Case Name: WILLIAM THOMPSON, Respondent, v. CORNELIUS P. VROMAN, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-11
Citations: 73 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 245
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM THOMPSON, Respondent, v. CORNELIUS P. VROMAN, Appellant.
Judges: Herrick, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 73
Pages: 245–256

Head Matter:
WILLIAM THOMPSON, Respondent, v. CORNELIUS P. VROMAN, Appellant.
Conversion — deposit in bank in one’s own name of another’s funds — wrongful withdrawal and appropriation thereof — fiduciary capacity —finding of referee — bank account in evidence under stipulation.
Where a complaint states facts showing that a deposit in a bank by the defendant in his own name, of funds delivered to him by the plaintiff, was a wrongful appropriation thereof, and alleges a conversion by the wrongful withdrawing and use of the money, the action is one for wrongful conversion, although the complaint does not characterize the deposit as a conversion. (Mayham, P. J., dissenting.)
The General Term will not reverse a judgment, entered upon the decision of a question of fact by a referee, unless the evidence in favor of the appellant greatly preponderates. ' *
The refusal of a referee to find that a complaint, which plainly alleges a conversion, contains a cause of action in tort, is not a ground for reversal, especially where the referee does find that the defendant was guilty of a conversion of the money in suit. (Mayham, P. J., dissenting.)
A statement in a camplaint of facts showing that the defendant received the money in suit to deposit it in a bank for the plaintiff, in effect alleges that the fiduciary relation of principal and agent existed, although the word ‘ ‘ fiduciary ” is not used.
A finding that the defendant received the money in suit as the agent of the plaintiff to deposit it in a bank is, in effect, a finding that the defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity.
Where an agent receives money from a principal to deposit in a bank in the principal’s name, it is proper for a referee to refuse to find that such agent was in no way acting in a fiduciary capacity.
In an action to recover the amount of certain money of the plaintiff, alleged to have been deposited in a bank by the defendant in his own name, and to have been wrongfully withdrawn and converted by the defendant to his own use, a statement of the defendant’s bank account, taken from the books of the bank, was admitted in evidence for the plaintiff under a stipulation that the statement was correct and a true copy of the books kept by the bank, and showed the deposits to the credit of the defendant and the amounts drawn out, and that “ said statement may be read in evidence on the trial in this action as original evidence, and as equal evidence with the books.”
Held, that the statement was properly admitted under the stipulation. (Mayham, P. X, dissenting.)
Where the evidence is sufficient to sustain findings of a referee that there was a wrongful deposit of the money in suit in a bank by the defendant in his own name, and also a wrongful withdrawing and conversion thereof, no demand by the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, is necessary, and, therefore, an exception by the defendant to a ruling of the referee, admitting in evidence a letter offered in order to show such a demand, is not well taken.
In an action to recover money alleged to liave been deposited in a bank by tbe defendant for the plaintiff, and to have been wrongfully withdrawn by the defendant, it is competent for the plaintiff to show that the withdrawal was not with his consent; and by way of proving such negative fact the plaintiff should be allowed to state, on his examination, that he did not consent. (MAYnAM, P. J., dissenting.)
Appeal oy the defendant Cornelius P. Yroman from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Schoharie on the 28th day of November, 1891, on the report of a referee, for $1,188.50, with interest and costs.
On the trial before the referee the plaintiff was permitted, under defendant’s objection and exception, to give in evidence a statement of the defendant’s bank account, together with a stipulation signed by the attorneys for the respective parties in the words -following : “ It is hereby admitted that the above statement of account of Cornelius P. Yroman (the defendant in the action of "William Thompson against Cornelius P. Yroman) with the firm'of Henry R. Pierson & Son, formerly doing business at Albany, N. Y., is correct, and a true copy of the books kept by said bank. That the right hand column of figures and amounts shows the deposits with said bank or banks to the credit of said defendant, and the left hand figures the amounts of money drawn out of said bank or firm of bankers, and that the balance, $182.26, was the amount due from said bank or bankers to defendant, at the time of their failure, on or about the-day of January, 1890, and that this admission is not to be any evidence as to the disputed fact as to which of the two, the plaintiff or defendant, personally made the deposit with said bank or bankers of the item of $1,000, conceded by the complaint and answer to have been deposited.
“ It is also conceded and admitted that said $1,000 was part of the plaintiff’s pension money stated in said pleadings, and that said statement may be read in evidence on the trial in this action as original evidence, and as equal-evidence with the books.”
The plaintiff was also permitted, under objection and exception, to give in evidence the following letter from plaintiff’s attorneys to the defendant, which is referred to in the opinion of the court as Exhibit “ D: ”
“ Schoharie, April 3d, 1890.
“Mr. Cornelius Vboman:
“Dr. Sir.— "VVe have been retained by William Thompson (colored) to commence action against you for the recovery of the pension moneys you have used belonging to him. We have a full statement, showing that you took up his money from H. R. Pierson & Son before their failure, and that your statement to Thompson (if he informs us correctly) ‘that his money was lost,’ is a mistake. We would like to avoid a law-suit, if it can be done. The claim is now in our hands for adjustment and collection. Please give this your - immediate attention and oblige.
“ Y ours truly,
“HINMAN & DUGAN.”
The pleadings and other facts are set forth in the opinions.
D. 8. Mayham and O. JB. Mayham, for the appellant.
Hinman & Dugan, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Putnam, J.:
This action is brought for the wrongful conversion of $1,000., The complaint alleges that on the 26th day of May, 1887, plaintiff delivered to the defendant the sum of $1,000, with directions to place the same on deposit with H. R. Pierson & Son, bankers in Albany, N. Y., to remain there on interest for the benefit of plaintiff. Defendant receiving and agreeing to so deposit said money, in fact, deposited the same to his own credit. He was not. the owner of and had no interest in said money. That the same belonged to plaintiff. That thereafter and prior to October 5, 1888,, defendant, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff, unlawfully withdrew said money and unlawfully appropriated and converted the same to his own use.
While the complaint does not characterize the d&posit of this money by defendant in his own name as a conversion, yet it states all the facts, showing that such deposit by defendant was a wrongful appropriation of the fund. And the complaint also alleges a conversion by the Wrongful withdrawing and use of the said money.
Defendant, in his answer, alleges that the deposit of the said money in Ms own -name was done with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, and denies any wrongful appropriation of the same.
The case presents a question of fact, which the referee has determined in favor of the plaintiff. I have examined the testimony given upon the trial and the briefs submitted by counsel with care. The evidence was conflicting, and the referee might have reached a different conclusion from that arrived at. There was testimony in the case from which he could have determined that the money in suit was deposited in the defen dant's name with the consent of plaintiff. But I think there was sufficient evidence given to sustain the referee's finding on the question presented for his decision. The rule is familiar that on questions of fact the appellate court will not reverse unless the evidence in favor of the appellant greatly preponderates. Authorities sustaining this rule are cited by respondent and need not be 'discussed here. I think that this case does not present such a preponderance of evidence of the defendant as will justify a reversal of the judgment. On the contrary, if it were my duty to pass upon the testimony as an original question, I should hesitate before coming to a different conclusion from that reached by the learned referee.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the referee erred in declining, at defendant's request, to find that, " The complaint alleges a cause of action in tort, not contract," and also in refusing to find that, " In order to maintain this action in its present form, it must affirmatively appear that the defendant has been guilty of conversion." These errors, if they should be deemed such, are harmless. The complaint clearly alleges a cause of action in tort, and I see no reason why the referee should characterize it. The defendant has suffered no injury by his declining to find that a complaint plainly alleging a conversion contains a cause of action in tort. Again, in his findings, the referee distinctly determines that the defendant was guilty of a conversion of the money in suit, and a refusal to repeat the finding can produce no injury.
The referee did not err in declining to find that " defendant was in no way acting in a fiduciary caj>acity." He did find, properly, on the evidence in the case, that the defendant received $1,000, as the agent of plaintiff, to deposit, hence defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity. But it is suggested that there was no allegation in the complaint that a fiduciary relation existed. It is true that the complaint does not use the word " fiduciary." But facts are stated showing that defendant received the money to deposit, and hence that the relation of principal and agent existed. Wlieie an agent takes money from a principal to deposit in a bank in the principal's name, it cannot be said that the agent was " not, in any way, acting in a fiduciary capacity." (See Flagg v. Fly, 1 Edm., 206.) Hence the above request of the defendant to find was properly refused by the referee.
I think the error of the court below, if any, in overruling the objection to this question, asked of plaintiff, viz., "Did you piake nn ajiplication for a pension on account of yóur son being killed in the war ? " harmless. The error could not possibly produce any injury to the defendant.
The statement from the books of the bank was properly received in evidence under the stipulation. That stipulation provided that the statement might be read as original evidence; that it was correct as to the amount of deposits to the credit of defendant, and the amount drawn out by him.
As we have seen, the evidence in the case is sufficient to sustain the findings of the referee, that there was a wrongful deposit of the money in suit by defendant in his own name, and also a wrongful withdrawing and conversion of said fund. Hence, no demand, prior' to the commencement of the action, was necessary to be made by the plaintiff, and, therefore, the exception to the ruling of the referee admitting Exhibit " D " was not well taken.
It is insisted that the referee erred in overruling objections to the following question asked of plaintiff, viz.: " Did you consent that Mr. Yroman, defendant, should draw this $1,000 from the H. B. Pierson & Son bank? Objected to. No, sir; and I did not consent that he might use it; I did not know that he had done so ; I knew nothing about it until the bank had failed." I think the question was properly allowed to be answered as calling for a fact. .That the case was one where the plaintiff could properly show a negative. It was competent for the plaintiff to establish the fact that the withdrawal of the funds by the defendant was not one with his consent. This fact could only be shown in the way allowed by the referee. (See Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y., 263 Huggans v. Fryer, 1 Lans., 277; People v. Tubbs, 37 N. Y., 589; Crouse v. Garlock, 45 How., 85.)
There are other exceptions taken not necessary to be considered.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Herrick, J., concurred.