Case Name: Cephas BREWER v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1999-05-19
Citations: 66 Ark. App. 324
Docket Number: CA CR 98-935
Parties: Cephas BREWER v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Pittman, Jennings, Bird, Neal, Crabtree, Meads, and Roaf, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 324–336

Head Matter:
Cephas BREWER v. STATE of Arkansas
CA CR 98-935
992 S.W.2d 140
Court of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc
Opinion delivered May 19, 1999
Theresa Nazario, for appellant.
No response.

Opinion:
John F. Stroud, Jr., Judge.
Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of two counts of rape involving victims younger than fourteen years of age. On December 12, 1997, the trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years' imprisonment on each count and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. Theresa Nazario, appellant's court-appointed attorney, filed notice of appeal and ordered the transcript of the trial proceedings. A two-volume transcript, consisting of almost a thousand pages and costing $2,748.60, was provided at the State's expense because appellant was indigent. On September 28, 1998, Ms. Nazario tendered her motion to withdraw as counsel of record, stating that appellant "has hired private counsel to pursue his appeal. Attorney Karen Pope Greenaway has obtained transcripts as evidenced by the attached receipt in order to perfect the appeal." (Emphasis added.) The motion was filed on October 16, 1998, on which date the clerk's office confirmed that it had been served on appellant. On October 13, 1998, Ms. Greenaway had filed her entry of appearance in this case.
When the motions to withdraw and to enter an appearance were originally filed, respectively, by the appellant's public defender and his retained counsel, this court issued a per curiam opinion. In it, we remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that it conduct proceedings and render findings of fact regarding the source of funds used to hire appellant's retained counsel, the date that the funds were obtained and counsel was retained, and whether a demand was made on behalf of the State for reimbursement of the cost of the trial record. See Brewer v. State, 64 Ark. App. 372, 984 S.W.2d 65 (1998).
On remand, the trial court found that the appellant was still indigent. The trial court explained that it could not consider the real property owned by the appellant and his wife because appellant had conveyed the real property to his wife when he was unable to make the payments on the property; that appellant had no income and no money in savings; that he was incarcerated in the state penitentiary; that the cost of the transcript was substantial, as was the cost to retain counsel; and that his wife (by then his ex-wife) and siblings had paid the cost of retaining private counsel for him.
In response to the per curiam opinion that remanded this matter to the trial court, Judges Pittman, Neal, Roaf, and I concurred with Judge John Jennings's dissent to that per curiam. While we all agreed that any abuses in the process of obtaining transcripts by indigent defendants should be cured, the basis for the dissent was that this matter was best left to the State, through the attorney general's office, to represent the people and to ask for relief if such abuse was occurring. We reiterate that position here, now as the majority position, because we believe that in most instances the attorney general's office will be better suited than this court to supervise, investigate, and cure any abuses by indigent defendants in obtaining transcripts. In stating this preference, however, we do not in any way relinquish our authority to remand such matters to the trial court in appropriate circumstances. If all cases were to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether an appellant is still indigent after being repre sented by appointed counsel at trial and receiving a transcript at State expense, it should be only by rule that would apply to criminal cases in the supreme court and in the court of appeals. Rule-making authority lies with our supreme court, not the court of appeals. See Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373 (1982).
Moreover, in any future instances in which we might decide to remand such a matter to the trial court, we will expect the trial court to follow the standards enunciated in Hill v. State, 305 Ark. 193, 805 S.W.2d 651 (1991), and Hill v. State, 304 Ark. 348, 802 S.W.2d 144 (1991):
As we said when we remanded this matter, the burden of establishing indigency is on the defendant claiming indigent status. In considering whether an appellant is indigent, which is a mixed question of fact and law, some of the factors to be considered are the following: (1) income from employment and governmental programs such as social security and unemployment benefits; (2) money on deposit; (3) ownership of real and personal property: (4) total indebtedness and expense; (5) the number of persons dependent on the appellant for support; (6) the cost of the transcript on appeal; and (7) the likely fee of retained counsel for the appeal. Hill, 304 Ark. 348, 802 S.W.2d 144. Able-bodiedness and the level of education of the appellant are also given some consideration as is whether the appellant himself paid the cost of the appeal bond or has control or complete discretionary use of funds raised by others for his defense.
305 Ark. 193, 194, 805 S.W.2d 651, 652-53.
The ability of bystanders such as friends and family members to post bond or assist with expenses is not a factor in determining the appellant's indigency since indigency of the appellant does not depend on the financial position of his family and friends. Bystanders have no obligation to the state. An exception could be made, however, where the appellant has control or complete discretionary use of funds raised by others.
304 Ark. 348, 351, 802 S.W.2d 144, 145-46 (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court found that the appellant was still indigent and that the funds for private counsel were provided by the appellant's ex-wife and siblings. In accordance with Hill, 304 Ark. 348, 802 S.W.2d 144, the ex-wife and siblings had no obligation to the State to pay the cost of the transcript. Consequently, we accept the trial court's finding that appellant is still indigent, and we therefore find that Ms. Nazario's motion to withdraw as counsel should be granted.
Motion granted.
Pittman, Jennings, Bird, Neal, Crabtree, Meads, and Roaf, JJ., agree.
Griffen, J., Robbins, C.J., Hart and Rogers, JJ., dissent.