Case Name: New York State Higher Education Services Corporation, Appellant, v. Janet Laudenslager, Respondent
Court: New York Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1994-05-25
Citations: 161 Misc. 2d 329
Docket Number: 
Parties: New York State Higher Education Services Corporation, Appellant, v Janet Laudenslager, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 161
Pages: 329–331

Head Matter:
[616 NYS2d 135]
New York State Higher Education Services Corporation, Appellant, v Janet Laudenslager, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,
May 25, 1994
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Hayt, Hayt & Landau, Great Neck (Kenneth P. Backhus of counsel), for appellant. Friedman & Yaeger, New York City (Philip L. Friedman of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
Order dated December 17, 1993 reversed, with $10 costs, and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted in the principal amount of $5,056.27, with interest from October 20, 1978.
Defendant's student loan obligation was not discharged in the 1978 bankruptcy adjudication (11 USC § 523 [a] [8]). Plaintiffs claim, time barred in 1984, was revived on April 9, 1991, when Congress amended 20 USC § 1091a to preempt State limitations statutes for certain suits on guaranteed student loans (20 USC § 1091a [a] [1]). The legislation effectively revived some actions that were previously extinct (State of New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Starr, 179 AD2d 992; see, United States v Davis, 817 F Supp 926). This action was timely commenced in March 1992, within the "window" opened by the amendment to section 1091a. An action at law on a promissory note, commenced by a State agency in the public interest, is not vulnerable to a loches defense, nor to allegations of "equitable estoppel." (State of New York v Rockland County, 74 AD2d 921; Kahn v New York Times Co., 122 AD2d 655, 663; Columbus Trust Co. v Campolo, 110 AD2d 616.) Moreover, the recognition of such defenses would defeat the Federal purpose of extending the period for suit on defaulted student loans.
Plaintiff set forth a prima facie case entitling it to judgment on the promissory note, which defendant failed to oppose with sufficient evidence (Unisource, Inc. v Wolfe, 169 AD2d 567). Plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date the cause of action accrued (CPLR 5001), in this case October 20, 1978. The intent of the statute authorizing prejudgment interest is to indemnify successful plaintiffs " 'for the nonpayment of what is due to them' " (Love v State of New York, 78 NY2d 540, 544).
Ostrau, P. J., Miller and McCooe, JJ., concur.