Case Name: Virginia GUADIANO, et vir., Appellants, v. Maurice N. FLEISHMAN, et al., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1982-06-23
Citations: 636 S.W.2d 785
Docket Number: No. 16660
Parties: Virginia GUADIANO, et vir., Appellants, v. Maurice N. FLEISHMAN, et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before ESQUIVEL, BUTTS and BAS-KIN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 785–790

Head Matter:
Virginia GUADIANO, et vir., Appellants, v. Maurice N. FLEISHMAN, et al., Appellees.
No. 16660.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
June 23, 1982.
Frank Herrera, Jr., L. Wayne Scott, Martha Warren Warner, San Antonio, for appellants.
Edward F. Fahey, Joe Meador, San Antonio, for appellees.
Before ESQUIVEL, BUTTS and BAS-KIN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
BUTTS, Justice.
The former opinion in this case is withdrawn on appellant's motion for rehearing.
This is an appeal from a take-nothing judgment rendered by the trial court in a products liability and negligence case. We reverse and remand.
Virginia Guadiano, hereafter appellant, sustained back injuries when her foot slipped from a rung of a fixed steel ladder in the Abbey Rents warehouse in San Antonio on September 27, 1976. She retained a hand hold and "dangled" about twenty feet in the air before being helped down from the ladder. Joined by her husband, Gilbert Guadiano, she sued numerous defendants; however, all except appellee Maurice H. Fleishman, an architect, and appellee South Texas Maintenance, Inc., an industrial maintenance service business, were nonsuit-ed. Fleishman, architect for the building, designed some of its appurtenances, including the ladder in this case. Appellant alleged that Fleishman was responsible for the defective design of the ladder and that he also negligently designed it. The design of the ladder rungs, which were of steel, round, with no antiskid track or abrasive material on them was the focal point of the suit against Fleishman.
Appellant, who was the office manager of Abbey Rents, slipped from the ladder rung as she climbed to the roof scuttle (opening) in order to exit onto the roof to examine rain and storm damage. She alleged that South Texas had previously applied bird repellant, a "colorless, gooey," vaseline-like substance, to the ceiling beams and pipes in the warehouse, negligently causing the substance to coat the ladder rungs. She further alleged that South Texas had been requested to remove the spilled bird repellant but had failed to do so. She testified that she saw bird repellant on the ladder rung after her foot had slipped.
The only question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by appellant, not to consider evidence of her negligence, if any, in connection with the strict liability issue.
Jury instruction number one, encompassing appellant's strict liability theory of recovery, was:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the ladder in question was designed by Maurice H. Fleishman, Architect, the ladder was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this question is meant a product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.
Special issue number two was a "producing cause" issue. Special issue number three, which was the only negligence issue submitted, other than a comparative negligence one, asked:
Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence proximately caused the occurrence in question made the basis of this suit?
Answer by stating one of the following choices .
(A) South Texas Maintenance, Inc. or
(B) Maurice H. Fleishman or
(C) Abbey Rents or
(D) Virginia Guadiano or
(E) Any combination of South Texas Maintenance, Inc., Maurice H. Fleish-man, Abbey Rents and Virginia Gua-diano
(F) No one or none of the above.
In connection with special issue one, appellant requested this instruction:
You are further instructed that in answering this issue you shall not consider any evidence of negligence on the part of Virginia Guadiano, if any, in climbing the ladder in question on the occasion in question.
The trial court refused to submit the instruction. While the definitions of "negligence" and "defective design" may have certain similarities or common elements, they involve two separate theories of recovery. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex.1978), Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1975). The care taken by the supplier of a product in its preparation is not a consideration in strict liability; this is, however, the ultimate question in a negligence action. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, at 871.
The Texas courts have approved the Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 402A (1965) by holding a dealer of a product liable for subsequent injury caused by that product where the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1979) and cases cited therein. Strict liability in tort is recognized when the product is defective because of an unsafe design. See Rourke v. Garza, supra. Design defects may involve products which are manufactured as intended but whose design is unreasonably dangerous. See Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Foreseeability by the defendant is not an issue in products liability. Hartzell Propeller Co. v. Alexander, 485 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1972), writ ref'd n. r. e.). The plaintiff's due care or want of due care is immaterial in a strict liability action. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792-793 (Tex.1967). Restatement of Torts, Sec. 402A, comment (n), supra. Traditional contributory negligence does not bar recovery. Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, supra, at 575.
The instant case is a classic example of the plaintiff's right to seek recovery under two separate theories, strict liability and negligence, and, when they are plead and supported by evidence, to have those two theories submitted by sharp and clearly defined instructions to the jury. Presenting these two theories of recovery in one jury charge is, at best, confusing to a jury. But when the court's attention is directed to the confusing parts of the charge by a requested instruction, as here, it is the right of the plaintiff to have each theory submitted clearly and distinctly. This will characterize the differing burdens of proof and defenses. Tex.R.Civ.P. 277, 279.
We note in this case that special issue number three submitted on the theory of negligence does not indicate that the defense of contributory negligence applies only to that theory. Had the trial court expressly limited it and made it inapplicable to strict liability, the harm would have been alleviated.
These two theories of recovery are not merely separate "issues" which may be properly combined and submitted in a broad jury charge. See e.g. Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.). They are separate and distinct theories of recovery. Neither is a "collateral issue" of the other.
"The combination of old and new substantive theories of recovery with the existence of the allocation problems in strict liability has given rise to a new phenome non. A plaintiff may plead his ease alternatively upon grounds of negligence, strict liability . The different theories . throw a massive conceptual burden not only upon the attorneys and the trial judge, but also upon lay jurors. Having almost escaped the multitude of issues that once surrounded negligence cases, the bar is now faced with a multitude of new theories of action." Pope and Lowere, The State of the Special Verdict—1979, 11 St. Mary's L.J. 1, 50 (1979).
With strict liability it is the defendant's product, here product design, that the plaintiff seeks to impugn, whereas with negligence it is the conduct of that same defendant that the plaintiff would impugn. The resolution of these issues as framed, when the instant jury charge is viewed as a whole, may be construed to require negligence to be considered as part of the strict liability issue because it fails to clarify that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability. Generally, error in the submission of an issue is harmless when the findings of the jury in answer to other issues are sufficient to support the judgment. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex.1981). An exception exists, however, when the erroneously submitted issue confuses or misleads the jury. 609 S.W.2d at 750.
Nor can we say that the problem was solved because the answers to the negligence issues were consistent with those of the strict liability issues. The probable prejudice resulted from depriving appellant of a fair submission of her two distinct theories of recovery. We hold that the instructions as given were prejudicial to the appellant's right to have each theory of recovery clearly and separately submitted and considered by the jury. Tex.R.Civ.P. 434.
Appellant's motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
. Appellant also requested a separate instruction on Fleishman's negligence and want of due care in designing the ladder, which was denied.
. See footnote 1.