Case Name: MAZDA MOTORS OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant, v. S. C. HENDERSON & SONS, INC., and United States Fire Insurance Company, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-11-17
Citations: 364 So. 2d 107
Docket Number: No. EE-356
Parties: MAZDA MOTORS OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant, v. S. C. HENDERSON & SONS, INC., and United States Fire Insurance Company, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 364
Pages: 107–109

Head Matter:
MAZDA MOTORS OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant, v. S. C. HENDERSON & SONS, INC., and United States Fire Insurance Company, Inc., Appellees.
No. EE-356.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 17, 1978.
Adam G. Adams, II, of Adams & Adams, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Carl K. Staas of Boyd, Jenerette, Leemis & Staas, Jacksonville, for appellees.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
Mazda Motors appeals from a final judgment dismissing its complaint on the ground that its cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations which was in effect at the time its cause of action accrued.
Mazda Motors contends the dismissal of its complaint was error because prior to the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the legislature extended the period of limitation to four years, and its complaint was filed within this period of time. We agree and reverse.
A person has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely run and barred his action. Before the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the legislature may amend the statute enlarging the period of time within which an action may be brought. This is not retroactive legislation and does not impair a vested right. Corbett, et al. v. General Engineering & Machinery Co., et al., 160 Fla. 879, 37 So.2d 161 (1948).
The argument of Henderson & Son and U. S. Fire Insurance Company that the dismissal of the complaint is supported by Foley v. Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (Fla.1976), is without merit. Foley merely states that legislative intention to provide retroactive application of a shortened limitation period must be expressed in clear and explicit language and if there is reasonable doubt concerning the retroactive effect, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the party whose cause of action is dismissed.
The final judgment is reversed. This case is remanded for further appropriate action on the merits.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BOYER, Acting C. J., dissents.