Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Warren BRADY; COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Henry GEORGE
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1977-01-28
Citations: 470 Pa. 420
Docket Number: No. 141
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Warren BRADY. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Henry GEORGE.
Judges: Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 470
Pages: 420–462

Head Matter:
368 A.2d 699
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Warren BRADY. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Henry GEORGE.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Jan. 13, 1975.
Decided Jan. 28, 1977.
Israel Packel, Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Kenneth Biehn, Dist. Atty., Stephen B. Harris, Asst. Dist. Atty., Doylestown, B. Lerner, Philadelphia, for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
NIX, Judge.
The case presently at bar raises questions concerning the authority of a court, under the Act of November 22, 1968, P.L. 1080, 19 P.S. § 640.1 et seq. (Supp.1975-76) (hereinafter referred to as Immunity Act), to grant immunity from prosecution to a witness appearing before an indicting, grand jury. The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas denying the Commonwealth's petition for a grant of immunity. The Commonwealth appealed. We affirm.
The pertinent facts disclose that by a criminal complaint filed on August 10, 1972, Warren Brady and Henry George were charged with the crimes of "extortion, prohibited acts by public officers, and conspiracy." The complaint alleged that Brady and George, in their capacity as Bansalem Township supervisors, had extorted money and other rewards from construction contractors Joseph D'Egidio and John Carmerlengo, in return for favorable action on certain subdivision approvals and zoning changes needed by D'Egidio and Carmerlengo in their construction business.
At a preliminary hearing held on August 18, 1972, both defendants were bound over to court on the charges of extortion and prohibited acts by a public officer. The prosecuting attorney, however, withdrew the conspiracy charge.
On February 16, 1978, the remaining charges were presented to the regularly convened January Term, 1973, Bucks County Grand Jury. At this proceeding, D'Egidio and Carmerlengo were subpoenaed to testify regarding their transactions with the defendants. Both witnesses appeared, but refused to answer certain questions on the basis of their constitutional privilege against self incrimination. The supervising judge subsequently sustained their refusal to testify.
On March 2, 1973, the Attorney General, joined by the Bucks County District Attorney, petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for an order immunizing D'Egidio and Carmerlengo from prosecution and compelling them to testify. The court dismissed the petition, however, concluding that since the bill of indictment presented to the indicting grand jury did not allege a conspiracy, it was not a proceeding "related to organized crime or racketeering" as required by the Immunity Act. The court therefore held that it was without authority to confer the grant of immunity and order the witnesses to testify.
The Commonwealth appealed the court's order to the Superior Court, which affirmed per curiam. This Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal to resolve the questions raised concerning the scope and applicability of the Immunity Act.
I.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "no person . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.Const. Amend. V. The policies and rationale underlying this privilege against self incrimination were succinctly stated by the United States Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964).
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the development of our liberty — 'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' " It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state — individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." Id. at 55, 84 S.Ct. at 1596. (footnotes and citations omitted).
On another occasion, the court in discussing the privilege stated that:
No doubt the constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more far-reaching evil — a recurrence of the inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. Having had much experience with a tendency in human nature to abuse power, the Founders sought to close the doors against like future abuses by law-enforcing agencies. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428, 76 S.Ct. 497, 501, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956).
The Fifth Amendment thus defines the relationship between the government and the citizenry. It serves the function in our constitutional democracy of balancing are privacy and dignity of the individual with the power of the government to obtain testimony. While it may generally be asserted that the public "has the right to every man's evidence," that right is clearly limited by and sub ject to the Fifth Amendment. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892).
It has been recognized, however, that a grant of immunity may "supplant" the Fifth Amendment privilege, provided that it is coextensive with that privilege. This principle is premised upon the view that immunity leaves the witness and the government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege. See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra. While we recognize that immunity can be a valuable prosecutorial tool, we must also consider, however, that it constitutes an extraordinary exercise of power. It cannot be denied that a grant of immunity authorizes and even encourages interrogation which would otherwise be prohibited by the Fifth amendment. Therefore, if a grant of immunity is to erase the line drawn by the privilege between government and citizen, it must be done so with the utmost care, and with the least possible infringement of Fifth Amendment rights. For this reason, we reject at the outset the Commonwealth's assertion that the Immunity Act is a "sweeping provision" which must be "broadly construed." To the contrary, the delicate balance created by the privilege requires that the Act be construed according to its express terms, and that its applicability be limited to only those proceedings clearly within the purview of the language employed by the legislature. It is with this principle in mind that we approach our analysis and interpretation of the Immunity Act.
II.
The threshold question raised by this appeal concerns whether the Immunity Act may be employed to immunize witnesses called to appear before a regularly convened indicting grand jury. The lower court suggested that the language of the Act indicated that as to grand juries, the power of immunity is available only to those engaged in conducting an investigation, not to those solely concerned, as here, with the finding of indictments. We agree.
In reaching this conclusion, we first note that immunity statutes have historically been considered a prosecutorial "investigative tool." The first federal immunity provision, enacted in 1857, was passed to aid an investigation into a vote selling scheme allegedly occurring in the House of Representatives. Since that time, the underlying premise upon which immunity statutes have been enacted is their effectiveness in securing prosecutorial information. Restated, it is apparent that immunity statutes were designed to assist in the uncovering of criminal activity, as opposed to simply providing a means whereby sufficient information may be obtained for the prosecution and conviction of an individual offender. See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, supra, 406 U.S. at 446-47 nn. 14-15, 92 S.Ct. 1653. We have no doubt that the Immunity Act of 1968 was passed by the General Assembly to achieve this same purpose.
Turning to the language of the Act, it should first be noted that the title to the Act provides that it is " [a] n Act authorizing courts of record to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution . . . in a proceeding before certain grand juries, investigating committees or commissions and courts of record; . . ." (emphasis added). The legislature has specifically provided that "[t]he title and preamble of a statute may be considered in the construction thereof." In the title to the Act, it is clear that the Act is intended to apply only in proceedings before "certain" grand juries. The word "certain" cannot be considered mere surplusage, and must be construed to indicate that not all grand jury proceedings fall within the contemplation of the Act. Moreover, the entire thrust of the Act compels the conclusion that it is primarily intended to assist in the investigation of organized crime and racketeering. Such investigations are undertaken not by a regular, indicting grand jury, which functions only to receive complaints and approve indictments, but by a special grand jury convened under a mandate to procure information and make recommendations, or a regular grand jury specially charged by a ju •dicial authority to investigate a specifically delineated type of widespread criminal activity.
The distinction between the regular grand jury and the latter two categories of "special" grand juries is crucial; the preservation of the distinction assures that the grand jury's investigative powers are employed only in situations where the subject matter of the inquiry is aimed at conditions affecting the members of the community as a whole, and not in instances where the primary target is the individual. The Immunity Act by its express terms is similarly available only in proceedings relating to "organized crime and racketeering." Accepting this view, we then give meaning to the obvious legislative purpose in framing the Immunity Act to provide an effective means for the uncovering of pervasive and systematic criminal activity. We also preserve the delicate balance between the competing rights of the individual and society, by excluding the power to immunize from the arsenal of the prosecutor in his efforts to secure convictions of particular individuals. It is therefore clear that it is only the latter two categories of "spe cial" grand juries to which the Immunity Act was intended to apply, and the record adequately demonstrates that the Bucks County Grand Jury in the instant case was not clothed with special investigative authority.
The conclusion that the Immunity Act applies only to investigating grand juries is further supported by other language contained in that provision. Section 2 provides for a grant of immunity upon petition by the Attorney General, and requires that "[s]uch petition shall set forth the nature of the investigation and the need for the immunization of the witness." Act of November 22, 1968, § 2, 19 P.S. § 640.2 (Supp.1975-76) (emphasis added). This language clearly demonstrates that the Act is intended to be operative only to aid an "investigation", such as that undertaken by the two types of investigating grand juries delineated above. The legislature obviously did not intend to confer upon the Attorney General the power to immunize witnesses in all grand jury proceedings; such unlimited authority would undoubtedly subvert the fine balance between the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment and the power of the government to obtain testimony. We believe that the legislature specifically intended to avoid such a result, and did so by proscribing the power to immunize in proceedings before a regular, indicting grand jury, like that in the case presently at bar.
III.
An alternative ground for our holding also requires consideration, however, since it is our view that absent an allegation of conspiracy, the power to obtain a grant of immunity is not available under the Act.
Section 1 of the Immunity Act sets forth the circumstances under which a court may order a witness to testify, specifically limiting such authority to proceedings "relating to organized crime or racketeering." In addition, this Court has previously stated that "[u]nder the Act, a court may grant immunity to a witness and order him to testify only if the proceeding in which his testimony is sought relates to 'organized crime or racketeering.' " In re Salvatore LaRussa, 464 Pa. 86, 89, 346 A.2d 32, 34 (1975). There terms are defined in Section 6 of the Act as follows:
"Organized crime" and "racketeering" shall include, but not be limited to, conspiracy to commit murder, bribery or extortion, narcotic or dangerous drug violations, prostitution, usury, subornation of perjury and lottery, bookmaking or other forms of organized gambling.
Act of November 22, 1968, § 6, 19 P.S. § 640.6 (Supp. 1975-76).
Both the trial court and the Superior Court construed the words "conspiracy to commit" in Section 6 to modify each of the substantive crimes following thereafter. Since the conspiracy charge against both defendants had been withdrawn, it was concluded that under the statutory definition, the grand jury proceeding did not relate to "organized crime or racketeering", and the court was therefore without authority to grant immunity. We believe that the courts below correctly interpreted this language of the Act.
The Commonwealth argues that the lower courts erred in holding that the words "conspiracy to commit" in Sec tion 6 of the Act modified each of the substantive crimes following thereafter, contending instead that these words should be construed to modify only the substantive crime of murder. To support its contention, the Commonwealth asserts that each substantive offense listed in Section 6 should be considered the food upon which organized crime feeds, and that the legislature must have intended the Act to become operative whenever a crime of that nature was involved. Thus, it is suggested that the language "conspiracy to commit" should be interpreted to modify only murder in order to achieve the purpose of reaching this class of criminal activity.
Such a construction, however, not only vitiates the natural and nontechnical word arrangement employed by the legislature in Section 6, but it disregards an obvious legislative intention to reach the vast network of well conceived criminal ventures undertaken by those involved in organized crime. It is obvious that the legislature did not intend the Act to be operative to reach the criminal activity of one individual acting alone. Rather, the Act unquestionably addresses itself to the concerted action of organized criminal activity. It has long been recognized that "[a]n unlawful act may not prove injurious . . . when attempted by an individual, and may be readily prevented; the samé act attempted by the confederation of two or more may become dangerous to the public peace and to the security of persons and property, and harmful to the public morals by the very weight and power of numbers." Fimara v. Garner, 86 Conn. 434, 437-38, 85 A. 670, 672 (1913); See also, United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 35 S.Ct. 682, 59 L.Ed. 1211 (1915). The substantive crimes listed in Section 6 may or may not be the product of organized crime. Rather, we are inclined to believe that it is when such acts are the end product of an "unlawful agreement" that constitute the evil sought to be eradicated by the legislature. Thus, on the basis of the obvious legislative intention to reach organized, concerted activity, and the plain meaning of the language of Section 6, it is clear that before the authority to confer immunity arises under the Act, there must be a conspiracy to commit any of the substantive offenses as set forth in Section 6.
The Commonwealth also asserts, however, that the language of Section 6 "shall include, but not be limited to," implies that the legislature must have intended to reach the substantive offenses as well, including others not specifically enumerated in the Act. We agree that the legislature may have foreseen that it could not specifically identify all substantive offenses relating to organized crime, and we therefore agree that the legislature did not limit the Acts applicability to conspiracies to commit only the enumerated crimes. However, we also believe that the legislature intended only to provide sufficient latitude to reach conspiracies for any such unenumerated offenses relating to organized crime. We therefore cannot accept the Commonwealth's assertion that this language indicates a legislative intention to reach something less than concerted activity.
The Commonwealth also argues that the Immunity Act should be read in pari materia with the subsequently enacted Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911 (1973). That Act imposes criminal penalties and civil liability on anyone who receives benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, from a "pattern of racketeering activity.''' Its primary purpose is, through the use of civil remedies of the type traditionally employed against antitrust violators, to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business enterprises by organized crime. The Commonwealth contends that the definition of "racketeering activity" in the Corrupt Organizations Act should be incorporated into the Immunity Act. Subsection (h) of the Corrupt Organizations Act defines "racketeering activity" as follows:
(i) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of this title:
Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide)
Section 2706 (relating to terroristic threats)
Chapter 29 (relating to kidnapping)
Chapter 33 (relating to arson, etc.)
Chapter 37 (relating to robbery)
Chapter 39 (relating to theft and related offenses)
Section 4108 (relating to commercial bribery and breach of duty to act disinterestedly)
Section 4109 (relating to rigging publicly exhibited contest)
Chapter 47 (relating to bribery and corrupt influence)
Chapter 49 (relating to perjury and other falsification in official matters)
Section 5512 through 5514 (relating to gambling)
Chapter 59 (relating to public indecency)
(ii) any offense indictable under section 20(d) of the act of September 26, 1961 (P.L. 1664), known as 'The Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act' (relating to the sale and dispensing of narcotic drugs);
(iii) any conspiracy to commit any of the offenses set forth in subclauses (i) arid (ii) of this clause; or
(iv) the collection of any money or other property in full or partial satisfaction of a debt which arose as the result of the lending of money or other property at a rate of interest exceeding 25% per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period, where not otherwise authorized by law. . . . " 18 Pa.C. S. § 911(h) (1973).
At the outset, we must note that the Commonwealth urges upon us a technique of statutory construction unknown to the law of this jurisdiction — that is, definition by reference to subsequent legislation. Section 1921(c) of the Rules of Construction Act clearly provides:
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, § 3, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) (Supp.1976-77) (emphasis added).
Here, the legislature has specifically provided that former law on similar subjects may be used as an aid to construction, while never mentioning the possibility of so employing subsequently enacted legislation. Thus, reference to the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 to interpret the previously enacted Immunity Act would clearly be improper.
However, even if we assume for purposes of argument that reference to subsequent legislation is a valid interpretive technique, the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 does not support the Commonwealth's contention, but refutes it. First, the 1970 Act defines "racketeering activity" as set forth above, which definition includes the substantive offense of "criminal homicide." We note that the Commonwealth would concede, under its interpretation of the language, that the Immunity Act would not apply to a criminal homicide where no conspiracy was alleged. Therefore, the application to the Immunity Act of the definition of "racketeering activity" set forth in the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 would artificially broaden the Immunity Act's scope far beyond that provided by its express language. We do not believe that the legislature intended such a result.
Second, subsection (g) of the Corrupt Organizations Act, entitled "Immunity," incorporates by reference the Immunity Act of 1968. However, by its terms, subsection (g) permits a grant of immunity only " [wjhenever any individual refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to comply with a civil investigative demand issued pursuant to subsection (f) of this section or to testify or produce other information in any proceeding under subsection (d) [Civil Remedies] of this section." 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(g) (1973). The Immunity Act is thus incorporated by reference to apply only to civil proceedings. It seems unlikely that the legislature would have confined the Immunity Act's application solely to civil proceedings under the Corrupt Organizations Act if the interpretation urged upon us by the Commonwealth was correct. Indeed, the civil — criminal distinction in the Corrupt Organizations Act would have been unnecessary if the legislature had vested the Attorney General with the power to petition for an immunity award in all proceedings. In light of these considerations, it is clear that any effort to define the language of the Immunity Act by reference to the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 would be inappropriate and beyond the bounds of reasonable judicial construction. An accurate interpretation of the Immunity Act requires that we confine our examination to the express language employed by the legislature in that enactment alone, and that language clearly requires that a conspiracy be alleged before authority to grant immunity under the Act is conferred.
Finally, it is argued that our construction of the Immunity Act today is in conflict with this Court's recent decision in In re Falone, 464 Pa. 42, 346 A.2d 9 (1975). We, however, see no such contradiction. In Falone, supra, this Court upheld a judgment of contempt entered against a witness who refused to testify before the January, 1974, Special Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia, despite a grant of immunity. The proceeding in volved in Falone was an investigating and not an indicting grand jury. Moreover, the opinion in that case clearly referred to the fact of the Attorney General's allegation that Falone had "conspired with other organized crime figures to make payments of money to members of the Philadelphia Police Department for the purpose of influencing them in the performance of their official duties." 464 Pa. at 55, n. 17, 346 A.2d at 16, n. 17. Since the facts in Falone are clearly in line with our present holding, any language in that opinion indicating that immunity may be granted absent an allegation of conspiracy must be regarded as surplusage.
Order of the Superior Court Affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., filed a concurring opinion.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'BRIEN and POMEROY, JJ., joined.
. U.S.Const. Amends. V and XIV; Pa.Const. art. I, § 9.
. Commonwealth v. Brady and Commonwealth v. George, 69 D. & C.2d 146, 24 Bucks 149 (1973).
. 228 Pa.Super. 233, 323 A.2d 866 (1974). Judge Cercone filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Judge Spaeth.
. See Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 204(a), 17 P.S. § 211.204(a) (Supp.1975-76).
. It is quite clear, however, that immunity statutes in operation do not fully preserve the status quo provided by the privilege. See, e. g., Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant subjected to $900,000.00 jeopardy assessment by I.R.S. on basis of immunized testimony). Compelled testimony has also been used to impeach. See Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 Vill.L.Rev. 470, 481 (1974).
. Testimony is still "compelled" in the literal sense under a grant of immunity. As a means of obtaining statements, a grant of immunity merely substitutes the threat of contempt and a jail term for the beatings, intimidation and psychological coercion proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
. The Commonwealth contends that a grand jury's powers are traditionally broad, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), and that privileges against testi fying should therefore "not [be] lightly created nor expansively construed . . ." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). We do not believe, however, that the Fifth Amendment privilege may be subverted by a mechanistic invocation of the grand jury function. Rather, the privilege has traditionally been viewed as "the firmest limitation upon inquisitional power in the grand jury." Rief, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 829, 852 (1972). Nor can it reasonably be argued that the Fifth Amendment privilege is susceptible to the same type of limited breadth given to the amorphous "executive privilege" in United States v. Nixon, supra.
. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts In Theory and In Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L.J. 1568, 1571 (1963).
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, § 3, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924 (Supp.1976-77).
. The Rules of Construction Act provides that ". . . the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain." Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, § 3, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (Supp.1976-77).
. In Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 559, 30 L.Ed.2d 552 (1971), we summarized the requirements for calling an investigating grand jury as follows:
It has been suggested that the minimum requisites for obtaining a grand jury investigation are: (a) the subject matter of the investigation must affect the members of the community as a whole, rather than as individuals; (b) the investigation must be aimed at conditions and not primarily at individuals; (c) the ordinary processes of the law must be inadequate to cope with the problems; (d) the investigation must have a defined scope, be aimed at crimes, and supported by information indicating the existence of a system of related crimes or a widespread conspiracy; (e) information as to the crimes must come from direct knowledge or a trustworthy source. 443 Pa. at 137, n. 26, 277 A.2d at 774 n. 26.
See also In re: January, 1974, Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa. 586, 600, 328 A.2d 485, 492 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Camelot Detective Agency, Inc. v. Specter, 451 Pa. 370, 374, 303 A.2d 203, 205 (1973); McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 61-62, 187 A. 498, 504-05 (1936).
. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
. Section 1 provides in full as follows:
If, in a proceeding relating to organized crime or racketeering before a court, grand jury or investigating body set up by legislative enactment or by order of the Governor, any person shall refuse to testify or to produce evidence of any other kind on the ground that his testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him, that person may be ordered to give such testimony. The order to testify shall not be given except upon the order of court after a hearing in which the attorney general has established a need for the grant of immunity, as hereinafter provided. Act of November 22, 1968, § 1, 19 P.S. § 640.1 (Supp.1975-76).
. I cannot believe that "prostitution," for example in this context would include the sad soul who attempts to earn some money for herself alone but . . . only "prostitution" when it is an integral part of "organized crime" and "racketeering." Commonwealth v. Kolakowski, 55 Erie L.J. 21, 24 (1972).
. It should be noted that the original draft of the Immunity Act as introduced in the Senate provided for the granting of immunity ". . . in any proceeding . to any person." S.B. 1507, 1968 Sess., May 22, 1968. Upon consideration in the House, this provision was amended, with Senate concurrence, to strike out "any proceeding" and replace in its stead the phrase "a proceeding relating to organized crime or racketeering." The purpose of the amendment, according to its author, Representative Caputo, was to "provide certain safeguards to the citizens of this Commonwealth." Pa.Leg.J. (House), p. 1658 (1968). Undoubtedly, the primary "safeguard" was the elimination of the wide open investigations which could have resulted from the broad language of the original bill. On the basis of this history, it is abundantly clear that the legislature was concerned with restricting the scope of the Immunity Act only to investigations concerning organized criminal activity.
. For instance, while blackmail is not specifically enumerated in Section 6 of the Act, it seems evident that a conspiracy to commit blackmail would fall within the scope of the Act as relating to "organized crime and racketeering."
. The Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 was copied almost verbatim from Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1970). See Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U.Pa.L.Rev. 192, 197 n. 28 (1975).
. It is clear that the legislature utilized civil proceedings in the Corrupt Organizations Act in order to deal with the problem of organized crime without being burdened by the strict requirements of criminal procedure.
One feature of the legislation is that by treating violations as civil questions, it lessens the burden of proof, simplifies legal procedures, and affords the government broader rights of pretrial discovery.
Pennsylvania Crime Commission, Report on Organized Crime 93 (1970). The privilege against self incrimination is an "essential mainstay" of our criminal procedure, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), which cannot be diluted by a strained reference to a statute emphasizing non-criminal remedies and procedures.