Case Name: CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FLEETWOOD HOTEL, INC., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-04-12
Citations: 261 So. 2d 801
Docket Number: No. 39780
Parties: CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FLEETWOOD HOTEL, INC., et al., Appellees.
Judges: CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 261
Pages: 801–813

Head Matter:
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FLEETWOOD HOTEL, INC., et al., Appellees.
No. 39780.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 12, 1972.
James A. Kraus, New York City, Jonathan Weiss, Alfred Feinberg, Miami, Leonard Helfand, Miami Beach, and Tobias Simon, Miami, for appellant.
Cypen & Nevins, Miami Beach, and Dubbin, Schiff, Dubbin & Berkman, Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Chief Justice.
We here review by direct appeal a decision of the Circuit Court, Dade County, holding unconstitutional an Ordinance of the City of Miami Beach purporting to regulate rents. In rendering his opinion and making his decision the trial judge construed a controlling provision of the Constitution, namely, Section 2, Article VIII, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. See also Lissenden Company, Inc. v. Board of County Commission of Palm Beach County, 116 So.2d 632 (Fla.1960). Ordinance No. 1791, entitled "Housing and Rent Control Regulations," provides for regulation of rents in all housing with four or more rental units except for hospitals, nursing homes, retirement homes, asylums or public institutions, college or school dormitories or any charitable or educational or non-profit institutions, hotels, motels, public housing, condominiums and cooperative apartments, and any housing accommodations completed after December 1, 1969.
The City Council enacted the Ordinance in October, 1969 after making a determination that an inflationary spiral and a housing shortage existed in the City which required the control and regulation of rents. The City contends that it acted with the intent and purpose of protecting its residents from exorbitant rents.
Several lessors, who were directly affected, filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and attacking the validity on constitutional grounds. After considering motions for summary judgment filed by both parties, the Circuit Court, Dade County, declared the Ordinance invalid, holding, inter alia, that the Ordinance was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority by the City Council and construed Section 2, Article VIII, supra. This appeal followed and we affirm.
The trial court declared the Ordinance invalid after determining that the City of Miami Beach does not have the power to enact a rent control ordinance, that the Ordinance was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority by the City Council, and that the Ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically Sections 83.03, 83.04 and 83.20, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
The legal issues involved in this case are as follows:
(1) Whether or not the City of Miami Beach has the power to enact this rent control ordinance?
(2) Whether or not the rent control ordinance is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority?
(3) Whether or not the rent control ordinance conflicts with state law ?
The first issue must be answered in the negative. The City of Miami Beach does not have the power to enact the ordinance in question. This Court recognizes that the language in the Florida Constitution which governs the powers exercisable by municipalities has been changed by Article VIII, Section 2(b), 1968 Florida Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution of 1885 reads,
"The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time
Section 2, Article VIII of our new 1968 Constitution provides,
"(a) Establishment. Municipalities may be established or abolished and their charters amended pursuant to general or special law .
"(b) Powers. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
Although this new provision does change the old rule of the 1885 Constitution respecting delegated powers of municipalities, it still limits municipal powers to the performance of municipal functions.
That the paramount law of a municipality is its charter, (just as the State Constitution is the charter of the State of Florida,) and gives the municipality all the powers it possesses, unless other statutes are applicable thereto, has not been altered or changed. Gontz v. Cooper City, (Fla.App., 1970) 228 So.2d 913, Clark v. North Bay Village, et al., (Fla.1951) 54 So.2d 240. The powers of a municipality are to be interpreted and construed in reference to the purposes of the municipality and if reasonable doubt should arise as to whether the municipality possesses a specific power, such doubt will be resolved against the City. Liberis v. Harper (Fla. 1925) 89 Fla. 477, 104 So. 853. "Municipal corporations are established for purposes of local government, and, in the absence of specific delegation of power, cannot engage in any undertakings not directed immediately to the accomplishment of those purposes." Hoskins v. City of Orlando, Florida (5th Cir., 1931) 51 F.2d 901. The aforestated holding of the United States Fifth Circuit Court is entirely consistent with the 1968 change in our Constitution.
The Charter of the City of Miami Beach does not authorize the City of Miami Beach the power to enact a rent control ordinance. Section 6 of the Code contains no mention of such a power. The only possible source of such a power is Section 6 (x) which permits the City "to adopt all ordinances or do all things deemed necessary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare, comfort, education, morals, peace, health and convenience of said city, or its inhabitants and to exercise all of the powers and privileges conferred upon cities or towns by the General Law of Florida when not inconsistent herewith."
The weight of authority is that without specific authorization from the state, the cities cannot enact a rent control ordinance either incident to its specific municipal powers or under its General Welfare provisions. Warren v. City of Philadelphia, (1956) 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703, Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, (1954) 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99, Grofo Realty Co. v. Bayonne, (1957) 24 N.J. 482, 132 A.2d 802, Wagner v. Mayor and Municipal Council of City of Newark, (1957) 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794.
Local governments have not been given omnipotence by home rule provisions or by Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1968 Florida Constitution. "Matters that because of their nature are inherently reserved for the State alone and among which have been the master and servant and landlord and tenant relationships, matters of descent, the administration of estates . . . and many other matters of general and statewide significance, are not proper subjects for local treatment. . . . " Wagner v. Mayor and Municipal Council of Newark, supra, at 800. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (Ct.App.1929) made the following statement which is in support of the abovestated proposition,
"There are other affairs exclusively those of the state . . . None of these things can be said to touch the affairs that a city is organized to regulate, whether we have reference to history or to tradition or to the existing forms of charters."
Furthermore, since the inception of federal controls after the beginning of World War II, legislative history and the development of case law shows a recognition that rent control was not a matter within the realm of municipal power without express authority from the state and the existence of an emergency — as hereinafter discussed. Wagner v. Newark, supra. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has held that a city charter conferring police power in general terms did not empower the city to adopt a rent control ordinance. Old Colony Gardens, Inc., et al. v. City of Stamford, et al., 147 Conn. 60, 156 A.2d 515 (1959).
The State of Florida through legislative action has enacted statutory provisions to regulate the landlord tenant relationship. Chapter 83, Fla.Stat.F.S.A. Absent a legislative enactment authorizing the exercise of such a power by a municipality, a municipality has no power to enact a rent control ordinance.
In the area of rent control legislation in general, the Supreme Court of the United States has placed severe limitations on the power of state governments in the area of rent control. When such legislation is enacted, deprivation of rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and freedom to contract are at stake. The only justification for the utilization of such legislation found by the U. S. Supreme Court is an emergency. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 S.Ct. 465, 65 L.Ed. 877 (1921), Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 135 N.E.2d 801, appeal dismissed 355 U.S. 12, 78 S.Ct. 12, 2 L.Ed. 2d 20. Emergency has been narrowly defined. An increase in the cost of living (an inflationary spiral) alone is not a justification for rent control legislation which limits the amount of rent which a tenant may be required to pay. Chastleton Corporation, et al. v. Sinclair, et al., 264 U.S. 543, 44 S.Ct. 405, 68 L.Ed. 841 (1924). Explicitly designating the type of emergency which would be a viable basis for such legislation, the United States Supreme Court has held in Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, at 245, 42 S.Ct. 289, at 290, 66 L.Ed. 595.
"The warrant for this legislative resort to the police power was the conviction on the part of the state legislators that there existed in the larger cities of the state a social emergency, caused by an insufficient supply of dwelling houses and apartments, so grave that it constituted a serious menace to the health, morality, comfort, and even to the peace of a large part of the people of the state. That such an emergency, if it really existed, would sustain a resort, otherwise valid, to the police power for the purpose of dealing with it cannot be doubted, for, unless relieved, the public welfare would suffer in respects which constitute the primary and undisputed, as well as the most usual basis and justification, for exercise of that power." (emphasis supplied).
As regards the second issue involved herein, this Court finds in reviewing the constitutionality vel non of the rent control ordinance that some of the provisions amount to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority by the City Council of the City of Miami Beach without appropriate guidelines or the fixing of the outer limits as to the discretion involved. The Ordinance, among other things, provides:
"Section 16 A.2. Definitions:
A., except for:
(e) Certain high rental or special accommodations such as condominiums and co-ops whose tenants in the opinion of the city rent agency, do not require the protection of this Ordinance.
Section 16 A.4. General Powers and Duties of the City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration:
A. The city rent agency shall establish maximum rents which shall be those rents in effect on September 1, 1969.
B. Such agency, however, may correct or set aside any rent resulting from illegality, irregularity, or fraud.
C. Such rents shall be established having regard for those factors bearing on the equities of the matter.
F. Further adjustments of maximum rents may be made by the city rent agency where:
(a) . . .
(i) Should a landlord permit housing violations to exist beyond a reasonable time, then the city rent agency shall have the power to decrease the rent until the danger is eliminated . . . " (All underscoring added).
The same restrictions which apply to the Legislature's delegation of legislative authority also apply to the enactment of municipal ordinances under the general police power by municipalities in that city ordinances must not constitute an improper delegation of legislative, executive or administrative power. Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940). It has been previously held by this Court in Smith v. Portante, 212 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968), that:
"No matter how laudable a piece of legislation may be in the minds of its sponsors, objective guidelines and standards should appear expressly in the act or be within the realm of reasonable inference from the language of the act where a delegation of power is involved and especially so where the legislation contemplates a delegation of power to intrude into the privacy of citizens." (Underscoring added).
The rent control Ordinance at issue in the instant case does not contain objective guidelines and standards for its enforcement by the City Rent Agency nor can such be reasonably inferred from the language of the Ordinance.
Unrestricted discretion in the application of a law without appropriate guidelines and determining its meaning may not be delegated by the City Council to an agency or to one person. Stewart v. Stone, 130 So.2d 577 (Fla.1961); Amara v. Town of Daytona Beach, 181 So.2d 722 (Fla.App. 1st, 1966). In Dickinson v. State, 227 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla.1969), this Court said:
"The exact meaning of the requirement of a standard has never been fixed. The exigencies of: modern government have increasingly dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards in regulating enactments under the police power. However, when statutes delegate power with inadequate protection against unfairness or favoritism, and when such protection could easily have been provided, the reviewing court should invalidate the legislation. In other words, the legislative exercise of the police power should be so clearly defined, so limited in scope, that nothing is left to the unbridled discretion or whim of the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the act. Mahon v. County of Sarasota, 177 So.2d 665 (Fla.1965)."
"An ordinance requiring a nursery to obtain a certificate showing that it '[had] been approved by the Florida State Welfare Board' was held invalid in State ex rel. Ware v. City of Miami, 107 So.2d 387 (Fla.App. 3d Dist. 1958), the Court saying:
" 'As drawn, the effect of the ordinance is to confer upon the State Welfare Board the authority to grant approval to one yet withhold it from another, at whim, and without guides or accountability.'
"See also, Yellow Cab Company v. Ingalls, 104 So.2d 844 (Fla.App. 2d Dist. 1958); Barrow v. Holland, 125 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1960); Lewis v. Florida State Board of Health, 143 So.2d 867 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1962); Amara v. Town of Daytona Beach Shores, 181 So.2d 722 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1966)."
Yet, as provided for in Ordinance No. 1791, Section 16 A.3, the City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration established by this Ordinance shall consist solely of one individual, the City Rent Administrator. In this single individual is vested unbridled discretion to determine which accommodations are to be controlled and a number of other things. See Section A.2(e), Section 14 A.4(A) (B) (C), (F). This Court held in its recent opinion Municipal Court, City of Fort Lauderdale v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193 (opinion filed October 27, 1971) which involved the delegation of authority to the Mayor to establish curfews:
"History teaches us, however, the danger of vesting total power in a single individual without controls or restraint, even in an emergency."
As to the third issue, we agree with the finding of the trial court that this rent control ordinance does conflict with Florida Statutes Sections 83.03, 83.04, 83.06 and 83.20, F.S.A. Municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the State and must not conflict therewith. If doubt exists as to the extent of a power attempted to be exercised which may affect the operation of a state statute, the doubt is to be resolved against the ordinance and in favor of the statute. City of Wilton Manors v. Starling, 121 So.2d 172 (Fla.App.1960), City of Coral Gables v. Seiferth, 87 So.2d 806 (Fla.1956).
Section 16 A.5 D provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to remove a housing unit from the market if the same will result in eviction."
F.S. 83.04, F.S.A. provides a tenancy at will may be terminated by either party upon giving of specified notice. F.S. 83.04, F.S.A. provides that a tenant who holds over after a written lease has expired is a tenant at sufferance. F.S. 83.06, F.S.A. provides that a landlord may demand and receive double rent from a tenant who refuses to give up possession. F.S. 83.20, F.S.A. provides that a tenant at will or sufferance may be removed from the premises, evicted, if he holds over and continues in possession of the premises after the expiration of his time.
The trial court having correctly held the Ordinance invalid, and no reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment under review is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ" concur.
DEKLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
McCAIN, J., dissents.