Case Name: E. L. Bennett v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-11-01
Citations: 80 Tex. Crim. 652
Docket Number: No. 4185
Parties: E. L. Bennett v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 80
Pages: 652–675

Head Matter:
E. L. Bennett v. The State.
No. 4185.
Decided November 1, 1916.
Rehearing denied December 20, 1916.
1. —Murder—Appeal Bond—Recognizance—Jurisdiction.
Where, upon trial of murder and a conviction of manslaughter, the appellant instead of entering into a recognizance after giving notice of appeal, entered into an appeal bond while the trial court was still in session for the term, the appeal must be dismissed on motion of the State for want of jurisdiction.
2. —Same—Statutes Construed—Appeal Bond—Recognizance— Signatures.
Articles 316 and 317, Code Criminal Procedure, define the terms recognizance and bail bond as used in our code, and one of the differences in the definition of the two terms seems to be that a recognizance is the undertaking of the parties in such casa and is not signed but is made a matter of record in the court, while the bail bond is written out and signed by the defendant and his sureties, and where the instrument in question was in the form of a bail bond, signed by the parties and filed, and was- not entered in the minutes of the court, it must be held to be an appeal bond. Following Maxey v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Eep. 556.
3. —Same—Amendment—New Recognizance—Practice on Appeal.
Where the appeal was dismissed because the appellant had entered into an appeal bond instead of a recognizance as required by law, he could not be allowed to amend the bond by entering into and filing a recognizance, as this would not be such an instrument as is authorized by law, and is not supplying a defective recognizance entered into during the term time, and gives this court no jurisdiction of the appeal. Following Johnson v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Eep., 416, 143 S. W. Eep., 1165, and other cases.
4. —Same—Right of Appeal—Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment.
Where appellant’s appeal had been dismissed for want of jurisdiction in not filing his recognizance after notice of appeal, and he thereafter filed a motion in the trial court seeking to correct the judgment so as to give him the benefit of the indeterminate sentence law, and the State filed a reply thereto that said judgment and sentence were valid but prayed in the alternative that if the judgment was not correct, that the court enter the true judgment and sentence theretofore rendered, and the court thereupon found that said judgment did not truly record the said judgment and the sentence pronounced at a former term of the courts and defendant excepted and gave notice of appeal to this court; held, that the appellant had the right of appeal therefrom to this court and is not deprived of his right of appeal by reason of the fact that he failed to perfect his appeal from the entry made at the previous term. Following Maes v. State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 85, and other cases.
5. —Same—Rule Stated—Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment—Right of Appeal.
It has been the constant practice of the courts to entertain appeals in criminal as well as in civil cases, where the court below, having omitted to cause the entry of the judgment to be made at the proper term, had caused it to be entered nunc pro tune at a subsequent-term. Following Scott v. State, 26 Texas 116, and other cases.
6. —Same—Void Judgment—Nunc Pro Tunc—Statutes Construed.
The court’s power to enter a judgment nunc pro tune is independent of article 859, Code Criminal Procedure, and appellant’s contention that an appeal from a judgment entered nunc pro tunc is not maintainable except in cases where it is entered in lieu of a void judgment, or in cases where no judgment is entered at all, is not well taken. Following Eios v. State, 79 Texas Crim. Eep., 89, 183 S. W. Eep., 151, and other cases. Distinguishing Oflield v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Eep., 340, and other cases.
7. —Same—Rule Stated—Right of Appeal From Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment.
The rule that where a final judgment nunc pro tunc is entered, it is the conclusion of the trial from which the defendant may prosecute an appeal, is not modified by the case of Ex parte Strey, 28 S. W. Eep., 811, and other cases, and there being nothing in the record to show that appellant has not been in custody, etc., since the entry of the final judgment, the jurisdiction of this court attaches and the case will be considered on its merits.
8. —Same—Evidence—Husband and Wife—Diary—Statutes Construed. •
Where upon trial of murder and a conviction of manslaughter the defendant introduced a certain diary kept by his wife to show the illicit relations between herself and the deceased, the State should not have been permitted to introduce a diary kept by defendant’s wife after the homicide, which was calculated to bring the defendant into great disfavor with the jury, and should have been limited under article 811, Code Criminal Procedure, to such matters as were calculated to throw light upon the issues named; neither was the admission of this testimony permissible under the statute, which interdicts communications between husband and wife and, besides, was purely hearsay of a pronounced nature. Following Woodal v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Eep., 513, and other cases.
9. —Same — Self-defense — Charge of Court — Apparent Danger — Deadly Weapon.
Where, upon trial of murder, there was no evidence that the deceased had a deadly weapon in his possession at the time he was killed, and the defense was purely one of self-defense upon threats and apparent danger, the court’s charge on deadly weapons and actual danger was improper, and defendant’s requested charge on apparent danger should have been given, and a failure to do so was reversible error.
10. —Same—Charge of Court—Relative Strength of Parties—Disposition of Deceased.
Where the question of relative strength of the parties and the character and disposition of the deceased did not enter into the case in any manner, the court should not have submitted a charge thereon.
11. —Same—Self-defense—Threats—Charge of Court—Standpoint of Defendant.
The court’s charge on self-defense which confined defendant’s right thereto to the belief of the jury as a predicate for their finding in connection with threats of the deceased, was improper. It is the belief of the defendant at the time which should govern the jury in determining his guilt. ■
12. —Same—Self-defense—Threats—Charge of Court.
Where the court charged self-defense from the standpoint of threats, and the evidence raised the issue of apparent danger independent of the question of threats, the charge on self-defense should have been independent of and disconnected from the charge on threats.
Appeal from the District Court of Bexar. Tried below before the Hon. W. S. Anderson.
Appeal from a conviction of manslaughter; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
0. A. Keller, B. E. Ward, and John E. Biclcett, Jr., for appellant.
On question of cross-examination of wife: Eads v. State, 76 Texas Crim. Rep., 647, 170 S. W. Rep., 145; Johnson v. State, 66 Texas Crim. Rep., 586, 148 S. W. Rep., 328; Roberts v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 150, 168 S. W. Rep., 100; Downing v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Rep., 519, 136 S. W. Rep., 471, and cases cited in opinion.
On question of charge on self-defense: Swain v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 98; Edwards v. State, 61 id., 307; McDowell v. State, 55 id., 596; Lundy v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 131, 127 S. W. Rep., 1032.
E. B. Eendricks, Assistant Attorney General, D. A. McAskill, District Attorney, and Joe E. E. Graham, for the State.
On question of requested charge on self-defense: Link v. State, 73 Texas Crim. Rep., 82, 164 S. W. Rep., 987.
On question of nunc pro tunc judgment: Mendoza v. State, 172 S. W. Rep., 790, and cases cited in opinion.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
Hnder an indictment charging him with murder, appellant was convicted of manslaughter and his punishment assessed at three years confinement in the penitentiary.
There are several very interesting questions presented in appellant's brief and in the able argument made to the court; but we are met ati the threshold with a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Assistant Attorney General, on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction of this appeal, because appellant instead of entering into a recognizance on appeal as required by law, entered into an appeal bond while the court was still in session for the term. This is a jurisdictional question, and if proper steps were not taken to confer appellate jurisdiction on this court, we are powerless to enter any order herein other than to dismiss the appeal.
The instrument copied in the record contains all the essentials of a recognizance, but it is denominated an appeal bond, is signed by the principal and sureties and approved hy the sheriff and district judge, and marked filed hy the clerk on April 22, 1916. The term of court at which appellant was tried convened March 6, 1916, and adjourned on April 29th, it being thus conclusively shown that appellant entered into the obligation and secured his release during the term of court at which he was convicted.
Appellant's counsel earnestly insists that the instrument, although denominated an appeal bond, and signed by appellant and his sureties and approved by the sheriff, yet it was intended as a recognizance; that it was reduced to writing and signed by appellant and the sureties at the request of the trial judge; that appellant did in fact enter into a recognizance in open court as required by law. Articles 316' and 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure define the terms "recognizance" and "bail bond" as used in our Code, and one of the differences in the definitions of the two terms seems to be that a recognizance is "the undertaking of the parties in such case, is not signed, but is made a matter of record in the court where the same is entered into," while a bail bond is thus defined: "It is written out and signed by the defendant and his sureties."
Owing to the varying contentions in this court, the court instructed the Assistant Attorney General to procure a certificate from the clerk of the District Court of Bexar County as to whether the obligation in this case was ever entered of record in the minutes of the District Court, and the clerk of the District Court certifies over his official signature "that the appeal bond of defendant, E. L. Bennett, has never been entered of record in this office but merely filed." So under no construction of the law are we authorized to treat the instrument as a recognizance. A similar question to this was presented to this court in the case of Maxey v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 556, where in fact a recognizance was actually entered into but no judgment entry carried forward into the minutes of the court, and this cotirt held it was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In that case the court said:
"The Assistant Attorney General has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because there is no recognizance in the record, nor a certificate that appellant is confined in jail. In reply to this, appellant,has filed an affidavit of the county judge to the effect that a recognizance was actually taken in open court. This is not sufficient. The recognizance should have been entered of record in the final minutes of the court. A recognizance is an undertaking entered into before a court of record in session by a defendant in a criminal action and his sureties, by which they bind themselves, etc. The requisites thereof are prescribed by our statutes. Arts. 303, 308, 886-888, C. C. P. From an inspection of these articles it is evident that, whatever the court may have done in the way of taking recognizance, it is not perfected until this recognizance is entered of record in the final minutes of the ease. 20 Am. & Eng. Encv. of Law, 1 ed., 471. In Quarles v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 362, it was held that the entry of this recognizance could not be made nunc pro tunc so as to give this court jurisdiction. In Thompson v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 505, it was held it was the duty of appellant to see that this recognizance was entered of record before the adjournment of the court, and that such recognizance could not afterwards be amended. And see Dement v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 271. We accordingly hold that, in order to give this court jurisdiction it is necessary not only that the recognizancé be taken, but that such recognizance be entered of record during the term at which the appeal was taken."
If in fact appellant's counsel did enter into a recognizance, as he contends, and merely reduced it to writing, and had it signed at the request of the trial judge, yet he had another duty to perform—to see that it was entered of record in the minutes of the court. Thompson v. State, 35 Texas Grim. Rep., 505.
As the instrument copied in the record shows on its face to be an appeal bond and is so denominated in the record, was filed as such in the trial court and never entered of record in the minutes of the court, we are not authorized to treat it as a recognizance. Under such circumstances this court being without jurisdiction, the motion of the Assistant Attorney General must be sustained.
The appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.