Case Name: CHARLES K. BREEZE et al., Respondents, v. JOHN BROOKS et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1886-09-29
Citations: 71 Cal. 169
Docket Number: No. 8671
Parties: CHARLES K. BREEZE et al., Respondents, v. JOHN BROOKS et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 169–182

Head Matter:
[No. 8671.
In Bank.
September 29, 1886.]
CHARLES K. BREEZE et al., Respondents, v. JOHN BROOKS et al., Appellants.
Deed—Consideration Paid by Stranger—Resulting Trust—Fraudulent Conveyance —Estoppel.—The land, in controversy is part of a rancho, the legal title to which was, prior to 1865, held by the defendant Patrick Brooks and others as tenants in common. At that time Patrick Brooks was and since has been in the actual and exclusive possession of a portion of the rancho, and then held in fee an undivided interest therein. At the same time he and one Fay were in possession of another portion of the rancho, being the land in controversy. On the 26th of August, 1865, Patrick purchased the interest of Fay, and there upon took the exclusive possession of the portion last mentioned. There' after, in the same year, Patrick delivered the possession thereof to hi: brother, John Brooks, and subsequently, on the 17th of October, 1865, purchased another undivided interest in the rancho, and caused the conveyance thereof to be made to John and recorded. On the 29th of May, 1868, a decree of partition was rendered in an action in which Patrick and John were parties, whereby the premises in controversy were set apart in severalty to John. On the 5th of January, 1875, John conveyed the legal title to the land to Patrick by a deed for which no new consideration was paid. From 1872 to 1875 John dealt with the plaintiffs, who were merchants, and became indebted to them for goods sold and delivered. During the time of such dealings, John resided on the land in controversy, and acted in relation thereto as the apparent owner, and stated to the plaintiffs that he was the owner. The plaintiffs, relying upon such. statements, and without any knowledge that Patrick had or claimed any interest in the land, gave credit to John on the strength of his apparent ownership. During this time John was insolvent, and Patrick knew of his insolvency. The latter, however, never made any statement to the plaintiffs that John owned the land. The plaintiffs, having reduced their claim against John to judgment, brought the present action to set aside the deed of the 5th of January, 1875, on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors. Held, that the deed was valid, as the legal title acquired by John under the deed of October 17, 1865, and the decree of partition was held in trust for Patrick, and that the latter was not estopped from asserting title to the premises.
. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, and from an order refusing a new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of Commissioner Foote.
William M. Pierson, E. B. & J. W. Mastick, and W. C. Belcher, for Appellants.
The consideration for the land having been paid by the defendant Patrick Brooks, the legal title acquired by John Brooks was held in trust for the former. (Lessee of Smith v. McCann, 24 How. 398; Campfield v. Johnson, 5 N. J. Eq. 245.) Patrick was not estopped by his conduct in asserting title to the land. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 503; Stephen’s Digest of Evidence, 124; Biddle Boggs v. Mer ced M. Co., 14 Cal. 297; Davenport v. Turpin, 43 Cal. 602; Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., 93 U. S. 336; 2 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., sec. 807; Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N. Y. 221.)
Fox & Ross, and S. F. Leib, for Respondents.
The defendant Patrick Brooks is estopped to assert his title. (Cornish v. Abington, 4 H. & W. 549; Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 330; 2 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., sec. 805; Anderson v. Anderson, 69 Ill. 452.)

Opinion:
The Court.
This cause was heard before Department Two of this court, and an opinion rendered January 27, 1886. A hearing by the court in Bank was granted, which has been had. For the reasons given ill the opinion in Department, the judgment and order are reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.