Case Name: Hoyt vs. Jones
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1872-06
Citations: 31 Wis. 389
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hoyt vs. Jones.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 389–405

Head Matter:
Hoyt vs. Jones.
Recording Acó?. (1) Effect of judgment against grantees whose deeds w'e of record, upon one claiming under them by umecorded deed. (2) Who is a purchaser for value. (3) Pleading and proof in such cases.
Costs in Ejectment. (4) Abstract of Title.
1. By a series of conveyances in due form and duly recorded, the legal title to land passed from. X. through. A. and B. to O.; and by unre corded deeds it then passed from C. to D., and from D. to the plaintiff. X. then commenced suit against A. B. and C., neither D. nor the plaintiff being made a party thereto, and had judgment cancel-ling said recorded deeds, and adjudging the title to be inX. as against said defendants and all persons claiming under them after notice of lis pendens filed. Afterwards X. conveyed to Y. and he to defendant; and the deed to Y. was recorded before those from C. to D. and from D. to plaintiff. Held, in ejectment,
(1.) That the judgment in favor of X. was a public record, of which all persons concerned were bound to take notice.
(2.) That although such judgment did not of itself divest plaintiff’s title, it had the full effect, as against all the world, of a deed of quitclaim from 0. to X.
(3.) That Y., being a subsequent purchaser, in good faith, for value, from X., without knowledge or notice of said unrecorded deeds, was protected against them by the recording act (B. S., ch. 86, see. 25); and as to him, said prior unrecorded deeds were void.
(4.) That defendant took a perfect title by his deed from Y.
2. Defendant advanced the agreed price of the land to X. before the latter brought his suit against A. B., and 0.; and took a contract for the sale of the land, with an agreement that if X. failed to remove the cloud upon his title, the transaction should be regarded as a loan of money. After X. obtained his judgment, the parties treated the transaction as a sale of and payment for the land. Held, that defendant must be regarded as a purchaser for value.
3. In ejectment by the prior grantee of land against a subsequent purchaser whose deed is first recorded, the defendant is not bound to plead, nor in the first instance to prove, that his purchase was in good faith and for value; but may rely upon a mere assertion of paramount title with proof of the prior record of his deed. The burden is upon the plaintiff, in such a case, to show bad faith or want of consideration.
4. In ejectment, the expense of an abstract of title procured by the success ful party is no part of the taxable costs.
5. The admission of an'improper item in the taxation of costs in the court below, will not necessitate a reversal of the judgment in ejectment on an appeal therefrom; but, the judgment being affirmed upon the merits, a retaxation of the costs will be ordered, unless respondent remits the amount improperly allowed.
APPEAL from, the Circuit Court for Bodge County.
This action was brought to recover a lot of land containing about one and one-fourth acres, being part of the northeast quarter of section five, in township thirteen north, of range fifteen east, in the county of Dodge; which lot is particularly described in the complaint by metes and bounds.
The complaint is in the usual form of complaints in actions to recover real property. The answer is, 1. The general denial. 2. Title to the demanded premises in the defendant. 8. The statute of limitations, by reason of the adverse possession, by the defendant and his grantors, of said premises for more than twenty years.
To maintain the issue on his part, the plaintiff read in evidence on the trial: 1. Two patents from the United States to Seymour Wilcox (who is the common source of title), conveying to him the said northeast quarter of said section five. Said patents are dated February 1st, 1843. 2. A warranty deed Rom Seymour Wilcox and wife to John Taylor, dated July 23d, 1851, and recorded July 24th, 1851, conveying a portion of said quarter section, including therein the premises in question in this suit. 3. A warranty deed of the same premises conveyed by Wilcox to Taylor, executed by John Taylor and wife to Milo Sykes, and dated July 23d, 1851, and recorded November 3d, 1851. 4. A deed of warranty from Milo Sykes and wife to Byron Sykes, of the same premises, dated November 17th, 1851, and recorded November 25th, 1851. 5. A deed of warranty of the same premises, executed by Byron Sykes and wife to Wallace Mygatt, dated April 16th, 1853, and recorded April 30th, 1853. 6. A. warranty deed of the same premises, from Wallace Mygatt and wife to Edgar G-. Mygatt, dated July 15th, 1854, and recorded November lltlx, 1868. 7. A quitclaim deed of the same premises, executed by Edgar G. Mygatt and wife to the plaintiff, dated September 10th, 1858, and recorded November 11th, 1868.
The chain of title under which the defendant claims is as follows : 1. A bond dated August 7th, 1856; executed by Seymour Wilcox to George Babcock, conditioned for the conveyance to Babcock of the lot in controversy in this action in two years, or afterwards at the option of Babcock, in case Wilcox. should in the meantime obtain a perfect and undisputed title thereto; which bond also gave Babcock the possession of said' premises. 2. A judgment and judgment roll in an action commenced in 1858 in the circuit court for Bodge county, by Seymour Wilcox against the above named John Taylor, Milo Sykes, Byron Sykes and Wallace Mygatt, for the purpose of obtaining, upon grounds stated in the complaint therein, the judgment of that court cancelling and annulling all the above mentioned conveyances from Wilcox to Taylor, from Taylor to Milo Sykes, from Milo Sykes to Byron Sykes, and from the latter to Wallace Mygatt; in which action each of the defendants therein was personally served with the process or summons, and such proceedings were afterwards had therein that the court gave judgment for the plaintiff, in and by which it was, amongst other things, adjudged and determined that the four several conveyances last above mentioned were void and of no effect, and the title to the premises described therein was by said judgment adjudged to be in the said Seymour Wilcox and not in the said Wallace Mygatt, and it was further adjudged that the said Seymour Wilcox have, hold and enjoy the said premises as against the said Wallace Mygatt and all persons claiming under him since the filing of the notice of the pendency of such action. Such notice was filed November 10th, 1858. The judgment is dated July 18th, 1859, and remains in full force, not reversed, vacated or modified. 8. A warranty, deed of the premises claimed in the complaint in this action, executed by Seymour Wilcox and wife to said George Babcock, in consideration of four lrundred dollars, dated July 28th, 1862, and recorded June 14tk, 1864. 4. A warranty deed of the premises last mentioned, executed by George Babcock and wife to the defendant, dated July 28th, 1868, and recorded January 14th, 1869, the consideration therefor being six hundred dollars.
It also appeared on the trial, that the premises in controversy had continued in the exclusive and uninterrupted possession of Wilcox, Babcock, and the defendant, respectively, under their several conveyances thereof, from 1848 to the time of the trial, and that neither Taylor nor any grantee under him, down to and including the plaintiff, ever had any possession thereof.
The action was tried by the court without a jury, and the court found the foregoing facts, together with some others not necessary to be stated, and rendered judgment for the defendant, for costs, and adjudging that the plaintiff take nothing by his suit. From such judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court.
K Mariner and David S. Ordway, for appellant,
contended that the record of the judgment in favor of Wilcox in his action of ejectment against Taylor and others was improperly admitted in evidence in this action, the defendant herein having been the owner of the land before the commencement of such action, and not having been made a party thereto.
Gillett & Pier, for respondent.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed at the January term, 1872.
LyoN, J.
The conveyances from Wilcox to Taylor, from Taylor to Milo Sykes, from him to Byron Sykes, and from the latter to Wallace Mygatt, were effectually " wiped out " by the judgment of July 18th, 1859. From thenceforth those conveyances, and the record thereof, ceased to have any force or effect as evidence of title in the respective grantees therein named, or either of them, or as notice to subsequent purchasers from Wilcox. The court which rendered that judgment had jurisdiction of tbe subject matter thereof, and of tbe persons of tbe defendants named therein ; and it was adjudged that tbe foregoing conveyances were void and of no effect, and tbe title to tbe premises, or tbe lot in controversy in this action, was, by tbe terms of such judgment, confirmed in Seymour Wilcox. Instead of thus confirming tbe title thereto in Wilcox, bad tbe judgment directed Wallace Mygatt to execute a release of tbe premises to Wilcox, and bad such release been duly executed and recorded, obviously tbe effect would have been the same. That would merely have been tbe use of different means to accomplish tbe same end. In that case it would appear by the records, as it now appears, that Wilcox bad a perfect record title to tbe premises when be conveyed the same "to Babcock. It does not appear that either Wilcox or Babcock bad any notice, actual or constructive, of tbe existence of tbe unrecorded conveyances-from Wallace Mygatt to Edgar Gr. Mygatt, and from the latter to tbe plaintiff. Babcock was a purchaser of tbe premises from Wilcox in good faith, and for a valuable consideration. He was in the actual possession thereof under tbe bond previously executed to him by Wilcox, and after tbe same was conveyed to him be retained such actual possession by virtue of tbe conveyance. He also recorded such conveyance before tbe deeds to Edgar Gr. Mygatt and to plaintiff were recorded.
We see no good reason why, under these circumstances, Babcock did not take a perfect title to the premises in controversy. Suppose tbe plaintiff's claim of title was founded upon an unrecorded conveyance from Wilcox directly to Edgar Gr. Mygatt, or even directly to tbe plaintiff, of tbe existence of which Babcock bad no notice when be took tbe conveyance from Wilcox. In such case there can be no doubt that Babcock would bold tbe premises under bis recorded conveyance, by virtue of tbe recording act. K. S., cb. 86, sec. 25. We think tbe case as it stands involves tbe same principles — that there is no substantial difference between tbe case supposed and tbe one presented by this record.
Our conclusion is, that tbe deeds to Edgar Gr. Mygatt and to tbe plaintiff, respectively, are void as against tbe subsequent conveyance to Babcock, wbicb was first recorded; Babcock being a purchaser in good faitb and for a valuable consideration. It necessarily follows that tbe conveyance of the premises, executed by Babcock to tbe defendant, vested a good title thereto in the defendant, and that tbe judgment of the circuit court was properly in bis favor.
These views render it unnecessary to decide tbe other questions discussed in the arguments of tbe respective counsel, with a single exception. In adjusting the costs, the taxing officer-allowed an item of sixty dollars for an abstract of title ; and, on a review of tbe taxation, the circuit court, pro forma, ap proved tbe bill thus taxed, and allowed tbe item to remain therein. We do not think that tbe cost of an abstract of title is a taxable disbursement. The examination of the records for tbe purpose of ascertaining tbe state of tbe title seems to be the proper duty of tbe attorney, and if, for convenience, some other person is employed to perform such duty, we are aware of no statute wbicb authorizes the expense thereof to be included in tbe taxed bill of costs. Unless, therefore, tbe defendant remits tbe amount of that item, there must be a retaxation at tbe cost of tbe defendant, and tbe objectionable item stricken out. But this does not work a reversal of the judgment.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Tbe appellant moved for a rehearing, and his counsel, Messrs. Mariner, Smith & Ordway, contended that a judgment is operative only between parties and privies pendente lite and post litem (Gray v. Schenck, 4 Coms., 461; Story's Eq. Pl., Redf. ed., § 72 ); that to affect tbe title to land by a judgment, the owner of tbe land must be a party to the action (Hodson v. Treat, 7 Wis., 281; Morse v. Cord, 14 id., 217; Green v. Dixon, 9 id., 538; Stark v. Brown, 12 id., 572 ); that all men are presumed to know tbe law, and tbe judgment against Taylor and others was a public record, and whoever took a deed of the premises in question after the rendition of that judgment, is conclusively presumed to have known that if the title had passed out of Wallace Mygatt before that action was commenced, the true owner of the land was not bound by the judgment; that the judgment itself merely adjudges the title to be in Wilcox as against Wallace Mygatt and all persons claiming under him since the filing of the notice of pendency of said action; that the provisions of the registry law here relied on, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed; that to hold the judgment as of like effect as a release from Wallace Mygatt, and as standing in place of a deed, is a wide departure from the terms of the law; that Wilcox was not a purchaser from Wallace Mygatt (2 L. C. in Eq., 1; Jackson v. Dubois, 4 Johns., 221; Anderson v. Roberts, 18 id., 515; Dickerson v. Tillinghast, 4 Paige, 222; Thomas v. Kelsey, 30 Barb., 268; 29 id., 505, 539); that he did not pay a valuable consideration (Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns., 637; Wright v. Douglass, 10 Barb., 97; Arnold v. Patrick, 6 Paige, 310); that he did not have a conveyance in any sense in which that word is. used, because the judgment did not attempt to pass the title, but merely to declare the true state of the ti tie; that his conveyance, if any, was not first nor at any time duly recorded, (Wood v. Chapin, 3 Kern., 518; 4 Kent, 9th ed., 171); that Babcock was not a purchaser for value without notice; and that appellant should be permitted to show that-Wilcox and Babcock took with actual notice of appellant's deed. Counsel further argued that the court, in the action of Wilcox against Taylor and others, had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, i. e., of the title to the land in dispute, except so far as it had jurisdiction of the parties who had the title. Winborn v. Gorrell, 3 Ired., 117; 9 Paige, 136.