Case Name: Robert Ross DAVIS, Appellant, v. Charles E. SMITH, as Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Vero Beach, Indian River County, Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-10-03
Citations: 227 So. 2d 342
Docket Number: No. 69-31
Parties: Robert Ross DAVIS, Appellant, v. Charles E. SMITH, as Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Vero Beach, Indian River County, Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WALDEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 227
Pages: 342–346

Head Matter:
Robert Ross DAVIS, Appellant, v. Charles E. SMITH, as Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Vero Beach, Indian River County, Florida, Appellee.
No. 69-31.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.
Oct. 3, 1969.
Certified to Supreme Court Oct. 16, 1969.
L. B. Vocelle and C. Wendell Harris, Vero Beach, for appellant.
Gordon B. Johnston and James T. Vo-celle of Vocelle & Gallagher, Vero Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
OWEN, Judge.
^ This case presents the question of whether F.S.1967, Section 322.262(4), F.S.A., applies to a municipal court so that any person charged therein with driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired (herein called DWI) is entitled to a jury trial upon demand for such.
Appellant Robert Ross Davis was charged in the Municipal Court of the City of Vero Beach with DWI, the offense allegedly occurring September 4, 1968. His written demand for trial by jury was denied and the cause set for trial before the court. Davis promptly applied to the Circuit Court of Indian River County for writ of prohibition directed to the Judge of the Municipal Court on the grounds that by virtue of F.S. 1967, Section 322.262(4), F.S.A., the respondent municipal judge was acting in excess of his jurisdiction in requiring Davis to stand trial without a jury when a demand for a jury trial had been timely made. The respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for writ of prohibition placed in issue the question of whether the statute is applicable to municipal courts. This question was necessarily answered in the negative when the circuit court entered its order dismissing the petition.
We hold that the language of the statute, which we have quoted in the footnote, mainfests clear legislative intent that the statute would apply to any court in which a person is charged with the offense, including municipal courts, and therefore we reverse the order appealed.
We rely heavily on two well recognized principles of statutory construction. First, the legislature is presumed to know existing law when a statute is enacted. Second, the courts cannot presume that the legislature intended to enact a law without some useful purpose in view.
At the time this statute was enacted, a person charged with DWI was entitled, upon demand, to a trial by jury in the state courts but was not entitled to trial by jury in the municipal courts. Likewise, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure which became effective prior to the effective date of the statute, expressly govern all criminal proceedings in the state courts but by implication (and committee note) were not intended to apply to municipal courts. If the legislature intended the statute to apply only to DWI cases brought in the state courts (but not to DWI cases brought in municipal courts) the provision for the right to trial by jury and the provision making the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to the proceedings serve no useful purpose, as neither provision would confer any right upon an accused in a state court which he would not have absent the statute. Thus, to construe the statute as limited in application to DWI cases brought in the state courts we would have to assume that the legislature was either unaware of existing law or intended to enact law which would serve no useful purpose. We are not willing to make this assumption. The alternative, and to us the inescapable conclusion, is that the legislature intended F.S.1967, Section 322.262(4), F.S.A., to extend to persons charged in municipal courts with DWI the right to trial by jury and the applicability of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to the same extent that such rights would apply if such person were charged in the state court with DWI.
It is well to note that we are called upon in this case to determine only the question of legislative intent. We are not faced with constitutional questions. The decision we reach here does not conflict with the decision in Boyd v. County of Dade, Fla. 1960, 123 So.2d 323, nor the line of cases referred to therein commencing with Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 1894, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398, as all of these cases held that there was no constitutional right to trial by jury in the municipal courts. Neither do we see any conflict with Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, Fla.1968, 213 So.2d 689 or City of Gainesville v. Hilliard, Fla. App.1968, 207 So.2d 520, although conceivably some dicta in the latter case might support a conflict. The case before us presents a question of whether the legislature intended to provide a statutory right to trial by jury under certain specified rules of procedure to persons charged in the municipal court with DWI.
Appellee contends that it is important to note in the instant case that appellant was not charged with a violation of F.S.1967, Section 317.201, F.S.A. (a state criminal offense), but rather was charged with a violation of F.S.1967, Section 186.0177, F.S.A., which had been adopted as a traffic ordinance by the City of Vero Beach (and hence was a municipal ordinance). For the purpose of our decision in this case we make it clear that such a distinction is unimportant.
The appellant, having been charged in the Municipal Court of Vero Beach with DWI, and having made a timely demand for a jury trial, was entitled t'o such under the provisions of F.S.1967, Section 322.262(4), F.S.A. Whether that court has the means of providing such jury trial is a question we have not been called upon to decide. The order dismissing the petition for writ of prohibition from which this appeal has been perfected is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We view our decision here as one which passes upon a question of great public interest and upon receipt of appropriate application by either party, we intend to certify the same to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEN, J., concurs.
REED, J., dissents, with opinion.
. F.S.1967, section 322.262(4), F.S.A. Any person charged with driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired shall be entitled to trial by jury according to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
. Dickinson v. Davis, Fla.1969, 224 So.2d 262; Collins Investment Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.1964, 164 So. 2d 806.
. Dickinson v. Davis, Fla.1969, 224 So.2d 262; Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of America, Fla.1962, 144 So.2d 813; Alexander v. Booth, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 716; Girard Trust Co. v. Tampashores Dev. Co., 1928, 95 Fla. 1010, 117 So. 786.
. Fla.Const. Declaration of Bights, § 11, F.S.A.
. Boyd v. County of Dade, Fla.1960, 123 So.2d 323; State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 1924, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260; Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 1894, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398.
. Rule 1.010, F.R.Cr.P., 33 F.S.A.