Case Name: Cynthia Holbrook, an Infant, by Isabel S. McDonald, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Warren Holbrook and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with The People of the State of New York, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-07-27
Citations: 193 A.D. 286
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cynthia Holbrook, an Infant, by Isabel S. McDonald, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Warren Holbrook and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with The People of the State of New York, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 193
Pages: 286–291

Head Matter:
Cynthia Holbrook, an Infant, by Isabel S. McDonald, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Warren Holbrook and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with The People of the State of New York, Defendant.
Second Department,
July 27, 1920.
Wills — when posthumous child provided for or mentioned in will, within meaning of section 26 of Decedent Estate Law.
A posthumous child is provided for or mentioned in a will, within the meaning of section 26 of the Decedent Estate Law, where the testator, who was survived by his wife, bequeathed all his residuary estate to her absolutely ■ and further provided that “ if she should die before me and I should leave lawful issue then I give, devise and bequeath all my said residuary estate to my said issue per stirpes and not per capita, but if my said wife should die before me and I should not leave any lawful issue me surviving,” then said residuary estate was to be given to others named.
The words of survivorship in said will should not be held to defeat the natural purpose of the testator, where he had no children when he executed the will.
Mills, J., dissents, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendants, Warren Holbrook and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Westchester Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 10th day of April, 1920, overruling defendants’ demurrers to the complaint.
The issue of law herein was brought on and tried as a contested motion pursuant to section 976 of the Code of Civil Procedure..
This suit was for a partition of certain real estate of the late Elliot H. Holbrook, who died on March 8, 1919, leaving a widow, Elizabeth M. Holbrook, who gave birth to the plaintiff on August 5, 1919. Elliot H. Holbrook left a will which has been duly probated, wherein after certain bequests and devises he provided:
“ Fourth. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of which I may be seized or possessed, or to which I may in any manner be entitled, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife Elizabeth M. Holbrook absolutely and forever, but if she should die before me and I should leave lawful issue then I give, devise and bequeath all my said residuary estate to my said issue per stirpes and not per capita, but if my said wife should die before me and I should not leave any lawful issue me surviving, then I give, devise and bequeath my said residuary estate in equal shares to my surviving brothers and sister, the lawful issue of any deceased brother or of my sister to take the share per stirpes to which the parent would have been entitled if living.”
The Decedent Estate Law, section 26, enacts: “ Whenever a testator shall have a child born after the making of a last will, either in the lifetime or after the death of such testator, and shall die leaving such child, so after-born, unprovided for by any settlement, and neither provided for, nor in any way mentioned in such will, every such child shall succeed to the •same portion of such parent’s real and personal estate,' as would have descended or been distributed to such child, if such parent had died intestate.”
This complaint accordingly set out and averred that as to an undivided one-fifth part of the real estate mentioned, “ the plaintiff, as a child born after the making of said last Will and Testament of her father, and unprovided for by any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way mentioned in such Will, has succeeded to and has inherited, as if the said Elliot H. Holbrook had died intestate, the said equal undivided one-fifth part of the said real estate described.”
The executors of the will and the individual defendants demurred to the complaint for insufficiency, which demurrers were brought on as a motion. They were overruled with leave to answer. Defendants have taken these appeals from such order.
Edward S. Kaufman, for the appellants Halliday and Merrall, as executors, etc.
Alexander B. Halliday, for the appellants devisee and legatees.
Henry F. Miller, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Putnam, J.:
To maintain this suit plaintiff has to show that she, as an afterborn child, has been "neither provided for, nor in any way mentioned " in her father's will. The case of Stachelberg v. Stachelberg (124 App. Div. 232; affd., 192 N. Y. 576) apparently influenced the disposition of this motion. In that case the will made no provision for any child unless the mother should die before the father, and leave issue, which necessarily excluded a child born after the father's death. Mr. Holbrook, however, here provided for his leaving lawful issue. If his wife should survive him she was to take. If she did not survive there were two alternatives; one where there was issue surviving, and the other if he should " not leave any lawful issue me surviving." Hence he had in mind the case of children born after the making of the will,'whether bom in his lifetime or posthumously. To hold otherwise is to give an artificial and narrow sense to the term " lawful issue me surviving."
In Matter of Estate of Clark (3 DeG., J. & S. [68 Eng. Ch.] 111), that will gave property to M. C. for life, and after her death to " all and every the children of the said M. C. who shall survive me." An afterborn child of M. C. was held to be included. Lord Justice Knight Bruce said (p. 115): " I am of opinion that we may without impropriety hold the words ' who shall survive me ' to mean ' who shall be living after me; ' and I am not sure that this is not their strictly correct meaning." According to some lexicographers, it means " to live after." (See Worcester's Diet., word " survive; " Bailey v. Brown, 19 R. I. 669, 681.) In my view, by the term " issue " plaintiff was included as one of a class. (McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365.)
The result is reasonable. It saves the father from the reproach of overlooking an event so natural as a posthumous heir. Words of survivorship, therefore, should not be held to defeat the testator's natural purpose, who had no children when he executed the will. It would multiply words for those drawing wills to require at this day a further term to enlarge the expression " lawful issue." To write in a clause " whether after-born or not " hath hitherto seemed needless, and without necessity we should not tend to incumber the verbiage of such instruments.
I advise, therefore, to reverse the order, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and to sustain the demurrers.
Jenks, P. J., • Rich and Kelly, JJ., concur; Mills, J., reads for affirmance.