Case Name: Charles Douglas GULLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-02-26
Citations: 870 So. 2d 652
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01301-SCT
Parties: Charles Douglas GULLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: PITTMAN, C. J., SMITH AND WALLER, P.JJ., COBB AND EASLEY, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ AND DICKINSON, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 870
Pages: 652–665

Head Matter:
Charles Douglas GULLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 2002-CA-01301-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 26, 2004.
R. Charles Robb, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jean Smith Vaughan, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
CARLSON, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. This appeal arises from an Order of the Jackson County Circuit Court Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings. Charles Douglas Gulley, Jr., argues that after being sentenced for the same offenses under both the misdemeanor and felony portions of then-existent Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19 (Rev.2000), he was unlawfully imprisoned and is now entitled to be released because he has completed the misdemean- or sentence. Finding that the trial court sentenced Gulley under the felony portion of the statute and had additional statutory authority to impose a fine pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32 (Rev.2000), we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Gulley's post-conviction proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
¶ 2. On July 7, 1998, the Jackson County Grand Jury returned a 35-count indictment against Gulley, charging him with the embezzlement of funds by a bailee under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19. By way of this indictment, Gulley was charged with having embezzled $3,144,828.90 between September 1990, and March 1998, while serving as an agent for Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, Inc., a Minnesota corporation. The State elected to put Gulley to trial on seven of the thirty-five counts in the indictment. Gulley's trial in the Jackson County Circuit Court commenced on May 24, 1999, and concluded on May 29, 1999, with the jury finding Gulley guilty of each of the seven counts. Pursuant to the jury verdicts, Judge James W. Backstrom imposed penitentiary sentences upon Gulley on June 3, 1999. The sentencing order entered that day stated, inter alia:
[Ujpon the Defendant's conviction on the seven counts of Embezzlement, the Defendant, C. Douglas Gulley, be, and he is hereby, sentenced to serve Ten (10) years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections on each of the above Counts 1 through 6, to run concurrent with each other, and to serve Ten (10) years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections on the above Count 7, consecutive to the sentences in Counts 1 through 6, with the sentence in Count 7 suspended, and the Defendant to be placed on 10 years Post Release Supervision upon release from custody pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and provisions of Section 47-7-34 and Section 47-7-35 of the Mississippi Code as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, and should the Defendant fail to abide by the terms and provisions of the Post Release Supervision, then such Post Release Supervision shall be revoked, and the Defendant recommitted to the correctional facility from which he was previously released for a period of up to Ten (10) additional years, and the Defendant is assessed the costs of this proceeding and a fine of $1,000.00 on each count for a total fine of $7,000.00.
¶ 3. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, Gulley perfected a direct appeal of the trial court's denial of post-conviction motions for a J.N.O.V. or, in the alternative, a new trial. Gulley remained at liberty on bond pending his appeal to this Court, and he thus paid the court-ordered $7,000 fine on July 27, 2000. We assigned Gulley's appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court judgment on January 9, 2001. Gulley v. State, 779 So.2d 1140 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Gulley then filed a motion in this Court for leave to file a post-conviction motion in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Gulley's application was granted by this Court and remanded to the Jackson County Circuit Court. Gulley v. State, No.2001-M-00256-SCT (Miss. March 18, 2002).
¶ 4. Upon remand, Judge Backstrom, on June 11, 2002, entered his Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-19 (Rev. 2002), Judge Backstrom found that there was no material fact in dispute and that Gulley was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a question of law. Out of an abundance of caution, Judge Backstrom did however delete from the original sentencing order any reference to a fine and ordered the $7,000 fine returned to Gulley; however, Gulley refused to accept the proffered refund.
DISCUSSION
¶ 5. At the time of Gulley's conviction, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19 (Rev.2000) read as follows:
If any director, agent, clerk, servant, or officer of any incorporated company, or if any trustee or factor, carrier or bail-ee, or any clerk, agent or servant of any private person, shall embezzle or fraudulently secrete, conceal, or convert to his own use, or make way with, or secrete with intent to embezzle or convert to his own use, any goods, rights in action, money, or other valuable security, effects, or property of any kind or description which shall have come or been intrusted to his care or possession by virtue of his office, place, or employment, either in mass or otherwise, with a value of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or more, he shall be guilty of embezzlement, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or either.
(emphasis added). While not applicable here, we note that 2003 Miss. Laws eh. 499 § 7, effective July 1, 2003, amended Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-19, to revise the values and penalties for embezzlement. The 2003 amendment states:
If any director, agent, clerk, servant, or officer of any incorporated company, or if any trustee or factor, carrier or bail-ee, or any clerk, agent or servant of any private person, shall embezzle or fraudulently secrete, conceal, or convert to his own use, or make way with, or secrete with intent to embezzle or convert to his own use, any goods, rights in action, money, or other valuable security, effects, or property of any kind or description which shall have come or been intrusted to his care or possession by virtue of his office, place, or employment, either in mass or otherwise, with a value of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or more, he shall be guilty of felony embezzlement, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the Penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or both. If the value of such goods, rights in action, money or other valuable security, effects, or property of any kind is less than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), he shall be guilty of misdemeanor embezzlement, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both.
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19 (Supp.2003) (additions indicated by italics).
¶ 6. Gulley was sentenced under the felony portion of the statute, as it then existed, by being ordered to serve ten years per counts one through six, with the sentences to run concurrently, and Gulley was sentenced to serve ten years on count seven consecutive to counts one through six, with the sentence in count seven to be suspended. Gulley was placed on ten years' post-release supervision upon his release from the custody of MDOC. As part of his "Post Release Terms and Provisions," Gulley was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $7,000. These sentences and terms evidence that the trial judge intended Gulley to be sentenced under the felony portion of the embezzlement statute. We also find the provisions of Judge Backstrom's Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings to be compelling:
It is clear that the sentence in this case was legal, although it can be argued that the fine was excessive [footnote omitted]. This argument, however, overlooks Section 99-19-32 of the Mississippi Code that allows a fine in felony cases of $10,000 per case where no fine is allowed by the felony sentencing statute. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed arguendo with the proposition that the fine in these cases was excessive and not a sentencing alternative. The small fine in these cases was ancillary to imprisonment, as it was the intention of this Court to send this Petitioner to the penitentiary for the commission of these very serious crimes. This small fine should be treated as surplusage and deleted, and the amount of the fine returned to the Petitioner, [citations omitted]. An excessive sentence can be corrected, and the entire sentence does not have to be discharged. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947). Additionally, even though this Court in the interests of justice will require the fine to be returned to the Petitioner, this Petitioner should have raised this issue that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law pursuant to § 99 — 39—5(l)(d) in the trial court on appeal, but he did not. Since the sentence was not void, or the sentence had not expired, or the prisoner had not been unlawfully held in custody pursuant to § 99 — 39—5(l)(g), he has waived his right to present this issue under the post-conviction act. [citation omitted].
¶ 7. Gulley took offense to some of the language in Judge Backstrom's order and filed with this Court his Motion to Strike Order Dismissing PosNConviction Proceedings. In this motion, Gulley alleged inter alia that Judge Backstrom, in denying Gulley's post-conviction (PCR) motion, had "interjected evidence not of record before that Court" such as (1) Gulley's subsequent guilty pleas to the remaining 28 counts in the indictment, (2) Judge Backstrom's stated "intention" that the punishment should fit the crimes, (3) Gulley's misappropriation of funds in excess of $3,000,000, (4) Judge Backstrom's stated reliance on Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32 to undergird his assessment of the fines, and (5) Judge Backstrom's finding that the fine was "ancillary to imprisonment" and the intention was incarceration of Gulley for a long time.
¶ 8. However, we note that when an inmate files a PCR motion pursuant to statute, the applicable statute places an affirmative duty on the trial judge to review the record of the criminal proceedings under attack via the PCR motion. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11 provides inter alia:
(1) The original motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. (2) If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal and cause the prisoner to be notified.
Thus, it was proper for Judge Backstrom to consider matters not necessarily "in the record," based on the applicable statutes and our case law. See Harveston v. State, 597 So.2d 641, 642-43 (Miss.1992); Turner v. State, 590 So.2d 871, 873-75 (Miss.1991); Hentz v. State, 503 So.2d 262, 264 (Miss.1987). In Turner, we stated inter alia:
Miss Code Ann. § 99-39-11 provides that the trial court judge shall examine not only the motion, but also files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack as well as prior proceedings in the case to determine whether movant is entitled to relief.
590 So.2d at 875 (emphasis in the original). In making his findings, Judge Backstrom properly took judicial notice of his own docket and the prior proceedings had and conducted in both the criminal proceedings forming the basis for the attack via the civil PCR motion, as well as all proceedings had and conducted in the civil matter related to the PCR motion. We find that there was nothing inappropriate in Judge Backstrom's order denying Gulley's PCR motion, and that Judge Backstrom, in considering Gulley's PCR motion, diligently performed his responsibilities placed upon him by statute and case law.
¶ 9. Even considering arguendo that the trial court inappropriately sentenced Gulley under both the felony and misdemean- or provisions of the embezzlement statute, Gulley still is entitled to no relief. In Bass v. State, 328 So.2d 665 (Miss.1976), Bass was convicted of embezzlement, and he was sentenced to serve a term of five years in the state penitentiary. The trial court suspended Bass's sentence and placed him on supervised probation for a term of five years. Id. at 665. As a condition of the suspension, the trial court ordered Bass to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000. Id. This Court found that the trial court "exceeded its statutory authority when it attempted to add a $1,000 fine to the sentence." Id. at 667. This Court determined that there were two alternative sentencing methods under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-25 (Rev.2000), which states:
If any person shall fraudulently appropriate personal property or money which has been delivered to him on deposit, or to be carried or repaired, or on any other contract or trust by which he was bound to deliver or return the thing received or its proceeds, on conviction, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or either.
Id. Because the trial court elected to sentence Bass to a term of imprisonment, "the trial court, under the guise of a condition of the suspension, could not impose the additional sentence of paying a $1,000 fine." Id. Therefore, this Court affirmed the conviction and the suspended sentence of five years' imprisonment but this Court reversed the $1,000 fine. Id.
¶ 10. In Salter v. State, 387 So.2d 81 (Miss.1980), Salter was indicted on ten counts of embezzlement. He pled guilty to two of the pending indictments and received a three-year suspended sentence and was ordered to pay a fine of $10,000. Id. at 82. This Court found that this sentence was in error pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-11-31 which stated:
If any officer, or other person employed in any public office, shall commit any fraud or embezzlement therein, he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or in the county jail not more than one year, or be fined.
Id. at 84. The two methods of sentencing available under this section are alternative methods; therefore, "Salter could be fined in one case and given a penitentiary sentence in the other, but not fined and sentenced in both." Id. This Court held that Salter's sentence would be modified such that he would be sentenced to a three-year suspended sentence for the first count and a $10,000 fine for the second count, so that the plea agreement would be left in full effect. Id.
¶ 11. However, Bass and Salter were decided before Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32 (Rev.2000) was enacted. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32, states in pertinent part that:
(1) Offenses punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for more than one (1) year and for which no fine is provided elsewhere by statute may be punishable by a fine not in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). Such fine, if imposed, may be in addition to imprisonment or any other punishment or penalty authorized by law.
(emphasis added). This statute unequivocally empowers our trial judges with the authority to impose fines when no fine is provided elsewhere in the statute. Section 99-19-32, which is a "catch-all" for statutes which do not provide for a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment, first became effective July 1,1985, and was later amended in 1990. Had the trial judges in Bass and Salter had the benefit of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32, the sentences imposed in those cases would have been within their statutory authority.
¶ 12. In the recent case of Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773 (Miss.2001), Conley was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Conley was also ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. Id. at 805. The statute which provides for the sentencing of a person convicted of capital murder does not contain a provision for a fine. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev. 2000). This Court held that pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32:
The trial judge has acted within these statutory guidelines with his imposition of the penalties in this case. It is within the trial judge's discretion to impose these fines. Absent a showing that this discretion was abused, the fines must be upheld by this Court. See Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Miss.1992). Conley has not shown that the judge abused his discretion.
Conley, 790 So.2d at 805.
¶ 13. Gulley relies on our decision in Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375 (Miss.1986), in an effort to convince us that since he has paid his fine imposed under the misdemeanor portion of the embezzlement statute, he should be released from the penitentiary sentence imposed upon him under the felony portion of the statute. In the direct appeal of Lightsey's burglary conviction, this Court offered certain background information on Light-sey. We stated that Lightsey had pled guilty to embezzlement and was given a suspended sentence of six years and was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000. Id. at 376. Lightsey paid his fine; however, he was subsequently arrested for burglary which was in violation of his probation. Id. After being incarcerated in the state penitentiary and denied a writ of habeas corpus, Lightsey appealed to this Court. Id. at 376-77. This Court held in an unpublished opinion that "the trial court was without statutory authority to sentence Lightsey to the penitentiary and to impose upon him a fine, since Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19 (1972) is written in the disjunctive." Id. at 377. This Court determined that because Lightsey had already paid his fine, he should be released from prison after serving ten months. Id. In our published opinion,' this Court reversed Lightsey's conviction for burglary, finding the trial court erred in instructing the jury pertaining to flight. Id. at 380.
¶ 14. However, we again note that § 99-19-32 did not take effect until July 1, 1985. As in Bass and Salter, Lightsey's conviction of embezzlement occurred before this statute was enacted. Therefore, the trial court did not have the statutory authority to impose both a prison sentence and a fine upon Lightsey. Unlike Bass and Salter, this Court in Lightsey chose to uphold the fine and reverse the imprisonment sentence.
¶ 15. The dissent relies heavily upon the cases of In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943) and United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.1987), for the rule that if a statute is written in the disjunctive, only a fine or imprisonment may be imposed. However, as previously stated, the authority here to impose both a prison sentence and a statutory fine was granted by two separate and distinct statutes, not one statute written in the disjunctive. Therefore, these two cases do not apply to the case sub judice.
¶ 16. Finally, we take note that Judge Backstrom afforded Gulley partial relief under his PCR motion by removing the imposition of the fine from Gulley's sentence and ordering the previously paid fine returned to Gulley — an offer which Gulley refused. However, this action by Judge Backstrom in no way affords Gulley any relief from his penitentiary sentence. In his order dismissing Gulley's PCR proceedings, Judge Backstrom made an unequivocal finding that he had authority under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32 to impose a fine upon Gulley, but further stated that "[njevertheless, the Court will proceed arguendo with the proposition that the fine in these cases was excessive and not a sentencing alternative." Judge Backstrom then stated that "[a]n excessive sentence can be corrected, and the entire sentence does not have to be discharged." In so holding, Judge Backstrom relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947). In that case, Bozza was convicted of five counts of violating the Internal Revenue laws in connection with the operation of a still producing moonshine whiskey. At the sentencing hearing, the federal district court judge sentenced Bozza to a term of imprisonment but failed to impose certain statutorily mandated fines and penalties. After the initial sentencing, Bozza was detained at the U.S. Marshal's office and then at a local jail for a total of approximately five hours, when he was brought back before the sentencing judge, who by then had realized that he had failed to impose the statutorily required assessments. Bozza claimed double jeopardy, asserting that he had been sentenced twice for the same offense. In finding no merit to Bozza's assertions, the Court stated:
If this inadvertent error cannot be corrected in the manner used here by the trial court, no valid and enforceable sentence can be imposed at all (citations omitted). This Court has rejected the 'doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether because the court committed an error in passing the sentence.' (citations omitted). The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner, (citations omitted) . The sentence as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense.
330 U.S. at 166-67, 67 S.Ct. at 649.
¶ 17. Even if Judge Backstrom had erred (which he did not) in imposing a fine when he sentenced Gulley to penitentiary sentences for embezzlement, Judge Back-strom was within his authority to remove the fine via the PCR proceedings. However, for the reasons stated, this "illegal" fine would not vitiate the "legal" portion of the sentence — the penitentiary sentence. However, all of this having been said, Judge Backstrom clearly had statutory authority via § 99-19-32 to impose a fine when he imposed penitentiary sentences under the felony portion of the applicable embezzlement statute which provided no fine when imposing the felony sentence. The then existing statute under which Gulley was sentenced provided for a fine only when being sentenced as a misdemeanant.
¶ 18. In the end, it is clear that the trial judge sentenced Gulley under the felony portion of § 97-23-19. The fine was a condition of his post-release supervision. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32, the trial judge was within his statutory authority to impose such a fine, as one was not provided in the felony portion of § 97-23-19. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Gulley's motion for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
¶ 19. Because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing Gulley under the felony portion of § 97-23-19 and in imposing a fine pursuant to § 99-19-32, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Gulley's post-conviction proceedings.
¶ 20. AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C. J., SMITH AND WALLER, P.JJ., COBB AND EASLEY, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ AND DICKINSON, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Exhibit "A" attached to the sentencing order set out the specific terms and conditions of Gulley's post release supervision. Without reciting here verbatim the post-release terms contained in Exhibit "A," suffice it to state that the terms and provisions for the most part tracked the language of Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-35 (Rev.2000), with a few added conditions which we deem to be routine in post-release supervision and supervised probation sentencing orders.
. Gulley's Motion to Strike Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings was denied by order of this Court dated October 22, 2002.
. See also Miss. R. Evid. 201(b), which provides:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
. Laws, 1985, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 329, § 14, eff. from and after October 1, 1990.