Case Name: James Calvin Edward McGHEE v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1995-06-15
Citations: 657 So. 2d 799
Docket Number: No. 91-KA-00209-SCT
Parties: James Calvin Edward McGHEE v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 657
Pages: 799–808

Head Matter:
James Calvin Edward McGHEE v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 91-KA-00209-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 15, 1995.
Robin Alfred-Midcalf, Gulfport, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Jackson, Pat S. Flynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Justice,
for the Court.
James Calvin Edward McGhee appeals his conviction of capital rape of a nine-year-old female child and sentence of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as pronounced by the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County on February 6, 1991.
Feeling aggrieved, McGhee appeals to this Court citing two assignments of error:
I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE CRIME OF RAPE UNDER SECTION 97-3-65 (SUPP.1991) MISSISSIPPI CODE ANNOTATED AND, THEREFORE, THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
McGhee's claim that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is without merit and does not warrant discussion. After careful consideration of the remaining issue concerning McGhee's allegation that he was denied his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial, we find no reversible error and therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Having determined there is no merit to McGhee's claim that the verdict was against the overwhelming evidence, it is unnecessary to cite all of the factual details concerning the capital rape incident. Those facts pertinent for consideration of McGhee's allegations of statutory and constitutional violations of his right to a speedy trial are necessarily recited.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
DATE AND CORRESPONDING EVENTS
7/10/89 McGhee arrested.
12/7/89 McGhee indicted.
2/1/90 Motion for Speedy Trial filed.
2/26/90 McGhee Arraigned.
6/11/90 First trial date set.
6/15/90 Order continuing case entered.
(judge engaged in another trial.)
6/20/90 Order continuing case entered.
Judge engaged in same trial; reset for motions on Aug. 10, 1990.
6/20/90 Trial setting of December 3, 1990 agreed to by both McGhee and State.
11/29/90 McGhee's motion to dismiss filed.
12/3/90 McGhee announces ready for trial; State initially announces not ready due to missing witness, but later announces ready. Trial is preempted due to another case proceeding to trial.
12/12/90 Order continuing case entered, (judge engaged in another trial.) No date assigned.
1/24/91 McGhee filed amended motion to dismiss.
2/5/91 Motion to dismiss overruled, trial began. (574 days since arrest; 345 days since arraignment)
DISCUSSION OF LAW
I. WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF MCGHEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
McGhee's constitutional right to a speedy trial is considered under the factors established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The balancing test factors of Barker are as follows:
(1) Length of delay;
(2) Reason for the delay;
(3) Whether the defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial; and
(4) Whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay.
In considering this issue we are mindful of this Court's recent pronouncements in State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275 (Miss.1994), wherein we stated:
This Court recognized in Beavers v. State: No mathematical formula exists according to which the Barker weighing and balancing process must be performed. The weight to be given each factor necessarily turns on the quality of evidence available on each and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of nonpersuasion. In the end, no one factor is dispositive. The totality of the circumstances must be considered.
498 So.2d [788] 790 [1986].
We are mindful indeed that no one factor is dispositive of the question. Nor is the balancing process restricted to the Barker factors to the exclusion of any other relevant circumstances.
Magnusen at 1278.
(1) LENGTH OF DELAY
For consideration of the Barker factors, the relevant time begins to run from the date of arrest. From McGhee's arrest until trial, 574 days elapsed. This is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test and require an examination of each of the other factors. Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 168 (Miss.1991).
In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989), this Court held "that any delay of eight (8) months or longer is presumptively prejudicial." However, "[t]his factor, alone, is insufficient for reversal, but requires a close examination of the remaining factors." Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 676 (Miss. 1990). See also, State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275 (Miss.1994), wherein this Court stated:
The State, however, correctly observes that this delay, standing alone, is not enough to establish a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. "While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria . it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of the delay." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 531 (1992).
Magnusen, at 1280.
This factor favors McGhee, necessitating scrutiny of the remaining Barker factors.
(2) REASON FOR DELAY
The record is silent from McGhee's arrest on July 10, 1989 until the indictment on December 7, 1989. Next, the time period from arraignment on February 26, 1990 until the first trial setting on June 11, 1990 obviously counts against the State. The assigned trial judge was engaged in another trial, State v. Trong Nguyen, at that time and continued McGhee's case until the August 1990 term by order dated June 15,1990. On June 20, 1990, the judge was still trying the Trong Nguyen case and entered another order continuing the case for motions only until August 10, 1990. The State and McGhee entered into an agreement for a trial setting of December 3, 1990. McGhee's case was again preempted by another trial and Judge Jerry Terry entered an order of continuance, but failed to designate a specific trial setting in the order. McGhee's case went to trial February 5, 1991 with a special circuit judge presiding.
There were no continuances requested by either the State or McGhee. There is no indication in the record that any delay was intentional on the part of the State. Nor is there a showing by McGhee that the State gained any tactical advantage from the delay. As noted by Special Circuit Court Judge W.M. O'Barr, this was the "normal usual operation of the court." The delay was caused not by the State or McGhee, but rather, the overcrowded trial docket and the system in Harrison County of assigning each case to a particular judge as that case proceeded up to and through the trial process.
Where the reason for the delay is overcrowded dockets and understaffed prosecutors, this Court has stated that this factor will not be weighed heavily against the State. Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165 (Miss.1991); Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868 (Miss.1987); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814 (Miss.1986); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059 (Miss.1985). This Court, in Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So.2d 1343 (Miss.1981), held that a one-year delay caused by court congestion and a grand jury not in session when the crime was committed was not an unreasonable delay, where the appellant showed no prejudice.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis v. Puckett, 857 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1988), held in the case of a thirteen (13) month delay that there was no denial of Davis' speedy trial rights when part of the delay was caused by the "neutral" reasons of crowded dockets and shortage of prosecutorial staff and where no prejudice was demonstrated.
What should therefore be obvious is that if a shortage of prosecutorial staff can be good cause for delay, surely shortage of judges is equally "good cause shown." The record irrefutably indicates that Judge Terry, the assigned trial judge, was trying another case on each occasion that McGhee's case was set for trial. Judge Terry, on his own motion noted this reason for continuing McGhee's ease on the orders he entered. What could be more sufficient than the trial judge's own motion finding "good cause" because he was engaged in the trial of another case set prior to McGhee's? This is illustrative of only one of the numerous problems facing our trial judges these days — the lack of sufficient trial judges to handle the ever increasing and substantially crowded trial dockets of our state.
This Court has held that congested trial court dockets may constitute "good cause" for a trial's delay. Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 387 (Miss.1992); McGee v. State, 608 So.2d 1129, 1133 (Miss.1992); Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss.1991); Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.1991); Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876 (Miss.1987). See also, Winder v. State, 640 So.2d 893, 894 (Miss.1994).
In State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275 (Miss. Nov. 17, 1994), concerning a defendant's statutory right as opposed to his constitutional right to a speedy trial, where docket congestion may certainly constitute good cause for delay, this Court stated: "The same rationale should apply when the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, as opposed to his statutory right, is at issue."
Id., at 1282.
This Court has held that the preempting of a trial by another case constitutes "good cause." Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Miss.1991). The record reflects that the two initial continuances were granted on the trial court's own motion due to the trial of other cases set prior to McGhee's. Not a single continuance was requested by the State. This constitutes a finding of fact by the trial court. A finding of "good cause" is a finding of ultimate fact, and is no different than any other finding of fact on appeal; it should be left undisturbed where there is in the record substantial credible evidence upon which it was based. McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1007 (Miss.1993); Folk, 576 So.2d at 1247.
The situation presented in the case sub judice is practically identical to that in Mag-nusen, where three continuance orders were entered on the trial court's own motion citing that the judge was engaged in trial elsewhere. One of the orders additionally cited Magnusen's request for an omnibus hearing. This Court noted that the delay was partly caused by "a congested trial docket" and that such overcrowded dockets are not to be weighed heavily against the State. Magnu-sen, at 1282-83.
Justice these days predictably flows slower as dockets become more congested. All court dockets are overloaded. Harrison County is no exception to the rule. Trial courts and appellate courts alike require months, sometimes years, to determine outcomes. The process has become more complicated due to insufficient judges, as well as insufficient staffs in the offices of both prosecutors and public defenders. Many jurisdictions have limited facilities, space and time for complex criminal trials. The procedure in Harrison County was to assign a particular judge to a particular case. After three unsuccessful trial settings which resulted in McGhee's case being preempted, a special circuit judge finally afforded McGhee a first setting and his case was tried. The reason for the delay weighs lightly against the State as sufficient reasoning for the delay in this case has been substantiated.
(3) ASSERTION OF RIGHT
McGhee filed his motion for speedy trial on February 1, 1990, and a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on November 29, 1990. McGhee's motion to dismiss was considered and overruled on February 5, 1991, the day of trial. McGhee properly asserted his rights under the stat ute and constitutions of the State of Mississippi and the United States. It is not the duty of the accused to bring himself to trial. Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 823 (Miss.1986). It is the State, of course, that bears the burden of bringing an accused to trial in a speedy manner. Magnusen, at 1283 (citing Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Miss.1988)). McGhee only raised his motion to dismiss two months prior to the actual trial. This factor weighs slightly in favor of McGhee.
(4) PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT
McGhee demonstrated no actual prejudice. The delay was clearly caused by his case being preempted by other cases with prior settings superior to McGhee's. There was presumptive prejudice only. Speedy trial issues must be determined on a case by case basis. In McGhee's case, he was tried 574 days after arrest. He was out on bond during the entire time. Other than the unsupported, bald assertion of memory lapse and the anxiety associated with being charged with capital rape, McGhee admitted he suffered no prejudice. McGhee fails to provide this Court with any specifics whatsoever. How could there be a significant memory lapse over a time period less than one year after arraignment? Memory lapses of which dates, facts or details and by which witnesses? McGhee's other complaints of stigma and increased anxiety, alone afford no justification whatsoever for discharging McGhee as he requests.
McGhee does not allege anything close to actual prejudice. Had he done so, this factor would be weighed and balanced differently. Actual prejudice, occasioned by the delay, presents a different situation for this Court to analyze. In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss.1989), actual prejudice to Smith was occasioned by the delay. In Hughey v. State, 512 So.2d 4 (Miss.1987), thirty-three (33) months elapsed between indictment and trial; nevertheless, mainly due to lack of prejudice, this Court refused to reverse for failure to grant a speedy trial. In Barker, where the prosecution filed sixteen motions for continuance, the Supreme Court found no denial of a speedy trial where the delay was four years. This lack of prejudice factor should weigh heavily against McGhee in applying the Barker analysis.
Having reviewed all the Barker factors, based on the facts in this case, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that McGhee was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
II. WAS THERE A STATUTORY VIOLATION OF MCGHEE'S RIGHTS?
McGhee was arraigned on February 26, 1990 and tried on February 4,1991, obviously in excess of 270 days from the date of arraignment.
Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp.1991) entitled Indictments to be Tried Within 270 Days of Arraignment, provides:
Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.
The record reflects that 344 days elapsed from the date of arraignment until McGhee's trial. McGhee was initially set for trial on Monday, June 11, 1990, 115 days subsequent to arraignment. One week prior to trial, McGhee filed several motions which were not disposed of prior to the June 11 trial setting. Robin Midcalf, counsel for McGhee, confirmed that the motions were not settled. Ms. Midcalf stated: "I'm sure the record will reflect — that Friday I recall Ms. McAdams and I came to some sort of agreement as to the pending motions and I gave her a copy of a proposed order and that was done I believe that Friday following the Monday the trial was set." Another ease preempted McGhee's on June 11, 1990. Judge Jerry Terry, the assigned trial judge, on his own motion entered an order on June 15, 1990, continuing the case to the August 1990 term because he was engaged in the trial of State v. Trong Nguyen. On June 20, 1990, Judge Terry, again on his own motion, entered an order continuing McGhee's case for motions only until August 10, 1990, because he was still trying the Trong Nguyen case.
How was the December 8, 1990 trial date determined? McGhee's counsel shed sufficient light on the issue at the Motion to Dismiss Hearing held February 5, 1991, the morning of McGhee's trial. Referring to the Dec. 3, 1990 trial date, Ms. Midcalf told Special Circuit Judge W.M. O'Barr: "We did agree, had to agree to the next available trial setting.... I presented her (Ms. McAdams) with a proposed agreed order." However, the proposed agreed order was never entered. Failure to enter the agreed order is of little consequence, because the record clearly indicates that the December 3, 1990 trial setting was agreed to by both the State and McGhee.
Defense counsel having presented the proposed agreement to the State, and the State having accepted and agreed thereto for the December 3, 1990 trial setting, McGhee thus waived his statutory speedy trial rights for the period of June 20, 1990 to December 3, 1990. This Court, in Arnett v. State, 532 So.2d 1003, 1011 (Miss.1988), found that an oral agreement for a continuance tolled the 270-day statute without written order of continuance by the trial court. The case sub judice, with its two prior valid orders of continuance on motion of the trial judge, is factually similar to Arnett. Only the 115 days that elapsed from arraignment until the first trial setting on June 11, 1990, could be counted toward the 270 days. Even if the 63 days between Dec. 3,1990 and Feb. 5,1991 is counted, the total of 178 days is far short of a 270 day violation. The "good cause" orders of the trial court, by its own motion, and the agreed to trial setting of December 3, 1990, by the State and McGhee places the time frame well within 270 days, hence no statutory violation.
We need not apply our more recent ease of State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66 (Miss.1994), wherein this Court, rather than dismiss Harrison's case with prejudice, for a violation of the 270 day statute, remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant's ability to defend against the charge was prejudiced and whether the State deliberately engaged in oppressive conduct. Harrison was a case involving a clear violation of the 270 day statute, whereas the case sub judice absolutely is not.
CONCLUSION
McGhee's statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial have not been violated for the reasons set out above. The State in the ease sub judice did not file a single motion for continuance. The continuance orders were entered on the trial court's own motion due to his trying other cases set prior to McGhee's. It should go without saying that a trial judge cannot preside over two trials at the same time. There is nothing "generic" about the continuance orders entered in the case at bar. There is nothing in this record which shows intentional negligent action or deliberate attempts by the State to create or foster delay. McGhee was not just another number lost in the system. McGhee was tried at the earliest possible date in a jurisdiction with limited judges and prosecutors operating with an extremely congested trial docket, ultimately utilizing a special circuit judge to afford McGhee a trial. McGhee's counsel agreed to the December 3, 1990 trial setting thereby waiving any objection for the time frame of June 20, 1990 until December 3, 1990. In the ease at bar, an obviously congested trial docket with the designated trial judge presiding over another, previously set criminal trial, should clearly constitute "good cause" for the nominal delay in McGhee's trial for the capital rape of the minor female child.
We find no errors in McGhee's conviction of capital rape and sentence of life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
CONVICTION OF CAPITAL RAPE AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
BANKS, J., concurs as to Part I.
SULLIVAN, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by McRAE, J.
BANKS, J., joins as to Part II.