Case Name: CONGZHEN OU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORP., Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-04-01
Citations: 419 F. App'x 21
Docket Number: No. 09-4489-cv
Parties: CONGZHEN OU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 419
Pages: 21–23

Head Matter:
CONGZHEN OU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 09-4489-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
April 1, 2011.
Congzhen Ou, New York, NY, pro se.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York; Marta Ross, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of New York (on the brief), New York, NY.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Congzhen Ou, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's judgment dismissing her employment discrimination action for failure to prosecute. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.
"[W]e construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties' intentions into account," Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995), especially with respect to pro se litigants, see Phelps v. Kapnolas, 123 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1997). However, because a notice of appeal must "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed" pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), our jurisdiction "depends on whether the intent to appeal from [the] decision [at issue] is clear on the face of, or can be inferred from, the notices of appeal." New Phone Co. Inc. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.2007); see also Shrader, 70 F.3d at 256 (stating that, where a notice of appeal "fail[s] to mention" a specific order, we are "bar[red] from considering" an appellate challenge to that order). The requirements set forth in Fed. RApp. P. 3 and 4 are jurisdictional in nature, and, as a result, cannot be waived. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208-09, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (regarding Rule 4); City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 452 (2d Cir.2008) (regarding Rule 3), ovennded on other grounds by Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 983, 994, 175 L.Ed.2d 943 (2010).
Here, Ou's October 2009 Rule 60(b) motion and notice of appeal were both filed well beyond the time limit within which she could have either appealed from the district court's October 2008 judgment or tolled the time limit within which to appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Although her notice of appeal was timely filed from the order denying her Rule 60(b) motion, it did not reference that order, stating only as follows: "[n]otice is hereby given that Congzhen Ou hereby appeals to [this Court] from the Judgment dismissing] the case entered in this action on the 6[th] day of October, 2008." There simply is no information in Ou's notice of appeal that would permit an inference that she intended to appeal the October 2009 order denying her Rule 60(b) motion. See New Phone, 498 F.3d at 131. Accordingly, we have sua sponte determined that we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.