Case Name: HARTMAN v. ROBERTS-WALBY ENTERPRISES, INC. APPEAL OF UNITED BONDING INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1968-02-09
Citations: 380 Mich. 105
Docket Number: Calendar No. 23, Docket No. 51,685
Parties: HARTMAN v. ROBERTS-WALBY ENTERPRISES, INC. APPEAL OF UNITED BONDING INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Dethmers, C. J., concurred with O’Hara, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 380
Pages: 105–114

Head Matter:
HARTMAN v. ROBERTS-WALBY ENTERPRISES, INC. APPEAL OF UNITED BONDING INSURANCE COMPANY.
Decision of the Court.
1. Appeal and Error — Appeal as of Bight — Claim of Appeal— Setting Aside Default.
Court of Appeals’ order dismissing appeal claimed to lie as a matter of right from default judgment in action under the dramshop aet because “not timely filed” is vacated where claim of appeal was filed 14 days after entry of order denying motion for rehearing, a motion filed 7 days after entry of order denying motion to set aside default judgment, whieh last-mentioned motion had been filed 33 days after entry of default judgment, per Dethmers, C. J., Kelly, Black, and O’Hara, JJ.; with vacation relating solely to orders denying motion to set aside default judgment and rehearing thereof, per T. M. Kavanagh, Souris, and Adams, JJ.; with Brennan, J., dissenting on ground that motion to set aside default judgment was not appealable as a matter of right where not filed within 20 days of the judgment, and an application for rehearing of a motion could not rise to a higher status than the motion itself (CLS 1961, § 436.22; GCR 1963, 520, 528).
Separate Opinion.
Dethmers, C. J., and O’Hara, J.
2. Appeal and Error — Claim of Appeal — Time of Piling.
Claim of appeal, filed 14 days after filing of order denying motion for rehearing, which latter motion had been filed 7 days after order denying motion to set aside default judgment, which last-mentioned motion was filed S3 days after default had teen talcen, held, timely filed; henee, order of Court of Appeals dismissing appeal because it had not been timely filed was error (GCB 196S, 520, 528).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1,2,7] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 292, 293, 295, 306. Motion or petition for rehearing in court below as affecting time within whieh appellate proceedings must be taken or instituted. 10 ALR2d 1075.
[3] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 302, 303, 317, 322, 473.
[4] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 292, 293, 295, 302, 303, 306.
[5] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 293, 306.
[6] 30A Am Jur, Judgments §§ 648, 653, 713.
Separate Opinión.
Kelly and Black, JJ.
3. Appeal and Error — Amendment op Court Bules.
Court rules should provide for filing of proof of service on opposing counsel of notice of entry of judgment from which appeal may be talcen so as to accord full 20-day period for filing claim of appeal and payment of fee (GCB 1968, 808.1).
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanash, Souris, and Adams, JJ.
4. Appeal and Error — Time por Appeal — Determined Erom Date op Entry op Judgment.
Filing of claim of appeal from denial of motions to vacate default judgment and for rehearing within 20 days of entry of denial, but after 20 days from date of announcement of denial, held, to have been timely filed, as timeliness is determined by the dates of entry of judgments and orders, not the date the decision is announced from the bench (GCB 1963, 522.2).
5. Same — Appeal as op Bight — Timeliness.
Petition for rehearing motion to vacate default judgment, filed before entry of order denying motion to vacate, extended the time within which a claim of appeal as of right could be talcen from denial of motion to vacate until “20 days after entry of an order denying a motion for new trial or rehearing”, and claim of appeal filed 14 days after entry of order denying motion for rehearing was timely (GCB 1963, 803.1).
Dissenting Opinion.
Brennan, J.
6. Appeal and Error — Appeal as op Bight — Court Bulb.
Court rule giving party 1 year to move for relief from judgment does not create a new appeal as of right after the original time limits have run out (GCB 1963, 528).
7. Same — Appeal as op Right — Timeliness.
Motion to set aside default judgment filed S3 days after entry of default judgment is not appealable as a matter of right, not having been filed within the SO days of judgment, and although petition for rehearing of motion to set aside default judgment was filed within SO days of denial of motion to set aside default judgment it was not filed within SO days of the date of judgment and is not appealable as of right (GCB 1963, 5S8, 803.1).
Appeal by leave granted from Court of Appeals Division 2; Quinn, P. J., J. H. Grillis and McGregor, JJ., order granting a motion to dismiss an appeal from Oakland. Submitted November 8, 1967. (Calendar No. 23, Docket No. 51,685.) Decided February 9, 1968.
Complaint by Charlotte Hartman against Roberts-Walby Enterprises, Inc., and its surety United Bonding Insurance Co. under the dramshop act to recover for the loss of support, comfort, and companionship of her husband. Default judgment for plaintiff. United Bonding Insurance Co. moved to set aside the default judgment. Motion denied. Defendant moved for rehearing. Motion denied. Defendant appeals. Court of Appeals granted motion to dismiss appeal. Defendant moved for rehearing of order dismissing appeal. Motion denied.
Leave to appeal granted.
George Silith, for plaintiff.
Caplan & Bar shy (George Stone, of counsel on appeal), for defendant United Bonding Insurance Company.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
We granted leave to review an order of the Court of Appeals granting a motion to dismiss an appeal claimed as of right to that Court from the circuit court of Oakland county.
The relevant facts are as follows:
In April, 1964, plaintiff-appellee began an action under the "dramshop" act against the defendant tavern keeper, Roberts-Walby Enterprises, Inc., and its statutory surety defendant-appellant, United Bonding Insurance Company. Service on the surety was made pursuant to statute on the insurance commissioner. According to appellant surety company it sent the copy of the process to its general agent in Michigan. Allegedly it was lost in the mail and the first notice the general agent had of the action was' a notification that a default judgment in the full amount of its statutory bond, $5,000, had been taken on May 25, 1966.
Defendant-appellant on June 27, 1966, filed a motion entitled "Motion to set aside default judgment." The motion, by its express terms, was predicated on Rules 520 and 528, GCR 1963. Appellee responsively filed an answer in opposition thereto on June 30, 1966. Several appearances before the circuit judge followed and journal entries were made reciting denials of motions to set aside the default and denials of motions for rehearings thereof, but no order from which jurisdictional time could be computed was entered until August 4, 1966. The order denied the prayer to set aside the default. The learned circuit judge apparently made known his intended denial from the bench and a journal entry so noted on July 11, 1966.
Appellant filed a motion for rehearing on July 18, 1966. Again, no formal order from which jurisdictional time could be computed was entered disposing of the July 18 motion until October 10, 1966. From this order appellant claimed an appeal on October 24, 1966. On November 2, 1966, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the claim of appeal as not timely filed in accordance with, the requirements of Rule 803.1, GCR 1963. In the claim of appeal, however, appellant specifically made reference to the orders of August 4 denying the motion to set aside the default judgment, and the order denying the motion for rehearing entered October 10, 1966. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal "as not timely filed," and did not specify the rule or rules which it considered to be involved.
Under these circumstances, we can only relate the proceedings to the rules specified in the initial motion filed June 27, 1966, namely, Rules 520 and 528 of GCR 1963. No failure to comply with jurisdictional time provisions of either rule appears of record.
Accordingly, and since the jurisdictional time begins to run upon the date of actual entry and that only, we are constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing appellant's claim of appeal. That Court's order of dismissal is therefore vacated. Costs to the appellant.
Dethmers, C. J., concurred with O'Hara, J.
CLS 1961, §436.22 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 18.993).