Case Name: Patrick N. WARREN v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-02-26
Citations: 709 So. 2d 415
Docket Number: No. 92-KA-01312-SCT
Parties: Patrick N. WARREN v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 709
Pages: 415–425

Head Matter:
Patrick N. WARREN v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 92-KA-01312-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 26, 1998.
Rehearing Denied April 23, 1998.
Raymond L. Wong, Cleveland, for Appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., W. Glenn Watts, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for Appellee.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. In this case, we are presented with claims that the appellant was put in double jeopardy, that the trial court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict, that evidence of other crimes and acts was improperly admitted, that a flight instruction was not warranted, and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give jury instructions on the lesser included offense of trespassing and identification. Because we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense and identification instructions, we reverse.
I.
¶ 2. In cause number 7514, a grand jury returned an indictment against the appellant, Patrick N. Warren, charging him with the crime of voyeurism committed on or about February 20, 1992. A jury was selected and the trial commenced. However, during the State's direct examination of the voyeurism victim, Katray James, counsel for Warren objected to the line of questioning. A conference followed in the judge's chambers, where it was discussed and eventually conceded by the State's prosecutor that James' testimony concerning the incident on February 20 did not support the elements set out in the indictment.
¶ 3. In particular, the indictment alleged that Warren unlawfully peeped through a window of James' house with a lewd, licentious and indecent purpose. However, James' testimony about the February 20 inci•dent merely revealed that Warren threatened the lives of James and her children on this particular night, and not that Warren had a lewd, licentious, or indecent purpose for being at her home. As such, the State aborted the trial.
¶4. Subsequently however, Warren was re-indicted in cause number 7611 on two counts of voyeurism. Count I of the indictment alleged that he committed the crime of voyeurism against James on or about February 11, 1992. Count II of the indictment alleged that he committed the same offense against James on or about February 20,1992 (the same incident that had been charged in the aborted trial).
¶ 5. Warren filed a "Plea of Former Jeopardy" in which he argued that subjecting him to any trial for the offense of voyeurism would constitute double jeopardy in light of the previously aborted trial. The trial court agreed in part, ruling that Count II, charging Warren with the February 20 voyeurism offense, constituted double jeopardy. However, the trial court held that the February 11 voyeurism incident was not barred by double jeopardy protections.
¶ 6. At the subsequent trial, James testified that on February 11, 1992, at approximately 11:00 p.m., a man banged on her window and threatened to kill her and her children unless she did as he instructed. According to James, the man instructed her to go into her bedroom, pull back her curtains, take off her clothes, and "get off on [her-jself." James further testified that the man harassed and threatened her and her children for approximately two hours on the night of February 11, 1992. She identified Warren in court as the "peeping tom." Also over defense counsel's objection, James told the jury about other incidents concerning Warren which occurred on February 17 and 20. The trial court ruled that these inci dents were admissible under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) to show identity.
¶ 7. Warren testified in his own defense. He denied ever having gone to James' house and threatening her or ordering her to undress for his licentious purposes. In fact, Warren claimed that during the "peeping tom" incidents he was in McComb, Mississippi visiting his grandmother; however, he offered no corroboration of this claim.
¶ 8. Both sides rested and closed following Warren's testimony. During the jury instruction conference, counsel for Warren requested an instruction on the law of identification and an instruction on the lesser included offense of trespassing. The trial court denied both requests.
¶ 9. Based upon the evidence presented, the jury found Warren guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to the maximum allowed for the crime, five years imprisonment. Warren's attorney filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. The motion was denied. Aggrieved, Warren appeals to this Court.
II.
¶ 10. In his first assignment of error, Warren claims that he was charged in the first and second indictment with the same offense (voyeurism) which has the same elements. He argues that under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), he was subjected to double jeopardy and as such his conviction cannot stand. He also contends that the two-coúnt indictment was improper under Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769 (Miss.1991), as two offenses cannot be alleged in the same indictment unless they are based on the same act or transaction.
¶ 11. The State responds that while Warren was indicted twice for the voyeurism that occurred on February 20, 1992, he was not tried twice, since the first trial was aborted by the State and the February 20 voyeurism charge was stricken from the second trial by the trial court. Thus, the State asserts that since the February 11 voyeurism incident was not alleged in the initial trial, the instant case is not violative of double jeopardy.
11-12. The State's position is well taken. There is no double jeopardy bar to the prosecution and conviction of Warren for the February 11 voyeurism incident in the present case. Initially, there were two separate and distinct offenses charged in a single indictment. The lower court's dismissal of one of those counts on grounds of double jeopardy, however, cured any error that might have arisen from the multi-count indictment. Moreover, because of the lower court's dismissal of the February 20 voyeurism count, this was not a case of "separate and distinct offenses . tried in the same criminal proceeding." Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.
III.
¶ 13. Next, Warren contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict lodged at the close of the State's case-in-chief. The State argues that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's denial of Warren's directed verdict motion.
¶ 14. "It is elemental that after a motion for directed verdict is overruled at the conclusion of the State's evidence and the appellant proceeds to introduce evidence in his own behalf, the point is waived. In order to preserve it, the appellant must renew his motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence." Wright v. State, 540 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss.1989) (quoting Harris v. State, 413 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Miss.1982)); State v. Russell, 358 So.2d 409, 413 (Miss.1978).
¶ 15. Here, Warren moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's casein-chief. He then presented evidence in his own behalf, but did not renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Thus, he waived this assignment of error, and it is therefore not properly before this Court. Notwithstanding the bar, however, we conclude that the evidence and the reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court correctly denied Warren's motion for directed verdict. See White v. State, 566 So.2d 1256, 1259 (Miss.1990).
IV.
¶ 16. Warren further assérts that the trial court erred in allowing James to testify that he watched her house from a nearby baseball field on February 17 and threatened her and her children while peeping into her home on February 20. The trial court, over the objection of defense counsel, allowed this testimony for purposes of identity. Nevertheless, Warren argues that because James testified that she identified him from the February 11 incident, the other incidents were unnecessary and served only to unfairly prejudice him when they were admitted into evidence. The State responds that these incidents were properly admitted into evidence under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) to show Warren's identity, motive, and plan.
¶ 17. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character and that the person acted in conformity with that character. Such evidence is admissible, however, to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Miss. R. Evid. 404(b); Hewlett v. State, 607 So.2d 1097, 1103 (Miss.1992); Parks v. State, 522 So.2d 755, 756 (Miss.1988).
¶ 18. After a thorough review of the record, we find that James' testimony regarding her identification of Warren based upon the February 11 voyeurism offense was anything but conclusive. To the contrary, her testimony concerning when she saw Warren's face is confusing and contains several discrepancies. Clearly it was important that the February 11 identification be corroborated and bolstered by evidence of other experiences with the accused.
¶ 19. Thus, we conclude that it was not error for the trial court to allow James to also testify about the incidents that occurred on February 17 and February 20 to corroborate her identification of Warren as the "peeping tom." See Henry v. State, 209 So.2d 614, 617 (Miss.1968) (introduction of corroborating testimony where the collateral evidence is on a crucial issue in the trial of the case is permissible). Moreover, the plain wording of Rule 404(b) indicates that other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted in evidence to show several things, including identity.
120. Additionally, James testified that on February 20 Warren said to her, "I'm back," suggesting that he had previously been to her house (inferentially on February 11). Thus, the admission into evidence of the February 20 incident served an independently probative and permissible basis, i.e., it provided substantiating evidence that Warren had in fact been at James' house at a time prior to February 20, from which the jury could infer that the previous time was February 11 as asserted by the victim. This assignment of error has no merit.
V.
¶ 21. In Pannell v. State, 455 So.2d 785, 788 (Miss.1984), this Court concluded that a flight instruction should only be given in cases where the defendant's flight (1) is unexplained and (2) where the circumstance of that flight has considerable probative value. See also Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 56-57 (Miss.1985) (instruction that flight may be considered as a circumstance of guilt or guilty knowledge is appropriate where the flight is unexplained and somehow probative of guilt or guilty knowledge). From Pannell, a two-prong test has evolved which looks at whether the flight was explained, and if not, whether the flight has probative value. Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 279-80 (Miss.1987). If it is unexplained and probative of guilt, then a trial court commits no error in granting a requested flight instruction.
¶ 22. Here, Officer Little testified that on February 20, 1992, he responded to James' call to the police department in which she described what the "peeping tom" was wearing: a beige or tan-colored coat with a hood. When he pulled up to James' house, Officer Little saw Warren, who was wearing a beige coat with a hood attached to it. Little, who knew Warren prior to this confrontation, asked him if he would return to James' house for questioning regarding the "peeping tom" complaint. Warren declined the request by-fleeing. Moreover, during his testimony, Warren claimed that he was not even at James' house during the "peeping tom" incidents. He also stated that Officer Little did not know him and vice versa and that Officer Little did not see him or talk to him on February 20.
¶ 23. It follows that Warren did not explain or even acknowledge his fleeing from Officer Little on February 20. Thus, the first prong of the Pannell test is satisfied. The record is sufficient to meet the second prong of the Pannell test as well. In this case, the circumstance of Warren's flight from the officer certainly had considerable probative value regarding the primary issue of guilt of the crime alleged. Warren's unexplained flight, along with the other record evidence, tends to show a conscious sense of guilt when confronted by Officer Little and a desire to avoid punishment. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the flight instruction.
VI.
¶24. Warren next contends that the trial court erred in not granting his request for a lesser included instruction on the crime of trespass. The State argues that there was no basis in the record for Warren to have claimed that he was merely guilty of trespassing in light of Warren's claim that he was not even on the victim's property.
¶ 25. Contrary to the State's position, we conclude that it was reversible error to reject Warren's request for a lesser included instruction on trespassing. Our law is that the burden of proof is upon the State to prove each element of the crime. See e.g., Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 843 (Miss.1991). If it fails in so doing, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal on the offense charged even if the elements proven constitute guilt of a lesser offense. Toliver v. State, 600 So.2d 186 (Miss.1992). A jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve witnesses in whole or in part. Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1293 (Miss.1995). Moreover, in Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871 (Miss.1994), we restated the well-established rule governing the granting of lesser included offense instructions:
Only if this Court can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, and considering that the jury may not be required to believe any evidence offered by the State, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could convict . the defendant of [the lesser included offense], can it be said that the refusal of the lesser-included offense instruction was proper.
Id. at 877 (quoting Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss.1985)); Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Miss.1985).
¶ 26. Accordingly, Warren is guilty of voyeurism only if the jury believed all of what James had to say including her testimony suggesting Warren's lewd purpose for being on her property and looking through her window. Likewise, he is guilty only of trespassing if the jury decided to believe everything that James stated except that portion of her testimony suggesting Warren's lewd purpose. Thus, contrary to the State's contention, there was evidence to support the lesser included instruction on trespassing, and the instruction should have been given. The denial of the requested instruction constituted reversible error.
VII.
¶27. Warren also assigns as error the denial of instructions speaking to identification evidence. At trial, he offered instructions that directed jurors to consider factors impacting upon the accuracy of an identification. The State responds that the requested instructions were not necessary and improper because they were repetitive and constituted a comment upon the weight of the evidence.
¶28. In Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277, 280 (Miss.1990), we approved the very identification instruction proffered by Warren. We did not reverse in that case because we found that a sufficient portion of the instruction was given, rendering the erroneous striking of the remainder of the instruc tion harmless under the circumstances. In the instant case, however, none of the identification instruction was given. This failure to instruct the jury on the law of identification was error as this case turned on the identification of Warren by a single person. Therefore, the lower court's refusal to grant the instruction on identification was reversible error.
¶ 29. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings.
¶ 30. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J.
McRAE, J., joins this opinion in part.
McRAE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion.
WALLER, J., not participating.
. According to James, on February 17 Warren watched her home from a nearby baseball field for an extended period of time. She reported this incident to the police. Also, on February 20 Warren came to James' house, banged on her window, threatened and harassed her and her children for a very long time before she and her sons were able to escape to her neighbor's home, where she called the police. Based upon James' description of the "peeping tom," the responding officer, Reneal Little, stopped Warren — who had on a coat matching the description and who was leaving the vicinity of James' house — and asked him to return to James' house for questioning. Warren fled.