Case Name: GEORGE R. KING, Respondent, v. MILTON R. UNGER et al., Appellants
Court: District Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1938-04-07
Citations: 25 Cal. App. 2d 632
Docket Number: Civ. No. 11686
Parties: GEORGE R. KING, Respondent, v. MILTON R. UNGER et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Second Series
Volume: 25
Pages: 632–641

Head Matter:
[Civ. No. 11686.
Second Appellate District, Division Two.
April 7, 1938.]
GEORGE R. KING, Respondent, v. MILTON R. UNGER et al., Appellants.
Charles H. Goebel, Parker & Stanbury, Harry D. Parker, Raymond G. Stanbury and Vernon W. Hunt for Appellants.
Paul Blackwood for Respondent.

Opinion:
CRAIL, P. J.
This is an appeal by defendants from an order by the trial court granting plaintiff a new trial after ' the jury, at the instruction of the trial judge, returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Viewing the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must do in reviewing a judgment based upon a directed verdict (Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400 [14 Pac. (2d) 768]), the facts are these: About 10 A. M. on February 27, 1937, plaintiff arrived at the northwest corner of Broadway and Ninth Streets, where they intersect in the city of Los Angeles. The traffic being opened on Broadway and closed on Ninth Street, plaintiff stopped at the curb and waited for the signal to change to "Go" for southbound traffic. When the signal released traffic on Broadway, he looked to his left (east) to see if there were any cars in the intersection and, seeing none, stepped off the curb and proceeded across Ninth Street. He did not again look to his left but, while in the crosswalk sixteen feet from the northerly curb of Ninth Street, he was struck by an automobile driven in a westerly direction on Ninth Street by defendant Unger, who had entered the intersection at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour after the traffic signal had closed east and west traffic on Ninth Street. Defendant's car was 150 feet away when plaintiff looked.
Defendant Unger was the president of defendant Mills Transfer Co., Inc., and the automobile which he was driving had been loaned to him by its owners, defendants Herbert E. Woodward, Inc., and Herbert E. Woodward.
The contention of the defendants is that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, arguing that it was not only the plaintiff's duty to look immediately before placing himself in a position of danger, but that this duty to look is a continuing duty and is not met by looking once and then looking away, and he relies upon: Moss v. H. R. Boynton Co., 44 Cal. App. 474, 476 [186 Pac. 631]; Mayer v. Anderson, 36 Cal. App. 740, 742 [173 Pac. 174] ; Flores v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 576, 579 [59 Pac. (2d) 856].
The plaintiff looked to the left once. It is not the law that he owed a continuing duty to look to the left. The law is that he was under a continuing duty to exercise ordinary care. (Salomon v. Meyer, 1 Cal. (2d) 11 [32 Pac. (2d) 631]; McQuigg v. Childs, 213 Cal. 661 [3 Pac. (2d) 309]; Long v. Barbieri, 120 Cal. App. 207, 215 [7 Pac. (2d) 1082] ; Filson v. Balkins, 206 Cal. 209, 212 [273 Pac. 578]; Walker v. Mason, 109 Cal. App. 361 [293 Pac. 125].)
Plaintiff, having waited for the signal to change to "Stop" for all Ninth Street traffic, and for the signal to change to " Go " for Broadway traffic, and having then observed that the intersection was free of automobiles coming from the left, proceeded south in the pedestrian crosswalk crossing Ninth Street, and had a right to assume that the traffic on Ninth Street would obey the "Stop" signal. It cannot be said that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not looking again to the left after starting across the street. Whether he acted as a reasonably prudent person was a question of fact for the jury.
The sole allegation in the complaint was that the defendants drove, operated, maintained and controlled the automobile. The defendant contended at the trial and the court found that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that all of the defendants were driving the automobile in order to prove the cause of action against all of the defendants, whereas the evidence showed unequivocally that defendant Unger was the driver of the automobile and that none of the other defendants were present at the scene of the accident or had anything to do with the driving, operating, maintaining or controlling of the automobile at the time of the accident, and therefore the evidence failed to sustain the allegations of the complaint so far as all defendants other than the defendant Unger were concerned.
However, the defendants acquiesced in the trial of all issues affecting their liability, the Woodwards as owners of the car giving permission for its use, and Mills Transfer Company, as principal of the defendant Unger. The defendants do not contend that there was not sufficient proof. The contention is that the pleadings were not sufficient. The courts have uniformly held that amendments to conform to the proof should be allowed with the greatest liberality and that in proper circumstances it is error to refuse such permission. The defendants argue that the trial court had a right to deny the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and to grant a nonsuit, but they do not discuss in this connection that it also had the right to grant a new trial because of such ruling. In our view the court properly exercised its discretion in granting a new trial for the purpose of permitting the application for amendment. (Rabe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 198 Cal. 290, 299 [244 Pac. 1077].)
The defendants contend that the plaintiff did not make any motion to amend as to the Mills Transfer Company, but the court had already indicated that it would not grant any motions to amend the complaint at such a late date in the trial. We will not discuss whether such an amendment was necessary. If so, the trial court having definitely ruled that any suggestion of an amendment was too late, it did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial as to the Mills Transfer Company.
Order affirmed.
Wood, J., concurred.