Case Name: Robert E. LaRUE, et al. v. CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION, Lonnie Massey and Marjorie Margaret Cherniak
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1987-06-23
Citations: 512 So. 2d 862
Docket Number: No. 86 CA 0195
Parties: Robert E. LaRUE, et al. v. CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION, Lonnie Massey and Marjorie Margaret Cherniak.
Judges: Before LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, WATKINS, CARTER and LeBLANC, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 512
Pages: 862–865

Head Matter:
Robert E. LaRUE, et al. v. CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION, Lonnie Massey and Marjorie Margaret Cherniak.
No. 86 CA 0195.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
June 23, 1987.
Dissenting Opinion June 29, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 2, 1987.
Writ Denied Nov. 20, 1987.
Thomas J. Hogan, Jr., Greensburg, for Robert LaRue, et al.
Duncan S. Kemp, III, Hammond, for Lonnie Massey.
Charles Hughes, Jr., Bogalusa, for Crown Zellerbach.
Anthony Rollo, New Orleans, for Marjorie Cherniak.
Before LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, WATKINS, CARTER and LeBLANC, JJ.

Opinion:
EDWARDS, Judge.
The issue in this case is whether landowners in a subdivision subject to a restrictive covenant have a right and cause of action against the timber cutter and the corporation who bought the timber when it was cut down in violation of the covenant. We hold that they do not.
FACTS
Plaintiffs and defendant Marjorie Chern-iak are neighboring landowners in the Whispering Pines Subdivision in St. Helena Parish. Their land is subject to a recorded restrictive covenant which stipulates the minimum number of trees per acre to be maintained on each lot. Made defendants were Mrs. Cherniak, the landowner; Lonnie Massey, the timber cutter; and Crown Zellerbach, the timber buyer. Plaintiffs' petition alleges that defendants had actual knowledge of the restrictive covenant, yet cut all of the timber on a portion of Mrs. Cherniak's property in violation of the restrictive covenant.
Massey filed exceptions of no cause and no right of action, Crown Zellerbach moved for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' suit against them. Plaintiffs settled with and dismissed Mrs. Cherniak. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the petition discloses both their right and cause of action against defendants Massey and Crown Zellerbach under four theories: (1) timber trespass, LSA-R.S. 56:1478.1; (2) trespass; (3) conversion; and (4) general delictual liability under art. 2315 of the Civil Code.
Crown Zellerbach's motion for summary judgment was neither supported nor opposed by any documents other than pleadings and briefs, and consequently the case is presented to us as if on an exception of no cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 966-67; Owens v. Martin, 449 So.2d 448, 450 (La.1984). Our inquiry, then, is whether, taking the factual allegations of the petition as true, plaintiffs have a right and cause of action against defendants. Id.
TIMBER TRESPASS
It is unlawful for "any person to cut, fell, destroy or remove any trees, . growing or lying on the land of another, without the consent of the owner or legal possessor." LSA-R.S. 56:1478.1 A (emphasis added). A violator is liable in damages "to the owner or legal possessor of the trees." LSA-R.S. 56:1478.1 B. (emphasis added).
The petition states that Mrs. Cherniak sold the timber to Crown Zellerbach. Plaintiffs did not allege that they are owners or legal possessors of the trees, or that the trees were taken without the consent of the owner or legal possessor. Therefore there is no cause of action for timber trespass.
TRESPASS
Trespass, a common law tort actionable under article 2315 of the Civil Code, is "the unlawful physical invasion of the property or possession of another." Versai Management, Inc. v. Monticello Forest Prods. Corp., 479 So.2d 477, 482 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). "The action for trespass is designed to protect the interest in exclusive possession of the land in its intact physical condition." W. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 13 at 77 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser]. One who is neither an owner nor possessor has no right to sue for trespass upon the property. Id. at 78; 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 21 (1954). Plaintiffs did not allege that they are the owners or possessors of Mrs. Cherniak's property, or that Massey and Crown Zellerbach acted without the con sent of the owner. Consequently there is no cause of action in trespass.
CONVERSION
Conversion, likewise actionable under article 2315 of the Civil Code, is "any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another's goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time." Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 475 So.2d 756, 760 (La. 1985). Conversion is an act in derogation of a plaintiff's possessory rights. Id. As in trespass, the lack of consent by the owner or possessor is a prerequisite. Plaintiffs, not having alleged that they are owners or possessors of the trees, or that the trees were removed without the owner's consent, have no right to sue for their conversion. See Prosser, supra § 15; 89 C.J.S. Conversion § 73.
GENERAL DELICTUAL LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 2315
Plaintiffs' allegation in the petition that Mrs. Cherniak violated the restrictive covenant to which her land was subject, thereby causing them damage, clearly states a cause of action against her for damages. See LSA-C.C. art. 781; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737; 67 So. 641, 646 (1915). Yet plaintiffs have chosen to dismiss this claim and proceed only against the cutter and the purchaser of the timber.
The restrictive covenant created a duty on the part of Mrs. Cherniak, as well as future owners of the land, to abide by its terms. It was the breach of that duty, i.e., the duty of each landowner owed to all others in the subdivision to maintain a minimum number of trees, that caused the damages.
We know of no duty to the subdivision landowners that Massey and Crown Zeller-bach breached. While the petition does indeed state that plaintiffs' damages were caused by the acts of Massey and Crown Zellerbach, which would bring this case within the broad terms of article 2315 of the Civil Code, the element of fault is missing. Because we can find no duty to plaintiffs that Massey and Crown Zellerbach breached, we cannot find fault, and consequently there is no cause of action. Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants' cost.
AFFIRMED.
WATKINS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.