Case Name: Leslie SPIERLING, Appellant, v. FIRST AMERICAN HOME HEALTH SERVICES, INC., and Integrated Health Services, Inc., Appellees
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1999-09-01
Citations: 737 A.2d 1250
Docket Number: 
Parties: Leslie SPIERLING, Appellant, v. FIRST AMERICAN HOME HEALTH SERVICES, INC., and Integrated Health Services, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before EAKIN, SCHILLER and BROSKY, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 737
Pages: 1250–1262

Head Matter:
Leslie SPIERLING, Appellant, v. FIRST AMERICAN HOME HEALTH SERVICES, INC., and Integrated Health Services, Inc., Appellees.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued April 21, 1999.
Filed Sept. 1, 1999.
Reargument Dismissed Sept. 24, 1999.
John E. Stember, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Michael Torchia, Jenkintown, for appel-lees.
Before EAKIN, SCHILLER and BROSKY, JJ.

Opinion:
BROSKY, J.
¶ 1 Leslie Spierling ("Spierling") appeals from the July 13, 1998 trial court order granting Defendant-Appellees First American Home Health Services, Incorporated ("First American") and Integrated Health Services, Incorporated's ("Integrated Health") preliminary objections and dismissing Spierling's complaint.
¶ 2 On May 13, 1998 Spierling filed a two-count complaint against First American and Integrated Health in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. In Count I she alleged that she was wrongfully terminated after she reported suspected evidence of Medicare fraud, and at Count II she alleged that her wrongful termination constituted age discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Spierling sought damages in excess of $25,000 for lost wages, loss of professional status and reputation, and emotional distress.
¶ 3 In November 1991 Spierling was hired as a registered staff nurse by First American and three months later she was promoted to Supervisor of Staff Nurses. In 1993 she became an administrator at one of First American's offices, and held that position until her termination on June 28, 1996. In January 1996 First American filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the Southern District of Georgia and, as a result of the bankruptcy, Integrated Health became the successor corporation to First American and assumed all of its debts and liabilities.
¶ 4 During the course of Spierling's employment, the federal government con ducted an investigation of First American regarding Medicare fraud. The federal investigators notified Spierling and other First American employees that an "800" number fraud hotline existed and the employees were told by the investigators to utilize it to report suspected Medicare fraud. Spierling reviewed "old and discarded" files in First American's Shady-side Office (located in Pittsburgh) and found evidence of what she believed to be past Medicare fraud. Spierling's Complaint at p. 2, par. 7. She notified her supervisor, Joan Russo, who in turn reported it to Regional Vice President Karen Ferrari; Ms. Russo also provided the information to the fraud hotline.
¶ 5 Three days after the information was forwarded to the hotline, Ms. Ferrari traveled to Pittsburgh and terminated the employment of Spierling and Russo. Spi-erling also averred in her complaint that relevant records were shredded in the week following her termination' Spierling also alleged in her discrimination complaint filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"), which was considered by the trial court before it ruled on Appellee's preliminary objections to both counts of Spierling's complaint, that Defendant-Appellees had no legitimate reason to fire her and that they refused to provide any explanation regarding why she was terminated. She also alleged in the PHRC complaint that she was told that if she did not dispute the termination, then future prospective employers of Spierling would be informed that she was terminated from First American because of "downsizing".
¶ 6 Spierling's complaint also states that, "Both State and Federal Governments have a strong policy protecting individuals who report Federal Fraud." Spi-erling's Complaint at p. 2, par. 12.
¶ 7 In July 1996 Spierling, immediately after her termination, retained counsel. She subsequently obtained an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") preliminary form entitled General Intake Questionnaire; she dated the form as of December 25,1996 and filed the form on January 3, 1997. On March 27, 1997 Spierling filed a formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC but never filed a claim with the PHRC for a state age discrimination claim; the EEOC cross-filed the claim with the PHRC.
¶ 8 The trial court also considered the EEOC Intake Questionnaire before it ruled on both counts of Spierling's complaint. In the Questionnaire Spierling averred that: prior to her termination she had been given excellent evaluations by her supervisor; Defendant-Appellees' termination of her employment deviated from normal company procedures, which entailed notice, counseling, retraining and probation; three other supervisors were also terminated after they reported suspected evidence of Medicare fraud; Spier-ling was told that if she did not contest her termination then prospective future employers would not be given negative references; and, that she was told by supervisory personnel at First American to report any evidence of fraud, utilizing the hotline. EEOC General Intake Questionnaire, 12/25/96.
¶ 9 As mentioned, supra, the instant lawsuit was filed on May 13, 1998. On June 18, 1998 Defendant-Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. In regard to Count I, they stated that it should be dismissed since Pennsylvania does not have a "Whistle-blowers Law" for private sector employees nor a public policy exception for at-will employees such as Spierling. Regarding Count II, they alleged that it should be dismissed since Spierling failed to timely file her administrative complaint under the PHRA.
¶ 10 All parties filed briefs and oral argument was held. On July 13, 1998 the Honorable Ronald W. Folino granted Defendant-Appellees' preliminary objections and dismissed Spierling's complaint. Spi-erling then filed the instant appeal.
¶ 11 Spierling's statement of question presented is as follows:
Did the lower court err in granting Defendants' demurrer and dismissing Plaintiffs public policy wrongful discharge count where Plaintiff, a nurse-administrator, alleged that she had been terminated for reporting evidence of Medicare fraud to her immediate supervisor, where Plaintiff had an obligation to report such evidence under state and federal law, and where she had been instructed to look for such evidence by her employer?
Spierling's Brief at 2.
¶ 12 Our Supreme Court stated in Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231 (1998),
For purposes of reviewing the dismissal of a complaint based upon preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the averments of the complaint must be taken as true, except to the extent that they constitute conclusions of law. Willet v. Pennsylvania Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 549 Pa. 613, 702 A.2d 850 (1997).
Since sustaining the demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim or dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted.... If the facts as pleaded state a claim for which relief may be granted under any theory of law then there is sufficient doubt to require the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to be rejected. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 507 Pa. 360, 372, 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985).
Id. at 594, 716 A.2d at 1233.
¶ 13 Hence, we must accept as true the averments in Spierling's complaint that she uncovered evidence of past Medicare fraud on the part of Appellees and was fired for reporting the alleged fraud. Id.
¶ 14 Our Court stated in Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Super.1998),
It is well established that Pennsylvania recognizes the at-will employment doctrine. As this Court has noted, however, there are a few, narrow public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine:
These exceptions fall into three categories: an employer (1) cannot require an employee to commit a crime, (2) cannot prevent an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and (3) cannot discharge an employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute. [Citation omitted.]
Id. at 1273.
¶ 15 Our Supreme Court also stated in Shick v. Shirey, supra,
Pennsylvania law recognizes the doctrine of at-will employment so that, as a general rule, no cause of action exists based upon an employer's termination of an at-will employment relationship.
Generally, an employer "may discharge an employee with or without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract." Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Company, 139 Pa. 289, 297, 21 A. 157 (1891). "Absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason." Geary v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974). The employer's privilege to dismiss an employee with or without cause is not absolute, however, and may be qualified by the dictates of public policy.
[There are] exceptions to the general rule that there is no common law cause of action against an employer for dismissal of an at-will employee where the dismissal would threaten clear mandates of public policy. It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of those areas by virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is threatened. The notion that substantive due process elevates an employer's privilege of hiring and discharging his employees to an absolute constitutional right has long since been discredited.... [W]here the complaint itself discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for terminating an at-will employment relationship and no clear mandate of public is violated thereby, an employee at will has no right of action against his employer for wrongful discharge. Geary, 456 Pa. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180 (footnote omitted).
We reject the narrow view espoused by Shirey that what is cognizable as public policy is only that which has been legislatively enacted[.]
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There must be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal.
[W]e acknowledge[ ] the power of courts to pronounce public policy [as] contrasted [to] the power of the legislature. Public policy, in the administration of the law by the courts, is essentially different from what may be public policy in the view of the legislature. With the legislature, it may be, and often is, nothing more than expediency. The public policy which dictates the enactment of a law is determined by the wisdom of the legislature. Public policy . with the legislature may be, and often is, nothing more than expediency; but with the courts, it must, and may only, be a reliance upon consistency with sound policy and good morals as to the consideration or thing to be done.
[T]he courts may in a proper case, in the absence of a legislative pronouncement, determine what is against public policy.
Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest.
Where the legislature has spoken, however, we will not interpret statutory provisions to advance matters of supposed public interest. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 594, 596, 597, 600, 601, 602, 716 A.2d at 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237.
¶ 16 We reiterate that Spierling is only appealing the trial court's grant of Appel-lee's preliminary objections relating to Count I of her complaint (ie., wrongful termination for reporting past alleged Medicare fraud), and she agrees that the trial court properly dismissed Count II of her complaint (relating to age discrimination). Moreover, Spierling is not basing her claim on the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1421 et seq. She is basing her claim on the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
¶ 17 First, Spierling alleged in the materials evaluated by the trial court that she was instructed by a First American supervisor to report any instances of Medicare fraud to the hotline established by the federal investigators; hence, we must assume, in reviewing the trial court's order granting Appellee's preliminary objections, that Spierling, a registered nurse and administrator for Appellees, was obligated by her employer to report any suspected Medicare fraud. However, even accepting Spierling's allegations as true, we are unfortunately unable to afford her any relief since our review of the statutes and case-law cited by Spierling impose no duties and threat of penalties for failure to take the action that she did (ie., uncovering and reporting past suspected Medicare fraud).
¶ 18 The Professional Nursing Law, 63 P.S. § 211-225.5, cited by Spierling, affords her no relief (she cites to no applicable sections), nor do the Pennsylvania Code sections, relating to nursing, cited by Spierling since they do not mandate that she report, under threat of penalty, the sort of past alleged fraud discovered by her when reviewing First American's "old and discarded" files.
¶ 19 Additionally, Spierling's reporting of alleged fraud regarding the old and discarded files does not implicate 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 287, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a and 1320a-7b, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 or 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), all cited by Spierling.
¶ 20 Since Spierling did not plead and has not cited to any legal authority which imposed a statutory duty upon her to search "old and discarded" files for evidence of Medicare fraud and report the alleged fraud to the federal investigators, we can afford her no relief on public policy considerations and are constrained to affirm the trial court order granting Defendant-Appellees' preliminary objections and dismissing Spierling's complaint. Since Spierling was under no statutorily imposed duty to report the suspected past Medicare fraud, Defendant-Appellees did not request that Spierling commit a crime and there was no specific statutory prohibition against Spierling's discharge, we find that Defendant-Appellees were within their rights to discharge her as an at-will employee. Shick v. Shirey, supra; Hennessy v. Santiago, supra; Field v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 388 Pa.Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170 (1989).
¶ 21 Order affirmed.
¶ 22 SCHILLER, J., files a Dissenting Opinion.
. Integrated Health is the successor corporation to First American.
. Spierling was forty years old when the lawsuit was filed.
. Eventually, First American was assessed a substantial fine and its corporate president was sentenced to a term of imprisonment as a result of Medicare fraud.
. Spierling agrees that the trial court properly dismissed Count II of her complaint, and states that this appeal only involves Count I of her complaint.
.Spierling went through older, not current, files of First American to discover the alleged fraud. There is no contention that the files in question were open and being forwarded to Medicare for consideration or payment. Spi-erling admits in her complaint that the files were "old and discarded" and that the alleged "fraud had taken place in the past." Spierling's Complaint at p. 2, par. 7.
. 49 Pa.Code § 21.18
. We reiterate that Spierling is not contesting the trial court's dismissal of Count II of her complaint.