Case Name: Lassly v. Fontaine
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1809-10-09
Citations: 4 Hen. & M. 146
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Lassly v. Fontaine.
Judges: Absent, JUDGE ROANE.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 839–841

Head Matter:
*Lassly v. Fontaine.
Monday, October 9, 1809.
[4 Am. Dec. 510.]
Patent for Land — Validity in Foreign State. — A patent for land, granted by a sister state, is one of those public acts, to which every other state is bound to give full faith and credit, under the constitution of the United States; therefore the validity of such patent cannot be collaterally drawn in question, in the Courts of any other State, on a suggestion that the survey on which it was founded was a forgery.
Debt upon a. bond, with condition, that if the obligor, Fontaine, do cause a good and lawful right to be made to the obligee, Lassly, so that he enjoy peaceable possession on or before Sept. 19, 1797, to a tract of land lying in Davidson County, State of Tennessee, containing 640 acres, granted by the State of North Carolina, to Stockley Donaldson, by grant dated July 20th, 1796, then the obligation to be void ; and avers, that the defendant hath not made, &c. plea, “conditions performed;” replication, and issue thereupon.
On the trial of the cause, the defendant offered in evidence a patent for the lands in the declaration mentioned, under the hand of the Governor of North Carolina and seal of the State, which State it was agreed had a right to grant the lands, together with a plat and certificate of survey annexed thereto, to which the name of A. Foster, D. S. (deputy-surveyor) was subscribed ; as also a deed of bargain and sale, from himself to the plaintiff, bearing date the same day with the bond, upon which the suit is brought for the lands, as in the bond described, together with the deposition of one John Smith, the object of which was to prove, that he, with one Peyton, a surveyor, had gone round the boundaries in the deed mentioned, so far as they judged necessary to run the same, in order to ascertain the lands. Whereupon the plaintiff offered to prove, by sundry depositions, that the plat and certificate, annexed to the patent, were not made out and signed by A. Foster, or by his authority; alleging, that if he could prove this, that the said patent was a fraud upon the State of North Carolina, and void. To the introduction of which testimony, the defendant, by his counsel, objected; the District Court sustained the objection, and refused to admit the evidence; and the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
*Wickham, for the appellant, contended that, under such a covenant as that contained in the condition of this bond, the plaintiff was entitled to sue, on shewing a defective title; it was not necessary to prove an actual eviction, as where the covenant is for quiet enjoyment.
This was not merely a covenant for quiet enjoyment, but to make a good and lawful right. The words 1 ‘so that he shall enjoy,” &c. cannot be considered as qualifying the preceding part of the sentence; because the enjoyment of peaceable posses sion, was only the consequence of having a good and lawful right,
The State of North Carolina might set aside the patent, for fraud in obtaining it, either by scire facias or some other judicial proceeding. The laws of every country must be presumed to be conformable to general principles of equity. It is a matter of history, that Stokely Donaldson forged surveys to an immense amount. If the survey be a. forgery, the patent founded on it is a mere nonentity, an ideal thing; nothing passes by it, and we might clearly give evidence ' that there was no such land. It is true, that this Court cannot, by its act, vacate a patent emanating from the State of North Carolina; but, as between third parties, (not trenching upon the sovereignty of the State,) the Court may and must decide collaterally on the effect of the patent.
Call, for the appellee, contended, that the point, whether there was any land or not, was - not raised by the bill of exceptions. That admits that there was land; but states, that the plaintiff insisted on introducing evidence to prove that the title was defective, in consequence of a fraud in obtaining the patent.
The plaintiff is estopped by the instrument on which he sues, from urging the point for which he now contends. The conditions of the bond not only states expressly, that the State of North Carolina had granted such land, but describes it particularly. Instead of shewing that the defendant *had no title to this land, the plaintiff undertakes to prove, that the State of North Carolina never granted such. If this paper be made the foundation of the action, it must fail; because the plaintiff claims under a grant from N. Carolina, and then says that N. Carolina had no land. Perhaps an action of deceit might lie.
As to the objection, that if the surveys were forged, the grant founded on it was void, it cannot appear to this Court, that surveys were necessary. But if they were, the proper authorities in N. Carolina were satisfied. If the State of N. Carolina did not think proper to bring a scire facias to vacate the patent, shall the State of Virginia undertake to vindicate its rights? This Court, in the case of Witherinton v. M’Donald have lately said, that they would not suffer the validity of a patent to be impeached in this collateral way.
It is sufficient if the inferior Court gave a right judgment; it is unimportant whether their reasons for it were right or wrong,
Wickham, in reply. According to the arguments of Mr. Call, the obligee could not sue at all. • He could not bring an action of deceit, because, as between him and the obligor, there was no fraud. But it is said he is estopped by the words of the condition of the bond, which admits that there was such land. It should be recollected that these are the words of the obligor. He states, that the land was granted by the State of N. Carolina; and if it cannot be found, he has not complied with the condition of his bond. But the action was properly brought on the warranty.
The opinion of the Court was manifestly wrong. We were not permitted to meet the testimony of the defendant. We were not permitted to shew an adverse possession in the State of N. Carolina, or in any person whatever. The Court determined, that it was sufficient for him to have exhibited a deed purporting to be a conveyance of the *land from him. This prevented us from going further, and objecting that there was no conveyance from Donaldson. The onus probandi lay on the defendant by the plea of covenants performed. He introduced evidence to prove it, by shewing a survey of the land, but we were prevented from meeting it, by shewing that it was a forgery.
1 Bulstr. 2, Proctor v. Johnson; Cro. Jac. 233, Yelv. 175. S. C. 3 Lev. 46, Nervin v. Munns, &c.; 1 Sauna. 60, Gainsford v. Griffith.
1 Hen. & Munf. p. 306.
1 Call, 127, Davis v. Miller.

Opinion:
JUDGE) TUCKEJR,
(after stating the case.) By the 4th article of the constitution of the United States, "full faith and credit shall be given, in each State, to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State." A patent, under the hand of the governor and seal of the State, is one of those public acts to which full faith and credit must be given in every Court in the union, being a record of the highest nature. If the Courts of this State were to undertake to pronounce the public act of a sister State, thus solemnly authenticated, void, in consequence of any misfeasance or omission of duty in the inferior ministerial officers of that State, whose faithful discharge of their duty the patent supposes, it might lead to consequences far beyond the reach of my foresight. If the patent be void, or voidable, for the reasons suggested in the bill of exceptions, I conceive it to be competent only to th£ State of North Carolina, and its Courts, to pronounce it void. In what manner a patent may be avoided in that State, whether by a scire facias issuing out of the Court of Chancery, or otherwise, we' are not informed. But no evidence, not of equal dignity with the patent itself, can, I presume, be admitted in this State, to annul the operation of a grant made in due form by the proper authorities of any other State. I therefore think the evidence was rightly rejected by the Court.
A second exception was taken to the Court's opinion. The plaintiff offered sundry depositions to prove that the defendant had not, when requested, gone himself to Tennessee, and shewn, or procured any other person, to shew *the land to the plaintiff; to the admission of which testimony the defendant, by his counsel, objected. And the Court being of opinion that the defendant was, by the condition of his bond, in substance bound to make the plaintiff a lawful right, under which he might enjoy peaceably the said land, but that he had not bound himself by the said condition to shew the land to the plaintiff, the last-mentioned testimony was likewise rejected; and I am of opinion properly. If indeed the condition of the bond had been, that the defendant should make to the plaintiff a feoffment in fee-simple, with livery of seisin, he might then have alleged the refusal to go upon the land to give •actual seisin thereof, or appointing an attorney so to do in his behalf as a breach of the condition.
But having accepted a deed of bargain and sale for the lands from the defendant, there was no obligation on the defendant afterwards to go and shew the lands, unless he had specially undertaken to do so, which, for any thing that appears from the condition of this bond, he did not. I therefore think the judgment must be affirmed, there being no other point submitted to the Court but the admission or rejection of the above-mentioned evidence.
JUDGE FLEMING.
It seems strange that no notice is taken in the bill of exceptions, of the want of a conveyance from Donaldson, the patentee, to Fontaine; and as no such conveyance appears on the record, it may be presumed that none was exhibited at the trial. But as the circumstance was omitted to be stated in the bill of exceptions, this Court will take no further notice of it. I am of opinion that the decree be affirmed.
Absent, JUDGE ROANE.
a) See 1 Hen. & Munf. 308, Witherinton v. M'Donald.