Case Name: Norman Q. THOMAS, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas And Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Clark G. WARDEN, M.D.; Norman Q. Thomas, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas and Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and Clark G. Warden, M.D.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-12-11
Citations: 999 So. 2d 842
Docket Number: Nos. 2006-CA-01703-SCT, 2007-CA-00821-SCT
Parties: Norman Q. THOMAS, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas And Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Clark G. WARDEN, M.D. Norman Q. Thomas, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas and Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and Clark G. Warden, M.D.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN : OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J., AND EASLEY, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 999
Pages: 842–851

Head Matter:
Norman Q. THOMAS, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas And Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Clark G. WARDEN, M.D. Norman Q. Thomas, Jr., Individually and On Behalf of William Thomas and Anna Thomas, Two Minors v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and Clark G. Warden, M.D.
Nos. 2006-CA-01703-SCT, 2007-CA-00821-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 11, 2008.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 2009.
L. Breland Hilburn, Carroll Louis Clifford, IV, Jackson, Patrick Joseph Sche-pens, Roger Lane Mcgehee, Jr., attorneys for appellant.
Stuart Bragg Harmon, Kristopher Alan Graham, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
Eugene Randolph Naylor, Elizabeth G. Hooper, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
DICKINSON, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. This is a medical-negligence case which was dismissed by the trial court prior to adjudication of the merits because the plaintiff failed to comply with clear statutory requirements. We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2. The facts necessary to address the issues before us are essentially undisputed. On October 1, 2002, Dr. Clark G. Warden performed a duodenal switch bariatric surgery on Melinda Thomas at Ocean Springs Hospital. Due to complications, Thomas was admitted to Mississippi Baptist Medical Center ("MBMC"), where she died on September 7, 2003.
¶ 3. On September 6, 2005, Norman Q. Thomas, Jr. ("Mr. Thomas"), sent a pre-suit notice letter to MBMC and Dr. Warden. We are not told when MBMC received its notice. The notice addressed to Dr. Warden was returned, and Mr. Thomas sent another notice to a different address, but we are told that Dr. Warden received notice on October 24, 2005.
¶ 4. On November 4, 2005, Mr. Thomas filed suit against MBMC and Dr. Warden. MBMC filed its answer on December 20, 2005, raising as affirmative defenses the "plaintiffs' failure to comply with § 11 — 1— 58," and "plaintiffs' failure to comply with conditions precedent to the initiation of litigation."
¶ 5. On January 3, 2006, Mr. Thomas filed a certificate of compliance with Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-1-58, and on January 31, 2006, Dr. Warden filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the plaintiffs failed to wait sixty days after notice before filing suit, as required by Mississippi statutory law.
¶ 6. On January 31, 2006, Dr. Warden noticed his motion to dismiss for a hearing to be held on March 27, 2006. On August 28, 2006, the trial court granted Dr. Warden's motion to dismiss.
¶ 7. On October 17, 2006, MBMC filed its Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. On March 9, 2007, the trial court granted MBMC's motion, with prejudice, finding Thomas failed to strictly comply with Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-1-58 by not including a certificate of expert consultation with the complaint, and with Section 15-1-36(15) by not providing sixty days notice of the action to the defendants. Thomas appealed as to each defendant, and the appeals were consolidated.
ANALYSIS
¶ 8. Thomas raises the following five issues on appeal:
I. Whether the trial court erred in its determination that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58 and Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-86(15) are facially valid as the statutes did not violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 by unconstitutionally usurping judicial rulemaking power.
II. Whether the trial court erred in its determination that strict compliance is the appropriate standard of compliance, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58.
III. Whether the trial court erred in its determination that Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) is facially valid and that it does not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights to open courts pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution of-1890.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in its determination that strict compliance is the appropriate standard of compliance, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15).
V. Whether the trial court erred in its determination that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58 and § 15-1-36(15) did not impinge on the plaintiffs fundamental rights to open and accessible courts in violation of the equal protection clauses of the Mississippi and United States Constitutions.
¶ 9. Our recent decision in Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135 (Miss.2008), is disposi-tive of a portion of Thomas's first issue, and of issue two. We shall analyze issue one by first addressing Section 11-1-58, and then Section 15-1-36(15).
Section 11-1-58
¶ 10. Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-1-58 provides, in relevant part:
(1) In any action against a licensed physician, health care provider or health care practitioner for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services where expert testimony is otherwise required by law, the complaint shall be accompanied by a certificate executed by the attorney for the plaintiff declaring that:
(a) The attorney has reviewed the facts of the case and has consulted with at least one (1) expert qualified pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence who is qualified to give expert testimony as to standard of care or negligence and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of such review and consultation that there is a reasonable basis for the commencement of such action.
Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-58(l)(a) (Supp. 2008).
¶ 11. In Wimley, the issue was whether a complaint should be dismissed where the plaintiff failed to attach a certificate or waiver as required by Section 11-1-58. We held that
a complaint, otherwise properly filed, may not be dismissed, and need not be amended, simply because the plaintiff failed to attach a certificate or waiver. To the extent Walker [v. Whitfield Nursing Ctr., Inc., 931 So.2d 583, 591 (Miss.2006) ] and its progeny hold otherwise, they are hereby overruled.
Wimley, 991 So.2d at 138. In so holding, we stated that
we are unable to ignore the constitutional imperative that the Legislature refrain from promulgating procedural statutes which require dismissal of a complaint, and particularly a complaint filed in full compliance with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. We find Section 11-1-58's requirement that a complaint be accompanied by a certificate or waiver to be just such a procedural statute.
Id.
¶ 12. Wimley is dispositive of this issue. The trial court was in error, insofar as it based its dismissal of Thomas's complaint on his failure to include a certificate of compliance with the complaint.
Section 15-1-36(15)
¶ 13. The second argument presented in Thomas' first issue on appeal, and the arguments presented in his remaining issues on appeal, pertain to the constitutionality of Section 15-1-36, and whether this Court should require strict compliance with that statute's notice requirement. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36(15) states:
No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action. No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered. If the notice is served within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended sixty (60) days from the service of the notice for said health care providers and others. This subsection shall not be applicable with respect to any defendant whose name is unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and who is identified therein by a fictitious name.
Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) (Rev.2003).
¶ 14. In Pítalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So.2d 927 (Miss.2006), we affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements of Section 15-1-36(15). In so doing, we held that "this Court will apply the plain meaning of the statute." Id. at 929. We further noted:
When drafting Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-36(15), the Legislature did not incorporate any given exceptions to this rule which would alleviate the prerequisite condition of prior written notice. Simply stated, "shall" is mandatory, while "may" is discretionary.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So.2d 691 (Miss. 2006) (citing Pitalo, with approval).
¶ 15. The reasoning set forth in both Pítalo and Arceo is applicable to today's case. Section 15-1-36(15) clearly and unambiguously states that "[n]o action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action." Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15) (Rev.2003). Thus, because the defendants in this case did not have "sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action," this lawsuit was not lawfully filed, and it is of no legal effect.
¶ 16. The separate opinion states: "Thomas maintains the sixty days would have expired on Saturday, November 5, 2005, but that the statute of limitations was going to expire on Sunday, November 6, 2005, so the complaint was filed on Friday, November 4, 2005." Sep. Op. ¶ 42. It is surprising that the author of the separate opinion is persuaded to any degree by this absurd argument. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) clearly provides:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by . any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default . shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is . a Sunday . in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or any other day when the courthouse or the clerk's office is closed.
Miss. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the complaint could have been filed on Monday, November 7, 2005.
¶ 17. Some argue that strictly enforcing the statute's sixty-day notice requirement before the right to file suit ripens is unfair. Such arguments should be made to the Legislature, which made the rule. Our constitutional duty is to interpret and apply the law as it is written, not as we think it might have been more fairly written.
¶ 18. Our duty does, however, require that we set aside statutory provisions which violate the Mississippi or federal constitution. Thomas asserts that Section 15-1-36(15) directly conflicts with Section 24 of the Mississippi Constitution, which guarantees "[a]ll courts shall be open . and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay," because the sixty-day notice requirement impedes or delays citizens' access to courts. We previously addressed this concern in Arceo, in which Justice Carlson, writing for the majority, stated:
"There is no absolute right of access to the courts. All that is required is a reasonable right of access to the courts-a reasonable opportunity to be heard." Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 403 (5th Cir.1984) (cited with approval in Townsend [v. Estate of Gilbert], 616 So.2d 333, 337 (Miss.1993)). While the right under our state and federal constitutions to access to our courts is a matter beyond debate, this right is coupled with responsibility, including the responsibility to comply with legislative enactments, rules, and judicial decisions. While the plaintiff in today's case had the constitutional right to seek redress in our state courts for the unfortunate death of her daughter, she likewise had the responsibility to comply with the applicable rules and statutes, including section 15-1-36(15). Any different approach would render meaningless any rule or statute setting time limitations on litigants.
Arceo, 949 So.2d at 697.
¶ 19. Thomas also asserts that Section 15-1-36(15) violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Mississippi Con stitution by unconstitutionally usurping judicial rule-making power. Thomas further asserts that the notice requirement in Section 15-1-36(15) conflicts with Rule 3 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets out the procedure for the commencement of an action, and which contains no such notice requirement. Thomas finally asserts that the notice requirement suspends application of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to medical-malpractice plaintiffs, who have a constitutionally protected right to file a complaint and preserve their rights and claims on the date of accrual just like any other tort victim.
¶ 20. These arguments are without merit. While it is true that the rules governing litigation in Mississippi courts are within this Court's purview, Section 15-l-36(15)'s notice requirement is a pre-suit prerequisite to a claimant's right to file suit. The statute clearly provides that "no action . may be begun" until the notice requirement is met. The Legislature's authority to make law gives way to this Court's rule-making authority when the suit is filed, not before.
¶ 21. Although Wimley addressed a different statute, we nevertheless addressed in that case the constitutionality of statutory pre-suit requirements:
We hasten to say that our holding today has no effect on the constitutionality or applicability of other provisions or requirements of Section 11-1-58. Indeed, we guard just as diligently the Legislature's prerogative to set forth in legislation whatever substantive, pre-suit requirements for causes of action, and prerequisites to filing suit, it deems appropriate.... As stated, pre-suit requirements are clearly within the purview of the Legislature, and do not encroach upon this Court's rule-making responsibility. Indeed, we consistently have held that the Legislature has authority to establish presuit requirements as a condition precedent to filing particular kinds of lawsuits.
Wimley, 991 So.2d at 139.
¶ 22. Because Thomas failed to provide a sixty-day notice as required by Section 15-1-36(15), we must affirm the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. However, we hold that the trial court had no authority to enter judgment on behalf of either defendant, as no argument on the merits was presented by either defendant. The complaint should have simply been dismissed, without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
¶ 23. The trial court erred in granting judgment to the defendants and in dismissing the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to file with the complaint a certificate of compliance as required by Section 11-1-58. Although the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to either defendant, the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the notice requirement of Section 15-1-36(15) is affirmed. The dismissal, however, should have been without prejudice.
¶ 24. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN : OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J., AND EASLEY, J.
. Norman Thomas provided notice and filed suit individually, and on behalf of two minor children, William Thomas and Anna Thomas. We are not told of the relationship of any of these three individuals to the decedent, Melinda Thomas.
. We are not told if, or when, process was served on either defendant.
. This opinion should not be read as disposi-tive of whether the statute of limitations has, or has not, expired. We do not today address that issue, and hold only that the suit was filed prematurely.