Case Name: Fayella Amrine KEEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PEL STATE OIL CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Melton Truck Lines, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-01-06
Citations: 332 So. 2d 286
Docket Number: No. 12784
Parties: Fayella Amrine KEEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PEL STATE OIL CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Melton Truck Lines, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant.
Judges: Before BOLIN, HALL, and GLAD-NEY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 332
Pages: 286–292

Head Matter:
Fayella Amrine KEEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PEL STATE OIL CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Melton Truck Lines, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant.
No. 12784.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Jan. 6, 1976.
On Rehearing April 19, 1976.
Writ Denied June 11, 1976.
Hargrove, Guyton, Ramey & Barlow by Thomas J. Wyatt, Shreveport, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bodenheimer, Jones, Klotz & Simmons by G. M. Bodenheimer, Jr., Shréveport, for intervenor-appellant, Melton Truck Lines, Inc.
Wilkinson, Carmody & Peatross by Arthur R. Carmody, Jr., Shreveport, for Southwestern Electric Power Co., defendant-appellee.
Mayer, Smith & Roberts by Caldwell Roberts, Shreveport, for Pel State Oil Co., Inc. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., defendants-appellees.
Before BOLIN, HALL, and GLAD-NEY, JJ.

Opinion:
GLADNEY, Judge.
This suit arises out of a collision which occurred on November 5, 1973 in Shreve port, Louisiana. The tractor-trailer which Kenneth K. Keen was operating was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Rickey Fountain. Keen's tractor struck an electric utility pole, causing the high voltage lines to fall on it. The truck caught fire and Keen died as a result of burns and/or electric shock.
This action was brought by Fayella Am-rine Keen, widow of Kenneth Keen, individually and as tutrix of a minor child of the marriage, three major daughters of that marriage, and Audubon Indemnity Company, subrogee to the extent of property damages paid by it. Named defendants in the original petition were Rickey Fountain; Pel State Oil Company, Inc., Fountain's employer; and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Pel State's insurer. By supplemental and amended petition, Southwestern Electric Power Company was named as an additional defendant. Pel State, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company and SWEPCO answered in the nature of a general denial. Melton Truck Lines, Inc. intervened to recover ¿mounts allegedly owed as reimbursement for payments made on behalf of the deceased's employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Pel State and United States Fidelity & Guaranty moved for summary judgment contending that Fountain was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that, therefore, they were not vicariously liable for his negligence. The trial court granted judgment in favor of those defendants rejecting the demands of the plaintiffs and intervenor. A devolutive appeal was perfected to this court.
The motion for summary judgment was supported by two depositions, one of Sidney Crank, supervisor of Pel State at the time of the accident, and one of Fountain. Pel State and United States Fidelity & Guaranty contend that these depositions show conclusively that Rickey Fountain was not acting "within the course and scope of his employment" at the time of the accident and that they are not vicariously liable for the damage caused by him.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is set forth in LSA-C.C. arts. 176, 2317 and 2320, the latter of which states that:
"Masters and employers are answerable for the damages occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of functions in which they are employed."
There is no precise rule or definition by which we can determine in every instance whether the employee driver of a motor vehicle is acting within the scope of his employment. Each case must be decided largely on its own facts, keeping in mind the basic idea that the use of the vehicle at the time must have been in the exercise of a function for his employer and for which he was employed. LSA-C.C. art. 2320; Leger v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 251 So.2d 801 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1971); Babineaux v. Lavergne, 321 So.2d 401 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1975).
The depositions reveal that Fountain went to work for Pel State Oil Company, Inc. in September, 1973. After spending one week as a manager-trainee, he was assigned as one of two managers of one of Pel State's retail outlets. Later he was assigned as the sole manager of the station at which he was working at the time of the accident. In the course of his managerial duties he was required to take inventory, keep daily records of gasoline sales and count the receipts. He was responsible for the money received at his outlet.
The depositions establish that it was customary for Crank to come by the station to pick up receipts in the morning and in the afternoon. The morning receipts consisted of the amount received at the station during the night as well as the receipts which had been taken home by Fountain the previous evening, the latter being what remained after Crank's afternoon pickup in excess of that necessary for the night shift to make change. The depositions also indicate Fountain took the money home, possibly at the suggestion of his supervisors, in response to several robberies of the station before Fountain became manager.
The sworn statements establish that Fountain was on a monthly salary and that his hours were not recorded. His usual working hours were from 5 A.M. to 5 P.M. six days a week. He sometimes went to the station to perform his duties on his days off or stayed after his regular hours to complete his bookkeeping.
The accident occurred on Monday morning between 4:30 and 5:00 A.M. November 5, 1973. Fountain had been off on Sunday. He was carrying the receipts he had taken with him on Saturday evening for safekeeping. At the time of the accident he was driving to the station in a car which he was considering buying from one of his father's co-workers. Pel State had no interest in the vehicle. He received no compensation for his time while traveling, nor any allowance for his mileage. The money which Fountain was carrying was not necessary to the continued operation of the station.
The evidence establishes conclusively that Fountain was not hired to transport the receipts from the service stations. The "functions in which he was employed" were the operation and maintenance of the retail outlet of which he was manager. The testimony clearly reveals that supervisor Crank, not Fountain, was charged with the duty of making bank deposits, of transporting the money about town, and delivering the records prepared by Fountain to the business office of Pel State. The use of an automobile by Fountain was not indispensable to the conduct of the employer's business. It must be concluded that the depositions establish beyond all reasonable doubt that in this case there was no genuine issue of material fact.
A motion for summary judgment can only be sustained where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LSA-C.C.P. art. 966.
The summary judgment remedy is not a substitute for a trial and may not be resorted to when there is a genuine issue of material fact which must be resolved. Wilts v. Dixie Auto Sales, Inc., 315 So.2d 811 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1975). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to determine the merits of any factual issues raised, it is to determine only whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Wiltz, supra; Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963). The mover bears the burden of convincingly showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden being such that all reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of trial on the merits. Wiltz, supra.
We find that defendants have successfully carried that burden in this case. Since there is no genuine issue of material fact, and upon finding defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the judgment of the lower court sustaining defendants' motion for summary judgment is affirmed.
Before BOLIN, PRICE, HALL, MARVIN and SMITH, JJ.