Case Name: Joseph R. LACOSTE, Jr. v. Lorraine Metzler LACOSTE
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-11-30
Citations: 665 So. 2d 1229
Docket Number: No. 95-C-2122
Parties: Joseph R. LACOSTE, Jr. v. Lorraine Metzler LACOSTE.
Judges: Before BYRNES, CIACCIO, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 665
Pages: 1229–1234

Head Matter:
Joseph R. LACOSTE, Jr. v. Lorraine Metzler LACOSTE.
No. 95-C-2122.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 30, 1995.
Writ Granted Feb. 16, 1996.
Robert Charles Lowe, Steven Anthony Giaviano, David N. Prados, Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hawyer, New Orleans, for relator.
Darleen Marie Jacobs, A Professional Law Corporation, New Orleans, for respondent.
Before BYRNES, CIACCIO, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
hBYRNES, Judge.
The relator, Mr. Lacoste applied to this Court for writs to review a ruling by the trial court requiring him to pay post divorce alimony pendente lite pending a determination of the question of fault.
The parties were married on January 6, 1990 and have no children. Mr. Lacoste filed a petition for divorce on August 8, 1994, alleging that the spouses lived apart for 180 days. Mrs. Lacoste filed a similar petition for divorce on August 16, 1994, alleging that she was free from fault, and requesting alimony pendente lite of $15,000/month. On October 21, 1994, the parties entered into a consent judgment setting alimony pendente lite of $2,625/month from judicial demand, allowing Mrs. Lacoste to receive rental payments, use and occupancy of 6733-35 Louisville St., and making the wife responsible for all routine costs and expenses related to that property.
A judgment of divorce was granted on the husband's rule to show cause on June 14, 1995. The judgment provided: "The fault issue is pretermitted." The wife filed a rule to make past due alimony pendente lite (for June, July and August 1995) executory, which was granted on September 22, 1995. Mr. Lacoste seeks our review of that order.
|2The judgment granting the divorce has been appealed by neither party. The right to alimony pendente lite terminates when the divorce becomes final and definitive. Cassidy v. Cassidy, 477 So.2d 84 (La.1985) and Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 93-1964, p. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/27/94), 644 So.2d 1125, 1127-28, unit denied, 94r-2896 (La. 2/17/94), 650 So.2d 252.
Mrs. Lacoste argues that her right to alimony pendente lite continues until the issue of fault has been disposed of. Mrs. Lacoste prevails only if this Court finds either: 1) that alimony pendente lite continues until there has been a final decision on the question of fault independent of the finality of the divorce judgment; or 2) that a judgment of divorce cannot be considered final and definitive until the question of fault has been resolved. We find neither.
In Cassidy, 477 So.2d at 84, the Supreme Court set forth the facts:
After a trial on the merits, the trial court granted a separation based on mutual fault, and a divorce based on the couple living separately and apart for one year. This judgment precluded Mrs. Cassidy from receiving permanent alimony.
Mrs. Cassidy devolutively appealed the judgment finding her at fault in the separation.
The Cassidy court framed the issue succinctly at 477 So.2d at 85:
The single question before this court is should alimony pendente lite continue after a judgment of divorce but during an appeal of that judgment. Alimony pendente lite should continue during the pendency of an appeal until the divorce judgment becomes definitive. [Emphasis added.]
Note that the Cassidy court did not say that the single question was whether alimony pendente should continue pending a final determination of the question of fault. Although Mrs. Cassidy did not technically appeal the divorce decision, the Supreme Court reasoned at 477 So.2d at 86 that her appeal of the separation had the effect of preventing the divorce from becoming final:
Although divorce does not require a period of separation, it would be anomalous to consider a couple divorced Igwhen their separation is still being contested. Hill v. Hill, 114 La. 117, 38 So. 77 (1905). If such a practice were allowed, an appellate court might find itself denying a separation to couple that is already divorced. [Emphasis added.]
Thus in Cassidy the court's decision to award alimony pendente lite was based on the fact that pending the appeal of the separation the divorce could not be considered final. It was this lack of finality of the divorce, not the question of fault that gave rise to the right to alimony pendente lite in Cassidy. This is consistent with Wheelahan, and, indeed, all cases from this circuit subsequent to Cassidy as well as the codal bases for the alimony pendente lite versus permanent alimony. Wheelahan, 644 So.2d at 1127, explains that: "With the adoption of no fault divorce and the complete revision of the divorce provisions of the Civil Code of La. Acts 1990, No. 1009, the necessity of a suit for separation from bed and board became extinct." Therefore, under the new divorce laws the separation loses its significance and can no longer suspend the finality of the divorce decree as it could at the time of the Cassidy decision. But the rationale of the Cassidy decision, i.e., that alimony pendente lite is due until the divorce is final and definitive still holds.
Alimony pendente lite is based on the marriage relationship and does not cease according to Cassidy "until death or a definitive resolution of the divorce litigation." [Emphasis added.] Alimony pendente lite is not fault based and cannot be denied to a spouse at fault. Therefore, the question of fault alone is not sufficient to keep the right to alimony pendente lite alive. It is only when fault litigation has been coupled with proceedings that prevented the finality of the divorce that it has appeared that alimony pendente lite was related to the question of fault. But that relationship is only coincidental and illusory.
Dicta from this Court in Crifasi v. Crifasi, 94-0962, p. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95), 650 So.2d 347; Olson v. Olson, 519 So.2d 828 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988); and Martinez v. Martinez, 503 So.2d 544 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987) refer to the determination of fault, but the divorce was appealed in each of these cases. The Crifasi opinion commences with the statement by this Court that:
Appellant, Peggy Crifasi appeals judgments of the trial court granting Frank J. Crifasi a divorce . [Emphasis added.]
The fact that the appeal of the divorce was deemed abandoned in Crifasi when the appeal was ultimately decided does not change the fact that the appeal of the divorce suspended its effect until this Court ruled on appeal that the appeal of the divorce had been abandoned. In Crifasi, 650 So.2d at 349, this Court refers to "the fact that the divorce is now final" meaning contemporaneous with the rendering of the opinion. Cf. Zatzkis v. Zatzkis, 629 So.2d 1285,1286, writ denied 94-0159 (La. 6/24/94), 640 So.2d 1340, where neither party contested the divorce on appeal. This Court found that the divorce was part of the judgment that was appealed and, therefore, it was appealed when the judgment including it was appealed as a whole. This Court concluded that this entitled Mrs. Zatzkis to alimony pendente lite.
In Martinez this Court said at the outset that "the wife, Katherine De Montluzin Martinez, appeals the divorce." [Emphasis added.]
Likewise, in Olson this Court noted that "... the wife, Toni Watson Olson, appeals the divorce judgment." [Emphasis added.]
Thus the statements in Crifasi Martinez, and Olson concerning the continuation of alimony pendente lite until final disposition of the fault question are best regarded as dicta, the better explanation being that the divorces were appealed. In Wheelahan the divorce was not appealed.
Crifasi, Martinez, and Olson all rely on Cassidy and must be interpreted with that in mind.
_[sWe are aware that the first and second circuits may not share this view. See Nungesser v. Nungesser, 558 So.2d 695 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990), writ denied 560 So.2d 30 (La.1990); Wilson v. Brittain, 640 So.2d 261 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993); and Unkel v. Unkel, 26-650 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 382. We feel that the better view based on a more thorough analysis of the issues has been expressed by this Court in Wheelahan and by the fifth circuit in Williams v. Williams, 541 So.2d 928 (La.App. 5 Cir.1989), units denied 544 So.2d 384 (La.1989).
Additionally, we note that Nungesser may not be at variance with this decision. In Nungesser, 558 So.2d at 698 the court held that Mr. Nungesser was obligated to pay alimony pendente lite pending the appeal of the divorce: "Because the judgment of divorce was appealed and thus was not definitive, Mr. Nungesser's obligation to pay alimony pendente lite still existed." Mr. Nungesser also complained that he was required to continue to pay alimony pen-dente lite even after the appeal of the divorce had been dismissed. However, we infer from a careful reading of the case that the separation judgment was on appeal just as it was in Cassidy. In any event, Nungesser relies on Napoli v. Napoli, 543 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989) which is both clear and consistent with this Court's opinion expressed in the instant case:
[Alimony pendente lite] arises from the obligation of one spouse to support the other during the pendency of the marriage. It does not depend on the merits of the suit for separation or divorce, or upon the actual or prospective outcome of the suit. However, once the marriage is terminated, the mutual obligation of support, which is the foundation of alimony pendente lite, no longer exists. As such, this support does not terminate until a final, or definitive, judgment of divorce. Before a divorce judgment becomes definitive, it can be sus-pensively appealed. La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 3942. Since the marriage continues during an appeal of a divorce judgment, so does the obligation of care and support. Cassidy v. Cassidy, 477 So.2d 84 (La.1985). Napoli, 543 So.2d at 100.
The Wilson case relied on Nungesser and is no more persuasive. The Unkel case relied on Miguez v. Miguez, 604 So.2d 1056 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992). This Court does not adopt the Miguez reading of Cassidy.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rule granting alimony pendente lite following the judgment of divorce is reversed.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED.
PLOTKIN, J., dissents.