Case Name: Cahoon et al. v. Bank of Utica
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1852-12
Citations: 7 N.Y.3d 486
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cahoon et al. v. Bank of Utica.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 486–492

Head Matter:
Cahoon et al. v. Bank of Utica.
Joinder of actions. — Surrender of vouchers. — Costs.
The assignor of collateral securities, may, with a claim for a surplus, join one, for A surrender of the original evidence of debt. The entire claim is of equitable cognisance, though the amount of the surplus be undisputed.
The plaintiff in such action is entitled to the delivery of a note of which he is a joint-maker, as a voucher against his co-maker.
In such action, the costs are in the discretion of the court, under § 306 of the Code.
Cahoon v. Bank of Utica, 4 How. Pr. 423 ; s. c. 7 Id. 134, reversed.
Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, in the fifth district, where a judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, upon demurrer to the complaint, had been affirmed. (Reported below, 7 How. Pr. 134, and, at special term, 4 Id. 423.)
This was an action by the assignees of Stephen W. Brown, to recover a surplus received by the Bank of Utica, upon a mortgage pledged to it as collateral security for his own promissory notes, and one of the firm of Brown & Rossiter, and to compel a delivery of the notes to the plaintiffs, as assignees.
The complaint set forth that on the 4th day of May 1846, Stephen W. Brown assigned to the defendants a bond and mortgage for $3000, belonging to him, solely, as collateral security for the payment of three promissory notes of $1000 each, two of which were made by Brown alone, and one by Brown & Rossiter, a firm of which he was a partner, and one-half of which Rossiter was bound to pay; that the defendants had collected the mortgage, and that the moneys received on the collection, after paying the amount due upon the three notes, left a surplus in their hands of $89.52; that the plaintiffs, on the 30th day of May 1846, received from Brown an assignment of all his estate and rights in action, and that shortly after, and before the collection of the moneys on the bond and mortgage, by the defendants, he died, and that there were no executors or administrators of his estate; that the defendants, although requested by the plaintiffs, had refused to pay them the surplus moneys received by them, after the ^payment of the notes, and to deliver to them ^ the notes; and demanded judgment for the sum of $89.42, and a surrender of the Botes to the plaintiffs.
The defendants demurred to the complaint, and assigned for cause of demurrer:
1. That several causes of action have been improperly united in said complaint; that- is to say, a cause of action for the recovery of a certain amount of money due by contract from the defendants, and a cause of action to procure the delivery to the said plaintiffs of certain promissory notes in the said complaint mentioned.
2. That the cause of action for the recovery of the moneys in the complaint mentioned, belongs to and should be brought in the name of the personal representatives of Stephen W. Brown, and not by and in the name of the plaintiffs.
The court, at special term (Gridley, J.), gave judgment in favor of the defendants, upon the demurrer, on the ground that there was an improper joinder of causes of action. (4 How. Pr. 423.) And his decision having been affirmed, at general term (7 Id. 134), the plaintiffs took this appeal.
Loomis, for the appellants.
Hunt, for the respondent.

Opinion:
* Johnson, J.
The ground on which this case ought to be put is, that the complaint does not contain two causes of action. The claim is single; it stands substantially in the same position as if Brown himself were plaintiff. The gist of it is, that Brown had placed in the possession of the Bank of Utica a mortgage, the proceeds to be applied to pay three notes, one made by Brown & Rossiter, and the others by Brown, and the surplus to be returned to him. His assignees now seek an account of the proceeds of the mortgage and of their disposition, and to have the balance paid over, and the notes which are satisfied delivered up. It is no answer, to say that the balance of moneys could have been recovered in an action for money had and received; it would, none the less, have been the proper foundation for a bill in equity. Suppose, instead of a single security transferred to secure debts to a single person, twenty different securities had been transferred to the bank, to secure debts due to twenty different persons, does any one doubt that the remedy would b'e in equity ? It is only because there is no dispute about the amount due, that there seems to be any room for mistake as to the character of the claim. If that remained to be ascertained, it would be the clearest possible case for an *account; and yet this case is not clearer than that before us. For, surely, the accidental circumstance of the absence of a dispute as to the amount, can hardly be deemed to alter the value of the party's right.
Considering this proposition to be established, it remains to say a few words in regard to the claim to have the notes delivered up. Whatsoever may be the case as to Brown's own notes, he had a clear interest to require possession of the note of Brown & Rossiter, in order to be able to use it as a voucher in stating an account with Rossiter, and, therefore, having extinguished it by his own means, he had also a clear right to have the note delivered up. It is, in short, a complaint by a debtor to have his obligation delivered up and cancelled, and an account of the securities pledged for them, and payment of the overplus. That a claim so simple in its character, so well recognised,, and even familiar, under the old practice in chancery, should be seriously regarded as two distinct causes of action, requiring distinct modes of trial, and incapable of being joined in a single suit, is quite as surprising as the doctrine itself, if held to be well founded, would be inconvenient.