Case Name: UNITED STATES v. SOMMERS
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1909-05-28
Citations: 171 F. 57
Docket Number: No. 2,918 (1,957)
Parties: UNITED STATES v. SOMMERS.
Judges: Before ADAMS, Circuit Judge, and RINER and AMIDON, District Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 171
Pages: 57–65

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES v. SOMMERS.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 28, 1909.)
No. 2,918 (1,957).
1. Judgment (§§ 585, 720 ) — Res Adjudxcata.
Where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, its judgment is a bar to any subsequent suit upon the same cause of action, and is also, in any suit upon a different cause of action between the same parties, an estoppel as to any matter actually litigated.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1092, 1251; Dec. Dig. §§ 585, 720.*]
2. Judgment (§§ 956, 957 ) — Presumption of Jurisdiction of Subject-Matter.
A District Court being a tribunal of general jurisdiction, it is to be presumed that all matters covered by its judgment were in fact litigated by the parties; and, where such judgment is collaterally attacked, it will not only not be held void in the absence of proof of the evidence and pleadings on which it was based, but it may be doubted whether evidence, however strong, would be received to impeach it on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
•[Ifid. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§■ 1822, 182G; Dec. Dig. §§ 956, 957.*]
3. Judgment (§ 495*) — Collateral Attack — Customs Forfeiture — Bes Ad- ' judicata.
A District Court decreed in proceedings for the forfeiture of imported goods that no additional duty for undervaluation should be assessed. Held, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the court would he presumed to have had jurisdiction over this question, and that therefore the question was res adjudicata and could not be raised iu collateral proceedings.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 933; Dec. Dig. § 495.*]
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
• The decision below reversed a decision by the Board of United States General Appraisers (G. A. 6,536; T. D. 27,887).
This is a Revenue case which came before the trial court on appeal from the Board of General Appraisers. Appellee’s mother-in-law, while traveling in Europe, purchased for him a number of pictures, and shipped them to this country without an invoice. Upon their arrival at St. Douis, he applied through the customs brokerage Arm of O. H. Wyman & Co. for their entry. Mr. Thompson of that firm stated in a sworn affidavit which he presented to the customs officer that he knew nothing about the value of the pictures, and asked for an appraisement. The officer submitted the matter to proper appraisers, who made a report fixing the value at $205. Thereupon the collector demanded that formal entry be made and filed, wherein the actual cost or the foreign market value of the pictures should be stated. Mr. Thompson protested against this, stating that he had no knowledge himself of the value, nor any present means of obtaining such knowledge; but the collect- or refused to permit the entry unless such a paper was prepared and filed.» Thereupon Thompson executed an affidavit wherein the actual cost or foreign market value of the merchandise was stated at the price fixed by the appraisers, $205, and the duty was liquidated upon that basis, and the pictures delivered. At the same time a bond was given conditioned for the furnishing of a consular invoice. In due time the invoice arrived, and by it the value of the paintings was fixed at $750. Mr. Sommers, through his brokers, presented this invoice to the collector, and, upon the information thus supplied, the pictures were seized and proceedings instituted for their condemnation and sale upon the ground that they had been fraudulently entered. This cause was tried before the court without a jury, resulting in ’a judgment in favor of defendant on April 16, 1906. Thereafter, and on June 28, 1906, the entry was reliquidated by the customs authorities, and, in addition to the duty imposed by law upon the pictures at the valuation of $750, a further duty of 50 per cent, was assessed under Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 7, 26 Stat. 134, as amended by Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 32, 30 Stat. 211 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1893). Upon receiving notice of this action, appellee here, as defendant iu the forfeiture case, entered a motion therein in the District Court for modification of the judgment. The parties were fully heard on this motion, and the judgment was set aside and a new judgment entered, which provided that the paintings be “surrendered into the possession of said claim ant upon payment of the duty due and payable on the true value of the paintings, as shown by the consular invoice, but without the additional duty of 50 per cent, in the nature of a penalty provided for under certain- circumstances, and which the court holds should not be applied in this case.” Mr. Sommers, in, order to get possession of the paintings, paid, before the entry of this judgment, the additional exaction under written protest, and prosecuted this proceeding before the revenue authorities to obtain a return of the money, relying, among other things, upon the amended judgment. The revenue officers all sustained the legality of the additional 50 per cent, duty, and the appellee brought the decision of the Board of General Appraisers before the trial court by appeal. That court reversed the decision of the board, and entered judgment in favor of Sommers for the amount of the additional 50 per cent, duty, and to review that judgment the present appeal is brought.
The opinion filed l)y the Circuit Court reads as follows:
“TRIEBER, District Judge. The first liquidation was clearly tentative and not final. The true value of the picture imported was unknown to the importer, and was not definitely determined by the appraiser. This is conclusively shown by requiring the importer to execute a bond as set out in the petition. When the consular invoice was produced by the importer, it appeared that the first valuation made by the appraiser, which was $205, was too low, the cost thereof being $749.10. After this fact was ascertained the picture was seized by the collector, and an information for forfeiture under Customs Administrative Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 7, 26 Stat 184 (U. S.. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1898), was filed. Upon the hearing of that cause it was held by the court that there was no cause for the forfeiture, and the pictures directed to be delivered to the plaintiff without the 50 per cent, penalty. Thereupon, on June 29, 1906, more than one year after the first appraisement had been made, a new liquidation was; made by the collector in conformity with the consular invoice and a penalty of 50 per cent, interposed on the increased valuation. Upon these facts I am of the opinion that the collector had the power to make the second liquidation, the first having been, merely conditional and for the purpose of enabling the importer to obtain the picture. Whatever mistake there was in the first appraisement was an innocent one of fact, not only upon the part of the importer, but also of the appraisers. There can be no doubt but that nothing was done by the importer or his agent which would warrant a finding that it was intended to perpetrate a fraud on the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that there was a frank and true statement of ‘the facts made by the importer.
“For these reasons, the last liquidation is in fact the only one, and, being so, the importer cannot plead the one-year statute of limitations, nor is the government entitled to any penalty on the increased valuation. The judgment of the court is that the government is entitled to duties on the picture at a valuation of $749.10, but no penalties. Judgment will be entered accordingly.”
Truman P. Young, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Henry W. Blodgett, U. S. Atty., on the Brief).
Joseph H. Zumbalen (Ferriss, Zumbalen & Ferriss, on the brief), for importer.
Before ADAMS, Circuit Judge, and RINER and AMIDON, District Judges.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
AMIDON, District Judge
(after stating the facts as above). Could the judgment from which we have quoted above be collaterally attacked? It was presented to the Board of General Appraisers, and they disposed of it in the following language:
"So much as was said by the learned judge in reference to the amount of duties payable on the merchandise must be construed as obiter dictum, and of no binding force."
Judicial opinions may be narrowed by the principle referred to by the learned board, but we are not aware that the judgments and decrees of courts can be pared down by the doctrine of obiter dicta. In dealing with judgments the only question is, had the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties? If it had, its judgment is a bar to any subsequent suit upon the same cause of action, and is also, in any suit upon a different cause of action, between the same parties, an estoppel as to any matter actually litigated. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 361, 24 L. Ed. 195; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 400, 72 C. C. A. 405, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954. The cause of action here asserted by the government is that it is entitled to the 50 per cent, additional duty. That claim is denied by the appellee. This is the only controversy presented by the record or discussed by counsel. That matter is unquestionably covered by the judgment in the forfeiture case, both negatively and affirmatively. It was there first adjudged that Mr. Sommers was entitled to a return of his paintings, "upon payment of the duty due and payable on the true value of the paintings, as shown by the consular invoice." Second, it was adjudged that claimant was entitled to a return of the paintings, without the payment of "the additional duty of 50 per cent, in the nature of a penalty provided for under certain circumstances, and which the court holds should not be applied in this case." Unless that judgment is void, it establishes beyond question that the government was not entitled to the 50 per cent, duty, and that the appellee is entitled to a return of the money which was exacted of him without authority of law.
But it is said that the judgment is void because the only issue in the forfeiture case was whether the entry was fraudulent, and the pictures for that reason subject to forfeiture. The difficulty with that contention, however,' is that we have neither the pleadings nor the evidence in that case before us.. The court being a court of general jurisdiction, we are bound to presume that all matters covered by its judgment were in fact litigated by the parties. In the absence of all showing, we cannot assume that the court undertook to pass upon matters which were not submitted to it for decision. No doubt, if a court hy mere brutum fulmén should assume to adjudicate matters wholly outside the actual litigation, its judgment would be void; but such conduct is so foreign to the ordinary proceedings of courts of record that it may be seriously doubted whether evidence, however strong, would be received to impeach a judgment collaterally upon such grounds. Certainly a judgment cannot be so overthrown upon a mere speculative inference as to what the issues might have been. That, however, is all we have before us in the present case. Our attention is directed to the grounds of an ordinary suit for forfeiture, and the frame of the pleadings therein; and we are asked to hold as a matter of law that in the forfeiture suit here involved no other matters could possibly have been litigated by the parties. The premise does not support the conclusion. It is open to litigants to restrict or enlarge their issues within wide discretionary limits. Surely it was competent for the government and the claimant in the forfeiture case to litigate the question not only whether the entry was fraudulent, but also whether the paintings, in the absence of fraud, were subject to the additional 50 per cent. duty. Even if the evidence showed that there was no fraudulent intent, still the customs officers would have been entitled, and it would have been their duty, to retain possession of the paintings until all sums due thereon were paid to the government. Those officers proceeded upon that basis. They assessed the new duties and the penalty against the paintings, and retained them in their possession for the purpose of enforcing payment of this claim. Under such a situation, we are bound to presume that every matter covered by the judgment was in fact litigated by the parties. Indeed, the course of events, as disclosed by the record, contains persuasive evidence that what we are thus bound to hold as a legal presumption actually took place as a matter of fact. As above stated, the original judgment was rendered on April 16, 1906. The entry was reliquidated by the customs officers, and the additional duties and penalties imposed on June 28, 1906. Thereupon the claimant moved to modify the judgment. Why? Manifestly that it might be extended so as to cover all matters in dispute between him and the government. The second judgment recites that the parties were heard upon this motion, and that it is based "upon the pleadings and proofs adduced." Upon such a showing the original judgment was vacated and set aside, and. the new judgment entered. Thus, not only the presumption of law, but the showing disclosed by the record, established that the judgment embodies only such matters as were actually litigated by the parties. Such being the case, the rights of the parties in the present controversy there became res adjudicata, and upon that determination the paintings were not subject to the additional duty of 50 per cent., and the appellee here was entitled to a return of his money.
The decree must be affirmed.