Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Ellis BELL
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-06-11
Citations: 279 So. 2d 164
Docket Number: No. 52928
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Ellis BELL.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 279
Pages: 164–169

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Ellis BELL.
No. 52928.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 11, 1973.
Carey J. Guglielmo, John P. Everett, Jr., Kant row, Spaht, Weaver & Walter, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Willaim J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., M. Stephen Roberts, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
BARHAM, Justice.
Charles Ellis Bell was charged with armed robbery (R.S. 14:64), convicted as charged, and sentenced to serve 40 years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Twenty-eight bills of exceptions are in the transcript of appeal, but the defense has presented its case in this court through specifications of error. We find reversible error under Specification (C), which alleges that the court erred in repeatedly allowing the State to introduce impeachment evidence without instructing the jury on each occasion that the evidence was admissible only on the issue of the witness's credibility and not as substantive evidence of the defendant Bell's guilt.
At the various times when impeaching evidence was introduced on this trial, the judge gave no instructions on the limited purpose for which that evidence was received. The State so concedes, and the testimony attached to the bills of exceptions bears this out. Counsel for defendant did not ask the judge to give such instructions. Even so, however, under a long line of jurisprudence it was error for the judge not to give the appropriate instructions to the jury at the time the impeaching evidence was admitted.
" When an attempt is made to impeach a witness by the introduction of prior inconsistent statements the judge knows at once the limited purpose for which such evidence can be accepted. And it should be incumbent on him, and his duty, to so advise the jury without leaving it to the probability that, being laymen and not informed as to the niceties of the law, the members thereof will give it improper application.
"The danger of such a probability is clearly recognized by this court in State v. Willis, 241 La. 796, 131 So.2d 792, wherein we observed that the judge should instruct the jury as to the limited effect of impeachment evidence at the time it is admitted, and should not wait to include it later in his general instructions when such body would have to apply the instructions in retrospection. " (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Barbar, 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967); and cases there cited.
Both the State and the' defense cite State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971), and a reaffirmation of our holding there is necessary. In Ray we' repudiated the rule of Barbar and its predecessors that the duty was upon the judge to give the appropriate instructions regarding impeachment evidence and that his failure to do so was reversible error. We held in Ray that, "following the finality of this decision", the defendant must specifically request the trial court, at the time of admission of the impeaching evidence, to caution the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received, and that without such a request he cannot avail himself of the court's failure so to charge. Ray is not applicable here, however, for its holding was specifically given prospective effect only. The present case was tried in March, 1971, and the opinion in Ray on rehearing was rendered June'14, 1971. The former jurisprudence therefore states the law applicable here, and under that jurisprudence a reversal is required.
Specification of Error (A), involving several bills of exceptions, also shows reversible error. The State in opening statement said over objection that it would offer evidence of four other robberies in which the defendant Bell had participated. Not one scintilla of evidence, however, was offered on the trial connecting the defendant with two of these robberies. The State sought to connect Bell with the other two robberies through testimony elicited in its efforts to impeach its witness Leroy Green. (Our finding of reversible error under Specification (C) was made in connection with this testimony.) The impeaching testimony could be used only to attack the credibility of the witness Green. See State v. Barbar, supra, and cases there cited. Any such testimony which linked Bell to other robberies had no probative value as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged, and could not be used in this indirect and devious fashion to show guilty knowledge, system, and intent under R.S. 15:445 and 446.
The conviction and sentence are reversed and set aside, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
CALOGERO, J., concurs.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents for reasons assigned.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents for reasons assigned by MARCUS, J.