Case Name: Ronald Dale MADSEN and Terrisa Ruth Madsen, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jason Madsen, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Shawn D. SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1998-05-13
Citations: 125 N.M. 475
Docket Number: No. 17211
Parties: Ronald Dale MADSEN and Terrisa Ruth Madsen, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jason Madsen, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Shawn D. SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: WECHSLER, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 475–488

Head Matter:
1998-NMCA-092
963 P.2d 552
Ronald Dale MADSEN and Terrisa Ruth Madsen, individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jason Madsen, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Shawn D. SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17211.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 13, 1998.
Certiorari Granted July 7, 1998.
Steven L. Tucker, Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Santa Fe, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Robin E. Sabin, Victoria Davis Armstrong, Atwood, Malone, Turner & Sabin, P.A., Roswell, for Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
PICKARD, Judge.
{1} This case requires us to consider under what circumstances a housesitting arrangement will create an employer-employee relationship such that a homeowner may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the housesitter. As a related issue, we consider whether an employee's failure to act can be an omission occurring within the scope of employment.
{2} Plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages for the injury and wrongful death of their son, Jason Madsen, as the result of a shooting at Shawn Scott's home. The trial court entered summary judgment on Scott's motion, finding that Scott's housesitting arrangement with two brothers did not create an agency relationship such that Scott could be held vicariously liable for their negligence. On appeal, Plaintiffs present two issues: (1) whether the housesitting arrangement in this case could create an employer-employee relationship; and (2) whether Scott's instruction to his housesitter not to let anyone touch his guns, and the housesitter's failure to carry out that instruction, could constitute negligence for failure to act. We answer both questions in the affirmative and reverse.
FACTS
{3} In January 1992, Shawn Scott (Homeowner) planned to take an out-of-town trip. Homeowner engaged Melvin Franklin (Melvin) to take care of his home. Homeowner and Melvin were good Mends and worked together at a doughnut shop. Prior to leaving on his trip, Homeowner took Melvin to his home and instructed him to stay at the house, water the plants, not to have any wild parties, and not to let anyone, other than Melvin, touch his guns. Both Homeowner and Melvin had an interest in guns. Homeowner collected guns as a hobby and would take them shooting. Melvin also owned guns and would use them for hunting and shooting. At the time Homeowner was out of town, he left behind five rifles in an unlocked gun case. On top of the gun case was a .22 pistol. However, the guns were unloaded and no ammunition was left in the house. Homeowner told Melvin that if he wanted to take the guns out shooting he would have to bring his own ammunition.
{4} A few days after Homeowner left, he called to check on his house. Melvin's deposition equivocated as to whether Homeowner asked Melvin if anyone was touching his guns. Melvin testified that Homeowner "may" have asked such a question. When asked, "What did [Homeowner] say," Melvin responded, "He just wanted to know if the guns — ." Melvin then rephrased the answer to, "he probably would have just asked" if anyone touched the guns. At the time of that conversation, Melvin asked Homeowner whether Melvin's brother Richard Franklin (Richard) could also stay at the house. Homeowner gave his permission for Richard to stay at his home. Homeowner knew Richard, as he worked at the doughnut shop with Homeowner and Melvin. Homeowner also knew that Richard had an interest in guns. Richard had previously sold a gun to Homeowner and on one occasion, Richard had taken a gun he had purchased to the doughnut shop to show Homeowner.
{5} On January 26,1992, while the brothers were staying at the house, they invited Jason Madsen (Jason) and two female Mends over to watch the Super Bowl. Prior to the party, Richard and Jason had gone shooting with Richard's gun. During the party, Richard and Jason continued to play with guns, and guns were at various locations in the living room. Richard left his .38 pistol on the TV, and Homeowner's Daisy Pistol was on the coffee table along with ammunition. Richard also took Homeowner's .22 from the gun rack in the living room.
{6} During the time that Richard and Jason were playing with the guns, Melvin was also in the living room. Richard was sitting on a sofa a few feet from where Melvin was lying with his head resting on the sofa, watching TV. During the Super Bowl game, Richard and Jason decided to play "quick draw." Jason had Homeowner's gun and Richard had his own gun. Jason told Richard that he wanted to draw first. Jason reached for his gun, and then Richard drew his gun and pulled the trigger, the gun fired, and Jason was shot and killed.
{7} Jason's parents brought this suit against Richard, who fired the fatal shot, and Homeowner. Melvin, the person responsible for housesitting, was not sued. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Richard was negligent and that Homeowner was also negligent for his acts and omissions, particularly in leaving the guns unsecured. Plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint stating that: (1) Richard and Melvin were the employees/agents of Homeowner, (2) Melvin was negligent in failing to control and supervise the use and misuse of Homeowner's weapons, and (3) Homeowner was vicariously liable for the negligence of Melvin and Richard. Homeowner answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment on the basis that under these circumstances, he owed no duty to Jason because he could not have reasonably anticipated the shooting. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and granted Homeowner's motion for summary judgment. In its ruling, the trial court stated that "a[] principal agent relationship did not exist between Shawn Scott and Melvin Franklin with respect to any of the circumstances contributing to the death of Jason Madsen."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{8} An award of summary judgment will be upheld if no genuine issues of material fact exist or the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 194, 870 P.2d 155, 156 (Ct.App.1994). We consider the facts relating to each of the issues raised on appeal in the light most "favorable to support a trial on the issues because the purpose of summary judgment is not to preclude a trial on the merits if a triable issue of fact exists." Ruiz v. Garcia, 115 N.M. 269, 271, 850 P.2d 972, 974 (1993). In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, "we take note of any evidence in the record which puts a material fact in issue." Gillin v. Carrows Restaurants, Inc., 118 N.M. 120, 122, 879 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1994).
DISCUSSION — RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
{9} The principal question before us is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment based upon its determination that Homeowner owed no duty to Jason because Homeowner did not have an employer-employee relationship with Melvin or Richard. Because the trial court determined that there was an absence of any relationship which would create a duty in Homeowner toward Jason, our first inquiry focuses upon the correctness of this conclusion.
{10} Homeowner contends that the housesitting arrangement with Melvin did not create an employer-employee relationship. Plaintiffs argue that an employer-employee relationship was created or, alternatively, that there are genuine material facts in dispute that would preclude summary judgment.
{11} If one or both of the brothers was an employee of Homeowner then, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, Homeowner may be held liable for the tortious acts of his employees which are done in the scope of their employment. See Reynolds v. Swigert, 102 N.M. 504, 507-08, 697 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Ct.App.1984); see also Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 254, 784 P.2d 992, 997 (1989) (respondeat superior applies "when the claim is based in tort and the plaintiff alleges the employer is liable for the conduct of an employee because the employee was acting within the scope of employment.")
A. Right of Control
{12} In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the employer must have someone perform work or a service and must have the "right to control the manner in which the details of the work are to be done, even though the right of control may not be exercised." UJI 13-403 NMRA 1998; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) (1958) ("A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."). The fact that an employee does not receive any wages is not controlling. See California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 70, 801 P.2d 646, 652 (1990) (an employer-employee relationship may be gratuitous); Restatement, supra § 225 cmt. a ("Consideration is not necessary to create the relation of . master and servant.").
{13} It is undisputed that Homeowner engaged Melvin to housesit. Homeowner asked Melvin to keep an eye on the house, to water the plants, and not to let anyone touch Homeowner's guns. Thus, Melvin was performing a service for Homeowner.
{14} However, the issue in contention is whether Homeowner had the right to control the manner in which the details of the work were to be performed. Homeowner contends that he did not have the right to control the manner in which the housesitting arrangement was carried out. Homeowner argues that the instructions he gave to Melvin to watch the house, to water the plants, and not to let anyone touch the guns were not specific or detailed enough to provide him with the right to control Melvin's performance of those duties. In support of his argument, Homeowner refers our attention to the Hawaii case of Lai v. St. Peter, 10 Haw.App. 298, 869 P.2d 1352 (1994).
{15} In La% the court considered whether a housesitting arrangement created an employer-employee relationship so as to hold the homeowner liable for the tortious acts of his housesitter. Id. 869 P.2d at 1357. The Lai court distinguished between the right to direct the manner in which the details of the work are to be performed and rules which govern the general conduct of a person while on the property of another. Id. at 1357-58. The court held that a list containing general information about the operation of the house and requests was not sufficient to provide the homeowner control over the housesitter and thus create an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 1358.
{16} Lai is distinguishable from the present case. Most importantly, the facts are very different. Lai involved an arrangement in which the housesitter flew to Hawaii, paying her own expenses, for a vacation. Id. at 1357. The homeowner was going to be out of town during that period and allowed the housesitter to stay in his home. Id. at 1356. Moreover, the list of directions that the homeowner left did not appear to require the housesitter to do anything affirmatively for the homeowner other than water the plants. Id. at 1358. Rather, the list contained information regarding the daily operation of the home and other general information such as phone numbers. Id. As to the homeowner's request that the housesitter not wear shoes in the house, lie on the couch with wet or sweaty bodies, or leave valuables in the ear, these requests were only to govern the conduct of the housesitter while she stayed in the home, were not related to any duty she was performing, and were not related to any negligence. Id.
{17} Additionally, Lai is also distinguishable because it appears to have been decided, in part, on the fact that the injury to the plaintiff caused by the housesitter occurred outside the "scope of employment." Id. The housesitter was driving the homeowner's ear for her own personal use and not for any purpose related to the housesitting arrangement. Id. For reasons to be explained below, a factual issue is raised in this case whether Melvin was acting within or outside the scope of his employment.
{18} Nonetheless, Homeowner contends that his case is similar to Lai in that his instruction to Melvin regarding the guns was only to govern Melvin's conduct. We disagree. In this case, the instruction to Melvin not to let anyone touch Homeowner's guns appears to be part of the duties Melvin was to perform and not an instruction to govern Melvin's conduct. This is so particularly when Homeowner's intent for giving this instruction was for the safekeeping of his guns — his "prized possessions." Moreover, a factfinder could find that when Homeowner called Melvin to check up on things, he inquired whether anyone had been touching his guns. Thus, considering the facts in the light most favorable to a trial on the merits, an issue of whether Melvin's duties included supervising the use or misuse of Homeowner's guns is raised.
{19} To be sure, Homeowner's instructions to Melvin concerning the housesitting arrangement were not very specific or detailed. However, we do not agree with Homeowner's argument that the specificity of the instructions given is the sole factor to be considered in determining whether an employer-employee relationship was created. Other factors must be considered in determining whether a housesitting arrangement created an employer-employee relationship. As Prosser explains:
The traditional definition of a servant is that he is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another, whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled, or is subject to a right of control, by the other.
This is, however, a great over-simplification of a complex matter. In determining the existence of "control" or the right to it, many factors are to be taken into account and balanced against one another — the extent to which, by agreement, the employer may determine the details of the work; the kind of occupation and the customs of the community as to whether the work usually is supervised by the employer; whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct business or occupation, and the skill required of him; who supplies the place and instrumentalities of the work; the length of time the employment is to last; the method of payment, and many others.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70 (5th ed.1984) (footnote omitted).
{20} Our case law recognizes a similar proposition. As the Court in McCauley v. Ray acknowledged:
"Although control or right to control the physical conduct of the person giving service is important and in many situations is determinative, the control or right to control needed to establish the relation of master and servant may be very attenuated. In some types of cases which involve persons customarily considered as servants, there may even be an understanding that the employer shall not exercise control. Thus, the full-time cook is regarded as a servant although it is understood that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking."
McCauley v. Ray, 80 N.M. 171, 180, 453 P.2d 192, 201 (1968) (quoting Restatement, supra § 220 cmt. (d)(1)).
{21} The customs related to the supervision of the type of work being performed must be considered. A housesitting arrangement assumes that the homeowner will be gone and will not be present to supervise the details of the arrangement. Moreover, the homeowner supplies the instrumentalities of the work — the home. This is the object of the relationship — to safekeep the home — and is also the place where the work is to be carried out. Additionally, as noted previously, whether compensation is paid is not determinative; an employer-employee relationship may still be found even where no compensation is paid. See California First Bank, 111 N.M. at 70, 801 P.2d at 652.
{22} Finally, our case law has previously recognized a situation where a housesitting arrangement created an employer-employee relationship. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M. 516, 519-20, 494 P.2d 178, 181-82 (Ct.App.1971). Homeowner attempts to distinguish this case by arguing that the homeowner in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. left very detailed instructions to the housesitter regarding a furnace. Id. at 519, 494 P.2d at 181. It was in failing to pay attention to those details that the injury in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. was precipitated. Homeowner's attempt to distinguish State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. is unpersuasive. Just as the injury in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. was precipitated by the housesitter's failure to follow the involved instructions regarding the furnace, the injury in this case may be viewed as precipitated by the housesitter's failure to follow the less involved, but nonetheless specific, instruction not to let anyone touch the guns. Thus, it may be said that a master-servant relationship exists with "respect to the very thing from which the injury arose," see Benham v. All Seasons Child Care, Inc., 101 N.M. 636, 638, 686 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App.1984), making this ease more like State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. and less like Lai.
{23} Further, as we have just discussed, many factors are to be taken into account in determining the right to control, not just the specificity of the instructions given to the purported employee. Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that Homeowner did not have a right to control Melvin.
B. Scope of Employment
{24} Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for an employee's negligent act only if the employee was acting within the scope of employment. See UJI 13-406 NMRA 1998; Richardson v. Glass, 114 N.M. 119, 122, 835 P.2d 835, 838 (1992); Benham, 101 N.M. at 638, 686 P.2d at 980. Therefore, assuming an employment relationship did exist in this case, the question now becomes whether the brothers were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident.
{25} Homeowner argues that the brothers were furthering their own interests and engaging in horseplay at the time of the accident. See UJI 13-407 NMRA 1998 (defining scope of employment); Rivera v. New Mexico Highway & Transp. Dep't, 115 N.M. 562, 564, 855 P.2d 136, 138 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that the general rule is that an employer is not responsible for an employee's acts of horseplay because such acts are for the employee's personal amusement and not in furtherance of the employer's interests); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 306, 742 P.2d 517, 518 (Ct.App.1987) (employee furthering his own interests is not acting within the scope of employment); Benham, 101 N.M. at 638, 686 P.2d at 980 (stating that for an employee's act to be within the scope of employment it must have been done with the intent to perform a service for the employer). Specifically, Homeowner contends that the brothers, by inviting guests over for a Super Bowl party, and by playing with a loaded gun brought onto the premises by Richard, had departed from their employment and Homeowner cannot be held liable for their actions. Accordingly, Homeowner argues, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Melvin or Richard were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident. See Rivera, 115 N.M. at 564, 855 P.2d at 138 (stating that "when no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that an employee is acting in the course and scope of employment, summary judgment is properly granted").
{26} Plaintiffs do not dispute that Richard may have been engaging in horseplay at the time of the accident. Rather, Plaintiffs focus upon the actions of Melvin. Plaintiffs contend that at the time of the accident, Melvin was not participating in any horseplay but instead simply neglected to perform the specific duties given to him by Homeowner not to have wild parties and not to let anyone touch his guns. Plaintiffs explain that an employee's failure to act, where the employer has a duty to the person injured, renders the omission one occurring within the scope of the employment. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides the rule in such cases.
§ 232. Failure to Act
The failure of a servant to act may be conduct within the scope of employment.
Comment:
a. Necessity of duty of action by servant. In order that the failure of a servant to act can constitute conduct within the scope of employment, for which the master is responsible, the servant must have duties to perform at the time and the master must owe to the person injured a duty that the servant should act.
Illustrations:
1. P employs A as a watchman from 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. to guard against fires and burglaries. During this period A discovers a fire on the premises which endangers the adjoining house of T, but neglectfully fails either to put it out or give the alarm. The fire spreads to T's house. A's conduct is within the scope of employment.
Restatement, supra § 232 cmt. a & illus. 1.
{27} The Restatement applies when the employer owes a duty to the injured person. Homeowner argues that he did not owe a duty to Jason. Homeowner contends that he did not know the brothers would invite underage guests to his house. This argument is unpersuasive. Homeowner expressly gave the brothers permission to invite guests over with one limitation — no wild parties. While the brothers invited only three guests and there were no drugs or alcohol, we do not believe it would be unreasonable for a factfinder to find that a party in which loaded guns are being casually played with is "wild."
{28} When an employee has the authority to invite a guest onto the employer's premises, then "a person so invited is a guest of the [employer]" and the employer owes a duty to the guest as an invitee. Restatement, supra § 242 cmt. b. The duty of a landowner to an invitee is a duty of ordinary care to keep the premises safe for the visitor. See Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 118 N.M. 134, 139, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (1994). Plaintiffs argue that Melvin failed to abide by the duty of ordinary care that he owed to Jason and Homeowner may be held vicariously liable for this failure. This situation is similar to Restatement, supra Section 232 Illustration 1 quoted above in which the employee, who had a duty to report the fire to the neighbor, failed to respond and this conduct was within the scope of employment. In this case, Melvin had a duty to prevent Richard and Jason from misusing the guns and his failure to do so, as in the example above, renders this an omission occurring within the scope of employment.
{29} Furthermore, the fact that Melvin was watching TV at the time and ignoring the conduct of his guests does not place his conduct outside the scope of his employment. As the Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 232 provides:
c. Where servant acts for his own purposes. Unless there is a non-delegable duty, the master is not responsible if the servant's failure to perform is due to the fact that at the time the servant has departed from his employment. See § 235. As in other situations, it is a question of degree whether or not the servant has departed from, the employment. The mere fact that at the time he is doing something for his own purposes so that he neglects to act for the master is not sufficient to prevent responsibility of the master for his failure to act.
Illustration:
5. P employs A to drive his team. A leaves the team, properly hitched, by the roadside while he enters a tavern for the forbidden purpose of obtaining a drink. While in the tavern, he sees that the horses have become unhitched and are about to run away. He refrains from acting in order to finish his drink. A's conduct is negligent and within the scope of employment.
Restatement, supra § 232 cmt. c & illus. 5 (emphasis added).
{30} Nonetheless, Homeowner attempts to distinguish this illustration by noting that the instrumentalities that would cause harm, the horses, were the very thing that the servant was responsible for. In this case, Homeowner argues, the injury did not arise from the use of his gun. Rather, the injury occurred because Richard brought his own gun and his own ammunition onto the premises and then played a game of quick draw with Jason.
{31} Homeowner further argues that there was nothing inherently unsafe about the premises. The guns which he left in Melvin's care were unloaded and there was no ammunition in the house. Homeowner contends that the presence of guns alone is not sufficient to make a landowner liable for an injury occurring on the premises absent some knowledge that a person is reckless in the handling of guns. See Lopez v. Chewiwie, 51 N.M. 421, 424, 186 P.2d 512, 513 (1947). Homeowner explains that he could not have anticipated that anything like this would happen.
{32} However, Homeowner's arguments raise more questions than they answer and illustrate why this case is an inappropriate one to dispose of by summary judgment. Many factual questions are raised by the circumstances of this case, chief among them what Homeowner and Melvin knew regarding Richard's conduct with guns. Both Melvin and Homeowner knew that Richard had a great interest in guns. As Melvin stated, "part of being Richard's friend is [going] shooting." Melvin also knew that guns and ammunition were lying around the house, but took no action because it is normal for the brothers to have guns lying about, and it is normal for ammunition to be out when Richard is doing his "tricks."
{33} Homeowner's position also raises questions about what Melvin knew or should have known in regard to his brother's conduct leading up to the shooting. Melvin knew there were guns in the house. Also, one of Homeowner's guns was on the coffee table in the living room where Melvin was watching TV. Another gun was on top of the television that Melvin was watching. Ammunition was on the coffee table close to where Melvin was lying. Richard and Jason were also in the same room as Melvin when they began to play quick draw. Melvin claims that he did not know that the brothers were playing quick draw. However, the testimony shows that at the time of the shooting, Melvin was lying against the same sofa that Richard was sitting on — only a few feet away from where the game of quick draw was being played with one of Homeowner's guns. A question is raised whether Melvin should have known of the game but did not stop it or did know yet continued to watch TV, both of which would be contrary to the explicit instructions and duties that he was given.
{34} There are also issues of material fact raised as to whether Homeowner could have foreseen that someone could be injured by a gun. Homeowner knew that both brothers liked guns. In fact, Richard had previously taken a gun over to the doughnut shop to show Homeowner. It is reasonable to infer that Homeowner knew or should have known that by giving permission for Richard to stay at the house, he might bring along some of his own guns, some of which might be loaded. Moreover, although Homeowner did not leave any ammunition in the house for his guns, he told Melvin he could bring his own ammunition if he wanted to take the guns out shooting. Thus, it is also reasonable to infer that Homeowner knew or should have known that there would be loaded weapons in his home.
{35} Homeowner also expressly gave the brothers permission to have guests at the house. It is reasonable to infer that Homeowner knew that the brothers would have guests in his home while the brothers also had their firearms with them. Yet, Homeowner did not prohibit the brothers from bringing their own guns; nor did he prohibit Melvin from handling guns in front of the guests. Finally, Melvin could be viewed as negligently performing his duties of having no wild parties when he allowed a game of quick draw to be played with loaded guns in his presence during a party. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to a trial on the merits, we hold that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in this case.
CONCLUSION
{36} Thus, because there are issues of material fact regarding whether an employer-employee relationship was created, whether Melvin was acting within the scope of his employment when he failed to act, and whether this type of accident was foreseeable by either Melvin or Homeowner, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WECHSLER, J., concurs.
ALARID, J., dissents.