Case Name: Luis Mauricio Aguilar MEJIA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-12-19
Citations: 671 F. App'x 578
Docket Number: No. 13-73185
Parties: Luis Mauricio Aguilar MEJIA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 671
Pages: 578–579

Head Matter:
Luis Mauricio Aguilar MEJIA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-73185
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 14, 2016
Filed December 19, 2016
Angela Y. Suh, Attorney, Law Office of Angela Y. Suh, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner
Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Luis Mauricio Aguilar Mejia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar Mejia's motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than six years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), he has not demonstrated that he warrants equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring due diligence for equitable tolling), and he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[E]ven if a change in personal circumstances is sufficient to file a successive asylum petition under [8 U.S.C.] § 1158(a)(2)(D), a change in country conditions must still be demonstrated if the accompanying motion to reopen is untimely.").
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Aguilar Mejia's remaining contentions.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.