Case Name: Martha DUNHAM and Preston Dunham, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FRANK'S NURSERY & CRAFTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1990-12-12
Citations: 919 F.2d 1281
Docket Number: No. 89-2109
Parties: Martha DUNHAM and Preston Dunham, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FRANK’S NURSERY & CRAFTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 919
Pages: 1281–1299

Head Matter:
Martha DUNHAM and Preston Dunham, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FRANK’S NURSERY & CRAFTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 89-2109.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 8, 1990.
Decided Dec. 12, 1990.
Saul I. Ruman, Thomas A. Clements, Ru-inan, Clements & Tobin, Hammond, Ind., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Frank J. Galvin, Robert H. Bahner, Gal-vin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, Hammond, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
KANNE, Circuit Judge.
The issue in this case is whether the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) forbids a private litigant in a civil case from exercising a peremptory challenge on racial grounds. Other circuits confronting this issue have reached opposite conclusions. In Fludd v. J.B. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that Batson applies to the exercise of peremptory challenges by a private litigant in a civil case. In a recent en banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that Batson is limited to criminal cases. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc). We declined to resolve this issue in Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir.1988) on the grounds that it was not ripe for decision in that appeal. Today, we join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that Batson forbids a private litigant in a civil case from exercising a peremptory challenge on racial grounds.
Martha Dunham was injured in December of 1985 while shopping at Frank's Nursery & Crafts in Merrillville, Indiana. Mrs. Dunham received an electrical shock when she placed a Christmas ornament plug into a portable electric outlet. Frank's directed its customers to use the portable outlet to test the working condition of electrical ornaments prior to purchase. Martha Dun-ham brought a negligence suit against Frank's to recover for her injuries; her husband, Preston Dunham, asserted a claim for lost consortium and services of his wife due to her injuries. Jurisdiction in federal court was based upon diversity of citizenship in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Frank's and the Dunhams both consented to a United States Magistrate conducting all proceedings. On April 24, 1989, a jury trial was commenced. Both Mr. and Mrs. Dunham are black, and of the jury panel examined during voir dire, the only black member to be seated on the petit jury was peremptorily struck by Frank's. The Dunhams objected to this peremptory strike, claiming that it was racially motivated. The magistrate declined to require Frank's to provide a non-racial explanation for its strike, correctly noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has held that Batson applies to a civil case. The case proceeded to trial with a jury of seven white members. On April 28, 1989, the jury rendered a verdict against the Dunhams finding that, under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, Martha Dunham's fault was greater than fifty percent. The Dunhams appeal solely on the ground that the magistrate erred in declining to order Frank's to provide a non-racial explanation for its peremptory strike as required by Batson.
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids a prosecutor in a state criminal trial from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors from the venire solely because they are of the same race as the defendant. 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. In addition, the Court formulated an evidentiary standard for establishing that the state has struck a potential juror on account of his race. Specifically, the Court held that the prosecutor's striking of a defendant's racial peer from the venire can be used as circumstantial evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent. In so doing, the Court overruled the portion of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) which held that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge is presumptively based on proper considerations related to the case he is trying. Departing from Swain, the Court concluded that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge at the defendant's trial. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23.
In order to establish a prima facia case under Batson, the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to prevent members of his race from serving on the jury. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that the mere exercise of a peremptory challenge can be used as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptories to exclude veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Id.
Once the defendant makes a prima facia showing, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with a non-racial explanation for its challenge. Although the prosecutor's explanation does not have to rise to the level of cause, the mere denial of a discriminatory motive, or an affirmation of prosecutorial good faith does not suffice as a neutral explanation. After hearing the state's explanation, the trial court must determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24.
It is important to emphasize that the holding of Batson was based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases. While sixth amendment rights apply only to criminal defendants, equal protection rights apply to civil litigants as well as criminal defendants. Accordingly, the equal protection rationale underlying Batson does not stem from any rights or protections afforded to a criminal defendant that are not afforded to a civil litigant. The Court in Batson based its holding on three basic principles. First, the Court stated that "[cjompetence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial. A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror' " 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718 (citations omitted). Second, the Court stated that a prosecutor shall not be allowed to assume that a juror of the defendant's race will be partial to the defendant simply because of their shared race. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Finally, the Court reasoned that "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. It is obvious that these three principles are not dependent upon the fact that the jurors in Batson were being selected to sit for a criminal trial rather than a civil trial. Because the rationale of Batson is not inherently dependent upon the fact that Batson was a criminal proceeding, it is only logical to conclude that the Supreme Court would not intend the equal protection requirements of Batson to be limited to criminal cases.
This conclusion does not end our analysis, however, for the Constitution does not forbid private persons from discriminating. For a civil litigant to invoke the requirements of the equal protection clause, the litigant must show that the alleged discriminatory act is "state action" subject to the dictates of the Constitution. State action is readily apparent in the context of a criminal case; for there, a representative of the state — the prosecutor — exercises the peremptory challenge. However, state action is not so obvious in a civil case where the party utilizing the peremptory challenge is often a private individual, not a representative of the state. But the fact that a private litigant exercises a peremptory challenge does not automatically make that act private. As the level of interaction and cooperation between private individuals and the state rises — as it does in the jury selection process — it becomes increasingly difficult to discern precisely where private conduct ends and state action begins. In this case, Frank's, a private litigant, is the alleged discriminatory actor. For Batson to apply in this situation, the alleged discriminatory act — Frank's exercise of a peremptory challenge — -must fairly be said to be conduct attributable to the state. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), the Supreme Court established a two-part framework for determining the presence or absence of state action. The first part asks whether the claimed constitutional deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority. Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. As Frank's concedes, this requirement is clearly satisfied here. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1870 provides that each party in a civil case shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. The crucial question is whether the Dunhams can establish Lugar's second requirement: under the facts of a given case, can the party charged with the deprivation appropriately be characterized as a "state actor"? Id. The Court emphasized that a private party who exercises a right having its source in state authority — Lugar's first requirement — is not considered a state actor — Lugar 's second requirement — absent "something more." Id. at 937-39, 102 S.Ct. at 2754.
Determining what constitutes "something more" is far from a precise task. In Lugar, the Court referred to its own use of several different tests in making this determination, including the "public function" test, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); the "state compulsion" test, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); the "nexus" test, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., supra; and the "joint action" test, see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). The Court questioned whether these tests are actually different in operation or are simply different ways of "characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S.Ct. at 2755. The Court concluded that, in the final analysis, the state action determination must be based on the specific facts and the entire context of a given case. " 'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in .private conduct be attributed its true significance.' " Id. (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 860).
At the outset of this "necessarily fact-bound inquiry," it is instructive to examine the key facts of relevant precedents in which the Court has traced the line that separates private conduct from government action. In Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, the Court established that the equal protection clause forbids judicial enforcement of private, racially restrictive covenants. The Court held that enforcement of such private agreements by judicial officers in their official capacities amounted to state action. The Court applied a but for analysis, reasoning that, absent the intervention of the enforcing court, supported by the full panoply of state power, the persons excluded by the covenants would have been free to occupy the properties at issue. 334 U.S. at 19, 68 S.Ct. at 845.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., supra, the Court found that the state acted when a privately owned restaurant located in a state owned and operated parking garage refused to serve a black would-be-patron. Although the decision to discriminate was made by the restaurant owner, a private concern, the Court reasoned that the state could have affirmatively required the restaurant not to discriminate as a precondition to renting space in the parking garage. 365 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct. at 861-62. The Court reasoned that through its inaction, the state elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The Court concluded that regardless of the state's motive, it was not allowed to effectively abdicate its responsibility to prohibit racial discrimination occurring on its property. Id.
Recently, in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), the Court concluded that the activities of a probate court in a dispute between private parties caused the acts of one party to amount to state action. Tulsa involved a provision of the Oklahoma Probate Code barring creditor claims against an estate unless those claims are presented to the estate no later than two months after the estate notifies creditors that probate proceedings had commenced. A creditor who failed to comply with the two month requirement contended that the estate's notification did not comply with the requirements of the due process clause because the estate provided only publication notice to creditors as opposed to personal notice. Id. at 479-81, 108 S.Ct. at 1341-43.
The Court held that the estate's act of providing notice was an act that could be attributed to the government because of the probate court's role in the notification process in particular and the probate process in general. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the two month time bar did not begin to run until the probate court appointed an executrix and required her to file a copy of the estate's notice and an affidavit stating that the notice had been published. The Court reasoned that the role of the probate court was "so pervasive and substantial that it must be considered state action subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 487, 108 S.Ct. at 1345-46. The Court concluded that whenever "private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found." Id. at 486, 108 S.Ct. at 1345.
We now turn to whether there was state action in this case. The key is to determine whether the trial court's participation in Frank's exercise of its peremptory challenge is substantially different than the state's involvement in Shelley, Burton, or Tulsa. In holding that state action is absent in a civil case, Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee, writing for the en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit in Edmondson, characterized the role of a trial judge as follows: 895 F.2d at 221-22 (footnotes omitted). Judge Gee reasoned that this "mere standing aside" cannot constitute "action" in light of Supreme Court pronouncements that "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement . that the choice must . be deemed to be that of the State," Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2786, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (citing cases), and that "[mjere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the . Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing cases).
[t]he merely ministerial function exercised by the judge in simply permitting the venire members cut by counsel to depart is an action so minimal in nature that one of less significance can scarcely be imagined. No exercise of judicial discretion is involved, rather a mere standing aside; so that the fault — if it is a fault — lies with the system which permits such challenges, not with the judge's mere ministerial compliance with what the rule requires.
While the approach of the Fifth Circuit is certainly plausible, we believe that Supreme Court precedent requires a different characterization of the role of a trial judge in the peremptory challenge process. Analogizing to Shelley, Burton, and Tulsa, we are unable to characterize a judge's role as that of a "ministerial bystander." Admittedly, this case is different than Shelley in one key respect — a judge enforcing peremptory challenges, unlike a judge enforcing racial covenants, does not exercise judicial discretion; once a private litigant exercises a peremptory challenge, the judge has no choice but to excuse the stricken panel member. However, in applying a but for analysis in Shelley, the Court focused on a court's coercive powers, not its discretionary powers. A similar but for analysis is applicable here. Like the racial covenants in Shelley, enforcement of a peremptory strike is ultimately dependent upon the judge's coercive powers. When a private litigant peremptorily challenges a panel member, that challenge is not self-effectuating. The litigant may exercise the peremptory challenge — but it is the presiding judge who then exercises his authority to excuse the juror from service. All jurors are under the control of the presiding judge during the course of the trial. It is this control over the jury and its selection procedures, inherent in the powers of a federal judicial officer, which demonstrates that the ultimate enforcer of a peremptory challenge is the trial judge; enforcement is not dependent upon an agreement between the private parties.
In excusing a juror, the state, no less than in Burton, places its power and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. In addition, peremptory challenges are invoked in a courtroom operated by the government. If the Court in Burton did not allow the state to abdicate its responsibility to prohibit racial discrimination in a parking garage, it only seems logical that the Court would not allow the state to abdicate this responsibility in a court of law.
Up to this point, we have focused only on the function of a trial judge in excusing a juror pursuant to a private litigant's peremptory challenge. In finding state action in Tulsa, however, the Court did not limit its focus to the role of the probate court in the process by which the estate provided notice; rather, the Court emphasized the importance of the probate court's overall involvement in the probate proceedings. Likewise, our state action inquiry should focus on the overall involvement of the trial court in the jury selection process. The role of a federal district court in the jury selection process appears to be at least as pervasive as the role of the probate court in Tulsa. Congress determines the qualifications for jury service and the method of summoning jury panels; the district court, in turn, enforces these standards. 28 U.S.C. § 1865. In order to avoid discrimination in the selection of jury ve-nires, Congress also requires each district court to devise and enforce a plan for random jury selection. 28 U.S.C. § 1863. The clerk of the district court summons the venire to appear in court at a particular time and place. Of course, jury service in the federal system is not optional — if not excused by the district court, a summoned juror must fulfill jury duty.
In regard to the exercise of peremptory challenges, there are several discretionary measures open to a judge which tend to belie the characterization of the judge as a "ministerial bystander." For example, while the number of peremptory challenges is determined by statute in single party civil cases, a trial'judge has broad discretion in determining the appropriate number and allocation of peremptory challenges in multiparty civil cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1870. Perhaps more important, the trial judge indirectly determines the impact of any given number of peremptory strikes. Local court rules control the number of jurors empaneled in civil cases, thereby governing the relative effectiveness of peremptory challenges in determining the composition of a jury. The trial judge controls the conduct of voir dire and the range of information that may be discovered about a jury panel member, thus affecting the exercise of both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. In addition, the judge has broad discretion over whether or not to excuse a juror for cause, thus determining the number of jurors who remain eligible for the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Finally, a trial judge enjoys broad discretion in determining the manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised: he can decide which party exercises the last challenge; he can require the parties to exercise their challenges simultaneously in writing; or he can require one party to exercise all of its challenges first, thereby allowing the other party to act with full knowledge of its opponent's choices.
We do not think the role of the trial court in Frank's peremptory strike is significantly different than the role of the state in Shelley, Burton, or Tulsa. Accordingly, we conclude that the requisite state action is present in this case.
There is one final point we should address, however: the en banc court in Ed-monson noted that the Court in Batson declined to hold that the equal protection clause prohibits defense counsel in a criminal case from exercising peremptory challenges on racial grounds. 895 F.2d at 222. The en banc court hinted, and Frank's now argues, that the Court's failure to so hold is inconsistent with the view of the trial court as state actor. Id. We disagree. The Court in Batson explicitly declined to express a view one way or the other on whether the Constitution imposes any limits on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. 476 U.S. at 89 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1719 n. 12. Thus, it is clear that the Court in Batson did not address the issue of whether the trial court supplies the necessary state action in the context presented in this case.
Since Batson was decided in 1986, a debate has ensued as to whether it makes sense to allow a right to peremptory challenges — a device admittedly intended to allow a party to strike a potential juror for any reason, be it a hunch, an assumption or an intuitive judgement — once the Supreme Court created an equal protection exception to that right. One thing is certain — the future viability of peremptory challenges is quite uncertain. As of this date, the Supreme Court has not made clear whether the equal protection rationale of Batson forbids the exercise of peremptory challenges with regard to other cognizable categories such as sex, ethnic origin, religion and so on. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 124, 106 S.Ct. at 1737 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Some propose that we should completely abolish peremptory challenges (as they have in England), see Batson, 476 U.S. at 106-08, 106 S.Ct. at 1728-29 (Marshall, J., concurring), while others argue that we should restore peremptory challenges to the $re-Batson right with no exceptions. Regardless of what position one favors, the current status of the law — peremptory challenges which are not truly peremptory, with exceptions for some reasons but not others — hardly seems satisfactory. See United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir.1984) (Posner, J.) (permitting in quiry into the basis for a peremptory challenge causes it to collapse into a challenge for cause); Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 153 (1989).
For our purposes today, however, the debate over the partial invalidation of peremptory challenges was resolved by the Supreme Court in Batson; thus, our views on its merits are irrelevant to deciding this appeal. Our basic task has been to determine the presence or absence of state action. Having found the requisite state action, we are bound to hold that the requirements of Batson apply to Frank's use of its peremptory challenge. Accordingly, we must remand this case to the district court for it to determine whether the Dunhams can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. If the Dunhams establish a prima facie case, then the district court must require Frank's to show that it had some neutral, that is, non-racial reason for its challenge. If Frank's does not come forward with a non-racial explanation for its challenge, the district court shall order a new trial.
The case is Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. The en banc opinion vacated the original panel opinion, which held that Batson applies to a private litigant in a civil case. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.1988).
. In Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir.1990), the Eighth Circuit held that the requirements of Batson apply to a civil case when the government is the civil litigant exercising the peremptory challenge. Id. at 1008. The court declined to express a view on whether the action of a trial court alone, in a case involving no government litigants, can supply the necessary element of state action. Id. n. 2.
. Martha and Preston Dunham are residents of Lake County Indiana; Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc. is incorporated in the state of Michigan and has its principal place of business in Michigan. The amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.
. Batson was based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which applies only to the states, not the federal government. However, the right to equal protection of the laws expressed in the fourteenth amendment has been found by implication in the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which applies to federal action. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1164 n. 4, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954).
. The Court declined to express a view on the merits of Batson's sixth amendment arguments. 476 U.S. at 84, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 n. 4. Recently, in Holland v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), the Court held that the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment does not prevent either side in a criminal prosecution from exercising its peremptory challenges in order to exclude cognizable racial or other groups from the petit jury as long as the venire itself is drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
. The facts of Blum v. Yaretsky, see accompanying text, are not pertinent to our case. Unlike this case, the private action at issue in Blum failed to satisfy Lugar's first prong. In Blum, the Court noted that it was dealing with a case "obviously different from those cases in which the defendant is a private party and the question is whether his conduct has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it 'state' action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." 457 U.S. at 1003, 102 S.Ct. at 2785.
. The portion of the en banc opinion in Edmon-son pertaining to state action does not discuss Shelley, Burton, or Tulsa. See Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221-22.