Case Name: W. L. TANENBAUM, Petitioner, v. BISCAYNE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1966-09-28
Citations: 190 So. 2d 777
Docket Number: No. 34384
Parties: W. L. TANENBAUM, Petitioner, v. BISCAYNE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent.
Judges: THORNAL, C. J., and DREW and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 190
Pages: 777–782

Head Matter:
W. L. TANENBAUM, Petitioner, v. BISCAYNE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent.
No. 34384.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 28, 1966.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1966.
F. E. Gotthardt, of Gotthardt, Christie & Shepard and Kenneth L. Ryskamp, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert M. Riddle, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
The facts in this case are simple. W. L. Tanenbaum, the petitioner, is an osteopathic physician specializing in radiography. In September 1961 he removed from Allentown, Pennsylvania, to North Miami Beach where he became osteopathic radiologist at respondent's North Miami Beach hospital. The parties entered into an oral contract providing for his services for a period of five years terminable only after the expiration of that period and even then only upon 90 days written notice by either party. There was evidence that petitioner importuned respondent to execute a written agreement but this was never accomplished.
In April 1962 the respondent notified the petitioner that his services would be discontinued the first of the following July and in the next month petitioner filed his complaint for damages resulting from the respondent's action. Principal defense of the respondent, then defendant, was the Statute of Frauds, the relevant part of which provides, Sec. 725.01, that "[n]o action shall be brought upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement or promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized."
So, as might have been expected, the respondent moved, at the end of plaintiff's case for a directed verdict in its favor. This was denied. The motion was repeated at the close of all testimony and evidence, and ruling upon it was reserved by the court. Then the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $40 thousand. Later the respondent presented a motion for a judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict and the court granted it.
The trial judge found that the Statute of Frauds had been properly pleaded and that the contract was "within" the statute. He observed that the plaintiff, petitioner, had opposed the motion on the ground that the respondent was estopped from resorting to the statute. The judge rejected this view and entered judgment for the defendant, respondent, accordingly.
The controversy then went to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, where the appellant presented the lone question whether or not the Circuit Court had ruled properly that his claim was, as a matter of law, barred by the Statute of Frauds. That Court commented that the sole reason urged for the non-applicability of the Statute was the doctrine of "promissory estop-pel" which the Court said did not appear in any of the Florida decisions. Such being the case the Court was of the opinion that great caution should be exercised "in the consideration of the advisability of ingraft-ing onto the law of this State a provision which may have the effect of nullifying the legislative will of the State as expressed by the inactment [sic] of the Statute of Frauds
The District Court of Appeal referred to three decisions in which the doctrine of promissory estoppel had been recognized, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 15 Alaska 272, 217 F.2d 295; Fibreboard Products, Inc. v. Townsend, 9 Cir., 202 F.2d 180, and Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88, and commented that no decision had been found indicating that the principle of promissory estoppel as related to the Statute of Frauds had been "favorably considered by any Florida court in a law action * We are unable to elaborate on this statement except to say that there have been brought to our attention two cases in which the doctrine had been mentioned, South Investment Corporation, et al. v. Norton, et al., Fla., 57 So.2d 1, and Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., Fla. App., 172 So.2d 239. But in neither was the doctrine of promissory estoppel embraced.
The principle was also recognized in the Restatement of Contracts, § 90:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
The language of the Statute of Frauds we have already quoted is quite clear and its origin and purpose were plainly stated in Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341, as follows:
"The statute of frauds grew out of a purpose to intercept the frequency and success of actions based on nothing more than loose verbal statements or mere innuendos. To accomplish this, the statute requires that all actions based on agreements for longer than one year must depend on a written statement or memorandum, signed by the party to be charged. The statute should be strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to correct, and so long as it can be made to effectuate this purpose, courts should be reluctant to take cases from Us protection." (Italics supplied.)
Doubtless because this is a matter of first impression and therefore involves the introduction into the law of this State a relatively novel concept, the case was sent here on a certificate under Sec. 4(2), Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A. The question that emerges for resolution by us. is whether or not we will adopt by judicial action the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a sort of counteraction to the legislatively created Statute of Frauds. This we decline to do.
We agree with the conclusions of the Circuit Court and District Court of Appeal in rejecting the so-called doctrine of promissory estoppel and especially with the observation of the latter with reference to embracing it in view of the legislative prerogative of dealing with matters of this nature.
The petitioner had but to follow the provisions of the Statute of Frauds to secure his rights under the arrangement with the respondent instead of taking the position, rather tardily that they did not apply to him. Thirty-three years have passed since the Restatement we have quoted was adopted and there have been about 15 intervening sessions of the legislature at which the contents of Sec. 90 of the Restatement could have been incorporated into the act yet we know of no such effort or accomplishment.
Having undertaken to answer the question certified, the writ of certiorari which brought it here is discharged.
THORNAL, C. J., and DREW and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
O'CONNELL, J., dissents and concurs with ERVIN, J.