Case Name: Amy L. Roberts et al., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondents, v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., et al., Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2009-10-22
Citations: 13 N.Y.3d 270
Docket Number: 
Parties: Amy L. Roberts et al., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondents, v Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 270–296

Head Matter:
[918 NE2d 900, 890 NYS2d 388]
Amy L. Roberts et al., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondents, v Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., et al., Appellants.
Argued September 10, 2009;
decided October 22, 2009
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York City {JayB. Kasner, Scott D. Musoff, Jonathan Frank and Christopher R. Gette of counsel), and Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP (Sherwin Belkin and Magda Cruz of counsel), for Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P, and another, appellants.
I. The plain language of the Rent Stabilization Law permits luxury deregulation for previously stabilized buildings such as Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town. (Pultz v Economakis, 10 NY3d 542; State of New York v Patricia II., 6 NY3d 160; Jones v Bill, 10 NY3d 550; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; Sarniento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70; In re Princo Corp., 478 F3d 1345; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280; Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86; Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d 42; Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 87 NY2d 325.) II. The Appellate Division erroneously failed to consider that the Legislature’s decision not to modify the deregulation provisions supports the Division of Housing and Community Renewal’s interpretation and dismissal of the complaint. (Matter of Patton Indus. v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 97 AD2d 716; Rent Stabilization Assn, of N.Y. City v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; Matter of Versailles Realty Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 76 NY2d 325; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, A1 NY2d 24; Raffellini v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 196; Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 854 F Supp 151, 83 F3d 45; Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18; Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434; Engle v Talarico, 33 NY2d 237.) III. The Appellate Division’s “policy” concerns are irrelevant and unfounded. (Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98; People ex rel. Jenkins v Piscotti, 52 AD3d 1207; Matter of Mougiannis v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 25 AD3d 230.) IV The decision’s abrupt departure from prior interpretation supports reversal, but in the event the decision is affirmed, any remedy should not be retroactively applied to defendants. (Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97; Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184; Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18; Matter of King v Cuomo, 81 NY2d 247; Matter of Hilton Hotels Corp. v Commissioner of Fin. of City of N.Y., 219 AD2d 470; Busa v Busa, 196 AD2d 267.)
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, New York City (Alan Mansfield, Daniel J. Ansell and Steven Kirkpatrick of counsel), for Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company and another, appellants.
I. The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed. (Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18; Matter of Radich v Council of City of Lackawanna, 93 AD2d 559; Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784, 73 NY2d 995; Matter of Gaines v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 90 NY2d 545; Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn, v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75. NY2d 206; Matter of ATM One, LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 37 AD3d 714; Matter of Ardor Mgt. Corp. v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal of State of N.Y., 104 AD2d 984; Engle v Talarico, 33 NY2d 237; Demette v Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F3d 492; Walsh v Wusinich, 32 AD3d 743.) II. Principles of equity dictate that the Appellate Division’s order, if affirmed, should have only prospective effect. (Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97; Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184; Matter of Hilton Hotels Corp. v Commissioner of Fin. of City of N.Y., 219 AD2d 470; Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451.)
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, New York City {Alexander H. Schmidt, Daniel W. Krasner and Eric B. Levine of counsel), and Bernstein Liebhard LLP {Ronald J. Arañoff Stanley Bernstein and Christian Siebott of counsel) for respondents.
I. The Real Property Tax Law and Rent Stabilization Law require that the complex remain rent stabilized until the owners’ J-51 benefits expire. (Matter of Schmidt v Roberts, 74 NY2d 513; Matter of Agioritis, 52 AD2d 128; Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98; Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199; Walsh v Wusinich, 32 AD3d 743; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 71 NY2d 186; People v Marrero, 71 AD2d 346; Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86; Denza v Independence Plaza Assoc., LLC, 17 Misc 3d 1122[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52106[U]; Matter of Bello v Roswell Park Cancer Inst., 5 NY3d 170.) II. The Appellate Division’s reading of the statute avoids inequitable and unreasonable results. (Long v State of New York, 7 NY3d 269; People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234; People v Kramer, 92 NY2d 529; Milbrandt v Green Refractories Co., 79 NY2d 26; Matter of Ellington Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of New Hempstead, 77 NY2d 114.) III. The Appellate Division properly did not defer to the Division of Housing and Community Renewal on this matter of statutory interpretation. (Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept, of Personnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225; Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn, v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75 NY2d 206; Matter of Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 85 NY2d 480; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; Matter of Madison-Oneida Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v Mills, 4 NY3d 51; Matter of Richardson v Commissioner of N.Y. City Dept, of Social Servs., 88 NY2d 35; Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516; Two Assoc, v Brown, 127 AD2d 173; Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451.) IV The Division of Housing and Community Renewal regulations conflict with the statute. (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Festa v Leshen, 145 AD2d 49; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24.) V. Defendants’ legislative “acquiescence” argument is baseless. (Matter of New York State Assn. of Life Underwriters v New York State Banking Dept., 83 NY2d 353; Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; Rent Stabilization Assn. of N.Y. City v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156; Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn, v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75 NY2d 206; Engle v Talarico, 33 NY2d 237; RKO-Keith-Orpheum Theatres, Inc. v City of New York, 308 NY 493; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 84; Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70; Raffellini v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 196; Matter of Versailles Realty Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 76 NY2d 325.) VI. Defendants’ public policy arguments are impermissible and, in any event, are speculative and unpersuasive. VII. The Appellate Division’s decision should be retroactive. (Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184; United States v Security Industrial Bank, 459 US 70; Kuhn v Fairmont Coal Co., 215 US 349; People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254; Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213; Desist v United States, 394 US 244; Gager v White, 53 NY2d 475; Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97; Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244.)
Legal Aid Society, Harlem Community Law Office, New York City (iSteven Banks and Alan Conner of counsel), for Legal Aid Society, amicus curiae.
I. The Appellate Division’s decision correctly interprets Rent Stabilization Law ([RSL] Administrative Code of City of NY) § 26-504 (c), and its interpretation is in harmony with RSL §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2 (a). (Matter of KSLM-Columhus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; New York City Campaign Fin. Bd. v Ortiz, 38 AD 3d 75; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192; Friedman v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 105; Matter of Briffel v County of Nassau, 31 AD3d 79.) II. The receipt of J-51 tax benefits subjects all apartments to rent stabilization as landlords who receive J-51 tax benefits agree to be governed by rent regulatory statutes. (Denza v Independence Plaza Assoc., LLC, 17 Misc 3d 1122[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51106[U]; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280, 89 NY2d 917; Kent v Bedford Apts. Co., 237 AD2d 140; 546 W. 156th St. HDFC v Smalls, 43 AD3d 7; 12-62 Realty Corp. v Scapula, 2 Misc 3d 132[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50131[U].)
Meister Seelig & Fein LLP, New York City {Stephen B. Meister and Thomas L. Friedman of counsel), for Real Estate Board of New York, amicus curiae.
I. The judicial construction of Rent Stabilization Law (Administrative Code of City of NY) §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2 (a) advanced in the appellate decision contradicts established precedents and will have grave consequences for owners of New York City apartment buildings and their lenders, as well as New York City and state as a whole and therefore must be reversed. II. The Appellate Division’s construction of Rent Stabilization Law §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2 (a) is incorrect.
Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, New York City (David S. Hershey-Webb, William J. Gribben and Ronald S. Languedoc of counsel), for New York State Tenants & Neighbors Coalition, Inc. and another, amici curiae.
I. The Appellate Division correctly determined that the express language of the statute provided that all units for which the owner receives J-51 benefits may not be deregulated, regardless of how or when the units first became rent stabilized. (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept, of Probation, 72 NY2d 662; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280.) II. The legislative history of the Decontrol Law supports the Appellate Division’s construction of the statute. III. The Appellate Division correctly found that the Decontrol Law is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the purpose of the J-51 Law and the rent laws. (518 E. 13th Owner, LLC v Ellis, 22 Misc 3d 446; Matter of Bleecker St. Mgt. Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 284 AD2d 174, 97 NY2d 606; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NYSd 303; Drucker v Mauro, 30 AD3d 37, 7 NY3d 844; Pultz v Economakis, 40 AD3d 24, 10 NY3d 542.) IV Defendants’ misapplication of the Decontrol Law has resulted in a loss of affordable housing. (Jemrock Realty Co. LLC v Krugman, 64 AD3d 290; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 6 AD3d 28, 5 NY3d 303.) V Neither the Division of Housing and Community Renewal’s misinterpretation of the law nor the Department of Housing Preservation and Development’s policies provide a basis to reverse the court below. (Matter of Community Hous. Improvement Program v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 230 AD2d 66; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669; Matter of Dworman v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 359; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451.)
Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Nahins & Goidel, PC., New York City (Robert D. Goldstein, Paul N. Gruber and David B. Cabrera of counsel), for Community Housing Improvement Program, Inc. and another, amici curiae.
I. The construction of the relevant statutes and regulations adopted by the Appellate Division will have severe and unwarranted consequences to all owners of units which had been properly exempted from rent stabilization under the previously unquestioned administrative interpretation upon which the real estate community relied. (Noto v Bedford Apts. Co., 21 AD3d 762.) II. The presence of deregulated apartments in a J-51 building results in lower rents for current rent-stabilized tenants. III. The Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint because the apartments at issue were properly deregulated as a matter of law. (Matter of Prince Wooster Corp. v Tax Commn. of City of NY., 115 Misc 2d 100; Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d 437; Long v State of New York, 7 NY3d 269; Matter of Orens v Novello, 99 NY2d 180; Matter of Dworman v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 359; Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; Noto v Bedford Apts. Co., 21 AD3d 762; Matter of 31171 Owners Corp. v New York City Dept, of Hous. Presero. & Dev., 190 AD2d 441; La Guardia v Cavanaugh, 53 NY2d 67.)
Elizabeth R. Fine, General Counsel, Council of the City of New York, New York City (Lauren G. Axelrod and Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., of counsel), for Maria del Carmen Arroyo and others, amici curiae.
I. The First Department correctly held that the plain language of the Rent Regulation Reform Act makes clear that high rent decontrol does not apply to units in the J-51 program. (Geissal v Moore Medical Corp., 524 US 74; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280; Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653; Matter of Washington Post Co. v New York State Ins. Dept, 61 NY2d 557.) II. Appellants’ argument ignores the legislative history of the Rent Regulation Reform Act, which clearly demonstrates that the Legislature intended to exempt all J-51 units from high rent decontrol. (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v Board of Governors, FRS, 4=12 US 159; People ex rel. Davies v Cowles, 13 NY 350.) III. Appellants’ construction of the Rent Regulation Reform Act is at odds with other provisions of the Real Property Tax Law and Rent Stabilization Law which demonstrate the Legislature’s long-standing intent that all J-51 units remain rent stabilized. (Matter of Seaman, 78 NY2d 451.) IV The City Council intended that J-51 units be rent stabilized, and appellants fall far short of meeting the high standard of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Legislature intended to preempt the City Council. (Matter of Spielvogel v Ford, 1 NY2d 558; Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431; Incorporated Vil. of Nyack v Daytop Vil., 78 NY2d 500; Le Drugstore Etats Unis v New York State Bd. of Pharm., 33 NY2d 298; Matter of Pell v Coveney, 37 NY2d 494; Khrapunskiy v Doar, 49 AD3d 201; State of New York v Green, 96 NY2d 403; 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assoc, v Tyburski, 70 NY2d 325; Paterson v University of State of N.Y., 14 NY2d 432; City of New York v Park S. Assoc., 139 Misc 2d 997.)
Rosenberg & Estis, PC., New York City {Jeffrey Turkel and Nicholas Kamillatos of counsel), for Rent Stabilization Association of NYC, Inc., amicus curiae.
I. Rent Stabilization Law ([RSL] Administrative Code of City of NY) § 26-504 (c) does not apply to apartments that originally became subject to stabilization for reasons other than receiving J-51 benefits, which thereafter received such benefits, and does not bar luxury deregulation under RSL §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2. (Matter of 275 Webster Tenants v Wright, 238 AD2d 143; La Guardia v Cavanaugh, 53 NY2d 67; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; 8200 Realty Corp. v Lindsay, 27 NY2d 124; Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455; Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v State Tax Commn., 80 AD2d 675, 55 NY2d 758; Noto v Bedford Apts. Co., 21 AD3d 762.) II. Rent Stabilization Law ([RSL] Administrative Code of City of NY) §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2 allow apartments like those at Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town to be luxury deregulated, irrespective of how broadly RSL § 26-504 (c) is interpreted. (Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86; Matter of Dutchess County Dept, of Social Servs. v Day, 96 NY2d 149; People v Avilas, Inc., 29 AD3d 764; Matter of Lupoli, 275 AD2d 44, 99 NY2d 503; Matter of Prospect v Cohalan, 109 AD2d 210, 65 NY2d 867; New York State Crime Victims Bd. v T.J.M. Prods., 265 AD2d 38; People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192; Matter of Francois v Dolan, 95 NY2d 33; Erie County Water Auth. v Kramer, 4 AD2d 545, 5 NY2d 954.) III. The Appellate Division, when construing Rent Stabilization Law ([RSL] Administrative Code of City of NY) §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2, failed to take into account the rent regulatory community’s long-term practical construction of those provisions. (Rent Stabilization Assn, of NY. City v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156; Department of Fin. of City of NY. v New York Tel. Co., 262 AD2d 96; Matter of Kolb v Holling, 285 NY 104; Matter of Lockport Union-Sun & Journal v Preisch, 8 NY2d 54; Household Fin. Corp. v Goldring, 263 App Div 524, 289 NY 574; City of New York v New York City Ry. Co., 193 NY 543; Matter of Niagara Falls Urban Renewal Agency v O’Hara, 57 AD2d 471.) IV Adopting the tenants’ position would grant a windfall to undeserving tenants, and would adversely affect owners, lenders and the city’s housing stock. (Kraebel v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 959 F2d 395; Matter of 31171 Owners Corp. v New York City Dept, of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 190 AD2d 441.)
Jimmy Yan, General Counsel, Office of the Manhattan Borough President, New York City, for Office of the Manhattan Borough President, amicus curiae.
I. The Appellate Division correctly held that the high rent decontrol statute does not apply to units in the J-51 program. (Demette v Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F3d 492; Reid v Covert, 354 US 1; Pacific Gas Transmission Co. v Richardson’s Recreational Ranch, Ltd., 9 F3d 1394; Housing Auth. of Kaw Tribe of Indians of Okla. v City of Ponca City, 952 F2d 1183; Ramirez de Arellano v Weinberger, 745 F2d 1500; Dettmers v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 430 F2d 1019; Anderson v McKay, 211 F2d 798; Barton v Smith, 162 F2d 330; Jay v Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 150 F2d 247; Dunlap v Kansas, Dept, of Health & Envt., 211 F Supp 2d 1334.) II. The Appellate Division’s decision should be affirmed and applied retroactively to defendants and other landlords who have improperly deregulated apartment units while receiving J-51 benefits. (Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184; Gager v White, 53 NY2d 475; Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97; People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Pachter v Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 NY3d 609; Radec Corp. v KMart Corp., 251 AD2d 1003; Matter of Taihem F., 222 AD2d 322; James v Liberty Lines, 97 AD2d 749; Matter of Bleecker St. Mgt. Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 284 AD2d 174.) III. Defendants’ assertions of extreme economic impact are speculative and without merit. IV Defendants’ interpretation of the luxury decontrol statutes deprives New York City of the benefit of its bargain, undermining the public policy of strictly construing tax benefits to private parties at the expense of the taxpaying public. (Matter of 31171 Owners Corp. v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 190 AD2d 441; Matter of City of Lackawanna v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment of State of N.Y., 16 NY2d 222; Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434.)
Harvey Epstein, New York City, for Urban Justice Center, amicus curiae.
I. Allowing the premature deregulation of J-51 units directly conflicts with the purpose of the Rent Stabilization Law and will have devastating impacts on New York City’s tenants and its housing supply. (Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18; 245 Realty Assoc, v Sussis, 243 AD2d 29.) II. The Appellate Division correctly interprets Rent Stabilization Law ([RSL] Administrative Code of City of NY) §§ 26-504.1 and 26-504.2 (a) to preclude beneficiaries of the J-51 program from using the RSL’s “high rent” or “high income” exclusions to deregulate their rent-stabilized apartments. (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451; Matter of Belmonte v Snashall, 2 NY3d 560; Matter of Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v New York State Tax Commn., 72 NY2d 166; Matter of Dworman v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 359; Long v State of New York, 7 NY3d 269; People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280; Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455; Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205; Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98.)
Collins Dobkin & Miller, LLP, New York City (Seth A. Miller of counsel), for Mitchell-Lama Residents Coalition, amicus curiae.
The language exempting J-51 assisted apartments from deregulation is designed to harmonize with the requirement of the J-51 program that every J-51 assisted apartment remain regulated throughout the benefits period. (La Guardia v Cavanaugh, 53 NY2d 67; Pultz v Economakis, 10 NY3d 542; Demette v Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F3d 492; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 71 NY2d 186; Davis v Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 US 803; Matter of Lower Manhattan Loft Tenants v New York City Loft Bd., 66 NY2d 298; Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303; Matter of Sack v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 250 AD2d 537; State of New York v Fashion Place Assoc., 224 AD2d 280; East W. Renovating Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 16 AD3d 166.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
In this lawsuit, nine plaintiff tenants of Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town, two adjoining Manhattan apartment complexes comprising 110 buildings and occupying roughly 80 acres between 14th and 23rd Streets along the East River (the properties or the apartment complexes) contend that defendants Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P, and PCV ST Owner LP (collectively, PCV/ST), and Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company and Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company (collectively, MetLife), the current and former owners of the properties, respectively, were not entitled to take advantage of the luxury decontrol provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) while simultaneously receiving tax incentive benefits under the City of New York's J-51 program. We agree.
I.
In New York City, multiple dwellings may qualify for tax incentives designed to encourage rehabilitation and improvements (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 11-243 [previously § J51-2.5]). Specifically, the City's J-51 program, authorized by Real Property Tax Law § 489, allows property owners who complete eligible projects to receive tax exemptions and/or abatements that continue for a period of years. Eligible projects include moderate and gut rehabilitations; major capital improvements (for example, asbestos abatement or boiler replacement); and conversions of lofts and other nonresidential buildings into multiple dwellings (see Administrative Code § 11-243 [b] [2], [3], [8]; 28 RCNY 5-03 [a]). Rental units in buildings receiving these exemptions and/or abatements must be registered with the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), and are generally subject to rent stabilization for at least as long as the J-51 benefits are in force (see 28 RCNY 5-03 [f|). The Department of Housing Preservation and Development administers the J-51 program in the City of New York.
MetLife apparently first applied for and received J-51 benefits for the properties in 1992. At the time, the apartment complexes, which MetLife built in the 1940s, had already been rent-stabilized since at least 1974.
In 1993, the Legislature enacted the Rent Regulation Reform Act (RRRA) (L 1993, ch 253), which provided for the luxury decontrol or deregulation of certain rent-stabilized apartments. The RRRA identified two circumstances in which deregulation was warranted: (1) in vacant apartments where the legal regulated rent was $2,000 per month or more; and (2) in occupied apartments where the legal regulated rent was $2,000 per month or more and the combined annual income of all occupants exceeded $250,000 per year (RSL [Administrative Code] § 26-504.1, 26-504.2). The RRRA carved out an exception to luxury decontrol, which stated: "this exclusion [i.e., luxury decontrol] shall not apply to housing accommodations which became or become subject to this law [i.e., the RSL] (a) by virtue of receiving tax benefits pursuant to section . . . four hundred eighty-nine of the real property tax law [J-51 benefits]" (RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2 [a]). The Legislature subsequently expanded the scope of luxury decontrol by lowering the income threshold for defining high-income households to $175,000 and allowing postvacancy improvements to count toward the $2,000 per month rent threshold (L 1997, ch 116); and permitting deregulated units to remain deregulated even if an owner subsequently charges less than the $2,000 per month threshold (L 2003, ch 82).
On January 16, 1996—prior to the 1997 amendments to the RRRA—DHCR issued an advisory opinion, which stated that participation in the J-51 program only precluded luxury decontrol "where the receipt of such benefits is the sole reason for the accommodation being subject to rent regulation" (emphasis added). On its face, the DHCR advisory opinion relies exclusively on a textual interpretation of the RRRA's relevant provisions. Further, DHCR took the position that
"where Luxury Decontrol is applied before the 'J-51' tax benefit period has expired, the abatement should be reduced proportionately. That the Legislature recognized the inherent inequity of an owner's continuing to enjoy tax benefits after decontrol is apparent from RPTL Section 489 7 (b) (1), which provides that as to . . . [']any multiple dwelling, building or structure which is decontrolled subsequent to the granting of such benefits, the local legislative body or other governing agency may withdraw such benefits from such dwelling.' "
In April 2000, DHCR proposed changes to the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) in order to "conform regulations to statutes, particularly the RRRAs of 1993 and 1997, judicial determinations and . . . agency practice" (22 NY Reg [issue 14], Apr. 5, 2000, at 17). After public hearing and comment, DHCR adopted these changes, which became effective on December 20, 2000 (see 22 NY Reg [issue 51], Dec. 20, 2000, at 18-20 [notice of adoption]). As relevant to this appeal, DHCR amended section 2520.11 of the RSC, titled "Applicability," to provide that
"[luxury decontrol] shall not apply to housing accommodations which became or become subject to the RSL and this Code:
"(i) solely by virtue of the receipt of tax benefits pursuant to . . . section 11-243 (formerly J51-2.5) or section 11-244 (formerly J51-5) of the Administrative Code of the city of New York, as amended" (RSC [9 NYCRR] § 2520.11 [r] [5]; [s] [2] [emphasis added]).
And in February 2004, DHCR issued (and subsequently reissued in January 2007) Fact Sheet 36, entitled "High-Rent Vacancy Decontrol and High-Rent High-income Decontrol," which similarly specified that "[a]partments that are subject to rent regulation only because of the receipt [of J-51 benefits] do not qualify for high-rent vacancy decontrol" (emphasis added).
At some point after the RRRA was enacted, MetLife, with DHCR's approval (see RSL § 26-504.3 [b]), began charging market-rate rents for those rental units in the properties where the conditions for high rent/high income luxury decontrol were met. In late 2006, MetLife sold the properties to PCV/ST for $5.4 billion.
Months after the sale, plaintiffs—nine individuals who reside in seven apartments in the apartment complex—sued MetLife and PCV/ST on behalf of a putative class of all current and former tenants who allegedly were, or will be, charged rents that exceed rent stabilization levels for any period during which the landlord receives real estate tax benefits under the J-51 program. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that "in or about 2001 or 2002, and continuing through the present time," defendants have "improperly and unlawfully charged thousands of tenants market rents, even as [defendants] have collected . . . tax benefits under the J-51 program," amounting to "nearly $25 million"; they alleged that about one quarter of the 11,200 apartments in the apartment complex had been luxury decontrolled. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that units in the properties would remain rent-stabilized "until the last applicable J-51 tax benefits period . . . has expired [in or about 2017 or 2018]," and that defendants would "comply with all appropriate legal requirements to deregulate the units." Plaintiffs also sought relief in the form of rental overcharges totaling $215 million and attorneys' fees.
PCV/ST and MetLife moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, arguing that the RRRA's exception to deregulation for apartments that "became or become" subject to the RSL "by virtue of' receiving J-51 tax benefits did not apply to the properties because they did not "become subject to" the RSL "by virtue" of the receipt of J-51 tax benefits. Rather, the apartment complex "became subject to rent stabilization in or prior to 1974," nearly two decades before MetLife first received J-51 benefits.
In a decision dated August 16, 2007, Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that "the clear and unambiguous language of the RSL states that the luxury decontrol 'exclusion shall not apply to housing accommodations which became or become subject to this law (a) by virtue of receiving [J-51] tax benefits' " (2007 NY Slip Op 32639, *10, quoting RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2 [a]). Because the properties became subject to the RSL "18 years before applying for J-51 tax benefits," the court concluded that "defendants did not become subject to rent stabilization by virtue of receiving" these benefits (id. at *11).
Supreme Court further noted that this interpretation, adopted by DHCR, was consistent with the luxury decontrol laws, which were intended to "restore some rationality to a system which provides the bulk of its benefits to high income tenants" (id., quoting Noto v Bedford Apts. Co., 21 AD3d 762, 765 [1st Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]); that DHCR's interpretation of the statute, if not unreasonable or irrational, was entitled to deference; and that the Legislature's failure to amend the RSL in response to DHCR's interpretation when subsequently amending the luxury decontrol provisions showed that it acquiesced in this construction. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed Supreme Court's decision and order, and reinstated the complaint. The court concluded that building owners who receive J-51 benefits forfeit their rights under the luxury decontrol provisions even if their buildings were already subject to the RSL. According to the Appellate Division, the words "by virtue of' did not confine the exclusion from luxury deregulation to buildings that became subject to the RSL only because they received J-51 benefits; DHCR's interpretation of this provision was not entitled to deference because a pure issue of statutory reading and analysis was involved; if the Legislature had intended the provision to mean "solely by virtue of," as DHCR concluded, it would have used the word "solely"; its interpretation was "more consistent with the overall statutory scheme," which made no overt distinction between properties "subject to" the RSL solely as a result of the owner's receipt of J-51 benefits and those "subject to" the RSL before receiving such benefits; and Supreme Court's reading "invite[d] absurd and irrational results" (Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P, 62 AD3d 71, 83 [1st Dept 2009]).
The Appellate Division subsequently granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal, certifying the following question: "Was the order of this Court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?" For the reasons that follow, we answer affirmatively.
II.
PCV/ST and MetLife argue principally that the relevant exception to luxury decontrol applies only to accommodations that "became or become" subject to the RSL "by virtue of receiving tax benefits pursuant to section . . . four hundred eighty-nine of the real property Tax Law [J-51 benefits]" (RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2 [a]). And since the word "become" means to "pass from a previous state or condition" or to "take on a new role, essence, or nature" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 195 [1963]), a rental unit can "become" subject to the RSL only when it passes from being unregulated to being regulated—i.e., when its status changes on account of the owner's receipt of J-51 benefits. By contrast, a rental unit does not "become" subject to the RSL by virtue of receiving J-51 benefits if it was already subject to rent stabilization. According to PCV/ST and MetLife, if the Legislature had intended to preclude luxury deregulation for all rent-stabilized apartments receiving J-51 benefits, it would have omitted the phrases "became or become" and "by virtue of' from the statute, and simply written that the exception did not apply to accommodations "receiving" such tax benefits. They note that the Legislature used this latter phraseology in RSL § 26-504 (c) (referring to "Dwelling units in a building or structure receiving the benefits of [J-51]").
III.
PCV/ST and MetLife emphasize that since 1996 DHCR—the state agency entrusted with administering rent stabilization— has interpreted the luxury decontrol provisions in the manner they advocate. This is not, however, entirely correct; DHCR's interpretation and the one PCV/ST and MetLife now offer are different. DHCR has interpreted "by virtue of' to mean "solely by virtue of," while PCV/ST and MetLife rely on the "became or become" language of the statute. The two interpretations would lead to the same result in this case, but not in every case. For example, under DHCR's interpretation, a building that first became subject to the RSL due to receipt of J-51 benefits—but is also subject to the provisions of the RSL for some other reason (see RSL § 26-504)—would be subject to luxury decontrol because it would not be stabilized "solely" because of J-51 benefits. On the other hand, under the argument made by PCV/ST and MetLife, the same building would be exempt from luxury decontrol because it "became" subject to stabilization when the first triggering event—receipt of the J-51 benefits— occurred.
It is understandable that PCV/ST and MetLife prefer not to defend DHCR's reading, because it is contrary to the plain text of the statute. "By virtue of' and "solely by virtue of' simply do not mean the same thing. Nor do we owe deference to DH-CR's reading, for this appeal does not call upon us to interpret a statute where "specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or . . .an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom" is at stake such that we should "defer to the administrative agency's interpretation unless irrational or unreasonable" (Matter of KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 NY3d 303, 312 [2005], quoting Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Rather, where
"the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency and its interpretive regulations . . . And, of course, if the regulation runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision, it should not be accorded any weight" (Kurcsics, 49 NY2d at 459).
When construing a statute, we seek to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent (Carney v Philippone, 1 NY3d 333, 339 [2004]), and the starting point for accomplishing this is the statute's language (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006]). If the language is ambiguous, we may examine the statute's legislative history (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent School Dist, 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]).
Here, we conclude that defendants' interpretation of the exception to luxury decontrol for units that "became or become" subject to rent stabilization "by virtue of receiving" J-51 benefits conflicts with the most natural reading of the statute's language. Defendants essentially read these words as recognizing two categories of J-51-benefítted buildings—those, like the properties, that were rent-stabilized prior to receiving J-51 benefits, for which luxury decontrol became available in 1993; and those that only became rent-stabilized as a condition of receiving J-51 benefits, for which luxury decontrol is unavailable (at least during the benefit period). But there is no language anywhere in the statute delineating these two supposed categories, and we see no indication that the Legislature ever intended such a distinction—one that never occurred to anyone, so far as this record shows, until after the present lawsuit was brought. Contrary to PCV/ST's and MetLife's argument, there is nothing impossible, or even strained, about reading the verb "become" to refer to achieving, for a second time, a status already attained.
Even assuming that the reading given to "became or become" by PCV/ST and MetLife is a possible one, the RRRA's legislative history better supports our interpretation of the statute. The RRRA's sponsor stated that luxury decontrol was unavailable to building owners who "enjoy[ed] another system of general public assistance" such as J-51 benefits (NY Senate Debate on Assembly Bill A8859, July 7, 1993, at 8214). Although the dissent accuses us of "pluck[ing] a snippet" of the sponsor's words to support our conclusion (dissenting op at 291), in response to a question posed by a colleague exploring the very issue presented here, he said that
"should the exemptions contained in section 489 end, that's—those J.51s and 489s end, then they would be subject so that at no point do you have the [luxury] decontrol provisions applying to the buildings which have received the tax exemptions that I just mentioned" (Senate Debate at 8214).
The dissent's attempt to selectively highlight portions of the question does not diminish the force of the sponsor's answer, which plainly indicates that "at no point" would the luxury decontrol provisions apply to buildings which "received" tax exemptions being discussed, including J-51 benefits. Certainly it cannot be argued that the thrust of that statement indicates otherwise.
Nor will we infer, as defendants suggest, that the Legislature's inactivity in the face of DHCR's interpretation of the statute constitutes its acquiescence thereto. Legislative inactivity is inherently ambiguous and " 'affords the most dubious foundation for drawing positive inferences' " (Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185, 190-191 [1985], quoting United States v Price, 361 US 304, 310-311 [I960]). It is true that, where the practical construction of a statute is well known, the Legislature may be charged with knowledge of that construction and its failure to act may be deemed an acceptance (Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 84, 90 [1976]). However, at the time the Legislature most recently considered the statute, there is no indication that the specific question presented here—that DHCR's interpretation is improper and conflicts with the plain language of the statute—had been brought to the Legislature's attention (see Kurcsics, 49 NY2d at 459 n 4).
IV
Defendants predict dire financial consequences from our ruling, for themselves and the New York City real estate industry generally. These predictions may not come true; they depend, among other things, on issues yet to be decided, including retroactivity, class certification, the statute of limitations, and other defenses that may be applicable to particular tenants. If the statute imposes unacceptable burdens, defendants' remedy is to seek legislative relief. Moreover, the dissent predicts that our decision will cause "years of litigation over many novel questions to deal with the fallout from today's decision" (dissenting op at 295). That the courts and litigants may experience some additional burden, however, is no reason to eschew what we view as the only correct interpretation of the statute (cf. Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 237 [1988]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.
. The RSL is codified at Administrative Code of City of NY § 26-501 to 26-520.
. PCV/ST and MetLife also suggest that if we affirm the Appellate Division's decision and order, we should apply the statute prospectively rather than retroactively because they reasonably relied on DHCR's unambiguous and long-standing interpretation of the RSL's luxury decontrol provisions. Because the lower courts did not consider this issue—as defendants acknowledge—we do not consider it at this time.