Case Name: LIVINGSTON COUNTY v. LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT JUDGE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-01-21
Citations: 393 Mich. 265
Docket Number: Docket No. 55513
Parties: LIVINGSTON COUNTY v LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT JUDGE
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, Swainson, Williams, M. S. Coleman, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 393
Pages: 265–293

Head Matter:
NOTE: Where possible, a syllabus (headnote), such as this, will be released at the time the opinion is released. This syllabus is not a part of the opinion of the Court but has been written by the Supreme Court Reporter as a summary of the case for the convenience of readers. See United States v Detroit Lumber Company, 200 US 321, 337; 26 S Ct 282; 50 L Ed 499 (1906).
LIVINGSTON COUNTY v LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT JUDGE
Docket No. 55513.
Argued December 12, 1974
(Calendar No. 8).—
Decided January 21, 1975.
The Michigan Employment Relations Commission certified Michigan Council 55, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, as a bargaining representative for a unit of district and circuit court employees in Livingston County. The bargaining representative, employees, and representatives of the judiciary then bargained over a contract. During the bargaining a representative of the county Board of Commissioners was excluded from the bargaining room. The bargaining parties arrived at a contract and the Livingston Circuit Court, Paul R. Mahinske, J., issued an administrative order implementing the contract and submitted the order to the Court Administrator for approval. Livingston County and its Board of Commissioners filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for superintending control against the circuit judge. The Court of Appeals, Quinn, P. J., and McGregor and Bronson, JJ., granted the motion of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 55, to intervene as a defendant and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for superintending control (Docket No. 17716). Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that separation of powers has been violated and that due process and equal protection have been denied because they have not been afforded a neutral forum in which to determine whether or not the provisions of the contract are reasonable and necessary. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 1050-1054.
[2 — 4] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 273 et seq.; 1198 et seq.
[5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 18] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 1191.
[7, 11] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 4, 102.
[8, 9, 15-17] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 78, 79.
[12] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 272 et seq.
1. The bargaining parties used basically correct procedures, but no conclusion is reached as to the reasonableness or the necessity of the contractual provisions.
2. The bargaining process used does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Review of the contract for reasonableness is initially by submission to the Court Administrator for approval, and an adversary proceeding for review of reasonableness and necessity, if it appears that the budget reflecting the contract will exceed the total appropriation, is then available by an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court of the county before a disinterested judge, with appellate review by application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
4. The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for superintending control, and is affirmed.
Levin, J., joined by T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., dissented on the ground that:
The issue is one of statutory construction: who would the Legislature designate as the public employer under the Public Employees Relations Act had the matter come to mind. In the opinion of the dissenters it would have designated the county, not the courts, as to circuit and probate courts.
1. The circuit and probate courts do not have the same statutory authority to fix employees’ compensation that district courts have. While the "public employer” of district court employees, obligated by statute to bargain with the employees, is the district court as held in Judges of the 74th Judicial District v Bay County, 385 Mich 710; 190 NW2d 219 (1971), the "public employer” of circuit and probate court employees is the county, not the courts.
2. The “inherent power” of the courts to require the other branches of government to fund their needs extends only to situations of urgency or emergency, not to routine budgetary needs under a collective bargaining agreement.
3. The review procedure established by Administrative Order 1971-6 was intended as a constraint on the improvident exercise by judges of inherent power, and was not designed to review collective bargaining agreements.
4. The Legislature has always provided a limit on the amount the courts may spend in hiring employees and fixing compensation and the limit is generally expressed by the words "within amounts appropriated”. Courts do not possess inherent powers to appropriate money or require expenditures for what they determine is reasonable, but only for true emergencies, and may not properly assume financial obligations in a collective bargaining agreement greater than the amount appropriated by a legislative body.
Opinion op the Court
1. Courts — Labor Relations — Collective Bargaining — Court Administrator — Constitutional Law — Separation op Powers.
The bargaining parties used basically correct procedures where a bargaining representative for a unit of district and circuit court employees, the employees, and representatives of the judiciary engaged in bargaining over a contract, the bargaining parties arrived at a contract, and the circuit judge issued an administrative order implementing the contract and submitted the order to the Court Administrator for approval; the bargaining process used does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
2. Courts — Labor Relations — Collective Bargaining — Counties— Representative.
The best practice in collective bargaining between employees of district and circuit courts and the local judiciary is to invite a representative of the county Board of Commissioners to appear at bargaining sessions, not to bargain, but to present relevant data about other county employees.
3. Courts — Labor Relations — Collective Bargaining — Contracts —Review—Court Administrator.
Review for approval by the Court Administrator of an administrative order issued by a circuit judge implementing a collective bargaining contract between a local judiciary and its employees is a step in insuring the reasonableness and necessity of the contractual provisions, and participation in the review by representatives of the county Board of Commissioners and discussion point by point and clause by clause was contemplated by the Administrative Order of the Supreme Court providing for review (Administrative Order 1971-6).
4. Courts — Labor Relations — Collective Bargaining — Contracts —Counties—Review.
A county Board of Commissioners which wants an adversary proceeding in public view, on the record, to test the reasonableness and necessity of a collective bargaining contract between a local judiciary and its employees after the contract has been implemented by an administrative order of a circuit judge approved by the Court Administrator, if it appears that the budget reflecting the contract will exceed the total appropriation, may have such review in an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court of their own county, heard by a disinterested judge, with appellate review by application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
Dissenting Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, J.
5. Labor Relations — Statutes—Construction—"Public Employer”.
The question on review of a collective bargaining agreement between court employees and a county court system is whether the court or the county is the ''public employer” of certain persons who perform services for the Livingston County Circuit Court, Probate Court and District Court, and is one of statutory construction of the Public Employment Relations Act (MCLA 423.201 et seq.).
6. Labor Relations — Counties—Courts—"Public Employer”.
Livingston County is the public employer, within the meaning of the Public Employment Relations Act, of employees who perform services for the circuit and probate courts of that county; the district court is the public employer of certain persons performing services for that court.
7. Courts — Powers—Employees—Appointment—Compensation.
While circuit courts have the statutory authority to appoint and fix the compensation of a few speciñed employees, within amounts appropriated therefor by the county, that statutory authority, in contrast with the statutory authority of the district court, does not extend to most circuit court employees; the probate court has no statutory authority to fíx the compensation of any court employee.
8. Courts — Inherent Power — Budgetary Needs!
The inherent power in the judiciary to determine needs of the courts and to require the other branches of government to fund those needs may be invoked when a situation of "urgency” or "emergency” threatens the ability of the judiciary to function serviceably as a co-equal branch of government, not in support of routine budgeting; a new collective bargaining agreement ordinarily creates no "urgency” or "emergency”.
9. Courts — Emergency—Inherent Power — Collective Bargaining Agreement.
An "emergency”, justifying the invocation of inherent power of a court, may result if a public employer is unable or unwilling to offer court employees compensation and beneñts sufficient to retain their services or to obtain the services of competent replacement or additional personnel.
10. Labor Relations — Courts—"Public Employer”.
In ascertaining the public employer of persons who perform services for the circuit court and probate courts, competing statutes must be considered: the Public Employment Relations Act secures to public employees the right of collective bargaining, and there are general and speciñc statutes authorizing the county, and in some instances the courts, to appoint and ñx the compensation of public employees who perform services for the courts.
11. Courts — Employees—Compensation—Appropriations.
The Legislature has not authorized the circuit court or the probate court, in contrast with the district court, to appoint employees and ñx their compensation within the appropriations provided by the governing body of the county; such authority as has been conferred on circuit judges to ñx the compensation of speciñed judicial employees has been limited to the amount appropriated therefor for the speciñed employees by the board of commissioners, and line-item budgeting of the circuit and probate courts is contemplated by the statutes.
12. Statutes — Interpretation—Legislative Intent.
The ascertainment of legislative intent when there is no evidentiary or other reasonably authoritative guide to the meaning or purpose of the legislators requires the courts to guess what the Legislature would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present.
13. Labor Relations — Public Employment Relations Act — "Public Employer” — Legislative Intent.
The absence of a deñnition of, or a procedure for determining, a "public employer” in the Public Employment Relations Act requires the Court to guess whether the Legislature that en acted it, had the point come to attention, would have designated the courts or the county board of commissioners as the public employer of circuit and probate court employees (MCLA 423.201 etseq.).
14. Labor Relations — "Public Employer” — Legislative Intent.
The statutory pattern by which the compensation of most circuit and probate court employees is determined by the county board of commissioners or board of auditors, such authority as has been conferred on circuit judges to ñx the compensation of speciñed employees has been limited to the amount appropriated therefor by the county board of commissioners, and line-item budgeting is contemplated for circuit and probate courts, the fact that local court employees are not covered by separate judicial retirement programs but share in others, the limitation of the inherent power of courts to mandating expenditures in the minimum amounts necessary to hire and retain competent personnel, and the impossibility of collective bargaining when the negotiating public employer has no negotiating leeway because of the impecuniosity or attitude of the appropriating authority, all lead to the guess that the Legislature, had it considered the question in enacting the Public Employment Relations Act, would have designated the county board of commissioners, not the court, as the public employer of circuit and probate court employees to bargain collectively with them MCLA 423.201 etseq.).
15. Courts — Inherent Power — Administrative Order.
The review procedure of the administrative order prohibiting any judge from ordering the expenditure of public funds for any judicially required purpose until the order had been submitted to the Court Administrator was established as a constraint on the improvident exercise by judges of the inherent power to promulgate orders in emergency situations, and was not designed to review collective bargaining agreements (Administrative Order 1971-6).
16. Courts — Financing—Budgeting—Emergency—Inherent Power.
Any change in the method of Snancing or budgeting the judicial branch is a legislative, not a judicial, responsibility; however desirable or beneñcial the sought-for change may be, it does not create an emergency justifying invocation of inherent power.
17. Courts — Inherent Power.
Courts do not possess inherent power to appropriate money or require expenditures for whatever needs the judge, the Court Administrator, and the Supreme Court on review, determine are reasonable; inherent power exists only for true emergencies.
18. Labor Relations — "Public Employer” — Courts—Counties.
The public employer of circuit court and probate court employees of Livingston County is the Board of Commissioners of that county, and the 53rd District Court is the public employer of district court employees; these employers should negotiate new agreements with their employees.
Thomas Kizer, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiffs.
Stringari, Fritz, Kreger, Asher & Ahearn, P. C, for defendant.
Zwerdling, Maurer, Diggs & Papp, for intervenor.
Amici Curiae:
Freihoffer, Cook, Hecht, Oosterhouse & DeBoer, P. C. (by George C. Cook and Janet T. Neff).
Aloysius J. Suchy, Corporation Counsel, and David R. Kaplan, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Wayne County.
Foster, Lindemer, Swift & Collins, P. C. (by David Vander Haagen).

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We granted leave to appeal, 391 Mich 781 (1974), to consider questions raised by Livingston County's Board of Commissioners in connection with the first collective bargaining contract settled upon by a local judiciary and its employees to be tested in this Court. We affirm earlier decisions in deciding that the bargaining parties basically utilized correct procedures, but we reach no conclusion as to the reasonableness or necessity of the contractual provisions.
On September 22, 1972, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) certified Michigan Council 55, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, as a bargaining representative for a unit of district and circuit court employees in Livingston County. No one has challenged the appropriateness of that unit in this Court.
The bargaining representative, employees, and representatives of the judiciary then engaged in bargaining over a contract. This was to be expected, and was correct, in light of this Court's decision in Judges of the 74th Judicial District v Bay County, 385 Mich 710; 190 NW2d 219 (1971). During bargaining, according to the complaint and answer filed in this cause, it appears that a representative of the Board of Commissioners was excluded from the bargaining room. The specific details of the reasoning behind such exclusion are not set forth. This Court believes the best practice, in general, especially at initial bargaining sessions, is for the local judiciary to invite a representative of the commissioners to appear personally at such sessions. The commissioners' representative cannot actively bargain, of course, but such representative may present relevant data as to other county employees, e.g., wage levels for comparable jobs, provisions in other labor contracts, general county benefits, and county budget information.
The bargaining parties arrived at a contract on June 22, 1973. Circuit Judge Paul R. Mahinske issued an administrative order implementing the contract on July 16, 1973, and then on July 18, 1973, he submitted such order to the Court Administrator for approval, pursuant to this Court's Administrative Order No. 1971-6, 386 Mich xxix. This Court affirms those actions as being correct. The order of July 16, 1973, might not in some cases be necessary, but if it is, then review by the Court Administrator becomes a step in insuring the reasonableness and necessity of the contractual provisions. It was conceded by appellants, at oral argument, that their representatives were invited to the Court Administrator's office for a presentation of the commissioners' views on the contract. But it appears that the commissioners did not participate in a point-by-point, clause-by-clause, discussion of the contract, as this Court hoped would be the case under Administrative Order 1971-6. The reason for such nonparticipation appears to lie with the judgment of the commissioners' representatives, and their decision does not aid their argument that they have been denied due process of law.
Appellants now advance two basic arguments: that separation of powers has been violated, and that due process and equal protection have been denied because they have not been afforded a neutral forum in which to determine whether or not the provisions of the contract are reasonable and necessary. But the bargaining process used here does not violate the explanation of separation of powers set forth in Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 386 Mich 1; 190 NW2d 228 (1971), cert den 405 US 923; 92 S Ct 961; 30 L Ed 2d 794 (1972), and Commonwealth, ex rel Carroll, v Tate, 442 Pa 45; 274 A2d 193 (1971), cert den 402 US 974; 91 S Ct 1665; 29 L Ed 2d 138 (1971), and we continue to adhere to those precedents.
The reasonableness and necessity of such contracts are subject to review in Michigan. We already have provided for an administrative check on reasonableness through Administrative Order 1971-6. In addition, once the Court Administrator has approved a contract the Board of Commissioners may institute adversary court proceedings to test the reasonableness and necessity of the contract if it appears that the budget reflecting the contract will exceed the total appropriation. The commissioners may file suit promptly for injunctive relief in circuit court in their own county. Since the purpose of such suit would be to enjoin an administrative order of a judge of that very county, the commissioners may seek designation by the Court Administrator of a disinterested judge to decide the case on its merits. In order to expedite the settlement of disputes over wages and working conditions, any appellate review of the decision of the circuit court shall be by direct application for leave to appeal to this Court, and no writ of mandamus shall lie under Administrative Order 1971-6 until such proceedings, promptly begun and diligently pursued, are terminated.
By such holding, this Court's intent is to afford the legislative body a neutral forum in which reasonableness and necessity may be determined after adversary hearings. This Court is aware that this procedure may prolong public employee collective bargaining, and thus may disappoint the union and its membership. This Court also is aware that the commissioners may claim that any proceeding presided over by a judge will not be a neutral forum, and thus the commissioners may also be disappointed. The Court reminds the parties, however, that the Legislature has based public employee collective bargaining in Michigan on an industrial model. Such a model contains inherent difficulties when the ultimate public employer, the voting public, has elected representatives to three separate units in order to govern itself fairly.
The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint for superintending control, and is affirmed, without prejudice to the filing by plaintiffs-appellants of an appropriate circuit court action within 20 days of the issuance of this opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, Swainson, Williams, M. S. Coleman, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred.