Case Name: CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. NEW ORLEANS CANAL, INC., et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-10-16
Citations: 412 So. 2d 975
Docket Number: No. 66860
Parties: CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. NEW ORLEANS CANAL, INC., et al.
Judges: DIXON, C. J., and DENNIS, J., dissent with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 412
Pages: 975–983

Head Matter:
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. NEW ORLEANS CANAL, INC., et al.
No. 66860.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 16, 1981.
On Rehearing March 1, 1982.
Rehearing Denied April 30, 1982.
William J. Wegmann, William J. Weg-mann, Jr., of Law Office of William J. Wegmann, New Orleans, for defendants-applicants, A.N. Yiannopoulos, Baton Rouge, of counsel.
Salvador Anzelmo, Acting City Atty., Jack P. Panno, Asst. City Atty., John F. Fox, Jr., New Orleans, Amicus Curiae, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
WATSON, Justice.
This is a possessory action in which plaintiff, the City of New Orleans, contends that defendants have disturbed its possession of certain real property. LSA-C.C. art. 3455. A trial court judgment in favor of the City of New Orleans was amended and affirmed. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, 378 So.2d 995 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1979). A writ was granted to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 381 So.2d 1221 (La., 1980).
FACTS
The strip of property in dispute is forty feet wide and approximately 7,200 feet long. It is bounded on the south by Polk Avenue and on the north by Robert E. Lee Boulevard. On the east is the right-of-way of West End Boulevard. On the west there is a sixty foot wide strip of land which belongs to New Orleans Canal, Inc., a defendant. There is no line of demarcation between the forty foot and sixty foot strips. Between the sixty foot strip and Pontchartrain Boulevard lies a tract of land two hundred and forty feet wide which belongs to the State of Louisiana. The area between West End and Pontchartrain Boulevards is vacant. The City has mowed the grass and picked up the trash, thereby maintaining it as a neutral zone. The City has also installed cross streets, sewerage and utility lines between the two boulevards. The Court of Appeal concluded that the City's maintenance of the entire area established possession of the lesser included forty foot strip.
ISSUE
The two-point issue is whether the City: (1) intended to possess the property as owner; and (2) exercised corporeal possession. LSA-C.C. art. 3436.
CONCLUSION
A municipality has the right to expropriate private property for a public purpose after payment of just compensation to the owner. Art. 1, Section 4, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. However, possession is frequently a matter of fact rather than right. LSA-C.C. art. 3450. A private corporation may acquire possession through the agency of those administering its affairs. LSA-C.C. art. 3440. Similarly, a municipality can be a bad faith possessor of property without having any color of title. LSA-C.C. art. 3452. The question of ownership is not at issue in a possessory action. LSA-C.C. art. 3455, supra. Since ownership is not being decided, defendants' property is not being "taken". There is no violation of the constitutional protections extended to private property.
Defendants contend that this suit, filed in 1964, is governed by the St. Julien doctrine. St. Julien v. Morgan Louisiana & Texas Railroad Co., 35 La.Ann. 924 (1883) "appears to be petitory" in nature. 35 La.Ann. 924. It held that a corporation with the power of expropriation can acquire a servitude by unopposed use and occupancy. St. Julien was overruled prospectively in Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 330 So.2d 914 (La., 1976). The St. Julien doctrine is inapplicable here where the only issue is possession. When the question of ownership is litigated, the extent of any rights acquired by the City under the St. Julien doctrine can be considered.
Defendants also rely on LSA-C.C. arts. 3489 and 3490. Those articles concern the possession necessary for ten years' acquisitive prescription to commence. That possession is tantamount to good faith possession. It requires that the possessor hold the thing "in fact and in right as owner." However, even a bad faith possessor, one who has no right or title to the thing, can maintain a possessory action. LSA-C.C. art. 3454.
The type of possession needed to maintain a possessory action is "factual authority over a thing with the intent to own it." 2 La.Civ.Law Treat. (Yiannopoulas ) 2d Edition 211 at page 564. The showing required to denote an owner's control differs according to the nature of the property. Hill v. Richey, 221 La. 402, 59 So.2d 434 (La., 1952). The question is one of fact in each case. South Louisiana Land Co. v. Riggs Cypress Co., 119 La. 193, 43 So. 1003 (La., 1907). A fenced enclosure is not sacramental as long as the limits of possession are clearly delineated. Hill v. Richey, supra. Cutting grass on a right-of-way shows possession even though a portion of the enclosing fence has been removed. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Burch, 197 La. 160, 1 So.2d 64 (La., 1941).
The question is not whether the City owns the disputed strip of land, but whether it has exercised an owner's dominion over it. Unquestionably, it has. Construction and repair of streets and utilities are acts of possession. No one opposed these unequivocal and continuous activities by the City. Compare Reymond v. City of Baton Rouge, 145 La. 162, 82 So. 75 (La., 1919). The City has consistently treated the property as its own and has improved it without permission from any other party. In improving the property, the City has manifested the necessary intention to possess as owner. The City's acts of possession were apparent to all. They took place in an extremely public and visible location. Compare Carrere v. City of New Orleans, 162 La. 981, 111 So.2d 393 (La., 1926). To a passerby, the entire area has borne the aspect of a public square or neutral ground. The City has maintained the expanse in a manner appropriate to its nature by mowing the grass and picking up the trash. The tract bounded by West End, Pontchartrain and Robert E. Lee Boulevards and Polk Avenue has been in the possession of the City of New Orleans. The possession of the larger tract necessarily included possession of the lesser strip in dispute.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C. J., and DENNIS, J., dissent with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Honorable Paul B. Landry, Jr., participated in this decision as Associate Justice Ad Hoc in place of Lemmon, J., recused.
. The defendants are New Orleans Canal, Inc., Southdown, Inc., substituted as a defendant in place of Canal Assets, Inc., both Louisiana corporations domiciled and having their principal place of business in the City of New Orleans, Louisiana, Julius J. Weigel, Horace LeCompte, Arthur L. Gulledge, Elizabeth U. Gulledge, Betty S., wife of and August P. LeBourgeois, all residents of and domiciled in the Parish of Jefferson, Louisiana, Robert Louis Carruth, and Charles I. Kenny, Jr., each a resident of and domiciled in the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana.
. LSA-C.C. art 3455 provides:
"The action which a possessor for one year has against a person disturbing his possession, to be maintained in it or restored to it, as is said in the preceding article, shall be decided before pronouncing on the question of ownership, and the real owner shall not be allowed to repel it by endeavoring to prove his right."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3436 provides:
"To be able to acquire possession of property, two distinct things are requisite:
"1. The intention of possessing as owner;
"2. The corporeal possession of the thing."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3450 provides:
"Although possession results frequently from a fact, and not from right, it nevertheless confers on the possessor certain rights with regard to the thing possessed, some of which are peculiar to the possessor in good faith, and the others are common to all possessors."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3440 provides:
"For the same reason corporations may, acquire the possession of a thing, through the agency of those who administer their affairs."
. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 3452 provides:
"The possessor in bad faith is he who possesses as master, but who assumes this quality, when he well knows that he has no title to the thing, or that his title is vicious and defective."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3487 (emphasis added).
. LSA-C.C. art. 3454 provides:
"Rights, which are common to all possessors in good or bad faith, are that:
"1. They are considered provisionally as owners of the thing which they possess, so long as it is not reclaimed by the true owner or person entitled to reclaim it, and, even after such reclamation, until the right of the person making it is established.
"2. Every person who has possessed an estate for a year, or enjoys peaceably and without interruption a real right, and is disturbed in it, has an action against the disturber, either to be maintained in his possession, or to be restored to it, in case of eviction, whether by force or otherwise.
"3. Such a possessor may, by prescription, acquire the ownership of the thing which he thus possesses, after a certain time, which is established by law according as he has possessed in good or bad faith.
"4. Such a possessor has the right, in case of eviction from the thing reclaimed, to retain it until he is reimbursed the expenses he is entitled to claim."
. W.R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University.