Case Name: John O'Leary, Appellant, v. The County of Cook, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1862-04
Citations: 28 Ill. 534
Docket Number: 
Parties: John O’Leary, Appellant, v. The County of Cook, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 534–544

Head Matter:
John O’Leary, Appellant, v. The County of Cook, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM COOK.
A provision in, or amendatory of an act incorporating a college, which prohibits the sale of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, although no such object or subject is named in the title of the bill, is not unconstitutional.
Such a provision, although in a private or local law, incorporating a college, is so germain to the primary object of the charter, as not to conflict with that provision of the constitution, which declares, that no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title.
This action was brought by the County of Cook against John O’Leary, to recover the penalty prescribed by the second section of an act of the legislature of the State of Illinois, approved February 14, 1855, entitled “ An Act to amend an act entitled ‘An Act to incorporate the North-Western University,’” approved January 28, 1851, for selling liquor within four miles of the location of the North-Western University, in violation of the said section.
The action was commenced and tried before a justice of the peace in said Cook county; and upon the trial before the justice, judgment was rendered in favor pi the said county of Cook, for the sum of $25 and costs; from' which judgmént O’Leary appealed to the Circuit Court of 'Cook county.
The cause came on for trial before Manierre, Judge of the Circuit Court, without a jury, on the following facts agreed upon by the counsel for the respective parties:
“That the North-Western University, mentioned in an act entitled ‘ An Act to amend an act entitled ‘ An Act to incorporate the North-Western University,” approved January 28, 1851, is located in the town of Evanston, in Cook county, Illinois.
‘UFhat the said O’Leary did, within one month previous to the bringing of this suit, sell to one Mortimer Russell spirituous liquor at this defendant’s house, within two miles of the location of said university, in violation of said act.
“That a portion of the towns of Hiles and Hew Trier are included within the distance of four miles from the location of said university.
“ That all facts necessary to maintain the action under said law are admitted by O’Leary, he only reserving to himself the right to insist that the said law is unconstitutional.”
The court found for the plaintiff below, for $25 and costs.
Thereupon the appellant took an appeal, and assigns for error the following: That the court erred in deciding said cause in favor of the plaintiff below, the said law being unconstitutional.
HorKms & Hieschbach, for Appellant.
That the act of the legislature, approved Eebruary 14, 1855, (Laws of 1855, p. 483), entitled “ An Act to amend an act entitled ‘An Act to incorporate the Horth-Western University,’ ” approved January 28, 1851, is in contravention of the 23rd section of article 3 of the constitution—which provides that no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title—in this : that it embraces two separate and independent subjects—the one of a private character, viz., the amendment of the corporate powers of the university ; the other of a public nature, viz., prohibition of the sale of liquor within a given locality under a penalty—two subjects not germain to one another, and having no natural or necessary connection with each other, while only one subject is expressed in the title of the act. Session Laws 1855, p. 483; Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 23.
The second section of the act prohibits the sale of liquor under a penalty given to the county, and though affecting a particular locality, it affects public interests, and applies to all persons. It is, therefore, of a local, public nature. Sedgwick on Con. and Stat. Law, p. 33; Case of Rodgers, 2 Greenl. 303 ; Henridia v. Ayres, 12 Pick. 334; Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Greenl. 54.
The other sections of the act are manifestly of a private character.
The character of an act is to be determined by its provisions, and not by its title. 16 New York, 61.
That the object of this section of the constitution was to place a restriction on the practice and procedure of the legislature. Davis v. State, 7 Maryland, 151 ; Sedgwick on Con. and Stat. Law, 567; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 1 Selden, 252; Conner v. Mayor, etc., 1 Selden, 285; Opinion of Ch. J. Ruggles, 1 Selden, 293; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 Ann. Rep. 298 ; Opinion of Justice Foot, 297; Same case, 2 Sand. Supr. Ct. Rep. 361.
That without this provision in our constitution, the act in question would be valid. 12 Mod. 249, 613 ; Hob. 227; Sid. 24; Sedgwick Con. and Stat. Law, 32.
That the object of the section of the constitution in question, was to prevent the passage of statutes public in one part and private in another. Walker v. Caldwell, 4 Ann. Rep. 298, cited in Sedgwick Con. and Stat. Law, 569.
That this section of the constitution cannot be evaded by declaring such an act as the one in question to be a public law. The Belleville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20.
That the legislature have not the - power to absolutely and unqualifiedly prohibit the sale of any commodity or article of merchandise.
Hurd, Booth & Potter, for Appellee.
The question in this case is, whether the “ Act to amend an act, entitled ‘An Act to incorporate the North-Western University,’” approved January 28, 1851, is obnoxious to that part of the constitution which provides that “ no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, said act containing a prohibition of the sale of spirituous liquors within four miles of the location of said university, under penalty of $25, to be recovered by the county of Cook.
■ We suppose the question is to be viewed the same as if this provision was in the original act to which this is an amend ment, the title to which is, “ An Act to incorporate the NorthWestern University.”
There can be no doubt that the design of the prohibition is to protect the students of the university, and such as may be connected therewith, from both the moral and physical influences of bar-rooms, saloons and all other places for the sale of spirituous liquor. And the court has only to inquire whether such a precaution is germain to the objects of a university of learning in the neighborhood of a large city like Chicago, as this is. The word subject, (which is from the Latin subject/us, participle of subjicio, to lie under), signifies the thing forming the groundwork. It may contain many particulars which grow out of it, and are germain to it, and which if traced back, will lead the mind to it as the generic head. For instance, in legislation, the incorporation of a bank, railroad, college, etc., the subject, and such particulars, as will be subservient to such an incorporation, are germain to it, and properly included in the law. Crabb’s Synonyms, p. 325; The Belleville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20.
The word used in the constitution, “ expressed,” is peculiar, and does not mean that the “ subject ” should be stated in so many words in the title of the bill, but that it should be shown forth, made apparent, expressed, so that by reflection the mind may grasp it. The constitntion does not intend to hold the legislature to an accurate nomenclature of all its acts. If we can look through the words used in the title of the law, and discover the subject, groundwork or design of it, and that subject or design appears to be single, that will answer the constitution, however awkwardly it may be expressed, or however many particulars, which are germain to the purpose of the law, may be stated. The Belleville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 28; Firements Benevolent Association v. Lounsbury, 511 ; Schuyler Co. v. R. I. & A. R. R. Co., 25 Ill. 181.
Nearly all railroad charters contain penal provisions. The charter of the Illinois Central Railroad Company is a fair example. The 9th section, Priv. Laws, 1851, p. 61, provides that “ If any person shall willfully spoil, injure, etc., said road, or any part thereof, or anything belonging thereto, or used in connection with it, etc., shall forfeit to the railroad company treble damages, shall be liable to indictment in the county in which the offense may be committed, and pay a fine of from $30 to $100, to the use of the People, etc., or may be imprisoned in the penitentiary,” etc.

Opinion:
Catón, C. J.
The only question presented in this ease is, the constitutionality of the law under which the prisoner was convicted. The law is entitled, " An Act to amend an act entitled {An Act to incorporate the ISTorth-Western University.' " This amendatory act prohibits the sale of spirituous liquors within four miles of the university, under a special penalty, to be recovered by the county of Cook. It is insisted that the provision is within the inhibition of the constitution, which declares that "no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." That this is a private and a local law there is no question. Does it embrace more than one subject ? is the question. This clause is to be treated precisely as if it were found in the original charter to which this law is an amendment.
The object of the charter was to create an institution for the education of young men, and it was competent for the legislature to embrace within it everything which was designed to facilitate that object. Every provision which was intended to promote the well-being of the institution, or its students, was within the proper subject-matter of that law. We cannot doubt that such was the single design of this law. Its purpose was to keep far away from the members of the institution the temptation to intemperance and its attendant vices. Although this provision might incidentally tend to protect others, residing in the vicinity, from the corrupting and demoralizing influences of the grog-shop, yet that was not the primary object of the law, but its sole purpose was to protect the students and faculty from such influence. It was designed for the benefit and well-being of the institution, and this is the touchstone of the constitutionality of the enact ment. If its design was foreign from the subject of the law, which was the creation of, and to provide for the well-being of an institution of learning ; if the design was to protect the community generally, from the bad influences of a particular temptation, without a particular reference to the institution, then it might be said, with much propriety, that it was foreign and not germain to the subject of the law. . It is not a valid objection that the prohibition designed for the benefit of the institution, is guaranteed by a public penalty, or, as in this case, one going to the county. It was competent' to select any mode of enforcing the prohibition, which might be thought the most efficacious. Suppose, in the charter of a gas company, a prohibition against digging up and destroying the pipes, were enforced by indictment and imprisonment; or, as is often the case in railroad charters, a provision is inserted, making it indictable to tear up or injure the track, would it be said that such clause is unconstitutional, as not germain to the subject of the law, because the sanction of the prohibition is a prosecution in the name of the people ?
It was not the purpose of the constitution to deprive the legislature of any power, necessary to enable them to make private legislation ample and abundant to accomplish its legitimate purpose, but the object was to prevent them from covertly embracing several distinct and foreign subjects, in one act. Should we sustain this objection, we should tie up the hands of the legislature, so that it could not freely legislate on private subjects, so as to accomplish the needful purposes for which such legislation is properly designed. Indeed, we should practically repeal essential portions of the charters of probably a large majority of the private corporations of the State, which have hitherto never been questioned. We entertain no doubt of the constitutionality of the enactment, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.