Case Name: STATE v. STEWART
Court: Superior Court of Louisiana
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1924-07-08
Citations: 157 La. 494
Docket Number: No. 26070
Parties: STATE v. STEWART.
Judges: By the WHOLE COURT.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 157
Pages: 493–509

Head Matter:
(102 So. 584)
No. 26070.
STATE v. STEWART.
(July 8, 1924.
On Rehearing, Dec. 1, 1924.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
1. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey; 139 — Druggist who sells medical preparation containing alcohol for beverage purposes guilty of illegal possession.
Mere possession by a druggist of well-known medical preparations containing alcohol does not make Mm liable under Act No. 39 of 1921, §§ 1, 3, for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, but if he sells or deals in such a compound for use as a beverage, he is guilty of illegal possession for sale for beverage purposes. (Per Rogers, Land, and Thompson, JJ.)
2. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;l39 — Manager of drug store in control of intoxicating liquor is guilty of possessing for sale for beverage purposes; “person.”
Manager of drug store in control and possession, as such manager, of intoxicating liquor, sold for beverage pux-poses, is guilty of possession for sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes under Act No. 39 of 1921, §§ 1, 3, denouncing such possession by any “person,” and section 8, par. 1, defining the word “per: son” to include “corporations and their clerks, officers, agents, and servants.” (Per Rogers, Land, and Thompson, JJ.)
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Person.]
3. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;229 — Evidence as to sales by drug store employé, in. absence of manager, held admissible in prosecution of manager.
In prosecution of manager of drug store for possession of alcoholic compound for sale for beverage purposes, in violation of Act No. 39 of 1921, §§ 1, 3, evidence as to sales of such compound by employé during defendant’s absence held admissible to show purpose for which the liquor was kept. (Per Rogers, Land, and Thompson, JJ.)
4. Criminal law <@=369(l) — Rule as to admissibility of evidence as to other offense stated.
AVhere motive, guilty knowledge or criminal intent forms an essential or indispensable part of the inquiry, proof of another offense is ad* missible. (Per Rogers, Land, and Thompson, JJ.)
5. Intoxicating liquors &wkey;>!68 — Manager of drug store held guilty of possession, for sale, though actual sale was made by empioyé In his absence.
Manager of drug store who expressly or impliedly authorized employe to sell alcoholic compound for beverage purposes, in accordance with the custom of doing business in the drug store, was guilty of possession for sale of liquor for beverage purposes, under Act No. 39 of 1921, §§ 1, 3, though actual sale of liquor was made in his absence. (Per Rogers, Land, and Thompson, JJ.)
6. Criminal law <g&wkey;>f 158(1) —• Whether drug store possesses preparations for beverage or medicinal purposes is question of fact for trial judge.
Question whether drug store possesses concoctions such as tinctures, extracts, essences, etc., for beverage purposes or for medicinal purposes, is one of fact for the trial judge, and his determination is not subject to review by the Supreme Court. (Per St. Paul, J.)
7. Criminal law <@=1158(1) — Whether preparations in drug store are fit for beverage purposes is question of fact not reviewable by Supreme Court.
Whether concoctions, tinctures, extracts, essences, etc., in drug store, be or be not fit for use as beverage or for intoxicating beverage purposes, is question of fact which the Supreme Court will not review. (Per St. Paul, J.)
8. intoxicating liquors <@=134 — “intoxicating beverages” defined.
As a matter of law, the term “intoxicating beverages” does not include every liquid capable of being swallowed by a human being for the purpose of inducing intoxication, but only such liquids as are capable of or intended for constant or regular or frequent use, without deleterious effect other than intoxication, in view of purpose of Const. U. S. Amend. 18, and Act No. 39 of 1921. (Per St. Paul, J.)
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Intoxicating Beverages.]
On Rehearing.
9.Indictment and information <&wkey;l I0(31)r-lnformation charging drug store manager with possession of intoxicating liquor held sufficient.
In prosecution of drug store manager for possession of intoxicating liquor for sale for beverage purposes, under Act No. 39 of 1921, §§ 1, 3, indictment charging in words of statute that defendant had in his possession “intoxicating liquor” for sale for beverage purposes, held sufficient, in view of bill of particulars stating that the kind of liquor possessed was tincture of ginger, containing 90 per cent, of alcohol. (Per St. Paul, J.)
O’Niell, C. J., and Brunot, J., dissenting; Leche, J., dissenting on original hearing only.
Appeal from City Court of Alexandria Ward, Parish, of Rapides; Al. Hundley, Judge.
B. W. Stewart was convicted of possessing for sale intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
T. A. Carter, of Alexandria, for appellant.
A. V. Coco and Percy Saint, Attys. Gen., Cleveland Dear, Dist. Atty., of Alexandria (S. L. Richey, of Alexandria, T. Semmes Walmsley, of New Orleans, A. J. Bordelon, of .Marksville, and Percy T. Ogden, of Crowley, of counsel), for the State.
By the WHOLE COURT.

Opinion:
ROGERS, J.
Appellant prosecutes this appeal from a conviction and sentence for possessing for sale intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. He relies for reversal upon four bills of exception.
On motion of appellant, a bill of particulars was ordered. In obedience to this order, the district attorney showed that -the liquor consisted of three small bottles of tincture of ginger containing 90 per cent, of alcohol "possessed in the Hub Drug Company, Inc., of which defendant is manager," etc.
The first bill of exception reserved was to the ruling of the court in refusing the request of counsel for defendant to dismiss the affidavit on the ground that no crime had been committed hy defendant.
It is argued on behalf of defendant that the bill of particulars, taken in connection with the affidavit, shows that the liquor was not in the possession of defendant, nor was it his property, but it was the property of, and in the possession of, the Hub Drug Company; and that the possession of tincture of ginger, which is esteemed and used by numerous persons for its medicinal virtues, by a drug store does not constitute a crime, notwithstanding that one of the clerks may have sold a bottle of the concoction during the absence of the manager.
We think it may be safely conceded that the mere possession by a druggist of well known medical preparations containing alcohol does not make him liable under the statute for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. If, however, he sells or deals in such a compound for use as a beverage, since he must first possess it before he can sell or deal in it, he makes himself criminally liable for the illegal possession for sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. It becomes a question of fact in which the circumstances of each case must determine the intent.
The present prosecution is against the defendant as manager of the Hub Drug Company, Inc., and not against the corporation itself.
Section 1 of Act 39 of 1921 provides that "no person shall possess intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes."
Section 3 of the statute declares:
, "That any person who shall violate the provisions of this act by having in his possession, for sale, intoxicating liquors shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc.
In paragraph'1 of section 8 of the act, it is provided that:
"The word 'person' shall mean natural persons, associations, copartnerships, corporations, and their clerics, officers, agents and servants." (Writer's italics.)
It will thus appear that, under the express language of the statute itself, artificial, as well as natural persons; agents as well as principals, servants as well as masters, may be equally guilty of violating the' statute, and subject to the penalties therein prescribed.
While corporations must necessarily act through their officers, agents, servants, and employees, and may be held for violations of the statute by their said representatives, the officers, agents, servants, and employees-themselves may be prosecuted and punished' for their own illegal acts.
The affidavit in this case is against defendant as manager of the Hub Drug Company, and is clearly within the language of the statute, the defendant, as manager, being a clerk, officer, agent or servant of said corporation in the sense of paragraph 1 of' section 8 of the act. As said manager, he was in control and possession of the intoxicating liquor set forth in the affidavit and bill of particulars. If, in these circumstances, he could not be prosecuted and punished for possessing said liquor for sale for beverage purposes in the drug store, the-door would be opened wide to the indiscriminate and unrestricted ' possession and sale of intoxicating liquors by the simple expedient of organizing corporations to handle-the liquor traffic.
Bill of exception Ño. 2 was reserved to the action of the judge in overruling an objection to the testimony of a witness that, in the absence of defendant, he had purchased the liquor in question from an employee of the drug store. The ground of objection was that the defendant was not charged with selling but with possession,, and that it had been previously shown that he was not present when the sale was made. We find no error in the ruling.
Defendant did not deny that the compound that he was charged with 'haying in his possession for sale was kept in the drug store for sale. His only defense was that it was possessed and sold for medicinal, and not for beverage, purposes, and that the possession of the drug store was not possession by him.
The prosecuting witness testified that he had purchased this particular compound for beverage purposes, and that he had on other occasions purchased the same concoction from defendant and drank it in his presence at the soda fountain in the drug store of which defendant was manager. The fact that defendant happened to be absent when this particular sale was made did not affect the admissibility of the testimony for the purpose of showing that the compound was possessed for sale for beverage purposes. The evidence that it was sold for beverage purposes by defendant when present, and by his subordinate in his absence, is the best evidence that it was possessed for such purpose. Where motive, guilty knowledge or criminal intent forms an essential or indispensable part of the inquiry, proof of another offense is admissible. Marr's Criminal Jurisprudence, § 406; State v. Oden, 130 La. 602, 58 So. 351; State v. Morgan, 129 La. 154, 55 So. 747; State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505.
Bill of exception No. 3 was reserved to the ruling of the judge in admitting in evidence two of the three bottles of ginger purchased, over defendant's objection that the defendant was charged with possessing and not with selling, and that it was not shown that the purchase was made from the defendant; nor that he was present at the time; nor that it was made with his authorization. The ruling was correct.
The judge, in his per curiam, states that the evidence was admitted in order that he might inform himself of the alcoholic content of the Jamaica ginger alleged to have been possessed for sale for beverage purposes by the defendant, and, because, the proof had shown that the defendant had, on several occasions, sold this concoction for beverage purposes, and that, as manager of the Hub Drug Company, had possessed it on the occasions for which he was being prosecuted.
The subject-matter covered by this bill has been discussed in connection with the preceding bill. We may add, however, that defendant cannot escape responsibility because the unlawful sale was made in his absence if the act was done with his express or implied authority, and in accordance with the custom of doing business in said drug store. A strong inference that the clerk was acting within the scope of his authority is to be deduced from defendant's own conduct and custom of selling this particular-compound for beverage purposes.
The fourth and last bill of exception was reserved to the overruling of defendant's motion for a new tx-ial. The ruling was correct. The motion was based on the ground that defendant's conviction and sentence was contrary to the law and the evidence, and otherwise presented the- same issues involved in the bills which we have heretofore discussed.
The conviction and sentence appealed from are affirmed.
O'NIELL, C. J" and BRUNOT and LECHE, JJ., dissent, and O'NIELL, C. X, hands down reasons.
ST. PAUL, J., concurs, and files reasons.