Case Name: SEITZ v. MESSERSCHMITT et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-08
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 732
Docket Number: 
Parties: SEITZ v. MESSERSCHMITT et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 732–739

Head Matter:
(117 App. Div. 401)
SEITZ v. MESSERSCHMITT et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
February 8, 1907.)
1. Escheat—Mortgaged Property—Evidence—Findings.
Evidence held to justify a finding that the mortgagor and owner of the equity of redemption in the property in controversy died' without heirs capable of inheriting, and that at his death the title to the property vested by escheat in the state.
2. States—Actions Against—Right to Sue—Consent.
A sovereign state could not be sued in its own courts without its consent in a suit to foreclose a mortgage on land, the title to which it had acquired by escheat.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig. vol. 44, States, §§ 179-184.]
3. Same—Parties.
Where the courts of the state could acquire no jurisdiction over the state without its consent as a party to a suit to foreclose a mortgage on land the equity of redemption in which had escheated, the making of the Attorney General of the state a party in his representative capacity, and his appearance and demand for any surplus arising on the sale of the property, did not authorize the court to foreclose the state’s interest in the property under a judgment of foreclosure.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, States, §§ 179-184, 196.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by Anna Seitz against Magdalena Messerschmitt and others. From an order allowing the motion of defendant Messerschmitt to be relieved from her purchase of certain land on a sale pursuant to an interlocutory judgment in partition proceedings, on the ground that the property was not marketable, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
George Q. Collins, for appellant and for infant defendants.
Joseph T. Weed, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
The questions presented on this appeal are stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice LAUGHLIN. There is one ground upon which I do not agree with him. The conveyance of the referee on the sale under the judgment in the foreclosure action is the foundation of the title. In that action no defendant, as representing the heirs at law of the mortgagor, was made a party; it being alleged that the mortgagor died owning the equity of redemption in the property without heirs at law, which it may be assumed meant without heirs at law capable of inheriting real property in this state. The title is sought to be sustained upon that theory. If, however, the owner of the equity redemption died without heirs at law capable of inheriting the title to his real property, it escheated to the state, who therefore became the owner of the property in question subject to the mortgage.
I agree with Mr. Justice LAUGFILIN that the facts would justify a finding that the mortgagor and owner of the equity of redemption died without heirs at law capable of inheriting, and that therefore at his death the title to the property vested by escheat in the state. The question, then, is whether the title of the state was affected by the sale under the judgment of foreclosure. The people of the state were not a party to the foreclosure action, and it always has been a settled rule of law that a sovereign state could not be sued in its own courts without its consent. This question is discussed by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Kiersted v. People, 1 Abb. Prac. 385, and the rule as I understand it is there stated. He quotes from Bronson, C. J., in Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill, 159, that, "when a state is made defendant, the_ state courts cannot exercise jurisdiction." It seems to me clear that, if the courts of the state could acquire no jurisdiction as against the state to affect its title to real property, making the Attorney General of the state a party defendant in actions affecting real property could give the court no jurisdiction to sell the property of the state under a judgment in that action. Upon the assumption that the property escheated to the state, the state became the owner of the equity of redemption, and to sustain the title offered to the purchaser we must hold that the deed by the referee under the judgment of foreclosure conveyed the equity of redemption which had become vested in -the state. If the court had no jurisdiction over the state, in whom the title to the property had vested, it certainly could not sell the interest of the state in the property under a judgment in an action to which the state was not a party (Code Civ. Proc., § 1632) ; and, as the statute of limitation has not run against the state, I do not see how we can say that the interest of the state has been divested by the sale under this judgment.
The cases in which courts of equity have allowed a state, or the Attorney General of a state, to be made a party defendant, have been cases in which there had been an apparent lien upon real or personal property which apparently was owned by the state, and the Attorney General was made a party, not for the purpose of affecting the rights of the state, but to notify him of the existence of the controversy, so as to give him an opportunity to appear and protect the interests of the state, if he so desired. But in no case that I can find has it ever been held that where real property had vested in a state, making either the state or the Attorney General a party to an action affecting such real property, without legislative sanction, could divest the state of the property that had vested in it. While the Attorney General was the legal officer of the state, he had no power to divest the state of real property; that power vesting, solely with the Legislature. Making him a party did not bind him to interpose on behalf of the state, and upon principle I cannot see how it can be said that making him a party to the action and his appearance in the action could vest the court with jurisdiction to sell the property of the state, so as to divest it of title. I do not think we can declare in this action, to which the state is not a party, that the title of the state to this property has been divested by the sale under the foreclosure suit, and therefore I think the title is not marketable.
The order should therefore be affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
CLARKE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.