Case Name: STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Lynn KENNAMORE, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1980-09-08
Citations: 604 S.W.2d 856
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Lynn KENNAMORE, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BROCK, C. J., and FONES and COOPER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 604
Pages: 856–862

Head Matter:
STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Lynn KENNAMORE, Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court of Tennessee.
Sept. 8, 1980.
Jennifer Helton Small, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, Jon Kerry Blackwood, Asst. Dist. Atty., Somer-ville, Terry Abernathy, Sp. Prosecutor, Sel-mer, of counsel.
William S. Nunnally, Greeneville, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
OPINION
H ARBI SON, Justice.
Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the fatal shooting of Jimmy Cardwell on November 17,1977. As the case comes to this Court, the only questions presented involve jury instructions given or declined by the trial judge. The Court granted certiorari primarily to consider whether the so-called "true man" rule of self-defense should be adopted in this state, as requested by appellant.
Appellant shot and killed Cardwell on the evening of November 17,1977, near a campfire which the two young men and their companion Mike Cox had built. The evidence indicates that there had been no quarrel or dispute among the persons involved on the date in question. Decedent Cardwell had been drinking rather heavily during the day. Tests taken after his death revealed a blood alcohol content of .22 percent. In the past there had been ill feeling between Cardwell and appellant, arising out of a fight in which appellant had defeated the decedent and also out of an incident in which appellant, acting as an undercover agent for the local police, had given information implicating relatives of the deceased in illegal liquor sales. On the date of the homicide decedent had told companions he intended to avenge the wrongs he felt appellant had committed. These threats had not been communicated to appellant prior to the shooting.
The record shows without dispute that while appellant was kneeling to add fuel to the fire, Cardwell struck him violently on the head from behind with a soft drink bottle. Appellant sustained a scalp laceration three or four inches in length, which required extensive sutures, and he was hospitalized for about four days following the incident.
Immediately after the assault, appellant obtained his shotgun and killed Cardwell with a single shot. Appellant and Mike Cox gave significantly different accounts of the events following Cardwell's assault upon appellant.
Cox testified that appellant got up from his kneeling position and attacked the deceased, fell upon him and was astride him and hitting him. Cox pulled appellant off of Cardwell. He testified that appellant then ran to his truck, which was several feet distant, took a shotgun from it and shot the deceased, who was twenty to twenty-five feet away, obviously physically beaten, and still trying to get up after being knocked down by appellant. Cox said he pleaded with appellant not to shoot, but the latter stepped around him, swore at the deceased and fired.
On the other hand, appellant testified that Cardwell kicked him after hitting him with the bottle. Appellant appealed to Cox for help and got none. He said that earlier he had removed his shotgun from the truck when he and the decedent had heard some noise in the woods nearby. He said that he loaded the shotgun at that time and set it against the tailgate of the truck. After he was assaulted by decedent, however, appellant said that the gun had been moved and that he saw it in the grass on the opposite side of the campfire. Fearing that he was about to be further assaulted or attacked by the decedent, he seized the weapon, wheeled and fired the fatal shot. He said that the decedent was then ten to fifteen feet away. Appellant said that he was disoriented, frightened and in shock from the injuries which he had sustained. He feared that the deceased might be armed and suspected that Cox was implicated in a conspiracy with the deceased to kill him; consequently he fired in self-defense. He said that only three to five seconds elapsed between the assault upon him and the firing of the shot. At a preliminary hearing Cox had estimated that thirty seconds elapsed after appellant got his gun until he fired.
The conflicting evidence was submitted to the jury by the trial judge under general instructions taken almost verbatim, with some amplifications, from the early case of Rippy v. State, 39 Tenn. 217 (1858). As given, the instructions permitted the jury to consider all of the circumstances involved in the shooting, including the contention of appellant that he used force which was reasonable and justified in repelling an assault in a situation where he was either in actual danger of death or serious bodily injury, or where it reasonably appeared to him that such a condition existed.
The principal contention of appellant is that the instructions given made no mention of the subject of retreat or of the circumstances under which a person attacked would be justified in not retreating. Counsel for appellant tendered the following special request which was declined:
"If the defendant when assaulted was without fault and in a place where he had a right to be and was placed in reasonable apparent danger of losing his life or of receiving great bodily harm, he need not retreat, but may stand his ground, and repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, he kills his assailant, he is justified and should be acquitted."
There is a substantial split of authority among the various jurisdictions with respect to whether a person assaulted must retreat before taking the life of his assailant. The common-law rule generally required such a retreat, if reasonably feasible, except in defense of one's home or habitation or in the discharge of official duty. In a number of jurisdictions, however, it has been held that the victim of an unprovoked assault need not retreat but may stand his ground and repel the attack with whatever force is reasonably required. Homicide resulting from such self-defense is justified. See generally 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 235-240 (R. Anderson ed. 1957); 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 126 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1979); 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide § 163-165 (1968); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 1279 (1922).
The latter rule, sometimes referred to as the "true man" doctrine, has never been adopted in previous decisions in this state, nor do we think that it represents the bet ter view of the subject. It is true that in Morrison v. State, 212 Tenn. 633, 371 S.W.2d 441 (1963), the Court used language indicating that there is no duty to retreat where the victim of an assault is without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be and is put in reasonably apparent danger of death or great bodily harm. This language, however, was used in a case in which the accused was defending his residence or habitation, and the opinion must be read and construed in light of that fact situation. It does not stand as general authority for the adoption of the "true man" rule in this state. As precedent, we limit it to the defense of one's home or habitation.
In the recent case of State v. McCrary, 512 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn.1974), the Court noted that earlier authorities had established the rule that one can go no further than is reasonably necessary in defense of his person. It then stated:
"Also well established in the law of excusable homicide is the requirement that the slayer must have employed all means in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of taking another's life." 512 S.W.2d at 265.
The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions refer to withdrawal by the accused only in connection with his having made the first attack, an issue not involved here. See TPI-Crim. 36.02 (1978). Otherwise they treat the subject of self-defense in general terms. They stress the reasonableness of the force used, of the apprehension created and of the conduct of the accused under all of the facts and circumstances. The language of the trial judge was generally couched in terms of an earlier opinion of this Court rather than of the somewhat similar Pattern Instructions. As given, his charge permitted the jury to consider all of the circumstances of the case, including the unprovoked assault upon the accused, the past bad relations between the parties, and the necessity, or lack thereof, for the use of deadly force in self-defense.
We find no error in the instructions given, nor do we think that the trial judge was in error in refusing to include in his instructions the "true man" doctrine. Also, in the absence of a proper special request, we find no error in the failure of the trial judge to charge the jury specifically upon any legal duty of the accused to retreat or a right to stand his ground. As previously stated, sharply conflicting testimony had been presented in the trial, and many differing inferences or conclusions could be drawn therefrom by the triers of fact. Under appellant's version of the facts, there was no occasion to retreat nor any reason to consider the subject because he said that he had no opportunity to retreat, that he was injured from the assault which had been inflicted upon him and had neither time nor ability to leave the scene in safety or to make any sort of rational decision in that regard. Under the testimony of the eyewitness Cox, appellant had overpowered his assailant, effectively disabled him and thereupon, after arming himself, needlessly fired the fatal shot.
We think that the availability of an avenue of retreat and the practicality of using it, or the absence thereof, are factors or circumstances to be considered in determining whether an accused was justified in taking the life of another in self-defense. These are only two of many of the surrounding facts and circumstances to be taken into account in any given case, however. If the subject of retreat is to be referred to in the jury instructions, it should not be the "true man" rule contended for by appellant but only one of the factors to be considered by the jury. Since the tendered instruction in this case was not legally correct, there was no error in its refusal.
We believe that the foregoing was implicit in State v. McCrary, supra, but we think that it should be made explicit and suggest that the following instruction would be appropriate on the issue of retreat:
The law of excusable homicide requires that the defendant must have employed all means reasonably in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of taking another's life. This requirement includes the duty to retreat, if, and, to the extent, that it can be done in safety.
In the present case, in our opinion, it was for the jury to determine whether or not appellant was justified in the action which he took. The instructions given were adequate to enable the jury to make that determination. A correct instruction on the law of retreat would not have been beneficial to him, and its omission was, therefore, not reversible error.
The judgments of the Courts below are affirmed at the cost of appellant, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment. However, the offense for which petitioner was convicted does not carry with it a rendition of infamy, and the recitation to that effect in the judgment of the trial court will be deleted.
BROCK, C. J., and FONES and COOPER, JJ., concur.
HENRY, J., dissenting (see separate opinion).
. See also T.C.A. § 38-102, providing that resistance "sufficient to prevent the offense" may be made by a party about to be injured to prevent an offense against his person or property.