Case Name: M. S. STRINGER v. J. J. ELSAAS and A. H. Smart, as Sheriff of Nelson County, North Dakota
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-05-08
Citations: 37 N.D. 20
Docket Number: 
Parties: M. S. STRINGER v. J. J. ELSAAS and A. H. Smart, as Sheriff of Nelson County, North Dakota.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 20–27

Head Matter:
M. S. STRINGER v. J. J. ELSAAS and A. H. Smart, as Sheriff of Nelson County, North Dakota.
(163 N. W. 558.)
Exempt property — levy upon — law — in defiance of — knowledge of exemption — exemplary damages — jury may award.
1. When in defiance or disregard of law a party levies on and sells property known to be exempt, a jury may award exemplary damages.
Attachment — execution — property — levy upon — person or officer — acts of — rights of others — regard for — must have — process of law — abuse of.
2. In levying on property under an attachment or execution, a person is bound to act with due regard for the rights of others and to refrain from abusing the process of the law.
Opinion filed May 8, 1917.
Action in Conversion.
From a judgment and order of the District Court of Nelson County, Cooley, J., defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frich & Kelly, for appellants.
Where property levied upon is claimed as exempt, and appraisers are selected, their report as to property and value is the best evidence, and oral testimony in reference thereto is incompetent. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7734, and 7735; Wood v. Bresnahan, 63 Mich. 614, 30 N. W. 206; Levi v. Groves, 3 Ohio L. J. 569, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 508; 23 Century Dig. Title “Exemptions,” § 153.
“The value of the homestead premises, as fixed by the appraisers in setting of a homestead, is conclusive until vacated in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose, and parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict such determination in a subsequent collateral action.” 6 Ene. Ev. 529; Barney v. Leeds, 54 N. H. 128; Fletcher v. State Capital Bank, 37 N. LI. 369; Globe Phosphate Co. v. Pinson, 52 S. C. 185, 29 S. E. 549; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 5611-5615; 13 Ene. Ev. 560.
In their attempt to establish the value of the property, they should have shown the market value of similar goods either purchased or to be purchased for purposes of replacement. Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315; Note to § 3333, Cal. Civ. Code, 2 Kerr’s Cye. Codes (Cal.) pp. 2191 et seq.
In order to bind a person by his acts or words, as a waiver, it must be shown that he acted or spoke with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances attending the creation of the right he is alleged to have waived. 13 Ene. Ev. 1021.
8. G. Slculason and Ingman Sivinland, for respondent.
When plaintiff has proved that he was the owner of the property, and was within the statutory limit in value, the burden of proving that the property was not exempt was on defendant. 6 Ene. Ev. 557; Wagner v. Olson, 3 N. D. 74, 54 N. W. 286; Paddock v. Balgord, 2 S. D. 100, 48 N. W. 840; Thompson v. Peterson, 122 Minn. 228, 142 N. W. 307.
Exemplary damages are recoverable against one who knowingly sells exempt property, even if there is no actual malice. Galvin v. Tibbs, H. & Co. 17 N. D. 604, 119 N. W. 39; Cronfeldt v. Arrol, 50 Minn. 327, 36 Am. St. Bep. 48, 52 N. W. 857; Brown v. Bridges, 70 Tex. 661, 8 S. W. 502; Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, Gil. 128, 82 Am. Dec. 79; Gardner v. Minea, 47 Minn. 295, 50 N. W. 199; Willis v. Noyes, 12 Pick. 324; Matteson v. Munro, 80 Minn. 340, 83 N. W. 153.
The amount is for the jury to determine. Wright v. Waddell, 89 Iowa, 350, 56 N. W. 650; Howard v. England, 35 Minn. 388, 29 N. W. 63; Thompson v. Peterson, 122 Minn. 228, 142 N. W. 307.
A waiver is not presumed unless it is clearly proved. Every reasonable presumption will be made against it, especially when it relates to a constitutional right. 13 Ene. Ev.'559; Murphy v. Sherman, 25 Minn. 196; Pierce v. Boalick, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 218.
The value of goods in such cases is not determined solely hy the appraisement, but may be shown by the testimony of other witnesses who are familiar with the goods and values, and otherwise competent. The appraisement is not conclusive of the value. 6 C. J. p. 240, § 459; Douglass v. Hill, 29 Kan. 527.
The value either at time of asserting exemptions, or at time of trial, may be shown. Also, that it is under the limit. The owner of the goods is a competent witness as to value. So, of householders. The competency of such witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the court. 13 Ene. Ev. 560, 562, 567; Roden v. Brown, 103 Ala. 324, 15 So. 598; Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, Gil. 128, 82 Am. Dee. 79; 6 Ency. Ev. 558; Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich. 221, 54 N. W. 768; Lincoln Supply Co. v. Graves, 73 Neb. 214, 102 N. W. 457; Jensen v. Palatine Ins. Co. 81 Neb. 523, 116 N. W. 286; Langdon v. Wintersteen, 58 Neb. 278, 78 N. W. 501; Patterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 95 Minn. 57, 103 N. W. 621.
Errors assigned but abandoned in argument need no attention. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. 62 Minn. 315, 64 N. W. 902; Galvin v. Tibbs, II. & Co, 17 N. D. 602, 119 N. W. 39.
Where it clearly appears that, if errors were committed by the trial court in rulings on evidence, they could not and did not influence the jury, no prejudice can be claimed, and they would not constitute prejudicial error. Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, Gil. 128, 82 Am. Dec. 79; Galvin v. Tibbs, H. & Co. 17 N. D. 600, 119 N. W. 39.
If counsel objected to any portion of the charge on account of omissions or error as to law or fact, it was their duty to call the court’s attention to the same. Johnson v. MacLeod, 111 Minn. 479, 127 N. W. 497, 1120; Wickham v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 110 Minn. 74, 124 N. W. 639, 994; Jacobson v. Great Northern R. Co. 120 Minn. 52, 139 N. W. 142.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
The plaintiff sues to recover from defendants for the conversion of personal property alleged to be worth $612.50. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $550. The defendants appeal from the judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
It appears that, under a writ of attachment and a judgment against the plaintiff for $355.75, the defendants levied upon and sold all of plaintiff's household property, which was exempt from such levy and sale. The plaintiff was a resident of the state, and he duly claimed his exemptions.
By an appraisal made under the direction of the sheriff, the property was valued at $300. At a forced sale on execution it brought $366.75, and the evidence shows it was fairly worth about $450. Hence, it seems the jury allowed plaintiff $100 as exemplary damages. Tbe case was fairly tried, and the only real question is in regard to tbe exemplary damages. By statute it is provided:
Comp. Laws 1913, § 7168: "Tbe detriment caused by tbe wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be:
"1. Tbe value of tbe property at tbe time of tbe conversion, with tbe interest from that time.
"3. A fair compensation for tbe time and money properly expended in pursuit of tbe property."
Sec. 7145: "In any action for tbe breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when tbe defendant bas been guilty of oppression, fraud, •or malice, actual or presumed, tbe jury, in addition to actual damages, may give damages for tbe sake of example and by way of punishing tbe defendant."
In this case tbe defendants and their counsel knew, or ought to have known, that tbe property levied on was exempt. Tbe levy and sale was made in defiance or in disregard of tbe law, and it was manifestly oppressive. It was a gross abuse of tbe process of tbe law, and the plaintiff has been made a very considerable expense in trying to recover -the value of bis exempt property.
Under our statute when a debtor desires to claim exempt property by valuation, as per § 7731, then as per § 7733, be must make a schedule of all bis personal property of every kind, and deliver tbe same to tbe officer having tbe attachment. Tbe schedule must be subscribed and sworn to. Then, if there is any question in regard to tbe valuation being excessive, or if tbe property is in excess of tbe exemptions, tbe property must be appraised at tbe actual value of tbe several articles, .and tbe value of each article must be set down in tbe inventory or by lots, with tbe value opposite each article or set of articles, and, from -the appraisal so made, the debtor, bis agent, or attorney may select property to tbe amount exempt. When tbe total value of tbe property is confessedly less than tbe exemption, then tbe appraisement answers no purpose whatever; it becomes an idle act. And so it was in this case. Tbe sheriffs appraisal or valuation amounted to nothing, because there was no claim that tbe total value of tbe property was in excess of $500. Tbe valuation might have been put at $5 or $500, without in any manner affecting the exemption claim. Tbe purpose of such a valuation is merely to enable the debtor to select property to tbe amount of bis exemptions, and not to determine tbe value of tbe property in any subsequent proceeding.
In an action for tbe wrongful sale and conversion of property on a writ of execution, no court has ever held that tbe sheriff's appraisal was conclusive evidence of tbe value of tbe property. Tbe appraisal is made for tbe sole purpose of determining tbe exemption right, and it can be given no force or effect, only so far as it bears on tbe exemption right. Judgment affirmed.