Case Name: ADAMS v. THE GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-02-06
Citations: 81 Mich. App. 91
Docket Number: Docket No. 27709
Parties: ADAMS v THE GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY
Judges: Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and Bashara and P. R. Mahinske, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 81
Pages: 91–98

Head Matter:
ADAMS v THE GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY
Opinion op the Court
1. Workmen’s Compensation — Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation — Jurisdiction—Statutes.
A dispute or controversy within the meaning of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act is a jurisdictional element and its existence at the time a claim is properly filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau vests the bureau with jurisdiction over the claim which cannot be unilaterally divested by either party to the dispute (MCLA 418.847; MSA 17.237[847]).
2. Action — Forum—Jurisdiction—Voluntary Dismissals — Adversary Proceedings — Resolution of Controversies.
Restrictions upon voluntary dismissals require that a forum with jurisdiction over a controversy be permitted to proceed to a final resolution and that resolution may derive from a full adversary proceeding on the merits, stipulation by the parties to a determination, or summary resolution where a party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, but whatever mode is employed, the purpose, which is a final resolution of the controversy, is the same (GCR 1963, 504.1).
3. Action — Forum—Jurisdiction.
The forum must be permitted to render an ultimate resolution, once an adjudicatory proceeding has properly commenced.
4. Workmen’s Compensation — Employers—Referee’s Authority— Final Orders — Parties’ Rights.
An employer cannot, by an agreement to pay worker’s compensation, divest the hearing referee of authority to render a final order settling the rights of the parties.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 5-8, 10, 11] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 399, 472, 545.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 459-468.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 472, 545.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 459-468, 540.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 613-616, 630-637.
Concurrence by P. R. Mahinske, J.
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Employers—Voluntary Payment of Benefits — Dispute or Controversy — Parties’ Rights.
A dispute or controversy within the meaning of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act exists even though an employer offers to begin voluntary payment of compensation beneñts where all of the worker’s proofs have been submitted and where there still is a genuine dispute between the parties regarding rate of compensation and date of injury.
6. Workmen’s Compensation — Dispute or Controversy — Determination of Rights — Statutes.
The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act clearly indicates that any dispute or controversy can be submitted for a determination of rights (MCLA 418.841, 418.847; MSA 17.237[841], 17.237[847j).
7. Workmen’s Compensation — Employers—Voluntary Payment of Benefits — Determination of Rights — Statutes.
The simple expedient of voluntary payment of compensation beneñts by an employer determines nothing in the absence of an admission or stipulation as to all the conditions of liability; neither the payment of compensation nor the accepting of the same by an employee or his dependents shall be considered as a determination of the rights of the parties under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (MCLA 418.831; MSA 17.237[831j).
8. Workmen’s Compensation — Employers—Voluntary Payment of Benefits — Determination of Rights.
The payment of workmen’s compensation by an employer under an award, order, or proper stipulation determines the rights of the parties and such compensation cannot be discontinued or reduced without a further order or award.
9. Workmen’s Compensation — Appeal and Error — Appeal Board —Finding of Fact.
The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board is the ñnal fact ñnder in the cases before it, but if the board interprets the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act erroneously in reaching its decision appellate courts have the duty and authority to correct any such erroneous construction.
10. Workmen’s Compensation — Employees—Workers’ Disability Compensation Act — Compensation Proceedings — Voluntary Payment of Benefits.
Neither the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act nor the gen eral court rules contain any express provision which would allow an employer to unilaterally force an end to proceedings by offering voluntarily to pay compensation beneñts; furthermore, such an offer does not deny a claimant the right to proceed further to have the rights of the parties determined.
11. Workmen’s Compensation — Due Process Hearings — Bureau of Compensation — Overload of Litigation.
Due process requires that a workmen’s compensation plaintiff is entitled to a full and impartial determination of his claim even though voluntary payments of beneñts are offered by an employer.
Appeal from Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.
Submitted June 21, 1977, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 27709.)
Decided February 6, 1978.
Claim by Kermie Adams against The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company for workmen’s compensation. Benefits granted. Defendant appealed to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, which reversed the referee’s decision and award of benefits. Plaintiff appeals by leave granted.
Reversed.
Ripple & Chambers, P. C. (by Sanford L. Steiner), for plaintiff.
Lacey & Jones (by John L. Salter), for defendant.
Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and Bashara and P. R. Mahinske, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
The pertinent facts of this case are delineated in Judge Mahinske's concurring opinion. We conclude that procedural policy mandates reversal of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board determination and reinstatement of the referee's order.
Whether a dispute or controversy persists after an employer agrees to make voluntary payments, is an issue that exceeds the scope of inquiry required for the resolution of this case. A dispute or controversy within the meaning of MCLA 418.847; MSA 17.237(847) is a jurisdictional element. Its existence at the time a claim is properly filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau vests the bureau with jurisdiction over the claim. That jurisdiction cannot be unilaterally divested by either party to the dispute.
Policy considerations congruent to those underlying the restrictions upon voluntary dismissals embodied in GCR 1963, 504.1, require that a forum with jurisdiction over a controversy be permitted to proceed to a final resolution. See, e.g., African Methodist Episcopal Church v Shoulders, 38 Mich App 210; 196 NW2d 16 (1972). That resolution may derive from a full adversary proceeding on the merits, stipulation by the parties to a determination, or summary resolution where a party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Whatever mode is employed, the purpose is the same — a final resolution of the controversy.
A contrary result would leave the litigants susceptible to multiple commencements and terminations of the same proceedings depending upon the vagaries of an opponent inclined to frustrate final resolution of the case. The adverse consequences to the administration of justice are evident. Therefore, once an adjudicatory proceeding has properly commenced, the forum must be permitted to render an ultimate resolution.
In the case under review, the proceedings were commenced by plaintiff to determine his disputed right to compensation payments from defendant. Defendant cannot, by an agreement to pay com pensation, divest the referee of authority to render a final order settling the rights of the parties.
Reversed, and the order of the referee is reinstated. Costs to plaintiff.
D. C. Riley, P. J., concurred.