Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William J. KELLY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1979-03-14
Citations: 484 Pa. 527
Docket Number: No. 417
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William J. KELLY, Appellant.
Judges: Before O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 484
Pages: 527–531

Head Matter:
399 A.2d 1061
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William J. KELLY, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Nov. 13, 1978.
Decided March 14, 1979.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1979.
Alfonso Tumini, Armando A. Pandóla, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Bernard L. Siegel, Deputy Dist. Atty., Erie, for appellee.
Before O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Justice.
In August 1975, appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of obstructing the administration of the law, 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 5101, three counts of perjury, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902, and one count of bribery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4701. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to three to twenty months in prison on the three perjury counts. Sentence was suspended on all other counts. On appeal the Superior Court affirmed. 245 Pa.Super. 351, 369 A.2d 438 (1976). After review of the record and consideration of appellant's contentions, we find no basis for disturbing the order of the Superior Court and we affirm.
Only one issue merits comment! The trial court in this case placed notations on the verdict slip seeking to identify for the jury the separate counts charged. We are satisfied that sending out with the jury a verdict slip with identifying notations is not prohibited by Rule 1114, Pa.R.Crim.P. Here, where there were numerous separate and distinct charges against appellant, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in concluding that there was a need for the identifying notations. The notations themselves, while not ideally drawn, were nevertheless in essence neutral and viewed in the context of the court's instructions not suggestive or prejudicial.
Unlike Commonwealth v. Baker, 466 Pa. 382, 353 A.2d 406 (1976), the language on the verdict slip here is not a condensed and potentially misleading statement of the court's instructions. On its face the verdict slip left to the jury the decision whether defendant was guilty or not guilty. That the notations referred incidentally to some aspect of the Commonwealth's evidence does not in and of itself require reversal in the circumstances of this case.
Nonetheless, it is not inappropriate to observe as a general prudential principle that identifying notations which are not completely neutral create a potential for prejudice. It is therefore desirable for trial courts in the exercise of their discretion: (1) to determine after consultation with counsel whether, due to the complexity of the charges and the nature of the trial, there is a clear need for identifying notations on a verdict slip to avoid confusion by the jury concerning the issues before it; and (2) if such a clear need appears, to determine, after conferring with counsel, the text which best preserves the impartiality of the verdict slip. We are satisfied that trial courts together with counsel can achieve that result.
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
EAGEN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
POMEROY, former J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
Appellant has argued that (1) he was entitled to complete transcripts of the grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses and that the trial court erred in deleting those portions which it deemed not relevant to the charge against appellant; (2) hearsay statements of an unindicted co-conspirator should not have been admitted into evidence; (3) giving to the jury a verdict slip containing notations descriptive of each count was prejudicial error; (4) appellant's grand jury testimony was coerced and therefore should not have been admitted at trial; (5) appellant should have been charged under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 rather than 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101; (6) certain records were not properly qualified and hence should not have been admitted; (7) the trial judge's charge and his conduct during trial were prejudicial; and (8) the evidence against the appellant was insufficient.