Case Name: Sandra Diegel JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Irving Douglas JOHNSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-06-27
Citations: 847 So. 2d 1157
Docket Number: No. 5D02-425
Parties: Sandra Diegel JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Irving Douglas JOHNSON, Appellee.
Judges: THOMPSON, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 847
Pages: 1157–1164

Head Matter:
Sandra Diegel JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Irving Douglas JOHNSON, Appellee.
No. 5D02-425.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 27, 2003.
Eric K. Neitzke, of Eric K. Neitzke, P.A., and Steven J. Guardiano, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Ivan K. Clements, Jr., of Ivan K. Clements, Jr., P.A., DeLand, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PLEUS, J.
This is an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The former wife challenges aspects of the equitable distribution as well as the denial of her request for alimony. The parties were married for 13 years and had no children born of the marriage.
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). The test to be applied by this court is whether the trial court's order is supported by competent evidence. Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So.2d 203 (Fla.1983).
The trial court entered a final judgment which addresses the issues raised by the former wife save for two. A trial court's discretion is abused only where, based on the evidence before the trial court, no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court and "[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion." Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1203. We find no abuse of discretion. This opinion will address first the equitable distribution issues and then the issue of permanent alimony.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
No mention was made by the trial court in the final judgment of a $1,600 tax refund from the year 2000 which was retained by the former husband. No mention was made of proceeds from two life insurance policies on the former husband's late father which the former husband kept for himself. These policies provided death benefits of $12,000 and the former husband testified the policies were purchased with marital funds.
We conclude the trial court erred in failing to divide the tax refund and the life insurance proceeds between the former wife and former husband.
PERMANENT ALIMONY ISSUE
The uncontroverted evidence was that the former wife had three affairs while married to the former husband. She claims the court denied her alimony because of these affairs. On that issue, the trial judge made the following findings:
14. The Court finds that adultery should not be considered as a bar to alimony in this case because there if [sic] no evidence that the adultery caused the waste or dissipation of marital assets. The Court finds that the adultery caused the marriage to be irretrievably broken.
The crux of the former wife's argument for alimony is that she is 46 years old and suffers from numerous ailments including Crohn's Disease. On the issue of the wife's disability, the court noted:
18. The Court finds that the Wife's Crohn's Disease does not cause her to be totally disabled. The basis for Dr. Cheesman's opinion that the Wife could not work was basically Crohn's Disease would cause her to need to use the bathroom frequently which would be unacceptable to employers. The Court rejects this opinion and finds it unworthy of belief because the uncontroverted and undisputed facts are that the Wife was able to engage in sex with three men, strike up relationships, and carry on affairs with them. Further, the Wife was capable of driving more than 400 miles per week. The Court finds that an office setting is a far more suitable place for someone with Crohn's Disease than an automobile. Therefore, the Court finds that the Wife retains the residual functional capacity to engage in a broad range of sedentary work. Indeed, the Wife currently engages in work that has exertional requirements far greater than sedentary. The Court accepts Dr. Cheesman's opinion as to diagnosis, but rejects his opinion as to disability.
After a thorough review of the transcript, we find competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the final judgment. In Krafchuk v. Krafchuk, 804 So.2d 376, 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the court noted: "A twelve-year marriage is not considered a short-term nor long-term marriage, but rather falls into a 'grey [sic] area.' " When a marriage falls within this "gray area," a determination of entitlement to permanent alimony needs to be decided upon a review of other pertinent factors. We believe the court did just that. See Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So.2d 50, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing Gregoire v. Gregoire, 615 So.2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), and Ghen v. Ghen, 575 So.2d 1342 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)). This is not a case, as the dissent suggests, in which the former wife has passed from relative comfort to poverty or "from prosperity to misfortune."
This case is remanded to the trial court for a modification of the final judgment so that the former wife gets one-half of the tax refund and one-half of the insurance proceeds. Otherwise, the final judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
THOMPSON, C.J., concurs.
SHARP, W., J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.