Case Name: DELACROIX CORPORATION v. Chalin O. PEREZ; Stella Lands, Inc. and Chalin O. Perez, v. Delacroix Corporation
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-11-08
Citations: 794 So. 2d 862
Docket Number: No. 98-CA-2447
Parties: DELACROIX CORPORATION v. Chalin O. PEREZ. Stella Lands, Inc. and Chalin O. Perez, v. Delacroix Corporation.
Judges: Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MIRIAM WALTZER, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr. and Judge Pro Tern. PHILIP C. CIACCIO.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 794
Pages: 862–880

Head Matter:
DELACROIX CORPORATION v. Chalin O. PEREZ. Stella Lands, Inc. and Chalin O. Perez, v. Delacroix Corporation.
No. 98-CA-2447.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 8, 2000.
Writ Denied Jan. 26, 2001.
James E. Blazek, Donna M. Borrello, Adams and Reese, New Orleans, LA, and John B. Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Wilkinson, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Delacroix Corporation.
J. Carter Wilkinson, Troy J. Charpentier, Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Arraond, McCowan & Jarman, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Stella Lands, Inc. and Chalin 0. Perez.
Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MIRIAM WALTZER, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr. and Judge Pro Tern. PHILIP C. CIACCIO.

Opinion:
JjPHILIP C. CIACCIO, Judge Pro Tempore.
In this consolidated case, Delacroix Corporation ("Delacroix") appeals a judgment of the trial court finding that defendants, Stella Lands, Inc. ("Stella Lands") and Chalin 0. Perez ("Perez"), had acquired ownership in a disputed tract of land by thirty years acquisitive prescription. The judgment dismissed Delacroix's action to enjoin trespass against Perez, and the court retained jurisdiction over the remaining proceedings to determine the proper location of the boundary between the two properties. The trial court stayed those proceedings pending the review of the issue of acquisitive prescription on appeal. For the reasons stated more fully herein, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 1929, Delacroix Corporation acquired 109,567 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, including the property at issue. The two tracts of land relevant to this case included the "Stella" tract and the "Scars-dale" tract. The parties did not contest that Delacroix had a recorded title to the disputed acreage.
In 1951, Chalin Perez purchased 100 acres of the Stella tract fronting on the Mississippi River. In 1953, Perez entered into a grazing lease with Stella Lands for the 100 acres to the east of the land he purchased in 1951. The lease was "solely for cattle grazing and for hunting and trapping purposes." The lease between Stella Lands and Perez was renewed several times until Perez purchased a portion of the stock of Stella Lands in 1972 and the remainder in 1973 under the name of South Louisiana Enterprises. The Stella tract consisted of the property purchased in 1951 and 1973.
li;The Scarsdale tract is adjacent to and to the north of the Stella tract and is also adjacent to the property at issue. In 1953, Chalin Perez purchased part of the Scars-dale tract extending back to the Forty Arpent Line. The disputed property is adjacent to Scarsdale and Stella, and Perez began using the Delacroix property for cattle grazing soon after his purchase of those two tracts of land.
On December 22, 1993, Delacroix filed a petition to enjoin trespass against Perez, and included a claim for damages. In 1994, Stella Lands and Perez filed a separate petition to be maintained in possession of the disputed property. The actions were consolidated for trial that was held from February 10-26, 1998. In its judgment of March 16, 1998, the trial court ruled that Perez and Stella Lands had been in possession of a disputed tract of land for more than thirty years and had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the boundary dispute and stayed further proceedings on that issue pending the appeal of the prescription issue.
On appeal Delacroix contends the trial court erred in: (1) declaring that Perez and Stella Lands were owners of the disputed property; and (2) excluding Delacroix's Exhibits 41-A through 41-G. Although Perez and Stella Lands assign error in the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence in the record, Perez and Stella Lands have failed to answer Delacroix's appeal or file a separate motion to appeal the trial court's judgment, and thus we will not consider the assignments raised in their brief.
ISSUES
The disputed property concerns land lying between the Forty Arpent line and the west bank of the Forty Arpent Canal, and includes approximately 294 acres of | ¡land. Perez had legal title of the Stella and Scarsdale tracts only to the Forty Arpent line, but is claiming possession to the Forty Arpent Canal.
Delacroix claims that Perez had Delacroix's permission to use the property, and as a permittee, Perez was a precarious possessor and could not effect legal possession against his permittor, Delacroix. Delacroix also argues that it had title to the property and at all times maintained corporeal possession. Delacroix maintains that Perez's possession was clandestine and/or equivocal and had no legal effect.
Conversely, Perez argues that when he purchased the Stella and Scarsdale acreage in 1951 and 1953 respectively, he began using the property back to the Forty Arpent Canal, and he believed that this was the property line between his acreage and the Delacroix property. He argues that he used the subject property on a regular basis for grazing cattle, and later for hunting and crawfish farming. Perez contends that he had uninterrupted possession of the disputed property from the time he purchased the adjoining land until Delacroix's suit was filed in 1993.
LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Immovable property may be acquired through thirty-years acquisitive prescription without good faith or just title. La. C.C. art. 3486. The party alleging acquisitive prescription bears the burden of proving intent to possess as owner and that his possession has been continuous and uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal. La. C.C. arts. 3424, 3476; Rathborne v. Hale, 95-1225 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96), 667 So.2d 1197, writ denied, 96-0747 (La.5/3/96), 672 So.2d 692. The burden of proof of acquisitive prescription is by a preponderance of evidence; | ¿every presumption is in favor of the titleholder. Id.; Bradford v. Thomas, 344 So.2d 717 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 346 So.2d 714 (La.1977).
Whether a party has possessed property for thirty years without interruption is a factual issue which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Rogers v. Haughton Timber Co., Inc., 503 So.2d 1079 (La.App. 2 Cir.1987). However, unlike questions of fact, questions of law are not reviewed under the manifest error standard. Instead, questions of law are resolved by determining whether the trial judge was legally correct or legally incorrect. Palmer v. Blue Water Marine Catering, Inc., 95-342 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/18/95), 663 So.2d 780. Where the trial court's decision is based on an erroneous interpretation or application of law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion, such an incorrect decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court. Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067, 1071-1072 (La.1983).
DISCUSSION
By its first assignment of error, Delacroix contends that the trial court commit ted an error of law, and the judgment must therefore be reversed.
In his oral statements from the bench following the trial, the trial court stated in part:
In this matter, there is no evidence of any activity by Delacroix which would have deprived Perez of domination and control over this land. On the contrary, even Delacroix's witnesses confirm the domination and control over this property that Perez had. Whether such control was with Delacroix's consent or acquiescence or not is not relevant. It is the intent of the possessor, not the owner, which is relevant on that issue.
(Emphasis ours.)
| ^Specifically, Delacroix contends that this is a misstatement of the law on acquisitive prescription, and specifically the well-established law on precarious possession. We agree.
Under La. C.C. art. 3437, possession is precarious when it is exercised with the permission of the owner or on his behalf. Acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of a precarious possessor or his universal successor, who is presumed to possess for another although he may intend to possess for himself. La. C.C. arts. 3477, 3438; Nugent v. Franks, 471 So.2d 816 (La.App. 2 Cir.1985); Feazel v. Howard, 511 So.2d 1306 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 456 (La.1987).
Thus, whether Perez possessed the property with the consent of Delacroix is relevant to Perez's claim of acquisitive prescription, and the trial court erred in failing to consider Delacroix's intent in allowing Perez to remain on the property.
In the present case, the judge's opinion indicates that his ruling was based on his erroneous belief that it was irrelevant whether Perez possessed the property with Delacroix's consent or permission. Accordingly, we must independently review the record, applying the correct legal principles, and determine whether Perez met his burden of proving ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription.
The parties did not contest in this case that Delacroix had record title to the disputed acreage. Further, although the record shows that Chalin Perez used the disputed tract for many purposes over the course of several decades, there is no evidence of a written lease agreement between the parties regarding this property. However, Delacroix is claiming a verbal agreement with Manuel Molero and Mrs. O'Toole in their capacities as President of Delacroix. As these then-presidents of lathe corporation are now deceased, Delacroix had to prove the existence of an agreement by circumstantial evidence.
Delacroix contends on appeal that the trial court erred in excluding their Exhibits 41A-41G from admission into the record. Delacroix argues that these exhibits show that Perez expressly admitted that his intent was not adverse possession. The trial court denied admission of these exhibits, however, on the basis that it was part of a compromise agreement, citing La. C.E. art. 408. Delacroix proffered the evidence for our review.
Article 408 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence limits the admissibility at trial of evidence pertaining to compromise and offers to compromise. Section A of that article provides as follows:
In a civil case, evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, anything of value in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This Article does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise admissible merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This Article also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
However, the proffered documents do not pertain to offers to compromise the instant litigation. Rather, the documents were correspondence regarding Delacroix's efforts to lay the boundary line between Delacroix's and Perez's property. Although the letters were obviously an attempt by the parties to form a cooperative agreement, they do not consist of compromise negotiations on the issue of Perez's subsequent claim of adverse possession. This evidence is not the type of evidence relating to compromise negotiations and agreements which article |7408 seeks to exclude. Further, the documents contain a statement made by Perez which is otherwise admissible pursuant to La. C.E. art. 801(D)(2), a personal admission. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that these documents were inadmissible based on La. C.E. art. 408.
Exhibit 41-E, the entirety of which is attached to this opinion as Exhibit "A", is a letter dated June 3, 1993 from Chalin Perez to Dorothy Benge. The letter provides in part as follows:
I acknowledge that a portion of the crayfish pond is to the best of my knowledge on Delacroix Corporation property. However it was always my understanding that all of the rear (forty arpent line) up river portion of my crayfish pond, canal, and levee were on my property. Therefore, I am not prepared to acknowledge that if, in fact, a line subsequently is determined to be otherwise that I would acknowledge your ownership in that part of the property. The area involved would be minimal, but on the other hand the future relocation of my levees, canals and ditches would be very incovenient [sic] and costly. I appreciate your offer of long term lease with a minimal rental to satisfy your concern of adverse possession and am willing to enter into such a lease subject to acceptable conditions.
As I explained to you at our meeting, since I did not, at that time, have sufficient information to determine the location of the boundary line, I could not make definite assurances to you except that subject to the above paragraph, it was not my intention to adversely possess land owned by the Delacroix Corporation.
This statement by Chalin Perez must be viewed as evidence that although Perez may not have been aware of the precise boundary line between the property, he did not intend to claim ownership of property to which Delacroix held the title. Thus, the exclusion of this document was clearly prejudicial to Delacroix. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment excluding the proffered documents and hereby declare them admitted into evidence.
This evidence alone should be sufficient proof that Perez was a precarious possessor of the disputed property. However, there was ample additional evidence | ^presented at trial to support Delacroix's claim that Perez was using the property with their permission.
At trial, Dorothy Benge, Delacroix's president, testified that she understood from discussions with her mother, Mrs. O'Toole, that Perez had permission to use the property. She stated that both she and her mother were intimidated by Perez's position of power in parish government. She also testified that Delacroix's employees were informed of this fact and were told to accommodate Mr. Perez in any way possible. Delacroix's employees, Jerry Alphonso, Donald Ansardi and Clark Lozes, corroborated Ms. Benge's testimony that Perez had permission to use the property. These Delacroix employees testified that they were told that Perez had permission to use the property and to accommodate him.
In addition, Delacroix presented correspondence dated October 13, 1980 from Delacroix's counsel to Perez which unequivocally stated that Delacroix was "accommodating" Perez's use of the disputed property. (Exhibit 39F).
Perez testified at trial that he began using the disputed property, which had no visible boundary other than the Forty Arpent Canal, for varied purposes. He stated that he believed his property line extended to the canal and he denied obtaining permission from Delacroix to use the tract. Although Perez testified at trial that he did not receive permission from Delacroix to use this property, the evidence contained in the record fails to support this contention.
It is undisputed that Delacroix Corporation is an owner of thousands of acres of land in Plaquemines parish and has gone to great lengths to protect its ownership against adverse possessors. It maintains regular inspections and patrols by land, water and air to make certain that trespassers do not acquire any rights to its property, a large portion of which is undeveloped. Notwithstanding this fact, | aChalin Perez was allowed to use Delacroix's property on a regular basis with their knowledge. Perez and Delacroix apparently resided as neighbors on good terms for many years before this controversy arose, and all these facts are relevant evidence in this case. The weight of the evidence shows that had Perez not obtained consent from Delacroix for the use of the property, he would have certainly been evicted by Delacroix who was aware of his presence on the property for more than thirty years.
Under the circumstances presented here, we find that the evidence establishes that Perez was using the property with the consent and permission of Delacroix. Thus, Perez was a precarious possessor who is presumed to have possessed on behalf of Delacroix, his permittor, regardless of whether he intended to possess for himself. La. C.C. art. 3438. Acquisitive prescription therefore did not run in favor of Perez. La. C.C. art. 3477.
Further, there is no indication in the record that Perez at any point terminated the precarious possession or changed the nature of the possession by acts that were sufficient to give notice to Delacroix of such a change.
A precarious possessor commences to possess for himself when he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on whose behalf he is possessing. La. C.C. arts. 3439; 3478. There is no evidence on the record that Chalin Perez gave notice to Delacroix that he intended to possess this property for himself. In fact, his actions demonstrated that he was operating within the terms of the agreement allowing him to use the property. Although Perez used the property for many | inpurposes over the course of several decades, he did not manifest his intention to possess as owner by overt and unambiguous acts.
The intent to possess as owner cannot be covert and must be express. Although it may be implied if there is open, notorious, public, continuous and uninterrupted possession, which has to be to the exclusion of the owners, there must be strong evidence that gives the owner some notice that his property is in jeopardy. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 493 So.2d 253 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 496 So.2d 353 (La.1986).
Notwithstanding the fact that Perez's use of the property at issue was open, public and continuous, the evidence indicates that Perez did not take overt steps that would have alerted Delacroix that Perez intended to possess for himself or that Delacroix's property was in jeopardy. We recognized that Perez had unbridled use of the subject property: he erected gates on two of the canals on the property, he built duck blinds and deer stands and at one point evicted from the property a Delacroix permittee who was hunting on the property.
However, the record also indicates that Perez allowed Delacroix access to the property which refutes Perez's claim of ownership. The record also indicates that Perez's use of the property did not interfere with Delacroix's exercise of its rights of ownership. During this time, Delacroix granted innumerable oil leases, seismic rights of way and the actual drilling of two oil wells on its property without the interference of Perez. Delacroix submitted evidence that two oil wells were drilled on the disputed property by its lessees during Perez's possession of the property. Perez argues that this activity is insignificant because the drilling was not |^conducted for such a time period to interrupt Perez's possession of the property. However, we find the drilling activity to be significant in that it indicates that Perez was a permit-tee of Delacroix; otherwise, he presumably would not have allowed Delacroix to drill for oil on his land.
Further, the record shows that Perez was a lawyer and a knowledgeable oil lessor. The record indicates that Perez never attempted to grant oil leases on the disputed property which would have been consistent with his ownership of the property.
In addition, Delacroix presented evidence of geophysical seismic activity in 1973 on the disputed property. If Perez had believed that he owned the property as he testified at trial, it is unlikely that he would have allowed Delacroix to have this kind of access to the property. In addition, evidence presented at trial indicates that Delacroix continued to pay taxes on the property and grant mineral leases. Moreover, Perez entertained discussions with Delacroix concerning a lease for the property, but delayed signing any such agreement, allowing Delacroix to believe that he understood that he was possessing the property with their permission.
We find that by failing to overtly chai-' lenge Delacroix's use of the subject property, Perez in effect lulled Delacroix into a false sense of security that Perez was op erating within the terms of the oral agreement' between the parties. As outlined above, Perez did nothing to interfere with the- exercise of Delacroix's ownership right to this property. Perez's actions in this case must be interpreted in one of two ways: either he did not protest Delacroix's ownership rights because he acknowledged he did not own the property, or he did not protest the ownership rights because he did not want to alert Delacroix of his intention to claim ^ownership for himself by adverse possession. Under either scenario, Perez's claim of ownership fails.
It is readily apparent that the fact that Perez allowed these activities on the property at the instruction of Delacroix should not be evaluated as evidence of adverse possession. Since neither Perez nor Stella Lands ever gave sufficient notice to Delacroix of their intent to possess the disputed tract as owner, acquisitive prescription never commenced in favor of either one. La. C.C. art. 3478.
Further, the record indicates that Chalin Perez acknowledged Delacroix's ownership of the property during the course of his use of the property. La. C.C. art. 3464 provides that "prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he commences to prescribe." One who acknowledges another as owner cannot acquire legal possession because their possession is not acquired by an intention to possess for himself. Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So.2d 1087 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983).
The record indicates that during the 1960s Perez built a crawfish pond which was partially on the disputed property. In early 1980, the IRS began an investigation into whether Perez, the parish president at the time, had used parish equipment for the construction of the pond. In connection with this investigation, Perez requested from Delacroix a written assertion of Delacroix's ownership of the disputed acreage for the purpose of showing the work was not only done on the Perez property. Delacroix introduced an office memorandum dated August 19, 1980 from Delacroix's attorney to Ms. Benge's mother, Mrs. O'Toole. Ms. Benge read that document into the record, and the document indicates that Delacroix agreed to provide written affirmation to Perez that Delacroix owned part of the [ 1sacreage and no consideration passed from Perez to Delacroix for the use of the land on which the crawfish pond was located.
Delacroix also introduced a letter from Chalin Perez dated August 22, 1980 in which he refers to a rough draft of a letter of Delacroix Corporation. Perez stated that the letter was being requested by the IRS in examination of his income tax return. Ms. Benge read the rough draft of the letter into the record, which provided that Delacroix Corporation is the owner of the property extending from the Forty Arpent Line to the Forty Arpent Canal. Delacroix agreed to send this letter in return for a lease from Perez for the subject property.
The record also contains a memorandum from Delacroix's counsel to Mrs. O'Toole that the letter furnished by Delacroix at the request of the IRS had been successful and the matter had been dropped by the IRS. There was also a notation in this memorandum dated December 4,1980 concerning a lease had been provided to Perez for the subject property.
We interpret these documents in the record as evidence that Chalin Perez acknowledged ownership of the property by Delacroix. We hold that even assuming prescription had begun to run in favor of Perez, this acknowledgement in 1980 interrupted the prescription. The trial court erred in holding otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons assigned herein, the judgment of the trial court in favor of Chalin Perez and Stella Lands, Inc. and against the Delacroix Corporation is hereby reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Delacroix Corporation and against Chalin Perez and Stella Lands, Inc. |14enjoining the trespass of Perez and Stella Lands on the subject property as described in Delacroix's petition. The matter is remanded to the trial court to consider Delacroix's claim for damages and to set a boundary line between the properties. All costs of the trial court and appellate proceedings are to be borne by Chalin Perez and Stella Lands, Inc.
REVERSED AND RENDERED CASE REMANDED
BYRNES, J., dissents with reasons.
. The Civil Code articles on prescription were revised by Act 187 of 1982 effective January 1, 1983. Although the new articles required a precarious possessor to give "actual notice" to the owner that he intends to adversely possess for himself, the official revision comments stated that the new articles do not change the law. Nevertheless, we have applied the less stringent standard of notice required by the old law: the possessor must manifest his intention to possess for himself by overt and unambiguous acts. However, we note that under either standard, the actions of Perez were insufficient to give notice of his adverse possession.