Case Name: Orin A. MIMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-11-19
Citations: 994 So. 2d 1233
Docket Number: No. 3D07-2109
Parties: Orin A. MIMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, SHEPHERD, and SALTER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 994
Pages: 1233–1239

Head Matter:
Orin A. MIMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D07-2109.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 19, 2008.
Orín A. Mims, in proper person.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Nicholas A. Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, SHEPHERD, and SALTER, JJ.

Opinion:
SHEPHERD, J.
This is an appeal from a trial court order prohibiting a criminal defendant from filing further pro se motions. The reason articulated for the action was that the defendant had filed four successive Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 motions to correct illegal sentence which "argue[d] the same issues [as] in previous motions." The trial court was incorrect.
The four motions in question and the grounds asserted in each are as follows:
1. March 9, 2004: Mims files his first Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. In this motion, "[t]he defendant asserted] that the sentencing score-sheet presented to the court on the day [the] sentence was imposed was wholly inaccurate.... " The trial court denied the motion, finding it "meritless" and "lacking in any good faith basis." The court continued to "forewarn! ] [the defendant] that filing such pleadings in the future will warrant sanctions.... "
2. May 17, 2005: Mims files his second Rule 3.800 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. In this motion, Mims alleged that "The[] convictions that the trial court relied on to qualify the defendant as a habitual felony offender do[ ] not satisfy the substantive requirements necessary to qualify the defendant as a habitual felony offender...." That motion was denied, and the trial court again found the motion "[to have been made] without any apparent good faith," "placed [the defendant] on notice that the filing of similar motions in the future will subject him to sanctions, including a rule to show cause why he should not be held in contempt...."
3. December 1, 2006: Mims files his third Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. In this motion, Mims argued his sentence was illegal because it was imposed by a successor judge, rather than by the judge who accepted his plea. He also argued his sentence was illegal because the judge never expressly pronounced him guilty in open court, and the written judgment was not in the manner and form required by law. This motion was considered by a different trial judge than the one who heard the first two motions and was denied.
4. April 3, 2007: Mims files his fourth Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. In this motion, Mims argued his sentence was illegal because the trial court failed to determine whether his sentence would run concurrent or consecutive with a sentence yet to be pronounced. The trial court struck the motion, stating, "This is Defendant's third [sic] Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence in which he raises the same claim regarding his 9.2[-]year sentence." (emphasis added). Soon thereafter, the trial court issued an order to show cause to Defendant why he should not be prohibited from filing future pro se motions.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 allows a court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla.2003). Florida courts, including the Florida Supreme Court, have held that the phrase "at any time" allows defendants to file successive motions under Rule 3.800. Id. Only a previously adjudicated Rule 3.800 claim may not be raised a second time. Pleasure v. State, 931 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). It is clear in this case that no motion filed by this defendant sought to raise a previously adjudicated ground, as claimed by the trial court.
Recognizing the trial court fatally misread the substance of the motions, the State seeks to save the decision of the trial court by arguing Defendant also filed two unsuccessful Rule 3.850 motions and an unsuccessful motion to recuse one of the trial judges who handled his postconviction litigation. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest these motions filed by Defendant were frivolous, meritless, or not advanced in good faith. Moreover, the argument advanced by the State was not made or considered by the trial court. We cannot consider this argument for the first time on appeal. See Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla.1999).
We do not condone the filing of meritless or frivolous petitions and motions in our courts. See, e.g., Minor v. State, 963 So.2d 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Johnson v. State, 915 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Hepburn v. State, 934 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). However, "denying a pro se litigant the opportunity to file future petitions is a serious sanction, especially where the litigant is a criminal defendant who has been prevented from further attacking his or her conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. ." State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla.1999); see also, Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, ."). In this case, the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant from filing further pro se motions in the trial court. The trial court order prohibiting Defendant from filing future pro se pleadings is reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the merits of Defendant's current postconviction claim.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
COPE, J., concurs.
. The trial court also erred by striking the motion rather than ruling upon it. See Jordan v. State, 760 So.2d 973, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ("When a trial court denies a motion for postconviction relief and restricts a litigant's right to proceed subsequently in court, it must address the merits of the claims advanced by the litigant and determine that they are frivolous before commencing down the road to bar future filings."); see also Morgan v. State, 983 So.2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Longv. State, 793 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
. We applaud the dissent's encomium to Clarence Gideon. See infra pp. 1236-37. We also agree that all too often, prisoners abuse their postconviction rights. See infra p. 1238. The dissent makes a fine case that Mr. Mims should perhaps be barred from future filings in the circuit court based upon other conduct. If we were the prosecutor or a court of the first instance, we might agree. However, this is an error correcting court. Basic principles of jurisprudential rectitude preclude our affir-mance of the trial court judgment based upon arguments not made below. See, e.g., E.K. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 948 So.2d 54, 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).