Case Name: Martin Luther, Plaintiff in error, v. Luther M. Borden et al. Defendants in error; Rachel Luther, Complainant, v. Luther M. Borden et al., Defendants
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1849-01
Citations: 7 How. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: Martin Luther, Plaintiff in error, v. Luther M. Borden et al. Defendants in error. Rachel Luther, Complainant, v. Luther M. Borden et al., Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 1–88

Head Matter:
Martin Luther, Plaintiff in error, v. Luther M. Borden et al. Defendants in error. Rachel Luther, Complainant, v. Luther M. Borden et al., Defendants.
At the period of the American Revolution, Rhode Island did not, like the othei States, adopt a new constitution, hut continued the form of government established by the charter of Charles the. Second, making only such alterations, bj acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to their condition and rights as an independent State.
But no mode of proceeding was pointed outNy which amendments might he made.
In 1841 a portion of the people held meetings and. formed associations, which resulted in the election of a convention to form a new constitution, to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection.
This convention framed a constitution, directed a vote to be taken upon it, declared afterwards that it had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people of (¿8 State, and was the paramount law and constitution of Rhode Island.
Under it, elections were held for Governor, members of the Legislature, and other officers, who-assembled together in May, 1842, and proceeded to organize the new-government.
But the charter government did- not acquiesce in these proceedings. On the contrary, it passed stringent laws, and finally passed an act declaring the State under martial law.
In May, 1843, a new constitution, which had been framed by a convention called ' together by the charter government, went into operation, and has continued ever s since. . •
(The question which of the two opposing governments was the legitimate one, viz. . the charter government, or the government established by the voluntary con- • vention, has not heretofore been regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. Thejjolitical department has always determined whether a proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and tho - judicial power has followed its decision.)
(The courts of Rhode Island have decided in favor of the validity of the charter government, and the courts of the United States adopt and follow the'decisions of lie State^courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State/) " .
The question whether or not a .majority of those persons entitled' to suffrage voted to adopt.a constitution cannot be settled in a judicial proceeding.
The- Constitution of the'United States has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power of recognizing a State government in the hands of Congress. Under the existing legislation of Congress, the exercise of this power by courts-would be entirely inconsistent-with that legislation.
The President of the United States is vested with certain power by an act of Congress, and in this case he exercised that power by recognizing the charter government.
Although no State could establish a permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to pnt.down -an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The State must determine for itself what degree offeree the crisis demands.-
After martial law was declared, ah officer might lawfully arrest any one who he had reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection, or order a house to be forcibly entered. But no more force can be used than is necessary to accomplish the object; and if the power is exercised for the purposes of oppression, or any injury wilfully done-to person or property, the party by whom, or by whose order, it is committed would undoubtedly be answerable.
These two cases came up from the Circuit .Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, the former by a •writ of error, and the latter by a certificate of division in opinion. As the allegations, evidence, and arguments were the same in both, it is necessary to state those only of the first. They were argued at the preceding term of the court, and held under advisement until the present.
Martin Luther, a citizen of the State of Massachusetts, brought an action of trespass, quare clausum fregit against the defendants, citizens of the. State of Rhode Island, for'breaking and entering the house of Luther, on the 29th of June, 1842. The action was brought in October, 1842.
At November term, 1842, the defendants filed four pleas in justification, averring, in substance,—
An insurrection of men in arms to overthrow the government of the State by military force
That, in defence of the government, martial law was declared by the General Assembly .of the State.
That the plaintiff-was aiding and abetting said insurrection. That at the time the trespasses were committed, the State was under martial law, and the defendants were enrolled in the fourth company of infantry in the town of Warren, under the command of J. T. Child.
That the defendants were ordered to arrest the plaintiff, and, if necessary, to break and enter his dwelling-house.
That it was necessary, and they did break and enter, <fcc., doing as little injury as possible, «fee., and searched said house, &c.
To these pleas there was a general replication and issue.
The cause came on for trial at November term, 1843, when the jury, under the rulings of the court, found a verdict for the defendants. During the trial, the counsel' for the plaintiff took a bill of exceptions, which was as follows.
Rhode Island District, sc. :
Martin Luther v. Luther M. Borden et als.
Circuit Court of the United States, November Term, 1843.
Be it remembered, that, upon the trial of the aforesaid issue before said jury, duly impanelled to try the same, —
The defendants offered in evidence, in support of their first, second, and third pleas: —
1st. The charter of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and the acceptance of the same at a very great meeting and assembly of all the freemen of the then Colony of" Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, legally called and held at Newport, in the said Colony, on the 24th day of November, A. D. 1663.
That on the 25th day of November, A. D. 1663, the former lawful colonial government of the said Colony dissolved itself, and the said charter became and was henceforth the fundamental law or rule of government for said Colony. That, under and by virtue of said charter, and, the acceptance thereof as aforesaid, the government of said Colony was duly organized, and by due elections was continued, and exercised all the powers of government granted by it, and was recognized by the inhabitants of said Colony, and by the king of Great Britain and his successors, as the true and lawful government of said Colony, until the 4th day of July; A. D. 1776.
That the General Assembly of said Colony, from time to time, elected and appointed delegates to the General Congress of the delegates of the several Colonies of North America, held in the years 1774, 1775, and 1776, and to the Congress of the United States of America, in the years 1776 and 1778. And that said delegates of said Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations were received by, and acted with, the delegatés from the other Colonies and States of America, in Congress assembled, as the delegates representing the said Colony and State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations; and that on the 4th day of July; A. D. 1776, said delegates of the said Colpny of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations united with the delegates of the other Colonies as representatives of the United States of America, and as such assented to and signed in behalf of said Colony the Declaration of the Independence of the. United States of America.
That afterward, to wit, at the July session, of tibe General Assembly of said. State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, said General Assembly, by resolution thereof, did approve the said Declaration of. Independence made by the Congress aforesaid, and did most solemnly engage that they would support the. said General Congress in the said , Declaration with their lives and fórtunés.
That afterwards, to wit, on the ,9th day of July, 1778, the said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, by her delegates duly authorized thereunto, became a party to the articles of confederation and. perpetual union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,. South Carolina, and Georgia, and ratified and confirmed the same; and, as one of the United States of America under said articles of confederation and perpetual union, was received, recognized, and acted with and by the other States of the said confederation, and by the United States of America in Congress assembled, during the continuation of said confederacy.
That after the dissolution of said confederacy, to wit, on the 29th day of May, A. D. 1790, said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations," in convention duly called, elected, and assembled under an act of the General Assembly , of said State, ratified the Constitution of the United States, and under the same became, and ever since has been, one of the said United States, and as such, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and of the said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, hath ever elected and sent, and doth now send, Senators and Representatives to the Congress of the United States, who have been since, and now áre, received and recognized as such by the said United States, and in all respects have ever been received and recognized by the several States, and by the United States, as one of the said United States under the said Constitution thereof.
That from the said 4th of July, A.'D. 1776, to the present time,, the said charter and. the said government of the said State of • Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, organized, under the same, hath ever been acted under and recognized by the people of said State, and hath been recognized by each of the said United States, and hath been recognized and guaranteed by the said United States as the true, lawful, and republican constitution and form of government of said’ State; and that the said charter continued to régulate the exercise and distribution of the powers of said government of said State, and, except so far as it hath béen modified by the Revolution and the new order of things consequent thereon, continued to be the fundamental law of said State, until the adoption of the present constitution of said State, and the organization of the government under the same. ■
That all the officers of the said government of said Colony, and State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, organized under said charter as aforesaid, were elected in conformity with said charter and with the existing laws, from the first organization of the government under the said charter until the organization of the government under the present constitution of said State, and were and continued to be in the lull exercise of all the powers of said government, and in the full •possession of all the State-houses, court-houses; public records, prisons, jails, and all other public property, until the regular and legal dissolution of said government by the adoption of the present constitution, and the organization of the present government under the same.
2d. That the General Assembly of said State, at their January session, in the year of our Lord .one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, passed resolutions in the words following, to wit::—
“ Resolved by this General Assembly, (the Senate.concurring' with the House of Representatives therein,) That the freemen of the several towns in this State, and of the city of Providence, qualified to vote for general officers be, and they are hereby, requested to choose, at their semiannual town or ward meetings, in August next, so many delegates, and of the like qualifications, as they .are how respectively entitled to choose, representatives to the General Assembly, to attend a convention, to be holden at Providence, on the first Monday of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, to frame a new constitution for this State, either in whole or in part, with full powers for this purpose; and if only for a constitution in part, that said convention have under their especial consideration the expediency of equalizing the representation of the towns in the House of Representatives.
“ Resolved, That a majority of the whole number of delegates which all the towns are entitled to choose shall constitute a quorum ; who may elect a president and secretary; judge of the qualifications of the members, and establish such rules and proceedings as they may think necessary; and any town or city which may omit to elect its delegates at the said meetings in August may elect them at any time previous to the meeting of said convention.
“ Resolved, That the constitution or amendments agreed upon by said convention shall be submitted to the freemen in open town or ward meetings, to be holden at such time as may be named by said convention. That said constitution or amendments shall be certified by the president and secretary, and returned to the Secretary ofiState ; who shall forthwith distribute to the several town and city clerks, in due proportion, one thousand printed copies thereof, and also fifteen thousand ballots; on one side of which shall be'printed “ {Amendments or Constitution) adopted by the convention holden at Providence, on the first Monday of November lgst ”; and on the other side, the word approve on the one half of the said ballots, and the word reject on the other half.
, “ Resolved, That at the' town or ward meetings, to be holden as aforesaid, every freeman.voting shall have his name written on the back of his ballot; and the ballots shall be sealed up in open town or ward meeting by the. clerks, ánd, with lists of the names of the voters, shall be returned to the General Assembly at its next succeeding session; and the said General Assembly shall cause said ballots to be examined and counted, and said amendments or constitution being approved of by a majority o£ the freemen voting, shall go into operation and effect at such time as may be appointed by. said convention.
“ Resolved, That a sum not exceeding three-liundred dollars be appropriated for defraying the expenses of said convention, to be paid according to the order of said convention, certified by its president.”
That at their May session, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight, hundred and forty-one, the said General Assembly passed resolutions in the words following, to wit: —
11 Resolved by this General Assembly, (the Senate concurring with the House of Representatives therein,) That the delegates from the several towns to the State convention to be' holden in November next, for the pupose of framing a State constitution, be elected on the basis of population, in the following manner, to wit: — Every town of not more than eight hundred and fifty inhabitants may elect one delegate ; of more than eight hundred and fifty, and not more than three thousand inhabitants, two delegates; of more than three thousand, and not more than six .thousand inhabitants, three delegates; of more than six thousand, and not more than ten thousand inhabitants, four delegates; of more than ten thousand, and not more than fifteen thousand inhabitants, five delegates ; of more than fifteen thousand inhabitants, six delegates.
“ Resolved, That the delegates attending said convention be entitled to receive from the general treasury the same pay as members of the General Assembly.
“ Resolved; That so much of the resolutions to which these are in amendment as is inconsistent herewith be repealed.”
And that at their January'session, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, the said General Assembly passed resolutions in the words following, to wit: —
“ Whereas a portion of the people of this State, without the forms of law, have undertaken to form and establish a constitution of government for the people of this State, and have declared such constitution to be the supreme law, and have communicated such constitution to the General Assembly; and whereas many of the good people of this State are in danger of being- misled by these informal proceedings, therefore, —
“ It is hereby resolved by this General Assembly, That all acts done by the persons aforesaid, for the purpose of imposing upon this State a constitution, are an assumption of the powers of government in violation of the rights of the existing government, and of the rights of the people at large.
“ Resolved, That the- convention called and organized in pursuance of an act of this General Assembly, for the purpose of forming a constitution to be submitted to the people of this State, is the only body which we can recognize as authorized to form such a constitution, and to this constitution the whole people have a right to look, and Ave are assured they will not look in vain, for such a form of government as will promote their peace, security, and happiness.
“ Resolved, That this General Assembly will maintain its own proper authority, and protect and defend the- legal and constitutional rights-of the people.”
And that at their January session, in the year of our Lord one .thousand eight hundred and forty-two, the said General Assembly passed an act in the words following, to- wit: —
“An act in amendment of an act, entitled an act revising the act entitled , an act regulating the manner of admitting freemen, and directing the manner of electing officers in this State.
“ Whereas the good people of this State have elected delegates to a convention to form, a constitution, which constitution, if ratified by the people, will become the supreme law of the State; therefore, —
“ Be it enacted by the General Assembly as follows: — All persons hoav qualified to vote, and those'who may be qualified to-vote under the existing laAVs previous to the time of such their voting, and all persons Avho shall be qualified to vote under the provisions of snch constitution, shall be .qualified..to vote upon the question of the adoption of the said constitution.
“ That under and by virtue of the resolutions and acts last aforesaid, a written constitution of government for .the said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations was framed by a convention legally called, elected, and assembled, and that said proposed constitution was, in pursuance of the said resolutions and acts, on the 21st, 22d, and 23d days of March, A. D. 1842, submitted for adoption or rejection to all persons qualified by the existing laws of said State to vote, and also to all persons who, under the provisions of said constitution, were qualified to vote, in the legal town arid ward meetings of said State and of the city of Providence, legally called and assembled, and was by a majority of the persons so qualified by law to vote thereon, and actually voting thereon, rejected. That the said Martin Luther and his confederates, in causing and fomenting the said rebellion, voted against the adoption of said constitution; a copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked' A.
' 3d. The defendants further offered all the acts, resolutions, and proceedings of the said Gerieral Assembly of the said Colony and State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, from the organization of the said government under the said charter,until the organization of the present government under the present constitution.
4th. The defendants offered evidence, that on the 24th day of June, A. D. 1842, and for a long time before, and from that time continually, until after the time when the said trespasses are alleged in the plaintiff’s said declaration to have bqen committed, large numbers of men, among whom was the said Martin Luther, were assembled'in arms in different parts of the said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, for the purpose and with the intent of overthrowing the government of said'State, and destroying the same by military • force; and with such illegal, malicious, and traitorous intent and purpose, at and during the time's aforesaid, did, in different parts of said State, make and levy war upon said State, and upon the government and citizens thereof, and did attempt and enterprize the hurt, detriment, annoyance, and destruction of the inhabitants of said State, and the overthrow of the government thereof.
5th. That in order to protect and preserve said State, and. the government and the citizens thereof, from the destruction threatened by said rebellion and military force, the General Assembly of said State; on the 25th day of June, A. D. 1842, enacted •and declared martial law in the words following: —
“ An Act establishing Martial Law in this State,
“ Be it enacted by the General Assembly as follows: — ^Section 1. The State off Rhode Island and Providence Plantations is hereby placed under martial law, and the same is declared to be 'in full force, until otherwise ordered by the General Assembly, or suspended by proclamation of his Excellency the Governor of the State.”
And thereupon, on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1842, Samuel Ward King, governor, captain-general, and commander-, in-chief in and over said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, issued his proclamation in the words and figures following: —
“By his.Excellency, Samuel Ward King, Governor, Captain- • General,' and Commander-in-chief of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.
“ A Proclamation.
“ Whereas the General Assembly of the said State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations did, on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1842, pass the act following, to wit: —
“ ‘ An Act establishing Martial Law in this State.
“ ‘ Be it enacted by the General Assembly as follows: — Section 1. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations is hereby placed under martial law, and the same is der blared to be in full force until otherwise ordered by the General Assembly,' or suspended by proclamation of his Excellency the Governor of the State.’
“ I do, therefore, issue this my proclamation, to make known the same unto the good people of this State, and all others, that they may govern themselves' accordingly. And I do warn., all persons against any intercourse or connection with the traitor Thomas Wilson Dort, or his deluded adherents, now assembled in arms against the laws and authorities of this State, and admonish and command the said Thomas Wilson Dorr and his adherents immediately-to throw down their arms and disperse, that peace and order may be restored to our suffering community, and as they will answer the contrary at their peril. Further, I exhort the good people of this State to aid and support by example, and by arms, the civil' and military authorities thereof, in pursuing and bringing to condign punishment all engaged in said unholy and criminal. enterprise against the peace and dignity of the State.
“ In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of said State to be affixed to these presents, and have signed the same with my hand. Given at the city of Providence, [l. s.] on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1842, and of the Independence of the United States of America the sixty-sixth.
“ Samuel Ward King.
“By his Excellency’s command.
“ Henry Bowen, Secretary.”
6th. That at the time when the trespasses mentioned and set forth in the plaintiffs said declaration are alleged to have been committed, and at divers other times before that time, the plaintiff was aiding and abetting the aforesaid traitorous, malicious, and unlawful purposes and. designs of overthrowing the government of said State by rebellion and military force, and in making war upon said State, and upon the government and citizens thereof.
7th. That at the time when the pretended trespasses men tioned in the plaintiffs declaration are alleged to have been committed, the said State was under martial law as aforesaid, and the said defendants were enrolled in the company of infantry in the said town of Warren, in the fourth regiment of the militia of said State, and were under the command of John T. Child.
8th. That said John T. Child, on the 25th day of June, A. D. 1842, was duly commissioned and sworn as a quartermaster of the fourth regiment of the first brigade of militia'of Rhode Island, and continued to exercise such command until after the time when the trespasses mentioned in the plaintiffs declaration are alleged to have been committed; that on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1842, the said John T. Child received written orders from Thomas G. Turner, Esq., lieutenant-colonel commanding said regiment, and duly commissioned and sworn, “ to continue to keep a strong armed guard, night and day, in the said Warren, and to arrest every person, either citizens of Warren or otherwise, whose movement's 'were in the least degree suspicious, or who expressed the least willingness to assist the insurgents who were in arms against the law and authorities of the State.”
9th. That these defendants were ordered, by the said John T. Child, their commander as aforesaid, to arrest and take the said Martin Luther, and, if necessary for the purpose of arresting- and taking the said Luther, these defendants were ordered to' break and enter the dwelling-house of said Luther.
10th. That these defendants/in compliance with said orders, and for the purpose of arresting and taking said Luther, proceeded to his house and knocked at the door, and, not being able to obtain admission therein, forced the latch of the door of said, house, and entered the same for the purpose of making said arrest, doing as little damage as possible.
11th. That at the time these defendants were ordered to arrest the said Martin Luther, as before stated, the town of Warren was in danger of an attack from the said Martin Luther and his confederates, and the inhabitants of -said town were in great alarm on account thereof.
And the counsel for the plaintiff, to maintain and prove the issue on his part, offered in evidence the following matters, facts, and things, in manner following, to wit: —
1st. The plaintiff offered in evidence the proceedings and resolutions of a convention of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, passed 29th May, 1790, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed, marked A.
2d. The plaintiff offered in evidence the. report of a committee of the House of Representatives of the State of Rhode Island, &c., made in June, 1829, upon certain memorials to them directed therein, praying for an extension of the right of suffrage in said State, a copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked B.
3d. The plaintiff. offered in evidence-resolutions passed by the General Assembly of said State, at their session, January, 1841,'a copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked Q.
4th. The plaintiff then offered in evidence the memorial addressed to said Assembly, at said session, by Elisha Dillingham and others, a copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked D.
5th. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that, in the last part of the year 1840, and in the year 1841, associations were formed in many, if not in all, the towns in the State, called “ Suffrage Associations,” the object of which was to diffuse information among the people upon, the question of forming a written republican constitution, and of extending the right of 'suffrage. To prove this, he offered the officers and members of said associations, also the declaration of principles of said associations, passed February 7, 1841, and the proceedings of a meeting thereof on the 13th day of April, 1841; and also offered witnesses to. prove that a portion of the people of this State assembled at Providence, on the 17th day of April, 1841, under a call from the Rhode Island Suffrage Association, to take into consideration certain matters connected with the existing state of suffrage in said State, and to prove the proceedings of said meeting; and this he offered to prove by the testimony of the chairman of said meeting, and the clerk of the same, and of other, persons-present thereat; all of which proceedings and declaration, resolutions, &c., are hereunto annexed,-marked E.
6th. The plaintiff offered to prove that, on the 5th day of, May, A. D. 1841,' a mass convention of the male inhabitants, of this State, consisting of four thousand and upwards, of the age of twenty-oñe years and upwards, met at Newport, in said State, in pursuance of notice for that purpose; whereat, among other things, it was resolved by said convention as follows:
(See copy of- said resolutions hereunto annexed, marked F;)
7th. The plaintiff offered to prove that the said mass con vention at Newport aforesaid adjourned their meeting from said 5th day of May to the 5th day of July, 1841, to Providence, in said State, at which place and time last mentioned said convention reassembled,.consisting of six thousand persons and upwards, of the age of twenty-one years, and upwards, the same being the free male inhabitants of said State, when and where, among other things, it was resolved by said convention as follows: (See copy of said resolutions hereunto annexed, and marked G.)
8th. The plaintiif offered in evidence certain resolutions of the General Assembly of said State, passed at their May session, 1841; also a certain bill (or act) presented by a member of said Assembly, at the same session, and the proceedings of said Assembly thereupon, copies of which are hereunto annexed, marked H a, H b.
9th. The plaintiff offered in evidence the minority report from the Committee on the Judiciary upon the bill or act mentioned in the eighth offer, made to said General Assembly at their June session, A. D. 1841, arid the action of said General Assembly thereupon, copies of' which are hereunto annexed, marked I a, I b.
1.0th. The plaintiff offered to prove that the said State committee, by virtue of th¿ authority in them vested by the said mass convention, notified the inhabitants of the several towns, and of the city of Providence, in this State, to assemble together and appoint delegates to a convention, for the purpose of framing a constitution for this State aforesaid, and that every American male citizen, twenty-one years of age and upwards, who had resided in this State as his home one year preceding the election of delegates, should have the right to vote for delegates to said-convention, to draft a constitution to be laid before the people of said State; and that every thousand inhabitants in the towns in said State should be entitled to one delegate, and each ward in the city of Providence to three delegates, as appears by the following request duly published and proclaimed; also an address from said committee to the people of the State. See the copies of said request and address, hereunto annexed, and marked J á, J b.
11th. The plaintiff offered to prove that the said notice, request, or call was duly published and promulgated in public newspapers printed and published in said State, and by handbills which were stuck up in the public houses, and at various other places 'of public resort, in all the, towns, arid in every ward in the city of Providence, in said State.
12th: The plaintiff offered to prove, that,, at the adjourned mass convention aforementioned as held at Providence, in said State, on the 5th day of July,.A. D. 1841, the .people of the-State then present did by vote duly taken enlarge said State committee by the addition of the following-named persons, all citizens of this State, to wit: —
Providence County, Henry L. Webster, Philip B. Stiness, Metcalf Marsh.
Newport County, Silas Sissons.
Bristol County, Abijah Luce.
Kent County, John B. Sheldon.
Washington County, Wager Weeden, Charles Allen.
13th. The plaintiff offered to prove that, at the meeting of the said State committee, on the 20th day of July, 1841, at Providence aforesaid, when the said notice, request, or call was ordered, the following members of said committee were present,, and approved of the aforesaid call, and of all the .proceedings-, then had, to wit: Samuel H. Wales, Henry L. Webster,. Benjamin Arnold, Jr., Welcome B. Sayles, Metcalf. Marsh,. Philip B. Stiness, Dutee J. Pearce, Silas Sissons, Benjamin M. Bosworth, Abijah Luce, Sylvester Himes.
14th. The plaintiff then offered to prove that, in the month of August, 1841, citizens of this State, qualified as aforesaid, did meet in their several towns, and in the. several wards in the said city of Providence, and made choice of. delegates, in conformity with said notice, to meet in convention to form a draft of a constitution to he laid before the people of this State; and he offered the chairman presiding at said meetings, and the persons acting as clerks of the same, the votes <or ballots then and there cast by the' persons voting thereon, and of the persons then and there voting, to prove the aforesaid facts, and to prove the number of citizens so voting.
15th. The plaintiff offered to prove that the said delegates did' meet in convention, in said city of Providence, in the month of. October, 1841, and drafted a constitution, and submitted it to the people of said State for.their examination, and then adjourned, to meet in said city of Providence, in the month of. November, A. D. 1841; and he offered to prove this by the production of the original minutes, or records, of the proceedings of.said convention, verified by the oaths of the presidents and secretaries thereof, and of divers persons attending the same, as members thereof, or delegates thereto.
16th. The plaintiff offered to prove that, in pursúance of said adjournment, the said delegates did again meet in convention, in said Providence, in said month of November, and then completed the draft of- the following constitution, (a copy of which is hereunto annexed marked K,) and submitted the same to the people of srid State for their adoption or rejection, recommena- ing them to express their will on the subjeet, at meetings- to be duly presided over by moderators and clerks, and by writing their names upon their tickets, and to be Rolden in their several towns, and in the several wards of the city of Providence, on Monday, the 27th day of December, and on the two next successive days; and that any person entitled to vote, who, from sickness or other cause, might be unable to attend and vote in the town or ward meeting on the days aforesaid, might write his name on a ticket, and obtain the signature upon the back of. the same, as a witness thereto, of a person who had given in his voté, which tickets were in the following form, to wit: — “lam an American citizen, of the age of twenty-one years, and have my permanent residence, or home, in this State; 1 am (or not) qualified to vote-under the existing laws of this State. I vote (for or against) the constitution formed by the convention of the people assembled in Providence, and which was proposed to the people by said convention on the 18th day of November, A. D. 1841 ” ; which votes the moderator or clerk of any town or ward meetings should receive on either of the three days succeeding the three days before named; and which he olfered to prove by the production of said original minutes and records as aforesaid, verified as aforesaid, and by the testimony of said persons aforesaid, and by the 14th article of said constitution.
- 17th. The plaintiff offered to proye that meetings were held in, the several towns, and wards-of the city of Providence aforesaid, and. on the’days aforesaid, for the purposes aforesaid, in pursuance of the requirements of said constitution; and the said moderators and clerks did receive, on said three successive days, such votes of persons qualified as aforesaid, and then carefully kept and made registers of all the. persons voting, which, together with the tickets given in by the voters, were sealed up and returned by said moderators and clerks, with certificates signed and sealed by them, to the secretary of said convention, to be counted and declared at their adjourned meeting, on the 12th day of January, A. D. 1842; all of which he offered to prove by the testimony of the several moderators presiding at said meeting, and of the clerks of the same, and of the secretaries of said convention, and by the production of the original-votes or ballots cast or polled by the persons then and there voting, the original registers of. all said persons so voting, and the said certificates, signed and sealed as aforesaid, verified by the oaths of said moderators and clerks.
18th. The plaintiff offered to prove that the said convention of delegates-did meet in said Providence, on the said 12th day of January, 1842, and did then'and there count the said votes; and the said, convention thereafterwards, on the said 13th day of said January, did pass the preamble and resolutions following, to wit: —
« Whereas, by the return of the votes upon the constitution proposed to the citizens of this State by this convention, the 18th day of November last, it satisfactorily appears that the citizens of this State, in their original sovereign capacity, have ratified and adopted said constitution by a large majority; and the will of the people, thus decisively made known, ought to be implicitly obeyed arid faithfully executed.
“ We do therefore resolve and declare that said constitution rightfully ought to be, and is, the paramount law and constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.
“ And we further resolve and declare, for ourselves, and in behalf of the people whom we represent, that we will .establish said constitution, and sustain and defend the same by all necessary means.
“ Resolved, That the officers of this convention make proclamation of the return of the votes upon the constitution, and that the same has been adopted and become the constitution of this State ; and that they cause said proclamation to be published in the newspapers of the same.
“ Resolved, That a certified copy of the report of the committee appointed to count the votes upon the constitution, and of these resolutions, and of the constitution, be sent to his Excellency the Governor,, with a request that he would communicate the same to the two houses of the General Assembly.” A copy of which resolutions and proceedings is annexed, marked L c.
And he further offered to prove that the same was sent to said Governor, and by him communicáted to the said General Assembly, and by them laid on the table; and that, by a subsequent resolution of the House of Representatives in said General Assembly, the further consideration thereof was indefinitely postponed. All these matters he offered to prove by the production of the original minutes or records of the convention aforesaid, verified by the oaths of the president, vice-presidents, and secretaries thereof; by the report of the committee appointed by said convention to count said votes, verified by the certificate of the secretaries of said convention, and by the oaths of the members of said committee, and by the certificate of Henry Bowen, Secretary of State under the then acting government, and of Thomas A. Jenks, one of the clerks of the then House of Reoresentatives. And he. further offered to prove, that, at the s une session of said Assembly, a member of the House of Representatives submitted to that-body, for their action, a resolution referring- all the matters connected with the formation and adoption of the aforesaid constitution .to a select committee, with instructions to them to ascertain and report the number of votes cast, and the number of persons voting for the same, with full power to send for persons and papers; which resolution was rejected by'said House of Representatives, as appears by copies of the records of the said House for said session, hereunto annexed, and marked L a, and the exhibit hereunto annexed, marked L b, and the testimony of witnesses.
-. 19th.' The plaintiff then offered to prove that the officers of said convention did make the proclamation required by the said resolution of the said convention; arid he offered to prove this by a copy of said proclamation, certified by said officers, the oaths of said officers, and. the testimony of other witnesses. See form of proclamation annexed, marked X;
20th'. The plaintiff then offered to prove that the said constitution was adopted by a large majority of the male people of "this State, of the age of- twenty-one years and upwards, who were qualified to vote under said constitution, and also adopted by a majority of the -persons entitled to .vote for genéral officers under the then existing laws of the said State, and according to the provisions, thereof; and that so much of the same- as relates to the election of the officers named in the'sixth section of the fourteenth article of said constitution, on the Monday before .the 3d Wednesday of April, A. D. 1842, to wit, on the 18th day of said April, and all the other parts .-thereof on the first Tuesday of May, .1842, to wit, on the 3d day of said May, and then and there became, and was, the rightful and legal constitution of said State, and paramount law of said State ; and this he offered to prove by- the production of the original votes or ballots cast or polled by the persons voting- for or against the adoption of said constitution, by the production of the original registers of the. persons so voting, verified by the oath's of the several moderators and clerks of the meetings held for such votings, by the testimony of all the persons so voting, and by the said constitution.
21st. The pláintiff produced a copy of said constitution, verified by the certificates of Joseph Joslin, president of said convention of delegates elected and assembled as aforesaid, and for the purposes aforesaid, and of Samuel H. Wales, one of the vice-presidents, 'and' of John S. Harris and William Smith, - secretaries of the' same; and offered the. said Joslin, Wales, Harris, and Smith as witnesses to prove the truth of the matters set forth, -in said certificates ;■ which said copy, upon 'the' proof aforesaid, he claimed to be a true and authenticated copy of said constitution, and which constitution he claimed to be-the;.paramount law of the said State. '
22d. The plaintiff offered to prove, that, by virtue of, and in conformity with, the provisions. of said constitution, so adopted as aforesaid, the people of said State entitled to vote for general officers, Senators and Representatives, to the. General Assembly of said State, under said constitution, did meet, hi legal town and ward meetings, on the third Wednesday of April next preceding the first Tuesday of May, 1842, to wit, on the 18th day of April, 1842, and did elect duly the officers required by said constitution for the formation of the government unde* said constitution; and that said meetings were conducted .and directed according to .the provisions of said constitution and the laws of said State; and this he offered to prove by the evidence of the moderators and clerks of said meetings, and the persons present at the same. .
23d. The plaintiff offered in evidence that .the said general officers, to. wit, the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Senators and Representatives, all constituting the General Assembly of said “State under said constitution, did assemble in said city of Providence on the first Tuesday of May, A. D. 1842, to wit, on the 3d day of May, 1842, and did then and there organize a government for the said State, in conformity with the provisions and requirements of said constitution, and did elect, appoint, and qualify officers to carry the said constitution and' laws into effect; and, to prove the same, he offered exemplified copies of the acts and doings of said. General Assembly, hereunto annexed, and marked N a, N b, N c.
. 24th. The pláintiff offered in evidence a duly certified copy of that part of the. census, of the United States for the year 1840, which applies to the District and State of Rhode Island, &c., hereunto annexed, and marked 0.
25th. The plaintiff offered in evidence a certificate signed by Henry Boweii, Secretary of State of the then existing government of the State of ■ Rhode Island, &c.,..showing the number of votes polled by the freemen, in said State for ten years then last past; a copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked P. Also, under the same certificate, an act marked Q,, purporting to establish martial law.
26th.- And the plaintiff offered in evidence an authenticated copy of an act of the General Assembly under the charter government, passed at their June. session, A. D. 1842, entitled “ An Act to provide for calling a Convention of the People,” &c., and an act in amendment thereto; which said copy is hereunto annexed, marked Q, a. And also a copy of from thé records of the ■ House of Representatives (under said government), at their March session, A. D. 1842, hereunto annexed, marked R.
Whereupon, the counsel for the plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury, that, under the facts offered in evidence by the plaintiff, the constitution and frame of government prepared, adopted, and established in the manner and form set forth and shown thereby was, and became thereby, the supreme law of the State of Rhode Island, and was in full force and effect, as such, during the time set forth in the plaintiff’s writ and declaration, when the trespass alleged therein was committed by the defendants, as admitted in their pleas.
That a majority of the free white male citizens of Rhode Island, of twenty-one years and upwards, in the exercise of the sovereignty of the people, through the forms and in the manner set forth in said evidence, offered to be proved by the plaintiff, and in the absence, under the then existing frame of government of the said State of Rhode Island, of any provision therein for amending, altering, reforming, changing, or abolishing the said frame of government, had the right to reassume the powers of government, and establish a written constitution and frame of a republican form of government; and that having so exercised such right as aforesaid, the preexisting charter government, and the authority and the assumed laws under which the defendants in their plea claim to have acted, became mull and void and of no effect, so far as they were repugnant to and conflicted with said constitution, and are no justification of the acts of the defendants in the premises.
And the court, pro forma, and upon the understandings of the parties to carry up the rulings and exceptions of the said court to the Supreme Court of the United States, refused to give the said instructions, or to admit in evidence the facts offered to be proved by the plaintiff, but did admit the testimony offered to be proved by the defendants; and did rule that the government and laws, under which they assume in their plea to have acted, were in full force and effect as the frame of .government and’ laws of the State of Rhode Island, and did ^constitute a justification of the acts of the defendants, as set forth in their pleas.
To which refusals of the court so to instruct the jury as prayed for, as well as to the instructions so as aforesaid given ■by the court to the jury, the plaintiff, by his counsel, excepted, •and prayed the exceptions to be allowed by the court. And after the said instructions' were so refused, and so given as ■aforesaid, the jury withdrew, and afterwards returned their verdict for the defendants.
And inasmuch as the said several matters of law, and the said several matters of fact, so produced and given in evidence .on the part of the said plaintiff and the said defendants, and by their counsel insisted on and objected to in manner as aforesaid, do not appear by the record and verdict aforesaid; the said counsel for the plaintiff did then and there propose the aforesaid exceptions to the said refusals and opinions of said court, and requested them to put the. seal of said court to this bill of exceptions, containing the said several matters so produced and given in evidence for the party objecting as aforesaid.
And thereupon the judges of the aforesaid court, at the request of the counsel for the party objecting, did put their said seal to this bill of exceptions, the same being found to be true, pursuant to the law in such cases provided, at the term of said court and the trial aforesaid.
Joseph Story, [seal.]
The papers referred to in the above bill of exceptions, and made a part of it, were so voluminous that it is impossible to insert them. They constituted a volume of 150 pages.
The case was argued by Mr. Hallett and Mr. Clifford, for the plaintiff in error, although the brief was signed by Mr. Turner, Mr. Hallett, Mr. R. J. Walker, and Mr. Clifford. On the part of the defendant in error, it was argued by Mr. Whipple and Mr. Webster.
The brief filed on behalf of the plaintiff in error recited the facts contained in the bill of exceptions and documents attached thereto, in chronological order, and concluded thus: —
Points.
And upon these facts'the plaintiff in . error will maintain, that, by the fundamental principles of government and pf the sovereignty of the people acknowledged ánd acted upon in the United States, and the several States thereof, at least ever since the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the constitution and frame of government prepared, adopted, and established as above set forth was, and became thereby, the supreme fundamental law of the State of Rhode Island, and was in full force and effect, as such, when the trespass alleged in the. plaintiff's •writ was committed by the defendants.
That this conclusion also follows from one of the foregoing fundamental principies of the American system of government, which is, that government is instituted by the people,'and for the benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community. And that when any government shall b.e found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish the same, in such? maimer as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.
But that, in the case at bar, the argument is sufficient, even should it limit the right (which the plaintiff-disclaims) to a majority of the voting people, such majority having, in factj adopted and affirmed the said constitution of Rhode Island,
To sustain this genéral view, the following proposition is submitted^ as the theory of American government, upon which the decisión of this cause must depend.
The institution of American liberty is based upon the princi-pies, that the people are capable of self-government, and have an inalienable right at all times, and in any manner they please, to establish and alter or change the constitution or particular form 'under which that government shall be effected. This is especially true of the several States composing the Union, subject only to a limitation provided by the United States Constitution, that the State governments shall be republican.
In order to support this proposition, we have to establish the following, points: —
1st. That the sovereignty of the people is supreme, and may act in forming government without the assent of the existing government.
2d. That the people are the sole judges of the form of government best calculated to promote, their, safety and happiness.
3d. That, as the sovereign power, they have a right to adopt, such form of government.
4th. That the right to adopt necessarily includes the right to abolish, to reform, and to alter any existing, form of government, and to substitute in its stead any other that they may judge better adapted to the purposes intended.
5th. That if such .right exists at all, it exists in the States under the Union, not as a right of force, but a right of sovereignty ; and that those who oppose its peaceful exercise, and not those who support it, are culpable.
6th. That the exercise of this right, which is a right original, sovereign, and supreme, and not derived from any other human authority, may be, and must be, effected in such way and manner as the people may for themselves determine.
7th. And more especially is this true in the case of the then subsisting government of Rhode Island, which derived no power from the charter or from the- people to alter or amend the frame of government, or to change the basis of representation, or even to proposé initiatory measures to that end.
. .Upon the foregoing hypothesis, then, the-following questions arise: —
1st. Had the people of Rhode Island, in the month of De cember, 1841, without the sanction or assent of the Legislature, a right to adopt a State constitution for themselves, that constitution establishing a government, republican in form, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States ?
2d. Was the evidence of the adoption by the people of Rhode Island of such a constitution, offered in the court below by the plaintiff in this .cause, competent to prove the fact of the adoption of such constitution ?
3d. Upon the issuing of the proclamation of the convention, by which it had been declared duly adopted, namely, on the 13th day of January, 1842, and the acts under it, did not that . constitution, become the supreme law of the State of Rhode Island ?
If these questions are answered in the negative, then the theory of American free governments for the States is unavailable in practice.
If they be answered in the affirmative, then the consequences which necessarily follow are, —
1st. The charter government was, ipso facto, dissolved by the adoption of the people’s constitution, and by the organization and proceedings t>f th. new government under the same.
2d. Consequently, the act of March, 1842, “in relation.to offences against the sovereign power of the State,” and the act “declaring martial law,” passed June 24, 1842, were both void.
3d. The act of June, 1842, being void, affords no justification of the acts complained of in the plaintiff’s declaration.
4th. Those acts,, by the common law, amount to trespass, the facts being admitted by the defendants.
It has already been said that Mr. Hallett alone argued the case on behalf of the plaintiff in error, but the Reporter is much at a loss how to give even a skeleton of the argument, which lasted for three days, and extendéd over a great variety of matter. The' following points were discussed, and authorities read.
1st.- What is a state ?
Sydney on Government, pp. 15, 24, 349, 399; Locke on Government, B. 2, ch. 8, §<§> 95, 96, &c.; Burgh’s Pol. Dis., Yol. I. pp. 3, 4, 6;- Vattel, L. N.,.p. 18; Virginia Convention, 1775: Wilson’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 17, 304, 305; Federalist, No. 39, p. 150; 2 Dali. Rep. 419, 463, 464; 3. DHL Rep. 93, 94; 1 Tuck. Bl. Com., App., p. 10; 1 Story’s Com. orrCpnst., p. 193, <§> 208; 1 Elliott’s Deb., Gilp. ed., p. 65.
2d. Who are the people ?
The early political writers indiscriminately, use the words community, society, state, nation, body of the community, and great body of the people, to express the same idea, and sometimes the words the governed are used in the same sense.
.Sydney on Government, ch. 1,2,3; Locke on Government, B. 2, ch. 8, §<§> 95 et seq., ch. 13, &c.; Burgh’s Pol. Dis., Yol. I. ch. 2, 3, Yol. III. pp. 275-278; Vattel, L. N., p. 18; Virginia Convention, 1775, pp. 16, 27, 42, 78; Declaration of, Amer. Ind., &c.; Trevett v. Weeden, Varnum’s Argument in 1787; Wilson’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 17, 20, 25, 417, 420, Vol. II. p. 128, Vol. III. p. 291; Federalist, Nos. 1, 7, 14, 21, 22, 39, 40,63; Virginia Convention, 1788, pp. 46, 57, 58, 64, 65, 67 — 70, 79, 87, 95, &c.; '2 Dali. Rep. 448, 449, 452, 454, 458, 470 - 472 ; 3 Dali. Rep. 86, 92-94; 1 Tuck. Bl. Com., Pt. 1, note at p. 89, App., pp. 4, 9, 87; 1 Cranch, Rep. 176*; Helvidius, p. .78 (by Mr. Madison)’; Rayner’s Life of Jefferson, 377, 378; John Taylor, of Car., pp. 4, 412, 413,' 519, 447; Rawle on the Const., pp: 14- 17.
He cites Vattel, and uses the word people in the same sense Vattel had used the .word state.
4 Wheaton’s Report, p. 404; Story’s Com. on the Const., Vol. I., B. 2, §<§> 201 —' ¿04, &c.; Virginia Convention, 1829, 1830; Debates in .Congress, (Michigan,) Reg. Deb., Vol. XIII. Pt. 1; Everett’s Address, Jan. 9, 1836; Burke’s Report. .,
All the American political writers, <fcc., use the term people to express the entire numerical aggregate of the community, whether state or national, in contradistinction to the government or legislature.
Mr. Burke, in his Report,
cited above, says, that “ the (political) people^ include all free white male persons of the age of twenty-one years, who axe citizens of the state, axe of sound mind, and have not forfeited their right by some crime against the society of which they axe members.’.’
3d; Where resides the ultimate power or sovereignty ? .
Sydney oh Government, pp.. 70, 349, 436; Locke on Government, p. 316 ; Burgh’s Pol. Dis., VoL I., pp. 3, 4, 6, Vol. III. pp. 277, 278, 299,, 447; Paine’s Rights of Man, p. 185; Roger Williams on Civil- Liberty; Virginia Convention of 1775; Dec. of Amer. Ind.-; Wash. Farewell-Address ; Trevett v. Weeden, Varnum’s Argument; Wilson’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 17, 21, 25, 415, 417, 418, 420, Vol.-II. p. 128, Vol. III. pp. 277, 278, 299, 447; Federalist, No. 22, p. 87, No. 39, p. 154, No. 40, p. 158, No. 46, p. 188; Virginia Deb. of 1788, pp. 46, 65, 69, 79, 187, 230, ,248,313; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. Rep. 448 (Iredell), 454, 457, 458(Wilson), 470-472 (Jay), 304 (Patterson); Van-home’s Case, 3 Dali. Rep. 93 (Iredell); Doane’s Case, 3 Dali. Rep. 93 (Iredell); 1 Tuck. Bl. Com:, App., pp. 4, 9, 10; 1 Cranch, Rep; 176; Rayner’s Life of Jefferson, pp. 377, 378 ; John Taylor, of Oar., pp. 412, 413, 489, 490 ; 4 Wheaton’s Rep., p. 404 (Marshall); Rawle on the Const., p. 17; 1 Story’s Com. on the Const., pp. 185, 186, 194, 195, 198-300'; Virginia Convention . of 1829, 1830; Admission of Michigan (Buchanan, Benton, Strange, Brown, Niles, King, Vanderpoel, Toucey); Everett’s Address, p. 4; 4 Elliott’s Deb. 223; R. L Declaration of Rights, Art. 2 and 3.
4th. The right of the people to establish government.
Sydney, Locke, Burgh (cited ante); Dec. of Amer. Ind.; Wash. Farewell Ad.; Virginia Convention of 1775; Roger Williams ; Wilson; The Federalist; Virginia Deb. of 1778; 2 Dali. Rep.; 1 Tuck. Bl. Com., App.; 1 Cranch; Rayner’s Life of Jefferson; John Taylor, of Caroline; 4 Wheaton’s Reports; Rawle on the Constitution; 1 Story’s Com. on Const; Virginia Convention of 1829, 1830; Admission of Michigan; 2 Elliott’s Debates, 65 (Pat. Henry).
■ 5th. The mode in which the right may be exercised.
The English authors already cited, although they -all assert. the right of the people to change their form of government as they please for their own welfare, do not in any instance come nearer to pointing out any specific mode of doing it 'than by saying that “ they may meet when and where they please, and dispose of the. sovereignty, or limit the exercise of it.”
Sydney on Government, ch. 3, <§> 31, p. 399.
In the Virginia Declaration of June' 12, 1776, Art. 3, they Say it may be done “ in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the common weal.”
Declaration of American Independence; Wilson’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 17, 21, 418, 419; Vol. III. p. 293; Federalist, No. 2Í, p. 78, No. 39, p. 154, No. 40, p. 158, No. 43, p. 175; Vir- , gihia Convention of 1788, 2 Elliott’s Deb., pp. 46, 65, 67; 2 Dali. Rep., p. 448 (Iredell), p. 464 (Wilson, Jay); 1 Tuck. BI.. Com., part 1, p. 89, note; Appendix, pp. 92-94; Rayner’s Life of Jefferson, pp. 377, 378; 4 Wheaton’s Rep., p. 404 (Marshall); Rawle' on the Const., p. 17; 1 Story’s Com. on. the Const., pp. 198, 300, 305, 306; Virginia Convention of 1829, 1830, p. 195.
The anti-republican doctrine that legislative.action or sanction is necessary, as the mode of effecting a change of State government, was broaehed for the first time, under the United States government, by one Senator in the debate in Congress upon the admission of Michigan, December, 1846. See Congressional Globe and Appendix for 1836, 1837. It was opposed in the Senate by Mr. Buchanan, pp. 75, 147, Mr. Benton, pp. 78, 79, Mr. Strange, p.. 80, Mr. Brown, p. 81, Mr. Niles, pp. 82, 83, Mr. King, p. 85; in the House by Mr. Yan-derpoel, p. 131, Mr. Toucey, p. 185.
See Kamper v. Hawkins* 1 Virginia Cases, 28, 29, 36, 37, 46, 47, 50, 51, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 67-74.
The instances of Tennessee, Michigan, Arkansas, and the recent case of New York:
. So far as the foregoing authorities are proof of any thing, they establish the following positions, viz.: —
1.- That in the United States no definite, uniform mode has ever been established for either instituting or changing a form of State government.
2. That State legislatures have no power or authority over the subject, and can interfere only by usurpation, any further than, like other individuals, to recommend.
3. That the great body of the people may change their form of government at any time, in any peaceful way, and by any mode of operations that they for themselves determine to be expedient.
4. That even where a subsisting constitution points out a particular mode of change, the people are not bound to follow the mode so pointed out; but may at their pleásure adopt another.
5. That where no constitution exists, and no fundamental law prescribes any mode of amendment, there they must adopt a mode for themselves; and the mode they dó adopt, when adopted, ratified, or acquiesced in by a majority of the people, is binding upon all.
6th. When and by what act does a State constitution become the paramount law ?
A constitution, 'being the deliberate expression of the sovereign will of the people, taires effect from the time that will is uríequiyócally expressed, in the manner provided in and by the instrument itself.
The Constitution of the United States became the supreme law upon its ratification by nine States, in the mode pointed out by' the Constitution itself.
A similar rule of construction has been adopted by the several States ever since.
Constitution of New York, p. 123 of Atner. Const.; Pennsylvania, p. . 139; Delaware, p. 157, § 8; Kentucky, p. 241; Louisiana, p. 300, § 7; Mississippi, p. 316, § 5; Michigan, p. 392, § 9.
This constitution was adopted in convention, May 11, 1835, —ratified by the people on the first Monday of October, — a legislature elected in the same month, — held a session in November, —organized their judiciary, March, 1836, but were not admitted into the Union until January 26, 1837. .Validity.has been given to her legislative acts passed in March 1836; therefore her constitution took effect as the supreme law, .upon its ratification by the vote of the people, on the first Monday of October, 1835.
That this constitution was so considered, see speech of Mr. Morris, in Gales & Seaton’s Cong. A'pp.,. p. 68; Mr. Benton, Mr. King, Mr. Vanderpoel, Mr. Toucey, Congressional Globe and Appendix, 1836 - 7.
See also 1 Story’s Com. on Const. Judge Nelson says (1 Virginia Cases, p. 28), — “It is confessedly the assent of the people which gives validity to a constitution.” Judge Henry, p. 47; 9 Dane’s Abr., p. 18, $ "8, p. 26, <§>• 14, p. 22, <§> 11, when the United States Constitution became binding, p. 38, § 28, p. 41, <§> 32, p. 44, <§> 35.
These authorities establish the position, that constitutions take effect and become binding from the time of their Ratification by the vote of the people.; which, in the language of Washington, is of itself “ an explicit and authentic act of the' whole people.”
7 th. The difference between a change of government anü. a-, revolution.
2 Dali. Rep., .419, 464, 308; Wilson’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 383, 384,. “ A change of government has been viewed,” &c.; Ibid.,- pp. 20, 21; Federalist, No. 21 (Hamilton), p. .78, No. 39,-p. 154, No. 40, p. 158, No. 43, p. 175 (Madison); Washington’s Farewell Address; the- several State constitutions ; Helvidius (Madison); Rawle on the Const.; 1 Story’s Com. on the Const., p. 300; 1 Cranch, p. 176 (Marshall)';. 9 Dane’s Abr., pp. 67, 68, <§> 56.
All these go to establish the constitutional right of changing State forms of government. But the right of revolution, ill the common and European acceptation of the term, implying a change by. force, is nowhere sanctioned, so far as individual States are concerned, in the Constitution of the United States, if it may be in that of any of the States. On the contrary, as such revolution may involve insurrection and rebellion, as in the cases of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the Constitution of the United States, Ar.t.' 1, Sect. 8, §§ 14. and-18, makes ex-'
press provision to resist all such force with the whole military force of the nation, if required, and the act of Congress of February 2.8, 1795, for calling out the militia, was passed to carry that provision into effect. So' that,, underthe American sys- tern of government, a revolution and a mere peaceful change of government aré entirely distinct and different things, — one being provided for, the other, in effect, guarded against.
8th. Why a revolution to change the form of a State government can never he resorted to within the limits of the United States Constitution, while a State remains in the Union.
The United States Constitution, Art. 4, Sect. 4, provides that “ the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union' a republican form Of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot he convened) against domestic violence.”
Now, therefore, if revolution includes insurrection and rebel-Mon (all of which are attempts to ehange a subsisting government by force), then they create that “domestic violence” which is contemplated by the Constitution, and which, by the act of 1795, they have by law provided for suppressing. How, then, can revolution be resorted to, to ehange a State government ? With respect to the Constitution of the United States the case may, I think, be different.
As to the decision of State courts.
The rule applies to cases where the decision of a State court has become a rule of property, and to the construction of local, statutes. Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 391. It must be a fixed and received construction. Shelby re Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Gardner v. Collins, 3 Pet. 85.
But the Rhode Island court, in the trial of Governor Dorr for treason,, refused to consider the people’s constitution, or to decide between that and the charter government. They held (p. 38) that, “ if a government had been set up under what is called the people’s constitution, and they had appointed judges to give effect to their proceedings, and deriving authority from such a source, such a court might have been addressed upon a question like this; but we are not that court.’1
The rule of State decision does not apply to this case, —
1.. Because it involved no rule of property nor construction of a statute enacted by a~.legislature acknowledged by both parties, but related to the existence of a constitution and government under it.
% The court never decided which was the valid constitution, but refused’ to take jurisdiction of that question or to hear it at all.
S. The excitement of the times forms an exception.
4. It was made a political question, and not a judicial construction, as as it entered into the ease.
Mr. Whipple, for the defendant in error, said that the question to he decided was, whether a portion of the voters of a
State, either the majority or minority, whenever they choose, assembling in mass meeting without any law, or by voting where there is no opportunity of challenging votes, may overthrow the constitution and set up a new one ? But he would leave the discussion of general principles to his associate, and confine himself to the more minute facts of the case.
The court below ruled out the evidence, offered by the plaintiff in error. Were they right ? They offered parol proof of a new constitution, which was said to have been adopted by an out-door proceeding, not recognized by any law. No parallel can be found to this case in any government, the freest that ever existed, where it was attempted by such a summary proceeding to hind all those who. had no participation in it.
The charter and laws of Rhode Island were liberal and even radical. It was eminently a government of the people. {Mr. Whipple here went into á particular examination of the charter and laws to illustrate this point.) The usage has-been always for.the'legislature to receive and act upon, petitions for extension of the right of suffrage, and this usage constitutes the law. All changes must originate with the legislature.
The following proposition is true, viz.: — That no resistance to law is to be countenanced, unless in case of oppression irremediable otherwise. Was this the case here ? Difficulties had existed for thirty years in the way of framing a - constitution, not consisting in an electoral vote, but in the basis of representation. Towns had grown up and claimed a greater share in representation in the legislature. But in conventions, the allotment- of representatives was according to the scale of representation then existing in the legislature, and they kept things, just as they were. Power remained in the same hands.In January, 1841, the legislature passed resolutions calling a convention, organized -upon the same basis upon which it stood itself, and on the 7th of February 1841, the Suffrage Association adopted a declaration of principles, one of which was as follows, viz.: —
“ Resolved, That whenever a majority of the citizens of this State who are recognized as citizens of the United States shall, by delegates in convention, assembled, draft a, constitution, and .the same shall be accepted by their constituents,. it-will be, to all intents and purposes, the law of the State.”
Yet in the petition upon which the legislature acted it.is said, — “Your petitioners would not take the liberty of suggesting to your honorable body any course which should be pursued, but would leave the whole affair in your hands, trusting to the. good sense and discretion of the General Assembly.”
And yet, within a fortnight after the legislature had provided for a convention, in conformity with this petition, these same persons took the affair into- their own hands, and issued the declaration, cf principles above mentioned. Was there ever a case where a legislature submitted alterations of a constitution to be voted upon by any other’ than qualified voters ? And yet Rhode Island did more than this. ' By the resolutions of January, 1841, she permitted every male .inhabitant to vote upon the adoption of the constitution which might be proposed. (Mr. Whipple here read and commented' cm many documénts, to show that the friends of the “ people’s constitution ” only wanted to get ahead of the legislative convention, and that of course ■ there was no case of irremediable oppression. )
The “ declaration of principles ” above mentioned is founded upon the idea, that the people can change the constitution whenever they choose to do • so, according to the resolution above quoted; ’ and yet the thirteenth article of the Dorr constitution says that all propositions to amend the constitution must originate in the legislature, and then- be ratified by the people. Although our amended constitution gave to the petitioners all they asked-, yet they voted against it when before the people for adoption, and it was rejected by a small majority. (Mr. Whipple here commented on the irregularities in voting upon the adoption of the Dorr constitution.)
It has been contended by the opposite counsel, that they had a right, in the court below, to prove, by parol, the adoption of their constitution; that every .male inhabitant over twenty-one years of age has a natural right to vote; that their votes are binding upon the government; that their government had a right to take the military arsenal by force ; and that thisv court has a right to decide that our government, now and always represented in Congress, was not a legitimate government.
There is no such thing as a. natural right to vote. There are three classes of rights : natural, such as those recognized in the Declaration of Independence; civil, such as the rights of property-; and political rights. Society has nothing to do with natural rights- except to protect them. Civil rights belong equally to all. Every one has the right to acquire property, and even in infants the ipvs of all governments preserve this. But political rights are matters of practical utility. A right to vote comes under this class. If it was a natural right, it would appertain to every human being, females and minors. Even. the Doír men excluded all under twenty-one, and those who had- not Tesided within the State during a year. But if the State has the power to affix any limit at all to the enjoyment of this right, then the State must be the sole judge of the extent of such restriction. It can confine the right of voting to freeholders, as well as adults or,residents for a year. The boasted power of majorities can only show itself under the law, and not against the law, in any government of laws. It can only act upon days and in places appointed by law.
But it is urged by the opposite' counsel, that the great doctrine of the sovereignty of the peo , and their consequent power to alter the constitution whe er they choose, is the American doctrine, in opposition to tha f the Holy Alliance of Europe, which proclaims that all reforms must emanate from the throne. Let us examine this so-called American doctrine. I say that a proposition to amend always comes from the legislative body. (Mr. Whippte here examined, seriatim, the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions of each State, to show that this principle ran throúgh the whole of them.)
Look at the subject in another aspect. In Congress each House must agree, and even then the President may veto a bill. Sixteen millions of people in the large .States may be in favor of amending the Constitution, but their will may be thwarted by four millions in the small States. What then becomes of this vaunted American doctrine of popular sovereignty, acting by majorities ? There is no such thing in the United States as, a forcible revolution. The Constitution- forbids it. The framers of it gave to the federal government power to put down a rebellion, because they saw that remedies for all grievances were provided by law.
Mr. Webster, on the same side.
This is an unusual case. During the years 1841 and 1842, great agitation existed in Rhode Island. In June,-1842, it subsided.' The legislature passed laws for the punishment of offenders, and declared martial law. The grand jury indicted Dorr, for treason. His trial came on in 1844, when he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Here is a suit in which the opposite counsel say that a great mistake has happened'in the. courts of Rhode Island; that Governor King should have been indicted. They wish the governor and the rebel to change places. If the court can take cognizance of this question, which I do not think, it is not to be regretted that it has been brought here. .. It is said to involve the fundamental principles of American liberty. This is true. It is always proper to discuss these, if the appeal be made to reason. and not to the passions. There are certain principles of liberty •which have existed in other countries, such as life, the right of property, trial by jury, &c. Our ancestors brought with them all which they thought valuable in England, and left behind them all which they thought were not. . Whilst colonies, they sympathized with Englishmen in the Revolution of 1688. There was a general rejoicing. But in 1776 the American people adopted principles more especially adapted to their condition. They can be traced through the Confederation and the present Constitution, and'isur principles of liberty have now become exclusively American. They are distinctly marked. We changed the government where it required change; where we found a good one, we left it. Conservatism is visible throughout. Let me state what I understand these principles to be.
The first is, that the people are the source of all political power. Every one believes this. Where else is there any power ? There is no hereditary legislature, no large property, no throne, no primogeniture. Every body may .buy and sell. There is an equality of rights. Any one who should look to any other source of power than the people would be as much out of his mind as Don Quixote, who imagined that he saw things which did not exist. Let us all admit that the people are sovereign. Jay said that in this country there were many sovereigns and no subject. A portion of this sovereign power has befen delegated to government, which represents and speaks the will of the people as far as they chose to delegate théir power. Congress have not all. The State -governments have not all. The Constitution of the United States does not speak -of the government. It says the United States. Nor does it speak of State governments. It says the States; but it recognizes governments as existing. The people must have representatives. In England, the representative system originated, riot as a matter of tight, but because it was called by the king. The people complained sometimes that - they had to send up burgesses. At last there grew up a constitutional representation of the people. In our system, it grew up differently. It was because the people could not act in mass, and the right to choose a representative is every man’s portion of sovereign power. Suffrage is a delegation of political power to some individual. Hence the right must bfe • guarded and protected against Urce or fraud. ' That is one principle. Another is, that the qualification which entitles a man to vote must be prescribed by previous laws, directing how it is to be exercised, and also that the results shall be certified to some central power so that the vote may tell. We know no other principle. If you go beyond these, you go wide of the American track. One principle is, that the people often limit their government; another, that, they often limit themselves. They secure themselves against sudden changes by mere majorities. The fifth article of the Constitution of the United Stages is a clear proof of this. The necessity of having a concurrence of two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose amendments, .and of their subsequent ratification by three fourths of the States, gives no countenance to the principles of the Ddrr men, because the' people have chosen so to limit themselves. All qualifications which persons are required to possess before they can he elected are, in fact, limitations upon the power of the electors; and so are rules requiring, them to vote only at particular times and places. Our American mode of government does not draw any power from . tumultuous assemblages. If any thing is established in that way, it is deceptive. It is true that at the Revolution governments were forcibly destroyed. But what did the people then do? They got,together and took the necessary steps to frame new governments, as they did in England when James the Second abdicated. William asked Parliament to assemble and provide for the case. It was a revolution, not because there was a change in the person of the sovereign, but because there was a hiatus which must be filled.. It has been said by the opposing counsel, that the people can get together, call themselves so many thousands, and establish whatever government they please. But others must have the same right. We have then a stormy South American liberty, supported by arms to-day and crushed by arms tomorrow. Our theory places a beautiful face on liberty, and makes it powerful for good, producing no tumults. When it is necessary to ascertain the will ni the people, the legislature must provide the means of ascertaining it. The Constitution of the United States was established in this way. It was recommended to the States to send delegates to a convention. They did so. Then it was recommended that the States should ascertain the will of the people. Nobody suggested any other mode.
The opposite counsel have cited the examples of the different States in which constitutions have been altered. Only two provided for conventions, and yet conventions have been held in many of them. ' But how ? Always these conventions were called together by the legislature,, and no single constitution has ever been altered by means of a convention gotten up by mass meetings. There must be an authentic mode of ascertaining the public will somehow and somewhere. If not, it is a government of the strongest and most numerous. It is said, that, if the legislature refuses to call a convention, the case then resembles the Holy Alliance of Europe, whose doctrine it was that all changes must originate with the sovereign. But there is no resemblance whatever. I say that the will of the people must prevail, but that there must be some mode of finding out .that will. The people here are as sovereign as the crowned, heads at Laybach, but their will is not so easily discQvered. They cannot issue a ukase or edict. In 1845, New York .passed a law recommending to the people to vote for delegates to a convention; but the same penalties against fraud were provided as in other elections. False oaths .were punished in the same way. The will of the people was collected just as in ordinary occasions.
What do the Constitution and laws of the United States say upon this point. The Constitution recognizes the existence of States, and guarantees to each a republican form of government, and to protect them against domestic violence. The thing which is to be protected is the existing State government. This is clear by referring to the act of Congress of 1795. In case of an insurrection against a' State, or the government thereof, the President is to interfere. TI.j Constitution proceeds upon the idea, that each State will take care to establish its own government upon proper principles, and does not contemplate these extraneous, and irregular alterations of existing governments.
Let us now look into the case as it was tried in the court below, and examine, —
1st. Whether this court can take judicial cognizance of, and decide, the questions which are presented in the record.
2d. Whether the acts which the plaintiff below offered to prove were not criminal acts, and therefore no justification for any body.
3d. Whether in point of fact any new government was put into operation in Rhode Island, as has been alleged.
(Mr. Webster here examined the pleas, &c., and narrative of proceedings, as above set forth.) The new constitution was proclaimed on the 13th of January, 1842. On the 13th of April, officers were appointed under it, and Mr. Dorr was chosen governor. On the 3d of -May the legislature met, sat that day and the next, and then adjourned to meet on the first Monday in July, in Providence. But it never met again. What became of it ? The whole government went silently out of existence. ■ In November, 1842, the people voted to adopt a constitution which had been framed under legislative authority, and in May, 1843, this new constitution went into operation and has ever since continued. If. this displaced Mr. Dorr’s government, then there was an interregnum in the State of nearly a year. But between the first Monday in July, 1842, and May, 1843, what had extinguished this government of Mr. Dorr ? It must have gone out of itself, and, in fact, only lasted for two days, viz. the 3d and 4th of May, 1842. In August, 1842, Dorr was indicted for treason, tried in March, 1844, and found guilty. (Mr. Webster here read an extract from the charge of Chief Justice Durfee.)
To return to the first point mentioned. Can this court, or could the court below, take cognizance of the questions which are raised in the record ? If not, the proof was properly rejected.
The question which the court was called upon to decide was one of sovereignty. Two legislatures were in existence at the same time. Both could not be legitimate. . If legal power had not passed away from the charter government, it could not have got into Dorr’s. The position taken on the other side is that it had so passed away, and it is attempted to be proved by votes and proceedings of meetings, &c., out of doors. This court must look elsewhere, — to the Constitution and laws, and acts of the government, of the United States. How did the President of the United States treat this question ? Acting under the Constitution and law of 1795, he decided that the existing government was the one which he was bound to protect. He took his stand accordingly, and we say that this is obligatory upon this court, which always follows an executive recognition of a foreign government. The proof offered below, and rejected by the court, would have led to a different result. Its object was to show that the Dorr constitution wás adopted by a majority of the people. But how could a' court judge of' this? Can it know how many' persons were present, how many of them qualified voters, and all this to he proved by testimony ? Can it order to be brought before it the minutes and registers of unauthorized officers, and have them proved by parol ? The decisions of the legislature and courts of Rhode Island conclude the case. Will you reverse the judgment in Dorr’s case ?
The .second proposition is a branch of the first, viz.: —
If the court below had admitted the evidence offered by the other side, and the facts which they alleged had been established by proof, still they would not have afforded any ground of justification. The truth of this proposition is sufficiently manifest from these two considerations, namely, that the acts referred to were declared to be of a criminal nature by competent authority, and no one can justify his conduct by criminal acts.
3. Let us now inquire whether, in point of fact,.any new gov ernment was put into operation in Rhode Island, as has been alleged.
It has been before stated that the government of Mr. Dorr, if it ever existed at till, only lasted for two days. Even the French revolution, rapid' as it was, required three. During those' two days, various officers were appointed; but did any one ever hear of their proceeding to discharge their several duties ? A court was appointed. But did any process ever issue under its authority ? Was any person ever sued or arrested ? Or did any officer, so appointed, venture to bring his official fimctions into practical operation upon either men or property ? There was nothing of this. The government was nothing but a shadow. It was all paper and patriotism; and went out on the 4th of May, admitting itself to be, what every one must now consider it, nothing but a contemptible sham.
Mr. Clifford (Attorney-General) concluded the argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error. He confined his attention almost exclusively to the point, that a State bad no right to declare martial law. But of his argument the Reporter, has no notes.
Mr. Justice Catron, Mr. Justice Daniel, and Mr. Justice McKinley were absent on account of ill health when this case was argued.
Bor the reason, see Madison, 2 Ell. Deb. 95, and Pinckney, 4 Ell. Deb. 319, that for our system “ we cannot find one express example in the experience of the world.”

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case has arisen out of the unfortunate political differences which agitated the people of Rhode Island in 1841 and 1842.
It is an action of trespass brought by Martin Luther, the plaintiff in error, against Luther M. Borden and others, the defendants, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house. The defendants justify upon the ground that large numbers of men were assembled in different parts of the State for the purpose of overthrowing the government' by military force, and were actually levying war upon the State; that, in order to defend itself from this insurrection, the State was declared by competent authority to be under martial law ; that the plaintiff was engaged in the insurrection; and that the defendants, being in the military service of the State, by command of their superior officer, broke and entered the house and searched the rooms for the plaintiff, who'was supposed to be there concealed, in order to arrest him, doing as little damage as possible. The plaintiff replied, that the trespass was committed by.the. defendants of their own proper wrong, and without any such cause; and upon the issue joined on this replication, the parties proceeded to trial.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff and the defendants is stated at large in the record; and the questions decided by the Circuit Court, and brought qp by the writ of error, are not such as commonly arise in an action of trespass. The existence and authority of the/ government under which the defendants acted was called in question; and the plaintiff insists, that, before the acts complained of were committed, that government had been displaced and annulled by the people of Rhode Isl- and, and that the plaintiff was engaged in supporting the lawful authority of the State, and the defendants themselves were in arms against it.
This is a new question in this court, and certainly a very grave one; and at the time when the trespass is alleged to have been committed it had produced a general and painful excitement in the State, and threatened to end in bloodshed and civil war.
The evidence shows that the defendants, in breaking into the plaintiff's house and endeavouring to arrest him, as stated in the pleadings, acted under the authority of the government which was established in Rhode Island at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and which is usually called the charter gov-eminent. For when the separation from England took place, Rhode Island did not, like the other States, adopt a new constitution, but continued the form of government established by the charter of Charles the Second in 1663; making only such alterations, by acts of the legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to their condition and rights as an independent State. It was under this form of government that Rhode IslantJ united with the other Statés in the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards ratified the Constitution of the United States and became a member of this Union; and it continued to be the established and unquestioned government of the State until the difficulties took place which have given rise to this action.
In this form of government no mode of proceeding was pointed out by which ameñdments might be made. . It authorized the legislature to prescribe the qualification of voters, and in the exercise of this power the right of suffrage was confined to freeholders, until the adoption of the constitution of 1843.
For some years previous to the disturbances of which we are^ now speaking, many of the citizens became dissatisfied witlT the charter government, and particularly with the restriction upon the right of suffrage. Memorials were addressed to the legislature- upon this subject, urging the justice and necessity of a more liberal and extended rule. But they failed to produce the desired effect. And thereupon meetings were held and associations, formed by those who were in favor of a maro extended right of soffrage.,which finally resulted in the election of a convention to form a new constitution to ho submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection.. This convention was not authorized by any law of the' existing government. It was elected at voluntary meetings, and by those citizens only who favoréd this plan of reform; those who were opposed to it, or opposed, to the manner ip which it was proposed to be accomplished, taking no part in the proceedings. The persons chosen as above mentioned came, together and framed a constitution, by which the right of suffrage was extended to every male citizen of twenty-one years of age, who had resided in the State for one year, and in the town in which he offered to vote for six months, next preceding the election- The convention also prescribed the manner in which this constitution should be submitted to the decision of the people, — permitting every one to vote on that question who was an American citizen, twenty-one years old, and who had a permanent residence or home in the State, and directing the votes to be returned to the convention.
Upon the return of the votes, the' convention declared that the constitution was adopted and . ratified by a majority of the people of the State, and was the paramount law and constitution of Rhode Island. And it communicated this décision to the governor under the charter government, for the purpose of being laid before the legislature; and directed .elections to be held for a governor, members of the legislature, and other officers under the new constitution. These elections accordingly took plaee, and the governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, and senators and representatives thus appointed assembled at the city of Providence On May 3d, 1842, and immediately proceeded to organize the new government, by appointing the officers and passing the. laws necessary for that purpose.
The charter government did not, however,. admit the validity of these proceedings, nor acquiesce in them. On the contrary, in January, 1842, when this new constitution was communicated to the governor, and by him laid before the legislature, it passed resolutions declaring all acts done for the purpose of imposing that constitution upon the State to be an assumption ot the powers of government, in violation of the andJ, nat n would maxntam its authority anddel'end tlwPlegal and constitutional rights of the peopled ~~
iirsdopting this measure, as well as in all others taken by the charter government to assert its authority, it was supported by a large number of the citizens of the State, claiming to be a majority, who regarded the proceedings of the adverse party as unlawful and disorganizing, and maintained that, as the existing government had been established by the people of the State, no convention to frame a new constitution could be called without its sanction; and that the times and places of taking the votes, and the officers to receive them, and the qualification of the voters, must be previously regulated and appointed by law.
But, notwithstanding the détermination of the charter government, arid of those who. adhered to it, to maintain its authority, Thomas W. Dorr, who had been elected governor under the new constitution., prepared to assert the authority of that government by forcé, and many citizens assembled in arms to support him. The charter government thereupon passed an act declaring the State under martial IawTand at the same time proceeded to call out, the militia, to repel, the threatened-attack and. to subdue those who were engaged in it.. In this state of the contest, the house of the plaintiff, who was engaged in supporting the authority of the new government, was broken and entered in order to arrest him. The defendants were, át the time, in the' military service of the old government, and in arms to support its authority.
It appears, also, that the charter government at its session of January, 1842,_took measures to call a convention to revise the existing form of government; and after various proceedings; which it is not material to state, a new constitution was formed by a convention elected under the authority of the charteiT government, and afterwards adopted and ratified by the people; the times and places at which trie votes were to he given, the persons who were to receive and return them, and the qualification of the voters, having all been previously authorized and provided for by law passed by the charter government. This new government went into operation in May, 1843, at which time the old government formally surrendered all its powers ; and this constitution has continued ever since to be tne admitted and estahiisbpfl gnwrnment of'Rhode Island:---'—
•The difficulties with the government of which Mr. Dorr' was the head were soon over. They had ceased before the cori-stitution was framed by the convention elected by the authority of. the charter government. For after an unsuccessful attempt made by Mr. Dorr in Ma^, 1842, at the head of a military force, to get possession of the State arsenal at Providence;, in which he was repulsed, and an assemblage of some hundreds of armed men under his command at Chepatchet in the June following, which dis >ersed upon the approach of the troops of the old government, no further effort'was made to establish it; and until the constitution of 1843 went iiTttrrrpera— tiomfhe. charter government continued to assert its authority and exercise its powers, and .tn-^enforce obedience .^throughout the State, arresting and imprisoning, and punishing in its lüdi-cial tribunals, those who had appeared in arms .against it.
Wmio not understand from the argument that the constitution under which the plaintiff acted is supposed to have been in force after the constitution of May, 1843, went into operation. The contest is confined to the year preceding. The plain* tiff" contends that .the charter government was displaced, afid ceasécftohhyeanv lawful power, alter the organization, in May, 1844¿. oí the government which he supported, and although thaUgovernmenc never was able _to_ exercise any authority-in the State, nor to command obedience to its laws or .to its officers yet Tjé~rnRÍKts that, it. was thelawiul and established govern nTent^npan^ftfa^gEaMnd — that it was ratified by a large ma-forifyTffthe male people-jo£-the_State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were en~ titled to vote for yon eral officer~slimder"theTKeti .existing laws of-the-Siate. The fact that it was so ratified was not admitted ; and at the trial in the Circuit Court he offered to prove it hy the production of the original ballots, and the original registers of-the persbns voting, verified by the oaths of the several moderators and clerks of the meetings, and by the testimony of all the persons so voting, and by the said constitution ; and also offered in evidence, for the same purpose, that part of the census of the United States for the year 1840 which applies to Rhode Island ; and a certificate, of the secretary of state of the charter government, showing the number of votes polled by the freemen of the State for the ten years then last past.
The Circuit. Court rejected this evidence, and instructed the jury tha^ the charter government and laws under which the defendants acted were, at the time the trespass is alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect as the form of government and paramount law of the StateT'and constituted a justification of the acts of the defendants as set forth in their pleas. " ' ' " " ' "
ItiFtETs opinion of the Circuit Court that we are now called upon to review. It is set forth more;at large in the exception, but is in substance as above stated; and the question presented is certainly a very serious one: For, if this court_ig,. authorized to enter upon this inquiry as proposed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter government had no legal existence during the period of time above mentioned, —if it had been annulled by the adoption of the opposing government, — then the laws passed by its legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries and com pensation to its officers illegally paid; its public accounts improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into operation answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.
When ,the decision of this court might lead to such results,. it becomes its duty to examine very carefully,its_own powers before- it_undertakes to_exercise jurisdiction.
Cértainly, the question which the plaintiff proposed to raise by the testimony ne eneren nas not heretoiore been retyrgrriyad-as a In. forming the
constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always de-_. termined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ' ratified or not by the people of the State — and-4he~Turl'LciaI power has followed its iecigion.. In Rhode Island, the question has been directly decided. .Prosecutions were there instituted against some of the persons who had been active in the forcible opposition to the old government. And in more than one of. the cases, evidence was offered on the part of the defence similar to the testimony offered in the Circuit Court, and for the samé purpose ; that is, for the purpose of showing that the proposed constitution had been adopted by the people of Rhode Island, and had, therefore, become the established. government, and consequently that the parties accused were doing nothing more than their duty in endeavouring to support- it.
But the courts uniformly held that the inquiry proposed to be made belonged to the political power and not to the judicial'; that it rested with the political power to decide whether the charter government had been displaced or not; and when . that decision was made, the judicial department would be hmmrj t.o take notice of it as the paramounfTaw of the State,'' without the aid of oral evidence o ttiPPiraminatinn nf wit, nesses; that, according to the law;s and institutions of Rhode Island, no such change had been recognized by the political power; and that the charter government was the lawful and established government of the State during the period in con-''fest, and that those who were in arms against it were insurgents, and liable to punishment. This doctrine is clearly and forcibly stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State in the trial of Thomas W. Dorr, who was the governor elected under the opposing constitution, and headed the armed force which endeavoured to maintain its authority
Indeed, we do not see how the question could be tried and judicially decided in a State court. Judicial power presup'poses an established- government capable of .enacting laws and enforcing their exeoution.'and of appointing judges to expound and* administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority of t.he government, from which it is .derived. And- if- the authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it. And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the rpiestionJ-t undertook to_trv. Tf it decides at all as a'court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising judicial power.
It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the.authority of State decisions, that the trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the constitution of 1843 went into operation. The judges who decided that case held their authority under that constitution; and it is admitted on all hands that it was adopted by the people of the State, and is the. lawful and established government. It is the decision, therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the constitution and laws of Rhode Island is not questioned by either, party to this controversy, although the government under which it acted was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government.
The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State ; and the well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern-merely. the constitution and laws of thejState
Upon what ground could the Circuit Court oTthe United States which tried this case have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode Island? Undoubtedly the courts of the United States-have certain powers under the Constitution and-Jaws^of-the-United States which do not belong t,o*'the-State courts. Butthe power of determining that a State government has beén^law-fully established, which the courts of the State disown and repudiate, is not one of them. IJpon sucliaquestion the courts of the United States' are bound tcTToHow the decisions of the State tribunals! and must therefore regard the charter government as the lawful and established government during the time of this contest. * "- '
Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution, unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it ? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it.' And certainly it is no part of the judicial-functions of any court of the United States to. prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right t'o those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision./
And-if the then existing law of Rhodc/Island which confined the right of suffrage to freeholders is to govern, and this question is to be tried by that rule, how could the majority have been ascertained by legal evidence, such as a court of justice might lawfully receive ? The written returns of the moderators and clerks of mere voluntary meetings, verified by affidavit, certainly would not be admissible; nor their opinions or judgments as to the freehold qualification of the persons who voted. The law requires actual knowledge in the witness of the fact ip which he testifies in a court of justice. How, then, could the rqajority of .freeholders have been determined in a judicial proceeding ?
The- court, had not the power to order a census of the freeholders to be taken; nor would the census of the United States of 1840 be any evidence of the number of freeholders in the State in 1842. Nor could the court appoint persons to examine and determine whether- every, -person who had voted possessed the freehold qualification which the law then required. ' In the nature of things, the Circuit Court could not know the name and residence of every citizen, and bring him before the court to be examined. Arid if this were attempted, where would such an inquiry have. terminated ? And how long must the people of Rhode Island have waited to learn from this court under what form of government they were living during the year in controversy ?
But this is not all. The question as to the majority is a question of fact. It depends Upon the testimony of witnesses, and if the testimony offered by the plaintiff had been received, the defendants had the right to offer evidence to rebut it} and there might, and probably would, have been conflicting testimony as to the number of voters- in the State, and as to the legal qualifications of many of the individuals who had voted. The decision would, therefore, have depended upon the rela tive credibility of- -witnesses, and the weight of testimony; and as the casé before the Circuit Court was an action at common law, the question of fact, according to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States, must have been tried by the jury. In one case a jury might find that the constitution which the plaintiff supported was adopted by a majority of the citizens of the State,, or of the voters entitled to vote by the existing law. Another jury in another case might find otherwise. And as a verdict is not evidence in a suit between different parties, if the courts of the United States have the jurisdiction contended for by the plaintiff, the question whether the acts done under the charter government during the period in contest are valid or- not must always remain unsettled and opeji to dispute. The authority and security of the State governments do not rest on such unstable foundations.
Moreover, the Constitution of the United States, as far' as it has provided tor an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere in tne domestic concerns ~of a State, has treated the subject as -political in~its natureTand placed the nower m the hands of that department.
-"v The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitutionof the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide"what government is the established one in a State. For -gsttorUmted States guarantee to each~Sfafe a republican government. Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican oiTrEot And.when~the senators "and representatives'Of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union,~tholTuthority of the government imder which they are appointedTas well as its republican character, is recognized by--the-pfoper constitutional authority. Anfftts~d5cision'is"binding on every other department of the government, and couk not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the cm .test in this case did not last long enough to bring the mat;or -to this issue ; and as no senators or representatives were elected under the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head,- Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there, and not in' the courts.
So, too, as relates to -the clause in the above-mentioned article of the Constitution, providing for cases of domestic violence. It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfil this guarantee. They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which required the federal government to interfere. But Congress thought otherwise, and no doubt wisely; and by-the act of February 28, 1795, provided, that, " in case of an insurrection .in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such.insurrection."
By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the, government cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. If t..iere is an armed conflict, like the one of which we are speak-, ing, it is a case of domestic violence, and one of the parties must be in insurrection against the lawful government. And the President .must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed upon him by the act of Congress.
After the President has acted and called out the militia, is a Circuit Court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right ? Could the court, while the parties were actually contending in arms for the.possession of the government, call witnesses before it and inquire which party represented a majority of the people ? If it could, then it would become the duty of the court (provided it came to the conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly) to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the. troops in the service of the United States or the government which the President was endeavouring to maintain. If the judicial power extends soJhx^-the guarantee.. contained in the (Jonstiñítimi-of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order. Yet ifthis right doesTioTresicie in The, courts when the conflict is raging, if thppñhcial power is at that time bound to follow the, decision_Qf the political, it must be equally bound wheiT~ the contest is overi It cannot, when peace is restored, punish as offences and crimes the acts which it before recognized, and was bound to recognize, as lawful.
It is true that in this case the militia were not called out by the President. But upon the application of the governor under the charter government, the President recognized him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his authority if it should be found necessary for the general government to interfere; and it is admitted in the argument, that it was the knowledge of this decision that put an end to the armed opposition to the charter government, and prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed constitution.. The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his. determination, was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders. And it should be equally authoritative. Tor certainly no court of the United States, with a knowledge of this decision, would have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful government; or in treating as wrongdoers or insurgents . the officers of the governihent which the President had' recognized/and was prepared to support by an armed force. In the case of foreign nations, the government acknowledged by the President is always recognized in the courts of justice. And this principle has been applied by the act of Congress to the sovereign States of the Union.
It' is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may be abused. All power may be abused if. placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power would be more safe, arid at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of the same State are in arms against each other, and the constituted authorities unable to execute the laws, the interposition of the United States must be prompt, or it is of little value. The ordinary course of proceedings in courts of justice would be utterly unfit for the crisis. And the elevated office of the President, chosen as he is by the people of the United States, and the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when acting in a case of so much moment, appear to furnish as strong safeguards against a wilful abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could well provide. At all events, it is conferred upon him' by the Constitution and laws of the United States,, and must therefore be resDected and enforced in its judicial tribunals.
. A question very similar to this arose in the case of Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29-31. The first clause of the first section of the act of February 28, 1795, of which we have been speaking, authorizes the President to call out the militia to repel in-vasión. It is the second clause in the same, section which authorizes the call to suppress an insurrection against a Slate government. The power given tp - the President in each case is the same, — with this difference only, that it cannot be exercised by him in the latter case, except upon the application of the legislature or executive of the State. The case above mentioned arose out of a call made by the President, by virtue of the power conferred by the first clause ; and the court' said, that, " whenever a statute gives a discretionary power tó any person to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." The grounds upon which that opinion is-maintained-are set forth' in the report, and we think are conclusive. The same principle applies to the case how before the court.. .Undoubtedly, rf the President in exercising this power shall fall into error, or invade the rights of. the people of the State, it would be in the power of Congress to apply the proper remedy. But the courts must administer the law as they find it.f
The remaining question is whether the defendants, acting under military-orders issued under the authority of the government, were justified in breaking and entering the plaintiff's house. In relation to the act of the legislature declaring martial law, it is not necessary in the case before us to inquire to what extent, nor under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State. Unquestionably a military government, established as the permanent government of the State, would' not be a republican government, and it would be ttie duty of Congress to overthrow it,. . But the- law of "Rhode"Island evidently contemplated no such..government. It whs intended merelyTdr the crisis, and to meet the peril in which the existing government was placed by the armed resistance to its authority. It was so understood and construed by the State, authorities. And, unquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other- government. The State itself must determine what degree of-force the crisis demands. Andif the government, of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified throughout^ the Stqt.e, as to require the use of its military force and the~deciara-' tion of martial law, we see no ground unon which this court can question its authority. It was a state of war; and the established government resorted to the rights and- usages of war to maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition. And •in that state of things the officers engaged in its military ser vice might lawfully arrest any one, who, from the .information before them, they had reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection; and might order a house to be forcibly entered and searched, when- there were reasonable grounds for supposing he might be there concealed. Without thq power to do this, martial law and the military array of the government would be mere parade, and rather encourage attack than repel it. No more force, however, can be used than is necessary to accomplish the object. -And if the. power is exercised for the purposes of oppression, or any injury wilfully done to person or property; the party by whom, or by whose order, it is committed would undoubtedly be answerable.
We forbear to remark upon the cases referred to in the argument, in relation to the commissions anciently issued by the kings of England to commissioners, to proceed against certain descriptions of persons in certain places by the law martial. These commissions were issued by the king at his pleasure, without the concurrence or authority of Parliament, and were often abused for the most despotic and oppressive purposes. They were used before the regal power of England was well defined, and were finally abolished and prohibited by the peti-' tion of right in the reign of Charles the First. But they bear no analogy in any respect to the declaration of martial law by the legislative authority of the~State, made for the purposes of self-defence, when assailed by an armed force; and the cases and commentaries concerning these commissions cannot, therefore, influence the construction of the Rhode Island law, nor furnish any test of the lawfulness of the authority exercised by the government.
' Upon the whole, we see -no reason for disturbing the judgment of the Circuit Court. The admission of evidence to prove that the charter government was the established government of the State was.an irregularity, but is not material to the judgment. - A Circuit Court of the United States sitting in Rhode Island is presumed" to know, the constitution and law of the State. And in order to make up its opinion upon that subject, it seeks information from any authentic and available source, without waiting for the formal introduction of testimony to prove- it, and' without- confining itself to the process which the parties mar^ offer. But this error of the- Circuit Court does not affect the result. For whether this evidence was or was not received, the Circuit Court, for the reasons herein before stated, was bound to recognize that government as the paramount ,and established authority of the State.
Much of the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned upon political rights and political questions, upon which the court has been urged to express an opinion. 'We decline doing so. The high power has been conferred on this court of. passing judgment upon the acts of the State sovereignties, and of the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, and of determining whether they are beyond the limits of power marked out for them, respectively by the Constitution of the United States. This tribunal, therefore, should be the last to overstep the boundaries which limit its own jurisdiction.' And while it should always be ready to meet any question confided to it by the Constitution, it is equally its duty' not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly belong to other forums. No one, we believe, has ever doubted the, proposition, that, according to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and "change their form of government at tneir own pleasure"; But whether they have changed it or not by abolishing an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.
The judgment of the Circuit Court must therefore be affirmed.
Rachel Luther v. Luther M. Borden et al.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court. This case has been sent here under a certificate of division from the Circuit Court for the District of. Rhode Island. It appears, on the face of the record^ that the. division was merely formal, and that the whole case has been transferred to this court, and a multitude of points (twenty-nine in number) presented for its decision. We have repeatedly decided that this mode of proceeding is not warranted by' the act of Congress, authorizing the justices of a Circuit Court to certify to the Supreme Court a question of law which arose at the trial, and upon which they differed in opinion. And many cases in which, like the present one, the whole case was certified, have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The same disposition must be made of this! The material points, however, have been decided in the case of Martin Luther against the same defendants, in which the opinion of this court' has been just delivered, and which was regularly brought up by writ of error upon the judgment of the Circuit Court. The case before us depends mainly upon the same principles, and, indeed, grew out of the same transaction; and the parties will understand the judgment of this court upon all the material points certified, . from the opinion it has already given in ihe case referred to.
This case is removed to the Circuit Court.
Martin Luther v. Luther M. Borden et au.