Case Name: Lois Ann HENNIGAN, Appellant, v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., and GCO Minerals Company, Inc., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1993-01-28
Citations: 848 S.W.2d 276
Docket Number: No. 09-92-032 CV
Parties: Lois Ann HENNIGAN, Appellant, v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., and GCO Minerals Company, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before WALKER, C.J., and BROOKSHIRE and BURGESS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 848
Pages: 276–284

Head Matter:
Lois Ann HENNIGAN, Appellant, v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., and GCO Minerals Company, Inc., Appellees.
No. 09-92-032 CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.
Jan. 28, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1993.
Richard Ellis Turkel, Orange, for appellant.
Kevin M. Jordan, Houston, for appellees.
Before WALKER, C.J., and BROOKSHIRE and BURGESS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
BURGESS, Justice.
This is a summary judgment appeal. Lois Ann Hennigan sued I.P. Petroleum Company, Inc. and GCO Minerals Company, Inc. for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, "negligent infliction of mental anguish" and sex discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. The alleged wrongful acts occurred in connection with the termination of Lois Hennigan's employment as a security/gate guard at I.P. Petroleum. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered a take nothing judgment. Appellant raises six points of error.
Lois worked as a security guard at the gate to the I.P. Petroleum oil field. Her husband Aldon Hennigan was also a security guard there. Lois filed for divorce and obtained a temporary restraining order which restrained Aldon from going about Lois' place of employment, and which also restrained Aldon's "agents, servants, and employees, and on those persons in active concert or participation with them and who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise." Appellant's employment was terminated August 12, 1989, the day after Aldon was served with the temporary restraining order.
Point of error one urges "the facts support that plaintiff's claim for sex discrimination is not time barred". An employer is prohibited from discharging an employee on the basis of gender. Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp.1992). Appellees claimed Hennigan failed to timely file a sworn complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. They produced the document asserted to be the sworn complaint filed with the Commission. It is dated March 12,1990, more than 180 days after the occurrence. As the movant seeking summary judgment on the ground of an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon appellees to establish as a matter of law that no complaint was filed within the 180 day period. The March 12 complaint is titled "Amended Complaint". Since it is an amended complaint, there must be an original complaint, or at least the movants had a duty to establish that there was no original complaint. Appellees argue that the original complaint did not comply with all of the requirements of Article 5221k. This is not sufficient to establish a right to summary judgment as a matter of law. As a general rule, commencement of suit stays the running of the statute of limitation regardless of how defectively the cause may be presented, so that an amendment relates back to the time of filing of the original. Curtis v. Speck, 130 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1939, writ ref'd). The summary judgment record does not reveal the date the original complaint was filed with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Appellees failed to meet their initial burden, that is to establish a right to summary judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1985); Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a. Although appellant has shown error, the motion for summary judgment contained an alternate ground for summary judgment. Thus, we must review point of error two before we may consider whether the error raised under point of error one is reversible error.
Point of error two contends "the facts support that plaintiffs claim for sex discrimination was not abandoned nor waived by plaintiff." The motion for summary judgment urged there was no genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of appellant's cause of action for sex discrimination, based upon her deposition testimony, as follows:
Q. [By Counsel for Defendants]: Are you trying to tell the jury that you were fired in retaliation for you filing the divorce?
A. [By Lois Hennigan]: I think so.
Q. So, you weren't terminated because you're a woman, simply because you filed for divorce?
A. Do what now?
Q. You were not terminated, in your mind, because you are a woman. You were terminated simply because you filed for divorce?
A. Yes.
This is an admission she was not terminated on the basis of gender. This admission negates an essential element of her cause of action, entitling appellees to summary judgment unless the summary judgment evidence raised a fact issue. Henni-gan claims she repudiated this testimony in her response to the motion for summary judgment. The affidavit includes the following statements:
1. [Counsel for defendants] was very aggravating and had me so upset, I did not completely realize what he was asking or what I was saying.
2. The real reasons they fired me were several. They wanted another man in the job, and also, they wanted to hurt me because I filed for divorce.
3. The men got together to hurt me, to get rid of me in retaliation for the divorce and to have an excuse to replace me with a man.
4. When [counsel for defendants] asked me the question "You were not terminated, in your mind, because you are a woman. You were terminated simply because you filed for divorce," I was not thinking of the legal aspect of my answer, but just trying to put into my own words what I thought they had done to me. They fired me for all the above reasons and because I am a woman. The word "simply" in the question was very confusing, and I had trouble responding to it. The question was worded in such a way as to be confusing, and it tricked me.
5. They persecuted me and fired me because I am a woman.
Statements 2, 3, and 5 are eoncluso-ry statements of opinion. Appellees objected on that ground. A legal conclusion in an affidavit is insufficient to raise an issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment. Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.1984). Statements 1 and 4 place the deposition testimony in context but do not refute her previous admission beyond the conclusory assertion "they fired me . because I am a woman." Summary judgment was proper because the summary judgment evidence negates an element of appellant's sex discrimination action. Points of error one and two are overruled.
Point of error three argues "the facts support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress which is not solely based on termination alone." Absent an express contract to the contrary, an employer has the absolute right to discharge an employee with or without cause. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99 (1888). Where there is an intentional infliction of emotional distress independent of the discharge of the employee the fact that the conduct was ancillary to the termination of employment is no defense for such conduct. Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ granted). In order to assert a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hennigan must show: (1) appellees acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) appellees' actions caused appellant emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by appellant was severe. Tidelands Auto Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Hennigan argues: (1) the appellees' actions were retaliatory in nature because she was not discharged until she had the divorce petition served upon her husband; (2) the termination was sex discrimination; (3) the conduct was outrageous because she did nothing wrong with reference to her employer and she received little or no support from her husband; (4) the conduct was outrageous because her husband and agents of appellees conspired to discharge her. A review of the summary judgment record reveals that Hennigan complains only of the fact of her termination and the motivation therefor, not the manner in which she was terminated. The record contains no conduct independent of the termination of employment, and no evidence that the termination was affected in an extreme and outrageous manner. See Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198 (1992). Point of error three is overruled.
Point of error four urges the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. There is no recognized separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 186, 121 L.Ed.2d 131 (1992); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). On December 2, 1992, the Texas Supreme Court absolutely eliminated negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action. Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 231, 1992 WL 353277, (December 2, 1992). Point of error four is overruled.
Point of error five contends "the facts support a cause of action for civil conspiracy". In order to assert a cause of action for civil conspiracy, Henni-gan must show there was a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.1979). To be actionable, a civil conspiracy must consist of wrongs that would be actionable against the conspirators individually. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.1963). The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Hennigan's discrimination and distress claims. Since ap-pellees were entitled to summary judgment on the underlying claims, they are likewise entitled to summary judgment on the overarching conspiracy. Point of error five is overruled.
Point of error six states: "Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment where the facts show genuine issues of material fact still to exist?" To be entitled to summary judgment on the whole case, appellees must prove as a matter of law no genuine issue of material fact exists as to one or more elements of each of appellant's causes of action. American Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). Summary judgment was proper as to each of the theories pleaded. Point of error six is overruled. The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.