Case Name: Jerry D. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-02-13
Citations: 865 So. 2d 640
Docket Number: No. 2D03-180
Parties: Jerry D. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAVIS, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 865
Pages: 640–644

Head Matter:
Jerry D. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D03-180.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 13, 2004.

Opinion:
CANADY, Judge.
Jerry D. Anderson appeals the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because we conclude that there has been no conclusive showing that Anderson is entitled to no relief, we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Anderson makes claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel and an error in the sentencing guidelines scoresheet used in his sentencing. We conclude that the trial court's summary denial of Anderson's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims should be affirmed and will not further address those claims. We conclude, however, that the summary denial of Anderson's scoresheet-error claim should be reversed.
In April 1997, Anderson was charged by information with attempted murder in the second degree — a violation of section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (supp.1996)— for an offense that allegedly occurred on March 8, 1997. In October 1997, Anderson entered a no contest plea and was sentenced to two years' community control followed by five years' probation. In April 2000, Anderson was charged with a probation violation. In February 2001, he was found guilty and sentenced to ninety months in prison.
The sentencing court utilized a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.990(a) sentencing guidelines scoresheet — the score-sheet used under the 1994 guidelines, which are applicable to the charged offense. The scoresheet used by the sentencing court reflects 137 total sentence points and a sentencing range of 81.75 to 136.25 months.
The scoresheet error alleged by Anderson relates to the scoring of the primary offense level. For reasons that are not discernable from the record before us, the offense of attempted murder in the second degree charged against Anderson was scored as a level 9 offense (91 points). As the postconviction court recognized, this scoring of the primary offense level was an error which resulted in an increase in the total sentence points calculated on the scoresheet.
The scoring of an inchoate crime — such as attempted second-degree murder — is based on the offense level that would have been applicable had the crime been completed. Under the applicable statutes, second-degree murder was a level 10 offense and attempted second-degree murder should have been scored at two offense levels below the completed crime. See § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994); § 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.702(d)(6). Anderson's correct primary offense level thus was level 8 rather than the level 9 reflected on the scoresheet used by the sentencing court. With the primary offense scored correctly at level 8 (74 points), Anderson's score-sheet would reflect 120 total sentence points and a sentencing range of 69 to 115 months.
The postconviction trial court concluded that Anderson "was not adversely affected" by the scoresheet error because the ninety-month sentence previously imposed "is within the corrected range." In reaching the conclusion that Anderson was not entitled to relief, the postconviction court relied on Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000), and Hummel v. State, 782 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). In Heggs, which invalidated the statute adopting the 1995 sentencing guidelines, the supreme court held that "if a person's sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines (without a departure), then that person shall not be entitled to relief under our decision here." 759 So.2d at 627. In Hummel, the First District stated that the supreme court had in Heggs "announced a new harmless error analysis to be applied in dealing with scoresheet inaccuracies." 782 So.2d at 451. The First District thus concluded that the Heggs standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to relief is generally applicable to claims based on scoresheet errors and not limited to errors arising from the use of the invalid 1994 guidelines.
This court has, however, not understood Heggs as establishing such a generally applicable standard for determining whether scoresheet errors require resen-tencing. On the contrary, in Voss v. State, 808 So.2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), Collins v. State, 788 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and Bigham v. State, 761 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) — which were decided after Heggs — we have adhered to the view that a scoresheet error, like the error shown by Anderson, requires resentencing unless it can be shown conclusively that the same sentence would have been imposed if the corrected scoresheet had been used by the sentencing court. See also Sprankle v. State, 662 So.2d 736, 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that scoresheet error was basis for relief under motion to correct illegal sentence even where sentence imposed using incorrect scoresheet was "still within the permitted range of punishment" under the correct scoresheet and stating that "[w]hen a corrected score-sheet places the defendant in a different cell, the error cannot be presumed to be harmless, unless the record conclusively demonstrates that the trial court would have given the same sentence had it known the correct score").
In sum, we employ the would-have-been-imposed standard for determining whether scoresheet errors require resentencing, while the First District under Hummel uses the could-have-been-imposed standard adopted from Heggs. Anderson would not be entitled to relief under the could-have-been-imposed standard articulated in Hummel. But he is entitled to relief under the would-have-been-imposed standard utilized in this district because there has been no conclusive showing that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had utilized a correctly calculated scoresheet.
We recognize that the sentencing transcript or other record documents may conclusively demonstrate that the sentence imposed was not affected by the score-sheet error. If the trial court determines on remand that the record conclusively refutes Anderson's claim, it will be necessary for the trial court to enter a new order denying relief and to attach to the order the portions of the sentencing transcript or other record documents that conclusively show that Anderson is not entitled to relief. Otherwise, Anderson must be resentenced using a corrected score-sheet.
We acknowledge that our decisions in Voss, Collins, and Bigham are inconsistent with the First District's decision in Hum-mel, and therefore certify direct conflict pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi).
Reversed and remanded with instructions; conflict certified.
DAVIS, J., Concurs.
ALTENBERND, C.J., Concurs with opinion.