Case Name: William E. D. Stokes, Respondent, v. Edward S. Stokes, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-04-19
Citations: 155 N.Y. 581
Docket Number: 
Parties: William E. D. Stokes, Respondent, v. Edward S. Stokes, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 155
Pages: 581–615

Head Matter:
William E. D. Stokes, Respondent, v. Edward S. Stokes, Appellant.
Burden of Proving Defense—Defendant Demanding Affirmative. A defendant in an action on notes who pleads a tender of payment made on condition of the surrender of bonds held as collateral security, which has been refused by the plaintiff upon the ground that he held the bonds as security for other obligations as well as for the notes, has the burden of proving that the bonds are not held as security for any other purpose than the payment of the notes in suit, when that is the only issue made in the case and he has expressly demanded and has been given the affirmative.
Stokes v. Stokes, 11 Mise. Rep. 716, affirmed.
(Argued March 17, 1898;
decided April 19, 1898.)
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the late Superior Court of the city of New York, entered March 16, 1895, overruling defendant’s exceptions, directed to be heard in the first instance at General Term, and ordering judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon the verdict directed by the court.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinions.
James G. Garter for appellant.
If the plaintiff was entitled to hold the bonds only as security for the payment of the notes in suit, the counterclaim was established and the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. (Halpin v. P. Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 ; Bailey v. County of Buchanan, 115 N. Y. 297; Cass v. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 248; Cutler v. J. G. Co., 43 Hun, 516; Wheelock v. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; E. F. Ins. Co. v. Norris, 74 Hun, 527; Code Civ. Pro. § 544; Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305 ; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22; Potter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Decker v. Mathews, 12 N. Y. 313; Atkinson v. R. P. Co., 43 Hun, 173 ; 114 N. Y. 168.) Plaintiff’s denial in his reply is a conjunctive denial that the bonds “ were deposited with and accepted and are held by plaintiff solely ” as security for the notes in suit. It is not a denial that the bonds were originally deposited with and accepted by the plaintiff solely as security for these notes or of any of the facts alleged in the answer as to the time and circumstances of their deposit or of the agreement under which they were received. (Kay v. Whittaker, 44 N.Y. 565; Bliss on Code Pleading, § 332.) The judgment in the action of Edward S. Stokes v. William E. D. Stokes was a conclusive adjudication that at the time of the tender the plaintiff herein had failed to perform the consideration of the agreement of August 18, 1891, and that for this reason it could not be enforced against the defendant. (Stokes v. Stokes, 148 N. Y. 708; Freeman on Judgments [4th ed.], § 248; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. [U. S.] 198; Strang v. Moog, 72 Ala. 460; P. Bank v. Eberts, 96 Mich. 396; W. S. Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465 ; Blackinton v. Blackinton, 113 Mass. 231; Parnell v. Hahn, 61 Cal. 131; Woodhouse v. Duncan, 106 N. Y. 527; Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray, 299; Gove v. Lyford, 44 N. H. 525.) As tlie plaintiff had failed to perform the consideration of the agreement, he was not entitled to retain the securities thereunder. (Dunham v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76 ; Gates v. Preston, 41 N. Y. 113; Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150 ; Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cow. 120; Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Den. 238; W. S. Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465; Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 358.) The bonds were recoverable by the defendant upon demand. (Weaver v. Bentley, 1 Caines, 47; Wheeler v. Board, 12 Johns. 363; Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pick. 20; Raymond v. Bearnard, 12 Johns. 274.) The contention that the 125 Hoffman House bonds were, or might have been, held by W. E. D. Stokes, apart from the agreement of August 18, 1891, as security not only for the four notes in suit, but also for other obligations upon which E. S. Stokes was at one time contingently liable, to wit, certain notes of C. H. Bead, is without force. (Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N. Y. 521; House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259.)
Benjamin F. Tracy for respondent.
The defendant failed to prove the conversion of the 125 Hoffman House bonds. (Greenl. on Ev. §§ 636, 637; Hayes v. Riddle, 1 Sandf. 248 ; Addison on Torts [7th ed.], 502; Heilman v. Lazarus, 90 N. Y. 672; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 263 ; F. L. & T. Co. v. Siefke, 144 N. Y. 354; Whitlatch v. F. & C. Co., 149 N. Y. 45; Lamb v. C. & A. R. R. & T. Co., 46 N. Y. 271; Davis v. Jenney, 1 Met. 221; Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269 ; Perley v. Perley, 144 Mass. 104.) The judgment in the action of Edward S. Stokes against W. E. D. Stokes did not adjudicate that Edward S. Stokes had the right of possession of the 125 Hoffman House bonds. (Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351; Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372; Springer v. Bien, 128 N. Y. 99 ; Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N. Y. 521; House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259; Lance v. Shaughnessy, 86 Hun, 411; Campbell v. Butts, 3 N. Y. 173; Burdick v. Post, 12 Barb. 168; 6 N. Y. 522; Belden v. State, 103 N. Y. 1; Campbell v. Consalus, 25 N. Y. 613.) The judgment in the action of Edward S. Stokes against W. E. D. Stokes adjudicated that Edward S. Stokes had not the right of possession of the 125 bonds and could not maintain conversion therefor. [De Witt v. Chandler, 11 Abb. Pr. 459; Code Civ. Pro. § 1209.) The entire consideration of the contract of August 18, 1891, never failed. (Van Blarcom v. B. Bank, 9 Bosw. 532; Schouler on Bailment, §§ 178, 181; Story on Bailment, § 300; Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637; Duncomb v. N. Y., H. & N. R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 190; Eichelberg v. Murdock, 10 Md. 373; Bishop on Cont. §§ 81, 101; O. P. R. R. Co. v. Forrest, 128 N. Y. 83; Maxwell v. Graves, 59 Iowa, 613.)

Opinion:
Haight, J.
This action was brought to recover the amount of four promissory notes, made by the defendant and payable to the order of the plaintiff. The answer herein admitted the making of the notes set forth in the complaint, and that they were due and unpaid. It then alleged, for a first defense, that, on ¡November 15th, 1892, the defendant duly tendered to the plaintiff the sum of §37,500, the amount of the promissory notes, with interest and costs, upon condition that the plaintiff should surrender to the defendant certain securities deposited with him by the defendant as collateral to the notes; that the plaintiff declined to accept the tender, and refused to deliver the securities, and that the defendant was, and always has been, ready to pay the notes on the delivery of such securities.
For a second defense and by way of counterclaim, it was alleged in the answer that, at the time of the execution of the notes in question, the defendant deposited with the plaintiff, as security therefor, one hundred and twenty-five of the first mortgage bonds of the Hoffman House Corporation, of the actual and par value of $125,000, and thirty bonds of the United Lines Telegraph Company, of the actual and par value of $30,000; that such bonds' were accepted and held by the plaintiff as collateral security for the payment of the notes and for no other purpose; that, on the loth day of ¡November, 1892, the defendant tendered to the plaintiff $37,500, the amount of the notes, with interest and costs, upon the express condition that the plaintiff should surrender to the defendant the one hundred and fifty-five bonds so held by him as collateral 'security; that the plaintiff declined the tender and refused to deliver over the bonds, and then and there converted the same to his own use; that the bonds were worth the sum of §155,000, and judgment was demanded for the amount thereof, less the amount of the notes, with interest and costs. The plaintiff replied by denying that the one hundred and fifty-five bonds were deposited with him solely as collateral security for the payment of the promissory notes described in the complaint, and alleged that the one hundred and twenty-five Hoffman House bonds had come into his possession prior to August 24th, 1891, on which day the parties entered into a written contract, dated on the 18th day of August, 1891, in which it was, among other things, agreed that, " sixthly, and as security for these guarantees, for a loan of about thirty-two thousand dollars and for any obligation of said Edward S. Stokes to said William E. D. Stokes, connected with said ¡Read, and against any foreclosure of the said mortgage, said Edward S. Stokes has deposited with William E. D. Stokes bonds of said Hoffman House to the par value of $150,000."
At that time one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars of the Hoffman House bonds had been deposited with William E. D. Stokes, leaving twenty-five thousand dollars par, value of said bonds to be thereafter deposited.
In a former action between the same parties, W. E. D. Stokes demanded judgment that Edward S. Stokes specifically perform the contract of August 18th, 1891, by depositing with him twenty-five thousand dollars, par value of the Hoffman House Corporation bonds, in addition to that which had been theretofore deposited as collateral security for the obligations undertaken under the provisions of the contract, in which action it was found, as a fact, that, prior to the 18th of August, 1891, the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff upon four promissory notes, aggregating thirty-two thousand dollars, and that he was also indirectly liable to the plaintiff upon a note for $10,000, made by one Cassius H. Read and indorsed by the defendant, and on another note for $15,000, made by Cassius H. Read, and guaranteed by the defendant. The judgment roll in that action was introduced in evidence upon the trial of this action. At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $39,445.68.
The allegations of the conqrlaint having been admitted in the answer, the only issue tendered by the pleadings was as to whether the bonds were held as collateral security for any other purpose than tire payment of the notes in suit. Upon this issue the defendant demanded, and was given, the affimative. It is now said he was not bound to prove a negative. But there was no other issue, and on that he had demanded the affirmative. The duty then devolved upon him of establishing his defense or counterclaim. The tender having been made by him upon the condition that the plaintiff should surrender the bonds, the burden rested upon the defendant of showing that the bonds were held as collateral security for the payment of the notes in suit, and for no other purpose.
In the case of Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. R. & T. Co. (46 N. Y. 271, 279) Grover, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ££ It sometimes occurs, in the progress of a trial, that a party holding the affirmative of the issue, and consequently bound to prove it, introduces evidence, which uncontradicted, proves the fact alleged by him. It has, in such cases, frequently been said, that the burden of proof was changed to the other side; but it was never intended thereby that the party bound to prove the fact was relieved from this; and that the other party, to entitle him to a verdict, was required to satisfy the jury that the fact was not as alleged by his adversary. In such cases, the party holding the affirmative is still bound to satisfy the jury, affirmatively, of the truth of the fact alleged by him, or he is not entitled to a verdict." (See, also, Heilman v. Lazarus, 90 N. Y. 672; Claf lin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 263; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Siefke, 144 N. Y. 354, 359 ; Whitlatch v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 149 N. Y. 45.)
The defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that " when the first three notes were given, I deposited with plaintiff, as collateral thereto, one hundred thousand dollars of the Hoffman House Corporation bonds and thirty thousand dollars of the United Lines Telegraph bonds." He also testified that when he gave the other note, or some time between May and August, he deposited with the plaintiff twenty-five thousand dollars of the Hoffman House bonds, in addition to those he had before deposited, so that the plaintiff had one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars of the Hoffman House bonds and thirty thousand dollars of the United Lines Telegrah bonds as against these loans. It will here be observed that the defendant has neglected to state that the bonds were not deposited for other purposes as well as for the loans made.
The next bit of evidence introduced was the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, dated the 18th day of August, 1891. The defendant was then asked the following question by his own counsel: " Were those one hundred . and twenty-five thousand dollars worth of bonds deposited by you with the plaintiff as collateral for any other debt, or for any other purpose, than for those notes and whatever is stated in this agreement ? " The witness answered : " I would like to premise my answer somewhat by explaining. Those bonds were deposited, as I previously stated, previous to the agreement of August 18tli, 1891." His counsel then repeated the question and he answered: " I allowed them to remain with the plaintiff for that purpose, and for no other purpose." The purpose specified in the question was for the notes in suit and " whatever is stated in the agreement." Upon referring to the agreement we find that the bonds were held as security, not only for the payment of the notes, but for any obligation of Edward S. Stokes to W. E. L>. Stokes, connected with Head and as against any foreclosure of the mortgage. As we have already seen, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff upon two notes, made by Cassius H. Read,, amounting to twenty-five thousand dollars, which had been indorsed or guaranteed by the defendant. This is all the evidence given upon the subject.
We think the defendant failed to show that the bonds were held by the plaintiff as collateral for the payment of the notes, and for no other purpose, and that he consequently failed to establish his defense or counterclaim.
It was contended upon the argument that the determination of the former action should control the disposition of this case. In that case, as we have seen, specific performance of the contract was sought, which required Edward S. Stokes to deliver to William E. D. Stokes an additional $25,000 par value of the Hoffman House bonds as further collateral security for the obligations mentioned in the contract. In that case it appeared that one of the chief objects which the parties sought to accomplish was the purchase of the Read stock, so that the parties, William and Edward, could together be the owners of the whole stock of the Hoffman House Corporation, and as such owners could operate the Hoffman House as a hotel. After the contract had been executed it was found that the Read stock could not be purchased, and consequently the main purpose and consideration of the contract failed. It was under these circumstances that we refused to compel specific performance. (Stokes v. Stokes, 148 N. Y. 708.) It is possible that, owing to the failure of the principal part of the consideration of the contract, it should be held to be abrogated as a whole, a question which we do not now determine; but if we should so treat the contract, it would not affect the question under consideration in this case, or relieve the defendant of the burden assumed by him when he attempted to prove his defense or counterclaim. The loans made upon the notes in suit and the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff, incurred by indorsing the Read notes and the deposit of the Hoffman House bonds as collateral, all took place before the agreement was made. This the defendant concedes in Ms testimony, and the only question with reference thereto is as to whether the bonds were deposited with the plaintiff as collateral security for the defendant's liability upon the Read notes, or as collateral to the notes in suit alone. In determining this question the affirmative was with the defendant. As we have seen, he has failed to show that the bonds were delivered to the plaintiff as collateral security for the payment of the notes in suit, and for no other purpose. The trial court, therefore, properly directed a verdict against him for the amount conceded to be due upon the notes.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Martin, J.
Three opinions having already been written in this case I shall content myself with a brief statement of the reasons which lead me to the conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed. It is apparent that the case of Stokes v. Stokes (148 N. Y. 708) cannot be given the effect claimed for it by the present appellant and accorded to it in the opinions which favor a reversal. The only question actually involved in that case was whether, under the circumstances proved, specific performance ought to be decreed. It arose upon the then defendant's counterclaim by which he sought to compel the plaintiff in that action to specifically perform the contract of August eighteenth by depositing $Ü5,000 of bonds, in addition to the $155,000 already deposited with him. It was understood by the parties, when they entered into that contract, that William could probably purchase from Read his stock which consisted of 1,963 shares. That, he was unable to do. He was thus relieved from the investment of a large amount of money which would have been required for the purpose if he had been able to make the contemplated purchase. That the securities which he held were abundantly sufficient to indemnify him against any liability, actual or contingent, which then existed by reason of that contract, was obvious. Under those circumstances, this court held that specific performance ought not to be decreed, and that the General Term erred in reversing the judgment of the Special Term, which dismissed both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim. Obviously this was upon the ground that the liability of William was less than was originally contemplated, and, hence, did not require the deposit of any additional security to completely indemnify him. Under the circumstances the discretion which rests in a court of equity in determining whether specific performance shall be granted or withheld, plainly authorized the court to refuse the decree sought. The right of specific performance rests in the judicial discretion of the court, and may be granted or withheld upon a consideration of all the circumstances and in the exercise of such discretion. (Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 222 ; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155 ; Miles v. Dover Furnace Iron Co., 125 N. Y. 294, 297; Gotthelf v. Stranahan, 138 N. Y. 345, 351; McPherson v. Schade, 149 N. Y. 16, 21; Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299, 306.)
It is a well-established principle relating to this subject that specific performance will never be decreed where it would be • inequitable. It is immaterial whether the fact that it is inequitable arises from the provisions of the contract, or from external facts or circumstances which affect the situation and relations of the parties, for in either case it may constitute a sufficient ground for a court of equity to withhold this peculiar relief, and to leave the parties to their legal remedy. (Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445; Clarke v. Rochester, Lockport & N. Falls R. R. Co., 18 Barb. 350; Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y. 362; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 317; Murdfeldt v. N. Y., W. S. & B. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 703; Day v. Hunt, 112 N. Y. 191, 195; Conger v. N. Y., W. S. & B. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 32; Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. [4 Q. B.] 180; Shrewsbury & Birmingham Railway Co. v. London & N. W. Railway Co., 4 DeG., M. & G., 115; 6 House of Lords Cases, 113; Wedgwood v. Adams, 6 Beav. 600 ; 8 id. 103.)
In reviewing the judgment in the first case, the General Term was not justified in reversing itj unless it appeared that the proof so clearly preponderated in favor of a conclusion adverse to that reached by the trial court that it could be said with reasonable certainty that it erred in its conclusion. (Baird v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 567; Lowery v. Erskine, 113 N. Y. 52, 55 ; Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600, 607; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 120 N. Y. 614, 617; Devlin v. Greenwich Savings Bk., 125 N. Y. 756 ; P. I. Co. v. " Hopatcong" & " Musconetcong" 127 N. Y. 212; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 253; Cook v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 117; Bloom v. Nat. Savings & Loan Co., 152 N. Y. 119; Foster v. Bookwalter, 152 N. Y. 168.) There was no abuse of the discretion possessed by the trial court. In that case, as it was unnecessary, it would have been clearly inequitable to require the defendant to deposit the additional $25,000 in bonds, and, hence, the trial court was justified in dismissing the counterclaim, and the General Term was not authorized to reverse its determination. Therefore, this court properly reversed the decision of the General Term and directed judgment absolute for the defendant.
Thus, it is seen that the decision of this court in that case did not involve the validity or effect of the agreement between the parties, but only whether, under the circumstances proved, Edward should be required to specifically perform it by depositing the additional $25,000 of bonds. Whether the bonds in the possession of William might be held by him as collateral security for the purposes mentioned in the contract of August eighteenth, was not involved, and, therefore, the judgment in that case has no bearing upon the question now before ns. It neither constituted an estoppel to the plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to hold the bonds in his hands for the liabilities mentioned in the agreement, nor was it proper evidence upon that subject. The rule in relation to the estoppel of judgments, as announced by Lord Chief Justice De Grey in the Duchess of Kingston's case, was indorsed by this court in Stannard v. Hubbell (123 N. Y. 520, 528). It is as follows: " That neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within the jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred, by argument from the judgment." It was said by this court in the Stcmnard case that that rule had been uniformly accepted by the courts as an accurate statement of the law, and it was there held that where an estoppel is claimed in respect to some fact involved in a former action, it is only material, relevant and necessary facts decided in the former action that are conclusive in a second, and that a judgment does not operate as an estoppel as to immaterial or unessential facts, even though put in issue by the pleadings and directly decided. (Campbell v. Consalus, 25 N. Y. 613; People ex rel. v. Johnson., 38 N. Y. 63; Woodgate v. Fleet, 44 N. Y. 1; Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465.) Again, in Springer v. Bien (128 N. Y. 99) it was held that, although a judgment had been entered in a former action, it did not prevent the relitigation of a fact litigated and found in such action, which was irrelevant to the issues therein, and did not enter into, and was not involved in, the final judgment. A judgment does not operate as an estoppel in a subsequent action between the parties, except as to such facts as are litigated and decided, and which have such a relation to the issue that their determination was necessary to the determination of that issue. (House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259.)
As we have seen in the trial of the former action, the only issue was whether, under the circumstances, specific performance should be decreed. Whether the securities already in the possession of William might be held by him as security for the liabilities mentioned in the agreement, was not at all material, or in any way necessary to the determination of that issue. It was not a relevant or necessary fact to be decided in that case. The decision of the court was only to the effect that as William was abundantly secured against loss by reason of any liability of Edward, direct or contingent, it would be inequitable to compel the latter to deposit the additional security provided for by the contract, and, hence, the court would not accord to him the peculiar relief of specific performance, but leave the parties to their legal remedy. Hence, it follows that the question whether William is entitled to hold the bonds in his possession as collateral security for the performance of the provisions of the contract, is an open one and not controlled by the decision in that case.
As the judgment in the former action between the parties was not conclusive against the right of William to hold the bonds remaining in his hands as security for all the claims provided for in the agreement of August eighteenth, I think they may be held for all the guaranties contained in that agreement, for the loan of the $32,000, for any obligation of the defendant connected with Read, including the two notes made by Read and indorsed or guaranteed by the defendant, amounting to $25,000, as well as against any foreclosure of the mortgage mentioned therein. That contract was not so far entire that the purchase of all of Read's nineteen hundred and sixty-three shares of stock by William was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the rights conferred upon him by the provisions of that agreement. Indeed, it is manifest from the contract itself that the parties contemplated the situation which actually arose as to the inability of William to purchase all the shares owned by Read. This is shown by the portion which states that he is about to purchase of Read the remainder 'of his stock, or a portion thereof, with the intent that the parties may be the owners of the whole, and by the further provision that William was to sell and transfer to Edward, at the price paid, one-half of the whole, or of such portion of the 1,963 shares as he might purchase from Read. Thus, the contract clearly shows that the parties intended that William should purchase the entire stock held by Read if it could be done, when the parties would together be the owners' of the whole, but that he might be able to purchase only a portion was contemplated, as is plainly evinced by the language employed.
The consideration for the contract of August eighteenth was the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties. The-provisions to be kept or performed by William have been performed by him, except so far as he has been unable to pur chase all of the 1,963 shares of stock then owned by Bead. He purchased all Bead would sell. He could do no more. As we have already seen, the probable impossibility of purchasing all of this stock was understood by the parties when the agreement was made. But there was no provision that, in that event, the contract should become invalid or inoperative, or that it should not bind the parties as to its other provisions which coulfl be performed. To say that there was a failure of the consideration for this contract is not, I think, correct. Hor do I understand that this court intended to hold that there was such a failure of the consideration as to render the contract inoperative. I think the condition which ultimately existed was not only contemplated by the parties, but that they intended that in case of the inability of William to purchase the Bead, stock, the remainder of the contract should continue in force. This seems manifest from the provisions and purpose of the agreement, which was to carry on the business of managing the hotel, restaurant and café connected with the Hoffman House, and for the management of the business of the coloration, as well as from the provision showing that the possibility of his being unable to purchase the whole of the Bead stock was contemplated when the agreement was made.
It must be admitted, however, that, in the opinion in the first case, the judge writing took a somewhat different view of the provision as to the purchase of the Bead stock. But the consideration of that question was merely incidental, and not at all important or material in determining the issue there ¡presented, which was plainly stated by the learned judge as follows : " Ought specific performance, under the circumstances, to be now decreed?" A majority of the court was of the opinion that it ought not, and that was the sole question decided. As was said by Yank, J., in Colonial City T. Co. v. Kingston City R. R. Co. (154 N. Y. 495): " It was not our intention to decide any case but the one before us. If, as sometimes happens, broader statements were made by way of argument or otherwise than were essential to the decision of the questions presented, they are the dicta of the writer of the opinion and not the decision of the court. A judicial opinion, like evidence, is only binding so far as it is relevant, and when it wanders from the point at issue it no longer has force as an official utterance." It seems to me that the only question decided in the former case was whether specific performance should be decreed, and that the question now before this court was not involved in that case. Hence, while I concur in the opinion of my brother Haight, I am also of the opinion that, under the agreement between the parties, the plaintiff was entitled to hold the bonds in question to secure all the guaranties and obligations mentioned in its sixth paragraph, that the tender by Edward was, consequently, insufficient, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.