Case Name: In the Matter of the Estate of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased. D'Anjou Pearsall, as Administrator, etc., of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased, Respondent; Walter A. Evans Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-03-19
Citations: 191 A.D. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Estate of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased. D’Anjou Pearsall, as Administrator, etc., of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased, Respondent; Walter A. Evans Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 191
Pages: 291–300

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Estate of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased. D’Anjou Pearsall, as Administrator, etc., of Margaret P. Humphrey, Deceased, Respondent; Walter A. Evans Appellant.
First Department,
March 19, 1920.
Gift — gift of bonds inter vivos with agreement that donor shall receive income therefrom for life — alleged gift of stock not con stituting gift inter vivos — agreement that donor shall receive income and have title to stock if she survives donee.
There may be a valid gift of bonds inter vivos, although the donor is entitled to receive the income therefrom during her life, if in fact there is no limitation placed on the right of the donee to have dominion or control over- the bonds, or any agreement that they are to revert to the donor should the donee predecease her.
But where stock was delivered to an alleged donee with an agreement that all the dividends therefrom should be payable to the donor during her lifetime, and that in the event that the donee should predecease the donor the stock should revert to the donor, and that to effectuate this purpose the stock should not be transferred to the name of the donee during the lifetime of the donor, there was not a gift of the stock inter vivos, as the donor had not divested herself absolutely of title and control and retained a power of revocation so that the transaction was testamentary in its nature.
Smith, J., and Clause, P. J., dissent in part, with opinion.
Appeal by Walter A. Evans from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in the office of the clerk of said court on or about the 8th day of November, 1919, directing him to turn over to D’Anjou Pearsall, as administrator, etc., of Margaret P. Humphrey, certain personal property.
Stuart McNamara of counsel [Garret A. Brownback and Raymond B. Seymour with him on the brief], for the appellant.
William M. Wherry of counsel [James M. Blackwell with him on the brief], Blackwell Bros., attorneys, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Page, J.:
In so far as the decision of the court relates to the gift of the bonds, I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Smith. The allegations of the answer show a present voluntary gift of the bonds; that upon the respondent's insistence the decedent agreed to receive the interest payable on the bonds from the date of delivery until her death and that the respondent thereafter detached all coupons from said bonds as the same latured from time to time until her death and either delivered he same to the decedent or cashed said coupons himself and aid the amount thereof to the decedent. There is no allegation that these bonds were to revert to the donor in case the respondent should predecease her, nor was there any limitation on his right to dispose of them. The donor parted with all right of dominion or control over the bonds. The agreement of the donee to pay the interest on the bonds to the donor during her lifetime would not invalidate the gift of the bonds under the authorities cited by Mr. Justice Smith.
In my opinion the allegation of the answer concerning the stock is not sufficient to show a valid gift inter vivos. The stock was alleged to have been delivered upon the agreement " that all dividends thereafter payable on said stock during her life should be paid to her and that in the event that the respondent should predecease said decedent, the said stock should revert to her, and that for this purpose the certificate should not be presented for transfer into the name of respondent during the lifetime of decedent." (Italics are mine.) Therefore, all that Walter A. Evans secured by the delivery of this stock was the possession thereof. The title still remained in Margaret P. Humphrey. This clearly appears from the fact that the^e was no agreement to retransfer or to bequeath it by will, but that the stock, in the event of Evans' death before Mrs. Humphrey's would revert to her. The certificate was to remain in her name, and it was a part of the agreement that all dividends on said stock during her life were to be paid to her. Therefore, Evans merely held the stock during her lifetime with the agreement that he could transfer it to himself after her death. There can be no doubt under these circumstances that Mrs. Humphrey could have at any time revoked the transaction. Until the donor has divested herself absolutely and irrevocably of the title, dominion and control of the subject of the gift she had power to revoke. (Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212; Lehr v. Jones, 74 App. Div. 54.)
In the present case Mrs. Humphrey reserved to herself title to the stock and the enjoyment of the income derived therefrom during her lifetime. It was only after death that the gift would become effective. This was insufficient to establish a gift. (Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 435.)
I, therefore, am of opinion that as to the stock the learned surrogate correctly held that the transaction was testamentary and void. As to the bonds, however, for the reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Smith, the transaction was a gift inter vivos and not testamentary. The decree of the surrogate must, therefore, be reversed and the matter remitted to the Surrogate's Court, to proceed in accordance with the opinion of this court.
Laughlin and Merrell, JJ., concur.