Case Name: ELEANORE D. CONSTANTINE, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM WAKE, Defendant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-06-11
Citations: 1 Sweeny 239
Docket Number: 
Parties: ELEANORE D. CONSTANTINE, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM WAKE, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 31
Pages: 239–252

Head Matter:
ELEANORE D. CONSTANTINE, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM WAKE, Defendant.
A covenant to pay rent runs with the land and binds the assignee. A bornes, i. e., a sum of money greater than the rent paid by an under-tenant for a lease of premises, is rent. An under-lease vests only a partial estate in the under-tenant, whereas, an assignment transfers the whole interest of the first lessee to the assignee.
The essential nature of the conveyance is not affected by the particular words employed ; although the instrument purports to be a lease or demise, it is still an assignment if the lessor part with the whole of his interest. A lease creates an estate, and an assignment transfers the estate from one person to another after it has been created.
If the instrument conveys all the estate of the grantor, it is an assignment (per Freedman, J.). If it convey a less estate than the grantor had, and leave a part of the estate, however small, in the grantor, it is a lease (per Freedman, J.).
Before Monell, McCunn, and Freedman, JJ.
[Decided June 11, 1869.]
This case was tried before Mr. Justice Jones and a jury.
The facts are as follows: In July 1, 1862, the plaintiff leased 182 Fulton street, this city, to John P. Wake, for the term of eleven years and ten months, at the yearly rent of one thousand dollars; and, in addition thereto, if the premises should, at any time during the continuance of the term thereby granted, be rented for or yield to the said Wake, “ his executors, administrators, or assigns, more than one thousand dollars per annum, in addition to the taxes and assessments, then, in that case, one half of the excess shall be paid to Mrs. Constantine.” In 1865, Wake granted and demised the premises to his brother, William Wake, the defendant, for the term of eight years, from the 1st of May, 1866 (the whole of the then unexpired term of the first mentioned lease), at the annual rent of $1,000, with taxes and assessments; then William Wake made a lease to Abbey, Sturdevant & Co., of the same premises, for eight years, being the balance of the original term • Abbey, Sturdevant & Co. agreeing to pay John P. Wake as “ bonus for said lease, the sum of §12,000,” payable by instalments, in addition to the $1,000 of rent per year, as mentioned in the original lease. Four thousand dollars, part of the bonus, was paid to William Wake, and this action was brought to recover one half of the same, Mrs. Constantine charging that the $12,000 bonus is an increase of rent, or yield, for said premises, and that' she is, under her covenant in j;he original lease to that effect, entitled to one half of said bonus.
After 'the evidence was closed on both sides, counsel for defendant asked the Court to charge the jury that defendant was entitled to their verdict. •
The Court refused to so charge, and defendant’s counsel excepted.
The Court thereupon charged the jury that plantiff was entitled to their verdict, to which charge defendant’s counsel excepted.
Thereupon the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for ' the amount claimed.
The Court ordered the exceptions be heard in the first instance "at the General Term, the judgment in the mean time "to be stayed.
Mr. F. E. Mather for defendant.
Defendant never was assignee of John P. Wake. Ho principle or incident of feudal tenures can be appealed to to make him such; and if made assignee, it must be by the letter of Exhibit B, or by operation of the law applicable thereto (1 R. S., 718, sec. 3, and 748, sec. 2; Van Rensselaer v. Smith, 27 Barb., 149).
The lease to William made him the lessee and tenant of John : it shows such to have been “ the intent of the parties,” and that intent “ is consistent with the rules of law.”
It also shows that John did not thereby convey, transfer, or make over to defendant all his interest in the demised premises: hence it is not an assignment (2 Bl. Com., 326; Burrill’s Law Dictionary).
The residue of the term (using that word in its proper legal signification,) was not transferred to defendant.
“ The word term does not merely signify the time specified in the lease, but the estate also and interest that pass by that lease; and, therefore, the term may expire during the continuation of the time, as by surrender, forfeiture, and the like” (2 Bl. Com., 144; Fairman v. Platt, 8 Pick. R., 339).
A transfer of the residue of the term is not a/n assignment unless the instrument of transfer be an assignment in form and fact; or unless it “ can be collected from the whole instrument” that the grantor thereby intended to transfer and make over unconditionally all his rights and interest in the demised premises; and that the grantee so accepted it.
The four thousand dollars paid to defendant is not, in any sense, rent.
It is not money reserved or agreed to be paid.
It is a sum paid in gross, and is no more rent than would have been a like sum if agreed to be paid by John to the .plaintiff, in gross, nor than would have been a like sum if realized from a sale at public auction, by the Sheriff, by virtue of judgment and execution against William, of his interest in the lease (Smith v. Mapleback, 1 T. R., 441).
If defendant became assignee of John, he (defendant) is not liable as assignee to plaintiff in this action.
The agreement as to the “ one half of the excess ” is not such as runs with the land, or such as creates a liability by privity of estate (Willard v. Tillman, 2 Hill., 277).
That possible “ excess ” is not rent in any proper sense of the term ; it lacks the two indispensable qualities, viz., certainty and yearly (2 Bl. Coms., 41; Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb., 368).
The only covenant or agreement in respect to paying any thing by-John is (fol. 24) for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators {not his assigns) for the payment of “ the said yearly rent above reserved, on the days and in the manner limited and prescribed as aforesaid, for the payment thereofP
That covenant (so far as concerns this action) relates only to the yearly rent reserved, payable quarterly.
The moneys claimed in this action are not (as above shown) yearly rent, nor payable on any day limited or prescribed.
Defendant is not liable in this action either by privity of estate or privity of contract or otherwise.
Mr. Charles D. Adams for plaintiff.
The §12,000 bonus (of which $4,000 has been paid) was additional “ rent or yield ” of the premises provided for in the original lease.
Bent is any profit in money, provisions, chattels, or labor, issuing out of lands and tenements in retribution for their use (2 Bl. Com., 41 ; 1 Kent Com., 367 ; 14 Peters Rep., 526).
The $12,000 was a part of the consideration paid for the use of the premises, which constitutes the essence of rent; and calling it a “ bonus ” does not alter its character (1 Bouvier’s Law Dict., 187).
A gross sum paid to the landlord for the use of the premises is rent (authorities above cited).
Bent need not be a sum specified in the lease itself. It is only necessary that it should be capable of being made definite and certain.
The covenant to pay rent runs with the land, and binds the assignee (Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y., 575 ; Jacques v. Short, 20 Barb., 269 ; Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 id., 368-9; Taylor’s Land, and Tenant, sec. 437).
Every assignee is the tenant of the original landlord, and stands in the same relation to the original landlord as the first lessee (4 Kent Com., 95; 14 Mass., 487 ; Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow., 129; 17 Wend., 473; Taylor’s Land, and Tenant, sec. 437; 9 Pick. R., 52 ; 16 Barb., 481; 20 Wend., 23 ; Townsend on Sum. Proceedings, 33).
The assignee holds in privity of estate of the original landlord (Taylor’s Land, and Ten., sec. 436).
An assignee takes the thing assigned, subject to all equities to which the original party is subject, and must perform all covenants which are annexed to the estate as long as he is in possession (Taylor’s Land, and Tenant, see. 437; 24 Barb., 365 ; Astor v. Lent, 6 Bosw., 612).
The principle is laid down by all the elementary writers in England and in this country, as follows: An assignment of a lease is the transfer of the lessees whole interest or estate in the thing demised to some third person.
Blackstone, in 2 Com., 317, says, “A lease is always for a less time than the lessor hath in the premises; for if it be for the whole interest, it is more properly an assignment than a lease.”
“If the deed pass all the estate or term of the termor, it is an assignment” (4 Kent Com., 11th ed., 96 [marginal page] and cases there cited).
If the instrument convey all the estate of the grantor, it is an assignment. If it convey a less estate than the grantor had, and what is not conveyed remain in the grantor, it is a lease.
Washburn, in his work on Real Estate, vól. i., p. 333, sec. 2-4, states the general rule to be that “ a grant by the lessee of his entire estate will be an assignment, whether in form a lease, or an instrument in terms an assignment,” and cites 2 Preston Con’s, 124.
A reversion is essential to a lease, and there can be a reversion only to one holding a greater estate (Taylor Land, and Ten., sec. 16 ; Smiley v. Van Winkle, 6 Cal., 605 ; Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y., 576 ; vide 1 Platt on Leases).

Opinion:
McCunn, J.
We are clearly of opinion that the plaintiff should recover.
It is obvious to remark, that the instruments of the 5 th and 6th of December, 1866 (exhibits E, F, and G-), were conceived in apprehension of the present action, and were contrived to evade the claim in controversy. Whether they be effectual to accomplish the object in view, depends on the determination of the following points:
1. Does a covenant for rent run with the land, or is it a merely personal engagement ? That it is a real as distinguished from a personal covenant, and that it attaches to the estate instead of subsisting in privity of contract, was among the resolutions in Spencer's case, 5 Reports, 16, and has since been recognized as a fundamental principle by every court in which the system of English jurisprudence is administered. That a covenant for rent runs with- the land is an axiom of law, and neither argument nor authority is essential to its support.
2. Was the $12,000 " bonus," agreed to be paid to William Wake by Abbey, Sturdevant & Co., rent, in the technical sense of the word ? Bent is the recompense for the use and occupancy of lands; and it signifies nothing how or when that recompense may be rendered and received. It may be rendered in services, in goods, or in money. It may be fixed by the contract of lease, or its amount may be ascertained by some subsequent event. It may be payable by stated instalments, or it may be paid in a gross sum at the inception of the tenure.
Its essential characteristic, as rent is, that it be a recompense for the use and occupancy of land. Bow, when Abbey, Sturdevant & Co. agreed "to take" of William Wake "a lease of Bo. 182 Eulton street," and to pay him $12,000 for the privilege of talcing, occupying, and enjoying those premises, there was essentially a contract of lease and a reservation of rent; and the substantial nature of the recompense stipulated for the use and possession of the land, cannot be changed by calling it a " bonus." The definitions of law are strictly inquiries, and have reference, not to names, but to properties. What recompense did Abbey, Sturdevant & Co. render to William Wake for the use and occupancy of the premises? The annual tribute of $1,000 only? Or, did they pay him, besides, the gross sum of $12,000 ? And for what was this $12,000 agreed to be paid, if not for the use and occupancy of the premises ? Bor, except the use and occupancy of the premises, was there any consideration for the ' payment-of the $12,000 ? On the other hand, what compensation di d William W alee exact -for the lease of the premises ? Only $1,000 a year % Or did he demand an additional sum of $12,000 ? The entire amount agreed to he paid William Wake for the use and occupancy of the premises, constituted the rent reserved for the use and occupancy of the premises; and it is still vent, though $12,000 be sequestered from other payments, and arbitrarily distinguished as a " bonus."
3. Did the defendant, William Wake, hold by under-lease or by assignment ? and this is the principal contention in the case. The distinction between an under-lease and an assignment is elementary and substantial. An under-lease vests only a partial estate in the second lessee, a reversion being left in his lessor; whereas, an assignment transfers the whole interest of the first lessee to the assignee. The test is, whether the grantee leaves a reversionary interest in the lessor, or operates a transfer of his entire term % In the one event, it is a sub-lease ; in the other,. an assignment. The essential nature of the conveyance is not effected by the particular words employed, and though the in strument purport to be a lease of demise, it is still an assign ment, if the lessor part with the totality of his interest. In the case under adjudication, the original lessee, John P. Wake, transferred his entire term to the defendant, William Wake, and the defendant, William Wake, took and held the premises as assignee. As assignee, the defendant, in privity of estate, is bound by the covenants that run with the land. This was the rule laid down in the case of Williams v. Earle, decided last month in the Queen's Bench, and reported in New York Transcript of 15th of May, 1869. The covenant for rent runs with the land, and the defendant is liable to the plaintiff on the original lessees' agreement to pay the plaintiff one half the excess over a thousand dollars a year which the premises " yielded," or for which-they rented at any time during the continuance of the term. Besides the annual instalment, the premises yielded the gross sum of $12,000, payable in three equal instalments, one of which, $4,000, was paid the defendant by Abbey, Sturdevant & Co., and of that sum plaintiff is entitled to a moiety.
Judgment should be entered on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.