Case Name: MARY RUTH YOUNG v. LOUIS P. PRICE AND ALLEN L. SOUZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND DOING BUSINESS AS PRICE CONCRETE TANK COMPANY, AN HAWAIIAN CO-PARTNERSHIP
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1968-06-07
Citations: 50 Haw. 430
Docket Number: No. 4531
Parties: MARY RUTH YOUNG v. LOUIS P. PRICE AND ALLEN L. SOUZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND DOING BUSINESS AS PRICE CONCRETE TANK COMPANY, AN HAWAIIAN CO-PARTNERSHIP.
Judges: Richardson, C.J., Mizuha, Marumoto, Abe and Levinson, JJ.
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 430–451

Head Matter:
MARY RUTH YOUNG v. LOUIS P. PRICE AND ALLEN L. SOUZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND DOING BUSINESS AS PRICE CONCRETE TANK COMPANY, AN HAWAIIAN CO-PARTNERSHIP.
No. 4531.
June 7, 1968.
Richardson, C.J., Mizuha, Marumoto, Abe and Levinson, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
MIZUHA, J.
The plaintiff-appellant, Mary Ruth Young, was injured in 1958 when she fell over a garden hose stretched across the sidewalk. The defendants-appellees operated a construction company. One of their employees had attached the hose to a fire hydrant and stretched the hose across the sidewalk to private property. The plaintiff testified that she was carrying an open umbrella, tilted slightly forward, to protect her from the wind and rain. She also was carrying a ledger, 8" x 12" and %" thick, a bag of silver, and an airline bag. She testified that she was looking straight ahead and was walking at a moderate pace. Although her glasses had become steamed, she had not stopped to clean them. She further testified that she saw no one else on the street, that she did not see the hose until after she had fallen, and that she did not see the hydrant or any warning devices.
Three workmen, including the one who said he placed them, testified that two warning cones, one with a red flag in it, were placed alongside the hose at the edges of the sidewalk. One testified that he saw the plaintiff approach the hose, lift her foot to step over it, and fall to the ground.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants alleging that the defendants, through their employees, failed to exercise reasonable care to protect pedestrians from the hazard they had created by stretching the hose across the sidewalk. At the first trial, the jury found for the plaintiff, but this court reversed and ordered entry of judgment for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203. On rehearing, the court modified the ruling by remanding the case for a new trial on the grounds that the question of contributory negligence was for the jury to decide and that introduction of evidence of plaintiff's ailments unrelated to the accident was prejudicial, 48 Haw. 22, 395 P.2d 365. At the second trial, the jury found for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff alleges two errors. First, she alleges the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a cone and a flag similar to those the witnesses testified were at the scene of the accident. Second, she alleges the trial court erred in denying her requested Instruction No. 11. We find that both rulings were erroneous and reverse the judgment below.
The trial court erred in admitting into evidence alleged replicas of a yellow cone and a red flag which were purported to be at the scene of the accident. There was a definite conflict in testimony as to whether said objects were present or not, a dispute which goes to the very essence of liability. Defendants contend that the yellow cone and red flag were placed at the scene of the accident to warn pedestrians, but plaintiff maintains that she did not see any warning devices near the scene of the accident. There is no admission by plaintiff of its existence. Where such conflict exists, the credibility of a witness' testimony is for the jury to decide, and the introduction of replicas of disputed evidence is prejudicial.
In the first trial of this case, see 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203; 47 Haw. 408, 390 P.2d 141, plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $37,500.00 general damages and $424.90 special damages, but the judgment was reversed because of error. This court stated:
" , 'there is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian.' (pp. 314-315). From this it follows that the defendants were required to take steps commensurate with the danger created, to warn or protect pedestrians using the sidewalk. Whether defendants properly did so appears to me to have been clearly a question for the jury. Further, my present view is that the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence is so inextricably entwined with and dependent on the issue of defendants' negligence that it also was properly submitted to the jury. While the evidence on each issue still appears to me to predominate in favor of the defendants, I am now unwilling to say that reasonable men might not differ on the facts or the inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the facts and reach different conclusions in resolving the two issues. These questions are undoubtedly close ones. * 48 Haw. 22, 25, 395 P.2d 365, 367.
In the first trial, replicas of the yellow cone and red flag were not admitted in evidence, and plaintiff won a jury verdict. In this second trial, the court admitted replicas of the yellow cone and red flag in evidence, which remained in full view of the jury until the verdict was returned for the defendant. The cone measured 11" square at the base, and stood 21" high, tapering to a circular top 2" in diameter. A 3)4" strip at the base was black, the yellow portion was 15" high and the red portion of the top was 2)4" wide. The red flag measuring 18" x 19" was attached to a pole 31" long. It stood like a flaming fireball in full view of the jurors throughout the trial.
The admission of replicas Of the yellow cone and red flag precluded any doubt in the minds of the jury as to their existence. The presence of these physical objects in the courtroom with the blessing of the trial judge is in my opinion unquestionably prejudicial since this court in a previous opinion definitely and unequivocally stated:
" , 'there is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian.' (pp. 314-315). From this it follows that the defendants were required to take steps commensurate with the danger created, to warn or protect pedestrians using the sidewalk. Whether defendants properly did so appears to me to have been clearly a question for the jury. " (Emphasis added) 48 Haw. 22, 25, 395 P.2d 365, 367.
Admission of the replicas of the yellow cone and red flag in this case was tantamount to the court telling the jury that there was a yellow cone and red flag to warn pedestrians and therefore defendants took the necessary and proper precautions. The admission of the replicas of the yellow cone and red flag in this case cannot be compared to the drawing of a diagram by a witness or admission of a picture which was taken of the scene immediately after an accident occurred. Admission of prejudicial evidence cannot be "sloughed off" by limiting instructions. When there is a conflict in the testimony as to the presence of warning devices as in this case, the credibility of the witness is for the jury without an assist from the trial judge.
Appellee has not cited a case to support the proposition that demonstrative evidence may be admitted where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the existence of certain physical objects.
Authorities which admit demonstrative evidence are those cases where there is no conflict or dispute as to the existence of the particular object sought to be proven. There is an implication that demonstrative evidence must be based upon undisputed preliminary facts. Sellew v. City of Middletown, 121 Conn. 331, 185 A. 67; Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101; Finch v. W. R. Roach Co., 295 Mich. 589, 295 N.W. 324.
In Sellew v. City of Middletown, supra, plaintiff brought an action against the city for injuries sustained when she allegedly fell on a sidewalk. Plaintiff offered a pan of stones or pebbles in evidence which she testified were similar to those which were present on the sidewalk when she fell. There was no dispute as to the existence or non-existence of stones or pebbles. The court stated that plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to support the court's exercise of its discretion in admitting the stones in evidence for the purpose of illustrating to the jury the situation as it existed.
In Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., supra, a tenant brought an action against her landlord to recover damages for injuries resulting from the collapse of a folding bed. The court, in reference to the admission in evidence of a folding bed without conclusive evidence that it was the identical bed which had collapsed, held it was properly admitted. Again, there was no dispute as to the existence or non-existence of a folding bed.
In Finch v. W. R. Roach Co., supra, the defendant owned an orchard and sold cherries at lower prices to those who did their own picking. Plaintiff elected to pick his own cherries and was provided a ladder by the defendant. While picking cherries on top of the ladder, plaintiff fell and sustained severe injuries. The suit was based upon the claim that defendant supplied plaintiff with an unsafe and defective ladder. A model of the ladder was admitted into evidence over the objections of the defendant to illustrate its defectiveness. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the trial court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the model was secondary evidence. The court held that the model was inadmissible because plaintiff failed to account for the absence of the original or give notice to produce it, and that this was fatal to recovery. The appellate court reversed and held that there was no error in the use of the model which was not a facsimile in every detail. Neither plaintiff nor defendant contended that a ladder was not involved; hence there was no dispute as to the evidence sought to be proven. The undisputed preliminary fact was that a ladder had been used. Therefore, demonstrative evidence was properly admitted only on this basis.
In all three cases an established fact preceded the introduction of demonstrative evidence. The established fact in Sellew v. City of Middletown, supra, was that stones or pebbles had been present on the sidewalk when plaintiff fell. There was no dispute as to that fact. The established fact in Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., supra, was that a folding bed had been used by plaintiff and in Finch v. W. R. Roach Co., supra, the established fact was that a ladder had been used by plaintiff to pick cherries. Again there was no conflict of a preliminary fact.
Isaacs v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 548, 313 P.2d 684, a case involving a hose on the sidewalk, is not applicable to the facts of this case. The question before the court was whether the testimony of the plaintiff-pedestrian in identifying the hose on which he tripped was sufficient identification to be admitted into evidence. Plaintiff's testimony was as follows:
"Q. Did you see the same hose [exhibit No. 7} yesterday? A. I saw a hose I believe to be the same hose.
"Q. How long is the hose? A. Fifty feet, or slightly more.
"Q. Do you know whether or not the hose you saw the other day was the same hose? A. No, sir, I don't know absolutely. I believe it to be."
The court held that the identification of the hose by the plaintiff was sufficient to be admitted into evidence.
All of the other cases relied upon by appellee are not in point. Although there are no case authorities on the exact question presented in the case at bar, Cady, Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L. R. 333, 346, focuses upon undue prejudice resulting from the misuse of demonstrative evidence:
"Even though proffered demonstrative evidence passes the test of verity with flying colors, still a large hurdle remains — judicial discretion. Even though an exhibit be perfectly accurate, the trial judge has discretion to exclude demonstrative evidence that may create undue prejudice in the minds of the tribunal — such 'sympathy,' 'distraction,' 'resentment,' 'repulsion,' or 'indignation' that overcomes the rational processes of the trier of fact. . . Wigmore compares criminal and civil cases and concludes that the risks of unfair prejudice are of greater frequency in personal injury cases and so implies that the trial court should exercise discretion to exclude more firmly in civil than in criminal cases. In any event, the court's discretion is to 'prevent abuse' of demonstrative evidence."
See also, Bunge, Demonstrative Evidence — A Grandstand Play, 42 Ill. Bar J. 72, and Milwid, The Misuse of Demonstrative Evidence, 28 Ins. Couns. J. 435.
The lower court also erred in refusing to give plaintiff's Instruction No. 11, which reads:
"As a general rule it is the duty of one who, in the lawful use of a sidewalk, creates a dangerous condition thereon or therein, to use reasonable care to warn pedestrians of its existence or to protect them against injury.
"There is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian.
"From this it follows that the defendants were required to take steps commensurate with the danger created, to warn or protect pedestrians using the sidewalk."
This is a verbatim statement of the law of this case as written in two previous opinions, Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203; 48 Haw. 22, 395 P.2d 365.
The first paragraph of plaintiff's Instruction No. 11 is a verbatim statement of the general rule which was clearly stated in Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 314, 388 P.2d 203 (first case), and 48 Haw. 22, 395 P.2d 365 (second case).
In the first case, this court reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant at the close of all the evidence on the ground that plaintiff "{b]y failing to see — ahead of her on the sidewalk and in her direct line of vision — that which was obviously plainly in view, namely, the hose, cones and flag, ahead of her and in her direct line of sight, plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and was guilty of con tributory negligence as a matter of law." 47 Haw. 309, 322-323, 388 P.2d 203, 211-212.
The reversal which was based upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, specifically stated:
"However, there is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian.
* # * a? *
"Having created some risk to pedestrians, the defendants here were under a legal duty to exercise ordinary care in taking such precautions as might reasonably be necessary under the attendant circumstances to prevent injuries to pedestrians using the sidewalk in a lawful and proper manner." 47 Haw. 309, 314-315, 388 P.2d 203, 207-208.
After rehearing, this court set aside its decision in the first opinion that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but reversed because of other error. However, the court did clearly state in the second opinion:
"As the court's opinion (first opinion) states, 'there is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian.' (pp. 314-315). From this it follows that the defendants were required to take steps commensurate with the danger created, to warn or protect pedestrians using the sidewalk. Whether defendants properly did so appears to me to have been clearly a question for the jury.
* #
"In short, I now am in agreement with the conclusion of the dissenting justices that the trial court did not commit error in denying defendants' motions for a directed verdict." 48 Haw. 22, 25, 395 P.2d 365, 367.
The three quotations in plaintiff's Instruction No. 11 are clear and concise and correct statements of the law as to the facts which this court reviewed in the first two opinions. There is no change in the facts in this case. On the cited quotations, there is no disagreement between the first and the second opinions even though the second .opinion overruled the first on the question of contributory negligence. It is difficult to see how the instruction can be construed that the trial court had made a factual finding that the risk created by the hose constituted a dangerous condition, or that it had in fact ruled that a dangerous condition existed. All it says is "{t]here is no question that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian." The first paragraph states the general rule as approved by this court in 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203, followed by clear statement on the risk and hazard created by a hose. Simple, clear cut statements of the law as expressed by this court cannot be construed into ridiculous assumptions to justify the refusal of an instruction.
Defendants contend that statements in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11 were fully covered by defendants' Instructions Nos. 10, 11 and 19 which were given by agreement. These were as follows:
"Defendants' Instruction No. 10
"Negligence is the doing of an act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonable prudent person would do, actuated by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property or person.
"This definition of negligence applies irrespective of whose conduct is in question, whether it be the conduct of the defendants or of the plaintiff."
"Defendants' Instruction No. 11
"You are instructed that every person has the duty to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety, according to the circumstances then present.
"Ordinary care is that care which persons, of ordinary prudence exercise in the management of their own affairs and in order to avoid injury to themselves or to others."
Helen B. Ryan (Ryan and Ryan of counsel) for plaintiff-appellant.
William L. Fleming (Smith, Wild, Beehe if Cades of counsel) for defendants-appellees.
"Defendants' Instruction No. 19
"Because the amount of care used by the ordinarily prudent person varies in proportion to the danger known to be involved in what is being done, it follows that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution required will vary with the nature of what is being done and all the surrounding circumstances. To put it another way, as the danger that should reasonably be foreseen increases, so the amount of care required by law also increases."
Defendants' Instruction No. 10 defines "negligence," No. 11 defines "ordinary care," and No. 19 states that the amount of care varies in proportion to the degree of danger present. They are all general instructions. None of the instructions relates to the law of negligence with respect to a hose on a sidewalk, nor the specific duty of defendants to warn or protect pedestrians when a hose is placed across the sidewalk. Where instructions are asked which correctly state the law on any issue presented, it is error to refuse to give them unless the points are adequately covered by instructions given. It is generally considered error to refuse to give a requested instruction on a given point which is accurate and applicable though the point may have been unequivocally covered by a general instruction which was given. Nawelo v. von Hamm-Young Co., 21 Haw. 644.
Defendants' Instructions Nos. 10, 11 and 19 did not adequately cover the issues presented by Plaintiff's Instruction No. 11. It did not state (1) that the presence of a hose on a sidewalk creates some risk or hazard to a pedestrian, and (2) that defendants who placed a hose on the sidewalk, were required to take steps commensurate with the danger created to warn or protect pedestrians using the sidewalk.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
We have handed down two additional opinions, affirming the trial court's denial o£ a motion to file an appeal in forma pauperis (unpublished) and striking a portion of the plaintiff's brief, 49 Haw. 314, 424 P.2d 107.