Case Name: Michael GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-12-02
Citations: 354 F. App'x 577
Docket Number: No. 08-2121-cv
Parties: Michael GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges, BRIAN M. COGAN, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 354
Pages: 577–579

Head Matter:
Michael GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 08-2121-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Dec. 2, 2009.
Michael Golden, Massapequa, NY, pro se.
Janet L. Zaleon, Senior Corporation Counsel, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges, BRIAN M. COGAN, District Judge.
District Judge Brian M. Cogan of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Golden, pro se, appeals from (1) an award of summary judgment in favor of his employer, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection, on his claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and (2) an order denying his motion for reconsideration. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1. Standards of Review
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). We will uphold a summary judgment award only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We review a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir.1998).
2. FMLA Framework and Claims
The FMLA was enacted to provide, inter alia, "job security for employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary periods." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4). Eligible employees may take leave for up to 12 weeks during any 12-month period. See id. § 2612(a)(1). It is "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA]." Id. § 2615(a)(1). In order to be protected by the FMLA, an employee must provide the employer with appropriate notice of an absence. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c), 825.303(b). In the case of an unforeseeable absence, "an employee should give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave as soon as practicable." Id. § 825.803(a). An employer may require an employee "to comply with the employer's usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave." Id. § 825.302(d).
Plaintiff does not dispute that, with regard to the occasions on which he did not work a full, seven-hour day, he failed to give notice of his intention to take leave, despite being notified in writing of the need to do so. Insofar as Plaintiff argues that he should have been allowed to take paid leave in connection with several full-day absences, we conclude that he failed to provide timely notice of leave for a serious medical condition and has not demonstrated that it was his employer's practice to allow paid leave under the relevant circumstances. See Santos v. Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, 252 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that employer is not required to allow substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave in circumstance that would not otherwise qualify for paid leave).
Plaintiffs claim that his supervisor's alleged harassment discouraged him from submitting leave slips is not supported by the record. Like the district court, we conclude that Golden failed to demonstrate either that he was unable to submit leave requests to administrators other than his direct supervisor or that the supervisor's conduct "would have deterred an employee of ordinary firmness, in a situation similar to his, from requesting or taking FMLA leave." Golden v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 06 Civ. 1587, 2007 WL 4258241, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007).
3. Reconsideration
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion because Plaintiff failed to show "exceptional circumstances" warranting reconsideration of the district court's order. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have considered all of Plaintiffs remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of the district court are AFFIRMED.
. This was the language applicable at the time of the events at issue. The regulation now provides that "an employee must provide notice to the employer as soon as practicable." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (effective Jan. 16, 2009).