Case Name: Whiteside's Administrator vs. Hickman and Ross
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1830-01
Citations: 2 Yer. 358
Docket Number: 
Parties: Whiteside’s Administrator vs. Hickman and Ross.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 358–376

Head Matter:
Whiteside’s Administrator vs. Hickman and Ross.
' A judg-ment was rendered in the circuit court against the original defendant, and his securities in appeal from the county court. From this judgment, he prayed and obtained an appeal in error to the supreme court. The record did not show, that the securities joined in the writ of error, or that they had been severed or refused to.join. It was held that although the securities did not, in form, join in the writ of error, they were nevertheless parties to it, and that the supreme court had jurisdiction to render judgment against them upon affirmance of the judgment below.
This was a scire jadas, brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants, suggesting that at a supreme court ’of errors and appeals for the fourth judicial circuit of .this State, holder) at Nashville, on the third Monday in ,Jan. 1821, Jenkin Whitesides, the plaintiff's intestate, .recovered against Roger R. Sappington, and Thomas Hickman and Daniel Ross, his securities in appeal, the sum of one thousand dollars for his debt, as also the sum .of three hundred and thirty-nine dollars, for his damages, sustained by reason of the detention of said'debt, and also forty-eight dollars costs, which were adjudged to .said Whitesides by said court. The scire jadas then suggests the death of Jenkin Whitesides, and the appointment of the plaintiff as bis administrator. It then suggests the death of Roger B. Sappington; that he die<3 intestate, and that no person has administered upon his estate. The scire facias then states that execution of the .aforesaid judgment yet remains to be made. It was made returnable‘to January term, 1828.
' The defendant, Ross, pleaded, first, nul tiel record Second, that the action at law in the scire facias mentioned, was commenced originally in the county court of Davidson county, by Jenkin Whitesides against Roger B. Sappington alone, where judgment was given in favor of Whitesides; from which judgment Sappington appealed to the circuit court; and that the said Daniel Ross, became one of his securities for the prosecution of the appeal; that judgment was given in said circuit court against the appellant Roger B. Sappington and his sureties,of whom defendant,' Ross, was one.;, that after the rendition of said judgment, said Roger B. Sapping-ton alone, prayed and obtained.an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to the said supreme court, and entered into bond with security for the prosecution thereof, but that he, the said Daniel Ross, did not join the said Roger B. Sappington in the prosecution of said, appeal in the nature of a writ of error, nor was he any party to the same, either as principal or surety, or otherwise; and so the said Ross says no judgment could be rendered against him in this court, and that the same is void, &c.
The third plea states the suit-in the county court of Davidson, the judgment,-, appeal by Sappington to the circuit court, the defendant, Ross, becoming one, of the securities to prosecute the appeal, as stated in the second plea. It then slates, that he as such security, executed a bond with said Sappington, conditioned to be void; if the said Sappington should prosecute his said appeal with" effect, or abide by, perform and fulfil the judgment, sentence or decree of the said circuit court therein. That the said circuit court gave judgment on the appeal against the said Roger B. and his sureties, for the prosecution thereof; from which said judgment, the said Roger B. alone prosecuted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to the supreme court, in which the said defendant, Ross, did not join, &c. and that there was no final-judgment in said circuit court against the said Sapping-ton, for the performance or fulfilment of which onty, was he, the said Daniel Ross, liable, &c.
The fourth plea states, that after the decision of the said suit referred to in the said scire facias, in this court, to. wit, on or about the 4th June, 1822, the said Roger B. Sappington filed an injunction bill, and obtained a writ of injunction, enjoining the said Jenldn Whitesides from carrying into effect the said judgment, and entered into bond with security for the amount of said judgment, to secure and indemnify the said Jenldn against loss by reason of the suing out the said injunction; and so the sn!d Ross says, if over he was liable to satisfy said nidg-J ’ J J o rnenf, he is forever acquitted and discharged thore-from, &c.
]isl)C joined upon the plea of nul ticl record,” and the other pleas were all demurred to.
Balch, for the plaintiff.
Wathington, Miller, and Yergr.r, for the defendants.

Opinion:
Perk, Judge.
The construction put upon o tracts of Asssembly has been, that when a security in appeal from the county to the circuit court, enters himself as such, lie becomes identified with the party appealing, and in the event of the appellant being cast, the security is liable to the extent of his principal. By our acts of Assembly, the appeal bond is directed to make a part of the record to lie sent up, on which, by motion, judgment is ordered to be entered against the security, and upon such judgment, so rendered, one execution issues. This is the end of the suit in the circuit court.
But it is said this may all be true, and yet when a writ of error is prayed for by the original party to the suit, and the cause taken up to the supreme court, the security is not necessarily taken along. To this I answer, that if the record does not show that the security has severed himself and will not join in the writ, the judgment being against both, will be taken up in tolo. If it is not so taken up, what is there to prevent an execution from issuing against the security pending the writ of error in the supreme court? and what is to be done if the money should be collected, and afterwards there should be «reversal of the judgment? It may be a: severed, refund the money; but who can help seeing that cost must be incurred, and often property sacrificed.
Waiving, however, arguments arising from inconvenience, what is the judgment to be rendered in the supreme court? By the act of 1809, this court is to render such judgment as the circuit court ought to, or was bound to render. The judgment, therefore, the supreme court, must be as broad as the judgment in the circuit court. If then, the judgment in the circuit court should be against the principal and security, how shall we narrow the judgment in this court to the cipal only? To do so we must violate the act which is directory to us, to give such judgment as the circuit court should have passed.
We must not forget that our mode of proceeding is statutable. To comply with our statutes and render them consistent in extenso, I cannot see my way more plainly than in the track marked out heretofore. To innovate upon thé practice heretofore established, ought not to be done, unless some good might result from it. In affirming in the supreme court, and thereby rendering the judgment against both, there is no increase of cost; the execution will be single; whereas, upon the plan proposed, two executions must issue, one • from the circuit court against the surely, the other against the principal from the supreme court.
To authorize the clerk in the circuit court to act, supposing the writ of error to have operated as a supersedeas, evidence of the affirmance of the judgment in the su- preme court must be sent down; often'a new suit by sci. fa. will be necessary. For myself, I am opposed to the running of more executions than one for the same demand, where it can be avoided.
But there is another view of the subject, which to my mind is a strong argument against the practice now contended for. If the judgment in' the circuit court is complete against the security, and he may at his pleasure rest there, while the principal'takes up the cause by writ of error; the security by the act of 1809, eh.— will be entitled to his judgment on motion against his principal: our practice avoids this consequence, and entitles the security to the judgment against the principal whenever he shall be finally concluded, and not before.
The argument most strongly urged against this course • is, the giving judgment against the security who is not a party to the writ.
The answer to that argument, is, he is a party to the record; for the appeal bond which carries him from the county to the circuit court, will be more effectual iu taking him from the circuit to the supreme court; because the appeal bond becoming part of the record is then accompanied by a judgment against him founded on it.
The policy of the law we are not to draw in question; the rules by which the security is reached are few, they are direct; and being given by acts of Assembly cannot be departed from.
Catron, Judge.
The cause of Stump vs. Sheppard, (Cooke's Rep. 191,) decided by the supreme court in 1812, presented the precise point litigated in this cause. It declared what the practice had been theretofore, viz: that the sccuiities did not in form join in the writ of error from the circuit court to this court. It has been followed uniformly, for almost twenty years, without inconvenience or complaint, so far as we know and believe, and i see not the least reason for changing it.
The appeal bond from the county to the circuit court, is declared part of the record, by the act of 1794, ch. 1, sec. 64, and judgment inslanter may be entered up upon the bond, if the appellant is cast. By the act of 1809, ch. 49, sec. 27, this court is bound to render such judgment as the circuit court should have rendered upon the record. Suppose Sappington upon the appeal from the county court, had reversed the judgment of that court in the circuit court, from which Whitesides had appealed to this court, and we had reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and affirmed that of the county court; would we not have proceeded to render judgment upon the appeal bond from the county to the circuit court? Certainly. It is the practice of every day; we have no other; why is it so? Because, the appeal bond is part of the record, the securities are in court, and we give judgment upon the whole record. So it is when their principle prosecutes the appeal in error. Suppose no judgment had been rendered'by the circuit court against the' securities. 'Ross and Hickman, but only against Sappington, who had alone prosecuted the appeal in error to this court, on affirmance here, we would have been bound by the act of 1809, to give such judgment as the circuit court ought have rendered, and judgment would have been given against the securities from the county to the circuit court, for the amount of the judgment in the circuit court. If thisjudgment be pronounced void, thousands in the various courts of the State must share the same fate,