Case Name: Michael BARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2013-10-16
Citations: 123 So. 3d 665
Docket Number: No. 4D12-2702
Parties: Michael BARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GROSS, TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 123
Pages: 665–665

Head Matter:
Michael BARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D12-2702.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 16, 2013.
Michael Barrett, Chipley, Pro Se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Michael Barrett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with two claims. The petition was summarily denied. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have treated his petition as a motion filed under Rule 3.800. We agree in part.
The first issue raised in the petition alleged trial court error in the jury instruction. Because this issue could have been raised on appeal, the claim was not cognizable in a postconviction motion. See Waterfield v. State, 1 So.3d 235, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The second issue, however, alleged a discrepancy between the written sentence and the sentence that was orally imposed. In particular, Barrett alleged that the court never orally imposed a habitual felony offender (HFO) designation. Because this type of discrepancy can be challenged in a Rule 3.800(a) motion, we i'everse and remand with direction to treat the claim as such. See State v. Akins, 69 So.3d 261, 268 (Fla.2011) (holding that modification of judgment and sentence to reflect an HFO designation that was not orally pronounced at sentencing violated double jeopardy and constituted an illegal sentence).
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded.
GROSS, TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.