Case Name: Michael MORDENTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-02-22
Citations: 982 So. 2d 710
Docket Number: No. 2D05-4407
Parties: Michael MORDENTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAVIS, J., Concurs with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 982
Pages: 710–718

Head Matter:
Michael MORDENTI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D05-4407.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 22, 2008.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Terri L. Backhus, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, CHARLES M., Associate Senior Judge.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in excluding statements made by the alleged coconspirator, deceased at the time of trial, which, if believed by the jury, would exonerate Michael Mordenti. We hold that the trial court did err and reverse.
Mordenti was first convicted of first-degree murder in 1991, at which time he received the death penalty. Mordenti's conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in 1994. However, on review of a denied motion for postconviction relief, that court reversed the conviction and sentence because of a Brady violation. Mordenti v. State, 894 So.2d 161 (Fla.2004). A second trial resulted in a mistrial (hung jury). Mordenti was tried once again, resulting in a second conviction and this appeal.
Larry Royston, the victim's husband, was immediately the prime suspect in the ease. Because he had an alibi (he was with the victim's mother at the time of the murder), law enforcement believed a hired killer was involved. Through Royston's telephone records, the police were led to Gail Mordenti Milligan. When she was called in for questioning, Mrs. Milligan demanded immunity for her cooperation, and apparently without any additional investigation, she received it. She then told the investigators that indeed she was the go-between in setting up this murder-for-hire. Royston offered $10,000 for the murder of his wife, and Mrs. Milligan set out to find a contract killer. Mrs. Milligan told authorities that her former husband, Michael Mordenti, after initially refusing, had agreed to do the murder. This was her testimony at trial, and it was the only material evidence against Mordenti.
The Florida Supreme Court in reversing Mordenti's original conviction noted how critical Mrs. Milligan's testimony was in obtaining the conviction:
Mordenti was convicted primarily on the testimony of one woman, Gail Mor-denti Milligan. No physical evidence was produced linking Mordenti to the murder, and Gail was the only witness who was able to place Mordenti at the scene of the murder. There was no money trail, no eyewitnesses, no confession, no murder weapon, no blood, no footprints, and no DNA evidence linking Mordenti to the murder. The prosecution's entire case relied solely on Gail's testimony, and the jury crediting that testimony.
894 So.2d at 168.
The testimony in the case indicates that Royston never met Mordenti. This is im portant because when Royston first saw Mordenti in court, he blurted out to his attorney in a crowded courtroom, "That's not the guy" or "That's not him." This statement, as well as others, was not discovered until after Royston committed suicide shortly before his trial. The prosecutors of Mordenti convinced a judge that Royston's attorney-client privilege ended with his death and obtained an ex parte order requiring Royston's attorney, Treve-na, to respond to the State's questions. Although the above quoted courtroom statement was not specifically mentioned, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the importance of Trevena's testimony in its decision overturning Mordenti's conviction:
After Royston committed suicide, the State obtained an ex parte order signed by the trial judge stating that the attorney-client privilege did not apply and ordering Trevena to submit to an interview with the State....
During the evidentiary hearing [on the motion for postconviction relief] the trial court ruled that Trevena's testimony with regard to the information he received from his deceased client in preparation for his murder trial was inadmissible hearsay. However, the trial court permitted postconviction counsel to proffer Trevena's testimony. The proffer indicated that Trevena conveyed to the prosecution that Larry Royston believed that "Gail Mordenti had orchestrated [the murder]." Trevena informed the State that "Mr. Royston had indicated to [him] that [Royston] did have a sexual affair with Gail Mordenti, and that she wanted to continue that affair." Trevena further informed the State that Gail "wanted Mr. Royston freed up so that she could share . in his assets." Finally, Trevena communicated to the State that Royston maintained that the thirteen-minute cellular phone call on June 7, 1989, the day of the murder, from Royston to Mordenti was "innocent in nature and that it was relating to some type of a boat or motor vehicle," and "[t]here was no discussion concerning any homicide or violence, . it was related to business and . the call had been set up by Gail."
Id. at 173 (some alteration in original).
Even though the credibility of Mrs. Milligan was the central issue of this case, the trial court refused to allow Trevena's testimony on the basis of hearsay and privilege. There was simply no privilege remaining at the time of the third trial. If the privilege ever existed (the statement was blurted out in a crowded courtroom for anyone to hear), it was waived when the State inappropriately required Treve-na to respond to its questions. The statement then became public information. The Florida Supreme Court made this abundantly clear in its decision. The court did not treat the information as privileged and discussed its potential admissibility. That has become the law of the case as it relates to privilege.
With regard to the application of the hearsay rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The uncorroborated statement of a cocon-spirator raises such concerns. The one who took the money, picked the murderer, and was given immunity must be subject to the closest scrutiny during cross-examination. Mrs. Milligan was not. The Florida Supreme Court discussed the potential problem of hearsay in its decision and suggested it should be available for impeachment of Mrs. Milligan who, for example, had denied a sexual relationship with Royston. Royston's statement also meets the spontaneous statement exception as well as the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule.
It may well be that the jury will not believe Mr. Trevena or may put some other construction on Mr. Royston's statements. But the jury should have that opportunity.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DAVIS, J., Concurs with opinion.
STRINGER, J., Dissents with opinion.
. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
. Had Mrs. Milligan testified that her boyfriend had committed the murder, there would have been some corroboration because independent witnesses stated that two people were seen in the vicinity of the murder at or near the appropriate time and that while neither met the description of Mordenti, one did meet the description of Mrs. Milligan's boyfriend.
. Royston's attorney testified on proffer that Royston had been "adamant that [Mordenti] had absolutely nothing to do with [the murder]."
. Suppose Mordenti had been executed following his first conviction and sentence before this information was revealed by the State? What confidence would the public have in the criminal justice system?