Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ramon TORRES, III
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-02-19
Citations: 281 So. 2d 451
Docket Number: No. 52977
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ramon TORRES, III.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 281
Pages: 451–456

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ramon TORRES, III.
No. 52977.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 19, 1973.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 21, 1973.
On Rehearing Aug. 20, 1973.
Cyrus J. Greco, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., New Orleans, Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Attys,, Baton Rouge, Alton T. Moran, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice.
On December 15, 1971, Ramon Torres, III was charged by bills of information with the crimes of aggravated burglary and aggravated crime against nature. Prior to the trial the defendant's counsel filed a motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements and a confession made by the defendant to police officers investigating the case. This motion to suppress was denied by the trial court to which ruling the defendant objected and reserved a bill of exceptions. Thereafter, prior to the trial the defendant applied to this court for remedial writs complaining of the denial of the motion to suppress. The application for remedial writs was denied by this court on the grounds that the defendant had an adequate remedy through appeal in the event of a conviction. State v. Torres, 261 La. 770 (1972), 260 So.2d 699.
On the date set for trial the defendant's counsel announced to the court that the defendant was willing to plead guilty to the charge of aggravated crime against nature. Prior to the entry of the plea of guilty, however, defense counsel and the state entered a stipulation into the record which is the basis of the main issue on this appeal. Following the entry of the stipulation the defendant was extensively "boykinized," and he was then allowed to plead guilty to the charge of aggravated crime against nature. The court sentenced the defendant to the Department of Corrections for a period of 7 years.
On this appeal we are asked to review two bills of exceptions reserved and perfected by the defendant prior to the plea.
At the outset we are met with the argument made by the state that a plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior thereto (which would preclude us from reviewing the bills of exceptions. See State v. Val entine, 259 La. 1019, 254 So.2d 450 (1971), and cases cited therein).
The defendant contends, however, that the rule concerning waiver of non-jurisdictional defects by a plea of guilty, is only operative, where the plea of guilty is knowing and voluntary. Defense counsel further contends that the plea of guilty in this case was not a knowing and voluntary plea, because the defendant was of the belief at the time the plea was made that the question of the admissibility of his inculpatory statements and confessions would be reviewed by this court on appeal. That is, defense counsel contends that since the defendant was under a mistaken belief that the bill of exceptions taken to the denial of the motion to suppress would be reviewed by this court on appeal, then his consent or will to make the plea is vitiated, if this court on appeal cannot review the bill of exceptions because of the rule of the Valentine case, supra.
We admit that in order for a plea of guilty to be valid (therefore precluding on appeal a review of prior non-jurisdictional defects), it must be an intelligent, understanding and voluntary waiver of the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial with all of the consequences and rights attending such a trial (such as the right to have certain errors of the trial court reviewed upon appeal) Boykin v. Alabama, supra. We also find that the bill of exceptions taken to the denial of the motion to suppress the inculpatory statements and confession of the defendant is addressed to an allegedly non-jurisdictional defect. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
Therefore, we are faced with the task of ascertaining from the record before us whether the defendant's plea of guilty was tainted by his mistaken belief that we would on appeal review his bill of exceptions taken to the denial of the motion to suppress.
Defense counsel contends that the effect of the stipulation entered into between him and the prosecutor was to cause the defendant to plead guilty under the assumption that he could have his plea set aside on appeal should we review his bill of exceptions and find it valid. However, from the transcript that we have before us, we cannot make a finding that the defendant was, in fact, pleading guilty subject to the condition that this court would review his bill of exceptions on appeal. The stipulations which were entered into were obviously the work of defense counsel, and we have no way of ascertaining from this record the state of mind of the defendant. Therefore, we are unable to say that the record supports the defendant's contention that his plea of guilty was not voluntary and understanding. The trial court extensively "Boykinized" the defendant, as reflected in some eight pages of the transcript, and made it clear to him that he was waiving a vast number of rights guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution and, in effect, admitting his guilt. More specifically, the trial court questioned the defendant regarding his waiver of the presumption of innocence, right to trial by jury, right to cross-examine his accusers, and the right to compel witnesses to testify in his behalf. The defendant responded to each of these questions by indicating that he understood these rights and understood that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. More significantly, however, the trial court asked Mr. Torres whether he had been promised anything in connection with his plea, to which he responded in the negative. We feel that with the record in this state the defendant's contention that the plea was not a voluntary and understanding plea is not substantiated. The defendant was shown to have at least some college education and we feel that he recognized the seriousness of his plea and all of its ramifications.
Our holding that the record does not substantiate the defendant's contention, of course, means that we are precluded from reviewing the bills of exceptions taken prior to the plea. We are limited on this appeal to an inspection of the pleadings and proceedings for errors discoverable on the face thereof. State v. Valentine, supra. We find none.
We note, however, that the defendant is not without a remedy to further complain and show that his plea was made under the mistaken assumption concerning our appellate review. By way of habeas corpus the defendant may well be able to show that his plea was invalid due to the peculiar circumstance of the entry of the stipulation, and his understanding of the advice of his attorney. We are merely saying here that the record before us on this appeal does not support his contention.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. He was made aware of the nature and extent of the constitutional rights which he is deemed to have waived by pleading guilty. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
. His attorney may have mistakenly advised him that this court could review the bill of exceptions in spite of his plea of guilty.