Case Name: LEE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-04-10
Citations: 148 S.W. 706
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEE v. STATE.
Judges: DAVIDSON, P. J., not sitting.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 148
Pages: 706–713

Head Matter:
LEE v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 10, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, June 19, 1912.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 193% ) — Former Jeopardy — Subsequent Trial por Lesser Op-penses.
Defendant, indicted for murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in the second degree, after a reversal of that judgment, could not be again tried for murder in the first de gree, but could be tried again on tbe indictment for murder in the second degree and lesser offenses.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 366, 387, 389, 394; Dec. Dig. § 193%. ]
2. Juey (§ 58 ) — Drawing Jury — Jury Wheel Law — Constitutionality.
Jury Wheel Law (Acts 30th Leg. c. 139), which provides that the keys for the jury wheel shall be kept by the sheriff and the district clerk, and that the clerk and the sheriff shall draw from the wheel the names of jurors, and that when a special trial is ordered the clerk shall draw from the wheel the names required, is constitutional.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 266; Dec. Dig. § 58. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 1171 ) — Appeaj>—Harmless Error — Conduct oe Trial.
In a trial for murder, where the district attorney, after having been told that certain pictures were not admissible, offered them in evidence, but the jury were not permitted to see them, his conduct was harmless.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3126, 3127; Dec. Dig. § 1171. ]
4. Witnesses (§ 363 ) — Impeachment—Bias or III Feeling.
The bias, prejudice, or state of feeling of a witness toward a person on trial may be shown.
[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1177, 1178, 1181; Dec. Dig. § 363. ]
5. Criminal Law (§§ 419, 420 ) — Evidence-Hearsay.
Where defendant, in a trial for murder, testified that he was knocked down by deceased and lost his watch and had been informed that a certain person had picked it up and brought it to the police station, and the chief of police testified that such person had brought accused’s watch to him and delivered it, evidence as to what the finder said to the chief of police at the time he delivered the watch was hearsay and not admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 973-983; Dec. Dig. §§ 419, 420. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 1153 ) — Trial—Reception oe Evidence.
In a trial for murder, permitting a witness for the state, after defendant had testified, to reiterate in rebuttal a part of his testimony on a material point, was not such gross abuse of the trial court’s discretion as to require a reversal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3061-3066; Dec. Dig. § 1153. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 730 ) — Appeal—Argument oe Counsel.
In a trial for murder, the district attorney said that he hoped that his right hand would shiver at his side before he would ever ask a jury to convict a man when the evidence did not show his guilt, never, never, and that he dismissed whenever he had no evidence to convict a ease. Held that, considered with the court’s verbal instruction that the jury could not consider such remark, it was not error.
[Ed. Note. — For other’ cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. § 730. ]
8. Criminal Law (§ 720% ) — Trial — Remarks oe District Attorney.
In a trial fcir murder, after a remark of the district attorney had been withdrawn from the jury, his statement, that never in any case would he submit to the jury a case where the evidence did not justify a conviction, was unobjectionable. ,
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1677; Dec. Dig. § 720%. ]
9. Homicide (§ 340 ) — Triai^Instructions —Manslaughter.
In a trial for murder, where the charge on manslaughter was that approved on a former appeal, with the addition that an assault and battery, a blow inflicted by deceased causing pain to defendant, was adequate cause for manslaughter, the additional instruction was without injury where defendant was convicted only of manslaughter.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 715, 717, 720; Dec. Dig. § 340. ]
10. Homicide (§ 300 ) — Trial—Instruction on Sele-Deeense.
Where defendant in a trial for murder testified that deceased knocked a third person down, and_ on remonstrance by defendant, knocked him down, advanced toward him, threw his hand behind him, and said, “I will just kill you,” and that defendant then fired one shot, got to his feet, and fired two more, thinking that deceased was going to kill him, an instruction that a reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm will excuse one in using all necessary force to protect his life or person, and that in such case the party acting under such real or apparent danger was not bound to retreat in order to avoid killing his assailant, and that if deceased, when killed by defendant, had made, or was making, an attack with a weapon calculated to produce death or bodily harm, defendant was not guilty, and that in determining the question the facts and circumstances should be considered as they appeared to defendánt at the time, was proper.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Gent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dee. Dig. § 300. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
11. Homicide (§ 169 ) — Admissibility oe Evidence — Quarrel Between Defendant and Third Person.
Defendant’s quarrel with a third person just previous to his killing of deceased was admissible as showing the condition of his mind and the circumstances that led up to the killing.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Gent. Dig. §§ 341-350; Dec. Dig. § 169. ]
12. Witnesses (§ 255*) — Examination—Refreshing Memory.
■ Where a witness for the state said that he did not remember, the district attorney might refresh his memory by showing him his testimony at a former trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Gent. Dig. §§ 874-890; Dec. Dig. § 255. ]
13. Criminal Law (§ 853*) — Conduct oe Trial — Discussion About Admissible Evidence.
Where evidence is properly admissible, a discussion in the presence of the jury about admitting it is not error.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal. Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1459, 1535, 1591, 1592, 1730, 2010; Dec. Dig. § 853. ]
14. Homicide (§ 269 ) — Trial—Instructions —Self-Defense.
Where the statute makes a certain thing adequate cause for manslaughter or defines the existence of certain conditions to be adequate cause, and the facts show the existence of such conditions at the time of the question, the is sue of adequate cause must be submitted to the jury.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 563; Dec. Dig. § 269. ]
15.. Homicide (§ 309 ) — Manslaughter—Evidence— Instructions.
Where accused testified that, just before the shooting, deceased, on accused’s verbal remonstrance for some act, knocked accused down, advanced on him, threw his hand behind him, and said that he would kill him, and accused as he was getting up fired one shot and two more after he had gotten to his feet, that the blow hurt when struck and for a couple of days afterwards and knocked the breath out of defendant and dazed him, an instruction that an assault and battery, a blow inflicted by deceased upon defendant causing pain or any condition creating sudden passion, was adequate cause for manslaughter, and that if defendant, in a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, as the same has been herein-before explained, and not in defense of himself, killed deceased, he was guilty of manslaughter, was a proper application of the law to the facts.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homicide, Gent. Dig. §§ 649, 650, 652-655; Dec. Dig. § 309. ]
16. Homicide (§ 300 ) — Self-Defense—Instructions — Attack bx Deceased.
In a trial for murder, where accused testified that deceased had knocked him down, advanced toward him, threw his hand behind him, and said he would kill him, an instruction on self-defense, that if deceased had attacked or was about to attack accused, was not objectionable because not predicated upon a demonstration from which it reasonably appeared to defendant that his life was in danger.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dee. Dig. § 300. ]
17. Criminal Law (§ 778 ) — Trial — Instructions — Burden of Proof.
Such charge on self-defense, in addition to the charge on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, immediately followed by a charge that in all criminal cases the burden of proof is on the state, was not objectionable as shifting the burden on defendant.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1846-1852, 1960, 1967; Dec. Dig. § 778. ]
18. Homicide (§ 300 ) — Trial—Instructions -Self-Defense — Burden of Proof.
Nor was such charge objectionable on the ground that it might have caused the jury to infer that they should judge of the transaction from what the after developments disclosed to be the real facts.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dec. Dig. § 300. ]
19. Homicide (§ 300 ) — Instructions — Threats.
In a trial for murder, where the whole is-_ sue of self-defense was contested, and defend-’ ant, the only witness thereto, testified that deceased had knocked him down, advanced on him, and put his hand to his hip pocket and said he would kill him, an instruction on threats was properly given.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dec. Dig. § 300. ]
20. I-Iomioide (§ 300 ) — Evidence—Relative Age and Strength of Parties.
Where defendant, in a trial for murder, testified that he had known deceased a number of years, that deceased had been drinking and was quarrelsome and was in very bad humor after a quarrel at a dance, that he saw him pull his pistol out and strike tbe counter at two different times before the shooting and also knock a third person down, that he then knocked accused down and threatened to kill him, an instruction on self-defense, allowing the jury to proceed on the relative strength and size of the parties and the defendant’s knowledge of the character of deceased, was not objectionable.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see ■ Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614, 616-620, 622-630; Dec. Dig. § 300. ]
21. Criminal Law (§ 1180 ) — Appeal—Subsequent Appeal — Law of the Case.
Where the trial court follows a decision on a former appeal on the second trial of that identical case, the same question will not be reviewed again unless it was shown that some injury resulted to defendant by following such decision.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3002-3004; Dee. Dig. § 1180. ]
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Harris County; C. W. Robinson, Judge.
Henry Lee was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
B. T. Branch and S. B. Ehrenwerth, both of Houston, for appellant. Richard G. Mau-ry, Dist. Atty., of Houston, and C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER, in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was indicted for murder, tried and convicted of the offense of manslaughter, and his punishment assessed at five years' confinement in the penitentiary.
This is the second appeal in this case; the opinion of this court on the former appeal being reported in 54 Tex. Cr. R. 382, 113 S. W. 301.
1. Appellant in this case insists that the indictment charging him with murder in the first degree, and on the former trial having been convicted of murder in the second degree, which judgment was by this court reversed, he could not be again tried under that indictment. It is true appellant could not be again tried for murder in the first degree; but having been convicted on the former trial of murder in the second degree, and the verdict on his application having been set aside, he could again be tried on the indictment for murder in the second degree, and lesser offenses.
2. Appellant, by motion to quash the jury panel, and in his motion for new trial, again insists that the "jury wheel law" as passed by the Legislature in 1907 (Acts 30th Leg. c. 139) is unconstitutional. The law since the trial of this case by act of the Legislature has been amended so as to meet all the objections made by appellant in his brief, and, inasmuch as this question cannot again arise, we do not discuss nor pass thereon. In the former opinion of this court in this case the law was upheld, and it relating solely to a question of practice in the selection of a jury, and appellant does not state nor insist that other than a fair and impartial jury was obtained, in deference to the opinion of the court on the former appeal, we think it proper to follow that decision. If appellant showed or attempted to show he had been deprived of any right, or the jury, selected in the mode and manner it was, was biased or prejudiced against him, or that a different result might have been obtained had the jury been selected in another manner, we would investigate the question. Appellant has filed an able brief on the question of the constitutionality of the provisions of that law; but inasmuch as the trial court, in the selection of the jury, followed the decision of this court on the former appeal, we will not review the question in this case.
3. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion on the former appeal in this case, and we do not deem it necessary to restate them, except in so far as it may be necessary to discuss the questions raised in the motion for new trial.
It appears that the district attorney, by questions propounded to the witness Frank Casey, sought to elicit that appellant, just a few moments prior to this difficulty, had a difficulty with Mr. Haney. The court sustained the objection of appellant, and the matter, as recited in the bill, presents no error.
4. It also appears that the state's attorney, after having been told certain pictures were not admissible in evidence, offered them in evidence; the objection of appellant being sustained. As the jury was not permitted to see the pictures, no harm could have resulted to appellant.
5. While defendant was on the witness stand testifying, on cross-examination, he was asked if he knew the state's witnesses Casey and Harmon, and if they were on friendly terms with him, to which defendant answered they were. The bias, prejudice, or state of feelings of a witness towards a person on trial is always permitted to be shown. Pope v. State, 143 S. W. 611, and cases cited.
6. Appellant testified that he was knocked down by deceased, and lost his watch, and he had been informed that Briggs Chumley had picked it up and brought it to the police station. Chief of Police Ray testified that Chumley had brought appellant's watch to him and delivered it. Appellant then sought to prove what Chumley said to Ray at the time he delivered the watch. This would be hearsay and not admissible.
7. It is also complained that Henry Harmon, who had been, used as a witness by the state in making its ease, after defendant had testified, in rebuttal was permitted to reiterate a portion of his testimony on a material point. This is hardly proper practice; but it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and only in a case of a gross abuse of this discretion would we be authorized to reverse a case on that account.
8. Appellant reserved a bill of exceptions to the following remarks of the district attorney:" "In the closing argument of the district attorney he argued to the jury as follows: 'Gentlemen of the jury, after having done my duty, and after I impress upon you the facts in each case, in order that I may aid you, I hope that my right hand may shiver at my side before I will ever ask a jury to convict a man when the evidence does not show he is guilty. Never! Never! Gentlemen! Gentlemen! I dismiss then whenever I have not evidence to convict in a ease.' To which argument the defendant objected because it was improper for counsel to express his personal opinion and throw into the scales of justice arguments like that as his belief, to which the state's counsel then stated, T stated that unless I believed from the evidence in a particular case, ' to which defendant stated that was his objection, and thereupon, at the request of the district attorney, the court verbally instructed the jury not to consider his remarks and the state's counsel then turned and stated to the jury: T will repeat the statement as I thought I had made it; that never in any case will I submit to the jury a ease where the evidence does not justify a conviction, never in any case will I submit it to the jury, unless the evidence justifies it. This presents no error, as the court instructed the jury not to consider the first remarks made, and the latter remarks are unobjectionable.
9. In several paragraphs of the motion for a new trial appellant criticises the charge of the court on manslaughter. The charge is a virtual copy of the charge given by the court and quoted in the former appeal of this case, with the addition there suggested s the court in this charge instructing the jury: "The following are deemed adequate causes: An assault and battery; that is, a blow or lick inflicted by deceased causing pain to defendant." The charge as given was approved with that exception, and we do not deem it necessary to discuss this matter further. The jury only found appellant guilty of manslaughter on this trial, and certainly appellant suffered' no injury in that respect.
10. On the question of self-defense the court instructed the jury: "A reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm will excuse a party in using all necessary force to protect his life or person, and it is not necessary that there should be actual danger, provided he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him from his standpoint at the time, and in such case the party acting under such real or apparent danger is in no event bound to retreat in order to avoid the necessity of killing his assailant. If from the evidence you believe the defendant killed the said James S. Simpson, but further believe that at the time of so doing the deceased had made or was making an attack on him which, from the manner and character of it and the relative strength of the parties and the defendant's knowledge of the character and disposition of the deceased, coupled with the threats of deceased at the time (if any), caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, and that, acting under such reasonable expectation or fear, the defendant killed the deceased, then you should acquit him; and if the deceased was armed at the time he was killed and was making such attack on defendant, and if the weapon used by him and the manner of its use were such as were reasonably calculated to produce death or serious bodily harm, then the law presumes the deceased intended to murder or aimed to inflict serious bodily injury upon the defendant. In determining whether the defendant acted in what reasonably appeared to him to be his necessary self-defense, it is the duty of the jury to look at the transaction from what you believe from the evidence was the standpoint of the defendant at the time, and consider the same in the light of the facts and circumstances, as you believe they appeared to the defendant at the time, and not from any other standpoint; but it is for the jury to determine from the evidence what were the appearances to the defendant, and what the standpoint of the defendant was, and in what light he did in fact view the facts and circumstances at the time."
The only witness testifying who raised the issue of self-defense was defendant, and he testified: "Mr. Simpson (the deceased) knocked Ghumley down, and I stepped up to him and said, 'Jim, don't do that,' and he hauled away and knocked me down. After hitting me and knocking me down, he advanced on me and throwed his hand behind him and said, T will just kill you, you son of a bitch,' and as I was getting up I fired one shot and jumped to my feet and fired two more shots. I thought he was going to shoot —was going to kill me."
The charge above fully presented the issue of self-defense as made by this testimony, and, as the state's testimony would show that the killing took place entirely under different conditions, the judgment is affirmed.