Case Name: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, etc., Petitioners, v. Martin BLUMENTHAL, Trustee, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-06-21
Citations: 675 So. 2d 598
Docket Number: Nos. 94-52, 94-137
Parties: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, etc., Petitioners, v. Martin BLUMENTHAL, Trustee, Respondent.
Judges: Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 675
Pages: 598–613

Head Matter:
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, etc., Petitioners, v. Martin BLUMENTHAL, Trustee, Respondent.
Nos. 94-52, 94-137.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 21, 1995.
Order Granting Certiorari on Rehearing En Banc Feb. 21, 1996 and Adopting Judge Cope’s Dissent to the Panel Opinion As the Opinion of the Court.
Rehearing Denied June 5, 1996.
Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., Daniel A. Weiss, Asst. County Atty., John G. Fletcher, Miami and Joni Armstrong Coffey and Craig H. Coller, Assistant County Attorneys, for petitioners.
Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Ro-sen & Quentel, Clifford A. Schulman, Elliot H. Scherker and Reginald L. Bouthillier, Jr., Miami, for respondent.
Shubin & Bass, Miami, for Redlands Citizens Association, Inc. and Bird-Kendall Homeowners’ Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The petitioners, Metropolitan Dade County, West Dade Federation of Homeowner Associations, Inc., Morgan I. Levy, Russell Geyer, and John H. Bechamps, petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Dade County Circuit Court, Appellate Division, which granted a petition for writ of certiorari on behalf of the respondent, Martin Blumenthal, Trustee [Blumenthal]. We deny the petition.
Blumenthal applied to Metropolitan Dade County to rezone a twenty-acre parcel in West Dade in order to develop a 360 unit apartment complex. The rezoning application requested that the property be rezoned from GU (an interim zoning designation) to RU-4L (Residential Limited Apartment House with a maximum of twenty-three units per acre). Under Dade County's Comprehensive Development Master Plan (CDMP), the parcel is located within an area designated as medium density residential use which permits twenty-five dwelling units per acre. Blumenthal's proposed project, Devon Lakes, would have eighteen units per acre.
The rezoning application was submitted to the county's Developmental Impact Committee (DIC). The DIC's detailed report addressed the impact the project would have on the environment, the economy, transportation, and essential services such as potable water supply, sewer service, police, fire, parks, schools, and solid waste management. In addition, the DIC's report stated that there is a need for this type of affordable housing in the area. After a thorough review, the DIC found that the requested zoning was consistent with the CDMP and recommended that the property be rezoned as requested.
At the Metropolitan Dade County Commission hearing, Blumenthal's counsel presented evidence and experts in support of the rezoning application. Mr. Martin Tabor, the developer, introduced a map of the area. The map showed that many nearby developments were also zoned as RU-4L. Mr. Tabor also explained that the proposed project meets or exceeds every planning and zoning requirement. In addition to Mr. Tabor's testimony, other experts also testified in favor of the proposed project.
Counsel for the West Dade Federation of Homeowner Association [Federation] stated that his client objected to an eighteen-unit per acre density, but that it would agree to thirteen units per acre. Morgan Levy, the president of the Federation, explained to the Commission that although nearby developments were zoned RU-4L, the average density for Doral Park, which is located east of the subject parcel, is six units per acre. Levy also explained that the Commission, through prior zoning decisions in favor of the Federation, had established a "trend" of limiting the area east of N.W. 114th Court, where the subject parcel is located, to a density of thirteen units per acre. In order to explain this "trend," Mr. Levy introduced a map of Section 19, the section containing the subject parcels. Section 19 runs from N.W. 117 Avenue to N.W. 107 Avenue, and from N.W. 41 Street to N.W. 58 Street. The subject property borders N.W. 107th Avenue at approximately N.W. 43 Street. The only project within Section 19 is the Mag-Landea project which runs from approximately N.W. 117th Avenue to N.W. 112 Avenue and from N.W. 48 Street to N.W. 51 Street. The Mag-Landea project is approximately eighty acres with an average density of approximately eighteen units per acre; the western forty acres have a density of twenty-three units per acre, while the eastern forty acres (east of N.W. 114th Court) have a density of thirteen units per acre. Mr. Levy argued that the "trend" was to limit the density of any project east of N.W. 114th Court to a density of thirteen units per acre. Therefore, Mr. Levy's evaluation of the zoning "trend" for Section 19 was based only on the Mag-Landea project since the remainder of Section 19 is undeveloped. In addition to Mr. Levy's testimony, Dorothy Posada, a member of the board of directors of the Doral Woods Homeowners Association, stated that the existence of an apartment complex near her development with a density of twenty-three units per acre, has depressed the value of homes in the area.
The Commission denied Blumenthal's rezoning application stating at the hearing that thirteen units per acre was an emerging trend in the area. The Commission's resolution stated that the rezoning "would be incompatible with the neighborhood and area concerned and would be in conflict with the principles and intent of the plan for the development of Dade County."
Thereafter, Blumenthal filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Commission's decision. The circuit court, appellate divi sion, granted the writ finding that the Commission's decision was "arbitrary and not based on substantial competent evidence, as the neighbors' testimony in opposition was conclusionary and without adequate support." This petition for writ of certiorari follows.
As explained in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982), this court's scope of review in the instant case is very narrow.
[W]here full review of administrative action is given in the circuit court as a matter of right, one appealing the circuit court's judgment is not entitled to a second full review in the district court. Where a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review in the circuit court from administrative action, the circuit court must determine whether procedural due process is accorded, whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court, upon review of the circuit court's judgment, then determines whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law.
Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626; see Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 476 (Fla.1993). Since the petitioners have not raised the issue of whether the circuit court afforded them procedural due process, the only issue presented is whether the circuit court applied the correct law.
In the instant case, the circuit court applied the correct law when it found that the Commission's decision was not supported by competent substantial evidence. The petitioners argue that this court should reevaluate the circuit court's finding that the Commission's decision was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Under the parameters set forth in Vaillant, this court would be exceeding its scope of review if it did.
Although not necessary for our decision, we, nonetheless, are of the opinion that the Commission's decision was not based on competent substantial evidence. The Commission's decision was based mainly on the testimony of an objecting neighbor, Morgan Levy. In essence, Mr. Levy testified that a zoning "trend" had been established to limit the density in the subject area to thirteen units per acre. However, Mr. Levy is not an expert on zoning matters and is, therefore, unqualified to testify as to zoning trends. There are instances in which lay persons are just as qualified as expert witnesses to offer their views on certain matters. For example, a lay person is just as qualified as an "expert witness" to testify as to natural beauty. See Board of County Comm'rs of Pinellas County v. City of Clearwater, 440 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see Grefkowicz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 389 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (finding that neighboring property owners' testimony that zoning applicants intended to use strictly residential property for commercial use constitutes competent substantial evidence). But lay persons are not just as qualified as expert witnesses to offer their conclusions or predictions as to zoning trends. Moreover, even if Mr. Levy were just as qualified as an expert to testify as to zoning trends, the construction of one or two projects with densities of thirteen units per acre is not sufficient to establish a "trend."
Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of certiorari because to make a determination as to competency and sufficiency of the evidence presented at the hearing would be an impermissible reevaluation of the evidence and outside the scope of our review.
HUBBART and GODERICH, JJ., concur.
. The DIC is comprised of various departments and agencies, including the following:
(1) Public Works Department, consisting of a representative of the Highway Planning Division and a representative of the Subdivision Control Division;
(2) Planning Department, consisting of a representative of the Development Planning Division and a representative of the Research Division;
(3) Building and Zoning Department;
(4) Park and Recreation Department;
(5) Environmental Resources Management Department;
(6) Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Authority;
(7) Miami-Dade Police Department;
(8) Fire Department;
(9) Dade County Transportation Administration;
(10) Capital Improvements Division;
(11) Department of Solid Waste Management;
(12) School Board of Dade County; and,
(13) South Florida Water Management District.
33-1303.1(A), Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida.
.The DIC's report states, in part, as follows:
This residential proposal is well conceived with respect both to the subject property's proximity to significant centers of employment in the West Dade area, and with respect to accessibility to other major employment centers surrounding Miami International Airport. The need for additional affordable housing in this area is apparent and has been documented in the Comprehensive Development Master Plan. Higher density residential development should be encouraged in those areas planned to accommodate such higher density, thus taking advantage of existing and planned infrastructure. Underuse [sic] of such areas promotes urban sprawl.
. Blumenthal's attorney explained at the hearing that it would not be economically feasible to build only thirteen dwelling units per acre due to land costs, infrastructure costs, and construction costs.
. "[Daymen's opinions unsubstantiated by any competent facts" do not constitute substantial competent evidence in zoning proceedings. City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
. It is not our intention to discourage objecting neighbors from voicing their opinions at Commission hearings.