Case Name: Frank SIMPSON, Appellant, v. W. A. WOODHAM, as Sheriff of Gadsden County, Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-06-07
Citations: 332 So. 2d 693
Docket Number: No. Y-400
Parties: Frank SIMPSON, Appellant, v. W. A. WOODHAM, as Sheriff of Gadsden County, Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 332
Pages: 693–695

Head Matter:
Frank SIMPSON, Appellant, v. W. A. WOODHAM, as Sheriff of Gadsden County, Florida, Appellee.
No. Y-400.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 7, 1976.
Jack A. Harnett, of Harnett & Curry, Quincy, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
BOYER, Chief Judge.
Appellant, who was arrested in Florida for extradition to Alabama, argues here that he is entitled to be discharged from custody because the rendition warrant issued by the Governor of Florida was not physically filed or introduced into evidence in the proceedings on his petition for ha-beas corpus which was heard in the Circuit Court. We agree.
Introduction of the Governor's warrant is essential, and the warrant should be introduced in order to test the competency of the evidence supporting it. DiPiero v. State, Fla.App. 3rd 1974, 300 So.2d 700. The DiPiero case is virtually identical to the case sub judice, except in the former, the defendant was in the process of being extradited to Maryland instead of Alabama. The prosecutor totally failed to introduce into evidence the Governor of Florida's rendition warrant, and, while he did offer to introduce the Governor of Maryland's warrant into evidence, the warrant was never successfully introduced.
It may be considered formalism to require a piece of evidence to be formally introduced into evidence in light of the fact that the evidence was unquestionably before the court, but we are of the view that "evidence", waved around in the presence of the trier of the facts, judge or jury, may not be properly considered unless and until it is introduced into evidence. As stated in the DiPiero case, introduction of the Governor's rendition warrant was vital to the State's case. The warrant was, in effect, the only piece of evidence that could serve as the basis for introduction of the other evidence adduced. It would be a dangerous precedent indeed to hold that vital and essential evidence may be considered although not introduced.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of certiorari is reversed, with directions that appellant be discharged.
REVERSED.
MILLS, J., concurs.
SMITH, J., dissents.