Case Name: PIEZO TECHNOLOGY and Professional Administrators, Inc., and Old Republic Ins. Co., and Southern Fire Adjusting Co., Appellants, v. Geraldine SMITH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-04-26
Citations: 413 So. 2d 121
Docket Number: No. ZZ-27
Parties: PIEZO TECHNOLOGY and Professional Administrators, Inc., and Old Republic Ins. Co., and Southern Fire Adjusting Co., Appellants, v. Geraldine SMITH, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 413
Pages: 121–128

Head Matter:
PIEZO TECHNOLOGY and Professional Administrators, Inc., and Old Republic Ins. Co., and Southern Fire Adjusting Co., Appellants, v. Geraldine SMITH, Appellee.
No. ZZ-27.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 26, 1982.
Bernard J. Zimmerman, William G. Ber-zak and W. Michael Miller of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, for appellants.
Donna L. Bergh of Walker, Buckmaster, Miller & Ketcham, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Employer/carrier appeals a workers' compensation order which found that claimant was wrongfully discharged contrary to the provisions of § 440.205, Florida Statutes. We conclude that a deputy commissioner is without jurisdiction to make such a determination unrelated to any pending claim for benefits otherwise due under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and we therefore reverse.
The order determining that employer Piezo Technology violated § 440.205, Florida Statutes, is based on findings (1) "that the employer improperly terminated Geraldine Smith as a result of her attempts to claim further workmen's compensation benefits" instead of the alleged reason of excessive absenteeism; (2) that the deputy had "jurisdiction to hear this cause pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 440.205, § 440.25, and § 440.45," and (3) that a prior order denying additional benefits for the claim in question "does not preclude the undersigned from considering a violation of Fla.Stat. § 440.205 inasmuch as that statute is not predicated upon a showing that monetary benefits are due the injured worker."
Section 440.205, Florida Statutes, provides that:
No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law.
The legislative history of § 440.205 shows that the bill was at one time drafted with explicit provisions for sanctions and jurisdiction in the circuit court. Journal of the House of Representatives, pp. 208-210 (April 10, 1979). By amendment these provisions were deleted, and the law as enacted prescribes no specific sanctions or jurisdiction. Because the omitted provisions covered only matters of remedy often left to general law, the amendment can be regarded as deletion of surplusage having no significant bearing on the question of forum for enforcement. Certainly the language of the provision enacted, supra, does not negate a civil remedy in courts of general jurisdiction, nor does it support application of the maxim for construction of laws which are amended by substitution of language that gives a different meaning:
Where the journals recording the history of the enactment of the statute show that language that gave a particular construction to it was taken out by an amendment, another provision being substituted that gives a different meaning, a construction based on the provision before its amendment will be avoided, [emphasis supplied]
See 30 Fla.Jur., Statutes, § 103 (1974) (citing State ex rel. Finlayson v. Amos, 76 Fla. 26, 79 So. 433 (1918). Equally certain is the fact that the purpose of the provision, stated in the title of the act, is "prohibiting retaliatory discharges of employees." Because, as detailed below, that purpose is not susceptible of accomplishment within the limited jurisdiction of deputy commissioners under Chapter 440, and because we may not assume that the provision is a nullity or useless enactment, we conclude that the creation of a cause of action for wrongful discharge, cognizable in the circuit court, was the means intended for accomplishment of the stated legislative purpose.
We conclude however that a wrongful discharge action is clearly not cognizable by a deputy commissioner within the parameters of Chapter 440. Although deputy commissioners are authorized by § 440.25(1) to "hear and determine all questions" in respect to a claim for compensation, the request for a § 440.205 wrongful discharge finding in the case before us is neither a claim for "compensation" nor "benefits" as those terms are used in Chapter 440.
The order appealed in this case is likewise not properly entered by a deputy commissioner under Chapter 120. Section 120.565 provides for declaratory statements by way of agency opinion and final agency action; however, § 440.021 establishes that deputy commissioners are exempt from Chapter 120 and shall not be considered an agency or a part thereof. We find no authority for imbuing a deputy commissioner with "agency status" for the limited purpose of § 440.205 adjudications, and we therefore conclude that such adjudications may not be made under § 120.565, since that statute expressly requires agency action.
The order appealed is reversed.
WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ" concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents w/opinion.
. Factors involved in actions for statutory enforcement are noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and Trans-America Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979).
. Chapter 79-40, Laws of Florida.
. Cf., Sharer v. Hotel Corporation of America, 144 So.2d 813 (Fla.1962); Girard Trust Company v. Tampashores Development Co., 95 Fla. 1010, 117 So. 786 (1928).
. See Segal v. Arrow Industries, 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).