Case Name: Ronnie George TORRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-10-04
Citations: 440 So. 2d 392
Docket Number: No. 80-470
Parties: Ronnie George TORRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH, COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 440
Pages: 392–404

Head Matter:
Ronnie George TORRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 80-470.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 4, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1983.
Michael H. Lambert, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
Torrence was charged in a three count information with armed burglary, attempted robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In charging attempted robbery (count II), the information alleged as follows:
CHARGE: Attempted Robbery, in Violation of F.S. 812.13 & 777.04.
SPECIFICATIONS OF CHARGE: In that RONNIE GEORGE TORRENCE did, on or about the 22nd day of February, 1979, at or near Daytona Beach within Volusia County, Florida, unlawfully by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, attempt to take certain property, to-wit: money, the property of Thoni Oil Magic Benzol Gas Stations, Inc. as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of Richard Graves, Jr., and in the course of committing said Robbery, carried a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, (emphasis supplied)
The use of the phrase "carried a firearm" was apparently intended to bring into operation the enhanced felony provision in section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides "If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree . ".
After instructing the jury on attempted robbery, the trial court, believing aggravated assault to be a lesser included offense, proceeded to charge the jury on the elements of that crime. The record does not reveal any objection by Torrence's counsel to this instruction.
Torrence was found guilty of aggravated assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment on the aggravated assault charge but sentencing was withheld on the use of a firearm charge. On this appeal, the question is whether aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of attempted robbery and if not, whether Tor-rence's failure to object to the instruction thereon constituted a waiver of any error.
In Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla.1968), the supreme court identified four categories of lesser included offenses. An aggravated assault is not a necessarily lesser included (category three) offense of attempted robbery since it was not necessary for the state in seeking to prove an attempted robbery to prove an aggravated assault. Brown, 206 So.2d at 382-83. Nor is it a category four lesser included offense in this case because the information did not contain all the elements of an aggravated assault. An aggravated assault occurs when a person commits an assault with a deadly weapon or with an intent to commit a felony. § 784.021, Fla.Stat. (1981). The crime contemplates the use of a deadly weapon, i.e., that the accused assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon. Vitko v. State, 363 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also State v. McQuay, 403 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). An allegation that the accused "carried a firearm" is insufficient in this regard. Vitko.
The remaining question, however, is whether the error in giving the instruction was fundamental and requires reversal of the conviction in the absence of an objection. We believe that Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla.1981), controls this question.
In that ease, Ray was charged with sexual battery and the trial court instructed on commission of a lewd and lascivious act (lewd assault) as a lesser included offense. Both crimes are second degree felonies. A reconstructed record of the charge conference reflected that defense counsel did not object to the court's charge. Ray was convicted of lewd assault and on appeal initially argued that such crime is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery. The supreme court agreed, finding that it is not a Brown category three lesser included offense and further that it was not a category four lesser included because the information failed to contain all the elements of lewd assault. The court then considered whether the conviction constituted fundamental error.
After defining fundamental error as that which amounts to a denial of due process, the court enunciated the following rule regarding a conviction under an erroneous lesser included charge:
We hold, therefore, that it is not fundamental error to convict a defendant under an erroneous lesser included charge when he had an opportunity to object to the charge and failed to do so if: 1) the improperly charged offense is lesser in degree and penalty than the main offense or 2) defense counsel requested the improper charge or relied on that charge as evidenced by argument to the jury or other affirmative action. Failure to timely object precludes relief from such a conviction, (emphasis added)
403 So.2d at 961.
The court concluded that no waiver existed in the case before it since the crime on which the trial court erroneously instructed and of which Ray was convicted (lewd assault) was not lesser in degree and penalty than the crime charged and the record did not show that Ray's attorney had requested or affirmatively relied on the instruction.
Applying Ray here, while count II of the information charging attempted robbery did not allege all of the elements of aggravated assault and hence that crime was not a category four lesser included offense, it was not fundamental error to convict Tor-rence of the crime since he had opportunities to object on the record to the erroneous instruction as well as the verdict form and failed to do so and aggravated assault is. lesser in degree and penalty than attempted robbery.
We also emphasize that there was ample evidence presented to prove Torrence used the firearm, that the instruction to the jury on aggravated assault correctly required proof of use of the firearm, and that Tor-rence was not in any way embarrassed or prejudiced in his defense as defense counsel repeatedly questioned witnesses regarding the use of the firearm. See Blow v. State, 386 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Therefore, we conclude that the omission of the term "used" in the context of this case was not fundamental error and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH, COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., concur.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., dissent with opinion.
. This count was nol prossed.
. This matter has been determined en banc because of a potential conflict with Carter v. State, 380 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Wilson v. State, 383 So.2d 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
. In approving the new standard jury instructions and schedule of lesser included offenses in 1981, the supreme court renumbered and reduced the Brown categories to two:
1. Offenses necessarily included in the offense charged, which will include some lesser degrees of offenses; and
2. Offenses which may or may not be included in the offense charged, depending on the accusatory pleading and evidence, which includes all attempts and some lesser degrees of offenses.
See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 403 So.2d 979 (Fla.1981); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases; Nos. 56,734, 58,799 (Fla. April 16, 1981) [1981 F.L.W. 305], In this schedule of lesser included offenses, which is presumptively correct and complete, Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 961, n. 7 (Fla.1981), aggravated assault is listed as a category two offense to the crime of robbery.
.In Vitko the court, in reversing the conviction for aggravated assault, did not mention whether the defendant objected to the aggravated assault instruction.
. See § 812.13, 777.04(4)(b) and 784.021, Fla. Stats. (1981). It should be noted that because the charge conference and closing arguments to the jury were not transcribed, the record does not reveal whether Torrence's counsel requested the charge on aggravated assault or relied on it in arguing to the jury.