Case Name: Thomas W. FREY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-03-05
Citations: 708 So. 2d 918
Docket Number: No. 88924
Parties: Thomas W. FREY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: OVERTON and WELLS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 708
Pages: 918–926

Head Matter:
Thomas W. FREY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 88924.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 5, 1998.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Ann Pfeiffer Corcoran, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Frey v. State, 679 So.2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), wherein the court certified:
Is the offense of resisting arrest with violence a specific intent crime to which the defense of voluntary intoxication applies?
Id. at 38. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the negative and approve Frey.
Deputy Britt was on uniformed patrol at 11:30 p.m., April 20, 1994, when he saw Thomas Frey acting suspiciously near Earl's Trailer Park. Britt asked Frey for identification, and when a radio check showed an outstanding arrest warrant, Britt attempted to handcuff him. Frey, who was very drunk (his blood alcohol level was .888, or approximately four times the legal limit for driving), said, "I'm not going to jail," and grabbed Britt's throat with both hands, choking him. Britt tried to break free but could not. The deputy kicked and punched Frey, and in a final attempt to free himself, shot Frey in the legs. Both Britt and Frey were treated at the hospital for their injuries.
Frey was charged with aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence. He was tried before a jury and in closing argument defense counsel argued that Frey had been too drunk to form the specific intent to commit the crimes. The prosecutor, on the other hand, told the jury that while voluntary intoxication is a defense to aggravated battery, it is not a defense to resisting arrest with violence. The judge in his instructions to the jury echoed the prosecutor's statement of the law. Frey was convicted of battery and resisting arrest with violence. The district court affirmed and certified the above question.-
Frey argues that resisting arrest with violence is a specific intent crime and that his requested instruction on voluntary intoxication should have been given on this charge. He asserts that the trial court erred not ohly in denying the instruction but also in instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to resisting arrest with violence. We disagree.
Voluntary intoxication has long been recognized in Florida as a defense to specific intent crimes, as this Court noted in Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1985):
[W]e note that this Court has long recognized voluntary intoxication as a defense to specific intent crimes. Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla.1967); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891). In Garner we stated that when
a specific or particular intent is an essential or constituent element of the offense, intoxication, though voluntary, becomes a matter for consideration . with reference to the capacity or ability of the accused to form or entertain the particular intent, or . whether the accused was in such a condition of mind as to form a premeditated design. Where a party is too drunk to entertain or be capable of forming the essential particular intent, such intent can of course not exist, and no offense of which such intent is a necessary ingredient, [can] be perpetrated.
28 Fla. at 153-54, 9 So. at 845.
Linehan, 476 So.2d at 1264. The defense, however, is unavailable for general intent crimes. Id.
Professor LaFave describes the general contours of specific intent, as opposed to general intent, crimes:
[T]he most common usage of "specific intent" is to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime. Common law larceny, for example, requires the taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the defendant's mental state as to this act must be established, but in addition it must be shown that there was an "intent to steal" the property. Similarly, common law burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another, but in addition to the mental state connected with these acts it must also be established-that the defendant acted "with intent to commit a felony therein." The same situation prevails with many statutory crimes: assault "with intent to kQl" as to certain aggravated assaults; confining another "for the purpose of ransom or reward" in kidnapping; making an untrue statement "designedly, with intent to defraud" in the crime of false pretenses; etc.
1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(e)(1986)(footnotes omitted).
To determine whether resisting arrest with violence is a general intent or specific intent crime, we look to the plain language of the statute:
843.01 Resisting officer with violence to his person. — Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer . in the lawful .execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . is guilty of a felony of the third degree....
§ 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1993).
The statute's plain language reveals that no heightened or particularized, i.e., no specific, intent is required for the commission of this crime, only a general intent to "knowingly and willfully" impede an officer in the performance of his or her duties. In fact, the statute is similar in format to the statute defining arson, which we held to be a general intent crime. Only if the present statute were to be recast to require a heightened or particularized intent would the crime of resisting arrest with violence be a specific intent crime. Our holding is in harmony with our precedent.
Based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the result in Frey as explained herein.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON and WELLS, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs with an opinion.
GRIMES, Senior Justice, concurs with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J., concurs.
. See Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla.1985) (The arson statute reads in part: "Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged . [a] dwelling . is guilty of arson in the first degree which constitutes a felony of the first degree_").
. For instance, the statute might be recast to read: "Whoever knowingly and willfully resists . an officer . in the lawful execution of any legal duty, with the intent of doing violence to the person of such officer . is guilty of a felony of the third degree."
. See Linehan, 476 So.2d at 1264 ("Florida courts have rejected the voluntary intoxication defense in the following cases involving general intent crimes.... Williams v. State, 250 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (violence while resisting arrest)...Cf. Colson v. State, 73 So.2d 862 (Fla.1954) (the jury did not err in rejecting the claim that the defendant was too drunk to "resist . the sheriff"). We disapprove Gonzales v. State, 488 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), wherein the court ruled that "resisting an arrest with violence[] is a specific intent crime." Id. at 610.