Case Name: Jacob John DOUGAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-04-09
Citations: 398 So. 2d 439
Docket Number: No. 47260
Parties: Jacob John DOUGAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS, Acting C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 398
Pages: 439–441

Head Matter:
Jacob John DOUGAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47260.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 9, 1981.
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1981.
Joseph M. Nursey, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. All-britton and David P. Gauldin,-Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Jacob Dougan was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in a trial proceeding which we affirmed on direct appeal. Barclay v. State, 343 So.2d 1266 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892, 99 S.Ct. 249, 58 L.Ed.2d 237 (1978). At approximately the same time that our decision was rendered in that case, the United States Supreme Court released its opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), holding that it is a denial of due process for the death sentence to be imposed when the trial judge, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case, considers information which the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain.
In order to provide for all persons whose sentences of death had been approved by this Court the protections which Gardner required, and to provide for a uniform procedure to hear applications for relief filed in reliance on Gardner, we entered so-called "Gardner relief orders" for all affected individuals. After one such order was entered for Dougan, we vacated Dougan's sentence and remanded for resentencing, Barclay v. State, 362 So.2d 657 (Fla.1978), because the record and response of the trial judge did not clearly indicate that Dougan's counsel had a meaningful opportunity to be heard on any of the matters contained in the pre-sentence investigation report which the trial judge had considered in his original sentencing order. In taking that action, we expressly remanded the case for a new hearing "at which the defense [would have] the opportunity to rebut any of the information contained in the pre-sentence investigation reports . " Id. at 658. Our directive was quite clear that this Court would review a reimposition of the death penalty, "limited to matters related to the compliance with this order." Id.
The trial judge who originally sentenced Dougan conducted a three-day hearing at which Dougan's attorney produced twenty-six character witnesses and made a number of motions. All motions were denied by the trial judge, and at the conclusion of the hearing a new death sentence was imposed. The case is now back in this Court to review that sentence of death. On the basis of a close review of the transcript of the three-day hearing and all other matters submitted to the Court in conjunction with the appeal now pending, we are satisfied that the trial judge's new sentence of death is appropriate.
Counsel for Dougan filed multiple motions during the course of the Gardner remand proceeding, not one of which was directed to the mandate we had issued. Treating the remand as an opportunity to revisit the constitutionality of the death penalty, the bias of the trial judge, the impropriety of articulated aggravating circumstances found in the original sentencing order, and a range of other matters unrelated to our directive, Dougan's counsel endeavored to treat the remand as a full-blown sentencing proceeding. The trial judge properly rejected counsel's attempt to expand the proceeding. Songer v. State, 365 So.2d 696 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956, 99 S.Ct. 2185, 60 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1979).
Our vacation of Dougan's death sentence for Gardner relief was technically-based, serving the sole purpose of allowing Doug-an's counsel to demonstrate that matters contained in the pre-sentence investigation report were improper and prejudicial. Dougan has now had that opportunity, and from the record he has failed to show that any information contained in the pre-sen-tence investigation report was in any way erroneous, misleading or prejudicial.
We now hold that Dougan was not prejudiced by the trial court's early consideration of a pre-sentence investigation report which his counsel originally had no opportunity to rebut, that the original findings of the trial court were not tainted or otherwise rendered invalid by the pre-sen-tence investigation report, and that the reimposition of a death penalty was proper. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, Acting C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion with which OVERTON, J., concurs.
. See also Funchess v. State, 399 So.2d 356 (Fla.1981) (trial court on remand for Gardner relief properly refused to provide an entirely new sentencing proceeding in which a new advisory jury could be reconvened).
. Our disposition of this proceeding in accordance with the limitations imposed at the time we remanded this proceeding to the trial judge makes unnecessary any consideration of multiple challenges which Dougan raises to the proceeding below, to the imposition of the death penalty, to the motion denials by the trial judge, and to the absence of a resentencing jury. That the disposition of these matters is unnecessary to this proceeding does not mean that we have not reviewed or considered the arguments presented by Dougan's counsel in this appeal. We have, and the fact is that each argument presented by Dougan's counsel is fully, adequately and accurately refuted or rebutted by the contrary contentions made in appel-lee's brief.