Case Name: Bernard A. GOTTSCHALK et al., Appellants, v. Gerald W. RUDES, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1958-05-14
Citations: 315 S.W.2d 361
Docket Number: No. 13340
Parties: Bernard A. GOTTSCHALK et al., Appellants, v. Gerald W. RUDES, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 315
Pages: 361–368

Head Matter:
Bernard A. GOTTSCHALK et al., Appellants, v. Gerald W. RUDES, Appellee.
No. 13340.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
May 14, 1958.
Rehearing Denied July 23, 1958.
Lieck & Lieck, San Antonio, for appellants.
Carl Wright Johnson, Alfred W. Offer, San Antonio, for appellee.

Opinion:
BARROW, Justice.
This is a personal injury suit brought by Bernard A. Gottschalk, individually and as next friend for William Charles Gotts-chalk, a minor, against Gerald W. Rudes as defendant. Plaintiffs charged a number of acts of negligence and the defendant charged acts of contributory negligence against the minor plaintiff. The jury found two acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, which were a proximate cause of the minor plaintiff's injuries, and found one issue of contributory negligence against the minor plaintiff. Upon this verdict of the jury, the court entered judgment for the defendant and plaintiffs appealed.
The facts, in brief, are that the accident occurred just about dusk on October 16, 1954, as the minor plaintiff, who lacked two days of being eight years old, was attempting to push his bicycle across an expressway in San Antonio at the San Marcos Street exit. The defendant was operating .his automobile on said expressway at the rate of approximately forty-seven to fifty miles per hour just prior to colliding with the boy, and in attempting to avoid the collision slowed his car to about five miles per hour. The expressway in that area is a controlled access expressway, being divided in the center by a median strip or island, with one-way traffic on either side, and bicycles and pedestrians are forbidden from being upon or crossing the expressway. Upon seeing the minor plaintiff attempting to cross, the defendant locked his brakes and skidded until the boy was struck by the left front of the automobile.
By their fifteenth point appellants complain that the court erred in not submitting to the jury a negligence issue in connection with Issues Nos. 24 and 25. Special Issue No. 24 inquired if "immediately prior to the accident the plaintiff, William Charles Gottschalk, attempted to cross the Express Way at a point other than within a marked or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, thus presenting the issue of a violation of Section 78(a) of Article 6701d, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. Special Issue No. 25 inquired if such action was a proximate cause of the accident.
It was upon a finding of contributory negligence in answering these two issues in the affirmative that the court denied any recovery to the minor plaintiff.
It is appellants' contention that it was a fact question for the jury to determine whether or not, on account of the age of the minor plaintiff he was negligent in attempting to cross the expressway at a point other than a marked or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection was negligence, taking into consideration his age, intelligence, experience and capacity, and that the court erred in holding that the minor plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se if he did so attempt to cross the expressway.
This presents a problem that has never been expressly before the Courts of this State, but has been passed on many times by the Courts of other States.
Generally speaking, the Courts in most jurisdictions, including this State, recognize that during the early stages of infancy, there is a conclusive presumption that the child is incapable of contributory negligence, but there is a conflict in .decisions upon the age at which the presumption becomes ineffective. Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry, 128 Tex. 347, 97 S.W.2d 166; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Texas v. Sanderson, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W.2d 646; Sorrentino v. McNeill, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 723. There follows a period during which the presumption is rebuttable, depending upon the age, intelligence, experience and capacity of the child. This rule is universal insofar as contributory negligence generally is concerned. The question for determination here is whether or not the rule applies in cases involving the violation of a penal statute or ordinance.
While there are variations and exceptions to the rule, it may be said, generally, that a violation of a penal statute or ordinance is negligence per se. However, in cases not involving law violations by an infant, special consideration .is given to a child's age, intelligence and .capacity, in determining the question of his contributory negligence. The standard of care for the child is not to be judged by that of the reasonably prudent man, but by that care which a child of the same age, intelligence, capacity, and experience would ordinarily be expected to exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
More precisely stated, the question is, which of the two rules is to give way to the other where there is a violation of law by an infant? .Upon this subject :the decisions are not in harmony. The minority rule is that the negligence per ^se rule is to .prevail over the rule giving . special consideration to the factor of in- . fancy. In other words, where the child has passed the age where he is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence, .then the child is amenable to the law just as an adult. The majority rule is that • in cases involving a violation of a penal statute or ordinance by a child, special .consideration should be given to his age, .intelligence, experience and capacity, and . that the question of his negligence is a . question of fact to be determined by the jury, under proper instructions from the .court. Graham v. Werfel, 229 Ala. 385, (157 So. 201; Scalf v. Eicher, 11 Cal.App.2d 44, 53 P.2d 368; Mecchi v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 674, 102 P.2d 422, 104 P.2d 26; Hackert v. Prescott, 165 Minn. 134, 205 N.W. 893; Peterson v. Miller, 182 Minn. 532, 235 N.W. 15; Hubred v. Wagner, 217 Minn. 129, 14 N.W.2d 115; Rule v. Claar Transfer & Storage Co., 102 Neb. 4, 165 N.W. 883; Locklin v. Fisher, 264 App.Div. 452, 36 N.Y.S.2d 162; McNamara v. Cohen, 184 Misc. 872, 55 N.Y.S.2d 600; Fightmaster v. Mode, 31 Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407; Michalsky v. Gaertner, 53 Ohio App. 341, 5 N.E.2d 181; Kriens v. McMillan, 42 S.D. 285, 173 N.W. 731; Williams v. Black, 147 Tenn. 331, 247 S.W. 95; Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 P. 62; Kuczko v. Prudential Oil Corp., 110 N.J.L. 111, 164 A. 308; Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231; 174 A.L.R. 1170.
The only Texas case which, in our opinion, throws any light on the problem is Green v. Ligon, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 742, 746. In this case the court had before it the question of the negligence of a five-year-old child. An issue was submitted to the jury as to whether the minor plaintiff was negligent in attempting to cross a street at a place other than an intersection, obviously in violation of a city ordinance, which was answered in the negative. The defendant contended that notwithstanding that' finding he was ' entitled to judgment, evidently on ' the ground that such action was negligence per se. The Court in overruling 'this contention said:
"Considering her age, intelligence, capacity and discretion, whether or not the degree of care shown to have been used by her for her own safety was sufficient and raised a fact issue for the jury."
Having considered both the majority and minority rules, we believe that the majority rule is more sound, just and equitable, and that it would be unjust and inequitable to hold, as a matter of law, that a child of the age of William Charles Gottschalk is guilty of negligence per se in the violation of a penal statute. We believe, as do the holdings in the cases above cited, the issue of negligence is a fact question, taking into consideration the child's age, intelligence, experience and capacity, and should have been submitted to the jury. The court erred in failing to submit this issue of fact to the jury.
Appellee contends that appellants have waived this point by their argument to the jury to the effect that the minor plaintiff should not have been on the expressway. We do not agree with this contention. The court had in effect SO' instructed the jury in submitting Issues 24 and, 25 in the form of contributory negligence per se.
In view of the fact that the case must be reversed and remanded for another trial on account of the error hereinabove discussed, we feel that we should express our views on appellants' complaints with reference to the trial court's definition of proximate cause.
The trial court in his charge defined negligence, both as to the defendant and to the minor plaintiff, as follows:
"By the term 'negligence', as used in this charge, as applied to the de fendant, Gerald W. Rudes, is meant the failure to exercise such care as a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
"By the term 'negligence', as used in this charge, as -applied to the plaintiff William Charles Gottschalk, is-meant the failure to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent, child of his age, intelligence, experience and capacity would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances;"
By several points appellants complain that the court erred in the definition of proximate .cause as applied to the minor plaintiff, and contend that in -said definition the court should have instructed the jury that the injury, or some similar injury, should have been foreseen and anticipated by an ordinarily prudent child of. plaintiff's age, intelligence, experience and capacity.
We note the trial court in his definition of negligencé informed the jury, the degree of care required was that of the ordinarily prudent child of the age, intelligence, experience and capacity of the child involved.
We think the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in connection with its definition of proximate cause, that the injury or some similar injury should have been foreseen and anticipated by an ordinarily prudent child of the age, intelligence, experience and capacity of the child involved. The burden was on the appellee to prove contributory negligence on the part of the child plaintiff. By its definition of proximate cause, the court required defendant to prove only that a person of ordinary'prudence should have foreseen and anticipated the result or some similar result.
We believe our opinion in this respect is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Rogers, 147 Tex. 617, 218 S.W.2d 456, which we think is the only analogous Texas case.
In that case the Court had before it a suit by an eleven-year-old girl against the Railway & Terminal Company for recovery of damages arising from-injuries to the child as a result of being struck by the company's bus at a street intersection. The case embraced the issues of negligence and contributory negligence.
The trial court in its instruction preceding the special issues in the charge, defined "ordinary care" as "such care as a person of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances," and defined "negligence" as "the failure to use ordinary care." The Court also defined "proximate cause" and "proximate-' ly contributed to cause," and described the result as one that reasonably would have been anticipated by a person of ordinary prudence. ' ' -
The plaintiff excepted to these definitions, insofar as they related to the issues of contributory negligence of the child involved, on the ground that they imposed Upon the child a greater degree of care than that required of her by law, and requested definitions appropriate to a child of the age, intelligence, experience and capacity of the child involved.
• While the Court. in its opinion did not discuss the question of foreseeability in the instruction on proximate cause, the Court did hold that the exceptions should have been sustained and the instructions given.
No direct authority has been cited on the question of the element of foreseeability in the definition of proximate cause as applied to the conduct of children, and we have found none, but we think the question of the ability of the child to know, foresee, anticipate and appreciate the danger is a question of fact for the jury and should be submitted under appropriate instructions.
We feel that it is unnecessary to discuss the other matters complained of, for the reason that they are not likely to occur on another trial.
For the error above pointed out the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.