Case Name: WASHINGTON & IDAHO RAILROAD CO. v. COEUR D'ALENE RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY et al.
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1889-03-19
Citations: 2 Idaho 580
Docket Number: 
Parties: WASHINGTON & IDAHO RAILROAD CO. v. COEUR D’ALENE RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 580–590

Head Matter:
(March 19, 1889.)
WASHINGTON & IDAHO RAILROAD CO. v. COEUR D’ALENE RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY et al.
[21 Pac. 562.]
Injunction — Eight of Way — Action at Law. — Where a railroad prays for a perpetual injunction against another railroad, enjoining the entering upon its right of way and for a decree of title, and it appears at the time of trial the defendant has completed its line of road over the disputed ground and is in the actual occupation and use of the same, held, the court was right in refusing a judgment of perpetual injunction, but should not have passed upon the title, leaving the plaintiff to his action at law.
APPEAL from District Court, Shoshone County..
Woods & Heyburn, for Appellant.
Under the system of express findings, nothing is implied, but full findings are required upon every material issue without any request therefor, and with no exception on account of defects; and, if any material issue is left unfound, it is ground for a reversal of judgment. (Robinson v. Railroad Go., 57 Cal. 417; Everson v. Mayhem, 57 Cal. 144; Knight v. Roche, 56 Cal. 25.) The finding on every material issue is necessary, although no evidence was introduced upon such issue. (Campbell v. Buck-man, 49 Cal. 362; Speegle v. Leese, 51 Cal. 415.) There is no presumption of an implied finding under our practice. (Railroad Go. v. Reynolds, 50 Cal. 90; Campbell v. Buchman, 49 Cal. 362; Dowd v. Glarke, 51 Cal. 263.) There being findings in the record, there is no presumption of the waiving of findings upon any issue. (People v. Forbes, 51 Cal. 628; People v. Fu-qua, 61 Cal. 377; Van Court v. Winterson, 61 Cal. 615.) The approval by the Secretary of the Interior of the act of a railroad in locating its line may perfect a grant of absolute title, which cannot be questioned or defeated by any person other than the government itself. (Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Moffat v. United States, 112 U. S. 32, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Steel v. Refining Co., 106 U. S. 450, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 30.) As long as a grant remains uncanceled, it cannot be invaded by a mere trespasser, or one who does not claim to enter by virtue of a better title. (Aurora Hill Consol. Min. Co. v. Mining Co., 34 Fed. 520.) The courts cannot exercise the power of eminent domain either directly or indirectly. The question of the propriety or policy of a condemnation is not a judicial one, but one vested solely in the legislative authority. (Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 11; Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 309; Boston etc. B. Co. v. Salem, etc. B. Co., 2 Gray, 34, 35.) The right of way of one railroad cannot be tWmi by another, except it be in a canyon, and then only on showing of actual necessity in suit instituted especially for that purpose. (Montana Cent. B. Co. v. Helena etc. B. Co., 6 Mont. 416, 12 Pac. 916; Bailway Co. v. Ailing, 99 TJ. S. 463; Denver etc. By. Co. v. Denvef etc. B. Co., 17 Fed. 867; Pennsylvania B. Co/s A-ppeal, 93 Pa. St. 150; Housatonic B. Co. v. Lee etc. B. Co., 118 Mass. 391; Boston etc. B. Co. v. Lowell etc. B. Co., 124 Mass. 368.) When the plats of the plaintiff were approved, the grant attached and was anchored to the definite line indicated upon the plat. (Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 60; Ex parte Bailway Co., 101 TJ. S. 713; Leavenworth etc. B. Co. v. United States, 92 TT. S. 741; Knevals v. Hyde, 1 McCrary, 402, 6 Fed. 651; Van WycTc v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Kansas Pac. By. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 TJ. S. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566; Bailway Co. v. Ailing, 99 TJ. S. 475.)
Albert Allen and William H. Clagett, for Respondents.
At the time of making the survey over the line in controversy herein the plaintiff had not filed, or attempted to file, in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, its articles of incorporation or proofs of its organization, and did not do so for more than a month after the survey. Hence the. survey of plaintiff was, at the time it was made, and ever since has been, and is now, absolutely void, as against the defendant, which has, subsequent to such survey, surveyed and constructed its road over the same. (Belh v. Meagher, 104 TJ. S. 279; Bailroad Co. v. Sture, 32 Minn. 95, 20 N. W. 229.)

Opinion:
WEIR, C. J.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants, in which the plaintiff asks a judgment and decree of this court enjoining the defendant, and all persons claiming under it, from in any manner entering upon the right of way of the plaintiff at the town of Wallace, in the county of Shoshone, extending in length a mile and a half, and in width one hundred feet on each side of the central line of the railroad of plaintiff, as surveyed and designated on the ground, and from further constructing said railroad on said right of way, and from interfering with the plaintiff in the peaceable and exclusive possession and occupancy of said right of way; and that the title be decreed in the plaintiff as against the defendant. It therefore appears that this action is for a final judgment of injunction in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. An answer was interposed by the defendant, and upon issues framed the cause came on for trial. A preliminary injunction was granted in this cause, hut was subsequently vacated upon motion. It appears from the findings in this case that, at the time of the trial thereof, the defendant had completed its line of road over the disputed ground, and was in the actual use and occupation of the same. The plaintiff, it would seem, had an adequate remedy at law, if its contention is correct, and the court below was right in refusing a judgment of perpetual injunction, as prayed for; but we think that the court should not, in that case, have passed upon the ownership and title of the premises in question, but should have left the plaintiff to his action at law. The judgment of the court below should be modified as we have stated, and, as modified, the same is affirmed, without costs to either party in this court or in the court below.