Case Name: BOSWORTH et al. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1898-02-25
Citations: 87 F. 72
Docket Number: Nos. 442, 452, 453, and 454
Parties: BOSWORTH et al. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. et al.
Judges: Before WOODS, JENKINS, and SHOWALTER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 87
Pages: 72–94

Head Matter:
BOSWORTH et al. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
February 25, 1898.)
Nos. 442, 452, 453, and 454.
1. Carriers of Goods — Destruction by Fire — Delivery.
A railroad operated by defendant as receiver, being without yard facilities or switching engines at its terminus, in East St. Louis, entered into a contract with a terminal company having yards and tracks and connecting with St. Louis, by which such company, for a stipulated charge, agreed to furnish to the railroad the necessary yard room and track facilities, and the necessary switch engines and yard men for making up and breaking up its freight trains. It was the custom, in operating under this contract, for the terminal company to take cars of freight arriving, and place them on its tracks, where they remained until a new waybill was furnished to it by the defendant, and were then transferred according to its directions. In case of freight consigned to St. Louis, it was the custom of defendant to notify the consignee on its arrival, and, on receipt of directions ■ from such consignee, to issue the waybill to the terminal company, designating the point of delivery. It appeared that the terminal company, to increase its transfer business across the river, had offered to dealers in barley in St. Louis to hold upon its tracks free of charge cars received by it, until the barley should be sold, but it did not appear that defendant knew of such arrangement. Certain cars loaded with barley, the shipments being induced by this arrangement, and also a car, No. 1,004, consigned to a point in Alabama, came over defendant’s road, and were taken by the terminal company, and placed on its tracks, where it usually placed defendant’s cars. While standing upon such tracks, where some of them had remained for several days, the cars were destroyed by fire through the negligence of the terminal company. No waybills for any of such cars had been issued by defendant. Held, that as to the cars loaded with barley and their contents defendant was not liable. Woods, X, holding that, under the arrangement between the consignees and the terminal company, which, in the absence of their dissent, was binding on the shippers, there was a delivery by defendant when the cars came into the actual possession of the company. Showalter, J., concurring on the ground that the taking possession of the cars by the terminal company with knowledge that the shipment over defendant’s line had been completed, and that they were to be moved over its tracks to some point of delivery or connection, constituted a delivery to it as connecting carrier. Jenkins, J., dissenting on the ground that there was no delivery by defendant, which relieved him of liability as a carrier, until shipping directions had been given to the terminal company, that company having no authority to move or deliver the freight until the receipt of such directions, and only in accordance therewith. As to car 1,004, held, that there was no delivery, and defendant was liable for its loss. Showalter, J., dissenting.
9. Same — Continuous Carriage.
When a car load of goods is shipped for continuous carriage over connecting lines, the initial carrier is not relieved of responsibility by merely delivering possession of the car to the connecting carrier, but his liability for a loss continues until he has also delivered shipping directions to the latter. Showalter, J., dissenting.
Appeals from (lie Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois.
These appeals are from decrees against the appellant, O. II. Bosworth, as receiver of the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company, in favor of iuterví-iiíts in the case of the Mercantile Trust Company against the Chicago, Peoria & A. Louis Railway Company, wherein the receiver was appointed, for damages (•alisal by the burning of freight ears and Ilieir contents, of which the appellant is alleged to have had possession as a common carrier, on the evening of October 28, 3894, at East St. Louis. By an amendment the petitions were made to charge that, while the cars were still in the possession of the receiver at East St. Louis, he negligently caused and permitted them to be placed in proximity to a wooden warehouse filled with baled and loose hay, which was exposed to fire from passing locomotives, and in some manner caught fire, which, communicating to the cars, caused the damage complained of. The amounts decreed 10 be paid to the interveners, respectively, were: To the Chicago, Milwaukee <fc St. Paul Railway Company, $9,033.73; to Jacob Uaú, 81,144.07; to the Hunt-ting Elevator Company, $2,600.95; to the Carr, Ryder & Engler Company, S777.26; and to others, not parties here, whoso decrees it has been agreed shall abide the result of these appeals, various sums, aggregating nearly $10,000. The facts, in the main, were agreed upon; and the controlling question is whether the cars and goods at the time of destruction were in the possession of the receiver, or had passed into the possession of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, which owned the tracks upon which the ears were standing when they were consumed. It appears that, not having adequate yard facilities of its own at East St. Louis, the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company on August 1, 3892, entered into an agreement with the terminal railroad association for the use of its tracks, and, either by acquiescence or by formal stipulation, that agreement remained in force between the terminal association and the receiver. Only the first, fourth, and fifth clauses need be quoted:
“It is agreed that the party of the first part [the terminal railroad association] shall furnish the necessary yard room and track facilities in their yards in East St. Louis, Illinois, as now located, and the necessary switch engines and yard men to do the switching of the party of the second part in the making up and breaking tip of all freight trains that depart from and arrive at East St. Louis, and to furnish storage room for a reasonable number of cars necessary to properly lake care of and handle the business of the party of the second part, not exceeding one hundred and fifty (150) cars at any one time; and the charge for the facilities and the work above named shall be at the rate of fifty (50) cents per loaded car in and out, except cars on which the party of the first part receives a bridge tell, which will be handled free; empty cars in and out free.” “Fourth. All cars consigned to and from the East St. Louis freight house of the party of the second part to be switched to and from the Wiggins Transfer tracks without extra charge. Regular switching charges and rules to apply on all other cars to and from connections; the party of the first part to be governed in making its collections by instructions shown on billing to it as to who should pay. In the absence of any instructions the switching charges will follow the car. Fifth. The party of the first part to furnish track room upon which the engines of the party of the second part can be switched and cared for and turned as may be required; the care of such engines to be under the supervision of the party of the first part; the price for the service rendered to be agreed upon by the master mechanic of the party of the first part and the superintendent of motive power and machinery of the party of the second part.”
“These tracks of deposit,” says the master’s report, “were not exclusively used by the O., P. & St. L., but the cars seem to have been always placed upon them.” It is apparent from- the evidence, however, that the receiver had no voice in determining where a car should be placed, or with what care it should be guarded.
For the purpose of saving the labor and expense of making proof, the parties stipulated that the property described in the several petitions was destroyed as stated: that the Carr, Ryder & Engler Company, a corporation, on October 20, 3S94, delivered the property described in its petition to the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company at Dubuque, Iowa, loaded in car No. 1,004 of the Rock Island & Peoria Railway Company, and consigned for transportation as per bill of lading to the May & Thomas Hardware Company, Birmingham, Ala., by way of Bast St. Louis, Ill.; that the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company was the owner of the 88 cars described in its petition; that during the evening of October 2S, 1894, those cars, while on the tracks of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, commonly used by the receiver under the agreement between that association and the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company, dated August 1, 1892, were damaged by fire to the total amount of $9,033.73; that the cars were consigned as per bills of lading and waybills introduced in evidence; that Jacob Rau, of Wykoff, Minn., at the times and places alleged in his petition delivered to the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company two car loads of barley, consigned to the Orthwein Grain Company, St: Louis, Mo., by way of East St. Louis, 111.; that receipts, in the form of exhibits attached to the stipulation, were given by the railway company at the time the barley was received for transportation; and that when destroyed the barley belonged to the petitioner, and was of the value of $1,144.07. The stipulation in respect to the shipment of the Huntting Elevator Company is in the same words, except that the consignee named is the Teichman Commission Company, and the value of the goods destroyed is stated to have been $2,650.95. Like stipulations were made concerning the cases of other interveners, from wThose decrees there has been no formal appeal. The agreement was afterwards amended by striking out the clause in respect to the ownership of the bailey shipped by the several petitioners, except Rau and one other, whose consignments were for sale on commission.
It is contended by the appellant that the destination of the cars consumed, except five, as shown by the waybills and receipts or copies thereof introduced in evidence by the interveners, was Bast St. Louis, although in the column under the head of “Marks and Consignees” the name of the consignee, and the words “St. Louis, Missouri,” appear. The shipments of barley, except those for sale on commission, were made in pursuance of telegraphic correspondence showing offers of net prices by the brokers or commission men at St. Louis, accepted by the shippers; and it is contended by the appellant that on delivery of the grain to the carrier the title passed to the consignees, and that the interveners have no right of action. On the other hand, proof was offered to show that delivery at St. Louis was intended by the parties, and that on that understanding other shipments were made after the fire in lieu of those destroyed. At the time of the fire, the cars destroyed, together with others which were injured and afterwards repaired, had been on the tracks of the terminal association for various periods of time, — one since the 28th day of September preceding, — and of those received in October there arrived bn the 10th, 1; on the 16th, 1; on the 24th, 4; on the 25th, 18; on the 26th, 12; on the 27th, at 7:55 a. m., 9; at 6:44 p. m., 2; and on the 2Sth, at 6:55 a. m., 4; at 1:45 p. m., 1; and at 2:57 p. m.. car 1,004. Of the aggregate number (54), all but 8 were cars of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company.
In respect to the manner in which the ears brought in over the receiver’s road were handled and disposed of by the employés of the receiver and of the terminal association under their agreement, it appears that after an incoming train had been broken up, and the cars placed on the tracks of the termina) company, they remained there, in the physical control of that company, until the consignee, to whom the receiver was accustomed to send prompt notice of the arrival of a car consigned to him, should indicate the particular destination, which might be on the east or west side of the river, or a point on the line of another railroad, whereupon the receiver would make out and deliver to the terminal company a new waybill, on which that company would transfer the car as directed. It appears further that on the delivery of such a new waybill, and not sooner, it was the custom .of the receiver, if the car belonged to another company, to send notice to that company that the car had been delivered to the terminal association; it being the custom of railroad companies in that way to keep each other advised of the disposition and whereabouts of their respective cars. It satisfactorily appears further that it was the custom of brokers and buyers at St. Louis to leave in the cars, until sold, certain classes of goods, and particularly consignments of barley received upon the tracks of the terminal railroad association, whether billed to St. Louis or East St. Louis; the mode of selling goods so held being by samples taken on the arrival of cars by agents of the consignees employed to visit daily the yards for that purpose. It further appears that the receiver at the hearing before the master made a statement of facts which he proposed to prove by some of the consignees of the barley in question, and asked time to produce the witnesses, and that in order to avoid delay it was agreed by the interveners that, if produced, the witnesses would testify, as stilted by counsel for the receiver, to the effect following; “That the terminal railroad association personally solicited this particular barley business, originating on the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, upon which this controversy is pending; that these solicitations by the terminal railroad association were made to all barley dealers In St. Louis to whom the particular consignments of barley were made which are now in litigation; that the terminal railroad association, as an inducement to barley dealers and shippers, agreed to hold the ears on their tracks at East St. Louis, and offered other facilities in and about their yards at East St. Louis, by which the St. Louis Terminal Railroad Association succeeded in securing the business of all the shippers (by that, term I mean the consignees and shippers), except the business of the John Wall Commission Company, whose business was being handled by the Wiggins Perry Company, a competing line with the St. Louis Terminal Railroad Association, and that at a later day they also secured the business of this last-named firm; and that this solicitation was made in the interest of the terminal railroad association, for the express purpose of having the business sent down the east side of the Mississippi river, so as to give them the benefit of the transportation across the river at East St. Louis to St. Louis, in competition with lines west of the Mississippi river.”
In a general report of the master touching all the cases, it is said “that no notice was sent to the owner, shipper, or consignor of the arrival of said cars a.t St. Louis, or of the delivery of them to the terminal railroad”; and, in the special report upon the case of Jacob Kau, it is said, concerning his cars, that “no notice of their arrival was given to owner.” It is not reported that the consignee of any car was not notified by the receiver, and did not otherwise have knowledge, before the fire, that the car had arrived, and was upon the terminal tracks, subject to his order. On the contrary, the proof is that the consignees received from the shippers immediate notice by mail of each consignment, and in addition received a sample of the grain, which, according to the report, the shippers were accustomed to send by express. Informed in this way of the number and contents of a car in transit, the agent of the consignee in regular and daily attendance in the yards for that purpose was able to take, and, there being no evidence to the contrary, presumably did take, the required sample from each car promptly upon arrival. This conclusion is fortified by a letter of the Orthwein Grape Company to one of the interveners, in which ifc is said, "Two of your cars [giving the numbers] arrived this afternoon,” and by i.he testimony of Rau to tlio effect that his consignee had possession of samples of Ills grain iakeu from the cars on the day of their arrival at East St. Louis. The proof, in addition to the facts stated, being that notice of the arrival of cars was regularly and promptly sent to'the consignees by the employés of tlní receiver, the fair inference, in the absence of contrary evidence, is that notices of the arrival of the cars in question were sent, and were duly received by the consignees.
Bluford Wilson, for appellants.
Burton Hanson, for appellees.
Before WOODS, JENKINS, and SHOWALTER, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied April 1, 1898.

Opinion:
WOODS, Circuit Judge
(after making the foregoing statement). If Hie facts were simply that tinder the agreement of 1892, and in accordance with the custom which had grown up, cars from the receiver's road were taken by the terminal association and placed upon its tracks, and permitted to remain there until the receiver, at the request of the consignee, should make out and deliver to the terminal association new waj bills showing a particular destination, it would perhaps be true, as contended in behalf of the interveners; that the responsibility of the receiver for the cars, with their contents, which were destroyed, had not ceased, because the waybills under which they could have been transferred had not been made out. But, besides the fact of the custom, the undisputed evidence is that shipments of barley originating on the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, including the consignments in dispute, were made to or by way of East St. Louis in order that the cars should come into the possession of that association for transfer in pursuance of an understanding amounting to an agreement between the assoeiátion and the consignees that the association should hold the cars on its tracks, and afford other facilities about its yards at East St. Louis, until the consignee of a car should determine and give notice to what point the transfer should be made.. That agreement was equivalent to a specific direction by the consignee upon the receipt of each car by the terminal association that the car should be held for further orders; and' in that situation, whatever otherwise might have been his duty, the receiver was under no obligation to notify the consignee of the arrival of a car, and it is not material whether such notice was given or not. The delivery to the terminal association was complete, and no delay in making out new waybills, or in sending junction notices to the owners of the cars, if owned by other companies, could be of force to show a continued legal or constructive possession by the receiver. The consignees, whether buyers of the grain or agents of the shippers, it is well settled, had authority, in the absence of notice to the contrary, to direct what disposition should be made of the cars on their arrival at East St. Louis, and the legal result is the same as if the terminal company's possession and detention of the cars had been with the consent or by direction of the interveners themselves. In view'of the custom which prevailed, and of the agreement between the terminal association and the consignees of barley at St. Louis, the liability of the receiver as carrier ceased once the cars had been placed upon the terminal tracks. From that time the question was not whether the placing of the cars upon its tracks by the terminal association operated to transfer the liability of a carrier from the receiver to the terminal association, but was whether the liability of a bailee for hire, or as warehouseman, was on the receiver, or on the terminal association. It is doubtless true, in a general sense, that the shipper of goods, or the owner of goods shipped, is entitled to the common-law liability of the carrier until the goods shall have reached their destination; but that right, it must be clear, does not exist when the course of transportation is not to be continuous, as when, to the knowledge and with the consent of the shipper, there must be on the way a place and period of storage; and, when the right exists, it is one which the shipper or his agent, the consignee, may waive, and in this case it was waived by the consignees when they agreed and directed that the cars and contents should be held on the terminal tracks to await their specific orders for transfer. If the original destination was St. Louis, and was so intended by the shippers, no notice of any restriction upon the authority of the consignees to change the destination was given; and when by their direction the course of transit was broken or suspended the liability of the carrier raised, and under the facts, as they appear, the liability of bailee commenced, on the part cither of the receiver or of the terminal association, and the question is, on which? It does not solve this question to say (hat the action of the terminal association, under its contract with Ihe receiver to break up trains and to remove the cars to'certain tracks, did not constitute a delivery. Under that contract, and under the custom which had prevailed, if the proof went no further, it is conceded that the terminal association would have been under obligation to obey the orders of the receiver with respect to the cars; but when, in addition to that contract and the custom, it is shown that the terminal association was under a separate agreement with the consignees (to which the receiver was not a party, and of which it does not appear that he had knowledge) to hold on its tracks all cars consigned to them, until they should give notice of the desired transfer, a radically different case is shown. Under that agreement it was not material, nor was it contemplated, that the terminal association should know of the final destination of any car, or of its contents, until the lime for transfer should come. The purpose of the agreement was to leave the destination undetermined until the last. No liability as common carrier could attach to the terminal association until a forward movement or transfer of the car should be ordered; and there being, as already explained, no question of liability as a carrier j the question of formal delivery, as affecting the existence of such liability, or its transfer from one company to the other, was in no sense; involved. Whether (he receiver, either in ignorance of the agreement of the association with the consignees, or for other reason growing out of the custom of business between ihe two companies, supposed himself to be in some sense responsible for the consignments in question, is not material. Neither is it important, if true, that the terminal association undertook to furnish terminal or yard facilities which it was the duty of the receiver's company to provide;. If otherwise there would have been such a duty on the receiver, lie was relieved of the duty iu respect to these cars by force of the agreement between the consignees and the terminal association. To a consignee who has provided a place for the receipt and storage of his goods a carrier is certainly under no obligation to afford like faeiUlies; and if, by reason of an independent contract, the carrier has a right to make delivery or to store goods in the same place provided by the consignee, the carrier does not on that account remain responsible io that consignee for the safety of his goods after depositing them in that place. These consignees having bargained with the terminal association to hold their cars upon its tracks, the tracks became theirs for that purpose, just as much as otherwise they would have been the tracks of the receiver under his agreement with the terminal association; and, the cars having been placed upon those tracks, the receiver's possession and responsibility ceased, as they would have ceased if the cars had been placed on private tracks of the consignees; and whether waybills had been handed over, or re mained in the possession of the receiver, could be of no possible significance.
The principles of law underlying these propositions, if they are not to be regarded as elementary, are well established and familiar, and are quite in harmony with the opinion in Mt. Vernon Co. v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 92 Ala. 296, 8 South. 687, and other cases to which reference has been made. See, also, Pratt v. Railway Co., 95 U. S. 43. While it is conceded that ordinarily there must be a continuous liability as common carrier upon somebody until the goods have arrived at their destination, manifestly the rule does not apply when, as here, the shipper, through his agent, the consignee, has consented to an interruption of the course of transit, and to the holding of the goods meanwhile by a bailee of his own selection. The supposed difficulty with the proposition that the terminal association was still in possession, because it did not know that these cars were for St. Louis, nor to whom they were consigned, nor w'hether they might not be intended for the Wiggins Perry Company, and in the usual course of business could not know until waybills had been delivered to it, is not substantial. There is no evidence that the association did not in fact know that the cars were for consignees in St. Louis for whom it had agreed to hold cars. The evidence show's that sometimes the agents of the association at the instance of consignees called for cars for which no waybills had been requested of the receiver "by the consignees. I,f the information had been deemed important, it was easy to obtain it from the consignees and their agents, and doubtless from the agents of the receiver, without waiting for the time of transfer, when, customarily, waybills were called for and delivered. The information, however, was not in fact important, because until the particular destination of a car had been determined by the consignee the responsibility of the association as bailee was only for ordinary care, and could not be greater or less whether the name of the consignee or the destination of the car were -known or unknown. u Indeed, the association, under its contract with the receiver, was under the same liability to the receiver, if the receiver remained liable to the owner; and on no possible supposition or theory is it perceived that its liability could be affected by its knowing or not knowing whether particular cars came within the scope of its agreement with the consignees at St. Louis. Besides, it wras not a part of the agreement that the terminal association would hold for the consignees cars received upon its tracks, which it knew to be, or when it knew them to be, so consigned. Such a limitation upon the scope of the agreement is not even suggested by the evidence, would be in itself unreasonable, and presumably was not in the mind of either party. Even under the agreement with the receiver, the actual possession and physical control of the cars passed immediately upon arrival to the terminal association; and, if consigned to parties for whom the association had agreed to hold them, there is no reason suggested for continued liability of the receiver, in any character, except the lack of the mere formality of making out and delivering to the terminal association a waybill, which, in the course of business, could not be made out until the consignee, in his own pleasure, should give the necessary diredion; and, if tliat had been done, the terminal association would have become liable, as a carrier, to make an immediaie transfer to the place, or in tin* direction, of ultimate destination. In other words, on the theory that the terminal association's liability to the consignees or shippers could arise only upon receipt, in the usual course, of waybills from the receiver, it could never have become liable as bailee under its agreement with the consignees to hold the cars for them, and could have Incurred liability only as a carrier to make transfers as ordered. It is evident, moreover, that the receiver was not bound to .make out new waybills, and might have avoided this formal objection to his discharge from liability, if he had known of the agreement of the terminal association with the consignees, by de livering or tendering the original waybills on the arrival of the ears, or at a later time to the terminal association; but that, again, would have been only a. formality, without substantial effect upon the relations or rights of the parties, and therefore was not necessary. It is perhaps true that, if the responsibility of the receiver had not ceased, the owners, whether consignees or shippers, would have liad their election lo sue the receiver for 'a breach of contract as bailee, or ihe terminal association for negligently causing the injury; but. having themselves entered into an understanding with the terminal association whereby it was to hold the goods for them, they necessarily waived any right to look further to the responsibility of the receiver; and, upon the desíruction of their property through the fault of the terminal association in exposing it to what the master has characterized as a veritable fire trap, they had, upon the facts disclosed, and presumably have yet, a clear right of action against that association upon its contract with them; and in such an action, if brought, the association could hardly be heard to say that no liábiliiy had arisen under lhat contract because it had not received waybills, or did not know to whom the cars had been consigned.
If it appeared that the receiver had knowledge of the agreement between the terminal association and the consignees, the plain, if not necessary, inference, would he that it was merely for the convenience of the parlies that the receiver did not give the original waybills, or copies, to the terminal association upon the arrival of cars, but waited until the consignees had determined the final destination, and then made out new waybills; and, if it be assumed that the receiver was ignorant of that agreement, it is no less clear that the terminal association and the consignees, solely for their own convenience, continued, according to the custom, not to call upon the receiver for waybills until by the determination of the consignees the cars were to be forwarded; and the legal consequence should be and is the same as if the receiver had possessed full knowledge of the situation, or, if there he a difference, it is in the receiver's favor. The principle involved is well illustrated, upon a converse state of facts, in the case of St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Ins. Co.. 139 U. S. 223, 11 Sup. Ct. 554. There the owners of cotton destroyed by fire, and the railroad company which was sued, were, as here, in separate contract relations with the Union Compress Company, which, like the terminal association here, held the goods as bailee either for the owner or for the railroad company. Pursuant to a custom which had grown up for the convenience of all parties, the railway company had been in the habit of giving to the owners of cotton, in exchange for the receipts of the compress company, through bills of lading, before the cotton had been loaded upon the cars, and had been accustomed to give the compress company notice of the fact of loading, with direction in each instance to ship the cotton on the railroad by a route and to an address named; but in this case no bill of lading had been given, and, before loading, the cotton was burned. The railroad company was charged with a negligent failure, though often requested by the compress company, to furnish transportation according to its contract with that company; and one of the questions in the case was how far the railway company's liability in the action was affected by the fact that it had issued bills of lading for other cotton, which formed a part of the accumulated mass which was burned in the street, — no "waybill having been given for the 340 bales for the destruction of which the suit was brought. "This cotton, certainly," says the opinion, "was in the exclusive possession and control of the compress company. - The' railway company had not assumed the liability of a common carrier, or even of a warehouseman, with regard to it; had given no bills of lading for it; had no custody or control of it, and no possession of it, actual or constructive; and had no hand in placing or keeping it where it was." And, speaking directly in respect to the effect of the issuing of bills of lading upon the company's liability for cotton covered thereby, the court said:
"There is nothing else in the ease which has any tendency to show that the railway company had or exercised any control or custody of the cotton, or of the place where it was kept by the compress company, before it was put upon the cars by that company. The evidence warranted, if it did not require, the inference that the bills of lading were issued merely for the convenience of all parties, and with no intention of making any change in the actual or legal custody of the cotton until it was so loaded. California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387-415, 10 Sup. Ct. 365. Upon the facts of this case, it may well be doubted whether the liability of the railway company as a common carrier began before the cotton had been received upon its cars, and had thereby come into its actual and exclusive possession and control."
In California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., referred to above, in respect to a similar issue of bills of lading it is said:
"At most, the railroad companies, by acquiring the receipts of the plaintiff and issuing bills of lading for the cotton, took only constructive possession of it;, and the plaintiff, retaining actual and physical possession of it, did not lose any element qf possession necessary to give it the right to effect insurance for its, own benefit."
So, bere, upon the' facts stated, the nondelivery of waybills by the receiver to the terminal association, in any view, can constitute evidence only of constructive possession, and, since in that respect a waybill is less significant than a bill of lading, should not, in view of the agreement between the consignees and the terminal association, be deemed to be controlling, or even persuasive, evidence of continued possession, even constructive, on the part of the receiver, and of consequent responsibility for the safe-keeping of the cars. Two things are necessary .to the beginning of liability as a carrier, namely, delivery (that is io say, a transfer of the physical possession of the goods) and shipping directions, while to the initiation of liability merely as a bailee for hire notice of ulterior destination is unimportant, and only possession of the goodsis essential. And it is on this distinction that upon a delivery thereof into the possession of the terminal association the liability oi' the receiver ceased, and that association, if any one, became responsible for such cars and coutents as were covered by its agreement with the consignees, whether it had or had not received notice of the ultimate destination of particular cars.
It is conceded that a railroad company is responsible for the cars of another company in use upon its road, under the same rule of liability as for the goods carried therein; and it follows that, not being responsible in these cases for the contents of the cars of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Eailway Company, the receiver is not responsible for the loss of the cars themselves.
The agreements and the custom under which cars were transferred at East St. Louis, of course, had no application to the case of the Carr, Ryder & Engler Company, and the decree in favor of that company was right. .No cessation in the course of carriage was contemplated, and, by the rule that the liability of one carrier iu a continuous transit does not cease until the liability of the connecting carrier begins, the receiver must be held responsible for the loss of the goods of that company. Though in physical possession, under its agreement with the receiver, of the car in which the goods were being transported, the terminal association had not become responsible as a carrier therefor, because it had not been put in possession of a waybill or other form of information on which it could proceed with the carriage. In respect to that car, no interruption in the course of transit having been contemplated or authorized either by the shippers or by the consignees, it may be said that the receiver, as one of the connecting carriers, was under the double duty — it would perhaps be proper to say as agent for the shipper — to deliver possession and to communicate shipping directions to the next carrier; and that duty, in one aspect, not having been performed, his liability as carrier had not ceased.