Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Cassie PATTERSON, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-01-15
Citations: 315 F.3d 1044
Docket Number: No. 02-1213
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Cassie PATTERSON, Appellee.
Judges: Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 315
Pages: 1044–1054

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Cassie PATTERSON, Appellee.
No. 02-1213.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Sept. 13, 2002.
Filed: Jan. 15, 2003.
Richard E. Monroe, argued, Springfield, MO, for appellant.
David C. Mercer, argued, Springfield, MO, for appellee.
Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
We review this case for the second time. Previously, in United States v. Patterson, No. 01-1462, 2001 WL 969006, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug.27, 2001) (unpublished), we held that the District Court erred in departing downward from the range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines, and we vacated the sentence of probation and remanded for resentencing. The government now appeals from the sentence of probation imposed by the District Court following our remand. We again vacate that sentence and remand for resentencing within the applicable guidelines sentencing range.
I.
Cassie Patterson (Patterson) pled guilty to four counts of methamphetamine distribution, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). Patterson's plea of guilty arose from selling approximately one ounce of methamphetamine to a government informant in four controlled transactions. Patterson is a divorcee with two children from two prior marriages and a third child from an out-of-wedlock relationship. Patterson's children live with her at her mother's residence.
Under the guidelines, Patterson's base offense level was 20 and her criminal history category was III. At her original sentencing on January 23, 2001, the District Court adopted the probation officer's recommendation to grant Patterson a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a)-(b). Patterson's resulting guideline range, with a base level offense of 17 and a criminal history category of III, was thirty to thirty-seven months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). The District Court departed downward under § 5K2.0 from this range and sentenced Patterson to a term of five years of probation. In departing downward, the District Court relied on two discouraged factors (Patterson's family obligations and her health condition). On appeal, we vacated Patterson's sentence and held that the District Court abused its discretion in granting a downward departure by relying on these two discouraged sentencing factors. Patterson, 2001 WL 969006, at *2. We remanded the case for resentencing.
A few days before Patterson's resen-tencing, her counsel notified the District Court that Patterson's extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation warranted a departure from the applicable sentencing range. In support of this claim, Patterson called three witnesses during the resentencing hearing. Jane McCullough, a long-time friend of Patterson's, testified "[Patterson] was home all the time after that. Took care — was with her kids constantly. Helped her mom, was around her family all the time. Helped her grandparents daily. She was just day and night a different person, was back to her old self." Resentencing Tr. at 7. Randy Teague, Patterson's uncle, testified that "[Patterson's] done a tremendous job since [the time of her arrest] of changing her life around." Resentencing Tr. at 10. Specifically, he noted that "[s]he's a very good mother now" and that she was very helpful to her grandparents on their family farm. Re-sentencing Tr. at 12. Finally, Brenda Weter, Patterson's mother, testified that Patterson had changed "[d]rastically" from the time of her arrest and that she had moved home and "really made an effort to change." Resentencing Tr. at 16. The government called Patterson's probation officer who testified that Patterson had tested positive for methamphetamine use in March 2001 (two months after her initial sentencing) and that she admitted to ingesting methamphetamine on three occasions that month. Resentencing Tr. at 21. The probation officer further testified that, as a result of these violations, Patterson completed a drug treatment program and that she had committed no other violations while she was under his supervision. Patterson did not engage in any counseling or drug treatment programs during the period from her arrest to her initial sentencing.
Based on this record, the District Court again departed downward under § 5K2.0 and imposed a sentence of five years of probation to reward Patterson for her post-offense rehabilitation efforts. Specifically, the District Court concluded, "I'm going to find that [Patterson] made a desperate attempt to rehabilitate herself, and I'm going to leave her on probation and let you all supervise her . I think she's made a desperate, desperate attempt to rehabilitate herself, and I admire her for it." Resentencing Tr. at 24. The District Court also noted that, in granting the departure, it only considered Patterson's conduct from arrest to the first sentencing.
II.
The government appeals Patterson's sentence on two grounds. First, the government argues that the District Court abused its discretion in granting a downward departure on the basis of her post-offense rehabilitation efforts. Second, the government contends the District Court violated Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not adequately giving notice of its intent to depart downward.
"We review the district court's decision to grant a downward departure for an abuse of discretion." United, States v. Hasan, 245 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 905, 122 S.Ct. 238, 151 L.Ed.2d 172 (2001). In most cases, a district court's decision to depart from the guidelines will be due substantial deference. United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 580 (8th Cir.1998). However, a district court's authority to depart from the guidelines exists only in limited circumstances. United States v. Hendricks, 171 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir.1999). As the Sentencing Guidelines state, a sentencing court may depart from the applicable guidelines when factors exist in a case "that have not been given adequate consideration by the Commission" or when, "in light of unusual circumstances, the weight attached to that factor under the guidelines is inadequate or excessive." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. "In the absence of a characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from that called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the guideline range is not authorized." Id. at cmt. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
This Court recognizes that a defendant's "postoffense rehabilitation," if atypical, may be an acceptable basis for departing from the otherwise applicable guidelines range. United States v. Kapitzke, 130 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Sims, 174 F.3d 911, 912 (8th Cir.1999) ("We have held that a defendant's post-offense rehabilitative conduct — that is, conduct from arrest up to the time of sentencing — can, if sufficiently atypical, furnish an appropriate basis for downward departure."). Nonetheless, "[b]ecause the acceptanee-of-responsibility guideline already takes post-offense rehabilitation efforts into account, departure under § 52K.0 is warranted only if the defendant's efforts are exceptional enough to be atypical of the cases in which the acceptanee-of-responsibility reduction is usually granted." United States v. DeShon, 183 F.3d 888, 889 (8th Cir.1999) (citations omitted).
While a decision to depart on the basis of extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation is generally a "fact-based judgment call that falls within the district court's sentencing discretion," Kapitzke, 130 F.3d at 824, we will reverse that decision if it is unsupported by the record. See United States v. Allery, 175 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that district court abused its discretion in granting downward departure for defendant's post-offense rehabilitation efforts where record showed defendant did nothing more than obey the law since his conviction). We find the record in this case is devoid of any facts that warrant a departure on this ground. Rather, we agree with the government that, at most, the evidence demonstrates Patterson did nothing more than lead a lawful life after her arrest. As in Allery, Patterson's activities during the eight months between her arrest and initial sentencing "are hardly different from those of thousands of other offenders and thus cannot serve to take [her] case out of the heartland of those to which [the] guidelines apply." Id. at 614.
Moreover, in the cases where this Court has affirmed downward departures for post-offense rehabilitation, the rehabilitative efforts commenced before the defendants were subject to prosecution. See United States v. Newlon, 212 F.8d 423, 424 (8th Cir.2000) (prior to defendant's arrest on federal charges, defendant had, at his own request, entered a treatment program for his drug and alcohol addictions); DeShon, 183 F.3d at 889 (defendant engaged in extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation efforts and accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct "during the investigation, but a year before his indictment"); Kapitzke, 130 F.3d at 823 (defendant entered sex offender and chemical dependency treatment programs "voluntarily and before he was aware that federal charges would be filed against him."); see also United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 100 (1st Cir.2001) (noting that "[t]he reason that timing matters in rehabilitation cases is that a defendant who decides independently to turn his life around likely deserves higher marks than one who undertakes rehabilitation mainly (or at least partially) to gain advantage in imminent criminal proceedings.") (citation omitted). In this case, Patterson's rehabilitation efforts did not begin until after the police arrested her for distributing methamphetamine. The dissent does not address this critical point.
We also conclude, based on the record before us, that the District Court did not give adequate consideration to the fact that it had already awarded Patterson a three-level adjustment to her base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. In most cases, post-offense rehabilitation is not a permissible ground for departure because it can be accounted for by an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See Kapitzke, 130 F.3d at 823; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. app. n. 1(g) (listing "post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment)" as considerations in granting acceptance of responsibility adjustment). Here, the District Court offered no explanation why Patterson's post-offense conduct of becoming an attentive mother and helping her grandparents — even if relevant — together with whatever pre-initial-sentencing efforts she may have made to quit using illegal drugs were not accounted for by the three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Similarly, the dissent is unable to offer any rationale or precedent for departing from the rule enunciated in Kapitzke. The record reflects that Patterson participated in a drug treatment program, but only after her initial sentencing. Patterson's probation officer required her to participate in this program because she had violated the terms of the probation imposed at her initial sentencing by continuing to use methamphetamine. Though we grant that drug addiction is usually not easily overcome, the probation violation strongly suggests that Patterson had not truly reformed herself in an extraordinary way by the time of her initial sentencing. Cf. Craven, 239 F.3d at 100 (noting defendant's conduct while in pretrial detention "casts significant doubt over the advisability of a downward departure" for post-offense rehabilitation).
In light of the fact that We previously remanded this case for resentencing, we also have some concerns that the sentence imposed by the District Court was due perhaps more to its sympathy for Patterson than to any evidence of her extraordinary rehabilitation efforts prior to her initial sentencing. Congress, through the United States Sentencing Commission, designed the sentencing guidelines to reduce disparities of this very nature. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (noting Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission and charged it with developing sentencing guidelines to eliminate disparities in sentences for "offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.") (internal citation omitted).
Finally, we believe it is necessary for us to note our concern about the dissent's attempt to impugn the motives of the government in bringing this appeal. Put in its proper context, the colloquy between the District Court and the Assistant United States Attorney during the resentencing hearing, quoted by the dissent, post at 1052, shows the District Court was not pleased that the government had signaled its intent to appeal Patterson's sentence of probation. Without any apparent eviden-tiary basis, the District Court went on to attack the government's motives. As this Court's decision demonstrates, the government was on solid ground in believing that the facts of this case and the law of this Circuit did not support the downward departure from the Guidelines sentencing range to probation.
For the reasons stated, we find the District Court abused its discretion in departing downward on the basis of Patterson's post-offense rehabilitation efforts. We vacate the sentence of probation and remand this case to the District Court for resen-tencing within the applicable Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months.
. The District Court sentenced Patterson under the November 1, 1999 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) manual. See U.S.S.G. Manual (1998) & Supp. (May 2000).
. The dissent argues that we have somehow usurped the role of the sentencing court by substituting our view of the record in this case. Nothing could be further from the truth. While we give substantial deference to a sen- • tencing court when reviewing a downward departure decision, Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d at 580, we must also ensure that a district court, in the absence of atypical circumstances, sentences within the applicable guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, cmt. Here, the District Court departed downward once again from a sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months and sentenced Patterson to a term of probation. In support of this departure, the dissent argues Patterson "did far more than simply obey the law; she completely turned her life around." Post at 1052. The record only reflects that Patterson attempted to quit using drugs and made efforts at becoming an attentive mother and helpful member of her family following her arrest. We fail to see what is so atypical about this behavior. As discussed above (and not addressed by the dissent), we have previously held that conduct of this nature is not sufficiently atypical to remove a case from the applicable guidelines sentencing range. See Allery, 175 F.3d at 614. If we were to adopt the dissent's view, thousands of offenders would be entitled to downward departures for doing nothing more after becoming subject to prosecution and before sentencing than merely obeying the law and living as useful members of their families. This could not possibly be what Congress intended when it enacted the guidelines and permitted departures under § 5K2.0 only in unusual circumstances. The dissent's view of this case is undoubtedly shaped by long-held disdain for the Sentencing Guidelines, see, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091-93 (8th Cir.2000) (Bright, J" concurring), as well as by a heartfelt concern, which all of us fully share, for anyone struggling to break free from a drug habit or drúg addiction. Little else could explain the dissent's refusal to acknowledge and accept the law of this Circuit on downward departures. Nothing in this decision deprives district courts of discretion to grant downward departures in sufficiently atypical cases. Despite the dissent's claims to the contrary, Patterson's case is simply not one of them.
. We note Patterson's probation violation squarely refutes the dissent's claim that, "Neither the AUSA nor the majority can point to any evidence that rebuts the fact that after her arrest Patterson reformed her life." Post at 1052.
. Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by failing to provide sufficient notice to the government concerning its intended reason for departure.