Case Name: Mark CHYNOWETH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent; Ramona MARSTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1977-11-29
Citations: 572 P.2d 1081
Docket Number: Nos. 15494, 15495
Parties: Mark CHYNOWETH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent. Ramona MARSTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: MAUGHAN, and HALL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 572
Pages: 1081–1084

Head Matter:
Mark CHYNOWETH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent. Ramona MARSTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delmar LARSON, Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Defendant and Respondent.
Nos. 15494, 15495.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1977.
Robert Van Sciver, Salt Lake City, for Mark Chynoweth.
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for Ramona Marston.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., R. Paul VanDam, Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
WILKINS, Justice:
All statutory references herein are to Utah Code Ann., 1953, unless otherwise indicated.
The plaintiffs were charged in a complaint issued by Salt Lake City Court on September 15, 1977, with the offenses of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree (a capital felony) in violation of Sec. 76-5-202(c) and (f), enacted in 1973 and amended in 1975; Criminal Conspiracy (felony in the first degree) in violation of Sec. 76-4-201, enacted in 1973; and Attempted Criminal Homicide (felony in the first degree) in violation of Sec. 76-5-202(c) and (f), supra. Also see Sec. 76-4-101, enacted in 1973. The complaint states that the victim of the homicide was Rulon Clark Allred and the intended victim of the attempted homicide was Merlin Kingston.
Plaintiffs Marston and Chynoweth filed separate complaints for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 17th and 18th, respec tively, in the District Court of Salt Lake County claiming that they have been denied bail and consequently are unjustly imprisoned in the custody of the defendant. A hearing was held jointly on both complaints before said Court on October 20, 1977. On October 25, 1977, the Court, by memorandum decision, denied bail for plaintiffs and dismissed the writ. From the District Court's ruling, plaintiffs appealed and the matter was heard before this Court on November 4, 1977.
In its memorandum decision, the District Court denied bail on the basis of the deposition of Detective Paul W. Forbes, who investigated the subject matters of the crimi-nalcomplaint, though a hearsay objection was made by plaintiffs to this deposition which was originally taken before a Salt Lake City Court Judge prior to issuing the complaint pursuant to Sec. 77-11-3, which states:
When a complaint is made before a magistrate charging a person with the commission of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the offense charged, and he may also examine any other persons and may take their depositions.
Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled as a matter of right to reasonable bail under Utah's Constitution, statutes, and case law unless the State by presenting competent evidence sustains its burden of proof to deny bail on the basis that one of the crimes specified in the criminal complaint with which plaintiffs are charged, noted ante, is a capital offense.
Art. I, Sec. 8, Constitution of Utah, states:
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong. . amendment to this provision was approved by the voters of Utah and became law on January 1,1973, but that amendment added provisions not applicable to these cases. It in no way repudiated or altered the traditional right of one's entitlement to bail in capital cases except ". . . when the proof is evident or the presumption strong. ." As this Court stated in Scott, supra:
Art. I, Sec. 8 has been a part of this State's highest law since statehood. An
This provision affirms the fundamental right to bail of one accused of a crime; and it does so in mandatory terms .
unless one of the exceptions exists.
The prosecutor may present proof in affidavit form or, as in this case, in the depositional form described to oppose the release of those accused but not over the accuseds' objection. See State v. Obstein, 52 N.J. 516, 247 A.2d 5 (1968). In this cited case, the New Jersey Supreme Court made the following pertinent remarks which we adopt:
The bail hearing before the trial court is not a unilateral one. That is, the prosecutor cannot limit the testimony to his direct examination of the State's witnesses. The defendant has the right of cross-examination. In this connection it must be remembered that the proceeding is not a wide-ranging one for discovery, nor for exploration or determination of guilt or innocence. The prosecutor, however, cannot prevent the accused from producing witnesses to introduce facts pertinent to the inquiry. But the narrow and focal issue must be kept in mind by the trial court and the hearing tailored to that issue, i. e., whether the facts adduced by the State, notwithstanding contradiction of them by defense proof, warrant the conclusion that if believed by a jury they furnish a reasonable basis for a verdict of first degree murder. At 247 A.2d 9 (note cases cited therein).
The Utah Rules of Evidence are applicable to and controlling at bail hearings.
For reasons given in this opinion, the decision of the District Court is reversed and this matter is remanded to said Court for the purpose of conducting a hearing consistent with this opinion to determine whether or not plaintiffs should be admitted to bail.
No costs awarded.
MAUGHAN, and HALL, JJ., concur.
. See Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9, Constitution of Utah; Secs. 77-43-3 and 77-43-12; and Scott v. Ryan, Utah, 548 P.2d 235 (1976).
. Note Rule 2 thereof which states:
Except to the extent to which they may be relaxed by other procedural rule or statute applicable to the specific situation, these rules shall apply in every proceeding, both criminal and civil, conducted by or under the supervision of a court, in which evidence is produced.