Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JEROME HOLLOWAY, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1997-06-19
Citations: 177 Ill. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 80088
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JEROME HOLLOWAY, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 177
Pages: 1–20

Head Matter:
(No. 80088.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JEROME HOLLOWAY, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 19, 1997.
FREEMAN, C.J., dissenting.
Roland Burris and James E. Ryan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Jack O’Malley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica X. Calderon and Susan R. Schierl, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Debra R. Salinger and Barbara C. Kamm, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Jerome Holloway, was convicted of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13) and sentenced to a prison term of six years. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 275 Ill. App. 3d 736. We granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Defendant was charged by indictment with having committed two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against his daughter, C.H., when she was 11 years old. Prior to trial, defendant objected to the admission of hearsay statements made by C.H. to her cousin, Erin Dalzell, when C.H. was 13 years old. The court ruled the hearsay statements admissible .under section 115 — 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115 — 10).
The evidence presented consisted of the testimony of C.H., Erin, and Dr. Sharon Ahart. Based on this evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced defendant to two concurrent six-year terms. The court subsequently vacated its original judgments and entered a finding of guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault. Defendant was again sentenced to two concurrent six-year terms.
The appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. 275 Ill. App. 3d 736. The appellate court found that Erin's testimony concerning what she had been told by C.H. should not have been admitted under section 115 — 10(a)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because C.H. was over the age of 12 when she told Erin of the alleged assault. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 737. Section 115 — 10 states in relevant part:
"(a) In a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child under the age of 13 * the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by such child of an out of court statement made by such child that he or she complained of such act to another; and
(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by such child describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any áct which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 115 — 10(a)(1), (a)(2).
The appellate court found the statute to be ambiguous. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 742-43. The court noted that the legislature enacted section 115 — 10 to lend credibility and assistance to the testimony of child victims by creating a hearsay exception. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 744. The court believed that section 115 — 10 allows out-of-court statements of a sexual assault only when the child was under the age of 13 at the time of the outcry. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 744-45. Thus, the appellate court held that Erin's testimony should have been excluded from the trial. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 745. The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 745. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
I. FACTS
Defendant traveled to Rosemont, Illinois, in November 1987 to visit his former wife and their three children. At trial, defendant's oldest daughter, C.H., testified that she came home from school on a Thursday around 3 or 3:30 in the afternoon and observed defendant sitting on a couch watching television. C.H. had not seen defendant in over a year. Although C.H.'s younger twin sisters were in the apartment complex, C.H. testified that they were not in the unit at that time.
C.H. testified that she sat on the couch next to defendant. According to C.H., defendant began to touch her thighs and buttocks in an uncomfortable manner. C.H. moved to the floor. Defendant then made derogatory comments about her mother and called C.H. "a bad girl," telling her that she would pay for what she had done. C.H. stated that defendant then slapped her twice.
C.H. testified that defendant tied her hands above her head and stuck an object into her mouth. Defendant next pulled down his pants. C.H. observed that defendant had a birthmark on his buttocks. C.H. stated that defendant subsequently assaulted her both vaginally and orally. When the telephone in the apartment began to ring, defendant stopped and untied C.H. Defendant allegedly threatened that he would hurt her even more and would kill her sisters and mother if she ever told anyone what had happened. C.H. indicated that the phone rang for anywhere between 2 and 10 minutes. Defendant told her to answer the phone. C.H. could not recall who was on the telephone. C.H. stated that defendant then watched her shower, making sure that she washed her entire body. She claimed that she did not see her father during the rest of his visit.
In August 1990, C.H., then almost 14 years old, hosted a sleep-over party with her cousins Erin and Lindsey at her house. C.H. testified that she was not very involved with her cousins at the sleep-over. Upon prodding by Erin, C.H. told her cousins about defendant's alleged attack nearly three years earlier. The cousins convinced C.H. to tell her mother and stepfather. C.H. stated that she then went to her parents' room, woke up her stepfather and told him about the incident. C.H. claimed that, because of impaired hearing, her mother did not wake up at that time.
Fifteen-year-old Erin testified that in August 1990, she stayed overnight at C.H.'s house. She stated that C.H. appeared to be "dazing off" and was very quiet. Erin stated that C.H. avoided the issue when asked what was wrong. Erin testified that C.H. eventually said that she was having nightmares about her father, and that her father had touched her. Erin stated that she then told C.H. to tell her mother. On cross-examination, Erin testified that she was very close to C.H. between 1987 and 1990, and that C.H. had never before told Erin of the incident nor, to her knowledge, had C.H. awakened screaming during this time.
Dr. Sharon Ahart, a board eligible pediatrician, testified that on August 16, 1990, C.H. told her that defendant penetrated her both vaginally and orally. According to Dr. Ahart, C.H. denied that anyone else touched her in her vaginal area. Dr. Ahart stated that although she did not use the term "penetration" in her medical report, she had found evidence of trauma to C.H.'s vagina that had been caused by sexual penetration. This finding was based on C.H.'s medical history, Dr. Ahart's own physical examinations, and C.H.'s statements to her that she had been abused. Dr. Ahart could not determine the object which had penetrated C.H. solely from her physical examination.
Defendant presented the testimony of Lieutenant Lee Mayer of the Rosemont police department. Mayer stated that he interviewed C.H. on August 17, 1990, after she had complained to her parents. Mayer testified that C.H. did not tell him that defendant touched her legs or buttocks, called her mother derogatory names, or watched her shower and told her to wash her entire body. Mayer testified on cross-examination by the State that C.H. told him during the interview that defendant put his penis in her vagina and mouth.
Defendant testified next. He stated that he came to Illinois in November 1987 to pursue a reconciliation with his former wife and to see his children. He testified that he arrived in Chicago around 7 or 7:30 p.m. on Thursday, November 15, and that his former wife and their three children met him at the airport. Defendant stated that, because of the time of his arrival, it was impossible for him to have been at the apartment at 3 or 3:30 on that afternoon, which is the time C.H. said the incident occurred. Further, defendant stated that he went to the mall with C.H., his twin daughters, and his niece Lindsey on Friday evening. At the mall, the girls took a group picture at a coin-operated photo booth. Defendant asserted that this photo proved that C.H. saw defendant after the alleged incident. The photo was not dated and C.H. claimed that she did not remember when the photo was taken.
Defendant testified that, after he returned from the mall with his children, he and his ex-wife argued and defendant was asked to leave the house. Defendant returned to the house for about five hours on Sunday, November 18. After this, defendant spent a couple of days with some of his friends before returning to California. Defendant claimed that he was never alone with C.H. during his November visit. According to defendant, he did not return to Illinois until December 1990, after the charges had been filed against him.
As additional evidence, defendant stated that the birthmark C.H. claims to have seen during the assault was well known in the family because his grandfather had the same birthmark. The family had allegedly discussed defendant's birthmark numerous times while he was still married and defendant stated that he had shown the birthmark to all of his children.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Outcry Admissibility When Declarant Over 12
In construing section 115 — 10, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995). When possible, the intention of the legislature should be determined from the language of the statute. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). In the instant case, though the parties' interpretation of the statute differs based on their respective definitions of the phrase "such child" in sections (a)(1) and (a)(2), both defendant and the State assert that the language of section 115 — 10 is clear and unambiguous.
The State believes that "such child" in sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) refers to a child who was under the age of 13 when a sexual act was perpetrated regardless of the age of the child at the time the child made an outcry. Defendant maintains that the phrase "such child" in sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) refers only to the phrase "under the age of 13" as used in section (a) and that the child, therefore, must have been under the age of 13 at the time of the outcry for the statements to be admissible under the hearsay exception.
While the State's interpretation has merit, the defendant's construction of the statute also is reasonable. When a statute can be reasonably interpreted in two different ways, it is ambiguous. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Once a statute is found to be ambiguous, it is appropriate to look beyond its plain language to ascertain legislative intent. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995).
Section 115 — 10 was originally passed in response to the difficulty in convicting persons accused of sexually assaulting young children. This difficulty occurs because children's testimony in sexual assault cases is often inadequate. Problems in proof may result when the lesser developed cognitive ahd language skills that children have hinder them in adequately communicating the details of an assault. The legislature sought to create a hearsay exception to allow into evidence corroborative testimony that the child complained to another person about the incident.
During discussion of the bill, Representative Jaffe asserted that the bill "deals with corroboration that a child has been sexually molested and testimony that * [the child] complained of such an incident." 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 25,1982, at 87 (statements of Representative Jaffe). Additionally, in speaking to an amendment to lower the age from children under the age of 18, as originally introduced, to children under the age of 13, as finally passed, Representative Stearney questioned whether the age of 17 was "rather high" and whether there was any need for corroboration of a 17-year-old. 82d 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 25, 1982, at 88 (statements of Representative Stearney).
It appears that the legislature, in providing for the admission of evidence of outcry statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule in certain cases, was concerned with the ability of the victim to understand and articulate what happened during the incident and the reluctance many victims have relating the details of the incident at trial. Evidence of an outcry statement made to another by a child under the age of 13 would corroborate the testimony of a child who, by reason of age, may be reluctant or unable to clearly express the details of the incident. The State's interpretation would measure the applicability of the statute based solely on the age of the victim at the time of the assault without regard to the age of the child at the time of a subsequent outcry. The importance of allowing hearsay testimony of an outcry, however, is not dictated by the age of the victim when the assault occurs. Instead, it is dictated by the victim's ability to adequately testify to the alleged incident. We believe that the legislature addressed these concerns by limiting the admission of hearsay statements under section 115 — 10 to those statements made by a child under the age of 13.
In 1993 and 1994, the legislature enacted amendments to section 115 — 10(a). The 1993 amendment increases the list of crimes perpetrated against young children in which the hearsay exception is allowed. The 1994 amendment expands coverage to certain mentally retarded persons — showing the legislature's desire to rectify difficulties when the complainant has an impaired ability to testify. See 725 ILCS 5/115 — 10(a) (West 1994). The State's contention that these amendments show the legislature intended an expansive statute allowing hearsay testimony when the declarant is over the age of 12 reads the amendments too broadly.
We note also that our holding today is consistent with the prior opinions of our appellate court. People v. E.Z., 262 Ill. App. 3d 29, 34 (1994) (child must be under the age of 13 at the time the statement is made in order to hold hearsay statements admissible under section 115 — 10); People v. Bridgewater, 259 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (1994) (age limit applies to the time the statement was made as well as to the time when the abuse allegedly occurred).
Following the decisions in E.Z. and Bridgewater, the legislature attempted to pass an amendment that directly addressed the age at which the outcry must occur in order to be admissible as a hearsay exception. In 1995, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would have amended section 115 — 10 to increase the age of the victim of a sexual assault for which a hearsay statement could be admitted from under 13 years of age to under 15 years of age. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 160, 1995 Sess.
The bill also provided that the hearsay statement would not be inadmissible because the child was 15 years of age or older when the statement was made. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 160, 1995 Sess. The Senate amended the bill to make the statement admissible only if the outcry was made within one year of the incident. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 160, 1995 Sess. The legislature could not agree on the amendment; therefore, the bill did not become law. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 160, 1995 Sess.
The legislature's attempt to amend section 115 — 10 could be viewed as an attempt by the legislature to change the law in response to the appellate court's decisions in Bridgewater and E.Z. Because the legislature did not amend section 115 — 10 to address the question of when an outcry statement can be admitted as a hearsay exception, however, we are left with the statute in its current form.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the interpretation of the language of the present statute reached by the appellate court in Bridgewater and E.Z. If there is to be a change in the age in which an outcry statement is to be made in order to be admissible under section 115 — 10, it must be made by the legislature.
We further note that our holding is consistent with the language of statutes adopted in many other states. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1997) (child must be age 11 or under at time of statement); Ind. Code Ann. § 35 — 37 — 4—6 (Michie 1994) (for hearsay statements to be admissible, the child must be under the age of 14 at time of trial); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(3) (West Supp. 1988) (child must be under the age of 10 at time of statement); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.075 (West 1996) (child must be under the age of 12 at time of statement); Ohio R. Evid. 807 (Anderson 1996) (child must be under the age of 12 at time of trial or hearing); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5985.1 (West Supp. 1996) (child must be age 12 or under at time of statement). At least 12 other states, by statute, limit the admissibility of outcry statements in a similar way.
For the reasons mentioned, we believe that the legislature intended that for an outcry statement to be admissible as a hearsay exception under section 115 — 10 the victim must have been under the age of 13 at the time the statement was made.
B. Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Defendant contends that, without the hearsay testimony concerning the statements made by C.H., the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. During the trial, the court found C.H.'s testimony credible and believable, Dr. Ahart testified to evidence of trauma to C.H.'s vagina, and Lieutenant Mayer corroborated the major aspects of C.H.'s testimony. We find that this evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Following People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979), we do not suggest any implication as to defendant's guilt or innocence that would be binding on retrial. Our finding is intended only to protect defendant from being subjected to double jeopardy.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that hearsay statements made by a declarant over the age of 12 concerning sexual abuse that occurred when the declarant was under the age of 13 are not admissible under section 115 — 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Additionally, we find that the evidence remaining after the exclusion of the hearsay testimony warrants a new trial. We affirm the decision of the appellate court reversing the circuit court and remanding the cause to the circuit court for a new trial.
Affirmed.