Case Name: JOHN R., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1989-03-30
Citations: 48 Cal. 3d 438
Docket Number: No. S003000
Parties: JOHN R., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 438–467

Head Matter:
[No. S003000.
Mar. 30, 1989.]
JOHN R., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel
Taylor R. Culver, William A. Barnes and William C. McNeill III for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Robert M. Aran, Starnes & Drapiewski, Jennifer A. Becker and Christopher N. Wu as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Ralph A. Lombardi, Owen T. Rooney and Hardin, Cook, Loper, Engel & Bergez for Defendant and Respondent.
Breon, O’Donnell & Miller, Margaret E. O’Donnell, Emi R. Uyehara and Nancy B. Bourne as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

Opinion:
Opinion
ARGUELLES, J.
John R., then a 14-year-old junior high school student, allegedly was sexually molested by his mathematics teacher while he was at the teacher's apartment participating in an officially sanctioned, extracurricular program. The principal question before us is whether the school district that employed the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. We hold that the doctrine is not applicable in these circumstances and that while the school district may be liable if its own direct negligence is established, it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee's torts.
Facts
At the time of the incidents giving rise to this case, John R. was a ninth grade student at a junior high school in the Oakland Unified School District (district). His mathematics teacher, who had also taught John in the seventh grade, asked John to participate in the school's instructional, work-experience program, under which students received both school credit and monetary payments for assisting teachers by, for example, helping to correct other students' papers. The nature of the tasks would suggest that the program was aimed mainly at high-performing students. John had a history of poor grades in mathematics, but his marks in this teacher's class reflected what his attorney, no doubt ironically, termed "a remarkable increase in his ability to do math . . . ."
Whether legitimately or through artificially inflated grades, John was allowed to participate in the program. Performance of the required work by students at teachers' homes was an option authorized by the district, and the teacher either encouraged or required John to come to his apartment for this purpose. Over the course of many sessions at the teacher's apartment, the teacher sought to develop a close relationship with John as the boy's tutor and counselor, and ultimately endeavored to seduce him. The teacher attempted to convince John that engaging in sex acts with him would be a constructive part of their relationship and, at times, threatened to give John failing grades if John would not go along with his desires and said he would tell people that John had solicited sex from him. On one occasion in February of 1981, the teacher succeeded in pressuring John into sexual acts, including oral copulation and anal intercourse.
When John protested and told the teacher he would report the incidents to his parents, the teacher threatened to retaliate against him if he revealed what had taken place. As a result of these threats, and his embarrassment and shame at what had happened, John did not disclose the incidents to anyone for a number of months. John finally told his father about the molestation 10 months later in December 1981.
John's mother reported the incident to the district that same month, speaking to the vice-principal of John's school and a district community relations representative and asking them how she should proceed. She was advised to put the matter in the hands of the police, who were then told of the molestation by the district representative. John's mother also contacted an attorney and was advised by him to wait for the criminal investigation to substantiate John's charges before she pursued any civil remedy.
John's parents, on behalf of their son and on their own behalf, brought suit against the teacher and the district, alleging that the district was vicariously liable for the teacher's acts and directly liable for its own negligence. After two rounds of demurrers and amended complaints, the district's demurrer to plaintiffs' third amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the four causes of action on which plaintiffs sought to hold the district indirectly liable for the teacher's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The case then proceeded to trial against the teacher on all causes of action and against the district limited to those causes of action premised upon its direct liability for negligent hiring and supervision of the teacher. At the outset of trial, the district's motion for nonsuit as to those remaining claims was granted on grounds unrelated to the merits (post, p. 444), and judgment was entered in the district's favor on all causes of action against it.
The Court of Appeal reversed both the grant of nonsuit and the earlier order sustaining the district's demurrer to those causes of action against it premised on a theory of vicarious liability, reasoning that the facts as pleaded by plaintiffs could allow the trier of fact to find the district responsible for the tort of its employee because the teacher's misconduct, although not within or contemplated by his official duties, was made possible by his use, and abuse, of the official, job-created authority he was given over the boy. We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly resolved this unsettled and significant question.
Discussion
Timeliness of Claim
Before we turn to the vicarious liability issue, we must first address a threshold question—whether plaintiffs complied in timely fashion with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)—for if we were to conclude they did not, all of their claims against the district would be barred on that ground (Gov. Code, § 945.4; see Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal.3d 874, 883 [112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588]), and we would have no occasion to consider whether the district could be held vicariously liable for the tort of its employee. The question arises here because plaintiffs did not present a written claim to the district within 100 days of the accrual of their causes of action—measured from the date that John was molested—as then required by Government Code section 911.2, nor did they present an application for leave to file a late claim within 1 year of that time, as required by Government Code section 911.4, subdivision (b).
Although the trial court initially found that plaintiffs should be excused from the statutory claim requirement, it later granted a nonsuit in favor of the district on this issue. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the trial court on this point, holding that plaintiffs' late-claim application, presented to the district in May 1982 some 15 months after the assault, was made within the allowable 1-year period because, under the "delayed discovery" doctrine (see Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 187 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421]), plaintiffs' causes of action should not be deemed to have accrued until John told his parents about the incidents in December 1981. The district contends the Court of Appeal erred in finding the claim timely on that basis.
Our initial review of this issue raised a serious question in our minds whether the relevant authorities supported application of a delayed-discovery theory of accrual on the facts of this case, but it appeared that, under the reasoning of a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions (see, e.g., Snyder v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1318, 1324 [253 Cal.Rptr. 156]; DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1026 [242 Cal.Rptr. 368]), the facts alleged in the complaint, if proven, might well demonstrate that the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel. We accordingly requested the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question and, having fully considered the issue, now conclude it is appropriate to remand the timeliness question for a factual determination on the applicability of equitable estoppel.
It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. (See, e.g., Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood (1971) 6 Cal.3d 353, 357-359 [99 Cal.Rptr. 13, 491 P.2d 805]; Rand v. Andreatta (1964) 60 Cal.2d 846, 850 [36 Cal.Rptr. 846, 389 P.2d 382]; Bruce v. Jefferson Union High Sch. Dist. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 632, 635 [26 Cal.Rptr. 762].) Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential. (See Industrial Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 684, 689-690 [252 P.2d 649].) A fortiori, estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim. (See, e.g., DeRose v. Carswell, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1026; Longo v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co., N.Y.C. Sys. (3d Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 443, 444.) And here, the teacher's threats to retaliate against John if the boy reported the incidents of sexual molestation allegedly did just that.
Although the teacher's alleged threats in this case were no doubt motivated largely by self-interest, rather than to prevent John from filing a claim against the district, it would clearly be inconsistent with the equitable underpinnings of the estoppel doctrine to permit the district to benefit to plaintiffs' detriment by such threats. (Cf. Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist. (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 715, 722-723 [300 P.2d 78].) Putting aside for the moment the substantive question whether the district may be held vicariously liable for the teacher's alleged molestation of John, we have no hesitation in concluding that the teacher's threats may be taken into account in resolving the procedural status of plaintiffs' claims against the district. Plaintiffs alleged that the district's own negligent conduct—e.g., the failure to make an adequate investigation of the teacher's background before hiring him and the failure to guarantee that the extracurricular program was properly supervised—renders it liable for their injuries. Assuming plaintiffs can establish their case, it would plainly be inequitable to permit the district to escape liability only because the teacher's threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the district had elapsed. We conclude that, for purposes of applying equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against the district was tolled during the period that the teacher's threats prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.
We do not determine as a matter of law that the district is estopped from asserting as a defense plaintiffs' failure to comply with the claims statutes. That is a question of fact for the trial court on remand. (Henry v. City of Los Angeles (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 299, 306 [20 Cal.Rptr. 440].) Because the trial court did not analyze the timeliness of plaintiffs' claims in this light, it made no findings on any of the factual issues relevant to the equitable estoppel doctrine. It did not determine (1) whether any threats were in fact made by the teacher, (2) when the effect of any such threats ceased, or (3) whether plaintiffs acted within a reasonable time after the coercive effect of the threats had ended. (See DeRose v. Carswell, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1026-1027; Bertorelli v. City of Tulare (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 440-442 [225 Cal.Rptr. 582].) In the absence of an adverse finding on any of these points, it was error to have granted a nonsuit in favor of the district on the timeliness question; on remand, the trial court must resolve these matters to determine whether the action may go forward.
Our decision that a remand is required on the timeliness question brings to the fore the more pressing question in this case, as we must now decide whether plaintiffs should not only have the opportunity to pursue their claims against the district premised upon its direct liability for negligent hiring and supervision of the teacher, but whether they may also seek to hold the district vicariously liable for the acts of its employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Vicarious Liability
The principles governing application of the doctrine of respondeat superi- or to make an employer responsible for the torts of an employee are familiar and easily stated. "[A]n employer's liability extends to torts of an employee committed within the scope of his employment. [Citation.] This includes willful and malicious torts as well as negligence. [Citation.]" (Martinez v. Hagopian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1227 [227 Cal.Rptr. 763].) Whether a tort was committed within the scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, where the undisputed facts would not support an inference that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. (Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 138 [176 Cal.Rptr. 287].)
Scope of employment is viewed broadly in this context. "The fact that an employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment at the time of his wrongful act does not preclude attribution of liability to an employer. [Citation.]" (Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.) The employer is not liable if the employee substantially departs from his duties for purely personal reasons (ibid.), but "where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been serving his employer." (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 756, 758-759 [172 P.2d 1], quoted with approval in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 970 [227 Cal.Rptr. 106, 719 P.2d 676].)
The question before us here is whether an employer (specifically, a school district) can be held liable for a sexual assault committed by an employee (here, a teacher) on another person (particularly, on a student committed to that teacher's supervision). The natural, initial reaction is "No! Of course not!" A more personal escapade less related to an employer's interests is difficult to imagine. But the question is not so easily disposed of. It is closer than might appear upon first examination, but we ultimately conclude the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the trial court on this point.
The courts of other jurisdictions and our own Courts of Appeal have struggled in recent years over whether and how to apply the respondeat superior doctrine to the sexual assaults or misconduct of employees. The historical and perhaps still prevailing point of view declines to impose vicarious liability in such circumstances. But the other school of thought has its adherents as well, and what we must decide here is if such liability should be imposed in light of the law of this state and the purposes of the doctrine.
Plaintiffs urge us to take the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal, which looked not to whether a teacher's sexual abuse of a student is foreseeable in the sense that it is characteristic of the job or broadly incidental to a school district's activities (see Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968), but rather to the nature of the teacher-student relationship. The essence of their argument is that vicarious liability is appropriate when the tort is a consequence of the employer's conferring of official authority on the employee. That is, plaintiffs would have us impose liability on the employer if: (1) there is an official, job-created, hierarchical relationship by which the employee is given authority over a certain, and possibly limited, class of persons; and (2) there is a sufficient nexus between the exercise of that authority and the commission of the tort that it was foreseeable the authority so conferred might be abused to the detriment of the victim.
We recognize that this theory is not without substance. It serves to explain certain of the decisions imposing liability on employers for the sexual misconduct of their employees and to distinguish those cases declining to hold the employer responsible, and finds some support in the language of both lines of cases.
In Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 133, for example, holding a school district not liable for a janitor's rape of a student, the court noted: "In each of the[] cases [in which an employer was held vicariously liable for an employee's tortious assault on a third party], a work-related dispute preceded the assault. . . . [I]t is clear from this line of cases . . . that the acts leading up to the tort must bear some relation to the employee's duties." (Id., at p. 141.) Unlike the present case, there was plainly no work-related basis for the janitor's assault, no authority given him over the student, and no more than "an independent, self-serving pursuit wholly unrelated to his custodial duties." (Ibid.)
In White, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, holding a county subject to vicarious liability for the threats made by a deputy sheriff to rape and murder a motorist he had stopped, the court employed substantially the reasoning plaintiffs would have us adopt here: "A police officer is entrusted with a great deal of authority. This authority distinguishes the situation here from the facts of Alma W. Unlike a school custodian, the police officer carries the authority of the law with him into the community. The officer is supplied with a conspicuous automobile, a badge and a gun to ensure immediate compliance with his directions. The officer's method of dealing with this authority is certainly incidental to his duties; indeed, it is an integral part of them. . . . [T]he wrongful acts flowed from the very exercise of this authority. [][] It follows that the employer/government must be responsible for acts done during the exercise of this authority." (Id., at p. 571.)
And in Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 718, holding a church not responsible for a Sunday school teacher's molestation of a minor, the same Court of Appeal that decided White explained its earlier decision: "The distinguishing feature in White is that the errant conduct arose out of an abuse of the employee's official authority. By virtue of the exercise of this authority, the police officer was able to perpetrate his assault. The focus is not on whether the police officer's activity is either characteristic or foreseeable, but rather on whether the assault arose out of the exercise of job-created authority over the plaintiff." (Id., at p. 723.)
Plaintiffs urge us to adopt this rationale and to find the authority given a teacher over a student tantamount to that given the police officer over the community at large. We agree that in the eyes of a child, a teacher's authority can be very great. And here the complaint alleged the teacher used his authority to obtain John's participation in the extracurricular program and thereby obtained the boy's presence at the teacher's home away from other eyes. The teacher told John that sexual conduct was part of a teacher-student relationship and was intended to help John with his problems. The extensive control teachers are authorized to exercise over their students supports the analogy to White, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, and lends some credence to the proposition that a school district should not be immune from liability where a teacher's molestation of a student directly flows from the exercise of that job-created authority.
But although the facts of this case can be made to fit a version of the respondeat superior doctrine, we are unpersuaded that they should be or that the doctrine is appropriately invoked here. We draw our decision not from the various factual scenarios in which vicarious liability has or has not been imposed on employers for the torts of their employees, but instead from the underlying rationale for the respondeat superior doctrine.
"The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing business." (Johnston v. Long (1947) 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [181 P.2d 645].) "Although earlier authorities sought to justify the respondeat superior doctrine on such theories as 'control' by the master of the servant, the master's 'privilege' in being permitted to employ another, the third party's innocence in comparison to the master's selection of the servant, or the master's 'deep pocket' to pay for the loss, 'the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business.' " (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959-960 [88 Cal.Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988], quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) p. 471.) "Three reasons have been suggested for imposing liability on an enterprise for the risks incident to the enterprise: '(1) [I]t tends to provide a spur toward accident prevention; (2) it tends to provide greater assurance of compensation for accident victims])] and (3) at the same time it tends to provide reasonable assurance that, like other costs, accident losses will be broadly and equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the enterprises that entail them.' ' (Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967, quoting 5 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) § 26.5, p. 21, fns. omitted.)
The first of these three considerations just noted plays little role in the allocation of responsibility for the sexual misconduct of employees generally, and with respect to the unique situation of teachers, indicates that untoward consequences could flow from imposing vicarious liability on school districts. Although it is unquestionably important to encourage both the careful selection of these employees and the close monitoring of their conduct, such concerns are, we think, better addressed by holding school districts to the exercise of due care in such matters and subjecting them to liability only for their own direct negligence in that regard. Applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose, in effect, strict liability in this context would be far too likely to deter districts from encouraging, or even authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one contacts between teachers and students or to induce districts to impose such rigorous controls on activities of this nature that the educational process would be negatively affected.
Nor is the second consideration—the assurance of compensation for accident victims—appropriately invoked here. The acts here differ from the normal range of risks for which costs can be spread and insurance sought. (See Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 144.) The imposition of vicarious liability on school districts for the sexual torts of their employees would tend to make insurance, already a scarce resource, even harder to obtain, and could lead to the diversion of needed funds from the classroom to cover claims.
The only element of the analysis that might point in favor of vicarious liability here is the propriety of spreading the risk of loss among the beneficiaries of the enterprise. School districts and the community at large benefit from the authority placed in teachers to carry out the educational mission, and it can be argued that the consequences of an abuse of that authority should be shared on an equally broad basis. But the connection between the authority conferred on teachers to carry out their instructional duties and the abuse of that authority to indulge in personal, sexual misconduct is simply too attenuated to deem a sexual assault as falling within the range of risks allocable to a teacher's employer. It is not a cost this particular enterprise should bear, and the consequences of imposing liability are unacceptable.
In sum, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in looking mainly to the factual similarities between this case and White, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, and in failing to consider whether the underlying justifications for the respondeat superior doctrine would be served by imposing vicarious liability here. We need not and do not decide whether White itself was properly decided or whether the job-created authority theory has any validity in evaluating vicarious liability for the torts of police officers. It suffices here to note that the authority of a police officer over a motorist—bolstered most immediately by his uniform, badge and firearm, and only slightly less so by the prospect of criminal sanctions for disobedience—plainly surpasses that of a teacher over a student. The teacher's authority is different in both degree and kind, and it is simply not great enough to persuade us that vicarious liability should attach here for the teacher's tort. Furthermore, invoking respondeat superior here would raise an entirely different specter of untoward consequences, or interference with the purposes for which the authority was conferred in the first place, than might result from the imposition of vicarious liability in the limited context of a police officer's abuse of authority. We doubt that police departments would deprive their officers of weapons or preclude them from enforcing the laws, but we see a significant and unacceptable risk that school districts would be dissuaded from permitting teachers to interact with their students on any but the most formal and supervised basis.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed insofar as it reversed the trial court's grant of nonsuit based on the untimeliness of plaintiffs' late-claim application under the Tort Claims Act—thus allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to show, in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion, that their application was timely under principles of equitable estoppel. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it reversed the trial court's order sustaining the district's demurrer to those claims premised on a theory of vicarious liability under the respondeat superior doctrine and the Court of Appeal is directed to enter judgment affirming the trial court's order—thus leaving plaintiffs free to pursue only their claims against the district premised on its own direct negligence in hiring and supervising the teacher.
Broussard, J., concurred.
As this case comes before us following an appeal from a judgment of nonsuit at the outset of trial and a prior order sustaining a demurrer to the third amended complaint, we accept as true the facts alleged by plaintiffs. (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 714, fn. 3 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]; Smith v. Roach (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 893, 897 [126 Cal.Rptr. 29].)
Criminal charges were filed against the teacher on the theory, based on John's statements at the time, that the molestation occurred in May of 1981. John so testified at the teacher's trial in August of 1982. After both sides had rested in that trial, the court dismissed the charges. The parties before us agreed in the Court of Appeal that the case was dismissed because the evidence showed, and the judge stated, that the incident could not have occurred any later than February of 1981.
A cause of action accrues for purposes of the filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act on the same date a similar action against a nonpublic entity would be deemed to accrue for purposes of applying the relevant statute of limitations. (Gov. Code, § 901.) For minors, however, the time of accrual is generally more significant in the context of the claims statute. With certain exceptions, the statute of limitations does not run during the time a potential plaintiif is a minor, and such a party accordingly has up to a year after attaining the age of majority to bring suit on a cause of action for personal injury. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 352, subd. (a).) This respite does not apply to a claim against a public entity under the Tort Claims Act, however (Code Civ. Proc., § 352, subd. (b)), and Government Code section 911.4, subdivision (b) expressly provides that the "time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss is a minor shall be counted" in determining whether a late-claim application was timely filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action.
This is not, as Justice Eagleson's concurring and dissenting opinion would have it (cone, and dis. opn., post, p. 459), delayed discovery in different guise. Quite simply, equitable estoppel may prove to preclude the district from asserting that plaintiffs' claims were not timely made; it cannot, as might delayed accrual of the causes of action, lead to the conclusion that the claims were in fact timely. As a result, equitable estoppel imposes requirements on a claimant that a delayed-discovery theory of accrual would not. (See, e.g., Regus v. Schartkoff (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 382, 387 [319 P.2d 721].) That the two doctrines may produce similar results in some circumstances does not make them equivalents, and it is misleading to assert that the majority does so.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Eagleson apparently thinks it contradictory for us to conclude that the teacher's threats may be the basis of an estoppel against the district although we conclude the district cannot be held vicariously liable for the teacher's underlying conduct. (See cone, and dis. opn.,post, pp. 455-457.) Not so. There is no inconsistency in distinguishing the acts supporting a claim of estoppel here (the teacher's threats) from those on which plaintiffs premise their causes of action (the sexual molestation), for estoppel rests on the conduct which precluded the filing of a claim, conduct separate and apart from that which caused the injury on which the claim is based. First, such threats might be made by an employee in an effort to conceal any number of underlying torts, some of which would be within the scope of employment and others not. Whether an employer would be vicariously liable on the underlying claim has no bearing on whether the threats would justify an estoppel, allowing that claim to be brought and the question of vicarious liability resolved on the merits. Second, even if, as here, the conduct which caused the injury falls outside the scope of employment and fails to provide a basis for imposing vicarious liability, the employer may be independently liable for its own conduct. And if the employee succeeds by threats or duress in coercing the victim not to file a claim within the relevant period, the employer may be estopped from relying on that separate and independent misconduct to absolve itself of any responsibility for its own acts.
In determining when the estoppel ceased to operate here, the trial court must take into account the nature of the conduct on which the estoppel is based—conduct that here lacks a clear ending point, particularly in light of the allegations that the teacher's threats against John continued even after the boy had told his parents of the molestation and the incidents had been reported to the district and the police. The finding on that point will not only affect the inquiry into whether plaintiffs acted within a reasonable time after the estoppel expired, but will also dictate whether plaintiffs must show the delay in filing their claims was excused by mistake or excusable neglect (see Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c)) and whether the district should have the opportunity to demonstrate prejudice in defending against the claims as a result of the delay. (See Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 32 [56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818].)
See Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718, 722-724 [243 Cal.Rptr. 128] (church not liable for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1461 [232 Cal.Rptr. 685] (archbishop not liable for sexual relations between seven priests and minor parishioner); Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pages 143-144 (school district not liable for rape of student by janitor); Boykin v. District of Columbia (D.C.App. 1984) 484 A.2d 560, 562-563 (school district not liable for sexual assault on student by teacher); Bozarth v. Harper Creek Bd. of Ed. (1979) 94 Mich.App. 351 [288 N.W.2d 424, 425] (same); Gambling v. Cornish (N.D.Ill. 1977) 426 F.Supp. 1153, 1155 (municipality not liable for abduction and rape by police officers).
See Richard H. v. Larry D. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 591, 596 [243 Cal.Rptr. 807] (liability of clinic where psychotherapist consulted by married couple had sexual relations with the wife); White v. County of Orange (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 566, 571-572 [212 Cal.Rptr. 493] (liability of county for deputy sheriff's threats to rape motorist); Simmons v. United States (9th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2d 1363, 1368-1371 (liability of federal agency for mental health counselor's sexual involvement with client); Turner v. State (La.App. 1986) 494 So.2d 1292, 1295-1296 (liability of state for National Guard recruiter's sexual misconduct with applicants); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry (Minn. 1982) 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-311 (liability of clinic for therapist's sexual relations with patient); Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge (La.App. 1979) 380 So.2d 119, 121-122 (liability of city for policeman's rape of detainee); Lyon v. Carey (D.C. Cir. 1976) 533 F.2d 649, 651 [174 App.D.C. 422] (liability of employer for deliveryman's rape of customer).
We thus cannot agree with the view espoused by Justice Kaufman in his concurring and dissenting opinion, that the facts of this case bring it within some exception to what he concedes should ordinarily be a rule against the imposition of vicarious liability on an employer for a sexual assault committed by an employee. Although Justice Kaufman acknowledges the distinction between foreseeability as an element of respondeat superior and foreseeability as a test for negligence, we think his analysis in fact confuses the two. The factors he points to in urging we recognize vicarious liability here are matters relevant to whether the district itself acted negligently, not to whether it should be vicariously liable for its employee's acts regardless of its own fault. Justice Kaufman would have us prejudge plaintiffs' direct claims against the district for its own negligence and would deny the district any opportunity to show that it acted reasonably. We cannot accept such an approach.
We must also observe that the opinion seems to reflect an unduly pessimistic view of human nature, for, if we read the opinion correctly, it seems to suggest that sexual misconduct is foreseeable any time a minor and an adult are alone in a room together, at least if not constrained by the possibility of being interrupted. (See cone, and dis. opn., post, p. 465.) Given the facts of this case and the benefit of hindsight, all would have to agree that the prospect of such misconduct is conceivable, but that is a far cry from foreseeability, even under the broad meaning that concept is given in the respondeat superior context. Simply stated, for the reasons we discuss (post, pp. 450-452), we think the teacher's acts here can only be characterized as "so unusual or startling" (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 619 [124 Cal.Rptr. 143]) that vicarious liability cannot fairly be imposed on the district.
Thus, to the extent the extracurricular program involved in this case may have lacked certain prudent safeguards, such as requiring the written permission of a child's parents before the child could participate or requiring the presence of other children or adults if the activities were to occur in a private location away from the school, we think these factors relevant mainly to plaintiffs' claims against the district based on its own alleged negligence and not to the policy question (see Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 959) of the district's vicarious liability for the acts of its employee. (See also ante, p. 448, fn. 8.) And, Justice Kaufman's perplexing comments to the contrary notwithstanding (conc., and dis. opn., post, p. 465, fn. 1), plaintiffs' direct claims against the district are before us. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a); see ante, p. 443; post, p. 452.)