Case Name: John BOMBARD, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Fisher Auto Parts, Inc., Employer)
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 2010-11-08
Citations: 189 Vt. 528
Docket Number: No. 09-380
Parties: John BOMBARD, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Fisher Auto Parts, Inc., Employer)
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 528–536

Head Matter:
2010 VT 100
John BOMBARD, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Fisher Auto Parts, Inc., Employer)
[12 A.3d 533]
No. 09-380
November 8, 2010.

Opinion:
¶ 1. Claimant appeals the denial of his request for unemployment benefits. On appeal, claimant argues that the hostile work environment at his job provided good cause to quit, and that the Board's conclusion otherwise is not supported by the findings. We disagree, and affirm.
¶ 2. The facts found by the Board can be summarized as follows. Claimant worked for employer Fisher Auto Parts, Inc. for nineteen months until he quit on May 4, 2009. His work tenure began at employer's Burlington store, where his manager had a volatile temper, at times throwing items around the store. During one angry episode, the manager used profane and threatening language towards claimant. Claimant reported this behavior to the regional manager, who responded by transferring claimant to employer's store in Essex. Unfortunately, the manager at the Essex store also had anger problems, a fact employer knew prior to transferring claimant. Claimant had been there only a couple of weeks, when on April 23, 2009, the Essex store manager engaged in a day-long argument with his wife over the phone, during which he shouted, threw things on the floor and around the store, and drove off multiple times, only to return still arguing with his wife. Unable to discuss this behavior with the store manager directly because the manager was so angry and unapproachable, claimant called the regional manager and left a voice mail message indicating they needed to talk. No one called back. The regional manager does not remember receiving this message.
¶ 3. On April 30, the store manager again became angry and upset. He told claimant that he was fed up and wanted to get a gun, climb a tower, and shoot a hundred people. Claimant was so disturbed by this statement that the following day, on his way to work, he decided he was too frightened to return because of what the manager might do. Claimant called in and claimed he could not work because his father had a heart attack. The next work day, Monday May 4, claimant went to work and arrived to find the regional manager present at the store. Claimant met with the regional manager and described the Essex store manager's angry behavior, characterizing the store manager as unstable. Claimant did not, however, mention his local manager's threat to shoot a hundred people. The regional manager responded that things are "going to get worse" and that claimant had to make a decision. Feeling like nothing would be done to correct his supervisor's behavior, claimant quit a few minutes later.
¶ 4. Claimant filed for unemployment compensation benefits. This request was denied, and claimant appealed. At a hearing before a referee, claimant described the problems with his managers in employer's Burlington and Essex stores. The referee listened to claimant's testimony, but refused to admit additional evidence regarding the behavior of the manager in the Burlington store since claimant was no longer in that store or working for that manager when he quit. Claimant's regional manager testified. He verified there were complaints about the tempers of both the Burlington manager and the Essex manager, and testified that he handled claimant's concerns about the Burlington manager's anger problems by speaking with the manager. The regional manager also testified that he knew the store manager in Essex had a volatile temper before he transferred claimant to that store. Employer's response to that problem was also to speak to the store manager.
¶ 5. While accepting claimant's version of the facts, the referee denied the claim, finding that claimant did not give his employer an opportunity to correct the problem before quitting. The referee concluded that claimant "neither demonstrated that any reasonable person would have been compelled to quit without notice under the circumstances, or that the employer would have been [un]responsive to his concerns." Claimant appealed to the Board. The Board agreed with claimant that his supervisor had engaged in inappropriate behavior, but concluded that claimant failed to establish that the misbehavior was so egregious as to justify quitting without notice to employer or to establish, in the alternative, that complainant afforded his employer the opportunity to address the working conditions before quitting. Claimant appeals.
¶ 6. On appeal, claimant does not challenge the Board's findings, but argues that its findings do not support the Board's conclusion. Our task in reviewing the Department's decision requires, therefore, a determination of whether, under the facts found, claimant voluntarily left without good cause attributable to the employer. See 21 V.S.A. § 1344(a) (2)(A) (voluntary termination is grounds for denying unemployment benefits absent good cause attributable to employer). This standard entails two considerations: first, whether there was "a sufficient reason to justify the quit," and second, whether the reason was "attributable to the employing unit." Allen v. Dep't of Emp't & Training, 159 Vt. 286, 289, 618 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1992) (quotation omitted). The burden is on the employee to prove both aspects of this analysis. Lynch v. Dep't of Emp't & Training, 2005 VT 114, ¶ 4, 179 Vt. 542, 890 A.2d 93 (mem.); Skudlarek v. Dep't of Emp't & Training, 160 Vt. 277, 280, 627 A.2d 340, 342 (1993). "Unless it can be demonstrated that the Board was erroneous in its findings and conclusions, we must uphold its decision." Rushlow v. Dep't of Emp't & Training, 144 Vt. 328, 330, 476 A.2d 139, 141 (1984) (citations omitted).
¶ 7. Because claimant initiated the separation from employment, it is his burden to demonstrate that his decision to quit was for good cause. Lynch, 2005 VT 114, ¶ 4. Generally, to determine good cause, we consider "what a reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances." Isabelle v. Dep't of Emp't & Training, 150 Vt. 458, 460, 554 A.2d 660, 661 (1988). There is no bright-line threshold in our law defining an intolerable working environment such that good cause to quit exists as a matter of law. Rather, we analyze each situation individually.
¶ 8. Our first point of analysis is whether claimant had sufficient reason to justify quitting his job. Examining the events at the Essex store, the Board found that claimant lacked sufficient reason to quit. For one thing, the Department found that the two incidents at the Essex store were not directed at claimant. Further, the Department found that the Essex manager's outburst about shooting a hundred people was more likely a matter of "blowing off steam" than an actual and imminent threat. The Department ultimately decided that claimant did not meet his burden to prove good cause because he had not "demonstrated that any reasonable person would have been compelled to quit without notice under the circumstances." This conclusion is supported by claimant's return to the job within two days of the declared threat.
¶ 9. Even assuming the local manager's generalized threats of violence could have been sufficient grounds to quit, the same cannot be attributed to employer, which was uninformed about such misconduct. "Generally, notice to the employer is required when an employee leaves a job for unsatisfactory working conditions so that the employer has an opportunity to rectify the situation before becoming responsible for unemployment compensation payments." Allen, 159 Vt. at 290, 618A.2d at 1319. The referee and the Board found that claimant did not inform his employer about the manager's threat at the Essex store. This is not disputed. Additionally, while he told the regional manager his general concerns about the store manager's anger in their May 4 meeting, claimant never reported the mass shooting threat or that he felt personally at risk in any way. Indeed, claimant did not provide notice of any specific problems, personal or general, until his meeting with the regional manager on May 4, after which he "quit within minutes."
¶ 10. Claimant argues unpersuasively that the Department should also have considered the events at the Burlington store on this point, on the theory that employer had the opportunity to rectify his situation starting then. Even were we to adopt this broader scope of inquiry — which, again, we decline to do — claimant's theory would fail for two reasons: his grievance at the second store was independent and distinct from the problem at the first store, and his grievance at the first store was resolved by employer's action. He argues that employer's decision to transfer him from the Burlington store was effectively a decision not to remedy that situation. Since employer failed to address the Burlington events, claimant argues, he had no reason to believe that it would have addressed the Essex events. Therefore, on claimant's logic, his quit was justified, and employer was responsible. The Board's finding that employee was satisfied with the transfer is unchallenged, however, and the differences in the managers' respective outbursts are undisputed. The Board's treatment of the Burlington incident as resolved and separate from the Essex situation is thus supported by the record and was not irrational. Moreover, even if claimant actually perceived the resolution of his first complaint as unsatisfactory, our precedent is that anticipation of a poor outcome is not a substitute for providing the employer with notice of the basis for the employee's concerns. Rushlow, 144 Vt. at 331, 476 A.2d at 141 ("a quit for anticipatory reasons is not good cause attributable to the employer" (citing Kasnowski v. Dep't of Emp't See., 137 Vt. 380, 382, 406 A.2d 388, 389 (1979)). Before terminating employment unilaterally, an employee must make some effort to remedy alleged poor working conditions or demonstrate that such effort would be unavailing. See id. (citing Dunston v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 136 Vt. 483, 484, 394 A.2d 1129, 1130 (1978)).
¶ 11. Claimant did not meet his burden of showing that a remedy would not be forthcoming. The regional manager's assertion that things would only get worse does not stand alone as a refusal to address the situation, especially in the full context of claimant's testimony. The situation, as described by claimant, was not that the local store manager was threatening him, but that company policies resulting in inadequate staffing imposed pressure on the local store manager that was making the manager irrational. Taking claimant's testimony as presented, the most the referee and Board could draw from it was that claimant confronted the regional manager not with a personnel problem peculiar to claimant, but with the larger problem of company staffing policy and its impact on management. That the company representative responded that things would get worse could reflect a lack of employer action to correct a problem reported by claimant between the company and its managers, but not inaction on any employment complaint personal to claimant. Likewise, the personal attacks against claimant by one supervisor at the Burlington store are irrelevant to the later, impersonal and generalized misanthropy experienced by claimant from a different supervisor at the Essex store.
¶ 12. Complainant likens his case to other cases in which harassment or abuse on the job constituted intolerable working conditions amounting to "good cause" to quit. Allen, 159 Vt. at 289, 618 A.2d at 1319; Turco v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 141 Vt. 135, 446 A.2d 345 (1982). Allen was a sexual harassment case in which we carved out a limited exception to the notice requirement. We held that where female victims of confirmed unwanted and serial sexual overtures in the workplace were deemed particularly susceptible to reprisal for, and discouragement from, complaining about sexual harassment, "a claimant who fails to report sexual harassment before quitting her job . is not automatically precluded from receiving benefits." Allen, 159 Vt. at 292, 618 A.2d at 1320. Nothing in the facts of this case implicates the Allen exception.
¶ 13. Turco is distinguishable from the circumstances here on several grounds. In that case, the claimant's fellow employees repeatedly harassed him, accusing him, for example, of theft on the job, in large part because of his religious beliefs. Instead of addressing the claimant's concerns after receiving notice or aiding the claimant's efforts to resolve the situation, the employer there fueled the internal conflict by j oining in the harassment or by inducing it through work assignments. After one incident, the claimant requested a meeting with his belligerent co-workers to address the problem. The employer refused. When, two days later, the employer assigned the claimant to work with one of the harassers and a physical altercation ensued, the claimant went to the vice president, complained of harassment, and announced that he intended to quit. The employer made no effort to address the problem, responding to claimant's departure simply by asking him to return his uniforms. We concluded the conditions in that case were intolerable because the employees directly harassed the claimant, yet, though claimant made the employer aware of his concerns, employer failed to take appropriate action. 141 Vt. at 138, 446 A.2d at 347.
¶ 14. In contrast, here the Board found the harassment experienced by claimant was not directed at him specifically. Nor did claimant make it clear to employer until the day he quit that the situation was even potentially intolerable, thus denying employer the opportunity to address any particularized employment complaint by the situation. In any event, assuming arguendo that the Board could have found sufficient cause to quit based on the given facts, its determination to the contrary is entitled to deference as supported by some evidence, such as claimant's return to work despite what the Board determined to be the supervisor's generalized and overblown threat. See Lynch, 2005 VT 114, ¶ 6 (holding that when findings are supported by evidence, Supreme Court defers to Board's decision). Compared to Turco, claimant's circumstances here were markedly less severe, and employer's fault and unresponsiveness in the matter not established.
¶ 15. Claimant has failed to show any reversible error on the part of the Department. We therefore will disturb neither its factual finding and conclusion that claimant lacked good cause attributable to employer, nor its conclusion that claimant is not entitled to unemployment compensation.
Affirmed.
The Department limited the scope of its inquiry to the last store to which claimant was assigned. On appeal, claimant asserts the Board erred in refusing to permit testimony about employer's lack of response to the manager's angry outbursts in the Burlington store. This testimony was proffered in an effort to expand the scope of the inquiry into employer's response to claimant. Claimant's theory was that the behavior of the managers at both stores was related because it stemmed from their being overworked and from the failure of employer to address the managers' behavior in an effective way. However, the Board did not accept claimant's theory, finding that claimant's problems with the Burlington store were resolved to his satisfaction when he was transferred. Claimant has not challenged these findings by the Board, and it was within the Board's discretion to exclude the evidence.
The dissent incorrectly attributes to this Court the characterization of the manager's shooting threat as "blowing off steam." Post, ¶ 19. Rather, this was the Board's conclusion as to the manager's "more likely" meaning, based on the generalized nature of the threat and the absence of any conduct to follow through. As noted above, this was further borne out by claimant's own return to the worksite one day later.