Case Name: George W. Honey v. B. Graham
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1873
Citations: 39 Tex. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: George W. Honey v. B. Graham.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 1–30

Head Matter:
George W. Honey v. B. Graham.
I. A proclamation by the Governor that the State Treasurer elect had absented himself from the limits of the State—not on public business and without leave of absence—leaving no bonded or responsible clerk, but leaving a man acting as such who, when called on to give the bond required by law, was unable to do so ; held, not sufficient to authorize the courts to infer an abandonment of the office.
8. The right to hold and exercise the functions of an office to which one is elected by the people, is regarded both as property and privilege, and the incumbent can only be deprived of his office in the manner pointed out in the 16th Section of the 1st Article of the Constitution.
3. Though the Governor may assume the existence of a vacancy in such an office, no case can occur wherein he will be authorized to adjudge the office forfeited.
4. The right of trial by jury exists in every case where it is charged that an office has been forfeited, and no emergency can arise which will deprive the claimant of this right, or which will authorize the Govenor in assuming judicial functions which do not constitutionally belong to him.
5. The power of the Governor to create a vacancy in an office exists only where the office is filled by the Governor’s appointment, without concurrence by the Senate or election by the people, and the term of office is undefined by law.
6. The right to an elective office may be lost by nonuser or misuser, though a party continue to assert it, but the determination of the question whether it be lost or not is for the judiciary and not the executive.
Appeal from Travis. Tried below before the Hon. J. W. Oliver.
On the thirtieth day of April, A. D. 1870, George W. Honey gave his bond and was duly qualified and commis sioned as Treasurer of the State of Texas. He continued to discharge in person the duties of the office until the twenty-third of April, 1872, when with his family he left the State, saying to several persons that he would be gone six weeks. He left his chief clerk, Burns, in possession of the office. Soon after Honey’s departure the Governor notified Burns that he must execute a bond for the faithful administration of the office. The bond was not executed to the satisfaction of the Governor, and on the twenty-seventh day of May, 1872, the Treasurer’s office was seized by military force and occupied by James Davidson, Chief of Police and Adjutant General of the State. Davidson acted in obedience to orders issued to him by Governor Davis, who on the same day issued a proclamation declaring the office of Treasurer vacant, for the following reasons, viz.:
“That George W. Honey, late Treasurer of the State of Texas, has absented himself from Austin, without the limits of the State of Texas, not on public business, and without having first obtained leave of absence from the Legislature while the same was in session, or from the executive during its recess, and has not left a bonded and responsible clerk, or a clerk who when by me required has been able to give a sufficient bond, in charge of the treasury of the State, whereby he has abandoned' his said office and the same has become vacant.”
He at the same time appointed B. Graham Treasurer; General Davidson put him in possession of the office, and ousted therefrom the employees of Honey.
On the same day Honey filed this suit against B. Graham, John D. Elliott, General Davidson, and others, for damages and a mandamus.
Subsequently the .action for . damages was abandoned as to all the parties, including Graham,,and was dismissed as-to all the parties except Graham. The case then pro ceeded to trial with no other parties than Honey and Graham, and on no other question than the right of the respective parties to the office. Graham was commissioned by the Governor as Treasurer of the State on the day when the office was seized by General Davidson. Three days before the day on which the office was seized the chief clerk, Burns, tendered a bond as required by the Governor, which was rejected, as the Governor stated in his evidence, because “all the securities were not perfectly responsible.” After the seizure of the office by Davidson, a committee was appointed during the trial by the district judge to investigate the condition of the treasury. The report made by that committee illustrates no issue involved in the final decision of the case.
A. J. Hamilton, Hancock & West, and Chandler, Carleton & Robertson, for the appellant.
—1. As to the creation and tenure of the office of Treasurer, see Consti-. tution of the State of Texas, Article 4, Section 7; Article 4, Section 21 ; Article 4, Section 20; Article 8, Sections 2, 4 and 6; Article 12, Section 41; and Article 1, Section 16 ; Paschal’s Digest, second edition, title “Treasurer,” page 890, Articles 5282 to 5291 inclusive, as to the office and duties of Treasurer ; see also Paschal’s Digest, page 925, title “Comptroller,” Articles 5413 to 5432 inclusive.
2. As to the duties of the chief clerk of the treasury, and as to his bond, see the following: Paschal’s Digest, Article 5291; General Laws Seventh Legislature, Chapter 153, page 247 (1858); General Laws Tenth Legislature, second extra session, page 18, Chapter 27, Act November 15, 1864.
3. Mandamus is the proper remedy. (Bradley v. McCrab, Dallam, 504; Banton v. Wilson, 4 Texas, 400; Lindsay v. Locket, 20 Texas, 516; Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 Howard, 66, cited and followed in the Great Northern Railroad case, decided at this term of the Supreme Court.)
4. When, as in this case, the executive has no power of removal; and, therefore, no power of creating a vacancy, he cannot be judge and jury both, but the fact of vacancy must be ascertained in accordance with law. (Keenan v. Perry, 24 Texas, 253; Hill v. State, 1 Ala., N. S., 559; Bowman v. Slifer, 25 Penn. St. R., 29; Ex parte Hennen, 13 Peters, 259; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Metcalf, Ky., 213, bottom page; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe, 648; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, Ky., 1; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vermont, 653; Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H., 202; People v. Fields, 2 Scammon.)
5. The assertion of the executive in his proclamation that the contingency authorizing him to appoint has happened, is no evidence whatever of that fact. (See Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe, 648; Bowman v. Slifer, 25 Penn. St. R., 29; People v. Fitch, 1 Cal., 519; State v. Lusk, 18 Mo., 333; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill, N. Y., 104; Callahan v. State, 2 Stewart & Porter, 389; Bruce v. Fox, 1 Dana, 448.)
6. In ascertaining these facts, as an office is regarded in some respects as a species of property, the course of the common law must be followed. (Womack v. Holliday, 2 Ala., N. S., 31; 4 Bacon’s Abridgment, title “Office,” letter G, p. 29; 2 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 263; Ex parte King; also, Collins v. Tracy, and Ex parte Hogg, all decided at the present term of the Supreme Court.)
7. The evidence in the cause adduced is wholly insufficient to establish, or even raise, a presumption of the existence of any one of the alleged grounds of vacancy. Mere absence, without any particular circumstance of aggravation, will never work a forfeiture of the office. (See Rex v. Corporation of Wells, 4 Burrow, 199.)
“Whenever an officer, who holds his office by patent, commits a forfeiture, he cannot regularly be turned out without a scire facias, nor can he be completely ousted or discharged without a writ of discharge ; for his right, appearing of record, must be defeated by a matter of as high a nature.” (7 Bac. Abg., letter M, p. 323.)
8. We have been cited to the following authorities by counsel for appellee, viz.: State v. Allen, 21 Indiana, 516; Leal v. Jones, 19 Indiana, 357; Kerr v. Jones, 19 Indiana, 351; and Hadley v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Blackford, 116. Upon a comparison of the facts of these cases with the facts of ■ the case at bar, these authorities will be found not applicable to the case under consideration.
9. A review of our Constitution and statutes (will show that it is impossible that the framers of them ever intended to clothe the executive with power to take military possession of the civil offices of the State, declare incumbents elected by the people out of office, and put his creatures in. (Constitution of Texas, Article 1, Sections 7, 16 and 17; 2 Story on Constitution, Book 3, Chapter 37, title “Executive;” Federalist, No. 77, p. 351; Opinions of Attorney General Stanberry, August 30, 1861, p. 4; Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 615; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, et seq.)
The abandonment must be acted on by the executive; but suppose it prove he was under a mistake, and there is no abandonment, shall the old incumbent lose his office through the mistake of the executive %
The judgment should be reversed, and this court should proceed to render such judgment as the court below ought to have rendered, restoring appellant to the office of Treasurer, from which he has been illegally driven.
Wm. Alexander, Attorney-General, for appellee.
What are the constitutional duties of the State Treas urer ? “He shall'receive and take charge of all public moneys paid into the treasury, countersign all warrants drawn by the Comptroller of Public Accounts, pay off the public creditors upon the warrant of the Comptroller of Public Accounts, and perform all such other duties as may be prescribed by law.” (Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 31.)
By the statute, he can receive public moneys on deposit warrants, and not otherwise; and can pay them, out on treasury warrants, and not otherwise. (Oldham & White’s Digest, Arts. 1883, 1883.)
His constitutional and statutory duties are enforced by a penal sanction. (Penal Code, Ch. 3, Secs. 335 and 337.) '
Which of his official duties (constitutional or statutory) can he perform when he is out of the State, and when hé has left no bonded and qualified chief clerk in the treasury ?.
The chief clerk is required to give a $35,000 bond, and even that did not authorize him to sign for the Treasurer. (Act of February 16, 1858, Ch. 153, p. 347.) Six months’ residence is also required. He must be a registered voter. Even after having given bond and qualified, he could not, until January 11, 1863, £ 1 sign the name of the Treasurer by himself as clerk,” save when “by reason of sickness, unavoidable absence ” (no other sort of absence), “or other cause’’ (of course, other than sickness, -or unavoidable absence), “the Treasurer’s name may not be affixed by himself.” (Acts of' 1863, Ch. 64, p. 44.)
What are the rights, powers and duties of the Governor touching the office of Treasurer of the State of Texas l The Treasurer is declared by the Constitution to be an officer of the executive department, of which the Governor is the head. (Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 1.)
As he must be commissioned, the Governor, under the Constitution, must ascertain who he is to commission. (Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 19.)
The Governor must know who are the incumbents of the offices constituting the executive department. How could he “require information in writing from all officers of the executive department” otherwise? (Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 7.)
If such be not the case, how is it possible for him to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed?” (Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 10; see also the Louisiana case of Bovee v. Horren, and Kerr v Jones, 19 Ind. R.)
Under the general requirement, that he shall “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” he was bound to declare the office vacant, when ex naturae, rerum Honey had so absented himself, that he could discharge no one of the constitutional or statutory duties of the office.
The action of the Governor being within the scope of his executive authority, and outside the scope of judicial jurisdiction, cannot be attacked collaterally any more than it can be appealed from directly. (Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. R., 537; Aulanier v. State, 1 Texas.)
The second commission is conclusive. (Dubuc v. Voss, 19 La. An. R., 310.)
The Governor, whose duty it is to commission, is bound to officially know and decide who are the incumbents of the offices constituting the executive department. (Constitution, Article 4, Sections 1, 7, 21 and 10.) His decision is necessarily final and irreversible. (Keenan v. Perry, 24 Texas, 360.) Under the requirements of Section 10 he must know and decide when any office, especially of his own department, is vacant, whether by death, resignation or abandonment. He has, by proclamation, held that the office of Treasurer was vacated by Honey by abandonment. He has commissioned and recognized Graham as Honey’s successor, and Graham has user of the office. (Aulanier v. The Governor, 1 Texas, 666; Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich., 531. See also, by way of analogy, Luther v. Borden et al., 7 Howard; 1.)
If the decision of the Governor was subject to revision by the cofirts, the record contains affirmative proof that it was correct in point of fact.
Honey was without the limits of the State. He left’no bonded clerk. Graham is in office, and the State has not by quo warranto sought to oust him. The State alone by a direct proceeding for the purpose can evict—that is, under our Constitution. (Article 8, Sections 2 and 4.)
Sheeks & Sneed, also for appellee.—We do not claim that the Governor can create a vacancy in any of the other' executive offices, but if a vacancy exists he has a right and it is made his duty to fill it. (Constitution of 1869, Article 4, Section 7.)
The power to fill a vacancy imposes the duty to inquire if a vacancy exists. (Hill v. The State, 1 Ala., N. S., 559.)
The commission gave the appellee a prima facie right to the office, and if he found it vacant he had a right to-take possession of it and hold it until it was judicially determined that there was no yacancy.
But if he had found Honey in the office, refusing to give it up, he would have been compelled to have resorted to the courts for a determination of his rights. (Hill v. ThState, 1 Ala., N. S., 559; 4 Blackford, 116; 19 Ind., 351; 19 Ind., 357; 21 Ind., 516.)
The Governor appointed appellee, commissioned him, as he had a right to do, and the appellee did not find Honey in the office, either in person or by a legal representative.
That Burns was not in any sense a-legal officer is shown by the statutes and constitutional provisions cited by appellant. He can only be regarded as a stranger and usurper, independent of Honey. (See also Constitution of 1869, Art. 22, Sec. 1.)
The question whether there was a vacancy or not can be determined by the courts as well after appointment as-before. (Hill v. State, 1 Ala.; 21 Ind., 516; 4 Blackford,, 116.)
Then the only question is whether there was a vacancy in contemplation of law or not.
A vacancy may be made by resignation, death, expiration of the term of office, abandonment, removal, or forfeiture.
Abandonment of an office is a species of resignation. (8 B. Monroe, 648.)
A man has abandoned his office when he goes away or does any other act that makes it impossible to discharge the duties of it, and leaves no competent deputy, assistant, or other representative recognized by law. (8 B. Monroe, 648, and Indiana cases above cited.)
Honey had done this, as is shown by the evidence in, the case. He had forfeited his office by his illegal use of' the public funds, and the evidence makes out such a case as would warrant the court in declaring his office forfeited if the appellee had found him in it and had been compelled to bring suit for the office. (21 Ind., 516; 4 Blackford, 116.)

Opinion:
Walker, J.
A majority of the court have arrived at ', an opinion in this case which I am authorized to express.. To this, however, may be added by my brother Me Ado o his own reasons for the opinion.
The 1st Section of the 4th Article of the Constitution creates the office of State Treasurer, and makes it a branch or subordinate department to the executive, oven which the Governor is chief. The 7th Section of the same article implies an authority in the Governor over the- different branches of the executive department. He is authorized at any time to require information in writing from any of the chiefs of this department concerning the business of their offices.
It may be somewhat difficult to determine the precise boundary line of this authority, or how far the Governor is himself officially responsible for the safe and efficient management of the several branches of this department.
The action of the Governor in the case at bar is not without precedent. Ohio, Mississippi and Louisiana, -have furnished similar cases. The -late Chief Justice of the United States, when occupying the executive office of Ohio, upon information duly brought to his notice, seized the treasury department and ejected a defaulting officer.
But mere precedent, to acquire the force of law, must in the first place rest upon the sound principles of law and reason ; it must be acquiesced in and uncontradicted by paramount authority.
No doubt is entertained of the authority of the Governor to appoint a Treasurer of the State when a vacancy -exists in that office. The inquiry then to which we may -.safely confine this opinion is, was there a vacancy in the office of State Treasurer on the twenty-seventh of May, 1872?
What information we have on this subject aside from the other evidence found izz the record, is contained in the Governor's proclamation of that date. To this State paper we must look for information as to the motive, reason and facts to sustain the judgment of the District Court.
Taking the proclamation of the Governor as true, aside from the legal conclusion that a vacancy existed in the office, do the facts justify such a conclusion?
The Governor declares in his proclamation, that George •W. Honey, late Treasurer of State, had absented himself from the limits of the State—not on public business, and "without leave of absence — leaving no bonded or responsible clerk, but leaving a man acting as such who, when called on to give the bond required by law, was unable to do so. These are the facts stated in the proclamation, from which a vacancy was inferred, and the .appellee appointed to fill the vacancy.
'The proclamation contains no charge of malfeasance, "misfeasance, fraud, or peculation against the appellant. A zealous effort, however, seems -to have since been made "to establish these charges against him. If true, they •could in nowise justify the Governor in depriving the ; appellant of his office by forcible ejectment therefrom.
The 16th Section of the 1st Article of the Constitution •reads thus: "Ho citizen of this State shall be deprived -of life, liberty, property, or privileges, outlawed, exiled, -or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the law of the land."
The right to hold and exercise the functions of an office to which the individual may have been duly elected, may be regarded both as property and privilege, and therefore the incumbent can only be deprived of his office " in the manner pointed out in the above quoted section of the Constitution. It may be safely admitted that more than one case might occur where the Governor would be authorized in assuming that an office was vacant; but no case can occur under our Constitution wherein the Governor would be authorized to adjudge an office forfeited.
Judgment belongs to the judiciary. A charge of forfeiture can only be made out on proof—proof sufficient to satisfy twelve unprejudiced minds.
To forfeit his right to an office, the incumbent must have done something sufficient in law to deprive him of the office; and the Constitution and laws secure to the person so accused the right of traverse—the right of trial— and no power on earth can lawfully deprive ham of these rights.
But it has been assumed on the argument of this' ease, that a great emergency existed requiring the removal' of George W. Honey from the office of State Treasurer,, and that the Governor, as in duty bound,, promptly met" the emergency.
Under a system of laws so well devised as ours, it is-", safe to assume that no such emergency can arise or cast: itself upon the Governor as would authorize him in assuming power and functions which do not constitutionally belong to him.
In our opinion, the argument does the executive great" injustice. The reason for his action is doubtless candidly stated in his proclamation, and there is here no assumption of any power to declare a forfeiture of the office.
There is no fact stated other than that, from which it must be inferred that the Governor acted upon the theory alone, that the appellant had voluntarily abandoned the-office; and the majority of this court concurring in this, opinion in nowise hold the executive responsible for any assumption of power on his part such as is assumed byappellee' s counsel.
The power of the Governor to fill a vacancy, when one-exists, is not disputed. The power to create a vacancy is denied by every authority, except where the office is filled by the Governor's choice of am incumbent without concurrence of the Senate or election by the people, and the term of office is undefined by law. In such case the incumbent holds at the pleasure of the executive, and may be at any time removed from the office. (Keenan v. Perry, 24 Texas, 253; Hill v. State, 1 Ala., 599; Bowman v. Slifer, 25 Penn. S., 29; 13 Peters, 259; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Met., 213; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe, 648; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vermont, 653; Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H., 202; People v. Fields, 2 Scammon, 79.)
The argument in this case by appellee's counsel goes even beyond an assumption that the Governor may adjudicate a-question of forfeiture; it claims that the adjudication is final, and from it no appeal can be taken.
It is said by counsel, "The Governor had cause to believe that the Treasurer had- not only absented himself from the State, without leave, for an indefinite period, -and that the person left in charge of the Treasury had never qualified or executed a bond, but that both the Treasurer and the person claiming to act as his chief clerk had been guilty of gross malfeasance, misuser and nonuser. Shall the Governor calmly fold his arms, witness daily unlawful execution of so important a trust when he has power to fill a vacancy, and is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, simply because the '.Treasurer is liable to indictment and impeachment ? Suppose the Governor had preferred charges against him (as was the case), no trial could be had at the first term, and if convicted at the next, he has the right of appeal, which 'would necessarily delay the case for twelve months or more. It is no answer-to say that it is better the State should suffer these inconveniences and delays than that -due course of the law of the land should not prevail."
This argument is very bold—apparently very candid— >but in that it assumes that the Governor may in any case (deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights, it is not less •bold and candid than it is false and dangerous. The '"law's delay and inconveniences" may now and then prejudice an individual, or the State may suffer thereby, Tint the argument in this case is simply revolutionary, and if reduced to its legitimate sequence, is the justification of the mob, it is the logic of revolution, it is the license dor illegal violence. The Governor never intended this; nothing in his proclamation convicts him of any such heresy. He has stated distinctly and unmistakably the-reasons which led to his action, and any presumption which would lead to a different motive or reasons than, those expressed would convict the Governor of insincerity to the people of the State, and found against him, in our-opinion, a most unjust charge.
Certainly it would be better that every dollar in the State treasury should be stolen, the vaults and safes-thrown into the river and the building reduced to ashes, than that the Governor should, in one jot or title, violate- or impede the due course of the law of the land. The Governor, as our chief magistrate, we look to for an example of obedience to the law; he is the sworn defender-of the Constitution on which life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness depend.
Believing, as we do, that the Governor acted upon the-facts stated in his proclamation, in view of the authority vested in him by the 7th Section of the 4th Article of the Constitution, how does his action affect this case ? He has neither adjudicated nor assumed to adjudicate any question of forfeiture, but he has acted upon a state of facts - which, when duly and impartially considered, if they do not fully justify his action, certainly go a great ways in-, that direction in a moral point of view.
On the twenty-seventh of May, 1872, he finds the State Treasurer to be absent in a distant State, without leave from public authority, not sent for the transaction of any public business; with him the principal members of his. family, the intended period of his absence unknown, the • community rife with rumors, however false they may have been, of fraud and peculation in the treasury; the chief clerk in charge of the treasury without an official bond, the amount of money and property in the-treasury-largely in excess of the Treasurer's bond—these were facts calculated to alarm, and no doubt did alarm, the executive, and especially considering his own constitutional responsibility over this department. That there was really nothing in these facts to have alarmed the Governor, could not, in the nature of things, be known to-him at the time.
Looking at the conduct of the executive merely in a moral point of view, his conduct is not such as might not' be expected in a prompt, vigilant and faithful public servant. But that he mistook the facts, at least so far as-they relate, to an abandoment of the office, and was thereby led to an undue exercise of power in appointing the appellee, we have no doubt.
And now we come to discuss the only question of real importance involved in this case. The authorities already referred to distinctly and unmistakably lay down the rule that there can be no abandonment of office without the intention to abandon it. (State v. Pritchard, Law Register, August number, p. 514, decided by Supreme Court of New Jersey.) The very word itself implies active volition; it involves a voluntary act. This voluntary act might bé proven, if it existed; but it has not been proven in this case. Ho part of the evidence is strong enough to raise the presumption that the appellant, in his own mind, ever intended to abandon his office. In the case of Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monroe, the' law is so clearly stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice, and the case is so strongly analogous to the one at bar, that it would seem we ought to have but little trouble in deciding this case.
Hardin had been elected Secretary of State. The law required him to reside at the capital, which he persistently refused to do. The Governor declared.the office vacant, and appointed Kinkaid to fill it. Hardin sued out a mandamus against Page, to compel the payment of his sal ary, and thus the question.came before the courts. The Chief Justice, says in his opinion: .
"Acknowledging the respect which we sincerely feel for the opinions and character of the Governor, whose acts are now brought in question, as well as that which is due from this department to the official acts of every Governor, we are bound to inquire whether the vacancy assumed either actually existed by. virtue of the facts alleged in the executive declaration and judgment, or was produced either by that act or the act of appointing a successor to fill .it. Conceding, without deciding, that an office may be made vacant by abandonment, and that there may be such evidence of it as to -authorize the Governor to consider the office vacant, and to fill it by a new appointment, still, unless he can by his own will'or judgment put an end to the rights of an •officer, or to his continuance in the office, the concession would have no plausible support in law or reason, except upon the ground that there should be unequivocal evi-dence of the voluntary rejection or resignation of the office."
No such evidence existed in that-case, nor is it found in the case at bar..
I readily conceive that a right may be forfeited or lost by a nonuser or misuser, though the party continue to .assert it; but the determination of the question, whether it be lost or not, is not a question for executive determination ; there must first be a judgment of amotion before the executive can fill the vacancy.
We therefore come to the conclusion, that the judgment •of the District Court is erroneous, and that George W. Honey is entitled to the office of State Treasurer; and .•such is the judgment of this court, reversing the judgment of the District Court.
Reversed and rendered.