Case Name: MATTHEW GAUNT HEPWORTH, Respondent, v. THE UNION FERRY COMPANY OF BROOKLYN, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-12
Citations: 69 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: MATTHEW GAUNT HEPWORTH, Respondent, v. THE UNION FERRY COMPANY OF BROOKLYN, Appellant.
Judges: Pratt, J., concur-red.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 69
Pages: 257–263

Head Matter:
MATTHEW GAUNT HEPWORTH, Respondent, v. THE UNION FERRY COMPANY OF BROOKLYN, Appellant.
Corporations — dissolution — an action for a tort su/i'nives — it may be continued against the directors as statutory trustees for creditors.
One Matthew Gaunt Hepworth handed to the ticket seller of aferry company money for a passage upon its hoat. The employee kept the money, refused to give a ticket and assaulted Hepworth, who thereafter began an action against the ferry company to recover the damages resulting from the assault. While the action was pending the charter of the ferry company expired by its own limitation.
Upon an appeal irom an order, made on tlie plaintiff’s application, continuing tlie action against tlie directors of tlie ferry company, acting as trustees for creditors, under tlie Revised Statutes, in the settlement of the affairs of the company:
Held, that the order was proper.
That, under the Revised Statutes, a claim arising out of a tort committed by the corporation stood upon the same basis as one resting on a contract with it.
That as the charter of the company pledged its property to pay all damages for the misfeasance of its employees, it was the duty of its managers or directors to pay all of its debts.
That the court had, of necessity, power to continue the action.
'That the statutory trustees of the company were the proper parties defendant.
(Dykman, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendant, the Union Ferry Company of Brooklyn, from an order, dated tbe 30th day of July, 1891, and entered in tbe office of the clerk of the county of Kings, granting a motion to ■revive the action and making the late directors of said company the .statutory trustees, under the Revised Statutes, parties defendant.
The petition of the plaintiff; contained, among others, the following-allegations :
That in and by the terms of the charter of said defendant it is provided, in substance and effect, that “ out of the issues and profits should be paid all costs, damages and expenses of every kind arising from injuries by collision, or injuries of any kind from accident or neglect, or misfeasance of persons employed in and about the business of the ferry or ferries of said company. The directors of the -.said company shall be authorized to retain and reserve therefrom ” (that is to say, the net capital of said company), “ such amount as in ■the discretion of the directors may be just and proper to meet all claims or demands then made or which may be anticipated, and for •which the company may or can in any manner be liable.”
,B. D. Silliman, for the appellant.
■James K Averill and E&wwd V. B. Kissam, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Barnard, P. J.:
On the 9th of June, 1889, the plaintiff handed to the defendant's ticket seller, in New York, money for a passage across the river to Brooklyn. The defendant kept his money, refused a ticket and committed an assault on him, and forcibly put him in the street. The plaintiff commenced an action for the assault in October, 1889. The corpoi'ation denied the facts on which the plaintiff based his complaint, and while the action was at issue and untried, the charter of the defendant expired by its own limitation. The Revised Statutes provide that on a dissolution of a corporation, the directors shall be trustees for the creditors and stockholders, with full power to settle the affairs of the corporation. A power to continue the action against the corporation, when its charter expired, pending an action against it, was given by chapter 295, Laws of 1832. This law was repealed in 1880. (Ghap. 245, Laws of 1880.)
The tort stands upon the same basis as a contract. (Martin v. Walker, 12 Hun, 46; Ford v. Johnston, 7 id., 563; Baker v. Gilman, 52 Barb., 26.) These cases either hold or approve of the principle that a conveyance made during a pending litigation to defeat the collection of a judgment for a tort can be set aside as if it was a contract debt. In other words, the statute creditor embraces those persons whose claims are based upon torts.
The charter pledges the' property of the corporation to pay all damages for misfeasance of the company's employees. The law makes the directors trustees to settle' the affairs of the corporation and to pay all debts against the corporation. The court has the power to continue the action which was pending at the dissolution of the corporation, of necessity. Such power existed before the act of 1832, and exists since the repeal of 1880.
A judgment taken against a corporation whose charter had been dissolved by decree, and after notice by the attorney for the corporation that he had no further power to appear in the case, was held void by the Court of Appeals. (McCullock v. Norwood, 58 N. Y., 562.)
In the present case the order makes the statute trustees defendants, and this seems to be the rule recognized in McCulloch v. Norwood (supra).
The order is, therefoie, right and should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements.
Pratt, J., concur-red.