Case Name: The State of Ohio v. James M. Cox and George F. Burba
Court: Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1911-01-26
Citations: 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Ohio v. James M. Cox and George F. Burba.
Judges: Gard, J.; Clark, J., concurs; Kyle, J., dissents.
Reporter: Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)
Volume: 11
Pages: 257–277

Head Matter:
OBSTRUCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY SCURRILOUS NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS.
Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County.
The State of Ohio v. James M. Cox and George F. Burba.
Decided, January 26, 1911.
Contempt of Court — Proceedings Against a Newspaper Publisher amd Editor — Jurisdiction of the Trial Court in Contempt Proceedings— Where the Case Commented Upon Had Gone to Judgment Before the Integrity of the Court was Impugned — Circumstances Which Purge a Publisher from Contempt — Pending Cases — Appeal Before Overruling of Motion for New Trial — Contempts Under the Common and the Statute Law — Section 12186.
1. Proceedings in contempt will not lie against tbe publisher of a newspaper, where it appears from the evidence that the article complained of was published at a time when he was in another city, and that he neither wrote the article, or inspired its publication, or consented to or approved it.
2. Where the common pleas court has held that a cause under consideration is an equitable one, other common pleas judges will adhere to that ruling when subsequently called in to sit in a proceeding in contempt growing out of the action of the accused in the same cause.
3. The judgment of the court having been rendered and an appeal taken and bond executed before the publication was made, it can not be assumed that the court in subsequently announcing the formal overruling of the motion for a new trial and ordering an entry made to that effect was influenced by said publication.
4. This being true the cause was not a pending cause in the court of common pleas at the time the publication was made, and could not become the subject of contempt proceedings in that court; nor •can it be successfully contended that because the matter to which the article referred was still a pending cause in the circuit court of the same county, that its publication was a contempt upon all the courts of the county, or that a gross vinification of the court constitutes such an open scandal upon the administration of justice generally, that it falls within the provisions of the statute providing summary punishment for a contempt which obstructs the administration of justice,
Gard, J.; Clark, J., concurs; Kyle, J., dissents.

Opinion:
Decision dismissing charge of contempt.
This is' an action for contempt against James M. Cox and George P. Burba, respectively the publisher and editorial writer of the Dayton Daily Neivs, a newspaper printed and of general circulation in Dayton and Montgomery county, Ohio. The committee appointed by the court of common pleas to investigate said matter found in their report that there had been a contempt of the court-in the publication in the editorial columns of this newspaper of date December 29th, 1910, of a certain article allegedly scandalizing the courts of Montgomery county, Ohio, and that James M. Cox and George F. Burba were responsible for the writing and publication of this allegedly contemptuous article.
The information filed by the committee is as follows:
"In obedience to the order of this court, the state of Ohio, by J. D. Clark, W. S. MeConnaughey, A. McL. Marshall and Roy D. Fitzgerald, members of the bar appointed by the court, for the purpose, charges and -states that on the 29th day of December, 1910, in Montgomery county,' Ohio, James M. .Cox and George F. Burba were guilty of contempt of court in this, to-wit:
"That at the time there was and had long been pending in .said court ease No. 27430,. the Dayton Reduction Company, plaintiff, vs. the City of Dayton, State of Ohio, defendant, wherein plaintiff sought to secure the specific performance of a contract to deliver garbage to a reduction plant and to recover damages from the city of Dayton for a breach thereof; that theretofore said court had referred the assessment of damages to a special master commissioner; that' said commissioner had reported his finding to the court fixing $79,420 as the amount of damages which defendant should pay; .that said court modified said finding by reducing said amount to the sum of $75,828-; that thereafter on .the 23d day of November, 1910, a motion for a new trial was filed, and on December 30, 1910, the court made an order -overruling the motion; that on the said 29th day of December, 1910, at the city of Dayton, county of Montgomery, and state of Ohio, said James .M. Cox and George F. Burba published in a newspaper which was generally circulated in said city, and county and in the court house thereof and in the presence, of the court on and after said date, the. following false and contemptuous article scandalizing the .courts .of .Montgomery county, Ohio, including this court' of common pleas, to'-wit:
' " ' That judgment. Certain eminently respectable citizens are making an effort to have the mayor use his good offices to compel the city to pay the award of nearly eighty thousand dollars sometime ago given to the reduction company as an outcome o£ its suit against the city of Dayton.
" 'If any "innocent holders" are about to lose anything in connection with the ease it is unfortunate. But when judicial pirates appoint dipsomoniacal referees to fix the swag for private grafters, the citizens are not likely to lose any sleep over the other fellow's losses.
" 'From the first to last the affairs in connection with the disposal of garbage have savored of a conspiracy to rob the city, and political buccaneers having "influence" with the courts have brought suspicion to the doors of many of the persons connected with the enterprise. .
" 'Let the ease be fought to the bitter end.
' ' That said publication was in reference to said .case and was false and malicious, and tended to degrade and defame said court of common pleas and to bring said court into general contempt and infamy in the minds of the citizens of said city and county and to obstruct the administration of justice in said ease and other eases pending in said court; all against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.
"Wherefore, said James M. Cox and George F. Burba are guilty of contempt of this court.
"(Signed) "J. D. Clark,
"W. S. McConnaughey,
"A. McL. Marshall,
"Roy G. Fitzgerald."
Pleas in abatement have been filed by Mr. Cox and Mr. Burba, which are identical in terms, and which go into a recitation of that which occurred in the court of common pleas in the case of the Dayton Reduction Company v. the City of Dayton, Ohio, and set forth specially a want or lack of jurisdiction in the. court oE common pleas issuing the process in question.
The case coming on to be heard upon the evidence offered by the committee, a copy'of this newspaper of date December 29, 1910, was first offered and admitted in evidence, and other newspapers offered and admitted, subject to the objection of counsel for the defendants, bearing allegedly upon the question of knowledge and responsibility, and then the testimony of divers witnesses; the defendants resisting .only op the plea of lack of jurisdiction,
The evidence shows that James M. Cox was not in the city of Dayton at the time of this publication and had no knowledge of it.prior to the time of its appearance in the newspaper; and that George F. Burba, who was and is an.editorial writer on this paper, wrote and caused to be published this article.
, While not admitting in terms the publication, the answer or plea, in abatement denies any contempt on the part of either Air. Cox or Air. Burba, and raise' explicitly and in terms the question' of the jurisdiction of the court to punish either of the defendants for .contempt for the reason, as the answer avers, that an appeal was perfected on December 17th, 1910, to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, from the judgment of the court of common pleas in case No. 27430, the Dayton Reduction Company v. the City of Dayton, Ohio, and that thereafter this action was not pending in the common pleas court, and therefore no cause that this article could prejudice in the due and proper administration of' justice.
Part of the'evidence and argument is addressed to the question as to whether or not this was a pending cause and the publication of this article a contempt thereof; the other question raised being that even if it be not a pending cause, is it not such an article that it is a contempt against the courts of this county generally and an article which openly scandalizes the courts and the administration of justice, there being no question but that the article was most contemptuous if connected with a pending cause in the court issuing process 1
[ I am of the opinion, first, that as there is no connection made in the evidence with any agency of James M. Cox in the publication of this article save that he is the publisher at the newspaper, and that as the evidence expressly shows that he was out of the city at the time of its publication and neither wrote the article, inspired its publication, or. consented to or approved of it, that there is nothing shown why this court should punish him for contempt, and therefore this particular defendant is released and purged of contempt/]
The jurisdictional question made in the answer of Mr, Burba is now for determination, and the evidence upon this question shows that the case was duly and properly appealed to the cir cuit court on December 17th, 1910, but that a motion for a new trial, which had been filed by the defendant, was pending and not overruled until December 30th, 1910, one day after the publication of the allegedly contemptuous article.
The court of - common pleas held in the case of the Dayton Reduction Company v. the City of Dayton that the cause was an equitable one and denied the request of the defendant for a jury trial, and inasmuch as this court is now sitting as that same court of common pleas, I am of opinion that the holding by the trial court on this question should be here adhered to, the circuit court being the only court now to decide whether it be an appealable cause, referring to a decision to appear'in the 83 O. S. Reports, and therefore I shall consider the cause as an equitable one.
With this conclusion it follows that the duly perfected appeal as made on December 17th, -1910, removed the cause from the court of common pleas to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, and therefore at the time of the publication of this article the case had passed from the jurisdiction of the common pleas court and was within the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
While the technical overruling of a motion for a new trial was not done until December 30th, 1910, the evidence discloses that there was no intention to really present that motion to the court or to insist upon its argument, and that all that was intended to be done was what was done, to-wit, the placing, on record of the formal entry overruling the motion for a new trial, and therefore there was nothing in this almost agreed to act which could be influenced by the publication of the article in question.
The case being appealable, it was wholly immaterial what disposition the trial judge- might make of the motion for a new trial, or whether he ever acted upon it at all. So it is my opinion that there was nothing pending in this case in the court of common pleas at the time of this publication which could be made the subject of contempt of court.
It is claimed finally by the committee haying in' hand the charges of contempt that independently of the fact of the case being within or without the court of common pleas, that it was in some court in Montgomery county and that this article was a contempt upon all the courts of Montgomery county and an open scandal on the • administration of justice in courts generally.
We have been cited to cases in the able presentation by the committee which it is claimed hold that the publication of an article such as this is contemptuous under the common law of England, and it is urged here that we give application to this rule.' Some of these cases are based upon Lord Hardwick's classification of contempts under the common law, which are as follows: '
1st. Where one scandalizes the court itself.
2d. The abusing of parties who are concerned in cases in court.
3d. Where one prejudices or attempts to prejudice mankind against persons before the case is heard.
The cases in the United States which hold, as some of them do. that any scandalous utterance or publication of or concerning a court is contemptuous, are all cases which follow the expression of the early English courts that a court has the inherent right to protect itself from slander or libel by attachment for contempt.
In Ohio, however, we have a statute on the question of, con-tempts of court, the one upon which these very charges are made, being Section 12136 of the General Code, which reads as follows:
"A court, or judge at chambers, summarily may punish a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. ' '
In Hunt v. State, 5 C.C.(N.S.), 626, on page 645 the court says, referring to the section cited:
' ' And that, we understand, is not intended to be restrictive of the inherent common law right of the court, but if is sufficiently comprehensive to include all of the power that the courts at common law ever had to punish contempts summarily. ' '
If this be true, and I am of opinion that it is, it necessarily follows that to punish for contempt something must have been done or said "to obstruct the administration of justice."
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized this in the case of Myers v. State, 46 O. S., at page 491, when it said:
"It was not the libel against the judge which constituted the offense for which the respondent was liable as for contempt of court — the offense consisted in the tendency of his acts to prevent a fair trial of the cause then pending in the court, it is this offense which constitutes the contempt and for which he could be summarily.
' ' The statute clearly authorizes, as did the common law, courts to punish summarily as contempts acts calculated to obstruct their business. They could not be maintained without such power nor could litigants obtain a fair consideration of their causes in a court where the jury of judge should be subject during the trial to influences in respect to the case upon trial calculated to impair their capacity to act impartially between the parties. ' '
In Post v. State of Ohio, 14 Circuit Court Reports, 112, the last syllabus reads:
"Newspaper comments however libelous having relation to proceedings which are past and ended, are not in contempt of court, or of the authority of the court to which reference is made. ' '
This syllabus is found from a consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in the Myers case, supra, and the circuit court says:
"It is apparent to us, that this language of the court (meaning the Supreme Court) was intended to and the court does hold that libels upon the court which do not relate to cases pending are not a contempt, and concur with the adjudication in those states which so hold."
Newspaper articles reflecting upon a court or court procedure may be either critical, libelous or contemptuous. A criticism is an expression of opinion in disapproval of a judge or court action, a libel an untrue, unjust and malicious attack upon a judge in his official capacity, a contempt an attack upon court or procedure which tends to affect the administration of justice in any pending cause.
We recognize the right of free speech and the right to full expression of private opinion in honest criticism or even censure, but when language passes this and becomes malicious in attack upon a judge of a court, then the law holds it to be a libel, and when by word, writing or act evil > influence is sought to be brought, to bear upon pending litigation by attacks made upon a judge officially or upon the conduct of a certain cause pending therein, this the law holds to be contempt.
The distinction between libel and contempt is obvious, for while a libelous attack may be proceeded against independent of any case, and affects but the person attacked, a contempt strikes at the very foundation of our free institutions when it attempts to obstruct the administration of justice between man and man.
.No court could properly maintain its dignity or the solemnity of its decrees if it were without power to punish those who seek by exciting public clamor or private vengeance to control or influence the action of court or jury in any pending litigation and thus prevent or hinder the triumph of right and justice, but beyond this the extraordinary process of contempt should not go.
The article in question, so the evidence shows, was written and published apparently without very full investigation or even appreciation of the subject-matter, and was, under the evidence submitted, a most unjust attack upon a court whose action so far as honesty and good faith were concerned, was nowhere brought in question by any of the parties to the cause, and the succeeding newspaper comments made thereupon were most indelicate and savored of bravado; but I can not believe that this most unworthy attack extended so that it obstructed or tended to obstruct the administration of full and complete justice in all cases before the courts of Montgomery county.
Such publication, while pernicious and subversive of the good order of society and the proper subject for penal legislation, has no direct tendency to obstruct the court in the free exercise of its functions. It is this autonomy of the court that is the subject of its extraordinary self defensive power. It may invoke this power to preserve its freedom of action, but not its general reputation. For the latter, it must rely upon its own rectitude and upon the good sense and appreciation of the people it serves.
With this conclusion it follows that the charge of contempt of court .as made against George F. Burba is not legally sustained.