Case Name: WHEELER et al. v. FRONHOFF et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-02-09
Citations: 270 S.W. 887
Docket Number: No. 3001
Parties: WHEELER et al. v. FRONHOFF et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 270
Pages: 887–890

Head Matter:
WHEELER et al. v. FRONHOFF et al.
(No. 3001.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Feb. 9, 1925.
On Rehearing, Feb. 26, 1925.)
1. Attorney and ciient <@=>190(2) — Attorneys held not entitled to intervene in client’s suit ■ after attempted .dismissal by client.
Agreement that attorneys were “to have one-third of any sum of money or property, or both, or either, that may be recovered or paid as a compromise of said suit,” held not a present sale or conveyance of interest in plaintiff’s cause of action entitling attorneys to intervene , after attempted dismissal by client and prosecute to judgment on their own account client’s suit.
2. Attorney and client <§=>190(3) — Defendant in suit has no duty to see that plaintiff keeps contract with his attorneys for contingent fees.
Defendant in suit owes plaintiff’s attorneys no duty to see that plaintiff complies with his contract for contingent fees, and, if plaintiff wrongfully compromises suit to injury of his attorneys, their remedy, if any, is suit against plaintiff, and not against defendant.
On Motion for Rehearing.
3. Pleading <@=>8(I5) — Allegation of collusion between client and defendant to defeat recovery of attorney’s fees held insufficient as conclusion.
Allegations, in attorney’s petition for leave to intervene in client’s suit after settlement with defendant, that client and defendant colluded together to defeat petitioner’s right to recover- any of property as attorney’s fees, held insufficient, in absence of statement of facts relied on to support conclusion.
Appeal from District Court, Bowie County ; Hugh, Carney, Judge.
-Action by B. Eronhoff against H. Eronhoff, wherein; ,C. A, Wheeler and others, attorneys for plaintiff under contract for contingent fee, filed petition for leave to intervene after attempted dismissal by plaintiff. Erom .judgment granting defendant’s motion to dismiss suit’ and to strike petition for leave to intervene, intervener's appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
B. Eronhoff, claiming to own an interest in certain property in the possession of H. Fron-hoff, employed appellants Pratt P. Bacon, C. A. Wheeler, and S. I. Robison, attorneys at law, to represent him-in a suit against said PI. Eronhoff to recover said interest. After suit as contemplated by B. Eronhoff was commenced, and while it was being prosecuted on'his behalf by said Bacon, Wheeler, and Robison, as his attorneys, he agreed with them in writing as follows:
“Whereas, the undersigned has a lawsuit pending in the district court of Bowie county in the state of Texas against H. Eronhoff, and has employed Pratt P. Bacon and Wheeler & Robison, attorneys at law, to represent him in said suit either in said district court or any other court to which said suit may be carried, and said attorneys have agreed to accept said employment, and it is understood and agreed that they are to'have one-third of any sum of money or property or both or either that may be recovered or paid as a compromise of said suit for their services therein. Given under my hand on this the 7th day of February, 1922.
“[Signed] B. Eronhoff.”
A trial of the suit commenced as stated resulted in a judgment in B. Eronhoff’s favor, which on appeal prosecuted to this court was affirmed (245 S. W. 737), but which on writ of error to the Supreme Court was reversed by a judgment of that court rendered April 2, 1924, in accordance with the opinion of a commission of appeals. 260 S. -W. 164. Before the mandate of the Supreme Court was filed in the trial court, to wit, on April 30, 1924, B. Fronhoff filed a motion to dismiss his suit in the court last mentioned. On the day said mandate was filed, to wit, July 5, 1924, said attorneys, appellants here, filed a petition whereby they sought to intervene in the suit, on the theory that the effect of the 'undertaking of their client, B. Fronhoff, set out above, was to convey to them an interest (alleged to be- of the value of $2,666.66) in his cause of action against H. Fronhoff which they were entitled to recover by continuing the'prosecution of the suit on their own account. . , July 28, 1924, H. Eronhoff filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ said petition wherbby they sought to intervene in the suit. August 25, 1924, the court rendered judgment dismissing B. Eronhoff’s suit as prayed for by him, and striking out appellants’ petition whereby they sought to intervene in the suit, as prayed for by H. Eronhoff. The appeal is from that judgment.
Si I. Robison, Pratt Bacon, and G. A. Wheeler, all of Texarkana, for appellants.
Sid Crumpton and W. W. Arnold, both of Texarkana, for appellees.,
Writ of error grai April 29, 1925.

Opinion:
WILDSON, C. J.
(after stating the facts as above). The judgment complained of is not erroneous, unless the legal effect of B. Fronhoff's agreement, set out in the statement above, was to transfer to appellants an interest in the cause of action in the subject-matter of the suit; for if that was not the effect of that agreement, appellants had no cause of action against H. Eronhoff, and therefore no right to intervene in the pending suit for the purpose of prosecuting it against him on their own account.
The language of the agreement is not like that used in Ry. Co. v. Vaughan, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 40 S. W. 1065, Ry. Co. v. Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S. W. 709, Lumber Co. v. Holt (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 1029, and Gibson v. Coal Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 266 S. W. 137, cited by appellants as supporting their claim of a right to intervene in the suit. In each of those cases the intent to transfer an interest in the cause of action ,or subject-matter thereof was shown by apt words. Not so here. The language used by B. Fronhoff was that—
Appellants "are to have one-third of any sum of money or property, or both or either, that may be recovered or paid as a compromise of said suit for their services therein."
That language, it seems to us, should' not be construed as evidencing an intention1 that title to an interest in the property or cause of action therefor was thereby and then to pass to appellants, and it is plain under the authorities, that unless the language evidenced such an intent the agreement did not operate to then pass anything to appellants. Cotton Co. v. Simmons, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 87 S. W. 842; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1280; 6 C. J. 742 et seq., and authorities there cited.
The view most favorable to appellants which can be taken Of the language, of the agreement, we think, is that it showed that appellants were to own one-third of any money or property recovered by B. Eronhoff, or paid to him as a compromise, when, and not before, same was so recovered or paid. In that view, if he did not recover anything, and if nothing was paid to him in settlement .of his claim, appellants, of course, acquired nothing because of the agreement.
It was. not alleged in appellants' peti tion that B. Fronhoff recovered or was paid anything as a result of the suit. If, however, the petition had contained such allegations, they would have shown no more than a liability on the part of B. Fronhoff to appellants, and not a liability .on the part of H. Fronhoff to them; for the latter owed appellants no duty to see that B. Fronhoff complied with his contract with them. So, and for the same reason, if B. Fronhoff wrongfully and to the injury of appellants compromised the suit, appellants' remedy, if any they had, was by a suit for damages against B. Fronhoff, and not against H. Fronhoff.
Appellees also urge as a reason why the trial court should have ruled as he did that appellants' petition "was filed too late," and cite Lambie v. Wibert (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S. W. 225, which seems to support the conten.tion. Whether it really does or not, and, if so, whether it correctly interprets the law, we will not undertake to determine, as we are satisfied the judgment complained of is not erroneous for the other reason urged by them.
The judgment is affirmed.
<@£5>For other cases see same topic and K.EY-NU 5R in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes -