Case Name: Mark J. SAFFERSTONE, Appellant, v. Linda SAFFERSTONE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-01-27
Citations: 501 So. 2d 165
Docket Number: No. 86-854
Parties: Mark J. SAFFERSTONE, Appellant, v. Linda SAFFERSTONE, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 501
Pages: 165–167

Head Matter:
Mark J. SAFFERSTONE, Appellant, v. Linda SAFFERSTONE, Appellee.
No. 86-854.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 27, 1987.
Blumenfeld & Cohen, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Broad & Cassell, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Mark J. Safferstone appeals a final judgment of marriage dissolution and raises four points on appeal. As to two of these points, we conclude that no abuse of discretion is shown in the trial court awards of (a) rehabilitation alimony of $150.00 a week for eight years, and (b) attorney's fees — although we think these awards represent the outer limits of the trial court's discretion in this case, given the limited financial circumstances of Mr. Safferstone and the $600 a month total child support award which he must pay under the final judgment for the parties' three minor children. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980); Wilds v. Wilds, 399 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Dominik v. Dominik, 390 So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
The remaining two points on appeal, however, have merit. Given (a) the generous nature of the awards which Mr. Saffer-stone must pay under the final judgment, (b) the otherwise limited financial circumstances of Mr. Safferstone, (c) the potential earning capacity of Linda Safferstone, the former wife, after eight years of rehabilitative alimony, and (d) the fact that the marital home is the only real asset of the parties, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award Mr. Safferstone's one-half interest in the marital home to Linda Safferstone as lump sum alimony. The trial court may, however, upon remand award exclusive possession of the marital home to Linda Safferstone for the minority of the parties' three children. See Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So.2d 75, 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Saldana v. Saldana, 372 So.2d 528, 529-30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Simpson v. Simpson, 372 So.2d 526, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
Beyond that, we can find no justifiable basis in this record for denying shared parental responsibility for the parties' three minor children as there was no showing made below that such shared responsibility would be detrimental to the children. § 61.13(2)(b)(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). The trial court may, however, upon remand make Linda Safferstone the primary residential custodian. See Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So.2d 4, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied and remanded, 488 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Frey v. Wagner, 433 So.2d 60, 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Nichols v. Nichols, 432 So.2d 648, 648-49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Consistent with these views, we therefore (1) affirm the final judgment under review as to (a) the award of rehabilitative alimony and (b) attorney's fees; (2) reverse the final judgment under review as to (a) the lump sum alimony award, and (b) the sole parental responsibility award as to the three minor children; and (3) remand the cause to the trial court with directions to (a) award joint parental responsibility for the parties' three minor children, and (b) enter whatever order may seem just under the circumstances with respect to the marital home without divesting Mr. Safferstone of his one-half interest therein.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ., concur.