Case Name: NEWMAN HEATING & BOILER REPAIR, INC., Appellant, v. James E. NEWMAN, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-03-18
Citations: 418 So. 2d 1008
Docket Number: No. AC-412
Parties: NEWMAN HEATING & BOILER REPAIR, INC., Appellant, v. James E. NEWMAN, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 1008–1013

Head Matter:
NEWMAN HEATING & BOILER REPAIR, INC., Appellant, v. James E. NEWMAN, Jr., Appellee.
No. AC-412.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 18, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 1, 1982.
Victor M. Halbach, Jr., of Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Stephen J. Pajcic, III, of Pajcic, Pajcic, Dale & Bald, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
The employer/carrier (E/C) challenge a compensation order contending that the deputy commissioner (deputy) erred in awarding the claimant permanent total disability (PTD).
The claimant is a welder and boilermaker who is the president and sole owner of the employer corporation. He sustained a serious compensable injury to his right knee in September of 1975 that has necessitated two operations and has resulted in a 50% permanent partial disability (PPD) of his right leg. Claimant had serious pre-exist-ing long-term back trouble for which he had been hospitalized several times. Claimant had continued to draw a salary from the employer corporation to and including the hearing date. His salary in 1978 and 1979 was higher than in prior years.
The deputy awarded the claimant PTD benefits on grounds that his back condition had merged with the compensable knee injury, rendering him totally disabled. The E/C contends that the deputy erred in not limiting claimant to the benefits payable for a scheduled injury to his right leg. For a number of years the Florida Supreme Court has said that diminished earning capacity is not a criterion for determining a compensation award in a case involving a scheduled injury. Mims and Thomas Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson, 340 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1976); Jewell v. Wood, 130 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1961); Magic City Bottle & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 116 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1959). The only exceptions to this rule are where the scheduled injury causes disability or incapacity in some other part of the body, as set forth in Kashin v. Food Fair, 97 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1957), or where claimant's disability is total rather than partial so that § 440.15(3), Fla. Stat., governing PPD, does not apply. Henderson v. Sol Walker Co., 138 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1962). Here, there is no substantial competent medical evidence that the scheduled injury caused disability or incapacity in some other part of the body so as to bring this case within the exception set forth in Kashin. In response to a question whether claimant's back pain was related to his knee problem, the claimant's treating physician, Dr. McClear, testified "I believe it could be." When asked whether the claimant's knee injury would have any effect on claim ant's back, Dr. McClear responded "I think it certainly could, yes." In Kashin, the doctor was of the opinion that the claimant "was suffering from a cardiac condition which was, in his opinion, probably brought on by the loss of blood and shock at the time of the original injury." (emphasis supplied) The court held that such a nebulous and speculative conclusion as to the causal relationship between the accident and the ultimate cardiac condition did not constitute substantial competent evidence that the industrial accident caused the cardiac condition. The language used by the doctor in Kashin was even less speculative and nebulous than that used by Dr. McClear. In this case there is no substantial competent medical evidence to show a relationship between the back trouble complained of by the claimant and his industrial accident. The lack of such evidence, together with the evidence that his back trouble had long pre-existed the industrial accident, makes it clear that this case cannot fit within the Kashin exception to the general rule on scheduled injuries. Additionally, the claimant's scheduled injury has not brought about a total disability which would permit a finding of PTD under the decision in the Henderson case. The alleged total disability found by the deputy was not based on the industrial accident and injury but on a combination of his industrial injury and his previous back problems. The back trouble cannot be considered unless it was related to or caused by the industrial accident. In addition, the claimant is still working and drawing a base salary. This fact generally indicates only PPD, not PTD. The award of PTD is reversed and the cause is remanded to the deputy with instructions to enter an award for PPD in accordance with the scheduled injury the claimant received.
MILLS, J., concurs.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents.