Case Name: KENNEDY FITZGERALD HANCOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1991-07-01
Citations: 12 Va. App. 774
Docket Number: No. 1482-88-2
Parties: KENNEDY FITZGERALD HANCOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 12
Pages: 774–789

Head Matter:
Richmond
KENNEDY FITZGERALD HANCOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1482-88-2
Decided July 1, 1991
Counsel
Michael HuYoung (Jane Chittom, on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion
COLEMAN, J.
On July 11, 1987, Kennedy Fitzgerald Hancock and three companions robbed the people attending a turkey shoot at a clubhouse in Chesterfield County. At his bench trial, Hancock pled guilty to three counts each of armed robbery and use of a firearm during a robbery. Code § 18.2-58 and 18.2-53.1. He was also found guilty of arson, Code § 18.2-79, and three counts of attempted capital murder by arson, Code § 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(d). On appeal, Hancock claims the Commonwealth did not prove the arson charge beyond a reasonable doubt. He also assigns several errors to his attempted capital murder convictions: (1) that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a principal in the first degree to the arson and, therefore, because Code § 18.2-18 mandates that only a principal in the first degree can be convicted of capital murder, he cannot be convicted of attempted capital murder; (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the specific intent to kill; and (3) that the Commonwealth failed to prove each element of the three counts of attempted capital murder because it produced only one of the three victims who were allegedly robbed and, therefore, failed to prove the crucial element that each victim was robbed. We find no merit in these contentions and affirm Hancock's convictions.
At Hancock's suggestion, he and three companions planned to rob the people who were attending the turkey shoot at the clubhouse. Hancock, who had been to several turkey shoot gatherings before, knew that people with large amounts of cash would be there gambling late into the night. On the way to the clubhouse, Hancock, who was driving, stopped his truck at á store so one of his compatriots could purchase a container of gasoline. Hancock anticipated that only a few people would be left at the clubhouse when they arrived around 1:00 a.m. Instead, they found approximately eighteen people present. Wearing masks, the four men burst through the only door to the small wooden structure, which had dirt floors and no windows. One of the men fired a shot into the air and announced it was a stickup. Hancock, who was carrying a pistol, gathered wallets from some of those present. One of Hancock's accomplices, who was armed with a double barrel shotgun, fired a shot over one man's head.
After the robberies, two of Hancock's accomplices left the building. According to Hancock, after his two confederates left, he and Kevin W. Bell remained behind in the clubhouse with the can of gasoline. Hancock testified that he never intended to start a fire and that he had merely planned to spill the gasoline in front of the door so the smell would scare the victims. He maintained that he did not carry the gasoline into the clubhouse and that he did not place the foam rubber cushion in front of the door, pour gasoline on it, or strike the match that started the fire. Hancock claimed that Bell did all of these acts. However, Thomas Mays, the only victim to testify at trial, said that the two men divided the tasks between them. He acknowledged that one was more responsible, perhaps, than the other. Mays could not identify which man was Hancock and which was Bell because they were wearing masks. He testified as follows:
Q. The two individuals that came back in, when you say there was a seat on the couch are you referring to one cushion or a number of cushions?
A. One cushion.
Q. Did you see which one of the individuals took that cushion off?
A. No, I didn't.

Q. Did you see whether or not the other individual had something in his hands?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he have?
A. A can of gas.
Q. Now, after that first individual took the cushion off the couch where did he place it, on the floor?
A. Yes.
Q. What did the second individual that had the can, what did he do?
A. He poured the gas on it and the first man lit the fire.
Q. That would be the man that took the cushion off the couch?
A. Right.
Upon starting the fire, one of the two men commanded, "Stay in with your hands over your head. Don't come out for ten minutes or we will shoot." As the two men left, one shut the door behind them and the room filled immediately with smoke. Those trapped inside were afraid to leave by the door. They managed to put out the fire by smothering it with plywood and escaped by kicking through the back wall. No one was injured. The arson investigator who inspected the scene testified that the center pole of the structure had been charred by the fire.
I. ARSON
Hancock contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for arson under Code § 18.2-79. We disagree.
Hancock does not contest that the fire was incendiary in origin; he conceded the fire was deliberate and even testified to the manner in which it was set. He claims, instead, the Commonwealth failed to prove that the fire damaged the building or whatever damage may have occurred was insufficient to establish "burning" within the meaning of Code § 18.2-79.
The arson expert testified that while the boards used by the victims to put out the fire were charred because of those efforts to extinguish the fire, damage to the center pole supporting the roof of the structure was due to the fire set by Hancock and his accomplices. While Thomas Mays, one of the victims, did testify that the building was not damaged, the arson expert testified the center pole was, in fact, charred. On appeal, the decision of a trial court sitting without a jury is afforded the same weight as a jury's verdict and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 604, 231 S.E.2d 312, 315 (1977). The trial court considered and determined the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, affording it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). Viewed in this light, we find the evidence supports the finding that the fire, which was of incendiary origin, did damage to the building.
"The amount of 'burning' necessary to be shown is any amount, provided there is a perceptible wasting of the fiber of the building or object which is a subject of arson, or some part of that building or object, by fire." 2A Michie's Jurisprudence Arson § 1 (1981). While no Virginia case has directly addressed this proposition, we follow the precedent set by a majority of other states which hold that only a slight burning is necessary. See Annotation, What Constitutes "Burning" to Justify Charge of Arson, 28 A.L.R.4th 482, at § 3, 6 (1984).
Hancock also claims the Commonwealth failed to prove he was the one who actually ignited the match to start the fire. Proof that he struck the match and ignited the gasoline is unnecessary for a conviction under Code § 18.2-79. The statute provides that anyone who did "aid, counsel, or procure the burning or destruction" is guilty of arson. Having established the fire was incendiary in origin, the Commonwealth's remaining burden was to prove "the accused was a guilty agent in the burning within the scope of the statute," Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 123, 306 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1983), and this the Commonwealth did. Hancock acknowledged that he was one of the two men who remained behind when the fire was ignited. We know from Thomas Mays that Hancock either doused the cushion with gasoline or placed the cushion and used the match to ignite the gasoline. Either act was sufficient to constitute arson in violation of Code § 18.2-79. Also, Hancock admitted it was his idea to bring the gasoline along. The evidence was sufficient for the fact finder to find that Hancock took an active part in setting the fire and did "aid, counsel, or procure the burning." See id.
II. ATTEMPTED CAPITAL MURDER
Hancock claims the Commonwealth failed in several respects to prove that he attempted to commit capital murder. He contends that Code § 18.2-18, as interpreted in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 255 S.E.2d 525 (1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 920 (1981), permits only a principal in the first degree to be convicted of capital murder. He argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the logical extension of the Johnson decision leads to the conclusion that only a principal in the first degree can be convicted of attempted capital murder. He reasons that, since he was not the "triggerman" who ignited the fire, he cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit capital murder because he could not have been convicted of capital murder had the attempt been carried to fruition. He claims, therefore, that his convictions for attempted capital murder were faulty because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was a principal in the first degree to the arson. Hancock also contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the specific intent to kill by setting the fire. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Hancock was a principal in the first degree to attempted capital murder.
Hancock contends that only the person who struck the match to ignite the gasoline and the cushion could be convicted as a principal in the first degree to attempted capital murder by arson. He contends that the Commonwealth's eyewitnesses could not identify whether he or his accomplice was the one to strike the match and set the fire. He argues that the evidence would, at most, prove he was a principal in the second degree since the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the "triggerman" who struck the match.
A principal in the first degree is one who is the instigator and moving spirit in the perpetration of a crime, who directs his associates and assists them in the actual commission. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 475, 487, 124 S.E. 237, 241 (1924). A principal in the second degree, on the other hand, is more passive in his participation. He is "one not the perpetrator of the crime, who is present, aiding and abetting the act done, or keeping watch or guard at some convenient distance." Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 568, 138 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1964); Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1015, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1961). There may be more than one principal in the first degree.
This occurs when more than one actor participates in the actual commission of the offense. Thus, when one man beats a victim and another shoots him, both may be principals in first degree to murder. And when two persons forge separate parts of the same instrument, they are both principals in the first degree to the forgery.
2 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 6.6 (2d ed. 1986).
In Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), multiple principals in the first degree were found to have committed capital murder, and in separate trials, two of the confederates were sentenced to death. Coppola had jointly participated with others in the fatal beating of a victim, which occurred during a robbery. After Coppola and his accomplice were convicted in separate trials and sentenced to death, Coppola claimed on appeal that under Code § 18.2-18 his conviction was erroneous since only the immediate perpetrator could be convicted of capital murder. The evidence showed that both men actively participated in the beating and in the planning and commission of the robbery. The Supreme Court upheld Coppola's conviction, even though his accomplice believed that his blows actually killed the victim. Id. at 257, 257 S.E.2d at 806-07. The Court said: "Since both . . . were convicted of the capital murder of [the victim], each was found by a jury to be an immediate perpetrator of that crime." Id.
Hancock's argument that there was a sole "triggerman" or perpetrator of the attempted capital murder by arson is without merit. Recently in Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 386, the Court upheld a capital murder conviction holding that Strickler was an "immediate perpetrator" in a beating death for purposes of the capital murder statute because he had taken a "direct part in inflicting fatal injuries" by either striking the victim or by holding her down while his accomplice did so. Similarly, when Hancock poured gasoline on the cushion while Bell ignited it, he took a direct act in committing arson, thereby making him an "immediate perpetrator." The evidence established a degree of participation by Han cock that would make him a principal in the first degree. "A principal in the first degree is the one who actually starts the fire; while a principal in the second degree is one who is present and assists the actual incendiary." Curtis, The Law of Arson 124 (1936). Thus, because Hancock was an immediate perpetrator of arson, which was the means by which serious injury or death would result from those acts, if the requisite intent was proven, the evidence was sufficient to support the attempted capital murder conviction.
The evidence shows that Hancock played an active role in the direct setting of the fire. It was his idea to stop and purchase gasoline; he was one of two masked men acting in concert who removed a cushion from a chair, placed it in front of the door, poured gasoline on it, set it on fire and said, "Stay in with your hands over your head. Don't come out for ten minutes or we will shoot." As noted, both the person who struck the match and the one who doused the cushion with gasoline for the other to ignite it were immediate perpetrators to arson. Both men were principals in the first degree. Both provided the direct means to ignite the fire. Placing the flammable material in place for another to ignite it makes that person a perpetrator. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence supports the judgment that Hancock was a principal in the first degree to the arson. See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. at 250, 275 S.E.2d at 806-07; Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. at 123, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 386 (1991).
Hancock also contends the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had a specific intent to kill anyone. In characterizing the intent required for a conviction of attempted murder, the Supreme Court said in Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 (1935), "To commit murder one need not intend to take life; but to be guilty of an attempt to murder, he must so intend. It is not sufficient that his act, had it been fatal, would have been murder." Id. at 661, 180 S.E. at 399. Specific intent may be shown by circumstances, including by a person's conduct or by his statements. Id. at 662, 180 S.E. at 399; Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954). The inferences to be drawn from proven facts, so long as they are reasonable, are within the province of the trier of fact. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295, 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968). The mere possibility that the accused might have had another purpose than that found by the fact finder is insufficient to reverse a conviction on appeal. Id. It is permissible for the fact finder to have concluded that a person intended the immediate, direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary acts. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Stokes v. Warden, Powhatan Correctional Ctr., 226 Va. 111, 306 S.E.2d 882 (1983).
Applying these settled principles, we cannot disturb the trial court's finding that Hancock had the specific intent to kill. Hancock and Bell poured gasoline on a cushion, placed it in front of the only door which provided a means of egress, and set it on fire. They also threatened the eighteen people that they would be shot if they attempted to leave. In Howard v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 222, 148 S.E.2d 800 (1966), the defendant appealed his conviction for attempted murder during the commission of the robbery. Id. at 223, 148 S.E.2d at 801. Just as Hancock did, the defendants in Howard threatened their victims. Just as Hancock claims that his threats were intended to frighten the victims and to prevent them from following him and his three companions, the defendants in Howard claimed the threats were intended only to frighten the victim "into keeping quiet." Id. at 227, 148 S.E.2d at 803. Howard thrust a pistol at one of his victims and it discharged. Although Howard maintained the shooting was accidental, the court stated: "Defendant's threats and conduct, when considered in the light of the attending circumstances, were sufficient to show that the criminal purpose had been formed in their minds." Id. at 228-29, 148 S.E.2d at 804.
We hold that the evidence, particularly Hancock's threats and conduct in setting the fire, were sufficient to establish that he had a specific intent to kill. Whether the required intent existed was a question for the trier of fact. Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977). In evaluating the trial court's decision in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and granting it any inferences, Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975), we cannot say the decision was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984). Therefore, we cannot disturb the conviction.
Finally, Hancock claims that because only one of the three victims testified at trial, the Commonwealth failed to prove that a victim was robbed in the other two attempted capital murder charges and, therefore, failed to prove an essential element of those two charges. We find no merit in the claim. Sufficient evidence was adduced to establish that the other two victims were robbed. Thomas Mays, the one robbery victim who testified, stated that money was taken from the other two victims at gunpoint by Hancock or his accomplices.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in Hancock's convictions, and accordingly affirm.
Affirmed.
Duff, J., concurred.
Now Code § 18.2-31(4).
For purposes of this appeal, we will accept without deciding, the proposition conceded by the Commonwealth. However, even though an attempt to commit capital murder is a lesser grade offense of capital murder, see Willoughby v. Smyth, 194 Va. 267, 271, 72 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1952), the capital punishment considerations which led the General Assembly to enact the proviso in Code § 18.2-18 which allows only a principal in the first degree to be held accountable and subject to the punishment for capital murder, do not necessarily dictate that where an accused is charged or only being prosecuted as a principal in the second degree, that he cannot be convicted of attempted capital murder. Who are principals in the first and second degree to an attempt to commit capital murder are problematic and have not been addressed on brief. Thus, since a resolution of this question is not necessary to our decision, we leave for another day whether the proviso in Code § 18.2-18 and the holding in Johnson require that a distinction be made as to how principals are to be punished for the non-capital offense of attempted capital murder.