Case Name: Donald J. PATRONELLI, Plaintiff, v. Carrie PATRONELLI, Defendant.
Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 2006-01-03
Citations: 623 S.E.2d 322
Docket Number: No. COA04-1666.
Parties: Donald J. PATRONELLI, Plaintiff,
v.
Carrie PATRONELLI, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 623
Pages: 322–322

Head Matter:
Donald J. PATRONELLI, Plaintiff,
v.
Carrie PATRONELLI, Defendant.
No. COA04-1666.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
January 3, 2006.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 6 January 2004 by Judge Anne B. Salisbury in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 August 2005.
Oliver & Oliver, PLLC, by John M. Oliver, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellee.
Manning, Fulton, & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
CALABRIA, Judge.
Carrie Patronelli ("defendant") appeals from an order of the trial court denying her claim for counsel fees. We affirm.
Donald J. Patronelli ("plaintiff") and defendant married in August 1997; however, by July 2001, the parties had separated. Subsequently, on 14 August 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, custody of a minor child, child support, and equitable distribution. Defendant counter claimed for custody of the minor child, child support, postseparation support, and alimony. In orders not pertinent to the present appeal, the trial court ruled on the issues of child custody, child support, and postseparation support. The trial court then set a hearing on the issues of alimony and related counsel fees. At the hearing, defendant's counsel stated, and the trial court found, that "[counsel] had incurred expenses and fees in the amount of approximately $2,500.00 in bringing the defendant's permanent alimony case to trial." The trial court further found, however, that "defendant is represented on a pro bono basis by her counsel" and "has not incurred any . expenses as she is not personally liable to her counsel for the same." The trial court then concluded, "The defendant has not incurred any [counsel] fees under [N.C. Gen.Stat.] § 50-16.4 [2003], and thus her claim for [counsel] fees should be denied." From the trial court's denial of her claim for counsel fees, defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court improperly denied her request for counsel fees. We disagree.
North Carolina General Statutes § 50-16.4, which governs counsel fees in alimony cases, states:
At any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3A, or postseparation support pursuant to G.S. 50-16.2A, the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony.
We review de novo whether a trial court properly denied counsel fees under this statute. See Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379, 193 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1972) (stating, "[p]roper exercise of the trial judge's authority in granting alimony. . . or counsel fees is a question of law, reviewable on appeal"). When construing a statute, "the task of the courts is to ensure that the purpose of the Legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished. The best indicia of that legislative purpose are the language of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish." Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C.App. 448, 450, 432 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1993). "Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute." State v. Anthony, 351 N.C. 611, 614, 528 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2000) (citations omitted).
The plain language of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-16.4 provides that when a dependent spouse is entitled to alimony or postseparation support, a trial court may enter an order "for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse." "Attorney's fees" are defined as "[t]he charge to a client for services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee." Black's Law Dictionary 125 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added). Accordingly, counsel fees cannot, by definition, be implicated in the present case where the dependent spouse never incurred counsel expenses.
The purpose of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-16.4 further supports our analysis. The legislative intent behind the allowance of counsel fees under section 50-16.4 is "to enable the dependent spouse, as litigant, to meet the supporting spouse, as litigant, on substantially even terms by making it possible for the dependent spouse to employ adequate and suitable legal representation." Lamb v. Lamb, 103 N.C.App. 541, 549, 406 S.E.2d 622, 627 (1991) (citations omitted). This is because "[i]t would be contrary to what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature to require a dependent spouse to meet the expenses of litigation through the unreasonable depletion of her separate estate where her separate estate is considerably smaller than that of the supporting spouse." Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 137, 271 S.E.2d 58, 68 (1980). In the case sub judice, the legislative intent of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-16.4 is not implicated given that the dependent spouse has no counsel fees, and therefore, there are no costs to shift.
We further note that our holding is not a value judgment on the meritorious and selfless services provided by pro bono counsel. Although there are strong public policy arguments in favor of legislation authorizing an award of fees to a public interest entity that represents claimants seeking postseparation support and alimony, it is not the province of the courts to read into legislation beneficent objectives when contrary to the plain language and purpose of a statute. These arguments, accordingly, must be reserved for the General Assembly.
Because the plain language and purpose of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-16.4 fail to include expenses incurred by pro bono counsel, we hold the trial court properly denied defendant an award of counsel fees.
Affirmed.
Judge LEVINSON concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents with a separate opinion.