Case Name: Marion DRAPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mattie Lee Murry DRAPER, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1989-08-23
Citations: 554 So. 2d 79
Docket Number: No. 20640-CA
Parties: Marion DRAPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mattie Lee Murry DRAPER, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before MARVIN, SEXTON and NORRIS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 554
Pages: 79–85

Head Matter:
Marion DRAPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mattie Lee Murry DRAPER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20640-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Aug. 23, 1989.
On Rehearing Nov. 1, 1989.
Nelson, Hammons & White by Walter D. White, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
William C. Monroe, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MARVIN, SEXTON and NORRIS, JJ.

Opinion:
SEXTON, Judge.
The defendant, Mattie Lee Murry Draper, appeals an adverse judgment of divorce. We dismiss the appeal for the reasons set forth below.
On February 8, 1967, Mr. Marion Draper filed for a divorce from Mattie Lee Murry Draper. On June 19, 1967, he filed an amended petition. Domiciliary service of these pleadings was made on Mrs. Draper's mother, Dora Washington. Mrs. Draper did not answer the petition. A judgment of divorce by default was signed on September 20, 1967; however, notice of the judgment was not served on Mrs. Draper.
On November 6, 1986, Mr. Draper died. In May 1988 Mrs. Draper opened his succession. She informed her counsel that her husband had been living with another woman, Beulah Crowder, in immovable property purchased by Mr. Draper in 1969. Upon demand to Ms. Crowder to vacate the premises, counsel for Mrs. Draper was informed of the existence of the divorce judgment. It was discovered that notice of the judgment had never been served. A petition for possession and order to show cause why Ms. Crowder should not be evicted was filed in the succession. On June 16, 1988, Mrs. Draper was personally served with notice of the 1967 judgment of divorce.
Mrs. Draper filed a motion for a new trial which was denied by the trial court on August 19, 1988. She then filed this appeal.
On appeal Mrs. Draper argues that because she was not served with notice of the judgment before Mr. Draper died, the delays for applying for a new trial and taking an appeal did not begin to run and there was no final judgment of divorce. She states that the effect of this failure to serve notice is the continuation of the community until Mr. Draper's death in 1986. Mrs. Draper asks this court to declare that the judgment of divorce is null.
LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1913 provides that "[njotice of the signing of a default judgment against a defendant on whom citation was not served personally, and who filed no exceptions or answers, shall be served on the defendant by the sheriff, by either personal or domiciliary service." Under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1974, when notice of the judgment is required under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1913, the delay for applying for a new trial does not begin to run until after the clerk has mailed or the sheriff has served the notice of judgment. The delay for taking an appeal does not begin to run until the expiration of the new trial delays. LSA-C. C.P. Arts. 2087 and 2123.
Because a default judgment was entered against Mrs. Draper, LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1913 applies. This article requires that notice of the judgment be served on Mrs. Draper. Because notice was not served until June 16, 1988, the delays for applying for a new trial or taking an appeal did not begin to run until that date. Any actual knowledge that Mrs. Draper may have had of the signing of a judgment beyond the record and absent compliance with the mailing or service requirement is not sufficient to cause the new trial and appeal delays to commence. Haywood v. Salter, 421 So.2d 1190 (La.App. 2d Cir.1982); Arnold v. Arnold, 345 So.2d 1020 (La.App. 2d Cir.1977).
Mrs. Draper's motion for new trial was timely, as was her motion for appeal; however, we dismiss this appeal because Mr. Draper's death makes the issue on appeal moot.
Louisiana law does not favor abatement of actions. Under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428, an action does not abate on the death of a party unless the action is one to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal. This article was adopted in order to abrogate jurisprudential rules favoring abatement of actions on the death of a party. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428, comment (a). Comment (a) notes that the intent of the redactors in drafting the twin codes of 1825 was to prevent judicial acceptance by Louisiana of the common law rules of abatement. Despite the efforts of the redactors, Louisiana courts had misinterpreted the co-dal provisions. Thus, LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 reinstated the intent of the redactors of the 1825 codes.
Because Louisiana strongly favors the continuation of actions on the death of a party, the exceptions to the rule against abatement are limited by LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 to actions to enforce rights or obligations which are strictly personal. LSA-C.C. Art. 1766 provides that "[a]n obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced only by the obli-gee, or only against the obligor."
In Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 232 La. 494, 94 So.2d 449 (1957), a case almost on point with the instant situation, the court found that the divorce action brought by the husband had abated on his death. As in the present case, a preliminary default taken by the husband was confirmed. Four days after the judgment granting the divorce was signed, he died. Mrs. Arceneaux then filed a suspensive appeal and asked the court to substitute the plaintiff's minor son by a previous marriage as plaintiff and to appoint a curator ad hoc to represent the minor. The curator ad hoc filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the question of divorce was personal and had become moot on the plaintiff's death.
The court agreed that the question of divorce between the parties had become moot because of the death of the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal.
Although Arceneaux was decided prior to the adoption of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 and at a time when courts presumably were more likely to find that actions had abated, we find that the result reached in Arcen-eaux should be the same result under today's code of civil procedure. In fact, as one of the exceptions to the rule against abatement of actions, comment (c) to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 cites an action for divorce.
We find that the action for divorce abated on the death of Mr. Draper. We decline to determine the effect of the divorce decree, believing that that issue is best resolved in the pending succession proceedings.
For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the parties.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
MARVIN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns written reasons.
On the original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court also ruled on the effect of the judgment of divorce even though that issue was not before the court. The court stated that at the time that the plaintiff died the divorce had not become final and that the plaintiffs death, rather than the divorce, had terminated the marriage. On rehearing, the court acknowledged its error and stated that its original opinion as to the effect of the judgment of divorce was not binding on the parties.