Case Name: White v. Johnson
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1793-04
Citations: 1 Wash. 159
Docket Number: 
Parties: White v. Johnson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 458–459

Head Matter:
White v. Johnson.
April Term, 1793.
Sheriffs — Liability for Acts of Deputy. — The high Sheriff alone is liable for the oficial acts of his deputy, unless in those cases where the law provides a special remedy against the latter.
Deputy Sheriff — Return on Process — Liability.— The law requires the Deputy Sheriff to add the name of his principal, as well as his own, to the return of all mesne process executed by him. But if -he fail to do so, it does not authorise the entering of a judgment against him, for failing to take a bail bond, though, individually, he is liable to a penalty for the omission.
This was a supersedeas to a judgment of the General Court. The case was — Johnson brought an action on the case in the General Court, against one Watson, and the writ, which was directed to the sheriff of -county, was returned executed, by White, thus, “executed, W. White d. s.” without mentioning the name of his principal, or of the county in which he acted as deputy sheriff. No appearance being entered for Johnson, a common order was entered against him, and against William White, deputy sheriff of-county, which was afterwards confirmed against the defendant and sheriff, and a writ of enquiry was thereupon executed. The jury found damages for the plaintiff, and the judgment was entered up, against the defendant Watson, and W. White, deputy sheriff of Louisa county. To this judgment, a writ of supersedeas was awarded by this court.
Ronold for the plaintiff in error.
The judgment is not warranted by any of the proceedings, which appear in the record. The writ is not directed to the sheriff of any county; it is not executed by the deputy sheriff of any county; nor is the interlocutory judgment, rendered against the deputy sheriff of any county; and yet, final judgment is entered against W. White deputy sheriff of Louisa county. How did it judicially appear, that White who executed the writ, was deputy sheriff of Louisa county? There might be two persons of that name, each of them deputy sheriff of different counties.
*But if this objection could be removed, there is another, which must be fatal: the judgment is rendered against the deputy instead of the high sheriff.
By the General Court law, passed in October 1777, C. 14, (j 14, if bail be not returned with a copy of the bail bond, the remedy is against the sheriff; and that the principal is intended, when the legislature speak of the responsibility of the sheriff generally, will appear. evident, by referring to other laws upon this subject. Thus, by the act of the 27th George II. C. 1, § 36, a remedy is given against the sheriff, for not paying money received by him on an execution: and by the 3d Geo. Ill, C. 5, a specific remedy is provided in such a case, for the creditor, as well as for the high sheriff, against the deputy. And this is exactly consonant with the principles of the common law, by which, the high sheriff alone, is liable for any breach of duty in the office of sheriff, and no action will lie against the deputy. Cowp. Rep. 43.
Duvall, for the defendant in error.
The act of 3d Geo. Ill, C. 3, (j 3, requires, that where the deputj' executes any writ, he shall endorse thereon, the day and month when the same was executed, and subscribe, as well the name of his principal, as his own. If the deputy in the present case, had pursued this direction, it might have been known, against whom to enter the judgment; and he ought not, by having omitted to perform this part of his duty, to be permitted to take advantage . of his own- misconduct. The declaration states the county in the caption ; — and therefore, it ought to be presumed, that White was the deputy sheriff of that county. As to the blank in the writ, that is cured by the act of Jeofails 5, Geo. I. The 'deputy sheriffs in this country, are very different from those officers in England, who act under a special authority from their principles. They qualify in open court, with the same formalities which are observed in respect to high sheriffs, and in many cases, they are recognized by our laws.
Ronold in reply. — Though the deputy be punishable for a false return, in omitting to endorse on the writ, the name of his principal, yet this omission cannot warrant the entering up a judgment against him.
Sheriffs — Liability for Acts of Deputy. — On the question as to the liability of the sheriff for the acts of his deputy, the principal case is cited in foot-note to James v. McCubbin, 2 Call 273; Mosby v. Mosby, 9 Gratt. 604 (see foot-note); Garrett v. Hutchinson, 86 Va. 875, 11 S. E. Rep. 406. See foot-note to Sangster v. Com., 17 Gratt. 124; monographic note on “Sheriffs.”
Same — Return —Appearance Bail. — The principal case is cited in Ruffin v. Call. 2 Wash. 183.

Opinion:
The PRESIDENT
delivered the opinion of the court.
The cases all prove, that in England, the remedy is against the high sheriff only, (in whose name every thing is done,) for the official acts of his deputy; unless in instances, where by ^'particular statutes, a remedy is given against the deputy. The same principle of law prevailed in this country, and was general, until the year 1763; when a law was made, giving to the creditor, a remedy by motion against the deputy sheriff, for money received by him on an execution. By the same law, the deputy was directed under a penalty, to put the name of his principal, as well as his own, to all mesne process executed by him. But if he failed to do so, neither this, nor any other law, authorized the entering of judgment against him, for not taking appearence bail upon such mesne process. The General Court law passed in 1777, warrants a judgment against the sheriff, which certainly means the principal, and not the deputy. The practice in the General Court, both before, and since the revolution, was to enter up judgment in such cases, against the deputy sheriff. But we are of opinion, that such practise was wrong, and unwarranted by any law.
The judgment therefore must be reversed, and the proceedings subsequent to the declaration set aside. The cause is to be remanded to the General Court, to be proceeded in de novo, from the return on the writ. _