Case Name: The Boston Turnpike Company against The town of Pomfret
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1850-08
Citations: 20 Conn. 590
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Boston Turnpike Company against The town of Pomfret.
Judges: In this opinion, Waite and Ellsworth, Js. concurred.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 590–602

Head Matter:
The Boston Turnpike Company against The town of Pomfret.
It is competent for a town-clerk to rectify any error which be had made in re- cording the proceedings of the town, by amending the record, so that it should state those proceedings truly.
And an application for a writ of mandamus, in such case is generally unnecessary.
The law attaches much less sanetity and importance to the entries of the votes and proceedings of towns and other municipal corporations, than to judicial records; and the rules which govern the amendment of the latter, are not applicable to the correction of the former.
The power of a town-clerk to amend his records, is confined to the individual whose duty it was originally to make them, and is allowed to him only while he is in office.
Against the abuse of this power. the law has provided safe-guards, not only in the selection of the officer, and the sanctions it imposes upon him, but in the provisional remedy it affords, by writ of mandamus.
Where an amendment of the record of a town vote, was made, some years after the original entry, by the town-clerk, not on his own personal knowledge, but on the information of others; it was held, that such amendment was not invalid.
Where the vote of a town may have the effect ofa contract with another party; this does not affect the power of the clerk to amend his record.
Tolland,
August, 1850.
This power is derived solely from his official character, and does not depend on the permission of the court, in which the record is offered as an instrument of evidence, nor on an enquiry into the truth of it, as originally made, or as amended.
An amended record, when offered in evidence, is, like an original record, conclusive evidence of its own truth. [As to most of these positions, and the result, two judges dissenting.)
This was an action on an agreement, alleged to have been made by the defendants, in 1843, to assume the turnpike road of the plaintiffs, which passed through the town of Pomfret ; and alleging a breach, by the defendants, in not keeping said road in repair according to their contract, by reason of which an injury was sustained by a passenger.
The cause was tried at Tolland, October term, 1849.
On the trial, it appeared, that the accident causing the injury, happened on the 17th of January, 1844. The plaintiffs claimed, that the undertaking of the defendants covered this time ; in proof whereof, they offered in evidence a writing, purporting to be a copy of the record of a vote, passed at a legal meeting of the inhabitants of the town of Pomfret, on the 2d day of October, 1843, duly certified by Job Williams, clerk of said town. According to this document, the liability of the defendants commenced on the 1st of January, 1844.
The defendants objected to the admission of such writing in evidence, on the ground, that it was not a correct copy of the record of the original vote, but materially variant therefrom; and in support of this claim, they offered in evidence the original record book of the town; according to which the liability of the defendants commenced on the 1st of April, 1844.
The plaintiffs claimed, that the book had been altered, and did not contain a true record of the vote, but that the writing which they offered, contained the only legal evidence of the vote actually passed.
Upon these conflicting claims of the parties, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their evidence, and to read the copy which they had offered, as prima facie evidence of the vote passed.
After the plaintiff had closed their evidence, the defendants reverted to said record book, and called Mr. Williams, who was clerk of the town when said vote was passed, and had ever since continued to hold that office, to prove, that the book before the court was the record book of the town, and then read therefrom the vote in question, as it there appeared. Upon enquiry made by the plaintiffs, he testified, that he was present at the meeting when the vote was passed, and shortly after recorded it upon the town records, in conformity with the copy shown by the plaintiffs, supposing, at the time, that he had made a true record of the vote ; and under that impression, he made and delivered to the plaintiffs the copy produced by them. But he afterwards discovered, that he had made a mistake in recording the vote, and thereupon, in the month of March, 1849, he altered the record to make it as it now appears. This alteration he did not make from any memorandum which he had previously made, nor from any recollection of his own as to the terms of the vote; but upon enquiry of the moderator of the meeting, and other respectable persons then present, he became satisfied, that the record, as originally made by him, was erroneous, and therefore altered it to its present form, He was perfectly satisfied, that the record, as it now stands, was a true record.
The defendants thereupon claimed, that the record as it now stands upon the book, was the only legitimate evidence of the vote; that no parol evidence could be received to contradict it; and that if such record be erroneous, the plaintiffs remedy is by a mandamus, or some other appropriate process.
The court decided, that it was competent for the plaintiffs to show, by parol evidence, that the original record had been falsely and improperly altered, by the clerk, and so was not a true record.
To show that the record had been rightfully amended, by the clerk, and made in conformity to the vote, as it was actually passed, the defendants offered the testimony of Charles Chandler, the moderator of the meeting, that the vote was passed in the form in which it stands recorded in the amended record.
The plaintiffs objected to the admission of this evidence, claiming that no parol evidence was admissible to prove what vote had been passed, or to contradict the record as originally made ; and that, if it were competent for the clerk to alter his record. after it had been made, he could do it only from memoranda previously made, or at least from his own personal recollection, and not from information derived from others. But this objection was overruled, and the evidence received.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants; and the plaintiffs moved for a new trial.
Welch and Toucey, in support of the motion,
contended That the vote of the town of Pomfret, as originally re- corded, is the only proper evidence of what was done in the town meeting, Stat. 628. 1. (ed. 1838.). 2.
That if, under any circumstances, the record may be amended, still the facts in this case did not warrant the altera- tion. There was nothing to amend by-no memorandum-no personal recollection-nothing but the information of others, out of court, and not under oath. This, instead of making a record, as the law regards it, of the highest sanctity, importing absolute and unimpeachable verity, would open a door for the introduction of the weakest and loosest of all evidence-nay, the instrument of fraud, whenever a town-clerk could be found, if honest himself, yet simple enough to be satisfied with the statements of others. They referred to and com- mented on Avery v. Butters, 9 Greenl. 16. Welles & al. v. Battelle, 11 Mass. R. 477. Thatcher v. Miller, in err. Id. 413. Hartwell & al. v. Littleton, 13 Pick. 229. 232. Cham- berlin & al. v. Dover, 13 Maine R. 472. Wilkie v. Hall, 15 Conn. R. 32. 3.
That the vote of the town was, in this case, a contract between the parties; and no act of one party, without the censent of the other, could vary its terms. 4.
That if there was an error in the record, as originally made, it could be rectified, by virtue of a mandamus, after a judicial investigation. 1 Sw. Dig. 563,4. T.
C. Perkins and H. Johnson, contra, contended,
1. That a town-clerk has power to alter the record of a town previ- ously made by himself. Welles v. Battelle & al. 11 Mass. B. 477. Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick. 229. 232. Cham- berlin & al. v. Dover, 13 Maine B. 472. Baldwin v. Mar- shall, 2 Humph. 116. 2.
2. That a town-clerk, in making his record, acts at his peril; and if he wakes a false record, he may be punished for for his misconduct. Welles & al. v. Battelle & al. 11 Mass. R. 481. Chamberlin & al. v. Dover, ubi sup.
3. That in this case, there was no necessity for a mandamus. That is brought only to compel an officer neglecting his duty, to perform it; and the writ must state a refusal to do the act. 1 Sw. Dig. 564,
4. That if the record is wrong as-it now stands, and a mandamus is the appropriate remedy, it is open to the plaintiffs. But if, on the other hand, the record now is right, there is ne occasion for resorting to it; the court will sustain the verdict. If, on the whole, the cause is rightly decided, no new trial will be granted.
5. That towns have no power to contract to repair the roads of other corporations. The town of Pomfret did not take this as a town road. The turnpike company still remain liable to travellers for injuries resulting from defects in their road. This is, at most, a mere contract of indemnity; which a town has no power to make, unless specially authorised; and no special authority has been shown or claimed.

Opinion:
STORRS, J.
The first question presented on this motion, is, whether the entry of the vote of the town of Pomfret, as originally made, by the clerk of that town, and as evidenced by the copy produced by the plaintiffs, or the entry of it as amended by him, and as it now appears on the record book, is to be deemed the true record of the proceedings of the town; and this depends on the question, whether the clerk had the legal power to make that amendment. A majority of the court are of opinion, that beth on principle and authority, it was competent for him to rectify any error which he had made in recording the proceedings of the town, by amending the record, so that it should describe those proceedings truly.
Our statutes expressly require town-clerks to keep the record books of their respective towns, and to enter truly all the votes and proceedings of the town. Tit. iii. ch. v. 58 p. 147. This duty is not performed, by an erroneous entry of those votes and proceedings; and unless we are to adopt the technical idea, that, as to any particular proceeding of the town, the clerk isfunctus officio as to his power of recording it, when he has once made an entry of it, however untruly, on the record book, we can perceive no good reason why it may not be rectified by him. We know of no authority which requires so narrow a construction of his powers: and it would, in many cases, work great inconvenience and injustice, not only to the town whose proceedings are thus recorded, but to others who are interested in those proceedings. If, when the entries of them are once made, it is beyond the power of the recording officer to amend them, it would be necessary, in every case of error, for those who might be affected by them, to resort to the dilatory and expensive remedy by mandamus, in order to have them corrected; and in many cases, there would be reason to fear, that such remedy would be quite inadequate, from lapse of time, or the death of the clerk, whose official position furnishes him the best means of knowing or ascertaining what was done by the town, or the conflict of memory among the spectators, to whom it would be necessary to resort for proof of the proceedings. Nordo we perceive any propriety in requiring this remedy to be resorted to, where the clerk is ready to correct his error. By amending the record himself he only does what the court would direct him to do, on the ground that his duty required it. An application for a mandamus, in such case, is generally unnecessary. To require it, would be to adopt a rule more strict than that which prevails in regard to amendments of judicial records.
But the law attaches much less sanctity and importance to the entries of the votes and proceedings of public corporations in their books, which are not technically records, but are termed public writings not of a judicial character, than to records properly so called, although the former are considered to be in the nature of records, and indeed are called such in our statutes, and have a like force and effect, when adduced in evidence.
Courts, however, have never adopted, and from their nature it would not be practicable to adopt, those strict, technical and peculiar rules as to their correction, which apply to the amendment of judicial records. On the contrary, it is deemed of so great importance to uphold the proceedings of our municipal corporations, that courts are disposed to be as indulgent in allowing entries of their proceedings to be amended, as is consistent with the safety of those whose in- terests would be affected by them. From carelessness, on the part of the clerks of our towns and other municipal corporations, or their not sufficiently appreciating the importance of fully and precisely describing their proceedings, they are frequently entered on their records very loosely and irregularly; and it is not to be expected that those officers will always be competent to perform their duty, in this respect, with the correctness which is desirable: to hold, therefore, that their entries, as first made, are beyond the reach of their subsequent correction, would produce the greatest confusion,
It is urged, that the sanctity of our records, and the security which they are designed to furnish, would be destroyed, and that they would be subject to constant mutilation and change, if, when once made, any alteration of them is to be tolerated.
We think, however, that while the amendment of them is confined to the officer whose duty it was originally to make them, and is allowed even to him only while he is in office, there is no serious ground for apprehension.
In the first place, there is every practicable security furnished to ensure a faithful discharge of the duties of these officers. They are selected, by the inhabitants of the towns, presumably for their integrity and capacity for the office; they are under an oath faithfully to execute its duties; their records are open to public inspection; and their entries, in the first instance, as well as any alteration of them, are made at their peril, as they are personally liable for all injuries arising from a violation or neglect ofduty. These coustituteas strong safeguards against falsehood in amendments to the original entries, as in those entries themselves.
But, lest these securities should prove insufficient, the law further provides a most effectual remedy for any errors in their records, whether arising from design, mistake, or accident, by the writ of mandamus, by means of which these errors may be corrected, on the application of any person interested; so that whatever may be the conduct or disposition of the clerk, it is not at his option, either as to his first entries or subsequent alterations, to determine how the record shall ultimately stand.
The authorities fully establish the power of clerks of towns and other municipal corporations, to amend their records, while they continue in office.
In Welles & al. v. Battelle & al. 11 Mass. R. 477. the record was made by the town-clerk, when in office, under a former election, and was amended by him, by adding to it words, showing by whom the oath of office was administered to him, when he was formerly elected to the office, and also to assessors chosen at the same meeting; and the amendment was made several years after the original entry of their appointment, and after the suit was brought against said assessors, in which it was necessary for them, in order to sustain their defence, to show by whom the oath to them was administered; and the amendments were held to have been legally made.
The correctness of this decision was recognized, by the same court, in Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick. 229. in which, however, it was decided, that one who was formerly a town-clerk, could not, after he had ceased to be such, amend a record made by him while he was in that office.
In Bishop v. Cone & al. 3 N. H. Rep. 516. it was held~ that a town-clerk, while in office, might amend his record of a vote of the town to raise money by a tax, under which vote the defendants justified, as select-men of the town~in an action of trespass de bonis, brought against them for issuing a warrant for the plaintiff's proportion of said tax, where the vote, as amended, would constitute a justification to the defendants in issuing said warrant, but as originally recorded~ would be no defence.
In Chamberlain v. The Town of Dover, 13 Maine R. 466. which was an action of assumpsit on a contract alleged to have been made with the plaintiff, by certain persons assuming to be authorized, by the defendant, to coptract on their behalf, a vote of the defendants was, at the instance of the plaintiff, allowed to be amended, after the commencement of the suit, by the present clerk, who made the original record, so as to show such authority, which did not appear from the vote, as originally recorded. The court say: "It is the duty of the clerk to record the doings and proceedings of the town; and if through inadvertence or misapprehension, the record has been defectively made, it is competent for him, while in office, to complete it according ~o the truth. He acts at his peril, and will be liable, if he falsifies or mistakes what it is his duty to record." This case shows the invalidity of the objection made to the amendment, in the present case, on the ground that it respects the terms of a contract between the parties. The vote is only an act of the town which furnishes evidence of the contract; and in regard to the propriety of allowing it to be amended, we perceive no difference between such a vote, and any other by which its own interests, or those of others, may be affected.
Nor is the amendment invalid, in this case, because it was made, by the town-clerk, not on his own personal knowledge, but on information derived from others. An amendment of a record stands on the same ground, in this respect, as the original record; and neither can be impugned, by an enquiry into the sources of knowledge on which it was made. It is not unusual that entries in our public records, even in those of a judicial character, are made by the recording officer, without any personal knowledge of the truth of what is recorded: but, when thus made, has it ever been supposed, that they were not to be deemed records, on that account? It is sufficient, that the fact recorded is ascertained by him, by whatever means, and that it is recorded by him, or by his authority.
Nor is his power originally to make, or afterwards to amend, a record, to be determined, by an enquiry into the truth of it, as so made or amended, Such power is derived solely from his official characterr and does not depend on the permission of the court in which the record is offered as an instrument of evidence. The only enquiry then, is, whether it is a record. Being shown to be such, it imports absolute and uncontroulable verity, and is, therefore, conclusive evidence of the facts which it states. It would be obviously absurd to make its admissibility or effect, as a record, depend on previous proof of its truth.
We attach no importance to the testimony adduced, in this case, as to the truth of the facts stated in the record as amended, as it was not claimed, that the amendment, if erroneous, was made fraudulently. The town-clerk having legal authority to make the amendment, and having exercised it honestly, the amendment was, like an original record, conclusive evidence of its own truth; and it was the duty of the court to receive it as such. If it was in fact false, the remedy was a suit, by the party injured, or an application for a mandamus.
We think, therefore, that the amended record offered by the defendants, on the trial, is to be deemed the true record of the vote of the town; and that, as it did not support the contract declared on, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial. Hence it is, unnecessary to determine, whether the defendants had authority to make that contract.
In this opinion, Waite and Ellsworth, Js. concurred.