Case Name: Richard M. WEEKS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1969-05-07
Citations: 252 A.2d 907
Docket Number: No. 4720
Parties: Richard M. WEEKS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KELLY and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 252
Pages: 907–909

Head Matter:
Richard M. WEEKS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 4720.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Jan. 27, 1969.
Decided May 7, 1969.
Michael M. Kearney, Arlington, Va., appointed by this court, for appellant. Ira M. Lowe, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.
Henry F. Greene, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Axel H. Kleiboemer, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for ap-pellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KELLY and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
KELLY, Associate Judge:
Appellant was convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree, destroying private property, and petit larceny on evidence showing, as far as pertinent, that a showcase window glass of a music store had been broken and a stereo stolen from the window. The sentences imposed were one year for attempted burglary and one year for petit larceny, to be served consecutively, and an additional year for destroying private property, to be served concurrently with the larceny sentence. The only alleged error which requires discussion is the validity of the trial court's action in imposing consecutive sentences.
Irby v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 17, 390 F.2d 432 (1967), makes clear that if in a single course of conduct two or more separate crimes are committed, we look to the intent of Congress to determine whether a substantial doubt exists as to its intention that double punishment should be imposed. If there is a substantial doubt of congressional intent, the rule of lenity is applied in favor of concurrent sentences. But while the application of the rule of lenity has heretofore presented many difficulties, circumstances do not require its application here.
It is true that the three offenses with which we are concerned are crimes against property, committed in a single course of conduct. But it is unnecessary to make nice distinctions between the interests sought to be protected by the several statutes under which appellant was charged, nor to base our holding on any such reasoning that in this one continuing transaction appellant's course of criminal conduct admitted of interruption. The fact is that appellant's true crime was burglary in the second degree, a felony. Our disposition of this case is premised on that fact, and we regard it as inconsequential that the felony was reduced by the prosecution to three separate misdemeanors.
It is seldom possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty a legislative intent as to cumulative punishment. However, Congress has recently made it clear that in its estimation burglary in the second degree is so serious a crime as to require, upon conviction, a mandatory minimum sentence of two years. With this clear expression of legislative intent we do not think it unjust to impose cumulative punishment for the several misdemeanors of which the burglary is comprised, particularly where no other considerations are present which dictate leniency.
To hold that under the circumstances of this case the trial judge could not in his discretion impose consecutive sentences would be to subvert the intent of Congress rather than to doubt it. Accordingly the judgments appealed from are
Affirmed.
. D.C.Code 1967, § 22-103; § 22-1801 (b) (Supp. II, 1968).
. D.C.Code 1967, § 22-403.
. D.C.Code 1967, § 22-2202.
. See, e.g., Barringer v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 399 F.2d 557 (1968).
. We have had occasion, at the direction of the United States Court of Appeals, to consider the propriety of consecutive sentences for attempted petit larceny and destroying movable property where the two crimes were committed in an attempt to pry open the locked trunk of an automobile. We reversed and remanded for resentencing. Watson v. United States, Nos. 4252 and 4253 (unpublished order dated June 18, 1968).
. D.C.Code 1967, § 22-1801 (b) (Supp. II, 1968).
. Cf. Jenkins v. United States, D.C.App., 242 A.2d 214 (1968).