Case Name: McCASHLAND v. KEOGH et al.
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1906-12-13
Citations: 32 Utah 11
Docket Number: No. 1771
Parties: McCASHLAND v. KEOGH et al.
Judges: McOARTY, C. J., and STKAUP, J., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 11–20

Head Matter:
McCASHLAND v. KEOGH et al.
No. 1771.
Decided December 13, 1906
(88 Pac. 680).
1. Appeal — Jurisdiction—Determination. — The Supreme Court is bound to take notice of a jurisdictional defect precluding it from determining an appeal whether the question was raised by the parties or not.
2. Same — Amount in Controversy. — Laws 1903, page 48, chapter 52, authorizes appeals from final judgments in the district court rendered on appeals from city courts, except when the judgment of the district court does not exceed one hundred dollars, exclusive of costs. Held, tliat a judgment of nonsuit rendered against plaintiff on appeal from a city court, in an action in which plaintiff sought to recover two- hundred dollars for services rendered, was not appealable.
ON REHEARING.
3. Courts — State Supreme Court — Jurisdiction — Constitutional Provisions. — Constitution, article 8, section 9, .authorizing an appeal from' all final judgments of the district courts to the Supreme Court, is applicable only to final judgments in actions originally begun in .the district court and does not apply to proceedings taken to the district court by appeal.
Appeal from District Court, Third District; T. D. Lewis, Judge.
Action by Dolly McCasliland against P. S. Keogh, and another. Prom a judgment of nonsuit of the district court of Salt Lake county on appeal from the city court of Salt Lake City, plaintiff appeals.
Dismissed.
D. B. Shields and-Snyder & Snyder for appellant.
Sutherland, Van Gott & Allison for respondents.
APPELLANT'S POINTS.
Pull performance by plaintiff removes the case from the operation of the statute. (29 Enc. Law, p. 811, note 8. Bowman v. Sheets, 124 Ind. 416; Fraser v. Gates, 118 Ill. 99, 1 N. E. 817; Bless v. J.enhins, 129 Mo. 647, 31 N. W. 938; Lally v. Oroolcsion Lbr. Go. [Minn.], 88 N. W. 846; 3 Current Law, p. 1527, note 59. Blanton v. Knox, 3 Mo. 342; Pitcher v. Wilson, 5 Mo. 48; Sicggett v. Gasón, 26 Mo. 221; Self v. Gordell, 45 Mo. 345; McConnell v. Brayner, 63 Mo‘. 461; Mitchell v. Branham [Mo.], 79 S. W. 739.)
If we concede that the contracts, sued on in this case were originally within the statute, and therefore unenforcible, still we insist that by permitting full compliance by appellants, respondents have waived the right to claim the benefits of the statute, even if they had pleaded it. (McGvAch-eon v. Galdwell [Ky. App.], 13 S. W. 1072; Lally v. Lbr. Go. [Minn.], 88 N. W. 846; Spinney v. Hill, 81 Minn. 316, 84 N. W. 116.) Respondents permitted appellant to fully perform and, after receiving the benefits of that performance, and encouraging it by partial performance on their part, now seek to avoid liability by claiming the benefits of the statute. That they should not be permitted to do this, see Grane v. Powell, 139 N. T. 389, 34 N. E. 911; Lally v. Lbr. Go., supra; Keller v. Bley, 15 Or. 429, 15 Pac. 707; Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43 N. W. 484.
The statute of fraud must he pleaded. This court has announced the rule in very positive terms that the statute of frauds, if relied upon as a defense, must be pleaded. In Abba v. Smith, 21 Utah 109, 119, it is said: “The plea of' the statute of frauds is a personal privilege which a party' may waive, and by failing to specifically plead it as a defense, defendant could not afterward avail himself of its benefits. This is the general and approved rule.” 9 Enc. of PI. and Pr., pp. 705, 715, 716; Lauer v. Richmond Inst., 8 Utah 305, 308. Lawrence v. Ghase, 54 Me. 196; Lewis v. Teal [Ala.], 2 So. 903; Lspalla v. Wilson, 86 Ala. 487, 5 So. 867; Grane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 389, 34 N. E. 911; 3 Current Law, p. 1534, sec. 13; 9 Ene. PI. and Pr., pp. 705, 715, 716, 717. 8 Amer. and Eng. Enc. Law, p. 747, note 2; Graff am v. Pierce, 143 Mass: 386, 9 N. E. 819; Lawrence v. Ghase, 54 Me. 196; Parwell v. Tillson, 76 Me. 227; Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 346; Dock Go. v. Dewey, 6 Gray 446.)
RESPONDENT'S POINTS.
This court will not consider the evidence offered by the appellant in the trial court, because appellant has not ex■cepted to the ruling of the trial court to the effect that the evidence was insufficient to establish tbe contract. (Evans v. Jones, 10 Utah 182; Thiele v. Roster, 63 Cal. 241; Lucas v. Richardson, 68 Cal. 618; McCartney v. Fitz Henry, 16 Cal. 185; People v. Morino, 85 Cal. 515; Marsters v. Lash, 61 Cal. 622.)
Tbe alleged contract is claimed to be oral and for a term of two years. Therefore, under tbe statute of frauds, it is void. (R. S. 1898, sec. 2467; Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 268; Koch v. Williams, 82 Wis. 186; Scott v. Bush, 29 Mich. 523; Patten v. Hides, 43 Cal. 509; 18 N. H. 293.)
Tbe eases on this subject go no farther than to bold that if one party to such an agreement performs bis part of it within a year, be may compel performance by tbe other party, without regard to the time conditioned for performance by tbe latter. (Frary v. Sterling, 99 Mass. 462; Loclc-wood v. Barnes, 3 Hill [N. Y.] 128; Broadwell v. Get-man, 2 Denio [N. Y.] 87; Warner v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 922; Frary v. Sterling, 99 Mass. 462; Bkowne, Statute Frauds, sec. 451; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., secs. 759, 1522, note 3; Railroad v. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286.)
Even if part or full performance upon one side could possibly avail to take a parol agreement out of tbe statute, such performance must have been on tbe faith of the contract, and incapable of explanation except through tbe terms of tbe contract. (26 Ene. Law, p. 53; Senior v. Anderson, 115; Cal. 507; Cooley v. Lobdell, 47 N. E. 784; Abba v. Smith, 21 Utah 109; May v. Sloan, 101 U. S. 237; Dwnphy v. Ryan, 116 U. S. 495.)
“In order to bind the principal, it must appear that tbe act done by tbe agent was in tbe exercise of tbe power delegated, and within its limits.” (Blum v. Robertson, 24 Cal. 128, 141; Moyle v. Cong. Society, 16 Utah 69.)
Garcia v. Free, 31 Utah 389, 88 Pac. 30.

Opinion:
ERICH, J.
This action originated in tbe city court of Salt Lake City. Tbe plaintiff sued to recover upon an alleged parol contract for personal services performed by her for tbe defendants. The amount involved was two hundred dollars. Plaintiff obtained a judgment in said court for the full amount against the defendant Keogh, from which he appealed to the district court of Salt Lake county. When the ease came on for trial in that court the plaintiff was nonsuited, and judgment dismissing the action, and for cofsts, was duly entered against her, from which she appeals to this court.
We are met at the threshold with the question whether this court has jurisdiction of the appeal in this case. In view that the question was not raised or presented by either party, this court must do so on its own motion. We have no right to proceed to a decision of the merits of any case where the law forbids us the right to do so, whether the parties desire it or not. Any judgment we may render in a case respecting the merits, where we had no jurisdiction, would always, and everywhere be a nullity, giving neither a right to anything, nor a protection to .any one. The question therefore is, has this court jurisdiction of this appeal ? We think not. This question was before this court in the case of Garcia v. Free, 88 Pac. 30, just decided, in which case we held that this court, in view of the provision contained in chapter 52, p. 48, Laws 1903, had no jurisdiction in cases appealed from judgments in the city court to the district court, unless the judgment in the district court exceeded the sum of one hundred dollars exclusive of costs. The judgment of the district court in this case was one of dismissal of plaintiff's action merely, and for costs. There is, therefore, no judgment such as permits an appeal to this court. This was the very question presented and decided in the ease of Garcia v. Free, supra. That case received thorough and careful consideration, and governs the decision in this case. For the reasons fully stated in the Gcurcia Oase, the appeal in this case must be, and accordingly is, dismissed at costs of the t appellant.
McOARTY, C. J., and STKAUP, J., concur.