Case Name: FORSYTH v. CITY OF OSWEGO
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-07-12
Citations: 99 N.Y.S. 1022
Docket Number: 
Parties: FORSYTH v. CITY OF OSWEGO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 99
Pages: 1022–1026

Head Matter:
FORSYTH v. CITY OF OSWEGO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 12, 1906.)
1. Municipal Corporations—Defective Street’s—Injuries to Travelers— Notice—Service—Time.
Where plaintiff was rendered mentally incompetent by an injury sustained by defect in one of defendant’s streets, and he served notice of his injuries within three months after his mental incapacity was removed, the notice was served in time, within Oswego City Charter, § 345, requiring notice of claim within three months after the injury.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 36, Cent. Dig. Municipal Corporations, §§ 1697, 1706.]
2. Same—Defects—Waiver.
Where, after service of a notice of plaintiff’s injury by a defect in a city street, the city caused plaintiff to appear before its committee on claims where he was fully examined, and at such examination the exact location of the accident and the precise time when it occurred were fully disclosed, and all the circumstances attending the same were given, the city thereby waived its right to object to the notice because it did not state the’date or time of the accident, as required by Oswego City Charter, § 345.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 36, Cent. Dig. Municipal Corporations, § 1700.]
Spring and Kruse, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Oswego County.
Action by Joseph Forsyth against the city of Oswego. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $225.51 damages and costs, and from an, order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, made on the minutes of the court, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The action was commenced on the 29th day of August, 1903, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff by being thrown from a wagon while riding on one of defendant’s streets on the evening of December 24, 1902,. alleged to have been caused solely through the negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff filed a verified notice and claim for damages On the 11th day of May, 1903. The defendant claims that the plaintiff’s failure to file such notice and claim within three months after the accident occurred, as required by section 345 of the charter of the city of Oswego, is a bar to any recovery in this action. The action is for negligence, and is brought to recover damages by the plaintiff for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him on the night of December 24, 1902, while driving along East Ninth and a Half street in the city of Oswego by being thrown from the wagon owing to the defective condition of the street, the particualr defect being a large bowlder, whereby the street was made dangerous, and permitted to remain in that condition by the defendant for so long a time and under such circumstances as to make the defendant guilty of negligence, which is controverted by the defendant; and it is further contended on its behalf that the notice required under the charter of the city was not given to it, or the effect of the failure so to do avoided, and so the action is barred under the provisions of the charter, to which attention will be called later. The action has been tried twice. The first trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $550. An appeal having been taken by the defendant, the judgment entered upon that verdict was reversed, and a new trial ordered, upon the ground that there had been no, substantial compliance by the plaintiff with the provisions of the charter which required the service of notice of claim. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff of $200, and, a judgment being entered thereon, the defendant again appeals therefrom, and urges the same objections as upon the former appeal. Case is reported on first appeal in 107 App'. Div. 187, 95 N. Y. Supp. 33.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, NASH, and KRUSE, JJ.
John Tiernan, Corp. Counsel, for appellant.
F. T. Cahill, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLENNAN, P. J.
The evidence in this case fairly tends to establish that, as a result of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, he was rendered incapable, and remained incapable, of serving the notice required by the statute within the time therein specified, but that he served a notice within three months after his mental incapacity was removed. We think under such circumstances the notice was served in time, within the meaning of the statute. Walden v. City of Jamestown, 178 N. Y. 213, 70 N. E. 466; Green v. Village of Port Jervis, 55 App. Div. 58, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1042; Barry v. Village of Port Jervis, 64 App. Div. 269, 72 N. Y. Supp. 104, also reported 93 App. Div. 618, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1127, affirmed 180 N. Y. 521, 72 N. E. 1139.
It is, however, urged that the notice as finally served failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, because it did not state the date or time of the accident, and clearly such omission would be fatal to plaintiff's right to recover provided the defendant had not waived the defect. Subsequent to the service of such notice, at the request of the city clerk, the plaintiff and his attorney appeared before the claims committee of the common council and the city attorney of such city, and submitted to an examination as to his claim and the details of the accident. By such examination the exact location of the accident and the precise time when it occurred were fully stated and disclosed, and all the circumstances attending it were given. After such examination the claim was, by resolution of the common council, referred to the claims committee and the city attorney, whose duty it was to investigate such claim, and report back to the common council. After such investigation the committee reported adversely to plaintiff's claim, the claim was rejected, and thereupon this action was commenced.
We think such action on the part of the defendant was a waiver by it of service of a notice in compliance with the statute, and that the defendant was estopped, after requiring the plaintiff to be examined as to the time and circumstances of the accident, from asserting that by his failure to serve a notice as required by the statute he could not maintain an action to recover damages for the injury sustained by him through the defendant's negligence. Grothier v. N. Y. & Brooklyn Bridge Co., 19 App. Div. 586, 46 N. Y. Supp. 621. The same principle is held in Weed v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 394, 31 N. E. 231. By the terms of the policy under consideration in that case, it was provided that notice of loss must be given to the insurance company forthwith, and it was held that such notice was not given forthwith; but the court said (page 407 of 133 N. Y., page 234 of 31 N. E.) :
"So, too, if the insurance company intends to claim that the notice of loss was not served in time, it should take its position promptly, and not put the assured to the expense of complying with other conditions in the policy, upon the assumption that adequate notice had been given. Here the proofs or loss were received and retained without any objection that the proper notice of loss had not been given. Not only this, but the defendant requested the plaintiff to amend his proofs from time to time without any suggestion that the proper notice had not been given. Under all the circumstances, the defendant may properly be held by its conduct to have waived the preliminary notice of loss."
In the case at bar no objection was made to the notice served by the plaintiff until after the plaintiff upon defendant's request had submitted to an examination before the committee of the common council and city attorney of the defendant, in which he related the date, tne place where, the nature, and all the circumstances, of the accident. Under such circumstances, we think it should be held that the defendant waived any defects in the notices of claim served by the plaintiff. This suggestion applies with equal force as to the time when such notice was served.
We conclude that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur, except SPRING and KRUSE, JJ., who dissent in an opinion by ICRUSE, J.