Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Martin Brian JAUREGUI, Defendant-Appellant.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2019-03-22
Citations: 918 F.3d 1050
Docket Number: No. 16-50429
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Martin Brian JAUREGUI, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 918
Pages: 1050–1068

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Martin Brian JAUREGUI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-50429
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2018 Pasadena, California
Filed March 22, 2019

Opinion:
BERZON, Circuit Judge:
Under federal law, the statutory maximum sentence for conspiracy to import a controlled substance depends on the specific, agreed-upon controlled substance "involv[ed]." 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), 963. We consider whether, consistent with the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, Martin Jauregui's sentence for conspiracy to import methamphetamine can be sustained solely by his admission that he conspired to import marijuana but it was "reasonably foreseeable" that methamphetamine would be imported. We hold that it cannot.
I
A
In January 2016, Jauregui attempted to cross the U.S.-Mexico border into Southern California. He was foiled when border agents discovered packages containing over six kilograms of methamphetamine in his car. Jauregui was arrested and questioned by two FBI agents.
During his interrogation, Jauregui told the agents he did not know there were drugs in the car, and went on to give the agents the following account: He had previously agreed with a man named Victor to smuggle marijuana into the United States. As the plan progressed, Victor gave Jauregui a car with the drugs loaded inside. At an uncle's urging, however, Jauregui decided not to go through with the marijuana smuggling and returned the car to Victor.
Later that day, Jauregui, wanting to visit his aunt near San Diego, asked Victor to borrow the car he had just returned. According to Jauregui, Victor told him that the drugs had been removed from the car. Throughout his interrogation, Jauregui repeatedly maintained that, at the time he crossed the border, he was unaware that drugs of any kind were hidden inside the car.
B
Jauregui was charged with one count of conspiracy to import methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952, 960, and 963, and one count of importation of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952 and 960. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count in exchange for the government's dismissal of the importation count.
At the plea colloquy, Jauregui's attorney at first provided the following factual basis for his plea:
Beginning on a date unknown and continuing up to January 31st, 2016, Mr. Jauregui was in agreement with at least two other persons to commit a crime of importing a schedule I or schedule II controlled substance under federal law.
He became a member of the conspiracy knowing of its object to import a controlled substance and intending to help accomplish that object. And it was reasonably foreseeable that the controlled substance may be methamphetamine.
For clarification, the district court asked Jauregui's attorney, "[W]hat was the point about it being whether he knew it was methamphetamine or some other drug?" The attorney explained that Jauregui "believed he was agreeing to import marijuana, but it was reasonably foreseeable that the substance would be methamphetamine under the Pinkerton case," referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946).
The district court then asked the government:
[D]o you agree with that factual basis on the conspiracy to import methamphetamine? Because he's pleading guilty to count one which is conspiracy to import methamphetamine, and a conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act. And if the illegal act is to import methamphetamine, then it's not to import some other prohibited drug. So if that is what he's pleading guilty to, then his factual basis is not adequate to satisfy count one unless the government is modifying the importation of methamphetamine to be a conspiracy to import methamphetamine or some other prohibited drug.
And if that's the case, what guidelines apply, the methamphetamine guidelines or the marijuana guidelines?
The prosecutor answered that "it's going to be [the government's] position in sentencing that the methamphetamine guidelines apply" and "that he knowingly imported the drugs." The district court pointed out that "unlike an importation charge, a conspiracy charge [requires] a mens rea to do the object of a conspiracy." So, the court explained, "if the object of the conspiracy is to import methamphetamine, then you would have to know it was methamphetamine."
In response, the prosecutor said, "I think that he has to know that there was a possibility. I think he has to know that it was reasonably foreseeable that it could have been methamphetamine instead of marijuana." Apparently convinced, the district court noted that Jauregui had already "admitted that," and the prosecutor agreed. Thus, "[b]ased on the Pinkerton theory and [Jauregui's] agreement that it was reasonably foreseeable that the drugs . he thought he was bringing in could have been methamphetamine," the district court concluded that there was a factual basis for Jauregui's plea.
C
A few months later, the district court held a sentencing hearing. In determining whether to apply a "minor role" sentencing reduction, the district court questioned Jauregui's version of events, noting that his story-that he had initially agreed to smuggle drugs across the border but had changed his mind-seemed "farfetched." The prosecutor responded that it had "pushed him very hard on that" but that Jauregui, whom the prosecutor called "very simple, very naïve," nonetheless "kept to his story." The court, however, disbelieved Jauregui's story and rejected Jauregui's request for a minor-role reduction.
Jauregui's attorney asked the district court to apply the Sentencing Guidelines for marijuana, because "[t]he way that [Jauregui] pleaded was that the agreement was for marijuana, although it was reasonably foreseeable it could be methamphetamine by the time it happened." The district court disagreed and so applied the Guidelines for methamphetamine. The court ultimately sentenced Jauregui to seventy-one months' incarceration. Jauregui did not object to the imposed sentence. This timely appeal followed.
II
The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee limits the judiciary's power to sentence criminal defendants. To impose a sentence above a statutory maximum, a court may not rely on any fact (other than a prior conviction) not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. See Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ; United States v. Guerrero-Jasso , 752 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2014).
Jauregui's present challenge to his sentence was not raised before the district court, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Chavez , 611 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under that standard, relief is warranted if (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Depue , 912 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
Federal drug crime statutes specify offenses covering all "controlled substances," not certain drug types or quantities. The permissible sentencing ranges, however, vary based on the drug type and quantity involved. See, e.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), 960(b) ; see also United States v. Buckland , 289 F.3d 558, 565-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). For purposes of Apprendi , because drug type and quantity determine the applicable statutory maximum, those factors must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant before the defendant can be sentenced to more than the relevant maximum for the generic crime. Buckland , 289 F.3d at 568.
Here, the generic crime is 21 U.S.C. § 963, conspiracy to import a controlled substance. The penalties for importation and conspiracy to import are the same. Id. The penalties for importing a controlled substance are set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), which lists the sentencing ranges for various drug types and quantities. Jauregui's indictment did not specify the quantity of drugs, so the relevant statutory penalties turned only on drug type. For an unspecified amount of methamphetamine, the applicable statutory maximum is twenty years. Id. § 960(b)(3) ; see also United States v. Thomas , 355 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2004). For an unspecified amount of marijuana, on the other hand, the applicable statutory maximum is five years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), 960(b)(4). Where drug type and quantity are not proven, the relevant statutory maximum is one year. See id. § 841(b)(3), 960(b)(7) ; see also United States v. Hunt , 656 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).
Applying § 960(b), the district court sentenced Jauregui to seventy-one months of incarceration, less than the statutory maximum for methamphetamine but more than the statutory maximum for marijuana. Whether that sentence is permissible turns on whether, in the course of pleading guilty, Jauregui admitted to conspiring to import methamphetamine.
A
"In assessing the scope of the facts established beyond a reasonable doubt by a guilty plea, we must look at what the defendant actually agreed to-that is, what was actually established beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Banuelos , 322 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2003). Our analysis thus depends on what facts Jauregui admitted when he entered his guilty plea. When sentencing results from a guilty plea, "[t]he government has the burden 'at the plea colloquy to seek an explicit admission of any unlawful conduct which it seeks to attribute to the defendant' " at sentencing. Thomas , 355 F.3d at 1199 (quoting United States v. Cazares , 121 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1997) ).
The government does not attempt to rely on Jauregui's indictment to establish his admission of conspiracy to import methamphetamine, for good reason. In the indictment, the government alleged that Jauregui "did knowingly and intentionally conspire with other persons known and unknown . to import methamphetamine , a Schedule II Controlled Substance, into the United States," thereby violating 21 U.S.C. § 952, 960, and 963 (emphasis added). "A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence." United States v. Broce , 488 U.S. 563, 569, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (emphasis added). A guilty plea does not, however, inevitably constitute an admission of all facts alleged in the indictment, as "allegations not necessary to be proved for a conviction . are not admitted by a plea." Cazares , 121 F.3d at 1247. Applying this principle, our court held in Thomas that a guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) was not an admission of the drug quantity alleged in the indictment, "[a]s drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense under § 841." 355 F.3d at 1195-96.
Here, Jauregui's guilty plea surely constituted an admission of the requisite elements to sustain his conviction for the crime of conspiracy to import a controlled substance, itself triggering a maximum sentence of one year. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(3) ; 960(b)(7). But his plea did not, on its own, establish an admission that the substance he conspired to import was methamphetamine, a crime subject to a twenty-year maximum sentence. See id. § 960(b)(3). Drug type is not a necessary element of a possession offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841, see Thomas , 355 F.3d at 1195-96 ; we see no reason why the same would not be true for an importation offense under § 960. Because drug type is "not necessary to be proved for a conviction," Cazares , 121 F.3d at 1247, Jauregui's guilty plea did not constitute an admission that he conspired to import the drug type alleged in the indictment-that is, methamphetamine.
The government instead relies solely on Jauregui's factual basis admissions during the plea colloquy. A review of that colloquy establishes that Jauregui never admitted to conspiring to import methamphetamine.
Instead, he specifically asserted that he had agreed to import only marijuana, not methamphetamine. In accordance with this limited admission, Jauregui's consistent account, as the prosecution explained at the sentencing hearing, was that he had, in fact, withdrawn from the marijuana importation agreement before undertaking the drive across the border and had no knowledge of the methamphetamine found in his car until the FBI agents told him of it.
Jauregui did, however, admit during his plea colloquy that "[h]e became a member of the conspiracy knowing of its object to import a controlled substance and intending to help accomplish that object" and also that "it was reasonably foreseeable that the controlled substance may be methamphetamine" (emphasis added). It is this "reasonably foreseeable" statement that the government contends was sufficient to support Jauregui's sentence for conspiracy to import methamphetamine.
B
Our question, then, is whether Jauregui's admission-that "it was reasonably foreseeable that the controlled substance may be methamphetamine"-was sufficient under Apprendi to expose Jauregui to sentencing under the statutory maximum for conspiracy to import methamphetamine. The applicable test is provided by our decision in Banuelos .
Under Banuelos , two findings are necessary to hold a defendant liable for conspiracy involving a particular drug type or quantity. First, the district court must find "that the conspiracy distributed a particular type and quantity of drugs"-that is, the existence of a conspiracy involving the particular drug type and quantity. Banuelos , 322 F.3d at 704. And second, the district court must also make a determination about the defendant's personal responsibility-"that the type and quantity were either within the scope of [the defendant's] agreement with his coconspirators or that the type and quantity were reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant]." Id. (emphasis added).
As to the second prong of Banuelos , Jauregui did not admit that importing methamphetamine was within the scope of his agreement with his coconspirators. But he did admit that "it was reasonably foreseeable that the controlled substance" he would transport "would be methamphetamine under the Pinkerton case." Under Banuelos , this admission was sufficient to satisfy this prong and potentially to expose Jauregui to liability for a federal drug conspiracy to import that methamphetamine.
Nothing Jauregui admitted during his plea colloquy, however, even hints at Banuelos 's first prong-"that the conspiracy distributed a particular type and quantity of drugs." Id. Jauregui never admitted that there was in fact a conspiracy whose object was importing methamphetamine, nor did he ever admit that the substance found in his vehicle was, in fact, methamphetamine.
To be sure, there was likely evidence available that might have supported the conclusion that there was, in fact, a methamphetamine conspiracy. This issue perhaps "could easily have been avoided had the district court or the prosecutor been more precise during the plea colloquy." Hunt , 656 F.3d at 916. But Apprendi prohibits a court from relying on evidence that could support imposing a sentence essential to determining the statutory maximum unless the essential fact has been admitted or found beyond a reasonable doubt. See 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. As Jauregui's admissions did not establish the existence of a conspiracy to import methamphetamine, he could not properly be sentenced for conspiracy to import methamphetamine.
The government's argument-that Jauregui may be held liable for a conspiracy involving methamphetamine even though he never admitted the existence of such a conspiracy-would expand Banuelos , potentially holding a defendant liable for all reasonably foreseeable objects of a conspiracy even if those objects were never agreed upon by any of the coconspirators. Given that "attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions" are disfavored, Grunewald v. United States , 353 U.S. 391, 404, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957), we decline to adopt the government's sweeping interpretation of Banuelos .
C
In sum, Jauregui's admission that "it was reasonably foreseeable that the controlled substance may be methamphetamine" did not permit the district court to sentence him for conspiracy to import methamphetamine. The district court therefore erred in imposing a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for conspiracy to import marijuana.
III
Although the district court erred, relief is not warranted unless the error satisfies the plain error standard. We conclude that, under plain error review, reversal is warranted.
First, the error was plain. As already discussed, under Banuelos 's standard, it is clear that Jauregui never admitted to any facts establishing that "the conspiracy distributed [the] particular type and quantity of drugs"-that is, methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced. 322 F.3d at 704.
Second, this error resulted in a sentence eleven months longer than the appropriate statutory maximum and so affected Jauregui's substantial rights. See United States v. Anderson , 201 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) ("An error that results in a longer sentence undoubtedly affects substantial rights."). The evidence was certainly not "overwhelming" with respect to whether Jauregui participated in a methamphetamine conspiracy. See United States v. Ornelas , 906 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a defendant's substantial rights were affected by a "plain instructional error" where "the evidence was not 'overwhelming' as to the omitted element"). Jauregui did not so admit, and again, in the plea context, the only relevant evidence is what the defendant admitted, not what might have well been established in a trial. And contrary to the dissent's assertions, the record actually indicates that Jauregui would not have admitted this fact, as he repeatedly maintained-during his interrogation, plea colloquy, and sentencing-that the object of the conspiracy he joined was to import marijuana and that he withdrew from that conspiracy. The portions of Jauregui's interrogation quoted by the dissent discuss a conspiracy to import only marijuana , not methamphetamine. Dissent Op. at 1066-67.
Third and finally, the error would seriously undermine the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Normally, "the possibility of additional jail time . warrants serious consideration in a determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b)," especially where the district court plays a significant role in determining the appropriate sentence. Rosales-Mireles v. United States , - U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 1897, 1907, 201 L.Ed.2d 376 (2018) ; see also id. at 1908 ("The risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the context of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the district court plays in calculating the range and the relative ease of correcting the error.").
Moreover, as already noted, the Supreme Court has expressly admonished courts to "view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald , 353 U.S. at 404, 77 S.Ct. 963. Conspiracy is frequently prosecuted, see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 12.1(b) (3d ed. 2017), and "prosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word processors as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a charge," United States v. Reynolds , 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990). Yet, as noted above, the government's position here would extend-beyond the already-expansive Banuelos standard-the scope of traditional conspiracy law.
"The requirement that the government prove facts supporting a greater sentence beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the defendant admit such facts, . is not an irrelevant technicality." Hunt , 656 F.3d at 916. To the contrary, the jury trial right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, involves "constitutional protections of surpassing importance." Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Under the circumstances here, the district court's fundamental error warrants reversal.
IV
The dissent contends that, in light of our conclusion that Jauregui did not admit the drug type charged in his indictment, the proper course of action is to vacate his conviction altogether, as there would be insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea. Dissent Op. at 1067-68. Not so. "Under the decisions in this circuit, a plea of guilty admits the facts constituting the elements of the charge." Cazares , 121 F.3d at 1246. Thus, there is no basis for us to conclude that Jauregui's guilty plea to conspiracy to import a controlled substance lacked a factual basis. Moreover, because Jauregui "challenged only his sentence, and not his conviction," we lack the power to vacate his conviction. Banuelos , 322 F.3d at 706. Instead, "we are required to remand the case with instructions to the district court to resentence [him] 'subject to the maximum sentence supported by the facts found by the [fact-finder] beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nordby , 225 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) ). We are not, as the dissent maintains, "[s]wapping in a specific uncharged drug type," Dissent Op. at 1064, but rather remanding to the district court to sentence Jauregui in accordance with the limitation imposed by the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee-that is, based on the facts Jauregui admitted as part of his plea colloquy.
Because Jauregui did not admit the facts necessary to establish his eligibility to be sentenced for conspiracy to import methamphetamine under Banuelos , the district court plainly erred in imposing a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for conspiracy to import marijuana, the only controlled substance admitted by Jauregui. We therefore vacate Jauregui's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED.
Actually, as we shall explain, the pivotal question is not which guidelines apply, but which penalty provision of the relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), apply, and so what the maximum penalty is.
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines permit a sentencing reduction "[b]ased on the defendant's role in the offense." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2016) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
For this reason, the district court's disbelief of Jauregui's story at sentencing is immaterial to our inquiry here, which pertains to the permissible penalty range. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.
At oral argument, the government argued for the first time that Jauregui's sentence could be sustained based on his attorney's statement that "the agreement was either for marijuana or methamphetamine." Oral Argument at 16:51, United States v. Jauregui , No. 16-50429 (9th Cir. July 10, 2018), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000013997. But the district court immediately requested clarification of that statement. Jauregui's attorney explained that Jauregui "believed he was agreeing to import marijuana, but it was reasonably foreseeable that the substance would be methamphetamine under the Pinkerton case." Thus, we do not understand the statement that "the agreement was either for marijuana or methamphetamine" to constitute an admission distinct from the one discussed in the text.
We recognize that, owing to the ambiguity of the word "conspiracy," Banuelos 's statement that "the district court was required to find . that the conspiracy distributed a particular type and quantity of drugs," 322 F.3d at 704 (emphasis added), could be interpreted to mean that the district court was required to find that Jauregui's coconspirators actually "distributed a particular type and quantity of drugs," not that they agreed to do so, see Conspiracy , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conspiracy (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (defining "conspiracy" as both "the act of conspiring together" and "a group of conspirators"). Even under this alternative interpretation, however, the first prong of Banuelos is not satisfied. Jauregui never admitted that his coconspirators in fact distributed methamphetamine, just that it was reasonably foreseeable that someone might do so. Cf. 322 F.3d at 705 ("On the basis of Banuelos' own admission, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy distributed more than 1000 kilograms of marijuana.").
The dissent argues that the presentence investigation report's discussion of the methamphetamine found in Jauregui's car strongly suggests the existence of a methamphetamine conspiracy. Dissent Op. at 1066. Although we have previously considered "undisputed evidence" found in a presentence investigation report for purposes of plain error analysis, United States v. Valensia , 299 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), the presentence report in this case is inapposite. Here, Jauregui consistently maintained that he did not know that there were any drugs in his car, let alone over six kilograms of methamphetamine. Moreover, it is conceivable that there was no such conspiracy. For example, one person, acting alone, may have conceived a scheme to put the methamphetamine in Jauregui's car. Alternatively, the conspirators could have been mistaken as to the drug type placed in the car.