Case Name: PEOPLE v. KIRKLAND
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-04-24
Citations: 40 Mich. App. 22
Docket Number: Docket No. 10159
Parties: PEOPLE v KIRKLAND
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and J. H. Gillis and Quinn, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 40
Pages: 22–36

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v KIRKLAND
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Limitation of Right— Public Interest—Fair Trial.
The right of an accused to represent himself at trial is not absolute when it conflicts with the interest of the public in insuring a fair trial; when the. right to represent oneself conflicts with the defendant’s own interest in receiving a fair trial, the right may be limited.
2. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Discharge of Counsel —Fair Trial.
A trial judge has a duty to accommodate both the defendant’s right to represent himself and the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel, at public expense if necessary, to the end of achieving a fair trial; while the right to counsel may be waived, it is always the duty of the trial judge to determine whether the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made.
3. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Discharge of Counsel.
Denying defendant’s motion to discharge appointed counsel and defend himself was not error where the defendant wanted counsel discharged because he had not located three alibi witnesses, the attorney made attempts to locate the witnesses, two of whom were believed overseas and the other, a prostitute with no known address, the case was very difficult to defend in that the evidence was overwhelmingly against the defendant, the court concluded that the defendant could not adequately defend himself, the record shows that counsel vigorously defended his client, and the court allowed defendant to ask questions if he wanted to do so.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3, 4, 6, 7] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 310.
[2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 311, 317.
[5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 313.
Dissent by Lesinski, C. J.
4. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self.
A person charged with a crime has a right to defend himself; but after trial has begun, the right to conduct one’s own defense is not absolute but qualified (Const 1963, art 1, § 13; MCLA 763.1).
5. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Discharge of Counsel.
A defendant’s request to represent himself must be granted when the request is unequivocally made before the jury has been chosen and the trial begun.
6. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Discharge of Counsel —Complexity Test.
A defendant’s right to represent himself does not depend on whether the trial court concludes that the defendant would be unable to represent himself fairly in light of the complexity of the case, because it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a defendant would be more skilled than his appointed counsel in the intricacies of courtroom procedure.
7. Criminal Law—Right to Represent Self—Prejudice.
A defendant is not required to show prejudice when his constitutional rights have been violated; a denial of a defendant’s right to represent himself is not justified by his appointed counsel’s vigorous defense or the complexity of the case.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Elvin L. Davenport, J.
Submitted Division 1 February 2, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 10159.)
Decided April 24, 1972.
Leroy Kirkland was convicted of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a felony and possession of burglary tools. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Luvenia D. Dockett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Burton L. Borden, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and J. H. Gillis and Quinn, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, J.
Defendant Leroy Kirkland was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a felony, MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305, and possession of burglary tools, MCLA 750.116; MSA 28.311. From these convictions, defendant appeals as of right.
Defendant's sole allegation of error is that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing his request to defend himself in propria persona.
Defendant was given assigned counsel, Mr. Arthur Arduin, immediately after his arraignment on February 4, 1970. Mr. Arduin represented the defendant at his preliminary examination and appeared with him when the case was assigned for trial on May 21, 1970.
Before the jury was selected, defendant addressed the trial judge, Judge Davenport, as follows:
"Defendant: With all due respect to the court I would like to ask for a change of counsel, please.
"The Court: Will you hire your own?
"Defendant: I am not able to."
The court explained the difficulty of assigning different counsel, and asked the defendant to explain why he did not want Mr. Arduin. The defendant stated, "I cannot communicate with my lawyer". In the colloquy that follows, defendant's dissatisfaction appeared to be based on Mr. Ar duin's inability to locate three alleged alibi witnesses, two of whom were thought to be overseas in the Marine Corps, and a third who was a prostitute with no known address. Defendant had apparently advised Mr. Arduin that he would have the woman contact him, which she failed to do. Mr. Arduin explained that he had made four separate trips to a bar that she allegedly frequented in order to locate her. He further indicated that he had conferred with his client on numerous occasions in the county jail. There were additional written communications between counsel and defendant.
After considerable discussion, the trial judge concluded that there was no evidence to justify discharging assigned counsel. Court was then adjourned with the announcement that trial would start the following morning.
The next morning, defendant requestéd an adjournment so that he could obtain sufficient funds to hire his own attorney. The judge stated that the trial would proceed, and further commented that he had the overall impression that the defendant just didn't want to go to trial. The defendant quite candidly admitted, "That may be true". The defendant then stated that he would like to represent himself because he did not have confidence in his attorney, and did not trust him.
The trial judge advised the defendant that he could represent himself if he wanted to, but that he would have the lawyer sit with him to advise him, and that the defendant could ask questions if he so desired.
In response to the prosecutor's query as to whether defendant would represent himself, the judge declared that the defendant would be unable to do so because he did not know enough to try his own case, but that he could confer with his lawyer about questions he wanted asked.
It was apparent to the trial court that this was a case that would be most difficult to defend. The defendant was observed by police officers exiting the rear door of a florist shop, crowbar in hand, and was apprehended hiding under a porch after a short chase. The outer door and an inner office door in the shop had been pried open, and numerous burglar tools were found at the scene. Defendant admitted that he had been in the area but stated that he had run and attempted to hide under the porch when someone "hollered 'Police' ". He ran because he had just left an after-hours drinking establishment, and was afraid that he would be apprehended and charged with violating his parole. Defendant had prior convictions for burglaries and receiving stolen property.
In these circumstances, the trial judge had ample reason to conclude that the defendant would be unable to fairly represent himself. There can be no argument that counsel's work was excellent throughout the trial, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant.
The right of the accused to represent himself at trial is not absolute when it conflicts with the interest of the public in ensuring a fair trial. For instance, the right has been held to be limited, if asserted after trial has commenced, in the interest of preventing obstruction of criminal justice by the calculated manufacture of new hindrances and novel speculations of error. People v Henley, 382 Mich 143 (1969).
When it conflicts with the defendant's own interest in receiving a fair trial, his right to represent himself may be likewise limited. Certainly of equal importance to the accused is the right to be repre sented by counsel, at public expense if necessary. It falls on the trial judge in the first instance to attempt to accommodate both of these equally important rights, to the end of achieving a fair trial. While the right to counsel may be waived, it is always the duty of the trial court to determine whether the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made.
The tentative draft of the American Bar Association Standards relating to the function of the trial judge offers sound guidelines:
"A defendant should be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the court makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that he
"(a) possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision; and
"(b) comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.
"Commentary
"Although Federal statutes (28 USC § 1654) and many state constitutions, e.g., Art 1, § 9, Constitution of Pennsylvania, authorize defendants in criminal cases to represent themselves, the right is not absolute. The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel cannot be abrogated unless knowingly and intelligently waived, however strongly the defendant may desire to proceed alone. See Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 US 708 (1948); ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, § 7.1-7.3 (Approved Draft, 1968). Particularly when a trial is involved, the interest of the public in an orderly, rational trial is entitled to consideration in determining the defendant's right to appear pro se. See United States v Bentvena, 319 F2d 916, 937 (2d Cir 1963); Butler v United States, 317 F2d 249, 258 (8th Cir 1963).
"A fair trial is impossible if a defendant is tried for a crime while denied counsel. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963). This is so for the reason that, except in most unusual circumstances, a trial in which the accused is unrepresented by counsel is a farcical effort to ascertain guilt. No intervention by the trial judge on behalf of the accused can eliminate the need for competent counsel. Cf. Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 69 (1932).
"Most defendants who seek to appear pro se do so in ignorance of the value of counsel and of their own inadequacies, or out of paranoid distrust of appointed counsel. More sophisticated motives may include the hope that the absence of counsel may afford a basis for reversal of a conviction regarded as inevitable, or a desire to ventilate societal hostility through the dramatic vehicle of a disorderly trial. See generally, Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 Duquesne L Rev 245 (1964). None of these sources of the desire to dispense with counsel outweigh the rights of codefendants, or the interest of the public in a just and orderly trial. Nor do they require the court to disregard the long-term interest of the accused in having guilt or lack of guilt fairly determined." ABA Project oh Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to the Judge's Role in Dealing With Trial Disruptions, Standard C.2 and commentary, pp 10, 11 (Tentative Draft, May 1971).
In the instant case, the trial judge conducted a thorough inquiry, and after considering the complexity of the case and the difficulties of conducting the defense, concluded that the defendant would be unable to fairly represent himself.
The record confirms the accuracy of this conclusion. Trial counsel took advantage of every opportunity, by motion, examination, and cross-examination to protect the defendant's interest. Defendant, unskilled in the law, could not have performed this service for himself. The trial judge was in the best position to make that determination; indeed, it was his duty to do so. By clearly advising the defendant that he could ask questions if he so desired, yet requiring assigned counsel to conduct the defense, the trial judge achieved the fairest accommodation of the conflicting interests £lt stclk.6 llGlTG
People v Fred Smith, 22 Mich App 22 (1970), was a case remarkably similar to the instant case. The sole issue raised was the same. There, on the date set for trial and prior to the selection of the jury, defendant indicated to the trial court that he was dissatisfied with his assigned counsel. No dissatisfaction with or objection to assigned counsel was made thereafter by the defendant despite the fact that the trial continued for several days. The same is true in the instant case. A careful examination of the record here of necessity leads us to the conclusion that the defendant did not unequivocally request that he be permitted to conduct his own defense and the trial court did not err in allowing previously assigned counsel to continue to represent the defendant during his trial. Compare United States ex rel Maldonado v Denno, 348 F2d 12, 15-16 (CA 2, 1965), cert den 384 US 1007; 86 S Ct 1950; 16 L Ed 2d 1020 (1966); People v Henley, supra.
Affirmed.
Quinn, J., concurred.