Case Name: FEINBERG v. ALLEN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-03-08
Citations: 128 N.Y.S. 906
Docket Number: 
Parties: FEINBERG v. ALLEN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 128
Pages: 906–909

Head Matter:
FEINBERG v. ALLEN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
March 8, 1911.)
1. Estoppel (§ 110 )—Equitable Estoppel—Pleading—Necessity.
An equitable estoppel ordinarily may be made available either by a plea in bar or may be used as evidence on the trial; and, if relied on as evidence, the facts creating the estoppel need not be pleaded.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 300; Dec. Dig. § 110. ]
2. Sheriffs and Constables (§ 130 )—Conversion—Estoppel.
•In an action for the conversion of wood sold by the sheriff under an execution against plaintiff’s wife, the sheriff may, without pleading the facts creating an equitable estoppel in favor of the execution creditor, show that plaintiff and his wife obtained from the execution creditor the money with which the wood was prepared for market, under the representation that the business was the wife’s business, and that she was getting the wood out for the execution creditor, and that the moneys advanced were in part payment of the wood sought to be furnished to him.
[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Sheriffs and Constables, Dec. Dig. § 130. ]
Appeal from Judgment on Report of Referee.
Action by Max Feinberg against Chauncey D. Allen. From a judgment for defendant entered on the report of a referee, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, SEWELL, and HOUGHTON, JJ.
C. J. Vert, for appellant.
William H. Dunn (John H. Booth, of counsel), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & '§ number in Dee. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
This case was before the court in 118 App. Div. 497, 103 N. Y. Supp. 339, and, in addition to the facts there stated, it now appears that the plaintiff and his wife obtained from the judgment creditor, Fonda, the money with which the wood in question was chopped and prepared for market, under the representation that the business was the wife's business, and that she was getting out the wood for Fonda, and that the moneys advanced were in part payment of the wood so to be furnished to him. Upon a refusal to deliver the wood, Fonda obtained a judgment against the wife and levied upon the wood in question, and the plaintiff brings this action claiming to be the owner of the wood, asserting that it was cut upon his land, and that he, instead of his wife, was doing the business. The appellant vigorously challenges the statement in the former opinion that it is not necessary to plead the facts relied upon to create an equitable estoppel.
An equitable estoppel ordinarily may be made available either by a plea in bar or may be used as evidence upon the trial. If relied upon as evidence only, it is no more necessary to plead it than to plead any other kind of evidence.
In Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372, the plaintiff, seeking to set aside the lien of a mortgage on the ground that it was procured by fraud, was defeated upon the trial by proof of another judgment in defendant's favor involving the same issue, although it was not pleaded; Allen, J., saying for, the court:
"Had it been offered as constituting a bar, or as an estoppel in the action, it would have been inadmissible, not having been pleaded as a defense. =: » * But, as evidence of a fact in issue, it was competent although not pleaded, like any other evidence, whether documentary or oral. A party is never required to disclose his evidence by his pleadings. The evidence was competent to disprove a material allegation of the complaint traversed by the answer. As evidence it was conclusive as an adjudication of the same fact in an action between the same parties."
In Meeder v. Providence Savings Society, 58 App. Div. 81, 68 N. Y. Supp. 518, Id., 171 N. Y. 432, 64 N. E. 167, an assignee of a life insurance policy pleaded that the premiums had been fully paid. The answer denied the allegation, and that constituted the defense. It was held competent under the pleadings for the plaintiff to prove that, before he took an assignment of the policy, the defendant had assumed the payment of the premium in question, and that the defendant was estopped from denying such proof of payment.
In Prevot v. Lawrence, 51 N. Y. 219, the essential fact to establish the estoppel was not pleaded, but the estoppel was treated as evidence, and given effect as such.
It must therefore be considered that the defendant proved conclusively in this case that the wood was the property of the wife and therefore subject to the execution. The estoppel, as evidence, is as available to the defendants as it would be if Fonda himself were the defendant.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur; SMITH, P. J., in result.