Case Name: Starsha SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee; Starsha Sewell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-02-01
Citations: 508 F. App'x 259
Docket Number: Nos. 12-2009, 12-2140
Parties: Starsha SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee. Starsha Sewell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Prince George’s County Department of Social Services, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 508
Pages: 259–260

Head Matter:
Starsha SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee. Starsha Sewell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Prince George’s County Department of Social Services, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 12-2009, 12-2140.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: Jan. 9, 2013.
Decided: Feb. 1, 2013.
Starsha Sewell, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie A. Lewis, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
No. 12-2009 dismissed; No. 12-2140 affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Starsha Sewell appeals the district court's orders remanding her first action (No. 12-2009) and dismissing her second action (No. 12-2140) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
No. 12-2009: With respect to the district court's order remanding Sewell's first action, we grant Appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. A district court's remand order is generally not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006). While an exception applies for civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006), the exception requires the removal petitioner to allege: (1) the denial of a right arising under federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality, and (2) that she is denied or cannot enforce the specific federal rights in the state courts. Johnson v. Miss., 421 U.S. 213, 219, 95 S.Ct. 1591, 44 L.Ed.2d 121 (1975). Because Sewell relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), a provision of general applicability, she cannot satisfy the first prong of Johnson. See Ga. v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966). We therefore lack authority to review the district court's remand order.
No. 12-2140: With respect to the district court's order dismissing Sewell's second action, because Sewell provides no argument in her informal brief addressing the district court's dispositive holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Se-well has forfeited appellate review of the court's dismissal order. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We also grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny as moot Se-well's motion for relief from judgment, and deny her motion for default judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
No. 12-2009 DISMISSED;
No. 12-2140 AFFIRMED.
We also lack jurisdiction to review the remand order because the plain language of § 1443 provides that removal is available only to defendants, not plaintiffs.