Case Name: Ruddle's Ex'or v. Ben
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1839-07
Citations: 10 Leigh 467
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Ruddle’s Ex’or v. Ben.
Judges: (Absent Cabell and Brooke, J.)
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 428–433

Head Matter:
*Ruddle’s Ex’or v. Ben.
July, 1839,
Lewisburg.
(Absent Cabell and Brooke, J.)
Emancipated Slaves — Subjection to Debt of Former Owner — Habeas Corpus. — A slave, after being1 emancipated, is taken by execution to satisfy tbe debt of a former owner, contracted before be executed a bill of sale for tbe slave to tbe person by whom tbe emancipation has been made: Held, a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy ; and on this writ, it may be determined whether or no the bill of sale is valid against' creditors. By two judges.
Slaves — Sale of — When Not Voluntary — Case at Bar.— The owner of a slave permits him to act for him self, paying the owner a hire. During three years that he so acts, the slave, besides paying- the hire, earns §200, of which he deposits $75 with the owner. The owner, contemplating an eventual emancipation. makes a bill of sale, and delivers to the grantee possession of the slave, for the consideration of $200. of which the $75 in his hands is taken as part. The other earnings of the slave ($125) are afterwards collected and paid over in satisfaction of the balance of the consideration money. In the transaction, there is no intent to defraud the grantor’s creditors. The grantee afterwards emancipates the slave, and the slave so emancipated is taken by execution to satisfy a debt of 1he first owner, contracted before he executed the bill of sale. Held, the bill of sale cannot be considered a purely voluntary one, and the slave so emancipated should, upon a habeas corpus, be discharged from custody, leaving the creditor to resort to eauity to set aside the bill of sale and the instrument of emancipation, if he can properly do so, because of the inadequacy of the consideration for the bill of sale, or upon any' other ground. By two judges-dissentiente Tuokbk, P.
Adam Dirting owning a man of colour named Ben, sometimes called Ben Ware, as his slave, died intestate, leaving his sons John Dirting and Adam Dirting his sole distributees, who received the slave from the administrator of their father’s estate, in a course of distribution. Afterwards, to wit, on the 6th of May 1830, Adam Dirting, for the consideration of 200 dollars, sold to John Dirting his moiety of the slave, and from that time John had him as sole owner. Subsequently John Dirling executed *a bill of sale for Ben to Michael Barr, and Barr executed an instrument in writing emancipating and setting free Ben. The bill of sale from John Dirting was for the consideration of 200 dollars, and was executed the 31st of December 1833; and possession of Ben was then delivered by Dirting to Barr. The instrument of emancipation likewise bore date on the 31st of December 1833; but the 11th of July 1836 was the day on which it was acknowledged and admitted to record in the court of Shenandoah county. In this county the parties resided.
James Fuddle executor of Isaac Fuddle was a creditor of Mary Koontz, who died intestate. Administration of her estate was granted to John Dirting on the 13th of February 1832, and bond was given by the administrator, with Adam Dirting -and Henry J. Wunder as sureties. Soon after John Dirting’s qualification as administrator, to wit, on the 24th of February 1832, assets to the amount of the debt due Fuddle’s executor came to the hands of John Dirting as administrator, and were wasted or misapplied by him. Fuddle’s executor, on the 21st of June 1834, brought a suit in chancery against the administrator and his sureties, and on the 16th of August 1838 obtained a decree against them for 86 dollars 38 cents, with interest from the 1st of February 1833 till paid, and the costs. Upon this decree an execution was issued, directed to the sheriff of Shenandoah, and the same was levied on Ben.
Ben, being detained in custody under this execution, applied to the judge of the circuit court of Shenandoah for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and shewed, by the affidavit of another person, probable cause to believe that he was detained in custody without lawful authority. Thereupon the judge, (requiring bond with security in the penalty of 40 dollars, conditioned for the payment of such costs and damages as might be awarded against the prisoner, and that he would not ^escape by the way,) granted the writ of habeas corpus, directed to the sheriff of Shenandoah, returnable immediately before him; and the sheriff accordingly brought the prisoner before the judge, and certified the cause of his detainer; whereby it appeared, that under the execution before mentioned, he was levied on as the property of John Dirting, and that he was detained for no other cause.
Upon the trial, the judge caused all the material facts proved to be made a part of the record.
In the opinion of the judge, the fact was sufficiently proved, that at the time of the execution of the bill of sale from John Dirting to Michael Barr, neither party intended thereby to delay, hinder or defraud the creditors of Dirting. It appeared that on the 31st of December 1833, all the debts then due and owing by Dirting (including the claim of Fuddle’s executor) amounted to about 200 dollars, and Dirting had then property more than sufficient to pay all his debts. He had paper to the amount of ISO dollars, a horse that afterwards sold for 70-dollars, some other property (the particular value of which was not ascertained) and the money which had been and was thereafter to be paid him by Ben, as is presently mentioned.
Though the consideration for the bill of sale from Dirting was 200 dollars, yet Barr himself paid no part of that consideration, nor did he assume or promise to pay any part, but the whole amount was paid to Dirting by Ben. Whilst Dirting was the owner of Ben, he permitted him to work out, Ben paying him 1 dollar per week or SO dollars per year; and all he earned over that sum was to be his own. Ben regularly paid Dirting the hire, and previously to the 31st of December 1833, deposited with him a little upwards of 75 dollars of his own money, which was taken and considered as part of the 200 dollars, the consideration for which the bill of sale was executed. Dirting relied *on the promise of Ben to pay him the balance in a short time; and the same was so paid by Ben. There was paid, on the 25th of January 1834, 50 dollars, and on the 11th of October 1834, 25 dollars. The dates of the other payments were not precisely ascertained, no receipts having been given; but those payments were made very shortly after December 1833; and all the money had been earned by Ben before that time, though not then collected.
As to the value of Ben at the time the bill of sale was executed, there was conflicting evidence. Upon the whole thereof, the judge stated the fact to be that his value was 350 dollars; believing, from the evidence, that if he had been brought into market, he would have sold for about that sum.
When the bill of sale was executed, on the 31st of December 1833, Michael Barr signed a paper writing in which he stipulated that Ben should be free at his death.
From the 31st of December 1836, Barr exercised acts of ownership over Ben as his slave, by giving him orders permitting him to work for certain individuals and to receive the pay, and at one time a general order permitting him to work for any person he might choose. The earnings of Ben were in part received by him, and in part collected by Barr and paid over to him. Ben performed work for Barr, for some of which he was paid; for some he was not paid, as he did not claim anything. Ben’s wife was a slave belonging to Barr.
On the 11th of July 1836, a second bill of sale was executed by John Dirting, conveying Ben to Barr; and it was acknowledged in court the same day. This bill of sale bears date, on its face, the 31st of December 1833, the day of the execution of the first bill of sale, and the time when possession of Ben was delivered by Dirting to Barr. The reason assigned for táking the ^second bill of sale, and which appeared to be the true reason, was that neither Barr nor his counsel was then apprized of the fact that Adam Dirting had ever conveyed his interest in Ben to his brother John. The second bill of sale was therefore prepared, antedated as of the date of the first, and Adam Dirting procured to witness it, that he might thereby impliedly waive any right or claim he might have to Ben. Afterwards the bill of sale of the 6th of Xvfay 1830 from Adam to John was discovered.
The deed of emancipation from Barr to Ben was executed by Barr in consequence of the advice of an attorney whom he consulted, that he was liable to be presented by the grand jury for permitting Ben to work and trade as he did. This deed of emancipation, though dated the 31st of December 1833, was not executed until July 1836. It was antedated at Barr’s request, with a view to shield him from prosecution | for the time past, although he was told by the scrivener (who was the attorney he consulted) that the deed of emancipation could have no effect before it was recorded.
There was in the hands of the sheriff of Shenandoah, an execution on behalf of Sybert Jordan & Co. against Dirting, for a debt of 23 dollars 41 cents, due before the bill of sale of the 31st of December 1833 was executed: but Jordan & Co. to secure that debt, took of Dirting, on the 11th of November 1834, a deed of trust on| property sufficient at the time to pay the debt. The judgment had been obtained since.
Dirting, in consequence of not paying for the support of a bastard child, was imprisoned, and took the oath of insolvency on the 11th of November 1834. The child, it appeared, was not born till the 4th of September 1834. Ben was not included in Dirting’s schedule.
*An indemnifjúng bond was required by the sheriff who levied on Ben, before he would make the levy; and the bond was given by Ruddle’s executor. Wunder, the surety, gave to Ruddle’s executor a counter indemnity.
The judge of the circuit court, being of opinion that the law and the evidence required that he should discharge Ben, ordered that he be discharged according^'; and Ben, by his counsel, waiving all claim to judgment for costs, no costs or charges were awarded against either party.
The proceedings and judgment were signed by the judge, certified by him, and entered among the records of the circuit court of Shenandoah. And Ruddle’s executor feeling himself aggrieved by the judgment, the court of appeals, on his petition, granted a writ of error.
G. B. Samuels, for the plaintiff in error.
All the money paid to Dirting as the price of Ben, was earned by Ben whilst the slave of Dirting. The slave could not be entitled to the money as his property, but the wages earned by him during his slavery belonged to his master. The money received by Dirting as the price of Ben, being Dirting’s own money, the conveyance to Barr was therefore without valuable consideration, and void as to creditors. The record further discloses that Dirting and Barr meditated a fraud on the law, by permitting Ben to stay in Virginia against the policy of the statute requiring emancipated slaves to remove from the commonwealth. Dirting, if able, might have emancipated Ben at once; but he would then have been required to leave the state. To evade the law in this respect, the title was conveyed gratuitously to Barr, who permitted Ben to act as a free man, paying him — the master paying his own slaves — for all the labour he ever performed. Unless we are concluded by *the opinion of the judge, there is also enough in the record to shew that Dirting and Barr intended a fraud upon creditors. The consideration, even if paid by Barr, was wholly inadequate; the sum of 200 dollars having been received for a slave worth, in the opinion of the judge, 350 dollars. Dirting was deeply involved in debt, and, in less than a year afterwards, had to take the benefit of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors. Ruddle’s executor, moreover, was an antecedent creditor. As to him, the transaction should be treated as fraudulent and void, without regard to the amount of Dirting’s debts, the value of his property, or his circumstances. Reade’s adm’r v. Livingston & others, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 481; Townshend v. Wind-ham, 2 Ves. sen. 11. If Dirting himself had manumitted Ben, it is clear, under the statute 1 Rev. Code, ch. Ill, {j 54, p. 434, that Ben would have been liable to be taken by execution to satisfy debts contracted by Dirting before making the emancipation. Now here, Dirting has voluntarily conveyed Ben to Barr, upon an understanding that he is to treat him as a free man from the first, and afterwards manumit him. If Dirting can thus evade the payment of his debts, he does that indirectly which he could not do directly.
Alexander Anderson, for defendant in error.
To make a deed voluntary, it must be without any, the least, valuable consideration. Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 407. If any thing valuable pass between the parties, the transaction is a purchase. Jackson v. Peek, 4 Wend. 301. Here, the money earned by the slave, and paid as the consideration for the sale, is to be regarded as a valuable consideration, if there be any analogy to the state of villenage. Co. Lit. 117a, note 161, and 118a, $ 177. But even if the conveyance be regarded as voluntary, the doctrine of setting aside such conveyances by persons indebted at the time, does not go to the extent contended for. Tunno v. Trezevant, 2 Desauss. *'270. A trifling indebtedness, where the grantor retains under his control property sufficient to meet his debts, is not enough to avoid a voluntary conveyance. In the case of such a conveyance, as in any other case, the question is whether there was actual fraud. And this question is to be determined upon the whole evidence. Jackson v. Peek, 4 Wend. 301. Here, it cannot be alleged that there was the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. Such an allegation is precluded by the state of the facts, as certified by the judge of the circuit court. Nor is there any other aspect in which the conveyance can be held fraudulent as to Dirting’s creditors. See Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R. 587; Hamilton v. Russel, 1 Cranch 309; Sydnor v. Gee, 4 Leigh 535; Wheaton v. Sexton’s lessee, 4 Wheat. 503; Sexton’s lessee v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, and Hinde’s lessee v. Long-worth, 11 Wheat. 199. Neither the sale to Barr, nor the subsequent emancipation by him, was in fraudem legis; because, 1st. Dirting’s object was neither the immediate nor remote emancipation of Ben: 2dly, Barr bought him because he was the owner of his wife, and intended that Ben should be his slave, at least during Barr’s own life. Nor can the emancipation be impeached on the ground that Barr was induced to it by fear of prosecution for a violation of law in reference to his duties and obligations as master. The grounds on which the rights of the defendant in error can be assailed must be such as derive their efficacy from considerations affecting the conduct of Dirting, and him alone.
Though it be supposed that Dirting designed a fraud upon his creditors, still, if Barr was a bona fide purchaser, his title is not to be affected. Sands v. Hildreth, 14 Johns. Rep. 498. The doctrine has moreover been sanctioned even hy this court, that a fair and bona fide purchaser from one who was a volunteer under a fraudulent grantee, is entitled to protection against the ^creditors of the grantor. Coleman v. Cocke, 6 Rand. 618. Ben may be regarded as an innocent purchaser without notice, and on that ground entitled to his freedom. See also Bppes &c. v. Randolph, 2 Call 183; Garland v. Rives, 4 Rand. 282; 1 Rev. Code, ch. 101, | 3, p. 373, and Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.
Emancipated Slaves — Subjection to Debt of Former Owner — Habeas Corpus. — In Sbue v. Turk," 15 Gratt. 259, Judge Robertson delivering the opinion of tbe court said: '“It is settled that a negro, claimed and held as á slave, cannot litigate bis right to freedom under a writ of habeas corpus. In this case, however, tbe petitioner produces bis papers showing,’ 'on their face, that he has been regularly emancipated, and registered as a free negro ; and it appears upon the return and evidence, that those bolding him in custody do not claim him as their slave, but that he is held by virtue of an execution levied for the purpose of subjecting him to a debt due from A. Hanna. The matter in controversy is not whether the petitioner is a freeman or a slave : but whether, as an emancipated negro, he is liable for a debt of Hanna, his former owner — that is to say, whether, being free, he is subject to a lien, the enforcement of which may have the effect of reducing him again to the condition of slavery.
“In Ruddle’s Mx’or v. Ben, 10 Leigh 467, it was .held that a writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy in such case. This decision, however, was made by a court composed of three judges only, one of whom dissented ; and so is not of binding authority. But I think that the decision of the majority, upon this question, was right; and the reasons given by Judge Parker in support of it, are so clear and forcible, that I cannot do better than refer to that portion of his opinion, expressing my entire concurrence in the views presented by him, upon this point.”
In this same case, Judge Lee, dissenting from the opinion of the court, said: “I am of opinion that the writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for the assertion of the right to freedom claimed by the plaintiff in this case. It is true it was sustained by the opinion of two of the three j udges who sat in the case of Buddle’s Mx’or v. Ben, 10 Leigh 467, but the reasons on which it was rested are to my mind quite unsatisfactory. That the claimant produces a deed of emancipation cannot, as it seems to me, change the remedy for the enforcement of the right which it is alleged to confer, and it is conceded that in general this right cannot be litigated upon a writ of habeas corpus; and although those who claim his custody, do not claim as masters that he is their slave, they do claim that to them the deed of emancipation is ineffectual and that they have the right to treat him as property and subject to be sold as the slave of the debtor party. The question at last is one of freedom or slavery, absolute freedom or qualified slavery, and should be tried in a more convenient and appropriate proceeding than a habeas corpus.”
See generally, monographic note on “Habeas Corpus ” appended to Ex parte Pool, 2 Va. Gas. 276.
Slaves — Emancipation in Pursuance of. Contract between Plaster and Slave — Liability for Debt of Master, — In Shue v. Turk, 15 Gratt. 266, the proposition is laid down that a slave, who has, under a contract for his future emancipation, paid his master the stipulated price for his freedom, and who has been actually emancipated in consequence thereof, is liable to be subjected to the payment of any debt of his master, existing at the time of the emancipation. The reason given, is because the emancipation in such case is without any valuable consideration — the price paid by the slave not constituting such consideration, inasmuch as not only the slave himself, but everything made by or belonging to him, is in law the property of his master.
Concerning the principal case, the court says: “It is true, that the opinion of a majority of the court, in Ruddle's Ex'or v. Ben, 10 Leigh 467, appears to be in conflict with this view: but, as has been already stated, that case is not binding as authority ; and the decision in this respect (as indeed is shown by Judge Tucker, who dissented on this point,) is so opposed to the necessary consequences resulting from the relation of master and slave, that it cannot be regarded as law.”
In Shue v. Turk, 15 Gratt. 275, Lee, J., in delivering his dissenting opinion, said that the principal case is not a binding authority upon any point.
Chancery Jurisdiction — Emancipated Slaves — Cred itors.-In Jincey v. Winfield, 9 Gratt. 713, it is said: “A court of chancery has jurisdiction to adjust the rights of the creditors and of the freed men. It will enjoin the creditors' execution, even alter it is levied on the freed men, until it can ascertain, by proper inciuiries, whether there be any other property which .should be applied to their exoneration : and will not utterly reject their claim 'until it is found that no possibility exists of effectuating their emancipation.’ That such is the law, and such the mode of its administration, -will plainly appear by reference to the cases of Woodley v. Abby, 5 Call 336; Patty v. Colin, 1 Hen. & Munf. 519 ; Dunn v. Amey, 1 Leigh 463 ; Elder v. Elder, 1 Leigh 252 ; Nicholas v. Burruss, Id. 289; Parks v. Hewlett, 9 Leigh 511; Ruddle’s Ex'or v. Ben, 10 Leigh. 467."

Opinion:
PARKER, J.
A preliminary question has been suggested in this case, which meets us in limine. It is whether the matters in controversy between these parties could be properly tried upon a writ of habeas corpus. If the issue was one of slavery or no slavery, and the right of the defendant in error to freedom was the litigated point, presenting some real and not merely colourable ground for controversy, I should concede that it ought not to be determined upon the habeas corpus, for the reasons assigned in the case of De Lacy v. Antoine & others, 7 Leigh 438. But it appears here that the matter in question is not the right to freedom, but the right to levy an execution on one who has been duly emancipated by an acknowledged owner. Ben is a free man under the act of assembly, but the claim is to make him liable for the antecedent debts of Dirting, because Dirting's conveyance to Barr, being purely voluntary, was not binding on creditors, although it was binding on Dirting. The real question is, whether Ben is illegally confined in custody; and the solution of that question depends not upon the en-quiry whether he was duly and properly emancipated, but whether, being emancipated, he is not liable to a charge which, if allowed, may or may not reduce him to his original state of slavery. No person is claiming to be his master, no person is detaining him asa slave, so as to authorize him to petition a court to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis for the recovery of his freedom, under our act of assembly; but the return to the writ of habeas corpus is, that he has been taken in execution to ^satisfy a debt due from his former master, and the validity of that return depends on considerations extraneous of the question whether or no he is a slave. Although the enquiry thus presented may be complicated and difficult, involving questions of fact as well as law, yet that is no reason for denying to the petitioner the benefit of the great and salutary writ of habeas corpus. If often happens that a judge is forced to decide the most embarrassing and delicate questions on the return to that writ. The writ itself applies to all cases of illegal detention of the person, except that which grows out of the relation of master and slave; and it would apply to that also, but that another remedy is provided which seems virtually to exclude a resort to the habeas corpus. If the petitioner were allowed to sue in forma pauperis one detaining him as a slave, and should recover in the action, still that decision would not determine the questions raised on this record, or preclude the creditors of Dirting from levying their executions. Therefore I think we may now adjudicate the righ-t of the petitioner to be discharged from the custody of the sheriff of Shenandoah, in-this proceeding by habeas corpus.
There is no difficulty about the facts of the case. [Here the judge detailed them.]
In applying the law to these facts, we must recollect that the deed of emancipation from Barr to Ben is not assailed, and that it was not for a debt contracted by the person emancipating, before such emancipation was made, that the petitioner was taken in execution, (see 1 Rev. Code, ch. 111, 2 S4, p. 434,) but for the debt of Dirting, who had conveyed to the emancipator, and received at the same time a paper writing stipulating that Ben should be free at the emancipator's death. Nor is the conveyance to Barr made utterly void as to creditors by the act of fraudulent conveyances; because the facts certified negative the idea that it was "contrived, *of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud creditors;" and because, if the consideration paid to Dirting is not "deemed valuable in law," the conveyance was by deed duly .proved and recorded, and possession delivered by the grantor. Although therefore, if the deed be voluntary, creditors may certainly avoid it, yet it may be doubted whether, under the circumstances, this execution could be levied on the petitioner, who had been duly emancipated by Barr and was then in the enjoyment of all the rights of a freeman, without first setting aside the deed from Dirting to Barr, and the deed of emancipation from Barr to the defendant in error. But waiving this enquiry, I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that the deed to Barr, with the view of ultimate emancipation, was a purely voluntary one: without which the plaintiff in error cannot subject Ben to the debt due from Dirting to his testator. Dirting had permitted his slave to act for himself, upon being paid a hire which is not proved to be an inadequate one.- Dur'ing the three years that he thus acted, the petitioner earned the 200 dollars which was afterwards paid to his master as the consideration for the conveyance to Barr. This money, if in the slave's possession, might have been taken from him by Dirting notwithstanding the previous arrangement, if he chose to exercise the rigid power of a master; for I readily concede that in this commonwealth no contract between a master and slave is binding, and the latter can acquire no property of which the former may not deprive him. But this, I think, results from the power which the master may exert over the slave, and the denial to the latter of all remedy to recover back the money so taken, rather than from any acknowledged principles of right and justice. If the master does not choose to exercise the power over the extra earnings of the slave, and to commit a manifest injustice, I do not perceive *that we are bound to allow his creditors to urge a want of consideration, when no fraud upon their rights was contemplated, and none can be practised, if an actual equivalent has been received, although that equivalent consists of something upon which the master, against conscience, might have seized. Besides, the case is stronger, where (as here) a part of the consideration was beyond the power of the master. About 125 dollars of the earnings of the slave whilst the property of Dirting, had not been collected at the date of the conveyance, but was afterwards collected and paid as a part of the 200 dollars. Dirting could not have recovered this money from the employers of Ben, because he had permitted his slave, in violation of the law, to trade and act as a freeman, and that law would not have assisted him in recovering from others under a contract thus made with the slave. The money was, however, paid to Ben whilst he belonged to Barr, and was applied (by the latter, I presume,) in discharging the consideration money mentioned in the deed. This 125 dollars was more than the amount of the debt due to the testator of the plaintiff in error; and being received by Dirting afterwards under such circumstances, prevents-us, as I think, from considering the conveyance a purely voluntary one. Whether 1 the price stipulated, or this portion of it, was adequate or not, might be a material circumstance in determining the question of fraudulent intent; but as that is settled by the proofs before the judge, it can have no influence on the question now under consideration.
The cases cited are those wherein a. fraud was meditated upon existing creditors; or where the conveyance was made with a view to future indebtedness; or where a conveyance of property, although accompanied by possession, has been set aside in equity for the want of a valuable consideration. The case at bar does not belong to either of the two first classes; nor to the last, ^'unless we are prepared to decide that the master cannot bestow upon the slave the privilege of acquiring any property, which may serve as a foundation (if the master's will and conscience so determine) for a consideration moving, mediately or immediately, from the slave to the master, for the inestimable grant of freedom. In this anomalous case, where there is no authority to bind us. I conceive we may obey the dictates of humanity and justice.
I am therefore for affirming the order of the judge discharging the petitioner from the custody of the sheriff of Shenandoah ; leaving the plaintiff in error to seek his remedy in equity, if he has any.
STANARD, J., expressed a strong doubt as to the proprietj' of the remedy resorted to. But being overruled on that point by a majority of the court, he stated that he concurred in the opinion of Parker, J., on the merits. ; l