Case Name: O'CONNER'S CASE
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-02
Citations: 3 Abb. Pr. 137
Docket Number: 
Parties: O’CONNER’S CASE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's Practice Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 137–144

Head Matter:
O’CONNER’S CASE.
Supreme Court; First District; General Term;
February, 1867.
Habeus Corpus.—Enlistment.—Jurisdiction oe 'State Courts.
Under the Act of Congress of 1862-64, the courts of the States should not exercise jurisdiction to discharge men enlisted in the army of the United States.
Certiorari to review an order denying an application to discharge an enlisted soldier.
Owen O’Conner, the father of John O’Conner, sued out a writ of habeas corpus in December, 1866, directed to Major-General Butterfield, Superintendent of the general recruiting service of the United States, commanding him to produce the body of John O’Conner, appearing, by the petition of the said Owen, to be his son, enlisted into the service shortly before that time, under the age of twenty-one years; the said Owen being entitled to the custody and services of his son. General Butterfield made return to the writ, that the said John had been regularly enlisted into the army, and he annexed the enlistment papers of the said John, whereby it appeared that he enlisted at Boston, in the State of Mass., December 12, 1866; that he was then of the age of twenty-two years, bom at Weymouth, Mass.; and that he was by occupation a laborer. To this statement he made oath on December 13, 1866, before a Lieutenant of the U. S. Artillery, who also certified to his inspection of the recruit; that he was sober when enlisted; that to the best of his belief, the recruit was of lawful age; that in accepting him the officer had observed the regulations governing the recruiting service. General Butterfield also returned that in pursuance of the directions of the Judge Ad vocate-General of the army, a copy of which, in writing, he also annexed, it was not his duty to produce the said recruit in court. He further declared that his denial of the jurisdiction of the court, and refusal to produce the recruit, was from a sense of official duty, and not from any disrespect or contempt of the court.
At the hearing before the judge who granted the writ, the petitioner made oath that the recruit was born in Ireland, January, 1849; that he would not be eighteen years of age until the 6th of January, 1867, and he was not eighteen years of age at the time of his enlistment; that he was supported by his father, the petitioner, for whom he worked and to whom he owed service; that he, the father, had not sold his services or consented to his enlistment.
This evidence was not disputed, except by the introduction of the enlistment papers and the oath of the recruit therein contained; but its admissibility was objected to on behalf of government.
The judge thereupon dismissed the writ of habeas corpus ; and the proceedings were now brought up upon certiorari for a review of the judgment.
A. Loring Cushing, for the petitioner.
Asa Bird Gardiner (2d Lieut. U. S. Infantry), for respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, J.
In this case, while I am of the opinion that the judges of the State courts might have exercised jurisdiction prior to the passage of the act of 1862 and 1864,1 am not clear that the exercise of that power remains. No doubt Congress might pass an act prohibiting the State judges from interfering with enlistments in the army or navy. If they possess that power, the enquiry arises, whether the provisions in those statutes do not virtually prohibit it. They provide for a mode of discharge by the Secretary of War, and they annex terms and conditions on which such discharges can be granted. These provisions may be construed as having provided a mode by which persons improperly enlisted can be discharged, and as having forbidden other modes of obtaining them.
I am inclined also to yield to the opinions of the judges of the United States Courts in this district on this question, as the petitioner may apply to any of these judges on habeas ' corpus for relief. I
At any rate it is unnecessary to send the case back to the judge who allowed the suit.
All the evidence was taken between the parties, and if the general term are of the opinion that the party should be discharged they can now order it. The judge below passed upon the evidence and denied the application. The general term can only reverse his decision and make the order he should have made if he was in error.
Clerke, J.
I agree with Judge Ingraham in thinking that the Federal Government has by recent legislation assumed such jurisdiction in cases of kind, as to make it necessarily exclusive. This, I think, it has a constitutional right to do under the power given to it " to raise and support armies." (Const, of U. S., § 8, sub. 11.) Besides, this is a controversy to which the United States is a party, as much so as to an action in which a collector of a port is a party ostensibly, but the United States actually.