Case Name: William F. Heins, plaintiff and respondent, vs. Charles A. Peine, defendant and appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1868-06
Citations: 6 Rob. 420
Docket Number: 
Parties: William F. Heins, plaintiff and respondent, vs. Charles A. Peine, defendant and appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 29
Pages: 420–431

Head Matter:
William F. Heins, plaintiff and respondent, vs. Charles A. Peine, defendant and appellant.
Although the accounts between consignor and consignee are adjusted, up to a certain period, and a specified sum is agreed to be paid by the former to the latter, tor commissions and advances, the consignee is entitled to a lien upon the goods, not only for that sum, but for interest upon advances subsequently made by him. Hence a tender of the sum so agreed to be paid, without including such interest, will not entitle the consignor to recover possession of 'the goods.
(Before Robertson, Ch. J., and Jones, J.)
Heard and decided June, 1868.
The defendant’s business is that of selling goods on com-.. mission. In January, 1865, one Zingsen consigned certain goods to the defendant. The terms upon which the goods were consigned were, according to Zingsen, that if the defendant sold the goods at as great a profit as he represented that he had sold one case, he (Zingsen) would give him $500; but according to the defendant they were that he, the defendant, was to have a commission of five per "cent on the sales, and Zingsen guarantied that the commission would amount to at least $500 in the first year.
Between January, 1865, and April 21, 1865, the defendant sold, at auction, a small bill of the goods, amounting to $300, and made advances to Zingsen, upon the goods, as follows: February 6, $500; March 30, $500; April 5, $700; April 21, $400. On the 21st April, Zingsen and the defendant having each become dissatisfied, they, stated the account between them, and the defendant agreed to take $250 for his commissions, disbursements and interest on his advances. The account thus stated showed a balance of $2050 in favor of the defendant, due May 21, 1865.
The defendant swears that he agreed to take the $250 only on condition that it was paid that'day, and stated that if he waited until the next day he should charge $500. The plaintiff, who negotiated the settlement between Zing- sen and the defendant, swears that the defendant, in order to settle the matter, agreed to make up his account due on the 21st of May at so much, and put it down in pencil. The stated account was put in evidence, and omitting the heading, except the date, was as follows:
1865. “April 21st, 1865. Feb. 6. To cash advanced on consignment, $500 Mar. 30. 66 66 66 500 April 5. 66 66 66 700 “ 21. 66 66 66 400 To rent and salary,...... . 500 $2600 April 4. By cash T. E. Halsey & Co. . . , 300 #2300 (In pencil) ......... . 250 (In pencil) (In pencil) Due May 21st, 1865.” $2050
Both the plaintiff and Zingsen swear that they saw the defendant write in pencil the words and figures, “ Due May 21st, 1865.” The defendant swears that the date is not his handwriting.
The only other evidence bearing on this settlement is the testimony of Zingsen/ who swears, “Mr. Heins said to Mr. Peine, we will give you one half (that is, of the $500,) if you give us the goods and a specified account of what you have done, and Mr. Peine said he would do it.”
At the time of making this settlement, Zingsen transferred the balance of the goods remaining unsold, to the plaintiff, who thereupon consigned the same to the defendant to be sold to the best advantage for cash, but not forced. No express agreement was made between the plaintiff and defendant as to commissions, compensation or interest on advances. Under this consignment the defendant proceeded until the 12th of August to make sales at private sale and also at auction, under the plaintiff’s directions, and received the proceeds of the sales, and made an advance of $230 to the plaintiff.
On the 12th of August the defendant made out the following account:
1865. Eeb. 6. To cash loan . . ........ . $500' 00 Mar. 30: “ .......... 500 00 April 5. “ .......... 700 00' “21. “ .......’. . .■ 400 00 Rent, salary and interest ..... [ XXX XX XXXX ]. Apl. 4. “ 26. ■May 12. ' “ 19. 66 66 June 1. “ 12. “ 16. July 19. Aug. 4. “ 12. $2,600 00 By cash from T. E. Halsey & Co. $300 00 “ Curtis & Co. . . 206 58 “' Same .... 64 08 “ Same .... 43 65 “ T. E. Halsey & Co. 102 94 “ 63 doz. spectacles 78 75 “ T. E. Halsey & Go. 230 03 “ ' Hallgarten&Herzfeld . . . . 718 51 “ T. E. Halsey & Co. 357 36 “ Same .... 202 94 “ Same . . . . 148 80 2,453 64 •$146 36 June 30.- Paid W. F. Heins .... 230 00 Aug. 12. Paid cartage and laboP ... 3 64 233 64 To balance New York, Aug. 12th, 1865. $380 00 C. A. Peine.
Between the 12th and 28th of August, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant .$130, and demanded the goods remaining unsold. The defendant refused to deliver them unless he was paid $380. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this action of claim and delivery. The defendant, after several denials of the allegations in the complaint, sets up a lien on the goods, to the amount of $380 and interest from August 12, 1865.
The judge charged the jury, among other things, “If you find that $250 (referring to that sum in the stated account) was full compensation, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.” To which the defendant excepted. He also charged: “ If you find the agreement was that $250 should be received as full compensation, and also find that the' plaintiff demanded an account of the defendant, and offered to pay him all he was entitled to, that is sufficient.” To which the defendant excepted.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed the value of the property at $3500. A motion for a new trial was made, and denied, and judgment was then entered, on the verdict.
The defendant appealed from the order denying his motion for a new trial, and also from the judgment.
John J. Townsend, for the appellant.
I. The verdict is wrong, because the defendant was entitled to more than $130, which was tendered after August 12, 1865.
II. Upon the evidence, a verdict for the defendant was possible. Under the charge, a verdict for the defendant was impossible. At folio 78 it was charged,' “ if the agreement was to take $250 as compensation, you will say so.” At folio 82, “ if you find the agreement was that $250 should be received as full compensation, that is sufficient.” At folio 84, “ if you find there was an agreement to receive $250 as full compensation, that ends it.” As the agreement to accept $250, 21st May, 1865, is an undisputed fact, and consistent with the defendant’s claim for compensation afterwards earned, and to interest afterwards accruing, the charge in the particulars here excepted to is equivalent to a direction to the jury to find for the plaintiff.
IH. The statement of facts presents the evidence in regard to the original agreement between Peine and" Zingsen. Peine claimed that he was to have at the least $500 per annum, Zingsen claiming that he said, “ I could give you that if you go on in that way.” Neither claims that the right to receive $500 depends on a sale of all the goods. It was so charged. The defendant was entitled to have the original agreement properly submitted to the jury, for all his rights depend upon subsequent modifications of that agreement. It could aid the jury in estimating the value of his subsequent services.
IV. The defendant was entitled to have the value of his services, and of the use of his money after 21st April, 1865,
. estimated. He made that request. The charge refused this and fixed a limit not to be passed, to wit, 21st April, 1865. This was in effect directing a verdict for the plaintiff.
V. The charge from folio 79-to 81, it is claimed, was even more injurious to the defendant. At folio 79, the court stated, “there is no evidence of any services after 21st of April, 1865.” A juror interposed: “ I understand that the $250 was for services up to that time—and Mr. Heins, after he took a transfer, &e., left the goods in possession of Mr. Peine.” The court: “Not at all,” &c., and proceeded to state, in effect, that in April the defendant agreed to retain the goods until August, to send them to auction from time to time,' (without compensation,) pay himself and hand over the balance to the plaintiff; at all events, that he did nothing for which he would be entitled to charge. It will be vain to look for any evidence of such an agreement. It was to accept a certain sum on 21st May, 1865. An indefinite future was not then provided for. The juror was right.
■ VI. To this very emphatic limitation of time, 21st April, 1865, is the submission to the jury of the value of the defendant’s services to be referred. As at folio 82—“ What is a fair compensation to the defendant,” &c. And at folio 84— “It is simply-a question what'his services and advances are worth.”
VH. The charge at folio 83, “ that nothing was earned by the defendant by way of commission, except on the $78.75,” must have misled the jury, and made them believe that the defendant’s claims to any important sum were without foundation. &
Yin. The charge that, “ under the agreement the goods ought to have been sold without sending them to auction,” must have misled the jury. • As the agreement is the entire compact, the jury must have been induced to think that the defendant violated it when he sold goods at auction. But he was directed to sell at auction, in writing, May 3, 1865, and all those sales wer'e authorized by the plaintiff.'
IX. The charge, “Nor is the defendant entitled to $500 by virtue of carrying out the original agreement;” and at folio 77—“I understand the condition of that agreement to be that the goods were sold in the ordinary way by the defendent,” is wrong, because it was not claimed by either party that there was any such condition, and whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the sum specified, he is entitled to have the agreement properly presented to the jury, as a part of the history of the case—as an agreement modified but not violated—and useful at least to aid in forming an estimate of the value of his services.
X. The case was presented to the jury as if the defendant had agreed on 21st April, 1865, to make no charge in any event in the future. This is very plainly a misconception of the case, and very injurious to him. There could be no motive in making such an agreement; if he were not paid on 21st May, 1865, it was uncertain when he would be, or how much the single item of interest would amount to, irrespective of commissions, labor, storage, &e.
0. Bairibridge Smith, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Jones, J.
There is not the slightest evidence upon which a verdict finding either that the $250 was full compensation or was agreed to be received as such, could be based. On-the contrary it is clear that the $250 was adjusted and agreed upon as full compensation for all disbursements and commissions made and earned up to April 21, and for interest on advances up to a period not extending beyond May 21st, only. Upon this there is no conflict of testimony. Therefore the instructions excepted to were erroneous. They were instructions that the jury might find certain facts to be established, to support which there was not only no evidence, but which were controverted by all the evidence in the case, and that upon the finding and facts they should render a verdict for the plaintiff.
'But although these instructions are erroneous, still they • would not call for a new trial if the court clearly saw that they could not by any possibility have prejudiced.the defendant.
If the evidence fails to show that the defendant has a lien for disbursements made, or commissions earned, since the 21st of April, or for interest on advances, accruing since May 21st, for an amount exceeding the sum tendered, he is not prejudiced. The evidence shows that since the 21st of April some sales were made upon which a commission would be chargeable. True there is no proof either of what the customary rate of commission is, or of any express agreement as to commissions or compensation, or of the value of the service. I do not, however, consider it necessary that such proof should have been given, since any commission on these sales, no matter how small, would increase the amount for which the defendant had a lien, beyond the sum of $130 tendered. It is not, however, necessary to decide this point, for the interest accruing on the advances. subsequent to May 21st, in whatever way the same maybe calculated, with reference to the application of moneys received from sales of goods, increases the amount for which the defendant has a lien, considerably above the sum tendered.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.