Case Name: Charles Lawrey, Respondent, v. Walker D. Hines, Director-General of Railroads, Operating Southern Pacific Steamship Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1923-12-27
Citations: 237 N.Y. 174
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles Lawrey, Respondent, v. Walker D. Hines, Director-General of Railroads, Operating Southern Pacific Steamship Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 237
Pages: 174–186

Head Matter:
Charles Lawrey, Respondent, v. Walker D. Hines, Director-General of Railroads, Operating Southern Pacific Steamship Company, Appellant.
Railroads — negligence — process — service of summons upon representative of federal agent designated to accept service in action against railway company — action not commenced until . after end of federal control not maintainable against director-general in office at time of accident — when summons may be properly amended so as to substitute name of proper defendant.
1. An action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff through the negligent operation of a steamship, under the control of the defendant, as director-general of railroads, may not be maintained against said defendant where the action was not commenced until after federal control was ended.
2. Where, however, it may be fairly inferred that the officer of the corporation owning the steamship to whom the summons was delivered was the duly authorized representative of the federal agent, empowered to accept delivery in the latter’s behalf (the federal agent having superseded the director-general), an order amending the summons by substituting the name of the proper defendant may properly be granted if requested. (Hungerford Brass & Copper Co. v. Hines, 236 N. Y. 528, followed.)
Lawrey v. Hines, 206 App. Div. 612, reversed.
(Argued October 1, 1923;
decided December 27, 1923.)
Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered March 16, 1923, which affirmed an order of Special Term denying a motion for a dismissal of the complaint.
The following questions were certified':
“ 1. Can this action, which was commenced on or about the 3d day of June, 1920, after the termination of federal control of the transportation systems of the United States, to recover damages for a cause of action arising out of and during federal control wherein the defendant in the title of said action was described as “ Walker D. Hines, Director-General of Railroads, operating Southern Pacific Steamship Company,” and services of summons and complaint having been duly effected, upon the person designated for service of summons in action against the United States arising out of federal control, be maintained against the United States?
“ 2. The defendant having appeared and answered the complaint herein and having failed to demur to the defect in the description of the party defendant, and the defect appearing on the face of the pleadings, is the defendant estopped from now raising that question? ”
J. Ard Haughwout for appellant.
The action purported to be an action against the goyernment and as such it purported to be brought against the wrong representative of the government. (Railroad v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554; Sandoval v. Davis, 288 Fed. Rep. 56; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; DeSimone v. Transportes Maritimos Do Estado, 200 App. Div. 82; Hudson v. Davis, 289 Fed. Rep. 943; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Treat v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 185 Fed. Rep. 760; Central Union v. Treat, 171 Fed. Rep. 301; Hoffeld v. United States, 36 Ct. of Cl. Rep. 230; Eberhart v. United States, 204 Fed. Rep. 884; Whalen P. & P. Mills v. Davis, 288 Fed. Rep. 438.) Even if the suit had purported to be brought against the right representative of the government it purported to be brought against Walker D. Hines who was not at that time acting as such representative. (Davidson v. Payne, 289 Fed. Rep. 69.) The defendant is not estopped by the fact that it appeared and answered and did not demur. (Stage v. M. C. R. R. Co., 199 App. Div. 675; Klippel v. Weil, 204 App. Div. 323.)
Joseph Banner for respondent.
This action is against the United States and not against an officer of the government. (Misouri P. R. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554; Western Union T. Co. v. Poston, 256 U. S. 662; Northern Pacific R. R. v. N. Dakota, 250 U. S. 135; Standard v. Davis, 278 Fed. Rep. 968; Hines v. Dahn, 267 Fed. Rep. 105.) The defect, if any, in describing the defendant has been waived. (De Puy v. Strong, 37 N. Y. 372; Sullivan v. N. Y. & R. C. Co., 119 N. Y. 348; Hotopp v. Huber, 160 N. Y. 524; Parmele Co. v. Haas, 171 N. Y. 582; People ex rel. Bacon v. Northern C. Ry. Co., 164 N. Y. 289; Hawks v. Mapes-Reeve Cons. Co., 82 App. Div. 72; Rosenweig v. Hines, 285 Fed. Rep. 622.)

Opinion:
Cardozo, J.
I think it is fairly to be inferred, both from what the defendant says and from what he omits to say, that the officer of the corporation to whom the summons was delivered was the duly authorized representative of the federal agent, empowered to accept delivery of the summons in the latter's behalf. No point is urged to the contrary. The failure to make the objection is persuasive that the facts do not justify the making.
In these circumstances our decision in Hungerford Brass & Copper Co. v. Hines (236 N. Y. 528) would be authority for an order amending the summons if such an order had been requested. The difficulty is that the plaintiff has not asked for an amendment, but is content with the action as he has brought it. He stands upon his right to charge Walker D. Hines with liability for injuries suffered during the period when Mr. Hines was director-general of railroads, though action was not brought till federal control was ended. The right does not exist.
The order of the Appellate Division and that of the Special Term should be reversed with costs in all courts, and the motion for judgment dismissing the complaint with costs granted, unless within thirty days and on payment of said costs the Special Term permits an amendment of the summons by substituting the name of the proper defendant.