Case Name: In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, Judge of County Court, Branch No. 1, Jefferson County, Wisconsin
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1975-11-25
Citations: 70 Wis. 2d 508
Docket Number: No. 75-154
Parties: In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, Judge of County Court, Branch No. 1, Jefferson County, Wisconsin.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 70
Pages: 508–544

Head Matter:
In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, Judge of County Court, Branch No. 1, Jefferson County, Wisconsin.
No. 75-154.
Argued September 2, 1975.
Decided November 25, 1975.
(Also reported in 235 N. W. 2d 409, 238 N. W. 2d 63 and 239 N. W. 2d 297.)
Briefs were filed in support of the Hon. Charles E. Kading by Richard L. Cates, John H. Bowers, Michael S. Weiden and Lawton & Cates, all of Madison, with oral argument by Richard L. Cates.
Briefs were filed in support of the validity of Rule 17 of the Code of Judicial Ethics by Bronson C. La Follette, attorney general, and Betty R. Brown, solicitor general, with oral argument by Ms. Brown.
Motion for rehearing denied, without costs, oh February 3, 1976. Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen dissents.

Opinion:
Wilkie, C. J.
The matter before us concerns the validity of Rule 17 of the Judicial Code of Ethics which this court adopted on June 28, 1974, and which requires an annual financial report listing assets and liabilities of each state judge, owned by the judge, by his spouse, or by his legal dependents. Judge Kading filed his financial report (for assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1974) on March 5th, in advance of the March 15, 1975, deadline. All items were completed, with the exception of Item 10, which called for disclosure of assets. At Item 10 Judge Kading wrote the following words:
"Sorry. I decline to furnish this information at this time. At such time as any case is assigned to me in which I might conceivably be prejudiced because of any asset owned by myself, wife, or any relative, dependent or otherwise, the situation will be fully disclosed to the Administrator of Courts."
On March 25, 1975, the supreme court directed the Judicial Commission to investigate Judge Kading's failure to comply with Rule 17 and to take action on any violation it might find.
Commission Chairman Francis J. Wilcox informed Judge Kading by letter of April 24, 1975, that the report as returned constituted a violation of Rule 17. Chairman Wilcox also stated that the commission proposed to report this violation to the supreme court and to recommend appropriate discipline, but that before this was done, Judge Kading would be granted a hearing if he desired. On May 9, 1975, Judge Kading replied by letter to the executive secretary of the commission that the reason he had failed to comply was that the asset-disclosure requirement was, in his opinion, unconstitutional on a number of specific grounds. Judge Kading also rejected the opportunity for a hearing.
On June 11, 1975, the Judicial Commission made its formal determination in this matter. It found that Judge Kading had not filed a complete financial report, and concluded that this was a violation of Rule 17. The commission recommended that the supreme court take whatever appropriate action would insure Judge Kad-ing's compliance with Rule 17. The supreme court, on June 16, 1975, ordered Judge Kading to comply with Rule 17 on or before June 27, 1975, or show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the supreme court and why other appropriate action should not be taken by the court. By letter, dated June 19, 1975, Judge Kading answered that he still refused to comply because, in his view, Rule 17 was unconstitutional. On June 24, 1975, the supreme court ordered that a supreme court hearing be held on September 2, 1975, on the question of the constitutionality of Rule 17, and on the question of which sanctions were appropriate for violation of Rule 17.
The following issues are raised in this original proceeding :
1. Did this court have the power to adopt and enforce the Code of Judicial Ethics in 1967, and the 1974 amendment, Rule 17?
2. Is Rule 17, which provides for mandatory disclosure of assets, an unconstitutionally overbroad intrusion into the private economic affairs of judges?
3. Is Rule 17 invalid as a legislative act?
4. Does Rule 17 establish a prohibited additional qualification for office?
5. Is Rule 17 a fundamentally unfair deprivation of due process?
We hold that the court had authority to adopt the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 17 of that code; that Rule 17 is valid in all respects as against all of the challenges made by Judge Kading; that this court has the authority to enforce Rule 17. We order Judge Kading to comply with the provisions of Rule 17 and reserve jurisdiction on this entire proceeding, pending that compliance.
Authority to adopt and enforce code.
The Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted on November 14, 1967, after (1) nearly two years of careful study by a special committee created by this court to study the question of whether this court should adopt such a code and to recommend provisions of the code; (2) unanimous recommendation by the study committee consisting of six trial judges and three attorneys both that this court has authority to adopt a code of ethics and proposing a detailed Code of Judicial Ethics; and (3) over one year of study of these reports by this court with a public hearing on September 12, 1967. In a unanimous order entered by the court, in which the code was promulgated, we declared:
"We hold this court has an inherent and an implied power as the supreme court, in the interest of the administration of justice, to formulate and establish the Code of Judicial Ethics accompanying this opinion. It governs judicial acts of a judge in his official capacity and certain personal conduct which interferes or appears to interfere with the proper performance of his judicial conduct. This power, inherent in the supremacy of the court and implied from its expressed constitutional grants of supervisory power, embraces all members of the judiciary including members of this court not only because they are lawyers but also because they are judicial officers in a court system constituting the judicial branch of the state government with a solemn duty to perform their judicial duties well."
Effective January 1, 1972, a Judicial Commission was created by the court to enforce the code. Certain rules of procedure for the commission also became effective on that date. More detailed rules of procedure for the commission were later adopted by this court, effective January 1, 1973. The code was amended by order of this court on June 28, 1974, in order to add Rule 17.
Judge Kading challenges this court's authority to adopt the original 1967 Code of Judicial Ethics and the additional provisions of Rule 17. We reject this attack on the fundamental authority of this court. Both the adoption of the code and the later adoption of Rule 17 are actions of this court performed under its inherent power to function as the supreme court and also performed in carrying out the function of superintending control as expressly set forth in art. VII, sec. 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution, as follows:
"The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state; but in no case removed to the supreme court shall a trial by jury be allowed. The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same."
Inherent judicial power has been explained by this court in the following terms:
". . . when the people by means of the constitution established courts, they became endowed with all judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial functions delegated to them. . . . But the constitution makes no attempt to catalogue the powers granted. . . . These powers are known as incidental, implied, or inherent powers, all of which terms are used to describe those powers which must necessarily be used by the various departments of government in order that they may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon them by the people."
In another case this court amplified its description of this inherent judicial power as follows:
". . . The constitution does not speak of the powers of courts. It does speak of their jurisdiction, but not of their powers. In the same manner the constitution speaks of trial by jury, but it does not attempt to define the term 'jury.' It is settled that the trial by jury contem plated by the constitution was the trial by jury known to the common law. Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 220 N. W. 197. So when the term 'court' is used in the constitution it is plain that the framers had in mind that governmental institution known to the common law possessing powers characterizing it as a court and distinguishing it from all other institutions. This power has been referred to by all legal scholars and writers as the inherent power of courts. . No one entertains the thought, whether it be called inherent or implied, that it is a power which transcends the constitution. It is a power which may be taken away by the constitution, just as all courts may be abolished by the constitution. No mere creature of the people can rise above the people in importance, dignity, or power. The statement in the opinion that it was a power that existed independent of the constitution merely meant that it was a power which inhered in the courts established by the constitution and existed by reason of their creation, independent of any affirmative power expressly conferred by the constitution."
The function of the judiciary is the administration of justice, and this court, as the supreme court within a statewide system of courts, has an inherent power to adopt those statewide measures which are absolutely essential to the due administration of justice in the state.
The Code of Judicial Ethics is one such measure. One of its purposes is to eliminate the possibility that conflicts of interest will interfere with the fair and impartial administration of justice. The code primarily regulates judicial acts of a judge in his official capacity, and no one can claim that such official acts do not relate to the due administration of justice in the state. The code also contains binding rules which regulate certain personal conduct of Wisconsin judges. The reason for this is that certain personal conduct, such as investment in enterprises involved in litigation, is likely to interfere (or have the appearance of interfering) with the proper performance of the judge's official duties. As such, it directly affects the due administration of justice, and so is a proper subject for the exercise of this court's inherent power.
Judge Kading argues that this court's inherent power is limited to regulation of attorneys and to the procurement of that which is physically necessary to the operation of its courtroom. The fundamental misconception of this argument is that it would limit the exercise of inherent power by this court to whatever has been done in the past. The inherent power of this court is shaped, not by prior usage, but by the continuing necessity that this court carry out its function as a supreme court. Even the passage which Judge Kading cites from In re Cannon to support his restrictive interpretation refers to regulation of attorneys as only "a constituent element" and "a part of the inherent power of the court" (emphasis supplied).
In addition to the inherent power of this court, we find an additional source of authority for this court's promulgation of the Judicial Code and of Rule 17 in the power which is reasonably implied from this court's express constitutional authority to exercise " 'a general superintending control over all inferior courts.' " This power of superintending control is "unlimited in extent . . . undefined in character . . . [and] unsupplied with means and instrumentalities." That this is "a clear, unequivocal grant of power" has been recognized from the earliest days of Wisconsin law. Mr. Justice Roujet Marshall, after a painstaking survey of this power concluded in 1908 that it is "not limited other than by the necessities of justice" and that it necessarily includes "all . . . means applicable thereto and all power necessary to make such . . . means fully adaptable for the purpose." The superintending power is as broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the courts of this state.
Judge Kading argues that, since the superintending power has been used in the past only to control courts in matters between parties to a litigation, it cannot be extended to other situations. This misconceives the nature of the superintending power. If this power were strictly limited to the situations in which it was previously applied, it would cease to be superintending, since this word definitely contemplates ongoing, continuing supervision in response to changing needs and circumstances. The power of superintending control should not be ossified by an unduly restrictive interpretation of its extent.
Judge Kading relies upon Petition of Heil for his interpretation of the superintending power:
". . . it is a well-established rule that superintending control will be exercised only at the behest of a party to a proceeding in an inferior court .
". . . the purpose of this jurisdiction is the protection of a person in his rights as litigant."
Yet adoption of the code fits within this purpose. The rights of all litigants are protected by the code, since it insures integrity and impartiality in the judiciary. If the superintending power can be used to protect particular parties to a particular litigation, then surely it can be used to protect the rights of litigants in general. Indeed, the constitutional grant of this power is made in general terms. It cannot be said that exercise of this power necessarily depends upon a specific petition from a specific litigant.
Judge Kading also relies upon State ex rel. Department of Agriculture v. Aarons:
. . The superintending power is over the courts and not over the person who happens to be judge of the court acting in an administrative capacity."
But this case, involving denial of a petition to appoint appraisers, provides no support for Judge Kading's argument. As the court in Aarons said, a "judge of [a] court acting in an administrative capacity" might as well not be a judge. He could just as well have been a city mayor or chairman of a county board. The point was that he was not in any way acting judicially, and thus was beyond the reach of the superintending power. Yet enforcement of the code aims at insuring that, when a judge acts judicially, he acts impartially and ethically. Certain rules relate to aspects of a judge's personal life, but only insofar as they might affect his judicial performance.
The final case cited by Judge Kading is Seiler v. State:
". . . the power of superintending control . . . has to do only with controlling inferior courts . . . ."
Again, the argument is that the words "inferior courts" cannot include any personal conduct of a judge. However, when a judge acts non judicially but in a way that might influence judicial performance, he directly affects the administration of justice in "inferior courts." As such he is within the scope of the superintending power.
Judge Kading also argues that the adoption of a code of ethics for judges is a matter for the legislature alone to enact. In addition to our determination here that (1) this court has the inherent authority to adopt such a code as the supreme court performing its duties under our Wisconsin system of government, and (2) this court has the authority to adopt the code under its constitutional authority of superintending control over inferior courts, it must be noted that the legislature itself in recent years has specifically chosen not to adopt a code of ethics for judges. Thus in the 1973 legislative session, in enacting as part of the 1973 budget law (ch. 90) a code of ethics for state officials, the legislature specifically exempted the judiciary.
Judge Kading argues that the constitutional means of removal are exclusive in the sense that no other sanctions short of removal by the prescribed means can be imposed upon a sitting judge. For this proposition he relies upon the following dicta:
"The constitution having prescribed the particular method by which a . . . judge may be removed . . . the rule of construction expressio unms est exelusio al-terius is peculiarly applicable to this situation."
"It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that where . . . methods of removal are provided by the constitution, the constitution in those respects is exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the legislature . . . to provide for removal in other than the constitutional method."
These statements mean only that, when a judge is removed, he must be removed by the constitutional method. They do not say that sanctions short of removal are con stitutionally defective. Also, in those jurisdictions where censure, contempt, and suspension have been employed as sanctions by the judiciary, there was a constitutional provision vesting in the legislature the power to remove judges. In spite of this, other supreme courts have held that they could impose these other sanctions short of outright removal. In each case, the supreme court involved based its decision upon its responsibility as a constitutionally charged superintendent and upon the proposition that it was unsound jurisprudence to refuse to exercise judicial power where there was an established need for it and no explicit constitutional barrier to its exercise.
As to Rule 17, Judge Kading's attack goes not only to the basic lack of authority in this court to adopt a judicial code, including Rule 17, but also includes the assertion that by requiring public disclosure of his personal assets, Rule 17 invades matters of such a private nature that it is beyond "the ambit of the power of this court to promulgate."
However, this argument ignores the recent erosion of confidence in and respect for public officials which has been so detrimental to our system of government. No one can deny that there has been a growing skepticism in regard to the integrity and impartiality of public officials at all levels. The legislature of this state has attempted to reverse this trend by enacting a Code of Ethics for Public Officials which includes a financial disclosure requirement. As noted, the judiciary is specifically exempted from the coverage of this statutory code, in a manner consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. This legislative action follows this court's promulgation in 1967 of the comprehensive Code of Judicial Ethics. It should be noted that this code goes well beyond the legislatively prescribed Code of Ethics for Public Officials in general by requiring that a judge "shall not participate in any matter in which he has a significant financial interest."
Rule 17 is a reasonable additional regulation promulgated by this court as a response to the compelling need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. This need is not merely a passing whim of a citizenry temporarily disillusioned by recent national events. It is a continuing necessity, as this court has recognized:
". . . A prejudiced judge is abhorrent to settled notions of justice, and nothing tends to bring courts or the administration of justice into disrespect more than the spectacle of a prejudiced judge sitting in judgment upon the rights of litigants. A lack of confidence in the integrity of courts rocks the very foundations of organized society, promotes unrest and dissatisfaction, and even encourages revolution."
Since such public confidence is absolutely crucial to the due administration of justice, the adoption of Rule 17 was well within the scope of this court's inherent and supervisory powers.
We therefore conclude that the adoption and enforcement by . this court of a strong code of ethics in 1967, with the sound financial disclosure rule of 1974, is an appropriate action taken by the judiciary to keep its own house in order so as to better assure the effective, fair and impartial administration of justice in our Wisconsin state courts.
Overbroad invasion of privacy.
Judge Kading argues that Rule 17 is an unconstitutionally overbroad intrusion into his private economic affairs. The threshold question on this inquiry must be whether Judge Kading, an elected public official, has a fundamental constitutional right to economic privacy, because it is only the existence of a fundamental right which triggers the further requirement that the enactment not sweep too broadly into this area of fundamental freedom.
A fundamental freedom from intrusion by government into one's personal privacy has been found to lie in the penumbra of various federal constitutional provisions. Among these provisions are freedom of association under the first amendment, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment, the right against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment, the retained rights of the people under the ninth amendment, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the court held that the right to marital privacy warranted overturning a state law forbidding sale of contraceptives to married persons. In Roe v. Wade the court, in declaring the Texas abortion statute unconstitutional, held that the right to privacy included a qualified right to terminate pregnancy. These decisions are limited in carving out the area of privacy. They indicate only that intimate personal and familial matters, having to do with procreation, are within the protected zone of privacy. Protection of the ownership of property is quite another matter. Neither Griswold, nor Wade, nor any other supreme court case, holds that the right to privacy extends to freedom from disclosure of one's assets and liabilities.
One additional factor is most important in this case. It is the fact that Judge Kading is not solely a private citizen. Judge Kading is by voluntary choice a public official. While public officials, of course, do not waive their constitutional rights, they are nevertheless set apart from other members of society in terms of certain rights, as the law on libel makes clear. One who willingly puts himself forward into the public arena, and accepts publicly conferred benefits after election to public office, is legitimately much more subject to reasonable scrutiny and exposure than a purely private individual.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is extremely doubtful that a public official has a fundamental constitutional right to economic privacy.
Even if one assumes that such a fundamental right exists, Rule 17 can still meet the stricter constitutional test applied to laws that impinge upon fundamental rights. This test, as enunciated in various supreme court cases, is that the law must arise out of a compelling governmental purpose, which cannot be achieved by any means less restrictive of constitutional freedoms.
There are compelling public interests behind the adoption of Rule 17. The first is to assure the impartiality and honesty of the state judiciary. The second is to instill confidence in the public in the integrity and neutrality of their judges. The third is to inform the public of economic interests of judges which might present a conflict of interest. Taken together, these paramount public interests are enough to subordinate the assumed right of a public official to be free from compulsory economic disclosure.
Yet compelling public interests are not enough to validate Rule 17, if the means chosen are not sufficiently narrow. The means chosen must not merely bear a rational relation to the legitimate end; they must be clearly necessary to the attainment of that end. Any over-breadth which sweeps unnecessarily into the area of protected freedoms is fatal to the validity of such a law.
Judge Kading argues that Rule 17 is overbroad in that it requires him to disclose all of his assets, and not just those which might be relevant to the performance of his official duties. The problem which this position presents is that it would be impossible to devise an objective scheme of relevant and nonrelevant judicial assets. The only practical way that such a limitation could be writ ten into Rule 17 would be for each judge to make a personal determination as to whether a particular asset is relevant to a particular case. But how would any interested litigant know whether a judge owned a particular asset that was relevant to a specific case? The disclosure pursuant to Rule 17 is an entirely reasonable regulation to insure the achievement of the basic aims of Rule 17.
Judge Kading also argues that Rule 17 is overbroad in that it requires him to disclose the assets of his spouse and legal dependents. Of course, without this provision, a judge could transfer record title of questionable assets to his spouse or dependents and escape exposure under Rule 17. Also, a judge would be just as likely to lose his impartiality if his spouse or children owned assets which would be materially affected by the outcome of a case, as he would if he himself owned those assets. It is entirely necessary to achieve the purposes of Rule 17 that reports include the assets of spouse and dependents.
Finally, in regard to overbreadth, it should be noted that Rule 17 does contain limiting provisions designed to eliminate disclosure of those financial details not necessary to the achievement of the purposes of Rule 17. Household and personal effects, automobiles, and recreational equipment need not be listed. Assets of less than $100 value are exempted. Most importantly, neither the dollar value nor the quantity of the assets need be disclosed.
While this is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction, other states have decided similar cases. In the 1970 case of City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, the California Supreme Court found that state's first attempt at a financial disclosure law to be an overbroad intrusion into the privacy of public officials. Over a vigorous dis sent, the court found that "the protection of one's personal financial affairs and those of his (or her) spouse and children against compulsory public disclosure is an aspect of the zone of privacy." Given this fundamental right, the court held unconstitutional a full disclosure law which did not distinguish between relevant and non-relevant assets. However, the California law included all state and local officials, in whatever capacity they served, and whatever their responsibility. The court specifically stated that a full disclosure law aimed solely at legislators or others in sensitive positions might meet with its approval.
Cases in other jurisdictions have rejected the rationale of City of Carmel-By-The-Sea. In two cases the Illinois Supreme Court questioned the notion of a zone of economic privacy for public officials, and held that, whatever the status of economic privacy, the government had a compelling interest in the disclosure laws at issue and that they were narrowly enough drawn to escape constitutional infirmity. In 1972, in Stein v. Rowlett, the court upheld the Governmental Ethics Act, which required full disclosure of assets by most Illinois public officials. In 1974, in Illinois State Employees Asso. v. Walker, the court found constitutional a full financial disclosure requirement imposed by order of the governor upon officials of the executive branch. Like Rule 17, the order in question required full disclosure of the assets of one's spouse and members of one's family living at home. In 1974, in Fritz v. Gorton, the Washington Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to that state's full financial disclosure law for public officials. In addition to full disclosure, this law mandated disclosure of the assets of the official's immediate family.
In Stein, Walker, and Fritz those who challenged full financial disclosure claimed that such a requirement was unconstitutionally overbroad. The argument regarding overbreadth was in those cases the same as the over-breadth argument made here by Judge Kading. In all three cases this argument was rejected. Judge Kading seeks to distinguish Stein, Walker, and Fritz on the ground that the financial disclosure laws there in question were passed, respectively, by a legislative enactment pursuant to constitutional authorization, an executive order, and a popular initiative. However, the nature of the state institution or source of state power is irrelevant to the question of overbreadth. If the law sweeps too broadly and impinges upon a fundamental right, then it is unconstitutional, no matter how it was passed. Thus the fact that Rule 17 was adopted by order of this court makes it no more susceptible to a claim of overbreadth than the enactments at issue in Stein, Walker, and Fritz.
Finally, both Stein and Fritz were appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the appeals later dismissed, in unanimous decisions, for want of a substantial federal question. Such a dismissal is a decision on the merits. Thus, it must be concluded that the weight of authority is against the proposition that full financial disclosure laws for public officials are unconstitutionally overbroad.
Legislative act.
Judge Kading asserts that it was improper for this court to adopt Rule 17 because that rule is a legislative act. This is merely a conclusory assertion which obscures the real question, which is whether this court has the authority to promulgate the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 17. We have answered this question in the affirmative. Moreover, as we have also noted, the legislature apparently did not agree that detailed regulation of judicial ethics was proper legislative action since it specifically exempted the judiciary from the Code of Ethics for Public Officials.
Judge Kading's reliance on Lathrop v. Donohue to support his argument is completely misplaced. That case held only that an order of this court creating an integrated bar "had the characteristics of legislation" and was thus reviewable by the United States Supreme Court under a federal statute authorizing review where, inter alia, "the validity of a [state] statute" was drawn into question. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in that case upheld the validity of this court's order, in spite of the fact that it had the characteristics of legislation.
Additional qualifications for office.
Judge Kading also argues that Rule 17 prescribes a prohibited additional qualification for holding office. On this point he relies upon State ex rel. Kleist v. Donald for this proposition. But this case holds only that the legislature, in amending a law providing for an additional circuit, could not shorten the term of an incumbent, because this had "the effect to remove a judge from office," which is forbidden by art. VII, sec. 6 of the constitution. Kleist sets forth no rule regarding additional qualifications for office.
There are dicta in other cases to the effect that, where the qualifications for an office are set forth in the constitution, no additional conditions may be attached except by constitutional amendment. Yet, as to the judiciary, only qualifications for the supreme court justices and circuit court judges are established in the constitution. Judge Kading is a county judge. The fact that he is also a probate judge, as described by art. VII, sec. 14, of the constitution, does not give him standing to assert this supposed rule, since this section prescribes no qualifications for office.
Even if Judge Kading were a circuit court judge, these statements in prior cases do not constitute a hard- and-fast rule that would invalidate Rule 17. They are dicta only. Moreover, Rule 17 is more accurately viewed as a condition which is ancillary to, and not in addition to, conditions set forth in the constitution for circuit court judges (no other compensation, no other public office). The purpose of these conditions is to avoid undue influence and conflict of interest, which is precisely the aim of Rule 17.
Fundamental unfairness.
Judge Kading cites Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann to support his contention that ap plication of Rule 17 to sitting judges, without a period of adjustment, is fundamentally unfair and violative of due process. Both Roth and Perry do establish a broader definition of "liberty" and "property" as those terms are used in the fourteenth amendment. But, even if one makes the very large assumption that Rule 17 deprives Judge Kading of "liberty" or "property," the only teaching of Roth and Perry is that the person thus deprived is entitled to a prior hearing before he is deprived. That is, Roth and Perry are cases involving procedural due process, and not substantive due process, as Judge Kad-ing apparently contends. In this case, the requirements of procedural due process were adhered to. Before Rule 17 was generally adopted, notice was given, and a public hearing was held in the supreme court. Before any consideration was given to depriving Judge Kading of anything, he was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, both before the Judicial Commission and before this court. Roth and Perry are inapposite to the facts of this case.
We conclude, therefore, that Rule 17 is valid in all respects as against the challenges made by Judge Kading and that he is obliged to comply with the provisions of Rule 17.
Because Judge Kading has apparently refused to comply with the provisions of Rule 17 because of his assertion that the rule is unconstitutional, and we have now sustained the rule, Judge Kading should be given a reasonable time to comply with the rule. Accordingly, the court will retain jurisdiction of these proceedings pending compliance or noncompliance. In filing his report as required by Rule 17, the disclosure of the assets and liabilities of his spouse is to be made to the extent that he possesses information on those items, if any.
By the Court. — Rule 17 is valid; compliance with the provisions of Rule 17 is ordered, compliance to be on or before twenty days of this order; jurisdiction of these proceedings reserved pending further order of the court.
Code of Judicial Ethics (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 252, 153 N. W. 2d 873, 155 N. W. 2d 565.
Id.
Id. at page 254.
Code of Judicial Ethics (1972), 52 Wis. 2d vii.
Id. at pages x, xi.
Judicial Comm. Rules of Procedure (1973), 57 Wis. 2d vii.
In the Matter of the Amendment of Code of Judicial Ethics (1974), 63 Wis. 2d vii.
State v. Cannon (1929), 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N. W. 385. See also: State v. Cannon (1928), 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N. W. 603.
In re Cannon (1932), 206 Wis. 374, 392, 393, 240 N. W. 441.
In re Integration of Bar (1946), 249 Wis. 523, 25 N. W. 2d 500; In re Integration of Bar (1956), 273 Wis. 281, 77 N. W. 2d 602.
See, for example: In re Janitor of Supreme Court (1874), 35 Wis. 410.
(1932), 206 Wis. 374, 396, 397, 240 N. W. 441.
Attorney General v. Blossom (1853), 1 Wis. 277 (*317), 283 (*325).
Ibid.
State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms (1908), 136 Wis. 432, 462, 118 N. W. 158.
(1939), 230 Wis. 428, 430, 433, 284 N. W. 42.
(1946), 248 Wis. 419, 423, 22 N. W. 2d 160.
(1901), 112 Wis. 293, 300, 87 N. W. 1072.
Secs. 19.41-19.50, Stats.
Sec. 19.42 (8), Stats.
The constitution means of removal are impeachment (art. VII, sec. 1), address (art. VII, sec. 13), and recall (art. XIII, sec. 12).
State ex rel. Kleist v. Donald (1917), 164 Wis. 545, 551, 160 N. W. 1067.
State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler (1930), 200 Wis. 518, 553, 228 N. W. 895.
In re Mussman (1972), 112 N. H. 99, 289 Atl. 2d 403; Ransford v. Graham (1964), 374 Mich. 104, 131 N. W. 2d 201; In re Graham (1962), 366 Mich. 268, 114 N. W. 2d 333 (suspension); In re Assignment of Huff (1958), 352 Mich. 402, 91 N. W. 2d 613 (contempt); Judges of Cedar Rapids Municipal Court (1964), 256 Iowa 1135, 130 N. W. 2d 553; In re Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids (Iowa 1971), 188 N. W. 2d 354 (censure).
See especially: In re Mussman, supra, footnote 24, at pages 405, 406; Ransford v. Graham, supra, footnote 24, at page 202.
Code of Judicial Ethics, supra, footnote 1, at page 253.
Supra, footnote 19.
See. 19.44, Stats.
Supra, footnote 20.
Code of Judicial Ethics, supra, footnote 1, at page 259.
In re Stolen (1927), 193 Wis. 602, 620, 214 N. W. 379, 216 N. W. 127.
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U. S. 479, 485, 497, 85 Sup. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510; NAACP v. Alabama, (1964), 377 U. S. 288, 307, 84 Sup. Ct. 1302, 12 L. Ed. 2d 325; Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U. S. 479, 488, 81 Sup. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231.
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, footnote 32, at pages 484, 487-499 (Goldberg, J., concurring); 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); 502 (White, J., concurring); see also: Camara v. Municipal Court (1967), 387 U. S. 523, 539, 87 Sup. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930; Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U. S. 643, 656, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 84 A. L. R. 2d 933; Boyd v. United States (1886), 116 U. S. 616, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746.
Supra, footnote 32.
(1973), 410 U. S. 113, 93 Sup. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, rehearing denied, 410 U. S. 959, 93 Sup. Ct. 1409, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694.
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District (1966), 65 Cal. 2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 Pac. 2d 409.
See: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U. S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686.
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra,, footnote 32, at pages 485, 497; NAACP v. Alabama, supra, footnote 32, at page 307; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, footnote 32, at page 488.
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, footnote 32.
In the Matter of the Amendment of Code of Judicial Ethics, supra, footnote 7.
(1970), 2 Cal. 3d 259, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 Pac. 2d 225.
Id. at page 268.
Id. at page 272. A revised financial disclosure law, which distinguished between relevant and nonrelevant assets, was subsequently upheld by the California Supreme Court in County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974), 11 Cal. 3d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 522 Pac. 2d 1345.
(1972), 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N. E. 2d 409.
(1974), 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N. E. 2d 9.
(1974), 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 Pac. 2d 911.
Stein v. Howlett, supra, footnote 44, at page 578; Illinois State Employees Asso. v. Walker, supra, footnote 45, at page 526; Fritz v. Gorton, supra, footnote 46, at page 300.
Stein v. Howlett (1973), 412 U. S. 925, 93 Sup. Ct. 2750, 37 L. Ed. 2d 152; Fritz v. Gorton (1974), 417 U. S. 902, 94 Sup. Ct. 2596, 41 L. Ed. 2d 208.
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price (1959), 360 U. S. 246, 247, 79 Sup. Ct. 978, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1200.
Supra, footnote 19.
(1961), 367 U. S. 820, 81 Sup. Ct. 1826, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1191.
(1917), 164 Wis. 545, 160 N. W. 1067.
State ex rel. Tesch v. Von Baumbach (1860), 12 Wis. 344 (*310), 346 (*312); Fordyce v. State ex rel. Kelleher (1902), 115 Wis. 608, 92 N. W. 430; State ex rel. Bloomer v. Canavan (1914), 155 Wis. 398, 145 N. W. 44; State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler (1930), 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895.
Art. VII, secs. 7, 10 and 24, Wis. Const. For the same conclusion in a similar context, see 30 Op. Atty. Gen. (1941), 148.
(1972), 408 U. S. 564, 92 Sup. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548.
(1972), 408 U. S. 593, 92 Sup. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570.