Case Name: The State of Washington, on the Relation of Washington Toll Bridge Authority, Plaintiff, v. Cliff Yelle, as State Auditor, Respondent, Dale L. Yust et al., Intervenors.1
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1959-07-31
Citations: 54 Wash. 2d 545
Docket Number: No. 35170
Parties: The State of Washington, on the Relation of Washington Toll Bridge Authority, Plaintiff, v. Cliff Yelle, as State Auditor, Respondent, Dale L. Yust et al., Intervenors.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 545–564

Head Matter:
[No. 35170.
En Banc.
July 31, 1959.]
The State of Washington, on the Relation of Washington Toll Bridge Authority, Plaintiff, v. Cliff Yelle, as State Auditor, Respondent, Dale L. Yust et al., Intervenors.
The Attorney General, Weter, Roberts & Shefelman and Harold S. Shefelman, Special Assistants, and John S. Robinson and Stanton P. Sender, Assistants, for plaintiff.
The Attorney General, Robert F. Hauth and Robert J. Doran, Assistants, for respondent.
Chadwick, Chadwick & Mills (Stephen F. Chadwick, Jr., of counsel), for intervenors.
Slade Gorton (Pendleton Miller and Grosscup, Ambler, Stephan & Miller, of counsel), and Robert W. Graham and Edward G. Dobrin (Bogle, Bogle & Gates and George N. Prince, of counsel), amici curiae.
Reported in 342 P. (2d) 588.

Opinion:
Hill, J.
The plaintiff, Washington Toll Bridge Authority, seeks a writ of mandate from this court, directing the State Auditor to sign certain revenue bonds to be issued pursuant to Washington Toll Bridge Authority Resolution No. 338 to finance the construction of a toll bridge to cross Lake Washington from a site in the vicinity of Union Bay, on the west side, to Evergreen Point, on the east side of the lake.
By Laws of 1957, chapter 266, p. 1037, the legislature authorized the toll bridge authority to issue its revenue bonds to provide funds for the construction of an additional Lake Washington bridge. Section 2 of the act contains the following covenant with the bondholders':
"Said revenue bonds shall constitute obligations only of the Washington toll bridge authority and shall be payable both principal and interest solely from the tolls and revenues .derived from the operation of said toll facility as hereinbefore constituted. Said bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of the state of Washington, and shall contain a recital on the face thereof to that effect, and shall be negotiable instruments under the law merchant. Such bonds shall include a covenant that the payment or redemption thereof and the interest thereon are secured by a first and direct charge and lien on all of the tolls and other revenues received from the operation of said toll facility and from any interest which may be earned from the deposit or investment of any such revenues, except for payment of costs of operation, maintenance and necessary repairs of said facility. The tolls and charges to be imposed shall be fixed in such amounts so that when collected they will produce revenues that shall be at least equal to expenses of operating, maintaining and repairing said toll facility, including all insurance costs, amounts for adequate reserves and coverage of annual debt service on said bonds, and all payments necessary to pay the principal thereof and interest thereon."
The bonds are to be paid solely from the tolls and revenues derived from the operation of the bridge. However, the State Highway Commission is authorized by Laws of 1959, Ex. Ses., chapter 11, p. 1700 (hereafter referred to as the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act), to pledge not to exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars each year out of the proceeds of the excise taxes imposed on motor vehicle fuels to guarantee the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, should the' tolls collected in any year be insufficient for that purpose. Tolls may be continued on the bridge until the Motor Vehicle Fund is reimbursed for any payments it may have made on the principal- and .-interest, on the bonds in consequence of this guarantee. This pledge is referred to in the bonds, and they are niade a lien not only on "all of the tolls and other revenues received from the operation of said bridge," but
". . . upon the proceeds of excise taxes imposed1 on motor vehicle fuels . . . pledged pursuant to Chapter 11 of the 1959.Extraordinary Session Laws- of the State of Washington in an amount not to exceed $750,000.00 per year, ."
It is this authorization of the State Highway Commission to pledge a portion of the proceeds of excise taxes imposed on motor vehicle fuels for-payment of the bridge bonds, if its revenues from tolls are insufficient for that purpose, which the State Auditor has challenged as unconstitutional, and which, together with certain claimed defects in the resolution authorizing the bond issue, forms the basis for his refusal to sign the bonds.
The 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act is some seventeen pages in length, but contains only two sections, one of which is a one-sentence declaration of emergency. It contains many specific appropriations for many purposes. For subsequent reference we set out the title and all of the act pertinent to this proceeding:
"An Act Adopting the supplemental budget and making appropriations for miscellaneous purposes, and declaring an emergency.
"Be It Enacted by the Legislature o-f the State of Washington:
"Section 1. The following sums, or so much thereof as shall severally be found necessary, are hereby appropriated out of the several funds indicated, for the fiscal biennium beginning July 1, 1959 and ending June 30, 1961, except as otherwise provided.
"State Highway Commission
"(1) Motor Vehicle Fund Appropriation for the following purposes: 100,000.00
"The state highway commission may, at the request of the toll bridge authority, pledge such sum to guarantee the payment of principal and interest on bonds issued by the authority in connection with construction of a second Lake Washington toll bridge, at a site to be determined by the toll bridge authority, or any subsequent refunding bond issues or for sinking, fund requirements or reserves established by the authority with respect thereto. To the extent of any such pledge the state highway commission shall use such moneys to meet such obligations as they arise but only to the extent that revenues of the project are insufficient therefor.
"(2) The state highway commission at the request of the toll bridge authority is further authorized to pledge the proceeds of excise taxes imposed on motor vehicle fuels now directed by law to be deposited in the motor vehicle fund available for state highway commission purposes in an amount not to exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars per year for the purposes set forth in subparagraph (1) above.
" (3) Whenever the state highway commission shall have made a pledge of motor vehicle funds as authorized in subparagraphs (1) and (2) above, the legislature agrees to continue to impose excise taxes on motor vehicle fuels in amounts sufficient to provide the state highway commission with funds necessary to enable it to comply with such pledge and to make necessary appropriations to the state highway commission for such purposes.
"(4) Any money from the motor vehicle fund used by the state highway commission for payment of principal or interest on any bond issue of the toll bridge authority to finance a second Lake Washington toll bridge shall be repaid to the motor vehicle fund to be used for state highway purposes, from revenues of such project and tolls may be continued for any required additional length of time necessary for this purpose."
It should be noted that subparagraph (1) is an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars from the Motor Vehicle Fund. The Motor Vehicle Fund includes:
"All fees collected by the State of Washington as license fees for motor vehicles and all excise taxes collected by the State of Washington on the sale, distribution or use of motor vehicle fuel and all other state revenue intended to be used for highway purposes, . . . " Art. II, § 40, Washington state constitution (amendment 18).
The seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars per year, referred to in subparagraph (2), is from a specifically designated portion of the Motor Vehicle Fund, i.e., "pro ceeds of excise taxes imposed on motor vehicle fuels." By subparagraph (3), the legislature agrees to continue to impose the excise tax on motor vehicle fuels in an amount sufficient to provide the funds necessary to make available the seven hundred fifty thousand dollars.
The State Auditor is correct in his contention that subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of the appropriation to the State Highway Commission introduce a new subject not germane to the appropriation, or to subparagraph (1), and constitute a clear violation of Art. II, § 19, of the Washington state constitution, which says:
"No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
It is conceded that there can be no continuing appropriation, and that the only valid amount here appropriated from the Motor Vehicle Fund is one hundred thousand dollars.'
The vigorous attempt to justify the inclusion in an appropriation act of an authorization to the State Highway Commission to divert annually for an indefinite period three-quarters of a million dollars from the proceeds of a specific excise tax to the Toll Bridge Authority to guarantee the payment of principal and interest of certain revenue bonds (if needed), amounts to no more than saying, "if you are willing to follow us, we can show how others have found a way around the constitutional provision in question."
We are not interested in a way around. The constitutional provision requiring that every law shall embrace but one subject was written into the constitution of many states, because (as the Maryland Court of Appeals says)
. ". . . there had crept into our system of legislation a practice of engrafting upon measures of great public importance foreign matters for local or selfish purposes, and the members of the Legislature were often constrained to vote for such foreign provisions to avoid jeopardizing the main subject or to secure new strength for it, whereas if these provisions had been offered as independent measures they would not have received such support. ."
Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm. (1946), 48 A. (2d) 593, 598, 599.
Without the protection created by the constitutional requirement above quoted, appropriation bills would be. peculiarly vulnerable to this legislative evil. Indicating that appropriation bills are distinctive, this court said in State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen (1915), 85 Wash. 260, 272, 148 Pac. 28, 32:
". . . An appropriation bill is not a law in its. ordinary sense. It is not a rule of action. It has no moral'or divine sanctipn. It defines no rights and punishes no wrongs. It is purely lex scripta. It is a means only to the enforcement of law, the maintenance of good order, and the life of the state government'. Such bills pertain only to the administrative functions of government. . . . "
Appropriation bills are made temporary in nature by the provisions, of Art. VIII, § 4 (amendment 11), which require that all expenditures of moneys appropriated be made within one calendar month after the end of the fiscal biennium.
It follows that, if legislation of a general and continuing nature is to be passed, it cannot come under the subject of appropriations; yet that is exactly what has been done here. Coupled with the appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars, made in subparagraph (1), is the provision in subparagraph (2) that gives the State Highway Commission the continuing authority to pledge a portion of the proceeds of the tax on motor vehicle fuels to guarantee the payment of principal and interest on the bonds issued to finance this bridge. The grant of this continuing authority creates a rule of action, a segment of substantive law, to be effective far beyond the period of the biennium in which appropriations can constitutionally have effect. We cannot see how this grant of continuing authority to pledge further moneys from the Motor Vehicle Fund can be said merely to "qualify" the one-hundred-thousand-dollar appropriation contained in sub-paragraph (1). It in no 'way affects the purpose of the appropriation, or creates conditions' to' its disbursement; nor'is it in any way necessary for the appropriation's.taking effect as contemplated.
. Added to this is subparagraph (3) by which the .legislature agrees, to continue its .excise taxes on motor vehicle fuels, and to make such appropriations as are necessary to make the State Highway Commission's pledges effective. An obligation is here created which has effect, far beyond the biennium. It is patently more than just a qualification upon the one hundred thousand dollars appropriated for the present biennium. It is undoubtedly germane to the grant of authority to the State Highway Commission contained in subparagraph (2), but has no possible relevance to the appropriation.
If the "selfish purpose," of transforming revenue bonds into bonds partially guaranteed by a continuing pledge of three-quarters of a million dollars each year from the proceeds of the tax on motor vehicle fuels, is to be accomplished, it should be on its own merits, and not stowed away as subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars in an act which has as its title:
"An Act Adopting the supplemental budget and making appropriations for miscellaneous purposes, and declaring an emergency."
, We have here a second subject in the same bill (and a subject not covered by the title), and, consequently, a double violation of Art. II, § 19. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State (1956), 49 Wn. (2d) 520, 304 P. (2d) 676; Power, Inc. v. Huntley (1951), 39 Wn. (2d) 191, 235 P. (2d) 173. See Ruud, "No law shall embrace more than one subject," 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958).
It is equally apparent that the portion of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act, with which we are concerned, violates Art. II, § 37, of the state constitution, which provides,
"No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its. title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length."
Subparagraph (1), heretofore referred to and quoted in full on page 670, provides that the principal and interest of the bonds issued by.the Toll Bridge Authority "in connection with construction of a second Lake Washington toll bridge" may be 'paid from the one hundred thousand dollars appropriated from the Motor- Vehicle Fund if the "revenues of the project are insufficient" for that purpose. Subparagraph (2) authorizes the use of "seven hundred fifty thousand dollars, per year" from the proceeds of excisé taxes imposed on motor vehicle fuels, for a like purpose.
These two subparagraphs obviously amend that portion of the Laws of 1957, chapter 266, § 2, which states that the revenue bonds which the Toll Bridge Authority may issue for the second Lake Washington toll bridge "shall be payable both principal and interest solely from the tolls and revenues derived from the operation of said toll facility."
The 1957 law does more than restrict the power of the Toll Bridge Authority; it restricts the sources available for payment on the bonds. New powers are created, which come from the clearly substantive provisions of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act, and which definitely amend the restriction as to the source of payment.
We do not regard it as material that any amounts taken from the Motor Vehicle Fund to pay principal and interest on the bonds will ultimately be repaid from tolls and revenues of the bridge. Moneys of the Motor Vehicle Fund are being made available to guarantee prompt payment of principal and interest on these bonds, and this constitutes a provision substantially at variance with the restriction on the source of payment which is a part of the 1957 act.
The purpose of Art. II, § 37, of our state constitution has been stated, as follows, in State ex rel. Gebhart v. Superior Court (1942), 15 Wn. (2d) 673, 685, 131 P. (2d) 943, 949:
"The section of our constitution above referred to was undoubtedly framed for the purpose of avoiding confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty in. the statutory law through the existence of separate and disconnected legislative provisions, original and amendatory, scattered through differ ent. volumes or different portions of the same volume. Such a provision, among other things, forbids, amending a statute simply'by striking out or inserting certain-words, phrases, or clauses, a proceeding formerly common, through which laws became complicated and their real- meaning often difficult of ascertainment. The result desired by such a provision is to have in a section as amended a complete section, so that no further search will be required to determine the provisions of such section as amended."
As indicated above, the effect of the portion of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act, now under consideration, is to strike out the word "solely" from § 2, chapter 266, Laws of 1957, and this is clearly amendatory.
The challenged portion of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act is unconstitutional for the reasons indicated.
We do not attempt to pass on the other constitutional issues raised by the State Auditor and the intervenors.
Our decision on the constitutional issues involved makes, it unnecessary to discuss, the validity of certain provisions of the Toll Bridge Authority's Resolution No. 338, which have been challenged by the State Auditor. It is obvious that the Toll Bridge Authority cannot, by resolution, take a position in conflict with the terms and conditions imposed upon the authority by the Laws of 1957, chapter 266, which authorized the construction of the bridge with which we are here concerned. Neither can it abdicate authority with which it has been invested; nor can it delegate authority which is nondelegable. It follows from what has already been said that any attempt to change the character of revenue bonds, to bonds guaranteed in part by the annual pledge of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars of highway trust funds (see amendment 18 of the Washington state constitution), is beyond its authority. See State ex rel. Eastvold v. Maybury (1956), 49 Wn. (2d) 533, 304 P. (2d) 663.
The State Auditor properly refused to sign bonds issued under the authority of Washington Toll Bridge Authority Resolution No. 338, in reliance upon the terms of the quoted portion of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act.
No portion of the 1959 Supplemental Appropriations Act is affected by this decision, except the appropriation to the State Highway Commission.
This does not mean that the bridge across Lake Washington need be delayed. It is clear that chapter 266, Laws of 1957, gives requisite authority to proceed. The seven hundred fifty thousand dollars a year, which counsel say would probably never be used, falls far short of being sufficient to guarantee even the annual interest on thirty million dollars worth of bonds; but it is an entering wedge. If the court were to approve the method used here to make a token guarantee from tax sources of what are supposedly revenue bonds, it would afford the precedent for complete guarantees from tax sources by a similar procedure.
The writ of mandate is denied.
Weaver, C. J., Donworth, Ott, and Foster, JJ., concur.