Case Name: Daniel W. SNETHEN, Appellant, v. Crispus NIX, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1989-09-15
Citations: 885 F.2d 456
Docket Number: No. 88-2041
Parties: Daniel W. SNETHEN, Appellant, v. Crispus NIX, Appellee.
Judges: Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 885
Pages: 456–464

Head Matter:
Daniel W. SNETHEN, Appellant, v. Crispus NIX, Appellee.
No. 88-2041.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 10, 1989.
Decided Sept. 15, 1989.
James P. Cleary, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant.
Thomas D. McGrane, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
In 1975, an Iowa district court jury convicted petitioner Daniel W. Snethen of first degree murder. The court sentenced Snethen to life in prison without parole. He later appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa, sought state post-conviction relief, and petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus relief, but his conviction was upheld at each level. On appeal, Snethen argues that his detention violates his federal constitutional rights because:
(1) the trial court erred in permitting his examining psychiatrist to testify against him;
(2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning inculpatory statements he made while in custody because he had requested counsel before making them; and
(3) the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that he was sane at the time of the murder.
Finding no violation of Snethen's constitutional rights, we affirm the district court's denial of his habeas petition.
I.
In September 1974, Daniel Snethen was in jail in Polk County, Iowa, serving time for a felony charge unrelated to the murder giving rise to this action. One month later, police questioned Snethen's half-brother, Luke Foster, concerning the August 1974 murder of Timothy Hawbaker. When Snethen's mother learned that her sons were suspects in a homicide investigation, she came to the Lucas building, where Luke Foster was being questioned, and told police that "[i]f Danny did this, he will tell me."
Police brought Snethen to the Lucas building one hour after his mother arrived there. When he was informed of his Miranda rights, he declined to speak without an attorney present. The police then decided to take Snethen back to jail, but his mother asked to speak with him before he was taken away. After their conversation, Snethen's mother invited the police to join them, and Snethen made a series of remarks (which were recorded in shorthand by one of the officers, see infra) inculpating him in the murder of Timothy Hawbaker. Snethen also reiterated that he did not wish to continue speaking without counsel present. Nevertheless, Snethen signed a statement admitting his involvement in the Hawbaker homicide. The content of Snethen's inculpatory remarks (as recorded in the officer's shorthand) was as follows:
I am involved in this and my brother wasn't and I request an attorney with me throughout.
As far as my brother involved, no. I will tell all details with my attorney with me.
My brother not involved, he left. I was fighting. He left and I was fighting and no [sic] knew what had gone on. He wasn't there at the time the action took place. I am not cutting a brother loose, he left I picked him up later and took back to his car. He walked down the road and took off, he was not involved in anything. He didn't know anything happened. He knew nothing about it.
He did not have anything to do with this. I will say I am a guilty suspect in the case, but I can't admit to any murder or anything. He did not do anything. He left, I got him back and later on took the car and knew something had happened to it.
I will talk through and with an attorney. I am no animal. I have crabs and they won't call a doctor and the whole darn cell has [crabs] and they gave us some medicine to wash with.
I will discuss from the beginning to the end when my attorney is with me.
I will state one thing, there is another suspect involved, but my brother don't know who it is. I took the knife for self protection.
The whole thing was an accident. I didn't mean to happen, it was pure accident.
After [it] happened I threatened Luke if it got out he would have to be done away with. I played on his mind.
State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1976).
After Snethen's indictment for first degree murder, his attorney requested a psychiatric exam to determine whether Snethen was competent to stand trial and whether he had been sane at the time of the alleged murder. Dr. Paul Loeffelholz evaluated Snethen. After the evaluation, Snethen was ruled incompetent in a competency trial and sent to a psychiatric facility for treatment. Dr. Loeffelholz later certified that Snethen had regained competence to stand trial. A jury agreed in a second competency trial, so the date for Snethen's criminal trial was set.
At a suppression hearing prior to his trial, Snethen challenged the admissibility of the inculpatory statements he made in the Lucas building. The court agreed to suppress the written confession, but refused to suppress the shorthand notes recorded by the officer.
During his trial, Snethen relied on the insanity defense. He called a medical expert to testify that Snethen had paranoid/schizophrenic tendencies that may have limited his capacity to understand his actions, but that testimony was contradicted by Dr. Loeffelholz, who concluded that Snethen did have the capacity at the time of the alleged murder to distinguish right from wrong. Dr. Loeffelholz also testified that during his initial evaluation, Snethen made a number of inculpatory statements. Snethen did not object to this testimony. The jury found Snethen guilty of first degree murder and the court sentenced him to life without parole. The conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 1976). Snethen was later denied state post-conviction relief, Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1981), and federal habeas relief, Snethen v. Nix, (June 6, 1988). Civil No. 87-279-B
II.
Snethen's first argument on appeal is that the district court should have granted his habeas petition because the trial court's admission of Dr. Loeffelholz' testimony concerning inculpatory statements Snethen made during his pretrial psychiatric evaluation violated his rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. We do not believe that the admission of that testimony entitles Snethen to habeas relief. We express no opinion concerning the merits of this contention because it is procedurally barred. Snethen failed to raise the issue of Dr. Loeffelholz' testimony when he sought postconviction relief. As the district court indicated in its denial of Snethen's petition, Snethen could have overcome the procedural default for federal habeas relief if he demonstrated cause for its occurrence and "actual prejudice" engendered by it, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), but he made no such demonstration. Consequently, this issue is procedurally barred.
III.
Second, Snethen contends that he is entitled to habeas relief because the admission of the inculpatory statements he made to the police in the Lucas building violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. We disagree. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment right to counsel attaches when an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation. Id. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any way." Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Once the suspect indicates that he wishes to exercise his Miranda rights, police must cease questioning the suspect immediately unless, ,as the Court emphasized in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the suspect initiates further communication with the police.
Likewise, the Court held in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), that if a suspect in custody requested counsel, courts must presume that any subsequent waiver of his rights was involuntary unless he initiated further contact with the police.
In light of these precedents, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying Snethen habeas relief based on his Miranda contentions. Snethen argues that (1) he did not initiate further communication with the police; (2) the police wished to obtain a confession from him even after he requested counsel; and (3) he made his confession in a "coercive situation." See Petitioner's Brief at 18. These contentions are not persuasive because we see no indication that the police questioned Snethen after his request for counsel or that they coerced him to speak.
The Iowa Supreme Court found that when Snethen insisted that he did not wish to speak without counsel present, the police decided to return Snethen to the county jail. At this point, Snethen's mother prodded Snethen, both in the .presence of police and in a private discussion, to describe the Hawbaker killing to the police so his half-brother would not be punished unjustly. It was "coercion" by his mother that led to Snethen's inculpatory remarks, not by the police. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), emphasizes that inculpatory remarks encouraged by influences other than "coercive police activity" are not inadmissible. Connelly argued that the "voice of God" commanded him to confess. Snethen's command came from his mother. Since Snethen, like Connelly, failed to demonstrate police coercion, his contention that his "coerced" confession was secured in violation of the United States Constitution is unmeritorious. Without compelling influence, psychological ploys, or direct questioning by law enforcement officials, the Court wrote in Connelly, "[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521. In accordance with that doctrine, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to grant habeas relief to Snethen on the basis of his Miranda arguments.
IV.
Finally, Snethen contends that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence that he was sane at the time of the Hawbaker killing. He argues that this failure renders his conviction invalid under the fourteenth amendment. We do not believe that the district court erred in failing to grant Snethen habeas relief on the basis of this issue. A great deal of evidence was adduced during the trial to the effect that Snethen was sane at the time of the killing. Dr. Loeffelholz, who had many opportunities to observe and treat Snethen, testified that at all relevant times Snethen knew the nature and quality of his actions. The testimony of Luke Foster concerning Snethen's attempts to cover up the crime contained a great deal of information that could persuade a jury that Snethen was sane at the time of the murder. We find no error in the district court's rejection of Snethen's insufficient evidence argument.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Snethen's habeas corpus petition.
. The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
. We note that Snethen was before this court five years ago. Since his habeas petition contained unexhausted claims, Snethen was directed to return to state court to exhaust all available state remedies. Snethen v. Nix, 736 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.1984). Having completed exhaustion, Snethen has returned to federal court.
. The Iowa Supreme Court wrote that:
The murder charge arose from the brutal slaying of Timothy Hawbaker in Polk County on August 31, 1974. The State alleged [Snethen] killed Hawbaker late that night near a levee south of Des Moines by choking him and beating him with a bumper jack.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed [Snethen] met Hawbaker in downtown Des Moines during the evening involved when an automobile driven by [Snethen] was in a minor accident with an automobile driven by Hawbaker. [Snethen] was driving a car owned by his halfbrother, Glenn "Luke" Foster, who was a passenger in the vehicle. Hawbaker asked Luke not to report the accident. He offered Luke and [Snethen] a ride in his car, and they accepted. After riding around for about an hour, the trio ended up near a levee south of Des Moines, close to the site of an Iowa Power and Light Company building. [Snethen] and Hawbaker had been arguing. The three men left the car, and [Snethen] and Hawbaker began to scuffle with each other. Luke left the scene on foot because he did not wish to be involved. [Snethen] choked Hawbaker, struck him on the head several times with a bumper jack, and stabbed him numerous times in the chest. The blows from the bumper jack caused Hawbaker's death. [Snethen] dragged Hawbaker's body into a nearby cornfield, took his wristwatch, and left the body there. [Snethen] burned the Hawbaker automobile near the scene of the homicide.
State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 309-10 (Iowa 1976).
. Snethen's trial and direct appeal took place before the United States Supreme Court decided Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). We need not determine whether Wainwright applies retroactively to Snethen's failure to object in those proceedings because Snethen failed to object in his state post-conviction relief proceeding, which took place post- Wainwright.
. We also note that in light of the overwhelming evidence of Snethen's guilt derived from other sources (most notably his confession in the Lucas building after his discussion with his mother), any error in admitting Dr. Loeffelholz' testimony concerning Snethen's inculpatory statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
. Finally, we note that well-established federal habeas precedent indicates that:
[Q]uestions relating to the admissibility of evidence are matters of state law and generally do not give rise to constitutional errors which are subject to redress in federal habeas corpus cases.
Maggitt v. Wyrick, 533 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.1976). See also Williams v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.1984); Riley v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.1984).
Under the doctrine enunciated in the cases cited above, Snethen could not prevail on habe-as review by virtue of his evidentiary arguments concerning the admission of his confession in the Lucas building and Dr. Loeffelholz' testimony unless he established that their admission was so prejudicial that it undercut the "fundamental fairness" of his trial. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 289, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). Snethen has not made such a showing, so his arguments fail to overcome the considerable obstacles preventing ha-beas review of evidentiary matters.