Case Name: Fairbank Canning Company v. Elizabeth C. Innes
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1887-04-26
Citations: 24 Ill. App. 33
Docket Number: 
Parties: Fairbank Canning Company v. Elizabeth C. Innes.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 33–39

Head Matter:
Fairbank Canning Company v. Elizabeth C. Innes.
Action against Employer for Damages for Causing Death of Plaintiff's Husband—Agreement—Reasonable Care—Approved Appliances—Defective Elevator—Negligence—Question for Jury—Practice—Declaration—Instructions.
1. In an action to recover damages for causing the death of the plaintiff’s husband, who was killed by reason of the defective construction of an elevator which he was employed to operate, it is held: That a certain conversation with the deceased can not be construed as an agreement on his part to take the risk of defects in the construction of the elgvator, or to relieve the defendant from the duty of using reasonable care to provide such appliances for safety as were known and in general use;' that it was for the jury to draw from the evidence the inference of care or of negligence; that the deciar ition was sufficient after verdict; and that objection to it should have been taken by demurrer before trial.
2. Upon a rehearing it is further held: That in the absence of proof of any other intervening cause, the giving way of the timbers and supports was of itself sufficient evidence to justify a verdict that their construction was negligent; that it was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care and diligence in supplying, for the use of its employes, machinery which should be reasonably safe and secure; that it was for the jury to determine whether an elevator constructed without a brake was reasonably safe; that the evidence does not show a contract on the part of the deceased to assume any risks beyond those which might result from his own want of care; that there is no evidence tending to charge him with negligence; and that there was no substantial error in giving and refusing instructions.
[Opinion filed April 26, 1887.]
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Bollin S. Williamson, Judge, presiding.
Mr. John C. Richberg, for appellant.
“ Where defects in machinery or other appliances are as well known to the servant as to the master, the servant must be regarded as voluntarily incurring the risks resulting from its use, unless the master, by urging upon the servant or coercing him. into danger, or in some other way, directly contributes to the injury.” C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 18 Ill. App. 124.
In this case there was no urging or coercing; on the contrary, the deceased was warned that he took it at his own risk, as it was; he knew just as well as the master that there was no air-brake on this elevator; as an experienced elevator man, who had made two trial trips, he could not help but know it; and if the steam-brake was taken off on the night of February 2d, he was bound to know when he took charge of the elevator on the 3d, that it was not on, and certainly before the accident occurred, as he had made numerous trips on the morning of the accident. C., R. I. & P. R’y Co. v. Lonergan 118 Ill. 41; Payne v. Reese, 100 Pa. 306; C. & N. W. R’y Co. v. Snyder, 117 Ill. 376; C., M. & St. P. R’y Co. v. Stondart, 16 Ill. App. 145; Stafford v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 114 Ill. 244; C. & E. I. E. R. Co. v. Geary, 110 Ill. 383, 389.
Mr. John B. Skinner, for appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Appellant brings this appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for 85,000, recovered by appellee for causing the death of George Innes, the husband of appellee.
It appears from the record that the deceased was employed by the superintendent of appellant to run the elevator, that he was an experienced elevator man, had run elevators for many years and was careful and competent. Within a short time after he commenced to run the elevator on the first trip he made, either the beams overhead and which bore the weight of the elevator, or the wheel over which the cable ran, broke, and the elevator was precipitated to the bottom of the shaft and Innes was killed. There is nothing to show that the falling of the elevator was due to any carelessness on the part of deceased, and from his experience and character for prudence the jury might infer the exercise by him of proper care in managing the elevator. It is in proof that there was no air-brake on the elevator and that if a proper air-brake had been upon it, the fall of the elevator would have been prevented. It further appears that a steam-brake, which was on the elevator, was removed, and it does not appear that the attention of Innes was called to the fact that there was no air or steam-brake upon it when he was placed in charge of it. So far as external appearance went, the elevator appeared to be in good condition. The superintendent told Innes when he went upon the elevator that he must look out and run at his own.risk, and Innes told him not to be afraid, that he had run an elevator for twenty years. Appellant presses this with a view of showing that Innes took the risk of all danger, but we think it plain that the conversation had reference to his care and his competency and that it can not be understood as an agreement on his part that he took the risk of defects in the construction or machinery of the elevator which were unknown to him, or that it can be construed to relieve the appellee from the duty of using reasonable care to provide upon the elevator such appliances for safety as were known and in general use. The jury is the proper tribunal to draw from the evidence the inference of care and of negligence in such cases, and when there is evidence before them which authorizessuch inferences the court can not interfere.
Ho point is made against the instructions of the court, but counsel contends that the declaration is insufficient, and that this motion in arrest of judgment ought'to have been sustained; we think the declaration' sufficient after verdict. The objection to it should have been taken by demurrer before trial. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Harwood, 90 Ill. 425; L. S. & M. S. R'y Co. v. O'Connor, 115 Ill. 254.
On the whole record, we think the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.