Case Name: Joseph LEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-12-22
Citations: 411 So. 2d 880
Docket Number: No. 80-1408
Parties: Joseph LEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 411
Pages: 880–883

Head Matter:
Joseph LEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 80-1408.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 22, 1981.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1982.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Paul Mendel-son, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant was charged by information with kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida of false imprisonment and unarmed robbery, as lesser included offenses of the charges in the information, and not guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court entered adjudications of guilt and imposed concurrent sentences of seven and two years imprisonment. Appeal is taken from the judgment and sentences.
Appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error in its comment during cross-examination of a witness when the court said, "He is answering; he is being as precise as he can." We do not agree. In our view there is no reasonable possibility that the instant statement by the trial judge deprived defendant of a fair trial. See and compare: Blake v. State, 336 So.2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 323 (Fla.1977) (trial judge's comment that witness was trying to answer the best way she knew how was not impermissible comment on weight and credibility of witness' testimony so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial) and Robinson v. State, 161 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (trial judge's comment that witness was honest, poor man with inferior education and was doing his best to answer questions could have been interpreted as indication of preference and necessitated new trial for defendant); see generally: 15 Fla.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 741.
The second ground urged for reversal is based on the trial court's refusal to allow the defense to call defense witnesses whose names had not been supplied to the state as provided for by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220. Defense counsel did not request, until after the state had rested, that testimony of the unlisted, potentially-alibi witnesses, be allowed. The court, upon inquiry, see Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971), found that the discovery violation was not justifiable (counsel's stated reason for failing to timely list and call such witnesses being that he had been more concerned with the co-defendant), and that the state would be unduly prejudiced by allowance of such testimony at that juncture since it was not then in a position to impeach or rebut the testimony. In our view the inquiry made was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Richardson v. State, supra, and furthermore, the court reasonably exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony of the unlisted defense alibi witnesses. Rolle v. State, 355 So.2d 491 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Lail v. State, 314 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Chester v. State, 276 So.2d 76 (Fla.2d DCA 1973).
Finally it is contended that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury that specific intent is an element of the offense of robbery, as charged in count II of the information. Specific intent, i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property taken, has been held to be an essential element of the crime of robbery upon which a jury instruction is required. Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 979 (Fla.1981). However, as was pointed out in this court's opinion in Williams v. State, 400 So.2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), decided after Bell, failure to charge the jury with respect to specific intent to commit robbery does not constitute fundamental error "in the absence of a real dispute on that question." Williams v. State, supra, at 545. Since no issue or dispute was presented at trial of this cause with respect to defendant's specific intent to commit the robbery, we conclude that failure to give this instruction, which was neither requested nor was its omission objected to, does not constitute fundamental error. Williams v. State, supra; see also Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); Simpkin v. State, 363 So.2d 45 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Younghans v. State, 97 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957); Waters v. State, 298 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
For the reasons stated, the judgment and sentences are affirmed.
Affirmed.