Case Name: CHRISTIAN v. ROSS, administrator
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1916-05-18
Citations: 145 Ga. 284
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHRISTIAN v. ROSS, administrator.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 284–287

Head Matter:
CHRISTIAN v. ROSS, administrator.
1. An absolute deed of conveyance will not, at the instance of the grantor, be canceled merely because of a breach by the grantee of a promise made by him in consideration of which the deed was executed.
2. An equitable petition for cancellation of a deed, based solely upon a ground of the nature above indicated, is not amendable so as to make a case for cancellation on the ground either that the grantor was mentally incapable of contracting or was induced by fraud to execute the conveyance.
May 18, 1916.
Equitable petition. Before Judge Littlejohn. Sumter superior court. July 15, 1915.
Miss Kate Ross brought her petition against R. G-. Christian, and prayed for a decree cancelling a certain deed in which she was the grantor and the defendant the grantee, and for other equitable relief. By this deed she conveyed for a given consideration the land therein described. The consideration as expressed in the deed was the assumption by the grantee of a loan which was an encumbrance on the land, and the payment of a stipulated sum monthly by the grantee to the grantor for and during her life. A separate and distinct written agreement was executed .by the grantor and grantee, simultaneously with the execution of the deed, in which was embodied the provision for the payment of the sum due monthly. The grantor reserved a life-estate in the land, but this for a stated consideration she leased to the grantee. The grantee had failed to perform his undertaking to pay off the encumbrance and to pay the sums due monthly. TJpon this statement of facts a cancellation of the deed was asked. Pending the suit the petitioner died, and her administrator was made a party, and at a subsequent term of the court he offered an amendment in which it was set up, that the defendant was insolvent when the original petition was filed; that he had received more from Kate Eoss than he had contributed to her support; that at the time of the negotiations for the conveyance of the land Kate Eoss was of a weak mind, easily to be influenced and directed and led by any one in whom she had confidence, and she reposed confidence in the grantee; and that he had taken advantage of her mental weakness and by promises of assistance and care, as well as expressions of friendship, had procured the execution of the deed. The defendant by appropriate demurrers attacked the petition as originally filed and the allowance of the amendment. The demurrers were overruled, and the defendant excepted.
Wallis & Fort and W. T. Lane, for plaintiff in error.
B. L. Maynard, contra.

Opinion:
Beck, J.
(After stating the foregoing facts.) The issues made by the pleadings in this case are covered by the decision and rulings in the case of Brand v. Power, 110 Ga. 522 (36 S. E. 53). The syllabi in that ease, which constitute the headnotes in this case, show the substance of the ruling; and the decision which elaborates that ruling renders further discussion of the questions here unnecessary.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except