Case Name: Ida Jean HARTMAN, Appellant, v. OPELIKA MACHINE AND WELDING COMPANY and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-05-28
Citations: 414 So. 2d 1105
Docket Number: No. TT-50
Parties: Ida Jean HARTMAN, Appellant, v. OPELIKA MACHINE AND WELDING COMPANY and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Appellees.
Judges: SHIVERS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 1105–1117

Head Matter:
Ida Jean HARTMAN, Appellant, v. OPELIKA MACHINE AND WELDING COMPANY and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Appellees.
No. TT-50.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 28, 1982.
R. P. Warfield and James M. Barton, II, of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, Pensacola, for appellant.
Charles C. Sherrill and Larry Hill, of Sherrill, Moore & Hill, Pensacola, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Judge.
In this products liability action, Ida Jean Hartman appeals from a final judgment in favor of appellee, Opelika Machine and Welding Company, the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product which purportedly caused certain personal injuries suffered by her at the Monsanto Textiles Company mill where she worked. Appellant Hartman relies for reversal upon several asserted trial errors, only two of which merit extended discussion: (1) Whether the entry of a directed verdict for appellee on the theory of strict liability was reversible error, and (2) whether it was reversible error for the trial judge to allow Opelika to present evidence of Monsanto's design changes in the spin buggy after the accident. We find the first assigned point requires reversal, but affirm the latter.
Appellant was employed by Monsanto as a drawtwist operator. Her job was to take finished yam from one drawtwist machine, put the spools of finished yarn onto the arms of a spin buggy, and move on to the next machine. The spin buggy had a rectangular base, and was mounted on four wheels so that it could be rolled by the operator along the plant floor from machine to machine. At each end of the spin buggy's rectangular base were stanchions to which were welded several projecting arms made of aluminum tubing, that served as handles for moving the buggy and to hold the bobbins of yarn. The accident occurred while appellant was walking backwards, pulling at the same time the top arm of the buggy with her right hand, when the arm handle broke off, thereby causing her to fall onto the concrete floor.
Appellant's three-count fifth amended complaint sought recovery on the theories of implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability. Prior to trial, a summary judgment was granted in favor of Opelika on the strict liability count, insofar as any design defect was concerned, upon uneontra-dicted evidence that the spin buggy was fabricated by Opelika based upon a design and specifications furnished by Monsanto. At trial, after all evidence for plaintiff and defendant had been presented, the trial court directed a verdict for Opelika on the strict liability count, as to any manufacturing defect, and submitted the case to the jury on the counts charging breach of implied warranty and negligence. As to those theories, the jury returned verdicts absolving Opelika from liability.
Although the record before us does not disclose the trial judge's reasons for directing a verdict on the strict liability count at the close of all the evidence, we presume from Opelika's arguments here and in the court below that the trial judge was persuaded by Opelika's "stream of commerce" argument. Opelika maintains that a manufacturer which fabricates and supplies a product solely for the use of a single purchaser, using a design, plans and specifications furnished by the purchaser, is not "engaged in the business of selling such a product" within the meaning and intent of Section 402A, Restatement of Torts (Second). If this were the basis for the court's decision, it was without legal foundation. Opelika was in the business of manufacturing and supplying products such as the spin buggy to independent customers, and we find no authority to suggest that Opelika's liability for a defectively welded part should be determined on different principles than for a manufacturer who places its product on the market for sale to the general public. Section 402 of the Restatement of Law of Torts (Second), defining strict liability, "applies to any manufacturer of . a product [for use or consumption], to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor . . " See comment f to Section 402A.
The arguments made by defendant here should be compared with those of the defendant manufacturers in Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) and Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), to the effect that because they assembled certain military products according to the government's specifications and design, and sold the products exclusively to the government, they were not part of the distributive proc ess. Both courts rejected these arguments, holding that strict liability applies to a situation which is essentially commercial in nature, involving the transmission of the product into the stream of commerce.
Opelika's stronger argument is that notwithstanding the fact that the lower court may have erred in granting the motion for directed verdict on Hartman's strict liability claim, the error was harmless only because the charge given to the jury on implied warranty, being substantially similar to that of strict liability was, in effect, an instruction which was tantamount to strict liability. Opelika relies upon a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Sansing v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 354 So.2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), in which the court held that no error occurred due to the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability claim because the charge given the jury on breach of implied warranty closely paralleled that given on strict liability. Had the same or substantially similar charge been given by the court to the jurors in the case below as was given them in Sansing, we would have no difficulty in agreeing that the directed verdict on the strict liability claim was harmless. The trial court's instruction in Sansing was, however, far different from that given here. Compare the charge given below with that given the jury in Sansing.
The Sansing instruction substantially approximates the standard instruction presently provided juries in strict liability actions, to the effect that "[a] product is defective if it is in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user and the product is expected to and does reach the user without substantial change affecting that condition." See Standard Instruction PL-4. On the other hand, the charge given here was patterned after Standard Instruction PL-2, relating to the implied warranty of merchantability, stating that "[a] product is defective if it is not reasonably fit for the uses intended or reasonably foreseeable by (defendant)." Obviously, then, both the standard instruction on strict liability and the instruction given by the trial court in Sansing on breach of implied warranty of merchantability emphasize — unlike the charge given here — the unreasonably dangerous condition of a product that may cause physical harm to the user. The failure to charge the jury on a product's potential affinity for causing injury is a serious omission. As Professor Wade has ob served: "[A] product may be defective and still not be likely to cause injury. An automobile, for example, may have something wrong with the ignition so that it will not start properly, or the clock or the radio may not work correctly. If so, it is obviously defective, but it is not harmfully defective." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss.LJ. 825, 832 (1973).
Instead of advising the jury that a defendant may be liable for manufacturing a defective product which may be so unreasonably dangerous as to cause physical harm to a human being, the charge given below stresses the contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller, or the idea of a contractual action for failure of the plaintiff to receive what had been contracted for. Indeed, the various remedies afforded the respective parties under Part VII of the UCC relating to sales (2.701-.724) underscore such contractual relationships. As examples, the buyer's remedies include his right to cancel the contract, to recover damages for non-delivery of the goods, to obtain specific performance or replevy the goods, etc., UCC 2.711; yet, only one remedy is permitted him in the event he suffers personal injuries, and it is limited to consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach which are "proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." Section 672.715(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) (UCC 2.715(2)(b)). Thus, the reasonable fitness test for determining whether goods are merchantable
was never intended to be a test for ascertaining when a maker would be liable for damages incurred by those who were physically harmed. This is apparent from the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code provides for recovery of damages for physical harm as consequential damages from a breach of warranty and only then if that damage proximately results from the breach of warranty. This means at the very least that physical harm from such unfitness must be reasonably foreseeable.... [T]his is a circuitous route to saying that the product is unreasonably dangerous.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 37 (1973) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
An additional problem stemming from the indiscriminate application of the implied warranty standard to a strict liability action is the measure of damages awardable. As we previously observed, one who seeks damages for personal injuries in an action founded on breach of implied warranty may receive them only if they "proximately result . from any breach of warranty." Section 402A, however, does not limit the recovery of damages to those which are proximately caused by a product's defectiveness, but instead uses the words, "harm thereby caused .," thus suggesting that it may have been the drafters' intention to require the plaintiff to prove only that the defective product was the factual cause of his injury.
Professor Wade pinpoints another problem in gauging the measure of damages awardable in strict liability cases if a warranty standard is applied. Because damages for personal injuries resulting from breach of warranty are characterized by the UCC as "consequential", such damages might be limited to the rule stated in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Rep. 145 (1854), requiring that damages recoverable for breach of contract be those which are reasonably foreseeable or within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. If such a limitation were imposed upon a claim brought under strict liability, another paradox emerges: although strict liability is founded on tort, see comment m to Section 402A, tort principles would necessarily be disregarded in determining the measure of damages in strict liability. The anomalous result would be that a claimant's recovery in strict liability would ordinarily be far less than that allowable if the action were founded upon negligence, an action which strict liability was designed to supersede.
There can be little doubt that the scope of strict liability is far more extensive than a claim based on implied warranty. In fact, one of the reasons West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80, 90 (Fla.1976) gave for its adoption of Section 402A was that "warranty law in Florida has become filled with inconsistencies and misapplications in the judiciary's attempt to provide justice to the injured consumer, user, employee, bystander, etc., while still maintaining the contractual principles of privity." The creation of Section 402A was no doubt in part motivated by the drafters' efforts to correct such judicial "misapplications" and "inconsistencies." Indeed, comment m to Section 402A states:
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted to a "warranty," either running with the goods sold, by analogy to covenants running with the land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally agreed that a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of the strict liability where there is no such contract. There is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.

The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. In short, "warranty" must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability in tort.
Restatement of Law of Torts (Second), 355-56.
Thus, as the above comments indicate, the standard for product defectiveness in warranty actions is not wholly applicable to claims grounded upon strict liability. Until the lines of demarcation are clearly drawn, we are reluctant to state that the standard charge pertinent to an action for breach of implied warranty, stressing as it does a plaintiff's loss of bargain, coextends with the standard charge presently required for strict liability. And, because the in struction as given below failed to suggest to the jury the alleged offending product's potential for causing physical harm to the user, it was, in our judgment, an incomplete and misleading instruction, the effect of which was reversible error. Cf. Escambia County Electric Light & Power Co. v. Sutherland, 61 Fla. 167, 55 So. 83 (1911); Adkins v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 351 So.2d 1088 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).
In her second point, appellant urges that it was error to allow defendant to produce evidence showing Monsanto's post-accident design changes to the buggy consisting of substitution of steel bars for the hollow aluminum tubing arms, and the welding of a bracket to each arm where it joined the stanchion. Appellant bases this point upon the well-settled general rule, followed in Florida, that evidence of a change in condition or repairs made after an injury-causing accident is not admissible as proof of the defendant's negligence in failing to make the repairs or changes prior to the accident. City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So.2d 774 (Fla.1955); City of Niceville v. Hardy, 160 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), and see Section 90.407, Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), "Subsequent remedial measures." There are only two recognized exceptions to the general rule in Florida pertinent to the issue before us: First, inquiry as to subsequent repairs is permissible on cross-examination to test credibility. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer v. Lee, 90 Fla. 632, 106 So. 462 (1925). Second, evidence of subsequent repairs can be used in rebuttal if the opposing party "opens the door." Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 383 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
We have found no cases in Florida involving the precise factual situation to that before us, i.e., where post-accident design changes were made by one not a party to the litigation, and such facts are sought to be admitted into evidence by one or more of the parties. There is, however, impressive out-of-state authority both permitting, see, e.g., Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 395 Mich. 661, 238 N.W.2d 1 (1976); Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Wiedemann Machine Co., 280 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1960), and excluding such evidence. See Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Barnhouse, 293 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex.Civ.App.1956). We prefer the rule of admissibility under the limited circumstances applicable to this case, and adopt the reasons advanced by the Michigan Supreme Court for its reception:
The rule [of exclusion] is defended in terms of relevancy and policy. Such evidence is said to be irrelevant because it is capable of explanations equally as plausible as an admission by conduct of pre-ac-cident neglect of duty. If relevancy were the only criteria, Professors Wigmore and McCormick both point out that such evidence would meet the usual standards of relevancy. The rule is primarily grounded in the policy that owners would be discouraged from attempting repairs that might prevent future injury if they feared that evidence of such acts could be introduced against them. This policy consideration is absent in a case, such as this, where imposition of liability is not sought against the person taking the remedial action.
(238 N.W.2d at 4) (footnotes omitted).
In view of our ruling upholding the admission of such evidence when the change is made by one not a party to the action, we find it unnecessary to address appellee's contention that the general rule excluding evidence of post-accident remedial action is inapplicable in products liability litigation. See, on this issue, Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App.Div., 1976); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal.1974); and Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill.App.3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (Ill.3d DCA 1972); contra, Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), holding that the rule of exclusion applies in strict liability actions as well as negligence actions, and noting the split in jurisdictions.
Finally, we have considered and affirm the trial court's rulings as to appellant's two remaining points, one asserting error in allowing defense witness Lamar to testify concerning the design of the spin buggy, the other claiming error in permitting expert witness Johnson to testify. The trial judge is accorded considerable leeway in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and the qualifications of an expert witness. See Whitten v. Erny, 152 So.2d 510 (Fla.2d DCA 1963); Seaboard Air Line R. C. v. Lake Region Packing Association, 211 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Headley v. Lasseter, 147 So.2d 154 (Fla.3d DCA 1962); Vitale Fireworks Manufacturing Company v. Marini, 314 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Johnson v. State, 314 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). And we do not find on this record such an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SHIVERS, J., concurs.
LARRY G. SMITH, J., concurring in part and dissenting.
. The jury was instructed:
The alternative claims of the plaintiff are a claim of negligence and a claim of breach of implied warranty of the [sic] fitness. On each of these claims, the defendant has denied liability- The issues for your determination on the breach of implied warranty claim of the plaintiff against the defendant are whether the buggy manufactured, assembled and fabricated by the defendant, Opelika Machine and Welding Company was defective when it left the possession of said defendant and if so, whether such defect was a legal cause of injury or damage sustained by the plaintiff. The product is defective if it is not reasonably fit for the use intended, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant .
. The instruction given the jury in Sansing was as follows:
In order for the plaintiffs to recover from the defendants Ford and Firestone for injuries sustained as a result of a defect in the truck wheel rim assembly involved in this litigation it is necessary that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by some defect or dangerous condition in the wheel rim assembly which makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user. The wheel rim assembly in question must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user of the product, possessing the knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. 354 So.2d at 897 (emphasis supplied).
. This instruction tracks generally the black letter statement of Section 402A, Restatement of Torts (Second), providing in part: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer."
. This is the "reasonably fit" standard prescribed under the UCC for determining a product's merchantability. See Section 672.-314(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) (UCC 2.314(2)(c)).
. Professor Wade was one of the members of an advisory committee which assisted in drafting Section 402A.
. Dean Page Keeton also contributed to drafting Section 402A.
. This is a view advocated by certain commentators. See, e.g., R. Parks, A. C. Watts-Fitzgerald, T. A. Watts-Fitzgerald, Products Liability, 33 Mi.L.Rev. 1185, 1206 (1979); D. Maleson, Negligence is Dead But Its Doctrines Rule Us From the Grave: A Proposal to Limit Defendant's Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 Temple L.Q. 1 (1978).
.See Wade, supra, at 933-34.
. The damages recoverable for the commission of a tort are of course not circumscribed by any rule of foreseeability as long as the consequences directly and proximately result from the wrongful act, provided that such act is not interrupted by the intervention of an independent cause, without which cause the injury could not have occurred. See Fla.Jur.2d, Damages, § 36 (1980). For a more extended discussion of the differences in the damages recoverable in tort as opposed to contract actions, see Prosser, Law of Torts, § 92 at 619-20 (4th ed. 1971).