Case Name: The Wilmington Candy Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Remington Machine Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware
Court: Delaware Superior Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1906-01-06
Citations: 5 Penne. 543
Docket Number: No. 124
Parties: The Wilmington Candy Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Remington Machine Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 543–556

Head Matter:
The Wilmington Candy Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Remington Machine Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.
Case—Contract—Breach of Warranty—Ice Making and Refrigerating Plants—Evidence—Custom of Doing Business, Method of—Test of Machine—Lapse of Time—Changes—What Plaintiff Must Prove—Unreasonable Time— • Measure of Damages.
1. In an action for breach of warranty of an ice making and refrigerating plant installed by defendant for plaintiff, where the business to be done was the making ot candy, the plaintiff cannot prove the custom of candy manufacturers with respect to the manufacturer, but may show the plaintiff’s method of malting it.
2. The plaintiff cannot show the result of the test of the warranted machine made by an expert after it had been used fifteen months, and after it had been changed by the plaintiff both in its parts and in the system by which it was operated.
3. The defendant having asked the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant because the declaration alleged a breach of the contract in not building the plant according to specifications as distinguished from a declaration upon the express warranty, the court refused to give such instruction inasmuch as the pleadings showed that the declaration was upon the warranty.
4. If the plant, at the time it was installed was first class in every respect, capable of doing the work it was warranted to do, when operated in accordance with the instructions of the defendant, the terms of the contract and warranty were met.
5. In constructing and installing the plant, it was the duty of the defendant to avail itself of any and all knowledge it actually had or ought to have had, by inspection, information or otherwise, of the character of the buildings and place in which the plant was to be located, of the purpose for which it was to be used in connection with the business of the plaintiff as manufacturer of candy, of the conditions which surrounded the plant and under which it was to be operated. The law presumes the defendant was possessed of the requisite knowledge to perform the work it undertook, in contemplation of such conditions and surroundings.
6. If the failure of the plant to perform the work warranted was caused by the incompetency fault or negligence of the plaintiff, by the failure to follow the instructions of the defendant, or to do the work properly that was required to be done as a condition precedent, the plaintiff cannot recover.
7. If there was a failure for an unreasonable time on the part of the plaintiff to notify the defendant of the alleged defects in the plant, such failure may be considered by the jury, in connection with all the other evidence, for what it is reasonably worth, as tending to rebut the existence of such alleged defects.
8. To recover, the plaintiff must prove a breach of the warranty declared upon by a preponderance of the evidence.
9. If the jury should find for the plaintiff, the measure of damages would be the difference between the value of the plant as it was actually installed, and what its value would have been if it had been installed according to the warranty, together with any expenditures made by the plaintiff which were necessary, and actually incurred, by reason of the defects or insufficiency of the plant, under the terms of the warranty.
(December 14, 1905—January 6, 1906.)
Lore, C. J., and Grubb and Pennewill, J. J., sitting.
John W. Brady and John F. Neary for plaintiff.
J. Harvey Whiteman and Victor B. Woolley for defendant.
Superior Court, New Castle County,
November Term, 1906.
Action of Trespass on the case
(No. 124,
May Term, 1904),
to recover for an alleged failure to perform its warranty of an ice-making and refrigerating plant furnished by the defendant to the plaintiff.—See further facts in the charge to the jury,
At the trial, Joseph Riggi, an expert candy maker and superintendent of the plaintiff at the time of the installation of the said plant, was produced as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and questioned as follows:
By Mr. Brady;
Q. What is the custom of candy factories with respect to bringing hot chocolate to the coating room ?
(Objected to by Mr. Woolley, of counsel for defendant, as irrelevant, there being nothing in the contract relating to a chocolate room or indicating that the defendant undertook to cool, chill or refrigerate a" chocolate room, and therefore any answer that the witness might give as to the custom in the chocolate business would have no bearing upon a contract such as signed by the parties to. this suit and could not bind the defendant in the face of the covenants he undertook as specified in the contract.)

Opinion:
Lore, C. J.:
—We think the matter of custom is irrelevant as it appears to us just now. You may show the actual conditions of the room there and whether these defendants may have reasonably contemplated the conditions stated by the plaintiff, or that they were brought to their notice.
Q,. What is the custom with respect to the Wilmington Candy Company as to the bringing of hot chocolate into their coating room?
(Objected to by Mr. Woolley, of counsel for defendant, on the same grounds as above stated, and on the further ground that it is a special custom and not a general custom of the trade, and certainly such custom the defendant company could not know.)
Mr. Brady:—We propose to show that the representatives of the defendant came to this factory, that they came there during working hours, that there is a regular method of cooling chocolates in that coating room and they either saw or ought to have known of that custom.
Lore, C. J.:—We think you can show these conditions, but that is not a question of custom.
Grubb, J.:—Show the method, but not the custom of cooling it.
Q,. What was the method with respect to bringing warm chocolate into the coating room of the Wilmington Candy Company, prior to the making of the contract ?
(Objected to by Mr. Woolley, of counsel for defendant, on the same grounds as before stated to the same line of testimony.)
Mr. Neary:—We claim that we ought to be allowed to prove what is the usual and ordinary business method used in the cooling room there and that that business was carried on in that room; not that these particular things were called to the attention of the defendant.
Grubb, J.:—A majority of the Court think that this line of testimony is admissible, and I will state the particular ground upon which we rule it in.
It has been shown by the evidence that the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff knowing that the latter was engaged in the manufacture of candy, to make this machine for the proper purpose of the candy manufacturer in its establishment. The defendant is bound therefore, if this contract was to apply to that business, to know whatever it could ascertain in a reasonable way and with reasonable diligence. It is bound to know that which it could reasonably have known. When it knew that the plaintiff wanted this machine for the purpose of manufacturing candy, and had actually been there and examined the establishment before the contract was made, it must have known, or at least will be held to have known—because it is very reasonable that it should have known—that the plaintiff manufactured chocolate among other candies or confections. Therefore the plaintiff, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, has the right to show that while it was manufacturing chocolate, it manufactured it by a particular method and did use whatever appliances, means or methods were necessary in the proper manufacture of chocolates; and the plaintiff is seeking now to show that the method it employed was a proper one, and one that was generally employed in the trade in the manufacture of that kind and quality of chocolate. We think the plaintiff can put that evidence in for that purpose.
Of course the Remington Company, in its defense, either by cross examination or by witnesses of its own, may show that the methods and appliances used by the plaintiff, the heat or other things, were not proper to be used in a candy establishment in the manufacture of the chocolates in question.