Case Name: ADKINS v. HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-07-01
Citations: 143 Mich. App. 824
Docket Number: Docket No. 68912
Parties: ADKINS v HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and C. W. Simon, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 143
Pages: 824–834

Head Matter:
ADKINS v HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 68912.
Submitted July 17, 1984, at Lansing.
Decided July 1, 1985.
James Adkins’s life was insured by Home Life Insurance Company in the amount of $6,500. The policy included a double indemnity clause for accidental death. James Adkins died as a result of injuries suffered in an automobile accident, and Home Life paid $6,500 to Linda Kay Adkins, James’s widow and beneficiary, but refused to pay the additional $6,500 as provided under the double indemnity clause on the ground that a provision of the policy excluded double indemnity coverage where death resulted from the commission or attempt to commit a crime. Tests taken after the accident showed that James Adkins’s blood alcohol content was .22%. Since he was operating his vehicle with a .22% blood alcohol content, Home Life reasoned that Adkins was operating the vehicle in violation of the law and that he died during the commission of a crime. Linda Kay Adkins filed suit against Home Life Insurance Company in Jackson Circuit Court alleging breach of contract and seeking payment under the double indemnity clause of the policy. The court, Charles J. Falahee, J., granted a directed verdict in favor of Home Life. Plaintiff appeals by leave granted. Held:
1. The trial court’s application of a presumption that a .10% blood alcohol content constitutes intoxication denied plaintiff an opportunity to present her case. The presumption that a .10% blood alcohol content constitutes intoxication is not applicable to' civil actions, and the application of that presumption impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff.
2. What constitutes a crime that would invoke the double indemnity exclusion is ambiguous. That provision must therefore be strictly construed against the insurer. Such construction leads to the conclusion that a reasonable person would not think that driving while under the influence would constitute a crime sufficient to invoke the exclusion. The exclusion does not apply.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq.
Construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol present in system. 16 ALR3d 748.
Am Jur 2d, Insurance § 269 et seq.
Division of opinion among judges on same court or among other courts or jurisdiction considering same question, as evidence that particular clause of insurance policy is ambiguous. 4 ALR4th 1253.
Danhof, C.J., concurred in the result only based on the holding that the word "crimes” in the exclusion clause is ambiguous and, therefore, the exclusion does not apply. He would not address the presumptions question since the court’s ruling on the "crimes” issue disposes of the case.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
C. W. Simon, Jh., J., dissented. He would hold that the word "crimes” as used in the exclusion clause is not ambiguous and that the circuit court correctly construed that clause. Further, he would hold that any error by the circuit court in relying on the statutory presumption that a person with a .10% blood alcohol content is intoxicated was harmless and inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to redress sua sponte. He would affirm the circuit court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of defendant.
Opinion of the Court
1. Intoxicating Liquors — Blood Alcohol Content — Presumptions — Civil Actions — Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor.
The statutory presumption in the Michigan Vehicle Code that a .10% or greater blood alcohol content of a vehicle operator constitutes intoxication does not apply in civil cases or in the prosecution of a person solely for driving under the influence of liquor (MCL 257.625[2], 257.625a[3][c]; MSA 9.2325[2], 9.2325[l][3][c]).
2. Insurance — Contracts — Ambiguities — Judicial Construction.
An insurance contract which is ambiguous must be liberally construed in favor of the insured.
3. Contracts — Ambiguities.
A contract is ambiguous when its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.
Dissent by C. W. Simon, Jr., J.
4. Insurance — Contracts — Ambiguities — Judicial Construction.
Ambiguous language in an insurance policy will be construed for the insured and against the insurer; however, in the absence of ambiguities, the rights of the parties rest on the insurance contract as written, and courts should not indulge in forced construction so as to cast upon the insurance company liability which it has not assumed.
5. Insurance — Contracts — Unambiguous Language.
Unambiguous language in an insurance policy should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
6. Insurance — Contracts — Judicial Construction.
Insurance policies should be read with the meaning which ordinary laymen would give to their words.
Rappleye, Wilkins & Arcaro (by Riccardo D. Arcaro), for plaintiff.
Stanton, Bullen, Nelson, Moilanen & Klaasen, P.C. (by Charles A. Nelson and William J. Braaksma), for defendant.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and C. W. Simon, Jr., JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the directed verdict entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff is the widow of James Adkins, who died as a result of an automobile accident. Mr. Adkins's life was insured by defendant in the amount of $6,500. The policy also included a double indemnity clause for accidental death. Defendant paid plaintiff $6,500 but refused to pay the additional $6,500 as provided under the double indemnity clause. A blood alcohol level test taken from Mr. Adkins shortly after his death revealed his alcohol level to be 0.22 percent. On the morning of the date set for trial, the court accepted Mr. Adkins's blood alcohol level into evidence, applied the presumption that intoxication occurs at 0.10 percent, and, when the court learned that the only evidence to rebut the presumption of intoxication would be the testimony of plaintiff, who was not present at the accident that resulted in her husband's death, granted defendant a directed verdict. The trial court reasoned that driving while intoxicated constituted a crime sufficient to invoke defendant's exclusionary clause, which provides that benefits are not paid for any losses sustained while committing a crime.
On appeal plaintiff contends that error occurred in the granting of the directed verdict. We agree.
The trial court applied the presumption that a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent constitutes intoxication. We do not find this presumption to be applicable in civil actions. Due to the trial court's acceptance of this presumption, plaintiff was not given an opportunity to present her case. While the trial judge was willing to afford her an opportunity to rebut the presumption of intoxication, we find that application of this presumption was incorrect and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff. The burden of proving intoxication of the decedent belonged to defendant. The defendant would be permitted to place the blood alcohol level of decedent into evidence, however, the burden would be on defendant to prove by expert testimony and other evidentiary means what the blood alcohol level meant. Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the presumptions created by statute for criminal proceedings. MCL 257.625a; MSA 9.2325(1).
See MCL ' 257.625a(3)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(3)(c), which provides for the presumption of intoxication.
"(3) Except in a prosecution relating solely to a violation of section 625(2), the amount of alcohol in the driver's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions:
"(c) If there was at the time 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
The Legislature has said that these presumptions do not arise in a prosecution relating solely to a violation of § 625(2). This action appears to be solely within that section which provides that:
"(2) A person, whether licensed or not, whose blood contains 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within the state." MCL 257.625(2); MSA 9.2325(2).
Accordingly, we find reversible error to have occurred in the admission of these presumptions.
The trial court and defendant also believe that since the decedent's blood alcohol level was greater than 0.10 percent, he was intoxicated and this constituted a crime sufficient to trigger the life insurance policy's exclusion that:
"Benefits are not provided under this coverage for any loss which results from, or is caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by committing or attempting to commit a crime
We cannot agree with this. What constitutes a crime that would invoke this exclusion is ambiguous.
"An insurance contract which is ambiguous must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 604; 278 NW2d 688 (1979)." Usher v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 126 Mich App 443, 447; 337 NW2d 351 (1983).
"A contract is said to be ambiguous when its words may reasonably be understood in different ways." Raska v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan, 412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982).
Certainly defendant had the option to place an exclusion in its insurance policy that would have excluded coverage for losses sustained while under the influence of drugs or intoxication. 13 ALR2d 987.
In our opinion a reasonable person would not think that driving while under the influence would constitute a crime sufficient to invoke this exclusion. Mindful of the rule that an insurance policy should be strictly construed against the insurer, we conclude that this exclusion would not apply in the instant action. Celina Mutual Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315, 320-321; 355 NW2d 916 (1984), and Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins Co, 393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975).
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Hubenschmidt v Shears, 403 Mich 486; 270 NW2d 2 (1978).