Case Name: BUTTREY FOOD STORES DIVISION, Jewel Companies, Inc., a New York Corporation, Appellant (Defendant), v. Ruthe COULSON, Appellee (Plaintiff)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1980-12-03
Citations: 620 P.2d 549
Docket Number: No. 5251
Parties: BUTTREY FOOD STORES DIVISION, Jewel Companies, Inc., a New York Corporation, Appellant (Defendant), v. Ruthe COULSON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Judges: Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 620
Pages: 549–561

Head Matter:
BUTTREY FOOD STORES DIVISION, Jewel Companies, Inc., a New York Corporation, Appellant (Defendant), v. Ruthe COULSON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 5251.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Dec. 3, 1980.
Thomas D. Roberts of Morgan & Brorby, Gillette, for appellant.
Don M. Empfield and Willis Geer of Geer & Empfield, Gillette, for appellee.
Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
The appellant, Buttrey Food Stores Division, Jewel Companies, Inc., challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of the trial court in a case involving personal injuries sustained in a fall on the appellant's business premises. Specifically the appellant urges error in the allocation of one hundred percent of the causative negligence to it; the insufficiency of evidence of permanent injury; excessiveness of the judgment; excessive cost allowance for an expert witness; and the failure of the appellee, Ruthe Coulson, to plead the amount of her damages. We shall affirm the judgment of the trial court which was entered after a trial to the court without a jury except as to the issue of excessive costs. We will reverse the award of costs and remand the case to the trial court for a proper determination of the costs to be awarded.
As more completely stated in the briefs of the parties, the issues presented are as follows:
"1. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF 100% NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND 0% NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
"2. THE FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE IN HER COMPLAINT OR REVEAL IN ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES THE PARTICULAR DAMAGES SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED.
"3. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF ANY PERMANENT INJURY ARISING FROM THIS FALL.
"4. THE EXTREME EXCESSIVENESS OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN VIEW OF THE MEDICAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
"5. THE EXCESSIVENESS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS FEE ALLOWED AS A COST."
The material operative facts in this case are not complicated. On January 20, 1979, Mrs. Coulson fell while entering the But-trey Store in Gillette, Wyoming. The weather that day was clear and bright but there was an accumulation of snow and ice on the ground. It was a bit messy and slushy underfoot, and it appeared that the temperature was above freezing. Mrs. Coulson was wearing shoes with soft rubber soles. Accompanied by a friend with whom she had lunched, Mrs. Coulson went to the Buttrey Store in the early afternoon. There was a large amount of ice in the store parking lot. Mrs. Coulson entered through the northwest doors, which consist of an inner door and an outer door. There was a rubber mat between the two doors and in addition a cloth-type mat three feet by six feet was placed between the outer and inner doors. Inside the inner door was another cloth mat three feet by six feet, and beyond that was a tile floor. The assistant manager testified that there were spare mats available at the store which were not in use. These mats were rented under an arrangement that cost Buttrey's $5.00 each time fresh mats were exchanged for soiled ones.
Immediately upon stepping off the cloth mat onto the tiled floor Mrs. Coulson fell. She stepped off with her right foot and fell first on her right knee. She then fell full length on the floor, and her right shoulder, right sleeve, right leg and hip area were wet when she got up from the floor. A store employee stated that he could observe a skim of water on the floor adjacent to the mat from the checkstand some 20 feet away.
Mrs. Coulson evidenced pain immediately in her countenance. She complained of pain to a store employee. After she got up she walked haltingly and had to hang onto something. There was pain localized in her kneecap shooting in both directions, and her knee felt progressively worse all the time and began to swell.
After she had completed her errand at the Buttrey Store her friend took her directly to the emergency room at the hospital. At this time Mrs. Coulson looked like she was strained and hurting. She was examined, and X rays were made, and her knee was wrapped with an Ace bandage. The following Monday she saw her family physician, who examined her and suggested she go home and keep her leg elevated. She was bedridden for about two and one-half weeks, and it was two months before she could stand with any assurance. She had to elevate her leg at work.
Mrs. Coulson previously had suffered an injury to this knee. She testified, however, that that injury had healed, and prior to the accident she walked without a limp and her knee was not at all unstable. After the fall she walked more slowly and haltingly. She sought support and the knee was unstable. She had difficulty driving her car. She gave up exercises that had been suggested because they were too painful. She stopped watching television because it was difficult to traverse the stairway to the basement of her home. She stopped attending meetings and church events. She did not visit the Senior Citizens Center as had previously been her habit.
Mrs. Coulson was employed as a proofreader at the Gillette News Record prior to the fall where she earned $3.75 an hour and usually worked a 25-hour week. She also did tutoring for homebound students, and was paid at the rate of $5.00 an hour for such tutoring by the school district. She had medical bills of $138.72, and a loss of earnings of $600.00. A medical doctor who specializes in orthopedics testified as to his examination of Mrs. Coulson's knee. He found that there was some limitation of range and the evidence of the prior injury was apparent. Her kneecap felt large and was somewhat misshapen. He found evidence of arthritic spurs and what he described as extensive degenerative arthritis. A significant fall could aggravate the arthritis that was present and could cause discomfort in addition to aggravating the arthritis. He did observe atrophy of the thigh muscles which could be attributed to bed rest of two to four weeks. In his opinion Mrs. Coulson would benefit from a patellectomy, which is the removal of the kneecap. The medical expenses for that procedure would be approximately $800.00
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and a judgment was entered in favor of Mrs. Coulson. In the judgment the trial court apportioned negligence by ascribing 100 percent to the appellant and none to Mrs. Coulson. Damages were awarded to Mrs. Coulson in the amount of $10,207.29. (There is an inconsistency in the judgment and it may be 28 cents instead of 29 cents.) Mrs. Coulson also was awarded costs in the amount of $690.50. On appeal the appellant attacks all aspects of the judgment.
The appellant concedes the store owner owes a duty to those whom he has expressly or impliedly invited to come on his premises to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render his premises reasonably safe to visit. There is no difference with respect to that duty between the majority of the court and those members who are dissenting in part and concurring in part. The store owner must use ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition, and he is charged with an affirmative duty to protect visitors against dangers known to him and against dangers which he might discover by use of reasonable care. Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 Wyo. 357, 374, 192 P.2d 617, 622 (1948); Rhodes v. El Rancho Markets, 9 Ariz.App. 576, 581, 454 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1969); Shutt v. Kaufman's, Inc., 165 Colo. 175, 180, 438 P.2d 501, 503 (1968); Pushard v. J. C. Penney Company, 151 Mont. 82, 85, 438 P.2d 928, 929 (1968); Safeway Stores, Incorporated v. Keef, Okl., 416 P.2d 892, 894 (1966); Glover v. Montgomery Ward and Company, Okl.App., 536 P.2d 401, 408 (1974); and Pribble v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 249 Or. 184, 191, 437 P.2d 745, 749 (1968). Cf., Honan v. Moss, Wyo., 359 P.2d 1002, 1006-1007. This concord may serve to distinguish that portion of the opinion of the court in Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, at 192 P.2d 630, which states:
" we cannot perceive that if it be claimed that plaintiff slipped as a result of the combination of her wet shoes and the slush and water tracked in by the store's customers, there could be predicated thereon any failure on defendant's part to perform a duty which it owed the plaintiff. "
It well may be, however, that we have effectively departed from that aspect of the court's opinion.
The appellant, however, does rely upon the case of Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, in arguing further that:
" Assuming that the proof does show a dangerous floor condition did exist, unless the condition was one created by the proprietor himself or under his authority, a plaintiff must show, in order to recover on a theory of negligence that the proprietor had actual notice of the condition, or that it had existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care the proprietor should have known of it and taken remedial action, Dudley v. Montgomery Ward and Company, 1948, 64 Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617, Annot. Slippery Floor-Injury, 62 A.L.R.2d 6, Prosser, Law of Torts § 61 (1971), Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (Utah 1977), 565 P.2d 1139. "
The appellant states this argument in another way as follows:
" Without some even minimal showing that the proprietor knew of the situation, or by the passage of time should have known of it, the Plaintiff-Appellee's proof has failed, thus she has no basis upon which to recover. "
Given the circumstances of this case, the better rule is stated in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes, Miss., 191 So.2d 411, 416 (1966), as follows:
" when plaintiff has shown that the circumstances were such as to create a reasonable probability that the dangerous condition would occur, he need not also prove actual or constructive notice of the specific condition, in this instance a specific puddle of water. "
Other cases involving hazards other than those caused by weather expressing the rule set forth above can be found in Annotation, 85 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1978).
While the nature of the condition was different, the rationale expressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado for elimination of proof of actual or constructive notice of the specific condition is persuasive:
"The basic notice requirement springs from the thought that a dangerous condition, when it occurs, is somewhat out of the ordinary. Such was the case under the facts of Woolworth v. Peet, 132 Colo. 11, 284 P.2d 659 (1955), and Denver Dry Goods v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257 (1953), which the defendant has urged upon us. In such a situation the storekeeper is allowed a reasonable time, under the circumstances, to discover and correct the condition, unless it is the direct result of his (or his employees') acts. However, when the operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement dissolves. Then, actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need not be proved. Bozza v. Vornado, 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777 (1964)." Jasko v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839, 840 (1972).
The Colorado Supreme Court went on to point out that this concept had been applied, although not specifically discussed, in Denver Dry Goods Company v. Gettman, 167 Colo. 539, 448 P.2d 954 (1969), a case factually similar to this case.
The dissenting and concurring justices would affirm on the basis of holding that the notice requirement was satisfied by the evidence in this case. There is no testimony from the employee who observed the water on the floor, however, as to when he observed it or to indicate in any way how long the water may have been there prior to Mrs. Coulson's fall. We conclude that it is not necessary to infer the requisite notice from this evidence. In an instance such as this where the existence of water on the floor of the store premises was a reasonable probability because of the weather conditions no proof of actual or constructive notice is required. The abrogation of any requirement that actual or constructive notice of the specific dangerous condition be established in such an instance does not make the store proprietor an insurer of the safety of his customers. The question of negligence under the applicable standard is still presented to the trier of fact, who is charged with comparing the respective negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. Proof of actual knowledge should be a factor in arriving at the decision as to the respective percentages of negligence. It might well lead to an apportionment of 100 percent to the defendant as occurred in this instance. Certainly the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's judgment in this regard. See, e. g., Champion Ventures, Inc. v. Dunn, Wyo., 593 P.2d 832, 834-835 (1979); Meeker v. Lanham, Wyo., 604 P.2d 556, 559-560 (1979); and Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, Wyo., 604 P.2d 198, 200-201 (1979) (citing Lusk Lumber Co. v. Independent Producers Consolidated, 35 Wyo. 381, 249 P. 790 (1926), reh. den. 36 Wyo. 34, 252 P. 1029 (1927)).
Without citing authority, appellant apparently recognizes the significance of our statement in Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978), that ordinarily the question of negligence under the comparative negligence statute is one for the finder of fact. This appears to be so because still relying upon Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, the appellant argues that in this instance some negligence must be ascribed as a matter of law to Mrs. Coulson. Appellant contends that in the exercise of ordinary care she would have worn overshoes or boots, which she did not, and that she was admittedly inattentive as to where she was walking. The record would indicate that Mrs. Coulson was not inattentive and that she was wearing soft rubber shoes at the time of her fall. Whether these factors under the usual rules manifested negligence upon the part of Mrs. Coulson has to be a question to be resolved by the finder of fact, in this case the district court. We expand upon what we said in Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, supra, by saying that while the apportionment of negligence may be affected in the trial court by a conclusion of the court that as a matter of law one party had not been guilty of negligence, the apportionment of negligence is a matter purely for the finder of fact, and there is no rational basis that any reviewing court could rely upon in attempting to adjust the percentages of negligence attributed to the parties by the finder of fact.
Turning now to the failure of plaintiff to specifically allege in her complaint or reveal in answers to interrogatories the particular damages sought to be recovered, we find no reversible error in this claim. It appears that the plaintiff made every effort to make her complaint comply with § 1-1-114, W.S.1977. That statute provides:
"The ad damnum clause or prayer for damages incorporated in a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief based upon personal injury or wrongful death shall not state any dollar amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment other than an allegation that the damages are of an amount necessary to establish jurisdiction of the court. "
This statutory provision was considered by this court in Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977), and the conclusion reached by the court was that the language of the statute makes it clear that the plaintiff shall not allege a dollar amount as damages. Obviously we cannot find error in the failure of a plaintiff to specifically allege in her complaint the particular damages sought to be recovered, given our previous construction of this statute. The appellant in its argument recognizes the effect of this statute, but argues that there was an inadequate response to its Interrogatory Number 6, the question and answer reading as follows:
"6. Please itemize your alleged damages.
"ANSWER: Special damages known at this time are these: Medicals, $122.72 and Lost Wages, $625.00."
We cannot read into that response any intention to waive general damages, and certainly the appellant could not rely upon that since the sum of the two amounts set forth in the Answer is less than the jurisdictional allegation in the Complaint. We note that the record discloses no effort on the part of appellant to follow up the information set forth in the answer to the interrogatory. From the record here, Mrs. Coul-son's deposition was not taken and there was no effort to require any further answer to this interrogatory. The only complaint made to the trial court occurred during Mrs. Coulson's testimony at a point at which she was explaining her loss of wages. The claim made by the appellant at that point was that the testimony was objectionable because it would be expanding upon the amount claimed as loss of wages in the answer to the interrogatory. The objection made by the appellant was limited in that fashion, and the response from Mrs. Coulson was that she would not attempt to show losses other than $600.00 but was simply presenting evidence tending to show that a minimum of $600.00 in lost wages had been incurred as damages to Mrs. Coulson.
Upon analysis of the record, it appears clear that no complaint was made in the trial court with respect to general damages. The appellant here argues, however, that "because of her failure to allege general damages and the answers to Defendant-Appellant's interrogatories, Plaintiff-Ap-pellee should be precluded from any recovery of general damages on the basis of unfair surprise." We therefore hold that this argument falls under our rule that we will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal unless they go to jurisdiction or are otherwise of such a fundamental nature that the court must take cognizance of them. Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 (1979). We do add, however, that the contention that a defendant in a personal injury case would be surprised by evidence tending to show general damages is a claim of error out of which no prejudice could flow. General damages are such an inherent aspect of any personal injury case that a claim such as appellant makes of surprise at offered proof of such damages must be viewed as only technical in nature. Without more record support of the attack upon the position of Mrs. Coulson this court, if it were to consider this claim of error, would conclude that no error occurred.
We treat together the third and fourth issues raised by the appellant. Both of these claims of error can be disposed of by referring to Mariner v. Marsden, Wyo., 610 P.2d 6 (1980). The appellant here contends that the testimony of the expert medical witness was inadequate to support a causative effect producing any permanent physical harm to the appellee. Mariner v. Marsden, supra, cannot be read otherwise, however, than as holding that other evidence, even in the absence of expert medical testimony, can be sufficient to support an award of general damages by a trial court. In the statement of facts set forth above we have noted the problems which Mrs. Coulson encountered after this fall, and testimony as to pain and suffering. We noted that her activities have been curtailed in significant respects, and having also held in Mariner v. Marsden, supra, that it is proper to award damages for loss of enjoyment of life, we conclude that the evidence in this case was ample to support the award of damages by the trial court. The appellant argues further, however, that in any event the amount awarded was excessive. Again in Mariner v. Marsden, supra, we relied upon earlier authorities setting forth the proposition that the amount to be assessed for damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of personal injuries is a matter within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. In this instance we do not find anything in the record indicating passion or prejudice on the part of the district judge, and the amount awarded, considering the evidence of the change occurring in Mrs. Coulson's life after this injury, does not shock our collective judicial conscience. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979), and authorities cited therein.
Finally, turning to the appellant's claim that the award of costs was excessive, we are compelled to afford relief as to this aspect of the case. We do not know how much of the costs awarded are attributable to the expert witness' fee. There is in the record no statement of any sort setting forth the costs which were awarded to Mrs. Coulson. Undoubtedly the expense for the expert witness represented a substantial portion of the costs. A trial court does have discretion to award more than $25.00 as a witness fee to an expert witness. Section 1-14-102, W.S.1977, provides for "such other amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case." In Roberts Construction Company v. Vondriska, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171 (1976), this court considered an award of costs for a survey of real estate. We there held that the expense did not appear to be necessary, and that there was no evidence as to the reasonableness of the charges, which we said was required before costs could be awarded. While we have approved an award of substantial personal injury damages in the absence of medical testimony, we noted that the tactic of not presenting professional medical evidence "reeks of risk," Mariner v. Marsden, supra, at p. 8. We would not, therefore, dispute the necessity of the expert medical testimony here. Since we do not know, however, the amount awarded for the expert witness fee and since there is no evidence as to the reasonableness of that fee, the trial court did commit an abuse of discretion in awarding any amount in excess of $25.00. We must reverse the award of costs, and remand the case for a determination of the proper costs awardable as a matter of course to the prevailing party according to Rule 54(d), W.R.C.P. In so doing we express our disapproval of the practice of awarding costs in the absence of a filing with the court of an appropriate statement of the costs.
The judgment is affirmed insofar as the award of damages to the plaintiff is concerned. The judgment is reversed with respect to the award of costs, and the case is remanded to the district court for a proper determination of the appropriate costs to be awarded to the plaintiff.