Case Name: In re RYAN S.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2002-04-22
Citations: 369 Md. 26
Docket Number: No. 85
Parties: In re RYAN S.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 369
Pages: 26–66

Head Matter:
797 A.2d 39
In re RYAN S.
No. 85,
Sept. Term, 2001.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
April 22, 2002.
Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Celia Anderson Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued Before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

Opinion:
BATTAGLIA, Judge.
The questions with which we are presented in this case involve, once again, the juvenile court practice that existed in Montgomery County when the juvenile court was part of the District Court, whereby adjudicatory hearings were commenced -within the requisite time period pursuant to Rule 11-114 but were continued on non-consecutive trial dates over a period of months. Today, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner, Ryan S., waived his right to challenge the untimeliness of his adjudication; if error is found, we shall also consider whether the petitioner's motion for dismissal, or in the alternative, mistrial, should have been granted by the juvenile court due to violations of Rule 11-114b. Finally, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the juvenile court's order that Ryan and his mother, Linda S., pay restitution to the victim's insurer, Kaiser Permanente, in the amount of $10,000.00.
I. Statement of Facts
This ease arises from an altercation between the petitioner, Ryan S., and the victim, Ronnie Dent, at the petitioner's home in Rockville, Maryland, on February 4, 1998. Dent, a 48-year-old man and cousin of Ryan's natural father, began a sexual relationship with Ryan's mother, Linda S., shortly after the death of Ryan's father. This relationship greatly upset Ryan, who was seventeen at the time of the altercation, and Ryan expressed his disapproval of the relationship to both Dent and his mother on several occasions. According to Dent, Ryan threatened to kill Dent a couple of times prior to their physical altercation.
The facts concerning the evening of February 4, 1998 were disputed. Both parties' versions agree, however, that at some point during the evening, Dent and Ryan began arguing.
Dent claimed that when he arrived at the home of Ryan and Linda S. on the evening of February 4, 1998, Ryan began yelling at Dent, exclaiming that he did not want Dent "coming around here, seeing my Mom." Dent testified that Ryan immediately grabbed a knife and moved toward Dent. To protect himself, Dent grabbed a vacuum cleaner and raised it to his shoulder. When Linda S. jumped in between them, Dent turned to put the vacuum cleaner down. As he was doing so, Ryan stabbed Dent in the back.
Ryan alleged that when he and Dent were arguing, Dent threatened to "crush him." Ryan further testified that Dent threw him to the ground and appeared to be reaching for something in his pocket. To protect himself, Ryan got up and ran to the kitchen to grab a knife. Dent then came after Ryan and again threw him into the ground, falling on top of him. The two struggled violently on the floor until, at some point, Dent exclaimed that he had been stuck with the knife. Ryan claimed that this was unintentional, that Dent "probably fell on it [the knife]."
Dent sustained serious injuries and was hospitalized as' a result of the altercation.
II. Procedural History
Ryan turned himself into the police on May 11, 1998, and three days later, on May 14, 1998, he appeared before the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court. The District Court ordered that Ryan be detained at the Alfred D. Noyes Children's Center ("Noyes") pending a "reverse waiver" hearing to determine whether his case would be heard in a juvenile or "adult" court.
On June 5, 1998, the petitioner was indicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for first degree assault and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. On June 10, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion to transfer his charges to juvenile court pursuant to Article 27, Section 594A. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County held the "reverse waiver" hearing on August 10, 1998, and on August 14, 1998, ultimately granted the motion and ordered that the charges be transferred to juvenile court.
The State filed a petition in the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court on August 20, 1998, charging Ryan with delinquency based on first degree assault, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. The State also sought the statutory maximum amount of restitution, $10,000.00, from Ryan and his mother for Dent's medical expenses.
Ryan's adjudicatory hearing began on September 10 and continued on September 11, 1998. Pre-trial motions were heard and three of the State's witnesses testified. The adjudicatory hearing, however, was far from complete; the juvenile court scheduled the hearing to resume on December 13, 1998. Ryan contested both his continuing detention at Noyes and the duration of the delay between the hearings. The cohrt refused to release Ryan and refused to move the adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date. As a result, Ryan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. At the habeas corpus hearing, the Circuit Court, without formally ruling, verbally directed that Ryan be released from Noyes and that the juvenile court reschedule the date of the hearing for within thirty days of September 10, 1998. The juvenile court refused-to honor the Circuit Court's instruction regarding scheduling, but ultimately did release Ryan from Noyes. Upon Ryan's release, the Circuit Court determined that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was moot and the petition was withdrawn.
The adjudicatory hearing resumed on December 14 and 15, 1998. When it became apparent, again, that the trial would not be completed during these scheduled dates, the court and counsel discussed scheduling issues again. The hearing was continued to January 13, 1999, and Ryan made no objection.
On the 13th of January, Ryan moved for a mistrial alleging that he had been denied his right to a fair trial due to the lengthy and disjointed nature of his adjudicatory hearing and because the recordings of the prior hearings were unintelligible, which he alleged was a violation of Rule 16 504. The motion for mistrial was denied, and the juvenile court resumed and completed the petitioner's adjudicatory hearing. The court found the petitioner not involved in first degree assault, but involved in second degree assault, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure.
To the extent necessary, a more detailed description of the procedural history and the pertinent portions of the transcripts of this case will be provided when discussing the issues presented below.
III. Discussion
A. Waiver
The Court of Special Appeals held that while the petitioner's complaint concerning the "protracted and disjointed nature of the proceedings in this case" was valid, the complaint, itself, was waived. See In Re Ryan S., 139 Md.App. 94, 111, 774 A.2d 1193, 1202 (2001). The intermediate appellate court asserted that the petitioner did not make a timely objection to the court's continuances and further claimed that any objection the petitioner did make was based on a violation of Rule 11-114b.2 and not Rule 11-114b. 1, which was the basis upon which the motion for dismissal was argued. Id. at 111-12, 774 A.2d at 1202-03. We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals. The conclusion that the petitioner waived his right to appellate review of the timeliness and continuity of his trial is erroneous.
Contrary to that which the Court of Special Appeals alludes is necessary to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party need not, in every circumstance, recite a specific litany to constitute an objection to a trial ruling or course of action. Maryland Rule 4-323(c), applicable to criminal cases, provides in relevant part:
For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court.
As we stated in Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993), where defense counsel failed to make a specific motion but indicated his disagreement with the court's view on whether the reluctance of a juror (as demonstrated by polling) should be a factor in considering whether the verdict was defective, a party need only make known his "objection to the action of the court." Id. at 344, 619 A.2d at 550. See also Caviness v. State, 244 Md. 575, 578, 224 A.2d 417, 418 (1966)(stating that "unless a defendant makes timely objections in the lower court or makes his feelings known to that court, he will be considered to have waived them and he can not now raise such objections on appeal")(emphasis added).
Similarly, Maryland Rule 2-517(c), applicable to civil cases provides, in relevant part,
For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court.
In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Theiss, 354 Md. 234, 729 A.2d 965 (1999), we discussed the historical development of Rule 2-517 and, quoting from a predecessor rule, Rule 17, noted that "[fjormal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; . it is sufficient that a party at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take.... " Id. at 245, 729 A.2d at 971 (quoting Court of Appeals Rule 17 (1945)); accord Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp. v. Malory, 143 Md.App. 327, 351, 795 A.2d 107, 121 (2001), cert. denied 364 Md. 141, 771 A.2d 1070 (2001).
Thus, as long as the party, whether in a civil or criminal case, clearly makes the judge aware of the course of action he or she desires the court to take and the reasons for such course of action, the party shall have adequately preserved that issue for appellate review. See Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 472, 337 A.2d 100, 107 (1975); Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 575, 185 A.2d 344, 347 (1962), cert. denied 375 U.S. 845, 84 S.Ct. 98, 11 L.Ed.2d 72 (1963). While the juvenile rules are silent on this matter, the standard for determining preservation in criminal and other civil cases holds true in juvenile cases as well.
In the case at hand, the petitioner, without question, alerted the court to his concerns about the lack of continuity and the duration of the delays between the hearings. When the adjudicatory hearing was initially scheduled, the petitioner expressed concern over the fact that the judge only allowed for a half-day, but the court assured the petitioner that it would "move cases" if necessary to accommodate the hearing.
After the pre-trial motions were argued and testimony from three State witnesses taken on September 10 and September 11, 1998, it became apparent that the adjudicatory hearing would not be completed. The court informed the parties that the adjudicatory hearing would be continued to December 14, 1998. Given the length of the delay, counsel for the petitioner requested that the court release the petitioner from Noyes. The court denied the motion based on the seriousness of the injury inflicted upon Dent and the petitioner's three-month delay in turning himself into the authorities.
Immediately after the judge denied the motion to release the petitioner from custody, the petitioner's counsel protested the amount of time between the hearings. The ensuing colloquy was, in relevant part, as follows:
[Defense Counsel] Judge, now that you've made your ruling about his detention, I guess I would like to revisit the issue of when we're going to hear this case. I mean, my understanding of the statute is that, he's entitled to have an adjudication hearing mthin thirty days. He, we're available Monday. But I mean, I think that he's either entitled to be released, or . entitled to have his hearing completed within thirty days, so that he can have a determination about whether he's involved or not involved.
[Court] Well if that, I mean, if that were the case [defense counsel], then any time that a case went, went into a second day, if it was the thirty-first day, he would, he would be entitled to be released and the case couldn't be concluded. And what if it was a case that would take a month to try? . .
[Defense Counsel] That's not the situation that we have in this case.
[Court] I know that it's not, but it could lead, it could lead to that point. I'm very distressed that this case can't be heard sooner, I wish that it could, it's difficult for me, as the trier of fad. But, unfortunately . we have been given statutory authority to handle termination of parental rights cases, which are long, drawn out, protracted proceedings that all of our calendars are getting filled up with those kinds of cases.
(emphasis added).
Thus, the petitioner's counsel expressed concern for both the length of delay between the hearings and the fact that the petitioner would be in detention at Noyes for three more months. The juvenile court then suggested that the petitioner file a motion to advance the trial date because rescheduling "would have to be a matter that would be addressed to . the [judge in charge]. Because if my calendar's going to be reshuffled to put this case in earlier, that would have to come . from [the judge in charge]." Petitioner's counsel, again, stated that the requirements of Rule 11-114 were being violated:
[Defense Counsel] And Your Honor, I would just like to say that I, looking at [Rule] 11-11], my reading of this rule says that the hearing shall be held within thirty days. And if it is not to be held within thirty days . [t]hen the Respondent shall be released. We are not waiving.
[Defense Counsel] My . [b]elief is that the Court of Appeals would say that if the trial was beginning, just like a one hundred and eighty day ruling, if the trial begins and continues on the hundred and eighty first and hundred eighty second day, you've complied with the rule. If the Court were confronted where the trial begins on the thirtieth day, and continues [un]til the ninetieth day, I would say that the Court of Appeals would say that that is not complying. And I'm just asking Your Honor to follow the rule and either continue this trial . on Monday, or release him today.
[Court] Okay, I feel that the rule has been complied with. If you wish to file a motion to advance, because it would involve a re-shuffling of the, of the Court's calendar, that I don't feel that I have the authority to do, it should be addressed to [the judge in charge], and I'll certainly be happy to abide by his ruling.
(emphasis added).
In response to the juvenile court's ruling, and in lieu of its suggestion, the petitioner's counsel filed for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus was directed not only to advancing the trial date, but also to securing the release of the petitioner from Noyes. It is clear that the petitioner's concerns about the delay between his hearings were presented in the context of the habeas corpus petition because the Circuit Court verbally instructed the juvenile court to set a trial date within thirty days of September 10th and release the petitioner from Noyes.
The judge in charge of the juvenile court refused, however, to accept the Circuit Court's verbal directive stemming from the habeas corpus petition:
[State] Your Honor, we had a hearing [in response to a habeas corpus petition] just a few minutes ago in front of [the administrative judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County]. [He] . ordered that the Juvenile Court is to set a, trial date within thirty days of September 10th .
[Court] Tell me something. How does this Circuit Court order me to do that?
[State] Your Honor, I was trying .
[Court] What jurisdiction do they have?
[State] I was trying to select that word carefully but .
[Court] Because I don't think they do, and I'm not going to comply with an order of the Circuit Court.
[Court] Let him [act on the habeas corpus]. Because frankly, he's not running my Court, I object to him trying to do so. I gave his Clerk, with you on the phone, reasons why we weren't able to set this within thirty days. Judge Weinstein should understand that this Court is the same level as the Circuit Court, unfortunately, it still has the name District Court. But, I am not going to do, I'm not going to let Judge Weinstein be the administrative Judge for this Court. He's not going to tell me when I'm going to set cases in.
[State] Okay.
[Court] I'm going to try to comply with the law . I believe I have. And I will not permit the Circuit Court to order me to set a trial date. If he wants to release somebody on habeas corpus, it's on him.
(emphasis added). . Notwithstanding the views of the judge in charge of the juvenile court, the petitioner clearly made his objection to the untimeliness of the adjudicatory hearings known to the court. That the petitioner failed to specifically cite subsection b.l of Rule 11-114 is irrelevant. The petitioner chose to object to the juvenile court's ruling by filing a petition for habeas corpus relief and further voiced his objections at the hearings thereafter. At this juncture, it was within the power of the juvenile court to correct the error by advancing the trial date. As we have often stated, whether a court had the ability to correct an error is a significant factor in determining whether a party waived appellate review of his or her complaint. See State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 189, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994)(asserting that "[t]he interests of fairness are furthered by 'requiring counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings' ")(quoting Clayman v. Prince George's County, 266 Md. 409, 416, 292 A.2d 689, 693 (1972)); Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119 A.2d 917, 921 (1956)(stating that a party's "failure to exercise the option [to object] while it is still within the power of the trial court to correct the error is regarded as a waiver of it estopping him from obtaining a review of the point or question on appeal").
After the juvenile court declared that it would not reconsider the scheduling of petitioner's adjudicatory hearing, we can find no fault in counsel's determination to concede to the court's ruling; in fact, he arguably had no choice but to yield to the court. See In re Emileigh F., 353 Md. 30, 36-37, 724 A.2d 639, 642 (1999)(stating that when "it was apparent that [the court's] ruling on further objection would be unfavorable to the defense . .the absence of a further objection did not constitute a waiver")(quoting Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 515, 601 A.2d 1093, 1094 (1992)). The Court of Special Appeals glossed over the basis for, and significance of, the petition for writ of habeas corpus by improperly qualifying the petitioner's motion as an objection "solely on the ground that he was being detained," when it is clear from the record that the length of the time between hearings was also a crucial element of his argument. See In re Ryan S., 139 Md.App. at 111, 774 A.2d at 1203. Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court improperly emphasized the distinctions of subsections b.l and b.2 of Rule 11-114 when it deemed the petitioner's objections to have only fallen under subsection b.2. See id. at 111-12, 774 A.2d at 1203. As the Court of Special Appeals, itself, stated in this very case, "[tjhere is no logical reason to treat the thirty-day requirement of subsection b.l any differently than the thirty-day requirement of subsection b.2." Id. at 109, 774 A.2d at 1201. The purpose of Rule lili! is not limited by its subsections; delays in juvenile adjudications, in general, subvert the overriding goal to "rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society." In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 68, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000)(quoting In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 106, 527 A.2d 35, 38 (1987)); see also Md.Code, (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 3-802 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (outlining the purposes of the juvenile delinquency statute). Put simply, Rule 11-114 guarantees juveniles a timely adjudication, and should one fail to occur within the thirty days, a detained juvenile is to be released.
The petitioner's objections to the scheduling of the adjudicatory hearing were clear and apparent. Because he was detained at the time, both subsection b.l and b.2 applied to the petitioner's circumstances; that he may have chosen to emphasize one subsection over the other in voicing his objection to the court does not mean that the petitioner waited his right to protest the other. So long as the objection to the scheduling of the adjudicatory hearing is clear, as it was in this case, a party cannot be said to have waived his or her ability to protest the timeliness of the court's scheduling under Rule 11-114.
B. Adjudicatory Hearing Requirements Under Maryland Rule 11-114.
A juvenile court, under Rule 11-114b.1, is only permitted to extend the time within which it may hold an adjudicatory hearing for "extraordinary cause shown." In relevant part, Rule 11-114b.1 provides:
However, upon motion made on the record within these time limits by the petitioner or the respondent, the administrative judge of the county or a judge designated by him, for extraordinary cause shown, may extend the time within which the adjudicatory hearing may be held. The judge shall state on the record the cause which requires an extension and specify the number of days of the extension,
(emphasis added). The scheduling of a hearing pursuant to subsection b.2 also has similar time restrictions; it expressly states that the adjudicatory hearing "shall be held within the time limits set forth in subsection 1 of this section." See Rule 11-114b.2. Thus, the extraordinary cause provision would be applicable also to hearings scheduled for juveniles, who at some point during the process, were detained. We discussed the criterion of "extraordinary cause" in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), with respect to the scheduling requirements for criminal cases under Article 27, Section 591 of the Maryland Code. We stated that while extraordinary cause is a fact-based determination made on a case by case basis, "[cjlearly, . it is cause beyond what is ordinary, usual or commonplace; it exceeds the common order or rule and is not regular or of the customary kind." Hicks, 285 Md. at 319, 403 A.2d at 361. Extraordinary cause means for other than ordinary reasons.
The extraordinary cause standard in Rule 11-114 was chosen intentionally and with purpose. The subcommittee on domestic and juvenile rules presented a report to the Rules Committee on the proposed changes to Rule 914b which highlights the basis for the stricter standard. The subcommittee report stated:
in the opinion of the subcommittee, the standard which would be set by a good cause provision would not be sufficient to preserve the strong public policy which calls for the relatively speedy hearing of juvenile matters. Accord ingly, the subcommittee recommends that the Rule be amended to include an "extraordinary cause" provision.
The chairman of the subcommittee explained that the higher standard was based on the pervasive perception that juvenile cases should be handled in a more expeditious manner coupled with the existing tendency to relegate juvenile cases to positions of low priority. The subcommittee feared that a good cause standard might result in the granting of continuances as a matter of course; thus, additional safeguards (extraordinary cause) were necessary to ensure the swift disposition of juvenile cases.
Interestingly, the Rules Committee itself initially declined to accept the subcommittee's extraordinary cause standard, and instead selected a good cause standard with the caveat that the Rule would expressly state that certain matters do not constitute good cause. The proposed Rule stated, "[f]or the purposes of this rule, the general congestion of the court's calendar or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the petitioner shall not constitute good cause." Maryland Rules Committee Notes, Domestic and Juvenile Subcommittee (October 16 and October 17, 1981). Ultimately, the Rule was adopted with an extraordinary cause standard, yet we find it significant that even under a good cause standard, the Committee was unwilling to allow court congestion to be the basis for an extension of the time limits for a juvenile's adjudicatory hearing as prescribed by the Rule.
Without a more compelling reason, overcrowded dockets do not constitute, and never have constituted, "extraordinary cause." See e.g. Frazier, 298 Md. at 458, 470 A.2d at 1288 (stating that when "extraordinary cause," contrary to "good cause" was required for postponement of a criminal case, "it was arguable that, as a matter of law, overcrowded dockets did not constitute sufficient cause for a postponement"). Today, not only are we tasked to review the problematic practices of untimely or disjointed adjudicatory hearings as witnessed in this case, but we must address the apparent adherence to this practice in the Montgomery County juvenile justice system.
Commencing hearings to technically beat the clock and then continuing those hearings to dates far beyond that which was envisioned by Rule 11-114 appears to have been a chronic problem in the Montgomery County juvenile court. The Court of Special Appeals pointedly cautioned the Montgomery County juvenile system to avoid this practice in In re Vanessa C., 104 Md.App. 452, 656 A.2d 795 (1995). The intermediate appellate court, in that case, considered whether the provisions of Section 3-815 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Rule 914, regarding the length that a child may be held in custody prior to a Child In Need of Assistance ("CINA") hearing, were mandatory or directory. Id. at 458, 656 A.2d at 798. The Court of Special Appeals interpreted the mandate that "an adjudicatory hearing.... [be] held within thirty days," to mean that the hearing did not need to be completed within thirty days, but rather, "that the hearing [shall] be initiated within thirty days and completed with a reasonable degree of continuity." Id. at 459, 656 A.2d at 798 (emphasis added). In explaining that which is contemplated by a reasonable degree of continuity, the Court of Special Appeals stated, "a hearing once begun must continue, insofar as possible, on a day to day basis until completed." Id. Particularly apropos to our discussion of the systemic problems in Montgomery County was the court's elucidation of the purpose for enunciating the inherent continuity requirements for adjudicatory hearings: "Tfee evil sought to be avoided is the present practice, at least in Montgomery County, of continuing cases . for periods as long as thirty days, thereby prolonging the CINA determination for from three to five months in some cases." Id. (emphasis added). The practices within the juvenile justice system in Montgomery County were so as to warrant admonition by the Court of Special Appeals nearly seven years ago. It is disturbing, therefore, that the present case stands as yet another example that this disapproved practice persists.
It is incontrovertible that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 11-114; more troubling, however, is that the record plainly manifests the court's low regard for the scheduling requirements of the Rule. We provide some excerpts from the case sub judice to demonstrate this point.
The sole basis for the court's postponements was overcrowded court dockets. On the several occasions where scheduling was discussed among the litigants and the juvenile court, delays were based on an apparent unwillingness to move other cases to accommodate the requirements of Rule 11-114. First, despite proffers by both parties that this case would take a considerable amount of time to adjudicate, (an assessment with which the court did not disagree on the record),, the court originally set the case for a half-day hearing (although, an additional day was added subsequent to the hearing). At the hearing concerning the habeas corpus petition before the juvenile court on September 16,1998, the State presented testimony that the adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for half-days on both the 10th and 11th of September despite the fact that "[a]ll of us, from fairly early on, felt that the case was going to take a significant amount of time." The court assured the parties that it would move cases, if necessary, to accommodate the length of the hearing, but this pledge of flexibility never came to fruition.
Second, the court scheduled the resumption of the adjudicatory hearings three months after the initial hearing. Despite the petitioner's objection to his continuing detention and the length of time between hearings, the court refused to release the petitioner from Noyes and refused to move the adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date. The petitioner immediately filed for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to which, as mentioned earlier, the Circuit Court indicated that it would decide in the petitioner's favor if the hearing were not rescheduled and the petitioner released. The juvenile court, however, refused to re-schedule the adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date.
The court seemed unimpressed with respect to compliance with Rule 11-114 in conformance with the concerns as expressed In re: Vanessa C., supra. When discussing the additional days needed for trial, defense counsel asserted, and the State agreed, that at least two more days would be needed to complete the trial. The judge in charge of the juvenile court responded:
"Just assume that I were in . of a mind to start just clearing dockets, which is going to generate huge upheavals, among other people. But, just focusing for a time on this particular case. If I do that, . we're already past the thirty days, so there's no way to rectify it.... There's no point in my trying to do it."
(emphasis added). The judge in charge of the juvenile court continued,
the truth is . I don't have any more authority than anybody else . [tjhey've just thrown this title at me, Judge in charge. So, I get to make those kind of calls. So, . I'll accept the criticism for the Court, because I somehow got this job to try to manage things. What I'm saying is, even if I were to toss out a whole bunch of other cases and have you start again tomorrow, there's no . what's the point, because we've already missed, the thirty days.
(emphasis added). The State disagreed with the court's interpretation of the Rule and argued that the decision by the Court of Special Appeals in In re Vanessa C. supported the position that adjudicatory hearings should be completed within a reasonable time from commencement. See In re Vanessa C., 104 Md.App. at 459, 656 A.2d at 798. At that point, the judge in charge of the juvenile court agreed to look at the court calendar again to see if the case could be accommodated. The court recessed briefly, but upon return, again rejected the requests to move the adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date because the move would disrupt cases already scheduled:
Admittedly, many cases involv[ed] individuals who were not being detained. But, [the judge in chargej made the decision, which I certainly totally endorse, that it would just be too, too completely disruptive to the cases that are already calendared to the individuals, the attorneys who have already worked their calendars around those dates, to start shuffling dates in accommodation to this case.
To deny the petitioner his right to timely and continuous adjudication under Rule 11-114 on the basis of avoiding the generic disruption of the court calendar is unacceptable. Avoiding the "disruption" of a court calendar, absent some evidence of a specific explanation of the weighing of the competing cases by the court in its triage, cannot take precedence over the rights guaranteed by our statutes or rules of Court to juveniles subject to the justice system. The juvenile court failed to honor this hierarchy of rights and seemingly placed the rigidity of its docket ahead of the rights of an accused delinquent. Contrary to assertions by the dissent, there is no evidence on the record that reflects that honoring the petitioner's right to a timely adjudication would have prevented the court from honoring another juvenile's right to a timely adjudication, save the mere assertion by the juvenile judge that the court had several termination of parental rights cases on its docket. Again, a specific explanation of the exigencies of the competing cases in the court's triage is necessary before we will accept a crowded court docket as a basis-for denying a juvenile his right to a timely adjudication.
Several adverse consequences result from the apparently systemic violations which were specifically witnessed in this case. The petitioner and other juveniles in his position have a right to have timely and continuous adjudication so that a determination can be made, as quickly as possible, as to whether the juvenile is involved or not involved in the alleged delinquent act. This right is of the highest priority because of the explicit guarantee in Rule 11-114, and in order to ensure that juveniles are given the benefit of all the rehabilitation and treatment options available. See In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 68, 763 A.2d at 146 (stating that "the overriding goal of Maryland's juvenile statutory scheme is to rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society")(quoting In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 106, 527 A.2d at 38).
In fact, it is because of the Legislature's particular interests in rehabilitating juveniles to ensure that they become productive members of society that this Court previously has held that mandatory dismissal is an inappropriate sanction for all Rule 11-114 violations. See In re Keith, 310 Md. at 107, 527 A.2d at 39 ("We decline to undermine the legislature's efforts by hastily applying a rule to juvenile cases that was formulated to address problems inherent in the adult criminal system. Accordingly, we conclude that the Hicks solution is an inappropriate answer to violations of Rule 914.") We noted in In re Keith, that contrary to Rule 746 (the rule at issue in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979)), Rule 914 (now Rule 11-114) was not enacted to fortify the requirements of a mandatory statute enacted by the Legislature. Id. at 105-06, 527 A.2d at 38. Rule 746 was largely enacted as a result of our summary approval of the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Young v. State, 15 Md.App. 707, 708, 292 A.2d 137, 138, aff'd mem., 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972), overruled by State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979), which held that the time limitations set forth in Article 27, Section 591 of the Maryland Code (establishing the 180 day rule for commencement of criminal trials) were merely directory, not mandatory. Thus, based on the seemingly purposeful enactment of Rule 746 in response to the Young decision, we determined that mandatory dismissal for Rule 746 violations was both the intended and required solution.
Again, because the Legislature had different goals and purposes behind enactment of the Juvenile Causes Act, see § 3-802(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, we determined that mandatory dismissal of juvenile petitions was not the required solution. That we declared mandatory dismissal to be inappropriate, however, does not mean that dismissal, itself, is inappropriate in all circumstances. In fact, in In re Keith, we stated that:
[I]n determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 914 [now Rule 11-114], a judge presiding over a juvenile cause should examine the totality of the circumstances as required by Rule 1-201. In doing so, the judge must keep in mind the overriding purpose of the juvenile statute along with the fact that this purpose will ordinarily not be served by dismissal of the juvenile proceeding. Neither the juvenile nor society should be denied the benefits of the juvenile's rehabilitation because of a technical violation of Rule 914's scheduling requirements. Nevertheless, we do not foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances dismissal will be a proper sanction.
310 Md. at 109-110, 527 A.2d at 40 (emphasis added). The juvenile court in the case sub judice failed to consider the totality of the circumstances in rendering its decision on the motion to dismiss; it simply concluded that the structure of the juvenile system in Montgomery County did not permit a "willy nilly" moving of cases previously scheduled. Subsequently, when the motion to dismiss was renewed on January 21, 1999, the court did consider, more fully, the prejudice that allegedly befell the petitioner as a result of the delays between hearings but ultimately determined that the prejudice was not great and that extraordinary cause for the rescheduling existed because "the Court's calendar simply could not possibly accommodate [the petitioner's case]."
Upon considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we believe that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for the Rule 11-114 violation. First, Rule 11-114 was clearly violated; while the hearings were commenced within thirty days, the courts failed to complete the hearings with a reasonable degree of continuity — a three month postponement of the hearing in this case is hardly a reasonable interruption in the adjudicatory process. Second, as we discussed, supra, no extraordinary cause was established for the delay.
Third, the lack of continuity and the length of the delay inherently and actually prejudiced the petitioner. The combined detention, both actual and home electronic monitoring, of the juvenile from the time he turned himself in to the final adjudication was eight months. Home electronic monitoring, while not deemed "detention" in the institutional sense, remains a significant restriction on the liberty of a juvenile, as employment, school attendance and other freedom of movement may still be denied the restrictee. Restrictions on the liberty of a juvenile are particularly troublesome when rehabilitative programs are not afforded the juvenile during detention or home restriction. The goal of providing swift adjudi cations to juveniles exists, in part, to ensure that the State quickly determines the type of rehabilitative assistance most suitable for the offending juvenile. See Md.Code, § 3-802(a)(4) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
In addition to the personal prejudices, the petitioner's adjudicatory hearing was adversely affected in several ways as a result of the delays. A defense witness died during the interval between the hearings. The State argues that this cannot be prejudice because a statement of the deceased witness was stipulated and entered into evidence. Because there was no other admissible basis for the statement without the actual presence of the witness, this stipulation only occurred in the context of discussing prejudice when the petitioner renewed his motion to dismiss at the hearing scheduled for the rendition of the verdict; all evidence had been admitted and closing arguments heard at this point. Therefore, the fact remains that the petitioner's case-was void of this witness's testimony. While the death of a witness cannot, itself, be grounds for a mistrial or a dismissal, it is evidence of prejudice and should be considered by the court.
Furthermore, the lack of continuity in the petitioner's adjudicatory proceedings inherently prejudiced his ability to obtain a fair adjudication in that the finder of fact was forced to pass judgment based on facts established in evidence from half-day hearings held four months before. Despite the juvenile court's assurances that it kept scrupulous notes and reviewed some portions of the recordings prior to judgment, and notwithstanding our confidence in a court's ability to recall such evidence, we are unpersuaded that the ills of an inherently disjointed process entirely were remedied thereby.
While courts should be hesitant to dismiss juvenile cases for violations of Rule 11-114 and other applicable juvenile provisions, we find the circumstances of the present case to be a "most extraordinary and egregious eircumstance[ ] . [which] dictate[s] dismissal as the sanction for this violation.... " In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 109, 527 A.2d at 40. Therefore, we hold that dismissal of the petitioner's case is an appropriate remedy for the flagrant violations of Rule 11-114 by the-Montgomery County juvenile court.
C. Restitution
The juvenile court ordered the petitioner and his mother to pay $10,000.00 in restitution to Kaiser Permanente for the company's payment of the victim's medical bills pursuant to Section 3-829 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See Md.Code. (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol), § 3-829 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("The court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a child, the child, or both as provided under Article 27, § 807 of the Code."). The petitioner argues that (1) they do not have the ability to pay the judgment; (2) restitution is inappropriate in this case because of extenuating circumstances; and (3) an insurer may be awarded restitution only when it directly compensates the victim, which did not occur in this case. Because we hold that the statute does not permit a court to award an insurer restitution when that insurer did not directly compensate the victim, we have no reason to address the other portions of petitioner's argument.
Article 27, § 807 provides, in part:
§ 807. Restitution for crimes.
(a) Restitution upon conviction, acceptance of plea of nolo contendere, etc.; priority of payment; reasons for not ordering restitution. — (1) A court may issue a judgment of restitution directing a defendant to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime, if:
(ii) The victim suffered actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, burial expenses, any other direct out-of-pocket losses, or loss of earnings as a direct result of the crime;

(4) A court need not issue a judgment of restitution under this section if the court finds:
(i) That the defendant or liable parent does not have the ability to pay the judgment of restitution; or
(ii) Good cause to establish extenuating circumstances as to why a judgment of restitution is inappropriate in a case.
(5) The court may order that restitution be made to:
❖ ❖ *
(iii) A third-party payor, including an insurer, which has made payment to the victim to compensate the victim for a property loss or pecuniary loss under this subsection.
See Md.Code Ann. (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), Art. 27, § 807. In interpreting a statute, our principle goal is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent. See Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 211, 783 A.2d 194, 200 (2001); Tipton v. Partner's Mgmt. Co., 364 Md. 419, 434, 773 A.2d 488, 497 (2001) (quoting State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998); Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). We look first to the actual language of the statute and where the ordinary and plain meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, we implement the statute as it is written. See Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1246 (2001); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A.2d at 139-40; Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994).
The provision regarding restitution to third-party payors was added in 1982 in response, in part, to our decision in Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 438 A.2d 490 (1981), which held that Article 27, Section 640, the restitution statute at that time of the Montgomery opinion, did not permit court-ordered restitution for private insurance companies. See id. at 161, 438 A.2d at 493. The provision now permits restitution to "[a] third-party payor, including an insurer, which has made payment to the victim to compensate the victim for a property loss or pecuniary loss under this subsection." Md.Code, Art. 27, § 807(a)(5)(iii) (emphasis added). While pecuniary loss, as a result of medical expenses, certainly falls under this provision, it is clear, when examining this provision in the context of others in the section, that the Legislature intended to compensate the victim for direct out-of-pocket losses. See Md.Code, Art. 27, § 807(a)(l)(ii)(provid-ing compensation to the victim for "actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, burial expenses, any other direct out-of-pocket losses . ")(emphasis added). Payments made by an insurance company to the hospital, pursuant to an insurance coverage contract, are not a victim's direct out-of-pocket losses for which he or she can be compensated.
Furthermore, restitution in this situation could not be for payment made to the victim to compensate the victim because, quite simply, the insurance company never made a payment to the victim to compensate the victim for his pecuniary loss. Restitution, in this case, could only be said to be for the pecuniary loss of the insurance company under the legitimate terms of the contract into which it entered with the insured. We refuse to read any broader the language of the Legislature, so apparently carefully constructed to avoid such situations. As we have stated, "where the Legislature in a statute expressly authorizes a particular action under certain circumstances, the statute ordinarily should be construed as not allowing the action under other circumstances." Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 329 Md. 494, 505, 620 A.2d 886, 892 (1993). Thus, where this statute expressly authorizes restitution to third-party payoi-s, such as insurance companies, for payments made to the victim to compensate the victim for property or pecuniary loss, we shall construe the statute as not allowing restitution in other circumstances.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to that court to reverse the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court. The petitioner did not waive his right to object to the Rule 11-114 violation and the circumstances of the violation in this case warrants dismissal. Furthermore, the juvenile court erred in ordering the petitioner to pay restitution to the victim's insurance company for payments the company made directly to the hospital because such restitution is not expressly permitted by the language of Article 27 Section 807.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND AND TRANSFER THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS THE JUVENILE PETITION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
. As of March 1, 2002, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had jurisdiction over juvenile causes. See 2001 Md. Laws 414.
. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, Section 594A(a) provided:
(a) Transfer to juvenile court. — In any case, except as provided in subsection (b), involving a child who has reached 14 years of age but has not reached 18 years of age at the lime of any alleged offense excluded under the provisions of § 3-804(e)(l) or (4) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the court, exercising jurisdiction may transfer the case to the juvenile court if a waiver is believed to be in the interest of the child or society.
This portion of the Maryland Code was repealed by the Acts of 2001, ch. 10, § 1 (effective October 1, 2001), and is now located at. Section 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum.Supp.) Article 27, Section 807(a)(3)(ii) provided, in relevant, part:
As an absolute limit against one child, the child's parent, or both, a judgment of restitution issued under this section may not exceed $10,000 for all acts arising out of a single incident.
This portion of the Maryland Code was repealed by the Acts of 2001, ch. 10, § 1 (effective October 1, 2001), and is now located at Section 11-604(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
. The emergency room physician, the police officer who first arrived at the scene, and the victim, Dent, testified during the September adjudicatory hearings.
. As of September 11, 1998, Ryan had been detained for nearly four months at Noyes.
. The propriety of the Circuit Court's verbal directive at the habeas corpus hearing is not before us in this case.
. On the 14th of December, the first day the hearings resumed, Ryan moved for a mistrial for violation of Rule 16-504 which requires the court to report verbatim all trials and hearings. Portions of the copies of the September 10th and 11th adjudicatory hearings were inaudible which, Ryan argued, caused tremendous hardship in his preparation for the resumed hearings, particularly with respect to the testimony of Dent. The court, after listening to the master copy of the tapes, found the quality to range from "almost lifelike clarity to being somewhat fuzzy, particularly during parts of cross examination [of Dent] conducted by [defense counsel]." Therefore, the court denied the motion for mistrial but permitted Ryan the opportunity to review the master copy of Dent's testimony prior to resumption of his testimony.
. The record indicates that Ryan actually renewed his earlier motion for mistrial from the December 14, 1998 hearing, see supra note 7. The petitioner expanded upon arguments proffered at the December hearing, alleging that the disjointed nature of the trial was grounds, itself, for a mistrial, but also that the nature of the trial made the recordings of the trial even more critical for adequate preparation and representation in a fair trial. The audio recordings of the hearings failed to capture significant portions of the petitioner's cross-examination of the witnesses.
. Maryland Rule 11-114 provides for the scheduling of adjudicatory hearings, in relevant part, as follows:
b. Scheduling of hearing.
1. Adjudicatory hearing. An adjudicatory hearing shall be held within sixty days after the juvenile petition is served on the respondent unless a waiver petition is filed, in which case an adjudicatory hearing shall be held within thirty days after the court's decision to retain jurisdiction at the conclusion of the waiver hearing. However, upon motion made on the record within these time limits by the petitioner or the respondent, the administrative judge of the county or a judge designated by him, for extraordinary cause shown, may extend the time within which the adjudicatory hearing may be held. The judge shall state on the record the cause which requires an extension and specify the number of days of the extension.
2. Prehearing detention or shelter care. If the respondent is in detention or shelter care, the adjudicatory hearing shall be held within thirty days from the date on which the court ordered continued detention or shelter care. If an adjudicatory hearing is not held within thirty days, the respondent shall be released on the conditions imposed by the court pending an adjudicatory hearing, which hearing shall be held within the time limits set forth in subsection 1 of this section.
. The colloquy between the defense counsel and the court regarding the setting of the adjudication date was as follows:
[The Court] . So, he'll be detained at Noyes, we'll set a half day hearing, adjudication hearing in thirty days. And we should have a pre-trial before it. That way, we'll get together and really assess how many witnesses and so forth. Yes?
[Defense Counsel] I was going to say, just from talking to my colleagues about the way that this works, I mean, I'm pretty sure that this is going to be an adjudication .
[The Court] I'm going to move cases if I have to. I'm setting it for a half day.
(emphasis added).
. The defense counsel explained, at the September 16, 1998 hearing before the judge in charge, why the habeas petition was filed:
[O]ur position is simply that Ryan['s] . rights arc to have . an adjudication completed within thirty days . And, if that requires Your Honor to move cases, then we believe that's what Ryan is entitled to. And if not, then there is a remedy under the rule. And it's not. to say that the Court's docket has to be disrupted. There is a remedy under the rule, . . the rule says he needs to be released. We asked [the juvenile court judge] to do one or the other of those requirements in the rule, and he chose to do neither and that's where we are today and that's why we filed the habeas.
. The Court of Special Appeals and the dissenting opinion fail to appreciate that the hallmark of both subsections is a timely adjudication. That subsection b.2 also provides a remedy for detained juveniles should the courts fail to provide the requisite timely adjudication, does not mean that a detained juvenile who objects to the untimely nature of his/her proceedings must specifically articulate whether he or she is objecting under subsection b.l or subsection b.2 in order to ensure that his or her right is preserved. So long as it is clear from the record, as it was in the case sub judice, that the juvenile objected to the delays, we shall consider his Rule 11-114 right to a timely adjudication preserved.
. Article 27, Section 591 was later amended and the "extraordinary cause" provision became "good cause." See 1980 Md. Laws Ch. 378. This change occurred in part to "oiler the courts some leeway in the disposition of an extremely heavy case load." See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 460, 470 A.2d 1269, 1289 (1984)(quoting testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, February 12, 1980). Thus, with respect to the newly amended "good cause" standard of Article 27, Section 591, we stated, "particularly in light of the testimony before the Committee, clearly indicated a legislative intent that crowded court dockets may constitute sufficient cause for trying a case beyond the 180-day deadline." Id. at 461, 470 A.2d at 1289.
. We note that in In re Keith, 310 Md. 99, 527 A.2d 35 (1987), we refused to blindly apply the holding in Hicks, i.e. that under the provisions of Rule 746, dismissal was appropriate for the State's failure to comply with mandatory requirements of Rule 746, to juvenile proceedings under Rule 914 because of the particular needs of juveniles who encounter the justice system. Id. at 107, 527 A.2d at 39. That we disapproved of applying the same sanction for a violation of Rule 914 as for a violation of Rule 746 does not mean that interpretations of Rule 746 are per se inapplicable to juvenile proceedings under 914. In fact we acknowledged that "Rule 914 and Rule 746 contain nearly identical language," but ultimately held that the identical language of the rules did not automatically warrant an identical sanction for violation. Id. at 103, 527 A.2d at 37.
. We should not be understood to maintain that a judge necessarily must accept a party's assessment of how long that party requires to put on its case. In the present case, however, both parties agreed on the estimate for the length of the trial and the court did not dispute that estimate on the record.
. Not every postponement, even because of scheduling problems, necessarily constitutes a violation of Rule 11-114. "Extraordinary circumstances" is the test. We hold merelythat a deliberate policy of fragmenting a case through the device of long and repeated postponements over objection for no reason specific to the case itself will suffice to constitute a violation.
. Article 27, Section 591 provides:
(a) Setting the date. — The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court:
(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:
(1) The appearance of counsel; or
(ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and
(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.
(b) Changing the date. — On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date.
(c) Court rules. — The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts.
. In September, when the petitioner's counsel requested to resume the hearings sooner than December, counsel noted that the petitioner had learning disabilities and attention deficit, hyperactive disorder, and that while Noyes agreed to provide the petitioner with GED books, it would not allow him into the GED program. Thus, the petitioner was "not being provided any services . . [and was] putting his life on hold because of a Court's calendar."
. The statement was written by the witness prior to his death and given to the police.
. The State argued that Linda S. is not a party to (his appeal because she had separate counsel for the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but before this Court she is being represented jointly with her son by the Office of the Public Defender. We disagree with the State's presumption. The petition for writ of certiorari was submitted on her behalf, as well as the petitioner's. The Office of the Public Defender elected to represent both parties on appeal and Linda S. has not indicated that its representation of her is unauthorized.
. See 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 477.
. At the time of the Montgomery decision, Article 27, Section 640 provided, in pertinent part:
(b) Restitution may be ordered upon conviction of certain crimes.— Upon conviction for a crime where property of another has been stolen, converted, unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or where the victim suffered actual medical expenses, direct out of pocket losses, or loss of earning as a direct result of the crime, the court may order the defendant to make restitution in addition to any other penalty provided for the commission of the crime.
Md.Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1980 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 640.