Case Name: A. Bledsoe v. The International Railroad Company
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1874
Citations: 40 Tex. 537
Docket Number: 
Parties: A. Bledsoe v. The International Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 537–600

Head Matter:
A. Bledsoe v. The International Railroad Company.
1. A mandamus will issue only when the duty to be performed is ministerial in its character; and when the duty is imposed upon the officer requiring the exercise of judgment or discretion, a mandamus will not lie.
■2. The word “ministerial,” when applied to an official act, has reference generally to an act done under authority of a superior; and in this sense it could never apply to the chief executive with respect to anything required by the legislative authority.
3. The act of countersigning and registering the bonds by the Comptroller contemplated by the charter of the International Railroad Company was not a mere clerical or ministerial duty, but it was the duty of the Compl trailer, as well as of the Governor, to see to it that the proper and necessary work to be done by the company before the bonds could issue under the law had been performed.
4. The District Court has not the power or authority under the Constitution to compel an officer of the Executive Department of the government to perform an official duty.
5. Under the former Constitutions the supreme executive power was vested in the Chief Magistrate; under the present Constitution it is vested in the entire body of magistracy composing the Executive Department, with the powers of each separately defined.
Appeal from Travis. Tried below before the Hon. J. P. Richardson.
On the fifth day of August, 1870, a special act was passed by the Legislature of the State of Texas entitled “An act to incorporate the International Railroad Company, and to provide for the aid of the State of Texas in constructing the same.” The Governor of the State neither approved the bill nor returned it to the house in which it originated, and the same became a law by reason of executive non-action within the constitutional period. So much of that act as is necessary to a proper understanding of this case is set forth in the opinion.
On the eighteenth of November, 1873, the International. Railroad Company brought suit in the District Court of Travis county against A. Bledsoe, Comptroller of the State, alleging that, tinder the terms of its charter, the International Railroad Company was organized and proceeded with the construction of its road, and on the twenty-fifth of November, 1871, the president of the road notified the Governor of Texas, in writing, that fifty-two-miles thereof had been completed, and thirty-three other miles gradéd and prepared for the iron, and formally offering fifty miles of said railroad for inspection ; that an appointment of inspectors was made December 2, 1871, and their reports submitted on the eleventh and thirteenth of December, 1871, showing that in the construction of fifty miles the company had fulfilled the requirements of the charter ; that on the twenty-second of April, 1872, the Governor transmitted to the Treasurer three hundred one thousand dollar bonds, as provided for in said charter, requesting the signature of that official to each of them, -and that he, after signing them, turned them over to the Comptroller to be countersigned and registered ;• that on the fourteenth of March previous, two hundred similar bonds had, in like manner, been transmitted; that these bonds were returned by the Comptroller to the Governor without being “countersigned and registered,” and his reasons for non-action stated.
The company prayed for a decree directing that a peremptory mandamus be issued to A. Bledsoe, commanding him, as Comptroller of the State, to countersign and register and return to the Governor the five hundred bonds 'transmitted to him by the Governor through the Treasurer, and for general relief.
On the seventh of February, 1873, the defendant, Bledsoe, appeared and demurred generally and specially to the petition, assigning as special causes of demurrer, among others, the following :
“1. That it was in effect a suit against the State.
“2. The Comptroller cannot be compelled to exercise-his official discretion in any particular way.”
Bledsoe further answered, specially setting out at length that the passage of the act of incorporation was-procured by means of fraud, bribery and corruption, and was therefore null and void; that the act was not read in-each house of the Legislature on three several days, as¡ required by the Constitution, unless in case of great emergency. He also filed a general denial.
On February 8, 1873, plaintiff excepted generally to the answer of defendant, and on the same day filed an amended petition.
On the eighth of March, 1873, defendant filed also an. amended answer, alleging that the plaintiff, its agents and' employés, procured the passage of the act of incorporation by promising and paying to various members of the1 Legislature large sums of money as an inducement for their votes upon the act, and the said members were-thereby unduly influenced, and under such influence did vote for the passage of said bill; and that therefore the act was void.
On March 9 the company filed motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus, and on the same day the court rendered its decision on the various demurrers, overruling-all of defendant’s demurrers, and also the exception of' petitioner to defendant’s first plea in bar, and sustaining petitioner’s exceptions to the other plea, to which rulings both parties excepted.
On March 9, 1873, the Attorney-General filed a plea of intervention in the name of the State, which, upon demurrer and exceptions of petitioner, was dismissed. Exceptions taken to this action of the court were abandoned in this court, and this court requested by the Attorney-General to dismiss intervenor’s appeal. Other orders and proceedings were had, which are not material,to be noticed, and on the third day of July the cause came on for trial. Defendant moved for a continuance, which was-overruled and a trial had. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, ‘commanding the Comptroller to countersign and register the five hundred bonds specified.
Defendant on the same day moved for a new trial on 'various grounds, which was overruled, and separate appeals taken to the Supreme Court by the defendant and Interven or.
The errors assigned by Bledsoe were—
“1. The overruling defendant’s application for a conmance.
“2. The overruling defendant’s demurrers.
“3. Error of the court in all its rulings adverse to -defendant, as shown by bills of exception.
“4. Error of the court in overruling the motion for a new trial.”
The bonds were signed by the State Treasurer, and delivered by him to the State Comptroller on the twenty-¡fourth of April, 1872.
The reasons assigned by Comptroller Bledsoe for returning the bonds to the Governor without their being ■countersigned and registered -were stated in his letter accompanying them. No objection seems to have been made to the performance by the company of the obligations imposed by the charter, but the Comptroller expressed a doubt as to the power of the Legislature to impose on him the duty of levying a tax to meet the liabilities growing out of the issuance of the bonds. He -expressed his desire to have a legislative interpretation of ■the company charter at the next session, and based his 'refusal to countersign and register the bonds chiefly on. "the fact that he believed it would impose on the people a ¡burden of ruinous taxation.
The case was submitted to the jury with instructions to 'return a verdict upon two special issues, in response to which the following verdict was returned:
“1. We, the jury, find the allegations of the plaintiff’ s petition to be true.
“2. We, the jury, find the allegations of fraud not true.”
The briefs filed in this cause were able and exhaustive upon several points not discussed or decided in the opinion ; the discussion of these points in the briefs is therefore omitted.
Wm. Alexander, Attorney-General, for appellant.
If the Legislature itself cannot tax us for any other than a public use; if it has no constitutional power to levy a tax to make a present; if the parts of the charter pointed out are null and void, and 'if neither it nor any other statute, public or private, levies the requisite-tax, what power has the comptroller to countersign, etc.,, and to assess % What right has the company to a mandamus to compel him.to countersign, etc., and to Assess-without a levy ?
A mandamus does not lie, even in a court that has original jurisdiction, to- compel any officer to do against his judgment and will any act involving an exercise of official discretion. (Arbery v. Beavers, 6 Texas, 457; Commissioner General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Texas, 471.)
Ho authority has been adduced, and none is believed to exist, showing that it is competent for the Legislature,, under our Constitution — its chief power of attorney — to create an artificial person (see The State v. The S. P. R. R. Co., 24 Texas, 121) and vest it with privileges in derogation of common, right, which it could not confer upon a. citizen.
Geo. Clark, Attorney-General, also for appellant,
contended that neither the District Court of Travis county nor any other court can compel one of the heads of the executive department to perform an official duty, no matter what the duty may be, or in what manner it may be devolved, citing Houston Tap and Brazoria Railroad v. Ran dolph, 24 Texas, 317; Section 1, Article 11; Section 7, Article 5; Section 1, Article 4, State Constitution; and argued that the Constitution of Texas differed in this respect from most of the other States in which the supreme executive power was vested in the Governor alone. (Dennett, Petitioner, 32 Maine 508; Mauran v. Smith, 8 Rhode Island, 192; State v. The Governor, 1 Dutcher, N. J., 331; Law v. Towns, Gov., 8 Ga., 360; Hawkins v. The Governor, 1 Ark., 570.)
It will thus be seen that the case of the Houston Tap and Brazoria road stands not alone as a bright star in the legal firmament, and that, although it has advanced the principle to a point beyond the others, the advance was made with cautious step, and that it rests upon a foundation of solid constitutional principle which cannot ■be shaken.
All those authorities, Federal and State, which hold a • doctrine adverse to that contended for in argument, when examined, are found to turn back to and rest upon the famous case of Marberry v. Madison. What did the -court decide in that case % Nothing except that it had ¿no jurisdiction. If there was no jurisdiction, how could fit be rightfully determined whether a mandamus could be awarded in a supposed case ? Does it not present a strange .anomaly for a judge to say he has not jurisdiction, and still declare what a court might or would do if it had % The rule was discharged in that case for a want of jurisdiction; and while the opinion should be justly esteemed for its reasoning, its force and - authority as precedent cannot be invoked, for it never had any. Its enunciations rare not applicable to the case at bar, on account of the •difference between the Federal Constitution and that of the State of Texas, in designating and constituting the executive department. The court will bear in mind that the doctrines announced in that opinion met with marked -disfavor among the fathers who had made the Constitu tion, and who were disposed sedulously to guard it from infraction. We have Mr. Jefferson’s authority for saying .that if the Supreme Court had granted a mandamus in that case, he should have regarded it as trenching upon his appropriate sphere of duty; that he had instructed Mr. Madison not to deliver the commission, and that he was prepared, as President of the United States, to maintain his own construction of the Constitution, with all the powers of the government, against .any control that might be attempted by the judiciary in affecting what he regarded as the rightful powers of the Executive and Senate within their peculiar departments. (Jefferson’s Works, Vol, 4, pp. 75, 317, 372.)
But the argument is brought forward that for every right there must be a remedy, and the idea seems monstrous to some that the official action of an every-day officer like the Comptroller is not subject to judicial control. It is urged that a citizen may be wronged by a decision of the Comptroller, and that government is. a failure which does not secure him redress by judicial investigation and determination. Counsel fails to see any force in the argument. Certain duties are assigned to the judiciary, and yet who is so bold as to say that no citizen is ever wronged by their decision ? Hot because judges are corrupt, but because they are men just as the Comptroller is. Is not the latter officer vested necessarily with powers quasi-judicial, and does he not pass judgment •every day upon the rights of citizens, and from "his judgment there is no appeal % The same power put him there that placed the judges upon the bench — with this advantage in favor of the Comptroller, that in his case the power was exercised direct, while with the judges it is exercised in a manner indirect. The duties of the Comptroller are now and have been well defined in the Constitution. That of the judges is also well defined. Are the latter selected on account of their supposed peculiar fitness for the discharge of their duties, and the former not?
II If the court below had jurisdiction, this was not' a proper case for its exercise. • The duty imposed by the act in question necessarily required on the part of the Comptroller an exercise of discretion or judgment, aiid a mandamus will not lie to control it. When'the act tó be done involves discretibn in determining whether the duty exists,' it is not to be deemed merely ministerial, (Commissioner v. Smith, 5 Texas, 471; Board v. Bell, Dallam, 366; 7 Cranch, 504; 6 Wheat., 598; 11 Peters, 524; 14 Peters, 497; 6 Howard, U. S., 92, 100, 101, 102.)
It is admitted that upon a casual glance at Section 9 of the act, set out at length in the statement of the case, it would seem that the Comptroller had nothing to do but to “countersign and register” the bonds. But a critical examination manifests that the duties devolved upon him are of an extraordinary character'. • The section hardly admits of the construction that it became the duty of the Governor, Treasurer and Comptroller, immediately after the act became lawj to have the whole amount of the bonds engraved, signed, countersigned ¡and registered, and deposited with the Governor, to be by him delivered to the company at stated times upon the completion of each section. The Governor is- hardly the proper custodian of the bonds of the State, and the section itself draws a distinction between the issuance and delivery of the bonds". It provides “that no bonds under this act shall be issued to said company until it shall have completed at least twenty miles of said railroad, whereupon said bonds' shall be issued and delivered for the amount of said railroad, and thereafter for every ten miles, according to the terms of said charter.”
The delivery must be made by the Governor, but who issues the bonds ? Hot the Governor alone, for he is incapable of performing this act alone. The issuance must be performed by all three officers, by affixing to the bonds their proper official signatures, but this issuance shall not take place until twenty miles of said road are completed. How completed ? According to the terms of the charter — that is, “in a thorough and substantial manner.” Who is to determine this fact? The Governor alone ? The law does not say so, and it would seem a singular construction to hold that the Comptroller and Treasurer were mere figure-heads and must perform this important official duty upon the ipse dixit of the Governor, when the law is entirely silent upon this point. I take the true meaning and intent of the section to be that the law having provided that no bonds were to be issued until the completion of twenty miles of the road in a thorough and substantial manner, the officers charged with the duty of issuance must determine the question each for himself as to whether twenty miles had been completed, and, if so, whether in a thorough and substantial manner, before affixing his signature. If so, the discretion and judgment devolved upon each is clear.
It may be contended, that the law having provided a mode in which these facts were, to be ascertained, the sworn statement of the chief engineer of the company, together with the sworn report of the inspecting officer of the State, were conclusive, and neither the Governor, nor Treasurer had authority to gainsay or go behind them. A contingency can easily be concieved wherein such result would not ensue. Suppose the sworn reports to the contrary, notwithstanding the Governor should ascertain that twenty miles of the road had not been completed, or that the work was defectively done, and that through corrupt influence sworn reports were obtained, would he be authorized to deliver bonds ? The determination partakes necessarily of a judicial character, involving questions both of law and fact. While the law pre scribes the evidence upon which a determination is to be had, it does not exclude other evidence, cumulative or rebutting.
Again, the Comptroller is intrusted with a large discretion as to the amount of tax to be raised each year in order to meet the payment of the semi-annual interest and to provide two per cent, as a sinking fund. Suppose these bonds are required to be issued all at once, and de: posited with the Governor, how is the Comptroller to know what number of bonds have been delivered to the •company, and what amount of tax is necessary? It may be 'answered that the Governor will inform him from time to time, but the law makes no such provision. Is it not clearly within the purview of the act that the Comptroller is to countersign and register such number of bonds as might from time to time become necessary, and that with the countersigning, registering and issuance of each batch he should immediately take steps to have a sufficient tax assessed and collected to meet the interest and Sinking fund? How else is he to know the amount of tax necessary ? And yet. it may be contended that he Iñust perform this important duty without inquiring as to whether the company had complied with its charter or not. Sufficient discretion is vested in him to enable him to bankrupt the people of the State by the assessment and collection of an onerous tax (if such proceeding is constitutional), and yet no discretion is given him to enable him to determine whether any tax is necessary at all. This would seem an absurdity. The law contemplated that he, as well as the others, but he especially, should determine when the company was entitled to its bonds, and the proper amount it was entitled to upon each application, and no court has authority to say that his determination was wrong, and to control the discretion with which he is vested.
Walton, Bell and Pease, for appellee.
The law vests in the Governor the discretion and judgment to decide when the defendant is entitled to these bonds. This discretion and judgment has been exercised by the Governor, who has issued the bonds and done everything in his power towards a delivery of them to the plaintiff.
The State is not in default, and the plaintiff has no occasion to sue her.
The plaintiff has no cause of complaint against any one but the defendant for his failure to perform the mere clerical or. ministerial duty of countersigning and registering the bonds — a duty in regard to which nothing 'is left to his discretion or judgment.
The plaintiff is without remedy under our laws unless a mandamus can be obtained to compel the defendant to perform the ministerial duty of countersigning and registering these bonds.
The authority of the District Court to issue a mandamus in a case like the present one is sustained by repeated decisions of this court.
In support of that authority we refer to the case of Commissioner of the General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Texas, 471, in which Judge Wheeler says: “ The practice of resorting to this proceeding against this officer, and to enforce the performance of this particular duty, is believed to have-had its origin almost as early as the creation of the office itself, and to have been continued without a question as to its legality down to the present time. (2 Texas, 581.) But the right to this writ in a case like the present rests upon other authority than the practice of the courts. By a statute of the Congress of the Republic, approved twenty-fffth of January, 1841 (5 Statutes, 84, Sec. 9), it was enacted that ‘ all writs of mandamus sued out against the heads of departments or bureaus of the government shall be made returnable before the District Court at the seat of government.’ It is well known that this statute was adopted in consequence of a practice then prevailing of calling upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office, by process from the courts of remote counties, to show cause against the issuance of this writ in cases like the present in such distant counties. This act clearly recognizes the right to obtain the writ at the seat of government; and it must, moreover, be regarded as a legislative recognition of the legality of the practice then existing of employing this writ as a private remedy, for it was its use in practice as such which the Legislature undertook to regulate. The use of the writ as a private remedy seems to be comformable to modern practice.” And he refers to 3 Howard, 100.
In the same case Judge Wheeler says: ■ “It has been, however, by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, decided that a mandamus will issue to an officer of the government only when the duty to be performed is ministerial in its character; but that when there is imposed' upon the officer by law a duty requiring the exercise of judgment or discretion, a mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of that discretion.” (12 Pet. R., 524, 609; Id., 497; 7 Cranch, 504; 6 Wheaton, 598; 6 Howard, 92; Board of Land Commissioners v. Bell, Dallam, 366.)
“Respecting the general rule, there does not appear to have been any question. But the difficulty has been in making its application to particular cases, and determining in such cases what acts are to be considered as ministerial and what not. The distinction between ministerial and judicial and other official acts seems to be, that when the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial; but when the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment in determining whether the duty exists, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial.”
We refer also to the case of Meyer v. Carolan, 9 Texas, 252, in which Judge Lipscomb says: "It was said by this court, in discussing the grounds on which a mandamus could issue, ‘ it is an undoubted principle of law that this writ will not issue against a public officer unless to compel the performance of an act clearly defined and"enjoined by law, and which is therefore ministerial in its nature, and neither involves any discretion nor leaves any alternative.’ (Glasscock v. Commissioner of General Land Office, 3 Texas, 53; 12 Peters R., 524; 14 Peters R., 514; 3 Howard, 100.) The same rule is laid down by the court in Cullum’s Administrator v. Latimer, 4 Texas, 329.” And he then quotes at considerable length the foregoing opinion of Judge Wheeler.
In Horton v. Pace, 9 Texas, 81, the court does not question the right to issue a mandamus in a proper case, but the writ is refused because it is sought to compel an officer to do an act in violation of a statute, and because the facts do not show a necessity for the survey sought by mandamus.
We also refer to Stewart v. Crosby, 15 Texas, 546, in which appellant had prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant (Commissioner of General Land Office) from issuing patents to Catlett & Johnson, who were made defendants; and also prayed for a mandamus to compel Crosby to issue patents to plaintiff. Catlett & Johnson answered and prayed for a mandamus against Crosby to compel him to issue patents to them. The first mandam,us was refused, and the last one was issued by the District Court. This judgment was affirmed, the opinion having been delivered by Judge Wheeler.
In McClelland v. Shaw, 15 Texas, 319, Judge Wheeler does not question the principles contended for, but refuses the mandamas because the party was not entitled to, the right he claimed.
In Puckett v. White, 22 Texas, 563, Judge Wheeler lays down the same principles.
In Durrett v. Crosby, 28 Texas, 694, Judge Moore says: “There is no principle more, firmly settled on reason and authority than that a mandamus will not issue to compel a public officer to perform an act unless it be clearly enjoined and defined by law, and therefore ministerial in its character, and involves neither the exercise of discretion nor leaves any alternative.”
In Tabor v. Commissioner of General Land Office, 29 Texas, 520, Judge Smith lays down the same principles.
In the case of the Houston and Great Northern Railroad Company v. Kuechler, Commissioner of General Land Office, 36 Texas, 382, a mandamus was issued against the Commissioner to compel him to issue land certificates under “An act to encourage the construction' of railroads in Texas by donations of land,” and the court quotes the above cases with approval.
In opposition to this array of authorities, the appellant will probably rely on the cases of Hosner v. De Young, 1 Texas, 769, and League v. De Young, 2 Texas, 500, and Marshall v. Clark, 22 Texas, 23, in each of which there is an intimation that these particular cases are in effect suits against the State, which cannot be sued without its consent. It will be observed, however, that the decision in neither of these cases was placed on that ground solely. The two first were applications for a mandamus against a county surveyor to compel him to make surveys upon what are commonly known as “fraudulent certificates,” upon which he was prohibited to make a survey by express statute.
The opinion in both of these cases is really and mainly placed upon the grounds that the law had given the parties another remedy, which they had ¡neglected to avail themselves of, and that the surveys sought to be enforced by mandamus were expressly prohibited by statute. In the last case the decision was also really and mainly" placed upon the ground that the act was not defined and enjoined by law, and that there was no authority of law for doing the act for which the mandamus was asked.
The decisions of this court since these cases show that •it has never considered them as having the effect contended for by appellant. •
The Supreme Court of the United States certainly "does not consider them as having that effect. For in the case of Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace, 203, which was an injunction granted by the United States Circuit Court of Texas restraining the Governor and Commissioner of the General Land Office of Texas from issuing patents on surveys made within the reservation granted to the Memphis and El Paso Railroad Company, the court say, “ that making a State officer a party does not make the State a party, although her lawívjpay prompt his action, and she may stand behind him as the real party in interest. That a State can be made a party only by shaping the bill expressly with that view, as where,” etc., and it is well known that that court is governed by the decisions of the highest State court in cases that arise under the laws of the State. '
In support of the plaintiff’s right to a mandamus in this case we also refer to the following cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the Supreme Courts of other States of the Union, in which it has been held that a mandamus would be granted against public officers in cases similar to this: 1 Cranch, 137; 12 Peters, 526; 5 Ohio State, 529; 23 Missouri, 353; 4 Minnesota, 309; 7 Ohio State, 372; 5 Hamilton, Ohio, 358; 8 Monroe, Ky., 440; 14 Arkansas, 687; 10 Wisconsin, 518; 6 Ohio State, 318; 4 Michigan, 27; 12 Ohio, 54; 3 Indiana, 452; 19 Barbour, 472; 23 Barbour, 339; 1 Selden, 65; 15 Barbour, 529; 12 Barbour, 607; 4 Hill, 634; 41 Maine, 15; 17 Howard, 275; The People v. Secretary of State et al., 58 Illinois, 90.
Nor is the case of the Houston Tap and Brazoria Railway Company v. Randolph, 24 Texas, 317, an authority against appellee’s right to a mandamus in this case. The mandamus prayed for in that case was refused mainly upon the insufficiency of the petition. It did not, as the court held to be necessary, clearly appear that the applicant had a clear right to the thing demanded, and that it was the plain duty of the officer to do the act required of him. Indeed, it was obvious from the charter and the facts of the case that the plaintiff was not entitled to the loan from the school fund which was demanded.
The court also refused the writ because the act which it was sought to force the Treasurer to perform was not only official, but required the exercise of his judgment as an officer, and involved important questions of law as well as fact, which are enumerated and commented on in the opinion of the court. When this case is properly understood, it certainly does not warrant the conclusion that the court entertained the slightest intention of annulling its own former decisions, as well as those of England and every court in America, that a public officer may be required by writ of mandamus to perform a purely ministerial duty, positively required by law, and involving neither official judgment nor discretion. When considered in connection with the facts of the case and the grounds upon which it was decided, the force and pertinency of the comments upon the general dictum and principles of law in respect to mandamus can be readily perceived and are appreciated.
In one particular, however, this case is a strong authority in favor of appellee. It holds that the warrants issued by the board of school commissioners to the railroad company applying for a loan are conclusive that it had done the work required by law, and was free from any adverse claim. So in the present case, the action of the Governor conclusively determined the performance of the acts by reason of which appellant was entitled to the bonds. The transmission of the bonds, after being signed by the Governor and Treasurer, to appellee was conclusive as to him of appellant’s right to them, and left nothing open for his determination, and nothing for him to do beyond the mere ministerial duty of countersigning and registering them as matter of security and protection of the State against forgeries-or fraud.

Opinion:
J. W. Ferris, Special Justice.
This case is brought here by an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Travis county awarding a peremptory mandamus against the appellant, A. Bledsoe, Comptroller of the State of Texas, and commanding him to countersign and register five hundred State bonds, calling for one thousand dollars each.
The action is based upon an act of the Legislature of this State, passed August 5, 1870, entitled, "An act to incorporate the International Railroad Company, and to provide for the aid of the State of Texas in constructing the same," and more particularly upon the 9th Section thereof, which is as follows:
"Sec. 9. In order to secure and promote the rapid construction of said railway, and thereby afford cheap and necessary facilities for emigration into the State, as well as speedy communication between the northeastern and southwestern boundaries, and with the Eastern and ¡Northern States, and to meet, as soon as practicable, the Avants of the people of this State in promoting the settlement of the vacant lands and development of its resources, the State of Texas consents, binds and obligates itself to donate, and hereby grants to said company, the bonds of the State of Texas to the extent and amount of ten thousand dollars per mile for each mile of said railroad constructed under this charter; said bonds to be of the denomination of one thousand dollars each, payable to the company or bearer in thirty years from the date thereof, with interest at thó rate of eight per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, viz., on the first day. of January and the first day of July of each year; said bonds to have coupons attached, for each installment of interest which may become due — which said coupons shall be made payable upon presentation at the city of New York, through such agents of the State as the Governor may select and appoint to pay the same; said bonds shall be signed by the Governor and the Treasurer of the State of Texas, and countersigned and registered by the Comptroller, with the séal of the State of Texas affixed thereto, and shall be delivered by the Governor to the president or such other officer of said company as shall be specially appointed to receive and receipt for the same, on the sworn statement of the chief engineer of.' said company, and the written report of such officers or agents of the State as the Governor may have appointed for that purpose, that ten miles of said railroad have been completed in a thorough and substantial manner; which affidavit and report, together with the receipt for said bonds, shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State; provided, that no bonds under this act shall be issued to said company until it shall have completed at least twenty miles of said railroad, whereupon said bonds shall be issued and delivered 'for that amount of said railroad, and thereafter for every ten miles, according to the .terms and conditions of this charter. The Comptroller of the State shall cause to be assessed a tax upon all taxable property, real and personal, in the State, and upon all occupations, proportioned to the taxes levied by general law on such property and occupations, a sum sufficient annually to pay the accruing semi-annual interest on §aid bonds, and two per cent, as a sinking fund; which said sum shall be assessed and collected, and deposited in the treasury of the State, subject to the order of the Governor, to meet the payment of the interest coupons and the principal of said bonds as soon as- and whenever the same shall become due ; provided, that no greater tax shall be assessed and collected by authority of this section than may be needed from time to time' to pay said interest and sinking fund."
In the petition of the appellee it is represented that' the International Railroad Company is a body politic and corporate, created and established under said act that there was granted to said company the right to construct and own a railroad, and to maintain the same, across the State of Texas, and upon a line designated in said act; that after being duly organized the said company raised the necessary means and completed fifty-two-miles of railroad and fully equipped the same within the time required by said act; that the same was duly reported to the Governor, who thereupon appointed two persons as agents of the State to examine and report-upon the work; that it appeared from the sworn statement of the chief engineer of said company and the report of said agents that said fifty-two miles of railroad, work was of a superior quality, and was in full compliance with the requirements of said act; that thereupon-the said Governor, under said 9th Section of said act-,, caused five hundred bonds of the State of Texas, each, for the sum of $1000', to be prepared, the same having-coupons attached and to run for thirty years ; that the-said Governor signed said bonds, and transmitted them to the Treasurer, who also signed them; that when the-same were transmitted by the Treasurer to the Comptroller, he failed and' absolutely refused to countersign and register the same; that it was the duty of said officer under said 9th Section to countersign and register said bonds (a copy of one of the bonds and a coupon attached being brought into court); that said company has no other remedy bub that which can be afforded by the writ of mandamus commanding the said Comptroller to countersign and register said bonds, and thereupon a peremptory mandamus is prayed for at the hearing in the District Court.
There were general and special demurrers to the petition, and an answer to the merits by the defendant. After the several demurrers were overruled, a trial was had on the facts; and upon a jury verdict judgment final was rendered against the defendant. There was also an intervention by the State of Texas, but as the same has been .abandoned no further notice need be taken of it.
The questions which first properly come up for consideration by the court, and which have been frilly and ably discussed by the counsel, arise upon the demurrers, and are these:
1. Does the record present a proper case for a mandamus, considered on general principles ?
2. Has the District Court the power and authority to compel the Comptroller of the State of Texas to countersign and register the State bonds ?
It is unnecessary to give an account of the origin and use of the writ of mandamus in England. It has been more or less employed in all the courts of America for many years, and the principles applicable to its use have been much discussed. It is sufficient to say that the proceeding by mandamus has for'its object the enforcement of a duty, and that it has ever been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, subject to important restrictions. A mandamus will issue to an officer of the government only when the duty to be performed is ministerial in its character ; and when a duty is imposed upon the officer requiring the exercise of judgment or discretion a mandamus will not lie. (5 Texas, 478; 12 Pet. R., 524, 609; 7 Cr. R., 504; 6 Wheat., 598; 6 How., 92.)
It was said by Justice Wheeler: " The distinction between ministerial and judicial and other official acts seems to be, that when the law prescribes and defines the-duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to, leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial; but when the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment in determining whether the duty exists, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial. (5 Texas, 479.)
This, perhaps, defines the rule as clearly as it can be-done, yet it must be admitted that "the use of terms-handed down from a country where a different government and different laws obtain is calculated to make it difficult of application to particular cases. The word "ministerial" has reference generally to an act done under authority of a superior; and in this sense it could never apply to the chief executive with respect to anything required by the legislative authority. The word "discretion" strictly applies to but few acts. The Grovernor has a discretion in the exercise of the pardoning power, and sometimes a court in determining the amount of a fine; but the instances are few indeed where an officer, executive or judicial, in exercising the functions of his office is left to act solely at his discretion. " The discretion of a judge is said to be the law of tyrants." (Bouvier.) So also the word "judgment" most generally has reference to some determination by a judicial tribunal. It is evident, then, that these words are not to be used in a restricted sense. Where the line of demarkation lies between a ministerial act and an act involving the exercise of judgment is not always easy to determine. In the case of Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters, 518, Justice Catron said: "Any sensible distinction applicable to-all cases it is impossible to lay down; such are the refinements and mere verbal distinctions'as to leave an almost unlimited discretion to the court. How easily the doctrine may be pushed and widened, to any extent, the case furnishes an excellent illustration. The process of' reasoning adopted by those who maintain the power to ^assume jurisdiction is, that where a right exists by law to •demand money of an officer and he refuses to paytthe •court can enforce the right by mandamus, and to ascertain the existence of the right it is the duty of the court to construe the law; and if by such construction the right is found and the refusal to pay ascertained to have been a mistake, then the officer will be coerced to pay out the money as a-ministerial duty." This reasoning is' then pronounced an assumption which cannot be recognized.
. In this case it is contended, that under the 9th Section •of the act incorporating the International Railroad Company, the part to be performed by the Comptroller of the State, to-wit, countersigning and registering the bonds, is ¡a mere clerical or ministerial duty, in regard to which nothing is left to his discretion or judgment. There is discretion or judgment to be exercised somewhere, and by some person or persons; for it is expressly provided •"that no bonds shall be issued to said company until it ishall have completed at least twenty miles of said railroad," etc.; and in the 13th Section of the same act it is provided that "the railroad of said company shall be thoroughly and substantially built; its iron rails shall be of weight not less than fifty pounds," etc. It is evi•dent that the sworn statement of the engineer and the report of the agents were intended to furnish evidence only upon which the proper tribunal might act. It is said that this tribunal is the Governor; but it is difficult to see wherein the authority to decide is granted more to him than to the Treasurer or Comptroller. The injunction is, that "no bonds shall be issued" until a given amount of railroad work is completed, whereupon " the bonds shall ;be issued and delivered," etc. How, there .is a separate provision requiring, that the bonds be delivered by the Governor to the president of the company after they are executed ; why, then, use the expression "issued and delivered" in this prohibitory clause ? If by issued was intended only delivery, what would prevent the execution of the bonds and the accumulation of interest thereon long before the determination upon the work and the delivery?
It is more reasonable to conclude that the prohibition of the issuance of the bonds included also their execution ; and that, as it is necessary for the Governor, Treasurer and Comptroller to participate in their execution, it is the dirty of each one to see to it that the proper and necessary work is first performed; when, if in their judgment the law should be complied with by the company, the proper bonds could be issued, and by the Governor delivered to the company. The three highest executive officers of the State are brought to this work, involving a large financial operation, and it is evident that they are jointly and severally charged with the duty of protecting the interests of the State, involving more than can be properly said to be a mere clerical or ministerial duty.
Again, the act of countersigning and registering the State bonds by the Comptroller, as provided for by the law in this case, is an official act pertaining to one of the principal executive departments of this State, and ilecessarily calls for the exercise of judgment. It is believed that this position is well sustained by the best author ties.
In the case of Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters, 515, which was a proceeding for mandamus against the Secretary of the Navy of the United-States to enforce the payment of a half pension fixed by a special law of Congress, Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The duty required by the resolution was to be performed by the head of one of the executive departments of the government in the ordinary discharge of his official duties. In general such duties, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, are not mere ministerial duties. The head of an executive department of the government, in the administration of the various and important concerns of his office, is continually required to exercise judgment and discretion.. He must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under which he is from time to time required to act. If he doubts, he has a right to call on the Attorney-General to assist him with his counsel; and it would be difficult to imagine why a legal adviser was provided by law for the heads of departments unless their duties were regarded as executive, in which judgment and discretion were to be exercised." The court cannot "by mandamus act directly upon such officer, and guide and control his judgment or discretion in the matters committed to his care in the ordinary discharge of his official duties."
The same doctrine was distinctly announced in the case of Kendall v. The United States, 12 Peters, 610, a leading case on this subject. The court then said: "The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the Postmaster General in the discharge of any official duty," etc. And it was held in that case that "all room for the exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise, was shut out. by the direct or positive command of the law," etc.
The-same principle is still more strongly stated in the later case of the United States v. Guthrie, 17 Howard, 303, when Justice Daniel, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It would occur a priori to every mind that a treasury not fenced round or shielded by fixed and established modes and rules of administration, but which could be subjected to any number or description of demands, asserted and sustained through the undefined! and undefinable discretion of the courts, would constitute-a feeble and inadequate provision for the great and inevitable necessities of the nation. The government, under such an absence of all rule, would, if practicable at all, be administered, not by the great departments ordained by the constitution and laws, and guided by the modes therein prescribed, but by the uncertain and perhaps contradictory action of the courts in the enforcement of their views of private interests." The same court then proceeds to say that, "The power of the courts of the United States to command the performance of any duty by either of the principal executive departments, or such as is incumbent upon any executive officer of the government, has been strongly contested in this court, and in so far as that power may be supposed to have been conceded, the concession has been restricted by qualifications which would seem to limit it to acts or proceedings by the officer not implied in the several and inherent functions or duties incident to his effice — acts of a character rather extraneous, and required of the individual rather than of the functionary." (See other authorities; 5 Texas, 479; Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Texas, 466.)
The Constitution of the State of Texas expressly names the Comptroller of Public Accounts as an executive officer of the government. (Art. 4, Sec. 1.) It assumes to define the powers and duties pertaining to his office. (Art. 4, Sec. 20.) "He shall superintend the fiscal affairs of the State; keep all the accounts of the State; audit all the claims against the State; draw warrants upon the Treasurer in favor of the public creditors, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law." It provides that the Treasurer of the State "shall receive and take charge of all public money paid into the treasury; countersign all warrants drawn by the Comptroller; pay off the public creditors upon the warrant of the Comptroller," etc. (Sec. 21.) It also provides that the Attorney-General shall give legal advice in writing to all officers of the government. (Sec. 23.)
The control and management of the fiscal affairs of a government is of the very highest importance. This power is given to the Comptroller. "He shall superintend," which includes the power of directing under the law. True, he must "perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law," but only such as are in conformity with the Constitution, and are compatible with his powers under it.
The Comptroller being thus placed at the head of the fiscal department, clothed with the power of directing the same, and entitled to bring to his aid able counsel, surely it was intended that in all matters pertaining to the duties of his office, under the Constitution, he should exercise judgment and discretion.
To countersign and register State bonds would manifestly be an official act, and one pertaining to his general duties under the Constitution; for that done, and the bonds would stand as audited and perfected claims against the government, and would perhaps operate as warrants on the Treasurer.
Furthermore, the Comptroller should determine, before countersigning and registering the bonds, whether they in all respects conform to the law; and should consider also the different provisions of the law as they relate to his obligations under the Constitution.
1. The bonds presented to him in this case, as appears from the record, are made payable in the city of New York, so also the coupons; when the act of incorporation' provides only that the coupons should be made payable in that city.
2. The act provides that he shall assess a tax on all the taxable property in the State, to meet the accruing interest on said bonds and to raise a sinking fund ; when no tax for that purpose appears to have been levied by the legislative authority.
3. The act provides that the fund raised by taxation, and deposited in the treasury, shall be subject to the order of the Gtovernor to meet the payment of the debt; when by the Constitution the - superintendence and direction of all ¡the fiscal affairs are given to the Comptroller.
All these and more are proper matters for the exercise of judgment, both upon the facts and in expounding the law, by an officer, touching the duties of his office, and with reference to a subject of such vital interest to the State. If, then, it is- considered by the courts of the United States that the heads of the executive departments, created by law only, and not by the "Constitution, are authorized to expound the law, and that the general duties pertaining to their office are not ministerial, is there not a greater reason for the rule as applied to an executive officer of this State, holding his trust directly from the people, and whose office is created by the Constitution, with its powers expressly defined therein ?
Again, "to entitle a party to this remedy by mandamus he must show a clear legal right in himself, and a corresponding obligation on the part of the officer; for if the right or the obligation be doubtful, the court will not interfere by this process." (Arbery v. Beavers, 6 Texas, 473.) The fact alone that the bonds were made payable in New York, when the law does not authorize it, would show no obligation on the part of the Comptroller to countersign them.
Second. It is considered that the District Court has not the power and authority under the Constitution to compel an officer of the executive department of the government to perform an. official duty. This conclusion must follow from the structure of our government, and the distribution of power under the Constitution between the three independent departments of government.
This question was first raised and elaborately discussed in the United States Court, in the case of Kendall v. The United States, before referred to. And in the opinion of the court it was announced that, "The theory of the Constitution undoubtedly is, that the great powers of the government are divided into separate departments; and so far as these powers are derived from the Constitution, the departments may be regarded as independent of each other." (12 Peters, 609.) In the same case Chief Justice Taney, delivering a separate opinion, declined to discuss the question, saying that- " the office of Postmaster General is not created by the Constitution, nor are its powers or duties marked out by that instrument. The office was created by act of Congress, and it may limit its powers and regulate its proceedings." (12 Peters, 625.) It is noticeable, however, that the court in its ruling in that case, and in all the cases since that time touching the subject, has disclaimed any interference with the powers and official duties properly appertaining to the heads of the executive department of the government. (14 Peters, 515; 17 How., 303; 6 Wheat., 349.) This right of interference was expressly disclaimed by the court, as before shown, in the case of the United States v. Guthrie, 17 Howard, 303, and it .was then said that whenever the court has assumed to exert its power against any executive officer, it was only as "to acts of a character extraneous and required of the individual lather than of the functionary." (17 Howard, 303.) It would seem that where a want of power in the courts to enforce a mandamus against a high executive officer has not been conceded, nearly the same end has been practically reached by a liberal construction as to the judgment and discretion necessary and proper to be exercised by such officer.
The question may be said to have been authoritatively settled in this State under the Constitution of 1845, in the case of the Houston Tap and Brazoria Railroad Company v. Randolph, 24 Texas, 335. The opinion appears to have been-rendered'after a contest showing research and ability, and by a full court. The following quotation from the opinion is here made, to-wit:
"The 2nd Article of the Constitution provides that 'the powers of the government of the State, of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit, those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.' Here is a direct prohibition of the blending of the departments. It contemplates that the persons employed in each department will be wise enough and honest enough to discharge the duties entrusted to them without the aid or interference of the others. And it is a full warrant for each department to disregard and repel such interference; for, as before said, each one of these departments acts under a delegated limited authority, and if one exceed its authority by usurping powers not belonging to it, its act is a nullity, not binding the other departments, and may be totally disregarded by them. If the Governor were to dictate to the judges the judgment to be pronounced, and enforce obedience by his power over the militia, the usurpation would be startling indeed, and too plain for discussion. Hot any more so in principle, however, than for the District Court of Travis county, or the Supreme Court of the State, to require by its mandate that the Governor of the State shall sign a patent to land, or the Comptroller shall audit an account, or the Treasurer of the State shall pay a draft upon the treasury."
Since that ruling was published two constitutions of the State of Texas have been made (that of 1866 and that of 1869), and the same inhibition as to the exercise of power by persons of the different departments of government is retained, and doubtless with a full knowledge of the ruling of the court on this important question. And, as if it were intended by the framers of the Constitution now in force to leave no room for judicial construction, that instrument is made to expressly define the different ex ecutive offices which constitute the executive department, one of which is the Comptroller of Public Acccounts. (Art. 4, Sec. 1.) And with reference to the Comptroller, among others, it.expressly defines his powers and marks out the line of his duties (Art. 4, Sec. 20), which was never done before in any Constitution of this State. It is observable, also, that whereas under the old Constitution the supreme executive power was vested in the chief magistrate, under the present Constitution it is vested in the entire magistracy composing the executive department, with the powers of each separately defined. Are all these changes meaningless ? Surely not. They must have been intended to more clearly define the boundaries of power between the three great departments of the government, and also between the different offices composing the executive department.
These considerations furnish additional and very strong reasons why the court should adhere to the ruling made in the above case of the Houston Tap and Brazoria Railroad Company v. Randolph.
In the .different States of the Union the executive power is vested in the Governor, while in this State, as before stated, it is vested in the magistracy composing the executive department. The authorities are numerous sustaining the independence of the executive department. (Dennett, Pet., 32 Maine, 508; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I., 192; State v. The Governor, 1 Dutcher, N. J., 331; Law v. Towns, 8 Ga., 360; Hawkins v. The Governor, 2 Ark., 570.)
If there is no other remedy than by mandamus against the Comptroller for the non-performance of official duties, the same could be said of the Governor, and of a judge of the court. It is as reasonable to suppose that one officer would act up to the performance of duty as faithfully as another. Evidently this independence of power in the different departments was intended to act as a cheek and restraint against usurped authority.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of this State are relied on as authority in support of the jurisdictional right of the court to award a peremptory mandamus in this case. It may be well to determine the weight of such authority by examining into their origin and history. First, it must be considered that a petition for a writ of mandamus has never been sustained in this State against the Governor, Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer, or Auditorial Board, though many have been filed and prosecuted. They have been sustained against the Commissioner of the General Land Office in very few instances —perhaps three or four out of the numerous cases wherein it has been attempted. (Horton v. Brown, 2 Texas R., 78; Ward, Commissioner, v. Townsend, 2 Texas R., 581; H. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Kuechler, 36 Texas R., 382.)
In the first case, the suit above referred to was between two claimants, and the writ was incidental. In the second, there was no statement of facts, and the rule was adopted that ' in their absence the legal intendment is in favor of the correctness of the judgment." In neither of the two first cases referred to was the question of the right to the writ argued by counsel, or discussed by the court. The early cases afterwards" determined by this court, in which the principles were énunciated as applicable to the remedy by writ of mandamus, were cases in all of which it was held that the writ could not be sustained. And the principles announced were assumed to be drawn mainly from the decisions in these two cases, and from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon that subject. (Glasscock v. Commissioner General Land Office, 3 Texas, 53; Bracken v. Wells et al., 3 Texas, 90; Commissioner General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Texas, 477; Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Texas, 464, and others.)
The rule announced by Justice Wheeler in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Commissioner General Land Office v. Smith, as the conclusion thus arrived at, was that "a mandamus may issue to compel the Commissioner of the Greneral Land Office to issue a patent when it shall hate been made- to appear to the court that the right of the party is clear." (5 Texas, 480.) Thus holding that, however complex the facts, or confused the law in the construction of it, when, after investigation in a court, the right is made to appear to be clear, the writ of mandamus would issue. That this was the exact position assumed may be seen by reference to his opinion in 5 Texas, 479. This, it is believed, extended the remedy far beyond the decisions quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, it has been held by that court that a mandamus could not issue against the Commissioner of the Greneral Land Office of the United States, in a case wherein there were complex facts to be examined into, requiring judgment, and which " calls for the exercise of the judicial functions of the officer." And upon the question as to whether a mandamus can be issued in any case against the Commissioner, it is said in that opinion, "we have found no case in which this power has been exercised. Patents are to be signed by the President in person, or in his name by a secretary, under his direction, and countersigned by the recorder of the G-eneral Land Office." (United States v. The Commissioner, 5 Wall., 565.)
It must be recollected that this remedy was introduced in Texas mainly as an incident to suits between private litigants in the different counties of the State, which caused a statute to be passed requiring such suits against the heads of departments or bureaus to be brought in Travis county. (Act of 1846, Hartley's Digest, Art. 643, p. 237.) However such act may have recognized the legality of such suits, it could not be held, either in its terms or by implication, to have enlarged and extended the remedy by mandamus beyond the enforcement of a merely minis terial act by any of such officers, while they were regarded as high executive officers of the State. (5 Texas, 478.)
It must be considered, also, that the office of Commissioner of the General Land Office, previous to the Constitution of 1869 (which made it a constituent portion of the executive department), was a mere commission to aid in perfecting and preserving land titles, and that the Commissioner was regarded and treated by the courts as merely a ministerial officer, whose office was created and shaped, and whose duties in said office were prescribed, entirely by the acts of the Legislature, and all of whose official acts and determinations, whether involving the exercise of judgment or not, were subject to be enquired into in a suit by mandamus. (Norton's S. v. The Commissioner, etc., 2 Texas, 362; Com. G. L. O. v. Smith, 5 Texas, 479-80; Glasscock v. Com. G. L. O., 37 Texas, 53.) The limitations of the remedy to purely ministerial acts, as announced in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in 1 Cranch, 12 and 14 Peters, 6 Wheat., 6 Howard, 5 Wallace), though quoted as a basis, were never practically applied to the Commissioner in any of the decisions as it was applied to the acts of the heads of departments in the government of the United States. It must be observed, also, that none of those decisions in reference to the Commissioner consider or discuss the question of the division of the powers of government — treating the Commissioner as part of, or subject to, the executive department of the government.
The last case, wherein the writ was issued to the Commissioner, though decided since the Commissioner has been made a constituent portion of the executive department of the State by the Constitution of 1869, is rested upon previous decisions and general principles. (Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 36 Texas, 382.)
Under the view here presented, it is not perceived that the decisions relating to the Commissioner of the General Land Office can be of any great weight of authority in this case.
At the late session of the State Legislature a compromise act, or act of adjustment, with the International Railroad Company was passed, and other questions have been presented for our consideration as if an adjudication thereon was contemplated by said act. There is a provision in the act that the same shall not be considered as in any way interfering with the litigation in this case. Moreover, there is no expression recognizing the State of Texas as a party to the suit. It having been already decided that the court has no jurisdiction over this case, any further opinion on the questions presented would be extra-judicial and without authority.
For the reasons given, it is considered by the court that the judgment of the court below be reversed and that the cause be dismissed.
Reversed akd dismissed.