremacy Clause violation because there is no discrimination against the federal claim in favor of similar state claims (see e.g. McKnett, 292 US at 233-234). And it follows that if the jurisdiction of a state court does not embrace a certain claim, a litigant cannot evade that rule by raising the same state claim in federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction (see Baker v Coughlin, 77 F3d 12, 15 [2d Cir 1996]). The equality requirement of the Supremacy Clause is satisfied in each of these situations because litigants stand on the same footing—regardless of whether they choose to invoke the authority of a state or federal court—and there is no incentive to engage in the repudiated practice of forum shopping that "frequently and predictably produce[s] different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court" (Felder v Casey, 487 US at 141).
Applying these precepts, we cannot say that Correction Law § 24 violates the Supremacy Clause. The statute, by emphasiz ing that "[n]o civil action shall be brought in any court of the state," creates a neutral jurisdictional barrier to all claims— state and federal—for monetary damages in a state court against any correction officer in his or her personal capacity for actions within the scope of employment. Section 24, therefore, does not discriminate against section 1983 actions " 'solely because the suit is brought under a federal law' " (Howlett, 496 US at 373, quoting McKnett, 292 US at 233-234; see Murnan v Wabash Ry. Co., 246 NY at 247)—it applies with equal force to all state and federal claims based on the identity of the defendant and the alleged conduct at issue (see Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d at 854; Cepeda v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 995, 997 [3d Dept 1987], Iv denied 70 NY2d 602 [1987]; cf. Meehan v Illinois Power Co., 347 Ill App 3d 761, 767, 808 NE2d 555, 562 [App Ct 2004] [no Supremacy Clause violation regarding refusal to permit claims based on federal age discrimination statute because "(a) 11 cases involving age discrimination, whether based on federal law or state law, are barred from Illinois circuit courts"], Iv denied 211 Ill 2d 582, 823 NE2d 967 [2004]). Put simply, because Correction Law § 24 does not treat section 1983 claims differently than it treats related state law causes of action, the Supremacy Clause is not offended.
Nor does the fact that a plaintiff can sue the state directly in the Court of Claims alter our analysis. Ordinarily, a state cannot be sued under 42 USC § 1983 because states are not considered to be "persons" within the purview of the federal statute (see Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US at 65). Although states are excluded from section 1983 liability, the New York Legislature has recognized that the State of New York is, in effect, the real party in interest when there is a challenge to a correction officer's alleged conduct arising from the discharge of official duties. As a result, the state provides repre sentation and indemnification for correction officers sued for conduct occurring within the scope of employment (see Public Officers Law § 17 [2], [3]). Section 24 (2) further reflects this assumption of responsibility by allowing for the recovery of certain damages against the state in the Court of Claims. Correction Law § 24 therefore creates an exclusive forum for plaintiffs seeking redress of claims against the state—the Court of Claims—despite the absence of jurisdiction in state courts to entertain claims of civil rights violations against those employees directly. By restricting the forum for a certain type of claim to a particular state court, the Legislature did nothing more than exercise its prerogative to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts in a manner consistent with New York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, which does not allow civil rights claims to proceed against the state in Supreme Court.
In our view, New York does not discriminate against section 1983 claims by allowing state, but not federal, actions involving DOCS employees to be adjudicated in the Court of Claims since it was Congress that decided to exempt the states as responsible parties from the purview of the federal statute. Furthermore, federal law acknowledges that states can be sued by individuals only in state courts unless sovereign immunity is waived or abrogated (see US Const Amend 11; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 [1996]). Moreover, litigants like plaintiff can use the federal courts to pursue section 1983 claims against individual defendants and seek all of the rights and remedies available under the federal act, although a section 1983 claim brought against a correction officer in federal court cannot raise analogous, jurisdictionally barred state law claims (see Baker v Coughlin, 77 F3d at 15). Thus, when Correction Law § 24 applies, New York courts necessarily adjudicate only state claims brought against the state and federal courts adjudicate only federal causes of action brought against individuals. In the end, New York does not discriminate against section 1983 actions in favor of analogous state law claims because Correction Law § 24 removes subject matter jurisdiction over any cause of action— state or federal—for money damages in state Supreme Court for conduct by DOCS employees. Consequently, section 24 does not violate the Supremacy Clause.
Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
. See People v Haywood, 184 AD2d 450, 450 (1st Dept 1992), Iv denied 80 NY2d 904 (1992).
. Plaintiff has also filed other pro se complaints during his term of confinement (see e.g. Kollar v Conagra Foods Retail Prods. Co., No. 07 CV 0130, 2007 WL 1371105 [WD NY 2007] [complaint regarding ingestion of allegedly tainted peanut butter]; Haywood v Republic Tobacco, Co., L.P., 2007 WL 1063004, *1 [WD NY 2005, No. 05-CV-842A] [complaint alleged exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke]; Haywood v Nabisco Inc., 2005 WL 3523467 [Sup Ct, NY County 2005] [complaint asserted that a "Chip's Ahoy" cookie contained a penny that cracked his tooth]; Haywood v Koehler, 78 F3d 101, 103 [2d Cir 1996] [complaint of use of excessive force]; Haywood v Hudson, 1994 WL 36388, *1, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 877, *1 [ED NY 1994, CV-90-3287] [complaint of use of excessive force]).
. This federal statute provides that
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ."
. The complaint also asserted a second cause of action based on an alleged violation of plaintiffs state constitutional rights.
. Plaintiff's alternative claim, that the statute merely indemnifies correction officers, was not raised in Supreme Court and is therefore unpreserved.
. Section 24 operates without regard to the identity of the plaintiff, such as when a correction officer seeks to sue his superior officers for civil rights violations (see Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d at 853).
. Cases such as Howlett and Felder, relied upon by plaintiff and the dissent, are distinguishable from this case. In Howlett, for example, the state provided an immunity defense to the section 1983 action that did not apply to related state law claims and that would not have been available if the action had been commenced in federal court (see 496 US at 359, 364). Similarly, in Felder, state law imposed a notice of claim requirement on section 1983 claims that would not apply if the action had been initiated in federal court (see 487 US at 141). In both cases, the state laws upset the equilibrium the Supremacy Clause was designed to maintain and were therefore unconstitutional.
. New York's waiver of sovereign immunity is conditioned on submission to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims (see NY Const, art VI, § 9; Court of Claims Act § 8).