Case Name: P.V., BY HER GUARDIANS AD LITEM T.V. AND L.V. AND T.V. AND L.V., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. CAMP JAYCEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND "A" THROUGH "Z" DOE (FICTITIOUS NAMES ACTUAL NAMES BEING UNKNOWN), DEFENDANTS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2008-11-24
Citations: 197 N.J. 132
Docket Number: 
Parties: P.V., BY HER GUARDIANS AD LITEM T.V. AND L.V. AND T.V. AND L.V., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. CAMP JAYCEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND “A” THROUGH “Z” DOE (FICTITIOUS NAMES ACTUAL NAMES BEING UNKNOWN), DEFENDANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 197
Pages: 132–179

Head Matter:
962 A.2d 453
P.V., BY HER GUARDIANS AD LITEM T.V. AND L.V. AND T.V. AND L.V., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. CAMP JAYCEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND “A” THROUGH “Z” DOE (FICTITIOUS NAMES ACTUAL NAMES BEING UNKNOWN), DEFENDANTS.
Argued February 19, 2008
Decided November 24, 2008.
Walter F. Kawalec, III, argued the cause for appellant (Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys).
Philip G. Auerbach argued the cause for respondents (Lomur-ro, Davison, Eastman & Munoz, attorneys).

Opinion:
Justice LONG
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This choice-of-law case involves the question of whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11, applies to a tort committed in Pennsylvania. In 2003, a mentally disabled New Jersey resident was sexually abused at a summer camp located in Pennsylvania but operated by a New Jersey charity. Her parents sued the camp individually and on her behalf for negligent supervision at the campsite. The trial judge granted the camp's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of charitable immunity to which New Jersey adheres by statute. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring that Pennsylvania law governs the action because the commonwealth, which has abrogated charitable immunity and is the state in which the tortious conduct and injury occurred, has the greater governmental interest in the ease. The camp filed a petition for certification that we granted.
Although we have traditionally denominated our conflicts approach as a flexible "governmental interest" analysis, we have continuously resorted to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) in resolving conflict disputes arising out of tort. See, e.g., Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-96, 792 A.2d 1208 (2002); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119-39, 733 A.2d 1133 (1999). That approach is the "most significant relationship" test. Under that standard, the analysis in a personal injury case begins with the section 146 presumption that the local law of the state of the injury will apply. Once the presumptively applicable law is identified, that choice is tested against the contacts detailed in section 145 and the general principles outlined in section 6 of the Second Restatement. If another state has a more significant relationship to the parties or issues, the presumption will be overcome. If not, it will govern.
Examining the facts of this case as they relate to the contacts and principles articulated in the Second Restatement, we conclude that Pennsylvania, the state in which the charity chose to operate and which is the locus of the tortious conduct and injury, has at least as significant a relationship to the issues as New Jersey, and that the presumptive choice of Pennsylvania law therefore has not been overcome.
I.
Over thirty years ago, New Jersey Camp Jaycee, Inc. (Camp Jaycee) was organized as a not-for-profit corporation to operate a summer program for mentally challenged individuals. Although Camp Jaycee was incorporated in New Jersey and maintains an administrative office here, it has chosen to carry out its primary charitable mission in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at a campsite in the town of Effort.
In 2003, one of Camp Jaycee's campers was P.V., a twenty-one-year-old female from New Jersey with Down syndrome and mental and emotional handicaps. P.V. had attended the camp for at least three consecutive summers. According to the complaint, in August 2003, P.V. was sexually assaulted by another camper, as a result of which she sustained injuries requiring medical treatment.
P.V.'s parents, T.V. and L.V., as guardians ad litem and individually, instituted a personal injury action in New Jersey against Camp Jaycee and several fictitious defendants. They alleged that Camp Jaycee and its agents, servants, and employees were careless and negligent in the supervision of P.V. "at the camp" in Pennsylvania. Camp Jaycee filed a motion to dismiss, asserting immunity from suit under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11.
The trial judge granted Camp Jaycee's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the CIA, the camp is immune from suit by a beneficiary. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring that the CIA is not the governing law of the case because Pennsylvania, the state of the wrongful conduct and injury, has abrogated charitable immunity and has a greater interest in regulating the conduct of entities operating within its borders than New Jersey has in immunizing not-for-profit corporations. P.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 393 N.J.Super. 19, 21-22, 922 A.2d 761 (App.Div.2007). In ruling, the Appellate Division relied in part on the exceptions that have been carved out of the CIA (e.g., the CIA does not immunize charities against actions for intentional conduct) as diluting New Jersey's interest. We granted Camp Jaycee's petition for certification, 192 N.J. 295, 927 A.2d 1293 (2007), and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
II.
Camp Jaycee argues that New Jersey has a transcendent interest in the application of its charitable immunity law because the camp was organized under the laws of New Jersey; both parties are domiciled in New Jersey; Pennsylvania has no interest in the post-event rights and liabilities of two New Jersey domicili- aries; Pennsylvania is merely "the happenstance of the situs of the accident"; and no Pennsylvania citizen was injured.
P.V. counters that Pennsylvania, the state in which Camp Jaycee chose to operate; in which the tortious conduct and injury occurred; and in which the relationship of the parties was centered, has at least as great if not a greater interest than New Jersey in the resolution of this matter because of its concerns over conduct-regulation and redress to tort victims.
III.
The background of our present approach to conflict of laws is helpful to this analysis. Traditionally, our courts, like those of most jurisdictions, followed the bright-line rules embodied in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934). Those rules applied the law of the jurisdiction where a right was said to have "vested." William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1371, 1376 (1997).
A tort right vested, for example, in the state where the injury occurred (rather than, say, where the wrongful conduct occurred); a contract right vested in the state where the last act necessary to make the contract took place (usually the acceptance), and so on. The system purported to solve all choice-of-law problems by isolating a key fact (such as where the plaintiff was injured); once the location of that fact is identified, the law to be applied follows ineluctably. On the surface, at least, the judge exercises no discretion; choosing applicable law is a routine, humdrum enterprise.
[Ibid,]
Under that system, courts could choose between competing laws simply by applying concepts such as lex fori, lex loci, and lex contractus, without analyzing the content of the laws, the specific facts of a case, or the contacts the parties may have had with other states. That approach often resulted in the application of the law of a state with no real connection to the litigation and led to the downfall of the First Restatement. Id. at 1380-85.
During the 1950s, "legal realists" attacked the vested rights theory and countered that, in choosing between conflicting laws, courts should take into account the policies behind those laws and the facts of the cases that gave rise to the conflict. Id. at 1380 (citing Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits", 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 681, 682 (1988) (noting early criticisms of First Restatement)).
In 1967, we joined with other jurisdictions in abandoning the First Restatement approach to tort cases, embracing the modern governmental interest analysis, for which Professor Brainerd Currie is generally credited. See Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 234-35, 229 A.2d 625 (1967) (foregoing application of lex loci approach). The governmental interest test has traditionally been described as an approach by which courts seek to assess countervailing state laws through statutory construction and other interpretative mechanisms to determine whether the states' policies are aligned with either party in the litigation. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 Buff. L.Rev. 329, 349-50 (1997). See generally Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 627 (1963). Under the governmental interest test, where an actual conflict exists, courts must "identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by each state's contacts to the litigation and the parties." Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 248, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986).
Four years after our adoption of the governmental interest analysis, and seventeen years after the reform effort had been undertaken, the Second Restatement was finalized. To a great extent, it embraced the "reasoned elaboration" school of judicial analysis that requires a thorough explanation of every judicial decision, tied closely to the facts of the ease, and an articulation of why the decision is just. Reynolds, supra, 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1387 (quoting Henry Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 145-52 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Friekey eds., 1994)). In place of black letter law, the Second Restatement contains presumptions and detailed considerations that bear on conflicts analyses. The philosophy underlying the Second Restatement has been described as follows:
to provide guidance for judges by reminding them of things to consider in making a choice-of-law decision. The judge then would weigh the factors in light of the facts and explain why she reached the particular result. The listed factors certainly do not control the decision; rather, they merely suggest items upon which the judges should reflect. In other words, the Second Restatement provides judges with a starting point: a set of presumptions and a list of concerns worth addressing. It is then up to the judge to make it all work. The judge has to choose which law to apply, not which theory. Indeed, theory has relatively little to do with decision-making under the Second Restatement.
[Id. at 1388.]
Section 6, which has been described as the "cornerstone of the entire Restatement," Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 2.14 (4th ed.2004), prescribes that
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in determination and application of the law to be applied.
[Restatement, supra, § 6.]
The Second Restatement also provides specific guidance for resolving particular types of cases. See, e.g., Restatement, supra, ch. 8 ("Contracts"). In connection with tort, section 145 of chapter 7 is entitled "The General Principle" and prescribes that: "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Restatement, supra, § 145(1). The contacts that are weighed in making that assessment include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
[Restatement, supra, § 145(2)(a)-(d)J
Although the Second Restatement eschews the bright lines established by its predecessor, it does not abandon all rules:
Once one ventures past section 145, however, the chapter dramatically changes character. Instead of infinitely open-ended sections, the Second Restatement, for the most part, articulates reasonably definite rules. To be sure, these succeeding sections contain escape valves that refer to section 6. Many of the rules echo the First Restatement's preference for choosing the law of the injury state. Others do not refer to the injury state directly, but choose connecting factors very likely, if not certain, to lead to the application of the law of the injury state----Only a relatively few sections refer solely to the general formula of section 145 without providing some presumptive choice.
[Patrick J. Borehers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1232, 1239-40 (1997) (footnotes omitted).]
In a personal injury case, the relevant presumption is contained in section 146, which provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
[Restatement, supra, § 146.]
As is evident, a pure governmental interest analysis is distinct from the Second Restatement approach. In the former, the strength of the countervailing governmental interests is disposi-tive. The latter
does not focus solely on the state interests; instead, it directs courts to apply the law of the jurisdiction with "the most significant relationship" to the issue before the court. In making this determination, the court is required to consider all of the contacts that each jurisdiction has with the issue.
[Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 Rutgers L.J. 527, 530 (2005) (footnotes omitted).]
In other words, "rather than the Second Restatement being intended to provide a metric for determining the strength of state interests, the respective strength of the states' interests is a factor to be considered in measuring the significance of the contacts of the relevant states." Id. at 546.
Following the promulgation of the Second Restatement, we again modified our analysis, using the Second Restatement framework as our methodology in Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 119-39, 733 A.2d 1133. Indeed, although dissenting on the merits, Justice Pollock explicitly declared what the majority had implicitly acknowledged by resorting to the Second Restatement: "New Jersey's governmental-interest test is substantially similar to the most-significant-relationship test adopted by the American Law Institute in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (the 'Restatement ') (1971). Thus, New Jersey now adheres to the method of analysis set forth in Restatement sections 6 (Section 6) and 145 (Section 145)." 160 N.J. at 144, 733 A.2d 1133 (Pollock, j., dissenting).
More recently, in Emy, supra, this Court specifically cited the presumption in section 146 and also identified and applied the section 145 contacts and section 6 principles to resolve a choice-of-law issue. 171 N.J. at 95-97, 792 A.2d 1208. Although continuing to denominate our standard as a kind of governmental interest test, we now apply the Second Restatement's most significant relationship standard in tort cases. Under that standard, the law of the state of the injury is applicable unless another state has a more significant relationship to the parties and issues.
The Second Restatement assessment takes place on an issue-by-issue basis. Id. at 95, 792 A.2d 1208. It is qualitative, not quantitative. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir.1975). In other words, the inquiry does not focus solely on the number of contacts with each state, although that can be persuasive. We also look to the principles in section 6 to measure the significance of the contacts in order to determine whether the presumption has been overcome. Viewed through the section 6 prism, the state with the strongest section 145 contacts will have the most significant relationship to the parties or issues, and thus its law will be applied.
IV.
Procedurally, the first step is to determine whether an actual conflict exists. That is done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable laws to determine whether " 'there is a distinction' " between them. Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 430 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Grossman v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 273 N.J.Super. 42, 49, 640 A.2d 1194 (App.Div.1994)). If not, there is no choice-of-law issue to be resolved. Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 621, 917 A.2d 767 (2007); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484, 679 A.2d 106 (1996).
Here, it is clear, as the parties have conceded, that an actual conflict exists between the laws of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. By enacting the CIA, the New Jersey Legislature has carved charitable corporations out of its tort law system and declared them to be free from most tort liability. That statute provides:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, employees, agents, servants, or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be hable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association____
IN.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a).]
Contrary to New Jersey's policy of immunization, Pennsylvania has definitively abrogated its charitable immunity laws and has chosen to subject charitable corporations to the same tort liability as all others. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193, 207-08 (1965). Essentially then, the conflicting laws of New Jersey and Pennsylvania are two sides of the same coin — basically comprehending polar opposite positions regarding immunity from tort liability. If New Jersey law applies, the case will be dismissed. If Pennsylvania law applies, it will proceed. Because there is an evident conflict, we turn to the Restatement analysis.
V.
Once a conflict is established, our point of departure is section 146, which, in this matter, presumes that Pennsylvania law (the local law of the state where the injury occurred) will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. See Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 95, 792 A.2d 1208 (commencing analysis from section 146 presumption). In that respect, Camp Jayeee makes a fundamental misstep in its analysis by misconceiving our turn away from the black letter law of lex loci as rendering the place of injury of little importance. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the presumption in section 146 underscores. Indeed, "the simple old rules can be glimpsed through modernity's fog, though spectrally thinned to presumptions." Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.1999).
Section 146 recognizes the intuitively correct principle that the state in which the injury occurs is likely to have the predominant, if not exclusive, relationship to the parties and issues in the litigation. Restatement, supra, § 146 comment d. It is from that vantage point that we turn to the remaining contacts set forth in sections 145 and the cornerstone principles of section 6 to determine whether New Jersey has "a more significant relationship . [with] the occurrence and the parties" than Pennsylvania. Restatement, supra, § 146. Only such a finding would overcome the presumptive rule of section 146.
VL
Under section 145, the first contact is the place where the injury occurred — Pennsylvania. Although Camp Jayeee characterizes the place of injury as Pennsylvania's only contact with the case, nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, the second section 145 contact is the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred — that also is Pennsylvania. Despite our dissenting colleagues' contrary suggestion, the only allegation of negligence in the complaint is negligent supervision at the Pennsylvania campsite. In that respect,
[w]hen both conduct and injury occur in a single jurisdiction, with only "rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied" to determine an actor's liability. That is so because "a state has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there." The place of injury becomes less important when it is simply fortuitous.
[Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 125-26, 733 A.2d 1133 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 145 comment d) (internal citations omitted).]
The place of the injury is fortuitous when "it bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issue." Restatement, supra, § 145 comment e (citing Restatement, supra, § 146 comments d-e). Here, the happening of the tortious conduct and injury in Pennsylvania was not a fortuity, as Camp Jaycee contends — Pennsylvania was the only location in which Camp Jaycee operated its camp for mentally disabled persons. It was a permanent fixture in that location. P.V. resided in Pennsylvania for at least three summers under the control of the camp. From that standpoint, Pennsylvania was not an unanticipated detour on.the way to another location; it was the final destination. See Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 137, 733 A.2d 1133 (citing Reale v. Herco, Inc., 183 A.D.2d 163, 589 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1992) (noting infant plaintiffs decision to vacation at Hershey Park had direct and substantial nexus with Pennsylvania)).
The third contact is "the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." Restatement, supra, § 145(2)(c). To be sure, P.V. is a New Jersey domiciliary, and Camp Jaycee is a New Jersey not-for-profit corporation. However, P.V. chose to attend the camp in Pennsylvania. Moreover, as the Second Restatement underscores, the use of the term "domiciliary" when referring to corporations is imprecise. See id. § 145 comment e. Courts should focus not only on an entity's place of incorporation but also on its principal place of business. Ibid. Indeed, in balancing those two epicenters, "[a]t least with respect to most issues, a corporation's principal place of business is a more important contact than the place of incorporation, and this is particularly true in situations where the corporation does little, or no, business in the latter place." Ibid.
In this case, Camp Jaycee was incorporated for the primary purpose of running a camp for mentally disabled children and adults. As far as this record reveals, Camp Jaycee has chosen to perform that function solely in Effort, Pennsylvania, and, although it does maintain an administrative office in New Jersey, the principal place of the business for which it was incorporated is Pennsylvania.
The final section 145 contact is the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Even if P.V. signed on as a camper through Camp Jayeee's administrative office in New Jersey (and the record is silent on that issue), it is of little consequence because this is not a contracts case. Rather, it is a tort action and, from that perspective, there is no question that P.V.'s relationship with Camp Jayeee was centered on her camp experience in Effort, Pennsylvania.
In sum, on one side of the contacts ledger, P.V. and Camp Jayeee are eo-domiciliaries of New Jersey. On the other side of the ledger, Camp Jayeee chose to perform the sole charitable function for which it was organized in Pennsylvania; P.V. chose to attend a camp in Pennsylvania; the relationship between P.V. and Camp Jayeee was centered on the camp experience in Pennsylvania; the tortious conduct (negligent supervision) took place solely in Pennsylvania; and P.V. was injured in Pennsylvania.
Standing alone, New Jersey's contacts are certainly no greater than those of Pennsylvania. However, because our analysis is not merely quantitative, we also look to the principles of section 6 to measure the significance of those contacts. In other words, do the section 6 considerations gin up or diminish the values to be ascribed to the contacts relative to the issue presented?
VII.
Reduced to their essence, the section 6 principles are: "(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the states." Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 101-02, 792 A.2d 1208 (quoting Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122, 733 A.2d 1133).
A.
The competing interests of the states and relevant tort law principles overlap in this ease. Both Pennsylvania and New Jersey have established tort law systems intended to compensate tort victims and deter wrong-doing. However, from that scheme, New Jersey has carved out charitable corporations and declared them to be free from most tort liability. The Legislature has determined that the proper way to encourage charity in New Jersey and to guarantee continuance of the good works charities provide is to insure they will not have to expend their resources on litigation. "[T]he essence of the public policy favoring charitable immunity is the preservation of private charitable contributions for their designated purposes." Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 169 N.J. 167, 178, 777 A.2d 37 (2001) (quoting Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Dev. Corp., Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 317, 326, 579 A.2d 360 (App.Div.1990)).
As previous rulings have declared, New Jersey's public policy in enacting the CIA is "strong" and is to be "considered remedial and be liberally construed." Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church, 275 N.J.Super. 594, 598, 646 A.2d 1130 (App.Div.1994). Although there are exceptions to the immunity provided, those exceptions do not, in any measure, water down the importance of the policy to our state, and to the extent that the Appellate Division suggested otherwise, it was wide of the mark. In any event, our focus is not on the importance of the policy to the state but on the relationship between the policy and the contacts.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has explicitly rejected the policy of charitable immunity. Flagiello, supra, 208 A.2d at 207-08. It is the characterization of Pennsylvania's policy that is at issue in this case. Camp Jaycee denominates Pennsylvania's abrogation of charitable immunity as nothing more than a post-event loss-allocation construct, which it argues renders the conduct-related contacts in Pennsylvania essentially irrelevant. In framing the issue that way, Camp Jaycee suggests that Pennsylvania's interest will not be impaired if we apply New Jersey law to bar the suit of a New Jersey citizen.
It is not surprising that, in support of that view, Camp Jaycee has relied on the decision in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985). There, two members of a New Jersey Boy Scout troop were sexually abused by their scoutmaster on an outing in New York. Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 681. Their parents sued in New York, and the Court of Appeals of New York held the suit barred by the New Jersey doctrine of charitable immunity to which New York does not subscribe. Ibid. In ruling, the Court characterized New York's abrogation of charitable immunity as a loss-allocation measure. Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 686. It concluded that New York, the place of the conduct and injury, had no true interest in the outcome because the victims and defendant were New Jersey residents, thus making New Jersey the state with the preeminent interest — immunity. Id. 491
N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 688-89.
The dissenting judge disagreed with that characterization:
There can be no question that this State has a paramount interest in preventing and protecting against injurious misconduct within its borders. This interest is particularly vital and compelling where, as here, the tortious misconduct involves sexual abuse and exploitation of children, regardless of the residency of the victims and the tort-feasors. (See, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-60, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354-3356, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, on remand 57 N.Y.2d 256, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582, 441 N.E.2d 1100.) Despite the majority's denial, New York's law in question is intimately connected to this overriding interest.
Indeed, this deterrence function of tort law, whether it be in the form of imposing lability or denying immunity, is a substantial interest of the locus state which is almost universally acknowledged by both commentators and the courts to be a prominent factor deserving significant consideration in the resolution of conflicts problems.
[Schultz, supra, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 691-92.]
That is our conclusion as well. The proper characterization of Pennsylvania's policy is that it is a measure limned for the purpose of "prevention], protection] and compensation]." Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 691. Indeed, when a state decides to abrogate its charitable immunity law, it typically does so with the intention of insuring due care: "[I]t both assures payment of an obligation to the person injured and gives warning that justice and the law demand the exercise of care." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957). In Flagiello, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used strong language to describe its conduct-regulating interest in abolishing charitable immunity:
Human nature being what it is, administrators of a hospital, cognizant that the hospital is insulated from tort liability, may be less likely to exercise maximum scrutiny in selecting personnel than if the hospital were held monetarily liable for slipshod, indifferent, and neglectful conduct of employees. As Justice Rutledge said in the Georgetown case, [President and, Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C.Cir.1942),] "immunity tends to foster neglect while liability tends to induce care and caution."
[Flagiello, supra, 208 A.2d at 202; see also Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 95 (1959) ("[W]e believe that abolition of such immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of school bus accidents _"), superseded by statute, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 to 10-101, as recognized in Harrison v. Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 197 Ill.2d 466, 259 Ill.Dec. 440, 758 N.E.2d 848, 851 (2001); Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762, 97 P.2d 798, 802, 805 (1939) (holding a nonprofit hospital liable to an injured party because "[California] should not be added to the list of those whose courts have encouraged — as in some degree they surely have — the agents of charitable institutions to render less than due care for the security of Ufe, Umb, and property, the very things which it is the sole purpose of such institutions to preserve and protect.").]
Our dissenting colleagues' suggestion that the heart of Flagiello was the transformation of hospitals into "big business" and the protection of Pennsylvania residents says too little. Post at 173-74, 962 A.2d at 478-79. Flagiello devoted equal, if not more, attention to the notion that every wrong has a remedy and the paradoxical and unjust results generally produced by the charitable immunity doctrine. Id. at 195, 197, 203, 204-05.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since extended Flagiello to include torts occurring to non-paying patients in hospitals, Siewicz v. Wyo. Valley Hosp., 417 Pa. 533, 208 A.2d 238, 238 (1965), and torts on property owned by religious organizations, Nolan v. Tifereth Israel Synagogue of Mount Carmel, Pa. Inc., 425 Pa. 106, 227 A.2d 675, 676-77 (1967).
Additionally, in its ruling, the court in Flagiello never referred specifically to Pennsylvania residents but to patients generally. 208 A.2d at 195, 197, 203, 204-05. In fact, the court approvingly quoted Judge Fuld's prophetic statement in Bing that
[i]t is not too much to expect that those who serve and minister to members of the public should do so, as do all others, subject to that principle and within the obligation not to injure through carelessness. It is not alone good morals but sound law that individuals and organizations should be just before they are generous.
[Bing, supra, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d at 8.]
Essentially then, there are two conflicting policies at issue here — New Jersey's post-event loss-allocation policy and Pennsylvania's conduct-regulation and redress policy. The question is how those policies relate to the relevant contacts.
We conclude that, in the main, the policies are aligned with Pennsylvania's contacts. As we previously stated, the fact that the conduct and injury occurred in Pennsylvania was not fortuitous. Camp Jayeee has a continuous and deliberate presence in Pennsylvania. The camp is tasked with the responsibility of supervising and caring for mentally disabled campers for extended periods of time within the commonwealth. It is that perennial presence and activity in Pennsylvania that is inextricably intertwined with Pennsylvania's interest in conduct-regulation. If Pennsylvania's tort law is to have any deterrent impact and protect other campers from the type of harm inflicted upon P.Y., it must be applied in situations where tort-feasors repeatedly perform their tasks within the state, regardless of the home state of the campers. Indeed, there is no way for a state to "make its territory safe for residents without making it safe for visitors too. If it is unsafe for visitors it is unsafe for residents." Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 Geo. L.J. 53, 89 (1991).
Concededly, New Jersey's interest in protecting its charitable corporations is aligned with the parties' co-domieiliary status in this state. However, where, as here, the plaintiff chooses to attend camp and the corporation opts to perform its primary charitable acts outside the state, the strength of that contact is diluted. Indeed, immunity laws are designed to encourage persons to engage in the particular conduct within the state. Where defendant's conduct takes place in another state, the immunity goals are diminished. Restatement, supra, § 146 comment e.
B.
The interest of interstate comity seeks to "further harmonious relations between the states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them." Restatement, supra, § 6 comment d. It considers "whether application of a competing state's law would frustrate the policies of other interested states." Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122, 733 A.2d 1133. Affording immunity for the negligence committed by Camp Jayeee in Pennsylvania would significantly frustrate Pennsylvania's purpose in deterring tortious conduct within the commonwealth. Cf. id. at 137, 733 A.2d 1133 ("New York 'has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there.'" (citation omitted)); see also Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 108, 792 A.2d 1208 (applying New York law "[bjecause the policy underlying New Jersey's law is not thwarted by application of New York . law to this case, and because the compensation and deterrence policies underlying New York's law are advanced.").
Although we have departed from the rigid application of the lexi loci approach, we have continuously deferred to the rights of other jurisdictions to regulate conduct within their borders. That is particularly so when the conduct is ongoing and directed towards residents and non-residents alike.
New Jersey can continue to protect charities operating in this state even if the law of Pennsylvania is applied to the Pennsylvania activities in this case. The converse is not true. If New Jersey's immunity law is applied, Pennsylvania's ability to regulate the conduct of those who chose to operate within its borders will be substantially impaired. See, e.g., Melik, supra, 49 N.J. at 230, 229 A.2d 625 ("In the present case the State of Ohio has a real interest in having its rules of the road apply to the conduct of the parties in the operating of a motor vehicle on the highways of that state. Under principles of comity the courts of New Jersey will recognize and follow the Ohio laws relating to traffic safety."); Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 129, 733 A.2d 1133 (citing Bray v. Cox, 39 A.D.2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785-86 (1972)) (applying New York's law despite both parties being domiciled in New Jersey in recognition that "New York has strong governmental interests in applying Section 388 to an accident within its borders even when none of the parties is a New York resident").
C.
In respect of the parties' expectations, Camp Jayeee argues that the parties' co-domiciliary status in New Jersey gave it a reasonable belief that it would be immune under the CIA and that P.V. should have been aware of that immunity. In other words, it organized in New Jersey so it would not have to respond in tort for its wrongful actions toward beneficiaries, and P.V. understood that protection. That view overlooks the reality of this case: Camp Jaycee operates its camp in Pennsylvania; P.V. chose to attend the camp in Pennsylvania; there is nothing in the camp's certificate of incorporation to suggest that it is limited to New Jersey residents; P.V. was sexually assaulted at the camp in Pennsylvania; and this lawsuit alleges carelessness and negligence at the camp. In Fu, supra, we dismissed the notion that a corporation could reasonably expect automatic immunization when conducting affairs outside the state: "[Hjowever reasonable may be a rental agency's reliance on New Jersey's vicarious liability laws for purposes of an accident in this State, any blanket reliance on this State's law as a defense to conduct occurring in a foreign jurisdiction could not be justified." 160 N.J. at 135, 733 A.2d 1133. Thus, although the parties legitimately might have expected that Camp Jaycee's activities in New Jersey were immune under the CIA, they should not have expected it to carry that immunity into another state.
D.
The interests of judicial administration require courts to consider issues such as practicality and ease of application, factors that in turn further the values of uniformity and predictability. Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 102, 792 A.2d 1208; Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 124, 733 A.2d 1133. As the Second Restatement points out, the section 146 presumption in favor of the law of the state of the injury, in itself, "furthers the choice-of-law values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and, since the state where the injury occurred will usually be readily ascertainable, of ease in the determination and application of the applicable law." Restatement, supra, § 146 comment c. Moreover, where, as here, the contacts and principles of the Second Restatement lead inexorably to the conclusion that a particular state's relationship to the parties and issues is predominant, judicial administration consider ations necessarily yield. Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 102, 792 A.2d 1208 (citing Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 124, 733 A.2d 1133). See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 Ind. L.J. 437, 462 (2000) (recognizing ease-of-application consideration must yield to judicious results in fact-patterns analogous to present case).
VIII.
In sum, in balancing the relevant elements of the most significant relationship test, we seek to apply the law of the state that has the strongest connection to the case. As we have said, in a personal injury action, the analysis begins with section 146 of the Second Restatement, which presumes that the local law of the state of injury will be applied. If the presumptive rule points to a specific jurisdiction, the court will look to the remaining contacts in section 145 and the principles embodied in section 6 of the Restatement to determine whether another state has a more significant relationship to the parties or issues. In that ease, the presumption will be overcome; otherwise, the presumption will govern.
Here, under section 146, the law of Pennsylvania is presumptively applicable because it is the state of injury. In addition, it is the state in which P.V. chose to attend camp; in which Camp Jaycee chose to carry out its charitable function; in which the tortious conduct occurred; and in which the parties' relationship was centered. On the other side of the contacts ledger, P.V. and Camp Jaycee are New Jersey domiciliaries. Thus, both jurisdictions bear a relationship to the case.
On a purely quantitative level, Pennsylvania's contacts substantially outweigh those of New Jersey, suggesting that it is the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and issue. Nevertheless, we have looked to section 6 to determine whether more or less weight should be ascribed to those contacts, thus altering the balance and warranting an override of the section 146 presumption.
Our conclusion is that the presumption has not been overcome. Although both states have strong countervailing policies regarding immunity, Pennsylvania's policy of conduct-regulation and recompense is deeply intertwined with the various Pennsylvania contacts in the case. On the contrary, New Jersey's loss-allocation policy does not warrant the assignment of priority to the parties' domicile in New Jersey in connection with activities outside the state's borders.
The comity considerations likewise favor the Pennsylvania contacts because the application of Pennsylvania law would not thwart New Jersey's interest in protecting charitable activities in this state, whereas the application of New Jersey law would necessarily subvert Pennsylvania's interest in deterrence and recompense. Further, the parties could not have expected New Jersey immunity to apply to the camp's out-of-state activities. Finally, no judicial administration interest is implicated here.
In short, neither the contacts themselves nor the section 6 considerations support the conclusion that New Jersey has a more significant relationship to the case than Pennsylvania. In fact, the converse is true. Although we recognize the vitality of our own policy of immunizing charities, in this case, it must yield to the presumption favoring application of Pennsylvania law, which has not been overcome.
IX.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial judge for further proceedings consistent with the principles to which we have adverted.
The certifícate of incorporation does not limit the organization to providing services to New Jersey residents.
By 2006, only ten states continued to adhere to the First Restatement for tort cases. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 697, 712 (2006).
Section 168, which provides specific guidance regarding charitable immunity, adheres to that analysis: "The law selected by application of the rule of § 145 determines issues of charitable immunity." Restatement, supra, § 168,
Our dissenting colleagues lament the loss of the "more nuanced" governmental interest approach. Post at 157-58, 962 A.2d at 468-69. The question is, more nuanced than what? It is certainly fair to suggest that the governmental interest analysis is more nuanced than its predecessor, the bright line lex loci test. However, as the Second Restatement itself underscores, the most significant relationship test embodies all of the elements of the governmental interest test plus a series of other factors deemed worthy of consideration. Restatement, supra, § 6(2)(b)-(c). As a matter of simple logic, the new end point — the most significant relationship test — is more and not less nuanced than its predecessor.
That is the decisional rationale that.has been adopted by the majority of our sister jurisdictions that abide by the Second Restatement. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 III.2d 147, 316 Ill.Dec. 505, 879 N.E.2d 893, 903-05 (2007); Malena v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 264 Neb. 759, 651 N.W.2d 850, 856-57 (2002); McKinnon v. F.H. Morgan & Co., Inc., 170 Vt. 422, 750 A.2d 1026, 1028-29 (2000); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1984). We recognize as we reaffirm our adherence to the most significant relationship test that the Second Restatement has, like its predecessor, come under criticism. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L.Rev. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying to be all things to all people, it produced mush."); Shaman, supra, 45 Buff. L.Rev. at 361 ("Because the second Restatement tries to be so much and do so much, it is rife with inconsistency, incongruence, and incoherence."). Nevertheless, we believe that its exhaustive analytical framework is an advance over prior models and places us in company with the majority of our sister jurisdictions that have aligned themselves with a specific approach. Symeonides, supra, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. at 712 (identifying twenty-three states that have adopted the Second Restatement approach).
The Charitable Immunity Act does not apply to "aggravated wrongful conduct, such as malice or fraud, or intentional, reckless and wanton, or even grossly negligent behavior." Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 97, 902 A.2d 900 (2006) (quoting Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 NJ. 530, 542, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) (Handler, J., dissenting)).
Most conflicts scholars are in accord with the dissent. The majority opinion in Schultz has been excoriated by conflicts scholars of every stripe as "awful," "perfidious," "troubling," "perverse," "nonsensical," "irrational," and in line with New York's "own bad record in choice of law cases." See Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 Alb. L.Rev. 883, 910-11 (1993); Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles: Paradigm Shift or Pandora's Box?, 18 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 867, 887 (2001); Reynolds, supra, 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1408-11 (1997); Aaron D. Twerski, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: Territorialism in the Guise of Interest Analysis in Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 59 Brook. L.Rev. 1351, 1358-59 (1994).
We note that, on the merits, this case is entirely distinct from Schultz insofar as the Boy Scout troop in Schultz was chartered in New Jersey and the assault took place on an outing to New York. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 681. In fact, some assaults in Schultz also took place in New Jersey. Ibid. Here, the camp was a fixture in Pennsylvania and the assaults and the injury occurred there.