Case Name: Willard Wayne MAYNARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1959-11-18
Citations: 331 S.W.2d 63
Docket Number: No. 31022
Parties: Willard Wayne MAYNARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 331
Pages: 63–64

Head Matter:
Willard Wayne MAYNARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 31022.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 18, 1959.
On Motion to Reinstate Appeal Jan. 20, 1960.
Brown & Shuman, by Clifford W. Brown, Lubbock, for appellant.
William J. Gillespie, County Atty., J. Q. Warnick, Jr., Asst. County Atty., Lubbock, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
WOODLEY, Judge.
The complaint and information contained three counts alleging separate offenses of speeding. Each count alleged for enhancement of punishment purposes a separate prior conviction in corporation court for speeding.
The jury found appellant guilty upon all three counts and assessed the punishment as to each at 30 days in jail and a fine of $100 and the judgment rendered cumulated the jail terms.
The State moves that the appeal he dismissed because the record does not show that notice of appeal was given in open court and entered of record, as required by Art. 827, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
The motion is well taken. Baker v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 172, 128 S.W.2d 1201.
The appeal is dismissed.
On Motion to Reinstate the Appeal
Supplemental transcript having been filed showing that notice of appeal was properly given and entered, appellant's motion to reinstate the appeal is granted.
The principal point raised is the sufficiency of the evidence to identify ap pellant as the defendant in the corporation court convictions.
The State offered the testimony of the arresting officer in each case identifying appellant as the person who was arrested and to whom certain numbered speeding tickets were issued. Complaints and judgments of the corporation court bearing these same numbers were offered in evidence.
No person who was present at the trial, if there was a trial, identified appellant as the defendant in either of the corporation court cases. He did not, so far as the record reveals, sign any authorization for a plea of guilty to be entered for him.
The State relies upon Rice v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 367, 292 S.W.2d 114; Martinez v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 142, 268 S.W.2d 139; Usener v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 274 S.W.2d 710 and Ellison v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 406, 227 S.W.2d 545, in each of which the evidence was held sufficient though there was no testimony from a witness present at the prior trial to identify the defendant as the person previously convicted.
The cases cited all dealt with a prior conviction in the county court for an offense for which a jail term could be assessed and at tire trial of which the presence of the defendant was mandatory. We are unwilling to extend these holdings to cases where the defendant is not required to attend the trial. The evidence shows that in the Lubbock Corporation Court anyone may appear before the Cashier and pay a fine, which results in the entry of a judgment of conviction against the person to whom a designated traffic ticket was issued.
We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that appellant was previously convicted as alleged. Without the prior convictions available for enhancement, the punishment assessed is in excess of the maximum provided for the offenses charged.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.