Case Name: Frieda Joyce JOHNSON, personal representative of the Estate of Horton Winfield Johnson, for herself and for the Benefit of Kevin Lee Nix, Cynthia Ann Johnson and Tamara Joyce Nix, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-01-13
Citations: 779 F.2d 1492
Docket Number: No. 83-5764
Parties: Frieda Joyce JOHNSON, personal representative of the Estate of Horton Winfield Johnson, for herself and for the Benefit of Kevin Lee Nix, Cynthia Ann Johnson and Tamara Joyce Nix, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RO-NEY, TJOFLAT,' HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRÁVITCH, ‘JOHNSON, HENDERSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 779
Pages: 1492–1497

Head Matter:
Frieda Joyce JOHNSON, personal representative of the Estate of Horton Winfield Johnson, for herself and for the Benefit of Kevin Lee Nix, Cynthia Ann Johnson and Tamara Joyce Nix, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 83-5764.
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 13, 1986.
Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., Joel D. Eaton, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jeffrey D. Fisher, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Linda Collins-Hertz, Jonathan Goodman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., Robert S. Greenspan, Nicholas Stephen Zeppos, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RO-NEY, TJOFLAT,' HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRÁVITCH, ‘JOHNSON, HENDERSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Frieda Joyce Johnson, respondent, brought this wrongful death action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-2680. She alleges that her husband, a helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard dispatched to search for a civilian boat, died as a result of the negligence of civilian Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controllers who had assumed control over the helicopter when inclement weather prevented visual navigation. The district court, relying on Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed. 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1985). On April 24, 1985, we granted the government's suggestion that this matter be reviewed by the en banc court. 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir.1985). Such action vacated the panel opinion. Upon consideration by the full court, the panel opinion found at 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1985) is reinstated.
As noted in footnote 13 of the panel opinion, the Supreme Court granted certio-rari in the ease of Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3rd Cir.1983), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 321, 83 L.Ed.2d 259 (1984). On June 27, 1985, the Court announced its opinion in that case, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985). The opinion of the Supreme Court is most helpful to our decision herein and reinforces the analysis set forth in the panel opinion.
Shearer involved the death of an Army private, who, while off duty, was kidnapped and murdered by another serviceman who was also off duty and away from his base. The claim made under the Federal Tort Claims Act was that although the Army knew that the other serviceman was dangerous it negligently failed to control him or warn others about him. The government contended that the suit was barred by both 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act not applicable to claims arising out of assault and battery) and the Feres doctrine. Only four members of the Court found § 2680(h) applicable. Section II B of the opinion, which discussed the Feres doctrine, was joined in by eight members of the Court (Justice Powell did not participate in the case). Special emphasis is placed upon military discipline and whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions. In Shearer, the Court concluded that the "[Respondents complaint strikes at the core of these concerns" and held the claims barred by the Feres doctrine. — U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 3043 (footnote omitted).
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice noted,
"[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases."
Id. Following this command, we find that the panel opinion has given proper consideration to the Feres factors with particular attention to whether or not the claims asserted here will implicate civilian courts in conflicts involving the military structure or military decisions. The claims presented are based solely upon the conduct of civilian employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (a civilian administration within the Department of Transportation) who were not in any way involved in military activities. The fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard is not sufficient, standing alone, to activate the Feres preclusion.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.
. Section II B reads:
Our holding in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), was that a soldier may not recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Id., at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. Although the Court in Feres based its decision on several grounds,
"[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty.'" United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 [83 S.Ct. 1850, 1857, 10 L.Ed.2d 805] (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 [75 S.Ct. 141, 143, 99 L.Ed. 139] (1954).
The Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases. Here, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the fact that Private Shearer was off duty and away from the base when he was murdered. But the situs of the murder is not nearly as important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions, see Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2058, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977), and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline, see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365, 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983).
Respondent's complaint strikes at the core of these concerns [footnote omitted]. In particular, respondent alleges that Private Shearer's superiors in the Army "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control over Andrew Heard, . failed to warn other persons that he was at large, [and] negligently and carelessly failed to . remove Andrew Heard from active military duty." App. 14. This allegation goes directly to the "management" of the military; it calls into question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman [footnote omitted].
Respondent's case is therefore quite different from Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949), where the Court allowed recovery under the Tort Claims Act for injuries caused by a negligent driver of a military truck. Unlike the negligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle, the claim here would require Army officers "to testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058. To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place restraints on a soldier's off-base conduct. But as we noted in Chappell v. Wallace, such "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, . and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments."' 462 U.S., at 302, 103 S.Ct. at 2366 quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 2446, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973).
Finally, respondent does not escape the Feres net by focusing only on this case with a claim of negligence, and by characterizing her claim as a challenge to a "straightforward personnel decision." Tr. of Oral Arg. '37. By whatever name it is called, it is a decision of command. The plaintiffs in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering did not contest the wisdom of broad military policy; nevertheless, the Court held that their claims did not fall within the Tort Claims Act because they were the type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness. Similarly, respondent's attempt to hale Army officials into court to account for their supervision and discipline of Private Heard must fail. — U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 3043-44.