Case Name: Elbert BROWN and Edith Brown, Appellants, v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.; the Celotex Corporation; Nicolet, Inc.; Gaf Corporation; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; and Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-11-01
Citations: 441 So. 2d 1098
Docket Number: No. 82-2678
Parties: Elbert BROWN and Edith Brown, Appellants, v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.; the Celotex Corporation; Nicolet, Inc.; Gaf Corporation; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; and Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Appellees.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 441
Pages: 1098–1101

Head Matter:
Elbert BROWN and Edith Brown, Appellants, v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.; the Celotex Corporation; Nicolet, Inc.; Gaf Corporation; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; and Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Appellees.
No. 82-2678.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 1, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 1983.
Frederick M. Baron and Jane N. Saginaw, Robles & Robles, and Brian Weinstein, Dallas, Tex., for appellants.
Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans and Charles P. Schropp and Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and Clark Jordan-Holmes, Tampa, Harold C. Knecht, Jr., Coral Gables, Stephens, Lynn, Chernay & Klein and Debra Levy Neimark, Kimbrell, Hamann, Jennings, Womack, Carlson & Kniskern and Michael K. McLemore, Miami, Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs and James C. Rinaman, Jacksonville, Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl and James C. Bleck, Miami, for appellees.
Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The trial court entered final summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the action, commenced July 31, 1979, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979). We reverse because there remains a material factual issue as to whether claimant, prior to July 31, 1975, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action against product manufacturers for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos. See Perez v. Universal Engineering Corp., 413 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Nolen v. Sarasohn, 379 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
In addition to the testimony upon which the dissent focuses, plaintiff also testified that he has visited physicians regularly during his adult life, in later years complaining of shortness of breath, and that he was not informed by any physician until 1979 that he suffered from an asbestos-related disease. There is no showing by the defendants that any physician could have established to a reasonable medical certainty— priorato 1979 — a cause and effect relationship between plaintiffs exposure to asbestos and his physical disability.
It is a burden of one seeking summary judgment to demonstrate conclusively the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966). On the record before us the burden is not carried.
Reversed and remanded.
. Section 95.11 provides in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.
(a) An action founded on negligence.

(e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures.
Section 95.11(3) must be read in conjunction with Section 95.031(2), which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Actions for products liability . under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3) .