Case Name: Wayne ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-09-04
Citations: 585 So. 2d 757
Docket Number: No. 90-KA-0215
Parties: Wayne ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 757–761

Head Matter:
Wayne ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 90-KA-0215.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 4, 1991.
Ed W. Jenkins, Comer & Jenkins, Boone-ville, for appellant.
Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., John R. Henry, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
PITTMAN, Justice,
for the Court:
I.
Wayne Robinson was indicted and plead guilty in the Circuit Court of Tishomingo County to the reduced charge of possession of more than one ounce and less than one kilogram of marijuana, and was sentenced by Circuit Judge Thomas J. Gardner, III to three (3) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. This sentence was suspended and Robinson was placed on probation. Robinson was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000.00 and all costs of court, and $4,500.00 in cash in a related civil matter was forfeited to the State.
Within three (3) days Robinson was arrested on similar charges and brought before the Circuit Court. Judge Gardner set aside the first sentence and ordered Robinson to serve a term of three (3) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
Robinson filed a Motion for Post-Conviction Relief challenging the second sentence on the ground the sentencing court was without jurisdiction, and requesting that the first sentence be reinstated. The Circuit Judge summarily dismissed the motion on January 30, 1990, and Robinson prosecuted this appeal.
II.
The invalidity of the second sentence is asserted on two grounds. First, Robinson alleges that the original sentence was a final judgment signed by the judge, filed and entered in the court's minutes prior to the date of the second sentence. This claim is without merit because the second sentence was imposed during the same court term as the first sentence. Jones v. Index Drilling Co., 251 Miss. 578, 170 So.2d 564, 571 (1965). This Court, citing Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 410, 26 L.Ed. 797 (1882), stated the general rule:
. all the judgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, however conclusive in their character, are under the control of the court which pronounces them during the term at which they are rendered or entered of record, and they may then be set aside, vacated, modified or annulled by that court, (emphasis supplied)
Jones, 170 So.2d at 571.
Robinson's next contention assails the validity of the second sentence because it imposed greater punishment than the first. The guilty plea was entered as a result of a plea bargain which included a recommendation by the State that Robinson be given a suspended sentence. The record confirms that Robinson plead guilty because of this recommendation of a sus pended sentence. However, Robinson's contention is without consequence because the trial court erred in originally suspending sentence.
The sentencing judge had authority to suspend sentence and place Robinson on probation under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-33 (1972) "except where the defendant has been convicted of a felony...." During plea qualification, Robinson was asked by the sentencing judge if he had a prior felony conviction. He answered, "I had a prior felony conviction." The felony conviction was for the crime of grand larceny in Alcorn County in 1972. The sentencing judge concluded that Robinson was "not technically eligible for suspension" but, nevertheless, followed the State's recommendation and imposed a suspended sentence in spite of that exception.
Hamlin v. Barrett, 335 So.2d 898, 899 (Miss.1976) involved a similar fact situation distinguishable by the fact that the sentencing judge was not aware that the accused had a prior felony conviction when he imposed a suspended sentence and probation. In fact, the accused answered the judge's question if he was a first offender by replying that his only prior offense was a "traffic ticket." After the sentence, the trial judge learned that the accused had a prior felony conviction for robbery in New York State. With this knowledge, the judge revoked the suspension and probation. This Court stated:
We hold that the court had jurisdiction even though the grant of probation was technically inappropriate.
* >(t
This case makes it clear and we stress that before granting probation to defendants convicted of crimes trial judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel must exercise care to see that probation is proper under § 47-7-33, supra. Here, though after developed facts (prior felony conviction) show that probation was improperly and mistakenly afforded Hamlin,.... (emphasis supplied)
Hamlin, 335 So.2d at 899-900.
There was no misleading Judge Gardner in this case. He knew that Robinson had been convicted of a felony prior to his suspending the sentence and placing Robinson on probation — an act of judicial nullification. The sentence was, therefore, clearly erroneous. See Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895, 897 (Miss.1981); Royalty v. McAdory, 278 So.2d 464, 467 (Miss.1973); Freeman v. State, 220 Miss. 777, 72 So.2d 139 (1954); Steadman v. State, 204 Miss. 322, 37 So.2d 357 (1948); Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 57 So. 806 (1912).
III.
Clearly, § 47-7-33 does not permit suspension of sentence and probation to a defendant with a prior felony conviction. Robinson's suspended sentence and probation was without authority and, therefore, invalid. Because Robinson plead guilty on the improper inducement that he was eligible for a suspended sentence or probation, he is therefore permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and he must be allowed to enter a new plea and offered the opportunity of a new trial. Vittitoe v. State, 556 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Miss.1990). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and restore Robinson's plea of not guilty to the indictment for possession of more than one ounce and less than one kilogram of marijuana and remand for such further appropriate proceedings.
LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs by separate written opinion, joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J.
PRATHER, J., dissents by separate written opinion joined by McRAE, J.