Case Name: Brock v. Jones
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1852
Citations: 8 Tex. 78
Docket Number: 
Parties: Brock v. Jones.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 39–40

Head Matter:
Brock v. Jones.
Though ife is said to have been once made a question, it is now well settled that sales at auction are within the statute of frauds.
In order to save the contract as to the purchaser of real estate at auction from the operation of the statute of frauds the auctioneer must make some entry or memorandum in writing of the name of the purchaser and the terms of the sale. (Note 18.)
Error from Galveston. Tlie appellee sued tlie appellant to recover the purchase-money of certain lots in the city of Galveston.
It was in proof t-liat tlie lots were offered for sale at auction under a deed of trust and power from Blahu and wife to the appellee, on tlie i)th day of November, ISIS, and struck off' to tlie appellant, who was tlie highest bidder at tlie sale ; but no memorandum was made by the auctioneer at the time. Some few days after the auclioneer met the. appellant and (old him the deed was made out and left with Frosli, and t hat he could pay to him the money and get the deed. Tlie deed was produced in evidence.
Noth IS. — Dawson v. Miller, 20 T., 171. A party can rocover compensation for money expended for tlie case of another under a contract which cannot bo onforced because it is not in writing. (Hay v. Young, l:i T., 550.)
The plaintiff’s right to recover was resisted on various grounds, of which only one was noticed by this court; that is, that the contract of sale was void under the statute of frauds, there being no memorandum thereof in writing signed by the party.
Sherwood 8f Goddard, for plaintiff in error.
It nowhere appears that Brock signed any contract for the purchase of the land, or that any one authorized by him signed any contract on his behalf, or assumed so to do, or made any memorandum thereof.
No memorandum was made by the auctioneer, in writing. The ease, therefore, comas clearly within the statute, and the pretended contract with which Brock is sought to be charged is void.
Sales at auction are within the statute of frauds; also sheriff’s sales. (2 Kent, 539; McComhv. Wright, 4 Johns. Chan. R., G59; Closon v. Bailey, 14 Johns. H., 405; Jackson ®.‘ Catlin, 2 Johns.. R., 248; Simouds v. Catlin, 2 Caine’s R., 61.
J. A. Swett, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Wheblbb, J.
Though it is said to have been once made a question, it is now well settled that sales at auction are within the statute of frauds. The auctioneer may be the agent of both parties. In general he is to be considered as lawfully authorized by the purchaser to sign the contract of sale for him as the highest bidder. 'The writing his name as the highest bidder in the memorandum of sale by the auctioneer immediately on receiving his bid and knocking down the hammer is a sufficient signing- of the contract within tlie statute of frauds so as to bind the purchaser. Entering the name of tixe buyer by the auctioneer in his book is just the same tiling as if the buyer liad written his own name. The purchaser who bids and announces his bid lo the auctioneer gives tiie auctioneer authority to write down his name, and the authority to the agent need not be in writing." (2 Kent. Comm., 539-49 ; Chit, on Con., 304, 6 Am. Ed.; 2 Const. R., 821; 2 McC. R., 104; 12 Wend. R., 566-7; Long on Sales, (Rand's Ed.,) 60, 01; 7 Port. R.,73; 3 McC., 458.)
But the auctioneer must make some entry or memorandum in writing of the name of the purchaser and the terms of the sale in order to save the contract., as to the purchaser, from the operation of the statute of frauds. The contract must be evidenced by some " memorandum thereof " in writiug, and "signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized." (I-Iart. Dig., art. 1451.)
Ho such entry or memorandum appears to have been made by the auctioneer in the present case. The contract was not, therefore, obligatory upon the purchaser, and unless it had been so at the time he could not be compelled afterwards to accept a conveyance and pay the purchase-money. The subsequent tender of a conveyance by the vendor could not render a contract void under the statute when made obligatory upon the purchaser. Unless the contract liad been valid and binding upon the parties at the time it could not be rendered so by any subsequent act of one of them.
It is clear that upon the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed.