Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RANDALL JAMES MAXWELL, Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2001-01-31
Citations: 172 Or. App. 142
Docket Number: 10-97-00429; CA A98951
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RANDALL JAMES MAXWELL, Appellant.
Judges: Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Armstrong, Judge.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 172
Pages: 142–171

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted February 5, 1999,
affirmed January 31, 2001
STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RANDALL JAMES MAXWELL, Appellant.
(10-97-00429; CA A98951)
18 P3d 438
John Halpern, Jr., argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Janet A. KLapstein, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Armstrong, Judge.
EDMONDS, P. J.
Armstrong, J., dissenting.
Deits, C. J., vice Warren, S. J., retired.

Opinion:
EDMONDS, P. J.
Defendant appeals from two convictions for sodomy in the first degree, ORS 163.405, after a jury trial. He raises eight assignments of error. We discuss only those assignments that would benefit the bench and the bar. We affirm.
The charges underlying the convictions involve alleged oral-genital contact with a then four-year-old child, K, in September 1996 and alleged oral-genital contact with another then three-year-old child, B, between January and the fall of 1994. Defendant was also charged with sexual abuse of B, but he was acquitted of that charge. At the trial in June 1997, the children, B's mother Kelly, and K's mother Jennifer, testified, as did B's brother, M, who witnessed the contact with B. Although the victims' families were unacquainted with each other, both families were acquainted with defendant. K's family lived down the road from defendant for several years near Junction City. B's family lived several miles away from defendant for a period in 1994, while B's father worked for defendant. In August 1994, B's family moved to the state of Washington.
B, who was six years old at the time of trial, testified about two incidents where she claimed defendant abused her. She said that the incidents occurred when she and other children were playing at defendant's residence. Her brother, M, testified that as to one of the incidents, he went into defendant's residence and saw defendant engaged in activity with B that amounted to sodomy. He watched for about 45 seconds and then left. Because B did not tell her mother about what occurred, M decided not to say anything either. After the family moved to Washington, B reported the incident to her mother, and M then told her what he had seen. Kelly contacted a medical clinic to have B examined, and a criminal investigation ensued.
As to the other conviction, the state's evidence showed that K and her mother, Jennifer, visited defendant at his residence on September 8,1996, for the purpose of seeing some stray kittens that K had found and had given to defendant. While there, Jennifer and defendant conversed and smoked marijuana together. Later, Jennifer left defendant's residence briefly, leaving K at defendant's residence. When she returned, she observed that K's playsuit was buttoned incorrectly. She testified that defendant volunteered that he had helped K go to the bathroom. That night, while Jennifer was bathing her, K reported that defendant had engaged in activity amounting to sodomy. Jennifer's husband was out of town. She contacted her mother, to whom K reiterated her report. Jennifer was uncertain about what action to take. She feared her husband's reaction; she was concerned about having to disclose her use of marijuana and the fact that she had prior convictions for negotiating a bad check and harassment. Two days later, she contacted the police for advice, but did not give them any details. A week later, Jennifer filed a formal complaint with the police. As a result, K was interviewed at the Lane County Child Advocacy Center. A videotape of that interview was admitted into evidence.
Defendant also testified at trial. He acknowledged contact with the families but denied any sexual contact with the children. He said that he knew B's family only briefly and that the children visited only when their parents were present. He said that Jennifer and K had visited his residence as they described but that during the time that Jennifer was gone, he was working in his shop and was not with K, who was in the house. He also said that he and Jennifer had smoked as many as four joints of marijuana during the course of her visit. He specifically denied helping K in the bathroom.
In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence from a witness who was prepared to testify that Jennifer had been observed to smoke marijuana on 50 or more occasions while at defendant's residence. Defendant asserted to the trial court that the evidence was relevant to Jennifer's ability to perceive accurately on September 8. He offered the evidence under OEC 406, which provides:
"(1) Evidence of the habit of a person is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
"(2) As used in this section, 'habit' means a person's regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific, distinctive type of conduct."
The trial court ruled that the evidence was not admissible, reasoning that the use of collateral prior bad acts cannot be used to impeach a witness's testimony.
On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was admissible to demonstrate that Jennifer "had smoked large amounts of marijuana and that it could therefore, reasonably be concluded that she was intoxicated [on September 8]." In her testimony, Jennifer admitted that she had smoked a joint with defendant on that occasion but denied that she had smoked any more than that or that she was "stoned" that day. That testimony conflicted with defendant's testimony about the quantity of marijuana consumed at defendant's residence. Thus, any potential probative value of the proffered evidence is limited to demonstrating that Jennifer smoked more than one joint with defendant.
Admissible "habit" evidence under OEC 406 must be evidence that is specific to an issue at trial. In Charmley v. Lewis, 302 Or 324, 729 P2d 567 (1986), the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when he was struck by a car operated by the defendant. The crucial issue was whether the plaintiff had the right of way because he was within an unmarked crosswalk when he was struck. The court held that evidence that plaintiff habitually and invariably crossed the street on which he was struck within the unmarked crosswalk was admissible to demonstrate that he was within the crosswalk on the date that he was struck. Here, the fact that Jennifer smoked marijuana at defendant's residence on 50 or more separate occasions does not tend to prove that Jennifer had an invariable habit of smoking more than one joint of marijuana on every occasion. The trial court did not err in excluding the proffered evidence.
In his third assignment of error, defendant assigns error to the trial court's granting of the state's motion to exclude evidence that Jennifer had made prior false accusations of sexual abuse of K. Defendant sought to offer evidence that Jennifer had accused K's father of molesting K when she was an infant. Jennifer denied having made that accusation. According to defendant, the evidence was admissible because Jennifer testified in the state's case about the report of sexual misconduct made by K to her about defendant under OEC 803(18a)(b). Defendant relies on our decision in State v. LeClair, 83 Or App 121, 730 P2d 609 (1986), rev den 303 Or 74 (1987). In LeClair, the defendant argued that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence of allegedly prior false reports of sexual abuse made by the victim. We reasoned that false statements about sexual conduct are not statements of "past sexual conduct" within the meaning of OEC 412 (the Rape Shield Law), and therefore, are not subject to OEC 412. Moreover, credibility generally cannot be attacked by specific instances of conduct under OEC 608(2). Nonetheless, we held that
"regardless of the prohibitions of OEC 608, the Confrontation Clause of Article I, section 11, requires that the court permit a defendant to cross-examine the complaining witness in front of the jury concerning other accusations she has made if 1) she has recanted them; 2) the defendant demonstrates to the court that those accusations were false; or 3) there is some evidence that the victim has made prior accusations that were false, unless the probative value of the evidence which the defendant seeks to elicit on the cross-examination (including the probability that false accusations were in fact made) is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, embarrassment or delay." Id. at 130.
LeClair's analysis is helpful to defendant only if the third category in our opinion is extended to alleged prior false accusations made by a nonvictim. Our ruling in that case had its genesis in Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Section 11 provides, in relevant part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face." Here, only K and defendant were present during the alleged abuse. Jennifer's testimony pertained to the circumstances leading up to the time when K was left alone with defendant and afterwards. At trial, defendant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine both K and Jennifer as to their testimony. The proffered evidence constitutes additional evidence first offered by defendant for impeachment purposes. The admissibility of impeachment evidence that Jennifer had made false claims of sexual abuse of K against another person is at odds with OEC 608(2) because it is about a specific instance of conduct offered to attack her credibility. The question then is whether Article I, section 11, requires the admission of the impeachment evidence of Jennifer under the circumstances of this case, despite the provisions of OEC 608(2).
As we said in LeClair, the requirements of Article I, section 11, are not met simply because defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim about the specific incident with which defendant was charged. The right of confrontation includes the right to engage in effective cross-examination to impeach witnesses who are called by the state. Id. at 128. However, a defendant's confrontation right is not absolute, and courts have discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination if the evidence will confuse the jury, will unnecessarily delay the trial or is only marginally relevant. LeClair, 83 Or App at 129. Here, defendant's proffered testimony does not meet the requirements for admissibility under LeClair, even if we were to extend its holding to nonvictim witnesses.
In defendant's offer of proof, witness Donna Wickwire was asked if Jennifer told her why she had moved to the neighborhood. Wickwire answered:
"The entire story was very well circulated by Dean[ ] and his father, Dick Sr., especially in the presence of Jennifer. But numerous times, and without Jennifer present, that the reason she moved to the neighborhood is that she was getting divorced from her husband and her husband had sexually molested [K] as a young infant, baby child. There were times she had to go into court, she said, to face those charges and explain what those charges were. She had to take [K] with her.
"Q. And Jennifer told you this?
"A. Yes. She was in the room many times. The story is very well known.
"Q. The stories were told in front of [Jennifer]?
"A. Yes.
"Q. She never corrected them.
"A No sir. That's what all of us believed. It had gone on more than one occasion!.]"
Defendant also called Jennifer as a witness in his offer of proof.
"Q. Mrs. Skiller, have you claimed that Jason Berk — who is Jason Berk?
"A. [K]'s real father. He died.
"Q. He died. He was hit by a car?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Have you ever claimed that he has molested [K]?
"A. No, never.
"Q. Never?
"A. Never. He never hurt her, but he just wasn't the greatest — you know, wasn't a nurturing father. He never touched her in any way, but he just wasn't very nurturing.
"Q. So he did not, to your knowledge, molest [K]?
"A. No.
"Q. The question would be, have you told other people that he did?
"A. No, never."
As we said in LeClair, Article I, section 11, trumps OEC 608 only when the defendant has demonstrated that the witness has recanted prior accusations or that the witness made prior accusations that are demonstrably false. In addition, the probative value of the evidence must substantially outweigh the risk of prejudice, confusion, embarrassment or delay. Here, defendant's evidence falls short of those requirements. The evidence does not show that Jennifer made accusations of sexual abuse against her former husband and then admitted that the reports were false. Instead, there is a factual dispute whether she ever made such statements. The fact that she testified that she did not make the accusations makes the issue a collateral matter on which the admission of evidence would have unnecessarily delayed the trial and confused the issues before the jury. Also, the evidence that Jennifer said that her former husband molested K has marginal relevance to the impeachment of her testimony regarding defendant's case. Defendant's theory of the case is that Jennifer fabricated the report and taught K to repeat it. The fact that she purportedly claimed in a divorce proceeding that her former husband had molested K as a "young infant, baby child" does little to support defendant's theory. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's offer of proof.
In his sixth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it excluded the testimony of witnesses Southerton and King regarding Jennifer's character for truthfulness. In State v. Caffee, 116 Or App 23, 27, 840 P2d 220 (1992), rev den 315 Or 312 (1993), we held that our standard of review under OEC 608(1) is for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion on an evidentiary ruling by a trial court occurs when the court's ruling exceeds the range of all legally correct discretionary choices. In that context, "discretion" refers to the authority of the trial court to choose among several legally correct outcomes. State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4 P3d 1261 (2000). Jennifer worked for Southerton for three weeks in 1996 at a daycare center. Southerton was prepared to testify that, in her opinion, Jennifer "was not truthful." In an offer of proof, Southerton testified that her opinion was based only on the fact that Jennifer had not disclosed on her employment application that she had prior criminal convictions. The prosecutor objected on the ground that a sufficient foundation had not been supplied for the admission of Southerton's opinion. She argued that one act, susceptible of competing inferences of mistake or dishonesty, during a three-week period of contact between Southerton and Jennifer, was not a sufficient basis upon which to render an opinion under OEC 608(1). The parties and the trial court discussed the issue at length, and defense counsel pointed out that the rule permits both personal opinion and reputation testimony. The trial court concluded that the foundation was insufficient for the witness to testify about community reputation for truthfulness. It then returned to the prosecutor's point about opinion testimony, asking defense counsel if he had case authority for the proposition that a witness is permitted to render an opinion "based on that single circumstance." Defense counsel conceded that he could produce no such authority. He replied, "She formed an opinion. And it is based upon something that happened. So we think that's a sufficient foundation for offering her opinion to the jury." The court responded, "[t]he objection is sustained upon lack of foundation."
Based on that record, defendant and the dissent contend that the trial court erred. In a global approach to the issue, the dissent would reverse because it believes that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between the foundation required for personal opinion testimony and the foundation required for reputation testimony in making its ruling. We understand the record differently. The focus of the trial court was on whether the single circumstance in this case could suffice to give rise to either an admissible personal opinion or an opinion about community reputation concerning character for untruthfulness. In that light, any distinction between required foundations as proffered by the dissent is academic to determining whether the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion.
The nature of character evidence is that it "is evidence of a particular human trait. A person's character with respect to truthfulness means that person's propensity to tell the truth in all the varying situations of life." State v. Marshall, 312 Or 367, 372, 823 P2d 961 (1991). Thus, under the rule, a character trait for untruthfulness is distinguishable from individual acts of untruthfulness. Also underlying the provisions of OEC 608(1) is the requirement that a foundation be laid before an opinion about a character trait is admissible. Kirkpatrick explains:
"A character witness, whether testifying as to reputation or opinion, will not be allowed to testify until a foundation has been laid showing that the witness has either sufficient acquaintance with the reputation of the person in the relevant community or sufficient personal contacts with the individual to provide a basis for an opinion regarding that person's character. The contact must have been recent enough so there will be a current basis for the testimony." Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 166-67 (3d ed 1996).
We agree with the trial court that it was not required to admit Southern's testimony. To hold otherwise would mean that the distinction between character traits and individual misdeeds would be obliterated. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of error in that regard.
Witness King worked for defendant. He testified that he saw Jennifer at defendant's residence more than 40 to 50 times. He was asked:
"Q. Based on your contacts with Jennifer, did you form a personal opinion as to her credibility, her character for truthfulness?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is your opinion about [Jennifer's] truthfulness?
"A. Very slim.
"Q. Are you saying she's truthful or untruthful?
"A. Untruthful.
"Q. Now, you're indicating — do you have an opinion or knowledge of her reputation among other people for truthfulness?
"A. No Sir."
Apparently, the trial court ruled that King's contacts with Jennifer were an inadequate basis on which to form a personal opinion of her character for truthfulness. We disagree. Their contacts occurred over a period from 1994 to 1996 and involved numerous personal contacts. We conclude that defendant laid an adequate foundation for the admission of King's testimony.
In his seventh assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony by witness Wickwire regarding K's character for truthfulness. Wickwire lived about 400 feet away from defendant and has a daughter who was a playmate of K's. Wickwire operates a day care center at her house. She testified that K came to her house to play, that she saw her in the grocery store and in shopping malls, and that she saw K when she went to K's residence or when K's mother came to her house. She testified that when K came to play with her daughter, there would be "[m]any times" that she would have conversations with K and that she often would listen while K was conversing with her daughter. Wickwire was prepared to testify that in her opinion, K was "not always truthful," but the trial court excluded her testimony. It did not explain its reasoning on the record. We hold that defendant demonstrated that Wickwire had sufficient acquaintance with K for Wickwire to render an opinion as to K's character for truthfulness.
In his eighth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding character testimony from witnesses King, Coonradt and Berry regarding B's mother, Kelly's, character for truthfulness. In 1994, both B's father and King worked for defendant. King testified that the last time he saw Kelly was about a week before her family moved to Washington in 1994. He testified that while at defendant's workplace, he would encounter Kelly on a "weekly" basis. He was asked:
"Q. Are you familiar with the reputation of [Kelly] for truthfulness?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is her reputation for truthfulness?
"A. Poor.
"Q. Do you also have a personal opinion about Kelly's truthfulness?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is your personal opinion of her truthfulness?
"A. She doesn't know what the word means."
The trial court, relying in part on our holding in Caffee, ruled that King had insufficient contacts with Kelly to be permitted to express his opinions before the jury. In Caffee, we held that the trial court did not err by excluding a defense witness's opinion testimony about the victim's truthfulness on the grounds of remoteness and inadequacy of contacts. The witness had known the victim from childhood but had had very little recent personal contact with the victim or with other people who knew the victim. Instead, her opinion was predicated on letters that she had received from the victim. Caffee is instructive because it illustrates the need for a recent and adequate acquaintance with the person's reputation in the community or with the person who is the subject of the opinion before an opinion about character is admissible. Thus, the rule of Caffee can be stated as follows: The admissibility of evidence of prior character to prove present character depends on whether, in the discretion of the trial court, the contacts on which the opinion is based are frequent enough and recent enough to have probative value to the testimony given in court. See also 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 928 (Chadbourn rev 1970).
Here, Kang's contact with Kelly was while King was working at defendant's work site in 1994. As King testified, "I would show up and she would be there already, or I would be there and she would show up." He said, "Whatever we were working on, she would be in the way." He agreed that, during those times, the focus of his attention was on his work. The question is whether, in light of King's testimony, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence. The trial court correctly recognized the rule that the admissibility of evidence of prior character to prove present character will depend on the probative value for impeachment purposes of the testimony offered. The application of that rule results in the possibility of more than one legally correct outcome, as McCormick's and Wigmore's writings and Coffee's holding instruct. It does not matter whether this court, sitting as the trial court, would have admitted the evidence. What does matter is whether the trial court's ruling was within the range of legally correct choices and produced a permissible legally correct outcome. Rogers, 330 Or at 312. We hold that the trial court could properly conclude that King's opinion about Kelly's character for truthfulness was based on contacts so remote that they would not ordinarily create an impression about character, particularly when the issue was Kelly's character at the time of trial. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded King's opinion as to Kelly's character.
Debbie Coonradt testified that she met Kelly in 1994 when B's family lived on her property for six or seven weeks. She said that she interacted with Kelly on a daily basis during that time. When asked about her personal opinion as to Kelly's character for honesty, she replied, "[n]ot very good." When asked what Kelly's reputation was in the community, Coonradt said, "[v]ery poor." She testified that she had no contact with Kelly since that time. The trial court excluded the evidence for the same reason that it excluded King's testimony about Kelly. Under the circumstances, the trial court could properly conclude that Coonradt did not have recent contacts sufficient to enable her to offer an opinion that would reflect on the truthfulness of Kelly's testimony in 1997. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court excluded Coonradt's opinions.
Regarding Kelly's character for truthfulness, witness Berry was asked whether he knew her. He answered, "I have met Kelly." The following testimony ensued:
"Q. Did you form enough contact with [Kelly and her husband] to have an opinion about their credibility[?]
"A. Yes.
"Q. And what was your
"A. I didn't have a very good opinion of their credibility.
"Q. That's specifically with regard to [Kelly]?
"A. Yes.
"Q. How about — did you have knowledge of her reputation among others in the community?
"A. No."
Again, the trial court ruled that the foundation laid by defendant for the admissibility of Berry's opinion was inadequate. We agree that its decision was a permissible exercise of its discretion in light of our prior holdings.
The dissent would reach a contrary conclusion regarding defendant's eighth assignment of error. As we understand its position, it believes the rule to be that "[although remoteness from the time of trial is a basis for excluding reputation evidence, it is usually not a basis for excluding opinion evidence." 172 Or App at 167 (Armstrong, J., dissenting). From that premise, it concludes (as it would have in regard to defendant's sixth assignment of error) that "[i]n excluding the opinion testimony of three of the witnesses because of its remoteness, the trial court relied on an incorrect understanding of the foundation requirements for opinion testimony." Id. at 168. Again, our reading of the record differs from that of the dissent. The trial court's rulings were not predicated on any purported foundational differences between opinions based on personal contacts and opinions based on community reputation. Thus, the dissent in its reasoning has assigned a fictional basis for the trial court's exercise of discretion. Rather, as we have said, the trial court took its cue from Caffee, focusing on whether the contacts on which the opinions were based were frequent and recent enough to have probative value to the testimony given in court. Thus, the dissent's reasoning reduces to the proposition that it would have exercised its discretion differently, had it been the trial court.
In summary, the only rulings of the trial court with which we disagree are the exclusion of King's testimony regarding his opinion about Jennifer's character for truthfulness and the exclusion of Wickwire's testimony about K's character for truthfulness. The question remains whether those erroneous rulings require reversal of defendant's convictions. "Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial." OEC 103(1). Nonetheless, a trial court's erroneous ruling requires reversal unless there is little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den 520 US 1233 (1997). We do not agree with defendant's arguments that the court's rulings regarding Jennifer and K's character for truthfulness could have affected the jury's verdict regarding B. The charges pertaining to B involved acts that were discrete from the one regarding K. Moreover, defendant was acquitted on one of those charges. We affirm the conviction of defendant regarding B.
Regarding Jennifer's credibility, defendant testified and denied that any abuse had occurred. He was allowed to offer evidence that Jennifer had been convicted for negotiating a bad check. He was also permitted to offer the testimony of Wickwire that, in her opinion, Jennifer was "untruthful"; the testimony of Darden that Jennifer was "not truthful"; and the testimony of Berry that Jennifer "was not very credible" and that her reputation for truthfulness was "bad." King's opinion that Jennifer was "untruthful" is cumulative of the testimony of Wickwire, Darden and Berry. We do not perceive how its admission could have affected the jury's verdict when the similar testimony of three other witnesses was unpersuasive. We conclude there is little likelihood that admitting King's testimony could have affected the jury's verdict regarding K. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 130 Or App 656, 664, 883 P2d 266 (1994), rev den 320 Or 569 (1995) (holding that no prejudicial error occurred from the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress when the evidence sought to be suppressed duplicated other evidence properly admitted in evidence).
The trial court's exclusion of Wickwire's testimony about K's character is a closer question. The state's evidence against defendant included K's testimony, Jennifer's report of K's statements to her, testimony from K's grandmother to whom K also reported her version of what had occurred, the videotape made of K at the Lane County Child Advocacy Center and the testimony of a police officer about Jennifer's report of the matter to the police. There was no incriminating physical evidence offered by the state. The only two people who were present when the alleged sodomy occurred were defendant and K. Thus, the jury was required to determine whether the state had proved its charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on the conflicting testimony of defendant and K and it could be argued that the jury's verdict had to turn on the credibility of K. Wickwire, had she been permitted to testify, would have testified that K was "not always truthful." She was the one defense witness who had had extensive contact with K, and the jury heard no other comparable testimony from any disinterested witness with the same degree of acquaintance. It would follow that K's credibility was an important issue to the jury's consideration of the case.
On the other hand, an examination of defendant's theory at trial undercuts the notion that Wickwire's testimony was material to his case. Defendant's theory at trial was not that K had fantasized or had made up the story that she had been abused; instead, it was that she had been coached to testify that defendant "[ljicked my pee pee." Defendant expended much effort in an attempt to show that Jennifer was not a credible person and that the accusation against him was prompted by the dishonest adults in K's life. Wickwire and other defense witnesses were allowed by the court to express opinions about Jennifer's character for truthfulness. Moreover, defendant elicited from K during cross-examination that she had talked to the prosecutor, her mother, her stepfather, and her grandmother about "what you have to say [in court]" and that they "helped [her] practice what to say."
Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the admission of Wickwire's opinion of K's character for truthfulness would have materially advanced defendant's theory of the case. In litigating the issue of K's credibility as compared to his, defendant was faced with the problem of explaining why a four-year-old neighbor child would accuse him of sexual abuse. A trier of fact could infer from ordinary knowledge that, in general, most four year olds are not always truthful but, also, that it would be improbable under the facts of this case that K would have falsely accused defendant by herself or made up a story on her own. Through his cross-examination of K and Jennifer, defendant was able to create the very inference that he desired the jury to draw from Wickwire's testimony — that Jennifer had prompted K to claim that defendant had abused her. Wickwire's opinion evidence that K is "not always truthful" is merely cumulative of that testimony and adds little to it if, as defendant argues, K was merely the tool of her mother's dishonesty. Thus, as defendant chose to try the case, the issue of credibility became a swearing match between Jennifer and defendant. In that context, the opinion that K is not "always truthful" is, on its face, of little weight. We conclude that, in light of defendant's theory of defense and the relative weight of Wickwire's opinion testimony, there is little likelihood that the trial court's exclusion of that portion of her testimony affected the jury's verdict.
Affirmed.
OEC 608 provides:
"(1) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but;
"(a) The evidence may only refer to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and
"(b) Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witnesses for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
"(2) Specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility of the witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Further, such specific instances of conduct may not, even if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness."
In LeClair, there was evidence that the victim's mother had made reports to the authorities about past sexual abuse of the victim. Both the mother and the child denied the reports and the alleged abuse at a later time. We ruled that the evidence did not establish false claims made by the victim on that record.
Dean Skiller is Jennifer's husband, and Dick Sr. is her father-in-law.
1 The court told defense counsel, in part:
"It may be a situation in which a job is the most important thing to someone. And they're willing to make a false statement, which is not representative at all with respect to, number one, community opinion with respect to the truthfulness — or the character of that person for truthfulness."
McCormick describes the rule that we applied in Caffee in this fashion:
"The crucial time when the character of the witness under attack has its influence on his truth-telling is the time when he testifies. But obviously reputation takes time to form and is the result of earlier conduct and demeanor. Hence, the reputation does not reflect character exactly at the trial date. The practical solution is to do what most courts actually do, that is, (1) to permit the reputation-witness to testify about the impeachee's 'present' reputation as of the time of the trial, if he knows it, and (2) to accept testimony as to reputation as of any time before trial which the judge in his discretion finds is not too remote!. 1"McCormick on Evidence, 173-74 (5th ed 1999) (footnotes omitted).
The dissent undertakes a harmless error analysis as to defendant's conviction for sodomizing B based on its perception that the court erred in excluding the testimony of witnesses who were prepared to testify as to the truthfulness of Kelly, B's mother. As we have held, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Coonradt, King and Berry in that regard.
In closing argument, defense counsel told the jury:
'TJenniferl knows dam good and well she's taking her daughter down to the Child Advocacy Center to be videotaped, to make a statement about Randy Maxwell allegedly licking her pee-pee.
'TJenniferl knows that's what the whole case is about. And she agrees that she informed her daughter, fKl, that that's what was going on there. And you can conclude, based upon the circumstances that you heard described, that she talked to her about what she was going to be asked and what she was going to say; and in fact practiced her testimony with her."
On redirect examination, K reasserted the truthfulness of her accusation.
The dissent advances a number of reasons why it believes that the excluded evidence could have affected the jury verdict as to K. Hypothetically, those reasons could make sense under different circumstances, had the case been tried as the dissent posits. However, our determination about whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence had little likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict necessarily requires us to examine the trial court's rulings in the context of defendant's theory of the case and the evidentiary record as a whole, and not in the abstract.