Case Name: HARWELL v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1980-07-16
Citations: 246 Ga. 203
Docket Number: 36297
Parties: HARWELL v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY.
Judges: All the Justices and Judge Frank S. Cheatham, Jr., concur, except Hill, J., who dissents. Bowles, J., disqualified.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 246
Pages: 203–206

Head Matter:
36297.
HARWELL v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY.

Opinion:
Undercofler, Chief Justice.
Certiorari was granted in this case to determine the singular issue of whether Georgia Power Company is authorized by the statutes of this State to condemn real property in fee simple.
Georgia Power brought an in rem proceeding to gain title in fee simple unencumbered to 71.768 acres of land owned by appellant pursuant to the "Special Master Act" (Ga. L. 1957, p. 387; 1967, p. 825; Code Ann. § 36-601a) for the purpose of acquiring property upon which to construct a hydro-electric generating facility licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and which would produce electricity to be sold to the public. A detailed description of the facility is contained in the Court of Appeals decision, Harwell v. Ga. Power Co., 154 Ga. App. 142 (267 SE2d 769) (1980), and will not be repeated here.
After a hearing, the Special Master found that acquisition of a fee simple interest was necessary. The trial court then entered judgment condemning the property in fee simple. The Court of Appeals, applying the statutes and a prior decision by this court, affirmed. We think the Court of Appeals has correctly stated the law and affirm.
Under the provisions of Georgia Law, 1897, p. 68 (Code Ann. § 36-801), the legislature granted to corporate utilities such as Georgia Power Company, which generate electricity by water or steam power " to be used for the purpose of lighting towns or cities, or supplying motive power to railroad or street car lines, or supplying light, heat or power to the public, . . . the right to purchase, lease or condemn rights-of-way or other easements over the lands of others in order to run lines of wires, maintain dams, flow backwater or for other uses necessary to said purposes, upon first paying just compensation to the owner of the land to be affected." Thus, under the 1897 act, Georgia Power is defined as a condemning body exercising powers of eminent domain.
The Special Master Act provides in Code Ann. § 36-603a that "whenever it shall be necessary for such condemning body to take or damage private property, or any interest or easement therein" the condemning body can petition the superior court having jurisdiction for a judgment in rem against said property, "condemning the same in fee simple."
We think the Special Master Act is ample authority for the power company to condemn in fee simple whenever it can show a public purpose and necessity. While the appellant contends that the issue whether a utility is authorized to condemn in fee simple is a question of first impression in this court, we think the issue has been previously decided in Sadtler v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 396, 398 (223 SE2d 819) (1976), cited as authority by the Court of Appeals. Although Sadtler dealt with title to property condemned by the Georgia Department of Transportation for a highway project later abandoned, we held in that case that the Special Master Act provided additional legal basis that the interest DOT has taken in the property was in fee simple.
It is of interest to note that the Special Master Act as originally enacted in 1957 (Ga. L. 1957, p. 387), limited the meaning of "condemning" bodies to the State of Georgia, or any branch of the government of the State of Georgia or any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the State. The legislature amended the act in 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, p. 461) to add housing authorities as condemning bodies. A second amendment in 1967 (Ga L. 1967, p. 825), added "all other persons, firms and corporations possessing the right or power of eminent domain..." It must be concluded that the legislative intent in the 1967 amendment was to vest power companies which supply electricity to the public with the power to condemn in fee simple for public purposes and subject to the protective statutory procedures provided in the act.
Argued June 4, 1980
Decided July 16, 1980
Rehearing denied July 30, 1980.
J. Corbett Peek, Jr., James Garland Peek, for appellant.
Karl M. Kothe, J. Kirk Quillian, Robert R. Edwards, for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices and Judge Frank S. Cheatham, Jr., concur, except Hill, J., who dissents. Bowles, J., disqualified.