Case Name: BEDFORD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-02-22
Citations: 238 S.W. 224
Docket Number: No. 6695
Parties: BEDFORD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 238
Pages: 224–226

Head Matter:
BEDFORD v. STATE.
(No. 6695.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 22, 1922.
Rehearing Denied March 15, 1922.)
1. Forgery <&wkey;28(4) — Motion to quash where charging part of indictment called forged trust “deed,” a deed, properly overruled.
Where, in the charging part of an indictment, the instrument alleged to have been forged was called a deed, but as set out in hsec. verba it was a deed of trust, a motion to quash addressed to the alleged contradictory recital was properly overruled; a trust “deed” being a deed within the definitions (citing 2 Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, p. 1919).
2. Criminal law <&wkey;598(2) — On facts showing lack of diligence in locating witness, refusal of continuance not error.
Where an indictment was returned October 30, 1920, and no subpoenas were issued or applied for until July 1, 1921, and process for defendant’s witnesses was returned unserved July 5 and July 8, but defendant located the mother of one of the witnesses on July 15, from whom he expected to learn where witness was, but no further effort was made before trial on July 18, there was such lack of diligence it was not error to deny continuance.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;597(l) — Where absent witness’ testimony would not have been believed, no error In refusing continuance.
Where the testimony expected of an absent witness appears so contrary to that given by unimpeached witnesses and so impossible of truth that if the witness were present his testimony would not be believed, there was no error in refusing continuance.
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Witnesses <&wkey;l— Right of compulsory process for witness not a matter of discretion.
The right of compulsory process for witnesses is of the Constitution, and its issuance is not a matter for the discretion with the trial court, and one who fails to follow the requirements of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 525-545, on witnesses and the manner of enforcing their attendance, must abide by the consequences.
5. Criminal law <&wkey;603(l I) — Statement, in application for continuance, that defendant made diligent inquiry to locate witness, a conclusion.
The statement, in a motion for continuance, that defendant made diligent inquiry to locate a witness, was a conclusion; a mere affirmation of diligence not being sufficient, but the facts must be set forth showing the diligence.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Harris County; C. W. Robinson, Judge.
D. L. Bedford was convicted of forgery, and he appeals'.
Affirmed.
Green & Boyd, of Houston, for appellant.
E. T. Branch, Dist. Atty., of Houston, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the criminal district court of Harris county, and his punishment fixed at five years in the penitentiary.
The conviction was for forgery. In the charging part of the indictment the instrument alleged to have been forged is called a "deed." It is set out in the indictment in lieec verba, and shows' to be a deed of trust. A motion to quash was addressed to this alleged contradictory recital of the indictment. It was properly overruled. That a written conveyance of land conveys the interest, of the grantor for the purpose of securing a debt would not prevent its being a deed within the definitions. 13 Cyc. p. 519; Lockridge v. McCommon, 90 Tex. 234, 38 S. W. 33; 2 Words and Phrases, First Series, p. 1919.
The only remaining question is the refusal of appellant's request for a continuance. Two witnesses, Maxie and Blocker, were absent. No diligence is shown. The indictment was returned October 30,-1920, and no subpoenas were issued or applied for until July 1, 1921. This appears to be appellant's first effort to obtain the testimony of said witnesses. Subpoena for Maxie was issued to Harris county, for Blocker to Navarro county. Process for both was returned not served; that for Blocker being returned on July 5th, and that for Maxie on July 8th. No alias process was secured. No reason is stated in the application for failing to further search for Maxie. It is stated that upon the return of said subpoena for Blocker, appellant made diligent inquiry as to his whereabouts. This is but a conclusion. It is further stated that on July 15th appellant located Blocker's mother at Cuney, Tex., and that he expects to learn from her where said witness is. No effort appears to communicate with said mother between July 15th and 18th, the date set for trial. Same might have resulted in locating Blocker and securing, his presence. This is clearly not diligence. Vernon's C. C. P., p. 307, for collation of authorities; Yelton v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 38, 170 S. W. 318; Brown v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 119, 22 S. W. 596.
The refusal of the continuance was made a ground of the motion for new trial. When so presented there arisesi the added questions of the likelihood that the absent witness would have testified as stated in the application for continuance, and also the question as to whether such testimony be probably true and likely to effect a result different from that attained. The testimony expected from Blocker appears so contrary to that given by unimpeached witnesses, and so impossible of truth, if theirs be true, as to seemingly justify the conclusions, if said witness was present on the trial he would not have given the testimony desired, and that, if present and so testifying, it would not have been believed.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
<&wkey;For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBEK in-all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes