Case Name: NIEMI v. STANLEY SMITH LUMBER CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1915-04-06
Citations: 77 Or. 221
Docket Number: 
Parties: NIEMI v. STANLEY SMITH LUMBER CO.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Moore, Mr. Justice Burnett and Mr. Justice McBride concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 77
Pages: 221–235

Head Matter:
Argued March 17,
affirmed April 6,
rehearing granted May 25, 1915. On rehearing former opinion set aside and judgment reversed July 6, rehearing denied September 7, 1915.
NIEMI v. STANLEY SMITH LUMBER CO.
(147 Pac. 532; 149 Pac. 1033.)
Master and Servant—Injury to Servant—Dangerous Place to Work—■ Evidence—Question for Jury.
1. Whether an employer was negligent in selecting a tree to which a cable was attached near a place where employees were cutting down trees, held, under the evidence, for the jury.
Master and Servant — Injury to Servant — Negligence—Proximate Cause —Question for Jury.
2. "Whether the negligence of an employer was the proximate cause of the death of an employee, held, under the evidence, for the jury, under the rule that it is the duty of the jury to look at the facts and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected in orderly sequence with the prime cause, or disconnected 'by some intervening agency affecting its operation.
[As to proximate and remote causes of injury from negligence, see notes in 50 Am. Rep. 569; 36 Am. St. Rep. 807.]
Master and Servant — Injury to Servant — Contributory Negligence.
3; Whether an employee injured while cutting down a tree was guilty of contributory negligence, held, under the evidence, for the jury.
Master and Servant — Injury to Servant — Assumption of Risk.
4. Whether an employee injured while cutting down a tree assumed the risk arising from the negligent failure of the employer to furnish a safe place to work, held, under the evidence, for the jury.
Master and Servant — Injury to Servant — Employers’ Liability Act.
5. A complaint in an action for the death of an employee cutting a tree which fell on wires attached to another tree, by reason of which the latter tree broke and fell on him, which alleges that the employer negligently selected an unsafe tree to which it attached wires and negligently failed to top the tree selected and to clear the timber from the tree, that by reason thereof the accident happened and rendered the work of the employee hazardous, states a cause of action, under the Employers’ Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16), both as to machinery and inherently dangerous occupation.
[As to what is “accident arising out of and in course of employment” within Employers’ Liability Act, see note in Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1284.]
Death — Action for Death — Statutory Provisions — Construction.
6. Section 380, L. O. L., providing that, where death of a person is caused by the wrongful act of another, the personal representative of decedent may sue at- law therefor, if decedent, had he lived, could have sued for an injury done by the same act, is not repealed by Employers’ Liability Act, but the two must be construed together, and, as far as possible, effect must be given to the provisions of each, but the provision in the Employers’ Liability Aet, enumerating the persons entitled to sue for death, is exclusive of Section 389, so long as any one of the persons named therein survive, but, in case none survive, the representative of decedent may sue under Section 380.
Pleading — Complaint—Cause of Action — Sufficiency.
7. A complaint must state facts sufficient to constitute a eause of aetion and entitling plaintiff to recover.
From Hood River: William L. Bradshaw, Judge.
Department 1.
Statement by Mr. Justice Benson.
This is an action by Joel Niemi, administrator of the estate of Oscar Laine, deceased, against the Stanley Smith Lumber Company, a corporation, for damages for personal injuries causing the death of Oscar Laine the plaintiff being the administrator of decedent’s estate. The circumstances surrounding the accident, so far as they are of value here, are as follows: Defendant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber in Hood Diver County. In this occupation it maintains a number of logging camps in whose vicinity the trees are felled and prepared for the sawmill, to which they are subsequently transported. Among other equipment for this purpose defendant had a large aerial wire cable attached at each end to a standing tree, about 60 feet from the ground, so as to permit the logs to be hoisted and carried along said cable, and down out of the mountains. The upper one of these trees, which will be called, for the purposes of this discussion, “the gin tree,” had the aerial cable attached thereto by a heavy iron band, or collar, to which were also attached five guy wires, which radiated from the collar to stumps used as anchors, which wires varied in length from 100 to possibly 125 feet. The aerial cable and guy wires were tightly stretched for staying the gin tree.
On the 12th of September, 1913, decedent, as an employee of defendant, with another, was engaged in felling trees in the vicinity of the gin tree above mentioned. They had been so employed until about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, when they cut down a tree, which in falling struck a guy wire near the stump to which it was anchored, and the shock of the impact was so great as to break the gin tree in two at a point about 22 feet below tbe collar to which the cable and guy-wires were attached. As the gin tree broke, one of the falling branches struck the decedent, causing injuries from which he subsequently died, and this action followed. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Crawford & Eakin, with an oral argument by Mr. Robert S. Eaten, Jr.
For respondent there was a brief with an oral argument by Mr. Leroy Lomax.
As to duty of active inspection of instrumentalities, see note in 41 L. R. A. 70.
As affected by fact that instrumentality was purchased from responsible dealer, see note in 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1120. Reporter.

Opinion:
Department 1.
Mr. Justice Benson
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is conceded by the parties that the plaintiff's action is based upon defendant's liability at common law. There are two assignments of error.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion for a nonsuit. This contention is based upon the grounds: First, that there is no evidence tending to prove any negligence upon the part of defendant in selecting the gin tree, or using it for the purpose to which it was applied. It is not necessary to go into the evidence extensively upon this point, but it is sufficient to say that, while there is some conflict in the testimony, one witness who examined the remains of the tree after the accident says that "it was a dead tree; it showed that it had been dead for some time. " The evidence also discloses that the cable had been attached during the preceding fall, and we think that it was a question for the jury to answer as to whether defendant had been negligent in the selection thereof.
Defendant next insists the negligence alleged by plaintiff was not the proximate cause of the injury complained of. It is true that the tree Was not broken by the use for which the tree was selected and used, but by the falling of a tree across one of the guy wires, which act defendant contends should be regarded as the proximate cause.
It is not always easy, in a particular instance, to place a finger upon a specific act, and safely say: ' ' This is the act which directly produced a given result." In this case the successive steps are that defendant selected a certain tree to carry a cable, and stayed the same with guy wires. The decedent felled a tree which struck a guy wire, breaking the gin tree, of which a falling limb struck and killed him. If Laine had not felled the tree so that it struck the guy wire, the gin tree would not have broken, and the falling limb would not have caused a death. But, if the guy wire had not been attached to a defective tree, it may be that no accident would have happened. The falling tree striking the wire, the impact breaking the gin tree, and the falling limb killing the man, might, we think, be classed as an unbroken chain of causal events. As is said by Mr. Justice Lord, in the case of Hartvig v. Northern Pac. L. Co., 19 Or. 525 (25 Pac. 359):
" 'Whether the injury in a particular case was such natural and proximate result of the wrong complained of is ordinarily for the decision of the jury.' It is their province to look at the facts as they transpire, and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected in orderly sequence with the prime cause, or disconnected by some intervening agency affecting its operation. ' '
Under the evidence we think that this question was properly submitted to the jury.
We shall now consider defendant's contention that contributory negligence is conclusively disclosed by plaintiff's evidence. It appears from the record that Laine and a fellow-workman had been cutting trees all day, in the same vicinity, under the direction of a foreman. A short time prior to the falling of the tree which struck the guy wire, they had felled another tree which had lodged against a hemlock. The last tree which was cut, and fell against the guy wire, stood about 40 feet away from the gin tree, and about midway between two guy wires, which were 10 feet apart. A short distance beyond this tree, and also midway between the guy wires, stood the hemlock, with the cut tree lodged against it. Before felling the last tree Laine asked the foreman if he should not cut the hemlock, hut the foreman said, "No." The surviving workman, Kyllonen, says at one time that they felled the last tree in such a manner as to dislodge the tree which was leaning against the hemlock. At another time he says: "We tried to fall it straight between the guy wires." Taking this evidence into consideration, we are forced to the conclusion that it was for the jury to say whether there was contributory negligence.
We come, then, to the question of the assumption of risk, and this problem is closely connected with that of proximate cause. If the jury should find that the attaching of the cables and guy wires to a defective tree was a link in a continuous chain of causes without a break, and that defendant was negligent in the matter of furnishing decedent with a safe place to work, then it would also he their duty to determine whether or not the danger arising from such negligence was so open and apparent that the servant should have known it and therefore assumed the risk.
Appellant's second assignment is that the court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict. What we have already said in regard to the motion for a nonsuit is equally applicable to this; and the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed. Rehearing Granted.
Mr. Chief Justice Moore, Mr. Justice Burnett and Mr. Justice McBride concur.