Case Name: UPHAUS v. WYMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1959-06-08
Citations: 360 U.S. 72
Docket Number: No. 34
Parties: UPHAUS v. WYMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
Judges: with whom The. Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join, dissenting.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 360
Pages: 72–108

Head Matter:
UPHAUS v. WYMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
No. 34.
Argued November 17-18, 1958.
Decided June 8, 1959.
Royal W. France and Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Hugh H. Bownes and Victor Rabinowitz.
~ Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General of New Hampshire, argued the cause for appellee.. With him on the brief was Dort S. Bigg.
Nathan Witt and John M. Coe- filed a brief for the National Lawyers Guild, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.

Opinion:
Mr; Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here again on appeal from a judgment of civil contempt entered against appellant by the Merrimack County Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. It arises out of appellant's refusal to produce certain documents before a New Hampshire legislative investigating committee which was authorized and directed to determine, inter alia, whether there were subversive persons or organizations present in the State of New Hampshire. Upon the first appeal from the New Hampshire court, 100 N. H. 436, 130 A. 2d 278, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case to it, 355 U. S. 16, for consideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957). That court reaffirmed its former decision, 101 N. H. 139, 136 A. 2d 221, deeming Sweezy not to control the issues in the instant case. For' reasons which will appear, we agree with the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
As in Sweezy, the Attorney General of New Hampshire, who had been constituted a one-man legislative investigating committee by Joint Resolution of the Legislature, was conducting a probe of subversive activities in the State. In the course of his invéstigation the Attorney General called appellant, Executive Director of World Fellowship, Inc., a voluntary corporation organized under the laws of New Hampshire and maintaining a súmmer camp in the State. Appellant testified concerning his own activities, but refused to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum which called for the production of certain corporate records for the .years 1954 and 1955. Tb. information sought consisted of: (1) a list of the names of all the camp's nonprofessional employees for those two summer seasons; (2) the correspondence which appellant had carried on with and concerning those persons who came to the camp as speakers; and (3) the names of all persons who attended the camp during the same periods of time. Met with appellant's refusal, the Attorney General, in accordance with state procedure, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 491, § 19, 20, petitioned the Merrimack County Court to call appellant before it and require compliance with the subpoenas.
In court, appellant again refused to produce the information. He claimed that by the Smith Act, as con strued by this Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 (1956), Congress had so completely occupied the field of subversive activities that the States were without'power to investigate in that area. Additionally, he contended that the Due Process Clause precluded enforcement of the subpoenas, .first, because the resolution under which the Attorney General was authorized to operate whs vague and, second, because the documents sought were not relevant to the inquiry. Finally, appellant argued that enforcement would violate his rights of free speech and association.
The Merrimack County Court sustained appellant's objection to the production of the names of the nonprofessional employees. The Attorney General took no appeal from that ruling, and it is not before us. Appellant's objections to the production of the names of the camp's guests were overruled, and he was ordered to produce them: Upon his refusal, he was adjudged in contempt of court and ordered committed to jail until he should- have complied with the court order. On the demand for the correspondence and the objection thereto, the trial court made no ruling but transferred the question to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. That court affirmed the trial court's action in regard to the guest list. Concerning the requested production of the correspondence, the Supreme Court entered no order, but directed that on remand the trial court "may exercise its discretion with respect to the entry of an order to enforce the command of the subpoena for the production of correspondence." 100 N. H., at 448, 130 A. 2d, at 287. Ño remand having yet been effected, the trial court has not acted upon this phase of the case, and there is no final judgment requiring the appellant to produce the letters. We therefore do not treat with that question. 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-124 (1945). We now pass to a consideration of the sole question before us, namely, the validity of the order of contempt for refusal to produce.the list of guests at World Fellowship, Inc., during the summer seasons of 1954 and 1955. In addition to the arguments appellant made to the trial court, he urges here that the "indefinite sentence" imposed upon him constitutes such cruel and unusual punishment as to be a denial of 'due process.
Appellant vigorously contends that the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951 and the resolution creating the committee have been superseded by the Smith Act, as amended. In support of this position appellant cites Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra. The argument is that Nelson, which involved a prosecution under a state sedition law, held that "Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition." This rule of decision, it is contended, should embrace legislative investigations made pursuant to an effort by the Legislature to inform itself of the presence of subversives within the State and possibly to enact laws in the subversive field. The appellant's argument sweeps too broad. In Nelson itself wé said that the "precise holding of the court , . . is that the Smith Act . . . which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribed the same conduct." (Italics supplied.) 350 U. S., at 499. The basis of Nelson thus rejects the notion that it stripped the States of the right to protect themselves. All the opinion proscribed was a race between federal and state prosecutors to the courthouse door. The opinion made clear that a State could proceed with prosecutions for sedition against the State itself; that it can legitimately investigate in this area follows a fortiori. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, where the same contention was made as to the identical state Act, it was denied sub silentio. Nor did our opinion in Nelson hold that the Smith Act had proscribed state activity in protection of itself either from actual or threatened "sabotage of attempted violence of all kinds." In footnote 8 of the opinion it is pointed out that the State had full power to deal .with internal civil disturbances. Thus registration statutes, quo warranto proceedings as to subversive corporations, the subversive instigation of riots and a host of other subjects directly affecting state security furnish grist for the State's legislative mill. Moreover, the right of the State to require the production of corporate papers of a state-chartered corporation in an inquiry to determine whether corporate activity is violative of state policy is, of course, not touched upon in Nelson and today stands unimpaired, either by the Smith Act or the Nelson opinion.
Appellant's other objections can. be capsuled into the single question of whether New Hampshire, under the facts here,' is precluded from, compelling the production of the documents by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let us first clear away some of the underbrush necessarily surrounding the case because of its setting.
First, the academic and political freedoms discussed in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, are not present here in the same degree, since World Fellowship is neither a university nor a political party. Next, since questions concerning the authority of the committee to act as it did are questions of state law, Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 84 (1902), we accept as controlling the New Hampshire Supreme Court's conclusion that "[t]he legislative history makes it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it [the Legislature] did and does desire an answer to these, questions." 101 N. H., at 140, 136 A. 2d, at 221-222. Finally, we assume, without deciding* that Uphaus had sufficient standing to assert any. rights of the guests whose identity the committee seeks to determine. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). The interest of the guests at World Fellowship in their associational privacy having been asserted, we have for decision the federal question of whether the public interests overbalance these conflicting private ones. Whether there was "justification" for the production order turns on the "substantiality" of New Hampshire's interests in obtaining the identity of the guests when weighed against the individual interests which the- appellant asserts. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, supra.
What was the interest of the State? - The Attorney General was commissioned to determine if there were any subversive persons within New Hampshire. . The obvious starting point of such an inquiry was to learn what persons were within the State.- It is therefore clear that the requests relate directly to the Legislature's area of interest, i. e., the presence of subversives in the State, as announced in its resolution. Nor was the demand of the subpoena burdensome; as to time, only a few months of each of the two years were involved; as to place, only the camp conducted by the Corporation; nor as to the lists of names, which included about 300 each year.
Moreover, the Attorney General had valid.reason to believe that the speakers and guests at World Fellowship might be subversive persons within the meaning of the.New Hampshire Act. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found Uphaus' contrary position "unrelated to reality." Although the evidence as to the nexus between World Fellowship and subversive activities may not be conclusive, we believe it sufficiently relevant to support the Attorney General's action. The New Hampshire definition of subversive persons was born of the legislative determination that the Communist movement posed a serious threat to the security of the State. The record reveals that appellant had participated in "Communist front" activities and that "[n]ot less than nineteen speakers invited by Uphaus to talk at World Fellowship had either been members of the Communist Party or had connections or affiliations with it or with one or more of the organizations cited as subversive or Communist controlled in the United States Attorney General's list." 100 N. H., at 442, 130 A. 2d, at 283. While the Attorney General's list is designed for the limited purpose of determining' fitness for federal employment, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), and guilt by association remains a thoroughly discredited doctrine, it is with a legislative investigation — not a criminal prosecution— that we deal here. Certainly the investigatory power of the State need not be constricted until, sufficient evidence of subversion is gathered to justify the institution of criminal proceedings.
The nexus between World Fellowship and subvérsive activities disclosed by the record furnished adequate justification for the investigation we here review. The Attorney General sought to learn if subversive persons were in the State because of the legislative determination that such persons, statutorily defined with a view toward the Communist Party, posed a serious threat to the security of the State. The investigation was, therefore, undertaken in the interest of self-preservation, "the ultimate value of any society," Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 509, (1951). This governmental interest outweighs individual rights in an associational privacy which, however real in other circumstances, cf. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, supra, were here tenuous at best. The camp was operating as a public one, furnishing both board and lodging to persons applying therefor-. As to them, New Hampshire law requires that World Fellowship, Inc., maintain a register, open to inspection of sheriffs and police officers. It is contended that the list might be "circulated throughout the states and the Attorney Generals throughout the states have cross-indexed - files, so that -any guest whose name is mentioned in that kind of proceeding immediately becomes suspect, even in his own place of residence." Record, p. 7. The record before us, however, only reveals -a report to the Legislature of New Hampshire made by the Attorney General in accordance with the requirements of the resolution. We recognize; of course, that compliance with the subpoena will result in exposing the fact that the persons therein named were guests at World Fellowship. But so long as a committee must report to its legislative parent, exposure — in the' sense of disclosure — is an inescapable incident of an investigation into th.e presence of subversive persons within a State. And the governmental interest in self-preservation is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in associational privacy of persons who, at least to the extent of the guest registration statute, made public .at the inception the association they now wish to keep private. In the light of such a record we conclude that the State's interest has not been "pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come into fatal collision with the overriding" constitutionally protected rights of appellant and those he may represent. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307 (1940).
We now reach the question of the validity of the sentence. The judgment of contempt orders the appellant confined until he produces the documents called for in the subpoenas. He himself admitted to the court that although they were at hand, not only had he failed to bring them with him to court, but that, further, he had no intention of producing them. In view of appellant's unjustified refusal we think the order a proper one. As was said in Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 197 (1958) (dissenting opinion):
"Before going any further, perhaps it should be emphasized that we are not at all concerned with the power of courts to impose conditional imprison-. ment for the purpose of compelling a person to obey a valid order; Such coercion, where the defendant carries the keys to freedom in his willingness to comply with the court's directive, is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees."
We have concluded that the committee's demand for the documents was a legitimate one; it follows that the judgment of contempt for refusal to produce them is valid; We do not impugn appellant's good faith in the assertion of what he believed to be his rights. But three courts have disagreed with him in interpreting those rights. If appellant chooses to abide by the result of the adjudication and obey the order of New Hampshire's courts, he need not face jail. If, however, he continues to disobey, we find on this record no constitutional objection to the exercise of the traditional remedy of contempt to secure compliance.
Affirmed.
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened:
"That the attorney general is hereby authorized and directed to make full and complete investigation with respect to violations of the subversive activities act of 1951 and to determine whether subversive persons as defined in said act are presently located within this state. . . N. H. Laws, 1953, c. 307.
The investigation authorized by this resolution was continued by N. H. Laws, 1955, c. 197.
18 U. S. C. §2385 (1956).
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1955, c. 588, § 1-16.
Note 2, supra.
Note 1, supra.
Section 1 of the Subversive Activities Act, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1955, c. 588, § 1-16, defines "subversive person":
" 'Subversive person' .means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the. commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches, by .any means any person to éommit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the state of New Hampshire,- or any' political subdivision of either of theni, by force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive' organization or a foreign subversive organization."
Since 1927, there has been in effect the following statute in New 'Hampshire:
"All hotel keepers and all persons keeping public lodging houses, tourist camps, or cabins shall keep- a book or card system and cause each guest to sign therein his own legal name or name by which he is commonly known. Said book or card system shall at all times be open to the inspection of the sheriff or his deputies and to any police officer. . . ." N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1955, c. 353, § 3.
The Attorney General represents that the public camp of World Fellowship, Inc., is clearly within the purview of this statute. Although the lists sought were more extensive than those required by the statute, it appears that most of the names were recorded pursuant to it.