Case Name: GALLENKAMP v. GARVIN MACH. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-02-05
Citations: 86 N.Y.S. 378
Docket Number: 
Parties: GALLENKAMP v. GARVIN MACH. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 86
Pages: 378–386

Head Matter:
(91 App. Div. 141.)
GALLENKAMP v. GARVIN MACH. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 5, 1904.)
1. Master and Servant—Employment of Minors—Dangerous Machinery.
It cannot be said as a matter of law that a conveyor consisting of an endless chain with metallic pan-shaped shelves about every 13 feet, moving about a foot a second, used for carrying tools from one floor to another of a factory, is not a dangerous machine, within Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415, § 81, providing that children under 16 years of age shall not be permitted to assist in operating dangerous machines of any kind.
2. Same—Operating.
One who attends, on a floor of a factory, a machine for conveying articles from one floor to another, assists in operating it within Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415, § 81, providing that children under 16 shall not be permitted to assist in operating dangerous machines.
3. Same—Contributory Negligence—Questions for Jury.
Whether a boy 15 years old, attending a machine for conveying tools from one floor to another of a factory, in trying to prevent tools from falling in the shaft, was guilty of contributory negligence in placing his head in the shaft, where the shelves of the machine were moving about a foot a second, so that he was struck by one, was a question for the jury.
Ingraham and McLaughlin, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Gustav Gallenkamp, Jr., by his guardian ad litem, against the Garvin Machine Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant pursuant to an order granting a motion for a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s case, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, O’BRIEN, INGRAHAM, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Alexander Rosenthal, for appellant.
Franklin Pierce, for respondent.

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
This action is brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant. The action is predicated upon a violation of section 81 of the labor law (Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415), which provides that "children under sixteen years of age shall not be permitted to operate or assist in operating dangerous machines of any kind." The defendant was a manufacturer of tools and machinery, and its plant was in the city of New York. The building consisted of eight floors. A machine known as a "conveyor," operated by mechanical power, was used by the defendant for the purpose of carrying tools to and from the different floors. It was constructed in a shaft extending from the bottom to the top of the building. The walls of the shaft were three inches in thickness, consisting of steel laths with plaster upon either side. The conveyor consisted of endless chains, passing over sprocket wheels 18 inches in diameter located at the top and basement of the building, with pan-shaped metallic shelves about 3 feet in length attached to and suspended between the chains at intervals of about 13 feet. The conveyor was in constant motion during business hours. There were .two openings in the shaft at each floor, one opposite the ascending pans and the other opposite those descending for the purpose of putting on and taking off tools. These openings were about 18 inches above the floor, and were 3 feet wide and 46 inches high, and had doors by which they could be closed when not in use. The conveyor moved at the rate of about one foot per second. On or about the 3d day of June, 1902, the plaintiff applied to the defendant for employment. He was accompanied by his father, who, in answer to an inquiry by the superintendent as to the boy's age, said he had "just turned fifteen," which was the fact. According to the plaintiff's testimony the superintendent refused to employ him unless a certificate was obtained from the board of health to the effect that he was 16 years of age; and upon a misrepresentation of the facts such a certificate was obtained and presented, and the plaintiff was employed. For seven days he worked in the tool room on the third floor under one Herman Lehr. On the eighth day Lehr directed him to attend the conveyor on the fourth floor, on account of the absence of the boy who regularly attended it. This was his first experience at that work, and he had received no warning as to the danger or instructions as' to the safe method of performing the duties thus assigned. There were from 50 to 75 mechanics working on that floor. After plaintiff had been working at the conveyor four or five hours, one of the employés came over with five tools to be sent to another floor, and requested plaintiff to "hurry up and get these checks for these tools." Their system was to have slips accompany the tools to be receipted and returned. The plaintiff testified that he immediately filled out such a slip, and proceeded to put the tools upon one of the pans of the descending conveyor; that two of the tools, just as he got them in the pan, fell over the side, and "I made a grab for them to catch them, but they were too far gone, and just then the pan came down and caught my head between the pan and the landing." It appears that there was a space of about six inches between the edge of the pan and the side of the shaft toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted that he knew that if he put his head far enough into the opening to be within range of these passing pans he was liable to receive injuries.
The respondent seeks to sustain the judgment upon three grounds: (i) That this was not a dangerous machine; (2) that the plaintiff was neither operating nor assisting in operating it; and (3) that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law.
I think it cannot be said as matter of law that this was not a dangerous machine within the contemplation of the statute. It was a mechanical contrivance, in constant motion, and propelled by practically irresistible mechanical power. The plaintiff was obliged to remove the tools from a pan while it-was passing this opening of less than four feet, which would take only about four seconds, and likewise he was obliged to load a pan while it was passing the same distance. Although the conveyor did not move with great rapidity, yet it is manifest that the work was attended with danger, and the safety of the operator required that he should be of Sufficiently mature judgment to keep his mind constantly upon the work. In the case of Hindle v. Birtwhistle, 1 Q. B. (1897) 192, in sustaining a conviction for a violation of the factory act of England for neglect to properly guard dangerous machinery, where the question arose as to whether the machinery was dangerous, it was said, "Machinery or parts of machinery is or are dangerous if in the ordinary course of human affairs danger may be reasonably anticipated from the use of them without protection."
I am also of the opinion that the plaintiff was assisting in the operation of this machine. Strictly speaking, perhaps the person who applied the power to set the machinery in motion was the operator; but the mere operation of the machine without the agency of the employes upon the different floors would have been fruitless. It was intended as a time-saving device, and to render its operation effectual required the assistance of employés upon the different floors. Those thus engaged were clearly, I think, assisting, at least, in operating the machine within the fair intent and meaning of the statute.
The question of contributory negligence was, in my opinion, one for the consideration of the jury. In the case of Marino v Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530, 66 N. E. 572, 61 L. R. A. 811, where a boy 13 years of age employed in a factory in violation of another provision of the labor law prohibiting the employment of children under the age of 14 years in factories, was injured by the starting of a cogwheel while he was cleaning a press. The Court of Appeals held that the mere employment of the plaintiff in violation of the statute was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant sufficient to take the case to- the jury, and that the statute amounted to a legislative declaration that children under 14 years of age, in accepting employment and performing duties assigned to them in violation of the law, were not of sufficient age and discretion to be deemed guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. The prohibition against the employment of children under 16 years of age in the operation or assisting in the operation of dangerous machinery requires the same construction. The Legislature, although it saw fit to permit the employment of children over 14 and under 16 years of age in factories, deemed it necessary to prohibit their employment in operating or assisting 'in the operation of dangerous machines. It is evident that the Legislature appreciated that children between those ages are apt to be, thoughtless and absent-minded, and to have their attention diverted from work, and therefore are liable to injury if working on dangerous machines. The.effect of the Court of Appeals decision in the Marino Case is that contributory negligence, even in such case, relieves the employer of liability, but that it is a question for the jury whether or not the infant was guilty of contributory negligence. Doubtless, if it appeared that the plaintiff, at the time realizing and appreciating the danger, heedlessly thrust his head in the path of the descending pans, it would be contributory negligence as matter of law; but that is not this case. The plaintiff was injured while attempting as best he could to perform the duties assigned to him. It was for the jury to say whether at the time he appreciated and realized the danger, and, if so, he would be guilty of contributory negligence ; but, if not, they would be justified in finding freedom from contributory negligence on his part. The case of Monzi v. Friedline, 33 App. Div. 217, 53 N. Y. Supp. 482, was decided long before the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Marino Case, and it is unnecessary to decide now whether it is affected by the latter, for there the plaintiff was 17 years of age, and, while the decision went upon the assumption that greasing a cable to an elevator, which he was operating, was cleaning machinery, and within the prohibition of the statute forbidding the employment of males under 18 years to clean machinery while in motion, yet there the plaintiff had control of the motion of the elevator and cable; and the motion which caused the injury was his own act, and he was deemed clearly negligent as matter of law.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with 'costs to appellant to abide the event.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.