Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. ONE ASSORTMENT OF 89 FIREARMS, Appellant, National Rifle Association of America, Amicus Curiae
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1982-01-26
Citations: 669 F.2d 206
Docket Number: No. 81-1055
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. ONE ASSORTMENT OF 89 FIREARMS, Appellant, National Rifle Association of America, Amicus Curiae.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 669
Pages: 206–213

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. ONE ASSORTMENT OF 89 FIREARMS, Appellant, National Rifle Association of America, Amicus Curiae.
No. 81-1055.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 3, 1981.
Decided Jan. 26, 1982.
Herbert W. Louthian, Columbia, S.C., for appellant.
Richard E. Gardiner, Springfield, Va., for amicus curiae.
Mary G. Slocum, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C. (Henry Dargan McMaster, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., on brief), for ap-pellee.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge.
An action for forfeiture was brought by the United States of America against 89 (originally 92) firearms it seized under a search warrant of the premises of Patrick M. Muleahey. Paragraph 6 of the complaint seeking forfeiture alleges:
That said firearms were had and possessed and used and intended to be used on January 20,1977, and prior thereto by Patrick M. Muleahey in Richland County, South Carolina, in violation of the laws of the United States by engaging in the business of a dealer in firearms and ammunition without the said Patrick M. Muleahey having first applied for and received a license as a dealer in firearms and ammunition as required by 18 U.S.C. 923(a); and said firearms having been used and intended to be used and involved in said unlicensed firearms business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1) and 923(a), thereby became forfeited to the United States under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 924(d).
The same 89 firearms were introduced as exhibits in Criminal Action 77-00013 brought in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina by the United States of America against Patrick M. Muleahey under an indictment charging that he unlawfully and knowingly engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without being licensed in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and § 924(a). The criminal case was tried before a jury and resulted in a not guilty verdict on March 16, 1977.
This not guilty criminal verdict was raised as a defense in the forfeiture action, but upon motion of the United States the defense was stricken from defendant's answer. The forfeiture action was then tried without a jury, and the Court concluded:
. . . [T]he firearms here in question were involved in, used or intended to be used in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). Such firearms are rendered subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d), which forfeiture is hereby ordered. 511 F.Supp. 133 at 139.
In connection with this conclusion, the Court found that these firearms were used by Patrick M. Muleahey from May 13,1976, to January 20, 1977, while Muleahey was engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without being properly licensed. The criminal indictment against Muleahey charged him with being engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without being licensed to do so from on or about May 12, 1976, up to the return of the indictment on January 19, 1977.
Muleahey, the claimant in the present action, seeks return of the 89 firearms upon the ground that the jury verdict in the criminal action conclusively settled the issue that he was not engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a license, so the firearms could not have been used by him while engaged in such a business without a license.
Mulcahey contends that the present action is barred by the holding in Coffey v. U. S., 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684 (1886). We agree.
Coffey was tried on a criminal charge of violating the revenue laws of the United States by operating a distillery without payment of the required taxes. He was acquitted on this charge, and shortly thereafter the United States sought forfeiture of the distilling equipment. Coffey raised the prior acquittal as a bar to the forfeiture action and the Supreme Court agreed stating at page 442, 6 S.Ct. at page 440:
The principal question is as to the effect of the indictment, trial, verdict and judgment of acquittal set up in the fourth paragraph of the answer. The information is founded on sections 3257, 3450 and 3453; and there is no question, on the averments in the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit.
The question, therefore, is distinctly presented, whether such judgment of acquittal is a bar to this suit. We are of opinion that it is.
At 443, 6 S.Ct. at 440 the Court stated:
Yet, where an issue raised as to the existence of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal proceeding, instituted by the United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such person, on subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States, where, as against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem. It is urged as a reason for not allowing such effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal case may have taken place because of the rule requiring guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that, on the same evidence, on the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict for the United States, in the suit in rem. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and determined against the United States; and all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of guilt, is a punishment therefor. There could be no new trial of the criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with a difference only in the consequences following a judgment adverse to the claimant.
Coffey was acquitted on a charge of operating a still without paying the necessary tax thereon and could raise this acquittal as a bar to an action for forfeiture of the distilling equipment. Mulcahey was acquitted on a charge of being engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a license and can raise this acquittal as a bar to the present forfeiture action involving the 89 firearms, since a jury has already found that these 89 firearms were not being used by Mulcahey in the business of dealing in firearms without a license.
The government argues that the present action is controlled by One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972), in which the Court held that forfeiture of the ring and stones was not barred by the owner's acquittal on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 which covers willfully and knowingly, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling articles into the United States without submitting the same to required customs procedures. The Court found that the second action was not barred because the essential elements of proof in the two actions were not the same. In the criminal action it was necessary to prove a knowing and willful intent to defraud the United States, which was not required in the forfeiture. The Court was careful to point out that if the elements of proof were the same then the government would be barred. At page 234, 93 S.Ct. at page 491 the Court stated:
Collateral estoppel would bar a forfeiture under § 1497 if, in the earlier criminal proceeding, the elements of a § 1497 forfeiture had been resolved against the government. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 [90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469] (1970).
In Mulcahey's criminal proceeding the elements of the present forfeiture were all resolved against the government, so the present action is barred by collateral estop-pel.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones did not overrule Coffey. The Court. in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, at footnote 5 distinguished the two cases as follows:
The difference in the issues involved in the criminal proceeding, on the one hand, and the forfeiture action, on the other, serves to distinguish Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 [6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684] (1886), relied upon by the District Court in the present case. Coffey involved a forfeiture action commenced after an acquittal. This Court noted, in holding the forfeiture barred, that "[t]he information [for forfeiture] is founded on § 3257, 3450 and 3453; and there is no question, on the averments in the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit." Id., at 442 [6 S.Ct., at 440]. The Court specifically distinguished the situation where "a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to support the civil action." Id., at 443 [6 S.Ct., at 441]. See also Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 17 S.Ct. 778, 42 L.Ed. 127 (1897).
To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) the government must prove two essential elements: First: that the defendant, between the dates specified in the indictment, engaged in the business of dealing in firearms (or ammunition); and second: that at the time he engaged in that business he was not a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer in firearms. 2 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 59.10.
The same two essential elements must be proved in the forfeiture action. The same firearms that were introduced into evidence in the criminal action are the subject of the forfeiture action. The United States had its day in court on these identical issues in the criminal proceeding and is collaterally estopped by the verdict in that case from pursuing the matter in this forfeiture action.
Title 18, U.S.C. § 924(d) states:
Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used or intended to be used in the violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, or any violation of any other criminal law of the United States, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture . (Emphasis added)
The criminal verdict conclusively decided that the firearms in question were not "involved in or used or intended to be used in the violations of any provision of this chapter."
The government, in addition to One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, relies upon Glup v. United States, 523 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1975), Epps v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 375 F.Supp. 345 (E.D.Tenn.1973) and United States v. One (1) 1969 Buick Riviera Automobile, 493 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974). This reliance is misplaced. In Glup the firearms were seized on June 8, 1970 and declared forfeited on August 11, 1970, because Glup had taken no action to contest the seizure and forfeiture. Two years later Glup was indicted on three counts charging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) and three counts charging him with violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202. The forfeited firearms were used in evidence at the trial on these charges, but none of the six counts involved firearms included in the June 8, 1977 seizure. Glup was acquitted on all six counts by a jury. In Glup the forfeiture preceded the criminal acquittal, and the charges contained in the indictment did not involve the firearms which had been declared forfeited.
In Epps the plaintiff was seeking return of certain firearms and ammunition which had been seized and used against him in a criminal proceeding based upon 18 U.S.C. § 922(a), but the Court did not mention the United States Supreme Court decision of Coffey v. U. S., which was still good law as evidenced by footnote 5 in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, a case decided in 1972, the year prior to the Epps decision.
In One (1) 1969 Buick Riviera Automobile, the individual was charged with importing marijuana, but the criminal charges were dismissed prior to trial, and the Fifth Circuit was careful to point out that no issue had been actually litigated by the dismissal of the prior criminal charge and, therefore, Coffey did not apply.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the acquittal in the prior criminal action involving the identical facts and essential elements is a bar to the present forfeiture proceeding. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED.