Case Name: Duff v. Duff's Ex'ors
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1832-02
Citations: 3 Leigh 523
Docket Number: 
Parties: Duff v. Duff's Ex’ors.
Judges: CABELE, J. I am of the same opinion.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 715–718

Head Matter:
Duff v. Duff's Ex’ors.
February, 1832.
Appellate Practice — Capacity of Testator to Make Will — Opinion of Lower Court Affirmed — Case at Bar. —In a controversy concerning the probal of a will of real as well as personal estate, in a circuit court, the evidence of the witnesses as noted by the indite, is, by consent, spread on the record: the evidence thus stated, is wholly silent as to the execution of the will by the testator, and attestation by the witnesses; but it is clearly to be collected from the record, that the only point in controversy was, whether the testator was of sound mind, and that the due execution of it, supposing him sane, was not disputed: the circuit court, being satisfied that the testator was of sound mind, and, therefore, admitting the will to probat, this court, concurring in the opinion of the circuit court as to the sanity of the testator, affirmed tie sentence — Dissentiente, Tucker, P., who thought, that the cause ought to he remanded to the circuit court for a new hearing, on which the evidence of due execution, now wanting, might he supplied.
A writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Samuel Duff, was offered for probat, by the executors therein named, in the county court of Russell; and Rees Duff, a son of the deceased, appeared to contest the probat. There were six subscribing witnesses to the will; four of whom, and sundrj- other witnesses, were examined in the *county court; which pronounced sentence, “that the said writing was executed as a will of real and personal estate, according to the statute in such case made and provided, and that the testator, at the time of making and executing the same, was of sound disposing mind and memory;” and therefore, “that the said writing should be established, and recorded, as the last will and testament of the said Samuel Duff deceased.’’ Rees Duff appealed from the sentence to the circuit court.
In the circuit court, the following agreement between the parties, by their counsel, was entered on the record: “It is agreed between the counsel for both parties, that the testimony of the witnesses to be examined upon the hearing of this appeal here, as the same shall be taken down by the judge of the court, shall be used as the evidence in the event of an appeal, to avail as much as if their depositions were regularly taken.’’ The testimony was accordingly noted down by the judge, from the lips of the witnesses; and he prefaced his notes of the evidence, with these words: “Mr. Estill states the case, with the circumstances necessary to enable the court to understand it. The only question is, Was the testator of sound mind when he executed the will?” .And then followed the testimony of three of the subscribing witnesses, and of several others, as noted by the judge; all of which related to the question of sanity only: no question was asked, by the counsel on either side, or b3r the court, touching any other point. It appeared that the will was written for the testator, by one of the witnesses; and in the testimon}' of the three subscribing witnesses examined in the circuit court, as stated by the-judge, not a word was said concerning the execution of the will, or their attestation thereof. The circuit court, upon consideration of the evidence, affirmed the sentence of the county court; and then Rees Duff appealed to this court.
Leigh, for the appellant,
discussed the question as to the testator’s sanity, upon the evidence. And he admitted, that’ *it was sufficiently apparent from the record, that that was, in fact, the only point of dispute in the courts below; yet, he said, there was such a fatal defect in the proof of this will, as stated in the record, that this court could not affirm the sentence, even if it should think the testator’s sanity unquestionable. There was no proof whatever, that the will was attested by the subscribing witnesses, in the presence of the testator; no proof, indeed, that the will was executed by the testator, in any way. In the actual state of the proof, he thought, the court must reverse the sentence; and, either pronounce sentence against the will (which, if it should concur in opinion with the courts below, as to the sanity of the testator, it would, he was aware, under the circumstances of the case, be very loath to do); or remand the cause to the circuit court, for a rehearing there, in order that the whole case might be fully stated on the record.
Johnson, for the appellees,
maintained, that there could be no reasonable doubt, that the testator was of sound disposing mind and memory. If, for the defect in the proof as to the execution and attestation of the will, this court should reverse the sentence, he said, the latter alternative suggested by the appellant’s counsel, was certainly the proper course: the court would never pronounce a sentence, which would, in effect, set aside and annul a good will, upon a ground, on which the party opposed to it, never thought of contesting it. But he contended, that this court ought to pay no regard to the supposed defect in the proof. The parties agreed, that the judge’s notes of the testimony, should be substituted in place of depositions regularly taken ; and thus adopted his state of the case and of the controversy; and he prefaced his state of the evidence, by saying, that Mr. Estill stated the case, with the circumstances necessary to enable the court to understand it; and that the only question was, whether the testator was of sound mind when he executed the wil’? Now, it' was plain, the judge stated that this was the only question, because Rstill said *it was so; and plain, that Estill was the appellant’s counsel, since he opened the case, in the circuit court: and, as the only question he raised, was as to the sanity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will, he admitted the due execution, if the testator was sane. The evidence in the circuit court, was properly confined to the only question of fact in dispute, the sanity of the testator. In the county court, the evidences as to the execution and attestation had been adduced; and the sentence of the county court shewed, that due execution and attestation was proved there.
Appellate Practice — Remanding of Causes.-in the principal case upon the question concerning the probate of a will, the only point in controversy was, whether the testator was of sound mind, the question of due execution, supposing him sane not being disputed, the circuit court being satisfied that the testator was of sound mind admitted the will to probate and the appellate court concurring in the opinion as to the sanity of the testator affirmed the sentence. But Tucker, P., who dissented, thought that the cause ought to be remanded to the circuit court for a new hearing, on which the evidence of due execution might be supplied. In the discussion of the question as to when a cause ought to be remanded to the inferior court for rehearing, Tucker, P.. in the following cases refers to his opinion in the principal case. Miller v. Argyle. 5 Leigh 469; Cropper v. Burtons, 5 Leigh 431; Watkins v. Carlton, 10 Leigh B74; Sitlingtons v. Brown, 7 Leigh 275. and note.

Opinion:
CARR, J.
It is clear from the record, and was admitted in the. very candid argu.ment of counsel, that the sole matter in contest in the courts below, was, Whether the testator was of sound mind when he executed the will? The question of due execution of the will, formed no part of the controversy; and I cannot doubt, that we ought, on this record, to take it as a point admitted by the parties. The record shews, that, in the county court, the due execution of the will was regularly proved. In the circuit court, it seems from the entry on the record, that before the cause was gone into, the-counsel agreed, that, in case of appeal, the testimony, as the same should te taken by the judge, should be used as evidence. This I understand to be a substitution of the judge's notes of the evidence, for regular depositions, and thus making those notes a part of the record; especially, as we must of necessity conclude, that his statement was examined and agreed to by the counsel. The judge, being aware of this substitution, would of course be more full and particular in taking his notes. Mr, Estill I take to have been counsel for the appellant, because the judge's notes shew, that he was the opening counsel. Now the judge begins his notes, thus: "Mr. Estill states the case, with the circumstances, which are necessary to enable the court, to understand it. The only question is, was the testator of sound mind when he executed the will?" 'x'This is the introduction to the testimony, and was no doubt taken from the lips of Mr. Estill, as he opened the cause. I repeat, it is agreed to, and made part of the record by the counsel, and must be taken by us as forming a portion of the case. The conclusion from it is irresistible to my mind, that the parties were satisfied with the proof of the due execution of the will, and meant only to contest the capacity of the testator. What the parties admit need never be proved. Three of the witnesses to the will are examined before the circuit court, and it is stated by them, that they did witness it, but in that general and incidental way which shews that this was not the matter in contest. It would, I think, have a very mischievous effect, it we were to suffer a party, not merely to stand by, but actively to co-operate in thus turning the cause into another channel, and then come to a superiour court upon some formal point, from which his own conduct has led oif the attention of the court below.
With respect to the soundness of the testator's mind, at the time of executing the will, I am clearly of opinion, that the sentence of the courts below, is correct; and I think it ought in all things to be affirmed.
CABELE, J. I am of the same opinion.