Case Name: Jean Audrey HASTINGS n/k/a Jean Audrey Shepard, and Lance Hastings n/k/a Lance Shepard, Appellants, v. Lawrence Vaeth HASTINGS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-01-22
Citations: 841 So. 2d 484
Docket Number: No. 3D02-815
Parties: Jean Audrey HASTINGS n/k/a Jean Audrey Shepard, and Lance Hastings n/k/a Lance Shepard, Appellants, v. Lawrence Vaeth HASTINGS, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, LEVY, and FLETCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 841
Pages: 484–487

Head Matter:
Jean Audrey HASTINGS n/k/a Jean Audrey Shepard, and Lance Hastings n/k/a Lance Shepard, Appellants, v. Lawrence Vaeth HASTINGS, Appellee.
No. 3D02-815.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 22, 2003.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 28, 2003.
Delaney Hill, P.A. and Patricia A. Dempsey, for appellants.
Brenda M. Abrams (Boca Raton), for appellee.
Before COPE, LEVY, and FLETCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
In 1953 Jean Audrey Hastings, n/k/a Jean Audrey Shepard [mother] and Lawrence Vaeth Hastings [father] divorced. The father was ordered to pay child support until their son reached the age of 21. In 2001 the father filed a declaratory action, seeking to have determined whether he has an obligation to pay support for his 50-year-old son, who has an autism-related, chronic condition (Asperger's syndrome) for which he began receiving treatment at age 8. The mother and the son counter-petitioned for the establishment of support for the son under Section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes, a savings clause enacted when the disability of nonage was removed for persons 18 years of age and over. Section 743.07(2) reads in pertinent part:
"This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to such person reaching majority ."
By this enactment the legislature did not create a right or a cause of action, but "saved" any common law right or cause of action from extinction by section 743.07(1).
The trial court granted summary judgment for the father, apparently concluding that after the passage of many years it is now too late for the support action to be brought. We disagree.
First, there is no doubt that the son has a common law right of support from his parents. Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla.1952)("Generally, the obligation of a parent to support a child ceases when the child reaches majority, but an exception arises when the child is, from physical or mental deficiencies, unable to support himself."); Fincham v. Levin, 155 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)(Father was obligated to support or contribute to support of unmarried, adult daughter, who lived with divorced mother and, since birth, had been mentally and physically unable to care for or support herself). See also Brown v. Brown, 714 So.2d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). In Brown, the Fifth District Court pointed out that the right to such support from the father belongs to the dependent adult child, not to the mother. "Indeed, the mother, as well as the father, is a potential defendant in the support action." Brown, at 477. Thus a dependent person may bring an independent action to enforce her or his right to support from his or her parents.
In summary, the right to support belongs to the mentally or physically disabled adult child whose disability began prior to her or his majority, and the duty of support lies with both parents, throughout their lives. Thus the issue of support is not totally resolved in divorce actions wherein the mother and father allocate (or have allocated for them) the support payments for their dependent child as such a dependent person can bring an action in accordance with the rule establishing appropriate parties in actions involving legal incompetents. Brown, at 477.
The trial court, in entering summary judgment for the father, relied on cases such as Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) and Baldi v. Baldi 323 So.2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). These decisions state that whether a minor is a dependent person entitled to support payments beyond the time of attaining majority is a question to be determined by the court at the time of the minor's attaining majority. These cases, however, were not meant to apply to situations as the instant one. Cyr and Baldi dealt with the statutory nonage change of section 743.07(1), Florida Statutes and whether child support should be to age 18 or to age 21. They do not affect a dependent person's right to an independent action against her or his father or mother, which action can brought at any time as the parents remain responsible for support throughout the dependency, and throughout their lives.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
COPE, J., concurs.
. The age of majority at that time. See, e.g., Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So.2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
. The mother supported the parties' dependent son by herself from the time the son was 21 until recently when she became unable to continue doing so.
. By Section 743.07(1), Fla. Stat. (effective July 1, 1973).
. Our decision here is limited to those situations in which the dependent person became mentally or physically incapacitated prior to her or his reaching majority.