Case Name: PEOPLE v. MORGAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-08-26
Citations: 63 Mich. App. 686
Docket Number: Docket No. 20700
Parties: PEOPLE v MORGAN
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 63
Pages: 686–691

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MORGAN
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Pleas of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea — Appeal and Error — Examination of Record.
An appellate court must examine the entire record to determine whether a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea of guilty was properly denied.
2. Criminal Law — Pleas of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea — Courts —Discretion—Abuse of Discretion.
A court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a criminal defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty where the defendant claimed he thought he could withdraw his plea at any time prior to sentencing and that his lawyer so advised him, but where the defendant was well familiar with the plea-taking process, and an examination of the record reveals that the defendant had pled guilty to the same charge earlier in the same proceedings and tried to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing on that occasion also, and where it appears that the defendant is merely sentence-and-judge shopping.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
3. Criminal Law — Pleas of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea — Setting Pleas Aside — Courts—Discretion—Court Rules.
A criminal defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before a court has accepted it on the record; and the court, either on motion of the defendant or sua aponte with the defendant’s consent, may set aside the plea atter it has been accepted on the record (GCR1963, 785.7[4]).
4. Criminal Law — Pleas of Guilty — Nolo Contendere — Setting Pleas Aside — Courts—Discretion.
Discretion with great liberality is the standard to be applied by a court in determining whether a plea of guilty or nolo contendere should be set aside during the period between acceptance of the plea on the record and the imposition of sentence; except in rare cases even a belated claim of innocence merits a full trial on the original charge, even if the court believes the defendant is guilty.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3, 5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 491, 503-506.
[4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 497, 501, 502.
5. Criminal Law — Pleas op Guilty — Withdrawal op Plea — Courts —Discretion—Abuse of Discretion.
A court abused its discretion in denying a defense motion to withdraw a plea of guilty in a period between the court’s acceptance of the plea on the record and the imposition of sentence where the motion did not come as a surprise to the court and defense counsel indicated that the defendant would be ready for trial on the scheduled trial date.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph A. Gillis, J.
Submitted February 14, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 20700.)
Decided August 26, 1975.
Frank Morgan, also known as James Mackey, was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, and Arthur N. Bishop, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Gerald S. Surowiec, for defendant on appeal.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, P. J.
Defendant, Frank Morgan, pled guilty to the crime of second-degree murder, MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549, and was sentenced to life in prison. He now appeals as of right presenting one issue for our consideration. We affirm.
Defendant was originally charged with first-degree murder, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548, in connection with the shooting death of Gerald J. Riley, an off-duty Detroit police officer. In January of 1973 defendant was permitted to plead guilty to second-degree murder over the prosecutor's strenuous objections. When defendant appeared for sentencing he asked to withdraw his plea and the trial judge denied his request. He was sentenced to life in prison. The prosecution thereupon filed in this Court a complaint for superintending control and a motion for an order to show cause which was denied on May 25, 1973, based on this Court's reading of Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672; 194 NW2d 693 (1972), Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v Recorder's Court Judge, 47 Mich App 615; 209 NW2d 610 (1973). The prosecution's application for leave to appeal to our Supreme Court was held in abeyance pending the outcome of Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974). On March 27, 1974, our Supreme Court, on the basis of their decision in the above case, set aside defendant's plea and remanded the case for trial on the first-degree murder charge. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v Recorder's Court Judge, 391 Mich 791 (1974).
After the case was remanded the prosecutor withdrew his objection to the reduced plea and the defendant again waived his right to a trial and asked the court to accept his plea to second-degree murder. After thoroughly questioning defendant, the court, apparently being convinced the plea was voluntarily and knowingly given, again accepted his plea and ordered that a new presentence re port be prepared. Before sentencing the defendant wrote a letter to the trial court stating that he was innocent and informing the judge that he wanted to withdraw this second plea. He filed a motion for a new trial and repeated his request at the time of sentencing. The trial court denied the request and imposed sentence.
We have reviewed the plea-taking procedures in this case and find them to be very thorough and in compliance with all plea-taking requirements. Defendant claims he thought he could, at any time prior to sentencing, withdraw his plea and says his trial lawyer so advised him. We do not feel this, in itself, is an absolute ground for withdrawal of a plea. The entire record must be examined.
After doing so we are convinced that this defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. To say the least, we are not impressed or sympathetic with this defendant's claimed naivete. An examination of defendant's criminal record discloses that he was well familiar with the plea-taking process. Several charges against defendant were disposed of by pleas. Furthermore, and more importantly, after defendant offered his first plea of guilty to the charge of second-degree murder he also sought to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, but the trial judge denied the motion at that time also. In light of this we, like the trial judge, simply are not persuaded by his present claims. In fact, it appears to us that this defendant is merely sentence-and-judge shopping.
We have carefully weighed all the factors here and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea.
Affirmed.
O'Hara, J., concurred.