Case Name: In the Matter of New York Post Corporation, Respondent, v. Robert Moses et al., Comprising the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1961-07-07
Citations: 10 N.Y.2d 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of New York Post Corporation, Respondent, v. Robert Moses et al., Comprising the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 199–209

Head Matter:
In the Matter of New York Post Corporation, Respondent, v. Robert Moses et al., Comprising the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Appellants.
Argued May 17, 1961;
decided July 7, 1961.
Samuel I. Rosenman, Max Freund, Andrew J. Schoen and Donald I. Laventhall for appellants.
I. No common-law rule gives the Post a clear, legal right to inspect Triborough’s books and records. (Matter of North v. Foley, 238 App. Div. 731; People ex rel. Henry v. Cornell, 32 How. Prac. 149, 47 Barb. 329, 35 How. Prac. 31; Matter of Egan, 205 N. Y. 147.) II. Triborough is not subject to the provisions of section 51 of the General Municipal Law. (Kennedy v. Fehlhaber Pile Co., 263 App. Div. 819; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 430; Brooks v. Wyman, 246 N. Y. 534; Blackburn v. Clements, 297 N. Y. 971; Lassin v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 215 App. Div. 652; Halleran v. City of New York, 132 Misc. 73, 226 App. Div. 785; Klein v. O’Dwyer, 192 Misc. 421; Borek v. Golder, 190 Misc. 366; Taylor-Fichter Steel Constr. Co. v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 241 App. Div. 75; Matter of Egan, 205 N. Y. 147; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. White’s Estate, 144 F. 2d 1019.) III. The files, books and records of the Triborough here sought to be inspected are not records kept in a “ public office ” within the meaning of that phrase as it is employed in section 66 of the Public Officers Law. Nor do they constitute public records which they must also be in order to satisfy the requirements of said section. In any event, the inspection granted by the order below could not possibly be justified by section 66, which does not authorize an inspection of records but only requires the public officer involved to make transcripts of specifically identified documents. (Matter of Natelson v. Portfolio, 291 N. Y. 290; Matter of Blandford v. McClellan, 173 Misc. 15; Matter of Erenberg v. Brill, 10 A D 2d 769; People ex rel. Stenstrom v. Harnett, 131 Misc. 75, 224 App. Div. 127, 249 N. Y. 606; People ex rel. Schweller v. Prendergast, 89 Misc. 584; Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N Y 2d 677; Matter of Walker v. Watson, 201 Misc. 556, 280 App. Div. 760.) IV. The Public Authorities Law is a comprehensive statute, regulating the Authorities created thereunder, which has specific provisions dealing expressly with inspection of their files. The fact that the Public Authorities Law makes no provision for inspection by the public of the Triborough’s files evidences the Legislature’s intent not to permit such inspections. (Fulmer v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 137; Matter of Plumbing Assn. v. Thruway Auth., 5 N Y 2d 420.) V. The ratio decidendi of Borah v. White County Bridge Comm. (199 F. 2d 213), based on facts strikingly alike to those here involved, is peculiarly applicable to this proceeding and shows that the court below erred. (McGovern Trucking Co. v. Moses, 16 Misc 2d 72, 277 App. Div. 758.) VI. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Post could show a clear, legal right of inspection, the order below is far too extensive in scope and should be reversed by the court in the exercise of its discretion. The articles concerning Triborough heretofore printed in the Post furnish additional grounds for reversal. (Matter of Coombs v. Edwards, 280 N. Y. 361; Matter of Ahern v. Board of Supervisors of Suffolk County, 7 A D 2d 538, 6 NY 2d 376; Matter of Lord, 167 N. Y. 398.) VII. No constitutional questions involving freedom of press are here involved. The Post’s rights are the same as those of any citizen. . (Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y. 71; Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651.)
M. Marvin Berger and Burton M. Marks for respondent.
I. At common law the right of inspection was given to every citizen and taxpayer and it may be abridged only by an explicit statutory enactment. (Matter of Egan, 205 N. Y. 147; Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290; People ex rel. Stenstrom v. Harnett, 131 Misc. 75, 224 App. Div. 127; Matter of North v. Foley, 238 App. Div. 731; State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N. J. L. 332; Casey v. McPhail, 2 N. J. Super. 619; Fagan v. State Bd. of Assessors, 80 N. J. L. 516; Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446.) II. Triborough is a l( board * # * acting for or on behalf of (a) * * * municipal corporation ” and its books and records are public records and open “ to the inspection of any taxpayer.” (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. White’s Estate, 144 F. 2d 1019; Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352; Borek v. Golder, 190 Misc. 366.) III. Section 66 of the Public Officers Law expresses a strong legislative policy to confer a clear statutory right to inspect the records sought unless the statute which created the Authority or some other statute specifically forbids such an inspection. (Matter of Walker v. Watson, 201 Misc. 556, 280 App. Div. 760; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 208 Misc. 322, 2 N Y 2d 677; Matter of Plumbing Assn. v. Thruway Auth., 5 N Y 2d 420; Ciulla v. State of New York, 191 Misc. 528; Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N Y 2d 374; Matter of Erenberg v. Brill, 10 A D 2d 769.) IV. The Public Authorities Law does not regulate inspection of Triborough’s records but deals with the filing of reports. The Legislature’s intent is to permit inspection by the public under relevant statutory provisions. V. Borah v. White County Bridge Comm. (199 F. 2d 213) is inapplicable to this proceeding. (Chicago Tit. & Trust Co. v. Danforth, 236 Ill. 554; United States v. White County Bridge Comm., 275 F. 2d 529.) VI. The order of the Appellate Division is, if anything, too narrow in scope but was warranted in the exercise of discretion of the court below. (Matter of Andresen v. Rice, 277 N. Y. 271; Matter of Bergerman v. Murphy, 199 Misc. 1008, 278 App. Div. 388, 303 N. Y. 762; Matter of Zielinski v. Harding, 177 Misc. 773.) VIL Refusal of access to Triborough’s records would violate the Post’s constitutional rights. (Times Picayune v. United States, 345 U. S. 594; Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y. 71; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S, 252; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367.)

Opinion:
Burke, J.
The order under review, granting respondent the right to inspect books, records and files of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, reversed Special Term, which had found (1) that the provisions of section 66 of the Public Officers Law and section 51 of the General Municipal Law do not apply to this Authority, and (2) that petitioner has not shown that special interest requisite to obtain an inspection of the records of the Authority. We conclude that Special Term was correct.
Decisions such as Benz v. New York State Thruway Auth. (9 N Y 2d 486) are expressive of a constitutional and legislative policy that public authorities should be subjected only to those procedures which have been specifically mandated. " [Tjhere is no jurisdiction in any court of any suit against [an Authority] except as the Legislature has in terms created such jurisdiction " (supra, p. 489). We are, therefore, restricted initially to a search for that provision of the Public Authorities Law which gives a citizen and taxpayer, by virtue of that status, a right of inspection.
Although the Legislature has from time to time seen fit by appropriate legislation to subject Authorities to various degrees of control and inspection (Public Authorities Law, § 552, 560, 2500, 2502, 2503; State Commission of Investigation Act [L. 1958, ch. 989], § 2, subd. 1, par. b; subd. 11, par. c; Public Authorities Law, § 2501, added,by L. 1961, ch. 615), there is no provision which has authorized a tollpayer or citizen to examine the papers of an Authority.
Eespondent, aware of the lack of specific legislation, argues that it has such a right under the general provisions of law applicable to public records of government (Public Officers Law, § 66; General Municipal Law, § 51). Such a contention may be sustained here only if the Authority is an agent of the city (§51) or constitutes a " public office " (§66).
In this regard the respondent must fail. " [T]he cases confirm the conclusion that a public authority enjoys an existence separate and apart from the State, even though it exercises a governmental function". (Matter of Plumbing Assn. v. Thruway Auth., 5 N Y 2d 420, 424.) The language in that opinion clearly points to our conclusion here:
" Although created by the State and Subject to dissolution by the State, these public corporations are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to function with a freedom and flexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board, department or commission" (p. 423).
' ' However close such relationship [between the State and the Authority] may be, though, it is abundantly clear that the Authority stands on its own feet, transacts its business affairs through its own personnel and on its own initiative and is not subject to the strict requirements imposed upon a board or department of the State by a provision such as section 135 of the State Finance Law" (pp. 424b-425). (See, also, Bird v. New York State Thruway Auth., 8 A D 2d 495, 496-497.)
Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz (2 N Y 2d 677) is not authority to the contrary. 11 The specific issue presented in [that] case # relates to a transcript merely of the charge given by the judge to the jury" (p. 687).
Section 51 of the General Municipal Law having been clearly construed as not giving a right of action against officers or agents of the State (Bull v. Stichman, 298 N. Y. 516, motion for rearg. den. 300 N. Y. 460; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N. Y. 1), it can only be applicable here if the Authority is an arm of the city. We find no such close connection. While the city and its officials have duties of supervision, they are not such as to enable us to conclude that the Authority acts for or on its behalf (see, also, Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 430, 441, wherein it was held that no right of action existed under section 51 against the City Board of Elections; " The defendants, the city board of elections, doubtless are local officers, but no relation of principal and agent, or of master and servant, exists between them and the city"). The true beneficiary of the actions of this public benefit corporation has been clearly designated by subdivision 4 of section 3 of the General Corporation Law: "A ' public benefit corporation ' is a corporation organized to construct or operate a public improvement wholly or partly within the state, the profits from which enure to the benefit of this or other states, or to the people thereof."
This does not present, as petitioner would have us believe, a " system whereby these immense expenditures of money by the Authority, created for the benefit of the people, could be made without any right of the people's representatives to investigate the conduct of the Authority". The Legislature, creating the Authority by special act (L. 1946, ch. 954; N. Y. Const., art. X, § 5), has provided that it must report to, and be subject to investigation by, the State Comptroller and City Comptroller, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, the State Commission of Investigation, the Mayor of the City of New York, and even a trustee designated to represent a proportion of the bondholders. (Public Authorities Law, § 552, 560, 2500, 2502, 2503; State Commission of Investigation Act [L. 1958, ch. 989], § 2; 1952 and 1960 General Bond Resolutions of Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.). Had the Legislature desired the object sought by the respondent, it could easily have so provided in the special act, or in those provisions applicable to all public authorities. Had the people favored that result, the extensive constitutional provision, adopted in 1938, would have so stated.
We must, therefore, conclude that when a corporate entity is specifically created by comprehensive and complete legislation which protects the State and city from liability and frees the Authority from restraints otherwise applicable to agencies of the government, there is no reason to invoke laws general in nature. Considered thus, neither of the statutes urged by petitioner is applicable, and the records and files of the Authority do not constitute 1 ' public records ' ' which might be deemed open to inspection by any member of the public.
It is significant that, even in the case of parties with special interests, the Legislature has taken pains to precisely define the remedies available to them against an Authority (cf. Public Authorities Law, § 361-b, 368, subds. 4, 5).
Though we are strongly in favor of enforcing the government's duty to disclose to its citizens the course of conduct of its various departments, in the ease of a public authority it is for the Legislature, rather than the courts, to decide to what extent its operations may be subjected to public scrutiny. Where the Legislature has provided specific means for supervision, the courts may not engraft amendments which the Legislature has not even impliedly sanctioned.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of Special Term reinstated, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division.