Case Name: George J. O'SULLIVAN, Appellant, v. Arma G. HICKS, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1963-01-24
Citations: 313 F.2d 900
Docket Number: No. 16949
Parties: George J. O’SULLIVAN, Appellant, v. Arma G. HICKS, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 313
Pages: 900–906

Head Matter:
George J. O’SULLIVAN, Appellant, v. Arma G. HICKS, Appellee.
No. 16949.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 31, 1962.
Decided Jan. 24, 1963.
Charles B. Sullivan, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Paul J. Sedgwick, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before Wilbur K. Miller, Bastian and Burger, Cirucit Judges.

Opinion:
BASTIAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court, sitting as a Probate Court, vacating the appointment of an administrator.
The appointment had been made on the petition of one George J. O'Sullivan [appellant] for letters of administration on the estate of James L. Hicks, deceased. The petition averred that said Hicks died on June 3, 1960, at Andrews Air Force Base, in Maryland, while a resident of the District of Columbia. It further averred that petitioner had made search and inquiry for a will of the decedent and had neither found one nor obtained information that there was one; that decedent left surviving him his widow and, to petitioner's knowledge, no other persons; that decedent had an interest in a policy of insurance on his automobile, which had been involved in an accident in which petitioner was injured; and that, as principal creditor, petitioner was entitled to apply for letters of administration.
The Probate Court entered an order of publication against the widow and the unknown heirs and next of kin of decedent; and appellant's counsel directed a letter to said widow containing a copy of the order of publication. " This order of publication directed the widow to show cause why the application for administration should not be granted. After the expiration of the time fixed in the order of publication, and no appearance having been entered by the widow, the Probate Court entered an order appointing an independent administrator, who duly qualified.
Thereafter a motion was filed by the surviving widow, through the attorney for the insurance carrier, to vacate the order appointing the administrator and to dismiss the petition of appellant for letters of administration, the grounds of the motion being that decedent was not a resident of the District of Columbia and that he left a will, which was in the possession of decedent's widow. The Probate Court thereupon entered an order vacating the appointment of the administrator, and this appeal followed.
Title 20, § 216, D.C.Code (1961), provides as follows:
"If there be no relations, or those entitled decline or refuse to appear and apply for administration, on proper summons or notice, administration may be granted to the largest creditor applying for the same; and if creditors neglect to apply, it may be granted at the discretion of the court."
Under Title 40, § 423, of the Code, the operation of a motor vehicle in the District of Columbia by a nonresident is deemed equivalent to an appointment of the District Commissioners by such nonresident to be his true and lawful attorneys upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle in the District of Columbia. This section further provides, among other things, for the method of service on the Commissioners by the plaintiff in any such action, with copy to the defendant. We think, if § 423 is to be meaningful, it is necessary, if the nonresident who operated the automobile is deceased and no personal representative has been appointed, that a personal representative of the deceased be appointed on whom notice as provided by § 423 may be served.
Although it appears from the record that the widow, who was named as executrix in the will, has declined or failed to come into the District of Columbia, this should not militate against the appointment of an administrator, as the injured person is in effect the "largest creditor" and, aeeoTdingly, entitled to have administration granted in the event no fiduciary is appointed. Failure by the heirs at law or next of kin to have a personal representative appointed should not render nugatory the provisions of § 423; and the appointment of the largest creditor is authorized, on proper summons or notice, if those entitled decline or refuse to appeal and apply for administration. Title 20, § 216, D.C.Code (1961), supra. The applicant here is said to be the only creditor in the District of Columbia. Cf. Welch v. Welch, 57 App.D.C. 212, 19 F.2d 686 (1927). He was entitled to request the appointment of a disinterested party since he, as the injured party, would necessarily have to be the plaintiff in any litigation against the estate.
Appellee contends that there are no assets of the decedent in the District of Columbia and that, therefore, under Title 20, § 201, D.C.Code (1961), administration may not be granted. This argument does not meet the point that there is a claim here which, if finally established after trial, gives certain rights, among them the right to proceed against the insurance carrier. It is without dispute that appellant, if successful in his personal injury suit, may issue a writ of garnishment against the insurance carrier, whether or not the actual policy is in the District of Columbia. In this connection it is significant that the attorney for the insurance carrier is, in fact, the attorney appearing for the wife.
We think that Title 40, § 423, and Title 20, § 216, D.C.Code (1961) must be read together to reach a proper interpretation in this context. If that is not done, the estate of a person sought to be reached by the jurisdiction of Title 40, § 423, can escape the purpose of that statute if his next of kin refuses to accept appointment as administrator in the District of Columbia or to consent to the appointment of another as such; or, in the event a testamentary paper is left by a deceased tort feasor, if the executor refuses to have that testamentary paper probated or to take any steps to have a personal representative appointed.
Complaint is made that the application for the appointment of an administrator was not filed in good faith, based on the fact that the petition for administration recited that decedent was a resident of the District of Columbia and that there were no heirs other than the widow. These statements were made on information and belief only, and were due to the fact that the applicant for administration sought but could not obtain direct information from the widow. In any event, we consider these formal and qualified statements insufficient to justify removal of the administrator.
It follows that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of the order appointing an administrator.
So ordered.
. So far as appears, the will has never been admitted to probate; certainly no petition for ancillary letters in this jurisdiction has ever been filed. The widow has expressed no intention of obtaining ancillary letters in the District of Columbia.