Case Name: Johanna Joanne McGHEE, through her Guardian, Pamela L. McGHEE, and Pamela L. McGhee, personally, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GLENNS FERRY, Idaho, Defendant-Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1986-11-26
Citations: 111 Idaho 921
Docket Number: No. 16147
Parties: Johanna Joanne McGHEE, through her Guardian, Pamela L. McGHEE, and Pamela L. McGhee, personally, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GLENNS FERRY, Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
Judges: SHEPARD, and BAKES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 111
Pages: 921–925

Head Matter:
729 P.2d 396
Johanna Joanne McGHEE, through her Guardian, Pamela L. McGHEE, and Pamela L. McGhee, personally, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GLENNS FERRY, Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 16147.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Nov. 26, 1986.
David Lee Posey, Payette, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald J. Farley and Larry D. Spurgeon of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Chartered, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
The facts in this case are undisputed and can be simply stated as follows: On August 16, 1982, appellant, Johanna McGhee was injured when she fell from a swing located at Hull Memorial Park in Glenns Ferry, Idaho. Her mother, Pamela McGhee, brought suit against the city, the owner of the park, based on theories of negligence and strict liability. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and held that the city was immune from liability pursuant to I.C. § 36-1604. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when a review of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party reveals no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). Since the facts in this case are not disputed, we need only determine whether the district court properly applied I.C. § 36-1604 in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment.
The statute provides limited liability to landowners who gratuitously allow others to use the land, or equipment attached to or used on the land, for recreational purposes. Appellants argue the legislature did not intend the statute to apply to public entities and tht the operation of a city park falls outside the scope of "Recreational Purposes." We disagree.
I.C. § 36-1604 provides in part:
"36-1604. Limitation of liability of landowner. — (a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.
"(b) Definitions. As used in this section:
"1. 'Land' means private or public land, roads, trails, water, watercourses, private or public ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to or used on the realty.
"2. 'Owner' means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.
"3. 'Recreational Purposes' includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicing, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, animal riding, motorcycling, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done without charge of the owner."
. In reviewing statutory language we "will assume the legislature intended what it said in the statute, and we will construe statutory terms according to their plain, obvious and rational meanings." Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 690, 692 P.2d 332, 334 (1984). Here the statute in (b)l defines "land" as "private or public land," and in (b)2, it defines "owner" as "the possessor of a fee interest — " Based on the plain meaning of this language we conclude that the city of Glenns Ferry is the "owner" and Hull Memorial Park is "public land" as defined by the statute. Therefore, the statute applies to public entities. This conclusion is supported by Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 P.2d 685 (1985), where we held the same statute applicable to the state which also owned and operated a park.
Appellants' contention that the operation of a city park is outside the scope of "Recreational Purposes" is mischaracterized. If what they are asserting is that operation of a city park does not fall within the purview of the statute, we have already addressed that issue above. If not, the focus is not on the operation of the park, but whether appellants' use of a park swing is a "Recreational Purpose" within the meaning of the statute. Although the statute lists several activities in the definition of "Recreational Purposes," the statute expressly provides that the list is not exhaustive. Additionally, appellants have not argued that using the park swing is not recreational in nature. Nevertheless, applying the plain and obvious meaning of "Recreational Purpose," it is clear that such activity is recreational and, therefore, we conclude that appellants' activities were within the meaning of the statute.
Accordingly the district court's judgment is affirmed and, respondent's request for attorney fees is denied.
Costs to respondent on appeal.
SHEPARD, and BAKES, JJ., concur.