Case Name: FT. LOGAN MENTAL HEALTH CENTER and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Petitioners, v. Lewis G. WALKER; the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado; and Charles McGrath, Director of the Division of Labor, Respondents
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1986-03-20
Citations: 723 P.2d 740
Docket Number: No. 85CA0470
Parties: FT. LOGAN MENTAL HEALTH CENTER and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Petitioners, v. Lewis G. WALKER; the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado; and Charles McGrath, Director of the Division of Labor, Respondents.
Judges: BERMAN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 723
Pages: 740–743

Head Matter:
FT. LOGAN MENTAL HEALTH CENTER and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Petitioners, v. Lewis G. WALKER; the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado; and Charles McGrath, Director of the Division of Labor, Respondents.
No. 85CA0470.
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.
March 20, 1986.
Rehearing Denied April 17, 1986.
Certiorari Denied (Ft. Logan) Aug. 25, 1986.
Margaret D. Keck, William J. Baum, Denver, for petitioners.
John Hoyman, P.C., John Hoyman, Greeley, for respondent Lewis G. Walker.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Robert C. Lehnert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents Indus. Com’n and Charles McGrath.

Opinion:
TURSI, Judge.
Ft. Logan Mental Health Center and State Compensation Insurance Fund (petitioners) seek review of a final order of the Industrial Commission which determined that a job-related psychiatric disability suffered by Lewis Walker (claimant) was com-pensable under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act (Act), § 8-41-101, et seq., C.R.S. We affirm.
Claimant was employed as a geriatric nurse at Ft. Logan when he became involved in an altercation with a patient. As a result, claimant's superiors took disciplinary action against him. Subsequently, claimant became severely distressed because he perceived the discipline as unwarranted and unjust. Claimant also experienced a deterioration in a pre-existing hypertension condition which had previously been under control. Because of these problems, claimant consulted, among others, two psychiatrists.
One of the psychiatrists concluded that claimant was suffering from a pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder which was aggravated by the events at Ft. Logan and recommended that claimant not return to work there. He further opined that the aggravation was disabling and that, absent the subject incidents, claimant would have been able to continue his duties at Ft. Logan.
The other psychiatrist diagnosed claimant as having a pre-existing paranoid personality disorder which was not aggravated by the events at Ft. Logan.
The Commission concluded that claimant sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing psychiatric condition which was caused by a work-related incident and awarded benefits.
On review, petitioners first contend that the manifestation of claimant's pre-existing mental condition is not an injury as contemplated by the Act. We disagree.
Our supreme court has held that job-related mental or emotional stress may cause an injury which supports an award for an ensuing disability. See City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo.1985). Further, we have recognized the compensability of mental disability resulting from a job-related incident. See Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo.App.1981). Combining these determinations with the principle that the aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable, see State v. Richards, 158 Colo. 155, 405 P.2d 675 (1965), we conclude that the manifestation of claimant's condition is within the purview of the Act. But see Vigil v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 1049 (D.Colo.1983); Luna v. City & County of Denver, 537 F.Supp. 798 (D.Colo.1982).
Petitioners also contend that there is insufficient evidence that the events at Ft. Logan aggravated claimant's condition. Specifically, they contend that Dr. Yost's opinion was insufficient because he failed adequately to explain it. We do not agree.
The alleged omission goes only to credibility, which matter is within the Commission's sole province. Thus, we are bound by its ruling on review. See Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 34 (1970).
Order affirmed.
BERMAN, J., concurs.
PIERCE, J., dissents.