Case Name: Patrick Horrigan, Appellant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896
Citations: 7 A.D. 377
Docket Number: 
Parties: Patrick Horrigan, Appellant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 377–379

Head Matter:
Patrick Horrigan, Appellant, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Respondent.
Master and servant—when a servant assumes the risks of the employment.
In an action brought to recover damages resulting from injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, a railroad company, in the use of a defective derrick and flat-bottomed car upon which it stood, it appeared that whatever defects or imperfections existed in the car or derrick were known by the plaintiff prior to the accident, and that he was fully apprised of the extent thereof.
S.eld, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of continuing to use the plant in the condition in which he knew it to be, and was properly nonsuited.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Patrick Horrigan, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Onondaga on the 25th day of January, 1895, upon a nonsuit granted by the court after a trial before the court and a jury at the Onondaga Circuit.
The plaintiff requested to have the case submitted to the jury and his request was denied and an exception was taken. An exception was taken when the motion for a nonsuit was granted.
The action was brought to recover the' damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant.
On May 14, 1891, the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant, engaged with a wrecking crew nf some fourteen men at De Witt. There was a derrick, having a mast and boom, set up on an ordinary fiat-bottom car, used in keeping the railroad tracks free from wreckage, and in transferring heavy bodies from one car to another. The car was fitted out with clamps, intended to hold the car on the' track when, the derrick Was under the strain of a heavy load, and it was claimed that the clamps had become dulled and blunt to some extent, so that they would not hold the car on the day of the accident. There was evidence tending to show that the car had been used for some time and had become somewhat impaired, and that one of its sills was-somewhat decayed and wormeaten. The car was under the charge of one Teller.. Previous to the occasion of the injuries received by the plaintiff he had observed that the car was somewhat impaired, and had called the attention of Teller to it.
It seems that when'the wrecking crew were engaged in using the car and derrick on the occasion of the injuries, the sill of the car broke, and the plaintiff, who was engaged in turning the derrick windlass, was .thrown from the car and his leg broken, and injured in some other respects. Plaintiff testified that he had observed whether the clamps would hold the cal* in position while the derrick was in use. He testifies: “ I saw it pull right up one time and tip over. About six or eight weeks before, when the clamp was on, it gave way, and the car rolled over, and threw off three or four men that were on it.” He testified that he had known the car about six years, and “ the timber of it — they were pine timber, and their dimensions, as nearly as I can state, were six by eight, or six by six inches. * * * I noticed a kind of a dent or split across the sill. It came right above where it broke; * * * that is the middle clamp; the side of the rent I should guess was about a quarter of an inch, and about eight inches long * * * along the sill, of the car; the outside sill; * * * what I observed about it before that, I mean while in operation, was when we would be lifting any heavy purchase ; it used to settle down until the sill over which we would be raising the burden would fall right pretty near the rail — within a foot or fourteen inches of the rail; * * * when I observed it settle we were raising railroad car trucks. * * * It broke just exactly about in that part of the car where that clamp stands, this side of the trucks. * -* * The car was split clear across and fell; the side split off; the break came with reference to this sill about the same place that I pointed out to the foreman; that is about ten feet from the end of the car ; from the end where the crane stood. * * * When the car tipped’ or rolled over, it turned me off all in a moment; six seconds didn’t intervene when I was thrown to the ground. * * * I had noticed before this that it would creak when in operation and settle down.”
In the course of the remarks made by the trial judge in granting the nonsuit he observed: “ Here the plaintiff knew just as much about this defect as any one; he saw it; he had seen how the machine acted on previous occasions ; he knew the danger, and yet he remained. * * * There is an assurance that what he had the same power to discover was not right by the use of his senses, was all right.”'
William, Kennedy, for the appellant.
Frank Hiscock, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.:
(1) There -is a. presumption that the judgment of nonsuit was properly granted.
(2) There is no certificate in the appeal book that the case contains all the evidence introduced upon the trial. (Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Seale, 3 App. Div. 515.)
(3) There was no motion for a new trial on the minutes. The only exceptions reviewable are those taken to the refusal to submit the case to the jury and to the granting of the motion for a nonsuit.
It is quite apparent from the evidence that whatever defects or imperfections existed in the car or derrick were known by the plaintiff prior to the accident, and that he was fully apprised of the extent thereof, and it is quite obvious that he assumed the risk of remaining in the use of the plant in the condition in which he knew it to be.
(4) There was no evidence given tending directly to indicate that Teller was an incompetent servant, or that the defendant knew that he was incompetent, and, besides, the question as to his competency does not seem to have been agitated at the trial.
The foregoing suggestions lead to the conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.