Case Name: RICHARD A. SHELEY, Indiv. and as Adm'r, Appellee, v. GERALDINE GUY, Appellant
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1976-05-28
Citations: 63 Ill. 2d 544
Docket Number: No. 47811
Parties: RICHARD A. SHELEY, Indiv. and as Adm’r, Appellee, v. GERALDINE GUY, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 63
Pages: 544–550

Head Matter:
(No. 47811.
RICHARD A. SHELEY, Indiv. and as Adm’r, Appellee, v. GERALDINE GUY, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 28, 1976.
RYAN, SCHAEFER, and UNDERWOOD, JJ., dissenting.
Pree & Pree, of Springfield, and Edwin C. Mills, of Lincoln (Michael W. Hogan, Ronald W. Olson, and Edward G. Free, of counsel), for appellant.
Harris & Harris, of Lincoln, and Jerome Mirza and Associates, Ltd., of Bloomington (Jerome Mirza, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE CREBS
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action for wrongful death. Defendant was charged with negligently driving her car so as to strike and kill a four-year-old child. Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $10,000 was entered by the circuit court of Logan County based on a jury verdict. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. (Sheley v. Guy, 29 Ill. App. 3d 361.) We granted leave to appeal.
Defendant's first contention is that she was not proved guilty of negligence as a matter of law. This requires a review of the testimony. There were no eyewitnesses to the impact. There is some conflict in the evidence as to the location of the child. The jury apparently found that she was standing close to the side of the highway waiting to cross the street. This would appear to be the most reasonable conclusion from all the evidence. While the defendant testified that she pulled off the road after the accident, the jury apparently found that she started moving to her right before the accident and this caused her car to hit the little girl.
We find a reasonable basis for this conclusion by the jury from the following facts: (1) near this point on the 18-foot roadway, defendant's car met a truck coming from the opposite direction which, according to the testimony, measured 8 feet to 814 feet in width; (2) the point of impact about 27 inches from the rear bumper of the car indicates either that the car was moving to the right or that the little girl ran into the side of the car; (3) assuming that the little girl had stopped and was waiting to cross the road, it is unlikely she would then have moved forward into the side of the car.
Also, we find this conclusion to be consistent with defendant's testimony that she never saw the little girl. Since she did not know of the girl's presence, it is reasonable to assume she would follow her natural instinct when meeting the truck on the narrow road and pull to her right.
While there is evidence consistent with the defendant's theory that the little girl ran into the side of her car, the weight of the evidence is otherwise. The direct testimony of three disinterested witnesses has the little girl stopped at the side of the road. Only the passenger in defendant's car saw a girl running, and this was on a sidewalk a short distance from the accident scene. If the little girl ran to the spot at the side of the road and then stopped, the testimony of all the witnesses on this point can be reconciled.
Defendant next contends that the trial judge's failure to declare a mistrial when counsel for plaintiff made an indirect reference to insurance constitutes reversible error. There is no question that the remark, made during rebuttal argument, was improper. Plaintiff's counsel claims the remark was "provoked" by argument of defendant's counsel. Defense counsel did make statements attempting to elicit the sympathy of the jury which were improper. We do not find these sufficient to excuse plaintiff's comment. However, since we conclude that the finding of liability has a complete basis in the evidence and the damage award is reasonable, it thus appears that the jury was not prejudiced by the remark, and therefore a reversal is not required.
The plaintiff argued to the jury that damages should be between $50,000 and $60,000. Defense counsel argued liability only and did not argue damages. The evidence showed the child to be of above average ability for her age. The award of $10,000 under these circumstances is further indication that the jury was not prejudiced in its deliberations by the improper remark of counsel.
Defendant has raised other objections which we have considered and find to be without sufficient substance so as to require a reversal.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.