Case Name: PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-12-20
Citations: 378 So. 2d 862
Docket Number: No. 79-2096
Parties: PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 378
Pages: 862–866

Head Matter:
PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 79-2096.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 20, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1980.
Talbot D’Alemberte of Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Florence Beth Snyder, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae — Florida Society of Newspaper Editors.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, Chief Judge.
In this proceeding the media, in the person of Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., seeks review of a trial court order curtailing the activities of the electronic media in reporting the trial of a criminal case.
In a case pending in the Circuit Court, Arthur Michael Sekell stands indicted for first degree murder for allegedly killing William Wright, Jr., by setting him afire. A pretrial motion was filed by the state requesting the court to limit filming or photographing of two witnesses. The motion alleges that both witnesses are inmates at Lantana Correctional Institute and are vital to the state's case; both fear that if there is television coverage of the trial while they testify their personal safety in prison will be greatly jeopardized.
The press was given notice of the hearing on said motion and counsel for the petitioner was present. As the hearing opened the state furnished the court and defense counsel with affidavits from the two witnesses in question. Counsel for petitioner was not furnished copies of these affidavits nor apprised directly of their contents. However, the prosecutor advised the court that neither of the witnesses would testify at trial, even under pain of contempt, if their testimony were televised or if they were photographed. He also advised the court that a Lieutenant from the prison was present to testify regarding the danger envisioned by the witnesses. An extended colloquy thereafter ensued, mostly between counsel for the defense and the press, on the one hand, and the trial judge, on the other, concluding with the judge's announcing:
So I will grant the motion and I will not permit the still cameras photography or the televising if there is going to be any televising.
Earlier in the hearing, in an attempt to point up the folly in prohibiting photographs and the televising of the witnesses, counsel for the press suggested that the press was free to make sketches of the witnesses or publish existing photographs and thus divulge their image to the public. At this suggestion the trial judge stated he would bar that activity also. No written order was entered, but the parties have treated the court's ruling as being restricted to photographs, sketches and televising of the two witnesses in question.
The focus of this case, as we see it, is not on the constitutional right of access to the courts, but rather on the proper construction and interpretation of the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Florida in In Re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct, 370 So.2d 764 (Fla.1979). In that case of original jurisdiction, after a lengthy pilot program to study the effects of the electronic media in the courtroom, the Supreme Court concluded that Canon 3 A(7), Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting broadcasting, televising, recording or taking photographs in the courtroom was no longer required to insure a defendant's right to a fair trial or to preserve an atmosphere conducive to judicial proceedings. Thus, said Canon was amended to allow electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state in accordance with the standard of conduct and technology promulgated by the Supreme Court. The allowance of such media coverage, however, was made subject to the authority of the trial judge to control the proceedings before the court so as to ensure decorum, prevent distraction and ensure the fair administration of justice. For clarity, the Court included its own commentary which, in pertinent part, points out that the revised Canon constitutes a general authorization for electronic media and still photography coverage of court proceedings for all purposes, subject to the limitation of the court's own standards having to do with equipment, personnel, etc.
The Post-Newsweek Court recognized that there are unique problems which can arise with respect to particular participants in judicial proceedings, such as a child in a custody proceeding, prisoners, confidential informants, sexual battery victims and witnesses under identity protection. Therefore, it was felt expedient to promulgate a standard to assist the presiding judge in exercising his discretion in determining whether to prohibit electronic media cover age of a particular participant. In that regard the Court stated:
[W]e deem it imprudent to compile a laundry list or adopt an absolute rule to deal with these occurrences. Instead, the matter should be left to the sound discretion of the presiding judge to be exercised in accordance with the following standard:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular participant only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different from the effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively different from coverage by other types of media. (Emphasis added.) 370 So.2d at 779.
The state contends that Post-Newsweek authorizes the exclusion of electronic media when individuals who fall into one of the enumerated categories, such as prisoners, are called to testify. Further, the state seems to be of the view that the trial judge need not support his decision to limit electronic or still photography coverage with a finding of necessity since the necessity, in such instances, is presumed. We reject that analysis of the Post-Newsweek case. On the contrary, while it is incumbent upon the trial judge to protect those witnesses who by testifying in front of the electronic media may actually be exposed to serious harm, the need for such unique protection must be clearly demonstrated by competent evidence. Our concern on this review is to determine whether the record before this court comports with the foregoing standard. It is our conclusion that it fails to do so.
We think it was appropriate for the court to require notice to the media of the hearing on the state's motion to curtail electronic and still photography. Ostensibly, the purpose of such a proceeding is for the presiding judge to hear evidence so that he can make findings as a predicate for the exercise of his discretion in granting or denying the motion. In the nature of things, we would expect the press to contest any proposed limitation upon full coverage as envisioned by Canon 3 A(7), supra. Therefore, the party moving for a limitation on coverage would seem to have the burden of adducing some credible evidence necessitating the limitation, while the press should have the right to cross-examination and the adduction of contrary proof.
In the case at bar the state filed a motion which alleged essentially that it had two vital witnesses who were inmates of a Florida prison and that they were afraid if their testimony were televised or they were photographed their personal safety would be jeopardized. The trial court was furnished with identical affidavits from the two witnesses, which the prosecutor and Attorney General state show the witnesses will refuse to testify if their testimony is to be televised or photographed because they fear for their safety in prison. At the hearing the prosecutor also advised the court that the state had a prison official present who would testify in support of the motion. However this testimony was not presented and, as we mentioned earlier, the trial court discussed the matter with counsel and, based solely upon the motion and affidavits, the motion was granted.
We emphasize that the trial judge made no findings, as required by the Post-News week standard, nor, in our judgment, could he have done so. The motion and affidavits simply set forth subjective fears of the two witnesses involved without any objective facts upon which the court could make a determination regarding the substantive validity thereof; to say nothing of the inability of the press under the circumstances to test the substance of the state's position. No facts were shown so that the court could determine whether the alleged fear was real or imagined. To require less would result in an automatic exclusion of the media upon any witness simply advising the court that he harbored some uncertainty about his safety should he be exposed to the media while testifying.
Finally, we see no reason for withholding the witnesses' affidavits from the press at the hearing or for their subsequent sealing in the record. No request was made that they be sealed nor do they contain any relevant matter not already known to the parties or reflected by the record which needed to be secreted.
In view of the foregoing the order sought to be reviewed is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of holding a further hearing so that findings can be made to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining the issue presented. We also direct that the affidavits in question be unsealed and filed in the court file.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
LETTS, J., dissents in part.
. The trial judge sealed the affidavits of the two witnesses but they have been furnished to this court for our consideration.