Case Name: Earl C. OGDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2019-03-13
Citations: 273 So. 3d 162
Docket Number: No. 1D17-4040
Parties: Earl C. OGDEN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 273
Pages: 162–169

Head Matter:
Earl C. OGDEN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D17-4040
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 13, 2019
Rehearing Denied May 28, 2019
Earl C. Ogden, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Appellant seeks review of a final order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief, which raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the summary denial of Appellant's first claim without discussion. However, we reverse the summary denial of Appellant's second claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant that he was facing a mandatory life sentence as a prison releasee reoffender when the State made a plea offer of fifteen years in prison as a prison releasee reoffender, which it later withdrew.
Appellant alleged that if defense counsel had advised him of the maximum sentence he faced when the State made the plea offer, he would have accepted the offer instead of leaving the offer open, which resulted in the offer being withdrawn. If true, defense counsel's failure to advise Appellant of the maximum sentence when discussing the plea offer constituted deficient performance. As this court has observed:
Our precedent requires attorneys to inform their clients of the maximum sentences they may face when advising them as to whether to reject a plea offer. Although counsel in the instant case was advising his client to leave an offer open, rather than to reject it outright , knowledge of the statutory maximum was vital to an informed decision as to whether to accept the offer or leave it open, thus risking its withdrawal.
Pennington v. State , 34 So.3d 151, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Appellant sufficiently alleged that he was prejudiced because (1) he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been properly advised; (2) the prosecutor would not have withdrawn the offer; (3) the court would have accepted the offer; and (4) the sentence would have been less severe than the sentence that was in fact imposed. Alcorn v. State , 121 So.3d 419, 430 (Fla. 2013).
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Appellant's claim is not conclusively refuted by the record of Appellant's subsequent plea because " '[p]rejudice . is determined based upon a consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would have been done with proper and adequate advice .' " Armstrong v. State , 148 So.3d 124, 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Alcorn , 121 So.3d at 432 ) (emphasis in original); accord Smith v. State , 219 So.3d 978, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; see also Wilson v. State , 189 So.3d 912, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that "events occurring after Mr. Wilson rejected the plea offer could not cure counsel's alleged failure to provide him with all of the information necessary to make an informed decision concerning the offer").
Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of Appellant's second claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Smith , 219 So.3d at 979 (reversing the summary denial of the defendant's postconviction claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he qualified for a mandatory sentence under the prison releasee reoffender statute prior to his rejection of two plea offers); Armstrong , 148 So.3d at 126 (reversing the summary denial of the defendant's postconviction claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the maximum sentence and the possibility of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence as a prison releasee reoffender during plea negotiations, resulting in the rejection of a favorable plea of forty-eight months in prison); Mathis v. State, 848 So.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing the summary denial of the defendant's postconviction claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender if convicted at trial, resulting in the rejection of the State's plea offer to a lesser included offense).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.
Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur; Winokur, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
To the extent that the dissent advocates a "bright line" rule prohibiting any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless a defendant alleges either counsel's failure to convey a plea offer or misadvice urging the rejection of a plea, this unduly limits defense counsel's duty to "advise defendant of . all pertinent matters bearing on the choice of which plea to enter and the particulars attendant upon each plea and the likely results thereof, as well as any possible alternatives that may be open to the defendant." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171(c)(2)(B) ; see also Odegaard v. State , 137 So.3d 505, 508 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ; Rivera v. State , 128 So.3d 876, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). The dissent alleges that Appellant's claim is legally insufficient because he never alleged that he rejected the State's plea offer due to counsel's lack of proper advice. However, the fact that Appellant alleged that he asked for more time to consider the plea offer-rather than rejecting it outright-is a distinction without a difference. In both cases, the alleged prejudice is the same, i.e., Appellant failed to accept a more favorable plea offer due to counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. It matters not whether the failure to accept was an outright rejection of the offer or failure to accept the offer before it was withdrawn. Pennington , 34 So.3d at 156. In fact, it could be argued that Appellant's request for more time makes for a more compelling claim because it suggests that Appellant was seriously considering the offer and might have accepted it before it was withdrawn if he had been properly advised. Different from the dissent's assertion, there is nothing facially unreasonable about this allegation such that it would be proper to summarily deny it without an evidentiary hearing.