Case Name: Dale A. SCHMITT, Corinne Breeding, Richard A. Knox, D. B. Salmon, James B. Miller, Raymond Fields, and James J. Hunter, as the State Personnel Board of the State of Oklahoma, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Joe B. HUNT, Defendant in Error
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1960-12-19
Citations: 359 P.2d 198
Docket Number: No. 39203
Parties: Dale A. SCHMITT, Corinne Breeding, Richard A. Knox, D. B. Salmon, James B. Miller, Raymond Fields, and James J. Hunter, as the State Personnel Board of the State of Oklahoma, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Joe B. HUNT, Defendant in Error.
Judges: DAVISON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and WELCH, JOHNSON and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 359
Pages: 198–219

Head Matter:
Dale A. SCHMITT, Corinne Breeding, Richard A. Knox, D. B. Salmon, James B. Miller, Raymond Fields, and James J. Hunter, as the State Personnel Board of the State of Oklahoma, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Joe B. HUNT, Defendant in Error.
No. 39203.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Dec. 19, 1960.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1961.
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Fred Hansen, First Asst. Atty. Gen., W. L. Keat-ing, Oklahoma City, of counsel, for plaintiffs in error.
Collins, Moore & Sellers, Sapulpa, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
HALLEY, Justice.
Briefly stated this is an action by Joe B. Hunt, the insurance Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma to restrain the State Personnel Board of Oklahoma from bringing; the employees of the State Insurance Department and of the State Insurance Commissioner under the jurisdiction of the Personnel Board. The Director of the Personnel Board notified the State Insurance Department that under a schedule adopted by the State Personnel Board that the State Merit System for Personnel Administration would be extended to include the employees of the State Insurance Department as of April 25, 1960. This suit was filed to prevent such action.
The counsel for the respective parties to this proceeding have briefed this case under five heads which are as follows:
"1. The action is not premature.
"2. The act in question attempts an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the State Personnel Board.
"3. The act in question usurps the prerogatives and duties of the Insurance Department of the State of Oklahoma, and of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma.
"4. The act in question attempts an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the Governor of the State of Oklahoma.
"5. The act in question violates the constitutional provisions of this state in regard to appropriation of public funds."
Since the important thing in this lawsuit is the constitutionality of Title 74, Ch. 27, O.S.Supp.1959, which we are deciding, we will not discuss the first proposition. The prematurity of this suit is of no concern.
Parties will be referred to' as they appeared in the trial court.
We will discuss the remaining propositions in their order. We think it would be helpful to set out the purpose as set out in the first paragraph of the Act:
"The general purpose of this Act is to provide all citizens a fair and equal opportunity for public service, to establish conditions of service which will attract officers and employees of character and ability, to establish uniform job and salary classifications, to increase the efficiency and economy of the governmental departments and agencies by the improvement of methods of personnel administration, to provide a statutory basis for the existing merit system of personnel administration covering the employees of the State Employment Security Commission, Crippled Children's Commission, the State Department of Health, and the State Department of Public Welfare, and to provide for the extension of the merit system to the employees of such other state agencies or departments as the Governor may direct by an Executive Order. The Legislature further declares that, in its considered judgment, the proper administration of our State government requires the enactment of this measure."
In the consideration of the constitutionality of any Act of the Legislature it must be borne in mind that such an Act should be held constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is shown beyond a reasonable dou-bt. Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs, 194 Okl. 495, 153 P.2d 235; Leveridge v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Okl., 294 P.2d 809. See also the cases shown in West's Oklahoma Digest, Constitutional Law, <®=48.
The function of the Court is clearly limited to the determination of the validity or invalidity of the Act. There is a presumption that the Act is constitutional. Application of State of Oklahoma Building Bonds Commission, 202 Okl. 454, 214 P.2d 934.
Under proposition II the plaintiff says that Title 74, Ch. 27, attempts an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the State Personnel Board and for that reason is unconstitutional. With this contention we cannot agree.
To us there is nothing in the Act that takes away any power of the Legislature or unlawfully delegates legislative authority to the Personnel Board. Surely the Legislature would not undertake to enumerate the entire gamut of operations of the Board. From necessity, it has become increasingly imperative that many quasi-legislative functions be entrusted to departments, boards and commissions. These things must be done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and their doing, in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the republic and is thus sanctioned by the highest law. Cornell v. Harris, 15 Cal.App.2d 144, 59 P.2d 570. In order to have a successful operation of an institution of the kind set up by the Legislature to insure improvement of the personnel problems involved in the operation of a State Government the Board in control must have some leeway in its operations or otherwise it could not move.
Today there are at least fifteen State Merit System Acts operating in other jurisdictions, which contain similar provisions to our Title 74 O.S.Supp.1959, Section 805 (2) and they have not been declared unconstitutional.
The authority to make rules and regulations carrying out the purposes of Merit Systems or Civil Service Acts has been held not to be an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in the following cases from other jurisdictions: Yeilding v. State ex rel. Wilkinson, 232 Ala. 292, 167 So. 580; Cornell v. Harris, supra; People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N.E. 229, 41 L.R.A. 775; Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.2d 49; Opinion of the Justices, 138 Mass. 601; Gregory v. Kansas City, 244 Mo. 523, 149 S.W. 466; Green v. State Civil Service Commission, 90 Ohio St. 252, 107 N.E. 531; State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N.W. 832, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 480.
The foregoing cases sustain the general rule announced in 10 Am.Tur., Civil Service, Section 4, as follows:
"It is a well-recognized principle that a state legislature may enact laws providing that appointments to public offices or positions shall be made according to merit and fitness and that such merit and fitness must be ascertained by competitive examination. Such laws, though assailed on many grounds, have, with only a few exceptions based upon some particular feature of the law or some particular constitutional provision, been uniformly held constitutional. The main considr eration in the selection of officers and agents is the public welfare. A public office is not the property of an officeholder within the constitutional . provision against depriving a man of property; nor does it ever become a vested right as against the right of a state to remove its incumbent.",
and 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138, p. 621, which is:
"Civil Service. The legislature 'may establish a civil service commission, and, within limitations imposed by the constitution, may confer on it authority to adopt and enforce rules for carrying into effect the provisions.of a civil service statute, including rules governing the appointment of public officers, their tenure of office, the preparation and holding of examinations, the grading of papers, the granting of veterans' preference, promotion, and removal-; to classify offices and employments; to determine exemptions on account of the impracticability of ascertaining merits by examination; and to make investigations concerning the action of persons in the public service and make reports thereof.
"Retirement. The legislature may delegate to executive officers or agencies various powers with respect to the retirement of public officers or employees."
While we have not previously considered the validity of this Act, we have heretofore considered in other cases many of the legal problems presented and argued in this case.
In Associated Industries of Oklahoma et al. v. Industrial Welfare Commission et al., 185 Okl. 177, 90 P.2d 899, 901, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus is as follows :
"Power to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative, and cannot be delegated whereas the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order to carry out that policy and apply it to varying conditions, although partaking of a legislative character, is in its dominant aspect administrative and can be delegated."
In Atchley v. Board of Barber Examiners, 1953, 208 Okl. 453, 257 P.2d 302, 303, the third paragraph of the syllabus is in part as follows:
" The authority to make rules to carry out the policy declared by the Legislature is administrative and not legislative even though the Legislature has provided that a violation of such rules shall be punished as a public offense."
The Oklahoma Merit System Act substantially follows the traditional patterns of other state merit or civil service acts. None of these do more than establish the 'basic, provisions as to the manner in which appointments, promotions and status of "classified" state employees may be effected. The constitutionality of certain of such statutes, challenged on the ground that there had been an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, has been upheld in the decisions heretofore cited. The courts distinguish between the unlawful delegation of "legislative power" and authorization to augment or implement the civil service or merit act. This Court has recognized this principle in Harris v. State, 1952, 207 Okl. 589, 251 P.2d 799, wherein the second paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:
"The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power, but it may delegate authority to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. It may delegate power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own operation depend."
The plaintiffs rely on two Arizona cases to sustain their position but these cases are so different from the case at bar that there is no comparison. In Tillotson v. Frohmiller, 34 Ariz. 394, 271 P. 867, an initiative measure which gave the Board of Control the power to establish manufacturing and similar establishments, the right to start a State Banking System and to provide funds therefor was being considered by that court. Specific provisions of the Constitution were violated fay this measure and it was held unconstitutional. It is not comparable to the question here.
In Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854, an initiative measure was also involved. It gave to the State Civil Service greater powers than that given to our Board and some provisions which were in conflict with the Arizona Constitution. The opinion approved the rule that the Legislature may leave to officers and boards and commissions the duty to determine whether the facts exist to which the law itself is restricted. We say that a Merit System can be established and we think that the powers granted the Personnel Board are in harmony with our constitutional provisions.
The third proposition discussed is "The act in question usurps the prerogatives and duties of the Insurance Department of the State of Oklahoma and of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma." The three sections of the Con stitution of Oklahoma that touch on the Insurance Department and Insurance Commissioner are Sections 22, 23 and 24, Article VI, and are as follows:
"22. There is hereby established an Insurance Department, which shall be charged with the execution of all laws now in force, or which shall hereafter be passed, in relation to insurance and insurance companies doing business in the State.
"23. There shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State, at the first general election, a chief officer of said department, who shall be styled 'The Insurance Commissioner,' whose term of office shall be four years: '24. The Insurance Commissioner shall give bond, perform such duties, and possess such further qualifications as may be prescribed by law."
There is nothing in these sections vesting in the Insurance Department or Insurance Commissioner the power or right to appoint the employees of these offices. Sections 22 and 24 subject such offices to the force and provisions of laws later passed by the Legislature. Without further elaboration we think such provisions eliminate any contention of continued appointive power under any provisions of law prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
This conclusion has support when considered in the light of the appointive power, and under which plaintiff presumably is acting, provided by the Legislature when it enacted 36 O.S.Supp.1959, Section 305, passed in 1957, which in part provides:
"The Insurance Commissioner may appoint such deputies, assistants, examiners, actuaries, attorneys, clerks and employees, at salaries to be fixed by the Insurance Commissioner, as may be necessary properly to discharge the duties imposed upon the Insurance Commissioner under this code. The Insurance Commissioner shall appoint all examiners for his office. "
We do not consider the given right to appoint such employees as being conclusive on the Legislature or not being subject to qualification or change. In 10 Am.Jur., Civil Service, Section 4, p. 924, it is stated:
"The legislature may confer a power of appointment upon a designated official and then restrict his discretion to a selection among appointees found to possess the requisite qualifications ascertained by tests and civil service examinations. "
Neither do we consider the Act objectionable by reason of any complaint that it would be impracticable to fill certain positions by competitive methods because of the confidential nature thereof or required peculiar or unique abilities needed to fill such positions. Section 802 provides the order placing the agency or department under the Merit System may provide "exempt positions as stipulated by said order." This is a matter to be resolved on hearing and conference as set forth in Section 805(5) and thereby insure the proper working of the Act in accordance with the announced policy of the Legislature.
In 10 Am.Jur., Civil Service, Section 13, p. 935, it is stated:
" Positions placed in an exempt class by the action of civil service commissioners have been held to constitute an exception to a constitutional mandate that all positions as far as practicable must be filled only after competitive examinations, but the decision of a commission to exempt a position must be based upon the impracticability of selecting appointees on the basis of competitive examina- . tions. * . "
We do not see how the Merit System Act in any way curtails the powers and duties of the Insurance Department or Insurance Commissioner as provided by our Constitution. It simply furnishes a different method for obtaining personnel. Those provisions of the Statutes which affect these two agencies were made by the Legislature and can be changed by the Legislature.
The fourth proposition before us is "The Act in question attempts an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the Governor of the State of Oklahoma." This is the point on which the trial court held Title 74, Ch. 27, O.S.Supp.1959, as unconstitutional. With all due respect to the views of the eminent trial judge we believe that he miscdnceives the provisions of the Act before us. This question has much in common with the proposition which we first discussed in this opinion. As with the first we cannot see that the Legislature has unlawfully delegated any legislative authority to the Governor.
The first two paragraphs of Section 802, of the Act in question are as follows: •
"The word agency as used in this Act .is defined to mean any board, com- • mission or institution of the State' Government. The Governor of the State of Oklahoma', upon determining that the merit system of personnel administration with the rules and regulations adopted thereunder should be required, : is • hereby empowered and authorized, at his discretion, by an Executive Order, to place any agency or department of the State Government, and the employees thereof, with exempt positions as stipulated by said order, under the merit system of personnel administration prescribed by this Act and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder by the State Personnel Board. This Section shall not authorize by Executive Order the removal of any agency or department of State government placed under the merit system of personnel administration prescribed by this Act and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder by the State Personnel Board.
"Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, this Act shall not be extended to any department or agency or employee, except in the manner and as provided in this Section. Pending the issuance of any such Executive Order by the Governor and pending the effective date of the system as specified in any of said orders by the Governor, the agency or departmental merit system for personnel administration heretofore established ,in any of the State departments shall be in full force and effect."
There is nothing in this provision which gives the Governor unlawful legislative authority. It simply provides for the implementation and progress of the Merit System. It enables such system to begin its operation in an orderly way. The Governor has done what the Legislature intended that he do and that was to bring the employees of the State of Oklahoma under a Merit System just as soon as possible. More than 90% of such employees 'are now under it. When an Act is an accomplished fact, and the intention of the Legislature is carried out, it. would be unsound to hold that because the Governor might not carry out the provisions of the Act it is unconstitutional. There is nothing to show that the Governor had any other idea than to carry out to the fullest the administrative duties placed upon him by the Legislature. Should the Legislature be dissatisfied because all employees are not under the Merit System as set up it could very easily bring them under the Act. We feel sure that the Governor will carry out to the fullest the duties placed upon him under this Act in due season.
It is argued by plaintiff that the Governor is authorized by the Act to repeal certain existing statutory enactments which authorize the Insurance Commissioner to employ such clerks and assistants as may be necessary to properly discharge the duties imposed upon him as the Insurance Commissioner. We do not believe the Act is susceptible of this construction.
Section 20 of the Act in question repeals any and all other Acts or parts of Acts which are in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act. The total effect of the repealing clause, when considered in connection with Section 2 of the Act, is that the repealing clause does not go into effect so as to repeal Acts in conflict therewith un til the Governor signs an Executive Order. As applied to the Insurance Commissioner it means that the existing law which authorizes the Commissioner to employ his assistants will be repealed when the Merit System becomes effective as to his department. It is then that the old law comes into conflict with the new. The Legislature has simply delayed the time when the repeal will become effective. In this connection it is interesting to note Section 9 of the Act.
' In Section 9, it is provided:
"If and when this Act and the rules and regulations issued hereunder have inet the standards required for a merit system of personnel administration by interested Federal agencies, it shall supersede the merit system provided by any Oklahoma Statute now in full force and effect. "
From the foregoing it is clear that it was intended that conflicting laws would be superseded and repealed as a matter of law, when the Merit System is invoked for any particular department or agency of government.
Under the view herein expressed the Legislature incorporated in the Act the policy of the State applicable to the employees of the State. There is no question that a statutory enactment may ordinarily provide that it will take effect on the happening of some future event. Firemen's Benevolent. Ass'n v. City Council of City of Santa Ana, 168 Cal.App.2d 765, 336 P.2d 273; State of New Mexico v. Spears, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356, 39 A.L.R.2d 595; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 410, p. 979.
There is no merit in the contention that the Legislature failed to furnish standards or rules for the guidance and use of the Governor preliminai-y to the making of an order. In examining and analyzing the entire Act we find sufficient standards in the intent and policy set forth in the Act to guide the Governor in determining if and when the Act should become operative as to any agency or department of government. All that remains to be done is for the Governor to extend the Act to the Insurance Department and the department of the' Insurance Commissioner. The Act becomes operative as to these upon an act or event, which in this case is an order of the Governor and which is essentially an administrative act. LePage v. Bailey, 114 W.Va. 25, 170 S.E. 457, 458. As to this particular point we hold that the Act is not repugnant to the Constitution but that the Act does not become effective or operative until such time as the Executive Order is actually issued as to any particular department or agency of government.
The Governor was entrusted with certain responsibilities under this Act. It was the type of thing that could have been given to any administrative agency.
Plaintiff's contention herein is similar to that- presented in Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, supra [185 Okl. 177, 90 P.2d 902], wherein it was urged that the "Minimum Wage Law" was unconstitutional as Constituting an unauthorized delegation of legislative power. It was there contended the Commission was given a "roving authority" and to exercise its whim in.the selection of the industries to be included in its operation. Our statement in that decision is applicable to the present situation:
"The view is advanced that the legislature has delegated an unwarranted authority to the Commission in that it has failed to designate the particular industries included in its operation and given the Commission a 'roving authority to select' the trades, occupations or professions to which its power shall be applied and in so doing to exercise its whim if it so chose, in the selection to be made. This challenge to the validity of the act is based upon a misinterpretation of the act. It does not leave to the Commission the power to determine to what industries the act shall be made applicable, but on the contrary by the act itself it is made applicable to, and requires the maintenance of proper working conditions and adequate minimum wages in all industries except those designated as excluded."
We think that when the thing the Legislature intended has become a reality and a working unit in the government of this State we are not at liberty to lightly say the original Act is unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs urge that the Maryland case of Ahlgren v. Cromwell, 179 Md. 243, 17 A.2d 134, upholds their position. That case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
There the issue basically involved was whether the Governor could by executive order or proclamation, pursuant to the then established civil service law, repeal another statute which was not expressly or impliedly repealed. The statute authorized the Governor of Maryland to extend the merit system by executive order to employees or classes of employees excepted from or not included in the classified service by the civil service law. There was a special statute, as to watchmen, which expressly excepted such position from the operation of the civil service law. It was held by the Maryland court that the Governor could not override such special statute by placing such positions under the merit system, for the effect of the Governor's action would be to repeal the special statute, which only the Legislature could so do. This was the precise narrow issue involved in the Ahl-gren. case.
The Oklahoma Legislature was aware that there was a merit plan already operative in certain agencies of the State. It had the knowledge of how the Merit System had been operating in such. state departments and agencies, and of the problems that had occurred in establishing merit or civil services in other states. There were many practical problems to be solved and, based on its known knowledge and experience, the Oklahoma Legislature determined to leave inclusion of agencies and departments to some administrative authority after study, and then to extend the Merit System wherever deemed practicable. It chose the Governor as the administrative authority to extend the Merit System, in his discretion, "upon determining that the merit system of personnel administration with the rules and regulations adopted thereunder should .be required." 74 O.S. Supp.1959, Section 802, para. 1. This is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power, but rather a conferring of authority on the Governor exercisable only under and in pursuance of the Merit System Act. The authority granted by the Act is administrative and relates merely to the execution of the Act and does not by its terms unlawfully delegate to the Governor legislative authority.
In State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 1957, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537, 540, the seventh paragraph of the syllabus is .as follows :
"The Legislature may not delegate its powers to make laws but may enact a law in general terms which confers upon an officer or board administrative duties to enforce and apply the law, and, to accomplish that end, to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of' some future fact, event or condition, which the officer or board is required to ascertain; but, the statute must prescribe reasonably clear standards by which those vested with the duty to-make the statute operate will do so in the manner intended. Where, however, the discretion to be exercised relates to a police regulation for the protection of the public morals, health, safety or, general welfare, and it is, im-. possible or impracticable to provide such standards and to do so would defeat the legislative object sought to be accomplished, legislation conferring such discretion may be valid and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations."
The Legislature, of. course, reserves to-itself, notwithstanding such authorization to the Governor, the power to preempt action by the Governor in extending the law, either in anticipation of any such action or after the Governor has so acted, where the Legislature may differ with the Governor as to the wisdom of making any extension of the law to any particular department or agency.
Courts have distinguished between the unlawful delegation of "legislative power" and authorization to augment or implement the civil service statutes for many years. This was the basis on which the constitutionality of the Federal Civil Service Act was upheld in Butler v. White, C.C., 83 F. 578. There, the Federal Law was challenged on the ground that it delegated legislative power to the President and the Civil Service Commission. The Federal Civil Service Act authorized the President to determine, by rules and regulations carrying out the Act, to what departments and agencies and what classes of positions the Civil Service Act and rules may apply from time to time. Such distinction was also held valid in such typical cases as Green v. State Civil Service Commission, 90 Ohio St. 252, 107 N.E. 531; State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N.W. 832, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 480; Opinion of the Justices, 138 Mass. 601; People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N.E. 229, 41 L.R.A. 775.
.The case of State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, supra, in distinguishing between the delegation of legislative authority and conferring authority or discretion to an administrative agency to carry out the provisions of a reasonably comprehensive law is in point.
This Court has sustained the delegation of authority in quite similar situations. In Wells v. Childers, 196 Okl. 339, 165 P.2d 358, we held valid the delegation of authority to the Governor in the use of the Contingency Fund as delegation of administrative power.
In Adwon v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 204 Okl. 199, 228 P.2d 376, 377, we said:
"The Legislature is itself the judge of the conditions which warrant legislative enactments, and they are only to be set aside when they involve such palpable abuse of power and lack of reasonableness to accomplish a lawful end that they may be said to be merely arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and hence irreconcilable with the conception and due process of law."
What we have in this case is not the unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
The fifth question for our determination is whether Title 74, Ch. 27, violates the constitutional provisions of this State in regard to appropriation of public funds.
It is urged that Section 813 of the Act is contrary to Sections 55 and 56, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. We set out the Sections from both the statutes and the Constitution:
"§ 813. Payment of administrative costs. —
"The administrative expenses and cost of operating the merit system shall be paid by the various divisions of the State Government included within the merit system by an Executive Order issued under Section 2 hereof, and each such division shall be authorized to include in its budget estimates its pro rata share of such cost, and shall remit such shares quarterly from departmental or agency funds to the personnel administration fund. Beginning with the effective date of this Act the Director shall maintain accurate records reflecting the cost of administering its provisions, and at the close of each quarter-year period he shall summarize said cost, and shall bill each department or agency included within the terms of this Act by the issuance of an Executive Order under Section 2 hereof, with a pro rata share of the administrative cost based on the relationship between the quarterly average number of employees in the classified service of such department or agency, and the quarterly average number of employees in the classified service of all the departments or agencies included within the terms of this Act by Executive Order for the appropriate calendar quarter."
"§ 55. Appropriations — Necessity and requisites
"No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law, nor unless such payments be made within two and one-half years after the passage of such appropriation act, and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any'other law to fix such sum."
"§ 56. General appropriation bills— Salaries — Separate appropriation bills
"The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the State, and for interest on the public debt. The salary of no officer or employee of the State, or any subdivision thereof, shall be increased in such bill, nor shall any appropriation be made therein for any such officer or employee, unless his employment and the amount of his salary, shall have been already provided for by law. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject."
It is to be noted the Act in question and Section 813 thereof went into effect on July 17, 1959, and that most appropriations for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1960, and June 30, 1961, to pay salaries and operating expenses of existing State Departments and Agencies went into effect prior to July 17, 1959. We are of the opinion and so hold that Section 813, applies only to appropriations thereafter made for a department or agency for the ensuing fiscal years based on "its budget estimates" of necessary expenditures for said years. Under the foregoing estimates, distinctly specified appropriations could be made for the benefit of the personnel administration fund. Section 813 under such construction and operation is clearly valid. We call attention to Campbell v. Cornish, 163 Okl. 213, 22 P.2d 63, where the seventh paragraph of the syllabus provides as follows:
"A statute should be given a construction in conformity with the Constitution in order that its constitutionality may be sustained, if the statute is susceptible of such a construction."
We call attention to similar provisions in the Merit System Acts of Georgia and Florida which have never been held invalid and are as follows:
"Sec. 110.10 — (1). The administrative expense and costs of operating the merit system shall be paid by the various divisions of' state government, and each such division shall be authorized to include in its budget estimates of its pro-rata share of such cost."
"40-2207(e). an annual budget covering all the costs of operating the Merit System Council upon the approval of such budget by the Governor he shall be empowered to direct that the necessary pro rata share of the several' departments concerned be made available for expenditure by the Merit System Council and without the necessity of further approval by the respective departments from whom said funds are to be derived : "
We think, however, that where any agency or department brought under the Merit System has funds available the same maj be used by it to pay the State Personnel Board as the agent of such department in examining the qualifications and employing its authorized personnel and to compensate the Personnel Board for its services in the manner set forth in Section 813 of the Act and in which case Section 55, Article V of the Constitution would not be either involved or violated.
We cannot see where Article V, Section 56 of the Constitution is in any way vio lated by Title 74, Ch.. 27. It. deals with appropriations and salaries that are in no way affected by this Merit System Act.
The plaintiff cites Ex parte Pope, 33 Okl.Cr. 5, 242 P. 290, and approved in State ex rel. Perkins v. Sneed, 143 Okl. 142, 287 P. 1021, as sustaining his position. That case held an Act unconstitutional because of the lack of public supervision. Such situation does not exist in the present case as there is an abundance of public supervision provided in Title 74, Ch. 27.
We consider the Act we have under scrutiny constitutional and that it violates no provision of our Constitution.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants and denying the plaintiff any relief in this case.
DAVISON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and WELCH, JOHNSON and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
BLACKBIRD, IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., dissent,