Case Name: The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward P. CRABTREE, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1980-09-16
Citations: 618 P.2d 484
Docket Number: No. 16405
Parties: The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward P. CRABTREE, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: STEWART, J., concurs.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 618
Pages: 484–490

Head Matter:
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward P. CRABTREE, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16405.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 16, 1980.
Stephen R. Madsen, Provo, for defendant and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Ernie Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

Opinion:
HALL, Justice:
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of one count of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) with intent to distribute for value, and another count of the same offense (involving possession of cocaine).
On October 12, 1978, defendant was driving north on U.S. Highway 6 between Green River, Utah, and Price, Utah, when he was observed by Utah Highway Patrolman Steven Rapich to be exceeding the speed limit. The officer pulled defendant over, and, at the officer's request, defendant produced a driver's license issued by the state of Alaska. The officer asked that defendant accompany him to his patrol car while he called in on the license and on defendant's vehicle, a stationwagon bearing Nevada license plates. While issuing the speeding citation, the officer noted a pair of hemostats protruding from defendant's coveralls, and asked to examine them. Defendant complied, and the officer immediately observed a brown residue having the odor of marijuana. Defendant was asked if he had marijuana in the car, and after a brief exchange, he produced a small bag half filled with marijuana.
Patrolman Rapich then asked permission to check the car to see whether it contained any more of the substance, which defendant granted. In the car, the officer located a duffle bag, in which defendant asserted was a pistol. The officer opened the bag and found two firearms.
At this point, Patrolman Rapich heard back from the radio dispatcher that defendant was wanted on a fugitive warrant. Defendant was promptly arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car. The station-wagon was locked after the contents thereof (including a suitcase) were removed to the patrol car. The two then proceeded toward Price, defendant receiving the Miranda warning en route. The officer asked if any more firearms were concealed in defendant's possessions, to which defendant replied that there was one more in his suitcase. Defendant also stated that, if the police were going to look through the suitcase, he wished to be present, there being a large quantity of money contained therein as well.
Upon arriving at the station, Patrolman Rapich conducted defendant to a room with a table, wherein the suitcase was opened and the contents inventoried with defendant looking on. The purpose of the procedure, in the officer's words was "to make sure that I had every item that Mr. Crab-tree had of his belongings listed as being in my possession now so that I could return all of it to him to both his and my satisfaction." Upon examining the contents of the suitcase, the officer found another firearm, $11,000.00 in cash, and a container filled with what he suspected was a controlled substance. The substance was later tested and proved to be heroin and cocaine.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence taken from the suitcase on the grounds that the search was conducted illegally and without his consent. The motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges of possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant's basic contention on appeal is that the search made of the suitcase which contained the controlled substance forming the basis of his conviction was a denial of his constitutional right of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. He reasons that the search was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, nor by the presence of exigent circumstances, nor was it accomplished with his consent. We hold that the police procedure followed in this case falls within the inventory search exception to the search warrant requirement, and affirm the trial court.
This Court regards as dispositive in the instant case the decision of South Dakota v. Opperman. That case involved an automobile impounded by local police offices for multiple parking violations. Pursuant to standard procedure, the police made an inventory search of the car in order to catalog all valuables found therein. In the glove compartment, a small bag was found, which contained marijuana. The defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence so seized as having been obtained pursuant to an invalid search. The Court rejected the assertion, holding that the procedure which had uncovered the evidence did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Noting that an inventory examination of the contents of an automobile impounded by the police was a procedure justified by the need to protect private property while in police custody, by the need to protect the police against claims of stolen property, and by the need to protect the police or others from potential danger, the Court first questioned whether, indeed, the inventory was a "search" at all, judged by constitutional standards. Even given the proposition that a constitutional "search" be involved, however, the Court reasoned that the lack of a warrant infringed on no constitutional rights of defendant. No suggestion was made that the inventory was a subterfuge for investigation. The search was prompted by an awareness that the car contained valuables (several of which were visible from outside). Defendant in the action had not made any other arrangement for the disposition of his possessions. The search went no further than the glove compartment of an automobile, where, by prior ruling, an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy. Given such circumstances, the inventory search survived constitutional scrutiny.
In the instant case, the arresting officer was clearly proceeding in a manner similar to the policeman in Opperman. Having made an arrest, he took defendant's possessions into custody for safekeeping. Defendant told the officer that his suitcase contained both a loaded firearm (a potential source of danger) and a large amount of cash (for which the department could be held responsible). In defendant's presence, the officer therefore resolved to open the suitcase and to catalog its contents. No covert investigative intent is alleged. Such circumstances clearly bring the present case within the standard of reasonableness in light of the Opperman decision.
Numerous state courts, facing situations analogous to the one presently under consideration, have permitted the inventory search. In Roush v. State, the defendant was arrested for reckless driving. Upon arrest, the defendant stated that there was a large sum of cash in the car, though he declined to state where, taunting the arresting officer with the claim that the police would be unable to locate it. A search of the car was made at the station for the purpose of inventory. No money was recovered, but a briefcase located in the trunk was discovered to contain illegal barbiturates. The court ruled that the search, being devoid of investigative intent, and occasioned by defendant's own representations, was reasonable. In State v. Keller, . defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license. After the car was towed to the impound lot, police noticed an open case on the floor of the car which contained syringes and other drug paraphernalia. Also visible was a fishing tackle box, bound closed with red wire. Upon opening the box, the officers discovered a quantity of illegal narcotics. The court upheld the search, noting the importance of the underlying purposes of inventorying a suspect's valuables taken into custody upon arrest, and abiding by the trial court's finding that the search was not for evidence. To similar effect is the case of In re One 1965 Econo-line wherein the defendant was found by police in an immobile van which appeared to have been in an accident. Defendant was incoherent and uncooperative, but eventually left the van, and was informed by police that it would have to be towed away, and that they would need to inventory the contents (to which defendant voiced neither objection nor assent). Upon opening the back of the van, police discovered a small shaving kit, which was found to contain a controlled substance. The court upheld the search, again noting that it was strictly inventory procedure, and not unreasonable by constitutional standards. The court particularly emphasized that the personal character of a shaving kit did not render the search an unreasonable intrusion, stating that the purpose of inventorying a suspect's valuables was to protect them, and that it would be illogical to bar the cataloging of items simply because they were in a place where a greater degree of privacy is anticipated, such being the very type of location where valuables most needing protection would be likely to be found. Most recently, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed a fact situation similar to the present case and found the inventory procedure proper. In Dearing v. State, police apprehended an armed robbery suspect. Upon arrest, the defendant asked the arresting officer to retrieve two suitcases from a bus station locker, stating that they were "all he had in the world." The suitcases were found and opened for inventory. Therein were found firearms which were introduced as evidence against defendant. The court determined that Opperman permitted the search. While electing to treat the inventory process as a "search," the court observed that it was not conducted in the hope of uncovering evidence, but was merely a caretaking procedure, and that, while the state's interest in conducting such a procedure had to be balanced against the individual's rights against unreasonable intrusions, the facts weighed in favor of the search, the defendant having relinquished his expectation of privacy by requesting that the bags be retrieved, much as did the defendant in the instant action by requesting that he be present during the inventory.
Defendant relies on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. Chadwick (recently expanded upon in the case of Arkansas v. Sanders, which is sufficiently similar to the former decision in all relevant respects that the two will be referred to together hereafter), for the proposition that the opening of defendant's suitcase under the circumstances of the instant case constituted an unreasonable search in violation of defendant's rights. Both the Chadwick and the Sanders, decisions involved the apprehension of suspected narcotics carriers upon their departure from mass transit terminals. In both cases, police investigative techniques led the arresting officers to believe that they had probable cause to search the suspects' luggage (a suitcase in one case, a foot locker in the other). Both searches were conducted without warrants, for the express purpose of uncovering evidence to support the arrest. In both cases, the government sought to defend the search as falling within the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement. The resulting decisions rejected the argument, holding that the automobile exception, like all exceptions to the warrant requirement, was narrow, and did not extend to the warrantless search of luggage upon probable cause, simply because the luggage happened to be in an automobile at the time it was seized. The decisions likewise ruled that the searches were not validated as being incident to a lawful arrest.
Neither decision addressed itself to the searching of luggage as a police inventory procedure following arrest on other charges. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, in the Chadwick decision, expressly stated that:
In circumstances involving noncriminal inventory searches, where probable cause to search is irrelevant, we have recognized "that search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable cause concept." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n. 5 [96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000] (1976). This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant simply have no application in that context; the constitutional reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other bases.
Indeed, the decision in Dearing v. State, addresses the applicability of the Sanders and Chadwick decisions to the type of pro cedure here under consideration, and concludes, as have we, that Opperman is more nearly on point, and takes precedence.
In the light of the foregoing, the facts of the instant case clearly disclose the inapplicability of the decisions in Chadwick and Sanders to the issue presented. It is undisputed that the arresting officer was not conducting an investigative search of defendant's suitcase. The arrest was on the basis of a fugitive warrant; the suitcase was taken into custody as a matter of police practice. The arresting officer having been informed that the suitcase contained a large amount of money, the case was opened (in defendant's presence, and at his request to be present) strictly in order to inventory its contents and enable the policeman to "return all of it to him (defendant) to both his and my satisfaction."
The decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
STEWART, J., concurs.
. Both in violation of U.C.A., 1953, 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii).
. Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah.
. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).
.It is noted that the Opperman decision involves the inventory search of an automobile, rather than of a suitcase found therein. As will be seen, however, both the language of the decision and the rationale underlying the holding do not limit the matter to automobiles specifically.
. See, e. g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
. It is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the character of defendant's request to be present constituted a consent to the search. Defendant's statement, however, clearly establishes a diminished expectation of privacy regarding the contents of the suitcase.
. Fla., 203 So.2d 632 (1967).
. 9 Or.App. 613, 497 P.2d 868 (1972).
. 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973).
. Ind., 393 N.E.2d 167 (1979).
. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
. 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2986, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).
. Supra, footnote 2.
. The procedures used in the cited cases fell wide of the restrictions placed on warrantless searches pursuant to arrest by the case of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
. United States v. Chadwick, cited supra, at p.
. Cited supra, footnote 10.