Case Name: In the Interest of G. G. P., a child
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-04-02
Citations: 382 So. 2d 128
Docket Number: No. 78-1095/T4-115
Parties: In the Interest of G. G. P., a child.
Judges: SHARP, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 382
Pages: 128–132

Head Matter:
In the Interest of G. G. P., a child.
No. 78-1095/T4-115.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 2, 1980.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Tatjana Ostapoff, Chief, Appellate Division, and Denise Banjavic, Legal Intern, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Glenn H. Mitchell, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
UPCHURCH, Judge.
This is a consolidated appeal from two orders of adjudication of delinquency and two orders of disposition whereby appellant was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for an indeterminate period of time not to go beyond his twenty-first birthday.
We REVERSE.
A single question is presented by this appeal: should the trial court have granted a motion to suppress a confession induced by an implied promise of immunity?
To be admissible in evidence, a confession and statements in the nature thereof must be freely and voluntarily made. At the time of the confession, the mind of the defendant must be free to act uninfluenced by either hope or fear. Frazier v. State, 107 So.2d 16 (Fla.1958). In determining the voluntariness of a statement, the court must consider the "totality of the circumstances". Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858 (Fla.1964); Williams v. State, 156 Fla. 300, 22 So.2d 821 (1945). If the totality of the circumstances were calculated to delude the accused or to exert undue influence over him, the confession must be excluded; if the actions of the interrogator were such that they induced the accused to confess by threat or by promises of a benefit, thus rendering the confession untrustworthy, then the statement should be excluded. See Fillinger v. State, 349 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Upon review, the appellate court will not usually disturb the decision of a trial judge on admission of the confession if there is evidence to support its admission. If it appears prima facie that the confession was freely and voluntarily made, then the burden is upon the defendant to show that it was in fact not a voluntary confession. Cochran v State, 117 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
Appellant offered to provide information about some burglaries to a St. Cloud police officer. The officer proposed an arrangement whereby appellant, who had worked with, the officer on other cases, would be granted immunity if he gave information about the burglaries. After several interviews, the St. Cloud officer asked appellant to talk to an Osceola County deputy. Unknown to appellant or to his mother, who had been present at some of the interviews, the St. Cloud officer had given to the Osceola Sheriff's Office the information provided by appellant. Appellant ad mits that the Osceola deputy advised him that any promises made by the St. Cloud officer would not be binding on Osceola County.
The evidence considered by the trial court on the motion to suppress consisted of two taped interviews. In the first interview, appellant was given and stated that he understood, his Miranda rights. He was then questioned and confessed to involvement in several burglaries. In the second interview, appellant was asked whether anyone had promised or threatened him in any fashion. Appellant answered that the St. Cloud officer had promised he would talk to the judge and the "cops," including those in other counties, so that appellant would definitely not have to go to Youth Hall. He also stated that his mother and an Officer Jolly were present at the time the promises were made. The tape clearly shows that appellant believed that the promise of immunity made by the St. Cloud officer covered all the burglaries. If such a belief were reasonable under the circumstances, then appellant's confession must be excluded.
Appellee contends that appellant understood that the Osceola deputy would not be bound by the promises of the St. Cloud officer; however the disclaimer was not recorded. This omission is surprising because the purpose of the question regarding promises or threats is to insure that the statement is not later excluded as being coerced. Recording the disclaimer should have been mandated because appellant's belief that a promise had been made was on tape. Appellant's belief that immunity extended to all crimes was reasonable in view of the attendant circumstances, especially the fact that the St. Cloud officer transmitted the information to the Osceola Sheriff's Office without the knowledge or consent of appellant or his mother. Without that information, the Osceola deputy would not have directed his investigation toward appellant. While promising immunity on the one hand, the St. Cloud officer became the initiating force of appellant's prosecution in another jurisdiction.
It is unreasonable to expect one of appellant's age and position to fully comprehend the jurisdictional limits of the various officers. Unless it could be effectively and clearly demonstrated that appellant understood that the Osceola deputy would not cooperate with the St. Cloud officer and would not be bound by that officer's promises or any other promises, the disclaimer would not be sufficient to attentuate the "taint" of the original promise. Such was not the quality of the disclaimer in this instance. Appellant's belief in the promise of immunity was reasonable under the circumstances and the statements which resulted should have been suppressed.
The orders of adjudication of delinquency and the orders of disposition of the lower court are REVERSED.
SHARP, J., concurs.
COBB, J., dissents with opinion.