Case Name: PEOPLE v. CRAWL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-08-29
Citations: 401 Mich. 1
Docket Number: Docket No. 56294
Parties: PEOPLE v CRAWL
Judges: Ryan, J., concurred with Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 401
Pages: 1–36

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v CRAWL
Docket No. 56294.
Argued January 5, 1977
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided August 29, 1977.
Claude E. Crawl was convicted by a jury in Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Elvin L. Davenport, J., of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The defendant’s alleged accomplice, Harold Wilson, was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of second-degree murder, and testified for the prosecution at Crawl’s trial. Defendant argues, among other issues, that a pistol and cartridges introduced into evidence were obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure of a barber tool bag found in the apartment where he was arrested; and that refusal to give an instruction to the jury on second-degree murder was erroneous. The Court of Appeals, J. H. Gillis, P. J., and McGregor and Adams, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 13529). Defendant appeals. Held: The conviction of first-degree murder is reversed and the case remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder, or, upon motion of the prosecutor, a new trial for first-degree murder.
Justice Coleman, joined by Justice Ryan, would remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder and for resentencing because the court refused the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. However, she did not agree that the police search was unjustified or illegal. The lack of control by the police and the danger of the situation justified proceeding to search the bedroom without first obtaining a search warrant. To have delayed would have needlessly endangered the lives of police officers. The limits on the scope of searches without warrants established by the United States Supreme Court cases, on which Justice Levin’s opinion relies, do not come into play until arrests have been made and the police are in control of the situation. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Three persons besides the defendant, one of whom could have been the third participant in the robbery and murder reported to the police, were milling or running around the apartment where the defendant was arrested, and one of the handguns used in the crime had not been found. The search conducted in the instant case was quite limited in scope and occurred contemporaneously with a situation dangerous to the officers’ lives, and was reasonable under exigent circumstances.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 11] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 496, 525.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 588, 589.
[2, 3, 5-9,13] 68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 37, 92.
Constitutionality of searching premises without search warrant as incident to valid arrest. 23 L Ed 2d 966.
[4] 68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures § 89.
[6] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 559.
[10] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 45.
[12] 68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 35, 36.
[14] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545.
[15] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 566.
[16] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 539.
[17] 81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 498, 522, 560.
Justice Williams, with Justice Blair Moody, Jr., concurring, also would remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder and for resentencing. Although he agreed with Justice Levin’s analysis of the present law of search and seizure, he dissented from a finding on these facts that the search of the bedroom and the seizure of the gun was violative of the law. The police testified that they searched under the circumstances that people were "milling all over the place”, that the rooms were in close proximity, and that it was a night search for murderers in a building where "they had had trouble, * * * shootings, that sort of thing.” On this record a “protective” search was justified and reasonably necessary for self-protection and the safety of the other police officers.
Justice Levin, with the Chief Justice and Justice Fitzgerald concurring, wrote that:
1. Although a search without a warrant may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest, an arrest made outside an arrestee’s residence does not justify a subsequent search of the residence. However, even assuming it was lawful to conduct a "protective” search of an apartment following the defendant’s arrest outside, the search without a warrant of a barber tool bag discovered in that search and the seizure of its contents were not within any of the narrowly circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The arresting officer had determined that no one was in the room where the bag was found who might destroy evidence or use a weapon that might be contained in the bag. The revolver and cartridges seized from the bag were not in plain view as the officer searched for a suspect in the room. There were no circumstances, exigent or otherwise, justifying the search of the bag and the seizure of its contents without a warrant.
2. Refusal of defense counsel’s request for instructions to the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree (felony) murder was erroneous. If this were the only error, the conviction could be affirmed as one of second-degree murder and the case remanded for resentencing unless the prosecutor opts for a new trial for first-degree murder. Since allowing introduction of evidence obtained during an impermissible search and seizure affects the validity of a conviction of second-degree murder, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
3. The defendant’s assigned counsel did not brief the search and seizure issue in the Court of Appeals. That failure was a serious mistake. The rule requiring presentation of appellate issues first to the Court of Appeals is of no greater dignity than the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. If an accused person’s right to protection against impermissible searches and seizures can be waived by the carelessness or ineptitude of counsel, then, by like principle, the rule requiring that appellate issues be presented first to the Court of Appeals can be waived by the prosecutor’s failure timely to call the Court’s attention to noncompliance with this rule.
4. The prosecutor was entitled to rebut the implication that testimony by the defendant’s alleged accomplice was motivated by self-interest with evidence showing the nature of the concessions made to the witness, who had admitted his participation in the matter by pleading guilty of second-degree murder and had been sentenced. The disclosure should, however, be full and complete to avoid misleading the jury, for example, by showing that he was still subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Decision of the Court
1. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Instructions to Jury.
A conviction of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery is reversed and the case remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder, or, upon motion of the prosecutor, a new trial for first-degree murder where the trial court refused a request to instruct the jury on second-degree murder (MCL 750.316, 750.317; MSA 28.548, 28.549).
Opinion by Coleman, J.
Ryan, J.
2. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches — Incident to Arrest.
A search by police, limited to the discovery and opening of a barber tool bag in an apartment bedroom, which occurred contemporaneously with an arrest of a suspect in a robbery and shooting, was not unreasonable or illegal because lack of control by the police and the danger of the situation justiñed proceeding without a search warrant where three other persons, one of whom could have been another participant reported in the crime, were milling or running around the small apartment, and one of the handguns used in the crime had not been found (US Const, Am IV).
3. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches — Incident to Arrest.
The limits on the scope of searches incident to arrest without a warrant established by the United States Supreme Court do not come into play until arrests have been made and the police are in control of the situation (US Const, Am IV).
4. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches.
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation to obtain a search warrant if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others (US Const, Am IV).
5. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches.
The sanctity of the home is an important value that must be protected; however, other values must be weighed in the balance according to the circumstances of each case challenging a search without a warrant, such as the value of protecting police officers’ lives and of bringing a dangerous felon to the bar of justice (US Const, Am IV).
6. Appeal and Error — Preserving Question — Instructions to Jury.
A defendant convicted of ffrst-degree (felony) murder should receive the benefft of a Supreme Court decision and his case should be remanded for entry of a conviction of second-degree murder and for resentencing on the ground that the trial court refused the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on second-degree murder where the defendant’s appeal was held in abeyance by the Court pending the decision of that issue in another case.
Opinion Concurring in Part by Williams, J.
Blair Moody, Jr., J.
7. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches.
"Protective” searches of a residence without a warrant may be justiñed when reasonably necessary to prevent the danger that a suspect at large in the residence may resist or escape; however, once all persons occupying the residence are under supervision and control and there is no reason to believe that anyone else is present, the rationale for a "protective” search no longer obtains and a further search may not be conducted (US Const, Am IV).
8. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches.
A "protective” search of a room in an apartment by a police officer was justiñed and reasonably necessary for self-protection and the safety of other police officers where police testified that the persons occupying the apartment were "milling all over the place”, that the rooms were in close proximity, and that it was a night search for murderers in a building where "they had had trouble, * * * shootings, that sort of thing” (US Const, Am IV).
Opinion by Levin, J.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Fitzgerald, J.
9. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Protective Searches — Plain View — Exigent Circumstances.
A revolver and cartridges seized from a barber tool bag in an apartment was obtained by an impermissible search and seizure without a warrant, assuming it was lawful to conduct a "protective” search of the apartment following the arrest of a defendant outside, where the arresting officer had determined that no one was in the room who might destroy evidence or use a weapon that might be contained in the bag, and the evidence seized was not in plain view as the officer searched for a suspect in the bedroom (US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, §11).
10. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Lesser Included Offenses.
There are lesser included offenses of felony murder; second-degree murder is always a lesser included offense of ñrst-degree murder (MCL 750.316, 750.317; MSA 28.548, 28.549).
11. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Lesser Included Offenses— Instructions to Jury.
In every trial for ñrst-degree murder, including felony murder, the court is required to instruct the jury sua sponte, even over objection, on the included offense of second-degree murder (MCL 750.316, 750.317; MSA 28.548, 28.549).
12. Searches and Seizures — Warrant Requirement.
The primacy of the search warrant requirement is well established; the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject to only a few speciñcally established and well delineated exceptions which are 'jealously and carefully drawn” (US Const, Am IV).
13. Searches and Seizures — Without a Warrant — Incident to Arrest.
An arrest made outside an arrestee’s residence does not justify a subsequent search of the residence, although a search without a warrant may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest (US Const, Am IV).
14. Appeal and Error — Preserving Question.
Ordinarily the Supreme Court will not consider an issue that has not been preserved at the trial level and presented to the Court of Appeals; requiring preservation of error at the trial level provides the trial judge an opportunity to rule correctly and to avoid unnecessary retrials, and also provides a record for appellate review.
15. Searches and Seizures — Appeal and Error — Preserving Question.
The rule requiring presentation of appellate issues ñrst to the Court of Appeals is of no greater dignity than the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures; if an accused person’s right to protection against impermissible searches and seizures can be waived by the carelessness or ineptitude of counsel, then, by like principle, the rule requiring that appellate issues be presented ñrst to the Court of Appeals can be waived by the prosecutor’s failure timely to call the Court’s attention to noncompliance with this rule.
16. Criminal Law — Evidence—Accomplices—Conviction.
An accomplice’s plea of guilty or his conviction following a trial is not admissible against another person.
17. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Accomplices—Impeachment—Plea of Guilty.
A prosecutor was entitled to rebut an implication raised on cross-examination that testimony by an accused’s alleged accomplice was motivated by self-interest with evidence showing the nature of the concessions made to the witness, who had admitted his participation in a felony murder by pleading guilty of second-degree murder and had been sentenced; the disclosure should, however, be full and complete to avoid misleading the jury, for example, by showing that he was still subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Research, Training & Appeals, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Chari Grove; Steven L. Schwartz, of counsel) for defendant.

Opinion:
Coleman, J.
(reversing in part, affirming in part). Because this case was administratively held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Carter, 395 Mich 434; 236 NW2d 500 (1975), I concur in the result reached by Justice Levin in part I of his opinion. The defendant's case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder and for resentencing.
I cannot agree with Justice Levin that Sergeant Ewald's cursory search of the bedroom during a potentially life-endangering situation while the occupants of the apartment were not yet under police control was unjustified or illegal. He acted reasonably to protect the lives of his fellow officers.
I
At approximately 9 p.m. on May 11, 1971, Detective Sergeants Edward Ewald and Lawrence Kelly of the Detroit police department received a radio message directing them to investigate a robbery and shooting at a Detroit bar. They arrived at the bar at approximately 9:15 p.m. There they were told that sometime between 8:30 p.m. and 8:50 p.m. two men armed with handguns had robbed the bar and killed the bartender. One of the handguns used in the crime had already been recovered. They were also told that one of the robbers had been wounded, captured and taken to Detroit General Hospital.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. Ewald and Kelly went to the hospital and spoke with the wounded robber. He told them that the other robber's name was Claude Crawl and that Crawl was the one who had shot the bartender. He gave them a rough description of Crawl and the address of an apartment in Highland Park where Crawl could be found. He also said a third man was involved in the robbery, but he did not name or describe the man or say where the man could be found.
Ewald and Kelly left the hospital and radioed the Highland Park police department for assist anee. Soon a Highland Park scout car with three uniformed officers joined them and the group drove towards the Highland Park address where Crawl was said to be. They arrived at the address shortly after midnight.
The address was a two-story apartment building. The wounded robber had said Crawl would be in apartment 204. The Highland Park officers warned Ewald and Kelly that there had been trouble, including shootings, at this apartment building in the past. One Highland Park officer drove the scout car into an alley behind the building and remained with the car. Ewald, Kelly and the remaining Highland Park officers approached the building's front entrance. They pinpointed the location of apartment 204. Ewald positioned himself in an alcove from which he could observe the apartment's windows and the front of the building. Kelly and the two officers continued upstairs to the apartment.
When Kelly and the two officers reached the apartment, Kelly knocked on the door. One of the occupants of the apartment opened the door and admitted the three policemen into a small hallway. Straight ahead the hallway led to the living room and kitchen. Three steps from the door on the left side of the hallway was the entrance to a small bedroom. The occupants were scurrying all through the apartment. The three policemen ran through the apartment looking for Crawl and trying to bring the occupants under control.
Meanwhile, Ewald observed from his position downstairs a man climb out one of the apartment's windows and jump to the ground. Ewald shouted for the man to halt and identified himself as a police officer. The man walked a few steps and then halted. Ewald determined that the man was Claude Crawl, placed him under arrest and ordered him back to the apartment.
Approximately two minutes after Kelly and the two officers were admitted to the apartment, Ewald and Crawl appeared at the door. The door was open and Ewald directed Crawl, who was now handcuffed, inside. Ewald turned Crawl over to the control of one of the officers. Another man and two women were in the living room. They were milling or running around. There was much confusion. Kelly and the other officer were trying to persuade the occupants to sit down and stay still. At this point, Ewald looked in the bedroom. No one was there. Ewald then looked under or on the bed and saw a small black barber's case. He opened the unlocked case and found a chrome plated handgun, live and spent shells, barber's tools and identification cards belonging to Crawl. Ewald did not look anywhere else in the bedroom. He seized the case and its contents, and took these items to police headquarters along with Crawl and the three occupants, who had been arrested on narcotics charges. Crawl was charged with first-degree murder after confessing to the crime.
Before trial, Crawl filed a motion to suppress the items seized at the apartment. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied. The items were admitted into evidence against Crawl at his trial. Several witnesses identified the gun as looking like one of the guns used in the robbery. A ballistics expert testified that tests run on the gun and bullets found at the scene of the robbery showed that the gun was used in the robbery. Crawl testified that he was a barber. The identification cards found with the gun were Crawl's.
II
Justice Levin contends that at the point Sergeant Ewald entered the bedroom there was no justification for seizing and opening the barber's case. He says that "there was no danger that anyone in the apartment could grab the bag and make use of any weapon contained in the bag". I respectfully disagree.
When Sergeant Ewald captured Crawl outside the apartment, he was not thereby prohibited from returning to the apartment to assist his fellow officers. When he entered the apartment, about two minutes after the raid began, the situation was not under police control. An unidentified man and two women were milling or running around the living room of this small apartment. There was a great deal of confusion. The man could have been the third robber. The other handgun used in the crime was not accounted for. The officers had every reason to believe they were in a life-endangering situation. There had been trouble, including shootings, at this apartment building in the past. It was dark and late at night. They were looking for a murderer and an accomplice who might well be prepared to kill again.
Under these circumstances, I cannot say that Sergeant Ewald's cursory search was unreasonable or illegal. The lack of police control and the dangerousness of the situation justified his proceeding without first obtaining a search warrant. To have delayed would have needlessly endangered the lives of his fellow officers.
Justice Levin relies heavily upon Chimel v California, 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), and United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1; 97 S Ct 2476; 53 L Ed 2d 538 (1977), to support his conclusion that the search in this case was illegal. The limits on the scope of warrantless searches established by these cases do not come into play until arrests have been made and the police are in control of the situation.
In Chimel, three policemen were admitted to the defendant's home by the defendant's wife and waited for the defendant to return from work. When he arrived, the police arrested him for burglary of a coin shop. Then, accompanied by the defendant's wife, the police conducted a detailed 45-minute search of every room in the house. In Chadwick, federal officers seized a double-locked footlocker they suspected to contain marijuana. The footlocker was transported to a Federal police building where it was locked in an evidence storage room. A few hours later, at their convenience, the officers opened and searched the footlocker.
Neither Chimel nor Chadwick involved uncontrolled and potentially life-endangering situations like the situation in the case at bar. Also, the searches in those cases were much more intrusive than the quick, protective search undertaken here. Thus, I do not find either of these cases to be controlling or convincing precedents.
The case at bar is much more like Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 US 294; 87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967). There the police were told that an armed robber had just entered a certain address. The police went to the address, a two-story house, and knocked on the door. A woman answered the door and admitted the police. The police knew the robber was armed, but they did not know where in the house he was. They immediately fanned out through the house looking for the robber and for weapons. In the course of the next few minutes, one policeman found the robber in an upstairs bedroom and arrested him. Ammunition for a handgun and a cap worn by the robber during the robbery were found underneath the mattress of the robber's bed and ammunition for a shotgun was found in a bureau drawer. A sawed-off shotgun and a handgun were found on the main floor inside a toilet flush tank and clothing worn by the robber during the robbery was found in the basement inside a washing machine. The United States Supreme Court upheld the search for and seizure of all these items, saying:
"They [the police] acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that [the robber] was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape." Warden v Hayden, supra, 298-299. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, although the police knew where Crawl was and had already arrested him, three other persons, one of whom could have been the third participant in the robbery and murder, were milling or running around the small apartment. The situation was not under control. The police had every reason to believe that their lives were in danger. Sergeant Ewald's cursory search, limited to the discovery and opening of the barber's case (a logical place to hide a small handgun), was a minor intrusion into the defendant's privacy necessary to insure that the police had control of the other handgun used in the robbery so that it could not be used against them by one of the three persons not yet under police control or arrest.
Justice Levin suggests that the police had other alternative courses of action that could have insured their safety just as well. Upon leisurely reflection, that may or may not seem true. However, we must remember that a police officer acting in a crisis situation does not enjoy the luxury of calm contemplation and collegial discussions before he or she must make on-the-scene decisions that may mean the difference between life and death.
Obviously, a line must be drawn somewhere. The sanctity of the home is an important value that must be protected. In drawing a line, however, other values must be weighed in the balance. The value of protecting police officers' lives and of bringing a dangerous felon to the bar of justice are two that come to mind. These values must be carefully weighed according to the circumstances of each case.
Here, the search was quite limited in scope and it occurred contemporaneously with an ongoing situation potentially dangerous to the officers' lives. The officers did not know what they would be facing when they entered the apartment. Sergeant Ewald only looked in one very logical place, the barber's case laying on the bed, to find the missing handgun. The handgun and shells used in the crime were, in fact, in the case. He well could have judged that the security of all depended on finding and seizing the gun. In his place, I believe that my reaction would have been the same.
Sergeant Ewald acted reasonably under exigent circumstances. I would not draw the line as finely or as narrowly as Justice Levin has done today. Neither legal precedent nor moral values nor the need for a lesson to the police in self-restraint require a complete reversal of the defendant's conviction on the basis of this search and seizure.
None of the other issues raised by the defendant warrant a complete reversal and the granting of a new trial. However, because his case was held in abeyance for the decision in People v Carter, supra, on the procedural issue of whether instructions on second degree murder must be given in felony murder cases, and because he requested such instructions at trial, he should receive the benefit of the Carter decision. Therefore, I would remand to the trial court for resentencing on a conviction of second-degree murder, or, upon the motion of the prosecutor for a new trial on the original charge of first-degree murder.
Ryan, J., concurred with Coleman, J.
Justice Levin's opinion is dicta to the extent that it attempts to decide whether the holding in People v Carter is to be retroactively applied to cases preceding Carter that were not held in abeyance for the decision in that case. It should also be noted that none of the cases cited by Justice Levin in footnote 2 of his opinion discussed whether Carter should be retroactively applied to nonabeyance cases. All of the cited cases were decided by peremptory orders and there fore should not be interpreted as controlling precedents on the issue of Carter's retroactivity. The question of the extent of Carter's retro-activity is still open.
Ewald originally said he saw the case "under" the bed, but thereafter consistently testified that he saw it lying on top of the bed when he looked in the bedroom.