Case Name: KENNEDY v. JOHN WANAMAKER, NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-06-02
Citations: 129 N.Y.S. 1053
Docket Number: 
Parties: KENNEDY v. JOHN WANAMAKER, NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 129
Pages: 1053–1059

Head Matter:
KENNEDY v. JOHN WANAMAKER, NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 2, 1911.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 216 )—Injury to Servant—Assumption of Risk.
A porter, while cleaning the shaft of a passenger elevator in the basement of a building under the direction of the foreman of the porters, was struck by counterweights of the elevator descending because the operator of the elevator moved it. The operator was informed of the porter’s presence in the shafts, and notices, “Elevator not running,” furnished for the purpose, were, according to custom, posted near the elevator entrance on each floor, and according to custom it was the duty of the operator to hold the elevator at the first floor until notified by the porter that the work in the shaft was completed. Without such notice, the operator raised the elevator, causing the accident. There was no defect in the appliances, and no evidence that the operator was incompetent, other than might be inferred from the moving of the elevator in violation of the custom, nor that the operator had violated the custom before. Held, that the porter as a matter of law assumed the risk of any negligence of the operator.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 567; Dec. Dig. § 216. ]
2. Master and Servant (§ 265 )—Injury to Servant—Burden of Proof.
Where, in an action by an employs for injuries while cleaning the shaft of a passenger elevator, caused by the operator of the elevator moving it, the evidence showed that the employer had furnished printed and-written instructions for the guidance of the elevator operators, the employs had the burden of showing that the instructions had not been communicated to the operator, and, in the absence of proof, it would be assumed that the elevator operator had been properly instructed.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 887-908; Dec. Dig. § 265. ]
3. Master and Servant (§ 162 )—Injury to Servant—Negligence.
Where an employer maintaining a passenger elevator in his building properly instructed the operator of the elevator not to move it while a servant was cleaning the shaft, the employer was not required to employ a watchman to see that the operator obeyed the instructions, and hence was not liable for injuries to the servant caused by the operator negligently starting the elevator in violation of his duty.'
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 327; Dee. Dig. § 162. ]
Ingraham, P. J., and Dowling, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Patrick Kennedy against John Wanamaker, New York. From a judgment of dismissal entered on a direction of the court on a motion for nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s case, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 134 App. Div. 950, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1117.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, MILLER, and DOWLING, JJ.
Richard J. Donovan, for appellant.
Herrick C. Allen, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
On the 11th day of January, 1908, the plaintiff, while in the employ of defendant and engaged in the performance of his duties as a porter in cleaning the shaft of a passenger elevator in the basement of the defendant's department store in the city of New York, was struck and severely injured by counterweights of the elevator which descended, not owing to any accident to the machinery, but by the operation of the elevator by the regular operator thereof, Clark, who was .also in the employ of defendant, and this action is brought to recover damages for the injuries thus sustained.
The complaint contains two counts, in both of which liability is predicated upon the same state of facts; excepting that in 'the first a cause of action at common law is alleged, and the second attempts to allege a cause of action under the employer's liability act. The second count was abandoned on the trial. The question presented for decision on this appeal is whether the plaintiff alleged and proved a cause of action against his employer for negligence under the common law.
The plaintiff alleged in the first count of his complaint, and his testimony is to the same effect, that the foreman of the porters directed him to clean the shaft; that in accordance with the custom which had existed since defendant took charge of the store in October, 1896, and for two or three years prior thereto during the occupancy thereof by defendant's predecessor, during all of which time plaintiff was employed in the same capacity, he thereupon informed the operator of the elevator that he was about to clean the shaft in the basement, and directed said operator to post the usual notices; that thereupon framed notices provided for that purpose, printed in large type, were posted upon the several floors at the entrance to the elevators on which were the words, "Elevator not running," and the elevator was brought to a stop at the first floor, where it was the duty of the operator, according to the custom, to hold it until notified by the plaintiff that his work in the shaft below was completed; that, notwithstanding this, after the plaintiff had been working in the shaft below the elevator for a period of about 40 minutes, the operator moved the elevator to about the sixth floor, causing the counterweights to descend in the groves in which they slid and to come in contact with plaintiff; that, when the elevator shafts above the basement floors were cleaned by the porters, like notices were hung out, and the porters stood upon the elevators in doing their work and signaled the operator from time to time as it became necessary to change their position.
The negligence charged is that the defendant failed to properly protect the plaintiff, to make and enforce proper rules with respect to giving warning, to refrain from operating the elevator, to post sufficient notices, and to instruct its servants properly, and that it negligently caused the elevator to be operated while plaintiff was in the basement below, and negligently permitted the elevator to become and remain out of repair so that it would start without the application of power, and employed incompetent servants. The only material evidence given bearing on any of these theories of negligence has already been stated. There was no evidence of any defect in the elevator and no evidence that any of the operators were incompetent, other than might be inferred from moving the elevator on this occasion in violation of the custom; but there is no evidence that the operator ever did this before. The evidence shows that all necessary notices were posted as already stated. A reversal of the judgment is sought principally upon the ground that the defendant neglected to adopt and promulgate rules, and to properly instruct its servants.
The plaintiff had, I think, received all necessary instructions, and he assumed the risk of any negligence in this regard, for he was fully acquainted with the manner in which the work was done ana knew the danger quite as well as his employer.
It is not necessary to decide whether the nature of this business was such that it was the duty of the defendant to adopt and promulgate formal rules or to give specific instructions to its servants with respect to the operation of the elevators while porters were working in the shaft, for, if the common law devolved that duty on the defendant, it is not to be presumed that it was not performed, and it appears by the evidence that there were printed and written instructions for the guidance of the elevator operators, and it was not shown that these instructions were not communicated to them.
If that would have availed plaintiff, the burden of showing it rested upon him, and not on the defendant. The only negligence to which the evidence points is the neglect of the operator of the elevator to perform his duty to refrain from moving the elevator in a manner that would precipitate either it or the counterweights on the plaintiff, who was working below him in the shaft.
Assuming, as we must, that the elevator operator was properly instructed with respect to the performance of his duties, then I am of opinion that the defendant was not required to employ another znan or men to stand guard over the elevator operator and give notice to the plaintiff in case the elevator was negligently started in violation .of the custom and of the duty devolving on the operator. If it may be said that it was the duty of the defendant at common law to hire another employé to watch the elevator operator, then it is difficult to see where that duty would end, for as well might it be said that the jury might speculate and say that the further duty devolved .on the defendant to employ still another watchman to watch the first and see that he performed his duties, and the number of employes to be thus employed to see that other employés performed their duties would in each case depend on the opinion of the jury with respect to the particular facts. No authoritative decision in this jurisdiction has as yet gone to that extent, and it would he opposed to precedents. The effect of the opinion of the Presiding Justice is, I think, to make the master responsible for the negligent •act of the elevator operator. Within well-decided precedents, the elevator operator was a coemploye, the risk of whose negligence plaintiff assumed.
I am therefore of opinion that under well-settled law the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action, and that the nonsuit was proper.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
MCLAUGHLIN and MILLER, JJ,, concur.