Case Name: In the Matter of Vito P. Battista, Respondent, v. James M. Power et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of the City of New York, et al., Appellants; John V. Lindsay et al., Respondents, and Gerald J. Turetsky et al., Intervenors-Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1965-10-28
Citations: 16 N.Y.2d 198
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Vito P. Battista, Respondent, v. James M. Power et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of the City of New York, et al., Appellants; John V. Lindsay et al., Respondents, and Gerald J. Turetsky et al., Intervenors-Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 198–205

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Vito P. Battista, Respondent, v. James M. Power et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of the City of New York, et al., Appellants; John V. Lindsay et al., Respondents, and Gerald J. Turetsky et al., Intervenors-Respondents.
Argued October 27, 1965;
decided October 28, 1965.
Leo A. Larkin, Corporation Counsel (Robert E. Hugh of counsel), for Board of Elections of the City of New York, appellant.
I. The plain mandate of section 248 of the Election Law must be observed unless its application would result in unconstitutionality. (Matter of Belford v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70; Matter of Lazer v. McNab, 19 A D 2d 830, 13 N Y 2d 935.) II. Assuming, arguendo, that equities may be considered in the construction of the statute, retention of the traditional position of the propositions, amendments and question must prevail over the granting of a separate column to the Independent Citizens body. (Matter of Haviland v. Ellrodt, 268 N. Y. 488; Matter of Aurelio [Cohen], 291 N. Y. 176.)
Justin N. Feldman for Abraham D. Beame, appellant.
I. Special Term was correct in holding that the circumstances of this case do not warrant departure from the express mandates of section 248 of the Election Law. (Matter of Nulty v. Board of Elections, 296 N. Y. 645; Matter of Belford v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70; Matter of Lazer v. McNab, 19 A D 2d 830, 13 N Y 2d 935.) II. The Civil Service Fusion party is entitled to a separate column on the voting machine. (Matter of Haviland v. Ellrodt, 268 N. Y. 288; Matter of Aurelio [Cohen], 291 N. Y. 176.) III. Special Term had jurisdiction and none of the political parties or candidates were necessary parties.
Robert MacCrate and David W. Peck for John F. Lindsay and others, respondents.
I. There is no provision of law that requires an exclusive column to be assigned to the Civil Service Fusion party rather than to any other independent body. (Matter of Haviland v. Ellrodt, 268 N. Y. 488; Matter of Aurelio [Cohen], 291 N. Y. 176.) The Independent Citizens party is entitled to be restored to its position in column E as determined by the Board of Elections on September 27, 1965. (Matter of Gilfillan v. Beyer, 124 Misc. 628, 212 App. Div. 855, 240 N. Y. 579; Matter of Haskell v. Voorhis, 246 N. Y. 256; Matter of Callaghan v. Voorhis, 252 N. Y. 14; Matter of Lynn v. Nichols, 254 N. Y. 630; Matter of Crane v. Voorhis, 257 N. Y. 298; Matter of Nulty v. Board of Elections, 271 App. Div. 791, 296 N. Y. 645; Matter of Smyth v. Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 198 Misc. 604; Matter of Belford v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70; Matter of Lazer v. McNab, 19 A D 2d 830,13 N Y 2d 935.)
Lewis Abrahams and Maurice N. Abrahams for Vito P. Battista, respondent.
Special Term followed and adhered to the statutory mandate in its order and the Appellate Division erred in its modification thereof. (Matter of Nulty v. Board of Elections, 296 N. Y. 645; Matter of Belford v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70; Matter of Lazer v. McNab, 13 N Y 2d 935; Matter of Schmidt v. McNab, 13 N Y 2d 935.)
Maurice A. Reichman for intervenors-respondents.
I. The Board of Elections has the discretion to award the candidates of an independent body a separate row or column even though those candidates have been nominated by two parties. (Matter of Crane v. Voorhis, 257 N. Y. 298; Matter of Gilfillan v. Beyer, 240 N. Y. 579; Matter of Aurelio [Cohen], 291 N. Y. 176; Matter of Smyth v. Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 198 Misc. 604; Matter of Cannizzaro v. Tubman, 23 Misc 2d 280,10 A D 2d 718; Matter of Belford v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70.) II. Petitioner at Special Term failed to show that the Board of Elections acted arbitrarily with respect to the intervening appellant. Therefore, the order should be reversed. (Matter of Walsh v. Boyle, 179 App. Div. 582; Matter of Luchowski v. Lawley, 26 Misc 2d 148, 11 A D 2d 1084; Matter of Curran [Cohen], 266 App. Div. 609, 291 N. Y. 682.) III, The order at Special Term has been unduly harsh and prejudicial to these intervening appellants.

Opinion:
Chief Judge Desmond.
I vote to reverse the order appealed from and to reinstate the Special Term order. I do so under the compulsion of section 248 of the Election Law which in language too clear for misreading denies an additional " independent " column on the ballot to a candidate who already appears thereon as the candidate of two major parties. This old statute expresses a continuing legislative policy of preventing the major party candidates from pre-empting the whole ballot through the device of setting up independent political bodies.
No one doubts the constitutionality of section 248. True, in some particular situations the courts held that it could not constitutionally be enforced since in those instances application ' ' would be unfair and prejudicial to a particular class of voters ' ' (Matter of Callaghan v. Voorhis, 252 N. Y. 14, 18; Matter of Crane v. Voorhis, 257 N. Y. 298). "Unfair and prejudicial" must mean something beyond detriment or inconvenience since the Legislature itself has said that fairness calls for the prohibition of a third column. The kind of unfairness and prejudice which would make the section unconstitutional as to a particular group must be of such character as to deprive that group of proper representation on the voting machine or otherwise make it practically impossible for the members of that group to vote as such. No such unfairness or prejudice appears here, especially when we take into account all the circumstances of the case as we are commanded to do by the precedents (see 257 N. Y., p. 301). I do not see how it could be considered constitutionally unfair to the Lindsay candidates to deny them a third line when to do so would not only leave several other independent political bodies off by themselves and huddled together on one line of the machine, but would result also in putting the proposed important constitutional amendments and questions in an inaccessible place at the bottom corner of the machine. Under the Special Term order there can be no unconstitutional unfairness since the candidate who is demanding a third line will still have two lines and the other two major candidates will have two lines and one line respectively.
What " unfairness " there is here results from administrative delay in deciding on the makeup of the machine with the further result that this litigation, affecting thousands of voting machines, comes to us only four days before election.
I concur fully with Judge Burke's opinion.