Case Name: James G. GIBSON, Individually, Cecelia A. Gibson, Individually, and James G. Gibson and Cecelia A. Gibson d/b/a T.G.'s Washout, Appellants v. Jeffery WRIGHT, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jeffery Henderson, Deceased, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-04-20
Citations: 870 So. 2d 1250
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-00640-COA
Parties: James G. GIBSON, Individually, Cecelia A. Gibson, Individually, and James G. Gibson and Cecelia A. Gibson d/b/a T.G.’s Washout, Appellants v. Jeffery WRIGHT, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jeffery Henderson, Deceased, Appellee.
Judges: KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 870
Pages: 1250–1265

Head Matter:
James G. GIBSON, Individually, Cecelia A. Gibson, Individually, and James G. Gibson and Cecelia A. Gibson d/b/a T.G.’s Washout, Appellants v. Jeffery WRIGHT, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jeffery Henderson, Deceased, Appellee.
No. 2002-CA-00640-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
April 20, 2004.
Craig Robert Sessums, Hugh Gillon, Jackson, Brian Austin Hinton, Columbus, attorneys for appellants.
James Ashley Ogden, Jackson, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
MYERS, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Jeffery Henderson was shot during an attempted robbery at T.G.'s Washout in Jackson, Mississippi. Jeffery Wright, individually, and on behalf of the Henderson Estate brought suit for a wrongful death claim arising from his father's death. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, a verdict was returned against James G. Gibson and Cecelia A. Gibson, individually, and James G. Gibson and Cecelia A. Gibson d/b/a T.G.'s Washout (Gibsons). The Gibsons now appeal raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY BOONE
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE EXAMINATION OF ANTHONY BOONE AT TRIAL
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION D-21 WITHOUT MODIFICATION
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 2. On February 3, 1998, Jeffery Henderson drove his girlfriend, Mary Coleman, to work. Coleman was an employee of T.G.'s Washout and was scheduled to close the laundromat that night. After dropping Coleman off, Henderson drove to his mother's house in order to pick up some laundry he agreed to wash for her. He returned to T.G.'s Washout and washed his mother's laundry along with some of his own.
¶ 3. After Henderson finished the laundry, he helped Coleman clean up the laundromat and prepare to close for the night. While Henderson was sitting in the laundromat's office, a man entered the laundromat through the side door and handed Henderson a note. The note demanded money. Henderson informed the man that there was no money and the man shot Henderson in the chest. The assailant and another individual immediately fled the scene. Henderson died shortly thereafter and two men were charged, convicted, and sentenced for the murder.
¶ 4. Wright brought suit complaining that the Gibsons breached the duty which they owed to Henderson as an invitee. Wright alleged that the Gibsons were negligent in the operation of their business due to a lack of security measures. Wright alleged that this lack of security measures was the proximate cause of Henderson's death.
¶ 5. The Gibsons filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Henderson was, at most, a licensee. The Gibsons argued that the motion should have been granted because there was no proof the Gibsons had willfully and wantonly injured Henderson. The trial judge ruled there was a genuine issue of material fact as to Henderson's status at the time of his death. As a result, the motion for summary judgment was denied.
¶ 6. During discovery, the Gibsons conducted several depositions including that of Anthony Boone. Boone was an accomplice of the gunman, David Young. Wright filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude Boone's deposition. The trial court granted Wright's motion as to Boone's deposition. The trial court ruled that Wright had no opportunity to cross-examine Boone at his deposition. As a result, the trial court excluded the evidence.
¶ 7. At the close of Wright's evidence, the Gibsons moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied and the jury ruled in favor of Wright. The Estate of Henderson was awarded $540,000. Wright was awarded $250,000 individually. After the final judgment, the Gibsons moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. This post-trial motion was denied. Aggrieved by the result, the Gibsons filed the present appeal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
¶ 8. As to the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the Gibsons's motion for summary judgment, we hold that the ruling on summary judgment was interlocutory in nature and was subsequently rendered moot by the trial on the merits. Black v. J.I. Case Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 568, 569-70 (5th Cir.1994). In other words, "[o]nce trial begins, summary judgment motions effectively become moot." Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir.1995). As a result, we decline to review this issue.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
¶ 9. The standard of review- concerning a motion for a directed verdict is well settled. We "will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving the appellee the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence." Gatewood v. Sampson, 812 So.2d 212, 219 (¶ 11) (Miss.2002) (citing Steele v. Inn of Vicksburg, Inc., 697 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss.1997)). If the facts are so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that a reasonable juror could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, this Court must reverse and render. Id. On the other hand, if substantial evidence exists in support of the verdict, that is, "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions," then this Court must affirm. Id.
¶ 10. The Gibsons argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict for two reasons. First, the Gibsons argue that although Henderson was initially an invitee he subsequently became a trespasser because he entered the laundromat's office after being told not to do so. Second, the Gibsons argue that although Henderson was initially an invitee he subsequently became a licensee because he had finished washing his own clothes and was helping his girlfriend clean up.
¶ 11. Wright argues the trial court correctly denied the Gibsons's motion for a directed verdict. Wright asserts that the trial testimony established Henderson as an invitee. Wright further asserts that he met all of the necessary elements of a wrongful death claim and that the jury properly ruled in his favor.
¶ 12. A person's status on a landowner's premises dictates the duty involved. Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co., 358 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss.1978). "A person is considered an invitee if they enter the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage." Titus v. Williams, 844 So.2d 459, 467 (¶ 29) (Miss.2003). "A landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises reasonably safe and when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not in plain and open view." Id.
¶ 13. A licensee enters another's property for his or her own convenience, pleasure or benefit pursuant to the license or implied permission of the owner. Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So.2d 999, 1003 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001). A trespasser enters another's property without any right, lawful authority, express or implied invitation, permission, or license. Titus, 844 So.2d at 467 (¶ 29). "A landowner owes a licensee and a trespasser the same duty, to refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him." Adams v. Fred's Dollar Store of Batesville, 497 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Miss.1986). There is, however, one recognized exception for a licensee, in that ordinary reasonable care is required where the landowner engages in active conduct and the plaintiffs presence is known to him. Id. at 1101. "This exception is not applicable where the licensee is injured as a result of the condition of the premises, or passive negligence." Id.
¶ 14. The Gibsons direct our attention to Lucas v. Buddy Jones Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 518 So.2d 646 (Miss.1988), and ask us to rule in a similar fashion. In Lucas, a mother dropped off the couple's child at her spouse's work. Id. at 647. The father was going to watch the child while the mother went to a doctor's appointment. Id. When the mother returned to pick up the child, she fell on a piece of ice in the defendant's parking lot. Id. The mother sued claiming she was an invitee but the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 649.
¶ 15. The court found that Lucas was going to Buddy Jones Ford solely to pick up her son so they could go home. Id. at 647. In her deposition, "Lucas admitted that there was no business purpose in her visit to Buddy Jones Ford and that the business derived no benefit from her visit." Id. Since the facts were undisputed as to Lucas's status, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial court acted proper in not allowing the jury to consider the question of whether or not Lucas's status was otherwise. Id. at 648.
¶ 16. The Gibsons argue that, like Lucas, Henderson was on the defendant's property solely for his own convenience, pleasure or benefit. We disagree. Henderson's status is distinguishable from Lucas's because there is evidence that Henderson entered T.G.'s Washout in answer to the implied invitation of the Gib-sons for their mutual advantage. First, there is uncontradicted evidence that Henderson washed clothes at T.G.'s Washout on the day in question. Henderson did not leave T.G.'s Washout from the time he washed his clothes until the time he was shot. This seems to be the classic example of a business invitee or patron.
¶ 17. Second, there is evidence that the Gibsons accepted the benefit of Henderson being at T.G.'s Washout with Coleman. While it can be said that Henderson bene-fitted by helping his girlfriend so she could close early, the Gibsons likewise benefitted from having Henderson accompanying Coleman at night. The Gibsons gained an advantage in the form of increased profits and employee safety. With Henderson present at night, Coleman was free to utilize the machines in order to complete customers' orders without having to remain in the office. Coleman also felt safer having Henderson present in the laundromat. More importantly, the Gibsons acknowledged and accepted these benefits.
¶ 18. The classification of an entrant on another's property is a question of law only where the facts are undisputed. Adams, 497 So.2d at 1100. The Gibsons argue that, like Lucas, the facts surrounding Henderson's status are undisputed. We disagree.
¶ 19. The Gibsons argue that neither Henderson's mother nor Coleman could refute the fact that Henderson was told by James Gibson not to go into the office. Apparently, only Henderson could refute that assertion. That would be impossible considering Henderson is deceased. However, this does not render the facts surrounding Henderson's status as undisputed.
¶ 20. There was evidence presented at trial that the Gibsons established a pattern of authorizing Henderson and other patrons access behind the counter to help employees. In addition, there was evidence concerning the integrity of the Gibsons's claim that Henderson was not allowed behind the counter. At trial, Coleman testified regarding a conversation between James Gibson and herself:
Q: What was the nature of that call?
A: You and the other attorney called me and was asking some questions so then I got in touch with Mr. Gibson and I asked him what was going on. And he told me he had been wanting to get in touch with me but he didn't have a phone number.
Q: What else did he say to you?
A: I asked him, well, what do you want me to do. And he said, well just tell them I didn't want him back there behind the counter he wasn't allowed back there and you didn't want him back there and just exaggerate. You know what to do.
Q: Is it your testimony today that Mr. Gibson didn't want him behind the counter either?
A: Now Mr. Gibson told me he was letting him come back there because he wanted him back there to make it more safer in that neighborhood.
¶ 21. This evidence contradicts not only the fact that Henderson was not allowed in the office, but also the fact that Henderson had been demoted from invitee to licensee. We find that the issue as to Henderson's status was disputed. As a result, it was a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
¶22. Wright also presented evidence that the Gibsons had breached then-duty to Henderson. In other words, that the Gibsons had failed to keep T.G.'s Washout reasonably safe by failing to provide adequate security measures. At trial, Wright presented evidence as to T.G.'s Washout's lack of lighting above the side entrance and the fact that the side door was left unlocked and open even at night. Wright also presented evidence that other businesses in the immediate vicinity of T.G.'s Washout enacted security measures such as adding lights, installing window bars, and providing security during business hours while T.G.'s Washout did not.
¶ 23. Likewise, Wright presented evidence that Henderson's attack by a third person was reasonably foreseeable. In Lyle v. Mladinich, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that there were two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 399 (Miss.1991). "The requisite 'cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or (2) actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists [on the premises].... " Lyle, 584 So.2d at 399 (quoting Grisham v. John Q. Long V.F.W. Post No. 1057, Inc., 519 So.2d 413, 416 (Miss.1988)). In addition, evidence of the existence of an atmosphere of violence may include the frequency of criminal activity on the premises in question as well as the overall pattern of criminal activity prior to the event in question that occurred in the general vicinity of the defendant's business. Gatewood, 812 So.2d at 220 (¶ 14).
¶ 24. Wright presented evidence that the Gibsons had actual knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed at T.G.'s Washout. At trial, Wright presented evidence that the Gibsons had previously hired a security officer to watch the laundromat at night but later declined to extend his services.
¶ 25. In addition, Wright tendered John Tisdale as a witness. At the time of the incident, Tisdale was a City of Jackson Police Commander in Precinct Four. Precinct Four encompasses the area in which T.G.'s Washout is located. Tisdale testified as to the frequency of crime at T.G.'s Washout and of other businesses in the area. Tisdale testified that the proximate cause of Henderson's death was the failure to lock the side door.
¶ 26. Finally, Wright tendered Officer Kenneth Goodrum, a sergeant with the City of Jackson Police Department, as a witness. Like Tisdale, Goodrum testified as to the frequency of crime at T.G.'s Washout and other area businesses. Goodrum also testified that he had previously spoken with James Gibson during an anti-crime initiative conducted in Precinct Four. Goodrum testified that he recommended security measures to Gibson. Gibson denied this allegation at trial.
¶ 27. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Wright and giving him the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence, we find that substantial evidence exists to support the verdict. The Gibsons have failed to meet the burden necessary to overturn the jury's verdict. As a result, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Gibsons's motion for a directed verdict.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY BOONE
¶ 28. The standard of review for either the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion. Harrison v. McMillan, 828 So.2d 756, 765 (¶ 27) (Miss.2002) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999)). This Court will not reverse an erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. Id.
¶29. At Boone's deposition, the Gib-sons's counsel asked Boone questions regarding the attempted robbery. Boone made several allegations that were damaging to Wright. Boone alleged that he knew Henderson and that he used to sell drugs to Henderson. Contrary to Young's testimony, Boone alleged that they were at T.G.'s Washout to collect a drug debt. After these allegations, Boone demanded money before going any further. Counsel informed Boone that they could not pay him for his deposition. Boone then claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer any more questions. Wright's counsel attempted to question Boone, but Boone refused to answer.
¶ 30. Wright filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude Boone's deposition from the evidence because he had no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. Wright argued the deposition was hearsay and did not meet the requirements under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1).
¶ 31. The trial court agreed with Wright and partially granted his motion in limine. The trial judge excluded Boone's deposition for any purpose solely because Wright had no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. The trial judge also excluded any testimony concerning Henderson's alleged drug use or drug debt. The trial judge stated, however, that the Gibsons were free to question Coleman about allegations of Henderson's drug use and any debt owed to Young or Boone.
¶ 32. On appeal, the Gibsons argue the trial court erred for two reasons. First, the Gibsons argue that, under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, objections to the admissibility of depositions may only be made "for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying." M.R.C.P. 32. Second, the Gibsons argue that, assuming Wright did make a valid hearsay objection, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides an exception for former testimony since Boone is unavailable. We disagree.
¶ 33. Boone's deposition would be hearsay because it is a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." M.R.E. 801(c). In addition, Boone's deposition does not meet the exemption requirements under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Boone's availability does not change this result. Since Wright could have objected to the deposition as hearsay regardless of whether Boone was present at trial or not, we find the Gibsons's first argument to be without merit.
¶ 34. The Gibsons's second argument fails for similar reasons. Former testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." M.R.E. 804(b)(1). In addition, the declarant must be unavailable. Id. The trial judge ruled that Wright had no opportunity to cross-examine Boone. As a result, the deposition fails to meet the requirements under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). We find that the judge did not abuse his discretion in making that decision.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE EXAMINATION OF ANTHONY BOONE AT TRIAL
¶ 35. The Gibsons requested and were granted a court order allowing Boone to testify in person. Boone was transported from the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility to the Hinds County Courthouse. Boone gave his name and verified that he was serving time for capital murder. Other than that, Boone's answer to every question was, "I plead the fifth." The trial court asked Boone, "[D]o you intend not to answer any questions here today?" Boone replied, "I intend not to answer any." Despite this, the trial judge allowed the Gib-sons to ask more questions but Boone refused to answer. The Gibsons unsuccessfully attempted to impeach Boone with his deposition. The trial judge then ended the examination and excused Boone from the witness stand and ordered that he be sent back to jail.
¶ 36. The privilege against self-incrimination is available to witnesses in criminal and civil proceedings. In re Knapp, 536 So.2d 1330, 1334 (Miss.1988). In addition, the person claiming the privilege can be a nonparty witness. Woodham v. State, 779 So.2d 158, 161 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001).
¶ 37. The Gibsons argue they should have been able to ask Boone every question they had prepared. The Gibsons argue that Boone was required to provide the trial court with sufficient information for it to determine whether or not Boone's response would, in fact, incriminate him. The Gibsons further argue they should have been able to impeach Boone with his deposition. The Gibsons direct our attention to Harrell v. Duncan, 593 So.2d 1 (Miss.1991), and ask us to rule in a similar fashion.
¶ 38. We decline because Harrell involved a defendant who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid opposing counsel's cross-examination. In the case sub judice, Boone was a non-party witness called by the Gibsons on direct examination. We agree that a party who is testifying in a civil suit must claim his Fifth Amendment privilege on a question by question basis. Knapp, 536 So.2d at 1334. However, the Gibsons can provide no support for the notion that a non-party witness in a civil case has to proceed in the same fashion. As a result, we find the trial judge did not commit reversible error by ending Boone's questioning.
¶ 39. In addition, it was not error for the trial judge to prohibit the Gibsons from impeaching Boone with his own deposition for two reasons. First, the trial judge previously ruled that Boone's deposition was inadmissible for ah purposes. Second, once a witness invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege, his silence does not constitute grounds for impeachment. Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 751 (Miss.1992). We find the trial court's decision to end Boone's questioning proper.
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION D-21 WITHOUT MODIFICATION
¶ 40. When determining whether reversible error lies in the granting or refusal of various jury instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole to determine whether a jury has been incorrectly instructed. Haggerty v. Foster, 838 So.2d 948, 953(¶ 4) (Miss.2002). When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Id.
¶ 41. The pertinent portion of jury instruction D-21 states that "[i]n a civil action such as this, if a witness refuses to testify on the grounds of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, you the jury, may draw an adverse inference from the [defendant's refusal to testify." Wright objected to this language and the trial judge modified the instruction by removing the phrase "adverse inference" and replacing it with "whatever conclusion you believe proper." The modified instruction was then offered to the jury.
¶ 42. On appeal, the Gibsons argue that jury instruction D-21 should have been offered to the jury unmodified because an adverse inference may be drawn from a civil defendant's refusal to answer questions based on the Fifth Amendment. However, as noted above, this particular rule of law, as true as it may be, has only been applied in Mississippi to the actual parties of a civil action. See Harrell, 593 So.2d at 5-6; Knapp, 536 So.2d at 1334; Morgan v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 222 So.2d 820, 828 (Miss.1969). Boone was not a party to this action. The unmodified instruction was not a correct statement of the law because it called for an adverse inference due to the "defendant's" refusal to testify. This simply was not true. In reviewing the record, we find the instructions, read as a whole, fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice to the Gibsons.
¶ 43. Moreover, if a party wishes to preserve error on the refusal of a proposed jury instruction, he must specifically object before the instruction is presented to the jury. Lewis v. Hiatt, 683 So.2d 937, 944 (Miss.1996). There is no indication in the record that the Gibsons objected to the modified instruction before it was offered to the jury. We find the Gibsons's final issue to be without merit.
¶ 44. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. STATUTORY DAMAGES AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
. T.G.'s Washout is a coin operated laundromat. The business offers self-service coin operated laundry facilities as well as a "fluff-n-fold" service whereby customers can leave their laundry with the employees to be washed, dried, and ironed.