Case Name: STILLINGS v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-06-05
Citations: 82 N.Y.S. 726
Docket Number: 
Parties: STILLINGS v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 82
Pages: 726–728

Head Matter:
STILLINGS v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 5, 1903.)
1. Street Cars—Personal Injuries—Contributory Negligence.
Decedent, while seeing, some distance away, a south-bound car approaching, started, at a street crossing, to walk diagonally across the street in order to board an approaching north-bound car. He signaled to the latter to stop, which it did. Its conductor called to him to hurry. When in the center of the track on which the south-bound car was running, he was warned by a companion of its approach, and stepped back, but was struck and killed. There was evidence that the southbound car was proceeding at a speed of 20 or 25 miles an hour, and that no signal of its approach was given. Held, that the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury. '
2. Wrongful Death—Damages—Excessive Verdict.
A verdict for $10,000 for causing the death of a man 73 years of age, successful in business, apparently in good financial circumstances, leaving a wife and adult children, to none of whom he gave financial aid except to the wife, was excessive, and should be reduced to $5,000.
McLaughlin and Ingraham, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by William E. Stillings, as executor of Isaac Stillings, deceased, against the. Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Conditionally affirmed.
Argued before HATCH, McLAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, INGRAHAM, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Charles F. Brown, for appellant.
Archibald C. Shenstone, for respondent.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, J.
At about midnight on January 7, 1899, the plaintiff's testator was killed by being struck and run over by a car belonging to the defendant and in charge of its servants. The car was proceeding southerly on the westerly track of the defendant's road on Central Park West. The decedent and a companion were at the southwest corner of Central Park West and Sixty-Ninth street, intending to take a north-bound car on the defendant's road. Such a car was seen at about Sixty-Ninth street, and a south-bound car was also seen at about the southerly side of Seventy-First street. The decedent and his companion left the southwest corner of Sixty-Ninth street, signaling to the north-bound car to stop. It did stop between the north and south lines of Sixty-Ninth street. They walked quite fast towards the north-bound car, diagonally northeastward from the street corner from which they started. The conductor cried to them to come on and to hurry up. The decedent's companion reached the north-bound car in safety, and was about four feet in advance. He turned and saw the decedent right behind li::n in the center of the south track, with the south-bound car rapidly approaching. He called to the decedent to look out for the car, and he testified that the decedent attempted to avoid it by a backward movement, but was struck before he could leave the track, and was killed.
There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff to show that the south-bound car was proceeding at a very rapid rate of speed, as much as about the rate of 20 or 25 miles an hour; also that no gong was sounded and no warning given. There is evidence from which the jury could well infer that the car was being run at such a rate of speed as not to be under control at street crossings or the places at which pedestrians are expected to cross the street. The theory of the defendant is that the car was • proceeding only at the rate of some eight miles an hour or less; that by reasonable vigilance or prudence the decedent could have seen the impending danger from the approaching car, and could have avoided it. However, under the evidence as it stands, the question of contributory negligence was one for the jury. They might well believe from the evidence that the decedent and his companion might reasonably. have expected to reach the north-bound car in safety, and that the motorman of the south-bound car would have his car under control, so that they might cross without danger. Upon the whole evidence, we see no reason for charging the decedent with contributory negligence as matter of law.
We have examined the exceptions in the case, but we do not think they are of sufficient importance to require a reversal of the judgment.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $10,-000. We can find no basis in the evidence authorizing a judgment in so large a sum. The decedent was 73 years of age. He was a successful business man, apparently in good financial circumstances. He left a widow and adult children. No information is given us as to his income, or as to what contribution he made to his family, or what they might reasonably expect from him in the future. There is a singular lack of data in this case upon which to base pecuniary loss to the next of kin. None of the next of kin of the decedent was receiving pecuniary aid from him, but only the wife. The damages are excessive, and should be reduced to $5,000.
If the plaintiff will stipulate so to reduce the judgment as entered to the sum of $6,586.73, the judgment as modified by such reduction and the order appealed from will be affirmed, without costs. If, however, the stipulation is not given, the judgment and order must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
HATCH and LAUGHLIN, JJ., concur.