Case Name: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. EASTERN STEEL COMPANY, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1982-02-19
Citations: 671 F.2d 104
Docket Number: No. 81-1704
Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. EASTERN STEEL COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Before ADAMS, GIBBONS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 671
Pages: 104–116

Head Matter:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. EASTERN STEEL COMPANY, Respondent.
No. 81-1704.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 14, 1981.
Decided Feb. 19, 1982.
As Amended March 3, 1982.
Allison W. Brown, Jr., James D. Donathen (argued), William A. Lubbers, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Michael F. Kraemer (argued), William J. Payne, Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Before ADAMS, GIBBONS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board petitions for enforcement of its order directing Eastern Steel Company (Eastern) to cease and desist from several unfair labor practices, to reinstate two employees, and to bargain collectively with the Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Union No. 107 (Union). We enforce.
I
Eastern conducts a steel processing, warehousing and selling business at Wyndmoor, Pennsylvania. Its management consists of its owner and president, Edward J. Mammana and an employee found by the Board to be a supervisor, A. Robin Lough-ran. Eastern employs in its warehouse a full-time truck driver, a full-time machinist-warehouseman, and two regular part-time machinists-warehousemen, one of whom, Edward Mammana, is the president's son. In June of 1979, James Fogerty, the truck driver employee, obtained from a union organizer union authorization cards which were distributed to the bargaining unit employees other than the owner's son. Signed cards for the three were turned over to the Union on June 6, and on June 8 it sent a letter to Eastern claiming to represent more than fifty percent of the employees in the warehousemen, drivers and machine operator classifications. When Eastern declined to recognize it as a bargaining representative, the Union, on June 11,1979 filed a petition for a representation election with the Board's regional office. The unfair labor practices which are the subject of the administrative proceedings involve Eastern's reactions to the bargaining demand and the representation petition.
The Board charged that Eastern violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., by threatening employees with loss of benefits if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative, by forbidding discussions about the Union, and by interrogating employees about Union activities. It charged Eastern with violating Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging two employees for union activity. The complaint alleged, and Eastern denied, that A. Robin Lough-ran is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that Loughran is a supervisor.
The ALJ also found: that upon receipt of the bargaining demand president and owner Mammana asked Loughran to inquire of the truck driver, Fogerty, whether he had signed a union card; that Lough-ran interrogated Fogerty about signing a card; that later Loughran interrogated the full-time warehouse employee McClellan; that both denied signing cards; that Mammana interrogated part-time employee Johnson about whether anyone from the Board had come around, and about signing a card; that Johnson also denied signing; that Mammana later met with three of the four bargaining unit employees, including his son, interrogated them about signing cards and when each denied signing, charged that "somebody was lying, because he knew the cards were filled out;" that in the conversation with the three employees Mammana charged Fogerty, who was absent, with being responsible for starting the union activity and that he was a "no good bum" and a lazy worker. The Administrative Law Judge also found that Mammana expressed hostility to unions by observing that people who join unions "usually are low-life, or they can't make a go out of life"; threatened, if a union came into the warehouse, that "the place wouldn't be as lax as it is", that they would no longer receive a Christmas bonus or be covered by Eastern with Blue Cross or Blue Shield, and that Eastern would not be responsible for anyone's pension; threatened further that the practice of assigning employees to whatever work was available would cease if the employees unionized and that they would work fewer hours. The Administrative Law Judge also found that at the close of his meeting with the employees, Mammana instructed those who were present not to talk about the Union until after the representation election. The foregoing findings are supported by substantial evidence and amply justify the Board's legal conclusions that Eastern, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act coercively interrogated employees about, threatened them with retaliation for and restrained them from engaging in protected activity.
The Administrative Law Judge also found that, about a week after his meeting with the employees, Mammana discharged Union adherents McClellan and Loughran and laid off Union adherent Johnson; that both were discharged because Eastern knew or suspected that they had signed union authorization cards; that their discharge would destroy the Union's majority in the bargaining unit; that thereafter a temporary employee was hired; and that an offer to McClellan to rehire him as a supervisor, which would take him out of the bargaining unit and justify his discharge if he later engaged in union activities, was made after McClellan filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, for the purpose of limiting Eastern's backpay liability. These findings of fact are also supported by substantial evidence and support the Board's conclusion that Eastern violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging McClellan and Johnson.
The foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law justify the Board's order that Eastern cease and desist from the interrogations, restraints and threats and that McClellan and Johnson be offered reinstatement with back pay.
II
The Administrative Law Judge also found that, when it demanded recognition on June 11, 1979, the Union had valid union authorization cards from three members of a bargaining unit which consisted of those three plus the owner's son, and that thereafter Eastern refused to bargain collectively. She concluded that in the circumstances of this case a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy, and the Board agreed. Eastern objects to the enforcement of that order, alleging that the Board's findings of fact do not justify an order and that the Board failed to articulate reasons for issuance.
It is settled by our decision in NLRB v. Permanent Label Corporation, 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), that the Board may satisfy the statement of reasons requirement of Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981), by adopting the findings of the Administrative Law Judge who conducted the hearing. The Board followed that practice in this case, and thus we turn to those findings.
In explaining why a bargaining order remedy was appropriate, the Administrative Law Judge first observed that this was a case in which the Union started with a card majority.
In short, before Respondent began its violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, all of the employees in the unit had executed operative cards designating the Union as its collective-bargaining representative. Under such circumstances, a bargaining order should issue not only in the "exceptional" case of "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices which are of "such a nature that their coercive effect cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be held," but also in "less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process." [NLRB v.] Gissel [Packing Co.], supra, 395 U.S. [575,] at 613-614 [89 S.Ct. 1918, 1939-1940, 23 L.Ed.2d 547].
(App. 266). Having found that a card majority existed, she then considered why a representation election was not a sufficient protection for the employees' choice of a bargaining representative.
In view of Respondent's action in destroying the bargaining unit by discriminatorily discharging all but one of the employees in the unit, I conclude that the instant case calls for, at the very least, a "second-category" bargaining order. Whether in such a "second category" case the refusal to bargain constitutes a Section 8(a)(5) violation and calls for a bargaining order turns on whether the possibility of erasing the effects of past unfair labor practices and insuring a fair election by the use of traditional remedies is slight and employee sentiment would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order. Among the factors material in making such an assessment are the extensiveness of the employer's unfair labor practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future. Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 614-615 [89 S.Ct. at 1940]; Daybreak Lodge Nursing & Convalescent Home, 230 NLRB 800, 804-805 (1977), enfc., 585 F.2d 79 (C.A. 3, 1978); Frito-Lay, [Inc. v. NLRB], supra, 585 F.2d [62,] at 68-69 [ (3d Cir. 1978) ].
On the basis of these standards, I agree with the General Counsel that a bargaining order should issue here. As previously noted, the June 1979 discharges rendered an immediate election impossible, because they reduced the unit to only one employee; and no more were hired until January 1980. Furthermore, "The discharge of employees because of union activity is one of the most flagrant means by which an employer can hope to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative because no event can have more crippling consequences to the exercise of Section 7 rights than the loss of work." Ethan Allen, Inc., 247 NLRB No. 90 (1980); see also, Atlanta Blue Prints & Graphics Co., 244 NLRB No. 105 (ALJD Part II, p. 12) (1979). "Moreover, in a small unit, the impact of such discharges has a far greater effect than in a larger one and practically makes a fair election impossible." Pay 'N Save, supra, 247 NLRB No. 184. In addition, Respondent coercively interrogated all the unit employees about union activities, unlawfully forbade employees even to discuss the Union until after the election, and threatened to punish all of them, if the Union came into the shop, by withdrawing Christmas bonuses, insurance benefits, and a pension plan, and by being less "lax" than at present. All the discharges and threats, and most of the interrogation, proceeded from Respondent's president and sole stockholder, who is the active head of the business. Furthermore, so far as the record shows, the only conduct by Respondent even arguably constituting an effort to neutralize these unfair labor practices was its offer to McClellan of a job which, although it paid the same as his old job, was more difficult, removed him from the bargaining unit, and exposed him to lawful discharge for subsequent union activity. In view of the top-level source of Respondent's unfair labor practices and the absence of any real effort to counteract them, I conclude that the mere issuance of a cease-and-desist, reinstatement/backpay, and notice-posting order will likely be insufficient to deter Respondent from future unfair labor practices which would impede a fair election. (Footnotes omitted).
(App. 266-67). Thus the stated reasons refer to (1) the reduction of the bargaining unit to one employee; (2) the discharge of employees to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative — a most flagrant means of dissuasion; (3) the effect of such discharge in so small a unit; (4) the coercive interrogation of every unit employee; (5) the forbidding of employees from discussing the union until after the election; (6) the threats of punishment if a union were chosen; (7) the high level of management from which the discharges, threats and interrogation emanated; (8) the fact that the President was also the sole stockholder; and (9) the fact that even after a charge was pending Mammana attempted to remove McClellan from the bargaining unit by offering him a job as a supervisor.
These nine reasons are legally sufficient to justify issuance of a bargaining order where the Union started with a card majority. To those reasons we can add another. When the employer's workforce consists of four persons, one of whom is the son of the president, and the other three sign valid union authorization cards, the degree to which employees' free choice of a bargaining representative will be enhanced by a Board supervised secret ballot election is undiscernible. In such circumstances the only thing accomplished by delaying collective bargaining for an election is to provide an opportunity for the unfair labor practices to affect the behavior of one or more eligible voters.
As to Eastern's objection to the manner in which the Administrative Law Judge expressed the need for a bargaining order, we can only reiterate what was said in Permanent Label.
We do not believe enforcement should be denied merely because the ALJ did not write down the inescapable inference he made in recommending that a bargaining order issue — that merely ordering the Company to refrain from future violations would not erase the effects of those threats and other egregious violations from the employees' memories, and thus that the possibility of a fair rerun election was slight.
657 F.2d at 521. A remand for a clearer statement of reasons here would accomplish only two things. It would postpone, perhaps for eighteen months, the issuance of an order directing Eastern to bargain collectively with the Union, and it would perhaps teach the Administrative Law Judge a lesson in grammar! We are not, however, running a clinic in legal writing. Her reasoning process is sufficiently discernible for our review.
The Board's order of January 9, 1981 will be enforced in full.
. The Board's Decision and Order are reported at 253 NLRB No. 163.