Case Name: Ruben DURON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1996-01-25
Citations: 915 S.W.2d 920
Docket Number: No. 01-94-1238-CR
Parties: Ruben DURON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUTSON-DUNN, ANDELL and O’CONNOR, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 915
Pages: 920–924

Head Matter:
Ruben DURON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-94-1238-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Jan. 25, 1996.
Winston Cochran, Jr., Houston, for appellant.
John Holmes, District Attorney, Rikke Graber, Assistant District Attorney, for ap-pellee.
Before HUTSON-DUNN, ANDELL and O’CONNOR, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
O'CONNOR, Justice.
The appellant, Ruben Duron, Jr., pleaded guilty without an agreed recommendation to the offense of indecency with a child. The trial court convicted the appellant of indecency with a child and assessed punishment at two-years imprisonment. In three points of error, the appellant asserts the court erred in convicting him because of defects in the indictment. We affirm.
Did the indictment allege an offense?
The appellant contends in point of error one the indictment is fundamentally defective because it does not allege the offense of indecency with a child. The appellant's indictment reads:
The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas, Ruben Duron, Jr., hereafter styled the Defendant, on or about April 2, 1994, did then and there unlawfully, with intent to arouse the sexual desire of the Defendant, have sexual contact with Olivia Morales, hereafter styled the Complainant, a child under the age of seventeen years and not his spouse, by rubbing his penis between Olivia Morales' legs.
(Emphasis added). A person commits indecency with a child if, with a child younger than 17 years and not his spouse, he engages in sexual contact with the child. TexPenal Code § 21.11(a)(1) (1994). "Sexual contact" means "any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." TexPenal Code § 21.01(2) (1994). The appellant asserts his acts alleged in the indictment do not fit the statutory definition of "sexual contact" because he touched his genitals against a non-genital area of the complainant.
The State argues the appellant waived this claim by pleading guilty without an agreed recommendation. When a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty without a plea bargain agreement, the defendant waives all non-jurisdictíonal defects that occurred before the entry of the guilty plea. Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); Courtney v. State, 904 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet. h.). Jurisdictional defects are defects that go to the very power of the State to bring the defendant in court to answer the charge against him. Courtney, at 908. Jurisdictional defects include claims of double jeopardy and the facial unconstitutionality of the statute prescribing the offense alleged, but do not include constitutional violations in obtaining evidence, defects in the indictment, or sufficiency of the evidence. Id.
In response, the appellant claims the indictment was not actually an indictment because it does not allege an offense. An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury that charges a person with the commission of an offense. Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b). The presentation of an indictment vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the case. Id. A written instrument is an indictment for jurisdictional purposes if it comes from the grand jury, purports to charge an offense, and is facially an indictment. Ex Parte Morris, 800 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ex Parte Gibson, 800 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim.App.1990). The charging instrument in the present case was returned by a grand jury, purported to charge the appellant with the offense of indecency with a child, and was facially an indictment. Therefore, we hold the indictment vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the case, and the appellant waived all complaints of alleged defects in the indictment by voluntarily entering his guilty plea.
The appellant claims the indictment did not allege an offense. The State contends the appellant waived his claim by not filing a motion to quash the indictment before trial. We agree. Article 1.14(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregu larity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other post-conviction proceeding.
Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 1.14(b) (Supp.1995).
The defect in the indictment challenged by the appellant is a defect of substance. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 27.08(1) (1989). Article 1.14(b) provides a defect of substance in an indictment is waived if the defendant does not object before the date on which the trial begins. State v. Turner, 898 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Ho v. State, 856 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.). The statute does not distinguish between correctable and non-correctable defects. Turner, 898 S.W.2d at 306. Rather, all defects of form and substance are waived if the defendant does not object before the date on which the trial begins. Id. Because the appellant did not object to the indictment in this case, we hold he waived his complaint that the indictment did not allege an offense.
We overrule point of error one.
Mens rea in the indictment
In points of error two and three, the appellant contends the indictment did not allege a culpable mental state as to all elements of the charged offense. He asserts this rendered his plea invalid and deprived him of due process of law and due course of law under both the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend 14; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. Specifically, the appellant asserts the indictment was defective because it did not allege he knew the victim was under 17 years of age. The appellant argues he did not waive this defect by not objecting before the day of trial because the United States Supreme Court decision of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994), issued after the appellant's guilty plea, altered the Texas law in effect at the time the appellant plead guilty.
The crime of indecency with a child in Texas does not require the State to prove the defendant knew at the time of the offense his victim was a child under age 17. Roof v. State, 665 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). Nevertheless, the appellant contends this ease is no longer good law in light of X-Citement Video. In that case, the defendant was charged under a federal statute that criminalized the knowing receipt or transportation of a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 466-67. The Supreme Court was faced with the decision of whether the term "knowingly" in the statute applied to the phrase "the use of a minor." Id. — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 467. In deciding that "knowingly" modified the phrase "the use of a minor," the Court relied partially upon the common-law presumption that a scienter requirement should apply to each statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 469.
We do not find X-Citement Video disposi-tive to the facts of this case. First, the holding in X-Citement Video did not purport to announce a new constitutional rule for state criminal prosecutions. Second, the Court acknowledged the common-law presumption of mens rea to all the elements of a crime does not apply to sex offenses in which the victim's actual age is determinative despite the defendant's reasonable belief the victim has reached the age of consent. X-Citement Video, — U.S. at - n. 2, 115 S.Ct. at 469 n. 2.
We hold the indictment in this case is not defective for failing to allege the appellant knew his victim's age when he committed the charged offense.
We overrule points of error two and three.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ANDELL, J., dissents.