Case Name: Dax, Respondent, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1925-01-13
Citations: 185 Wis. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: Dax, Respondent, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 185
Pages: 432–438

Head Matter:
Dax, Respondent, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Appellant.
December 10, 1924.
January 13, 1925.
Railroads: Accidents at grade crossings: Contributory negligence.'
Where a pedestrian had a continuous unobstructed view of a railroad track for several miles from a distance of fifteen feet from the track, and her attention was not diverted by any cause, and the jury found she was guilty of a want of ordinary care which must have consisted in a failure to look or listen, or to do both, such failure amounted, as a matter of law, to more than a slight want of ordinary care and precluded recovery for her death. Crownhart, J., dissents, p. 433.
Appeal from a judgment of the county court of Iowa county: Aldro Jenks, Judge.
Reversed.
Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s wife caused by being struck by one of defendant’s trains in the village of Avoca.
On the evening of October 19, 1922, at about half-past six, the plaintiff’s wife started to walk from her home to some place south of defendant’s tracks along Second street, which is crossed by three of its tracks. The first track reached by her was the passing track, and about fifteen feet further on she reached the main track, on which she was struck by a freight train of twenty-nine cars coming from the west and instantly killed. A house track left the main track close to where Mrs. Dax was struck. The Dax home was about 110 feet north of the tracks and on-the west side of Second street. There is a little dispute as to just how unobstructed her view was to the west from her house to near the right of way. The ground was practically level for several miles to the west, and the only obstruction of any consequence to a view was a small building- about fifty feet north of the track and about 150 feet west of Second street. The night was cloudy but the air was clear. The engine carried a headlight that threw a bright light at least 1,600 feet ahead.
Mrs. Dax was thoroughly familiar with the crossing, having gone back and forth over it many times. She was a woman sixty-eight years old, weighed 175 pounds, wore glasses, was slightly deaf, and walked witja a limp' or hitch at a usual rate of a little over two miles an hour.
The jury found a negligent speed of tráin on the part of the defendant and that such negligence was the proximate cause of her death. They also found a 'want of ordinary care on her part that proximately contributed to produce her death, but that her negligence was not more than a slight want of ordinary care, and. damages in the sum of $2,500.
From a judgment in favor of plaintiff the defendant appealed.
For the appellant there were briefs by H. I. Killilea, Rodger M. Trump, and Thomas E. Torphy, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Torphy and Mr; Killilea.
For the respondent there was a brief- by Platt Whitman of Highland and Mason & Priestley of Madison, and oral argument by Mr. T. M. Priestley and Mr* Whitman.

Opinion:
Vinje, C. J.
The evidence is undisputed that before the deceased reached the passing track she had an unobstructed view to the west along the track for several miles and such view she had continually from the passing track a distance of fifteen feet till she reached the main track. There is no evidence that her attention was by any cause diverted. The jury having found her negligent, such negligence must have consisted in a failure to look or listen, or .both. Does such failure under such circumstances amount to more than a slight want.of ordinary care? This court has answered the question so many times in the affirmative and given its reasons therefor that no more is now needed than to state that such answer is adhered to, and to refe*r to a few of the late cases so holding. O'Toole v. D., S. S. & A. R. Co. 153 Wis. 461, 140 N. W. 293; Todoroff v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 169 Wis. 554, 173 N. W. 214; Puhr v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 171 Wis. 154, 176 N. W. 767; Bahlert v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 175 Wis. 481, 185 N. W. 515; Twist v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 178 Wis. 513, 190 N. W. 449; Plautz v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 180 Wis. 126, 192 N. W. 381; Sweeo v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 183 Wis. 234, 197 N. W. 805.
The case of Gordon v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. 168 Wis. 244, 169 N. W. 570, is relied upon by plaintiff. That case has been distinguished so many times that it is needless to do so in this case further than to call attention to' the fact that plaintiff in the Gordon Case drove an automobile, while here the deceased walked. As stated in White v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 147 Wis. 141, 133 N. W. 148, in the case of a foot traveler the zone of danger is so narrow and it is so easy for the traveler to reach a place of safety or to remain there that no close comparison can be made between one traveling on foot and one driving a team or an automobile. In the latter cases the team or automobile may be moving as fast as the train and many things may affect the power to stop or speed up, not to speak of the attention that must be-given the team or automobile. The foot passenger has perfect and instinctive control of himself and can almost instantly step outside the zone of danger.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint upon the merits.