Case Name: Richard G. RISER, Appellant, v. Harley O. TEETS, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1958-03-17
Citations: 253 F.2d 844
Docket Number: No. 15639
Parties: Richard G. RISER, Appellant, v. Harley O. TEETS, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 253
Pages: 844–848

Head Matter:
Richard G. RISER, Appellant, v. Harley O. TEETS, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, Appellee.
No. 15639.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
March 17, 1958.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 1958.
Pope, Circuit Judge, dissented.
George T. Davis, San Francisco, Cal., Carl B. Shapiro, Fairfax, Cal., for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arlo E. Smith, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of California, for appellee.
Before HEALY, ORR and POPE, Circuit Judges

Opinion:
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was tried and convicted in a California court of the murder of two people — a man and his wife — and was sentenced to death. His defense was an alibi. Pursuant to a state statute, Pen. Code, § 1239(b) he was accorded an automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, which tribunal affirmed the conviction. People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 305 P.2d 1, 15. Certiorari was denied, 353 U.S. 930, 77 S.Ct. 721, 1 L.Ed.2d 724. Thereafter appellant petitioned the court below for the writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he had been denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. The district court (Judge Murphy sitting) issued an order staying appellant's execution until final disposition could be made of the petition; and after a hearing the application for the writ was denied. The matter is now before this court on appeal.
The evidence in the case is set out in exhaustive detail in the California court's opinion on the automatic appeal, and no more of it will be touched upon here than is essential to an understanding of the points raised.
Prior to the trial counsel for appellant had asked that there be turned over to them by the authorities, for impeachment purposes, copies of statements allegedly made by the two eyewitnesses to the killing, describing the murderer. These requests were denied by the trial judge. Other demands for the production of evidence along the same line were made during the course of the trial and were denied. The State Supreme Court held that the rulings constituted error. However, it decided that the error was not prejudicial in that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the defendant been allowed to obtain and introduce the statements in evidence.
The basis of this holding lay in the fact that fingerprints of appellant were found on a bottle and on a glass at the bar where the murders were committed. Also, the finding of a certain type of hand- cast bullets in the bodies of the victims was held to point strongly to appellant as the slayer. "Fingerprint evidence," said the court, "is the strongest evidence of identity, and is ordinarily sufficient alone to identify the defendant." The court added that in this case there was the further evidence afforded by the presence of the hand-cast bullets.
Article 6, § 4y2, of the Constitution of the State of California reads in material part:
"No judgment shall be set aside, or [no] new trial granted, in any case for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
This provision applies in both civil and criminal cases.
Appellant relies heavily on Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103. The opinion in that ease contains no intimation that the procedural requirement laid down in it is to be taken as one of due process under the Constitution of the United States. The Court went no further than to say (353 U.S. at page 668, 77 S.Ct. at page 1013) that the standard announced is one for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.
The decision of the court below is affirmed.