Case Name: Sylvester J. CALLIER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1989-12-12
Citations: 780 S.W.2d 639
Docket Number: No. 71414
Parties: Sylvester J. CALLIER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: RENDLEN, HIGGINS, COVINGTON and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 780
Pages: 639–648

Head Matter:
Sylvester J. CALLIER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 71414.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Dec. 12, 1989.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Sandra A. Mears, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent-appellant.
Larry O. Denny, Kansas City, for petitioner-respondent.

Opinion:
ALMON H. MAUS, Special Judge.
Upon the basis of Section 302.272.5(2), the Director of Revenue refused to issue a school bus operator's permit to respondent Sylvester J. Callier. Callier filed a Petition for Review in the circuit court. Section 302.311, RSMo 1986. The circuit court declared Section 302.272 unconstitutional and ordered the Director to issue the permit. The Director appeals.
The issues in this case are presented with the following evidentiary background. Callier had been driving a school bus for B & J School Bus Service, Inc., for seven years. That company operated school buses under contract with a school district in Jackson County. He applied for a permit under Section 302.272. A record check established that in 1961 he had been convicted of wife and child abandonment and nonsupport. Section 559.350, RSMo 1959. As stated, because of the conviction the Director denied the permit.
Callier's Petition for Review alleged:
4. That R.S.Mo., Section 302.272(5) [sic] is:
(a) A taking of Petitioner's permit to [sic] a school bus without due process of law.
(b) Is an ex post facto punishment of Petitioner for a 1961 criminal offense.
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(d) Is a denial of equal protection of the law.
At the hearing de novo, his attorney verbally objected because the offense for which Callier was convicted was not an offense set forth in Section 302.272.5(2). The circuit court apparently determined this objection and subsequent evidence constituted an amendment of the petition. Rule 55.-33(b). The relevant evidence consisted of the application and record of Callier's conviction.
The findings of the circuit court included the following. Callier had not been convicted of any offense listed in Section 302.-272.5(2). That if Section 302.272.5(2) was applicable to Callier, "it would be taking of Petitioner's right to operate a school bus, if otherwise properly licensed, without due process of law."
3. R.S.Mo. Section 302.272(5)(7) [sic] if applied to Petitioner would be a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States, where compliance with Section 302.272(5) [sic] is optional for school districts in third or fourth class counties, without any standards for exercising said option, and mandatory for school districts in first or second class counties.
Upon the basis of these findings, the circuit court ordered the Director to issue Callier the permit.
The parties in concert assert this appeal is within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court because it involves the validity of a statute. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. Nevertheless, this Court is "obliged and entitled to consider questions of jurisdiction, whether or not raised or advanced by the parties." ABC Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Clemans, 658 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. banc 1983).
This appeal involves the validity of Section 302.272 only if the record presents a "constitutional issue" of that validity. See Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. banc 1986). A constitutional issue is raised only when presented in accordance with rules of long standing. These rules are found in a multitude of cases. They have been succinctly summarized as follows.
It is firmly established that a constitutional question must be presented at the earliest possible moment "that good pleading and orderly procedure will admit under the circumstances of the given case, otherwise it will be waived."
Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis, 384 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Mo.1964), quoting Securities Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 326 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Mo.1959).
A party asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute or ordinance bears the burden of supporting that contention by at least relating his argument to the statute or ordinance and issue at hand. Atkins v. Dept. of Building Regulations, 596 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Mo.1980). To properly raise a constitutional question, plaintiffs are required to: (1) raise the constitutional question at the first available opportunity; (2) designate specifically the constitutional provision claimed to have been violated, such as by explicit reference to the article and section or by quotation of the provision itself; (3) state the facts showing the violation; and (4) preserve the constitutional question throughout for appellate review.
City of Eureka v. Litz, 658 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Mo.App.1983). See also Century 21 v. City of Jennings, 700 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. banc 1985); City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (banc 1949); State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210 (banc 1948); State ex rel. Allison v. Barton, 355 Mo. 690, 197 S.W.2d 667 (banc 1946); State ex rel. Spradling v. Bondurant, 501 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.App.1973); and Creamer v. Banholzer, 694 S.W.2d 497 (Mo.App.1985).
With rare exception, unless a constitutional issue has been raised, a question of the constitutionality of a statute is not before the Court. "This determination is beyond the scope of the petition in the case. Constitutional questions must be properly raised by the parties. The question was not raised and was not properly before the trial court and is not properly for review here." City of St. Louis v. Missouri Com'n on Human Rights, 517 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Mo.1974). See also State v. Wickizer, 583 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. banc 1979); State v. Flynn, 519 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1975). When a constitutional question has not been raised, a declaration of the invalidity of a statute on such a basis by a circuit court is erroneous and should be reversed. Moreover, the case does not involve the validity of a statute, and this Court does not, on that basis, have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal. St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education, 456 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.1970).
It is not necessary to discuss all instances that constitute an actual or an apparent exception to these rules. See City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 219 S.W.2d at 372. It is sufficient to make the following observations. The doctrine of inherency has been abolished. Christiansen v. Fulton State Hospital, 536 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. banc 1976). When the public interest is involved, these rules do not prevent this Court from deciding constitutional questions. State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 213 S.W.2d at 210. Nor do they impinge upon the authority of a court to determine a criminal statute or a statute proscribing individual conduct is invalid within the strict limitations set forth in State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. banc 1982).
The relevant parts of the Petition for Review have been noted. The petition contains no designation of any constitutional section claimed to have been violated. It pleads no facts showing a constitutional violation. It is patently insufficient to raise a constitutional issue and a question concerning the validity of Section 302.272. "But certainly it should not be held a mere allegation that a given act, claim, right or statute 'violates the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Missouri/ or the 'applicable' provisions of those Constitutions, properly raises a constitutional question." City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 219 S.W.2d at 380 (emphasis added). In the absence of compelling reasons otherwise, this case should be transferred to the court of appeals with instructions to reverse the finding of the circuit court that Section 302.272 is invalid and to determine if Callier had been convicted of a crime listed in Section 302.272.5(2). Christiansen v. Fulton State Hospital, 536 S.W.2d at 159. Dictum in Kansas City v. Hammer, 347 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.1961) (finding jurisdiction to be in this Court because of the circuit court's unprovoked declaration of unconstitutionality) should not be followed.
However, to so transfer the case would create a degree of uncertainty concerning the validity of Section 302.272. Even though the question had not been raised, the circuit court found that section to be invalid for two reasons. It is in the public interest to determine if the entire act is invalid for the reasons expressed by the circuit court.
The circuit court first found that, if applicable to Callier, Section 302.272.5(2) would constitute a taking of Callier's right to operate a school bus without due process. This finding includes no facts upon which that conclusion was based. It is not certain if that finding refers to procedural or substantive due process. It is obvious, as demonstrated by the hearing upon the Petition for Review and this appeal, that Callier has been accorded procedural due process. Division of Employment Security v. Smith, 615 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. banc 1981).
" 'The substantive due process aspect of this test mandates that the ordinance have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest_ Similarly, the equal protection clause requires that classifications drawn by the ordinance have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.' " Simpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Mo. banc 1988) (citations omitted) (quoting American Motorcyclists Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 622 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo.App.1981). As hereafter developed, Section 302.272 does bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and does not deny substantive due process to Callier.
The circuit court's second finding was that Section 302.272 violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because of an impermissible classification of counties.
The proper analysis of a claim of statutory invalidity by reason of the "equal protection clause" is well established.
In equal protection claims the first step is to ascertain whether the statutory scheme "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution...." If so, the statutory scheme receives strict judicial scrutiny to ascertain whether the classification is necessary to a compelling state interest. Id. If the classification neither burdens a suspect class, nor impinges upon a fundamental right, the only issue is whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In such a situation the burden is on the person attacking the classification to show that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, and is purely arbitrary. Under this analysis a classifica tion will be upheld if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which would justify it.
Belton v. Board of Police Com'rs, 708 S.W.2d 131, 139 (Mo. banc 1986) (citations omitted). See also Collins v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. banc 1985); Simpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d at 392; Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Etc., 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. banc 1982). It is obvious that Section 302.272 does not burden a suspect class. State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo. banc 1988); State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 296, 98 L.Ed.2d 256. It is equally well established that the right to drive a school bus is not a fundamental right within the meaning of that analysis. Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 S.W.2d at 475, n. 2; State Bd. of Registration v. Giffen, 651 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Mo. banc 1983). The right of the legislature to establish classifications based upon population has long been recognized.
The question of classification is primarily for the Legislature. If there is any reasonable basis for the classification made the court must sustain it.
Population furnishes a proper basis for classification in a general law regulating counties which fall within the class when such classification is reasonable and germane to the purpose of the law.
. Where, as here, population is a reasonable basis for classification it is only necessary that the act apply to all places of the same population designated in the law_
State ex rel. Fire Dist. of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W.2d 593, 595 (banc 1945). See also State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority, 517 S.W.2d 36, 43-44 (Mo. banc 1975); State ex inf. Barker v. Southern, 177 S.W. 640, 643 (Mo. banc 1915).
No extended discussion or citation of authorities is required to demonstrate the state has a legitimate interest in excluding those who disregard the needs of children from the operation of school buses. Moreover, there is a rational basis for the optional application of that section to school districts located in counties of the .third or fourth class. The larger counties have a bigger pool of possible drivers from which to draw. Supervisors in the larger counties will often possess little or no personal knowledge of the character of applicants. Those supervisors cannot exercise as direct and immediate control as supervisors in the smaller counties. Subsection 302.272.7 did not cause that section to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Callier also argues that Section 302.272.-5(2) and (3) deny him equal protection because of Section 302.272.5(3) bars only those convicted within ten years of the offenses listed therein (offenses against property and drug offenses), as distinguished from Section 302.272.5(2) which places no time limitation upon convictions of the offenses listed therein. As stated, this constitutional issue was not raised. The circuit court made no determination of this issue which creates uncertainty concerning the constitutionality of Section 302.272. This Court need not and does not consider that argument. It is an argument of "under inclusion". Those interested in the question may consult City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Collins v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d at 246; State v. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d 643 (Mo.1975); State ex inf. Gavin v. Gill, 688 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. banc 1985); City of St. Louis v. Liberman, 547 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. banc 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 116, 54 L.Ed.2d 92.
Also as stated, the circuit court found Callier had not been convicted of an offense listed in Section 302.272.5(2). The Director's appeal from that determination would properly be to the court of appeals. Nonetheless, in the interests of judicial economy it will be decided by this Court. Christiansen v. Fulton State Hospital, 536 S.W.2d at 159.
Section 302.272.5(2) includes "an offense against the family as defined in chapter 568 . or of any similar crime_" Chapter 568 does not define any offense in the precise terms used in Section 559.350, RSMo 1959. However, Section 568.040 does define the offense of "criminal nonsupport". The elements of the offense so defined are virtually identical to an offense of abandonment and failure to support defined in Section 559.350, RSMo 1959. Callier had been convicted of a "similar crime" as an offense defined by chapter 568. The contrary determination by the circuit court is erroneous.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the Petition for Review is denied.
RENDLEN, HIGGINS, COVINGTON and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs in result.
BLACKMAR, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
HOLSTEIN, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when the case was submitted.
. Section 302.272, as applicable to this case, became effective September 1, 1988. Basically, the section provides that no person shall operate a public school bus unless he holds a school bus operator's permit. The subsections of that statute relevant to this appeal read as follows.
5. The director of revenue, to the best of his knowledge, shall not issue or renew a school bus operator's permit to any applicant:
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(2) Who has been convicted of any felony for an offense against the person as defined by chapter 565, RSMo; of any misdemeanor or felony for a sexual offense as defined by chapter 566, RSMo; of any misdemeanor or felony for prostitution as defined by chapter 567, RSMo, of any misdemeanor or felony for an offense against the family as defined in chapter 568, RSMo, of any misdemeanor or felony for pornography or related offense as defined by chapter 573, RSMo; or of any similar crime in any federal, state, municipal or other court of similar jurisdiction of which he has knowledge;
(3) Who has been convicted of any felony involving robbery, arson, burglary or a related offense as defined by chapter 569, RSMo; any felony or misdemeanor for violation of drug regulations as defined in chapter 195, RSMo; or any similar crime in any federal, state, municipal or other court of similar jurisdiction within the preceding ten years of which he has knowledge.
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7. Compliance with subsections 1 through 6 of this section shall be optional for school districts whose central administrative offices are located in counties of the third or fourth class. No school bus operator employed by such school district shall be required to comply with the provisions of subsections 1 through 6 of this section unless the board of education elects by written record to adopt compliance with this section.
. Effective October 8, 1989, subsection 7 of Section 302.272 has been deleted. 1989 Mo.Legis. Serv. 1253 (Vernon). The provisions of Section 302.272 are now applicable to school districts in all counties.