Case Name: BROWN v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1902-03-04
Citations: 129 Mich. 588
Docket Number: 
Parties: BROWN v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Judges: Moore, Grant, and Montgomery, JJ., concurred. Long, J., did not sit.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 129
Pages: 588–589

Head Matter:
BROWN v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Municipal Corporations — Negligent Injuries — Limitations.
Under section 2 of Act No. 463, Local Acts 1895, amendatory of the charter of Detroit, limiting the time for bringing actions for negligent injuries, but saving “lawful causes of action” then existing on condition that suit be commenced within six months from the time when the act should take effect, an action for an injury sustained before the act became operative, brought within six month's after the rejection of the claim by the council, was in time. Springer v. City of Detroit, 118 Mich. 69, followed; Klass v. Same, 129 Mich. 35, distinguished.
Error to Wayne; Rohnert, J.
Submitted January 30, 1902.
Decided March 4, 1902.
Case by Horace Á. Brown against the city of Detroit for personal in] uries caused by a defective sidewalk. From a judgment for defendant on verdict directed by the court, plaintiff brings error.
Reversed.
Moore & Moore, Henry B. Shaw, and Charles S.' Hampton, for appellant.
P. J. M. Hally and A. B. Hall (T. E. Tarsney, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
Hooker, C. J.
This cause is similar in its facts to the case of Springer v. City of Detroit, 118 Mich. 69 (76 N. W. 122), except that the plaintiff in this case delayed action for a period of 4 months and 20 days after action by the council, while in that case the period was 1 month and 6 days only. In that case it was held that the statutory period of 6 months did not commence to run until the council took action upon the claim. This action was brought within such period under that rule. The case of Klass v. City of Detroit, ante, 35 (88 N. W. 204), was a case where the accident occurred after the passage of the statute, and was governed by the express and unequivocal language of the statute.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to the defendant to plead within 20 days.
Moore, Grant, and Montgomery, JJ., concurred. Long, J., did not sit.