Case Name: Captain David RABREN and Tampa Tri-County Pilots Association, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees; Captain Gary MURPHY, Captain Stephen Cropper, and Captain Michael Farrell, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-08-27
Citations: 497 So. 2d 1245
Docket Number: No. BF-89
Parties: Captain David RABREN and Tampa Tri-County Pilots Association, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees. Captain Gary MURPHY, Captain Stephen Cropper, and Captain Michael Farrell, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees.
Judges: MILLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 497
Pages: 1245–1254

Head Matter:
Captain David RABREN and Tampa Tri-County Pilots Association, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees. Captain Gary MURPHY, Captain Stephen Cropper, and Captain Michael Farrell, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS and Department of Professional Regulation, Appellees.
No. BF-89.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 27, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1986.
H. Glenn Boggs, Tallahassee, and J. Michael Shea, Tampa, for appellants.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and John E. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
REVISED OPINION
SHIVERS, Judge.
Upon consideration of the motion for rehearing filed by appellee Board of Pilot Commissioners, we deny the motion for rehearing but revise and substitute the following opinion.
Captain David Rabren, Tampa Tri-County Pilots Association, Captain Gary Murphy, Captain Stephen Cropper, and Captain Michael Farrell appeal an order of the Division of Administrative Hearings denying their challenge to Florida Administrative Code Rule 21SS-8.10. We reverse.
In 1975 the Legislature established the Board of Pilot Commissioners within the Division of Professions of the Department of Professional Regulation. Section 310.001, Florida Statutes, empowered the Board to perform such duties and exercise such powers to protect the waters, harbors and ports of the State as are conferred by Chapter 310, Florida Statutes. Section 310.141, Florida Statutes (1975) provided that:
All vessels, except vessels exempted by the laws of the United States or vessels drawing less than 7 feet of water, shall have a licensed state pilot or certificated deputy pilot on board when entering or leaving ports of this state....
Vessels exempted by the laws of the United States from the requirement that they take on state-licensed pilots are U.S. ships described in 46 U.S.C. § 8502. The State may not level piloting charges on coastwise vessels. Vessels "plying coastwise" are those engaged in domestic trade. The only vessels which states may require State pilots to operate are foreign vessels.
On June 11, 1984, Captain Valenti, United States Coast Guard Captain of the Port of Tampa, notified the Board of Pilot Commissioners (the Board) that certain pilots in Tampa Bay were claiming that neither the State of Florida nor the Coast Guard had jurisdiction to regulate shifting activities in Tampa Bay (moving ships from one place to another).
Acting pursuant to sections 310.001 and 310.141, Florida Statutes, the Board prom ulgated Rule 21SS-8.10, Florida Administrative Code, to deal with shifting activities in Tampa Bay. Rule 21SS-8.10 reads as follows:
Any vessel requiring a state pilot that is underway on the navigable waters of the State of Florida shall have a state pilot aboard except when in the docking or undocking mode. Docking or undocking mode is when the tugs are alongside and the vessel is under the direction of the master, docking master, or state pilot or deputy pilot.
The State, if it elected to do so, could regulate pilots in their shifting activities in Tampa Bay. Section 8501(a), 46 U.S.C., provides that, except as otherwise provided, pilots in bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports of the United States shall be regulated or in conformity with the laws of the States.
Appellant Capt. Rabren holds both a state pilot's license and a federal pilot's license. Appellants Capts. Murphy, Cropper and Farrell hold only federal pilots' licenses. Capt. Rabren and the other captains are all members of Appellant TriCounty Pilots Association. They maintain that Rule 21SS-8.10 wrongfully prevents those who do not have Florida pilot licenses from shifting foreign vessels from port to port in Tampa Bay. They contend that once a foreign vessel enters Tampa Bay it comes under the U.S. Coast Guard; that a non-licensed pilot should be able to pilot it around in Tampa Bay, which they argue is just one big port; and that the vessel should be required to have a state-licensed pilot only when it is "entering" or "leaving" Tampa Bay.
The hearing officer found, and we feel correctly, that Tampa Bay is not just one port. Port is statutorily defined:
310.002 Definitions.
As used in this act:
(4)The word "port" means any place in the state into which vessels enter or depart and includes, without limitation, Fernandina, Nassau Inlet, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, Canaveral, Ft. Pierce, West Palm Beach, Port Everglades, Miami, Key West, Boca Grande, Charlotte Harbor, Punta Gorda, Tampa, Port Tampa, Manatee, St. Petersburg, Clearwater, Apalachicola, Carrabelle, Panama City, Port St. Joe, and Pensacola.
Section 310.061, Florida Statutes, specifically names four of the ports in Tampa Bay:
310.061 Provision for licensing state pilots.
(1) There shall not be more than 3 pilots for the Port of Pensacola; 3 for the Port of Fernandina and Nassau Inlet; 16 for the St. Johns River, including the Port of Jacksonville; 22 for Tampa Bay, including the Ports of Tampa, Port Tampa, Manatee, and St. Petersburg; 4 for the Ports of Punta Gorda, Charlotte Harbor, and Boca Grande, inclusive; 3 for the Port of Panama City; 3 for the Port of Key West; 3 for the Port of Palm Beach; 3 for the Port of Ft. Pierce; 4 for the Port of Port Canaveral; 14 for the Port of Miami; 10 for the Port of Port Everglades; 3 for the Port of Port St. Joe; and 2 for any port not specifically mentioned in this chapter. Nothing herein shall be construed to require the appointment of the maximum number of pilots authorized for any port.
(2) The Board shall determine the number of pilots in conformance with subsection (1) based on the supply and demand for piloting services and the public interest in maintaining efficient and safe piloting services.
We affirm the Hearing Officer's finding that there exist four separate ports in Tampa Bay.
Section 310.002, Florida Statutes, defines "pilotage waters of the state":
310.002 Definitions.
As used in this act:
(5)The term "pilotage waters of the state" means the navigable waters within the boundaries of the state.
F.A.C. Rule 21SS-8.10 would require a state pilot on a vessel that is underway on the navigable waters of the State of Florida, except when docking or undocking. The statute, section 310.141, requires a state-licensed pilot on board "when entering or leaving ports of this state." When the legislation on this was introduced, House Bill 1358 proposed this language for section 310.14, Florida Statutes (now 310.-141, Florida Statutes):
All vessels, except vessels exempted by the laws of the U.S., shall when entering or leaving ports of this state or when operating in pilot waters of this state, at all times have on board a licensed state pilot or certificated deputy pilot for the port or waters in question, (emphasis added)
House Bill 1358, thus, contained the language "or when operating in pilot waters of the state." However, when the bill was passed into law and became section 310.141 it did not contain the words "or when operating in pilot waters of the state." Since these words, which section 310.002, Florida Statutes, defines as "navigable waters within the boundaries of the state" were omitted, we are required to note the significance of the omission.
In the instructional Florida State Supreme Court case of State ex rel. Finlayson v. Amos, 76 Fla. 26, 79 So. 433 (1918), petitioner, owner of a 32 horsepower automobile with a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons applied, under Chapter 7275, Acts of the Legislature of 1917, to have his automobile registered in accordance with law. The comptroller refused to do so, maintaining that the registration fee was $12, not $5 and that he had to have $7 more before registering the car. The issue presented was the construction to be placed on series B and C of section 6 of the automobile license act of 1917, that read in part:
The following fee shall be paid to the comptroller upon the registration or reregistration of motor vehicles in accordance with the provisions of this act.
Passenger Vehicles
Series A — Motorcycles .$ 2.00
Series B — For any automobile and other motor driven vehicle with a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons . 5.00
Series C — Automobiles of more than 25 h.p., and not more than 40 h.p. • 12.00
Series D — Automobiles of more than 40 h.p., and not more than 60 h.p. 15.00
Series E — Automobiles of more than 60 h.p. 30.00
Any type of automobile seating ten or more passengers . 100.00
Petitioner asserted that since his automobile had a seating capacity of not more than five persons, he should pay a fee of $5 as provided for in Series B. The comptroller maintained that since the automobile had more than 25 horse power and not more than 40, the petitioner was required to pay a fee of $12. The Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brown, wrote that due to the conflicting provisions of that law, the court could seek light in the history of the passage of the act through the Legislature. Justice Brown referred to Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 470:
The proceedings of the Legislature in reference to the passage of an act may be taken into consideration in construing the act. Thus the reports of committees made to the Legislature have been held to be proper sources of information in ascertaining the intent or meaning of the act. Amendments made, or proposed and defeated, may also throw light on the construction of the act as finally passed, and may properly be taken into consideration.
In the Amos case, when the Senate Bill passed the Senate and went to the House, series B read "Automobiles of not more than 25 h.p. $7.00." In the House an amendment was adopted to strike out the words "automobiles of not more than 25 h.p. $7.00" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "For any automobile and other motor-driven vehicle with a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons $5.00." This amendment was then rejected in the Senate, but later considered by a conference committee composed of members from both houses, and thereafter adopted by the Senate upon recommendation of the conference committee. Justice Brown noted that the ruling of the comptroller would nullify the amendment and restore to the bill that part of it which the Legislature rejected. The supreme court held:
If the amendment had not been adopted, the comptroller's interpretation would be correct, but he ignores the amendment, and interprets the law as if it had passed as originally introduced in the Senate. There is no authority for a department of the government charged with the execution of a law, to restore a provision which the Legislature strikes from the act when in progress of its passage. Whatever the Legislature does within its constitutional authority, no other department of the government may change, modify, alter, or amend.
It seems quite clear to us that, when the Legislature struck from the act under consideration, as originally introduced, language identical with the construction now placed upon series B by the comptroller, the Legislature in the clearest and most positive manner showed its disapproval of his construction, and this court must enforce the clearly expressed legislative will.
We therefore find that series B of section 6 of chapter 7275, Acts of 1917, provides for a license tax of only $5 on any automobiles or other motor-driven vehicles, with a seating capacity of one and not more than five passengers, without regard to horse power.
We conclude that the Board's rule is not one permitted by the statute, and is over-broad.
The legislative history of the statute in the case sub judice reveals that the Legislature refused to adopt statutory language approximately equal to the language in the rule. The Board had no authority to, in effect, amend the statute to do what the Legislature refused to do. The statute without the rule gives no authority to the State to require a licensed state pilot or certificated deputy pilot on board except when in the docking or undocking mode, on any vessel requiring a state pilot that is underway on the navigable waters of the state.
Section 310.141, Florida Statutes, requires state-licensed pilots on foreign vessels entering or leaving the ports of the state. Since Tampa Bay consists of at least four ports, section 310.141 may already apply to shifting activities in Tampa Bay.
The Legislature has the authority to require pilots in its bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports, but it cannot be done by rule when the Legislature has refused to broaden the requirement. We conclude that Rule 21SS-8.10, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
REVERSED.
MILLS, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., dissents, with written opinion.