Case Name: Donald BROWN, Appellant, v. Virginia (Gordon) BROWN, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-08-01
Citations: 764 So. 2d 502
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00027-COA
Parties: Donald BROWN, Appellant, v. Virginia (Gordon) BROWN, Appellee.
Judges: BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING, AND PAYNE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 764
Pages: 502–508

Head Matter:
Donald BROWN, Appellant, v. Virginia (Gordon) BROWN, Appellee.
No. 1999-CA-00027-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Aug. 1, 2000.
Christopher Andrew Arledge, Crystal Springs, Attorney for Appellant.
Joseph A. Fernald, Jr., Brookhaven, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING, AND PAYNE, JJ.

Opinion:
PAYNE, J., for the Court:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶ 1. This is an appeal from the Copiah County Circuit Court where Donald and Virginia Brown were divorced on October 8, 1992. Pursuant to the divorce, a property settlement was entered which, in pertinent part, awarded primary physical custody of the parties's minor children, Seth and Tucker, to Virginia with reasonable visitation rights to Donald.
¶ 2. This petition comes as a result of Donald's May 4, 1998 filing of a motion for modification requesting a change in custody for both sons. In support of his motion, Donald alleges that at different times Virginia had three separate men living with her in her one-bedroom apartment, forcing the boys to sleep on the couch. Donald also showed where Virginia's delinquency in paying utility bills caused her electricity and telephone service to be cut off, that she had moved six times within six years, and that she, among other things, repeatedly used foul language in front of the children. In support, as well, Donald offered twelve year old Seth Brown's statement that he preferred to live with his father.
¶ 3. After a trial on this matter, the chancellor ruled no material changes had occurred as to warrant a change in custody of the two sons from Virginia to Donald and that the best interests of the children would be that they not be separated from one another. From such denial of modification of custody, Donald now appeals,
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 4. In this petition, appellant Donald Brown raises three issues for our review. First, Donald argues the chancellor erred in considering each of Virginia Brown's offending acts individually rather than under a totality of circumstances analysis. Second, Donald argues the chancellor did not give proper deference to Seth Brown's statement that he preferred to live with his father. Third, Donald argues the chancellor erred in finding Donald had slumbered on his rights by not bringing this motion for modification sooner.
¶ 5. With each issue, our standard of reviewing the chancellor's decision is clear: "This Court will not overturn the decision of a chancellor in domestic cases when those findings are supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, or applied an erroneous legal standard." Kennedy v. Kennedy, 650 So.2d 1362, 1366 (Miss.1995). As described further in this opinion, we find no abuse of discretion with regard to each of the three issues presented and now affirm the chancellor on all issues.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING EACH ALLEGED ACTION OR OMISSION BY VIRGINIA BROWN INDIVIDUALLY, RATHER THAN BY THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THUS FAILING TO FIND THAT THE CHILDREN'S CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT WAS CLEARLY ADVERSE TO THEIR BEST INTERESTS, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILDREN WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED, AND THAT AS SUCH A CHANGE IN CUSTODY WAS WARRANTED.
¶ 6. With this issue, Donald argues both the sufficiency of evidence did not support the chancellor's decision and that his motion for directed verdict should have been granted. In support of his motion that modification of custody was warranted, Donald submitted that Virginia changed residences six times in six years; she failed to pay utility bills causing such service to be cut off; she lived on different occasions with three different men in the same house as the children; she used profane and indecent language in front of the children; and she schooled the children in south Copiah County while the family lived in south Lincoln, forcing the kids to awaken at five thirty in the morning to ready themselves for school which caused the kids to fall asleep in class. Donald argues the chancellor erred in considering the charges individually that Virginia behaved inappropriately as custodian of the children, rather than view all charges collectively in a totality of circumstances review, and that the chancellor's specific address of each allegation shows that he apparently declined to conduct the proper "totality of circumstances" analysis, thus violating the rule that isolated incidents cannot be used in examining change in custody. As stated in Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So.2d 374 (Miss.1996), "the chancellor must have found that 'the overall circumstances in which a child lives have materially changed and are likely to remain materially changed for the foreseeable future and, of course, that such change adversely impacts the child.' " Touchstone, 682 So.2d at 379 (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss.1984)).
¶ 7. In our review of the chancellor's order, we see that since Donald opted to bring up individual instances in support of his contention that material changes had occurred, the chancellor chose to show how each individual allegation was not sufficient in itself or when taken with the whole, to constitute a material change. Donald's construction of the chancellor's explanatory decision is far more strict than should be read.
In the ordinary modification proceeding, the non-eustodial party must prove: (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has transpired since issuance of the custody decree; (2) that this change adversely affects the child's welfare; and (3) that the child's best interests mandate a change of custody. A chancellor's finding of fact on such a matter will not be set aside or disturbed on appeal unless the finding is manifestly wrong or is not supported by substantial credible evidence.
Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 775 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). Donald has. not shown that such a substantial change in circumstances has transpired that the children have been adversely affected which would dictate that custody be changed to him. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in this modification proceeding. This issue has no merit, and we affirm the chancellor's decision not to modify custody.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING THE PREFERENCE EXECUTED BY SETH BROWN- INTO CONSIDERATION AS PART OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, INSTEAD OF CONSIDERING THE PREFERENCE SEPARATELY.
¶ 8. Seth Brown stated that he preferred to live with his father; however, the chancellor found this statement alone unpersuasive to change custody. Donald argues that the chancellor failed to conduct a totality of circumstances test to find that the best interests of the two Brown children would be to live with their father. The chancellor emphasized the negative effect a separation of the two boys would have on the younger brother and also expressed that, in his opinion, the best inter est and welfare of Seth would also be to remain with his younger brother.
Even if the court was to consider [the child's] preference as a factor in the custody determination, it would be merely one element of many to be weighed by the chancellor. The chancellor is not in any way bound to respect the desires of the child, since the main objective remains the best interests of the child.
Westbrook v. Oglesbee, 606 So.2d 1142, 1147 (Miss.1992). Seth Brown's statement of preference alone cannot be weighed so heavily as to, on its own, modify custody. Donald errs in alleging that the chancellor failed to use the totality of the circumstances to find a change in custody was warranted, namely because the chancellor failed to consider the totality of Seth's statement of preference in conjunction with Virginia's aforestated problems.
¶ 9. The chancellor described how he did consider Seth's preference, but that "the polestar consideration is the best interest of the child." Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d 740, 743 (Miss.1996). Finding no abuse of discretion, we find the chancellor's indication in the record that he considered many factors, including Seth's preference and the best interests of the children, do not evidence an abuse of discretion, and we affirm on this issue.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DONALD BROWN WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A CHANGE OF CUSTODY BECAUSE HE SLUMBERED ON HIS RIGHTS BY NOT BRINGING HIS MOTION TO CHANGE CUSTODY SOONER.
¶ 10. Donald cites a maxim of equity that essentially says that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. The appellee states, however, that the chancellor was not applying laches as a bar to modification, but was only commenting on the failure of the appellant to assert a claim in a timely fashion, since some of Donald's allegations were four years removed in time. We decline to address this third issue since it only concerns a comment the chancellor made admonishing Donald that if he really were concerned for the children's well-being, he certainly would earlier have instituted action. Donald is claiming that his delay caused the chancellor not to modify the custody; as stated earlier in this opinion, this is not the basis for the chancellor's decision not to modify custody. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 11. Finding no merit to any of the three issues which Donald Brown raises, we now affirm the chancellor on all issues.
¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CO-PIAH COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., IRVING, AND MOORE, JJ., CONCUR. BRIDGES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE AND THOMAS, JJ. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.