Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Milton PRATER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-09-13
Citations: 337 So. 2d 1107
Docket Number: No. 57586
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Milton PRATER.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 337
Pages: 1107–1111

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Milton PRATER.
No. 57586.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 13, 1976.
Lyall G. Shiell, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
Milton Prater was charged by bill of information with the distribution of heroin, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. After trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged and was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, he relies upon two assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury that, in the event defendant was found guilty of distribution of heroin, a mandatory life sentence would be imposed. Defendant argues that justice requires the jury be informed of this mandatory penalty so that they would give "more careful consideration to their verdict."
There is no merit to this contention. Under our law, the jury in a criminal case is the judge of the law and facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by the court. La.Code Crim.P. art. 802. Upon a verdict of guilty, the sentence is imposed by the court on the defendant. Id. art. 871.
Our jurisprudence is uniform in holding that the imposition of sentence or the fixing of the punishment for conviction is solely within the province of the judge and is not a function of the jury which is concerned only with the determination of guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Blackwell, 298 So.2d 798 (La.1974); State v. Lewis, 296 So.2d 824 (La.1974); State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So.2d 847 (1971); State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867 (1967); State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So.2d 571 (1963). Likewise, we have held that sentence regulations, such as those relating to mandatory terms, form no part of the applicable law for the judge's charge to the jury. State v. Harris, supra; State v. Green, supra. In other jurisdictions where the jury determines only guilt or innocence and the court imposes the penalty as in Louisiana, it is not error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury on possible penalties. The general view is that penalty is simply of no concern to the jury. State v. Blackwell, supra, and authorities cited therein.
Accordingly, we do not find that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the penalty that would be imposed by the court on the defendant in the event of his conviction of the crime charged. This assignment of error is without substance.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in overruling his objection to the testimony of Detective Branham that he "observed between 12:35 and 2:50 numerous transactions take place" at the location where the officer had defendant under surveillance immediately prior to his arrest. Defendant argues that there had been no foundation for this testimony and that it was ambiguous. He further submits that the testimony was particularly prejudicial in view of the fact that there was no evidence of the sale or distribution of heroin by him other than the testimony of Edward Prevost, a well-known police character who had been promised immunity.
We find no substance to this contention. Detective Branham, a police officer for ten years, testified as to his surveillance of defendant. He described what he saw prior to, during and after the offense here charged. In our view, he had sufficient experience and knowledge of narcotics transactions to express an opinion that he observed "numerous transactions."
As a general rule, a witness is ordinarily incompetent to give opinion testimony. La.R.S. 15:463 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the witness can testify only as to facts within his knowledge, and neither as to any recital of facts heard by him, nor as to any impression or opinion that he may have.
It is nonetheless well settled that, in exception to the rule of La.R.S. 15:463, a witness may state a natural inference from facts that he had observed. However, it is necessary that the witness state the basic facts upon which the inference was based. State v. Rogers, 324 So.2d 403 (La.1975); State v. Davalie, 313 So.2d 587 (La.1975); State v. Lewis, 288 So.2d 324 (La.1974).
Furthermore, the testimony of Edward Prevost was not the only testimony at trial of the commission of the offense. Deandrea Sutherland, a companion of Pre-vost, described how she and Prevost bought heroin from the accused at the time in question. Officer William Schultz likewise testified that he watched the sale of heroin to Prevost and Sutherland by the defendant.
In sum, we find no merit in this assignment of error.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DENNIS and DIXON, JJ., dissent.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Assignment of Error No. 3 was specifically abandoned in brief.