Case Name: CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, and Transportation Insurance Company, an insurance corporation, Appellants, v. Julian W. WALTON, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-06-30
Citations: 318 So. 2d 546
Docket Number: No. U-220
Parties: CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, and Transportation Insurance Company, an insurance corporation, Appellants, v. Julian W. WALTON, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: JOHNSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 546–549

Head Matter:
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, and Transportation Insurance Company, an insurance corporation, Appellants, v. Julian W. WALTON, Jr., Appellee.
No. U-220.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 30, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1975.
Walter L. Robison, Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for appellants.
J. Richard Moore, Corrigan, Werber & Moore, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
STEWART, LEON F., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment in favor of Appellee, plaintiff below, against the Appellants, City of Jacksonville, a municipal corporation, and Transportation Insurance Company, its insurance carrier, defendants below. Plaintiff had sued the defendant for false arrest and imprisonment.
At about 5:00 a.m. on November 5, 1972, two police officers of the City of Jacksonville noticed a 1967 yellow and black Cá-maro being driven erratically on the service road of the Arlington Expressway in Jacksonville. They fell in behind the automobile and stopped it when, in their opinion, it continued to be driven erratically. Appellee's brother-in-law was driving and furnished the officers with identification and a valid driver's license. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Ap-pellee showed any identification. After determining that there were no outstanding warrants against either of the men and that the car was not stolen, the officers apologized and left, heading toward downtown Jacksonville.
The officers then heard a report of a rape In the downtown area. The rapist was described as heavy-set, six feet tall, light skinned, wearing a black hat, and driving a gray Grand Prix. The officers continued downtown, gassed up their car, and then decided that one of the men in the Camaro which they had stopped could be the rapist. Meanwhile, Appellee herein had called the police station to report that he was unable to find his wallet after the officers left. The officers returned to the scene where they had first seen Appellee and his brother-in-law. They were still there. Appellee had found his wallet, and showed identification. The officers then arrested him.
It was undisputed that Appellee produced identification giving his correct name. The police had been supplied with the name of the suspect, to-wit, Donald McIntyre. Further, the arresting officers refused to drive 400 feet from the arrest scene to talk to Appellee's wife, but took Appellee to jail. We might note here that the jury could have determined from the testimony that the only part of the description given by the victim to the police which matched that of Plaintiff-Appellee was that both were black.
Appellee was taken to jail, where he was charged with A & B and assault with intent to commit rape. He was fingerprinted, photographed, and booked. Upon being shown the photograph of Appellee and his brother-in-law the victim stated that neither of the men was the one who assaulted her, and that Donald McIntyre looked nothing like Appellee. Thereafter the charges against Appellee were dismissed.
Plaintiff-Appellee brought suit against the City of Jacksonville and the arresting officers for false arrest and false imprisonment, which ended in a jury verdict for the Plaintiff-Appellee and against all the defendants therein.
Appellants contend that the issue before the Court on this appeal is whether the arrest of Plaintiff-Appellee without a warrant was valid.
Appellee contends that the issue is whether or not, at the time of Plaintiff-Appellee's arrest, the arresting officers had reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that he had committed the assault with intent to commit rape.
We agree with Appellee's statement of the issue.
Florida Statutes, Sec. 901.15, provides when arrests by officers without a warrant are lawful. The applicable portions read:
"901.15 When arrest by officer without warrant is lawful — A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
"(3) He reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it."
Appellants and Appellee agree that the test in determining whether there existed reasonable ground to arrest without a warrant in the case sub judice is the sufficiency of the knowledge by the arresting officer, put to the test of what a reasonable man knowing all the facts within the knowledge of the officer, would have believed under the circumstances.
The Supreme Court of this State in the case of State of Florida v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392, defined "probable cause" as follows :
"The facts constituting probable cause need not meet the standards of conclusiveness and probability required of the circumstantial facts upon which conviction must be based. The sufficiency of the officer's knowledge is not to be judged by an analysis of the effect of each isolated circumstance. Rather, it is to be measured by the test of what a reasonable man would have believed had he known all of the facts known by the officer."
This test of what a reasonable man, possessed of the knowledge of the police officer, would have believed was followed also in the cases of Russell v. State, 266 So.2d 92 (3d, Fla.App.); Hardy v. State, 276 So.2d 536 (4th, Fla.App.); State v. Knapp, 294 So.2d 338 (2nd, Fla.App.).
Mr. Justice Powell of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), stated:
"The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.' "
In the case sub judice it is quite obvious that the jury determined and did find that the arresting officers, with the knowledge of all the facts, when viewed in the light of what a reasonable man would believe, where not justified in the arrest of Plaintiff-Appellant. From our review of the transcript of the trial we can find nothing to justify our finding that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Therefore the verdict and judgment entered below are hereby affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., concurs.
BOYER, Acting C. J., concurs specially.