Case Name: CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Shelton ROSS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-04-28
Citations: 654 So. 2d 1311
Docket Number: No. 94-KA-0695
Parties: CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Shelton ROSS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 654
Pages: 1311–1345

Head Matter:
CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Shelton ROSS.
No. 94-KA-0695.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 28, 1995.

Opinion:
|1CALOGERO, Chief Justice.
Shelton Ross was charged by the City of Baton Rouge with violating a municipal ordinance which prohibits "drug traffic loitering." Ross filed a motion to quash alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional and expressly preempted by legislative enactment. The City Court of Baton Rouge granted defendant's motion to quash, finding the ordinance unconstitutionally vague'and overbroad, and invalid under the expresé legislative preemption provision of LSA-I^.S. 14Ú.4&}
The City of Baton Ijlouge appealed the decision, invoking our appellate jurisdiction under Article V, § 5(D) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Based upon our review of the record and our examination of the applicable constitutional, statutory, and municipal law, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the "drug traffic loitering" ordinance is expressly preempted by LSA-R.S. |214:143, and therefore affirm the judgment quashing the affidavit charging a violation of the municipal ordinance. Because we affirm the trial court's ruling on nonconstitutional grounds, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the portions of the trial court's judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
On September 29, 1993, two Baton Rouge City Police officers were parked at a corner on Chippewa Street in Baton Rouge. Two men, one of them the defendant, Shelton Ross, were leaning against a fence nearby. Although the two individuals were not engaged in any obvious criminal activity, the officers nonetheless called them over to their vehicle. One officer then questioned the two individuals while the other searched the ground near where the men had been standing. A piece of paper containing three rocks of cocaine was found near the fence, and the two men were issued misdemeanor summonses.
On October 20, 1993, the City of Baton Rouge filed a misdemeanor affidavit in the Baton Rouge City Court charging Shelton Ross with one count of violating Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances pertaining to "drug traffic loitering." The ordinance provides in pertinent part as follows:
Section 13:1055. Drug-Traffic Loitering.
(a) As used in this section:
13(5) "Public Place" is an area generally visible to public view and includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, transit stations, shelters and tunnels, automobiles (whether moving or not), and buildings, including those which serve food or drink, or provide entertainment, and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them.
(b) A person is guilty of drug-traffic loitering if he or she remains in a public place and intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1.
* ⅝
(d) A person is not guilty of drug-traffic loitering if he or she merely remains in a public place without also intentionally soliciting, inducing, enticing, or procuring another to engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1.
On October 29, 1993, Ross filed a motion to quash the misdemeanor affidavit. He alleged a number of grounds for the invalidity of the ordinance in his motion, the only one of which is pertinent to this opinion being a contention that the ordinance was preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143, see Note 1, supra, which makes it a municipal misdemeanor to "engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1."
The trial court conducted hearings on the motion to quash on January 4, 1994, and January 7, 1994. No witnesses were sworn, both hearings consisting solely of the arguments of counsel upon the motion. The defense argued that the ordinance, insofar as it represented an attempt by a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana to enact an ordinance criminalizing conduct also punishable as a felony under state law, was preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143.
In response, the city prosecutor first observed that LSA-R.S. 14:143 was enacted in response to past occasions where a criminal defendant had been convicted of violating a municipal ordinance, by definition a misdemeanor, and had then been able to successfully plead double jeopardy when faced with a subsequent State felony prosecution arising out of the same conduct. The city prosecutor then noted that conviction under the ordinance required proof of an element, i.e. that the crime be committed "in the public," not found in any comparable state felony statutes. The city prosecutor concluded from this analysis that in this case double jeopardy would not lie for a subsequent state felony prosecution, and that | therefore the ordi nance was not preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash. In addition to declaring the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the trial court also found the ordinance to be preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143. The trial court signed a written judgment ordering the prosecution quashed on January 7, 1994.
The City of Baton Rouge timely perfected an appeal to this Court, invoking our jurisdiction under Article V, § 5(D) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Jurisdiction is proper in this case because it involves an ordinance passed by a duly constituted municipality of this state which has been declared unconstitutional. See Note 2, supra; Holthus v. Louisiana Racing Comm'n, 569 So.2d 547 (La.1990). In addition, our jurisdiction extends to all issues of law presented by the trial court's judgment. La. Const. Art. V, § 5(A), (C), (E). Compare La. Const. Art. V, § 5(F); Church Point Wholesale Beverage v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697, 700 (La.1993).
For the reasons given below, we affirm the trial court's decision that the ordinance is invalid on nonconstitutional grounds, i.e. that it is expressly preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143, and therefore affirm the trial court's judgment quashing the misdemeanor affidavit. Our finding on the nonconstitutional issue makes a review of the trial court's declaration of the ordinance's unconstitutionality, the original basis of this Court's jurisdiction in this matter, superfluous, and accordingly we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues ruled upon below. For this reason, we move directly to a discussion of the effect of the statutory preemption provision of LSA-R.S. 14:143 upon the ^ordinance under which Shelton Ross is being prosecuted.
II. Is Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances Expressly Preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143?
LSA-R.S. 14:143 provides that "[n]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact an ordinance defining as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony under state law." The trial court found that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances fell within this statutory preemption. The trial court's ruling was based first upon a construction of the statute as a safeguard against duplication of prosecution under state and local criminal provisions, and second upon the conclusion that the City's ordinance penalized a significant amount of "conduct" already regulated by state felony statutes.
Before we consider the application of this statute to this particular ordinance, however, it is necessary that we first construe LSA-R.S. 14:143 to determine its parameters, as neither this Court nor any court of appeal has had the opportunity to interpret LSA-R.S. 14:143 since its passage in 1983. Because the origins of this particular statute shed much light on its purpose and intended scope, we begin with a brief outline of the developments that led to the passage of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
A. History of LSA-R.S. 14:143
The problem this statute is designed to address arises as a consequence of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). In Waller, the Court held that for double jeopardy purposes, a municipality and a state constitute the same sovereign, and therefore a conviction or acquittal entered as a result of the violation of a municipal ordinance bars a later prosecution by a state's attorney under a state statute proscribing the "same offense." The difficulties that Waller created for those state jurisdictions, like Louisiana, which allow dif ferent tiers of government to define and prosecute criminal violations was well-stated by the California Supreme Court in Kellett v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206, 209 (1966) (In Bank):
We recognize that in many places felonies and misdemeanors are | ^usually prosecuted by different public law offices and that there is a risk that those in charge of misdemeanor prosecutions may proceed without adequately assessing the seriousness of a defendant's conduct or considering whether a felony prosecution should be undertaken. When the responsibility for the prosecution for the higher offense lies with a different public law office there is also the risk that a well advised defendant may plead guilty to a misdemeanor to foreclose a subsequent felony prosecution the misdemeanor prosecutor may be unaware of or may choose to ignore. Cases may also arise in which the district attorney is reasonably unaware of the felonies when the misdemeanors are prosecuted. In such situations . a defendant guilty of a felony may escape proper punishment.
Compare Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); People v. Stefan, 146 Ill.2d 324, 166 Ill.Dec. 910, 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294 (Col.1990) (En Banc); State v. Weide, 775 S.W.2d 255 (Mo.App.1989).
This Court first confronted in State v. Suire, 319 So.2d 347 (La.1975), the dilemma presented by a subsequent state prosecution of an offense for which a municipality had already obtained a conviction. In Suire, the defendant was convicted in the Mayor's Court of Lake Arthur for the municipal offenses of disturbing the peace and aggravated battery. When the local district attorney later prosecuted Suire under the state aggravated battery statute, LSA-R.S. 14:34, Suire filed a motion to quash the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. The district court granted the motion and quashed the prosecution, and the State appealed.
The basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Lake Arthur's ordinance penalizing aggravated battery, a state felony offense, was "inconsistent with . state law" and therefore preempted. Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 349. See also LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(1). A ^unanimous Court rejected the State's argument, finding that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the Parish's delegated police power and that it was not inconsistent with or in conflict with any state statutes. Id, at 350. The Court specifically noted that, given the absence of any contrary legislative expression, "it is immaterial that the same conduct is punished by both state and municipality in the concurrent exercise of police power." Id.
Justice Tate, the author of the Court's opinion, also authored a special concurrence. In his concurrence Justice Tate stressed that the Court had declined to decide whether Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 was intended "to exempt from local regulation any conduct which the state legislation punishes as a felony." Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 351 (Tate, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Tate speculated that the legislature might soon enact "clarifying legislation," and that if such legislation were to statutorily "deny local governments the power to enact police regulations punishing conduct which the state punishes as a felony" there would be no need to reach the underlying constitutional question. Id. Justice Tate concluded by reiterating the "need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local police regulation under the 1974 Constitution." Id.
Despite Justice Tate's entreaties, no legislative action was immediately forthcoming, and six years later this Court revisited the issue in State v. Foy, 401 So.2d 948 (La.1981). In Foy, the |8defendants pleaded guilty in the Mayor's Court of Tallulah to the violation of a city ordinance defining the crime of burglary and specifying it as a misdemeanor. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 949. The local district attorney later prosecuted the defendants in district court under the State felony burglary statute, LSA-R.S. 14:62. Id. The district court quashed the State prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, and the State appealed. Id.
As in Suire, the basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense, and that therefore jeopardy had never attached in the initial prosecution. Foy, 401 So.2d at 949. See Note 4, supra. The Court in Foy began by noting that LSA-R.S. 33:441 granted the mayor's court jurisdiction "over all violations of municipal ordinances." Id. The Court then found that under Suire the State had no standing to challenge any constitutional infirmity in the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the mayor's court, and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. Id., at 950.
Justice Dennis, although concurring in the majority's decision in the case, wrote separately to address the State's argument that Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, see Note 5, supra, in and of itself preempted the city court's subject matter jurisdiction. After pursuing "an extensive examination of the transcripts of the constitutional convention debates" dealing with Article VI, § 9(A)(1), Justice Dennis concluded that "the constitutional intent was merely to limit the power of municipalities to the imposition of punishment without hard labor for a violation of a municipal regulation" and not to also limit |9what conduct those regulations might address. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 951 (on rehearing) (Dennis, J., concurring). However, Justice Dennis, hearkening back to the sentiments expressed in Justice Tate's special concurrence in Suire, also remarked that "the abuses referred to in the state's application for rehearing and oral argument on rehearing indicate a possible need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local jurisdiction of criminal prosecutions based on felonious conduct." Id., at 951.
In 1983, the legislature responded to the suggestions of Justice Tate in Suire and Justice Dennis in Foy with LSA-R.S. 14:143. 1983 La.Acts, No. 531, § 1. The minutes of the House committee which considered it reveal that the statute is "designed to alleviate a person pleading guilty to a municipal offense of something like burglary and then it is impossible for the district attorney to prosecute as a state offense (which is a felony)." Committee Meeting Minutes, House Comm. on Admin, of Criminal Justice, House Bill No. 275, Pp. 4-5 (April 21, 1983). The factual scenario discussed in committee was identical to that in Foy, indicating a legislative awareness of this Court's decision in Foy and a legislative desire to resolve the concurrent jurisdiction problem in the favor of the State.
In construing LSA-R.S. 14:143, therefore, we must examine the terminology employed in the statute in light of its purpose as revealed by this history. That purpose is to prevent local governments from passing criminal ordinances defining as a misdemean- or the "same offense" (as that term is understood in the double jeopardy context) proscribed by a State felony statute.
B. The Constitutional Underpinning of LSA-R.S. 14:143
Before we continue, however, we consider it advisable to first Lpdiscuss whether the statute rests upon firm constitutional grounds, particularly since issue of whether the statute impermissibly robs local governments of powers delegated to them by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 was raised below by the city prosecutor in response to the defendant's preemption argument.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the statute aims to deprive local governments of a degree of their lawmaking authority. Such a result invites our scrutiny, particularly when Home Rule Charter governments like the City-Parish government of Baton Rouge are affected. "Home rule entities must be regarded as more than creatures of the legislature, since their powers and functions are granted directly by the constitution and their discretion is constitutionally preserved against undue interference." Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168, 1173 (La.1984) (citation omitted).
We have no difficulty in deciding that LSA-R.S. 14:143 is constitutional insofar as it is directed at those local governments that function under a Home Rule Charter adopted after the effective date of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Article VI, § 5(E) of our constitution provides that such a home rule charter government may only exercise "any power . not denied by general law." The same limitation applies to governmental subdivisions not under the authority of a Home Rule Charter. La. Const. Art. VI, § 7(A). LSA-R.S. 14:143, as a "law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature which is uniformly applicable . to all political subdivisions," is just such a "general law," and therefore may constitutionally circumscribe the authority of such local governments. La. Const. Art. VI, § 44(5). Compare Lafourche Parish Council v. Autin, 94-CA-0985, 648 So.2d 343 (La.1994).
However, in this particular case we are dealing with a Home Rule Charter Government that pre-existed the 1974 Constitution. See Note 2, supra. For such an entity different rules apply, as we |11recently stated in City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs, No. 93-C-0690, 640 So.2d 237 (La.1994). In City of New Orleans, we concluded that Article VI, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provided not only that those Home Rule Charter governments existing prior to our 1974 constitution retained the power they had exercised under the 1921 constitution, but also that they retained this power absent the limitation that legislative supremacy had previously presented. We thus made it clear that when confronting such home rule entities the legislature no longer possesses, as it did under the 1921 Constitution, "the unqualified power to withdraw, preempt, or overrule a local law that is consistent with the constitution and was enacted pursuant to a constitutionally maintained preexisting home rule charter." City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 251. Contrast City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors, 43 So.2d 237, 242 (La.1949).
However, we also recognized that Article VI, § 9(B), which provides that "the police power of the state shall never be abridged," demands that the ascendancy of pre-1974 Home Rule Charter governments not be absolute. See also Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So.2d 1218, 1225 (La.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S.Ct. 1476, 108 L.Ed.2d 613 (1989) ("[Art. VI, § 9] does not purport to strip the subdivision entirely of its police power, but simply sets forth specific limitations in certain areas"). We then articulated the test by which the balance between these two competing constitutional interests should be resolved: "a litigant claiming that a home rule municipality's local law abridges the police power of the state must show that the local law conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole." City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 252 (citations omitted ). We apply that test to the constitutional validity of LSA-R.S. 14:143, | ^examining the statute to see if it "is necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole."
The statute, as has already been discussed, is designed to prevent municipal interference in State felony prosecutions. The responsibility to protect citizens from criminal depredation is one of the most fundamental aspects of the State's police power. One way in which the State, through its legislature, acts upon that responsibility is by assessing the harm that certain conduct causes, proscribing that conduct, and imposing punishment for engaging in that conduct. The most severe of these crimes are those "for which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor," i.e. felonies. LSA-R.S. 14:2(4).
In this case the State's interest is one of constitutional import, since the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly accords to the legislature, and not to local governments, the exclusive right to define felonies and to the district attorneys the exclusive right to prosecute them. See La. Const. Art. VI, § 9(A)(1); Art. V, § 26(B). More particularly, the Louisiana Constitution expressly provides that "[n]o local governmental subdivision shall . define and provide for the punishment of a felony." La. Const. Art. VI, § 9(A)(1)._Ji3When a municipality defines as a misdemeanor an offense that the legislature has designated a felony, and places a defendant in "jeopardy" for committing that offense so that the State cannot later retry the defendant, the municipality effectively prevents the State from inflicting upon the defendant the punishment the Legislature has decided is appropriate for the severity of that defendant's conduct. While such a substitution of judgment may be quite proper in matters of local concern, criminal justice is a field which is perhaps uniquely a matter of statewide, and not local, concern. Accord, Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 299 A.2d 385, 390 (1973); People v. Stone, 190 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 236 Cal.Rptr. 140, 146 (1987). This is particularly true in Louisiana, where the legislature has traditionally enjoyed plenary power over "the determination and definition of acts which are punishable as crimes." State v. Taylor, 479 So.2d 339, 341 (La.1985). See also La. Const. Art. III, § 1(A); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So.2d 1084, 1085 (La.1980). For these reasons, we can only conclude that when the legislature took the advice of two respected justices of this court and enacted LSA-R.S. 14:143, it did so in pursuit of a "vital interest of the state as a whole."
We also find that the statute is "necessary" to further that interest. In City of New Orleans, we stated that "to demonstrate that the state statute is 'necessary' it must be shown that the protection of such state interest cannot be achieved through alternate means significantly less detrimental to home rule powers and rights." City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 252. In lathis case the state interest is imperilled because of the existence of a municipal ordinance which defines the "same offense," as that term is understood in the double jeopardy context, as an existing state felony statute. There simply is no alternative to preempting such an ordinance if the vital state interest in ending local governmental "interference" in state felony prosecutions is to be advanced.
Thus, we find that the statute is a constitutional exercise of the legislature's police power. We are obligated not to forget, however, the constitutional backdrop against which we proceed with our construction of the LSA-R.S. 14:143. Although on its face we find LSA-R.S. 14:143 to be a constitutional exercise of legislative authority, it remains so only if narrowly construed, since an expansive reading of the preemptive scope of the statute might "impermissibly infringe upon the local affairs of a home rule government." Bayou Cane Fire Dept. v. Terre-bonne Parish, 548 So.2d 915, 920 (La.1989). With this limitation in mind, we advance to the construction of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
C. Construction of LSA-R.S. 14:143
In drafting LSA-R.S. 14:143, the legislature was aware of the constitutional implications of preempting a significant part of Louisiana local governments' criminal jurisdiction. Thus, to specify the scope of the statute's effect, the legislature utilized a number of terms which are defined in the constitutional article dealing with local governments. See La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. We now turn to those definitions to assist us in our construction of the statute.
A "[gjoverning authority" is "the body which exercises the legislative functions of the political subdivision." La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. A "[pjolitical subdivision" is "a parish, municipality and any other unit of local government . authorized by law to perform governmental functions." Thus, LSA-R.S. 14:143 by its express terms is aimed at the legislative branch of local | ^government. Compare LSA-R.S. 40:1796 ("[n]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact . any ordinance or regulation more restrictive than state law concerning . firearms or ammunition").
From the legislature's choice of these terms, viewed in light of the statute's purpose, we conclude that the legislature intended that the preemption of a local ordinance under this statute be accomplished through a facial challenge of the ordinance as written, and not from one or more case-by-case adjudications based upon particular facts. A corollary to this conclusion is that any ordinance which falls within the preemptive scope of the statute cannot be given a "saving" construction; rather, if the ordinance, according to its plain language, presents a substantial risk that |i(ia prosecution under it will place a defendant in "jeopardy" so as to bar a subsequent state felony prosecution, that ordinance must fall. We reach this determination because of the need for uniformity in this area (a need which substantiates the State's interest), as well as the practical difficulties of having trial judges prophesy upon an empty record the evidence and argument to be proffered in any given proceeding.
Having determined that the preemption under LSA-R.S. 14:143 is limited to a facial comparison of the municipal ordinance and comparable state felony statutes, we must next consider what municipal ordinances fall within its scope. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the statute is meant to preempt any penal ordinance which is sufficiently similar to a state felony statute as to constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, we look to double jeopardy jurisprudence to discover a standard by which we may determine whether an ordinance is preempted under the statute.
Under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 596,
Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is:
(1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or
(2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial.
See U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the 117same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); La. Const. Art. I, § 15 ("[n]o person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense "). In determining whether two prescribed offenses constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, Louisiana courts have applied two different standards, the "same evidence" test and the Blockburger or "same elements" test. State v. Fontenot, 408 So.2d 919, 921 (La.1981).
The "same evidence" test focuses upon the actual physical and testimonial evidence necessary to secure a conviction. Under the "same evidence" test, "|i]f the evidence required to support a finding of guilt of one crime would also have supported conviction of the other, the two are the same offense under a plea of double hajeopardy, and a defendant can be placed in jeopardy of only one." State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175, 1177 (La.1980). "The 'same evidence' test depends upon the proof required to convict, not the evidence actually introduced at trial." State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651, 654 (La.1980) (citations omitted). See also State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 252, 254 (La.App. 4 Cir.1994): State v. Roblow, 623 So.2d 51, 56 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993). Thus, under the "same evidence" test our concern is with the "evidential focus" of the facts adduced at trial in light of the verdict rendered, ie. how the evidence presented goes to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. State v. Miller, 571 So.2d 603, 606 (1990); State v. Powell, 598 So.2d 454, 470 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1089 (La.1992).
Although the primary test employed by Louisiana courts to determine whether double jeopardy lies for any given prosecution, the "same evidence" test provides no workable standard for the preemption of ordinances under LSA-R.S. 14:143. This is because, by its very nature, the "same evidence" test requires that at least one trial be completed so that a trial judge may compare the evidence offered to convict the defendant at the first trial with that which the prosecution intends to offer at the second trial. | njSince double jeopardy under the "same evidence" test revolves around how particular facts are utilized at trial, this test does not lend itself to the sort of facial statutory comparison which we find LSA-R.S. 14:143 mandates.
A different result obtains when the Blockburger or "same elements" test, employed by the United States Supreme Court to determine when two offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes, is considered. United States v. Dixon, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). See also Peter J. Henning, Precedents in Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 1 (1993). The Blockburger test, first articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), requires a comparison of the elements of the statutes under which a defendant is charged. After the statutory elements are compared, "if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not" then those statutes do not define the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. People v. Mendoza, 190 Colo. 519, 549 P.2d 766, 769 (1976) (En Banc) (citations omitted ).
RoApplication of the Blockburger test serves the purpose of LSA-R.S. 14:143 well, in that it provides a straightforward method of determining whether, on its face, a municipal ordinance constitutes the "same offense" as a state felony statute. We thus hold that a trial court, when faced with a challenge to a municipal ordinance on the ground that it is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143, should apply the Blockburger test. If the trial court finds that the elements of that municipal ordinance establish the "same offense" as any felony offense established by the legislature, ie. that the municipal ordinance and the comparable state statute do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not, then that municipal ordinance is preempted and must be declared void. See Note 18, supra. In addition, the entire range of lesser-included offenses contemplated by the municipal ordinance or the state statute should be considered in this analysis; if any hypothetical combination suffices to constitute the "same offense" under Block-burger, the entire ordinance must fall. Id.
D. Is Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143?
12iWe now turn this formula to the ordinance before us. The ordinance is violated if 'Ta] person . remains in a public place and intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1." The trial court found that the ordinance was invalid because part of proving a violation of the ordinance was a showing that LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 had been violated as well.
Insofar as the trial court found sections 40:966 through 971.1 of R.S. 40 to be lesser-included offenses of the ordinance, the trial court failed to appreciate the nature of the offense established by the ordinance as one of criminal solicitation. "It is clear that solicitation and the other inchoate offenses are not lesser included offenses of the principal crimes." People v. Landwer, 254 Ill.App.3d 120, 193 Ill.Dec. 273, 282, 626 N.E.2d 306, 315 (1993), appeal allowed, 155 Ill.2d 570, 198 Ill.Dec. 548, 633 N.E.2d 10 (1994). Accord, State v. Beavers, 394 So.2d 1218, 1224 (La.1981) ("inciting to riot" and "participating in a riot" are separate offenses); State v. Eames, 365 So.2d 1361 (La.1978) (Id). Thus, double jeopardy would not lie under Blockburger for consecutive prosecutions under the ordinance and for the direct commission of any of the felony offenses found in LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, and therefore this contention is not sufficient to invoke the preemptive application of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
Nevertheless, we find that the ordinance is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143 because its criminal solicitation provision overlaps with LSA-R.S. 14:28, which makes it a felony offense to "incite a felony." The Baton Rouge ordinance makes it a misdemean- or offense to solicit or procure another for the purpose of violating LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, the majority of these sections being felonies; LSA-R.S. 14:28(A) makes it a felony offense to "incite or procure another person to commit a felony." Insofar as a number of the offenses defined at LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 are felonies, the municipal ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 define the "same offense" funder Blockburger.
The fact that the ordinance contains as an element of the offense that the proscribed conduct take place "in public" does not vary our decision, since both the ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 must require proof of a fact the other does not for them to be separate offenses under the Blockburger or "same elements" test. See Note 18, supra. There is simply no fact that must be demonstrated to show a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:28 that would not also satisfy in part the city prosecutor's burden in proving a violation of the Baton Rouge ordinance. Therefore, we find that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143.
E. The State's recourse under LSA-R.S. 14:143
It must be recognized that this particular case is in some ways a deviation from the scenario envisioned by the legislature when it passed LSA-R.S. 14:143. That statute was passed to prevent 12ijcriminal defendants from availing themselves of a municipal prosecution and its attendant lesser punishments and thereupon avoiding a later felony prosecution by the State for the same conduct. Thus, this situation, a criminal defendant utilizing LSA-R.S. 14:143 and the existence of a comparable state felony statute to avoid a municipal prosecution, must be considered somewhat anomalous.
Furthermore, a state prosecutor may not be able to intervene or institute a parallel felony prosecution in state district court once a municipal prosecution has begun in a municipal court. Although municipal and district courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, "it is a well-established rule of law that, where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court which first obtains jurisdiction obtains it to the end of the controversy to the exclusion of all others." State v. Sawyer, 57 So.2d 899, 902 (La.1952). Thus, once a prosecution has commenced in a municipal court, the district attorney is precluded from intervening and obtaining the dismissal of such prosecution on the grounds of preemption, since "[n]o district attorney . shall appear, plead, or in any way defend or assist in defending any criminal prosecution or charge." La. Const. Art. V, § 26(C). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 65. Finally, the State of Louisiana may have no standing to raise any sort of postconviction challenge to a conviction under a municipal ordinance because it was not party to the original prosecution. See Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 950, citing Suire, supra.
By passing LSA-R.S. 14:143, the Legislature has endeavored to confer upon the state as prosecutor a means of protecting its prerogative to pursue felony prosecutions free from unnecessary obstacles. Compare Board of Comm'rs v. Connick, 94-CA-3161, 654 |24So.2d 1073 (La.1995). Accordingly, we determine that this necessary State interest may be vindicated by recourse to a declaratory judgment action invoking the remedial, ie. preemptive, provision of LSA-R.S. 14:143. See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1871 et seq. Compare Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1958, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The threat of immediate injury that a municipal ordinance proscribing the "same offense" as a felony statute portends for the state and its prosecutor, given that once a prosecution commences under the municipal ordinance the district attorney is unable to intervene, renders such a situation a "justiciable controversy." Church Point Wholesale Beverage v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697, 701 (La.1993); American Waste v. St. Martin Parish, 627 So.2d 158, 162 (La.1993).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's ruling that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances is expressly preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143. That statute mandates that if a challenged municipal ordinance establishes the "same offense," as defined by the "same elements" or Blockburger test, as any state felony statute, then that ordinance is preempted. After applying that test to this ordinance, we find the ordinance to be preempted under LSA-R.S. 14:143 because it possesses the "same elements" as LSA-R.S. 14:28 ^"inciting a felony"), a state felony offense.
DECREE
For this reason, we affirm the trial court's judgment quashing the prosecution against Shelton Ross.
DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT ORDINANCE IS PREEMPTED BY LSA-R.S. 14:143 AFFIRMED.
Justice Jeffrey P. Victory, Associate Justice, not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3. See State v. Barras, 615 So.2d 285, 286 n. 1 (1993).
1. § 143. Preemption of state law No governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact an ordinance defining as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony under state law.
. This ordinance, originally numbered Ordinance 9572, Section 1, was adopted by the Metropolitan Council of the Parish of East Baton Rouge and the City of Baton Rouge on January 27, 1993, and codified at Title 13:1055 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Baton Rouge (as amended). See La. Const. Art. VI, § 10. This ordinance was lawfully adopted, pursuant to specific constitutional authorization:
The right of the City of Baton Rouge to enact ordinances which prohibit certain criminal conduct and to have those violations prosecuted in city court stems from the Home Rule Charter enacted under the authority of Article XIV, Section 3(a), of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 continued in effect existing Home Rule Charters and the powers, functions and duties empowered by those charters. La. Const. Art. VI, Section 4.
Bush ex rel. State v. Williams, 504 So.2d 1060 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987), writ denied, 505 So.2d 1131 (La.1982). See also 1921 La. Const. Art. XIV, Section 40(d) ("every municipality shall have . the . right to adopt and enforce local police . regulations"); State v. Reuther, 227 La. 1037, 81 So.2d 387, 389 (1955).
. Focusing upon the facts before him, the trial court found that "the same evidence is warranted for a conviction under this statute that's warranted for a conviction under" corresponding state felony statutes, and that therefore double jeopardy would attach for purposes of a subsequent state felony prosecution. The trial court then discussed how subsection (b) of the ordi-nancc on its face required proof of a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966 — 971.1, and in addition how the "solicits, induces, entices, or procures" language of the ordinance implicates the state statutes defining the "principal" theory of criminal culpability and the inchoate offenses of "conspiracy" and "attempt." See LSA-R.S. 14:24, 26, 27.
. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(1) provides that "[a] person shall not be considered as having been in jeopardy in a trial in which . the court was illegally constituted or lacked jurisdiction." This statutory declaration accords with the traditional limitation upon double jeopardy protection that "before a person can be said to have been put in jeopardy of life or limb the court in which he was acquitted or convicted must have had jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged." Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S.Ct. 749, 751, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1194, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Thus, "conviction of a minor offense in an inferior court does not bar a prosecution for a higher crime, embracing the former, where the inferior court did not have jurisdiction of the higher crime." State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1962).
In Suire the State also alleged that double jeopardy had not attached because "[t]he indictment was invalid." Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 349; LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(3). However, LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(3) only addresses defects in the form or content of the affidavit, information, or indictment which initiates a prosecution, not any infirmity in the underlying statute or ordinance upon which the prosecution is based. See State v. Garcia, 588 So.2d 703 (La.1991) (per curiam); State v. Ruple, 437 So.2d 873 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983). In addition, the jurisprudence makes it clear that this provision may not be invoked by the State to annul a prior conviction; rather, the invalidity of the affidavit, information, or indictment must be raised "on the motion of the defendant himself" for this exception to double jeopardy to apply. State v. Williams, 301 So.2d 587, 588 (La.1974). See also Ball, supra, at 669-670, 16 S.Ct. at 1195; State v. Mann, 250 La. 1086, 202 So.2d 259 (1967); State v. Owens, 28 La. Ann. 5 (La.1876).
. This provision provides that "[n]o local governmental subdivision shall . define and provide for the punishment of a felony."
. In doing so, the Foy Court noted that "[a]s in Suire, 319 So.2d 349 n2, there is no evidence of a collusive effort to avoid State prosecution." Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 950 nl.
. Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 does not affect the adjudicatory jurisdiction of local courts; this provision limits only "local governmental subdivisions," defined in Article VI, § 44(1) as a parish or municipality. Local courts, on the other hand, are entities distinct from such "local governmental subdivisions," separate creatures of the legislature whose composition and jurisdiction are defined exclusively by legislative act. See La. Const. Art. V, § 15(A); La. Const. Art. XIV, § 16(A)(5) (retaining prior courts and continuing legislative supremacy over municipal courts, posited in 1921 La. Const. Art. VII, § 51, in statutory form). See also 12, infra.
. This view is bolstered by the fact that House Bill No. 275, which eventually became LSA-R.S. 14:143, was presented to the responsible House committee by Raymond Lamonica, executive counsel to the Governor, and to the responsible Senate committee by Pete Adams, a representá-tive of the Louisiana District Attorney's Association. See Committee Meeting Minutes, House Comm. on Admin. of Criminal Justice, House Bill No. 275, Pp. 4-5 (April 21, 1983); Committee Meeting Minutes, Senate Comm. on Judiciary (B), House Bill No. 275, Pp. 2-3 (June 14, 1983).
. City of New Orleans also posited a second prong of this test, namely that "the litigant must show that the state statute and the ordinance are incompatible and cannot be effectuated in harmony." City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 252, In this case, since the state statute's aim is to void the local ordinance, we consider this showing made.
. The "police power" is "[t]he power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances . not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." Black's Law Dictionary, P. 1317 (4th ed. 1968) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In the American constitutional scheme, the "police power" is the legislative authority enjoyed by the states, i.e. not constitutionally delegated to the federal government or constitutionally appropriated by the federal Congress, as the residuary sovereigns in our federal system. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419, 6 L.Ed. 678 (1827); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1859). In Louisiana, "the constitution presupposes the existence of the police power and is to be construed with reference to that fact." Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655, 661 (1929). This corresponds to the "general principle of judicial interpretation that, unlike the federal constitution, a state constitution's provisions are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature." Director of La. Recovery Dist. v. Taxpayers, 529 So.2d 384, 387 (La.1988) (emphasis added). Accord, La. Const. Art. III, § 1(A); New Orleans, etc. v. Civil Service, etc., 422 So.2d 402, 406 (La.1982).
.Prosecutions for the violation of municipal ordinances proceed, as a practical matter, in the local city or parish court. The statutes defining the jurisdiction of city courts make it clear that all prosecutions must be tried without a jury, and therefore a city court cannot constitutionally sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment for more than six months without hard labor. See LSA-R.S. 13:1895; State v. Bosworth, 373 So.2d 152, 154 (La.1979); State v. Hebert, 543 So.2d 637 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989). Parish courts are explicitly limited to the imposition of a penalty not to exceed six months imprisonment without hard labor. See LSA-R.S. 13:1450; State v. Boasso, 478 So.2d 945 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985), writ denied, 484 So.2d 660 (La.1986); State v. Davis, 427 So.2d 1238, 1240 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983). The effect of these provisions is to guarantee that a defendant who is convicted or pleads guilty to a municipal offense in a municipal or parish court is limited to a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment without hard labor.
. By its plain language LSA-R.S. 14:143 does not affect the adjudicatory jurisdiction of local, i.e. municipal, parish, or mayoral, courts. See City of Baton Rouge v. Malik, 404 So.2d 883, 885 (La.1981) {on original hearing). LSA-R.S. 13:1894, which defines the general criminal jurisdiction of municipal courts, grants such courts jurisdiction over "the trial of offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are not punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, including the trial of cases involving the violation of any city or parochial ordinance." Accord, LSA-R.S. 13:1446(A); 2493(A); 2501.1(F); LSA-R.S. 33:441 (same or similar language used to prescribe jurisdiction of may- or's courts, parish courts and New Orleans city and traffic courts). This statute provides that for a municipal court to entertain jurisdiction, a proceeding must "involve" a "trial" for a "viola tion" of any "city or parochial ordinance;" it says nothing about whether that ordinance must be valid, or even constitutional for that matter. Compare City of Harahan v. Olson, 200 So.2d 874, 875 (La.1967). Although we do not here contest the power of the legislature to shape the jurisdiction of local courts, we believe that a statute expressly directed towards the governing authority of a Louisiana political subdivisions does not do so. Contrast Bosworth, supra, 373 So.2d at 154 ("R.S. 13:1895 specifically provides that prosecutions in city courts are to be tried without a jury"). See also Note 7, supra.
Furthermore, construing the statute in such a way as to deprive local courts of jurisdiction over local criminal matters would not effectuate the Legislature's purpose in passing LSA-R.S. 14:143, since the district court would still enjoy its constitutionally assigned "original jurisdiction of all . criminal matters." La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A)(1). See Hebert, supra, 543 So.2d at 638 (municipal prosecution transferred to district court); Boasso, supra, 478 So.2d at 949 (same). Finally, such a reading the statute might lead to circumstances where "the court was without jurisdiction in the first instance, even though sentence was imposed or served." People v. Anderson, 140 A.D.2d 528, 528 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (N.Y.App.1988) (citation omitted). Such a re-suit, subjecting that defendant to a second punishment for substantially the same offense without a clear legislative intent to do so, would implicate the "multiple punishment" prong of double jeopardy. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); State ex rel. Restrepo v. State, 593 So.2d 1258, 1259 (La.1992).
. A continuous offense is "a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set in motion by a single impulse and operated by unintermittent force." State v. Barlow's, Inc., 111 Idaho 958, 729 P.2d 433, 436 (1986), citing United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., Pa., 306 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 412, 83 L.Ed. 563 (1939); State v. Williams, 211 Neb. 650, 319 N.W.2d 748 (1982); State v. Johnson, 212 N.C. 566, 194 S.E. 319 (1937). Official Revision Comment (d) to LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 596 states that "Clause (2) of the above Art. 596 is necessary to prevent multiple prosecutions for continuous offenses." Thus, a "continuous offense," which involves a single criminal "impulse" that may produce criminal consequences over a long period of time, e.g. possession of stolen goods over several months, must be distinguished from the situation where a number of offenses arc committed in the course of a single transaction, e.g, aggravated battery during a kidnapping. For the former, only prosecution for the single offense, regardless of its duration, is permitted; for the latter, this provision is inappo-site and does not itself bar a prosecution for each distinct "offense'' perpetrated in the single transaction (although other double jeopardy limitations may apply).
.Although we speak here in terms of LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 596, as a practical matter issues of double jeopardy have been resolved with recourse to the relevant constitutional provisions since the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause was made enforceable against the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). With this in mind, we have in the past and continue to interpret our state statutory and constitutional double jeopardy provisions in light of the purposes behind the United States Constitution's prohibition against "double jeopardy:"
(1) To prevent undue harassment of accused criminals with anxieties and the expense of repeated prosecution and the expense of repeated prosecution for the same offense;
(2) To eliminate the likelihood that innocent persons, accused of a crime, may be convicted solely because of repeated prosecution;
(3) To achieve certainty, reliability, and respect for the judicial process;
(4) To assure the finality of judgments and give to final judicial determinations the full force and effect of res judicata;
(5) To avoid the imposition of multiple and increased punishment for a single offense, thereby circumventing subsequent legislative enactments regarding the punishment imposed for specific crimes.
Bray v. State, 506 S.W.2d 772, 774-775 (Tenn.1974).
. In addition, we have also stated that under this test even where the same evidence is not needed to secure a conviction for both prosecutions, double jeopardy will nonetheless bar a second prosecution where "the gravamen of the second offense is essentially included within the offense for which first tried." State v. Nichols, 337 So.2d 1074, 1076 (La.1976) (citations omitted ). We have employed this ancillary prong to the "same evidence" test primarily to associate a number of criminal acts which occur in the course of a single transaction or occurrence and which, although established by different facts, nonetheless comprise the same discrete "wrong" or "injury" which the law seeks to punish and deter. See State ex rel Smith v. Phelps, 345 So.2d 446, 450 (La.1977); Nichols, supra, 337 So.2d at 1078; City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, 310 So.2d 596, 599-600 (La.1975); State ex rel Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So.2d 505, 507-509 (La.1974).
. In Stale v. Carouthers, 607 So.2d 1018, 1028 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds, 618 So.2d 880 (La.1993), the court of appeal found that where nine rocks of cocaine seized in the defendant's room were used to prove possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and two other rocks sold to an undercover officer were used to prove distribution of cocaine, no double jeopardy attached because the "same evidence" was not used to secure each conviction. Ca-routhers may be contrasted with State v. Leblanc, 618 So.2d 949, 957 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993), where the court found that the use of the same package of cocaine to prove possession of cocaine and attempted distribution of cocaine arising out of the same transaction constituted double jeopardy under the "same evidence" test. See also State v. Twohig, 624 So.2d 16, 17 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993).
. Wc have on occasion found that it was unnecessary for a defendant to go through the rigors of a second trial when the prosecution's prospective offer of proof at a second trial was sufficiently specified in the indictment or information, or by a bill of particulars or other discovery device. See, e.g., Nichols, supra, 337 So.2d at 1076. In City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, supra, 310 So.2d at 600, however, wc reversed the trial court's decision quashing a DWI prosecution on double jeopardy grounds and remanded the case for trial, observing that it was conceivable that the State might rely upon evidence other than that utilized in the first prosecution to obtain a conviction in the second. The only cases where we have employed the "same evidence" test prior to the initial trial of a defendant have involved the particular situation presented by a duplicitous indictment or misjoinder of defendants or offenses. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495, 532(3); State v. Coody, 448 So.2d 100, 103-104 (La.1984).
. In United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir.1992), the federal Fifth Circuit noted that even if the statutory elements of two offenses were not identical there were still three other ways, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that the two statutes could qualify as the "same offense." The first, the "same conduct" test, no longer exists. See United States v. Dixon, supra, at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2860 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)). The second, the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause enunciated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), is of no assistance to us in formulating a preemption standard for LSA-R.S. 14:143 because it requires an initial trial resulting in the acquittal of the defendant and a correlation of facts at issue in the first and second trials before it comes into play. See State v. Bolden, 639 So.2d 721 (La.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 724, 130 L.Ed.2d 629 (1995).
The third, however, is applicable to our situation; it is that doctrine treating lesser-included offenses and the greater offense in which they are included as the "same offense." See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). Properly understood, this approach does not deviate from the Blockburger analysis, since that test provides that two offenses are not the "same" for double jeopardy purposes only if each requires proof of a fact the other does not. In a situation where one offense is subsumed into the other, there is no fact which must be proven to secure a conviction as to the lesser-included offense which must not also be proven to convict for the greater offense, and thus under Blockbur-ger the two offenses are the "same."
Although this principle is fairly straightforward, courts have struggled with situations where there arc a variety of lesser-included offenses which might serve as components of the greater offense. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-421, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); United States v. Colon-Osorio, 10 F.3d 41, 45-46 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2749, 129 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994); Rubino v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 1266, 1269-1270 (5th Cir.1988). The best example of this is felony-murder, where a variety of felonies may constitute the lesser-included offense in felony-murder. Since our purpose here is not to clarify the scope of the double jeopardy doctrine in Louisiana, but only to formulate a standard by which the preemptive reach of LSA-R.S. 14:143 may be gauged, we need not directly address this dilemma; the fact that double jeopardy might present itself in the context of a conviction under a municipal ordinance and a subsequent prosecution under a state felony statute, with one or the other of these provisions being under some circumstances a lesser-included offense of the other, is sufficient to invoke the preemptive power of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
. In such application, a trial court should also apply any of the extant "exceptions" to the Blockburger rule. See, e.g., United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992) (conspiracy and substantive crime not the "same offense"); State v. Poland, 255 La. 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970) (attempted murder and murder not "same offense" where victim dies after attempted murder conviction secured).
. Since the ordinance was passed in 1993, see Note 2, supra, and the statute enacted in 1983, we need not address whether LSA-R.S. 14:143 may be applied retroactively to ordinances passed prior to its effective date.
. Even were we to interpret LSA-R.S. 14:28 as a general intent crime it would not change our analysis. Although the fact that the definition of specific intent is subsumed into that of general intent, see LSA-R.S. 14:10(2), confuses the issue, nevertheless whenever an offense requires proof of a criminal intent, general criminal intent is the baseline. It is a showing of actual or subjective criminal intent, not just objective circumstances, which would constitute a relevant "other fact" in Blockburger terms. Were LSA-R.S. 14:28 a general intent crime, it would merely mean that the ordinance required proof of two additional facts, that the violation occurred in public and with specific intent, that LSA-R.S. 14:28 does not. LSA-R.S. 14:28 would still not require proof of any facts that the ordinance did not (because specific intent is included in the definition of general intent), and thus would still constitute the "same offense" under Blockburger.
. On March 18, 1994, the trial court issued a supplement to its earlier judgment in which it stated that "the court also reviewed LSA-R.S. 15:1351 et seq., and found that the conduct regulated by City Ordinance 13:1055, is also preempted by certain provisions of this state statute." Given our finding that the ordinance is expressly preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143 we need not directly address this supplemental judgment. However, we do note that courts have consistently found that racketeering and other "criminal enterprise" statutes do not proscribe the "same offense" as their predicate acts. See United States v. O'Connor, 953 F.2d 338 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 924, 112 S.Ct. 1979, 118 L.Ed.2d 578 (1992); United States v. Evans, 951 F.2d 729 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 920, 112 S.Ct. 1966, 118 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992); United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 983, 112 S.Ct. 1666, 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992); United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991, 107 S.Ct. 589, 93 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986). In addition, the drug racketeering statute does not so "occupy the field" of narcotics regulation that "the exercise of dual authority is repugnant to a legislative objective." Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So.2d 482, 497 (La.1992), citing Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So.2d 1218, 1227 (La.1989).
.Even were the effect of LSA-R.S. 14:143 to deprive the local court of subject matter jurisdiction the "lack of standing" hurdle would remain. This is because a final disposition by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is, for double jeopardy purposes, "merely voidable, not void ab initio." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Pa.Super. 132, 645 A.2d 234, 244 (1994), citing McCar ver v. State, 379 So.2d 979 (Fla.1980); In re Bryan, 16 Cal.3d 782, 129 Cal.Rptr. 293, 548 P.2d 693 (1976); Walls v. State, 326 So.2d 322 (Miss.1976).
. This case is consistent with our opinion in Connick insofar as both decisions affirm and defend the constitutional prerogative of the district attorney to investigate and prosecute those who violate state criminal statutes. In Connick, we held that the district attorney's constitutional right to pursue a criminal investigation and prosecution under slate criminal statutes can only be enjoined by a district court in exceptional circumstances. In this case we conclude that the Legislature, to bolster the constitutional authority of the district attorney, has determined that district attorneys should be free of the specter of a felony defendant invoking double jeopardy based upon a prior municipal conviction under a municipal ordinance which penalizes the same conduct as the state felony statute. The appropriate remedy for alleviating such municipal "interference" in state criminal prosecutions, also expressly conferred by LSA-R.S. 14:143, is the preemption of such ordinances, and the appropriate procedural vehicle for the district attorney to invoke this remedy is the declaratory judgment action provided for in our Code of Civil Procedure.
. The proper parties to this action are of course the State, through its representative the district attorney, and the affected local governmental subdivision, which must be made a party to the proceeding. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1880.