Case Name: Deryk McCAIN, a minor, by his father and next friend, David P. McCain and David P. McCain, individually, Appellants, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY CO., an Illinois corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1959-04-07
Citations: 110 So. 2d 718
Docket Number: No. 58-207
Parties: Deryk McCAIN, a minor, by his father and next friend, David P. McCain and David P. McCain, individually, Appellants, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY CO., an Illinois corporation, Appellee.
Judges: HORTON, Acting C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 110
Pages: 718–726

Head Matter:
Deryk McCAIN, a minor, by his father and next friend, David P. McCain and David P. McCain, individually, Appellants, v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY CO., an Illinois corporation, Appellee.
No. 58-207.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
April 7, 1959.
Rehearing Denied April 29, 1959.
Sams, Anderson, Eaton & Alper and Phillip Goldman, Miami, for appellants.
Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Atkins, Carson & Wahl, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
PEARSON, Judge.
The appellants are a minor and his father. They appeal from a summary final judgment entered in an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the eight year old boy when he walked into and broke a plate glass door. The question to be determined is whether, under those facts which were established to be without genuine issue, the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We hold that the question of negligence is, upon the facts of this case, an issue for the jury, and accordingly the judgment is reversed.
The complaint alleged that the defendant owned and operated the model home in which the minor was injured. It was further charged that the defendant was guilty of negligence in that:
"(1) They failed to keep the said premises reasonably safe for small children, although they knew, or should have known, that children would be on the premises with their parents;
"(2) They failed to notify or warn the minor plaintiff of the presence of said glass door, although they knew, or should have known, that a minor child was likely to injure himself in the manner in which the plaintiff did injure himself;
"(3) They failed to place any stripping or other warning sign on the said glass, as is customary in this community under the same or similar circumstances."
The defendant answered, denied negligence and presented the defense that the minor was guilty of contributory negligence. Final summary judgment was granted upon the basis of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and certain depositions including that of the minor.
It was established that the defendant, Bankers Life, was in the business of selling homes in a subdivision. Its model homes were open to the general public and were for the purpose of stimulating the buying of homes in the subdivision. Immediately prior to the accident the minor plaintiff and his mother had visited and inspected a model home belonging to the same defendant which was located next door to the house in which the accident occurred. Both homes were fitted with sliding glass doors or panels separating the Florida room from the back yard. The minor plaintiff during his mother's inspection of the adjoining house had walked back and forth between the living room area and the backyard several times through the open glass doors. Immediately upon leaving the first model home the plaintiff and his mother went to the house next door; the accident occurred when the minor plaintiff walked into one of the glass panels in the closed door of the second house.
It is urged that the final summary judgment was proper under the general proposition that a person is required to. see what is there to be seen by the ordinary use of his senses, and if it is there to be seen, it is deemed, in law, to have been seen. Cf. Kagan v. Eisenstadt, Fla.App.1957, 98 So. 2d 370. Following this view, it is urged that the present case is governed by the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Pettigrew v. Nite-Cap, Inc., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 492, 493.
In the Pettigrew case, supra, the appellant-plaintiff was injured when she walked into a large plate glass door at the entrance of appellee's restaurant. Appellant's testimony revealed that the accident occurred in the evening, that the door was of clear glass, and that there was a wide metal strip on the top and the bottom of the door and a lucite handle located in the usual place on the door with black knobs at the top and bottom to hold it in place. At the close of the appellant's case the lower court directed a verdict for the appellee. The Court held:
"The handle, knobs, and metal strip on the door were plainly visible and the door was located at the place a door would naturally be expected. It is clear to us that that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was her failure to see that which, by the exercise of reasonable care, she should have seen."
See also Stone v. Hotel Seville, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 847. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions and are in accord with Pettigrew v. Nite-Cap, Inc., supra.
In Rosenberg v. Hartman, 313 Mass. 54, 46 N.E.2d 406, a business invitee upon leaving the defendant's store, walked into a glass door, which had been closed subsequent to the time of his entry. The door was described as being one large piece of practically transparent glass swung on pins at top and bottom with glass handles about a foot in length and a metal plate with a keyhole at about the usual position of a lock. The Court held:
"We do not think negligence ought to be found merely because the door was made of one large piece of glass. It could not have been wholly invisible. Its handles, lock, and fittings were in plain sight. A door is to be expected at the entrance of a store."
The same result was reached in the case of Dukek v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 248 Minn. 374, 80 N.W.2d 53, 56, when a business invitee brought an action against a store owner for injuries sustained when he walked into a glass plate panel constituting a part of the entrance to the store. The entrance of the store consisted of three glass doors with a glass panel on either side. The plaintiff, a Western Union messenger boy, was injured in leaving the building when he walked into the panel on the side of the exterior doors. Before he got to the doors just described, he walked through a vestibule where there were three glass doors practically identical with those described and in line with them. There were no glass panels on the sides of the interior doors. Also inside of the vestibule were hand railings for use in ascending or descending three steps and these railings were in line with the doors. The injured party had entered these premises on two other occasions. The court held "there was nothing to distract plaintiff, nor was there anything to prevent his seeing the door and distinguishing the doors from the adjacent panels." The court further held: "it is inescapable that the accident happened because plaintiff did not look where he was going."
A plate glass window case in which a minor of sixteen years of age was involved, is found in A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, Tex. Civ.App.1949, 223 S.W.2d 310, 311. Here the invitee entered the place of business by passing through double doors constructed of iron grillwork, and he observed a plate glass window at one side of the door. When he later proceeded to leave the place of business, he dropped his head when some thirty feet from the doors and window in question, and continued to walk with his head down, "and never looked up again until he walked through the plate glass window." The court held that the plate glass window through which the plaintiff walked was small as compared with the double entrance doors, which were clearly defined and of which the plaintiff had full knowledge. Thus the court concluded that plaintiff failed to observe that which should have been observed by him in the exercise of reasonable care.
Acme Laundry Co. v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App. 1955, 284 S.W.2d 745, is a case involving a suit brought by a business invitee against a laundry for injuries sustained when the plaintiff 'walked against and broke a plate glass window as he attempted to leave the defendant's laundry. The court held that the laundry owed the plaintiff the duty to protect him against conditions on its premises which would involve an unreasonable risk to his safety, the danger of which would not be open and obvious to a person exercising ordinary care. The court further held that the plate glass windows did not constitute such an unreasonable risk and plaintiff knew of the glass doors and panels, since they were open and obvious and readily discernible.
A contrary holding to the above cases is found in Grabel v. Handro Co., City Ct. 1955, 161 N.Y.S.2d 998, 999. In that case the plaintiff walked against a glass panel serving as a section of an arrangement of glass doors in the lobby of a commercial building. The glass doors had handles, and the glass panels, one at each end of the bank of doors, were framed with stainless steel. The plaintiff had not been in the building for two weeks, although he worked there. As he was leaving the building on a warm, sunny day, he thought he was walking through an open space, but instead walked into a glass panel from which a red masking tape had been removed. The court held that the entire arrangement gave an illusion of space arid "when the illusion is so successful that some hapless person is injured in mistaking the illusion for reality he can hardly be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law."
Shannon v. Broadway & 41st Street Corporation, 298 N.Y. 589, 81 N.E.2d 324, likewise departs from the majority rule applicable to glass door or window accidents However this case appears to be an exception to the majority rule because of its factual background. Here, the plaintiff was at a sidewalk cafe. A window separated the outside tables from the cafe and on occasions was let down into the floor to permit uninterrupted passage to the outside cafe. The accident occurred on a day when the outside cafe was not in operation, and the plaintiff walked into the window. The court affirmed the appellate division (272 App.Div. 1029, 73 N.Y.S.2d 711), which latter court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff.
In Harold Corporation v. Herzberg, Fla. App.1959, 110 So.2d 683, the factual situation is somewhat analagous to the Shannon case, supra. This court cautioned in the able opinion written by associate judge, E. Harris Drew:
"Where the question is whether a plaintiff could or should have observed the hazard, as opposed to the question of whether he must realize the significance of and keep in mind that which he admittedly sees or knows, the cases will turn upon their peculiar facts and there will rarely be a controlling precedent."
It is apparent that the only real basis for denial of liability in a glass door case is that the plaintiff ought to have observed the door or window. It was established without issue that the door in the instant case consisted of two sliding glass panels. Each panel was four feet, five-eighths of an inch in width and six feet, nine and seven-sixteenths of an inch in height. These panels were in aluminum frames, (the width of the framing is not set out in the affidavits or otherwise), and the locking stile of the aluminum frame at the jam was two and one-quarter inches in width and one and five-eighths inches wide at the center or interlocking stile. The over-all door size was eight feet, five-eighths of an inch in width and six feet, ten inches in height. The glass was transparent without any markings on its surface. Taking as established that under normal conditions the courts hold that a plaintiff should see an ordinary glass door, does it follow that a minor should have seen this door?
The question of the degree of care to which a child should be held has been before the Supreme Court of Florida upon several occasions. In Dupuis v. Heider, 113 Fla. 679, 152 So. 659, the Court considered the effect of a plea of contributory negligence in a case involving a boy thirteen years of age. It was pointed out that age is not always the determining factor on the question of the capability of exercising care. Other factors which must be considered were enumerated. They are mentality, intelligence, experience, training, discretion, and alertness. To the same effect is Turner v. Seegar, 151 Fla. 643, 10 So.2d 320. See also cases cited at 38 Am.Jur., Negligence § 205.
In Winner v. Sharp, Fla.1949, 43 So.2d 634, it was held that a three year old child is incapable as a matter of law of conduct amounting to contributory negligence. The City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 278, 279, involves a case in which a twelve year old girl fell as a result of a hole in a sidewalk in front of her home. The sole question on the appeal- of the case was whether contributory negligence appeared as a matter of law. The city conceded that it was negligent in permitting the sidewalk hole to stay unrepaired. The girl testified that she did not know about the existence of the hole. The Court pointed out that the question is always whether the plaintiff used due care for his own safety, taking into account all the circumstances, of which the visibility of the object encountered is an important circumstance, but still only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration. Further the Court held:
"It takes more indication of danger to alert a child than to alert an adult. 'Children are necessarily lacking in the knowledge of physical causes and effects which is usually acquired only through experience. They must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses, and must be presumed to have less ability to take care of themselves than adults have.' Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798, 800."
In the Jacksonville case the court concluded that a child's prudence and judgment is itself a question of fact.
It can be said with confidence, that in whatever situation the law finds children, it usually deals with them differently than it does with adults. This fact is further illustrated by the decision of our Supreme Court in Burdine's, Inc. v. McConnell, 146 Fla. 512, 1 So.2d 462, 463, where it was held that because of the possible lack of comprehension of danger by children a merchant owes a greater degree of care 'o them in the maintenance of his place of business. The following language from that case is suggestive of the rule applied here:
"Circumstances alter the application of the rule to cases. What is reasonable care to one class of invitees might fall short as to another. Those who invite children, who have not arrived at the age of discretion, to go upon their premises are required to exercise a relatively higher degree of care for their safety than to adults. That degree of care is commensurate with the attending facts and circumstances of each case. Burnett v. Allen, 114 Fla. 489, 154 So. 515; Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798; Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Adams, 50 Fla. 429, 39 So. 183, 7 Ann.Cas. 241; and Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 14 S.Ct. 619, 38 L.Ed. 434.
"The law imposes such duty. It is a jury question whether the duty has been violated."
Takashi Kataoka v. May Department Stores Co., 60 Cal.App.2d 177, 140 P.2d 467. But see Valunas v. J. J. Newberry Co., 336 Mass. 305, 145 N.E.2d 685.
The public display of a new house is especially designed to attract families. Cf. Rainbow Enterprises v. Thompson, Fla. 1955, 81 So.2d 208. The owner is charged with knowledge that children of all ages will be accompanying their parents and will be included among his business invitees. Burdine's, Inc. v. McConnell, supra; see also 44 A.L.R.2d 1319.
As stated in Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798, 800, "[children] must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses". It would not be unreasonable for a jury to find that this minor had no previous experience with houses containing glass doors. It is likewise not unreasonable to find that this child experienced for the first time, what to him was a unique happening, that of passing directly through the rear of a home to the back yard area, without having to go through a door. Whether the child should have alerted himself to the actual conditions as they existed at the time of the accident presents a question of fact best decided by the common experience of the public, i. e., the jury. Accordingly, the summary final judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
HORTON, Acting C. J., concurs.
GIBLIN, VINCENT G, Associate Judge, dissents.