Case Name: MARY J. DARROW, Respondent, v. FAMILY FUND SOCIETY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-11
Citations: 49 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 245
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARY J. DARROW, Respondent, v. FAMILY FUND SOCIETY, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 49
Pages: 245–252

Head Matter:
MARY J. DARROW, Respondent, v. FAMILY FUND SOCIETY, Appellant.
Provision a/ooiding an insurance policy in case the assured shall die in the violation of, or the attempt to violate, any criminal law — the assured does not violate such a provision by committing suicide — Penal Oode, secs. 173, 178.
This action is brought by the plaintiff upon a policy of insurance or bond issued by the defendant, a corporation organized under chapter 175 of 1883, by which it agreed to pay to the plaintiff, the wife of one James H. Darrow, “within sixty days after the receipt of satisfactory evidence to the society of the death of the within named member, during the continuance of this bond in full force, * * * five thousand dollars from the death fund of this society at the time of said death, as hereinbefore mentioned and provided.” It further provided as follows: “ This bond shall be void if the member named herein shall die in consequence of a duel or by the hands' of justice, or in violation of, or attempt to violate, any criminal law of the United States, or of any State or country in which the member herein named may be.” Upon the trial the judge excluded evidence offered by the defendant to show that Darrow committed suicide, upon the ground that that would not be a defense to the action.
Held, that he did not err in so doing. (Learned, P. J., dissenting.)
Neither suicide, nor the successful attempt to commit it, is made a crime by the Penal Code of this State. (Per Landon, J.)
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered at the Saratoga Circuit upon a verdict directed by the court, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial made upon the minutes of the justice before whom the action was tried.
This action was brought upon a policy of insurance or certificate of membership issued by the defendant, a corporation organized under chapter 175 of the Laws of 1883, upon the life of James IT. Darrow for the sum of $5,000.
The policy, or as it is styled by its own terms the bond, bears date January 14, 1885, is issued under the corporate seal and the signatures of the vice-president and secretary of the defendant, and, among other things, binds the defendant to pay to the plaintiff (then the wife, now the widow, of the insured), “ within sixty days after the receipt of satisfactory evidence to the society of the death of the within named member, during the continuance of this bond in full force, * * * five thousand dollars from the death fund of this society, at the time of said death, as hereinbefore mentioned and provided.” The defendant is what is known as an assessment insurance society, and the scheme of raising the funds to pay the death claims is set out in the bond and is as follows: “ Whenever the death fund is insufficient to meet the existing claims by death, a call shall be made upon this entire class of membership in force, * * * but not more than one call shall be made to meet one death claim. Eighty per cent of the net amount received from such call shall be deposited in a bank and be used for the payment of death claims only, and the remaining twenty per cent shall be set apart as a reserve fund and deposited in a trust company to be accumulated to meet any contingency that may arise by reason of extra mortality, if any.” The bond further provides as follows: “ This bond shall be void if the member named herein shall die in consequence of a duel or by the hands of justice, or in violation of, or attempt to violate, any criminal law of the United States, or of any State or country in which the member herein named may be.”
The answer tendered but two issues that are material to this appeal: First. That the bond was made payable only out of the death fund, and payment was conditioned on the sum being realized from an assessment, and that there was not any money in the death fund applicable to the payment of the bond. Second. That the bond was void if the deceased should die in violation of, or attempt to violate, any criminal law of the United States, or of any State or country in which he might be, and that he died in the State of Now York from the effects of poison taken and administered by himself with intent to take his own life in violation of the criminal law of the State. For the purpose of showing suicide of the deceased the defendant offered certain evidence, to which the plaintiff objected on the ground that suicide was not one of the causes specified in the policy which would avoid it, and was no defense to the action. The court sustained the objection.
George Wilcox, for the appellant.
jEdgar T. Braclcett, for the respondent.
See post, p. 252.

Opinion:
Landon, J.:
The question is whether the insured died "in violation of, or attempt to violate, any criminal law of the United States, or of an}' State or country in which, the member may be." I think that suicide, or the successful attempt to commit it, is not made a crime by our Penal Code. " A crime is an act or omissioif forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction by," etc. (Sec. 3.) "Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, yet, from the impossibility of reaching the successful perpetrator, no forfeiture is imposed." (Sec. 173.) Attempting suicide is made a crime. (Sec. 178.) It is thus defined: "A person who, with intent to take his own life, commits upon himself any act dangerous to human life, or which, if committed upon or towards another person and followed by death as a consequence, would render the perpetrator chargeable with homicide, is guilty of attempting suicide." (Sec. 174.) It seems to follow that the attempt to commit suicide, if successful, is suicide and no crime, but only "a grave public wrong," but if unsuccessful, is a crime. Section 685 — which provides that " a person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime was consummated, unless the court in its discre-, tion discharges the jury and directs the defendant to be tried for the crime itself" — can, from the nature of the case, have no application to an attempt to commit suicide. The attempt is the crime itself. To bring it within the section there should be an attempt to attempt to commit suicide. If there is an attempt to commit suicide, the success of the attempt does not consummate the crime, but avoids it. How could the jury be discharged and the defendant be tried for the crime itself ? What crime ? The section must be limited to the cases to which it can apply.
The objection that this action, being at law, could not be maintained because there was not sufficient proof of money in the death fund of the defendant, is satisfactorily answered in the opinion of the presiding justice.
I advise an affirmance of the judgment and order.
Bockes, J.:
The condition in the " bond " counted on is as follows: " This bond shall be void if the member named herein shall die in violation of or attempt to violate any criminal law," etc.; that is, shall die in violating or in attempting to violate any criminal law. Admit, as it must be admitted under the exceptions to the exclusion of evidence, that Darrow committed suicide: was this condition broken ? It would not be broken by the act of suicide; for suicide, although " a grave public wrong," is not within the reach of criminal law. (Penal Code, § 173.) But did he not, under the above admission, attempt suicide, which is itself a crime? (Penal Code, § 171, 178.) Certainly he did ; yet he did not die in the commission of the attempt as an independent aet. The attempt as an independent act is the crime declared by law; that is an unsuccessful act, having suicide for its consummated purpose. It is the unsuccessful act which is made punishable as a crime (sec. 178), not the successful act, which is beyond the reach of punishment under municipal law. An attempt implies a want of successful purpose. Of this Darrow did not die. He died of a successful purpose. He, therefore, did not die of the attempt, which, as a separate and independent act, is by law declared to be a felony, and made punishable as such. The offense contemplated by the Criminal Code (the attempt) is an offense for which the offender may be punished by imprisonment in the State prison. Such was not Harrow's offense. The mere reading of section 685 of the Penal Code shows the inapplicability of that section to this case. That provides for an act which the perpetrator survives. It must follow, therefore, that he did not die " in violation " of that provision of the Criminal Code (and there is no other applicable to the case), which makes an attempt to commit suicide an offense for which punishment is provided. As above suggested, this provision of law had in contemplation a punishable offense, to wit: an attempt, without success, to commit suicide; and, as is also above suggested, of. this he could not die. If the above conclusion be sound, proof that Darrow committed suicide would not show that he died " in violation of or attempt to violate any criminal law," because of which, according to its provisions, the " bond " in suit would be void.
It may be added that there was proof of money belonging to the death fund, applicable to the " bond " in suit, to the extent of the recovery.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed,with costs.