Case Name: Rawlings v. Rawlings et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1919-10
Citations: 121 Miss. 140
Docket Number: No. 20792
Parties: Rawlings v. Rawlings et al.
Judges: Holden, J., concurs.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 121
Pages: 140–185

Head Matter:
Rawlings v. Rawlings et al.
[83 South. 140,
In Banc.
No. 20792.]
I. Parent and Child. Duty of support. Enforcement by child of duty to support.
While it is the duty of a parent to support his infant child, yet the existence of this obligation on the part of a parent does not justify a court of equity in entertaining a bill or action by tbe child against its father to determine in advance the amount of support and maintenance and compel obedience to its orders in premises by imposing a lien upon property of the parent or otherwise.
2. Same.
The moral obligation of a parent to support his child is not directly enforceable, and a court of equity cannot compel the performance of this duty. The duty may be enforced however under statute, or directly, as where a stranger supplies an infant with necessaries and recovers therefor against the parent.
8. Homestead. Rights of children.
There is no provision in law giving a child an interest such as the wife has in the homestead or rather lands of the father.
Appeal from the chancery court of Adams county.
Hon. R. W. Cutrer, Chancellor.
Bill by Earl Rawlings and others by next friend against Thomas Rawlings. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
Ernest E.. Brown, for appellee.
I submit with confidence the lower court should have sustained the demurrer, even if the hill of complaint can be treated as if it had charged defendant was able to support complainant’s and had wrongfully refused to do so. In short a child cannot successfully maintain in Mississippi a suit in any court against his father for a support. As was decided in East v. King, 77 Miss. 738, he is legally liable to those who furnish his minor child with necessaries, where it is shown he was able to furnish ■ the necessaries and wrongfully refused to: do so, hut the child cannot sue the father for an allow-,* anee or act as the judge of wit at his father should furnish him. A disinterested third person' must, look into the question as to whether what ,*he furnishes the minor are necessaries that his father has wrongfully failed to furnish, and can only recover from the father upon alleging and proving he furnished necessaries the father could furnish and had wrongfully failed to furnish.
In many states where it is the law that a father is legally as well as morally hound to support his indigent minor child, there are statutes which prescribe how this legal duty may be enforced. In Mississippi a father who is able is liable legally as Avell as morally to support his minor child, who is indigent and incapable of supporting himself.
We have two statutes bearing upon the subject, to wit: Sections 3571 and 5055 (K) of Code of 1906, which reads as follows: “3571 (3148) Certain relatives bound to support pauper. — The father and grandfather, the mother and grandmother, and brothers and sisters, and the descendants of any pauper not able to work, as the board of supervisors shall direct, shall at their own charge, relieve and maintain such pauper; and in case of refusal shall forfeit and pay the county the sum of eight dollars per month, for each month they may so refuse, to be recovered in the name of the county; and shall be liable to any person who supplies such poor relative, if abandoned, with necessaries, not exceeding said sum per month.”
“5055. Vagrants, who are (Laws 1904, ch. 144): The following persons are and shall be punished as vagrants, viz: Every person who shall abandon his wife or family, without just cause, leaving, her or them without support, or in danger of becoming a public charge.”
Under section 3571, of Code of 1906, the father of a pauper child, who is unable to work, is liable for the support of such child and to pay the county eight dollars per month or any person who furnishes the necessaries for such child not exceeding eight dollars per month for every month he fails to furnish such child with necessaries.
Sec. 5055 (K) makes a father, who abandons his child without just cause, leaving him in danger of becoming a public charge a vagrant, and under the following section 5058 the father is made liable to commitment to jail, unless he gives bond for support of such child.
The above statutes contemplate that the county or a person furnishing the indigent child with necessaries can recover from a parent for same to an amount not exceeding eight dollars per month or that the state on an affidavit charging the father with being a vagrant on account of his leaving an indigent child without support can compel the father to give bond for support of his child for twelve months. There is however, no statute of this state or decision of this court that even hints that a child, no matter how young or indigent or helpless, can sue his father for a support. On the contrary every expression of this honorable court from its earliest history is opposed to the, contention of appellees that they can maintain a suit for a support against their father. It has expressly held a minor child could not recover from his father for personal injuries inflicted by his father upon him.
“The peace of society, and. of families composing society, and of a sound public policy, designed to sub-serve the repose of families and the best interest of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear. in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state through its criminal laws will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be held to demand.” ■Hewlett v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 703, 711.
In another case decided fifteen years later or during November Term, 1916, it was decided even that one standing in loco parentis towards a child is not liable in damages to the child for chastisement inflicted upon the child. Calhoun, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: “It is conceded and is plainly the law, that, if Holmes stood in loco parentis, there could be no civil action by the child, it is also conceded as is clear from this record, that he was in that relation, unless it was changed by the testimony of the mother, contradicted by several witnesses, that when she gave the child, she said she was not to be whipped. This does not alter the relation or change the status of the child, who was to be taken and treated as one of the children of the family.” Rosa Fortinberry by next Friend v. Marshall Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, lb. 42 So. 799.
It is true a chancery court has jurisdiction to render decrees for the management and sale of property of minors, but in the instant case no property or property rights of a minor are involved, but minors simply have sued their fathers for an allowance and asked that the allowance be made a lien upon property of their father. The lower court treated the suit of the minors as if it was one by an indigent wife for a decree for alimony against her husband, who was able to support her and had wrongfully failed so' to do. The chancery court is vested with full jurisdiction of marriage and divorce by chapter 37, of Code of 1906, and as divorces are discouraged by the courts in the interest of society as well as of the family life, this court has favored the granting of alimony to an indigent wife against an erring husband dissolving the bonds of matrimony. Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694; Verner v. Verner, 62 Miss. 260'; McFarland v. McFarland, 64 Miss. 449.
■ Where the wife is entitled to alimony either with or without a divorce being granted her, she has an interest which enables her to vacate an invalid conveyance of the homestead by the derelict husband. Scott v.. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 580.
The wife’s right to alimony constitutes an interest in her husband’s estate, which she can protect by describing in her bill of complaint the real estate of her husband upon which she wishes the alimony made a lien and by filing a lis pendens notice under section 3148, of code of 1906, describing the realty to be fixed with a lien for payment of the alimony. See Gallaspy’s Sons Go. v. 'Massey, 99 Miss. 208, 216.
There i.s, however, no statute of this state or decision of this court that even hints a minor child has an interest in his father’s estate that enables him to obtain a decree against his father for a support and fix as security for its payment a lien upon his father’s realty, and the decision of the lower court is contrary to all previous expressions of this court, which deny the minor child .the right to sue his father even for a personal injury.
Should the startling decision of the chancellor be affirmed and established as the law in this state, parental discipline will be undermined, the welfare of society and peace of families disturbed and the courts likely be flooded with suits by extravagant and unruly minor children against their fathers for unreasonable alloivances to be fixed as liens upon real estate of their fathers, in which they have no interest w-hatever.
Parental discipline, the peace of the family and public policy forbid that a minor child should have the right to sue his father for an allowance and have same fixed as á lien upon the father’s realty.
L. T. Kennedy, for appellee.
It is admitted that it is the legal duty of the father to support and maintain his children and complainants in pursuance of their legal rights ask a remedy. We will take up the questions presented in counsel’s brief in their order.
He contends there is no description given in the bill of complaint of the plantations, neither the county in which they are located, nor whether they are income producing or not. Our answer to this is — that it is not necessary to describe the property in detail in the bill of complaint, but the lis pendens notice is the proper place to insert the description of the property. As to whether the property is income producing or not is absolutely immaterial upon the question of the children’s right to a support from their father. The law books lay down the principle that it is the duty of the father to support and maintain his children, and we nowhere find this principle conditioned upon the fact as to whether or not his property is income producing, or whether or not he is able financially. The question of his ability financially only has to do with the amount or the station in life in which he shall maintain his children. We submit that it is not necessary that it should be alleged that the father is able to support his children.
However, the bill of complaint alleges that he is the owner of certain plantations and the lis pendens record in the same cause and obtained by the complainants sets up the name of the three plantations aggregating about twenty-two hundred acres.
The ability of the father to support the children is only a question going to the amount, which he should be required to expend for their support and is purely defensive and cannot be raised by demurrer.
If he is not the owner of the plantations described in the lis pendens, then the notice could in no wise affect him and he has no just cause of complaint with respect to such action. If he does own the three plantations, a presumption of which, we think fairly arises from the record if it is not distinctly stated as a fact, it then come§ with very poor grace that he should present to this court by way of demurrer, that it should first be shown he is able to support his children, notwithstanding he owns twenty-two hundred acres of land.
In the next place, counsel urges that a child cannot successfully maintain a suit in Mississippi against its father for support. The proceeding- is based entirely upon that principle of law, that makes it the duty of the father to support the child and that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy.
Section 35071, of the Code, which permits any person, who supplies a child with necessities to recover from the parent was simply granting a right to third persons, who had furnished necessities to a child, and in no wise was intended to take away from the child the remedy to pursue his. own rights.
The case of East v. King 77 Miss. 738, cited by counsel only construes the statute by simply stating that a father is legally liable to one who furnishes his minor child with necessities. It does not hold that the child itself could not recover. It would place the law in a very peculiar situation to hold that a minor child had a right to demand support of its father, but that its only remedy was to induce some third person to furnish ■ him with the necessities of life and that the third person, at his own costs, expense and risk should recover from the father of the child by showing that the father was able to support the child, that he had refused, and that the supplies furnished were necessities for the child. If such is the law, where is the third person, or the merchant, who would assume such responsibilities and take such risks to furnish the necessities for the helpless children of an unworthy parent?
Counsel for appellant' relies upon the cases of. Heiolett v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 703: Fortenberry v. Marshall, 89 Miss. 373, but both of those cases were seeking civil redress for personal injuries, suffered by a child at the instance of the parent. The court held that a child could not seek civil redress in our courts for- per-.' sonal injury by a parént or a person who stood in loco-, parentis towards a child or who was exercising their parental authority. Both of those rested upon a principle far removed from the one sought to be enforced is the case at bar. Both are based upon an allegation of abuse of parental authority. The case at bar is based upon a legal right of the child and the legal duty of the father. Both of those cases were based upon an alleged commission of a wrong and this case is based upon an admitted omission of a legal duty.
It is perfectly plain to any one that our courts should not be open to children to sue their parents on account of chastisement. But it is equally as plain that our courts should be and are open to children to obtain from their father, their just rights. There is no question in the case at bar affecting or questioning the exercise of parental authority, but merely the neglect of a parental duty.
The case is not based upon section 1673 of the Code of 1906, upon the question of the court having authority to make all orders touching the care of children, when a divorce shall have been granted, but we can find a very helpful decision upon that section in connection with the case at bar. In the case of Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694, annotated under the above section, it was held that the above section did not prevent the courts from entertaining bills and making decrees for separate maintainance for the wife, without a bill for divorce, the principle in the Garland case is not based upon the above section, but it is based upon the duty of the husband to support the wife and the court says, that such a proceeding is not prevented by section 1673.
It is the duty under the law for the husband to support a wife, but the wife may lose her right by wrong doing. It is likewise the duty of the parent or father to support a minor child and the right may be enforced in like manner. The right of a wife to separate maintainance, without a divorce, is not based on any statute, but is a right by virtue of the relation and the courts afford a remedy.
We do not for one moment contend that minor children, who are living with their father and being supported in the same way he is supported, eating at his table and living in his home could successfully maintain an action against him for failure to support them. Such a parent would not be a vagrant under our statute, but where a parent does not live with his minor children, does not support them or does not" contribute anything to their support, but has promised time and time again that he would do such; has three plantations and when called upon by the court even then demurs, to a bill of complaint, that asks support for six minor children, we submit that a different state of facts is submitted.

Opinion:
Stevens, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The six minor children of Thomas Rawlings, appellant, exhibited, by next friend, their bill of complaint against their father, alleging that the defendant had not lived with them or their mother for a number of years; that their father had not for a long period contributed anything to their support; that the mother was not able to care for them and that they were without means of support; that the defendant was the owner of a certain plantation, and that this plantation "is liable to them for a support." The prayer of the bill is that upon final hearing "the court will ascertain what amount is sufficient for the monthly support of said minor children, and order and decree that such amount be paid monthly by the defendant, and that the same be •made a lien upon the property of the defendant," etc. The alleged plantation of the defendant is not described in the bill, but a lis pendens notice was filed, indicating in a general way the real estate upon which a lien is. sought. The defendant demurred to the bill, the demurrer was overruled, and this appeal prosecuted.
This is not an action for board and lodging furnished the minors, either by the mother or a third person. This is a proceeding in equity to have the chancellor fix in advance a monthly allowance for the infant children of the defendant, to enter a decree requiring the defendant to pay the sum fixed, and to adjudge a lien upon the defendant's real estate for the sums so ordered to be paid. The law as known and expounded for centuries fails to sanction any such proceeding. We recognize to the fullest extent the obligation of a parent to support his infant child, and nothing said in this opinion would discount in the least this primary obligation, imposed by the law of nature. The question before us is one as to the remedy in the case made by the bill. (l)oes the existence of the obligation on the part of the parent justify a court of equity in entertaining a •bill or action by the child against its father to determine in advance the amount of support and maintenance, and compel obedience to its orders in the premises by imposing a lien upon property or otherwise 1 On this point the authorities are in accord. In 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), p. 1052, it is said:
"The moral obligation of a parent to support his child is not directly enforceable, and a court of equity •cannot compel the performance of this duty. The duty may be enforced, however, under statute, or indirectly, as where a stranger' supplies an infant with necessaries and recovers therefor against the parent."
In 20 R. C. L. par. 31, it is said that:
"The civil remedy is more commonly worked out by holding that, if the father leaves his children destitute, he confers on any one who finds them in that condition an agency to supply them with necessaries; the volun teer can therefore recover the cost of the supplies from the father in a civil action."
Practically the same declaration is made in the text of Cyc. (volume 29, p. 1614), and on page 1683 it is -pointed out that "actions by children against their parents are not to be encouraged, . . . and a minor child has no right of action against a parent for the tort of the latter." In the footnotes to the text last quoted is our own case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682. In this case, which appears in our reports as Hewlett v. Ragsdale, our court, by Woods, J., in forcible language declared:
"The peace of society, and of the families composing-society, and a sound public policy, designed to sub-serve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the • rumor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand. ' '
This language was quoted with approval by the supreme court of Tennessee in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A. 991, 102 Am. St. Rep. 787, 1 Ann. Cas. 130. There has been brought to our attention nd case which, based upon the common law or general equity jurisdiction, sanctions this proceeding. On the contrary, the exact question was elaborately considered, and the point ruled adversely to the contention of complainants, in the case of Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308. In the Huke Case, a daughter seventeen years of age, by next friend, filed her petition in equity against her father for support and maintenance. It was there, as here, contended that the chancellor has full jurisdiction over the persons and property of infants but the court of appeals of Missouri observed:
"This action proceeds in the face of elementary principles."
The court further said: "No instance is found in the books where such an action as the present has been maintained, either at law or in equity. At one period in our English history a statute was enacted that, if any Popish parent should refuse to allow his Protestant child a fitting maintenance, with a view to compel him to ,change his religion, the Lord Chancellor 'should, by order of the court, constrain him to do what is just and reasonable. Stat. 11 & 12 "W. Ill, c. 4. The very enactment of this statute — the necessity in the state of the law for such a statute — shows that a father was under no compulsory obligation at common law, or by the principles of equity, to support his infant child. A case arose after the passing of this statute, making this conclusion still more clear. The daughter of a wealthy Jew had embraced Christianity, and he turned her out of doors. On the petition of the parish for relief against him, they were held entitled to none, because it was not alleged that she was poor or likely to become chargeable. 1 Ld. Raym. 699. This gave occasion for another statute, which ordained that, if Jewish parents should refuse to allow their Protestant children a fitting maintenance, suitable to the fortune of the parents, the Lord Chancellor, on complaint, might make such order as he should see proper. Stat. 1 Anne, c. 30; 1 Bla. Com. 449. . . . No court of chancery in England ever made an order requiring a father, however wealthy, to set apart out of his own estate a fund for the maintenance and education of his infant child, or even to provide sustenance for such child. The common law of England has, from the earliest times, left this duty to the natural feelings of the parents, and experience has shown that the confidence has riot in general been misplaced."
An in Alling v. Alling, 52 N. J. Eq. 92, 27 Atl. 655, paragraph. 1 of the headnotes reads:
"1. A court of chancery has no jurisdiction to compel a parent to support an infant child."
In the opinion by Pitney, V. C., the following language by the supreme court of Connecticut in Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411, is quoted with approval:
"Connected with this obligation of maintenance there is a parental privilege. The parent is entitled to the custody and care of the child which he sustains, and to such service as it can render, and he has a right to exercise his own discretion in determining the fitness and necessity of the allowances to be made and of the support to be furnished to his children, for which he is to be made chargeable."
If the jurisdiction of equity has been enlarged in any of the states of the Union, it is certainly based upon some statute. We have in our state two statutes* which indirectly bear upon the subject. Section 3571, Code of 1.906 (section 6188, Hemingway's Code), imposes a duty upon certain relatives to support pauper members of their family. By this statute the father of a pauper child is made liable to the county in the sum of eight dollars per month for each month the father lias failed or refused to provide the necessary support and maintenance, and furthermore is made liable to any person in like sum who supplies such poor relatives with necessaries. By section 5055 (section 3332) every person who abandons his wife or family without just cause, leaving her or them without support, or in danger of becoming a public charge, is declared a vagrant, and punishable as such. Statutes for the protection of the poor have been enacted in England, and in most, if not all, the states of the Union. The English Statute of 43 Eliz. c. 2, provides:
"The father and mother, grandfather and grandmother, of poor, impotent persons, shall maintain them, if of sufficient ability, according as the quarter session shall direct."
In considering the Connecticut statute, declared to be "nearly a transcript of the English statute on this subject," the supreme court of Connecticut ruled that their statutory' provisions "embrace as well minor as adult children." Finch v. Finch, supra, 22 Conn. 416. Poor infants cannot then be said to be without some' remedy. If a father, though able, becomes so depraved as willfully to abandon his offspring, he is answerable to the criminal laws of our commonwealth. But such cases' must be few indeed. When they exist, they are generally the result of differences between husband and wife and a home broken up by domestic troubles. And in cases of divorce the chancery court is given jurisdiction by statute (section 1673, Code of 1906; section 1415, Hemingway's Code.) to "make all orders touching the care, custody, and maintenance of the children of the marriage," that "may seem equitable and just," and afterwards may "change the decree, and make from time to time such new decrees as the case may require."
We are not justified in enlarging the jurisdiction of chancery beyond that indicated by the statute, and in opening the door of the courts to any unruly or disobedient child who may complain at either the amount or kind of support and maintenance provided by the father. The same reasons that led the court to the conclusion reached in Hewlett v. Ragsdale, supra, are persuasive here. "The repose of families and. best interests of society forbid" any such action. If the chancellor can fix in advance the amount of support each dissatisfied child must receive, then is parental authority superseded by judicial fiat, parental discipline swept away by self-assertion and disobedience on the part of children, and the integrity of the home, the corner stone of society, is undermined. The bill even prays that a lien be fixed upon the father's real estate. By no provision of law is the child given an interest, such as the wife has, in the homestead or other lands of the father.
For the reasons indicated, the decree of the learned chancellor will be reversed, the demurrer sustained, and decree entered here in appellant's favor.
Reversed, and decree here.