Case Name: Landrey v. Harmon, Mayor, et al.; Weddle v. Harmon, Mayor, et al.
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1916-04-26
Citations: 29 Ohio C.C. Dec. 303
Docket Number: 
Parties: Landrey v. Harmon, Mayor, et al. Weddle v. Harmon, Mayor, et al.
Judges: Ferneding, Kunkle and Allread, JJ.
Reporter: Ohio Circuit Court Decisions
Volume: 29
Pages: 303–306

Head Matter:
APPEAL — CIVIL SERVICE — OFFICE AND OFFICERS.
[Miami (2nd) Court of Appeals,
April 26, 1916.]
Ferneding, Kunkle and Allread, JJ.
Landrey v. Harmon, Mayor, et al. Weddle v. Harmon, Mayor, et al.
1. Common Pleas on Appeal from Municipal Civil Service Commission Determines De Novo Question of Removal of Police or Fire Chief.
Act 106 O. L. 412 (Sec. 486-17a G. C.), providing for an appeal from the municipal civil service commission to the court of common pleas in case of removal of the chief of police or the chief of the fire department, gives jurisdiction to the court of common pleas to try the question of removal de novo.
2. Appeal from Civil Service Commission to Common Pleas Perfected.
The appeal is perfected when the necessary papers and transcript are filed in the office of the clerk of the court of common pleas within the prescribed time.
[Syllabus by the court.]
Error.
G. T. Thomas and William IT. Gilbert, for plaintiffs in error.
J. G. Fullerton, Jr., W. A.. Haines and Kenneth Little, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
ALLREAD, 3.
George Landrey, as chief of the fire department, and John W. Weddle, as chief of police, of the city of Troy, were removed from office by the mayor, Clay E. Harmon.
They each appealed to the municipal civil service commission, where the orders of the mayor were affirmed.
Appeals were then taken to the court of common pleas, where the proceedings were dismissed upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review the evidence before the commission or to try the questions of removal de novo.
These proceedings in error are brought to obtain reversals of the judgments of the court of common pleas with Instructions to try de novo the questions of removal.
The right of appeal depends upon the following portion of Sec. 486-3 7<i G. 0. (106 O. L. 412) :
"Provided, however, that in the case of the removal of a chief of police or chief of the fire department of a municipality an appeal may he had from, the decision of the municipal commission of the court of common pleas of the county in which such municipality is situated to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal. Such appeal shall be taken within ten days from the finding of the commission."
Counsel for defendants in error contend that the absence of a provision fixing the details as to the transfer of such case renders the appeal provision ineffective and invalid.
We think there is sufficient in the statute to make the appeal effective.
The statute is quite as definite as Sec. 2461 6. C., in relation to appeals from the board of county commissioners to the court of common pleas, the validity of which has been repeatedly affirmed by cur Supreme Court.
The appeals in the court of common pleas in the eases at bar were complete when the appellants caused to be filed in the court of common pleas the papers, or copies thereof, upon which the cases were heard before the municipal commission, and transcripts of the decisions of such commission.
It is next contended by counsel for defendants in error that the appeals invoke the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas merely to review the sufficiency of the charges or reasons for removal, but do not confer jurisdiction to try the questions of removal de novo.
This question is not free from difficulty. Counsel for defendants in error in support of their view cite the case of State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 116 [5 N. E. 228]; State v. Hoglan et al. 64 Ohio St. 532, 545 [60 N. E. 627], and State v. ClenDening, 93 Ohio St. 264.
It must be kept in mind, however, in considering the Hawkins, Hoglan and GlenDening cases, that they were not under statutes providing for appeals.
They were quo warranto, mandamus or prohibition cases in which the court determined only as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear and determine the charges presented.
The legislature by the appeal provision above quoted evidently intended to change the rule represented by the Hawkins, Moglan and ClenDening cases and to confer a more extensive jurisdiction upon the court of common pleas, as the court of final appeal where the grounds of removal might be tried and considered as a judicial question.
An "appeal" from the "decision of the municipal commission" would imply that the case be heard de novo.
The legislature is presumed to have used the word "appeal" in view of its accepted and established meaning.
In the case of Zanesville v. Telegraph & Tel. Co. 64 Ohio St. 67 [59 N. E. 781; 52 L. R. A. 150; 83 Am. St. 725], on page 83, Williams, J., says:
"An appeal is the removal of a cause or matter from an inferior jurisdiction after its decision, to a superior jurisdiction for retrial on its merits."'
- In Ault man, Miller & Co. v. Seiberling, 31 Ohio St. 201, 204, it is said:
"The effect of an appeal, under our system, is to vacate the order, decision, or decree appealed from, and to carry the cause into the appellate court, both upon the law and facts, the same as if no decision had been made."
The same definition is found in other reported eases.
It is contended that the appeal clause conferring jurisdiction upon the court of common pleas "to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal" is a limitation of the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to a determination of the sufficiency of the reasons for removal or of the written charges upon which the case was heard before the municipal commission.
We think, however, upon careful consideration, that this clause does not confine the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to a mere review of the sufficiency of the written charge filed or the reason assigned as a ground for removal.
The "cause of removal" referred to in the statute lies back of the writen charge and is the act or conduct of the official upon which the removal was founded.
There are many pertinent definitions given by jurists and text-writers, but we find it unnecessary to go further than to quote from Judge Spear iu the case of Baltimore & O. Ry. v. Larwill, 83 Ohio St. 108 [93 N. E. 619; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195], on page 115, as follows:
"A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts Avhich gives rise to a right of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf."
So, in each of the eases at bar, the cause of removal must necessarily antedate the proceedings for removal and consist of the fact or combination of facts upon which the order of removal was made. '
The fact that the appeal is the second appeal in the same proceeding goes only to the construction of doubtful terms, if any, in the statute authorizing it. If. the statute is sufficiently clear, as we think this statute is, the scope of the appeal should not be unduly limited.
We have considered the sufficiency of the reasons for removal, which with the explanations would probably constitute the issues, and are of opinion the same are sufficient.
The judgments of the court of common pleas in the above cases should be reversed and the causes remanded with instructions to proceed to trials de novo.
Judgments reversed.
Ferneding and Kunkle, JJ., concur.