Case Name: BENNETT et al. v. BAGWELL & STEWART, INC., et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1958-04-11
Citations: 214 Ga. 115
Docket Number: 19974
Parties: BENNETT et al. v. BAGWELL & STEWART, INC., et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., who dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 214
Pages: 115–120

Head Matter:
19974.
BENNETT et al. v. BAGWELL & STEWART, INC., et al.

Opinion:
Candler, Justice.
The plaintiffs in error brought an action for injunctive relief in the Superior Court of Forsyth County against Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., Leland Bagwell, and Robert Gibson, as joint tortfeasors. The petition in substance alleges that the defendants are, in a populous rural community of Forsyth County, maintaining and operating what is commonly referred to as a rendering plant; that it is a continuing nuisance resulting directly from the improper manner in which it is maintained and operated by them; and that the plaintiffs personally and their property are being specially injured and damaged by it. General demurrers were interposed to the petition by all of the defendants, and to the judgments overruling them there are no exceptions. The defendants Bagwell & Stewart, Inc. and Leland Bagwell filed pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, in which they averred that the Superior Court of Forsyth County was without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against them, since the legal residence of each was in Cherokee County, and that the facts alleged in the petition are insufficient to state a cause of action for any of the relief sought against the resident defendant Gibson, an employee of the defendant corporation with no control over the manner and way its plant is maintained and operated. The issues made by the special pleas were tried on a written stipulation, which shows the following facts: The corporate defendant's main office and legal residence is in Cherokee County, Georgia, where its books and records are kept. It is sole owner of the rendering plant, in Forsyth County, the maintenance and operation of which is the subject matter of this litigation. Leland Bagwell is also a resident of Cherokee County. He is president, general manager, treasurer, and sole owner of the corporate stock in Bag-well & Stewart, Inc. He spends from 25 to 30 hours per week at the corporation's plant in Forsyth County, supervising, directing, and controlling its maintenance and operation. The defendant Gibson is a resident of Forsyth County, and is an employee of the defendant corporation. He is the corporate defendant's main foreman at its rendering plant in Forsyth County, has three sub-foremen working under him, and gives all orders and directions for work to be done at the plant during the absence of the defendant Bagwell. He has authority to hire and fire employees at the plant, subject to the defendant Bagwell's approval. The plant is operated continuously, both day and night, and he is subject to call at all times when his presence at the plant is needed. On this stipulation the parties respectively moved for a verdict, and the court directed one in favor of the defendants on their special pleas and dismissed the case as to all of the defendants. The plaintiffs, in due time, moved for a judgment notwithstanding such verdict, and the exception is to a judgment denying their motion. Held:
That the facts alleged in the petition are sufficient to show the existence of a continuing nuisance specially injurious in specified particulars to the plaintiffs personally and to their property, was settled by the unexcepted-to rulings on the defendants' general demurrers; as to that question, those rulings fixed the law of the case and it is well settled in this jurisdiction that a nuisance is a trespass (Cox v. Strickland, 120 Ga. 104, 47 S. E. 912, 1 Ann. Cas. 870), and that a court of equity will enjoin a continuing trespass. Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491 (13 S. E. 2d 20, 133 A. L. R. 684); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 (37 S. E. 2d 785); Houghton v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 209 Ga. 577 (74 S. E. 2d 844); Dowdell v. Cherry, 209 Ga. 849 (76 S. E. 2d 499). Under art. 6, sec. 14, par. 4 of the Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-4904), "suits against joint . . . trespassers, residing in different counties, may be tried in either county." Therefore, even though art. 6, sec. 14, par. 3 of the Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-4903), requires that "Equity cases shall be tried in the county where a defendant resides against whom substantial relief is prayed" (see also Code § 3-202), where a petition for injunction, brought in the county where one defendant resides, seeks to restrain a continuing trespass which all of the defendants are committing, the court is not without jurisdiction to grant such relief, even though all except the one defendant are residents of other counties in this State. And this is true, even though the resident defendant, as an employee or agent of a nonresident defendant, may have been acting only under his command or authority in the commission of the trespass. As authority for this ruling, see Sellers v. Page, 127 Ga. 633 (56 S. E. 1011), where it was said at page 637: "In such case if one, upon employment of another, commit a positive wrong against a third person, as to such third person the law of principal and agent does not apply, but both are liable to him as principals. If all of the conditions existed as herein-before recited, they were such as to constitute all of the defendants joint wrongdoers, engaged in an enterprise to commit the injury of which the plaintiff complained." For other cases which hold that injunctive relief may be obtained against several joint tortfeasors residing in different counties of this State where the suit is brought for substantial relief against all of them in the county where only one resides, see Baggett v. Linder, 208 Ga. 590 (68 S. E. 2d 469); Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390 (9 S. E. 2d 622); Baker v. Davis, 127 Ga. 649 (57 S. E. 62); MaPhaul v. Fletcher, 111 Ga. 878 (36 S. E. 938); and Millbank v. Penniman, 73 Ga. 136. Applying this principle of law to the allegations of the petition and the stipulated facts, a verdict for the plaintiffs was demanded on the issue of jurisdiction as raised by the defendants' special pleas. Hence, the court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiffs' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Direction is therefore given that the trial judge, on receipt of the remittitur from this court, vacate the verdict which he directed on the special pleas; that he enter judgment on them in favor of the plaintiffs; and that he also vacate and set aside the order dismissing the plaintiffs' case.
Submitted January 15, 1958
Decided April 11, 1958
Rehearing denied May 7, 1958.
B. F. Schuder, Wheeler, Robinson & Thurmond, A. C. Wheeler,
Emory F. Robinson, for plaintiffs in error.
Leon Boling, H.' G. Vandiviere, H. L. Buffington, contra.
Judgment reversed with direction.
All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., who dissents.