Case Name: Bill N. DAVIS and Betty G. Davis, his wife, Appellants, v. Wesley R. HAGIN and Mabel P. Hagin, his wife, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-01-16
Citations: 330 So. 2d 42
Docket Number: No. Y-210
Parties: Bill N. DAVIS and Betty G. Davis, his wife, Appellants, v. Wesley R. HAGIN and Mabel P. Hagin, his wife, Appellees.
Judges: MILLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 330
Pages: 42–44

Head Matter:
Bill N. DAVIS and Betty G. Davis, his wife, Appellants, v. Wesley R. HAGIN and Mabel P. Hagin, his wife, Appellees.
No. Y-210.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 16, 1976.
John R. Weed, of Weed & Bishop, Perry, for appellants.
Michael S. Smith, Perry, for appellees.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
Soon after this mortgage foreclosure action was at issue, the mortgagee gave notice that the case would be tried twenty-one days later. Rule 1.440(c), R.C.P., requires that thirty days fall between notice and trial. Not immediately, but only two days before trial, appellant's counsel gave notice of an objection to the trial date. He made known his objection to the court on the day of trial. The court overruled the objection, tried the case and foreclosed the mortgage. The only point on this appeal is the propriety of the trial court's action in trying the case twenty-one days after the notice.
The trial court acted within the proper limits of its discretion in disregarding a technical violation of the rules which was so tardily complained of. No substantial grounds supported appellants' objection to the trial date and, for aught that ap-, pears, no prejudice resulted. See Rule 1.-010, R.C.P. We may assume that to sustain appellants' objection when made would have been to delay the trial many more than nine days.
If the purpose of the tardy objection below was to delay the disposition of appellees' claim while retaining the property in litigation, this Court has regrettably but unwittingly served that purpose by overlooking unauthorized and unexcused lapses in appellants' advancement of this appeal. Out of this Court's traditional deference to the lawyer's struggle to meet competing demands for his time and strength, we denied appellees' motion to quash or dismiss the appeal notwithstanding appellants' failure to file timely directions to the clerk and a timely record under Rule 3.6j(l) and their failure to file a timely brief under Rule 3.7a. We will dispense with rehearing and issue the mandate forthwith.
Affirmed.
MILLS, J., concurs.
BOYER, C. J., dissents.