Case Name: DE WITT v. MONJO
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-01-05
Citations: 61 N.Y.S. 1046
Docket Number: 
Parties: DE WITT v. MONJO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 61
Pages: 1046–1052

Head Matter:
DE WITT v. MONJO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
January 5, 1900.)
1. Novation—Evidence.
Defendant ordered goods from a manufacturer, but before their delivery he sold his business, and they .were delivered to his vendee, who agreed to-pay for them. The manufacturer was advised of the sale and tbe_ existence of the agreement, and when the bill for the goods fell due received a note for the amount, executed by such vendee. From the time the note was received until there was a final failure to pay a balance- due on a draft which had been substituted for the note, the manufacturer dealt with defendant’s vendee as though it were primarily liable for the goods, and without reference to defendant. Held, that these facts were sufficient to establish a contract of novation by which the defendant was discharged.
3. Reference—Hearing—Reopening Case.
The exercise of the discretionary power of a referee to open a case, after the evidence is closed, to permit a party to give material evidence to establish his defense, will not be reversed unless abused.
O’Brien, J., dissenting.
Appeal from judgment on report of referee.
Action by William E. De Witt against Louis Monjo. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, entered on a referee’s report, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BEUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, McLAUGHLIN, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Albridge C. Smith, for appellant.
Thomas M. Rowlette, for respondent.

Opinion:
RUMSEY, J.
The action was brought to recover the balance due upon a sale of goods by the Midland Steel Company, of which the plaintiff was assignee, to the defendant. From the judgment entered upon the report of the referee dismissing the complaint this-appeal is taken.
It appears that in the early part of the year 1896 the defendant, who was doing business under the name of Louis Monjo, Jr., & Go., ordered from the Midland Steel Company a car load of steel-at the price of $759.32, upon a credit of 60 days. There was considerable delay in the shipment of the goods, and they were not finally received until about the 15th of May, 1896. Before that time the defendant had sold to the National Wrought-Steel Manufacturing Company, and that company had taken possession of, all his-property and business, and -when this car load of steel reached the place to which it was consigned it was delivered to the National Wrought-Steel Manufacturing Company. On the 2-9th of July that company delivered to the Midland Steel Company, the seller of the goods, its promissory note for the amount due upon the car load of steel. The note was not paid when due, but was renewed. When the renewed note became due, that was not paid, but after some negotiations the Midland Steel Company drew its draft for the amount of the note, with interest, upon the Wrought-Steel Company, which was accepted by it, and a. payment of $425 was made by the acceptor upon the draft. The remainder was not paid, and it is to recover that remainder that this action is brought.
The foregoing facts are not disputed. It is conceded that the claim of the Midland Steel Company was assigned to the plaintiff before" the bringing of this action. It is claimed by the defendant that upon his sale to the Wrought-Steel Company of his property and business that company agreed to pay for this car load of steel when it was received; that the Midland Steel Company was advised of the purchase by the National Wrought-Steel Manufacturing Company of the defendant's plant and business, and of the general relations between the Wrought-Steel Company and the defendant; and that, knowing these relations, it accepted the Wrought-Steel Company as its debtor under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion that it consented to the agreement between that company and the defendant, by which the Wrought-Steel Company agreed to pay for this car load of steel; and that by reason of its assent to that agreement a novation took place, as a result of which the defendant was discharged and the Wrought-Steel Company became the debtor of the Midland Company. There was evidence which warranted the finding that the Wrought-Steel Company had agreed with Monjo to pay the bill for this car load of steel, and there was also evidence that this agreement was known to the Midland Steel Company, although there is no direct evidence that the precise terms of the agreement were made known to it. It is undisputed, however, that the Midland Steel Company was advised of this agreement between Monjo and the Wrought-Steel Company, and the facts shown raise an inference that it accepted the situation, and, when the bill for the steel became due, received the note of the Wrought-Steel Company in place of the obligation of Monjo. It is clear, too, that from the time that note was received until there was a final failure of the Wrought-Steel Company to pay the balance due upon the draft which had been substituted for the note the Midland Steel Company dealt with the Wrought-Steel Company precisely as though it were liable primarily for the steel, and without reference to Monjo.
From these facts it is fair to infer, as seems to have been inferred by the referee, that the Midland Steel Company assented to the agreement by which the Wrought-Steel Company assumed to pay for this car load of steel, and accepted that company as its debtor in the place of Monjo, to whom the steel was originally sold. These facts are all that are necessary to establish a novation. To prove the assent of the creditor it is not necessary that express knowledge of the transaction be brought home to him, but that assent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, precisely as other facts may be similarly proved. 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 880, 881, 889; Hotchin v. Secor, 8 Mich. 494; and Regester v. Dodge, 61 How. Prac. 107, 114. There was sufficient evidence, therefore, to warrant the conclusion reached by the referee. It is quite true that these facts were not found by him in his report, but, as the evidence would have warranted the finding of them, the court will infer their existence, although not found in the report, to sustain the judgment. Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parker Press Co., 135 N. Y. 209, 213, 31 N. E. 1018.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that the referee erred in opening the case, after the evidence was closed, to permit the defendant to give material evidence bearing upon this question of novation. Whether it was proper or not to open the case was a matter within the discretion of the referee, and that discretion will not be reversed, unless, from the facts, it is made to appear that the discretion has been abused. We cannot infer any abuse from what is shown in this case. The plaintiff made no application for an adjournment, after the new evidence was received, to enable him to meet the facts which then appeared. It is to be assumed, therefore, that he did not deem it necessary to make such proof, and he cannot now say that he- had no opportunity to do so. The evidence admitted was clearly competent and relevant, and it was equally within the discretion of the referee to receive it if he saw fit.
We can find no error in .the judgment, and for that reason it is affirmed, with costs to the respondent. All concur, except O'BRIEN, J., who dissents.