Case Name: Lewis J. Townshend, Appellant from Judge of Probate allowing Will of George H. Townshend
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1892-08-13
Citations: 85 Me. 57
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lewis J. Townshend, Appellant from Judge of Probate allowing Will of George H. Townshend.
Judges: Peters, C. J., Walton, Libbey and Foster, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 85
Pages: 57–62

Head Matter:
Lewis J. Townshend, Appellant from Judge of Probate allowing Will of George H. Townshend.
Cumberland.
Opinion August 13, 1892.
Probate. Appeal. Notice. B. S., c. 63, § 25.
In probate appeals, service of the reasons thereof upon the attorney of the adverse party, appearing in the probate court, does not -wort a compliance with the provisions of the statute that require the same to be made upon the party himself.
On exceptions.
This was an appeal from a decree of the probate court for the county of Cumberland, approving the last will and testament of George H. Townshend.
After the appeal was entered in this court, E. W. Freeman, Esq., attorney for Oliver. Otis Howard, appeared specially for the purpose of objecting to the sufficiency of the service of the reasons of appeal on his client, and moved that the appeal be dismissed, because the appellant did not serve the reasons of appeal on the parties who appeared in the probate court and especially did not serve said reasons of appeal on the said Oliver Otis Howard, as provided by law.
It appeared that said Howard appeared in the probate court by attorney only, and that the reasons of appeal were served on said attorney only, the said Howard himself being out of the State, and so far away that a -seasonable and personal service upon him could not be had.
The presiding justice being of opinion that the service was insufficient, and that the excuse offered was insufficient to supply the want of a legal service, sustained the motion and ordered the appeal dismissed and the case remanded to the probate court.
The statute regulating the appeal in this case is as follows : "Fourteen days at least before the sitting of the appellate court he [the appellant] shall serve all the other parties, who appeared before the judge of probate, in the case, with a copy of such reasons attested by the register.” E. S., c. 63, § 25.
The appellant took exception to the ruling.
George Walker, for appellant.
If statute receive a strictly literal construction, the right of appeal is practically denied to appellant. He cannot serve his appeal on appellee because he was not a party "who appeared before the judge of probate in the case.” He cannot serve it on appellee’s attorney because the attorney is not the party. Statute should be construed so as to make it effective for its designed purpose. It cannot stand literally, since an appellee, could prevent the appellant from prosecuting appeal's by appearing in probate by attorney only. A literal construction of the statute would require appellants to make personal service themselves of reasons of appeal and not by an officer as is customary and usual. The statute designates no officer to make such service. The mode of service is undefined. No provision made for service when the appellee is out of the State. Reasonable service sufficient, such as shall give appellee notice that appellant intends to prosecute his appeal and inform him of his reasons of appeal. Notice and knowledge of appeal are constructively served on a "party” when duly served on his attorney of record. JVewbit v. Appleton, 63 Maine, 491; Aclams v. Robinson, 1 Pick. 461. Here the appellee has by his own voluntary act, residence beyond the State, made it impossible for appellant to serve on him his reasons of appeal. To save forfeitures, a liberal construction should be given a statute if remedial. Perley v. Jewell, 26 Maine, 101.
E. W. Freeman for appellee.
Eight of appeal purely statutory. Statute being in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. End. Stat. § 127; DwellyY. Dwelly, 46 Maine, 377. So, where it is directory and prescribes forms of procedure (Sedg. Stat. pp. 319, 320), especially statutes of frauds, wills, and limitations. Every requirement must be followed to give jurisdiction. No other method of service prescribed except on appellee in person.
The requirements as to proper parties to give and receive service, time and forms of service, forms of reasons, and even record of service, must be accurately followed in order to give jurisdiction to the appellate court. The right to appeal is lost by a failure to comply with the requirements. Sedg. Stat. p. 348 ; (1883) Knightv. Werskoff, 20Ela. 140 ; (1883,) OkamY.Paly, 63 Cal. 317; (1882,) Peed v. Allison, 61 Cal. 461; State v. Conkling, (la.), 44 N. "W. 247 ; (1890,) Pender v. Lancaster, (S. C.), 11S.E. 634; (1890,) Coffin v. Edgington, (Id.), 23 Pac. 80; (1874,) Hewitt v. Wetherby, 57 Mo. 279 ; (1887,) Fuller v. McClure, 25 Mo. App. 418; (1858,) Peacock v. The Queen, 4 C. B. N. S. 267 ; Powberry v. Morgan, 9 Exch. 730 ; Q. v. The Justices of Middlesex, 7 Jur. 396; S. C. 17 L. J. M. C. Ill; (1887,) Hyde v. Coldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29; (1883,) Madison County Bank v. Suman, 79 Mo. 530; (1875,) Wait v. Demeritt, 119 Mass'. 158.
Where the statute is directory, the forms to be followed and the acts to be done become conditions precedent to jurisdiction, and non-compliance is fatal. End. Stat. § 443; Knight v. Norton, (1839,) 15 Maine, 339.
Hardship to a defaulting appellant, is removed by E. S., 1883, c. 63, § 25, which provides : "If any person from accident, mistake, defect of notice, or otherwise without fault on his part, omits to claim or prosecute his appeal as aforesaid, the supreme court, if justice requires a revision, may, upon reasonable terms, allow an appeal to be entered and prosecuted with the same effect, as if it had been seasonably done.”
The legislature, when placing these sections together, provided for two classes of cases. Section twenty-five is in the nature of an equitable provision for certain cases which cannot be legally comprehended in the preceding section. The latter section seems to include in its enumeration the characteristics of the principal case; the former section plainly does not; and the strict construction that is called for will not admit this appeal under section twenty-four.
The theory of strict construction is favored in this State because where other than actual personal service is allowed, it is so specified by statute. The following aré instances of express provisions for service on an attorney : Writ of review, R. S., c. 89, § 8; citation to poor debtor’s disclosure, c. 113, § § 21 and 27; notice to take depositions, c. 107, § 6 ; wrrits against non-residents, c. 81, § 21; demand and service on executors out of the State, c. 64, § 41; notice on appeal from insolvency commissioners, c. 66, § 12. Notice to ward of proposed sale of real estate may be served upon his heirs, c. 71, § 25.
Counsel also cited : TJ. 8. v. Monson, 1 Gall. 14 ; 3 Bl. Com. 455 ; State v. Meeker, 19 Neb. 444; Stats. Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. YI, 2 Coke Inst. 308; Wilb. Stat. p. 107 ; 1 Kent Com. 464; Esterley’s Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 195; Guar. &c. Co. v. Burlington, 23 Fla. 514 ; Clark v. Snyder, 20 Hun, 330 ; Jordan v. Bowman, 28 Mo. App. 608 (1890) ; St. Louis v. Grub el, 32 Mo. 295 ; Morgan v. Edwards, 5 H. & N. 418.
This statute as amended by c. 243, Public Laws of March 21, 1893, now reads: “ When a non-resident party appears by an attorney residing in this State before the judge of probate in any case, and an appeal is taken, the service of a copy of the reasons of appeal upon such attorney shall be sufficient.”

Opinion:
Haskell, J.
The learned brief of the appellee's counsel makes it clear that sei'viee of the reasons of appeal upon the attorney of a party, in the probate court, cannot work a compliance with the provisions of the statute, R. S., c. 63, § 24, that require the same to be made upon the party.
More mischief is likely7 to come from allowing service in such cases to be made upon the attorney, in a court where appearances are often not entered of record, than convenience; especially, as R. S., c. 63, § 25, provides ample remedy, when service upon the party cannot be made in season to comply with the statute, or fails from mistake without fault.
Exceptions overruled.
Peters, C. J., Walton, Libbey and Foster, JJ., concurred.