Case Name: Davis et al., Appellees, v. Loopco Industries, Inc., Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1993-04-07
Citations: 66 Ohio St. 3d 64
Docket Number: No. 92-636
Parties: Davis et al., Appellees, v. Loopco Industries, Inc., Appellant.
Judges: Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 66
Pages: 64–68

Head Matter:
Davis et al., Appellees, v. Loopco Industries, Inc., Appellant.
[Cite as Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 64.]
(No. 92-636
Submitted January 19, 1993
Decided April 7, 1993.)
Ellis B. Brannon and Gary T. Mantkowski, for appellees.
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Phillip J. Campanella and Joseph A. Castro-dale, for appellant.

Opinion:
Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.
The certified question presented by the appellate court is whether Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 60, 30 OBR 165, 507 N.E.2d 331, adopted the traditional test or the expanded test to determine whether a successor corporation is a mere continuation of a predecessor corporation. We need not reach this issue, however, as we find the asset purchase agreement between the Old Loopco and New Loopco presents a genuine issue of material fact.
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. Because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, it must be awarded with caution. Doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359, 604 N.E.2d 138, 140. "If a contract is clear and unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter of law and there is no issue of fact to be determined. Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241 [7 O.O.3d 403, 374 N.E.2d 146]. However, if a term cannot be determined from the four corners of a contract, factual determination of intent or reasonableness may be necessary to supply the missing term." Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ohio, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 15 OBR 448, 449, 474 N.E.2d 271, 272-273.
The asset purchase agreement provides in part:
"1.6 Assumption of Liabilities. In connection with and in partial consideration for its acquisition of the Purchased Assets, Buyer shall assume as of the Effective Date (üi) certain product liability and warranty obligations, but only to the extent expressly provided in Section 4 hereof ."
"4.7 Product Liability. Buyer shall assume no obligation or liability for product liability claims relating to occurrences taking place before the close of business on the Effective Date; and Seller shall assume no obligation or liability with respect to product liability claims relating to occurrences taking place after the close of business on the Effective Date."
From the four corners of the purchase agreement, we cannot determine which party is responsible for product-liability claims occurring after the effective date of the asset purchase agreement. The contract is neither clear nor unambiguous. Viewing these provisions most strongly in Davis' favor, reasonable minds could conclude that New Loopco assumed liability after the effective date of the transfer. This presents a question of fact for the fact-finder. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.