Case Name: THE PEOPLE ex rel. LEON LAWTON v. HENRY W. SNELL, SHERIFF
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-01-04
Citations: 34 N.Y. Crim. 209
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE ex rel. LEON LAWTON v. HENRY W. SNELL, SHERIFF.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 209–226

Head Matter:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Jan. 4, 1916.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. LEON LAWTON v. HENRY W. SNELL, SHERIFF.
(216 N. Y. 527.)
(1.) Bastardy. *
Under the common law the father of a bastard was not liable for the support of either the mother or the child. In this state the liability of the father exists solely by virtue of the statute (Code Grim. Pro. §§ 838-886), and the proceedings by which the liability shall be determined and fixed are defined and controlled exclusively by such statute which must be in its substance strictly and fully complied with.
(2.) Same—Jurisdiction of police justices in cities of second class.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable to second class cities (Second Class Cities Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 53], § 185), a police justice of a city in that class has jurisdiction to try bastardy proceedings only where the defendant is arrested in the county of the police justice, or where, having been arrested in another county, and having been afforded an opportunity to give the security prescribed by law. he has failed to give it.
(3.) Same—When police justice acting without statutory jurisdiction holds defendant in bastardy proceeding defendant must be released on habeas corpus.
A bastardy proceeding was instituted before a police justice in a city of the second class, and a warrant issued for the arrest of defendant, who was arrested in another county, but was not taken before any magistrate of that county. He was taken before the police justice who had issued the warrant, who thereupon entered upon the inquiry in respect to the charge against defendant in the manner provided by the statute (Code Crim. Pro. § 848), although defendant by his counsel objected to the jurisdiction of such police justice. The police justice entered an order of filiation requiring him to give the undertaking required by the statute (Code Grim. Pro. § 851). Defendant did not comply with such order and was arrested under the statute (Code Grim. Pro. § 852) and committed to the county jail of the county in which the proceeding was instituted. Thereupon he obtained a writ of habeas corpus, which, upon its return, was dismissed by the county judge, which order was affirmed by the Appellate Division. Held, error; that the order of filiation was void because the police justice transgressed his power, and the relator was entitled to be discharged.
* See Note, Vol. 23, p. 23.
People ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, 168 App. Div. 410, reversed.
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered May 11, 1015, which affirmed an order of the Rensselaer County Court dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the relator to custody.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
Wallace H. Sidney for appellant.
The relator not having been taken before a magistrate in Schoharie county as directed by section 844 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police Court of the city of Troy had no jurisdiction of the person of said Leon Lawton, and no jurisdiction to make the commitment which it did committing said Leon Lawton to jail, and said Leon Lawton was illegally confined in jail under said commitment and entitled to his discharge upon said writ. (Code Crim. Pro. §§ 844, 845; People ex rel Savey v. Finnell, 88 Misc. Rep. 129; Hutton v. Bretsch, 157 App. Div. 68.) The motions made by the relator for his discharge were good and should have been granted for the reasons that the Police Court of Troy had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or of the subject-matter. (People ex rel Savey v. Finnell, 88 Misc. Rep. 129; People v. Cowie, 34 N. Y. 888; 88 Hun, 498; People v. Quimby, 72 Misc. Rep. 421; People v. Barry, 16 App. Div. 462; People v. Freilewel, 42 N. Y. Supp. 373; People ex rel. Van Riper v. N. Y. C. Protectory, 106 N. Y. 604; McCarg v. Burr, 186 N. Y. 467; People v. Liscombe, 60 N. Y. 559; People ex rel. Frey v. Warden, 100 N. Y. 20; People ex rel. Stumpf v. Craig, 79 Misc. Rep. 98; Decker v. Ekelman, 17 Misc. Rep. 665.)
John P. Taylor, District Attorney (Charles I. Webster of counsel), for respondent.
The police justice of the city of Troy had jurisdiction of the charge against the defendant and of the person of the defendant. (L. 1909, ch. 55, §§ 184, 185.) It is no defense to a criminal prosecution that the defendant was illegally or forcibly brought within the jurisdiction of the court. (Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110; Matter of Lagrave, 45 How. Pr. 301; U. S. v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. 131; U. S. v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 300; People v. Rowe, 4 Park. Cr. Rep. 253; People v. Eberspacher, 79 Hun, 410; People v. Jeratino, 62 Misc. Rep. 587; People v. Cuatt, 70 Misc. 455; People ex rel. Edwards v. Warden, etc., 37 Misc. Rep. 635.)

Opinion:
Collin, J.:
The relator is in the custody of and detained by the defendant by virtue of a commitment issued under section 852 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus issued by the county judge of Rensselaer county it was dismissed and the relator remanded to custody by an order which the Appellate Division affirmed.
The proceeding was instituted in the court of the police justice of the city of Troy in Rensselaer county, a city of the second class. It was governed by the provisions of title V, chapter 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, except the police justice, instead of two magistrates (Code of Crim. Pro. § 848), conducted it. (Second Class Cities Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 53], § 185.) The relator, whose arrest as the father of the bastard the warrant issued by the police justice directed (Code of Crim. Pro. § 841), resided and under the warrant and the indorsements of it duly made (^ 843) was arrested in Schoharie county. Section 844 provided :
" When the defendant is arrested in another county, he must be taken before the magistrate who indorsed the warrant, or before another magistrate ofythe same city or county, who may take from the defendant an undertaking, with sufficient sureties, to the effect:
" 1. That he will indemnify the county, and town or city, where the bastard was or is likely to be born, and every other county, town or city, against any expense for the support of the bastard, or of its mother during' her confinement and recovery, and to pay the costs of arresting the defendant, and of any order of filiation that may be made, or that the sureties will pay the sum indorsed on the warrant; or,
" 2. That the defendant will appear and answer the charge at the next county court of the county where the warrant was issued, and obey its order thereon."
The relator was not taken before the magistrate of Schoharie county who indorsed the warrant, or any other magistrate of that county, but was taken before the police justice of Troy, who entered upon the inquiry in respect to the charge against the relator as provided in section 848. The relator by his counsel objected to the jurisdiction of the police justice to so proceed, upon the ground, among others, that "section 844 had not been complied with. The objection was overruled, the inquiry conducted and the order of filiation, certifying the reasonable cost of arresting the relator and the sums to be paid by him for the support of the child and mother, made. (§ 850.)
Section 851 provides:
" If the defendant be adjudged to be the father, he must immediately pay the amount certified for the costs of the arrest and of the order of filiation, and enter into an undertaking, with sufficient sureties approved by the magistrates, to the effect,
" 1. That he will pay weekly or otherwise, as may have been ordered, the sum directed for the support of the child, and of the mother during her confinement and recovery, or which may be ordered by the county court of the county; and that he will indemnify the county, and town or city where the bastard was or may be born (as the case may be), and every other county, town or city, which may have been or may be put to expense for the support of the bastard, or of its mother during her confinement and recovery, against those expenses, or that the sureties will do so, not exceeding the sum mentioned in the undertaking, and which must be fixed by the magistrate; or,
" 2. That he will appear at the next term of the county court of the county, to answer the charge and obey its order thereon, or that the sureties will pay a sum equal to a full indemnity for supporting the bastard and its mother, as provided in the first subdivision of section 844."
Because the relator did not comply with the provisions of this section, he was committed to the county jail. (§ 852.)
The police justice did not have the power, under the facts presented, to subject the relator to the provisions of section 851. The common law did not make the father of a bastard liable for the support of either the mother or the child, and the liability of the relator exists solely by virtue of the statute. (Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181; 2 Kent's Com. [13th ed.] p. 215.) The proceedings by which the liability shall be determined and fixed are defined and controlled exclusively by the statutes which must be in their substance strictly and fully complied with. (Hutton v. Bretsch, 216 N. Y. 23.)
In the present case the power of the police justice to proceed beyond the issuance and indorsement of the warrant (§§ 842, 843) depended upon either of the two sets of facts or conditions, that (a) the officer aresting the relator in Schoharie county had taken him before the magistrate of that county, who indorsed the warrant (§§ 843, 844), and the relator did not give an undertaking as provided in section 844 and had been taken before the police justice (§§ 846, 848), or (b) the officer had taken him before the Schoharie county magistrate and the relator gave an undertaking as provided in section 844, had been discharged from arrest (§ 845) and the warrant, indorsed with the certificate of the Schoharie county magistrate of the discharge of the relator, and the undertaking delivered to the police justice. (§§ 845, 854.) The police justice had not the power to commit the relator to the county jail unless the first of such sets of facts or conditions existed. (§ 852.) Unless such facts or condition existed, an order of filiation did not subject the relator to the provisions of section 851. Those conclusions are produced and compelled by the mandatory and imperative commands of the statute. The officer 66 must93 take the defendant before the magistrate of the county of defendants residence in order that he may take the undertaking ( § 844) and the undertaking being given, he 66 must99 discharge the defendant (| 845), and thereupon the officer 66 must99 deliver the warrant indorsed with a certificate of the discharge, and the undertaking to the magistrate issuing the warrant. If the defendant do not give the undertaking the officer 66 must39 take him before the last-named magistrate, who then and in that event66 must99 proceeed as provided in sections 848-850. When the defendant gives the undertaking, and when it and the warrant indorsed with the certificate of defendant's discharge are delivered to the magistrate who issued the warrant, then and in that event the magistrate " must " proceed as prescribed in section 854, but an order of filiation made while so proceeding does not subject the defendant to the provisions of section 851, and, therefore, does not subject him to any commitment. While the word 66 must," when used in statues, is not universally and necessarily mandatory (Jenkins v. Putnam, 106 N. Y. 272; Matter of Thurber, 162 N. Y. 244, 252), here, indubitably, the directions of the sections are mandatory and imperative. The validity of the order of filiation and the commitment depended upon a strict compliance with the substance of them. Such conclusion rests upon either of two rules which, while akin, are not identical. The one, the jurisdiction or, in other words, the power of a judicial tribunal to try or inquire and adjudge in a proceeding purely statutory, in which the subject-matter and the remedy are purely the creatures of the statutes, is delimited and confined by the provisions of those statutes. An invalidity of its determination or adjudication in the proceeding will result from its action in disobedience to or controvention of the statutory requirements, as well as from its lack «'£ power to take cognizance of the claim or accusation—want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter'—-or to secure the con's h-uctive or actual appearance of the defendant or accused— want of jurisdiction of the person. The order of filiation was void unless all the material requirements of the statute were substantially complied with. (People ex rel. Ritzenthalcr v. Higgins, 151 N. Y. 570, 12 N. Y. Crim. 186; Huton v. Bretsch, 216 N. Y. 23; Sprague v. Eccleston, 1 Lans. 74; People v. Crispi, 106 App. Div. 176; 19 N. Y. Crim. 492; Brahmstead v. Ward, 44 Wis. 591; State v. Wakefield, 60 Vt. 618.) The other, compliance with the commands of a mandatory statute, is a condition precedent to the validity of an act or determination under it. The mode or way in which the act shall be done or the determination reached prescribed by it must be strictly pursued, otherwise the act or the determination will be void. (2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Const. [2d ed.] § 627; State v. Perkins, 58 Vt. 722; Norwegian Street, 81 Pa. St. 349.)
From the facts and the references to the Code section.! already stated it is clear and certain that the police justice did not obey in matters of substance, or proceed in conformity with the statutory requirements. His power, from the commencement of the proceeding to its termination came to him through and as given in those mandatory and imperative provisions and a step or act in the proceeding in disobedience of or in conflict with them was coram, non judice. For the reasons stated the order of filiation was void and the relator did not become subject to the provisions of section 852.
This conclusion does not conflict with the directions of section 684 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that a departure from the prescribed form or mode of pleadings or proceedings not prejudicing a substantial right of the defendant does not render a judgment or proceeding invalid. The procedure of the officer and the police justice was prejudicial to the relator in three respects: (1) It deprived him of the right to give an undertaking under section 844 in the county of his residence and thereby secure his discharge from arrest. (2) It subjected him to the provisions of sections 851, 852, whereas if he had given an undertaking under section 844 those sections would have been inapplicable. (3) He could give an undertaking under either subdivision of section 844 and have, upon an appeal to the County Court from an order of filiation, a full rehearing, that is, he could appeal from the entire order. He could not give an undertaking under subdivision 1 of section 851 and appeal from the entire order; his appeal in that case would be limited to the part of the order fixing the weekly or other allowances to be paid. (§§ 861, 862, 864, 865, 867.)
The reasons for reversal are not opposed, at any point, to those for the decision in People v. Eberspacher (79 Hun, 410, 9 N. Y. Crim 251). The mere illegality of the act of the officer in refusing to take the relator before the magistrate of Schoharie county, or in taking him directly before the police justice is not the basis for our conclusion. The basis for it is that the taking jf the relator before the Schoharie county magistrate was a condition precedent, by virtue of the statutory requirements, to the making of the inquiry and the order of filiation, and was not fulfilled. This feature was lacking in the Eberspacher case. The relator did not waive the non-fulfillment (Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 425; Baird v. Heifer, 12 App. Div. 23) and was not bound to appeal from the order of filiation in order that he might escape its effect. Inasmuch as it ¡ was void, because the police justice trangressed his power, the relator might assert its invalidity through the writ of habeas corpus. I concur in the opinion of my , brother. Chief Judge Bartlett.
The orders of the Appellate Division .and County Court should be reversed and the relator discharged.