Case Name: Burwell and Others v. Corbin and Others
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1822-04-10
Citations: 1 Rand. 131
Docket Number: 
Parties: Burwell and Others v. Corbin and Others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 56–67

Head Matter:
Burwell and Others v. Corbin and Others.
April, 1822.
[10 Am. Dec. 494.]
Wills — Execution—Proof of — Sufficiency) —Case at Bar.
—A decedent leaves a will conveying real estate, wholly written by another and signed by that other with the name of the testator. There are two subscribing witnesses to this paper : one of whom saw the signature and heard the testator acknowledge that it was signed by his authority; the other does not say whether the paper was signed or not at the time of his attestation, the testator merely declaring “it is my will;” it was held that such a paper was not proved according to the requisitions of the statute.
Evidence — Competency of Witnesses — Quaere,—A man who is made a prochein ami to an infant without his knowledge or consent, is not disqualified from being a witness; but quaere, what shall amount to a recognition by such prochein ami, that his name was properly used ?
This suit was 'originally brought in the Williamsburg chancery court, and after-wards removed to the Fredericksburg district.
Bacon Burwell and others, heirs at law of James B. Burwell deceased, of Richmond county, filed their bill *in .chancery against John R. F. Corbin, Thomas P. Smith and Francis Smith, stating: that since the death of the said James B. Burwell, the said Cor-bin had produced a pretended paper-writing as the last will of the said James, whereby the greater part of his estate is devised away from the relatives and friends of the deceased and left to the said Corbin; and legacies are bequeathed to the said F. Smith and Thomas P. Smith: that the said paper is wholly feigned and counterfeit: that the said paper has been exhibited by the said devisees to the county court of Richmond for probat, and being proved by the two attesting witnesses, has been admitted to record, and letters of administration granted to the said John R. F. Corbin: that the witnesses aforesaid were perj'ured: that the complainants being only relievable in equity, they pray that an issue may be directed to try whether the said paper is the true last will of the said James B. Bur-well deceased, &c.
John R. F. Corbin says in his answer, that some time before the death of James B. Burwell, he had been induced by strong persuasions and warm professions of friendship, to reside with the said Burwell; and during this time, he transacted most of the business of the said Burwell: that some short time before the death of the latter, he requested the defendant to write his will; 'which he accordingly did, in exact conformity to the instructions of the said Burwell: that upon perusing the said will, the said Burwell expressed his entire approbation of it, and requested the defendant to sign his name for him, to the same: that it was attested by two credible witnesses, who subscribed their names in the presence of the said Burwell: that he denies the fraud, combination, and forgery charged in the bill: that the said will was established in the county court of Richmond, although it was opposed by the strenuous efforts of the complainants, to invalidate the act and stigmatize the character of the defendant: that although the complainants are the .nearest relations of the said Burwell, yet the defendant is not *very remotely allied to him in blood; that as to one of the complainants (Rucy Clements) the testator had always manifested a rooted aversion to her, &c.
Francis Smith denies his participation in any fraud or combination; that he was not privy to the execution of the will, and did not know of the existence of such an instrument, until after the decease of the said Burwell, &c.
The paper in question, purporting to be a will, is attested by Thomas I. Scrimger and David Barrick, as subscribing witnesses.
Many depositions were taken on both sides, embracing a great variety of matter, and impeaching and supporting the character of Barrick, one of the subscribing witnesses.
The court of chancery ordered an issue to be made up and tried in the superior court of law for the county of Caroline, ■“whether, the writing produced and referred to in the bill of the plaintiffs, bearing date the 2d day of September, 1811, purporting to be the last will and testament of James B. Burwell, deceased, be the will of the said James B. Burwell or not; the verdict of which jury, when rendered, shall be certified to this court; and the court doth decree and order, that upon the trial of the said issue, copies of the bills, answers and exhibits, and depositions of such of the witnesses as are dead, or cannot attend the trial, shall be read in evidence.”
William Ball, the next friend of some of the infant plaintiffs, being dead, Bacon Burwell was admitted -to prosecute the suit as their next friend.
The issue directed by the court, was accordingly made up in the usual form, and tried in the superior court of law for Caroline county.
The jury not agreeing on their verdict, it was agreed by the parties, “that the question of law arising on the evidence of the subscribing witnesses to the paper-writing in the declaration mentioned, purporting to be the will of James B. Burwell, in the event that that evidence *should be credited by the jury, to wit: whether that evidence shews that the said paper-writing was duly executed as a will, according to the first section of the act of the general assembly, passed the 13th day of December, 1792, entitled ‘an act reducing into one the several acts concerning wills, the distribution of intestates’ estates, and the duty of executors and administrators,’ shall be reserved by a special finding of the facts that the jury may determine to be proved by that evidence by the jury, to be decided by the proper court; and all parties agreeing to waive all objection, now and hereafter, that might be made to any irregularity or supposed irregularity in this course.”
The jury being sent out, returned a verdict in these words:
“We of the jury find that the paper-writing in the proceedings in this cause mentioned, bearing date the 2nd day of September, 1811, purporting to be the last will and testament of James B. Burwell, deceased, is the true last will and testament of the said James B. Burwell, deceased, in the proceedings in this cause mentioned, if the proper court shall be of opinion that the said paper-writing was duly executed as the last will and testament of the said James B. Burwell, deceased, upon the following facts, which we find: that on the 2nd day of September, 1811, the said James B. Burwell requested Thomas I. Scrimger, a subscribing witness to the said paper-writing, to call at his house that evening on his way from Richmond court, as he (Burwell) had particular business with him; that the said Scrimger was detained at Richmond court-house by a thunder storm, and did not call at the said Burwell’s that evening; that the next morning, the 3rd of September, 1811, a messenger came from the house of the said Burwell to the said Scrimger, to know if he had gotten home; and the said Scrimger, on the morning of that day, went to the said Burwell’s house, and there found *the said James B. Burwell and John R. F. Corbin, a defendant in equity in this suit, together; when, after the said Scrimger had spoken to the said Burwell and Corbin, the said Burwell gave a paper-writing to the said Corbin, and requested him to hand it to the said Scrimger, that he might sign it as a witness; that the said Corbin took the said paper-writing, and observed to the said Burwell, that he had not signed it himself, when the said Burwell observed, ‘aye, you can sign it for me;’ whereupon the said Corbin, in the presence of the said Burwell, signed the name of the said James B. Burwell to the said paper-writing, and then delivered the said paper-writing to the said Thomas I. Scrimger, who, in the presence of the said Burwell, signed his name to the said paper-writing as a witness; that the said paper-writing was then delivered by the said Corbin to the said Burwell, who put it into a small pocket-book, and put the book into his pocket; that the said Thomas I. Scrimger, when he returned the said paper-writing to the said Corbin, in a low voice, in thfi presence of the said Burwell, asked the said Corbin if that paper was the said Burwell’s will, when the said Corbin answered that it was; but the witness did not know that this enquiry and answer was heard by Burwell; that the said Thomas I. Scrimger, at the time of his signing the said paper-writing as a witness, enquired in the presence of the said Burwell, if there was to be no other witness; when the said Corbin answered, in the presence of said Burwell, that David Barrick had been sent for, but was not at home; and we find further, that the said David Barrick, having returned home at night on the 3rd of September, 1811, was informed by his wife that the said Bur-well had sent for him in the course of that day: that the said Barrick went to the house of the said James B. Burwell on the morning of the 4th of September, 1811, and found the said James B. Burwell sitting on _ the bed with the said *paper-writing in his hand, when the said James B. Burwell asked him to sign that paper, and, the said David Barrick thereupon signed his name to the said paper-writing as a witness, in the presence of the said James B. Burwell: that the said Barrick then asked the said Burwell, what it was that he had signed, and the said Burwell replied ‘it is my will, but you need not make a talk of it; it is time enough;’.-and that the said paper-writing,^ so attested or signed by the said Scrimger and Barrick, is the same which was admitted to record in the county court of Richmond on the 4th day of November, 1811, which is referred to in the proceedings and issue in this cause; and that the said James B. Burwell, at the time of the attestation of the said paper-writing by the said Scrimger and Barrick, was of sound mind and disposing memory; and if the court shall be of opinion, that the said facts do not shew that the said writing was duly executed according to the directions and provisions of the 1st section of the act of the general assembly, passed the 3,3th day of December, 1792, entitled ‘an act reducing into one the several acts concerning wills, the distribution of intestates’ estates, and the duty of executors and administrators,’ then we find that the said paper-writing is not the last will and testament of the said James B. Burwell, so far as it affects the real estate of the said decedent James B. Burwell.”
Upon this verdict, the court “being strongly inclined to think that it is not necessary, and perhaps not proper, that this court should give any opinion on the facts found by the jury on this issue, was about to certify the verdict without giving an opinion, but it being suggested by the counsel, that possibly the chancellor may think that this court ought to certify its opinion, and if so, that great delay would arise to the parties from sending it back to this court, for this reason the court proceeds to pronounce its opinion, and the parties being *heard by their counsel, it seems to the court here, that the paper-writing in the Verdict mentioned in the last will and testament of the said James B. Burwell deceased, duly executed as a will according to the first section of the act of the general assembly, passed the'13th day of December, 1792, entitled ‘an act reducing into one the several acts concerning wills, the distribution of intestates’ estates, and the duty of executors and administrators;’ and it is ordered, that the verdict of the jury in this issue, and the opinion of this court, be certified to the superior court of chancery for the Fredericksburg district.”
At the trial the plaintiffs tendered a bill of exceptions which was received, stating, that the defendants in the issue (who were the plaintiffs in the chancery suit) offered in evidence a deposition of William Ball duly taken in this cause; which William Ball was admitted to be the same William Ball who1 is named in the bill, as the next friend of Edwin, James and Nancy Bur-well, infant children of James Burwell, (who are among the complainants in equity,) and that the said William is now" dead. But the plaintiffs in the issue objected to the said deposition being read, because the said W. Ball was named in the bill as the next friend of the said infant complainants, and so was at the time of taking his deposition, interested in the cause, being liable for costs; although it was stated in evidence by the counsel who drew the said bill, that he drew it, and used the name of the said William Ball as next friend, without consulting him, or being authorised by him so to use his name; nor so far as he knows or believes, was the said William Ball, at any time prior to his said deposition, being taken or at that time, apprized, or had he any knowledge of the fact, that his name had been so introduced in the said bill; though he cannot say, that he was not apprized of the fact in some other way, which objection to the deposition being read, was sustained by the court, and the same was excluded.
*The verdict being certified to the court of chancery, that court was of opinion that the paper-writing in the proceedings mentioned, was the last will and testament of James B. Burwell deceased, and accordingly dismissed the bill.
The complainants obtained a supersedeas from this , court. In their petition they assign three errors: 1st, that the issue was directed tto be tried in the superior court .of Caroline county, in which county neither the lands lay, nor the testator died: that the issue devisavit vel non is local and ought not to be tried out of the proper county, but for good cause shewn on the record: 2nd, because the deposition of William Ball was rejected: .3rd, because the will was not duly executed. The two last objections only were relied on in the argument or discussed by the court.
The case was argued in this court at great length by Leigh and Wickham for the appellants, and Tucker, Stanard and Call for the appellees;
but as the case received an ample discussion from the court, the arguments of counsel are omitted.
JuDGE Cabell’s opinion in the principal case can be found in the Appendix to this volume, 1 Band. 468.
Wills — Execution—Proof of — Sufficiency,—In Smith v. Jones, 6 Rand. 34, it is said that the court in Burwell v. Corbin, 1 Rand. 131. was acting on a special verdict. And, in Boyd v. Cook, 3 Leigh 54, the case at bar is distinguished from the principal case, the court saying through Carr, J., that, in the principal case, the court was acting on a special verdict, where everything must be directly found, and nothing inferred; but that in the case at bar, the court of probate was acting as a jury and might draw from the evidence every inference and conclusion which a jury might draw. In Boyd v. Cook. 3 Leigh 54, it was held that the will of a blind man should be admitted to probate as a will of real as well as personal estate, if attested at his request in the same room with him, though it be not proved that the will was read to him in the presence of the attesting witnesses, or that it was ever read to him. provided it appears satisfactory to the court, that he was acquainted with its contents, and intended to make the testamentary dispositions therein contained.
In Dudleys v. Dudleys, 3 Leigh 436, the authority of the principal case is doubted and the decision therein discussed at length by the judges. In this case (Dudleys v. Dudleys, 3 Leigh 436), the will was written by a person who testified that he also signed the testator’s name thereto in the presence and at the request of the testator, and then subscribed his own name as a witness in the presence of the testator: and another witness testified that some years afterwards, while at the testator’s house, it was suggested to the testator that it was a favourable time to have his will witnessed, and that the testator assented; that the paper in question was produced; that the witness took it near the testator and inquired whether he acknowledged it as his will, and the testator said he did; upon which the witness subscribed it as a witness in the presence of the testator. It was held, Judge Brooke dissenting, that the acknowledgment of the paper by the testator to the second witness, was a recognition of the signature thereto as his own, and evidence from which a court of probate might well infer that the testator’s signature to the will was written by his authority, and that therefore there were two witnesses to the execution of the will as required by statute. In delivering his opinion, Carr, J., said (p. 440): "It was said, in the argument, that tbe point in this case, is decided by Burwell v. Corbin; that the distinction taken in Smith v. Jones, between a court of probate acting upon evidence, and a court of chancery, acting on a special verdict found on an issue of devisavit vol non. would not reconcile the cases; and that we must overrule Burwell v. Corbin, if we sustained the will here. Por myself, I must say, I think that case went too far. Yet there is, surely, a sound distinction between a court of probate acting upon the evidence, and a court deciding the law upon the facts found by a special verdict. Upon this distinction. the court, in Smith v. Jones, meant to leave Burwell v. Corbin undisturbed; and I am not disposed, at present, to inquire, whether, on the strict and narrow ground of a special verdict, it may not stand: but, certainly, I can never consent that it shall govern a court of probate, in deciding upon evidence.” Judge Cabell said (p. 441): “In the case of Smith v. Jones, Judge Carr, speaking for the court, draws a distinction between a case where the court is deciding upon a special verdict, as in the case o,f Burwell v. Corbin, and a case like the present, where the court has to decide, as a court of probate, on the evidence given for or against a will: in the former case, we are limited to the facts as stated; we can deduce no inference from them: in the latter, we may infer every thing from the evidence, that a jury might fairly infer. I' sat in Burwell v. Corbin. It is due to candor to admit, that .1 did not proceed on any such distinction as that taken in Smith v. Jones. My opinion would not have been different, at that time, had the case stood on a statement of the evidence, and not on a special verdict. But I have had occasion to reconsider, with great attention, the case of Burwell v. Corbin, and I have come to the conclusion, that the decision can be justified, only on the ground that it was on a special verdict; and that, even in that aspect of the case, it ought to have been sent back for a more perfect finding of the facts.” But Judge Brooke in his dissenting opinion said that he thought the principal case was not correctly understood: and, while it was a case of an anomalous character, yet the principle decided by it was entirely correct. To sustain this view, the judge explains the principal case at some length; and says that the point in Burwell v. Corbin was not involved in Smith v. Jones, 6 Rand. 32. Judge Tucker thought the principal case not exactly in point in the case at bar, but he said he should certainly not disregard its authority whenever it was in point. See principal case also cited in Clarke v. Dunnavant, 10 Leigh 27, 29; Sturdivant v. Birchett, 10 Gratt. 79, 103. See further, monographic note on “Wills” appended to Hughes v. Hughes, 2 Munf. 209. The principal case is also cited in Powell v. Manson, 22 Gratt. 189.
The infant plaintiffs prosecute in the nam e of William Ball, their next friend. — Note in Original Edition.

Opinion:
JUDGE COALTER:
April 10th.
It would be unnecessary in this case to decide, whether the deposition of Ball was properly rejected, if the court was unanimously of opinion that this will, on the merits, could not be supported as a good will of lands. This however not being the case, it becomes necessary for me, at least to express my doubts as to the correctness of that decision.
I think it clear, that if a man's name is used as next friend to infants, without his knowledge or consent at any time given, he is not answerable for costs, and if not so answerable, and in no other way interested, that he is a good witness. The improper conduct of adult plaintiffs or their counsel, in prosecuting a suit in this way, jointly *with infants, cannot prejudice the latter, nor subject the next friend, without his assent, to the payment of costs.
There is no proof in the cause, that the witness even knew that his name had been used as next friend; on the contrary, it is in proof, that when it was first so used he was ignorant of it. It does not appear that he ever paid fees to counsel, attended to take depositions, or took any part in the business. It is said, he was probably so named in the commissions; but' this does not appear: on the contrary, the caption of his deposition recites a commission in a suit between "Burwell and others and Corbin and others;" and in another deposition taken before the same justices, the caption recites the names of the parties, without naming Ball as next friend. Had he been so named in the commission by which his deposition was taken, it is strange that neither the justices nor the parties should have adverted to the extraordinary fact of one of the plaintiffs giving evidence in the cause.
But this deposition was not excepted to, by endorsement on it, as is usual in chancery suits. On the contrary, the cause was twice heard on this deposition with others, without objection; once, probably when Ball was alive, and once during the same term, at which his death is stated in the record; at which time too the issue was directed, and the depositions of the witnesses who were dead, ordered to be read on the trial.
There is, therefore, not only the absence of the necessary proof to shew an interest in the witness; but all these facts and circumstances tend to prove the contrary.
But then it is said, that if Ball was not answerable for costs, there was no next friend of the infants, and so they were not properly parties to the suit; and as in that case depositions against them could not be read, so neither could those in their favor; and that on this ground, Ball's deposition would be properly rejected. This at first appeared to me a formidable objection; but on reflection I am not entirely satisfied with it. Suppose one of the defendants' important witnesses had been dead, and his deposition objected to on this ground, that Ball had never assented to become next friend, might it not well have been said in answer to this, that the suit was regularly brought, a next friend to the infants being named? He could have assented, had the deposition been in his favour, and in that case it would have been read; but as it is against him, he chooses now to dissent, and thus the process of the court will be used to entrap and defraud the parties. I should think it would be very hard to exclude the deposition on the part of the defendant under such circumstances. But, if it would have been proper to exclude Ball's deposition for this reason, and if that reason will go equally to exclude all the depositions on both sides, (for they were all taken before Burwell was appointed next friend,) ought not the chancellor to have set aside the verdict, to have awarded new commissions, or to have directed a new trial, excluding all the depositions?
These are important considerations, which I should deem worthy of further investigation, and proper to be decided one way or the other, were it not, that excluding Ball's testimony, and considering every thing else as regular, I am satisfied, on the merits, that the writing in question cannot be supported as a good will cf lands.
This paper-writing, signature and all, is in the handwriting of the appellee Corbin, who is the principal devisee; and the question is, whether its execution is properly attested and proved by two subscribing witnesses?
The statute requires that a will of lands shall be in writing, and where not wholly written by the testator himself, shall be signed by him, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and be attested by two or more credible witnesses in his presence.
In the case before us, the" alledged will is one which is not signed by the testator, as before stated, but it is proved by a witness, (independent of what is said by one of the subscribing witnesses, as hereafter noticed,) that Corbin ^acknowledged that he himself had subscribed the testator's name to it. The subscribing witnesses also attested it at different times.
I understand it to be clearly established by all the authorities, that every important requisite of the statute must be attested and proved by each witness. Otherwise, there would be but one witness to prove what the law says must be attested by two. They must attest a writing, not a blank sheet; they must attest a writing signed, and not one unsigned. When this writing was handed to the first subscribing witness, and he was asked to attest it, it was not signed. Suppose he had attested' it in that form, and it had remained unsigned until the next day, when the second witness attested it, and the testator had then discovered the omission, and signed 'it; would this be an attestation of a signed will by two witnesses? Or suppose that one witness attests in the presence of the testator, and the same witness takes the same paper into an adjoining room, where another witness only hears the testator acknowledge, and attests the same paper, but not in his presence; although the first witness is one of the highest credit,, and a jury on his evidence should find that it was the same paper which the testator had but the moment be fore signed and published as his will, could it be established as such under the statute?
As I understand the law and all the adjudications upon it, we are not at liberty to believe any thing, which the statute requires to make the will a complete one, on the testimony of one witness. Suppose the statute had required but one witness, and he knows only a part of these facts, which he is to* attest; as, for instance, he knows it was a writing he attested, but he does not know it was a signed writing, and it turns out that the signature, which after-wards appears to it, was not even in the hand-writing of the alledged testator. Could this be established as a will executed, according to the statute? And would not such a decision open a wide door to frauds?
*The witnesses, in this case, attested at different times. The first proves, that when he was called on to attest, the paper was not signed at all. When the testator was reminded of this, he directed Corbin to sign it for him, which he did in his presence. This witness, then, proves the signature by another. But that is not enough. He must prove and did prove, that it was so signed by the direction of the testator, and in his presence; and although it was not stated by the testator to be his will that he had thus caused to be signed; yet, if the other witness had been present at that time, and had attested and proved the same facts, I am not prepared to say that it would not be a publication of a will, notwithstanding it was not deolared to be such at the time; although I think, especially where it is written and signed by another, that there are many reasons which would require a publication of it, in some way indicating that it was a will, in order to guard against frauds. The other witness, however, is totally silent as to the signature. In his deposition, he does not say it was a signed paper. But the verdict, after mentioning this writing as proved by the first witness, goes on to find that this same paper was presented to, and attested by, the second witness. But what is the fair interpretation of this finding? The first witness identified the paper that he speaks of, and which, on the day before, had been signed by Corbin and attested by him: and the second witness subscribed the same paper. The jury then could well find, as they did, without proof by the second witness, that he saw a signature to the paper; and as the deposition of this witness is silent as to signature, and the jury are also silent as to this important point, except so far as they refer to it as the same paper (a term, which they give to it before it was signed at all,) I cannot infer that this witness saw a signature of any kind, when he attested. So, that if the will had been signed by the testator himself, there being no acknowledgment or recognition of the signature before this witness, I think the proof that it *was a signed will, would be incomplete. The verdict is evidently intended simply to state the facts as proved by these two witnesses, and to submit to the court, whether such proof is a compliance with the statute. They had no right to find the fact conclusively, on the testimony of one witness, that it was a signed paper. We must, therefore, consider it, as if they had said "so far as one witness can establish the fact, we find it was a signed paper, and that the said paper, so proved to be a signed paper, was -published to, and attested by, the second witness."
It was a long time, and after much hesitation, before the courts were satisfied, that all the witnesses must not be present at the same time, and see the very fact of signing. Indeed, they ultimately came to this decision, as it were by piece-meal.' First, the testator resealed; which was considered (erroneously as is now admitted) to1 be an act equal to signing; then came a case in which he drew his pen over his name before a subsequent witness. By these solemn acts, it was considered that he had signed in fact before each witness, at different times; and although the statute required that they should attest a signed paper in presence of the testator; yet, as it did not require them to do so in the presence of each other, and having attested what was considered^ the same fact, though at different times, it was thought they could as well prove it as if they had attested together. Having thus established the propriety of a separate attestation, the next question was, whether an acknowledgment of the hand-writing, without resealing or drawing the pen again over the name, would do? It was then discovered, that separate attestations had been too long established to have that question disturbed. Admitting this to be law, then it was found that an acknowledgment of the hand-writing was as good, nay better, than resealing, which at most could only be considered as a recognition of the name opposite to the seal; sealing itself being no signing within the statute; and that it was even better than drawing the pen over the *name again, which some judges seemed to think might be a r.e-execution, and destroy the previous attestation.
An acknowledgment, then, that the signature was the hand-writing of the testator, was considered tantamount to proof of seeing him write his .name. It was capable of disproof too, if a'will not signed by him, was offered to probat; and although it was admitted, that even with this guard, these decisions opened a door to frauds; yet the cases had gone too far to admit of the court's retracing their steps, which they would willingly have done; but they protest against going farther. No case is to be found, in which the acknowledgment of a signature, not in the handwriting of the testator, was held enough.
In Ellis v. Smith, lord Hardwicke said, "It has been hinted as if this determination would lead the way to a farther deviation from the statute, and by consequence allow testators' declarations, that another signed for him, to be good; but authority given by a testator is a collateral thing, and a thing that ought to be proved. Consequence is not to be built upon consequence, in cases of this nature. I think where things are expressly required bástatele, courts are not to say other things shall be equivalent to them."
I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that there is no case under the statute of frauds in England, in which an acknowledgment has been received as equivalent to proof of actual signing, except where the testator has, in some way, recognized the signature as his own hand-writing in the presence of all the witnesses, and who were therefore all capable of attesting the paper as a signed paper. Such recognition has only been held as something equivalent to personal presence, at the act of signing; but it could not be so, unless the signature was at least seen, and in some way acknowledged. No case, I think, has gone beyond this, and all the judges agree that even this was going too far.
*There is no case where the signature was by another, not in the hand-writing of the testator, and where even a full acknowledgment that it was by another (naming him) by the direction and in the presence of the testator, has been held equivalent to proof of all these facts. Lord Hardwicke says, this would not be admitted. A fortiori, all these things would not be inferred by a simple declaration, that "this is my will," even if the witness saw that it was a signed paper. The most that such a declaration would be held to prove, according to the cases, is, that this would be a recognition of the testator's own signature. I incline to think the cases do not go this far;^ but that an express recognition of the signature as his accompanied with proof of that fact, if required, is as far as they establish, and as far as we ought to go. But say it would be a recognition of his signature, if it was actually signed by him; how can an acknowledgment, in the same form of words, prove one thing, to wit: this is my hand, if that had been the fact, or another, to wit: this is my name, signed by such a person in my presence and by my authority, when the witness heard no such thing? If all this is to be inferred from the simple acknowledgment of the will, (which is all that is found in this case as it regards the second witness,) who is to infer it? Not the witness; he can only state the fact. The jury I think could not do so, and if they could, they have not done so. If the court can, it must be, not as an inference of fact, but of law: that according to the true construction of the law, the second witness has proved that the testator, by this acknowledgment, has established the fact, not to the attesting witness but to the court, that this will was signed with his name, by Cor-bin, in his presence and by his direction. We cannot derive our knowledge of this from the first witness. He is not competent, of himself, to prove any important fact, any more than one witness can disprove an answer in chancery. We must have two, and must make out, by construction *of law, those matters of which the second witness was ignorant. We may simplify the enquiry as to our power to do this, by supposing-that Corbin had signed the will before either witness attested, and that they attested, either separately or together, just such an acknowledgment as the second witness proves; could we say that this will was signed by Corbin, in the presence and by the direction of the testator?
If lord Hardwicke is right, as I think he is, in saying that even an express acknowledgment of those facts will not do, surely one, which would import at most that it was his own hand-writing, will not.
One reason why a seal was not considered equal to signing was, that a seal could at this day be easily counterfeited. l.t only remained to counterfeit the hand-writing of a witness or witnesses who were dead, by proving whose hand writing the will would be established. So in the case of signature by another, all that will be necessary will be to sign it in a hand not like that of any person known, and forge the hand-writing of witnesses who are dead; or get witnesses to swear that he acknowledged the will, without stating who wrote the signature, so1 as to avoid detection from the guard that circumstance would afford, and the will is established, as one signed by authority.
When a man acknowledges a will signed by himself, he knows the fact that he did sign it, and if it turns out that a will is offered to probat, not signed by himself, the fraud is detected. But he may think he is acknowledging such a will as this, when in fact, being in extremity, another, not signed by him, has been imposed upon him.
I am therefore humbly of opinion, that if we establish this will, we must do it' on the testimony of one witness only, and as the law does not permit this, that the decree of the chancellor must be reversed.
1 Vez. junr. 11.