Case Name: JOHN PAUL TROYAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANA REYES, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2006-09-29
Citations: 367 Ill. App. 3d 729
Docket Number: No. 3—05—0132
Parties: JOHN PAUL TROYAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANA REYES, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 367
Pages: 729–749

Head Matter:
JOHN PAUL TROYAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANA REYES, Defendant-Appellee.
Third District
No. 3—05—0132
Opinion filed September 29, 2006.
Scott Pyles (argued), of Krockey, Cernugel, Cowgill, Clark & Pyles, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellant.
Raymond E Fabricius (argued), of Pool, Leigh & Fabricius, of Ottawa, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE LYTTON
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, John Paul Troyan, filed suit against defendant, Dana Reyes, for damages he sustained as the result of an "automobile ac cident. The jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $1,681.76 in damages. We reverse and remand.
In 1993, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident. Immediately after the accident, plaintiff went to the emergency room at Provena St. Joseph Medical Center. At the emergency room, he was given pain medication and referred to an orthopedic specialist for follow-up treatment. Plaintiff received follow-up treatment from Dr. Hiroshi Eguro a few days later. Dr. Eguro prescribed physical therapy for plaintiff, which he received from Marge Taylor at MedRehab, a rehabilitation center.
In 1995, plaintiff filed suit against defendant. In 1998, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his suit. In 1999, plaintiff timely refiled his action. In 2000, plaintiff sent defendant requests to admit, among other things, the following facts:
"4. That as a result of the collision, Plaintiff suffered $4,052.38 in medical bills that were reasonable and customary charges related to Plaintiffs injuries.
5. That as a result of the collision, Plaintiff suffered a traumatic cervical strain.
6. That the medical records of St. Joseph Medical Center, MedRehab of Illinois, and Hiroshi Eguro, M.D. were kept in the ordinary course of business at each medical facility.
8. That as a result of the collision, Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury to his cervical spine."
Defendant objected to the above requests to admit as requests for opinions, adding that they requested facts about which she had "no personal knowledge or information." She further responded:
"[T]his request pertains to matters protected by the physician/ patient privilege. Therefore, the Defendant, DANA C. REYES, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in Request to Admit or Deny Number[s] [4, 5, 6 and 8]."
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant's responses and to deem the facts contained in the requests admitted. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion.
At trial, neither Dr. Eguro nor Marge Taylor was available to testify. Dr. Eguro was deceased, and Marge Taylor had moved and could not be located. Plaintiff called the recordkeepers from Provena St. Joseph Medical Center and Dr. Eguro's office, who testified that the records were created and kept in the ordinary course of business. The trial court found that the foundational requirements were met and admitted the medical records into evidence. In pertinent part, those records consisted of (1) medical records from Dr. Eguro dated November 9, 1993; (2) medical records from Dr. Eguro dated January 4, 1994; (3) a medical report from Dr. Eguro dated July 14, 1994; (4) a report from MedRehab written by Marge Taylor; and (5) a radiology report from Dr. Robert E. Boyd of Provena St. Joseph Medical Center.
Plaintiffs attorney sought to present the records to the jury during his closing argument, and defendant objected. The trial court did not allow plaintiff to present to the jury any of Dr. Eguro's 1994 medical records or Dr. Boyd's radiology report. Plaintiff was allowed to present to the jury redacted versions of Marge Taylor's report and Dr. Eguro's 1993 medical records, containing only plaintiff's subjective statements to the medical providers. The redacted portions of the records contained the observations, assessments, diagnoses and impressions of Dr. Eguro, Ms. Taylor and Dr. Boyd.
At trial, plaintiff testified that his neck was injured as a result of the automobile accident with defendant. He received medical treatment from Dr. Eguro and Ms. Taylor for approximately four or five months following the accident, until April or May of 1994. After that, plaintiffs injuries resolved except for occasional headaches. He testified that he incurred $4,131.66 in medical expenses for treatment he received as a result of the accident.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and determined that the total amount of damages suffered by plaintiff was $2,402.52, itemized as follows: $0 for loss of normal life; $0 for pain and suffering; $359.92 for medical expenses; and $2,042.60 for property damages. The jury found that plaintiff was 30% negligent; therefore, plaintiffs damages were reduced by 30% to $1,681.76. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only. The trial court denied the motion.
I. MEDICAL RECORDS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by refusing his request to publish his medical records to the jury. Specifically, he wants us to determine whether his medical records containing opinions and diagnoses should have been published to the jury under the business records exception.
Relevant evidence, which tends to prove a fact in controversy or renders a matter in issue more or less probable, is generally admissible. Bachman v. General Motors Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 797, 776 N.E.2d 262, 295 (2002). A trial court's decision regarding the presentation of evidence to a jury is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 225 Ill. App. 3d 882, 922, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1219 (1992). If a trial court abuses its discretion, a new trial should be ordered only if the exclusion of evidence appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. See Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1040-41, 768 N.E.2d 303, 320 (2002).
In Illinois, business records are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 145 Ill. 2d R. 236(a). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 provides:
"Any writing or record * made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in the regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of the business to make such a memorandum or record at the time of such an act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but shall not affect its admissibility." 145 Ill. 2d R. 236(a).
In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court amended Rule 236 to allow medical records to be treated as any other business record. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 236(b), Committee Comments. Medical records are now admissible in Illinois courts as long as a sufficient foundation is laid to establish that they are business records. See LoCoco v. XL Disposal Corp., 307 Ill. App. 3d 684, 689-90, 717 N.E.2d 823, 828 (1999); Lecroy v. Miller, 272 Ill. App. 3d 925, 935, 651 N.E.2d 617, 623 (1995).
In order to fulfill the foundational requirements of a business record, it is not necessary that the author or creator of the record testify or be cross-examined about the contents of the record. See Lecroy, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36, 651 N.E.2d at 624. "[T]he circumstantial probability of their trustworthiness is a practical substitute for cross-examination of the individual making the entries." People v. Wells, 80 Ill. App. 2d 187, 194, 224 N.E.2d 288, 292 (1967). A custodian or any person familiar with the business and its mode of operation may provide testimony establishing the foundational requirements of a business record. In re Marriage of Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d 894, 905, 671 N.E.2d 85, 92 (1996). That the author of a record does not testify affects only the weight, not the admissibility, of the record. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 236(a).
Once a witness has established the foundational requirements of a business record, "[t]he records themselves should be introduced." Smith v. Williams, 34 Ill. App. 3d 677, 680, 339 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1975). Business records should only be barred from admission if they are irrelevant, prejudicial or for some other legally appropriate reason. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 719 N.E.2d 348 (1999).
Business records are an exception to the hearsay rule because of their inherent trustworthiness and reliability. See Eastman v. Depart ment of Public Aid, 178 Ill. App. 3d 993, 998, 534 N.E.2d 458, 462 (1989); People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 73, 565 N.E.2d 900, 914 (1990). "The rationale for the business-records exception is that in carrying on the proper transactions of business, business records are useless unless accurate, making the motive to follow a routine of accuracy great while making the motive to falsify nonexistent." People v. Peterson, 150 Ill. App. 3d 782, 786, 502 N.E.2d 450, 454 (1986).
Like other business records, medical records are "inherently reliable." People v. Trotter, 178 Ill. App. 3d 292, 297, 533 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1988); Bolton v. BE&K Construction, 822 So. 2d 29, 34 (La. App. 2002); see also United States v. Woods, 970 F. Supp. 711, 720 (D. Minn. 1997). They are reliable because they are generated by those who have no reason to prevaricate and must rely on their accuracy:
"Medical records, in general, warrant consideration as trustworthy evidence. The records contain information supplied to or by health professionals to facilitate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions. With proper treatment hanging in the balance, accuracy has an extra premium." Cucuras v. Secretary of the Department of Health00 & Human Services, 993 F.2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The same reasoning applies to diagnoses and opinions contained in medical records. Diagnoses should be admissible to the same extent as objective facts because a diagnosis "is the major premise from which the physician draws his conclusions as to the proper treatment to be rendered; normally, the progress of the patient depends upon its accuracy." Falcone v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 98 N.J. Super. 138, 149, 236 A.2d 394, 400 (1967). Medical providers are motivated as professionals to reach their diagnoses, opinions, and conclusions as conscientiously and accurately as possible. See Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 781 (1st Cir. 1990). Since the diagnoses are an integral part of plaintiffs medical records, the same indicia of reliability that inures to business records in general apply to opinions contained in the medical records because the opinions are worthless unless accurate. See generally Birch v. Township of Drummer, 139 Ill. App. 3d 397, 406, 487 N.E.2d 798, 805 (1985).
Medical records containing diagnoses and opinions are trustworthy because "there is no more reason to expect doctors to render an unreliable diagnosis than there is to expect them to base diagnoses on untrustworthy facts." J. McLauglin, Weinstein's Federal Evidence §803.08[6][d], at 803-73 (2d ed. 2006). "[Rjecords containing statements of medical opinions constitute a 'firmly rooted exception' to the hearsay rule." Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 780, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803. As such, their reliability is inferred. See Zaragoza v. Ebenroth, 331 Ill. App. 3d 139, 142, 770 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (2002) (reliability is inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception).
Because of their inherent reliability and trustworthiness, we hold that diagnoses and opinions contained in medical records should be admissible and published to the jury as a proper part of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Our decision is in accord with a large and growing national trend. The federal courts and at least 35 states allow the admission of records containing diagnoses or opinions either by statute, rule or case law. See 5 C. Fishman, Jones on Evidence §33:4, at 103-13 (7th ed. 2003). Similarly, Illinois courts have held that "Rule 236(a) does not bar the admission of business records because they contain opinions." Birch, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 806 (safety study that contained opinions was admissible business record); see also Amos v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 191 Ill. App. 3d 637, 646, 548 N.E.2d 96, 102 (1989) (accident reports containing conclusions and opinions fall within business records exception); People ex rel. Schacht v. Main Insurance Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 826, 833, 462 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1984) (financial documents containing opinions were proper business records).
Our holding, however, does not give parties free rein to introduce medical records as a substitute for expert medical testimony. Like all business records, medical records may be excluded if they are not relevant or are too complex for the jury to understand on its own. See 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §293, at 266 (5th ed. 1999). Additionally, medical testimony is often required to establish a prima facie case of negligence. See Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 306 Ill. App. 3d 689, 694, 714 N.E.2d 607, 610 (1999) (medical testimony is generally necessary to establish causation in a negligence case).
Furthermore, our ruling contains some self-limiting features. If the declarant is available, the adversary may call the declarant to testify and bring out any weaknesses in the diagnosis. See Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 781, citing 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §290, at 613 (1954). Also, the opposing party may call an expert to show the shortcomings of the diagnoses and opinions. See Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 781, citing Weinstein's Evidence par. 803(6)[06], at 803 — 198, 803— 199 (1990).
In this case, the trial court prohibited plaintiff from publishing the records to the jury because Dr. Eguro and Marge Taylor were not available to testify about the opinions contained therein. The trial court relied on Kelly v. HCI Heinz Construction Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 36, 668 N.E.2d 596 (1996), where the appellate court held that medical records could not be admitted as evidence without "live testimony." Citing McCormick, the Kelly court stated that federal courts are "reluctant" to allow an opinion that is not subjected to cross-examination. Kelly, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 42, 668 N.E.2d at 600, citing J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §293, at 281 (5th ed. 1999). Kelly also relied on People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 74, 565 N.E.2d 900, 915 (1990), which concluded that prison incident reports do not qualify as business records.
We disagree with Kelly for two reasons. First, McCormick does not state that federal courts are reluctant to allow the introduction of medical records containing opinions, such as diagnoses. On the contrary, such records are regularly and properly admitted as business records without expert testimony under Rule 803(6). See Sosna v. Binnington, 321 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2003); Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 780-82 (1st Cir. 1990); Norton v. Colyer, 828 F.2d 384, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1987); Higgins v. Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 497 (10th Cir. 1985); J.W. v. Contoocook Valley School District, 154 F. Supp. 2d 217, 230 (D.N.H. 2001). McCormick properly states that federal courts can exclude opinions when they are irrelevant or their probative value is outweighed by the danger that the jury will be misled or confused (J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §293, at 266 (4th ed. 1992), citing Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Fed. R. Evid. 402), or when medical records involve difficult matters of interpretation or a central dispute in the case, such as causation. See J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §293, at 266 (4th ed. 1992); see for example Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126, 131 (Okla. App. 1983) (complex and speculative diagnoses of psychiatric conditions); Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967) (physician's opinion as to the cause of plaintiffs illness). McCormick's discussion of these evidentiary qualifications does not indicate a "reluctance" by the federal courts to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence; it merely acknowledges the evidentiary limitations of Rule 803(6).
Second, we find Kelly's reliance on Smith misplaced. Smith involved prison incident reports, which the Illinois Supreme Court found were not admissible under the business records exception because they "lack the necessary earmarks of trustworthiness and reliability generally attendant to regularly kept business records." Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 73, 565 N.E.2d at 914. Unlike prison incident reports, medical records are considered trustworthy because they are made to assist and document a patient's treatment. See FENCL-TUFO Chevrolet, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 510, 523 N.E.2d 926 (1988); Tendai v. Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, 161 S.W.3d 358, 366 (Mo. 2005).
Since we have found that the medical records containing the opinions and diagnoses of Dr. Erugo and Marge Taylor are admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, we must now determine if they are relevant or are too complex for the jury to understand on its own. See Bachman v. General Motors Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 797, 776 N.E.2d 262, 295 (2002) (explaining that only relevant evidence is admissible); Clark v. Hoosier Casualty Co. of Indianapolis, 319 Ill. App. 202, 205, 48 N.E.2d 787, 788 (1943) (excluding medical records that were "unintelligible without translation by a medical expert"). Based on our review of the records, we find that the jury could have easily understood the opinions and diagnoses contained in Dr. Eguro's and Marge Taylor's November 1993 and January 1994 records. Those records do not contain difficult medical terminology or opinions. Additionally, we find that the records are relevant because plaintiff testified that he received treatment for injuries related to the accident during those visits. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the jury to see those records.
However, it is not clear from the record if Dr. Eguro's July 1994 medical report is relevant to plaintiff's injuries in this case. Since plaintiff testified that he finished his treatment with Dr. Eguro in April or May of 1994 and the report does not specifically refer to the accident, the July 1994 report may not apply to the matter in question. On remand, the trial court must determine the relevancy of the July 1994 report.
Finally, we hold that the trial court properly prohibited plaintiff from presenting Dr. Boyd's radiology report. Plaintiff's attorney conceded, and we agree, that Dr. Boyd's radiology report contains complicated medical terminology. As a result, that record was likely too complex and confusing to aid the jury absent medical testimony. See Clark, 319 Ill. App. at 205, 48 N.E.2d at 788; Nauni, 670 P.2d at 131.
Having found that the trial court abused its discretion, we must now determine if the outcome of the trial was affected. See Schmidt, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1040-41, 768 N.E.2d at 320. Plaintiff testified that he incurred $4,131.66 in medical bills for treatment he received in the five months following the accident. Nevertheless, the jury awarded him only $359.92 in medical expenses, apparently for the treatment he received on the day of the accident. It appears likely that the jury's award of only a small portion of plaintiff's total medical expenses resulted from the jury's inability to review plaintiffs medical records. According to those records, plaintiff suffered cervical injuries from the accident that required medical treatment and physical therapy for a period of five months. Furthermore, without the opinions and diagnoses of the medical professionals who treated plaintiff, the jury could not fully understand the extent of plaintiffs injuries. Thus, the trial court's exclusion of the records likely affected the outcome of the trial and deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to fully prove his case. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. See Schmidt, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1040-41, 768 N.E.2d at 320.
II. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS TO ADMIT
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to deem admitted numbers 4, 5, 6 and 8 of his requests to admit. We review de novo the trial court's denial of plaintiffs motion to deem admitted certain requests. See Robertson v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 196, 199, 799 N.E.2d 852, 855 (2003).
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 allows a party to serve on any other party "a written request for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request." 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a). A request to admit is proper if it relates to statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact. See P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 236, 703 N.E.2d 71, 77 (1998) . Requests seeking conclusions or opinions of law are improper. See People v. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798, 625 N.E.2d 835, 840 (1993). However, "requests for admissions of factual questions which might give rise to legal conclusions are not improper." P.R.S. International, 184 Ill. 2d at 236, 703 N.E.2d at 77.
"[A] request for admissions is proper if a finder of fact must take some analytical step, no matter how small, from the contents of the admissions to the final conclusion that the party seeks to establish." Hubeny v. Chairse, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1043-44, 713 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1999) . The amount of medical expenses a plaintiff incurred as a result of an event, the necessity and reasonableness of medical services, and the fair reasonable cost of medical services rendered are all proper subjects for requests to admit. See Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344, 346-48, 795 N.E.2d 368, 370-71 (2003); Hubeny, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 713 N.E.2d at 226.
A party responding to a request to admit must (1) admit the factual matter; (2) deny the factual matter; (3) explain why he cannot truthfully admit or deny the factual matter; or (4) object on the ground that some or all of the requested admission is privileged, irrelevant or otherwise improper. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c). "[A] party has a good-faith obligation to make a reasonable effort to secure answers to requests to admit from persons and documents within the responding party's reasonable control." Szczeblewski, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 795 N.E.2d at 372.
In this case, plaintiff asked defendant to admit that (1) the cost of plaintiffs medical treatment related to the accident was reasonable; (2) plaintiff suffered a certain injury from the accident; (3) plaintiffs injury was permanent; and (4) the records of various medical provid ers were kept in the ordinary course of business. Defendant objected to these requests, claiming that they called for opinions. She also claimed that she lacked personal knowledge to admit or deny the matters and could not investigate further because they were protected by the physician/patient privilege.
These requests sought the admission of facts that are proper subjects for requests to admit. See Szczeblewski, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 346-48, 795 N.E.2d at 370-71; Hubeny, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 713 N.E.2d at 226. Thus, defendant's objection that these requests called for an "opinion" was improper.
Defendant also asserted that the requests were protected by the physician/patient privilege. However, the physician/patient privilege does not apply because plaintiff filed this lawsuit placing his physical condition in issue. See 735 ILCS 5/8 — 802(4) (West 2002); Galindo v. Riddell, Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d 139, 148, 437 N.E.2d 376, 383 (1982). Further, plaintiff already provided defendant with all of his medical records and bills. Thus, the physician/patient privilege did not prohibit defendant from responding to the requests.
On remand, the trial court should allow defendant to amend her responses.
III. JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES
Finally, plaintiff contends that the jury's award of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In light of our decision to reverse and remand this case for a new trial, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the jury's award of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
IV CONCLUSION
The order of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
O'BRIEN, J., concurs.
Evidence not falling under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, such as the business records exception, may be admissible if it possesses guarantees of trustworthiness. See People v. Bueno, 358 Ill. App. 3d 143, 152, 829 N.E.2d 402, 409 (2005). Even if we were to find that the opinions contained in the records did not fit under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, we would conclude that they were sufficiently trustworthy and, thus, admissible. In evaluating the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, courts will consider whether (1) the declarant had a motive to fabricate; (2) the statements are written or oral; (3) the statements are contradicted by direct evidence; and (4) the declarant is available to testify. See 18 Ill. L. & Prac. §124, at 355 (2003).
Each of the four factors weighs in favor of the records' trustworthiness and reliability. First, plaintiffs medical providers had no reason to fabricate or inaccurately record their observations, opinions and impressions of plaintiff and his medical condition. See Richardson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 731 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (La. App. 1999) ("There is no motive for the person whose duty it is to make the entries to do other than record them correctly and accurately"). Second, the medical providers' statements were written and recorded in plaintiff's medical records to become a part of plaintiff's permanent medical history. Third, the opinions and diagnoses contained in the medical records are not contradicted by any other evidence. Finally, Dr. Eguro and Ms. Taylor were not available to testify, as Dr. Eguro was deceased and Ms. Taylor could not be located. Thus, we find that these records would be admissible as trustworthy evidence even absent the firmly rooted business records exception to the hearsay rule.
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); Ala. R. Evid. 803(6); Alaska R. Evid. 803(b); Ark. R. Evid. 803(6); Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6); River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. O&G Industries, Inc., 219 Conn. 787, 799, 595 A.2d 839 (Conn. 1991) (construing Conn. Gen. Stat. §52 — 180); Colo. R. Evid. 803(6); Del. R. Evid. 803(6); Haw. R. Evid. 803(6); Idaho R. Evid. 803(b); Ind. R. Evid. 803(6); Iowa R. Evid. 803(6); Ky. R. Evid. 803(6); La. Code Evid. Art. 803(6); Me. R. Evid. 803(6); Md. R. 5 — 803(6); Mich. R. Evid. 803(6); Minn. R. Evid. 803(6); Miss. R. Evid. 803(6); Mont. R. Evid. 803(6); N.H. R. Evid. 803(6); Nev. Rev. Stat. §51.35; N.J. R. Evid. 803(c)(6); N.M. R. Rev. 11 — 803, N.C. R. Evid. 803(6); N.D. R. Evid. 803(6); Okla. Stat. Ann. §2803(6); Or. Rev. Stat. §40.460(6); R.I. R. Evid. 803(6); S.D.C.L. §19 — 16—10; Tenn. R. Evid. 803(6); Texas R. Evid. 803(6); Utah R. Evid. 803(6); Vt. R. Evid. 803(6); W. Va. R. Evid. 803(6); Wis. Stat. Ann. §90.803(6); Wyo. R. Evid. 803(6).
A business record containing opinions or conclusions affects the weight, not the admissibility, of the record. See Birch, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 407; Amos, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 646; Schacht, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 833.