Case Name: Jerome Allen BARGO, Terry Gene HOWELL, Gary MORSE, et al v. A. L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, and Steve CLARK, Attorney General
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1983-05-09
Citations: 279 Ark. 180
Docket Number: CR 82-143
Parties: Jerome Allen BARGO, Terry Gene HOWELL, Gary MORSE, et al v. A. L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, and Steve CLARK, Attorney General
Judges: Purtle, J., dissents.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 279
Pages: 180–183

Head Matter:
Jerome Allen BARGO, Terry Gene HOWELL, Gary MORSE, et al v. A. L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, and Steve CLARK, Attorney General
CR 82-143
650 S.W.2d 227
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered May 9, 1983
Appellants, pro se.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: LeslieM. Powell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

Opinion:
Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.
Appellants, Jerome Allen Bargo, Terry Gene Howell, and Gary Morse filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Lincoln County Circuit Court wherein they challenged the determination of their parole eligibility date by the Arkansas Department of Correction. The trial court dismissed, and on appeal we affirm.
The relevant facts can be summarized as follows: Appellants had all been convicted of various offenses and were serving time in the Department of Correction. In 1979 appellants were convicted and given additional sentences for escape. Appellant Bargo was given a six-year sentence to run concurrent with his original five-year sentence. Appellants Howell and Morse were given four-year sentences to run consecutive to their original 21 and 18-year sentences respectively.
Sometime after these escape convictions the Department of Correction informed appellants that their parole eligibility would now be determined under the more stringent provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2829 (Repl. 1977 rather than Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2807 (Repl. 1977), which had governed their original sentences. Appellants responded by filing this petition.
We must first decide whether a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate method to challenge the determination of appellants' parole eligibility, and we conclude that it is not. Habeas corpus petitions are restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201 (1961).
Furthermore, in the similar case of Webb v. Bishop, 242 Ark. 320, 413 S.W.2d 862 (1967) we held that a habeas corpus petition was not the correct way to attack a revocation of parole. "Such an attack must be by direct proceeding and not collateral, as was attempted by appellant Webb." Webb, supra, See also Davis v. Mabry, 266 Ark. 487, 585 S. W.2d 949 (1979) where this Court ruled upon an inmate's parole eligibility date after he had filed a "petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus" in circuit court.
The trial court's dismissal of appellants' writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
Purtle, J., dissents.