Case Name: C. Chaffe, Jr., Syndic, vs. Mrs. Nancy A. Scheen and Husband
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1882-05
Citations: 34 La. 684
Docket Number: No. 8473
Parties: C. Chaffe, Jr., Syndic, vs. Mrs. Nancy A. Scheen and Husband.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 684–693

Head Matter:
No. 8473.
C. Chaffe, Jr., Syndic, vs. Mrs. Nancy A. Scheen and Husband.
In a suit to annul a dation en patement, it is not inconsistent to allege that the act is a pure simulation, but if not simulated, that it has been made in fraud of creditors and gives an unfair preference.
Where an insolvent has made a surrender under our State laws, which has been accepted, and a syndic has boon appointed by the creditors who have participated in all the insolvent proceedings, they are not estopped from opposing debts placed on tlie schedule, nor from suing to bring into the estate property alleged to have been fraudulently disposed of by the insolvent.
When the act states that the consideration of the dation enpaiement is a donation to the wife of her father’s undetermined interest in a commercial partnership, without any aooom* pauying inventory of the partnership assets, and the alleged donor did not joiu in the act; and where, in a suit for separation of property, tlie court had refused to recognize such an item, said dation en %wiemcat must be considered a nullity.
This case is not one covered by the Code, which provides that oven if the consideration, expressed, does not exist, the act will bo valid, if sufficient consideration is shown. Dy that is meant such consideration as was contemplated by the partios, at the time of execution of the act, but which was misdescribed in said act
Where a judgment of separation was rendered, but no execution issued, under which any seizure was made, for more than a year afterwards, it will not he considered a bona fide non-interrupted suit, as is required, in order to obtain payment of the wife’s claims.
Where there is no return made of the writ, there is no evidence that execution ever issued.
APPEAL from the Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River. Logan, J.
Montfort S. Jones, for Plaintiff and Appellant:
On Motion to Elect.
1. It is not an inconsistency in pleading to a direct action to annul, to allege that a sale is simulated, and if not simulated that it is fraudulent. 30 A. 1203; 27 A. 98.
2. The law does not permit a creditor to sue all his debtors in the same action, unless there is a,iomt liability or priority of contract which authorizes the joinder; nor will it permit a party to be joined in a demand in which he has no interest. 14 A. 181; 12 A. 74.
On the Merits.
1. The dation enpaiement from Sebeen to his wife, having been made fov a false cause, or for a consideration which never existed, was a simulation in fraud of creditors, and an absolute nullity. C. C. 1893, 1894, 1900, 1779; 1 A. 192; 3 A. 230.
2. The consideration expressed in the deed having been sued for by Mrs. Sebeen and rejected by the Court, and she having acquiesced in the judgment, her light to sot it up is res adjudicata against her. This Court has a right to construe that judgment, and in doing this, that construction must be adopted which is in accordance with the facts and law of the case. 4 L. 100 * 5 L. 289 ; 15 A. 223, 079; 10 A. 305.
3. Any indebtedness on the part of the vendor to the vendee, not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the transaction, will not give validity to a nudum pactum. Where the consideration expressed does not exist, to meet the requirements of 0 . 0.1900, the existence of a real indebtedness on the part of the vendor must be proved and identified with the contract to the extent of being shown to be the real “ consideration.'1 30 A,. 750.
4. Donations inter vivos of immovables and incorporeal things must bo by authentic act; and where such donations constitute the cause aud consideration of an alleged indebted' ness on the part of the husband to the wife, and the fact of the giving which constituted tli© debt, is denied, they must be proved by authentic evidence, and parol is not admissible to prove same. C. C. 1536, 1538; 22 A. 97, 358, 393; 15 A. 585; 12 M. 649; 3 A. 610; 23 A. 242.
r>. Article 1341. Civil Code, merely dispenses with the authentic act of acceptance on tho part of the donee, required in the preceding Article, 1540. It does not dispense with the authentic actof donation, but, on the contrary, presupposes such an act. O. C. 1540,1541.
fi. Items of indebtedness in excess of $500 must be proved by one witness and corroborating circumstances. C. C. 2277.
7. The recitals of a deed cannot bo altered, contradicted or explained by oral testimony.
8. The fruits of real estate follow the ownership.
it. A judgment in tho wife’s favor and against the husband, can have no effect as against third parties, when alleged to he fraudulent, unless supported by proof of its truth; nor is the creditor concluded by the proof adduced when the judgment was rendered. If required, she must administer logal proof. 28 A. 546; 19 A. 96 ; 4 L. 422; 12 L. 304 ; 11 L, 536; 4 A. 135 ; 10 A. 87.
10. By the operation of Art. 123, Constitution of 1868, and Act 95 of 1869, a tacit mortgage in existence prior to January, 187J, and not recorded by that date, is absolutely destroyed, as to third persons, and can never be revived. 22 A. 278; 24 A. 25 $ 28 A. 584.
11. The creditors of J. H. Sohoea, tho husband, having acquired superior rights against his property before the wife’s claim became a mortgage by registry, and before any valid transfer to her had been made, she can be allowed to retain said proporty as a credit on her judgment, subsequently obtained, only subject to the claims of the creditors. 33 A. 821, 532.
12. The dation cn paumznt of Nov. 23,1878, from Sebeen to his wife, having been made* not to replace jjaraphernalia, hut for no consideration, and no consideration having been proven, was a simulationiu fraud of creditors and an absolute nullity. It cannot he given effect by a subsequent judgment. Corpus sine anima, extrinsecus apparens, intrinsecus nihil habens— or, as Mr. Justice Spencer described it, vox et preetereanihil — it cannot he given any effect whatever.
13. “ The separation of property, although decreed by á court of justice, is null, if it has not been executed by the payment of the rights and claims of the wife, made to appear by an authentic act, as far as the estate of the husband can meet them, or at least by a bona fide uninterrupted suit to obtain them. C. C. 2428 (2402); Nachman vs. LeBlanc, 28 A. 345; 24 A. 138; 23 A. 571.
<T. F. Pierson, for Defendants and Appellees :
1. Plaintiff is nob entitled to cumulate in the same suit two causes of action which are contrary to or preclude each other. C. P. 149. And, if he do so, defondant is entitled, before answering, to have him elect upon which one of tho two he means to proceed. C. P. 152.
2 The allegations that an act is a simulation, or if not simulated, that it is a fraudulent act, subject to be revoked, are allegations and causes of action which are contrary to and preclude each other. Hen’s Higst., p. 1031, No. 1.
3. The allegation that the £ct is one or the other is an implied admission that it is not bot7i1 and that one of these attributes necessarily precludes the other, and plaintiff must elect upon which one ho will stand
4. A litigant cannot he permitted to shift at wilL to a contradictory position in reference to the subject-matter of the litigation to defeat an adversary. Hen’s Higst., p. 526, No. 22; ib. 143, 2031.
f>. A solemn judicial admission cannot he denied when made with a full knowledge of the truth. Such admission can only ho retracted upon the plea of error of fact.
6. When tho law makes no distinction the court can make none, and the rule established by O. P. 149 cannot be evaded by cumulating inconsistent demands in tho alternative form.
7. The title to the defendant from her husband and her judgment against him being subsequently made a part of tho proceedings by the husband, in making a voluntary snrrender to Ms creditors, becomes ratified, indorsed and acquiesced in by the unqualified and unreserved acceptance thereof by his creditors, and cannot, thereafter, be assailed by the syndic representing such creditors, except upon the plea of error, fraud, deceit or the like.
8. The husband may make a transfer of property to bis wife, in satisfaction of her paraphernal claims, when he is embarrassed or insolvent, and whether her mortgage is recorded against him or not, and whether or not there be a mortage in favor of a third person on the property transferred. Levi vs. Morgan, 33 An. 534; Payne vs.Hemp, ib. 818.
9. If the cause expressed iu the consideration should be one that does not exist, yet tin» contract cannot be invalidated if the party can show the existence of a true and sufficient consideration. C. 0., 1900; Brown vs. Brown, 30 An. 966 ; 3 An. 235; 12 An. 531; 13 An. 25; 18 An. 238, 733.
10. Where the entire record of the wife's suit and judgment against her husband is presented, including all the evidence filed therein, the judgment being rendered on default in the absence of the husband, there being no irregularity appareut in the proceedings and the evidence supporting the judgment in her favor, the burden of proof will be shifted on the syndic of the husband’s insolvent estate, plaintiff assailing her judgment for fraud and collusion, to make good his allegations by proof.
11. Parol testimony is admissible to prove the wife’s account against the husbaud, though the account be for the price of lands given to her hy her father by parol. She is not bound to produce authentic evidence of the donation from her father of the property, the proceeds of which have been converted and used by her husband. In such case neither the husband nor his creditors under Mm can contest the validity of the donation to tbe wife by her father The validity of such donation can he inquired into ouly by the donor or some one under him, or the donee. 2 L. 40; Snow vs. Copeley, 3 An. 610; Pecquet vs. Pecquet, 17 An. 224; Johnson & Hamilton vs. Jordan <fe Poster, 22 An. 486.
The husband, who is the agent, can never be heard to contest the title of the wife's property in his hands as such, nor can third persons do so under him. He is hound to restore what he has even unduly received. C. C 3005 [2974]; 21 An. 545, 645; 22 An. 599; 10 R. 481.
12. The Civil Code of La., unlike the Code Hapoleon, fixes no peremptory time within which the execution of the judgment of the wife must he begun. Pulton vs. Husband. 7 R. <4. The time within which the execution of the judgment against the husband must be begun depends upon tbe exigencies or circumstances of each case. She might be unable to obtain an execution for a year or more and still continue an uninterrupted suit to obtain payment. 23 An. 321; 7 R. 74; 10 An. 688; 13 An. 474; 12 An. 76.
Where the judgment is rendeied on the 27th of May, but not exigible untilabout the 1st of July, and execution issued thereon about the 12th or 15th of September, her judgment will not be invalidated, where the property of the husband was alliu custodiam legin at the suit of the attaching creditors of the husband. 7 R. 74; 10 An. 688.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered hy
Todd, J.
This is an action brought by the syndic of the estates of J. H. Scheen and of Lisso & Scheen, insolvents, to annul an act of giving in payment, executed hy J. H. Scheen to his wife, Mrs. Nancy A. Scheen, on the 23d of November, 1378, and a judgment obtained by the wife against her-said husband on the 27th of May, 1879.
There was an exception filed to the petition, on the ground of its containing conflicting allegations, iu charging thatthe act of giving in payment attacked, was simulated, and if not a pure simulation, it was a fraudulent attempt on the part of an insolvent debtor to give an unfair preference to one of his creditors.
The prayer of the petition was substantially and to the effect that the act and j udgment assailed be declared null and void. This prayer was equally appropriate, whether the alleged nullity resulted from the one cause or the other of those assigned. The object and purpose of the suit was to procure the annulling of the act and judicial proceeding complained of, in order to reach the property of the insolvent debtor. It was an action of nullity, and its prayer determined its character, and was comprehensive enough to justify the decree of nullity asked for, upon either of the grounds urged, in the alternative in the petition.
This identical question was determined in the case of Johnson vs. Mayer, 30 A. 1203, and in the reasons of the Court for their conclusion upon the question involved, we quote the following:
" The next plea filed by defendants, was one to compel plaintiff to elect between the two grounds of his demand, to-wit: Simulation and fraud on the ground that they are inconsistent. We see no inconsistency in saying that a sale is simulated, and if not simulated, that it is fraudulent. It is very like claiming a right by two titles. When sales are attacked by direct action, there is no reason why the party may not demand relief from them by alleging simulation, or fraud, or both. We are not disposed to hamper the remedies of creditors by doubtful technicalities. In the class of cases now under consideration, the widest latitude should be given them, for they are necessarily, to a great degree, uninformed as to the precise relation existing between their debtor and his coadjutors in wrongdoing. Often they are compelled to strike in the dark. If the purchaser's title is an honest one, it is better for him that the double test be applied, in one, instead of two suits."
This decision, and the reasoning by which it is supported, meet our hearty concurrence.
The exception was, therefore, properly overruled.
Another exception pleaded by the defendant, was, in substance, that the. acceptance of J. II. Scheen, the insolvent, surrender, and the participation in the proceedings thereunder by his creditors, and the election of the syndic by them, debarred the latter, as their representative, from objecting to the schedule of the insolvent, as to the debts included therein, and to claiming property as belonging to his estate, not placed in the schedule.
There is no force in this exception. The surrender upon the formal showing, made by the insolvent, -was accepted by the Judge for the benefit of the creditors. R. S. Sec. 1789. And the appointment of the syndic, like that of an assignee in bankruptcy, so far from committing the creditors to the correctness of the schedule, and precluding them or their representative from seeking to amend or change it, was but a preliminary step to the regulation and adjustment as between the insolvent and the creditors, and among the latter, inter sese, of all matters embraced in the surrender, and reported in, or pertaining to, the schedule submitted.