Case Name: NATKINS v. WETTERER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-11-21
Citations: 78 N.Y.S. 713
Docket Number: 
Parties: NATKINS v. WETTERER.
Judges: Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, McLAUGHLIN, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 78
Pages: 713–721

Head Matter:
(76 App. Div. 93.)
NATKINS v. WETTERER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 21, 1902.)
1. Landlord and Tenant — Dispossession—Summary Proceedings — Defenses-—Accounting—Injunction.
Code Civ. Proc. § 2244, authorizes a tenant in summary dispossess proceedings to set up any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim, as though the claim for rent was the subject of the action; and section 2265 declares that such a proceeding cannot be stayed by injunction before final order except where an injunction would be granted to stay-proceedings in ejectment. Held, that a tenant’s denial of rent due by reason of payments of interest and water-rent liens on the property, as-authorized by the lease, and prayer for an accounting, being properly pleaded as a defense to the summary proceedings in a municipal court, it was error for the supreme court to grant an injunction before the entry of a final order in the summary proceedings staying the same pending a suit in the supreme court between defendant and the landlord for an accounting of the rents.
O’Brien and Hatch, TJ., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action by I. Newton Natkins against Matilda Wetterer. From an order granting an injunction restraining a prosecution of summary proceedings to dispossess plaintiff as a tenant pending a suit for an accounting of rents, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, McLAUGHLIN, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Lawrence P. Mingey, for appellant.
Lewis M. Isaacs, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
The complaint alleges that on or about the 17th day of July, 1902, the defendant, the owner of certain premises in the city of New York, instituted summary proceedings to recover possession of the premises, alleging a default in the payment of rent under a lease to the plaintiff's assignor; that in such proceeding this plaintiff duly appeared and filed his verified answer, denying the allegations of the petition, and alleging that all rent due under the lease had been paid; that, upon the trial of the issues thus presented, the plaintiff claimed to have paid certain sums of money for interest of mortgage, taxes, and water rates imposed upon the said property, that the defendant had failed to pay, and claimed to be entitled to credit of the amount thus paid under a clause in the lease which provided that in case default should at any time be made by the owner in the payment of any interest on mortgages then a lien on the demised premises, or in case the owner should fail to pay the taxes, water rates, and assessments levied thereon, the said lessee should have the right to pay the same, and deduct the amount of such payment from any rent then due or to become due under the said lease; that among other sums claimed to have been paid by the said plaintiff was the sum of $52, water rent; that upon the trial of the proceeding the petitioner claimed, to the surprise of the plaintiff, to have paid said sum of $52 for water rent prior to its payment by the plaintiff, and disputed the other payments alleged to have been made by the plaintiff for taxes and interest upon mortgages upon the leasehold premises; that it seems to have been conceded that unless these payments were established, and the plaintiff was entitled to deduct the amount thereof from the rent due under the lease,- the plaintiff had failed to pay the rent due, and the question before the justice of the municipal court was whether or not the plaintiff had made the payments alleged, which he was entitled to deduct from the rent; that if, in point of fact, this sum of $52 was paid by the defendant, as aforesaid, pripr to the payment by this plaintiff, the plaintiff was "innocently in default on the 1st day of July, 1902, in the payment of rent under said lease in the amount of $13.80, which amount, with interest thereon to August 4, 1902, amounting to $0.08, — in all, $13.88"; that the, issues raised by the petition and answer in such proceeding came on for trial before the municipal court of the city of New York in the Tenth judicial district; that the evidence was taken before the court, and the case was taken under advisement by the justice on the 4th of August, 1902, and no final order in the proceeding had been .made; that on August 4, 1902, the plaintiff duly paid into the said municipal court the sum of $13.88, together with the costs of the summary proceedings to the credit of the said proceeding, and for the benefit of the defendant, the petitioner therein, and on the same day notified the defendant of such payment; and that when the rent for the month of August, 1902, became due, the plaintiff duly tendered the full amount thereof to the defendant. Upon these facts, which were not disputed,by the defendant, the plaintiff commenced this action, asking for an arccóuift-ing of all sums due from the plaintiff to the defendant under the lease before referred to, for rent or otherwise, and all payments made by-the plaintiff for rent, interest, taxes, assessments, or water rents, and for an injunction restraining the defendant from continuing said summary proceeding, and the institution of any other proceeding by reason of any alleged default in said rent heretofore accruing, and obtained from the court below an injunction restraining the further prosecution of the summary proceeding before the municipal court, and restraining the defendant, her agents, attorneys, and servants, from procuring or suffering the issuance of a warrant of dispossess in said summary proceeding, and from interfering in any wise with the peaceable use and enjoyment by the plaintiff, his subtenants and assigns, and all persons claiming under him, or any of them, in the premises in question, and from dispossessing or evicting him or them therefrom. And from the order continuing such injunction during the pendency of the action, the defendant appeals.
These proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 2231 to 2265, inclusive). Section 2235 provides that the applicant must present to the judge or justice a written petition, describing the premises of which the possession is claimed, and the interest therein of the petitioner, stating the facts which, according to the provisions of the section, authorize the application by the petitioner, and the removal of the person in possession. Section 2238 provides that the judge or justice to whom the petition is presented must thereupon issue a precept directed to the person or persons designated in the petition as being in possession of the premises, and requiring them to remove from the property (describing it), or to show cause before him at a time and place specified in the precept why possession of the property should not be delivered to the petitioner. Section 2244 provides that, at the time when the precept is returnable—
"The person to whom it is directed, or his landlord, or any person in possession or claiming possession of the premises, or a part thereof, may file with the judge or justice who issued the precept, or with the clerk of the court, a written answer, verified in like manner as a verified answer in an action in the supreme court, denying generally the allegations, or specifically any material allegation of the petition, or setting forth a statement of any new matter constituting a legal or equitable defense, or counterclaim. Such defense or counterclaim may be set up and established in like manner as though the claim for rent in such proceeding was the subject of an action."
Section 2254 provides that the party against whom a final order is made, requiring the delivery of possession to the petitioner, may, at any time before a warrant is issued, stay the issuing thereof, and also stay an execution to collect the costs. Section 2260 provides for an appeal from a final order in such a proceeding; and section 2265 provides that:
"Where a petition is presented as prescribed in this title, the proceedings thereupon before the final order, and, if the final order awards delivery of the possession to the petitioner, the issuing or execution of the warrant thereupon, cannot be stayed or suspended by any court or judge, except in one of the following methods: (1) By an order made, or an undertaking filed, upon an appeal, in a case and in the manner specially prescribed for that purpose in this title. (2) By an injunction order, granted in an action against the petitioner. Such an injunction shall not be granted before the final order in the special proceeding, except in a ease where an injunction would be granted to stay the proceedings, in an action of ejectment, brought by the petitioner,, and upon the like terms; or after the final order, except in a case where an injunction would be granted to stay the execution of the final judgment in such an action and upon the like terms."
It has long been settled that a court of equity will not enjoin the prosecution of an action of ejectment, or the enforcement of a judgment to such an action, where the facts relied upon to justify the injunction could have been set up as a defense in the ejectment action. If, therefore, the municipal court had jurisdiction to determine-the questions presented by the complaint, and which the plaintiff asks may be determined in this action, then, under the prohibition contained in section 2265 of the Code, the injunction restraining the-prosecution of the proceeding, or the issuance of the warrant to dispossess the plaintiff, should not have been granted. Under section 2244 of the Code, the defendant could, by his answer, deny the fact that rent was due and unpaid, and that he held over after default in the payment thereof, and upon the trial show that the rent had been, paid, or that under the lease there was no rent due; and, if an accounting was required to determine that question, such an accounting could have been had before the justice. If, under the terms-of the lease, the plaintiff had paid the taxes, assessments, or interest which he was entitled to apply upon rent due or to grow due, equal, in amount to the rent due, the justice had jurisdiction to try that issue, and upon proof of that fact the issuance of a warrant by the-justice would be error. If there was an erroneous determination by the justice of any question relevant upon the trial of the issue raised by the answer to the petition, the plaintiff's remedy was an appeal-, from the final order awarding possession of the premises to the defendant. Upon such appeal, ample provision is made for a stay of the warrant to be issued under such order. That upon such a. defense being set up by' answer, it was intended that the question of the amount of rent due should be determined by the justice, appears-from the last clause of section 2244, which provides, "Such defense or counterclaim may be set up and established in like manner as. though the claim for rent in such proceeding was the subject of an action." If the landlord had sued the tenant for rent, and the tenant had set up as an answer that he had paid taxes, assessments, and interest, which, under the terms of the lease, were to be deducted from, the rent due, the question as to how much was due would be necessarily involved; and the court would have to determine whether the various payments hád been actually made by the tenant, and whether-such payments should be deducted from the rent to be paid under the lease, and when a defense in such a proceeding which alleges the payment of the rent is interposed, it is to be "set up and established, in like manner as though the claim for rent in such proceeding was-the subject of an action." When the action was commenced, there-was no determination by the justice of the question submitted to him, and no final order has been granted directing the issuance of a. warrant; and it cannot be presumed that the justice will issue a warrant unless the proof before him justifies it. We must take the facts- alleged in the complaint as true, in determining whether or not the court should interfere with this proceeding, regularly before the justice of the municipal court, and stay the further prosecution thereof. All of these questions can be settled and should be settled in the special proceeding before the justice of the municipal court, and there is certainly in such a case as this no justification, for an application .to a court of equity before a final order had been granted. If a final order adjudging to the landlord the possession of the premises should be granted, and plaintiff could not ascertain the amount due .for rent, or from the nature of the decision of the justice, that question could not be determined, the propriety of an appeal to a court •of equity for relief would then be presented; but, to justify such an application, it must be shown that without such application the plaintiff was unable to ascertain how much was due. The cases decided before the amendment of the Code giving to the justice jurisdiction to determine such a question as was here presented do not now apply.
I think the order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs :and disbursements, and the motion for an injunction denied, with $10 costs.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, J., concur.