Case Name: NAACP, INC., through its Florida Conference of Branches of NAACP, Mattie Garvin, on her own behalf and as mother of Keith Garvin and Keith Garvin, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS and the State Board of Education, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-02-26
Citations: 822 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 1D00-3138
Parties: NAACP, INC., through its Florida Conference of Branches of NAACP, Mattie Garvin, on her own behalf and as mother of Keith Garvin and Keith Garvin, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS and the State Board of Education, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: POLSTON, J., CONCURS; BROWNING, J., dissents with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 822
Pages: 1–14

Head Matter:
NAACP, INC., through its Florida Conference of Branches of NAACP, Mattie Garvin, on her own behalf and as mother of Keith Garvin and Keith Garvin, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS and the State Board of Education, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
No. 1D00-3138.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Feb. 26, 2002.
Opinion on Limited Grant of Certification July 26, 2002.
John D.C. Newton, II, and Daniel H. Thompson of Berger Singerman, Tallahassee; Mitchell W. Berger of Berger Singer-man, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Carol A. Licko of Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Miami, for Appellees/Cross-Appel-lants.

Opinion:
WEBSTER, J.,
NAACP, Inc., through its Florida Conference of Branches of NAACP, Mattie Garvin, individually and as mother of Keith Garvin, and Keith Garvin, individually, seek review of a final order entered by an administrative law judge (ALJ) in a rule challenge proceeding. In that order, the ALJ rejected appellants' challenge to all but one of several rule amendments adopted by the Florida Board of Regents and approved by the State Board of Education in response to a request made by the Governor in an executive order "that the Board of Regents implement a policy prohibiting the use of racial or gender set-asides, preferences or quotas in admissions to all Florida institutions of Higher Education." By cross-appeal, the Board of Regents and the State Board of Education seek review of those portions of the order holding that appellants had standing to bring the rule challenge, and that the amendment that repealed Florida Administrative Code Rule 6C-6.001(10)(e)6 was "an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." We conclude that no competent, substantial evidence was presented to establish that any of the appellants had standing to bring the rule challenge. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand with directions that the ALJ dismiss the rule challenge for lack of standing.
I.
On -November 9, 1999, Governor Bush signed. Executive Order 99-281, which outlined his "One Florida Initiative." Section 3 of that Executive Order was titled "Non Discrimination in Higher Education." In paragraph (b) of that section, the Governor "request[ed] that the Board of Regents implement a policy prohibiting the use of racial or gender set-asides, preferences or quotas in admissions to all Florida institutions of Higher Education, effective immediately." On February 17 and 18, 2000, in an effort to comply with the Governor's request, the Board of Regents adopted amendments to its rules setting general requirements for student admissions (Fla. Admin. Code R. 6C-6.001), admission requirements for entering freshmen (Fla. Admin. Code R. 6C-6.002), and admission requirements for entering dr transferring graduate and professional students (Fla. Admin. Code R. 6C-6.003). The Board of Education approved the amendments on February 22, 2000.
Appellants immediately filed a petition pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Stát-utes (1999), challenging seven of the amendments that modified the existing rules by (1) reaffirming the state's commitment to increasing diversity in university admissions, but repealing language stating that universities may use alternative admission methods to increase enrollment of a diverse student body; (2) establishing the "Talented 20 Program" which guaranteed university admission to students in the top 20 percent of their high school graduating class as determined by the Florida Department of Education; (3) prohibiting the use of racial and gender preferences in the admissions process, but al lowing for the consideration of various race and gender-neutral factors as part of an applicant's "profile assessment"; and (4) repealing the rule providing for alternate admissions to limited access programs, i.e., upper level programs with competitive admissions due to limited space or resources. They claimed that (1) all seven amendments were "an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" because there was no specific statutory authority authorizing the Board of Regents to prohibit consideration of factors that a university deemed relevant in the admissions process (such as race, national origin, or gender), to limit alternative admissions, or to guarantee admissions to a defined class of students; (2) the amendment to rule 6C-6.002(5), which provided that class rankings under the "Talented 20 Program" would be determined by the Department of Education, was "arbitrary and capricious" because the Department of Education relied on class ranks provided by individual school districts, which used different ranking systems, pending development of a uniform methodology; and (3) the amendment to rule 6C-6.002(7), which guaranteed university admission to students in the top 20 percent of their high school graduating class, usurped the appropriations power of the legislature by committing the Board of Regents and the Board of Education to expend state funds prior to their appropriation by the legislature.
The Board of Regents and the Board of Education responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. According to the motion, the allegations of the petition were legally insufficient to demonstrate that any of the appellants had standing, either individually or in a representative capacity, because they failed to demonstrate how any of them (or any of NAACP's members) would suffer any injury because of the amendments. Rather, according to the motion, the petition alleged nothing more than speculation regarding what might happen-in the future.
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the ALJ held that the petition's allegations were legally insufficient to demonstrate standing as to NAACP in its individual capacity and standing of the Garvins to challenge amendments to rule 6C-6.003, which related to admissions to graduate and professional schools. (Appellants do not challenge those rulings on appeal.) The ALJ denied the motion in all other respects, holding that the allegations were otherwise legally sufficient to demonstrate standing.
A final hearing, at which evidence was presented, was held on April 24-26, 2000. On July 12, 2000, the ALJ entered his final order. In that order, he held that appellants had presented sufficient evidence to establish NAACP's "associational standing . to represent [its] members as persons substantially affected by the proposed amendments," and that the Garvins were "substantially affected by the proposed amendments to [r]ules 6C-6.001 and 6C-6.002." Regarding the merits of the rule challenge, the ALJ held that the repeal of rule 6C-6.001(10)(e)6 (which provided that, "[w]here necessary to achieve established equal access enrollment goals, up to ten percent of the students may be admitted to a limited access program with different criteria") was "an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority"; but that all of the other challenged amendments were valid. This appeal and cross-appeal follow.
II.
Standing to challenge proposed or existing administrative rules is governed by statute in Florida. Section 120.56(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), states that only those who are "substantially af fected by.a rale or a proposed rale may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rale on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." To demonstrate that one is or will be "substantially affected by a rule or a proposed rule," one must establish both that application of the rule will result in "a real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact" and that "the alleged interest is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated." See, e.g., Lanoue v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 751 So.2d 94, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Ward v. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 651 So.2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); All Risk Corp. of Fla. v. State Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 413 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Fla. Dep't of Offender Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). An injury is not "real and sufficiently immediate" if the likelihood of its occurrence rests upon speculation or conjecture. See, e.g., Ward, 651 So.2d at 1237; Jerry, 353 So.2d at 1236.
A.
In Florida Home Builders Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So.2d 351, 353-54 (Fla.1982), the court held that trade or professional associations have standing in certain circumstances to challenge, pursuant to section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes, an agency rule on behalf of their members:
To meet the requirements of section 120.56(1), an association must demonstrate that a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are "substantially affected" by the challenged rule. Further, the subject matter of the rule must be within the association's general scope of interest and activity, and the relief requested must be of the type appropriate for a trade association to receive on behalf of its members.
Without discussing the justification for doing so, we have previously extended this concept of "associational standing" to associations other than trade or professional associations. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 595 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Farmworker Rights Org., Inc. v. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 430 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As no party to this appeal has questioned those decisions, we assume (without deciding) that the assumption made in them was correct, and that NAACP qualifies as an association for purposes of Florida Home Builders though it is not a trade or professional association.
The ALJ concluded that NAACP had "associational standing" to represent its members because "significant numbers of middle or high school students in [its] Florida Youth Councils and college students in [its] Florida College Chapters [would be] substantially affected" by the rule amendments. He did not, however, specify how any of those students would be "substantially affected." Instead, relying on our decision in Coalition of Mental Health Professions v. Department of Professional Regulation, 546 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), he said that "[t]he fact that NAACP student members will be regulated by the proposed amendments in their admissions to the [State University System] establishes that they are substantially affected persons, without the need for further factual elaboration of how each member would be personally affected." This was error.
B.
In Coalition, a coalition consisting of several professional associations whose members would all be subject to "three rules which propose[d] to define the practices of clinical social workers, marriage and family therapists and mental health counselors" appealed a final order denying it standing to challenge the proposed rules. 546 So.2d at 28. We reversed, "holding that [the coalition's] members, being subject to and regulated by the proposed rules, have party status." Id. We said, further, that "[t]he fact that appellant's members will be regulated by the proposed rules is alone sufficient to establish that their substantial interests will be affected and there is no need for further factual elaboration of how each member will be personally affected." Id. In essence, we created what appears to be a presumption. However, it was not intended to have wide application but, rather, was intended to apply only to trade or professional associations whose members were to be regulated by the challenged rules. It seems to us that several considerations support such a reading.
The operative facts in Coalition included that the coalition was composed of professional associations, and that all of the associations' members would be regulated, in the practice of their professions, by the proposed rules. Id. There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the court intended the presumption it had crafted to apply to any other factual scenario. Moreover, the opinion must be read in light of that in Florida Home Builders, in which the supreme court had limited its holding regarding "associational standing" to trade and professional associations. To do otherwise would, at least arguably, place Coalition in conflict with Florida Home Builders. Finally, a presumption is "[a] legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts." Black's Law Dictionary 1203 (7th ed.1999). The creation of a presumption such as that in Coalition makes sense in the context of a trade or professional association all of whose members will be regulated by the challenged rules. It makes considerably less sense in other contexts, such as that presented here.
The rule amendments challenged by appellants would not "regulate" NAACP's members in the sense that the word was used in Coalition. The amendments would have no impact on them whatsoever unless and until they applied for admission to a university undergraduate, graduate or professional program, and even then there is no evidence to suggest that any impact would be adverse. In short, the amendments have not been shown to have an impact on NAACP's members that is different from the impact they will have on all citizens. In this sense, we find instructive the discussion in State Board of Optometry v. Florida Society of Ophthalmology, 538 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), an opinion authored by Judge Zehmer, who, only several months later, also authored Coalition. Reversing the hearing officer's decision that the Florida Society of Ophthalmology and the Florida Medical Association had standing to challenge a rule adopted by the Florida Board of Optometry intended to permit "optometrists licensed under chapter 463[, Florida Statutes,] . to administer certain topical ocular drugs in the diagnosis and treatment of the human eye[, which] practice previously fell within the exclusive domain of . physicians who were licensed under chapters 458 and 459 and practiced ophthalmic medicine" {id. at 879), the court said:
[Petitioners' continuing general interest in the quality of eye care being provided to the public is not predicated upon a legally recognized right of sufficient immediacy and reality to support their standing to challenge the validity of the adopted rule.... Petitioners, representing or being physicians licensed under chapters 458 and 459, are not subject-to regulation or control under chapter 463, are not subject to regulation or control by the rule, and cannot predicate standing on the notion that the application of the challenged rule will prevent or obstruct their practicing ophthalmic medicine . "Whether application of the challenged rule will cause the petitioning physicians, or any physicians represented by the petitioning associations, an injury of sufficient immediacy and reality under the criteria set forth in Jerry [i.e., Fla. Dep't of Offender Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)] is purely a matter of speculation and conjecture.
Id. at 881. To read Coalition as did the ALJ would render unnecessary any showing that "a substantial number" of an association's members will be "substantially affected" (i.e.,- injured) by a challenged rule, as required by Florida Home Builders. Instead,' "associational standing" would be established whenever an association could demonstrate that any of its members might be subject to the application of the rule at some future date.
C.
Because NAACP was not entitled to rely on the Coalition presumption, it was obliged to satisfy the test for "associational standing" announced in Florida Home Builders; i.e., it was obliged to establish by competent, substantial evidence that "a substantial number of its members . [would be] 'substantially affected' " by the challenged amendments, that "the subject matter of the rule.[is] within [its] general scope of interest and activity," and that "the relief requested [is] of the type appropriate for a[n] . association to receive on behalf of its members." 412 So.2d at 353-54.
NAACP offered no evidence to suggest that any of its-members will suffer "a real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact" as a result of implementation of any of the proposed rule amendments; On the contrary, Leon Russell, the immediate past president of NAACP's Florida Conference of Branches and a member of its national board of directors, testified that it was impossible to predict what effect the amendments would have on any of NAACP's members. On appeal, appellants have conceded that the true focus of their attack on the rules is that they do not wish to see "successful affirmative action programs and policies in the admissions process" replaced "with an untried 'Talented 20' program and a prohibition on 'preferences.' " In other words, they are unwilling to have what they believe has been a- beneficial policy replaced by one that may or may not prove to be equally beneficial.
We conclude that NAACP failed to present competent, substantial evidence to establish that any of its members would suffer "a real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact" because of implementation of any of the rule amendments challenged. As a result, it failed to demonstrate that any of its members would be "substantially affected" by implementation of any of the challenged amendments. Therefore, it failed to carry its burden of establishing "associational standing" pursuant to the test announced in Florida Home Builders, and we need not consider whether it met the other requirements, including establishing "that the alleged interest [was] arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated." We hold that NAACP lacked "associational standing" to challenge the rule amendments. Accordingly, we must reverse the ALJ's decision to the contrary.
III.
Appellant Keith Garvin is an African-American who was in the tenth grade at a Florida public high school. He was also active in the NAACP Youth Council. He had not applied to any university; but, upon graduation from high school, hoped to major in computer science or engineering at a university in the State University System. Appellant Mattie Garvin is Keith's mother. She was a member of NAACP, and was interested in "providing] her son . with the best possible educational opportunities." The ALJ concluded that the Garvins' had standing to challenge the amendments to rules 6C-6.001 and 6C-6.002 because they "[we]re substantially affected by th[ose] proposed amendments." He did not, however, specify how either Garvin would be "substantially affected" by the amendments to either rule. Instead, he again relied on Coalition, concluding that it was sufficient that "Keith Garvin, and Mattie Garvin on his behalf, [would]' have their admission to the [State University System] universities regulated and controlled by the proposed amendments." This, too, was error.
As we have previously explained, the presumption created in Coalition was intended to apply only to trade or professional associations whose members will be regulated by the challenged rules. It was clearly not intended to extend to individuals.
To establish standing for purposes of section 120.56(1), the Garvins were both obliged to demonstrate by competent, substantial evidence that they would be "substantially affected" by the proposed rule amendments. Neither of them carried their burden because . neither presented any evidence to suggest that he or she would suffer "a real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact" as a result of implementation of any of the proposed amendments. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that, at his current rate of academic progress, Keith will be eligible for admission regardless of the impact that any of the challenged amendments might have. Moreover, because Keith had two more years of high school to complete, any claimed injury would not be "real and sufficiently immediate" but, rather, would rest upon rank speculation. But for her desire "to provide her son . with the best possible educational opportunities," Mrs. Garvin's claim is derivative of her son's. Her' understandable desire to ensure that her son receives a first-class education is one shared by all parents.
We conclude that Keith Garvin and his mother failed to present competent, substantial .evidence that either would suffer "a real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact" because of implementation of any of the rule amendments challenged. As a result, they failed to demonstrate that they would be "substantially affected" by implementation of any of the challenged amendments. Therefore, we hold that they lacked standing to challenge the rule amendments. Accordingly, we must reverse the ALJ's decision to the contrary.
IV.
Because we have concluded that appellants lacked standing to bring the rule challenge, we do not address the merits of that challenge. We note that, as our decision does not reach the merits of appellants' challenge to the rule amendments, there is nothing to prevent appellants from subsequently bringing another- challenge, provided they are able to satisfy the requirements for standing. See, e.g., Allbright v. Hanft, 333 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ("a judgment rendered on any grounds which do not involve the merits of the action may not be used as the basis for the operation of the doctrine of res judica-ta"); § 120.56(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) ("A substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of an existing rule at any time during the existence of the rule"). We reverse the final order, and remand with directions that the ALJ enter an order dismissing the rule challenge for lack of standing.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
POLSTON, J., CONCURS; BROWNING, J., dissents with written opinion.