Case Name: The AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. Emanuel M. FRUCHTER, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-08-02
Citations: 283 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: No. 42944
Parties: The AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. Emanuel M. FRUCHTER, Respondent.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., and ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 283
Pages: 36–41

Head Matter:
The AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. Emanuel M. FRUCHTER, Respondent.
No. 42944.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 2, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1973.
James E. Tribble, of' Blackwell, Walker, Gray & Powers, Miami, for petitioner.
Joseph C. Brannen, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
Review by certiorari is sought of the Third District's decision at 266 So.2d 61; the petition urges conflict with Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So.2d 51 (Fla.1971). We fail to find conflict and accordingly discharge the writ as improvidently issued.
This Court's standard jury instructions (in this instance 3.7 on weight of the evidence), while to be generally followed where applicable, are not intended to change the substantive law applicable to the case. This is the essence of the problem here.
The synthesis forming the basis for this review was the trial court's refusal to give plaintiff's requested instruction that the defendant insurance company had the burden of proof to show that total disability had ceased, in the instance where the company had previously acknowledged the existence of total disability and then had terminated disability payments. The authority for such request was our earlier holding in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lecks, 122 Fla. 127, 165 So. 50 (1936), and the subsequent Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 151 Fla. 661, 10 So.2d 316 (1942), to the effect that once the insurer has acknowledged such disability by proceeding to make disability payments under the policy, then in a suit upon a discontinuance thereof and demand for resumption of premium payments, the burden is cast upon the insurer to prove that the disability no longer continues. The language variation in the policy here and in Leeks and Ewing does not in our judgment change the principle applying.
We uphold the Third District's correct application and continued viability as a matter of substantive law of the holdings in Leeks and Ewing and the district court's reversal and remand of the cause for a new trial.
Rigot, asserted for conflict, merely clarified the quantum of proof in an action for fraud to be the same as in any other claim and no longer to require the higher degree of proof than the greater weight of the evidence. Here the question is upon whom the burden of proof falls; in Rigot it was the degree of proof required of such party, there being no question of who had the burden. There is no conflict.
It is urged that the jury should have been instructed regarding a "presumption" of continuing disability but still charge that plaintiff must prove such continuing disability by the greater weight of the evidence. Such is not the law as set forth in Ewing.
Matters of "presumption" arising from the evidence are usually for the court in determining whether or not there is a sufficient basis for submitting the case to a jury as a matter of law. A jury is guided by the weighing of the evidence on the issues which is its principal function. Submitting instructions regarding "presumptions" might well lead to improper speculation by a jury; it should instead be instructed with regard to the weight of the evidence in accordance with standard jury instructions for its guidance in this respect, consistent, however, with applicable substantive law.
The use of the word "burden" in the rejected instruction might better have been deleted and instead to have charged that the insurance company "must establish by the greater weight of the evidence", etc. Or, alternatively, transposing the position of the parties as set forth in the standard jury instruction 3.7 would afford a similar result, placing the "burden" upon the insurer in these circumstances. But given as they were, the instructions improperly cast the burden upon the insured, contrary to the doctrine announced in Leeks and Ewing.
After a full consideration and arguments heard in the cause we have determined that the writ of certiorari was improvidently issued and accordingly the writ is hereby
Discharged.
CARLTON, C. J., and ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS and ADKINS, JJ., dissent.
. "In an action for disability benefits under an insurance policy such as we have in this case, the insurance company has the burden of establishing by the greater weight of the evidence that the insured was and is able to engage in an occupation for remuneration or profit and that total disability within the insurance policy had ceased."