Case Name: McClellan Dry Dock Company vs. Farmers' Alliance Steamboat Line et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1891-03
Citations: 43 La. Ann. 258
Docket Number: No. 10,637
Parties: McClellan Dry Dock Company vs. Farmers’ Alliance Steamboat Line et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 258–274

Head Matter:
No. 10,637.
McClellan Dry Dock Company vs. Farmers’ Alliance Steamboat Line et al.
1. "When several defendants are sued and judgment is prayed against all in solido the defect of the petition, in not specifically alleging that one of them is indebted, is cured by the annexing and ípaking part of the petition of a bond exhibiting his liability, by his answer without exception and by administration of proof without objection.
2. Joint owners of a steamboat employed in carrying passengers and personal property for hire are, in all transactions connected with such use, as to third persons, commercial partners and liableirc solido.
3. A vei’dict finding in favor of plaintiff “for full amount of claim” is not void under O. I\, Art. 522.
4. A judgment on such a verdict, which fails to allow a credit, admitted on the face of plaintiff’s claim, is erroneous, and when remittitur is not entered until after appeal has been completed and filed in this court, this can not deprive appellant of his right to amendment and to have the cost of appeal cast on appellee.
5. On the facts the finding of the jury approved.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. ElliSj J.
W. S. Benedict for Plaintiff and Appellee.
J. F. Pierson for Defendants and Appellants:
1. BAV. Marston personally is not a party to the suit in the lower court. He is not alleged to be either a principal or a surety to the debt claimed.
The judgment against him individually in the lower court in solido with the defendant corpomMcm and its surety on the bond is erroneous.
Suretyship is never presumed; it must result from the express terms of the contract. -C. O. 3039.
If he was a co-principal debtor, then he would be bound only jointly with the defendant corporation, and liable for his virile share of the debt. O. C. 2080, 2086.
The Verdict.
2. In a suit on account for $7899.21, subject to a reduction of $602.20 for two payments, tbe verdict of the jury “for full amount of claim” is void for uncertainty. C. P. 522.
When the verdict was “Nine in favor of judgment for plaintiff and recognize mortgage,” the court say: “ All authorities agree that a verdict not stating the amount in exact terms is bad.” Miller, Lyon & Co. vs. Cappel, 39 An. 882, and authorities there cited*
3. But if the verdict be valid in form it should be set aside:
(ft) Where the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence. Proffat on Jury Trial, Sec. ¿72.
(6) Where the jury disregarded the verdict on one side. Ibid. ¿73.
(c) For an error of law or its application -to the facts, in which the court will follow its own opinion. Livaudais vs. Perret, 11L. 303.
(d) Where the evidence does not make full proof of plaintiff’s demand. Dupré vs. Desmaret, 5 An. 591; Seaton vs. Municipality No. 2,3 An. ¿¿; Jones vs. Pereira, 18 An. 102; Osborne vs. Moore, 12 An. 7l¿; Delavigne vs. Williams, 11 An. 250-291.
(e) We are bound to regard, but not to adopt, the verdict so as to make it the basis of our judgment. Incases in which doubt exists in our minds, we remand a case for the opinion of another jury. Hosea’s Widow and Heirs vs. Miles, 13 L. 110; La. State Bank vs. Ledoux, 3 An. 685.
What Pdaintiee Must Prove.
¿. (ft) It is a general principle that it is the duty of a plaintiff so to manage his business and to produce in court such evidence as to make it certain that he is entitled to what he demands, and that courts can not judicially declare his demands well founded without such proof. Benton vs. Bidault, 6 An. 31; Kearney Blois & Co. vs. I-Iauche, 18 An. 117.
(&) It was the duty of the plaintiff to make out a clear right, which he has not done. Bradley vs. Frelsen, 10 An. 311; Mummy vs. Haggerty, 15 An. 270.
(c) It is not enough that a plaintiff renders his claim probable; he must make it legally certain under any circumstances. Bodenheimer vs. Bodenheimer, 37 An. 1007; Beck vs. Fleitas, 37 An. ¿95-96; Jackson & Anderson vs. Beling, 22 An. 378; Ocean Dry Dock vs. Stein, 29 An. N. R.; Skipwithvs. His Creditors, 19 La • 206; Insurance Co. vs. Coons, 36 An. 272; A.lland vs. Orleans Nav. Co., 12 R. ¿71.
Witnesses.
5. Witnesses confused as to what they only believe, instead of know; who testify formidably in chief, but fail on cross-examination to disclose any basis for their knowledge, are entitled to no value, even as a beginning or as an aid of proof. Thompson vs. Gee, 37 An. 603; Beck vs. Fleitas, 37 An. ¿95; Benton vs. Bidault, 6 An. 31; Carver & Oo. vs. Harris, 19 An. 121.
On Reconventionau Demand.
Damages are due for breach of an obligation to do or not to do. C. 0.1926,
The party who violates the obligation of his contract is liable to the payment of such damages as the other party has sustained by his default. C. C. 1930.
Where there has been an active violation of the contract, damages are due from the moment of its contravention. C. C. 1932.
Where the payment of money is not the object, the measure of damages is the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, and of the profits he has been deprived. C. C. 1934.
A designed breach of the contract from some motive of interest or ill will is a breach in bad faith. O. 0.1934, Sec. 1.
Por this the debtor is liable, not only for all consequences which were or might have been foreseen, but also for those which are the direct and immediate consequences of the breach. Iibd., Sec. 2.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fenner, J.
The-steamboat " G. W. Sentell" was docked and repaired by the plaintiff, under a written agreement between plaintiff and B. W. Marston, which stipulated that plaintiff was to dock her for $75, charge $10 per day demurrage, and that " all work and materials to be by the day, subject to any and all inspectors the owner may see fit to send."
The work was done under the supervision and direction of Capt. Boardman and Ben. Hopkins, designated by Capt. Marston to represent him in the work, and also of the official inspectors of the United States and of the Board of Underwriters.
When the work was done and the bill therefor was presented, Capt. Marston refused to pay. Plaintiff declined to permit the boat to leave without payment or security, whereupon a bond was furnished. The principals named in the bond are "B. W. Marston, individually and as president of the Farmers' Alliance Steamboat Line, and others interested with them';" and the surety was G. W. Sentell & Co. The condition of the bond was, " that if said principals shall well and truly pay to said McLellan Dry Dock Company the amount due them by said steamboat G. W. Sentell, its masters and owners, for the services aforesaid, to be fixed by agreement if possible, and if not, by suit at law, then this obligation to be null, otherwise to be of full force and virtue."
The present suit was brought upon the contract and bond for the amount of plaintiff's bill, and judgment was asked in' solido against the Farmers' Alliance Steamboat Line, B. W. Marston individually, and G. W. Sentell & Co. All the defendants were cited, and, interposing no exception, they all appeared and pleaded by answer to the merits, and by a plea in reconvention. The gravamen of the defence was that the plaintiff's bill was excessive and beyond the value of the work done and material furnished.
Immediately after filing answer, the defendants moved the court for the appointment of experts, one to be selected by defendants and one by plaintiff, and in case of disagreement, one by the court, with directions "to examine and report to the court the character, value-and amount of the repairs made on the G. W. Sentell by the plaintiff, the report of said experts to be used on the trial of the case before the jury." The motion was. granted, and accordingly, the plaintiff and defendants each selected an expert. They did not disagree, but united in a report substantially affirming the correctness of the bill sued on.
The case was tried before a jury which was prayed for by defendants, and - resulted in a verdict in favor .of plaintiff for the full amount claimed, and rejecting the reconventional demand.
From the verdict and judgment thereon the present appeal is taken.
Defendants, in this court, assign several grounds of error:
1. They claim that B. W. Marston, personally, was not a party to the suit, and that the judgment against him individually can not stand. The prayer of the petition conclusively negatives this contention, because it expressly prays for the citation of B. W. Marston, personally, as one of the defendants, and for judgment against all the defendants in solido, and upon the back of the petition service is accepted by counsel for the defendants, and the defendants all answer. The defect of the petition in not alleging specifically that Marston was indebted is cured by the annexing of the bond, which was made part of the .petition -and which exhibited his liability, by his answer without exception, and by the administration of proof without objection.
2. It is claimed that, if subject to any judgment, Marston is only liable as a joint principal, and was erroneously condemned in solido. We think it sufficiently appears from the tenor of the bond that the principals signed as owners of the G. W. Sentell, and Marston's own testimony shows that he was one of the owners, if not sole owner. The boat was employed by the owners in the carrying of passengers and personal property for hire, and these repairs were made in the course of such employment and for the purpose of enabling her to continue the same. Under our Code it is well settled that joint owners of a steamboat employed in carrying personal property or passengers for hire are, in all transactions connected with such use, as to third persons, commercial partners, and liable in solido. Rev. C. C. 2825; 5 An. 260; 3 An. 88; 1 An. 836, and'many other cases.
This suffices to fix his solidary liability.
3. The verdict is assailed as being informal and void for want of certainty. The verdict is in these words: "We, the jury, find a verdict for the plaintiff, with interest from date of bill, for full amount of claim."
It is true that Article 522, C. P., prescribes that the form of 'a general verdict if in favor of plaintiff is " verdict for plaintiff for so much, with interest." Equally true is it that we have frequently held that "a verdict not stating the amount in exact terms or their equivalent is bad." Miller vs. Cappel, 39 An. 882.
But it would be stretching strictness beyond reason or-precedent to hold that this verdict does not express the exact amount as clearly as if it had been written in figures. The " full amount of plaintiff's claim" admits of neither doubt nor uncertainty. It is expressed in the prayer of the petition as "the sum of $7899.21, with legal interest from 22d December, 1888, until paid, subject-to the credit by $602.30, as of date the 3d January, 1889."
But while the verdict is good, the judgment rendered thereon is unquestionably bad. It allowed $7899.21 without deducting the credit admitted on the face of the claim. This, of course, was error, a mere blunder, but one which, by the signature of the judgment, acquired executory force against the defendants, from the effect of which they had the right to claim relief by appeal. Had the plaintiff entered his remittitur in the lower court before appeal, he would have left the defendants no ground of complaint on that score. But he has only entered his remittitur in this court after the appeal has been perfected and filed here. This can not deprive defendants of their rights to have the judgment amended and, as a consequence, to have the costs of appeal cast on plaintiff.
4. The length of our opinion on the facts of the case shall be in inverse proportion to the length of time which we have devoted to a patient study of the voluminous evidence, and the minute and extended criticism of all its details' presented in the oral and written arguments of defendants' counsel.
We think the claim of plaintiff is fully proved. The evidence in its support is complete and convincing. The experts, whose appointment was provoked by defendants and one of whom was selected by themselves, agreed in a report sustaining the plaintiff. The jury, which was prayed for by the defendants, approved it by their verdict. The judge, who presided over the trial and heard the witnesses, confirmed it by his judgment. The opposing evidence submitted by defendants is weak and inconclusive, and the infirmity of their case is rendered conspicuous by their failure to produce the only witnesses who might have effectually contradicted the testimony of plaintiff, viz: Hopkins and Boardman, who represented defendants in the progress of the work* and were familiar with all its details. These witnesses were accessible, and their absence can only be explained by the fear of defendants that, like the expert they had selected, their evidence would support the plaintiff's claim.
5. The reconventional demand has no merit. It .is based substantially on two charges, viz: first, that the plaintiff delayed the docking of the Sentell beyond the time agreed on; second, that plaintiff consumed unnecessary and unreasonable time in making the repairs. Neither charge is sustained. The evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff informed defendants that the steamer "E. W. Cole" was to be docked before the " Sentell," which latter should be taken as soon as the " Cole" was finished. This was complied with. There was some delay in getting the "Cole" in dock, owing to reception of two other vessels before her, presumably in fulfilment of prior engagements. No complaint of this delay was made at the time. The work was prosecuted diligently and with all reasonable dispatch, and though the time consumed was longer than the parties anticipated, this was due to the fact that the repairs found to .be needed were much more extensive than was supposed.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be amended so as to conform to the verdict of the jury, and to allow a credit thereon of $602.20 with interest from January 3, 1889, and that, as thus amended, the same be now affirmed, plaintiff to pay costs of appeal.