Case Name: James H. HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L. E. MAYFIELD et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1958-03-25
Citations: 106 So. 2d 330
Docket Number: No. 8795
Parties: James H. HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L. E. MAYFIELD et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 106
Pages: 330–336

Head Matter:
James H. HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L. E. MAYFIELD et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 8795.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
March 25, 1958.
On Rehearing Oct. 30, 1958.
Charles M. Peters, Shreveport, for appellants.
Jackson B. Davis, Shreveport, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
AYRES, Judge.
By this action, a sequel to Johnson v. Hunter, La.App., 88 So.2d 467, plaintiff seeks reimbursement of damages recovered of him by Johnson. Plaintiff, a building contractor, constructed for his own account and for sale a residence in the City of Shreveport, which he' sold to Johnson. Pursuant to a verbal contract, the plumbing was installed by defendants, who furnished the materials and fixtures and performed the necessary labor. Following his occupancy of the residence, Johnson sustained damages due to defective plumbing and/or its defective and improper installation. In the aforesaid action Johnson recovered of plaintiff $630.86, with legal interest from judicial demand and costs incurred in that proceeding, the aggregate of which is $812.14. This sum, plus $500 as attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the aforesaid action, plaintiff seeks to recover of defendants herein.
From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, as prayed for, except as to the attorney's fees, defendant has appealed. Plaintiff having neither appealed nor answered defendants' appeal, his claim for attorney's fees may be considered as abandoned. Neither have the defendants urged their exception of no cause and of no right of action in this court and, consequently, said exception is likewise considered as abandoned.
Defendants contend, however, that the trial court erred in its failure to give effect to the prescriptive period of one year applicable to actions in redhibition, as provided in LSA-C.C. Art. 2534. In this regard, it is claimed that since the former action between Johnson and Hunter was one in redhibition, the present action should be so characterized. This, for obvious reasons, does not necessarily follow. Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold which renders it either absolutely useless or its use so inconvenient and imperfect that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it had he known of the vice. LSA-C.C. Art. 2520. But, where the defect in the thing sold was such as to merely diminish its value, the buyer may limit his demand to a reduction in the purchase price. LSA-C.C. Art. 2541. Such was the situation in the former action. However, here, no sale whatsoever is involved, only an action for damages for breach of a contract. The character of the action determines the prescription applicable thereto. Therefore, this not being a redhibitory action, the prescription pleaded has no application. The prescription applicable is one of ten years. LSA-C.C. Art. 3544; American Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc., v. West End Country Club, 171 La. 482, 131 So. 466; Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359; Transportation Equipment Co. v. Younger Bros., Inc., La.App., 34 So.2d 347; S. H. Hanville Lumber & Export Co., Inc., v. C-B Lumber Co., Inc., La. App., 52 So.2d 61; Landry v. A. & O. Builders, La.App., 60 So.2d 723; Oberling v. Miller, La.App., 86 So.2d 748.
As to the merits of the issues in this controversy, a detailed statement or discussion of the facts is deemed unnecessary as they were fully discussed in our opinion in the former case. Neither does it appear that further amplification could serve any beneficial purpose, particularly in view of the fact that the present record discloses no material difference in the facts of the two cases as would warrant or justify a departure from the conclusions heretofore reached as to the fault or cause of the damages sustained. We heretofore stated:
"It is clear from the proof in this case that the damage complained of was caused by the defective commode and/or its installation. A proper installation would have included an inspection to determine that the mechanism would properly function and automatically shut off the flowing of the water through the intake pipe before the bowl overflowed. Whatever inspection was made, as contended by defendant, did not disclose the imperfection which caused the damage. Such inspection was, therefore, inadequate for the purpose or to forestall the event or calamity which followed. The commode was, therefore, not free of vices and defects at the time the house was sold to plaintiff by defendant." 88 So.2d 467, 471.
It, therefore, follows that defendants breached their contract. Their obligation under the contract extended to whatever is incident to such contract and included, of course, is the obligation to complete the work contracted in a workmanlike manner so that the object contracted will properly function and render the service contemplated by the contract. One of the incidents of this obligation is that the party who violates his contract is liable for the payment of damages which the other party sustained by his default. LSA-C.C. Art. 1930. If an undertaker, such as defendant here, fails to do the work he has contracted to do, or if he does not do it in a manner agreed upon, he is liable in damages for the losses resulting from the noncompliance with his contract. LSA-C.C. Art. 2769.
Neither do the facts established in the present record justify or warrant any departure from the conclusions reached as to the quantum of damages. The record substantiates the findings in the former case. It would be illogical and inequitable to reverse the conclusions heretofore reached except upon the most positive and definite proof. Upon the institution of the redhibitory action aforesaid, defendants were made parties to that action but were relieved from making a defense thereto upon their own motion in the form of an exception of no cause and of no right of action, leaving the present plaintiff therein as sole defendant, who was made to answer, to defend and to respond in damages for the alleged negligent acts of the defendants, notwithstanding the plaintiff's efforts to secure their defense through a call in warranty, which was likewise dismissed on their own motion. The observation has particular application to defendants' present contention that the defect in the plumbing installation was only a matter of a minor adjustment. Nevertheless, whether from a defect in the plumbing fixtures or their installation, or from a minor maladjustment, the water overflowed a commode and the adjoining bedrooms, damaging the carpets. Plaintiff now seeks reimbursement of the damages he was required to pay, the correctness of which has not been seriously disputed.
Finally, the defendants plead that contributory negligence on plaintiff's part bars his recovery. Of the various grounds upon which this plea is predicated, only one needs be noticed. All others are apparently abandoned. It is contended that plaintiff knew of the failure of the commodes in the residence to properly operate prior to the occasion when the rooms overflowed and failed to give notice to defendants of that fact. This plea is without merit. The burden of proof is upon the parties who plead contributory negligence to establish the facts upon which such plea is predicated. There is no conclusive proof or showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants or their employees were not notified of the mal-functioning of the plumbing involved. Mrs. Johnson, wife of plaintiff's vendee, notified plaintiff of that fact, who first testified that he informed defendants' employee, then employed in the plumbing of a residence adjacent to the one where plaintiff was working. Although plaintiff testified it was his custom and practice to relay such complaints to the proper parties, he had no independent recollection of giving particular notice in the instant case. However, defendants' employee was not produced as a witness and no explanation was given therefor. Neither did defendants produce as a witness Mrs. Mayfield, who, the record discloses, was in charge of defendants' office and who would more likely have received the complaints or had knowledge thereof. Pretermitting the question as to whether a failure of plaintiff to notify the defendants, as urged, would constitute such contributory negligence as would relieve defendants of their responsibility under their contract, it could only be concluded that defendants have not sustained their burden of proof, particularly in view of the fact that the employee aforesaid was not produced as a witness.
We find no error in the judgment appealed and, accordingly, it is affirmed at appellants' cost.
Affirmed.