Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. M. Russell BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. District Justice Edward VERBONITZ and the District Attorney of Luzerne County, Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-10-10
Citations: 525 Pa. 413
Docket Number: No. 63 Eastern District Appeal Docket 1989
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. M. Russell BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. District Justice Edward VERBONITZ and the District Attorney of Luzerne County, Appellees.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 525
Pages: 413–424

Head Matter:
581 A.2d 172
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. M. Russell BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. District Justice Edward VERBONITZ and the District Attorney of Luzerne County, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Sept. 24, 1990.
Decided Oct. 10, 1990.
Frank W. Nocito, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.
Corréale F. Stevens, Dist. Atty., Joseph C. Giebus, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellees.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
The issue presented in this case is whether hearsay testimony presented at a preliminary hearing regarding a victim's account of an alleged criminal incident, which is the sole evidence presented by the Commonwealth, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
On June 24, 1987, Appellant, M. Russell Buchanan, was arrested and charged with statutory rape, corruption of a minor and endangering the welfare of a child. A preliminary hearing was held before District Justice Edward Verbonitz, Luzerne County. At the hearing the Commonwealth, over defense counsel's objection, presented the hearsay testimony of the investigating police officer, who recounted the alleged criminal incident as it was alleged to have been related to him by the victim, a seven year old child. The victim did not testify, nor was any other evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The district judge ruled that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case and bound Buchanan over for trial.
Thereafter, Buchanan filed a writ of habeas corpus in the court of common pleas. At Buchanan's habeas corpus hearing the Commonwealth, over defense counsel's objec tion, put into evidence the transcript of the preliminary-hearing. No additional evidence was presented. The trial court entered an order denying habeas corpus relief and upon the motion of Buchanan, refused to amend its order to include certification language, to provide permission to appeal the interlocutory order (Pa.R.A.P. 1311). Buchanan filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court which was transferred to the Superior Court. The Superior Court denied the petition for review, and Buchanan petitioned the Supreme Court for allowance of appeal. We granted allocatur and now reverse.
In Pennsylvania, a person accused of a crime, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, has a right to a preliminary hearing. Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Mirarchi, 481 Pa. 385, 392 A.2d 1346 (1978). The principal reason for a preliminary hearing is "to protect an individual's right against unlawful arrest and detention". Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 11, 198 A.2d 565, 567 (1964). The preliminary hearing:
seeks to prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime which was never committed or for a crime with which there is no evidence of his connection.
Id. At the preliminary hearing it is incumbent on the Commonwealth to establish "at least prima facie that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the one who committed it". Commonwealth v. Mullen, 460 Pa. 336, 341, 333 A.2d 755, 757 (1975) (emphasis added), See also, Commonwealth v. Prado, 481 Pa. 485, 393 A.2d 8 (1978). In order to satisfy this burden of establishing a prima facie case, the Commonwealth must produce legally competent evidence, Commonwealth v. Shain, 493 Pa. 360, 426 A.2d 589 (1981), which demonstrates the existence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and legally competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of facts which connect the accused to the crime charged. See, Commonwealth v. Wodjak, 502 Pa. 359, 466 A.2d 991 (1983).
In this case it is clear that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden. As Justice Flaherty stated in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa. 588, 619, 427 A.2d 631, 647 (1981) "[fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence". If more than "rank hearsay" id. is required in an administrative context, the standard must be higher in a criminal proceeding where a person may be deprived of his liberty. The testimony of a witness as to what a third party told him about an alleged criminal act is clearly inadmissible hearsay, Commonwealth v. Maybee, 429 Pa. 222, 239 A.2d 332 (1968), Commonwealth v. Whitner, 444 Pa. 556, 281 A.2d 870 (1971) and thus, does not constitute legally competent evidence. In this case the Commonwealth has failed to establish prima facie that a crime has been committed and that Buchanan committed that crime.
Additionally, a criminal defendant has a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him: this right being secured by the United States Constitution; the Pennsylvania Constitution; and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) the United States Supreme Court held that a preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" of the prosecution so as to constitutionally require representation by counsel. See also, Commonwealth v. Carver, 292 Pa.Super. 177, 436 A.2d 1209 (1981). Justice Brennan in his "Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court", in Coleman, listed four purposes for requiring the "guiding hand" of counsel at a preliminary hearing:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.
Id. 399. U.S. at 10, 90 S.Ct. at 2003, 26 L.Ed.2d at 397.
While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that the full panoply of constitutional safeguards (ie., confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process) must attend a preliminary hearing, it has inferred as much in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In Pugh, the court held that the right to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination and compulsory process are not essential for a pre-trial detention hearing held pursuant to the Fourth Amendment because such a hearing is not adversarial in nature. The court stated, however, that when a pretrial hearing takes the form of a preliminary hearing and thus, adversary procedures are used, "[t]he importance of the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-examination". Id. at 120, 95 S.Ct. at 866, 43 L.Ed.2d at 69.
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions" the accused has a right to meet the witnesses against him — "face to face". Pa. Const. Art. 1 § 9. This right necessarily includes the right to confront witnesses and explore fully their testimony through cross-examination. A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding which is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution. It is not a sidebar conference at which offers of proof are made. Thus, the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates a criminal defendant's right to confrontation and cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. In this case, Buchanan was denied the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, the charges are dismissed and the appellant is discharged.
FLAHERTY J., files a concurring opinion which CAPPY, J., joins.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion which McDermott, j., joins.
McDERMOTT, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The exceptions to the rule that an accused has a right to a preliminary hearing are where: 1) the accused is a fugitive from justice; 2) there is a presentment of an investigating grand jury directly to an indicting grand jury; and 3) an indicting grand jury makes a presentment based on personal knowledge of the jurors. See, Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Mirarchi, 481 Pa. 385, 392 A.2d 1346 fn. 7 (1978).
. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to be confronted with the witnesses against him____" U.S. Const. amend. VI.
. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . to meet the witnesses face to face,____" Pa. Const. Art. 1 § 9.
. The defendant shall be present at any preliminary hearing except as provided in these rules, and may, if he desires;
1) be represented by counsel
2) cross-examine witnesses and inspect physical evidence against him;