Case Name: THE STATE ex inf. ELLIOTT W. MAJOR, Attorney-General, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1911-11-27
Citations: 237 Mo. 369
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex inf. ELLIOTT W. MAJOR, Attorney-General, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA.
Judges: Lamm, Ferriss and Brown, , JJ., concur in all except the judgment suggested in this opinion; Kennish, J., not sitting, having been of counsel.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 237
Pages: 369–424

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex inf. ELLIOTT W. MAJOR, Attorney-General, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA.
In Banc,
November 27, 1911.
1. COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: Eliminating Destructive Competition: Benefit to Consumer: Legislative Rule. A combination, organized for the purpose of acquiring the properties and assets of a half dozen large companies engaged in a fierce and demoralizing competition and doing in this country from eighty to ninety per cent of the business in which they were engaged, cannot be held not to be one declared unlawful by the statute, simply because its first results were to restore an equable condition to the market and to remove that destructive competition. The law is not interested alone in the consumer. A competition between producers may become so fierce and destructive as to be of no ultimate advantage to the consumer; yet the tendency of a fair competition is to produce a wholesome condition of the market. The law also has regard for the producer; competition may be of such a character and so designed as to destroy weaker competitors, -leaving only a giant in the field, who then would have a monopoly of the market; the law will protect a small manufacturer or dealer from the destruction that the avarice of a powerful rival might design. It is impossible for the Legislature to prescribe a general rule by which competition conducive to a wholesome condition of the market can be distinguished from a combination that is demoralizing and disorganizing.
2. -: Reasonable Restraint: Unused Power or Moderate Use. When a contract or act of combination is to be upheld on the theory that it is only a reasonable restriction on trade, it must appear on the face of the contract or act that the restriction which it creates is limited within reasonable bounds. It will not avail one who attempts to defend a contract unlimited in its terms, or an act unlimited in the apparent scope of its power, to say that it will be used only in a moderate degree. The law is jealous of unlimited power in whosesoever hands placed. When men ■deliberately and intelligently acquire power that will enable them to control the market of a useful article, it is no defense for them to say they did not control the trade or limit competition in that article, and have not used their power oppressively. The statute is designed to prevent the acquisition of power for the purpose of influencing the market by combinations of concerns that otherwise would compete with each other in the market. The purpose of those entering the combination is to be ascertained from the consequences that naturally will result from their acts. The fact that the acquired power has not been used to the injury of the consumer or other dealers is no defense.
3. -: -: Combining Competing Companies. The buying of the entire assets of five or six great companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of farming machinery and combining them into one corporation, with the design that the fierce and destructive competition that had existed between them might cease, and with the result that it did cease, is in violation of the anti-trust statutes, and the corporation has no right to do business in this State.
4. -: --: -: Brought About by Separate Contracts. The fact that there was no joint agreement between the competing companies to merge themselves into one or to sell their entire assets to another, does not affect the fact that the purchaser combined their properties for the purpose of ehminating competition between them; nor does the fact that each conducted its part of the scheme as if it were simply making á separate sale of its own properties. Those things show they were acting cautiously, and were endeavoring to avoid the appearance of a combination, and to circumvent the anti-trust laws; but if the effect was to remove them all from trade as active competitors and to combine all their business in the one purchaser, the form of contract by which the combination was brought about cannot save it from condemnation.
5. -: Corporations: Doing Business in State: Principal and Agent. What a principal is forbidden to do in his own name he cannot do through an agent. Where a corporation of New-Jersey cannot do business in Missouri, since it is a combination in restraint of trade, in violation of the anti-trust statutes, it cannot do business in this State through a Wisconsin corporation, previously licensed to do business here, whose stock and assets it has acquired. If the unlawful principal cannot legally obtain a license to do business here neither can its agent, nor will a license previously issued to its agent avail.
6. -: -: -: -: Amount of .Capital Invested Here. A corporation cannot do business in this State through a sales agent whose capital stock is less than a hundredth part of its own capital. A New Jersey corporation, capitalized for $120,-000,000 and engaged in the manufacture of harvesters, even if it were not to be otherwise excluded, cannot be permitted to do business here through a sales agent, a Wisconsin corporation, whose properties it has bought and whose capital represented in this State at the time it was licensed to do business here was only $750,000.
7. -: Penalty. In determining the penalty to be adjudged in the ease of a corporation shown to be an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, the court should have regard to the consequences to follow its decision. If it would be an injury to the people of the State to forbid the foreign corporation to do business here, the court may pronounce a judgment of .ouster, and suspend the judgment on terms that will be fair to the company and conducive to the welfare of the people. And in considering the welfare of the people the evil of enhancing the prices of its manufactures to the injury of the people is not the only evil to be guarded against; the driving of small competitors out of business is a wrong that must be held in view.
8. -: Facts Showing Arrangement and Purpose Thereof: Penalty. Six corporations manufacturing mowers, binders and reapers were engaged in fierce competition in the sale of their machines. They were doing business everywhere and from eighty to ninety per cent of the harvester business of the country, the balance being done by smaller .concerns in picked places where conditions were more favorable and competition less active. The owner of one of them applied to Perkins of New York for a loan of money, and stated the condition of the business generally. Perkins bought the entire properties of another, a Wisconsin corporation, and then he and the 'owners of the other five met around a table in New York and conveyed all the assets, patents, trade-marks, machines and other tangible properties of each company, by separate contracts, to a trustee, for a named sum; then the International Harvester Company (a New Jersey corporation) was organized with a capital of $120,000,000, and these properties were conveyed to it by the trustee, its stock being issued to voting trustees, each trustee holding stock therein in proportion to the valuation of the separate properties of the separate six companies as fixed by their separate contracts, .this stock and this arrangement being accepted by the former owners of the separate companies in payment for their properties. Because some of the states would not admit within their borders a corporation of such large capital stock, and others imposed a larger license tax than the mergers thought was reasonable, it was decided that the International Harvester Company would limit its operations to manufacturing the machines, and, to sell them, would employ another company which would not be objectionable to the laws of those states. For this purpose the managers of the International Harvester Company turned their attention to the Wisconsin corporation, whose stock and properties it then owned, and which had already been licensed to do business in this State, and is the only respondent, and whose name they changed to the International Harvester Company of America, and whose directors they elected. This company, having charge of the entire business of selling the machines manufactured by the other, appointed sales agents in each state, one for the “McCormick” machines, one for the “Deering,” one for the “Champion,” etc., and compelled each agent to take the machines at a price named by the company, and to sell them at a price named by it, and for a named commission, and if there was any reduction from the listed price to the retailer or consumer the reduction was to and did come out of the agent’s commission, and each agent confined himself to selling the machines mentioned in his contract, and could sell those of no other manufacture. After four years of the nine since this arrangement was effected, the provision that the agent was to sell the machines at a price named by respondent was omitted from the agents’ contracts. Immediately after the consolidation was effected, competition in the trade ceased. The first year thereafter, prices of machines to consumers was lowered. Thereafter there was a small increase in prices, but that increase was not equal to the increase in cost of production.
Held, by all the judges, that the arrangement was an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and was made for the purpose of lessening full and free competition, and the respondent being a party to the arrangement should be ousted from doing business in this State until it severs itself as a member of the combination.
Held, by VALLIANT, C. J., that the International Harvester Company should be permitted to obtain a license to do business in this State upon the payment of the license tax prescribed by law, and upon condition that it do not use its power either to force a competitor to sell or to drive it out of the market by unfair methods, and that it will not raise the prices of the machines it sells beyond a fair profit on their cost and the expense of marketing them, the license to stand revoked if at any time hereafter, on motion of the Attorney-General, it be made to appear that said company has violated any of said conditions.
Held, by GRAVES, J., that the judgment should not be made to apply to the International Harvester Company, since it is not a party, but only to the International Harvester Company of America, -which is the only respondent; and that respondent should be fined $50,000, and ousted from the State, the ouster to be conditioned upon its severance within a time prescribed by the court of all unlawful connection with the International Harvester Company.
Held, by FERRISS, J., that no fine should be imposed, but that respondent should be ousted, the ouster to be suspended upon condition that respondent show within a specified time that it is no longer a member of the combination.
Upon rehearing, th© fine of $50,000 is reduced to $25,000 and the judgment of ouster, upon condition, affirmed.
9. -: -: Judgment: Against Company Not Party. The court should not by its judgment place restrictions upon a company not before the court. If such a company desires to do business in this State it should have the right to make application for a license unhampered by a prejudgment in a ease to which it was not a party. But in determining whether or not a company that is a party is an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and the punishment to be assessed, the court should consider the relation such other company bore to it, and the character of business done by each. [Per GRAVES, J.] '
10. -: Statute: To What Applies. The statute (Sec. 10301, R. S. 1909) prohibits two classes of “arrangements, contracts, agreements, combinations and understandings”; namely, (1) those that were made “with the view to lessen ; . . full and free' competition,” but which may not have been so operated as to accomplish the result intended; and (2) those “which tend-to lessen . . . free and full competition” and which in fact do or did lessen competition. Judged by this evident meaning of the statute, the International Harvester Company of America from its inception was a corporation that falls within both classes. To bring the arrangement within the prohibition of the statute it is not necessary that competition actually stopped; if it was made with the view of lessening competition it is unlawful. [Per GRAVES, J.]
11. -: -: At Date of Arrangement: Continuing. If a new corporation with the “design and view of lessening full and free competition” bought up all the properties and assets of several other competing corporations and engaged in the manufacture of the same and like machines, and respondent, organized as a sales agent for the sale of the machines made by said company, was a party to said arrangement, it was then and now is guilty of violating the anti-trust statutes. If the arrangement was unlawful when made, it remains unlawful so long as it exists. [Per GRAVES, J.]
12. --: Construction Combiners Placed Upon Own Acts. Not only the meaning of a contract, but the purpose of an act, may be judged by the construction the parties thereto place upon it. The purpose of one act can be gathered by subsequent acts immediately following, where the subsequent acts were done in pursuit of a performance of the first. [Per GRAVES, J.]
13. -: Penalty: Defrauding State of Taxes: Fine. As the respondent has openly violated the laws whilst domiciled in this State, by entering into an arrangement to thwart competition; has defrauded the .State of license taxes to which it was entitled, • by acting as a sales agent on a capital of one-fortieth of that of its principal and by paying only one-fortieth of what its principal would have had to pay had it done business in its own name; has participated in lowering prices and driving other competitors from the field; has for nine years maintained an unlawful arrangement to decrease competition in this State, contrary to its laws; and has by its conduct been enabled to filch the purses of the agriculturalists, a fine of $50,000 and a conditional ouster are a reasonable and conservative punishment. [Per GRAVES, J.]
14. -: Of Public Benefit: Nevertheless an Illegal Combination. Although the facts show that .the combination has so far been beneficial to the community; that the price of its machines has not been raised in proportion to the increased cost of production, and other incidental benefits have accrued to the consumers; and that independent manufacturers have not been injured by reason of the combination; yet as the combination, as shown by the facts in evidence, was created to prevent the competition which up to that time had existed among the various companies that were merged into the combination, it must be held to be unlawful and in violation of the statute which forbids a license to do business in this State to any foreign corporation organized to lessen competition, and must be ousted. [Per FERRISS, J.]
15. -: -: Penalty: Fine. But in such case the corporation should not be fined, because such penalty is not required by the statute; but the judgment of ouster should go, and the company be prohibited from doing business in this State so long as it remains a member of such combination. [Per FERRISS, J.]
. Quo Warranto.
Writ of ouster awarded (and suspended conditionally).
Elliott W. Major, Attorney-General.
Charles G. Bevelle and James T. Blair, Assistant Attorneys-General, for informant.
(1) The commissioner, who heard the testimony and had the witnesses before him, reports that from the evidence adduced the International Harvester Company was organized for the express purpose of suppressing competition, and that respondent has been, and is. maintained by the International Harvester Company solely in furtherance of that unlawful purpose. Unless the findings of a commissioner appointed by the court to report on the law and facts are affirmatively and clearly shown to be wrong, the court will accept same as correct. State ex rel. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 177 Mo. 38; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 194 Mo. 164-5. (2) The organization of the International Harvester Company was brought about to restrain competition and was illegal. Secs. 10298, 10299, 10300, 10304, 10322, R. S. 1909; Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551; Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632; Distillery &■ Cattle Feed Co. v. People, 156 111. 448; State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 719; National Land Co. v. Grote Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 266; Eustis v. Edgar, 207 Mo. 289; Finck v. Granite Co., 187 Mo. 244; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700; American Biscuit Co. v. Klotz, 44 Fed. 721; Strait v. National Harrow Co., 18 N. Y. Supp. 224; National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 Fed. 667; National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed, 36; Continental- Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 166 Fed. 945; Attorney-General v. A. Booth & Co., 143 Mich. 89; Merz Capsule Co. v. U..S-Capsule Co., 67 Fed. 414; Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Lewis Yoight, Sons & Co., 148 Fed. 939; National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 129; Clancey v. Onondago Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62 Barb. 395; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 279; Pitts- burg Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46; Noyes on Corporate Relations (2 Ed.), secs. 307, 310; Beach on Monopolies and Industrial Trusts, sec. 159, pp. 505, 507, pr. 167, p. 543; pr. 165, p. 536; Eddy on Trusts and Monopolies, p. 550; pr. 617, 620, 621, 622; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Oh. St. 137; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co.-, 54 Hun, 356; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582; Bishop v. American Preserves Co., 157 111. 284; Dunbar v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 224 111. 9; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1; 2 Cook on Corp. (6 Ed.), pr. 503a; State ex rel. v. Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1; Railroad Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348; State ex rel. v, Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356; Froelieh v. Musicians Mutual Benefit Assn., 93 Mo. App. 383; Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo. App. 64; State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506; State ex rel. v. National Harvester Co. (Kansas case not yet officially reported); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; Joint Traffic Assn. v. United States, 171 U. S. 338; Clark v. Central Railroad, 50 Fed. 346; International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 S. W. 637; International Harvester Co. v. State, 99 Pac. 603; Cohen v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 166 N. Y. 298; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434; Railroad v. Railroad, 41 La. Ann. 970; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290. (3) The effect of this combination has been not only to restrain competition, but to create a monopoly. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177; People v. Chicago, Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 268; Con. Securities Co. v. Transit Co., 165 Fed. 945; Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Lewis Yoight, Sons & Co., 148 Fed. 939; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; Strait v. National Harrow Co., 18 N. Y. Supp. 224; American Biscuit Co. v. Klotz, 44 Fed. 721; National Lead Co. v. Grote Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 266; Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632; Froelich v. Musicians Mut. Benefit Assn., 93 Mo. App. 383; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 O. St. 137. (4) Respondent has been, and is, maintained by the International Harvester Company solely for the purpose of selling its products and in furtherance of the unlawful purpose for which it was organized and is violating the anti-trust laws of Missouri. Cases cited under Point 2, supra. (5) Respondent’s license should also be revoked upon the additional ground that it has ceased to perform the functions for which it was licensed, and has permitted itself to be used in evasion of the Missouri law which precluded the International Harvester Company from doing business in this State. Secs. 3040, 3343, 3347, R. S. 1909; State ex rel. v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 32;’ Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 51; Commonwealth v. Bank, 28 Pa. St. 389; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun, 354. (6) When, in the exercise of its constitutional power, the Supreme Court refers a proceeding in quo warranto, which involves a charge of conspiracy, to a commissioner to report upon the law and the facts, his findings thereon will be accepted by the court as correct unless they are affirmatively and clearly shown to be wrong. State ex rel. v. Continental Tobacco Co., 177 Mo. 38; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 194 Mo. 164. (7) The organization of the International Harvester Company was brought about to restrain competition and was illegal. Whatever breaks down competition is destructive of public interest^ and antagonistic to the public welfare. State ex rel. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1; United States v. Addyston Pipe &. Steel Co., 54 U. S. App. 747. The provisions of the common law, and its remedy of refusing to enforce these tainted contracts, were not entirely sufficient to guarantee the preservation of this sound policy, and, in order to make it more effective and to circumvent the artifices and various new forms to which monopolists resorted as the exigencies of the times required, sweeping legislation along this line was enacted by practically all of the States, as well as the National government. From time to time amendments to these statutes have been added until now it seems they are quite sufficient to suppress the evil in all its forms whenever they are applied by courts which probe beneath the thin surface and decide without favor. The Legislature of this State has performed its full duty in this respect, and if trusts and combinations are permitted to flourish here, the blame cannot be charged to that department. R. S. 1899, sees. 8965, 8966, 8967, 8971 and 8978. This statute is comprehensive enough to meet all cases, and cover all forms, however skillfully contrived. Noyes on Intercorporate Relations (2 Ed.), secs. 307, 310. Beach on Monopolies and Industrial Trusts, sec. 159. •
Selden P. Spencer and W. M. Williams for respondent.
(1) The decision in this case becomes one of great practical importance to all persons and corporations doing business in Missouri. In an age “where modern industrial conditions are such that combination is not only necessary but inevitable,” and when the uniting of properties and doing business on a large scale is an “economic necessity,” it is of supreme importance that the commercial world should know precisely the fine demarking the legitimate corporation from the illegal “trust.” .It presents the problem of construing the laws of Missouri in such a plain and practical manner that they may effectively and completely protect the people from the evils which these laws were designed to cure, without interfering with legitimate business development, or running counter to irresistible economic laws. But this court has already dealt with, that problem, and its decisions in former cases give the rules for its rational and practical solution. As said in C. C. C. & I. R. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348:- “The important thing to be secured is a sound and salutary general principle, and not merely cases with closely resembling facts.” In the same case the court said: “We are not required to decide nor do we decide, that combinations fair to the public, untainted by any sinister design, and formed solely to prevent the destruction of business by unregulated competition, may not be valid.” (2) These enactments were intended to be of practical benefit to the public by preventing the evils resulting from conspiracies to restrain trade or to acquire a monopoly, and from contracts whose primary purpose and direct effect are to suppress competition. They were not designed to interfere with any use that individuals or corporations may make of their property which does not injuriously affect the rights of others. The statute applies to individuals and corporations alike. Continental Tobacco Co. Case, 177 Mo. 32. It must also be remembered that the magnitude of the business is not the test by which a violation of the statute is to be determined. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 195. What does the statute forbid? (a) Every contract, agreement or combination of any character or kind whereby individuals or corporations, pretending to be separate and independent, limit prices, divide territory, fix the output, or by any other means stifle competition between themselves or restrain trade; and this regardless of the amount of business or extent of territory in which the parties to such agreement operate. State v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356. (b) A joint selling agent who fixes the prices for the products of separate and apparently competing concerns is likewise condemned. This was the situation and the holding in the Finek and Euston cases, 187 Mo. 244, and 207 Mo. 289. (c) The holding and controlling of stock of competing corporations by a board of trustees, so that all are placed under one joint management, although the plants belong to separate and independent corporations or individuals. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582. (d) “Holding” companies, which own and control the stock of competing corporations and thus bring them all under one control while ostensibly the plants are operated separately. State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1. Corporations or individuals pretending to act independently while co-operating with each other to enrich themselves by preying upon the public, are especially harmful, since others desiring to enter the field are prevented, because it appears to be fully occupied by active competitors. On the other hand, if a single person or corporation actually owns and is operating these same plants as a single property, this condition invites rather than prevents the entrance of new competitors. This emphasizes the distinction between a consolidation of properties which is lawful and a combination of existing companies which is illegal. ¡People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y 624; See Appendix, p. 10. (e) Illegal combinations taking on a corporate form as a mere cloak or cover behind which constituent corporations “continue corporate life and activity through the instrumentality of another corporation.” McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Co., 71 Fed. 787; National Lead' Co. v. Grote Paint Store Co., 8 Mo. App. 266. (f) The mere danger from a gigantic corporation, because of its power to harm which may never be exercised, is guarded against by our statute limiting, the capital stock of corporations which may be organized or licensed in this State. Lead Company case, 80 Mo. App. 247. What does the statute permit? (a) Certainly, it was not intended by the Legislature to interfere with the formation of partnerships between individuals simply because they are competitors in business. Such a partnership would not be illegal be cause the partners knew that by joining their energies in business, the former competition between them would cease and that this would be the necessary effect of their acts. Fairbanks v. Leary, 40 Wis. 643. (b) Likewise, the statutes expressly permit the consolidation of two manufacturing corporations, which, of course, is express authority to unite the plants and properties of competing corporations under one ownership. This right is not affected because the consolidating corporations desire to end competition between them. R. S. 1909, sec. 3403. (e) A corporation formed for the purpose of actually acquiring the absolute and complete title to properties and plants formerly in competition and of operating the same under a new management and control so as to secure greater efficiency and more economical administration, is not within the statutory prohibition merely because of the incidental ending of competition arising from such organization. Any other rule would prohibit competing individuals from forming partnerships and corporations, from purchasing the properties of others, or from consolidating with another. State v. Continental Tobacco Co., 177 Mo. 32. If there is a lawful business reason for the organization of a corporation to acquire the properties owned by others, the incidental effects upon competition resulting therefrom will not make the organization wrongful. In other words, the statute of Missouri says you may acquire, but- you must not agree or arrange. You may consolidate, but you must not combine. You may do business on a large scale, but you must not deceive the public by pretending to be competing when you are not. You may unite under one ownership all the property you wish, but you may not organize in Missouri a corporation with more than $50,000,000 of capital or as a foreign corporation employ more than $10,000,000 here. If, therefore, a corporation organized by Mr. Perkins with capital entirely furnished by parties who had never been eon nected with or engaged in the harvester business, could have purchased, under precisely the same circumstances and for the same purpose and with the same results (as seems to be conceded by the State) the properties and plants of the harvester companies whose plants were acquired by the New Jersey Company, upon what principle can the acquisition by the latter be held invalid? It will not do to say that the statute permits one and prohibits the other, because there is no such express permission or prohibition in the statute based upon the personnel of the stockholders in the new company. Continental Tobacco case, 177 Mo. 37; Sugar Refining case, 121 N. Y. 624. (3) This proceeding is against respondent, not the New Jersey Company, and respondent must be judged by its own acts. That respondent’s stock was acquired and is now all held in the interest of the New Jersey Company’s stockholders, does not affect its corporate fife or identity. Kansas, etc., Coal Ry. Co. v. Northwestern C. & M. Co., 161 Mo. 288. Respondent has done no act in Missouri in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Respondent’s sale of those products here is as free from illegality or injury as though made by local dealers, factors or jobbers. United States v. McLaughlin, 169 Fed. 302; Lonabaugh v. United States, 179 Fed. 476. Respondent has no monopoly in binders or mowers, and is an active competitor in twenty-one lines of agricultural implements.

Opinion:
VALLIANT, C. J.
This is an original proceeding in this court on the information of the Attorney-General, charging the respondent with violating the anti-trust laws of this State. There is not much dispute about the essential facts in the case; the difference between the parties consisting mainly in the contention on the part of the State that the acts that were done by the respondent and its associations were done for the purpose of suppressing competition and regulating prices, and the contention on the other hand that the acts were done for the purpose of bringing about a more rational and conservative method of conducting the business of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements within the legitimate bounds of the law and with no purpose of creating a monopoly or suppressing competition, or regulating prices, in the sense that those terms are used in the statutes.
The respondent is a Wisconsin corporation chartered in 1881, under the name Parker-Dennet Harvesting Machine Company, to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling harvesting machines, that is, binders, mowers, etc., and other agricultural implements. It was located at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and conducted its manufacturing business there. Its name was afterwards changed to Milwaukee Harvesting Company and under that name it was licensed to do business in this State in 1892. It established itself here and conducted its business of selling its own manufactured articles until the occurrence of the events herein complained of by the State, since which time it has conducted a business of selling only the products of the International Harvester Company, a New Jersey corporation, which corporation will be hereinafter more particularly referred to and discussed. After the organization of the last named corporation it acquired all the stock of respondent and respondent's name was again' changed, the last name being the International Harvester Company of America; the words "of America" alone distinguishing its name from that of the New Jersey corporation. Respondent is frequently referred to in the-evidence as the "Milwaukee," and for convenience and ready distinction we shall sometimes refer to it by that name.
Besides the Milwaukee Company there were other foreign corporations, manufactuers and sellers of farm implements of the same or similar character, licensed to do business in this State, among them: the McCormick Harvester Company, an Illinois corporation; the Plano-Manufacturing Company, also an Illinois corporation; the Warder-Bushnell & Glessber Company, an Ohio corporation, and the D. M. Osborne and Company, a New York corporation. In addition to the above corporations the Deering Company, which was an Illinois copartnership, was also a manufacturer and seller of harvesting machines and doing business in this State. The manufacturing plants of all these concerns were located in their respective State domiciles; the business they conducted here was that of selling their manufactured products. There were other concerns engaged in like business, but the six companies above named, including respondent, were the chief concerns, and in 1902 (which was the date of the alleged unlawful combination), and for several years prior thereto, they did from eighty to ninety per cent of all harvesting machine business in the United States and in the State of Missouri. The commissioner has listed these companies in the rank of the relative volume of business done by each as follows: (1) the McCormick, (2) the Deering, (3) the Warder-Bushnell & Glessner, {4) the Plano, (5) the Osborne and (6) the Milwaukee. The machines of each company bore the company's trade-mark for a name: "McCormick," "Deering," "Champion" (the Warder-Bushnell & Glessner), "Plano," "Osborne" and "Milwaukee," and were well known to the trade by their respective trade-marks.
In 1902 and for several years prior thereto a very active, an unusually active, competition was practiced by these companies between themselves and others engaged in like business. The commissioner describes the competition as "active, persistent, strenuous and fierce." Respondent describes it as "a bitter wasteful warfare, of a sort never known in any other business in the world." It also says: "Competition was not fair and business-like, such as the law encourages, but a fierce conflict, causing the ruthless ruin of competitors," and of no fair advantage to the farmer. To avoid the disasters with which that condition of the market seemed to threaten the companies engaged in the harvester machine business, the International Harvester Company, the New Jersey corporation, was on August 12, 1902, created, and into it was merged all the properties and business of five of the companies above named, to-wit, the McCormick, the Deering, the Warder-Bushnell & Glessner, the Plano, and the Milwaukee, and in January, 1903, the New Jersey corporation purchased all the stock of the Osborne company and thereupon all the property of that company was transferred to the New Jersey company. Thus in January, 1903, the New Jersey company had acquired the plants and properties of the companies that theretofore had manufactured and sold eighty or ninety per cent of all the harvesting machines in the United States and to that extent it thereafter dominated the market. During . 1903 it acquired control of the Altman-Miller Company, an Ohio corporation, that manufactured and sold a harvesting machine called the "Buck-Eye," and it has since acquired the properties of other concerns engaged in manufacturing harvesting machines and other farm implements in the United States and properties outside the United States. The commissioner finds the value of all its assets to be, on January 31, 1907, $156,282,454.16.
The New Jersey corporation is engaged in manufacturing all of the harvester machines above named and putting them on the market under their respective names, the "McCormick," the "Deering," the "Champion," etc., and the respondent is its sole agent for putting its products on the market. The negotiations which ended in the organization of the New Jersey company were conducted by Mr. Perkins of the banking house of J. P. Morgan & Company, and they were the result of his reflections on the situation of the. harvester machine business prompted by a visit of Mr. McCormick to him in 1902. The object of Mr. McCormick's visit was to obtain money to extend the business of his company. He was fully conscious of the danger to his business threatened by the fierce competition of the other concerns who were his rivals; his was the strongest one of them all, but he wanted to gain more strength to enable him to compete with his rivals successfully. He did not at that time have any idea of forming a combination with his rivals to allay competition and control the market. His talk with Mr. Perkins was in furtherance of his purpose to obtain more money to extend his business, and there was nothing said between them at that time indicative of a purpose to form a combination. Having fully laid his purpose before Mr. Perkins, the latter took time to consider it, and they parted with the understanding that they would meet again. Mr. Perkin's reflection led him to the conclusion that the conditions were favorable for the introduction into the field of a great corporation to engage in manufacturing harvester machines and other agricultural implements. With this idea in his mind when they met again, Mr. Perkins proposed to Mr. McCormick to purchase his plant. The matter was fully discussed and the proposition was agreeable. Mr. McCormick was willing to sell and Mr. Perkins to buy at a price to be agreed on, based on a fair valuation of the property and business. Mr. Perkins had in mind then the purchase of other concerns and was negotiating with them, and Mr. McCormick knew that fact. During these negotiations Mr. Perkins bought for J. P. Morgan & Company all the assets of the Milwaukee Company and paid for them in cash. That seems to have been an outright purchase, not dependent in any degree on the consummation of the negotiations looking to the purchase of the assets of the other companies. Mr. Perkins testi fled that he would have bought the McCormick Company even if he could not have obtained the others. He testified that after talking with McCormick he negotiated with the managers of the other companies, trading with each separately. "After finding out what I could buy the companies for, I tried to pay them in the best coin I had to deliver and they agreed to take stock in the new company in payment." Except with the Milwaukee company there was no concluded contract of purchase, but only an agreeable understanding, until July 28th, 1902, when the respective representatives of all these companies met around a table in New York and each one then and there signed the contract for the sale of the assets of the company he represented. Up to that time there was never a meeting of the representatives of those companies to discuss and agree upon the plan of organization. The negotiations were conducted by Mr. Perkins, or under his direction, with each company separately. He testified that he bought the property of each company, just as he would buy a horse in the market. The evidence shows, however, that each company knew that like negotiations were going on with the other companies and each agreed to take pay in stock in a company to be formed. At the date of the signing of the contracts the respective representatives of the companies had come to New York in relation to this business, but they had held no communication with each other, they came together for the first time when they signed the contracts; these contracts were all alike and were prepared and ready for signature when the parties met around the table.
It was not a joint contract, but each executed a separate one transferring to the trustee named all the property and rights of every description, including accounts and bills receivable, trade-marks, trade names and good will of his company. And it was provided: "The purchase price to be paid by the purchaser to the vendor for all and singular said property shall be the aggregate of the several appraisals and valuations hereinafter provided for and of said accounts and bills receivable and cash, if any, and shall be payable in full-paid non-assessable shares of the capital stock of said purchasing company taken at par." The purchasing company referred to was the New Jersey corporation to be thereafter organized, the immediate transfers being to a trustee to hold until that organization. The acts of the representatives of the several corporations were duly sanctioned and approved by the stockholders of the respective companies, and by the partners in the Deering Company. The agreement to take pay in stock of the company to be formed applied to all the companies except the Warder-Bushnell & Glessner Company; the exception as to that company was made because it was discovered that part of its capital stock was owned by two estates, therefore the proportion belonging to those estates was to be paid in cash, the rest in stock.
All of the contracting companies parted with all their assets of every description and good will, leaving them only the shares of stock which were of no use or value. The next step was the organization of the International Harvester Company under the laws of New Jersey with a capital stock of $120,000,000, which was distributed as follows: J. P. Morgan & Company, having paid for the property and stock of the Milwaukee Company, $3,148,196.66, and their services and expenses in the organization being estimated at $3,451,803.34, they were awarded stock to the amount of $6,600,000; the tangible properties of the McCormick, the Deering, the Warder-Bushnell & Glessner; and the Plano ha-ving been appraised at $53,400,000, and their guaranteed bills receivable and accounts at $40,000,000, stock to the amount of $93,400,000 was distributed to them, and the remaining stock to the amount of $20,-000,000 was issued to individuals who subscribed for it.
After the organization of the New Jersey corporation, all the other companies that had been absorbed by it ceased to do business and thereafter the business of manufacturing and selling harvester machines and other farm implements was conducted by the New Jersey corporation. But because some States would not admit into their borders a corporation of such large capital stock, and others imposed a license tax that the managers thought was unreasonable, it was decided that the corporation would limit its operations to manufacturing the machines and implements, and would employ another concern which would not be objectionable to the laws of those States, to sell its products. For this purpose the managers of the New Jersey corporation turned their attention to the respondent in this case, then called the Milwaukee Harvester Company, the property of which the New Jersey corporation had already acquired, and the stock of which it also owned. The advantage of using this respondent also appeared by the fact that it was already licensed in the States where it was desired to go, and it could operate in those States as the selling agent of the New Jersey corporation under the licenses that it already had. The International Harvester Company (the New Jersey Corporation), being then the owner of the stock of the respondent, the Milwaukee Company, caused the respondent's name to be changed to the International Harvester Company of America, and chose its board of directors, and since then the respondent has been engaged exclusively in the business of selling the machines and implements manufactured by the New Jersey corporation.
Its mode of doing business was to appoint at different places in the State what it called a "sales agent" who was to conduct the business of selling the machines under certain specifications and limitations set out in an elaborate contract on a printed form. This contract for the first three years contained a clause requiring the agent to sell all the machines or property received by him under the contract at such prices and on such terms as might be fixed by respondent or its general agent, and also an agreement on the agent's part not to accept the agency of any other concern in like business; but those restrictions were ehminated from the contract used in 1906 and thereafter. Under the contract after those clauses were ehminated, the agent was required to pay the company a certain price for each machine sold, and whatever he might get in- excess of that price was his commissions. The sliding of the price at which the agent might sell was within the margin of his own commissions, the ' price he was to pay the company was fixed. The evidence showed that there was considerable competition in the trade after the absorption of the competing companies; some of the witnesses, who were agents, testified that there was as much competition after 1902 as there had been before that date. But the competition there spoken of was chiefly between the agents selling the different machines made by the New Jersey corporation; that is, an agent who had the selling of a "McCormick" would compete with one selling the "Deering" or the "Champion" or the "Buck-Eye," etc., and it was within the margin of the agent's commissions. And the evidence showed that there were three independent companies in the market competing with the agents of the respondent, and they did a good business. But as compared with the volume of business done by the respondent that done by the independent companies was small. In entering into the contract the agent was permitted to select "either the "McCormick," the "Deering," the "Champion," the "Plano," the "Osborne" or the "Milwaukee," but was generally confined to one fine.
The evidence also-shows that the price of Harvester machines was not materially higher after the New Jersey corporation entered the field than it was before, until 1908, -when it was increased eight or ten per cent; whilst in the meantime there had been a greater increase in the price of the material and labor used in their construction. The evidence also shows that whilst harvesting machines were the chief products of the companies absorbed by the International Harvester Company, that company has greatly enlarged its business and extended it to many other farm implements, and has thus put itself in competition with the many concerns that theretofore were and still are engaged in' manufacturing such other farm implements and the farmers generally have profited thereby. The evidence also shows that the machines manufactured by the International Company have been greatly improved in quality and the item of repair material has been reduced in'price and placed within closer reach of the farmer. On the whole the evidence shows that the International Harvester Company has not used its power to oppress or injure the farmers who áre its customers.
I. In 1902, when the negotiations which led up to the -organization of the International Harvester Company were begun, competition between the large harvester machine companies in the United States was such as to reduce the market to a condition that was deplorable from the standpoint of the competing companies and it is not certain that its tendency was towards the ultimate advantage of the consumer of those machines. Whilst the tendency of fair competition is to produce a wholesome condition of the market, yet competition may be of such a character and so designed as to destroy the weaker competitors, leaving only the giant in the field, who then would have a monoply of the market. The law is not interested alone in the consumer, but it has regard also for the producer and would, if it could, protect a small manufacturer or dealer from the destruction that the avarice of a powerful rival might design. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is not without force, that the competition that existed in 1902 in the harvester machine market was not the kind of competition that the lawmakers had in mind when they enacted the anti-trust statutes. But unfortunately for that argument it is impossible for the Legislature to prescribe a general rule by which competition conducive to a wholesome condition of the market can be distinguished from a competition that is demoralizing and disorganizing. In a late case (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1), the Supreme Court of the United. States held that the act of Congress which prohibits contracts in restraint of trade was to be construed in.the light of reason, and when so construed it did not forbid the making of every contract that had for its purpose a restrain of trade, but only such as had for its purpose an unreasonable restraint of trade; and, for an example, the court referred to contracts whereby a voluntary restraint would be put by an individual on his own right to carry on his trade or calling; contracts of which character were by the common law of England at one time held to be void, but the doctrine was afterwards modified so that it was only when a restraint by contract was so general as to be coterminous with the kingdom that it was treated as void. Reading the whole opinion in that case wé infer that when the court says a reasonable restraint of trade is not forbidden by the statute, it refers to the restraint which is placed on the trade by the terms of the contract or by the act in question. Under that decision as we understand it, if a contract provides for a reasonable and lawful restraint of trade it is not forbidden by the statute or if the act done is potential only of such a reasonable restraint it is- not condemned. Under the rule there laid down if a contract in question or an act of combination is significant or potential only of a reasonable restraint of competition it is not within the condemnation of the statute. But when a contract or act of combination is to be upheld on the theory that it is only a reasonable restriction on trade, it must appear on the face of the contract or act that the restriction which it creates is limited within reasonable bounds. It will not avail one who attempts to defend a contract unhmited in its terms or an act that is unhmited in the apparent scope of its power, to say that it will be. used only in a moderate degree. The law is jealous of an unhmited power in such case in whose-, soever hands it may be placed-. After laying down the rule of reasonable construction the court turned to the facts of that case and held that the acquisition of power by the Standard Oil Company betokened its unlawful purpose. The court said: "Because the unification of power and control over petroleum and its products, which was the inevitable result of the combining in the New Jersey corporation by the increase of its stock and the transfer to it of the stocks of so many.other corporations, aggregating so vast a capital, gives rise, in and of itself in the absence of countervailing circumstances, 'to say the least, to the prima-facie presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal methods of industrial development, but by new means of combination which were resorted to in order that greater power might be added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed, the whole with the purpose of excluding others from the trade and thus centralizing in the combination a perpetual control of the movements of petroleum and its . products in the channels of interstate commerce."
And again the court said: "So far as the decree held that the ownership of the stock of the New Jersey corporation constituted a combination in violation of the first section and an attempt to create a monopoly or to monopolize under the second section and com manded the dissolution of the combination, the decree was clearly appropriate."
In the case at bar we are to take the acts of the parties and judge their purpose by the consequence' that would naturally result. When men deliberately and intelligently go to work and acquire power that will enable them to control the market, if they choose to exercise it, there is no use for them to say that they did not intend to control the trade or limit competition, nor when the legality of their act of acquisition is in question is it any use for them to say we have not used the power to oppress any one. Counsel for respondent argue that the mere possession of power incident to the possession of wealth is not unlawful if it is not unlawfully exercised, and that is so. Wealth is power, and it may, without violation of law, be exercised to influence the market. The statute we are now considering is not designed to limit the amount of wealth one may lawfully acquire, therefore not designed to limit the influence that wealth may exert, but it is designed to forbid the acquisition of power for the purpose of influencing the market by combinations of interests that otherwise would compete in the market. The law regards such a power acquired by such a combination as dangerous to the rights of the people and forbids its acquisition. If immediately on the organization of the International Harvester Company and its appointing the respondent to act as its agent and before any of its products were put on the market an information in quo warranto had been presented in court against it, it would have been no answer to the complaint for the respondent to say: True it is we have this power, but we are not going to use it to the injury of the farmers or of other dealers in the same kind of implements. Neither is it any defense, after operating under the power for a time, to say we have not up to this date used the power to injure anyone.
Doubtless it could have been well said in behalf of the Standard Oil Company in the case above cited, that under its operation the price of coal oil had not been increased and that many products of petroleum other than illuminating oil, not before known or used, had been developed, and on the whole the public had been benefited, although in the acquirement of the power small producers and dealers may have been driven out of business and ceased to compete in the market.
So in the ease at bar: the price of harvesting machines has not increased in proportion to the increased cost of construction, or the increased merit of the machines, and respondent has brought other farm implements into trade, and it is also true that not all, though some of the smaller concerns that were competitors on the market, have ceased their struggle for existence and retired from the field.
There can be no doubt but that the competition that existed between the concerns that were engaged in manufacturing and selling harvester machines in 1902, was the moving cause of the organization of the International Harvester Company, and there can be no doubt but that that competition ceased when that corporation took charge of the business. The suppressing of that competition may not have been Mr. Perkins' purpose; he may have thought that he could organize a great corporation that could five and prosper in spite of competition. He bought the Milwaukee Company without waiting to see what he could do with others, and he said that he would have bought the McCormick even if he could not have bought the others. But we are not concerned with what he would have done, our attention is directed to what he did, and that was the buying of all' these concerns and combining them in one corporation, with the result that the fierce competition that had existed ceased. He said that he bought the property of each of these companies just as lie would buy a horse in the market. He was probably mistaken in that figure of speech. This transaction was conducted with great skill and ability and evidently with an eye on the anti-trust statutes of this and other states, with the purpose of either avoiding or evading those statutes. Whilst the negotiations with each company were. conducted separately yet they were conducted with reference to the result of like negotiations with the other companies. No definite contract of purchase was concluded with either company, except the Milwaukee, until like contracts were made with the others and the agreement to take pay in stock of the corporation to be. formed showed that the managers of each company knew of what the corporation was to consist. The managers of these several' corporations were men of conspicuous business intelligence, they would never.have agreed to sell the property of their companies and- take pay in stock of a corporation to be formed unless they knew of what that corporation was to consist. The fact that they did not all get together and agree to merge their companies in one, but on the contrary each conducted its part of the scheme in form as if it were simply making a sale of its property, shows that they were acting in fear of the anti-trust statutes. And the fact that they did not all sign one contract, but each a separate one, shows caution to avoid the appearance of combination, yet when all the several contracts were signed the effect was the same as if they had all signed one contract. And the fact that the representatives of the five companies were all in New York on that business at the same time but stopping at different hotels and holding no communication with each other again shows caution. If there had been no anti-trust laws in the land and these gentlemen had all concluded, in order to suppress what they call this unbusinesslike and ruinous competition, to unite their interests in one great- company (as in fact they did), the most natural thing for them to have done would have been to meet together and talk it over and agree on the details. In the ease above cited the Supreme Court of the United States, commenting on the comprehensive terms of the antitrust act of Congress, which in that particular is like our statute, said: "In view of the many new forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought about could save such restraint from condemnation." And so we say under our statute the form of contract under which this combination was brought about cannot save it from condemnation, and respondent cannot escape the result by saying it was-not designed to suppress reasonable competition, but only the ruinous and unbusinesslike methods that were then in practice, because there is no such limit in the power conferred.
We hold that the International Harvester Company, the New Jersey corporation, is an unlawful combination to suppress competition and regulate prices-within the meaning of our statute, and therefore it has no right to do business in this State.
II. The respondent the International Harvester Company of America, the Wisconsin corporation, is doing business in this State under a license issued to it by the Secretary of State in 1892. At that time it was an independent corporation under the name of the Milwaukee Harvester Company, manufacturing and selling its own harvester machines. Of this corporation the commissioner says: "This corporation and its stockholders once had capital, now it has none; everything that it or its stockholders once had now belongs to the International Harvester Company. . . . The respondent in truth and in fact is a mere sales department of the International Harvester Company." '
At the date of the organization of the International' Harvester Company and at the time it began doing business in this State through the agency of the respondent, it could not have obtained a license in its own name, because at that time our law did not admit into the State a foreign corporation of such large capital, but since then our statute has been amended and the amount of the capital is now no objection. But the fact is the International Harvester Company began doing business in this State through the agency of the respondent at a time when, even if it was otherwise entitled, it could not have obtained a license in its own name. And although now the amount of its capital stock would not exclude it from the State yet the fact that it is an unlawful combination in the light of our anti-trust statutes would exclude it. What a principal is forbidden to do in his own name he cannot do through an agent. If a principal has no authority, he cannot confer authority on an agent.
There is another aspect in which the respondent appears. When the respondent obtained its license to do business in this State it was an independent corporation manufacturing and selling its own machines and it was for the purpose of selling its own product that the license was granted. It now has no business of its own, no property, no independent existence, it is in fact a mere sales department of the International Harvester Company, which company has never been licensed to do business in this State. We do not mean to say that the respondent while doing the business for which it was licensed in 1892 could not also, if its charter so provided, have acted as agent for some other concern and sold its goods, provided the other concern could have lawfully sold its own goods, but whether when the respondent committed a complete abandon ment of the business for which it was licensed, had no longer any business of its own, it could take up a mere agency, is a question worthy of consideration. But perhaps there is no use. deciding that question since we have already concluded that respondent's principal has not and has never had any right to do business in this State, therefore as its principal's agent respondent has no such right. The amount paid by respondent for the license issued to it in 1892 was $62.50, which was the minimum tax prescribed by the statute, and was estimated on the representation of the respondent at that time as to the proportion of-its capital stock, which was $750,000, represented by its business in this State. The International Harvester Company with a capital of $120,000,000, even if it was not otherwise excluded, could not lawfully use the license based ' on an estimate of the proportion of the capital stock of another company which was less than a hundreth part of its capital. If such were permitted corporations with enormous capital would soon learn to organize or acquire smaller ones and send them into the State to do its business with a minimum fee.
III. We have already said in effect that when a party is called into court to answer a charge of unlawful combination in restraint of trade, it is no defense to say that the power thus acquired has been or will be used with moderation. But after the court has adjudged the party guilty of the act charged and comes to consider the penalty to be adjudged, the past conduct of the party in the exercise of its power is a fact worthy of consideration. Our anti-trust statute says that if the party found guilty of the act forbidden is a domestic corporation its charter shall be adjudged forfeited, and if it is a foreign orporation its right to do business in this State shall be adjudged forfeited. Besides the statute/ we have the common law on the subject of combinations in restraint of trade and the penalties under that law; in this respect the State courts have a jurisdiction that the Federal courts, who have no common law jurisdiction, do not have.
In determining the penalty to be adjudged in a case of this kind the court should have regard to the consequence to follow its decision. It would be an' injury to the people of this State to forbid the International Harvester Company to do business here; therefore, whilst we must obey the mandate of the statute and pronounce a judgment of ouster, yet, we may suspend the execution of the judgment, as this court in some cases has sometimes done, on terms that would be fair to the corporation and conducive to the welfare of the people of the State.
One of the evils intended to be guarded against, by the law is the enhancing of prices to the injury of the consumer, but that is not the only evil that may be done by a great power in the market; the driving of small competitors out of the trade is a wrong that the law would prohibit. This is not a paternal government, and the State does not undertake to deprive one of the advantage his greater wealth gives him in the market over one of smaller means, but it does undertake to prevent a combination of interests to drive others out of the market. If the International Harvester Company were disposed to exercise the power its enormous wealth gives, and if it were left unrestrained to do so, it could drive every competitor it now has from the field. In considering what restraints the court in this ease, in that respect, should impose, we experience difficulty. A company of so much strength has the power to temporarily reduce the price of its goods to such a degree as that all competitors would be compelled to either sell out or quit the business, and when the field by such means would be cleared the prices would be at the will of the survivor. There would be no advantage to the people in that. On the other hand it will not do to say that this com pany shall not, because of the superior facilities it possesses for economical manufacturing, put its products on the market at a price that other concerns possessing less facilities cannot afford, and must therefore leave the field. Nor, will it do to say that this corporation shall not buy out the smaller manufacturers and dealers, for that might be unjust to the latter, depriving them of an opportunity to sell when they so desired.
If the International Harvester Company is to be permitted to continue to do business in this State, either in its own name or through the agency of respondent, it must be on condition that it shall not use its power either to force a competitor to sell or drive it out of the market by unfair methods, and that it will not raise the prices of the articles it sells beyond a fair profit on their cost and the expense of marketing • the same. And since the International Harvester Company has been doing business in this State, through the agency of respondent, under license that it had no right to use, it should pay to the State a reasonable .sum for the privilege enjoyed, and it should take out a license in its own name under the terms and condiditions prescribed in section 3039, Revised Statutes 1909, and pay therefor the tax in that section prescribed, estimated on the proportion of its capital stock represented by its property and business in Missouri, and subject itself to all the requirements of foreign corporations doing business in this State prescribed in article 1 of chapter 33 of the Revised Statutes of 1909. The license so to be taken out to stand revoked if at any time hereafter on motion of the Attorney-General it be made to appear to this court that the corporation, either in person or by its agent, has violated any of the conditions above specified. If the International Harvester Company sees fit to comply with the terms above specified it may carry on its. business in this State either in person or through the agency of the respondent, but not on the respondent's present license.
The International Harvester Company not being a party to this suit, of course we can impose no fine or other penalty on it; it-not being in this State it is •not subject to expulsion from our borders, we can only affect it in the person of its representative, the respondent.
The judgment is that the license issued to respondent in 1892 to do business in this State is hereby revoked, and that respondent pay the costs of this suit. But it is further adjudged that if the International Harvester Company shall within sixty days pay the above mentioned reasonable sum to be fixed by the court on motion to be hereinafter made and shall take out a license to do business in Missouri on the terms and conditions above specified, it may conduct its business here either in its own name or through the respondent as its agent until the license expires by law or a breach of one or more of the conditions above mentioned.
Lamm, Ferriss and Brown, , JJ., concur in all except the judgment suggested in this opinion; Kennish, J., not sitting, having been of counsel.
SEPARATE OPINION.