Case Name: Aida Cohn, Respondent, v. Ansonia Realty Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-06-05
Citations: 162 A.D. 791
Docket Number: 
Parties: Aida Cohn, Respondent, v. Ansonia Realty Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 162
Pages: 791–794

Head Matter:
Aida Cohn, Respondent, v. Ansonia Realty Company, Appellant.
First Department,
June 5, 1914.
Negligence — injury by fall down elevator shaft — failure of operator to close door during temporary absence — proof justifying recovery — injuries caused by fright — anticipation of possible accident.
Action to recover damages for personal injury. The plaintiff, a woman with three children, lived in an apartment house owned by the defendant. An elevator shaft was directly opposite the door of her apartment. While the plaintiff was locking her door her children entered the elevator car, and when she turned and saw the ear ascending without the operator in attendance she fainted and fell into the elevator shaft. The operator testified that before leaving the car he had closed the door leading to it, but that it did not catch and was very easily opened and shut; but he admitted that he had left open the door giving entrance to the shaft. On all the evidence, held, that a judgment for the plaintiff should be affirmed.
Under the circumstances the defendant cannot escape liability upon the ground that the plaintiff’s fright was the proximate cause of her injuries, for while there can be no recovery for fright alone, there may be a recovery where fright results in actual physical injury.
Nor can the defendant escape liability upon the theory that the operator of the elevator could not reasonably have foreseen the accident, as he admitted that he had not closed the door leading to the shaft.
McLaughlin, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, Ansonia Realty Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 22d day of October, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury for $2,500, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 6th day of November, 1913, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
George J. McDonnell, for the appellant.
Wales F. Severance, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
Plaintiff, a young married woman with three children, lived in an apartment on the ground floor of a house owned by defendant. The elevator shaft was directly opposite the door to her apartment and distant therefrom only three or four feet. She left her apartment with her children, who ran ahead into the elevator car, while plaintiff turned to lock her door. When she faced about again she saw the car ascending with her two children in it and no operator, and the door opening from the hallway into the elevator shaft as well as the door of the car open. She was so overcome by fright that she fainted and fell into the elevator shaft. The elevator operator, employed by defendant, admittedly had left the elevator unattended while he had gone for some purpose to a rear room. He conceded on the stand that he had not closed the door leading from the hall into the shaft; that he never did so except when the elevator was in motion, and-that he had never been instructed to do so. He said that he had closed the door of the car, but that it did not catch and was very easily opened and shut. The jury was quite justified in inferring that he had not closed the door at all, or, at least, had only partially closed it. Under the circumstances, even if the door of the car was closed, it was not latched, and a prudent person might have anticipated that some one would enter the car while the, attendant was away. To leave the car in that condition was certainly careless. It does not appear what caused the car to start. It may be, as defendant insists must have been the case, that the children started it. But even so, the opportunity to start it resulted from the carelessness of the operator in leaving the car in such a condition that any unauthorized person could enter it and start it in motion. In my opinion the jury was quite justified in convicting the defendant of negligence. (Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N. Y. 312; Wilcox v. City of Rochester, 190 id. 137; Jolliffe v. Miller, 126 App. Div. 763; affd., 196 N. Y. 504.)
But it is urged that it was plaintiff's fright which was the proximate cause of her injuries, and that defendant is not responsible in damages for the consequence of a fright caused by its negligence. For fright alone, unconnected with physical'injury, it is true that no recovery can be had, but when the fright results in an actual physical injury a different rule pre vails. (Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 23 App. Div. 141; Wood v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 83 id. 604; affd., 179 N. Y. 557.) It is also said that even if it was negligent to leave the car in the condition in which it was left, still the operator could not reasonably have foreseen that such an accident as this would occur. It was not necessary, however, that the operator should have been able to anticipate that this particular accident would happen. He was bound to know, however, that if he left the car so circumstanced that any person might enter it and start it up, it might happen that some one would do so, and if that did happen the entrances to the shaft from the hall would inevitably have been left wide open, for he confessedly had not closed the door leading from the hall into the shaft. In my opinion the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Ingraham, P. J., Clarice and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; McLaughlin, J., dissented.