Case Name: BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD v. HOOKER
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1914-04-06
Citations: 233 U.S. 97
Docket Number: No. 121
Parties: BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD v. HOOKER.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 233
Pages: 97–157

Head Matter:
BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD v. HOOKER.
ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OP THE STATE OP MAS- . SACHUSETTS.
No. 121.
Argued December 10, 11, 1913.
Decided April 6, 1914.
Congress, by the Hepburn Act and the Carmack amendment in 1906, has regulated the subject of interstate transportation of property by Federal law to the exclusion of the States to control it by théir own policy or legislation. Pennsylvania v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, distinguished, having been decided prior to the passage of the Hepburn Act.
Knowledge of the shipper that the rate is based on value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed'with the Interstate Commerce.Commission, and the effect of so filing the schedules makes the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier alike.
The limitation of liability of carriers for passengers’ baggage is covered by the Interstate Commerce Act and the Carmack amendment to the Hepburn Act applies thereto as well as to liability for shipments of freight.
Under § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act carriers must include in the ' schedules of fates filed regulations affecting passengers’ baggage and the limitations of liability.
A provision in a tariff schedule that the passenger must declare the value of his baggage and pay stated excess charges for excess liability over the stated value to be carried free, is a regulation within the meaning of §§ 6 and 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act and as such is sufficient to give the shipper notice of the limitation.
In construing a statute, the practical interpretation given to it by the administrative body charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight.
The effect of permitting the carrier to file regulations as to passengers’ baggage which limit its liability except on payment of specified rates is not to change the common law rule that the carrier is an insurer against its own negligence but simply that the carrier shall obtain commensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed.
Where charges for full liability as specified in the published tariff are unreasonable, they can only be attacked before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Congress is familar with the customs of travelers including that Of checking baggage; and so held that a baggage check is sufficient compliance as to passengers’ baggage with the provision in the Carmack amendment for issuing a receipt or bill of lading for the shipment.
If the subject needs regulation it is within the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under §§ 1 and 15 of the Act of June 18, 1910, to make requirements as to checks or receipts to be given for baggage by common carriers.
209 Massachusetts, 598, reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Car- mack Amendment to the Hepburn Act and' the right of a comm on carrier which has filed schedules containing regulations as to passengers’ baggage to limit its liability for loss of such baggage caused by its own negligence to the extent and in the manner specified in the schedules, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Frederick N. Wier, with whom Mr. Edgar J. Rich was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:
Congress has assumed exclusive, jurisdiction of the subject-matter in issue thereby making the determination of the effect and validity of the baggage regulations of the plaintiff in error a Federal question.
Rates, parts of rates, and regulations affecting or determining rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered, have the force of law and therefore enter into , and become a part of all contracts for interstate transportation.
The regulations contained in the schedules of the railroad company providing for carrying 150 pounds of personal baggage not exceeding $100 in value free for each passenger on presentation of a full ticket and specifying rates for excess value, have the force of law.
Such regulations are not void as being contrary to the common law or as against public policy or in violation of any Federal statute.
The reasonableness of the regulations is not in issue.
The regulations do not offend any principle of common law or public policy.
The regulations are not in violation of any Federal statute.
Such regulations are a part of the rates, and are regulations affecting or determining rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered, and when contained ip the schedules of the plaintiff in error had the force, of law and entered into and became a part of the contract with defendant in error.
The regulations affected and determined rates, fares, and charges.
• The regulations affected and determined the value of the service rendered.
Upon the ground of estoppel the limit of liability is $100 and would be even if the regulations of the railroad company were confined to the first paragraph.
In support of these contentions, see Adams Ex. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; Alair v. North Pacific R. R., 53 Minnesota, 160; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254; Blumantle v. Fitchburg R. R., 127 Massachusetts, 322; Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Olney, 63 Michigan, 58; Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 538; Hart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; Hoeger v. Chi., Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co., 63 Wisconsin, 100; Re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167; Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Louis. & Nash. Ry. v. Motley, 219 U. S. 467; Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 531; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361; Polleys v. Black River Imp. Co., 113 U. S. 81; Squire v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 98 Massachusetts, 239; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107.
Mr. Samuel Williston for defendant in error:
The carrier and its agents, having received possession of the goods,- were charged with the duty of delivering them or explaining why that had not been done. Galveston Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 492.
There is no question involved of the limits of Federal and state laws.
By the rule of the common la,w a limitation of liability was invalid unless a special contract was made by which the shipper agreed thereto, or unless the shipper was es-topped by misrepresentation. Brown v. Eastern R. R., 11 Cush. 97; Malone v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 12 Gray, 388; Graves v. Adams Exp. Co., 176 Massachusetts, 280; John, Hood Co. v. Am. Pneumatic Co., 191 Massachusetts, 27; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 470, 481.
. There can be no limitation of liability without the assent of the shipper. Cau v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344.
The law in the absence of special contract fixes the degree of care and diligence due from the railroad company to persons carried on its trains. York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U. S. 331, 343; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 441, 442; Saunders v. Southern Railway, 128 Fed. Rep. 15.
Similar decisions have been made in recent years in precisely the same manner as before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Acts. Williams v. Central R. R. Co., 183 N. Y. 518; S. C., 93 N. Y. App. Div. 582; Martin v. Central R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. App. Div. 552; Homer v. Oregon Short Line, 128 Pac. Rep. 522; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line, 82 So. Car. 478; Flliott on Railroads (4th ed.), § 1510; Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.), §§ 401, 405; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Adams Express Co. v. Green, 112 Virginia, 527.
A few States have upheld to its full extent a contract of valuation or limiting liability, but have also held that no merely formal assent can be inferred from accepting a bill of lading or a receipt without actual knowledge of its contents, and without the shipper’s attention being called by the carrier to the limitation, though an agreement made with full knowledge of the situation would bind the shipper. See Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), § 410; Plaff v. Pacific Exp. Co., 251 Illinois, 243; Hill v. Adams Exp. Co., 82 N. J. L. 373; Wichern v. U. S. Exp. Co., 83 N. J. L. 241.
The ground upon which the validity of a limitation upon a recovery for loss or damage due to negligence depends is that of estoppel. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 476; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 651. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, distinguished.
While in Massachusetts it has been the law that the acceptance of a document binds one who receives it, though he may not choose to read it, as held in Grace v. Adams, 100 Massachusetts, 505; Grinnell v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 113 Massachusetts, 299; Hoadley v. Nor. Transp. Co., 115 Massachusetts, 304; Clement v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 137 Massachusetts, 463; Graves v. Adams Exp. Co., 176 Massachusetts, 280, and see Cau v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431, it has also been the law both of this court and of the Massachusetts court that a public notice of an asserted limitation by the carrier, even though the' shipper was aware of it (which was not the fact in the case at bar), does not have the effect of an agreement or representation. Some actual assent is necessary. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 Howard, 344, 382; Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318, 328; Judson v. West. R. R. Corp., 6 Allen, 486, 491; Buckland v. Adams Exp. Co., 97 Massachusetts, 124, 131. See also 1 Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed., § 406; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. (8c.) 470; Richardson v. Rowntree (1894), A. C. 217; Parker v. Southeastern Ry. Co., 2 C. P. D. 416.
A limitation of liability is not a rate. ■ It is a limitation or diminution of the service, agreed to generally in order to secure a lower rate. The carrier’s reward ought to be proportionate to the risk. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 660; Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27.
The Carl Case is not to be understood as meaning that a limitation of liability or the valuation on which such a limitation is based is literally part of the rate itself. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 509; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254, 259.
It is a contract a,s to what the property is,in reference to its value. The only ground upon which the limitation can stand is that it was filed as part of the rate. Estoppel can in no way enlarge or diminish or in any way affect a filed rate. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 475; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 651.
The amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1906 did not change the law either as to what a rate is or what the effect is of a rate duly filed. Whatever is now binding as a rate upon a shipper was binding before 1906. The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375; Cau v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431; Saunders v. Southern Ry., 128 Fed. Rep. 15; Chi., Mil. &c. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477.
A limitation of liability in any form except by contract or a representation by the shipper has never been permitted by the law. The attempt to escape from this rule of the common law is as ineffectual as the attempt to escape the statutory liability cast upon an initial carrier by the Carmack Amendment, which was held futile in Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186; Galveston &c. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481; Norf. & West. Ry. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593.
A limitation of liability is not within the meaning of the words “Rule, Regulation, or Practice.” Curry v. Marvin, 2 Florida, 411, 415; In re Leading of State Lands, 18 Colorado, 359; Martin v. Cent. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. App. Div. 552, 553. Railroad Company v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27, distinguished.
A regulation which needs the assent of the person who is to be regulated as a condition of its efficacy is not properly called a regulation. It is not even an offer, until brought to the knowledge of the person to whom it is addressed.
There is no provision for the filing of contracts with shippers and no. method of making them public defined in the statute. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 81; Louis. & Nash. Ry. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 479.
The fact that a proposed limitation of a carrier’s liability must be filed as part of the tariff does not involve the conclusion that all shippers thereupon become bound by the limitation. Wehmann v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 58 Minnesota, 22, 29; Mannheim Ins. Co. v. Erie &c. Transp. Co., 72 Minnesota, 357.
The passenger was not chargeable with constructive assent to the asserted limitation of liability.
A law or a statute is binding, whether persons subject to the law are aware of it or not. A rate duly filed is unquestionably equally binding; but shippers are not conclusively presumed to know it. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 652; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Int. Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, 197; Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 164 Fed. Rep. 376; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 179 Fed. Rep. 614; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 85.
There is no estoppel barring defendant in error from showing the value of her baggage. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 651; Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550
Judicial decisions do not support the construction of the statute contended for by the plaintiff in error.
Although a shipper has no redress because a rate is unreasonable, except by the direct proceedings allowed by the act, Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 222 U. S. 506; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Int. Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184; Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 230 U. S. 247, and the unreasonableness of a rule, regulation, or practice of a carrier must be objected to in the same way, Balt. & Ohio R. R. v. United States, 215 U. S. 481; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 230 U. S. 304, an assertion contained in the tariff, even if made in terms (as it was not), that the passenger does make such an agreement, still less an assertion that liability is limited, unless a contract is made, is neither a rate, a rule, a regulation, or a practice, and the question of its reasonableness can be raised in the courts. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Chicago, St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Mo., Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, do not conflict with this; and see Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254; Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N.Y. 170.
There is no discrimination between different travellers involved in the decision of the Massachusetts court. Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 653. Tex. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Gulf &c. R. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, distinguished. And see Merchants Press Co. v. Insurance Co., 151 U. S. 368, 388; Judge v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 189 Fed. Rep. 1014.
The consequences of upholding the contention of the plaintiff in error show that the contention must be erroneous. Matter of Released Rates, 131. C. C. 550.
The schedules filed make the defendant in error liable for the excess charge for value and the railroad liable for the full value óf the baggage. Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 650.
There is no hardship upon the carrier in the decision below. The obligation imposed by that decision is no greater than that which everywhere existed prior to the passage of the Interstate Commerce Acts, and still exists as to intrastate shipments. York County v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107, 113; Squire v. N. Y. Central R. R., 98 Massachusetts, 239, 248; Hill v. Boston &c. Railroad Co., 144 Massachusetts, 284.
The rule of the common law has not been changed in regard to such a case as the present. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 511; Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170, 175; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254, 259.
The statute does not diminish the liability for negligence imposed on the carrier by the common law. Such liability may be enforced in the state courts. Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Day
delivered the opinion of the court.
Katharine Hooker brought an action in the Superior Court of Middlesex County, Massachusetts, to recover from the Boston & Maine Railroad as a common carrier on account of the loss of certain baggage belonging to her, which had been transported by the defendant in interstate commerce from Boston, Massachusetts, to Sunapee Lake station, New Hampshire, on September 15, 1908. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for the value of the baggage lost with interest. The case was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upon exceptions of the defendant, and upon its rescript, returned to the Superior Court overruling the exceptions (209 Massachusetts, 598), judgment was there entered for the plaintiff for $2,253.77.
The defendant insists that the recovery of the plaintiff should have been limited to the sum of $100, in view of certain requirements , made by it concerning the transportation of baggage and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. From the findings of fact it appears that the baggage was checked upon a first class ticket purchased for the plaintiff (although not used by her, she traveling upon another similar ticket purchased by herself); that at the time the baggage was checked the plaintiff had no notice of the regulations hereinafter referred to limiting the liability, of the defendant (further than such notice is to be preáumed from the schedules filed and posted as hereinafter stated).; that' no inquiry was made by the defendant on receiving - the plaintiff's baggage as to its value; that there was no evidence that any more expensive or different mode of transportation was adopted for baggage the value of which was declared to exceed $100 than for other baggage; that any reasonable person would infer from the outward appearance of the plaintiff's baggage when tendered to the defendant for transportation that the value largely exceeded $100, and that the loss of plaintiff's baggage was due to the negligence of defendant.
The court further found that previous to and during September, 1908, the defendant had published and kept open for inspection and-filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, in accordance with the act of Congress relating to interstate) commerce and amendments thereto and the orders and regulations of the Commission, schedules giving the rates, fares and charges for transportation between different points, including Boston and Sunapee Lake station, all terminal, storage and other charges required by the Commission, all privileges and facilities granted or allowed, and all rules or regulations which in any way. affected or determined such rates* fares and charges or the value of the service rendered to passengers; that during the same time, in accordance with an order of the Commission of June 2, 1908, making comprehensive regulations as to rate and fare schedules, the defendant had placed with its agent in Boston all rate and fare schedules and the terminal and other charges applicable to that station, and had enabled and required him to keep in accessible form a file of such schedules, and had instructed him to give information contained therein to all seeking it and to afford to inquirers opportunity to examine the schedules, and that the defendant in the manner shown and in all other ways conformed to the acts of Congress and the orders and regulations of the Commission with reference to such schedules. The court also found that the schedules contained provisions limiting the free transportation of baggage- to a certain weight and the liability of the defendant to $100, followed by a table of charges for excess weight, and also contained the following provision:
"For excess value the rate will be one-half of the current excess baggage rate per one hundred pounds for each one hundred dollars, or fraction thereof, of increased value declared. The minimum, charge for excess value will be 15 cents.
"Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage not to exceed one hundred dollars in value for a passenger presenting a full ticket and fifty dollars in value for a half ticket, unless a greater value is declared and stipulated by the owner and excess charges thereon paid at time of taking the baggage" (p. 600); that the excess charge for transporting baggage valued at $1,904.50 which was the value of the baggage lost, from Boston to Sunapee Lake station during September, 1908, according to the schedüles, was $4.75; that notices were posted at or near the offices where passengers' tickets were sold in the Boston station stating that tariffs naming the rates on interstate traffic were on file with the agent and would be furnished for inspection upon application, and that notices were posted in the baggage room of that station, in a conspicuous place and in sight of persons using the room for checking baggage, reading that personal baggage not exceeding $100 in value would be checked free for each passenger on presentation of a first class ticket and containing information with reference to excess weight. And the court further found that the plaintiff did not declare at the time her baggage was checked that it exceeded $100 in value and did not pay any charges for valuation in excess of that amount.
It is to be borne in mind that the action as tried and decided in the state court was not for negligence of the Railroad Company as a warehouseman for the loss of the baggage after its delivery at Sunapee Lake station, but was solely upon the contract of carriage in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in deciding the case, held that the Interstate Commerce Act . did not in any wise change the common law rule, applicable in Massachusetts, that regulations of this character, limiting the amount of recovery for baggage lost, must be brought home to the knowledge of the shipper and assented to or circumstances shown' from which assent might be implied. In reaching this conclusion that learned court relied upon the case of Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, in which case it was held ,that a State might apply its local law and policy to recovery for the loss of a horse shipped in interstate commerce from Albany, New York, to Cynwyd, in the State of Pennsylvania, and injured by the negligence of á carrier in the latter State, notwithstanding the. bill of lading contained an express condition that the carrier assumed liability to the extent only of the agreed valuation in event of loss. It was further held in the Hughes Case that the Interstate Commerce Act, in the respect then under, consideration, had not enacted an exclusive rule upon which recovery-might be had governing responsibility for loss, and that as the law then stood the State might enforce its own regulations authorized by statute or judicial decision as to responsibility for such negligence.
Since the decision in the Hughes Case the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, has been passed, and this court has held that by virtue of that act (particularly § 20, the Carmack Amendment) the subject of interstate transportation of property has been regulated by Federal law to the exclusion of the power of the States to control in such respect by their own policy or legislation. In this connection we may refer to the cases of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657.
The cases in 226 and 227 U. S., it is true, involved liability for express or freight shipments made upon express receipts, bills of lading or separate contracts, showing on their face or by reference to tariffs the opportunity for valuation for the purpose of fixing the rate and liability, and the . limitation appearing in such form of contract was declared to be valid and effectual to relieve the carrier from a greater liability than that therein expressed. But the court did not stop there: In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra, p. 509, it said: "The knowledge of the shipper that the rate was based upon the value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed with the .Commission." In Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, supra, p. 652, this court, said: "The valuation the shipper declares determines the legal rate where there, are two rates based upon valuation. He must take notice of the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge is no excuse. 'The rate when made out and filed, is notice, and the effect is not lost, although it is not actually posted in the station. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155. It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates, based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay. . . (p. 654). To the extent that such limitations of liability are not forbidden by law, they become, when filed, a part of the rate." And in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, supra, this court said that the shipper was compelled to take notice of the rate sheets contained in tariff schedules, (p. 669), "not only because referred to in the contract signed by them, but because they had been lawfully filed and published. . . (p. 671) When the carrier graduates its rates by value and has filed its tariffs showing two rates applicable to a particular commodity or class of articles, based upon a difference in valuation, the shipper must take notice, for the valuation automatically determines which of the rates is the lawful rate." In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490, this court said, p. 493: "That rule of liability [the uniform rule established by the Hepburn Act] is to be enforced in the light of the fact that the provisions of the tariff enter into and form a part of the contract of shipment, and if a regularly filed tariff offers two rates, based on value, and the goods are forwarded at the low value in order to secure the low rate, then the carrier may avail itself of that valuation when sued for loss or damage to the property." And in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 5(38, this court said: "But so long as the tariff rate, based on value, remained operative it was binding upon the shipper and carrier ,alike and was to be enforced by the courts in fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties. The tariffs are filed with the Commission and are open to inspection at every station. In view of the multitude of transactions, it is not necessary that there shall be an inquiry as to each article or a distinct agreement as to the value of each shipment. If no value is stated the tariff rate applicable to such a state of facts applies. If, on the other hand, there are alternative rates based on value and the shipper names a value to secure the lower rate, the carrier, in the absence of something to show rebating or false billing, is entitled to collect the rate which applies to goods of that class, and if sued for their loss it is liable only for the loss of what the shipper had declared them to be in class and value."
Before these cases were decided this court had held that the effect of filing schedules of rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission was to make the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier alike, thus making effectual the purpose of the act to have but one rate, open to all alike and from which there could be no departure. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 81; Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 476. This principle it will be perceived was fully recognized in the series of caaes decided since the passage of the Hepburn Act, beginning with the case of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra. It is true that the Carmack Amendment requires a receipt or bill of lading to be issued concerning shipments of property in interstate commerce and that in the cases construing that amendment a bill of lading was issued, and according to the) circumstances of the case the bill of lading and its efféct are discussed in each of these, but the effect of filing the schedule is not lost sight of and the doctrine of the previous cases as to the purpose of filing and the necessity of adherence to such schedule is uniformly recognized.
The court below, after conceding that the subject-matter of passenger's baggage in interstate travel is within the control of Congress, and saying that there was no specific regulation respecting it, said (p. 602):
"The precise position of the defendant is that as the limitation of liability for baggage was filed and posted as a part of its schedules for passenger tariff, the limitation thereby became and was an essential part of its rate, from which under the interstate commerce law it could not deviate, and by which the plaintiff was bound, regardless of her knowledge of or assent to it. If the premise is sound, then the conclusion follows, for the public are held inexorably to the rate published, regardless of knowledge, assent or even misrepresentation. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242. Melody v. Great Northern Railway, 25 So. Dak. 606."
It follows therefore, from the previous decisions in this court, that if it be found that the limitation of liability for baggage is required to be filed in the carrier's tariffs, the plaintiff was bound by such limitation. Having the notice which follows from the filed and published regulations, as required by the statute and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, she might have declared the value of her luggage, paid the excess tariff rate and thus secured the liability of the carrier to the full amount of the value of her baggage, or she might, for the purpose of transportation, have valued it at $100 and received free transportation and liability to that extent only, or, as she did, she might have made no valuation of her baggage, in which event the rate and the corresponding liability would have automatically attached. As to the finding that the plaintiff's baggage was apparently worth more than $100, as above set forth, it appears that the contents of the two trunks and suit case were not disclosed or known to the carrier, and the finding in this respect, necessarily based on the appearance of the baggage, cannot be said to show a procurement of.transportation in violation of the requirements of the filed schedules at a rate disproportionate to its known value.
Let us now turn to the Interstate Commerce Act and see whether the matter of the limitation of baggage liability is covered by that act. Section 6 provides (as amended by § 2 of the Hepburn Act, June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 586):
"That every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act shall file with the Commission created by this Act and print and keep open to public inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares, and charges for transportation between different points on its own route and between points on its own route and points on the route of any other carrier by railroad, by pipe line, or by water when a through route and joint r-ate have been established. If no joint rate over the through route has been established, the several carriers in such through route shall file, print, and keep open to public inspection as aforesaid, the separately established rates, fares and charges applied to' the through transportation. The schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the places between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately all terminal charges, storage charges, icing charges,-and all other charges which the Commission may require, all privileges or facilities granted or allowed and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates," fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee. Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large type, and copies for the use of the public shall be kept posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot, station, or office of such carrier where passengers or freight, respectively, are received for transportation, in such form that they shall be accessible to the public and can be conveniently inspected. The provisions of this section shall apply to all traffic, transportation, and facilities defined in this Act.

"No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this Act, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this Act, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this Act; nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrier'refund or remit in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates, fares, and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities in the transportation of passengers or property, except such as are specified in such tariffs. ."
It is to be observed that the schedules are required to state, among other things, in naming certain charges, "all other charges which the Commission may require, all privileges or facilities granted or allowed and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee." The question then is did the limitation as to liability for baggage based upon the requirement to declare its value when more than $100 was to be recovered come within that provision.
It seems to, us that the ordinary signification of the terms used in the act would cover such requirements as are here made for the amount of recovery for baggage lost by the carrier. It is a regulation which fixes and determines the amount to be charged for the carriage in view of the responsibility assumed, and it also affects the value of the service rendered to the passenger. Such requirements are spoken of, in decisions dealing with them, as regulations; as, a common carrier "may prescribe regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks he may have to encounter." York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107, 112. "It is undoubtedly competent for carriers of passengers, by specific regulations, distinctly brought to the knowledge of the passenger, which are reasonable in their character and not inconsistent with any statute or their duties to the public, to protect themselvés against liability, as insurers, for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value, except upon additional compensation, proportioned to the risk. And in order that such regulations may be practically effective and the carrier advised of the full extent of its responsibility, and, consequently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon its part, it may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract for the transportation of baggage, information from the passenger as to its value; and if the value thus disclosed exceeds that which the passenger may reasonably .demand to be transported as baggage without extra compensation, the carrier, at its option, can make such additional charge as the risk fairly justifies." Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27.
Mr. Justice Brewer, sitting in the Circuit Court, in Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 165, 178, thus defined the term regulation: "Within the term 'regulation' are embraced two ideas: One is the mere control of the operation of the roads, prescribing the rules for the management thereof, — matters which affect the convenience of the public in their use. Regulation, in this sense, may be considered as purely public in its character,' and in no manner trespassing upon the rights of the owners of railroads. But within the scope of the word 'regulation,' as commonly used, is embraced the idea of fixing the compensation which the .owners of railroad property shall receive for the use thereof; and when regulation, in this sense, is attempted, it necessarily affects the property interests of the railroad owners; and it is 'regulation' in this sense of the term."
Turning to the act itself we think the conclusion that this limitation is a regulation required to be filed by the act is strengthened by section 22 which provides: ". . . But before any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, shall issue any such joint interchangeable mileage tickets with special privileges, as aforesaid, it shall file with the Interstate Commerce Commission copies of the joint tariffs of rates, fares, or charges on which such joint interchangeable mileage tickets are to be based, together with specifications of the amount of free baggage permitted to be carried under such tickets, in the same manner as common carriers are required to do with regard to other joint rates by section six of this act." This section would indicate that Congress thought that § 6 of the act had to do with specifications of the amount of baggage which would be carried free and that such regulations should be filed under the requirement of § 6 to which it referred.
This conclusion is further strengthened by the action of theJtnterstate Commerce- Commission, in requiring by its Tariff Circular No. 15-A, entitled "Regulations Governing the Construction and Filing of Freight Tariffs and Classi fication and Passenger Fare Schedules," effective April 15, 1908, and in force at the time of the loss here in question, that:
" 34. Tariffs shall contain, in the order named
" (g) Rules and regulations which govern the tariff, the title of each rule or regulation to be shown in bold type. Under this head all of the rules, regulations, or conditions which in any way affect the fares named in the tariff shall be entered. . . . These rules shall include . . . the general baggage regulations, and also schedule of excess-baggage rates, unless such excess-baggage rates are shown in tariff in connection with the fares."
This requirement is a practical interpretation of the law by the administrative body having its enforcement in charge, and is entitled to weight in construing the act.
The act of June 18, 1910 (c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 546), defining, in •§ 1, the duties of carriers to make just and reasonable regulations affecting, among other things, the carrying of personal, sample and excess baggage, may be noted in passing. This statute was before the Commission in a case involving such regulations. Regulations Restricting the Dimensions of Baggage, 26 I. C. C. 292. Concerning it the- Commission, by Clark, Chairman, said (p. 293):
"Prior to June 18, 1910, the act to regulate commerce contained no specific provision relating to the interstate transportation of baggage, except in connection with the issuance of joint interchangeable mileage tickets. The Commission had, however, under authority of section 6, required carriers to publish and file their general baggage regulations and their schedules of excess-baggage rates. Section 1 was amended on the date named, the amendment, in so far as it is material, reading as follows:
"It is hereby made the duty of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this act to establish, observe, and enforce . . . just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting classifications, . . . the manner and method of presenting, marking, packing, and delivering property for transportation, the facilities for transportation, . . . the carrying of personal, sample, and excess baggage.' "
And it is to be observed that the Commission considers its requirement with reference to including baggage regulations in the tariff schedules, quoted above, as adequate, for the same provisions appear in its current circular.
We are therefore of the opinion that the requirement published concerning the amount of the liability of the defendant based upon additional payment where baggage was declared to exceed $100 in value was determinative of the rate to be charged and did affect the service to be rendered to the passenger, as it fixed the price to be paid for the service rendered in the particular case, and was, therefore, a regulation within the meaning of the statute.
By requiring the baggage regulations, including the excess valuation rate, to be filed and become part of the tariff schedules, the rule of the common law that the carrier becomes an insurer of the safety of baggage against accidents not the act of God or the public enemy or the fault of the passenger (the rule established in this country, 3 Hutchinson on Carriers, § 1241) was not changed. The effect of such filing is to permit the carrier by such regulations to obtain commensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed for the safety of the passenger's baggage, and to require the passenger whose knowledge of the character and value of his baggage is peculiarly his own to declare its value and pay for the excess amount. There is no question of the reasonableness or propriety of making such regulations, which would be binding upon the passenger if brought to his knowledge in such wise as to make an agreement or what is tantamount thereto. This much is conceded 'by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error. The liability of a carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act was said, in the Croninger Case (226 U. S. p. 511), to be (aside from the responsibility for the default of a connecting carrier) "not beyond the liability imposed by the common law as that body of law applicable to carriers has been interpreted by this court as well as many courts of the States." And in that case (p. 509) it was laid down as the established rule of common law "as declared by this court in many cases that such a carrier may by a fair, open, just and reasonable agreement limit the amount recoverable by á shipper iii case of loss or damage to an agreed value made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk." And-see the previous cases in this court there cited. But the effect of the regulations, filed as required, giving notice of rates based upon value when the baggage to be transported was of a higher value than $100, and the delivery and acceptance of the baggage without declaration of value or notice to the carrier of such higher value, charges the carrier with liability to the extent of $100 only.
The language of the regulation filed, reads: Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage not to exceed $100 in value, etc., unless a greater value is declared, etc. We have said that this limitation does not relieve from the insurer's liability when the loss occurs otherwise than by negligence, and we think applies equally when negligence of the carrier is the cause of loss, as is found in this case. The effect of the filing gives the regulation as to baggage the force of a contract determining "Baggage liability." In Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U. S. 331, 341, followed in the later cases in this court, it was held that a recovery may not be had above the amount stipulated though the loss results from the carrier's negligence. "The carrier must respond for negligence up to that value." The discussion and conclusion reached in the Croninger and Carl Cases, sufra, leave nothing to be said on this point. This rule is recognized in New York, Tewes v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 N. Y. 151; Gardiner v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., 201 N. Y. 387.
If the charges filed were unreasonable, the only attack that could be made upon such regulation would be by proceedings contesting their reasonableness before the Interstate Commerce Commission. While they were in force they were equally binding upon the railroad company and all passengers whose baggage was transported by carriers in interstate commerce. This being the fact, we think the limitation of liability to $100 fixed the amount which the plaintiff could recover in this case, and there was error in affirming the recovery for the full value of the baggage, in the absence of a declaration of such value and payment of the additional amount required to secure liability in the greater sum.
We do not think the requirement of the Carmack Amendment, that a railway company receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, required other receipts than baggage checks, which it is shown were issued when the baggage was received in this case. When the Amendment was passed Congress well knew that baggage was not carried, upon bills of lading, and that carriers had been accustomed to issue checks upon receipt of baggage. We do not think it was intended to require a departure from this practice when the matter was placed under regulation by schedules filed and subject to change for unreasonableness upon application to the Commission. Such checks are receipts, and there is no special requirement in the statute as to their form. It is doubtless in the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to make requirements as to the checks or receipts to be given for baggage if that subject needs regulation. Act of June 18, 1910, § 1 and 15, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539.
Reversed and remanded to the Superior Court oj Massachusetts for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
As amended by the Act of Feb. 8, 1895, e. 61, 28 Stat. 643.