Case Name: Dr. Ralph HUGHES and Mary Ellen Hughes, d/b/a Hughcrest Farms v. COLLEGEDALE DISTRIBUTORS
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1978-02-01
Citations: 355 So. 2d 79
Docket Number: No. 49782
Parties: Dr. Ralph HUGHES and Mary Ellen Hughes, d/b/a Hughcrest Farms v. COLLEGEDALE DISTRIBUTORS.
Judges: INZER, P. J., took no part.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 355
Pages: 79–84

Head Matter:
Dr. Ralph HUGHES and Mary Ellen Hughes, d/b/a Hughcrest Farms v. COLLEGEDALE DISTRIBUTORS.
No. 49782.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 1, 1978.
Dr. Ralph Hughes, pro se.
Scribner & Brewer, William H. Brewer, Tupelo, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
WALKER, Justice, for the Court.
This was an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, in favor of Collegedale Distributors in the sum of $1,896.53 against Dr. Ralph Hughes and Mary Ellen Hughes d/b/a Hughcrest Farms. The case was originally affirmed per curiam.
Subsequently on petition for rehearing and after reconsideration, we now withdraw the original per curiam opinion and substitute this written opinion, affirming the lower court.
Collegedale Distributors, a wholesaler of health foods and supplies, brought suit against the Hughes, who purchased health foods for resale on an open account showing a balance due of $1,896.53. The Hughes were doing business as Hughcrest Farms Health Food Store in Tupelo, Mississippi. An itemized account, together with an affidavit to the correctness of the same, was duly attached as an exhibit to the declaration filed by appellee and was made a part thereof.
Appellant, Dr. Ralph Hughes, filed a pleading styled "Affirmative Defense and Answer." This pleading contained a plea in bar in which the court was requested to dismiss the declaration on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-29 (1972). The circuit court overruled the plea in bar holding that the Uniform Commercial Code's six-year statute of limitations, Mississippi Code Annotated section 75-2-725 (1972) was applicable and not Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-29 (1972), the three-year statute of limitations.
The question on appeal is whether the six-year statute of limitations is applicable on the facts of this case.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-29 (1972) [the three-year statute] provides:
Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, actions on an open account or account stated not acknowledged in writing, signed by the debtor, and on any unwritten contract, express or implied, shall be commenced within three years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. (Emphasis added).
That portion of section 15-1-29 which reads, "Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, . . . " was an amendment thereto in 1966, Chapter 316, section 10-105, and became effective from and after March 31, 1968, the same time as the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Uniform Commercial Code is now the controlling law in this State insofar as the sale of goods is concerned. The case at bar involves a sale of merchandise by a wholesaler to a retailer, and the Uniform Commercial Code applies.
The Uniform Commercial Code provision with respect to the statute of limitations on contracts for sale, Mississippi Code Annotated section 75-2-725(1) (1972) [the six-year statute] provides:
An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action has accrued.
It is clear that when suit was filed, the Uniform Commercial Code of 1968 was the controlling law in this State insofar as sale of goods is concerned. However, since section 15-1-29 provides coverage specifically for "actions on an open account", the question arises whether it should be applicable on these facts or whether the language "except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code" makes section 75-2-725(1) the applicable statute of limitations.
The Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitations is, by its express terms, applicable to any "contract for sale." That term is defined in Mississippi Code Annotated 75-2-106 (1972), which provides in part:
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401) [§ 75-2-401]. A "present sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.
The sale in this case consisted of the purchase by the Hughes from Collegedale Distributors and shipment of the goods and merchandise to the Hughes at a certain price. Such a transaction falls squarely within section 75-2-106, and, therefore, the six-year statute of limitations provided for under section 75-2-725 is controlling, and the lower court was eminently correct in its application of the statute. This construction is further strengthened since as pointed out previously, the age-old three-year statute pertaining to, among other things, open accounts and accounts stated not acknowledged in writing, was specifically amended at the time of the adoption of the Code, making it operable "Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code . .
Additionally, Chapter 2 of the Code (Sales) and section 75-2-102 which is concerned with the scope of the chapter and contain exclusions from the Sales chapter provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers. (Emphasis added).
Notably, the only statutes then existing which were exempted from the operation of the Code, are those regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers. On the present facts, appellants are neither farmers nor consumers, but a health food business; and the sales transaction was a purchase of goods for the purpose of resale.
Section 75-1-102 entitled "Purposes; rules of construction; variation by agreement" provides, in part, as follows:
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this code are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; .
After carefully considering the above quoted pertinent sections of the Uniform Commercial Code and considering all of the provisions in pari materia, along with section 15-1-29 which was amended as herein-before stated to become effective at the same time as the Uniform Commercial Code, we are of the opinion that it was the intention of the Legislature to exempt consumers and farmers from the six-year statute of limitations, section 75-2-725, and to make applicable to consumers and farmers the shorter statute of limitations provided for in section 15-1-29. There may be other "specified classes of buyers" enumerated within the Uniform Commercial Code sections that come under the three-year statute of limitations, but we have not been cited to, nor are we able to find such other sections.
We therefore hold that on the facts of this case Mississippi Code Annotated section 75-2-725 (1972), the six-year statute of limitations, is the applicable statute.
The cases of Bryan v. Bryan, 323 So.2d 84 (Miss.1975) and McArthur v. Acme Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 336 So.2d 1306 (Miss. 1976) are not applicable in the case at bar since section 75-2-725(1) [the six-year statute] was not urged, argued or briefed in these cases. In the McArthur case, the opinion especially stated that "No issue is raised concerning the Uniform Commercial Code." (336 So.2d at 1307).
For the foregoing reasons, the relief prayed for in the petition for rehearing should be and is hereby denied and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
ORIGINAL PER CURIAM OPINION WITHDRAWN; RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN PETITION FOR REHEARING DENIED; AND THIS WRITTEN OPINION AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT SUBSTITUTED.
PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur.
SMITH,- P. J., and ROBERTSON, J., dissent.
INZER, P. J., took no part.