Case Name: In the Matter of the Appraisal, under the Transfer Tax Act, of the Estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt, Deceased. The Comptroller of the State of New York, Appellant; William K. Vanderbilt et al., as Executors et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-10-07
Citations: 172 N.Y. 69
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Appraisal, under the Transfer Tax Act, of the Estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt, Deceased. The Comptroller of the State of New York, Appellant; William K. Vanderbilt et al., as Executors et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 69–82

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Appraisal, under the Transfer Tax Act, of the Estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt, Deceased. The Comptroller of the State of New York, Appellant; William K. Vanderbilt et al., as Executors et al., Respondents.
1. Tax — Transfer Tax upon Contingent Remainders Payable Forthwith Out of Property Transferred. The rule that future contingent estates are not taxable under the Transfer Tax Act (L. 1890, cli. 908, § 230; arad., L. 1897, cli. 284) until they vest in possession and the beneficial owner ascertained, has been changed by chapter 76 of the Laws of 1899, which provides that “When property is transferred in trust or otherwise, and the rights, interests or estates of the transferees are dependent upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or in part created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall he imposed upon said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of the said contingencies or conditions, would he possible under the provisions of tliis article, and such tax so imposed shall he due and payable . forthwith, out of the property transferred,” so that the tax is payable forthwith out of the property transferred, and whoever may ultimately take the property takes that which remains after its payment. The tax is not upon property, but still remains a tax upon succession.
2. Method of Imposing Tax. An estate in trust created by will for specified periods, with a remainder vested in the beneficiary subject to be defeated by his death before the expiration of such periods, must be separately appraised and the transfer tax determined according to the percentage fixed by the statute for those who are contingently entitled to the estate, and when fixed the tax is forthwith payable out of the trust estate.
Matter of Vanderbilt, 68 App. Div. 27, modified.
(Argued June 12, 1902;
decided October 7, 1902.)
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered May 12, 1902, which affirmed an order of the Mew York County Surrogate’s Court assessing a transfer tax upon the estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt, deceased.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
G. D. B. Hasbrouch for appellant.
The surrogate erred in refusing and neglecting to tax the transfers of remainders made by the 17th clause of the will of Cornelius Vanderbilt. (Matter of Sherman, 153 N. Y. 4 ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 55 ; Matter of Knoedler, 140 N. Y. 380; Murdock v. Ward, 178 U. S. 146; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 430; Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 185, 189 ; Schooley v. Rew, 23 Wall. [U. S.] 331; Miller v. Miller, 18 Hun, 507 ; Matter of Dows, 167 N. Y. 231; Plummer v. Ward, 178 U. S. 115.)
Chandler P. Anderson and Henry B. Anderson for respondents.
Mo tax can be assessed upon estates or interests in expectancy which are contingent or defeasible until they vest absolutely in possession or enjoyment. (Matter of Gould, 156 N. Y. 423 ; Matter of Curtis, 142 N. Y. 219; Matter of Roosevelt, 143 N. Y. 120; Matter of Hoffman, 143 N. Y. 327; Matter of Davis, 149 N. Y. 539 ; Matter of Gibson, 157 N. Y. 680.) The rule established by the cases cited, so far as it applies to the case at bar, has not been changed by the amendment of 1899 to section 230 of the Tax Law, either with respect to the character of the tax imposed, the method of its computation, or the date of its assessment. (Matter of Howell, 34 Misc. Rep. 434; Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 56.) The act does not impose a tax with respect to property subject to a power of appointment until the exercise of the power. (Matter of Dows, 167 N. Y. 227.) The facts of the case at bar bring it exactly within the application of the rules above ■stated. ( Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 197; Zartman v. Ditmars, 37 App. Div. 173; Vawdry v. Geddes, 1 R. & M. 203; Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 107; Dimmick v. Patterson, 142 N. Y. 322.)

Opinion:
Haight, J.
Prior to an amendment of 1899 the Transfer Tax Law (L. 1896, ch. 908, section 230, as amended L. 1897, eh. 284), provided that £' Estates in expectancy which are contingent or defeasible shall he appraised at their full, uudiminislied value when the persons entitled thereto shall come into the beneficial enjoyment or possession thereof Under this statute it has repeatedly been held that future contingent estates were not taxable until they vested in possession and the beneficial owner could be ascertained. The question now presented is as to whether this statute has been changed. The legislature, by chapter 76 of the Laws of 1899, amended section 230 of-the Tax Laws, known as chapter 908 of the Laws of 1896, by which the provision of the statute quoted is omitted and in place thereof we have the following: " Whenever a transfer of property is made, upon which there is, or in any contingency there may be, a tax imposed, such property shall be appraised at its clear market value immediately upon such transfer, or- as soon thereafter as practicable." Then follow provisions particularly specifying the manner in which the value of future or limited estates shall be determined. Then it is provided that " When property is transferred in trust or otherwise, and the rights, interests or estates of the transferees are dependent upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or in part created, defeated,, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of the said contingencies or conditions, would be possible under the provisions of this article, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith, out of the property transferred."
It seems to me clear that the legislature by this amendment intended to change the law upon the subject and to make the transfer tax, upon property transferred in trust payable forthwith. The tax is not required to be paid by the conditional transferee, for, by the provisions of the statute, it is to be paid " out of the property transferred." So that whoever may ultimately take the property takes that vdiich remains after the payment of the tax. This amendment makes provision for property transferred in trust. It, therefore, contemplates defeasible transfers as well as absolute transfers.
By the seventeenth clause of the will of the testator the residue and remainder of his estate was given in trust to his executors for the benefit of his son Alfred G. Vanderbilt, which trust is to continue until he becomes thirty years of age, at which time one-half of the trust estate is to be turned over to him, and, as to the balance, the trust is to continue until he becomes thirty-five, when the remainder is to become his absolutely. The will also contains a provision that in case he dies before becoming thirty or thirty-five the estate shall be given to other persons. The only contingency, therefore, that can happen to defeat his taking the estate in possession is his death before the period fixed for the transfer of the jtossession of the property to him. The estate created, therefore, is an estate in trust for the periods mentioned, with a remainder vested in Alfred G., subject to be defeated by his death before arriving at the age of thirty or thirty-five. (Matter of Seaman, 147 N. Y. 72Campbell v. Stokes, 142 N. Y. 23; Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 370; Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133; 2 Washburn on Beal Property, 629.)
Under the view taken by me of this statute, the transfer- tax still remains a tax upon succession. Each trust estate created is to be separately appraised and the tax determined according to the percentage fixed by the statute for those who are contingently entitled to the estate; and when fixed, the tax is forthwith payable out of the trust estate.
The order of the Appellate .Division and that of the surrogate should be modified as indicated herein, and the proceedings remitted to assess the tax, with costs to the Comptroller.
Cullen, J.
I vote for the reversal of the order below. It is conceded that the statute on its face provides for the immediate taxation of the whole corpus of the trust estate, regardless of the fact that the persons who may ultimately receive either the whole or part of such corpus cannot now be ascertained, and for the payment of the tax out of the fund. I concede that if the statutory scheme creates a property tax it cannot be sustained. I think that such is the doctrine of the Pell Case (171 N. Y. 48) in which I fully concurred. But in my opinion the tax now sought to be imposed is not a property tax and the Pell case is not an authority for such a claim. In that case the interests of the devisees and legatees attempted to be taxed were given by the will of the testator who had died long prior to'the enactment of any inheritance tax. Technically they may have been, and probably were, vested subject to be divested by death before the demise of the life tenant, but in the ordinary sense of the term they were contingent, that is to say, it was impossible to determine who would actually enjoy the property until the death of the life tenant. Nevertheless the interests of the devisee accrued on the death of the testator, and at that instant, and were immune from legislative attack whether contingent-or vested. (Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245.) We, therefore, held that the legislature could not impose a tax on the transfer of property which had previously been made. This case presents a situation the reverse. True, it cannot now be told who will ultimately enjoy the copus of the estate till the life tenant dies or arrives at the prescribed age. But the legis lature might have forbidden the suspension of the absolute ownership of the property for any period whatever as it has forbidden suspension for more than two lives in being. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States of the inheritance tax: "The right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of the law, and not a natural right — a privilege, and, therefore, the authority which confers it may impose conditions upon it. From these principles it is deduced that the states may tax the privilege." (Magoun v. Trust Co., 170 U. S. 283; Matter of Dows, 167 N. Y. 227.) There, fore, the state can say a devise or bequest may be made where the interests are contingent or the ultimate beneficiaries unknown till after some period, but in such case there shall be exacted from the beneficiaries, whoever they may prove to be, a tax to be presently taken out of the property. This, in effect, it has said, for the provision of the Transfer Tax Law under consideration was in force at the time of the testator's death. The fact that the tax is to be paid out of the property does not render it a tax on property. In both the federal and state inheritance tax laws are to be found provisions, in the case of personalty, requiring the executor to deduct the •amount of the tax before turning over the legacy to the legatee, and in the case of realty making the tax a lieu on the property; yet nobody has supposed that these provisions render the tax a property tax. If such was their effect, neither the federal -nor state statute could be upheld. A tax is a property tax when imposed by reason of the ownership of property; a transfer tax when imposed on the method of its acquisition.