Case Name: E. F. Kirwan Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland, vs. Joseph D. Truxton, late sheriff
Court: Delaware Superior Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1899-04-11
Citations: 2 Penne. 48
Docket Number: Trespass de Bonis Aspoetatis No. 78
Parties: E. F. Kirwan Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland, vs. Joseph D. Truxton, late sheriff.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 48–61

Head Matter:
E. F. Kirwan Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland, vs. Joseph D. Truxton, late sheriff.
Amendment—Pleading—Practice—Demurrer—Comity—Parties— Foreign Corporations—Receivers.
1. The defendant may by leave of the Court strike out a plea in bar and substitute therefor a plea in abatement; and also may amend a plea in bar so as to make it a plea in abatement, it being in substance a plea in abatement but lacking the proper form.
2. Where receivers of a corporation have been appointed by a court in another State, it is to be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the appointment was valid.
3. The powers conferred by the laws of one State can have no operation in another State except by comity, and therefore a corporation cannot as of right sue in any other jurisdiction, than that from which it derived its corporate powers. The practice, however, is now universal in this country to permit by comity corporations of one State, having the right to sue there, to sue in the courts of another State unless the exercise of that privilege is repugnant to the interests or policy of such State.
4. By comity receivers are now generally permitted to maintain suits in other states for the the protection of the interests, and the enforcement of the claims, of the corporations for which they were appointed, provided it would not be contrary to the policy of such states, or detrimental to the interests of their citizens, or of others who have acquired rights there.
5. When the laws of the State in which receivers of a corporation are appointed provide that such receivers shall be vested with all the estate and assets of every kind belonging to the corporation, and that suits may be brought and carried on by them, either in their own names and capacities as such receivers, or in the name of the corporation for which they shall have been appointed, such corporation will not be permitted to sue in this State in its own name unless it appears that the suit is brought by the authority of the receivers. To permit it to do so would be an unwarranted disregard of the laws of a sister State, instead of an act of comity.
6. When by the laws of the State creating the corporation it has been deprived of the right to the possession or control of its assets, and the right to sue in the courts of such State for the recovery of any of its debts or rights of action, it would be unreasonable to ask the courts of another State, upon grounds of comity, to permit such corporation to sue there, or to exercise any of the powers of which it had been deprived by the laws of the State of its creation.
(April 11, 1899.)
Judges Spruance and Grubb sitting.
Lewis C. Vandegrift, A. F. Polk and Charles M. Curtis for plaintiff.
Herbert H Ward, Charles F. Richards a nd C. W. Cullen fo defendant.
Superior Court, Sussex County,
April Term, 1899.
Trespass de Bonis Aspoetatis (No. 78,
Oct. Term, 1897).
Demurrer.
Mr. Richards, of counsel for defendant,
at the argument on the demurrers, stated to the Court that the above stated case was continued at the last term of Court, being the October Term, 1898, with general leave to amend; that as the ease stood at that time, there were certain pleas in bar filed, but since the last term the defendant had filed three additional pleas, two of which were pleas in abatement, and one, a plea in bar. Recognizing the general principle of law, that pleas in abatement are improper with pleas in bar, he asked leave of the Court to withdraw said pleas in bar, leaving the two pleas in abatement which had been filed since the last term; also to amend the third additional plea so as to make it a plea in abatement.
Mr. Curtis, of counsel for plaintiff,
objected on the ground that a plea in abatement cannot be filed after the filing of a plea in bar; that having already admitted the standing of the plaintiff in this suit in this Court, by not filing a plea in abatement, the defendant cannot go back and say the plaintiff has no standing in this Court.
Spruance, J.:—Your application would amount to this, that after filing a plea in bar, the defendant cannot, by leave of the Court, strike out that plea and substitute a plea in abatement.
Mr. Curtis:—Exactly.
The Court here stated that they would like to hear the matter discussed.
Mr. Vandegrift, of counsel for plaintiff,
raised the point that as the defendant .had taken the initiative he should open the discussion and cite the authorities sustaining his position. The Court held that as the plaintiff objected, the burden was upon him to sustain his objection; the same as in the case of an objection to a question asked a witness in the trial of a case.
After quite an extended argument by counsel on both sides, the Court rendered the following decision:

Opinion:
Spruance, J.:
This motion is to strike out all of the pleas in bar, except the last, and to amend said last plea so as to make it a plea in abatement, it being alleged that it is in substance a plea in abatement, but lacks the proper form.
We have no doubt about this subject. We have much more imperative and extensive power in this regard than any English court we know anything about. The Constitution, Section 24, Article 4, provides: "In civil causes when pending, the Superior Court shall have the power, before judgment, of directing, upon such terms as it shall deem reasonable, amendments, impleadings and legal proceedings, so that by error in any of them, the determination of causes, according to their real merits, shall not be hindered," etc.
The Revised Code, of 1893, Section 11, Chapter 112, provides : " In any civil cause pending before the Superior Court, the said Court shall have power, at any time before judgment, to allow amendments either in form or substance, of any process, pleading or proceeding, in such action on such terms as shall be just and reasonable."
We therefore think we have ample power to grant this motion and to allow the amendment asked for. When the motion for the continuance of this case was made at the last October Term of this Court, we find in looking at the report of the case, (1 Pennewill, 409) that one of the grounds for granting the application for continuance was as follows: "It was admitted that the plaintiff at the time of bringing this suit was insolvent and the property in the hands of a receiver. The receiver was not made a party, and the defendant had no knowledge whatever of the insolvency until within a few hours past, and had no opportunity to avail himself of any defence if any, growing out of that fact, and we think he ought to have time to examine that question and take such advantage of it as he is entitled to,"
Counsel for the defendant have examined into the question then raised, and have come to the conclusion that that fact cannot properly be brought before [the ¡Court except upon a plea of abatement, and to refuse this application would be wholly inconsistent with the ruling of the Court upon the application at the last term. We have not the slightest hesitancy about it, and grant the motion.