Case Name: G. Rambo v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-10-24
Citations: 96 Tex. Crim. 387
Docket Number: No. 7431
Parties: G. Rambo v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 387–394

Head Matter:
G. Rambo v. The State.
No. 7431.
Decided October 24, 1923.
Rehearing denied January 23, 1924.
1. —Selling Intoxicating Liquor — Indictment.
The proposition that to charge a sale of liquor capable of producing intoxication does not charge a violation of the law is untenable. Following Tucker v. State, 251 S. W. Rep., 1090.
2. —Same—Suspended Sentence — Age of Defendant.
The contention that a person over the age of twenty-five years may obtain the benefit of a suspended sentence when charged with a violation of the liquor law is untenable. Following Davis v. State, 246 S. W. Rep., 395.
3. —Same—Bills of Exception — Rebuttal.
Where it was shown in the record on appeal that the matters so objected to had been inquired about by the defendant in his direct examination of the witnesses, and that the parts so objected to were brought out by the State in rebuttal and in reply to the direct examination there is no reversible error.
4. —Same—Evidence—Intoxicating Liquor.
The objection being that the witness testifying had not qualified as an expert is not a meritorious objection to the testimony of said witness that the liquor was intoxicating.
5. —Same—Charge of Court — Practice in Trial Court.
It was not erroneous to refuse the appellant’s request for a peremptory instruction of not guilty, as the evidence supports a conviction.
6. —Same—Bill of Exceptions — Practice on Appeal.
Where there is nothing in the bill of exceptions which showed the connection of the testimony objected to this Court is unable to appraise the weight of the objection and the mere statements of grounds of objection is not sufficient.
7. —Same—Suspended Sentence — Charge of Court.
Where it was admitted that appellant was over twenty-five years of age there was no error in refusing the charge on the law on suspended sentence in the instant case.
8. —Same—Argument of Counsel.
Where the argument of State’s counsel was not abusive, etc., there is no reversible error, in the absence of a requested charge asking the jury not to consider same. Rainey v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 296, and other cases.
9. - — Same—Rehearing—Bills of Exceptions.
Where many circumstances could arise in a prosecution of the sale of intoxicating liquor which would make pertinent and proper proof of the operation of a still by the accused, and none of the bills of exception certified to facts which would show such testimony to have been inadmissible, there is no reversible error. Following Reub v. State, 93 Texas Crim. Rep., 345, and other cases.
10. —Same—Requested Charges — Practice on Appeal.
Where the alleged requested charge which was refused bore no indorsement of the trial judge, was silent as to when it was presented, did not show whether it was given or refused; if refused, it bore no notation over the judge’s signature; neither did there appear in the record any separate bill of exceptions curing the defects mentioned, and bringing the matter forward for review, there is no reversible error. Following Grace v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 328, and other cases.
11. —Same—Indictment—Verdict—Judgment—Reforming Sentence.
Where the indictment contained four counts and were all submitted to the jury who were directed to find under which count they convicted, and the verdict was for the second and third counts, one for selling and one for furnishing liquor, and the punishment fixed at one year only, there is no fundamental error calling for a reversal, and the judgment is so reformed as to apply the verdict to the second count in the indictment, that is, the sale of the liquor.
12. —Same—Rehearing—Reforming Judgment — Verdict.
In reforming the judgment and directing the application of the verdict in the judgment to the offense set out in the second count of the indictment, this Court does not think its action open to the objection that the Court does set aside a verdict that is certain, and the second application for permission to file said second motion for rehearing is therefore refused.
Appeal from the District Court of Burnet. Tried below before the Honorable J. H. McLean.
Appeal from a conviction of selling intoxicating liquor; penalty, one year imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
F. H. Hammond and J. F. Murray, for appellant.
On questions of bills of exception and requested charges, Grimes v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 542; Harris v. State, 100 S. W. Rep., 920; Monroe v. State, 120 id., 479; Gaines v. State, 138 id., 387.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
From a conviction in the District Court of Burnet County for selling intoxicating liquor, appellant brings this appeal.
The facts are amply sufficient to support the conclusion of the jury and will not be further discussed.
By his first bill of exceptions appellant complains of the overruling of his motion to quash the indictment based on the proposition that to charge a sale of liquor '1 capable of producing intoxication" does not charge a violation of the law. This question has been decided adversely to appellant's contention. Tucker v. State, 94 Texas Crim. Rep., 505, 251 S. W. Rep., 1090.
Complaint is also made because the law forbidding the sale of liquor seeks to prevent a person over the age of twenty-five years from obtaining the benefit of a suspended sentence, when charged with a violation of said law. This contention has been decided against appellant in the case of Davis v. State, 93 Texas Crim. Rep., 192, 246 S. W. Rep., 395.
By his bills of exception Nos. 2, 4 and 8 appellant complains of matters which he insists were wrongfully brought out in testimony. Each of said bills of exception is qualified by the learned trial judge by a statement that the matters so objected to had been inquired about by the appellant in his direct examination of the witnesses and that the parts so objected to were brought out by the State in rebuttal of and in reply to the direct examination made by appellant. Neither of said bills of exception presents any error in view of the qualification mentioned.
Objection to a witness testifying that said liquor is intoxicating, the objection being upon the ground that the witness had not qualified as an expert, does not seem to this court to be a meritorious objection.
It was not erroneous to refuse the appellant's request for a peremptory instruction of not guilty. The testimony, as stated above, seems ample to support the conviction.
By his bill of exceptions No. 7 appellant complains of a certain witness for the State being permitted to testify that he had seen a container before, which was then shown him and that he had repaired the coil in said container some months prior to this trial, and that he had had a conversation with appellant in regard to repairing said coil. There is nothing in the bill which shows the connection of the evidence thus objected to, and we are. unable to appraise the weight of the objection. We can conceive of many conditions which might arise in a case such as this in which this evidence would be very material. We have said in many cases that the mere statement of grounds of objection by the appellant does not amount to proof of the truth of the facts stated in such objection.
Bill of exceptions No. 9 presents appellant's complaint of- the refusal of the learned trial judge to submit to the jury the question of a suspended sentence. It was admitted that appellant was over twenty-five years of age and in such case it is provided by law that the accused shall not be entitled to the benefit of a suspended sentence. Davis v. State, supra.
The argument complained of by appellant contains no abusive language, nor does it evidence the introduction of any statement in the argument regarding the evidence which contained matter not in testimony before the jury. The record is barren of any requested charge asking the jury not to consider such argument. Rainey v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 296; Monroe v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 326.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.