Case Name: SANFORD v. THE STATE; NICELY v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1984-02-09
Citations: 169 Ga. App. 769
Docket Number: 66814; 66815
Parties: SANFORD v. THE STATE. NICELY v. THE STATE.
Judges: Banke, J., concurs. Deen, P. J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 169
Pages: 769–772

Head Matter:
66814. 66815.
SANFORD v. THE STATE. NICELY v. THE STATE.

Opinion:
Carley, Judge.
Appellants were tried before a jury under a three count indictment. Count I alleged that appellants had violated OCGA § 27-3-13 (Code Ann. § 45-511) by hunting game animals from a motor vehicle. Count II alleged a violation of OCGA § 27-3-10 (Code Ann. § 45-509), which provides that it is unlawful to hunt wildlife upon a public road. Count III alleged that appellants had hunted game animals at night with a light exceeding six volts, in violation of OCGA § 27-3-2 (Code Ann § 45-502). The jury returned guilty verdicts as to all three counts.
Each appellant filed a separate notice of appeal from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered on the guilty verdicts. Their appeals present the same question for review. Accordingly, the two appeals will be treated as companion cases for purposes of appellate review.
Appellants do not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize a finding that they were hunting game animals at night, upon a public road, with a light exceeding six volts. What appellants do assert is that this evidence would authorize but one conviction because all three crimes for which they were prosecuted were included "as a matter of fact." Gunter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 176 (2) (270 SE2d 224) (1980). The basis of this contention is that, under the evidence adduced at trial, all three crimes occurred simultaneously as part of one transaction. Appellants do not suggest however, which two crimes have been merged into the other.
"When the same conduct of an accused may establish the commission of more than one crime, the accused may be prosecuted for each crime. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one crime if: (1) One crime is included in the other; or (2) The crimes differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct." OCGA § 16-1-7 (Code Ann. § 26-506). For purposes of this statute, one crime is not included in the other if " 'they involve proof of distinct essential elements . . .' [Cit.]" Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 174 (293 SE2d 395) (1982). Bivens v. State, 166 Ga. App. 580, 582 (305 SE2d 29) (1983). As the two crimes alleged to have merged in Coleman and in Bivens shared the essential elements of possession of a firearm, the three crimes alleged to have merged in the instant cases share the essential element of hunting game animals or wildlife. However, as was the case with the crimes in Coleman and in Bivens, each of the three crimes in the instant cases has an additional essential element distinct from the others. In addition to "hunting" game animals or wildlife, OCGA § 27-3-13 (Code Ann. § 45-511) proscribes engaging in that activity "from . a motor vehicle," whereas OCGA § 27-3-10 (Code Ann. § 45-509) prohibits that activity from taking place "upon any public road in this state," and OCGA § 27-3-2 (Code Ann. § 45-502) makes it unlawful to hunt at night with a light exceeding six volts. Proof of each of the distinct, essential elements of the "hunting" activity proscribed by OCGA § 27-3-2, 27-3-10, and 27-3-13 (Code Ann. § 45-502, 45-509 and 45-511) respectively will authorize punishment, as well as prosecution, for three separate crimes. Thomas v. State, 128 Ga. App. 538 (197 SE2d 452) (1973); Coleman v. State, supra; Bivens v. State, supra.
Decided February 9, 1984.
William T. Elsey, for appellants.
Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, for appellee.
By introducing evidence authorizing a finding as to the distinct essential elements of the three crimes charged, the state in the instant case met its burden of proving that appellants were conducting their hunting activity in such a manner as to be guilty of three separate and unmerged offenses. Compare Estevez v. State, 232 Ga. 316 (206 SE2d 475) (1974); Gunter v. State, supra. Each conviction in the instant cases rests upon the common element that appellants were engaged in hunting, but each also rests upon proof of additional distinct elements not shared with the others. It was not error to enter judgments of conviction and sentences as to the three crimes.
Judgments affirmed.
Banke, J., concurs. Deen, P. J., concurs specially.