Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Curtis BROWN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-12-24
Citations: 592 So. 2d 308
Docket Number: No. 91-474
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Curtis BROWN, Appellee.
Judges: Before FERGUSON, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 592
Pages: 308–312

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Curtis BROWN, Appellee.
No. 91-474.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 24, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Angelica D. Zayas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Amy D. Ronner, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellee.
Before FERGUSON, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
FERGUSON, Judge.
The single issue in this appeal is whether the defendant's incriminating confession was given in response to an unlawful interrogation following his invocation of the right to counsel.
Curtis Brown, a suspect in a burglary, theft, and criminal mischief case, was arrested, advised of the charges against him, and informed of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of an attorney. He unequivocally invoked those rights and refused to answer any questions without the presence of an attorney.
Notwithstanding the clear invocation of those rights, the officer continued to discuss the case, informing the defendant that he had been listed as a suspect by the victim, that three witnesses had placed him at the scene of the crime, that his girlfriend had implicated him in the burglary, and that he had been seen in possession of an item stolen in the burglary. After confronting the defendant with these details, the officer placed the defendant in an interrogation room and handcuffed him to a bench. Approximately an hour and a half later, the defendant was removed to a "booking room" where he then said he wanted to tell "the truth," or "his side of the story." The defendant was again given Miranda warnings, after which he signed a prepared statement of confession.
In a written order suppressing the confession, the court found:
In the case sub judice, it was incumbent on the detective to cease any conversations with the defendant which the detective should have known could lead to responses from the defendant regarding the case for which he had been arrested. The statement of the defendant that, "I have to tell you the truth," came only after continued information had been repeated to Brown by Potts. The amount of time that lapsed between the end of these statements by Potts to Brown did not serve to render Brown's waiver and statements to have been freely and voluntarily made. The second signed waiver was ineffective in waiving the defendant's right to counsel.
We affirm.
It is settled that once an individual is given Miranda warnings, and that person indicates in any manner prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 722-23 (1966). After an individual has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, any statement taken after the invocation of that right cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Id.; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).
The dissent gives to the word "interrogation" the same narrow construction that was rejected in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). There the court gave a broad and practical definition to the term, holding:
'[Ijnterrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.... A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90.
This is not the case where, in the context of a brief conversation between officers, the defendant was moved to make a self-incriminating response which the officers had no reason to expect. In this case the officer's words and conduct were protracted and evocative and, as the trial court found, should reasonably have been known by the officer as likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Jones v. State, 497 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questions but also includes police conduct likely to induce incriminating responses), rev. denied, 506 So.2d 1043 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823, 108 S.Ct. 87, 98 L.Ed.2d 48 (1987).
Although he initially expressed disbelief in the defendant's testimony on the main issue — whether the officer's case-related monologizing in his presence induced the incriminating response — the trial judge, as trier of the facts, resolved the conflicting evidence in favor of the defendant. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress has a presumption of correctness and, where the record supports its ruling, it is impermissible for the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. Wasko v. State, 505 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Fla.1987).
Affirmed.
LEVY, J., concurs.