Case Name: JOHN W. STARR, COMPLAINANT, vs. JOSEPH A. KEEFER AND ELIZABETH L. KEEFER, HIS WIFE, AND WILLIAM TUCKER, DEFENDANTS
Court: Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1873-09
Citations: 1 MacArth. 166
Docket Number: No. 2668
Parties: JOHN W. STARR, COMPLAINANT, vs. JOSEPH A. KEEFER AND ELIZABETH L. KEEFER, HIS WIFE, AND WILLIAM TUCKER, DEFENDANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (District of Columbia - reported by Mackey)
Volume: 8
Pages: 166–168

Head Matter:
JOHN W. STARR, COMPLAINANT, vs. JOSEPH A. KEEFER AND ELIZABETH L. KEEFER, HIS WIFE, AND WILLIAM TUCKER, DEFENDANTS.
Equity Docket.
No. 2668.
I. A deed of trust directed tlie trustee to permit the cestui que trust to en joy the rents, issues, and profits arising from the trust-estate during his life, and to hold the same until his children should come of age-The deed afterward contain a provision in these words: “And in the mean time apply the rents, issues, and profits arising therefrom, to the support, maintenance, and education of the said child or children
Held, that such cestui ¡rue trust had not an interest in the property,, which equity would apply to the satisfaction of a judgment-debt.
STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
The bill of complaint sets forth that complainant has an unsatisfied judgment against the defendants Keefer and wife for the sum of $1,275, with interest thereon from the 11th day of April, 1869, and costs of suit, and that an execution had been returned nulla bona. The object of the suit is to subject the equitable interests of Keefer and his wife, in the real estate described in the bill as lot 11 in Davidson’e subdivision of square 344, in the city of Washington, to the satisfaction of said judgment.
The question arises upon a deed of trust executed by one William Marbury, (in which the said Keefer and wife also-join,) conveying the said lot to the other defendant, William Tucker, on the 25th day of March, 1859. After the usual habendum clause is the trust in question, contained in the following words:
"In trust, nevertheless, that the said William Tucker shall permit the said Joseph A. Keefer to hold, use, and enjoy the issues, rents, and profits arising therefrom for and during the term of his natural life, and, after the decease of the said Joseph A. Keefer, to hold the same in trust for his wife, Elizabeth L. Keefer, and their child who is now living, and such other child or children as may hereafter be begotten between the said Joseph A. Keefer and Elizabeth L. Keefer, his wife, and to hold the same until the aforementioned child or children shall have become of age, and in the mean time to apply the rents, issues, and profits arising therefrom to the support, maintenance, and education of the said child or children.”
And further on is the following additional provision on the same subject:
“And it is hereby expressly understood and convenanted that the said Joseph A. Keefer and wife may at any and all times hereafter, prior to the said child or children coming of the age of twenty-one years, dispose of said property for the benefit of said child, without let or hinderauce by said William Tucker, his heirs or executors 3 and upon the re-in vestment of the said money it shall be, as expressed in this indenture, in the name of the said William Tucker as trustee, or, in the event of his death, the said Keefer and wife may appoint another in his stead.”
Upon the first of these clauses in the deed, the complainant contends that Keefer has an equitable life-estate in the property, and that his wife has also a vested interest therein; and he asks that said interests may be sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of the said judgment. In their answer, the defendants last named set up various matters in avoidance of the judgment. A replication was filed, but there was no evidence on the part of the said-defendants. They, however, claim that the property is in no manner liable for their debts, and that it is vested for the sole benefit of their children ; and they ask the court to construe the deed so as to give to it this effect.
The case comes to the general term upon an appeal from a decree made at the special term dismissing the bill with costs.
R. B., Washington and William TF, Boarman, for complainant, made the following point as to the construction of the deed:
It is clear, from the deed to William Tucker, that the defendant Joseph A. Keefer has an equitable life-estate in the property in question, because the trustee is to permit him “to hold, use, and enjoy the issues, rents, and profits arising therefrom for and during the term of his natural life.”
It is also clear that the defendant Elizabeth L. Keefer has a vested equitable interest by virtue of said deed.
John E. Norris contra.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice MacArthur
delivered the opinion of the court:
We are all of opinion that the clauses of the deed creating the trust were evidently for the benefit of the children. If the deed only provided that Keefer should hold and use the property, and enjoy the rents, issues, and profits during his life, he would undoubtedly possess an equitable interest which might he subjected in this jurisdiction to the satisfaction of his debts and obligations. But it is quite clear that he is permitted to enjoy these advantages for the special purpose of applying them to the support, maintenance, and education of the child then in being, or of any other children that might be born to him thereafter. To secure this end, appeal's to be the primary object of the trust. This view is confirmed by the subsequent clause on the same subject-matter giving the said Keefer and wife a right to hold the property sold for the benefit of the children at any time prior to their coming of age. These different provisions in the instrument impose upon Keefer the performance of duties for the benefit of the children, and show that his relation to the trust is simply fiduciary.
If the prayer of the bill be allowed the material parts of the trust will be defeated, and the children would fa.il entirely to receive the benefits created in their favor. We are of opinion that the defendants have no interest in the property which can be applied to the satisfaction of their debts.
The decree dismissing the bill must be affirmed.