Case Name: BARNET et al. v, NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-05-05
Citations: 153 N.Y.S. 374
Docket Number: No. 88/67
Parties: BARNET et al. v, NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 153
Pages: 374–380

Head Matter:
BARNET et al. v, NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(No. 88/67.)
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 5, 1915.)
1. Carriers @=>149%—Injury -or Destruction of Goods—Limitation of Liability—Statutory Provisions.
Under the Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, pars. 11, 12,-34 Stat. 593 [Comp. St. 1913, § 8592, pars. 11, 12]) requiring earners ,to issue a receipt or bill of lading, and providing that no contract,, receipt, or regulation shall exempt such carrier from the liability thereby imposed to the holder of the receipt or bill of lading, a provision in a bill of lading for an interstate ship-
'Fm- Other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes ment that the carrier should not be liable for any loss or damage caused by the act of God, etc., would be disregarded as violative of the statute in determining the carrier’s liability for injuries caused by high water.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 651-653, 660^ 662; Dee. Dig. @=149%.]
2. Carriers @=123—Injury or Destruction of Goods—Proximate Cause.
When a car containing a shipment of goods by plaintiff reached the carrier’s yards, the water in a river, by reason of an unusual freshet, was 2% feet higher than the highest previous record. The water continued to rise until it reached unslaked lime in another car in the yards, causing the lime to burn and destroy plaintiff’s goods. Held, that the carrier’s negligence, if it was negligent in placing plaintiff’s goods near the car of lime, was the proximate cause of the destruction of the goods.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 506, 507, 539-543; Dec. Dig. @=123.]
3. Carriers @=136—Injury or Destruction of Goods—Questions for Jury.
Whether the placing of the car near the car of unslaked lime was negligence was a question for the jury, as the carrier owed plaintiff an active duty to use reasonable care not to expose his property unnecessarily, and it knew or was chargeable with knowledge that, if the water reached the lime, a fire would naturally result, and presumably it knew or should have known the contents of the car containing the lime.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers,. Cent. Dig. §§ 478, 596-598; Dec. Dig. @=136.]
Smith, P. J., and Howard, J., dissenting.
<@px>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUBÍBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Trial Term, Albany County.
Action by William Barnet and another against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. From a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiffs, and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial upon the minutes, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, LYON, HOWARD, and WOODWARD, JJ.
Visscher, Whalen & Austin, of Albany (H. Le Roy Austin, of Albany, of counsel), for appellant.
Charles M. Stern, of Albany (Merwyn H. Nellis, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
The Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (Act June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591), so far as we are interested in it, provides that the carrier shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for goods received for transportation "and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such carrier from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law." I agree that this provision controls the shipment in question. The conditions and limitations in the bill of lading may be disregarded as violative of the statute quoted. The liability then rests upon the statute. The sole question, therefore, is: Was the defendant's negligence the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss ?
An unusual freshet, continuing for some days, caused by the heavy rains within the watershed, raised the water of the Hudson river to an unprecedented height. The peak of the flood was between noon and 1 o'clock in the afternoon on the 28th of March, at which time the water was about five feet higher than the highest previous record. The hydrographic engineer, in the employ of the federal government, swears that at Troy, prior to 1 o'clock on the 27th, the water raised one-fifth of a foot an hour; after that until it reached the peak, one-tenth of a foot an hour, and it fell with the same degree of fall. At this rate of advancement, 24 hours prior to noon on the 28th the water must have been about 2% feet lower than it was at the peak, which would make the flood at noon on the 27th about 2% feet higher than any previous flood.
The car left Rensselaer at 10:27 a. m. on-the 27th. It does not appear definitely when it arrived at Troy, but probably about noon of that day. When the defendant placed the plaintiff's car in immediate proximity to the car of unslaked lime, it knew that the water was higher than it ever had been known to be before and was still rising. It therefore owed the plaintiff an active duty to use reasonable care not to expose his property unnecessarily. It knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, that if water reached the unslaked lime a fire would naturally result. We may assume that it knew or should have known the contents of the car containing the lime. -It is true that the unusual height of the water caused the car containing the lime to burn, but, if the car containing the plaintiff's goods had been properly placed, the burning of that car would have caused the plaintiff no injury. The loss, as a proximate cause, is due to the fact that the defendant negligently placed plaintiff's goods next to the car of lime. The question for the jury was whether, under all the circumstances, the placing of the car was a negligent act on the part of the defendant, which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. We find no exception calling for reversal.
I favor affirmance. All concur, except HOWARD, J., dissenting in opinion in which SMITH, P. J., concurs.