Case Name: The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, appellants, v. The Central Stock-Yard and Transit Company, respondents
Court: New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1887-11
Citations: 43 N.J. Eq. 605
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, appellants, v. The Central Stock-Yard and Transit Company, respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Equity Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 605–616

Head Matter:
The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, appellants, v. The Central Stock-Yard and Transit Company, respondents.
A preliminary, mandatory injunction will be ordered only in case of extreme necessity.
On appeal-from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet, whose opinion is reported in Delaware &c. R. R. Co. v.. Central Stock-Yard Co., 16 Stew. Eq. 77.
Messrs. Bedle, Muirhead & McGee, for appellants.
From the pleadings, it will be observed that the stock-yard company admit all the equities of the bill, and deny only that they are under any duty to receive live stock from the complainants.
They especially admit:
That large numbers of dealers in live stock and meat have offices and places of business at their yards.
That cattle are sent there in all ways.
That they are there fed, watered, cared for, sold and dealt in by large numbers of dealers.
That there a large portion of the meat supplies of New York, Jersey City, Hoboken and vicinity are handled and dealt in.
And that their stock-yards furnish a large part of the live stock business done in the port of New York.-
That on Aug. 19th, 1887, they notified complainants that they would not receive live stock from them, and that they do refuse to receive any live stock transported over complainants’s roads and consigned to shippers doing business at their yards, so long as complainants do not send there all the stock they carry.
That they do receive from every other corporation and individual, and have so far not declined to receive from anybody else.
That it is their intention to prevent transportation of any live stock to their yards, coming over the railroads of the complainants, unless they will give them all their business.
They raise two questions in the answer.
1. That they have the legal right to do, and refuse to do, business with whom they please-.
2. That whatever may be their duty to shippers, they are not obliged to receive live stock from the complainants.
And, in the argument, they raise the further question that this court has no power to grant a mandatory injunction at the beginning of the suit.
I. The defendants are bound by law to receive live stock tendered to them at their yards by the complainants in any lawful manner.
In considering the questions at isspe, the court must bear in mind, therefore, that these defendants are possessed by their charter:
1. Of all the-powers of corporations generally.
2. Of the powers of railroad companies, steamboat companies and other common carriers, both by land and water.
3. Of the powers of inn-keepers.
4. Of very large public powers of a governmental nature.
5. And that they are chargeable with all the duties which these various corporations are charged with, and, besides that, with the duties which are laid upon all people who devote their property to a public use.
6. And that, by their conduct of their business, a usage has arisen to do business with the complainants and all other common carriers, to receive all live stock tendered by them, and that this usage has continued for years, and has been acted «pon and become a fixed part, and a large part of the business of the whole continent. Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 8 Vr. 531; Union L. & E. Co. v. Erie Ry. Co., 8 Vr. 23; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Chicago, Burl. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 94 U. S. 164; Chicago M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Olmsted v. Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct, 18 Vr. 311; Balt. & O. R. R. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 455; Fargo v. Redfield, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 463; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Oregon R. R. Co., 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 71; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 87; Rhodes v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 31. [Annexed to this case is a very important and valuable note on the question cf terminal facilities and discrimination, to which we particularly call the attention of the court]; McCoy v. C., 1, St. S. & C. R. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 3; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Thomp. on Carriers of Pass. 2; see Addison on Torts 494; Hawthorne v. Hammond, 1 C. & K. 404; Hull v. Jacques, 6 C. & P. 725; Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 219.
The attention of the court will no doubt be called by counsel for the stock-yard company to the Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1.
In those cases the supreme court overruled the decisions of lower courts in three cases where mandatory injunctions had been issued to compel railroad companies to carry express companies in the peculiar manner which express companies desired to be carried, namely, to take them upon passenger trains; to give them parts of cars; to carry their packages without examination, and to permit their messengers to remain in custody of the express matter, and to accompany the same. But these cases were expressly decided upon the point that not only was no usage shown to carry all express companies alike, but that a usage was shown not to do so, and that it appeared by the case that, from the inception of the express business, it had been the custom of each railroad company to carry but one express company, and give as the reason that express companies require peculiar, exclusive facilities, and that the railroad companies could not conveniently carry in that way more than one express company at a time, and that in all instances of which the court had knowledge, express companies had been carried upon express contracts made between the railroads and the express companies, and that the business was such as to make it more for the convenience of all concerned, and of the public, that it should be so, than would be the case if all companies could apply for such exclusive facilities without contract; but the case holds that the railroad companies would be bound to take from the express companies goods tendered by them in the same manner as by individuals, and there is nothing in the cases from beginning to end which is contrary to the principle contended for in the case át bar, or which overrules the principle on which the cases above cited were decided.
The status of express companies is held to be peculiar, and the only point decided is that they cannot, on general principles, demand the exclusive privileges they sought to obtain.
The case at bar differs from them in its essential character.
II. The court ought to grant a preliminary 'injunction, as-prayed in the bill.
It has the power to do so.
1. The injury threatened is real and irreparable.
2. There is no unsettled -question of law, and even if there were, the injury to complainants being irremediable, the court has power to grant the injunction asked.
3. The equities are admitted by the answer. There is no material question of fact in the case disputed.
4. Preliminary injunctions of this nature have been issued by courts of equity, generally, and by the court of chancery, and by this court whenever the right to restrain, the violation of which the injunction is asked for, is made out, and there is a present want of the use of the right.
5. The distinction between prohibitory injunctions and those that are called mandatory is very shadowy, at best, in this class of cases, and the use of terms does not affect the substance involved.
6. The relief at law is inadequate.
7. If .the injunction prayed for be refused,- this court will not be able to put the complainants, if ultimately successful, back into the position they would have occupied if their rights had not been interfered with by the defendants, and this is the test upon which the question of granting this injunction must be determined.
8. The granting of the injunction prayed will do no harm to the defendants.
9. The complainants acted promptly. Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Telephone Co., 15 Stew. Eq. 141; Whitecar v. Michenor, 10 Stew. Eq. 6; Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Ry. Co., 5 C. E. Gr. 379; Thropp v. Field, 11 C. E. Gr. 82; Longwood Valley R. R. Co. v. Baker, 12 C. E. Gr. 166; Domestic Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. Metropolitan Telephone Co., 13 Stew. Eq. 160, 13 Stew. Eq. 287; Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. 391 § 1359; Virginia Coupon Cases, 35 Fed. Rep. 654; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; Bertenshaw v. Horngrove, 7 Pac. Rep. 370; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 537; Lanier v. Allison, 31 Fed. Rep. 100.
III. A railroad company, a common carrier, may contract to forward or deliver goods beyond its own line. This is not .ultra vires. The cases are all one way in favor of this proposition. Lawson on Contracts § 334; Redfield on Carriers §§ 190-197; Hewitt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases 568.
Mr. Leon Abbett, for respondents, cited:
“Express Cases,” 117 U. S. 1; Lord v. Carbon Iron Co., 11 Stew. Eq. 452, 458, 459; Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Railway Co., 5 C. E. Gr. 379; Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R. R. Co., 3 Stew. Eq. 299; Long Branch Commissioners v. West End R. R. Co., 2 Stew. Eq. 566; West Jersey R. R. Co. v. Cape May and Schellenger's Landing R. R. Co. 7 Stew. Eq. 164; Jersey City Gas Light Co. v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 13 Stew. Eq. 431.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Beasley, C. J.
This court concurs with the vice-chancellor, that the facts exhibited in the bill of complaint will not justify the allowance, in limine, of a mandatory injunction.
The case will be found fully stated in the opinion of the vice-chancellor, upon inspection of which it will appear, in the estimation of this court, that, at the present stage of the procedure, no such pressing necessity is shown to exist, as is requisite by a rule of practice that is perfectly established, as a basis for an application for the writ that is here sought. The appellant, by its own showing, is not absolutely excluded from these stock-yards; it is only prevented from delivering its cattle there in a certain mode. At an increased expense, it can obtain access to the yards as it formerly did, and this increased expense would plainly be recoverable from the respondent, in the event of a decision against it on the general merits of the controversy. There does not seem to have been any difficulty in putting the proceeding at once on final hearing. Under such circumstances, we cannot depart from the settled course of practice.
Let the decree be affirmed.