Case Name: REHABILITATION CONCEPTS PLUS, INC., Charles Jackson, Agent, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Clarence WILLS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2007-10-10
Citations: 968 So. 2d 262
Docket Number: No. 42,400-CA
Parties: REHABILITATION CONCEPTS PLUS, INC., Charles Jackson, Agent, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Clarence WILLS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before WILLIAMS, GASKINS, PEATROSS, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 968
Pages: 262–270

Head Matter:
REHABILITATION CONCEPTS PLUS, INC., Charles Jackson, Agent, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Clarence WILLS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 42,400-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Oct. 10, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 2007.
See also 926 So.2d 771.
Clarence Wills, pro se.
Angela M. Smith, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, GASKINS, PEATROSS, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ.

Opinion:
LOLLEY, J.
11 Clarence Wills appeals a judgment by the Shreveport City Court, Parish of Cad-do, State of Louisiana, in favor of Rehabilitation Concepts Plus, Inc. ("Rehabilitation Concepts") on its suit on open account. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Facts
As presented on appeal by Rehabilitation Concepts, this lawsuit involves a seemingly straightforward suit on open account by Rehabilitation Concepts against Wills for the amount of $2,188.00. However, beneath the simple facade presented by Rehabilitation Concepts lies far more complicated content.
On January 24, 2003, Wills was involved in a motor vehicle accident, and he obtained treatment from Rehabilitation Concepts-a company that provides rehabilitation and therapy services. Wills received treatment from Rehabilitation Concepts from January 29, 2003 through February 26, 2003. As claimed by Rehabilitation Concepts, Wills failed to pay the amount due of $2,188.00, despite repeated demands for payment. Although the record contains Wills' consent for treatment, there is no contract for services included that would provide what the terms for payment might have been.
Previously, Wills had filed suit in connection with his accident, which he ultimately settled with National Automotive Insurance Company ("National Automotive") for $5,700.00. The settlement appears to have included the fees for services provided by Rehabilitation Concepts in the amount of $2,188.00. An initial concursus proceeding was instituted by National Automotive to determine how the settlement proceeds would be | .disbursed. The hearing on that matter took place at the trial court on September 28, 2005, and was the subject of an appeal to this court. See Wills v. National Automotive Ins., 41,034 (La.App. 2d Cir.04/12/06), 926 So.2d 771 {"Wills I"). In the initial concursus proceeding, the trial court entered judgment that allowed the withdrawal of Wills' settlement proceeds and the payment to Rehabilitation Concepts (along with other creditors in the litigation) of Wills' debt. However, in Wills I this court vacated that judgment due to procedural irregularities, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
On September 26, 2006, the second con-cursus proceeding was held. Although the judgment does not reflect that a representative for Rehabilitation Concepts appeared, the concursus record does contain the minutes from the trial court that show personal service being made on Rehabilitation Concepts on May 22, 2006. The trial court's judgment dated October 4, 2006, dismissed the concursus proceeding and ordered the disbursement of the entire settlement proceeds to Wills. That judgment makes no mention of Rehabilitation Concepts and was not appealed by any party.
Rehabilitation Concepts filed its petition on open account on September 26, 2006— the same day as the second concursus proceeding. In its statement of claim, it noted that "[i]n a court proceeding this AM in the courtroom of Judge Bill Kelly, the proceeds of settle [sic] are being released to Mr. Wills." Wills answered that he only owed Rehabilitation Concepts $500.00. Further, he moved for that proceeding to be removed from Small RClaims Court to City Court, which it was. On November 21, 2006, the trial court heard oral arguments and reviewed the presented evidence on Rehabilitation Concepts' suit on open account. It considered the argument by Wills regarding the concur-sus proceeding and Rehabilitation Concepts' failure to assert its claim. However, the trial court determined that the record of the concursus proceeding did not indicate that Rehabilitation Concepts had been served with notice so that Rehabilitation Concepts could assert its claim against the settlement proceeds. Based on that, the trial court determined that Wills owed Rehabilitation Concepts $2,188.00 on open account. This pro se appeal by Wills ensued.
Discussion
On appeal, Wills argues that Rehabilitation Concepts is precluded from asserting a claim against him, because it failed to assert its claim during the concursus proceeding. In essence, Wills argues that the concursus judgment is res judicata as to the subsequent claim on open account by Rehabilitation Concepts. We agree.
The peremptory exception of res judicata cannot be supplied by the court— it must be specially pleaded. La. C.C.P. art. 927 B; Knighten v. Knighten, 447 So.2d 534 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied, 448 So.2d 1308 (La.1984). Although Wills, appearing herein and at the trial court pro se, has not filed specifically a pleading entitled "Exception of Res Judi-cata," his argument, both before the trial court and now on appeal, is obviously such. Before both courts, Wills argued that Rehabilitation Concepts had an opportunity to make its claim in the concursus proceedings, but failed to do |4so, and should be precluded from later coming and asserting a claim against him. Whereas the words "res judicata" were never uttered by this pro se litigant, he sufficiently raises the issue of res judicata, and we will consider it on appeal. See Fox v. National Gypsum, Inc., 1996-25 (La.App. 5th Cir.04/30/96), 673 So.2d 1223.
As provided in La. C.C.P. art. 4651, "[a] concursus proceeding is one in which two or more persons having competing or conflicting claims to money, property, or mortgages or privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their respective claims contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding." Concur-sus is a form of procedure and has been characterized as a facility or means of applying the substantive law. The primary purpose of the concursus statute is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and actions, and it contemplates a proceeding leading to a single judgment which finally adjudicates all issues between the parties. Bienville Holding Co., Inc. v. Quality Mach. & Supply, Inc., 29,113 (La.App. 2d Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 429, writ denied, 1996-3083 (La.02/07/97), 688 So.2d 507. The definition of the concursus proceeding under La. C.C.P. art. 4651 requires that two or more competing claimants to a fund or other property be impleaded to made defendants in the action. Id. Each defendant in a concursus proceeding is considered as being both a plaintiff and a defendant with respect to all other parties. La. C.C.P. art. 4656.
In this matter, a review of the court minutes from the second concursus proceeding shows clearly that Rehabilitation Concepts received personal service of notice of the proceedings on May 22, 2006. It is unclear |show the trial court made a determination that Rehabilitation Concepts did not have notice of those proceedings-a finding that was the basis for its ultimate determination that Rehabilitation Concepts should prevail in its claim against Wills. On September 26, 2006, the second concursus proceeding was conducted. Although the judgment rendered following that proceeding does not indicate an appearance by Rehabilitation Concepts, Charles Jackson, the owner and agent of Rehabilitation Concepts, admitted at the trial on the claim for open account that he had knowledge of and was present at the concursus proceeding. Moreover, in the Statement of Claim filed at the trial court by Rehabilitation Concepts and signed by Jackson on September 26th, it noted that the concursus proceeding had taken place that morning, signifying knowledge of the proceeding. Finally, appeal counsel for Rehabilitation Concepts confirmed that Jackson was present at the September 26th concursus proceeding.
Louisiana R.S. 13:4231, which addresses the issue of res judicata, states as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
|⅜(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at that time of the final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
Further, as stated in the La. Civil Law Treatise, 1A Civil Procedure-Special Proceedings 52, § 4.3:
Res judicata, literally "the thing adjudged," bars relitigation of claims that have been processed to final judgment in an action between parties. The societal policies underlying the doctrine are obvious: judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties. However, a final judgment should not bar all claims between parties, but only those claims which were or should have been litigated in the suit. The general common law rule is that the judgment bars all claims "which might have been pleaded" in the suit.
In determining the issue at hand, we consider the stated concept of res judi-cata as it pertains to the concursus proceeding, noting that the procedural tool of concursus contemplates a proceeding leading to a single judgment which finally adjudicates all issues between parties. Here, although the trial court erroneously determined otherwise, the record clearly shows that Rehabilitation Concepts was properly served with notice of the second concursus proceeding and Jackson, by his own admission, was present at the hearing on behalf of Rehabilitation Concepts. It was given an opportunity to appear and assert its claim for the funds it was owed as a result of providing medical treatment to Wills. If Rehabilitation Concepts, which appeared through its owner, Jackson (presumably a non-lawyer), was ignorant as to the nature of those proceedings, it was incumbent upon it to |7secure legal counsel to offer advice and to protect its legal rights. Failure to do so, in this case, only served to deprive Rehabilitation Concepts of that portion of the settlement proceeds that it might have otherwise been entitled to. Rehabilitation Concepts' failure to assert its claim properly during the concursus proceeding served to prevent it from subsequently revisiting the very same issue (i.e., payment of its claim for treatment of Wills' injuries) against him. Rehabilitation Concepts got its bite at the apple at the concursus proceedings, and it cannot have a second bite on its suit on open account. So considering, we conclude that the judgment rendered by the trial court following the second concursus proceedings is res judicata as to Rehabilitation Concepts' claim for payment in connection with Wills' personal injury litigation against National Automotive-claim that clearly existed at the time of the second concursus proceeding.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in favor of Rehabilitation Concepts Plus, Inc. and against Clarence Willis is reversed. Costs of these appeal proceedings are assessed to Rehabilitation Concepts.
REVERSED.
GASKINS, J., dissents with written reasons.
PEATROSS, J., dissents with written reasons.
. Why Rehabilitation Concepts did not make a claim at the second concursus proceeding is unknown and unexplained. It is especially perplexing in light of the fact that it' did receive its share of the proceeds at the initial concursus proceeding, which judgment was subsequently vacated by Wills I. On appeal, Rehabilitation Concepts makes no mention of the concursus proceeding and does not address Wills' argument as to such, focusing solely on the issue of the open account.
. Wills has also requested additional reimbursement of expenses he claimed to have incurred in connection with his appeal. Said expenses are not recognized costs of the appeal and are not considered herein.