Case Name: The Inhabitants of Cummington versus The Inhabitants of Springfield
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1824-09
Citations: 2 Pick. 394
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Inhabitants of Cummington versus The Inhabitants of Springfield.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 419–422

Head Matter:
The Inhabitants of Cummington versus The Inhabitants of Springfield.
A person bom in Great Britain came to this country as a soldier in the British army under General Burgoyne, was made a prisoner of war on the 17th of October, 1777, and was never exchanged, but not being confined, he voluntarily continued his residence in this commonwealth until the present time» Held, that he was a citizen.
So of one born in England, who deserted from the same army and who had over since resided in this commonwealth. See note.
Assumpsit for expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the support of Daniel Prince, a pauper, whose settlement was alleged to be in Springfield.
The only question raised was, whether the pauper was a citizen of this State, and so capable of gaining a settlement in Springfield. This question depended upon the following facts, which appeared upon a case stated.
Prince was born in Great Britain. He came to this country in the war of the revolution, as a soldier in the British army under the command of General Burgoyne, was captured with him in 1777, was marched into this commonwealth as a prisoner of war, and was never exchanged; but not being confined, he voluntarily continued his residence in this commonwealth to the present time.
J. H. Lyman and Forbes, for the plaintiffs,
said that only the officers of Burgoyne’s army were admitted to their parole, and that the pauper could not have remained a prisoner during the war, but that it was to be inferred from the facts stated, either that he was discharged, and then he might elect to become a citizen of this State, or that he deserted, and then he came within the case in which the Court had given an opinion n January 1824, upon a question submitted to them by the Senate in June preceding, relative to the citizenship of George Phipps, a pauper. They cited Charlestown v. Bos ton, 13 Mass. R. 471 ; Calvin’s case, 7 Co. 1 ; Talbot v Janson, 3 Dallas, 133 ; M'Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 2 Cranch, 280 ; Lambert’s Lessee v. Paine, 3 Cranch, 97 ; Dawson’s Lessee v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch, 321 ; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. R. 236 ; Gardner v. Ward, ibid. 244 ; Ainslee v. Martin, 9 Mass. R. 454 ; Lessee of Jackson v. Burns, 3 Binn. 74.
jBZiss junior, being informed by the Chief Justice that the Court, notwithstanding the opinion given to the Senate as before mentioned, intended to hear an argument in any case that should come before them, involving the same question, contended, in behalf of the defendants, that the pauper had not, acquired the right of a citizen. He came here as an enemy and remained here as a prisoner of war. He was liable to be exchanged as such at any time during the continuance of the war, and if our government should have had occasion to resort to retaliatory measures, he was liable to them and might have been executed. If he was a deserter, the British government had a right to punish him by military law. When the statute of 1777, of treason, was passed, he was a prisoner. Under these circumstances he could not become a citizen during the war, nor did he by the treaty of peace of 1783. Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. R. 313 ; Jackson v. Wright, 4 Johns. R. 75 ; M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 209 ; Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 453 ; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29.
The opinion alluded to, which was written by the Chief Justice and concurred in by Putnam and Wilde, Justices, was as follows.
Considering that the same question may arise in controversies respecting property between private litigating parties, we have entertained doubts of the propriety of giving an opinion without the aid of argument by counsel, who might present views to us of importance in the consideration of the subject; but understanding that the public business is embarrassed by the pendency of many applications before the committee on accounts, which depend upon a solution of this question, we have deemed it our duty to yield to the request of the honorable Senate, with the understanding, that if hereafter the rights of suitors shall require a revision of the subject, we shall feel obliged to grant them a hearing, and that the opinion now given will not be binding, if it shall be made to appear that it is incorrect
The facts stated for our consideration, are, that George Phipps, now a pauper, was bom in England, and came to this country as a soldier in the British army, under the command of General Burgoyne, that he deserted to the Americans, and has ever since resided in the town of C., within this commonwealth, that he has acquired and held real estate within that town, and has paid taxes therefor, and also for his poll and personal estate. The question presented is, whether by virtue of the treaty of peace in 1783, he is a citizen of the United States, or is still an alien.
We suppose if he were not a citizen before the treaty, he did not become such by the mere force of that instrument. The treaty operated as a relinquishment on tile part of Great Britain, of the allegiance claimed by that government from all who had before been the subjects of it, and had by force of the laws of any one of the United States become its citizens or subjects. But it could not confer the rights of citizens upon any who had not before enjoyed them. Thus in the cases of Gardner v. Ward and Kilham v. Ward, reported in the second volume of Massachusetts Reports, it was de cided that persons born in Massachusetts before the revolution, who had withdrawn to a British Province during the war, and had returned before the ratification of the treaty of peace, retained their citizenship, notwithstanding their absence while hostilities continued; while the same persons, had they remained in the British province until after the treaty, would have been British subjects, because they had chosen to continue their former allegiance, there being but one allegiance before the revolution, and that being to the sovereign of Great Britain. It was considered that Massachusetts had rightfully assumed the rank of a sovereign and independent state, and that she lawfully succeeded to the right of self-government, the sovereignty being in the people as a body politic. All, therefore, who were born within her limits, and who had not been expatriated voluntarily, or by compulsion, had a right to claim the protection of her laws, and owed allegiance to her as their sovereign; but a British subject not born within Massachusetts, would not have become a citizen, from the mere fact that he was here on the ratification of the treaty of peace.
But there are other facts from which, connected with the treaty, citizenship may be deduced in favor of persons born without the territory of Massa chusetts.
S. P. Dupont v. Pepper, State Rep. (S. C.) 5 ; 2 Kent's Com. (2d ed.) 40.
See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 122, 123.
After the declaration of independence, by Congress, in 1776, each one of the then colonies, parties thereto, became separate and independent states, or sovereignties, with the perfect right of enacting their own laws, and of declaring the terms and principles upon which the duty of allegiance and the right of protection should depend.
Among the earliest exercises of sovereign power by Massachusetts, was that by which the character of a citizen was ascertained, and his duties in relation to the State were prescribed.
The statute of treason, as it is called, was passed in the year 1777, [2 Mass. Laws, (edit. 1801,) 1046,] and it enacts, “ that all persons, abiding within the State, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to this State, and are members thereof.” It is not required by this statute, that persons thus constituted members of the State, should be born within its territory, it being undoubtedly intended to comprehend within the political family, all persons of whatever country, who should be voluntarily dwelling within the State, making it their home.
If the statute was prospective, and we think it clearly was, it being the policy of the times to invite into tire State those who might be able to contribute in their persons and property to maintain its liberty and independence, then the case of the pauper who has given rise to the question, is clearly within its provisions.
The case of prisoners of war would not be embraced by the statute, because their residence was constrained, and indicated no affection towards the country, or its cause. But one who deserted from the army, and vo.untarily took up his residence in one of our towns, demeaning himself as a subject and citizen, is such a one as the State chose to adopt as a member, and to whom it offered protection in exchange for allegiance.
The subject of the present inquiry must have left the British army very soon after the passing of the statute before cited, and may be presumed to have accepted the invitation contained in it, to become a member of the State.
He has practically enjoyed all the privileges, and submitted to all the duties of a citizen, for forty-five years. He was with us at the adoption of the constitution of the State, and of the United States, and also when the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was ratified. Probably his citizenship has never been called in question until he became a pauper
We therefore are of opinion that George Phipps, who is mentioned in the :,rder of the Senate to which this is an answer, is a citizen of Massachusetts, and of the United States.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The fact of the pauper's voluntarily remaining here being agreed, negatives his / being a prisoner of war, and makes the case come within the opinion given to the Senate.
Defendants defaulted
Hebron v. Colchester, 5 Day, 169 ; see per Story J. in 3 Peters, 164 ; Doe v. Acklam, 2 Barn. & Cress. 779 ; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters, 242 ; 2 Kent's Com. (2d ed.) 59, 60 ; Manchester v. Boston, 16 Mass. R. 230 ; Auchmuty v Mulcaster, 5 Barn & Cressw 775 ; Bright v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535