Case Name: Boris F. NAVRATIL v. James H. SMART, d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-05-26
Citations: 400 So. 2d 268
Docket Number: No. 13912
Parties: Boris F. NAVRATIL v. James H. SMART, d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service, et al.
Judges: Before COVINGTON, CHIASSON, PONDER, LEAR and WATKINS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 400
Pages: 268–278

Head Matter:
Boris F. NAVRATIL v. James H. SMART, d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service, et al.
No. 13912.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 26, 1981.
J. Rodney Ryan, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant Boris F. Navratil.
Bryan E. Bush, Jr., Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant James H. Smart d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service.
Charles K. Watts and Robert L. Kleinpeter, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Associates Financial Services Co., Inc.
Before COVINGTON, CHIASSON, PONDER, LEAR and WATKINS, JJ.

Opinion:
CHIASSON, Judge.
Plaintiff, Boris F. Navratil, sued for damages for the unlawful conversion of his automobile by defendants, James H. Smart, d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service and Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. (Associates). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Smart for $1,500.00 for loss of use of his vehicle and inconvenience. Plaintiff's suit against Associates was dismissed. Both Navratil and Smart appealed.
The undisputed sequence of events of this case is correctly stated by the trial court in its written reasons for judgment, as follows:
"The events of this drama arose on Ben-nington Avenue which is located in a growing area of Baton Rouge. Several nightclubs, business establishments, and restaurants are compacted into this area. Because this area attracts so many people, vehicular parking has become a major concern especially to the business firms and restaurants. Associates, one of the business firms in this area, had sustained a large amount of damages which was allegedly caused by persons parking in their lot while patronizing the surrounding nightclubs. To solve this problem and protect their property, Herbert Fink, branch manager of Associates, authorized Smart to remove vehicles which were illegally parked after hours on Associates' property. [Exhibit P-1]. Five signs were installed on Associates property. These signs stated 'Customer Parking Only, others will be towed away at owner's expense.' Smart testified that two of these signs were located on each side of the drive leading to the street, two were located in the back lot, and one was located in the side lot.
"On weekend nights Smart would survey the Associates' parking lot. If any vehicles were parked illegally in the lot, he would proceed to tow them away one at the time. He would bring these vehicles to a fenced lot on Airline Highway where they would be stored until the owner paid Smart towage and storage fees.
"The plaintiff, an attorney, spent the evening of April 6,1979, entertaining a client and other friends. Around midnight the plaintiff decided to end the evening's festivities with a nightcap at the Split Decision which is one of the nightclubs located on Bennington Avenue. Being unable to locate a vacant parking spot in the club's lot, the plaintiff spied an empty space in the Associates' parking lot which was almost completely occupied. The plaintiff parked his Lincoln in the southeast corner of the side parking lot. While the plaintiff and his client imbibed Smart made his rounds, noticed the Associates' lot was filled with illegally parked ears and proceeded to tow the cars to the pound, including the plaintiff's Mark IV. When the plaintiff alighted from the Split Decision with his client, he found that his vehicle was missing. Thinking it was stolen, the plaintiff called the Baton Rouge City Police who informed him that his car had been towed away by Road Runner Wrecker Service. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff telephoned Road Runner Wrecker Service, but received no answer. The plaintiff had his son pick him and his client up and take them home. The next morning the plaintiff contacted Smart and demanded the return of his vehicle. Smart refused until the plaintiff paid him towage and storage fees in the amount of $57.50. This suit was filed the following Monday."
The only factual matter that was disputed at the trial was whether the signs were up on the night of this incident. Smart testified that the signs were posted that night while Navratil denied the presence of the signs. We agree with the further finding of fact of the trial court that there was no sign either at the entrance of the parking lot of Associates or where the plaintiff eventually parked his car.
The trial court found that the initial towing of plaintiff's car was not an unlawful act. It found that Associates had taken "reasonable effort to keep their property free of intruders." The signs, contend the trial court, warned noncustomers of the consequences of noncompliance. The court concluded that "Associates and Smart had the right to remove these vehicles, including the plaintiff's, and charge towing and storage fees" citing the case of Hopper v. Bills, 255 La. 628, 232 So.2d 296 (1970). We do not think that case stands for such a proposition and therefore reverse the trial court on this initial determination.
The Hopper case cited by the trial court does not stand for the proposition that a private property owner can use the "self-help" of a wrecker service to remove a vehicle from his property. In Hopper, supra, the State Police requested a wrecker service to remove a vehicle that had overturned near the highway and which constituted a traffic hazard. The Supreme Court concluded that the wrecker service was acting with authority from the State Police who were exercising their police power.
The question that is presented to us is whether a private property owner can take whatever means he determines to remove a vehicle from his property that is trespassing on it or is on his property without the landowner's consent.
In defining the legal criteria for finding a trespass, the trial court correctly stated that:
" To be a trespasser it must be shown that the party entered the premises despite evidence indicating the desire of the owner to maintain the privacy of his premises or where the property is such that the intruder would be well aware that his entry would be against the owner's wishes. An example of the latter would exist in the case of a private yard or estate where a residence is located. However, where the owner of the property attempts to attract business patrons, the owner's intention in restricting activity must be clearly manifested to the public. This can be done by erecting fences or maintaining other restraining devices which evidence the owner's intent to limit entry on his property."
According to the trial court, Associates had demonstrated to noncustomers its intention to restrict activity on its parking lot. However, in this case the court made a determination that no signs were visible to the plaintiff when he parked his car in the almost completely filled parking lot. We must conclude that there was no manifestation to the public or to the plaintiff at this time that Associates wanted to restrict the use of its parking lot.
Next we must consider whether the towing away of plaintiff's car was a right vested in a property owner or whether the actions amounted to "self-help" which is shunned by the courts. Neither of the defendants have cited any law, statute or case, that gives them the right as property owners to remove unwanted movables from their property.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the defendants cannot take such action but must resort to legal proceedings. In support of his contention he analogizes to the situation where the courts frown upon creditors seizing property that they have a legal lien on. He argues that Associates does not have as strong a legal claim to plaintiff's property as some of those creditors. Plaintiff also cites Civil Code Article 688 which prohibits a landowner from cutting or removing branches from his neighbor's trees that have come onto his proper ty. Finally, he also cites Civil Code Article 667 and its construction in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971) for the proposition that a landowner is liable to third parties for injuries suffered by them due to noxious substances._
None of these contentions directly determine the predicament that many private landowners are faced with. As is the case here the practice of parking a car for a period of hours on Friday and Saturday nights would not be adequately remedied by landowners who would have to wait until Monday morning to file an injunction prohibiting these people from parking their cars. On the other hand, the tolerance of letting people park on one's property without permission infringes on the landowner's right to "acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect and dispose of private property." Plaintiff makes one other contention in his brief that the landowner could 1 ave had the City Police Department issue a ticket to plaintiff for parking on private property according to Title 11, Section 17 of the Baton Rouge Traffic Code.
Our limited holding is that under the circumstances presented by this case the towing away of plaintiff's car by Smart under contract with Associates was illegal. The illegality consisted of using self-help in the removal of plaintiff's vehicle without adequate warning to the public of Associates' desire to restrict parking on its property.
The illegality of taking plaintiff's car amounted to a conversion which, although is of common law descent, is recognized as actionable as a tort in Louisiana law under Civil Code Article 2315. This actionable wrong was recognized by the Supreme Court in Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So.2d 574 (1957). See also Deshotels v. Statewide Trailer Sales, 333 So.2d 259 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976).
The trial court found that no conversion had occurred until Smart refused the request of Associates to release the vehicle to the plaintiff. We find that Associates, as principal, was liable to the plaintiff until Smart, as Associates' mandatory, denied Associates' request to release plaintiff's vehicle. Up until that time both parties are liable and after this period Smart alone is responsible for the unlawful detention of the vehicle.
The reason for the detention asserted by Smart is that the car was the only security he had to be compensated for his expenses in towing and storing the car. This reasoning is not valid and Smart had no right to retain possession of the car. As stated by the Supreme Court in previously granting the supervisory writs in this case: "The defendant has retained possession of the vehicle without any right to do so."
Smart also contends that he was possessing for Associates initially and that Associates cannot in midstream change its position. We do not find any merit in this contention. Smart was only a mandatory of Associates by way of the letter of agreement between the two. Associates revoked the mandate when it requested Smart to return plaintiff's vehicle. Once that mandate was revoked, Smart was liable for any consequences which exceeded his authority. La.C.C. art. 3010. The expenses and losses incurred by Smart should have been reimbursed by the principal, Associates. La.C.C. arts. 3022 and 3024. Nothing in this opinion derogates from any rights Associates may have against the plaintiff.
Our final determination is on the question of damages. The trial court awarded plaintiff $1,500.00 for loss of use of his car and inconvenience. We now modify this award due to our determination above.
The plaintiff seeks the following damages: $3,000 for loss of use of vehicle; $2,000 for depreciation of vehicle; $5,000 for shock, embarrassment, humiliation and inconvenience; $112 for repair of air conditioner; $98 for loss of radar detector unit; and $5,000 for attorney's fees for dissolving an illegal seizure.
It was established that the rental value of a like car would be $500 a month. The car was towed away on April 6, 1979 and returned to the plaintiff in mid July. The award of $1,500 for loss of use of the car is affirmed. Awards for depreciation of a vehicle illegally seized and shock, embarrassment and inconvenience are compensa-ble items. Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389, 111 So.2d 320 (1958), Peterson v. Olinde Hardware & Supply Co., 356 So.2d 92 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1978). We think the evidence supports a finding of $1,500 for depreciation and $500 for the shock, humiliation and inconvenience.
In regard to attorney's fees, the plaintiff contends that he should be compensated since such fees are awarded for dissolution of judicially sanctioned seizures. La.C.C.P. art. 3608. He argues that it would be an injustice if a person could not receive an award for dissolution of an illegal seizure. The general rule is that "attorney fees are not allowed except when authorized by statute or contract." Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So.2d 1275 (La.1978). There is no contract between the plaintiff and the defendants that provides for such fees and the legislature has not provided any law for compensation of attorney's fees in this instance. As sympathetic as we are to this plaintiff, an award of attorney's fees cannot be maintained.
No evidence was presented as to the value of the radar detector unit nor that the air conditioning unit was broken due to the fault of defendant. Therefore, we agree with the denial of these awards by the trial court.
Finally, Associates and Smart contend that Mr. Navratil should have mitigated his damages by initially paying the towing and storage fees to retain his car. Navratil was under no duty to pay for the return of his illegally seized automobile. The record shows that Navratil made demand for his car on the Saturday morning but to no avail. He then resorted to the courts for legal help, via injunction, to secure his vehicle on the following Monday. Having resorted to summary legal action as soon as possible fulfills the requirement to mitigate one's damages. See Weber v. McMillan, 285 So.2d 349 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973).
The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part, modified in part and affirmed in part. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Boris F. Navratil, and against the defendants, James H. Smart, d/b/a Road Runner Wrecker Service and Associates Financial Services Company, Inc., in the sum of $3,500 with interest thereon from date of judicial demand, until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings. Associates is liable in solido with Smart in the sum of $1,500 and costs; and Smart is individually liable for the remainder in the sum of $2,000.
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND RENDERED.
. In Runde v. Biddle, 41 IIl.App.3d 223, 353 N.E.2d 410 (1976) and Murrell v. Trio Towing Services, Inc., 294 So.2d 331 (Fla.App.1974), the plaintiffs conceded the right of the property owners to remove their vehicles.
. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites Samaniego v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 350 So.2d 193 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1977) writ denied 352 So.2d 240 (La.1977); Martinez v. Therma-King Sales & Serv. Div., 346 So.2d 798 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977) writ denied 349 So.2d 884 (La.1977).
. 1974 La.Const. Art. I, Sec. 4.
. Associates did admit that they erected a fence around the property eventually to prohibit people from parking in its lot.
. See Kunde, supra, and Murrell, supra.