Case Name: J. W. Howell v. E. G. Hanrick
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1895-02-07
Citations: 88 Tex. 383
Docket Number: No. 169
Parties: J. W. Howell v. E. G. Hanrick.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 383–413

Head Matter:
J. W. Howell v. E. G. Hanrick.
No. 169.
1. Spanish Grant—Erasures and Interlineations.
The penalty of nullity did not attach to erasures and interlineations appearing in a Spanish grant for land in Texas made in 1833, except where the same were not noted at the foot of the instrument before it was signed by the officer. Where this was done, the instrument was valid............. 392
2. Construction of Grant.
The title in evidence showed the concession to Aguirre, also the.application for survey, the permission to locate, and the field notes; the protocol reciting, that the grant is made in pursuance of the concession. This showed title in Aguirre, although in the final title it is stated, that “possession is given and title conferred upon Valdez.” The mistake is evident, and does not vitiate the title of Aguirre ...................................... 393
3. Withdrawal of Evidence by the Charge.
The withdrawal or limiting of the effect to be given to immaterial evidence which might properly have been excluded from the jury, is no grounds for complaint. It is not charging upon the weight of evidence. See example. 393
4. Burden of Proof—Ancient Instrument.
The title paper produced in evidence by plaintiff was a certified copy of the original, an archive in the Land Office—an ancient instrument. It was attacked for forgery. The paper being competent without proof of execution, as a copy from the Land Office, the burden of proving forgery was upon the defendant, and it was not error to so charge the jury.................... 394
5. Power of Alcalde Under Special Concession.
In the concession to Aguirre, the alcalde is directed to have the eleven leagues of land surveyed, to put him in possession of it, and to give him the evi- ’ dence of his right. These duties were purely ministerial. His power was clearly defined in the documents issued by the Governor, without which he had no authority whatever. It was a special power authorizing him to perform a single act, with reference to one grant of land, to be extended to a specified person ................................................... 395
6. Exhausted Concession—Void Grant.
If, as contended by plaintiff in error, the alcalde, on October 4,1833, extended a title to Aguirre for eleven leagues, such grant exhausted the concession, and the subsequent grant, on October 22, 1833, under which the defendant in error claims, was absolutely void as to all persons.................... 398
OR APPLICATION POR REHEARING.
7. Questions Raised on Writ of Error.
"Where a question was discussed and decided by the Court of Civil Appeals upon assignments of error made, and where such decision is specifically alleged as error in the application for writ of error, it can not be held that the issue is not before this court...................................... 411
8. Power of Alcalde.
Able counsel have not presented to us any authority for the position that the alcalde, as such, ever had any authority, under the laws of Coahuila and Texas, to grant a second title upon a concession. His authority was exhausted in extending the first title................................411, 412
9. Pre-emption—Land Certificates—Constitution.
Howell’s survey was made May 4,1876. At that date there was no law which prohibited the acquisition of this land under the Act of May, 1873 (by preemption). Article 14, section 2, of the Constitution, determining upon what lands the land certificates could he located, did not affect the acquisition of land under homestead donations or pre-emption rights........... 412
10. Public and Unappropriated Land.
If the grant by the alcalde was a second grant upon the same concession, it was wholly unauthorized, and did not in any way appropriate the land or confer any right thereto; and in that event the land was public and unappropriated public domain, subject to appropriation by plaintiff in error at the time his survey was made...................................... 413
Error to Court of Civil Appeals for Third District, in an appeal from Travis County.
The Court of Civil Appeals consisted of Judge Collard and Special Judges L. H. Brown and L. J. Storey, appointed instead of Chief Justice Fisher and. Justice Key, who were disqualified.
Action of trespass to try title by Hanrick, claiming under an alleged grant for ten leagues of land, of date October 22, 1833, made by L. Lesassier, alcalde, etc., to Rafael de Aguirre. The defendant claimed under pre-emption claims, surveyed May 4, 1876. Suit was brought in Williamson County, and venue was changed to Travis County. Judgment for plaintiff approved by the Court of Appeals. Writ of error on application of defendant.
This Aguirre title was the subject of discussion in Hanrick v. Kavanaugh, 60 Texas, 1, and Hanrick v. Dodd, 62 Texas, 75. The reports of these cases, with the opinion, give the facts.
The errors complained of by the plaintiff in error are succinctly set forth by Justice Brown in his statement of the case in the opinion.
Terrell & Walker, A. S. Fisher, and Thos. E. Snead, for plaintiff in error.
—1. Grants must be construed and interpreted with a view to the law of the time and place of their execution, which enters into, controls, and limits the grant; and when such law requires or prohibits the execution of the granting instrument in a particular way under the penalty of nullity of the grant, and such vice is apparent from the face of the instrument, it is void, and confers no right. Ley III, title 18, part 3; Ley I, title 23, lib. 10, Rov. Rec. —; Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion, p. 888; Ley I, title 6, part 7, and Ley I, title 7, part 7; Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion, p. 671; Leyes 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, title 7, part 7; Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion, p. 894.
2. For an ancient instrument to prove itself, even at common law, by its antiquity, it must appear on its face to be genuine and free from suspicion. The most favorable rule ever announced for one claiming under such a deed is, that when there are erasures and interlineations on the face of the deed, it becomes a question of fact for the jury whether they were made before or after its execution, with no presumption as to the time when they were done, if the interlineations are in favor of the grantees or those claiming benefit under them; while the doctrine best sustained by authority is, that he who propounds a deed suspicious from changes apparent on its face, must show when they were made. Stooksbury v. Swan, 85 Texas, 563; Hill v. Nisbett, 58 Ga., 589; Walter v. Short, 5 Gill, 252; Wilson v. Henderson, 9 S. & M., 375; Barnham v. Ayer, 35 N. H., 351; Maybee v. Sniffin, 2 E. J. Smith (N. Y.), 1.
And even if over thirty years old, the suspicious alterations must be explained: 1 How., 104; Cowen & Hill’s Notes on 4 Phil, on Ev., part 2, p. 373, note 200; Id., 366, note 197; Lan v. Mumma, 34 Pa. St., 274; Acker v. Ledyard, 8 Barb., 514; Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio (N. S.), 445; Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa. St. (11 Harris), 244; Matthews v. Coulter, 9 Miss., 705; Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Cow., 531; Heffinger v. The State, 16 S. & R., 44; Commissioners v. Hannon, 1 N. & M., 554; Jackson v. Osborne, 2 Wend., 555; Neie v. Case, 25 Kan., 510; Tyree v. Rives, 57 Ala., 173; Pyle v. Oustatt, 92 Ill., 209; 1 Lit. (Ky.), 219; 1 How., 104; 5 Barb., 279; Maybee v. Sniffin, 1 N. Y. (2 G. Smith); 15 Johns., 293; Scrivner v. The People, 33 Ill., 276.
3. The law having limited the quantity of land which could be granted by the government to one individual to eleven leagues, and such grant having been legally issued, and the concession under which the grant was made exhausted, the power or authority of the commissioner, whose authority was derived alone from such concession, to extend a title under this particular concession, ceased, and his acts in attempting to make an additional grant to the same individual was without authority of law, and void. Mason v. Russell, 1 Texas, 729-731; De Leon v. White, 9 Texas, 600; Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Texas, 612; Sherwood v. Fleming, 25 Texas Supp., 427; Gunter v. Mead, 78 Texas, 635; Pollard’s Heirs v. Files, 3 Ala., 47; Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat., 380; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendell, 9 Crunch, 87.
4. It is respectfully asked that this court reopen the decision in Hanriclc v. Jackson, 55 Texas.
While we are willing to admit that so much of the opinion in that case which holds that a grant voidable alone for fraud in the officer extending it, and that it can only he attacked by the State or some one holding a prior equity, is sound law, yet we are not willing to concede the court’s premises that this grant is voidable only as applicable to the case as now presented. Our contention is, that the grant of October 22, 1833, purporting to have been issued to Eafael de Aguirre, is not only voidable, but absolutely void; not because of the fraud itself on the part of the officer extending such title (if in fact it was ever extended) as a grant to Eafael de Aguirre, but because, first, of the absolute want of power in the commissioner, Lesassier, to extend this second grant to Aguirre; second, of the illegality of the act in thus extending it, which appears from the face of the paper itself, and evidence aliunde.
To hold Lesassier’s act valid would be, in effect, to hold that he had full power to grant eleven leagues of laud without the aid of the concession, which could only be issued by the executive, and that the alcalde possessed power beyond the restrictions of the government in granting land. Certainly such a doctrine can not receive judicial sanction. There is no difference in principle in making a grant that the law says you shall not make, in doing a thing the law says you shall not do, and in granting land in a particular territory in which the law says grants shall not be made. The whole depends upon the same principle, viz., want of power or authority to do a prohibited act.
We therefore contend: 1. That as the law restricted the granting power of its agents to eleven leagues of land united in one person, that no officer whose duty it was at such time to grant land could grant to the same person two separate and distinct eleven league grants to different land. 2. That no officer authorized by the government did grant to Eafael Aguirre two concessions for eleven leagues of land. 3. That the concession granted on the 14th June, 1830, and the additional order of May 2,1832, were exhausted by extension of the final title and act of possession of date 4th of October, 1833, granting the land on the Brazos. 4. That the pretended grant of October 22, 1833, to Eafael Aguirre to the land on the San Gabriel was issued without a concession to support it, and therefore void. 5. That as the commissioner, Lesassier, possessed no general power to grant eleven leagues of land, his authority and power in this particular matter ceased upon the extension of the final title and act of possession of October 4,1833, granting the land on the Brazos to Eafael Aguirre.
Walton & Hill, for defendant in error.
—The only point to .which we wish to advert in reply to the argument of plaintiff in error, is that which grows out of the third paragraph from the last of the court’s charge, and is as follows: “On the question of forgery of said final title, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the forgery, and it is incumbent on him to establish the forgery by a preponderance of the evidence.”
This part of the charge, in the presence of the doctrine laid down in Stooksbury v. Swan, 85 Texas, 565, would probably be technical error; but we claim that it is not error in this case, at least not reversible error. Before a case will be reversed for error in the charge, the error must probably have some material effective weight to turn the scales of decision contrary to the direction they would have turned had the charge not been given. [Counsel discussed the facts.]
Immaterial error will not cause reversal. Gaston & Thomas v. Dashiell, 55 Texas, 530, and case cited; Railway v. Dillahunty, 53 Texas, 212; Bowles v. Brice, 66 Texas, 731, and cases cited; Erwin v. Bowman, 51 Texas, 513; De Montel v. Speed, 53 Texas, 339; Galveston v. Morton, 58 Texas, 409; Dotson v. Moss, 58 Texas, 152; James v. Thompson, 14 Texas, 465; Cook v. Wooters, 42 Texas, 296.
Where evidence is all on one side, the court may charge a verdict. Washington v. Bank, 64 Texas, 6; Baldridge v. Cartrett, 75 Texas, 633; Stewart v. Kemp, 54 Texas, 253, citing Reid v. Reid, 11 Texas, 585.
The original title has been upheld by this court in a most elaborate and exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice Moore, in Jackson v. Han-rick, 55 Texas, 17, in which every objection urged in this case against the validity of the original grant was adversely passed on by the full court. Forgery was not passed on, because not made; but there was and is no evidence in this case that does not point to one or the other of the objections overruled or not sustained in that ease; and in no instance and in no respect does it point to forgery, or tend to establish forgery.

Opinion:
BROWN, Associate Justice.
—Hanrick sued Howell in the District Court of Williamson County to recover a tract of land situated in that county; the venue was changed to Travis County, where the trial was had and judgment rendered in favor of Hanrick, which was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.
Howell claimed the land under a patent issued by the State of Texas. Hanrick claimed it by virtue of an eleven league grant issued by the State of Coahuila and Texas, in 1833. The record is voluminous, but for the purpose of determining the questions presented in this court the following statement will be sufficient:
In the year 1830, Jose Maria de Aguirre, for himself and as attorney for Rafael de Aguirre and Thomas de la Vega, made a joint application to the Governor for permission to purchase each eleven leagues of land in the territory of that State. TJpon the petition, the Governor issued the following permit or order:
"Lecha Vicario, June 14, 1830. .
"By virtue of article 24 of the colonization law of the 24th of March, 1825, I authorize each one of the applicants to purchase the eleven sitios (leagues) they apply for from the public domain of the State, at such point as may suit them, after the commissioner appointed by the federal government shall have selected a sufficient quantity to cancel the debt due by the State to the federation. The duly qualified mayor (alcalde) of the municipality within whose jurisdiction said land may be located will put them in possession of the aforesaid sitios (leagues) and issue the respective patent thereto, previously classifying their condition and quality, so as to assess the amount they shall pay the State for them, for which payment the terms of the aforesaid law are granted to them. The petitioners will be furnished from the secretary's office with a copy of their application and of this petition, that upon application with them to the commissioner the ends proposed may be accomplished.
"A copy of the original filed in the archives of the secretary's office in my custody, from where it was ordered to be made by direction of H. E., the governor.
"Leona Vicario, June 13, 1830.
"Santiago Del Valle, Secretary."
On the 2nd day of May, 1832, the same parties, by Jose Maria de Aguirre, applied to the Governor for an order that they be placed in possession of the lands, reciting the former order of date June 14,1830, and that no objection had been made thereto, and continues in this language:
"It appears that the time has now arrived when they can proceed, without hindrance, to receive the lands they have contracted to purchase; and as it may happen that they might be located within the limits of some of the several colonization contracts for the distribution of whose lands a commissioner of surveys is appointed, he prays T. E. to direct that not only the mayors (alcaldes) to whom they shall apply to put them in possession of the sitios (leagues) they may select, but also the commissioners of surveys within their respective jurisdictions, shall do the same, so as to avoid any inconvenience that might retard the possession they apply for. He prays T. E. to comply with his request, wherein he will receive justice.
"Leona Vicario, May 2, 1832.
"Jose Maria de Aguirre."
Upon the above application, the Governor issued the following order:
"Leona Vicario, May 2, 1832.
"In consideration of the foregoing application, and in conformity with the order issued from this department and transmitted to the head of the department of Bexar, on the 23rd day of June, 1830, I hereby appoint the commissioner for the distribution of land within the respective colony wherein the sitios (leagues) granted to the applicant and his associates may be located, and in case they are not included in any colony contract, then the mayor (alcalde) of the respective munici pality, or the nearest thereto, pursuant to the instructions and orders having reference to the subject, will proceed to give them the possession aforesaid. The applicant will be furnished through the office of the secretary with a copy of his petition and of this order, for the purposes that they may be required, attaching the original to the document authorizing the purchase. "Letona.
"Santiago del Valle, Secretary."
October 4, 1833, Samuel M. Williams presented to Luke Lesassier, the alcalde of San Felipe de Austin, a written request that he, as attorney of Bafael de Aguirre, might be permitted to select the lands for said Bafael de Aguirre on the west bank of the Brazos river, which was within the limits of Austin and Williams' colony. The application was referred by the alcalde, Luke Lesassier, to Austin and Williams for their approval, with directions, that in case they consented, it was to be delivered to Francis W. Johnson, surveyor-general, to survey the land. On the 5th of the same month, Samuel M. Williams, for himself and his partner, gave consent, and Francis W. Johnson surveyed the land, but the date of the survey is not given.
Luke Lesassier, alcalde of San Felipe de Austin, with the assisting witnesses, Robert Peebles and C. C. Givens, executed the protocol of the final title to the land, which was dated October 4, 1833. This instrument recited, that Luke Lesassier, exercising the powers conferred upon him by the order of 2nd day of May, 1832, and in consideration of the sale made by the Governor on the 14th day of June, 1830, put Samuel M. Williams, attorney for Rafael de Aguirre, in possession of the eleven leagues on the west bank of the Brazos river, conferring title upon him thereby; referring to the field notes made by Francis W. Johnson for description.
The field notes returned by Johnson begin thus: "The land that I have surveyed by virtue of your foregoing order to the attorney for the citizen Bafael de Aguirre, is located on the west bank of the Brazos Biver, and contains the lines, boundaries, limits, and corners following," giving the metes and bounds.
The title appears to be complete and formal, and was deposited in the Land Office, as required by law.
October the 4th (the same date as the first application), Samuel M. Williams, as attorney for Bafael de Aguirre, presented to the same alcalde of San Felipe de Austin a second application, based upon the same permit, to purchase eleven leagues of land, dated June 14, 1830, and the order of the Governor of May 2, 1832, for permission to select and have surveyed eleven leagues of land for Bafael de Aguirre, ten to be located and surveyed on the San Andres Biver and Cow Bayou, which embraces the land sued for, and one at another place. This land was also within the limits of Austin and Williams' colony, and was by the alcalde referred, on the — day of October, 1833, to Austin and Williams, for their approval, and upon approval to be delivered to Francis W. Johnson, surveyor-general, and by him to be surveyed. Consent was given by Samuel M. Williams, on the 5th day of October, 1833, and Johnson, the surveyor-general, surveyed the land and returned the field notes, which are without date.
Upon this second application a final title was made out, from which we make the following extracts: "At the city of San Felipe de Austin, on the twenty-second day of the month of October, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, I, Citizen Luke Lesassier, the duly constituted mayor (alcalde) of this city and its municipality, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon me by the order dated at Leona Vicario, on the fourteenth day of June, 1830, and 2d of Hay of the year last past, and in consideration of the sale authorized by the said executive in favor of the citizen Rafael de Aguirre, resident of said Leona Vicario, for eleven sitios (leagues) of land, as appears by his executive order, dated at the said Leona Vicario on the said fourteenth of June, 1830," etc., "I confer upon and put the aforesaid attorney of Perfecto Valdes in the full, actual, and corporeal possession of eleven sitios (leagues) of land, the same that he applied for and were sold to him by the government, on- the San Javiel Creek and Cow Bayou."
This title was signed by Luke Lesassier, with Robert Peebles and C. C. Givens assisting witnesses, and at the bottom, above the names of the alcalde and witnesses, is this note: "Interlined—y 2 de Mayo, po po anno—valid—Altered Catorce. Rafael Aguirre—arroya San Javiel —valid; also Juno—Juno valid."
Wherever the words "Rafael de Aguirre," "fourteenth," "June," "San Javiel Creek," appear in the application, the reference by the alcalde to Austin and Williams, and the final title, the evidence shows, that other words had been scratched out and the words there appearing written over the erased word. The evidence tends to prove, that where the words "Rafael de Aguirre" were thus inserted, the words "Perfecto Valdez" had been erased; and that where the word "fourteenth" was thus inserted, the word "thirteenth" had been erased; that July (Julio) was erased where "June" is inserted; and that in the grant, the words "Brazos River" were erased and "San Javiel Creek" inserted, and "Cow Bayou" interlined. Also, that "2d of May of the year last past" was interlined.
On the 13th day of July, 1830, the Governor of Coahuila and Texas granted permission to Perfecto Valdez to purchase eleven leagues of land, to be selected by him out of the public domain, and directing the alcalde of the municipality where selected, or of the nearest thereto, to put him in possession and give evidence of title. Ro application appears to have been made to the alcalde on this permit, except as shown by the second application made by Williams, set out above. Samuel L. Williams gave consent to the selection within the colony of Austin and Williams, February 8,1833, and the land was surveyed by William Moore for Mrs. McManus, May 1, 1833, on the east bank of the Brazos River. Ho final title is shown, unless the one under which plaintiff's claim was so issued to Valdez, and changed as claimed by defendant, to Rafael de Aguirre.
Defendant in the court below filed a general denial, plea of not guilty, and pleas of the statute of limitations of three, five, and ten years. He also filed an affidavit that the original of the grant and other papers were forged. ,
The following questions are presented to this court by the plaintiff in error:
1. That under the law then in force the grant was void, because the alterations were not made according to law, although noted at the foot, and before the signature of the officer.
2. If the paper is valid, it does not vest title in Rafael de Aguirre.
3. That the court erred in charging the jury, that the papers introduced by plaintiff were regular upon their face, and, with proof of heirship, were sufficient to entitle him to recover, if they found that the grant was not forged.
4. That the court erred in withdrawing from the jury certain facts as evidence of forgery.
5. That the court erred in placing the burden of proving that the alterations were made after the signing of the grant, upon the defendant.
6. That the grant under which plaintiff claims title is void, because prior to the making of the said grant the alcalde had made to Rafael de Aguirre a valid grant of eleven leagues of land under the same concession, and by virtue of the same power, and that his power was exhausted by the making of the first grant.
Plaintiff in error claims, that if the alterations, interlineations, and erasures which appear on the face of the protocol of this title were made before the same was signed by the officer, and noted, as appears on the face of the instrument, in good faith, the grant is void, because the words erased were not barred out and the substituted words written above, and in the amendation clause both words mentioned, that which was barred out made invalid, and the words inserted made valid. So far as the erasures and interlineations affect the validity of the instrument, the law in force at the time must govern. We find translated and copied into the opinion of the court in Hanriclc v. Cavanaugh, 60 Texas, 1, the law as it then was, so far as it affects this question. We copy such part as we deem applicable to the questions here presented, as follows:
"In order that a public instrument be considered authentic and lawful, the following circumstances are required. Page 888, second column: 8. That the document be cleanly written, without blanks, erasures, obliterations, interlineations, or corrections, especially in the substantial parts; for example, in the names and surnames of parties, of the notary public, and the witnesses, in the terms and the amount, and the thing in relation to which the writing is done, in the compact and conditions, and in the day, month, and year of the date, and in the place where the instrument was executed; and that in case that any correction, obliteration, or addition be made at the time of reading the instrument to the parties, the same be authenticated at the foot of it by the notary, previous to the signing, in order to prevent suspicion of fraud. Ley III, title 8, part 3; Ley XII, title 19a, part 3; Ley I, title 23, Lib. 10, Xov. Rec., and Code de Cem., art. 240.
" The two laws of the Partidas above quoted characterize as suspicious and unworthy of credit any instrument of writing which has been scratched, corrected, underscored, written over, or torn or cut in any of the substantial parts above referred to, unless the party introducing it shall prove that it was done by force or accident; and on the contrary, they require its admission as valid if it bears no such vices or defects in any of its essential parts, and when there is no suspicion of a fraudulent intent.
" But shall we also apply the first part of the provisions to the 'matrix' preserved by the notary public among his protocols'? If the instrument (the matrix) appears with the obliterations, additions, corrections, or other alterations not authorized as the law requires, shall it be null and void to the prejudice of either, and perhaps both parties'? We may suppose either that the two instruments were closed and signed after the alterations were made, or on the contrary, tliat the alterations were made after the instrument had been perfected and signed. It would be natural to suppose that the instrument was closed and signed without the alteration, for the presumption is, that while writing, the notary public would conform himself to the requirements of the law, and the lawrequired him to mention and authenticate them before signing, if in fact they existed at that time. Therefore an instrument shall not be null on account of the failure to approve or authenticate the alteration that maybe found in it, because it should not - be in the power of the notary public or anybody else thus to destroy the effects of an authentic document to the prejudice of the parties interested; but on the contrary, the alteration shall bear the vice of nullity, the additions, writing over, erasures, and corrections shall be considered as not having been made, and the words unlawfully written over, or erased, or altered, shall be considered as existing, and shall have all their effects when their tenor can be ascertained, or an interpretation or combination of that which precedes, or that which follows, discloses their meaning."
It is our opinion, that the penalty of nullity did not attach to erasures and interlineations except where the same were not noted at the foot of the instrument before it was signed by the officer, and that where this was done the instrument was valid. In this case, the interlineations and words inserted were so noted, as the law says "authenticated," by the officer before the signature; at least it so appears upon the face of the paper. It follows, that if valid, that is, if it was so interlined before signing, the grant was not invalidated by such alterations. We see nothing in this law, nor in any other that has been called to our attention, which renders void a public instrument which was altered, if the words to be changed were not barred out and others inserted above them. We hold, that the grant was not void for this reason.
Eafael de Aguirre purchased the eleven leagues of laud from the government, with.the right of selection, and his right depended upon the concession issued by the Governor. Clay v. Holbert, 14 Texas, 202. The concession, the order of May 2, 1832, the application for the survey, the permission to locate in the colony limits, and the field notes, were all in the name of Eafael de Aguirre, and the prococol itself recites, that the grant is made in pursuance of the authority conferred by the concession to Eafael de Aguirre, and on application of Samuel M. Williams, his attorney; and then says, in substance, that possession is given and title conferred upon the "said attorney of Perfecto Valdez." This is a clear mistake. It was an oversight in not erasing the name of Valdez, whether made before or after execution and delivery. Such a mistake in the name can not have the effect to defeat the grant, if otherwise valid, which is shown by all the papers preceding, and the context, to have been made to Eafael de Aguirre. Clay v. Holbert, 14 Texas, 202; Hanrick v. Jackson, 55 Texas, 17.
The court did not err in instructing the jury, that the muniments of plaintiff's title were regular on their face, and, with the proof of heirship, entitled plaintiff to recover if the grant was not forged. There was no question about the heirship, and the court properly reserved for the jury the question of forgery, which wTas the only question as to the title, as shown by the evidence. We do not think that the jury failed to understand this charge, and that they did not conclude that the court in that charge made any reference to the erasures shown on the face of the paper, or expressed or intimated any opinion as to the weight to be given to them. The Court of Civil Appeals did not err in its decision upon the second and third points presented.
It is insisted for plaintiff in error, that the court erred in giving the jury the following instruction:
"The fact that a subsequent location or locations of pre-emptions or land certificates have been made by the defendant or other person on the lands granted by either one of said titles, or the fact that a patent or patents have been issued on said subsequent location or locations, or the fact that the two said eleven league tracts of land, or either one of them, were not surveyed on the ground, or the fact that there-have been claims adverse to said eleven league titles or to either one of them, or the fact that the said eleven league surveys or either one of them have been dropped from the map or maps in use in the General Land Office, does not in any way affect the validity of either one of said titles so in fact extended to said Eafael de Aguirre."
The evidence tending to establish the facts mentioned in the charge had been admitted to the jury, we believe, in every instance over ob jections of the plaintiff, and it was proper to withdraw them or limit their effect by the charge. We do not see how a fact mentioned could legitimately affect the conclusion to be drawn as to the issue of forgery of the title. They each and all transpired after the time when the grant was made, and were in no way connected with the acts of any of the parties who participated in procuring or issuing the grant. There was no error in this charge.
The protocol of the title in question in this case was deposited in the General Land Office, and became an archive of that office. The plaintiff in the court below introduced in evidence a certified translated copy of the protocol. Defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the original had been changed in material points, and the issue of forgery was thus made. The court charged the jury as follows:
"On the question of forgery of the said final title, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the forgery, and it is incumbent on him to establish the forgery by a preponderance of the evidence."
Plaintiff in error contends that the court erred in giving this charge, and claims that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove the grant to be genuine, and to account for the erasures and interlineations.
The affidavit of forgery was unnecessary in the case. The instrument is not embraced in article 2257, Revised Statutes. The same proof would have been required of the parties respectively if it had not been made. Parker v. Chancellor, 73 Texas, 479.
If the admissibility of the copy had depended upon the age of the original, or upon proof of its execution, or if the erasures and interlineations had not been noted at the foot of the paper, the burden of proof would have been upon the plaintiff, and the charge erroneous. Stooksbury v. Swan, 85 Texas, 563; Park v. Glover, 23 Texas, 469. But the certified copy of the grant was admissible without reference to its age and without proof of its execution, because it was a copy of an archive of the General Land Office, and because the original, being an official act, proves itself, and would be admissible in evidence without proof. Houston v. Perry, 5 Texas, 462; Andrews v. Marshall, 26 Texas, 216; Hatchett v. Connor, 30 Texas, 109; Railway v. Jarvis, 69 Texas, 527. Ho proof being required, of the plaintiff, the issue was made upon the instrument by the defendant, and the burden of proof rested upon him, upon the familiar principle, that the burden rests upon the party who has the affirmative of the issue. The defendant claimed, that alterations noted at the foot of the grant were made after the grant was executed and delivered, and upon this issue the burden rested upon him. Thompson v. Thompson, 12 Texas, 327; Wells v. Moore, 15 Texas, 521; Peverler v. Peverler, 54 Texas, 53. It is true that it is said in Park v. Glover, 23 Texas, 469, that it rested with the party offering an instrument which appears upon its face to have been altered, to account for the change; but in that case the alteration was not accounted for at the foot of the paper. There was no error in the charge of the court as applied to the facts of this pase.
Under the law in force when the title under which Hanrick claims was issued, no person could purchase from the government more than eleven leagues of land. Colonization Law of 1825, art. 24; Laws C. and T., p. 19. The concession granted by the Governor of the State to Eafael de Aguirre states that it is issued under that article of the law, and concedes to him the right to select and purchase eleven leagues of land out of the public domain of the State; the commissioner or alcalde is directed to have that quantity of land surveyed, to put De Aguirre in possession of it, and to give to him the evidence of his right. The duties of the alcalde were purely ministerial; his power was clearly defined in the documents issued by the Governor, without, which he had no authority whatever. Clay v. Holbert, 14 Texas, 202.
The evidence shows, that under the same authority—the concession of June 14,1830, and order of May 2,1832—Luke Lesassier, alcalde of San Felipe de Austin, issued another grant to Eafael de Aguirre for eleven leagues of land situated on the west bank of the Brazos Eiver, which grant appears to be in all respects regular.
It is claimed by the plaintiff in error, that when Lesassier made this grant he exhausted his power, and that if the title under which plaintiff below claims was in fact issued by Lesassier to Aguirre, he had no authority so to do, acted in violation of law, and his act was void. The court charged the jury as follows:
"If Luke Lesassier, alcalde of the municipality of San Felipe de. Austin, in fact extended to Eafael de Aguirre two titles for eleven leagues of land each, with the knowledge of said Eafael de Aguirre, or his attorney, Samuel M. Williams, such act was not a forgery as to either one of said titles, but was in law a fraud on the government; and the government only, and not the defendant in this case, can question the validity of either title so in fact extended to said Eafael de Aguirre."
It is claimed by counsel for defendant in error, that the question has been decided by this court in the case of Hanrick v. Jackson, 55 Texas, 17; and this view seems to be conceded by counsel for plaintiff in error.
In the case referred to, Chief Justice Moore delivered the opinion of the court, and in the course of it he said: "But it is said, that if this grant is not void upon its face, it is shown by extraneous testimony to have been extended by the officer from whom it emanated, without authority, in violation of law, and in fraud. That a grant may be shown to be void by proof that the officer had no authority to make such grant, or that the law did not warrant it, is beyond question. But if such grant is authorized by law, and may be legally issued by the officer from whom it emanates, we are not prepared to admit that it may be attacked for fraud not appearing on the face of the grant, except by the government or some one having a pre-existing equity,. unless the right to do so is expressly conferred on the party attacking it by law." The learned judge proceeds to state and discuss the question raised upon the concession, and then continues: "It is, however, urged with much force, that while there was a concession of eleven sitios of land to the grantee, this concession had been fully satisfied by the extension of the title upon it for other lands prior to the date of the present grant. And therefore the extension of this title purporting to be in satisfaction of the same concession, must be regarded as extended without authority, and as a fraudulent attempt to appropriate double the quantity of land to which the grantee was legally entitled." The opinion then recites the facts bearing upon this question, and states the conclusion, as follows: "Appellee insists, that by the extension of title for land on the Brazos the authority of the officer to make a grant to the interested party was exhausted, and all subsequent acts by him were null and void. But in our opinion, the facts do not warrant the-conclusion. The alcalde by the order was clothed with the authority to extend title to the interested party, and must determine how and when he had done so. But while we admit that the want of power of an officer to make a grant may be shown, as has been often held, to invalidate such grant, we do not think appellee brings this case within this rule by proving, if such is the proper conclusion from the evidence, that Lesassier granted eleven sitios of land prior to the date of the title now in question. The want of authority of the officer which renders the title void is to be shown by the law, or that he attempted to exercise his authority beyond the territory over which he has jurisdiction, or something of the like character, and not from proof of mere error of the officer in extending to one not in fact legally entitled, but whom he supposed to be. The alcalde was an officer authorized to grant titles of this character. True, his authority did not justify him in extending to Aguirre more than eleven leagues of land. Bor should the board of land commissioners give more than one certificate to the same applicant, or the Commissioner of the General Land Office issue a second patent on the same certificate; but to do so, would be an improper exercise of authority, rather than an act without authority. So we think the action of the alcalde, if unwarranted, was an erroneous exercise of authority, instead of an act without authority."
It is said in the opinion quoted, that the alcalde "was an officer authorized to grant this character of titles." If it was intended to assert that such officers were invested by law with that authority, it is not sustained by any statute law of that State that we have been able to find, nor by any rule of decision adopted by courts or officials of that government. On the contrary, the twenty-fourth article of the colonization law gives the right to purchase from the government alone, and the unbroken line of decisions in this court, so far as we have been able to discover, is, that the concession must proceed from -the Governor. Alcaldes as such had no authority to issue these titles, but acted only when empowered by the Governor so to do. The power given to the alcalde in this case was a special power authorizing him to perform a siugle act, with reference to one grant of land, to be extended to a specified person. He was invested with no discretion; the quantity of land to be granted was determined, and the person entitled to it was ascertained; in fact, every right was settled before the business came to his hands. It is not analogous to the case of a board of land commissioners or the Commissioner of the General Land Office. They were empowered by law to issue certificates or patents, to determine when they should be issued, and to whom; they acted for the State, and bound the State. Neither is it governed by the same principles as the case of Johnson v. Smith, 21 Texas, 722. In that case, the grant did not require the approval of the federal executive; the commissioner was empowered to determine who were entitled to such grants, and the court rightly held, that his decision could not be attacked by a party who had no prior right. The case of Sideck v. Duran, 67 Texas, 256, was decided upon the ground that the first survey was abandoned in making the application for the second one.
The rule laid down in Hanrick v. Jackson for determining whether or not the officer had authority to make the grant is, that the want of power must be shown by the law, or that he attempted to exercise his authority beyond the territory over which he had jurisdiction. The rule itself shows that it is not applicable to this case, for the reason, that the authority exercised was not conferred by law, and therefore could not be measured by the law; there was no territory over which he had jurisdiction in such matters, and this test of territorial jurisdiction could not be applied.
The court, in the course of the opinion, on page 32, says: "Certainly in our opinion it can not now be questioned by a party having no pre-existing equitable claim or interest." This is based upon a recital of facts, and is in truth a decision, that under the facts of the case the claim had become valid, although it might have been improperly issued.
The court as then organized had authority to decide upon the evidence in the case; but this court has no such power. We therefore . refrain from discussing the evidence, but feel called upon to say, as matter of law, that the defendant below was not called upon nor required to prove that De Aguirre accepted a grant for which he, by attorney, applied, which was located at a point that he designated, or that the testimonio did not issue to land of which his grant declares that he received possession aud evidence of title, nor that he paid dues to the. government, as it was his duty to do. The question here presented is, assuming that Luke Lesassier, in pursuance of the authority conferred by the concession and order of the Governor, did make a valid grant to De Aguirre of eleven leagues of land prior to the time when this grant was made, did the making of the first grant exhaust his power, and is the second grant void? We have no doubt —upon authority and sound principie—that if it be shown that a valid grant was issued under the power vested iu Luke Lesassier by the Governor, that is, one which vested title to the land on the Brazos River in Rafael de Aguirre, the power conferred upon him by the Governor was thereby exhausted, he had no authority to make the second grant, and it is absolutely void as to all persons. 1 Sug. on Powers, marg. p. 90; Smith v. Taylor, 21 Ill., 303; Ward v. Barrows, 2 Ohio St., 241; Fritsch v. Klausing, 13 S. W. Rep., 241.
Delivered February 7, 1895.
Whether or not the first grant was made complete, whether it was afterwards lawfully abandoned, and all facts bearing upon the validity of the first grant, are questions to be left to the jury, under proper instructions from the court. The trial court erred in giving the instruction complained of, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in not sustaining the assignment of error based upon the giving of that charge, for which errors the judgments of both courts are reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court of Travis County.
Reversed and remanded.