Case Name: BROOME-CLINTON CO. v. WOLTZER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-12-18
Citations: 144 N.Y.S. 768
Docket Number: 
Parties: BROOME-CLINTON CO. v. WOLTZER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 144
Pages: 768–770

Head Matter:
BROOME-CLINTON CO. v. WOLTZER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department
December 18, 1913.)
1. Landlord and Tenant (§ 90*)—Termination of Tenancy—Continuance of Occupancy.
Whether the mere leaving of property in the premises by a tenant upon removal is a continuance of his occupancy is usually a question of fact, in determining which the value of the goods as compared to the amount of the rent is material.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 284r-289; Dec. Dig. § 90. ]
2. Stipulations (§ 18*)—Effect.
A stipulation by defendant’s attorney, in an action for rent, in which the landlord claimed that the tenant’s occupancy was continued after removal by leaving certain “douche pans’’ on the premises, “If they find 100 douche pans in the place, I am willing to have judgment entered against my client,” if not set aside, would support a judgment for plaintiff, where over 135 pans were found.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Stipulations, Cent. Dig. §§ 41-54; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]
Whitaker, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.
Action by the Broome-Clinton Company against Samuel Woltzer. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued November term, 1913, before LEHMAN, PAGE, and WHITAKER, JJ.
Joseph Krinsky, of New York City, for appellant.
Myron S. Yochelson, of New York City, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § numbeb in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
LEHMAN, J.
The plaintiff has recovered a judgment for the sum of $40 for four months' rent of a cellar at the rate of $10 a month. The defendant had moved from the premises before the beginning of the four months, and the only theory upon which the plaintiff can recover is that the defendant had left in the premises certain property, and that the presence of this property in the premises continued the defendant's occupancy. It is claimed that this property was only rubbish abandoned by the defendant, and certainly the only property that could possibly be considered to constitute anything but rubbish, • which defendant intended to abandon, was a pile of about 150 douche pans, which, it is testified, had been rendered valueless by water some two years before.
The question of whether the mere leaving of property Upon removal constitutes a continuance of the occupancy is usually one of fact. In considering this question of fact, it seems to me that not only the value of the goods left must be considered, but the ratio of that value to the amount of the rent of the premises is material. While the testimony produced here that 150 douche pans were left would in my opinion not justify a holding of continued occupancy of valuable premises, it might be sufficient to show continued oc cupancy of a cellar rented at $10 per month, particularly as it appears. that these douche pans had not been removed as. rubbish during a period of two years after the time they had been spoiled by water.
However, whatever the rule might ordinarily be, it seems to me undoubtedly sufficient in this case, because the defendant's attorney stipulated, apparently in the presence of the defendant, that:
"If they find 100 douche pans in the place, I am willing to have judgment entered against my client for the full amount."
Pursuant to that stipulation, the case was adjourned, and over 135 douche pans were found in the premises. While the stipulation was perhaps foolish, it represents at least a concession that the presence of 100 douche pans would constitute sufficient evidence to justify a'judgment on the facts against his client. If the attorney,had at the trial attempted to withdraw this stipulation and concession, I would be willing to- agree that the defendant should be relieved of it; but no motion to that effect was made, and I am unwilling to concede that an appellate court has power to disregard on appeal a stipulation or concession against which the party asked no relief at the trial.
In my opinion, judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
PAGE, J., concurs.