Case Name: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellants
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1994-09-07
Citations: 161 Ill. 2d 502
Docket Number: No. 77405; No. 77566
Parties: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION et al., Appel-lees, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 161
Pages: 502–521

Head Matter:
(No. 77405.
(No. 77566.
THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION et al., Appel-lees, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellants.
Announced August 10, 1994.
Opinion filed September 7, 1994.
Rehearing denied September 12, 1994.
HARRISON, J., joined by MILLER and HEIPLE, JJ., dissenting.
Gordon B. Nash, Jr., and Ina L. Turner, of Gardner, Carton & Douglas, and Rene A. Torrado, Jr., Janet M. Hedrick and Paula K. Bebensee, of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, all of Chicago, for petitioners-appellees.
Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondents-appellants State Board of Elections et al.
Thomas R. Meites, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Meites, Frackman, Mulder & Burger, of Chicago, for respondent-appellant Patrick Quinn.
Thomas E. Johnson and Phillip H. Snelling, of Johnson, Jones & Snelling, of Chicago, for intervening respondents-appellants.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated cases involve a proposed amendment to article IV, the legislative article, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, by use of the initiative procedure established in article XIV, section 3, of our constitution. On August 10, 1994, this court entered a judgment preventing various public officials from placing the proposed amendment on the November 1994 general election ballot. This opinion will state the reasons for that judgment.
BACKGROUND
Two organizations, the Eight is Enough Committee and Term Limits Illinois (Proponents) petitioned to amend article IV, sections 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 2(a), 2(b), 2(c)). The Proponents seek to impose a limit on the number of years a State legislator may serve in the General Assembly. As amended, the constitutional provisions would read as follows (additions are underlined):
"§ 2. Legislative Composition
(a) One Senator shall be elected from each Legislative District. Immediately following each decennial redistricting, the General Assembly by law shall divide the Legislative Districts as equally as possible into three groups. Senators from one group shall be elected for terms of four years, four years and two years; Senators from the second group, for terms of four years, two years and four years; and Senators from the third group, for terms of two years, four years and four years. The Legislative Districts in each group shall be distributed substantially equally over the State. For the exclusive purpose of calculating of service under the tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person who serves two years or less of a term of a Senator shall be deemed to have served two years and a person who serves more than two years of a four-year term of a Senator shall be deemed to have served four years.
(b) Each Legislative District shall be divided into two Representative Districts. In 1982 and every two years thereafter one Representative shall be elected from each Representative District for a term of two years. For the exclusive purpose of calculating length of service under the tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person who serves any part of a term of a Representative shall be deemed to have served two years.
(c) To be eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly, a person must be a United States citizen, at least 21 years old, and for the two years preceding his election or appointment a resident of the district which he is to represent. No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly for more than eight years. No person who has served six years in the General Assembly shall be eligible to be elected to a four-year term as a Senator. This tenure limitation is not retroactive and shall not apply to service as a member of the General Assembly before the second Wednesday in January, 1995. In the general election following a redistricting, a candidate for the General Assembly may be elected from any district which contains a part of the district in which he resided at the time of the redistricting and reelected if a resident of the new district he represents for 18 months prior to the reelection."
The Proponents circulated their petition pursuant to article XIV, section 3, of our constitution. The Proponents obtained more than the required number of voters' signatures — 437,088, which represents approximately 13% of all those who voted for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election in 1992. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3.) The Proponents filed the petition with the Illinois Secretary of State, who in turn forwarded it to the Illinois State Board of Elections.
The Chicago Bar Association and two of its officers (CBA) began two legal proceedings. The CBA alleged in both proceedings that the proposed amendment did not meet the requirements of article XIV, section 3. In cause No. 77566, the CBA brought a taxpayer action in the circuit court of Cook County under the disbursement of public moneys statute, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. (735 ILCS 5/11 — 301 et seq. (West 1992).) In cause No. 77405, the CBA brought an original action in this court, seeking a writ of mandamus. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a); 134 Ill. 2d E. 381.
The CBA named the same parties as defendants in the taxpayer action and respondents in the original mandamus proceeding: the Illinois State Board of Elections, the State Comptroller, the State Treasurer, the Secretary of State, the Cook County clerk, and the Chicago board of election commissioners (officials). Also, the Proponents have been allowed to intervene on the side of the officials.
In the mandamus proceeding, we allowed the CBA's motion for leave to file its petition for the writ. In the taxpayer action, the trial court entered an order in favor of the CBA. The court declared the proposed amendment to be invalid and permanently enjoined the expenditure of State funds for the amendment. We ordered that the trial court enter an automatic notice of appeal, and that the appeal be transferred directly to this court and consolidated with the mandamus proceeding.
DISCUSSION
Preliminary Matters
Initially, we agree with the dissent that issues of standing and ripeness do not preclude a review of the merits. 161 Ill. 2d at 516 (Harrison, J., joined by Miller & Heiple, JJ., dissenting).
Also, we agree with the dissent that the mandamus proceeding in this court must be dismissed. (161 Ill. 2d at 516 (Harrison, J., joined by Miller & Heiple, JJ., dissenting).) It must be remembered that a writ of mandamus commands a public officer to perform an official, nondiscretionary duty that the petitioner is entitled to have performed and that the officer has failed to perform. (Madden v. Cronson (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514; People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons (1940), 374 Ill. 557, 567-68.) The writ provides affirmative rather than prohibitory relief. Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 453, 468.
Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that the CBA seeks prohibitory and not mandatory relief. Indeed, we note that several times during oral argument in this court the CBA stated that the "initiative process should go no further." Also, no party has alleged that any of the officials have failed to perform any official duty related to the proposed amendment. The appropriate proceeding for a case such as this is not a petition for a writ of mandamus, but rather a taxpayer action for injunctive relief. 735 ILCS 5/11 — 301 et seq. (West 1992); Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 453, 461 (Coalition I); see Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 394, 396 (CBA).
Taxpayer Action
We now turn to the merits of the taxpayer action. Article XIV, section 3, of our constitution establishes a constitutional initiative process for amending the legislative article: invalid because it does not meet the subject matter requirement of article XIV, section 3. The CBA argues that the proposed amendment does not affect either the General Assembly's structure or procedure and certainly not both.
"Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3.
The CBA contends that the proposed amendment is
We emphasize that this court voices no opinion as to the wisdom or desirability of the proposed amendment. Rather, our judgment is based solely on our settled construction of article XIV, section 3. See CBA, 137 Ill. 2d at 407.
As in Coalition I, we are presented with the question of whether a proposed amendment to our constitution satisfies the constitution's own requirements for its amendment. As this court explained in Coalition I:
"Article XIV, section 3, of the Constitution provides specific requirements for the proposing of amendments under the initiative procedure. The Constitution has an express limitation as to the subject matter of a proposal: 'Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.' Any offered amendment under the initiative obviously must comply with the procedure and limitations on amendment set out in section 3 before it can be submitted to the electorate. As this court has observed: 'The constitution is the supreme law * and every court is bound to enforce its provisions.' [Citation.]" Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 460.
The controlling legal principles are settled. The prior constitutions of this State did not provide for amendment through the direct initiative process. (CBA, 137 Ill. 2d at 398.) The Framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended article XIV, section 3, to be a very limited form of constitutional initiative. The Framers considered that a general initiative provision was unnecessary due to the liberalized amendment procedures of the new constitution. (CBA, 137 Ill. 2d at 401.) The Framers also "expressed concern that a general initiative provision would be subject to abuse by special interest groups and might result in hasty and ill-conceived attempts to write what should have been the subject of ordinary legislation into the Constitution." Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 467.
Based on the Framers' concerns, article XIV, section 3, provides only for amendment of the legislative article, article IV. Further, not every aspect of the legislative article is subject to amendment through the initiative process. Rather, " 'Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.' " (Emphasis added.) CBA, 137 Ill. 2d at 398, quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3.
In Coalition I, this court held that the word "and" in the "structural and procedural" requirement means "and." Accordingly:
"As commonly understood, the word 'and' would thus limit initiatives to amendments whose subjects would be both structural and procedural, such as a proposal for the conversion from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature or for the conversion from multiple- to single-member legislative districts. Giving effect to the language of section 3 would produce no absurdity or unreasonable result. This court is without authority to substitute 'or' for the 'and' the constitutional convention used in stating 'structural and procedural' unless a contrary intention is clearly manifested. We judge a contrary intention is not clearly manifested." Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 466.
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that the proposed amendment does not meet the "structural and procedural" requirement of article XIV, section 3. The eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator do not involve the structure of the legislature as an institution. The General Assembly would remain a bicameral legislature consisting of a House and Senate with a total of 177 members, and would maintain the same organization.
Likewise, the eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator do not involve any of the General Assembly's procedures. The process by which the General Assembly adopts a law would remain unchanged.
The dissent does not dispute these legal principles or the necessary result from an application of these principles to the proposed amendment. Rather, the dissent relies upon Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I to argue that the word "and" in the "structural and procedural" requirement of article XIV, section 3, should mean "or." 161 Ill. 2d at 518-19 (Harrison, J., joined by Miller & Heiple, dissenting), relying on Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 473-76 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
However, even if the word "and" in the "structural and procedural" requirement meant "or," the result in this case would not change. As we explained, the proposed amendment does not meet either the structural or the procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3.
Further, and more fundamentally, the dissent relies upon a dissent and not the law as declared by this court. The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis permits society to presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals. The doctrine thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government both in appearance and in fact. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. However, a court will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only for articulable reasons, and only when the court must bring its decisions into agreement with experience and newly ascertained facts. Vasquez v. Hill-ery (1986), 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598, 610, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624-25.
Specifically, "[although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." (Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311.) In the present case, the Proponents have not shown any special justification for this court to depart from our holding in Coalition I.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus in cause No. 77405 is dismissed; and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in cause No. 77566 is affirmed.
No. 77405 — Petition dismissed.
No. 77566 — Judgment affirmed.