Case Name: Meyer Bros. Drug Company, Appellant, v. W. B. Self, Defendant; Eli Penter, Interpleader
Court: Kansas City Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1898-12-05
Citations: 77 Mo. App. 284
Docket Number: 
Parties: Meyer Bros. Drug Company, Appellant, v. W. B. Self, Defendant; Eli Penter, Interpleader.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 77
Pages: 284–294

Head Matter:
Meyer Bros. Drug Company, Appellant, v. W. B. Self, Defendant; Eli Penter, Interpleader.
Kansas City Court of Appeals,
December 5, 1898.
1. Chattel Mortgage: failure to record: creditor’s right. Where a chattel mortgage is recorded long before the creditor’s debt was created, he can not complain of its having been withheld from the record for some time after its execution, otherwise the creditor whose debt is created between the execution and the recording.
2. Appellate and Trial Practice: instruction: finding: complaint. An appellant can not complain of the soundness of a legal proposition which he embodied in an instruction which the court gave and then found the facts against him.
3. -: -: -: evidence: mortgagee’s estoppel. Where the trial court at appellant’s instance submits his contention in an instruction and finds the facts against him and there was evidence to support the finding, the appellate court will not interfere. In this case the contention of the mortgagee’s estoppel by failing to claim property when giving a delivery bond in an attachment against the mortgagor is properly submitted in an instruction and there is evidence to support the finding against him.
motion for rehearing.
4. Chattel Mortgage: description: inventory. Where a chattel mortgage after describing the property refers to an inventory which is not recorded with the mortgage, the validity of the description must be determined by the mortgage and not by the inventory, and the description set out in the opinion is held a sufficient description without reference to the inventory referred to.
5. -: taking possession: new pledge. The chattel mortgage of a stock of goods is good between the parties although the mortgagor remains in possession and sells for his own use, and the mortgagee may at any time take possession without the consent of the mortgagor and such taking possession is not a new pledge of the property, for the mortgage transfers the title while a pledge transfers the possession.
Appeal from the Boone Circuit Court. — Hon. J. A. Hockaday, Judge.
Aeeibmed.
E. W. Hinton and Websteb G-obdon for appellant.
(1) In order to be effective, the description in a chattel mortgage musí; be sufficiently definite to apprise all persons interested with reasonable certainty of the exact property conveyed. Goddard v. Jones, 78 Mo. 518; Stonebreaker v. Ford, 81 Mo. 532; Bozeman v. Fields, 44 Mo. App. 432. (2) The conduct of the mortgagee in permitting the mortgagor to remain in possession of the mortgaged stock of goods, and to dispose of them in the ordinary course of business for his own profit, where he was given a fictitious credit, rendered the mortgage fraudulent in fact. Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432 loe. eit. 445; Petring v. Chrisler, 90 Mo. 649; Bullene v. Barrett, 87 Mo. 185; Mercantile Co. v. Parkins, 63 Mo. App. 310; Hisey v. Goodwin, 90 Mo. 366; Russell v. Rutherford, 58 Mo. App. 550; Dry Goods Co. v. Brown, 73 Mo. App. 245. However it was urged below that the mortgagee’s possession cured this objection, and the case of Barton v. Sitlington, 128 Mo. 164, was relied on as an authority to support this position. Williams v. Kirk, 68 Mo. App. 462. (3) Even if the fraudulent character and effect of the mortgage could have been cured by the mortgagee’s taking possession, no sufficient change of possession was shown. Wright v. McCormick, 67 Mo. 426; Stewart v. Nelson, 79 Mo. 524. (4) The interpleader is estopped to claim the goods by reason of his failure to do so at the time of the levy, etc. Bradley & Co. v. Beau, 20 Mo. App. Ill; Mansur v. Hill, 22 Mo. App. 372; Bigelow on Estoppel [4 Ed.], p. 543.
MoKeighan, Barclay & Watts and E. W. Hinton and Webster G-ordon for appellant.
(1) The chattel mortgage on which the interpleader relies did not impart notice to the plaintiff as a creditor of Self under the law in regard to chattel mortgages. An “express statute,” Revised Statutes 1889, section 5176, declares that no deed of trust of personal property shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto, unless possession be delivered or “unless the mortgage or deed of trust be acknowledged or proved and recorded.” One great question in this case is whether the mortgage, of which the record would impart notice to creditors, was ever recorded? Now, it appeared in evidence that that inventory was never recorded with the conveyance, nor was it recorded in any way, at any time. Mastin v. Stoller, 107 Mo. 317; Evans v. Graden, .125 Mo. 72; Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 603; West v. Bretelle, 115 Mo. 659; Dolde v. Yodicka, 49 Mo. 100; McCullock v. Holmes, 111 Mo. 447; Glamorgan v. Railway, 72 Mo. 139; Shirras v. Caig, 7 Craneh, 48. (2) Throughout the case it appears that Self remained in possession of the property with the consent of the present interpleader, sold the goods covered by the mortgage in the usual course of business, and replenished the stock from time to time. It is well settled by decisions of our courts of last resort that such a course of dealing vitiates the mortgage security because it is considered fraudulent in fact as to creditors. Smith v. Ham, 51 Mo. App. 433; Mercantile Go. v. Perkins, 63 Mo. App. 310. It may be urged in answer to this contention that the possession taken under the chattel mortgage would cure the fault of which we complain, but we think that answer may be parried by another thought (which has received no consideration as yet by the court) through inadvertence on the part of appellant. A pledge requires competent parties, and the inter-pleader could not, by merely taking possession of property of a person so unsound as to be a fit subject for an insane asylum (where he soon afterwards dies) acquire any greater rights (by reason of such a taking of possession) than he had by virture of his chattel mortgage alone.
C. B. Sebastian for respondent.
(1) The description in the mortgage is sufficient. It not only contained the usual description given of such property, but mentioned the place where it was kept, and, in addition, referred to an inventory. This would enable- third persons to identify the property. This cleai’ly brings it within the rule laid down by our courts. McNichols v. Fry, 62 Mo. App. 13. (2) All the other questions raised by appellant were submitted to the court upon declarations of law which were very favorable to appellant, and were given by the court who tried the case sitting as a jury. So there is no question of law before this court for review. Appellant’s abstract of the evidence is condensed, and its probative force weakened, by reducing it to the narrative form. But it clearly shows that the finding and judgment were for the right party. (3) Appellant virtually concedes that all objections to the mortgage were cured by the possession taken by the interpleader. But contends that the interpleader is estopped by his failure to claim the property .at the time of the levy, and by his giving a bond. The trial court, in giving appellant’s fourth declaration of law, recognized all the principles applicable to this contention, but found the facts did not sanction the contention. This finding is fully sustained by the evidence.

Opinion:
Ellison, J.
This action was brought by attachment wherein a stock of drugs was attached as the property of defendant Self. Interpleader claimed the property under a chattel mortgage executed to him by Self and a trial of his title resulted in his favor. Plaintiff appeals.
We pass over the objection made by plaintiff as to the sufficiency of the description in the mortgage with the remark that the description is ample to support the conveyance.
The mortgage was executed in January, 3893, and recorded in May of that year. Plaintiff's claim against Self did not arise until long after the recording and consequently we rule that withholding' the mortgage from record for the time stated, did not affect its validity as against this plaintiff, since its action in dealing with Self could not have been founded on the absence of the mortgage from the record. If during the time the mortgage was withheld from record plaintiff, being misled, had permitted Self to become indebted to it, then the question would have been similar to Williams v. Kirk, 68 Mo. App. 462, and that of Barton v. Sitlington, 128 Mo. 174. But such was not the case.
Interpleader seems to have permitted Self to remain in possession from the time the mortgage was given until November 30,1896, a short while before the attachment was levied, when he took possession, as we must assume, since the finding in his favor.
On December 16 the attachment was levied and interpleader giving a forthcoming bond remained in possession, when on December 21, 1896, he sold the goods under the mortgage and purchased them at the sale. It was while Self remamec* lü possession by interpleader's permission, that plaintiff's account was made with Self. Plaintiff contends that inter-pleader permitted Self to thus remain in possession and deal with the goods as his own, that it deceived plaintiff and caused the credit to be extended, notwithstanding the mortgage was recorded, and that the mortgage thereby became fraudulent in fact. We are relieved from expressing any opinion on the soundness of this contention as a legal proposition, since the court at the instance of plaintiff embodied the proposition in instruction number 5 and yet found the fact against plaintiff, of which he has now no right to complain.
Plaintiff further contends that the possession taken by interpleader was not such open and notorious possession as to be effective under the statute. This was also submitted by instructions and passed upon on the facts.
But it is further claimed by plaintiff that- inter-pleader by giving the delivery bond on the attachment being levied is estopped now to assert that the goods were his and not Self's. This point is also not well taken from the fact that the court gaye a£ plaintiff's instance the following intruction: "The court declares the law to be that if at the time of the levy of the writ of attachment in this case the interpleader did not assert any claims or right to the attached property but gave a forthcoming bond for the same; and that the sheriff by reason of interpleader's failure to make or assert any claim to such property refrained from levying upon other property of the defendant not embraced in such mortgage then the verdict must be for the plaintiff in attachment."
The court must have found there was no ground to charge interpleader 'with deceiving the sheriff, or that he conceale'd his claim to them from the sheriff. The contrary clearly appears. The whole case shows that there was no endeavor on the part of interpleader to conceal his ownership. Idis claim was not only of record but was well known. We think the court's finding is amply supported by the case of Petring v. Chrisler, 90 Mo. 659.
After an examination of the record and points made against the judgment we find no reason justifying us in disturbing it and hence order its affirmance.
All concur.