Case Name: McNatt v. Hyman
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1948-12-31
Citations: 204 Miss. 824
Docket Number: 
Parties: McNatt v. Hyman.
Judges: L. A. Smith, Sr., J., joins in this dissent.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 204
Pages: 824–847

Head Matter:
McNatt v. Hyman.
On Suggestion of Error
In Banc.
Dec. 31, 1948.
(38 So. (2d) 107)

Opinion:
The original and dissenting opinions (36 So. (2d) 161) are as follows:
Alexander, J.
Bill was filed by McNatt to quiet his title to all the minerals in, on or under a described tract. Answer and cross-bill were filed by the appellee, Hyman, who asserted ownership by a tax title. Later Hyman filed an original bill to confirm his title thereto. By agreement both causes were tried together. Final decree went to Hyman and appellant's bill was dismissed.
Appellee's title rests upon a deed from Sam Hyman dated May 21, 1946. This grantor had acquired title through two delinquent tax sales of the lands in 1943 and 1944 respectively, both being made to the said Sam Hyman. The assessment under which such sales were made was substantially as follows: "NW14 SWü and all N% lying W of Clear Creek. S 13, T 19, B 7," in-Washington County. Appellant had record title to all the minerals therein.
In February 1942 McNatt requested the tax assessor to assess his minerals separately from the lands. The assessor refused so to do. Whereupon McNatt applied to the Chancery Clerk, who in turn directed him to the sheriff. The sheriff "assessed" the minerals at one dollar an acre, accepted a commensurate amount as "taxes" from appellant and issued a receipt therefor. This was done for the years 1943 to 1945, inclusive. A notation was made by the sheriff upon the assessment roll showing the number of the receipt followed by the letters "M R," which it is claimed, indicate mineral rights.
It is seen, therefore, that the narrow point for decisions is whether there was a valid separate assessment of the minerals. The proper method for such separate assessment is provided by Code 1942, sec. 9770. It is true that appellant sought to follow that method but the assessor refused to allow it.
It is not difficult to find materials for a judgment sympathetic toward appellant who made futile effort to isolate his mineral interest from the surface estate and thereby protect it against loss by a tax sale of the entire interest, such as was suffered by the appellant in Stern v. Parker, 200 Miss. 27, 25 So. (2d) 787, 790. Such, however, must be the fate of appellant's claim here, unless it was "separately assessed."
The basis for the alleged separate assessment of the minerals is that they had been "left unassessed" by the assessor. Code 1942, sec. 9901. There should be no doubt that the entire estate had been assessed by the assessor. Any inquiry into the reasons for refusal by the assessor separately to assess the minerals overlooks the controlling fact that he did not do so, and results merely in a personal criticism of that official.
In Stern v. Parker, supra, we said: "The land cannot be said not to have been taxed 'in any way.' The land was assessed on the tax rolls by governmental subdivisions at a valuation, approved by the board of supervisors, after notice to those interested to appear and object. These appellants never did appear and object or do their duty to the taxing powers, themselves, their government or fellow citizens. The land was assessed in its entirety, and that means all of its assessable estates, by this unit assessment. This, they could and should have had corrected then, but did not. ' '
It is true that appellant here did undertake to effect a separate assessment. But his efforts fell short of available compulsory process by which he may have attained this end. We see no reason to charge the appellee, who, for all the record shows, is a bona fide purchaser from one who had acquired a tax deed to the entire estate, with the acts of omission of either the appellant or the assessor. Section 9770 concludes as follows: "And the value of said interest or interests shall be determined and fixed in the same manner and by the same officials now required by law to value and assess property for taxation." As further stated in the Stern case: The fact that the tax assessor did not assess the sub-surface estate of appellants is not available to them to defeat the claims of appellee here. It was their primary duty to protect themselves, ."
The minerals were here not such as had been unassessed. Gully v. J. J. Newman Lbr. Co., 178 Miss. 312, 172 So. 740, 741; Stern v. Parker, supra. The original assessment of the land by the assessor was not void. His subsequent conduct could not make it so. His refusal to comply with Section 9770 may subject him but not appellee's title to criticism. The sheriff was without authority to make informal assessment ' ' of the minerals as land or interests that had been left unassessed." This leaves appellant in the situation presented in Stern v. Parker, and the same result must follow.
Affirmed.