Case Name: R. H. BURRITT, Appellant, v. Bob HARRIS, Ray Greene, Lem Merritt, Julian Warren, and Fletcher Morgan, as and Constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, and John H. Crosby, as Zoning Director of Duval County, Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1964-07-02
Citations: 166 So. 2d 168
Docket Number: No. E-310
Parties: R. H. BURRITT, Appellant, v. Bob HARRIS, Ray Greene, Lem Merritt, Julian Warren, and Fletcher Morgan, as and Constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, and John H. Crosby, as Zoning Director of Duval County, Florida, Appellees.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 166
Pages: 168–182

Head Matter:
R. H. BURRITT, Appellant, v. Bob HARRIS, Ray Greene, Lem Merritt, Julian Warren, and Fletcher Morgan, as and Constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, and John H. Crosby, as Zoning Director of Duval County, Florida, Appellees.
No. E-310.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
July 2, 1964.
Marks, Gray, Yates, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, for appellant.
J. Henry Blount and Thomas D. Oakley, Jacksonville, for appellees.

Opinion:
MASON, Associate Judge.
This is the second appeal of this case. The first was an interlocutory appeal brought by the appellees herein from an interlocutory order of the chancellor refusing to dismiss this suit on appellees' motion. Appellees (defendants below) sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that an original suit did not lie in equity to review a decision of a county zoning board, but that the same could only be reviewed by cer-tiorari. We affirmed the chancellor under authority of Harris et al. v. Goff et al., Fla.App., 151 So.2d 642, and held that the actions of a county zoning board were legislative in character and not quasi-judicial. Harris et al. v. Burritt, Fla., 151 So.2d 645. Thereupon a final hearing was held upon the complaint and answer of the appellees herein and testimony taken, and decree was entered by the chancellor dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
The sole question to be determined is whether appellees abused their authority in refusing to rezone appellant's land from residential to industrial use. It is the position of appellant that the record upon which the chancellor's order of dismissal with prejudice is based does not reflect such substantial and reasonable relationship between the public health, morals, safety and welfare of the citizens of Duval County and a residential-use zoning as to justify and sustain the refusal of the County Zoning Board (appellees herein) to rezone so as to permit him to use his land for industrial purposes. He assigns as error the chancellor's order of dismissal, the effect of which order is to uphold the action of the Zoning Board.
The record herein discloses that pursuant to statutory authority the appellees constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County adopted a zoning resolution for the unincorporated areas of Duval County including the property now owned by appellant. This resolution was adopted prior to appellant's purchase of the property in 1957, and zoned the property in question as "Residence 'A' ". Property zoned as "Residence 'A' " has its use thereby restricted exclusively to residences, publicly owned and operated recreational facilities, churches and schools, and non-commercial boat piers or slips for docking private watercraft, and accessory buildings. After purchasing the property appellant tried unsuccessfully several times to have the appellees rezone his property from "Residence 'A' " use to permit industrial use of it. Each time he was turned down by the appellees. His last application was a request to have the zoning of his property changed from "Residence 'A' " to "Industrial 'A' ". This suit is one to have the Court declare the "Residence 'A' " zoning classification void as unreasonable, arbitrary, and confiscatory of appellant's property, and to enjoin appellees from enforcing as against appellant's property any zoning restrictions more stringent than "Industrial 'A'
Property zoned "Industrial 'A' " by the zoning regulations may be used for light to medium manufacturing and industry, including sawmills and machine shops, for certain commercial uses, and for retail establishments. Testimony before the chancellor establishes that appellant paid $23,500 for his property zoned "Residence 'A' ", and that its value so zoned at the time of final hearing was $32,500. If the zoning classification were changed to "Industrial .'A' " its value would approximate $65,000.
Appellant's property on its western boundary abuts and is contiguous to the eastern boundary of Imeson Municipal Airport, the commercial airport serving the City of Jacksonville and owned and operated by that city. A portion of the Airport also borders upon the southern boundary of appellant's property, so that his property is bounded on the south and the west by the Airport. To the east and north of appellant's property lies other residentially-zoned property which borders upon the Broward River. Thus appellant's property is bounded on the north and east by other residentially-zoned property, and upon the south and west by the Airport. Appellant's property has no water frontage. The Airport is not under the jurisdiction of county zoning. Therefore, the City as owner does not have to conform to any regulations of the County. The Airport has an east-west runway, the easternmost end of which lies approximately 700 feet south of the south line of appellant's property. There is a north-east south-west runway, the north end of which lies to the west of plaintiff's property. However, the City of Jacksonville has secured aviation easements over the area which lies between said northern terminus of said runway and the Broward River to the north. The easternmost boundary of this easement is within 1000 feet of the northwest corner of appellant's property. The only way of ingress and egress to appellant's- property is a county owned and maintained road known as Cedar Bay Road which begins at Main Street Road to the west of appellant's property and runs easterly norlfh of appellant's property, turning south at the northeast corner thereof and dead-ending at a point east of the southeast corner of his said property. Main Street Road is a thoroughfare running generally north and south to the west of and parallel to the Airport, and parallel to the residential property which lies north of said Cedar Bay Road. There are residences scattered along this Cedar Bay Road in an area zoned "Residence 'A' ". Aircraft using the north-east south-west runway approach and leave this runway over the easement adjacent to and across said Cedar Bay Road. Jet aircraft, including F 102 jets operated by the Air National Guard, use this runway for take-off and landing. At the time of the final hearing the Airport had a combined total of 608 scheduled commercial flights daily in and out of said airport. Six commercial air lines use the Aib-port and operate 18 daily jet flights from it. There was testimony that numerous complaints had been made to the City of Jacksonville by the residents along Cedar Bay Road concerning the noise made by jets taking off from the Airport from this north-east south-west runway. The City Commissioner in charge of the Airport testified that these complaints, along with the opinion of the Federal Aviation Agency that the area around the Airport was too crowded, has caused the City to consider building a new airport for the City of Jacksonville.
Appellant produced testimony that his property is of the same type, i. e., rolling sand hills, scrub oaks and pine, as that of adjacent properties lying to the south-east and south of him and which are zoned for industrial use, and which are now being used by various oil companies as oil terminals. Two real estate appraisers testified that appellant's property is unsuitable- for residential purposes due to its proximity to the airport and that the highest and best use to which it could he put is industrial use. These witnesses testified that the Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Administration would not approve mortgage loans for residences upon this property because of its airport proximity. St. Regis Paper Company operates a paper mill on the other side of Broward River from appellant's property and the real estate experts testified that the odors from the mill were detrimental to residential use of appellant's property.
The Zoning Director of Duval County testified that adjacent properties zoned for industrial use by appellees were so zoned because they had river frontage; that "Industrial 'A' " zoning requested by appellant, if granted, would permit light (and under certain conditions, heavy) industries and manufacturing which could have smokestacks that could produce smoke. This, in the judgment of appellees, would be detrimental to aircraft taking off and landing upon the north-east south-west runway used mostly by jet aircraft, both because of the possible height of the stacks and smoke emanating therefrom. The City Commissioner of Jacksonville in charge of the Airport also testified that industrial smoke emanating from existing industry has created a hazard to aircraft using the Airport. The Zoning Director also testified that a change in zoning of appellant's property to industrial use would be detrimental to the owners of residences in the residential area adjacent to appellant's property. Thus, the refusal to rezone appellant's property was based upon two factors, viz.: safety and anticipated damage and injury to adjacent residents. The Zoning Director also stated that the Zoning Board considered as premature a change of this property to industrial use at the time of its last refusal, in view of the uncertainty of the future use of Imeson Airport.
Two of the conditions which appellant claims makes his property undesirable for residential purposes, viz.: proximity to the Airport and proximity to the St. Regis Paper Mill, existed at the time appellant purchased his property. Also, at the time of his purchase, the property was zoned for residential use only.
There are certain principles pertinent to the disposition of this appeal. First, the right of an owner to devote his land to any legitimate use is property within the terms of both the Federal and State Constitutions, and zoning authorities may not, under the guise of the police power, impose unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions upon such use. Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406; State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Company v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210; Friedland v. Hollywood, Fla.App., 130 So.2d 306. Zoning boards are in the same category as all other administrative boards with reference to validity of regulations or ordinances promulgated by them, and although their ordinances and regulations will be given serious consideration and their judgments great weight, where it is conclusively shown that they deprive a person of his property without due process or otherwise infringe on state or federal constitutional guarantees unreasonably, such ordinances and regulations cannot be said to be reasonably debatable, and will be declared invalid. Zoning regulations which have no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, are arbitrary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, Fla., 71 So.2d 148; Tollius v. City of Miami, Fla., 96 So.2d 122. When property, restricted to a defined use by a zoning regulation, changes its character to the extent that it is no longer adaptable to the use it is zoned for, it then becomes the duty of the zoning authorities to relax its restrictions if a failure to do so would result in confiscation of the property. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642. When a particular attempted exercise of the police power by a state, or under its authority, passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat, it will be stricken down and declared void. Purity Extract & Tonic Company v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 33 S.Ct. 44, 57 L.Ed. 184, "Spot zoning", that is to say, variances from the general pattern of the zoning regulation, which permits a less restrictive use of some properties in the area zoned than other properties therein, and which violate the integrity of the district and destroy the character of the neighborhood, is universally condemned by the courts. City of Miami Beach v. Midcentury Corp., Fla., 75 So.2d 606; Parking Facilities v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 88 So.2d 141.
The burden is upon the appellant to show reversible error, for the decree of the chancellor comes before this Court clothed with the presumption of correctness. City of Miami v. Hollis, Fla., 77 So.2d 834. One who assails the validity of a zoning regulation must carry the burden of proving its invalidity, and this burden is an extraordinary one. Blank et al. v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, Florida, decided by the District Court of Florida, Second District, 161 So.2d 683, opinion filed February 28, 1964; City of Miami Beach v. Silver, Fla., 67 So.2d 646. The Zoning board acts in a legislative capacity and the Court in reviewing its action may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364. Legislative intent will be sustained if the validity of the regulation in its application to the property in question is "fairly debatable". City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, Fla., 86 So.2d 442. The regulation is said to be "fairly debatable" when for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, Fla., 71 So.2d 148. The fact that property zoned residential is more valuable for commercial purposes does not of itself invalidate a zoning regulation or ordinance. Polk Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, Fla.App.1962, 143 So.2d 917. The fact that a property owner purchased the property with knowledge of the restriction placed upon its use by a zoning regulation is a factor to be considered by the zoning board in considering his application for a variance or change on the claim of hardship, even though he still could attack its validity on the ground that the regulation was void from its inception on constitutional grounds. Mayer v. Dade County, Fla., 82 So.2d 513.
We have considered the facts of this case as reflected in the record before the chancellor in the light of the several principles enunciated, supra, and arrive at the conclusion that the chancellor did not err in dismissing this suit with prejudice. We, therefore, affirm.
Inherent in the order of dismissal below is the finding by the trial court that the appellees did not abuse their authority in refusing to rezone appellant's land to permit industrial use of it. As to appellant's charge that a continuation of residential-use zoning amounts to confiscation of his property, this is refuted by the fact that the value of his property actually increased from its purchase price of $23,500 to $32,500, between the date of purchase in June of 1957 to the date of the final hearing herein on June 3, 1963. We fail to see that an increase of over 38% in value during a six-year period amounts to confiscation. Furthermore, appellant has failed to carry the burden of showing that the character of his property has so changed as to make a refusal by the Zoning Board to alter its zoning classification, confiscation of his property.
Nor do we believe that the appellant has carried the burden of establishing that the action of the appellees, acting as the Zoning Board, in continuing the residential-use character of his property, was, under the circumstances as reflected in the testimony and evidence before the chancellor, either arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory. We conclude that the chancellor was correct in concluding that their action was not permeated with either of said vices. It is true that the evidence before him was conflicting, but we hold that he was justified in determining, as he evidently did in dismissing the suit, that there was such a substantial and reasonable relationship between the public safety and welfare of the citizens and residents of the County and a residential-use zoning as to justify and sustain appellees' refusal to rezone appellant's property to permit its industrial use. The evidence is ample to support a finding that to permit industrial use of this property would increase an already existing hazardous condition surrounding Imeson Airport, and thus make the use of the Airport more unsafe than it now is, without the addition of more buildings and structures which could be located on appellant's property if it were permitted to be put to industrial use. The fact that appellant's property lies contiguous to the terminus of the runway of the Airport which is most used for landings and take-offs of aircraft, particularly large jets, would alone justify appellees' refusal to permit its industrial use. And certainly the appellees should, as they evidently did, consider the welfare of the residents of dwellings located along Cedar Bay Road to the north and east of appellant's property. These people had the right to be secure in the fact that the area in which they established their dwellings, and which includes appellant's land, was and would remain residential in character, and that they would not have to be subjected to the various nuisances to abutting residents usually associated with the industrial use of property. At any rate, appellant purchased this land knowing at the time that it could be put to residential use only and thus by his .own conduct created the exact hardship of which he now complains.
Appellant charges that appellees have been guilty of "spot zoning" in the general area of his property, in violation of the provision of the statute under which they act as a Zoning Board, which requires that zoning regulations "shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan". He cites in support of this charge seven variances granted by the Zoning Board since 1950. However, an examination of the map of the area (plaintiff's Exhibit 4), refutes this charge, for all of the variances involve properties lying great distances from appellant's land, with one exception, and that is the property now zoned "Industrial 'B' ", lying to the south and east of his land, with only a small portion of it touching his southeast corner. The Zoning Director distinguished the character of this latter area from that of appellant's land, stating that all of it was waterfront property, and that appellant's was not. The aerial map in evidence of the general area surrounding appellant's property, of the Airport, of the industrial areas to the west, south and east' of the Airport, and of the residential areas lying to the north and east of appellant's land, depicts the fact that there are no residences in the areas rezoned from residential to industrial use. The same map depicts numerous residences spotted throughout the areas still zoned "Residence 'A' ", and lying to the north and east of appellant's property. As we have seen, appellant's property is completely surrounded by either the Airport or other residence property. Therefore, the granting of the variances complained of in no wise affects the character of the neighborhood in which his property lies. It is evident that the variances granted by appellees, and the granting of which appellant says is discriminatory in relation to the Zoning Board's refusal to grant his request, in no wise violate the integrity of the area in which appellant's land lies, nor destroy the character of that neighborhood as a residential district.
We cannot say that the action of the Zoning Board has been proven herein to have been either arbitrary or unreasonable. Nor has it been shown to have been discriminatory, or confiscatory as it affects appellant's property. Certainly, this record reflects that in its application to appellant's property the regulation of the Zoning Board which zoned such property for residential use only is "fairly debatable", and being so, the legislative intent is sustained.
The order of the chancellor below dismissing appellant's suit with prejudice is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., concurs.
RAWLS, J., dissents.