Case Name: TAYLOR v. DOMINICK
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1892-06-06
Citations: 36 S.C. 368
Docket Number: 
Parties: TAYLOR v. DOMINICK.
Judges: Mr. Justioe MoG-owaN concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 368–384

Head Matter:
TAYLOR v. DOMINICK.
1. Malicious Prosecution — Evidence op Character. — The rule which permits a defendant in an action for malicious criminal prosecution to attack the character of the plaintiff has no application to evidence offered to show that plaintiff’s character had not suffered by reason of the prosecution.
2. Harmless Error- — Testimony.—If the trial judge erred in sustaining an objection to a question propounded to a witness, it was a harmless error where the same witness and another testified fully on the same point.
3. Ibid. — Ibid.—Reasons op the Judge. — Where the ruling of the trial judge is correct, it will not be reversed on appeal because of its being based on erroneous grounds. Therefore where the trial judge excluded testimony, ruling that the plaintiff’s character was not in issue, it was a harmless error where the same testimony was received at another stage of the case and went to the jury, and where no effort was made to attack the character of the plaintiff.
4. Charging Juries — Malicious Prosecution. — The trial judge has no right to say anything to the jury as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, nor is he bound to remodel a request to charge so as to make the requested proposition correct. Therefore, in action for malicious prosecution, the judge properly refused to charge that the finding of “no bill” by the grand jury was “not sufficient evidence of the want of probable cause,” as such finding was no evidence on this point, and the jury had been already, in effect, so charged.
5. Ibid. — Ibid.—For like reasons the general powers of the grand jury were not relevant to the issues in such an action.
Mr. Justice Aldrich, dissenting.
Before Wallace, J., Newberry, November, 1890.
In this case Hon. James Aldrich, Judge of the Second Circuit, sat in the place of Mr.' Justice Pope, who had been of counsel in the cause. It was an action by J. W. Taylor against W. C. Dominick, for malicious prosecution, commenced December 14, 1889. The case is fully stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Aldrich as follows:
This was an action for a malicious criminal prosecution. Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges : that the defendant instituted a prosecution against him for burglary and grand larceny ; that he had been arrested upon that charge upon a warrant sworn out by the defendant; that he was required to enter into a recognizance, conditioned for his appearance to. answer said charge in the Court of General Sessions for Newberry County ; that an indictment was preferred against him in said court upon said-charge; that the grand jury returned “no bill”; that he had been discharged by order of the court, which ended the prosecution ; that defendant, in making his affidavit instituting and continuing the prosecution, had acted maliciously and without probable cause; “that by the said prosecution the defendant did this plaintiff incalculable and irreparable injury and damage;” and demanded judgment for five thousand dollars damages and costs. The defendant, in his answer denied each and every allegation of the complaint.
The case, being at issue, came on to be tried at the November term, 1890, of the Court of Common Pleas for Newberry County before his honor, Judge Wallace, and a jury. During the trial defendant’s counsel asked the plaintiff as a witness on cross-examination : “Don’t you stand just as well in the community as you did?” Plaintiff’s counsel objected, “that this is irrelevant.” His honor sustained the objection, upon the ground “that this is not a question of character.” The question above stated was asked when plaintiff was recalled as a ivitness in his own behalf, and had testified as follows upon his examination in chief: “Do you think that that prosecution against you for breaking into your grandmother’s smokehouse and stealing $1,000 in gold, and being brought up before the trial justice, and being required to give a bond and coming into the criminal court here has damaged you at all? A. Yes, sir: I think it has. Q. Iiow much has it damaged you ? A. I could not have any idea. It injured my feelings, and I heard the people talking about me out in the community, and 1 could not have any idea how much it has damaged. Q. Would you have let all that happen for $5,000? A. No, sir. Q. Would you have let it happen for anything at all ? Do you feel that that thing can ever be made up? A. No, sir ; it never can.”
During the further progress of the trial the defendant offered Brooks Warner, who resides about four miles from plaintiff, as a witness, to testify as to the character of the plaintiff, and said witness was asked: “By reason of that prosecution has he, i. e., the plaintiff, been damaged in the community in which you live ?” Plaintiff’s counsel objected to this question as being irrelevant, and his honor ruled: “He (the plaintiff) said he had been affected outside of his neighborhood ; that was in answer to ¿questions on the cross-examination. The plaintiff’ has not put his character in issue. He does not claim damages to his character. It is irrelevant, and not in reply to plaintiff’s case, and not making out the case of the defendant, and the defendant has got no case, except in reply. The question is asked as to the character of plaintiff outside of his neighborhood. The question is objected to and overruled on account of irrelevancy, and damages are not claimed on account of injury to his character.”
His honor was requested to charge the jury : “1. That in an action for malicious prosecution, the fact that the grand jury had returned ‘no bill’ against the plaintiff, is not sufficient evidence of the want of probable cause for the prosecution which had been brought against him by defendant.” His honor declined to so charge, because it was “improper to charge on sufficiency of evidence.”
“2. That in order to maintain an action for malicious prosecution, it must appear that the defendant had instituted the prosecution without probable cause, and also through malice. The plaintiff must, of course, show the state of facts that indicate malice, or he subjects his action to a non suit. Throwing out the bill by the grand jury is entirely at their discretion. They are by no means bound to find the bill, although probable cause exists and is laid before them.” His honor embraced all of said request in his general charge to the jury, except the last two sentences, which he refused to charge, upon the ground: “The duties of grand jury irrelevant.” He did not charge the jury upon the legal effect of the return of “no bill” by the grand jury, nor upon the duties of the grand jury in regard to bills of indictment.
In his general charge to the jury the presiding judge said: “Now, you will see the first thing, therefore, of which the jury must be satisfied, is that the proceedings complained of have been ended. In order to show that to the jury the record was produced, upon which the finding of no bill was entered, and the order of the presiding judge discharging the defendant from further responsibility under his recognizance, and permitting him to go free without day, according to the form of such orders. That was submitted to you for the purpose of showing that the proceedings complained of here have been ended — that the proceeding is done with.”
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,300; judgment was entered upon said verdict, and defendant appeals from said judgment upon the following exceptions :
Because his honor, the presiding judge, erred : 1. In sustaining the objection to the question propounded to plaintiff on his cross-examination, “Don’t you stand as well in the community to-day as you did?” and in ruling that “this is not a question of character.”
2. In sustaining the objection to the question put to Brooks Warner, “By reason of that prosecution has he (plaintiff') been damaged in the community in which you live?” was irrelevant, and in ruling, “He said he had been affected outside of his neighborhood. That was in answer to question on cross-examination. The plaintiff has not put his character in issue. He does not claim damages to his character. It is irrelevant, and not in reply to plaintiff’s case, and not making out the case of the defendant, and the defendant has got no case, except in reply. The question is asked as to the character of the plaintiff outside of his neighborhood. The question is objected to and overruled on account of irrelevancy, as damages are not claimed on account of injury to his character.”
3. In ruling that the defendant could not introduce evidence as to the character of plaintiff in this action.
4. In ruling that the defendant could not introduce evidence as to the character of the plaintiff under the general denial of the complaint interposed by the answer.
5. In ruling that the plaintiff’s character was not in issue, and that the plaintiff did not claim damages to his character.
6. In ruling that testimony on the part of the defendant as to the character of the plaintiff was: 1st, irrelevant; 2d, notin reply to the plaintiff’s case; and 3d, not making out the case of the defendant.
7. In ruling that the question asked as to the character of the plaintiff outside of his neighborhood was irrelevant, and that damages are not claimed on account of injury to his character, and for that reason excluding evidence as to character of plaintiff.
8. In refusing to charge the jury as requested by the defendant, “That in an action for malicious prosecution the fact that the grand jury had returned ‘no bill’ against the plaintiff is not sufficient evidence of the want of probable cause for the prosecution which had been brought against him by the defendant.”
9. In refusing to charge the jury as requested by the defendant, “Throwing out the bill by the grand jury was entirely in their discretion. They are by no means bound to find the bill, though probable cause exist and is laid before them.”
Messrs. Blease Blease and Creo. S. Mower, for appellant.
Messrs. Johnstone $ Cromer, contra.
June 6, 1892.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice McIver.
Being unable to concur in all the conclusions reached by his honor, Judge Aldrich, I propose to state, very briefly, the reasons for my difference of opinion. I do not understand that the testimony objected to was offered for the purpose of showing, or that it tended to show, that the character of the plaintiff was either good or bad ; but, on the contrary, it was manifestly offered for the purpose of showing that plaintiff's reputation has suffered no damage by reason of the groundless prosecution which had been brought against him — that he stood just as well in the community as he had done before. While, therefore, it may be, and is, conceded that the authorities cited in the opinion of his honor, Judge Aldrich, to show that it is competent for the plaintiff, in an action for malicious prosecution, to introduce evidence tending to show his good character, and for the defendant in such an action to offer evidence assailing plaintiff's character, it does not seem to me that any one of those authorities touch the question here presented; and, so far as I am informed, there is no authority decisive of that question.
A careful examination of the "Case" will show that no testimony was offered tending either to assail or to sustain the general character of the plaintiff, and hence the Circuit Judge neither made, nor was he called on to make, any ruling as to the competency of such testimony. While it is true that there is a general statement made in the "Case" that "the defendant' offered Brooks Warner, who resides about four miles from plaintiff, as a witness, to testify as to the character of the plaintiff," yet when we turn to the notes of the stenographer of the proceedings at the trial, set out in full in the "Case," we find the following: "Brooks Warner called for. defendant, being sworn: By Mr. Binase: Do you live in the same community with Mr. Willie Taylor ? A. No, sir. Q. How far do you live from Mr. Taylor ? A. I suppose about four miles. Q. Has Mr. Taylor been damaged because he was prosecuted for breaking into Mr. Dominick's house ?" To this last question defendant's counsel objected and the objection was overruled. The witness was then asked by the same attorney : "Do you know whether the plaintiff has been damaged in the neghborhood ? A. I don't think he has. I think he stands about as high in our community as he did before. Q. Do you knowr whether he has been damaged ? A. No, sir ; I couldn't say that. I live four miles from him. I don't know what the community thinks of him. I can only say what the community that I live in say. Q. By reason of that prosecution has he been damaged in the community in which you live ?" To this last question defendant's counsel objected, and then it was that the Circuit Judge made the ruling set out in the second ground of appeal sustaining the objection.
It also appears in the "Case" that when the plaintiff was on the stand as a witness he was asked on the cross-examination the following question: "Don't you stand just as well in the community to-day as you did?" which, being objected to, the court .ruled: "This is not a question of character but it likewise there, appears that in the course of the same cross-examination the plaintiff was permitted to testify without objection : "Around home I suppose I stand as good as ever, but not at other places. I. do not; where men don't know me, certainly not." So that it seems to me, even if the ruling complained of was erroneous (a question which I do not propose to consider) it was a harmless error, as the plaintiff was permitted to testify that while the prosecution had not injured his standing in the immediate neighborhood in which he lived, yet it had injured him in other communities, and the witness, Brooks Warner, was permitted to testify that the standing or reputation of the plaintiff had not" been injured by the prosecution in the community in which he resided.
It is urged, however, that the remarks of the Circuit Judge, that "this is not a question of character," and that "the plaintiff has not put his character in issue. He does not claim damages to his character," &c., excluded defendant from the privilege of offering testimony tending to show that plaintiff was a person of bad character. I do not think that such a view can be sustained. It is well settled that this court confines itself to a consideration of the questions determined by the court below, without regard to the correctness of the reasons which may be given for the conclusion that may there be reached, and that if the conclusion reached is correct, the fact that erroneous reasons are given for such conclusion will not warrant this court in reversing the judgment appealed from. So that even conceding that there was error in the reason given — that the plaintiff's character was not in issue — for the ruling complained of, that is not sufficient ground to reverse the judgment, when it appears that the testimony, though erroneously ruled out at one stage of the trial, was, in fact, received and went before the jury. There is nothing whatever in the "Case" tending to show that the defendant either offered or desired to introduce evidence assailing the general character of the plaintiff, and, therefore, the idea that he was deterred from doing so by the ruling of the Circuit Judge just considered rests only on conjecture, in which I do not think this court is permitted to indulge. The general remark made in the statement of the case, that Brooks Warner was offered as a witness to testify as to the character of the plaintiff, is not sufficient to support such a conjecture, for when that witness was put upon the stand, not a single question was asked him as to the general character of the plaintiff, and, on the contrary, he was interrogated only as to the injury which plaintiff's reputation had or had not sustained in the community where the witness resided.
Next, as the error assigned in the 8th ground of appeal. It does not seem to me that the Circuit Judge erred in refusing the request in the form in which it was submitted, which constitutes the basis of this ground. There is nothing better settled than that the Circuit Judge has no right to say anything to the jury as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of any evidence, properly before them, to establish any fact at issue in a given cause. He may, if he sees proper, or if he is requested so to do, instruct the jury as to what is or is not legal evidence of a fact; but when any evidence is properly before the jury for any purpose, he has no authority to instruct the jury, or even to intimate any opinion, as to its sufficiency to establish any fact in the case. Nor is a Circuit Judge under any obligation to restate a proposition incorrectly stated in the request, and thus corrected charge such request; for if the proposition, as stated, cannot be properly charged, he may refuse the request altogether.
Now, in this case the Circuit Judge was not requested to instruct the jury that the finding of the grand jury constituted no evidence whatever as to the question, whether there was or was not probable cause for the prosecution, but the request was to instruct the jury that such finding "is not suffi-eient evidence of the want of probable cause," thereby implying that it was some, though not sufficient, evidence of that fact, which would have been erroneous, as it is well settled, both bj reason and authority, that in considering the question as to probable cause, the attention must be confined to the facts as they presented themselves to the mind of the prosecutor at the time of the institution of the 'prosecution, without regard to any fact occurring afterwards, for the very obvious reason, that the mind of the prosecutor could not possibly have been affected by any fact which may have occurred after he had commenced the prosecution. Hogg v. Pinckney, 16 S. C., 387; Caldwell v. Bennett, 22 Id., 1. It seems to me plain, therefore, that there was no error in refusing the request in the form in which it was submitted. Especially is this so when, as in this case, the Circuit Judge had already, in his general charge, practically instructed the jury that the finding of the grand jury with the order of discharge was introduced only for the purpose, and could only have the effect, of showing that the prosecution had been ended before the commencement of this action. For like reasons, I do not think the 9th ground of appeal can be sustained. The general powers of the grand jury were not relevant to any issue submitted to the jury, and the request to charge upon which this ground is based was, therefore, properly refused.
It seems to me that there was no such error in the rulings below as w'ould warrant this court in reversing the judgment appealed from, and I think, therefore, that the same should be affirmed; and this being the conclusion reached by a majority of the court,
It is the judgment of this court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
Mr. Justioe MoG-owaN concurred.