Case Name: The State against City Council of Charleston
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1817-05
Citations: 1 Mill 36
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State against City Council of Charleston.
Judges: The other Judges concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 36–44

Head Matter:
The State against City Council of Charleston.
nature agiiSVcorporation by the AtbSf Gofiatiie stws court possesses all the Kepreriuftemiiu¿ cündcfth”spowers granted to of6 c3eatto°.° «they may tax bonds, which are Taxable property.
This was a case on information in nature of a quo warranto, tried before Mr. Justice Gantt, at Charleston, in Term, 1816.
The brief states the case in the words of the information, as follows: John S. Richardson, Attorney General of the said state of South Caroli* ^ na, who sues for the said state in this behalf, . * —. . comes here into Court at Charleston, m the dis-7 trict aforesaid, on the 11th day of June, 1816, in the same term, and for the said state, gives the Court here to understand and be informed, that the city of Charleston, to wit, the City Council of Charleston, for the space of years last past, and more, hath used, without any charter or warrant, the power and privilege of franchise, of laying a tax or assessment on bonds, notes, or other obligations, upon which interest hath been, or probably would be received; and of providing for the payment of the said assessment, and in case of default, for enforcing the payment thereof; which said powers the said City Conn eil of Charleston still doth use. That in and by an ordinance ratified in Council the 26th day of February, in the year 1816, entitled “An ordinance to raise supplies for the use of the city of Charleston for the year 1816,” it is ordained, among other things, that the following species of property, owned and possessed within the limits of the city of Charleston, shall be subject to a taxation, in the manner, at the rate, and conformably to the provisions herein after specified, &c.; that after the enumeration of certain subjects of taxation, the said ordinance proceeds as follows, to wit: that all personal estate consisting of money, bonds, notes, or other obligations, upon which interest has been actually received, or will probably be received, (funded stock of this state and the United States excepted,) bank stock, the property and stock of insurance companies, whose capitals are not exempted from taxation by the laws of the state, and all stock in trade, shall be liable to a tax of 75 cents on every hundred dollars of the value or estimate thereof, to be returned by the respective owners, and to be assessed by the city inquirer and assessor, and assistant assessor. That in the several years past, the assessments or taxes made as aforesaid, have been paid to, and received by, the City Council of Charleston, in conformity to the provisions of the ordinance laying the same ; and that in the aforesaid ordinance for raising supplies for the present year, provision is made for raising the assessments required to be made-as aforesaid, and in default of payment thereof w'tiiin the period limited therein, further proviis made for enforcing payment ox me same by process, against the lands and goods of the defaulter; and in case he have neither lands nor' goods, by process against his person; that payment of the aforesaid assessment is now required' to be made. All which powers, privilege, and franchises, the said city of Charleston hath as aforesaid usurped, and still doth usurp, upon the said state, to the great prejudice thereof. Whereupon the said Attorney of the said state, for the said state, prays the advice of the Court in the premises and due process of law against the said City Coimcil of Charleston, in this behalf to be made to answer to the said state, by what warrant the said city of Charleston, to wit, the City Council of Charleston, claim to have, use, and enjoy, the powers, liberties, privileges, or franchises aforesaid. And the' Court having granted the said rule, and the same being served upon the said City Council, they-showed cause by their attorney, John Gadsden, whereupon the said Court of Sessions decided in favour of the relator ; from which decision the said City Council doth appeal to the Constitutional Court upon the following grounds :
Charleston,
May, 1817.
1. That an information in nature of a quo warranto will not lie against a Corporation as a body. at the relation of a private person in the name of the Attorney General.
2. That the said City Council have full power, by the act of incorporation, to make on the inhabitants of Charleston, or those who hold taxable property within the same, for the safety, convenience, benefit, and advantage of the said city, as shall appear to them expedient: That Mr. John Ravenell, the relator, is an inhabitant of the city of Charleston; that the bonds, notes, or other obligations of the said John are taxable property within the said city, and that the said City Council had therefore a right to impose the said tax upon the moneys, bonds, notes, or other obligations of the said John, yielding an interest.
3. That the City Council had a right to levy the said assessment, by the usual process of execution for the collection of taxes.

Opinion:
Colcock, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court. The first ground for consideration is, whether an information in the nature of a quo vjarranto will lie against a corporation as a body, at the relation of a private person in the name of the Attorney General. It is clear that the Court of General Sessions does possess a superintending authority over all civil corporations, by an act of Assembly passed in 173], sect. 31; all the powers of the King's Bench, are vested in this Court; and it is laid down in 1st Blackstone, p. 481, that this power is vested in the King, and by him exercised in his Court of King's Bench; and although it has been said that this power is not vested in the King, as visiter of these corporations, yet it has never been doubted but that the Court of King's Bench, from its general superintending authority, where-other jurisdictions are deficient, has power to regulate and restrain the proceedings of all corporations. The mode of proceeding by information, in the nature of a quo warranto succeeded to the old writ of quo warranto, which fell into disuse with the Court of Eyre, and has always been recognized as a common law proceeding. 3d Burrows, 1817. The statute of Anne, as well as that of 4 and 5 of William and Mary, (which latter is not of force in this State,) gave this remedy to individuals; the former in cases relating to corporate rights, the latter generally for all misdemeanors. Although it appear to admit of some doubt whether an information in nature of a quo warranto, at the instance of a particular individual, will lie against a corporation as a body, yet there can be none that such a proceeding by the Attorney General, in behalf of the State, will lie, 2 Shower, p. 275; Salk, p. 374; 3 Burrows, p. 1812; 5 Mass. Rep. p. 30; 8th Modern, p. 114; Lord Raymond. I am induced to consider the case before us as one of this character. Two objections have been urged against this: first, that the' information is signed by the Attorney General, at the request of John Ravenell; and secondly, that it is a matter of individual concern, and there is a private • remedy. As to first, the words " at the request, &c." may be rejected as surplusage. 1 Burrows, p. 407. It may be considered as a mere memorandum of the name of the person who gave the. first information to the Attorney General; for in all such cases it is clear that this public officer must be informed by some individuals of the usurpation of the rights of government. It cannot be conceived that he officially would know of every encroachment which might be made by corporations on the prerogatives of government. The information does not in the body of it profess to be ex relatione John Ravenell, and this.is always the case when the proceeding is for an individual injury. But does it appear that this is for an individual injury? I conceive it does not. On, the contrary, it is a matter of general concern to all the corporators of the city. The complaint is, that the City Council has passed an ordinance unlawfully imposing a tax on bonds. Can this be said to affect Mr. Ravenell alone ? If the charge be well founded, is it not a usurpation of the power of the State ? It is worthy of remark, that in two of the cases above quoted, The King vs. the City of London, and The King vs. The Mayor of Genterden, this was the ground of complaint; and in the latter case, among the reasons assigned for granting the rule, is one which may be considered as a satisfactory an swer to the objection, that the individual had a remedy by action at law. " The Court directed ' \ J ' that this matter should bé tried upon information, and that for two reasons. The one, because a single person might not be able to contest this matter in an action against the whole corporation; and the other, because if a verdict should pass for or against such single person, it would not end the contest which might happen with the rest." 8th Modern Reports, 114. The case then is considered as a public prosecution, in the name of the Attorney General, in behalf of the State. In determining the second ground, it . will be necessary to recur to the act of incorporation, the 4th clause of which enacts, among' other things, " That the said City Council shall also'be vested with full power and authority to make, such assessments on the inhabitants of Charleston, or those who hold taxable property within the same, for the safety, convenience, benefit, and advantáge of the said city, as shall appear to thein expedient." In pursuance of which authority, the City Council, on the 26th February, 18! 6, passed the ordinance imposing the tax complained of. It is said that the clause of the act of incorporation does not give the city the power to tax bonds yielding interest, because, 1. They are not considered as property. 2. If so considered, they cannot be called taxable property, within the meaning of the legislature; and, a corporation cannot take any pówer by im plication; but whenever their authority is questioned they must show it clearly. Upon the first point in this ground, there can be little doubt. Whatever opinion may have been entertained in relation to choses in action, it is now a received one that they are considered as property. A devise of all testators' goods will pass. Bonds 4, Bacon, 353. It was contended that they are not to be considered as taxable, because at the time of the incorporation of the city they were not regarded in that light, and because there is no direct benefit derived from the corporation to bonds. The act is unquestionably prospective in its operation; and this is to be collected both from its language and design: from its language, because it says they are vested with power to make such assessments as shall appear to them expedient. From its design, which was to vest them with full powers to regulate the police of the city, for the safety, convenience, benefit, and advantage of its inhabitants. It is presumed that the principle of taxation has been misconceived. It is not necessary to show a direct benefit resulting from the protection of government to the particular, article taxed; but the right to tax an individual results from the general protection afforded to himself and property. Vattel, p. 150. And a rule established in all well regulated communities is, that the citizens . should contribute towards the support of government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities. The sources of revenue to individuals are rent, profit, and wages, and every ^ax mus^ he finally paid from one or all three of these' sorts of revenue. Smith's Wealth of Nations, Vol. 3, 255; do. 3 Vol. 216, 247, 248. A profit on bonds, then, as well as a profit on money, is a legitimate subject of taxation. It has been so considered by most of the European governments, and by our state. But suppose a case, (and it cannot be considered as an extreme one, for it is common in our state;) a man converts all his property into bonds: would it be just that he should enjoy the -benefits resulting from the police of the city, and not contribute towards its support ? I presume not. 1 am of opinion, then, that the act of incorporation is prospective in its operation, and that bonds are taxable property within the meaning and spirit of it; and that therefore the City Council had a right to pass the ordinance in question. As to the third ground, I shall give no opinion on it, because it does not appear to arise in the information, and the counsel did not appear to conceive it material.
ü?"taxable
Ravenell and Toomer in support of the motion.
Gadsden, contra.
The other Judges concurred.