Case Name: Vernon A. LaFAYE, Gary F. Hannon, Richard D. Brock, and Presser, LaFaye & Hannon, P.A., Appellants, v. Neil N. PRESSER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-12-20
Citations: 554 So. 2d 610
Docket Number: No. 89-837
Parties: Vernon A. LaFAYE, Gary F. Hannon, Richard D. Brock, and Presser, LaFaye & Hannon, P.A., Appellants, v. Neil N. PRESSER, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 554
Pages: 610–613

Head Matter:
Vernon A. LaFAYE, Gary F. Hannon, Richard D. Brock, and Presser, LaFaye & Hannon, P.A., Appellants, v. Neil N. PRESSER, Appellee.
No. 89-837.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 20, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990.
Steven A. Werber and James M. Riley, of Commander, Legler, Werber, Dawes, Sad-ler and Howell, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellants.
George L. Hudspeth, of Mahoney, Adams, Milam, Surface & Grimsley, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Judge.
Following our prior decision in this cause, LaFaye v. Presser, 535 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), remanding the case to the trial court with directions that it award prejudgment interest on the judgment imposed at the contractual rate, rather than at the statutory rate, the trial court on remand found that the amount of contractual interest from the date of loss, July 31, 1986, through the date of the initial final judgment, November 23, 1987, was $13,-376.02. The court also imposed the statutory rate of interest on this $13,376.02 sum for the period from November 23, 1987 through the date of the amendment to the final judgment (March 7, 1989), added the two amounts together and directed that the total sum should thereafter bear interest at the annual statutory rate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Initially, we disagree with appellants' contention that the trial court erred in establishing the date of loss, for purposes of calculating prejudgment interest, as of the date appellee filed his complaint, July 31, 1986. This issue is controlled by our prior opinion in this cause, which gave the trial court the discretion on remand to determine whether the date of loss was July 31, 1986, the date previously identified.
Having thus properly determined that the date of loss in this case was July 31, 1986, the court was also correct in awarding prejudgment interest of $13,376.02, which was based upon the value of the stock ($171,307.00), and which was computed at the contract rate of six percent, running from the date of the loss (July 31, 1986) through the date of the judgment (November 23, 1987).
However, the trial court erred in awarding interest at the statutory rate on the prejudgment interest award of $13,-376.02 for the period from November 23, 1987 to March 7, 1989. First, appellee's right to prejudgment interest ended at the time the judgment was entered (November 23, 1987), and the taking of the appeal did not extend appellee's right to prejudgment interest. Second, the award is an inappropriate award of compound interest, because it required interest to accrue "on a sum that is itself interest." See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Smith, 527 So.2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment awarding the statutory rate of interest on all interest that accrued after November 23, 1987, is reversed and the case remanded for the entry of a corrected judgment.
We have considered the remaining arguments of appellants and, finding them without merit, affirm.
AFFIRMED in PART, REVERSED in PART, and REMANDED.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., dissents and concurs with written opinion.
. Although appellee is not entitled to prejudgment interest after November 23, 1987, when the judgment was awarded to him, he may claim postjudgment interest allowable on judgments pursuant to Section 55.03, Florida Statutes (1985). Although our prior opinion was directed more to the issue of prejudgment interest, we did "reverse as to the part of the judgment assessing statutory interest, concluding that statutory interest cannot be sustained, because the contract, which the court relied upon in part in awarding interest, expressly provides for six percent interest." LaFaye, 535 So.2d at 636. We consider this statement to be the law of the case on the issue of the interest rate. Thus, appellee would only be entitled to post-judgment interest from November 23, 1987, at the rate of six percent, and only on the amount of the judgment itself ($171,307.00).