Case Name: Charles Rowland Greiner v. Thelma Mae Greiner, Nona L. Noel
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1979-01-16
Citations: 179 Ind. App. 61
Docket Number: No. 3-675A130
Parties: Charles Rowland Greiner v. Thelma Mae Greiner, Nona L. Noel.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 179
Pages: 61–73

Head Matter:
Charles Rowland Greiner v. Thelma Mae Greiner, Nona L. Noel.
[No. 3-675A130.
Filed January 16, 1979.]
Orval W. Anderson, of Gary, for appellant.
Rudolph Tanasijevich, of Hammond, for appellee.

Opinion:
HOFFMAN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment allowing attorney fees pursuant to a decree of divorce in which a property settlement was agreed to by the parties. The issue raised concerns an alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court in fixing the amount of those fees.
The record reveals the following evidence most favorable to the trial court decision. In August 1973, Thelma Mae Greiner entered into an attorney-client relationship with Nona L. Noel for the purpose of seeking counsel with regard to difficulties arising out of her marriage to Charles Rowland Greiner. The fee to be paid for Mrs. Noel's services was to be based on "the number of hours . . . spent and how difficult the work was and how hard it was to put it together." At Mrs. Greiner's direction, a complaint was filed for separation from bed and board on August 31,1973, pursuant to IC 1971, 31-1-22-1 (Burns Code Ed.).
Thereafter, Noel began discovery proceedings to ascertain the joint marital assets which would be pertinent to the determination of a property settlement. Among other things, Noel had Mrs. Greiner list the types of business with which her husband was involved. From this and other factors Noel formed an opinion about the Greiners' net worth which she concluded to be about $350,000 greater than those assets listed by the husband through his counsel. Unable to obtain a sworn statement of what, in fact, were the husband's assets, Noel scheduled him to be deposed and subpoenaed certain related documents for use at that deposition. In response an opposing motion for a protective order was filed upon which the trial court heard evidence and eventually ordered additional discovery. Since this discovery order had not been totally complied with, Noel pursued other sources of information, particularly with regard to purchases made by Mr. Greiner of real estate at allegedly less than fair market value from his wife's father. Meetings were scheduled with accountants and financial statements were prepared. However, the disparity between the alleged assets of the husband was not resolved to the satisfaction of Noel. Accordingly, she was precluded from arranging a satisfactory property settlement between the parties. Subsequently, Mr. Greiner convinced his wife to agree to a settlement drawn up by another attorney not of record. That property settlement apparently based on the husband's allegations of his assets became the one eventually incorporated into the divorce decree entered between the parties and included an agreement that the question of attorney fees for each side would be determined by the trial judge and paid by the husband.
On January 17,1975, Noel petitioned the trial court for an allowance of attorney fees in the amount of $25,000 based largely upon the effort spent in attempting to discover the husband's assets. The trial court heard evidence concerning the propriety of the requested fee and found $12,400 less a certain credit to be owing for services by Noel to Mrs. Greiner. Thus judgment was entered for the wife on her amended complaint for absolute divorce with the separate property settlement made part of the decree while the husband was ordered to pay the wife's attorney fees as assessed. From that order to pay fees Mr. Greiner perfected this appeal.
Appellant as a preliminary matter contends that the trial court erred in refusing to make findings of fact with regard to its assessment of attorney fees. Relying on Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A), the husband argues that upon his request there should have been a finding of facts specially so that it could be determined on what grounds the trial court ruled.
However, the alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining the amount of attorney fees focuses on the weight of evidence and the credibility to be accorded each witness. The narrowness of the issue presented in this context precludes a meaningful basis upon which special findings could have been entered in lieu of the general statement of reasons given by the trial court in its final order. Furthermore, special findings are not required except in the specific class of cases set forth in Trial Rule 52(A), supra, or unless the parties requested them in writing prior to the admission of evidence. Lamb v. Conder (1975), 166 Ind.App. 293, 335 N.E.2d 625. Under such circumstances, the court was not required to make special findings of fact. Weiss v. Weiss (1974), 159 Ind.App. 231, 306 N.E.2d 120.
In substance then the question becomes whether the fees ordered under the circumstances were so excessive as to be unsupported by the evidence and therefore erroneous as a matter of law. In evaluating such a contention this Court is strictly circumscribed to a determination of whether there is any evidence of probative value in support of the result reached by the trial court, since it is only where the evidence is without conflict and can lead to but one conclusion, and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that the decision will be set aside as contrary to law. Pokraka v. Lummus Co. (1952), 230 Ind. 523, 104 N.E.2d 669. Otherwise the often repeated protection accorded the fact finder, that this Court will not weigh evidence on appeal, would become a wavering standard susceptible to abuse and outside the bounds of due process.
In this context it has been held that a trial court's judgment awarding attorney fees in a dissolution action can be reversed on appeal only where a clear abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. Geberin v. Geberin (1977), 172 Ind.App. 255, 360 N.E.2d 41. Moreover, the fact that the same circumstances might justify a different outcome does not permit the substitution of this Court's judgment for that of the trial court. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson (1976), 170 Ind.App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785. Abuse of discretion only occurs when the trial judge made an erroneous conclusion in judgment, a conclusion against logic and effect of facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.
Burkhart v. Burkhart (1976), 169 Ind.App. 588, 349 N.E.2d 707; See, Geberin v. Geberin, supra.
In the case at bar the trial court conducted a full hearing concerning the proper amount of fees to be ordered. Significantly, the evidence heard in addition to that of attorney Noel was conflicting. Several attorneys were called to testify as experts. One called on behalf of Noel testified that based on his experience in Hammond, Indiana, a percentage of the value of the property settlement could be considered as a factor in setting a fee to be charged for a divorce. He stated that this was particularly true where much of the legal work involved ascertaining the amount of property actually owned by the parties despite stiff resistance by the husband. Further, upon consideration of 91 hours of recorded work, in addition to several days in court, and obtaining the outside services of an accountant, a fee of $25,000 would be appropriate.
An attorney from Rensselaer, Indiana, while not having a present practice in Lake County, Indiana, and while qualifying himself as knowing "something about hourly rates" stated generally that $5,000 would be a reasonable fee to charge based upon $40 per hour. He further remarked that such a figure presumed that the final settlement was "actually arranged by the parties themselves" and "almost a split."
Another attorney from Hammond, Indiana, stated that $4,800 was an appropriate fee for the husband to pay based upon an hourly rate, that certain work for a wife in a divorce case should more properly be chargeable to her and that the husband should only be "chargeable with the basic underlying fee and not with any percentage of recovery in the case." In addition, however, he stated, "It is certainly . . . proper for a lawyer to charge a woman in a divorce additional fees over and about what she expects the husband to contribute." Further, "results are . . . important and a lawyer is entitled to be paid by his client an additional bonus... out of and from funds that are created solely through the knowledge, ability and diligence of counsel."
The Hammond Bar fee schedule was admitted over appellant's objection as evidence of a reasonable fee. The schedule would prescribe an additional fee over a certain flat rate of "15% of net value of property recovered, gained or retained" which under the circumstances herein would be $20,650. The husband designates this admission of evidence as error on appeal relying on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975), 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572. However, in the context of the case at bar the Hammond fee schedule could be considered some evidence of what a reasonable fee should be. Casting aspersions on its presumed function in the context of Goldfarb cannot preclude its admission as relevant evidence bearing on the dispute before the trial court. Moreover, any consideration accorded such evidence goes to its weight and not its admissibility.
Thus with the testimony of three expert witnesses in addition to Mrs. Greiner and her attorney and with the evidence of the Hammond Bar fee schedule, the trial court made the following conclusions relative to the award of fees:
"... [A]s to the issue remaining of, the question of awarding attorneys fees, the Court reviews the evidence presented today and according to the evidence only the assets show, of the defendant . . . Three Hundred and Twenty Thousand to Two Hundred and Seventy Thousand----There's also evidence to show that the approximate value of the property settlement agreement of the wife is $135,000. It's also clear that there were complicated financial dealings and the assets of the defendant are not any straightforward holdings. It appears to the Court there's some lack of forthrightness as to the defendant in regard to discovery. Now there's no question that this matter cannot be approached as a simple non-contested divorce; it's been pending for some time and there have been contested issues of discovery, and certainly the issue of attorneys fees is strongly contested by both parties. However, the primary reason we have the situation is that a third attorney not retained, or not of record in this case, prepared a property settlement agreement.
"There's some indication in final argument that perhaps the parties were dissatisfied with the attorneys in this case, and if the parties were dissatisfied with counsel it appears to the Court that the best course would have been to discharge the counsel of record then no issue of anything beyond hourly rate could have been considered in granting reasonable compensation for any services already performed. However, the parties chose to agree and proceed with the counsel of record. Without the agreement, which plaintiff s counsel has testified she recommended against, the plaintiff may have received more by way of a property settlement agreement than a Hundred and Thirty-five Thousand or she may have received less than a Hundred and Thirty-five Thousand if this case had been litigated on that issue. Apparently the only work left to be completed was the final hearing and the financial information and counseling given the plaintiff by her counsel, and I cannot help but believe assisted in the property settlement agreement as well as any counsel that the defendant's attorney may have given him, although . these counsel were not the ones that participated in the property settlement agreement. And when a matter is contested and work is done by counsel over a period of time and the matter is suddently [sic] agreed reasonable attorneys fees cannot be avoided merely by a settlement. Whatever is determined to be a reasonable fee under the law which controls this case, that is Burns 3-1216, the entire amount of such fee is due from the husband.
"Some federal decisions notwithstanding bar schedules are of particular assistance to the Court in those matters where the Court must set a fee, and of course this is not only in domestic relations matters but in estates and even in pauper counsel fees . [T]hey represent a reasonable, what a reasonable fee may be. However, they should be viewed in light of each particular case and the Court has done so in this case. And on the basis of the facts as the Court finds them to be and as presented in evidence, the Court finds a reasonable attorney fee to be Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Dollars which is hereby assessed against the defendant to be reduced by the sum of Four Hundred Dollars previously paid. . . ."
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial court was concerned with the contested issues involving discovery and with the true value of the appellant's assets. Accordingly, in fixing an appropriate fee the trial court did not view the divorce as "simple" and "non-contested," but rather as involving "complicated financial dealings." Furthermore, despite the final form of the property agreement the trial court deemed the wife's retained counsel as having contributed to her overall bargaining position and as having assisted in the ultimate result and final decree reached by Mrs. Greiner. The trial court, in addition, resolved the conflicting advice of the second Hammond attorney by applying the statutory requirement that the husband be responsible for all of the wife's attorney fees including appropriate counseling to the wife's needs notwithstanding a separate settlement agreement.
Nevertheless, appellant places great emphasis on the arbitrariness of the minimum bar fee schedule and attempts to focus on the trial court's improper use thereof. Clearly, however, the evidence does not solely support this conclusion. Instead, the trial court merely commented that these schedules represent what a reasonable fee might be and that they should only be viewed in light of the facts of each particular case.
Furthermore, the bar fee schedule is not the sole reference from which the amount of the property settlement could be relevant as a determinant of fees. The size of the settlement and the total assets available to the parties may relate directly to the difficulty of the legal work involved. More specifically, evidence of difficulty in discovering numerous holdings by Mr. Greiner in various land development projects was evidence from which the trial court could draw a reasonable conclusion that a fee of about half the percentage rate was appropriate.
As this district stated in Geberin v. Geberin (1977), 172 Ind.App. 255, 360 N.E.2d 41, a factor available to a determination of a proper fee derives from the trial judge's personal knowledge of the practice of law and appropriate compensation therefor in the action before him.
"The trial court may take judicial notice of what a reasoanble attorney's fee would be, even absent any evidence in the record. Cox v. Cox (1975), 163 Ind.App. 172, 322 N.E.2d 395; Hibbard v. Hibbard (1974), 161 Ind.App. 422, 315 N.E.2d 731. Facing a situation in which attorney fees for appeal were awarded, the Second District, Indiana Court of Appeals, noted: 'The trial court was familiar with the action, the amount of work which would be required on appeal, and the parties' financial situations.' Wireman v. Wireman (1976), 168 Ind.App. 295, 343 N.E.2d 292, 298."
(172 Ind.App. 262, 360 N.E.2d 44.)
In the case at bar there was conflicting evidence of fees ranging from $25,000 to $4,800 for the work performed. The trial court assessed an attorney fee of $12,400. The presumption in favor of this disposition as correct is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to the considera tion of a case on appeal. Shula v. Shula (1956), 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612. No reason has been given why this presumption is not applicable here nor why this Court should substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Lowdermilk, J., participating by designation, concurs.
Staton, J. dissents with opinion to follow.
. IC 1971, 31-1-22-1 (Burns Code Ed.) was repealed by Acts of 1973, P.L. 297, § 4, p. 1598 effective September 1, 1973.
. Any question raised by the converse situation involving a written request is specifically left undecided.
See, Smith v. Smith et al. (1953), 124 Ind.App. 343, 115 N.E.2d 217.
See also, Wolverton v. Wolverton (1904), 163 Ind. 26, 71 N.E. 123.
. The court in Goldfarb noted at 780 of 421 U.S. and 2010, 95 S.Ct.:
"A purely advisory fee schedule issued to provide guidelines, or an exchange of price information without a showing of an actual restraint on trade, would present us with a different question."
. IC 1971, 31-1-12-11 (Burns Code Ed.) states in pertinent part:
"... And, on decreeing a divorce in favor of the wife or refusing one on the application of the husband, the court shall, by order to be enforced by attachment, require the husband to pay all reasonable expenses of the wife in the prosecution or defense of the petition including a reasonable sum for the services of the attorney representing such wife which sum for attorney fee shall be payable direct to said attorney and the order for same shall be in the name of said attorney, when such divorce has been granted or refused. . . ."
It has since been repealed by Acts 1973, P.L. 297, § 3, which provides:
"That no such repeal shall apply to any action for divorce pending without a final decree on the effective date of this act, but upon the first entry of a final decree for divorce thereon by the trial court, such repeals shall thereafter apply to such pending action."
. Moreover, it should be noted that if the schedule is admissible evidence of a reasonable fee than a fortiori, it serves as a legitimate basis upon which the trial court can render its decision.
. Barelli v. Levin (1969), 144 Ind.App. 576, 247 N.E.2d 847 is of no application when as here no contingency fee was arranged and the fee actually awarded was unrelated to the percentage rate claimed of the property.