Case Name: WATTS v. SMITH
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-04-09
Citations: 375 Mich. 120
Docket Number: Calendar No. 38, Docket No. 50,330
Parties: WATTS v. SMITH.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Smith, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 120–135

Head Matter:
WATTS v. SMITH.
Opinion of the Codet.
1. Parties — Joinder—Successive Rear-End Collisions — Neck Injuries.
The granting of a motion to dismiss second defendant held, error in action for single indivisible injury to neck which plaintiff claimed to have suffered as a result of successive rear-end collisions, one in the morning en route to work and the other in the afternoon, involving the dismissed defendant, while en route home from work, the defendants having been properly joined under pertinent court rule (OCR 1963, 206.1).
2. Torts- — Joint Tort-Peasors.
Allegations that defendants’ successive negligent acts effected a single, indivisible injury which it is alleged eould not be said to have resulted but for the concurrence of such acts, even though there were no concert of action between the defendant tort-feasors, entitled plaintiff to have them tried in the same suit as joint tort-feasors; but if the results, as well as the acts, are separable, so that it can be said that the act of each would have resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion of injury caused thereby, each can be held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.
References for Points in Headnotes
52 Am Jur, Torts § 112.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 55.
Right of defendant sued jointly with another or others in action for personal injury or death to separate trial. 174 ALR 734.
52 Am Jur, Torts § 112.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 55.
Right of defendant sued jointly with another or others in action for personal injury or death to separate trial. 174 ALR 734.
3. Trial — Successive Rear-End Collisions — Single Indivisible Injury — Separate Trial — Discretion of Court.
Separate trials may be ordered as to defendants whose successive rear-end collisions with car in which plaintiff was a passenger is claimed to have resulted in a single indivisible, neck injury, should further proceedings before trial make it appear necessary to prevent prejudice, or if it appear to be in furtherance of the convenient administration of justice in the discretion of the trial eourt, otherwise the matter should proceed to joint trial under proper instructions (GGR 1963, 505.2, 509,3).
Separate Opinion.
Black, J.
4. Parties — Joinder of Defendants — Common Issues of Law or Pact.
A plaintiff in an action of tort may properly join defendants when there is pleaded that a right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same series of occurrences, and if a question of law or fact common to them will arise in the action (GGR 1963, 206.1).
5. Same — Joinder of Defendants — Trial of Separate Issues — Discretion of Court.
The court rule permitting a plaintiff to join defendants where it is pleaded that a common issue of law or fact will arise in the action does not decide that separate issues, if such are established when the pleadings are complete and the pretrial summary has been filed, must be tried together, such being a matter of judicial discretion (GGR 1963, 206.1, 206.2, 207, 505.2).
6. Same — Joinder of Defendants — Successive Rear-End Collisions — Neck Injuries.
The granting of a motion to dismiss second defendant because he had been improperly joined held, error in action for single indivisible injury to neck which plaintiff claimed to have suffered as a result of successive rear-end collisions, one in the morning en route to work and the other in the afternoon, involving the dismissed defendant, while en route home from work, the defendants having been properly joined under pertinent eourt rule (GGR 1963, 206.1).
7. Torts — Joint Tort-Peasors.
Defendants whose successive negligent acts effect a single, indivisible injury which it cannot certainly be said would have resulted but for the concurrence of such acts, even though there were no concert of action between the defendant tortfeasors, are to be held liable as joint tort-feasors; but if the results, as well as the acts, are separable, so that it can be said that the act of each would have resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion of injury caused thereby, each can be held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.
8. Same — Successive Negligent Acts.
Defendants whose successive negligent acts effect a single, indivisible injury which it cannot certainly be said would have resulted but for the concurrence of such acts should not be absolved as a matter of law, simply because of the complexity of the injury or injuries plaintiff has suffered.
9. Same — Successive Tort-Eeasoes.
Difficulty in separating injury to plaintiff done by successive tort-feasors furnishes no reason for holding that one tort-feasor should be liable for the acts of others with whom he is not acting in concert.
10. Trial — Successive Bear-End Collisions — Single Indivisible Injury — Discretion oe Court — Separate Trial.
Whether or not plaintiff’s claims for a single, indivisible injury, brought against alleged defendant tort-feasors who were not acting in concert and were involved in 2 rear-end collisions that occurred several hours apart, should be tried together or separately is primarily for the trial judge.
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ.
11. Parties — Joinder—Successive Bear-End Collisions — Neck Injuries.
Order granting motion to dismiss second defendant prior to trial Reid, not error, not premature, nor an abuse of discretion in action for alleged single indivisible injury to neclc which plaintiff claimed to have suffered as a result of successive rear-end collisions, one in the morning en route to worlc and the other in the afternoon, involving the dismissed defendant, while en route home from worlc, since the joinder of the 2 defendants would not promote the convenient administration of justice (GCS 1963, 206.1).
Appeal from Genesee; Baker (John W.), J.
Submitted May 5, 1964.
(Calendar No. 38, Docket No. 50,330.)
Decided April 9, 1965.
Case by Theron Watts against Mack Wayne Smith and R. B. Havers for personal injuries sustained in 2 unrelated rear-end collisions of automobiles on February 26, 1962. Order determining misjoinder and dismissing defendant Smith as party. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Leitson, Dean, Dean & Abram (Robert Abram, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Gault, Davison & Bowers (Matthew Davison, Jr., of counsel), for defendant Smith.

Opinion:
Smith, J.
This is a pleading case in which a misjoinder of parties defendant and of causes of action was ruled by the trial court. The court held, in applying GCR 1963, 206, that "joinder would not aid the convenient administration of justice." Before issue was joined, an order dismissing defendant Smith as a party was entered.
The facts are simple: plaintiff was a passenger in a car which was struck from the rear twice in one day — once while plaintiff and his driver were en route to work in the early morning and the second time in the afternoon while they were returning from work. Defendant Havers is allegedly responsible in law for the morning collision and Smith the one in the afternoon. Plaintiff asserts in his declaration and bill of particulars filed December 31, 1962, that after the morning collision he "felt a generalized pain in his head and back," but continued to work. Ho says he worked a full 8-hour day "with pain in his back, headache, and a feeling of fatigue," After the afternoon, collision which was more violent, plaintiff went home "with pain in his neck and back." The next day, he went to work, despite the pain, bnt in less than an hour went to the "plant hospital which rendered first aid." He completed his workday but 2 days later went to a hospital where he was treated, X-rayed and released. Several days later he returned to work but was unable to continue.
In his declaration filed December 31, 1962, plaintiff asserts "That the defendants herein are liable for the personal injuries and damages to your plaintiff by reason of their negligence on February 26, 1962. Both collisions causing the following injuries." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues here, as he did below, that he "will suffer an irreparable injustice if these causes are separated and would put the plaintiff, the innocent party, in a position where he would be required to prosecute separate suits, where the defense of each could be the uncertainty of the injuries."
GCE 1963, 206.1, as to permissive joinder of parties, reads in part as follows:
"All persons may be joined in 1 action as defendants
(1) if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action; or
"(2) if it appears that their presence in the action will promote the convenient administration of justice."
Accepting the allegations of plaintiff's declaration as true, that is, he suffered a single indivisible injury as a result of successive negligent acts of defendants, we conclude that plaintiff had a right to maintain his action against both defendant Smith and defendant Havers in the same suit. The order dismissing should, therefore, be reversed.
The rule applicable to this case is stated in Meier v. Holt, 347 Mich 430, at pages 438, 439:
" 'Although it is not always definitely so stated the rule seems to have become generally established that, although there is no concert of action between tortfeasors, if the cumulative effect of their acts is a single, indivisible injury, which it cannot certainly be said would have resulted but for the concurrence of such acts, the actors are to be held liable as joint tort-feasors; whereas, if the results, as well as the acts, are separable, in theory at least, so that it can be said that the act of each would have resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion of injury caused thereby, each can be held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.' (1 Cooley on Torts [4th ed], § 86, pp 279, 280.)"
If after further proceedings before trial, it should appear necessary to prevent prejudice, or if it should appear to be in furtherance of the convenient administration of justice, the trial court may, within its sound discretion, order separate trials as permitted in GrCR 1963, 505.2, or sequential treatment of issues as provided in GCR 1963, 509.3. Otherwise, the matter may proceed to joint trial under proper instructions embodying the rule in Meier and predecessor cases. If deadlock should develop over apportionment of damages, it would then be incumbent upon the trial court to consider the language of Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich 425 (100 ALR2d 1), beginning at page 432:
"But if, on the other hand, the triers of the facts conclude that they cannot reasonably make the division of liability between the tort-feasors, this is the point where the road of authority divides." See the suggested answer at p 436.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs to plaintiff.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, O'Hara, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Smith, J.