Case Name: James J. Weir v. John McGee et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-04
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 20
Docket Number: 
Parties: James J. Weir v. John McGee et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 20–33

Head Matter:
James J. Weir v. John McGee et al.
Whether, in a given case, the sale of land was by the acre, or in gross, is, in general, matter of judicial construction of the deed or contract.
In general, where there is a mention of the quantity of acres, and also a certain . description of the subject by metes and bounds, or by other known specification, the call for the quantity of acres is held to be but matter of description, and does not entitle the purchaser to an abatement of the price, though the quantity of acres should fall short of the given amount.
Where there has been an executed conveyance of the land by a particular description, and with an enumeration of the quantity of acres, the latter is held to be matter of description merely, and cannot be deemed an implied covenant for quantity. But, if an estate be sold by the acre, and there is a deficiency in the number conveyed, the purchaser will be entitled to an abatement of the price, or to compensation, if the price has been paid under a mistake.
On a question, whether a sale of land was by the acre or in gross, and the contract is proven by a deed, it is the province of the court to construe the deed, and it was not proper for the court to leave the decision of the question to the jury upon the parol evidence adduced on the trial alone, or as controlling the legal import of the deed.
Parol evidence is admissible to show gross mistake as to the number of acres; but how far it may be received for any other purpose than to show such mistake or fraud in the case of an executed conveyance may admit of question. It certainly is not admissible to change the legal import of a deed. Where a party, with a view to impeaching the credit of a witness, interrogates him as to whether he had not previously made a certain statement concerning a fact, to which interrogatory he answers that he does not remember to have made the statement imputed to him, the better opinion seems to be, that it is competent to prove the statement imputed ¡by another; but if it should appear, on inquiry, that the statement imputed to the witness contradicts his evidence in court, an opportunity must be given him on re-examination to make any explanation in his power as to the apparent contradiction.
Whore the testimony of the witness, whose credit was sought to be impeached, was taken by interrogatories, and was not present in court, the.opportunity thus not having been afforded him to explain the apparent contradiction, the evidence offered to impeach his credit was inadmissible.
Where evidence, tending to impeach the credibility of a witness, is admissible, but is offered for another. purpose, if it be inadmissible as evidence to impeach the credit of the witness, it should bo restricted, by the instructions of the court to the jury, to the purpose for which it was admitted.
Where an agent of one of the parties to the suit was himself a competent witness, and was examined as such on the trial, it was not proper to admit evidence of his declarations in respect to the subject-matter of which he was so competent to testify..
Appeal from Cherokee. Tried below before Hon. B. A. Beeves, one of the district judges.
íhis action was brought by James J. Weir against John McGee and James A. McGee for $103 50, the unpaid residue of a promissory note, given by the defendants to the plaintiff, for the sum of $600, as part of the consideration for the purchase by them, from the plaintiff, of 200 acres of land, at the price of $1,200.
The defendants set up as a defense against the action, that the tract of land purchased by then!, for which" the note was given, was falsely represented by the plaintiff to contain 200 acres, whereas said tract contained in fact only 182fr acres, and that, therefore, they are entitled to an abatement in the price of the amount which the plaintiff claims. They plead, as a further defense, that Hugh Weir, alleged by them to have been, at the time referred to, the general agent of plaintiff, with full, authority to contract and act in the premises, before the commencement of this suit, ascertaining that there was a deficiency of 17f acres in the tract of land sold as aforesaid, agreed with defendants to allow, and did allow, the abatement by them claimed, and received the balance of the purchase-money from them, and delivered up to them the said note.'
The plaintiff replied, that the said tract of land was at the time of sale, and ever since was, considered and estimated in the vicinity as containing 200 acres; and for said quantity had before often been sold and conveyed from one person to another; and that he had purchased it under the same estimate as to quantity. That the defendants, before purchasing the same, knew the boundaries of -the same, and with said knowledge accepted the conveyance to the same.
The plaintiff alleged that the land was sold to the defendants in gross at $1,200, and not by the acre; that it was sold by a certain description and specification of metes and bounds, which were shown to the defendants; that the sale was fairly made, without fraud or concealment; that the mention of the quantity of acres was mere matter of description of the land; and that the plaintiff did not covenant or warrant that the tract contained 200 acres.
The plaintiff denied the alleged settlement of the matter in dispute by his agent, and averred that the defendants procured the possession of the note by a fraudulent contrivance, and against the will or consent of said agent:
The deed of conveyance from the plaintiff" to the defendant, John McG-ee, of the tract referred to, recites the consideration of $1,200, and conveys by metes and bounds “ a certain tract of land, situated, lying, and being in said State and county, being a part of the Walker league, and the place on which I now live, containing 200 acres, bounded as follows(setting forth the field-notes.) The parol testimony on the question, as to whether the sale of the tract of land was in gross, or a sale of it by the acre, was conflicting. The evidence was direct to establish either proposition. The defendants proved that the tract contained no more than the number of acres it was alleged by them to contain in their defense. The testimony of Hugh Weir, the plaintiff’s agent, taken for the plaintiff" by interrogatories, in answer to certain cross-interrogatories propounded by the defendants, was to the effect, that, on a certain occasion, whilst ón his way to see the defendants, for the purpose of collecting the note of $600 before referred to, Mr. Shaw informed him that the defendants had surveyed the land, and that there was a small deficiency in the estimated contents; that Shaw told him he thought the defendants would pay a part, but not the whole of the note; he further stated, “that he had no recollection of saying, in that conversation, that if the defendants should pay for the quantity of land there was actually in the tract, he would be satisfied.; or that that was as much as he wanted; or that he would be satisfied with less than the amount of the note.” The witness stated that neither did he recollect saying anything to Shaw as to what amount of the note the defendants should or ought to pay. The defendants introduced on the stand the witness Shaw, who testified that at the time referred to, Weir, the witness, stated to him that he had understood there was some difficulty about the note; to which he replied, that the defendants had caused the land to be surveyed; found it deficient about 17 acres, and that they would not pay for more land than they actually acquired by the purchase. That Weir rejoined, “ that, if they paid for all the land they got, it was all that could be expected, and would be satisfactory to the plaintiff, who could look to his vendors for the deficit.” To this evidence the plaintiff objected, and moved to exclude it: because, if it were intended to impeach the testimony of Weir, the predicate for doing so had not been laid; and because there was no proof of such agency of the witness Weir as would make his statements to the prejudice of the plaintiff" legal evidence. The objections were overruled, and the testimony was allowed.
The court instructed the jury, among other things, that if they believed from the evidence that the sale and purchase of the land was in gross, referring to the boundaries as given, the plaintiff would be entitled to the whole amount of the purchase-money, although the tract may not have contained as much as 200 acres. Also, that if the land were sold by the acre, and not in gross, the defendant would be entitled to an abatement or credit for any deficiency in the amount' of the land less than the estimated quantity of 200 acres, at the rate agreed to be paid per acre, according to the evidence.
The plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury that the deed conveys the land by certain calls-, metes, and bounds, and it is immaterial whether any, and what quantity of acres is expressed; that the description of boundaries is conclusive. The court refused to give the instruction.
Verdict and judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiff appealed, and assigned as error, that the court erred in submitting in the charge, for the finding of the jury, the legal construction of the deed from the plaintiff to John McGee, instead of charging directly the legal effect of the deed; and in refusing to give the instructions asked by the plaintiff, and in overruling his objections to the testimony of Shaw.
Bonner £ Bonner, for appellant, (with whom was also Mr. Priest.)
—1. The first error assigned is, that the court erred in submitting in the charge, for the finding of the jury, the legal construction of the deed from James J. Weir and Catherine Weir to John McGee, which deed conveyed the land, for which the note mentioned in the pleadings was given, instead of charging directly to the jury the legal effect of said deed.
The material part of this deed is as follows:
“The said James J. Weir and Catherine J. Weir, for and in consideration of the sum of $1,200, to us in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hath this day bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain, sell, and convey, unto the said John McGee, his heirs and assigns, a certain tract or parcel of land, situate, lying, and being in the State and county above, being a part of the Walker league of land, and the place on which I now live, containing 200 acres, bounded as follows: beginning on the southwest corner on a stake of T. Anderson’s land, running east with said marked line to a stake at the southeast o corner of P. Anderson’s land; thence south on the marked line to the league-line of the said Walker to a stake; thence west to a point due south from the place of beginning; conveying the entire interest that we, the said James J. Weir and Catherine J. Weir, have to the above-described 200 acres of land; and in consideration of the above sum, we, said James J. Weir and Catherine J. Weir, do bind ourselves, our executors, administrators, and assigns, to warrant and forever defend, &c., the right, title, and interest of the above tract or parcel of land above described to the said John McGee,” &c,
On this instrument the court charged the jury as follows:
“If the jury believe from the evidence, that the sale and purchase of the land were in gross, referring to the boundaries as given, the plaintiff would be entitled to the whole amount of the purchase money, though the tract may not have contained as much as 200 acres, unless the note was given up and settled, on paying a part of it, to the plaintiff’s authorized agent.”
It is the duty of the court to give construction to all written instruments, for they- are presumed to know and be guided by the sound rules of construction laid down by the wisdom of ages; and that this construction should not be left to the fluctuating and unguided judgment of juries. Humerous authorities to this point will he found collected in 1 Bouv. Law Die., p. 322, title Construction, § 8, to which we would most respectfully refer.
As, then, one of the material issues of this case depended upon a proper legal construction of this deed, and which construction the court failed to make, but left to the jury; and, upon an improper construction of which, by them, their verdict must have been mainly founded, it is respectfully submitted, that, in this failure to construe this instrument, the court materially erred.
2. The second error assigned is, that the court erred in refusing to give the charge asked by plaintiff. This charge is as follows:
“ That the deed conveys the land by certain calls, metes, and bounds, and it is immaterial whether any and what quantity of acres is expressed: that the description by boundaries is conclusive.”
The object of this charge was to give a proper construction to said deed, and if it were the duty of the court to construe the deed, as contended for above, and if the construction asked for in the charge were the proper one, there was certainly error in the court in rejecting this charge: that given by the court failing to give any construction whatever to the deed.
That it was the province of the court to construe the instrument we think without doubt, from the above-cited authority to this point; and the next question for conside ration is, whether the construction asked by the rejected charge was the correct one.
“ The mention of quantity of acres, after a certain description by metes and bounds, or by other known specifications, is but a matter of description, and does not amount to any covenant, or afford ground for the breach of any of the usual covenants, though the quantity of acres should fall short, of the given amount. Whenever it appears by the definite boundaries, or by words of qualification, as £ more or less,’ or as £ containing by estimation,’ or the like, the statement of quantity of acres in the deed is mere matter of description, and not of the essence of the contract. The buyer takes the risk of the quantity, if there be no inter-mixture of fraud.” (4 Kent’s Com., marginal page 467, and note “a,” which cites Mann v. Pierson, 2 Johns. Rep., 27; Smith v. Evans, 6 Binney Rep., 102; Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. Rep., 355; 1 Aiken Rep., 325; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. Rep., 706; Allison v. Allison, 1 Yerg. Tenn. Rep., 16; see also 1 Story’s Eq. Jur., §144; also Dalton and wife v. Rusk and wife, Supreme Court of Texas, Austin, Term 1858.) All of which authority, so far as we have access to • examine, fully support the doctrine laid down in Kent.
Again, we find in note “¿>” to the same page, 4 Kent, 467, that “if land be sold by certain bounds, or for so much—so much for the entire parcel—which is per aversionem, in the language of the civilians, as for a field enclosed, or an island hi a river, which is a distinct and entire object, any surplus of the land over the quantity given belongs to the vendee, and the price cannot be increased or diminished on account of disagreement in measure or quantity;” and refers to Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason Rep., 414; Innis v. McCummin, 125 Martin (Louis) Rep., 425; Jessussin v. Dashiel, 13 Louis Rep., 151; Philip Wilson, 16 Id., 185.
As tested by the above rules, the proper construction of the deed under consideration was given in the charge asked by the plaintiff, and which was rejected. This deed from Weir and wife purports to convey, for the consideration of $1,200, “200 acres of land, bounded as follows.” [Here follows, in immediate connection, the calls and boundaries of the land, and which calls are for certain fixed and defined corners, surveys, and marked lines.]
Then follows a clause in which the grantors state that they are “conveying the entire interest” “that' they have in and to the above-described 200 acres of land,” evidently and positively referring to the boundaries; and after this comes an express covenant, warranting “in-fee-simple the right, title, and interest of the above tract or parcel of land above described,” again referring in the warranty clause to the metes and bounds.
It is evident, from the very face of the deed, that the parties contracted with reference to the boundaries described, and not to the number of acres mentioned; and this evident intention becomes the positive proper construction of the instrument, when we test it by the rules of law above mentioned.
We must respectfully invite the attention of the Supreme Court to a very brief comparison of the case now before the court with that of Allison v. Allison, 1 Yer., 16, above referred to, as they seem to be very analogous. In that case, John Allison sued Margaret Allison, executrix of Frank Allison, and declared issue upon a deed of bargain and sale, the material parts of which read thus: “ The said Frank Allison, for and in consideration of $1,000, &c., hath given, granted, &c., unto the said John Allison, his heirs and assigns forever, one certain tract or parcel of land, containing 300 acres,” ('mentioning the quantity before the description, as in the Weir deed,) “ situate, lying, and being in the county of Washington, on the head spring of the south branch of Boon’s creek, at a chestnut on Frank Allison’s line,” (the Weir deed beginning at a more noted corner, to wit, the corner of an established survey;) “thence with his line south, 35° west, 50 poles, to a red-oak,” &c.; the Allison deed thus designating the land sold, hut not with more or greater certainty than the Weir deed; and then, in further analogy to the Weir deed, it contains a clause in the habendum and tenendum, of “all the right," &c., of the said Frank Allison; the Weir deed containing a clause conveying all the “entite interest ” of the grantors; and, in further analogy to the Weir deed, it contained a clause warranting “said tract of 300 acres of land, hutted and bounded as aforesaid,” not stronger than the clause in the warranty of the Weir deed, which states, “the above tract or parcel of land above described;” and, in still further analogy, there were not in either deed the usual words of qualification, “ more or less,” or a covenant that the land contained the given quantity of acres; and there was, in the Allison deed, a deficit of 25 acres out of 300; and in the Weir deed, a deficit of 16J „ acres in 200; wanting only about one-half acre of being the very same proportion.
'in this case-of Allison v. Allison the Supreme Court says, that the question, “whether the deed from Frank Allison to John Allison contained a covenant that the tract of land thereby conveyed should in quantity comprise 300 acres, depends on the construction of the deed, which is always a matter of law; for there is no express covenant introduced by the parties for this purpose and to this effect. Unless, therefore, one is raised by the construction from the premises in the deed, no such covenant exists.” (Page 18.) The court, then, after an elaborate review of the decisions on this point, citing and approving the Connecticut ease of Snow v. Chapman, 1 Root, 528; the New York case of Mann & Tales v. Pierson, 2 Johns. Rep., 27; the Massachusetts case of Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. Rep., 355; and the Pennsylvania case of Smith v. Evans, 6 Binney’s Rep., 102, holds to the well-settled and uniform doctrine of the most enlightened courts of the Union, “that where the quantity is mentioned, in addition to a description of the "boundaries, the whole must be considered as mere description, and the quantity yield to the boundaries, whether it be more or less than that actually contained in the limits expressed.” (Page 20.) The case goes on to decide, that the failure to insert the usual words, “more or less,” is not material.
The distinction, that the above case of Allison v. Allison is a suit for damages for a breach of covenant, and the one before the court, is, for the defendants, a suit in the nature of a suit in abatement of the purchase-money in reconvention, is believed to be wholly immaterial; and we think this decision conclusive of the point here raised.
Again, the Weir deed, now before the court, purporting to convey only the “ entire interest” of the grantors, Weir and wife, is equivalent to a qidt-claim deed only, and this neutralizes any apparent plausible construction to the contrary of the one contended for above.
From the principles laid down by our most enlightened courts, there was error in the refusal of the court below to give the charge asked for by plaintiff
Donley f Anderson for appellee.

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
-—-Contracts for the sale of land are considered of two descriptions: 1st, where the sale is of a specific quantity, which is usually denominated a sale by the acre; and, 2d, where the sale is of a specific tract, by name or description, which is said to be a sale in gross. (2 Bibb, 271.)
Whether, in a given case, the sale was by the acre or in gross, is, in general, matter of judicial construction of the deed or contract; and numerous cases are reported in which the courts have construed the contract to be a sale by the acre or in gross according to the terms employed in the instrument. (1 Sug. on Vend., § 3, and cases cited in notes; 4 Kent's Com., 466-7, and notes; Bawle on Cove nants, 520.) In general, where there is a mention of the quantity of acres, and. also a certain description of the subject by metes and bounds, or by other known specification, the mention of the quantity of acres is held to be but matter of description, and does not entitle the purchaser to an abatement of the price, though the quantity of acres should fall short of the given amount. Where there has been an executed conveyance of the land by a particular description, and with an enumeration of the quantity of acres, the latter is held to be matter of description merely, and cannot be deemed an implied covenant for quantity. But if an estate be sold by the acre, and there is a deficiency in the number conveyed, the purchaser will be entitled to an abatement of the price, or to compensation if the price has been paid under a mistake.
The charge of the court recognizes the true distinction between a sale by the acre and in gross; but the objection to the charge is, that the court did not give a construction to the deed, blit left it to the jury to decide from the evidence, whether the sale was by the acre or in gross. It would seem that this objection to the charge is not without good reason. It certainly was the province of the court to construe the deed; and it was not proper for the court to leave the decision of the question to the jury upon the parol evidence alone, or as controlling the legal import of the deed. Such evidence is admissible to show gross mistake as to the number of acres, (Harrison v. Talbot, 2 Dana, 258,) but how far it may be received for any other purpose than to show such mistake or fraud in the case of an executed conveyance, may admit of question. It certainly is not admissible to change the legal import of a deed. Whether it was entitled to any effect in the present case, need not now be decided, as the point has not received the attention of counsel in argument, and there is another ground upon which the judgment must be reversed. The case of Harrison v. Talbot, above cited, may be consulted with advantage upon this branch of th'e case. (And see Young v. Craig, 2 Bibb, 270; Nelson v. Carrington, 4 Munf., 332.)
We are of opinion that the objection to the admission of the testimony of the witness (Shaw) was well taken. The main object of introducing this witness doubtless was tó impeach the credit of-the witness, (Weir,) the plaintiff's • * agent. The witness, it seems, had been interrogated with the view to impeach his credit, and answered that he did not remember to have made the statements imputed to him. In such a case the authorities are not agreed whether evidence of the statement of the witness is admissible. (1 Greenl. Ev., § 462; 2 Phil. Ev., 4 ed., by C. & H., 959, 960.) Mr. Phillips thinks the better opinion is, that the evidence should be admitted, adopting the ruling of Parke B., in Crowley v. Page, 7 C. & P., 791. But still, he says, if the statement imputed to the witness should appear, on inquiry, to contradict his evidence in court, .it would evidently be proper to give him an opportunity, on re-examination, to make any explanation in his power as to the apparent contradiction; and such, it seems, is the universal practice. It is obviously just, where the variance between the present statement of the witness, upon oath, and his former statement, as reported by a third person, may be as much owing to the mistake of the one as the misstatement of the other, that the memory and credit of both witnesses should be fairly tried and contrasted. The supposed contradiction may be- satisfactorily explained; and hence the opportunity to explain must be afforded. But here the opportunity was not afforded, and could not be, because the testimony of the witness (Weir) was taken by interrogatories. He does not appear to have been-present in court, and not having been apprized of the statement of the witness offered to contradict him, or impeach his credit, he had no opportunity afforded him for any explanation. This was a sufficient reason to exclude the evidence offered to impeach the credit of the witness. If the evidence were admissible for any other purpose, it should have been restricted in its admissions to that purpose, and the jury should have been made aware that it 'was not to be received by them as impeaching the credit of the witness, Weir. But the only other purpose for which it could have been offered was to prove the settlement with the agent. It was not competent, for that purpose, to give evidence of the declarations of the agent, because he was himself a competent witness, and was examined in the case. We are of opinion, therefore, that the court erred in admitting the evidence, for which error the judgment must be reversed, and the cause
Remanded.