Case Name: Guy E. BABIN, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the minor, Guy E. Babin, Jr. v. ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-06-30
Citations: 336 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: No. 7515
Parties: Guy E. BABIN, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the minor, Guy E. Babin, Jr. v. ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before GULLOTTA, STOULIG and MORIAL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 336
Pages: 900–904

Head Matter:
Guy E. BABIN, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the minor, Guy E. Babin, Jr. v. ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 7515.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
June 30, 1976.
On Rehearing Sept. 14, 1976.
Donald P. Schwarz, Matthew J. Hill, Jr., Robert B. Chopin, Mitairie, for plaintiff-appellee.
John P. Hammond, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before GULLOTTA, STOULIG and MORIAL, JJ.

Opinion:
MORIAL, Judge.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the conduct of a 3j4 year old child can exculpate a dog owner from the consequences of his dog's actions.
On May 19, 1972 Guy E. Babin, Jr., age 3j4 years, was bitten about the face and shoulder by a dog owned by defendant, Richard X. Patin, while the child was a guest in the Patin home. As a result of the accident, the child was taken to the Mercy Hospital emergency room where his wounds were sutured. He was released later that day and his sutures were eventually removed one week later.
Plaintiff, Guy E. Babin, individually and as administrator of the estate of the minor, Guy E. Babin, Jr., filed suit against defendants, Richard X. Patin and his liabilty insurer, Zurich Insurance Company. After trial on the merits, plaintiff was awarded judgment in the full sum of $3,470.61 representing $2,250.00 in general damages; $1,200.00 in future medical expenses; and $20.61 in past medical expenses. Defendants appeal contesting the trial court's finding of liability and alternatively contesting the award of $1,200.00 for future medical expenses.- We affirm.
Defendants contend the jurisprudential rule that a dog owner is presumed to be liable for the consequences of his dog's actions does not apply in this case because the victim here precipitated his injury by pulling the dog's tail.
Plaintiff contends, the trial court ruled as a matter of law, that it is no defense on the part of the dog owner to show that the reason the dog bit the child was because the child pulled the dog's tail.
Defendants' position is based upon the rule in Holland v. Buckley, La., 305 So.2d 113 (1974) that:
" The owner may exculpate himself from such presumed fault only by showing that the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the fault of the third person for whom he is not responsible, or by a fortuitous event."
We believe, as did the trial judge, that Guy E. Babin, Jr., a 3(4 year old child is incapable of fault and, therefore, his actions cannot bar his recovery.
Defendants admit that a 3(4 year old child is incapable of contributory negligence. They assert, however, that the "fault of the victim" which serves to exculpate a dog owner from the consequences of his dog's actions is in this situation broader than and not synonymous with negligence. They further assert that such a restrictive interpretation of the term fault does injustice to the underlying reason for the dog owner's liability, i. e., that between the person who created the risk of harm and the innocent victim injured thereby, the risk creator should bear the loss. We disagree.
In discussing the actions of a child, the terms negligence and fault have been used interchangeably. In Barnes v. Shreveport City R. Co., 47 La.Ann. 1218, 17 So. 782 (1895) the court stated:
"We may dispose of the defendant's charge of contributory negligence in respect to the child by observing that it was only three years old, and incapable per se, of contributory fault;" (emphasis ours).
Furthermore, as noted by the trial judge, Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.Rev., defines the civil law concept of fault as "negligence ; want of care."
A child of tender years is incapable of appreciating the consequences of his actions and, therefore, cannot be held accountable for them. See Westerfield v. Levis, 43 La.Ann. 63, 9 So. 52, 55, (1891). In effect, a 3(4 year old child can never be other than an innocent victim. We believe this view is not inconsistent with the balancing test which forms the basis of the dog owner's responsibility. Whether the child pulled the dog's tail or not,, he remains an innocent victim who has been injured by one who created the risk of harm. Therefore, the risk creator, the person who maintains the animal for his own use or pleasure, must bear the loss.
Additionally, we find the award of $1,-200.00 for future medical expenses to be supported by the record and within the trial judge's "much discretion." A plastic surgeon, Dr. Louis Krust, testified that on his second examination of the child on April 18, 1975 he found residual scarring which caused a slight cosmetic deformity when the child smiled. He estimated the fee for corrective surgery of this condition to be approximately $1,300.00. As pointed out by defendants, he also noted the scar was not visible from a distance of 12 feet, that he could not guarantee success from the procedure and that he would not recommend further surgery without parental insistence.
In order to recover future damages, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is reasonably certain to incur such damages. Gurley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 242 So.2d 298 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1970). Although the record is devoid of any indication on the part of Mr. and Mrs. Babin that they intend to have surgery performed on their son, the fact remains that the scarred condition might be improved by the surgery. Undoubtedly, the child, as he grows older, will have increasing participation in the decision as to whether or not to undergo the surgery. The final decision will not rest exclusively with the parents. Accordingly, we believe the probability of the child incurring future medical expenses has been sufficiently proven.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Defendants are to pay all costs.
AFFIRMED,
Before GULOTTA, STOULIG and MORIAL, JJ.