Case Name: Joseph Edward ROWE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-02-26
Citations: 523 So. 2d 620
Docket Number: No. 88-4
Parties: Joseph Edward ROWE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 523
Pages: 620–623

Head Matter:
Joseph Edward ROWE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-4.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 26, 1988.
On Motion for Rehearing March 30, 1988.

Opinion:
THREADGILL, Judge.
Joseph Edward Rowe appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence. We affirm.
Rowe is serving several separate but concurrent sentences imposed in Pinellas County. In March, 1985, he was convicted by a jury of grand theft. The state thereupon announced its intent to seek a ten-year sentence, after determining that Rowe qualified as a habitual felony offender. Having been placed on notice of the likelihood of enhancement of the theft sentence, Rowe negotiated a plea to the remaining charges for a total of ten years, to run concurrently. Rowe did not contest the habitual offender adjudication.
Rowe now claims, first, that the overall ten-year sentence was based upon a guideline scoresheet error. Among the errors he alleges is that the presumptive sentence was calculated under the more severe "robbery" category (based on the offense charged), when it should have been computed under the "theft" category (the actual offense of conviction). Rowe also claims that points for "legal constraint" were added because of a mistaken belief that he was on parole at the time of the sentence, and that too many points were awarded for "prior record."
We begin our analysis by noting that at the time these sentences were imposed an upward departure from the presumptive guideline sentence could be based upon the finding that the defendant was a habitual offender. See, e.g., Brady v. State, 457 So.2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Not until 1986 did the supreme court hold otherwise. Whitehead v. State, 498 So.2d 863 (Fla.1986). Thus the departure in Rowe's case, had it been appealed in timely fashion, would have been sustained. This court has since held that Whitehead is not to be applied retroactively to habitual offender sentences which became final prior to the announcement of that decision. Cusic v. State, 512 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); McCuiston v. State, 507 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In other words, a guideline departure based upon the habitual offender statute is not an illegal sentence per se. The First District Court of Appeal appears to hold otherwise. Hall v. State, 511 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Additionally, it has long been recognized that a guideline departure can be sustained if it is the product of a plea bargain. See, e.g., Orsi v. State, 515 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We recognize that a court is not authorized to impose an unlawful sentence just because the defendant agrees to it. Williams v. State, 500 So.2d 501 (Fla.1986). However, this case is distinguishable from Williams in that both parties engaged in give and take. Rowe gave up his right to trial on the remaining charges in exchange for the certainty of a ten-year total sentence, while the state gave up whatever chance it might have had to ensure Rowe's detention far beyond ten years. After examination of the record in the present case we are convinced that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence notwithstanding any possible scoresheet errors. Thus resentencing is not required. Brown v. State, 508 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Brown v. State, 507 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Rowe's final prayer for relief concerns the plea bargain itself. He believes that this bargain should be vacated because it was founded in a material mistake of fact and law. We cannot agree. It is true that a claim of ineffective counsel can be predicated upon erroneous advice in the sentencing guidelines context. See, e.g., Lucas v. State, 461 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The failure to object to known scoresheet miscalculations might qualify as ineffective assistance if the defendant is prejudiced by counsel's omission. Pettway v. State, 502 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). However, as with any other claim of ineffective assistance, the movant must at least allege that the outcome—in this instance the sentence—would have been different but for the blunders of counsel. Morris v. State, 493 So.2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Where it is clear from the record that a departure from the guidelines was intended, based upon criteria that were lawful at the time of sentencing, it is not enough to show, as Rowe has tried to do, what the presumptive guideline sentence would have been. Instead we find that counsel's decision to recommend the plea bargain, once Rowe was locked into the initial ten-year sentence, conceivably prevented Rowe from serving an even greater number of years. We do not believe that counsel should be faulted for failing to anticipate that the supreme court would eventually invalidate the principal reason employed by Rowe's trial judge to exceed the guidelines.
We do note that, again, the first district appears to offer some support for Rowe's arguments regarding the lawfulness of his sentence. In Taylor v. State, 512 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the defendant, prior to the Whitehead decision, was convicted of armed burglary and the state threatened to invoke the habitual offender act. Rather than face the possibility of a life sentence Taylor agreed to accept a fifteen-year sentence in lieu of the guideline recommendation of twelve years. Finding that the sole inducement for Taylor's agreement to the departure sentence was the avoidance of a more severe, but unlawful, sentence, the court analogized the situation to Williams and directed that Taylor be sentenced pursuant to the guideline recommendation. Fortuitously for Taylor, the Whitehead decision appears to have issued while his judgment and sentence were being appealed; the issue did not arise, as do Rowe's grievances, via rule 3.800(a) well after the time for appeal had elapsed.
Affirmed.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
. § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1985).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.988(c).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.988(f).