Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, v. Wayne J. PRATHER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-02-18
Citations: 290 So. 2d 840
Docket Number: No. 53979
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, v. Wayne J. PRATHER.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 840–843

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, v. Wayne J. PRATHER.
No. 53979.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 18, 1974.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Fred A. Blanche, III, Sp. Prosecutor, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Murphy W. Bell, Director, Warren J. Hebert, Trial Atty., Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
The defendant was tried and convicted of simple burglary. R.S. 14:62. He was sentenced to serve three years in the State penitentiary. Defendant appeals, relying upon one bill of exceptions to obtain a reversal of his conviction and sentence.
At trial the defendant, through his counsel, announced his intention to take the witness stand in his own behalf. Defense counsel informed the court out of the presence of the jury that the defendant had previously been convicted of burglary, and moved that the district attorney be prohibited from using this conviction for impeachment purposes. The trial judge, relying upon R.S. 15 :495, overruled this motion stating:
". . . in the opinion of this Court, those questions should be limited — prior convictions should be limited to matters which reflect on veracity under oath, such as perjury. However, that is not our jurisprudence, and therefore, the Court will overrule the motion that was made by counsel."
Defendant reserved his one bill of exceptions. The accused then took the stand in his own behalf, and the State used his prior conviction to impeach his credibility.
Defense counsel concedes that R.S. 15:495 clearly permits the State to use evidence of prior convictions of felonies to impeach the credibility of a defendant once the defendant has placed his credibility at issue by becoming a witness at the trial. He contends, however, that the statute is unconstitutional, depriving the accused of due process and equal protection of the laws.
R.S. 15:495 provides:
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced from any other source than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached, he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit the same; and no witness, whether he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein."
R.S. 15:462 provides:
"When a person accused, or a husband or wife becomes a witness, such witness shall be subject to all the rules that apply to other witnesses, and may be cross-examined upon the whole case."
The trial judge was correct in his application of the statute. Louisiana jurisprudence has not limited impeachment testimony to recent crimes, nor to crimes indicative of the credibility of the witness or of the testifying defendant. State v. Rossi, La., 273 So.2d 265 (1973). R.S. 15:495 has been read to include convictions of misdemeanors. State v. Odom, La., 273 So.2d 261 (1973); State v. Dundas, 168 La. 95, 121 So. 586 (1929) and the cases cited therein.
Our jurisprudence is uniform in holding that a witness who takes the witness stand in his own behalf waives his privilege against self incrimination, and is subject to cross-examination and impeachment in the same manner as any other witness. State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227 (1958); State v. Suire, 142 La. 101, 76 So. 254 (1917).
In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967), the United States Supreme Court in dicta recognized the validity of using evidence of other crimes for purposes of impeachment when the defendant has taken the stand and testified on his own behalf. The proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (approved by the Supreme Court and currently awaiting Congressional approval) perpetuate this traditionally recognized method of impeachment.
In the present case the defendant admitted a previous conviction of burglary that occurred two years before. This conviction is not too remote in time to be irrelevant. The jury is capable of assigning a proper weight to such evidence affecting the defendant's credibility.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
. Contra, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). In Santiago a statute similar to R.S. 15 :495 was held unconstitutional.