Case Name: Geronimo VEGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-09-17
Citations: 900 So. 2d 572
Docket Number: No. 2D03-5024
Parties: Geronimo VEGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 900
Pages: 572–574

Head Matter:
Geronimo VEGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D03-5024.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Sept. 17, 2004.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 2005.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deena DeGenova, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
STRINGER, Judge.
Gerónimo Vega was adjudicated guilty and sentenced, following a jury trial, for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence. Because the jury instructions given on the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer constitute fundamental, reversible error, as conceded by the State, we reverse Vega's conviction and sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer and remand for a new trial on that charge. We affirm without comment as to the resisting arrest with violence charge.
Battery on a law enforcement officer can be committed either by "actually or intentionally touching or striking the officer against the officer's will, or by intentionally causing bodily harm to the officer." Hendricks v. State, 744 So.2d 542, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see § 784.03(l)(a), .07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the offense with which he is charged. Dixon v. State, 823 So.2d 792, 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Zwick v. State, 730 So.2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)), review dismissed, 819 So.2d 134 (Fla.2002).
The information in this case charged Vega with only one form of battery on a law enforcement officer, stating that Vega "did knowingly, unlawfully, and intentionally touch or strike" a law enforcement officer. However, the trial court instructed the jury, without defense objection, to convict if the State proved Vega "intentionally touched or struck [the officer] against his will or caused bodily harm to [the officer]." Because Vega was not charged with committing battery on a law enforcement officer by intentionally causing bodily harm, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on this alternative.
As the State rightly concedes, this error is fundamental because the jury returned a general verdict of guilt without specifying the basis for the conviction, making it impossible to know, whether Vega was convicted of the form of battery with which he was charged rather than the form with which he was not charged. See id. Accordingly, we reverse Vega's conviction and sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer and remand for a new trial on that charge. We affirm Vega's conviction and sentence on the resisting arrest with violence charge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.
ALTENBERND, C.J., Concurs with opinion.