Case Name: LIVESLEY v. KREBS HOP COMPANY
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-12-13
Citations: 57 Or. 352
Docket Number: 
Parties: LIVESLEY v. KREBS HOP COMPANY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Slater, having been of counsel in the former proceeding, did not participate herein.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 352–377

Head Matter:
On Petition for Restraining Order Pending Appeal, decided Oct. 20, 1908.
On the Merits, argued Feb. 1, decided March 1, 1910.
Rehearing allowed and re-argued Aug. 4,
decided Dec. 13, 1910.
LIVESLEY v. KREBS HOP COMPANY.
[97 Pac. 718: 107 Pac. 460: 112 Pac. 1.]
Appeal and Error* — Supersedeas—Allowance by Court.
1. Under the Constitution of Oregon, Article VII, Section 6, providing' that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction only to reverse the final decisions of the circuit courts, it has no original jurisdiction, and cannot issue any writ in an original proceeding, but, as an incident to its appellate jursdiction, it nas such inherent powers as are necessary to the effectual exercise of such jurisdiction, and for that purpose it may issue a restraining order.
Appeal and Error — Security—Necessity.
2. Section 420, B. & C. Comp., authorizing injunctions pending suits, is applicable to the Supreme Court when it exercises its power to issue a temporary injunction, and it should allow the writ only on the filing of the undertaking provided for by Section 419.
Appeal and Error — Security—Necessity.
3. Pending the determination of an appeal from a decree dissolving a preliminary injunction and dismissing a suit to restrain the enforcement of a judgment, the Supreme Court has power to Issue a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of the judgment, though a temporary injunction cannot be allowed simply for the protection of appellant from damage or hardship.
Sales — Breach by Seller — Damages—Effect of Refusal by Buyer to Perform.
4. Plaintiffs contracted to buy of defendant 100,000 pounds of hops each year for five years, at a certain price, to be paid in installments, the hops to be grown upon a certain farm and delivered not later than October 15th each year. The contract was complied with the first year, after which the farm was sold and plaintiffs in the spring of the next year notified defendant and the purchaser that they would retire from the contract, and thereafter refused to recognize its existence. Defendant brought an action on the contract and secured judgment. Defendant on October 15th of the second year had the hops on hand ready for delivery if demanded but no demand was made, and no offer was made to deliver them. The hops at that time were worth 14 or 15 cents per pound. Part of the hops were sold the following spring at 7 cents per pound, and the balance a year later were worth only 2 or 2% cents per pound. Held, that notwithstanding such judgment, the effect of which was to continue the contract in full force, plaintiffs, having refused to recognize the contract as binding, were not entitled to recover on the basis of the value of the hops on October 15th.
Sales — Breach of Contract by Buyer — Rights and Duties of Seller — Resale of Goods.
5. A seller is not bound to resell the goods for the protection of a buyer who refuses to recognize the binding effect of the contract, and defends a suit for the price, since it is for the seller to decide whether it will sell the goods and retain the proceeds, and await the final outcome of the litigation or hold the same, in readiness for delivery at the termination thereof, and only in case of fraud or of an abuse of discretion can he be held accountable for any greater sum than the goods are actually worth at the time the buyer asserts his right to enforce the contract.
Sales — Breach of Contract by Buyer — Tender by Seller.
6. It Is not incumbent on a seller, in order to avoid responsibility to the buyer for retention of the goods on the buyer’s repudiation of the contract, to tender a delivery thereof on the date specified in the contract.
Sales — Breach by Seller — Measure of Damages.
7. Where the seller wrongfully retains the goods, he is liable to the buyer for the highest market price between the date for delivery and the time of the actual sale thereof.
Costs — On Appeal — Penalty for Delay — Good Faith.
8. Under Section 559, B. & C. Comp., which provides for a 10 per cent penalty for delay caused by an appeal, where it is affirmed and there is no probable cause for taking the appeal, where the legal problems presented were not easy of solution, and were of a class upon which eminent counsel may differ and the suit was manifestly instituted and prosecuted in good faith, it was not within the statute.
Sales — Breach of Contract — Remedies.
9. Where a seller refused to acquiesce in the buyer’s attempt to cancel the contract of sale before any payment was made thereon, and recovered judgment for advance payments overdue, the buyer, refusing to recognize the contract as binding, could not compel an accounting after a resale of the goods by the seller on the theory that he could recover on the basis of the value of the goods on the date fixed for delivery, so that he could not enjoin enforcement of the judgment against him.
Appeal and Error — Equal Division of Court — Effect.
10. Where the Supreme Court is equally divided, the decree of the trial court is affirmed.
From Marion: William Galloway, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Justice Eakin.
This suit was brought in the circuit court of Marion County, by T. A. Livesley and John J. Roberts, co-partners doing business under the firm name and style of T. A. Livesley & Co. against the Krebs Hop Company, a corporation, to enjoin it from enforcing by execution the judgment entered in that court on the 30th day of April, 1908, upon the mandate of the Supreme Court in the case- of Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley for the sum of $4,048, besides interest and costs, and to cancel the judgment. The amount involved in the action and for which the judgment was rendered being advance payments due from these plaintiffs to the defendant on a contract for the purchase of certain hops, the judgment having been obtained prior to the harvesting or delivery of the hops to the plaintiffs, plaintiffs allege in this suit that the defendant did not tender or deliver the hops to them, but has sold and disposed of the hops to other parties, and that defendant is about to, and will, if not restrained, issue an execution on the judgment and enforce it against plaintiffs, and that defendant is insolvent. A preliminary restraining order was issued by the judge of the lower court which was served upon the defendant. Thereafter the suit was put at issue and tried by the court, and findings in favor of the defendant were filed, and on August 10, 1908, a decree was rendered dissolving the injunction and dismissing the suit. The transcript on appeal was filed in this court on September 14, 1908, and on September 16th plaintiffs filed in this court a petition asking for a restraining order to stay the execution pending a hearing on the merits, the motion being supported by an affidavit showing that execution was issued on the judgment August 15, 1908, against the property of the plaintiffs and placed in the hands of the sheriff of Marion County for enforcement, and that the lower court "refused to grant to plaintiffs a stay of execution pending the appeal. On the 16th day of September, 1908, this motion was by the Chief Justice set down for hearing for October 5th, pending which hearing a temporary restraining order was issued.

Opinion:
Decided October 20, 1908.
On Petition for Restraining Order Pending Appeal.
197 Pac. 718.]
Restraining Order Issued.
Messrs. Teal & Minor and Mr. William M. Kaiser for the petition.
Mr. John A. Carson and Mr. Thomas Brown, contra.
Mr. Justice Eakin
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question to be decided is whether the Supreme Court in such a case has jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is defined by the Constitution of Oregon, Article VII, Section 6, viz.:
"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction only to revise the final decisions of the circuit courts."
And it can have no jurisdiction beyond what is granted by the constitution. Therefore it has no original jurisdiction, and cannot issue any writ in an original proceeding, but, as incident to its appellate jurisdiction, it has such inherent powers as are necessary to enable it effectually to exercise such jurisdiction. Elliott, App. Proc. § 20 says:
"It is not to be understood that an express statutory provision is required to confer upon an appellate tribunal authority to exercise an auxiliary authority in aid of its appellate power, although such auxiliary authority may be in its nature original, for all courts of the rank of appellate courts proper have such general powers as are necessary to enable them to effectually exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them."
The grant of appellate jurisdiction, whether made by the constitution or by statute, necessarily vests in such court all powers of an incidental nature required to make the granted jurisdiction effective. Ib. § 22. At section 512 the same author says that appellate tribunals are invested with power to issue injunctions when necessary to enable them fully and effectually to exercise appellate jurisdiction; and this authority is recognized in many of the states under constitutional limitations similar to those of this State. The Wisconsin Constitution (Article VII, Section 3) provides: "The Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only" — and, further, that it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same. In Cooper v. City, 34 Wis. 181, in discussing the power of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of injunction, the court holds that the third clause of that section of the constitution, relating to the issue of writs, has reference only to the exercise of original jurisdiction, namely, to suits commenced in that court, and say that, as incident to the full and proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction in cases brought up by writ of error or appeal, the power to grant the writ or order the stay of proceedings in these cases exists without an express grant. To the same effect is People v. Cook Circuit Court, 169 Ill. 201 (48 N. E. 717) ; Kent v. Mahaffy, 2 Ohio St. 498; Yeoman v. Lasley, 86 Ohio St. 416; Wagner v. Railway Co., 38 Ohio St. 32; Leech v. State, 78 Ind. 570; Jones v. City of Little Rock, 25 Ark. 284; Doughty v. Railroad Co., 7 N. J. Eq. 630 (51 Am. Dec. 267). Mandamus in aid of appellate jurisdiction is recognized by this court in Che Gong v. Stearns, 16 Or. 219 (17 Pac. 871). See, also, Works, Courts & Juris, pp. 98, 171. Therefore we conclude that the appellate court has power, as incidental to its jurisdiction, to issue a restraining order when necessary to aid or protect its appellate jurisdiction.
And in a case in the appellate court, in which a provisional injunction is proper, Section 420, B. & C. Comp., is equally as applicable as in cases in the circuit court. In such cases the writ should be allowed only upon filing the undertaking provided for in Section 419, B. & C. Comp. Elliott, App. Proc. § 513, says:
"The statute makes no provision as to the procedure in obtaining a restraining order or injunction on appeal, but the practice is substantially that prescribed for the trial court."
Mr. Justice JOHNSON in Wagner v. Railway Co., 38 Ohio St. 40, a case similar to this, speaking of the writ, quotes Section 5572 of the Ohio Code, which contains similar provisions to Section 420, B. & C. Comp., and says: "This would authorize a temporary order pend ing the litigation, and is an exercise of the appellate power, which follows the case into whatever court it may be appealed, or taken on error, as part of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by law."
The question then arises: Is this a proper case for the issuance of such a writ? It cannot be allowed simply for the protection of plaintiffs from damage or hardship. That is the province of a court of original jurisdiction. It is said in Doughty v. Railroad Co., 7 N. J. Eq. 629, 636 (51 Am. Dec. 267), that the issuance of such a writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction "is manifestly a very high and delicate exercise of power — one which should by no means be exercised as a matter of course, but only upon the most imminent necessity." This court has jurisdiction to issue this writ only in aid of or to protect its appellate jurisdiction, and for no other purpose. But the threatened enforcement by execution of the judgment, which is the subject of this suit, would operate to satisfy the judgment, and thus nullify any decree this court might render relating thereto, or at least render such a decree difficult of enforcement. As said in Chegary v. Scofield, 5 N. J. Eq. 525, 531: "We can do nothing but review the particular order or decree appealed from, except that, where the Chancellor, by his decree, has loosened a man's hands, we may, by a preliminary order, tie them up again, until we can hear the appeal and determine whether he ought to be let loose or not."
Therefore we are of the opinion that this is a proper case for issuance of the writ to preserve the subject of litigation pending the hearing on the merits; and a restraining order will be allowed, as prayed for in the application, upon plaintiffs filing an undertaking in this court, as provided by Section 418, B. & C. Comp., in the sum of $500. Petition Allowed.
Statement by Mr. Justice King.
This is a suit by T. A. Livesley and John J. Roberts, co-partners as T. A. Livesley & Co., against the Krebs Hop Company, a corporation, for an accounting, and to enjoin the issuance of execution and collection of a judgment, for the sum of $4,000, in a certain action, wherein this defendant was plaintiff and these plaintiffs were defendants. The facts leading up to the controversy are as follows: On August 25, 1904, the parties hereto entered into a contract in writing, wherein Livesley & Co., the plaintiffs, agreed to purchase, and the Krebs Hop Company, defendant, agreed to sell, a certain quantity of hops therein specified. Under this contract (see 51 Or. 527, 528: 92 Pac. 1084) the Krebs Hop Company agreed to sell and deliver to these plaintiffs, f. o. b. cars Independence, Or., or f. o. b. boat Murphy's Landing, not later than the 15th day of October, during each of the years 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908, 100,000 pounds of hops, the hops to be the product of, and grown on, the Krebs Hop Company's Buena Vista farm, sometimes known as the Henderson W. Murphy farm, situated in Polk County. The contract price of the hops was 14 cents per pound, to be paid $2,000 between the 1st and 15th day of April of each year, $2,000 between the 1st and 15th day of May of each year, $6,000 between the 1st and 5th day of September of each year, and $4,000 on delivery and acceptance of the hops by the buyer. No controversy respecting compliance with the contract occurred during the year 1905, but on November 4th of that year the Krebs Hop Company executed a warranty deed, purporting to convey to Ladd & Bush the entire farm upon which the hops were to be grown. The deed was recorded 11 days later, at which time an instrument in writing was executed, assigning to Ladd & Bush all payments to accrue to it under the hop contract. Subsequently Ladd & Bush gave notice to Livesley & Co. that all moneys accruing under the contract must be paid to them, and not to their assignor. After some correspondence Livesley & Co. notified Ladd & Bush and the Krebs Hop Company in writing, to the effect that they would retire from and refuse to be bound by the contract. The Krebs Hop Company, without offering to deliver any hops, on May 19, 1906, brought an action against the plaintiffs on the contract, not for damages, but to recover and secure, and did secure, judgment in the sum of $4,000 for the April and May installments. Livesley & Co. then appealed to this court, resulting in an affirmance of the judgment, and on April 30, 1908, a mandate from this court, affirming the judgment in the court below, was entered. At the time of the commencement of this suit defendant was threatening to issue an execution against plaintiff on this judgment; hence this proceeding.