Case Name: Cecil H. Cables et ux. vs. The Bristol Water Company
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1912-11-01
Citations: 86 Conn. 223
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cecil H. Cables et ux. vs. The Bristol Water Company.
Judges: Hall, C. J., Prentice, Thayer, Roraback and Wheeler, Js.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 223–229

Head Matter:
Cecil H. Cables et ux. vs. The Bristol Water Company.
First Judicial District, Hartford,
October Term, 1912.
Hall, C. J., Prentice, Thayer, Roraback and Wheeler, Js.
In reviewing the propriety of setting aside a verdict as excessive, this court is dealing directly with the action of the trial judge and only incidentally with the action of the jury.
The supervision which a trial judge has over the verdict is an essential part of our jury system.
This judicial supervision involves the exercise of a legal discretion, a clear abuse of which must appear to warrant a review by this court on appeal.
In determining whether there has been such an abuse of discretion, in setting aside a verdict as excessive, great weight is due to the action of the trial court, and every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of its correctness.
Argued October 3d
decided November 1st, 1912,
Action by lower riparian owners to recover damages for wrongfully diverting, discharging, and polluting the waters of two brooks flowing through their farm, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict for the plaintiffs for $3,075 which the trial court set aside as excessive, from which ruling the plaintiffs appealed.
No error.
Theodore M. Maltbie and William M. Maltbie, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Noble E. Pierce, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion:
Prentice, J.
Upon this appeal we are called upon to review the action of the trial judge in setting aside a verdict as being excessive, and not the action of the jury in rendering the verdict, save as such review is necessarily incidental to a determination of the propriety of the judge's action. Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 446, 39 Atl. 797; McKone v. Schott, 82 Conn. 70, 71, 72 Atl. 570.
The supervision which a presiding judge has over a verdict which may be rendered is an essential part of the jury system. Burr v. Harty, 75 Conn. 127, 129, 52 Atl. 724; Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 68, 71, 49 Atl. 854; Fell v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 Conn. 494, 496, 57 Atl. 175. "It tends to make jurors more careful in reaching their conclusions, and gives confidence to all suitors that the finding of the jury will not be affected by any improper motives. 'Trial by jury ' in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and empanelled, to administer oaths'to them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on an acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence." Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 68, 71, 49 Atl. 854; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 13, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580.
This judicial supervision involves the exercise of a legal discretion, and action by the court in its exercise will not be reviewed by this court unless it clearly appears that that discretion has been abused. Burr v. Harty, 75 Conn. 127, 129, 52 Atl. 724; Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 447, 39 Atl. 797; Chatfield v. Bunnell, 69 Conn. 511, 521, 37 Atl. 1074.
In determining whether there has been such an abuse, "great weight is due to the action of the trial court, and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness." Fell v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 Conn. 494, 496, 57 Atl. 175; McKone v. Schott, 82 Conn. 70, 71, 72 Atl. 570; Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 446, 39 Atl. 797; Chatfield v. Bunnell, 69 Conn. 511, 521, 37 Atl. 1074.
Where the question passed upon is one as to whether or not a verdict should be set aside as excessive, "a large discretion is of necessity vested in the trial court, and only in cases where that discretion is unreasonably exercised ought the action of the trial court to be set aside." Gray v. Fanning, 73 Conn. 115, 117, 46 Atl. 831; Case v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 711, 83 Atl. 1020.
This record does not disclose an unreasonable use of the judicial discretion.
There is no error.
In this opinion Hall, C. J., Thayer and Roraback, Js., concurred.