Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RICHARD LOREN ALEXANDER, Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1972-03-23
Citations: 9 Or. App. 42
Docket Number: No. C-57570
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RICHARD LOREN ALEXANDER, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 9
Pages: 42–54

Head Matter:
Argued July 19, 1971, re-argued January 17,
affirmed March 23,
petition for rehearing denied April 18,
petition for review denied June 20, 1972
STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RICHARD LOREN ALEXANDER, Appellant.
(No. C-57570)
495 P.2d 51
William C. Snouffer, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Lindsay, Nahstoll, Hart, Duncan, Dafoe & Krause, Portland.
Thomas II. Denney, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and John W. Osburn, Solicitor General, Salem.

Opinion:
FOLEY, J.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of posses sion of marihuana. On appeal he claims that the evidence seized from his apartment and admitted into evidence against him should have been suppressed.
The relevant seizure occurred on December 12, 1969, when police officers went to defendant's apartment to execute a warrant for his arrest on a separate charge of selling dangerous drugs. The police did not have a warrant to search the apartment.
The defendant argues that under a proper definition of the term, the evidence seized was not in plain view, and even if in plain view, was nevertheless inadmissible because the officer's observations were really an "accusatory visual search" and on the further ground that the items seized were 12 to 15 feet away on the other side of a room divider, not under the immediate control of the defendant and thus not subject to seizure as incident to a valid arrest under Chimel v. California, 395 US 752, 89 S Ct 2034, 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969). The state seeks to justify the seizure on the basis that it was incident to a valid arrest and that the evidence seized was in plain view at the time of the arrest.
A brief statement of the facts will help to explain our analysis of the problem. An undercover officer, Bobert Koch, on October 8, 1969, had purchased methamphetamine from the defendant and an indictment had been returned against him approximately two months after the amphetamine purchase. Officer Koch and several other officers were in the process of serving some 60 arrest warrants which were the culmination of extensive undercover activity. Included in the warrants was one for the defendant. They had served the arrest warrants during the evening on more than 40 persons and around 3 a.m. on December 12, 1969, they arrived at defendant's apartment. Koch and his companion officer, both dressed in civilian clothes, knocked. Officer Koch was recognized by defendant and he and his companion were invited inside by defendant who did not yet know they were police officers. No mention was made of the officers' ultimate purpose—to assist the other officers in effecting defendant's arrest. Officer Koch testified that as he walked across the room after being admitted he glanced through an opening in a room divider into the other part of the room toward a low table and after he sat on the sofa he turned and looked through a series of shelves at the low table again. He saw baggies of what he concluded to be marihuana. The distance was 12 to 15 feet. Whether the record supports his conclusion we discuss later in this opinion. Officer Koch and defendant talked about a variety of subjects for about eight minutes. Officer Koch did not immediately seize the baggies though he remained present in the room where the baggies were visible until they were seized. Through prearrangement the accompanying plainclothes officer was then sent from the apartment to alert several other officers. Thereafter they came into the apartment and served the arrest warrant upon the defendant. Officer Koch then directed one of the officers to the baggies which were seized by the officer. The trial court, after hearing the testimony, sustained the seizure " based upon my finding that the marihuana was openly visible to Officer Koch, that at that time he could plainly see it
First, as to defendant's claim that this was an "accusatory visual search," we find this not to be a valid claim. Items which are in plain view under any common-sense application of the words do not necessarily become the subject of a search. "Plain view" is defined to mean free of impediments to view and clearly or distinctly recognizable. It is not necessary to search for items which are thus directly in the line of sight and view and distinctly recognizable. Whether such items may be seized is another question which we will discuss later.
Second, we look to defendant's assertion that the seizure was invalid because even if incident to arrest the items were not within the immediate control of defendant and thus not subject to seizure under Chimel v. California, supra. We do not reach this question because we conclude that the seizure was not incident to an arrest. Officer Koch and his companion were still in their "drug culture" manner of dress and were invited into defendant's home by defendant. As far as defendant knew, these were not officers but his friends and he treated them and admitted them to his home as such. It was while they were in his house in this status, in the room to which they had been invited, that Officer Koch observed what he said he recognized as a baggie of marihuana.
An officer who is in a place where he has a right to be may seize contraband which is in plain view without the necessity of a search warrant and without the necessity that the seizure be incident to an arrest. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 US 234, 236, 88 S Ct 992, 19 L Ed 2d 1067 (1968); State v. Johnson, 232 Or 118, 374 P2d 481 (1962); State v. Jones, 1694-95, 4 Or App 447, 450-51, 479 P2d 1020 (1971). Although the actual seizure occurred after the other officers had entered the room, it was at Officer Koch's direction and was based upon the observation which he had made during his invited entry and during the period when he was in the room as defendant's invited guest. There was no intrusion upon defendant's privacy during the time Officer Koch testified he observed the contraband. Contrary to the claims that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S Ct 2022, 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971), condemns the seizure, we do not believe it governs in this case, where the relationship is that of guest-host, as distinguished from an intrusion upon privacy as with an arrest warrant or a search warrant.
We come now to the question of whether the baggie was in plain view and, as such, recognized as marihuana by the officer.
The testimony of the officer on this point is ambiguous. At one point in his testimony the officer said:
"I have not at any time stated I was positive there was marijuana. ® I had probable cause."
At another point, in answer to a question by the judge, he said:
Once I sat down and then took a good look at it, at this point I had in my mind more than a reasonable doubt that it was [marihuana]."
Cross-examination by defense counsel:
" Mr. Koch, you then said you were certain after you were seated on the sofa that the items were baggies containing what is usually, in your past experience, what usually would be a container of marijuana?
"A [Mr. Koch]: I felt that I had sufficient probable cause as to think certainly this was beyond a reasonable doubt."
We believe a reasonable interpretation of the officer's testimony would be that he was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt it was marihuana that he saw.
It is basic that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe and must have actually observed the fact. McCormick, Evidence 19, § 10 (1954). Evidence of the witness's background, education, experience and training is relevant to assist the fact finder in making his assessment and appraisal of the witness's testimony. In connection with his training and experience, Officer Koch testified as follows:
He was a graduate of the Miami Police Academy, Miami, Florida. He had one and one-half years' experience as a police officer in North Miami Beach, which included narcotics enforcement. He had special training in narcotics through the Federal Narcotics Bureau in the Miami Police Academy and 10 to 20 hours of classroom work specifically in narcotics, embracing the identification of the various narcotic drugs including marihuana. From August 1, 1969, to Decem ber 11, 1969, he worked for the Portland, Oregon, Police Department, assigned to the narcotics unit. During this period he engaged in the purchase of various narcotic drugs, including marihuana, which resulted in between 60 and 70 indictments at the one time, all involving criminal activity in drugs.
In addition to his general experience in the identification of narcotics, Officer Koch testified that he had previously, during the several months' period of his undercover work in Portland, observed marihuana in defendant's apartment in the same clear sandwich baggies, such as are purchased at the supermarkets. The trial court had the benefit of the above information and, in addition, the trial court was accorded a view of the room divider to better enable it to assess the evidence. In examining the record we are satisfied that there was substantial evidence from which the court could have found that the marihuana was plainly visible to Officer Koch and he could and did recognize it as that narcotic. Where the evidence is such, the findings of the trial court will be upheld by this court. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968); State v. Fisher, 5 Or App 483, 484 P2d 864 (1971).
Affirmed.
The defendant urges that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S Ct 2022, 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971), renders the seizure in this case unreasonable. Coolidge involved a previously planned, intentional, as distinguished from non-planned, seizure of evidence. It involved the seizure of evidence as distinguished from contraband.
In discussing the plain view doctrine and the prior justification for an intrusion upon defendant's privacy, the court said:
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. " (Emphasis supplied.) 403 US at 466.
Tliis interpretation is supported by one of defense counsel's succeeding questions when he said in part:
" [TJoday in response to the Judge's question you said you were positive they contained marijuana