Case Name: The State vs. Fracis Le Blanc
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1813-05
Citations: 1 Tread 354
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State vs. Fracis Le Blanc.
Judges: Colcock, Brevard, and Bay, Justices, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 354–359

Head Matter:
CharlestoN, May Term, 1813.
The State vs. Fracis Le Blanc.
Lance and Simmons, for the Motion.
The testi-uionyof an infant of 7 years, corroborated by circun-heH° suffi. justify a conviction offence, biiityC1'of *' such witness ispvo petty left tothejury.
In rape, any the least penetration is sufficient. Quiere, if emission be necea-. • sary ? the fact property left to the jury.
Motion for a new trial.
The defendant in this case was found guilty of t carnal knowledge of an infant, under the age or ten years, contrary to the statute. The material witner. was chüd, an infant little more than seven years 0](] at the time the charge is laid. It appeared in evidence, that several days elapsed before she disclosed any of the circumstances stated in her evi¿ence . an¿ not then, till she was charged by her 7 7 ° J mother, (who discovered blood on her linen,) with having had connection with a man, and closely questioned as to the circumstances. She then pointed out the prisoner, as the offender, and his house as the scene *of the offence. It was also proved by the physicians, that both were suffering under the same disease. Opposed to this evidence were the facts of the child's not complaining of the injury till a considerable time after, as well as the circumstances under which the narrative from her was obtained ; the time of day between the hours of two and five o'clock in the afternoon, in August, and the public situation, in which the outrage was charged to have been perpetrated; her inconsistency in declaring to the magistrate that she cried out, and in deposing in court, that she did not. A witness for the prisoner deposed, that on that very day, (which he was enabled to ascertain from circumstances, having been examined by the magistrate soon after the alleged occurrence,) he was at the house of the prisoner, at the very time the prisoner was charged with the commission of the crime, and that nothing of that sort took place. The child deposed also to an attitude, viz. that she stood up with her legs between his, and he sat down. She also stated, that he did not move her from the floor.
The court charged the jury, that the testimony of the mother and father, (which, beyond the circumstances of the child’s disclosure, was only a repetition of her narrative) was, (if they, the witnesses were believed,) in law, confirmation of the child’s evidence. That they were not bound to believe Pi^n^s witness, though uncontradicted, but might exercise their discretion, as to the weight his evidence was entitled to. That if they thought the child had, in delivering her testimony, forgotten from her embarrassment her real attitude, they were at liberty to take that into consideration ; and that it was probable the magistrate was mistaken, when he stated, that the child had said before him that she cried out, as his attention was not probably drawn particularly to this point. He charged also, that the least degree of penetration, coupled with emission, was a consummation of the crime. These appear to be the material facts, but this is not given as a full or minute statement of the evidence. A motion is made for a new trial, on the following grounds.
1st, Because the verdict is without sufficient evidence on the part of the state, and contrary to the evidence offered for the defendant.
2ndly, Because the verdict is contrary to law, inasmuch as upon all the evidence in the case, it appeared that even supposing and assault to have been committed on the infant, with the intent of carnally knowing her, the crime was not committed; and, in the attitude to which she deposed, was impracticable.
3rdly, Because his honor the judge misdirected the jury in his charge, in the several particulars mentioned in the brief.
4thly, Because the verdict was in other respects _ , _ * contrary to law and evidence.

Opinion:
Nott, J.
In a case of this nature, I am not disposed to say more than is sufficient to justify the opinion I am about to give. I think the law was fairly stated, and the facts fairly submitted to the jury by the presiding judge, and I do not see any good ground to set aside the verdict. The only grounds relied upon for a new trial, which appear to be entitled to consideration, are; 1st, That it is paying too much regard to the testimony of a child of nine years old, to suffer that alone to deprive a man of his life : 2d, Admitting it to be true, the act was not so far accomplished as to constitute the of-fence for which the defendant is indicted.
With regard to the first point, it belonged to the jury to judge whether she was of sufficient character and discretion to deserve credit. And unless such evidence is to be considered sufficient, no person can ever be convicted of this offence; for the patient is the only person by whom it is to be expected that the person can be identified. The commission of the fact on so young a subject, is in a great measure susceptible of proof from other circumstances. And in the present case, the testimony of the child is strongly corroborated by circumstances, both as it relate s to the person and the fact.
First, with regard to the person, her saying it was a barber's shop ; pointing out the defendant at once as the man; the description of the closet where the offence was committed, which she could not have known, if she had not been there ; — the disease be- . f0Und on him which had been communicated to her, and the consistency of her story, so often related, are circumstances which could hardly have conspired to support a fabricated tale.
With regard to the fact, the corroborating circumstances are equally strong. That an unlawful connection was attempted may be inferred from the disease which she contracted; for, although it is admitted that the infection may be communicated without carnal intercourse, yet, such a thing is not to be presumed : and when this fact is relied on only as a circumstance to strengthen her testimony, it cannot fail to have that effect. The lameness which •was immediately observed by the mother, and the stains upon her clothes, although not absolutely conclusive, are certainly strong corroborating circumstances. I am, therefore, satisfied with the verdict.
With regard to the witness, who pretended he was in company with the defendant at the time the transaction is said to have taken place, and the other testimony relied upon to weaken the evidence on the part of the prosecution, it belonged to the jury to decide; and I do not feel authorised to say they have not decided correctly.
But 2dly, It is said that the act was not so com - ijleted as to constitute the offence, and that there could not have been a sufficient penetration. It is laid down by all writers on criminal law, that the . . . least penetration is sufficient. The child herself has proved there was some penetration. The doctora all concur that some penetration may be effected on a subject as small as this, — and if it might be, the lameness affords a presumption that sufficient force was used for ' that purpose. The marks upon hex* clothes strengthen the presumption, that it actually did' take place. In Rimin'*s case, 1 East, 438. it is said, the passage was so narrow that a finger could not be introduced; yet the fact was left to a jury, who found the defendant guilty. All the judges held, that it was properly referred to the jury, and refused to set aside the verdict. I presume, that, in that case, the penetration was no greater than in this, and that the facts ought to have been, as they were, left to a jury.
With regard to the other ingredient, which it is contended is necessary to constitute this offence, (if it is necessary, of which I have strong doubts,) I think that also properly left to the jury. But, finally, if the facts as proved are true, the moral guilt of the defendant is sufficiently established ; and the jury having thought it legally proved, I am not disposed to look with eagle's eyes to see if I cannot, by some legal subtlety, rescue him from the punishment he so justly deserves.
Colcock, Brevard, and Bay, Justices, concurred.