Case Name: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE Company and Progressive Gulf Insurance Company, Appellants v. ALL CARE, INC. d/b/a Jackson Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2005-06-07
Citations: 914 So. 2d 214
Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-01197-COA
Parties: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE Company and Progressive Gulf Insurance Company, Appellants v. ALL CARE, INC. d/b/a Jackson Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Appellee.
Judges: . KING, C.J., LEE, P.J. AND MYERS, J., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J., AND GRIFFIS, J., JOINS AS TO ISSUES II AND III. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 914
Pages: 214–242

Head Matter:
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE Company and Progressive Gulf Insurance Company, Appellants v. ALL CARE, INC. d/b/a Jackson Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Appellee.
No. 2003-CA-01197-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 7, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 23, 2005.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 10, 2005.
W. Wayne Drinkwater, Margaret Oer-tling Cupples, attorneys for appellants.
William P. Featherston, Linley Jones, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
BRIDGES, P.J.,
for the Court.
BACKGROUND
¶ 1. A1 Care, Inc. (All Care) sued Progressive Gulf Insurance Company (Pro gressive) in Hinds County Circuit Court. All Care sought damages based on the assertion that Progressive engaged in tor-tious interference with All Care's business relations. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict for All Care and awarded $1,436,000 in actual business losses. Post trial, Progressive filed an unsuccessful motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Progressive appeals the circuit court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and asserts the following allegations of error, listed verbatim:
I. WHETHER ALL CARE FAILED TO PROVE THAT PROGRESSIVE DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH A MALICIOUS INTENT TO HARM ALL CARE'S BUSINESS, AND WITHOUT A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE OR JUSTIFIABLE CAUSES.
II. WHETHER ALL CARE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE PROGRESSIVE DEFENDANTS PROXIMATELY CAUSED QUANTIFIABLE DAMAGES TO ALL CARE.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DAMAGES TESTIMONY OF DR. STAN SMITH TO BE HEARD BY THE JURY.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. Between July of 1994 and August of 1997, All Care owned and operated a medical clinic in Jackson, Mississippi. All Care treated minor soft tissue injuries, exclusively. The majority of All Care's patients were client referrals from personal injury attorneys. Personal injury attorneys tended to refer their clients to All Care because All Care utilized a "lien billing system."
¶ 3. According to All Care's lien billing system, when a personal injury attorney referred a client to All Care, All Care would provide treatment to that client and would forego payment at that time. If a patient collected on his personal injury claim, All Care was paid from the proceeds. If a patient did not collect on his personal injury claim, the patient was held personally responsible for All Care's medical bills. At the end of 1995, All Care experienced a drop in the number of referrals. As a result, All Care's earnings dropped.
¶ 4. During All Care's existence, Progressive employed an insurance adjuster named Michael Muench. In his role as an adjuster, Muench frequently engaged in conflicts with various personal injury attorneys over the amount and propriety of All Care's medical fees. All Care believed that Muench targeted All Care and waged an inappropriate war of attrition against All Care's reputation and billing practices. All Care felt that Muench ultimately bullied numerous personal injury attorneys into sending their clientele to competing medical clinics. All Care eventually became increasingly unprofitable and blamed Muench and Progressive for its decline in earnings. Accordingly, All Care filed suit against Progressive, from which the present action arises.
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER ALL CARE FAILED TO PROVE THAT PROGRESSIVE DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH A MALICIOUS INTENT TO HARM ALL CARE'S BUSINESS, AND WITHOUT A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE OR JUSTIFIABLE CAUSES.
¶ 5. Broadly speaking, Progressive asserts that All Care failed to prove the prima facie elements of a claim of tortious interference with business relations. Tortious interference with a business relationship occurs when "a wrongdoer unlawfully diverts'prospective customers away from one's business, thereby encouraging customers to trade with another." Cenac v. Murry, 609 So.2d 1257, 1268 (Miss.1992) (internal quotations omitted). To prove a prima facie claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the acts were intentional and willful;
(2) the acts were calculated to cause damage to a plaintiff in its lawful business;
(3) the acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice); and
(4) actual damage and loss resulted.
MBF Corp. v. Century Bus. Communications, Inc., 663 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1995).
¶ 6. In this issue, Progressive asserts that All Care failed to prove that Progressive's actions were calculated to cause All Care to suffer damage and loss. Additionally, Progressive asserts that All Care failed to prove that Muench's actions were without right or justifiable cause. If Progressive is correct in either assertion, this Court must reverse and render judgment for Progressive. Conveniently, we can address both contentions in a single analysis.
¶ 7. Progressive maintains that the jury could not have found malicious intent due to Muench's criticisms of All Care's business practices. Further, Progressive asserts that Muench had a justifiable interest in and reason for scrutinizing All Care's billing and treatment practices. Truly, conduct related to a legitimate, employment-related objective constitutes justifiable acts, which cannot "give rise to an inference of malice." Hopewell Enter., Inc. v. Trustmark, 680 So.2d 812, 818-19 (Miss.1996). Accordingly, tortious interference requires "intermeddling . without sufficient reason." Morrison v. Mississippi Enter. for Tech., Inc., 798 So.2d 567(¶ 28) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Progressive claims Muench was fully justified in his comments to personal injury attorneys. According to Progressive, since Mueneh's comments were justified, Progressive is immune from liability.
¶ 8. Progressive argues that All Care did not present any evidence from which a jury could find that Muench acted in a malicious manner. That is, Progressive argues that Muench's job as an insurance adjuster was to scrutinize All Care's bills for errors and to challenge those errors. Progressive points to testimony from All Care's witnesses that, of the twenty-four All Care claims Muench was associated with, he never failed to settle a single claim for a fair value. Progressive asserts that Muench's actions may have inconvenienced All Care, or cost All Care money, but that does not make Muench's actions unlawful. Hall v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 727 So.2d 776(¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.1999); Vestal v. Oden, 500 So.2d 954, 956-57 (Miss.1986).
¶ 9. Muench, an insurance adjuster, no doubt had a justifiable reason for negotiating with personal injury attorneys over All Care's fees. Muench's employer, Progressive, had an obvious reason to encourage Muench to seek lower fees. It requires no speculation to recognize that Progressive would prefer to retain money, rather than pay it to All Care. Progressive would cease to operate if it did not scrutinize claims. However, it is not Muench's scrutiny of treatment fees that is problematic.
¶ 10. The evidence showed Muench made comments well beyond his role as an insurance adjuster. Muench alleged that All Care was under investigation by the state attorney general. All Care was not under investigation by the state attorney general. Muench commented that All Care was under investigation by the state medical licensure board. All Care was not under investigation by the state medical licensure board. Muench told an attorney that All Care illegally practiced physical therapy. All Care did not practice physical therapy at all. Muench mailed an attorney a letter indicating that All Care was unlawfully billing for physical therapy. All Care did not bill for physical therapy. Muench told an attorney that All Care employed physicians that were unqualified to practice medicine. The physicians that All Care employed were all licensed to practice medicine. What was Muench's purpose in advancing these repetitive misstatements? How did Muench advance his employer's interest in stating his unfounded allegations? How did Muench justify his actions in light of his role as an insurance adjuster? Would an allegation that All Care employed unqualified physicians somehow lead to a decreased fee for All Care's services?
¶ 11. The standard attached to Progressive's assertion requires this Court to accept that evidence as true where that evidence supports the verdict. Herrington v. Spell, 692 So.2d 93, 103 (Miss.1997). The verdict suggests that Muench had no justifiable employment-related purpose in communicating allegations that did not serve any purpose connected to his role as an insurance adjuster. Muench could only arrive at his conclusions through some misunderstanding or an unfounded interpretation, as all of the relevant statements were false. It is not beyond the realm of possibility to conclude that Muench completely fabricated his allegations and lied to the attorneys he dealt with. It is clear that the jury could have concluded that Muench's comments were intended to cause All Care to suffer loss. It is equally clear that the jury could have determined that Muench did not have justifiable or legitimate cause to communicate numerous unfounded allegations, completely unrelated to his duties as an insurance adjuster. Because Muench communicated falsehoods to the largest group of All Care's clientele, which caused those clients to take their business elsewhere, the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict suggests that the circuit court's decision on this issue is correct. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
II. WHETHER ALL CARE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE PROGRESSIVE DEFENDANTS PROXIMATELY CAUSED QUANTIFIABLE DAMAGES TO ALL CARE.
¶ 12. Similar to the first issue, Progressive asserts that All Care failed to prove the prima facie elements of a claim of tortious interference with business relations. In this issue, Progressive asserts that All Care failed to prove Muench's actions caused All Care to suffer quantifiable damages. Furthermore, Progressive asserts that even if damages could be inferred from the testimony at trial, there was no "hard" evidence from which the jury could determine the amount of damages incurred. In other words, Progressive argues that the jury's finding of damages is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. When faced with such an assertion, this Court must accept as true that evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135(¶ 16) (Miss.2002) (citations omitted). Only when the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb the verdict on appeal. Id.
¶ 13. In order to prove a prima facie case of damages, "the plaintiff must show (1) a loss, and (2) that the defendant's conduct caused the loss." MBF, 663 So.2d at 598 (quoting Cenac, 609 So.2d at 1271). A party will not be able to escape liability because of a lack of a perfect measure for damages. MBF, 663 So.2d at 599. Rather, sufficient proof is that which is a reasonable basis for computation of damages and the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances of the case that will enable the trier of fact to arrive at a fair approximate estimate of the loss. Id.
¶ 14. Regarding Progressive's contention that All Care did not present "hard evidence" to show Muench was responsible for the failure of All Care's entire business, in Cenac, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered a similar contention. Cenac, 609 So.2d at 1257. The Cenac court concluded that the plaintiff therein failed to demonstrate "hard" proof that the defendant therein caused the plaintiffs. business to suffer financial ruin. Id. at 1272. The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff in Cenac only presented one witness who testified that he stopped frequenting the subject business because of the defendant. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff in Cenac attempted to put forth evidence that demonstrated a list of customers who stopped patronizing the subject business due to the defendant's acts. Id. That evidence was never admitted, so the jury could not consider' it. Id. However, the Cenac court recommended the means to arrive at "hard" proof of damages. That court suggested that "hard" proof of damages could be accomplished by illustrating and comparing the volume of business and profits before and after the alleged malicious acts. Id. So, the question is whether All Care submitted hard proof of damages by illustrating and comparing the volume of All Care's business and profits before and after Muench's acts.
¶ 15. In the case at bar, All Care presented documentary evidence that the number of its clients dropped significantly after the fourth quarter of 1995. All Care also demonstrated that the amount of charges that All Care billed to patients decreased. Consequently, All Care's profitability dropped. All Care submitted quarterly billing summaries, payment summaries, and referral summaries in its effort to prove damages. The billing and payment summaries showed a decrease in All Care's patient inventory and receivables between 1995 and 1997. Accordingly, All Care succeeded in demonstrating "hard" proof of damages, as discussed in Cenac.
¶ 16. "Hard" proof of damages notwithstanding, All Care directs this Court's attention to Fred's Stores of Mississippi, Inc. v. M & H Drugs, Inc., 725 So.2d 902(¶36) (Miss.1998) to suggest that the financial statements in evidence at trial, along with the testimony at trial suffices as an adequate demonstration of causation and damages. In Fred's Stores, a former employee of Super D pharmacy took a list of pharmacy customers and their spending histories when the employee took a position at a pharmacy in Fred's. Id at (¶ 2). That employee sent targeted mailings to Super D's customers in an effort to induce Super D's customer to switch to Fred's. Id. At trial, Super D submitted a list of one hundred-fifty customers who switched from Super D to Fred's, as well as a tabulation of how much money those customers spent at Fred's. Id. at (¶ 37). On appeal, Fred's argued that customers on the list should have testified that they chose to shop at Fred's instead of Super D because of the letters sent by the former employee. Id. at (¶ 34). Fred's argued that the customers' failure to testify as such amounted to insufficient proof of proximate cause. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that no testimony from the past customers was required, as the customer list in evidence consisted of "hard proof' of the business's financial losses. Id. at (¶ 37).
¶ 17. In Fred's Stores, the customer list illustrated which customers ceased to use Super D in favor of Fred's, and the exact amount of business lost from each customer, thus sufficing as "hard proof' in the eyes of the Court. Id. Here, All Care submitted exhibits that indicated that the number of clients visiting All Care decreased significantly after the fourth quarter of 1995. Those exhibits also indicated that the amount All Care billed, and ultimately All Care's profitability dropped in direct relation to the decrease in clients over that time period. Clearly, All Care demonstrated loss of income. The jury had evidence to compare the volume of business and profits before and after Muench's acts, which was sufficient to show malicious intent.
¶ 18. As mentioned, in order to prove a prima facie case of damages, "the plaintiff must show (1) a loss, and (2) that the defendant's conduct caused the loss." MBF, 663 So.2d at 599 (quoting Cenac, 609 So.2d at 1271). This Court has resolved the first "prong" of MBF. We now turn our attention to the second "prong" and resolve whether All Care presented evidence that Muench was the cause of those losses.
¶ 19. Progressive claims that All Care did not present evidence that tended to link the effects of Muench's conduct to any quantifiable part of the decline in All Care's business. Progressive asserts that there was no evidence from which a jury could find that All Care lost any particular number of patients, or any amount of income, as a result of Muench's dealings with the attorneys All Care presented. Further, Progressive argues that the testimony of All Care's witnesses was insufficient to establish a "fair and approximate loss" as required by MBF. MBF, 663 So.2d at 599. Finally, Progressive suggests that a survey of the two hundred attorneys who referred clients to All Care would have been the best method to establish how many attorneys were dissuaded from dealing with All Care due to Muench's actions, as well as to what extent attorneys were dissuaded from dealing with All Care.
¶ 20. Interpreting the evidence at trial, one could argue that the evidence does not show that Muench was the sole cause of All Care's losses. Just as in MBF, numerous other factors could have played various roles in All Care's demise. Regarding Muench's impact, of the thousands of claims that passed through All Care, Progressive handled fewer than two dozen claims. Regarding other possible factors, shortly after All Care arrived on the Jackson medical market, numerous competitors quickly followed suit. All Care was a subsidiary of Neuro-Diagnostics Associates, Inc. (NDA). Other NDA clinics went out of business. In fact, NDA had fifteen to twenty clinics operating in 1998. By January of 2003, only nine of those clinics remained in operation.
¶ 21. While numerous factors may have played various roles in All Care's demise, it requires no assumption to recognize that the evidence showed All Care's clientele was almost entirely patient referrals from personal injury attorneys. Evidence also showed that attorneys decided to stop sending clients to All Care because of Muench's actions, particularly Muench's comments that All Care was under investigation by the state attorney general and the medical licensure board. Evidence also showed that Muench told an attorney that All Care was illegally practicing physical therapy and mailed a letter to another attorney and claimed that All Care was unlawfully billing for physical therapy, when All Care did not. Finally, evidence demonstrated that Muench told an attorney that All Care did not employ physicians that were qualified to practice medicine. None of these allegations were true and Muench, at best, could only reach those conclusions through misguided and unfounded interpretations. At worst, Muench fabricated them.
¶ 22. Thus, the evidence could lead a hypothetical jury to conclude that Muench's actions caused harm to All Care. But does that mean that the evidence was sufficiently presented to allow the jury to create a fair and approximate calculation of damages? Some could conclude that a survey of those attorneys who referred clients to All Care would have amounted to sufficient proof of quantifiable damages. One possible interpretation of the evidence is that All Care's proof of damages is not a sufficiently specific measure of damages to carry a claim of tortious interference with business relations.
¶ 23. However, All Care presented evidence that their largest referral source, Don Evans, made his decision to stop sending clients to All Care largely due to Muench's actions and disclosures. Andy Stewart testified that he referred his clientele elsewhere due to many factors, but mainly because (1) he had such a difficult time settling cases with Muench and (2) Muench made such derogatory statements about All Care. Marc Pearson called Muench's criticisms and tactics "highly unusual" and testified that he stopped sending his clients to All Care because he "just didn't want the hassle." Accordingly, the record reflects that Muench caused All Care's largest source of referrals, among others, to cease doing business with All Care.
¶ 24. More problematic, any attempt to quantify All Care's losses, given the circumstances, can only be accomplished based on a fair degree of speculation. There is no gauge by which we or the jury can attempt to calculate any reasonably exact amount of loss that resulted from the attorneys' decisions to direct clients to other medical providers. Each attorney referral that would direct a client to All Care would be based upon different facts or circumstances that led the client to seek legal assistance. Consequently, each injury would be specifically varied from the next, requiring varied treatment and a similarly varied fee. Each case would require individual treatment without uniform costs. Accordingly, no singular estimate could serve as a "basic charge" or standard fee. As a result, the jury could only act fairly by calculating an approximate amount of damages. As stated above, a party will not escape liability for lack of a perfect measure of damages. MBF, 663 So.2d at 599. Causation must be as specific and certain as the nature of the particular case may permit. Freeman v. Huseman Oil Int'l, Inc., 717 So.2d 742(¶ 13) (Miss.1998). However, "the right to recover is not precluded by uncertainty regarding the exact amount of damages." Fred's Stores, 725 So.2d at (¶ 44). "The evidence need only lay a foundation upon which the trier of fact can form a fair and reasonable amount of . damages." Id. (quoting Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 72 F.3d 454, 462 (5th Cir.1995)).
¶ 25. One important consideration is whether All Care presented evidence that Muench's claims spread among the legal community. While Evans only testified that he thought he discussed his problems with All Care with other attorneys, one could conclude that, based on the notion that Evans did not testify as to whom he talked to, did not identify how many lawyers he talked to and only thought he may have talked to other attorneys, then All Care did not present sufficient evidence of decline in referrals due to Muench. However, if Progressive wanted to demonstrate any flaws in Evans' testimony, Progressive was free to do so on cross-examination.
¶26. The weight of Evans' testimony was a jury consideration, one that the jury certainly exercised. Moreover, whether Evans' comments spread among the legal community, as a whole, is irrelevant. The proper consideration would be whether Evans' comments spread among that group of lawyers who would need to refer clients to lien billing medical providers: attorneys who operate on a contingency fee basis on behalf of clients that lack the ability to pay for services until after resolution of their claims. Regardless, Evans responded affirmatively, albeit without conviction. Certainly Evans did not respond that he did not speak about All Care with his colleagues.
¶ 27. No precedent indicates that calculating damages depends on perfect calculation, prediction, exactness, or precognitive skill. Rather, the calculations should be exact as possible. E.g., Freeman, 717 So.2d at (¶ 13). Perfection is not the intended line of demarcation. There is no perfect trial. Our system of justice is the best system that imperfect humans have developed. Called upon to resolve disputes, we use the jury system to allow citizenry to allocate justice as the law permits. Here, the jury determined that All Care proved sufficiently quantifiable damages. While it is not impossible that a jury could err, in this case, the jury had enough evidence to quantify damages. Our standard of review mandates affirming such findings. Wal-Mart Stores, 818 So.2d at (¶ 16). By the nature of this case, any attempt to quantify an exact measure of loss would have to be speculative inasmuch as the claims and clients are speculative. How could All Care possibly predict what injuries would "come through the door?" How could All Care predict treatment for those speculative injuries?
¶ 28. While the testimony did not indicate that Muench caused all of All Care's business failure, there was evidence that indicated Muench caused All Care to suffer damages, albeit the evidence did not demonstrate to what degree Muench caused All Care's demise and the amount was not necessarily exact. Still, the evidence was sufficiently presented to allow a fair and approximate calculation of damages.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DAMAGES TESTIMONY OF DR. STAN SMITH TO BE HEARD BY THE JURY.
¶29. The substance of this issue involves expert testimony by Dr. Stan Smith. All Care presented Dr. Smith's testimony on the element of damages. Dr. Smith testified that All Care suffered a precise amount of loss, beginning in 1997. Dr. Smith predicted that over a thirty year period, All Care's future lost income would total $16,430,932, though the jury did not return a corresponding damages award.
¶ 30. In this final issue, Progressive asserts that the circuit court's decision to allow Dr. Smith's testimony constitutes reversible error. Progressive further asserts that Dr. Smith's testimony (1) failed to connect All Care's losses to Muench, (2) was based on speculation, (3) was based on demonstratively false assumptions, and (4) bore no relation to the evidence. Progressive concludes that the circuit court's decision to allow Dr. Smith's testimony resulted in violations of Rules 402, 403, 702, and/or 703 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Admission of expert testimony is within the trial judge's discretion. Mississippi Transp. Com'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31(¶ 4) (Miss.2003). We are mindful that, on appeal, the decision of a trial judge regarding the admission or suppression of evidence will stand "unless we conclude that the decision was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion." Id.
¶ 31. Dr. Smith testified as an expert. At the time of trial, the standard in Mississippi for the admission of expert witness testimony was the "general acceptance" test. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). Expert testimony should be admitted only after a two-pronged inquiry. M.R.E. 702. First, the witness must be qualified as an expert because of the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education he or she possesses. Id.; see also, Watkins v. U-Haul Int'l Inc., 770 So.2d 970(¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2000). Second, the witness's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact. Watkins, 770 So.2d at (¶ 10). In order to meet this second prong, the expert's methodology must have been "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." Comment to M.R.E. 702 (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
¶ 32. Progressive argues that Dr. Smith failed the first and second prongs of the M.R.E. 702 inquiry. Progressive asserts that Dr. Smith is an expert in hedonic damages, while this case requires a calculation of lost future net profits for a commercial enterprise. While it is true that Dr. Smith has qualified as an expert in over one hundred cases regarding hedonic damages, and has written a text on the subject, Dr. Smith's "primary" area of expertise, so to speak, is irrelevant to this issue. The relevant inquiry is whether Dr. Smith's testimony is admissible under Frye and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
¶ 33. "[A] theory or method is not generally accepted when it is unique to a particular situation, not taught or discussed in courses or textbooks, 'breaks new ground,' and is not used by other practitioners in that particular field." McLemore, 863 So.2d at (¶ 40). While Progressive does not assert that computation of lost future business profits is unique or groundbreaking, Progressive does challenge Dr. Smith's methodology on numerous grounds. Progressive notes that Dr. Smith admitted that he had no idea why All Care's business declined, and offered no opinion that the decline was caused by Progressive. All Care responds that Dr. Smith's role was to establish damages stemming from Muench's actions, rather than to establish causation of All Care's decline. Just because Dr. Smith did not establish causation does not make his testimony inadmissible. Dr. Smith testified as an expert witness to establish damages, not causation.
¶ 34. Progressive also claims that Dr. Smith's methodology was unhelpful to the jury because Dr. Smith undertook no research to determine the number of medical clinics that the Jackson market could support, or how many years such a clinic could operate. Further, Progressive asserts that Dr. Smith was excessively lib eral in calculating All Care's lost profits because Dr. Smith failed to consider mitigating circumstances in arriving at his damages figure. In essence, Progressive argues that Dr. Smith should have been required to discount those losses that All Care suffered due to other factors that affected All Care's business failure.
¶ 35. While it is proper to set off losses caused by other factors, it is Progressive's duty to present such evidence, either through cross-examination or independent testimony and documentary evidence. Accordingly, the jury, as finders of fact, bears the responsibility for calculating damages. Moreover, the jury did not grant the damages figure that Dr. Smith derived. Rather, the jury granted significantly reduced damages. It is not outside the realm of possibility to view the jury's findings as their decision to weigh other factors affecting the business's failure against Muench's liability.
¶ 36. Progressive also argues that Dr. Smith's testimony was not relevant and helpful to the jury because Dr. Smith erred in considering All Care's weekly patient capacity and operating expenses. In finding fault with Dr. Smith's stated weekly patient capacity, Progressive argues that no testimony in the record showed that All Care actually treated 275 patients in a given week. However, All Care did present evidence that indicated that it operated at that capacity, if only briefly. The jury also had an opportunity to scrutinize that testimony against documentary evidence that demonstrated the number of patients that All Care actually treated.
¶ 37. Regarding the contention that material facts must be sufficient in scope for the witness to form a rational opinion, the documentary evidence, combined with Dr. Smith's testimony, was sufficient for the witness to formulate a rational opinion, especially in light of the jury's amended damages figure.
¶ 38. A trial judge abuses his discretion when he allows an expert to testify while relying on data that was not reasonably accurate. APAC-Mississippi Inc. v. Goodman, 803 So.2d 1177(¶ 30) (Miss.2002). However, the supreme court qualified that proposition by defining why such data is not reasonably accurate: it was provided by the plaintiffs counsel's estimates and not reflected on the plaintiffs records. Id. Here, the data was not entirely provided by plaintiffs counsel but was reflected in the plaintiffs records as well.
¶ 39. Finally, Progressive asserts that Dr. Smith's testimony was inadmissible under M.R.E. 403. Rule 403 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states that evidence, though relevant, "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." M.R.E. 403. There can be no doubt that Dr. Smith's testimony was prejudicial to Progressive. It would defy logic if All Care attempted to use an expert to demonstrate damages if that expert's testimony did not prejudice Progressive in some way. Still, that prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of Dr. Smith's testimony.
¶ 40. Progressive takes issue with Dr. Smith's assumptions and facts and the way they affected his testimony. In reaching the conclusion that Dr. Smith's testimony did not assist the trier of fact, Progressive argues that a court must be wary because expert testimony based on speculative information may- convey an impression of exactness where a jury's common sense is less available than usual to protect it. Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 145 (4th Cir.1994). Progressive argues that the trial judge abdi cated his role as a gatekeeper because a party may not assume facts not in evidence or unsupported by the evidence or omit material undisputed facts as a basis for arriving at an expert opinion. Magnolia Hosp. v. Moore, 320 So.2d 793, 799 (Miss.1975). As discussed above, Dr. Smith could not provide an exact, unequivocally quantifiable amount of damages because All Care's fees would vary according to a patient's necessary treatments. Moreover, if Progressive would have presented contradictory or impeachment evidence, through Dr. Smith or its own expert, any inconsistencies would have come to light. At any rate, the jury applied their judgment and adjusted the damages to conform to the amount they deemed appropriate.
¶ 41. Progressive points out that All Care sought to prove Mueneh was the sole cause of their damages. It requires no assumption to conclude that even if the jury failed to find that Mueneh was the sole cause of All Care's loss, the jury could still find that Mueneh was at least a cause or even a significant cause of All Care's demise. Regardless, there was sufficient evidence to lead the jury to its conclusion. Especially when, based on the nature of the case, it seems impossible to arrive at an ascertainable level of approximate damages. Further, it is not "certain" that the jury afforded Dr. Smith's testimony undue weight, nor was the trial judge's decision clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion.
¶ 42. Dr. Smith's testimony was the only specific damages testimony. If Progressive had an expert that could contradict Dr. Smith's valuation, it should have presented that witness. Progressive was free to cross-examine Smith and impeach his testimony. This Court should hesitate to create precedent that allows for reversible error where one side disagrees with the other side's methodology in calculating damages. Rather, it is an attorney's duty to impeach an adversarial damages witness, or cast doubt on his testimony with one's own expert, rather than claim "the jury got it wrong" in an appeal. Suffice it to say, we affirm the trial judge's decision to admit Dr. Smith's testimony.
¶ 43. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
. KING, C.J., LEE, P.J. AND MYERS, J., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J., AND GRIFFIS, J., JOINS AS TO ISSUES II AND III. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Since that time, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the rule as stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and as modified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). McLemore, 863 So.2d at 34. Since the Frye "general acceptance" test was the controlling law at the time of trial, an examination of Daubert is unnecessary.