Case Name: ALSUP v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-01-22
Citations: 210 S.W. 195
Docket Number: No. 5116
Parties: ALSUP v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 210
Pages: 195–198

Head Matter:
(85 Tex. Cr. R. 36)
ALSUP v. STATE.
(No. 5116.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 22, 1919.
On Motion for Rehearing, March 12, 1919.)
1. Criminal Law @=>936(6) — New Trial-Deprivation of Testimony — Surprise —Failure to Move for Continuance.
Where defendant, charged with murder, lost testimony of desired witness, because witness was indicted for complicity in same offense, but defendant did not move for postponement on ground of surprise, under Code Cr, Proc. 1911, art. 616, he could not for first time set up matter in his motion for new trial. Defendant should have moved for postponement, and then have demanded witness’ trial first.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Criminal Law @=>1056(1) — Appeal — Failure to Except to Charge.
Defendant cannot complain of charge, or of failure of the Court of Criminal Appeals to discuss it in its former opinion, where no exceptions were taken to it, or any other part of the charge, prior to reading to the jury, as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 735.
3. Homicide @=>300(3) — Self-Defense — Instruction.
In prosecution for murder, charge that reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily injury will excuse a person in using all necessary force to protect himself, whether or not there is actual danger, if he acts on a reasonable apprehension of danger from his standpoint at the time, held not erroneous.
4. Criminal Law @=>829(5) — Instruction— Self-Defense.
Instruction that if it reasonably appeared to defendant from his standpoint that deceased was about to take his life, or do him serious injury, he was justified in the killing, taken in connection with main charge on self-defense, held to sufficiently instruct jury to view situation from defendant's standpoint, so as to justify refusal of a special charge.
5. Criminal Law @=>806(1) — Instructions— Repetition.
Charges already given should not be repeated.
6. Criminal Law @=>761(6) — Instruction-Assumption of Facts — Self-Defense.
In prosecution for homicide, defendant’s request to charge that each juror must place himself in defendant’s position, and determine from all facts, as they appeared to defendant, whether or not his apprehension of death or serious injury was reasonable, held properly refused as on weight of evidence, as assuming defendant had fear of death or injury.
7. Criminal Law @=>1122(6) — Appeai^-Ques-tions Reviewable — 'Refusal of Instruction.
Where it does not appear from defendant’s requested special charge, or from the bill of exceptions taken to its refusal, whether it was presented or refused before or subsequent to reading of charge to jury, Court of Criminal Appeals cannot consider the matter.
8. Criminal Law @=>829(1) — Instructions— Refusal of Request.
A special charge, given almost verbatim in the main charge, is properly refused.
9. Homicide @=>188(5) — Self-Defense—Evidence — Reputation of Deceased.
In prosecution for murder, defendant setting up self-defense, the state was properly permitted to ask a witness if he knew the general reputation of deceased in Ms community for being a quiet, peaceable man, over objection that alternative was not included in, and that something was omitted from, the question.
10. Criminal Law @=>451(3) — Evidence— Anger.
In prosecution for murder, defendant setting up self-defense, the state properly asked a witness if he had talked to deceased just before the difficulty, and whether he was mad or not.
11. Criminal Law @=>398(1) — Evidence—Location of Bullet Holes.
In prosecution for homicide, defendant setting up self-defense, the state properlj asked witnesses as to the location of bullet holes in the clothing worn by deceased at the time of the fatal difficulty.
12. Criminal Law @=>1037(2) — Appeal- Reservation of Grounds of Review — Remarks of Prosecuting Attorney.
Where defendant’s counsel privately stated to court that he excepted to remarks in argument of state’s attorney, but did not request, verbally or in writing, that jury should be instructed not to consider such remarks, defendant cannot complain of them on appeal.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Williamson County; James R. Hamilton, Judge.
Will Alsup was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. F. Taulbee, oí Georgetown, for appellant.
E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted of murder, and his punishment fixed at seven years' confinement in the penitentiary.
On this appeal his most serious complaint is that he was deprived of the testimony of his witness Allison, by reason of the fact that while the jury were being selected in his ease, and after the witness had been sworn and put under the rule, said witness Allison was indicted for the same offense as that charged against appellant, and he was thereby unable to have the benefit of Allison's testimony, which facts, and the testimony he expe'cted to- obtain from said witness, were set out at length in appellant's motion for new trial. It also appears that appellant did not know of such indictment or the arrest of said witness thereunder, until after the completion of the jury and the arraignment and plea of not guilty of the appellant, but that he did know of same before any testimony was introduced.
There is no claim or allegation on the part of appellant, in his motion for new trial, that the indictment of Allison was fraudulently or purposely obtained, without just ground, and to deprive appellant of his testimony, nor is such proposition suggested or sustained by any evidence introduced in support of said motion for new trial. From the record it seems that the indictment against Allison for complicity in the same offense charged against appellant was rather expected by the parties. The grand jury met on the first Monday in January, 1918, and recessed on the 11th, after returning an indictment against appellant; said recess being 'taken until the 28th of said month. On the 14th the trial court set the case of appellant down for January 29th. The grand jury reconvened on the 28th and on the 29th returned into court the indictment complained of by appellant here. The district attorney states, without controversy, that he was not with the grand jury on the day the indictment against Allison was returned, and also says that when the grand jury took its recess, as mentioned, he was surprised that an indictment had not been returned against Allison.
Our statute (article 616, O. C. P.) plainly provides for a continuance or postponement of a case upon application of either party, when by some unexpected occurrence, after the trial has begun, the applicant is so taken by surprise as that a fair trial cannot be had. If appellant really desired the testimony of Allison he should have availed himself. of his right under this statute and should have made such motion. While same is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, its apparent abuse has always been revised by this court, and if an accused failed to avail himself of this plain remedy, he cannot for the first time set up the matters which constitute the unforeseen occurrence in his motion for new trial.
As said by this court in Childs v. State, 10 Tex. App. 183, speaking of a case where the appellant claimed surprise during the trial:
"It then became the duty of the defendant to apply to the court for either a continuance or postponement, and not to pass it by and depend upon a new trial to enable him to counteract the effect of the surprise. He should have acted at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, and not having done so, he cannot now be heard to complain."
See Higginbotham v. State, 3 Tex. App. 447; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 32 Am. Rep. 595; Roach v. State, 21 Tex. App. 249, 17 S. W. 464; Eldridge v. State, 12 Tex. App. 208.
That such matter is not available when set up for the first time on -motion for new trial is well settled. Raleigh v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 484, 168 S. W. 1050; Graves v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 419, 144 S. W. 961; Bryant v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 394, 33 S. W. 978, 36 S. W. 79.
Other witnesses testified substantially as appellant claimed Allison would have done, and one accused, on the trial, or at any other stage in his case, may not neglect his plain statutory remedies, and take chances on the result, and on motion for new trial make his first complaint • because the result was unfavorable tb him. Appellant should have made a motion for a postponement, setting up the facts, and if same had been granted he could then have demanded the trial first of Allison in due statutory form.
The other matters set up by appellant we do not think constitute any reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.
t5=>Fci other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes