Case Name: The State ads. David L. Wakely
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1820-05
Citations: 2 Nott & McC. 410
Docket Number: 
Parties: *The State ads. David L. Wakely.
Judges: CoiiOOOK, Nott, Gantt, and Johnson, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 619–620

Head Matter:
*The State ads. David L. Wakely.
Every Court acting clearly -within its jurisdiction, in a case legally submitted, is independent oí all others, to which no appeal is given.
No prohibition lies to restrain the proceedings of a Court Martial for irregularities, as long as it acts within its jurisdiction.
This was a prohibition, tried before Mr. Justice Richardson, at Chambers who made the following decision : “ It is admitted that A. Hall is a private within the beat company of Oapt. Wakely. It is not denied in the oath verifying the suggestion, that the Court Martial was legally constituted. But it is alleged that A. Hall was not summoned to attend one of the musters, and had a legal excuse for Ms absence at the other. It is not denied that A. Hall was summoned to attend the Court M artial, but it is alleged that the Court had no proof that he had been summoned to attend either the musters or the Court Martial; and that execution has been issued to levy the fines, without the said A. Hall being previously required to pay the same.
“ There may have been grounds for an appeal, but as the Court was legally constituted, and had jurisdiction of the subject in contestation; and as A. Hall was summoned to attend the Court, and failed to offer any excuse for his absence, I cannot perceive any usurpation of jurisdiction, or such a want of testimony, as would authorize the issuing of the writ of prohibition. Every Court acting clearly within its jurisdiction, in a case legally submitted, is independent of all others, to %dhich no appeal is given. The motion for a prohibition is, therefore, dismissed.
The relator gave notice, that he would appeal from the decision in this case, and for a reversal thereof, on the following grounds :
1. That the Court Martial proceeded to give judgment against the said Ainsley Hall, without proof that he was in default in not attending the musters for which he was fined.
2. That the Court gave judgment against the said Ainsly, without proof of his being summoned to attend the Court Martial.
3. *That there was no charge exhibited against him before the Court rX,,, Martial, of which he had any notice, and therefore any fine imposed by *- default was illegal.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by.
Richardson, J.
To answer these objections to the decision of the judge, I have but to inquire, as in the case of McDonald and Bonner v. Elfe, 1 Nott & M'Cord, 504, for what prohibition lies ? " The complaint should be that the party aggrieved has been drawn ad aliud examen by a jurisdiction usurped, or by a process disallowed by the laws." See 2 Inst.-229, 243, 607. 2 H. Black. 100. "The general ground," says the last authority, "being an excess of jurisdiction, when they assume a power to act in matters not within their cognizance." Lord Loughborough goes on to state, in the same well considered case, Grant v. Sir Charles Gould, in which the charge of irregularity was directly in question, one other ground of prohibition, " which is indeed," he continues, "but a species of the other, to wit, that where the authority is limited by Act, (meaning an authority which was before inherent in the Inferior Court,) the Court which acted differently from the prescription of the Act, exceeded its jurisdiction, and is, therefore, liable to prohibition. Beyond these two grounds," said the judge, "it does not occur to me that there is any other which can be stated,, upon which the Courts of Westminster Hall can interfere in the procedings of other Courts, where the matter is within their jurisdiction." Coming directly to the charge of irregularity in the proceedings, he says, (p. 101,) " the most that can be made of it, is an error in the proceedings, but we cannot prohibit on that account." The doctrine, then, is well settled, and to grant a prohibition in this case, would be to exercise appellate powers, and to review the proceedings. But that we cannot do.
Blanding, for relator. Butler, for defendant.
The relator does not deny that he was cited to attend the Court; but he did not appear, and judgment passed by default. What evidence was *4-121 Educed to *show that he had been summoned to turn out at the -* musters, and had failed to do so, does not appear. If insufficient, that would be matter of appeal, and not a ground for prohibition. If notice of the precise charge against the relator was not given, that, too, would be merely a ground of appeal, but such irregularity, though it may be good cause to review, cannot place the case out of the jurisdiction of the militia Court. Wherever the party is aggrieved, he has an appeal to the officers of the regiment, after notice of the fine imposed. Mil. M. L. 44, sec. 130. And unless there be an appeal, a subsequent Act (Mill. 54, see. 1T9, ) mates the sentence in express terms, "final and conclusive, when approved" by the officer ordering the Court. So that the statute conspires with the general doctrine to prevent this Court from interfering. The motion is, therefore, dismissed.
CoiiOOOK, Nott, Gantt, and Johnson, JJ., concurred.
See 1 K. & McC. 504, and ante, Harp. 311, 511; 2 McC. 240.
8 Stat. 516.
8 Stat. 529, § 3.