Case Name: The CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Sam I. SILVER et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-01-11
Citations: 257 So. 2d 563
Docket Number: No. 71-133
Parties: The CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Sam I. SILVER et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 257
Pages: 563–573

Head Matter:
The CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Sam I. SILVER et al., Appellees.
No. 71-133.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 11, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1972.
Alan H. Rothstein, City Atty., Horton, Schwartz & Perse, Miami, for appellant.
Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward, Miami Beach, John R. Farrell, Miami, for appel-lees.
John G. Immer, Miami for Coconut Grove Civic Club, amicus curiae.
Beckham & McAliley, and William Hug-gett, Miami, for Tigertail Ass’n, amicus curiae.
Adams, George & Wood, .Miami, for Citizens League, amicus curiae.
Richard L. Lapidus, Miami, for Tropical Audubon Soc., amicus curiae.
Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
PEARSON, Judge.
The City of Miami appeals from a final judgment which holds:
"1. The present R-l, single family residential zoning restrictions on the Plaintiffs' property bears no relationship whatsoever between the need for zoning restriction and the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
"2. The present R-l, single family residential zoning use limitation and restriction upon the subject property is ill-founded, unreasonable, and arbitrary to the point of confiscation, and as applied to the Plaintiffs' property said zoning restrictions are invalid and unconstitutional.
"3. The Court finds, determines and orders that no zoning restriction or use limitation be imposed or applied to the Plaintiffs' property which will restrict or limit its use to any greater degree, extent or utility than R-S zoning restrictions under and pursuant to presently existing City of Miami zoning ordinances."
The trial judge has fully set forth the factual basis for his decision:
"The Plaintiffs are owners of a tract of unimproved bayfront property consisting of nearly five acres situate in the City of Miami. The property abuts South Bayshore Drive at the approximate foot of Kirk Street in Coconut Grove, and runs easterly from South Bayshore Drive to Biscayne Bay.
"The subject property first became zoned single family residential by the City of Miami in 1937 when, by the same comprehensive zoning ordinance, the City of Miami zoned virtually every foot of bayfront property from the Miami River to Dinner Key as single family residential (R-l).
"North of the subject property is Rockerman Canal, which runs from Biscayne Bay to South Bayshore Drive, and which, unbridged, establishes a natural line of demarcation between the single family zoning in which the subject property lies, and other, more remote single family zoning lying northeast of Rocker-man Canal. Situate on the north side of Rockerman Canal is a small, single street subdivision, only half improved notwithstanding its platted presence for almost seventeen years. Nevertheless, Rocker-man Road is the nearest bay-oriented single family zoned properties which have actually been built upon in recent years. There was evidence of some multiple family apartment use in fact occurring in this single family zoned area.
"Coral Reef Yacht Club, zoned waterfront recreational (W-R), less than 600 feet southwest of the subject property, likewise abuts the easterly boundary of South Bayshore Drive, and extends to the waters of the Bay. The evidence disclosed that existing W-R zoning classification upon the Coral Reef Yacht Club properties had been changed from its original 1937 R-l single family classification and use a number of years previously.
"l. Uses permitted under W-R zoning include, inter-alia,
'(1) Boat Docks, Slips, Piers, Wharves, Anchorage and Moorages for Yachts and Pleasure Boats.
(2) Yacht Clubs.
(3) Boat Rentals, Boat Livery, and Boats for Hire.
(4) Boat and Marine Motor, Sales and Display, Yacht Broker, Marine Insurance Broker.
(5) Boat and Marine Motor, Service and Repair while boats are in the water.
(6) Retail sale of boating, fishing, diving and bathing supplies and equipment.
(7) Restaurants and refreshment stands.
(8) Seaplane Base, Dirigible Base, Heliports.
[etc]'
"It is noted that between the subject property and Rockerman Canal on the north and Coral Reef Yacht Club to the south, lies large City tracts recently acquired by purchase, and thereafter recently rezoned by the City from single family to a P-R classification.
"2. The uses permitted under P-R zoning appear to be unlimited. At all events, there are no express prohibited uses."
"Since approximately 1960 the City of Miami has apparently planned to acquire the subject property by condemnation or otherwise, as an integral part of a proposed expansion and extension of existing Dinner Key waterfront and marina facilities from existing locale, northerly to Rockerman Canal.
"Modern sewer facilities were installed and became operative in the immediate area of the subject property by at least April, 1969.
"The evidence disclosed that as early as 1961, incident to implementation of a comprehensive overall zoning study, the City's own Planning and Zoning Board recommended that the single family residential district in which the Plaintiffs' tract is located, be rezoned to a multiple residential use classification.
The trial court found that single family residential zoning upon plaintiff's property was grossly unreasonable. The court further found that recent zoning changes had so changed the area that R-l zoning was no longer a constitutional application of the zoning power. In addition, the court made the specific finding that the city's restrictive zoning was adhered to for the "obvious purpose of its ultimate acquisition at as low a price as possible."
The property is bounded on two sides by South Bayshore Drive and Biscayne Bay. The tracts on the other sides, although zoned R-l at the present, are within an area designated by the city for future park and recreational use and in fact contain some areas already purchased by the city and rezoned P-R.
The City of Miami in its appellant's brief has presented a single point on appeal in which it urges that the record does not support the trial court's conclusion that the R-l zoning classification is invalid, but on the contrary, that the ordinance in question as applied to appellees' property is fairly debatable. In its argument, the city under several subheadings urges: a) that the record fails to show a deprivation of reasonable use, b) that the record fails to show an unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of appellees' property rights, c) that the court improperly considered the city's change of zoning of its own property because the city is not subject to zoning restrictions, and d) the record does not support the conclusion of the trial court that the motive of the City of Miami in retaining single family zoning was to procure appellees' property at a minimum cost. In addition, we have the benefit of several briefs of amicus curiae. Each of these briefs urge that the interests of the people of this area can best be served by preserving this tract for the ultimate acquisition by the city for public park purposes.
While we are not unsympathetic to the acquisition of land in our crowded cities for public park purposes, we do not think that we are privileged to bend the law or to disregard the findings of the trial judge upon the evidence before him in order to accomplish a public purpose which, if we understand the argument presented, would enable the city to acquire the subject property by payment of less than its true value.
Because appellant's point on appeal urges that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the trial judge it is necessary for this court to examine the entire record in the light of the briefs. This examination reveals that this case was fully tried by able counsel. The record contains several hundred pages of testimony and depositions. Because of the nature of the case a great deal of the testimony was by expert witnesses. These witnesses, whose qualifications as real estate experts were accepted by the court, in our opinion, amply support the conclusion reached by the trial judge. It would be exhausting both to the writer and to the reader to present here a witness by witness analysis of the testimony presented to the trial court. Therefore, we will not undertake that task. A brief summary of some of the evidence which we think supports the conclusion reached by the trial judge is as follows. The appellee as plaintiff presented the testimony of W. Bates Cole whose qualifications as a real estate expert were stipulated to by the city. Mr. Cole testified: "I feel the [subject] property is entirely unsuited for R-l construction," and that, as R-l zoned "the property as a practical matter, it could not be used." Mr. Cole also testified that his personal examination of the area disclosed considerable multiple family-apartment usage in the immediately surrounding R-l areas, together with other indications such as a number of for-sale signs reflecting substantial transition of the area surrounding the subject property to non-single family use. In addition, Mr. Cole pointed out that the subject property lies within an area extending from Rockerman Canal on the north to Coral Reef Yacht Club on the south, all lying east of South Bayshore Drive; that, this last above described area had been zoned R-l since 1937; that, nevertheless, no single family residential development had taken place within that area of the subject property over these several decades. He also noted that the Everglades School, located just north of Rockerman Canal on the west side of South Bayshore Drive (together with its tennis courts, parking areas and athletic field located on the east side of South Bayshore Drive), was de facto use which is not permitted under R-l zoning classification.
Appellees' position that the property was not usable in its present R-l classification was also advanced by the testimony of Mr. Fred Ridolph who is also stipulated by the appellant to be qualified as an expert. Mr. Ridolph's testimony was that the property was presently unusable for single-family units and that because of the location of the property and the uses surrounding it a change to multiple-family zoning would not constitute spot-zoning. Of course the city countered with the testimony of its own expert witnesses. Ordinarily the weight to be given expert testimony is for the trier of fact, Hawkins v. Schofman, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So.2d 336. We are unable to say from a review of the totality of the testimony before the trial court that he applied a wrong rule of law or that he misapprehended the weight of the testimony or the significance of the physical facts concerning the subject property.
We turn now to appellant's contention that the trial court erred in concluding that the motive of the City of Miami in retaining single-family zoning was to procure appellees' property at a lower price. We note now that an error in this finding would not necessarily result in reversal of the judgment appealed. If the trial court correctly determined that the R-l zoning is "unreasonable and arbitrary to the point of confiscation and as applied to plaintiffs' property — invalid and unconstitutional" then the holding as to the equitable estop-pel of the city to resist a higher classification is only ancillary to the trial court's basic finding.
In Board of Commissioners of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank and Trust Co., Fla.App.1958, 108 So.2d 74, the District Court recognized the general rule that courts will not explore the motives of a legislative body in promulgating zoning classifications. Nevertheless, the court held in that case that the City of Tallahassee through the exercise of its zoning powers, restricted the use of property in the Capitol Center area in cooperation with the State Government, so that the state, when it came time to acquire the property through the exercise of the power of eminent domain, could do so at a cheaper price. The District Court further held that this was an improper exercise of the zoning power and in so doing stated:
"Even when adorned with a mantle of civic improvement we cannot conceive of a policy of government afflicted with greater potentials for abuse of the private citizen. The only difficulty with the desires of all of the officials as well as the effort which they put forth to effectuate their wishes, simply was that out of their ambition to construct an attractive Capitol Center that would be a credit to all of Florida they imposed upon certain private property owners in the involved area the burden of suffering what amounted to an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on the use of their property."
We think that the evidence in this record that the City of Miami has over a period of years consistently resisted the attempt to change the zoning classification on this property while at the same time publicly announcing its intention to acquire the property for uses beyond the present zoning lends support to the trial judge's conclusion. Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950); State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932); 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning '§ 7.32 (1968).
On March 14, 1966, the City passed Resolution No. 37550, stating that on September 29, 1964, the electorate of the City of Miami approved the issuance of general obligation bonds to defray the cost of acquiring the subject property and neighboring properties for the expansion of the "Dinner Key Waterfront Recreational facilities." On September 24, 1965, the ap-pellees were notified by a formal letter from the City of Miami of the city's intention to acquire the subject property for the expansion of the "Miami Dinner Key Marina-Park facilities." Mr. Sam I. Silver, one of the owners of the subject property, testified that after receipt of the letter of September 24, 1965, attempts were made, to negotiate with the city but were fruitless, and that during the entire period of time the zoning application was held up and delayed. Finally on March 28, 1968, the city denied the appellees' application for rezoning. That resolution is numbered 39525. The very next numbered resolution of the City of Miami, namely, Resolution No. 39526 dated the very same day as the denial of the appellees' application for rezoning (March 28, 1968), authorized and directed the City Manager and the City Attorney to negotiate for the purchase of the subject property. Silver testified, that after having met with total frustration and constant delays, the city finally denied the application for rezoning and instantaneously passed the resolution authorizing the City Manager to negotiate to buy the property. The instant law suit was filed on May 28, 1968, and after that the parties still had further discussions and negotiations regarding the city's acquisition of the subject property. On December 11, 1969, the city passed Resolution No. 41182 authorizing the condemnation of the subject property and neighboring properties for "additional Marina facilities." Silver testified that the condemnation suit, to take the subject property and the neighboring properties for the "purpose of providing additional marina facilities," was filed and served in July, 1970. '
The appellant relies upon the case of Donch v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 503 for reversal. We agree with the trial court's determination that the holding in the Donch case is not governing under the facts of this case. First, there are the physical and geographic facts that the Donch property is located a considerable distance to the north and across Rock-erman Canal and well beyond the area where the city has changed the zoning for its proposed public purposes. Second, we think the evidence in this case that the subject property is completely unusable for single-family dwellings makes the holding in Donch inapplicable here. See Tollius v. City of Miami, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 122.
Upon the motion of the appellant, city, this appeal was advanced for oral argument. The motion sets forth the city's pending action to acquire the subject property by proceedings in eminent domain. In order to effect the purposes set forth, we limit the time for the filing of petitions for rehearing to five days from the filing of this opinion.
Because of the views expressed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. "At all events, it is clear that the uses expressly permitted by W-R zoning classification are uses which, if deemed desirable by the City, may also he allowed in P-R classified properties. Recognizing that the Plaintiffs' property seems presently destined because of pending condemnation for a P-R/W-R classification by reason of its declared prospective public marina use, the City might be viewed at this late hour as equitably estopped to declare that the restrictive single family residential zoning on Plaintiffs' property bears any relationship whatsoever to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. In any case, the record seems perfectly clear that R-l single family residential zoning restrictions upon the subject property are grossly unreasonable, no longer remotely suitable or desirable as applied to the plaintiffs' property, and as applied are arbitrary to the point of confiscation."
. The trial court considered the Donch opinion and concluded:
"The Court is thoroughly familiar with the facts, evidence and circumstances involved in Donch et al. v. City of Miami, 214 So.2d 503 (Ma.App.3rd, 1963), having examined the record therein upon joint request of the parties. The property, as well as surrounding facts, in Donch, however, is physically, environmentally, and esthetically distinguishable from the property and surrounding facts involved in matter sub judiee. For example, the Donch property located considerable distance northerly of Rockerman Canal, which canal forms a natural boundary and which totally separates the subject property from Donch. Further, the tract involved in Donch was in fact encircled by residential zoning. Here, approximately 200 feet to the northeast and 445 feet to the southwest of the Plaintiffs' property is P-R zoning. A further distinguishing factor is that immediately to the north and south of the Donch tract were located developed residential subdivisions of single family residences. In contrast, the property here involved is bracketed and encircled by completely unimproved tracts bearing a P-R zoning classification.
"The evidence in this case clearly reflect recent zoning changes of nearby properties to the northeast as well and to southwest of the subject property, from R-l to P-R. Indeed, th City of Miami's condemnation petition involving the Plaintiffs' property must be viewed as in the nature of an implicit recognition by the City legislative authorities that single family zoning is no longer needed, desirable or warranted upon the area to be condemned which includes the Plaintiffs' land. For these reasons, inter alia, the Court finds and determines Donch v. City of Miami, supra, entirely distinguishable and thus irrelevant to reasonable analysis of the evidence presented in this case."