Case Name: Otis Lee JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-02-16
Citations: 538 So. 2d 533
Docket Number: No. 87-2189
Parties: Otis Lee JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 538
Pages: 533–537

Head Matter:
Otis Lee JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 87-2189.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 16, 1989.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Colin Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHARP, Chief Judge.
Jackson appeals from his conviction of three counts of sexual battery. He argues that Williams rule evidence concerning a prior claimed rape victim was improperly admitted because it only was relevant to show lack of consent by the victim, V.B., in this case. We affirm.
Y.B. testified that she was sitting outside of a closed bar in Dade City when Jackson drove by and they started talking. She was acquainted with Jackson, and agreed to go with him to purchase cigarettes at a store and deliver a package. After running these errands, Jackson drove away from Dade City and into Hernando County. V.B. became frightened. When she opened the door in an attempt to jump out of the car he sped up to prevent her escape. He drove into the country on dirt roads and stopped. He threatened to kill her, beat her up, and he raped her several times. He turned the front lights of the car on and made her stand nude in front of them. V.B. managed to escape, running away naked through a field and orange grove. She found a house and received help from strangers. They gave her a smock and called an ambulance.
Deputy Lee, who interviewed Jackson after the incident, stated that Jackson told him he had picked up V.B. at the bar in Dade City after she offered him sex for $20.00. They ran some errands and then drove to a rural area about one mile outside of Dade City where they had consensual sex several times. Afterwards, he dropped her back at the bar. Jackson denied ever being in Hernando County that night or having any knowledge of how V.B. got there.
Jackson elected to take the stand in response to Officer Lee's testimony. In limited testimony, Jackson testified that his ear had mechanical problems and could not be driven for twelve miles, the distance to the point in Hernando County where V.B. claimed she was sexually assaulted. He admitted having sex with V.B., but he claimed she consented.
The trial court permitted similar fact evidence from victim S.M. and Officer Blackman concerning a sexual battery which occurred thirteen and one-half months prior to the incident with V.B. The court instructed the jury that this testimony could only be considered by them for the limited purpose of proving intent and plan on the part of Jackson. S.M. testified that she had known Jackson previously, that Jackson had offered to drive her to her boyfriend's house, but instead drove north into a rural area on dirt roads to a grove in Hernando County not far from where the crime against V.B. occurred. S.M. was frightened, and tried to jump out of the car. But Jackson sped up the car to prevent her escape. He then threatened to kill S.M., beat her up and raped her. He turned on the car lights and raped her in front of them. Officer Blackman, the investigator of the earlier incident, testified that Jackson gave the same excuse as in the incident with V.B., i.e., that he had paid S.M. money for having sex with him ($25.00 in S.M.'s case). Both S.M. and V.B. denied this.
In this appeal, Jackson concedes that S.M.'s testimony was relevant to show modus operandi, or plan, or scheme. However, he argues that the admission of Officer Blackman's testimony "did nothing toward showing method of operation," but showed only consent which is impermissible under this court's reasoning in Hodges v. State, 403 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. den., 413 So.2d 877 (Fla.1982).
The Williams rule, as codified by section 90.404(2)(a) provides that similar fact evidence which reveals the commission of a collateral crime is admissible if it tends to show a relevant fact at issue, such as a common scheme and plan, and not just bad character or propensity. After its relevance is shown, the evidence is excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988). We have held that Williams rule evidence is not admissible when it is solely relevant to prove consent vel non on the part of a rape victim. Hodges. But this does not mean Williams rule evidence is not admissible in sexual battery cases. See Hodge v. State, 419 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 426 So.2d 26 (Fla.1983).
Like the instant case, Williams involved a rape prosecution. The victim testified that the defendant had been hiding in her family car parked in a certain parking space. A sheriff testified that upon his arrest the defendant told him that he entered the car to take a nap under the mistaken belief that the automobile belonged to his brother. The defendant elected to take the stand, claiming he and the victim had engaged in consensual sex. The trial court permitted evidence that about six weeks before the alleged rape, a young girl had found the defendant on the back seat floor of her car. The defendant was arrested and had similarly stated at police headquarters, that he had crawled into the car to take a nap under the mistaken belief that it was his brother's car. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling admitting the similar fact evidence holding:
It definitely had probative value to establish a plan, scheme, or design. It was relevant to meet the anticipated defense of consent. At the time when it was offered in the presentation of the state's main case, it had a substantial degree of relevance in order to identify the accused. Finally, it was relevant because it demonstrated a plan or pattern followed by the accused in committing the type of crime laid in the indictment. (emphasis added).
Williams, 110 So.2d at 663.
As previously stated, S.M.'s testimony was admissible and relevant to show mo-dus operandi, plan or scheme. Further, the similarities of where and how the rapes occurred rebutted the material fact issue raised by Jackson that he had not had sex-with V.B. in Hernando County. Such similar events surrounding the sexual batteries of the victims, and Jackson's identical explanations that he had paid $20.00-$25.00 for their favors, were relevant to rebut his disputed claim of sex for pay.
Finally, the record in this case demonstrates that any error in admitting Offi cer Blackman's testimony was harmless, and not a feature of Jackson's trial as to deprive him of a fair trial. Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla.1960); Snowden v. State, 537 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In addition to V.B.'s testimony, there was testimony from the person who came to V.B.'s aid, the paramedic, the examining doctor and the crime technician that V.B. was sexually assaulted in Her-nando County and did not have consensual sex one mile outside Dade city. There is no reasonable possibility that any error resulting from Blackman's testimony contributed to the verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). See also, Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So.2d 129 (Fla.1988).
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).
. Section 90.404(2)(a) states:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.