Case Name: Lillian J. Upchurch v. State of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1910-03
Citations: 96 Miss. 586
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lillian J. Upchurch v. State of Mississippi.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 586–590

Head Matter:
Lillian J. Upchurch v. State of Mississippi.
[51 South. 810.]
Ckimiitai, Law and Pbocedube. Witnesses. Interest of. Evidence to-show.
Where, on the trial of a woman, for the murder of her husband, her-stepchildren, decedent’s children, were material witnesses against her and testified that their statements, uttered just after their father’s death, to the effect that he had committed suicide were-made by defendant’s direction, it was reversible error to prevent, defendant from showing that the witnesses had, since making their statements, been informed that her conviction would entitle-them to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on their father’s, life.
FROM the circuit court of Sunflower county.
IIoN. James M. OashiN, Judge.
Madame TJpchurch, appellant, was indicted and tried for, and convicted of murdering her husband, was sentenced to the penitentiary for life and appealed to the supreme court.
The facts upon which the decision turned are stated in the-opinion of the court.
Ghapman & Quinn, for appellant.
Tbe Code of 1906, § 1923, provides that “any witness may be examined touching bis interest in tbe cause,” etc. In tbe cross-examination of tbe witness Pittman, tbe defense tried to sbow bis interest in tbe conviction of appellant, Mrs. Up-eburcb, by proving that be was related by marriage to tbe deceased ; tbat be, in connection with other relatives of tbe deceased, bad employed counsel to prosecute tbe defendant, knowing or believing tbat if she were convicted of tbe crime with which she was charged, tbe insurance policies on tbe life of the-deceased, which were payable to bis widow, could be collected by tbe children of the deceased. To this line of testimony an objection, sustained by the court, was made by tbe state. Likewise tbe defense attempted to show tbe interest of tbe witnesses, Iva Upchurch, Alma Upchurch, and Bethel Upchurch, in tbe conviction of tbe defendant. Evidently it was fatal error to exclude from tbe consideration of tbe jury the interest of each of these witneses in tbe conviction of tbe defendant; she bad a right, especially given her by statute, to have tbe jury know what interest those testifying against her bad in tbe outcome of her trial, and this right was denied her by tbe court below; and when this right was denied her, she was then denied tbat fair and 'impartial trial according to law to which every person charged with crime in tbe state of Mississippi is entitled and she now demands at tbe bands of this court that she be given tbat right of which she was deprived by tbe court below. Who can say but tbat tbe verdict of tbe jury in this case would have been far different bad they known tbat tbe deceased bad policies of insurance on bis life in tbe sum of $2,000 payable to bis widow; tbat under tbe provisions of these policies, she could not recover one penny if she murdered her husband or if be committed suicide; tbat if she were proven guilty of murdering her husband, tbe children of tbe deceased -who are tbe stepchildren of tbe defendant would obtain tbe ■proceeds of tbe insurance;-tbat tbe witness Pittman, who married a niece of tbe deceased, knew or believed tbis to be true, -being so advised by bis counsel, Mr. Stone, and was making -every effort in bis power to bave ber convicted, and tbat tbe ■children of tbe deceased, Iva, Alma, and^ Betbel, knew or believed that on tbe conviction of their stepmother, they would get tbe insurance money on their father’s life? It was tbe right of the defendant to bave all these facts before tbe jury in order that they might be weighed in making up their ver-•diet. Who knows but tbat all these matters would bave explained to the entire satisfaction of tbe jury the vast discrep*-ancies between tbe statements made to neighbors by tbe children of tbe deceased, and their testimony at the coroner’s inquest, and about tbe manner in which be came to bis death, and their testimony in tbis trial; that the jury would bave concluded tbat the venal disposition of Pittman bad prompted him, or some of bis relatives, to pour into tbe minds of the children of the deceased the poison of avarice and rapacity, inciting them to change their story of what they saw from tbe statements made by them to what they testified to on tbe trial of tbis ■case, which latter are diametrically opposed to the former; and tbat tbe child, Alma, bad been influenced by these mercenary motives to testify as she did about the conduct of appellant and Cunde on the night after tbe deceased was shot? Only a jury can answer tbis query, and tbe defendant asks tbat she be given tbe right of having a jury pass upon all of tbe material facts of ber case, which right was denied ber at ber former trial.
George Butler, assistant attorney-general for appellee.
Tbe record discloses tbat deceased bad bis life insured for bis wife for some $2,000, and it is suggested tbat if it could be shown tbat she murdered ber husband she could receive no benefit from tbe insurance. This fact was brought out by counsel himself on cross-examination, and was not injected into tbe ease by tbe state for tbe purpose of showing any motive for tbe killing. It, of course, was not permissible to inquire of Pittman witb reference to a conversation bad between bim and Stone in regard to tbe insurance policy on tbe grounds-that counsel now claim, because that did not show or tend to show that Pittman bad any pecuniary interest in tbe insurance; and tbe questions to- Iva, Alma, and Bethel Upchurch did not go to tbe point of pecuniary interest, but, as above-stated, was injected by defendant into tbe case for tbe purpose of building up a strawman-motive, and tben tearing it down by showing that under tbe terms of tbe policy in question,, if she murdered ber husband she would be precluded from taking, or receiving and enjoying tbe benefits. It is always competent, of course, as affecting credibility, to show tbe wit-' ness’ interest in tbe case, but tbe proper way to do this is to ask them if they were interested, and tben, if they deny that they were, to prove by evidence aliunde that they were interested; but this question was never asked these witnesses, and they were never given any chance to state whether they wei*e or were not interested. .On tbe contrary, every effort was made to inject tbe conversation between counsel and these children into tbe case for tbe purpose, as above stated, of apparently furnishing tbe motive for the killing and tben disproving tbe weight of that testimony by showing that appellant could not take under tbe terms of tbe policy.

Opinion:
Mates, J.,
delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.
Tbe accused is tbe stepmother of several children of deceased, and is charged with, tbe assassination of their father and ber husband. Several of these stepchildren were introduced as witnesses by tbe state, and their testimony is of a most damaging character. Tbe theory of tbe defense is that deceased was not killed, but suicided, and it is shown that these same witnesses so stated when first interviewed; but on tbe trial of tbe case, while admitting that they bad first said that their father killed bim- self, they claim that they so stated because their stepmother had told them so to. do. It is shown that since tthe killing these children have had frequent converse with the relatives of the deceased, and the theory of the defense is that these relatives have caused this change in the testimony of these children. It appears that deceased had a life insurance policy in favor of accused, his wife, and the defense attempted to ask these witnesses about this insurance policy, and to show as a motive for this change in their statement as to how the killing occurred that the relatives of deceased had told these children that they would be the beneficiaries under the policy in case they were successful in convicting their stepmother of the crime charged. This testimony was objected to by the state and excluded.
The exclusion of this testimony was in the highest decree prejudicial to the rights of accused. These same witnesses had stated facts contradictory to the testimony they were then .giving, which facts exculpated, and proved the innocence of the accused, if true. They had stated that their father killed himself when first interrogated about it, and they had sworn to this at the coroner's investigation. When asked on the stand if they did not say that their father killed himself, they admit saying it, but now say that they said it because accused told them to say that. At all events, they have changed their testimony from their former statements, and the accused should have been allowed to show any facts that might tend to prove why they had changed. She attempted to do so by •showing that they were made aware of the fact that if she was convicted it meant a pecuniary benefit to them; it meant that the fruits of the policy of insurance would go to them, instead of their stepmother, for whom they seem not to have much affection. This testimony tended to show why there had been so remarkable a change in their statements about this killing, and should have been admitted.
Reversed and remanded.