Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lenard Stanley MYERS, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-12-15
Citations: 756 So. 2d 343
Docket Number: No. 32,777-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lenard Stanley MYERS, Appellant.
Judges: Before CARAWAY, PEATROSS, KOSTELKA, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 756
Pages: 343–356

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Lenard Stanley MYERS, Appellant.
No. 32,777-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Dec. 15, 1999.
Opinion Granting Rehearing March 1, 2000.
Louisiana Appellate Project by Amy C. Ellender, Mer Rouge, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Tommy J. Johnson, Donna Frazier Hall, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee.
Before CARAWAY, PEATROSS, KOSTELKA, JJ.

Opinion:
hKOSTELKA, J.
A unanimous jury found Lenard Stanley Myers ("Myers") guilty as charged of possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, La. R.S. 40:967(C). The court sentenced Myers to four years at hard labor with credit for time served but suspended the balance of the sentence and placed Myers on three years active supervised probation with special conditions. Additionally, the trial court ordered that the defendant pay court costs or serve twenty-five days in the parish jail. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
While conducting a series of drug-buy stops near a known "crack house" in the 3100 block of Harp Street in Shreveport, Louisiana, Shreveport Police Officer Mike McConnell ("McConnell") stopped Myers for questioning after he saw him exit the house on June 9, 1996, at approximately 4:15 p.m. In order to calm Myers' nervousness, McConnell explained that Myers had been stopped because he fit the description of a suspect for whom police were looking. McConnell also conducted a pat-down search of the suspect. Although then finding no weapons, McConnell later "could see [a matchbox] through the [left] breast pocket" of Myers' white shirt. McConnell asked the defendant if he smoked; Myers responded that he did not. McConnell then inquired about the purpose for the matchbox. Myers asked "What matchbox?" and then reached for the matchbox in his pocket. Being aware that drug suspects carry razor blades and/or crack cocaine in matchboxes, McConnell stopped Myers and removed the matchbox himself. McConnell then shook the box and reported hearing a "strange rattle" inside. Myers volunteered that he had found the matchbox and did not know what was in it. Thereafter, McConnell opened the box and discovered .5 grams of what a field test and a later crime lab analysis identified as crack cocaine. McConnell arrested Myers.
12Myers filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence recovered by McConnell claiming that both the stop and subsequent search were illegal. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Upon conviction, Myers appealed.
Discussion
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In assignment of error number two, Myers complains that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of cocaine. It is appropriate that we first address the sufficiency of the evidence complaint. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992). The criterion for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence is whether, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact-trier could find that the state proved all elements of the crime be yond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Clower, 30,745 (La.App.2d Cir.06/24/98), 715 So.2d 101. That standard, initially enunciated in Jackson and now legislatively embodied within La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Smith, 441 So.2d 739 (La.1983); Clower, supra.
The crime of possession of cocaine is the knowing and intentional possession of cocaine without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner while acting in the course of his profession. La. R.S. 40:967(C). In this case, McConnell discovered cocaine in a matchbox seized from the pocket of. Myers' shirt. The jury obviously rejected Myers' claim that he found the box and his denial of knowledge of the contents. Considering Myers' exit from a known drug location, we find this conclusion to have been a reasonable one. When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, this evidence is sufficient to convict Myers of the crime of possession of cocaine.
| JTerry Stop/Search and Seizure
Myers contends in assignment of error number one that the trial judge erroneously refused to suppress the evidence seized from the matchbox because the officer had neither a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop nor an articula-ble belief that he was in danger to justify the subsequent search and seizure of evidence.
Great weight is afforded to the trial court's determination of a motion to suppress, as it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Jackson, 31-836 (La.App.2d Cir.03/31/99), 736 So.2d 967. In ruling on a motion to suppress, the reviewing court may consider evidence presented at trial in addition to evidence presented at the motion to suppress. State v. Fisher, 97-1133 (La.09/09/98), 720 So.2d 1179.
The right of law enforcement officers to temporarily detain and interrogate persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity is well established. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The right to make an investigatory stop must be based upon reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Jackson, supra. Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is something less than probable cause, but the officer must have "articulable knowledge" of particular facts which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, provide reasonable grounds to suspect the detainee of criminal activity. Id. Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to make an -investigatory stop should be determined under the totality of the circumstances, in light of the officer's experience, training, and common sense. The officer's experience may be a consideration in ascertaining whether his inferences from the given facts were reasonable. Id. Indeed, to assess the validity of an investigatory stop, the critical inquiry focuses on the officer's 14knowledge at the time of the stop. State v. Branch, 30,733 (La.App.2d Cir.07/06/98), 714 So.2d 1277, unit denied, 98-2359 (La.01/08/99), 734 So.2d 1227.
Flight, a furtive gesture, nervousness, or startled behavior at the sight of a police officer is not, by itself, sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. However, this type of conduct may be a factor leading to a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. Reputation of an area is an-articulable fact upon which an officer can rely and which is relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. State v. Willis, 31,561 (La.App.2d Cir.01/20/99), 728 So.2d 493. Further, presence in a high crime area, coupled with nervousness or flight or suspicious actions upon approach of the officers, is enough to justify an investigatory stop. State v. Taylor, 363 So.2d 699 (La.1978); Jackson, supra. Such a high crime area is a place in which the character of the area gives color to conduct which might not otherwise raise the suspicion of an officer. State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La.1983).
In this case, McConnell testified that on June 9, 1996, he observed Myers exit a known drug location with a package; McConnell had previously made numerous drug arrests at the location. On that day, other arrests had also been effectuated through the drug-buy operation. McConnell stopped Myers after following him in his police car approximately one block north of the drug location. Myers appeared to be unaware that he was being followed. When McConnell made contact with him, however, Myers became very nervous and fidgety. Based upon McConnell's past experience, training, and common sense, and Myers' nervous demeanor and departure from a known drug house where arrests had earlier been made, we find that a reasonable suspicion that Myers had or was engaging in criminal activity existed. Accordingly, McConnell's investigatory stop of Myers was legal. We next address the legality of the search and seizure of the matchbox.
| KThe seizure of contraband other than weapons during a lawful Terry stop was justified under the "plain-view" doctrine in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). That doctrine permits the seizure of an object without a warrant if police are lawfully in a position to view it, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if police have a lawful right of access to it. Willis, supra. Simply stated, the rule is that if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).
In this case, Myers testified that he had previously conducted a pat-down search for weapons when he saw "[a matchbox] through the [left] breast pocket" of Myers' white shirt. Accordingly, the matchbox was in plain view. Because McConnell was lawfully in a position to view the evidence (during the lawful Terry stop), and there exists no issue regarding his lawful access to it, the crucial inquiry under these facts is whether the incriminating nature of the item was immediately apparent to McConnell so as to justify the seizure and search of the matchbox. More succinctly stated, the issue under these facts is "whether an officer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the [matchbox] in plain view." Texas v. Brown, supra, at 735, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
Pursuant to the United State Supreme Court's analysis and resolution of similar facts and issues in Texas v. Brown, supra, we find that McConnell legally seized and searched the matchbox pursuant to the "plain view" exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Texas v. Broum involved the seizure of a heroin-filled opaque green balloon by a police officer who had conducted a vehicle stop. At issue was the "immediately apparent" requirement of the "plain view" doctrine because the |fiofficer could not readily see the illegal drug inside of the balloon. In upholding the search and seizure, the Supreme Court explained that the "phrase 'immediately apparent' was . an unhappy choice of words ." due to the implication "that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of the evidence [was] necessary for an application of the 'plain view' doctrine." Texas v. Brown, supra, at 741, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
In discussing Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), which also involved the "plain view" doctrine, the Court stated:
Plainly, the Court did not view the "immediately apparent" language . as establishing any requirement that the officer "know" that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed, Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), that "[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."
Id. at 741-742, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
Continuing, the Court stated:
[PJrobable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable-cause requirement:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but ás |7understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."
Id. at 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
In upholding the search, the court, in Texas v. Brown, supra, attached importance to the officer's awareness, both from his participation in previous drug arrests and discussions with other officers, that balloons tied like the one he saw were frequently used to carry illegal drugs. Indeed, the court stated, "[t]he fact that [the officer] could not see through the opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents— particularly to the trained eye of an officer." Id. at 743, 103 S.Ct. 1535.
In this case, McConnell was clearly aware that Myers had just left a known drug house where numerous arrests had been made. Moreover; from experience and common sense, the officer knew that ' drug offenders carry razor blades and cocaine in matchboxes. Suspiciously, after questioning by McConnell, Myers admitted that he did not smoke and quickly offered exculpatory explanations .for his possession of the box. In State v. Stevens, 95-501 (La.App. 5th Cir.03/26/96), 672 So.2d 986, the court upheld the seizure of a matchbox which contained cocaine based upon the "plain-feel" doctrine and noted:
Police officers neither live nor work in a vacuum. They immediately know, from common sense and experience, that certain areas are known for drug activity, that trafficking in drugs is a dangerous occupation, that drug dealers are generally armed and . place crack cocaine in matchboxes.
| «This rationale applies to these circumstances as well. Accordingly, we find that McConnell had probable cause to believe that the matchbox he saw in Myers' pocket contained illegal contraband. Upon finding cocaine in the box, the officer then had probable cause to arrest Myers for possession of cocaine. We find no error in the trial court denial of Myers' motion to suppress. See State v. Hall, 555 So.2d 495 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ denied, 577 So.2d 44 (La.1991), which upheld seizure of foil packets that officers recognized from their experience as a commonly used method of packaging narcotics; State v. Davis, 555 So.2d 633 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 566 So.2d 959 (La.1990), which upheld the plain-view seizure of a tightly-wrapped white package on the console of a parked vehicle; See also Willis, supra, which upheld the seizure of crack pipes pursuant to the "plain feel" doctrine; State v. James, 98-2348 (La.App. 1st Cir.06/25/99), 740 So.2d 200, which upheld the search of a film canister "felt" by police during a pat-down search when the officer knew that drug offenders kept drugs in such containers; State v. Williams, 98-3059 (La.App. 4th Cir.03/03/99), 729 So.2d 142, which upheld the seizure of cocaine from a large bag of individually-wrapped bags felt during a pat-down search based upon the "plain feel" doctrine; State v. Sheehan, 97-2386, (La.App. 4th Cir.12/09/98), 740 So.2d 127, which upheld the search of a cigarette pack felt during a pat-down search based upon the "plain feel" doctrine.
Default time
Myers' third assignment of error challenges that portion of his sentence which imposes mandatory jail time in default of payment of court costs.
IsAn indigent person may not be incarcerated because he is unable to pay a fine which is part of his sentence. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); Jackson, supra. Although a defendant is presumed indigent if he is unable to afford counsel, this presumption may be rebutted with evidence placed into the record establishing defendant's ability to pay. State ex rel. Armstead v. State, 589 So.2d 1050 (La.1991); State v. Gaar, 32,243 (La.App.2d Cir.08/18/99), 746 So.2d 41. A defendant may be found indigent for representation purposes, but may be able to pay a reasonable fine and costs. See State v. Moreau, 31,879 (La.App.2d Cir.03/31/99), 735 So.2d 717, 723, where the court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of indigency in a case involving a defendant who had appointed counsel but frequented nightclubs and was gainfully employed at the time of his arrest; See also State v. Collins, 32,409 (La.App.2d Cir.12/08/99), - So.2d -, -, 1999 WL 735863; State v. Bell, 32,869 (La.App.2d Cir.12/08/99), — So.2d -.
In the present case, the record shows that Myers was represented at trial and on appeal by appointed counsel. Nevertheless, at the time of ordering the payment of costs by Myers, the court explicitly inquired into the defendant's employment history. Only after Myers informed the court that his employment as a notary public produced regular income for him did the court impose the twenty-five day jail time in default of payment of costs. We find this exchange to have been not only an adequate inquiry into Myers' ability to pay, but also evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of Myers' indigency as it pertains to the payment of costs. Accordingly, under these facts, the trial court committed no error in imposing the jail term in default of the payment of court costs.
Error Patent
We note that the trial court failed to advise Myers regarding the prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. lin930.8. Although this apparent oversight is not grounds for reversal under La.C.Cr.P. art. 921, the required notice is designed to apprise the defendant in advance about the statutory limitation. Accordingly, the district court is hereby directed to send appropriate notice in accordance with the newly amended provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 (Acts 1999, Reg. Sess., No. 1262) within thirty days of the rendition of this opinion, and then file, in,the record, proof that Myers received such notice. State v. Morvan, 31,511 (La.App.2d Cir.12/09/98), 725 So.2d 515, writ denied, 99-0186 (La.05/28/99), 743 So.2d 659.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Myers' conviction and sentence are affirmed. The trial court is directed to send appropriate notice to Myers of post-conviction relief time delays within thirty days of the rendition of this opinion, and then file, in the record, proof that Myers received such notice.
AFFIRMED.
CARAWAY, J., dissents with written-reasons.
. We are aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) which established the "plain feel" extension to the "plain view" doctrine. In Dickerson, when making a Terry frisk, the officer felt a small lump in defendant's pocket. Only after examining the lump with his fingers did the officer determine the item to have been cocaine. Because the incriminating character of the evidence was not immediately apparent to the officer, the court found the subsequent seizure of cocaine to have been, unconstitutional. On those factual grounds, we distinguish the present case from Dickerson.
. We are mindful of the seemingly conflicting fifth circuit decision in State v. Barney, 97-777 (La.App. 5th Cir.02/25/98), 708 So.2d 1205. Considering McConnell's knowledge, experience and immediate response to the . matchbox, we choose to follow the Stevens interpretation of the Supreme Court's "immediately apparent" requirement.
. We also find the initial seizure of the matchbox to have been made pursuant to a lawful Terry frisk. McConnell's experience, and Myers' movement toward the removal of the box from his pocket, were adequate both to continue a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed and rekindle a reasonable belief of harm which had not been previously considered by McConnell. Then, the remaining factors, i.e., high crime location, Myers' admission that he did not smoke and exculpatory statements regarding his possession of the box, are sufficient to establish probable cause to search the matchbox. See Stevens, supra.