Case Name: Evelyn Preston and Edward Chabot, III v. Shirley Chabot and Edwin W. Free, Jr.
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1980-02-07
Citations: 138 Vt. 170
Docket Number: No. 303-78
Parties: Evelyn Preston and Edward Chabot, III v. Shirley Chabot and Edwin W. Free, Jr.
Judges: Present: Barney, C.J., Daley, Larrow, Billings and Hill, JJ.
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 170–185

Head Matter:
Evelyn Preston and Edward Chabot, III v. Shirley Chabot and Edwin W. Free, Jr.
[412 A.2d 930]
No. 303-78
Present: Barney, C.J., Daley, Larrow, Billings and Hill, JJ.
Opinion Filed February 7, 1980
James C. Gallagher of Downs, Raehlin & Martin, St. Johns-bury, for Plaintiffs.
Edwin W. Free, Jr., of Richard E. Davis Associates, Inc., Barre, for Defendants.

Opinion:
Larrow, J.
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment order entered in Caledonia Superior Court which, in order to prevent Edward Chabot, Jr., from profiting by his crime, imposed a constructive trust upon defendants, Shirley Chabot and Edwin W. Free, Jr., of an undivided one-half interest in certain real property for the benefit of plaintiffs, children of Edward Chabot, Jr.'s first marriage.
Edward Chabot, Jr., and Norma Chabot were married on January 22, 1938, and subsequently, by virtue of two deeds, took title as tenants by the entirety to certain real estate located in Hardwick, Vermont. On November 15, 1965, Edward Chabot, Jr., shot his wife and was charged with murder. He pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to the state penitentiary. Norma Chabot died intestate and her probate estate consisted entirely of personal property; no real property was listed in the inventory or final account.
After his release from prison in 1969, Edward Chabot, Jr., married Shirley Chabot and later, by straw deed, purportedly conveyed the Hardwick property to himself and Shirley Chabot as tenants by the entirety. He also on that same day, December 10, 1975, executed a will which left his entire estate, real and personal, to Shirley Chabot with the exception of small cash bequests to each of his children and grandchildren. Edward Chabot, Jr., died on December 29, 1975, survived by Shirley Chabot, children and grandchildren. Plaintiffs, though aware of their father's remarriage, did not learn of the December 10, 1975, deed and will until after his death.
A declaratory judgment action, seeking a constructive trust for the benefit of plaintiffs over the Hardwick property, was commenced on January 10, 1976. By agreement of the parties, an evidentiary hearing was waived, and the case submitted upon an agreed statement of facts and memoranda of law.
Defendants appeal, the trial court having found for plaintiffs, and assign as error the court's findings that: (1) this action was not barred by laches; and (2) in order to prevent Edward Chabot, Jr., from profiting by his crime, a constructive trust be imposed upon defendants of an undivided one-half interest in the subject property.
We deal first with the issue of laches. Laches is an affirmative equitable defense, and the burden is on the party relying on it. Quazzo v. Quazzo, 136 Vt. 107, 114, 386 A.2d 638, 643 (1978). Laches involves prejudice to the adverse party, actual or implied, resulting from plaintiffs' delay in asserting their rights. Turner v. Turner, 131 Vt. 253, 257, 305 A.2d 592, 595 (1973). It does not, however, arise from delay alone, but from delay that disadvantages another. Stone v. Blake, 118 Vt. 424, 428, 110 A.2d 702, 705 (1955). Furthermore, a trial court's determination on the issue of laches is a matter of much discretion which will not be overturned unless clearly shown to be wrong. Laird Properties New England Land Syndicate v. Mad River Corp., 131 Vt. 268, 282, 305 A.2d 562, 570 (1973).
Although more than eleven years elapsed between the murder of Norma Chabot and the institution of this action, there was no showing below that this delay in any way prejudiced the defendants. No evidence whatsoever was introduced as to defendant Edwin Free, Jr., who is a party to this action only by virtue of being executor of Edward Chabot, Jr.'s estate. Nor did evidence below indicate that defendant Shirley Chabot was prejudiced; her only change in status during this period was marrying Edward Chabot, Jr., and, two weeks before his death, receiving a deed purporting to make her a tenant by the entirety in the Hardwick property. Defendants have not shown how they are worse off by the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust now, than had it been imposed immediately after Shirley Chabot's marriage in 1970 to Edward Chabot, Jr. In both instances, Shirley Chabot would receive one-half of her late husband's interest in the subject property; defendants have not demonstrated prejudice.
Defendants' claim that if plaintiffs had taken legal action earlier and prevailed, Edward Chabot, Jr., would have made "other suitable arrangements" for Shirley Chabot is without merit. The evidence below is to the contrary. He willed Shirley Chabot substantially everything he owned, and even if he knew during his lifetime of this lawsuit, he could not have acted differently; there was nothing more to leave her.
In their second claim, defendants contend the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs, Edward Chabot, III and Evelyn Preston, owned legal title to an undivided one-half interest in the property. We disagree.
There was at the time of Norma Chabot's death in 1965 no Vermont statutory provision governing the descent and distribution of property from a decedent to the slayer of that decedent. But cf. 14 V.S.A. § 551 (6) (statutory provision added in 1972 which caused a person convicted of intentionally and unlawfully killing another person to forfeit his share of that person's estate). This Court had, however, adopted the common law principle that one should not profit from his wrong. In re Estate of Mahoney, 126 Vt. 31, 34, 220 A.2d 475, 478 (1966). This principle was not extended to every case where a killer acquired the victim's property as a result of the killing. Instead, the Court reasoned that the slayer should not be permitted to improve his position by the killing, but should not be compelled to lose property that he had a vested interest in had there been no killing. Id.
Based on Mahoney, defendants argue that Edward Chabot, Jr., received at his wife's death the entire property, forfeiting nothing. They contend Edward Chabot, Jr., did not profit from his killing as he already, as a tenant by the entirety with his slain wife, Norma Chabot, owned the whole property, and should not forfeit this vested right in the whole.
Tenants by the entirety are, as defendants claim, viewed as each being vested, under a legal fiction, with title to the whole; there being no moieties. Town of Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 506-07, 22 A. 618, 618 (1891). Additionally, during their joint lifetimes, neither has a share that can be disposed of without the other joining. Id.
While Edward Chabot, Jr., had a vested right in the subject property, defendants' claim that he did not profit from this killing, if he received the entire property, is frivolous. A legal fiction, that each tenant by the entirety owns the whole, cannot obscure the fact that before Norma Chabot's murder, Edward Chabot, Jr., as a tenant by the entirety, had to share the profits of the property and, moreover, his right to sole and complete ownership was contingent upon surviving his wife. Cf. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 118, 129 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1955) (joint tenants). Whereas, after, and because of, this murder Edward Chabot, Jr., became the sole owner of the Hardwick property, no longer sharing the profits, nor fearing the loss of his interest. See G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 478 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
As the trial court correctly indicates, it would be unconscionable for Edward Chabot, Jr., after murdering his wife and cotenant by the entirety, to retain the entire interest in the property and then pass title to his second wife as a successor tenant by the entirety. A husband who murders his wife should not be better off propertywise merely because he holds property by the entireties rather than some other way. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 127, 80 A.2d 923, 925-26 (1951). Therefore, to avoid this unconscionable result, the trial court imposed a constructive trust on one-half of the subject property for benefit of plaintiffs.
The trial court found, and we think correctly, that the most equitable and appropriate method of distribution for resolv ing the instant case is one which recognizes that the estate was severed by the unlawful killing, and that the Hardwick property held by Edward, Jr., and Norma Chabot as tenants by entirety vested in Edward, Jr., when he survived Norma, but his estate is required to hold one-half of the property in constructive trust for Norma's heirs, the plaintiffs. See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1141 (1972). The trial court analogized the present situation to a divorce, which under Vermont law destroys the tenancy by the entirety and creates by operation of law a tenancy in common among the parties. Stewart v. Bleau's Estate, 102 Vt. 273, 276-77, 147 A. 692, 693 (1929). This position has been taken by other jurisdictions to prevent the "unconscionable mode" of acquiring full legal title by the husband's survival of his murdered wife. Pannone v. McLaughlin, 37 Md. App. 395, 405, 377 A.2d 597, 603 (1977); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 915, 27 S.W.2d 757, 760 (1930). See also National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957); Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954).
This result works no forfeiture to defendants as they receive what Edward Chabot, Jr., was entitled to. Nor, however, do defendants profit, as they are prevented from acquiring any additional benefits from the murder of Norma Chabot. Despite the theory of ownership of the whole by tenants by the entirety, which defendants espouse, we think it is incorrect to suggest that the interest of a surviving husband is the same as his interest prior to his wife's death. Death severed the tenancy by the entirety and created a tenancy in common between the parties, the deceased's, Norma Chabot's, share being held in constructive trust for benefit of her heirs, the plaintiffs. See Pannone v. McLaughlin, supra, 37 Md. App. at 403, 377 A.2d at 602; Barnett v. Couey, supra, 224 Mo. App. at 915, 27 S.W.2d at 760.
A constructive trust is a tool often used by courts to prevent unjust enrichment. See Annot., supra, at 1129. It is a "formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression," Bradley v. Fox, supra, 7 Ill. 2d at 117, 129 N.E.2d at 705, and is, under these facts, a most appropriate vehicle. See In re Estate of Mahoney, supra, 126 Vt. at 36, 220 A.2d at 479; Miller v. Belville, 98 Vt. 243, 248, 126 A. 590, 593 (1924). The trial court's imposition of a constructive trust was proper, and the judgment below is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.