Case Name: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LeRoy IVERSON, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1960-03-07
Citations: 10 Utah 2d 171
Docket Number: No. 9103
Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LeRoy IVERSON, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: CROCKETT, C. J., and WADE and McDonough, jj., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 10
Pages: 171–174

Head Matter:
350 P.2d 152
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LeRoy IVERSON, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 9103.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 7, 1960.
Walter L. Budge, Atty. Gen., Jay E. Banks, Dist. Atty., Peter F. Leary, Asst. Dist. Atty., John L. Black, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant.
Horace C. Beck, Salt Lake City, for' respondent.

Opinion:
CALLISTER, Justice.
Defendant was charged under the automobile homicide law, Section 76-30-7.4, U.C.A. 1953, with causing the death of Hermania Padilla by driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and carelessly and recklessly causing her death on August 23, 1958, in Salt Lake County. The trial was to a jury and at the close of the state's case the defendant made a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the state had failed to prove its case. The trial judge took this motion under advisement, and the trial proceeded.
After all the evidence had been presented by both sides defendant renewed the motion to dismiss upon the same ground. The trial judge reserved his ruling upon the motion and submitted the case to the jury.
The jury, after deliberation, returned a verdict of guilty. However, upon polling the jury, one of the jurors changed his mind and refused to concur with the guilty verdict. The trial judge declared the jury to be a "hung jury" and discharged them.
Subsequently, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. From that ruling the state has appealed, setting forth in its brief evidence from which it contends that the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is our view that this contention is correct and that the trial court was right in its first determination to let the case go to the jury. However, in view of the disposition of this case, as indicated below, we see no useful purpose in detailing the evidence herein.
The law involved is ably discussed in the opinion of Justice Wolfe in State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258. The controlling principle is that upon such a motion the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for determination of the guilt or innocence of defendant.
The judgment is reversed but the defendant having been in jeopardy there can be no further proceedings herein. .State v. Thatcher, supra; as to when jeopardy attaches, see State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WADE and McDonough, jj., concur.