Case Name: John HERFORT, d/b/a Herfort Diamond Ring Factory, Appellant, v. R. Clyde HARGROVE, Jr., Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1980-10-08
Citations: 606 S.W.2d 359
Docket Number: No. 13162
Parties: John HERFORT, d/b/a Herfort Diamond Ring Factory, Appellant, v. R. Clyde HARGROVE, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 359–361

Head Matter:
John HERFORT, d/b/a Herfort Diamond Ring Factory, Appellant, v. R. Clyde HARGROVE, Jr., Appellee.
No. 13162.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Austin.
Oct. 8, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1980.
Logene L. Foster, Foster, Pope & Orsak, Sugar Land, for appellant.
Tommy Jacks, Doggett & Jacks, Austin, for appellee.

Opinion:
PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.
The sole question before us is whether the appellant "had done business" in Travis County within the meaning of the Special Venue Statute, Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 17.56, 1977 Tex.Gen.Laws, Ch. 216, § 6 at 604.
The facts are undisputed. Appellant, the only witness that testified, stated that he lived and had a place of business in Fort Bend County; that he owned one store in Rosenberg from which he sold jewelry and diamonds; and sales were made through this one store. He further testified that he had no salesmen, that he did not advertise in any trade journals, or any telephone books in Travis County. He testified that he would send receipts to people in Travis County if they made payments on any goods purchased in his store, and that he had sent some of these receipts to people who reside in Travis County, Texas, however, that the receipts had been sent after all negotiations and sales had been made in Rosenberg, Port Bend County.
Appellee who had bought certain diamonds from appellant, which diamonds are allegedly inferior to the quality that they had been represented to be, has brought suit against appellant in violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Appellee actually resides in Brazos County (Bryan). However, he maintains that venue has correctly been laid in Travis County because appellant has sold diamonds to Travis County residents on a continuous basis for the past several years and has routinely mailed to Travis County residents their purchasers receipts. The receipts contain appellant's "logo" with a slogan "Factory Prices on Diamonds." Appellee claims that venue in Travis County is correctly placed even though the Travis County residents went to appellant's store in Fort Bend County, purchased the merchandise there and paid for it there.
The trial court overruled appellant's plea of privilege and held that venue lay in Travis County. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for trial in Fort Bend County.
Section 17.56 of the Deceptive Trade Practices at the time of the transaction read:
"An action brought which alleges a claim to relief under Section 17.50 of this sub-chapter may be commenced in the county in which the person against whom the suit is brought resides, has his principal place of business, or has done business." (Emphasis added.)
The Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer Protection Act does not set forth any standard for the determination of those acts which prove that a party has "done business" within the meaning of the statute.
Appellee cites us to Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ), where the court held that advertising in the yellow pages of the telephone directory was tantamount to doing business in the county where the advertising appeared. We note, however, that the ad in Dairyland contained the word "AGENTS" followed by a list of nine insurance agencies, which have addresses in Harris County.
The receipt in question is nothing more than evidence of business culminated in Fort Bend County and the logo on the receipt is nothing more than a reminder to people with whom appellant has already dealt that appellant is still doing business in Fort Bend County.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter an order transferring the cause to Fort Bend County.
. The 66th Legislature has subsequently amended the Act doing away with the "has done business" provision. This amendment was effective August 27, 1979. See Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 17.56, 1979 Tex.Gen.Laws, Ch. 603, § 7, at 1332.
. Inasmuch as we find that appellant has not "done business" in Travis County, we do not reach the question of whether appellee, a resident of Brazos County, can bring suit in Travis County.