Case Name: W. H. Carroll vs. J. N. Stewart
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1850-11
Citations: 4 Rich. 200
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. H. Carroll vs. J. N. Stewart.
Judges: O’Neall, EvaNS, Wardlaw and Withers, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 200–202

Head Matter:
W. H. Carroll vs. J. N. Stewart.
Under the Act of 1787, (5 Stat, 15,) making it lawful for tire executors of a will, “ or the majority of such executors as shall qualify," in certain cases, to sell and j, convey the lands of their testator, one of two qualified executors cannot sell and convey.
Before Withers, J., at York, Fall Term, 1850.
This was an action of trespass to try the title to a small parcel of land. The plaintiff derived title from the last will and testament of Thomas Carroll, who devised all his real estate to his wife, to be disposed of in her discretion, during life or widowhood, or until his, the testator’s, children should arrive at full age; “ and, at her death, or marriage, or when all my children shall arrive at full age, I will that the property be equally divided amongst my wife and children, by mutual con sent, or by sale of the whole.” Abram Hardin and Joseph Whistenhunt were appointed and qualified as executors. The widow married; and, thereupon, Abram Hardin conveyed the land sued for to the plaintiff. Joseph Whistenhunt, the other executor, was examined for the plaintiff, and said that letters were issued to him and Hardin, and he joined in making some returns at first, but that he had left the management of the estate to Hardin, and had told him that he did not want to act in that matter. The land was sold by order of the Ordinary, on the petition of Hardin. The warrant to appraise it was directed to him only, and, after that, he only made returns to the Ordinary’s office.
His Honor thought that Whistenhunt should have joined Hardin in the conveyance, and nonsuited the plaintiff.
The plaintiff appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial, on the ground that his Honor erred in holding that the deed executed by Hardin to the plaintiff, ought to have been jointly executed by Hardin and Whistenhunt: it appearing, from the evidence, that Whistenhunt refused to act as executor after the marriage of the widow, and refused to join in the deed.
Witherspoon, for the motion.
-, contra.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Frost, J.
It appears, from the recital in the report, that the testator did not " will and declare his land to be sold by his executorsand this power to sell is, therefore, not to be derived from the Statute 21 H. 8, c. 4, (2 Stat. 457.) The direction of the testator is that, on the occurrence of a certain event, his land should be sold; but it is not declared by whom the sale should be made. This brings the case within the Act of 1787, (5 Stat. 15,) which provides that, whenever any person has directed his lands should be sold for the payment of debts, .or for distribution, among legatees, of the money which may arise from the sale in such case, "it shall be lawful for the executors of such person, or the majority of such executors as shall qualify on the said will, if no person is expressly named for that pur pose, to sell and convey the lands, agreeable to the intention of the testator." Before this Act, it was never questioned that, when a testator directed his estate to be sold, but gave no power to his executors to sell, that a sale by the executors was illegal: (Drayton vs. Drayton, 2 Des. Eq. 250.) It is the recited purpose of the Act to remedy that inconvenience. The power of the executors to sell, in this case, must be entirely derived from the Act.
The authority which it confers must be strictly pursued. The Act should be construed in analogy to the case of a power to sell land conferred by a will. At common law, when the devise is that two executors should sell, one alone cannot sell, though the other refused to be executor, or die. The mention of the number is held to annex a personal authority to them and to appropriate the trust to them, in the same manner as if the authority were given to two persons, by name. But, if the words of the devise be answered, that is held sufficient: as, if one make three executors, and devise his land to be sold by his executors, and one of them die before the time of sale, the other two may sell, because the terms of the power, which require the plural number, are satisfied. (Pow. on Dev. 238, 242.) By the Act of 1787, when the testator has directed his land to be sold, and no person is expressly named for that purpose, " it shall be lawful for the executors, or a majority of such as shall qualify," to convey the land. Hardin cannot claim the authority conferred on a " majority of such as will qualify;" for one is not a majority of two. But Hardin and Whistenhunt might have conveyed jointly under the power conferred on the executors.
It may fairly be inferred to be the intention of the Legislature, that if only two executors are appointed, one should not have the power to sell, without or against the consent of the other; but that the concurrence of both should be required, and be shown by their uniting in the deed of conveyance.
The motion is refused.
O'Neall, EvaNS, Wardlaw and Withers, JJ., concurred.
Motion dismissed.