Case Name: SPURLOCK v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2010-02-15
Citations: 286 Ga. 512
Docket Number: S09A1475
Parties: SPURLOCK v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hines, Melton and Nahmias, JJ., who concur specially.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 286
Pages: 512–528

Head Matter:
S09A1475.
SPURLOCK v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al.
(690 SE2d 378)

Opinion:
CARLEY, Presiding Justice.
Scott Spurlock (Father) and Lois Spurlock (Mother) were divorced in 2005. Pursuant to the final divorce decree, Father was ordered to pay monthly child support of $1,063. Three years later, he initiated a review of that child support order by the Department of Human Resources (DHR) pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12. DHR recommended that his child support obligation be reduced to $718 per month, and petitioned the trial court to adopt that recommendation.
The trial court did not fully adopt DHR's recommendation, but did order that Father's child support obligation be reduced to $1,000 per month. Acting pro se, Father appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to its grant of an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals then transferred the case to this Court based upon our jurisdiction over divorce and alimony cases. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (6).
1. We initially determine whether a modification of child support arising out of a DHR review under OCGA § 19-11-12 invokes this Court's divorce and alimony jurisdiction.
"[C]ase law has recognized for over a century that alimony includes support for children, leaving no question regarding the relationship of child support to alimony. [Cits.]" Jones v. Jones, 280 Ga. 712, 716 (2) (632 SE2d 121) (2006). See also Conley v. Conley, 259 Ga. 68, 69 (2) (377 SE2d 663) (1989); Veal v. Veal, 226 Ga. 285, 287 (2) (174 SE2d 435) (1970). Alimony may be recovered outside the context of a divorce proceeding. However, the right to make a claim for "alimony depends upon a valid, subsisting marriage between the applicant and the [person] out of whose estate the allowance of alimony is claimed, and this is true even though it is claimed only for the support of a child. [Cits.]" Eskew v. Eskevo, 199 Ga. 513 (2) (34 SE2d 697) (1945). Thus, an award of child support always constitutes alimony if it is made in a divorce decree proceeding, but it may or may not represent alimony outside the divorce context.
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over a case involving an original claim for child support which arose in either a divorce or alimony proceeding. Compare O'Quinn v. O'Quinn, 217 Ga. 431 (122 SE2d 925) (1961). Furthermore, actions for modification of alimony either for support of a former spouse or of a child, so long as the original award arose from a divorce or alimony proceeding, have always been within this Court's jurisdiction. Perry v. Perry, 213 Ga. 847, 849 (1) (102 SE2d 534) (1958). See also Parker v. Parker, 277 Ga. 664 (594 SE2d 627) (2004); Iannicelli v. Iannicelli, 169 Ga. App. 155 (1) (311 SE2d 850) (1983).
This Court routinely exercises its divorce and alimony jurisdiction when actions for modification of child support previously awarded in a divorce decree are brought by a parent pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19. See Jones v. Jones, supra; Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571-572 (1) (592 SE2d 664) (2004); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ga. 479 (512 SE2d 255) (1999); Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 (511 SE2d 167) (1999); Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 518 (1) (467 SE2d 556) (1996). Likewise, this Court has repeatedly exercised jurisdiction in cases involving DHR's review pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12 of child support awards originally established in a divorce decree. See Falkenberry v. Taylor, 278 Ga. 842 (607 SE2d 567) (2005); Dept. of Human Resources v. Allison, 276 Ga. 175 (575 SE2d 876) (2003); Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 263 Ga. 885 (440 SE2d 9) (1994); Allen v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 262 Ga. 521 (423 SE2d 383) (1992).
An action for child support modification under OCGA § 19-11-12 is neither inconsistent with, nor materially distinguishable from, a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19, such that the former, unlike the latter, does not invoke this Court's jurisdiction. Although the two code sections were enacted for different legislative purposes, "the review and modification proceedings of OCGA § 19-11-12 are reconciled to and consistent with the modification proceedings set forth in OCGA § 19-6-19." Kelley v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 269 Ga. 384, 386 (2) (498 SE2d 741) (1998).
Therefore, we hold that appeals from orders in proceedings for modification of a child support award which arose from a prior divorce or alimony action, regardless of the code section under which the modification was pursued, are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Because this case involves alimony for the support of children, we retain it and proceed to make all other necessary determinations.
2. After the Court of Appeals transferred the case here, we denied a motion to dismiss in which Mother argued that, because jurisdiction is properly in this Court, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to grant the application for discretionary appeal, and that such grant is therefore void. For the same reason, Justice Nahmias opines in his special concurrence, not that the appeal should be dismissed, but rather that, in accordance with certain unpublished orders, we should strike the transferred appeal and re-docket it as a granted application. However, such unpublished orders serve as neither binding nor physical precedent. Tunnelite v. Estate of Sims, 266 Ga. App. 476, 480 (3) (597 SE2d 555) (2004). It appears that we have just as often followed a different practice, as revealed in our published opinions. That practice has been simply to resolve the appeal. Parker v. Parker, 277 Ga. 664, 665 (594 SE2d 627) (2004); Etheredge v. All American Hummer Limousines, 269 Ga. 436, 437 (498 SE2d 60) (1998); Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 640 (423 SE2d 653) (1992). Although the question merely lurked in the record in those cases, such practice is supported by the only relevant authority which has clear precedential value: When this Court granted an application and then transferred the appeal, we observed that "the Court of Appeals may consider the case as it would if it had granted the application." Collins v. AT&T, 265 Ga. 37, 38 (456 SE2d 50) (1995).
Moreover, the procedure which we followed in the unpublished orders cited by Justice Nahmias is plainly unnecessary. Striking and re-docketing this appeal is not required to preserve our ultimate jurisdiction over the application. The special concurrence contains absolutely no authority that, whenever a case is transferred for jurisdictional reasons, every prior decision in the case must be formally vacated merely so that the receiving court can determine every motion or application anew. Throughout the pendency of this appeal, we have had the option to exercise our jurisdiction by dismissing the appeal as having been improvidently granted. By declining to do so, we have not ignored the jurisdictional limits set forth in the special concurrence, and instead have implicitly determined that the application was properly granted. In that way, we have not only exercised our jurisdiction, we have also chosen not to slow down the already delayed appellate consideration of this case.
3. Father contends that the trial court erred in failing to make written findings in accordance with OCGA § 19-6-15 (c) (2) (E) (iii) and (i) (1) (B) (iii) of the presence or absence of special circumstances justifying a departure from the presumptive amount of child support called for in that statute's guidelines.
Mother relies in part on the absence of any transcript of the proceedings and the resulting presumption of regularity. However, a lack of mandatory written findings " 'overcomes the presumption of regularity. (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Valley Wood, 290 Ga. App. 177, 178 (1) (659 SE2d 410) (2008). See also Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 287 Ga. App. 133, 134 (1) (650 SE2d 795) (2007). "Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion." Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 858 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003). See also Dept. of Human Resources v. Wilcox, 219 Ga. App. 757, 758 (466 SE2d 662) (1996) (where no transcript and no written findings pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-15, order modifying child support pursuant to DHR review vacated and case remanded for written findings). To the extent that Carson v. Carson, 226 Ga. App. 659, 660 (3) (487 SE2d 447) (1997) holds otherwise, it is hereby overruled.
Mother also argues that OCGA § 19-11-12 does not require the trial court to apply the guidelines or to take any action at all, because subsection (e) of that statute provides that, when the trial court finds a significant inconsistency between existing child support and the amount resulting from application of the guidelines in OCGA § 19-6-15, "the trier of fact may use this inconsistency as the basis to increase or decrease the amount of support ordered." (Emphasis supplied.) However,
Section 19-11-12 complies with the federal mandate that requires States to put in place effective procedures whereby every three years, the State conducts a review of support orders being enforced and, if appropriate, adjusts those orders in accordance with current statutory guidelines established for the determination of appropriate child support award amounts. [Cit.]
Kelley v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, supra at 387 (3). See also 42 USC § 666 (a) (10) (A) (i) (I), 667 (a). In light of its state and federal statutory context and of this Court's precedent, we conclude that OCGA § 19-11-12 (e) serves a purpose similar to OCGA § 19-6-15 (d), which provides that any court applying the child support guidelines "shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial."
This provision shows that the legislature intended to prohibit a trial court's rote application of the percentage range in the guidelines by requiring the court to consider all of the evidence presented before setting the parent's final child support obligation, in order to ensure that the obligation is fair and appropriate.
Weil v. Paseka, 282 Ga. App. 403, 407 (1) (b) (638 SE2d 833) (2006). Like OCGA § 19-6-15 (d), OCGA § 19-11-12 (e) serves to emphasize that the qualitative determinations of
whether special circumstances make the presumptive amount of child support excessive or inadequate and whether deviating from the presumptive amount serves the best interest of the child — are committed to the discretion of the court....
Hamlin v. Ramey, 291 Ga. App. 222, 224-225 (1) (661 SE2d 593) (2008). Accordingly, OCGA § 19-11-12 (e) does not authorize the trial court to refrain from written findings or any other compliance with OCGA § 19-6-15.
The trial court's written order incorporated a worksheet and schedules showing that the presumptive amount of Father's child support obligation under the guidelines is $725.44, and that an upward deviation of $274.30 from the presumptive amount was appropriate due to Father's high income. The order itself also stated that there were "non-specific deviations" and that "[a]ny further modification is not in the child's best interest." However, the order failed to
state how application of the presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and how the best interest of the children for whom support is being determined will be served by the deviation. OCGA § 19-6-15 (c) (2) (E) and (i) (1) (B). In addition, the order must include a finding that states how the court's or jury's application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support. OCGA § 19-6-15 (c) (2) (E) (iii). Because the court in this case applied a [high income] deviation from the presumptive amount of child support but failed to make all of the findings required under OCGA § 19-6-15 (c) (2) (E) and (i) (1) (B), we reverse the trial court's final judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Turner v. Turner, 285 Ga. 866, 867 (1) (684 SE2d 596) (2009). Compare Rumley-Miawama v. Miawama, 284 Ga. 811, 812 (1) (671 SE2d 827) (2009) (where trial court awards "the presumptive amount of child support without applying a discretionary deviation, OCGA § 19-6-15 does not require the court to issue findings to explain its reasoning in reaching that decision.").
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
All the Justices concur, except Hines, Melton and Nahmias, JJ., who concur specially.