Case Name: Robert S. HART et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. HARDGRAVE et ux., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1958-03-25
Citations: 103 So. 2d 910
Docket Number: No. 8797
Parties: Robert S. HART et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. HARDGRAVE et ux., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 103
Pages: 910–921

Head Matter:
Robert S. HART et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. HARDGRAVE et ux., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 8797.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
March 25, 1958.
On Rehearing June 20, 1958.
Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Trichel & Johnson, Shreveport, for appellants.
Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, Shreveport, for appellees.

Opinion:
HARDY, Judge.
This is a suit for the recovery of damages resulting from an automobile collision between a 1955 Chevrolet automobile owned by Continental Supply Division, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, driven by Robert S. Hart, and a 1954 Chevrolet automobile owned by James E. Hardgrave and driven by his wife, Myrtle D. Hardgrave. The plaintiffs are Hart, Continental Supply and the latter's workmen's compensation insurer, Consolidated Underwriters. Named as defendants are James E. and Myrtle D. Hardgrave, husband and wife. Plaintiff, Hart, sought judgment in the sum of $9,500, representing damages for alleged pain and suffering, past and future, disfigurement and possible impairment of earning capacity. Plaintiff, Continental Supply, prayed for judgment in the sum of $579.77, representing damage to its Chevrolet automobile, which amount was stipulated by counsel, on trial, as the correct estimate of damage. Consolidated Underwriters prayed for the recovery of $55 as medical expenses, an additional sum of $245 allegedly paid as a compromise of plaintiff's compensation claim, together with $20 as cost of effecting the settlement of said claim.
From a judgment in favor of defendants rejecting plaintiffs' demands, all plaintiffs have appealed.
In this court defendants-appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, in which pleading they alternatively asked that the case be remanded to the district court.
We proceed first to a consideration of defendants' motion, which is predicated upon allegations of fact incorporated therein setting forth that in a civil action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division, these defendants, James E. Hard-grave and Myrtle D. Hardgrave, as plaintiffs, in an action against Consolidated Underwriters as liability insurer of Robert S. Hart, recovered judgment in the principal sum of $13,500, which judgment was subsequently compromised and settled, and, as a consequence, the said action in Federal Court, on joint motion of counsel, was ordered dismissed with full prejudice to all claims of the said plaintiffs arising from the automobile collision which is the basis of the suit now under consideration by this court, on appeal.
First, it is to be observed that the factual allegations which are the basis of defendants' motion are not controverted and therefore must be accepted as true. Carpenter v. Madden, 233 La. 840, 98 So.2d 209; Carpenter v. Madden, La.App., 94 So.2d 699; Attaway v. Melton, La.App., 88 So.2d 417; State ex rel. Payne v. Irion, 163 La. 1019, 113 So. 360.
Defendant's motion, which is in effect a plea of res judicata based upon a settlement in accord and satisfaction of a judgment with one of these plaintiffs, could not, under any possible theory, be considered as binding upon the other plaintiffs in this action^who were-not j>arties.-to_the suit _jn_ the Federal Court. However, as against the plaintiff, Consolidated Underwriters, we think the plea of res judicata is good, for the motion to -dismiss specifically evidences the intention of the parties thereto to terminate all disputes between them, arising from or growing out of the automobile collision of September 10, 1955, which is the basis of the present action. Our conclusion might be otherwise if Consolidated Underwriters, one of the plaintiffs in the instant case, had prayed for payment of its claim by preference and priority out of any amount awarded in favor of the plaintiff, Hart, For this relief, however, the plaintiff, Consolidated Underwriters, did not pray, but, to the contrary, it prayed for judgment against the defendants for the principal sum of $320. In view of the settlement of all claims as between Consolidated Underwriters and these defendants it is quite evident that the rights of these parties as between one another have been finally adjudicated and such adjudication has been fully satisfied.
For these reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal, insofar as it is directed against the plaintiffs, Hart and Continental Supply, is overruled. As to the plaintiff, Consolidated Underwriters, the motion to dismiss the appeal is sustained.
The accident occurred about mid-afternoon of September 10, 1955, on Highway No. 1 which is also known as North Market Street, just outside the limits of the City of Shreveport, at the point of intersection of a cross-over connecting the two paved lanes of- the highway designated for northbound traffic with similar lanes for the accommodation of southbound traffic. The cross-over between the twelve or fourteen feet neutral space between the lanes of traffic is located opposite a gasoline service station on the west side of the highway. At the time of the collision the defendant, Mrs. Hardgrave, was driving her car north, followed by the car driven by Hart proceeding in the same direction. Hart had turned into the inside northbound traffic lane some two blocks south of the point of collision. Plaintiff, Hart, alleged and testified that as he proceeded northbound on the inside traffic lane of the highway he overtook the Hardgrave car, which was moving north in the outside or easternmost lane of travel; that he signaled his intention of passing by blowing his horn, despite which, when he was within a few feet of the rear of the Hardgrave car, the driver thereof, Mrs. Hardgrave, turned her vehicle to the left immediately into the said plaintiff's lane of travel; that in a vain effort to avoid the collision he turned his car sharply to the right, striking the left rear of the Hardgrave car with the right front of his vehicle; that he was thrown forcibly against the steering wheel and dash of .his car, lost control thereof, and the vehicle came to rest against a cyclone fence enclosing private property on the east side of the highway at a point established to have been some 150 feet, more or less, from the point of impact.
In direct contradiction of plaintiff's version of the occurrence Mrs. Hardgrave testified that she was proceeding in the left lane for a distance of approximately a block and a half before reaching the crossover, during which time she signaled by the use of her directional blinker lights the intention of making a left turn, and that her automobile was struck forcibly in the rear before she made any actual turning movement off of the highway.
Certain material facts, fortunately, were definitely established, namely, that Mrs. Hardgrave suffers from partial deafness and that she never did at any time observe the approach of Hart's automobile from the rear.
The testimony of a State Trooper, who investigated the accident within a few minutes time after its actual occurrence, located the point of impact as being near the center of the northbound highway lanes, which point was established by the tire marks of the Hardgrave car which was moved some twenty feet north and turned completely around by the force of the impact and came to rest in the neutral ground, just to the west of the northbound traffic lanes, facing south.
The Trooper further testified that after the accident he questioned both parties, but this is squarely denied by Mrs. Hardgrave, who testified on trial that her only conversation with the Trooper occurred after she was removed to the P. & S. Hospital in Shreveport. In this connection it is pertinent to note that Mrs. Hardgrave's testimony on trial substantially differs in a num ber of material particulars with a question and answer statement which she gave to the insurance investigator two days following the accident. This question and answer statement was transcribed by Mr. Ray J. Hanrahan, a court reporter, whose testimony on trial verified the transcript.
Adverting to the charges and counter-charges of negligence between the parties as specified in their pleadings, it is noted that plaintiff alleged negligence against Mrs. Hardgrave in that (a) she turned to the left across the highway without giving adequate signal of her intention; (b) she failed to observe traffic to her rear before making a left turn; (c) she attempted to make a left turn from the outermost right hand lane; (d) she failed to have her automobile under proper control, and (e) she failed to heed the warning given by Hart of his intention to pass.
Without the necessity for detailed discussion we conclude that the charges identified under (a), (b), (c) and (e) were adequately established. The testimony of the State trooper with reference to the tire marks of the Hardgrave car definitely fixes the position of the said vehicle in or near the center of the highway and not in the inside westerly lane as testified by Mrs. Hardgrave. The testimony of Mrs. Hardgrave herself is positive that though she made observation to her rear she did not see the approaching Hart car and did not know of its presence until the occurrence of the collision. No reason can be ascertained which would explain Mrs. Hardgrave's failure to perceive the approach of the Hart vehicle if, indeed, she attempted to make observation to her rear, and it follows that she was guilty of negligence in not seeing that which could and should have been seen. The conclusion that Mrs. Hardgrave turned to her left from the outside lane is justified by the clear testimony of the plaintiff, Hart, on this point, corroborated by the physical evidence of the tire marks to which reference has been made above. Unquestionably, Mrs. Hardgrave failed to hear the horn signal which Hart testified he gave prior to making the attempt to pass and this failure is clearly accounted for by Mrs. Hardgrave's infirmity of hearing.
Defendant's answer charged Hart with negligence in (a) driving at an excessive, etc. speed in a congested area; (b) failing to keep a proper lookout; (c) failing to heed the signals for a left turn; (d) driving at a speed in which he was unable to stop and avoid injury and damage; (e) failing to brake or slow his vehicle in time to avoid the accident, and (f) failing to turn his car to the extreme right where he had ample room to pass defendant's car.
After careful examination of the record we cannot find that any of these charges have been acceptably established. It was not shown that Hart's speed was excessive or dangerous. The only testimony as to speed is of that of Hart, who asserted he was driving about 35 miles per hour. An attempt was made on the part of other witnesses to estimate the speed on the basis of the apparent violence of the impact but this inexpert opinion evidence failed to carry any substantial weight. It is true the State Trooper testified that the area in which the accident occurred was regarded as a congested area within which a speed above 35 miles would be considered dangerous. Despite this testimony we find nothing in the record which is sufficient to establish the slightest basis for a conclusion that the speed of Hart's automobile had any connection with the accident. It is further to be noted that, insofar as is established by the record, the legal speed at the point and at the time of the accident was fixed at 60 miles per hour. Finally, we are convinced that the speed of the Hart vehicle at the time could not be concluded as having exceeded the possible brackets of 35 to 40 miles per hour. The mere fact that the Hart car traveled some 150 feet following the impact is indicative of nothing in this connection, for the driver was incapacitated and the car was completely out of control. There is not the slightest ground for the charge that Hart was careless in his ob servation or that he failed to heed the signals for a left turn. On this latter point there is considerable doubt by reason of the conflict between Mrs. Hardgrave'9 sworn testimony and her transcribed statement as to when and where she actually attempted to signal for a left turn, for, in the statement to which reference is made, she repeatedly declared that she applied her brakes and put on her blinker lights just as she was turning at the intersection of the cross-over. These statements are irreconcilable with her sworn testimony. Finally, we think Hart's testimony, substantiated by the location of the points of physical damage to the cars involved, establishes his effort, by turning, to attempt to avoid the collision. Due to the negligent actions of the driver of the Hardgrave car this action was futile.
Defendants filed supplemental and amended answer in which they added an additional charge of negligence against plaintiff, Hart, on the ground that he was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, etc. The charge of intoxication against the plaintiff, Hart, is completely unsupported by proof and deserves no further consideration nor comment.
Upon the basis of our evaluation of the established facts we are firm in the opinion that the collision was due solely and directly to the negligence of the defendant, Myrtle D. Hardgrave.
As has been noted above, the amount of the claim of plaintiff, Continental Supply, for damages to its automobile was stipulated in the sum of $579.77 and judgment should be entered accordingly.
The grounds upon which plaintiff, Hart, bases his claims for damages were itemized in his petition as follows:
"Pain and suffering in the past $2,500.00 Pain and suffering in the future 1,000.00 Disfigurement 1,000.00 Possible impairment of earning capacity 5,000.00 $9,500.00" Total
Except for the barest possible suspicion of evidence the record before us is utterly devoid of anything remotely approaching acceptable proof which would sustain plaintiff's claims for future pain and suffering, disfigurement or possible impairment of earning capacity, and as a result we think any detailed discussion of these items would be in the nature of academic exercise.
The only item upon which plaintiff has offered any reasonable evidence relates to his pain and suffering following the accident. Fortunately, the injuries inflicted were neither severe nor serious. Following the accident plaintiff was removed to the Confederate Memorial Hospital where he was given first-aid treatment; he was then removed to the P. & S. Hospital, where he was treated by Dr. E. T. Hilton. With reference to plaintiff's injuries Dr. Hilton testified:
"A. He had lacerations on the left side of the forehead and had some contusions over the ribs on the right side of the chest.
"Q. What did you do for him? A. We sutured the head wound and taped his chest up and kept him in the hospital overnight for observation in case of a brain concussion.
"Q. Was he released the following day? A. He was, yes, sir.
"Q. You didn't find any evidence of a brain concussion thereafter, did you ? A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you see him after that, Dr. Hilton ? A. One week later I saw him in the office to take his stitches out.
"Q. Had the wounds recovered at that time on the head? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was the condition of the ribs? A. He was complaining of no pain — ."
The witness could not testify positively that plaintiff's chest was taped at the time he removed the stitches from the head wound.
Plaintiff testified that he suffered pain for "a long time"; that his chest was taped for about thirty days; that his forehead was bandaged for twelve days, and that though he lost no time from work his discomfort lasted for a period of "around 70 days" during which time he had to be assisted in his work by the warehouse employees of his company and by his customers.
On the basis of the above skeletal testimony we can only conclude that plaintiff's injuries were minimal and his recovery in the nature of damages should be limited to a nominal figure, which we fix in the amount of $500.
For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is annulled and set aside.
Defendant's motion to dismiss, insofar as it is directed against the plaintiff, Consolidated Underwriters, is sustained and there is judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, Consolidated Underwriters dismissing the demands of said plaintiff.
On the merits it is ordered that there be judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Robert S. Hart, and against the defendants, James E. Hardgrave and Mrytle D. Hard-grave, in solido, in the sum of $500 with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per an-num from date of judicial demand until paid.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Continental Supply Division, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, and against the defendants, James E. Hardgrave and Myrtle D. Hardgrave, in solido, in the sum of $579.77 with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from date of judicial demand until paid.
It is further ordered that costs of this appeal be and they are taxed against plaintiff-appellant, Consolidated Underwriters, and all other costs are assessed against defendants-appellees.