Case Name: Cleo LECROY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-05-02
Citations: 954 So. 2d 747
Docket Number: No. 4D06-403
Parties: Cleo LECROY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 954
Pages: 747–749

Head Matter:
Cleo LECROY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D06-403.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 2, 2007.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Margaret Good-Earnest, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion for Rehearing
WARNER, J.
We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place.
Appellant challenges his sentence, entered after remand from the supreme court. Lecroy v. State, 911 So.2d 98 (Fla.2005). He was not represented by counsel at the sentencing proceeding and contends that this was a violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm the order of resen-tencing, as the entry of the sentence by the circuit court in conformance with the requirements of the supreme court was a ministerial act for which the presence of the defendant was not required. See Dougherty v. State, 785 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("The imposition of a sentence is a crucial stage at which the defendant is entitled to be present. An exception is made in resentencing cases where all that is required on remand is a ministerial act of sentence correction.") (citations omitted).
The order of the supreme court specified the exact sentence to be imposed (life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years). The circuit court had no jurisdiction to vary from that mandate. Thus, this case is akin to those cases where the appellate court remands for the trial court to conform the written sentence to its oral pronouncement. See, e.g., Frost v. State, 769 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA2000).
The supreme court came to the same conclusion in Huckaby v. State, 343 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla.1977). In reversing a death sentence, the court said:
The sentence of death is vacated, however, and this case is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a sentence of life imprisonment on the sixth count. For the reason expressed in Anderson v. State, 267 So.2d 8 (Fla.1972), it is not necessary to return Huc-kaby to the trial court for resentencing.
In this case, the trial court- simply conformed the sentence to the pronouncement of the supreme court. Because it had no jurisdiction to do otherwise, it performed a ministerial act.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.