Case Name: O. Tuck ADAMS, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Mary Jane Adams, Deceased v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-DESOTO, INC., Michael A. Dorrity, M.D., Jolee Rutherford, M.D., Mandalay Resort Group f/k/a Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc. d/b/a Gold Strike Casino Resort
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-08-16
Citations: 965 So. 2d 652
Docket Number: No. 2006-IA-00455-SCT
Parties: O. Tuck ADAMS, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Mary Jane Adams, Deceased v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-DESOTO, INC., Michael A. Dorrity, M.D., Jolee Rutherford, M.D., Mandalay Resort Group f/k/a Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc. d/b/a Gold Strike Casino Resort.
Judges: Before WALLER, P.J., DICKINSON and RANDOLPH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 652–662

Head Matter:
O. Tuck ADAMS, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Mary Jane Adams, Deceased v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-DESOTO, INC., Michael A. Dorrity, M.D., Jolee Rutherford, M.D., Mandalay Resort Group f/k/a Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc. d/b/a Gold Strike Casino Resort.
No. 2006-IA-00455-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 16, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 2007.
Sara Bailey Russo, Ralph Edwin Chapman, Dana J. Swan, Clarksdale, attorneys for appellant.
Walter Alan Davis, Oxford, Bradley Keith Overcash, Gainsville, L. Carl Hag-wood, Eugenia G. McGown, John Ramsey MeCarroll, III, attorneys for appellees.
Before WALLER, P.J., DICKINSON and RANDOLPH, JJ.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. On November 12, 2004, Mary Jane Adams ("Mary Jane"), a resident of Richmond, Virginia, fell at the Goldstrike Casino ("Goldstrike") in Tunica County, Mississippi, and sustained a neck injury, severe chest wall pains, and multiple rib fractures. Mary Jane was transported to Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, ("Baptist Memorial") in DeSoto County, Mississippi. Mary Jane informed personnel at Baptist Memorial she was on Coumadin therapy, and she also was wearing a medic alert bracelet to indicate such. While at Baptist Memorial she was treated by Doctors Michael Dorrity ("Dr. Dorrity") and Jolee Rutherford ("Dr. Rutherford").
¶2. Mary Jane was released the next day and given permission by her physicians to fly home to Richmond. The following morning, her husband attempted to rouse her, but he was unable to do so. On Mary Jane's death record, the cause of death is listed as blunt trauma to the chest suffered as the result of her fall at the Goldstrike.
¶ 3. This interlocutory appeal stems from a Complaint filed by Tuck Adams ("Adams"), Mary Jane's husband, against Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc.; Dr. Dorrity; Dr. Rutherford; Mandalay Resort Group flk/a Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.; and Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc. The Complaint was filed in Tunica County. The Complaint charged Mandalay Resort Group f/k/a Circus Circus and Circus Circus Mississippi with negligence in the maintenance of their casino, the Goldstrike, in Tunica, Mississippi. The Complaint charged the medical defendants with negligence in the treatment and care of Mary Jane.
¶ 4. Circus Circus Mississippi d/b/a Goldstrike Casino filed its Answer. Bap tist Memorial filed a separate Answer claiming, inter alia, that venue in Tunica County was not proper as to it, and that venue was proper only in DeSoto County, where Baptist Memorial is located. Baptist Memorial later filed a separate Motion to Transfer Venue, citing Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3) (Rev.2004), and averring the acts of alleged medical negligence by the medical defendants all occurred only in DeSoto County. Drs. Dorrity and Rutherford filed a separate Answer, as well as a Motion to Transfer Venue to DeSoto County.
¶ 5. Goldstrike filed a Response to and Joinder in the Motion to Transfer Venue filed by Baptist Memorial. Goldstrike asserted a forum non conveniens argument that it is located adjacent to DeSoto County, that many of its employees who would be witnesses in the case were residents of DeSoto County, and that venue as to the majority of the defendants was proper in DeSoto County.
¶ 6. In Response to the Motions to Transfer, Adams argued that pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), the action could be brought in Tunica County, where "a substantial event that caused the injury occurred." See Miss.Code Ann. § ll-ll-3(l)(a)(I) (Rev.2004). Adams asserted Goldstrike's failure to maintain reasonably safe premises precipitated the injury and ultimate death of his wife. Adams further argues that if other, non-medical defendants were being sued, subsection 1 of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3 would apply.
¶ 7. A hearing was held on the medical defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue, as well as Goldstrike's Motion for Joinder in Baptist Memorial's Motion to Transfer Venue. The trial court correctly granted the Motion to Transfer as to the medical defendants and ordered that the action against the medical defendants be transferred to DeSoto County. However, the trial judge denied Goldstrike's Motion. Before the trial court entered its Order, Adams filed a Motion to Reconsider and to Stay Entry of Order. Adams argued that this is a wrongful death case and that the case could not be severed pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-7-13, which states, in pertinent part, "[Tjhere shall be but one suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned . " Adams cited Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 82(c) and this Court's decision in Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160 (Miss.2004).
¶ 8. In its Response, Baptist Memorial pleaded the facts sub judiee were distinguishable from McKinney and further argued that if Adams's contention that the claims against the defendants should not be severed was correct, then pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3), the only permissible venue for the one suit was DeSoto County.
¶ 9. The trial court affirmed its earlier decision by granting the Motion to Transfer to DeSoto County as to the medical defendants only. The trial judge again denied the joinder request of Goldstrike. The trial court "[was] cognizant that this order will in effect constitute a severance of the claims presented against the Defendants in this case."
¶ 10. Adams filed a second Motion to Reconsider, which was denied by the trial court. Adams appeals from this denial and Order Granting Transfer of Venue as to the three medical defendants. Adams presents the following issues on interlocutory appeal:
I. Whether the trial erred in severing the case?
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Motions to Transfer. Venue? ,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11. The resolution of this case requires the Court to employ separate standards of review.
"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to change venue, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard". . A trial judge's ruling on such an application "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly or properly exercised under the circumstances of the case."
Wayne General Hospital v. Hayes, 868 So.2d 997, 1001 (Miss.2004) (citing Guice v. Miss. Life Ins. Co., 836 So.2d 756, 758 (Miss.2003)).
¶ 12. Additionally, the Court must interpret a statute, and "statutory interpretation is a matter of law which this Court reviews de novo." Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So.2d 284, 287 (Miss.2007) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the trial court erred in severing the case?
¶ 13. Adams argues there is no legal basis to sever, relying on Miss.Code Ann. Sect.11-7-13 and Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160 (Miss.2004). The medical defendants, as well as Goldstrike, agree the case should not be severed pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-7-13. All parties are correct. An action for wrongful death cannot be severed pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-7-13 and.this Court's holding in Long. Severance of -this case is violative of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-7-13 and would certainly not promote judicial efficiency. See M.R.C.P. 1.
¶ 14. Severance of this action is also inconsistent with Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 85-5-7 (Rev.1999), which addresses the limitation of joint and several liability for' damages caused by two or more persons; contribution between joint tortfeasors; and determination of percentage of fault. Adams correctly asserts in his brief that separate trials would create, and almost certainly would result in, inconsistent holdings, including apportionment of fault. This analysis is applicable not only in wrongful death actions, but in other suits as well, because splitting the cause of action is prohibited by prior decisions of this Court and most certainly would lead, to inconsistent verdicts by the separate juries. Miss.Code Ann. Sect.11-7-13 and 85-5-7 dispassionately eliminate this conundrum. See Alexander v. Elzie, 621 So.2d 909, 910 (Miss.1992) (Mississippi is among the majority of states which do not allow splitting a cause of action).
¶ 15. For these reasons, the trial court erred in severing this wrongful death case.
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Motions to Transfer Venue?
¶ 16. Adams asserts that while DeSoto County may also be a proper venue for this action, the action was properly brought in Tunica County and should not be transferred. The medical defendants and Goldstrike counter that the only permissible venue for all defendants is DeSo-to County, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3). The pertinent portions of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3 state:
(1) (a)(i) Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred....
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, any action against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, physician assistant, psychologist, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, chiropractor, institution for the aged or infirm, hospital or licensed pharmacy, including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred....
¶ 17. The medical defendants suggest that the meaning of the word "notwithstanding" is clear and therefore, subsection (3) is to control regardless of the language of subsection (1). The medical defendants further argue that since Adams concedes the alleged acts of medical negligence took place wholly in DeSoto County, utilizing "a straightforward application of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3), the only appropriate venue for claims against the medical defendants is DeSoto County."
¶ 18. Initially, Adams argued venue was proper in Tunica County pursuant to M.R.C.P. 82(c) and Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), as an action shall be commenced where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. See Miss. Code Ann. § ll-ll-3(l)(a)(I) (Rev.2004)(emphasis added). Adams asserts the injury would not have occurred and necessitated medical care but for the fall at the casino in Tunica County.
¶ 19. Adams and the medical defendants argue there is a conflict between Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11 — 11—3(1)(a)(i) and 11-11-3(3). However, the Legislature has furnished guidance through its "notwithstanding" language contained in Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3).
¶ 20. Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3) states, "Notwithstanding subsection (1)," and this "notwithstanding" language is quite telling in determining venue for medical providers. "Notwithstanding" is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "(1) In spite of; (2) Nevertheless; (3) In spite of the fact that." . See Webster's II New College Dictionary 749 (3d 2001).
¶ 21. "When construing the meaning of a statute, we must look at the words of the statute." Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss.1985). Further, "[o]ur duty is to carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case." Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss.2005).
¶ 22. The "notwithstanding" language is clear. Regardless of Goldstrike's joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. This Court addressed the issue of when medical providers are not found in the same county in its recent decision in Rose v. Bologna, 942 So.2d 1287 (Miss.2006).
¶ 23. The dissent incorrectly concludes that this Court, by following the mandate of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3, is "creating a special class of medical defendants." The contentions advanced by the dissent reveal an aversion to the legislative act and are better suited for debate before the Legislature.
¶ 24. Enacting venue statutes referencing only certain groups of defendants is not novel to this State. We have noted:
The first statute dealing with venue was contained in the 1807 Statutes of the Mississippi Territory. This statute provided that all civil cases shall be commenced in the circuit court of the county in which the defendant may be found or if a real action, action of ejectment, or trespass quare clausum fregit, then in the county where the cause of action arose. In addition, no free-holder of the territory could be sued out of the county of his permanent residence unless it be one of the actions for which the statute made an exception. The venue statute found in Hutchinson's Code of 1848, one of the first codes following statehood, contains almost the identical language as that of the 1807 statute.
Clark v. Luvel Dairy Prods., Inc., 731 So.2d 1098, 1105 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). Venue regarding specific classes of defendants was long recognized by our previous venue statutes. Separate venue statutes were enacted for railroad, express, steamboat, power, superpower, telephone and insurance companies, executors, nonresident motorists and state boards. See Hemingway's 1917, § 487 (1930); Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-5, -7,' -13 (repealed 2002); see also Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-9, -15 (Rev.2004).
¶ 25. The dissenting opinion is structured loosely around a perceived constitutional violation which has no application to the case sub judice and was not raised by either party. "This Court 'may not act upon or consider matters which do not appear in the record and must confine itself to what actually does appear in the record.'" Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1973).
¶ 26. Contrary to the language of the dissent, this Court firmly recognizes and accepts the responsibility of ensuring the preservation of every citizen's constitutional rights. The author of the dissent has a penchant for the repetitious citation of the same provisions of the Constitution, as evidenced by recent dissents in civil matters, wherein Miss. Const. Art. 3, Sections 24- and 25 have been cited. The dissent fails to demonstrate injury to the plaintiffs case, as it is still pending in a court of competent jurisdiction. The plaintiff still "has a remedy by due course of the law" and has not been "debarred from prosecuting any civil cause for him[self].... " See Miss. Const, art. 3, § 24; see also Miss. Const, art. 3, § 25.
¶ 27. Adams additionally argues there is a conflict between Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3) and Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 82(c), which states in pertinent part, "Where several claims or parties have been properly joined, the suit may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been brought...." M.R.C.P. 82(c).
¶ 28. However, before applying M.R.C.P. 82(c), one must examine M.R.C.P. 82(b), which states, "Except as provided by this rule, venue of all actions shall be as provided by statute." Therefore, a determination as to where the action could properly have been brought circuitously leads us to the venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3 (Rev.2004).
The presence of medical providers in this action renders subsection (1) inapplicable, as the "notwithstanding" language of subsection (3) negates the language of subsection (1). Therefore, as subsection (3) is applicable, the only proper venue for this action is DeSoto County. Adams's claim that M.R.C.P. 82(c) is in conflict with the venue statute is unfounded.
CONCLUSION
¶ 29. According to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-7-13, and consistent with this Court's holding in Long, the trial judge erred in severing this wrongful death action.
¶ 30. The trial judge did not err in transferring the medical defendants to De-Soto County. However, it was error not to order Goldstrike to DeSoto County along with the medical defendants. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's severance order and its denial of reconsideration, and we remand this case to the trial court with directions to transfer the entire case to the Circuit Court of DeSoto County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 31. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ, CONCUR. DICKINSON, J, CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, C.J, WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ. DIAZ, P.J, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY GRAVES, J.
. These defendants collectively will be referred to as the "medical defendants."
. In its Answer, Goldstrike denied that Mandalay Resort Group does business in Tunica County as the Goldstrike Casino and denied that the Circuit Court of Tunica County had jurisdiction over Mandalay Resort Group. This issue is not addressed by the Circuit Court, and in all of its pleadings, Circus Circus, Inc. refers to itself as Circus Circus, Inc. d/b/a Goldstrike.
. See Randolph, J., specially concurring in Caldwell v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 956 So.2d 888, 895(Miss.2007).
. Including the present case and Caldwell, 956 So.2d at 895 (Randolph, J., specially concurring); see also Coleman v. A-Bex Corp., 943 So.2d 697, 702 (Miss.2006) (Randolph, J., not participating); Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 121 (Miss.2006) (Randolph, J., joining the dissent in part).