Case Name: STATE v. CHARLES JONES et als.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1915-12-15
Citations: 170 N.C. 753
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. CHARLES JONES et als.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 753–757

Head Matter:
STATE v. CHARLES JONES et als.
(Filed 15 December, 1915.)
Railroads —• Statute — Charter Provisions — Entry Before Condemnation — Rightful Entry — Forcible Trespass.
A provision in the charter of a railroad company that it shall not be required to institute proceedings for the condemnation of lands prior to the time of entering thereon for the purpose of constructing its road is valid; and where the exercise of this power does not come within the exceptions of Revisal, sec. 2587, as to invading a dwelling-house, yard, etc., the entry upon the land is rightful under the terms of the statute, and does not constitute forcible trespass, though the way is fenced off by the owner, who forbids the entrance with loaded guns.
Wauker, J., dissenting.
Appeai by defendants from Harding, J., at March Term, 1915, of WlLKES.
This is an indictment for forcible trespass. Tbe defendants, employees 5f a railroad company, were engaged in- grading tbe right of way across tbe lands of Jesse Dula, brother of tbe prosecuting witness. They owned adjoining tracts of land on tbe southwest side of Elk Creek. Tbe prosecuting witness also owned land on tbe other side of tbe creek, where be lived. Before tbe survey for tbe railroad was made be executed a deed for a right of way across bis land, with tbe stipulation that it should not run between bis dwelling and Elk Creek. In locating tbe road tbe engineers found it to be difficult to avoid locating tbe track between bis dwelling and Elk Creek. They therefore proposed to locate it there with a view of paying him for tbe right of way, since that location was not permitted under bis deed. He obtained a restraining order against tbe construction of tbe road between bis dwelling and tbe creek. This delayed tbe construction of tbe road, and tbe company abandoned that route and obtained a right of way from other parties on tbe south side of tbe creek, so as to again reach its line where it bad been located beyond tbe prosecutor’s land, on tbe north side. In doing this, tbe company bad to run over 80 to 100 feet of bis land on tbe south side of tbe creek. Tbe prosecutor obtained a restraining order to prevent this, wbicb was dismissed by tbe judge 26 August, 1914, about a month, before the trespass alleged. When the grading had gotten within 50 or 100 feet of prosecutor’s line at that point he stretched a wire across the right of way, on 23 September, from a willow to a stake. This being torn down by some one, on the morning of 25 September, 1914, the day of the alleged trespass, he went to the location armed with two double-barreled shotguns and supplied with two boxes of shells. He again put up the barbed wire across the right of way, stretching it from the willow on the bank of the creek to a stake 45 feet distant. This fence inclosed nothing and was intended to inclose nothing.
The defendants, railroad employees, in going to their work on Jesse Dula’s land had been in the habit of crossing the creek at the ford and then going up the creek bank without getting on the prosecutor’s land. When the defendant railroad hands came to their work the morning in question the prosecutor was there with his armament and forbade them going on with the work, saying that he would kill the first man that attempted it. Walter Jones, one of the defendants, happened to come along the public road on some errand, and, seeing that trouble was likely, asked the other defendants to wait until he could get an officer to help him preserve the peace. When the officer came the foreman of the works and one of the hands proceeded to cut the wire and fill up a ditch which the prosecutor had cut as an obstruction. He forbade them to do this, and attempted to shoot, but was prevented by the officer.
Attorney-General Biclcett and Assistant Attorney-General Calvert for the State.
Finley & Hendren for the defendants.

Opinion:
ClaRK, C. J.
Upon the evidence the court should have instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.
The defendants were employees grading the right of way of the Watauga and Yadkin River Railroad Company, whose charter gave it the right to go upon land and construct its road before instituting condemnation proceedings. Its amended charter giving the above powers is chapter 11, Pr. Laws 1913, which amended the previous charter, chapter 411, Pr. Laws 1905, and contains this provision: "And said railroad company shall not be required to institute proceedings for the condemnation of lands prior to the time of entering upon the lands of any person for the purpose of constructing its line of railroad." This provision of its charter has been recently upheld in R. R. v. Ferguson, 169 N. C., 70.
The court was possibly misled by S. v. Davenport, 156 N. C., 596, where it was held that the entry into the possession of another by force, no matter bow that possession was obtained, for wbat purpose, or bow long exercised, would make tbe defendants guilty. In that case tbe alleged trespass was on bebalf of a lumber company wbieb did not possess tbe right of eminent domain. But bere tbe defendants have entered under tbe right of eminent domain, and tbe company was entitled to possession, having surveyed and located tbe right of way and entered thereupon for the- construction of tbe road.
Tbe prosecutor bad been successful by bis restraining order in preventing tbe locating of tbe road on bis side of tbe creek between bis dwelling and tbe stream. Tbe railroad company bad then changed its location of tbe right of way to tbe other side of tbe creek, and tbe restraining order against tbe company from using that location, which tbe prosecutor bad sued out, bad been dissolved on 26 August by tbe judge, who bad thus upheld tbe legality of possession of tbe right of way by tbe railroad company. Tbe resort of tbe prosecutor thereafter to bis "shotgun injunction," with tbe accompaniment of barbed-wire entanglements and trench, could not make tbe possession of tbe railroad company illegal nor reverse tbe action of tbe judge in dissolving tbe restraining order.
IJpon tbe facts in this case there was a forcible trespass, but it was not by these defendants. Tbe prosecutor was tbe party liable to indictment. Tbe right of eminent domain is in tbe State, and was conferred by it upon this railroad company rightfully, as tbe construction of a railroad is "for a public purpose." This location did not come under any of tbe exceptions in tbe statute, Revisal, 2587. It did not invade any dwelling-house, yard, kitchen, garden, or burial ground.
In refusing tbe motion to nonsuit there was
Error.