Case Name: RANKIN, Respondent, v. LOVE, et al., Appellant
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1951-06-14
Citations: 125 Mont. 184
Docket Number: No. 9032
Parties: RANKIN, Respondent, v. LOVE, et al., Appellant.
Judges: MB. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIB, and MB. JUSTICE FEEE-BOUBN, concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 184–201

Head Matter:
RANKIN, Respondent, v. LOVE, et al., Appellant.
No. 9032.
Submitted January 25, 1951.
Decided June 14, 1951.
232 Pac. (2d) 998.
Mr. John M. Comfort, County Attorney, Virginia City, for appellants.
Mr. Frank E. Blair, Mr. Robert J. Webb, Virginia City, for respondent.
Mr. Wesley W. Wertz, Helena, amicus curiae.
Mr. Comfort, Mr. Blair and Mr. Wertz argued orally.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
This is an appeal from a decree and judgment permanently enjoining the defendants, Pearl C. Love, P. T. Hacker, William Armitage, Stanton Frisbie and John Jenkins, as trustees of School District No. 52, Madison county, Montana, and also as trustees of High School District No. 52, Madison county, Montana, and John C. Tolson, as clerk of both boards of trustees, from becoming indebted in a sum greater than the constitutional limit of three per centum of the value of the taxable property in School District No. 52 and the purported Ennis High School District, viewing the two districts as a single taxing unit within the prohibition of section 6, Article XIII of the state Constitution and section 75-3902, R. C. M. 1947, from selling, offering for sale or delivering any bonds of the district in excess of such constitutional limit.
School District No. 52, Madison county, regularly organized under the school laws of this state, has maintained at Ennis a grade school and a fully accredited high school covering the full four years' course of study since at least the year 1921, totaling in all a complete twelve full years of instruction upon a fully accredited basis. At the times herein mentioned School District No. 52 had no grade or elementary school indebtedness, but the indebtedness for its high school amounted to $22,553.91. The value of the taxable property of the district was $4,267,362.
The district was desirous of constructing and equipping an elementary school estimated to cost $115,000, and in addition required an estimated $37,000 for the constructing and equipping of one multipurpose room to be used by the high school and one boiler room, both to be erected in conjunction with the elementary school. The two amounts total $152,000. Considering school district No. 52 and high school district No. 52 as one taxing unit, the constitutional limitation of 3% of the value of the taxable property would yield only $128,020.80, and consequently the proposed indebtedness would be some $46,533.00 in excess of the then constitutional limit.
At the time of the Third Constitutional Convention in 1889 and the drafting of our Constitution, our public school system was. well outlined and established. The framers of our Constitution were well advised of the schools provided and of the function of the school district as the taxing unit.
Under the school law of 1879, Rev. Stat. 1879, Ch. LV, sec. 1132, the territorial legislature, after providing for the school districts, further provided for the high school as follows: "Whenever the interests of the districts require it, the board of trustees may establish a high school, employ a principal teacher and subordinate teachers, and grade the school into departments and classes," both to be financed through the single taxing unit of the school district as established.
A reading of the statutory provisions for public schools, prior to and at the time of the adopting of our Constitution and of the work of the committees and the debates in the convention and the Constitution itself, clearly indicates the large amount of work and thought that was given to the subject of free public schools — districts had been established, provision made for the election of trustees, their duties, separate school elections, the grades, departments and the subjects to be taught, and where deemed necessary such district could establish a high school, and all through such history of the development of the public school system the school district was known as the only taxing1 unit for the support of such schools. No separate unit for taxation or otherwise was known as a high school district.
At the time of the drafting of section 6 of Article XIII there was no example or conception of any additional taxing unit to be superimposed on the school district as then known, nor could they have had any such condition in mind, as their debates clearly demonstrate that they were alert in seeing to it that a .definite limit of indebtedness was imposed for each taxing unit of government.
The provisions of the Constitution are to be construed in the light of conditions as they existed at the time of its adoption. State ex rel. Bottomly v. District Court, 73 Mont. 541, 547, 237 Pac. 525; State ex rel. Jackson v. Kennie, 24 Mont. 45, 60 Pac. 589.
Knowing that there was only one kind of public school district and that such district could provide all schooling from the first grade to and including a high school, the Constitutional Convention declared in clear and unmistakable language, that all could understand, a safeguard and protection for the taxpayer against the overenthusiastic impulse to saddle an unreasonable and intolerable tax burden on the property of a school district by declaring that no school district shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding "three (3) per centum of the value of the taxable property therein ' *." The intent and purpose of this provision is so specific, unambiguous and clear that it needs no interpretation. To leave no doubt, they further solemnly declared: "® * >:i all bonds or obligations in excess of such amount given by or on behalf of such school district shall be void". Mont. Const., Art. XIII, sec. 6, supra. Emphasis supplied.
The framers of our Constitution further provided that the public schools shall be open to all children and youth between the ages of six and 21 years. Mont. Const. Art. XI, sec 7.
The provisions of our Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory. Mont. Const., Art. III, sec. 29.
We are here considering the fundamental, basic and substantive law of our state.
It is the duty and responsibility of this court to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution as written, neither to add to nor to subtract from, neither to delete nor to distort.
Obviously, the only purpose of a school district is to designate a certain territory within which a public school or schools may be established and maintained. The school laws of this state have always clearly contemplated the establishment of a school or schools, high schools as well as grade schools, within the district as being essential to the very existence of the district itself. The kind of school that is thus contemplated is spoken of in the laws upon the subject as a "public school," or "public schools." Such a school is a school established and maintained at public expense and comprising the elementary grades, and when established, the grades of high school work.
In accordance therewith, a high school, when established, becomes an integral part of the public school system in that particular district. It is under the jurisdiction of the same board of trustees as the elementary grades or any other department of the public school system existing in that particular "school district," and financed and maintained by taxation on the property lying and being within the exterior boundaries of that particular school district. This was the law of this state prior to and at the time of the wi'iting of our Constitution in regard to public schools and "school districts," and it is still the law of this jurisdiction.
The framers of our Constitution specifically designated and provided for the various public taxing units or districts for the state, the county, the city, the town, the township, and the school district; no mention is made of a high school district as a separate taxing unit, for the very good reason that by law any "school district" could establish a high school, as a part of the school district taxing unit.
The argument of need, necessity, hardship or inconvenience, cannot avail in the interpretation of the constitutional mandate relative to the limitations placed upon the power of school districts to contract indebtedness. The rule of strict construction must be applied, and any doubt as to such power must be resolved against it. If this court is to be controlled in the interpretation of the Constitution by considerations outside its provisions, there would be very few, if any, provisions of it which would not be rendered nugatory. See: Butler v. Andrus, 35 Mont. 575, 90 Pac. 785; State ex rel. Helena Waterworks Co. v. City of Helena, 24 Mont. 521, 63 Pac. 99, 55 L. R. A. 336, 81 Am. St. Rep. 453; 1 Abbott on Municipal Corporations, sec. 151, p. 324; 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 39.07, p. 14, sec. 41.11, pp. 323, 324.
It is also crystal clear that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the legislature in regard to school districts to extend the limit therein fixed as it allowed for cities and towns in providing sewage systems or to procure a water supply. The constitutional provision curbs equally the power of the legislature, the officials and the people themselves, and was designed to protect the taxpayer from the folly and improvidence of either, or of all combined.
In the absence of constitutional limitations, the legislature may create or abandon a district, or it may change the boundaries of districts, or create joint districts. The legislature, however, may not enlarge the power of a school district to create a debt beyond the limitations imposed by section 6 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
In this case the indebtedness proposed to be incurred, at that time, with the existing indebtedness, exceeded the constitutional limit of three per cent. Under the then limit fixed by our Constitution, this could not be done "in any manner or for any purpose" to an amount in the aggregate of three per cent.
The high school district attempted to be created under Chapter 275, Laws of 1947, has no authority to operate and manage a high school; but its sole purported function is to borrow money for the purpose of construction, repair, improvement and equipment purposes only, all of which purposes and powers have heretofore been conferred upon and exercised by the board of trustees of every school district in which grade and high schools have been established. All of such purposes and powers granted by Chapter 275 were and had been exercised by the board of trustees of school district No. 52 prior to the action creating high school district No. 52. The only effect of the attempted creation of high school district No. 52 was to divide the powers already exercised by school district No. 52 and an attempt to expand the constitutional limit of indebtedness by the pyramiding of another tax unit upon the identical property and taxpayers of school district No. 52. Contravening section 6 of Article XIII as it does, Chapter 275, Laws of 1947, R. C. M. 1947, secs. 75-4601 to 75-4606, is unconstitutional and is invalid.
The people of any school district and of district No. 52 may spend whatever sum.of money is necessary in the maintenance of their public schools in accordance with statute, so long as they do not create an indebtedness in excess of the limit set by section 6 of Article XIII and thereby pass on an obligation to the coming generations beyond the limit provided.
Section 6 of Article XIII is a limitation of indebtedness as distinguished from a limitation of the amount that may be raised by taxation to serve the necessary current expenses of the district. It is a laudable endeavor for people to desire to sacrifice in providing the facilities and opportunities of a good public school system of education for their children. It is true that under the conditions of the past few years, the increase in pupil load, rising prices and costs of operation, school trustees have been hard pressed in their search for finances to keep pace with the growing demand. However, there is a legal and constitutional method of remedying this situation and that method is by amending the Constitution.
The injunctive decree entered July 25, 1950, was correct under the Constitution as it then read. However, the 1949 legislature, proceeding in the proper and constitutional manner set in motion the machinery whereby the constitutional limit of three per centum would be raised to five per centum. This was accomplished by the enactment of Chapter 193, Laws of 1949, and the submission thereof at the November 1950 election to the qualified electors of the state, of a proposed constitutional amendment to section 6 of Article XIII of our Constitution. The proposed amendment was adopted and on December 6, 1950, by proclamation of the Governor became operative and a part of our fundamental law, which now provides: "No * ' school district shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum (5%) of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and all bonds or obligations in excess of such amount given by or on behalf of such school district shall be void."
Thereafter, to make the statute conform with the foregoing constitutional amendment, the legislature by the enactment of Chapter 65, Laws of 1951, amended section 75-3902, R. C. M. 1947, which amendment does not become effective until July 1, 1951.
The trial court's injunctive order continues in full force and effect and virtue until July 1, 1951, the effective date of Chapter 65, Laws of 1951, on which date it becomes inoperative by virtue of the above mentioned subsequent enacted legislation, of which school district No. 52, Madison county, Montana, being the taxing unit, may then take full advantage and proceed within the limits and prohibition of the Constitution and statutes, as amended.
The majority decision in House v. School District No. 4 of Park County, 120 Mont. 319, 184 Pac. (2d) 285, is expressly overruled, and we call attention to the fact that the rights of parties who have heretofore entered into contracts and the validity of the bonds that have been sold in reliance upon this court's decision in the House Case, supra, are in no way affected by this decision, and are to be determined in accordance with the well established rule as set forth in the following cases: Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 68 U. S. 175, 17 L. Ed. 520; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294, 70 U. S. 294, 18 L. Ed. 38; Douglass v. Pike Co., 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. Ed. 968; Township of New Buffalo v. Cambria Iron Co., 105 U. S. 73, 26 L. Ed. 1024; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 451, 452, 44 S. Ct. 197, 68 L. Ed. 382; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 20 S. Ct. 736, 44 L. Ed. 886; Levin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 179 Md. 125, 17 A. (2d) 101; Hoven v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 163 Minn. 339, 204 N. W. 29, 30; 7 R. C. L., Courts, sec. 36, p. 1010; 97 A. L. R. n. 11, p. 516; 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, see. 41.11, p. 324.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, but as of July 1, 1951, the injunction order and writ become inoperative by reason of the amendment of the Constitution and statute, which become effective subsequent to the entry of the decree and issuance of the writ.
Bemittitur will issue forthwith.
MB. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIB, and MB. JUSTICE FEEE-BOUBN, concur.