Case Name: Leonard E. WOLFE, Appellant, v. The CITY OF D'IBERVILLE, A Municipal Corporation, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-10-16
Citations: 799 So. 2d 142
Docket Number: No. 2000-CP-01295-COA
Parties: Leonard E. WOLFE, Appellant, v. The CITY OF D’IBERVILLE, A Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 799
Pages: 142–151

Head Matter:
Leonard E. WOLFE, Appellant, v. The CITY OF D’IBERVILLE, A Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
No. 2000-CP-01295-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 16, 2001.
Leonard Wolfe, Appellant, Pro Se.
Virginia L. Carothers Lococo, Diberville, Attorney for Appellee.
Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.

Opinion:
BRIDGES, J"
for the Court:
¶ 1. The original action that began this case was filed in 1996, when the D'Iberville Water and Sewer District (the District) sued Wolfe for payment of past due service charges which Wolfe claims he never owed. The justice court judge hearing the case ruled in favor of Wolfe and the District subsequently appealed that decision to the County Court of the Second Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi.
¶ 2. On March 7, 1997, a motion was filed to revive the case under the name of "City of D'Iberville," which had taken over the duties of the District by that time. An order was filed by the judge on March 11, 1997, and the case was revived. Following this occurrence, the City then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its case against Wolfe on May 29, 1997. The order for the dismissal was filed by the judge on June 2, 1997.
¶ 3. On the same day, Wolfe filed suit against the City in county court alleging that the City failed to connect his properties to the water and sewer lines and that he suffered extensive losses due to this failure. Shortly thereafter, Wolfe voluntarily dismissed his action because he failed to file a notice of claim as required by law. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.2000). Wolfe later filed a proper notice of claim, alerting the City that he intended to file suit against it. Wolfe went on to file his complaint against the City in the county court on January 22, 1999, arguing that the City wrongfully failed to connect his properties to the water and sewer lines due to his failure to pay certain fees which he claims he does not owe. He asserts that he lost thousands of dollars in rent money and also incurred other financial losses. Additionally, Wolfe contends that he has undergone serious emotional distress because of his ongoing battle with the City.
¶ 4. The City filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, which was heard by the county court on May 7, 1999. In an order filed on July 29, 1999, the county court granted summary judgment to the City and dismissed Wolfe's cause of action against the City with prejudice. On August 24,1999, Wolfe filed an appeal to the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Harrison County. The circuit court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth by the county court in its final judgment and affirmed the county court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the City, citing that it found no genuine issue of material fact to be disputed by the parties.
¶ 5. As well, the circuit court ruled that Wolfe's notice of appeal was untimely and thereby statutorily barred. Wolfe now appeals to this Court for relief claiming that summary judgment should not have been granted to the City and that he should be heard in court in a trial of this matter. He also asserts that he filed his appeal before the circuit court in a timely manner according to Rule 5.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice.
FACTS
¶ 6. In January 1996, the D'Iberville Water and Sewer District enacted a municipal ordinance which required that all businesses and residences within the perimeters prescribed pay a minimum monthly payment to cover a debt service charge for the water and sewer lines being provided. The ordinance states that all residences and businesses within the set boundaries would be held liable for the fee, no matter whether they were connected to the water and sewer lines or not. In our instant case, however, Wolfe complains that he should never have been required to pay this service charge on his business, located on Gorenflo Road in D'Iberville, because it was not connected to the system and therefore, he was not a "user" as set out by the ordinance. Wolfe goes on to assert that he had an oral agreement with an employee of the District that he would not have to pay for this charge. However, there is nothing in the record to corroborate this declaration.
¶ 7. Wolfe did begin to pay water and sewer debt service charges for his property on Gorenflo Road in July 1988, but continually refused to pay the past due portion of these service charges that had accrued beginning in September 1986. The District's records show that, at the time that Wolfe started paying the monthly charges, the District applied those payments to his past due balance first. However, Wolfe never brought his account current by paying the complete balance, citing that he did not owe those charges before July 1988. Therefore, the District refused to connect Wolfe's business to the water and sewer lines until his account balance was settled.
¶ 8. Wolfe also has a dispute with the District regarding a separate piece of rental property on Racetrack Road in D'Iber-ville. Wolfe had paid a deposit and tap fee for that property in November 1993, and was to call the District when he wanted the installation of the taps performed. Upon his request that the taps finally be installed in August 1994, the District was forced to charge him the current prices for the materials and labor which were higher than when he paid his original deposit the year before. Wolfe refused to pay the overage, citing that he never received an itemized list detailing exactly what the extra charges were for as he had requested. After this dispute, the current chairman of the District reached an agreement with Wolfe whereby his tap fees were reduced and Wolfe then paid those fees. Wolfe, however, is asserting that he suffered lost rents on the Racetrack Road property for the period of time in which he refused to pay what he claims were unsubstantiated charges.
¶ 9. Wolfe feels aggrieved that his properties were without the benefit of access to water and sewer lines set up by the District for a long period of time and therefore seeks relief in the form of money damages for lost rents and emotional suffering. Wolfe challenges that his appeal to the circuit court from county court was filed in a timely manner because he filed it within the thirty days required by Rule 5.04 of the URCCC. Wolfe contends that this rule supersedes Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-79 (1972), which gives a complainant only ten days from the county court judgment to file a proper notice of appeal.
¶ 10. Wolfe cites absolutely no legal authority in support of any of his arguments against the City, which took over the duties of the District after its dissolution. On the other hand, the City cites various case law as framework for its claims and defenses, some relevant to our review, some not.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11. This Court will conduct a de novo review on all cases before it where summary judgment has been granted. Gale v. Thomas, 759 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Miss.1999); Quinn v. Mississippi State University, 720 So.2d 843, 846 (Miss.1998). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gale, 759 So.2d at 1152; Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss.1990). "If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Otherwise, the decision should be affirmed." Gale, 759 So.2d at 1152 (quoting Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983)).
¶ 12. When one party swears to one version of the facts in issue and the other party says the opposite, therein lies a scenario which would require the denial of summary judgment to the moving party. Quinn, 720 So.2d at 846. The burden of proving that there exists no genuine issue of fact in the matter is on the party moving for summary judgment. Id.; McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 630 (Miss.1996); Mantachie Natural Gas Dist. v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 594 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶ 13. To begin, we note that this Court is not obligated to review this case on any level because Wolfe has submitted no case law or other authority to support his claims. Ratcliff v. State, 752 So.2d 435 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.1999); Harveston v. State, 742 So.2d 1163 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.1999); Hewlett v. State, 607 So.2d 1097, 1107 (Miss.1992). See also Dozier v. State, 247 Miss. 850, 157 So.2d 798, 799 (1963). Wolfe provides us with nothing but his own bald assertions that he was wronged by the City and his own shaky interpretations of and opinions on Mississippi's rules of procedure and statutory law. The Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled that "where a party fails to cite case law in support of his argument, we are not bound to address his assertions of error." Ratcliff, 752 So.2d at (¶ 7) (citing Hewlett, 607 So.2d at 1107).
¶ 14. In his brief before this Court, Wolfe replaces the page where his list of authorities should be with a paragraph indicating that, despite his efforts, he could find no law on which to base his claims. This is not acceptable. There is ample law that has been published for many years on the subjects of summary judgment, statutes of limitation, sovereign immunity, breach of contract, etc., which Wolfe could have used to better formulate his arguments. Obviously, it is not up to this Court to do Wolfe's research for him. Because he cites no authority, we are not under any obligation to review his complaints on appeal from the county and circuit court decisions. Ratcliff, 752 So.2d at (¶ 7).
¶ 15. Notwithstanding Wolfe's failure to properly prepare his appeal before this Court, thereby creating a procedural bar to his claims, we have elected to discuss some issues which we feel are relevant to our finding that Wolfe's assertions contain no merit. Before we do so, however, we would like to note our disagreement with the lower court's decision regarding Wolfe's deadline on his appeal from county court to circuit court. We find that Wolfe is correct in asserting that his appeal was timely filed, but not necessarily for the precise reasons that Wolfe argues.
¶ 16. Rule 5.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice sets forth a requirement that all appeals from county court be filed no later than thirty days after the final judgment of the court. On the other hand, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-79 (1972) gives a complainant only ten days from the county court's final judgment in which to file a notice of appeal along with an appeal bond. To solve this matter, we look to a very recent decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court in which it was decided that "[w]hile our own rule-making power takes precedence, we note that, with the passage of H.B. No. 1207 during its 2001 regular session, the Legislature amended § 11-51-79 to replace the ten-day appeal period with the thirty-day appeal period, effective July 1, 2001." Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Service, Inc., 2000-CP-00036 SCT (¶ 4), 797 So.2d 929 (Miss.2001).
¶ 17. Therefore, the question of whether Rule 5.04 of the URCCC supersedes the deadline in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-79 (1972) has now been explicitly answered. In Davis, the court applied this new and unambiguous rule to a notice of appeal which was filed in 1999, the same year as the notice of appeal in our instant case. Id. at (¶ 4). Being apprised of this new ruling, we are convinced that Wolfe's appeal was timely requested. However, this cannot cure the fact that Wolfe has not conquered the issue of summary judgment in this case. He has not effectively rebutted the City's case which, we are convinced, has proven that it was entitled to summary judgment. As such, an in-depth discussion on questions of law, such as limitations and sovereign immunity would be a waste of this Court's time.
¶ 18. We are concerned only with reviewing the lower court's decision in this case that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be disputed here. Both parties admit that, due to Wolfe's unpaid balance on the debt service charges billed to him, the City refused to connect his property to water and sewer lines. While the major dispute between the parties is whether the City wrongfully denied this service to Wolfe, that question has been answered by the municipal ordinance found in the record of this case and detailed in the case of Lepre v. D'Iberville Water and Sewer District, 376 So.2d 191, 193 (Miss.1979).
¶ 19. If there were any questions in our minds about the ordinance at issue here due to ambiguities in the record, those questions were quickly satisfied upon reading the Mississippi Supreme Court's evalu ation of this exact ordinance in the Lepre case. Id. The D'Iberville ordinance regarding water and sewer access among residents and business owners, mandates that "all persons [are] liable for the minimum rate charge . whether they were connected up or not." Id. It was shown that the citizens of D'Iberville voted on this ordinance and it passed. Id. Further, the court went on to hold that compelling these property owners to connect to the water and sewer lines and requiring them to pay the service charge, whether connected or not, was "clearly within the authority of the rule-making body." Id. at 194.
¶ 20. The reason for allowing this demand for payment of service charges by the District (now, the City), is to "protect the health of persons residing within congested areas and in order to assure the payment of bonds issued for such purposes." Id. at 193. The benefit is incurred by every property owner, whether or not they are utilizing the system. Id. at 194. "The benefit was not limited to just those persons who connected onto the system, and the charge for paying for the system should not be so limited." Id.
¶ 21. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court has declared that this ordinance governing the water and sewer district/the City of D'Iberville is appropriate and in line with the powers of the municipality, we cannot find any merit in Wolfe's claims that he was not a "user" and therefore should never have been assessed those charges and denied access to the water and sewer lines. Id. at 193-94. Because the dispute as to whether Wolfe was rightfully compelled to pay the fees before he could gain access to the water and sewer lines has been resolved by the approval of the City's ordinance by Mississippi's highest court, there is nothing left for Wolfe to argue and no remaining facts in dispute that are material to this case. Every other claim set forth in Wolfe's brief revolves around this one and only disagreement of an already settled fact. Therefore, all assertions on questions of law, such as whether sovereign immunity applies, whether Wolfe's claims are time-barred, and the like, are moot and need not take up this Court's time, despite the fact that the City has gone to great lengths to make arguments on those points of law, albeit in the form of a verbatim version of the county court's conclusions of law with little original arguments of its own.
¶ 22. Taking into consideration every document in the record of this case, including all pleadings, discovery, affidavits, depositions, etc., we are convinced that the City has met its burden here. The City has put forth solid evidence to support its assertions and we again note that Wolfe, on the other hand, has cited zero authority which this Court could use to favorably consider his arguments in rebuttal of the City's case. There is simply no proof that any damages are owed to Wolfe by the City because the City wrongfully refused service to Wolfe. Wolfe offers nothing to dispute the City's assertions that he was denied service because he simply did not follow the ordinance. This Court cannot find for Wolfe just because he does not like the D'Iberville ordinance or because he thinks it is not fair. Therefore, the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the decision of the lower court should be upheld.
¶ 23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, P.J., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND CHANDLER, JJ.