Case Name: KNIGHT v. UNITED STATES LAND ASSOCIATION
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1891-12-21
Citations: 142 U.S. 161
Docket Number: No. 824
Parties: KNIGHT v. UNITED STATES LAND ASSOCIATION.
Judges: The Chief Justice, Me. Justice Beadley and Me. Justice Gray did not hear the argument or participate in the decision • of this case.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 142
Pages: 161–216

Head Matter:
KNIGHT v. UNITED STATES LAND ASSOCIATION.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
No. 824.
Argued October 23, 26, 1891.
Decided December 21, 1891.
This court takes-judicial notice of facts concerning the pueblo of San Francisco, (not contradictory of the findings of the referee in this case,) which are recited in former decisions of this court, in statutes of the United States and of the State of California, and in the records of the Department of the Interior.
It is settled law that a patent for public land is void at law if the grantor State had no title to the premises embraced in it, or if the officer who issued it had no authority to do so; and that the want of such title or authority can be shown in an action at law.
The power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs exclu sively to the political department of the government, and the action of that department is unassailable in the courts, except by a direct proceeding.
In matters relating to the sale and disposition of the public domain, the surveying of private land claims and the issuing of patents thereon, and the administration of the trusts devolving on the government, by reason Of the laws of Congress, or under treaty stipulations respecting the public domain, the Secretary of the Interior is the supervising agent of the government, to do justice to all claimants, and preserve the rights of the people of the United States.
The Secretary of the Interior had ample power to set aside the Stratton survey of the San Francisco pueblo lands, (although approved by the surveyor general of California, and confirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, with no appeal taken,) and to order a new survey; and his action in that respect is unassailable in a collateral proceeding.
The method of running the shore line of the bay of San Francisco in the Yon Leicht survey was correct.
The well-settled doctrine that, on the' acquisition of the territory from Mexico, the United States acquired the title to lands under tide water in trust for the future States that might be erected out of the territory, does not apply to lands that had been previously granted to other parties by the former government, or had been subjected to trusts that would require their disposition in some other way.
The patent of the United States is evidence of the title of the city of San Francisco under Mexican laws to the pueblo lands, and is conclusive, not only as against the United States and all parties claiming under it by titles subsequently acquired, but also as against all parties except those who have a full and complete title acquired from Mexico, anterior in date to that confirmed by the decree of confirmation.
The court stated the case as follows:
This was an action of ejectment brought in the superior court in and for the city and county of San Francisco, California, by the United Land Association, a corporation of that State, and one Clinton 0. Tripp, against Thomas Knight, to recover a block of land in that city bounded by Barry, Channel, Seventh and Eighth Streets, and known as block number forty. The controversy involves an interesting question of title to the property described, the plaintiffs asserting that the premises were below the line of ordinary high-water mark at the date of the conquest of California from Mexico, and, therefore, upon the admission of the State into the Union in 1850, enured to it in virtue of its sovereignty over tide lands; and the defendant insisting that the lands are a portion of the pueblo of San Francisco, as confirmed and patented by the United States.
The complaint, filed on the 23d of November, 1880, alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners in fee of the premises described, and were entitled to the possession thereof, and that they had been wrongfully dispossessed thereof by the defend.ant, who continued- to hold such unlawful possession, to their ■damage in the sum of $100, and to their loss of the rents and profits thereof in the sum of $500. Wherefore they prayed a judgment of restitution and damages aforesaid.
The answer consisted of a general denial of all the allegations of the complaint; and the cause, being at issue, was, by stipulation of counsel, referred to a referee, to take testimony, “try all the issues and report his-findings and judgment thereon.”
In obedience to the order of the court the referee tried the case, making an elaborate finding of facts and concluding, as matter of law, that judgment should go for the plaintiffs. Accordingly,' on the 2d of June, 1888, a judgment was entered in the superior court in favor of the plaintiffs. That judgment was afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State on appeal; and, after two separate rehearings, the judgment of affirmance was adhered to by a bare majority of the court, three of the judges dissenting. 85 California, 448, 474. This writ of error was then sued out.
It appears from the bill of exceptions that, on the trial of the case before the referee, the plaintiffs, to sustain the issues on their behalf, introduced evidence tending to show the location of the premises to be as alleged in the complaint, and also a complete and good title in themselves under a grant from the State and certain mesne conveyances, provided the title to the premises was originally in-the State, and provided certain deeds (which were also introduced) from the state tideland commissioners, dated, respectively, November 24 and 27, 1875, were effectual to convey said title. For the purpose of proving title in the State they offered parol testimony to show that in 1854 the premises were below the line of ordinary high-water mark, and that Mission Creek (which is an estuary of the bay of San Francisco and runs alongside this block) was, at that time, navigable for a considerable distance above them. This evidence was objected to, on the ground that parol evidence was inadmissible to prove the boundary lines of the decree of confirmation of the pueblo lands, but the objection was overruled and an exception noted.
The plaintiffs then offered in evidence certain documents relative to the confirmation to the city of San Francisco of its pueblo lands, and also the first survey of those lands under the decree of confirmation, which survey, made by deputy surveyor Stratton, approved by ' the surveyor general of California and confirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, did not include the premises in controversy. They also produced a witness who testified that the premises were below ordinary high-water mark, as laid down on such survey. To the introduction of this survey as evidence, and •to the parol proof of the location of the premises with reference to the line-of high tide, as delineated thereon, the defendant objected on the ground that the survey was not matter of ■record, that-it did not tend to prove, as between the parties hereto, where the line of high. tide was, being res inter alios aota, and that it had been cancelled arid superseded by another survey subsequently made in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of the Interior. The objection was overruled, the survey was admitted in evidence, and the defendant duly excepted.
' The plaintiffs also produced in evidence certain maps made by persons in official station in 1853, 1857, 1859 and 1864, showing the line of high tide at about the same line as on the aforesaid Stratton survey. Objections were made to these maps as evidence, but they were overruled and exceptions were noted.
The plaintiffs also introduced in evidence the original minute-book of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco, and.read a resolution passed by the board on the 23d of December, 1878, that no appeal should be taken from the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office approving the Stratton survey. Objection-was made to this evidence, but it was overruled and an exception was noted.
The plaintiffs then offered in evidence the deeds from the state land commissioners to one Ellis,, (from whom they derived their title,) together with the letter of the attorney general of the State, advising the board to dispose of all the tide lands not in litigation, and where they could ascertain to whom the state title ought to go, in pursuance of the tideland acts. The deeds embrace the property in dispute. The defendant objected to these deeds on the ground that they were incompetent, in that the board of tide-land commissioners had no power or jurisdiction to make them, and on the further ground that there was nothing to. show that the board was advised by the attorney general to make such deeds. ÍThe objection was overruled, and an exception was noted. The plaintiffs thereupon rested their case.
The defendant, to sustain the issues on his part, offered in evidence the patent of the San Francisco pueblo lands, regularly issued to that city on the 20th of June, 1884, and also the plat of said pueblo lands surveyed under instructions from the United States surveyor general by deputy surveyor Yon Leicht in December, 1883, which showed an endorsement of approval by the Commissioner of the General-Land Office, under date of May 15, 1884, and was also endorsed as follows: “ The field-notes of the survey of the pueblo lands of San Francisco, from which this plat has been made, are strictly in accordance with the instructions of the honorable Commissioner of the General Land Office received with his letter, dated November 25, 1883, as the same appear of record and on file in this office. United States surveyor general’s office, San Francisco, California, January 17th, 1884. ~W. H. Brown, United States surveyor general for California.”
It was admitted that the land in question is included within the exterior boundaries of the patent; but the patent was objected to as incompetent to show title in the city of San Francisco, as against grantees of the State of the premises, for the following reasons:
“ 1st. The State of California acquired her title by virtue of her sovereignty on her admission into the Union, and her title could not be overthrown by declarations of the United States made after title had vested in her.
“ 2d. That as to lands acquired by virtue of her sovereignty, the State was not the owner of a private land claim, and was not bound to present her claims to the board of land commissioners, organized under the act of Congress entitled, ‘ An act to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California,’ passed March 3, 1851, nor is she concluded as to her rights' by not presenting, them as provided in section 13 thereof, nor by any decision on the claim of another person. The act did not apply to her of her property.
“ 3d. The only authority for the patent was a decree of the United States Circuit'Court, which court was not vested with jurisdiction over the State or the property of the State, although it was vested with jurisdiction over natural persons and corporations. Neither the decree nor any proceedings under the decree could affect the title of the State or furnish evidence against her.
“ 4th. The State was not a party to the record in the case of The City, &c. v. The United States, nor is she affected as a natural person or corporation would be by a failure to attend before the United States surveyor general and object to a survey, as provided in section one of the act of Congress approved July 1, Í864, and entitled ‘An act to expedite the settlement of titles to lands in the State of California.’ But, being a stranger to the entire record and proceeding, the patent is not competent evidence against her or her property.
“5th. The first survey is the final adjudication of the. land office of the location of the premises described in the decree, because —
“ (a.) In confirming a survey under the acts of March 3, 1851, and 'July 1, 1864, the Commissioner acts in a special judicial capacity, and his decisions are not appealable to the Secretary of the Interior.
■ “ (b.) The city refused to appeal, and this refusal appears in the record, and there was no appeal.
“ (e.) The first confirmed survey is better evidence of the location, in this case than the patent, and the patent is void to the extent that it departs from it.
“ (d.) The decree confirms to the city only the land above or within the ordinary high-water mark at the date of the conquest.
“The premises are outside that specific boundary, and, as the surveyor general had no authority under the acts of Congress to. survey, nor the land office to patent, land not confirmed to the claimant, the decree controls, and the patent is void to the extent that it departs from the specific boundary given in the decree.”
The evidence was admitted, but the referee refused to find thereon in favor of the defendant, and an exception was noted.
The defendant also introduced in evidence the judgment roll in a case tried in a state court between this defendant and' the -city and county of San Francisco, in which a judgment was rendered in his favor in "November, 1868, quieting his title to the premises.
■ That was all the evidence introduced, and upon it the referee found the material facts of the case substantially as follows: The premises in dispute are below ordinary high-water mark as the same existed on the 7th of July, 1846, (the date of the conquest of Mexico,) and are below and outside of a survey of the pueblo claim made by deputy surveyor Stratton, and approved by the surveyor ‘general of California on the 13th of August, 1868, and confirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November 11, 1878, but are within a subsequent survey of the pueblo, made by deputy surveyor Yon Leicht in 1884, which was not approved by the .surveyor general of California, but was certified by him to have been made in accordance writh orders from the Secretary of the Interior. The patent for the pueblo lands was issued on this second survey, and recited, among other things, the proceedings had in relation to the perfecting of the pueblo title, including the decree of confirmation and the confirmatory acts of Congress. The plaintiffs derived their title from the State through certain mesne conveyances, regular and legal in all respects, while the defendant did not connect himself with the title of the State.
Upon the foregoing facts the referee found as conclusions of law that —
(1) The State of California upon her admission into the Union, September 9, 1850, became seized in fee of the premises in dispute;
(2) This title subsequently became vested in the plaintiffs, by virtue of certain conveyances described;
(3) This title of the plaintiffs was subject to defeat by the decree of the Circuit Court confirming the claim of 'the pueblo, but the premises being without the confirmed survey of 1878, and outside of the specific boundary given in the decree, remained the property of the State;
(4) “The second (Von Leicht) survey was illegal because it was not approved by the surveyor general of California, -no appeal Avas taken to the Secretary of the Interior from the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office approving the prior survey; and because the second survey was not retained in the office of the United States surveyor general for ninety days, and no notice of the same was given to enable parties in interest to file protests, as required by law; and because, in approving said prior survey, said Commissioner of the General Land Office was acting in a judicial capacity and his judgment thereon is not reversible and was not legally reversed ”; and,
(5) The description of the premises contained in the patent being in excess of the premises described in the prior survey and in the decree, the patent, to the extent that it covered land of the State not confirmed to the claimant, was invalid, and did not operate to convey the State’s title to the premises in controversy.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State was based upon substantially the same grounds as that of the referee; and the correctness of the propositions of law involved therein is draAvn in question by this writ of error.
To understand precisely the exact nature of the questions involved in this case a somewhat more detailed statement of facts than is contained in the above findings of the .referee yrill be found useful. These facts are not contradictory of. those findings, and are recited in former decisions of this court, statutes of the United States, and.of the State of California, and the records of the Interior Department, of all of which the court can take judicial notice.
The pueblo of San Francisco has been a fruitful subject of litigation for many years, both in the Land Department of the government and in the state and Federal courts. For the purposes of this case a brief history only of the litigation is deemed essential.
The city of San Francisco, as the successor of a Mexican pueblo of that name, presented its claim to the board of land commissioners created by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1851, for the confirmation to it of a tract of land to the extent of four, square leagues, situated on the upper portion of the:, peninsula of San Francisco.' In December, 1854, the board confirmed the claim for only a portion of the four square leagues, and both the city and the United States appealed to the District Court of the United States. The United States subsequently withdrew its appeal, but the case remained in the Distript Court undisposed of until September, 1864, when, under the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1864, it was transferred to the United States Circuit Court, which sustained the contention of the city and entered a confirmatory decree in its favor on the 18th of May, 1865. 4 Sawyer, 553, 577. The language of that decree is as follows : “ The land of which confirmation is made is a tract situated within the county of San Francisco, and embracing so much of the extreme upper portion of the peninsula above ordinary high-water mark, (as the same existed at the date of the conquest of the country, namely, the seventh of July, a,d. 1846,) on which the city of San Francis go is situated, as will contain an area of four square leagues-—said tract being bounded on the north and east by the -bay of San Francisco; on the west by the Pacific Ocean; and on the south by a due east and west line drawn so as to include the area aforesaid,” subject to certain exceptions and deductions not necessary to be stated.
Both the United States and the city appealed from that decree — the United States from the .whole decree, and the city from so much of it as included the aforesaid deductions and exceptions in the estimate of the quantity of land confirmed. While these, appeals were pending Congress passed the act of March 8, 1866, “ to quiet the title to certain lands within the corporate limits.of the city of San Francisco.” This act is as follows:
“Be it enacted, etc., that all the right and title of the United States to the land situated within the corporate limits of the city of San Francisco, in the State of California, confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the decree of the. Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of California, entered on the eighteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, be, and the same are hereby, relinquished and granted to the said city of San -Francisco and its successors, and the claim of the said city to said land is hereby confirmed, subject, however, to the reservations and exceptions . designated in said decree, and upon the following trusts, namely, that all the said land, not heretofore granted to said city, shall be disposed of and conveyed by said city to parties in the bona fide actual possession thereof, by themselves or tenants, on the passage of this act, in such quantities and upon such tertns and conditions as the legislature of the State of California may prescribe, except such parcels thereof as may be reserved and set apart by ordinance of said city for public uses: Provided, however, That the relinquishment and grant by this act shall not interfere with or prejudice any valid adverse right or claim, if such exist, to said land or any part thereof, whether derived from Spain, Mexico or the United States, or preclude a judicial examination and adjustment thereof.” 14,Stat. 4, c. 13.
The appeals to this court were thereupon dismissed. The measure of the city’s title to the-four square leagues of land is to be found in the decree of confirmation and the act of Congress just recited. The question of the city’s title having been settled, it became necessary to fix the boundaries of its lands by a survey. This duty, under the law, devolved upon the political department of the general government having charge of the public lands. Accordingly, in 1867 and 1868, under instructions of surveyor general Upson, deputy surveyor Stratton made a survey of the confirmed claim, and the same was approved by the surveyor general, and subsequently, after lying in the General Land Office, at Washington, for about ten years, it -was confirmed by the commissioner on the 11th of November, 1878. 2 O. L. L. 1234. In making this survey Stratton ran its lines along the line of ordinary high-water mark of the bay of San Francisco until he came to Mission Creek, a small stream or estuary of the bay, and then followed the tide line up the creek, and crossing over, ran down on the other aide. This plan seems aiso to have been followed with reference to a few other small estuaries. The city protested against this method of survey, and, through her attorney of record, gave notice of appeal from the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the Secretary of the Interior, claiming that the proper method of running the line along the bay was to follow the tide line of the main body of water and cut across the mouths of all estuaries or creeks which are arms of the bay. The board of supervisors of the city, however, decided not to appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office confirming the Stratton survey, and, declaring that the action of the attorney was unauthorized, discharged him. . Thereafter the board passed a resolution, addressed to the Secretary of the Interior, in which it was stated that, in its opinion, the Stratton survey was entirely Correct and legal, and should be approved.
Notwithstanding this action of the board, the Secretary of the Interior sent for the papers in the case, and, upon an elaborate examination of the points involved, reversed the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office approving the Stratton survey, thus substantially sustaining the original protest of the city to the running of the boundary line of the grant up the estuaries of the bay.
Upon motion for review, a subsequent Secretary of the Interior sustained the action of his predecessor, and ordered a survey made in conformity with the views of the department. 2 Land Dec. 346. It was under those instructions that the Yon Leicht survey was made, upon which the patent was issued. Subsequently an application was made to a succeeding Secretary to have the patent recalled and cancelled, and a new patent. issued; but it was. denied, the Secretary holding that he had no power under the law to grant the application, and that even if he had, he should decline to exercise it, because he - considered the views of his predecessors sound and correct. 5 Land Dec. 483.
Mr. Edwa/rd R. Taylor for plaintiff in error. Mr. Samuel M. Wilson was with him on the brief.,
Mr. Charles N. Fox for defendants in error. Mr. Philip C. Galpin was with, him on the brief,
in which were cited: United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272; Jones v. Martin, 13 Sawyer, 314, 317; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488; Tubbs v. Wilhoit, 138 U. S. 134; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618; Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 7 Sawyer, 418, 427; West v. Cochran, 17 How. 403; Stanford v. Taylor, 18 How. 409; Willott v. Sandford, 19 How. 79; Davis v. Wiebold, 139 U. S. 507; Attorney General v. Chambers, 4 DeG. M. & G. 206; Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 California, 11; S. C. 79 Am. Dec. 151.
Mr. Galpin also filed the following points for defendants.
I. The political department of the government known as the Department of the Interior has no power to carry into effect the provisions of the .Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, except in so far as that power is conferred by. acts of Congress. No power in that regard is given save by the act of March 3, 1851, relative to settlement of private land claims and the acts amendatory thereof. • 9 Stat. 631; 13 Stat. 332, § 714 Stat. 218. .*
II. The Department of the Interior is not authorized to order a patent for land to any Mexican citizen or'his successors in interest, in satisfaction of the treaty, except of land that has. first been confirmed to that citizen by the judicial tribunals appointed by Congress to ascertain and settle private land claims arising under the treaty.
III. Where a tract of land limited by specific boundaries has been so confirmed by the judicial tribunals authorized by Congress, a patent which includes lands (not public lands of the United States) outside of the boundaries given in the decree, does, not operate to pass title to such outside lands.
IY. The patent is presumptive and persuasive evidence that its courses and distances do follow the specific boundary of the decree; but it is not conclusive.
The contestant in ejectment may prove to the trial court if he can, that the officer has exceeded his jurisdiction; and that the land included in the patent is in truth outside of the grant confirmed, and, therefore, outside the conveying power.
' To deny this is to assert simply that the Department of the Interior, without authority to adjudicate upon what land shall be confirmed or conveyed, may issue a patent to land not confirmed; and the conveyance passes title to the outside land, until and unless the party affected by the overlap shall bring suit to cancel that part of the. description, and reform the patent. That is to say, a patent to land outside of the jurisdiction'of the officer, conclusively proves that the land is within it. So that, if the decree confirms the peninsula of San Francisco, the land office may patent the city of Oakland, and the patent passes the title to the land in the latter city ! If this be so, the patent becomes more potent than the decree, and the court becomes an appendage of the land office.
Y. If the court has confirmed a Spanish grant for a certain number of leagues to be located within certain larger exterior boundaries, (as has often occurred in this State,) the court by its decree has confirmed the grant to every part of the land up to the exterior boundaries, and the whole of that land is placed within the jurisdiction of the land office for the purpose of surveying and patenting. the number of acres allotted to the claimant. This duty although in a measure judicial, (where no restriction of specific boundaries is contained in the decree,) is chiefly ministerial,, and may be exercised anywhere within the exterior boundaries.
It results that so long as the survey and the patent are restricted to land within the exterior boundaries, the land is within the conveying power of the officer. It has been placed within his grasp by the decree of the court.
' VI. But if a river, the sharp crest of a mountain ridge or the overflowing surface of the bay, impinging on the shore, defines the exterior boundary of the' grant and the decree allots to the claimant, for instance, four square leagues in a .square form lying next north and west of the specific boundary, and the surveyor chooses to patent land outside of the exterior boundary, and south and east of it, the land so patented, not being public land of the United States and unconfirmed to the claimant, is not within the conveying power of the officer.
■ Such is precisely this case; the land confirmed was no more than “ so much of the extreme upper portion of the peninsula” “above ordinary high-water mark,” and within an east and west, southern boundary line “as will contain” four leagues.
The surveyor, knowingly and remonstrating, was compelled, by order of the Secretary of the Interior, to cross this line and go outside of the exterior boundary of the land confirmed. The patent covered land which had not been the property of the -United States after the admission of California into the Union in September, 1850.
VII. Nor is it any answer to say that notwithstanding the admission of California into the Union, she did not take this property discharged of the right of the government to use it, if necessary, in liquidation of the obligations of the treaty. Grant that this was so; still California did take the fee without grant and without patent, by virtue of her sovereignty, in September, 1850, subject to the right of the government to take it from her for the purposes, aforesaid. But the govern^ ment has not required it for that purpose; on the contrary, the decree of confirmation effectually removed that lien from the title of the State. It results that land below high tide was .not within the.conveying power of the Land Department, and the title of the State was not affected by the patent.
VIII. It will be said, “ that the specific line of ‘ high-water mark ’ yields to the more general description of ‘ the bay : ’ that, according to all the principles of map-making, a bay-takes the contour line of the coast, and that, as the land is designated as lying between the ocean and the bay, the more general description of £ the bay ’ controls the words ‘ embracing so much of the extreme upper portion of the peninsula above high-water mark, etc., on which the city of San Francisco is situated, as will contain, etc.,’ that the shore line of the bay does not follow the line of high tide; and the latter is to be abandoned.”
It is manifest from the decree that the words ££ ocean ” and “ bay ” are words of general description. The shores of each are described by the “ line of ordinary high tide.” There is no such thing possible as bay shore line visible under water. The result of this interpretation is, that the specific boundary of the line of high tide is eliminated whenever the surveyor chooses to depart from it. If such a construction is admissible at one point, it is of necessity at all others.
He may run anywhere from point to point and'from headland to headland, and include the land of the State wherever he is disposed so to do. The result would be, possibly, that he would touch the line of high tide only at the extreme points which jutted into the sea, commencing at the Presidio and ending at the Potrero.
He could have disturbed the title to the water front of the city. An unknown, invisible and .shifting boundary of a contour line which may be run this way a mile or two, or that way a mile or two, at the caprice of the surveyor, was not a .desirable boundary for the city; and none such was then intended.
IX. The real and only question presented by this record is ■as to the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the patent. When the plaintiff in ejectment has located h-is land beyond the •specific boundary given in the decree by evidence unassailed, does a patent to land unconfirmed to the claimant override all contrary proof, and conclusively establish that this patent is valid outside the boundaries of the decree, and that this land wvas confirmed to the- claimant %

Opinion:
Me. Justice Lamae,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The case as presented by this record involves some very interesting questions. Ever since the decision in Polk's Lessee v. Wendall, 9 Cranch, 87, it has been the settled law of this court that a patent is void at law if the grantor State had no title to the premises embraced in it, or if the officer who issued the patent had .no authority so to do, and that the want of such title or authority can be shown in an action at law. Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 380, 384; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. 284, 318; Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How. 426; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160; Best v. Polk, 18 Wall. 112; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 453; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 519; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 625, and authorities there cited.
It is sought by the plaintiffs to • bring this case within that rule; and it is, therefore, strenuously insisted that the patent for the. San Francisco pueblo is void to the extent that if embraces lands below ordinary high-water mark of Mission Creek, as that line existed át the date of the conquest from Mexico in 1846. In order to Sustain this proposition the claim is put forth that the Stratton survey was correct, and was never legally set aside; that the Yon Leicht survey, upon which the patent was issued, was wholly unauthorized in law and void; and that the premises in dispute being excluded by the Stratton survey, and being proved by parol evidence to have been below the line of ordinary high-water mark, were never legally included in the patent, and were not included in the decrete of confirmation.
It is a well settled rule of law that the power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs exclusively to the political department of the government, and that the action of that department, within the scope of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by a direct proceeding. Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691, 699, and cases cited. Under this rule it must be held that the action of the Land Department in determining that the Yon Leicht survey correctly delineated the boundaries of the pueblo grant, as established by the. confirmatory decree, is binding in this court, if the Department had jurisdiction and power to order that survey. It is claimed, however, and the referee so determined, that no such power or authority existed in the Department, because it had been -exhausted by the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in approving and confirming the Stratton survey in 1878. This contention is based upon the proposition that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to set aside the order of the Commissioner approving and confirming the Stratton survey, especially in view of the fact that no appeal was taken from such order and the authorities of the city acquiesced in that survey. This proposition is unsound. If followed as a rule of law, the Secretary of the Interior is shorn of that supervisory power over the public lands which is vested in him by section Ml of the EeVised Statutes. That section provides as follows: " The Secretary of the Interior is charged with-the supervision of public business relating to the following subjects: . . . Second. The public lands, including mines." Sec. 453 provides: " The Commissioner of the General Land Office shall perform, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands, and also such as relate to private claims of land, and the issuing of patents for all [agents] [grants] of land under the authority of the government." Sec.. 2478 provides: " The Commissioner of the General Land Office, wider the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, is authorized to enforce and carry into execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions of this title [The Public Lands] not otherwise specially provided for."
The phrase, "under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," as used in these sections of the statutes, is not meaningless, but was intended as an expression in general terms of the power of the Secretary to supervise and control the extensive operations of the Land Department of which he is the head. It means that, in the important matters relating to the sale and disposition of the public domain, the surveying of private land claims and the issuing of patents thereon, and the administration of the trusts devolving upon the government, by reason of the laws of Congress or under treaty stipulations, respecting the public domain, the Secretary of the Interior is the supervising agent of the government to do justice to all claimants and preserve the rights of the people of the United States. As was said by the Secretary of the Interior on the application for the recall and cancellation of the patent in this pueblo case (5 Land Dec. 494): " The statutes in placing the whole business of the Department under the supervision of the Secretary, invest him with authority to review, reverse, amend, annul or affirm all proceedings in the Department having for their ultimate object to secure the alienation of any portion of the public lands, or the adjustment of private claims to lands, with a just regard to the rights of the public and of private parties. Such supervision may be exercised by direct orders or by review on appeals. The mode in which the supervision shall be exercised in the absence of statutory direction may be prescribed by such rules and regulations as the Secretary may adopt. When proceedings affecting titles to lands are before the Department the power of supervision may be exercised by 'the Secretary, whether these proceedings are called to his attention by formal notice or by appeal. It is sufficient that they are brought to his notice. The rules prescribed are designed to facilitate the Department in the despatch of business, not to defeat the supervision of the Secretary. For example, if, when a patent is about to issue, the Secretary should discover a fatal defect in the proceedings, or that by reason of some newly ascertained fact the patent, if issued, would have' to be annulled, and that it would be his duty to ask the Attorney General to institute proceedings for its annulment, it would hardly be seriously contended that the Secretary might not .interfere and prevent the execution of the patent. lie could not be obliged to sit quietly and allow a proceeding to be consummated, which it would be immediately his duty to ask the Attorney General to take measures to annul. It would not be a sufficient answer against the exercise of his power that no appeal had been taken to him and therefore he was without authority in the matter."
There is authority in this court for this holding. Magwire v. Tyler, 1 Black, 195, was a case involving the right of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 107, c. 352, reorganizing that bureau, and of the Secretary of the Interior, under the act of March. 3, 1849, 9 Stat.-395, establishing that, department, to take jurisdiction of surveys made in the upper Louisiana country upon confirmed Spanish titles. One. of the questions presented was whether the Secretary of the Interior could reject such a survey and order a new one of the same claim, and issue a patent upon the second survey. By the act of March 3, 1807, the board of commissioners appointed to pass upon the merits of such claims was required to deliver to each party whose claim was confirmed a certificate that he was entitled to a patent for the tract of land designated. This certificate was to be presented to the surveyor general, who proceeded to have the survey made and returned, with the certificate, to the recorder of land titles, whose duty it was to issue a patent certificate, which, being transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, (then the head of the Land Department,) entitled the party to a patent. By the' act of April 25, 1812, the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury was transferred to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The act of April 18,1814, required that accurate surveys should be made, according to the description in the certificate of confirmation, and that proper returns should be made to the Commissioner, of the certificate and survey, and of all such other evidence as the Commissioner might require. The court said: " These acts show that the surveys and proceedings must be, in regard to their correctness, within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner; and such has been the practice. Of necessity he must have power to adjudge the question of accuracy preliminary to the issue of a patent."
After referring to the act of July 4, 1836, which conferred plenary powers on the Commissioner to supervise all surveys of public lands, " and also such as relate to private claims of land and the issuing of patents," and also to the act of March 3, 1849, the' third section of which vested the Secretary of the Interior, in matters relating to the General Land Office, including the power of supérvision and appeal, with the same powers that were formerly discharged by the Secretary of the Treasury, the court said: " The jurisdiction to revise on the appeal was necessarily coextensive with the powers to adjudge by the Commissioner. We a,re, therefore, of the opinion that the Secretary had authority to set aside Brown's survey of Labeaume's tract, order another to be made, and to issue a patent to Labeaume, throwing off Brazeau's claim." 1 Black, 202. See also S. C. 8 Wall. 650, 661.
A similar question arose in Snyder v. Sickles, 98 U. S. 203, 211, and was decided in the same way, the court going into an elaborate examination' of the powers of- the Secretary of the Interior to review the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and reaffirming the doctrines of Magwire v. Tyler.
In Buena Vista County v. Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railroad, 112 U. S. 165, 175, a question arose whether the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office under the act of March 5, 1872, 17 Stat. 37, was intended to be final, from which no appeal would lie to the Secretary of the Interior. That act provides: " That the Commissioner of the General Land Office is hereby authorized and required to receive and examine the selections of swamp lands in Lucas, O'Brien, Dickinson and such other counties in the State of Iowa as formerly presented their selections to the surveyor general of the district including that State, and allow or disallow said selections and indemnity provided for according to the acts of Congress in force touching the same at the time such selections were made, without prejudice, to legal entries and rights of Iona fide settlers under the homestead or preemption laws of the United States at the date of this act." It is to be observed that there was nothing in that act expressly giving an appeal from the Commissioner's decision to the Secretary. But the court said: " There is nothing in the act which alters the relation between the two officers as otherwise established, or puts the decisions of the Commissioner, under that act, upon a footing different from his other decisions."
The powers and duties of the Secretary of the Interior were no greater under the acts under consideration in the cases to which we have referred than they are under section's 441, 453 and 2478 of the Kevised Statutes. They were practically, and to all intents and purposes, the same. The general words' of those sections are not- supposed to particularize every minute duty devolving upon the Secretary and every special power bestowed upon him. There must be some latitude for construction. In the language of this court in the late case of Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 524: "It is obvious, it is common knowledge, that in the administration of such large and varied interests as are- intrusted to the Land Department, matters not foreseen, equities not anticipated, and which are, therefore, not provided for by express statute, may sometimes arise, and, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior1 is given that superintending and supervising power which will enable him, in the face of these unexpected contingencies, to do justice." See also Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48.
It makes no difference whether the appeal is in regular form according to the established rules of the Department, or whether' the Secretary on his own motion, knowing that injustice is about to be done by some action of the Commissioner, takes up the case and disposes of it in accordance with law and justice. The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the. law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of. to a party not entitled to it. He represents the government, which is a party in interest in every case involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands.
Furthermore, the power of supervision and control exercised by the Secretary of the Interior over all matters relating to the disposition and sale of the public, lands, under § .453, Eev. Stat., is substantially the same as his power over the Bureau of Pensions, under § 471. That section provides: "The Commissioner of Pensions shall perform, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, such duties in the execution of the various pension and bounty laws as may be prescribed by the President."
There is nowhere any express power given to the Secretary of the Interior to hear and determine appeals from the Commissioner of Pensions; and yet the power is exercised daily without question. And such power was expressly asserted in United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, and impliedly recognized in Miller v. Raum, 135 U. S. 200.
The same remarks apply to the powers of the Secretary of the Interior, under a similarly worded section of the Revised Statutes, (§ 463,) to supervise and control the management of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which powers, so far as we are advised-, have never been questioned.
But even if there was any doubt of the existence of such power in the Secretary' of the Interior, as an original proposition, still the exercise of it for so long a period — going back to the organization of that department — without question, ought to be considered as conclusive as to the existence of the power. Hastings & Dakota Railroad v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, and authorities there cited.
We conclude, on this branch of the case, that the Secretary of the Interior had ample power to set aside the Stratton survey and order a new survey by Yon Leicht; and that his action in such matter is unassailable in the courts in a collateral proceeding. The Yon Leicht' survey, therefore, must be held' as a correct survey of the pueblo claim as confirmed by the Circuit Court. Moreover, the method of running the shore line of the bay of San Francisco, adopted by the Yon Leicht survey, was. approved by the Circuit Court itself in Tripp v. Spring, 5 Sawyer, 209; and on this point we entertain no doubt.
The only remaining question in the case, as we understand it, and as we desire to consider it, may be thus stated: Admitting that the Yon Leicht survey is correct and follows the decree of confirmation; admitting, also, that the patent followed the survey and the decree, and that the premises in dispute are embraced in the patent: Was parol evidence admissible to show that these premises were below the ordinary high-water mark—not of the bay óf San Francisco, but of Mission Creek, a navigable arm of the bay, as that line existed at the date of the conquest from Mexico in 1846 % The contention on this branch of the case is, that, if all these admissions be taken as true, yet the land in dispute never was a portion of the pueblo of San Francisco, because, at the date of the conquest,' it was below the ordinary high-water mark of Mission Creek, and, therefore, upon the admission of California into the Union in 1850, passed to the State in virtue of its sovereignty over tide lands.
To this contention we cannot give our assent; .and in the view which we take of the question, we think there was error in admitting evidence to show that the land was below, high-water mark of the creek, and that the Supreme Court erred in sustaining this ruling. For this and other reasons hereinbefore stated the judgment should have been for the defendant.
It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the original States were reserved to the several States, and that the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States possess within their respective borders. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471, 478; Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65. Upon the acquisition of the territory from Mexico the United States acquired the title to tide lands equally with the title to upland ; but with respect to the former they held it only in trust for the future States that might be erected out of such territory. Authorities last cited. But this doctrine does not apply to lands that had been previously granted to other parties by the former government, or subjected to trusts which would require their disposition in some other way. San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656. For it is equally well settled that when the United States acquired California from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, they were bound, under the 8th article of that treaty, to protect ail rights of property in that territory emanating from the Mexican government previous to the treaty. Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 California, 11; Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478.
Irrespective of any such provision in the treaty, the obligations resting upon the United States in this respect, under the principles of international law, would have been the.same. Soulard v. United States, 4 Pet. 511; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 87; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 436; United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 211, 260.
These observations lead directly to the determination of the force and effect of the title of the pueblo of San Francisco, derived from the former government of Mexico, as opposed to the title which it is insisted passed to the State of California upon its admission into the Union by virtue of its sovereignty over all tide lands in the State below the high-water line, even including such as are situated within the limits of the pueblo.
If we have succeeded in showing that the tract in dispute was part of the land claimed by the city of San Francisco as' successor of the Mexican pueblo of that name; that it is within the four square leagues described in the decree of the United States Circuit Court for the district of California, entered May 18, 1865 ; that that court decided and decreed that the claim of title was valid under the laws of Mexico; that the official survey of the United States officers is correct and followed the decree of confirmation ; and that the patent of the government of the United States, following the survey and.decree, embraced within its calls the property in dispute; we think it clearly follfrtvs that the patent of the government is evidence of the title of the city under Mexican laws, and is conclusive, not only as against the government and against all parties claiming under it by titles subsequently acquired, but also as against all parties except those who have a full and complete title acquired from Mexico anterior in date to that confirmed by the decree of confirmation. This conclusion is fully sustained by the decisions of this court.
The case of San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656, 670, 672, is directly in point. That was a bill by Le Eoy against' the city,of San Francisco'to quiet his title to certain, property within the limits of the city. The plaintiff below claimed at' the trial the benefit of a, deed of the' land from the tide-land commissioners of the State, which purported, for a consideration of $352.80, to release to the grantee the' right, title and interest, of the State of California to the premises therein described- The city relied on the patent of the government based, on the confirmation of the United States Circuit Court for the district of California.
The court held that the title of the city rests upon the dpcree of the court recognizing the title to the four square leagues of land, and establishing their boundaries; and that even if there were any tide lands within the pueblo the power and duty of the United States under the treaty to protect the claims of the city of San Francisco as successor to the pueblo were superior to any subsequently acquired rights of California over the tide lands. Upon the question involved the court said:
"We do not attach any importance, upon this question of reservation, to the deed of the tide-land commissioners, executed to Sullivan on the 3d of December, 1870, for the State did not at that time own any tide or marsh lands within tb,e limits of the pueblo as finally established by the Land Department. All the marsh lands, so called, which the State of California ever owned, were granted to her by the act of Congress of September 28, 1850, known as the Swamp Land Act, by which the swamp and overflowed lands within the limits of certain States, thereby rendered unfit for cultivation, were granted to the States to enable them to construct the necessary levees and drains to reclaim them. 9 Stat. c. 84, p. 519. The interest of the pueblo in the lands within its limits goes back to the acquisition of the country, and precedes the passage of that act of Congress. And that act was never intended to apply to lands held by the United States charged with any equitable claims of others, which they were bound by treaty to protect. As to tide lands, although it may be stated as a general principle — and it was so held in Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65—that the titles acquired by the United States to lands in California under tide waters, from Mexico, were held in trust for the future State, so that their ownership and right of disposition passed to it upon its'admission into the Union, that doctrine cannot apply .to such lands as had been previously granted to other parties by the former government, or subjected to trusts which would require their disposition in some other way. When the United States acquired California it. was.with the duty to protect .all the rights and interests which were held by the pueblo of San Francisco under Mexico. ' The property rights of pueblos equally with those of individuals were entitled to protection, and provision was made by Congress in its legislation for their investigation and confirmation. Townsend v. Greely, 5 Wall. 326, 337. The duty of the government and its power in the execution of its treaty obligations to protect the claims of all persons, natural and artificial, and, of course, of the city of San Francisco as successor to the pueblo, were superior to any subsequently acquired rights or claims of the State of California, or of individuals. The confirmation of the claim of the city necessarily took effect upon its title as it existed upon the acquisition of the country. In confirming it, the United States, through its tribunals, recognized the validity of that title at the date of the treaty — at least, recognized the validity of the claim to the title as then existing, and in execution of its treaty obligations no one could step in between* the government of the United States and the city seeking their enforcement. It is a matter of doubt whether there were any lands within the limits of the pueblo, as defined and established by the Land Department, that could be considered tide lands, which, independently of the pueblo, would vest in the State. The lands -which passed to the State upon her admission to the Union were not those which were affected occasionally by the tide, but only those over which tide water flowed so continuously as to prevent their use and occupation. To render lands tide lands, which the .State by virtue of her sovereignty could claim, there must have been such continuity of the flow of tide water over them, or suqh regularity of the flow within every twenty-four hours,-as to render them unfit for cultivation,, the growth of grasses or other uses to which upland is applied. But even if there were such lands, their existence could in no way affect the rights of the pueblo. Its rights were dependent upon Mexican laws, and when Mexico established those laws she was the' owner of tide lands as well as uplands, and could have placed the boundaries of her pueblos wherever she thought proper. It was for the United States to ascertain those boundaries when fixing the limits of the claim of the city, and that was done after the most thorough and exhaustive examination ever given to the consideration of the boundaries of a claim of a pueblo under the Mexican government. After hearing all the testimony which could be adduced, and repeated arguments of counsel, elaborate reports were made on the subject' by three Secretarios of the Interior. They held, and the patent follows their decision, that the boundary of the bay, which the decree of confirmation had fixed as that of. ordinary high-water mark, as it existed on the 7th of July, 1846, crosses the mouth of all creeks entering the bay. There was, therefore, nothing in the deed of the tideland commissioners which could by any possibility impair the right of the city to exercise the power reserved in the Yan Ness ordinance over such portions of the lands conveyed to occupants under that ordinance as had been occupied or set apart for streets, squares and public buildings of the city. Such a reservation should have been embodied in the decree in this case."
In the case of Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 491, the court, upon a question very similar to this in many of its aspects, followed a similar course of reasoning from which we think the conclusion we have reached is logically deducible. In that case the court uses the following language :
" The position of the defendants is, that as against them the patent is not evidence for any purpose; that as between them and the plaintiff the whole subject of title is open precisely as though no proceedings for the confirmation had been had, and no patent for the land had been issued. Their position rests upon a misapprehension of the character and effect of a patent issued upon a confirmation of a claim to land under the laws of Spain and Mexico.
" In the first place, the patent is a deed of the United States. As a deed its operation is that of a quit-claim, or rather a conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the land, and it takes effect by relation at the time when proceedings were instituted by the filing of the petition before the Board of Land Commissioners.
" In the second place, the patent is a record of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant as it existed upon the acquisition of the country. Such acquisition did not affect the rights of the inhabitants to their property. They retained all such rights, and were entitled by the law of nations to protection in them to the same extent as under the former government. The treaty of cession also stipulated for such protection. The obligation to which the United States thus succeeded was, of course, political in its character, and to be discharged in such manner, and on such terms, as they might judge expedient. By the act of March 8, 1851, they have declared the manner and the terms on which they will discharge this- obligation. They have there established a special tribunal, before which all claims to land are to be investigated ; required evidence to be presented respecting the claims; appointed law officers to appear and contest them on behalf of the government; authorized appeals from the decisions of the tribunal, first to the District and then to the Supreme Court'; and designated officers to survey and measure off the land when the validity of the claims is finally determined. When informed, by the action of its tribunal, and officers, that a claim asserted is valid and entitled to recognition, the government acts, and issues its patent to the claimant. This instrument is, therefore, record evidence of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant. By it the government declares' that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico ; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government, this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclu sive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie. If parties asserting interests in lands acquired since the acquisition of the country could deny and controvert this record, and compel the patentee, in every suit for his land, to establish the validity of his claim, his right to its confirmation and the correctness of the action of the tribunals and officers of the United States in the location of the same, the patent would fail to be, as it was intended it should be, an instrument of quiet and-security to its possessor. The patentee would find his title recognized in one suit and rejected in another, and if his title were maintained, he would find his land located in as many different places as the varying prejudices, interests or notions of justice of witnesses and jurymen might suggest. Every fact upon which the decree and patent rests would be open to contestation. The intruder, resting solely upon his possession, might insist that the original claim was invalid, or was not properly located, and, therefore, he could not be disturbed by the patentee. No construction which will lead to such results can be given to the fifteenth section [meaning the fifteenth section of the act of 1851, for the purpose of ascertaining and settling private land claims in California]. The term ' third persons,' as there used, does not embrace all persons other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the. property."
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions for further proceedings i/n conformity with this opinion.