Case Name: The People ex rel. Thomas A. Davies, Appellants, v. The Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City and County of New York, Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1872-02-20
Citations: 47 N.Y. 501
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. Thomas A. Davies, Appellants, v. The Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City and County of New York, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 501–507

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. Thomas A. Davies, Appellants, v. The Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City and County of New York, Respondents.
The provisions of the act of 1822 (Laws of 1822, chap. 257, § 4), which enacted that no property of the Society of the New York Hospital should be subject to be taxed by virtue of any law of this State, did not constitute a contract, but was a spontaneous concession, and therefore subject to modification or repeal.
The subject expressed in the title of the act entitled “ An act to make provisions for the government of the county of New York” (chap. 875, Laws of 1869), embraces the raising and appropriating of money, the imposition of taxes to defray the expenses of the government of the county, and also a consideration of the property to be taxed. The provision, therefore, of section 2 of that act, which provides that the real estate of the New York Hospital, except buildings which are actually used for hospital purposes, shall be liable to taxation the same as other property, is not in contravention, of section 16, article 8 of the Constitution, and is effectual to modify and restrict the exemption contained in the act of 1822.
The omission, in stating the corporate name of the prefix *1 The society of,” is not a material variance, where it is not shown that there is any other hospital having property in the city of New York exempt from taxation, to which the name in the act could apply.
(Argued February 8, 1872;
decided February 20, 1872.)
Appeal from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court directing judgment for defendants upon a writ of certiorari issued under chap. 302, Laws of 1859, to review the action of defendants in assessing certain lots owned by the Society of the Yew York Hospital.
In 1822 the legislature passed an act entitled “An act further to amend the act incorporating the Bank of Yew-burgh, and for other purposes.” The fourth and last section is as follows: “ And be it further enacted that no real estate whatsoever belonging to the Society of the Yew York Hospital shall be subject to be taxed by virtue of any law of this State.” (Laws 1822, chap. 257, p. 290.)
The Revised Statutes provide as follows: “ All lands and all personal estate within this State, whether owned by individuals or corporations, shall be liable to taxation, subject to the exemptions hereinafter specified.” (1 E. S., p. 387, § 1.) The real estate of the hospital is not one of the specified exemptions.
In the New York county tax levy for 1869 the legislature further enacted: “ The real estate of the New York Hospital, except buildings which are actually used for hospital purposes, shall be liable to taxation in the same manner as other property.” (Laws 1869, chap. 875, § 2, vol. 2, p. 2116.) The act is entitled “ An act to make provision for the government of the county of New York.”
In 1870, defendants assessed certain portions of the real estate belonging to the hospital, and which was owned by them at the time the exemption of 1822 was passed, at a valuation of $236,000.
At the time of such assessment the relator was lessee, for a term of twenty-one years, of the property so assessed.
Hpon the refusal of the respondents to correct or reverse their decision, the relator applied for a writ of cerUora/ri to review their decision.
Noah Davis for appellants.
The charter of the Society of the New York Hospital is a contract within the meaning of article 1, section 10, of the United States Constitution. (Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 3 Wheat., 515.) The act of 1822 was in the nature of an amendment to its charter, and the legislature had not the power to terminate or impair the implied contract without the consent or properly ascertained default of the corporation. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, page 280; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard, 133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. v. Debott, 18 id., 380; Mechanics’ and Traders' Bank v. Thomas, id., 384; M'Gee v. Mathias, 4 Wall., 143 ; Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430; Washington University v. Rouse, id., 439; The St. Paul and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Min., 297; Alexander v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn., 223; Osborne v. Humphreys, 7 Conn., 335, in point; London v. Litchfield, 11 Conn., 251.) The second section of the act of 1869 is unconstitutional and void. (The People v. The Board of Supervisors of Chautauqua County, 43 N. Y., 10; The People v. Hill, 35 N. Y., 449; The People v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y., 193; The Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. The Mayor, etc., 4 Seld., 241; Sharp v. The Mayor, 31 Barb., 562; Pullman v. The Mayor, 54 Barb., 166 ; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y., 186; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y., 404.) This certiorari brings up all questions that could be considered upon a return to the common-law writ. (Moorehead v. Hollister, 2 Seld., 6 N. Y., 309; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 1 Seld., 5 N. Y., 383; Bodine v. Goodwin, 1 Seld., 568 ; Niblo v. Pool's Adm., 25 Wend., 283; Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend., 616.)
C. E. Miller for respondents.
The act of 1822 did not constitute a contract, and continued only during the pleasure of the soverign power. (The People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 629; Rector, etc., of Christ Church, Phila. v. County of Phila., 24 Howard U. S. R., p. 300; Brainard v. Town of Colchester, 31 Conn., 407; Lord v. Litchfield, American Law Register, vol. 10, p. 493.) All laws granting exemption from taxation are to be most strictly construed. (Blackwell on Tax Titles, p. 409, and cases cited; State v. Wilson, Pennington, 300; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 516; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Shelly, 1 Black., 447 ; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 629.) The exemption ceased when the property was leased. (Armstrong v. Treasurer of A. Co., 16 Peters, 281.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The act of 1822, chapter 257, section 4, which enacted that no property of the Society of the Hew York Hospital should be subject to be taxed by virtue of any law of this State, did not constitute a contract, but was a spontaneous concession by the legislature, not connected with any service or duty imposed upon the corporation. It was, there fore, subject to modification or repeal. (Rector, etc. of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 24 Howard U. S., 300.)
We are of opinion that the act of 1869, chapter 875, section 2, was valid and effectual, and so modified the act of 1822 as to deprive the lots in question of the benefit of exemption from taxation. It provides that the real estate of the Hew York Hospital, except buildings which are actually used for hospital purposes, shall be liable to taxation, in the same manner as other property. The return of the commissioners shows that the lots in question were not used for hospital purposes, at the time of the imposition of the tax by the respondent.
Two objections are now taken to the validity of the enactment in question: 1st. That it is contained in a local bill, and that the subject of the enactment is not expressed in the title of the act; and, secondly, that the description, "real estate of the Hew York Hospital," does not designate lands of " The Society of the Hew York Hospital."
The title to the act of 1869 is, "An act to make provision for the government of the county of Hew York."
This was the usual title of the bill, generally known as the county tax levy, which was annually passed hy the legislature, to enable the supervisors to raise money by taxation and otherwise, for the purpose of defraying certain expenses of the government of the county. The act specifies the purposes for which the moneys are to be raised, and the amounts and the manner of raising the required sums. It authorizes the raising of a part of these moneys by tax, and part by the issue of bonds, and provides for the levying of taxes in future years, for the payment of the principal and interest of such bonds. It declares that the taxes thereby authorized shall be imposed upon the estates subject to taxation according to law, within the county, and adds to those estates, one which had previously been specially exempted from taxation, viz.: certain real estate of the Hew Y.ork Hospital. All of these provisions relate to the one common subject of making provisions for the government of the county.
The Constitution does not require that every detail of a bill, which affects private or local interests, be set out in the title, or made the subject of a separate act. If all these details are fairly embraced in the subject which is mentioned in the title, the Constitutional provision is complied with. (Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. The Mayor, etc., 8 N. Y., 252, 253.)
To require that the title of every private or local bill should give express notice of all the provisions which it contains, or of every private interest which it affects, would be to demand more than is reasonable or practicable. The Constitution has gone as far in that direction as was deemed wise, by confining every such bill to one subject, to be expressed in the title. The subject of this bill was, making provision for the county government. This title was well understood as referring to the raising and appropriating of money, and the imposition of taxes; and these acts necessarily involved the consideration of the property to be taxed in that locality. If the property, already subject by law to taxation, was deemed insufficient, or if it was found necessary to resort to property previously exempted, it was not foreign to the subject of the bill to remove or modify that exemption, and thus add to the subjects of taxation.
We think the property in question was sufficiently described in the act of 1869, as real estate of " The New York Hospital." The variance in the corporate name consisted only in the omission of the prefix " The Society of." It was not shown or claimed that there was any other hospital having property in the city of New York, not liable to taxation, or to which the name used in the act of 1869 could apply. No want of identity is suggested in the petition. On the contrary, the petitioners set forth in their petition the act of 1869, and aver that the tax complained of was imposed by virtue of that act, and claim the tax to be invalid, not on the ground that the Society of the New York Hospital is not the corporation intended by the act, but that any law, subjecting the property of that corporation to taxation, is an act impairing the obligation of a contract.
Hnder these circumstances the mere omission in stating the corporate name of descriptive words, which can be implied from the residue of the name, is not a material variance.
In the case of The Mayor, etc., of Lynne (10 Co., 122 b), where the corporate name of the plaintiff was " The Mayor and Burgesses of the borough of Lynne Begis," and they were named in a bond as " The Mayor and Burgesses of Lynne Begis," the variance was held immaterial, the court expressing the opinion that, in case of such a mere verbal misnomer, the party seeking to avoid the instrument should he driven to show that there was some other corporation bearing the name used in the deed; and that a deed, by or to a corporation, ought not to he avoided by nice and verbal variances when the true name appears, either by matter expressed in the words used, or necessarily implied therein. (S. C., p. 126 b.)
Here the substance of the corporate name was "The Hew York Hospital." The prefix, " The Society of," was not a distinctive appellation but a description of the character of the body, which would necessarily be implied from its use of a collective or corporate name. The omission of such a prefix, though adopted as part of a corporate name, is not a fatal variance; as, for instance, where an action was brought by " the president, managers and company of the Berks and Dauphin Turnpike Boad " upon written agreement, and the writing produced was with " The Berks and Dauphin Turnpike Company," the variance was held not to be fatal. (6 Sergeant & Rawlins, 12, 17.) Many similar cases might be cited.
The act of March 23d, 1810, and the general appropriation hills for many years past, contain appropriations for " The Hew York Hospital," and mention no other institution in the city of Hew York bearing a similar name.
We think that the legislature has clearly manifested its intention to modify and restrict the exemption contained in the act of 1822. That it had power to do so; that the manner in which it has exercised this power is not in contravention of section 16, of article 3, of the Constitution of 1846; and that it is, consequently, our duty to give effect to its act.
The judgment of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be affirmed with costs.
Chubch, Ch. J., Allen, Geoveb and, Peokham, JJ., concur ; Rapadlo, J., not voting; Folgeb, J., absent.
Judgment affirmed.