Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Montreal BLAIR, also known as Monty, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-03-21
Citations: 419 F. App'x 465
Docket Number: No. 10-10145
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Montreal BLAIR, also known as Monty, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 419
Pages: 465–467

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Montreal BLAIR, also known as Monty, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-10145
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 21, 2011.
Susan Cowger, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Montreal Blair, Beaumont, TX, pro se.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, USDC No. 3:06-CR-168-l.
Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se and informa pauper-is, Montreal Blair, federal prisoner #35120-177, appeals the district court's granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (term of imprisonment modification) motion to reduce his sentence based upon Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (lowering base offense levels for crack-cocaine offenses); his sentence was lowered from 260 to 216 months' imprisonment. He contends the court erred by: failing to entirely recalculate his Guidelines range, including the amount of cocaine for which he is liable, in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and its progeny; and denying his requested hearing as part of the § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. The district court's decision to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3462, 177 L.Ed.2d 1064 (2010).
Contrary to Blair's assertions, the Government did not stipulate that he was accountable for only 50 grams of crack cocaine. He was not entitled to a full resentencing, but only to the two-level reduction in his offense level provided by Amendment 706. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(3), (b)(1). Because a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction does not constitute a full resentencing, the mandatory limitations on sentence reductions set forth in § 1B1.10 were not affected by Booker, and the bifurcated reasonableness review mandated by Booker and its progeny does not apply here. See Evans, 587 F.3d at 670-72.
The record shows the court implicitly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the amended Guidelines range of 188-235 months. See id. at 673-74; United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir.1995). Moreover, Blair has identified no factual dispute that would have been resolvable by the district court; therefore, he was not entitled to a hearing. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b)(4); United States v. Patterson, 42 F.3d 246, 248-49 (5th Cir.1994).
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.