Case Name: MISSOULA MERCANTILE CO., Respondent, v. O'DONNELL et al., Appellants
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1900-04-02
Citations: 24 Mont. 65
Docket Number: No. 1192
Parties: MISSOULA MERCANTILE CO., Respondent, v. O’DONNELL et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 65–81

Head Matter:
MISSOULA MERCANTILE CO., Respondent, v. O’DONNELL et al., Appellants.
[No. 1192.]
[Submitted January 31, 1900.
Decided April 2, 1900.]
Appeal — Briefs—Mechanic’s Lien — Lienable Materials — Evidence — Burden of Proof — Owner—Recorded Claim of Lien — Establishment of Debt — Parties—Pleading.
1. Where appellant’s brief contains citations of authorities, without any attempt to apply or refer them, in a consecutive or orderly way, to errors assigned, such assignments of error will not be considered on appeal, as such a brief fails to meet the requirements of Section 3, of Rule X„ of the Supreme Court.
2. A cover for a stovepipe flue, opening into the chimney from the interior of a building, and removable when such flue was to be used, was not material entering into the construction of the building, nor a fixture, and hence such building was not subject to a lien therefor.
3. The burden is on a lien claimant to establish his lien, and to support this burden, he must show not only that he furnished the materials, but also that they were used for the enhancement of the property to which he claims he has a right to resort as ' security for.tlie debt thus created; in the absence of this showing, his equity does not arise.
4. A husband of the owner of a building contracted with plaintiff to furnish the hardware for the building, and plaintiff’s books showed the items charged to the husband. The account was kept separate from other accounts with the husband, and, on being subsequently examined by him, he declared it correct and promised to pay it; but there was no evidence that the hardware charged was ever furnished for, or entered into, the construction of the building. Held, that such proof was insufficient to show that the materials were used for, or enhanced the value of, the building, so as to entitle plaintiff to a mechanic’s lien therefor.
5. Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2131, provides that a lien claim for materials furnished in the construction of a building shall contain an account of the amount due, and a description of the property to be charged; and Section 2132 declares that the county clerk shall make an abstract thereof In a book kept by him, which shall contain the name of the person against whose property the lien is filed. Held, that a recorded lien claim for materials furnished in the construction of a building, which fails to state the name of the owner or person whose interest is sought to be charged, is fatally defective.
6. Since the existence of a mechanic’s lien for materials depends on the establishment of a debt for which the building is a security, and such debt can only be shown by a judicial proceeding, to which the debtor is a party, á judgment establishing a lien against a building in an action to which neither the person contracting the debt, nor the owner of the interest sought to be charged with the lien, was a party, was invalid.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
1. Where the denials in an answer are insufficient to raise an issue on a particular allegation of the complaint, but both plaintiff and defendant introduced evidence on the theory that the issue was sufflcient.it is too late for plaintiff to object for the first time on appeal that there was no Issue.
2. Under the Statutes of Montana, the name of the “owner” required to be mentioned in the lien claim is the name of the owner of the interest to be effected by, or charged with, the lien, and the mention of the record owner is not sufficient when he is not the person for whose use or benefit the jrroperty, building, or improvement is constructed, repaired, or altered.
3. Though the mechanics’ lien law is remedial in character, its requirements must be complied with.
4. The fact that certain persons are named as parties in the complaint does not make them such; service of summons is necessary for this purpose.
Appeal from, District Court, Flathead county; D. F. Smith, Judge.
Action by the Missoula Mercantile Company against E. C. O’Donnell, Johanna S. Peterson, Olif Peterson and another. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendants Olif and Johanna Peterson appeal.
Reversed.
Statement of the Case.
This is an action to foreclose a lien for materials furnished by plaintiff for the erection of a brick dwelling upon lots 1 and 2 in block 99 of the town of Kalispell, Flathead county. As a foundation for the claim, the plaintiff alleges a contract with one E. C. O’Donnell, entered into on August 15th, 1895, under the terms of which plaintiff was to furnish certain hardware to the said O’Donnell, to be used in the erection of said building, for which the said O’Donnell agreed to pay the reasonable value. It is alleged that the said materials were so furnished at various times, beginning on August 19, 1895, and up to and including January 23, 1896, the date of the last item; that the price of the whole thereof, with interest from the last-named date, remains due and unpaid; and that all the materials were used in the construction of said building. The complaint then continues, substantially: That the said E. C. O’Donnell and one Mary O’Donnell during all the times mentioned were husband and wife, living together as such; that at the time the said contract was made the said Mary O’Donnell had made a concract to purchase said lots 1 and 2 from the Kalispell Townsite Company, the owner thereof, under the terms of which she was to become the owner upon paying the full amount of the price agreed upon between herself and the said company; that she had entered upon and taken possession of said premises, with full authority to make improvements thereon; that the building was erected by E. C. O’Donnell for the said Mary O’Donnell, under her direction and authorization, after she had made the contract aforesaid with the Kalispell Townsite Company; that on or about November 11, 1895, to enable her to raise money to complete the building, she transferred her interest in the lots to the Kalispell Building & Loan Association, for money advanced to her by said last-named company; that thereupon the said Townsite Company conveyed the lots to the Kalispell Building & Loan Association, which thereafter held the same as security only for the money so loaned by it to Mary O’Donnell; that thereafter, and on or about July 26, 1896, the said Mary O’Donnell assigned to the defendant Johanna S. Peterson her interest in the premises, who became, and still is, the absolute owner thereof, by conveyance from the Kalispell Building & Loan Association, made at said last named date; and that defendant Olif Peterson is her husband. Then follow the usual allegations touching the filing of the notice and claim of lien with the recorder of Flathead county. This was filed on April 17, 1896. The claim is made a part of the complaint, as an exhibit. It consists of an itemized account of the goods furnished from August 19, 1895, up to- and including January 23, 1896, between plaintiff and E. C. O’Donnell, and is verified by the following affidavit:
“State of Montana, )
“County of Flathead, )
SS'
“H. C. Keith, affiant, makes oath and says that the Missoula Mercantile Company is a corporation duly created and existing under the laws of the state of Montana; that the annexed is a true and correct account of the material furnished by said Missoula Mercantile Company to and for E. C. O’Donnell,' at Kalispell, in said county, and that the prices thereof, set forth in the account hereto annexed, are just and reasonable, and the saméis unpaid; that said material was furnished for said E. C. O’Donnell at the time in said account, mentioned, under and by virtue of a contract between affiant, as managing agent for said Missoula Mercantile Company, and said E. C. O’Donnell, and for a certain brick building located on the premises hereinafter described. And affiant further makes oath and says that the Kalispell Townsite Company and Kalispell Building & Loan Association were, at the time said contract was entered into, and said labor was performed, and said material was furnished, the owner of said brick dwelling, and that said building is situate on a certain lot of land owned by the Kalispell Building & Loan Association, described as follows: Lots one and two (1 & 2), block ninety-nine (99), of the original townsite of Kalispell, county of Flathead, state of Montana. And this affiant, as Inanaging agent for said Missoula Mercantile Company, claims a lien on said premises for said Missoula Mercantile Co.
“H. C. Keith.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of April, A. D. 1896.
“Robert L. Clinton,
“[Seal.] Notary Public. ”
The complaint concludes with a prayer for judgment against E. C. O’Donnell and Mary O’Donnell for the amount due on the account, with interest and costs, including attorney’s fees and necessary disbursements, and that the judgment be declared a lien upon the property described. The O’Donnells were made parties in the complaint, but neither was served with summons. The Townsite Company and the Building & Loan Association were not made parties. At the hearing the names of the O’Donnells were stricken from the complaint upon the request of plaintiff’s counsel. Olif and Johanna Peterson answered, denying all the material allegations of the complaint. The cause was heard without a jury. The court' found for plaintiff on all the issues, and rendered judgment that the claim of plaintiff, with costs, disbursements, and attorney’s fees, amounting in all to $202.01, was a lien upon the premises described, and directed them to be sold to satisfy this amount. The defendants Olif and Johanna Peterson appeal from this judgment and an order denying their motion for a new trial.
Mr. Frank L. Gray, for Appellants.
Mr. W. F. Foffsinger, for Respondent.

Opinion:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BRANTLY,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The brief filed in this cause by counsel for appellants fails almost entirely to meet the requirements of Section 3 of Rule X. This section (subdivision "c") requires "a brief of the argument exhibiting a clear statement of the points of law or fact to be discussed, with a reference to the page of the record, and the authorities relied upon in support of each point." Appellants' brief, after a specification of 13 errors as grounds for a reversal of the judgment, discusses briefly the demurrer interposed to the original complaint, and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of the trial court, and then proceeds: "We will respectfully submit the following authorities, which we think are applicable to the demurrer, motion for nonsuit, and motion to strike lien, hereinbefore referred to; also, other assignments of error." Then follow citations of authorities, without any attempt to apply or refer them, in a consecutive or orderly way, to any of the errors assigned. In order to consider the points thus sought to be m'ade by counsel, it would be necessary for us to sort out the authorities, refer and apply them to the appropriate assignments, and thus determine whether there is merit in appellants' contentions. This task we must decline to undertake. The duty of counsel under the rule has been " noticed and emphasized so often (Beck v. O' Connor, 21 Mont. 109, 53 Pac. 94; Babcocks. Caldwell, 22 Mont. 460, 56 Pac. 1081; Gibson v. Hubbard, 22 Mont. 517, 57 Pac. 88) that it should not be necessary to revert to it again. If counsel cannot present their contentions in a clear and orderly way, it were better to leave them unnoticed in the brief; for this Court will not undertake the labor which counsel should perform.
Omitting consideration of any of the matters just mentioned, Ave pass to the examination of the o,nly question fairly presented in appellants' brief. The court below found generally that ' 'all the averments of the complaint are true. ' ' This general finding necessarily includes a finding as true of the essential averment that the plaintiff filed with the clerk of Flathead county, within 90 days from the time the materials were furnished, its claim of lien, sufficient in substance to meet the requirements of the statute (Section 2131, Code of Civil Procedure.) Appellants contend that the proof on this point does not support the finding. Whether this is so depends first upon whether the last two items charged in the account on January 23, 1896, were furnished for, and used in, the construction of the O'Donnell house. These items are shingle nails and one flue stop, charged at 25 and 15 cents, respectively. The last charge made upon the account prior to January 23d, was on January 10th. This is made up of two items, — tin shingles and a piece of tin, — amounting to 65 cents. The claim of lien was filed on April 17th. Computing the 90 days from January 23d, the claim was filed in time (Helena Steam Heating & Supply Co. v. Wells, 16 Mont. 65, 10 Pac. 78); but, taking January 10th as the date of the last item, the filing was after the expiration of 90 days, and therefore too late. A flue stop, such as the article charged here, is not a lienable article. One of the witnesses speaks of it as a "movable fixture of a house." The proof shows that it is a cover for a stovepipe flue opening into the chimney from the interior of the house, but removable at pleasure when the flue is to be used. It is, therefore, not such material as enters into the structure of a building; nor is it a fixture, within the meaning of the statute (Section 2130, Code of Civil Procedure, and Section 1076 of the Civil Code), so as to be the subject of a lien. (Boisot, Mech. Liens, Sec. 96.) But, waiving the question of the lienable character of this item, we think the proof fails to show chat either it or the nails were furnished for and used in the house. The plaintiff offered proof tending to show that E. C. O'Donnell contracted with H. C. Keith, the manager of the plaintiff, for the furnishing of the hardware for the building. The books of plaintiff show these items charged to E. C. O'Donnell on January 23d. This account was kept separate from the other accounts of O'Donnell. Some time in the spring of 1896 O'Donnell examined the account, and "did not object to it, — said it was all right." He also promised to pay it. This proof is not sufficient to show that the articles were either furnished for, or entered into, the building, — unaided, as it is, by any direct proof, or by some such circumstances as that the work was still in progress, and was of such character as to require such materials, and that they were delivered at the building. Furthermore, the other proof tends to show, without contradiction, that the last work done on the building was on January 10th. On this day one of the workmen topped the chimney, and laid around it a few tin shingles, to make the proper joining to the roof, which was then otherwise completed. The house, in its unfinished state, was .immediately occupied by the O'Donnells, and was not completed until after the sale to Johanna Peterson, in July. There is no proof tending to show that any work was done after the house was occupied, or that any material was used in it. The Petersons lathed and plastered the house, and finished it in other respects, after they purchased it. These facts seem to us conclusive upon this point. The burden is upon the plaintiff to establish his lien (Boisot, Mech. Liens, Sec. 618), and, to support this burden, he must show, not only that he furnished the materials, but also that they were used for the enhancement of the property to which he claims he has a right to resort as security for the debt thus created. In the absence of this showing, his equity does not arise. [Silvester v. Mine Co., 80 Cal. 510, 22 Pac. 217; Weir v. Barnes, 38 Neb. 875, 57 N. W. 750; Chapin v. Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461; Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318; Taggard v. Buckmore, 42 Me. 77; Shulenberg v. Prairie Home Institute Co., 65 Mo. 295.) This is evidently the meaning of the statute (Section 2130 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Furthermore, to establish a lien against any interest of Mrs. O'Donnell in the property in controversy, — which is the purpose of this suit, —the recorded claim of plaintiff is insufficient, in omitting to state her name as the owner, or that she was in any way interested therein. The general rule is that, whenever the particular statute requires the claim to contain the name of the owner or reputed owner, the omission of this detail is fatal to the lien. (Phillips, Mech. Liens, 345, and cases cited.)
Section 2131 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the claim shall contain a just and true account of the amount due, after allowing all creclits, and a correct description of the property to be chai'ged. . Looking to this provision alone, we should perhaps hold that it is not necessary to set forth the name of the owner. But the following section (section 2132) provides that the county clerk shall make, in a book kept for that purpose, an abstract containing (1) the date of the filing; (2) the name of the person holding the lien; (3) the amount thereof; (4) the name of the person against whose property the lien is filed; and (5) a description of the property to be charged. Construing the two sections together, the conclusion seems unavoidable that the name of the owner, or person whose interest is sought to be charged, must be stated; otherwise, the clerk could not perform the duty enjoined upon him by the latter section without instituting an independent inquiry upon his own account,- — a task which in no wise appertains to his official duties. The abstract required to be made by him is of the lien, and the necessary particulars of it cannot be set forth by him unless the claim contains them. The Supreme Court of Iowa has construed a similar statute, and holds that it does not by implication make this requirement ( Welch v. McGrath, 59 Iowa, 519, 10 N. W. 810, 13 N. W. 638); but we do not agree to a construction which renders a substantial part of these provisions useless and ineffective. In Montana Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Obelisk Mining & Concentrating Co., 15 Mont. 20, 37 Pac. 897, this Court assumed that the provisions of the Compiled Statutes of 1887 (Compiled Statutes of 1887, Fifth Division, Secs. 1371-1373, and amendments, Laws 1887, p. 71), which are substantially the same as Sections 2131 and 2132, supra, required the claim of lien to state the name of the owner. Again, in Richards v. Lewisohn Bros., 19 Mont. 128, 47 Pac. 645, it was said that this construction of the provisions of the Compiled Statutes was necessary in order that they might all be harmonized and rendered effective. We. think it but a fair and reasonable construction, and should be applied to Sections 2131 and 2132, supra. It imposes no burden upon the claimant, other than is contemplated by these provisions, and a compliance on the lienor's part enables the clerk to perform his duty, which otherwise he could not do. The claim of plaintiff is therefore fatally defective in this particular.
There is another question, which is not directly raised by appellant, but which is so patent upon this record that we deem it proper to call attention to it. The O'Donnells were not made parties. Under the proof in the record, E. C. O'Donnell contracted the debt for the materials furnished by the plaintiff and became personally liable' to pay it. This debt is the only foundation there is for this suit. If there is no debt, there can be no lien. The existence of the lien depends upon the existence of the debt, for which it stands as security. It cannot be enforced until the fact of indebtedness be shown. This fact cannot be shown except in proper judicial proceedings for that purpose, to which proceeding the debtor is made a party. In other words, no j udgment can be rendéred or enforced in any case until the debtor is made a party to the proceeding, and the fact and amount of his liability are judicially ascertained. (Gilliam v. Black, 16 Mont. 217, 40 Pac. 303; Kerns v. Flynn, 51 Mich. 573, 17 N. W. 62; Vreeland v. Ellsworth, 71 Iowa, 347, 32 N. W. 374; Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel & B. Ry. Co., 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35; Sinnickson v. Lynch, 25 N. J. Law, 317; Estey v. Lumber Co., 4 Colo. App. 165, 34 Pac. 1113.) The lien is not in any sense the, or any, cause of action. It is merely an incident, ancillary or subsidiary to the main fact — which is the debt. The creditor may waive his lien, — the incidental right, — and pursue the debtor upon his personal liability, but he cannot enforce the lien without ascertaining both the fact of indebtedness and the amount of it in the only way recognized by law; that is, by making the debtor a party, and litigating the question of indebtedness with him. The section of the statute (Section 2138 of the Code of Civil Procedure) providing who may be made parties to suits to enforce liens in no wise changes the rule as to those who are necessary parties.
The judgment and order appealed from are reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to grant a new trial.
Beversed and, remanded.
[Decided April 30, 1900.]