Case Name: Gary JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-12-16
Citations: 853 S.W.2d 527
Docket Number: No. 70713
Parties: Gary JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: BAIRD and MALONEY, JJ, concur in the result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 853
Pages: 527–543

Head Matter:
Gary JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 70713.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Dec. 16, 1992.
Rehearing Denied March 17, 1993.
Roy E. Greenwood, court appointed on appeal, Austin and Hal Ridley, on appeal only, Huntsville, for appellant.
Frank Blazek, Dist. Atty., Timothy J. Ferreri, Asst. Dist. Atty., Huntsville, and Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
BENAVIDES, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of Capital Murder for intentionally killing James Hazelton and Peter Sparagana during the same criminal transaction. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A) (West 1990). After the jury returned an affirmative answer to both special issues submitted under Tex. Crim.Proc.Code Ann. Art. 37.071(b) (West 1988), the judge assessed a sentence of death. The judgement of the trial court is affirmed.
I.
On the evening of April 30th, 1986, Bill and Shannon Ferguson were in their pasture waiting on a mare to foal. Sometime before 10:00 p.m. they observed a truck heading in an eastward direction pull over near a gate of the adjacent Triple Creek Ranch. They noticed someone get out of the truck, heard a chain rattle on the gate, and observed someone from the truck go through the gate and onto the ranch. The truck's headlights had been turned off, but Mrs. Ferguson noticed that when the driver of the truck applied the brakes, an unusual brake light pattern appeared. Concerned there was a burglary in progress, Mrs. Ferguson ran to her house to call the ranch managers, the Hazeltons. Other evidence showed that the original chain had been cut and a new lock had been placed on the gate.
Fifteen minutes later, the Fergusons observed Jim Hazelton's truck appear at the same gate on Highway 30. Unable to enter that gate, Hazelton backed up and entered the Ranch from another location. Eventually, the Fergusons heard Hazel-ton's truck stop. Upon hearing a gunshot, Mrs. Ferguson rushed to her house to phone Mrs. Hazelton and the police.
While Mrs. Ferguson was calling the police, Mr. Ferguson remained in the pasture watching to see if anyone exited the gate. Several minutes after the first gunshot, Mr. Ferguson heard several shots fired in rapid succession. After a brief silence, Mr. Ferguson heard someone plead for his life. The pleas were silenced by two more shots.
When the police arrived, they discovered the bodies of Jim Hazelton and Peter Spar-agana, Hazelton's brother-in-law, dead from bullet wounds fired at close range.
At trial the State presented damaging evidence from three of appellant's brothers — Tracey, Randy, and Ricky. Tracey Johnson testified that appellant came to Missouri during the fall of 1986, returned Tracey's .44 caliber pistol and asked him to destroy it because the pistol had been involved in a double murder in which appellant and their brother Terry had participated.
During that same visit to Missouri, Ricky Johnson testified that appellant was in possession of the .44 caliber pistol; that appellant admitted killing one man with the gun; and that appellant and Terry had also killed a second man. A state firearms examiner later identified a bullet fragment retrieved from Hazelton's body as being fired from the same .44 caliber pistol appellant returned to Tracey.
Randy Johnson also testified that appellant told him of the events that transpired at the Triple Creek Ranch. Appellant told Randy that he and Terry were out at the Triple Creek to steal something when two men "got the drop on them." While Terry distracted them, appellant was able to shoot one of the men. Appellant and Terry caught the other man, brought him back to the barn, made him kneel, and tied his hands behind his back. While the second man plead for mercy, appellant shoved the gun in his mouth. The medical examiner later testified that the second man died from a contact bullet wound to the mouth.
Appellant explained the reason for killing the two men to his brother Randy: "Dead men don't talk."
II.
In the first point of error, appellant contends that he was entitled to an accomplice-witness instruction under Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 38.14 (West 1979):
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.
Appellant requested the instruction because of the testimony of Terry Johnson, appellant's brother, who was indicted for the same offense. As part of a plea agreement with the state, Terry Johnson had agreed to testify against his brother. The state, however, decided their evidence was complete without Terry's testimony and chose not to call Terry to the witness stand. During defense's case-in-chief, appellant attempted to inculpate Terry by calling him to testify. On direct examination by defense counsel Terry testified as to his participation in the robbery and inculpated appellant in the killing of Hazelton and Sparagana.
Appellant recognizes prior case law which indicated that when an accomplice is called by the defense to testify on behalf of the defense, no accomplice-witness instruction is required. But appellant argues the rationale for such a rule was based on the old "voucher" rule which is no longer in effect, and thus appellant was entitled to the instruction. See Russeau v. State, 785 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). However, in Selman v. State, this Court reaffirmed the "established principal in this State that testimony elicited from a witness called by the accused and offered by the accused is not accomplice-witness testimony which must be corroborated as contemplated under Article 38.14." 807 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see also Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (trial court erred in giving accomplice-witness instruction where witness was called by defense). The very language of the rule illustrates its inapplicability to appellant's cause. The statute begins, "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice ." supra. But the State did not rely on the accomplice's testimony but closed its case-in-chief without calling him. It did not seek a conviction based upon the testimony of Terry Johnson. The statute provides for situations where a conviction is based in some part on the testimony of an accomplice. In this case, the witness was called by the defense, and his testimony as to the events of the crime was elicited by the defense. While the State did cross-examine the witness concerning his testimony, the witness had already testified as to the events of the crime. See Selman, supra (Miller, J. concurring opinion). As we opined in Selman, "accomplice-witness testimony must be corroborated and the jury so instructed only when the State calls the witness and seeks to rely on such witness's testimony." 807 S.W.2d at 311. This is not the type of evidence which must be corroborated under the statute. No accomplice-witness instruction was required.
Point of error three is related to point of error one. Appellant complains that because the trial court failed to give an accomplice-witness instruction during the guilt-innocence phase, the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's affirmative finding to special issue number one during the punishment phase. Appellant contends, among other things, that if the testimony of Terry Johnson was excluded the remaining evidence is circumstantial as to the issue of deliberateness and the jury was left in the position of guessing how the actual deaths occurred. But since all of his arguments are predicated on the contention that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the accomplice-witness rule during the guilt-innocence phase, we reject appellant's arguments.
We find there is sufficient evidence to find appellant acted deliberately. The facts at the guilt stage of the trial alone can often be sufficient to support the affirmative finding of the jury to the special issues at the penalty stage of the trial. Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525, 538 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900, 110 S.Ct. 257, 107 L.Ed.2d 207 (1989). "A jury must find 'a moment of deliberation and the determination on the part of the actor to kill' before it is justified in answering 'yes' to special issue number one." Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 95-96 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The determination of deliberateness must be found from the totality of the circumstances. Williams, 773 S.W.2d at 539; Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 897, 88 L.Ed.2d 931 (1986). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Hazelton died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head, a contact type gunshot wound to the face into the neck, and a graze wound to the right shoulder. The medical and firearms examiner identified the fragments retrieved from the neck of Hazelton as being fired from the .44 caliber pistol retrieved from appellant's brother Tracey. There were also .38 caliber fragments retrieved from the gunshot wound to the head. The medical examiner's testimony and the evidence of the position of the body was consistent with someone being shot at point blank range in the face, and then when Hazelton was lying on the ground he was again shot in the head by someone standing over the body. The contact wound to the face could illustrate deliberateness.
But in addition to the wounds, Terry Johnson testified during defense's direct that he told appellant someone was coming up in a truck through the woods. Appellant's reply was that they would have to shoot it out because he was not going to get caught. While Terry went to look for a means of escape, appellant hid in waiting. The evidence reflects much more than an intentional killing of Hazelton. Appellant recognized and determined that by killing Hazelton and Sparagana, he could not be implicated because, as he told Randy: "Dead men don't talk." Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to allow a rationale juror to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant deliberately killed Ha-zelton. Appellant's first and third points of error are overruled.
III.
In appellant's second point of error, he contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to return affirmative finding to the question of future dangerousness. Again, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
The jury can consider numerous factors in determining whether the defendant poses a continuing threat to society including, but not limited to, the following:
1. The circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant's state of mind and whether he or she was working alone or with other parties;
2. The calculated nature of the defendant's acts;
3. The forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime's execution;
4. The existence of a prior criminal record, and the severity of the prior crimes;
5. The defendant's age and personal circumstances at the time of the offense;
6. Whether the defendant was acting under duress or the domination of another at the time of the commission of the offense;
7. Psychiatric evidence; and
8. Character evidence.
Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
Specifically, appellant claims that "the mere fact of two persons being murdered in the same transaction should not be considered a special factor" on the issue of future dangerousness in the second special issue. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 37.071(b)(2) (West 1988). But it is not the mere fact of two persons being murdered that is a special factor. No killing exists in a vacuum. The circumstances of the offense, and the events surrounding it may provide greater probative value than any other evidence regarding the probability of future acts of violence. Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 761 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); see also Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 935 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Sosa v. State, 769 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). We are unwilling to abandon this view and to disregard the circumstances of the offense in making our sufficiency review.
During the punishment hearing, a state's expert testified that the defendant represented a future threat to society. There was also testimony from a neighbor that appellant shot and killed his dog. Appellant fired a semi-automatic rifle at a range of 75 to 100 feet killing the dog which was approximately 3 to 5 feet from appellant's neighbor. When the jury considered the second issue, the circumstances surrounding the criminal act itself were certainly more damaging than the testimony at punishment. Evidence at trial also indicated appellant had previously worked on the ranch. This work presented appellant ample opportunity for him to prepare a plan for the burglary. Appellant and his brother entered the Triple Creek Ranch late at night. They cut the gate's lock and replaced the lock with one of their own to prevent detection and entered the ranch heavily armed with an intention of stealing a specific welder that appellant had observed at the ranch.
When appellant and his brother heard the approaching truck, instead of fleeing the scene, appellant hid in waiting. As Hazelton and Sparagana approached, appellant's brother distracted Hazelton providing appellant an opportunity to shoot Ha- zelton and capture Sparagana. Appellant then had Sparagana get on his knees, and while Sparagana plead for mercy, appellant shoved the pistol barrel in Sparagana's mouth and fired. The purpose for both murders was that "dead men don't talk." The circumstances of the offense are such that the jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant presented a future threat to society. See Vuong, 830 S.W.2d at 935. Accordingly, appellant's second point of error is overruled.
IV.
In points of error four, five, and six, appellant attacks the court's charge during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial on numerous grounds including the constitutionality of Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.-03(a)(6)(A).
In point of error four, appellant contends § 19.03(a)(6)(A) is unconstitutional in its application, violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution, and that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite under numerous provisions of the Texas and U.S. constitutions. We disagree.
While appellant complains that § 19.03(a)(6) violates the Texas Constitution, appellant proffers no argument or authority as to the protection offered by the Texas Constitution or how that protection differs from the protection guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. We decline to pursue appellant's Texas Constitutional arguments for him. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577, 579 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 501-502 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Tex.R.App.Proc. 74 and 210.
With regard to the claims under the U.S. Constitution, we note that prior to the enactment of § 19.03(a)(6) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas capital punishment scheme in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (plurality opinion). When analyzing whether a state's capital murder scheme is violative of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has continually considered whether the scheme suffi-cieptly narrows or limits the class of death-eligible defendants and whether the scheme allows a jury to sufficiently consider the mitigating evidence. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 273-274, 96 S.Ct. at 2957; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990).
Initially we must decide whether the Texas capital murder scheme, with the enactment of § 19.03(a)(6), complies with the Eighth Amendment by sufficiently narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court noted "[the] presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by the jury." 494 U.S. at 306-07, 110 S.Ct. at 1083. While we note that with the addition of Tex.Penal Code § 19.03(a)(6) the Texas capital murder scheme is broader than it existed when Jurek was decided, the addition of a second "murder" to the list of aggravating circumstances, such as rape, burglary, kidnapping, etc., does not make the Texas statute overbroad so as to violate the Eighth Amendment. The addition of this aggravating circumstance to the Texas capital murder scheme adequately channels the jury's discretion in the assessment of punishment, thus satisfying the Eighth Amendment. Narvaiz v. State, supra; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990). We reject appellant's facial attack to the statute in his fourth point of error.
In the same point of error, appellant additionally argues that the statute is void for vagueness because the statute fails to define the terms "criminal transaction" and "same scheme or course of conduct." Initially, appellant must show that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Vuong, 830 S.W.2d 929, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Parent v. State, 621 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Because the phrase "same scheme or course of conduct" relates to § 19.03(a)(6)(B) which was inapplicable to his conviction, the constitutionality of that portion of the statute may not be challenged. See Vuong, 830 S.W.2d at 941; Parent, 621 S.W.2d at 797.
We also find that the term "criminal transaction" is not vague as applied to the facts of this case. There is no dispute on appeal that appellant and his brother entered the property with the intent to steal certain specified items from the Ranch. While appellant and his brother were in the course of this transaction, two men discovered their presence. While one of the men was distracted appellant shot him. The other man was caught and shot execution style. Appellant's brief only suggests that appellant, himself, did not murder both men, but that instead his brother actually pulled the trigger. While these issues may present a defense to the capital murder charge, we cannot see how this even raises the issue of whether the murders were committed within the same "criminal transaction." As we stated in Vuong, "[e]ven the most narrow construction of the term 'same criminal transaction' would include the type of actions the jury determined were committed by appellant." 830 S.W.2d at 941. Appellant's constitutional challenge to the statute on the basis that it is void for vagueness is also rejected in appellant's fourth point of error.
In both points of error four and five, appellant recognizes the general rule that the law of parties applies to the capital murder statute. Nevertheless he contends the legislature did not intend for the law of parties to apply to the newly enacted § 19.-03(a)(6)(A). We refuse to read such an exception in the statute. This Court has continually held that the law of parties announced in § 7.01 and 7.02 is applicable to capital murder cases. Crank v. State, 761 S.W.2d 328, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 209, 107 L.Ed.2d 162 (1989); English v. State, 592 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 254, 66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980); Ruiz v. State, 579 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.Crim.App. [panel op.] 1979); Pitts v. State, 569 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (en banc). It would be an anomaly for this court to say the law of parties under § 7.01 and 7.02 applies to capital murder cases except under § 19.-03(a)(6), where there is no language in the statute indicating such an exception. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (plurality opinion) ("As jurists, we are obliged to implement the expressed will of our legislature, not the will it keeps to itself.")
Appellant's final arguments, intertwined within points of error four, five and six, are based on the assumption that the law of parties does not apply to § 19.03(a)(6)(A). At trial during the guilt-innocence stage, the jury was instructed on the law of parties under Tex.Penal Code § 7.01 and 7.02. (West 1990). Appellant's argument is both a constitutional argument and a challenge to the interpretation of the statute.
Appellant contends a capital murder conviction based on the law of parties under § 7.02(b) is unconstitutional under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3371, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). Appellant's reliance on Enmund and Tison are misplaced.
The Texas capital murder scheme does not allow an individual to be put to death for merely being a party to a murder. As this court said in Cuevas v. State:
To be convicted of a capital felony in Texas, a defendant must intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual in certain enumerated circumstances. See Y.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.03. Of course, application of the law of parties at the guilt phase means it is possible for a non-triggerman, such as appellant, to be convicted of a capital offense. However, a capital defendant will be assessed the death penalty only if the jury answers the special issues of Art. 37.071(b) in the affirmative. Special issue number one requires the jury to determine "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased would result." Because the law of parties may not be applied in answering this issue, an affirmative verdict is possible only when the jury finds that the defendant's own conduct satisfies both parts of special issue number one. Therefore, the first special issue of Art. 37.071(b) includes the Enmund and Tison findings.
742 S.W.2d 331, 343 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1488, 99 L.Ed.2d 716 (1988). The Texas special issue contained in Art. 37.071(b) sufficiently limits the imposition of death so as to meet constitutional challenges under En-mund or Tison. Having found that an individual may be found guilty of capital murder based on the law of parties and the statute is constitutional as applied to appellant, his fourth, fifth, and sixth points of error are overruled.
Y.
Appellant next complains of certain instructions given to the jury in the court's punishment charge. The instructions immediately preceded the first special issue and provided as follows:
In answering Special Issue No. 1 you are instructed that before you may answer "yes" to Special Issue No. 1, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Gary Johnson, either solely caused the death of James Hazelton and Peter Sparagana by shooting them with a handgun, or that the defendant contemplated that the death of James Hazelton and Peter Spar-agana would result while acting as a party or in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the offence [sic] of burglary of a building.
Appellant's seventh, eighth and ninth points of error essentially complain of error in the use of three specific terms — "contemplated," "party," and "conspiracy," respectively in the instruction quoted above. Because appellant failed timely to object to the Court's charge, appellant must claim any such error was 'fundamental,' and "... he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he 'has not had a fair and impartial trial'— in short 'egregious harm.'" Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 at 171 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
In point of error seven, appellant contends that the trial court's insertion of the word "contemplated" rises to the level of egregious harm because of its vague and indefinite nature and thus, since the court did not give a concomitant definition of the term, appellant was denied due course of law under Article I, Sections 10, 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution. Because the court failed to define "contemplated" in the charge, appellant argues the jury did not examine appellant's conduct but rather what appellant may have contemplated. We do not believe that the term "contemplated" has become so technical that it is a legal term of art requiring the trial court to define the term. As opined in Russell v. State:
Where terms used are words simple in themselves and are used in their ordinary meaning, jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms, and under such circumstances such common words are not necessarily to be defined in the charge to the jury. [Citations omitted.]
665 S.W.2d 771, 780 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 1428, 79 L.Ed.2d 752, rehearing denied, 466 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 1720, 80 L.Ed.2d 192 (1984). The jury was entitled to give the term the common and ordinary meaning of the word. We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "contemplated."
Appellant also argues that the preparatory instruction for special issue one is fundamentally defective because it allows the jury to answer in the affirmative without any regard to the specific conduct of the defendant. While the preparatory instruction, by'itself, may not focus the jury's attention on the conduct of appellant, special issue one clearly does:
Was the conduct of [appellant] that caused the death of the deceased, James Hazelton and Peter Sparagana, committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result.
[Emphasis added.] Because the first special issue correctly focuses the jury's attention on the conduct of appellant, and no egregious harm is shown, his seventh point of error is overruled.
Appellant further complains that the term "party" in the preparatory instruction constitutes an instruction on the law of parties, such that, appellant can be sentenced to death for being merely a party to the offense. Appellant correctly notes that the law of parties cannot be applied to the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1407, 84 L.Ed.2d 794 (1985). When the law of parties is presented to the jury in the guilt phase of a trial, a trial court should give an "anti-parties" charge at punishment when requested. Belyeu v. State, 791 S.W.2d 66, 73 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1337, 113 L.Ed.2d 269 (1991); Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Cuevas v. State, supra.
Appellant argues that failure to give such an instruction is harmful whether or not an objection is made, thus requiring a reversal under Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). We disagree. Absent an objection or request, an "anti-parties" charge is not required by statute or by the constitution. Belyeu v. State, 791 S.W.2d at 73; Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1407, 84 L.Ed.2d 794 (1985). Because no objection is made, appellant's eighth point of error is rejected.
Appellant specifically complains in point of error nine that the preparatory instruction was fundamentally defective because it lessened the prosecutor's burden. Appellant believes the jury was authorized to answer affirmatively to special issue number one, if appellant was shown to be "in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the offense of burglary of a building." Essentially, appellant argues, if the jury found appellant participated in a conspiracy they were authorized to answer the special issue in the affirmative. The charge merely instructed the jury that if, at the guilt phase of the trial, their guilty verdict was predicated upon § 7.02(b), criminal responsibility involving conspiratorial liability, then at the punishment phase, in order to warrant the affirmative finding, it was mandated that the jury find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant "contemplated" that the death of the victims would result. Coupled with the instruction focusing on appellant's own conduct causing the death of the victims which was committed by him deliberately with the reasonable expectation that death would result, we fail to see any egregious harm which could have resulted from the trial court's instruction. Point of error nine is overruled.
VI.
Appellant's tenth point of error alleges that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the requested definition of "deliberately." This Court has previously addressed the issue of defining "deliberately" and held no definition is required. We decline to reconsider the issue here. Lewis v. State, 815 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1296, 117 L.Ed.2d 519 (1991), and cases cited therein.
VII.
In the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth points of error, appellant contends that the Texas capital murder statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. He claims a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution based upon the trial court's failure to submit an additional instruction that takes into account appellant's mitigating evidence.
This Court addressed appellant's facial challenge to the Texas statutory sentencing scheme recently in Lewis v. State. We opined:
It is plain from a reading of Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) and Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) that the statutory method of assessing the death penalty in Texas can be administered in a manner consistent with the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Whether it is so administered in fact depends upon the circumstances of individual cases. But, in any event, the capital sentencing procedure is not itself unconstitutional for its failure to provide for jury consideration of mitigating evidence.
815 S.W.2d at 567. The central question in analyzing the constitutionality of the Texas statutory scheme is the application of the capital sentencing procedure, and whether the special issues sufficiently allow for the jury to consider any mitigating evidence.
Appellant directs this Court's attention to the following mitigating evidence in support of his constitutional challenge:
1) evidence of lack of violent behavior towards other persons,
2) evidence that he was a hard worker at his last place of employment,
3) testimony by his ex-wife that he was non-violent,
4) and testimony from an expert witness specifically challenging the state expert's ability to predict future dangerousness.
The evidence of appellant's non-violent behavior and the evidence that he is a hard working individual are mitigating in nature. However, the mitigating effect of such evidence can be considered within the second special issue. See Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 705-6 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 448, 116 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991); Ex Parte Baldree, 810 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ex Parte Ellis, 810 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). On the other hand, the evidence from appellant's expert witness is not in itself mitigating evidence, but rather a challenge to the credibility or the weight of the State's expert witness. The jury could consider any mitigating effect of the testimony in assessing the weight or credibility of the State's expert in the consideration of the special issue. Accordingly appellant's points of error are overruled.
VIII.
In the fourteenth point of error, appellant contends the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to charge the jury on the issue of provocation as required by Tex.Crim.Proc.Code Ann. Art. 37.071(b) (West 1988), which states:
On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the fol lowing three issues to the jury: . (3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was reasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
The third special issue must be given if raised by the evidence. Robinson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), reh'g granted on other grounds, (July 3, 1991). In support of his argument that it was raised by the evidence, appellant points to the testimony of Mr. Ferguson who testified he heard five to seven shots fired. Because appellant's .44 magnum revolver only held six shots, appellant asks us to infer that one of the victims fired first, and in such a manner that it provoked appellant to shot him. Such is more in the nature of speculation than a permissible inference, especially since all the evidence indicates quite to the contrary that in fact appellant initiated the violence. Appellant additionally points to the testimony of Terry Johnson in support of his contention that a gun fight ensued. However a more careful reading of Terry's testimony supports the contrary. Terry testified during the defense's direct examination that appellant told him that "as soon as he hit [Hazelton] he fired a shot at him, Hazelton boy fired a shot at him as he was going down." Additionally, Terry testified that when they heard the approaching truck, Terry told appellant that they were going to get caught. Appellant replied, "the only thing we can do is shoot it out with them." None of the evidence presented raises an inference that appellant was provoked into shooting Hazelton. No error was committed by the trial court's failure to sua sponte charge the jury on the third special issue. Appellant's fourteenth and final point of error is overruled. The judgement of the trial court is affirmed.
BAIRD and MALONEY, JJ, concur in the result.
. By per curiam order we withdrew our original opinion of December 19, 1990. The cause was resubmitted on original briefs on May 23, 1991.
. Section 19.03 of the Penal Code provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.-02(a)(1) of this code and:
(6) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct.
. The jury was instructed on the law of parties under § 7.01(a), which states:
A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or both.
The trial court also instructed the jury under § 7.02(a)(2) and (b):
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:
(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense . (b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy,