Case Name: VIOLET BOGY MOSELEY v. BERNARD P. BOGY et al; BERNARD P. BOGY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1917-12-01
Citations: 272 Mo. 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: VIOLET BOGY MOSELEY v. BERNARD P. BOGY et al; BERNARD P. BOGY, Appellant.
Judges: Boy, C., dissents.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 272
Pages: 319–341

Head Matter:
VIOLET BOGY MOSELEY v. BERNARD P. BOGY et al; BERNARD P. BOGY, Appellant.
In Banc,
December 1, 1917.
1. CURTESY: In Property Devised by Will. If the wife’s will gives an undivided half interest in fee simple in her property to her husband, and the other undivided half interest to their children in fee simple, the husband- is put to his election as to whether he will claim under the will or claim his curtesy devolved upon him by operation of law. The two claims are inconsistent, and he cannot have a half in fee simple, and a curtesy in the other half.
Held, by WILLIAMS, J., dissenting, that the intention to exclude the husband from his legal right to curtesy must be clearly expressed; if it is doubtful, he is not excluded.
2. WILL: Devise to Husband: Fee Simple Exclusive.of Curtesy. The first clause of-the will read: “Should I die leaving surviving me my husband and a child or children, then it is my will that my whole estate, real and personal, be divided between my husband and children, in the proportion of one-half to my husband and one-half to my child or children.” The third clause read: “Should I die leaving surviving me neither husband nor children, then and in such event I give, devise and bequeath my whole estate; both real and personal, to my mother, Anne El Griffith.” Held, that testatrix’s intention -was to devise to her husband a half interest in fee simple in her entire property, and a half interest in fee simple to her children, and not to devise the real estate subject to the husband’s curtesy,, even though the will. by its terms does not . attempt to dispose of his curtesy. The word “estate” did not mean the interest she had in the property, but meant the property itself; and 'that view is enforced by the third clause, which uses the same words to describe the property and gives her “whole estate, real and personal” to her mother, in case neither husband nor children survived her, it being clear that she intended to give a vendible fee simple title to her mother in such event.
Held (by GRAVES, C. J., concurring) that the same view is further enforced by the second clause of the will by which testatrix declared that in case of her death leaving her husband surviving, but no child or children, her “whole estate, real and personal” is given in equal parts to her husband and mother, thereby making it clear that she did not intend to make the real estate given to her mother subject, to the husband’s lifetime enjoyment.
Held, by WILLIAMS, J., dissenting, that the husband had an estate or interest in the'lands at the time the will was made, and the will by its very terms includes everything that was hers and excludes everything'else; and there being no clearly expressed intention to exclude the husband’s curtesy, he was not put to his election, but was entitled to hold both his estate by the curtesy and the half interest in the remainder devised to him by the will.
3. -: Election: By Butting Will Into Effect. The husband, to whom his. wife’s will gave one half her property in fee simple, by presenting the will to the probate court and making the usual affidavit, by applying for letters testamentary and qualifying as executor, by filing an inventory of the, estate and swearing to same, in which he set forth the real estate and listed no personal property, by his final settlement reporting that there was no personal property for distribution and being discharged, by receiving a benefit under the will which gave to him a vendible fee simple title to one half of testatrix’s property, and by thus deliberately putting the will into effect with full knowledge of his rights under it and of all the property affected by its provisions, elected to take under the will, and cannot now elect to renounce it and take his curtesy in the entire estate.
Held, by GRAVES, C. J., concurring, that a letter addressed to . his daughter’s lawyer in which he stated that at the time the will was probated he was informed by the court that he had “a fee simple in one half and a curtesy in the other half, as there were no conditions attached to the acceptance of the one half left me absolutely,” further shows that he was claiming under the will, one half the estate in fee simple and the other half for life, and manifested his election to take under the will.
Held, by WILLIAMS, J., dissenting, (1) that the act of the husband in presenting the will for probate and acting as executor thereunder does not, in itself, constitute an election to claim under the will, and the fact that he was informed by the probate court when he presented the will for probate that he was entitled to one-half the estate in fee simple and to curtesy in the other half nullifies any inference of an election that may be otherwise drawn from qualifying as executor under the will; (2) that the fact that he claimed both curtesy and under the will does not of itself amount to an election to take under the will and relinquish his curtesy; and (3) that if the facts show an election they show an election to take the curtesy and not under the will, since he never received any property under the will, and there was no personalty, there has been no change in the ownership or possession of any of the realty since testatrix’s death, and he has claimed to be collecting the rents by right of his curtesy.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Rhodes E. Cave, Judge.
Affirmed.
S. T. G. Smith for appellant.
(1) A married woman cannot by will dispose of ber real property except subject to the rights of tbe husband to his curtesy therein. Sec. 536, R. S. 1909. (2) Where a man and woman are married and issue capable of inheriting is born of said marriage, the husband, by operation of law, immediately becomes vested of a freehold estate in all real property of which the wife was seized at the time of her death. Myers v. Hansbrough, 202 Mo. 495; Donovan v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149; Kennedy v. Koopman, 166 Mo. 87; Fitzgerald v. Brennan, 57 Conn. 743; Foster v. Marshall, 22 N. H. 491; In re Folwell’s Estate, 59 Atl. (N. J.) 467. (3) A provision in a will of a wife in favor of her husband will never be presumed to be in lieu of curtesy unless such a design is unequivocally expressed. Bryant v. Buford, 49 Mo. 546; Hasenritter v. Hasenritter, 77 Mo. 162; Richardson v. DeGiverville, 107 Mo. 422; Burnley v. Thomas, 63 Mo. 392; Pemberton v. Pemberton, 29 Mo. 408; 1 Jarman on AVills (6 Ed.), p. 547. (4) Where a testatrix owns a partial interest in real estate and devises the “whole of my estate,” all that passes by her will is that part of the fee simple which is left in the testatrix by the law after the curtesy right of the husband has been cut out of the fee simple, and such a devise does not convey, or attempt to convey, the curtesy right of the husband. Myers v. Hansbrough, 202 Mo. 495; Donovan v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149; Pratt v. Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq. 510; Penn v. G-uggenheimer, 76 Ya. 839. (5) Where a testatrix has only a partial interest in real estate and in her will employs general words in disposing of same, such as “my whole estate,” “all my lands,” “all my estate,” no case of election arises which requires a devisee holding a part of the property to elect whether he will take under the will or keep what he already has. Keas v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647; Penn v. Guggenheimer, 76 Ya. 839; Tony v. Spragins, 80 Ala. 541; Charch v. Charch, 57 Ohio St. 561; Pratt v. Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq. 510; 1 Pomeroy on Eq. Jur., sec. 473. (6)’ The word “my” in a will used to describe property disposed of is expressive of restriction to the extent of the interest of the testator only. Sauvage v. Wanhop, 143 S. W. (Tex.) 259; Emery v. Haven, 67 N. II. 505; Estate of Mumford, 1 Myrick Prob. R. 134; Thomas v. Blair, 111 La. Ann. 683. (7) If the court should find that this case is a case for an election, it appearing that the appellant Bernard P. Bogy has never exercised his right of election, then he is still entitled to elect as to which he will take, his curtesy right, or the half given by the will of his wife, Eleanor M. Bogy. Pratt v. .Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq. 510; Shuster v. Morton, 187 S. W. (Mo:) 2; Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534.
Arthur G. Moseley and W. W. Herron for respondent.
(1) The action for partition in this case should be sustained, although it might be held that the defendant has title by curtesy. R. S. 1909, sec. 2559; Atkinson v. Brady, 114 Mo. 202. (2) The rules of law with reference to curtesy and dower are closely analogous in this State, and a construction placed upon 1 he rights of the party in the one instance will, when it can be done, be placed upon the rights of the party in the other. R. S. 1909, secs. 120, 360, 361, 535, 536; Teckenhrock v. McLaughlin, 246 Mo. 717; Moore v. Hurd, 76 Kan. 826; Everett v. Kresky, 92 Iowa, 333. (3) Estates given by will are always regarded as vesting immediately unless the testator has clearly manifested an intention that they should be contingent upon a future event. Schofield v. Allcott, 120 111. 374. An intervening life estate in one of the donees was not contemplated by the testatrix making this will, and consequently not intended by her; am intervening life estate would delay the enjoyment of the provisions made in the will for the benefit of the three donees and cannot but be antagonistic to the provisions of the will and the intention of the testatrix as shown thereby. (4) Where the surviving husband who otherwise would be entitled to a curtesy in the lands of his deceased wife is left a part of her lands in the will, he is obliged under the law to elect whether or not he will take under the will or under the law, for he cannot take under both. Casler v. Gray, 159 Mo. 595; Young v. Boardman, 79 Mo. 186; Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534, 64 L. R. A. 287; Fox v. Windes, 127 Mo. 511, 48 Am. St. 648; 1 Woerner, Am. Law of Adm. (2 Ed.), p. 500; Wood v. Trust Co., 265 Mo. 511; Schuster v. Morton, 187 S. W. (Mo.) 2; Clark v. Clark, 132 Ind. 25; Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa., 500; Clark’s Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 377; McBride’s Estate, 81 Pa. St. 305; Severson v. Severson, 68 Ohio, 656; Aschenford v. Chapman, 81 Kan. 312; Pearson v. Harrington, 32 Ala. 240; Allen v. Boomer, 82 Wis. 371; McReynolds v. Jones, 30 Ala. 101. (5) The will must be accepted as a whole. The donee cannot accept the part that is in his favor and reject the portion that may be against him. Wood v. Trust Co., 265 Mo. 211; Stoeckler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 270; Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 444; O’Brien'v. Ash., 169 „ Mo. 300; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 30 W. Va. 604; Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534; Ditch v. Sennott, 117 111. 367. (6) The appellant by his acts in probating the will, qualifying under it as executor, a>s' well as by other conduct with reference thereto, elected to take under the will, and now cannot relinquish. Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 440; Allen v. Allen, 124 N. C. 334; Allen v. Boomer, 82 Wis. 372; Smith v. Wells, 134 Mass. 11; Mitchell v. Vest, 136 N. W. (Iowa) 1055; Craig v. Conover, 80 Iowa, 358; In re Frank’s Estate, 66 N. W. 919; Appeal of Coe, 64 Conn. 352; In re Melot’s Estate, 231 Pa. 520; Hydev. Baldwin, 17 Pick. (Miss.) 307; Weeks v. Patten, 18 Me. 47; Martin v. Battey, 87 Kan. 582; Hoggard v. Jordan, 14 N. C. 610; 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 634; Schuster v. Morton, 187 S. W: (Mo.) 2. (7) Under the Married Woman’s Act a husband has no vested estate in his wife’s separate property during her life. Evans v. Lob-dale, 6 ILoust. (Del.) 215. (8) In the construction of a will the intention of the testator must prevail unless it is contrary to some rule of law. Borland on Wills, p. 296; Burnet v. Burnet, 244 Mo. 497. (9) The estate by curtesy is derived by the husband through his wife and contemplates a continuation of the estates of the wife in the husband during his life and makes no break in the succession, whereas title by will is an alienation and constitutes a passing of the title. 1 Washburn on Real Property, p. 159; Hayes v. Baprniger, 169 Fed. 224.

Opinion:
WHITE, C.
The plaintiff sued in ejectment for a one-fourth interest in certain real estate in the city of St. Louis, and in a second count of the petition demanded partition of the same alleging that the plaintiff was entitled to an undivided one-fourth interest in fee simple in the premises; the defendant Bernard P. Bogy to an undivided one-half interest, and the defendant Bernard P. Bogy, Jr., to an undivided one-fourth interest. Plaintiff is the daughter, and defendant Bernard P. Bogy, Jr., is the son, of Eleanor M. Bogy, deceased, and defendant Bernard P. Bogy is the surviving husband of Eleanor M., and the father of Violet and Bernard P., Jr. Plaintiff claims under the will of her mother who died June 10, 1904. Defendant Bernard P. Bogy in his separate answer asserts his right to possession of the property in dispute, by virtue of his curtesy.
The plaintiff in reply set up the will of Eleanor M. Bogy, alleged that Bernard P. Bogy accepted its provisions, and elected to take under it, and further alleged that by such acts he was estopped to claim any interest in the real estate contrary to its provisions. The first clause of the will is as follows:
"First. Should I die leaving surviving me my husband and a child or .children, then it is my will that my whole estate, real and personal, be divided between my husband and children, in the proportion of one half to my husband and one half to my child or children. ' '
The third clause is as follows:
"Third. Should I die leaving surviving me neither husband nor children, then and in such event I give, devise and bequeath my whole estate, both real and personal, to my mother Ann E. Griffith."
The fourth clause appoints Bernard P. Bogy executor and requests that he may serve without bond. The judgment of the circuit court was in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
I. If it was the intention of the testatrix by the first clause of the will to give her husband an undivided one-half interest in fee simple in the premises and to her children an undivided half interest in fee simple, and that intention clearly appears, then Bernard P. Bogy was put to his election. a.s to whether he would claim under the will or claim his curtesy devolved upon him by operation of law. The two claims are inconsistent. The children could not have their fee simple interest if his.curtesy should be carved out leaving them only a remainder, and he would not have a vendible, fee-simple, half interest in the property if he simply held his life estate in the whole.
The principle applicable here has been considered and discussed in all its important phases in recent adjudications of this court. The rule announced by this court may be stated thus: Where a testator by will attempts to dispose of property which the will cannot affect because by operation of the law it devolves upon another, and at the same time makes provision for such other out of property which the testator may devise, the other cannot accept the provision of the will without allowing his property to go as the will directs. [Stoepler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 258, l. c. 270; Wood v. Trust Co., 265 Mo. l. c. 525, and cases there cited; Lindsley v. Patterson, 177 S. W. l. c. 832; Schuster v. Morton, 187 S. W. 2.] All those oases, under varying circumstances and construing different statutes, announce the principle in similar general terms.
II. It is claimed by appellant that the will by its-terms does not attempt to dispose- of the curtesy of Bernard P. Bogy, and therefore he is not put to his election. Appellant contends with much subtlety and plausibility that the use of the expression ' ' my whole estate, real and personal, ' ' could not include the estate and interest of the surviving husband; and further that the testatrix under the terms of the will as a whole, and the circumstances surrounding, could not have intended to pass any estate except that which lawfully she might devise, and therefore the effect of the will was merely -to dispose of the remainder after the termination of the husband's life estate, giving the plaintiff an undivided one-fourth in that remainder.
The term "estate" as used in instruments of this character does not necessarily mean the interest which one may have in certain property; it also has a popular significance, a general significance, to which the courts sometimes give effect. When applied to real estate the word is sometimes construed to mean the testator's specific lands and not the quantity of interest he may have in them. [Godfrey v. Humphrey, 29 Am. Dec. 621, 18 Pick. 537.] "The word estate . . . may be used to express either the quantity of interest devised or to designate the thing devised." [Hart v. White, 26 Vt. l. c. 267; Hudson v. Wadsworth, 8 Conn. 348, l. c. 358.] The word "estate" taken in this primary sense as used in a will has been held to be synonymous with the word "property." [Foil v. Newsome, 50 S. E. (N. C.) l. c. 598.] According to some of the dictionary definitions it may mean "fortune," "possessions." So it does not necessarily follow that Because the testatrix speaks of her "estate" the word must be given its restrictive meaning which would include only her specific interest in the property. It is probable that when she used the expression "my whole estate, real and personal," it was equivalent to saying "all my real estate and personal property." Therefore, we may gather from 'the instrument, in the light of surrounding circumstances, what was the intention of the testatrix. Having ascertained that intention the solution of the question is at hand. [Burnet v. Burnet, 244 Mo. l. c. 497.]
Appellant argues that the husband's curtesy is a life estate vested on the death of his wife by force of the common law, and she could not have had in contemplation to dispose of it, as might be the case if she had specifically described the property instead of mentioning her estate. It should be noticed that the terms used in the statutes and in rules laid down in decisions defining and describing -the curtesy of the husband at common law always mention it as an interest in his wife's land. He acquires his right to the curtesy by virtue of it being "her land." The statute (Sec. 536, R. S. 1909), empowering a married woman to devise land by will, mentions it as "her land," and provides that such devise shall be subject to the rights of the husband to his curtesy. In all those instances "her land" is spoken of as designating the property which is under consideration and not her specific interest in it. The Married Woman's Act óf 1889 applied to this property because the marriage took place in 1890. The husband's common-law curtesy was a mere life estate, contingent on his outliving her. The wife had entire control and management of her real estate, and enjoyment of the usufruct free from her husband's control. She could convey it without his joining in the deed and pass a fee simple title, subject only to the contingency that he might outlive her and claim his curtesy in it. [Farmers Exchange Bank v. Hageluken, 165 Mo. 443; Kirkpatrick v. Pease, 202 Mo. l. c. 490.] Yery naturally she would call it "my real estate," and when she mentioned her "estate real and personal" in the will, she intended the words to have the same force as such words have when used in the statutes, and desired them, to be as inclusive as if she had used a specific designation and description of the property to be affected.
Furthermore, the third clause of the will provides that if her husband and children do not- survive her, her "whole estate, both real and personal," shall go to her mother. Of course, it cannot be questioned that the third clause, if the conditions were such that it would apply, would pass the fee simple estate. There is no reason to suppose that by the use of those words in one clause of the will she meant to devise merely a remainder and in another clause she meant by the same words to pass the entire estate. Nor is it likely that she intended to pass a larger interest in the personal property than in the real estate when using the words, "my whole estate, real and personal." And, when she expressed her desire in the will by saying, "it is my will that my whole estate, real and personal, he divided between nay husband and my children in the porportion of one-half to my husband and one-half to my child or children," it is highly improbable that she thereby intended a higher and larger interest in the specific property should be vested in her husband than in her children. It would be unusual if she intended to restrict her children each to. an undivided one-fourth interest in remainder in the property when the law gave them the entire remainder. It is apparent that her purpose in making the will was to make some provision for the children in addition to what the law gave them, a provision which would go into immediate effect for their benefit.
III. It is asserted, however, that even if the husband is put to a election he has not elected and may yet do so. It is true that an election being a choice between two alternatives, there would be none
if the appellant merely claimed both under the will and his right by curtesy. [Cobb v. Macfarland, 87 Neb. l. c. 411; Whitridge & Alexander v. Parkhurst, 20 Md. l. c. 70-1.] It is also a rule that when one is put to an election between two inconsistent courses and he first adopts one by some unequivocal art, that is an election which he cannot afterwards recall. [Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534; Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. l. c. 480.] The appellant in this case now claims both his curtesy in the property and an undivided half interest in remainder under the will. Eleanor M. Bogy died in 1904 and the defendant Bernard P. Bogy, after her death, continued in possession of the real estate. That act was consistent with either a claim of curtesy or a claim under the will, because by the terms of the will he was tenant in common with his children who were minors living with him at the time. [Hynds v. Hynds, 253 Mo. l. c. 33; Boothe v. Cheek, 253 Mo. l. c. 130; Stevens v. Martin, 168 Mo. 407, l. c. 412; Seibert v. Hope, 221 Mo. l. c. 635; Rodney v. McLaughlin, 97 Mo. l. c. 431.] At that time he performed no unequivocal act indicating an intention to claim his curtesy, but he did certain things which unequivocally indicated an intention to claim under the will. The will was in his possession at the time of his wife's death. He presented it for probate to the probate court, making the usual affidavit. He applied for letters testamentary, making affidavit that he would ' ' faithfully execute the last will of the testatrix. ' ' He filed and swore to an inventory of the estate. This inventory sets forth the real estate here in dispute and lists no personal property. He filed his final settlement reporting there was no personal property for disbursement and was discharged.
The authorities are conflicting as to whether or not the mere qualifying and acting as executor is an election to take under the will. In California such acts are held insufficient to show election (In re Gwin, 77 Cal. 313; Estate of Frey, 52 Cal. 658); but in North Carolina the contrary is the rule (Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 53 N. C. 287; Syme v. Badger, 92 N. C. 706): Many cases occur where such acts are noted as indicating an intention to elect, but are associated with other facts such as accepting a bequest. [Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. l. c. 444.] Many cases, cited in the text-books as holding that acting as executor is not an election, show facts which qualify the act: for instance, the case of Whitridge & Alexander v. Parkhurst, 20 Md. 62, where the executrix was claiming both under the will of her mother, of which she was executrix, and also under the earlier and conflicting will of her father; the case of Tyler v. Wheeler, 160 Mass. 206, where it was held the husband did not elect by qualifying as executor, because the will gave him nothing; the case of Kerrigan v. Conelly, 46 Atl. (N. J.) 227, where the surviving husband qualified as administrator with the will annexed, and he could carry out some provisions of the will which were not inconsistent with his claim under the law; the case of Reaves v. Garrett's Admr., 34 Ala. 558, where the executrix qualified in ignorance of her rights; the case of Pace v. Pace, 271 Ill. 114, and In re Proctor's Estate, 103 Iowa, 232, where the acts done as executor were not inconsistent with the claim under the law.
Often it has been held that any act or declaration of the widow plainly indicating a purpose to take under the will, or recognizing the force of the will, constitutes an election. [Craig v. Conover, 80 Iowa, l. c. 358; Melot's Estate, 231 Pa. 520. See also Appeal of Scholl, 17 Atl. (Pa.) 206.] Where a widow filed a petition asking the court to carry the will into effect, she was held by that act to have elected. [Ashlock v. Ashlock, 52 Iowa, l. c. 322.] She could not afterwards reconsider the election so made, for the Supreme Court of Iowa in deciding the case said: "The moment she made such election, it appears to us that her relation to the estate, as well as that of the other devisees, became fixed." [See also Mitchell v. Vest, 136 N. W. (Iowa) 1054; Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa, 500.]
In this case the acts of Bernard P. Bogy in proving the will and qualifying under it, are inconsistent with any theory except an election to take under it. The absence of personal property emphasized the character of his acts. He could not say that he might execute the will in any particular and leave the real estate intact. The only property to be affected by it, as he must have known when he proved it, was the real estate now in dispute. His only reason for probating it and qualifying as executor was to carry out its provisions relating to the real estate. He received a benefit under it, because he acquired the vendible fee simple title to the half interest which it gave him. He had full knowledge of his rights.. He knew what the law would give him independent of the will, and he knew what the will would give him. He knew all the property affected by the provisions of the will. Having that knowledge he deliberately chose to put the will into effect, declaring that he would execute its provisions; therefore he elected to take under it.
The judgment is affirmed.
Boy, C., dissents.
PER CURIAM: — The foregoing opinion of White, C., is adopted as the opinion of Court in Banc.
Bond and Walker, JJ., concur; Graves, G. J., Faris and Woodson, JJ., concur in separate opinion by Graves, G. J.; Blair, J., dissents; Williams, J., dissents, and adopts the opinion of .Roy, G-, as his dissenting opinion.