Case Name: Mitchell v. Smith
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1889-04
Citations: 13 Colo. 170
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mitchell v. Smith.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 170–173

Head Matter:
Mitchell v. Smith.
replevin — Jurisdiction.— Goods ia the custody of a United States marshal, under attachment issued from a federal court, may be replevied by suit in a state court, by consent of the federal court.
Appeal from District Court of Clear Creek County.
Louis Mitchell brought his action of replevin in the state court, claiming ownership and right to the possession of the goods and chattels described in the complaint. Walter A. Smith, among the defenses set up in his answer, avers that he held the property as United States marshal, by virtue of levies under writs of attachment duly issued out of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado, in the two certain suits brought against one Max Mechlenburg.
At the trial the foregoing averments set up in the answer were admitted to be true. It is denied that the property levied upon was the property of Mechlenburg. The complaint contained, inter alia, the averment “that, prior to the commencement of this action, the plaintiff obtained leave from the circuit court of the United States to sue the defendant, who is and was United States marshal for the district of Colorado.”
June 12, 1885, the cause was tried to a jury, and verdict rendered for plaintiff. Motion to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, was sustained by the court. Thereupon, on motion of defendant, judgment was rendered upon the pleadings in favor of defendant, to reverse which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Messrs. M. J. Waldheimer and H. B. O’Reilly, for appellant.
Messrs. Rogers & Cuthbert and Mr. R. S. Morrison, for appellee.

Opinion:
Richmond, C.
The only question seriously argued by either party is the right of plaintiff to maintain this action of replevin in the state courts; a United States court having first obtained, by attachment, jurisdiction of the property.
The question here presented was conclusively settled by this court in Smith v. Bauer, 9 Colo. 380, wherein it is announced that property in the hands of a marshal, under a writ of attachment from the federal court, cannot be interfered with by the sheriff under process from a state court, though the possession of the property be wrongful, and not by virtue of a proceeding in rem; but where the consent of the federal court to proceed in the state court against the marshal is first obtained, the rule is otherwise. We deem this decisive of the case at bar on this point.
The rule above referred to is based upon principles of comity and necessity. Its purpose is to avoid unseemly conflict between the federal and state courts. The exception recognized rests upon a failure of the reason of the rule, and is in the interest of economy and justice. By the attachment of the marshal the property is taken temporarily into the custody of the federal court, and placed under its control. By the order of that tribunal consenting to replevin in the state court, a conditional relinquishment of this custody and control is effected. While in the custody of the federal court necessity requires that the right of the state court to possession be denied. In this sense only is the matter jurisdictional. The exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon the state court by law is for the time being, necessarily held in abeyance, but when the custody is voluntarily relinquished by the federal tribunal, for the express purpose of enabling the state court to act, the necessity mentioned no longer exists.
The judgment should be reversed, but this reversal does not operate to reinstate the verdict, and therefore appellant's request for an order directing judgment thereon must be denied.
Reversed.
Reed and Pattison, CO., concur.
Per Curiam.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.