Case Name: Morton v. Green
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1873
Citations: 2 Neb. 441
Docket Number: 
Parties: Morton v. Green.
Judges: Justice Lake concurring in that conclusion, the judgment of the Court below is affirmed.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 441–478

Head Matter:
Morton v. Green.
Ejectment. An action for the recovery of real property under the Code can only be supported by showing a legal title in the plaintiff as contra-distinguished from an equitable title.
-. The holder of a receiver’s certificate cannot, after the entry upon which the paper was issued has been cancelled, maintain an action of ejectment; for he has only an equitable title; and this notwithstanding sect. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, making such certificate proof of title equivalent to a patent against all but the holder of an actual patent.
-: Jurisdiction, The courts of law are without jurisdiction. to interfere in controversies between adverse claimants of the public land until the government has, by the issuing of the patent or otherwise, parted with the legal title.
Error to tbe District Court for Lancaster County.
It was ejectment brought by Morton, Hopkins, & Manners, against Green & Smith, to recover tbe south half of tbe north-east quarter of section twenty-one (21), and the north half of tbe south-east quarter of section twenty-one (21), and tbe south-east quarter of the northwest quarter of said section twenty-one (21), all in township number ten (10), north of range number six (6), east of the sixth principal meridian. Green & Smith being lessees of the State, it intervened to defend the title. The petition and the answer of Green & Smith were in the usual form. The answer of the State alleged that it was the owner of the lands, and claimed title by virtue of the Act of Congress, approved July 22, 1854, entitled “ An act to establish the office' of Surveyor-General of New Mexico, Kansas, and Ne braska, to donate to actual settlers therein, and for other purposes; ” also the act of Congress, approved on the 19th of April, A.D. 1854, entitled “ An act to enable the people of Nebraska to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of the State into the Union on equal footing with the original States ; ” and the act of Congress, approved Feb. 9, A.D. 186T, entitled “An act for the admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union ; ” and the State claims, and it has, through its proper officers, selected and located, said lands, and performed each and every act necessary to be done on its part to perfect its said titles to said lands. The cause was tried before Lake, J., and a jury. On the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence two certificates, as follows : —
Register’s Office, Nebraska City, N.T.,
Sept. 12, 1859.
Military land-warrant, No. 80,268, in the name of Johanna George Elerle and Christine Constantin, has this day been located by John W. Prey upon the north half of south-east quarter of section twenty-one (21), and north-west quarter of the south-west quarter of section twenty-two (22), in township ten (10), north of range six (6), east, subject to any pre-emption claim which may be filed for said land within thirty days from this date.
Contents of tract located, one hundred and sixty acres, R & R 38. The dates of assignments in all cases must be given at the time they are acknowledged, and no assignment of this certificate will be regarded.
And. Hopkins, Register.
Military Bounty Land Act of 28th. September, 1850.
Register’s Office, Nebraska City, N.T., Sept. 12, 1859.
Military land-warrant, No. 10,027, under the name of William B. Davis, has this day been located by John W. Prey upon the south half of the north-east quarter, the south-east quarter of the north-west quarter, and the north-east quarter of the south-west quarter, of section twenty-one (21), in township ten (10), north of range six (6), east, subject to any pre-emption claim which may be filed for said land within forty days from this date.
Contents of tract located, one hundred and sixty acres, R & R 57. And. Hopkins, Megister.
The plaintiffs then showed several mesne conveyances from Prey to themselves, and rested. The defendants then offered in evidence a certified copy of a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land-Office , to the Register and Receiver, Feb. 17, 1862. The plaintiffs objected, and the Court overruled the objection; and the defendants read the same, as follows: —
Generar Land Office, Feb. 17, 1862.
Gentlemen, — For your information, I herewith enclose you a copy of the instructions from this office of present date to the surveyor-general at Leavenworth, Kansas, respecting not only the general examination he is required to make, to the end that all salt springs, salt licks and salines, shall be reported to the District Land-Office and to this office, in order that they may be respected as reserved lands, but particularly respecting eleven locations which had been allowed at your office upon certain tracts reported as salines.
Those eleven tracts, with the name of the locator in each, case, are described in the enclosed schedule “ A ” herewith. As soon as the surveyor-general shall have made a report to this office of the result of the examination in the eleven cases in question, you will be advised of the definite action of the department in the matter.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. M. Edmunds, Commissioner.
Register and Receiver, Nebraska City, Nebraska Ty.
The defendants also offered in evidence a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land-Office, dated the same day, addressed to the Surveyor-General of Nebraska, &c., stating that, under the law, saline lands were reserved from sale; that it was reported to him, that, by collusion between surveyors and speculators, saline lands had not been so reported as they should have been; and directing that an examination be made by the latter officer into the character of the lands here ■ in question among other tracts.
The proceedings of the surveyor-general in pursuance of the above letter and his report were, under the plaintiff’s exception, read in evidence, showing that the lands in question were salines; also a letter from the commissioner to the register and receiver of the Local Land-Office, dated June 20,1862, that the locations, the certificates of which are above given, were cancelled because the lands were saline, and therefore reserved from sale; also evidence under like exception that the register and receiver had accordingly noted the cancellations on their plat and tract books; also a letter from the commissioner to the local officers, dated Aug, 15, 1862, directing them to return to the General Land-Office the patents for the lands here in question, which had some years before been sent to them for delivery to the parties. Oral evidence was given showing that the lands were salines.
The Court directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants; which they did. Judgment being entered thereon, the plaintiffs filed this petition in error.
I). Gantt, for plaintiffs in error.
1. The Court erred in overruling the objections to, and admitting in evidence, the letters of the Commissioner of the General Land-Office, the letters of the surveyor-general, and reports of sub-agents of the government, because the same were ex-parte proceedings, and offered to show that the entry of the lands in question was cancelled by land-officers, who were successors to those who made and approved the contract with the purchaser.
By such contract of purchase of the land, the purchaser acquired a “vested right,” which can only be set aside or cancelled according to law by a proper judicial tribunal, and not by the land-officers. 27. S. Constitutional Amendments, Art. Y.; Astrom et al. v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 109; Morton v. Blankership et al., 5 Mo., 355; Johnson v. Tousley, Sup. Ct. 27. S., last term; United States v. Stone, 2 Wallace, 585-537; United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Peters, 401; Merrill v. Hartwell, 11 Mich., 20; Harty v. Hull, 2 Binn., 511; United States v. Willard, — Paine, 539 ; Janes v. Lawler, 33 Ala., 340; Ware v. Brush, 1 McLean, 535.
2. The only fair and legitimate construction of the fourth section of the Act of July 22, 1854, is to apply its provisions and inhibitions exclusively to the donation system of lands provided in the second and third sections. Any other interpretation will produce contra dictions in the act which cannot be harmonized; and will also bring this act in direct conflict with the proviso of the eleventh section of the Act of April 19, 1864. Sturgis v. Qrowninshiel'd, 4 Wheat., 202.
3. The eleventh section of the Act of 19th April, 1864, clearly and distinctly recognizes a “ vested right ” to the land in question in J. W. Prey, grantor of plaintiffs, and thereby operates as a clear, sufficient, and indubitable affirmation and confirmation of title in the purchasers, and estops the United States from denying a “ vested right ” in the lands in the plaintiffs. Fletcher v. Peclc, 6 Granch, 137; Strothers v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 454; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How., 325 ; Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binn., 231.
4. The Act of May 18, 1796, that of March 26, 1804, and all other land acts of the government providing for the disposal of public lands, must, in respect to every one of such acts, according to every rule of construction, be limited in its application to those lands only which are designated in the act, and can extend only to lands in that Territory designated to which the Indian title had been extinguished. Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Peters, 426; Banforth’s Lessee v. Thomas, 1 Wheat., 158; Qherolcee Nation v. State of Georgia, 5 Peters, 17-48.
James E. Philpott and Seth Robinson, for Green & Smith, defendants in error.
I. 1. The act of the Commisioner of the General Land-Office in cancelling Prey’s entry was not a ministerial duty, but a matter resting in his judgment and discretion, and within his jurisdiction, requiring the construction and consideration of many acts of Congress. Gains v. Thompson, 7 Wallace, 347, and cases there cited; Bates v. Herron, 35 Ala., 117; O’Brien v. Perry, 1 Black, 182; Sarkness v. Underhill, 1 Black, 316.
And the following cases to the contrary are not supported by any principle of sound reasoning, and the point was not necessary to their determination : Groom v. Sill, 9 Miss., 323 ; Perry v. SSunlon, 11 Miss., 585 ; Arnold v. Grimes, 2 iwa, 1; Brill v. Styles, 35 TK., 305.
2. The operation of such action on the part of the commissioner was not, indeed, to destroy any of the equities of the plaintiffs or Prey; but it was effective to settle the question of the legal title between the plaintiffs and the United States: otherwise the plaintiffs might compel the issuance of a patent, and thereby clothe themselves with the legal title; but it is settled that this cannot be done. Gains v. Thompson, above cited.
3. The only ground upon which it can be claimed that the plaintiffs ever possessed the legal 'title to the land in controversy is furnished by sect. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which makes the usual duplicate receiver’s receipt proof of title equal to a patent against all but the patent itself. But, whatever force this section may be entitled to, it is subject, nevertheless, to the following qualifications, which are operative here; namely: —
(1.) The first qualification is, that whenever the question in any court, State or Federal, is, whether the title to land once the property of the United States has passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property, becomes subject to State legislation, so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States. Wilcox v. Jaclcson, 13 Peters, 517; 3 Washburn on Real Prop., 169.
(2.) The second qualification is, that until the patent has actually been issued, and the title passed in accordance with the laws of the United States, it remains subject to the control, judgment, and discretion of the executive department of the General Government; and it is only after the legal title has so passed from the United States, and the matter has ceased to be under the control of the executive department, that courts of justice will interfere, and decree the legal title to belong to the person against whom the department has decided. Gains v. Thompson, above cited.
4. How, then, can it be contended that the plaintiffs have legal title, when that title is impeached and effectually destroyed by the very record which is adduced in support of it?
5. Now, the legal title to the lands in controversy is vested either in the plaintiffs or in the defendants, or in the United States. It is not in the plaintiffs, for the reasons above stated. If it be not in the plaintiffs, it is immaterial in which of the others it may be; for, if it be in either, the judgment of the Court below must be affirmed. If it be in the United States, the plaintiffs cannot prevail in any form of action: not in ejectment to recover the possession, because, to do that, they must allege and prove a legal estate in themselves; not by bill to recover the title, because the United States is not a party, and could not be made a party. If it be in the defendants, they may prevail by first filing a bill to recover the legal title, but not in an ejectment to recover the possession.
The cancellation of Prey’s entry left the plaintiffs but a mere equity. Gains v. Thompson, 7 Wallace, 347, 353 ; Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 Sow., 315; Barnard v. Ash ley, 18 How., 48 ; Garland v. Wynn, 20 How., 6; Bates y. Herron, 35 Ala., 117; Brill v. Styles, 35 HI., 305; O'Brien y. Perry, 1 Black, 132; Harkness y. Under-hill, 1 Black, 816; Hester y. Kembaugh, 9 N ^ jif., 130.
And no case can be found where ejectment has been supported upon a mere entry, backed only by a duplicate receiver’s receipt, where the legal title has actually passed from the government to the defendant, or where the government has refused, through its proper officers, to part with the legal title, except in those States where ejectment will lie upon an equitable title; and Missouri is such a State. O'Brien y. Perry, above cited; see Wilcox y. Jackson, 13 Peters, 517.
'Where the legal title has not passed from the government, or where it has passed to one party, another party holding a mere duplicate receiver’s receipt necessarily has but an equitable title at best; and an equitable title will not support an action of ejectment. Jackson v. Harrington, 9 Coiv., 88; Jackson y. Sisson, 2 Johns. Cas., 321; Jackson v. Van Slyck, 8 Johns., 486 ; Jackson y. JDeinont, 9 Johns., 60 ; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat., 212; Penn y. Holme, 21 How., 481; Hickey v. Stewart, 3 How., 750; Adams on Ejectment, 43 et seq., and note 1, and cases cited; Tyler on Ejectment, 74 et seq., and cases cited.
And the only way in which an equitable title can be assisted at law is by allowing the presumption to prevail in certain cases that there has been a conveyance of the legal estate. Jackson v. Pierce, 2 Johns., 226 ; Adams on Ejectment, 44, note 1.
6. By special statute in some States, an equitable title which will support an action for a conveyance will support ejectment. Adams on Ejectment, 44, notes; Tyler on Ejectment, 73. But in this State, by express enactment, the action can only be maintained by him who holds the legal estate. Code of Civil Procedure, sect. 626.
II. Upon the second question which arises in the case the defendants rely upon the following points and authorities to sustain the judgment of the court below : —
1. Whenever a tract of land has been appropriated to public use, or reserved for any purpose, it is severed from the mass of the public domain; and subsequent laws are not construed to embrace it, though they do not in terms except it. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters, 513.
2. The following acts of Congress are applicable to the case at bar, and, if there were no others, would fully sustain the action of the commissioner in cancelling Prey’s entries: Act 18th May, IT96, sect. 3; 1 TJ. S. Stat., 466. Act 26th March, 1804, sect. 6 ; 2 TJ. S. Stat., 277. Act 21st April, 1806, sect. 11; 2 TJ. S. Stat., 391. Act 3d March, 1811, sect. 10 ; 2TJ. S. Stat., 665.
3. These and the following acts clearly show that the uniform policy of the government has been to reserve all saline lands from private entry, and to grant them to the several States: Act 3d March, 1807, sect. 2; 2 TJ. S. Stat., 438. Act 29th February, 1808, sect. ; 2 TJ. S. Stat., 470. Act 6th March, 1820, sect. 6, subd. 2; 3 TJ. S. Stat., 547. Act 27th September, 1850, sect. 14; 9 TJ. S. Stat., 500. Act 14th February, 1853, sect. 9 ; 10 U. S. Stat., 159. Act 14th February, 1859, sect. 4, subd. 4 ; 11 TJ. S. Stat., 383. Act 29th January, 1861, sect. 3, subd. 4; 12 TJ. S. Stat., 127. Act 19th April, 1864, sect. 11.; 13 TJ. S. Stat., 49.
And these acts further show that the form of the grant of salt springs is uniform, and that there is nothing peculiar in the grant to this State.
4. The Act of 22d July, 1854, sect. 4, 10 TJ. S. Stat., 308, expressly reserves saline lands in this State from entry or. sale, and is conclusive, not only against the title, but the right of the plaintiffs.
5. The defendants, being in possession under color of title, might impeach even. a patent. Crammelin v. Minter, 9 Ala., 594.
Robert K. and James L. Bradford, and Gteorge S. Roberts, Attorney-General, for the State, argued the same points, and also submitted a printed argument of forty-eight pages.
E. Wakeley, in reply for plaintiffs in error.

Opinion:
Ckoense, J.
This was an action to recover the possession of lands, commonly styled an action of ejectment, and is purely legal in its character. The plaintiffs assert and must maintain a legal title to the lands claimed. Sect. 626, Code of Civil Procedure. By the laws of some States, ejectment may be sustained by proof of an equitable right to the lands, the possession of which is sought-, and an examination of some of the cases urged upon the attention of this Court will show them to have arisen under laws of that kind, and of course they can have no bearing here.
The plaintiffs claim as grantees of one Prey. Prey's pretended title is from the United States, and is based on his attempt, in the year 1859, to obtain the lands in question by the location of land-warrants thereon. In the month of September of that year, he located his warrants, and 'received the usual certificate from the local land-office at Nebraska City. This was followed by the transmission of patents from the General Land-Office to the Local Office. Before their delivery, how ever, the Commissioner of the General Land-Office at Washington, ascertaining that these lands were saline and not agricultural lands, recalled the patents, and can-celled the location of Prey ; claiming that the lands were not subject to location pr sale, but that they were reserved by the Act of Congress of July 22, 1854.
To show how the defendants, Green & Smith, came into possession, I may remark, that, by the act of Congress admitting Nebraska as a State into the Union, " all salt springs within said State, not exceeding twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining, or as contiguous as may be to each, shall be granted to said State for its use, the said lands to be selected by the governor thereof within one year after the admission of the State, and, when so selected, to be used or disposed of on such terms, conditions, and regulations as the legislature shall direct; provided that no salt spring or lands, the right whereof is now vested in any individual or individuals, or which hereafter shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall, by this act, be granted to said State." I may say, in passing, that this proviso has no peculiar application to the lands in question, being such as is usually attached to lands of like kind. Nebraska was admitted in March, 1867. In June of the same year the governor made selection of saline lands, including those in question. This selection was, at the time of the trial, before the land department at Washington for approval. In the mean time the legislature of Nebraska had given authority therefor, and the governor had leased these saline lands to said Green & Smith, who took possession of the same, and whom the State has been let in to defend. Whether the act admitting Nebraska, and the selection of these lands by the governor, gives title to the State without patent or other evidence of title, I will not stop to discuss. The plaintiffs aver that they "are seized in fee of" the lands in dispute. This they must maintain without reference to the strength of defendant's title.
The highest evidence of plaintiffs' title 'would be a patent from the United States. This they cannot produce ; and they admit, that, for their failure to show one, they could not hope to succeed were it not for sect. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is relied on. That section says, " The usual duplicate receipt of the receiver of any land-office, or, if that be lost or destroyed or beyond the reach of the party, the certificate of such receiver that the books of his office show the sale of a tract of land to a certain individual, is proof of title equivalent to a patent against all but the holder of an actual patent." But it is answered, the certificate in this case has been cancelled or destroyed by the return of, or offer to return, the warrants, and the cancellation of Prey's location. To this it is replied, that the commissioner could not, by an ex-parte proceeding, destroy Prey's right to the land in question; that, admitting that, if these lands were reserved by law, the location was void, yet the commissioner was wrong in his interpretation of the Act of July, 1854.
Upon this branch of the case the argument of counsel on both sides was very able and elaborate ; but in the view I take of the case I shall not follow in the discussion, nor consider the many interesting points debated. It is enough to know that the grantor of the plaintiffs not only never received a patent for these lands, but his right to do has most forcibly been denied by those acting for the United States. While, on the other hand, these lands have been selected under the general grant made by Congress, the State's lessees have entered upon them, and, from all that appears, are holding them with no suggestion of opposition from the government. What ever grounds Prey or his grantees may have to demand a patent from the government constitute at most an equitable right, which in a proper suit, with proper parties, might be declared. Until they can show this patent, they are not "seized in fee of" the lands in question. When a patent shall have rightfully passed to them, the United-States authorities cannot destroy it. Before it has passed, this State, by its courts or its legislature, is not competent to wrest it from the United States. Congress is given full power to dispose of the public lands of the United States, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the same. Sect. 3, Art. IV., U. S. Constitution. Accordingly Congress has, from time to time, passed laws providing for the sale or donation of the public lands; has appointed the officers through or by whom the title shall pass from the government to the grantee, and prescribed the steps to be taken before title shall pass. In the case before us, the first requirement for a valid location of these lands is, that they should be subject to sale or location. The first officers to act upon this question are the officers of the local land-office. They might refuse to permit a location on lands properly subject to it, or allow a location on lands properly reserved. Their action is not conclusive. An appeal is provided to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office from the decision of the local officers. From this officer an appeal can again be taken to the Secretary of the Interior Department. Many mistakes are likely to be committed by these different officers in disposing of the public lands ; but their correction is left with these public officers in the control of their respective departments, and in the discharge of their several duties. But, until the issuance of a patent and the parting with the title by the government, the courts cannot interfere. Litchfield v. The Register and Receiver, 1 Wool worth's Circuit-Court Reports, 308; Brewer v. Kidd, 23 Mich., 440; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Kendall v. Stokes, 12 Peters, 608; State of Mississippi v. Johnson, President, 4 Wallace, 475. In the cases of Smiley v. Sampson, and Tousley v. Johnson, reported in 1 Nebraska Reports, this Court sustained suits brought to recover the legal title from those who had wrongfully obtained patents from the government which of right should have been issued to the plaintiffs. We there felt at liberty to review and overrule the decision of the Federal officers in their interpretation or construction of United-States laws ; and we were sustained in the United-States Supreme Court for so doing. But it will be remarked that the Court took no action, nor entertained jurisdiction, until a patent had been issued, and the lands had passed from the United States, and had fallen, in common with all other lands within the State, under State control or jurisdiction.
In Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Peters, 450, it is said, " Congress has the sole power to give dignity and effect to titles emanating from the United States; and the whole legislation of the Federal Government in reference to the public lands declares the patent the superior and conclusive evidence of legal title : until it issues, the fee is in the government; by the patent, it passes to the grantee, and he is entitled to recover the possession in ejectment." As the State cannot compel the surrender by the government of a title, so it cannot, by any law it may pass, declare that to be a title that is not in fact such under the laws and regulations of the United States. Congress has granted a number of salt-springs and a quantity of lands to the State. The governor is selected to designate them. No provision is made for the issuing of patents for them, as under general land-laws. As between the United States and the State of Nebraska, the title to the lands selected may be regarded by both as in the latter. Yet the plaintiffs, with a certificate that may have been unadvisedly issued in violation 'of law, and perhaps fearing to test the strength of their claim by appeal to the highest land-officer, seek to obtain the possession of lands upon a certificate worthless between themselves and the government, because they chance to hold it, and the State has no patents. This is attempting a use of the section of our Code referred to never designed, and one wholly unwarranted. To those familiar with delays attending proceedings in the land department, the purpose of the section is evident. It is quite usual for years to intervene between the purchase of a piece of land and receiving a patent therefor. That it is competent for the State to pass a law which will enable a purchaser to defend his possession of lands purchased from the General Government, and for which he has paid his money and taken his certificate, I will not question. There he holds in harmony with the government, his certificate is in force, and his right is complete, except the possession of the patent, which is sure to follow. The case is entirely different where it appears that a patent is denied, and the very certificate is destined as far as the government is able to do it. It is not the design of this law to enable a party to build up a right on an empty technicality like this, in subversion of well-established rules governing the acquirement of public lands. It applies in cases where the possessor of the certificate holds harmonious relations with' the government.
In Astrom et al. v. Hammond, 3 McLean's C. C., R. 109, a bill was filed to restrain collection of taxes on land for which no patent had yet issued. The Court says, " Until the patent is issued, the purchaser has not the legal title; but having made his entry of the land, and paid his money for it, the government can no more dispose of the land to another person than if the patent had issued. The final certificate, obtained on the payment of the money, is as binding on the government as the patent. " To language like this we are pointed, to show, that, being possessed of his certificate, Prey's right cannot be thus destroyed by the cancellation of his location. Taking the language alone, and as applied to the case there before the Court, it is all very proper ; holding, as the purchaser did no doubt, in harmony with the government, he had every right in and to the land that a patentee would have, and should pay tax accordingly. And further: if the lands were subject to entry, and had been properly entered, with no superior claim ahead of it, the government could not destroy his right to the land, and his claim to have the patent for it; that is, it could not legally do so. But, as will be seen by reference to the cases cited above, although the purchaser may be entitled to a patent, the evidence of legal title, yet he could-not compel its delivery by mandamus, nor enjoin the land-officers from giving the patent to a claimant not legally entitled to it. The purchaser, however clear his right may seem to be, must, when disputed, prosecute his claim through the several branches of the land department; and, if he fails there, he may, after the government has parted with the legal title by issuing a patent to another, proceed against such other person to obtain the legal title." This rule is well established; and there is nothing in Astrom et al. v. Hammond, or in those cases containing like expressions, which militates against it, or which is authority upon which to predicate the argument, that, because one is entitled to a legal title, he may, therefore, prosecute ejectments without first obtaining it.
The construction I place upon this action will, I think, be seen by a full reading of the section. In case of the certificate being lost, or beyond the reach of the party, it provides that the certificate of the receiver, that the books of his office show the sale of a tract of-land to a certain individual, may be introduced in evidence ; the object evidently being to show, that, as between the purchaser and the United States, the former is rightly in possession, or is entitled to be. If, however, the books of the receiver were produced, or a transcript of them was offered in this case, the reverse of this would be shown. Further support of this view is found in the fact, that this section is standing alone, under a title relating to Evidence, with no other pertaining to public lands or equitable titles. If it had been the design to permit a recovery of the possession of lands upon proof of equitable right, there is no reason why it should be confined to the single case of a holder of a receiver's certificate.
For want of time, I have not investigated the correctness of the additional ground upon which my associate placed his decision in the District Court, that these lands were reserved, and not subject to sale or location. Neither have I deemed this the proper case in which to enter upon such examination. I choose to place my decision upon the one ground, that, under our statute to maintain ejectment in a case like this, the plaintiff must produce a patent, or show that he holds a final certificate in harmony with the government. If 'the plaintiffs are entitled to a patent, let them first obtain it: then ejectment will be in order. If they are not entitled to one, the Court should not permit them to build up a claim to lands of great value, to which they have no right, upon a simple certificate unlawfully and unadvisedly issued.
Justice Lake concurring in that conclusion, the judgment of the Court below is affirmed.