Case Name: Leroy H. MERKLE, Jr., etc., Petitioner, v. Carrie H. ROBINSON, etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-07-08
Citations: 737 So. 2d 540
Docket Number: No. 91,967
Parties: Leroy H. MERKLE, Jr., etc., Petitioner, v. Carrie H. ROBINSON, etc., Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 737
Pages: 540–549

Head Matter:
Leroy H. MERKLE, Jr., etc., Petitioner, v. Carrie H. ROBINSON, etc., Respondent.
No. 91,967.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 8, 1999.
Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner.
Roy L. Glass, St. Petersburg, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision asking the following certified question of great public importance:
DOES THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST ADOPTED IN BATES V. COOK, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla.1987), FOR USE IN APPLYING FLORIDA'S BORROWING STATUTE, SECTION 95.10, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALSO APPLY TO CASES INVOLVING FLORIDA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 95.11, FLORIDA STATUTES?
Robinson v. Merkle, 700 So.2d 723, 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the question to read as follows:
DOES THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST ADOPTED IN BATES V. COOK, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1987), FOR USE IN APPLYING FLORIDA'S BORROWING STATUTE, SECTION 95.10, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALSO APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED UNDER FLORIDA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 95.11, FLORIDA STATUTES?
We answer the rephrased question in the affirmative.
The facts established below are as follows:
Robinson, a West Virginia resident, filed suit in Pinellas County, Florida, against the estate of Dr. Carmelo Terliz-zi to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by Dr. Terlizzi's medical negligence during her delivery and birth on May 12, 1977. [ ] On May 12, 1977, Shirley Hargis [Robinson's mother] was admitted to Cabell Huntington Hospital, in Cabell County, West Virginia, under the care of Dr. Terlizzi. Mrs. Hargis was provided pre-natal obstetrical care by Dr. Terlizzi prior to this hospital admission. It is alleged that Robinson was born with perinatal asphyxia, hypoxia, and a seizure disorder as a result of Dr. Terlizzi's medical negligence. Dr. Terlizzi practiced medicine in West Virginia but retired to Florida, where he died in 1987.
Robinson argues the West Virginia statute of limitations applies to this action because the negligent conduct which gave rise to the cause of action occurred in West Virginia and because the parties were West Virginia residents at the time of the occurrence.[ ] We agree but note that our decision conflicts with a decision from the Third District on the same issue. See Rodriguez v. Pacific Scientific Co., 536 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 545 So.2d 1368 (1989).
Robinson alleges, and it is not disputed, that her cause of action for medical malpractice is not barred under the West Virginia statute of limitations. She argues that section 55-2-15, West Virginia Code (1995),[ ] a general tolling provision which tolls the statute of limitations on infants' claims while they are minors, makes her claim viable under West Virginia law. Robinson further argues that this limitations provision governs the action rather than the limitations period imposed by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993).[ ] Thus, the question to be settled here is whether Florida's statute of limitations was properly applied to a tort action which arose in West Virginia and which is not barred by that state's statute of limitations.
Robinson, 700 So.2d at 724. The district court held that "Florida's statute of limitations should not be used to bar a cause of action which arose in another state or territory when that state or territory has the more significant relationship to the cause of action, and the action is not barred in the foreign state." Id. at 725. The district court then applied its holding to the instant case where
the parties lived in West Virginia at the time of the injury, the injury occurred in West Virginia, the doctor-patient relationship began and ended in West Virginia, and the contract of insurance was entered into in West Virginia. The relationship of Florida to this action is limited to the fact that Dr. Terlizzi, some ten years after this injury, changed his residence to Florida. Under the significant relationship .test, West Virginia has more interest in this cause of action; therefore, its statute of limitations should apply.
Id. at 725-26. We agree.
This Court has held that in tort actions involving more than one state, all substantive issues should be determined in accordance with the law of the state having the most "significant relationship" to the occurrence and parties. See Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla.1980). The "significant relationship" test has been applied by this Court to questions involving conflict of law issues regarding statutes of limitation affected by the borrowing statute. See Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So.2d 1112, 1114-15 (Fla.1987) (holding that "just as in the case of other issues of substantive law, the significant relationships test should be used to decide conflicts of law questions concerning the statute of limitations" where the borrowing statute applies).
In the present case, this Court holds that the "significant relationship" test should be applied to Florida's statute of limitations. Traditionally, Florida courts would apply Florida's statute of limitations to bar a claim that arose' in a foreign jurisdiction if Florida's limitation period was shorter. See Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920). The justification given for applying the limitations period of the forum rather than the jurisdiction where the cause arose is that statutes of limitation are procedural in nature and not substantive; thus, the forum's limits should apply even though the substantive law giving rise to the action may be from a foreign jurisdiction. See Bates, 509 So.2d at 1114. The distinction between "procedural" versus "substantive," however, has been "universally assailed" because a "right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most valuable attribute." Id. (quoting Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492, 496 (1919)). Thus, the rejection of that distinction results in treating statute of limitation choice of law questions the same as "substantive" choice of law questions which, as stated above, Florida decides pursuant to the "significant relationship" test. See Bishop, 389 So.2d at 1001.
The fear that the "significant relationship" test would expose Florida courts to unnecessary litigation that would detrimentally tax our court system is unpersuasive. Application of the "significant relationship" test to statute of limitation choice of law questions should not greatly increase the work load of Florida courts. To discern the impact of this change out of all the cases considered by Florida courts, we would first narrow the number of cases to those that present a choice of law question; we would narrow that group to cases that present a statute of limitations choice of law question; and then we would further narrow the latter group to cases where our reliance on the "significant relationship" would allow the case to proceed in Florida that would have been barred under the traditional test. Thus, the limited class of cases that Florida would entertain is where the case arose outside of Florida, Florida's statute of limitation is shorter than the foreign jurisdiction's, and the foreign jurisdiction is found to have the most significant relationship to the litigation. This does not amount to an opening of "flood gates." To the extent Florida courts will entertain some additional cases, we find that this expense is counterbalanced by this Court's policy of providing litigants with a forum to seek redress for wrongs that have been suffered for which relief is provided by law.
We see no reason to refrain from employing the "significant relationship" test to conflict of law issues concerning limitation periods generally, thereby treating conflicts of law pertaining to section 95.11 consistently with conflicts concerning substantive law and. with conflicting limitations periods affected by the borrowing statute. We therefore agree with the opinion below and likewise "read the language in Bates to be applicable to any conflict of law question concerning a statute of limitation, including section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993)." Robinson, 700 So.2d at 725.
Accordingly, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, approve the decision below, and disapprove Rodriguez v. Pacific Scientific Co., 536 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which OVERTON, Senior Justice, concurs.
OVERTON, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion.
. The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint as barred by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993).
. "Robinson filed suit against Dr. Terlizzi's estate in West Virginia, but the action was dismissed because West Virginia's long-arm statute could not be used to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Robinson, 700 So.2d at 724 n. 2.
. This section provides:
General saving as to persons under disability-
If any person to whom the right accrues to bring any such personal action, suit or scire facias . shall be, at the lime the same accrues, an infant or insane, the same may be brought within the like number of years after his becoming of full age or sane that is allowed to a person having no such impedi-menl to bring the same after the right accrues . except that it shall in no case be brought after twenty years from the time when the right accrues.
W. Va.Code§ 55-2-15 (1995).
. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993), provides in part:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.
. The borrowing statute, section 95.10, Florida Statutes (1997), provides: "When the cause of action arose in another state or terri- tory of the United States, or in a foreign country, and its laws forbid the maintenance of the action because of lapse of time, no action shall be maintained in this state."
. In answering this conflict of law question, it is immaterial for purposes of our analysis that section 95.1 l(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), is characterized as a statute of repose versus a statute of limitation. We have distinguished the statutes thusly: statutes of repose bar actions by setting a time limit within which an action must be filed as measured from a specified act, after which time the cause of action is extinguished; statutes of limitation bar actions by setting a time limit within which an action must be filed as measured from the accrual of the cause of action, after which time obtaining relief is barred. See Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 418 (Fla.1992). This distinction may be critical in determining whether a claim is barred where, for example, negligence is not discovered until years after the incident causing injury; however, this distinction has no bearing on the choice of law question since whether a jurisdiction applies a statute of repose or limitation in a given case is simply the "law" of that jurisdiction which is employed after application of the "significant relationship" test determines which jurisdiction's law is to be applied. This conclusion is consistent with this Court's predicate use of the "significant relationship" test when determining which jurisdiction's substantive law, borrowing statute, and statute of limitation should apply. See Bates, 506 So.2d 1114; Bishop, 389 So.2d 1001. We see no reason to treat a statute of repose any differently from the above mentioned laws.