Case Name: Caroline A. Sudduth, Appellant, v. Bruce K. Chapman, as Secretary of State, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1977-01-07
Citations: 88 Wash. 2d 247
Docket Number: No. 44460
Parties: Caroline A. Sudduth, Appellant, v. Bruce K. Chapman, as Secretary of State, Respondent.
Judges: Hunter, Wright, Brachtenbach, and Dolliver, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 247–267

Head Matter:
[No. 44460.
En Banc.
January 7, 1977.]
Caroline A. Sudduth, Appellant, v. Bruce K. Chapman, as Secretary of State, Respondent.
Hamley & Hamley and G. Cliff Armstrong, Jr. (John Remington Graham, of counsel), for appellant.
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Wayne L. Williams and Carol A. Smith, Assistants, for respondent.

Opinion:
Rosellini, J.
The appellant brought an action in the Superior Court for Thurston County, pursuant to RCW 29.79.210, seeking a writ of mandate to compel the respondent Secretary of State to certify to the ballot Initiative 322, popularly known as the "anti-fluoridation" measure. The respondent had, after canvasing the petitions, determined that they lacked sufficient signatures to qualify under Const, art. 2, § 1A (amendment 30).
Evidence introduced by the appellant at the Superior Court hearing showed that the respondent had rejected the signatures of 4,656 registered voters because they had signed petitions more than once. The rejection was based upon RCW 29.79.200 which provides, inter alia: "If the secretary of state finds the same name signed to more than one petition he shall reject the name as often as it appears."
The appellant also showed that, in the brief period of time during which she had access to the petitions before the court hearing, it was discovered that a number of rejected signatures were in fact signatures of registered voters. Testimony of her expert tended to show that a projection of the ratio of valid signatures to the total number investigated would lead to a conclusion that more than a sufficient number of registered voters had signed the petitions. While the objectivity of the sample used and the qualifications of the witness were questioned by the respondent, he offered no expert testimony contradicting the projections.
The reason that some registered voters were rejected, it appears, was that the respondent did not have in his office any record, or in some cases the current record, of their registration, and did not look beyond the cards on file in his office to determine whether persons signing the petitions were registered voters. The appellant had discovered the canvasing errors by checking 21 rejected signatures against King County voter registration records. She found that 16 of these were registered voters.
The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the provision of RCW 29.79.200 quoted above, contending that all registered voters who signed the petitions were entitled to have their signatures counted once. She further contended that the Secretary of State had the duty to check the rejected signatures against local records, or accord them a presumption of validity, where such rejections were based upon the fact that the names did not appear on records in the respondent's office. The Superior Court rejected both of these contentions, holding RCW 29.79.200 constitutional and concluding that, under applicable statutes, in performing his function of canvasing initiative petitions, the Secretary of State is not obliged to look beyond the registration cards on file in his office, or to take any action to assure that his records are current.
When the appeal to this court was argued, we determined that the Superior Court should be reversed. Because the fruits of the appeal would be lost if our order had to await the preparation of an opinion, there remaining barely sufficient time before election day to comply with the procedures provided in the election law for placing the issue on the ballot, we issued the writ and noted that an opinion would follow. While the initiative subsequently failed at the polls, that fact does not relieve the court of the obligation to explain its order (Const, art. 4, § 2), and this opinion may be regarded as relating back to the date of the writ.
We consider first the constitutionality of RCW 29.79.200, insofar as it provides that, if the Secretary of State finds the same name signed to more than one petition, he shall reject the name as often as it appears. It is contended that this provision exceeds the authority conferred upon the legislature under Const, art. 2, § 1A (amendment 30), to enact legislation "especially to facilitate" the operation of the section providing for the initiative and referendum. This authorization directly follows and modifies the declaration that the section is self-executing.
Those provisions of the constitution which reserve the right of initiative and referendum are to be liberally construed to the end that this right may be facilitated, and not hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further than is necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this constitutional right. Rousso v. Meyers, 64 Wn.2d 53, 390 P.2d 557 (1964); State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 569, 166 P. 1126 (1917); State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914).
Was the legislature justified in denying to registered voters who signed petitions more than once, the right to have one of these signatures counted? Does the measure facilitate the initiative process? The respondent makes no showing that it does. The intent of amendment 30, as we read it, was "to require that an initiative measure be placed upon the ballot if the requisite number of registered voters sign it. Refusing' to count a duplicate signer as one petitioner frustrates, rather than furthers this purpose.
This court impliedly recognized this principle in Edwards v. Hutchinson, 178 Wash. 580, 35 P.2d 90 (1934), where it said that when a legal voter has signed a referendum petition, his signature must be counted, even though the person soliciting his signature has violated the law.
Is the measure nevertheless necessary to "fairly guard against fraud and mistake"? (Rousso v. Meyers, supra at 60; State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, supra.) The respondent does not argue that it is. While there are 20 states having constitutions which provide for the initiative and referendum (see 21 Book of the States 1976-1977, Table 7, at 218 (1976)), he does not suggest that any of them has found it necessary to enact a provision such as that found in RCW 29.79.200, in order to protect the integrity of the initiative process. Our own research has failed to disclose a comparable provision. There appears to be a dearth of cases upon the point, but the Arizona Supreme Court has held without hesitation that where a signature appears more than once on a petition, it should be counted once. Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942) (overruled with respect to another point only in Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656 (1947)). There the court said, at page 228:
In view of the multiplicity of petitions which are circulated before each election, it is not surprising that some honest citizens may become so confused by the number of petitions presented to them that they may inadvertently sign two or more for the same measure. This, of course, is carelessness on their part, but if they are legally entitled to sign, we think one signature should be allowed and the others stricken.
There is nothing to indicate that the purpose of this provision was to discourage duplication of signatures. It is significant that RCW 29.79.090, which directs that signers be warned of criminal sanctions, does not require that they be warned that duplicate signatures will not be counted.
Were there some showing of facts upon which the legislature could reasonably have found that this provision was necessary to facilitate the initiative process and guard its integrity, we would, of course, be obliged to defer to the legislative judgment; but since no state of facts which would justify it has been proposed, in order to protect the right of the people which was reserved by them in their constitution, we must hold this portion of RCW 29.79.200 to be iii excess of the legislative authority granted.
The respondent's theory is that the people, in adopting amendment 30 in 1956, intended to incorporate the provision of RCW 29.79.200 relating to the counting of duplicate signatures, which had first been enacted in 1913, and has never been challenged. This intent can be found, he says, in the fact that the amendment requires a specified number of "valid signatures of legal voters", whereas article 2, section 1A, did not speak in terms of signatures but rather provided that initiative measures should be proposed by a certain percentage of "legal voters". Obviously, this change in language was one of form rather than substance. There was implicit in article 2, section 1A, a requirement that the signatures be valid, that is, genuine.
A reading of the amendment will disclose that its purpose was to change the percentage of voters required to propose a measure. It did not purport to deal with the criteria or methods of determining who is a "registered voter" or what is a "valid signature." In the absence of language in an amendatory enactment indicating that the enactor's attention was directed to a given subject, it will not be presumed that the amendment was intended to affect that subject. See State v. Sam, 85 Wn.2d 713, 538 P.2d 1209 (1975).
If the names of the signers whose signatures appeared more than once upon the petitions are added to the total certified by the respondent, the petitions are still short of the required number by 264. The appellant's evidence tended to show that, because the records in the office of the respondent were not kept current, a large number of registered voters were erroneously rejected — and most probably a sufficient number to validate the petition. However, it was the opinion of the Superior Court that the Secretary of State has no statutory obligation to take affirmative steps to see that these records are current. We find the statutes open to a different interpretation.
RCW 29.79.220 places upon the Secretary of State the duty of canvasing the names on a petition within a specified time. It does not provide a method of determining whether the signatures are those of registered voters. RCW 29.07-.090 provides that, at the time of registering any voter, each registration officer shall require him to sign his name upon a card and give his address and precinct. Those cards are to be sent to the Secretary of State's office weekly. RCW 29.07.120.
RCW 29.07.130 provides:
The cards required by RCW 29.07.090 shall be kept on file in the office of the secretary of state in such manner as will be most convenient for, and for the sole purpose of, checking initiative and referendum petitions and mailing pamphlets required for constitutional amendments and by the initiative and referendum procedure. They shall not be open to public inspection or be used for any other purpose.
It was evidently the opinion of the trial court and is argued here that the Secretary of State under these statutes is obliged to rely upon the diligence of the local registration officers in forwarding registration cards to his office, and is neither authorized nor required to take any action to see that his records are current. We cannot agree with this narrow reading of the statute which places upon him the duty of canvasing the initiative and referendum petitions. RCW 29.07.130 provides that the registration cards shall be used for the sole purpose, provided therein. It does not mean that the Secretary of State has no duty to see that his records are kept current. Statutes regulating the elective process should be liberally construed in the voter's favor. Knowles v. Holly, 82 Wn.2d 694, 513 P.2d 18 (1973); State ex rel. Orr v. Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 49 P. 346 (1897).
It must be remembered that the legislature, in placing this responsibility upon the Secretary of State, gave him the primary duty of carrying out the constitutional mandate with respect to the people's right to exercise the legislative power. We cannot conceive that that duty requires no affirmative effort on his part to see that his records are reasonably current, so that persons entitled under the constitution to join in such petitions may have their names counted.
There may be and undoubtedly are limits to the methods which the Secretary of State can employ in making sure that his records are in good order. We do not suggest that, under ordinary circumstances, he is required to examine local registration records. But if he is not receiving the weekly reports required under RCW 29.07.120, he can make a reasonable effort to convince the delinquent registration officers that they should comply with the requirements of the statute. Also, he must be diligent in maintaining the records in his office so that signatures can be effectively and accurately checked. While the Secretary of State necessarily has discretion in selecting the methods of keeping his records current and orderly, some action must be taken when the records are known to be incomplete.
The respondent states that this court has, for over 80 years, held that where there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the laws governing elections, the actions will be upheld, citing Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 33 P. 1059 (1893); Loop v. McCracken, 151 Wash. 19, 274 P. 793 (1929); and Vickers v. Schultz, 195 Wash. 651, 81 P.2d 808 (1938). All of these cases have held that technicalities will be overlooked in order to give effect to the will of the people expressed in an election. They do not support the proposition that irregularities will be overlooked where they result in the denial of the franchise or the right of petition.
It must be remembered that the constitutional provision is self-executing. In a case such as this, where the proponent of a measure was able to discover a substantial number of errors due to inadequacy of records within a very short period of time, and where the evidence shows that the Secretary of State was aware of the state of his records and does not claim to have taken any steps to see that the situation was corrected, and where out of 13,043 rejected signatures only 264 are needed to qualify the measure, we think that the presumption of validity which attaches to a signature upon a petition must weigh sufficiently in the proponent's favor to entitle her to have the measure placed upon the ballot.
It has previously been so ordered.
Hunter, Wright, Brachtenbach, and Dolliver, JJ., concur.
[En Banc. February 17,1977.]
Const. art. 2, § 1A (amendment 30), provides, in part:
"Hereafter, the number of valid signatures of legal voters required upon a petition for an initiative measure shall be equal to eight percentum of the number of voters registered and voting for the office of governor at the last preceding regular gubernatorial election."
In fairness to the respondent, it should be noted that his interpretation of his duties does not differ materially from that of his predecessors.
There is a presumption that petitions that have been circulated, signed, and filed are valid, and the burden of proof to show their invalidity rests upon those protesting against them. Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); State ex rel. Hill v. Olcott, 67 Ore. 214, 135 P. 902 (1913); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Initiative and Referendum § 54 (1969).