Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. McArthur BREEDLOVE, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-04-06
Citations: 655 So. 2d 74
Docket Number: No. 82731
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. McArthur BREEDLOVE, Appellee.
Judges: GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 655
Pages: 74–78

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. McArthur BREEDLOVE, Appellee.
No. 82731.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 6, 1995.
Rehearing Denied June 1, 1995.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Michael J. Minerva, Capital Collateral Representative, Gail E. Anderson, Todd G. Scher and Terri L. Baekhus, Asst. Capital Collateral Representatives, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The State appeals an order vacating Breedlove's death sentence and granting Breedlove a new sentencing hearing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.
Breedlove was convicted in 1979 of first-degree felony murder for killing a man during a residential burglary. The jury recommended that Breedlove be sentenced to death, and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. The judge found the following aggravating factors: (1) Breedlove had prior convictions for crimes of violence; (2) Breed-love committed the homicide during the course of a burglary; and (3) the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. The judge found that no mitigating circumstances applied.
Among his arguments raised on direct appeal, Breedlove contended that the trial court erred when it denied Breedlove's requested jury instruction regarding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. Though not mentioned in our opinion, we necessarily rejected this contention when we affirmed the conviction and sentence in Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 184, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982).
In 1992, Breedlove appealed the denial of his second motion for postconviction relief and filed a petition for habeas corpus which raised, in part, the unconstitutionality of the instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, the wrongful application of this aggravator to his case, and ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase. We found that Breedlove's arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of the instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator and the application of this aggravator to his case had already been fully considered on direct appeal and were therefore procedurally barred. Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla.1992). However, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the ineffectiveness of counsel at sentencing.
On remand, the trial court denied all relief. Breedlove appealed, but while that appeal was pending, we relinquished jurisdiction so that the trial court could hear Breedlove's instant motion for postconviction relief predicated upon the recently decided opinion in Espinosa v. Florida, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). Breedlove argued that at his original trial the judge had erred when he refused to grant Breedlove's request for an expanded instruction for the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. The trial court ruled in Breedlove's favor and held that Breedlove had properly preserved his Espinosa claim regarding the vagueness of the jury instruction and that Breedlove should be granted a new sentencing hearing because the court could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would still have recommended the death penalty if the expanded instruction had been given.
At the outset, it is clear that the jury instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel given at Breedlove's trial was of a type that was declared unconstitutional ten years later in Espinosa. Further, we cannot accept the State's contention that Breedlove failed to preserve the issue at trial. He submitted a proposed instruction which contained the language deemed so critical to the validity of the aggravator in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). The judge denied the requested instruction as being "covered in the charge." In the appeal from his conviction, Breedlove argued that the judge had erred in denying his requested instruction. Thus, the point was sufficiently preserved. See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668 (Fla.1993); Atwater v. State, 626 So.2d 1325 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994).
However, we believe that the failure to give the requested instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel was harmless error. The evidence presented at the trial clearly established that Breedlove committed the murder in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The fatal stabbing was administered with such force that it broke the victim's collar bone and drove the knife all the way through to the shoulder blade. The puncture of the victim's lung was associated with great pain and the victim literally drowned in his own blood. The victim had defensive stab wounds on his hands and did not die immediately. Moreover, the attack occurred while the victim lay asleep in his bed as contrasted to a murder committed in a public place. In fact, in discussing this aggravator in Breed-love's direct appeal, we stated that this killing was "far different from the norm of capital felonies" and set apart from other murders. Breedlove, 413 So.2d at 9. Under the facts presented, this aggravator clearly existed and would have been found even if the requested instruction had been given. See Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1066, 1069 (Fla.1994); Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So.2d 1051, 1055 (Fla.1993); Gorby v. State, 630 So.2d 544, 548 n. 6 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 99, — L.Ed.2d — (1994); cf. Thompson v. State, 619 So.2d 261 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 445, 126 L.Ed.2d 378 (1993). Further, there were two other valid aggravating circumstances, including the previous conviction of a violent felony. While Breed-love presented some testimony concerning possible psychological problems, two state experts expressly stated that they found no evidence of organic brain damage or psychosis and one of them said Breedlove was malingering. Any error in the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not affect Breedlove's sentence. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
We reverse the order vacating Breedlove's death sentence.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
.Breedlove's jury instruction read as follows: H, that the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Now, "heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile.
"Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others, pitiless.
This type of instruction was declared improper in Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), but it was not until Espi-nosa that the holding in Shell was deemed applicable to Florida's practice of judicial sentencing following a jury recommendation.
. The proposed instruction provided:
The aggravating circumstances that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, applies only where the actual commission of the capital felony was accomplished by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies — the con-sciousless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tortuous to the victim.
. In reaching this conclusion, we are not invading the prerogative of the fact finder. The trial judge who entered the order granting the new sentencing proceeding took no testimony and was not the judge who presided at the original trial.
. Breedlove's reliance on James v. State, 615 So.2d 668 (Fla.1993), is misplaced because in that case it was determined that the facts did not support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel.