Case Name: ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1977-06-06
Citations: 431 U.S. 633
Docket Number: No. 76-5206
Parties: ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA
Judges: with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 431
Pages: 633–650

Head Matter:
ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA
No. 76-5206.
Argued March 28, 1977
Decided June 6, 1977
Garland R. Rolling argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Louise Korns argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Harry F. Connick.
Jules E. Orenstein, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of New York as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General.
Frank Carrington, Wayne W. Schmidt, Glen R. Murphy, Courtney Evans, Cecil Hicks, and James P. Costello filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore and William E. James, Assistant Attorneys General, and Howard J. Schwab and Alexander W. Kirkpatrick, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Harry Roberts was indicted, tried, and convicted of the first-degree murder of Police Officer Dennis Mclnemey, who at the time of his death was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties. As required by a Louisiana statute, petitioner was sentenced to death. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (2) (1974) , On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed his conviction and sentence. 331 So. 2d 11 (1976). Roberts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. The petition presented the question whether Louisiana's mandatory death penalty could be imposed pursuant to his conviction of first-degree murder as defined in subparagraph- (2) of § 14:30.
Shortly before that petition was filed, we held in another case (involving a different petitioner named Roberts) that Louisiana could not enforce its mandatory death penalty for a conviction of first-degree murder as defined in subparagraph (1) of §14:30 of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1974). Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976) (hereafter cited as Stanislaus Roberts for purposes of clarity). In the plurality opinion in that case, the precise question presented in this case was explicitly answered.
This precise question was again answered by the Court in Washington v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 906 (1976). The petitioner in the Washington case had killed a policeman and was tried and sentenced to death under the same provision of the Louisiana statute as was the petitioner in the present case. We vacated the death sentence, holding: "Imposition and carrying out of the death penalty [in this case] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roberts v. Louisiana. . ." Ibid. See also Sparks v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 905 (1976); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U. S. 907 (1976).
Recognizing that this Court had already decided that a mandatory death sentence could not be imposed for the crime that Harry Roberts committed, the Attorney General of Louisiana initially conceded that "under this Court's decision in Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, No. 75-5844, [the sentence of death in the present case] cannot be carried out unless, of course, this Court grants Louisiana's Application for Rehearing and modifies its former holding." Brief in Opposition 2-3. The Court nevertheless granted certiorari on November 8, 1976, 429 U. S. 938, and on November 29 limited the grant to the question "[w]hether the imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death for the crime of first-degree murder of a police officer under the law of Louisiana violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." 429 U. S. 975.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976), this Court held that "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." In Stanislaus Roberts, supra, we made clear that this principle applies even where the crime of first-degree murder is narrowly defined. See n. 2, supra.
To be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. There is a special interest in affording protection to these public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property. But it is incorrect to suppose that no miti gating circumstances can exist when the victim is a police officer. Circumstances such as the youth of the offender, the absence of any prior conviction, the influence of drugs, alcohol, or extreme emotional disturbance, and even the existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably believed provided a moral justification for his conduct are all examples of mitigating facts which might attend the killing of a peace officer and which are considered relevant in other jurisdictions.
As we emphasized repeatedly in Stanislaus Roberts and its companion cases decided last Term, it is essential that the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either the particular offender or the particular offense. Because the Louisiana statute does not allow for consideration of particularized mitigating factors, it is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, we hold that the death sentence imposed upon this petitioner violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be set aside. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed insofar as it upholds the death sentence upon petitioner. The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
That section provides in part:
"First degree murder
"First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
"(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
"(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upoT>, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or
"(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great, bodily harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence; or
"(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; [or]
"(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
"For the purposes of Paragraph (2) herein, the term peace officer shall be defined [as] and include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, district attorney, assistant district attorney or district attorneys' investigator.
"Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death."
In 1975, § 14:30 (1) was amended to add the crime of aggravated burglary as a predicate felony for first-degree murder. 1975 La. Acts, No. 327.
"The diversity of circumstances presented in cases falling within the single category of killings during the commission of a specified felony, as well as the variety of possible offenders involved in such crimes, underscores the rigidity of Louisiana's enactment and its similarity to the North Carolina statute. Even the other more narrowly drawn categories of first-degree murder in the Louisiana law [one of these being the wilful, deliberate, and premeditated homicide of a fireman or a police officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties] afford no meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual offender." 428 U. S., at 333-334.
"Only the third category of the Louisiana first-degree murder statute, covering intentional killing by a person serving a life sentence or by a person previously convicted of an unrelated murder, defines the capital crime at least in significant part in terms of the character or record of the individual offender. Although even this narrow category does not permit the jury to consider possible mitigating factors, a prisoner serving a life sentence presents a unique problem that may justify such a law. See Gregg v. Georgia, [428 U. S. 153, 186 (1976)]; Woodson v. North Carolina, [428 U. S. 280, 287 n. 7, 292-293, n. 25 (1976)]." Id., at 334 n. 9 (emphasis added).
We recognize that the life of a police officer is a dangerous one. Statistics show that the number of police officers killed in the line of duty has more than doubled in the last 10 years. In 1966, 57 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty; in 1975, 129 were killed. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 1975, Uniform Crime Reports 223 (1976).
See, e. g., the portion of the proposed standards of the Model Penal Code quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 193-194, n. 44 (1976).
We reserve again the question whether or in what circumstances mandatory death sentence statutes may be constitutionally applied to prisoners serving life sentences. See n. 2, supra, quoting 428 U. S., at 334 n. 9.
Indeed, our holding in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), that the Texas sentencing procedure was constitutionally adequate rested squarely on the fact that mitigating circumstances could be considered by the jury. In that case the joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens stated:
"But a sentencing system that allowed the jury to consider only aggravating circumstances would almost certainly fall short of providing the individualized sentencing determination that we today have held in Woodson v. North Carolina, [428 U. S.,] at 303-305, to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. For such a system would approach the mandatory laws that we today hold unconstitutional in Woodson and Roberts v. Louisiana [428 U. S. 325 (1976)]. A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.
"Thus, in order to meet the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances. In Gregg v. Georgia, we today hold constitutionally valid a capital-sentencing system that directs the jury to consider any mitigating factors, and in Proffitt v. Florida we likewise hold constitutional a system that directs the judge and advisory jury to consider certain enumerated mitigating circumstances. The Texas statute does not explicitly speak of mitigating circumstances; it directs only that the jury answer three questions. Thus, the constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors." Id., at 271-272 (footnote omitted).
In joining this opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall agree that the plurality opinion in Stanislaus Roberts, supra, controls this case, but adhere to their view that capital punishment is in all circumstances prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.