Case Name: Timothy Edwards MYERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-11-07
Citations: 770 So. 2d 542
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00923-COA
Parties: Timothy Edwards MYERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, LEE, MOORE, PAYNE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 770
Pages: 542–558

Head Matter:
Timothy Edwards MYERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 1999-CA-00923-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Nov. 7, 2000.
Richard C. Conant, Pascagoula, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Pat S. Flynn, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
SOUTHWICK, P.J,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Timothy Edwards Myers pled guilty in 1996 to kidnaping. In 1999 he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied relief. On appeal Myers argues that no factual basis for his crime was shown at the plea hearing and that he was not informed of the proper maximum and minimum sentences. Additionally, Myers argues that the prosecution breached the plea bargain agreement and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We find that the only meritorious issue concerns the prosecution's failure to comply with its plea agreement. We reverse the sentence imposed and remand for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge, with the State this time fulfilling its part of the agreement.
FACTS
¶ 2. Myers was indicted for kidnaping a seven year old girl from the parking lot of a store in Pascagoula. He agreed to take the girl in his van to her nearby home, but instead took her to Mobile, Alabama. Myers talked by telephone to a police detective about ransom money, believing that he was talking to the girl's family. As a result of the conversation, Myers went to a rest stop on the interstate highway to pick up the ransom, having just dropped the girl off at another location. He was met by police officers, and the girl was soon found. He was indicted for kidnaping and for felony child abuse. Due to a mistake in the child abuse count, a nolle prosequi order was entered on that charge. The one charge on which guilt was found and a sentence imposed was this:
Timothy Edward Myers, . on or about September 23, 1995, did . feloniously, willfully and without lawful authority forcibly seize and confine or inveigle [his victim] with the intent to cause [her] to be secretly confined or imprisoned against her will....
¶ 3. After jury selection began, a plea agreement was reached between the State and Myers. At the plea hearing both the prosecutor and defendant explained their understanding of the agreement. They agreed that Myers was pleading guilty to kidnaping in exchange for the other charges to be dropped and a sentencing recommendation of twenty-five years. It was understood that Myers would receive a sentencing hearing as he desired to convince the court to impose a lesser sentence. However, the State reserved the right to reinstate the other charges if a sentence of less than twenty-five years was entered.
¶ 4. Almost four months later the sentencing hearing was held. A different prosecutor, District Attorney Dale Harkey, was present who stated he did not know the specifics of an agreement and recommended the maximum of thirty years. That was the sentence imposed in December 1996.
¶ 5. In January 1999 Myers filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The relief was denied and Myers's appeal has been deflected to this Court.
DISCUSSION
1. Factual basis for guilty plea
¶ 6. In reviewing the quantum of evidence in this record, the Court focuses on the level of proof that applies to a guilty plea. After discussions involving himself, counsel, and the State, an accused may agree to plead guilty, which avoids the need for the State to present all the evidence that it has to a jury. However, the State is still obligated to present the evidence to the court. There are requirements that must be met, but we find them satisfied here.
¶ 7. What must have occurred for Myers to be guilty under this indictment is that he did "forcibly seize and confine or inveigle" the victim "with the intent to cause [her] to be secretly confined or imprisoned against her will." There is no suggestion of forcible seizing. An interpretative issue arises as to whether the word "forcibly" also applies to "confine" or potentially even to "inveigle." A review of the statute indicates that a person commits the offense if he does "forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with the intent to cause such person to be secretly confined" against her will. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (Rev.2000). Inveigling has no component of force, but only of coaxing. One does not forcibly inveigle. Guilt exists if Myers coaxed the girl into his vehicle with the intent secretly to confine her against her will. See Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 789 (Miss.1987)(explaining the elements of kidnaping).
¶ 8. Mississippi precedents indicate that the sufficiency of a guilty plea is not measured only by what the accused admitted. In fact, it is not necessary for the defendant to admit guilt in order for the plea to be accepted. Corley v. State, 585 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss.1991). What is needed is a voluntary and knowledgeable plea and an "independent evidentiary suggestion of guilt." Reynolds v. State, 521 So.2d 914, 917 (Miss.1988). Reynolds based its conclusion on a United States Supreme Court decision in which the accused denied guilt, stated that he was nonetheless pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily because of the likelihood of conviction if he did not, and three witnesses provided evidence that would have been sufficient to support a conviction. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)).
¶ 9. Therefore a plea may be accepted if there is enough evidence to satisfy the court before which the plea is offered that the State, if put to its proof, could demonstrate guilt. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (cited in Corley, 585 So.2d at 767). The Court upheld a defendant's guilty plea even though in his petition he explicitly disclaimed guilt, but agreed to accept a plea bargain under the authority of Alford. Brown v. State, 533 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Miss.1988).
¶ 10. Perhaps the least amount of proof supporting a guilty plea appeared in the most frequently cited of the relevant cases, Corley v. State, 585 So.2d 765. At the plea hearing the court asked the prosecutor to recount what he thought the State could prove.
In capsule form, Your Honor, the State case would show that Corley, together with another man, White, by prearrangement met Robert Eugene Parkerson on the 2nd of December, 1987, behind Prince's Drive-In North of Greenwood on Highway 7, within the jurisdiction of this Court; that after a conversation between Corley and Parkerson, Corley shot Parkerson with a large caliber handgun, causing his death.
Id. at 768. The court then asked, "Mr. Corley, does this substantially and in an abbreviated form describe the facts of the crime for which you enter this guilty plea?" The response was "Yes, sir. I didn't do the shooting, but I was there; but I didn't do the shooting." Id.
¶ 11. The Supreme Court relied upon the fact that "the District Attorney's summary of the prosecution's proof shows guilt and was made in Corley's presence." Id. Corley admitted that he was present but denied that he did the shooting. However, when Corley denied doing the shooting, there was nothing specific on which to base Corley's participation in a crime. He had made arrangements to meet the deceased and another man, but for what purpose is unstated. The court held "it fairly inferrable that, even taking Corley's version of the facts, Roger T. White shot and killed Parkerson under circumstances where Corley was an accessory before the fact." Id. An accessory before the fact must advise, direct, or encourage the criminal enterprise, but is not physically present. Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 363 (Miss.1986). The principal difference between the accessory before the fact and an aider and abettor is the actual or constructive presence of the accused at the scene of the crime. Pleasant v. State, 701 So.2d 799, 803 (Miss.1997). Since Corley was present, it might be fair to say that the relevant inference was that he was an aider and abettor. Yet there was no admission by Corley, and no reference in the prosecutor's summary, that Corley had helped advise or encourage the enterprise nor took any action towards its completion.
¶ 12. Perhaps the inference arises since it would be unreasonable to assume that Corley was willing to plead guilty to murder if he and White had just planned to talk over some innocent social matter with White's victim. Still, it is possible that Corley did not understand that he had to have some knowledge of White's murderous intentions before being complicit. When he agreed with what the prosecutor said, he had not agreed to any knowledge of what the actual shooter was going to do. That did not trouble the Corley court. Though the details are never given as additional factual support for the plea, the court mentioned that at a preliminary hearing the prosecution presented what was called "substantial proof that Corley killed Parkerson." Id. at 767.
¶ 13. Substantial gaps in the evidence or admissions before a court are common in guilty pleas. Quite generally, it has been held that a "factual showing does not fail merely because it does not flesh out the details which might be brought forth at trial. Fair inference favorable to guilt may facilitate the finding." Corley, 585 So.2d at 767. A significant defect, if the perspective of trial evidence is erroneously taken, existed in the following plea that was nonetheless upheld:
Gazzier next argues that the trial judge should not have accepted his guilty plea in light of the fact that he only admitted to attempting to penetrate the victim, while a sexual battery charge requires actual penetration. Gazzier notes that Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 8.04(A)(3) requires that a court determine that "there is a factual basis for the plea." The State correctly notes, however, that the law does not require that a defendant admit every aspect of a charge against him. Instead, a guilty plea will be considered valid even though the defendant makes only a "bare admission of guilt." Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d 103,106 (Miss.1993), see also Lott v. State, 597 So.2d 627 (Miss.1992). In the view of this Court, Gazzier's statement at his guilty plea hearing that he had "attempted" to penetrate a. thirteen-year-old girl constitutes a "bare admission of guilt" as set forth in Gas-kin.
Gazzier, 744 So.2d at 779. Even without evidence of the necessary penetration, the plea was valid.
¶ 14. Myers similarly made an admission of the substantial elements of the charge against him — he was the person who took the girl and asked for ransom. The specifics of his then-plans were not detailed, but a bare, indeed, a substantial admission occurred.
¶ 15. Also of importance is that evidence to support the plea can be from matters outside what occurred at the plea hearing itself. The entire lower court record should be examined. Corley, 585 So.2d at 767. In Corley the testimony adduced at a preliminary hearing was added to what was said during the plea. Id. A prior hearing on a demurrer to the indictment provided usable evidence in Brown, 533 So.2d at 1124. The Court also has relied upon proceedings on an earlier indictment that contained sworn statements from two witnesses to the crime. Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d at 106. In Gaskin, the Supreme Court held that what was presented at the plea hearing itself was insufficient, and then relied upon these prior affidavits to affirm the conviction. Id.
¶ 16. Myers admitted several things. He took the girl in his vehicle, but his "intentions were to help the child." He did not forcibly take her but had no one's permission to do so. He took her to Mobile, Alabama after picking her up in Pas-cagoula, Mississippi. He talked to a police detective about ransom money, believing that he was talking to the girl's family. He went to a rest stop on the interstate highway to acquire the ransom, having first dropped the girl off at another location. Later at his sentencing hearing he admitted that he told the girl in the parking lot that he would take her home since she did not live very far. Instead he took her from Pascagoula to Mobile where he made the call about ransom.
¶ 17. These remarks at the sentencing hearing are significant regarding intent at the time that he took the girl in his vehicle. They exceed being the necessary bare; admission that he inveigled the girl to proceed with him. The precedents cited above require that the court look at the entire record to determine the factual basis for the plea. Matters from a prior indictment were used in Gaskin. Here, we are considering admissions after the plea. Under circuit court rules, Myers still could have filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea at that time, though it would have been discretionary with the trial judge on whether to grant it. URCCC 8.04(A)(5). The Court finds that in light of the judge's continuing discretion regarding the plea that it is appropriate also to consider evidence presented to him at that time in evaluating the sufficiency of the factual basis.
¶ 18. Moreover, various Supreme Court precedents make it appear unimportant whether the court was aware of all the facts to support the guilty plea prior to accepting it irrevocably. The usable proof must have been offered in the presence of the accused, but we are not concerned with "what facts the sentencing judge knew but what facts were available and in the record or otherwise before the court." Corley, 585 So.2d at 768. A more recent case that is still pending on rehearing considered evidence presented at the post-conviction relief hearing, when the State indicated that this evidence was in its possession at the time of the earlier plea. Carter v. State, No. 97-CT-01468-SCT, — So.2d -, 1999 WL 1126595 (Miss. Dec.9, 1999).
¶ 19. It is on the scale described by the preceding authorities that the Court is to weigh the evidence, accepting that less conclusive evidence must be shown than at trial, that reasonable inferences are available to fill gaps that might have been filled with evidence at trial, and that it is an understanding of the charges and a voluntary plea of guilt that is the overriding consideration.
If 20. What is unquestioned is that Myers admitted that the girl got into his car for the purpose of being driven home, but then he did not take her there. He admitted seeking ransom for the child and driving to a highway rest stop to claim it. There was no discussion of what might have been said in the vehicle when Myers decided not to take the short trip to her house, but those are the details beyond the necessary bare admissions. That Myers either altered or just ignored the girl's desire to be taken straight home can be inferred, a lesser inference than occurred in Corley to make that accused at least an accessory. Another reasonable inference from that set of facts is that Myers intended to restrain the young girl against her will if that was necessary. Absent some such threat over the telephone, it is hard to imagine how the demand for ransom was made.
¶ 21. The Court acknowledges that another section of the kidnapping statute raises some questions about the point just made about restraint. The separate section that immediately follows in the statute for confining a child under the age of ten against the will of the parents was not charged. The factual possibility of a child's blithe willingness to travel with a stranger may be a significant part of the reason for the alternative language in the statute. By charging the general section, though, which concerns confining someone against that person's "will," the fact that the victim is a child and can not legally "consent" is arguably irrelevant. The State might not have wanted to accept the evidentiary burden of proving parental will in this case, since at least from Myers's version of the facts the girl was largely on her own. Myers stated that the girl told Myers that she did not know where her mother was, and when he asked the location of the father, her unresponsive answer was that her mother was on crack cocaine. No further evidence regarding the girl's family situation appears in the record. Not having so charged, the State cannot prove its case by the inference that the parents did not consent to the taking. On the charge made, there must be some basis to conclude that Myers had an intent to confine the girl against her will after coaxing her into the vehicle.
¶ 22. The statutory intent is to confine secretly or to imprison against the will. Myers did not need to have the intent to restrain her forever and never to release her. The statute only requires that the intent exist to confine for some period of time. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53. The Supreme Court has held that kidnaping is not a specific intent crime. That means that no proof is needed that Myers had the specific intent to kidnap at the time of taking this girl. Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 789 (Miss.1987). "[I]t is sufficient that the circumstances resulted in such a manner as to effect a kidnaping as opposed to an actual intent to kidnap, i.e. it is not necessary to establish the mental state of intent by direct evidence." Id. at 790.
¶ 23. That last quoted sentence could be seen as saying two somewhat unrelated things: 1) no actual intent to kidnap at the time of the beginning of the crime is needed, and 2) no direct evidence of the necessary intent is required. The latter point is true for all crimes, though, as intent is usually proved by circumstances and not by an admission by the defendant. Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Miss.1978). The significance of the holding that no specific intent is needed is that Myers need only to have the intent to cause the events that followed, the intent forming at each stage. When he decided to seek ransom in relation to when he took the girl is not important. That the girl got into his vehicle willingly with the promise to take her the few blocks home constituted a deceitful act, an "inveigling," when Myers in fairly short order decided not to take her home and instead to take her into Alabama. At some time after that he made a demand for ransom, which by reasonable inference must have included a threat not to release her — or worse.
¶ 24. Whether the Court infers the intent from the circumstance of Myers's picking up this girl and then later asking for a ransom, or whether only a general intent is needed to do the acts that led to the request for a ransom, there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to conclude that the State could prove this part of the charge. The trial court could conclude absent any other evidence of what happened in the Pascagoula parking lot that Myers's acts inveigled the girl into his car and that he had the intent secretly to confine her for some period of time against her will. The factual basis exists and we affirm on this issue.
2. Plea agreement
¶ 25. The second issue involves an alleged breach of the plea bargain agreement.
¶ 26. Myers and the prosecution reached an agreement that in return for a guilty plea the State would drop the other charges and recommend a twenty-five year sentence. At the plea hearing, the judge explained that she was not bound by the recommendation of the prosecution. That is correct, as the court has full discretion within the sentencing law regardless of a plea agreement. Martin v. State, 635 So.2d 1352,1356 (Miss.1994).
¶ 27. There is also an unusual feature of this agreement. Though the accused had agreed to plead if the State recommended a twenty-five year sentence, he was in fact not agreeing to stand mutely in his acceptance of that sentence recommendation. Myers wished a sentencing hearing at which he could present evidence and argument to convince the trial judge to give a lesser sentence. The trial court characterized this as an "open" plea, which more frequently is the description given to a plea agreement in which the State makes no sentencing recommendation. Regardless of the proper label, the agreement is clearly shown. Myers would plead guilty; the State would recommend twenty-five year's; other charges would be dropped if the sentence given was no less than that; and a sentencing hearing to permit Myers to seek a lesser sentence would be held.
¶ 28. The limitations on a prosecutor in this area are partly statutory:
A district attorney, or other prosecuting attorney, shall not compromise any cause or enter a nolle prosequi either before or after indictment found, without the consent of the court; and, except as provided in the last preceding section, it shall not be lawful for any court to dismiss a criminal prosecution at the cost of the defendant, but every cause must be tried unless dismissed by consent of the court.
Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-53 (Rev.2000).
¶ 29. Although the trial court is generally not bound to any plea agreement, there have been situations in which general rule does not apply. In one precedent, charges against the same defendant were pending before two different trial judges in Adams County. A plea of guilty to the charge pending before the first judge was entered, in exchange for the dismissal of the charges pending before the other circuit judge. The second judge had not yet been consulted. When the District Attorney after the guilty plea sought to have those other charges dismissed, the second judge refused. State v. Adams County Circuit Court, 735 So.2d 201, 202-203 (Miss.1999). The Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused her discretion in not dismissing the cases because the defendants had detrimentally relied upon the agreement when they pled guilty on the other charges. Id.
¶ 30. The detrimental reliance in Adams County was pleading guilty and the providing of information at the plea hearing. Id. at 205. Different reliance arose in one case in which a constable resigned from office as part of a plea agreement. Edwards v. State, 465 So.2d 1085, 1086 (Miss.1985). Substantial reliance has also been found when an accused provided information about the crime and submitted to a polygraph as part of a plea agreement. Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 592, 594-95 (Miss.1998).
¶ 31. The plea agreement here was breached. In return for a guilty plea, the State had agreed to a fairly simple obligation — make a recommendation for twenty-five years., Instead, the district attorney recommended thirty years. It is true that the trial judge was not bound by either figure, but it is the State's violation of its agreement regardless of ultimate sentence that concerns us.
¶ 32. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of a prosecutor's failure to fulfil a commitment to recommend a certain sentence. The Court held that since the prosecution had breached the agreement, the defendant was entitled either to specific performance or withdrawal of his guilty plea. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). In Santobello, the facts are remarkably similar to the present case. After reaching a plea agreement for the prosecution not to recommend any sentence, the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 258, 92 S.Ct. 495. At sentencing, a different prosecutor nonetheless recommended the maximum sentence, which was accepted. Id. at 259, 92 S.Ct. 495.
¶ 33. The Court stated that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. Even if the trial judge indicated that the improper recommendation was not the basis of the sentence, a reversal is still required in "the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty.... " Id. We have reached that same point in the present case.
¶ 34. The next step is our next issue. The Court remanded for this further action:
The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495. The rule we find stated, though the Supreme Court was fractured in its votes with only three of seven participating justices joining the opinion, is that the trial court and not the defendant decides the appropriate remedy. Subsequent consideration of the issue at the Supreme Court has suggested that the accused cannot insist on specific performance of a plea agreement and may be forced to go to trial. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). That appears still to leave the choice of remedy largely with the trial court.
¶ 35. Various federal courts have considered the Santobello remedy issue. In the Third Circuit, the rule is to remand the case to the district court for a determina tion of what relief should be granted. United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357 (3rd Cir.1989). The First Circuit generally orders resentencing before a different judge after which the petitioner "will obtain all he says he was promised and can then have no right to withdraw the plea." United States v. Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295, 300 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282, 286 (1st Cir.1976)).
¶ 36. Here, there was a plea agreement that was breached by the prosecution. We find that the agreement must be upheld. We remand to the lower court with instructions that a sentencing hearing be provided before a different trial judge. That judge must determine whether "the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement," or whether there are reasons justifying Myers's being permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. If withdrawal of the plea is not permitted, then the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation is controlled by the former agreement that a twenty-five year sentence is appropriate. The other terms of the agreement as shown on this record also are still in effect.
¶ 37. The requirement that a different trial judge be involved on remand should be taken as an objective determination about appearances, one that is commanded by Santobello. It is not a statement in any way about the specifics in this case. The new sentencing hearing is to be conducted by a judge who did not participate in the earlier sentencing hearing in any capacity.
¶ 38. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING PETITIONERS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. ALL COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO JACKSON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, LEE, MOORE, PAYNE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
IRVING, J., DISSENTING WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY KING, P.J.
MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.