Case Name: The State of Louisiana vs. Bernard J. Estoup
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1887-10
Citations: 39 La. Ann. 906
Docket Number: No. 195
Parties: The State of Louisiana vs. Bernard J. Estoup.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 906–910

Head Matter:
No. 195.
The State of Louisiana vs. Bernard J. Estoup.
A motion of appeal in a criminal ease must be made in open court (act 1878, hTo. 30, p. 56), within ten days after sentence was passed. "Where the court adjourns on that day, and the motion is made on the day of its reopening, the motion is in time.
A transcript of appeal in such a case need not be filed before the opening of the appellate court, whatever the return day be. It is in time if filed for such opening.
A witness on the stand cannot be permitted, over the seasonable objections of the accused, to . testify to what another person has told him touching the circumstances of the arrest of the latter, although such person so stated in presence of the accused, who was then m actual custody, and the latter did not contradict him and remained silent. The prisoner had a right to remain dumb.
The subsequent declaration of the trial judge in his charge to the jury that they were not to infer guilt from suoli silence, could not cure the illegal reception of the testimony.
The trial judge was as unable, as the appellate court is, to know wliat effect the unauthorized evidence produced on the mind of the jury.
APPEAL from the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. Roman, J.
ilí. J. Chmnmgham, Attorney General, for the State, Appellee.
W. L. Mvans, for Defendant and Appellant:
The prisoner was on a railroad train, under arrest, hcmdeuffed and shackled, at a time when a conversation between two other men occurred in his x>resence; he remained silent. Bill of exceptions, II. pp. 24 to 27.
Mere silence, while a party is wider aA'rest and in irons, affords no inference whatever of acquiescence in the statements of others made in his presence. Under such circumstances he is not called upon to contradict such statements. Such statements should not have gone to the jury over the timely objections of the prisoner. State vs. Diskin, 34 Ann. 921, 922; State vs. Munston, 35 Ann. 889 ; Com. vs. McDermott, 123 Mass. 440; Coni. vs. Kinney, 12 Met. 235 ; Com. vs. Walker, 13 Allen 570; Bob vs. State, 32 Ala. 560.
The invariable rule in this State and in England is, that where inadmissible evidence has been allowed to go to the jury in a criminal case, over the prisoner’s objection, he is entitled to relief. Bog. vs. Gibson, 16 Cox C. C. (copied in full in the brief); State vs. Perry, 16 Ann. 444; State vs. Monie et al., 26 Ann. 513; State vs. Gruso, 28 Ann. 952; State vs, Gregory, 33 Ann. 743 ; State vs. Mullen, 33 Ann. 159; State vs. Ton Sachs, 30 Arm. 943. (It is contended that in every criminal case reported in the Louisiana Annuals— covering a period of more tlian/orfa/ years — a new trial was granted where it was made to appear that inadmissible evidence was admitted over objection.)
The opinion of the trial judge upon/aefs which belong exclusively to the jury, cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. State vs. Crawford, 32 Ann. 527; State vs. Tompkins, 32 Ann. 623.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Bermudez, C. J.
The Attorney General contends that this court cannot consider the merits of this ease for the double reason, that the motion of appeal was offered and allowed and the transcript filed too late.
The defendant was sentenced on May 31, 1887. The court then adjourned, and reopened only on September 1, following. On that day, the accused, through counsel, moved for an appeal, which was granted, returnable to this court at this place (Shreveport) within ten days, and the transcript of appeal was filed here on October 1. The case was tried in the parish of Orleans (First Judicial District).
The act of 1878—No. 30, p. 56—relative to appeals in criminal cases provides, section 1, that "the party desiring to appeal, shall file his motion, either verbally or in writing, in open court in the courts of the First Judicial District, within ten days after the sentence shall have been passed." (Sec. 1.)
It is therefore clear that, as between the day on which the sentence was passed and that on which the appeal was asked and granted, the court did not sit at all, it was physically impossible for the accused to have filed his motion of appeal m open court.
Had ten judicial days elapsed in the interval, quite a different case would have been presented, as the law prohibits, in negative terms, that appeals be granted after the time specified shall have elapsed. (Sec. 3.)
It is true that the law directs that appeals in such cases shall be made returnable within ten days after the granting of the order of appeal; but the statute clearly contemplates that this must be so, where this court may be in session on the return day. (Sec. 4.)
Now, this court could not be in session at this place at all in September, as, under the law, the term opens here in October.
The law does not require vain things. Of what good would it have been, either to the State or to the accused, that the transcript be filed here within the ten days following September 1.
The ruling in State vs. Madlar, 38 Ann. 390, has not the remotest application to the present one, for the obvious reason that there ten judicial days had expired before the motion of appeal had been made, and likewise after the return day, and here none at all had previously elapsed.
The motion to dismiss is denied.