Case Name: Irwin L. LANGBEIN, Sylvan B. Burdick and Westley W. Silvian, Appellants, v. Eleanor C. COMERFORD, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1968-11-20
Citations: 215 So. 2d 630
Docket Number: No. 1960
Parties: Irwin L. LANGBEIN, Sylvan B. Burdick and Westley W. Silvian, Appellants, v. Eleanor C. COMERFORD, Appellee.
Judges: OWEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 215
Pages: 630–633

Head Matter:
Irwin L. LANGBEIN, Sylvan B. Burdick and Westley W. Silvian, Appellants, v. Eleanor C. COMERFORD, Appellee.
No. 1960.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.
Nov. 20, 1968.
Irwin L. Langbein, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Opinion:
WALDEN, Chief Judge.
This appeal is from an order denying restitution to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs formerly were partners in a law firm, and sought restitution from a former client of the dissolved firm.
The attorney-client relationship of the parties was terminated by mutual agreement. As an incident to the termination, plaintiffs prepared and submitted an accounting of the trust account held by plaintiffs for defendant's benefit. The accounting showed a balance on March 25, 1963, of $15,564.80.
Defendant questioned the amount of the fee plaintiffs proposed to charge. Her new attorney, therefore, negotiated a compromise fee of $9,100.00 to be paid in addition to the $12,004.37 in fees already paid and accounted for. The correctness of the accounting was not challenged.
Thereupon the parties executed a mutual release which related that an account had been submitted and that defendant had received the balance due her of $6,300.00. The parties, in consideration of the settlement, agreed to release each other from any and all claims.
Some weeks later plaintiffs discovered a bookkeeping error in that a payment of approximately $2,000.00 had been withdrawn from the trust account prior to the accounting, but had not been deducted from the trust account balance by plaintiffs' bookkeeper until some time later. This amount, which constituted attorney fees and expenses, was credited to the fees paid at the time of settlement. In short, though the accounting had shown the trust balance to be $15,564.80, it was in fact only $13,557.85. Adding in some minor expenses, plaintiffs had paid $1,901.91 too much in settlement with defendant. The existence and amount of this mistake is not questioned.
The error was immediately communicated to defendant and her new attorney, but no reply was made. Plaintiffs thereupon filed their complaint alleging the computation error in defendant's favor and requesting judgment for the excess paid to defendant. In accordance with a stipulation, the case was submitted to the trial judge for disposition on the basis of the pleadings, exhibits and a deposition of defendant. As a result of this procedure, it very well may be that the issues were not properly developed before the trial court. Regardless of the reason, the trial court held for defendant based upon the legal effect of the mutual release and upon the unilateral nature of the bookkeeping error. From this decision plaintiffs appeal. We reverse.
As a preface, we note the total absence of factual dispute in this case. Prior to execution of the mutual release, only the amount of the fee to be charged was in dispute, never the balance remaining in the trust account. Nor has defendant made any claim that her position was changed in reliance upon the overpayment. It should also be noted that defendant has chosen not to defend this appeal.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that $1,901.-91 had mistakenly been paid to defendant, and that defendant had shown no reason why she should be permitted to retain it. The proofs amply sustain the allegations.
Although the bookkeeping error was a unilateral mistake of fact, that constitutes no bar to recovery in this case. Florida case law supports the proposition that relief will be granted for unilateral mistake where the mistake goes to the substance of the agreement, is not the result of a lack of due care, and where the other party has not relied upon the mistake to his detriment.
The general release executed under mistake of fact cannot prevent plaintiffs' recovery. By its very terms, the release was premised upon defendant's desire to "pay all fees due attorneys" and to achieve the "return of balance of funds," both based upon the statements and accounts prepared by plaintiffs.
In Boole v. Florida Power & Light Co., 1941, 147 Fla. 589, 3 So.2d 335, the Supreme Court limited the scope of a purportedly general release to cover only those matters known or contemplated by the parties. Subsequent cases have further established in Florida the principle that a release executed pursuant to a mistake of past or present fact (as here, the balance of defendant's account) may on proper showing be set aside.
Nor does the mutual release constitute an accord and satisfaction such as would preclude recovery. The scope of an accord and satisfaction, just as the scope of a release, is primarily a matter of intention. Here the intention of the parties was to compromise only the amount of outstanding attorney fees.
In view of plaintiffs' showing that $1,-901.91 has been paid to defendant under mistake of fact, and of defendant's failure to allege or prove any circumstances making restitution inequitable, we reverse and remand for entry of a final judgment in plaintiffs' favor.
Reversed.
OWEN, J., concurs.
CROSS, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The statement of account sent by plaintiffs and signed and accepted by defendant related in part:
" Since some time and effort would be required to complete this matter, we have agreed to adjust our fee. Accordingly, we are prepared to accept in full payment the sum of $9,100.00. This sum deducted from $15,400.00, leaves a balance of $6,300.00, which we are prepared to deliver to you on your indication of acceptance of the above statement of account and execution of mutual releases."
. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Krasnek, Fla.1965, 174 So.2d 541. The Restatement of Restitution, § 20, states as a general principle:
"A person who has paid another an excessive amount of money because of an erroneous belief induced by a mistake of fact that the sum paid was necessary for the discharge of a duty, for the performance of a condition, or for the acceptance of an offer, is entitled to restitution of the excess."
. De Witt v. Miami Transit Co., Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 898; Ormsby v. Ginolfi, Fla.App.1958, 107 So.2d 272.
. United States Rubber Products v. Clark, 1941, 145 Fla. 631. 200 So. 385: Best Concrete Corp. v. Oswalt Engineering Service Corp., Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 587. See also Restatement of Restitution, § 11.