Case Name: Robert Earl WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1981-06-10
Citations: 622 S.W.2d 95
Docket Number: No. 60735
Parties: Robert Earl WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ONION, P. J., and TOM G. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 622
Pages: 95–99

Head Matter:
Robert Earl WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 60735.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
June 10, 1981.
Dissenting Opinion to Denial of State’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Rehearing Sept. 23, 1981.
Ronald H. Tonkin, Houston, for appellant.
Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., Lewis Dickson, III, Alvin M. Titus, Mike Wilkinson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty. and Alfred Walker, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and TOM G. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for aggravated robbery. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at 15 years.
At the outset, we are confronted with fundamental error which requires reversal in this cause. The indictment in the instant cause alleges in pertinent part that on January 7, 1977, appellant did then and there:
"while in the course of committing theft of cash money owned by Serena Long, hereafter styled the Complainant, and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property intentionally and knowingly threaten and place the Complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a pistol." (Emphasis added).
In applying the law to the facts of the case and instructing the jury under what circumstances to convict or acquit, the court charged the jury in the following manner:
"Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 4th day of January, 1977, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Robert Earl Williams, with intent to deprive Serena Long, the owner, of her personal property, to wit, cash money, belonging to said owner, did unlawfully appropriate or unlawfully attempt to appropriate from Serena Long said cash money belonging to Serena Long, and that the defendant, in so doing, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said cash money, then and there intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed said owner in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit, a pistol, then you will find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, as charged in the indictment.
"Unless you you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant." (Emphasis added).
An essential element of the offense of aggravated robbery which must be pled and proven is that the offense was committed "in the course of committing theft." Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 541 S.W.2d 185; Earl v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 514 S.W.2d 273.
In Evans v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 606 S.W.2d 880, this Court found that the court's charge in an aggravated robbery prosecution was fundamentally defective. There, it was stated:
"In the instant case the terms 'theft' and 'while in the course of committing theft' were properly defined in the definitional portion of the charge. However, the court's charge did not require the jury to find that the robbery occurred while in the course of committing theft as defined in the charge in order to convict; rather, the court attempted to set out the component parts of that element. Nevertheless, as noted above, the court omitted an essential part of the element when it did not require the jury to find that appellant took or attempted to take the property without the owner's effective consent. "A jury charge which authorizes a conviction without requiring the jury to find all of the elements of the offense charged is fundamentally defective. Thompson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 574 S.W.2d 103; West v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 572 S.W.2d 712. We likewise hold that when in applying the law to the facts, a trial court charges a jury on the component parts of an element of the offense rather than the element itself, the charge must require the jury to find all of the parts of that element in order to convict. The jury charge in the instant case did not so require and is fundamentally defective." Id. at 883.
The court's charge in the instant case suffers from the same defect as found in Evans. Namely, the court did not require the jury to find that the offense occurred "while in the course of committing theft." Moreover, in attempting to set out the elements of the offense of theft, the court omitted an essential part of the element when it did not require the jury to find that appellant took or attempted to take the property without the owner's effective consent. We conclude that the charge in the instant case is fundamentally defective in that it did not require the jury to find all of the elements of the offense in order to convict.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Before the court en banc.
. Young v. State, 622 S.W.2d 99 (No. 62-767-May 13, 1981).