Case Name: McFETRIDGE v. CHIADO
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-05-21
Citations: 116 Mich. App. 528
Docket Number: Docket No. 55581
Parties: McFETRIDGE v CHIADO
Judges: Before: N. J. Kaufman, P.J., and Bashara and R. I. Cooper, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 116
Pages: 528–539

Head Matter:
McFETRIDGE v CHIADO
Docket No. 55581.
Submitted December 16, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided May 21, 1982.
Leave to appeal applied for.
'Janet L. McFetridge brought a paternity action against Michael Chiado more than ten years after the birth of her child. The Wayne Circuit Court, James Montante, J., ruled that plaintiffs action was precluded by the six-year limitation period on paternity actions but that a declaratory judgment action could be maintained on behalf of the child. Defendant appeals by leave granted. Held:
1. Paternity proceedings are purely statutory. The statute provides that a paternity action may be brought by the child’s mother, the putative father, or the Department of Social Services within six years of the child’s birth. An action to determine paternity may not be brought separate from the provisions of the Paternity Act.
2. The six-year limitation period does not violate equal protection guarantees. To the extent that it causes disparate treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children it is substantially related to the permissible governmental interest in discouraging the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims.
Reversed and remanded for entry of accelerated judgment in favor of defendant.
R. I. Cooper, J., dissented. He would hold that, in view of the overriding purpose of the Paternity Act to provide for the support of illegitimate children and the present high degree of accuracy of blood testing, the relationship of the six-year limitation to the state’s interest in preventing stale or fraudulent paternity claims is tenuous at best. He would hold that the statute creates an unconstitutional classification based on illegitimacy. He would affirm the result reached by the trial court.
References for Points in Headnotes
10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards § 74.
[2, 3, 6] 10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards §§ 78, 86, 89.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings. 59 ALR3d 865.
16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 794.
16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 748, 750, 751.
10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards § 75.
Opinion of the Court
1. Children Born out of Wedlock — Paternity.
Paternity proceedings in Michigan are of a purely statutory nature.
2. Children Born out of Wedlock — Paternity.
A paternity action may be commenced by the child’s mother, the putative father, or the Department of Social Services within six years of the birth of the child; a child may not maintain a paternity action separate from that allowed under the paternity statute (MCL 722.714; MSA 25.494).
3. Children Born out of Wedlock — Paternity — Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Limitation of Actions.
The six-year limitation period for bringing a paternity action does not violate equal protection guarantees; to the extent that the limitation period causes disparate treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children in their ability to enforce support obligations, it is substantially related to the permissible governmental interest in discouraging the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims (MCL 722.714[b]; MSA 25.494[b]).
Dissent by R. I. Cooper, J.
4. Constitutional Law' — Equal Protection — Judicial Review.
The standard of judicial review of an equal protection challenge to social economic legislation is that a legislative classiñcation must be sustained if the classiñcation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
5. Children Born out of Wedlock — Paternity.
The overriding purpose of the Paternity Act is to provide for the support of illegitimate children.
6. Children Born out of Wedlock — Constitutional Law — Paternity — Limitation of Actions.
The six-year period of limitation for the bringing of a paternity action creates an unconstitutional classiñcation between a legitimate child, on whose behalf an action to enforce support may he brought at any time prior to his 18th birthday, and an illegitimate child, on whose behalf the paternity action must be brought within six years of his birth; this classiñcation is not substantially related to the purpose of the statute which is to provide for the support of illegitimate children (MCL 722.714; MSA 25.494).
Merrill, Tatham & Rosati, P.C., for plaintiff.
Archer, Kenney & Wilson (Zemke & Hirschhorn, P.C., of counsel), for defendant.
Before: N. J. Kaufman, P.J., and Bashara and R. I. Cooper, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff commenced the present paternity action over ten years after the birth of her child. Defendant moved for accelerated judgment based upon the six-year limitation period contained within the paternity statute. MCL 722.714(b); MSA 25.494(b). Plaintiff countered by arguing that the limitation period violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am XIV, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2. The trial court agreed that the statute precluded plaintiffs paternity claim but ruled nonetheless that a declaratory judgment action could be maintained on the child's behalf. Defendant appeals by leave granted.
Initially, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the child could maintain a separate declaratory action to determine her paternity. In Michigan, paternity proceedings are of a purely statutory nature. Pangborn v Smith, 65 Mich 1, 4; 31 NW 599 (1887). The pertinent statute provides that paternity litigation may be commenced by a child's mother, the putative father, or the Department of Social Services. In addition, a trial court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child's interests. MCL 722.714; MSA 25.494. In any event, the action is governed by the statutory six-year limitation. Absent legislative action, a child may not maintain a paternity action separate from that allowed under the paternity statute and subject to the limitation period. Cf. JMS v Benson, 98 Wis 2d 406; 297 NW2d 18 (1980).
Secondly, although the dissenting opinion has put forth a well-reasoned analysis of this issue, we do not believe the limitation period of MCL 722.714(b); MSA 25.494(b) operates to violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am XIV, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2. To the extent the limitation period causes disparate treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children, it is substantially related to permissible governmental interests. Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259; 99 S Ct 518; 58 L Ed 2d 503 (1978), Daniel v Collier, 113 Mich App 74; 317 NW2d 293 (1982). The governmental interest in this case is in discouraging the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims. The limitation period here, which is six years, does not produce an impenetrable barrier effectively shielding otherwise invidious discrimination. Because actions may be commenced by a child's mother, father or the Department of Social Services, the fact that the provision requires initiation of suit during the child's minority does not work an unfairness of constitutional magnitude. Daniel v Collier, supra.
Reversed and remanded for entry of accelerated judgment in favor of defendant.