Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Dino CINEL
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-05-27
Citations: 619 So. 2d 770
Docket Number: No. 92-KA-0913
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Dino CINEL.
Judges: Before KLEES, BYRNES and LOBRANO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 619
Pages: 770–783

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Dino CINEL.
No. 92-KA-0913.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 27, 1993.
Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Hans P. Sinha, Asst. Dist. Atty. and Wessel, Bartels & Ciaccio, Law Corp., William F. Wessel, Victoria L. Bartels, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant State of LA.
Arthur A. Lemann, III, Martha L. Adams, Arthur A. Lemann, III & Assocs., Edwin A. Stoutz, Jr., New Orleans, and Franz L. Zibilich, Metairie, for defendant-appellant Dino Cinel.
Before KLEES, BYRNES and LOBRANO, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
On May 21, 1991, the appellant was charged with possession of commercially-made items of child pornography. He was arraigned on May 28th and pled not guilty. Defendant filed various motions, including a motion to quash the bill of information, which was granted on January 10, 1992. The State appeals. We reverse.
FACTS
The defendant Dino Cinel was a priest assigned to St. Rita's Catholic Church in New Orleans from November, 1979 through December, 1988. He lived at the parish rectory in a suite of rooms for which he had the key, but which was also unlocked most of the time in order to allow the communal housekeeper access for cleaning and laundry purposes. On December 28, 1988, Cinel left New Orleans to visit his family in Italy, and he left his car with his friend Linda for her use during his absence. Later that day, Linda locked the keys in the car and called , the rectory to ask if someone could look in Cinel's room to see if there was a spare set of car keys. Father Tarantino, the pastor of the parish, entered the room and began looking through the desk drawers for the keys. During his search, he found catalogs for pornographic videotapes. Under these catalogs, he found unsealed manila envelopes which contained pornographic photographs of young men. Because Father Tarantino had a meeting to attend at that time, he put the materials back in the drawer and locked the door to Cinel's suite. He went back into the room later that night, searched the desk and á locker, and found more photographs, magazines, and homemade and commercial videotapes involving young men or boys. Father Tarantino contacted the Archdiocese of New Orleans the next day and was told to box up the materials. The materials were turned over to attorneys for the Archdiocese over Cinel's objection.
In January, 1989, Cinel retained William Campbell, a former Orleans Parish assistant district attorney, to help him retrieve the materials taken from his room. Campbell kept in contact with the attorneys for the Archdiocese concerning the return of these materials until March, 1989, when the materials were turned over to the Orleans Parish district Attorney's office. Campbell testified that soon after the transfer, he saw the district Attorney, Harry Connick, at Tulane University and spoke to him about the materials. Connick told him to contact George Tolar, the New Orleans Police Department officer who was the chief investigator for the Orleans Parish district attorney's office. Campbell testified that he spoke with Connick another time at his office, and Connick again directed him to Tolar. Campbell contacted Tolar, who repeatedly told him that his office was not really interested in the commercially-made materials, but that it was investigating the homemade videotapes and photographs to see if the young men contained in them were juveniles, a concern shared by the Archdiocese. Campbell testified that all through April and May, 1989, he kept in contact with Tolar and attempted to talk to an assistant district attorney who was in charge of the case, but in each instance he was told by various members of the office that Tolar was in charge of the case.
Campbell testified that in early May, To-lar told him that the State had decided not to indict or charge Cinel. The next week, however, a television reporter began asking questions about the case, and Campbell testified that he "became aware" that To-lar was taking another look at the case. At that point, Campbell spoke with Tolar and offered to produce the males in the videotapes to prove they were not juveniles, if in return the State agreed not to charge Cinel. Campbell testified that Tolar agreed, stating: "Yes, if you can prove to me that those are adults, then the case goes away. There's not a case." Campbell testified that he was negotiating in good faith that "either we get charged with whatever they can prove or if we can prove that there's no crime in here, we don't get charged with anything." Campbell maintained that Tolar repeatedly assured him that the State was not interested in the commercially-made materials, but only in the homemade materials.
In response to this agreement, Campbell contacted two of the men in the videotapes, Chris Fontaine and Ronald Tichenor, and had them execute affidavits swearing that they were at least seventeen years old when the videotapes were made. Campbell gave Tolar the affidavits and copies of Tichenor's and Fontaine's driver's licenses in May, 1989, and Campbell testified that at that time Tolar reiterated that Cinel would not be charged in connection with the videotapes or the pornography. In his office notes from August, 1989, Campbell wrote: "Tolar indicated to me on the phone that he was of the impression or opinion that he would probably not recommend prosecution for these offenses, but he did not guarantee it. That resulted this time." Campbell continued to be in contact with Tolar through September, 1989, when Tolar told him that he was satisfied that Fontaine and Tichenor were adults when the videotapes were made.
Campbell testified that he had no further contact with Tolar concerning this case until March, 1990, when he happened to be at the district attorney's office on an unrelated matter. At that time, he saw David Paddison, a former Orleans Parish assistant district attorney who was a practicing attorney, and Gary Raymond, a former investigator for the district attorney's office who was now a private detective, in Tolar's office discussing the materials seized from St. Rita's. At that time, he discovered that Paddison was representing Fontaine in a civil suit against the Archdiocese and Cinel. Campbell was no longer representing Cinel at that time.
Campbell reiterated that early in the negotiations he had tried to talk to the assistant district attorney in the screening division handling the case "to make sure that I was talking with the person who could make the decision in the office", but he was always referred to Tolar. The case was never funnelled through the screening division. He testified that Tolar told him that if he was satisfied that the males in the videotapes were not juveniles "then I'm not going to charge you cause there's not an offense" and then later told him: "we're not going to go forward." Campbell testified that he believed Tolar was authorized to represent the District Attorney's office in the matter.
George Tolar denied promising Campbell that Cinel would not be prosecuted on any charges if he produced evidence that the males in the homemade videotapes were not juveniles when the tapes were made. He testified that Connick contacted him and told him that boxes of evidence would be given to the district attorney's office by the attorneys for the Archdiocese, and Con-nick wanted him to review the materials to see if they contained evidence of any crimes. He testified that he discussed with Campbell the age of the males in the videotapes, as well as Cinel's wish to have the evidence returned to him. He testified that he never had the authority to decide whether to charge Cinel, and he never discussed the other possible charges against Cinel. He also admitted, however, that only he, Connick, and another investigator named Kessel were initially involved with the materials taken from Cinel. He admitted he probably told Campbell he was not concerned with the commercially-made items. However, he also testified that he did not even consider these items until after it had been established that the State could not prosecute Cinel on the videotapes.
Tolar admitted that by July or August, 1989, he and Connick had become satisfied that Cinel could not be prosecuted for the homemade videotapes. Tolar insisted that he suggested to Connick at that time that maybe Cinel could be prosecuted on the commercially-made materials, but Connick replied that "he wouldn't at that point in time."
Tolar testified that early in the investigation he had showed a videotape to Raymond, who had investigated a molestation case in St. Tammany Parish involving a priest, to see if Raymond recognized the youth involved. Raymond had kept the tape overnight, but he was unable to identify the youth. Tolar testified that after learning Fontaine's identity, he and Fon-taine had met with representatives of the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Customs concerning possible federal violations, and he had been in contact with the local U.S. Attorney's office. He stated that after the civil suit against Cinel and the Archdiocese had been filed, the district attorney's office received a subpoena duces tecum for the material seized from Cinel. In March, 1990, Paddison and Raymond obtained a "consent judgment" from the civil district court, in response to which these materials were turned over to Raymond.
Introduced at the hearing on the motion to quash was a memorandum from Tolar to Connick, dated February 22, 1990, wherein Tolar described taking "possession of several boxes of materials, most notably video tapes" from the Archdiocese. The memorandum states that the videotapes received involved "graphic sex acts with various individuals", two of whom were Fontaine and Tichenor. The memorandum notes that statements were taken from Fontaine in which he averred that he was at least seventeen years old when the videotapes were made. It also noted that Tichenor was "hostile and uncooperative." The memorandum ends with this sentence: "As a result of our investigation we determined that no violation of law occurred."
When questioned by the court about the meaning of the phrase "most notably video tapes" in this memorandum, Tolar explained that the last sentence referred only to the homemade videotapes, not to all of the materials seized from Cinel. He insisted that soon after this memorandum was written, he tried to persuade Connick to proceed with a child pornography charge against Cinel. However, there was no plan at that time to bring any charges against Cinel.
Harry Connick testified that Father Tarantino contacted him in December, 1988, to tell him that he had found the materials in Cinel's suite. He testified that when his office received the materials from the attorneys for the Archdiocese, they were directed to Tolar. He testified that he left the investigation in Tolar's hands, and at first Tolar did not tell him about the commercially-made materials, just the homemade videotapes. He testified that he and Tolar discussed the videotapes, the possible ages of the young men in them, and the problem of prescription with respect to the material. He insisted that he did not see most of the material seized from Cinel, having viewed only part of one videotape in Tolar's office.
Connick also insisted that he had not given Tolar authority to negotiate with Campbell regarding the charges. He testified that after it became apparent that Cinel could not be prosecuted with respect to the homemade videotapes, he decided not to pursue any charges with respect to the commercially-made materials because he had earlier received a letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office noting that it had received a complaint about Cinel and asking to review the materials for possible federal violations. Connick testified that in light of this letter, he thought that federal charges would be brought against Cinel with respect to these commercial materials.
Connick testified that he asked Tolar to write the February 22, 1990 memorandum about the materials when his office received the subpoena from the civil district court to produce them. He testified that he was unaware of any negotiations between his office and the attorneys for the plaintiffs concerning the materials. He denied ever being advised by Tolar to institute charges against Cinel for possession of the commercial materials. Connick testified that it was not until after Raymond Bigelow and Tim McElroy of his office reviewed the case that anyone recommended that charges be instituted.
Connick testified that in August, 1990, he received a letter from Raymond complaining about the lack of prosecution of Cinel. Connick showed the letter to Tolar and told him to study the materials again to see if charges could be brought. He testified that investigative reporter Richard Angelico called him about the case much later, and at that time he admitted that he had no intention of prosecuting Cinel. When asked if in February, 1990, he had made a decision not to prosecute Cinel "for anything", he replied: "Yes". However, he then clarified his response by stating: "As long as you understand that the decision was a conditional decision." According to Connick, the decision was based on his expectation that Cinel would be prosecuted by federal authorities, making prosecution by his own office unnecessary and counterproductive.
Gary Raymond also appeared at the hearing. He testified that he first became involved in the case when Tolar asked him in 1989 to view a videotape to see if he recognized anyone. He viewed the tape, but he was unable to do so. He testified that late in the summer of 1989, he came upon Fontaine working on a boat owned by a mutual friend of his and Tolar's. He characterized this encounter as coincidental and fortuitous. He kept in contact with Fontaine and eventually directed him to Paddison. He later learned of Tichenor from Tolar and also directed him to Paddi-son.
Raymond testified that he had received the materials from the district attorney's office in March, 1990, and had made copies for Paddison, the attorneys for the Archdiocese, and eventually for the district attorney's office before turning the tapes over to federal authorities in 1991. He testified that when he learned that there would be no prosecution of Cinel, he wrote a letter to Connick complaining of the failure to prosecute. He claimed that this action was not done in furtherance of the lawsuit filed by Fontaine and Tichenor. Raymond testified that sometime after he sent the letter, To-lar called him and said that the State was reopening the investigation. Raymond also testified that sometime in April, 1991, he ran into reporter Angelico and invited him to his office to discuss the case. He testified that he gave Angelico portions of the videotapes made by Cinel as well as copies of a videotaped deposition given in the civil case. He testified that Angelico taped a report for Channel 6, but when Channel 6 refused to run the story, Raymond contacted a reporter for the Washington Times and gave him the story, and .the story was then broken. He testified that he notified Angelico when he was to turn over the materials to the federal authorities, and Angelico filmed him delivering the materials.
The trial court granted the motion to quash the bill of information in this case, which involves the possession of commercially-made pornography involving juveniles, because it found that the State had promised that Cinel would not be prosecut ed on any of the materials seized from the rectory if he could prove that the males involved in the homemade videotapes were not juveniles when the tapes were made. The State argues that this ruling was erroneous for three reasons: (1) Tolar did not have the authority to make any such promise; (2) even assuming Tolar had apparent authority, he made no agreement not to prosecute Cinel on the commercial materials; and (3) even if some sort of immunity was offered, it could not apply to the charge on the commercial materials because the evidence supplied by Cinel was not related to the commercially-made videotapes, but only to the homemade videotapes.
We first address the issue of Tolar's authority to act on behalf of the district attorney's office.
Tolar's Authority to Make An Agreement
With respect to this issue, the State argues that according to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 61, "the district attorney has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute." Article 8 of the same Code confers this power upon assistant district attorneys also. In addition, the only Louisiana statute specifically granting any type of immunity (use immunity), is Code of Criminal Procedure article 439.1, which requires the agreement of the district attorney or the attorney general. Therefore, the State asserts that Tolar, a police officer serving as an investigator for the district attorney's office, did not have the authority to enter into an agreement with Cinel's attorney Campbell concerning the institution of any charges against the defendant.
The defense does not dispute the fact that Tolar had no actual authority to make a deal, but rather argues that Tolar had apparent authority, which makes his alleged agreement with Campbell binding on the State. In support of its argument, the defense cites various cases involving plea bargain agreements.
In State v. Tanner, 425 So.2d 760 (La.1983), the defendant was charged by bill of information in connection with a death arising from an automobile accident. The assistant district attorney in charge of the case told the defendant that if he and his witness testified before the grand jury and the grand jury chose not to indict him, the bill of information filed against him would be nolle prosequied. The defendant and his witnesses agreed and testified before the grand jury, which returned a no true bill. However, the assistant district attorney refused to nolle prosequi the case, and the defendant moved to quash the bill. The assistant district attorney denied making the promise, but also admitted that the defendant's attorney probably thought that he had. On review of the trial court's refusal to quash the charge, the Court acknowledged that the district attorney under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 61 has the sole control over the charging and prosecution of a case, and that generally the action of the grand jury is not binding on the district attorney. However, the Court found that the assistant district attorney's promise to the defendant to drop the charges, in exchange for his testimony before the grand jury, bound the district attorney's office to the promise not to prosecute the defendant once the grand jury returned a no true bill. The court spoke of the difference between use immunity and transactional immunity, and it noted that the State could have compelled the defendant to appear before the grand jury to testify, but any statements he made would not have been admissible against him (use immunity). However, by entering into the agreement with the defendant, the assistant district attorney was promising transactional immunity. The Court noted: "When a district attorney or assistant district attorney makes a good faith bargain with a person accused of a crime and defendant, in reliance on that bargain, relinquishes such a fundamental right as the privilege against self-incrimination, the State cannot repudiate the bargain." Id. at 763. The Court held that absent any prosecution for making false statements or perjury before the grand jury, the defendant was granted transactional immunity when the grand jury did not indict him.
Likewise, in State v. Bentley, 499 So.2d 581 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1986), writ den. 503 So.2d 477 (1987), the defendant was arrested on state charges, and an assistant district attorney directed the defendant to federal authorities, promising that if the defendant was charged in federal court and agreed to give information about other suspects, state charges would not be filed. The defendant complied with the agreement and subsequently pled guilty to federal charges. A new district attorney, who had not been in office when the agreement was made, indicted the defendant. On review, the Second Circuit ruled that the State was bound by the agreement reached with the former assistant district attorney, even though the agreement was not in writing. The court found that the defense attorney and the federal authorities:
gained the subjective understanding from conversations they separately had with [the assistant district attorney] . that the State agreed not to prosecute if Bentley fulfilled to his plea bargain with the federal government. Bentley incriminated himself and pleaded guilty, relying on the verbal representations and agreement that were made by the State, through its assistant district attorney, to his lawyer and to [federal authorities]. We find Bentley's reliance eminently reasonable.
Id. at 585. Finding that prosecution of the defendant would violate fundamental fairness, the court quashed the indictment.
In State v. Lehrmann, 532 So.2d 802 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ den. 533 So.2d 364 (1988), the defendant was a restaurant owner who had paid money to Eastwold, a city finance worker, in return for which Eastwold falsely calculated the defendant's tax liability to the city. Eastwold had testified before the state grand jury concerning other tax irregularities, but the defendant had not been mentioned by him. Federal authorities, also investigating tax irregularities, contacted the defendant, who agreed to testify before the grand jury and to wear a radio transmitter to record East-wold admitting his part in the tax fraud, in exchange for which the defendant was given transactional immunity from federal prosecution. Eastwold eventually signed his own immunity agreement with federal authorities, but he soon breached the agreement by telling other city officials about the investigation. Just before East-wold was to turn himself in to federal authorities and just before the defendant was to testify before the federal grand jury, Eastwold approached the Orleans Parish district attorney's office and entered into an immunity agreement with the district attorney which implicated the defendant. Eastwold's testimony before the state grand jury resulted in an indictment against the defendant.
On review of the trial court's refusal to quash the indictment, the defendant argued that the state charges against him should have been quashed because they arose from information he had given to federal authorities in return for a use-immunity agreement with them, and thus the state charges were a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. This court agreed, finding that Eastwold's testimony to the state grand jury was a direct result of the defendant's statements made to federal authorities in connection with his immunity agreement. This court stated: "The prohibition against the use of compelled testimony includes its utilization as an investigatory lead and 'use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosure.' Kastigar [v. United States ], 406 U.S. [441] at 460, 92 S.Ct. [1653] at 1665 [32 L.Ed.2d 212] [(1972)]." Lehrmann at 806. This court noted that the State had the burden of proving that the charges against the defendant arose from an independent source in order not to violate the defendant's immunity agreement, and the State had failed to do so.
In State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199 (La.1989), the defendant agreed to give information to the district attorney in Rapides Parish in exchange for that district attorney's agreement to charge him with only one count and to not use against him the information he gave. Part of the agree ment included the defendant also giving information to federal authorities concerning an arson investigation, which he ultimately failed to do. However, some of the information given to the Rapides district attorney involved state crimes committed in Avoyelles Parish for which the defendant was ultimately charged. The defendant sought to suppress the use of any statements he made in connection with his agreement with the Rapides Parish district attorney, and the trial court denied the motion.
On review, the Court ruled that while the agreement did not bar the filing of charges in Avoyelles Parish, any statements made in connection with the defendant's agreement with the Rapides Parish district attorney must be suppressed because they were given under an agreement of use immunity. In so finding, the Court likened the agreement to a contract, citing State v. Nall, 379 So.2d 731 (La.1980), where similar reasoning was applied to a plea bargain agreement. The Court noted that because both parties did not get what they had bargained for, the agreement should be dissolved. However, the Court further found that because the defendant's statements were made in anticipation of the agreement, they could not be viewed as having been voluntarily given, and as such they could not be used against him in the Avoyelles prosecution.
The key distinguishing factor between the above cases cited by the defendant and the instant case is that in the instant case, the alleged promise not to prosecute Cinel was made by a police officer investigating the case for the district attorney's office, not by the district attorney, an assistant district attorney, or even a staff lawyer in the district attorney's office. All four cases relied upon by the defendant involve an agreement made by the district attorney or an assistant district attorney. Moreover, of the four cases, only Tanner and Bentley are relevant because they deal with transactional immunity. By contrast, Lehrmann and Lewis concern use immunity, which is not applicable to the instant case because Cinel did not give up any information which could be used against him; rather, he gave the State exculpating information about the age of the parties seen in the videotapes.
We have located no Louisiana eases in which the court has found "apparent authority" to exist on the part of someone associated with the district attorney's office who is not an attorney. In support of its argument that the law does not contemplate such apparent authority, the State cites State v. Howard, 448 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ den., 449 So.2d 1355 (1984), wherein the defendant gave information to a police officer which led to arrests. The defendant contended that she was led to believe that if she gave this information, she would receive a certain sentence and favorable consideration would be given to her husband and brother. However, because the defendant refused to identify her drug supplier, the district attorney refused to concur in the agreement. On review, the First Circuit declined to enforce the agreement, holding that "[t]he district attorney is the only official vested in law to engage in plea bargains." Id. at 155.
Defendant argues strenuously that Howard is distinguishable because the police officer involved was not an investigator for the district attorney's office, as was Tolar. Even considering this fact, however, there is absolutely no indication in either the statutory law or the jurisprudence that the district attorney's office may be bound by the words or actions of a police officer, or of any other non-attorney employee of the office. In the absence of any legal basis, we decline to extend the doctrine of apparent authority so far. Moreover, such an extension of the law would not be warranted under the facts of this case because Campbell, who had worked in the district attorney's office, knew that only assistant district attorneys were authorized to- make deals. Based on this special knowledge, as well as the general precept that attorneys are charged with knowing the law, Campbell should have questioned Tolar's authority to make a binding promise. We therefore hold that Tolar did not have the requisite authority, apparent or otherwise, to make an agreement not to prosecute Cinel.
Because we find that Tolar lacked the authority to bind the district attorney's office, it is unnecessary for us to consider defendant's remaining two arguments concerning whether Tolar actually made an agreement and the scope of that agreement. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court which quashed the bill of information, and we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BYRNES, J., dissents with reasons.
. Cinel was charged in another case with a sixty-count bill of information charging him with each individual piece of pornography which comprised the one count in this case. That bill of information was quashed on October 26, 1991, and the State agreed not to appeal that decision.
. The Court found that a district attorney of one parish could not bar the district attorney of another parish from bringing charges for crimes committed in that parish.
. Nall involved a case where a defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for testimony implicating his codefendant.
However, at his codefendant's trial his testimony implicated only himself. The Court found that because the plea bargain agreement had been breached, the State could withdraw from the agreement. The Court further found, however, that any statements the defendant made in connection with the agreement could not be used against him.