Case Name: R. H. BOWMAN, Respondent, v. ARITON RETELIEUK, John E. Burke, et al., Appellants
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1918-05-03
Citations: 40 N.D. 134
Docket Number: 
Parties: R. H. BOWMAN, Respondent, v. ARITON RETELIEUK, John E. Burke, et al., Appellants.
Judges: Bruce, Ch. J., concurring.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 134–141

Head Matter:
R. H. BOWMAN, Respondent, v. ARITON RETELIEUK, John E. Burke, et al., Appellants.
(168 N. W. 576.)
Mortgage liens — action to cancel — mortgage barred by limitation — mortgage not paid — equity — action does not appeal to —- will not lie.
The purpose of this action is to cancel mortgage liens on the ground that the mortgages have not been paid and that they are outlawed. Such an action does not appeal to equity, and this court has several times held -that it does not lie.
Opinion filed May 3, 1918.
On petition for rehearing July 9, 1918.
Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, Honorable K. E. Leighton, Judge.
Defendants appeal.
Judgment reversed.
E. T. Burke, for appellants.
The pendency of the first action between these same parties and involving the same subject-matter is a complete bar to this present action, so far as appellants are concerned. The issues made by our answer there were the same as here. Comp. Laws 1913, § 7446, cases cited.
Foreclosure is not a proceeding in rem, but is an action in personam, and the Statute of Limitations may be waived. Colonial & U. S. Mtg. Co. v. N. W. Thresher Co. 14 N. D. 147, 70 L.R.A. 814, 116 Am. St. Rep. 642, 8 Ann. Cas. 1160; Bacon v. Mitchell, 14 N. D. 454, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 244; Boucofski v. Jacobson, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898; O’Toole v. Omlie, 16 N. D. 126; Adams v. Dickson, 66 Am. Dec. 608.
The plaintiff is in no position to plead the Statute of Limitations. He is in no better position than the mortgagor. He bought what title he has at sheriff’s sale. Board Church Fund v. Seattle Church, 19 Wash. 455, 53 Pac. 671.
The Statute of Limitations is tolled; the issues are still pending in another and prior action. But, equity and good conscience require that the mortgage debt be paid as a condition to its cancelation. Board Church Fund v. Seattle Church, 19 Wash. 455, 53 Pac. 671.
“'He who seeks equity must do equity.” .
If he wishes the mortgage canceled he must pay the debt secured. Tracy v. Wheeler, 15 N."p. 248, 107 N. W. 68. -•.......~ ' -
McGee & Goss, for respondent.
The object and purpose of our amended statute upon the subject of defenses, in actions to quiet title, was to correct or change the rule applying to pleading by way of reply. Scott v. District Court, 15 N. D. 259; Sess. Laws 1909, chap. 3; Comp. Laws 1913, § 8152; Rev. Codes .1905, § 7527.
Outlawed encumbrances and bankruptcy discharge may now be pleaded by way of reply, and such defenses are available to a mortgagor or to one claiming title to the mortgaged premises under and in privity with the original mortgagor. Rev. Codes 1913, § 7358; Rev. Codes 1913, § 8152.
The mortgage here in question was outlawed at the commencement of this action. The statute has conclusively ran against it. Colonial Mtg. Co. v. N. W. Thresher Co. 14 N. D. 147; Paine v. Dodds, 11 N. D. 189.
The mortgagor merely gave the mortgagee a remedy for the collection of the debt from the land, by an action to be brought against whomsoever might be the owner when the remedy became available. Colonial Co. v. Flemmington, 14 N. D. 181; Paine v. Dodds, 14 N. D. 189, 197; Mtg. Co. v. N. W. Thresher Co. 14 N. D. 147.
“The commencement of an action will not stop the running of the Statute of Limitations against a suit founded on a different cause of action.” 25 Cyc. 1290; Lang v. Chocteau R. Co. 117 C. C. A. 146.
“Where the Statute of Limitations had run at the time the claim for a lien was made, the equitable claim of a lien became a new and distinct cause of action.” U. P. E. Co. v. Nyler, 158 U. S. 285, 39 L. ed. 983, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 877 ; Whalen v. Gordan, 37 C. C. A. 70, 95 Fed. 305.
“A suit to establish a personal judgment as an equitable lien, but in a separate and distinct cause of action does not relate back to the commencement of the original action and is subject to the defense of limitations.” 17 R. C. L. 227, 228, 872; Simpson v. Mercantile Co. L.R.A. 191533, 1221; Hunter v. Ins. Co. 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1187.
“An injunction against the commencement of an action does not save the running of the Statute of Limitations unless, the statute so provides.” Osbom v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1, 46 L.E.A. 755, 81 N. W. 72; Barclay v. Blaekington, 127 Cal. 189, 59 Pac. 834; Lagerman v. Casserly, 23 L.B.A.(N.S.) 672 and note (Minn.) 120 N. W. 1086.
The mere pendency of an action between the same parties does not stay the Statute of Limitations from running.
“The defense of the bar of the Statute of Limitations applies strictly to the particular action to which it is pleaded, and hence if that suit be not brought within the statutory period the bar of the statute cannot be avoided by showing that another action has been brought by plaintiff against defendant on some cause of action within the period limited by the statute.” 25 Cyc. 1290; 117 C. C. A. 146, 153.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
This action is for the cancelation of a mortgage lien. Both parties claim under a common grantor. The complaint is in effect that in 1904 Betelieuk made two mortgages, which have been assigned to Burke, and they have not been paid, and under a subsequent mortgage and the foreclosure of the same the plaintiff has become the owner of the title to the land in question. The plaintiff says to Burke: "My grantor gave you two prior mortgages which have not been paid though more than ten years have elapsed since such mortgages became due. Therefore I demand that your mortgages he canceled, with costs."
Now, the plaintiff stands in the place of his mortgagor and for him says in effect: "It is more than ten years since I gave you those two prior mortgages, and I have failed to pay either principal or interest. Therefore I demand that the mortgages be canceled, with costs, and the court gave judgment that the mortgages be canceled, with $51.40 costs.
It seems quite ridiculous for a party to base a cause of action on an averment that he gave a mortgage and never paid it, and it is clearly contrary to the well-considered decisions of this court. Tracy v. Wheeler, 15 N. D. 248, 250, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 516, 107 N. W. 68.
But it is claimed that the law has been changed by chapter 3, Laws of 1909, which purposed to amend a section of chapter 5, Laws of 1901, in regard to a reply. It reads: "No reply shall be necessary on the part of the plaintiff except when the defendant in his answer claims a lien or encumbrance upon the property which prior to the commencement of the action was barred by the Statutes of Limitation or which shall have been discharged in bankruptcy. . . . The plaintiff may reply, setting up such defense and avail himself of the benefit thereof." Now if it was the purpose of the statute to change the substantive law under the guise of changing the form of pleading, then it is not an amendment and the purpose of the act is not expressed by its title. The title of chapter 3, Laws of 1909, relates merely to a matter of pleading, — a reply, — and not to any substantive act. If the purpose of this act was to give a party a right to maintain an action to cancel an outlawed mortgage, then that purpose should have been expressed in its title. Doubtless it is competent for a party to show by his pleadings that he gave a mortgage and disregarded his obligations for ten years and "to avail himself of the benefit thereof." But, as this court has held, such benefits amount to nothing and give no cause of action. It is vain for a party to plead the default of himself or' his grantor as a cause of action or of benefits. The law does not offer a reward for the violation of contract.
Judgment reversed.