Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Cleo D. LeCROY and Jon M. LeCroy, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-07-27
Citations: 435 So. 2d 354
Docket Number: No. 82-60
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Cleo D. LeCROY and Jon M. LeCroy, Appellees.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 435
Pages: 354–363

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Cleo D. LeCROY and Jon M. LeCroy, Appellees.
No. 82-60.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 27, 1983.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Stewart J. Bellus and Marlyn Altman, Asst. At-tys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James L. Eisenberg of Green, Eisenberg & Cohen, West Palm Beach, for appellee— Cleo D. LeCroy.
Michael Dubiner of Dubiner & Blumberg, West Palm Beach, for appellee — Jon M. Le-Croy.

Opinion:
HERSEY, Judge.
The state appeals from an order which determined several pretrial motions adversely to the prosecution. Our recitation of facts will be limited to those essential to a review of the pertinent holdings of the trial court.
Appellees were indicted on five counts, three of which are material here.
Counts THREE and FOUR of the indictment, alleging robbery, were dismissed for failure "to allege the essential element of an intent to permanently deprive . the respective owners of their property stolen therein."
Those counts provide:
COUNT THREE
The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their oaths do present that CLEO DOUGLAS Le-CROY and JON MICHELE LeCROY on the 4th day of JANUARY, 1981, in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, unlawfully by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, did feloniously rob, steal and take away from the person or custody of another, to-wit: JOHN HARDEMAN, III, a 30.06 rifle and a wallet with good and lawful currency of the United States of America in denominations to the State Attorney unknown of the value of more than one hundred dollars, and in the course of committing the robbery was armed with a certain firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun, contrary to Florida Statute 812.-13(2)(a),
COUNT FOUR
The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their oaths do present that CLEO DOUGLAS Le-CROY and JON MICHELE LeCROY on the 4th day of JANUARY, 1981, in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, unlawfully by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, did feloniously rob, steal and take away from the person or custody of another, to-wit: GAIL HARDEMAN, a .38 caliber revolver of a value of more than one hundred dollars, and in the course of committing the rob bery was armed with a certain firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun, contrary to Florida Statute 812.13(2)(a),
The "intent to deprive." is an essential element of the crime of robbery. Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 979 (Fla.1981). While the counts in question do not contain the specific language "with the intent to deprive" they do contain an allegation that the property was taken "unlawfully by force," and that appellees did "feloniously rob, steal and take away" the items in question. These terms are sufficient to apprise appel-lees of the nature of the crimes of which they are accused and are clearly not "so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(o). See Fountain v. State, 92 Fla. 262, 109 So. 463 (1926). "Indictments and informations should be upheld if they are in substantial compliance with the law." State v. Barnett, 344 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Accordingly, we hold that it was error to dismiss these counts of the indictment.
Count V was also dismissed; however, we find no error in that aspect of the order and therefore affirm in that respect.
Various defense motions to suppress statements and other evidence were considered by the trial court. As a result, five statements, two of Cleo Douglas LeCroy's and three of Jon Michele LeCroy's, were suppressed. If the sole test to be applied in appraising the voluntariness of these statements was the traditional one of whether the statements were in fact given voluntarily and without coercion or inducement, we would find them admissible. It is not enough, however, for the state to meet the challenge of factual voluntariness. In addition to being voluntary in fact, the statements must also have been legally voluntary; that is, the Miranda criteria must be met. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
As to both appellees, the Miranda warnings were read on more than one occasion. As to each, however, the following statement was also read (apparently under a police procedure for questioning a disinterested witness rather than the criminally accused):
This statement is taken primarily in' order to refresh your memory at the time you may be called upon to testify, if and when this matter goes to court.
We have previously affirmed a conviction in a case involving similar language where the trial court found the statement voluntary in spite of this language. Knowles v. State, 407 So.2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (per curiam affirmed. Anstead, J., concurs specially with opinion). The trial court here came to a different conclusion and suppressed the statements. The first and primary requirement of Miranda is:
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it — the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. [Emphasis added.]
384 U.S. at 467-468, 86 S.Ct. at 1624.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system — that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625.
The Miranda court was careful to point out that dilution of the warnings would not be tolerated. The opinion continues:
Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.
There can be no doubt that telling an individual during custodial interrogation that his statement is being taken primarily for the purpose of refreshing his recollection is a dilution of the Miranda warning and we hereby hold that it is a fatal one. We have little doubt that the statements would have been given without the prodding of this deception, but it is not a legitimate judicial function to permit speculation to stand as a substitute for constitutional rights. We, therefore, affirm suppression of the statements.
An additional impediment regarding the statements attributed to Jon LeCroy would have been rendered moot by our determination of the voluntariness issue except for the fact that it permeates another facet of the investigation; that is, the recovery of certain firearms. During the course of a car ride to Miami to recover these firearms, Jon LeCroy, who had been giving directions to the two detectives who accompanied him, asked for an attorney. At that point interrogation purportedly ceased; however, one of the detectives admitted that he continued to ask appellee for directions. Consequently, they arrived at a particular house in Miami and recovered the weapons. Miranda expressly prohibits such conduct.
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.
384 U.S. at 474-475, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628. We, therefore, affirm suppression of the firearms recovered on that occasion. We also affirm suppression of the 38 caliber pistol as recovered under circumstances clearly activating the "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
On this issue we offer a word in answer to the dissenting opinion: The purpose of the "inevitable discovery exception" to the exclusionary rule is to protect evidence obtained illegally where a concurrent legal investigation would assuredly have procured the identical evidence. Thus,
[t]he exclusionary rule does not come into play merely because the proffered evidence is in fact the product of an illegal act. If . the illegal act merely contributed to the discovery of the allegedly tainted information and . such information would have been acquired lawfully even if the illegal act had never transpired, the presumptive taint is removed, and the apparently poisoned fruit is made whole. In other words, if . the illegal act was not an indispensable cause of the discovery of the proffered evidence, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit — The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J.Crim.L., Criminology, and Police Sci. 307, 313 (1964).
In the instant case, while it is possible that the police could eventually have found the guns there is no evidentiary indication that they would have done so. Elliot's name was obtained only through the "involuntary" confession of Cleo and the location of the .38 caliber pistol was shown by Jon only subsequent to his request for an attorney. Application of the inevitable discovery exception to these situations is simply too attenuated. There was no showing here that when the illegality occurred the police possessed or were actively pursuing other evidence or leads which would have led to the discovery of the challenged evidence and that there was a reasonable probability that such evidence would have thereby been discovered as required under United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.1980).
In summary, we reverse the dismissal of Counts THREE and FOUR of the indictment. In all other respects we affirm the extraordinarily complete and lucid order of the trial court.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
ANDREWS, ROBERT LANCE, Associate Judge, dissents in part with opinion.