Case Name: Fred FERNEZ and Jacqueline R. Burns, Petitioners, v. Samuel A. CALABRESE, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-07-07
Citations: 760 So. 2d 1144
Docket Number: No. 5D99-1952
Parties: Fred FERNEZ and Jacqueline R. Burns, Petitioners, v. Samuel A. CALABRESE, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 760
Pages: 1144–1147

Head Matter:
Fred FERNEZ and Jacqueline R. Burns, Petitioners, v. Samuel A. CALABRESE, Respondent.
No. 5D99-1952.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 7, 2000.
Jeffrey S. Weiss, and Scott D. Danahy of Brown, Ward, Salzman & Weiss, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioners.
Lisa L. Hogreve and Vincent G. Torpy, Jr. of Frese, Nash & Torpy, P.A., Melbourne, for Respondent.

Opinion:
COBB, J.
Petitioners, Fred Fernez, individually and as Chief of Police of the City of Indian Harbour Beach, and Jacqueline Burns, individually and as City Manager and Assistant City Manager of the City of Indian Harbour Beach, seek certiorari review of an order of the circuit court denying their motion for summary judgment which asserted qualified immunity.
Respondent, Samuel Calabrese, sued the city and petitioners for money damages, alleging that his position as police captain was eliminated in retaliation for his reluctance to sign an internal affairs report with which he disagreed, his refusal to testify falsely regarding that report and his' refusal to sign a petition to promote petitioner Burns to the position of City Manager. Although an administrative hearing officer had found that respondent's position was eliminated for legitimate budgetary reasons and that the city had not acted arbitrarily, respondent contends that the budgetary reason given for the termination of his position was pretex-tual and that petitioners' actions violated his due process rights under the Florida Constitution (Count 1); deprived him of his right to free speech under the Florida Constitution (Count 2); violated his substantive due process rights under the Florida Constitution (Count 3); caused the intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 4); and breached his contract (Count 5).
In 1998, petitioners and the city filed motions for partial summary judgment, claiming that sovereign immunity barred respondent's claims for violation of substantive and procedural due process. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the substantive due process count (Count 3), but denied the motion on the procedural due process claim. (Count 1). Certiorari review of that order was denied. See Fernez v. Calabrese, 728 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Petitioners then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity from suit as a matter of law, with respect to the claims for violation of procedural due process (Count 1) and violation of the right to free speech (Count 2). Petitioners' motion for summary judgment was denied in two separate orders. The trial court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, but denied the motion without explanation. Petitioners then filed this petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial court's denial of their defense of qualified immunity from suit constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law causing irreparable harm.
Ordinarily, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable by certiorari because there is an adequate remedy available by appeal after final judgment. See generally Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1987); Vermette v. Ludwig, 707 So.2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 717 So.2d 534 (Fla.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 984, 119 S.Ct. 449, 142 L.Ed.2d 403 (1998); South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Dupont By and Through Dupont, 683 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Barber v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, 656 So.2d 961 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Chase Federal Bank v. Kim, 604 So.2d 909 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). However, in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187 (Fla.1994), the Florida Supreme Court held that an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law. The court pointed out that under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
The central purpose of qualified immunity is to protect public officials from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability, see Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). The Florida Supreme Court held in Tucker that qualified immunity of public officials involves immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense of liability, and is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. "[I]f orders denying summary judgment based upon claims of qualified immunity are not subject to interlocutory review, the qualified immunity of public officials is illusory and the very policy that animates the decision to afford such immunity is thwarted." 648 So.2d at 1190. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-527, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
The problem created by the instant case is that the purported claim asserted by the plaintiff below against the individual petitioners here, Fernez and Burns, is not an actionable tort. See Garcia v. Reyes, 697 So.2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(no cause of action exists for money damages for violation of state constitutional right). That being so, can Fernez and Burns have immunity, an affirmative defense, where there is no recognized tort to be immune from? Is there any available affirmative defense to a non-viable claim other than a simple motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action? If the answer to this question is no, and we believe that it is, then we must decline to exercise certiorari review of an abstract concept. Rather, this case should await disposition by the trial court in response to a proper motion by the petitioners. We therefore deny certiorari review.
CERTIORARI DENIED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. Although the trial court also denied the city's motion for partial summary judgment, immunity was not raised in that motion and this court denied certiorari review, as there was an adequate remedy at law.
. The defense of failure to state a cause of action may be raised by motion for judgment or at the trial on the merits in addition to being raised in either a motion under subdivision (b) of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(h)(2) or in the answer or reply. See Curcio v. Cessna Finance Corp., 424 So.2d 868, 870, n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).