Case Name: SCAMEHEORN v. BUCKS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1988-03-21
Citations: 167 Mich. App. 302
Docket Number: Docket No. 93145
Parties: SCAMEHEORN v BUCKS
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and Sawyer and J. S. Thorburn, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 167
Pages: 302–316

Head Matter:
SCAMEHEORN v BUCKS
Docket No. 93145.
Submitted May 6, 1987, at Grand Rapids.
Decided March 21, 1988.
Leave to appeal denied, 430 Mich 885.
Christopher W. Scameheorn, while a passenger on a motorcycle operated by Robert L. Bucks, was injured in a collision involving the motorcycle and a truck driven by Douglas J. Hauch. The accident occurred on a sidewalk of River Valley High School. Both Bucks and Hauch were operating their vehicles on the sidewalk in order to avoid "speed bumps” on the driveway of the high school. Scameheorn brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court against Bucks, Hauch, the River Valley School District and several individuals employed by the River Valley School District. The trial court, Ronald J. Taylor, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the school district and its employees, finding no merit in plaintiffs claims that the speed bumps constituted a dangerous or defective condition of a public building and that their existence constituted an intentional nuisance. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. Summary disposition of the dangerous or defective public building claim was proper. The trial court correctly concluded that the speed bumps were not defective because they were fit for their intended use in maintaining lower speeds on the driveway. It was the misuse of the speed bumps which led to plaintiffs injuries.
2. Summary disposition of the intentional nuisance claim was Plaintiff’s allegations failed to establish the existence of an intentionally created nuisance. While plaintiff alleged that the school district became aware that motorists drove on the sidewalk prior to plaintiff’s accident and further that the school district knew or had reason to know that it created a dangerous condition, nothing in plaintiff’s complaint suggests that defendant either acted for the purpose of causing harm or knew that harm was substantially certain to follow.
References
Am Jur 2d, Nuisances §§ 19 et seq.; 34, 35.
Am Jur 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 99 et seq.
Legal aspects of speed bumps. 60 ALR4th 1249.
Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway. 44 ALR3d 355.
Tort liability of private schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings, equipment, or outside premises. 35 ALR3d 975.
Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings or equipment. 34 ALR3d 1166.
3. The trial court correctly concluded that the school district is not vicariously liable for the alleged tort of its employees since plaintiff has failed to establish that the speed bumps and their placement and maintenance by the employees are within the dangerous or defective public building exception to governmental immunity.
4. The addition and maintenance of the speed bumps by the defendant school district employees was a discretionary-decisional act for which the employees are entitled to governmental immunity.
Affirmed.
Sawyer, J., concurred with the majority’s rejection of plaintiff’s arguments under the defective building exception to governmental immunity, but dissented from the majority’s holding regarding the intentional nuisance claim. Judge Sawyer would hold that, to establish intentional nuisance, a plaintiff must merely show that the defendant intended to create the condition found to be a nuisance, and not that the defendant intended to create a nuisance. In this case, with plaintiff having alleged that defendants intended to create the condition claimed to be a nuisance and with the question whether that condition is in fact a nuisance being one for the trier of fact, Judge Sawyer would reverse and remand for trial on the intentional nuisance claim.
1. Governmental Immunity — Defective Buildings.
A governmental agency is subject to liability for a dangerous or defective condition of a public building; a dangerous or defective condition may exist because of improper design, faulty construction, or the absence of safety devices (MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996[106]).
2. Governmental Immunity — Defective Buildings.
Whether a part of a public building is dangerous or defective is to be determined in light of the use or purpose that part is intended to serve; the existence of a defect and its relation to the injuries alleged by a plaintiff are to be determined by the trier of fact (MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996[106]).
3. Nuisance — Intentional Nuisance — Governmental Immunity.
A plaintiff, in order to establish a claim of intentional nuisance against a governmental agency, must show that there is a condition which is a nuisance and that the agency intended to create that condition; a plaintiff must show that the agency which created or continued the nuisance knew or must have known that harm to plaintiff was substantially certain to follow as a result of its actions.
4. Governmental Immunity — Vicarious Liability.
A governmental agency can be held vicariously liable in tort when its officer, employee, or agent, acting during the course of employment and within the scope of authority, commits a tort while engaged in an activity which is nongovernmental or proprietary, or which falls within a statutory exception to governmental immunity.
5. Governmental Immunity — Lower-Level Officials.
Lower-level governmental officials, employees and agents are immune from tort liability only when they are (1) acting during the course of their employment, or reasonably believe they are acting within the scope of their authority, (2) acting in good faith, and (3) performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts.
Seymour-Conybeare Law Office (by John C. Johnson and Bruce C. Conybeare), and Gruel, Mills, Nims & Pylman (by William F. Mills), of Counsel, for plaintiff.
Fisher, Troff & Fisher (by L. David Lawson), for defendants River Valley School District, Donald Bussler, Steven Lenar, David VanGinhoven and Charles Williams.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and Sawyer and J. S. Thorburn, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Cynar, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an April 15, 1986, judgment and order of summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity entered in favor of defendants-appellees River Val ley School District, Charles Williams, David VanGinhoven, Donald Bussler and Steven Lenar.
The facts, as alleged in plaintiffs pleadings, are as follows: On or about April 29, 1985, at 7:45 a.m., plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by defendant Robert L. Bucks, Jr., on the driveway of the River Valley High School. The operator of the motorcycle drove onto the sidewalk adjacent to the driveway so as to avoid the "speed bumps" in the school driveway. At the same time, defendant Douglas J. Hauch was approaching from the opposite direction in his truck, which was also driven on the sidewalk to avoid the speed bumps. A collision resulted and plaintiff suffered serious injuries.
As a result thereof, plaintiff filed a complaint on July 19, 1985. Thereafter, plaintiff filed two amended complaints. The second amended complaint alleged as to defendant River Valley that a dangerous or defective condition had been created or maintained at the high school due to the speed bumps. In addition, plaintiff alleged that the existence of the speed bumps constituted an intentional nuisance or nuisance per se and that River Valley was vicariously liable for the acts of employees Williams, VanGinhoven, Bussler and Lenar.
On February 4, 1986, defendants-appellees filed their motion for summary disposition alleging immunity from liability on the basis of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). On April 15, 1986, following the hearing on the motion held on March 25, 1986, the trial court granted defendants-appellees' motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 27, 1986. The instant appeal ensued.
Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the lower court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of River Valley on the basis that the public buildings exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106), was inapplicable. We do not agree.
Defendants' motion was brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). The judgment which granted defendants' motion does not state the subrule(s) under which it was issued.
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as well as any conclusions which can reasonably be drawn therefrom. The court may grant the motion only when the claim, on the pleadings alone, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify the right to recovery. Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 323; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), reh den 419 Mich 1201 (1984), cert den sub nom E R Squibb & Sons, Inc v Abel, 469 US 833; 105 S Ct 123; 83 L Ed 2d 65 (1984); Stewart v Isbell, 155 Mich App 65, 74; 399 NW2d 440 (1986).
In contrast, a summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(0(10) based on the lack of a genuine issue of material fact tests whether there is factual support for the claim. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence available to it. Giving the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party, the court must determine whether the type of record which might be developed would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Fulton v Pontiac General Hospital, 160 Mich App 728, 735; 408 NW2d 536 (1987). This Court is liberal in finding a genuine issue of material fact. Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 371-373; 207 NW2d 316 (1973). Where immunity from suit is at issue, the complaint must plead facts in avoidance of immunity. McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 77; 247 NW2d 521 (1976); Veeneman v Michigan, 143 Mich App 694, 697-698; 373 NW2d 193 (1985), lv gtd 424 Mich 876 (1986).
Plaintiff argues that the factual assertions in his second amended complaint show the existence of a "defective sidewalk/configuration or structure which encouraged motorists to drive on the sidewalk to avoid 'speed bumps' in the driveway." Plaintiff claims that these allegations state a claim within the public buildings exception to immunity. In addition, plaintiff claims as error the trial judge's determination that there was no defective or dangerous condition on the school grounds since this finding is a factual one within the province of a jury.
In Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730-732; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), a majority of the Supreme Court agreed on several principles governing the application of the "defect in a public building" exception. A dangerous or defective condition may exist because of improper design, faulty construction, or the absence of safety devices. The question regarding whether a part of a building is dangerous or defective is to be determined in light of the use or purpose that part is intended to serve. The existence of a defect and its relation to the alleged injuries are to be determined by the trier of fact.
This Court has held that, where the claim of liability arises not from a defect or dangerous condition in the building or its premises but from a failure to properly supervise activities conducted in the building or on its premises, the exception is inapplicable. Grames v King, 123 Mich App 573, 577; 332 NW2d 615 (1983), modified on other grounds 422 Mich 887 (1985); Lee v Highland Park School Dist, 118 Mich App 305, 309; 324 NW2d 632 (1982), lv den 422 Mich 902 (1985).
In this case, the trial court considered the pleadings, affidavits and depositions in making its determination regarding the public buildings exception. The trial judge concluded that the speed bumps were not defective because they were fit for their intended use. Instead, it was the misuse by plaintiff of the speed bumps which led to his injuries.
We concur in the trial court's findings. The speed bumps were placed on the driveway in order to maintain lower speeds. The accident occurred not as a result of some defect in the speed bumps. It resulted when Bucks tried to avoid using the speed bumps for their intended purpose. Thus, summary disposition was proper.
Plaintiff also argues that the speed bumps constituted an intentional nuisance since drivers tended to use the sidewalk to avoid them and this fact was known to the school district. Moreover, pláintiff claims, a factual issue was made out as to whether the school district created or maintained an intentional nuisance.
To establish an intentional nuisance claim against a governmental agency, a plaintiff must show that there is a condition which is a nuisance and that the agency intended to create that condition. Guilbault v Dep't of Mental Health, 160 Mich App 781, 788; 408 NW2d 558 (1987). In Garcia v City of Jackson, 152 Mich App 254, 259-260; 393 NW2d 599 (1986), Judge R. B. Burns of our Court discussed this concept. Citing Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124, 142; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep't of State Highways, 403 Mich 149, 161-162; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), Judge Burns provided the following definition of a "nuisance":
"In order to find an intentional nuisance, the trier of fact must decide based upon the evidence presented that the government agency intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. This finding comports with the definition of intentional nuisance set forth in Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 (1952):
" 'A second [type of nuisance] includes nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance.' " [152 Mich App 260.]
There are two conflicts in this Court regarding nuisance claims. The first conflict centers on whether an omission may constitute an intentional nuisance or whether an affirmative act is required. The two conflicting cases are Furness v Public Service Comm, 100 Mich App 365, 370; 299 NW2d 35 (1980) (holding that an omission or failure to act does not constitute an intentional nuisance), and Landry v Detroit, 143 Mich App 16, 25; 371 NW2d 466 (1985) (holding that a failure to act constitutes intentional nuisance).
The second conflict deals with what a plaintiff must show to establish the necessary intent for an intentional nuisance in fact. This conflict has been certified to the Supreme Court. In Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333, 336; 283 NW2d 739 (1979), citing Rosario and Gerzeski, this Court held that a plaintiff must show that the defendant who created or continued the nuisance knew or must have known that harm to plaintiff was substantially certain to follow as a result of defendant's actions.
However, in Veeneman, supra, p 699, this Court held that an intentional nuisance is one created by conduct intended to bring about conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. The Garcia Court acknowledged this conflict and chose to follow Veeneman.
However, we choose to follow Ford. In our opinion, the allegations in plaintiffs complaint failed to establish the existence of an intentionally created nuisance. While plaintiff alleged that the school district became aware that motorists drove on the sidewalk prior to this accident and further that the school district knew or had reason to know that it created a dangerous condition, nothing in plaintiffs complaint suggests that defendants either acted for the purpose of causing harm or knew that harm was substantially certain to follow. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to this claim, and the trial court correctly granted summary disposition.
We also reject plaintiffs contention that River Valley is liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the tortious acts of its agents and employees. The Supreme Court in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 625; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), set forth the narrow conditions under which a governmental agency may be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees:
A governmental agency can be held vicariously liable only when its officer, employee, or agent, acting during the course of employment and within the scope of authority, commits a tort while engaged in an activity which is nongovernmental or proprietary, or which falls within a statutory exception. The agency is vicariously liable in these situations because it is in effect furthering its own interests or performing activities for which liability has been statutorily imposed. However, if the activity in which the tortfeasor was engaged at the time the tort was committed constituted the exercise or discharge of a governmental function (i.e., the activity was expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law), the agency is immune pursuant to § 7 of the governmental immunity act. See Hirych v State Fair Comm, 376 Mich 384, 391-393; 136 NW2d 910 (1965), and Sherbutte v Marine City, 374 Mich 48, 50; 130 NW2d 920 (1964) (city cannot be held vicariously liable for torts of its police officers committed during the course of an arrest because the officers were engaged in police activity, which is a governmental function entitled to immunity).
The second amended complaint alleged that River Valley employees were acting during the course of their employment and within the scope of their authority in placing and maintaining the speed bumps. Since we found no public building exception or intentional nuisance, plaintiff has not shown a governmental immunity exception.
Finally, plaintiff argues error in the grant of summary disposition as to defendants Williams, Bussler, Lenar and VanGinhoven on the basis of immunity. Plaintiff claims that the addition and maintenance of the speed bumps constituted a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, act. We do not agree.
In Ross, our Supreme Court held that lower level governmental officials, employees and agents are immune only when they are (1) acting during the course of their employment, or reasonably believe they are acting within the scope of their authority, (2) acting in good faith, and (3) performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts. Ross, supra, pp 633-634.
In our opinion, the addition and maintenance of the speed bumps was a discretionary-decisional act for the purpose of alleviating speeding in the driveway. This indicates that the decision required "personal deliberation, decision, and judgment," Ross, supra, p 634, all of which are characteristics of discretionary acts. Thus, the individual defendants were immune.
Affirmed.
J. S. Thorburn, J., concurs in result only.