Case Name: DAVIS v. DAVIS et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1945-10-31
Citations: 23 So. 2d 651
Docket Number: No. 6871
Parties: DAVIS v. DAVIS et al.
Judges: KENNON, J., takes no part.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 23
Pages: 651–654

Head Matter:
DAVIS v. DAVIS et al.
No. 6871.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
Oct. 31, 1945.
Kay & Kay, of DeRidder, for appellant.
Wood & Wood, of Leesville, and J. S. Pickett, of Many, for appellees.

Opinion:
TALIAFERRO, Judge.
The plaintiff herein, Mrs. Mary A. Davis, is the divorced wife of Calvin Davis, one of the defendants. Judgment awarding her final divorce was rendered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Louisiana, on January 21, 1944. During the marriage of the parties, Calvin Davis purchased in his name several small parcels, of land in Sabine Parish, upon which the couple made their home until, for reasons not reflected from the record, Mrs. Davis left the matrimonial domicile in September, 1929, terminating conjugal relations which were never renewed. Davis, continued to live upon the land, referred to above, until he sold the same to I. C. Miller and his wife, Imer Miller, also defendants herein, on November 1, 1943.
On July 19, 1929, some two months before she abandoned her husband, plaintiff, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 35 of the Extra Session of 1921, executed a written declaration designating the referred to parcels of land as the family homestead. This instrument was signed before a Notary Public and two witnesses and was recorded in the mortgage records of Sabine Parish, whereas the Act requires registry in the Conveyance records.
The present suit was filed the day the divorce judgment was signed. Plaintiff, after alleging the acquisition of said land during the existence of her marriage to Calvin Davis, recordation of the declaration designating the homestead, rendition1 of final divorce between her and her husband and the fact that Calvin Davis had executed to the Millers what, on its face, purports to be a cash sale of said property, further alleged and charged that said land was an asset of the community of acquets and gains which existed between her and her husband, one-half interest therein devolving upon her in full ownership from date of said final divorce; that the ostensible act of sale by Calvin Davis to the Millers was no.t in fact a real sale, but, on the contrary, a sham, a fraud and a simulation arranged and executed purely for the purpose and out of the desire to cheat and defraud her of her community interest in said land; that no price whatever was paid by the Millers for the land, and no delivery of the property passed. She prays that the attacked sale be declared null and void and that same be set aside, only because it was a sham and fraudulent simulation; that the lands described therein be declared to belong to the community formerly existing between her and Calvin Davis, she owning one-half interest therein, and that partition thereof by licitation be ordered.
Defendants in limine filed a plea of res judicata to that portion of plaintiff's demand wherein it is alleged that she, as a partner in community, is owner of one-half interest in the land and entitled to a partition thereof. This plea was overruled. It will be hereinafter discussed.
Answering, defendants affirm the validity of the act of sale to the Millers, allege delivery of possession of the land therein described to them, and payment, partly cash and partly otherwise, of the purchase price recited therein; that negotiations for the sale of the property between Davis and the Millers extended over a long period prior to signing of the deed by Davis.
The lower court rejected plaintiff's demand and dismissed her suit. She appealed to this court.
Motion to Dismiss Appeal
Plaintiff litigated in forma pauper-is. The record in the case was not filed in this court on or prior to the return day nor within three days thereafter; nor was any extension of time for filing the record asked for or granted. On this state of facts appellees urge dismissal of the appeal as having been abandoned and cite many Supreme Court cases having like state of facts, sustaining their position. However, the motion is without merit. Counsel for the Millers in oral argument admits that under the decision of this court in Bolton v. Eznack, La.App., 187 So. 840, 841, the motion is not well founded. He is correct. After appellant procured order of appeal to this court no duty rested upon her to see to it that the appeal was perfected by filing of the record here prior to expiration of return day or within three days thereafter. That duty rested entirely upon the Clerk of Court, and appellant, being without fault, may not be penalized because the record was not timely filed. The Supreme Court settled this question decisively in Stockbridge v. Martin et al., 162 La. 601, 110 So. 828. This court in many cases has invariably followed the rule laid down in that case. The rule applicable to appeals to this court differs from that prevailing in the Supreme Court as concerns the responsibility for filing transcripts. The motion to dismiss is overruled.
Plea of Res Judicata
In this plea it is alleged that plaintiff in her suit for divorce prayed, as partner in community, to be recognized as one-half owner of the property described in her petition, being ,the same involved herein, and for partition thereof, and that her prayer in these respects was rejected by the judgment of the court, which is now final. In her petition for divorce, plaintiff did allege that .the community property should be partitioned; that she owned one-half interest therein and that it was indivisible in kind, but she did not pray ip consonance with these allegations. Her prayer covers nearly a full typewritten page, but nowhere therein does she pray that her interest in any part of the community property be recognized nor did she ask for partition thereof. This being true, the judgment granting a divorce omits reference thereto. In view of these record facts it cannot be said that the judgment impliedly rejected plaintiff's right to assert ownership of the community property and to demand partition thereof.
The case of Conrad v. Conrad, 170 La. 312, 127 So. 735, is in point. It was held therein, as reflected from the syllabus, that:
"Since separation from bed and board necessarily carries with it separation of goods and effects, under Rev.Civ.Code, art. 155, a decree of divorce or separation from bed and board is necessarily a decree of dissolution of community, and hence does not bar suit for partition of community property because degree failed to grant such relief, where it was not asked."