Case Name: Edward JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, a Corporation, erroneously sued as Bank of America NA, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-02-23
Citations: 713 F. App'x 639
Docket Number: No. 17-55819
Parties: Edward JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, a Corporation, erroneously sued as Bank of America NA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 713
Pages: 639–640

Head Matter:
Edward JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, a Corporation, erroneously sued as Bank of America NA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-55819
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted February 13, 2018
Filed February 23, 2018
Edward Jackson, Pro Se
Jan T. Chilton, Attorney, Mark Joseph Kenney, Severson & Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, Kerry W. Franich, Sever-son & Werson, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Edward Jackson appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and Federal Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jackson's action because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim and because Jackson's claims are time-barred. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1961e(f) (statute of limitations for claims under the ECOA); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth disclosure requirements under the FCRA).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as unsupported by the record Jackson's contention that the district court dismissed his action because of a mere typographical error or failed to hold him to a less stringent standard as a pro se litigant.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.