Case Name: Turpin, Administrator of James v. Thomas's Representatives
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1808-03-21
Citations: 2 Hen. & M. 139
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Turpin, Administrator of James v. Thomas’s Representatives.
Judges: By the whole Court, (absent JUDGE LYONS,) the decree of the Superior Court of Chancery affirmed.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 377–381

Head Matter:
*Turpin, Administrator of James v. Thomas’s Representatives.
Monday, March 21, 1808.
Equitable Relief — Against Judgments. — A Court of equity cannot relieve against a judgment at law merely on the ground that it was erroneous, even though the plaintiff at law was not entitled to recover, or not entitled in that form of action, and the judgment was obtained by default.
Same — Same—When Granted. — To entitle the defend ant at law to relief in equity in such cases, there must he some suggestion of fraud or surprise, or some good reason assigned for the failure, to make a defence at law.
Judgments — Person Not a Party. — A person, not a party to a judgment, is not hound hy it, in law or equity, merely on the ground that he was present, and cross-examined the witnesses.
On an appeal from a decree of the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond District, pronounced in June, 1803, whereby the bill of the appellant was dismissed.
James was high sheriff of Cumberland County, for the years 1773 and 1774, and Wm. C. Hill and Jesse Thomas were his deputies: they had also been co-deputies under one Smith the preceding high sheriff. In May, 1773, Hill gave a receipt to Thomas for sheriffs’ tickets, according to a list containing the specific items, which was headed, ''‘Sheriff of Cumberland, Jesse Thomas Ticket Iffst, ” and subscribed as follows: “Received tickets agreeable to the above list, which I promise to collect or return according to law. Wm. C. Hill, D. Sheriff,” without saying for whom. *In July, 1785, Thomas obtained judgment on motion, and without opposition, against James, as late high sheriff, for the amount of the above tickets; James assigning as a reason for his making no opposition to the motion, that he took it for granted the amount was due from Hill, his deputy, and that he should have his remedy over against him. Afterwards, in September, 1785, James moved for judgment against Hill; but his motion was overruled,” it appearing to the Court that the receipt of Wm. C. Hill, on which the judgment was obtained by Jesse Thomas against the said James, as late high sheriff, was discharged by the said Wm. C. Hill.” At what time, or to whom the receipt was discharged-, the record does not shew.
Thomas having, in the year 1797, renewed his judgment against James by a writ of a scire facias, the latter obtained an injunction from the late Judge of the High Court of Chancery, stating, that Hill had paid Thomas the amount before the rendition of the original judgment: also alleging in his bill that Thomas (though not a party to the motion against Hill) was present and cross-examined the witnesses. Ot this last circumstance, however, there is no further proof than its being alleged in the bill, and not denied in the answer.
The answer of Thomas positively denied the fact of payment. It was proved, indeed, that in 1783 and 1784, Thomas acknowledged that he and Hill had settled all their accounts, except a small store account; but it was insisted in the answer, and established by testimony, that this acknowledgment related only to the accounts between Hill and Thomas as co-deputies of Smith, the immediate predecessor of James. It is further proved, that after the time when Thomas made the above acknowledgment, Hill admitted that the tickets had not been paid by him, but said that James had himself collected, and ought to pay for them.
*The injunction having been dissolved, and the bill dismissed on a final hearing, an appeal was taken to this Court.
Randolph, for the appellant,
argued that the judgment of Thomas against James was neither warranted by law nor equity. These tickets were for services rendered by Thomas as the deputy of Smith, the immediate predecessor of James. The act of 1745, authorises a sheriff to make distress for fees due to himself, or the sheriff of another County, which shall be put into his hands to collect. But no law imposed upon a succeeding sheriff the duty of collecting fees due to a preceding deputy-sheriff. The 13th section of the same act, gave a remedy, by motion, against a sheriff for the secretary’s, clerks’ and surveyors’ fees; but no law authorised a motion for sheriffs’ fees till the year 1802.
The judgment of Thomas against James was by default; which is not binding, as to facts, either in law or equity. In the subsequent motion of James against Hill, the Court was satisfied that the tickets had been previously paid by Hill to Thomas; and, although Thomas was no party to that motion, yet he was present, and in vain attempted to give aid to James. This is expressly alleged in the bill, and not denied in the answer.
The great lapse óf time before Thomas moved for judgment against James, and his delays in attempting to enforce it, are strong arguments against the justices of the demand.
Hay, for the appellees.
Whatever error might have been committed by the County Court, in rendering judgment for Thomas against James, it was a question purely of a legal nature, which is no ground for the interference of a Court of equity. If this Court could properly have considered the question, it would still have been governed by a well known rule, that he who comes into a Court of equity for relief, must submit to do equity. Admitting the judgment of Thomas against James to have been erroneous in point of law, yet, the money being due in conscience, a Court of equity will not prevent the payment of it.
It is true that, on the motion of James against Hill, the Court gave to the testimony an extent to which it was not entitled. James was defeated on the ground that the receipt had been paid by Hill. But this was unimportant as it respected Thomas, since a majority of the witnesses prove, that his accounts with Hill had been settled, but that these tickets were not taken into the account. The money was consequently due to Thomas; and from whom it was due was a question between James and Hill.
No inference is to be drawn from the silence of Thomas from 1773 to 1785, when the situation of the country is considered.
As to the position, that the allegations of the bill are to be taken as admitted, because they are not denied in the answer, it is indirect opposition to a rule of the Superior Court of Chancery, established at the last term,
A previous questión in this case was, whether the Court would proceed to a hearing against the representative of Thomas, in that general character, or whether the representatives should be specially named. The cause having abated, by the death of Thomas, was revived, by consent, at the last term, in the name of his representatives generally.
Judge Tucker was of opinion, that the Court ought not to proceed till the parties were before it by name.
Judge Roane thought, that as the suit had been revived hy consent against the representatives of the appellee generally, it might be a surprise upon his counsel now to object; and cited the case of Southal v. M’Keand, in which such a practice seems to have been sanctioned by this Court.
Judge Fleming concurring in opinion with Judge Tucker, another cause was called. But Mr. Hay having afterwards suggested, that there was a Mr. Thomas, who was administrator, the cause was opened, and stood revived in the name of-Thomas, administrator, &c.
It seemed, however, to be the opinion of the Court, that in future no cause should be considered as revived. cill some person should be named as a party representing the deceased. — Note in Original Edition.
1 Wash. 339.
Ed. 1769, p. 140, sect. 12.
See Rev. Code, vol. 2, cli. 17, p. 16.
See ante, p. 17, Dangerfield and others v. Claiborne and others.

Opinion:
Wednesday, March 30. The Judges delivered their opinions.
JUDGE) TUCKER.
This cause having abated by the death of one of the parties, was revived by consent last term against the representatives of the party deceased, without naming them. The cause was now called for hearing, no person having been made defendant by name, in consequence of that order.
I was of opinion we ought not to proceed to a hearing of the cause, until the parties were before the Court by name.
JUDGE SOANE cited Southal v. M'Keand, which appeared to me to be in favor of my idea, He seemed to think the trial might proceed.
Vide 1 Wash. 339.