Case Name: Neczypor v. Jacobs, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1961-03-28
Citations: 403 Pa. 303
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 329
Parties: Neczypor v. Jacobs, Appellant.
Judges: Before Jones, C. J., Bell, Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Bok and Eagen, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 403
Pages: 303–319

Head Matter:
Neczypor v. Jacobs, Appellant.
Argued November 15, 1960.
Before Jones, C. J., Bell, Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Bok and Eagen, JJ.
re-argument refused April 21, 1961.
Irving R. Shull, with him Alfred I. Ginsburg, and Bernard L. Lemiseh, for appellant.
Miles Warner, for appellee.
March 28, 1961:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mb. Justice Musmanno,
Stephen S. Neczypor, the plaintiff in this case, obtained a verdict of $4,000 against Joseph Jacobs, the defendant, in an action of malicious prosecution. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the verdict. We granted allocatur.
Reading the record with all conflicts in testimony, and all inferences rising therefrom, as resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the following narrative is warranted. On June 4, 1955, Stephen Neczypor engaged himself to chauffeur for his friend John Lew, who was being married in Philadelphia. After the religious ceremony at church and the taking of the bridal pictures, Neczypor started home to get his wife to take her to the wedding reception scheduled for that evening. It was then after 4 p.m.
As he proceeded northwardly on Fifth Street, his car was bumped in the rear by another car being driven by the defendant in this case, Joseph Jacobs. It does not appear that the bump was a severe one, but it would seem that the lesser the damages in collisions of this kind the more apt the drivers are to enter into wordy warfare, each accusing the other of stupidity, gross carelessness and unflattering antecedents. Jacobs, who was a city detective dressed in street clothes, informed Neczypor that he had better be careful since he could give him a ticket. Neczypor retorted: "That don't give you no license to run into my automobile."
Operators' licenses and automobile registration cards were exchanged and the episode apparently ended. Both drivers got into their respective cars and continued on their respective journeys.
A few minutes later Jacobs passed Neczypor on the road and the latter noted that Jacobs' car was carrying a dealer's license plate. He pursued and caught up with Jacobs and said to him: "You know you showed me the wrong owner's card," and Jacobs said to Neczypor: "What are you going to do about it?"
As events were to turn out, Neczypor would have fared better if he had said he was going to do nothing about it, and had gone on to participate in the wedding festivities. Instead, he replied to Jacobs: "What do you think I am going to do about it? I am going to get a cop."
And he set out in search of a "cop." At Fifth and Lehigh he found two uniformed policemen and he complained to them: "Look can you help me? A guy just ran into my car. He says he is a cop. He had dealer's tags on it and it looked kind of fishy to me."
Jacobs soon appeared on the scene and spoke to one of the policemen who now asked Neczypor if he wanted to go to the police station. Neczypor replied: "Certainly. I have nothing to lose." In this he was a poor prophet. When he arrived at the station a policeman "frisked" him. The police sergeant on duty ordered him "frisked" the second time. When Neczypor explained that he had already been searched, the sergeant, according to Neczypor, "smashed" him in the face, breaking his glasses and cutting his face.
Neczypor asked: "What did you do that for?"
Jacobs spoke up: "I am going to railroad this . . . S.B."
Neczypor was taken to a police cell and locked up. Later he was examined by a police surgeon who asked him about consumption of intoxicating beverages. Neczypor explained that that morning, in toasting the wedding of his friend, he had two glasses of whiskey and a couple glasses of beer. It was now about 7 p.m.
He was returned to the cell. Still later he was handcuffed, placed aboard a police van and driven to City Hall where he was fingerprinted and photographed, the resulting picture showing the cut under his eye. He was then returned to the police cell. That evening his brother and a lawyer arrived and his release was effected.
The next day, at a hearing before a committing magistrate he was formally charged with operating an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In due time he was indicted and on that indictment he stood trial February 9, 1956 in the court of quarter sessions before a judge and jury. He was acquitted.
Now he brought a civil action in trespass against Joseph Jacobs, charging him with malicious prosecution. The defendant joined issue and the case went to trial on January 8, 1958 before Judge Carroll. Neezypor's attorney, in opening his case to the jury, made some improper remarks, a juror was withdrawn and the case continued.
In April, 1958, the case was tried again, this time before Judge Levinthal and a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Neczypor in the sum of $1500. Jacobs appealed to the Superior Court which ordered a new trial because of trial errors.
In April, 1959, Neczypor and Jacobs, who were now apparently making a career of this case, appeared in court to oppose each other for the fourth time before a jury. This time the jury seemed to see more injury in Neczypor than the previous jury had seen and awarded him a verdict of $4,000. The defendant again appealed to the Superior Court which, on a divided court of 4 to 3, affirmed the verdict. As already stated, we granted allocatur.
In this Court, Jacobs argues that he is entitled to judgment n.o.v. on the basis that the facts in the case demonstrate that he had probable cause to arrest and criminally prosecute Neczypor.
If, indeed, Jacobs had probable cause to take Neczypor into legal custody, he may not be held liable in damages, even though Neczypor was acquitted of the criminal charge. By probable cause is not meant an actual state of guilt. One is justified in launching a criminal prosecution if the facts convince him, as a reasonable, honest and intelligent human being, that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense. The arresting person may be in error, but if his error is an honest one, not motivated by personal malice, bias, or revenge, the law will hold him harmless, regardless of the eventual result of the criminal prosecution.
It would be a deplorable state of affairs if every police officer had to worry about the possibility of a civil action against him every time he arrested a seeming malefactor. Such a situation could conceivably lead to slackening of effort against crime because officers might feel that every time they chased an assumed lawbreaker they had to follow a thin chalk line, the slightest deviation from which would take them into civil court as a defendant. For that reason, the law is quite specific that a police officer, or anyone for that matter, may arrest on probable cause of criminal activity or participation. "In an action of malicious prosecution, plaintiff does not make out a prima facie case by proving only his arrest on a criminal charge and its termination in his favor. He must also show that 'the defendant did not have probable cause for initiating the proceedings': Sec. 672c Restatement, Torts. The issue on this phase of the case is: Did the defendant 'honestly believe' that the accused committed the crime for which he was prosecuted and was that belief based on 'a reasonable ground of suspicion of guilt': Taylor v. Shipbuilding Corp., supra. Plaintiff must further show that the prosecution was motivated by malice, or, to put as the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 672, expresses it, that the 'primary purpose for which the proceedings were initiated was not to bring an offender to justice':" (Simpson v. Montgomery Ward, 354 Pa. 87, 96).
On the other hand, the general public is entitled to be protected from abuse of police authority, which, history reveals, cannot be ruled out as impossible. One of democracy's principal functions is to prevent, to the extent that it is possible, the abuse of governmental power. The authority of a police officer to cause the arrest of anyone is almost absolute. It is conceded that that kind of authority is needed for, if, in the rapidly moving action of a potential crime, the police officer had to weigh theories and possibilities, consult history and code before he could halt a person fleeing from an ostensible crime, many a criminal would escape his just deserts and society would suffer. However, when no immediate action is called for and time may be devoted to adequate preliminary investigation, the protection of the individual demands such an investigation because the hardships, humiliation, suspense and expense to which an innocent person is subjected in an improper prosecution cannot be compensated for by a mere acquittal.
In the case at bar the police officer Jacobs should have moved with considerable circumspection, because he himself, it seems, had a personal ax to grind with Neczypor. A police officer should be as direct as a bullet when tbe occasion demands, but as impartial as the sunlight at all times. Jacobs' impartiality came into question since he was involved in a personal altercation with the person he forced into the macerating jaws of a criminal prosecution.
Jacobs testified that when he first saw Neczypor he was driving his car in a zigzag fashion. He stopped him, talked with him and smelled alcohol on Ms breath. He, however, did not arrest him, explaining that Neczypor told him he had been taMng medicine. Neczypor proceeded on his way, but later, when Jacobs became offended at Neezypor's attitude and language he arrested him. If Jacobs did not believe Neczypor was under the influence of alcohol when he first watched him zigzagging and after he had talked with him, why did he regard him intoxicated later (Neczypor not having taken any liquor meanwhile) because offensive language had been added to the reputed zigzagging?
In arresting and prosecuting Neczypor, was Jacobs interested in bringing an offender to justice or was he intent on revenging himself against Neczypor because of the latter's assumed disrespectful and insulting attitude toward him?
Jacobs' remark, as testified to by Neczypor, that "I am going to railroad this . . . S.B." undoubtedly told heavily against him with the jury.
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge submitted eleven interrogatories for special findings of fact. One of those interrogatories read: "At the time and prior to the time of the arrest, that is, while plaintiff was observed by the defendant to be operating his automobile on 5th Street between Girard and Lehigh Avenue, —did the defendant honestly and reasonably believe that plaintiff was operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor?"
The jury replied to this question with a fiat negative. Thus, we have a finding of fact that Jacobs had no factual basis upon which to base his conclusion that Neczypor was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Another interrogatory read: "Did the defendant cause the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff for a malicious purpose, that is, — do you believe that the primary purpose of the defendant was not to bring an offender to justice?"
The jury answered this question Yes. This answer supplied the ingredient of malice, indispensable in an action of malicious prosecution.
From these answers it is apparent that the jury found that Jacobs did not arrest Neczypor because he actually believed him to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but because he was piqued over their double encounter, first, when their cars came together, and, second, when Neczypor addressed taunting remarks to him.
The defendant contends in this appeal that the interrogatories submitted by the judge to the jury were "inadequate as to form and content." Judge Ervin, who wrote the opinion for the Superior Court in this case, excellently summed up the interrogatories as follows: "The interrogatories expressly covered the issues of plaintiff's arrest and prosecution by defendant, his subsequent acquittal, whether the arrest and prosecution were maliciously motivated, whether defendant honestly and reasonably believed plaintiff to have operated his automobile erratically, to have acted belligerently, to have had an alcoholic breath, whether plaintiff, in fact, operated an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor and whether defendant honestly and reasonably believed that he was. The last interrogatory related to damages."
To have added more interrogatories or stretched the eleven to a greater length would have made them subjects of tautology and confusion, and thus less understanding to the jury.
The defendant also complains that the verdict of $4,000 was excessive. Judge Ekvin also well disposed of this item in his opinion, namely: "The special damages which the jury could properly consider were in the sum of $625. The plaintiff suffered the fear and humiliation incident to being arrested, fingerprinted and photographed as a member of the 'rogues gallery'; he was incarcerated for several hours during which time he was physically prevented from communicating with his waiting and anxious family; he was physically abused, being struck in the eye and cut; he was required to undergo the emotional distress incident to the criminal trial, together with the attendant risk of conviction; his reputation has been permanently injured and his eligibility for future employment adversely affected. The plaintiff had a clean record and had never been convicted of any crime. In this day, with the decreasing purchasing power of the dollar being ever present, we do not believe that the verdict was so excessive as to shock the conscience of a judge."
Judgment affirmed.