Case Name: In the matter of John O'Connor, a private enlisted in the United States army
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-01-07
Citations: 48 Barb. 258
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the matter of John O’Connor, a private enlisted in the United States army.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 258–266

Head Matter:
In the matter of John O’Connor, a private enlisted in the United States army.
Congress has the power to pass an act prohibiting the state judges from interfering with enlistments in the army or navy, upon habeas corpus.
The acts of congress, of February, 1862, and of February and July, 1864, conferring upon the Secretary of War the authority to discharge enlisted minors, upon certain terms and conditions, are to be construed as having provided a mode by which persons improperly enlisted can be discharged, and as having forbidden other modes of obtaining their discharges. Leonabb, J. dissented.
The federal government has by those acts assumed such jurisdiction, in cases of this kind, as to make it necessarily exclusive. Per Clebke, J.
OWEN O’CONNOR, the father, sued out a writ of habeas corpus, in December, 1866, directed to Major General Butterfield, superintendent of the general recruiting service of the United States, commanding him to produce the body of John O’Connor, appearing by the petition of the said Owen to be his son, enlisted into the service shortly before that time, under the age of twenty-one years ; the said Owen being entitled to the custody and services of his said son. General Butterfield returned, to the said writ, that the said John had been regularly enlisted into the army; and he annexed the enlistment papers of the said John, whereby it appeared that he enlisted at Boston, in the state of Massachusetts, December 12, 1866 ; that he was then of the age of twenty-two years, born at Weymouth, Mass. ; and that he was by occupation a laborer; to which statement he made oath on the 13th of December, 1866, before a lieutenant of the U. S. Artillery, who also certified to his inspection of the recruit; that he was sober, when enlisted ; that to the best of his belief the recruit was of lawful age ; and that in accepting him the officer had observed the regulations governing the recruiting service. General Butterfield also returned that in pursuance of the directions of the judge advocate general of the army, a copy of which in writing he also annexed, it was not his duty to produce the said recruit in court. He further declared that his denial of the jurisdiction of the court, and refusal to produce the recruit, was from a sense of official duty, and not from any disrespect or contempt of the court. At the hearing before the judge who granted the writ, the petitioner made oath that the recruit was born in Ireland, January, 1849, and that he would not be eighteen years of age until the 6th of January, 1867, and that he was not eighteen years of age at the time of his enlistment, and was supported by his father, the petitioner, for whom he worked, and to whom he owed service ; that he had not sold his service, or consented to his enlistment. This evidence was not disputed, except by the introduction of the said enlistment papers, and the oath of the recruit, therein contained ; but its admissibility was objected on behalf of government.
The judge thereupon denied the motion to discharge the prisoner and the prisoner appealed.
A. Loring Cushing, for the petitioner. ■
Asa Bird Gardiner, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, J.
In this case, while I am of opinion that the judges of the state .courts might have exercised jurisdiction, prior to the passage of the acts of 1862 and 1864, I am not clear that the right to exercise that power remains. Ho doubt congress might pass an act prohibiting the state judges from interfering with enlistments in the army or navy. If they possess that power, the inquiry arises, whether the provisions of those statutes do not virtually prohibit it. They provide for a mode of discharge by the secretary of war, and they annex terms and conditions in which such discharges can be granted. These provisions may be construed as having provided a mode by which persons improperly enlisted can be discharged, and as having forbidden other modes of obtaining their discharges.
I am inclined, also, to yield to the opinions of the judges of the United States court in this district, on this question, as the petitioner may apply to any of those judges,- on habeas corpus, for relief.
At any rate it is unnecessary to send the case -back to the judge who allowed the writ. All the evidence was taken between the parties, and if the general term are of the opinion that the recruit should be discharged, they can now order it. The judge below passed upon the evidence and denied the application. The general term can only reverse his deci-i sion, and make the order he should have made, if he was in error.
Motion to discharge the prisoner should be denied.
Clerke, J.
I agree with Judge Ingraham, in thinking that the federal government has by recent legislation assumed such jurisdiction, in cases of this kind, as to make it necessarily exclusive. This I think it has a constitutional right to do, under the power given to it " to raise and support armies." (Const, of U. 8. § 8, subd. 11.) Besides, this is a " controversy" to which the United States is a party ; as much so as to an action in which a collector of a port is a party ostensibly, but the United States actually.