Case Name: BUCKLEY v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1915-10-27
Citations: 181 S.W. 729
Docket Number: No. 3764
Parties: BUCKLEY v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 181
Pages: 729–736

Head Matter:
BUCKLEY v. STATE.
(No. 3764.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 27, 1915.
On Motion for Rehearing, Dec. 22, 1915.
Appellant’s Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1916.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 19, 1916.)
1. Homicide <&wkey;254 — Murder in Second Degree— Sufficiency of Evidence.
Evidence in a prosecution for homicide held to sustain a conviction of murder in the second - degree.
[Ed. Note. — Dor other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 533-538; Dec. Dig. &wkey;254.]
2. Ckihinal Law <&wkey;800 — Instructions — Definition of WoSd.
In such prosecution it was not necessary for the court to define the meaning of the word “corroborate,” as it has a definite, well-understood meaning.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1808-1810, 1812; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>800.]
3. Criminal Law <&wkey;423 — Evidence — Acts of Conspirators.
In a prosecution for homicide, where. the testimony showed a conspiracy to whip a negro or negroes, evidence as to whipping other ne-groes, shooting into other houses, and going to the house of one to kill him for choking one of the conspirators was admissible, as the acts and conduct of each conspirator in the execution of the common purpose and design are admissible against each of the conspirators.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 989-1001; Dec. Dig. <@=> 423.]
4. Homicide <&wkey;29 — Independent Motive of Conspirator.
A conspirator to whip one person would not be guilty, where one of the conspirators killed another person upon an independent motive of his own.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>29.]
5. Homicide <&wkey;29 — Decree—Ratification.
In such case no subsequent ratification of a murder would render defendant liable as a principal offender, if he was not liable as a principal at the time of its commission.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. &wkey;29.]
6. Criminal Law <&wkey;778 — Instruction — Burden of Proof.
In a prosecution for homicide, where it appeared that defendant had conspired to whip a negro, a charge that although defendant was present when the wife of such negro was killed by one of the conspirators, yet, if there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he aided or encouraged such conspirator, or knew of his intention to commit an dnlawful act which might naturally and probably lead to the killing of the. wife, to acquit defendant, did not shift to the defendant'the burden of showing that the killing was done upon an independent motive, but gave him the benefit of the reasonable doubt on that affirmative defense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1846-1852, 1854-1857,1960, 1967; Dec. Dig. &wkey;778.]
7. Homicide <&wkey;29 — Intent—Conspiracy.
Although defendant was present when one was killed by a fellow conspiratox-, yet, if there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he knew of such conspirator’s intent to commit an unlawful act that might lead to such killing, or that, if present, he did not aid or encourage such conspirator, he would be guilty of no offense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>29.]
8. Homicide <&wkey;289 — Instruction — Evidence.
In a prosecution for homicide, where it appeared that defendant and others conspired to whip a negro, and where the evidence raised the issue that the negro’s wife was accidentally killed by a shot fired by one of the conspirators with the intent to kill the negro under circumstances in which it would have been murder had the negro been killed, an instruction that if the negro’s wife was killed by mistake or accident, when it was intended to kill the negro, the jury would convict, was applicable to the evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 594; Dec. Dig. <¿=>289.]
9. Homicide <&wkey;17 — Murder—Malice—Statute.
In view of Pen. Code 1911, art. 48, providing that one intending to commit a felony and through mistake or accident doing another act which, if _ voluntarily done, would be a felony shall receive the punishment for the offense actually committed, one shooting at anothfer and killing a third person is guilty of murder upon implied malice.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 23; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;17.]
Davidson, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Jasper County; A. E. Davis, Judge.
Walter Buckley was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Forse & Hamilton, of Newton, and J. T. Adams, of Orange, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, J.
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, his punishment being assessed at 10 years' confinement in the penitentiary.
The case originated in Newton county, and was transferred on change of venue to Jasper county, where it was tried. It may be stated this is a companion case to Harvey Davis v. State, reported in 172 S. W. 978. The two convictions grew out of the same transaction. It is deemed unnecessary to go into a detailed statement of the voluminous testimony. It is sufficient to state it substantially shows that Dock Hughes, Tom Hughes, Jr., Harvey Davis, and appellant got together with the understanding that they were going to whip a negro, and it may also be inferred that they may have gone far enough in their agreement to include more than one negro. In pursuance of this understanding, they went together, Harvey Davis being on horseback and the other three in a buggy; at least the four left in company and went to two or three different places and whipped two or three negroes. About midnight they concluded at the instigation of Dock Hughes, to go to the residence of Joe Kellum and give him a whipping. The reason for this is stat- eel to lie that it would make him raise á better crop than if he did not have the whipping. They reached Kellum's house somewhere between 12 and 1 o'clock at night. Dock Hughes sought entrance at the door, but did not obtain it. Tom Hughes, Jr., a relative of Dock Hughes, and Dock Hughes finally entered the house by breaking open the door. Kellum declined to let them enter the house. He was sleeping on one bed, and his wife on another in the same room. The contention of the state is that appellant went around to another door to prevent Kellum escaping from that direction, but it seems he did not remain there, but came away. At any rate, Dock Hughes and Tom Hughes entered the room. Grace Kellum, the deceased, expostulated with them for coming in her room, that she was dressed only in her night clothing, and asked them to leave. Grace Kellum had gone from her bed over to her husband's bed, and was sitting on it. Her husband, in the meantime, had obtained his gun, and secreted himself at the foot of the bed out of sight. Tom Hughes lighted a match. This went out, and he called for more matches, but deceased informed him they had none. He found a lamp and undertook to light it, but it contained no oil. About that time the shooting began. Joe Kellum, a state's witness, testified that Dock Hughes fired first. Tom Hughes, who turned state's evidence, testified that Joe Kellum fired first. Joe Kellum's shot took effect in Dock Hughes' body, from which he died. Dock Hughes shot Grace Kellum twice in the right breast. When Tom Hughes discovered that Dock Hughes had been shot, he picked up Dock's gun and walked to where the woman was, for the purpose of shooting her again. He found her in a dying condition, making a noise, indicating what we would call the "death rattle." When he did this appellant took the gun from him and prevented further shooting. She died shortly afterwards. The survivors were indicted for killing Grace Kellum.
The theory of the state was that this was a conspiracy between the parties to whip negroes, and among them Joe Kellum, and, that being true, that all the acts and subsequent events brought about by the four implicated made each responsible for everything that occurred, even to the killing of Grace Kellum. The appellant combated this theory from every standpoint that would suggest itself to counsel. They contend, first, that when Dock and Tom Hughes went into the house, he, appellant, would be bound no further than the agreement between them, if such an agreement was made, as contended by the state, to get Joe Kellum out and give him a whipping; that this did not contemplate a killing of Joe Kellum. The writer is disposed to agree with that theory of the case, but he may be in error about that under the recent case of Serrata v. State, 171 S. W. 1133, an opinion by Judge Harper, coincided in by Judge Prendergast. In that case I entered my dissent. But he that as it may, perhaps the court would have been justified in submitting the case upon the theory that, as they went there for the purpose of whipping Joe Kellum, had they killed Joe Kellum, appellant might have been responsible; he being there about the house at the time of such trouble. But Joe Kellum was not killed; he was not even shot at. Tom Hughes, the state's witness, who turned state's evidence, testified: That the woman was shot by Dock Hughes on purpose. He shot her twice while she was sitting on the bed, and, as I understand the record, Joe Kellum was not shot at, and was not even seen by the parties after they entered the house. That he fired from behind the foot of the bed and killed Dock Hughes, and Dock Hughes than killed Joe Kellum's wife. There is some evidence that Grace threatened the life of Dock and Tom Hughes after they entered the room. There is no evidence in this record, nor intimation from any source —-state or defendant — that Grace Kel-lum was included in any of their agreements, or that she was even thought of when they went to Joe Kellum's house. They went there to whip Joe Kellum. They did not seem to have known Grace Kellum was at home. If appellant and Harvey Davis and the two Hughes agreed to whip Joe Kellum, under the Serrata Case they possibly might be guilty of anything that followed, so far as Joe Kellum was concerned. But this rule certainly ought not to apply to Grace Kellum and her tragic ending, so far as appellant is concerned. He knew nothing of it until after the killing. It was not within the contemplation of any of the parties at the time they went to the house of Joe Kellum.
The court charged the jury on the law of principals in a general way, and then gave this charge:
"If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Walter Buckley, was present at the time Grace Kellum was killed, if she was killed, and if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Dock Hughes, Harvey Davis, and Tom Hughes, Jr., or either of them, killed Grace Kellum, if she was killed, yet, if you find from the evidence that the defendant, Walter Buckley, did- not aid or encourage the said Dock Hughes, Harvey Davis, or Tom Hughes, Jr., or either of them, to kill Joe Kellum or Grace Kellum, by any word or act or gesture, and did not know the unlawful intention, if any,, of the said Dock Hughes, Harvey Davis, and Tom Hughes, Jr., or either of them, to kill Grace Kellum or Joe Kellum, or to commit some unlawful act which might lead in its natural or probable consequences to the killing of Joe Kel-lum or Grace Kellum, or if you have a reasonable doubt about this, then you will find the defendant, Walter Buckley, not guilty."
Exception was reserved to this charge both before it was read to the jury and aft-erwards in motion for 'new trial, and reserved in a bill of exceptions independent of the original exceptions, among other things, that it placed the burden of proof on defendant, changed the reasonable doubt, and charged affirmatively that the jury must believe he did not aid or encourage the others in killing either Joe Kellum or Grace Kellum, before they could acquit him of killing Grace Kellum.
Again, the court charged the jury:
"If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Walter Buckley, either alone or acting as a principal with Dock Hughes, Harvey Davis, and Tom Hughes, Jr., or either of them, as that term has heretofore been defined to you, in the county of Newton, and state of Texas, on or about the 10th day of August, A. D. 1914, with a deadly weapon, did shoot and thereby kill Grace Kellum by mistake or accident, and at the time of the killing it was his intention, either alone or acting as principal with Dock Hughes, Harvey Davis, and Tom Hughes, Jr., or either of them, to kill Joe Kel-lum, and you further believe beyond a reasonable doubt that said killing was committed with malice aforethought, then you will find the defendant, Walter Buckley, guilty of murder."
Exception was reserved also to this charge and counter charges asked. These matters are properly presented without going into a detailed statement. We are of opinion that these charges were not correct. The burden of proof is on the state, and not the defendant. The defendant does not have to prove that he did not aid or encourage the killing. The state must prove that he did, and again the court coupled the killing of Joe Kellum, which may have possibly been within the terms of their agreement to whip him if he resisted, with the killing of Grace Kellum; it coupled Joe Kellum with Grace Kellum; and the jury is charged that if these parties killed either, they must find that appellant did not aid and encourage, before they could acquit. The second charge, wherein the court charged the jury with reference to a mistake or accident on the part of Dock Hughes and others in killing Grace Kellum,- was not raised by the facts. Tom Hughes, Jr., who turned state's evidence, makes it apparent that Dock Hughes killed the woman, deliberately and intentionally firing two shots while she was sitting on the bed. There is no evidence from this witness, as I understand this record, that Dock Hughes shot at Joe Kellum. In fact, he seems not to have shot at him; he was hid behind the bed, Dock shot and killed the woman. There was no mistake or accident in this matter. The theory of mistake or accident is based upon the theory that he was shooting at Joe Kellum, and by mistake or accident killed Grace Kellum. There is no evidence to sustain that proposition. The state's evidence excludes it. If Joe Kellum had been killed, appellant might be guilty of the homicide. But he certainly ought not to be held responsible for the act of Dock Hughes killing the woman sitting on the bed, either by mistake, accident, or purposely, under the facts of this case, and the jury should have been so instructed. In other words, before appellant could be convicted in this case for the death of Grace Kellum, it ought to have been shown that she .came within the terms of the agreement made between them. If after Dock Hughes got in the house he changed his mind, about the matter, or concluded to kill this woman, appellant ought not to have been charged with that unless he, in some way, knew and acquiesced in it before the killing. The state's evidence excludes that. The subsequent ratification would not have made him responsible. The doctrine of ratification of crime does not obtain. That was expressly decided in Walker v. State, 29 Tex. App. 621, 16 S. W. 548. In other words; to restate this case, as the law, it seems, ought to be enunciated, if, when these parties started out that night to whip one or more negroes, and finally by distinct agreement among themselves said they would whip Joe Kellum and thus cause him to make a better crop, and they went to his house for that purpose, all being there at the .house, in or about it, and around the yard, and Joe Kellum was killed under those circumstances, appellant would be brought within the terms of the homicide law, especially as announced in the Serrata Case, supra, and might be punished for the act of Dock Hughes. But he would not be responsible for the independent act, and with which he was in no way connected, and not within the terms of the original agreement, either directly or indirectly, in killing the woman. He ought not to be held responsible for that homicide, and the jury should have been told so plainly.
For the error in the charge of the court and failure of the court to submit the correct issues, this judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
<gw>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes