Case Name: IRWIN v. IRWIN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-09-19
Citations: 85 Mich. App. 576
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-777
Parties: IRWIN v IRWIN
Judges: Before: Allen,* P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 85
Pages: 576–582

Head Matter:
IRWIN v IRWIN
Docket No. 77-777.
Submitted January 8, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided September 19, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Gary A. Irwin obtained a judgment of divorce from Beverly J. Irwin in 1964. A portion of the property settlement provided that the plaintiff was the sole owner of the marital home and that if he were to sell the home prior to December 11, 1973, the defendant should receive one-half of the net proceeds. The defendant and the children of the marriage lived in the home from 1966 to 1976, when the plaintiff sold the property. During that time the parties agreed that in consideration for defendant’s occupying the home, plaintiff’s child support obligation was reduced by $100 per month. Upon the sale of the property, the defendant petitioned the court for one-half of the net proceeds, claiming that the limitation on the property settlement was ambiguous. The Macomb Circuit Court, George R. Deneweth, J., ordered payment of one-half the proceeds to defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
The limitation on the property settlement is not ambiguous and needs no interpretation. The Court of Appeals will clarify and interpret property settlements only where to do so will not change the substantive rights of the parties. The agreement should not be modified.
Reversed.
Allen, P. J., agrees that the provision is not ambiguous, but would hold that the case comes within a "fairness” doctrine which allows modification of a property settlement where necessary to alleviate inequities. Because the defendant maintained the home while she occupied it and at one time averted foreclosure by making several mortgage payments, and because plaintiff’s support obligations were reduced for the entire period, to allow sale of the home without awarding the defendant a portion of the proceeds from the sale and without reimburs ing her for the mortgage payments she made is patently inequitable.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 868.
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 904-906.
[2] 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation § 909.
Opinion of the Court
1. Divorce — Appeal and Error — Property Settlements — Modification.
The Court of Appeals will not clarify or interpret a property settlement in a divorce proceeding when the substantive rights of the parties are changed by such clarification or interpretation.
Dissent by Allen, P. J.
2. Divorce — Property Settlements — Modification—Fairness.
Revision of an otherwise ñnal property settlement in a divorce proceeding is proper where fairness necessitates the alleviation of inequities.
Jack C. Chilingirian, for plaintiff.
Hopping & Boyer, P. C. (by Donald M. Churilla), for defendant.
Before: Allen,* P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and M. J. Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
M. J. Kelly, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a February 9, 1977, order of the Macomb County Circuit Court determining and distributing to defendant one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home.
The parties were divorced on September 21, 1964. The property settlement provided that plaintiff "shall be the sole owner of [the] property" and was incorporated in the judgment of divorce with the following condition:
"The limitation contained in said Agreement to the effect that should the plaintiff, Gary A. Irwin, sell the property referred to on or before December 11, 1973, any amount received from the sale of said property over and above the outstanding mortgage balance as of December 11, 1963 shall be divided evenly between Gary A. Irwin and Beverly J. Irwin, is also affirmed."
Defendant and the three children of the marriage lived in the home from 1966 until plaintiff sold it in October of 1976. Defendant then petitioned the court for one-half of the net proceeds from the sale, claiming that the limitation on the property settlement was ambiguous and that she had understood it to mean that half the proceeds of the sale should be hers, regardless of the timing of the sale.
But the limitation on plaintiff's ownership is not ambiguous. It needs no interpretation. A fair reading produces no doubt about the ownership of the home and the disposition of any proceeds from the sale.
Thus, the ambiguity exception to the rule that property settlement provisions in divorce judgments are not modifiable does not apply here. See Firnschild v Firnschild, 67 Mich App 327; 240 NW2d 790 (1976), Dougherty v Dougherty, 48 Mich App 154; 210 NW2d 151 (1973).
Nor does this case resemble those where the court has modified property settlements on the grounds that fairness, or the intent of the settlement, or the court rules required modification. See Paul v Paul, 362 Mich 43; 106 NW2d 384 (1960), Greene v Greene, 357 Mich 196; 98 NW2d 519 (1959), GCR 1963, 528.3.
In any event this Court will clarify and interpret property settlements only when the substantive rights of the parties are not changed. Mitchell v Mitchell, 307 Mich 366; 11 NW2d 922 (1943), Boucher v Boucher, 34 Mich App 213; 191 NW2d 85 (1971). To accept defendant's argument for modification would change the rights of the parties. It would give defendant a property interest not given her in the judgment of divorce.
Therefore, the trial court erred in modifying the property settlement. The order modifying the. property settlement is reversed.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.