Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and James T. Vocelle, Walter L. Lightsey and Stuart L. Moore, as and constituting the Florida Industrial Commission, Relators, v. Ben C. WILLIS, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1960-11-04
Citations: 124 So. 2d 48
Docket Number: No. C-13
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and James T. Vocelle, Walter L. Lightsey and Stuart L. Moore, as and constituting the Florida Industrial Commission, Relators, v. Ben C. WILLIS, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 124
Pages: 48–64

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and James T. Vocelle, Walter L. Lightsey and Stuart L. Moore, as and constituting the Florida Industrial Commission, Relators, v. Ben C. WILLIS, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, Respondent.
No. C-13.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
Nov. 4, 1960.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1960.
Burnis T. Coleman and Lawrence Kan-zer, Tallahassee, for relators.
Pallot, Marks, Lundeen, Poppell & Hor-wich, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.
Relators have filed in this court a suggestion for writ of prohibition to restrain the Honorable Ben C. Willis, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida, from exercising further jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding pending in that court wherein Air Control Products, Inc., is petitioner and the Florida Industrial Commission is the respondent. We are not called upon to adjudicate in this proceeding the merits of the controversy which has arisen between Air Control Products, Inc., and the Unemployment Compensation Tax Division of the Florida Industrial Commission which forms the subject matter of the mandamus proceeding sought to be prohibited. The sole question presented for our determination is whether the Circuit Court of Leon County is proceeding without jurisdiction, or in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law.
The mandamus action in question was instituted by Air Control against the Flor ida Industrial Commission by petition which alleges that the Commission notified Air Control of its determination that an employer-employee relationship existed between Air Control and certain named independent contractors, and demanding employment compensation contributions on the money paid to such independent contractors. The petition further alleges that Air Control paid under protest the contribution assessment levied against it by the Commission, the protest being predicated upon the assertion that the independent contractors named by the Commission in its status determination were not employees, and for that reason no unemployment contributions on the amounts of compensation paid to them were assessable. Air Control thereafter made a written demand upon the Commission that it be granted an adjustment or refund of the amount of contributions so paid, which demand was made pursuant to the provisions of F.S. § 443.15 (6), F.S.A.
The petition alleges in paragraph 6:
"On or about August 6, 1959, the Respondents, by and through their official representative, advised the Relator that the request of July 15, 1959, was recognized as a request for refund and the Respondents, by and through their official representative, further advised the Relator that, upon the advice of the Legal Department of Respondents
" ' it would appear to be necessary to file a petition for Writ of Mandamus to require us to refund the money and if a Court of final jurisdiction so orders, we will do so but not otherwise.' "
The Commission admitted the truth of this allegation in its return to the alternative Writ of Mandamus. Air Control in its petition prays for the issuance of an alternative writ commanding the Commission to make the refund or grant an adjustment to Air Control in the amount paid by it.
Both Air Control in its petition and the Commission in its return alleged that the written demand by Air Control upon the Commission was made pursuant to the provisions of subsection (6) of Section 443.15, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which subsection provides in full as follows:
"Refunds. — If not later than four years after the date of payment of any amount as contributions, interest or penalties, an employing unit who has paid such contributions, interest or penalties shall make application for an adjustment thereof in connection with subsequent contribution payments, or for a refund thereof because such adjustment cannot be made, and the commission shall allow such employer to make an adjustment thereof without interest in connection with subsequent contribution payment by him, or if such adjustment cannot be made, the commission shall refund said amount, without interest, from the fund. For like cause, and within the same period, adjustment or refund may be made on the commission's own initiative. Provided, however, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a refund of contributions which were properly paid in accordance with the provisions of this chapter at the time of such payment; provided further that refunds under this subsection and under § 443.03(5) (g) 7. may be paid from either the clearing account or the benefit account of the unemployment compensation fund and from the special employment security administration fund with respect to interest or penalties which have been previously paid into such fund, provisions of § 443.10 (2) to the contrary notwithstanding."
A literal and uncritical reading of the first sentence of this quoted subsection might lead, a reader to conclude that the Commission would be always required to allow an adjustment or refund upon a timely application therefor, in view of the language "the Commission shall allow such employer to make an adjustment thereof or the Commission shall refund said amount ." Such a construction, of course, would be absurd and would permit employers to destroy the unemployment compensation program of Florida by the simple device of applying for an adjustment or refund within the time prescribed. We, instead, apply the basic rules of statutory construction (that a statute should not be construed to bring about an unreasonable or absurd result and that a statutory provision should be construed to effectuate the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute) and hold that in the quoted subsection the legislature intended that upon a timely application by an employing unit for an adjustment or refund, the Commission must then make a new determination as to whether such unit is entitled to an adjustment or refund; that, if the Commission then determines that the applying unit is so entitled, the Commission then shall allow the adjustment or make the refund. We cannot, however, find in the subsection a legislative intent to provide for a hearing on the application by the applying unit at which hearing evidence would be taken and a record made up which could be examined by an appellate court in certiorari proceedings.
Examining the actions of the Commission in the light of the quoted subsection as we construe it, the conclusion appears inevitable from the allegations of both the petition for writ of mandamus and the return to the alternative writ that the Commission arbitrarily denied the application of Air Control for an adjustment or refund without even making a redeter-mination, merely adhering to any determination it may have made originally to the effect that Air Control was liable for payment. That communication from the "official representative" of the Commission made this clear by declaring that the Commission would make a refund only if a court of final jurisdiction so ordered "but not otherwise." The statement in that communication that "it would appear to be necessary to file a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to require us to refund the money " cannot have the effect of conferring jurisdiction upon any court but does have the effect of supporting the conclusion that the Commission would take no further step on the application except if ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.
A profound fundamental principle is involved in this situation — whether the citizens of this State shall have recourse to the courts when an administrative agency of the state has with seeming arbitrariness refused to give consideration to an application for adjustment or refund made pursuant to a provision of law. The citizen in a case like this has no right of appeal or certiorari to obtain a review by the court, for no hearing has been provided by the legislature which would permit the making of a record that would allow an appellate court judicially to review the agency's order. Without such a record the only court proceeding which would seem to be available is the Writ of Mandamus, in which proceeding the court would have an opportunity to make the determination as to whether an applicant for an adjustment or refund was entitled to one or the other under the law and the facts. This is exactly what the Respondent in these prohibition proceedings has assumed jurisdiction to do in the instant case.
We cannot say that upon the record before us the Respondent is without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, and the burden is upon the Commission, which has filed the suggestion in prohibition before us, to allege sufficiently and to show in the record filed before us that the Respondent lacks jurisdiction or has exceeded it. Under such circumstances a Suggestion in prohibition must be denied. The suggestion should .also be denied for the additional reason that it attempts to make these prohibition proceedings a substitute for an appeal and has failed to show that the questions raised in its suggestion cannot adequately be settled on an appeal.
It was a situation somewhat like this that the people of Florida had in mind in 1885 when they adopted Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which section reads as follows:
"Courts open to everyone; remedy for wrongs. — All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
An exact factual situation as presented here was present in the Orange State Oil Company case. The allegations of the petition for writ of mandamus filed in that case are almost identical with those contained in the petition filed by Air Control in this case. In Orange State Oil the Commission had assessed unemployment compensation contributions against the oil company on the erroneous theory that the company's independent contractors were in fact employees, and all compensation paid them was taxable under the unemployment compensation law'. The assessment in that case, as here, was paid under protest and a demand for adjustment or refund was subsequently ¡made by the oil company. Upon the Commission's refusal to grant the refund, the proceeding in mandamus was instituted in the Circuit Court. The court proceeded to dispose of the case by determining the status of the so-called employees, and holding that they were in fact independent contractors and no unemployment contributions were payable on the compensation paid to them by the oil company. Having arrived at that conclusion the peremptory writ of mandamus issued and required that an adjustment or refund be made as demanded by the petitioner oil company. On appeal to the Supreme Court the Circuit Court's decision was affirmed. The cited decision is clear authority for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Leon County to entertain and carry to a conclusion the mandamus proceeding which the Commission now seeks to have prohibited by a writ of this court.
The Commission seeks to brush aside the effect of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the Orange State Oil Company case by contending first, that the Circuit Court's jurisdiction was not raised in that proceeding, and secondly, the decision was rendered under the unemployment compensation statute as it then existed and prior to its subsequent amendment. A careful comparison of the present statute under which Air Control seeks a writ of mandamus, with the statute which was in effect at the time Orange State Oil Company procured its alternative and peremptory writs of mandamus based upon substantially identical facts, will reveal that the subsequent amendments to the statute are minor in nature and have no effect upon the controlling principles of law on which our decision in this case must rest.
Before instituting this action in prohibition the Commission filed its answer to the alternative writ alleging among other things that through error or inadvertence it had failed to give Air Control written notice of the contribution assessment levied against it by registered or certified mail as required by the statute. The Commission seizes upon its own erroneous failure to comply with the requirements of the statute which it now seeks to invoke against Air Control's right to maintain this action by urging that such error on its part precluded Air Control from requesting the administrative hearing afforded it by F.S. § 443.-15(2) (a), F.S.A. The Commission rea sons that since the administrative remedy available to Air Control was not accorded it, the Commission's notification that it had considered and rejected Air Control's demands for a refund was premature. The answer seems to contend that because of both the erroneous and premature acts of the Commission, the entire slate should now be wiped clean, and Air Control should be required to commence new proceedings through which an administrative hearing on its application for adjustment or refund of the protested assessment may be held by the Commission, and the matter disposed of administratively in regular course as outlined in the statute. It is the position of the Commission that it has the exclusive authority through quasi-judicial proceedings, to determine employer-employee relationships of persons falling within the purview of the Unemployment Compensation Act, and jurisdiction to make such determination is not vested in the circuit courts of this state.
The petition for alternative writ affirmatively alleges that Air Control's demands for a refund or adjustment of the contributions paid under protest had been denied by the Commission which advised that Air Control's only avenue for relief lay in a mandamus action to be instituted in the Circuit Court of Leon County. To have then demanded an administrative hearing for the purpose of adjudicating this issue would have been a futile and fruitless gesture in view of the fact, according to the allegations of the petition, that this issue had already been resolved by the Commission in a manner adverse to Air Control. If, as alleged in the petition, the Commission had officially determined Air Control's right to an adjustment or refund without affording Air Control an administrative hearing on the matter, the Commission would be estopped to now insist that such administrative remedies to secure the refund must necessarily be exhausted before judicial review of the Commission's action can be obtained.
The suggestion for writ of prohibition is denied and the cause dismissed.
CARROLL, DONALD, J., concurs.
STURGIS, J., dissents.
. State ex rel. Carmichael v. Rowe, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 134.
. Florida Industrial Commission v. State ex rel. Orange State Oil Company, 1945, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599.
. F.S. § 443.15(2), F.S.A.