Case Name: Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Granville D. Pointer
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1874-07
Citations: 14 Kan. 37
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Granville D. Pointer.
Judges: All the Justices concurring.
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 37–67

Head Matter:
Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Granville D. Pointer.
1. Negligence oe Railway Company; Management of Moving Train. Where a person has been run over by a railroad train and injured, in an action for damages therefor a finding that the injury was caused by the gross negligence of the company will not be set aside when it appears that'he was run over by a train consisting of a locomotive, tender, one baggage and two passenger cars, which was started backward over á public crossing, in a populous city, with the brake on the engine out of repair and useless, with no brakemen at the other brakes, with no flagman*or other person at the rear of the train, or at the crossing, to warn persons of their danger, and no one on the train except three per_ sons, who were all on the locomotive, without the blowing of any whistle( though with the ringing of a bell, and along a track which from the locomotive could not be seen for a distance of from forty to fifty feet from the rear of the train.
2. --Ordinary Negligence. Where the term negligence is used without any qualifying word, it will be generally understood that ordinary negligence is meant.
3. --Contributory Negligence. Where the plaintiff is guilty of ordinary negligence, contributing directly to the injury, he cannot recover, except perhaps in cases of wanton and willful injury.
4. --Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is matter of defense; and if the record shows negligence of the defendant, and is silent as to the conduct of the plaintiff, a judgment for the plaintiff will be upheld.
5. Special Findings; Practice. Where any one of the findings in a special verdict is not specific and certain, either party may require that it may be made so before the jury is discharged.
6. --■ Where a finding, either regarded by itself or in the light of other findings, is not specific and certain, and the jury is discharged without any objection to it, or any effort to have it made specific and certain, it will thereafter be construed against the party in whose favor it is found.
V.--Contributory Negligence; Construction of Findings. In this case thfe jury found that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, immediately causing the injury; they also found that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, without specifying what degree of negligence, or whether proximately or remotely contributory: held, that it was apparent from the other findings, and the instructions of the court, that they intended only such slight negligence as was consistent with a right to recover compensation.
8. Negligence; When a Question for Jury. Where the facts are disputed, negligence is a question of fact for the jury: where the facts are undisputed, and but one deduction is to be drawn from them, it presents a question of law for the courts; but where the facts are undisputed, but are of such a nature that different minds will draw different conclusions from them as to the reasonableness and care of a party’s conduct, it is a proper question for the determination of a jury.
9. Concurring Verdicts. Where three successive juries have, on a doubtful question of negligence, found for the plaintiff, this court should be clearly convinced of the existence of error before it orders the setting aside of the third verdict.
Error from, Atchison Eistrict Court.
This case was here once before, and is reported in 9 Kas., 620, where a full statement of the pleadings, and of the main facts will be found, pp. 621, 622. On being remanded to the district court, another trial was had, at the June Term 1873. The facts, as proven on this trial, were set forth in a special verdict, which will be found in the opinion, infra. The jury found for the plaintiff, Pointer, and assessed his damages at $5,000. The Railway Company brings the case here on error.
J. P. Usher, and T. A. Hurd, for plaintiff in error:
1. The jury, by their 12th finding, found that Pointer’s injury was caused by the want of ordinary care and by the gross negligence of the defendant in the manner of running the train, and by the failure of the defendant to keep a lookout of any kind for persons who might be on the track— thereby explaining m what respeet there was a want of ordinary care; and in the 14th finding they further explain what was meant and intended by the language used in the 12th finding; and they further, by the 20th finding, find that the train was handled on that occasion in the usual manner in which said train was handled while backing up to be switched, and was manned as was usual in operating such train; and by the 8th finding^ find that the bell upon the engine was rung until the collision with the plaintiff. Taking these findings together, they show on what facts the jury predicated the finding of negligence on the part of the railway company. We contend that these findings of fact do not show negligence on the part of said company. The jury has found the facts on which they predicated negligence on the part of defendant below, and such facts do not in law constitute negligence. (39 N. Y., 61; 40 N. Y., 9, 34; 42 N. Y., 468.) The defendant below was not bound to keep a flagman on its track to warn persons off, nor to keep a lookout from the rear end of the train for like a purpose, nor keep a man upon the train for like purpose. The persons in charge of the train were not bound to anticipate defendant in error upon the the track, and were not bound to make any provisions for his safety; and if they had seen him, they were not bound to use any care toward him until they had reason to suppose that he would not take care of himself. Had they seen him, they would have had the right to suppose that he was a man of good sight and hearing, and that he would take reasonable car.e to protect himself. The bell was rung in time for him to escape, and he was bound to have left the track or suffer the consequences. (1 Dillon, 579; 39 N. Y., 358; 27 Barbour, 22; 40 N. Y., 34; 42N.Y.,468; 10 Iredell, 402; 55111,379; 25 Mich., 274.) The question whether this ground was used by the public to walk across • or go upon it, gave the public no rights there; and whether plaintiff in, error knew the ground was so used, or permitted the same, was entirely immaterial.
2. By the 13th finding the jury find that Pointer was guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury he received. This finding is decisive of the case, and the judgment below must be reversed and a final judgment for the plaintiff in error entered: 39 N. Y., 358, 368; 41 N. Y., 296; 45 N. Y., 660; 40 N. Y., 34; 29 Iowa, 562; 26 Iowa, 363; 18 Iowa, 280; 20 Iowa, 338, 562; 24 Iowa, 515; 21 Iowa, 15. If there is any doubt whether the jury by the 13th finding intended to find, that the negligence of the defendant in error contributed proximately to his injury, that doubt is removed by the 9th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th findings. The last-mentioned findings are fully sustained by the evidence.
3. Even if the 13th finding be omitted, the facts stated in the 17th, 18th and 19th findings defeat the action. The facts therein found show culpable negligence on the part of defendant in error. 55 111., 379; 1 Dillon, 579; 39 N. Y., 61; 25 Mich., 274.
If there is negligence on the part of both parties which contributed in any degree to the accident, or if plaintiff-below was guilty of negligence, he cannot as a matter of law recover, although defendant also may have been negligent, or may have neglected to perform some statutory requirement. (34 Iowa, 153; 25 Mich., 274; 1 Dillon, 579.) The evidence shows that the plaintiff was walking laterally upon the railroad track owned by the defendant, and further shows that he did not look back to see whether cars were approaching; that he gave no attention to his own safety; and that except for his own gross carelessness in going upon and walking along the track, without using all his faculties to discover approaching trains of cars, he would not have been injured. The rule of law upon this point is, that it is negligence for an intelli gent person to be upon the track of a railroad constantly-used, unless for the purpose of crossing the same; and if a person travel along a railroad track where cars are frequently passing, even for the purpose of crossing a public highway, he.is guilty of such negligence as will prevent a recovery for any injury he may receive, unless from gross and wanton negligence on the part of the employes of the railroad company; and the fact that plaintiff was run over is not presumptive evidence of such negligence on the part of the employes. 55 111,379; 25 Mich.,'274; 33 Ind., 335; 36 Md., 366; 7 Lansing, 11; 52 N. Y., 215.
4. The ground on which the plaintiff was injured was not a public street. It is true, the council of the city in 1863 passed an ordinance declaring certain lands to be a street, but no damages were ever assessed or paid as required by law, and nothing was done toward establishing a street beyond the mere passage of the ordinance; (see 21st finding.) We submit, that this ordinance did not establish a street; and if it did, the defendant in error had no right to go upon and walk laterally upon it. He avers in his petition that this land belonged to plaintiff in error. 5 Wall.,413; 55111,379.
5. The 3d instruction, in these words—
“ If the defendant was running its train in the limits of a populous city, where it was reasonable to anticipate the presence of many persons on the track, then its duty was to keep a vigilant look-out to avoid injury to pérsons on the track, and any violation of that duty would be negligence on its part; and if the plaintiff in this case was injured by reason of such negligence, and through no want of reasonable care on his part, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover full compensatory damages for all injuries so sustained”—
was improper for any form of verdict, and the court erred in giving it. And the following instructions, asked by plaintiff in error, were proper, and the court erred in refusing to give them, to-wit:
“4th. The plaintiff has shown by his own testimony that he stepped onto the track of defendant a short distance in advance of the train, by which he was injured; that he pro ceeded down the track in the same direction in which the train moved, and that after he stepped on the track he did not look behind him until the train was close upon him; and that if he had looked at any time after he stepped upon the track he could have seen the train- if it was approaching, and it is the duty of the jury to so find.
“8th. The defendant had the exclusive right to the use of its track at the point where the injury is testified to have occurred, and was not bound to anticipate the presence of the plaintiff or any other person on its track at that point, or that they would walk there in the way of its operation of its road.
“11th. If the servants of the defendant, upon the starting and backing of the train from the depot, rung the bell and continued to ring the same; and if, as soon as they ascertained the plaintiff was in danger, they stopped the train as soon as it could be done with the usual and ordinary appliances, then these facts tend to prove due care on the part of the defendant.
. “ 17th. If the plaintiff went on the track of the defendant, without the precaution of looking out for approaching trains, and if he neglected to use all his faculties to discover thé danger he was in from approaching trains, it was gross and culpable negligence on his part.”
The judgment upon the special verdict is contrary to law. The judgment is against the evidence. The further findings of fact asked by defendant below were warranted by the evidence, and the court erred in not directing the jury to make further findings.
Stillings & Fenlon, for defendant in error:
The findings in this case show, first, that defendant in error went upon the track of plaintiff in error on his way to the ferry-landing at a place usually frequented and used for such purposes by men, women and children; that before going upon the track he looked and saw that no train was in motion : second, that the train which caused the injury was started in motion after he was on the track, and the employes who moved the train did not see defendant in error — so that they must have started the train in motion without looking to see whether the track was clear or not: third, that the train was moved backward without brakemen, or any persons at or near the rear end of the cars to look out for or warn any person of danger, or to check the ,train if necessary, and at a place where there was much noise and confusion and the blowing of the whistle of the Missouri Pacific engine at a distance of 100 feet away: fourth, that the gross negligence of plaintiff in error in the manner in which the train was so operated was the immediate cause of the injury. It is claimed, however, by plaintiff in error that, although guilty of gross negligence, it is not liable, because the findings show Pointer guilty of negligence contributing to the injury. The acts of Pointer which the jury say are negligence contributory to the injury are set out by them: first, that Pointer, although he looked before stepping on the track to see that no train was coming, failed to turn round and look back for this train in the brief time he was going along and across the track: second, that Pointer could have gone further without getting on the track of the railroad, and then gone directly across the track. But the jury make the distinction as to whether the negligence on the part of Pointer was proximate, or remote, as clearly as could be expected of them in the preparation of a special verdict. They say that the negligence of the plaintiff “ was gross,” and was “ the immediate cause of the injury,” and, while they do not in so many words define the negligence imputed by them to the defendant in error as remote, the qualifying words used by them in the one case, and omitted in the other, show clearly that they intended to so find.
Counsel for plaintiff in error do not, if we correctly understand them, claim but that the company would be liable on the findings but for the acts of negligence set out in the verdict claimed to be contributory negligence on the part of defendant in error, but claim that he is barred of recovery by the acts of negligence imputed to him. In this we think counsel are wrong. The rule, as. laid down in 22 Ohio St., p. 20, would apply, and that the-case, as shown by the findings, comes within the exceptions to the rule of contributed negligence barring recovery. The same principle is sustained by this court, the court holding that in order to defeat plaintiff’s claim, his negligence must “proximately contribute to the injury.” 10 Kas., 472. And see 3 M. & W., 248; 41 E. C. L.,426; 65 Barb.; 67 Penn. St.; 13 Wall., 270; 49 N. Y., 521. That the backing of a train through a place frequented by the public, without any precaution being taken to guard against injury to men, women or children, and that too, at a place where the blowing of whistles and noise would likely prevent persons from observing it, is properly characterized by the jury as gross carelessness.
There is not a single finding of fact by the jury which there is not some evidence tending to establish. This being the case, by repeated decisions of this court, the court is not at liberty to set aside such findings, it being the sole province of the jury to determine whether a fact is established, when there is any evidence tending to prove such fact. And as this court has already laid it down as law, that an action wherein it is found that the proximate cause of the injury complained of was the negligence of the defendant can only be defeated when it is also found as matter of fact that the plaintiff “proximately” or immediately contributed to his own injury, and as there is a finding base'd on evidence that the “immediate,” the “proximate” cause of the injury here was the negligence of plaintiff in error, and no finding that Pointer “proximately” contributed, it seems plain to us that this court is bound by its own rulings to sustain the judgment herein.
This is the second time this case has come to this court by appeal on behalf of the railroad company, and we submit that'the jury, having twice found for defendant in error, is entitled to some consideration in this court.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Brewer, J.:
This was an action brought by Pointer in the district court of Leavenworth county, for personal injury by being knocked down and run over by the cars of plaintiff in error, near the railroad depot in the city of Leavenworth, on the 4th of February, 1870. The venue was changed to Atchison county, and the cause was tried before a court and a jury, in June, 1873, and the jury returned the following special verdict:
"We the jury find for a special verdict in the above entitled action, the following:
"First, That on or before the 4th of February, 1870, the plaintiff was passing across and along the railroad track of the defendant, in that part of the city of Leavenworth traversed by the road of the defendant, and while so passing at or near the junction of Water street with Chestnut street, which streets are nearly at right angles with each other, the plaintiff was knocked down and run over by the cars of the defendant. That two passenger cars, one baggage car, and a locomotive tender passed over the body of the plaintiff, and he was pulled out from between the wheels of the engine and tender in a bruised, wounded and otherwise injured condition of body, and in an unconscious state of mind.
• "Second, That by said cars knocking him down and running over him, the plaintiff had his shoulder dislocated, and had two of his ribs broken. That in consequence of the injuries then received by the plaintiff, he .suffered great pain and agony for a long time, and was confined to his bed for a period of about three months, and remained feeble and weak for a period of about six months, and during all of'said last-mentioned time was under the care and direction of a physician. That the plaintiff is a man between fifty and sixty years of age, and in consequence of said injuries his health and strength are permanently impaired.
"Third, That it was necessary for him to procure said medical attendance, and the cost of the same was five hundred dollars.
"Fourth, That the road of the defendant at the place the plaintiff was struck and injured, was at that time commonly used by persons for passing over and across the same from the city of Leavenworth to the ferry-landing, the same being a public ferry across the Missouri river at that point, and the only means of travel at that point between the west and east banks of the Missouri river; and the same had been so used before the location of the defendant's road at that place, and continued to be so used, with the knowledge of and without objection by the defendant, up to and including said date, and that there was no way of reaching the ferry except by cross ing the road of the defendant at that or some point near that place.
"Fifth, That the streets of the city had never been graded or improved at that or any other place leading to the ferry-landing, so as to show on the surface of the ground where they wer.e.
"Sixth, That the injuries occurred to the plaintiff at a place at which persons were in the habit of passing and repassing continually, with the knowledge and without objection on the part of the defendant.
"Seventh, That the place where the plaintiff was injured was on' ground which had been used by the public as a thoroughfare from the city of Leavenworth to the landing of the public ferry across the Missouri river ever since the year 1855 up to and.inclusive of the day of the injury, and which ground formed part of a tract of territory which, by ordinance of the city of Leavenworth, approved the 21st of October, 1863, was created into a street of said city, designated as Water street.
"FJighth, That the train so moved was being backed southward with an engine, upon which the brake was out of repair, so that such brake could not be worked, and was wholly useless to aid in stopping the train; that there were no brakemen at any of the other brakes on the train to use them in controlling the train, and no flagman or other person or thing on the train to warn persons of danger or to warn the engineer; nor was there any flagman at any point on the track between the depot from which the train moved to the place where the plaintiff was injured, nor was there any whistle blown on that train, but a bell was rung by them.
"Ninth, That the plaintiff at the time of the injury was with his back to the approaching train, at a point where there was much noise other than that made by the train, and was unconscious of the approach of the train. That when approaching the road near the same, plaintiff looked up the track toward the depot, and no train was then moving.
"Tenth, That if there had been a brakeman or flagman on the rear end of the train, or at any point on or near the track and near the moving train, he could easily have seen the danger the plaintiff was in in time to have warned the engineer and caused the train to stop before the injury, or could have apprised the plaintiff of the impending danger in time for him to escape.
"Eleventh, That the train was moving backward, and there was no person on the rear end of the train to warn, persons of danger, or to notify the engineer to check the train.
"Twelfth, That the injury to the plaintiff was caused immediately by the defendant's failing to use ordinary care, and by its gross negligence in the manner of the running of the train at that time and place, and by the failure of the defendant to keep a lookout of any kind for persons who might be on the track.
"Thirteenth, That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury.
"Fourteenth, That the injury to the plaintiff was caused by a failure on the part of the defendant through its agents and servants to use ordinary care in moving the locomotive and train at that time and place. That the place where the plaintiff was injured was within the-corporate limits of the city of Leavenworth, which was a city of over twenty thousand inhabitants at that time, and at a place where persons, men, women and children, had been and were in the. habit of passing and crossing with the full knowledge of the defendant, and without any protest or objection on its part.
"Fifteenth, That the only employes of the defendant on the train at the time the plaintiff was injured were three men — an engineer, a baggage-master and a yard-master — and these three employes were on the engine, the most remote point on the train from the rear end thereof, and from which place they could not see the track for forty or fifty feet from the rear end of the train.
"Sixteenth, That on or before the 4th of February, 1870, the Kansas Pacific Railway Company was the owner of and was operating its railroad from the city of Leavenworth to Lawrence.
"Seventeenth, That the ground occupied by the aforesaid Railway Company, running south from the depot in Leavenworth, was formerly uneven, and only passable for foot passengers. That the Railroad Company graded said ground, making it level for the purpose of laying their track, and that in so doing, in conjunction with the Missouri Pacific or Missouri River Railroad, so graded said ground about the width of two hundred feet from and running parallel with the Missouri river at the point whereat or about the said injury occurred, and that there was a space of level ground between the Pacific tracks and the Kansas Pacific Railway tracks of fifty feet, upon which foot passengers could walk at the said point, and that on the west side of the Kansas Pacific track, apd running parallel thereto, was a road that was passable for wagons and teams; said road was about thirty or forty feet wide, and bounded on the west by a precipitous bluff about fifty feet-high. Said road ran south about one thousand feet from the depot, and was used at and previous to the time of the plaintiff's injury, as h thoroughfare by which the public passed to the ferry across the Missouri river, a point nearly opposite the landing of the public ferry crossing the Missouri river between Kansas and Missouri, at which point the travel crossed the track of the Kansas Pacific and Missouri Pacific railways to reach the aforesaid ferry.
"Eighteenth, That the pláintiff could have reached the ferry by keeping west of defendant's 'tracks' to a point directly opposite the ferry landing, and thence east across said railway, not more than ten feet wide, to said ferry.
"Nineteenth, That the plaintiff was passing upon the track Avith his head down, and persons near by, apprehending that he Avas in danger, called to him with a loud/voice warning him of his danger — these persons standing, one upon the cars of the Missouri Pacific Raihvay Company, about fifty feet away, and the other in the space between the tracks of the Missouri Pacific and the Kansas Pacific railways. That the whistle of the locomotive of the Missouri Pacific Railway was blown, AA^hich was about one hundred feet from the plaintiff. That his attention was not attracted by the signals of warning, nor did he look up, but kept in the same position Avith head bent forward until he Avas struck in the back by the 'bumper' or 'draAvhead' of the rear car upon the end next to him, when, from the force of the blow he fell forward, when the train — tAvo passenger cars, one baggage car, and the engine and tender — passed over him.
"Twentieth, That the defendant's train was handled oh the day of the injury in the usual manner in which said train was handled Avhile backing up to be switched and left on the side track. The train was in charge of the yard-master, and neither he or any of the persons on the train kneAv the plaintiff was upon the track, and in the AA^ay of the train, until after his injury.
"Twenty-first, That on the 21st of October, 1863, the council of the city of Leavemvorth passed an ordinance laying out a street called 'Water street,' and there is no evidence that anything more was done in the premises by the authority aforesaid.
"We the jury find for the plaintiff, and assess his damages at five thousand dollars."
Before the jury was discharged, the defendant requested in writing that the court direct the jury to make further findings of fact, which was refused. The motion for a new trial was duly made by the defendant, and overruled, and defendant's motion for judgment was also overruled. The court rendered a judgment in favor of Pointer upon such special verdict, for the sum of five thousand dollars, and costs of suit, and defendant brings its petition in error in this court.
Upon this case two principal questions arise: First, is such negligence shown on the part of the company as, independent of the conduct of Pointer, will render it liable for the damages sustained ? and second, does there appear such contributory negligence on the part of Pointer as will defeat his recovery ? With the first question we ^|e trouble. The jury found specifically (12th finding) that the injury was caused by the gross negligence of the company. And if we turn to the other findings in which the circumstances of the injury are narrated, or to the testimony in the case, the whole of which is before us, we find ample warrant for this finding. A train .consisting of two passenger and one baggage car, a tender and locomotive, is started backward over a public crossing in a populous city, with the brake on the engine out of repair, and useless, with no brakemen at any of the other brakes on the train, with but three persons on the train, and all of them in the locomotive, with no flagman on the rear end of the train, or at the crossing, to give warning to persons on the track, -or to the engineer, without the blowing of a whistle, (though with a ringing of a bell,) and along a track which from the locomotive could not be seen for a distance of forty or fifty feet from the rear of the train. Add to this, that there was at the time much noise other than that made by the train, and we think a jury might properly say there was gross negligence.
The other question is embarrassing and difficult. By the 13th finding the jury say "that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury." Did they mean thereby such negligence as will defeat a recovery? Do the facts, as shown by the other findings, or the evidence, disclose such negligence? As a general rule, whenever the word "negligence" is used without any qualifying term, we understand that ordinary negligence is meant; and w^ere the triple distinctions of slight, ordinary, an(j grogg negligence are recognized, as in this state, ordinary negligence on the part of the plaintiff will, except perhaps in the case of wanton and willful injury, defeat a recovery. It is settled in this state that where the negligence of the plaintiff is but slight, or only remotely contributing to the injury, it will not defeat a recovery. K. P. Rly. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kas., 167; Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kas., 466. It seems to us also correct to hold, that the onus probandi, as •to the negligence of the plaintiff, is on the defendant; that if the record shows negligence on the part of the defendant, and is silent as to the conduct of the plaintiff, it makes out a case for recovery. We are aware of contrary decisions, and 'that in some states it is held that the burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively that he exercised due care, and was without fault. But if it is shown that a party has done wrong, and caused injury thereby, is not a prima facie case for compensation made? Logically, the wrongdoer should always compensate, and the wrong and the injury always entitle to relief. When the wrong of both parties contributes to the injury, the law declines to apportion the damages, and so leaves the injured party without any compensation. This is not strictly justice. The wrongdoer causing injury ought not to be released from making any compensation, simply because the injured party is also a wrongdoer, and helped to produce the injury. But many considerations, especially the difficulty of correctly apportioning the damages, and determining to what extent the wrong of the respective parties was instrumental in causing the injury, uphold the rule so universally recognized, that where the wrong, the negligence of both parties, contributes to the injury, the law will not afford any relief. But if the wrongdoer ought always to compensate for the injury he has wrought, and is relieved from the obligation to compensate only by the fact that the wrong of the injured party helped to cause the injury, it is incumbent on him to'show such wrong. It is matter of defense, to avoid the consequences of his own wrong. In the case of the U. P. Rly. Co. v. Hand, 7 Kas., 388, the question was incidentally noticed, and the intimation was in favor of the views herein expressed. See also Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 43 and 44, and cases cited in notes, and the late ease of Railroad Company v. Gladmon, 15 Wallace, 401, where the supreme court of the United States lay down the rules as given above. It seems to us to follow from this, that where the special verdict shows an iniury caused by gross negligence of the defendant, a recovery must be sustained, unless it is also apparent that there was such contributory negligence- as to relieve the defendant of responsibility; and that where it is uncertain whether such negligence is apparent, the doubt must be resolved against the defendant. In this case negligence and contributory negligence were not matters collateral and subordinate to the main issue, but were the vital and principal questions. To them the attention of counsel was mainly directed. The degree of negligence essential to defeat a recovery had been already settled by this court, and was doubtless known to counsel. The instructions are full of references to the different degrees of negligence. The jury specified in their verdict the degree of negligence of which they found the defendant guilty, and declare that it was the immediate cause of the injury. If any of the findings were not sufficiently definite and certain, either party could have called the attention of the court to it before the discharge of the jury, and had it made so. Arthur v. Wallace, 8 Kas., 267. And if the party whose interest it is to have it made definite and certain fails to do so, the omission will be taken against him in the construction of the finding. At the time this verdict was returned, the company objected that it was partial, incomplete, and inconsistent, and specified a number of points in which it desired correction, but said nothing as to this 13th finding. It appeared to be content with it. Turning now to the verdict, and we find that after the separate findings of fact, and as a part of the verdict, the jury return as follows: "We the jury find for the plaintiff, and assess his damages at $5,000." It appears from this, that the jury did not mean by the 13th finding to attribute to the plaintiff such a degree of negligence as would defeat his recovery. They intended only such slight negligence, or negligence so remotely contributory to the injury, as was consistent with his right to compensation. It may be said that this was in effect a general verdict, and that this the jury were not at liberty to return where a special verdict had been ordered. This may all be true; but it does not affect the question we are now considering, viz., the intent of the jury. They failed to specify the degree of negligence of the plaintiff — what degree did they intend — and upon this question of intent this quasi general verdict strongly bears. Nor can it be argued that this general finding was returned in ignorance of the law, and that the jury must have supPosec^ that Diere negligence of the defendant gave a right of recovery independent of the con-0f p]a}n£ig? £pe first instruction given, at the instance of the plaintiff, they were told substantially that the plaintiff could not recover if the injury resulted from his own negligence, but that slight negligence on his part would not defeat a recovery. To a similar effect is the third instruction given at the like instance. These instructions, and the general finding, point clearly to the intention of the jury in the 13th finding, and show that they contemplated only that slight negligence which is consistent with the right to compensation. Again, it seems that the last instruction given at the instance of the defendant throws some light upon this question. That instruction is as follows:
" The fact that persons were upon the track or yard of the defendant before, was no license to the plaintiff to be there, and was no justification, for the plaintiff being there; and he was guilty of negligence for being on the track, if the jury find that he was on the track."
As without dispute the plaintiff was on the track, when struck by the train, of course the jury could not find otherwise than that he was guilty of negligence. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this be good law or not, for surely it is a proposition of which the railroad company has no cause of complaint. It is enough now that it serves to indicate upon what the 13th finding was based. As it was an open question whether the place of the accident was a public crossing, it can hardly be that the court intended' to say to the jury, that, though this were a public crossing, the presence of the plaintiff on the track was such ordinary contributory negligence as, notwithstanding the gross negligence of the railroad company, would defeat a recovery. It seems to us therefore that the jury-intended by this 13th finding only such slight negligence as does not bar the right to compensation.
But the solution of this question by no means removes the difficulties in deciding the case. It is earnestly insisted by counsel, that the facts in reference to the conduct of the plain- ^ (defendant in error,) as they appear from the other findings, as well as from the testimony, show that culpable negligence on his part which will relieve the company from responsibility. It seems to us matter of great doubt, as we read the conduct of the plaintiff, as narrated either in the findings or the testimony, whether this claim of counsel is not correct, and whether plaintiff was not so negligent as not to be entitled to compensation. And perhaps this doubt is our best justification for upholding the verdict. This question of negligence is said to be a mixed question of law and fact. When the facts are disputed, it makes a question for the jury. When the facts are undisputed, and but one deduction is to be drawn from them, there is simply a question of law for the court. But where the facts, though undisputed, are such that when taken singly or in combination different minds will come to different conclusions as to the' reasonableness and care of the party's conduct, the question is one which may properly be left to the determination of the jury. Rld. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wallace, 657; Detroit & W. Rld. Co. v. VanSteinberg, 17 Mich., 99. In this case three separate juries have found for the plaintiff, and ^at, notwithstanding any imputations that could be made on his conduct, he was entitled to compensation. While we are not disposed, even if it were possible, to avoid any responsibility that properly belongs to us, or leave with a jury the burden of determining questions which we ought to decide, and while we should never permit the perpetratiQn of a glaring wrong upon a party, no matter how many successive juries should attempt it, yet the unanimous judgment of thirty-six intelligent, candid men, as to the reasonableness and care of a party's conduct at the time of an injury, ought to have no little weight with us.
We have outlined, in considering the first question, the conduct of the company. A similar outline is proper as to that of the plaintiff. It appears that there is a space south of the old depot in Leavenworth about 1,000 feet in length, and 200 feet in width, shut in between the Missouri river on the east, and a steep bluff on the west. At the lower end of this space was, at the time of this injury, and had been for years, a grist-mill built against the bluff, and also at times the landing place of the ferry-boat. The boat changed the landing-place from time to time to accommodate itself to the different changes of the water, so that only part of the time did it land at or near this space. Over this space the Missouri Pacific Railroad and this defendant had constructed four or five tracks, which were used in- the making-up of the trains, the tracks of the Missouri Pacific Road being next the river, and those of the defendant near the bluff. At the northwest corner of this space two streets came together, and prior to any occupation by the railroad companies the city had passed an ordinance for the opening of a street from the junction of these streets southward over this ground. But nothing more had been done toward securing the appropriation of the ground for street purposes. Both before and sub sequent to the occupation by the railroad companies, and at the time of this injury, there was a traveled way from the junction of the streets across this space, and over the tracks of the companies, at the ferry landing, and the traveled way the plaintiff was going to the ferry at the time he was run over. Between the tracks there was ample space and level ground for one to walk in safety, and west of this defendant's track, and close to the bluff, was a carriage-way which ran along the whole length of the space, and crossed the track at right angles at the mill. The plaintiff could have walked along this carriage-way, or between the tracks, and- been out of danger, except at the very moment of crossing. Instead of doing this, he got on to the track at about the junction of the two streets, and walked southward on it toward the ferry. At the time he got on to the track he looked, and no train was in motion. As he passed down the track the defendant's train started out from the depot, and the engineer on the Missouri Pacific train seeing plaintiff's danger whistled to alarm him, and the yard-master of the Missouri Pacific Company shouted and tried to attract his attention, but in vain. Erom this outline it can but be seen that the plaintiff was guilty of some negligence, that he did not act with the highest prudence. Indeed, as before remarked, honest minds might well differ as to whether his negligence was not so great as to disentitle him to relief. In comparing however the conduct of the two parties, it will be generally conceded that the negligence of the company was of a higher degree, and a grosser character, than that of the plaintiff. This case must be distinguished from those where a party approaches and crosses a track without looking to see whether any train is coming; for here the plaintiff looked, and not only did he see no train coming, but in fact there was none. The train started after he got on. Nor must it be confounded with those cases in which the injury occurs on ground in the exclusive occupation of the railroad company. It was on ground of which the public and the company were in joint occupation — on ground which, without objection by the com pany, the public was occupying and using as a street, over which the plaintiff was then passing on his usual way to his home, on the east side of the river. For a case which, while its facts are not altogether similar, has many elements in it to make it a most appropriate citation in this, see Butler, Adm'x, v. The M. & St. Paul Rly. Co., 28 Wis., 489. See also, Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall., 270. It seems to us, after a full and careful examination of this case, that the judgment must be affirmed.
Other objections are made by the learned counsel for plaintiff in error, but they are of minor importance. The record is voluminous, and many exceptions were taken. But this case has been once before to this court, and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff reversed; (K. P. Rly. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kas., 620;) and only such errors as are clearly prejudicial to the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error should be regarded.
The judgment will be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.