Case Name: Paul E. GARDNER, et al. v. ZULU SOCIAL AID AND PLEASURE CLUB, INC.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-02-10
Citations: 729 So. 2d 675
Docket Number: No. 98-CA-1040
Parties: Paul E. GARDNER, et al. v. ZULU SOCIAL AID AND PLEASURE CLUB, INC.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 729
Pages: 675–681

Head Matter:
Paul E. GARDNER, et al. v. ZULU SOCIAL AID AND PLEASURE CLUB, INC.
No. 98-CA-1040.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 10, 1999.
Writ Denied May 7, 1999.
Marianne Morales Zimmer, Metairie, Louisiana, Paul E. Gardner, New Orleans, Louisiana, for plaintiff/appellant.
Wiley G. Lastrapes Jr., New Orleans, Louisiana, for defendant/appellee.

Opinion:
11 BYRNES, Judge.
The plaintiffs-appellants allege that they had a contract to ride in the Zulu parade on Mardi Gras Day. Less than four blocks into the parade, the rear left tire broke off the axle of the float, leaving the float disabled and the riders stranded. The float was not repaired and the riders allege they had to take shelter in a nearby church as unruly spectators surrounded the float in search of throws. That was the end of the parade for them. As a consequence, plaintiffs allege damages for breach of contract. They seek pecuniary damages including fees and costs for: the float, costumes, make-up and labor, renting a dressing room, Krewe meetings, Mardi Gras Day transportation, food and drink for the float, float security, non-member riders fee, mandatory throws, coconuts and decorating materials, and assorted dated and undated throws. Plaintiffs also seek nonpecuniary damages, including but not limited to, mental anguish, inconvenience and loss of enjoyment "due to the failure of the defendant to meet its contractual obligation."
|2ZuIu filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Zulu was immune from suit under LSA-R.S. 9:2796, the Mardi Gras Parade immunity statute. In their opposition brief, plaintiffs argue that the Mardi Gras Parade immunity statute does not apply to their contract claims because the statutory immunity is applicable to tort claims only. Zulu responded that the plaintiffs had no contract with Zulu. The trial court granted Zulu's exception of no cause of action without written reasons, but allowed plaintiffs fifteen days in which to amend their petition in order to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs chose not to amend, but brought this appeal instead. We affirm.
The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs, 93-0690 (La.7/5/94); 640 So.2d 237, 241. It questions whether the petition sufficiently alleges grievances for which the law affords a remedy. Lewis v. Aluminum Company of America, 588 So.2d 167, 169 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), writ denied 592 So.2d 411 (La.1992). All well-pleaded allegations of fact must be accepted as true when considering an exception of no cause of action. Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 578 So.2d 1006 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991). The burden is on the exceptor. Haspel & Davis Mill. & Planting Co. Ltd. v. Board of Levee Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 95-0233 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/96); 680 So.2d 159, writ denied 96-2430 (La.12/6/96); 684 So.2d 932. The exception of no cause of action must be overruled if the petition states a cause of action on any grounds or portion of demand. Reis v. Fenasci & Smith, 93-1785 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/14/94); 635 So.2d 1319. The exception of no cause of action must be decided upon the face of the petition and any attached documents. Williams v. Touro Infirmary, supra. No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931.
Zulu argues that the plaintiffs had no direct contract with Zulu. The plaintiffs seem to acknowledge the truth of this in their brief when they argue that they are the third-party beneficiaries pursuant to LSA-C.C. art.1978 of a contract between Zulu and another. Regardless, we are unable to take cognizance of the contents of documents not annexed to the petition when reviewing an exception of no cause of action. Neither of plaintiffs' petitions have any documents or copies of | .¡contracts annexed. As stated previously, we are limited to the allegations of the petitions which we must assume to be true when reviewing an exception of no cause of action. We are precluded from noticing the contents of any documents or copies of contracts alluded to by the parties, but not annexed to the petition(s). The plaintiffs have made no allegations in their petition that they are a third party beneficiary of any contract. Accordingly, those portions of the record that are properly before this Court on an exception of no cause of action do not raise this issue. Therefore, we shall proceed based on the assumption that a contract of some kind existed entitling the plaintiffs to ride the Zulu parade as alleged in numbered paragraph "2" of their original petition, without being able to refer to any specific provisions thereof. We shall also assume that the float breakdown occurred as alleged. Finally, we must assume that the basis for Zulu's liability to the plaintiffs is as alleged in numbered paragraph "5" of the plaintiffs' original petition, i.e., "providing the plaintiffs with a defective float and negligent planning for potential breakdowns."
Zulu claims that it is immune from plaintiffs claim under LSA-R.S. 9:2796. Plaintiffs counter that LSA-R.S. 9:2796 was intended to apply only to "offenses and quasi offenses", and not to claims sounding in contract. It is true that LSA-R.S. 9:2796 B appears to be limited to immunity from being "struck by any missile, whatsoever which has been traditionally thrown, tossed or hurled by members of the krewe or organization ." However, paragraph "A" of LSA-R.S. 9:2796 is much broader in scope than paragraph "B ." LSA-R.S. 9:2796 A refers to "any loss I ¡or damage related to the parades . unless said loss or damage was caused by the deliberate and wanton act or gross negligence of the krewe or organization." [Emphasis added.] Plaintiffs made no allegations of deliberate or wanton acts, or gross negligence. Therefore, the only question is whether plaintiffs' claim constitutes "any loss or damage related to the parades" under 9:2796 A. The answer to this question is, "Yes." Therefore, Zulu is immune.
To limit the effect of 9:2796 to damages sustained by onlookers who are injured by things thrown from floats would render 9:2796 A meaningless. Such damages are specifically covered by paragraph "B." We must assume that the legislature would not have enacted 9:2796 A without some additional purpose. The expansive language in paragraph "A" referring to "any loss or damage related to parades" is intended to cover the broad spectrum of risks and losses normally associated with parading. Among such risks is the well-known possibility of a float breakdown. The plaintiffs contend that we are opening the door to allowing parading organizations to take money from would-be participants without any intention of providing them with an opportunity to parade. But the float breakdown in the instant case is very different from a situation where a parading organization might take a rider's money and then arbitrarily refuse to allow that rider to ride. Such a situation would be covered by the deliberate and wanton act exclusion found in 9:2796 A. This exclusion covers actions done in bad faith.
The record reflects that the defendant in its "Defendant's Exception of No Cause Action, and, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment," which exception and alternative summary judgment motion resulted in the judgment that is the subject of this appeal, specifically noted that the plaintiffs made no allegations of deliberate or wanton misconduct or gross negligence. Thus, after [ (¡having the matter called to their attention, plaintiffs still made no such allegations of deliberate or wanton acts or gross negligence, even after being given the opportunity to amend. To put it another way, plaintiffs failed to make any explicit allegations in their petitions of deliberate or wanton misconduct or gross negligence. Nor did they plead any facts from which such levels of culpability could be inferred. They have not raised this as an issue in argument, preferring to base everything on their contention that the parading immunity does not apply to their contractual claims.
Float breakdowns in Mardi Gras parades are a common occurrence and, therefore, a risk that should be reasonably anticipated. In other words, it is a risk normally associated with parading, and, therefore, one covered by the LSA-R.S. 9:2796 immunity. This Court is sympathetic with plaintiffs. It must be a great disappointment to wait perhaps a full year in eager and excited anticipation for the great day, only to have all high hopes and expectations dashed by a float breakdown. Were it not for the statutory immunity, this court would be receptive to plaintiffs' claims, not just for pecuniary damages, but also for damages to compensate them for their disappointment as well. But float breakdown, like police strikes and inclement weather are known contingencies. When it comes to Mardi Gras parading "you pay your money and you take your chances." The legislature in enacting LSA-R.S. 9:2796 can be assumed to have weighed the public utility of Mardi Gras parades against the risks ordinarily associated with such events, such as being struck by throws, or having a parade canceled, or having a float break down. The immunity granted by LSA-R.S. 9:2796 represents ajrdeeision by the legislature that the public utility of Mardi Gras parades outweighs the risks normally associated with such events.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
PLOTKIN, J., dissents with reasons.
. The plaintiffs in their petition make no reference to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1998. However, the special event nature of the alleged contract is such that it could be said to be "intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss," as provided in the first paragraph of LSA-C.C. art. 1998. Therefore, if, but only if, plaintiffs state a cause of action in contract, they may have a claim for nonpecuniary damages.
The second paragraph of LSA-C.C. art. 1998 provides for nonpecuniaiy damages where the contractual breach was "intended . to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee." Plaintiffs make no allegation of any such intention in their petitions, and they raise no such argument in their brief.
. The petition makes the following allegations:
1.
The defendant, Zulu Social Aid and Pleasure Club, Inc., is a Louisiana non-profit corporation which has its office in this parish. [Zulu cannot claim the benefits of LSA-R.S. 9:2796 unless it is a non-profit corporation. This allegation eliminates that issue.]
2.
The defendant entered into a contract which provided for the plaintiffs to participate as riders in the 1991 Zulu parade on Mardi Gras Day, February 12, 1991.
3.
Float #17 was provided by the defendant to the plaintiffs for use in the 1991 parade. Three and one-half blocks into the start of the parade, the left rear tire, while the float was in motion and without warning, fell off the axle causing the float to pitch violently to the left and come to rest at a precarious angle on the street.
4.
The plaintiffs were left on Jackson Avenue for several hours after the breakdown and had to take refugee [sic] in a church to avoid the crowds who had surrounded the stranded float removing and attempting to remove the plaintiffs' throws from the float.
5.
There was no attempt to repair the float and allow for the plaintiffs to complete the parade. Due to negligent planning by the defendant, there were no repair tracks located in the middle or end of the parade to provide repair services.
6.
Based on the defendant providing the plaintiffs with a defective float and negligent planning for potential breakdowns, the plaintiffs were denied their contractual right to participate in the 1991 Zulu parade.
The remaining allegations consist in the itemization of the plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs also filed an amended petition, but it served only to add an additional named party plaintiff. No documents or copies of contracts were annexed to either the original nor the amended petition.
. Interestingly, the acts of Zulu of which the plaintiffs complain, the "defective float and negligent planning," sound in tort.
. This is not a holding that a parading organization may not by contract agree to waive the benefits of the immunity afforded by LSA-R.S. 9:2796. Plaintiffs petitions do not raise the issue. Therefore, it was not considered as part of this appeal.