Case Name: MOTLEY v. TOM GREEN COUNTY
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1936-02-24
Citations: 93 S.W.2d 768
Docket Number: No. 4565
Parties: MOTLEY v. TOM GREEN COUNTY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 93
Pages: 768–773

Head Matter:
MOTLEY v. TOM GREEN COUNTY.
No. 4565.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.
Feb. 24, 1936.
On Rehearing March 30, 1936.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1936.
Upton & Upton and Travis E. Baker, all of San Angelo, for appellant.
O. C. Fisher and Glenn R. Lewis, both of San Angelo, for appellee.

Opinion:
HALL, Chief Justice.
J. M. Harper was elected and duly qualified as treasurer of Tom Green county on January 1, 1933. He served until his death on May 6, 1934. The commissioners' court fixed his compensation at one per cent, upon all funds received and disbursed, not to exceed the total sum of $2,000 per annum. Harper drew the entire amount due him as commissions in 1933. In January, 1934, he drew $659.74, which represented one per cent, of the receipts and disbursements of county funds during that month. In February he drew the sum of $1,340.26, which was less than one per cent, of the receipts and disbursements during such month, and this amount, which aggregated $2,000, he appropriated as his compensation for the year 1934.
After Harper's death on May 6, 1934, J. A. Motley qualified as administrator of his estate, and Tom Green county filed with Motley, as administrator, its claim for $1,315.09, contending that the consideration for such amount out of the $2,000 Harper had paid himself as commissions had failed, and asking that said sum be refunded. The claim was rejected, and Tom Green county filed this suit to recover $1,319.09.
In May, 1934, the commissioners' court appointed George A. Bond as treasurer, allowing him one-half of one per cent, of receipts and disbursements as his compensation. Bond's commissions, computed upon the amounts received during the remainder of the year and paid out, aggregated the sum of $983.53. This was paid him in December, 1934. Plaintiff then presented its claim to the administrator of Harper's estate for $983.53, which was rejected. The county then amended its petition and claimed said sum in the alternative.
No jury was impaneled, and the case as presented here is unusual in several particulars.
When the case was argued at Austin, the statement was made that no testimony had been introduced upon the trial. There is neither a statement of facts nor an agreed case, but the record contains what purport to be findings of fact by the trial judge, but is silent as to where he found them. Conclusions of law were also filed by him. The appellee's brief contains this statement: "Appellant requested the court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. No evidence was offered, but the court obliged by filing such findings made in accordance with the admissions in the pleadings." The pleadings were neither verified nor introduced in evidence. It therefore appears that the judgment was rendered in the court below without the introduction of any testimony whatever, and the record shows no agreement under any article of the statutes upon which such a judgment could have been entered.
A judgment without hearing evidence is erroneous unless some statutory requirement has been complied with which would tend to validate the judgment, Duke v. Gilbreath (Tex.Civ.App.) 10 S.W.(2d) 412; and a judgment of a court of record must be founded upon sufficient facts legally obtained. Blalock v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 1 S.W.(2d) 400, 402; McCankey v. Henderson, 24 Tex. 212; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 82 Tex. 448, 18 S.W. 605. The record contains no stipulation whatever, and no admissions were made in open court. As stated above, there is no statement of facts, and we have no agreed case.
Rev.St. art. 1837, provides that: "A trial in a Court of Civil Appeals shall be * ⅜ (2) or on statement of the pleadings and proof as agreed upon by the parties or their attorneys." We cannot consider the case under that article of the statute because, as stated, no proof was offered by either party, nor is .there any agreement shown in open court with reference to the testimony as having been made by either of the parties or their attorneys.
Rule 47 for the district and county courts provides: "No agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of' record."
In the case of Parrish v. Wright (Tex.Civ.App.) 293 S.W. 659, this court considered a case somewhat similar in its main features to the instant case because there was an agreement in open court with reference to the pleadings, and the judgment was rendered thereon, but no such agreement or stipulation appears in this record.
Rev.St., art. 2244, provides in substance that where it is agreed between parties or attorneys that the. evidence adduced upon the trial of the case is sufficient to establish a fact or facts alleged by either party, the testimony of the witnesses, and the deeds, wills, records, or other written instruments admitted in evidence relating thereto, shall not be stated or copied in detail into a statement of facts, but the facts thus established shall be stated as proved in the case, etc. This statute was enacted for the purpose of shortening statements of facts by relieving the stenographer of copying long instruments in the record, and by agreement incorporating the legal effect of such instruments or stating their substance, purport, and effect briefly.
Rev.St. art. 2280, provides: "The parties may agree upon a brief statement of the case and of the facts proven, with or without copies of any part of the proceedings as shall, in their opinion, enable the appellate court to determine whether there has been any error in the judgment; and, if the judge shall approve and sign such statement, it shall be filed among the papers of the cause and constitute a part of the record, and, on appeal or writ of error shall be copied into' the transcript in lieu of such proceedings themselves." This statute was enacted for the same general purpose as article 2244. It is also clear that no effort has been made to comply with this article of the statute.
No one has an inherent right to appeal from an adverse judgment. The right to appeal exists only in virtue of the Constitution and statutes of the state, in the absence of which there is no right. Field v. Anderson, 1 Tex. 437; Herd v. Pearman (Tex.Civ.App.) 275 S.W. 271; Shipley v. Dallas, etc., District (Tex.Civ.App.) 233 S.W. 556; Hudson v. Smith, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 412, 133 S.W. 486.
The Constitution, article 5, § 6, provides that Courts of Civil Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all civil cases of which the district courts or county courts have origi nal or appellate jurisdiction "under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Said courts shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate as may he prescribed by law."
The general rule, as stated in 3 C.J. 299, § 1, is that a constitutional provision that certain courts shall have appellate jurisdiction in such cases arising in inferior courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law limits the exercise of their jurisdiction to the extent and made which the Legislature may prescribe. Titus v. Latimer, 5 Tex. 433; Sherer v. Lassen County Super. Ct., 94 Cal. 354, 29 P. 716; Featherman v. Granite County, 28 Mont. 462, 72 P. 972; Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411.
Before this court can acquire jurisdiction of a case, it must have been tried below and transferred from that court to this court in accordance with some provision of the statute provided for that purpose. Unless the right of appeal is granted by the Constitution, it is but a privilege, not an irrevocable right, and may be restricted, changed, and regulated by the Legislature at discretion. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Blair, 108 Tex. 434, 196 S.W. 502, 1153, 184 S.W. 566. Since the right of appeal has been regulated by the statutes above referred to, an appeal must conform to some one of the methods provided before this court acquires jurisdiction. Hudson v. Smith, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 412, 133 S.W. 486; Powdrill v. Powdrill (Tex.Civ.App.) 134 S.W. 272; Muela v. Moye (Tex.Civ.App.) 185 S.W. 331.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the appeal is dismissed.