Case Name: John Stoney, vs. John. P. M'Neill
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1824-01
Citations: 1 Harp. 156
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Stoney, vs. John. P. M'Neill.
Judges: Johnson, justice, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 156–183

Head Matter:
John Stoney, vs. John. P. M'Neill.
Sf ter pleading to the merits, it is too late to ia« e advantage of the-plaintiff’s omissson to make oath of the debt or sum demanded,, at the time of filing his declaration, in a proceeding by attach-merit.
td person who is in possession of a bond, assigned in blank, is inlaw, prima facie, the owner; and the obligor making payment to such holder, bond fide, will be discharged.
JLny evidence which went to shew that the payment was made bona fide, 'should have been admitted; without regard to thein-tent-ion of the obligee, at the time of making the assignment.
One who had guarantied the ultimate payment of a bond, .toas held an incompetent witness to prove that it had not been paid to himself,-while it was in his possession, assigned in blank,
This-- was an action of debt, by process of attachment, brought by the- plaintiff, as assignee of Alexander Henry, ¡against the defendant, one of three co-obligors. The plaintiff made no affidavit of the subsistence of the debt, upon'filing bis declaration, as the attachment act requires. On the suggestion of the plaintiff's attornics, that the defendant had an attorney in fact,, residing in Charleston, á rule- was issued and served on him, requiring the defendant to plead within two months, or suffer judgment by default. In pursuance of this rule, the defendant pleaded, first: That there had been no assignment made ©f this -bond by Alexander Henry, the obligee, to the plaintiff; and secondly, that an assignment had been made by Alexander Henry, the obligee,-to Joshua Brown, to whom the defendant had satisfied his obligation, and was discharged. The bond in question was the joint and several obligation of William Walton, John Walton, and John P. M‘Neil, bearing date the 11th December, 1811. On the back of this bond, Alexander Henry the obligee, had endorsed his name, in blank, and annexed thereto his seal. The following special guarantee was also placed upon the back of the bond: “ I, Joshua Brown, do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators, to guarantee to the within named Alexander Henry, Iqs heirs, exec-tors, and administrators, and assigns, the ultimate payment of the within bond, on which has been made no payment what- . ever, together'With the interest to grow due thereon, according to the tenor and effect of the within bond. Given under my Jtand and seal, this the fourth day of June, 1812.”
- (Signed) Joshua Brown, (L. S.)
In this situation the bond had passed into the possession of Joshua Brown, by delivery, with whom it had remained for the space of two years, dunug which period, M'Neill, the defendant, in a settlement made with Brown, the holder of the bond, obtained from him the following receipt, which was endorsed upon the bond: “ Received at Charleston, the 25th May, 1813; from Mr. John P. M’Neill, the sum of eight thousand five-hundred and fifteen dollars, in consideration of which payment* I do hereby exonerate him from any further responsibility -oif account of the within bond.”
(Signed) Joshua Brown.
Subsequently to these proceedings, to wit, in the year 1817, the blank above the name of A. Henry, on the back of the bond, was filled up in these words: “ 1 assign and set over the within bond and ail my right and interest therein, to John Stoney, his executors and administrators, for value received.”
Mr. Joseph Bennett testified that the bond was brought to liimby Mr. Stoney, tobe sued for the benefit of all concerned. That the words over the name u A. Henry” were not then written, but that a receipt, signed by Joshua Brown, was then on the bond; that the assignment was filled up by the clerk in the office, when the declaration against Walton, one of the obligors, was'drawn. This declaration had been filed in July 1817, and the present suit was commenced in March, 1817, The defendant gave in evidence, an answer of Mr. Stoney, in the court of equity, in which he avers the assignment to have been to him- and three others, and that he had no exclusive in» terest in the bond, and that he received the bond from Joshua Brown, in 1814. On the adduction- of this evidence, a non-suit was moved for, which was overruled.
Mr. John Robinson was called by the defendant, to prove that Joshua Brown and Alexander Henry, who had been partners in trade, had given public notice in the papers, upon the dissolution of their partnership, that all debts due to them were transferred to Joshua Brown, and to show that this bond was-given for a partnership debt; hut the admissibility of this evidence was overruled; as also evidence which was offered of an arbitration between Brown and Henry, respecting the property of this bond, and evidence to prove a contrae* between Brown and Henry, respecting the assignment of this, bond.
General John Geddcs was called, by the defendant, and proved that he delivered this bond, wdth Henry’s name on the back of it, to Joshua Brown, on the 4th June, 1812. He stated that it had been agreed, by arbitration, to assign the bond, as a collateral security, to Fitzsimons, Stoney, William-son, and Cohen, and that it was part of the agreement that they should give a receipt; that Brown brought their receipt, and he (witness) delivered the bond to him; that the assignment was-made in pursuance of an arbitration, and was left in blank for the parties to fill up as they pleased. A Mr. Burke proved, that the consideration of the discharge by Brown, was cotton and produce, delivered by M‘Neill to him; and he stated that when MNeill made this satisfaction, he and the Waltons had failed, and that all his estate would not have paid 5s. in the pound.
To rebut the force of the evidence offered by the defendant, the plaintiff called Joshua Brown; to whom the defendant objected on the ground of interest; but the presiding judge ruled that his interest and the defendant’s were the same, and that being called by the plaintiff, he was competent to swear against his interest. Mr. Brown was first interrogated on his voir dire* and said he was not interested, because he was insolvent; and whatever the event of the suit might be, he could lose nothing. He was sworn in chief, and stated that the bond was delivered to him on the 4th June, 1812, to carry to the parties, who had given a receipt for it; but that neither Mr. Stoney, nor any of them would receive it, and he kept it two years: that M‘Neill offered to pay him one-third for a discharge; that witness told him,he had no right to receive it, and that the bond did not belong to him; that he was a mere earner; but M‘Neill said he did not care, and gave him the draft of a receipt, and said that if he would put that receipt on the bond, he would pay him, in produce, one-third of the bond. He said M'Neill had cheated him, and that he had lost $2,800 on the produce; but that he paid over the full amount towards satisfaction of Mr. Henry’s .notes.
The presiding judge stated to the jury, in the charge made t-o them,, that the assignment to Stoney had been fully proved;- and that he was entitled in law to recover the full amount-called' for by the bond: that the jury could not and ought not to respect the plea of satisfaction to Brown, to whom the evidence showed no assignment had been made; that it was not the intention-of Henry to assign to him, and, therefore, the assignment in' blank operated no transfer to him, with other views taken of the subject, all tending to shew that the right oi the plaintiff to' recover ivas undoubted. The jury found a verdict, corresponding with the charge, to the amount of the bond. The defendant now moves to set aside the verdict, and that a non-suit be entered, for the following reasons:
1st. That the affidavit of debt ivas indispensable by the at*--tachment act.
2d. That if the affidavit be not positively necessarjffin an attachment cause, it is at least essential that the contrary should not appear; hut the answer which was put in as evidence, expressly negatived the assertion of debt due to the plaintiffs.
3d. Because if any assignment was proved, it was an assignment to four persons jointly, and not to one severally. In the event of this motion failing, then a new trial is moved for;
1st. Because the presiding judge excluded evidence material to prove a joint assignment.
2d.- Because he rejected evidence, material to shew that A. Henry and John Stoney had enabled Brown to hold himself out as ■ the owner of the bond, with all the exte. nal indicia of property.
3d. Because he admitted the testimony of Mr. Brown, who * was directly interested in the event of the suit, and was mistaken • in supposing Brown ivas swearing against his interest.
The 4th and 5th grounds relate specifically to the charge of the judge, which has already been taken notice of.
Grimke, for motion.
The affidavit in this case was certain- - - ly matter of substance, being positively directed by the attachment act. If on the trial of a cause, it appear that the plaintiffis an alien or á slave, he will fail, though the matter may not have been pleaded. Such an one Is incapable to sue. The statute authorizes this process, on condition of making the affidavit; and ’ if in the progress of the cause, it appear that the affidavit was J?ot made, the defendant may avail himself of the defect.
As to the assignment of this bond to plaintiff; it is ig‘ evidence that the assignment in blank, on the back of the borní, was made with a view of transferring the property to four. The rule is that all who are legally interested on the subject matter 'of the action must join. How is it that Stoncy has sued alone? He might perhaps have maintained trover for the bond, if it had got out of his possession; but this would have been founded on his possession alone, and has no relation to the present question. A blank indorsement may he filled up after action brought, but it must be according to the rights of the. parties. Stcuey it -seems sues for the benefit of all concerned, but whence does he derive bis authority to do so? Those who are interested in a -contract or piece of property, may appoint an agent, whose acts will bind them, but this will not authorize him to sue in his own-name. Or admitting that the assignees of ibis bond might; by mutual consent, fill it up in the name of either, is there any evidence of such consent? Coijld a judgment in favour of tins plaintiff, be pleaded in bar to a suit by the four? Might a payment to the four be pleaded, so as to defeat the action of the present plaintiff? A question may well be made too, whether the whole of the assignees had a right to site, as the bend was only transferred to them in pledge.
Petigru, atfy. gen. for motion.
The evidence establishes, that the bond was placed in thejDossession of Brown, by Henry-; that the plaintiff and those interested with him, refused to receive-it of Brown, and permitted it to remain in his possession for two years, and that while in the possession of Brown, the payment was made by M‘Neill, and the discharge given, which appears on the hack of the bond. With respect to this part of the case, our proposition is, that if one person furnishes another with the means of exhibiting himself as. the owner of his property, he will be bound by his' acts, so far as third persons without notice, are concerned. This is the hinge on which the case turns, and will be examined particularly.
. An 'example may be given in the case of sales made by a factor: “When a factor deals for a principal who does not appear, and the factor delivers the goods in -liis own name, if the. person dealing with the factor on his own account, has,, any demand against the factor, he has a right to consider the factor ag f]he principal, and to sett off any demand he may have against the value of the goods so sold, and such would be a good answer to any action by the principal for the price of the goods.” George vs. Claggett, 2 Espin. Rep. 557. So in Delira vs. Edwards, “where a factor, by assent of bis principal exhibits himself as owner, and by that means obtains credit, the principal will be liable who furnished the means. 1 Maulé fa S.. 147. The case of a factor pledging, is treated as an exception from, the general rule; yet wherever a person furnishes another with the means to exhibit himself as owner, he shall be responsible. See Rah one vs. Williams, 7 T. R. .356. •
■ The transfer of a hill of lading, by a general assignment* is a case in point. In Wright vs. Campbell; 4 Bur. 2046, the owner had assigned the bill in blank and sent it to his factor, for the purpose'of receiving the goods for him. The factor disposed the bill of lading for his own use, in payment of his debts; the owner seized the goods. Per. Ld. Mansfield “if there he an authority never so general by indorsement on a hill of lading, without disclosing that the. endorsee is a factor, the owner as-between him and the factor, retains a lien ’till the delivery of the goods and'beforc they are actually sold and converted into money-. If the factor pay it over to a third person, with notice, it maybe followed in the hands of such third person, for in such case, it remains in his hands just as it did in the hands of the factor himself. But if they are bona fide sold by the factor, the vendee shall hold them by virtue of the hill of sale. If so,, then, the whole of this case turns on the question whether this was a fair transaction, without notice, or a trick and contrivar ce to cheat the owner.” In Solomons vs. Nissan, 2 T. R. 678, it is again laid down, that in all- those cases, between the real owner and third persons, the question is bonafides. But this is a question which was not submitted to the jury in the present case. His honor the presiding judge, instructed them that Brown had no right to receive the money, because the blank assignment was not made with a view of transferring the prop My •of- the bond to him, and that M‘Neil could not he protected in-•his payment, whether made bona fide or no. Had it been otherwise, we are very strongly persuaded, that, notwithstanding the testimony óf Mr. Brown, the jury, upon all the' circumstaaces- of the case, would llave decided for the fairness of the transaction on the part of the defendant.
The rule itself is founded upon a.general principle, that “where one of two innocent persons must suffer, by the act of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss, must-sustain it. Per. Ashhúrsi, J. in Lickbarrow vs. Mason, 2 T. R. 63.
But did Mr. Stoney and Mr. Henry, furnish Brown with the means of exhibiting himself as the owner of this bond? They permitted it to go into his possession and remain there, with an assignment in blank indorsed. What is the effect of a general or blank assignment? and in what docs it differ from a special assignment? As between the parties themselves, the actual owner still retains bis right, in whatever terms the assignment may .be drawn. But as to third person, the question is bona fide or not. It is a general rule that there is no difference between a general and a blank assignment. In the celebrated case of Lickbarrow®». Mason, this distinction would have been very material, but was abandoned. Per. Buller, J. “Lord Hardwick thought there was a distinction between bills of lading indorsed in blank and those indorsed to particular persons, but it was properly admitted at the bar that the distinction could tint be supported.” 2 T. R. 73. If we may rely on this authority, bur case is as strong ás it would have been,-had Henry written above his signature, “I assign to Joshua Brown.”
In this very case, his honour laid down, that Stoney might lawfully fill up the blank assignment. And why is this lawful? Because the assignment in blank is equal to an assignment tb a particular person.- So as to bills of lading: after establishing the principle, that bills of lading may be transferred by indorsement of the owners name, it was held, and so the jury found, ■on the second trial of the case of Lickbarrow vs. Mason, “that indorsements in blank, that is to say, by the shipper or shippers, with their names only, may be filled up by the person or persons to whom they are so delivered. 5 T. R. 683. On no other ground can the right of the holder to fill up the assignment be sustained. It is one of the incidents of an assignmeift in blank-’ that it gives to the person to whom it is delivered, the tight of-filling it up; and it gives him that right, because it is a tranfer of the property of itself. If it did not of itself transfer the property, the alteration made by filling up the blank would be forgery. The strictness of the common law; with respect to altering deeds is well known. Plgotfs case, 11 co. 27. The rule is the same as to other writings. Mastyn vs. Miller, 2 My. Bl. 141. Bulkley vs. Howell, 1 Nott 8c M'Cord, 249, was the case of an assignment in blank.
But if will be said Brown acquired' no right to fill up the blank; which is as much as to say, Brown did not acquire the real ownership by the assignment in blank. Neither would he have done so by a special assignment in his name, if it had been made for the use of Henry or any other person. Let it be admitted, however, that he- was only the apparent owner. The general rule applies to the case “that if one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall bear the loss who enabled .a third person to occasion it- •'
But it may be objected that there was in fact no assignment to Brown. Though Stoney- may he bound by Ms acts, in consequence of permitting him to exercise an apparent ownership; yet he himself still remained the real owner. In order to avail ourselves of the satisfaction made by Mr. M'Neill, we should have pleaded payment generally or satisfaction to the plaintiff, and that our plea of assignment to Brown, cannot be supported. In pleading, it is sufficient to alledge things accord* ing to their legal effect. If MNeill, without notice, paid to Brown as assignee, it supports the plea, because virtually he was assignee.
Yet how can it be concluded that there was no assignment to Brown, when our evidence was stopped. The bond wás his property, and certainly it is possible that we might have shewn it. The court, not knowing the circumstances, look upon him as a joint obligor. The rejection of the evidence is supported by the decision in this case, when formerly before the court. 1 Mc Cord, 85. The case only decides that payment to apart-ner, who does not appear in the bond, cannot be pleaded. It does not follow that partnership may not be an important fact in the proof that the payment was bona fide — or in proof of an assignment, if all partnership debts be assigned. But the judgment is in our favor, as it lays down expressly that every thing which could be proved under that plea, might be given in eyi* denee under the general issue.
Prioleau, against the motion.
I shall first inquire as to-the necessity of the affidavit, which was omitted to be filed withty the declaration; next, examine the sufficiency of the proofs, as' applicable to the issues in the case, and last, the competency of Brown’s testimony:
First, as to the affidavit. The attachment act requires that an affidavit shall be made, upon filing the declaration; it is not required that it shall be filed, or shall be in writing. The presumption is that an officer, intrusted with a public duty, has discharg-ed it; and if the affidavit were necessary, we ought to presume that the clerk of the court did not file the declaration •until it was made. But is it necessary, now, that the affidavit should have been made? The party defendant has appeared, and pleaded to the declaration, which he aiiedges to have been thus irregularly filed. (Here Mr. Prioleau was stopped by the court, who were satisfied as to this point.)
The questions presented by the issues are, did Henry assign to Stoney? did he assign to Brown? The assignment on the back of the bond, produced in court, was regular and perfect, and furnished complete evidence of the assignment.to Stoney. Parol testimony should not have been received to contradict this evidence. It is true, that parol testimony may be given, to shew for whom a blank endorsement was intended: but when the blank is filled up, according to the intention of the parties, it is regarded in law as though it had been written in full, from the beginning; and can be no more explained, contradicted, or altered, by parol testimony, than any other written instrument. For whom the assignment was intended, is a matter of fact, which was submitted to the jiuy; and they have found an assignment to Stoney, and no assignment to Brown.
Admitting all the force of the argument, that he who enables another to hold himself out, as the owner of his property, will be hound by his acts, it cannot avail the defendant, under his pleas, in the present case. Brown was not assignee. It is clearly proved that the bond was delivered to him as an agent. His guaranty, written on the bond, rebuts any presumption of his having an interest in it; for why guaranty the payment of a. debt due to himself? If he had any interest, previous to the transfer to Stoney, he could not now assert it; for ha was privy to that transfer, and sanctioned it by his acquiescence. Any thing which passed between Henry and Brown, is, as to the present plaintiff, res inter alios acta. If it was the defendant ’subject to shew that the plaintiffs acts, or his negligence, gave J5"o srn authority to receive payment, he should have pleaded payment generally. Payment to an agent would have sustained that plea, hut caunoi sustain those which are pleaded.
The guaranty of Bro wn must have had the effect of putting the defendant on his guard. He could scarcely suppose him the owner of a bond, for the payment of which he had bound himself to a third person: and he who pays money must see to the application of it, and be certain that he pays to his creditor.
Was Brown a competent witness? To render a witness incompetent, his interest must he direct; he must gain or lose by the event of the suit. A witness may be sworn against bis interest; or if he is equally liable to both parties, he is competent. (Í M- Cord, 285; 1 T. R. 164; 1 Espin. Rep. 120.* Phil. Eo. 56.) Brown swore against his interest. If he had proved the bond lawfully paid, his guaranty would have been discharged: by proving it unpaid, lffs liability, in the event of M‘Neill’s inability to pay, continued; and he moreover rendered himself answerable to M‘Neillfor the amount which he had received of him.
Hunt, against the motion.
This seems to be a case depending on facts; and the facts were fairly submitted to the jury. The question was, to whom was the bond assigned. The assignment was made in blank, and all testimony was admitted, which went to shew for whom it was intended.
What effect could the testimony, which was rejected, have had on this question. It was attempted to be shewn that this bond, in the name of Henry, was the property of Brown — or was partnership property. Even if this were the fact, and it were competent to shew it by parol, Brown, who is said to have owned the bond at the time the payment was made, would be estopped from setting up the claim. The testimony of Gen. Geddes shews that the guaranty of Brown, and the assignment Jo Stoney, were cotemporaneous; they wei’e part of the samp transaction. Brown then in effect, guarantied the payment to Stoney; and how can it be pretended that he was the owner, as against Stoney?
But it is said that-Stoncy, by permitting the bond, with blank assignment, to remain in the hands of Brown, enabled .Mm to- hold hiniself put as the owner, and is answerable for his acts. It does not appear, however, that Stoney knew the assignment to have been in blank. He knew that it had been agreed that the bond should be assigned to him: he was informed that it was assigned, and delivered to his agent; and naturally supposed that the obligor would take care to see the assignment and ascertain the 1 older’s right to receive, before he made payment.
Hafper, in reply.
1st. As to the affidavit, which is required by the attachment act, and which was omitted to be filed with the declaration. It is said that this provision of the act was intended for the benefit of the' defendant, and has been waived by pleading to the merits. The distinction is, that an irregularity may be waived, by the opposite party’s failing to take advantage of it at the earliest opportunity, or proceeding after it has been committed; a defect connot be so cured. Tidd. 435-. Is this a defect? Under a statutory proceeding, the omission of any thing which the statute positively enjoins, Is. a defect. The stat. 37, Geo. 3, c. I, gives an action of debt, to recover certain penalties under- the lottery act, and directs process to issue “ specifying therein the amount of the penalty or penalties sued for; whereof' an affidavit shall first be made and filed.” In the case of King, (¿. T. vs. Horne, 4 T. R. 349, it was. contended that the legislature had given the common law action of debt, and that if any irregularity had been committed, by failing to make and file the affidavit, it had been waived by taking out the declaration, but the court said, “ the act of parliament is imperative.” Our statute is nearly in the same words. See also Goodwyn, Q, T. vs. Parry, 4 T. R.577. ' .
We are to enquire, under our issues, whether there has been an assignment of this bond to the plaintiff, so as to enable him. to sue; and next, whether there was an assignment to Brown* «a whom we have pleaded satisfaction.
It may aid these inquiries, if we can ascertain in what manner the assignment of a bond is to be made. By the common law, any property in possession might be transferred, or assigned: choses in action, in genei’al, could not; but there was an exception, with respect to a particular sort of choses in action, by the law merchant. Our statute, which authorises the assignment of bonds, prescribes mode of effecting it; and it is. for' the court to determine whether they are to be transferred like any other personal property; or whether their transfer is to be governed by the rules which apply to negotiable paper; the only assignable choses i& action heretofore known to our law. It is perhaps not very material to our case,: how this may be settled; but our defence will stand in a different point of" view, as we regard the assignment to have been made in one Or other of these modes.
Things in possession may be assigned by deed, or by-writing without seal, or by words expressing the intention, accompanied by delivery.
As this assignment now appears on the bond, it seems to have been made by deed. But the testimony informs us of circumstances, which will prevent its operating as a deed. A blank signature and seal were first put on the back of the bond and the body of the instrument afterwards written above it. The slightest alteration of a deed will vitiate it. 11 Co. 27. French vs. Walton, 9 Fast, 851. Powell vs. Fuff, 3 Camp. 181. .A blank signature with a seal was decided to be no bond under our attachment law. Boyd'vS. Boyd, 2 JVott 8f M‘ Cord, 126. Judge Gantt, iu that case quotes from 4 Com. Fig. Titi Oblig. B. 3. “If a blank be signed' and sealed and afterwards written, it is no deed.”
• The same doctrine is equally true of any other writing; apart from the law merchant. A blank signature delivered and afterwards filled up as a bill of sale for a horse or a slave, would be as much a nullity as a seal, delivered to be filled up as a bond. There is no such thing known to our law as the filling up of. blank contracts, except under the custom of merchants.
This bond then was not transferred by deed or written assignment, was it transferred by delivery? The plaintiff is in ■ possession, but he has not shewn how he came by it. It is said to have-bcen delivered to Brown, as his agent. We might, if it-Were necessary, fairly contest the fact of Brown’s agency, for the plaintiff swears that he refused to receive the bond from Brown-and disavowed him as his agent. But waiving this oh-' jection, if Brown was the agent of the plaintiff, he was also the agent of three others.. The title, of the bond was vested in four, if it was transferred like other personal property, arid all the owners ought to have joined in the suit. 1 Chit. PI. 7.
The only ground on which the plaintiff can sustain this suit is, that being in possession of the bond, with an assignment- in blank, he bad a right to fill it up in his own name; that is, that it’s transfer is to be governed by the custom of merchants.
■ We might argue against ibis position, that the instrument is a specialty; and that to alter or release, and by parity of reason, to assign a specialty, an instrument of as solemn a nature is required. The authority to make a deed must he by deed. This court however has departed from the rigour of the-ancient principle, and in the case of Howell ads. Bulkley, 1 Mott JW Cord, 24b, it was decided that a bond might be assigned by writing without seal. It is necessary however, to qualify a conclusion' which-is drawn in that case.' The case ofNoke vs. Awder, Cro.-Elis. 373, 436, is cited, for the purpose of shewing that a covenant might be assigned by paról. The case oufy decides that where a term was created by deed, which contained covenants-running with the estate, as the term might be assigned without deed, the covenants should follow by operation of law. It is rather opposed to the inference which was drawn from it.
Admitting however, that the assignment may be made bf a signature in blank, it does not follow that it may be made by* a signature and seal. When it is filled up, it-becomes a deed, if any-thing; -and we have shewn that a deed cannot be so made. Negotiable paper- may be assigned by a blank indorsement; but-I’ apprehend not by a blank indorsement; with a seal annexed. If a signaturfe-bc delivered, for the purpose of having a note fon tbe- payment of money,. written above, it will be good when-filled up.-' Not so, if- it be under seal. The assignor •attempted tb -transfer by 'deed,, and it must operate -as a deed or not at all»-
Conceding however, what the plaintiff contends for; that being in possession, he had a right to fill up the blank, and that we must resort tb the law merchant, for the-rules which are to govern the transaction; let us see how our defence will stand in that view of the case. Perhaps this is the correct view, where a bond has been transferred by blank indorsement. So the case of Howell and Bulkley seems to regard it, and it accords with what we know of the intention of the legislature. It is well known, that long previous to the passing of our statute, there was a custom, in this state, of transferring bonds as negotiable paper. In reference to this established practice, the .act was passed.
By the law merchant, a note or bill, indorsed in blank, may be afterwards transferred by mere delivery, and any one into whose hands it may come, may fill up tire blank in his own name. On this and nothing else, rests the plaintiff’s right to sustain this suit. But had not Brown the same right to fill up the blank and bring a suit, or receive payment, when the bond was in his possession? Our case is surely not different from what it would have been if Brown had actually filled up the blank, previous to receiving payment. - It was contended, that he had not such right, and so the jury were instructed on the trial, because the blank assignment was not made with the intention of transferring the bond to him. Without insisting on the answer, that neither was there any intention of transferring to the plaintiff alone; we say that such intention was not necessary. The rule is, that he who is in possession of a negotiable paper, with a blank indorsement, is, prima fade, the owner. If he came into possession, bona fide, and for valuable consideration, he is owner against all the world', though not bona fide, non for valuable consideration, yet he shall be considered the owner, as to all who deal with him bona fide: those who mal e payment or ta>.e a transfer of the paper from him, in good faith and for valuable consideration, tdll be protected against dll the world. If the holder of a note or bill, indorsed in blank, or transferrable by delivery, lose it or be robbed of it, and it come into the hands of a bona fide holder, for valuable consideration, he may maintain an action ou it; or if' payment be made to.one who stole or found it, the person making pay-, ment will be discharged. Chit. Bills, 190. See Putnam vs, Sullivan, 4 Mass. Rep. 45-.
This is established for the protection of commerce, and on the principle which has been brought so fully to the view of the court, “that if one of two innocent persons must suffer, he shall bear the loss, who enabled a third person to occasion it.”
In our casé however, the bond was not stolen nor found by the holder; but was put into his possession and suffered to remain there for two years, by the person who claims to be the owner. It is difficult not to infer an intention that Brown should have authority to receive payment or make a settlement of the bond. If such intention did not exist, no conduct could be better calculated to enable Brown to commit a fraud. Even in England, it has been held that one mailing payment in good faith, to the holder of a bond or note not negotiable, should be protected. 1 Bos. & Pul. N. R. 103. Eq. Ca. Ab. 144, 5.
But if the plaintiff is owner of the bond now, it can scarcely be thought that either he alone, or together with the other three persons for whose benefit the assignment was made, was . owner at the time of this payment. The bond was assigned as , a collateral security and delivered to Brown, as the agent of ''the' assignees, who refused to receive it of him.. This refusal can only be interpreted into a determination of his agency and a relinquishment of their security. During the two years that it was in Brown’s possession, none of them could have received ■ payment. But was no other person authorized to receive payment? was the bond struck out of legal existance and in abeyance all that time?
The answer perhaps will be, that Henry, in whom the legal title of the bond was, previous to the attempt to assign, was the proper person to receive. If, so, it will be decisive of the admissibility of part of the testimony which was offered on our part and rejected. Evidence was offered of an agreement and • an arbitration, between Henry and Brown, on the subject of the property of this bond; as also that Brown and Henry had been partners, that this bond was given for a partnership debt, and that upon the dissolution, Henry had ■ advertised in the newspapers that Brown was authorized to receive all partnership debts. The evidence was rejected on the ground, as I un derstand it, that Brown, having sanctioned the assignment to Stoney and the rest, should not be permitted to set up a title, against them. But if their title at that time, is out of the question, we may certainly shew, that he had a title as against Henry. The agreement may have been to assign; the award may of itself have operated an assignment.
With respect to the competency of shewing by parol, that the bond was given for a partnership debt; we may produce numerous authorities to shew that courts of law will look into the equitable interests of parties, whose names do not appear on the bond; some of'thc cases having the closet analogy to the present. Legh, vs. Legh, 1 Bos. §■ Pul. 446; Winch, vs. Keely, 1 T. JR. 619, Bottomly, vs. Broohe, (cited in the last case.) 1 Johns. Rep. 531; 3 Johns. Rep. 425. At all events, that circumstance, together with the advertisement by Henry, would have been the most material evidence that could be given, to shew the good faith of M‘Npill, and that he had cause to believe Brown authorized to receive payment. It would be entirely conclusive but for
Brown’s testimony. The argument in favor of his competency, and that lie was indifferent in interest between the parties, seems to suppose that he guarantied nothing but the sol--veiicy of M‘Neill. But this is not so; he guarantied the ultimate payment of the bond; which includes two things; that there was-a good right of action on the bond, and that M!Neil would be solvent. If the bond had been forged, the guaranty would still have been binding. He warranted against the obligor’s having any defence at that time, and against any defence which might afterwards arise, by the act of him, (Brown.) If MNeill can defend the action, on the ground of payment to Brown, the verdict will be conclusive evidence against Brown, in an action on his guaranty, for the whole amount of the bond. If M‘NeilI should fail, he can, at most, recover but the money which he actually paid; or, if Brown tells the truth, that they were partici-pes fraudis, nothing at all.
Brown himself seems to have beeii conscious of this, for he puts his disinterestedness on the ground of insolvency. This is a new source of competency; but before it can avail the witness, the court must determine that he will always continue insolvent.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
JfCr. JusitcB Gantt.
The first ground taken for a nonsuit is, that the plaintiff failed; when called on, to produce the affidavit or the oath required by law, of the debt due. By the fifth section of the act of assembly, passed in 1744, the plaintiff is required, on filing liis declaration, to make oath to the debt or sum demanded. In tills ease, it appears that on the suggestion of the attorneys of the plaintiff, that the defendant had an attorney in fact, residing in Charleston; an order was obtained that a rule should issue, directing him to plead within two months from the date hereof, or that judgment by default should go. Under this order, the pleadings were regularly made up, and the parties were at issue on the merits.
By a clause of the act of 1785, all attachments shall be repleviable by appearance, and putting in special bail, if by the court ruled so to do. (Public Taws 368.) Here then was an appearance on the part of the defendant, and he pleaded to issue. No special bail was required or ruled by the court. After these proceedings, the court think that it was too late for the defendant to take advantage of such an omission; pleading to issue amounted to a waiver of such exception. The exception might have been taken advantage of by motion to dissolve the attachment, had the plaintiff in fact failed to comply with what tie law required of him; which is not to be presumed under all the circumstancés cf the case. This motion must, therefore, fail..
On the last ground taken for a non-suit, it is certain that the assignment as filled up, seems to be at variance with the proof offered, as to the right intended to be transferred. The testimony of Gen. Geddes is express, that the bond was to be assigned as a collateral security to Fitzsimons, Stoney, Williamson and Cohen; and the answer of Mr. Stoney, in equity (before alluded to) is equally express, that it'was not to be for his-exclusive benefit. But although others, besides Mr. Stonejy were interested in this bond, which was to be lodged as a collateral security, for thei.r joint benefit; still from the testimony of General Geddes, it appears that the assignment was left in blank, for the parties to fill up as they pleased. There can be *10 doubt that an action upon a contract, either express or implied, by parol or under seal, must be brought in the name of the party in whom the legal interest is vested; and that in all eases, if it appear on the face of the pleadings, that there are-Other obligees, covenantees or parties to the contract, who ought tobe, hut are not joined in the action, it is fatal on demurrer or on motion in arrest of judgment; and though the objection may not appear on the face of the pleadings, the defendant may avail hknself of it, either by plea in abatement, or as a ground of non-suit on the trial, upon the plea of general issue, 1st Chitty on Pleading, 3. 7. Notwithstanding such is the law, still the court think that as to such an endorsement as was made upon this bond, it is competent in the holder to fill it up as be pleases.
Op the ground taken for a new trial, 1 shall briefly comment: first, upon the admissibility of Joshua Brown, as a witness, and conclude by referring to the nature of this assignment, and wbat took place under it.
Mr. Brown was certainly an interested witness, and such as ought to have been excluded. He had guarantied the payment of this bond to Henry, and his assigns; consequently in tlie event of its not being recovered From M'Neill, he, Brown, would on his guarantee, have been liable to the assignee of Henry, for the amount of the bond. By fixing, therefore, a responsibility upon M'NeilI, he would at the same time free himself from the liability produced by his special guarantee. It is not denied hut that this circumstance, if it stood alone, would have rendered him incompetent; but it is urged that he is also liable to the same extent to M'Neill, on the receipt and discharge given to him on the bond, and tbat this equal liability to tbe parties litigant, went to remove the objection of interest and rendered him competent. But if what he has stated be a fact, it may well be questioned whether Brown.would he liable in any manner to M' Neill, who would in such case have made himself particeps crhninis; and in no event could he he liable to M!Neill, for morethan he received. So that it follows very clear-' ly that Brown was altogether interested in Stoney's recovery,- and, therefore, was in law an incompetent witness.
As to the assignment made by Henry, in blank, accompanied with the solemnity of a'seal and delivery of possession fp Brown, of the bond, no. other correct inference can be drawn from it, but that he, Brown, ipso facto, became in legal contemplation the assignee and owner of the bond, and that an obligor making payment, without fraud, to such holder and ostensible assignee, is and ought to be protected against the real owner, whoever he may be. The circumstance of tire special guarantee upon the back of the bond by Brown, would, in conjunction, with the possession of the bond in him, strengthen the presumption of his ownership. What other fair inference could be drawn, but that in consequence of his liability, he had taken np the bond and made it his own; and when we add thereto, the circumstance of the assignment in blank under seal, no possible doubt could remain on the mind of any man, but that Brown was not only the ostensible but the real and bona fide owner of. the bond, and might do with it as he pleased. It is certain that McNeill, the obligor, had no hand in placing the bond in the possession of Brown, nor had he any in its remaining with him for so long a space of time as two years. No person, therefore, concerned in interest, can with any color of propriety complain, if under circumstances so well calculated to deceive, a debtor has, when called on for payment, discharged Ins obligation to such holder and ostensible owner.
The filling up the blank in the name of Mr. Stoney, at a period long subsequent to the settlement made with Brown, can in no manner do away the legal eflect and operation of the payment which was made; a payment and discharge entered at the time on the bond, and which, if performed with good faith; •cannot be called in question.
I will only add one further remark in respect to the rejection of. Mr. Robinson's testimony. This evidence ought, in my opinion, to have been received. If it could have proved that this bond was the copartnership property of Henry and Brown; that •public notice in the papers bad been given, that all debts due to them were transferred to Joshua Brown; these facts, conjoined with the endorsement in blank by Henry, and possession of the bond by Brown, would certainly have established as strong a case to support the settlement made by M'Neill, as could possibly be presented to the view of a court and jury. Independently, however, of. this view, lire endorsement in blank by Henry, and possession of the bond by Brown, were sufficient in law to authorise Brown, as ostensible owner, to'adjust and settle with the obligor, M'Neill; as lie might think proper. The court are, therefore, c-f opinion that a new trial should be granted:
Johnson, justice, concurred.