Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1991-01-22
Citations: 187 Mich. App. 160
Docket Number: Docket No. 114122
Parties: PEOPLE v MARTINEZ
Judges: Before: Weaver, P.J., and Sawyer and Neff, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 187
Pages: 160–177

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MARTINEZ
Docket No. 114122.
Submitted September 13, 1990, at Grand Rapids.
Decided January 22, 1991, at 10:00 a.m.
Gilbert Martinez, also known as Roy Sotto Puente, pleaded guilty in the Berrien Circuit Court, Ronald J. Taylor, J., of one count of possession of more than 50 grams, but less than 225 grams, of cocaine, and was sentenced to thirteen to twenty years’ imprisonment. The defendant’s plea was conditioned upon the right to raise on appeal the issue whether the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger, which resulted in the discovery of the controlled substance, was valid. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
The search without a warrant was lawful. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
1. A police officer, consistent with US Const, Am IV, may order a passenger to get out of a motor vehicle during a routine traffic stop under circumstances in which the officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle. Because the officer in this case was permitted to order the defendant passenger to get out of the vehicle, he properly was in a position to observe a handgun in plain view in a bag in the passenger compartment.
2. The search without a warrant of the bag containing the handgun and a large sum of currency provided the officers with probable cause to believe that other weapons, contraband, or evidence of a crime could be found in another container in the vehicle. The further search without a warrant of a garment bag in the bed of the vehicle was reasonable under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that the search of the garment bag, and discovery of the cocaine, was proper.
Affirmed.
References
Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 16, 23, 39, 96, 99.
Validity of seizure under Fourth Amendment "plain view” doctrine — Supreme Court cases. 75 L Ed 2d 1018.
Lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation. 10 ALR3d 314.
Neff, J., dissenting, stated that extending the rule that a police officer can order a driver to get out of a vehicle after a routine traffic stop, even though the officer does not have any reason to be in fear for his safety or to suspect criminal activity, to include a passenger in the vehicle is an unwarranted violation of the Fourth Amendment, requiring reversal and remand for entry of an order suppressing the evidence.
1. Searches and Seizures — Automobiles — Routine Traffic Stops — Passengers and Drivers.
A police officer, for reasons of safety, may request a driver or a passenger to step from a vehicle and off onto the shoulder of the road during a routine traffic stop (US Const, Am IV).
2. Searches and Seizures — Without Warrants — Automobiles — Probable Cause.
The search of an automobile without a warrant is reasonable where the automobile legitimately has been stopped by a police officer and the officer has probable cause to conduct the search, i.e., where the facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable prudence to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime or contraband; if a search is so justified, it may include every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, Dennis M. Wiley, Prosecuting Attorney, and Margaret A. Penninger, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Kim Robert Fawcett), and Gilbert Martinez, in propria persona.
Before: Weaver, P.J., and Sawyer and Neff, JJ.

Opinion:
Sawyer, J.
Defendant pled guilty of one count of possession of more than 50 grams, but less than 225 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii), and was sentenced to serve a term of thirteen to twenty years in prison. He now appeals and we affirm.
Defendant's guilty plea was conditioned upon the right to raise on appeal the issue whether the search which disclosed the controlled substance was valid. The issue whether the search was lawful represents defendant's sole issue on appeal. For the reasons to be discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in not suppressing the evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On the afternoon of October 27, 1987, Harry Lenardson, Chief of Police of the City of Bridgman, was patrolling 1-94 in Berrien County when he observed a white pickup truck travelling westbound at a high rate of speed, emitting excessive smoke. Chief Lenardson then activated his overhead lights and pulled the pickup over. It is not disputed that this was a valid traffic stop. Chief Lenardson testified at the preliminary examination that his original intent was to issue a citation for the excessive smoke and to give a warning concerning the speed.
Chief Lenardson approached the vehicle and requested the driver, Victor Rodriguez, to produce his driver's license. Rodriguez informed Chief Lenardson that he did not have his driver's license with him and, in response to the chiefs inquiry whether he had any kind of identification, produced various documents, apparently including a proof of insurance. At this point, Chief Lenardson requested Rodriguez to get out of the vehicle and accompany him back to the squad car. According to Chief Lenardson, at that point he had not yet made a decision regarding whether he was going to arrest Rodriguez for having no operator's license in his possession or merely issue a citation and release him. Apparently, the chief intended to further investigate the matter before reaching a decision.
While Chief Lenardson was in his squad car, with Rodriguez seated next to him in the front seat, Berrien County Deputy Sheriff Jamie Lenard- son arrived at the scene. Chief Lenardson asked Deputy Lenardson to go to the pickup truck and ask the passenger to identify himself. Meanwhile, Chief Lenardson called the dispatcher and requested a check to determine if Rodriguez had a driver's license. While Chief Lenardson was waiting for a response to the radio call, he heard his son shout to him, "they have got a gun," and he saw his son draw his service revolver out and point it at defendant. Chief Lenardson then left his vehicle and went around and pulled Rodriguez out of the squad car, patted him down, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the squad car. Chief Lenardson observed Deputy Lenardson handcuff defendant and put him in the rear of the deputy's squad car.
Deputy Lenardson testified that he approached the passenger side of the truck to obtain defendant's identification pursuant to Chief Lenardson's request. The deputy asked defendant, who later identified himself as Gilbert Martinez, for identification, and defendant indicáted that he did not have any. At this point, Deputy Lenardson requested defendant to step from the vehicle, which defendant did. Defendant apparently indicated to Deputy Lenardson that he did not have any identification because he had lost his wallet. Deputy Lenardson testified that he requested defendant to get out of the vehicle for the deputy's own safety and that it was his standard practice in every traffic stop to have the individuals involved get out of the vehicle. After defendant got out of the vehicle, Deputy Lenardson looked inside the vehicle and saw a green leather bag lying on the passenger side floorboard._
According to Deputy Lenardson, the bag was partially open, and from his position he could see a plastic baggie tightly wrapped around what appeared to be a handgun. The deputy then reached inside the vehicle and into the bag and felt the handgun inside the plastic baggie. At this point, Deputy Lenardson yelled to Chief Lenardson that he had found a gun, drew his service revolver, and placed defendant against the side of the pickup truck. Deputy Lenardson then patted down defendant and asked him whether he had a permit for the weapon, to which defendant replied that he did not. Deputy Lenardson then handcuffed him and started to walk him back to the patrol car. While walking to the patrol car, he asked Rodriguez whether he had a permit for the weapon, and Rodriguez responded that he did not.
After defendant was placed in the rear of Deputy Lenardson's vehicle, and Rodriguez was secured in the rear of Chief Lenardson's vehicle, both officers returned to the pickup truck to conduct a further search. Deputy Lenardson indicated to Chief Lenardson that, in addition to finding the handgun, he had observed four packets containing large sums of money. Deputy Lenardson again returned to the passenger compartment of the vehicle and to the green leather bag and confirmed the presence of the handgun and the money. Meanwhile, Chief Lenardson went to the open bed of the pickup truck and searched a garment bag, which was in the bed of the pickup truck near the tailgate and apparently closed. Inside the garment bag, Chief Lenardson found approximately one pound of cocaine. The officers then returned to their vehicles and informed Rodriguez and Martinez that, in addition to being under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, they also were under arrest for possession of narcotics. It also should be noted that the weapon seized, a nine-millimeter Walther ppk-s semiautomatic pistol, was unloaded, and apparently no ammunition for the weapon was ever recovered.
On appeal, defendant argues that the search without a warrant, which yielded the cocaine, was unlawful and that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that Deputy Lenardson was without authority to request defendant to get out of the vehicle and, therefore, never should have been in a position to observe the handgun and that, in any event, the subsequent search without a warrant of the garment bag in the bed of the truck, which yielded the cocaine, was unlawful, even if the officers' conduct up to that point was authorized. We disagree.
The first question to be answered is whether Deputy Lenardson was authorized to request defendant, as a passenger in the vehicle, to step out of the vehicle. This appears to pose a question of first impression in Michigan, though the United States Supreme Court has addressed the question whether an officer during a routine traffic stop may ask a driver to step from a vehicle. In Penn sylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 110-111; 98 S Ct 330; 54 L Ed 2d 331 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a police officer may request a driver during a routine traffic stop to step from the vehicle and off to the shoulder of the road:
We think it too plain for argument that the State's proffered justification — the safety of the officer — is both legitimate and weighty. "Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." Terry v Ohio, [392 US 1, 23; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)]. And we have specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings — A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J Crim L C & P S 93 (1963)." Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 148, n 3 [92 S Ct 1921; 32 L Ed 2d 612 (1972)]. We are aware that not all these assaults occur when issuing traffic summons [sic], but we have before expressly declined to accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers than other types of confrontations. United States v Robinson, 414 US 218, 234 [94 S Ct 467; 38 L Ed 2d 427 (1973)]. Indeed, it appears "that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops." Id. at 234, n 5.
The hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver's side of the vehicle may also be appreciable in some situations. Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.
While Mimms justifies Chief Lenardson's conduct in asking Rodriguez to step from the vehicle, it does not directly answer the question whether Deputy Lenardson acted properly in asking defendant to step from the vehicle. However, we are persuaded that the reasoning behind Mimms is equally applicable to the passenger of a vehicle as it is to the driver of the vehicle. That is, the Supreme Court in Mimms concluded that an officer was justified in asking the driver to step from a vehicle for the officer's own safety, recognizing that a large number of assaults on officers occurs during routine traffic stops. This concern is equally applicable to the passenger of a vehicle as it is to a driver. In other words, if a police officer is justified in being concerned about a possible assault by the driver of a vehicle stopped during a traffic stop, that officer is also justified in being concerned about a possible assault by a passenger in that vehicle.
Indeed, this reasoning persuaded the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York to reach a similar conclusion in People v McLaurin, 120 AD2d 270, 274-275; 508 NYS2d 429 (1986):
We fail to discern any appreciable difference between driver and passenger in the degree of risk posed to the safety of a police officer. Hence, police officers are not required, as defendant contends, to treat passengers differently from the driver, and we reject the argument that the circumstances which render it permissible to order a driver out of a car after a lawful stop for a traffic violation are not equally applicable to a passenger. Before a police officer orders a passenger out of a car, he is not required to have, separate and distinct from the underlying traffic violation which serves as the predicate for the stop, an articulable basis to support a suspicion either as to the existence of criminal activity by the passenger or that he poses a threat to the officer's safety.
Accordingly, we hold that a police officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, order a passenger to get out of a motor vehicle stopped during a routine traffic stop under the same circumstances in which the officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle. Accordingly, Deputy Lenardson was authorized to ask defendant to step from the vehicle and, therefore, was properly in a position to observe the handgun in plain view in the green leather bag in the passenger compartment of the pickup truck.
However, defendant also argues that, even if the seizure of the handgun and search of the green leather bag were proper, the subsequent search of the garment bag in the bed of the pickup truck, which contained the cocaine, was improper and the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of the cocaine seized. We disagree.
At the time that the officers conducted the further search of the vehicle, including Chief Lenard-son's search of the garment bag, both defendant and Rodriguez were under arrest for the weapons charge and had been handcuffed and separately placed in the rear seats of the officers' respective patrol vehicles. Thus, we must determine whether the search of the garment bag without a warrant was authorized under an exception to the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that it was.
The prosecutor in his brief on appeal offers two justifications for the search of the garment bag, namely, the so-called "automobile exception" and the "search incident to arrest" exception. We conclude that the search comes within the provisions of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
In United States v Ross, 456 US 798; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982), the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a search of an automobile without a warrant is reasonable where the automobile legitimately has been stopped by a police officer and the police officer has probable cause to conduct the search. The Court further clarified the rule to specifically hold that if probable cause justifies the search of the lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Thus, the scope of a search without a warrant authorized by the automobile exception is neither broader nor narrower than that which a magistrate could legitimately authorize by a search warrant. Id. at 825. See also Michigan v Thomas, 458 US 259, 261; 102 S Ct 3079; 73 L Ed 2d 750 (1982).
Thus, the question may be framed as follows: Does the presence of a firearm and a large sum of currency in one container in a vehicle provide probable cause to believe that other weapons, contraband, or evidence of a crime may be found in another container in the vehicle? This presents a close question. Formulating an answer to this question is hampered by the fact that the prosecutor does not cite any cases in which probable cause was found to exist upon this minimal amount of evidence, nor, for that matter, does defendant cite any cases in which probable cause has been found not to exist upon this amount of evidence. Thus, to resolve our question, we turn to the definition of probable cause, that the facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable prudence to believe that the evidence of a crime or contraband sought is in the stated place. See People v Goins, 164 Mich App 559, 560; 417 NW2d 499 (1987). Thus, we need to determine whether a person of reasonable prudence would conclude from the presence of a firearm and a large sum of currency in one container that other weapons or contraband could be found in another container within the vehicle. With some hesitation, we conclude that the answer to that question is "yes."
Taken separately, neither the gun nor the currency would establish probable cause to believe that other evidence or contraband could be found elsewhere in the vehicle. The presence of the gun in the container might suggest that a second gun may exist in another container, though this is far from a foregone conclusion. Similarly, the presence of such a large sum of currency without a ready explanation for its presence might suggest, as it did to Deputy Lenardson, that defendants either had been involved in a robbery or were involved in drug trafficking. It therefore seems reasonable that if not another weapon, then contraband or other evidence of crime could be found in the other container in the vehicle.
We are cognizant that merely carrying a large sum of cash is not itself a crime, though carrying a concealed weapon in an automobile is a crime. However, the two items, taken together, could lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that contraband might be found in the garment bag in the bed of the pickup truck. Moreover, we will reverse a trial court's determination of a suppression issue only if the ruling was clearly erroneous, that is, if it left us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See People v Harmelin, 176 Mich App 524, 532; 440 NW2d 75 (1989). With this standard of review in mind, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that the search was proper.
Having concluded that the search is within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, we need not resolve the question whether the search could be authorized as a search incident to arrest.
Affirmed.
Weaver, P.J., concurred.
Deputy Lenardson is the son of Chief Lenardson.
At this time, Rodriguez apparently indicated that he had left his driver's license in Texas. The vehicle driven by Rodriguez had Texas license plates.
It is not entirely clear from Deputy Lenardson's testimony exactly when the amount of money involved was determined. However, the deputy apparently did determine on his initial investigation that there was a large number of bills in white envelopes in denominations of twenty, fifty, and one hundred. The total amount involved was approximately $10,000.
Since Const 1963, art 1, § 11 precludes the suppression of evidence of any drug or firearm seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling, our inquiry is limited to the question whether the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. Accordingly, we need not determine whether the Michigan Constitution would afford a suspect greater rights in this area than does the federal constitution. See People v Harmelin, 176 Mich App 524; 440 NW2d 75 (1989), cert gtd on other grounds sub nom Harmelin v Michigan, — US —; 111 S Ct 337; 109 L Ed 2d 742 (1990). Specifically, we need not determine whether a police officer, under the Michigan Constitution, may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop where the officer has no particular reason to fear the passenger or suspect that the passenger is involved in criminal activity. Cf. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439; 339 NW2d 403 (1983) (a passenger's refusal to identify himself or the use of an alias does not establish probable cause to conduct a search or make an arrest).
Indeed, one could even advance the argument that the passenger presents a greater threat to the officer than does the driver, since the officer's attention in the traffic stop is going to be focused on the driver, and he may not be immediately aware of the activities of the passenger, including the possibility that the passenger may retrieve a firearm and assault the officer.
Again, we make no determination of whether such a practice is permissible under the Michigan Constitution.
Defendant does not dispute that the seizure of the handgun and the search of the bag containing the gun was proper if Deputy Lenardson was authorized to request defendant to step from the vehicle. Rather, defendant's argument with respect to the seizure of the handgun and the search of the green leather bag is limited to the assertion that Deputy Lenardson was not authorized to order defendant from the vehicle and, therefore, was never in a proper position to observe the handgun in plain view. Since we have concluded that the deputy was authorized, we can conclude without further discussion that the seizure of the handgun, the search of the green leather bag, and the discovery of the money were authorized.
Defendant does cite People v Miller (On Remand), 128 Mich App 298; 340 NW2d 858 (1983), in which the Court, in dicta, stated that probable cause did not exist to search a briefcase located inside the passenger compartment of a car, with a handgun lying in open view on the seat next to the briefcase. Id. at 305, n 4. However, the facts for finding probable cause are stronger in the case at bar, because both a handgun and a large sum of money were discovered and both were inside a container, rather than in plain view on the seat of the vehicle.
E.g., defendants were not merchants on their way to make a bank deposit.
As defense counsel developed at the preliminary examination, it apparently is not a crime in defendant's home state of Texas to carry a handgun. This, however, is not entirely relevant, since the offense occurred in Michigan, not Texas. But see 18 USC 926A (a person who is lawfully entitled to possess and carry a firearm may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place, provided the firearm is unloaded and is inaccessible from the passenger compartment of the vehicle).