Case Name: John Buford IRVING, III v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1983-08-24
Citations: 441 So. 2d 846
Docket Number: No. 54358
Parties: John Buford IRVING, III v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 441
Pages: 846–856

Head Matter:
John Buford IRVING, III v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 54358.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 24, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1983.
Ford & Ford and James 0. Ford, Tupelo, for appellant.
Bill Allain, Atty. Gen., by Amy D. Whit-ten, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
John Buford Irving, III, was originally tried, convicted and sentenced to death in 1976 for the capital murder of store owner Gambrell Ray of Pontotoc County. Both conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court in Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss.1978), where the facts necessary to this opinion are stated. Subsequently the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi vacated the death sentence because it was that court's opinion Irving received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the district court's order, the state instituted resentencing proceedings, and Irving was again sentenced to death. He appeals, citing the following as error:
1. The trial court erred in granting State's instruction S-l;
2. The trial court erred in refusing defendant's instructions D-3, D-4 and D-ll;
3. The sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases;
4. The trial court erred in applying Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (effective from and after April 13, 1977).
Under his first assignment of error, Irving contends the granting of general sentencing instruction S-l was error for two reasons. We address each of these separately.
First, Irving argues the instruction improperly omitted definitions of the terms "robbery" and "pecuniary gain." The part of S-l pertinent to this argument appears below:
Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed:
(1) Whether or not the capital murder was committed while the defendant, John Buford Irving, III, was engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain. (Emphasis ours.)
Irving submits that by failing to define the emphasized terms the trial court neglected to channel the jury's discretion in arriving at sentence. We are of the opinion this argument fails in view of the posture of this case. In that the conviction by the first jury was not disturbed on appeal, the present sentencing jury was prohibited by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigat-ing the issue of guilty. Rather, the second jury's function was to accept the first jury's finding that Irving was guilty of felony-murder involving robbery and then to determine sentence. Thus the definition of robbery and pecuniary gain would have been pointless and possibly confusing to the sentencing jury. We therefore conclude that the trial court s refusal to define these terms was not error.
Appellant also argues the trial court erred in combining pecuniary gain with robbery in the first circumstance. We have held these terms are not mutually exclusive. Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563 (Miss.1982); Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236 (Miss.1978). Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss.1983), on facts similar to those in this case, upheld an instruction setting out robbery and pecuniary gain as separate aggravating circumstances. Thus while it would have been proper for the trial court to have separately listed these two aggravating circumstances, the court did not do so and the appellant now complains because of their being combined into one circumstance. We are of the opinion instruction S-l had the same content found permissible in previous cases and this argument is without merit. Moreover, the combining of the terms into one circumstance could possibly have benefitted Irving by presenting the jury with only one aggravating circumstance where two separate ones would have been justified.
Appellant's next attack on instruction S-l involves the second aggravating circumstance, taken from Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-19-101(5)(h) (1972), "that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner." He urges it was error for the court to omit definitions of these terms. This argument is meritless in view of Washington v. State, 361 So.2d 61, 66 (Miss.1978), wherein we stated:
It is our considered opinion that the average jury in its sound discretion and judgment understands the generally accepted meaning of the words "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" and is able to apply these words to different factual situations without further definition of these words.
It is our opinion that these words are not unconstitutionally vague.
See also Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss.1979), and Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss.1983).
Irving also argues that the evidence did not suggest the murder was "conscienceless or pitiless" or "unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d at 648, citing Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 611 (5th Cir.1978). Irving relies heavily on the fact that Ray died instantly. While the great majority of death penalty cases affirmed by this Court involve some type of physical and/or mental torture to the victim, we have never specifically held that a finding of § 99-19-101(5)(h) must be supported by evidence of prolonged suffering. In Edwards v. State, 413 So.2d 1007 (Miss.1982), involving a robbery murder victim who died within fewer than thirty minutes of a single shotgun wound to the chest, we held the death penalty was not excessive, stating "A more calloused and unjustifiable killing could hardly be imagined." 413 So.2d at 1013.
The evidence in this case reveals the victim died instantly of a single shotgun wound to the neck. Doubtless Ray was in fear of his life from the time he saw the gun pointed at him until he was shot a few seconds later. We observe the other cases in characterizing Irving have focused on other elements besides torture or suffering, such as the fact that the killing was "totally senseless" and committed upon a hapless unarmed victim, Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d at 650. The record shows Irving had known Ray for many years, that Irving used this familiarity to gain admittance into the store after hours and then shot Ray for a small amount of money. Because of these facts and considering that the present case depicts a killing no less heinous than those in Edwards and Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576 (Miss.1983), it was not error for the court to include § 99-19-101(5)(h) in instruction S-l.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant instructions D-3, D-4 and D-ll.
Instruction D-3 states, "I charge you that mitigating circumstances are those which do not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame." We have held there is no reversible error where the instructions read as a whole fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice. Norman v. State, 385 So.2d 1298, 1303 (Miss.1980). See also Barr v. State, 359 So.2d 334 (Miss.1978). Nor is a trial court required to grant cumulative or repetitious instructions. Ragan v. State, 318 So.2d 879 (Miss.1975).
The trial court granted instruction S-l which defined mitigating circumstances as "those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty." Further, the enumeration within S-l of the particular circumstances which the jury was allowed to consider reinforced this definition:
(1) Whether the defendant has a significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The defendant's age at the time of the capital murder.
(3) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to the capital murder committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor.
(4) Any other matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstances of the offense brought before you during the trial of this cause which you, the Jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant.
Thus we are of the opinion that S-l contained the substance repeated in D-3 and that it was therefore properly denied.
Instruction D-ll would have informed the jury that they might recommend mercy regardless of the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Directly in point is Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198 (Miss.1978), in which appellant relied on the following language from Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1256 (Miss.1976), "The jury shall not be required to make a special finding of any mitigating circumstances in order to return a verdict that the accused should be sentenced to life in prison." In Jordan we considered this language and stated:
We note the great difference in not requiring the jury to find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a verdict of life imprisonment as opposed to not requiring the jury to "make a special finding of any mitigating circumstance in order to return a verdict that the accused should be sentenced to life in prison." 365 So.2d at 1205.
We find no authority requiring the trial court to grant an instruction such as D-11. Moreover, Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601, 610 (Miss.1980), held that the "mercy instruction" was properly denied as conflicting with the court's instruction to weigh the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating .circumstances. However, compare Tokman v. State, wherein we approved the granting of such instruction. It therefore appears that the "mercy instruction" is not mandated, but will be approved if granted by the trial court largely because it is not prejudicial to a defendant.
Instruction D-4 would have required the jury to specifically consider the eight mitigating circumstances enumerated as follows:
(a) The defendant has no record of criminal convictions for crimes involving force or violence to persons;
(b) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(c) The defendant's prior family history that would reasonably be expected to contribute to the defendant's criminal conduct including:
(1) Fatherless up-bringing;
(2) Lack of parental guidance.
(d) Since the murder, the defendant has been spiritually converted and has committed his life to Christ;
(e) The defendant is a model prisoner;
(f) He is an ordained minister and ministers to his fellow inmates daily;
(g) He has been instrumental in reforming persons addicted to drugs;
(h) The defendant did not kill the victim. The court denied instruction D-4 because it contained elements not listed in Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-19-101 (1972), but granted instruction S-l, which set out the following mitigating circumstances:
(1) Whether the defendant has a significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The defendant's age at the time of the capital murder.
(3) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to the capital murder committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor.
(4) Any other matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstances of the offense brought before you during the trial of this cause which you, the Jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant.
Noting that opinions of federal circuit courts are normally persuasive, we distinguish Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1981), which held the trial court could not specifically prohibit the jury from considering mitigating circumstances in addition to those listed in the statute. No such prohibition is found in the present case; to the contrary, the trial court clearly instructed the jury that they could consider additional mitigating factors. The record contains scores of pages of testimony from seventeen witnesses relating to each factor in instruction D-4. This testimony went with the jury through instruction S-l in its deliberation. This authorized the jury to consider all the elements set out in instruction D-4, and therefore renders meritless appellant's complaint about the refusal of D-4.
Under his third assignment of error, Irving argues the following language from Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), requires reversal in the present case:
Although the judgments of legislatures, juries and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a' murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. We have concluded, along with most legislature and juries, that it does not.
458 U.S. at 796, 102 S.Ct. at 3376, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1151.
We are of the opinion this argument is predicated on the erroneous assumption that the jury was bound to accept the impeached and contradicted testimony of appellant's cousin, Keith Givhan, that it was Givhan and not Irving who shot Gamb-rell Ray. Noting first that the jury was entitled to reject such testimony, we again state that the issue of guilt was res judica-ta. Therefore, we are of the opinion that appellant is in no position to raise Enmund.
Appellant last argues the trial court's utilization of MCA, § 99-19-101 (effective from and after April 13, 1977) in his sentencing trial was improper according to MCA, § 99-19-1 (1972), and the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. MCA, § 99-19-1 reads as follows:
No statutory change of any law affecting a crime or its punishment or the collection of a penalty shall affect or defeat the prosecution of any crime committed prior to its enactment, or the collection of any penalty, whether such prosecution be instituted before or after such enactment; and all laws defining a crime or prescribing its punishment, or for the imposition of penalties, shall be continued in operation for the purpose of providing punishment for crimes committed under them, and for collection of such penalties, notwithstanding amendatory or repealing statutes, unless otherwise specially provided in such statutes.
Since appellant was originally tried and convicted in 1976 for this crime, he argues he should not have been sentenced according to the provisions of MCA, § 99-19-101, which did not come into effect until 1977. We conclude this argument fails on several grounds.
First, we are of the opinion appellant has misapplied § 99-19-1. By its terms, the statute comes to life only with respect to statutory changes "affecting the crime or its punishment." The 1977 amendments did not affect the substance of capital law but merely made changes in the procedures by which such cases were to be tried. Therefore, we do not find § 99-19-1 requires reversal in this ease.
Next considering appellant's ex post facto argument, we note a similar issue was addressed in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Between the time of the commission of Dob-bert's offense and the time of trial, Florida's death penalty statutes were changed to provide different procedures for determining sentence in capital cases. Dobbert argued the state violated the ex post facto clause by trying and sentencing him according to the new statutory procedures. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating, "It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law." 432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299, 53 L.Ed.2d at 357. The Court noted that the new statute, "simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime." 432 U.S. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d at 356. Finding that the statutory changes made between the time of the crime and the time of the trial were "procedural, and on the whole ameliorative," the Supreme Court upheld the sentence. 432 U.S. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d at 355.
We are of the opinion the foregoing analysis applies to this case. In Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1349 (Miss.1977), we considered the 1977 enactments and stated:
It will be observed that the statute requires a different form of verdict than the one set forth in Jackson v. State, supra. Miss.Gen.Laws Ch. 458 (1977) was enacted after our decision in Jackson, supra, and sets forth aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered by the jury at the punishment stage of a capital case. Juries shall be instructed in accordance with the statute in all trials after April 13,1977, the effective date of the statute.
Implicit in this pronouncement was that the new statutes provided increased protection for capital defendants and the intent that all such defendants on trial after April 1977, should merit this protection. We are of the opinion the ex post facto contention is without merit.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Irving received a fair trial. We also conclude the death penalty for John Buford Irving, III, is not disproportionate, wanton or freakish when compared with our other decisions upholding the death penalty subsequent to Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1976). Having scrutinized the'record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the lower court and set Wednesday, September 28, 1983, as the date for execution of the sentence and infliction of the death penalty in the manner provided by law.
AFFIRMED.
WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS and ROBERTSON, JJ., not participating.
APPENDIX "A"
DEATH CASES AFFIRMED BY THIS COURT:
Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss.1983).
Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss.1983).
Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427 (Miss.1983).
Pruett v. State, 431 So.2d 1101 (Miss.1983).
Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576 (Miss.1983).
Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737 (Miss.1982).
King v. State, 421 So.2d 1009 (Miss.1982).
Wheat v. State, 420 So.2d 229 (Miss.1982).
Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563 (Miss.1982).
Edwards v. State, 413 So.2d 1007 (Miss.1982).
Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383 (Miss.1982):
Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601 (Miss.1980).
Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999 (Miss.1980).
Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss.1980).
Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499 (Miss.1979).
Gray v. State, 375 So.2d 994 (Miss.1979).
Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198 (Miss.1978).
Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236 (Miss.1978).
Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss.1978).
Washington v. State, 361 So.2d 61 (Miss.1978).
Bell v. State, 360 So.2d 1206 (Miss.1978).
DEATH CASES REVERSED AS TO PUNISHMENT AND REMANDED FOR RE-SENTENCING TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246 (Miss.1983).
Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84 (Miss.1983).
Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss.1979).
. See Appendix "A".