Case Name: Paul Phillip SEVERANCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-12-13
Citations: 972 So. 2d 931
Docket Number: No. 4D07-338
Parties: Paul Phillip SEVERANCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHAHOOD, C.J., WARNER, POLEN, FARMER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 972
Pages: 931–941

Head Matter:
Paul Phillip SEVERANCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D07-338.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 13, 2007.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
En Banc
GUNTHER, J.
Appellant, Paul Phillip Severance, seeks review of his judgment and sentence for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. He argues that the trial court fundamentally erred in instructing the jury on the aggravated battery charge because the instructions did not provide that the State was required to prove that Severance touched the victim with the deadly weapon in committing the battery. We find no merit in Severance's argument and affirm his conviction and sentence. We also recede from our decision in Munoz-Perez v. State, 942 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
The facts established at trial were that the victim was at her apartment one night watching television with her nine-year-old son when Severance, her boyfriend at the time, knocked on her door. The victim gave Severance permission to enter her apartment. When the victim asked Severance where he had been all day, Severance became very angry and hit the victim on the face with a closed fist. The victim told her son to go into the other room, and Severance continued to hit the victim. Severance then went into the kitchen to get a knife, and when he returned from the kitchen, he pushed the victim onto the couch and threatened to kill her. The victim testified that Severance put the knife to the victim's throat, and the victim tried to grab the knife to prevent Severance from cutting her with it. The victim further testified that throughout the whole time, Severance was choking her with one hand and hitting her with the other hand. The victim's son testified that he observed the entire incident and that Severance was "fixing to slit my mom's throat." The son also testified that when he tried to get Severance off of his mother, Severance pulled him back by his hair.
During the charge conference, the trial court granted the defense's request to include a special jury instruction on aggravated battery that "bare hands are not a deadly weapon." Once that request was granted, defense counsel raised no further objections to the instruction on aggravated battery, and the trial court gave the following instruction:
To prove the crime of aggravated battery, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
The first is the definition of battery, and that is that, one, that Phillip [sic] Severance intentionally touched or struck [the victim] against her will.
And, two, that Paul Severance in committing the battery used a deadly weapon.
A weapon is a deadly weapon if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to cause — likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Bare hands are not a deadly weapon.
The jury returned a verdict finding Severance guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon on the victim as well as simple battery on the victim's son. On appeal, Severance challenges only his conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon arguing that the jury instructions given do not make it clear that to "use a deadly weapon" under the aggravated battery statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually touched the victim with the deadly weapon to commit the battery. Relying on Munoz-Perez, Severance contends that the instruction is misleading and constitutes fundamental, reversible error because the instruction improperly allowed the jury to convict him of aggravated battery if it found that he, while committing the battery, used a knife without touching the victim.
In Munoz-Perez, this Court concluded that the appellant's possession of the knife was insufficient to satisfy the requirement that he was using a deadly weapon while committing a battery. 942 So.2d at 1026. The testimony at trial was that the appellant grabbed the victim and held a sharp knife "near her throat" and also swung the knife in a threatening manner. Id. The appellant argued on appeal that because he never touched the victim with the knife, there was insufficient evidence to prove aggravated battery. Id. at 1027. This Court agreed, and reversed appellant's conviction for aggravated battery concluding that the trial court should have granted appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated battery charge. Id. at 1028. This Court stated:
The issue of whether there must be a touching with the deadly weapon in order to prove aggravated battery by using a deadly weapon has not been decided by any of the cases cited by the appellant or the state.
Our supreme court has noted that the legislature has made a distinction between carrying a deadly weapon and using a weapon in our statutes, in State v. Baker, 452 .So.2d 927 (Fla.1984) and Owens v. State, 475 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1985). We conclude, based on these cases, that the element "uses a deadly weapon" in the aggravated battery statute means using the weapon to commit the touching that constitutes the battery.
Id. at 1027-28.
However, we conclude that our interpretation in Munoz-Perez of the element "use a deadly weapon" under section 784.045(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2005) is incorrect. Section 784.045(l)(a)(2) defines "aggravated battery" as follows:
(l)(a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
⅜
2. Uses a deadly weapon.
§ 784.045(l)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). The text of the statute does not require that in using a deadly weapon, the deadly weapon must actually touch the victim or be used in any particular manner. Rather, section 784.045(l)(a)(2) requires that in committing the battery, the defendant uses a deadly weapon. Because there is no limitation or requirement in the text of the statute as to the manner of use of a deadly weapon, the plain meaning is that if a deadly weapon is used in any manner the battery is aggravated. The refusal of the Legislature to limit the manner or method of use of the deadly weapon does not make the statute ambiguous. On the contrary, it means instead that the drafters intended that it cover all uses.
The standard jury instruction on aggravated battery given in this ease is fully consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. The standard jury instructions are presumed correct and are preferred over special instructions. Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 755-56 (Fla.2001). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in giving standard instructions. Id. The standard jury instruction on aggravated battery does not require that the deadly weapon used must touch the victim to commit the battery. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.4.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in this case. We recede from Munoz-Perez v. State, 942 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) and hold that the element "uses a deadly weapon" in the aggravated battery statute does not require using the weapon to commit the touching that constitutes the battery. Rather, the plain meaning of the aggravated battery statute is that in committing the battery, the defendant used a deadly weapon, which includes holding a deadly weapon without actually touching the victim with the weapon. Severance's conviction and sentence for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SHAHOOD, C.J., WARNER, POLEN, FARMER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion in which GUNTHER, WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
STEVENSON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
MAY, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion in which STONE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
KLEIN, J., dissents with opinion in which TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.