Case Name: Mark Lee GIBSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-11-15
Citations: 835 So. 2d 1159
Docket Number: No. 2D01-497
Parties: Mark Lee GIBSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 835
Pages: 1159–1164

Head Matter:
Mark Lee GIBSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D01-497.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Nov. 15, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 2003.
Donald A. Smith, Jr., and Gwendolyn R. Hollstrom of Smith & Tozian, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Michele Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
GREEN, Judge.
Mark Lee Gibson appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The motion alleged three grounds for relief. The trial court summarily denied the first two grounds of the motion, and we affirm that ruling without further comment. Ground three of the motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on this ground. After the hearing, the trial court denied relief. We conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel did not prejudice Mr. Gibson, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and therefore, we also affirm this portion of the order.
This court previously affirmed Mr. Gibson's direct appeal of his judgments and sentences with an extensive written opinion. See Gibson v. State, 721 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In Gibson, the court detailed some of the circumstances that led to the present claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Gibson was charged with two counts of capital sexual battery and three counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child under twelve years of age, which carried a mandatory life sentence. The week before his trial, the attorney who initially represented Mr. Gibson was reassigned to another division, and Mr. Gibson was given a new attorney. There is some dispute as to exactly when this occurred. There is also some dispute as to the new attorney's ability to adequately prepare for the trial. Indeed, the new attorney requested a continuance the morning of trial alleging he was unprepared to try the case, but the continuance was denied. Ultimately, both the initial attorney and the newly assigned attorney represented Mr. Gibson. Both attorneys were experienced criminal trial attorneys.
In his postconviction motion, Mr. Gibson alleged that the new counsel did not adequately prepare a defense and, as a result, committed a critical, prejudicial error during the trial. While cross-examining the child victim, this attorney asked the child broad, open-ended questions. The child responded by testifying to additional acts of sexual abuse by Mr. Gibson with which Mr. Gibson had not been charged. At least one of these acts would have itself constituted capital sexual battery.
At the postconviction hearing, the attorney who elicited this testimony asserted that his questioning was a specific, thought-out trial strategy intended to show the child victim was confused in her many allegations. Mr. Gibson points out that there were other, less perilous ways to accomplish that purpose, such as asking very specific, limited questions or impeaching the child with prior statements. Whether a criminal defense attorney's decision to elicit testimony of uncharged crimes, which evidence is generally regarded as inherently highly prejudicial, can ever be considered a reasonable trial strategy is not an issue we need address in this case. See, e.g., Cabrera v. State, 766 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (noting "patently unreasonable" decisions, although characterized as tactical, are not immune from ineffective assistance claims). We conclude that there was no prejudice to Mr. Gibson from any error of counsel. See Cook v. State, 638 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (stating that court considering claim of ineffective assistance of counsel need not make a specific ruling on performance component when it is clear that prejudice component is not satisfied).
The child victim testified resolutely and consistently that the charged acts of sexual abuse occurred. More important, Mr. Gibson admitted to those acts in a recorded confession to law enforcement, including an admission that his penis made contact, or "union," with the victim's vagina, which would support his conviction for capital sexual battery. In a postconviction proceeding, it is Mr. Gibson's burden to establish prejudice as a result of counsel's errors. We conclude, as did the postcon-viction trial judge, that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial proceedings would have been different even in the absence of the child's testimony on cross-examination.
Affirmed.
SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with opinion.
BLUE, C.J., Dissents with opinion.
. We note that this strategy may have had some of its intended effect, as the jury ulti mately found Mr. Gibson not guilty of one count of capital sexual battery and not guilty of one count of lewd and lascivious act.