Case Name: Francisco Rodriquez v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-01-29
Citations: 100 Tex. Crim. 11
Docket Number: No. 8940
Parties: Francisco Rodriquez v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 100
Pages: 11–16

Head Matter:
Francisco Rodriquez v. The State.
No. 8940.
Delivered January 29, 1925.
Rehearing Granted April 15, 1925.
1. —Transporting Intoxicating Liquor — Indictment—Counts In.
Where an indictment charged in two counts the transportation of and possession for purposes of sale of intoxicating liquor, it was not error for the court to submit both counts to the jury, and also to refuse to compel the state to elect as between the counts. This practice is proper.
2. —Same—Special Charge — Properly Refused.
Where the theory of the defense is properly presented in the court’s main charge, it is not error to refuse a special charge presenting the same issues, though couched in different language, when requested by appellant.
OX BEHEABING.
3. —Same—Charge on Principals — Properly Given.
The court in this case properly charged on the law of principals, under Art. 78, P. C. If appellant gave another money with which to purchase the liquor and joined him and accompanied him to the place to which he was transporting it, this would make appellant guilty as a principal offender in the transportation.
4. —Same—Special Charges — Status of.
A special charge given to the jury at the request of appellant is entitled to receive the same consideration at the hands of the jury, as those instructions contained in the main charge. Such a charge should never be given unless it correctly presents the law of the case.
5. —Same—Argument of Counsel — Criticising Special Charge — Improper.
Where a special charge presenting the law of circumstantial evidence had been given to the jury, at the request of the appellant, it was highly improper to permit the district attorney in his closing address to say that the case was not one of circumstantial evidence, and that the court had simply given them the special charge because the appellant had requested same, in order that they might make a big speech in the case. This conduct of the district attorney, and of the learned trial judge in permitting same, necessitates a reversal of this case, and it is so ordered.
Appeal from the District Court of Caldwell County. Tried below before the Hon. M. C. Jeffrey, Judge.
Appeal from a conviction of transporting intoxicating liquor; penalty, one year in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
E. B. Goopwood, C. F. Richards and Hart, Patterson & Hart, of Austin, for appellant.
Tam Garrard, State’s Attorney, and Grover C. Morris, Assistant State’s Attorney, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge. —
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Caldwell county of transporting intoxicating liquor, and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
The State witnesses testified to facts which show that appellant was transporting a gallon of liquor on the occasion in question; that he brought it to a Mexican celebration and that he and some companions carried it off to a part of the grounds where they were found in possession of it. We think the court's definition of transportation was correct. • There were three Mexicans going together from a point in the grounds where the celebration was in progress down to the point where the officers arrested the party. The name of one of the Mexicans was unknown to the State witnesses. Appellant testified in his own behalf that the whisky was brought to the place where the officers arrested the party by one Vicente Fonseca. The court charged in the usual form the law of principals. An exception directed at the charge upon the ground that there were no facts calling for same, is without merit.
The indictment contained two counts, one charging the transportation and the other possession for purposes of sale, of intoxicating liquor. Appellant complains because the court refused to compel the State to elect, and submitted both counts to the jury. There was no error in the action of the court. The two counts were inserted in the indictment to meet possible phases of the testimony on the trial. There was evidence tending to support each issue. The court, properly submitted both counts. The verdict of the jury was confined to the count charging transportation, and the judgment and sentence followed the verdict. No error appears in this matter.
The complaint that there was no sufficient showing in the facts of a transportation of the liquor in question, seems to us without foundation ; the same is true of the complaint of the submission to the jury of the issue of transportation.
There is complaint of the refusal of a special charge in which appellant asserts that he sought to have presented his theory of the defense. The trial court instructed the jury that if appellant transported the liquor he should be found guilty of this offense; that if he did not, or if the jury had a reasonable doubt of that fact, he should be acquitted. A special charge was prepared by appellant instructing the jury that the State must prove by competent testimony beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact transport intoxicating liquors as that term is defined, and that it was not a violation of the law for a person to intend or to have an intention to transport intoxicating liquor. We think the appellant's theory of the case sufficiently safeguarded and presented by,the charges given.
At the instance of appellant the court gave to the jury a special charge presenting the law of circumstantial evidence. Complaint is made in a bill of exceptions that in his argument to the jury the "State's attorney' insisted that the case did not rest wholly upon circumstantial evidence. Objection is made also that the court refused to give to the jury an additional charge instructing them, after the argument was over, that this was a case on circumstantial evidence. We do not deem the action of the trial court in refusing this request to be erroneous. The court gave the requested charge and told the jury that the case was one of circumstantial evidence. The only feature of the case which brought it within that rule was that the State witness testified that when he saw appellant going with the other Mexicans through the celebration grounds to the point where they were arrested, appellant was carrying a package about the size of a gallon jar of whisky, wrapped in a newspaper. The other two Mexicans with him had nothing in their hands. The officers followed the three men in the direction in which they were going and found them together with a. newspaper wrapping lying on the ground and they had the gallon jar of whisky. It might be deemed doubtful as to whether the case was one on circumstantial evidence. We do not think the argument of the State's attorney of any material harm to appellant.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.