Case Name: LAWRENCE et al. v. TOWN OF MANSFIELD
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1911-11-27
Citations: 129 La. 672
Docket Number: No. 18,612
Parties: LAWRENCE et al. v. TOWN OF MANSFIELD.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 129
Pages: 671–677

Head Matter:
(56 South. 633.)
No. 18,612.
LAWRENCE et al. v. TOWN OF MANSFIELD.
(Nov. 27, 1911.)
(Syllabus by the Court.)
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. Appeal and Error (§ 47*) —Supreme Court — Jurisdictional Amount.
Where an amended answer sets up that the value of the matter in dispute exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this court, and where it is patent from the record that the value is as alleged, this court will, assume jurisdiction of the cause.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 47.*]
2. Municipal Corporations (§ 33*) — Extension op municipality — Ordinances.
Act No. 136 of 1898 does not deny the right of appeal from a judgment of a district court, decreeing a proposed extension of a municipality unreasonable and unjust. It merely provides that when a proposed extension shall have been declared unreasonable, or unjust, then all ordinances proposing practically the same thing shall not be passed within a year, and this time begins to run, when the matter has been appealed, only from the date of final judgment of this court.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 33.*]
On the Merits.
3. Statutes (§ 163*) — Repeal of General Act by Special Act.
The general law, conferring on municipalities the right to extend their territorial limits, is not repealed, by implication, by a later act conferring a charter on a town and providing its limits. The provisions of the general law extend not only to municipalities in ex istence at the time of its passage, but also to those created thereafter.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 238; Dec. Dig. § 163.*]
4. Municipal Corporations (§ 33*) — Exten- . sion of Municipal Limits — Review.
The question of whether the limits of a municipality should be extended is a quasi legislative one. Where the legislative body of a municipality has decided on an extension, this court can set it aside only when it is unreasonable, and it will not undertake to say it is unreasonable without abundant evidence to clearly establish that fact.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 33.*]
Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; Don E. Sor elle, Judge.
Action by Samuel Lawrence and others against the Town of Mansfield. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed, and action dismissed.
C. W. Elam, for appellant. H. T. Liver-man, for appellees.

Opinion:
On Blotion to Dismiss the Appeal.
BREAUX, C. J.
The grounds are that the jurisdictional amount sought to be alleged is less than the lower limit, and the supplemental answer, filed for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in this court, sets forth a fictitious amount; furthermore, that no appeal will lie from a judgment of the district court, decreeing a proposed extension of a municipality unreasonable and unjust, as such judgment is final for the period of two years, citing Act No. 136 of 1898 in support of the motion to dismiss on this point.
The defendant filed an answer to plaintiffs' petition, in which there was no jurisdictional allegation.
This answer was equally as silent upon the subject.
The defendant filed an amended answer in order to allege that the annulling of the ordinance assailed by plaintiffs will injure it in a sum exceeding .$2-,000 by the reduction in the alimony of the town.
The character of the issues, and the difference in the revenues of the town, or in the amount of the tax to be paid by each taxpayer, give a weight to the jurisdictional allegation, which we deem controlling in determining whether or not this court has jurisdiction.
It is proposed to add a large area to the limits of a small town. That of itself conveys the idea that there is a considerable interest involved, and this is confirmed by the jurisdictional allegation in question.
The other ground alleged for dismissing the appeal is that the matter at issue has been settled for a period of 12 months.
Were we to sustain that position, it would have the effect of denying to the unsuccessful litigant the right of appeal.
The limit of 12 months dates from the day that the question is finally disposed of by this court, and it is not limited to the date that the judgment is rendered in the district court.
The following excerpts sufficiently disclose the legislative intent:
The appéal from the ordinance "shall be by suit in the district court."
But, if the ordinance be adjudged unreasonable, it shall be vacated, and the extension or contraction of limits, and all ordinances proposing practically the same "shall be prohibited for one year."
It is an unavoidable construction when considered with that which precedes in the section, "prohibited for one year," from the time it is settled by the court of last resort.
The two provisions of the act in question must be taken and construed together.
It then becomes perfectly evident, as the first part of the section expressly refers to an appeal, that in construing the section the right of appeal must be taken into account.
The ordinance has not as yet been finally adjudged reasonable or unreasonable, and until then no delay begins under tbe terms of the act quoted.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.