Case Name: Kevin L. FOREHAND, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee
Court: Delaware Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 2010-06-22
Citations: 997 A.2d 673
Docket Number: No. 292, 2009
Parties: Kevin L. FOREHAND, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
Judges: Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 997
Pages: 673–681

Head Matter:
Kevin L. FOREHAND, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
No. 292, 2009.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: April 28, 2010.
Decided: June 22, 2010.
Reargument Denied July 9, 2010.
Joseph M. Leager, Jr., Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire and Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire (argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

Opinion:
BERGER, Justice,
for the majority:
In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of a statute that classifies a "walk away" escape after conviction as a violent felony. Appellant was serving Level IV probation and failed to return to the Plum-mer Community Corrections Center after work. He was arrested one week later and returned to custody. For purposes of a constitutional analysis, the fact that appellant's escape did not involve violence is irrelevant. Statutes are presumptively valid, and will be upheld if there is any rational basis to support the legislature's classification. It is entirely reasonable to label all escapes after conviction as violent felonies because the perpetrators are convicted criminals who may use violence to avoid apprehension by the police. Accordingly, we uphold the constitutionality of the classification and affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Kevin L. Forehand was arrested in March 2007 and indicted on charges of possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, second degree assault, felony resisting arrest, and other drug related crimes. He was released after posting bail, but Forehand failed to appear at his arraignment. In May 2007 he was committed to prison in lieu of bail. In August 2007 Forehand pled guilty to second degree assault. He was immediately sentenced to 8 years at Level V, suspended after one year for four years at Level IV work release, suspended after 19 months for Level III supervision.
On September 1, 2008, Forehand was serving his Level IV probation at the Plummer Community Corrections Center. After work that day he failed to return to custody. The next morning a warrant was issued, and Forehand was apprehended on September 8, 2008. Forehand pled guilty to escape after conviction and was sentenced as an habitual offender to a minimum mandatory term of 8 years at Level V. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The relevant portion of Delaware's habitual offender statute provides that a person with three prior felony convictions may be declared an habitual criminal after being convicted of a fourth felony. The maximum sentence is life imprisonment, and, if the fourth felony is a "violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c)," the minimum sen-tenee may not be less than the maximum sentence for that crime. Forehand pled guilty to escape after conviction, which is defined as follows:
§ 1253. Escape after conviction; class B felony; class C felony; class D felony:
A person shall be guilty of escape after conviction if such person, after entering a plea of guilty or having been convicted by the court, escapes from a detention facility or other place having custody of such person....
Escape after conviction shall be a class D felony; provided, however, that if the defendant uses force or the threat of force against another person or possesses a deadly weapon at the time of escape, it shall be a class C felony. If the defendant inflicts injury upon another person during the escape or from the time of escape until such person is again in custody, it shall be a class B felony....
Felonies are denominated Class A through Class G, with Class A felonies being the most serious. In addition, approximately 75 crimes, enumerated in § 4201(c), are "designated as violent felonies." Escape after conviction is included in the list. As a result, Forehand was sentenced as an habitual offender to 8 years at Level V.
Forehand seeks reversal of his sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that § 4201(c) is unconstitutional because there is no rational basis on which to classify a "walk away" escape as a violent felony. The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Delaware protect against deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." A statute violates the guarantee of substantive due process if it "manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." But the statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on Forehand to show that there are no "facts, either known or which could have been reasonably assumed, which afford[ ] support for the legislation."
The habitual criminal statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214, subjects repeat felons to enhanced punishment. The extent of that enhanced punishment depends on the number and gravity of the habitual offender's prior crimes as well as the gravity of the crime for which the offender is being sentenced. The General Assembly designated certain crimes as "violent" felonies for purposes of enhanced sentencing. The listed felonies do not always involve violence, but they are dangerous crimes that place innocent people at risk of harm. Escape after conviction, even in its most benign form, properly falls into that category. A convicted felon who fails to return to custody while on work release demonstrates, by his conduct, that it was a mistake to place him or her at that level of supervision. The assumption that such a criminal is safe to be in the community, likewise, is negated. An escaped convict must find a place to hide in order to avoid recapture, and it is reasonable to anticipate that a person in those circumstances might resort to violence or threats of violence.
Forehand also argues that his 8 year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Crosby v. State, this Court explained:
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution limits the sentencing discretion under Delaware's habitual offender statute by prohibiting sentences that are greatly disproportionate to the conduct being punished. To determine whether a particular sentence is prohibited, this Court must undertake a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed. If such a comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, then this Court must compare [Forehand's] sentence with other similar cases to determine whether the trial court acted out of step with sentencing norms.
Crosby had been sentenced to life in prison (calculated at 45 years) after committing forgery in the second degree, a class G felony. This Court held that Crosby's sentence was the rare case where an habitual offender received a grossly disproportionate sentence. In doing so, the Court noted that a 10 year sentence (which had been requested by the State) would not be unconstitutional.
Forehand's Eighth Amendment claim fails at the outset, as a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentenced imposed does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality. Forehand committed the crime of escape after conviction, a Class D felony. He did not just walk away from work release and return the next morning. Rather, he remained at large until the police arrested him one week later. An 8 year prison sentence may be considered harsh, but it does not approach the grossly disproportionate standard required for Eighth Amendment protection.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
. 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
. 11 Del. C. § 4205.
.U.S. Const. Amend V. See, also: U.S. Const, amend XIV; Del. C. Ann. Const, art. 1, § 9.
. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960).
. DiStefano v. Watson, 566 A.2d 1, 7 (Del.1989). See, also: Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198, 99 S.Ct. 1062, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979).
. See: Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 174 (Del.1988) (General Assembly properly characterized a daytime residential burglary as a serious crime involving potential violence and danger to human life.).
. 824 A.2d 894 (Del.2003).
. Id. at 908 (Quotations and citations omitted.).