Case Name: Geri E. FINLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Dennis SCOTT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-02-07
Citations: 687 So. 2d 338
Docket Number: No. 95-308
Parties: Geri E. FINLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Dennis SCOTT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: PETERSON, C.J., and COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 687
Pages: 338–351

Head Matter:
Geri E. FINLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Dennis SCOTT, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 95-308.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 7, 1997.
Jane E. Carey and Harry H. Morall, II, of Morall & Carey, Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Michael R. Walsh, Orlando, for Appel-lee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
We elect to hear this case en banc.
The issue before us is not whether the father should pay support for his child. Indeed, Mr. Scott has acted responsibly by acknowledging this obligation and paying support since the child was bom. And the issue is not the amount of support that should be paid in order for the child to enjoy the appropriate standard of living. The trial court has determined that $2,000 is the amount of the "monthly living expenses of the minor child" and the father does not challenge that figure. The issue in this case is whether, because of dictum in Miller v. Schou, 616 So.2d 436 (Fla.1993), Florida has become a support-plus state. In other words, are parents in Florida not only required to meet the day-to-day expenses necessary to maintain their children in the standard of living determined to be appropriate by the custodial parent but also to contribute a portion of their income into a trust account or guardianship account in order to meet the future but unspecified needs or wants of their children?
This case requires that we determine, under existing law, what the parental obligation is for child support when there is more money available than is required to meet the current needs of the child based on the actual standard of living found to be appropriate by the custodial parent. Before guidelines and before Schou, our task would have been easy. The support would be set to meet the current needs of the child, taking into account the ability of the parent to meet those needs. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 371 So.2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Since ability to provide the appropriate support is not in question in our case, under the old rule the total expenses required to meet the child's needs consistent with an appropriate standard would determine the support required from the paying parent. The mother now urges that a different rule applies.
In Schou, the supreme court declared that the child is entitled to "share in the good fortune" of the parent. Admittedly this statement is subject to interpretation. The mother contends that under this principle, and under section 61.30, Florida Statutes, as amended in 1993, she (on behalf of the child) is entitled to 5% of the father's income over $10,000 per month regardless of her actual expenses in raising the child. She contends that the "child support" statute and Schou mandate a forced transfer of 5% of the father's income to or on behalf of the child regardless of the child's needs. But we must decide if parents literally have this obligation to share their estate with their children in this fashion. If the obligation exists, does it automatically end when the children turn eighteen? If so, why? And do only the children of unwed or divorced parents have this "right" to share in their parent's estate or should we expect a flood of "next friend" eases against affluent but less indulgent married parents?
One court seems to agree with the mother's contention, at least in part. In Boyt v. Romanow, 664 So.2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA1995), the court recognized a "good fortune" award of child support. This was defined as the difference between the child support guidelines amount and the actual amount determined by the court to meet the child's needs. The court determined that this "good fortune" award should be placed in a trust account to be administered by a guardian ad litem for the child's future but unspecified use. Boyt cites Schou as authority for awarding excess child support (a good fortune award) in this manner. We do not read that intent into Schou. The issue in Schou was whether the father, who admitted that he had ample ability to meet an increased award of child support, should nevertheless be required to disclose his financial position. The court ruled in the affirmative holding that unless the court knew the specifics of the father's income, it could not determine the appropriate standard of living to apply to the modification of the child support obligation. The Schou court stated:
While technically the child's basic survival needs would be the same [regardless of the parents' income], the determination of "need" in awarding child support takes into account more than just the basic necessities of survival. [Citation omitted]. The child of a multimillionaire would be entitled to share in that standard of living — for example to attend private school or to participate in expensive extracurricular activities — and would accordingly be entitled to a greater award of child support to provide for these items, even though provisions for such items would not be ordered in a different case.
Schou, 616 So.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
Schou simply did not contemplate a child support "slush fund." In Schou, the supreme court merely required that the child support increase sought by the custodial parent be determined consistent with the standard of living appropriate to the parents' income. Although the Schou court observed "that the need of the child is only one of several factors to be considered in determining an appropriate amount of support", it did not suggest that support should be need-free. Id. at 438. For example, if a child "needed" a car, the type of car provided might depend on the parent's income. Schou does not suggest that a car must be provided to a twenty-two month old child even if the father has ample income. A "share in the good fortune" does not equate with a "share in the estate." There is no indication that the supreme court contemplated that a certain percentage of the parents' income would be set aside for support even if such amount was not reasonably needed to meet the child's expenses as determined by the custodial parent.
There is apparent disagreement as to who should choose the family's standard of living — the judge (or panel of judges) or the parents. We conclude, unless the child is being deprived of necessities, that the proper decision maker in this regard is the custodial parent (or both parents if they can work together) and not the court. If the custodial parent refuses to meet the child's basic needs, then a change of custody should be considered. We believe that setting the appropriate standard of living for one's family should be left to that family because although the amount of finances available may influence, even limit, the standard of living chosen, many parents use factors other than finances to determine the standard appropriate for their family. Factors such as family priorities, family values, experience, and tradition may be more important to some families than merely the amount of money available. Consideration of the child's ability, interests and personality may also influence that decision more than financial considerations.
Few (but almost certainly some) would suggest that an affluent married couple living together who decide to send their child to a public school instead of an expensive private school and who buy their child a used vehicle instead of a new convertible when he or she turns sixteen should be required to put the money saved by these decisions into a trust account for their child. Why then should a divorced parent or a parent of a child bom out of wedlock be required to advance funds for a private education or a new convertible when such expenses are not being sought and may never be sought by the custodial parent? That is the result of the court's action when, on its own, the court determines that the standard of living chosen by the parents or custodial parent is inadequate merely because the paying parent has the ability to pay more.
A "good parent" has been described as one who provides for all of the needs but only some of the wants of his children. This definition recognizes that once a parent meets the needs of the child (consistent with the parent's chosen life-style), the good parent uses further rewards to encourage industry, good deportment and proper attitude. This extremely important parental option is lost if the court decrees that a child is entitled to his share of the family wealth and will get it in spite of the parent's desire. In this vein, we interpret Schou as merely recognizing that the actual, current needs of the child should be determined on the basis of an appropriate standard of living. In other words, money for a private school could be provided if the parent intends to send the child to private school; tutors should be provided if the child needs a tutor and if the custodial parent is willing to employ one; a contribution to the cost of living in a better area if the custodial parent is willing to relocate might be factored into the support. But in any event, the support should be set in an amount that meets the actual, current living expenses of the child. There appears to be no rational justification, other than estate sharing, for requiring a parent to pay for a private education if the child is sent to a public school or for a tutor if one is not needed or desired or for a contribution for relocation if the custodial parent will not move merely so that the child or custodial parent can bank the difference.
The foregoing analysis brings us to the facts of this case. Under the guidelines as amended in 1993, the father would be required to pay $120,000 a year ($10,000 per month) for the support of one child. The judge, after considering the amount claimed in the mother's initial affidavit in the amount of $2,128 per month, which sum also included expenses for the mother and other children, and after rejecting a new figure in the amount of $5,173 (which still included the expenses of the mother and other children) submitted by the mother just prior to the final hearing because the court found such expenses to be either "exaggerated, misleading, false, non-existent, or inaccurate," found that the amount of child support required to meet the day-to-day living expenses consistent with the standard of living chosen by the mother was $2,000 per month and ordered this amount paid directly to her. This award is supported by the record. But instead of stopping here, the judge, probably influenced by Boyt and by the dictum in Schou, awarded an additional "good fortune" sum in the amount of $3,000 to be paid directly to an independent guardian and not earmarked for the day-to-day use of the child. Even if it is appropriate for judges to impose a standard of living on parents, may they do it from whole cloth? The mother in this case strained mightily, and with the assistance of able counsel, and could only justify a figure of $2,000 per month, $2Jh000 per year, to support a single child. If one considers that this child is a twenty-two month old toddler, is that so difficult to understand? If the court is nevertheless going to impose this grandiose standard of living, should it not at least direct the mother as to how she will spend the money?
The trial court did recognize the unreasonableness of a mechanical application of the guideline tables and reduced the total support obligation to $60,000 per year ($5,000 per month) — still two and one-half times the amount determined to meet the yearly current needs of the child — and ordered that the "good fortune" portion be set aside for future, unspecified uses. The court does not explain how this increased award relates to the child's needs or the child's standard of living and does not indicate how the additional amount is justified by the evidence in this case.
The trial court did make the statement in its Final Judgment that the $5,000 sum is "consistent with the actual and bona fide needs of the minor child" but did not pretend that there was record justification for such finding. The trial court, in its Final Judgment, admits that there is no supporting evidence for this figure when it holds:
8. That as to the issue of child support, this Court has determined that the amount of child support to be awarded shall be less than and, therefore, varies with, the child support guidelines imposed by F.S. 61.30(6) and, more particularly, the percentage multiplied by the combined parental income of the parents which exceeds $10,000 per month. The Court will not impose the guideline amount suggested by the Petitioner in the amount of $10,011 per month but will rather award $5,000 per month as child support because this amount is a more reasonable adjustment and, therefore, achieves a more equitable result, F.S. 61.30(ll)(k). (Emphasis added).
While we agree that $5,000 is a "more reasonable" monthly figure and thus more "equitable" than the $10,000 figure, unless it is tied to some evidence in the record, it remains merely a reduced "good fortune" award. It still has no relationship to the child's actual needs. It is merely a judicial compromise that can only be justified if we hold that need is no longer relevant to the concept of child support and then is only justified because it falls within the limits of the legislative child support guidelines. But if a child's needs are no longer relevant to the award of child support and we are to be guided only by the parents' income, by what authority did the trial judge in this case reduce the statutory $10,000 award? We agree with Ms. Finley that if need is irrelevant, the court erred in reducing her award.
On this appeal, the father questions what authority justifies requiring him to pay as "child support" any sum greater than that needed to meet the current expenses of his child. The mother, on the other hand, questions on what authority the court reduced the guideline award and, in addition, put part of that amount into a guardianship account. These issues require that we face the ultimate question of whether the legislature, by enacting section 61.30, Florida Statutes, intended to remove need from judicial consideration in setting child support. We think it did not. We believe that the guidelines incorporate a "presumed need" which, if not challenged, justifies the figure established by the tables as determined by the parents' income. Section 61.30(6) provides: "The following schedules shall be applied to the combined net income to determine the minimum child support need." (.Emphasis added). Therefore, depending on the parents' income, a presumptive need is determined from the schedules. The question then becomes whether the need thus determined is rebutta-ble. We believe it is. For example, the court may determine a greater need if there are extraordinary expenses [section 61.30(ll)(a) ] and may determine a lesser need if the child has independent income [section 61.30(ll)(b) ]. Further, there is a catch-all provision [section 61.30(ll)(k) ] which permits "any other adjustment" in order to achieve an equitable result. These provisions show that the need determined by the child support schedules is not written in stone.
If we are correct, however, and the guidelines do establish merely a rebuttable presumption of the child's need, since the father has challenged the award as being excessive we would expect him to have the burden of proof even though all of the records appear to be in the possession of the mother. The father attempted to meet that burden. The trial court specifically found that the mother refused to account for past child support payments; refused to produce records of expenses of the child even though ordered by the court to do so; failed to bring to court documents specifically requested by a Notice to Produce; and was "inaccurate, evasive, incomplete, and misleading" in her attempted compliance with a court order to produce summaries of her checkbook and cash expenditures. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the father met his burden and that the financial affidavits in the record are sufficient to prove the $3,000 per month award required to be paid to the guardian is excessive support and unwarranted.
A case involving a large but somewhat less dramatic amount of income was considered by the court in Dyas v. Dyas, 683 So.2d 971, (Ala.Civ.App.1995), affirmed, 683 So.2d 974, (Ala.1996):
When the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the uppermost limits of the child support schedule, the amount of child support awarded must rationally relate to the reasonable and necessary needs of the child, taking into account the lifestyle to which the child was accustomed and the standard of living the child enjoyed before the divorce . and must reasonably relate to the obligor's ability to pay for those needs.... To avoid a finding of an abuse of discretion on appeal, a trial court's judgment of child support must satisfy both prongs.
In this case, the amount awarded totally fails on the first prong; it is abundantly clear from the record that the child support awarded was based solely on the husband's perceived ability to pay and does not rationally relate to the reasonable and necessary needs of the two minor children.
The father in this case, at least inferentially, asks why it is that the children of a divorced parent or an unwed parent are entitled to a trust or guardianship fund when the children of married parents have no similar rights. Are married parents, at law, presumed to be so much more responsible than their unmarried or divorced counterparts that they will automatically provide adequately for their children? Assuming no modification in this case, the child will have a trust account of about a half million dollars (not including accumulating interest) when she reaches eighteen. Why should not the children of married couples with high incomes have this same right to a trust account? We have said that no parent, married or divorced, has an obligation at law to send his or her child to college. See Keenan v. Keenan, 440 So.2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Are we changing this rule as it applies to divorced or unwed parents by requiring them to contribute monthly to a trust account during the minority of their children? In Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court held that to require a divorced parent to send his or her child to college without requiring married parents also to do so would be a denial of equal protection under the law. Further, under Grapin, this equal protection concern could not be circumvented by indirection by increasing the amount of alimony in order to permit the other parent to send the child to college. Can it be circumvented by requiring that only unwed or divorced parents must set up "good fortune" trust accounts for their children's future (college) needs?
A parent's high income should only be considered by the court in determining the standard of living that the child should enjoy, and only in that manner should it influence the level of support. Other than Boyt, there appears to be no authority for requiring that a parent's estate be "shared with the child" in the form of contributions into a trust account. The state is empowered, even obligated, to require parents to appropriately provide for their children; however, any state-mandated payment in excess of the amount required to meet this parental obligation exceeds any child support justification. Current law does not appear to authorize a "good fortune" award separate and distinct from adequate child support which maintains the child in the appropriate standard of living.
Some suggest that a possible justification for this "excess" award is that because of the mother's circumstances, even with child support, she would be unable to provide the child with the lifestyle that the father could if he had custody. This reasoning would justify the award of excess child support in order to give the child a deferred standard of living which the child can enjoy when she is on her own. This points out the problem inherent in custody cases, particularly those involving out of wedlock children, that since the father has no obligation to support the mother the child's standard of living must necessarily be influenced by the circumstances of the custodial parent. The problem is great; the solution is obscure. While this solution may be appealing, it is not "child support." As the court observed in Richardson v. Richardson, 8 HawApp. 446, 808 P.2d 1279, 1286 (1991):
In Doe VI v. Roe VI, 6 Haw.App. 629, 736 P.2d 448 (1987), which is a pre-child support guidelines case, we stated that "an award of child support is for the child's current needs based on the child's appropriate standard of living and not for the purpose of saving portions thereof for future needs." [Citation omitted]. In other words, a payment in excess of the children's reasonable needs at the appropriate standard of living is, by definition, a payment for something other than child support.
While we agree that under the appropriate circumstances, such as when the mother squanders the support intended for the benefit of the child, the court may require an. accounting or place the money under the control of another, we hold that the award should be limited to the amount needed to currently support the child in the appropriate standard of living and not to provide a fund for future, unspecified uses. As the child's needs increase, and they might very well increase, the legislature has provided a remedy often used. It is called a "modification" and the procedure is set out in section 61.14, Florida Statutes. As a matter of fact, the Schou opinion resulted from a modification action. A "fund" should not be substituted for this procedure.
We acknowledge conflict with Boyt.
REVERSED AND REMANDED for further action consistent with this opinion.
PETERSON, C.J., and COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
DAUKSCH and ANTOON, JJ., concur and concur specially, with opinion.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion in which GOSHORN, J., concurs.
GOSHORN, J., dissents, with opinion in which W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents, with opinion in which GOSHORN, J., concurs.