Case Name: DOOLEY v. UNITED STATES
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1901-12-02
Citations: 183 U.S. 151
Docket Number: No. 207
Parties: DOOLEY v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: IVÍr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice IIarlah, Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peokham, dissenting: .
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 183
Pages: 151–176

Head Matter:
DOOLEY v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIROUXT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
No. 207.
Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901.
Decided December 2, 1901.
The act of Congress taking effect May 1, 1900, and known as the Foraker act, which requires all merchandise going into Porto Rico from the United States to pay a duty of fifteen per cent of the amount of duties paid upon merchandise imported from foreign countries, is constitutional.
The Constitution, in declaring that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, is limited to articles exported to a foreign country, and has no application to Porto Rico, which, in the case of De Lima y. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, was lield not to be a foreign country within the meaning of the general tariff law then in force.
The fact that the duties so collected were not covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but held as a separate fund to be used for the government and benefit of Porto Rico, and were made subject to repeal by the legislative assembly of that island, shows that the tax was not intended as a duty upon exports, and that Congress was undertaking to legislate for the island temporarily, and only until a local government was put in operation.
This was an action begun in the Circuit Court as a Court of Claims by the firm of Dooley, Smith & Co., to recover duties exacted of them and paid under protest to the collector of the port of San Juan, Porto Eico, upon merchandise imported into that port from the port of New York after May 1, 1900, and since the Foraker act. This act requires all merchandise “ coming into Porto Eico from the United States ” to be “ entered at the several ports of entry upon payment of fifteen per centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries.”
A demurrér was interposed by the District Attorney upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and also that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer to the complaint for insufficiency was sustained, and the petition dismissed.
The case was argued with De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; and Armstrongs. United States, 182 U. S. 243.
Mr. Henry M. Ward and Mr. John G. Carlisle for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edmund Curtis was on their brief.
Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Brown,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case raises the question of the constitutionality of the Foraker act, so far as it fixes the duties to be paid upon merchandise imported into Porto Rico from the port of New York. The validity of this requirement is attacked upon the ground of its violation of that clause of the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 9) declaring that " no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State."
While the words "import" and "export" are sometimes used to denote goods passing from one State to another, the word " import," in connection with the provision of the Constitution that " no State shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports," was held in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, to apply only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States.
That was an action to recover a tax imposed by the city of Mobile for municipal purposes, upon sales at auction. Defendants, who were auctioneers, received in the course of their business for themselves, or as consignees or agents for others, large amounts of goods and merchandise, the products of other States than Alabama, and sold the same in Mobile to purchasers, in unbroken and original packages. The Supreme Court of Alabama decided the case in favor of the tax, and the case came here for review.
The question, as stated by Mr. Justice Miller, was " whether merchandise brought from other States and-sold, under the circumstances stated, comes within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution, that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports." Defendants relied largely upon a dictum in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, to the effect that the principles laid down in that case as to the non-taxability of imports from foreign countries might perhaps apply equally to importations from a sister State.
In discussing this question, and particularly of the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, Mr. Justice Miller observed : " Is the word, ' impost,' here used, intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one State to another? Or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports ? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the ninth section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not at the same time exported from the former. But if we give to the word ' imposts ' as used in the first mentioned clause, the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word 'export' the corresponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad, and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries the power and its limitations concerning imposts."
" It is not too much to say that, so far as our research has extended, neither the word ' export,' ' import ' or ' impost ' is to be found in the discussion on this subject, as they have come down to us from that time, in reference to any other than foreign commerce, without some special form of words to show that foreign commerce is not meant. "Whether we look, then, to the terms of the clause of the Constitution in question, or to its relation to other parts"of that instrument, or to the history of its formation and adoption, or to the comments of the eminent men who took part in those transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention existed to prohibit, by this clause," (that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, levy anjr impost or duty upon any export or import,) " the right of one State to tax articles brought into it from another." This definition of the word impost was afterwards approved in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622. See also Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283.
It follows, and is the logical sequence of the case of Woodruff v. Parham, that the word " export " should be given a correlative meaning, and applied only to goods exported to a foreign country. Muller v. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457. If, then, Porto Bico be no longer a foreign country under the Ding-ley act, as was held by a majority of this court in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, and Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, we find it'impossible to say that goods carried from New Tork to Porto Bico can be considered as " exported " from New York within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution. If they are neither exports nor imports, they are still liable to be taxed by Congress under the ample and comprehensive authority conferred by the Constitution " to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." Art. 1, sec. 8. >
In another view, however, the case presented by the record is, whether a duty laid by Congress upon goods arriving at Porto Eico from New York is a duty upon an export from New York,' or upon an import to Porto Eico. The fact that the duty is exacted upon the arrival of the goods at San Juan certainly creates' á presumption in favor of the latter theory. At the same time it is possible that it may also be a duty upon an export. The mere fact that the duty is not laid at the port of departure is by no means decisive against its being such. It is too clear for argument that if vessels bound for a foreign country were compelled to stop at an intermediate port and pay into the Treasury of the United States a duty upon their cargoes, such duty would be a tax upon an export, and the place of its enaction would be of little significance. The manner in which and the place at which the tax is levied are of minor consequence. Thus in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, it was held that an act of a state legislature requiring importers of foreign goods to take out a license was a violation of the Constitution declaring that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay an impost or duty on imports or exports; and in the recent case of Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, we held that a discriminating stamp tax upon bills of lading, covering goods to be carried to a foreign country, was a tax upon exports within the same provision of the Constitution.
One thing, however, is entirely clear. The tax in question was imposed upon goods imported into Porto Eico, since it was exacted by the- collector of the port of San Juan after the arrival of the goods within the limits -of that port. From this moment the duties became payable as upon imported merchandise. United States v. Howell, 5 Cranch, 368; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486. Now while an import into one port almost necessarily involves a prior export from another, still, in determining the character of the tax imposed, it is important to consider whether the duty be laid for the purpose of adding to the revenues of the country from which the export takes place, or for the benefit of the territory into which they are imported. By the third section of the Foraker act imposing duties upon merchandise coming into Porto Rico from the United States, it is declared that " whenever the legislative assembly of Porto Rico shall have enacted and put into operation a system of local' taxation to meet the necessities of the government of Porto Rico, by this act established, and shall by resolution duly passed so notify the President, he shall make proclamation thereof, and thereupon all tariff duties on merchandise and articles going into Porto Rico from the United States or-coming into the United States from Porto Rico shall cease, and from and after such date all such merchandise and articles shall be entered at the several ports of entry free of duty." And by section four, " the-duties and taxes collected in Porto Rico in pursuance of this act, less the cost of collecting the same, and the gross amount of all collections and taxes in the United States upon articles of merchandise coming from Porto Rico, shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but shall be held as a separate fund, and shall be placed at the disposal of the President to be used for the government and benefit of Porto Rico until the government of Porto Rico, herein provided for, shall have been organized, when all moneys theretofore collected under the provisions hereof, then unexpended, shall be transferred to the local treasury of Porto Rico."
Now, there can be no doubt whatever that, if the legislative assembly of Porto Rico should, with the consent of Congress, lay a tax upon goods arriving from ports of the United States, such tax, if legally imposed, would be a duty upon imports to Porto Rico, and not upon exports from the United States; and we think the same result must follow, if the duty be laid by Congress in the interest and for the benefit of Porto Rico. The truth is, that, in imposing the duty as a temporary expedient,' with a proviso that it may be abolished by the legislative assembly of Porto Rico at its will, Congress thereby shows that it is undertaking to legislate for the island for the time being and only until the local government is put into operation. The mere fact that the duty passes through the hands of the revenue officers of the United States is immaterial, in view of the requirement that it shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but be held as a separate fund for. the government and benefit of Porto Rico.
The action is really correlative to that of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, in which we held that Congress could lawfully impose a duty upon imports from Porto Rico, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. It is true that this conclusion was reached by a majority of the court by different processes of reasoning, but it is none - the less true that in the conclusion that certain provisions of the Constitution did apply to Porto Rico, and that certain others did not, there was no difference of opinion.
It is not intended by this opinion to intimate that Congress may lay an export tax upon merchandise carried from one State to another. While this does not seem to be forbidden by the express words of the Constitution,-it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to lay such a tax without a violation of the first paragraph of Art. 1, sec. 8, that " all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." There is a wide difference between the full and paramount power of Congress in legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the States, which is merely incidental to its right to regulate interstate commerce. The question, however, is not involved in this case, and we do not desire to express an opinion upon it.
These duties were properly collected, and the action of the Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint was correct, and it is therefore
Affirmed.