Case Name: Tharon RAWSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her minor children, Seth Rawson and Cindy Rawson, heirs of John R. Rawson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent; Bernice JOHNSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Michael Wayne Johnson, Ruth Ellen Johnson and John Russel Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent; Laura DUNBAR, as Guardian ad Litem for Rickina Rossiter and Glen Raymond Rossiter, Jr., minor children and heirs of Glen Raymond Rossiter, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent; Mary WOOD, as Guardian ad Litem for Leslie D. Wood, her minor child, heir of Don B. Wood, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1988-12-22
Citations: 115 Idaho 785
Docket Number: No. 15338
Parties: Tharon RAWSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her minor children, Seth Rawson and Cindy Rawson, heirs of John R. Rawson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Bernice JOHNSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Michael Wayne Johnson, Ruth Ellen Johnson and John Russel Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Laura DUNBAR, as Guardian ad Litem for Rickina Rossiter and Glen Raymond Rossiter, Jr., minor children and heirs of Glen Raymond Rossiter, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Mary WOOD, as Guardian ad Litem for Leslie D. Wood, her minor child, heir of Don B. Wood, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent.
Judges: SHEPARD, C.J., and BISTLINE, J„ concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 785–790

Head Matter:
770 P.2d 794
Tharon RAWSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her minor children, Seth Rawson and Cindy Rawson, heirs of John R. Rawson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Bernice JOHNSON, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Michael Wayne Johnson, Ruth Ellen Johnson and John Russel Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Laura DUNBAR, as Guardian ad Litem for Rickina Rossiter and Glen Raymond Rossiter, Jr., minor children and heirs of Glen Raymond Rossiter, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent. Mary WOOD, as Guardian ad Litem for Leslie D. Wood, her minor child, heir of Don B. Wood, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 15338.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Dec. 22, 1988.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 1989.
Kenneth B. Howard, Jr., Coeur d’Alene, and Lloyd J. Webb, Twin Falls, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bredhoff and Kaiser, Washington, D.C., for defendant-respondent. George H. Cohen argued.
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie, Boise, as amicus curiae. Richard B. Kading argued.

Opinion:
ON REMAND FROM WRIT OF CERTIORARI
HUNTLEY, Justice.
1986 Opinion No. 30, issued February 24, 1986, was withdrawn upon grant of rehearing and a new Opinion No. 124 of September 4, 1986, Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America, 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742, was entered. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately vacated the latter opinion, remanding to this Court for further consideration in light of IBEW, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). This opinion is issued pursuant to the remand.
I.
The directive of the United States Supreme Court requires that we reconsider this case in light of the single issue presented in Hechler, supra. That issue is whether the state-law tort actions of the plaintiffs herein are pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
In Hechler, supra, the court had before it a substantially different issue than that presented herein. The court stated the issue as follows:
The question presented by this case is whether a state-law tort claim that a union has breached its duty of care to provide a union member with a safe workplace is sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of § 301. (Emphasis supplied.)
Justice Blackmun characterized Hechler's complaint as follows:
In her complaint, she alleged that "pursuant to contracts and agreements entered into by and between" the Union and Florida Power, and "pursuant to the relationship by and between" the Union and respondent, the Union had a duty to ensure that respondent "was provided safety in her work place and safe work place," and to ensure that respondent "would not be required or allowed to take undue risks in the performance of her duties which were not commensurate with her training and experience."
And Justice Blackmun noted:
Respondent conceded: "The nature and scope of the duty of care owed [her] is determined by reference to the collective bargaining agreement."
107 S.Ct. at 2163, 64.
In the instant case we are not concerned with imposing a duty on the Union to provide a safe work place. Rather, the issue here is whether the LMRA pre-empted prosecution of a tort action where the activity was concededly undertaken and the standard of care is imposed by state law without reference to the collective bargaining agreement.
In Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 2963, 64 L.Ed.2d 839 (1980), this Court dealt with the issue of federal pre-emption of the field under the LMRA. The steelworkers argue that all relationships between a union and its members resulting from a collective bargaining agreement are pre-empted, with the union's duty being only that of "fair representation." Although the N.L.R.B. has been given exclusive jurisdiction to regulate and interpret collective bargaining agreements, it has no authority to award damages in tort in favor of members and against the union. We remain of the view expressed in Dunbar:
We are cited to no authority, for example, which insulates a union for its negligent and tortious conduct toward one of its members, i.e., if a member of a union was struck by a motor vehicle owned by the union and operated by one of its officials during the course of his employment for the union, we cannot believe the union would be insulated from liability on the basis that the only duty it owed toward its members was that of fair representation. If a union's unreasonable conduct results in the death of one of its members, it should not he excused from liability because of the legal fortuity of its organizational status anymore than if its conduct brought death to a nonunion member.
100 Idaho at 527, 528, 602 P.2d at 25, 26.
In Hechler, supra, the court further focused the issue:
Under the principle set forth in Allis-Chalmers [Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) ], we must determine if respondent's claim is sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of § 301. Respondent's state-law tort claim is based on her allegation that the Union owed a duty of care to provide her with a safe workplace and to monitor her work assignments to ensure that they were commensurate with her skills and experience. Under the common law, however, it is the employer, not a labor union, that owes employees a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a safe workplace.
(1985)] in providing a safe workplace. 107 S.Ct. at 2167.
In the instant case we are not faced with looking at the Collective Bargaining Agreement to determine whether it imposes some new duty upon the union — rather it is conceded the union undertook to inspect and, thus, the issue is solely whether that inspection was negligently performed under traditional Idaho tort law.
In Hechler, supra, the court noted:
Respondent's allegations of negligence assume significance if — and only if — the Union, in fact, had assumed the duty of care that the complaint alleges the Union breached. The collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Florida Power, and ancillary agreements between those parties, contain provisions on safety and working requirements for electrical apprentices on which Hechler could try to base an argument that the Union assumed an implied duty of care. In order to determine the Union's tort liability, however, a court would have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care on the Union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, that is, whether and to what extent, the Union's duty extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by respondent in her complaint. Thus, in this case, as in Allis-Chalmers, it is clear that "questions of contract interpretation . underlie any finding of tort liability." (Emphasis supplied.)
107 S.Ct. at 2168.
In the instant case there is no need to look to the agreement to discern whether it placed an "implied duty" on the union or whether the duty "extended to the particular responsibilities alleged" because here the parties concede the union did actively undertake the subject inspection duties. The only question is whether duties clearly undertaken were performed negligently.
The Hechler court noted further in footnote 5:
In her brief to this Court, respondent argues, for the first time, that her claim is not dependent on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, because the union's duty of care to her may arise through independent state law responsibilities placed upon the Union simply by virtue of its relationship with its members, rather than as a result of the collective-bargaining agreement. Brief for Respondent 15-19. Respondent points out that she alleged that the Union owed her a duty of care "pursuant to contracts and agreements" entered into between the Union and Florida Power "and pursuant to the relationship by and between" the Union and Hechler. App. 4 (emphasis added).
Even assuming that respondent's pleadings may be construed liberally as stating that various, unenumerated Florida laws place a duty of care on a union to provide a safe workplace for its members, respondent effectively abandoned that theory in the lower courts and we decline to consider the argument here.
107 S.Ct. at 2168.
Thus, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Hechler in that here the state tort basis of the action was not abandoned, but has been pursued consistently both at the trial and appellate levels and the tort exists without reference to the collective bargaining agreement.
Accordingly, Heckler is inapposite and does not stand for the proposition that a federal LMRA pre-emption exists in the instant case.
The June 1988 opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), would appear to be dispositive and controlling of this case. In ¡Angle, the question presented was whether an employee, covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided her with a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause, could enforce her state law remedy for retaliatory discharge.
In holding that the state tort remedy was not pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA, the court stated:
To defend against a retaliatory discharge claim, an employer must show that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, cf. Loyola University of Chicago v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 149 I.. [LL] App.3d 8 [102 Ill. Dec. 746] 500 N.E.2d 639 (1986); this purely factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy in this case is "independent" of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of "independent" that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.
. even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.
Likewise, in the instant case, no interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement is required to determine whether the union member of the inspection team committed a tort when he committed various acts and omissions such as failure to note the self-rescuers were stored in boxes with padlocks or that the activating valves of the oxygen-breathing-apparatuses were corroded shut. Rather, such alleged acts of negligence are measured by state tort law.
We therefore adhere to our opinion as written.
II.
Our Opinion No. 124 of September 4, 1986, ruled upon two primary issues other than the pre-emption issue in Part III thereof. In Part I we ruled for the union and against claimants on the fraud cause of action. In Part II we ruled for the claimants and against the union on the issue of whether a negligence cause of action would lie under Idaho law.
Counsel invites this Court to revisit those issues in this hearing on remand from cer-tiorari. However, since the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction only to require our reconsideration of matters involving federal law, our decisions in Parts I and II remain the law of the case and we decline to reopen them under certiorari procedure.
Costs to appellants, no attorney fees awarded.
SHEPARD, C.J., and BISTLINE, J" concur.