Case Name: Marie Baucum SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNT OIL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1962-11-29
Citations: 152 So. 2d 599
Docket Number: No. 9820
Parties: Marie Baucum SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNT OIL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before HARDY, AYRES and BOLIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 152
Pages: 599–604

Head Matter:
Marie Baucum SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNT OIL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 9820.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
Nov. 29, 1962.
On Rehearing April 1, 1963.
See also 147 So.2d 405.
Marie Baucum Scott, in pro. per.
J. R. Goff, John S. Hunt, Shreveport, for Hunt Oil Co. and Haroldson L. Hunt, Jr., Trust Estate, defendants-appellees.
Armand A. Gutierrez, Arthur Aitkens, Shreveport, for Placid Oil Co., defendant-appellee.
Blanchard, Goldstein, Walker & O’Quinn, Shreveport, for General American Oil Co. of Texas, defendant-appellee.
Before HARDY, AYRES and BOLIN, JJ.

Opinion:
AYRES, Judge.
Plaintiff claims the ownership of an undivided Ys2 mineral interest in a certain-described tract of land in Claiborne Parish. She seeks a judgment recognizing her interest, and prays for an accounting of her alleged interest in all the oil, gas, and minerals produced from certain wells located upon adjacent property.
Made defendants are Hunt Oil Company, Placid Oil Company, General American Oil Company of Texas, and Haroldson L. Hunt, Jr., Trust Estate.
To plaintiff's petition, exceptions of no cause and of no right of action were filed and urged by all defendants. The exceptions are predicated upon the premise that plaintiff does not claim any mineral interest in the property upon which a well has been drilled and from which production is had, and that her mineral interest on properties adjacent to production has prescribed; and that since she has neither executed any lease held by the defendants, nor joined in any pooling and unitization agreement, she is not entitled to any rights or privileges flowing therefrom.
In addition, defendant, Hunt Oil Company, filed a motion to strike certain allegations from plaintiff's petition as being immaterial, argumentative, redundant, and insufficient, and predicated wholly upon evidence not admissible.
The exceptions of no cause and of no right of action and .the motion to strike were sustained. Plaintiff's suit was accordingly dismissed with 'prejudice. From that judgment, she prosecutes a devolutive appeal.
A determination of the question as to whether plaintiff's alleged mineral interest has or has not prescribed is unnecessary to a resolution of the issues presented by the exceptions. It suffices to say that plaintiff does not claim to own any mineral interest in the lands from which production of either oil or gas has been obtained. In the absence of some contractual relationship with the defendants, such as lessor or as a party to a voluntary pooling and unitization agreement, and in the absence of a forced unit created by orders of the Commissioner of Conservation, including property in which plaintiff has an interest, she could have no interest in production from property in which she claims no interest. That a forced unit has not been formed is affirmatively shown by the allegations of plaintiff's petition. The nonexistence of any contractual relationship between plaintiff and any of the defendants is likewise confirmed by her affirmative allegations.
As was stated in Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26, 29,
" when parties agree to unitize and integrate an entire tract of land, composed of contiguous or non-contiguous tracts, and provide for the payment of royalties in proportions according to the acreage and interest owned, the contract of the parties must govern."
Thus, parties may contract relative to the development of their properties and the sharing of production obtained from their several tracts. Such a contract would be the law between the parties.
The right of an owner of an adjacent estate to share in production obtained on a neighboring tract, in the absence of forced unitization, must he based upon a contractual relationship between the parties, who may, by such a contract, provide that a portion of the oil produced be deemed to have been produced from such adjacent property. No claim is made, as heretofore pointed out, that production has been obtained from a well physically located upon any property in which plaintiff claims a mineral interest. Nor, as already observed, does plaintiff claim to have any contractual' relationship with any of the defendants as to the sharing of production from other lands.
Hence, plaintiff is obviously without a right to share production from adjacent property in which she claims no interest,, and is, therefore, without right or interest in the subject matter of this action.
It is a fundamental rule that one-who had no interest has no right or standing in court. State ex rel. Adema v. Meraux, 191 La. 202, 184 So. 825; Johnston v. City of New Orleans, 234 La. 697, 101 So.2d 206. This rule is predicated upon the statutory requirement that
" an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts." LSA-C.C.P. Art. 681. Thus, the want of interest is amenable to an-exception of no right of action. Outdoor Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375.
Under the aforesaid state of facts affirmatively appearing from the allegations of plaintiff's petition, she has no right to share in the production of oil, gas, or other minerals from property or lands in which she claims no interest. Additional allegations could not serve to state a cause of action where none exists. Hence, dismissal of plaintiff's action with prejudice was proper.
With reference to the motion to strike certain paragraphs from plaintiff's petition, our examination of those allegations confirms the correctness of the action taken by the trial court. No error in that re •gard has been pointed out; nor do we find •any error.
While a layman has the legal right to appear in court in proper person to prosecute or defend any action in which he is personally interested, no such right is extended to the representation of others. Plence, plaintiff's purported representation •of third parties was wholly unauthorized.
We may, nevertheless, observe that the xights of such third parties are identical to that of the plaintiff, Marie Baucum Scott. Therefore, for the reasons hereinabove assigned, the petition, so far as it is applicable to them, does not disclose a cause of action.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed at plaintiff-appellant's cost.
Affirmed.