Case Name: Natalie DAVIS, Clyde Taylor, Benjamin Robinson, Richard Davison, Mary Hoosack, Charles Colder, Farlea Howie, Elroy Savage, Helen Myers, Monica Androski, and Kenneth Miller v. CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Jeffrey Leggette, Kirkwood Cottman, Andrea Golson, Fred Moon, Donald Masse, Charles Davis, and Joscelyn Keeve Bagley. Appeal of: Chester Upland School District et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2001-12-19
Citations: 786 A.2d 186
Docket Number: 
Parties: Natalie DAVIS, Clyde Taylor, Benjamin Robinson, Richard Davison, Mary Hoosack, Charles Colder, Farlea Howie, Elroy Savage, Helen Myers, Monica Androski, and Kenneth Miller v. CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Jeffrey Leggette, Kirkwood Cottman, Andrea Golson, Fred Moon, Donald Masse, Charles Davis, and Joscelyn Keeve Bagley. Appeal of: Chester Upland School District et al.
Judges: Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 786
Pages: 186–190

Head Matter:
Natalie DAVIS, Clyde Taylor, Benjamin Robinson, Richard Davison, Mary Hoosack, Charles Colder, Farlea Howie, Elroy Savage, Helen Myers, Monica Androski, and Kenneth Miller v. CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Jeffrey Leggette, Kirkwood Cottman, Andrea Golson, Fred Moon, Donald Masse, Charles Davis, and Joscelyn Keeve Bagley. Appeal of: Chester Upland School District et al.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued April 30, 2001.
Decided Dec. 19, 2001.
Leo A. Hackett, Media, for Chester Unpland School District, et al.
Deborah A. Krull, Media, Leonard V. Tenaglia, Darby, Joseph W. Chupein, Media, for Natalie Davis, Clyde Taylor, et al.
Michelle F. Duggan, for amicus curiae.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by allowance from an order of Commonwealth Court which affirmed in part and reversed in part a declaratory judgment issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County in a ease where furloughed professional employees of a school district claimed that they should have been recalled to fill certain newly created positions of employment.
Appellees Natalie Davis, et al., were tenured, professional employees of the Chester Upland School District (Chester Upland), appellant. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a decrease in student enrollment caused Chester Upland to suspend appellees from their positions of employment. See 24 P.S. § 11-1124(1) (Public School Code provision authorizing suspension of professional employees in the event of a substantial decrease in enrollment). Subsequently, Chester Upland experienced an increase in student discipline problems. To remedy this, new positions for professional employees were created at the end of 1992. Without offering the newly created positions to ap-pellees, Chester Upland hired new employees, namely, Jeffrey Leggette, et al., appellants.
Appellees filed an action in the court of common pleas seeking a declaratory judgment that they, rather than appellants, should have been hired for the positions. They alleged that they were qualified to fill the positions, that they had seniority over appellants, and that they were entitled to fill those positions pursuant to section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Public School Code. That section, in relevant part, provides:
Suspended professional employes or professional employes demoted for the reasons set forth in section 1124 shall be reinstated on the basis of their seniority within the school entity. No new appointment shall be made while there is such a suspended or demoted profes sional employe available who is properly certificated to fill such vacancy.
24 P.S. § ll-1125.1(d)(2).
Appellants responded that an action seeking a declaratory judgment could not be sustained. They asserted that, rather than filing an action in court, appellees were required to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement between Chester Upland and the teachers' association. On the basis that the agreement did not specifically address the rehiring of furloughed employees, however, the trial court rejected the argument that the matter should have been submitted to arbitration. Reasoning that appellees were qualified to fill the positions and that they had more seniority than appellants, it held that Chester Upland violated section 1125.1(d)(2), supra, by not rehiring appel-lees.
Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's order in part, on the basis that one of the newly created positions did not require certification and, thus, that Chester Upland had no duty to recall furloughed employees to fill that position. With regard to all of the other positions, however, it affirmed the trial court's order requiring that appellees be rehired.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing appellees, who are subject to a collective bargaining agreement that contains a grievance procedure, to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding their work-related complaint.
It has long been recognized that there is a strong public policy in favor of the arbitration of labor disputes. Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 280, 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983). Implementing that policy, the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), 43 P.S. § 1101.903, provides that "[arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory." (Emphasis added). Hence, appellees were required to take this dispute to arbitration, unless the dispute was outside the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The agreement between Chester Upland and its teachers' association sets forth a procedure by which all grievances are to be resolved. The purpose of this provision, the agreement states, is "to secure, at the lowest possible level, equitable solutions to the problems which may from time to time arise affecting teachers." Article III(B). The procedure involves a number of measures designed to resolve the dispute, and, where those measures fail, the dispute goes to arbitration. The initial levels of grievance resolution can be pursued by teachers with or without the assistance of the teachers' association. Article 111(D)(1). Where those measures fail, the association can be asked to submit the matter to arbitration. Article 111(C)(6)(a).
The present agreement sets forth a definition of grievance that Chester Upland asserts to be broad enough to encompass the present dispute, i.e., to bring the matter within the terms of the agreement. Specifically, Article 111(A)(1) provides:
A "grievance" is a complaint between a teacher and/or the Association and the School District in accordance with the procedures and Grievance Report forms incorporated herein as within this Article.
Whether the dispute between ap-pellees and Chester Upland is in fact a grievance that can be arbitrated under the collective bargaining agreement must, at least initially, be left to an arbitrator to decide. As we stated in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Bald Eagle School District, 499 Pa. 62, 65, 451 A.2d 671, 672 (1982), "[w]e have consistently held that '[t]he question of the scope of the grievance arbitration procedure is for the arbitrator, at least in the first instance.' Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 75, 391 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1978)". Thus, pursuant to the PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.903, supra, all questions of whether a matter is arbitrable must be decided in the first instance by an arbitrator, not a trial court. Id.; Chester Upland School District v. McLaughlin, 544 Pa. 199, 675 A.2d 1211 (1996) (affirming on the opinion of Commonwealth Court, 655 A.2d 621 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995)).
The trial court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to proceed in this matter, inasmuch as there had been no decision by an arbitrator as to the arbitrability of the dispute. Accordingly, Commonwealth Court erred in upholding the trial court's issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Order reversed.
SAYLOR, J., files a dissenting opinion in which NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ., join.
Appellees' motion to quash appeal and vacate the order of Commonwealth Court is denied.