Case Name: Kevin PURYEAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-12-27
Citations: 774 So. 2d 846
Docket Number: No. 4D99-3580
Parties: Kevin PURYEAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, C.J., DELL, GUNTHER, STONE, POLEN, KLEIN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 774
Pages: 846–855

Head Matter:
Kevin PURYEAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D99-3580.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 27, 2000.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Margaret Good-Earnest, and Damon E. Amedeo, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC
GROSS, J.
A jury found Kevin Puryear guilty of robbery, as a lesser included offense of robbery with a weapon. We write to address one issue — whether the victim's out-of-court descriptions of her assailant shortly after the robbery were admissible as non-hearsay under section 90.801(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999), as statements of "identification of a person," where the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.
Sixteen-year-old Amy Deese was the victim of the robbery. She testified that on April 27, 1999, between 3:00-4:00 p.m., she pulled into a stall at a do-it-yourself car wash. On her way to the change machine, she saw "a guy standing there by the fence" behind the car wash "[j]ust walking back and forth." No one else was around. Deese looked at the man for only "a couple of seconds. Just a glance." She "didn't pay any mind" to what he looked like. After getting change, Deese began to wash her car.
As she knelt to wash her tires, a man came up to her from the right. He put what she thought was a gun to her head. It felt hard and metallic. She saw out of the corner of her eye that it was black. The man told her something like, "give me your money." She hesitated, but without looking back, gave him six single dollar bills from her back pocket.
The man took off. Deese stood up and saw her assailant turn near the vacuum cleaners. He made a crude comment, and told her "you better be glad you're alive or thank God you're alive." When asked if she got a good look at him, she said "Not really. Just a side of his face." When asked if she got a good look at his face, Deese replied "No." Deese observed the man's clothing, height, and weight for only a matter of seconds.
Deese got in her car and drove home. She told her mother what had happened. Her mother advised her to make a police report and then left to look for the assailant.
Danny Cratsenberg, Deese's boyfriend, came over to the house. Deese told him about the robbery. The two of them went to look for the suspect, whom Deese had described. Not spotting the assailant, the victim and Cratsenberg went to the police station.
To a detective, Deese gave a description of the perpetrator as a black male wearing a burgundy or maroon shirt, white tennis shoes, and black faded jeans. She said he had body odor and was missing every other tooth. She estimated him to be age SOBS. Deese testified that she told the detective at the police station that the suspect had a mustache and missing teeth; she said she saw a mustache from glancing at his face as he stood by the vacuum cleaners after the robbery. But she said that she "just don't remember when I seen his teeth."
Deese and her boyfriend left the police station. On the drive home, near the car wash, Deese saw "the man crossing the street." He was the only black man in the area. Cratsenberg asked if the man was her assailant. Deese said she "hesitated because I wasn't really sure. Then I looked at him and I said yeah that's him." She was able to identify the robber based upon his clothes, height, and weight. She did not identify him by his face. Deese testified "I knew it's him by the clothes, and I also wanted it to be him because I knew the cops were looking for him."
The couple waved down a police officer, who stopped appellant. Without getting out of the car, from approximately twenty feet away, Deese identified appellant as he stood across the street from her. She was sure it was the person who robbed her based on "clothing and height, stuff like that."
In court, Deese was able to identify defendant as the person who robbed her.
During cross-examination, Deese conceded that when she first saw a man near the fence at the car wash, she only glanced at him and would not be able to recognize him again. She was not sure that the man by the fence was the same person she saw in the car wash or in police custody. The first time she saw her assailant's face was from a distance of about twenty feet as he was running away. He turned and paused, muttered obscenities at Deese, and continued on. Deese never got a full frontal view of his face. She was not sure when she saw his mouth with the missing teeth and admitted that her description of his teeth was "pretty much a guess." The victim testified that her in-court identification of defendant was based upon seeing him at the vacuum cleaners at the car wash. She said she was not good at estimating a person's height and weight. She noticed nothing unusual about the robber's teeth. When asked if she was positive, based on her observation of the assailant's face, clothing, height, and weight, that the man the police arrested was the same man who robbed her, Deese said she was not positive, only about seventy-five percent sure.
However, on re-direct examination, she said based on only the clothes, height, and weight, she was positive the man arrested was the assailant.
On the day of the robbery, Detective Wardlaw took a report from Deese at the police station. The state asked the detective, 'What was the description that [the victim] gave you?" Over appellant's hearsay objection, Wardlaw testified that Deese described the robber as "a black male, approximately six foot in height, 140 pounds, between the ages of 30, 35. He had a burgundy t[ee]-shirt with prints on it and faded black blue jeans." Wardlaw said that the victim reported that the perpetrator's shoes were "white sneakers" and said that he had "every other tooth missing in his mouth," a moustache, and a "very strong body odor to him."
After the detective finished her report, she responded to the scene where appellant had been detained. She saw that appellant "[absolutely" matched the description just given by the victim. The detective stood "very close" to appellant and noticed that he was "emitting a strong odor, body odor." Detective Wardlaw then went across the street and spoke to Deese, who identified appellant as her assailant. The detective testified that the victim took her time in making the identification.
During the direct examination of Crat-senberg, the state asked him to relate the description Deese had given him of her assailant. Defense counsel raised a hearsay objection, which the trial court overruled. Cratsenberg said that at Deese's house, right after the robbery, she told him that the robber was wearing a maroon shirt, faded black jeans, white sneakers, had "missing teeth" and a moustache; she said that the perpetrator was a black man and that he "stunk."
Officer Kazmierczak stated that she stopped appellant in the vicinity of the car wash because he wore a burgundy tee-shirt and black faded jeans. The officer found no weapon on appellant or in her search of the area. She found nothing on appellant that she could conclusively say belonged to the victim.
Puryear challenges the trial court's overruling of his hearsay objections, allowing both Detective Wardlaw and Cratsen-berg to relate to the jury the details of the victim's description of the robber given on the day of the crime.
At issue is the proper application of section' 90.801(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999). That section provides:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is:
⅜
(c) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.
Id. Since the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, under section 90.801(2)(c) her out-of-court statements to her boyfriend and the detective would be non-hearsay if they qualify as ones of "identification of [Puryear] made after perceiving" him. Id.
Analysis is complicated by cases from the Florida Supreme Court and this court falling on opposite sides of the issue. The disagreement centers on whether a "statement . of identification" under section 90.801(2)(c) is broad enough to include the details of the declarant's out-of-court description of a person, or whether that section is limited to the declarant's mere designation of a person as the one who committed the crime or other act at issue in the trial.
The supreme court construed section 90.801(2)(c) in a first degree murder case, Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270, 276 (Fla.1988). The victim of the homicide was a clerk at a FINA gas station. See id. at 272. One state witness saw the victim there at 6:17 a.m. See id. at 276. Another state witness arrived at the station at 6:20 a.m. and found no attendant on duty. See id. at 272. A third witness said the defendant left her at about 6:00 a.m. and drove north on the highway on a course that would have taken him by the FINA sta-' tion. See id. The defendant returned to his travelling companions at about 7:04 a.m. See id.
The defense in Swafford called "a person who had told the police that he had seen a man at the FINA station at 6:17 a.m. on the day of the crime, and the witness described from the stand the man he saw." Swafford, 533 So.2d at 276. The defense then sought to introduce a "police bulletin and the testimony of the officer who had prepared it, suggesting that the bulletin and testimony would provide a better description of the person seen than the witness'! ] recollection over three years later." Id. The trial court excluded both the bulletin and the testimony on the ground of hearsay. See id.
The supreme court held that the police bulletin and the testimony of the officer who prepared it was hearsay because neither was a statement of identification under subsection 90.801(2)(e):
This position [that the proposed testimony was nonhearsay] is erroneous because a description is not an identification. An "identification of a person after perceiving him," subsection 90.801(2)(c), is a designation or reference to a particular person or his or her photograph and a statement that the person identified is the same as the person previously perceived. The witness in this case never made an identification of the person he had seen; he only gave a description. This testimony does not meet the definition of "identification" as used in subsection 90.801(2)(c).
Swafford, 533 So.2d at 276 (citations omitted).
While Swafford might appear to contain the definitive interpretation of section 90.801(2)(c) as it applies to a declarant's description of a person, the supreme court reached a different conclusion in another first degree murder case, Power v. State, 605 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.1992). A key witness in Power was Frank Miller, who saw the victim go into a house where she said there was a man who "she believed wanted to rob her." Id. at 858. Miller saw a man inside the doorway. After the victim returned to the house, Miller drove back to his own house and called 911. To the deputy responding to the call, Miller "described the man he had seen as a white male with reddish hair." Id.
One of the many issues Power raised on appeal was that the trial court erred in allowing the deputy to testify that Frank Miller had said that "[t]he suspect was a white male with reddish-colored hair ." Id. at 862. The supreme court first held that the statement was "probably admissible" under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (1989). Id. Without equivocation, the court found the statement admissible under section 90.801(2)(c):
Additionally, the statement regarding the reddish hair was admissible non-hearsay as one of identification of a person made after perceiving him. See Sec. 90.801(2)(c). Frank Miller testified at trial and was clearly subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.
Id. (fhe supreme court also wrote that even if the statement were erroneously admitted, "any error was harmless." Id. Power did not cite to Swafford.
Like the supreme court, this court has reached different interpretations of section 90.801(2)(c). In Harrell v. State, 647 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), a police officer called to the scene of a robbery testified over objection that an eyewitness had "described the robber as wearing an orange shirt and brown pants" and that the "victim gave a similar description." Id. at 1017. Applying section 90.801(2)(c), we held that the "identification statements of the victim and [the eyewitness] to the officer were not inadmissible as hearsay, since they testified at trial." Id. at 1018.
Over two years later, in Davis v. State, 694 So.2d 113, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we reversed a burglary conviction "because of the admission of hearsay testimony of a police officer as to the description of a suspect given to him by the victim of the crime." A police officer arrived at the scene a short time after the crime, and the "victim gave him a description of the intruder, including race, approximate age and body shape"; the victim also said that the intruder "was wearing a white ribbed or striped shirt and blue gym pants." Id. at 113-14. The victim testified at trial and identified the defendant as the intruder. See id. at 114. Over the defendant's hearsay objection, the "officer was permitted to testify as to [the] victim's description of the intruder on the date of the incident." Id.
Citing to Swafford, we held that the exclusion from hearsay found in section 90.801(2)(c) did not apply because the officer testified to the victim's description of the intruder. See id. Without so stating, we adopted Swafford s conclusion that a declarant's description of a person is not a "statement of . identification" within the meaning of the statute. See id. Davis contains no reference to either Harrell or Power, both decided after Swafford.
Power and Swafford cannot be reconciled. Power holds that description testimony is admissible under section 90.801(2)(c). See Power, 605 So.2d at 862. Swafford holds that a declarant's description of a person is not an "identification of a person after perceiving him" within the meaning of the rule. Swafford, 533 So.2d at 276. Swafford involved a defendant's reliance on section 90.801(2)(c); in Power the state offered testimony under that section of the evidence code.
Although it is possible to dismiss the brief holding in Power as dicta, given the clear language of the opinion, that interpretation is available only to the supreme court. The evidentiary ruling in Sivafford could also have been based on other grounds. See supra, note 1. We therefore conclude that the supreme court overruled Swafford sub silentio in Power. See Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel, 727 So.2d 299, 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 519 So.2d 1157, 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
There is reasonable support for both interpretations of section 98.801(2)(c) found in the case law. Whether the statute should be expansively construed is a policy decision concerning the type of evidence a fact finder should consider at trial.
On one hand, the statute speaks of an "identification of a person," not merely a "statement of identification." A plain reading of the statute is thus consistent with Swafford ⅛ holding that "a description is not an identification" and that the statute contemplates "a designation or reference to a particular person or his or her photograph...." 533 So.2d at 276.
Identification is a forensic term of art which encompasses a process whereby a person first perceives a suspect and then identifies him or her, either through a lineup, a show-up, or other means. See People v. Sykes, 229 Mich.App. 254, 582 N.W.2d 197, 204 (1998).
The definition of "identification" in Black's Law DictionaRy 745 (6th ed.1990) reads as follows:
Proof of identity. The proving that a person, subject, or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged, or reputed to be; as where a witness recognizes the prisoner as the same person whom he saw committing the crime; or where handwriting, stolen goods, counterfeit coin, etc., are recognized as the same which once passed under the observation of the person identifying them.
(Emphasis added).
The definition of "eyewitness identification" reads:
Type of evidence by which one who has seen the event testifies as to the person or persons involved from his own memory of the eyent.
(Emphasis added). Black's Law DictioNARY 589 (6th ed.1990).
Both definitions relate the concept of a witness's recognition of the subject as the same person who was earlier observed by the witness identifying the subject. Similarly, Swafford interprets a statement of identification as:
a designation or reference to a particular person or his or her photograph and a statement that the person identifies is the same person previously perceived.
533 So.2d at 275.
Swafford presents the typical situation contemplated by section 90.801(2)(c) — one where the victim sees the assailant shortly after the criminal episode at a line-up, show-up, photo array, or chance encounter and says, "That's the [person]." Stanford v. State, 576 So.2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see State v. Lopez, 123 N.M. 599, 943 P.2d 1052, 1055 (App.1997). The rule allows introduction of an identification in situations "where the [declarant's] memory no longer permits a current identification" or "where before trial the witness identifies the defendant and then because of fear refuses to acknowledge his previous identification." United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (citation omitted).
On the other hand, there is also a body of law concluding that to allow description testimony of a person under section 90.801(2)(c) does not do violence to the policy behind the rule. These cases turn on the rationale that the ability to describe a person's physical characteristics is the fraternal twin of the capacity to identify the person. A witness's description of a suspect carries greater probative force when it occurs closer in time to the initial observation, when the witness's memory is fresher and unpolluted by intervening forces of suggestiveness.
Cases holding that a declarant's description of a suspect is a type of "identification" within the meaning of the statute reason that this interpretation is consistent with the policies behind the rule defining hearsay, which seek to facilitate the search for the truth. See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Moskowitz, 581 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.1978) (Friendly, J., concurring) (noting it would be a "straight-forward analysis to regard the sketch as an integral part of [the witnesses'] statements to the police artist which enabled him to draw it . it was thus admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(c)"); Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C.2000); State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 254, 659 P.2d 745, 750-51 (1983) (holding that a composite sketch, which is like a verbal description, is admissible as substantive evidence of a defendant's appearance under Hawaii evidence code section identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C)); State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 905 P.2d 1066, 1068-69 (App.1995). But see State v. Jenkins, 168 Wis.2d 175, 483 N.W.2d 262, 267-68 (App.1992) (citing Swafford and holding a description is not an "identification").
Under either construction of section 90.801(2)(c), the reasons for admitting identification statements as non-hearsay are that (1) the earlier, out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable than those made under the suggestive conditions prevailing at trial and (2) the availability of the declarant for cross-examination eliminates a significant danger of hearsay testimony. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(c) (Advisory Committee Notes); § 90.801, Fla.Stat.Ann. (1999), Law Revision Council Note-1976; State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla.1978). As Justice Anstead wrote when he sat on this court, with an out-of-court identification closer in time to the actual event, "there is a lessened possibility of taint than when an identification is made in court where the identified person (defendant) is in the obvious 'hotseat' alongside his counsel." Stanford, 576 So.2d at 740. Also, the rule permits "introduction of identifications made by a witness when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon him." United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2d Cir.1977) (footnote omitted). See 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaeet A. BergeR, Wein-stein's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801 App. 02[3] (2d ed.1999).
For these reasons, we follow the supreme court's 1992 decision in Power and our 1994 decision in Harrell. We recede from our 1997 case, Davis. We hold that because the victim testified at trial and was extensively cross-examined, the trial court did not err in admitting the victim's out-of-court statements to the detective and her boyfriend.
On the remaining issues, appellant failed to object to the state's use of the victim's prior inconsistent statements, so the issue is not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Green v. State, 711 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be brought in a motion for post-conviction relief. See Dennis v. State, 696 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Appellant failed to move for judgment of acquittal during the trial and we find no fundamental error in the defendant's conviction based on the evidence at trial.
Because of the apparent conflict between Swafford and Power, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
HAS SWAFFORD V. STATE, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla.1988) BEEN OVERRULED BY POWER V. STATE, 605 So.2d 856 (Fla.1992)?
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, C.J., DELL, GUNTHER, STONE, POLEN, KLEIN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
TAYLOR, J., concurs specially with opinion.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. The opinion in Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla.1988), does not indicate whether the police officer who prepared the bulletin received the information directly from the witness. The opinion states that the police bulletin was "derived" from the witness' description. If the officer did not hear the de-clarant's statements himself, then the testimony was objectionable, since it presented an unresolved double hearsay problem. Under section 90.801 (2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999), the declarant making the identification "must do so based on his or her personal knowledge of the individual identified and not upon the statement of another." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 801.9 (2000 ed).
. Section 90.80 l(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(c). As such, federal cases dealing with rule 801(d)(1)(c) are persuasive in construing the Florida rule. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 452 So.2d 559, 561-62 (Fla.1984); Hall v. Oakley, 409 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Page, 449 So.2d 813 (Fla.1984) (stating "if a Florida Statute is patterned after a federal law on the same subject, it will take the same construction in the Florida courts as its prototype has been given in the federal courts").