Case Name: MANSFIELD v. ENTERPRISE BRASS WORKS CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-06-03
Citations: 97 Mich. App. 736
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-5496
Parties: MANSFIELD v ENTERPRISE BRASS WORKS CORPORATION
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Beasley and G. E. Bowles, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 97
Pages: 736–753

Head Matter:
MANSFIELD v ENTERPRISE BRASS WORKS CORPORATION
Docket No. 78-5496.
Submitted November 8, 1979, at Grand Rapids.
Decided June 3, 1980.
Meredith Mansfield sought worker’s compensation benefits alleging that he was disabled as of his last day of work at Enterprise Brass Works Corporation by reason of a work-related aggravation of his arthritic back condition. None of the medical experts could say with any degree of medical certainty that the arthritic back condition arose out of or was aggravated by plaintiffs work; however, there was medical testimony to the effect that plaintiffs work aggravated the symptomatology of the condition, i.e., work-related factors increased the pain associated with the arthritic back condition. Plaintiff testified that the pain associated with his back condition increased as a result of a work-related incident and that this increased pain eventually caused him to quit his employment because the pain made it difficult to do his work. The administrative law judge denied benefits. On appeal, the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s denial of benefits, finding that the record failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the arthritic back condition arose out of or was aggravated by plaintiffs work. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
1. Review by the Court of Appeals of a determination by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is limited, in the absence of a showing of fraud, to ascertaining whether the board applied the correct legal standard.
2. Plaintiff, in making his claim for worker’s disability compensation benefits, had the duty to show by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable likelihood of cause and effect between his work and his arthritic back condition. Since the medical testimony was that there was only a conceivable or possible causal link between plaintiff’s work and his back condition, plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 5, 8] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 631.
[2, 3, 6, 8, 10] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 534.
[3, 6] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 240.
[4, 6, 7, 10] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 638.
[5] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 634.
[6] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 639.
[9, 10] 81 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 223.
Pleading aggravation of a pre-existing physicial condition in workmen’s compensation cases. 32 ALR2d 1459.
3. The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board’s review of the decision of the hearing officer is de novo in nature. The board must consider all the testimony, both expert and lay, and all the circumstances surrounding the disability or injury. The board is further obligated to provide the reviewing court with sufficient factual and legal support for its decision.
4. Since findings of fact by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board must be affirmed by the Court of Appeals if there is any evidence in the record to support the board’s findings, and since there was expert testimony that there was no causal relationship between plaintiffs back condition and his work, the board’s factual determination that that there was no work-related injury must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
G. E. Bowles, J., dissented. He would hold that the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board’s determination that there was no work-related injury is not binding on the Court of Appeals, since the board’s failure to consider the possibility that disability arose out of a work-related aggravation of the symptomatic conditions of the plaintiffs back constituted an error of law. He would reverse and remand to the board for consideration of whether plaintiffs work aggravated the symptomatology of the back condition and such aggravation caused a work-related disability, i.e., whether plaintiffs work caused him to have so much pain in his back that he was unable to continue with that work because of back pain arising out of a work-related incident.
Opinion of the Court
1. Workers’ Compensation — Appeal — Findings of Facts — Review.
Review by the Court of Appeals of determinations of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is limited, in the absence of fraud, to ascertaining whether the board applied the correct legal standard.
2. Workers’ Compensation — Burden of Proof.
A claimant in a worker’s compensation proceeding must prove he is entitled to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Workers’ Compensation — Burden of Proof — Work-Related Injury — Sufficiency of Evidence.
A claimant seeking worker’s compensation benefits for an arthritic back condition must show by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable likelihood of cause and effect between his work and the injury; where the most that medical experts could say was that there was a conceivable or possible link between the injury and the work, the causal link between the work and the injury is not sustained by evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence test.
4. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — De Novo Review — Findings of Fact and Law — Record on Appeal.
The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is obliged to review de novo the decision of the hearing examiner, considering all the testimony, both expert and lay, and all the circumstances surrounding the disability or injury, and to provide the reviewing court with sufficient factual and legal support for its decision.
5. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — Findings of Fact — Appeal.
A finding of fact by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board of no work-related disability must be affirmed by the Court of Appeals if there is any evidence in the record to support the appeal board’s findings; expert medical testimony that there was no causal relationship between a claimant’s arthritic back condition and his work and that the back condition was part of the normal degenerative process which accompanies aging is more than sufficient evidence to support the appeal board’s determination that there was no work-related injury.
Dissent by G. E. Bowles, J.
6. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — Standard of Review — Burden of Proof — Sufficiency of Evidence.
The standard of review to be used by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is whether a work-related disability was established by a preponderance of the evidence; the claimant need only show a reasonable likelihood of cause and effect between the work and the injury and need not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt other possible or probable causes of the injury.
7. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — Method op Review — Findings of Fact.
The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board must consider both the medical testimony and the factual background established by the claimant with respect to his claim of a work-related injury and must then make detailed ñndings of fact.
8. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — Findings op Fact — Burden op Proof.
The ñndings of fact of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board are binding absent proof of fraud where the appropriate legal standard has been applied and there is competent evidence in the record to support the ñndings; the board’s ñndings of fact are not binding where the board’s opinion indicates that it perceived that the claimant was required to prove the medical certainty of causation rather than to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
9. Workers’ Compensation — Words and Phrases — Disability — Aggravation op Symptomatology.
Disability under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is deñned as the inability to perform the work the claimant was doing when injured; that definition is not limited to aggravation of pathological conditions but includes aggravation of symptomatic conditions, including the aggravation of pain which results in a work-related disability (MCL 418.401[aj; MSA 17.237[401][a]).
10. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board — Findings op Fact — Disability — Causation.
The determination of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board must be set aside and the matter remanded to the board for further detailed ñndings of fact where the board based its determination that no disability existed solely upon consideration of the pathology of causation of the claimant’s arthritic back condition and failed to consider whether the claimant had a work-related disability arising out of aggravation of the symptomatology of that condition, i.e., whether the claimant had a disability caused by work-related aggravation of the pain associated with his arthritic back condition.
Marcus, Ruck & Flynn, P.C. (by David M. Wells), for plaintiff.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge (by Ellen J. Eggers), for Enterprise Brass Works Corporation and American Mutual Liability Company.
Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey (by Bert J. Fortuna), for Enterprise Brass Works Corporation and Mutual Insurance Company of Grand Rapids.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Beasley and G. E. Bowles, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, P.J.
In this case plaintiff appeals from a unanimous opinion of the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board affirming the administrative law judge's denial of compensation benefits. The essential facts in this case are not in dispute and are ably put forth in the dissent.
Initially plaintiff contends that the board applied an incorrect standard in determining whether plaintiff's condition of disability was caused or aggravated by his employment.
In the absence of fraud, this Court's review is limited to whether the board applied the correct legal standard, Medacco v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 48 Mich App 217; 210 NW2d 360 (1973), Barrett v Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co, 69 Mich App 636, 640; 245 NW2d 147 (1976). A claimant in a worker's compensation proceeding must prove that he is entitled to benefits by a "preponderance of the evidence". Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206; 267 NW2d 923 (1978).
In the instant case, the board specifically recognized and applied this standard. In its opinion, the board stated:
"Plaintiff's proofs failed to show to these reviewers work-related disability and we find that Referee Mikko properly dismissed the case by applying the preponderance of evidence test enumerated in Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206 (1978)."
Plaintiff acknowledges that the board properly recognized the correct standard but claims that in actuality the board applied the "beyond the shadow of a doubt" standard. We disagree.
The threshold fact question was whether plaintiffs arthritic back condition was the result of his employment or was caused by the natural aging process to which everyone is exposed. The evidence offered by plaintiff to prove that his back condition was work-related and not caused by other factors consisted of the deposition testimony of Dr. James Glessner and Dr. Burton Onofrio, as well as plaintiffs own testimony before the administrative law judge. Dr. August Aardema was called as a third expert witness on behalf of the defendant and was also deposed. When asked if he believed there to be any connection between plaintiffs disability and his employment, Dr. Glessner stated:
"I think probably the progression of the arthritis has been over a period of years based on just aging, hereditary manifestations and so on. It's conceivable that the kind of work he did may have hastened it, but I can't say that with any degree of certainty."
Dr. Aardema's testimony was essentially the same:
"Q [by Benjamin Marcus, attorney for the plaintiff] Would constant intermittent stress over the past few years before he left the employment be considered an aggravating factor?
"A What type of stress are you referring to?
"Q Such as we discussed before — the lifting, traveling. He was on the road constantly, he had to get in and out of the automobile, he had long rides — that sort of activity, doctor?
"A It's possible, yes.
"Q Possible or probable. 'Possibly' meaning—
"A I can't say that it's probable or not. Many people have back problems and have x-rays that look quite bad, and I don't think are necessarily aggravated by this type of thing."
To prevail plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable likelihood of cause and effect between the work and the injury. Although the board inartfully characterized the doctors as being unable to "positively" or "categorically" link plaintiffs disability to his employment, our review of the testimony indicates that the doctors were unable to find with any degree of certainty a link between work and the injury. The most the doctors were able to say was that such a link was "conceivable" or "possible". This is not enough evidence of a causal link to sustain the preponderance of the evidence test.
The board's reliance on Powell v City of Saginaw, 46 Mich App 751, 753; 208 NW2d 557 (1973), further persuades us that it applied the correct legal standard. Faced with essentially the same question as is present in the instant case, the Powell Court affirmed the board's denial of compensation benefits and held:
"Plaintiff offered medical testimony that the arthritic condition could have been aggravated by the working conditions. Such testimony, asserting possible causal connection between the work situation and the claimed disability was not conclusive on the appeal board. The board was within the scope of its exclusive function as determiner of fact in ruling plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing that his arthritic disability was work-related." (Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs reliance on Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105; 274 NW2d 411 (1979), as support for his argument that the board did not apply the proper standard in reaching its decision is misplaced. The board in this case rendered its decision on November 29, 1978, several months before the Supreme Court decided Kostamo in January of 1979. Notwithstanding this fact, Kostamo requires the appeal board to review de novo the hearing examiner's decision. The board is obliged to consider the opinions of all medical experts as well as lay testimony and to examine the circumstances surrounding the disability and/ or injury in determining whether or not there is any causal link to the employment. In addition, the board must also provide the reviewing court with sufficient factual and legal support for its decision.
In the instant case, the board considered additional evidence beyond the medical decisions in reaching its decisions.
Since there are no allegations of fraud, and since it does not appear that the board applied an incorrect legal standard, we decline to reverse the board on this issue.
We also cannot agree with plaintiffs second assertion that the board's finding of no work-related disability was not supported by the evidence. It is well established that this Court must affirm a decision of the board if there is any evidence of record to support its findings, since this Court is not a trier of fact in worker's compensation cases but rather reviews the findings to determine whether there is evidence to support the giving or denial of an award. Moore v Gundelfinger, 56 Mich App 73; 223 NW2d 643 (1974). Epps v Mercy Hospital, 69 Mich App 1; 244 NW2d 340 (1976). Dixon v Coldwater State Home, 59 Mich App 701; 229 NW2d 893 (1975). Goodman v Bay Castings Division of Gulf & Western Industries, 49 Mich App 611; 212 NW2d 799 (1973).
An examination of the record supports defendants' contention that there was evidence from which the board could have found that plaintiff's injury was not work related. The board based its findings on the deposition testimony of Drs. Aardema and Glessner who stated that they could not find a causal relationship between plaintiff's arthritic back and his work. The board also considered the deposition of Dr. Onofrio which was taken a year after the hearing before the administrative law judge and after the doctor had operated on plaintiff's back. Dr. Onofrio testified as to the normal degenerative process which accompanies aging. This is more than sufficient evidence to support the "any evidence" standard described in Pastaleniec v The Great A & P Tea Co, Inc, 49 Mich App 702; 212 NW2d 734 (1973).
Affirmed.
Beasley, J. concurred.