Case Name: Edward Dickson et al., Resp'ts, v. Mark Mayer, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-12-29
Citations: 35 N.Y. St. Rep. 616
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward Dickson et al., Resp’ts, v. Mark Mayer, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 35
Pages: 616–620

Head Matter:
Edward Dickson et al., Resp’ts, v. Mark Mayer, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed December 29, 1890.)
Attachment—Affidavit—Insolvent cobpoeations.
An affidavit for an attachment alleged that defendant, a corporation, was about to transfer or assign its property in contemplation of insolvency by means of judgments recovered against it. It appeared that all the judgments were recovered the same day, and that executions had been levied on defendant’s property, but it was not shown, except as to one in favor of' the president’s wife, that any of the judgments had proceeded from any act of any officer of defendant. As to said judgment it was alleged on information and belief that it was recovered at the instance of the president, and that it appeared from statements made by him and the attorney, the substance of which were not given, and also alleged a statement of the attorney in the president’s presence that he had been authorized to bring the suit by the president in the name of his wife, but it did not state that the president admitted or denied the truth of the statement. Held, that the affidavit was not sufficient to prove a violation of the statute or support an attachment on the ground stated.
(Beady, J., dissents.)
Appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an attachment for the reason that the papers on which it was granted were insufficient.
A. Blumenstiel, for app’lt; Kneeland, Stewart & Epstein, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Daniels, J.
The defendant was a corporation existing under the laws of this state, and the action was brought by the plaint iff for goods sold and delivered to the company upon which the amount claimed to be due was the sum of $2,556.56. This amount was stated in the affidavit of one of the plaintiffs to be due to them over and above all counterclaims known to him or to the plaintiffs.
The ground upon which the attachment was issued was that the defendant had assigned, disposed of and secreted property, or was about to do so, with intent to defraud its creditors. And the affidavit of one of the plaintiff's attorneys was chiefly relied upon as proof of this intended disposition of the defendant's property. It was not stated or shown in the affidavit that any of the defendant's property had been directly disposed of in this manner, but it was affirmed that judgments had been recovered against the defendant under which this disposition of its property was intended to be made. What was charged was in substance that the defendant was about to transfer or assign its property in contemplation of its existing insolvency in violation of § 4, title 4, chap. 18 of part 1 of the Revised Statutes. The manner in which that was to be done was by the recovery of these judgments and the levy which had been made under executions issued upon them on all the property of the defendant. But as to all the judgments not recovered by the wife of Mark Mayer, who was the president of the corporation, no facts whatever were disclosed, or sustained by the affidavits, proving that they had proceeded from any act of this, or any other, officer of the corporation. All that appeared as to those judgments was that they had been recovered on the same day, and executions had been issued and levied on the property of the defendant. And as to them this was not sufficient to prove that the defendant was about to transfer or assign any of its property in contemplation of its existing insolvency. Varnum v. Hart, 119 N. Y., 101; 28 N. Y. State Rep., 262.
But as to the judgment recovered in favor of Dessa Mayer on the same day as the others were recovered, the facts were more favorable to the right of the plaintiffs to an attachment. But they still failed to prove that the president of the corporation, who was the husband of this plaintiff, had officially interfered in any manner to induce the commencement of the action, or to secure the Tecovery of the judgment in favor of his wife. That her judgment was recovered at the instance of her husband was alleged in the affidavit to have been the fact according to the belief of the person who made it, but that was clearly no proof that this, or either one of the other officers of the corporation had directly interfered to induce the commencement of the suit or the recovery of this judgment; for mere belief is no evidence.
The attorney did also swear that it appeared from statements of Schlesinger and Mayer at the creditors meeting that Mark Mayer, the president of the corporation, had personally procured the commencement of the suit on behalf of his wife. But this part of "the affidavit is entitled to no weight or effect on account of the (omission of the statements. from which the inference is to be drawn. They should have been set forth, if anything more had taken place than what is afterwards stated in the affidavit, to afford the court an opportunity of determining whether this conclusion was maintained by any statements made by either of these persons. It is probable that it was not, for at the conclusion of the affidavit it is added that Schlesinger further stated at the meeting, in the hearing of Mark Mayer, as follows:
Q. You are attorney for Mrs. Mayer in the suit against Mark Mayer? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Mr. Mayer authorize you to commence this suit in the name of his wife ? A. He authorized me in the name of Mrs-Mayer.
But this did not prove the fact that Mayer did give this authority, for it is no more than the statement of the attorney himself. And it does not appear whether Mayer admitted or denied the truth of this statement, or that he acquiesced in its correctness by omitting to make any response to it whatever. In these respects the affidavit is materially defective, for it does not prove the fact to be, and which it was for the plaintiffs to prove, that Mayer did direct this suit to be commenced in the name or for the benefit of his wife. Without that direction there was not sufficient to present a case of a violation of the statute restraining the action of corporate officers in assigning and disposing of the property of the corporation in contemplation of insolvency. The order therefore should be reversed, with $10 costs and the disbursements, and the attachment should be vacated.