Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gerald BETHEA, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1976-11-22
Citations: 243 Pa. Super. 494
Docket Number: No. 6
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gerald BETHEA, Appellant.
Judges: Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 243
Pages: 494–503

Head Matter:
366 A.2d 262
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gerald BETHEA, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted March 1, 1976.
Decided Nov. 22, 1976.
Application for Allocatur Granted Jan. 31, 1977.
Dusan Bratic, Philip D. Freedman, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Marion E. MacIntyre, 2nd Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

Opinion:
VAN der VOORT, Judge:
On January 5, 1973, at approximately 7:00 P.M., appellant and two other men entered an A & P Supermarket in Harrisburg, and, while robbing the place, engaged in a shoot-out with a security guard, one Leonard Middleton. The manager of the store, Gerald Light, was wounded in the right wrist and left leg, and appellant was shot in the chest. Although numerous shots were fired, and at least twenty adults and several children were in the store at the time, no one else was injured. Appellant left the store aided by several of the robbers and went to Polyclinic Hospital where he was treated for the gunshot wound. Pursuant to a phone call from the hospital, Robert Miller of the Harrisburg police visited appellant in the intensive care unit of the hospital, advised appellant of his rights, and questioned him about the robbery. Appellant admitted at that time, and on several subsequent occasions, to participation in the robbery, and stated that a gun found during a search of his car had been carried by him during the robbery. Appellant was tried on October 3-4, 1973, before a judge and jury, was found guilty of aggravated robbery, assault with intent to maim, and unlawful carrying of firearms, and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of ten to twenty years, two and one-half to five years, and one and one-half to three years. No post-trial motions were filed. Appeal was taken to our Court from the judgment of sentence, with appellant raising two issues, neither of which merits a reversal.
Appellant first argues that he was not effectively represented by trial counsel, since trial counsel failed to follow up on appellant's pro se motion to suppress the results of an allegedly-illegal pre-trial confrontation. The test for effective assistance of counsel is well established: "[C]ounsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests." Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967). In the case before us, the confrontations complained about involved the police taking several of the people who had been in the A & P at the time of the robbery to the hospital "to see if this was the same person that was in the store." In view of the fact that the prosecution had available, and in fact did call at trial, at least one witness who had not seen appellant in the hospital, and considering that appellant, after proper Miranda warnings, on two separate occasions admitted to a police officer that he had taken part in the robbery in question, appellant's counsel could very well have determined that it would be futile to pursue the suppression issue. Trial counsel is not required to raise issues which are obviously without merit. Commonwealth v. Learn, 233 Pa.Super. 288, 335 A.2d 417 (1975): At trial, appellant took the stand and testified that he was in the store at the time of the robbery but stated that he was there only as a customer. Appellant denied that he had admitted to a police officer that he had participated in the robbery. Appellant's trial counsel could very well have concluded that the best possible strategy would be to attempt at trial to raise doubt as to whether appellant was actually a participant in the robbery. We find that the course chosen by counsel did have a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interests.
Appellant's second argument is that the trial judge unconstitutionally based sentence on appellant's refusal to plead guilty. At the time of sentencing, the lower court made the following remarks:
THE COURT: Well Gerald, it's a great shame, but you are going to learn in life that you have a responsibility for your actions, and it is not only your interests that have to be taken into account but it is the interest of the community. This was, as I say, an aggravated crime. As far as I'm concerned, even though it is your first offense I think substantial punishment must be inflicted here. If you had pled guilty, perhaps you were involved, there is no question in my mind, but had you pled guilty it might have shown me the right side of your attitude about this, but you pled not guilty, fought it all the way, and the jury found you guilty, and I'm going to sentence you at this time.
The sentence of the Court is that the defendant pay the cost of prosecution and that he undergo imprisonment in a state institution for a period of not less than ten nor more than twenty years to begin and be computed from January 27, 1973. That's in No. 236 Criminal Division 1973.
In No. 237 Criminal Division 1973 where the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to maim, we direct that he pay the cost of prosecution and that he undergo imprisonment for a period of two and a half to five years, said sentence to be concurrent with the sentence already imposed in 236 Criminal Division 1973.
In No. 238 Criminal Division 1973 where the defendant was convicted of unlawful carrying of firearms, I think the penalty there is three years, is it not?
MR. DILS: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. SEDOR: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The sentence of the Court is that the defendant undergo imprisonment in a state institution for a period not less than one and a half nor more than three years to run concurrent with the sentence imposed in No. 236 Criminal Division 1973.
Now, Gerald, you could have received a sentence of fourteen to twenty-eight years in this crime. I have sentenced you to ten to twenty. I didn't give you the maximum because of your age and the fact that you had a good prior record, but because of the seriousness of this crime and the ever present threat of robberies in this city, which have been occurring here for several years, we are going to serve notice by this case that that sort of thing isn't going to be tolerated.
In Commonwealth v. Staley, 229 Pa.Super. 322, 324 A.2d 393 (1974), our Court vacated a sentence and remanded for resentencing when the sentencing judge indicated that he was going to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant had chosen to stand trial rather than plead guilty: " 'The Court: Mr. Mandracchia, I am aware that Judge Williams gave him only eighteen months minimum to five years. On the other hand, that was a guilty plea. This was a trial. I am disposed to give him a larger minimum in this case because it was a trial.' " 229 Pa.Super. at 323-24, 324 A.2d at 394. On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Hill, 223 Pa.Super. 42, 296 A.2d 860 (1972) our Court affirmed the judgment of sentence although the trial judge had made a remark which indicated that he might have based sentence on appellant's refusal to admit guilt. Our Court found in Hill that the lower court had not based sentence exclusively on the defendant's refusal to admit guilt, but rather found that the court had reviewed all the factors which are appropriate for consideration before sentencing. In the case before us, the remarks of the trial judge indicate that he based the sentence on the violent nature of the crime and the fact that appellant had shown no sense of remorse. As we interpret the trial court's rémarks, proper consideration was given to all relevant factors, and appellant was properly sentenced.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
HOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which SPAETH, J., joins.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion in which HOFFMAN, J., joins.