Case Name: Karellen STEPHENS and Renee Stephens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, BY AND THROUGH its JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-02-23
Citations: 678 F. App'x 517
Docket Number: No. 12-35672
Parties: Karellen STEPHENS and Renee Stephens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, BY AND THROUGH its JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 678
Pages: 517–519

Head Matter:
Karellen STEPHENS and Renee Stephens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, BY AND THROUGH its JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-35672
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted February 21, 2017
Filed February 23, 2017
Kareilen Stephens, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Renee Stephens, Pro Se
Susan M. Dunaway, Multnomah County Attorney’s Office, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee Multnomah County
Cecil Reniche-Smith, Assistant Attorney General, AGOR—Office of the Oregon Attorney General,' Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees David F. Rees, Adrienne Nelson, Jean K. Maurer, Dale R. Koch, Michael Andrew McShane, Charlie G. Jenkins, Keely West, Jacob Weigler, Donald R. Letourneau, Schuman, Wolheim, Rosen-blum, Haselton, Duncan, Paul J. De Muniz, Oregon Medical Board, Oregon Department of Justice, John Kroger, Armstrong, Susan Glosser
Jay William Beattie, Attorney, Katie M. Eichner, Paul Silver, Lindsay Hart Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees James M. Callahan, Stoel Rives, LLP, Amy Elizabeth Joseph Peder-sen, Patricia Kay Runkles-Pearson, Rudy R. Lachemeier, Lachenmeier Enloe Rail and Heinson, Andy Simrin, Mitra Shari, Callahan and Shears, P.C.
Stephen C. Voorhees, Attorney, Candice Broock, Attorney, Kilmer Voorhees & Laurick, P.C., Portland, OR, for Defen-. dants-Appellees Scott Kocher, Richard Vangelisti, Vangelisti Kocher
Candice Broock, Attorney, Kilmer Voo-rhees & Laurick, P.C., Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee Washington County
Amy Elizabeth Joseph Pedersen, Attorney, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Nike, Inc., Phil Knight
Robert Winkler, Parks Bauer Sime Winkler & Fernety LLP, Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Todd Burkholder, Aimee McQuistion
Elijah B. Van Camp, Michael Stone, Attorney, Brisbee <& Stockston, Hillsboro, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Providence St. Vincent Hospital, Providence Health & Services
Janet M. Schroer, Attorney, Hart Wagner, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Oregon Health and Science University Hospital, S. Tubbesing, Nancy Gordon-Zwerling, David R. Solodnz, Joseph E. Robertson, Jr..
Peter 0. Tuenge, Attorney, Jamie E. Valentine, Esquire, Attorney, Keating Jones Hughes PC, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Julie Andrews, Oregon Emergency Physicians
Ralph C. Spooner, Attorney, Spooner & Much, P.C., Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Beth Phipps, Susan O’Leary
Thomas W. McPherson, Attorney, Mer-sereau Shannon LLP, Portland, or, for Defendant-appellee Portland Public Schools
Jay William Beattie, Attorney, Lindsay Hart Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee Betsy Fernly
George S. Pitcher, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appel-lee John Barker
Harry Auerbach, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees City of Portland, Portland Police Bureau, Rosie Sizer, Michael Reese, Dan Lui, Mulberry, Miller, John Eckhart, Bret Smith, Sam Adams
Amber Autumn Hollister, Deputy General Counsel, Helen Marie Hierschbiel, Oregon State Bar, General Counsel’s Office, Tigard, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Oregon State Bar, Scott A. Morrill, Sylvia E. Stevens
Jay William Beattie, Attorney, Katie M. Eichner, Lindsay Hart Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appel-lee Stephen P. Riedlinger
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Karellen and Renee Stephens appeal pro se the district court's judgment dismissing their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and state law, alleging violations of the First, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress ("IIED") stemming from an incident involving burns that their daughter allegedly suffered. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (res judicata); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to state a claim). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants Multnomah County, James M. Callahan, Callahan and Sheers PC, Scott Kocher, Richard Vangel-isti, Vangelisti Kocher, LLP, and Judges Rees, Nelson, and Maurer because plaintiffs raised or could have raised the same claims against the same defendants in a prior action. See Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (res judicata bars litigation in a subsequent action of " 'any claims that were raised or could have been raised' in a prior action" (emphasis and citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed the remaining claims under § 1983 because plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that defendants deprived them of any constitutional right. See Gibson, 781 F.2d at 1338 (requirements of a claim under •§ 1983). Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that defendants retaliated against them for any protected speech, see Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (requirements of a First Amendment retaliation claim); that they were denied their right to a jury trial, see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92, 23 L.Ed. 678 (1875) (Seventh Amendment jury right does not apply in state court); that their treatment by defendants could "be fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery," City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 126, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981) (requirements of a Thirteenth Amendment claim); that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against them based on their membership in a protected class, see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (requirements of an equal protection claim); or that they were unconstitutionally deprived of due process, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (requirements of a due process claim).
The district court properly dismissed the remaining claims under § 1985(3) and 1986 because plaintiffs made only concluso-ry allegations in support of a conspiracy. See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (requirements of a claim under § 1985(3)); Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[CJonclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss."); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A claim can be stated under section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985").
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' IIED claims because plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that defendants intended to inflict severe emotional distress on them or that -any act " 'constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.' " McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 901 P.2d 841, 849 (1995) (citation omitted) (requirements of an IIED claim under Oregon law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a pre-filing review order because the court gave plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard, developed an adequate record for review, made findings regarding their frivolous litigation history, and narrowly tailored the restrictions in the order. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (standard of review; factors to consider before imposing pre-filing restrictions).
The record does not support plaintiffs' contention that the district court was biased.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.