Case Name: Philadelphia, Appellant, v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1910-05-24
Citations: 228 Pa. 325
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 365
Parties: Philadelphia, Appellant, v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.
Judges: Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 228
Pages: 325–338

Head Matter:
Philadelphia, Appellant, v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.
Street railways — Rates of fare — Contract with municipality — Free transfers — Change of rate — Strip tickets.
1. Where a contract between a city and a street railway company provided “that the present rates of fare may be changed from time to time, but only with the consent of both parties hereto,” and it appears that at the date of the contract the company charged five cents for a continuous ride, sold tickets in strips at the rate of six for twenty-five cents, and gave free transfers at certain intersections issued both on cash fares and tickets, the company does not violate the terms of the contract by discontinuing the sale of the strip tickets without the consent of the city.
2. In ordinary signification a rate of fare is the unit or basic price upon which the total charge is based. In the carrying of passengers by street railway companies the rate is fixed at a flat price per ride, without reference to the distance traveled, and this basic price for a single ride in the ordinary and legal signification of the term is the rate of fare. A total charge of twenty-five cents for six rides is not a rate of fare either in the etymological or legal sense.
Mestrezat, J., dissents.
Argued Jan. 21, 1910.
Appeal, No. 365, Jan. T., 1909, by plaintiff, from decree of C. P. No. 2, Phila. Co., June T., 1909, No. 1,581, dismissing bill in equity in case of City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.
Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.
Affirmed.
Bill in equity for the specific performance of a contract and for an injunction. Before Sulzberger, P. J., Wilt-bank and Barratt, JJ.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court and by the report of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, 224 Pa. 544. The court dismissed the bill, Sulzberger, P. J., writing the opinion of the court and Wiltbank, J., filing a dissenting opinion.
May 24, 1910:
Error assigned was the decree of the court.
J. Howard Gendell, city solicitor, for appellant.
The words “rates of fare” must be construed in accordance with the intent of the parties, and this intent, we submit, is clear: People’s Natural Gas Co. v. Braddock Wire Co., 155 Pa. 22; Gass’s App., 73 Pa. 39; Gillespie v. Iseman, 210 Pa. 1; District of Columbia v. Gallaher, 124 U. S. 505 (8 Sup. Ct. Repr. 585); Virginia Pass. & Power Co. v. Com., 103 Va. 644 (49 S. E. Repr. 995); Martinsburg Bank v. Telephone & Supply Co., 150 Pa. 36; Chase v. R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 523; United States v. Ry. Co., 148 Fed. Repr. 646.
The case of Adams v. Union R. R. Co., 21 R. I. 134, comes the nearer to our own in various respects than any other that has been found.
Ellis Ames Ballard and John G. Johnson, with them James Gay Gordon, for appellee.
What was said by this court with respect to package tickets in disposing of the former controversy was the very basis and foundation of the decision.
The reasoning of the court upon which it based.its conclusion that no change in fare had been intended by the company in placing package tickets on sale, has not only not been disproved but has been confirmed by the evidence offered by the complainant.
The evidence offered establishes conclusively that the contract immediately prior to and at the time of its adoption, was understood by its adversaries, as well as those who favored it, as establishing a five cent fare and none other.
The eighth section dealt only with the legal fare which had been previously established by ordinance of councils, and not with mere details of management which might in individual cases have enabled a passenger to travel over certain routes for less than the established fare.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Elkin,
The questions raised by this appeal were considered and determined by this court in another proceeding between the same parties about one year ago: Philadelphia v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 224. Pa. 544. When the opinion in that case was handed down no dissent was noted and the views therein expressed represent the conclusions of the court. That case rules the one at bar. The court was then asked to construe and did construe the same contract, the same section of the contract, the same proviso, and the same particular words in the proviso, in a similar proceeding between the same parties, involving the rights of the same contracting parties. The question then raised and the issue now presented depend upon the same words in the contract. The findings of fact in the present proceeding do not differentiate the case at bar in principle from the one then decided. The question involved in both cases depends upon the construction of the words "rates of fare" used in the contract, and this question was exhaustively considered by our Brother Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the court in the former case. The court is now of opinion that the decision in that case is conclusive of the questions raised by this appeal. It is argued that the question then presented for determination was the right of the rapid transit company to abolish transfers, and the discussion of other matters relating to the proper construction of the words "rates of fare" should be treated as dicta not binding upon the courts or the parties. It may be that the exact question then raised might have been put upon narrower grounds so as to leave for future determination the broader questions necessarily involved, but the court in reaching its conclusion deemed it necessary to consider broadly the effect of the particular words of the proviso upon which the contentions were then and are now based in order to properly determine the issue then pending. Both cases depend upon the proper construction of the words "rates of fare" used in the contract. The contracting parties failed to define in their written agreement the meaning of these words, and the courts are not at liberty to arbitrarily make a new contract for them or by construction to adopt a meaning not imported by the language used. In ordinary signification a rate of fare is the unit or basic price upon which the total charge is based. In the transportation of passengers by railroads the rate is fixed at so much per mile and the total charge depends upon the number of miles traveled, while in the transportation of freight the rate is usually fixed at so much per 100 pounds and the total charge is calculated upon this basis. In such cases no one would seriously contend that the rate of fare or the freight rate was the total charge determined upon the basis of the miles traveled or the number of pounds carried. In the carrying of passengers by street railway companies the rate is fixed at a flat price per ride, without reference to the distance traveled, and this basic price for a single ride in the ordinary and legal signification of the term is the rate of fare.- A total charge of twenty-five cents for six rides is not a rate of fare either in the etymological or legal sense. No useful purpose will be served by amplifying the discussion at this time because the question was fully considered and disposed of by this court in the case referred to and the conclusion then reached will not be disturbed.
Decree affirmed at cost of appellant.