Case Name: SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert A. DELSMAN, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-03-21
Citations: 422 F. App'x 651
Docket Number: No. 09-16809
Parties: SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert A. DELSMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 422
Pages: 651–652

Head Matter:
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert A. DELSMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 09-16809.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 8, 2011.
Filed March 21, 2011.
Seth Isaac Appel, Ian Kenneth Boyd, Harvey Siskind LLP, San Francisco, CA, Gregory T. Casmento, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP, Houston, TX, pro se.
Paul Alan Levy, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.
Robert A. Delsman, an Individual, Eureka, CA, pro se.
Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. appeals from the district court's order dismissing its action alleging, inter alia, defamation and trade libel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Price v. Stossel, 620 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sedgwick's defamation and trade libel claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute because defendant Delsman's conduct was in furtherance of his free speech rights in connection with an issue of public interest, and Sedgwick did not meet its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 425.16; Ruiz v. Harbor View Cmty. Ass'n, 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 140-46 (Ct.App.2005) (setting forth § 425.16 analysis, and concluding that defendant's letter containing rhetorical hyperbole was free speech in connection with an issue of public interest and that plaintiff did not establish a probability of prevailing on his libel claim).
Sedgwick's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.