Case Name: KIRCHER v. IRON CLAD MFG. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-10-08
Citations: 118 N.Y.S. 823
Docket Number: 
Parties: KIRCHER v. IRON CLAD MFG. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 118
Pages: 823–827

Head Matter:
KIRCHER v. IRON CLAD MFG. CO.
(Supreme .Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
October 8, 1909.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 95 )—Statutory Regulations—Age of Employé.
The gist of a master’s civil liability for violating Labor Law (Laws 1897, p. 494, e. 415) § 162, as amended by Laws 1903, p. 547, c. 255, § 1, prohibiting the employing of any one under 16 years of age in a mercantile establishment, without a certain certificate of the health authorities, is his negligence in employing a person of such tender years that the Legislature has forbidden his employment, and, to relieve the master from sue¡h imputation of negligence, the jury must be able to find that he believed and was justified in the belief that the servant was of the prescrib ed age for work; the employment in and of itself making out a prima facie case of negligence against the employer.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 95. ]
2. Master and Servant (§ 289 )—Statutory Provisions—Age of Servant.
The statute itself in effect determines that a child under 16 years of age employed in a mercantile establishment is not as matter of law chargeable with contributory negligence.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 289. ]
Burr, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by Ferdinand Kircher, as administrator of Henry Ferdinand Kircher, against the Iron Clad Manufacturing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and GAYNOR, BURR, ' RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
Abram I. Elkus (Carlisle J. Gleason, on the brief), for appellant.
William J. Courtney, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
GAYNOR, J.
No one saw the accident happen, and there is no evidence showing what caused it. There was nothing the matter with the elevator or its machinery. The defendant was prohibited by section 162 of the labor law (Laws 1897, p. 494, c. 415, as amended by Laws 1903, p. 547, c. 255, § 1) from employing any one under 16 years of age in its mercantile establishment, without a certain certificate of the health authorities, and the deceased was between 14 and 15 and no such certificate had been issued. The rule applicable seems to be the same as that applicable to section 70 of the labor law (Laws 1897, p. 477, c. 415, as amended by Laws 1903, p. 437, c. 184, § 1), which is a similar prohibition against employing children to work in factories. Under this rule "the gist of civil liability is the negligence of the master in employing a person of such tender years that the Legislature has forbidden his employment," and to relieve the employer from such imputation of negligence the jury must be able to find that "the employer believed, and was justified in the belief, that the employé was of the prescribed age for. work." Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y. 94, 87 N. E. 77. That is to say, the employment in and of itself makes out a prima facie case of negligence against the employer, and he has to rebut it by showing justification for believing the employé to be of the lawful age. That question went to the jury in this case, and was found against the defendant on sufficient evidence. The question whether the defendant sufficiently instructed the deceased was also litigated and sent to the jury. It is not easy to see how the question of failure to instruct can be in a case where the employer is liable by the mere fact of wrongful violation of the statute, but no one is in a position to raise it here. Nothing can be gained, it seems to me, by a review of the decisions in this state under this and similar statutes. The one already cited, and that in Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530, 66 N. E. 572, 61 L. R. A. 811, seem .to be decisive. It is strongly urged for the defendant" that a nonsuit should have been granted for the reason that there was no evidence showing that the deceased was free from contributory negligence; but it was held in the Marino Case that that power was taken away from the court by the effect of the statute. The Koester Case confirms this, and further that the unlawful employment makes out a prima facie case for the plaintiff.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and RICH and MILLER, JJ., concur in result