Case Name: Burnice C. BAXLEY, Danny Lee Harvey, Frederick C. Hazelwood, and Glenn Barna, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee; Andre TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-11-25
Citations: 411 So. 2d 194
Docket Number: Nos. 79-36, 80-17, 80-64, 80-65, 80-454 and 80-456
Parties: Burnice C. BAXLEY, Danny Lee Harvey, Frederick C. Hazelwood, and Glenn Barna, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Andre TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, C. J., ORFINGER, and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 411
Pages: 194–197

Head Matter:
Burnice C. BAXLEY, Danny Lee Harvey, Frederick C. Hazelwood, and Glenn Barna, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Andre TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 79-36, 80-17, 80-64, 80-65, 80-454 and 80-456.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 25, 1981.
Joseph W. DuRocher, Public Defender, Glenn Klausman and Thomas E. Doss, III, Asst. Public Defenders, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, for appellants Baxley, Harvey, Hazelwood, and Barna.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant Taylor.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Michael Barnette, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
The question involved in these cases which have been consolidated for appeal is whether specific intent, i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, is a requisite element of grand theft pursuant to section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1979).
In Faison v. State, 390 So.2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), this court held that the "intent to permanently deprive" was required and that an information omitting this allegation was fatally defective. See also Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 979 (Fla.1981); State v. Allen, 362 So.2d 10 (Fla.1978); Hilty v. State, 386 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). In Allen, the supreme court held that there was no evidence of legislative intent to eliminate specific criminal intent as an element of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1977). In Bell, the supreme court found specific intent to be a requisite element of robbery and affirmed the definition of specific intent as "the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property."
This court sitting en banc follows Faison and again holds that specific intent, i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, is a requisite element of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1979).
The state contended that "the enactment of section 812.014 requires a construction that section 812.041 has been repealed to the extent that it may be in conflict with section 812.014." We disagree. Section 812.041 provides for an unauthorized temporary use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, boat or boat motor. Interpreting section 812.014 to require an allegation of specific intent to permanently deprive will achieve a field of operation for each statute. The principle was best stated by Chief Judge Dauksch in Carcaise v. Durden, 382 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980):
We also agree with the proposition that the legislature is presumed to know its own statutes and when it enacts a new statute, it is done with that knowledge. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Lee, 142 Fla. 68, 194 So. 305 (1940). However, we are also guided by the 'general presumption that later statutes are passed with knowledge of prior existing laws, and a construction is favored which gives each one a field of operation, rather than have the former repealed by implication.' (citations omitted)
382 So.2d at 1239.
"An indictment or information in the language of the statute is ordinarily sufficient, except where the words of the statute do not contain all of the essential elements of the offense; but, if the statute omits an essential element, the indictment [or information] must supply it with certainty." United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1972). In these cases, the informations did not allege the "intent to permanently deprive" and are therefore fatally defective.
REVERSED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., ORFINGER, and SHARP, JJ., concur.
COBB, J., dissents with opinion.
COWART, J., concurs with dissent.
. Section 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (1979), provides:
A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent:
(a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom.
(b) To appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto.
. Section 812.041, Florida Statutes (1979), states:
(1) Any person who temporarily uses any motor vehicle, aircraft, boat or boat motor without the authority of the owner or his representative, or who shall knowingly be a party to such unauthorized use, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to any case in which the taking of the property of another is with intent to steal the same or in which the taking is under a claim of right or with the presumed consent of the owner of other person having the legal control, care, or custody of the same.