Case Name: Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, v. Marjorie A. RUZZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-10-10
Citations: 703 So. 2d 1076
Docket Number: No. 97-82
Parties: Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, v. Marjorie A. RUZZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Respondents.
Judges: THOMPSON, J„ concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 703
Pages: 1076–1083

Head Matter:
Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, v. Marjorie A. RUZZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Respondents.
No. 97-82.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 10, 1997.
As Modified on Grant of Clarification Jan. 2, 1998.
Richard E. Johnson and Heather Fisher Lindsay, of Spriggs & Johnson, Tallahassee, for Petitioners.
Mark S. Peters of Amari, Theriac & Eisen-menger, P.A., Cocoa, for Respondents.

Opinion:
W. SHARP, Judge.
Balas and Shumate petition this court for a writ of certiorari to review certain portions of the lower court's order which granted, in part, a motion to compel discovery filed by respondents Ruzzo and Exec., Inc. Petitioners argue that those portions depart from the essential requirements of law and will cause them irreparable harm because they will be compelled to disclose intimate details of their sexual history. We decline to issue the writ of certiorari.
Balas and Shumate filed suit against Ruzzo and Exec, Inc., doing business as "The Boardroom." According to Balas and Shu-mate, The Boardroom operates ostensibly as a leisure spa but actually is a house of prostitution. Balas worked at The Boardroom from December 1993 until February 1996; Shumate worked there from October 1992 until March 1996. Ruzzo, the sole officer and shareholder of Exec, Inc., collected about fifty to sixty percent of each employees' earnings from performing sexual acts.
According to Balas and Shumate, Ruzzo exerted mental and emotional control over her employees and thus she was able to exploit them as prostitutes. Ruzzo required her employees to pay her substantial sums of money to attend "metaphysical workshops" conducted by Ruzzo or persons associated with her. At the work place, the employees were required to participate in religious and quasi-religious "circles," rituals and incantations. These practices were allegedly designed to break down the personalities of the women who worked for Ruzzo and to foster dependency and loyalty to herself. At one time when the earnings of a new employee were missing and believed to be stolen, Ruz-zo required that the petitioners be strip searched and body cavity searched. Ruzzo caused the petitioners to believe their continued employment was dependent on their submission to these searches and that they might be arrested on felony charges if they refused to submit to the searches.
Balas and Shumate's second amended complaint against Ruzzo contains seven counts. Count I is an action for coercion of prostitution pursuant to section 796.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioners allege the requirement that they perform sexual acts to retain their employment constitutes inducement and coercion to engage in prostitution. Count II is a claim for battery for the unwanted and offensive touching of the petitioners' bodies. Count III is a claim for false imprisonment for physically confining the petitioners against their will. Count IV alleges that respondents' actions constituted an invasion of petitioners' privacy. Count V is a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count VI alleges a civil rights action — that respondents have violated petitioners' right to be iree from crimes of violence motivated by gender within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 13981. Finally, count VII seeks civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering pursuant to section 772.104, Florida Statutes. The petitioners claim that they suffered emotional pain, anguish, humiliation, insult, indignity, loss of self-esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress. They seek an award of general and punitive damages, among other relief.
The discovery to which the petitioners are being required to respond is as follows:
I.
Interrogatory 8: Please advise how long have you been engaged in prostitution....
II.
Interrogatory 22: State with specificity the manner in which the acts as described in your Complaint have materially affected how you interact with your husband, boyfriend, fiancée' [sic] or any other individual of the opposite sex.
III.
Request for Production 30: A copy of any photographs, movies or videotapes in which you performed sexual acts and/or simulated sexual acts in exchange for money or other consideration.
IV.
Interrogatory 16: Please list the names, addresses, telephone numbers and rates of pay for all employers for which you worked, including the nature of the work, during the five years immediately preceding the date of employment with the Boardroom and from the date of your termination with the Boardroom to the present, providing the names of your immediate supervisors at each place of employment and the reason for your leaving each place of employment.
V.
Interrogatory 26: Please state your total income while employed at the Boardroom, and state the source of that income including any income from other employment or income earned from prostitution other than at the Boardroom.
VI.
Request for Production 34: Business records from any selfemployment or owned business ventures in the last 5 years, including any records or list of customers, "special customer lists" or "sugar daddy's list."
Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to the subject matter of the case and must be admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91 (Fla.1995); Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995); Russell v. Stardust Cruisers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The concept of relevancy is broader in the discovery context than in the trial context and a party may be permitted to discover evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, if it would lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Allstate; Amente. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(1) delineates the proper scope of discovery:
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Nonetheless, the discovery of certain kinds of information may cause material injury of an irreparable nature. This includes the "cat-out-of-the-bag" material that could be used to injure another person or party outside the context of the litigation, material protected by privilege, trade secrets or work product. Discovery was never intended to be used as a tactical tool to harass, embarrass or annoy one's adversary. Rather, pretrial discovery was implemented to simplify the issues in a case, to eliminate the elements of surprise, to encourage the settlement of cases, to avoid the cost of litigation, and to achieve a balanced search for the truth to ensure a fair trial. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla.1996).
Here the petitioners argue that the information sought to be discovered regarding prostitution and their sexual activities was propounded solely to embarrass them and to invade their right to privacy. The petitioners also claim that this information is privileged under section 796.09 and is not calculated to lead to evidence which would be admissible at trial.
Section 796.09 provides a person with a civil cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against anyone who coerces that person into prostitution, who coerces that person to remain in prostitution, or who uses coercion to collect or receive any part of that person's earnings derived from prostitution. In the course of litigation under this section, any transaction about which a plaintiff testifies or produces evidence does not subject the plaintiff to criminal prosecution or to any penalty or forfeiture. In addition, any testimony or evidence or any information produced by the plaintiff or witness for the plaintiffs cannot be used against the plaintiffs or witness in any other investigation or proceeding, except one for perjury.
Section 796.09(5) specifically provides that it is not a defense that the plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated for prostitution, that the plaintiff had engaged in prostitution prior to any involvement with the defendant or that the plaintiff made no attempt to escape from the defendant. Section 796.09(6) provides that convictions for prostitution or prostitution-related offenses are inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the plaintiffs' credibility.
This legislation was the result of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, which conducted an extensive investigation of prostitution in this state. The Commission's activities included interviews with law enforcement and corrections per sonnel, judges, public defenders, prosecutors, drug rehabilitation counselors, social workers, medical personnel, prostitutes, clients and pimps. The Commission found prostitution to be prevalent and uniform throughout the state and law enforcement largely unable to deter it under prevailing social attitudes and judicial practices. The Commission further found that prostitutes are often victims of economic, physical, and psychological coercion, that most persons do not chose to become prostitutes, but do so to survive, and that ninety percent of street prostitutes, both adult and children, are controlled by pimps who use a variety of coercive methods to maintain this control. The Commission determined that clients and pimps are rarely prosecuted and, when prosecuted, receive light sentences; whereas prostitutes, who are mainly females, are frequently prosecuted and receive harsher treatment in the courts. The Commission recommended changes in the methods of intervention in prostitution from punitive to therapeutic, changes in the law to require more equal treatment by the courts of the prostitute in relation to the client and the pimp and to lessen the incentive to traffic in human flesh by giving the prostitute access to the judicial system without first having to be arrested.
Under section 796.09, the petitioners' pri- or involvement in prostitution and their earnings from prostitution would be irrelevant. Hence discovery should not be permitted because such information would not be admissible at trial nor would it be reasonably calculated to lead to evidence ultimately admissible at trial. Even though the scope of discovery is generally quite broad, section 796.09 is designed to encourage prostitutes to sue their pimps. Thus the "usually broad scope of discovery may be constricted so that prostitutes will not be embarrassed, harassed or hindered in their actions.
Had the petitioners brought their lawsuit against Ruzzo and The Boardroom only under section 796.09, evidence of petitioners' past prostitution, including with the Boardroom, and their earnings relating to such activities, may not have been discoverable. However, the petitioners filed a multi-count complaint for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging numerous causes of action against the respondents. These other causes carry no such protection from discovery. Since the information sought by diseovr ery may be relevant or may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in one or more of these other causes of action or to determination of damages, we cannot conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in granting this discovery. See Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (by alleging fraud as well as breach of contract, purchaser placed at issue her reliance on venders' assertions, the veracity of financial documents she submitted to the vender, and the state of her mental health, including memory problems she was experiencing at the time of the alleged tortious conduct, thus deposition questions concerning her state of mind were relevant).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED.
THOMPSON, J" concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.