Case Name: McCULLEN v. NEW YORK & N. S. RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01-24
Citations: 74 N.Y.S. 209
Docket Number: 
Parties: McCULLEN v. NEW YORK & N. S. RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 74
Pages: 209–211

Head Matter:
(68 App. Div. 269.)
McCULLEN v. NEW YORK & N. S. RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
January 24, 1902.)
Carriers—Ejection of Passenger—Refusal of Fare—Instructions.
In an action against a railroad company for death resulting from the ejection of plaintiff’s intestate for refusing to pay his fare, though the court charged that, if a passenger refused to pay his fare, the conductor could then employ as much force as was necessary to effect his removal, using no violence and committing no unnecessary injury, its refusal to further charge that “if, however, the passenger refused to comply, and an injury happens,” the company was not responsible, was error, necessitating reversal of plaintiff’s judgment.
Goodrich, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Queens county.
Action by Margaret McCullen, as administratrix of John Wig-more, deceased, against the New York & North Shore Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
The instruction refused by the trial court appears in the dissenting opinion.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and BARTLETT, JENKS, WOODWARD, and HIRSCHBERG, JJ.
George E. Hickey (William E. Stewart, on the brief), for appellant.
J. Br.ownson Ker (M. P. O’Connor, on the brief), for respondent.

Opinion:
HIRSCHBERG, J.
Wigmore, the plaintiff's intestate, while a passenger on defendant's railroad, was asked by the conductor for his fare, and, refusing to pay the same, was ejected by the conductor, and received injuries which resulted in his death. We think the judgment and order must be reversed for the error contained in the refusal to charge at folios 423 and 424, the probable effect of which was to convey to the jury the idea that a recovery might be had for an injury which resulted from resistance on the part of the passenger to the act of lawfully ejecting him from the car, accompanied by no unnecessary violence. It is true the court had previously charged correctly upon the general question of the right of the defendant to eject the passenger under certain circumstances and conditions, using no unnecessary force. That no recovery could be had for an injury resulting from such resistance might be reasonably inferred, but was not expressly stated. The defendant was entitled to have the jury informed that, if injury resulted from such resistance, no recovery could be had; and had the court, upon the request being made, instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover within the spirit and meaning of what he had already charged, a different question would be presented. The express refusal to so charge when requested, in the absence of any previous direct information conveyed to the jury upon that subject, may have misled them into the belief that a recovery could be had for such injury, and we therefore think a new trial necessary.
WOODWARD, J., concurs. BARTLETT, J., concurs in result. JENKS, J., takes'no part.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event.