Case Name: Sara Jane SEDDON, et al., Petitioners, v. Fred HARPSTER and Doris Harpster, his wife, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-07-30
Citations: 403 So. 2d 409
Docket Number: No. 56771
Parties: Sara Jane SEDDON, et al., Petitioners, v. Fred HARPSTER and Doris Harpster, his wife, et al., Respondents.
Judges: OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 403
Pages: 409–414

Head Matter:
Sara Jane SEDDON, et al., Petitioners, v. Fred HARPSTER and Doris Harpster, his wife, et al., Respondents.
No. 56771.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 30, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1981.
Sanford A. Minkoff of the Law Offices of Christopher C. Ford, Tavares, for petitioners.
Robert F. Vason, Jr., Mount Dora, for respondents.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Acting Chief Justice.
We have before us a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in which the following question was certified to this Court pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution (1972):
Did the seven-year period of continual possession necessary to establish adverse possession under color of title begin on the effective date of Chapter 74-382, or could it have begun before that time where:
1. The claimant's paper title did not properly describe the disputed property; yet,
2. The disputed property had "been protected by a substantial enclosure" for more than seven years prior to 1975?
Seddon v. Harpster, 369 So.2d 662, 666-667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
This is basically a boundary dispute in which the plaintiff's ejectment action succeeded in the face of a defense of adverse possession. We shall refer to the parties by name in an attempt to avoid unnecessary confusion.
In 1964 Seddon's parents, her predecessors in interest, bought twenty acres of rural land in Lake County. A survey of the tract at that time showed the western boundary, i. e., the north-south midsection line, to be a county-maintained clay road. Relying on this, the Seddons erected a fence adjacent to the clay road.
In 1971 the Harpsters purchased property which, according to the legal description, abutted the western boundary of the Sed-don land. This made the north-south midsection line the common boundary between the two tracts. In 1975 the Harpsters brought an ejectment action against Sed-don, claiming she was wrongfully occupying the eastern portion of their property. The Harpsters contended that the true north-south midsection line ran east of the clay road. Seddon answered, inter alia, that even if the true boundary was east of the road, she owned the property up to the fence adjacent to the road by virtue of adverse possession.
Initially we note that the district court correctly affirmed the trial court's rejection of Seddon's claim of adverse possession "without color of title." § 95.18, Fla.Stat. (1975). This form of adverse possession may arise in the absence of a written instrument, judgment or decree describing the disputed property, but only if the claimant has paid taxes on that property. Seddon had paid taxes based on the legal description in her deed which used the correct north-south midsection line as a guide. The disputed property beyond that line and up to the fence would not have been covered. Failure to pay taxes necessarily defeats a claim of adverse possession "without color of title." § 95.18, Fla.Stat. (1975). The trial court, sitting without a jury, accepted the Harpster's expert witness' testimony that the correct north-south midsection line ran about 400 feet east of the clay road. In rendering final judgment for the Harpsters, the court noted that:
Under the present day reading of Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, there can be no doubt that the Defendant [Seddon] has met every requirement of acquiring title to property by adverse possession save and except for one. The Defendant [Seddon] has not held such property according to the provisions of Section 95.16, Florida Statutes for a period of seven years. Such section of the Florida Statutes only became law on January 1, 1975. Prior to that, Section 95.16 and 95.17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in Meyer v. Law, 287 So.2d 37 was the law.
369 So.2d at 664 (emphasis in original). The trial court refused to apply section 95.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1974), retroactively because it allegedly worked a substantive change from the prior law as interpreted in Meyer v. Law, 287 So.2d 37 (Fla.1973). The district court affirmed.
Meyer v. Law dealt with the statutory predecessors to the present statute. These sections read in pertinent part:
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of premises under claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises included in such instrument, decree, or judgment for seven years, the premises so included shall be deemed to have been held adversely . . .
Section 95.16, Fla.Stat. (1973). (emphasis supplied).
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in any of the following cases: . . .
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 . . .
Section 95.17(2), Fla.Stat. (1973) (emphasis supplied). In Meyer, the majority interpreted the foregoing statutes to mean that adverse possession under color of title could only arise where the claimant had "paper" title accurately describing the disputed property. Under Meyer, Seddon could not have acquired the land by adverse possession under color of title because at the time from which she claims possession, her deed's legal description did not include the area between the true boundary and the fence.
Chapter 74-382, sections 11 and 12, Laws of Florida, was enacted at the legislative session immediately following the Meyer decision. By combining the two preceding sections, the new statute clearly states that one does not have to have paper title correctly describing the disputed property as long as that area is contiguous to the described land and "protected by a substantial enclosure." § 95.16, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1974).
The crucial issue, then, is whether chapter 74-382 may be applied retroactively in favor of Seddon. The presumption is against retroactive application in the absence of an express manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary. Foley v. Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (Fla.1976). There is no such expression in chapter 74-382, sections 11 and 12, Laws of Florida. Seddon's argument that these provisions only clarified existing law and so may be applied retroactively must fail. The legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law and the judicial construction of former laws on the subjects of its enactments. Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179 (Fla.1951). It is also presumed that when the legislature amends a statute, it intends to accord the statute a meaning different from that accorded it before the amendment. Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla.1977). We can find no basis to afford retroactive application to chapter 74-382, sections 11, 12, Laws of Florida.
Our response to the question certified must therefore be that the seven-year period of continual possession necessary to establish adverse possession under color of title begins on the effective date of chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, i. e., January 1, 1975. The effective date is unaffected by the fact that although claimant's paper title did not properly describe the disputed prop erty, that area had been protected by a substantial enclosure for more than seven years prior to 1975.
The decision of the district court of appeal is approved.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.