Case Name: Ebenezer Buckingham & Co. v. Granville Alexandria Society
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1826-12
Citations: 2 Ohio 360
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Ebenezer Buckingham & Co. v. Granville Alexandria Society.
Judges: Judge Sherman did not sit, having been counsel in the cause.
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 2
Pages: 336–347

Head Matter:
*Ebenezer Buckingham & Co. v. Granville Alexandria Society.
Upon motion for an order to sheriff to make a deed, court only look to the execution on which the sale was made, and proceedings under it.
This was a motion for an order to the sheriff to make a deed for lands sold on a fi.fa. It was certified to the Supreme Court of Licking county, from the court of common pleas of that county? for the want of a constitutional quorum of disinterested judges to decide it, and was reserved for decision at Columbus. The facts were these:
At the October term, 1820, of the common pleas, the plaintiffs recovered judgment against the defendants for $3,752.62. Upon this judgment a ft. fa. issued in April, 1821, and among other property was levied on south half quarter 3, township 4, range 13, and on another tract of twenty-two and a half acres, on which the Granville furnace was erected. These lands were mortgaged to the bank which was defendant, and the levy was made in conformity with the provisions of the act of February 2,1821, providing for the collection of debts due from banks and bankers. The amount of debt due upon the mortgages and the value of the property were found and appraised according to law, and the sheriff returned that the lands were not sold for want of buyers.
At the September term, 1822, on the motion of the plaintiffs in execution, the levy and appraisements were set aside by the court. At the next succeeding term, May, 1823, the plaintiffs moved the court to rescind the order of the previous term, setting aside the levy and appraisement. This motion was continued for decision, and at the December term, 1823, an order was made rescinding the previous order, and restoring the parties to all the rights they had secured previous to the order of September term, 1822. At August term, 1824, the appraisement made upon the first ft. fa. was set aside, a new appraisement directed, and leave given to the plaintiffs to release so much of the levy as they might choose. A new appraisement was had, and the property bid off at two-thirds of that appraisement, upon which this application for the order directing a deed was made.
*Ewing, for plaintiff.
Irwin, for defendants.
Judge Sherman did not sit, having been counsel in the cause.

Opinion:
Opinion of the court, by
Judge Hitchcock
This motion was originally made in the court of common pleas of Licking county; and there not being a quorum of disinterested judges in that court to determine the question, it has been certified to this court for decision, according to the provisions of section 68 of the practice act. 22 State Laws, 64.
It is necessary in this case, as in every other, to inquire what is-the matter in controversy — what is the question to be decided ? The application is for an order upon the sheriff, to make a deed to the purchaser of certain lands, by him sold on execution, at the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants. The case must be considered in the same light as if the execution had been issued from this court. In such case we should not have gone back to inquire whether the judgment upon which the execution had issued was erroneous, or whether an improper order had been made for issuing the execution. If the execution had been improvidently issued the party injured thereby would not be without redress. The proper course for him to pursue would be to move to have the execution, or the proceedings under it set aside. Upon such motion the court might, with propriety, travel back and inquire whether, subsequent to judgment, there had been anything irregular in their own proceedings, or in the conduct or proceedings of their officers.
Counsel for defendants, in argument, treat the question as if it arose upon a motion to set aside the execution and proceedings, or as if the proceedings had been removed from the court of common pleas to this court, by certiorari, for irregularity. In this they mistake the point in issue. Admitting that there was so much irregularity in the proceedings that the court would, upon a proper application, *set them aside, still it does not follow that the motion now under consideration must be overruled. We certainly are not acting as a court of errors to review the proceedings of the court of common pleas. We are in effect acting as a court of common pleas. That court not being competent, in consequence of an interest in some of its members, to decide the motion submitted to them, the duty of making the decision is, by virtue of the statute, transferred to us.
Upon a motion to set aside an execution, as has been before observed, the court can, with propriety, examine the previous proceedings to ascertain whether there has been any irregularity in the orders of the court or in the proceedings of the clerk; but upon a motion similar to the present I apprehend we can look no further than to 'ascertain whether the officer, in making the sale, has pursued the law. I infer this from the nature of the application and from the words of the statute. These words are as follows : " Provided, that if the court to which any execution shall be returned by the officer, for the satisfaction of which any lands and tenements may have been sold, shall, after having carefully examined the proceedings of said officer, be satisfied that this sale has been made in all respects in conformity to the provisions of the act, they shall direct their clerk to make an entry in the journal, that the court are satisfied of the legality of such sale, and an order that the said officers make to the purchaser a deed for such lands and tenements."
Let us inquire, then, whether the sheriff, in making the sale, complied with the requisitions of the law. From the documents before us it is manifest that he caused the lands to be appraised "by five respectable disinterested freeholders" of the county; that these freeholders were by him duly sworn before they made the .appraisement; that the said appraisers made a return to him of their appraisement, " under their hands and seals; " that he forthwith thereafter deposited a copy of the return" with the clerk of the court from which the writ issued;" and that the property was sold for two-thirds of the appraised value. It is further manifest that he gave public notice of the time and place of sale, for more than thirty days before the day of sale, by advertisement in a public newspaper, printed in the ^county of Licking, the county in which the land lies, and that the sale took place at the courthouse of said county.
I am at a loss to discover in what particular the officer has failed in his duty. In fact, the complaint is not so much with respect to the officer, as to the court. Upon the whole, " after having carefully examined the proceedings " of the officer, I am "satisfied that the sale has, in all respects, been made in conformity to the iprovisions " of the statute, and that the order must be made according to the request of the plaintiff. Let it be made accordingly.