Case Name: CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO. v. GOSNELL ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1916-10-14
Citations: 106 S.C. 84
Docket Number: 9543
Parties: CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO. v. GOSNELL ET AL.
Judges: Mr. Justice Gage and Circuit Judges Moore, Sease, Rice, Bowman, Gary, Wilson, Peurieoy and Smith concur in the opinion announced by the ChiEE Justice.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 84–102

Head Matter:
9543
CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO. v. GOSNELL ET AL.
(90 S. E. 264.)
1. Commerce—Intoxicating LiauoRS—Interstate Commerce.—Interstate shipments of intoxicating liquor consigned to the shipper with order to notify were intended by the party to be notified for unlawful use. The shipments were held by the carrier for some time pending directions by the party notified, who was allowed to determine time of delivery. Held that, notwithstanding the interstate character of the shipments, and rulings that under the Wilson Act (act August 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St 1913, sec. 8738]), liquors transported from one State to another do not lose their character as an interstate shipment until arrival at their destination and delivery to the consignee, the liquors became subject to the local laws upon retention by the railroad company for an unreasonable time; it being deemed on grounds of public policy that there was a constructive delivery to the person notified.
2. Appeal and Error—-Review—Harmless Error.—Errors not prejudicial and which could not reasonably be supposed to have affected the result are no ground for reversal.
Before MemmingER, J., Greenville, October, 1915.
Affirmed.
Action by the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company against Reuben Gosnell, Corning & Co. and others. From a judgment for the first named. defendant, plaintiff and others of the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
This is an action of claim and delivery and was commenced on the 14th day of December, 1914, to recover possession of certain liquors described in the complaint, which were seized by the defendant, Reuben Gosnell. The complaint contains three causes of action, as the respective consignors and the parties to be notified of the shipments were different.
The defendant, Gosnell, denied that the seizure of the liquors was unlawful, and interposed two defenses, the first of which is 'as follows:
“That on November 24, 1914, this defendant, being informed that the liquors described in the complaint were illegally stored in a car of plaintiff’s, after same had arrived at their destination, and a reasonable time for the delivery thereof had elapsed, and that deliveries were being illegally made from said car, from time to time, to consignees, who are all notorious violators of the liquor laws of the State, obtained from Samuel Stradley, Esq., a duly • appointed magistrate for Greenville county, legal process, under and by virtue of which he made search of plaintiff’s premises, and seized and took possession of the liquors described in the complaint, stored in said car as aforesaid, and that in so doing he acted under legal process, issued by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and is entitled, under the laws of this State, to hold possession of said liquors.”
The second defense is as follows:
“That upon the arrival of the liquors described in the complaint plaintiff, as the defendant is informed and believes, duly notified consignees thereof, and thereafter unloaded said shipments from the cars in which they had been transported, transferred them to a local car in plaintiff’s railroad yard in the city of Greenville, placed on said car a local seal, and from time to time thereafter made delivery to consignees from shipments contained in said car; that said liquors had arrived at point of destination before seizure by this defendant; the consignees had been duly notified of their arrival, and, after such notification, permitted them to remain in car of carrier, who held them for an unreasonable length of time; that as to said shipments plaintiff, as this defendant is informed and believes, had, before the seizure of said liquors, ceased to hold them as a carrier,, and at such time held them as a warehouseman; that said liquors were purchased for an unlawful purpose, and that plaintiffs, by their conduct as above set forth, aided and abetted and assisted the various consignees in carrying out said unlawful purpose.”
The following statement appears in the record, as to the shipment by the defendant, Corning & Co., to the defendant, Tom Harrison:
“On November 9, 1914, Corning & Co., at Peoria, 111., shipped 25 cases of whiskey, consigned to themselves at Greenville, S. C., order notify Tom Harrison. The shipment was delivered to the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company by the Georgia Railroad Company, a connecting carrier, on November 17, 1914, and arrived at destination on November 20, 1914, four days before the seizure on November 24. The party to be notified was mailed written notice that the shipment had arrived at the depot. The shippers drew a draft upon Tom Harrison for the invoice price of the liquor, $153.25, and attached same to the bill of lading, forwarding through regular commercial channels for collection. Tom Harrison did not take up the draft with bill of lading, and did not pay the freight, $15.59, which was 'Collect.1 Between the arrival of the shipment at the depot and the seizure by the defendant, Gosnell, the agent of the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company (acting upon the advice of the local counsel of that railway company at Greenville), as he states, for safekeeping, stored the liquor in a box car standing upon a sidetrack near the warehouse door, where it was seized by the defendant, Gosnell, under a search warrant issued by Magistrate Stradley on November 24, 1914, charging that the liquor was being stored in the car by 'Tom Harrison, consignee.’ ”
Similar statements appear in the record as to the shipments by the defendants, Heyman & Baron and H. C. Myers & Co., to the defendants, W. J. Goodlett and D. F. Belcher, respectively.
The following shipments were made by Heyman & Baron, of Augusta, Ga., consigned to themselves, with instructions to notify W. J. Goodlett: (1) Five cases whiskey shipped September 22, 1914, arrived September 28, 1914; (2) fifteen cases whiskey shipped September 25, 1914, arrived September 28, 1914; (3) five cases whiskey shipped September 29, 1914, arrived October 1, 1914; (4) five cases whiskey shipped October 6, 1914, arrived October 7, 1914. These shipments were seized November 25, 1914.
The following shipments were by H. C. Myers Company from New York, consigned to themselves, with instructions to notify D. F. Belcher: (1) One case whiskey shipped July 9, 1914, arrived July 16, 1914; (2) one case whiskey shipped July 9, 1914, arrived July 16, 1914. 'These ship ments were seized August 13, 1914. All the bills of lading were marked, “For personal use.”
H. C. Harvley testified as follows in behalf of the plaintiff:
“Agent of Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company at Greenville continuously since March 3, 1913. On November 24, 1914, Reuben Gosnell, chief of rural police, searched for liquor in the warehouse, and in a car standing on sidetrack near warehouse. Seized 45 cases of whiskey and 15 or 18 barrels of beer. The liquor was placed in the car for safekeeping, to keep it from being stolen. Had had trouble with losing whiskey; cases had been broken up, and sometimes an entire case would be stolen. The liquor was in the car with other freight.”
Cross-examination':
“We were using the car practically as a warehouse. Don’t think there was any liquor in the warehouse. The car was under a local seal of the Charleston & ^Western Carolina Railway Company. Harrison and Goodlett received shipments probably every week on an average. Belcher not so often. Q. What was the reputation of Har-• rison and Goodlett in reference to being engaged in the lawful sale of liquor? * * * A. Their general reputation was that they were engaged in ,the unlawful sale of liquor. Harrison and Goodlett frequently got several shipments, at the same time, from the same party, covered by separate bills of lading. When such shipments would come in that way, I would put them in the car. When they would pay a draft attached to a bill of lading, covering a particular shipment, I would deliver that shipment to them. It made no difference how often they came, or for how much they came, the liquor would be delivered to them, if they presented the bill of lading covering that particular shipment or those particular shipments. It frequently happened that Harrison or Goodlett would send a bill of lading by someone, with an order on me to deliver to them, which I would honor, and deliver the liquor accordingly. On all order notify shipments we promptfy notify the party to be notified of the receipt by us of the shipment. This is done with both order notify and straight shipments. Storage would be charged on shipments not called for. I don’t recollect an instance where we charged storage against Harrison, Goodlett, or Belcher. In the car there were boxes which had been broken into and some of the contents abstracted. This was done before arrival here. It was not done by the intended consignees. They knew absolutely nothing about it.”
On cross-examination Tom Harrison declined to answer questions as to his being engaged in the unlawful sale of liquor, upon the ground that the answers might incriminate him. And, on the cross-examination, W. J. Goodlett testified :
“Had agency for near beer for Augusta Brewing Company. Have been engaged in the liquor business in Green-ville for several years. Was so engaged in November, 1914. I had a federal license, up to July, 1915, wholesale and retail.”
It was admitted as a fact that the storing of the liquor in the box car was in consequence of advice given by T. P. Cothran, Esq., local counsel of Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company at Greenville, to the agent, to protect the same from theft in the warehouse.
Two motions were made for the direction of a verdict— one by .the plaintiff and the other by the defendant—but both were refused.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, Gosnell, and the plaintiff appealed,
Messrs. Cothran, Dean & Cothran, and Mauldin & Turner, for appellants.
Messrs. Cothran, Dean & Cothran cite: As to whether an “order notify” shipment of liquor, interstate in character. intended by the party to be notifiedJfor unlawful use, subject to seizure under the laws' of South Carolina, while in the custody of a common carrier, before actual or constructive delivery to the party for whom, upon certain conditions, it is designed: 238 U. S. 62 and 199; 94 S. C. 444; 170 U. S. 412, 426 ; 32 C. C. A. 189; 223-U. S. 70; 196 U. S. 133; 206 U. S. 129; 214 U. S. 218; 199 U. S. 501; 203 U. S. 276; 67 S. C. 491; 73 S. C. 111. As to remarks of Judge with reference to defendants’ good faith: 81 S. C. 374.
Messrs. McCullough, Martin & Blythe, for respondent,
cite: As to whether the liquor was exempt from seizure because protected as interstate commerce: 236 U. S. 568, 571, 572; 206 U. S. 129; 73 S. C. Ill; 94 S. C. 444; 238 U. S. 190. As to error in allowing testimony as to the reputation of the parties to whom the liquor was shipped: Crim. Code 1912, sec. 838. Position of carrier: 27 S. C. 1.
October 14, 1916.

Opinion:
The Circuit Judge having been called to the aid of the Court:
The opinion of the Court en banc was delivered by
Mr. Chile Justice Gary.
There are numerous exceptions, but it will not be necessary to consider them in detail, as the appellant's attorneys state that the main question raised by them may thus be formulated: '
"Is an 'order notify' shipment of liquor, interstate in character, intended by the party to be notified for unlawful use, subject to seizure under the laws of South Carolina, before actual or constructive delivery to the party for whom, upon certain conditions, it is designed ?"
In the case of Smith v. La Par, 67 S. C. 491, 46 S. E. 332, it is said:
"Liquor purchased in another State and shipped to the purchaser in this State is not contraband, being protected as an article of interstate commerce until it is delivered to the purchaser. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 (18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088); State v. Holleyman, 55 S. C. 244, 31 S. E. 362 (33 S. E. 366, 45 L. R. A. 567). The fact that the purchaser to whom it is consigned is engaged in the illicit sale of liquor, and purchases it for the purpose of resale, can make no difference; the liquor is none the less an article of interstate commerce, and cannot be legally seized until it is delivered to the consignee."
The carrier, however, cannot claim the protection of the interstate commerce laws if it aids and abets the shipper or the consignee in evading the laws of the State against the sale of intoxicating liquors. The Court uses this language in the case of Jaro v. Holstein, 73 S. C. 111, 52 S. E. 870:
"The prime object of the federal commerce power is tc protect the freedom of legitimate trade among the States. This great power is acknowledged to be paramount as to all matters not reserved to and inherent in the police powers of the States, but it ought never to be so extended as to become an aid and shield for unlawful traffic. The police law of the State, which is designed to uproot illicit traffic in intoxicating liquors by seizure within the State of liquors intended for such traffic, does not materially or injuriously affect legitimate interstate commerce. Interstate commerce will not protect intoxicating liquors imported into this State for an unlawful purpose, if the importation is in such a way as to make the carrier an aider and abettor in the scheme to violate State laws."
This proposition is also sustained by the case of Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 27 Sup. Ct. 606, 51 L. Ed. 987, in which the Court says:
"We do not mean to intimate that an express company may not also be engaged in selling liquor in a State contrary to its laws, or that the fact that the consignee did not order a shipment might not be evidence for a jury to consider upon the question whether the company was not, in addition to its express business, also selling liquor contrary to the statutes. It is enough to hold, as we do, that under the averments of this indictment such testimony is immaterial. It is, of course, a question of fact whether a carrier is confining itself strictly to its business as a carrier or participating in illegal sales. The consignor alone may be trying to evade the statute. He may forward the liquors in the expectation that the consignee will, when informed of their arrival, take and ^s.y for them. So the fact that there is no previous order by the consignee may not be' conclusive of the carrier's wrongdoing, but still it is entitled to consideration in determining that question."
In regard to the question of delivery, the Court uses the following language in the case of Heymann v. Railway, 203 U. S. 270, 27 Sup. Ct. 104, 51 L. Ed. 178, 7 Ann. Cas. 1130:
"Of course, we are not called upon in this case, and do not decide, if goods of the character referred to in the Wilson act, moving in interstate commerce, arrive at the point of destination, and after notice and full opportunity to receive them are designedly left in the hands of the carrier for an unreasonable time, that such conduct on the part of the consignee might not justify, if affirmatively alleged and proven, the holding that goods so dealt with have come under the operation of the Wilson act, because constructively delivered. We say we are not called upon to consider this question, for the reason that no facts are shown by the record justifying passing on such a proposition."
Subsequently, however, the question was decided in the case of Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35 Sup Ct. 419, 59 L. Ed. 721, in which the Court used this language:
"The instant cause arose before passage of the act of Congress approved March 1, 1913 (37 Stat. 699, c. 90), known as the Webb-Kenyon bill; consequently neither its construction nor application is now involved; and what is said herein, of course, has reference to conditions existing prior to that enactment. Former opinions of this Court preclude further discussion of these propositions: Beer is a recognized article of commerce. The right to send it from one State to another and the act of doing so are interstate commerce, the regulation whereof has been submitted to Congress; and a State law which denies such right or substantially interferes with or hampers the same is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee or the expiration of a reasonable time therefor and prior thereto the provisions of the act of Congress approved August 8, 1890 (26 Stat. 313, c. 728)—the Wilson act—have no application."
It is within the province of the Court, and indeed, it is its duty, to render such an interpretation of the laws as will best subserve the ends of justice and the protection of the public, m so far as this may be done in accordance with well-established rules of construction. This may be accomplished at one time by a liberal and an another time by a strict interpretation. In construing the Wilson act the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that liquors transported from one State into another did not lose their character as an interstate shipment, and become subject to the laws of the State, until arrival at their destination and delivery to the consignee. Many dealers in liquors took advantage of the opportunity to leave such shipments in the custody of the carrier for as long a time as they saw fit, whether'reasonable or unreasonable, for the purpose of evading the laws of the State against the sale of intoxicating liquors. The Federal Supreme Court, recognizing that it was injurious to the morals, the health and welfare of the public for liquors to remain in the hands of the carrier for a length of time, limited only by the action of the dealer in supplying his customers, interpreted the word "delivery" to include not only an actual transfer of the liquors to the consignee, but likewise a constructive delivery, from the fact that they had remained in the custody of the carrier an unreasonable time after arrival at their destination. The proposition for which the appellant contends would defeat this construction. The liquors were consigned to the shipper, but it was never contemplated that they were to be delivered to him, but it was the expectation of the parties that the one who was to be notified would become the consignee. The consignor conferred upon him alone the power and authority of determining when the liquors should be delivered. He was the agent of the shipper to the extent of deciding when the liquors were to be removed, in so far as their delivery within a reasonable time was involved. The ruling that liquors were subject to the laws of the State, after they had remained a reasonable time in the hands of the carrier, was based upon public policy, which is paramount to the rights of private parties. McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 845; Lanahan & Sons v. Bailey, 53 S. C. 489, 31 S. E. 332, 42 L. R. A. 297, 69 Am. St. Rep. 884.
It would be against public policy for any one, even the carrier, to enter into a contract that the liquors should not be subject to the laws of the State after arrival at their destination and the expiration of a reasonable time thereafter, as such a contract would be inconsistent with the ruling adopted by the Federal Supreme Court hereinbefore mentionéd. The consignors are presumed to know the law, and that it is against public policy for liquors to.remain in the custody of the carrier after a reasonable time for their removal. The important fact to be determine in all these cases is whether the liquors were allowed to remain an unreasonable length of time, and not the fact as to which of the parties, as between themselves, was responsible for the failure to remove them. The question under consideration is not to be determined by principles regulating the relations between the consignor and consignee, but by the laws fixing the time within which the liquors shall become subject to the laws of the State. The exceptions raising this question are overruled.
There are two other exceptions, but they cannot be sustained, for the reason that, if there was error, it was not prejudicial; as there is no reasonable ground for supposing that the result would have been different if the error had not been committed.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Gage and Circuit Judges Moore, Sease, Rice, Bowman, Gary, Wilson, Peurieoy and Smith concur in the opinion announced by the ChiEE Justice.