Case Name: John Thedford WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-10-06
Citations: 742 So. 2d 496
Docket Number: No. 97-3855
Parties: John Thedford WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BROWNING, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 742
Pages: 496–500

Head Matter:
John Thedford WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-3855.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 6, 1999.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Carol Ann Turner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
BENTON, J.
This case asks the question whether a seventeen-year-old who has entered a plea of nolo contendere to armed robbery as a juvenile can thereafter be tried and punished as an adult, over objection on double jeopardy grounds, where the trial judge accepted the plea he tendered as a juvenile, after hearing his confession.
A criminal defendant earlier placed in jeopardy in juvenile court has a federal constitutional right, as appellant contends, not to be tried anew for the same offense as an adult. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Citing federal cases and Ray v. State, 231 So.2d 813 (Fla.1969), our supreme court has "held that jeopardy attaches on an unconditional guilty plea when the plea is or should have been accepted." Brown v. State, 367 So.2d 616, 620-21 (Fla.1979). The difference between a plea of guilty and the plea of nolo conten-dere that accompanied appellant's confes sion in juvenile court is without constitutional significance.
The parties have stipulated that the plea was in fact accepted and that the matter was set over for disposition under section 985.23, Florida Statutes (1997). See generally Medina v. State, 732 So.2d 1153, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)("Once a juvenile division judge finds (through an adjudicatory hearing or acceptance of a plea) that the child has committed a violation of law or delinquent act, the only permissible dispositions are in the juvenile system."). After the state attorney filed an "amended direct issue capias — adult" alleging armed robbery, however, the trial court concluded (in retrospect) that the absence of a document styled as a petition for delinquency rendered the proceedings in which the juvenile plea was taken a "nullity." On that basis, "Judge Barron withdrew Mr. Williams' plea and the case was . set for adult court."
John Thedford Williams' plea as a juvenile would have been a nullity only if the juvenile division judge before whom he appeared when he made the plea lacked jurisdiction over his person or over the subject matter. But the governing statute states:
The jurisdiction of the court shall attach to the child and the case . when the child is taken into custody with or without service of summons and before or after the filing of a petition....
§ 985.219(7), Fla. Stat. (1997). To the same effect as to personal jurisdiction, the statute provides elsewhere that the "appearance of any person in a hearing before the court obviates the necessity of serving process on that person." § 985.219(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Not every irregularity renders judicial proceedings nugatory. See generally Byrd v. State, 730 So.2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(noting clerk's "certificate stating that the original information could not be located" in affirming denial of collateral attack on judgment on grounds information need not be signed). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(g) forbids consideration of any "objection to an information on the ground that it was not signed or verified . after the defendant pleads to the merits." That a criminal defendant or juvenile respondent has grounds for obtaining reversal of a conviction or adjudication of delinquency does not, moreover, automatically afford the state grounds for setting the conviction or adjudication aside and beginning anew.
Verifying a pleading in the present case entitled "direct-issue capias," an assistant state attorney refers to "the foregoing information" and states that "this prosecution is instituted in good faith." See generally I.H. v. State, 405 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(holding the failure to file a petition for delinquency once an information has been filed "does not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction"). Set out under oath in the name of the state attorney, signed by an assistant state attorney, and duly filed with the clerk, it alleges:
CURTIS A. GOLDEN, State Attorney for the First Judicial Circuit of Florida, prosecuting for the STATE OF FLORIDA, in said County, under oath makes that: JOHN THEDFORD WILLIAMS, on or about March 21, 1997, at and in Okaloosa County, Florida, then and there being, did unlawfully by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, and with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive, take certain property, to-wit: United States currency, the property of Pizza Hut as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of William Bullock, and in the course of committing said Robbery, carried a firearm, to-wit: handgun, in violation of Sections 812.18(2)(a) and 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, against the form of the Statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida, a first degree felony, punishable by life imprisonment.
This so-called "direct-issue capias" is not addressed to the sheriff, and requires nothing of the sheriff. It functioned as a petition for delinquency. The language it employs plainly identifies a "violation of law," § 985.218(1), Fla. Stat. (1997), and does so with precision and specificity befitting a charging document. No petition for delinquency "shall be dismissed, or any judgment vacated, on account of any defect in the form of the petition." Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.035(d).
The conviction and sentence imposed in "adult court," which are, incidentally, apparently predicated on an accusatorial pleading ("amended direct capias — adult") that is virtually identical to the initial "direct — issue capias," must be reversed. The decision in Lisak v. State, 433 So.2d 487 (Fla.1983), resting as it does on statutory language now repealed, does not require a contrary result. See generally Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Pa.Super. 132, 645 A.2d 234, 246 n. 14 (1994). Having raised the double jeopardy issue in the trial court by timely objection and by motion to dismiss the information, appellant is entitled to reversal here.
Reversed and remanded.
BROWNING, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
MINER, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.