Case Name: William ALCORN v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE; Albert Burns v. City Of Baton Rouge, Through the Baton Rouge Police Department
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2004-12-30
Citations: 898 So. 2d 385
Docket Number: No. 2002 CA 0952-R, 2002 CA 0953-R
Parties: William ALCORN v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE. Albert Burns v. City Of Baton Rouge, Through the Baton Rouge Police Department.
Judges: Panel composed of Judges FRANK FOIL, VANESSA G. WHIPPLE, RANDOLPH H. PARRO, JOHN M. GUIDRY and PAGE McCLENDON.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 898
Pages: 385–394

Head Matter:
William ALCORN v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE. Albert Burns v. City Of Baton Rouge, Through the Baton Rouge Police Department.
No. 2002 CA 0952-R, 2002 CA 0953-R.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 30, 2004.
Jill L. Craft, Baton Rouge, for Appellees Plaintiffs William D. Alcorn, Jr. and Albert Burns, Sr.
Michael E. Ponder, Parish Attorney, Gwendolyn K. Brown, Arlene C. Edwards, Assistant Parish Attorneys, Baton Rouge, for Appellant Defendant City of Baton Rouge, through The Baton Rouge Police Department.
Panel composed of Judges FRANK FOIL, VANESSA G. WHIPPLE, RANDOLPH H. PARRO, JOHN M. GUIDRY and PAGE McCLENDON.

Opinion:
J^FOIL, J.
This tort case involves a judgment rendered against the City of Baton Rouge, through the Baton Rouge Police Department ("the City"), awarding damages to two retired police officers for claims of racial discrimination, racial harassment, and unlawful retaliation. The matter came before us last year, at which time we reversed the award to one of the officers for unlawful retaliation, but affirmed the awards to both officers for racial harassment and racial discrimination. Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, 02-0952, 02-0953 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1194. Subsequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated our opinion and ordered us to revisit the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination and racial harassment have prescribed. Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, 03-2682 (La.1/16/04), 863 So.2d 517. On remand, we conclude that the plaintiffs' claims are not prescribed and adopt our prior opinion of June 27, 2003, which addressed the merits of the damage awards.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Albert Burns, Sr., an African-American male, joined the Baton Rouge Police Department as a police officer in 1972 and retired in 1998. Mr. Burns filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 23, 1995. He filed suit against the City on October 9, 1996, alleging federal and state claims of age discrimination, race discrimination, and racial harassment, and a state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In 1973, William Duplessis Alcorn, Jr., an African-American male, joined the Baton Rouge Police Department as a police officer. Mr. Alcorn retired in 2000. He filed a claim with the EEOC on October 24, 1995. On September 24, 1996, Mr. Alcorn sued the City, alleging federal and state claims of age and race discrimination, racial harassment, and unlawful 13retaliation. Additionally, Mr. Alcorn alleged a state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The suits were consolidated for trial. On May 13, 1999, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment, dismissing both plaintiffs' claims in their entirety. The plaintiffs appealed that judgment. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of the claims of age discrimination based on prescription. This court further determined that summary judgment was inappropriate as to the claims of racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation, as genpine issues of material fact existed concerning the factual allegations, and remanded the case for trial of those issues. Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge c/w Burns v. City of Baton Rouge, 99-2464, 99-2465 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/00) (unpublished opinion).
The matter was tried before a jury on January 7-14, 2002. After trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with that verdict, awarding. Mr. Alcorn $300,000.00 for race-based harassment, $200,000.00 for racial discrimination, and $50,000.00 for unlawful retaliation. It further rendered judgment in favor of Mr. Burns in the sums of $300,000.00 for race-based harassment and $200,000.00 for racial discrimination. The City appealed, asserting numerous assignments of error. After hearing the matter, we rendered judgment affirming the awards for race-based harassment and racial discrimination, but reversing the award to Mr. Al-corn for unlawful retaliation. Alcorn, 02-0952, 02-0953, 851 So.2d 1194. The City sought writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court. The supreme court determined that we erred in concluding the exception of prescription was not properly raised on appeal. In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court vacated our judgment and remanded the case to this court to determine the merits of the City's 1 ¿defense of prescription. Alcorn, 03-2682, 863 So.2d 517! Considering the mandate of the Louisiana Supreme Court, we now address the issue of whether the plaintiffs' federal and state claims have prescribed.
DISCUSSION
The .plaintiffs assert claims for racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and La. R.S. 23:1006, and claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Louisiana's anti-discrimination law is similar in scope to the federal Title VII prohibition against discrimination, Louisiana courts have looked to federal jurisprudence to interpret Louisiana discrimination laws. King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 98-1805, p. 7 (La.6/4/99), 743 So.2d 181, 187; Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532, 539 n. 9 (La.1992). Following the United States Fifth Circuit, Louisiana courts have consistently applied the one-year prescriptive period found in La. Civ. Code art. 3492 to claims brought under La. R.S. 23:1006. See King, 98-1805 at p.7, 743 So.2d at 187, and cases cited therein. This one-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. La. Civ.Code art. 3492. Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are also governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delic-tual actions in La. Civ.Code art. 3492. Bus-tamento, 607 So.2d at 541. The prescriptive period for the federal claims differs, however, from that of the state claims. Under substantive federal law, a Title VII plaintiff |fimust file a claim of discrimination with the EEOC no more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). In a state that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the unlawful practice (a deferral state), this filing period is extended to 300 days if the employee initially filed a grievance with that agency. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2070, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Louisiana is a deferral state. La. R.S. 51:2231. Therefore, the 30(Uday filing period applies to the plaintiffs' federal claims.
Louisiana jurisprudence dictates that prescriptive statutes are to be strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. Thus, when there are two possible constructions, that which favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, an action should be adopted. King, 98-1805 at pp. 7-8, 743 So.2d at 187-188; Bustamento, 607 So.2d at 537.
In order to resolve the prescription issue before us, it is necessary to analyze the nature of the plaintiffs' cause of action. King, 98-1805 at p. 8, 743 So.2d at 188; Bustamento, 607 So.2d at 538. We note initially that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace is usually limited to cases involving a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of time. Bustamento, 607 So.2d at 538; White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1210 (La.1991). Here, the essence of the plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, like their claims for racial harassment, is the creation of a hostile work environment. In this situation, Louisiana courts apply the continuing violations analysis |fiutilized in considering harassment claims under federal and state anti-discrimination laws to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bustamento, 607 So.2d at 541. Thus, the analysis of the substantive law applicable herein is the same for all claims asserted by the plaintiffs.
The federal courts have recognized the existence of hostile environment harassment theory in race discrimination cases. King, 98-1805 at p. 8, 743 So.2d at 188. In the National Railroad Passenger Corporation case, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that "[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115, 122 S.Ct. at 2073. The court further stated:
The "unlawful employment practice" therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.... Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.
. Thus, "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated."
In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists, we look to "all the circumstances," including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." To assess whether a court may, for the purposes of determining liability, review all such conduct, including those acts that occur outside the filing period, we again look to the statute. It provides that a charge must be filed within 180 or 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one "unlawful employment practice."' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment- may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.
17That act need not, however, be the last act. As long as the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment practice has "occurred," even if it is still occurring. Subséquent events, however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment claim and 'a charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass the whole.
. Given, therefore, that the incidents constituting a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful employment practice, the employer may be liable for all acts that are part of this single claim. In order for the charge to be timely,.the employee need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.
. A court's task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115-120, 122 S.Ct. at 2073-2076 (footnotes and citations omitted).
In Bustamento, our supreme court held that in an action brought under Louisiana tort law for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the creation of a hostile work environment (albeit Bustam-ento involved sexual harassment in the workplace), "when the acts or conduct are continuous on an almost daily basis, by the same actor, of the same nature, and the conduct becomes tortious and actionable because of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic nature, then prescription does not commence until the last act occurs or the conduct is abated." Bustamento, 607 So.2d at 542.
The City argues that the claims for racial discrimination and harassment are untimely under both the state and federal prescriptive periods, and therefore, are not actionable. In response, the plaintiffs argue that their claims for racial discrimination and harassment have not prescribed because they were subjected to a continuously hostile work environment caused by the racially discriminatory practices of the City and this continued and cumulated over a period of time until they were forced to resign. In other words, the plaintiffs claim they were subjected to continuing, on-going, and unabated race-based harassment and ^discrimination, from the date each was hired through the date each was forced from their respective careers with the Baton Rouge Police Department.
After a thorough review of the entire record, we find that a jury could reasonably determine the plaintiffs were subjected to race-based harassment, which created a hostile work environment, continually throughout their careers. Evidence was presented that shows that they were subjected to racial epithets, slurs, and jargon, levied at them directly or in their presence on virtually a dally basis throughout their employment, spanning well over twenty years. A jury could reasonably conclude that the racially hostile work environment unreasonably interfered with their work performance and affected their employment.
Also, a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiffs were subjected to recurring acts of discrimination. Evidence was presented to show that both men were denied overtime, training opportunities, advancement in their careers, and the ability to effectively perform their jobs, and both men were ultimately forced to leave their chosen careers, which took place well after these lawsuits were filed.
Here, the jury obviously concluded that actions of race-based discrimination and harassment continued throughout the plaintiffs' employment — they never ceased. The jury was reasonable in concluding that the evidence overwhelmingly established he type of continual and cumulative acts necessary to constitute an actionable continuing violation claim. Thus, under Bus-tamento and National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the plaintiffs' federal and state claims of hostile work environment, as well as their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, are not prescribed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the City's defense of prescription. We adopt and reinstate our prior opinion in Alcorn, 02-0952, 02-0953, 851 |flSo.2d 1194, which reversed the trial court's award of $50,000.00 to William Alcorn for unlawful retaliation, but affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. Costs of these appeals in the sum of $955.04 are assessed to the City of Baton Rouge.
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION DENIED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
McCLENDON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Initially, Mr. Burns also asserted a claim of unlawful retaliation. At the beginning of trial, however, the trial judge severed that claim, and it is not part of this appeal.
. The supreme court concluded that an exception of prescription was preserved by the City's assertions, in a pre-trial motion for summary judgment, that the actions for racial discrimination and harassment had prescribed. The supreme court further noted that the trial court's judgment on the merits "contained no ruling on the prescription issue as it related to the race-discrimination/harassment claims." Alcorn, 03-2682 at p. 2, 863 So.2d at 519. Although the trial court has never ruled on the issue of prescription and no exception of prescription was timely filed with this court, the supreme court remanded this matter to our court with the express directive that we determine whether the plaintiffs' claims have prescribed.
. Prior to a 1997 legislative revision, La. R.S. 23:1006 prohibited intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin. La. R.S. 23:1006B. With the promulgation of La. Acts 1997, No. 1409, § 1 and 4, La. R.S. 23:1006-1008 were repealed and La. R.S. 23:331-334 were enacted relating to discrimination in employment due to race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin.
. La. R.S. 51:2231, et seq. provides for the execution of federal anti-discrimination laws in the State of Louisiana and creates the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights, which has the power to adjudicate claims of employment discrimination pursuant to La. R.S. 51:2231(0 and 51:2257.