Case Name: Gregorich, Appellant, v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company, Inc.
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1974-09-23
Citations: 230 Pa. Super. 144
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 210
Parties: Gregorich, Appellant, v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company, Inc.
Judges: Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercqne, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 230
Pages: 144–157

Head Matter:
Gregorich, Appellant, v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company, Inc.
Argued April 11, 1974.
Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercqne, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Chester 8. Fossee, with him Murovieh, Reale & Fossee, for appellant.
William G. Walker, with him Dickie, McGamey & Ghilcote, for appellee.
September 23, 1974:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Hoffman, J.,
This appeal challenges the validity of the nonsuit judgment entered by the court below at the close of plaintiffs case.
The plaintiff was seriously injured when he was struck by defendant's truck as he was crossing a snow-covered road in Pittsburgh in order to board a bus to work. On the day of the accident, December 24, 1969, at about 6:45 a.m., it was cold, dark and snowing. West Oarson Street was covered with snow which was piled up against the curb so as to make the roadway accessible to only one lane of traffic in each direction. At the northerly side of West Oarson Street there was no pedestrian footwalk, but only a curb and a fence separating the road from a stretch of railroad tracks. There was bus transportation traveling both westwardly and eastwardly on the street, and boarding indentations had been cut into the curb and fence at various intervals. Because of the snow, however, the indentations located a safe distance from the driving portion of the roadway were inaccessible on the day in question.
A few minutes before the mishap, an outbound bus had come to a stop at the bus stop and put on its flashing lights. Almost immediately thereafter, an inbound bus pulled into the southern curb and turned on its flashing lights so as to permit the boarding and discharging of passengers. Because of the high snow at the curbline, the buses were a distance from the curb in a position whereby the front end of the inbound bus was in lineal parallelism to the front end of the outbound bus.
With the buses so situated plaintiff attempted to cross the roadway in the middle of the intersection so as to reach the outbound bus. As a result of the in juries he sustained, he was unable to recall the entire incident. A motorist, however, who came to a stop behind the outbound bus, served as plaintiffs only spokeswoman as to the operative facts of the accident.
She testified that she first saw the plaintiff when he was a step or two in front of the inbound bus. She observed that the plaintiff was walking quickly. At about the same moment, she noticed the defendant's truck come from behind the stopped inbound bus. The truck, proceeding approximately 20-25 miles per hour and straddling the middle line of the roadway, attempted to pass between the two stopped buses. While in the process of passing this bus, the truck struck the plaintiff. The witness was able to say that the point of impact was approximately "a step" from the outbound bus. The truck had traversed the center line of the highway, striking the plaintiff while it was on "the wrong side of the road". She testified that she did not notice whether or not the plaintiff looked to his right and left to observe oncoming traffic, but she did conclude that a "split-second" later plaintiff would have safely reached the bus.
After this eyewitness to the accident testified, plaintiff rested his case. The defendant immediately moved for a nonsuit alleging that either plaintiff had failed to prove the negligence of the defendant in so negotiating its vehicle or that plaintiff had supplied sufficient evidence in his case to establish contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial judge granted defendant's motion, and subsequently refused plaintiff's motion to remove the judgment of compulsory nonsuit. This appeal has followed.
In reviewing a judgment for compulsory nonsuit, we are guided by the general rule that the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom and all conflicts therein must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Idlette v. Tracey, 407 Pa. 278, 180 A. 2d 37 (1962); Fullard v. Pittsburgh Urban Redevelopment Authority, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 184, 293 A. 2d 118 (1972). As such, a compulsory nonsuit may he entered only in a clear case and only where there is no doubt as to the inference to be drawn from the evidence. Hader v. Coplay Cement Manufacturing Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A. 2d 271 (1963).
It first must be emphasized that because the injuries suffered by the plaintiff caused him to lose his memory and recollection of the accident facts, he is entitled to a presumption of due care. Robinson v. Raab, 216 Pa. Superior Ct. 397, 268 A. 2d 225 (1970). Countervailing this presumption is the testimony of the eyewitness who testified that the plaintiff crossed in the middle of the street and not at the intersection. While the physical conditions present at the time may have made crossing at the intersection hazardous or difficult, the fact remains that crossing was attempted in the middle of the street. The law is clear that a pedestrian crossing a street between intersections is held to a higher degree of care than at street intersections, while the motor vehicle operator has a correspondingly lesser degree of care. Harris v. DeFelice, 379 Pa. 469, 109 A. 2d 174 (1954). The mere fact, however, that a pedestrian crosses between intersections is insufficient to prove contributory negligence. As the late Justice MtjsmanNO said in Nugent v. Joerger, 387 Pa. 330, 332-333, 127 A. 2d 697 (1956): "The tempo of the twentieth century being what it is, the law recognizes that a pedestrian is entitled to cross in the middle of a block in order to gain a few seconds' time which will hasten him on to his destination . Whether, and to what extent, a pedestrian and an automobilist obey the rules which, in a double adherence, would skirt every danger and avert collision, is a question of fact for the jury to decide____ Once it is admitted that Nugent had the right to cross Main Street at the point he did, and this admission is inescapable, it would be impossible to say that persons cannot disagree that what he did after stepping off the curb was contributory negligence."
The eyewitness went on to say that both buses stopped on opposite sides of the street leaving a narrow strip by which traffic, if it was to continue to move, could traverse. To so proceed was to drive down the middle of the street straddling the center line having at least a portion of a moving vehicle on the wrong side of the highway. This is what happened. The eyewitness testified that plaintiff crossed in front of the inbound bus and had nearly crossed over to the outbound bus when he was struck on the wrong side of the road by the striking vehicle.
Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it cannot be said that the operative facts of the case as well as the physical and meteorological elements of the situation did not provide an atmosphere in which the triers-of-fact could not differ. The buses were not parked, and therefore the cases dealing with the right of a vehicle to cross to the wrong side of the road in passing a parked vehicle are not applicable. See, e.g., Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123 A. 777 (1924). The buses were stopped to permit passengers to board and alight to the street. They were stopped only momentarily. We believe that, on the basis of these facts, a jury could conclude that the defendant was negligent in swinging around a bus, with its view partially obstructed, and proceeding at a speed of between 15-25 miles an hour down the center of the road in such a manner as to be unable to stop before striking and seriously injuring a pedestrian on the opposite side of the road. As our Supreme Court held in Matkevich v. Robertson, 403 Pa. 200, 202, 169 A. 2d 91 (1961): "This Court has held, again and again, that when an automobile is operated on the wrong side of the highway, that fact in itself is prima facie evidence of negligence and is sufficient to carry the case to the jury on that question." See also, O'Neil v. O'Neil, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 485, 205 A. 2d 687 (1964). We are unable to say that there is not sufficient doubt as to the reasonableness of defendant's passing of the stopped bus at a point and time which it chose to proceed.
Appellee's contention that plaintiff's own evidence established that he was contributorily negligent is likewise dismissed. We have already stated, supra, that crossing between intersections is not sufficient to prove negligence. Indeed, the only circumstance which could justify such a conclusion would have been an affirmative, unqualified statement by the eyewitness that the plaintiff had not looked both ways before crossing. When the eyewitness was asked if the plaintiff properly watched for oncoming traffic before entering the highway, she answered that she did not know and frankly had not noticed. She could only describe the course which plaintiff took and that he was walking "quickly".
In a case similar to the instant one, this Court reversed a compulsory nonsuit judgment where the plaintiff as a result of his injuries could not remember the accident. It was admitted that plaintiff had a green light in his favor before stepping into the intersection. The only question was that of contributory negligence. As such, negligence could only be inferred if plaintiff had failed to look for traffic and had placed blind reliance on the green light. Having no evidence to confirm plaintiff's failure to look, we held that: "The fact that appellant had no recollection of seeing defendant's car does not establish the fact that he had not seen it or had not performed his duty to look for it. However, in the absence of proof that he did not look before he proceeded to cross the eastbound lanes of traffic on Eastwick Avenue, we have no right to infer that he did not do so." Robinson v. Raab, supra at 401.
Judgment of compulsory nonsuit is reversed, and a new trial granted.