Case Name: Charlie LOVE and Rosie B. Love, In the Interest of Lavern Love, a Child v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1969-03-24
Citations: 221 So. 2d 92
Docket Number: No. 45239
Parties: Charlie LOVE and Rosie B. Love, In the Interest of Lavern Love, a Child v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: ETHRIDGE, C. J., GILLESPIE, P. J., and JONES, BRADY and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 221
Pages: 92–100

Head Matter:
Charlie LOVE and Rosie B. Love, In the Interest of Lavern Love, a Child v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 45239.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 24, 1969.
William E. Miller, Jr., Martha Wood, Jackson, for appellant.
Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Laurence Y. Mellen, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
. There is a well documented article on Application of Basic Constitutional Guarantees to Juveniles to be found in 39 Mississippi Law Journal 121 (1967). This article gives the history of the Youth Court in Mississippi and discusses the constitutional rights of juveniles, as shown by the cases through the opinion of the United States Court in Gault.

Opinion:
RODGERS, Justice:
This is an appeal from an order of the Chancery Court of Panola County, Mis sissippi, dismissing the appellant's motion to vacate an order entered in the Youth Court wherein the appellant was adjudged to be a delinquent, and directing that the petitioner be incarcerated in Oakley Training School. The motion was instituted as a result of the following facts.
On September 7, 1968, a deputy sheriff filed a petition in the Chancery Court's Youth Court Division of Panola County, Mississippi, suggesting that Lavern Love was a delinquent within the meaning of the Youth Court law of this state, namely section 7185-01, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1952).
The record shows that there was a hearing on November 6, 1967, and that the Chancellor entered an order declaring the respondent to be a "delinquent." The order also provided that the child, Lavern Love, should be confined in the Oakley Training School at Raymond, Mississippi for the term provided by law. The time for the appeal from this order elapsed.
On February 2, 1968, the appellant filed the motion requesting the Court to vacate the order and original judgment entered on November 6, 1967, and to grant movant a new, de novo hearing on the merits, for the following reasons:
(1) The movant, Lavern Love, did not have the effective assistance of counsel for his defense, because the attorney did not investigate the facts in the case and present witnesses on behalf of the movant.
(2) Movant was made to testify against himself.
(3) Movant was sent to a segregated institution.
Attached to the original petition were affidavits of Rosie B. Love, mother of the appellant here, and of Charlie Love, his father, which were filed in support of the motion.
The Chancellor entered an order refusing to hear the motion because, he said, he knew of his own knowledge that the petitioner, movant, did have an attorney, that there was a full and fair hearing, and that the attorney appointed by the Court had protected the rights of the appellant.
The Court refused to suspend the order committing Lavern Love to Oakley Training School pending an appeal to this Court.
This Court has recognized the right of persons to post-conviction remedies and the right to file an application in the form of a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, and the right to file a motion to vacate judgments in the trial court where the petition alleges that the judgment and sentence were obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners. In re Broom's Petition, 251 Miss. 25, 168 So.2d 44 (1964); Rogers v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So.2d 331 (1962).
This Court said in Windom v. State, 192 So.2d 689, 691 (Miss.1966):
"This Court has provided a plain, adequate and speedy post-conviction remedy for adjudication of all issues that may be raised under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Mississippi. If the judgment of conviction has been affirmed by this Court, the procedure is by application filed in this Court for leave to file in the trial court a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Miss.Code.Ann. § 1992.5 (1956); Miss. Rule 38. If the conviction has not been affirmed by this Court, a prisoner claiming the right to be released or the right to a new trial upon the ground (1) that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, or (2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or (3) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file in the court that imposed the sentence a simple motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment and grant a new trial, or may file a petition of like nature for a writ of error coram nobis for similar relief. The sentencing court may thereupon hear and determine the issues and make finding of fact and law."
In the case of Lang v. State, 232 Miss. 616, 100 So.2d 138 (1958), this Court permitted a rehearing where newly discovered evidence was had.
We think the foregoing cases make it abundantly clear that this state has an adequate post-conviction remedy for an application for relief by persons convicted of crime. Even the most hardened criminals are not denied a "full-blown hearing." But — Roes a juvenile have the same right after he has been "committed" to a state institution to remain in custody for many years ?
In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428,18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the United States Supreme Court laid down the rule that juveniles are entitled to the same protection under the Constitution of the United States as are adults, and to the right to a hearing under the Bill of Rights, and these rights are made applicable to the states.
In the Gault case the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to make findings or state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus^ to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him." 387 U.S. at 58, 87 S.Ct. at 1460, 18 L.Ed.2d at 563.
In May of last year, the United States Supreme Court again had an opportunity to speak on the subject of the constitutional rights of juveniles in In the Matter of Whittington, Petitioner, 391 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 1507, 20 L.Ed.2d 625 (1968). In that case the Juvenile Court of Fairfield County had determined that there was "probable cause" to believe that the minor had committed a crime. He appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals upon the ground that his constitutional rights had been violated. The Appellate Court dismissed his appeal sua sponte. Certiorari was granted to the United States Supreme Court (389 U.S. 819, 88 S.Ct. 112, 19 L.Ed.2d 69), and that Court, after pointing out the consequences of the juvenile law in Ohio, said:
"In Gault, this Court held squarely, for the first time, that various of the federal constitutional guarantees accompanying ordinary criminal proceedings were applicable to state juvenile court proceedings where possible commitment to a state institution was involved. Because the Ohio courts have not had the opportunity to assess the impact of that decision on petitioner's claims, we deem it appropriate to vacate the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Gault." 391 U.S. at 344, 88 S.Ct. at 1508, 20 L.Ed.2d at 628-629.
This Court has also held that a juvenile is entitled to the same rights as is an adult to due process of law. In the case of In re Slay, 245 Miss. 294, 300, 147 So.2d 299, 302 (1962), this Court said:
"This Court has attempted in our opinions heretofore to make it crystal clear that the constitutional rights of a child will be protected by this Court, and no human being, whether he be infant, adult or non compos mentis, will be incarcerated by a judicial tribunal within the confine of this State, except by due process of law."
We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is necessary for the Youth Court to provide a "full-blown hearing" upon a post-commitment petition, or motion, with such witnesses and testimony as may he offered when an application is filed requesting a hearing upon appropriate grounds as outlined in Windom v. State, 192 So.2d 689 (Miss.1966).
In the instant case the movant alleges that he did not have effective counsel to aid him in his trial. He was entitled to have an attorney to aid him, and he has a right to offer evidence on his "post conviction" hearing to show that an attorney appointed by the Court made no effective effort to aid the movant. The trial judge is not the final judge as to whether or not the attorney appointed by him was effective or whether or not the constitutional rights of a juvenile have been violated, but the evidence may be presented to the Supreme Court on appeal for our determination as to whether or not the constitutional rights of the movant have been violated.
Of course, if a witness is presented to the trial judge whose testimony is known by the trial judge to be perjured testimony, the trial judge may commit the witness to prison as provided for under section 2479, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). However, the mere fact that the trial judge does not believe the statement of the petitioner for post-commitment hearing will not relieve the trial judge from giving the petitioner a "full-blown hearing."
We are of the opinion that there is no merit in the third ground shown in the application for a post-commitment remedy, namely, that the movant was sent to a segregated institution, for the reason that the prison authorities must have the right to take into account tensions in maintaining security, discipline and good order in prisons and jails. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1212 (1968).
We hold, therefore, that this case must be reversed, and that the petitioner, Lavern Love, must be given a hearing in such a manner as to present his application for post-commitment petition to the Chancellor for his determination and order; moreover, the testimony must be recorded or a bill of exceptions provided so that this Court may review such hearing if an appeal is perfected.
Reversed and remanded to the Youth Court Division of the Chancery Court of Panola County, Mississippi.
ETHRIDGE, C. J., GILLESPIE, P. J., and JONES, BRADY and SMITH, JJ., concur.