Case Name: CRAWFIS v. GARDNER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-11-12
Citations: 65 Mich. App. 502
Docket Number: Docket No. 20947
Parties: CRAWFIS v GARDNER
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 65
Pages: 502–511

Head Matter:
CRAWFIS v GARDNER
Opinion of the Court
1. Statutes — Procedural Law — Amendments—Applicability.
A new statute dealing with procedure only prima facie applies to all actions, those which have accrued or are pending and future actions; no vested right can exist to keep statutory procedural law unchanged and free from amendment.
2. Intoxicating Liquors — Statutes—Dramshop Act — Amendments —Retrospective Application.
A statutory amendment to the dramshop act which states that "no action against a retailer or wholesaler or anyone covered by this act or his surety, shall be commenced unless the minor or the alleged intoxicated person is a named defendant in the action and is retained in the action until trial or settlement” is applicable in an action arising out of a motorcycle-automobile collision where the sequence of events was accident, amendment of statute, suit commenced thereafter and then release of the alleged intoxicated person (MCLA 436.22).
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, J.
3. Statutes — Construction—Prospective Application — Retrospective Application.
The general rule is that a statute is to be construed as having a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that its terms should operate retrospectively.
4. Intoxicating Liquors — Statutes—Dramshop Act — Amendments —Applicability.
An amendment to the dramshop act which attaches liability only if a bar patron is visibly intoxicated when served, and reduces the damages potentially recoverable by plaintiffs, as well as providing that no action may be commenced unless the patron is a named defendant and is retained in the action until the litigation is concluded, effects a major substantive change in a plaintiff’s cause of action; the amendment applies only to a wrongful furnishing of intoxicants occurring after the effective date of the amendment and not to an injury which occurs prior to enactment of the amendment.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 350-352.
[2, 4] 45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 79 et seq.
Appeal from Oakland, John N. O’Brien, J.
Submitted October 9, 1975, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 20947.)
Decided November 12, 1975.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by Judy A. Crawfis and Theodore J. Dietrich against Clifford G. Gardner, Robert Tassi, Thomas D. and Beverly A. Spencer, Donald L. and Mildred E. Collier, and Loy Limbaugh, for damages arising out of a motorcycle-automobile collision and for violation of the dramshop act. Summary judgments entered in favor of defendants Spencer, Limbaugh, and Collier. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Hamed W Suffety, P. C., for plaintiff Judy A. Crawfis.
John B. LaDue, for plaintiff Theodore J. Dietrich.
Ulanoff, Ross & Summer, P. C, for defendants Thomas D. and Beverly A. Spencer and Loy Limbaugh.
Leonard A. Baun, for defendants Donald L. and Mildred E. Collier.
Before: Quinn, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and D. F. Walsh, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, P. J.
Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of defendants Spencer and Limbaugh. The only question presented involves an interpretation of 1972 PA 196 which amended MCLA 436.22; MSA 18.993 (dramshop act).
May 27, 1972, a collision occurred between a motorcycle driven by plaintiff Dietrich and a car driven by defendant Gardner. Plaintiff Crawfis was a passenger on the motorcycle. Defendant Gardner was allegedly intoxicated.
1972 PA 196 became effective June 29, 1972. It amended MCLA 436.22 by adding the following:
"No action against a retailer or wholesaler or anyone covered by this act or his surety, shall be commenced unless the minor or the alleged intoxicated person is a named defendant in the action and is retained in the action until the litigation is concluded by trial or settlement."
It is commonly referred to as "the name and retain provision".
Sometime thereafter, plaintiffs commenced this action against Gardner. With permission, plaintiffs amended their complaint September 17, 1973 by adding bar owner defendants Tassi, Spencer and Collier as parties defendant and charging them with violation of the Dramshop Act.
November 26, 1973 and December 3, 1973, plaintiffs executed releases to Gardner, and on December 28, 1973, pursuant to stipulation, an order entered dismissing Gardner as a defendant.
April 9, 1974, defendants Spencer moved for summary judgment claiming that the release to Gardner acted as a release to them under amended MCLA 436.22. By order of April 17, 1974, this motion was granted.
With permission, plaintiffs again amended their complaint May 23, 1974 by adding bar owner Limbaugh as a party defendant and charging him with violation of the Dramshop Act. He moved for summary judgment on the same grounds that Spencers had asserted and this motion was granted by order of June 26, 1974 and by agreement, defendants Collier were included in the order.
It is plaintiffs' contention that since their cause of action arose prior to the effective date of the "name and retain" amendment, it is inapplicable because legislation is prospective unless the Legislature clearly states that the act shall be retrospective. We accept this basic rule of statutory construction, but it is inapplicable to this case.
Plaintiffs' cause of action against the bar owner defendants was statutory. The statute specified how the statutory right was to be enforced. The "how to enforce provisions" are procedural and are generally held to operate retrospectively, unless a clear contrary intention is shown. When a new statute deals with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all actions, those which have accrued or are pending and future actions. No vested right can exist to keep statutory procedural law unchanged and free from amendment, Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors, 371 Mich 480, 485; 124 NW2d 286, 288 (1963).
Prior to the time plaintiffs commenced their action against defendant bar owners the "name and retain" amendment was in effect, and by releasing Gardner, plaintiffs came under its limitation.
On the surface, this appears contrary to Koehler v DRT Sportservice, Inc, 55 Mich App 567; 223 NW2d 461 (1974), but in reality it is not. In the case before us, the sequence of events was accident, amendment of statute, suit commenced thereafter and then release. In Koehler, the sequence was accident, release, amendment of statute and then suit. We read Koehler in context with the facts of Koehler, and while it had factual support for the holding that the amendment affected substantive rights, that holding should be limited to Koehler and similar cases. It is not controlling precedent for holding procedural changes substantive changes when no substantive rights are involved.
Affirmed with costs to defendants Collier.
D. F. Walsh, J., concurred.