Case Name: COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al. v. DISTRICT NO. 1 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al.
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1951-03-02
Citations: 71 Idaho 192
Docket Number: No. 7694
Parties: COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al. v. DISTRICT NO. 1 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al.
Judges: PORTER and TAYLOR, JJ., and SUTTON, District Judge, concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 192–203

Head Matter:
227 P.2d 947
COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al. v. DISTRICT NO. 1 OF NEZ PERCE COUNTY et al.
No. 7694.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
March 2, 1951.
J. H. Felton and William J. Jones, Lewis-ton, for appellants.
Sam S. Griffin, Boise, for Independent School Dist. of Boise City, C. Stanley Skiles, Boise, for Boise City, amici curiae.
Cox, Ware & Stellmon, and Thomas- A. Madden, all of Lewiston, for respondents.

Opinion:
GIVENS, Chief Justice.
District No. 1 of Nez Perce County is an Independent School District at Lewis-ton in Nez Perce County, organized and operating under a special charter granted by act of the Territorial Legislature December 30, 1880, p. 408, 1880 Session Laws, and variously amended from time to time. Immediately south of and adjacent thereto is Common School District No. 2 organized under the general school laws; District No. 4, similarly organized, is immediately south of No. 2 and likewise, No. 3 is immediately south of No. 4. Districts Nos. 3 and 4 have for many years last past utilized solely the school house in District No. 2.
At an election May 15, 1950, ordered by said District No. 1 under and in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 92, 1939 Session Laws, p. 152, the voters of the three districts rejected annexation. May 16, 1950, more than ten resident freeholders of School District No. 2 petitioned appellants to hold an election to pass upon annexation. Remonstrance petitions were filed and later, upon proper application, a writ of prohibition was granted by the District Court restraining the holding of such election on the ground said Chapter 92, supra, is unconstitutional as expressly violative of Art. 3, Sec. 19 and Art. 9, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Interested voters in District No. 2 were allowed to appear and contest the application for the writ and are appellants herein.
Special charters of cities and school districts ante-dating the Constitution survived it, and such political entities since its adoption have constitutionally and legally operaced thereunder, and amendment of such charters may be made only by local and special laws which are not inhibited by Art. 3, Sec. 19. Wiggin v. City of Lewiston, 8 Idaho 527, 69 P. 286; Butler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234; Boise City National Bank v. Boise City, 15 Idaho 792, 100 P. 93; Howard v. Ind. School District No. 1, 17 Idaho 537, 106 P. 692; Bagley v. Gilbert, 63 Idaho 494 at 508, 122 P.2d 227; Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32 at 41, 170 P.2d 425.
No provision of Art. 3, Sec. 19 is more potent than any other, or any more restrictive, upon the passage of local and special laws amending a special Charter. State v. Romich, 67 Idaho 229 at 241, 176 P.2d 204.
District No. 1 was expressly recognized as a validly organized school district in Howard v. Ind. School District No. 1, supra, thus completely crossing the Rubicon of Art. 9, Sec. 1, because, if by such Section school districts could be organized only under the general statutes as respondent argues, the court could not have recognized the valid existence of District No. 1.
Respondents rely upon two Colorado cases, In re Senate Bill No. 23, 1897, 23 Colo. 499, 48 P. 647, and In re Senate Bill No. 9, 1899, 26 Colo. 136, 56 P. 173, in support of their contention this statute is unconstitutional. Suffice to- say this Court in the decisions above has held directly to the contrary to the extent these Colorado cases are in conflict, finding adequate distinction in that we do not have the provisions in some constitutions, including Colorado, Art. 5, Sec. 25 last sentence, prohibiting special laws where a general law will be applicable. Butler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393 at 398, 83 P. 234, supra.
Respondents attempt to differentiate between the constitutional right of the Legislature to amend special charters as to internal and as to external affairs of a chartered municipality or district.
In the first place, no such distinction is to be found in Art. 3, Sec. 19. In the second place, to follow such inhibition or distinction, as applied to extension of boundaries, to its logical end would mean no school district or municipality under special charter could ever extend its boundaries beyond those existing at the time of the original establishment—a patent absurdity. In re Common School Districts Nos. 18 and 21, 52 Idaho 363, 15 P.2d 732; American Nat. Bank v. Joint Ind. School Dist., 61 Idaho 405, 102 P.2d 826; 62 C.J. 122, 146; 56 C.J. 212.
Respondents further urge the horrendous results of upholding this statute as distinguished from the general statute and the potential wholesale gobbling up of little districts or surrounding territory by large chartered districts, but districts under the general statute may likewise annex and no attack is made thereon. If there is no constitutional inhibition on annexation generally, and respondents do not suggest that annexation as such transcends any provision of the Constitution, such argument is of no force. Furthermore, the only essential differences between the general law and the charter are: under the general statute, Chapter 5, Title 33, I.C., supervision and control by County and State committees, and method of election, and that a second election cannot be held within sixty days after a preceding election. Both under the general law and Chapter 92, the voters in the areas affected, i. e., to be annexed, determine by election — essentially in the same ultimate manner — whether they desire to be taken in.
Such differences noted above do not and there is no valid claim urged they do, make the method and procedure under Chapter 92 unconstitutional.
The extension of the boundaries of a specially chartered school district is as germane to the purposes for which it was chartered as the extension of an unchar-tered district under the general statute.
Lastly, -respondents urged Chapter 92 is unconstitutional as imposing a bonded indebtedness upon the annexed territory not in compliance with Section 33-909, I.C. The proceedings and the proposed vote be ing 'for annexation and not to authorize issuance of bonds, Section 33-909, I.C. has no application.
Though not free from doubt, because respondents do not mention the Section, we. assume they contend the charter provisions under consideration violate Article 8, Section 3, Const., because this clause — -"Thereafter the persons and property in said annexed territory shall be subject to all of the benefits, obligations and burdens of said district," imposes the existing bonded indebtedness of District No. 1 on the annexed territory. The election provided for in the charter being governed by only a majority, not a two-thirds vote.
So construed, it would be unconstitutional, People v. Hanford Union High School Dist., 148 Cal. 705, 84 P. 193, but the perforce inherent meaning of the words "all," "obligations and burdens," context of the charter, and paramount -pertinent rule of statutory construction do not justify such interpretation.
The words, "obligations and burdens" are of general meaning and do not of themselves denote or connote any particular character, kind or type of indebtedness ; nor does the word "all," though completely comprehensive, thereby encompass .bonded indebtedness because this court early announced, has consistently adhered to and emphasized this rule of statutory construction:
" 'The rule of construction universally adopted is that when a statute may constitutionally operate upon certain persons, or in certain cases, and was not evidently intended to conflict with the Constitution, it is not to be held unconstitutional merely because there may be persons to whom or cases in which it cannot constitutionally apply; but it is to be deemed constitutional, and to be construed not to apply to the latter persons or cases on the ground that courts are bound to presume that the Legislature did not intend to violate the Constitution.' " 14 Idaho at page 766, 95 P. at page 680.
" 'We construe the general words of our statute to be comprehensive only of those cases which are the rightful subjects of legislation of the kind in question. However, we disavow doing so merely in order to shelter the statute under the rule mentioned, but because the ancient established and wise canon of interpretation requires it to be done. Sporadic and anomalous cases indicating to the contrary may be found, as they may be found to the contrary of every settled accepted doctrine of the law; but the rule that the general words of statutes will be restricted in application to cases presumptively within the legislative intent has been so long accepted as a cardinal principle that its occasional denial, even by the most learned of courts, fails utterly of adverse impression.' " 14 Idaho at page 767, 95 P. at page 681.
" it (statute) should properly be construed in connection with the Constitution as covering only those cases contem plated by the Constitution and excluding those on which the legislative authority could not act." In re Gale, 14 Idaho 761, 768, 95 P. 679, 681.
" , there is another principle of law which would be applicable here, and that is that, where a statute would be unconstitutional as applied to a certain class of cases, and is constitutional as applied to another class, it should be held to have been intended by the Legislature to apply only to the latter class, and not to the former (citing authorities), and so we have no hesitancy in holding that the statute here in question has «0 application or reference to a corporation engaged solely and exclusively in interstate commerce, or in any way to interstate business, and so for that reason the statute does not run counter to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gifford, 25 Idaho 196 at 202, 136 P. 1131, 1132.
Applying these principles, we are justified in holding the charter imposes an obligation o'n the annexed territory to pay only current, ordinary and necessary expenses, not existing bonded or funded indebtedness of the annexing district.
"In cases like the one at bar, we have well-established rules in regard to the construction of statutes when their constitutionality is questioned. One is that the presumptions are all in favor of'the constitutionality of a statute. Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) page 255, quoting from Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, states the rule as follows : 'Whenever an act of the Legislature can be so construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the Constitution and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts'; and it is held by many courts that where there is room for two constructions of a statute, both equally obvious and equally reasonable, the court must,- in deference to the Legislature of the state, assume that it did not overlook the provisions of the Constitution, and designed the act to take effect. In this case it is the duty of the.court to adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words used, brings the statute into harmony with the provisions of the Constitution." Citing cases. Grice v. Clearwater Timber Co., 20 Idaho 70 at 77, 117 P. 112, 114;
Hall v. Johnson, 53 Idaho 667 at page 676, 27 P.2d 674; J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 Idaho 374 at 381, 32 P.2d 784; Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620 at 636, 57 P.2d 1068; Robinson v. Enking, 58 Idaho 24, 69 P.2d 603; Idaho Gold Dredg. Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 78 P.2d 105; Independent School District v. Common School District, 64 Idaho 303 at 308, 131 P.2d 786.
As against the attack made upon it by respondents, Chapter 92 of the 1939 Session Laws is not unconstitutional. The judgment granting the writ of prohibition is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the writ and permit the election to be held. Costs awarded to appellants.
Petition for rehearing' denied.
PORTER and TAYLOR, JJ., and SUTTON, District Judge, concur.