Case Name: Meigh Owen et al. v. The New York & Texas Land Co.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1895-11-27
Citations: 11 Tex. Civ. App. 284
Docket Number: No. 1207
Parties: Meigh Owen et al. v. The New York & Texas Land Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Civil Appeals Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 284–294

Head Matter:
Meigh Owen et al. v. The New York & Texas Land Co.
No. 1207.
1. Wife’s Separate Property — Conveyance by Husband.
The husband cannot convey or charge the wife’s interest in land constituting her separate property by a contract for its recovery in which she does not join in the manner provided by law for the conveyance of her separate real estate; and a transfer by him alone of his interest in a bond for title through and under which her right to such land accrues does not affect her title.
2. Same — Evidence—Declaration of Husband.
Declarations and statements by the husband adverse to the interest of the wife in her separate property are not admissible in evidence in an action by the heirs of the wife to recover the property.
3. Same — Deed of Wife Without Joinder of Husband.
A deed by the wife alone, the husband not joining her, will not convey the title to land which' is her separate property.
4. Same — Judgment—Wife Hot Party.
A judgment to which the wife is not a party does not operate to divest her title to land which is her separate property, though the judgment be taken under a contract made by the husband alone for the recovery of the land.
5. Married Woman — Estoppel.
In order for estoppel to bar a married woman in the assertion of her rights to her separate property, she must be guilty of fraud. Simply receiving the profits of an illegal sale, with knowledge of its execution, and assenting thereto, with an accompanying failure to properly assert her title, is not the character of fraud that will estop her.
6. Same — Ratification—Refunding Purchase Money.
The fact that a married woman accepts the benefits of a sale of her separate property made by herself in an illegal manner, without any act of disaffirmance, with full knowledge, does not amount to a ratification or estoppel, nor does it raise an equity against her right to recover the property, and without being required to refund the consideration which she has received.
7. Bond for Title as Conveyance — Presumption of Payment.
An instrument in the form of a bond for title, executed under the civil law in 1838, containing words of bargain and sale, with a promise to make another conveyance of the land when the patent should issue, conveyed the title; and after a great lapse of time, during which neither the grantor nor his heirs claimed against the instrument, it will be presumed that the consideration stated therein has been paid.
Appeal from Robertson. Tried below before Hon. Jxo, N. Henderson.
A statement of the facts appears in the opinion on motion for rehearing.
W. W. Ballew and W. O. Campbell, for appellants.
1. No married woman can be bound by the statement and declarations of her husband in reference to and concerning the title of the wife’s separate estate, and especially when such statements and declarations are not made in presence of and acquiesced in by the wife. Posey U. C., 360, 365; 8 Texas, 178; 14 Texas, 583.
2. To estop a married woman or her heirs from asserting right to land, she must be guilty of some positive fraud, or some act of concealment or suppression which in law would be equivalent thereto. Johnson v. Bryan, 62 Texas, 623; Smith v. Powell, 23 S. W. Rep.; Pom., Eq. Jur., sec. 1083.
3. Contract of husband and conveyance of wife’s separate property, oven under power of attorney, is void. Cannon v. Boutwell, 53 Texas, 626; Peak v. Brinson, 71 Texas, 310; Posey U. C., 35; 76 Texas, 37; 68 Texas, 261; 21 Texas, 40; 5 Texas, 195; 39 Texas, 98; 43 Texas, 340; 76 Texas, 359; 73 Texas, 289; 26 Texas, 737; 25 Texas, 129; 43 Texas, 79; 62 Texas, 108; 62 Texas, 623.
4. The conveyance from Slaughter to Ethan Stroud is not a common law instrument, and cannot be construed according to the rules of common law, but must be construed according to the rules of law then in force. The conveyance vested in Stroud complete title, legal, as well as equitable. Gainer v. Cotton, 49 Texas, 120; Hanrick v. Barton, 16 Wallace, 174.
West & Cochran and Ben B. Cain, for appellee.
1. A. Owen was Mary Owen’s husband, and as such had the care and management of her property. The statements and declarations made by him while acting in her interest and for the benefit of her separate estate, as he was acting while trying to induce Walker to bring suit upon a bond for title apparently outlawed and unexecuted, were in the scope of his authority and binding upon Ins wife. Paschal’s Dig., art. 4636; Id., 4641; Milburn v. Walker, 11 Texas, 339; Dalton v. Rust, 22 Texas, 133; Womack v. Womack, 8 Texas, 397; Perkins v. Baker, 38 Texas, 353; Ryan v. Maxey, 43 Texas, 192; Grande v. Chaves; 15 Texas, 550; Williams v. Ellingsworth, 75 Texas, 480.
3. The bond for title being executory did not convey the legal title under either the Common or Civil Law. The legal title was in Slaughter until divested by suit brought in the name of J. C. Walker. Wilson v. Simpson, 68 Texas, 308; Levis v. Cole, 60 Texas, 341; Broussard v. Hull, 3 Texas Civ. Appeals, 66.

Opinion:
FISHER, Chief Justice.
We reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case for further trial, for the following reasons:
1. The contract between J. C. Walker and Dr. Owen, and what occurred between them with reference to the attempted conveyance of the land in controversy to Walker by Owen, was not admissible in evidence. Neither the declarations and statements of Dr. Owen adversely to the interest of Ms wife in her separate property, nor 'the attempted conveyance or transfer by Mm of the bond for title without her joining in its executions, would be admissible against his wife if she was seeking to recover her separate estate, and the same rule applies where her heirs are seeking their inheritance from her. What rights in her separate property remained undisposed of at the time of her death, descended to her heirs, and the existence of facts that would authorize her to recover if she had sued before her death would authorize her lieirs to recover. McKay v. Treadwell, 8 Texas, 178; Clapp v. Engledon, 72 Texas, 254, s. c., 82 Texas, 293; Blois v. Findly, 75 Texas, 210.
The statute, it is true, gives the husband the authority to control" and manage the separate estate of the wife, and to this extent he - is in law her agent, but that power does not authorize him to dispose of her property except in the way pointed out by law, which must be by her consent expressed in the manner required by the statute regulating the conveyance of the separate property of the wife. Kempner v. Comer, 73 Texas, 199.
2. The statements of Maddox to the effect that he was the agent of Dr. and Mrs. Owens was not admissible for the purpose of proving agency. Agency must be proven independently of the declarations of the agent.
3. The deed executed by Mrs. Owen to J. C. Walker was not admissible in evidence. Her husband did not join with her in its execution, although it may be inferred from the facts that he assented to its execution. Cannon v. Boutwell, 53 Texas, 627; Ford v. Ballard, 1 Texas Civ. App., 378. The court below admitted the deed not as proving title, but upon the issue of estoppel. This was upon the theory as contended for by appellee, that Mrs. Owen, the ancestor of appellants, was estopped from urging her title to the land for the reason that she knew of the contract previously made by her husband with Walker and that she tacitly assented thereto and that she lqng acquiesced in the terms of that trade and to the conveyance in question, and that she had received the purchase money for the land.
Without determining whether the evidence in any of these particulars supports the contention of appellee, we may concede that if it •did, it would not establish an estoppel against Mrs. Owen. In order for estoppel to bar a married woman in the assertion of her rights to her separate property, she must be guilty of fraud. Simply receiving the profits of an illegal sale with knowledge of its execution, and assenting thereto with an accompanying failure to promptly assert her title, is not the character of fraud that will estop her. Smith v. Powell, 23 S. W. Rep., 1112; Ford v. Ballard, 1 Texas Civ. App., 378, and cases cited; Stone v. Sledge, 24 S. W. Rep., 698. In Johnson v. Bryan, 62 Texas, 626, it is said: "To estop a married woman from asserting her rights to land, it is essential that she should be guilty of some positive act of fraud, or else of some act of concealment or suppression which in law would be equivalent thereto."
4. The judgment obtained by Walker against the heirs of Slaughter was not admissible against those that are seeking to recover the separate estate of Mrs. Owen. Mrs. Owen was not a party to that judgment and she could not be affected by it. The alleged contract between Walker and Dr. Owens under which that judgment was obtained could not operate to pass the title of Mrs. Owen and vest it in Walker. The court below held that this judgment .placed the legal title in Walker, who held it in trust for Mrs. Owen, and he being vested with the legal title could convey. Mrs. Owen had the title independent of this judgment, and it was vested in her prior to the time the "judgment was obtained. We are at a loss to know what theory or principle of law will divest her of this title and lodge it in another without her consent being first obtained in the manner required by law, or give effect to a judgment to which she is not a party that places the title to her property in another.
5. We are of the opinion that the instrument executed by Francis Slaughter to Ethan Stroud conveyed a title to the land. This instrument was executed when the civil law was in force and we think falls within the ruling made in Gainer v. Cotton, 49 Texas, 120. It contains words of bargain and sale, with a further promise to make another conveyance when the patent should issue. In the case cited it appears that the consideration was paid, while in this case there is no express finding or evidence showing that all the consideration was paid. But, in view of the fact that, since the execution of this instrument in 1838, Slaughter nor his heirs have ever asserted against it or claimed any of the land in controversy, but upon the contrary recognized that it conveyed title when they submitted to the judgment against them in the suit by Walker on that instrument when he urged it as the title to the land, we can, from these facts and the long lapse .of time since its execution, presume that the consideration was fully paid. Walker v. Emerson, 20 Texas, 707; 2 Greenl. Ev., secs. 527-528; 2 Whart. Ev., 1360 to 1365; 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 207. But, admitting for argument's sake that the instrument is a bond for title, and only passes an equitable title to the land, this concession would not defeat the appellants' right to recover. The suit of appellee, it is true, is one for rescission and removal of cloud, but the appellants in reply there to pleaded that they were the owners in fee simple of the land sued for and ask for their judgment for the same. This, in effect, so far as they were concerned, became an action of trespass to try title, and the provisions of the law regulating that remedy would apply. As held in Wright v. Dunn, 73 Texas, 296, and the Hyland case, 28 S. W. Rep., 210, an action of trespass to try title may be maintained on a bond for title; and the latter case held that, although the title may be equitable, stale demand will not defeat it. If suit in trespass to try title is brought on an instrument of this character against trespassers and strangers to it, evidence of payment of the consideration stated in the bond for title is not essential to the right of recovery. Wright v. Dunn, 73 Texas, 295; Ann Berta Lodge v. Leverton, 42 Texas, 18.
If the appellees do not fall within this class, as before said, the law under the facts of the case, and owing to the long time that has elapsed since the execution of the bond, will presume that payment of the recited consideration was made.
6. The disposition that we have made of the several questions discussed would probably settle the "case and require us to render judgment in favor of appellants, but, in view of the fact that there is some evidence that speaks of a partition between Mrs. Owen and Mrs. Maddox,, we have concluded to reverse and remand the entire case.
Reversed and remanded
Delivered October 2, 1895.