Case Name: The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Bruce W. Evans, Respondent
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1986-10-09
Citations: 45 Wash. App. 611
Docket Number: No. 7721-3-II
Parties: The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Bruce W. Evans, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 611–623

Head Matter:
[No. 7721-3-II.
Division Two.
October 9, 1986.]
The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Bruce W. Evans, Respondent.
Patrick D. Sutherland, Prosecuting Attorney, and Gary R. Tabor, Deputy, for appellant.
Frank A. Peters, for respondent.

Opinion:
Worswick, C.J.
—A jury found Bruce W. Evans guilty of first degree arson arising out of a fire at his home. The State now appeals an order granting Evans a new trial. Evans cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence during trial. We reverse the order granting a new trial, affirm the verdict, and remand for the entry of judgment and imposition of sentence.
We need not recite the facts. It will suffice to note that the evidence was voluminous and the trial was lengthy. The State produced substantial evidence that the fire was set, and incriminating Evans. The defense contended that the fire was caused accidentally by defects in the wiring system of the house. Evans' retained counsel produced an expert who testified that the fire probably was so caused, but that he was not certain. The State called an expert who rebutted this contention. The jury obviously agreed with the State.
The verdict was received on June 30, 1982. Evans did not file a motion for a new trial within 5 days as required by the version of CrR 7.6(b) then in effect. On August 17, 1982, a substitution of defense counsel was effected. New counsel engaged a new expert who, based on his examination of the physical evidence, offered the opinion that the fire definitely was caused by defects in the electrical system. Based on this, new counsel filed a motion for a new trial. After hearing, the trial court made extensive written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and granted the motion.
At the threshold, the State contends that the trial court erred in considering the motion for new trial, because it was not timely made. We reject this contention. CrR 7.6(b) specifically allows the court in its discretion to extend the time. The record shows that, as to the newly discovered evidence issue, there was a sufficient basis for an extension. We find no abuse of discretion.
The trial court concluded that grounds for a new trial existed under CrR 7.6(a)(3) and/or (8). We disagree.
A new trial may be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence only if each of five requirements is satisfied: the evidence (1) will probably change the result of the trial; (2) was discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching. State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 223, 634 P.2d 868 (1981). The trial court's findings, although verities here, do not support its conclusions that all of these elements are present.
We do not believe that the Williams element (1) has been satisfied. It is plain that, with the generous use of hindsight, the new expert did a more thorough job of evaluating the physical evidence. In the final analysis, however, the most that can be said of his proposed testimony is that it is more definite than that of the previous defense expert. The trial court concluded that it would probably change the result if a jury believed it. However, nothing in the findings or the record shows that a jury would be required to, would, or for that matter should, believe it.
We also do not believe that the Williams element (3) has been satisfied. There is nothing whatever in the findings to show why, in the exercise of due diligence, the new expert and his opinions could not have been discovered before trial. In short, the requirements of CrR 7.6(a)(3) as amplified by State v. Williams, supra, have not been met.
The requirements of CrR 7.6(a)(8) also have not been met. We fail to find in the findings and conclusions any "definite reasons of law and facts" justifying a new trial under this portion of the rule. State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d at 228; Dybdahl v. Genesco, Inc., 42 Wn. App. 486, 713 P.2d 113 (1986). There is no suggestion that Evans had anything other than a fair trial by all of the usual standards, and we see nothing in the trial court's written or oral rulings that we can regard as " [objectively assessable reasons or facts" to persuade us to the contrary. State v. Williams, supra. We do not believe that CrR 7.6(a)(8) was meant to afford an avenue by which obstacles to the use of CrR 7.6(a)(3) easily could be surmounted.
In sum, this strikes us as a classic case: the defendant loses, then hires a new lawyer, who hires a new expert, who examines the same evidence and produces a new opinion. We cannot accept this as a basis for a new trial. See Trautman, Serving Substantial Justice—A Dilemma, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 270 (1965). Inasmuch as there is no adequate legal basis for the order granting a new trial, it must be considered an abuse of discretion. State v. Hoff, 31 Wn. App. 809, 814, 644 P.2d 763, review denied, 97 Wn.2d 1031, cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1093 (1982).
On cross appeal, Evans contends that the trial court erred in not granting him a new trial on the ground of " [e]rror of law occurring at the trial and excepted to at the time by the defendant". CrR 7.6(a)(6). Evans asserts that the error occurred when the trial court allowed Evans' ex-wife, Laura Evans, to testify that in 1973 Evans started a fire in their home in Seattle in order to obtain the insurance money to bail him out of his failing businesses. We find no merit in this contention.
ER 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d 358, 655 P.2d 697 (1982) set out the test to be applied in ER 404 (b) situations, emphasizing that ER 404(b) must be read together with the relevancy rule of ER 402 and the probative value balancing rule of ER 403. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 361.
The Saltarelli analysis requires three steps. First, as a threshold determination, the court must "identify the purpose for which the evidence is to be admitted." Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 362. A 2-part inquiry is needed in order to accomplish this. First, the identified fact for which the evidence is to be admitted must be of consequence to the outcome of the action. Second, the evidence must make the existence of the identified fact more or less probable. Salt- arelli, 98 Wn.2d at 363.
Having satisfied the threshold inquiry, the next step requires a determination that the evidence of prior crimes is logically relevant to a material issue in the case. Salta-relli, 98 Wn.2d at 362. The inquiry here is "whether the evidence as to other offenses is relevant and necessary to prove an essential ingredient of the crime charged." State v. Goebel, 40 Wn.2d 18, 21, 240 P.2d 251 (1952). Finally, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 379, 218 P.2d 300 (1950).
Applying the Saltarelli regimen to the present case, we conclude that Laura Evans' testimony was properly admitted. The 2-part threshold determination was satisfied. First, the trial court stated that the purpose of the testimony was to show identity. In addition to identity, the testimony also showed intent. Identity and intent were both necessary to convict Evans of first degree arson. RCW 9A.48.020. Second, the fact that Evans set fire to his home once before makes his intentional setting of this fire more probable.
The second part of the Saltarelli test, that the evidence was relevant to prove an essential element of the crime charged, was also met. Testimony that Evans planned and started a fire in his own home on a prior occasion is relevant to show that he knowingly started this fire.
The third element of the Saltarelli test was also satisfied. Although the prejudicial effect of Laura Evans' testimony appears substantial, this effect was weakened by the fact that Laura Evans was admittedly a somewhat biased witness because she is in a custody battle with Evans. On the other hand, the testimony was highly probative as to Evans' ability and inclination intentionally to start a fire in his home. The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether prejudice outweighs probative value. State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 491, 682 P.2d 925, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1002 (1984). The trial court did not abuse its discretion here.
Finally, we note and reject Evans' attempt to argue that evidence of the prior fire is inadmissible because it occurred 9 years before the present fire, the time lapse between the two acts thus precluding the use of the prior bad act as evidence in this case. The time lapse between the prior bad act and the present one affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Bouchard, 31 Wn. App. 381, 386, 639 P.2d 761, review denied, 97 Wn.2d 1021 (1982).
The order granting a new trial is reversed. The verdict is affirmed. Remanded for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence.
Reed, J., concurs.
The rule provides:
"(a) Grounds for New Trial. The court on motion of defendant may grant a new trial for any one of the following causes when it affirmatively appears that a substantial right of the defendant was materially affected:
"(3) Newly discovered evidence material for the defendant, which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence and produced at the trial;
"(8) That substantial justice has not been done. ."
In our discussion we assume we are dealing with newly discovered evidence. A strong argument can be made, however, that what we have here is a newly discovered lawyer and a newly discovered expert, and that the latter simply has based his opinion on his examination of physical evidence that has been present and available from the beginning.
The State has taken no exceptions, and the findings, to the extent they are findings and not conclusions, are verities. State v. Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 628 P.2d 806 (1981); see also State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).