Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie R. WOODS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-09-24
Citations: 283 So. 2d 753
Docket Number: No. 53487
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie R. WOODS.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 283
Pages: 753–756

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie R. WOODS.
No. 53487.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 24, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1973.
John E. Miller, Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Nathan E. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
Appellant Lonnie R. Woods was tried and convicted of armed robbery; he was sentenced to serve fifteen years at hard labor. From his conviction and sentence defendant has appealed, relying upon one bill of exceptions to obtain a reversal.
Defendant reserved his bill of exceptions to the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The motion was based on the failure of the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Woods to recuse himself.
There is no factual dispute in the case. Defendant, following his arrest, was represented by the office of the public defender of East Baton Rouge Parish. His case was allotted to Nathan E. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender. Mr. Wilson represented the accused at his arraignment at which time the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Subsequently, Mr. Wilson was appointed as an assistant district attorney for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. As such, Mr. Wilson conducted the prosecution of Mr. Woods on behalf of the State of Louisiana.
Following his conviction and before sentencing, the accused filed in the trial court a motion for a new trial. The motion was made in proper person, although the defendant had retained counsel. Defense counsel alleges and it is uncontroverted by the State that the first time he knew of the dual capacity in which Mr. Wilson participated in the case was when he received a copy of the defendant's motion for a new trial.
A hearing was held by the trial judge on the defendant's motion. Mr. Wilson testified that he had no recollection of having represented Mr. Woods and that he had no independent recollection of the case from his discussion with Mr. Woods. He stated that the first time that he knew of the conflict was at the opening of the defendant's trial on the merits, when the clerk read the court's minutes which indicated that Mr. Wilson had been present and representing the defendant at the arraignment.
The trial court at the conclusion of the hearing denied the motion for a new trial stating that the defendant had made no showing of prejudice which would require setting aside the conviction. To this ruling of the trial court the defendant reserved his one bill of exceptions.
Article 680 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"A district attorney shall be recused when he:
"(1) Has a personal interest in the cause which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration of justice;
"(2) Is related to the party accused or to the party injured, or to the spouse of the accused or party injured, to such an extent that it may appreciably influence him in the performance of the duties of his office; or
"(3) Has been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appointment as district attorney."
Article 680 is couched in mandatory language. There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson should have been recused in this case. This is readily conceded by the State in its brief before this court. The State, however, urges that the defendant did not file a timely motion for recusation, and, in the alternative that no prejudice has been shown and any violation is therefore harmless error.
Article 681 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure for the recu-sation of a district attorney:
"A district attorney may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusation has been filed or not, in any case in which a ground for recusation exists. A motion to recuse the district attorney shall be in writing and shall set forth the grounds therefor. The motion shall be filed, and shall be tried in a contradictory hearing, prior to commencement of the trial. If a ground for recusation is established the judge shall recuse the district attorney."
Neither the State's attorney nor the defense counsel realized prior to the trial that the assistant district attorney had previously represented the defendant. The defendant's testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial indicates that he was not aware that the procedure was irregular until such time as he was remanded to jail and spoke with other prisoners. Thus, while there was actually no timely motion for recusation under article 681, the record does reveal that this was not due to any fault of defense counsel or the assistant district attorney.
Under article 681 a motion to re-cuse must be filed prior to the commencement of the trial. A strict construction of the statutory language would allow a district attorney to prosecute a case when he should have recused himself, if the defense fails to file timely the motion to recuse. Defense counsel here testified that the first time he learned of Mr. Wilson's dual capacity was when he was given a copy of the motion for a new trial filed by the defendant in proper person while awaiting sentencing. A motion to recuse may be regarded as timely filed if the procedure is instituted within a reasonable period after the defense counsel learns of the impropriety.
Article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on. any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right."
Although the motion to recuse was properly filed, there has been no violation, of defendant's rights which warrant remedial action. The defendant readily admits the prosecutor did not secure any advantage. It is contended, however, that the mere fact that the assistant district attorney had represented the accused (by entering a plea of not guilty at arraignment) tainted the entire proceeding. The defendant has a right to a fair trial; if we believed that the failure of the assistant district attorney to recuse himself constituted a substantial denial of that right, we would reverse.
The defendant has failed, however, to show how he was prejudiced by Mr. Wilson's prosecution of the case. On the contrary, it appears clear from the trial transcript the defendant confessed his complicity in this crime to the police on the day of his arrest long before Mr. Wilson entered the case. Additionally, the victim of the crime positively identified this defendant as the perpetrator. The defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. Further, the defendant offered no witnesses on his behalf. These facts are not set forth in an attempt to show with 20-20 hindsight that the defendant was guilty of the crime and therefore could have suffered no prejudice by Mr. Wilson's action as prosecutor. Rather, they are discussed to show that the State's case was complete prior to the time that the defendant was arraigned, and that no evidence that could have been obtained through the defendant's communication with Mr. Wilson was introduced at the trial of the case. We therefore feel that under the facts of this case no injustice has been done to the defendant by the failure of Mr. Wilson to recuse himself. The trial judge was therefore correct in denying the motion for a new trial under the specific mandate 'contained in the first paragraph of article 851 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states:
"The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded."
For the reasons assigned, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CALOGERO, J., concurs.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.