Case Name: Thomas J. Kerr vs. The Camden Steam Boat Company
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1840-05
Citations: 1 Chev. Eq. 189
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas J. Kerr vs. The Camden Steam Boat Company.
Judges: Johnson, Ch., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 189–202

Head Matter:
Thomas J. Kerr vs. The Camden Steam Boat Company.
The Court of Equity has jurisdiction in the case of “an agent entrusted with funds of his principal, and having received other funds in the course of the agency, for which he is accountable, and who comes to render his account and have it allowed and himself discharged from his trust, and if any balance be due him, that, in the administration of complete justice, it be decreed him;” ihough it appear that the party is not without a remedy at law.
“ Where there is a continuing agency, and it is the business of the agent to disburse money to third persons on account of his principal, a bill will lie foi or ^against such principal.” [Harper, Ch.]
It seems that mere complexity of accounts between parties, would give jurisdiction in Equity; but quiere, — where the items of demand are all on one side.
Heard before Johnston, Cli., at Kershaw, June 1840, who delivered the following decree:
The only question presented, relates to the jurisdiction of the Court over the case made by the bill.
The bill states that the defendants, having contracted for a steam-boat, did, on the 22d April, 1836, through a committee, enter into an agreement with the plaintiff, signed by both parties, in the following words: “This agreement, made by C. Matheson and J. M. DeSaussure, as a committee of the Camden and Charleston Steam Boat Company, and T. J. Kerr, witnesseth:
“ That we empower and authorize T. J. Kerr to make contracts for an engine, joiner’s work, painter’s work, anchors, cables, and every thing complete to finish a steam boat now contracted for with Mr. Poyas; and also authorize him to finish and equip said boat in proper order for running, subject to the direction of said company or their committee. Said Kerr to go to the North and make all contracts on the most favorable terms, and to give every possible despatch and execution to the said business. For which duty, we agree to pay him 2J per cent, commissions on the amount of said contracts and payments by him; also, a proportionate part of his expenses to the North.”
That in the faithful execution of his engagements, the plaintiff proceeded to Baltimore and contracted for the engine for said boat, and returning to Charleston, where the agreement was entered into and where he resided, made the other contracts stipulated on his part, and attended to the completion and equipment of the said boat, so that she was fully equipped and furnished on her first trip from Charleston to Camden. That, to expedite the completion of said boat, the plaintiff during the progress of the work and after the boat was completed, advanced, at different times, various sums of money, exceeding the sums furnished him by the defendants for that purpose, and the bill refers to an accompanying exhibit marked A, for a statement of the sums received by the plaintiff on account of the defendants, and his expenditures and charges against them, leaving a balance in favor of the plaintiff of 12,560 03.
The bill further states, that after the boat was completed, the plaintiff was employed, by the defendants, as their agent to collect freights, furnish supplies, make contracts, and charters of affreightment for her; and that, in his said capacity as agent, he, at various times, received divers sums of money and made many disbursements to very considerable amounts, all of which are stated in exhibit B, shewing a balance of $548 06, due him. That he has requested defendants to account with him touching their mutual dealing, and in order thereto, has rendered his accounts to them, from time to time, with a request that they would pay him the balance claimed by him, or such balance, as upon a fair statement of the accounts, he might be found entitled to; but that they have refused to accede to his requisitions, under various false pretences; and, among others, that the contracts made by him for work and supplies were extravagant, and that he had let the boat, for a trip, or trips, to Fldiida, at a grossly inadequate rate. Besides which, the de-< fendants insisted that his accounts were not properly vouched; whereas the bill charges that the plaintiff has exhibited vouchers for every item usually vouched, and that he is prepared with vouchers for every item, except, perhaps, some items of small amount paid in petty sums, ai different times, and in such a manner as precluded his taking receipts.
The defendants, in their answer, admit the contract of the 22d April, 1836, as stated in the bill, but do not admit the charges and expenditures of the plaintiff, as set forth in the bill and exhibit A, in relation thereto. They also admit the employment of the plaintiff"as agent of the boat after her completion, but contest the charges and expenditures, to which he lays claim as such agent, and set forth in exhibit B. They particularly object that his contracts and expenditures set forth in the exhibits were grossly exorbitant, and that in relation to the services of the boat in Florida, the plaintiff" has not allowed them, in his account rendered, credit for the fair hire of the boat entrusted to his care and control.
Finally, the defendants plead to the jurisdiction of this Court, upon the case stated in the bill, and insist that the plaintiff has plain and adequate remedy at law. The case has been argued upon the sufficiency of this plea.
It is not doubted that the plea has been put in and the objection to the jurisdiction taken at the earliest time possible; nor that it is competent for the defendant to answer and plead to the jurisdiction at the same time. Neither is there any objection to the form of the plea. The question, then, is whether the court has cognizance of the case. The Act of 1791, provides “that suits in Equity shall not be sustained in any case where plain and adequate remedy can be had at Common Lawand it has been argued that, if it be true that the plaintiff can recover his demands at law, although this Court might have had a concurrent jurisdiction before the passage of this statute, the obvious import of the statute is to forbid this Court, after its enactment, to exercise this jurisdiction; and to command it to leave cases of concurrent jurisdiction exclusively to the cognizance of the Law Court, Such would have been my own construction of the Act, had it not so long and so uniformly received the interpretation that it is merely declaratory of the antient and established doctrine, that Equity will not interfere, unless it can grant a more certain, a more convenient, or a more complete relief; and that it was not intended to withdraw any matter from the Court, of which, at the passing of the Act it had jurisdiction. We are then to inquire whether this Court, according to established precedents, can take jurisdiction in this case.
It is not doubted that the plaintiff may, by recognized process, bring this company before a Law Court. It is not pretended in the bill, that he needs any discovery from the defendants. He has sought none, and has obtained none. He professes to be prepared with proof of his demands against the defendants.
No fraud is charged on the defendants, nor is any accident alleged calculated to impede the plaintiff’s recovery. If there is any trust in the case, it lies with the plaintiff, and not with the defendants. As agent, he is liable to account to. them for the funds received from them, or on their account, in the course of his employment. His demands against them are merely legal demands, or debts for such and such services, as for monies expended to their use. As he has evidence to establish these, as a jury is competent to decide on that evidence, and as a Law Court can give him a judgment according to the verdict, it is not perceived how it can with truth be asserted that he has not a remedy both plain and adequate.
Yet, it has always been asserted that, when accounts are long and complicated, when there are mutual accounts running for a long time, or consisting of a great number of items of Various character, or where one of the parties is a trustee for the other, chargeable and accountable for funds received, and seeks to discharge himself, in whole or in part, or even to claim an excess in his favor, Equity affords a relief far more convenient than Law. Although the books and cases are full of dicta to this effect, no precedent has been pointed out,'of a! jurisdiction assumed here, merely on the score of the length or complication of demands entirely legal in' their nature i nor where such jurisdiction has been asserted merely because’ there are demands on both sides. «
If the plaintiff can claim this jurisdiction, it must be on the’ ground of his being an agent, entrusted with funds by his principal, and having received other funds in thé course of his agency, for which he is accountable; and, that he comes here to render his account, and have it allowed, and himself discharged from his trust, and if any balance be due him, that, in the administration of complete justice, it be decreed him. It will not do to put this case on any other ground; otherwise, the boundaries of jurisdiction will be broken down, at great public inconvenience, and there will be nothing to prevent this forum from being flooded with every species of le-gardemands.
But, I think, the jurisdiction may be- safely put, and well maintained, on the ground of trust and agency. No doubt has been expressed of the right of an executor, guardian, or any other trustee, to claim a settlement in this tribunal. A-steward or bailiff may do so. Is there any principle which will discriminate between such agents and the one before the Court?
The only case relied on by the defendants’ counsel is that of Dinwiddie vs. Bailey, (6 Ves. 136.) That was a case where an action at law had been brought, by a principal,, against his agent, for money alledged to be due by the agent. The agent had counter demands; but, instead of setting, them off at law, he filed a bill full of obscure statements, praying that' the principal should be enjoined at Law and compelled to-meet him in Equity. The bill was dismissed. The principal had gone into a jurisdiction unquestionably concurrent, and which, having cognizance of the case, was not to be superceded by another, which was only concurrent. The defendant at Law was bound to meet the case in the Court where it was-brought, and where, according to the opinion of the Chancellor, there was no difficulty in obtaining all the remedy to which the statements, in his bill, entitled him. The Lord Chancellor ruled, therefore, that the case must be disposed of altogether at Law, where it was begun; observing that it would be another question whether this jurisdiction might not attach upon it; evidently meaning whether it might not have attached but for the possession of it by the Law Court.
It is ordered, that the plea to the jurisdiction be" overruled;, and the accounts’ be refeired to the commissioner.
The complainant appealed on the ground, that the Court of Equity had no jurisdiction of the case made in the bill.

Opinion:
Curia, -per
Harper, Ch.
Though it may not be easy ter define, by, a general rule, the class of cases in which a bill will lie for an account, yet, I think, there can be no doubt with respect to the present one. That an equitable jurisdiction exists in cases of complex and intricate accounts, between whatever parties, though an action might be maintained at law, and though no discovery be needed, the authorities have settled, beyond question. Such is the conclusion of Justice Story, whose work was cited in argument. (1 Sto. Eq. 433, §451. See, also, Mift. Pl. 96, and O'Connor vs. Spaight, 1 Sch. & Lef. 309.) It is true that, in some cases, it is said that there must be a series of mutual demands; not merely demands on one side and payments on the other. Yet, this Is to 'be taken with some qualification , for, in the case of The Corporation of Carlisle vs. Wilson, (13 Ves. 276,) though the demands were all on one side, and all of them admitted to be of a legal nature, yet the bill was held to lie. The question always is, whether there be an adequate remedy at law 1
The case stands on a different footing, when there is a relation of privity between the parties, such as that of bailiff, receiver, agent, or steward. It is said by Justice Story, and was -quoted in argument, that if the account is all on one side, and mo discovery be needed, the bill will not lie. But, if the bill is .against a person standing in such a relation of privity, it is always taken for granted, that a discovery is needed. It is said in McKenzie vs. Johnston, (4 Madd. 375,) that wherever the relation of agent exists, the bill will lie for an account. The party is entitled to discovery, and to have the account set out. It was where such a relation of privity existed, that the action of account lay at common law. (1 Bac. Ab. Tit. Accompt.) And is it questioned, but that the proceeding in Equity has .superceded the action of account! For the circumstances which rendered that action an inadequate remedy, see 1 Sto. Eq. 426, et seq; Jer. Eq. Jur. 504. A separate issue was sent Fy the auditor, to be tried upon every contested item.
But though a bill will lie against such an agent, upon a supposition that discovery is needed, will it lie in his favor, when he is not supposed to need any discovery? I know of no instance, within the Chancery jurisdiction, in which there is not a mutuality of remedy. A specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land is enforced in favor of the purchaser, because he is supposed to want the thing in specie. The vendor is also allowed to enforce it though there is no such reason, and he has plain and adequate remedy at law. It is a matter of familiar practice, that an executor comes into Court, to settle his accounts, and to be reimbursed, if he has advanced more than the parties were entitled to; though he needs no discovery, and might recover, at law, money paid by mistake. It is not doubted, but that the action of, account lay, in favor of either party, that the balance on either side might be ascertained. A party may come to have an account allowed. (2 Caines. Ca. 1, 3, 52, 53.)
When it is said that there is plain and adequate remedy at law, in this case, I do not suppose the action oí account to be meant, which has so often been decided not to afford an adequate remedy. Let us examine the adequacy of the remedy in an action of assumpsit. In Chancery, the practice is, that the accounting party "discharges himself by his affidavit, without voucher, when the amount of the item is under 40s. and by his affidavit, with the production of the voucher, when the demand is above 40 shillings, if no objection be taken. If any party objects, the person must be examined to whom the money was paid; if this cannot be done, the signature to the voucher must be proved." Bingham vs. Clanmorris, (12 Eng. C. C. R. 12.) If an objection be taken before the master, time is allowed to procure the necessary proof, and if the objection be. captiously and unnecessarily taken, the party may be made responsible in costs.
Very different is the case where the party comes before a jury. Here he must be prepared to prove by witnesses every charge that he has made, even to the smallest item of personal expenditure. Here is an account, containiug some hundreds of items, of money disbursed to a great number of individuals, many of them residing in other states. Preparatory to trial, it will be necessary to send commissions to prove the payments to these last,, at an enormous expense. All witnesses within the jurisdiction of the Court must be summoned personally. From their great number, it is not probable that all could ever attend at one time, and the plaintiff must either be indefinitely hung up, or submit to lose a portion of his demand. Once before the jury, there can be no time al lowed to supply any deficiency of proof. It is not necessary that the defendant should object. He has only to be silent, and the plaintiff must produce his proof. The vouchers are signed in a great variety of hand writings, and there is no reason for supposing that the plaintiff will be able to find a single witness capable of proving more than one of them. There would be a different abuse from that which has existed in the action of account. There might be fifty contested issues to be tried under one. The answer of the defendant suggests several issues, which probably would be greatly litigated. It would be a mockery of justice and of the complainant to say that he has an adequate remedy at law. It is on such reasons that Lord Ridesdale says, (Milf. Pl. 96,) that "though accounts may be taken before auditors in a Court of Common Law: yet, a Court of Equity, by its modes of proceeding, is enabled to investigate, more effectually, long and intricate accounts in an adverse way, and to compel payment of the balance, which ever way it turns." Such reasons governed in the case of The Corporation of Carlisle vs. Wilson. That was a bill to have an account of tolls which the defendant had become liable to pay for the last six years, by carrying goods through the streets of Carlisle. It was admitted that indebi-tatus assumpsit would lie, but, the Chancellor said, "how can a case of this kind be tried at the assizes; an account to be surcharged, upon which every inhabitant of Carlisle might be examined."
This is very different from the case of a merchant, or even factor, who, by proving his own book, or, probably by the testimony of one or two clerks, might be able to prove his whole case. I do not mean to say, though some of the cases express it very generally, that a bill will lie against every agent, if only to do a single act, or it appears that no account is necessary. It is not practicable, however desirable, to draw, with perfect precision, the line of ju risdiction. But, I am prepared to say, that where there is a continuing agency, and it is the business of the agent to disburse money to third persons, on account of his principal, a bill will lie for or against such agent. Such, I understand to be the case of the bailiff, receiver, or steward, and there is no reason applying to them, which will not apply with equal force in the present case. I think the decree should be affirmed.
Johnson, Ch., concurred.