Case Name: The State, v. J. B. Edge and W. Caussey
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 1 Strob. 91
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State, v. J. B. Edge and W. Caussey.
Judges: Richardson J., O’Neall J., Butler J., and Wardlaw J., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 91–93

Head Matter:
The State, v. J. B. Edge and W. Caussey.
Trespass to the person is indictable, but trespass to goods and chattels is not. Hence, to stop one’s carriage forcibly, without design or manifestation of intention to do him any bodily hurt, is not an assault. In such a case, the jury should be instructed to find the defendant guilty or not, according as they should decide that he intended to do an injury to the person oí the prosecutor or not.
One has a lawful right to recover his property which another is unlawfully carrying away, if he can do so without a breach of the peace, or a violation of ího criminal laws of the country.
Tried before Mr. Justice Richardson, at Horry, Spring Term, 1846.
This was an indictment for assault and battery. The only question was—had the defendants, or either of them, assaulted Litchfield, the prosecutor, by rudely stopping bis horse and chair on the road, in order to get a negro then in the chair with Litchfield. Litchfield and his brother had got possession of a negro claimed by Edge. They were carrying him off, under some supposed claim of their mother. Edge, having heard of this intention, called several friends, Caussey and some others; some carried guns. They met Litchfield with the negro, and Edge stopped him, by holding the bridle of the horse, and using threats, regaining the negro.
The presiding Judge left this equivocal case entirely to the jury to decide. First, whether the stopping of prosecutor’s horse by Edge, in the way proved, amounted to a rude assailing of his person, which might be done without actual striking him. As for instance, if A were to jerk a stick rudely out of the hand of B, it would be a battery. So checking a man’s horse might assail his person. The jury must decide if such a battery had been made by Edge. If a battery was committed, he did not hold it legally justified by the intention of Edge to recapture his negro. This would go greatly to extenuate the punishment—not to justify him.
Secondly, if they found Edge guilty, then Caussey might be found guilty, if he had conspired with Edge, as might be indicated by his threats, &c., &c., going up to the horse, &c., &c. But he thought this questionable.
The jury found both defendants guilty, and they appealed and moved for a new trial.
1. Because it is submitted that his Honor erred, in charging the jury that the defendant Edge was guilty of an assault, in stopping the horse of the prosecutor, Litchfield, in order to secure his negro—although it was the only possible means which the said Edge had, under the circumstances of the case, of rescuing his slave from the possession of one who had not only obtained possession of him in a clandestine manner, but who, he had every reason to believe, was carrying him off with a felonious intent.
2. That as the prosecutor was prima facie in the act of perpetrating a felony, the defendants, as citizens of the country, had a perfect right to arrest him, without any formal legal authority for that purpose: more especially, as the means they resorted to were barely adequate to effect this purpose, and the least objectionable of any that could have been devised.
3. That as there was not the slightest evidence against Caus-sey of an assault committed by him, the jury should have been instructed to acquit him.
Munro & Wilson, for the motion.

Opinion:
Evans J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon a slight view, it might seem that this case was decided by the case of the State v. Davis & Purdue, 1 Hill, 96, where the defendants were found guilty of an assault in cutting a rope by which the prosecutor had tied the body of a negro to his own person. This case was decided on the ground, that every thing attached to a man's person partakes of his personal inviolability, as the clothes he wears, or the stick he carries in his hand. But the extension of this doctrine to the extent contended for in this case would confound the distinctions between trespass to the person, which is indictable, and trespass to goods, which is not. Many cases are to be found in the English Reports, where the defendant wilfully ran against the carriage of the prosecutor, by reason whereof he was hurt and sustained bodily injury; but the cases go no farther. It would be going too far to say, that to stop the carriage in which the prosecutor is riding, without any design or manifestation of intention to do him any bodily hurt, can amount to an assault, any more than to stop a boat in which many persons were sailing, would be an assault on each and every of the passengers. In this case the declared object of the defendant Edge was to recover his negro, which the prosecutor was unlawfully carrying away. This he might lawfully do, if he could effect it without a breach of the peace or the violation of the criminal laws of the country. If this was his object, and so declared at the time, and there was no offer or attempt to commit any violence on the person of the prosecutor, I cannot regard the act as any thing more than a trespass; or at most, the momentary restraint on the liberty of the prosecutor would be only a false imprisonment, which it is now settled may bo committed without an assault; though the opinion seemed once to have been entertained, that a false imprisonment included an assault; 4 Bos. & Pul., 255.
In cases like the present, where no personal injury is done or attempted, the question is always one of intention, and the jury should be instructed to find the defendants guilty, or not, according as they should decide that he intended to do an injury to the person of the prosecutor, or not. That the jury may decide on this point, a new trial is ordered.
Richardson J., O'Neall J., Butler J., and Wardlaw J., concurred.