Case Name: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS & HELPERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-10-05
Citations: 581 F.2d 473
Docket Number: No. 77-1850
Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS & HELPERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 581
Pages: 473–481

Head Matter:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS & HELPERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent.
No. 77-1850.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 5, 1978.
Vance, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
Elliott Moore, Deputy Assoc. Gen. Counsel, John S. Irving, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Carl L. Taylor, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, John D. Burgoyne, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Alan Banov, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
John J. Blake, Stanley L. Basler, Kansas City, Kan., for respondent.
Before HILL, RUBIN and VANCE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
The National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of an order against a union for violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A); the union removed one of its members from his position as area steward because he filed an unfair labor practice charge against his employer without first pursuing the grievance procedure required by the union's contract, as he was urged to do by the union's leadership. Because the union policy to which the member, Perry Soape, refused to adhere reflected a legitimate union interest in harmony with our national labor policy, we hold that the union's action in removing him from an appointive union office is not the type of constraint on a union member's actions intended to be proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Consequently, we deny enforcement.
I.
Mr. Soape had been employed by General American Transportation Corporation as a boilermaker chipper until November, 1974. He contended that his termination was an unfair labor practice, and filed a charge with the Board alleging that the company had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3).
Mr. Soape was hired by the company at a different location in December,- 1974. He had been acting as area steward since January, 1974 and continued to do so in his new position.
Union officials repeatedly requested that Soape withdraw his charge with the Board and instead follow the grievance procedures under its collective bargaining agreement. They warned him that he would be making an enemy of the union if he refused.
When Soape did refuse, the union notified the company that it was removing him from his position as area steward. By letter dated February 19, 1975, the company informed him that it had received the union's notification, and, accordingly, that he could no longer leave the work site to attend to union business. Soape denied receiving the company's letter, but he saw it posted on a company bulletin board on February 24. When he insisted on leaving the job site that day to seek verification from the union that he had been removed, the company discharged him for leaving work without permission. As far as the record shows, Soape had no actual notice of the union's decision to remove him as area steward prior to that morning.
On the basis of additional charges filed by Mr. Soape, a consolidated complaint was issued against both the company and the union. The company was charged with violating Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) and (4), of the Act as amended, by terminating Soape, and by refusing to reinstate him because he engaged in union activities "and/or" because he had previously filed an unfair labor practice charge against the company. The union was charged with violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by relieving Soape of his position as area steward because he had filed the prior charge against the company directly with the Board.
The case before us involves only the Board's finding that the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
II.
The union challenges the Board's findings of fact on the basis that there is insufficient evidence that Soape ever held a position known as area steward, or that the union took action with respect to Soape because he filed charges with the Board. These factual determinations are, however, supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. They are, therefore, conclusive. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456; Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1977, 544 F.2d 815.
III.
We are thus left to consider whether the union's removal of Soape from his position as steward violated the Act. Conceding, arguendo, that the union's conduct might be held violative of the Act under a literal reading of Section 8(b)(1)(A), we adhere to the Supreme Court's holding that this section must be construed in accordance with the objective Congress sought to achieve and not merely by mechanical application of its precise words:
Congressional meaning is of course ordinarily to be discerned in the words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise words "restrain and coerce" Congress employed in § 8(b)(1)(A) produces . . extraordinary results we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the legislative history of the section.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 1967, 388 U.S. 175, 184, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2008, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, 1130. Allis-Chalmers establishes the existence of a realm of union affairs in which discipline that constrains the behavior of union members is permissible, notwithstanding a potential conflict between such restraint and the wording of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
The limits of permissible union self-regulation were drawn in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, 1968, 391 U.S. 418, 88 S.Ct. 1717, 20 L.Ed.2d 706. In the Marine Workers case, the Court held that a union could not dismiss from membership a member who violated a union rule that required him to exhaust intra-union remedies for grievances against the union before resorting to tribunals outside the union for relief. The union rule, the Court held, was contrary to the need for such free access to the Board as is necessary to effectuate the public policies that the Board is empowered to enforce:
Any coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat that access is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization. . [T]he overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative, except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are involved.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id., 391 U.S. at 424, 88 S.Ct. at 1722, 20 L.Ed.2d at 712. To the extent the sanction imposed by the union discourages or retards access to the Board, that penalty and the policy underlying it are impermissible "except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are involved."
In this case, however, the union's discharge of Soape as its representative, without further retribution of any kind, falls within the scope of permissible self-regulation as delineated by Marine Workers. The maintenance of cohesive leadership in a union that functions as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative is a legitimate union interest and a "plainly internal affair." It is no less "internal" because the policy sought to be enforced is embodied in a collective bargaining agreement rather than in a union's constitution or by-laws; as Allis-Chalmers and Marine Workers show, the existence of a union rule embodying the union leadership's policy position is not determinative of whether the matter in dispute is "plainly internal." It is essential only that the leadership's position be fairly representative of the union, consistent with national policy, and not arbitrary. A contractual grievance procedure of the kind invoked by the Boilermakers here has been referred to by the Supreme Court as a "major factor in achieving industrial peace" through collective bargaining, itself the cornerstone of our federal labor policy. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 1960, 363 U.S. 574, 578, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1350, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1414-1415.
Unlike the Marine Workers' union leadership, the Boilermakers' leadership was trying to discourage disregard of this process by its own spokesman. Whether the union policy sought to be enforced is embodied in a contract approved by the membership or in a union rule similarly adopted, the relevant questions for a reviewing court are whether that policy is consistent with the national labor policy, and whether the means of enforcement chosen reflects concerns . that are "plainly internal" affairs.
Soape's initial decision to lodge a complaint against the employer and not against the union does not alter the result. Although the latter case is not before us, the discharge of a union officer for filing a charge against his union might be a less "plainly internal affair" than the present case because we might be less able in that case to conclude confidently that the union's disciplinary interest was in cohesive leadership rather than in using that pretext to cloak a device to prevent effective relief for intra-union grievances. An attempt thus to impair members' rights would implicate considerations of public policy that would take the enforcement of the intraunion exhaustion-of-remedies requirement wholly outside the realm of permissible self- regulation. As we construe Marine Workers, a union's right to self-regulation extends to membership-approved rules and policies consistent with federal labor policy that are enforced by union sanctions chosen to further "plainly internal" union concerns. See also Scofield v. NLRB, 1969, 394 U.S. 423, 89 S.Ct. 1154, 22 L.Ed.2d 385.
Soape was not, in fact, denied access to the Board. He has pressed his charge against his employer, thus far unsuccessfully. No pecuniary penalty, nor any sanction affecting his membership status, was imposed by the union; as a union member, he could not lawfully have been discouraged by such sanctions from initial resort to the Board, notwithstanding the union's legitimate interest in encouraging adherence to contractual procedures. . However, upon assuming union office, Soape undertook duties also to carry out and further union policies and to help assure its success as a collective bargaining agent. The union's management, having concluded that the union's credibility as a bargaining agent would be furthered by its officials' adherence to negotiated processes — a rational conclusion that is consistent with the national labor policy — the union's leaders could reasonably expect its representatives' loyalty and support in pursuit of that policy. Soape's discharge for defiance of the leadership reflected the legitimate internal concerns of any functioning enterprise.
Our conclusion in this case squares with those cases that hold a union officer may be dismissed for expressing defiance of union policies, notwithstanding the provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), guaranteeing to labor union members the right of free speech. The law of this circuit distinguishes between discharge from office, which is permissible, Wambles v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 5 Cir. 1974, 488 F.2d 888, accord, Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, 2 Cir. 1978, 570 F.2d 439, see also Doe v. AFL-CIO, Dep't of Organization, etc., N.D.Ga.1975, 405 F.Supp. 389, and sanctions affecting membership status, which are not, Fulton Lodge No. 2 of International Association of Machinists v. Nix, 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 212, cert. denied, 1972, 406 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332. As we recognized in Sewell v. Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists, 5 Cir. 1971, 445 F.2d 545, 550-551, cert. denied, 1972, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 674, 30 L.Ed.2d 674:
[E]ach member of a labor union is guaranteed the right of free expression as well as the right to participate freely in the union's democratic processes. Disciplinary action for the exercise of such rights offends the terms of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. . . . This conclusion, however, does not permit an employee who accepts employment for the performance of certain specified duties to take the largesse and pay of the union, on the one hand, and, on the other, to completely subvert the purposes of his employment by engaging in activities diametrically opposed to the performance of his specified duties. As Judge Bell observed in Airline Maintenance Lodge 702, etc. v. Loudermilk, 5 Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 719, 723:
The rights of a union member under this statute must be balanced against the right preserved to the union to make rules as to the responsibility of the member toward the union as an institution. And this balancing process must rest on the facts.
To permit an individual to accept union employment, to receive union pay, and to enjoy the prestige of a union position, while spending his employer's time opposing the plans and policies he was employed to execute, would in our judgment, be unreasonable. All employees, whether they work for a union or a large commercial company, may be required at times to subordinate personal expression to the responsibilities of their employment. An essential and elemental ingredient of all employment is basic loyalty by employees to the employer in performing the duties of the job for which they were hired.
* $ * % $ *
To hold that a union has no right to discharge an employee for insubordination under the facts of his case would, we believe, seriously detract from effective, cohesive union leadership.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The rationale of the LMRDA cases applies a fortiori to this case. Individual constitutional rights are not at stake here; no balancing of First Amendment interests is involved. Neither is this a case in which a union officer is being penalized for compliance with a legal duty, such as testifying before the NLRB in an already-initiated action, cf. Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1966, 357 F.2d 466. There is no evidence that the union is trying to regulate access to effective enforcement of employee rights, or that the contractual grievance procedures were being discriminatorily enforced or would have been ineffectual.
Viewing this case, as we must, on its facts, it does not appear that the discharge of Soape from his position as area steward constitutes "restraint or coercion" as contemplated by the Act. Consequently, the Board's petition for enforcement of its order is DENIED.
. Reported at 227 N.L.R.B. 1695.
. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents:
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; .
The essential complaint in Soape's original charge was that he was dismissed by his employer because of his union activities. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, guarantees to employees:
The right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
Soape's original charge to the Board was thus an attempt to enforce his rights under Section 7. Read literally, Section 8(b)(1)(A) might thus be construed to prohibit any action by the union that constrains employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights by discouraging resort to Board enforcement proceedings.
. The bare existence of a colorable unfair labor practice charge predicated on an asserted violation of statutory rights cannot be construed as determining that a case of union discipline is not a "plainly internal matter." If it could, the proviso written by the Supreme Court in the AHis-Chalmers case, supra, would be no exception at all.
. As the Court analyzed the legislative history of Section 8(b)(1)(A) in the Allis-Chalmers case, supra, Congress's primary concern was the proscription of coercion aimed at non-union employees during organizational campaigns that would restrain them in the exercise of their right not to join in a labor organization for collective bargaining. 388 U.S. at 186-189, 87 S.Ct. at 2009-2011, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1131-1132. No such coercion is involved in this case.
. The record in no way indicates that the union's discharge of Soape as an officer in any way discouraged or was intended to discourage any union member from initial resort to the Board with respect to an unfair labor practice charge.
. Former NLRB Chairman Murphy dissented from the Board's disposition of this case on grounds essentially the same as the analysis now adopted by this Court. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1696.