Case Name: Application of Henry W. McKibbins for a transfer of his license to keep a hotel. Appeal of John G. Scouton
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1899-07-28
Citations: 11 Pa. Super. 421
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 5
Parties: Application of Henry W. McKibbins for a transfer of his license to keep a hotel. Appeal of John G. Scouton.
Judges: Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, W. W. Porter, W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 421–427

Head Matter:
Application of Henry W. McKibbins for a transfer of his license to keep a hotel. Appeal of John G. Scouton.
Transfer of liquor license — Practice, Q. 8. — Essentials of petition — Jurisdiction, Q. 8.
Good practice requires that a petitioner for a transfer of license should set forth in his petition the grounds upon which the transfer is asked for and there is no doubt that the court may in its discretion require it. Such averments in the petition are not, however, essential to a valid order transferring a license, and an order transferring a license will be sustained if the applicant shall have presented a petition setting forth all facts necessary under existing laws for original applications for liquor licenses. When the petition has been filed the requisite length of time, the court has jurisdiction to transfer the licen’se after due hearing upon satisfactory proof of the essential facts.
Refusal to renew lease — Ground for transfer.
One of the cases where the jurisdiction to transfer a license may be exercised is, where the owner of the building occupied by the licensee refuses to extend or renew a lease for the same.
Argued May 18, 1899.
Appeal, No. 5, Feb. T., 1900, by John G. Scouton, from decree of Q. S. Sullivan Co., directing transfer of liquor license to keep a hotel.
Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, W. W. Porter, W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ.
Affirmed.
Opinion by Rice, P. J. W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ., dissent.
Petition for transfer of a hotel liquor license. Before Kraus and Lire, associate judges.
It appears from the record that the petition set forth all the facts necessary under the existing law for original applications for liquor licenses. The petition, however, did not disclose the ground on which the transfer was asked for. Objections to the transfer were filed by John G. Scouton the landlord of the petitioner.
The court below entered the following order:
Now, April 4, 1899, this application came on for hearing and it appearing by the evidence in the case, that the owner of the building, now licensed, had refused to renew the lease of the building to the licensee until the licensee had bought a building, and taken steps to have his license transferred to the same, tlie remonstrance filed in this case by the owner cannot be considered by the court, as it was not filed until the day of the hearing of this case. Therefore license is transferred as requested.
J. G. Scouton appealed.
Errors assigned were (1) in transferring the hotel license from the McKibbins House to the old Clark store building. (2) In rejecting the remonstrance and answer of John G. Scouton, the owner of the .McKibbins House, and in refusing to consider the same. (3) In refusing to hear John G. Scouton before making an order transferring the hotel license from the McKibbins House to the vacant store building. (4) In that portion of its order which reads as follows : “ The remonstrance filed in this case by the owner cannot be considered by the court as it was not filed until the day of the hearing of this case, therefore license is transferred as requested.”
John G. Scouton, for appellant.
The petition for transfer sets forth no cause whatever as required by the act of assembly. It should have contained something to give the court jurisdiction. It should have stated some reason why the petitioner was entitled to the transfer. The act of 1897, section 1, by its express terms requires that the petition for transfer “set forth all the facts necessary under existing laws for original applications for liquor licenses.” The petition in this case is fatally defective, in this regard, it fails to set forth that the house has the four bedrooms and eight beds, as required by law. It fails to set forth that the house is totally or partially destroyed, or that the owner refuses to extend the lease.
The petition should show that the court had jurisdiction: Heery’s License, 4 Kulp, 57; Welti’s Election, 3 W. N. C. 165; Williams v. Johnson, 16 W. N. C. 223.
It had been decided before the act of 1897 that a transfer of a license would not be made from one house to another: Burns’s License, 3 Dist. Rep. 429.
As the jurisdiction of the court is exceptional, the petition should set forth that the reason stated in the act for transfer existed, viz: refusal of the landlord to renew the lease: Wacker’s License, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 323.
July 28, 1899:
The associate judges who are unlearned in the law heard the case. The president judge was absent. The appellant filed his answer remonstrating and asked to be heard upon grounds alleged as existing for the transfer. He was told that he came too late. The court went on and transferred the license without permitting a defense: Donoghue’s License, 5 P.a. Superior Ct. 1; Distillers’ License, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 87.
A license is granted to the place and not to the person: Hanlen’s License, 3 Pa. C. C. 474; Heilig’s License, 2 Dist. Rep. 342.
A. J. Bradley, for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Rice, P. J.,
The petition in the present case was that the court " grant him a license, a transfer from one house to another," etc. It was indorsed " petition and bond of Henry W. McKibbins for transfer of tavern license," and set forth " all the facts necessary under existing laws for original applications for liquor licenses." If the statute were silent on the subject it might well be argued that the applicant should have averred in his petition the grounds upon winch the transfer was asked for, and it may be remarked that even in the absence- of express statutory requirement it would be good practice to do so. Moreover, we have no doubt that the court may, in its discretion, require it. This, however, is not the question. The question is, whether such averment in the petition is absolutely essential to a valid order transferring the license. The answer to this question is contained in' the statute, which provides: " Any transfer of license . may be made during the regular term of court, or in chambers during vacation, when the applicant for said transfer shall have presented to the court a petition setting forth all the facts necessary under existing laws for original applications for liquor licenses." When, therefore, the petition for a transfer setting forth all that the statute requires has been filed the requisite length of time, the court has jurisdiction to transfer the license after due hearing upon satisfactory proof of the essential facts.
The objection, that the court refused-to consider the remonstrance filed by the appellant is not sustained by the record taken as a whole and fairly construed. The objection to the transfer, stated in Ms own language, was: " That affiant has never notified McKibbins to quit the premises, but on the other hand, has, at all times, and is at the present time, desirous that Mr. McKibbins continue to occupy the same. That he is ready and willing to extend the lease for said house with Mr. McKibbins for one year from June 23, 1899, upon the present terms." As to this objection the court said that it appeared " by the evidence in the case, that the owner of the building now licensed had refused to renew the lease of the building to the licensee until the licensee had bought a building, and taken steps to have his license transferred to the same." If the facts were as stated in the order a case was made out which authorized the court to transfer the license. One of the cases where the jurisdiction may be exercised is, where the owner of the building occupied by the licensee refuses to extend or renew a lease for the same. After a definite refusal of the landlord to extend or renew the lease, and, acting on the faith of that, the licensee has bought a suitable building and taken steps for the transfer of the license, the owner cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court by an offer made on the hearing to renew the lease upon the same terms. We are justified in assuming that it was tins offer or proposition contained in the remonstrance that the court referred to in that part of the order quoted in the fourth assignment; for it is very evident that the court did consider the objections raised by the appellant, and held them to be insufficient to prevent the transfer in view of the facts disclosed by the evidence. In this there was no error wlfich justifies reversal.
Judgment affirmed.