Case Name: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Ronald Lee MEREDITH, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1988-05-11
Citations: 753 S.W.2d 191
Docket Number: No. 05-86-00654-CV
Parties: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Ronald Lee MEREDITH, Appellee.
Judges: Before ENOCH, C.J., and STEPHENS and HOPKINS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 753
Pages: 191–199

Head Matter:
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Ronald Lee MEREDITH, Appellee.
No. 05-86-00654-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
May 11, 1988.
Gordon H. Montgomery, Dallas, David M. Douglas, Austin, for appellant.
Stanley I. Weinberg, Dallas, for appellee.
Before ENOCH, C.J., and STEPHENS and HOPKINS, JJ.
. The Honorable Harry W. Hopkins, Justice, retired, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas at Fort Worth, sitting by assignment.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ENOCH, Chief Justice.
Appellee filed a motion for rehearing. Appellee's motion for rehearing is granted. Our former opinion is withdrawn. The following is now the opinion of the Court.
The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the failure of the director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (the Department) timely to request a driver's license suspension hearing before a justice of the peace under section 2(f) of article 6701/-5 (Vernon Supp.1988) deprived the county court at law of jurisdiction to conduct the driver's license suspension proceedings at issue in this appeal. We hold that it did not. Having said this, we must next determine whether such failure, however, precluded suspension of the driver's license. We hold that it did. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction and render judgment that appellee's driver's license be reinstated.
The facts in this case are set forth in an agreed statement made by the parties pursuant to rule 50(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. In summary, they establish that on June 16,1984, Ronald Lee Meredith (Meredith) was arrested for driving while intoxicated. After having received all notices and warnings required by law, Meredith was requested to submit to a breath test on an intoxilyzer. He refused to do so. On July 11, 1984, Meredith was notified that pursuant to the provisions of article 6701/-5, section 2(f), his license would be suspended for ninety days based upon his refusal to submit to the intoxilyzer test. On July 19, 1984, Meredith timely requested a hearing before a justice of the peace to contest the license suspension. Although the director failed timely to request a setting for this hearing, a hearing was held before a justice of the peace on October 16, 1984. Pursuant to an order of the justice of the peace, the director suspended Meredith's license.
On February 13, 1986, the suspension proceeding was heard de novo in County Court at Law Number Three of Dallas County, Texas, and the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. The court subsequently filed conclusions of law as follows:
1. The requirement in Article 67011-5, (¾ (f), V.T.C.S., that the Department "shall, not later than the 10th day after the receipt of the demand, request a court to set the hearing for the earliest possible date", is mandatory and failure to comply is [sic] jurisdictional defect.
2. The Department's Counterclaim should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and Plaintiffs driving privileges reinstated.
3. Costs of court should be paid by the Department
(emphasis added).
The Department's first point of error asserts that the county court at law erred in holding that the director's failure timely to request a hearing setting before the justice court deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and, thus, required dismissal of the cause. As to this point, we agree.
At the time of the events of this case, sections 22(a), 22(c), and 31 of article 6687b and sections 2(f) and 4 of article 6701Z-5 governed review of a driver's license suspension resulting from a driver's refusal to submit to an intoxilyzer test. Article 6701Z-5, section 2(f) authorized an initial review by a justice of the peace. That review was obtained in the following manner.
Once a licensee refused to submit a blood or breath specimen, the officer to whom the refusal was made was required immediately to file a written report of the refusal with the director. See art. 67011-5, § 2(d). The director, after assuring that the report met statutory requirements, suspended the licensee's driver's license for a period of 90 days. See art. 67017-5, § 2(e), 2(f). This suspension became effective 28 days after the licensee received notice of the suspension by certified mail. Id.
If, not later than 20 days after receiving notice of the suspension, the licensee made a demand for a hearing before a justice of the peace, article 6701Z-5, section 2(f) directed the department to request a setting within 10 days of receipt of the licensee's demand for that hearing. The hearing was to be set in the same manner as a hearing under article 6687b, section 22(a).
In the review by the justice of the peace, the licensee was entitled to have factual determinations as to whether: (1) probable cause existed that the licensee or operator was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the highway or public beach while intoxicated; (2) the licensee or operator was placed under arrest by the officer and was offered an opportunity to give a blood/breath specimen; and (3) the licensee or operator refused to give the specimen upon request of the officer. See art. 6701Z-5, § 2(f); art. 6687b, § 22(a).
If the justice of the peace made affirmative findings on each of these three issues, section 2(f) required the director to suspend the licensee's driver's license for 90 days. If the justice of the peace failed to find one or more of the elements enumerated in subsection (f), the director was directed to reinstate the license. Art. 67017-5, § 2(g).
Neither article 67017-5, section 2(f) nor article 6687b, section 22(a) set out the procedural prerequisites for obtaining a review before the county court at law. However, after considering the applicable statutes, we conclude that if the findings of the justice of the peace resulted in suspension of a license, the licensee perfected an ap peal under 6687b, section 31 (amended 1987) by filing a petition in the county court. See Coleman v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 639 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, no writ). Under article 6701¿-5, section 2(f), the initial hearing before the justice of the peace was to be "set in the same manner as a hearing under [sjection 22(a)." Proceedings under section 22(a) have been characterized as merely special statutory proceedings, more in the nature of administrative rather than judicial proceedings. Prince v. Garrison, 248 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1952, no writ) (on rehearing) (construing an earlier version of section 22(a)). An irregularity in these initial proceedings did not defeat the jurisdiction of the county court at law.
Meredith argues that the director's suspension order was rendered null and void by the provisions of article 6687b, section 22(c) (repealed 1987). However, this section only voided the director's order once "an appeal [was] filed and the [county court at law] thereby acquire[d] jurisdiction" over the appeal. Art. 6687b, § 22(c) (repealed 1987) (emphasis added); see also Coleman, 639 S.W.2d at 37. The county court's decision in this case that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal would also mandate that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside the director's suspension order. See Id. at 38.
This is an appeal from the judgment entered by the county court at law. The action was brought pursuant to article 6687b, section 31 (amended 1987) as a trial de novo. By express statutory authority, the county court's jurisdiction was invoked when Meredith filed his petition. Article 6687b, § 22(c) (repealed 1987). The Department's first point of error, attacking the trial court's finding that the director's failure to request a hearing as provided for in article 6701Z-5, section 2(f) was jurisdictional, is sustained.
Because the trial court dismissed this case for want of jurisdiction and because we hold such ruling to be error, we must reverse. However, this does not end our inquiry. The Department's second point of error asserts that the county court at law erred in holding that the provisions of article 6701Z-5, section 2(f) are mandatory, because said provisions are merely directory in nature. We disagree.
The question is whether the failure of the Department of Public Safety to ask the court for a hearing within 10 days after receiving Meredith's hearing request as required by statute precluded suspension of his license. This question has been answered adversely to the Department. Balios v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd). The record before this Court shows that the Department failed within 10 days of Meredith's notice to request a hearing before the justice of the peace. Consequently, as a matter of law, the Department is precluded from suspending Meredith's license. The Department's second point of error, attacking the trial court's finding that the directive of article 6701Z-5, section 2(f) is mandatory, is overruled.
The trial court's judgment of dismissal is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED in favor of Meredith.
STEPHENS, J., dissents with opinion.
. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.
.Although not set out in the record, Meredith states in his brief that his license was actually suspended on November 12, 1984. See TEX.R. APP.P. 74(f).
. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 1127, § 6, 7, 1987 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. 7760, 7765 (Vernon), amended section 31 and repealed section 22(c) of article 6687b, effective September 1, 1987. The provisions of article 6687b, as they existed prior to these amendments, govern this appeal. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 1127, § 8, 1987 Tex. Sess.Law Serv. 7760, 7766 (Vernon). Therefore this opinion construes article 6687b as it existed prior to the revisions of 1987. See Act of April 23, 1941, ch. 173, § 31, 1941 Tex.Gen.Laws, 245, 255, for the text of art. 6687b, § 31 applicable to this case. The applicable text for art. 6687b, § 22(c) can be found in Act of June 19, 1965, ch. 717, § 3, 1965 Tex.Gen.Laws 1663, 1665. Other sections of articles 6687b and 6701/-5 discussed in this appeal are unchanged by the 1987 amendments.