Case Name: Wm. Fryer, and wife, administrator and administratrix of J. Harrell, v. Brown Bryan, and - Bigham, Sheriff
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1834-05
Citations: 2 Hill Eq. 56
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Wm. Fryer, and wife, administrator and administratrix of J. Harrell, v. Brown Bryan, and - Bigham, Sheriff.
Judges: O’Neall, J., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 49–53

Head Matter:
*Wm. Fryer, and wife, administrator and administratrix of J. Harrell, v. Brown Bryan, and - Bigham, Sheriff.
One, apprehensive that a decree for a large amount would be had against him, and with a view to defeat it, gave his bond to the defendant, his son, for twenty thousand dollars, on which judgment was obtained, and moneys arising from the sales of property by the sheriff claimed under it. On a bill to set aside the bond and judgment as fraudulent and void, the defendant admitted that the sum of three hundred and eighty two dollars was all that was really due to him, and claimed that the judgment should stand as a security for that amount: — Held, that the defendant, as a party to the fraud, was entitled to no favor; that the Court would not examine into the fraud to ascertain if any thing be really due; and the bond and judgment being fraudulent and void, the defendant should derive no benefit from them. [*56]
Marion — February, 1834.
The plaintiffs, as creditors of Lemuel Bryan, filed this bill to set aside a judgment obtained by the defendant, Brown Bryan, against his father, Lemuel Bryan, on which funds arising’ from the sale of his property by the sheriff were claimed, charging the same to be without consideration and fraudulent. The facts of the case, and the questions made in argument, are fully stated in the following Circuit decree:
De Saussure, Chancellor. The real question in this cause is, whether the object of the bond executed by Lemuel Bryan to his son, Brown Bryan, and the judgment thereon, was to defeat and defraud, or delay just creditors of their lawful demands; and if so, whether the same be void.
The condensed statement of the case is as follows: That Lemuel Bryan being largely indebted to various persons, and being under apprehension of a decree in Equity against him, in a suit then pending for a considerable amount, made and executed a bond to his son, Brown Bryan, in the penalty of $20*,000, with a condition for the payment of $10,000 ; there was no subscribing witness to the bond. After some time, and before the decree in equity, a suit was brought on the bond, and judgment obtained thereon, and entered up, in the penalty of $20,000, and execution issued and lodged in the sheriff’s office. No steps were taken by the son, Brown Bryan, to enforce said execution, but the same remained as a lien on the estate and effects of Lemuel Bryan. Other judgments and executions for smaller sums were enforced, and property sold, and the money paid to those creditors, without any interposition on the part of Brown Bryan. A large surplns, arising from the' sales of the property, was in the hands of sheriff Bigham, which still remains there. Brown Bryan, "sometime after the judgment and execution and sales, caused an entry to be made on the execution *on his judgment, stating that the sum of $382 was the only sum actually due him ; and it is not pretended that any more ever was due, nor has that amount, or any sum approaching it, be'en proved to be due by Lemuel Bryan, to his son, Brown Bryan. Meanwhile, a decree in Equity, for a considerable sum, had been obtained by Fryer and wife, as administrators of J. Harrell, in behalf of the children of Harrell, for their interest in the estate of Jacob Harrell, whose estate had been received and unaccounted for by Lemuel Bryan.
In attempting to enforce the decree, and to procure the payment of the debts established in behalf of the children who had been injured by the conduct of Lemuel Bryan, the effort was resisted by.setting up the judgment of Brown Bryan against Lemuel Bryan, as a prior lion, and covering all his property — and although an entry was finally made on the execution, that only the sum of $382 was due on the execution, yet this judgment has been interposed up to this time, as a shield to protect the estate of Lemuel Bryan against the decree and the demand for the money due thereon. On a rule taken out, calling on the sheriff to show cause why so much of the money arising from the sale of the estate of Lemuel Bryan, as exceeded the $382, latterly claimed for Brown Bryan, reserving that amount for discussion and decision, should not be paid to the plaintiffs, that rule was resisted, and no order could be obtained for the payment of such surplus; the return to the rule must have been of such a nature as to have produced that effect, and that return is not to be found. It has very improperly been withdrawn from the proceedings in the case, and leaves it uncertain on what ground the order proposed was then refused, which now, on full argument of the merits, is acquiesced in. The’grounds taken in that return made by the sheriff in order to have produced the effect of their defeating the rule, must have been some acknowledged uncertainty of what was actually due on the judgment of Brown Bryan. The sheriff’s answer to the bill relies on the uncertainty, as an excuse for not paying the money; and states that he had received $2,134, and paid away $1,112 on prior judgments, and had a balance of $1,022 in his hands which he could not pay over to the plaintiff, on account of the claims of the contending parties. It was argued that the bond executed by the father ‘to him for $20,000, was a fair bond given to secure the payment, not of $10,000, as is expressed on the face, but of a small sum alleged *to be Iona fide duo to him by his father, and some small additional advances expected to be made to him ; and that it was good to secure and cover the amount actually due him, and claimed to be $382. It was relied upon, that the answer of the defendant, Brown Bryan, denying any fraud in the transaction, was sufficient to repel the charge of fraud, and was conclusive in the case of a bill of discovery. This is a bill for discovery and relief, and the answer is contradicted by the testimony of the witnesses. They prove that Brown Bryan knew very well.that his father did not owe him a twentieth part of what the bond stipulated in the condition to pay, even if he owes him anything, (which has by no means been proved satisfactorily,) and that he (Brown Bryan) aided his father in preparing the bond for this fictitious debt, and wrote it for him, and has relied on the judgment obtained upon it, and is sot up as a screen to protect the property of Lemuel Brown from his creditors, the plaintiffs. The witnesses prove that Brown Bryan well knew the nullity of such a bond and judgment, and so he stated to them.
Upon a careful review of the circumstances of this case, I cannot have a doubt of what I am bound tó do. It was clearly a case in which a debtor, apprehensive of a large debt being established against him, in a suit pending against him, on behalf of orphans, whose father’s estate he had mismanaged, set up a fictitious demand against himself, and gave it the legal form of a bond and judgment, expressly in order to defeat, defraud and delay that just demand; it was given, and has been used for that purpose ; and I am bound to declare such bond, and the judgment founded on it, to be fraudulent and void.
A good deal of stress was laid, in the argument, on the character of Brown Bryan. It was alleged, and proved by respectable witnesses, entitled to perfect credit, that his character was pure, and indeed high in the estimation of his fellow-citizens; I am very glad of it, as it will pro- . tect him from the imputation of moral fraud, even if the circumstances of the case should compel the Court to decide that Lemuel Bryan committed an actual fraud, and his son misled by filial duty, or any other circumstance, should be adjudged to have incurred the blame of legal fraud, by lending his name and character to cover the attempts of his father to shelter his property from his creditors and their just demands oii him, by setting up a fictitious and enormous debt, as due by the father to *the son. The Court cannot permit justice to be entangled in such a cobweb, aud where the proofs of fraud are clear, the good charae- ■- J ter of a third person, who is induced to loud his name in the case, cannot be allowed to prevail against them.
There is another question remaining to be derided. It is admitted that Brown Bryan has no such enormous demand on his father, as the sum conditioned to be paid in the fictitious bond for $10,000 ; but it is contended, that at the time the bond was executed, there were some small debts due by the father to his stripling son, amounting to about $124, and that it was intended to make other occasional advances to the father, to be covered by the bond; and that, in fact, the son did make other advances to the father, so that the latter really now owes the former $382; and the son claims payment for that amount out of the fund in the sheriff’s hands, as protected by the bond and judgment. This claim is resisted by the plaintiffs, on two grounds : first, that it is not shown that the sum of $382 was really and justly due by Lemuel Bryan to his son Brown Bryan. Some proofs were given of a small debt of about $124, (at least the answer states that) beyond this no debt was proved. The second objection made by the plaintiffs is, that the defendant, Brown Bryan, having mingled whatever amount of fair claim he had on the father, in the fraudulent transaction of his father, cannot be permitted to protect, under that fraudulent bond and judgment which are null and void, even what may be really due to him, and therefore he stands merely on the footing of a simple contract creditor.
This question has come before the Court in several cases : In Miller v. ToIIeson, and others, (Harper’s Eq. Hep. 145), I decided that the transactions were fraudulent and void; but that B. Holder, having some just claims on ToIIeson, the conveyance of the land should stand as a security for what might be found to be justly due to him : the then Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, except so far as respected the debt alleged to be justly due Holder; but reserved that. Chancellor GailIard, who delivered the opinion of the Court of Appeals, stated that the decree must be supported as far as it decides against the defendant. But the Court was of opinion “that the decree did not go far enough. It orders the deed, made by ToIIeson, conveying the land to Holder, for the nominal consideration of $20,000, should stand as a security for such , balance as might be found to be bona ficle due by J. ToIIeson *to " -J Holder. The Court was of opinion, that although there might be something due by ToIIeson to Holder, the latter is not entitled to the benefit of the conveyance, as a security for what may be found due, because the deed making an absolute conveyance by ToIIeson to Holder for a large nominal price, was intended as a fraud to cover his property from his creditors; and as Holder lent his name to this fraud, he ought not to derive any benefit from it. The deed must therefore be considered void, and Holder must be allowed to pursue his remedy against ToIIeson, if there be anything due to him, which is at least doubtful.”' It appears to me that this decision is conclusive in the case we are considering, unless later decisions, made by the Court of Appeals, should have reversed it and changed the law.
I am told that in a case in Lancaster, of ■-, decided by me, I followed out the principle established, as above stated, and decreed according to the decision in Miller v. ToIIeson; but that the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decree generally, did let the security stand for as much as really had been paid. I was not furnished with a copy of the decree of the Court of Appeals, nor do I know the grounds of the decision. But I am satisfied that there must have been something peculiar in that case, which made an exception proper, and that the Court did not mean to set aside the principle in Miller v. ToIIeson, which I consider a very salutary one to discourage frauds of this kind.
It is therefore ordered and decreed, that the bond of Lemuel Bryan to Brown Bryan, for the very large penalty of $20,000, (conditioned to pay $10,000) when there was nothing really due but a very trifling sum, and that not satisfactorily proved, being made to delay, defeat and defraud creditors, is fraudulent and wholly void; and it is further ordered, that the defendant, sheriff Bigham, do immediately pay over to the plaintiffs the whole amount of money remaining in his hands, arising from the sale of the property of Lemuel Bryan — costs to be paid by the defendant, Brown Bryan.
From this decree, the defendant, Brown Bryan, appealed on the ground :—
That the Chancellor should have decreed the judgment to be valid to the amount of $382, the sum claimed to be due.
* Graham, for the appellant,
cited 2 Poth. 156-8; 13 Ves. 47 ; 2 John. Ch. 89; 1 M’C. Ch. 440; 2 M’C. Ch. 102; 1 Ves. sen’r, *- ^ 37; 1 John. Ch. 482; 4 John. Rep. 536, 598-9; 1 Eq. Rep. 167; 1 M’C. Ch. 265.
Moses, contra.
Probably, Brown v. McDonald, 1 Hill Ch. 297; which does not, however, sustain the position here contended for. R.

Opinion:
Johnson, J.
The fact that the bond and judgment were intended as a fraud on the creditors of Lemuel Bryan, is ascertained by the Chancellor's decree, and is fully sustained by the evidence : and as a party to that fraud, the defendant, Bryan, is entitled to no favor. We concur, therefore, with the Chancellor, that the judgment ought not to stand as a security for what may be due. The Court was nor bound to disentangle a web of fraud of his own manufacture, to ascertain that there may have been some good material mixed up with it.
Motion dismissed.
O'Neall, J., concurred.