Case Name: Steven Blaine JONES aka Daniel Raymond Mawkin, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1986-11-26
Citations: 720 S.W.2d 535
Docket Number: No. 759-85
Parties: Steven Blaine JONES aka Daniel Raymond Mawkin, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: TEAGUE, J., joins this opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 720
Pages: 535–538

Head Matter:
Steven Blaine JONES aka Daniel Raymond Mawkin, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 759-85.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Nov. 26, 1986.
Charles M. Mallín, Joseph A. Calamia, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty. and Matthew Dekoatz, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty. and Julie B. Pollock, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of murder. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). Punishment was assessed at 99 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Jones v. State, 689 S.W.2d 510, (Tex.App.—El Paso 1985). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether there was reversible error in the jury charge. We will vacate and remand.
Appellant asserts error in the trial court's failure to include within the paragraph in the charge applying the law of murder to the facts of the case an instruction that the State was required to negate beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. See Cobarrubio v. State, 675 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The trial court instructed the jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter. In essence, appellant claims that the trial court charged the jury in violation of Cobarrubio.
We observe that there was no objection by appellant to the placing of the State's burden of proof in accordance with Cobarrubio. See also Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), the Court of Appeals held that appellant had waived his complaint by failing to object to the charge. "Normally, the failure to object at trial preserves nothing for review.... However, where jury charge error is first raised on appeal, this Court will consider the complaint, albeit under a more exacting harm analysis if error is found. See Almanza, [supra]." Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696 at 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). We believe that the Court of Appeals has misconstrued Al-manza.
In Almanza, this Court held, inter alia, that Article 36.19, V.A.C.C.P., requires an appellate court to review jury charge error for harmlessness. The determination of whether alleged error in a jury charge requires reversal involves a two-step process. An appellate court must determine, first, whether error exists in the charge and, second, the extent to which a defendant was harmed by the error. The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the error was objected to at trial. If the defendant made a proper objection to the charge, then reversal is required if the error in the charge created "some harm." If there was no proper objection at trial, reversal is not required unless the error resulted in "egregious harm" to the defendant.
We will consider first whether the jury charge in the instant case was erroneous. In a murder case, when an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter is included in the jury charge, the burden of proving the lack of sudden passion is on the State. In addition, the issue of sudden passion must be included in the paragraph of the charge applying the law of murder to the facts of the case. Cobarrubio, 675 S.W.2d at 751. We find that in the instant case, the trial court failed to include the issue of sudden passion in the murder application paragraph, and that such omission was error. Since there was no objection to that portion of the charge, the next area of inquiry will be whether the error created harm so egregious as to deny appellant a fair trial.
In Castillo-Fuentes v. State, 707 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) and Lawrence v. State, 700 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), this Court addressed the issue of what disposition should occur in the face of unobjected Cobarrubio error. In Lawrence, voluntary manslaughter was an incidental defense, the main thrust of the defendant's case being self-defense. Thus, the harm, when viewed in light of Alman-za, was not egregious so as to require reversal. However, in Castillo-Fuentes, we held that where voluntary manslaughter was the primary defense, the Cobarru-bio error was egregious enough to require reversal, even in the absence of a proper objection.
When the Court of Appeals decided the instant case, it did not have the benefit of our decisions in Castillo-Fuentes and Lawrence. Therefore, we vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for consideration in light of Castillo-Fuentes and Lawrence.