Case Name: Maurice Ramon WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1995-08-31
Citations: 920 S.W.2d 675
Docket Number: No. 01-94-01032-CR
Parties: Maurice Ramon WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and TAFT and PRICE JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 920
Pages: 675–678

Head Matter:
Maurice Ramon WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-94-01032-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Aug. 31, 1995.
Rehearing Overruled Feb. 1, 1996.
Walter Pink, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., District Attorney, Alan Curry, Mark Vinson, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Before OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and TAFT and PRICE JJ.
. The Honorable Frank C. Price, former Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, sitting by assignment.

Opinion:
OPINION
OLIVER-PARROTT, Chief Justice.
Appellant was charged by indictment with unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing less than 28 grams. After an adverse ruling at a motion to suppress hearing, appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The judge assessed punishment at ten-years confinement pursuant to a plea bargain.
Appellant filed a "general" notice of appeal in which he complains of the trial court's failure to grant appellant's pretrial motion to suppress. The State argues that this Court is without jurisdiction to address this point of error because appellant's notice of appeal does not comply with the requirements of Tex.R.App.P. 40(b)(1), which states in relevant part:
Appeal is perfected in a criminal case by giving timely notice of appeal.... Notice of appeal shall be given in writing filed with the clerk of the trial court. Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order; but if the judgment was rendered upon his plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to Article 1.15 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, in order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdietional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall speeify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial[.] .
Tex.R.App.P. 40(b)(1).
In the instant case, the judgment was rendered on appellant's plea of guilty and the punishment agreed to by the defendant and his attorney did not exceed the recommended punishment. Appellant's notice of appeal did not specify that he was appealing matters which were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial nor did the appeal state that the court granted permission for the appeal. Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Unfortunately, a "general" notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court to review a trial court's ruling on a pretrial suppression based on a negotiated plea bargain. Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Forcha v. State, 894 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.); Moreno v. State, 866 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.).
The prior sentence is prefaced with the word "unfortunately" because we see no useful purpose that is served by rule 40(b)(1). The harsh result mandated by rule 40(b)(1) is the denial of an appeal of an otherwise ap-pealable matter, a written motion that was ruled on before trial. Tex.R.App.P. 40(b)(1). The notice of appeal has but one purpose' — -to limit an appellant's right to appeal. Clearly, it makes no sense to render the "death penalty" sanction on appeal for an appellant's failure to do a useless act. Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 664 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
We do not have jurisdiction to consider the denial of appellant's pretrial motion to suppress, but we urge the Court of Criminal Appeals to repeal the specificity requirement of rule 40(b)(1), or at least allow amendment under Tex.R.App.P. 83.
We dismiss the appeal.