Case Name: RUEBEN E. LYON, Executor, v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1912-12-02
Citations: 48 Ct. Cl. 30
Docket Number: No. 30467
Parties: RUEBEN E. LYON, Executor, v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 30–33

Head Matter:
RUEBEN E. LYON, Executor, v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 30467.
Decided December 2, 1912.]
On the Proofs.
An officer is court-martialed-for overstaying Ms leave and sentenced to forfeit one month’s pay. The sentence is approved by proper authority, but before it is promulgated the officer resigns and is honorably discharged.
I.The honorable discharge of an officer after he has been sentenced by court-martial to forfeit a month’s pay and the sentence has been approved does not remit the sentence or entitle him to recover the pay forfeited.
II.The promulgation of the sentence of a court-martial does not affect the validity of the sentence, which becomes final and operative when approved by proper authority.
III.The promulgation of the sentence of a court-martial is for the information of the public, and particularly for the information of the military arm of the Government.
The Befort&rP statement of the case:
The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
I. The claimant herein, Reuben B. Lyon, is the duly appointed executor of the estate of James B. Lybn, deceased, and as such prosecutes this action.
II. As shown by the military record of the claimant’s decedent in the War Department, said decedent was a first lieutenant in Company B, Twenty-third New York Cavalry, and while so serving was, on January 23,1864, granted a leave of absence for 25 days, but instead of returning to his command at the end of Ms leave he remained absent without proper authority until March 14, 1864. For such absence without leave said decedent was court-martialed and sentenced to forfeit to the United States his pay proper for one month, amounting to $51.73.
The sentence of the court-martial was approved April 30, 1864, and promulgated in orders dated May 5, 1865.
III. Subsequent to said court-martial and the approval thereof, but before its promulgation as aforesaid, the claimant was, on April 8, 1865, on tender and acceptance of his resignation on account of physical disability, honorably discharged from the service of the United States at Newbern, N. C.
IV. During the time said claimant’s decedent was absent without leave he was erroneously paid $39.62. His account as stated by the accounting officer is as follows:
CREDITS.
Short paid on account of pay and clothing in payments for period from Oct. 7, ,1861, to Apr. 21, 3863, inclusive_ $3.24
Travel subsistence from Newbern, N. C., to Providence, R. 1. (819 miles), $81.90, less $4.10 tax_ 77.80
Total credits- 81.04
DEBITS.
Paid for time while absent without leave-$39. 62
One month’s stoppage in accordance with sentence of general court-martial- 51. 73
Total debits- 91.35
Balance due the Government--' 10.31
Mr. G. D. Pennebaker for the claimant. Pennebaker, Oarusi de Jones were on the brief.
Mr. W. W. Seott (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson) for the defendants.

Opinion:
Peelue, Ch. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The only controversy in this case is as to the forfeiture of one month's pay under the court-martial proceedings, the contention being that, though the sentence of the court-mar tial was approved before the claimant was discharged, it was not promulgated until thereafter.
Whether the claimant was or was not honorably discharged after the approval of the court-martial proceedings is not material to the decision of the case, as the question is whether after approval the sentence of the court-martial became effective. If it did, then the one month's pay was thereby forfeited. But if we were to assume that the promulgation of the proceedings was essential, the lapse of time after the approval in this case would not operate either to nullify or modify the sentence, but would, if essential thereto, relate back and make effective such proceedings.
However, the question of the jurisdiction of the court-martial over the person and the subject matter is not questioned, nor is the fact of the approval of the sentence and notice thereof to the accused questioned. Therefore the case comes within the ruling of the court in the case of Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S., 333, 346, where the court, quoting from Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S., 13, 23, said: " The court had jurisdiction over the person and the case. It is 'the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases. Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings can not be collaterally impeached for any mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within the sphere of its authority. Its judgments, when approved as required, rest on the same basis and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest, under like circumstances. The exercise of discretion, within authorized limits, can not be assigned for error and made the subject of review by an appellate court."
The error complained of does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. The promulgation of the sentence was for the information of the public, and particularly for the military arm of the Government, and in no way affected the validity of the sentence, which had been duly approved and the accused notified thereof.
A statement of the account is set forth in the findings, and assuming without deciding that the claimant, in the absence of more specific proof, is entitled to the travel subsistence therein set forth, there still remains a small balance in favor of the United States; but as there is no counterclaim (United States v. Mitchell, 205 U. S., 161), and the original claimant has since died, we simply hold that the claimant is nof entitled to recover, and his petition is dismissed.