Case Name: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY GENERATING CO., on Its Own Behalf and to the Use of Others v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1959-07-15
Citations: 175 F. Supp. 505
Docket Number: No. 479-55
Parties: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY GENERATING CO., on Its Own Behalf and to the Use of Others v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Supplement
Volume: 175
Pages: 505–640

Head Matter:
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY GENERATING CO., on Its Own Behalf and to the Use of Others v. UNITED STATES.
No. 479-55.
United States Court of Claims.
July 15, 1959.
John T. Cahill and William C. Chanler, New York City, for plaintiffs. Robert G. Zeller, New York City, was on the briefs.
Kendall M. Barnes, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. George Cochran Doub, for defendant. John B. Miller, Herman Wolkinson and Robert E. Kaufman, Washington, D. C., were on the brief.

Opinion:
MADDEN, Judge.
The plaintiff, an Arkansas corporation, made a contract with the United States, dated November 11, 1954. The Atomic Energy Commission, (AEC), was the agency which acted for the Government in the transaction. The contract required the plaintiff to build and operate a large plant for the generation of electricity, the plant to be located at West Memphis, Arkansas, across the Mississippi River from Memphis, Tennessee, and to sell the electrical energy there generated to the United States. After the site for the plant had been acquired and some preliminary work had been done by the plaintiff, but before any considerable amount of construction of the plant had taken place, an important event occurred which eliminated the Government's need for the electricity which it had contracted to buy from the plaintiff.
Because of the elimination of its need for the electricity, the Government, through the AEC, on July 11, 1955, orally, and on August 1, 1955, by letter, notified the plaintiff that the Government was terminating the contract. On November 23, 1955, the AEC wrote the plaintiff that the Government had concluded that there had never been a valid contract between the parties. The Government's position is that, there never having been a valid contract, it is not liable to the plaintiff for any costs incurred by the plaintiff prior to the termination of the contract nor for any damages caused to the plaintiff by its termination. The plaintiff's position is that the contract was valid, and that the Government is liable to the plaintiff for the costs which the plaintiff incurred in connection with the contract.
The Tennessee Valley Authority, (TVA), an agency of the United States, operates the largest unified enterprise in the country for the generation and distribution of electricity. Its general field of'operation is the area drained by the Tennessee River and its tributaries. Since its establishment in 1933, it has constantly expanded its operations as the demand for electricity has increased. The AEC uses a large amount of electricity in its three plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. TVA supplied the current used at the Oak Ridge plant and a considerable part of that used at the Paducah plant. The Portsmouth plant was supplied by the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation, (OVEC), a corporation formed by several nearby private utilities in 1952 for the purpose of contracting with the AEC and building a generating plant to supply electricity to the AEC's Portsmouth establishment.
TVA was supplying some 1,000,000 kw of electricity to AEC at Paducah, from TVA's generating plant at Shawnee, Kentucky. To meet the growing demands upon it, particularly in and about Memphis, Tennessee, TVA desired to build a new plant, to be operated by steam, at Fulton, Tennessee, on the Mississippi River upstream from Memphis, with a capacity of about 450,000 kw. Both houses of Congress had in 1952, however, rejected proposed' amendments to TVA appropriation bills which amendments would have appropriated money to start construction of the Fulton plant.
The policy of the Eisenhower Administration, which took office in January 1953, was to have either private enterprise or local communities, rather than the United States, provide electric power generating facilities. The President's State of the Union message of February 2, 1953, announced this policy. The President's new Director of the Budget, Mr. Joseph Dodge, eliminated from the 1954 fiscal year budget the appropriation for the Fulton plant, which appropriation President Truman had proposed in that budget.
The Administration's policy with regard to public power was observed with approval by Mr. George D. Woods, chairman of the board of directors of First Boston Corporation, one of the leading investment banking concerns in the United States. First Boston had its offices in New York. Mr. Woods wanted to help to make the policy succeed. He obtained an appointment with Mr. Dodge, the Director of the Budget, and offered the services of First Boston. Mr. Dodge, a Detroit banker, new in the Government, wanted to have a study made to determine the controverted question of the extent to which the Government was really subsidizing the TVA. He needed a man experienced in public utility financing and expert in accounting and problems of the cost of money, and had not found such a man. Mr. Woods said that First Boston had such a man, Mr. Adolphe Wenzell, and he would see if Wenzell would undertake the work.
Wenzell was willing and, with the approval of his other superiors, he did accept the assignment. He served as a part-time consultant to the Bureau of the Budget, without compensation, but was to have $10 per day in lieu of subsistence, and reimbursement of his transportation expenses. It was understood that Wenzell would not sever his connection with First Boston and that he would continue to receive his regular salary from it. Wenzell began this work on May 20, 1953, and made his report to Dodge about September 20. In all, he spent 29 days in the Bureau of the Budget, and became acquainted with many of its staff. He had access to all pertinent reports and documents. His report, not surprisingly, indicated that the Government was, to a considerable extent, subsidizing the TVA. When he made his report to Dodge, he asked for and received permission to retain a copy, but was told that it was a confidential Bureau document and should not be shown to anyone else. Some time later Woods asked Wenzell to see the report and Wenzell let him read it.
The work which Wenzell did for the Bureau of the Budget in 1953 resulted in his getting acquainted with Rowland R. Hughes, then the Assistant Director, later the Director, who, as we shall see, was a principal actor in the events in 1954 leading to the contract here in litigation.
In the fall of 1953 the Bureau of the Budget decided that it would not include money for the Fulton plant, desired by TVA, in-the TVA appropriation figure to be presented to Congress in 1954, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955. Mr. Gordon Clapp, the General Manager of TVA, when he learned of this Budget decision, took the position that TVA must be allowed to reduce the amount of electricity it was supplying to AEC so that it would have electricity to satisfy the growing needs of other patrons. The Bureau began to draft language to be included in the President's budget message to the effect that an attempt would be made to relieve TVA of some of its power delivery to AEC, and that if that could not be done, the problems of the Fulton plant would be reconsidered.
Director Dodge in December of 1953 suggested to Admiral Lewis I. Strauss, Chairman of the AEC, and Mr. Walter J. Williams, AEC's General Manager, that capital expenditures by the Government for the Fulton plant could be avoided if AEC would contract with private industry for the construction of a generating plant that would supply 450,000 kw of power to AEC at its Paducah plant and thereby release the power which TVA was supplying there, so that that power could be used by TVA for its other requirements. Mr. Dodge reminded these men that, in two other instances, private utilities had made long-term contracts to supply power to AEC. Mr. Williams said he would consult with Mr. McAfee, who was president of one of the companies referred to by Dodge. McAfee's response was encouraging.
Dodge delegated to Hughes, the Assistant Director, the responsibility for the Bureau's part in pursuing the inquiry. AEC's only interest was in being assured an adequate supply of power. The interest of the Bureau of the Budget was that the necessary power be obtained, if possible, in a manner consistent with the Administration's policy of promoting a private enterprise economy and keeping Government expenditures as low as possible.
Edgar H. Dixon, president of Middle South Utilities, Inc., which owned utilities operating in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, learned from McAfee that AEC might be seeking an additional source of power in the Paducah area. He was interested because of the possibility of selling power and because he, like Woods of First Boston, wanted to lend a hand to the Administration in its effort to put the business of generating power into private hands. Dixon went to see Strauss, and conferred with him and his principal assistants. Hughes, at the Bureau of the Budget, learned of the meeting. He requested AEC to proceed with negotiations with private interests with a view to having additional power available not later than the fall of 1957. McAfee and Dixon were invited to a meeting to be held in Strauss's office on January 20, 1954.
About January 15, 1954, Hughes suggested to Dodge that Wenzell be again requested to assist the Bureau, because of his study of TVA and his knowledge of commercial transactions. By that time, the Administration had decided that the AEC should make a contract to purchase power from private sources, and that the Fulton plant would not be built. The Administration's fixed purpose, by that time, was to find private enterprisers willing to contract with it, and to make a fair and prudent bargain with them. Wenzell had had no part in those decisions.
For the Bureau of the Budget to know what would be a fair bargain, it had to know what interest rate the enterprisers would have to pay on the bonds which they would have to sell to finance the project. Wenzell was an officer of First Boston, a large enterprise whose business it was to find purchasers for such bonds. Since Hughes knew him and trusted him, it was natural that he should look to him for advice on the cost of money. Wenzell came to Washington on January 18,1954, and conferred with Hughes. Hughes told him of the meeting with Dixon and Mc-Afee, arranged for the 20th. He learned that Wenzell knew both these men, and asked him to attend the meeting and use his influence to impress upon them the need for prompt action on their part in getting up a proposition to the AEC. Hughes then arranged for Wenzell to see Strauss, whom he had not met before. Strauss also emphasized to Wenzell the necessity for prompt action.
At the January 20 meeting, McAfee and Dixon pointed out that if an additional generating plant should be built near Paducah, and the AEC should later need less power, there would be no other market for the power in that area. It was recognized that the real need for power was in the Memphis area, some 200 miles from Paducah, and that the new power, though bought and paid for by AEC, would be delivered to TVA and used by it to supply its customers. Dixon thought a more logical arrangement would be for TVA to contract directly for the needed power, rather than have AEC contract for it. The meeting moved to Hughes' office in the Bureau of the Budget. It was decided that Dixon would prepare a study of what it would cost for his company to construct a plant, across the river from Memphis in the territory of his Middle South company, capable of generating some 450,000 to 600,000 kw of power. To the suggestion of McAfee and Dixon that the arrangement of having AEC contract for power to be delivered to and used by TVA was awkward, Hughes responded that the decision as to what agency of the Government would make the contract would be made by the Government.
At the close of the meeting in Hughes' office, Wenzell and Dixon agreed that Wenzell would meet with a Mr. Seal of Ebasco, a company which performed engineering services for Dixon's companies, to enlighten Seal and thus expedite the study which Dixon was to make. Wenzell met with Seal in New York and reported to him the substance of the discussions up to date. He urged him to get to work on the study which Dixon had promised. On January 27 Seal and a Mr. Canaday, a vice president and director of Dixon's Middle South company, went to Wenzell's office in New York. They were engaged in formulating a plan for the project. Wenzell told them he would give them any help he could on the subject of the cost of money for the project. On January 29, Hughes telephoned Wenzell to find out what had happened at Wenzell's meeting with Canaday and Seal.
Wenzell had another meeting with Canaday and Seal, other visits with Hughes, and received a request from Dixon that Wenzell get the opinion of First Boston on what the interest rates would be on the bonds in such a project. Wenzell called together the First Boston experts on the subject, and telephoned the answer to Dixon. During the following days, Wenzell had several meetings with representatives of the interested private utilities at some of which other representatives of the Government were present. All these meetings were held either at the request of or with the knowledge of Hughes with whom Wenzell was in frequent touch by telephone.
When McAfee learned that the proposed plant was to be located in the Memphis area, he lost interest because that location was outside the area of the companies in which he was interested. Another company showed some interest in collaborating with Dixon, but shortly abandoned the idea. Hughes was disturbed because he feared that if Dixon could not get another company to join in the project, he might abandon it. About February 18, Dixon told Wenzell that he was to have a meeting the next day at the offices of The Southern Company, the owner of public utility companies operating, generally, in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. Wenzell reported this to Hughes who asked him to attend the meeting. Eugene A. Yates was the chairman of the board of directors of Southern, and was at the meeting, as were the other important officials of Southern.
Wenzell had known Yates for many years but had not, before this meeting, talked to him about the project here in question. Dixon made an earnest plea that Southern join in the project. Wenzell telephoned Hughes, reporting what occurred at the meeting. About February 20 Southern decided to take part in the project. Yates immediately notified Hughes. Dixon's Middle South and Yates' Southern are sometimes hereinafter called the sponsors.
Canaday and Seal had been working up a proposal and, on February 20, after Southern had agreed to join in the project, they began to put the proposal in draft form. On February 23, Dixon and Wenzell met Hughes at the Bureau of the Budget. Dixon showed Hughes an early draft of the proposal. On the same day Dixon, Yates, Kenneth D. Nichols, the General Manager of AEC, Wenzell and Mr. McCandless of the Bureau of the Budget reviewed the tentative draft to see whether it was complete enough to merit consideration by AEC. The draft which was reviewed said that it assumed a cost of money which had been given to it by responsible financial specialists, and that the offer was conditioned upon the sponsors' being able to obtain the money at those rates. In fact, the advice as to the cost of money had been given orally by Wenzell to Dixon, and had been incorporated in a draft of a letter written by Wenzell and addressed to Dixon on February 23, intended to be signed by First Boston, but never actually so signed or delivered.
On February 25, Dixon's Middle South company and Yates' Southern company submitted to AEC a formal proposal offering to form a new corporation which would finance and construct generating facilities from which 600,000 kw of electric power would be delivered to TVA at the middle of the Mississippi River at Memphis, the power to be paid for by AEC. The proposal went into detail as to the terms of the contract, the method of computation of the charges for the power, reimbursement for taxes, etc. When AEC received the proposal, it asked the Bureau of the Budget for its opinion. Hughes introduced Canaday, Seal, and Barry of Southern, to Mr. Schwartz, Chief of the Resources and Civil Works Division of the Bureau. Hughes told Schwartz that he wanted an analysis of the proposal by March 2, and that the men whom he had introduced would be available to answer questions. The Bureau staff commenced the study. The AEC staff began a similar study.
Hughes advised Schwartz that Wenzell would come to see him on March 1. When he arrived, the staff was completing the study and preparing the memorandum which Hughes had requested. Wenzell sat in the conference and took the position that the estimates of costs in the proposal were too high.
On March 2 there was a meeting of the Bureau staff and Wenzell and Seal of Ebasco. Seal was shown the proposed staff memorandum and was questioned about various items in the proposal of February 25. After Seal had left, the staff, with Wenzell participating, completed its memorandum, which said that it did not have sufficient information to make a close analysis, comparing costs with those of TVA, and that active participation by TVA would be required for such an analysis. The memorandum concluded by saying: "We believe that the rates involved are sufficiently close that negotiations should be entered into by the parties concerned." Wenzell then went to Seal's office, told him that the memorandum had been completed, and that Clapp of TVA and Nichols of AEC were to meet with Hughes on March 3.
Between March 3 and March 9, Wenzell, in New York, had telephone conversations with Hughes, Schwartz, Canaday, Seal, Yates and Dixon. All of these conversations related in some way to the project. On March 9, representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, AEC and TVA met and reviewed the draft of the analysis of the February 25 proposal. Wenzell was not present. Later in the day, in the Bureau, the completed draft was distributed to a group which included Wenzell, and a member of the staff gave an oral summary of the analysis. All present were of the opinion that the estimated costs in the proposal were too high. Wenzell was asked to so advise Seal and to find out whether the sponsors would make a better proposal. Wenzell advised Seal that the estimated costs were too high. Wenzell discussed with Dodge the subject of the estimated costs, told him that he, Wenzell, was not qualified to advise the Bureau on that subject, and suggested that the services of Francis L. Adams, Chief of the Bureau of Power, Federal Power Commission, be obtained. Dodge said he would find out whether Adams would be available.
On March 10, Dixon and Yates met with Mr. Linsley, chairman of First Bos ton's executive committee, in Linsley's office. Wenzell was present. Dixon was well acquainted with Linsley and had frequently asked for his opinion on security issues and the condition of the money market. Dixon wanted Linsley's opinion on the current situation with regard to financing a project such as the OVEC, which First Boston had assisted in financing some years before, and which was comparable to the proposed project.
On March 11 Wenzell attended a meeting of the staff of the Budget Bureau. As a result of the meeting, an AEC representative, Mr. Cook, telephoned Dixon and told him wherein the estimated costs were too high. A copy of the AEC-TVA analysis was given to Seal and Canaday who were asked to study it, and submit their comments, together with the sponsors' minimum cost proposal by March 15 or 16. On March 16, Dixon, Yates, and their principal assistants met with Dodge. In preparation for this meeting, Dixon and his associates had met in his hotel room and prepared a draft of a letter to be sent to AEC in reply to the AEC-TVA analysis. Wenzell may have been present at the meeting. In any event, he was given a copy of the draft and made changes on it in his handwriting. The letter was never put in final form, signed, or delivered to AEC. Wenzell was present at the meeting with Dodge. Dixon and his associates urged Dodge to have an analysis made of their February 25 proposal by someone other than the AEC-TVA group. Wenzell renewed his suggestion that Adams of the Federal Power Commission be requested to make such an analysis. On March 19 Adams began to do that. On March 24 Adams and representatives of the Bureau of the Budget met with Seal, and Adams told him that the figures in the February 25 proposal were too high, and asked him to have the sponsors submit new estimates of costs. Adams had, on March 23, discussed with Wenzell the subject of the cost of money for the project. Wenzell, between March 17 and March 30, had telephone conversations with representatives of the sponsors, and of the Bureau. On March 30 he was asked by the Bureau to be present at a meeting on April 3.
The sponsors had become aware that their February 25 proposal would not be acceptable. They prepared new cost estimates and submitted them to Hughes, Adams and others on April 3, at the meeting which Wenzell had been requested by the Bureau to attend and did attend. The sponsors were told that if they would submit a new firm proposal based upon their revised cost estimates, it would deserve serious consideration. It is probable that during this meeting Wenzell stated to Dixon, Yates and Hughes that the information which he had previously given them with regard to the interest rate on the bonds of the proposed project was still valid.
Also on April 3d Wenzell talked to Nichols at AEC. Nichols told him that the sponsors' new figures were close to being acceptable. He asked Wenzell to encourage the sponsors to refine their figures and to submit a proposal based on a fixed price for the construction of the new facilities, with details as to the basis on which the charges for power would be calculated. He told Wenzell that AEC could not consider a proposal which was not firm as to capital costs, nor one which did not contain cancellation provisions acceptable to the AEC. After the meeting with Nichols, Wenzell returned to New York, and did not make any more trips to Washington in connection with the project here involved.
The sponsors prepared a new proposal, after numerous discussions in Washington involving representatives of the sponsors, the Bureau of the Budget, and AEC. Dixon delegated a representative to inquire of various investment bankers and institutional investors as to the cost of money for such a project. This inquiry showed that the rate of interest would be about 3Vi%, which was the figure that Wenzell had on prior occasions given to Hughes and to the sponsors.
On April 12, 1954, the sponsors submitted their new proposal, which was dated April 10. A representative of the sponsors had, some days before the submission, informed Wenzell that it contained a statement that the sponsors' offer was conditioned upon their being able to arrange financing upon the terms which responsible financial specialists had advised them would be available. On the morning of April 12, before the sponsors went to Washington to submit their proposal, they met in Linsley's office at First Boston. Wenzell was present. Linsley was requested to and agreed to give them a written opinion, signed by First Boston, confirming Wenzell's prior statements as to the current rate of interest on bonds for such projects.
The April 10 proposal received intensive study and analysis by the Bureau of the Budget, AEC and TVA, and representatives of the sponsors were called in for information and discussion. On April 24 Hughes, who had, on April 16, 1954, succeeded Dodge as Director of the Bureau, recommended to the President that the Bureau be authorized to instruct AEC to proceed to negotiate a contract with the sponsors, and to instruct AEC and TVA to work out the necessary interagency arrangements. On May 27 a proposal was received from another group headed by a Mr. Von Tresckow. This proposal was studied, and on June 14 Hughes and Strauss presented summary analyses of the Dixon-Yates proposal, the Von Tresckow proposal and of the cost of the proposed Fulton TVA plant, to congressional leaders in conference with the President.
On June 16, with the approval of the President, Hughes gave to AEC and TVA the instructions which, he had, on April 24, recommended to the President. On June 30, AEC wrote the sponsors that their April 10 proposal "constitutes a satisfactory basis for negotiation of a definitive contract", and that AEC was ready to begin negotiations. Negotiations began on July 7 and ended with the signing of the contract here in litigation on November 11, 1954.
The Conflict of Interest Defense
Adolphe Wenzell's study of TVA for the Bureau of the Budget in 1953 is of significance in this case only as background. Through that work he became acquainted with Dodge, Hughes and others of the .Bureau staff. He became recognized by Hughes as a man sympathetic to the Administration's purposes and policy with regard to public power and private enterprise. His company, First Boston, was expert in the financing of large utility enterprises. When the Administration decided that it would, if it proved feasible, obtain the needed additional electric power by contracting with a private generating enterprise, Hughes thought of Wenzell as a possible useful consultant and obtained Dodge's permission to employ him.
It hardly needs to be said that Wenzell and his permanent employer, First Boston, wanted the explorations into the possibility of making a contract for the erection of a generating plant with private capital to eventuate in a contract. Their enthusiasm in this purpose equal-led, no doubt, but could hardly have exceeded, that of the President of the United States and his Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Wenzell was not hired by the Director to discover reasons why a contract should not be made. He was hired because he was a knowledgeable person and was on the Administration's side of the political-economic controversy about public versus private generation of electric power. It could hardly have been expected that the Administration would hire as a consultant an expert from the ranks of the enthusiasts for public power. The Administration's policy was a perfectly legitimate one, and it had a right to use all legitimate means to make its policy succeed. Its powerful urge to get a contract put it at a possible bargaining disadvantage, but no claim is made in this case that the contract which was made was an improvident one.
Wenzell's function of advising the Government as to the cost of money, a large element in the cost of electric power produced by a plant built with borrowed money, was not an arduous one. A few well placed telephone calls by any responsible person would probably have obtained such information.
Hughes really used Wenzell as an expediter. When Hughes learned that Wenzell knew McAfee, Dixon, and other important utility executives who showed an interest in the project which the Administration hoped to consummate, he used Wenzell to keep their interest alive and to get it into the form of a proposal which the Government could consider. Time was important. The construction of the needed plant would take years after a contract had been made. Those who preferred that the additional power should be obtained from a plant built by TVA with Government money were politically powerful, and were able and persistent. If the need became pressing, and there was no promise that private enterprise would satisfy it, the Administration's policy could not be maintained.
Wenzell discussed the subject freely with the representatives of the private sponsors. At the stage of proceedings during which he was employed by the Bureau of the Budget, there were no secrets. Every intelligent person knew that the Administration wanted to make a contract, and was anxious that private enterprise come forward with a proposal that would be acceptable. Hughes directed Wenzell to sit in the meetings of the sponsors and report to Hughes what he heard. He participated in the conferences of the agency staffs. He, no doubt, was able to give to Hughes a better overall view of events than any other person, and did, we should suppose, expedite the formulation of the proposal which formed the basis for the later negotiation of details and exact figures.
Wenzell had substantially nothing to do with the substance of the contract. He knew little about construction costs and said so, recommending Adams to the Bureau for that function. The cost of money was determined by forces beyond the control of the contracting parties. While the contract itself contained nothing of Wenzell's work, the fact that it was made at all may have been a result of his work. At any rate, he served the Administration faithfully in the tasks it assigned to him.
The Government says that the contract is invalid because of Wenzell's activities. It says that he had conflicting interests. As between the parties, the Government and the plaintiff which succeeded to the interest of the Dixon-Yates sponsors, we see not the slightest conflict of interest in Wenzell's position. The interest which he shared with the President and the Bureau of the Budget, that the negotiations should produce a contract, was the Government's interest, though it coincided with the sponsors' interest. He served the Government, did what he was assigned to do, did nothing for the Dixon-Yates interest and received nothing from it.
The Government says that a conflict of interest resulted from Wenzell's position with First Boston. When the Government hired Wenzell, it knew of his position with First Boston, and it knew what business First Boston was in. It wanted Wenzell's advice as to the cost of money borrowed to build generating plants. There was, of course, a substantial possibility that if the Administration's hope that private capital would build the necessary plant should be realized, First Boston, as one of the largest and most experienced firms engaged in arranging the financing of such enterprises, might be employed by the company which got the contract. As early as January 1954, it occurred to Mr. James, counsel for Dixon, that because of the public versus private power controversy which lay behind the whole project, and because First Boston would be a logical choice of the sponsors to manage the financing of the enterprise, if a contract should be made, critics of the project might make something of Wenzell's participation. At his counsel's suggestion, Dixon spoke to Wenzell, calling attention to the possibility of criticism, and suggesting that Wenzell discuss the matter with the Bureau of the Budget and with his counsel. Wenzell on the same day, February 23, spoke to Hughes about the matter, saying that it might become a matter of embarrassment to the Administration, and suggesting that Hughes discuss the subject with his political advisers. Hughes said that Wenzell was exaggerating the importance of the matter, but advised him to discuss it with his principals in First Boston and with First Boston's lawyers, and then talk to Dodge about it. Wenzell, on February 23, discussed the subject with Mr. Coggeshall, President of First Boston, who arranged for him to talk to Mr. Raben of Sullivan and Cromwell, First Boston's counsel. Wenzell told Raben that he had orally advised Dixon as to the cost of money borrowed for such projects, and had written a draft of a letter containing the same information. He said that First Boston had not been employed by the sponsors to handle the financing, but that it might be requested to do so if the Government and. the sponsors should succeed in making a contract. Raben advised Wenzell to terminate his employment as consultant in the Bureau of the Budget forthwith, and in writing; to advise First Boston that if it was later requested to handle the financing, if a contract should be made, it should consider whether it would be wise to do so, or, at least, whether it would be wise to accept a fee for doing so. Raben also told Wenzell to keep Dodge and Hughes informed of any developments in the matter. Raben telephoned to his senior partner, Arthur Dean, who was in Washington. Dean said he did not think there was a conflict of interest, but there was a problem of policy. He confirmed Raben's advice as to what should be done.
Wenzell did not resign from the Bureau of the Budget immediately, but continued to work for it until April 3. Hughes did not call upon him for any services after that date. He never submitted a written resignation.
. At least as early as April 12, Wenzell was of the opinion that if the Government and the sponsors made a contract, First Boston would be asked to undertake the financial arrangements for the sponsors. As it turned out, his assumption was unfounded, because, a month after that time, Dixon felt perfectly free to place 40 percent of the financing business with Lehman Brothers, and would, apparently, have felt perfectly free to place all of it elsewhere than with First Boston if he had so desired.
As we have said, the Government pleads the activities of Wenzell as a justification for its repudiation of its contract with the plaintiff. This presents a problem which obviously requires exploration. Ordinarily, in a conflict of interest case, there is a person who is acting for the Government in the negotiation of a contract but, who at the same time, has an interest in the other party to the contract which interest would cause him, or tempt him, to promote the contract, or permit favorable terms to be inserted in it, because that other party, and he through it, would profit by his acts. Ordinarily the conflicting interest of such a person is unknown to his superiors, or to those of his superiors who are faithful to their duties to the Government.
The instant situation is unusual in several respects. Wenzell had no interest in the plaintiff, which the Government seeks to make the victim of Wenzell's situation. He was not hired by the plaintiff; he owned no stock in the plaintiff. He had an interest in First Boston which company, by the logic of circumstances, might be offered the work of arranging the financing of the project when and if a contract for the project should be made. The sponsors had, during the time that Wenzell had been working for the Bureau of the Budget, made no commitment to or had any discussion with First Boston about handling the financing of the hoped for project. That the sponsors did not feel that they were, somehow, under an unexpressed but honorary commitment to First Boston is evident from the fact that, when the time came, in May, to make arrangements for the financing of the hoped for project, Dixon, as we have seen, insisted over the objection of. First Boston that Lehman Brothers should have a 40 percent interest in the financing, because that firm had some special talents that might be of use.
The sponsors, though they had not employed Wenzell, nor given him any interest in their enterprise, were the first to see the possibility that criticism might be directed at Wenzell's activities. They, rightly as it seems to us, saw the problem not as a conflict of interests problem but as a political public versus private power problem which presaged a fight with no holds barred. They in effect told Wenzell that he ought to get out. They could not fire him because they hadn't hired him. Wenzell reported the sponsors' admonition to Hughes, who saw no reason for alarm and kept on assigning tasks to Wenzell, and to First Boston, which obtained advice of counsel that Wenzell ought to get out, but did not follow it up by getting him out. So the two entities that had the power to remove Wenzell from the scene, the Government and First Boston, did not do so, and the entity that urged his removal but had no power to effect it, is sought to be made the victim of his nonremoval. Wenzell is sought to be assigned the role of a fifth-column, a secret weapon fortunately though without evil purposes planted by the Government, but adequate to destroy the enemy if it became necessary to resort to such a weapon. There is, it seems to us, something essentially cynical about the Government's Wenzell defense.
The Government concedes that the contract'which it seeks to repudiate was an honest one,' arrived at after hard and skilful bargaining by representatives of the Government who had complete fidelity to their trust, and which became useless to the Government only because of the intervention of a force majeure, the decision of the City of Memphis to generate its own power. The purpose of the contract being thus frustrated, the Government summons, in order to escape its responsibilities under its honest contract, the great moral and legal generalization that a servant cannot faithfully serve two masters. We think the applicability of the generalization to the instant situation must be carefully scrutinized, lest, not uniquely, a worthy principle be used to arrive at an unworthy result.
Suppose the Government wanted to determine the feasibility of building a bridge in a difficult location. An experienced and reputable bridge engineer is an official of a steel company. The Government employs him as a consultant to work with Government staff engineers and other consultants to determine whether, and how, the bridge could be built, and to work out the terms of a contract with a contractor who has shown an interest in building the bridge. The consultant works through the feasibility stage of the investigation, and during the preliminary stage of negotiation with the contractor, when the question was whether the bridge could be built at a price which the Government would consider it prudent to pay. Then the consultant ceases his work. The terms and details of the contract are laboriously worked out by faithful representatives of the Government and the contractor. The contract is signed. The contractor then begins to place its orders for the steel which it will need to build the bridge. It, for good business reasons, orders some of the steel from the company whose engineer had been employed by the Government as a consultant. Some event intervenes which convinces the Government that the bridge ought not to be built at all, and it cancels the contract. The contractor has been subjected to expense by the steps it took toward performance before the contract was canceled. It requests reimbursement for those expenses. The Government dis claims liability, on high moral principles. It concedes that the contract was an honest one, fairly negotiated and agreed upon. It is obvious that if its intervening change of mind had not occurred, and the contract had continued to be regarded as advantageous to the Government, the Government would have insisted upon performance and would have sought to recover damages from the contractor if it had refused or failed to perform. But, it says, we, with full knowledge of the possibility that his company might make a profit by selling steel to the contractor if it should be decided that it was feasible to build the bridge, and if a contract to build it should be made, employed a consultant who had a part in the early stages of the deliberations about the bridge. The purported contract is, therefore, for moral reasons, a nullity.
In the hypothetical ease, and in our instant case, the possibility of the consultant's principal employer's indirectly making a profit out of the project about which he was consulted, would extend to almost any conceivable private industry from which a competent consultant could be obtained. If an industry is not engaged in the kind of business about which the Government needs practical advice, it will not be called upon to furnish a consultant. If, then, the Government intends to treat the possible indirect interest of a consultant's employer as injecting a taint of illegality into any contract which might eventuate, the whole transaction becomes futile nonsense, a nullity before the beginning of even preliminary discussion. The Government itself has introduced the impurity into the draught, and later spurns it, because it itself has polluted it.
In Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67, 65 S.Ct. 442, 451, 89 L.Ed. 744, the Supreme Court said, with regard to the Government's argument that the contracts there in question were in violation of public policy and were therefore void:
"Our inquiry at this point, since corruption is not shown, is as to whether the likelihood of disadvantage to the Government is so menacing as to prohibit such contracts regardless of the effect in a particular case.
" ' Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. Vidal v. Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of Philadelphia, 2 How. 127, 197, 11 L.Ed. 205. As the term 'public policy' is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 51 S.Ct. 476, 75 L.Ed. 1112; Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 61 S.Ct. 414, 85 L.Ed. 500. It is a matter of public importance that good faith contracts of the United States should not be lightly invalidated. Only dominant public policy would justify such action. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, this Court should not assume to declare contracts of the War Department contrary to public policy."
Our conclusion is that Wenzell's activities were not within the prohibition of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 434, on which the Government relies, nor were they such as to render the contract in question unenforcible on grounds of public policy.
We think that, to reach the conclusion that the criminal statute here in question had in fact been violated, we would have to discard all the precedents with regard to the proper interpretation of criminal statutes. We would have to conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 434 was intended by Congress to be an expansive net long enough and broad enough to catch a Government employee and subject him to fine or imprisonment if he saw in the transaction a possibility that it might eventuate in a profit to him, or if he thought, mistakenly, that it would eventuate in a profit to him.
As we have seen, Wenzell's employer, First Boston, through which Wenzell's criminal conduct must be established, if it is established, did not have an interest in the Dixon-Yates transaction until after Wenzell's Government employment had terminated. There is not a shadow of evidence that it had any agreement or commitment, written or oral, formal or informal, contingent or otherwise that, in the event that the proposal which was in preparation when Wenzell's Government employment ended should result in negotiations which should, in the course of events, result in a contract, First Boston would be given the opportunity to earn a commission by selling the bonds of the corporation which would be formed to sign and perform the contract. The evidence is-perfectly plain that there was no such agreement or understanding. As we have seen, a month after Wenzell's Government employment had terminated, Dixon-Yates felt perfectly free to give the bond-selling business to whomever it pleased.
To treat such a prospect, or hope, or even mistaken belief in a nonexistent understanding, as a direct or indirect interest, subjecting the possessor of it to a fine or imprisonment or both, would seem to us to require that we discard all that the Supreme Court has taught us as to how to interpret a criminal statute. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 69 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed. 52; United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277, 72 S.Ct. 275, 96 L.Ed. 308; Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 74 S.Ct. 593, 98 L.Ed. 699; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356.
It is suggested that there is something sinister about the fact that Wenzell did not, as the lawyers for First Boston advised him to do on February 26, resign from his Government work "immediately, and in writing." Three days earlier, Wenzell had discussed with Hughes the possibility that if a contract should be made with the sponsors, First Boston might be asked to participate in the financing of it. Hughes thought that Wenzell was exaggerating the importance of the matter, and kept on calling on Wenzell to do chores for him in connection with the contract, until April 3. The fact that Wenzell did not resign "in writing", he having been employed by means of a telephone call, and all of his assignments having been given him orally, shows that he did not understand the importance which the lawyers attached to having documentary evidence in the file for a possible Congressional investigation or a lawsuit. We see nothing sinister in his not being cagy. The lawyers did not advise Wenzell to resign because they saw in his situation a conflict of interest. They saw in it a question of policy, for First Boston. On March 9 Wenzell was told by Dodge, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, that since there was, at that time, not even a proposal which could be used as a basis for negotiation, and in any event a long period of negotiation would precede the making of a contract and its financing, there was no immediate problem with regard to First Boston's possible participation in the financing. He said that if there was a possibility that First Boston might participate in the financing, Wenzell should wind up his work for the Bureau of the Budget as soon as possible. As we have seen, Hughes, Dodge's Assistant Director, kept on giving Wenzell chores to do for some three weeks longer, until April 3. We think that Wenzell's failure to resign ostentatiously and immediately, as a lawyer might have done, is of no significance.
The Government urges, in effect, that the doctrine which it calls to its defense is a prophylactic generalization which must be applied in cases of honest transactions in order to keep it available and effective in cases of dishonest transactions. The thought is that the Government, like the infant and the idiot, must have the protection of a broad legal incapacity. In this ease the actor for the United States was the Director of the Budget, acting immediately under and on behalf of the President of the United States. What he did was done legally, honestly, and with complete fidelity to the interests of the Government. The powers of even the Government's highest officials are defined by statute. We do not see in the case before us an instance in which the Government needs, as additional protection against the honest acts of its highest officials, a diaphanous cloak of immunity woven from an asserted vague and undefined public policy. We point again to the language of the Supreme Court in the Muschany case.
The Government has interposed other defenses, in addition to the one founded upon the activities of Adolphe Wenzell. Because this opinion is already long, our treatment of these defenses will be brief.
The "Replacement" Defense
The Government says that section 164 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 951, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2204, did not authorize the AEC to make the contract here in question. We quote the part of the section here pertinent in a footnote. The argument, in brief, is that the electric power contracted for in the contract in question was not to be used by AEC, and was not to be furnished to TVA "in replacement" of power furnished by TVA to AEC. The legislative history of section 164 shows that its language was written for the purpose of authorizing the very kind of a contract that was eventually made. If furnishing power to TVA at Memphis so that TVA could continue to furnish power to AEC at Paducah without neglecting to fulfill the expanding needs of its existing customers is not aptly describable as replacing to TVA power furnished by it to AEC, then Congress can be said to have used inept language. That would, if true, be no reason for a court to frustrate the undoubted intention of Congress.
The "Waiver" Defense
The Government says that certain statutory requirements of section 164 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, supra, were not complied with, and that the contract, as a consequence, never became effective. It relies on the following language in section 164:
"Any contract hereafter entered into by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days shall elapse while Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of adjournment for more than three days) before the contract of the Commission shall become effective: Provided, however, That the Joint Committee, after having received the proposed contract, may by resolution in writing, waive the conditions of or all or any portion of such thirty-day period."
The contract here in question was submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on November 11, 1954, the day the contract was signed. Congress was not in session at that time, and that Congress did not reconvene. The new Congress convened on January 5, 1955. The Joint Committee had been in session for some days before November 11, considering drafts of the contract, and considering whether the committee should waive the 30-day waiting period. On November 13 the committee adopted, by a 10 to 8 vote, a resolution waiving the waiting period. On January 28, 1955, the Joint Committee adopted, by a vote of 10 to 8, a resolution rescinding the resolution of waiver of November 13, 1954.
The Government says that the Joint Committee had no authority to sit when Congress was not in session and that the purported submission of the contract to the committee on November 11, and the committee's purported waiver of the waiting period on November 13, were ineffective. AEC, in a brief filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in proceedings in January 1955, seeking that Commission's approval of the plaintiff's equity financing, took the position that the Joint Committee had the power, though Congress was not in session, to waive the 30-day waiting period. The defendant herein, the United States, took the same position in a brief filed as •amicus curiae with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in proceedings to review the SEC's order approving the plaintiff's equity financing. The General Counsel of the AEC, and the Assistant Comptroller General of the United States, in formal official opinions, took the same position. We agree with these several opinions of representatives of the United States, rendered ante litem motam.
The "Indemnity" Defense
The Government says that the contract in question violated the following provision of section 12(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,15 U.S.C.A. § 791(a):
"It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, to borrow, or to receive any extension of credit or indemnity, from any public-utility company in the same holding-company system or from any subsidiary company of such holding company ."
In order to insure that the plaintiff would have sufficient income to amortize its bonds, as payments for that purpose came due, an agreement between the plaintiff and the operating subsidiaries of the sponsors was drafted, under which the subsidiaries agreed to take and pay for any surplus power which the plaintiff might have on hand because of the failure of TVA to take the agreed amount, and the subsidiaries also agreed to make up any shortage of power which the plaintiff might incur because of, for example, the disabling of its generators. The sponsors guaranteed the performance of the agreement by their respective subsidiaries. This agreement was called the "back-up and surplus power agreement." The making of this agreement was required by section 2.02 of the contract here in suit. The agreement was never actually executed because the Government's cancellation of the plaintiff's contract intervened.
The Government says that this agreement was a violation of section 12(a) of the Holding Company Act, quoted above. The SEC in its decision approving the plaintiff's equity financing, expressly held that the back-up and surplus power agreement was not a violation of section 12(a) of the Holding Company Act. The interpretation of that provision of that Act, and its application to various possible arrangements within utility systems, is peculiarly a subject for the expert handling of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We are not persuaded that its decision was erroneous.
The "Regulatory Approvals" Defense
The Government says that the contract had not become effective because the plaintiff had not, at the time the Government terminated the contract, secured all the regulatory approvals which were required. The Government refers to section 8.15 of the contract which reads as follows:
"Regulatory Approvals and Indebtedness: The obligations of the parties hereunder shall be subject to the following:
"(1) the receipt of all regulatory approvals, in form and substance satisfactory to the Company, necessary to permit the Company to perform all the duties and obligations to be performed by it hereunder or necessary to permit it to issue shares of its capital stock to the Sponsoring Companies and to issue the indebtedness referred to herein;
"(2) the execution and performance by institutional investors and banks of contracts or commitments, in form and substance satisfactory to the Company, providing for the issuance by the Company and the purchase by such investors and banks of the indebtedness referred to in the recitals of this contract; ."
The Government points out that, though the SEC had approved the plaintiff's equity financing, that approval had been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; that though the plaintiff had applied to the SEC for approval of its bank loan agreements and bond sale agreements, the SEC had not yet acted upon this application. It urges that since the regulatory approvals had to be "in form and substance satisfactory to the Company"' (plaintiff), not only had the contract not become effective in point of time, but it was invalid for lack of mutuality, since the plaintiff could escape liability under it by being dissatisfied with the approvals which the pertinent regulatory bodies would give it.
The parties expressly agreed, as shown in our findings 8, 9 and 191, that the contract became effective December 17, 1954. They must, therefore, have construed the provisions of section 8.15, quoted above, as conditions subsequent. As such, they would mean that the plaintiff could escape liability only if it could not, after diligent effort, obtain regulatory approvals which would be satisfactory to a reasonable person, in the circumstances. There is no indication that the plaintiff was not diligent in seeking the necessary regulatory approvals, or would have been dissatisfied with such approvals as were practically attainable. So far as appears, .the only reason the plaintiff did not get the approvals was that the Government's cancellation of the contract rendered the plaintiff's applications moot.
We conclude that none of the Government's defenses is-valid, and that it is liable to the plaintiff for its breach of the contract.
The Measure of Damages
The plaintiff does not seek to have its damages measured by the usual rule, which would entitle it to the profits which it would have made if it had been allowed to perform its contract and receive the compensation provided in the contract. The plaintiff says that the contract in question provided its own agreed measure of damages in ease the Government should cancel the contract. It points to section 7.07 of the contract, entitled "Cancellation Prior to Completion." That section, which is quoted in full in finding 205, provides in paragraph 1 that if, prior to the commencement of commercial operation of the third unit of the plant, the power requirements of AEC should be so reduced that it no 1'pnger needed the power contracted for, and if TVA did not elect to take the power, AEC should be entitled to cancel the contract by written notice, the effect of the cancellation being stated in paragraph 2.
Paragraph 2 of section 7.07 provides that if the notice of cancellation should be delivered prior to the time when the plaintiff had incurred expenditures of $40,000,000 on the project, then
"the AEC shall pay to the Company as cancellation costs such amount or amounts that there shall be available for distribution to the Sponsoring Companies net assets, including at cost to the Company land acquired for the site of the Facilities, equivalent to the investment of the Sponsoring Companies in the equity of the Company up to the effective date of such cancellation, after payment and satisfaction of all reasonable liabilities, costs, indebtedness, cancellation or revocation costs and damages, and all other reasonable costs, expenses, charges and losses resulting from such cancellation, including carrying charges on indebtedness of the Company to the earliest practicable date for the retirement thereof after the receipt of payment by the AEC under this paragraph, together with any premium payable upon the redemption of such indebtedness; * « *»
The Government points out that there was no reduction in the power requirements of the AEC, hence the Government could not have canceled and did not cancel the contract pursuant to the provisions of section 7.07. The plaintiff says that it has the right to waive the wrongfulness of the cancellation and have its damages measured by the provisions agreed upon for cases of rightful cancellation.
The Government's insistence that its cancellation was a breach of contract, rather than a cancellation permitted by the contract, is an attempt by the Government to profit from its own wrong. We say this because we suppose that the Government would not take this position unless it thought it saw in it an advantage to be gained by having the damages determined by a measure other than that agreed upon in section 7.07 of the contract.
We think that paragraph 1 of section 7.07, fairly, though not literally, read, was applicable to the cancellation here, in question. The cancellation took place because the Government no longer needed the power contracted for. The indirect and awkward arrangement of the contract was to have AEC purchase power to be delivered to and used by TVA. Section 7.07 (1) said that if ABC's power requirements were reduced so that it did not need the power contracted for, and if, then, TVA did not elect to take it, AEC might cancel the contract, with the cancellation consequences . provided in section 7.07(2). In fact, as both parties knew, AEC was never intended to get the power, and the lack of need for it by TVA would be the event that would necessitate and justify the cancellation of the contract. The essential purpose of section 7.07 was to provide a method of measuring damages if cancellation should occur, as it did, before the plant was built and put in operation.
We further think that the plaintiff's argument that the condition upon which the Government might lawfully cancel the contract, with a defined and limited liability for damages, was a condition which it could insist upon, or waive, at its election, and that the Government cannot elect to be a wrongdoer, an unjustified contract breaker, in order to gain some real or supposed advantage from its assumed turpitude, is a valid argument.
If the parties had foreseen what in fact occurred, and had covered that occurrence by an agreement specifically and unquestionably applying to the events that occurred, as to how to measure the damages, we do not see how the Government could have urged that it should pay less for a wrongful cancellation than for a rightful one. That much, at least, may be said for the fairness of the plaintiff's contention. In any event, the measuring of damages for the breach of a contract which is to be performed over many years, here 25 years, is a speculative and unsatisfactory task. It is not unnatural that a court, in such a case, would wish that the parties had agreed upon a formula which would permit the damages to be measured by arithmetic, rather than by speculation and prophecy. When the parties have in fact agreed upon a formula readily applicable to the situation at hand, though they did not agree to its application to that exact situation, we think a court has thé right to make use of the formula, if to do so seems fair to the court. In short, we do not think that one of the parties has a right to require a court to measure damages by a hard and unsatisfactory method, when that party has agreed to an easier and more satisfactory method for a closely comparable situation.
The language of the second paragraph of section 7.07 of the contract, quoted above, is our guide as to what items should be included in the plaintiff's recovery. It was at all times during the negotiation contemplated that the sponsors were to form a new corporation which would sign and perform the contract. The expenses which the sponsors paid or became obligated to pay were proper charges against the new corporation, the plaintiff, and are therefore proper subjects of recovery by the plaintiff. The expenditures made and obligations incurred by the plaintiff after its incorporation, in connection with the negotiation of the contract, its performance, and the mitigation of damages after its cancellation are recoverable. The counsel fees and expenses incurred by the sponsors are not vulnerable on the ground of duplication of services. It was natural that each sponsor should have the advice of its own counsel with regard to this important venture. The costs of administrative and court proceeding engaged in for the purpose of obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals is includible. Interest at the legal rate on the money invested by the sponsors in the stock of the plaintiff, computed to the date of termination of the contract, is a recoverable item, according to the language of section 7.07 of the power contract and of section 4.02 of the "interpretative memorandum."
Counsel fees and other expenses incurred in preparing for and prosecuting the instant litigation may not be recovered.
In paragraphs 19 and 22 of it's petition, the plaintiff says:
"The plaintiff will also incur additional expenses prior to the satisfaction of the judgment herein, the amount of which will be supplied by 'amendment hereto."
The parties stipulated at the trial that, with regard to post-petition claims, only .the question of liability would be presently decided, and the amount of the recovery, if any, would be determined in further proceedings. Expenditures made and obligations incurred after the filing of the petition, incident to the termination and settlement of commitments made in connection with the making and performance and termination of the contract, are recoverable.
The claims asserted on .behalf of plaintiff and several of the use-plaintiffs for "compensation for the loss of the use of their money represented by their respective claims" are not recoverable. These claims amount to a request for an allowance of interest on the judgment awarded, and since neither the Power Contract nor any applicable statute provides for such an award of interest, none is recoverable in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 2516. United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 67 S.Ct. 398, 91 L.Ed. 521.
We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the following claims in the amounts indicated:
Amount Amount
Claim Finding claimed allowed
Dickmann-Pickens-Bond Construction Co. 210 $14,553.03 $14,533.03
J. A. Jones Construction Company........ 212 143,160.33 143,160.33
Pandick Press, Inc......................... 213 38,338.76 38,338.76
Reid & Priest................................ 214 7,097.12 7,097.12
House, Moses & Holmes.................... 215 7,500.00 7,500.00
Arthur Andersen & Co...................... 216 16,469.66 16,469.66
Middle South Utilities, Inc................. 217 4,651.86 3,032.11
The Southern Company..................... 218 29,391.29 21,147.45
Arkansas Power & Light Co............... 219 7,484.09 7,484.09
First National City Bank of N.Y.......... 220 500.00 500.00
White & Case................................ 220 500.00 500.00
Mississippi Valley Generating Co......... 221-230 618,658.07 616,158.76
Ebasco Services, Inc. . 231 570,727.59 565,028.02
Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl.............. 233-235 235,198.76 232.491.75
Wmthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts____ 236-238 104,128.67 103,296.63
Willkie, Owen, Farr, Gallagher & Walton. 239-240 75,787.85 75,787.85
Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley........... 241-242 15,000.00 15,000.00
Total amount allowed . . 1,867,545.56
Judgment will be entered for the plaintiff in the above total sum, said sum representing the amounts found to be due the plaintiff on a portion of its claim. The amount due the plaintiff on the remaining portion of its claim will be determined in further proceedings pursuant to Rule 38(c), 28 U.S.C.
It is so ordered.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, District Judge, sitting by designation, and LARAMORE, Judge, concur.
. "Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, joint-stock company, or association, or of any firm or partnership, or other business entity, is employed or acts as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business -with such business entity, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
. "The Commission is authorized in connection with the construction or operation of the Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth installations of the Commission to enter into new contracts or modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for electric utility services for periods not exceeding twenty-five years . The authority of the Commission under this section to enter into new contracts or modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for electric utility services includes, in case such electric utility services are to be furnished to the Commission by the Tennessee Valley Authority, authority to contract with any person to furnish electric utility services to the Tennessee Valley Authority in replacement thereof."
This amount includes $11,027.79 for the benefit of Oman Construction Company.
There is disallowed $1,619.75 representing an unnecessary expenditure for transcripts.
Payments to Southern Services for salaries, overhead and travel expenses of its personnel m the sum of $2,446.55 in connection with the April 10, 1954, proposal to AEC and also in the amount of $2,999.28 in connection with negotiating the Power Contract, are disallowed as coming within the categories of unreimbursable expense defined in the interpretative memorandum set forth at the end of finding 218. There is also disallowed-$2,798.01 as an unnecessary expenditure for transcripts.
There is disallowed $2,500.00 representing the value of the sand deed acquired by plaintiff.
There are deducted and disallowed $3,239.15 and $1,500.42 because of plaintiff's failure to show that Ebasco was not required to absorb these expenses. There is also disallowed $960.00 because of plaintiff's failure to show that this item was a true liability.
There is disallowed $2,707.01 representing 63% hours spent in preparing the petition in this lawsuit.
There are disallowed: $264.74 representing 7 hours at an average hourly rate of $37.82, which time was spent in preparing the petition in this lawsuit; $567.30 representing 15 hours spent on the proposal to TVA.