Case Name: Hendrickson v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Company
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1934-06-11
Citations: 189 Ark. 423
Docket Number: 4-3485
Parties: Hendrickson v. Farmers’ Bank & Trust Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 423–434

Head Matter:
Hendrickson v. Farmers’ Bank & Trust Company.
4-3485
Opinion delivered June 11, 1934.
Opinion on rehearing delivered July 2, 1934.
J. ¥. Stevens, for appellants.
Wade Kitchens and W. H. Kitchens, Jr., for appellees.

Opinion:
Butler, J.
C. T. Fincher, trustee for the Farmers' Bank & Trust Company, brought suit in the Columbia Chancery Court to recover judgment on two promissory notes, one for $500 made on August 25, 1931, by the appellants, J. Gr. Hendrickson and Frances M. Hendrickson, his wife, and the other in the sum of $6,100 executed by J. Gr. Hendrickson on November 7, 1930. It was alleged that a certain mortgage, executed by the appellants on August 25, 1931, conveying to the appellee, trustee, certain property situated in the town of Magnolia, was made to secure the payment of both notes, and foreclosure was prayed with order of sale, etc. The mortgage declared on was exhibited and made part of the complaint. Summons was duly issued and served upon the appellants, and, upon their failure to appear or plead, decree was rendered by default in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. This decree was rendered on September 22, 1933, at a day of the regular July term of the court.
On January 10, 1934, after the lapse of the term at which the decree was rendered, the appellants filed a pleading setting up the proceedings heretofore mentioned and asked that the decree be opened and modified so as to restrict the foreclosure of their equity in the properly covered by the mortgage to the payment of the $500 note only. The ground upon which this prayer for relief was based was that the property was the homestead of the appellants, and the mortgage was not intended to, nor did it in fact, secure the payment of any indebtedness save the $500 note jointly executed by the appellants, and that "at the time the decree was obtained, counsel for plaintiff, by the complaint filed in said cause and by word of mouth, represented to the court that the deed of trust did include the $6,100 and did then and there obtain said foreclosure decree for said $6,100, when in fact said deed of trust was no lien against their homestead for said sum. If the court had been properly advised as to the execution of this note, the court would not have rendered such decree. The commissioner has advertised the lot to be sold on the 13th day of January,- 1934; by these statements plaintiff's counsel practiced fraud upon the court and obtained the decree herein mentioned. ' '
The complaint and exhibits in the former action were exhibited with this pleading.
Appellants' pleading, with the response of the appellee thereto, came on for hearing "upon the motion and complaint to set aside the decree filed on January 12, 1934, with exhibits thereto, and the. response of the Farmers ' Bank & Trust Company filed on January 22, 1934, both sides announcing that they do not desire to introduce any evidence, but desire that the question be submitted on the record and pleadings." The court thereupon treated the pleading of the appellants as a petition to vacate and modify the decree under § 6290, Crawford & Moses' Digest, subdivision 4. The court found that no fraud was perpetrated upon it, "but that, if an error was made in declaring a lien for the entire amount of the judgment, the same was an error of law; that the petitioners, J. G-. Hendrickson and Frances M. Hendrickson, were negligent in failing to respond to the summons and complaint in said original suit and make defense thereto; that, had they made defense to said action, they could have put in issue the question of a lien, and, had they been aggrieved by the action of the court thereon, might have perfected their appeal to the Supreme Court. The court, upon this hearing, does not decide the correctness of the original decree, but holds that any error of law in the decree upon an issue that might have been raised upon the trial of the original suit must be raised by appeal and not by motion to vacate the decree after the expiration of the term at which such decree was rendered." The prayer of the petition was thereupon denied, and petitioners have appealed.
The court below properly denied the motion to open and modify the decree. The term of the court at which the decree was sought to be modified had lapsed, and, while the court might have amended its judgment after lapse of the term to make it speak the truth, it has no power to correct its mistakes or errors or to make its judgment or decree conform to what should have been, but was not, done. Kelley Trust Co. v. Lundell Land & Lbr. Co., 159 Ark. 218, 251 S. W. 680.
It is contended by the appellants that a proper construction of the mortgage makes it a security only for the $500 specifically mentioned therein and subsequent debts contracted by the mortgagor and cannot be extended so as to make it security for antecedent debts. Counsel for the appellee placed a contrary construction on the mortgage, insisting that it was security for antecedent debts, which view the court adopted, is the fraud suggested.
It is unnecessary to set out the recitals in the mortgage upon which the contention of the appellants is-based, namely, that they did not render it security for antecedent debts. It is sufficient to say that the import of the language used is of such character as to create a reasonable difference of opinion as to its correct meaning, and the error committed by counsel and court, if any, consisted in a mistake of law. If the decree of foreclosure was not correctly responsive to the allegations of the complaint as controlled by the mortgage, which was the basis of the suit and a part of the complaint, this error might have been corrected by appeal from the default decree, and this was appellants' remedy. Estes v. Lucky, 133 Ark. 97, 201 S. W. 815; Old American Ins. Co. v. Perry, 167 Ark. 198, 266 S. W. 943.
The fraud for which a decree will be canceled must consist in its procurement and not merely in the original cause of action. It is not sufficient to show that the court reached its conclusion upon false or incompetent evidence, or without any evidence at all, but it must be shown that some fraud or imposition was practiced upon the court in the procurement of the decree, and this must be something more than false or fraudulent acts or testimony the truth of which wa.s, or might have been, in issue in the proceeding before the court which resulted in the decree assailed. James v. Gibson, 73 Ark. 440, 84 S. W. 485; Johnson v. Johnson, 169 Ark. 1151, 277 S. W. 535; Boynton v. Ashabranner, 75 Ark. 415, 88 S. W. 566, 1011, 91 S. W. 20.
The mere fact that the security of the mortgage was erroneously extended so as to include a debt for which it might not have in fact been security is not sufficient to show that the judgment was procured by fraud (Estes v. Lucky, supra), but constituted a mistake of law which could have been corrected by appeal, and the court correctly held that it was not authorized to reopen or set aside its decree for errors of law committed bv it. Stewart v. Wood, 86 Ark. 504, 111 S. W. 983.
A great part of the briefs, both of appellants and appellee, is devoted to a discussion relative to the correct construction and interpretation of the terms of the mortgage foreclosed. This question is not properly before us, and we are precluded from deciding it because no ap peal from the decree of foreclosure was ever taken in the trial court or granted by this court. The appeal from the order overruling the- motion , to vacate does not serve to bring up for review the decree of foreclosure. Bradley v. Ashby, 188 Ark. 707, 67 S. W. (2d) 739, and cases there cited.
The decree is affirmed.