Case Name: BRAVO ELECTRIC CO., INC., Appellant, v. CARTER ELECTRIC CO., etc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-03-17
Citations: 522 So. 2d 480
Docket Number: No. 87-667
Parties: BRAVO ELECTRIC CO., INC., Appellant, v. CARTER ELECTRIC CO., etc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: COBB and COWART, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 522
Pages: 480–482

Head Matter:
BRAVO ELECTRIC CO., INC., Appellant, v. CARTER ELECTRIC CO., etc., et al., Appellees.
No. 87-667.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 17, 1988.
Richard W. Prospect of Haas, Boehm, Brown, Rigdon, Seacrest & Fischer, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert K. Rouse, Jr., of Smith, Schoder and Rouse, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Bravo Electric Company, Inc., seeks review of an order which states:
[T]he MOTION OF CARTER ELECTRIC FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed by the plaintiff as to liability only is hereby granted.
Sua sponte, this court, citing Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So.2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed because it appeared that the order appealed from was a nonfinal, nonap-pealable order.
In Servotech, Inc. v. Atlantic Central Corporation, 497 So.2d 1341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), the trial judge granted the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. On appeal this court noted that no partial summary judgment was ever entered, and that the order merely granting the plaintiffs motion was itself not subject to appeal. This court also stated:
Our affirmance does not preclude defendant from obtaining review of a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff (Fla.R. App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv)) (as distinguished from a mere order granting a motion for a partial summary judgment, as was entered in this case) or from a final judgment in the cause (Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(1)(A)).
Id. at 1343, n. 2.
As a particular legal matter, an interlocutory trial court order merely granting or denying a motion neither adjudicates or judicially settles questions or issues of fact or law. Certainly it determines nothing conclusively or authoritatively. At best, it indicates which way the trial judge is thinking and, unless he changes his mind, which way he will rule when the subject matter of the motion is judicially determined. Traditionally it has been held that trial judges have the right and authority, at any time before entering a final judgment, to change their minds and to change any prior interlocutory ruling.
The appealed order in this case is nonfi-nal and does not adjudicate the issue of liability within the meaning of Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv); therefore, this cause is remanded to the trial court for 30 days for entry of an appealable order. See Lawler v. Harris, 418 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
REMANDED.
COBB and COWART, JJ., concur.
ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion.
. Alabama Hotel Co. v. J.L. Mott Iron Works, 86 Fla. 608, 98 So. 825 (1924); Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
. The dissent's contention that the 1977 revision of the appellate rules in regard to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), formerly Rule 4.2, would be meaningless unless construed to eliminate the need for a judgment to support an interlocutory appeal is unpersuasive. The purpose of the revision was to eliminate summary defense judgments from the category of interlocutory appeals, since they would be subject to plenary appeal as final judgments. The revision was intended to restrict, not expand, the appealability of "nonfinal judgments." Travelers Insurance Company v. Bruns, 443 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla.1984) (emphasis added).