Case Name: EMMA DUNCKEL, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DUNCKEL, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-02
Citations: 63 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 25
Docket Number: 
Parties: EMMA DUNCKEL, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DUNCKEL, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 63
Pages: 25–35

Head Matter:
EMMA DUNCKEL, Respondent, v. WILLIAM DUNCKEL, Appellant.
Oral agreement by a sole legatee and executor of a deceased maker of a note, to pay it — right to enforce the agreed consideration therefoi', viz., the giving of a life estate in land.
'One J. A. Dunckel, -wko was indebted in an amount of over $11,000, for the payment of about $7,500 of which one William Dunckel was liable as surety, died, leaving a will appointing his wife executrix and sole legatee thereunder. Soon after the death, William Dunckel promised the widow and executrix that if she would pay these debts on which he was liable, and would save him from paying the same, he would give her a life estate in certain land which had been occupied by John A. Dunckel during his lifetime, but of which William Dunckel was the owner. The widow agreed to pay these debts, for which, at that time, it was uncertain whether the estate of the deceased would be sufficient. She subsequently paid the debts, and delivered the notes on which William Dunckel was liable, to him, and demanded the life lease of the premises which she had continued to occupy after the death of John A. Dunckel, her testator.
It was claimed by William Dunckel that there was no consideration for the contract, inasmuch as the debts in question had been paid out of the assets of the estate of the testator, who was primarily liable.
Reid, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the defendant because of any money thus paid, for the reason that she had paid nothing except what she was bound to pay from the moneys belonging to the estate of her testator without regard to the agreement. (Learned, P. J., dissenting, on the ground that the promise was to pay the debts, whether the assets were sufficient or not.)
That the agreement was in violation of the provisions of section 8 of title 1 of chapter 7 of part 2 of the Revised Statutes, providing that “ every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration be in writing, and be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made.”
That while there are cases where purchasers have entered into possession of land, and paid the purchase-money or made substantial improvements and considerable expenditures thereon, in which courts of equity will specifically enforce the parol agreement, yet, in this case, there was no fraud to be frustrated, and no injustice to be prevented, and equity would not interpose on' the plaintiff’s behalf. (Learned, P. J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendant from so much of a judgment, entered in the above-entitled action in the office of the clerk of the county of Montgomery on the 23d day of April, 1888, as awarded judgment against the defendant, and also from orders denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and form an order granting an extra allowance.
The action was tried before the court and a jury at the Montgomery Circuit, and the judgment directed that, within ten days after service upon him of a certified copy thereof, the defendant, William Dunckel, should execute and deliver, duly acknowledged, to the plaintiff, Emma Dunckel, a proper and sufficient lease for her life of certain premises in the village of Fort Plain, Montgomery county, New York.
N. O. Moak, for the appellant.
JE. Counfryman, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Fish, J.:
John A. Dunckel, the husband of plaintiff and son of defendant,, died on the 9th day of February, 1883. At the time of his death John A. and his wife were occupying a house and lot, in the village of Fort Plain, which was owned by the defendant. They had occupied the same for about seventeen years, paying no rent to defendant, during which time John A. paid the taxes and made improvements upon the property from time to time, which amounted in the aggregate, according to the testimony of plaintiff, to about the sum of $2,800. Before that time the defendant advanced to-his son $3,000 with which to start business; and had paid $2,500-for the house and lot. When John A. died he was largely indebted to divers persons, and the defendant was indorser or surety for him upon divers notes, constituting a considerable part of the indebtedness, and was thus contingently liable to pay the notes. It was not known to a certainty whether or not the estate of the deceased was. sufficient to pay his debts in full. There was some uncertainty about it. It afterwards transpired that the entire indebtedness of the estate, which plaintiff paid as executrix, was $11,147, and the assets which came into plaintiff's hands as executrix netted, in the aggregate, $11,781, sufficient in amount to pay all the indebtedness, and leave-a balance, enough' to cover the fees of plaintiff as executrix and $300 allowance to which she was entitled by statute. It was, also, afterwards ascertained that the sum for which defendant was so-liable as surety was about $7,500.
Soon after the death of John A., and before administration upon his estate, the defendant, not knowing the exact amount of the son's-estate, and being apprehensive that it might not be sufficient to pay and satisfy all of said indebtedness, so that he might be required to-pay some balance of said debts from his own means, agreed orally with plaintiff that if she would pay said indebtedness, he would give her a life lease for her own life of the before-mentioned house and lot which she then continued to occupy after her husband's death.
Plaintiff herein agreed to the proposition and proceeded with her-duties as executrix of her husband's estate, and with the moneys-realized from her husband's estate paid the debts, paid all the notes upon which defendant was indorser or surety, and gave'them up to the defendant, asking for the promised life lease. The plaintiff did not pay any part of said indebtedness from her own money or means, .and was compensated for her duties as executrix by her lawful fees. There was no money or property consideration passed between them. 'The plaintiff was at the time in possession and actual occupancy of the premises in question; had no occasion to move or make any change in her business or condition in consequence of the agreement. She .•simply continued to occupy the same as she had done while her husband was living.
There is great conflict in the testimony as to whether or not the defendant ever made the agreement found, but there was sufficient -evidence to justify a finding that it was so agreed; on this appeal, the case must be treated on the assumption that such an agreement was made.
Upon the case stated this action cannot be maintained. The agreement in question is obnoxious to the provisions of section 8 of title 1 of chapter 7, part 2 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:
" Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, •or for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing and be subscribed by the party by whom, the lease or sale is to be made."
There are cases where, in pursuance of a parol agreement, purchasers have entered into possession of land, paid the purchase-money or made substantial improvements and considerable expenditures thereon, in which courts of equity have enforced the agreements .by compelling a performance.' (Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y., 34; Miller v. Ball, 64 id., 286; Kenyon v. Youlen, 53 Hun, 592.) However, in the case before us, we have not one which conies within the principle thus decided. The plaintiff herein lias done nothing to entitle her to the relief demanded. There is no fraud to be frustrated, no injustice to be prevented. Equity interposes only in such cases on account of what a party has done, as where the parol purchaser has fulfilled and lias invested either money or other value which will be lost to him and gained by the other party, unless the latter be required to perform his part of the parol agreement. In other words, equity is allowed to relieve the stern features of the .statute of frauds only when it it necessary to do so, and in cases where the enforcement of the statute would work a fraud rather than prevent one.
The full payment of the purchase-money in a parol purchase of land, standing alone, does not entitle a party to relief as against the-statute. There must be some further action. In cases of the purchase of lands in general, the taking possession and making improvements after payment of the purchase-money has heen held a necessary condition. (Malins v. Brown, 4 N. Y., 403; Miller v. Ball, supra; Freeman v. Freeman, supra; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y., 231.)
There was no sufficient consideration passing between the parties-to uphold the agreement; whatever conversation did pass between, plaintiff and defendant after the death of John A. Dunckel, regarding the subject of controversy, had relation to the estate of the deceased. John A. Dunckel had left a will in which he had made plaintiff his sole executrix and residuary legatee. She was about to take charge of the estate in her capacity as executrix, in the discharge of the duties of which she was bound to apply the same to the payment of the debts of her deceased husband. If defendant agreed to-anything, it was simply this ; if she applied the assets of the estate-to the payment of the debts in full, so that the defendant should not be called upon to pay any part of them, he would let her stay where she was, would not disturb her possession, but would give-her a lease for her lifc for the house and lot. It was only a good natured promise by an old man to the widow, which created no-legal obligation on either side, and, as a fact, the plaintiff did nothing but apply the money of the estate as it was her duty to do,, and which the law would have enforced. This agreement was of no more legal force than would have been a promise that if she-discharged the duties of her trust properly and according to law, he would make her a handsome present, or would give her additional compensation.
It is not a matter of much moment in this case what was the arrangement between the father and son at the time he purchased the house. The defendant bought the property for $2,500, and allowed his son to occupy the same for seventeen years without paying rent. Prior to that time he had advanced to his son $3,000' to go into business. Suppose, then, at the time he bought it, he had :said he was buying it for his son, it was an expression, as between father and son, having a different meaning than if between strangers. Every father as he advances in years is laboring for his children and .saving his estate for them. Then suppose the story of the plaintiff to be true, that in the course of seventeen years her husband had laid out $2,800 in improvements, he' would scarcely by that process have paid a rent equal to the interest on the purchase-money, and would not have reduced the advance of $3,000 before advanced •to him. In the year 1866, when defendant made the purchase, •the i'ate of interest was seven per cent; so that the interest on •$2,500 ran at the rate of $175 per year for the seventeen years, and -exceeded the amount of the son's repairs and improvements. As •between the father and son while living, there was no legal or •equitable right on the part of the son to demand a deed.
This action is not to be decided upon any sentimental idea oí what an old father ought, in good nature, to do for his children or •.their widows. "When relatives resort to the courts to enforce alleged legal demands, they must be governed by the same rules •and bearings as other hostile parties.
Finally, as an independent proposition, this plaintiff has not done anything or paid anything which gives her a claim of any sort against defendant. She could not maintain an action- against defendant for any money paid, because she has paid nothing except what she was bound to pay from the moneys belonging to the estate, without regard to the agreement. He owes her nothing for services. All she has done was to discharge the duties of executrix, for which she was paid out of the estate. It was not part of the agreement that she was to act as executrix, nor did she assume that duty because of the agreement. She expected to and did accept the trust because the will of her husband so appointed. The defendant agreed with her that if she would do her duty in the discharge of that trust, as the law itself required, he would give her the life lease. There was, therefore, no legal consideration for the agreement.
The finding of the Special Term that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendant, and requiring him to execute to plaintiff a life lease of the premises was error, and the judgment should be reversed.
Let judgment be reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event.