Case Name: VAN CAMP v. MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1904-09-13
Citations: 137 Mich. 467
Docket Number: Docket No. 141
Parties: VAN CAMP v. MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
Judges: Moore, O. J., and Montgomery, J., concurred with Grant, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 467–474

Head Matter:
VAN CAMP v. MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
1. Statutes — Construction—Penal Statutes.
Penal statutes will not be enlarged by construction.
2. Carriers — Passengers—Transportation—Change of Schedule.
Railroad companies may change their time-tables and may take off and put on trains, only reasonable notice to the public of such changes being necessary. 2 Comp. Laws, § 6235.
3. Same — Change op Schedule — Notice.
If, after reasonable public notice of change of schedule has; been given, a ticket agent misinforms a passenger, the statute (2 Comp. Laws, § 6235) providing a penalty in such cases does not apply, and the passenger can recover only his actual damages as at common law.
4. Same — Train Schedules — Failure to Maintain — Penalty.
Where a railroad company had advertised a train on a branch line to leave a connecting point shortly after the arrival of another train, and had sent printed posters to its agents showing the contemplated operation of such train, but before the time arrived when the train was advertised to be put on notice of its withdrawal was sent to some of the company’s agents, and was published, but the agent at Y. had received no such notice, by reason whereof he sold a ticket to plaintiff for passage over such branch line, and advised her of the run- ■ ning of the advertised train, and on her arrival at the junction point she was compelled to remain there overnight, the company ,was liable for the penalty prescribed by 2 Comp. Laws, § 6235, for failure to transport in accordance with her contract. Hooker and Carpenter, JJ., dissenting.
Error to Berrien; Coolidge, J.
Submitted May 17, 1904.
(Docket No. 141.)
Decided September 13, 1904.
Debt by Alberta E. Yan Camp against the Michigan Central Railroad Company for failure to transport, under 2 Comp. Laws, § 6235. There was judgment for plaintiff on a verdict directed by the court,, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
This suit was brought to recover the penalty of $100 provided by section 6235, 2 Comp. Laws, for the failure of the defendant to transport the plaintiff, in accordance with her contract of carriage, without legal or just excuse. Her home was in Benton Harbor, Mich. She was attending school at Ypsilanti, Mich. She purchased a ticket June 24, 1903, good for a continuous passage from Ypsilanti to Grand Junction. Her route was over the main line of the Michigan Central to Kalamazoo, from which place defendant has a branch line to Grand Junction. Previously to and at the time of purchasing her ticket she inquired of the defendant’s agent at Ypsilanti if she could take the train leaving Ypsilanti at 1:25 p. m., and make close connections at Kalamazoo with the train for Grand Junction. She was informed by the agent that she could, and he showed her a schedule stating that a train left Kalamazoo at 4:45 p. m., her train on the main line arriving at 4:25 p. m. She testified that she relied upon the schedule shown her, and the statement of the agent in purchasing a ticket. On arrival at Kalamazoo she was informed that there was no train running to Grand Junction .at 4:45, and she was therefore obliged to remain in Kalamazoo overnight. Defendant introduced as a witness its .agent at Kalamazoo, who testified that the defendant had issued a time card to take effect June 14, 1903, showing a train scheduled to leave Kalamazoo at 4-45 p. m. each day except Sunday; that that card was canceled by another one, eliminating that train from the schedule, and that a notice was received from the division superintendent’s office at Jackson advising that this train would not be put on until further notice; and that a further notice was received June 29th announcing that this train would ■commence to run July 1st. A time card was introduced in evidence, in which this train was advertised, to take effect June 14th. The evidence did not show when this card or time-table was posted in the office whence it was taken.
The above is a statement of all the evidence produced upon the trial. The court directed'a verdict for the plaintiff for the statutory penalty of $100.
Humphrey S. Gray and G. M. Valentine, for appellant.
John J. Sterling and Cady & Andrews, for appellee.
As to liability to passenger for default or delay in running railroad train, see note to Hansley v. Railroad Co., (N. C.) 32 L. R. A. 543.

Opinion:
Grant, J.
(after stating the facts). The statute is a penal one, and will not be enlarged by construction. Crosby v. Railroad Co., 131 Mich. 288 (91 N. W. 124).
In several cases we have discussed what constitutes a "legal and just excuse " within the meaning of the statute. Freeman v. Railroad Co., 65 Mich. 577 (32 N. W. 833);. Reed v. Railway Co., 100 Mich. 507 (59 N. W. 144); Hoyt v. Railway Co., 112 Mich. 638 (71 N. W. 172).
The learned counsel for the defendant contend that the undisputed facts do not bring the case within the statute. They admit that the defendant had determined to put on this extra train for summer service to leave Kalamazoo at 4:45 p. m. for South Haven, passing through. Grand Junction; that time-tables showing such train were prepared, and public posters were printed and sent to the agents along the line for public distribution; that they were to take effect June 14th. But they insist that immediately thereafter, and before June 14th, notice was sent to the several agents that this extra summer train would not be put on until further notice, and that a new public poster or time-table for distribution, omitting this extra train, was issued and published. If the facts were as stated, the defendant's position would undoubtedly be correct.. Railroad companies may change their time-tables, may take off and put on trains, and all that the statute requires is that they give reasonable notice to the public of such change. Sears v. Railroad Co., 14 Allen, 433 (92 Am. Dec. 780). If, when such reasonable notice is given, the ticket agent misinforms a passenger, this statute does not apply, and the passenger so misinformed can recover only his actual damages. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Hatton, 60 Ind. 12; Marshall v. Railway Co., 78 Mo. 610; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Ark. 74 (14 S. W. 468). In such case he must count upon the common-law liability, and not upon that of the statute.
The mistake of counsel is one of fact, and not of law. The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff applied two or .more times to the authorized agent of the defendant to- ascertain about this train. She was shown a time-table issued by defendant and in the hands of its duly authorized agent. She was under no obligation to look for a schedule posted in the defendant's depot or published in the newspapers. She went' to the proper place for the most reliable information. She obtained it by being shown a printed schedule. She relied on it as well as on the representations of the agent. This made her .case, and entitled her to a judgment under the statute, unless the defendant showed ' ' a legal and just excuse " for not carrying her in accordance with her contract of carriage and printed schedule. The defendant wholly failed to show that the notice countermanding the advertised schedule was delivered to its agent at Ypsilanti. Its only witness was the agent at Kalamazoo, who had nothing to do with issuing or countermanding schedules. He did not know, and did not testify that he knew, that any such countermand or notice was sent to the agent at Ypsilanti. Neither the agent at Ypsilanti nor the defendant's agent who was authorized to issue the schedule was called upon to testify that any such notice or countermand was sent to or received by the agent at Ypsilanti. It cannot, therefore, be said that the act which caused the plaintiff to purchase her ticket and take the train was solely that of the ticket agent at Ypsilanti. On thp contrary, it was the act of the defendant itself in issuing and publishing its schedules and failing to notify its agent of the change. So far as this record shows, the agent relied upon this schedule, and was authorized to rely upon it until notified otherwise.
The plaintiff made a case within the statute, and the judgment is affirmed.
Moore, O. J., and Montgomery, J., concurred with Grant, J.