Case Name: Scott M. MATHESON, Governor of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The Honorable J. Allan CROCKETT, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1978-01-11
Citations: 577 P.2d 948
Docket Number: No. 15584
Parties: Scott M. MATHESON, Governor of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The Honorable J. Allan CROCKETT, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: ELLETT, C. J., HALL, J., HENRIOD, Justice Retired, and SWAN, District Judge, participate in the opinion, with WILKINS, J., dissenting as appears hereinabove.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 577
Pages: 948–951

Head Matter:
Scott M. MATHESON, Governor of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The Honorable J. Allan CROCKETT, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 15584.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 11, 1978.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Joseph P. McCarthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
J. Thomas Greene, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This friendly suit for a declaratory judgment was brought by the governor of this state to seek an interpretation as to the meaning of U.C.A., 1953, 49-7a-39 which reads:
A trial judge shall retire upon attaining the age of 70 years, and a supreme court judge shall retire upon attaining the age of 72 years, provided; however, any judge serving a term as judge on May 13,1969, who has attained the age of retirement or attains that age during the term he was serving on May 13, 1969, shall retire on the completion of such term.
Justice Crockett will reach age 72 on January 19, 1978; and if he must retire, it will be necessary for the governor to appoint his successor to serve until the next general election.
The trial judge held that the section above set out does not require the justice to retire prior to the expiration of the term to which he was last elected. When Justice Crockett began his present term on January 4, 1971, as a justice of this Court, the law then in force and effect read:
A trial judge shall retire upon attaining the age of 70 years, and a supreme court judge shall retire upon attaining the age of 72 years; provided, however, any judge serving a term as judge on the effective date of this act, who has attained the age of retirement or attains that age during his present term shall retire on the completion of his present term. (U.C.A., 1953, 49-7-1.1)
Six months after the justice began his present term, section 49-7-1.1 was re pealed, and at the same time section 49-7a-39 was enacted. Ordinarily, when an act is repealed and the provisions thereof are simultaneously reenacted, the provisions of the old act are carried over into the new one without hiatus in the law. See 73 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 391. However, in the instant matter, the new act included a provision that the trial judge thought made a difference. This provision is contained in U.C.A., 1953, 49-7a-37 which reads:
Provisions of this act shall not be applied retroactively unless specifically so provided.
The trial judge held that Justice Crockett need not retire prior to the end of the term to which he was elected, and this appeal was brought to have the issue settled by the Utah Supreme Court. Our ruling in this matter will be of no consequence to any except the parties in this suit since no other judge or justice in this state was serving a term on July 1, 1971, that has not already expired, except for the Chief Justice of this Court whose term began prior to the first act and will expire at the end of 1978.
This suit has been conducted without rancor or animosity. Both plaintiff and defendant have been equally interested in having the matter determined. Counsel have cooperated to have the matter speedily decided, and this Court is grateful to the parties and to their counsel for the excellent manner in which this case has been handled.
Counsel for the plaintiff admitted that under the actual wording of the statute, Justice Crockett would not be compelled to retire at age 72. What he does argue is that the legislature, in enacting the new law, intended for him to do so.
We may look to the intention of the legislature when there exists an ambiguity in the language of the statute. Here we find no ambiguity at all for the statute clearly states that it is not to be applied retroactively. Such being the case, the defendant herein is not subject to a law that was effective after his present judicial term began; but, rather, he is subject to the law that was in effect at the beginning of his present term. That statute (U.C.A., 1953, 49-7-1.1) clearly permits him to complete his entire term even if he reaches age 72 before its expiration. So far as intent goes, it is just as reasonable to assume that the legislature intended to exclude the defendant from the retirement provision as it would be to assume that it meant some thing which was not said in the statute.
Justice Crockett did not become 72 years of age during the term that he was serving on May 13, 1969; and, therefore, section 39 which is not retroactive in its application does not apply to him.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs are awarded.