Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Harold SNEED
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-09-11
Citations: 680 So. 2d 1237
Docket Number: No. 95-KA-2326
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Harold SNEED.
Judges: Before BARRY, BYRNES and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 680
Pages: 1237–1241

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Harold SNEED.
No. 95-KA-2326.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 11, 1996.
C. Gary Wainwright, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellant Harold Sneed.
Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Karen Godail Arena, Assistant Distrcit Attorney of Orleans Parish, New Orleans, for appellee State of Louisiana.
Before BARRY, BYRNES and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
IrMURRAY, Judge.
Harold Sneed entered guilty pleas to possession of heroin in violation of La. Revised Statute § 40:966(C)(1) and to being a multiple offender, but reserved his right, pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Finding that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to suppress the evidence and Mr. Sneed's statements, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
New Orleans Police Sergeant Bruce Little testified that on March 20,1995, he met with an untested confidential informant who said that wholesale heroin distribution was taking place at an address on South Rendon Street. This informant admitted he also was a heroin user and seller, but Sgt. Little denied that information was given to "work off" charges arising from an arrest. The informant identified the seller on South Rendon Street as Adam Lawrence. Sgt. Little's investigation confirmed that Mr. Lawrence lived at the address given, that he had a lengthy arrest history, and that both local and federal investigators ^considered him a current narcotics trafficker. Additionally, a car parked in the driveway of the address was registered to Adam Lawrence.
The police set up a surveillance of the house at issue that same day. Mr. Sneed was seen arriving at the house in a silver Impala, accompanied by a female passenger. Mr. Sneed got out of the car alone and went to the front door where he was met by Mr. Lawrence. Both men went inside, then Mr. Sneed exited the house about a minute later and returned to his ear. As he was driving away, Sgt. Little radioed for nearby undercover officers "to make an investigatory stop" of the vehicle and its occupants.
Officer Lawrence Green testified that he, along with two other plainclothes policemen, had been instructed to remain in the area of Tulane Avenue and Jefferson Davis Parkway as backup for a narcotics investigation. After Sgt. Little's message was received, they located the silver Impala as it pulled into a gas station. The officers positioned their unmarked police car so that the Impala could not go forward, then got out and identified themselves as they approached the car. After Mr. Sneed got out, the officers informed him of the narcotics investigation and the surveillance on South Rendon Street. They advised him of his Miranda rights. Officer Green testified that at this point, Mr. Sneed "got kind of nervous and said, T know what you're looking for.' [The defendant] kind of like broke down and said, 'It's under the backseat.' " Mr. Sneed also asked the police not to arrest his wife, who was pregnant, because she had "nothing to do with it."
A search of the Impala resulted in the seizure of nineteen tin-foil packets of heroin from under the seat and $777 cash from a handbag found on the driver's side floor board. Mr. Sneed and his wife were arrested and taken to the police station, where the defendant was again advised of his rights. After executing a |3written waiver of rights, Mr. Sneed told Sgt. Little and others that he had gone to Mr. Lawrence's to pay for heroin purchased a week earlier, and that the drugs found in the car were what was left of that purchase.
After hearing this testimony and brief arguments from the parties, the trial court ruled that the motion to suppress the evidence and Mr. Sneed's statements was denied because the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and question Mr. Sneed. Mr. Sneed filed a writ application with this court, but before any disposition was made on the writ he entered his Crosby plea and was sentenced as a second offender. This appeal followed and was consolidated with the writ application.
DISCUSSION
An individual may be stopped and questioned by police if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person "is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense." La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 215.1. While "reasonable suspicion" is something less than the probable cause needed for arrest, it must be based upon particular articu-lable facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time the individual is approached. State v. Smith, 94-1502, p. 4 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1082. The officer's past experience, training and common sense may be considered in determining if the inferences drawn from the facts presented were reasonable. State v. Jackson, 26,138, p. 5 (La.App.2d Cir. 8/17/94), 641 So.2d 1081, 1084.
Mr. Sneed contends that the trial court erred in finding the police had reasonable suspicion to stop his ear. He therefore argues that the heroin and money were illegally seized, and his statements illegally obtained because they | constituted fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Relying primarily upon Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the State asserts that under the totality of the circumstances, the informant's tip was sufficiently corroborated to justify the investigatory stop in this case. The State also notes that the police neither directed Mr. Sneed into the gas station nor forced him from his ear, and that after being advised of his rights but before being questioned, Mr. Sneed voluntarily incriminated himself. It is therefore argued that the motion to suppress was properly denied.
The State's reliance on Alabama v. White is misplaced. The issue here is not whether the informant's tip was sufficient to give the police a justifiable belief that drug activity was being conducted at the house on South Rendon Street. Rather the issue is whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Sneed was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime when he drove away from that house. The only evidence presented on this issue was Sgt. Little's testimony that other officers had observed Mr. Sneed stop his car in front of the house, go inside for "about one minute," then drive away. There was no testimony that the area had a reputation for drug trafficking nor that there had been a succession of brief visits to the house by other individuals. No one testified that Mr. Sneed appeared nervous, furtive or secretive when he entered or departed the residence. Nothing indicates that Mr. Sneed carried anything into or out of the residence. It is not alleged that, after leaving the Rendon Street address, the driver |fiof the Impala committed a traffic violation. Mr. Sneed was stopped solely because he briefly had visited a residence that was under surveillance for drug activity.
This court has previously ruled that an individual's mere presence at a residence about to be searched pursuant to a warrant does not establish "reasonable suspicion" under Article 215.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. State v. Williams, 95-1971 (La.App. 4th Cir. 11/16/95), 665 So.2d 112. As in Williams, the officers here had nothing to connect Mr. Sneed to illegal activities at the Rendon Street house; the informant had not described either him or his car when detailing the alleged drug trafficking by Mr. Lawrence. Instead, Mr. Sneed was stopped based upon "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity." Williams at p. 6, 665 So.2d at 115, quoting State v. Range, 93-1693, p. 11 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/5/94), 642 So.2d 1318, 1324, writ denied, 94-2898 (La.6/30/95), 657 So.2d 1021.
The facts established here are thus distinguishable from those in other cases cited by the State as supporting the officers' actions. In State v. Finne, 92-2555 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/11/94), 632 So.2d 819, several others, including a known narcotics offender, had briefly visited a house under surveillance before that defendant was approached on departing the house. In State v. Richardson, 575 So.2d 421 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 578 So.2d 131 (La.1991), the defendant was stopped because he matched the description of a person observed conducting drug transactions. In State v. Harris, 613 So.2d 807 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 629 So.2d 388 (La.1993), the defendant was seen walking into pouring rain to meet with another man in an area known to harbor drug traffickers, and he fled when the police approached.
16None of these additional factors supporting a suspicion of participation in drug activity were shown to exist in this case. Although the residence was reasonably suspected as being used for narcotics transactions, Mr. Sneed's brief presence there, without more, was equally consistent with innocent behavior as with criminal conduct.
Consequently, we thus find that there were not sufficient articulable facts to justify Mr. Sneed's initial detention. Because both the evidence and the statements were obtained as a result of this illegal stop, the trial court's denial of Mr. Sneed's motions to suppress was erroneous and his Crosby plea must be vacated under Wong Sun v. United States, supra. Therefore, we pretermit discussion of the additional assignments of error.
REVERSED.
BYRNES, J., dissents with reasons.
. Testimony suggests that a warrant to search the house was, in fact, obtained shortly after the events at issue here.
. Officer Green testified that once his police car had pulled into the gas station, Mr. Sneed was not free to leave because the officers "intended to question him" as Sgt. Little had instructed.