Case Name: Janis G. BOYER, Appellant, v. Shannon BOYER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-10-03
Citations: 588 So. 2d 615
Docket Number: No. 91-544
Parties: Janis G. BOYER, Appellant, v. Shannon BOYER, Appellee.
Judges: COWART, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 588
Pages: 615–620

Head Matter:
Janis G. BOYER, Appellant, v. Shannon BOYER, Appellee.
No. 91-544.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 3, 1991.
Kelvin L. Averbuch, Orlando, for appellant.
W. Ford Duane, P.A., Orlando, for appel-lee.
Demetrios G. Glinos, Orlando, Guardian Ad Litem for Kristen, Shelly, Shannon and Collin Boyer.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
COBB, Judge.
This is an appeal from a dissolution judgment. The appellant has filed a motion with this court seeking an award of temporary appellate attorney's fees and costs for preparation of an appellate transcript. A similar motion was presented to the trial court, pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1989) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c), and it was denied on the basis that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider such a motion absent an appellate mandate. See Gieseke v, Gieseke, 499 So.2d 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In Gieseke, the Fourth District held that the trial court had no authority to award attorney fees "for the [wife's cross-] appeal" from a final judgment of dissolution. It was held that in order to obtain fees and costs on appeal, a litigant must first make the request to the appellate court.
We are asked to reverse the trial court's jurisdictional determination and its denial of a stay. We are also asked to remand this cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and an award of an attorney's fee pending appeal and an order directing the appellee husband to pay all clerk and court reporter costs incurred for this appeal. Gieseke is correct. The authority to award attorney's fees and suit money pending appeal resides in the appellate court. As held in Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676,18 So. 781 (1895), the allowance of temporary alimony, counsel fees, and suit money by an appellate court pending appeal (assuming a proper evidentiary showing) is predicated upon the general equitable jurisdiction of the court. The requirement of the evidentiary showing was reemphasized recently in Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So.2d 432 (Fla.1987).
Subsequent to Prine, the Florida Supreme Court held that an appellant in a domestic case who is seeking alimony and suit money pending appeal has the burden to show good faith and "reasonable grounds to believe that the appeal will be successful." Phifer v. Phifer, 124 Fla. 223, 168 So. 9 (1936). Such awards have been granted in other Florida Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 138 Fla. 589, 189 So. 871 (1939) and Riesner v. Riesner, 129 Fla. 762, 176 So. 765 (1937). In Horn v. Horn, 73 So.2d 905 (Fla.1954), the court held that the trial court had no power to enter an order requiring the payment of fees and costs in connection with an appeal, but specifically stated: "If necessity existed for such temporary counsel fees, the proper forum, under numerous precedents, is in this court." Horn at 907.
Once a prima facie case has been demonstrated to the appellate court, the better practice is to remand the matter to the trial court for a determination as to any factual disputes and, if an award is equitably indicated, the trial court should determine the amount of that award based upon need and ability since the appellate court is not equipped to conduct evidentiary hearings. See Sierra at 433-434. The standard to be applied by a court in making a determination as to temporary fees is the same as that for final fees. See Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So.2d 620 (Fla.1988).
Neither Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) nor section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1989), provides a basis for original trial court jurisdiction over the issue of appellate fees and costs, whether temporary or final. Rule 9.600(c) refers to the retention by the lower tribunal of its jurisdiction in matters that may come before it, not to the acquisition of jurisdiction of appellate fees or costs (prior to mandate) that it never had to begin with. See Mullins v. Mullins, 342 So.2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Although section 61.16 has been said to be the basis for an appellate court to award attorney fees on appeal, it does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to do so. Indeed, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(b) explicitly states that appellate attorney fees are to be assessed by the appellate court, although it may remand to the trial court for assessment and the latter is the proper tribunal for enforcement. Moreover, Rule 9.400(a) explicitly provides for taxation of appellate costs by the lower tribunal on motions heard within 30 days after issuance of the mandate — but not before.
In view of the clear language in Prine, and the Florida Supreme Court cases which have followed it, it is clear that there is no original jurisdiction in the trial court to award appellate attorney fees or costs prior to mandate. Hence, we agree with the trial court's denial of the motion filed below.
As we read the motion before us, the appellant has failed to demonstrate "reasonable grounds to believe that the appeal will be successful," as required by Phifer, and the motion contains no representation or showing of good faith. Accordingly, the motion for pendente lite fees and costs is denied, as is the appellant's motion to review the trial court's denial of a stay.
COWART, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. See, e.g., Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So.2d 432, 433-434 (Fla.1987); Thornton v. Thornton, 433 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla. 1983). Actually, the equitable authority of an appellate court to award such fees existed long before the first enactment of statutory authority for such fees in 1945, as shown by the language in Prine.