Case Name: Pablo GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-09-27
Citations: 300 So. 2d 691
Docket Number: No. 73-781
Parties: Pablo GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HOBSON, Acting C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 300
Pages: 691–694

Head Matter:
Pablo GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 73-781.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Sept. 27, 1974.
James A. Gardner, Public Defender, Sarasota, and E. Earl Taylor, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
GRIMES, Judge.
This is an appeal from a denial of appellant's motion to vacate judgment and sentence.
Appellant was indicted for first degree murder. Private counsel recommended by appellant's parents was appointed to defend him. Thereafter, appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to a term of twenty years. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court in Gonzalez v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1972, 267 So.2d 45.
The crux of appellant's motion to vacate is that his plea was not freely and voluntarily entered with an understanding of its consequences because he was not informed that second degree murder carries with it a mandatory minimum twenty year sentence. He says that there were two others involved in the crime with him and that they received sentences of only five years upon charges of third degree murder. He asserts that he would not have pled guilty to the second degree charge had he known of the mandatory minimum sentence.
On the direct appeal, we specifically held that the plea had been voluntarily entered by the appellant with full understanding of its consequences. The question of whether appellant was advised of the statutory minimum sentence does not appear to have been specifically considered.
Insofar as the responsibility of the trial judge was concerned, while it may have been prudent to advise the appellant of any mandatory minimum sentence before receiving the plea, there is no requirement in Florida that this be done. The judge did advise appellant that by virtue of his plea he could be sentenced to life imprisonment. In fact, he received twenty years. Appellant cannot complain that his associates received lesser sentences. For aught this record shows, he may have been the most culpable of the three.
Even if it be true that his court-appointed lawyer did not advise him of the minimum mandatory sentence, the circumstances of this case are such that appellant is not entitled to have his plea set aside. The court accepted a plea to the reduced charge of second degree murder at a time prior to the abolition of the death penalty by the U. S. Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed.2d 346 (1972). See Hagans v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 1968, 212 So.2d 79. Our statement in Manning v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1967, 203 So.2d 360, is apropos:
" . . . The fact that a plea of guilty is entered because of the defense attorney's promise of a lighter sentence does not render such plea involuntary. Baker v. State, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 346; Pitts v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 181 So.2d 739, 740; Manning v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 176 So.2d 380, 381. This is equally the law where the defense attorney is court-appointed. Pitts v. State, supra, 181 So.2d at 740. A criminal defendant, cannot be given the option of rejecting his uncoerced plea of guilty if his sentence fails to conform with, his expectations."
The order is affirmed.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., concurs.
SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.