Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas Henry GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1983-12-15
Citations: 106 Idaho 54
Docket Number: No. 14425
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas Henry GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 54–69

Head Matter:
675 P.2d 33
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas Henry GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14425.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Dec. 15, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1984.
Michael J. Vrable, Coeur d’Alene, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Larry K. Harvey, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder and from the sentence of death imposed upon that conviction, together with our review of the death sentence pursuant to I.C. § 19-2827. We affirm.
The circumstances surrounding the crime are largely without challenge except as to the location of and who did the actual killing. Some of the most damaging testimony came from the defendant Gibson himself who testified at trial. Gibson was charged with the first degree murder of Kimberly Ann Palmer. Palmer and a friend, Scott Currier, were in Spokane, Washington, where Currier had met members of a motorcycle group. On June 19, 1980, Palmer and Currier left for a camping trip in a blue and white van. On Friday, June 20, Currier and Palmer checked into a Spokane motel which was located a short distance from the residence of Donald Paradis; they immediately checked out of the motel, with Currier stating that his guns had been stolen, that he knew who did it, and that he was going to retrieve them.
Gibson testified that in the early morning hours of June 21, he, Paradis, and Larry Evans, among others, were at the Paradis residence when Currier and Palmer arrived. A fight erupted and Gibson testified that he watched Paradis beat Currier to death with a baseball bat. Gibson testified that he left for a short time, and upon returning found Currier lying on the floor dead or dying. Gibson testified that he saw Kimberly Palmer running out of the house and "as she ran by me I grabbed her, pulled her down to the floor and hit her and knocked her out" because he was afraid she would be calling for help. Gibson testified that he then moved Palmer to the kitchen, put her on the floor, took her pulse, determined that she was still alive, and related that to Larry Evans and that Evans then choked Palmer to death. Gibson testified that he watched the choking and thereafter determined that Palmer was dead.
Gibson testified that he and another then placed Currier's body in a blue sleeping bag while Paradis and Evans placed the Palmer body in a red sleeping bag. The bodies were then placed in the blue and white van, which was driven to a remote area just outside of Post Falls, Idaho. Other testimony indicated that at approximately 6:30 a.m. thht Saturday morning, the blue and white van was observed driving up a steep mountain road in a sparsely populated area south of Post Falls, Idaho. Two or three men were in that van, one of whom was wearing a distinctive cap. Gibson testified that the blue and white van stalled going up a hill, rolled backwards and overturned. Gibson stated that he stayed in the van while Paradis moved the body of Kimberly Palmer and Evans moved the body of Scott Currier. The van was then pushed over, abandoned, and Gibson, Paradis and Evans walked back to Post Falls. Gibson stated that he was carrying a rifle rolled up in a blue blanket.
Other testimony placed three men of the general description of Gibson, Paradis and Evans walking down that road toward Post Falls, Idaho that same morning. The men were all strange to the area and one was carrying a rolled up blue blanket. Three men of the same description were observed entering Post Falls that morning, and they were questioned by the police in Post Falls. One of those men was identified as Gibson and he was carrying a rolled up blue blanket. Another of the three was identified as Paradis.
Later that day, the blue and white van was seen turned on its side with debris scattered about just off that mountain road. Upon investigation, the body of Kimberly Palmer was found face down in a small stream nearby and the body of Scott Currier was found inside a sleeping bag. Currier's body was bound with pieces of terrycloth and had been bleeding. A distinctive belt buckle worn by Currier had been cut off. Palmer was found to have been strangled to death.
In the early morning hours of Sunday, June 22, the Paradis residence in Spokane was severely damaged by a fire caused by arson. In the basement of that house was found a rolled up rug, in which were found Currier's missing belt buckle, a lawn dart with traces of blood which matched puncture wounds in Currier's back, and a piece of blue terrycloth which matched the terrycloth found with the body of Currier.
On Monday, June 23, Gibson and a friend left the area; they were apprehended in northern California on June 25. Gibson gave a false statement to California authorities before being returned to the State of Washington where he was charged with the murder of Scott Currier. Following trial, he was acquitted of that charge and extradited to Idaho for the murder of Kimberly Palmer.
At trial, a major issue was raised concerning Idaho's jurisdiction over Gibson and, therefore, much of the State's case consisted of autopsy evidence which showed that the varying state of body decomposition indicated that Currier had been killed some hours before Palmer, and water in Palmer's lungs indicated that Palmer had actually been killed in the streambed in Idaho. That evidence, of course, contradicted the testimony of Gibson that Palmer had been killed in the Paradis' residence in the State of Washington.
Gibson asserts that at the preliminary hearing stage the information should have been dismissed for lack of probable cause, citing I.C.R. 5.1(c):
"If from the evidence the magistrate does not determine that a public offense has been committed or that there is not probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense, the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant."
The standard of review for probable cause findings at the preliminary hearing stage was stated in State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, at 636, 619 P.2d 787, at 791 (1979):
"At the preliminary hearing the state is not required to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it need only prove that a crime was committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it. [Citations]. The decision of a magistrate that there exists probable cause to bind a defendant over to district court for trial on the charges should be overturned only on a showing that the committing magistrate abused his discretion."
It is also stated that probable cause exists when the court has before it "such evidence as would lead a reasonable person to believe the accused party has probably or likely committed the offense charged." Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, at 709, 429 P.2d 836, at 839 (1967); Martinez v. State, 90 Idaho 229, at 232, 409 P.2d 426, at 427 (1965).
Without reciting the testimony, it is sufficient to state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing established that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would believe that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission of the offense charged. We find no abuse of the discre tion of the magistrate in his finding of probable cause.
At one point in time, Gibson was represented by the office of public defender for a period of approximately ten days, but during that time no member of that office so much as contacted Gibson. A member of that public defender's office joined the Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office during the time that it was prosecuting Gibson. That attorney was ordered by the prosecutor's office and by the trial court to speak to no one in the prosecutor's office regarding the Gibson case and that attorney faithfully maintained the silence. Nevertheless, Gibson asserts that the mere appearance of impropriety is sufficient to require reversal. We disagree. Gibson has failed to even allege, much less show, any actual prejudice. Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 (1975); see State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 611 P.2d 1047 (1980); State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 233, 392 P.2d 423 (1964). See also Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149 (1983).
Gibson asserts that the trial court should have excluded a statement made by him to a California district attorney since there was no compliance with I.C. § 19-853 in the obtaining of that statement. I.C. § 19-853, in essence, requires that Miranda warnings under certain circumstances be given in writing or otherwise recorded and that the person questioned acknowledge in writing that he has received the Miranda warnings. There is no contention that Gibson did not receive the Miranda warnings or that the actions of the California authorities did not comport with constitutional standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
Hence, we restate the issue: should an Idaho court exclude from evidence a statement taken in another jurisdiction admittedly in compliance with the United States constitutional standards but not obtained in compliance with an Idaho statute?
The major purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to assure that police act properly in obtaining evidence from suspects by removing the incentive to do otherwise. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 166 (2d ed. 1972).
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." Peltier, supra, 422 U.S. at 539, 95 S.Ct. at 2318; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).
It has also been stated that the Court would "simply decline to extend the court-made exclusionary rule to cases in which its deterrent purpose would not be served." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n. 24, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 1036 n. 24, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); see also United States v. Calandra, supra; Michigan v. DeFillippo, supra; United States v. Peltier, supra.
In the instant case, the California authorities acted validly within the constraints of the United States Constitution and, insofar as we are informed, followed the laws of their jurisdiction. We find no basis to assume that excluding probative evidence validly obtained by the California authorities in their jurisdiction would deter their future conduct or the conduct of their counterparts in other jurisdictions. Put simply, in a case of this type, there is no rationale whatever for the application of the exclusionary rule and since we deal here with the asserted violation of a state statute rather than a violation of a constitutional right, we refuse to invoke the exclusionary sanction to the statements made to the California authorities.
Gibson next asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence connecting Gibson with the death of Scott Currier since it constituted evidence of another crime for which appellant was not on trial. Generally, evidence of other crimes of a defendant is not admissible at trial to show the criminal propensity of the defendant. State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978). Evidence of other crimes may be introduced, however, if that evidence falls within one of the generally recognized exceptions to the general rule.
"However, this jurisdiction will admit evidence of defendant's past criminal activity to prove: (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, and (6) other similar issues." State v. Needs, supra 99 Idaho at 892-3, 591 P.2d at 139-40.
In the instant case, the evidence of the Currier death was not presented for the purpose of showing Gibson's criminal propensity, but rather for the purpose of showing motive and common scheme, and to present, as stated by the trial judge, a "rational and cohesive scenario," which, uses are permissible. State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975); State v. Dayley, 96 Idaho 527, 531 P.2d 1172 (1975); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971).
Gibson argues, nevertheless, that the "other crime" rule differs in this case since the evidence being introduced related to a crime for which Gibson had been acquitted. We disagree. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.1966); Buatte v. United States, 350 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.1965) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 856, 87 S.Ct. 104, 17 L.Ed.2d 83 (1966); Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928, 98 S.Ct. 1498, 55 L.Ed.2d 524 (1978); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal.2d 406, 78 Cal.Rptr. 186, 455 P.2d 122 (1969); People v. Douglas, 246 Cal.App.2d 594, 54 Cal.Rptr. 777 (1966); Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 311 (Fla.Ct.App.1973); Jenkins v. State, 147 Ga.App. 21, 248 S.E.2d 33 (1978); State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 836 (1966); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich.App. 452, 296 N.W.2d 613 (1980); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549 (1974); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 284 A.2d 549 (1971); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975); State v. Tarman, 27 Wash.App. 645, 621 P.2d 737 (1980). See also, Annot., Admissibility of evidence as to other offense as affected by defendant's acquittal of that offense, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962).
In the instant case, Gibson has not been charged with the murder of Scott Currier. Hence, we are not required to decide whether Gibson could be charged by a different sovereign, Idaho, for a crime committed in its jurisdiction for which he had previously been acquitted in Washington. Rather, Gibson stands charged with the murder of Kimberly Palmer in Idaho. Hence, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not specifically applicable to the case at bar. Nevertheless, it is argued that the attendant collateral estoppel rule under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), precludes the trial of Gibson since the ultimate issue has already necessarily been determined at a previous trial. We disagree.
In Ashe, the defendant had been charged with robbing one of six people who were engaged in a poker game. He was acquitted of robbing that one participant and acquitted. Thereafter, he was charged and convicted of robbing a second participant. It was held that the acquittal of robbing the first participant necessarily established that he was not the gunman at the holdup and hence could not be convicted for robbing the second participant.
The Ashe rationale is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Gibson's acquittal of murdering Scott Currier in the State of Washington does not necessarily establish that he did not participate in the murder of Kimberly Palmer in Idaho. The Washington jury in the Currier trial could have acquitted Gibson on any of a number of defenses, including lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Idaho jury in the Kimberly Palmer trial could well have believed on the evidence submitted that, while someone else killed Currier, Gibson prevented Kimberly Palmer's escape from the scene of the Currier murder, beat her unconscious, transported her into Idaho and there participated in her murder. See King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978).
Regardless of Gibson's guilt or innocence of Currier's murder, the evidence of that death is highly relevant as a motive for Gibson's participation in the murder of Palmer. Hence, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude introduction of the evidence of Currier's death during the trial of Gibson for the murder of Palmer.
Gibson next asserts prosecutorial misconduct in the calling of one Colis to the stand during Gibson's trial. We disagree. The State called Colis as a witness, who stated his name and address. He then was asked if he owned any kind of a vehicle. Before Colis could answer, an attorney representing Colis, introduced himself and stated that he had discussed the matter with Col-is. At that point, upon the request of Gibson's attorney, the jury was excused. It was only after the jury left the courtroom that Colis' attorney informed the court that he was instructing Colis to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer any questions. Colis affirmed that he was invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. At that point, the State offered to extend immunity to Colis and offered to obtain a grant of immunity from the State of Washington. The court held that the State could not show Washington had extended immunity to Colis, therefore, Colis was allowed to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Colis was then dismissed and the jury recalled and instructed that they were not to draw or make any inference or draw any conclusion concerning the appearance of Colis.
It is asserted that those facts merit reversal of the conviction of Gibson under a standard set forth in Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963). We disagree. In Namet it was stated that when the prosecution calls a witness knowing that the witness would invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify, no constitutional question is involved, but merely a claim of evidentiary trial error, and that such claim of error would have to be based either upon a "conscious and flagrant attempt" of the prosecutor to build his case upon inferences arising from that refusal to testify or a showing that "inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecutor's case in a form not subject to cross examination and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant." At pp. 185-187, 83 S.Ct. at 1154-1155. Here, neither of the two prongs of Namet are applicable.
Gibson admits the prosecutor made no "conscious and flagrant attempt" to build his case upon impermissible inferences and the record is clear that the appearance of Colis added no "critical weight" to the prosecution's case. See Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Cota v. Eyman, 453 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2054, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972). Here, the jury saw Colis only identify himself. It can hardly be said that testimony or presence added "critical weight" or any weight to the case of the prosecution.
As above indicated, the jury was not present when Colis invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908, 87 S.Ct. 852, 17 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). We further note that when the jury reentered the courtroom, they were instructed, "You are not to draw or make any inference or draw any conclusion concerning the appearance of Mr. John V. Colis in this courtroom." Hence, even assuming that Gibson was somehow prejudiced by the mere appearance of Colis in the courtroom, it was dissipated by the court's instruction. See Namet v. United States, supra; United States v. Edwards, supra.
Gibson also asserts that the trial court erred in its failure to give the circumstantial evidence instruction approved in State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979). Here the record indicates that the court adequately instructed the jury pursuant to the Holder requirement, albeit at the beginning of the trial. We find no error. We further note that the Holder ruling is required when "the evidence linking the defendant with the [crime] was entirely circumstantial." Holder at 133, 594 P.2d at 643. Here the evidence was far from "entirely circumstantial." We find no error.
Gibson argues that during the closing argument the prosecutor made two improper remarks which require the reversal of the conviction. First, the prosecutor utilized a "link in a chain" argument stating that all of the other links had performed their duties and it was now time for the jury to perform its duty. We find no error. See State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 99, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959); Horn v. State, 176 Ind.App. 527, 376 N.E.2d 512 (1978); Fulgham v. State, 386 So.2d 1099 (Miss.1980); see also Sparks v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 100, 275 S.W.2d 494 (1955).
Error is also asserted in the prosecutor making reference to Gibson's silence during his trial for Scott Currier's murder in Washington, i.e., "It's very strange that we have waited until a year has gone by, that the defendant has already been once in jeopardy in the State of Washington and acquitted, and then now he wants to tell the whole story, that of course he says [both murders] happened over there [in Washington], Why didn't he say this a year ago?" The general rule governing such remarks is stated in State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 671 P.2d 1051 (1983):
"It is clearly erroneous for a prosecutor to introduce evidence of the defendant's postarrest silence for the purpose of raising an inference of guilt____ It is likewise erroneous for a prosecutor to comment to the jury on the defendant's failure to testify at trial."
Nevertheless, that general rule is otherwise when the defendant himself takes the stand. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he interests of the other party in regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination." Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156, 78 S.Ct. 622, 627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958).
In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926), which was relied upon and reaffirmed in Jenkins, supra, it was held that once a defendant takes the stand in a second trial, after remaining silent in his first trial, he may be cross examined as to why he remained silent in the prior trial, his waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is total, and the permissible scope of cross examination is bounded only by the applicable rules of evidence. Jenkins, supra, reaffirmed that, having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by taking the stand, a defendant in a state trial may be impeached by his silence in accordance with that state's applicable rules of evidence. Under the standards set by Raffel and Jenkins, it is permissible to impeach a defendant regarding his earlier silence if the defendant takes the stand. However, we need not base our decision upon Raffel and Jenkins here Gibson not only took the stand, but commented upon his earlier silence. The rule under these circumstances has been stated:
"The rule would seem to be well settled that where a defendant in a criminal trial voluntarily takes the witness stand in his own behalf he is subject to the same rules applicable to other witnesses and may be cross-examined in regard to all matters to which he has testified on his direct examination or connected therewith." State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 99, 337 P.2d 1, 5, 6 (1959); State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 19, 107 P.2d 854, 858 (1940).
Once Gibson himself commented upon his earlier silence, he was subject to prosecutorial cross-examination and comment upon that testimony. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 1506, 75 L.Ed.2d 935 (1983).
Gibson next asserts that the imposition of the sentence of death is unconstitutional since here it was imposed by a judge rather than a jury. Our late cases of State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), and State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), are dispositive of this question.
Gibson next asserts that the trial court in its sentencing procedure failed to comply with I.C. § 19-2515, and that those failures of the trial court mandate resentencing. We disagree. Gibson asserts that the trial court improperly weighed the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in that the court grouped mitigating circumstances into categories, ie., "lack of previous felony convictions," "age," "military record," etc., and determined within each category whether there were sufficient circumstances to mitigate the actions of Gibson. That assertion misstates the facts. Gibson filed with the court a "pre sentencing statement" in which he listed eight items which he contended should be considered as mitigating: l)a) "Lack of previous felony convictions; b) Age-30; c) Military Record; and d) Family background. 2) Defendant's trial testimony; 3) Polygraph Examination; 4) Testimony of C. Gordon Edgren, M.D., FAPA; 5) Testimony of Cal Henderson."
Each of those factors set forth by the defendant were examined by the trial court and the court discussed why each, in turn, should or should not be considered mitigating. The trial court then also considered factors not listed by the defendant which could possibly be considered as mitigating. After considering each of those possible mitigating circumstances, the trial court determined, in its findings
"in considering death penalty under section 19-2515, Idaho Code, the court has found one mitigating circumstance, to-wit: the fact that the defendant has no substantial prior criminal record. However, the court does not find that such mitigating factor outweighs the gravity of the aggravating circumstance found."
The trial court properly enumerated and considered mitigating circumstances as required by I.C. § 19-2515, and State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981).
Gibson next asserts that the trial court erroneously, under I.C. § 19-2515, improperly held his silence against him in considering whether Gibson's cooperation with police should be considered as mitigating. Again, that assertion misstates the actions of the trial court. The court merely found that there was nothing mitigating in the way Gibson dealt with the police since he found there was no evidence that Gibson had cooperated with the police. There was no showing that Gibson's silence in the Currier murder trial was held against him in the sentencing process.
Gibson next asserts that the trial court erroneously found that Gibson "aided and abetted in the killing of Kimberly Ann Palmer in a very direct manner." Although Gibson argues that the evidence does not support the finding, we disagree. Gibson's own testimony clearly established that he very directly aided and abetted in the murder of Palmer. As noted previously, the jury was free to accept any part of Gibson's testimony as true and any part of it as false. Lono v. State, 63 Hawaii 470, 629 P.2d 630 (1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982). The jury could, and apparently did, believe that Gibson beat Palmer unconscious and participated in her transportation to the scene of the murder in Idaho where she was strangled to prevent her from telling of the murder of Scott Currier. Whichever version of the evidence the jury chose to believe, it is clearly established therein that Gibson intended that Kimberly Palmer die.
Gibson next asserts that persons who are mere aiders and abettors in a killing may not suffer the death penalty. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), clearly indicates that the death penalty is not an unduly severe punishment for an aider and abettor to a murder when that person intends that a killing take place. As above noted, there can be no doubt from the evidence that Gibson intended that Kimberly Palmer be killed in order to conceal the circumstances of the death of Scott Currier.
I.C. § 19-2827 requires that we now conduct an independent review of this cause and examine the total proceedings in the trial court to ensure that the sentence of death was imposed without resort to passion or prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, that the evidence supports the trial court's findings of aggravating circumstances, and that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate.
We find that all of the procedures mandated in potential death penalty cases were followed. Gibson was in attendance at the pronouncement of sentence and written findings of the trial judge on aggravating and mitigating circumstances were made. Gibson was given notice that the State intended to ask for the death penalty and was given notice of the State's intent to rely on the aggravating circumstances set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6)-(8), and (10). Gibson was allowed to submit a document to the court setting forth what Gibson felt were the mitigating circumstances that should be considered, and that document and its contents were considered by the trial court. An aggravation/mitigation hearing was held, evidence was taken, and arguments heard thereon. The trial court issued written findings setting forth the mitigating factors he considered and the aggravating factors he found beyond a reasonable doubt. One mitigating circumstance was found, i.e., the lack of significant previous criminal convictions, and that circumstance was weighed against the aggravating circumstance and found insufficient to stay the death penalty. We find no error.
I.C. § 19-2827 requires us to conduct a review of the sentence imposed in this case in comparison with the sentences imposed in similar cases to ensure that the sentence in the instant case was not excessive or disproportionate. We recently in State v. Creech, supra, conducted an extensive review of Idaho murder cases. We find that the sentence imposed in the instant case is not disproportionate to the sentence imposed in those cases reviewed in Creech where the death sentence was available as a form of punishment. We also have compared the instant case with our recent death penalty cases in State v. Creech, supra, and State v. Sivak, supra, and find that the sentence imposed in the present case is not disproportionate to the sentences imposed in those cases. We note that the murder committed in the instant case is similar to that committed in State v. Sivak, supra, in that in Sivak the trial court found that one of the reasons the victim was killed was to ensure the silence of the victim and prevent her from identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery. In the instant case, the trial court identified the motive for killing Kimberly Palmer as insuring her silence about the circumstances surrounding the murder of Scott Currier. We find the death penalty imposed in the instant case to be both proportionate and just.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are affirmed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.