Case Name: W. J. Rutledge, Jr. et al. (John R. Lemond et al.) v. State of Texas for the Use and Benefit of Ellis County Levee Improvement District No. 3
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1928-05-23
Citations: 117 Tex. 342
Docket Number: No. 4733
Parties: W. J. Rutledge, Jr. et al. (John R. Lemond et al.) v. State of Texas for the Use and Benefit of Ellis County Levee Improvement District No. 3.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 342–357

Head Matter:
MAY, 1928
W. J. Rutledge, Jr. et al. (John R. Lemond et al.) v. State of Texas for the Use and Benefit of Ellis County Levee Improvement District No. 3.
No. 4733.
Decided March 9, 1927; May 23, 1928.
(292 S. W., 164. 7 S. W., 2d Series, 1071).
Dwight L. Simmons and Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris, for plaintiff in error.
Sec. 36, of Chap. 146, Acts of 1915, Regular Session, is not an adoption by reference of all the provisions of the general laws with reference to State and county taxes, but merely adopts certain specific portions of the general laws, relating to the date of maturity, time of delinquency, and penalties to be provided on taxes due such levee improvement districts, ánd to the powers of the assessors and collectors for such districts; and does not take away the right of the property owner to any of his substantive defensive rights, nor deprive him of his right to plead the two years’ statute of limitation in bar of a right of action on such taxes. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ward County Irrigation District (El Paso Ct. Civ. App.), 257 S. W., 333, affirmed (Com. of App.), 270 S. W., 542; H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Travis County, 62 Texas, 18; Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Texas, 37, 3 S. W., 249; Town of Pleasanton v. Vance (Com. of App., Nov., 1925), 277 S. W., 89; Fischer v. Simon, 95 Texas, 234; Logan v. Stephens County, 98 Texas, 283, 83 S. W., 365; Bledsoe v. Haney, 122 S. W., 455; Commissioners v. Knight, 117 N. E., 565; 26 Cyc., 516, defining “Manner;” Words and Phrases (First Series), beginning at p. 4333.
The court erred in rendering judgment for any amount in favor of defendant in error against plaintiff in error on the taxes sued on, because the “Canales Act” and the Acts of the Legislature authorizing the formation of Ellis County ‘Levee Improvement District No. 3, defendant in error herein, by virtue of which it derives its authority, are invalid and in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that there is no legislative determination of the amount of the tax to be assessed by said district, and no legislative distribution of the tax burden among the tax payers of said district. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S., 396 (Archer County case); Scaling v. Williams, 184 S. W., 310; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345, 31 L. Ed., 763; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S., 112, 41 L. Ed., 364; Embree v. Kansas City & L. B. Road District, 266 U. S., 379, 69 L. Ed., 142; Sec. 59, Art. 16, of the Texas Constitution; Dallas County Levee District No. 2 v. Looney, 297 S. W., 310; Chap. 146, Acts of 1915; Art. 14, Sec. 1, Constitution of the United States.
The taxes for which this suit was brought are invalid and unconstitutional for the further reason that no hearing upon the apportionment of the burden is provided for in the Levee Improvement District Act under which Ellis County Levee Improvement District No. 3 assessed these taxes. The taxes are in the nature of a special assessment (Embree v. Kansas City Road District, U. S., 60 L. Ed., 629), and must be levied either on the benefit plan or on the ad valorem basis. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S., 396 (Archer County case); Scaling v. Williams, 184 S. W., 310; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S., 112; Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 266 U. S., 379; Sec. 59, Art. 16, of the Texas Constitution; Chap. 146, Acts of 1915, Texas Legislature; Art. 14, Sec. 1, Constitution of the United States.
IV. P. Dumas and Goree, Odell & Allen, for defendants in error.
This Honorable Court erred in adopting the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section A, and in holding that the general statute of two-year limitation operates against the defendant in error, so as to bar a recovery for the levee district taxes delinquent for the years 1919 and 1920. Acts of 1915, Chap. 146, Sec. 36; Acts of 1918, Fourth Called Session, Chap. 25, Secs. 9 and 10; Acts of 1918, Fourth Called Session, Chap. 44, Sec. 42 (amended by Acts of 1921, First Called Session, Chap. 50, Sec. 4); Dallas County Levee Improvement District No. 6 v. Curtis, 287 S. W., 301; Quinlan v. H. & T. C. Ry. Co., 89 Texas, 371, 34 S. W., 738; Leake v. City of Dallas, 197 S. W., 473; Dallas County Levee District v. Looney, 109 Texas, 326, 207 S. W., 310; Rev. Stats., 1925, Art. 2758.
The Levee District Act of 1915 expressly provides for a hearing before the Commissioners Court by any person who would be affected by the creation of said district, and with jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine “all contests and objections to the creation of such districts and all matters pertaining to the same”; and among the things which the court is expressly empowered to do as a result of such hearing is to determine the boundaries of the district, and thereby determine what properties shall be included therein.
Under the provisions of the Road District Act, which was construed by the Supreme Court in Browning v. Hooper, no provision whatever was made' for a hearing of any character with reference to the creation of the proposed district. The road district was not created by Act of the Legislature or of the Commissioners Court. When a petition was presented to the Commissioners Court signed by the requisite number of property owners, the court, without a hearing of any character, was required to order an election as to whether road bonds should be issued within the territory prescribed as a district by the property owners in their petition.

Opinion:
Mr. Judge BISHOP
delivered the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section A.
The statement of this case and the question here presented are as shown by the Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion, as follows:
"This suit was brought in the name of the State pro forma for the use and benefit of Ellis County, Levee Improvement District No. 3, against appellees, to enforce collection of delinquent taxes for the years 1919-1921, inclusive, regularly levied on- and assessed against 292.2 acres of land situated within the district.
"The defense urged was that the claim for taxes due for the years 1919 and 1920 was barred by the two-year statute of limitation. On trial before the court without a jury, the plea of limitation was sustained and appellant was denied a recovery for the taxes delinquent for the years 1919 and 1920.
"Only one question is presented for our consideration, that is: Did the general statute of two-year limitation operate against appellant so as to bar a recovery for the taxes for the two years mentioned ?
"Ellis County Improvement District No. 3 was organized under and is controlled by the provisions of Chap. 146, General Laws of the Thirty-fourth Legislature, page 229, et seq., approved April 1, 1915, and known as the Canales Act.
"In regard to the assessment and collection of taxes, the Act provides :
"Section 34. 'It shall be the duty of the tax collector to make a , certified list of all delinquent property upon which the improvement taxes have not been paid, and return the same to the County Commissioners Court, and said court shall proceed to have said taxes collected by sale by the collector or by suit, in the same manner as now provided for the collection of delinquent State and county taxes. ' "
"Section 36. 'All taxes levied or authorized to be levied by this Act shall be payable and shall mature and become delinquent as is provided by the laws of this State for State and county taxes, and, upon the failure to pay such taxes when due, the same penalties shall accrue and be collected as are provided by the laws of the State of Texas for the non-payment of State and county taxes. All taxes shall be a lien upon the property against which such taxes are as sessed. In the assessment and collection of the taxes levied or authorized to be levied by this Act, the assessor and collector of taxes shall, respectively, have the same powers and shall be governed by the same rules and regulations as are provided by the laws of the State of Texas, for the assessment and collection of State and county taxes, unless herein otherwise provided.' "
Art. 7662, Rev. Civ. Stats., 1911 (Art, 7298, Rev. Civ. Stats., 1925), is:
"No delinquent tax payer shall have the right to plead in any court or in any manner rely upon any statute of limitation by way of defense against the payment of any taxes due from him or her, either to the State or any county, city or town."
In the case of T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ward County Irrigation District No. 1, 270 S. W., 542, in which the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was affirmed, we held that this article did not include such improvement districts as the one here seeking to recover delinquent taxes due it, and that the general statute of two years' limitation operates to bar recovery, unless by legislative enactment such districts were excepted from the provision of the general statutes of limitation. The Court of Civil Appeals in this case holds that the provisions of this Act, under which the Ellis County Levee Improvement District No. 3 was organized, and which are quoted in the above statement, have the effect to exempt such districts from the bar of limitation.
These sections prescribe the duties of the assessor and collector of taxes and the County Commissioners Court, in regard to the levy and collection of taxes, and provide the manner in which these duties shall be performed. In providing the manner, they adopt the provisions of the laws of the State relating to State and county taxes. They also adopt the provisions of the laws of the State relating to State and county taxes as to the time when taxes shall mature and become delinquent, and as to the penalties which shall accrue and be collected. They make no reference to the provision of Art. 7662, and do not purport to adopt it. All references made are to provisions in regard to specific matters, and no reference to the right of a tax payer to insist upon the bar of limitation is made. The courts would not be warranted in assuming that the Legislature intended to adopt by reference the provision of a statute to which provision no reference is made.
The assignment asserting that the Act authorizing the creation of the district is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fed eral Constitution should be overruled. The provisions of this Act should be construed to authorize and require that the County Commissioners Court in creating the district protect all rights of those owning property within its proposed boundaries.
The holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that the trial court erred in sustaining the plea of limitation and refusing to render judgment for the taxes delinquent for the years 1919 and- 1920, though supported by the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals of the First District in the case of Holt v. State, 176 S. W., 743, is in direct conflict with the holdings made by the Court of Civil Appeals of the Eighth District (257 S. W., 333), and this Commission in the case of T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ward County Irrigation District No. 1, supra, and we recommend that its judgment reversing the judgment of the District Court be reversed, and that of the District Court be affirmed.
Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court, affirmed, as recommended by the Commission of Appeals.
• C. M. Cureton, Chief Justice.