Case Name: Christopher KIRSCHNER, An Infant by His Father and Next Friend, Gary E. KIRSCHNER, and Gary E. Kirschner and Linda Kirschner, Individually, Movants, v. LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1988-01-21
Citations: 743 S.W.2d 840
Docket Number: No. 86-SC-1001-DG
Parties: Christopher KIRSCHNER, An Infant by His Father and Next Friend, Gary E. KIRSCHNER, and Gary E. Kirschner and Linda Kirschner, Individually, Movants, v. LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: GANT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 743
Pages: 840–849

Head Matter:
Christopher KIRSCHNER, An Infant by His Father and Next Friend, Gary E. KIRSCHNER, and Gary E. Kirschner and Linda Kirschner, Individually, Movants, v. LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
No. 86-SC-1001-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Jan. 21, 1988.
Edgar A. Zingman, Virginia H. Snell, Mary E. Barrazotto, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, for movants.
John W. Bilby, Mark S. Fenzel, Jeffrey D. Thompson, Middleton & Reutlinger, Louisville, for respondent.

Opinion:
STEPHENSON, Justice.
In this lawsuit for personal injury, the trial court granted summary judgment to Louisville Gas & Electric Company. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary review and affirm.
The factual situation, as described by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
Christopher Kirschner was a highly intelligent, active fifteen-year-old who had just begun his freshman year in the honors program at Trinity High School and had made the honor roll. He led an active extracurricular life, both inside and outside of school.
The events leading up to Chris' being injured began on September 15, 1983. His activities on this date when he arrived home from school were his usual having something to eat, doing his homework, and then going outside to be with friends until dark. On this occasion, as Christopher Kir-schner and his friends had often done in the past, they went to an open field near his neighborhood to play. He and his friends were not the only children who played regularly in the field. All of the other children in the neighborhood played in that area.
LG & E owned an easement across the open field for the distribution of electricity and transmission of electricity by means of high-voltage transmission wires strung overhead from a tower in the field, then onward to other distant towers. The tower in question was located near an entrance to the field and was of the usual open "Eiffel Tower" looking type secured to a concrete base. There is no dispute but that LG & E owned so much of the property as was covered by their electrical transmission easement and that it owned and maintained the tower itself.
One of the four legs of the tower was equipped with ladder-like spikes protruding on opposite sides for the purpose of climbing the tower. The lower rungs could be reached by standing on the concrete base. There was no fence or other structure surrounding the tower. The four-tower legs beginning at the base and continuing up to a level of 66 feet form a hollow, open-pyramid shape with cross-supporting beams. Upward from the 66-foot level, they form a hollow square and continue in this shape to the top. At the 66-foot level, the cross girders forming the perimeter of the square are close enough to each other so that a platform could be formed by placing plywood across the outer girders. Also, at this level is the first of five sets of cross arms to which are attached the transmission lines carrying LG & E's high-voltage electricity.
On the day before the accident, Christopher Kirschner and his friends had hauled a piece of plywood from some distance to this field and up the tower to the 66-foot level and formed a platform with it. They returned the next day, the date of the accident, and climbed the "ladder" girder leg to the platform. At the first cross member above the concrete base directly in front of the ladder rungs is a plainly visible warning sign containing on three separate lines the words, "DANGER HIGH VOLTAGE" underneath each other. The top word, "DANGER," was in red capital letters on white; the next word "HIGH," in black on white; as well as the bottom word, "VOLTAGE," which also had a sharp accent mark over its first and last letter.
Once having settled in on the plywood platform, Christopher Kirschner spotted several young ladies from the neighborhood approaching on one of the many pathways through the open field, and he waved to them. In doing so, he did not touch any of the high-voltage transmission lines which were perhaps six feet away. The record is not clear as to the exact distance. At this point, electricity from the transmission lines arced, striking Christopher Kirschner and causing severe injuries to him.
With all of the activity in the field around the tower, there is nothing in the record to show directly or by inference that any other children had climbed the tower or that LG & E had any notice directly or by inference that anyone had done so.
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis that Kir-schner was a trespasser.
LG & E also relied upon KRS 381.232 as a bar to recovery. Kirschner asserts that KRS 381.232 is contrary to the Constitution of Kentucky, Sec. 54, in that it eliminates a cause of action existing at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution in 1891 or is more restrictive than a cause of action embodied in the common law in 1891. The statute provides:
The owner of real estate shall not be liable to any trespasser for injuries sustained by the trespasser on the real estate of the owner, except for injuries which are intentionally inflicted by the owner or someone acting for the owner.
"Trespass" is defined in KRS 381.231(1) as follows:
A "trespasser" means any person who enters or goes upon the real estate of another without any right, lawful authority or invitation, either expressed or implied, but does not include persons who come within the scope of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
We are of the opinion that the phrase "injuries which are intentionally inflicted" represents a codification of the common law recognized before the adoption of the present constitution. In construing this phrase, we hold that intentionally inflicted means inflicted by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. This type of conduct has been defined in Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th Ed. (1984), Chapt. 5, Sec. 34, pp. 212-213 as:
. .They apply to conduct which is still, at essence, negligent, rather than actual ly intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so intended....
The usual meaning assigned to "willful," "wanton," or "reckless," according to taste as to the word used, is that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences....
In support of his assertion that the statute is unconstitutional, Kirschner relies on Bransom's Administrator v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 5 Ky.Law Rep. 827 (1884), and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Popp, 96 Ky. 99, 27 S.W. 992 (1894).
Both of these cases are inapposite; both involve small children and are more an application of what is now the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. When addressing the issue here, Bransom's Adm'r, in dicta, stated that "the owner has no right to wantonly injure even an actual trespasser."
Kentucky Central R.R. Co. v. Gastineau's Adm'r., 83 Ky. 119 (1885), contains a comment on the state of the law as to trespassers as follows:
It is not required to anticipate the intrusion of others; and one who enters upon them without right, does so at his peril; and, in case of injury, cannot recover, unless it was wantonly inflicted after the danger was discovered. Its duty to such a person or a trespasser is merely negative — it must not, when it knows of the peril, act maliciously or with a disregard of obvious consequences. It is not required to use care to anticipate and discover the peril to such a person, but only to do so after the discovery of the danger. Until then no legal duty is imposed upon it, because no one, by a wrongful act, can impose a duty upon another.
The opinion also contains an observation on what is now the attractive nuisance doctrine:
Undoubtedly children of tender years should not be treated strictly as trespassers, when guided by childish instincts they stray upon the track or into the yard of a railroad.
We do not have that issue in this case.
The quote from Kentucky Central R.R. Company would seem to be even more severe than the duty imposed on a landowner by the terms of the statute.
The citation of pronouncements by this court on pre-1891 cases has not covered a definitive statement on the state of the pre-1891 law on the duty, if any, owed to a trespasser by a property owner. It is incumbent on Kirschner to show us that the statute is more restrictive than the state of the law in 1891, and he has not.
Our research has not improved upon the research of counsel. Turning to post-1891 cases, we find Johnson v. Paducah Laundry Company, 122 Ky. 369, 92 S.W. 330 (1906). On the theory that the 1906 court is more versed in long-standing common law rules prior to 1891 than are we, this statement is found:
In the case before us the plaintiff's own testimony shows that he deliberately and purposely left the highway for the purpose of walking across the lot to take his uncle out of sight of the street. He was willfully using the defendant's property for his private purposes without any invitation from the defendant, and without its consent. So far as he is concerned, it is immaterial how far the vat was from the highway. He was not a traveler on the highway at all when he fell into the vat. He was then a trespasser on appellant's lot, having intentionally left the highway for purposes of his own. The case would not be essen-tiajly different if there had been no highway adjoining the lot. It is insisted, however, that the owner of this unin-closed lot in a city ought to know that trespassers are liable to come upon it, and that a vat of boiling water is a thing so dangerous that it is negligence in the owner not to guard it as to one who falls into it in the dark. The general rule is that the owner of private grounds is un der no obligation to keep them safe for the benefit of intruders who come upon them for their own purposes, however innocent the purpose may be. 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 945, 946. The exceptions to the rule are where the owner of the property expressly or impliedly invites the use of it, or so maintains it as to make it what is sometimes called an attractive nuisance, especially in the case of children and animals. See, also, Bishop on Noncontract Law, § 845-853; Bransom's Adm'r v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 50 Am.Rep. 193, and cases cited. The case before us does not fall within either of these exceptions.
and, further, quoting with approval from an Arkansas case, this statement:
"In order to maintain an action for an injury due to negligence, there must be shown to exist some obligation or duty toward the plaintiff which the defendant has left undischarged or unfulfilled. [Citing authorities.] Hence it is that the owner of dangerous premises is not answerable for injuries suffered by a trespasser or mere licensee who comes thereon without invitation, allurement, or right. To such persons he owes only the duty to do them no wanton or willful harm. This seems a harsh rule, which justifies a man, legally, in keeping his property in a needlessly dangerous condition; but it has the support of the authorities, without, perhaps, exception."
This statement of the rule is in accord with the present-day rule and compatible with our interpretation of the statute. We are of the opinion the statute does not violate Sec. 54 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The order granting summary judgment by the trial court recited that "there appearing to be no material issue of fact disputing plaintiff's actions and conduct to be that of a trespasser, defendant's motion for summary judgment is sustained," citing Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 194 (1960).
Kirschner asserts that the trial court relied upon KRS 381.232 for his decision. For that reason, we discussed the constitutionality of the statute. The order does not state whether the trial court relied on the statute or on strictly common law principles. We are of the opinion the order granting summary judgment is proper in any event.
Chesser states the common law rule:
The possessor of premises owes no duty to a bare licensee or a trespasser to keep the premises safe for use of either, but he must refrain from inflicting or exposing him to wanton or willful injury or from setting a trap for him.
Kirschner argues that we should abolish the distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees. He argues that these distinctions are archaic, outmoded, and promote "all or nothing" results expressly disapproved in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984).
In considering whether to abandon principles of tort law, we should take a look at what standard is offered to replace these principles. Kirschner argues that he was, at fifteen, only a few months beyond the protection of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, which also should be abolished. In lieu of these established rules, Kirschner proposes that all cases be submitted to the jury on the basis of "reasonable care under the circumstances." This standard would apparently do away with the concept of a duty owed and liability for breach of that duty. Historically, all tort law has been based on the theory of whether a defendant violated a duty owed to the injured party. There is nothing illogical or unfair in requiring violation of a duty before liability can be imposed, and we reject Kir-schner's assertion that we should abolish the classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee. Hilen does not stand for the proposition that legal duties should be abolished; it simply determined that liability should be imposed according to fault, i.e., comparative negligence. Hilen presupposes a submissible issue of negligence and does not even suggest abandoning the concept of duties.
Thus, we conclude that Kirschner was a trespasser as a matter of law. He and his friends brought the plywood from a distance and carried it up the tower. The argument that somehow Kirschner was a licensee for the reason that LG & E knew children played in the field under the tower is simply not tenable. A trespasser is one who goes upon the property of another without any right, lawful authority, or invitation, either express or implied. There is nothing in this record to even suggest that LG & E knew or should have known that individuals were climbing the tower. Therefore, there is no implied invitation, and the presence in the field under the tower is simply irrelevant. The burden is on Kirschner to show an implied invitation, not LG & E to disprove this.
Lastly, Kirschner asserts that there is an issue of whether even as a trespasser LG & E exposed Kirschner to a concealed, dangerous condition. Kirschner admitted that he knew electricity is dangerous, although he equivocates about seeing the "Danger" sign, and he could not be heard to deny seeing clearly visible signs which he had to climb over. In this assertion, Kirschner claims that the concealed dangerous condition or "trap" is the fact that the injuries complained of were caused not by contact but by "arcing." Kirschner relies on Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, supra. We find this opinion unappli-cable. Chesser involved a condition created by the owner of the premises and liability was denied for the reason it was not foreseeable that the "licensee" would drink from the whiskey bottle. The bottle was filled with a poisonous liquid which caused severe injuries.
Here, the injury was caused by a known propensity of high-voltage electricity. High-voltage electricity is dangerous. There was sufficient warning of the danger, and we do not consider "arcing" to be a concealed dangerous condition in these circumstances.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the trial court are affirmed.
GANT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT, J., concurs in result only.
STEPHENS, C.J., and LEIBSON, J., dissent and file separate dissenting opinions.
VANCE, J., not sitting.