Case Name: ARROYO COLORADO NAVIGATION DISTRICT OF CAMERON AND WILLACY COUNTIES, Appellant, v. John M. YOUNG, Receiver et al., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1955-12-07
Citations: 285 S.W.2d 308
Docket Number: No. 10357
Parties: ARROYO COLORADO NAVIGATION DISTRICT OF CAMERON AND WILLACY COUNTIES, Appellant, v. John M. YOUNG, Receiver et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 285
Pages: 308–311

Head Matter:
ARROYO COLORADO NAVIGATION DISTRICT OF CAMERON AND WILLACY COUNTIES, Appellant, v. John M. YOUNG, Receiver et al., Appellees.
No. 10357.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
Dec. 7, 1955.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1956.
E. P. Yates, Brownsville, for appellant.
Davenport & Ransome, C. S. Eidman, Jr., Jack Wiech, Brownsville, for appellees.

Opinion:
ARCHER,' Chief Justice.
This is a scire facias proceeding, instituted by appellant on February 26, 1954, in the 103rd Judicial District, of Cameron County, Texas,. to revive a judgment for the sum of $213,517.52 rendered by that court. against several defendants, including the - appellees herein, on March 31, 1933. No- execution has ever been issued on said judgment, nor has the life of, said judgment been extended by scire facias or an action of debt. The trial court.ruled that the present proceeding is barred by limitation as provided by Article 5532 of the Revised Statutes, and, basing its action on that ruling, the court rendered judgment against appellant.
The appeal is predicated on one assignment of error and is that
"The trial court erred in sustaining the pleas of limitation of appellees and in overruling and denying appellant's scire facias to revive said judgment, and thereby holding that the statutes of ten years limitation run against appellant's cause of action."
The appellant takes the position that the judgment is only dormant and that appellant is a governmental agency and that limitation does not run against it. Appellant further says the Navigation District was created under Section 59 of Article 16 of the State Constitution, Vernon's Ann. St., and functions' for the bénefit of the general public.
The appellees invoked Article 3773 and Article 5532, V.A.C.S.,- against the, renewal of the judgment and the trial court found that the action is barred by the statutes of limitation.
We believe that the trial court was correct in sustaining the pleas of limitation of appellees and in overruling and denying appellant's scire facias to revive the -judgment.-
Article 5532 reads as follows:
"A judgment in any court of record-, - where execution has not issued within twelve months after the rendition of the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or an action -'of debt brought 1 thereon within ten years after date of such judgment, and not after."
Article 3773 as amended in 1933 reads:
"If no execution is issued within ten years after the rendition of a judg- ment in any court of record, the judgment shall become dormant and no ex- - ecution shall issue thereon unless such judgment be revived. If the first execution has issued within the ten years, the judgment shall not become dormant, unless ten years shall have elapsed between the issuance of execu--tions thereon, and execution may issue at any time within ten years after the issuance of the preceding execution."
We believe that the judgment sought to be rendered is forever barred and not only dormant. Zummo Packing Co. v. Cotham, Tex.Com.App., 137 Tex. 517, 155 S.W.2d 600; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ward County Irrigation District, Tex.Com.App., 270 S.W. 542.
Article 16, Sec. 59, Texas Constitution, provides for the conservation and development of all natural resources and for the creation of conservation and reclamation districts as may be found to be essential for such purposes.
' Most if not all óf the districts we have were created under Art. 16, Sec. 59 or have been - converted either by an Act of the Legislature or by the voters of such districts, and generally are Water Improvement Districts. Article 7622 et seq.; Water Control Districts, Article 7808 et seq.; Water Control and Improvement Districts, Article 7880-1 et seq.; Fresh Water Districts, Article 7881 et seq.; Levee Improvement Districts, Article 7972 et seq.; Návi-gation District, Article 8198 et seq.
Navigation Districts generally have additional powers provided by Article 8263h, § 1 to 50. ' This -particular District is operating under Article 16, Sec. 59 and Article 8263h, §T to 50.
Carpenter v. Arroyo-Colorado Nav. Dist. of Cameron and Willacy Counties, Tex.Civ.App., 111 S.W.2d 822.
In Willacy County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1 et al. v. Abendroth, 142 Tex. 320, 177 S.W.2d 936, 937, our Supreme Court held that
"Irrigation districts, navigation districts, levee and improvement districts, and like political subdivisions created under Section 59(a) of Article XVI of the Constitution, and statutes enacted thereunder carrying out the purposes of such 'constitutional provision, are not classed with municipal corporations, but are held to be political subdivisions of the State, performing governmental functions, and standing upon the same footing as counties and other, political subdivisions established by law."
We do not believe that Linz v. Eastland County, Tex.Com.App., 39 S.W.2d 599, 77 A.L.R. 1466, is in point. This case is discussed in Hatcher v. State, Tex.Com.App., 125 Tex. 84, 81 S.W.2d 499, 98 A.L.R. 1213, and cases cited therein.
The most recent case on-the application of limitation statutes to districts created under Art. 16, Sec. 59 of our Constitution is Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492, 198 S.W.2d 879, and in which case the Court discussed the question fully.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.