Case Name: Kenneth T. GLENN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-04-07
Citations: 411 So. 2d 1367
Docket Number: No. 81-120
Parties: Kenneth T. GLENN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 411
Pages: 1367–1369

Head Matter:
Kenneth T. GLENN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 81-120.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 7, 1982.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas R. Mott, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORFINGER, Judge.
In this appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of aggravated assault and two counts of armed robbery, appellant contends that because he was only seventeen years of age when these crimes were committed, the trial court could not impose adult sanctions without strictly complying with the procedures outlined in section 39.-111(6), Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm.
Appellant was sentenced to two thirty-year concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the armed robberies, and a consecutive five-year sentence for the aggravated assault. Jurisdiction was retained for the first one-third of the thirty-year sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and a written order was entered justifying this action. The trial court received and considered a pre-disposition report. It considered and rejected a request that appellant be sentenced as a youthful offender because of appellant's prior record, but it did not enter a written order making the findings of fact required by section 39.111(6)(d) and (j).
There was no objection made below to the court's imposing an adult penalty, nor to the absence of a written order; thus, this case falls squarely within the ambit of Rubasky v. State, 401 So.2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) and Dunman v. State, 400 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
In the record before us, the only objection made by appellant was to the retention of jurisdiction by the trial court. There was no assertion to the trial court that it had failed to consider the criteria of section 39.111(6)(c), nor was there any objection made to the absence of the written order required by section 39.111(6)(d), and these issues are raised for the first time on appeal. The error complained of is procedural, not fundamental. It does not affect the validity of the sentence, only the procedure required to be followed before imposing such sentence. Therefore, the failure to strictly comply with that statute must be first objected to at the trial level and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Rubasky, Dunman.
The only factors argued to the trial court prior to sentencing had to do with appellant's request that the court sentence him as a youthful offender under section 958.05, Florida Statutes (1979), but it was apparently agreed by all parties that appellant's prior commitments did not entitle him to mandatory classification as a youthful offender under section 958.04(2), although the trial court had discretion to classify him as such under section 958.04(3). Appellant urged the trial court to consider him for this treatment, but this request was rejected.
The judgments of conviction and the sentences are each, severally,
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. The court's written order, filed after imposing the sentence, said Glenn was "clearly a menace to society," "dangerous," and with a "propensity to violence." It noted his felony convictions totaled seven; said it detected in Glenn "no remorse"; and declared it felt Glenn would continue his criminal pattern if allowed to do so.