Case Name: Mary A. Coffin, Respondent, v. Saint Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., Appellant
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1886-06-14
Citations: 22 Mo. App. 601
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary A. Coffin, Respondent, v. Saint Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., Appellant.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 601–606

Head Matter:
Mary A. Coffin, Respondent, v. Saint Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., Appellant.
Kansas City Court of Appeals,
June 14, 1886.
1. Railroads — Requirement to Ring Bell, etc. — Construction of Section 1, Page 79, Laavs of Missouri, 1881 — Case Adjudged. — The statute (sect. 1, p. 79, Laws of Mo., 1881), does not impose the alternative duty on railroads to sound the bell or whistle at street crossings in cities. They are only required to ring the bell. So, when the statement, in this case, alleged the failure to ring the bell, it presented a statutory ground of negligence, and when proof was made Of this omission, a prima facie case was made out. This presumption the defendant was then at liberty to rebut by showing that the failure to ring the bell was not the cause of such injury, as provided by the statute.
on motion for re-hearing.
2. -Construction of Section 806, Revised Statutes — Obligation to Ring Bell, etc., in Cities. — Neither section 806, Revised Statutes, nor the statute above construed (and they are the same, except that the latter devolves upon the railway company the burden of proof where it fails to ring the bell, ecc.), relieve the railroad from the obligation, in cities, to ring the bell or sound the whistle eighty rods from each street crossing. But when the company has complied with the statute by ringing its bell up to the time it stopped at the station; and then resumed the ringing, as it should do, the instant it moves on, this would be a practical compliance with the statute. Semble, the legislature did not require railroads to sound a steam whistle inside of the corporate limits in the vicinity of street crossings, since it is a source of great disturbance and fright to horses and people, and, in such a case, is a nuisance.
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court, Hon. M. Gr. Mc-Gregor, Judge.
Affirmed.
Motion for re-hearing denied.
The case is stated in the opinion.
W. H. Phelps, for the appellant.
I. There are two counts in the petition — the first based on failure to ring the bell — the second, negligence in operating the train. No testimony was admissible under the first count; it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.. It is not sufficient to show the bell was not rung; it was also necessary to show that the whistle was not sounded. A railroad company is not required to do both. Either is sufficient. Van Note v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 641; Lamar v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 578 ; Haeferty v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 90.
II. Inconsistent instructions were given to the jury. Each must be correct in itself as far as it goes. They must all be consistent with each other, and the whole taken together must present but one doctrine, or the jury will have nothing to guide them. Goetz v. Railroad, 50 Mo. 472.
III. Where a jury may have been misled by erroneous instructions, a new trial will be granted, though there are other matters upon which the jury must or might have returned the same verdict. Shedd v. Augustin, 14 Kan. 282; State v. Nauert, 20 Mo. App. 295 ; Railroad v. Sawyer, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 231.
IV. Defendant’s instruction, number five, should have been given. Defendant was not liable, unless the failure to give the statutory signals, caused the injury. Alexander v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 494; Kendrick v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 521.
Joseph Cravens, for the respondent.
I. Section 1, page 97, Laws of Missouri, 1881, does not require the whistle to be sounded before crossing a street in a city. Cases referring to road crossings in the country have no application here.
II. Defendant’s negligence was clearly shown by the evidence.
III. The instructions are either correct or such as defencLant cannot complain of. The second is undoubtedly correct, since it presents the question of negligence aside from statutory liability. Goodwin v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 73 ; Bauer v. Railroad, 69 Mo. 219 ; Braxton v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 455; White v. Railroad, 20 Mo. App. 564.

Opinion:
Philips, P. J.
This action was begun in a justice's-court, and tried on appeal in the circuit court, where-plaintiff had judgment, from which defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The statement contained two counts. The first alleged that defendant is a corporation, etc., and that while-running one of its trains of cars through the city of Carthage, in Marion township, Jasper county, it negligently failed to ring the bell, placed on its locomotive engine, at a distance of eighty rods from where it crossed Third street, a publicly traveled street of said city, whereby it-ran down and killed plaintiff ' s cow at said street crossing.
The second count was based on the negligence of defendant's agents and servants in running and managing said train of cars, whereby plaintiff'scow was negligently killed, etc.
I. The principal contention of appellant is that the-first count does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it does not allege that defendant also failed and neglected to sound the steam whistle attached to said locomotive. At the hearing we were of the ©pinion that this objection was well taken, owing to the fact that it was not observed that the injury in question occurred at a street crossing, within the limits of a city. Section 1, page 79, Laws of Missouri, 1881, provides that: "A bell shall be placed on each locomotive engine, and be rung at a distance of at least eighty rods from the-place where the railroad shall cross any traveled public-road or street, and be kept ringing, etc., or a steam whistle shall be attached to such engine, and be sounded at- least eighty rods from the place where the railroad shall moss any such road or street, except in cities, ' ' etc.
From this it is plain that the statute does not impose the alternative duty on railroads to sound the bell or whistle at street crossings in cities. They are only required to ring the bell. So when the statement alleged the failure to ring the bell it presented a statutory ground •of negligence; and when it made pro.of of this omission it made out a primeo facie case. This presumption defendant was then at liberty to rebut by showing that the failure to ring the bell was not the cause of such injury. 'Statute, supra. ' While we are not prepared to say, as it is not necessary to the determination of this appeal, that proof of sounding the whistle could be regarded, as a matter of law, as a substitute for the ringing of the bell, it may be conceded that evidence of the sounding of the whistle is a fact which should go to the jury to show that the omission to ring the bell probably did not occasion the injury.
The defendant is in no position to .complain in this case, for the court, of its own motion, instructed the jury that if the bell was not so wrung, yet, if they found from the evidence that the whistle was sounded, the plaintiff could not recover on account of the failure to ring the bell.
In this view there was no such conflict in the instructions as was in any degree calculated to mislead the jury to defendant's prejudice. It, perhaps, got a more favorable submission than the law warranted, but of this it •cannot complain. Crews v. K. C., St. Joe., etc., Ry. Co., 19 Mo. App. 302.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. All -concur.