Case Name: THE AMERICAN PRINT WORKS v. LAWRENCE; HALE v. LAWRENCE
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1850-10
Citations: 23 N.J.L. 9
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE AMERICAN PRINT WORKS v. LAWRENCE. HALE v. LAWRENCE.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 9–28

Head Matter:
THE AMERICAN PRINT WORKS v. LAWRENCE. HALE v. LAWRENCE.
1. When a particular officer is authorized to destroy buildings where he shall judge it necessary to prevent the spread of a conflagration, by a statute which provides compensation for the buildings destroyed, it is a sufficient justification for the destruction of goods contained in such building, for which no compensation is provided, to allege that the building was destroyed according to such authority, and that it was absolutely necessary for the purpose of averting the conflagration, to destroy the building, without waiting to remove the goods.
2. A person who is a citizen, resident, and property owner in a city, may justify the destruction of buildings and goods on the ground of inevitable necessity to prevent the spread of a conflagration in the city, without alleging that the property in immediate and imminent peril was his own property.
This was an action of trespass, brought in .this court, against the defendant for destroying the goods of the plaintiff, by blowing up the same with gunpowder. The substantial part of the declaration is given in the former report of this case. The special plea, which this court adjudged sufficient, having been held bad by the Court of Errors, and the defendant having obtained leave to plead anew, pleaded the general issue and the two following special pleas in justification.
And for further plea in this behalf, by leave of the court here, &c., the said defendant, as to by gunpowder burning and destroying the said goods, wares, and merchandises, in the said declaration mentioned, says, that the said plaintiff, his action thereof against him, ought not to have or maintain, because, he says, that at the time of the committing the said supposed trespass in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, by him, the said defendant, to wit, on the 17th day of December, 1835, the citizens of the city of New York, in the state of New York, were, and for a long time previous thereto, to wit, from the year 1686, had been a body politic and corporate, by the name and style of “ the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York,” and from thence hitherto have continued and remained, and still continue and remain, such body politic and corporate as aforesaid, by the name and style aforesaid.
And the said defendant further)' says, that there have been at all times,'from the year last aforesaid, until and at the time of the committing of the said supposed trespass, certain . municipal officers and magistrates in the said city of New York, called the mayor and the aldermen, charged and invested with judicial, administrative and executive powers and duties, for the government of the said city, and the protection of the citizens and inhabitants thereof, and the estate and property therein.
And the defendant further says, that heretofore, to wit, on the 9th day of April, in the year 1813, the people of the state of New York, by their legislature, did ■ pass an act, among other things, regulating the destruction of buildings in the said city of New York, whenever such destruction should become necessary to prevent the spread of a eonflagra- . tion in the said city, and to save other buildings and property therein from taking fire, and being consumed thereby, entitled “An act to reduce several laws, relating par tiaularly to the city of New York, into one aot,” in which said act it was provided and enacted, that when any buildings in the city of New York should be on fire, it should be lawful for the mayor, or in his absence the recorder of the city, with the consent and concurrence of any two of the aldermen thereof, or for any three of the aldermen, to direct and order the same, or any other building which, they should deem, hazardous and likely to take fire, or to convey the fire to other buildings, to be pulled down or destroyed. And that, upon the application of any person interested in such buildings so pulled down or destroyed, to the mayor or recorder, or any two aldermen, it. should be their duty to issue a precept for a jury to inquire of and, assess the damages which the owners of such building, and all persons having an estate or interest therein, have sustained by the pulling down or destroying thereof. And, after providing the manner of conducting, executing, and returning of the said inquiry and assessment, and the confirmation thereof, the aot aforesaid further enacts, that the sums so assessed by the said jury shall be paid by the said mayor, aldermen, and commonalty to the respective persons in whose favor the jury shall have assessed the same, in full satisfaction of all demands of such persons, respectively, by reason of the pulling down or destroying such building. And the said defendant says, that the said provisions of the aforesaid act, from thence hitherto, have remained, and still remain in full force and effect, and unrepealed.
And that the said defendant further says, that at the time of committing of the said supposed trespass in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, by him, the said defendant, to wit, on the Ylih day of 'December, 18S5, the said city of Yew York, in the said plaintiff's declaration mentioned, and in which the said supposed trespass is therein alleged to have been committed by the said defendant, was densely populated, and compactly and closely built up with stores, dwelling houses, and other buildings, near to and adjoining each other, which were then used and occupied by the respective owners or tenants thereof for the residence of their families, the storing of goods, wares, and merchandises, and for other lawful purposes. And this defendant further saith, that on the day and year last aforesaid, and before the committing of the said supposed trespass in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, a fire had broken out in the said city, and for some time had been, and was then raging with great violence, and had burnt down and destroyed a great number of the said stores, dwelling houses, and other buildings, and threatened destruction to the said city, or to a great part thereof, and had actually communicated and set fire to a large number of said stores, to wit, to sixteen stores, including stores known and distinguished as number forty-four and number forty-six, situated on a public street in the said city called Exchange'Place, in each and all of which said last mentioned stores the said conflagration, at the time of the committing of the said supposed trespass, was raging with great violence, and threatened the destruction of adjoining buildings, and of a very large and valuable part of the said city.
And the said defendant further says, that near to and in the vicinity of the said stores, so as aforesaid on fire, there were certain other buildings, commonly called stores, known as numbers 48, 50, and 52, on the said street called Exchange Place, which, from their relative position .in regard to the said stores so as aforesaid on fire, were peculiarly exposed to the danger of being •set on fire, and were likely and liable, at any moment, to be ignited, and thereby to extend and communicate the fire to other and numerous and valuable buildings and stores, and to cause the total destruction thereof, with their contents, and to cause the destruction by the said conflagration of a large and valuable portion of the said city, and of the dwelling houses and other • buildings therein.
And the said defendant avers, that but for the acts and conduct of the said defendant, herein after mentioned, the said stores, above particularly mentioned or referred to as peculiarly exposed to danger, would inevitably and within a few moments have taken fire from the said stores or-buildings then already on fire as aforesaid, and would have communicated the fire to other stores and buildings in the vicinity thereof, and would thereby have been the means of consuming and destroying by fire many valuable stores and buildings, and of consuming and destroying by- fire a very large and valuable portion of the said city, and of the stores and dwellings therein, together with the goods, wares, and merchandises, and other property in such stores, dwelling houses, and building there being.
And the said defendant further says, that he was, at the time last aforesaid, and for a long time previous thereto had been and still is a resident and citizen of the said city of New York, in the state of New York, and the owner of valuable buildings and property real and personal, in the said city, and was present at and during the time of the aforesaid fire, and, as such resident citizen and owner, aiding, advising, and assisting in preventing the spread of the said fire, and in the protection of the buildings and property in the said city from destruction thereby; and this defendant, being so present at the said fire, had reason to believe, and did believe, that the said stores or buildings, so herein before particularly mentioned or referred to as peculiarly exposed to the said fire, would immediately and inevitably take fire and be burned up, with their contents, notwithstanding every effort that was or could be made to save the same from destruction, and would communicate the flames to adjoining buildings, and cause the destruction of a large part of the said city as aforesaid, unless the said stores or buildings were immediately and without loss of time destroyed, by blowing up the same with gunpowder or in some other way instantly demolishing the same, so as to prevent the further extension of the said conflagration.
And the said defendant further says, that to prevent the fur-, ther spreading of the said conflagration, and the destruction of a large portion of the aforesaid city, and of the buildings and property therein as aforesaid, the immediate destruction of the said stores or buildings, numbers 48 and 52, so herein particularly referred to as aforesaid, without waiting to remove there-out the goods, ■ wares, and merchandises, if any then being therein, was absolutely necessary; and without such immediate destruction of the said stores or buildings the said fire and conflagration could not and would not have been arrested, but would have extended itself, and have consumed and destroyed a large and valuable portion of the said city as aforesaid ; and for this reason and with this purpose and intent, and for none other, the said defendant, on the day and year aforesaid, did advise, cause, and procure the said stores or buildings, numbers 48 and 52, to be blown up with gunpowder and destroyed, thereby necessarily and unavoidably destroying the said store or building, number 50, as it was lawful for him to do, for the cause aforesaid.
And the said defendant further says, that on the day and year last aforesaid, at the place aforesaid, he was the mayor of the said city of New York, and that Edward Taylor and Egbert Benson, also citizens of the said city, were then respectively aider-men of said-city, and that they, the said defendant being such mayor, and the said Edward Taylor and Egbert Benson, being such aldermen, were, and each of them was present when the buildings aforesaid were on fire as aforesaid, and did deem the said stores or buildings, numbers 48 and 52, hazardous and likely to take fire, and to convey the fire to other buildings.
And the said defendant, and the said Edward Taylor and Egbert Benson, aldermen as aforesaid, in accordance with the aforesaid act of the legislature of the state of New York, regulating the destruction of buildings in the said city, deemed hazardous and likely to take fire as aforesaid, when such destruction was necessary as aforesaid, consented and concurred together in advising, causing, and procuring the blowing up and destruction of the said stores or buildings, numbers 48 and 52.
And the said defendant further says, the said goods, wares, and merchandises, in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, were in the aforesaid buildings or stores, numbers 48, 50, and 52, so as aforesaid blown up with gunpowder and destroyed as aforesaid, at the said time when the said defendant advised, caused, and procured the same to be- blown up and destroyed as aforesaid, whereby the said goods, wares, and merchandises were also consumed, blown up, and destroyed.
And the said defendant further says, that at the time of the blowing up and destruction of the said last mentioned buildings or stores, the said goods, wares, and merchandises could not have been removed or saved before the said stores or buildings would have taken fire, and endangered and communicated the flames to other buildings, and thereby consumed a great and valuable portion of the aforesaid city, and of the buildings and property of the citizens or inhabitants thereof. Wherefore the said defendant says, that for the cause aforesaid, and in the manner and on the day and year aforesaid, and to prevent the spreading of the said conflagration, and to save a large and valuable portion of the aforesaid city, and the buildings and property of the citizens therein, from being burned up and destroyed, he did necessarily (doing as little injury or damage as it was possible for him to do) blow up by gunpowder, burn and destroy, the said stores or buildings, numbers 48, 50, and 52, and, in so doing, did necessarily and unavoidably blow up by gunpowder, burn and destroy, the said goods, wares and merchandises, in the introductory part of this plea and in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, as it was lawful and necessary for him to do, for the cause aforesaid, t > wit, on the day and year and at the place aforesaid, which is the same supposed trespass in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, and whereof the said plaintiffs have above thereof complained against the said defendant, and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment if the said plaintiffs ought to have or maintain their aforesaid action thereof against him, &e.
The second special plea was the same as the first, omitting the parts printed in italics.
To these pleas the plaintiff replied as follows :
Replication to first special plea.
And the said plaintiffs, as to the plea of the said defendant by him seoondly above pleaded, say, that they, the said plaintiffs, ought not to be barred, &e., because they say, that the said plaintiffs had not any estate or interest in the said buildings or stores, in the said plea mentioned as having been blown up by gunpowder, burned and destroyed, by the said defend ant, at the time the same were so blown lip by gunpowder, burned and destroyed, as aforesaid ; and that to prevent the further spreading of the said conflagration in that plea mentioned, and the destruction of a large portion of the aforesaid city, and of the buildings and property therein as aforesaid, the immediate destruction of the goods, wares, and merchandises in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned was not absolutely necessary; nor would it have been impossible, without such immediate destruction of the said goods, .wares, and merchandises, to have arrested the said fire and conflagration: and of this they put themselves upon the country.
Replication to second special plea.
And the said plaintiffs} as to the plea of the said defendant, by him thirdly above pleaded, say, that they, the said plaintiffs, ought not to be barred, &a., because they, the said plaintiffs, say, that to prevent the further spreading of the said conflagration in that plea mentioned, and the destruction of a large portion of the aforesaid city, and the buildings and property therein as aforesaid, the immediate destruction of the goods, wares and mer'chandises in the said plaintiffs’ declaration mentioned was not absolutely necessary, nor would it have been impossible, without such immediate destruction of the said goods, wares, and merchandises, to have arrested the said fire, and conflagration : and of this they put themselves upon the country.
To these replications the defendant demurred, and added special causes of demurrer, as follows : To the replication to the first plea — 1 and 2, that it tendered useless and immaterial issues ; 3, that it was double, multifarious, and incapable of trial; 4, that it was argumentative; 5, that it did not confess or deny the material allegations of the plea; 6, that the matters therein were not so pleaded as to be capable of trial by the country; 7, that the same conclude to the country, and not with a verification. To the replication to the second plea —1, that it is argumentative; 2, that it is double and argumentative, and tenders an immaterial issue ; (3), that it is double; (4), that it is argumentative, and does not deny facts, but supposed inferences from them; 4, that it concludes to the country, instead of a verification.
To these demurrers there was filed the common joinder.
This issue at law was argued before the Chief Justice and Justices Xevius and Ogden.
William Kent, for plaintiffs.
B. Williamson and Hornblower, for defendants.
Vol. 1, 248.
Yol. 1,714.

Opinion:
The Chief Justice.
The question presented by the demurrer in this cause is not without embarrassment, arising, perhaps, not so much from the intrinsic difficulty of the question itself, as from the decisions which have been already made affecting it.
It is the undoubted duty of this court to give effect to the decision made in this cause by the Court of Errors. It is a duty equally clear, not to come in conflict with the decisions of the courts of a sister state on a question arising upon the construction of their own laws and the effect and operation of their own constitution. The plea heretofore pleaded in this case, and which was adjudged by the Court of Errors to be defective in substance, or any other plea presenting substantially the same defence, cannot be sustained by this court. The replication demurred to is unquestionably defective. The only question is, whether the plea now pleaded does present substantially the. same defence with that already overruled by the Court of Errors, or a defence inconsistent with the principles adopted by that court.
If, by the decision of the Court of Errors, the statute of the state of Hew York, upon which the defendant relies in his plea, was adjudged null and void, as a violation of the constitution of that state, then unquestionably those pleas are bad, and must be overruled. But tin's clearly was not the view of the learned judge by whom the opinion of that court was pronounced. He held, in opposition to the opinion of the court below, and to what was understood to be the decisions of the courts of Hew York, that the statute contained a grant of power; that the property destroyed by authority of the statute was destroyed- for public use; and that if it authorized the destruction of any property without providing compensation, it authorized the taking of private property for public use without compensation, and would therefore be unconstitutional and void. But he expressly held that the statute did not authorize the destruction of 'goods, but only the destruction of buildings, for which compensation had been provided by the statute. The statute, therefore, was not regarded as unconstitutional. If a different opinion was entertained by any member of the court, if it was considered that the statute did authorize a destruction of goods without compensation, and consequently was-so far void, the objection could affect the statute only pro tanto. So far as it provided compensation for property taken, the statute was constitutional and- valid.
The defendanc, therefore, in the destruction of the buildings, (which in its'consequences involved the destruction of the plaintiff's goods) acted under the authority of a constitutional and" valid law. The real ground of complaint is, that he exceeded the authority conferred by the statute, and thereby became a trespasser; that he not only destroyed buildings, which he might lawfully do, but also the plaintiff's goods,.which were in the building, and which the statute gave him no authority to destroy.
The plea under consideration in the Court of Errors, and which was adjudged defective, did. not aver that there was any necessity for the destruction of the goods. For all that appeared upon the plea, they might have been removed before the building was'destroyed. The utmost that could be assumed was, that such necessity might be inferred. " The very effort and force (said the learned judge, in- delivering the opinion,) required to destroy personal property-, which could be saved from conflagration- by any possibility, would be sufficient to-remove it; and save it from destruction." This defect the pleader has now attempted to remedy, and has averred that, to prevent the spread of the conflagration and the destruction of a large portion of the city, it was necessary to destroy the buildings, without waiting to remove the plaintiff's goods; and that the goods were thereby necessarily destroyed. He relics obviously, for his justification, not upon the common law rif/ht of necessity, hut upon a necessity created by the exigency of the statute, and growing out of the performance of his duty as a public officer.
The counsel of the plaintiff insists that the statute not only constitutes in itself no justification for the act of the defendant, but that it can in no wise contribute to his defence. That although ho acted in the discharge of his duty as a public officer, in good faith upon a sudden and alarming emergency, under the sanction of a constitutional and valid law, and in the execution of that law, all this is irrelevant and immaterial to his defence. He insists that the defendant is thrown back for his justification exclusively upon the common law doctrine of necessity ; that he must show, in justification, that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the plaintiff's goods to prevent the spread of the conflagration, and that the progress of the flames could not by possibility have been otherwise arrested. By his argument he carries the doctrine much farther, and insists that even this necessity will not avail the defendant, unless he shows that the act was done to protect his own property, not the property of others alone, from destruction. This position is most clearly erroneous. There is no such limitation of the common law right of necessity. If there be, and such is announced as the rule of law, there would be an end to all efficient efforts to arrest the progress of any conflagration. No men but those whose property was immediately in peril, and that the most imminent, Would ineur the hazard of an effort to check the flames.
The position of the counsel of the defence, as disclosed by his pleading, is that the statute of the state of New York, under which the defendant acted, was a constitutional and valid law; that it conferred upon the defendant an unquestionable right to destroy the buildings to arrest the progress of the flames; that for this purpose these buildings were destroyed by the defendant in the discharge of his duty as a public officer; that in the discharge of that duty, the exigency arose which rendered fhe destruction of the plaintiff's goods inevitable, in order to arrest the progress of the conflagration.
I incline to think the defendant is right in his construction of the law. It is certainly not without its difficulties. But it is the only view which will enable us at once to give effect to the judgment of the superior tribunal, and at the same time prevent our coming into direct conflict with the express and repeated adjudications of the courts of a sister state, upon the construction of their own statute. This result cannot be too strongly deprecated. Aside from all considerations of courtesy, its evil influences upon the administration of justice and the rights of parties litigant are apparent.
I am of opinion that the demurrer should be sustained, and the plaintiff's replication overruled, with costs.
The same order must be made in the ease of Hale v. Lawrence, upon the like pleadings.