Case Name: O.R. and M.L., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-04-09
Citations: 979 So. 2d 1105
Docket Number: Nos. 3D07-1038, 3D07-1039
Parties: O.R. and M.L., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
Judges: Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and SUAREZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 979
Pages: 1105–1110

Head Matter:
O.R. and M.L., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
Nos. 3D07-1038, 3D07-1039.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 9, 2008.
Karl E. Hall, Jr., Miami, for appellant O.R.; Joseph P. George, Jr., Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region of Florida, by and through Richard F. Joyce, Executive Assistant Regional Counsel, for appellant M.L.
Karla Perkins; Hillary S. Kambour, for appellees.
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and SUAREZ, JJ.

Opinion:
COPE, J.
The question presented by this dependency appeal is whether the trial court can enter a default against the defendant parents in the middle of the trial. We conclude that the answer is no, and remand for further proceedings.
The Department of Children & Family Services ("Department") filed a dependency petition against the father, O.R., and the mother, M.L., with respect to three minor children. The parents filed a denial and the case proceeded to trial. The parents were present for the first two days of the dependency trial, on November 16 and 17, 2006. The trial was scheduled to resume on January 24, 2007. The parents had been personally served with a summons to appear for that continued hearing date.
On January 24, the parents were not present. The court and the attorneys thought this was unusual because the parents had been present at all of the earlier proceedings. The attorneys did not know why the parents were not present, but moved for a continuance. The Department moved for a default.
The trial court denied the continuance and entered an order of dependency by reason of default. The order stated that the court's ruling was without prejudice to the parents to provide proof of an emergency which prevented their appearance at trial, in which case the order would be set aside. Thereafter the mother's counsel filed a motion to set aside the default dependency order, stating that she had traveled by automobile to New Jersey with the father and had car problems on the return trip. She stated that she did not have an independent means of traveling to court in time for the hearing. The trial court denied the motion. The parties timely appealed the dependency orders.
From a technical standpoint, the term "default" does not appear in the dependency statute. See Nickerson v. Dep't of Children & Families, 718 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). The statute does, however, contain the functional equivalent. In two situations, the failure of a defendant to appear can be deemed to be a consent to a dependency adjudication. See § 39.506(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).
First, "[fjailure of a person served with notice to personally appear at the arraignment hearing constitutes the person's consent to a dependency adjudication." Id. For this procedure to be available, the notice to appear must contain a statutory-warning. Id.' ; see Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c)(1).
Second, if a person appears at the arraignment hearing and the court orders that person to appear personally at the adjudicatory hearing for dependency (giving the date, time, and place), "then that person's failure to appear for the scheduled adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent to a dependency adjudication." § 39.506(3), Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.330(c).
Neither of the two statutory situations occurred in this case. The parents entered a written plea, so no arraignment hearing was held. Since there was no arraignment hearing, there was no court order for the parents to appear at the adjudicatory hearing. And, as already stated, the parents did appear at the first two trial days.
The Department argues that a summons was issued requiring the parents to appear personally for the third trial day. The Department asks us to expand the consent statute to say that the parents must be deemed to have consented to the dependency adjudication where they failed to obey the summons and failed to appear for the third trial day.
Florida's long standing public policy favors adjudication of disputes on the merits, see T.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 920 So.2d 170, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), and we decline the Department's invitation to extend the statute beyond its plain words. The statute says nothing about imposing a consent where a parent appears for the initial trial day and then fails to appear on a subsequent day. As this court stated in Nickerson, "In the absence of any statute or rule allowing for the entry of defaults in these types of proceedings, we conclude that the trial court had no authority to enter a default judgment-" Id. (citing In re A.L., 711 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)) (reversing default adjudication entered without authority); In re M.M., 708 So.2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (same); see also N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 960 So.2d 810, 812-13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (failing to appear at a filing hearing could not be treated as consent to dependency order where statute did not authorize such procedure).
In other civil matters, the failure of a defending party to appear at trial is not a basis for imposition of a default. See Turner Props., Inc. v. Marchetta, 607 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). There is no reason to believe that, in drafting the statute as it did, the Legislature intended to treat dependency matters any differently.
While a default was not authorized in the circumstances of this case, that is not to say that the trial needed to be stopped. When a defending parent fails to appear, but a consent adjudication is not authorized, the trial court has two choices: "(1) to proceed with the hearing by accepting testimony and evidence from those present, as well as argument of counsel, or (2) to continue the hearing." In re A.L., 711 So.2d at 601 (footnote omitted). To be sure, we all agree that public policy favors speedy determinations in dependency cases, where a child's immediate and future well-being is at stake. And, as between the two alternatives outlined in A.L., the better practice when a defending parent becomes absent midtrial is not to delay trial but to proceed with the hearing, accept testimony and evidence, hear argument of counsel, and resolve the matter as expeditiously as possible. This allows the court to avoid delay, parental or otherwise, in attending to the immediate needs of the child or children.
While the defense attorneys in this case moved for a continuance, they were unable to articulate any good cause for delaying the trial. The motion for continuance was properly denied. The Department should have proceeded with the presentation of its case, rather than seeking a default.
Because the default was unauthorized, we reverse the dependency adjudications as to both parents, and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
SUAREZ, J., concurs.
Subsection 39.506(3), Florida Statutes (2006), provides:
(3) Failure of a person served with notice to personally appear at the arraignment hearing constitutes the person's consent to a dependency adjudication. The document containing the notice to respond or appear must contain, in type at least as large as the balance of the document, the following or substantially similar language: "FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THE ARRAIGNMENT HEARING CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE ADJUDICATION OF THIS CHILD (OR CHILDREN) AS A DEPENDENT CHILD (OR CHILDREN) AND MAY ULTIMATELY RESULT IN LOSS OF CUSTODY OF THIS CHILD (OR CHILDREN)." If a person appears for the arraignment hearing and the court orders that person to personally appear at the adjudicatory hearing for dependency, stating the date, time, and place of the adjudicatory hearing, then that person's failure to appear for the scheduled adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent to a dependency adjudication.