Case Name: Wallace McPHETERS and Debra McPheters, for their own benefit, and as the natural parents and guardians of Aaron Roberts McPheters, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gene L. PETERSON, Defendant-Respondent, and The Ada County Highway District, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1985-03-19
Citations: 108 Idaho 107
Docket Number: No. 15269
Parties: Wallace McPHETERS and Debra McPheters, for their own benefit, and as the natural parents and guardians of Aaron Roberts McPheters, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gene L. PETERSON, Defendant-Respondent, and The Ada County Highway District, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant.
Judges: BAKES, J., and McFADDEN and WALTERS, JJ. pro tern, concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 108
Pages: 107–111

Head Matter:
697 P.2d 447
Wallace McPHETERS and Debra McPheters, for their own benefit, and as the natural parents and guardians of Aaron Roberts McPheters, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gene L. PETERSON, Defendant-Respondent, and The Ada County Highway District, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant.
No. 15269.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
March 19, 1985.
Howard Humphrey, of Clemons, Cosho & Humphrey, P.A., Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Louis F. Racine, Jr., of Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Chartered, Pocatello, Idaho, attorney for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
On March 5, 1982, five-year-old Aaron McPheters was injured in an automobile accident in a residential Boise neighborhood. As he entered the intersection of Latah and Kootenai streets, Aaron was struck by an automobile driven by respondent, Gene Peterson. Wallace and Debra McPheters initiated this action seeking damages on their own behalf and as the parents and guardians of Aaron McPheters. They alleged that the accident resulted from the negligence of Gene Peterson and the Ada County Highway District.
The case was tried to a jury. The. jury returned a special verdict finding that there was no negligence on the part of Gene Peterson or the Ada County Highway District which was the proximate cause of the accident. The McPheters have appealed citing as error the trial court's refusal to give Instructions 20 through 25 of their proposed jury instructions. The appeal against the Highway District was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the failure to give plaintiffs' requested instructions 20 through 25 constitutes reversible error. The record reflects that at the close of the evidence at trial, the district judge met with counsel outside the presence of the jury to discuss the proposed jury instructions. At that time, the McPheters' attorney objected to the court's refusal to give plaintiffs' instructions 20 through 27. Those instructions spoke to the standard of care required of the operator of an automobile; in particular, the standard of care required when a child is present.
In declining to give the instructions, the trial judge stated that he was electing to rely on the approach set forth in the Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI). He noted that IDJI 222 recommends that no instruction on the care required for the safety of a child be given. He further stated that, although he recognized some of the proposed instructions were taken from previous Idaho Supreme Court opinions, he believed under the circumstances of the present case they were argumentative and unnecessary, as the approved instructions adequately set forth the standard of care.
I.R.C.P. 51(a)(2) recommends that a trial judge use the IDJI whenever it contains an applicable instruction, unless the judge finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law. I.R.C.P. 51(a)(2) (1980). Pursuant to this recommendation, the trial judge defined "negligence" for the jury according to the general definition contained in IDJI 210. He also instructed the jury as to the standard of care required of a minor. IDJI 201 . We believe that these instructions adequately set forth the standard of care required of respondent in this case. Appellants contend that the instructions did not adequately delineate the standard of care required of an adult in relation to a child, or of an operator of a motor vehicle in relation to a pedestrian. We disagree. As we have previously stated "[i]n all but the most intricate negligence cases, the general definition of negligence sufficiently outlines the required standard of care." Mills v. Hunt Bros. Construction, Inc., 96 Idaho 563, 564, 532 P.2d 568, 569 (1975) (quoting Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75, 524 P.2d 536 (1974)). See also, Goodfellow v. Cogburn, 98 Idaho 202, 560 P.2d 873 (1977).
The jury was instructed that ordinary care means "the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence." Appellant has chosen not to provide us with a complete trial transcript, and, thus, we are unable to assess the evidence presented at trial. However, viewing the evidence most favorably to respondent as we are required to do on appeal (McBride v. Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 673 P.2d 55 (1983), Supreme Court must view evidence in favor of party prevailing below), the record actually before us does not demonstrate that this case was so intricate as to require additional instructions amplifying on this general standard of care. We hold that the trial court's instructions adequately stated the standard of care required of respondent in the present case. As we have repeatedly stated, where the substance of a party's proposed instructions are adequately covered, the trial court does not err in refusing the proposed instructions. See, e.g., Garrett v. Nobles, 102 Idaho 369, 374, 630 P.2d 656, 661 (1981).
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
No attorney fees on appeal.
BAKES, J., and McFADDEN and WALTERS, JJ. pro tern, concur.
. "When I use the word 'negligence' in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words 'ordinary care' mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence."
. "A minor has the duty to exercise the degree of care which would be expected from an ordinary child of the same age, experience, knowledge and discretion, under similar circumstances."