Case Name: Magdaleno V. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1980-03-05
Citations: 597 S.W.2d 917
Docket Number: No. 62274
Parties: Magdaleno V. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERTS and CLINTON, JJ., join in this dissent.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 597
Pages: 917–929

Head Matter:
Magdaleno V. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 62274.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
March 5, 1980.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1980.
Thomas Rocha, Jr., San Antonio, for appellant.
Bill M. White, Dist. Atty., Charles T. Con-away, Teofilo Chapa and Douglas V. McNeel, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder. After the jury returned affirmative answers to the issues submitted under Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., at the punishment stage, punishment was fixed at death.
In his first ground of error appellant attacks the grand jury selection method used to select the grand jury that returned his indictment.
In his argument under this ground of error appellant recognizes that the preliminary issue he must confront is the requirement of Muniz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 573 S.W.2d 792, that challenges to the composition of the grand jury must be raised at the earliest opportunity. Referring to Art. 19.-27, V.A.C.C.P., the Court in Muniz wrote:
"This statute has been interpreted to mean that the array must be challenged at the first opportunity, Valadez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 408 S.W.2d 109, which ordinarily means when the grand jury is impaneled. Challenge at this early date is sometimes impossible as when the offense occurs after the grand jury is impaneled. When challenge on impanelment is not possible, the array can be attacked in a motion to quash the indictment before trial commences. Ex parte Covin, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 320, 277 S.W.2d 109. If the defendant has an opportunity to challenge the array when it is impaneled and does not do so, he may not challenge it at a later date. Armentrout v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 238, 135 S.W.2d 479."
In an effort to distinguish Muniz, appellant argues that he was not indicted by the first grand jury impaneled after he was arrested and charged in this case, and that had he challenged that first grand jury "he would have been told that he was premature and thus he would have been required to prognosticate that the July 1977 grand jury would have been the one indicting him and thus the one to be challenged." The purpose of a challenge to a grand jury is not dependent upon knowing that the particular grand jury will consider the case of the challenging accused; the purpose is to prevent the challenged grand jury from considering his case. If no timely challenge is raised to the composition of the grand jury, it is presumed the accused had no ground for objection, and he is barred from raising a challenge at some later time that he should and could have raised in a timely fashion.
In the table of events in appellant's brief he concedes that he had been arrested and charged in this offense, and was represented by counsel, long before the grand jury that indicted him was impaneled. We find, as we did in Muniz, that appellant's failure to challenge the grand jury by a timely motion waived his right to make such a challenge. The ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error appellant asserts he is entitled to a new trial because the State violated an order on his motion for discovery by failure to disclose police offense reports of prior convictions. We initially note that his brief does not direct us to where the order on his motion may be found in the record, and our own examination of the instruments filed in the case and of the docket sheet does not disclose the existence of such an order.
During the course of a lengthy discussion of the offense reports, however, it appears that his motion for discovery of his police records had been granted prior to trial. Assuming the motion was granted, we point out that it has frequently been held that police reports are within the express exception from pre-trial discovery under Art. 39.14, V.A.C.C.P. Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314; Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 525 S.W.2d 165; Sheldon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 510 S.W.2d 936; McCloud v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 494 S.W.2d 888; Powers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 492 S.W.2d 274; Bradshaw v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 482 S.W.2d 233; Hart v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 944. Since the appellant was not entitled to pre-trial discovery of the police reports, no error is shown.
To the extent that appellant argues the State improperly suppressed the report in violation of his constitutional rights, we point out, as was stated in Young v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 552 S.W.2d 441, relying on Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972), that one essential component in consideration of a claim of prosecutorial suppression of evidence is that "the evidence's favorable character for the defense must be shown." Appellant makes no assertion that the undisclosed offense reports are of a favorable character for the defense.
The dissent takes the position that Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), was violated in this case. The situation here is not at all like that in Gardner. The holding in that case was:
"We conclude that petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." (Emphasis added.)
In Gardner, the defendant and his attorney were never informed of part of the information upon which the decision to impose the death penalty was based. Even after the trial was over and after the punishment was assessed, that information was not disclosed. The dissent's reliance on Gardner is misplaced. The testimony about which appellant complains was presented in open court and in his presence.
Finally, when, after lengthy discussion and argument between the attorneys over the use of the offense reports, objection was first raised on the basis of violation of the discovery order, appellant moved for a mistrial, but did not request a postponement or continuance under Art. 29.13, V.A.C.C.P., on the basis of surprise. This default alone would waive any error urged on the basis of surprise. See, Hays v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 205, 36 S.W.2d 1029, 1031.
The second ground of error is overruled. In his next three grounds of error appellant complains of the use made by the State of the three offense reports referred to in the previous grounds of error.
During the punishment phase of the trial the State called Dr. Grigson, who testified that appellant was a severe sociopath who would commit criminal acts of violence in the future. On extensive cross-examination appellant's counsel asked about the basis for that conclusion, and inquired at length into what acts of violence in appellant's past had been relied on by the doctor in making his determination. It was then on redirect examination that the eom- plained of offense reports were used to inquire further into the basis for the doctor's opinion. We hold the cross-examination by appellant on this subject opened the door under Art. 38.24, V.A.C.C.P., for the State to inquire further into the same subject.
Even though the dissent on its own initiative argues unreliability, appellant has made no attempt to show, by motion for new trial or otherwise, that the information received by the jury was in fact unreliable. Instead, the entire thrust of appellant's tactic in opening up this subject was to chal lenge the reliability of Dr. Grigson's conclusions through examination of what information he used to reach those conclusions. See footnote 1, above. It should reasonably have been expected that such a tactic could have opened a Pandora's box. These grounds of error are overruled.
Next appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty scheme. Such attacks have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. Jurek v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 934, affirmed 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 540 S.W.2d 693; White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 105; Granviel v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 552 S.W.2d 107; Freeman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 556 S.W.2d 287; Hughes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 562 S.W.2d 857. The ground of error is overruled.
Appellant also raises challenges to admission of the testimony of Dr. Grigson, on the theory that the psychiatric interview violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The brief, however, does not cite any trial objection, and our examination likewise reveals none. Nothing is presented for review. Muniz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 573 S.W.2d 792.
Finally, it is argued that the trial court erroneously denied appellant's motion that prospective jurors be examined under the Witherspoon criteria instead of under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 12.31(b). There is no contention, however, that examination of any prospective juror was restricted in this regard, nor that any prospective juror was dismissed in violation of the mandate of Witherspoon. The ground of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
. The extent to which the defense went into this subject on cross-examination is revealed by the following excerpt:
"Q. —would you refer to your notes and put at the top of the scale the shooting of February 8, 1977, and then trace back down the other violent acts which have occurred?
"A. Yes, sir, I will.
"Q. Don't read us the report. Just mark down shooting, maiming, knifing, whatever you have as far as violent acts.
"A. Yes, sir. Murder. Let's see. Attempt to kill, disruption and fights.
"Q. Well, now, give us the date on which this attempt to kill was supposed to have happened.
"A. Yes, sir. This was February the 10th, 1976, at the age of — I think he was 16 years old at that time. Using a butcher knife. Attempt to kill.
"Q. Tell us whether or not he stabbed somebody.
"A. I don't have that report, sir.
"Q. So you can't say that?
"A. No, I don't know whether he did or not. I really don't.
"Q. Doesn't that really say that he was chasing somebody with a butcher knife?
"A. No, sir, it doesn't. It says that he attempted to kill another student. Let's see. Prohibitive weapon — carrying a prohibitive weapon, January the 30th — I'm sorry. January the 31st, 1976. That was — we're going backwards, so January the 31st, 1976, where he was carrying a prohibitive weapon.
"Q. What was that weapon?
"A. I don't know, sir. I don't have that report.
"Q. It could have been a three-inch knife then?
"A. Something that was prohibitive. I assume it was something that was dangerous.
"Q. Show me where — show me where that, in itself, is a violent act.
"A. Well, it's against our laws.
"Q. I understand that, but you're talking about violent acts.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I understand that a shotgun may be a dangerous weapon, but a lot of people go out hunting with them.
"A. Yes, sir. But if you carry it into a bar, it's different.
"Q. Well, does it say that he carried it into a bar?
"A. No. I'm just saying compared to going hunting as compared to going into a bar. They'll put you in jail for it.
"Q. Well, we're speaking specifically—
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. —about previous violent acts, acts of violence.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So scratch that 31 January, '76.
"A. Well, I consider that violent, for a— again, a 16-year-old to be carrying around a prohibitive weapon. I would consider that an act of violence.
"Q. You're basing your opinion upon what? It doesn't tell you what kind of a weapon it was, does it?
"A. It was against the law.
"Q. Where is the violent act there?
"A. Well, the result—
"Q. I understand the illegal act, but tell me where the violent act is.
"A. I would consider that violent sir, for a 16-year-old to be carrying a prohibitive weapon when he's on parole. That would be violent to me.
"Q. A violent act, doesn't that denote and connote actually committing something?
"A. Well, that would be about like somebody saying, 'I'm going to kill you.' That would be a violent act to me.
"Q. No, that's a threat.
"A. Well, that's a violent act. From a psychiatric and medical standpoint, I would consider it violent.
"Q. All right. Well, let's go back. The jury can interpret whatever they want from what you're saying.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. The fact is that from you're reading it simply says, 'Carrying a prohibitive weapon.'
"A. Yes, sir. it does. And then — let's see. We go back to August the 27th 1974. At that time, it was burglary. We go back to—
"Q. Now, is there anything in there to indicate that anyone was hurt, injured, or property damaged or anything like that?
"A. I don't know what happened sir. I just have burglary. Then, July 28th, 1973, burglary. Then — let's see.
"Q. What age was he at that time?
"A. He was 14 years old in 1973. Then, in 1969, at the age of 10 — well, wait a minute. Before then, we have got, at age 13, he had a burglary and paint sniffing. At the age of 10, malicious mischief. That was 1959. Now, there's other—
"Q. It must be '69.
"A. 1969, yes, sir. That was malicious mischief at the age of 10. There's other fights that are reported, but it doesn't give the dates. Of course, his drug abuse; but there again, I don't have a specific date there. There was an auto theft which they have listed here, but I don't know when that occurred. There's an escape. I don't have any dates on that.
"Q. Escape? You mean running away from the state school for juvenile delinquents, right?
"A. Let's see. They just have it listed as escape. I don't really — I assume that's where he escaped from, but I don't really know. I think that's the only — that's the only thing that I have here at this time.
"Q. You made some reference to fights. These were fights when he was 10, 12, 13 years old; somewhere along there?
"A. I don't know at what ages. It didn't list them.
"Q. I would like for you to look back upon the information that's on the board and tell me — or chart — tell me exactly how many of those cases you can say — so that we all understand English the same way — involved the actual use of violence or the actual use of violent force such as to cause an injury, other than the murder.
"A. Yes, sir. Well, again, from a psychiatric medical standpoint, I consider it an act of violence for somebody to steal my car. I don't know what the malicious mischief was at the age of 10. It never resulted in charges, apparently. The burglary certainly, I think — I see that as being a violent act against my property. The escalation up the ladder to the point of carrying the concealed weapon or prohibitive weapon, then the attempt to kill, and then the murder — you see a very very definite escalation starting with age 10 and proceeding right on up to, I guess, the worst crime that one can commit.
"Q. All right. But you have reached the conclusion that carrying a prohibitive weapon was a violent act without any more information as to whether it was a switchblade knife, a hunter's knife, a machette, a pistol, or anything else?
"A. Well, it was sufficient enough, while he was on parole, for them to send him back. So I would consider that it was not like perhaps your son going out hunting and carrying a hunting knife, or even going hunting with a shotgun. I would consider that it was severe enough that they again put him back into Gatesville. So it was not a minor type violation I don't think.
"Q. But we don't know what it was? Or do you know? If you do, I would like for you to tell us.
"A. No, I don't know what kind of weapon it was, other than it was, again, severe enough where they put him right back in there again.
"Q. Well, doesn't the report from Gatesville say that they kept him in and out of Gatesville anyway?
"A. They kept him in and out?
"Q. Yes, they took him in and sent him back out.
"A. Yes, sir, they did.
"Q. And doesn't the report say that they recommended further retention and institution because his behavior improved as he was institutionalized?
"A. They recommended further institutionalization because he had improved?
"Q. Yes, as a form of therapy. Or did you not read that in the report?
"A. I don't recall it stating in that. I recall them stating that they thought he had improved, but obviously they had made a mistake. They were wrong, it said. Yes, it states there on — well, I don't have a page number, but it's right above his past medical record. It stated that he was doing well and would be replaced in the 11th grade, but did not desire to return to school upon release. 'Apparently the Defendant has not adjusted as well as one would like since his release.' And he was ultimately booked into the Bexar County Jail on 2/24/77, for the offense of capital murder.
"Q. Do you have in your possession a letter from James H. Smith, the consulting psychiatrist from the Texas Youth Council?
"A. No, sir, I don't.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit Number 1 was marked for identification.)
"Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked for identification as Defendant's Exhibit Number 1 and see if you have seen it, a copy of it, or any reports from that particular psychiatrist.
"A. No, sir, I haven't. It was summarized or included in Dr. Cameron's report, but I have not seen this specific report itself."
. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.