Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Troy Lee PETERS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-06-23
Citations: 315 So. 2d 678
Docket Number: No. 55822
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Troy Lee PETERS.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 315
Pages: 678–687

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Troy Lee PETERS.
No. 55822.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 23, 1975.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1975.
Richard W. Watts, Watts & Cassidy, Franklinton, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., John N. Gallaspy, Bo-galusa, for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
BARHAM, Justice.
Troy Lee Peters was convicted of armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant relies upon two specifications of error. Because we find error in the trial judge's refusal to suppress inculpatory statements allegedly made by defendant, we do not reach the merits of his second argument.
On the evening of September 1, 1973, Troy Lee Peters, two of his brothers, and a friend rode into Bogalusa from their home in Angie, and were stopped by police for a traffic violation. When the police officers discovered that Troy Lee's brother, the driver of the car, had no driver's license, they took him to the Bogalusa jail and set his bail at $1,000 property or $95 cash.
Defendant removed a tape player from the car and left the police station with a view toward getting help or selling the tape player to raise bond for his brother. He went first to a service station, where he spoke to Mr. Vernon Freeman, who testified that defendant was polite and friendly. The defendant offered to sell the tape player to Freeman, but left the service station when Freeman said he would only pay $15 for it.
It was at this point, at approximately 3 :00 a. m., that defendant approached Mr. James Stewart, the alleged victim of the armed robbery. Stewart, a dealer for the Times-Picayune, testified that he was standing at the rear of his truck assembling newspapers when defendant walked up to him and tried to sell him a tape player. Stewart claimed that he told defendant he was not interested in buying the player and that he turned back to his work when defendant walked away. He said that he was then struck across the shoulders and fell on the ground. When he looked up, he claims to have seen defendant standing over him, holding what looked like a "two by four." Stewart testified that in response to defendant's demand for money, he gave him his checkbook.
Defendant, on the other hand, maintained throughout his testimony that when he asked Stewart to buy the tape player, Stewart said he would not "do anything for no damn nigger." This led to an argument and defendant claims that he picked up a stick in the street and struck Stewart to protect himself, because he feared Stewart- was going to hit him. He denies that he took a checkbook or anything else. About an hour and a half later, he was arrested at a lounge and taken to police headquarters.
Defendant responded to questioning by Lieutenant Pritchard and Sergeant Penton, the interrogation beginning at approximately 5 :20 a. m. At the hearing on the motion to suppress defendant's alleged in-culpatory statements, the police officers testified that they read defendant his rights from a printed form, which defendant initialed, and that his oral statement was reduced to writing upon his request. In the signed statement the defendant admits he struck Stewart with the stick but makes no mention of taking the checkbook. Both officers testified that no special favors were offered the defendant, and that they did not strike or otherwise abuse him in order to compel him to confess. Moreover, Sergeant Penton testified that the defendant called him to his cell approximately three hours after he signed the statement, and told him that he had flushed the checks down the commode at the lounge where he was arrested. However, at trial Penton testified that defendant told him that he had flushed the checks down the commode at the jail. The checks were never found.
Defendant, on the other hand, testified at the motion to suppress that at the 5:20 a. m. interrogation Lieutenant Pritchard threatened him with violence, used harsh language to compel him to sign the written statement and backhanded him, breaking his tooth and bruising his lip. Peter displayed his broken tooth for the judge at the hearing. He claimed that he signed that statement only because of the physical duress to which he was subjected; he further disclaims any other conversation with any officer and denies ever having admitted to Sergeant Penton that he flushed checks down a commode.
Defendant's brother testified that he saw Troy Lee immediately before he was interrogated and that he was not physically injured; he further stated that when he saw him shortly after he had been alone with Penton and Pritchard, Troy Lee's tooth was broken and his lip badly bruised. Likewise, defendant's mother, while quite honestly admitting that her son had given her a great deal of trouble, swore that she had seen her son the day before the questioning and that his tooth was not broken nor his lip bruised, whereas those signs of physical abuse were present two days after he was arrested and incarcerated. The State offered no evidence rebutting the testimony of Peters, his mother, or his brother that he suffered an injury to his mouth, nor did it attempt to explain how his tooth was broken and his lip bruised.
The following provisions of Louisiana law are pertinent to our inquiry:
La.R.S. 15:451:
"Before what purposes [purports] to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises."
La.R.S. 15:452:
"No person under arrest shall be subjected to" any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of crime."
La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(C):
"On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the provisions of this article the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the grounds of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of proving that a purported written confession or written inculpatory statement was made freely and voluntarily and was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises."
La. Const. Art. I, § 11 (1921):
"No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel confession of crime; nor shall any confession be used against any person accused of crime unless freely and voluntarily made."
Voluminous jurisprudence interpreting these provisions has firmly rooted into Louisiana law the proposition that before a^confession may be admitted into evidence, the State has the burden of proving affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made freely and voluntarily by the defendant and not through coercion. See, e. g., State v. Thomas, 242 La. 210, 135 So.2d 275 (1961); State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So.2d 583 (1960); State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954); State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 46 So.2d 738 (1950). It is true that the decision of the trial judge on the question of whether a confession is free and voluntary is entitled to great weight. State v. Hall, 257 La. 253, 242 So.2d 239 (1970). However, a reviewing court cannot avoid its responsibility to examine the record to be certain that the State has fully borne its heavy burden of proof in these cases.
A review of the jurisprudence indicates some of the circumstances that have convinced this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was free and voluntary. For instance, in State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848 (1949), in the face of testimony by the jailer, to whom defendant had allegedly confessed, that the confession was free and voluntary, and by one of the officers who questioned the defendant that the accused had not been mistreated, this Court reversed the trial court's finding that the confession was free and voluntary. The Court said:
"We are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the record as made up fails to establish the state discharged its burden of establishing affirmatively the confession was freely and voluntarily made. We think that after the accused testified in detail about the mistreatment he received and the inducements offered him at the time he confessed, the jailer should have been recalled and re-examined with respect to the particulars testified to by the accused in order that the trial judge might have been afforded a better opportunity to weigh and decide this very important issue." 41 So.2d at 854.
In State v. Honeycutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So.2d 313 (1950), we again concluded that the State had not offered sufficient proof of the confession's voluntary character to sustain the trial court's admission of his statement. There the accused testified that he was mistreated and threatened in order to induce him to confess. Only the deputy sheriff who was alleged to have abused defendant was called by the State to rebut defendant's testimony. Because the State could have called some or all of the five other officers who were present at the questioning, thereby affording the trial court a better opportunity to weigh and decide whether the confession was free and voluntary, the Court found clearly erroneous the trial judge's admission of the confession merely because he did not believe defendant's testimony.
In State v. Simien, 248 La. 323, 178 So.2d 266 (1965), police officers testified that the oral confession made by the accused was free and voluntary and made without any inducements or promises, and that he was not threatened or harmed in any way. Defendant then testified specifically that he had been deprived of food and offered anything he wanted to eat if he would confess. Because the State failed to call any witnesses to contradict defendant's specific accusations, this Court held that the State had failed to sustain its burden of showing affirmatively that the confession was freely and voluntarily given.
In State v. Monroe, 305 So.2d 902 (La.1974), we reversed the trial court's ruling that the defendant's confession was admissible. We noted that, although the State had offered general testimony by officers that they witnessed no coercion, intimidation, or other undue influence, the State failed to carry its burden of proof since it did not rebut specific testimony by the defendant of coercive treatment outside the presence of those who testified.
Particularly apposite to our consideration here are the facts in the case of State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928). In that case, on the hearing to suppress a confession given by the accused, the State offered the testimony of an officer who conducted the interrogation. He stated that neither he nor any of the others questioning defendant had used violence or cruel treatment to induce the statement. However, defendant testified that he was not given adequate food, water and clothing, and that his life had been threatened. The Court held that it was incumbent upon the State to contradict defendant's testimony by calling witnesses to rebut his specific allegations, and stated:
" [Tjhere are some outstanding and acknowledged facts which leave no doubt that the confession made on the 28th of December was induced by the hardships and exposure to cold which the prisoner was compelled to suffer in-the Ninth Precinct Police Station until he consented to make a confession. It was proven beyond all doubt, and was not denied by any one, that he was sick with cold and sore throat and in a wretched condition when the police officers wrapped a blanket about him and brought him to the district attorney's office. " 119 So. at 527. (Emphasis supplied).
The facts before us demand, no less than did those in Scarbrough, that we reverse the judge's ruling that defendant's written statement and his alleged subsequent oral statement were admissible. Although the two officers present at the interrogation did testify that they did not physically abuse the accused, the State made no effort to rebut the clear testimony of three witnesses regarding Peters' altered physical condition, nor to explain how he suffered the uncontradicted injury to his lip and tooth. As with the objective symptoms of abuse present in Scarbrough, the defendant's bruised lip and broken tooth were undenied, explicit facts casting grave doubt upon the State's claim that it has borne its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.
If defendant's proof was false, it was within the power of the State to offer testimony contradicting the specific claim that his physical condition was altered after the interrogation and to explain how he incurred his injuries. As in the cases earlier discussed, we hold that, under all the facts before us, the State has not upheld its burden of proof because it failed to rebut specifically the testimony of defendant's witnesses when it presumably could have and thereby afforded the trial judge a better opportunity to decide this crucial issue.
Nor do we feel that this Court's decision in State v. Sims, 310 So.2d 587 (La.1975) requires a result different from the one we reach in this case, as argued by the State in its supplemental brief. The Court affirmed the trial court's admission of the confession in Sims because there the State introduced evidence that met and was in direct conflict with the defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the incident. In Sims the majority stated:
" It would be superfluous to require the officers to take the stand to repeat what they testified to in the State's affirmative showing. " 310 So.2d at 589.
The majority distinguished the facts in Sims from the jurisprudence discussed earlier herein on the basis that, in those cases, there had been no directly conflicitng testimony offered by the State in its presentation on the voluntariness of the confession. It was stated:
" No purpose would have been served by recalling the officers to repeat their testimony. Only when the defendant presents evidence which is not directly contradicted by the officer's original testimony is the State required to present evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence. " 310 So.2d at 590.
In the case before us, it cannot be said that it would serve no purpose or that it would be superfluous to require the State to rebut defendant's testimony. Not only did the State fail to directly contradict the statements made by defendant and his wintesses on the crucial issue of his physical injuries, but that testimony was completely ignored by the State. General allegations by the officers present that no force was used in eliciting the purported confession are insufficient to satisfy the certainty demanded by the law that a confession is free and voluntary before a man's own words may be used against him.
At the time the hearing was held in the trial court on the motion to suppress, the law was clear that it was the burden of the State to prove affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that an inculpatory statement was obtained freely and voluntarily. The State ignored the provisions of La.C. Cr.P. art. 703 and a long line of jurisprudence. The defendant not only presented witnesses supporting his own declaration of physical coercion, but he presented physical evidence which, supported by the lay evidence, conclusively shows specific physical abuse of the defendant in obtaining his inculpatory statement.
Moreover, we are constrained to note a substantial discrepancy in the testimony of one of the police officers on the motion to suppress and at the time of the trial in regard to the time and method by which the defendant told the officer that he had disposed of the allegedly stolen checks. We conclude that all statements introduced by the State were inadmissible.
Although not crucial to our decision here, we wish to point out the rather irregular procedure directed or at least sanctioned by the trial judge in this case. Because La.Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703(C) and La.R.S. 15:451 make it clear that the State bears the burden of proving that a confession was free and voluntary, the State should be obliged to call its witnesses first and to go forward with its proof at the hearing on the motion to suppress. In the present case, defense counsel, rather than the State, called the two police officers who were the State's witnesses and cross-examined them. Only then did the district attorney examine the officers, after which the defense called its own witnesses.
The State should have been required to call the officers on direct examination because only after the State has offered its proof is there any reason for the defendant to call witnesses to rebut their testimony. This error in procedure reveals a basic misunderstanding of the nature of the burden of proof in laying the predicate and meeting the motion to suppress in confession cases and may account partially for the substantive error requiring reversal in this case.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are annulled and set aside and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent for the reasons assigned by SUMMERS, J.