Case Name: James Dixon v. State
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1911-10
Citations: 101 Miss. 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: James Dixon v. State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 320–326

Head Matter:
James Dixon v. State.
[58 South. 5.]
Criminal Law. Disqualified jurors. Reversible error.
Where a defendant on trial for crime (uses every peremptory challenge allowed him. by law, it is fatal error for the court to overrule his challenge of disqualified jurors for cause.
Appeal from the circuit court of Yazoo county.
Hon. W. A. Henry, Judge.
James Dixon was convicted of manslaughter and appeals.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
Holmes é Holmes, for appellant,
filed an elaborate brief, too long for publication, contending that under the evidence in this case appellant should have been granted a change of venue and that the lower court erred in not sustaining appellant’s challenge of jurors for cause after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted. Peoples v. Yoakum, 53 Cal. 571; Safford v. State, 76 Miss. 258; Tennison v. State, 79 Miss. 708; Brown v. State, 83 Miss. 645; Anderson v. State, 46 So. 65; Fugate v. State, 82 Miss. 195; Murphy v. State, 92 Miss. 203; Jeffries v. State, 74 Miss. 677. \
Jas. R. McDowell, assistant attorney-general, for appellee.
Under our constitution, every person charged with crime is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. Jurors should not only be competent, but fair and impartial. However, the fact that a juror had heard the case discussed or has formed an opinion, does not necessarily disqualify him. Section 2685, of ’the Code of 1906, is as follows :
“Any person, otherwise competent, who will make oath that he is impartial in the case, shall he competent as a. juror in any criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he has an impression or an opinion, as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it appear to the satisfaction of the court that he has no bias, or feeling, or prejudice in the ease, and ho desire to reach any result in it, except that to which the evidence may conduct; but any juror shall be excluded, if the court be of opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error.”
To a large measure the qualifications of a juror under this section are left to the sound discretion and good judgment of the trial judge, subject of course to review by the highest tribunal.
Before'going into the testimony of the jurors on their voir dire examination in the instant ease, I will call attention to a few cases decided by our court where jurors were held to be competent, even though they had heard much of the cases, and had formed opinions.
In Green v. State, 72 Miss. 522, our court held, speaking through Chief Justice Cooper, said that:
“Under said statute one is not incompetent as a juror merely because, on his voir dire, he states that he lives in the immediate neighborhood where the crime was committed, had heard it discussed, and had formed an opinion as to the guilt or the innocence of the accused of such a fixed character that it would require evidence to remove it, provided that he makes oath that he can try the case fairly and impartially, according to the evidence. ’ ’
In Gammons v. State, 85 Miss. 103, the Creen case was approved'. In a very exhaustive opinion written by Judge Truly, and I ask a careful reading of Judge Truly’s opinion as it goes into the testimony taken on the voir dire examination, and in my opinion, the jurors in the case at bar are qualified according to the announcement in the Grammons case.
The court recently through Commissioner McLain approved the Green case, supra, in the case of Whitehead v. State, 52 So. .259.
And the court speaking through Judge Mayes, has recently approved, the Gammons case, supra, in the case of Cook v. State, 43 So. 618. See syllabus No. 7, and the exhaustive opinion of Judge Mayes, and authorities there cited.
The Grammons case was again approved in the Evans case, 40 South. 8.
It was held in Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, that:
“One who has no hostility to the accused, and who is not shown to be biased by a preconceived opinion as to render him incompetent as a juror, is not disquailfied, though he may have a bad opinion of the defendant’s character. ’ ’
It will thus be seen that our courts lay down a doctrine which must set a high standard for jury service. It has been a matter of favorable comment all over the country that in Mississippi one does not have to be a fool to do jury service. Any juror who can read vivid accounts of a homicide, and hear it discussed on the streets, and then swear that he has no opinion, is either a knave or a fool. Our legislature recognized the desirability of having good men on the jury, and therefore enacted the statute which provides that an opinion formed or expressed will not disqualify one for jury service, if the court is of opinion, by his answers to questions, that he will be fair and impartial, and if he swears that he will. I believe that a court of review should scrutinize the testimony of jurors with great care so that a fair and impartial jury guaranteed by the constitution, will be had in fact. But I submit in the case at bar that every single one of the men who sat upon this jury come clearly within the qualifications laid down in the Green case, and followed many times since by our court.
The defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and was allowed one additional challenge, which he also took advantage of, and exhausted.
Argued orally by J. G. Holmes, for appellant.
Argued orally by Jas. R. DcDowell, assistant attorney-general, for state.

Opinion:
Mates, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
After a most thorough examination of this record, it is our view that the jurors Cheatham, Wilson, Childress, and Pierce were disqualified as jurors, and the trial court should have sustained the challenge .for cause. Every peremptory challenge allowed appellant under the law was used, and therefore the failure on the part of the court to sutain the challenge for cause of any one of these jurors was fatal error. Nothing is to be gained by setting put in full the questions and answers of the jurors above specified. The answers were frank and fair, but clearly show disqualification. Questions of this character largely depend upon the facts of each particular case. Murphy v. State, 92 Miss. 203, 45 South. 865. This case is controlled by the cases of Jeffries v. State, 74 Miss. 675, 21 South. 526, Fugate v. State, 82 Miss. 189, 33 South. 942, and Murphy v. State, 92 Miss. 203, 45 South. 865, and cases cited in above opinions.
In reversing this case, we deem it proper to say that, in the light of the whole record, the trial court should grant a change of venue, if asked, when the case comes on for trial again.
Reversed and remanded.