Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ, Avelino Sanchez, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1971-04-23
Citations: 82 N.M. 585
Docket Number: No. 583
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ, Avelino Sanchez, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: HENDLEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 82
Pages: 585–592

Head Matter:
484 P.2d 1295
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ, Avelino Sanchez, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 583.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 23, 1971.
Dissenting Opinion May 7, 1971.
Leon Taylor, Albuquerque, for appellants.
David L. 'Norvell, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Frank N. Chavez, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. ' '

Opinion:
OPINION
WOOD, Judge.
Raymond Sanchez was convicted of burglary and larceny. Avelino Sanchez was convicted of burglary, larceny and unlawfully taking a vehicle. Sections 40A-16-3, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6), 40A-16-1, N. M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1969), and 64-9-4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2). Both defendants appeal. The issues involve: (1) probable cause for arrest and (2) sufficiency of the evidence.
Probable cause for arrest.
Defendants moved to suppress evidence taken 'from the car in which they had been riding shortly before their arrest. Suppression of this evidence was sought on the basis there was no probable cause for their arrest. By "probable cause" for arrest we mean "reasonable ground for belief of guilt." State v. Hilliard, 81 N.M. 407, 467 P.2d 733 (Ct.App.1970). See State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976, 87 S.Ct. 1171, 18 L.Ed.2d 136 (1967).
The officer testified he received a radio report that a burglary was in progress at a specified residence; "[t]hat two subjects in a foreign dark green car were seen at the area. " Enroute to the residence, the officer was advised by the radio operator " that the subjects were leaving and heading east on Gun Club [Road], " There is no contention that the radio operator did not have probable cause to relay this information to the officer. See Whiteley v. Wyoming Penitentiary Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). This was just prior to 10:00 a.m.
The officer proceeded east on Gun Club Road. He observed a small green foreign car with two persons in it turning south onto Isleta from Gun Club Road. It was the only green car on the road. At this point, he recognized Raymond as a passenger in the car. The officer followed the green car until it pulled into the driveway of a known "fence." At this point, he recognized Avelino as the driver of the car. He had known both defendants previously. Raymond got out of the car and went up to the door of the "fence's" house, then returned to the car.
The car then started out of the driveway. The officer testified: " and when they saw me approaching they backed off, went back into the driveway and defendant Raymond Sanchez jumped out of the car and ran." Avelino' stayed in the car. When the officer got up to the car he saw a television set, two guns and a pair of binoculars. The officer arrested Avelino "for burglary." This was at approximately 10:00 a.m. Raymond was also arrested "for burglary" a short time later.
Defendants correctly point out that the arresting officer " did not have a description of the reported burglars , did not know what items (if any) were stolen and had only a vague general description of the car the burglars were said to be driving. " Defendants state: " No probable cause for arrest existed, but at the most mere suspicion. "
We disagree.
The officer was informed of a burglary in progress; that two men were involved; that they left the burglarized residence in a green foreign car headed east on a certain road. The officer located such a car headed east on the identified road. This was the only car of such description on the road. He followed that car; there were two men in it; those men were the defendants. All of this occurred within the time period of "shortly before" until "approximately 10:00 a.m." These facts were sufficient for the officer, as a man of reasonable caution, to believe the defendants were the men who committed the burglary. The officer had probable cause for arrest. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); State v. Deltenre, supra; State v. Hilliard, supra; compare State v. Sedillo, 81 N.M. 47, 462 P.2d 632 (Ct.App.1969). There being probable cause for arrest, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Sufficiency of the evidence.
It is not disputed that a burglary and a larceny occurred, and that the car involved had been taken from the owner without his consent. By motions for a directed verdict of acquittal, defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Whether the trial court properly denied these motions is the issue under this point.
Defendants claim there was insufficient evidence to tie them to the crimes of burglary and larceny; Avelino makes the same claim in connection with the unlawful taking of the car. Defendants assert: " The only proof presented that could tie the defendants to the crime with which they were charged was the presence of stolen property in the car in which they were riding. " They rely on State v. Beachum, 82 N.M. 204, 477 P.2d 1019 (Ct.App.1970), where it is stated: " recently stolen property found in the exclusive possession of a defendant will not alone support a conclusion' of guilt. "
Here, there is more than possession of recently stolen property. The evidence, reviewed previously herein, connects the defendants with the residence that was burglarized and from which the property was taken.
As to the car charge, Avelino overlooks the definition of the crime. Section 64-9-4, supra, states in part: "Any person who shall take any vehicle intentionally and without consent of the owner thereof shall be guilty of a felony Avelino was driving the car, stolen approximately an hour prior to the arrest; 'the owner testified he gave no consent to Avelino to have the vehicle in his possession. As a part of his alibi defense, Avelino testified he had borrowed the car from an unidentified person several miles from the point the car was taken. Nevertheless, Avelino's testimony is evidence of an intentional taking. The only item for which there is no direct evidence is that of criminal intent, that is, a conscious wrongdoing. See State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct.App.1969). The inference of conscious wrongdoing could properly be inferred from the evidence of the place where the car was taken, the admission that Avelino had taken the car, and the evidence that no consent had been given.
Defendants, however, claim their convictions rest on circumstantial evidence which fails to meet the requirements of the circumstantial evidence rule. As stated in State v. Beachum, supra, the circumstances " must point unerringly to the'defendant, and be incompatible with, and exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than his guilt ." In this case, the evidence of the time factors, distances, observations of defendants, locations, and possession of the stolen goods points unerringly to defendants and -excludes eyery reasonable hypothesis other, than gui)t.. i
The judgment and sentences'of Avelino Sanchez are affirmed. The convictions of Raymond Sanchez are affirmed. However, the record shows that Raymond Sanchez was convicted of Counts II and III and acquitted of Count I. He was not sentenced for his conviction under Count III but was sentenced under Counts I and II. The cause is remanded for the purpose of imposing a sentence upon Raymond Sanchez consistent with the Counts under which he was convicted.
It is so ordered.
HENDLEY, J., concurs.
SUTIN, Judge.
I join in the affirmance of the burglary and larceny convictions but dissent from the affirmance of the conviction of Avelino Sanchez for unlawfully taking a vehicle.