Case Name: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Harold William Jones, Appellant
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1961-02-16
Citations: 57 Wash. 2d 701
Docket Number: No 34996
Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Harold William Jones, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 701–706

Head Matter:
[No 34996.
En Banc.
February 16, 1961.]
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Harold William Jones, Appellant.
John A. Petrich, H. Frank Stubbs, and Jack E. Tanner, for appellant.
John G. McCutcheon, Keith D. McGoffin, and Richard A. Mattsen, for respondent.
Reported in 359 P. (2d) 311.

Opinion:
Hill, J.
— The problem posed is what should be done when an appellant becomes insane while his appeal is pending and before it is argued.
Harold William Jones appealed from a judgment and sentence, entered November 18, 1958, by the superior court of Pierce county, adjudging him guilty of murder in the first degree and imposing the death penalty. This judgment was pursuant to the verdict and recommendation of the jury.
The appellant's brief on appeal was filed in the superior court on March 24, 1960, and that brief and the state's brief were filed in this court on May 4, 1960.
The appellant was indigent, and has been represented at all times, both in the superior court and in this court, by very capable court-appointed counsel.
May 9, 1960, counsel for appellant for the first time raised the question of the appellant's then mental condition. The case was remanded to the superior court of Pierce county for a determination of that question. That court, on the basis of the report of a sanity commission, entered an order on August 24, 1960, in which it found that the appellant
" . . . is suffering from psychosis and is therefore insane, and that such condition will continue indefinitely,"
and that the appellant
" . . . does not now appreciate his peril and he is unable to assist his counsel or himself in his defense in this matter."
Appellant's counsel then moved to stay the appeal, the date for oral argument having already been set by this court. The motion has been argued and is now before us for decision.
A plea of not guilty by reason of insanity had been interposed at the trial; however, the verdict of guilty was a conclusive determination of that issue adverse to the appellant. Grossi v. Long (1925), 136 Wash. 133, 238 Pac. 983. There had been no suggestion, at the trial, that the defendant did not appreciate his peril, or that he was unable to assist counsel in his defense; nor did such condition seem to exist while counsel were preparing their brief on the appeal. No suggestion of his incompetence to prosecute the appeal appears until six weeks or more after his appeal brief had been filed. It is very plausibly argued that the issues on the appeal have been framed by the briefs and nothing remains but the oral argument; there are no facts to be considered except those in the record, and there is no phase of the appeal in which Mr. Jones could be of any assistance to his counsel.
Nevertheless, there is the question of the right, or authority, of an attorney to continue to represent a client who has become incompetent. See Flaherty v. Flaherty (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 393, 397, 312 P. (2d) 205. True, we have here a situation where the attorneys were appointed by the court and the appellant could not discharge them without the permission of the court, even had he remained sane. Nonetheless, if mentally competent to participate in the appeal and not satisfied with the way in which his counsel were proceeding, it would be his privilege to supplement their efforts on his behalf. See State v. Mode (1960), 55 Wn. (2d) 706, 349 P. (2d) 727, in which the necessity for court-appointed counsel on an appeal is discussed. Further, he would be permitted to argue his case pro se. This privilege has been extended to prisoners, without counsel, in death-penalty cases (State v. Bird (1948), 31 Wn. (2d) 777, 198 P. (2d) 978), and should be extended to appellants in such cases who are dissatisfied with the efforts of counsel in their behalf. (Appellants in noncapital cases, in jail at the time their appeals were heard and who were without counsel, have had to submit their cases on the briefs.)
We are satisfied that when it is established that an appellant is incompetent to proceed with his appeal prior to the argument thereof because he does not appreciate his peril and is unable to assist his attorneys, or, as said by the Court of Appeals of New York, is unable "to confer with his counsel in reference to the argument thereof [his appeal] " (see People v. Skwirsky (1914), 213 N. Y. 151, 107 N. E. 47), the appeal should be stayed because the appellant is not competent to prosecute it.
The cases bearing on this situation have been collected and analyzed in the recent Court of Military Appeals case of United States v. Washington (1955), 6 U.S.C.M.A. 114, 19 C.M.R. 240. This is the only case squarely in point. The three judges divided three ways: one judge held that the insanity of the defendant deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed further and automatically stayed all proceedings; another judge held that the court had jurisdiction to proceed, but should exercise its discretion and stay the proceedings; and the third judge held that the court had jurisdiction to proceed and should proceed with the case and complete appellate review. Two judges favored the staying of the appellate proceedings and that was done. The varying points of view are well and exhaustively expressed in the three opinions, and recapitulation is unnecessary.
Suffice it to say that while, as we have indicated, it is our intention to stay the appeal in this case, we do it not because we question our jurisdiction to proceed with appellate review (if adequate safeguards for the insane appellant are provided), but because the appeal must be prosecuted, if at all, by a guardian or a guardian ad litem.
While it is unquestionably true that an appeal would rarely be prosecuted under such conditions, it should be possible. There may be numerous reasons, in a case where the death penalty is not involved, where a determination of an appeal — even if adverse to the insane appellant-might be more advantageous than an indefinite stay of the proceedings. Even where the death penalty has been imposed, if the claimed errors were clearly established, a reversal of the conviction and the removal of the status of convicted felon might conceivably make the prosecution of an appeal advisable. (In such a case the judgment, if affirmed, would not be executed while the insanity continued. State v. Davis (1946), 6 Wn. (2d) 696, 717, 108 P. (2d) 641; Grossi v. Long, supra.) The election to proceed with the determination of the appeal should rest with those designated by the appropriate court to protect and safeguard the interest of the insane appellant.
It appearing to this court that the appellant is at this time not competent to proceed with his appeal, all proceed ings herein are stayed until his competency to so proceed is restored, or someone appointed and qualified as his guardian or guardian ad litem shall show good cause why they should be permitted to prosecute the appeal in his behalf.
It is so ordered.
Finley, C. J., Donworth, Weaver, Rosellini, Ott, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur.