Case Name: M. B. McDonough v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-11-02
Citations: 47 Tex. Crim. 227
Docket Number: No. 3013
Parties: M. B. McDonough v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 227–234

Head Matter:
M. B. McDonough v. The State.
No. 3013.
Decided November 2, 1904.
ON REHEARING, June 11, 1905.
1. —Perjury—Wilful, False Statement Sufficient—Rule Before Grand Jury.
Where the court has jurisdiction to make the inquiry in general terms, any deliberate and wilfully false statement of a witness in answer to questions concerning the same, would constitute a good assignment for perjury; and this, although the question might be too general to form the basis "for the impeachment of the witness. Overruling Meeks v. State, 32 Texas Grim. Rep., 420; Higgins v. State, 38 Id., 539; McCurtry v. State, Id., 521.
2. —Same—Rule in Civil Cases—Deliberate, False, Answer Sufficient.
Where in the trial of a civil case, a witness was asked whether he had been previously injured by any railroad, and had ever made any claim therefor, to which he deliberately, willfully and falsely answered in the negative, he cannot afterwards avail himself of the generality of the question to defeat a prosecution for perjury, and an indictment assigning such question and answer as perjury is good upon motion to quash; and this even if the question to witness was not sufficiently definite, as to time, place and persons to afford a basis for his impeachment.
3. —Evidence—Statement of Defendant—Relevancy—Exception.
It was competent for the State to prove that appellant had stated to the witness about the time he instituted his suit for personal injuries, out of which grew the prosecution for perjury, that he had not been injured on any other railroad. However, the objection to this testimony was not reserved in due time by an exception.
4. —Same—legitimate Matter of Inquiry.
Where defendant was tried for perjury for having falsely deposed, in a civil case, that he had not been injured by any railroad previously, and had made no claim for such injuries, it was permissible for the State to show that defendant had testified to such former injuries in said civil suit on cross-examination; and this, although defendant had not testified in his trial for perjury.
5. —Same—Bill of Exceptions Must Show Testimony Objected to.
Where defendant was tried for perjury, for having falsely stated in his deposition in a civil suit for personal injuries, that he had never been previously injured by any railroad, his parol testimony in said suit was admissible, although not assigned as perjury, to shed light upon his intent. However, the bill of exceptions does not disclose what such parol testimony was.
6. —Bill of Exceptions—No Ruling Certified.
Where the court, in approving a bill of exceptions, certifies that no ruling was had with reference to certain testimony objected to by appellant, with relation to his flight and concealment, the matter is not properly presented for review. Besides such testimony would be admissible.
Appeal from the district Court of Tarrant. Tried below before Hon. Irby D. Dunklin.
Appeal from a conviction for perjury; penalty, three years imprisonment» in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Ho brief for appellant has reached the reporter.
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General, and 0. 8. Lattimore, for the State.
We make this statement, that whether McDonough intended to swear falsely and corruptly, that he had never been injured on any other road than the Fort Wayne and Pittsburg and that he had never made any claim or settlement or received any money other than the value of his time—was a question of fact, dependent upon all of the circumstances and not on the form of the question. The question as to whether the sworn statement be deliberately and knowingly false depends on the knowledge and intent of the maker of the statement and not on the form of the interrogatory. Regardless of the form of the question asked or of the false statement made in answer thereto, the true test to determine whether a thing be perjury or not is: Did the party deliberately make a false statement knowing it to be such and does the proof show such to-be the fact beyond a reasonable doubt. To make the question of a perjurer’s guilt depend on the knowledge of the interrogator of the matter inquired about, as exhibited in the particularity of his question would be to remove all possibility of punishing for perjury or false swearing one who wilfully, deliberately, intentionally and knowingly swears falsely in answer to a question, or about any matter in general, unless the questioner know enough about the facts inquired about at the time of putting the question to frame a question setting forth time, place, persons, etc. This is hardly ever true. In thousands of cases witness take the stand who are comparative or total strangers to the attorney questioning them. It is practically impossible in these numerous instances to frame such questions to adhere to the ruling announced in this ease; and it appears to us to take a large part of the strength and virility out of the perjury statute. It is carrying the doctrine casually mentioned in the Meeks case and not a decisive point therein, entirely too far. McLeod v. State, 75 S. W. Rep., 522; Stanley v. State, 74 S. W. Rep., 318; Williams v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 301; Fry v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 582; Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 Mass., 587; State v. Carey, 65 N. E. Rep., 527; Hernandes v. State, 18 Texas Crim. App., 134; People v. Dowdall, 82 N. W. Rep., 810; U. S. v. Hampton, 101 Fed. Rep., 714; Powell v. State, 37 S. W. Rep., 322; Terry v. State, 30 Mo. 368.

Opinion:
HENDERSON, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of perjury, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of three years.
It is only necessary to consider one assignment of error, which questions the action of the court refusing to quash the indictment. The indictment shows that the alleged perjury was committed on the trial in the district court in a certain case, wherein appellant was plaintiff and the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company was defendant, the pamp being for damages occasioned by alleged personal injuries sustained while plaintiff was in the employ of said railroad. In that suit plaintiff's deposition was taken, and among other things he was asked, the following questions: "Were you ever hurt on any railroad prior to being hurt by the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe, in August, 1902? Again, if you have testified that you were injured on any railroad or in any other way injured prior to being hurt in August, 1902, please state as to such injuries, the name of the railroad you were injured on; the time and place of injury, what was the cause of your injury, describe fully and particularly the circumstances under which you came to be hurt, what was the character of defect, if any, which caused your hurt. Again, did you ever make any claim against any of the companies in whose service you were when injured. If so with which of the companies did you make settlement ? How much did each one of them pay you and when? What was the nature and extent of your injuries? What portions of your body were affected or hurt ? Explain fully. How long were you troubled or did you suffer as a result of such injury or injuries," etc. To which questions, appellant replied, substantially, as follows: "Ho, sir, except he was hurt on the Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne and Chicago; and further, that he made no claim against any other company for injuries received by him. This testimony is alleged to have been material in said cause, and it is traversed as false. The indictment specifically alleges that appellant had previously in the same year (1902) set up a claim against the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company of Texas, for damages for personal injuries, and had been paid by said company the sum of $800 on said account. Motion to quash was predicated on the generality of the question asked, to wit: that said question or questions failed to specify any date when appellant should have worked for any railroads, and failed to give any date when defendant made any claims to any railroad, and fails to state the name of any railroad, the defendant worked for; and because the indictment setting out the traverse of each of said allegations, and that appellant's testimony was false, and that he knew it to be false, fails to give any dates or specify the times and dates when the defendant worked for any railroads, and when he was hurt by any railroads, and when he presented any claim to any railroad, or did any of the acts mentioned in said indictment. We have no doubt that the matter intended to be inquired about was a material issue in said cause then on trial. If appellant (plaintiff) had admitted that he had sustained injuries on other roads, and had made claim for damages on said account, the circumstances thereof may have been used to discredit him before the jury. If he had denied having made a claim against the other roads for damages, had the questions been properly propounded, it would have afforded the subject of impeachment. But we understand the rule to be, both in civil and criminal cases, when a collateral matter of this character is inquired about, the question or questions propounded should call the witness' attention to the circumstances; that is, the time, place and persons, and possibly the other circumstances involved in such transaction. The question should be so definite that, if the witness denied the matter inquired about, he may be impeached thereon. As we said in Meeks v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 420: "The time, place and sufficient of the circumstances to call the attention of the party to the transaction under investigation should have been stated, so that he might have known of what he was to testify. Certainly, if answers to such questions, could not constitute a predicate for the impeachment of the witnesses, it ought not to be sufficient to authorize his conviction of one of the most infamous of all felonies." ' McMurtry v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 521; Higgins v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 539. Recurring to the facts of this case, the questions state no particular time when appellant should have been hurt, or injured by any other railway; called the witness' attention, to no particular railroad, that he had presented any claim against for personal injuries; nor did the questions point to any incident connected with any claim against any other railroad, which might have served to call his attention thereto. The questions were indeed so general that we scarcely apprehend any one would claim a negative ansAver thereto, would furnish the basis for the impeachment of the witness. Indeed, if Ave recur to the record, we find that this same witness, when he was subsequently placed on the stand on the trial of the case, and his attention Avas directed to his claim against the M. K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, that he then stated he recalled the transaction, but did not think of it when he answered his depositions. This case is in itself an allustration of the wisdom of the rule above cited in perjury cases. Because the court refused to quash the indictment, the judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.