Case Name: Larry D. BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1982-01-18
Citations: 274 Ark. 539
Docket Number: CR 81-101
Parties: Larry D. BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Purtle, J., dissents.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 539–549

Head Matter:
Larry D. BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 81-101
626 S.W. 2d 935
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 18, 1982
[Rehearing denied February 16, 1982.]
Art Anderson and Mart Vehik, of McMath if Leather-man, P.A., for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Purtle, J., would grant the petition.

Opinion:
Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Larry D. Baxter, was convicted and sentenced to five years for aggravated robbery and three years for theft of property. The sentences were set to run concurrently. The Court of Appeals, by a three to three vote, affirmed the trial court, holding that the stop, arrest, and subsequent search of appellant's car and seizure of objects in the car were lawful. Baxter v. State, Court of Appeals, not designated for publication (September 9, 1981). On petition for review, we affirm.
Shortly before 4:00 p.m. on March 27, 1980, two men with pistols entered M & M Jewelers on Barrow Road, Little Rock. Jewelry cases were broken and jewelry items were placed in two sacks. The clerks were made to lie face down on the floor and were sprayed with mace.
The facts in part as set out by Judge Cloninger of the Court of Appeals are:
"At 4:05 p.m. Officer Porterfield of the Little Rock Police heard the police broadcast of the robbery. One of the robbers was reported to be carrying a Colt .45 automatic and wearing a rubber Halloween mask, green army fatigues, blue jeans and army boots; the other subject was reported to possess a .357 Magnum, and was wearing a rubber Halloween mask, green army fatigues, blue jeans and tennis shoes. Both men were described as white males about six feet tall.
"Officer Porterfield immediately went to check out Kanis Park, which is less than one-fourth mile from M & M Jewelers. The area between the store and Kanis Park is a wooded and grassy area, and intermittent rain had been falling. There were no leaves on the trees and the officer could see the entire park area. The officer met appellant's car, eastbound in the park away from the direction of M 8c M Jewelers."
Only appellant was visible in the car and no other person or vehicle was observed in the park. The officer turned his vehicle around, followed appellant's car, and stopped it at 4:10 p.m. to ask the person if he had seen anybody in the park. The officer stopped 15 feet behind appellant's car. Appellant then came back to the police car and identified himself as Larry Baxter. Appellant was wearing wet jeans and muddy tennis shoes. The officer told appellant that there had just been a robbery in the area and asked if he had seen anybody in the park. Appellant said he had seen no one. Because of appellant's wet jeans and muddy tennis shoes, the officer asked him for his driver's license. The officer also wanted appellant's identification in case detectives wanted to contact him later as a witness. As appellant was removing his driver's license from his wallet, the officer noticed his hands shaking. The officer then told appellant that he was going to look in his car, at which time appellant told the officer that he had two friends in his car.
The officer found two men matching the description of the reported robbers lying on the seats of the car. One of the men had on muddy black boots and wet jeans, and the other had on muddy tennis shoes and wet pants. The officer arrested the three and placed them in the back of his police car.
Two other officers arrived and observed through the window of appellant's car a green army type jacket, two pillowcases filled with something, and a wig. The items were removed from the car. Upon examination it was found that the pillowcases contained 192 different items of jewelry, a .357 Magnum, and a .45 automatic.
The crucial issue in this case is whether the initial stop of appellant was valid under state and federal law. If the stop is found to be valid, the logical progression of events which followed resulted in probable cause for the arrest. The subsequent search of appellant's car after the arrest was a search incident to a lawful arrest and valid under the recent case of New York v. Belton, 450 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
Cases regarding the police authority to make investigatory stops based upon reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or a person is involved in criminal activity are inapplicable to the stop at issue here. See U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Also inapplicable to this stop are cases in which the police have reasonable cause to believe that the person stopped is a material witness. Rule 3.5, Ark. Rules Grim. Proc., Ark. Stat. Ann., Vol. 4A (Repl. 1977).
Involved here is the question of the extent of permissible interruption a ci tizen must bear to accommodate a law enforcement officer who is investigating a crime. The practical necessities of law enforcement and the obvious fact that any person in society may approach any other person for purposes of requesting information make it clear the police have the authority to approach civilians.
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents the police from addressing questions to any individual. See Terry v. Ohio, supra. However, the approach of a citizen pursuant to a policeman's investigative law enforcement function must be reasonable under the existent circumstances and requires a weighing of the government's interest for the intrusion against the individual's right to privacy and personal freedom. To be considered are the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved, and the circumstances attending the encounter. People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210, 352 N.E. 2d 562 (1976).
Rule 2.2, Ark. Rules Grim. Proc., Ark. Stat. Ann., Vol. 4A (Repl. 1977) is a codification and an accomodation of these interests:
Rule 2.2 Authority to Request Cooperation.
(a) A law enforcement officer may request any person to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime. The officer may request the person to respond to questions, to appear at a police station, or to comply with any other reasonable request.
We pointed out in Meadows v. State, 269 Ark. 380, 602 S. W. 2d 636 (1981) that this Rule could be used in investigating crime, although it was found inapplicable to the facts in that case because the officers detained persons who were suspected of engaging in criminal activities.
The circumstances of this case bring us to the conclusion that this stop was reasonable. The scene of the crime was located approximately a quarter of a mile from Kanis Park. The robbers were last seen leaving the rear door of the jewelry store which placed them in a wooded area adjoining Kanis Park. The time sequence was such that a person in Kanis Park about the time that appellant was stopped likely would have seen the robbers — there being no one else in the park on this rainy afternoon. The intrusion into appellant's right of privacy and freedom of movement was minimal as compared to the governmental interest in investigating a very serious class A felony offense. The manner and intensity of the interference was slight and significantly casual. The officer stated that he only wanted to ask appellant if he had seen anyone in the park. The initial encounter was not an aggressive one as evidenced by the fact that the officer allowed appellant to walk back to his police car immediately after stopping him.
The circumstances leading up to the arrest were sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest — muddy tennis shoes, wet jeans, shaking hands, and appellant's statement that two other persons (who were not visible) were in the car. Having made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of the automobile, the officer was justified, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, in searching the passenger compartment of the car. The police may also examine the conténts of any containers found within the passenger compartment; the container may be searched whether open or closed since the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have in the containers. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a limited search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. New York v. Belton, supra.
Affirmed.
Purtle, J., dissents.
Carolyn Sue Teeter, who was employed at M & M Jewelers the day of the robbery, testified at trial that she could not remember the exact time of the robbery, but set various times for when the robbery occurred; all times stated were between 3:15 and 3:55 p.m. Tim Tiulove, another employee on the day of the robbery, testified that the robbery "was somewhere in the three o'clock hour. I would say between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m."