Case Name: Phillip C. Tucker v. J. S. Anderson, et ux.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 155
Docket Number: 
Parties: Phillip C. Tucker v. J. S. Anderson, et ux.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 155–159

Head Matter:
Phillip C. Tucker v. J. S. Anderson, et ux.
Where the plaintiff died, after judgment had been rendered against him, his administrator had no means of reviving the judgment against himself, in the District Court.
If the legislature had provided no mode of bringing up cases, the Supreme Court has competent authority to establish such modes, and to have rendered them effectual for that purpose; and, in cases not provided for by statute, it may authorize such appellate process as to enforce its own jurisdiction, and to secure to.the parties interested a revision of the judgment.
And because a party cannot revive a judgment against himself in the District Court, yet it may be done in the Supreme Court.
In a proceeding in the Supreme Court, by an administrator, to revive a judgment against himself, he need not give security for costs.
Error from Comal. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of the district judges.
This Suit was brought by Henry Sheldon against J. S. Anderson and E. M. Anderson, his wife, on several promissory notes, amounting to over the sum of $5,000and, on a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiff, Sheldon, gave notice of appeal; but before the appeal was perfected, he died. The plaintiff in error filed a petition for a writ of error, alleging that Sheldon had died subsequently to the rendition of the judgment, and admin, istration had been granted to him upon said Sheldon’s estate. The counsel of defendants in error filed a motion to dismiss, in the following words:
“And now comes defendant, by attorney, and moves the court to dismiss this cause from the docket, upon the following grounds:
“1. Suit was brought in the name of another party; and, since judgment, the plaintiff has been made a party, in a manner not prescribed by law.
“ 2. There is no wrifiof-error cost-bond.
“ 3. Manifest fraud was practised upon the jurisdiction of the court below; and, though apparent upon the record, was not fully developed until the parties went to trial on another issue.
“4. The errors sought to be revised are dependent upon a statement of facts; and there is no statement or bill of facts in the record, as prescribed by law.
“ 5. It would be trifling with the time of this court to consider the merits on a record presented in such a shape.
“ 6. And for other causes apparent on the record.”
W. L. G. L. Robarás, for the motion.
—The judgment was rendered in favor of defendant against Sheldon, the original plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed. The appeal was not perfected, and plaintiff died before writ of error was sued out, or any step taken for that purpose. The purported administrator simply filed a certificate of a county court that he was administrator, and petitioned for writ of error, setting out that he was administrator, and prayed for the writ.
1. The first position taken is, that at common law he could only become a party to such suit by suing out a scire facias.
2. The statute is silent, and points out no mode of making a party in such case.
3. The statute provides for the following cases: First, Where there are two plaintiffs, the suit may progress in’ name of the survivor; Second, Where either party dies between verdict and judgment, the judgment shall be entered as if both were living; Third, Where the plaintiff dies before verdict, the suit may be revived, by suggestion on the record, and if not made, scire facias shall issue against him by the clerk; Fourth, Where defendant dies before verdict, it may be revived in name of representative, by suggesting, death on the record in open court, or, upon petition of plaintiff representing the fact, scire facias shall issue; Fifth, Where suit is in name of one for use of another, it can proceed (by suggesting death of plaintiff) in name of the usee; Sixth, Where judgment exists, and plaintiff dies, execution may issue in name of administrator, by filing in district court an affidavit that plaintiff is deceased, and a certificate from a county court that the representative has been appointed by that court; Seventh, Where defendant dies after judgment, a certified copy is presented to administrator; Eighth, Where it is not a money-judgment, execution may issue by filing an affidavit with the clerk of the death of defendant.
In case of Morrison v. Lewis, 13 Tex., 64, the judgment was rendered against defendant, who sued out a writ of error and died before service of writ; his administrator waived service, filed the transcript, and suggested delay. The court decided' he had the right to waive service, as it' was a delay-case, and affirmed the' judgment with damages. In that case hoth parties were before the court when plaintiff in error died. In this case neither party was before the court.

Opinion:
Egberts, J.
—Sheldon having died after a judgment had been rendered against him, his administrator had no means of causing the suit to be revived against himself 'in the District Court. . '
A case similar in principle to this was decided by this court. (Teas v. Robinson, 11 Tex., 774.) In that case it was said, that "if the legislature had provided no mode of bringing up cases, this court has competent authority to establish such modes, and to have rendered them effectual for that purpose; and, in cases not provided for by statute, it is within the legal powers of the court to devise and authorize such appellate process as may be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction, and secure the rights of parties interested a hearing and revision of the- judgments in this court." There is no statute providing for a case like this. And as plaintiff in error could not revive the judgment against himself, and thereby cause himself to be made a party to the record in the court below, it is not perceived that any mode could have been adopted to secure his appellate remedy, to which he must certainly, in some way, have been entitled, more appropriate than by filing his petition for a writ of error, accompanied by a certificate from the proper authority, evidencing his right to act as administrator of the estate of Sheldon, who was the party against whom the judgment was rendered.
As. such administrator, he was not required to give a bond for costs, because the statute contains a special exemption in favor of administrators, the reason of which applies in all its force to the late statute requiring bond for cost to be given by parties seeking an appellate remedy, as well as to the previous statute's on that subject. To construe the late statute to have the effect of destroying this special exemption, would require of this court to render a judgment upon the bond against administrator in his individual capacity, or place the sureties on the bond in a worse condition than that of them principal. The statute of 1858, though general in terms, should not be held to repeal a special provision, previously enacted, creating an exemption in favor of administrators. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 557.)
Motion denied.