Case Name: COOPER v. GIBSON et al.
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1917-11-06
Citations: 69 Okla. 105
Docket Number: No. 6816
Parties: COOPER v. GIBSON et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 69
Pages: 105–109

Head Matter:
COOPER v. GIBSON et al.
No. 6816
Opinion Filed Nov. 6, 1917.
On Petition for Rehearing, Jan. 29, 1918.
(170 Pac. 220.)
1, Fraud — Conveyance of Different Tract.
Where, in the negotiations leading up to an agreement to exchange land, one party exhibits to the other a certain tract and represents chat that is the land which he offers to exchange, and the other, relying upon such representations, agrees to the exchange, and in the deed made in pursuance to the contract another tract and one of less value is described and conveyed, an actionable fraud is committed.
2. Fraud — Proof.
A wide latitude is allowed in cases of fraud, and circumstances altogether inclusive, if separately considered, may, by their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive'proof.
3.' Fraud — “Actionable Fraud” — Requisites.
To constitute actionable fraud, it must be made to appear: (1) That defendant made a material representation; (2) that'it was false; (3) that he made it when he knew it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the intention that it should he acted upon by plaintiff ; (5) that nlaintiff acted in reliance upon it; (0) that he thereby suffered injury, and (7) that all these facts must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, and all of them must be found to exist; the absence of any of them woúld be fatal to a recovery, following Wingate v. Render, 58 Okla. 656, 160 P'ac. 614.
On Petition for Rehearing.
4. Set-Off and Counterclaim — Pleading and Proof.
Under section 4746, Rev. Laws, 1910, a defendant may plead and prove .a counterclaim arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, or connected with the subject of the action, and it is not necessary that the same shall exist as between all parties and defendant in such action.
5. Limitation of Actions — Counterclaim— Statute.
A counterclaim pleaded as a defense, or set-off pleaded for the purposes of liquidating the whole or part of plaintiff’s claim, is not barred by the statute of limitations, until the claim or the demand of the plaintiff is barred.
(Syllabus by Galbraith, G.)
Error from District Court,. Harper County ; W. C. Crow, Judge.
Action by the Bank of Harwood against Sallie E. Gibson and Geo. H. Gibson and the First National Bank of Nevada, Mo., in which S. J. Cooper intervened. Judgment for the defendants and against the intervener for costs, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Ohas. Swindall and E. J. Dick, for plaintiff in error.
R. H. Nichols, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Opinion by
GALBRAITH, O.
This action w)as commenced in the trial court by the Bank of Harwood to recover on a promissory note for $286.85, given by S. E. and Geo. I-I. Gibson, and to foreclose a real estate mortgage on real estate located in Harper county, executed by the makers of the note to secure the same.. The First National Bank of Nevada, Mo., was made a defendant for the reason that it held a secón, i mortgage on the land to secure a promissory note for $700 and interest. The Gibsons paid the note of the Bank of Harwood, and the plaintiff in error S. J. Cooper intervened in the case on the ground that he had purchased the note given the First National Bank of Nevada, Mo., and its mortgage had been assigned to him, and that, that bank bad no further interest in the suit, and that he was the owner and holder of the indebtedness formerly held by that bank, and asked by way of cross-petition that, he have judgment against tile Gibsons for the amount of his note and interest and a foreclosure of hi-s mortgage. The Gibsons answered admitting the execution of the note set out by Cooper, but charged, that it had been given as a balance of tbe purchase money in a trade of property between Cooper and the Gilbsons, wherein Cooper had traded the Gibsons certain land in Harper county for landi of tbe Gibsons in Missouri, and a stock of merchandise; but that Cooper had defrauded them and they had sustained damages in more than the amount of the note, in this, that he had -shown them one tract of land and deeded them another tract and one of less value, wherefore they prayed judgment against Cooper.for the amount of .damages so sustained. There was a reply in the nature of a general denial, and upon the issues thus made the cause was tried to the court and a jury. The jury found that the Gibsons had sustained damages and fixed the amount of their, recovery at $1,169, and for the intervener for the amount of.the note sued upon, being the sum of $1,169. The court: rendered judgment upon the verdict against the intervener for cost, to review which this appeal is prosecuted. This being an action at law and the controlling issues being questions of fact, it was essentially a case for the determination of the jury.
It requires no citation of authority to establish the proposition advanced by tile defendants in error here that if Cooper, in the negotiations for the exchange of the land, showed the Gibsons one tract and deeded them another tract of less value, that he perpetrated a fraud upon them, and that he was liable in an action for damages for all the injury that they thereby sustained. The verdict of the jury, in effect, found these issues in fairlor of the Gibsons, and there being evidence to support such findings the verdict of the jury is conclusive on that point upon this appeal.
It is complained that the court erred iu giving instruction No. 2 to the jury, wherein the element oí fraud are explained and the law relative thereto is announced. An examination of that instruction will 'show that the trial court followed very closely the elements of fraud and the law controlling in cases of the character of the instant case, as declared 'by this court in Wingate et al. v. Render, 58 Okla. 656, 160 Pac. 614, and also in the case of Gannon, Goulding & Thies v. Hausaman, 42 Okla. 41, 140 Pac. 407, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519. Therefore giving that instruction was not error.
Again, it is complained that the trial court erred in the admission of testimony. The governing rule on this question is announced in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Hankins v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 42 Okla. 330, 141 Pac. 272, as follows:
"In determining the existence of fraud any evidence, direct or circumstantial, which is competent by other rules of law, and which in the opinion of the court has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove the allegations in the issue, is admissible. Great latitude is allowied in the introduction of ¡evidence, the extent of the investigation being largely in the discretion of the trial court, and objections to circumstantial evidence to show fraud may well be admissible when taken as a whole, although some of the (•iicumstances, considered separately, would be incompetent. The' whole transaction involving the alleged fraud may be given in evidence. 20 Cye. 10."
No prejudicial errors of law appearing upon the record, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
By the Court; It is so ordered.