Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTONIO DeHOYOS, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1976-09-20
Citations: 64 Ill. 2d 128
Docket Number: No. 47830
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTONIO DeHOYOS, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 64
Pages: 128–137

Head Matter:
(No. 47830.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTONIO DeHOYOS, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 20, 1976.
UNDERWOOD, RYAN and CREBS, JJ., dissenting.
William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, and Laurence J. Bolon, Raymond J. Prosser, and Larry L. Thompson, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Lynn Sara Trackman, Assistant Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Antonio DeHoyos, indicted for the murder of Jose Pallares, was tried before a jury in the circuit court of Cook County, convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than three nor more than nine years. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial (31 Ill. App. 3d 12) and we allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal.
The facts are adequately stated in the appellate court opinion and need not be repeated. Pallares died as the result of a gunshot wound suffered at the apartment of his aunt, Mary Sanchez, where he was then living. Although there was a sharp conflict in- the testimony concerning what occurred immediately prior to the shooting, it was not disputed that the fatal shot was fired from a pistol owned by defendant.
The appellate court reversed the judgment on the ground that the admission of the testimony of Frank Rogers, a rebuttal witness, concerning his prior conviction of a felony, was error so prejudicial to defendant as to require reversal. The People contend that the circuit court did not err in admitting the testimony and assuming, arguendo, that its admission was error, "it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case." Defendant contends that in admitting the testimony the circuit court improperly permitted the People to impeach its own witness and that the appellate court correctly reversed the judgment.
The shooting occurred on September 20, 1972, and defendant testified that he sought the advice of Frank Rogers "as to what I should do, in terms of, you know, the police and what not." He stated that with Rogers' knowledge and permission he stayed in his home from September 20 until he was arrested there on September 22, 1972. Called by the People in rebuttal, Rogers testified that the police had arrested defendant at his apartment and had also placed him under arrest "For having him at my house, which I didn't know he was there." During Rogers' direct examination the following ensued:
"Q. Mr. Rogers, have you been convicted of any crime?
A. Who?
Q. You.
A. Yes. You have that on evidence.
MR. ENGEL: Objection, he is trying to impeach his own witness.
MR. KARA VIDAS: I have a right to bring that out.
MR. ENGEL: Is he impeaching his own witness?
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KARA VID AS: What were you convicted of?
A. Narcotics. It is on the record.
Q. It was for sale of narcotics?
A. That is correct.
Q. And how much time did you get for sale?
A. Ten and a day.
Q. How much time did you spend in the penitentiary under the ten and a day?
A. Ten and a day.
Q. How much time did you spend in the penitentiary?
A. Ten and a day."
Although the parties and the appellate court have treated the question presented as involving "impeachment" of the People's rebuttal witness we do not so view it. This is an example of "the practice which permits the party who calls a witness with a criminal record to prove the record on direct examination." (3A Wigmore, Evidence sec. 900, at 667 n.l (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).) It is not impeachment of one's own witness; on the contrary it is an anticipatory disclosure designed to reduce the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the witness' credibility. The evidence is admissible on the ground that "The proponent of a witness need not allow such information damaging to his credibility to be first established on cross-examination *." United States v. Mahler (2d Cir. 1966), 363 F.2d 673, 678.
As we said in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 514, the prejudicial effect of evidence of a defendant's prior convictions "is unmistakable." It is generally recognized that proof of a prosecution witness' prior convictions may also be prejudicial to the defendant, especially where there is evidence of past association between him and the witness. In Loraine v. United States (9th Cir. 1968), 396 F.2d 335, the court said: "It is usually proper and desirable that the Government should bring out on direct examination, at the trial, the criminal record of its witnesses or any circumstances tending to undermine their credibility, although, on objection of the accused, such evidence may be excluded on direct examination." (396 F.2d 335, 339.) In United States v. Del Purgatorio (2d Cir. 1969), 411 F.2d 84, the court said: "We have held, however, that the Government on direct examination may bring out information damaging to its witnesses' credibility, including evidence of their criminal records, provided the jury is cautioned that the testimony is not evidence of the defendant's guilt." 411 F.2d 84, 87.
Although the party calling him may in most instances offer proof of a witness' prior conviction, the admissibility of such proof, as with many other types of evidence, may depend upon whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. (People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216.) Assuming, arguendo, but not deciding, that there was a sufficient foundation for Rogers' testimony and that it was proper rebuttal, we nevertheless agree with the appellate court that in admitting the testimony concerning his prior conviction, the circuit court committed reversible error. The testimony was not limited to proof of a prior conviction; the People went much further. Rogers was asked, and testified, not only about his prior conviction but also concerning the sentence imposed and the fact that he served all of it. This testimony was improper and in view of defendant's testimony that he had sought Rogers' advice "as to what I should do, in terms of, you know, the police and what not," its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative value.
Because this case is remanded for a new trial we consider several contentions made by defendant in this court. He contends that the evidence failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not agree. The jury was required to choose between conflicting versions of what had occurred and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Its verdict is adequately supported by the record.
We have also considered the arguments made concerning alleged errors in permitting defendant to be impeached by use of his testimony at a preliminary hearing, and the circuit court's refusal to give two tendered instructions. These contentions were considered and correctly rejected by the appellate court and need not be further discussed.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.