Case Name: Willie ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-12-03
Citations: 592 So. 2d 1119
Docket Number: No. 90-647
Parties: Willie ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 592
Pages: 1119–1121

Head Matter:
Willie ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-647.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 3, 1991.
On Motion for Rehearing Feb. 13, 1992.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Carol Ann Turner, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
JOANOS, Chief Judge.
Willie Lee Anderson has appealed from sentencing as an habitual felony offender, following his conviction by jury of four counts each of sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Following Anderson's conviction, the state filed notice of its intent to seek habitual felony offender classification. At the sentencing proceeding, the state offered as predicate convictions two prior felony convictions, which Anderson conceded were his. Based thereon, the court held that Anderson qualified as an habitual felony offender, and sentence was imposed accordingly. However, the trial court made no finding that the predicate convictions had not been pardoned or set aside, as required by section 775.084(l)(a)3. and 4., Florida Statutes (1989).
Anderson contends first that section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989) is unconsti tutional, in that the prosecutor's discretion to decide who among qualifying defendants will receive habitual offender treatment deprives him of equal protection of the laws, and infringes on the courts' power to impose punishment. He next argues that the classification must be reversed based on the trial court's failure to make all of the findings required by section 775.084(l)(a).
Anderson's constitutional arguments are without merit. The issue of prosecutorial discretion was addressed in Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990). Barber held that the guarantee of equal protection is not violated when prosecutors are given the discretion by law to "habitualize" only some of those criminals who are eligible, even though their discretion is not bound by statute. Mere selective, discretionary application of a statute is permissible; only a contention that persons within the habitual offender class are being selected according to some unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, would raise a potentially viable challenge. Barber at 1170 (emphasis in original). Barber addressed the separation of power issue as well, holding that "the executive branch is properly given the discretion to choose which available punishments to apply to convicted offenders." Barber at 1171.
The trial court's failure to make the findings required by section 775.-084(l)(a) is, however, reversible error, even in the absence of objection. Rolle v. State, 586 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), citing Parker v. State, 546 So.2d 727 (Fla.1989) and Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985). Anderson's sentence must therefore be reversed. We note that, on remand for resentencing, the trial court may resen-tence Anderson as an habitual offender, if the requisite statutory findings are made by the court and supported by the evidence. Rodger v. State, 583 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); King v. State, 580 So.2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.