Case Name: Henry ISOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-04-17
Citations: 819 So. 2d 154
Docket Number: No. 2D01-275
Parties: Henry ISOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ALTENBERND, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 819
Pages: 154–158

Head Matter:
Henry ISOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D01-275.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 17, 2002.
Rehearing Denied June 19, 2002.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Jean Marie Henne, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
FULMER, Judge.
Henry Isom appeals from his convictions for aggravated fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer, obstructing an officer without violence, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, driving while license suspended, and failure to give information. He challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress his confession. We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to grant the motion to suppress.
Officer Vleck was involved in the search for two subjects who led police on a high-speed chase that ended when the suspects crashed their van and fled the scene on foot. While heading home after searching for the suspects, Officer Vleck noticed Isom walking on the interstate. Officer Week stopped Isom and told him that he fit the description of a suspect and that he would have to wait to speak to another officer. Officer Week also told Isom that he was not supposed to hitchhike on the highway. Isom was moved off the highway and was approached by Officer Thorpe who advised Isom that he was investigating an incident where a suspect had fled from a vehicle.
An audiotape of Isom's interview with Officer Thorpe revealed that after the officer advised Isom of the Miranda warnings, the officer asked if he understood his rights, and Isom responded: "But I, I ain't did, I got, I need a lawyer cause I was hitch-hiking?" The officer answered: "No. (Pause) Where were you coming from Henry?" The interview continued, and Isom initially denied any involvement with the crashed van. However, Officer Ross questioned Isom at the scene an hour later, and in this subsequent interview Isom admitted to being the driver.
On appeal, Isom argues that he was entitled to have his confession suppressed based on Officer Thorpe's response to his question regarding the need for counsel. Both Isom and the State agree that our resolution of this issue is governed by the supreme court's decision in Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520 (Fla.1999), although the parties disagree as to the application of Almeida under the present facts.
In Almeida, after an initial interview in which Almeida executed a written waiver of rights form, the questioning officer prepared to conduct a formal recorded session. Once the recording began, Almeida acknowledged that he had previously been read his rights and that he understood them. He was then asked, "Do you wish to speak to me now without an attorney present?" Almeida replied, "Well, what good is an attorney going to do?" The detective conducting the interview essentially ignored the suspect's question. The court stated:
[W]e hold that if, at any . point during custodial interrogation, a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer. To do otherwise — i.e., to give an evasive answer, or to skip over the question, or to override or "steamroll" the suspect — is to actively promote the very coercion that Traylor was intended to dispel. A suspect who has been ignored or overridden concerning a right will be reluctant to exercise that right freely. Once the officer properly answers the question, the officer may then resume the interview.... Any statement obtained in violation of this proscription violates the Florida Constitution and cannot be used by the State. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966.
Almeida, 737 So.2d at 525.
Following Almeida, the court clarified the duty of law enforcement in State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297 (Fla.2001). In Glatzmayer, when the suspect asked the officers if they thought he should get a lawyer, the officers responded that it was his choice. The court concluded that suppression was not required and stated:
[N]othing in Almeida requires that law enforcement officers act as legal advis-ors or personal counselors for suspects. Such a task is properly left to defense counsel. To require officers to advise and counsel suspects would impinge on the officers' sworn duty to prevent and detect crime and enforce the laws of the state. All that is required of interrogating officers under Almeida and [State v.] Owen [, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla.1997) ] is that they be honest and fair when addressing a suspect's constitutional rights....
Id. at 305 (footnotes omitted).
In this case, when Isom asked the officer if he needed a lawyer for hitchhiking, the officer answered "No" and continued with the interrogation. We agree with Isom that the officer's response was improper pursuant to Almeida. Although the officer's answer was simple and straightforward, as required by Almeida, it was also evasive and misleading because the questioning that was about to occur was not directed to a hitchhiking offense. The officer should have clarified the reason for the interrogation so there would be no question that any waiver of counsel was made with Isom's full knowledge of the circumstances under which he was being questioned. Unlike Almeida, where the defendant had executed a waiver of rights form prior to asking the question at issue in that case, Isom's question arose during his initial interrogation while he was being given his Miranda rights for the first time. The officer's failure to dispel Isom's possible misunderstanding places in doubt the knowing and intelligent nature of both the initial waiver arid any subsequent waiver. Thus, although Isom did not make his admission to Officer Thorpe, but did so in a subsequent interview with Officer Ross, because the Almeida violation had already occurred, Officer Ross did not obtain a valid waiver of Isom's right to counsel. See Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 966 n. 14 (Fla.1992) ("Once the right to counsel has been invoked, any subsequent waiver during a police-initiated encounter in the absence of counsel during the same period of custody is invalid, whether or not the accused has consulted with counsel earlier"). Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of convictions and remand for the trial court to grant the motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND, J., Concurs.
SILBERMAN, J., Dissents with opinion.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).