Case Name: Rodney "Kipp" McLARTY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-04-08
Citations: 842 So. 2d 590
Docket Number: No. 2001-KA-01584-COA
Parties: Rodney “Kipp” McLARTY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS and CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 842
Pages: 590–604

Head Matter:
Rodney “Kipp” McLARTY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2001-KA-01584-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
April 8, 2003.
J. Stewart Parrish, Meridian, for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, for appellee.
Before MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS and CHANDLER, JJ.

Opinion:
THOMAS, J.,
FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Rodney "Kipp" McLarty was found guilty of aggravated assault and sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with seven years suspended and five years under post-release supervision. Aggrieved he asserts the following on appeal:
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST TO POLL THE JURY.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE INDICTMENT FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF TRIAL.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER THREE ON AIDING AND ABETTING AND TAKEN AS A WHOLE THE INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO PROPERLY SET FORTH THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AIDING AND ABETTING.
IV. THE JURY WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON WHAT CONSTITUTES A "DEADLY WEAPON" OR "OTHER MEANS LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY."
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY WITH NO RELEVANCE TO THE CHARGE.
VI. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A VERDICT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT AND IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JNOV AS THE GUILTY VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Finding reversible error in the trial judge's refusal to poll the jury and allowing the State to amend the indictment, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
¶ 2. Rodney "Kipp" McLarty, along with three other defendants were indicted on February 15, 2000, for the aggravated assault upon Shawn Mclnnish on August 21, 1999.
¶ 3. On August 21, 1999, Shawn McInnish and Jason Lee Stuart, both from Tupelo, accompanied two other friends to a party at Craig Young's house in Saltillo, Mississippi. The group arrived at the party around ten p.m. Shortly after arriving at the soiree, the group was offered a beverage. When they declined, a number of individuals, including McLarty, began to inquire sarcastically and insultingly as to the refusal. McInnish and Stuart decided to appease the wants of the group and accept the offer. The jibes from McLarty and others continued when McInnish displayed his lack of experience with the workings of a beer tap. After drawing a glass of beer, McInnish stood by Stuart and Young while taking in the various party scenes of Young's backyard. Stuart received a phone call about thirty minutes after arriving at the party and began to talk to the caller. It was about the same time when McInnish noticed a group of "boys" approaching him. McInnish, bewildered as to what the backyard legion was all about, stood there as the group approached. McInnish remembered nothing more until he regained consciousness and found himself lying bloodied and in great pain. He noticed that Stuart had been injured as well. Shortly after the affray, an ambulance was summoned and as the medics strapped McInnish to the stretcher and wheeled him into the ambulance McLarty and others yelled at him. The group was warning McInnish that if he preferred charges against them for their deed they would kill him and his mother.
¶ 4. At trial numerous witnesses testified about the incident and the facts leading up to the same. McLarty was described as soliciting individuals to take part in the beating of Mcinnish as well as leading the pack of "boys" in the attack. One witness testified that McLarty asked him to be sure that he "didn't get whipped." Another witness testified that she heard McLarty enlist the aid of two or three others with the intention of fighting. This same witness testified that she saw McLarty throw the first blow striking McInnish on the side of the head. Yet another witness testified that he too heard McLarty organize the attack and further stated that McInnish was taken by surprise by McLarty and his minions.
¶ 5. At trial the defense produced McLarty's former girlfriend to testify as to what she witnessed on the night of Young's party. She recalled that when McLarty and she arrived at the party, McLarty was approached by several boys and asked about his willingness to get into a fight, that he at first demurred but later expressed a desire to do so. The witness went beyond the acts witnessed and testified that the two individuals attacked should have expected to be attacked when they arrived that night as they were residents of Tupelo visiting Saltillo.
¶ 6. At trial, McInnish was allowed to testify about an incident which occurred two and a half years prior. The incident involved McLarty assaulting an unnamed girl and McInnish coming to her aid. The incident was offered as possible motive of the assault on him by McLarty.
¶ 7. McInnish suffered severe injuries as a result of the assault. The treating physician noted multiple abrasions about McInnish's eyes and forehead, and significant trauma to the lower part of his face. McInnish suffered a fractured jaw which required surgery and took about three months to heal throughout which time McInnish had to sustain himself on a liquid diet.
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THE REQUEST TO POLL THE JURY?
¶ 8. After the verdict was read in open court the trial judge began to thank the jury and excuse them when McLarty's counsel asked that the jury be polled. This request was denied. The right to poll the jury is explicit in Rule 8.10 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court. Rule 3.10 specifically provides that after the verdict is read in open court in the presence of the jury, "[t]he court shall inquire if either party desires to poll the jury, or the court may on its own motion poll the jury." URCCC 3.10. See also State v. Taylor, 544 So.2d 1387, 1389 (Miss.1989). We have recognized that the purpose of polling a jury is to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict which the foreman has returned and thus to enable the court and the parties to ascertain with certainty that a unanimous verdict has in fact been reached and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict to which he has not fully assented. Although defendant's counsel was tardy in his request for a jury poll, the jury was still in the courtroom. The trial court's failure to poll the jury is reversible error.
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN AMENDING THE INDICTMENT FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF TRIAL?
¶ 9. The State amended the indictment just five days prior to trial changing the wording of the indictment which originally was under § 97 — 3—7(2) (b) to fall under § 97 — 3—7 (2) (a). The Mississippi Supreme Court has made it "clear that the ultimate test, when considering the validity of an indictment on appeal, is whether the defendant was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense." Medina v. State, 688 So.2d 727, 730 (Miss.1996). The indictment must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 653-54 (Miss.1996); URCCC 7.06. The indictment is held to be sufficient if it contains the seven factors enumerated in URCCC 7.06.
¶ 10. McLarty contends the indictment charging him with aggravated assault pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3 — 7(2)(b) was amended erroneously less than five days before trial. McLarty argues that the amended indictment changed the substance of the charge from aggravated assault under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b) to a charge under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a). McLarty further argues that neither the original indictment nor the amended indictment was sufficient to properly charge him with aggravated assault.
¶ 11. The test for determining whether a change to an indictment is one of form or one of substance is well established. Shelby v. State, 246 So.2d 543, 545 (Miss.1971). An amendment to an indictment goes to form rather than substance "if the change does not materially alter facts which are the essence of the offense on the face of the original indictment or if the change does not materially alter a defense to the original indictment so as to prejudice the defendant's case." Chandler v. State, 789 So.2d 109, 111(¶4) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Any amendment not approved by the grand jury must be of form only and must not affect the substance of the charge pending. Rhymes v. State, 638 So.2d 1270, 1275 (Miss.1994).
¶ 12. The original indictment charged McLarty under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b). The amended indictment changed the substance of the indictment charging McLarty under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a). The original indictment charged McLarty and his cohorts with having
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit[ted] an aggravated assault upon Shawn McInnish by attempting to cause and by causing, knowingly and purposely, serious bodily injury to McInnish, a human being, with numerous deadly weapons, to wit: padlocks, chains, brass knuckles, baseball bat, and steel toe boots, by hitting and kicking [the] victim with their fists, feet and other unknown weapons causing serious bodily injury, thereby manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b).
We hold here that when the grand jury returned this indictment under subsection (b), requiring purposeful and wil-full and knowing actions, that stated the charge upon which this defendant could be tried. When the proposed amendment was offered to allow the jury to convict under section (a) of the statute to include recklessly causing serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, this proposed a change of substance and not of form.
Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Miss.1990).
¶ 13. The amended indictment replaced the pluralized weapons with weapon and instead of listing the weapons, stated: with other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. The amended indictment had the effect of changing the substance of the indictment. The amended indictment collapse (a) and (b), and confuse the two separate subsections. With over lapping terms of the statute in the amended indictment the indictment is rendered defective and unclear. Thus we reverse and remand for new trial.
VI. DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT DIRECTING A VERDICT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT AND IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JNOV AS THE GUILTY VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE?
¶ 14. McLarty argues that the trial court should have granted his directed verdict motion as well as his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. He contends that due to the lack of sufficiency of the evidence reversal is warranted.
¶ 15. A.motion for a directed verdict, request for peremptory instruction, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict all challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993). "Since each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court." Id. This occurred when the lower court denied the motion for JNOV. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807-8 (Miss.1987). "If there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty, this Court will not reverse." Meshell v. State, 506 So.2d 989, 990 (Miss.1987). See also Haymond v. State, 478 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1985); Fairley v. State, 467 So.2d 894, 902 (Miss.1985). This Court should reverse only where, "with respect to one or more elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty." Alexander v. State, 759 So.2d 411, 421(¶ 23) (Miss.2000) (quoting Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1293 (Miss.1995)). It is the jury's duty to resolve conflicts in testimony. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983).
¶ 16. This issue has no merit.
¶ 17. In view of disposition of issues one and two we need not address the remaining issues in as much as we do not believe they will reoccur at trial.
¶ 18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED AGAINST LEE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, LEE, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND CHANDLER, JJ.
IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
GRIFFIS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.