Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHARLIE MORQUECHO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2004-04-02
Citations: 347 Ill. App. 3d 382
Docket Number: No. 2-02-1182
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHARLIE MORQUECHO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: HUTCHINSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 347
Pages: 382–395

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHARLIE MORQUECHO, Defendant-Appellee.
Second District
No. 2—02—1182
Opinion filed April 2, 2004.
Timothy J. McCann, State’s Attorney, of Yorkville (Stephen E. Norris, Kendra S. Peterson, and T. David Purcell, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Richard J. Dvork, of Law Office of Richard J. Dvork, and Alfredo Acosta, both of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE McLAEEN
delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting the motion of defendant, Charlie Morquecho, to quash arrest and suppress evidence. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with one count each of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/ 401(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)), unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)). The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and subsequently denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State then filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of impairment.
At the hearing on the motion, defendant presented the testimony of Officer Jeff Ackland of the Plano police department. Ackland stated that, on the afternoon of August 5, 2001, he was assisting three Kendall County sheriff's deputies as they made an undercover drug purchase from a man named Antonio Gonzalez. Ackland's role was to detain "any other perp" in Gonzalez's car. The officers anticipated that another person would be with Gonzalez, although they did not know who that person might be. Ackland saw a black Ford Mustang enter the parking lot of the Eagle Dollar Store in Plano, where he was waiting in a van with the deputies. He recognized the vehicle as defendant's car from two prior contacts with defendant. Defendant was in the passenger seat and Gonzalez was driving. Ackland believed that Gonzalez got out of the car and entered an undercover police car; defendant did not enter that car. After a few minutes, Ackland received the "arrest signal," which meant that the drug buy had been made and that he was to detain the passenger. Up to that time, he had not seen defendant violate any law.
Ackland went to the passenger side of the car with his gun drawn and "asked" defendant to get out of the car. When defendant got out of the car "on his own free will," Ackland placed him on his stomach and handcuffed him. Ackland had no arrest or search warrant for defendant, nor did he receive defendant's consent to search his body. Deputy DeCamp patted down defendant and noticed a bulge in defendant's right sock. Inspector Whowell found cocaine in the spck.
Ackland had been a police officer for 21/z years and had arrested people on drug-related charges. None of those arrestees had been armed, but he had learned in his academy training that drug dealers and people in possession of narcotics often carry weapons.
The State presented the testimony of Inspector Chris Biggs of the Oswego police department. Biggs was assigned to the Kendall County Cooperative Police Assistance Team (CPAT), which was a county-wide drug task force. He had previously made undercover drug buys from Gonzalez and was to make another such buy on August 5, 2001. Biggs was alone in an undercover police car parked in the Eagle Store parking lot. Gonzalez drove up in a black Mustang with an unknown man in the passenger seat. Biggs subsequently identified defendant as the passenger. Gonzalez parked about 20 feet away from Biggs and entered the undercover car. After Gonzalez gave him cocaine, Biggs gave the prearranged arrest signal, and other officers arrested both Gonzalez and defendant. Biggs never saw defendant do anything other than sit in the car.
Biggs had been a police officer for four years and had been assigned to CPAT for IV2 years. He had training in narcotics enforcement and had been involved in undercover operations and executions of search warrants in drug cases. He learned that weapons are commonly involved in drug possession and delivery situations. Although the possibility of weapons was "always a concern going into a situation" involving narcotics, there were no particular facts that led the officers to believe that either Gonzalez or defendant was armed that day.
The State also presented the testimony of Deputy Tim DeCamp of the Kendall County sheriffs department. He had been a deputy for about five years and had arrested people who either sold or possessed narcotics. On the afternoon of August 5, 2001, he was assigned to CPAT and was in the van in the Eagle parking lot. He never saw defendant leave the Mustang before "the detention and subsequent arrest." After the arrest signal was given, DeCamp and Ackland opened the passenger door of the Mustang and "asked" defendant to get out of the car. When defendant was partially out of the car, they grabbed him by the arm and "ask[ed] him to get onto the ground." He was then handcuffed behind his back. Defendant did not resist at any time. Based on his prior training and experience, DeCamp knew that narcotics dealers often carry weapons. He patted down defendant and noticed "an unusual bulge," smaller than a golf ball, in defendant's right sock. He testified that "it did not feel like a weapon." He did not roll it around or move it once he made contact with it. Believing that the bulge may have been narcotics, DeCamp notified Inspector Whowell, who subsequently removed what appeared to be narcotics from defendant's sock. Prior to arresting defendant, DeCamp did not see defendant violate any laws. At the time of the arrest, the police had "no concrete evidence" that defendant was involved in Gonzalez's delivery of cocaine; it was, however, "a possibility."
The trial court held that the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and granted the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court concluded:
"There is not even enough here for a Terry stop. There is not even enough here to bring any suspicion that the defendant's involved in any kind of criminal activity whatsoever. * Clearly, the defendant was under arrest in this case. An arrest signal was given, the acts of the officer in taking him out of the car was [sic] clearly an arrest, and even if I accept that it's not, there are no facts that would lead me to believe that a pat down was required of the defendant."
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court may reverse the court's findings of historical fact only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). However, the appellate court must review de novo the ultimate conclusion of the trial court as to the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.
The State does not argue that it had probable cause to arrest defendant because of Gonzalez's drug sale. Instead, the State contends that, given "the totality of the circumstances," the officers should have been permitted to detain defendant and search him for. weapons. Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), an officer may conduct a limited search for weapons once he reasonably concludes that the person whom he legitimately stopped poses a threat to his safety or the safety of others. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 421 (1998). The officer's conduct must be based on more than a mere hunch; it must be supported by specific, articulable facts that, when taken together with natural inferences, reasonably warrant a belief that the officer's safety, or that of others, is in danger. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 422. The sole justification of such a search is to protect the police officer and others nearby, not to gather evidence. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 432. Because of this, the search must be limited in scope to a search designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other weapons that can be used to assault the officer or others. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 421-22. If an officer wishes to search for evidence of other criminal activity, such as drugs, he must have probable cause to do so. People v. Holliday, 318 Ill. App. 3d 106, Ill (2001). If a search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if a suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry, and its fruits will be suppressed. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 432.
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was not arrested when two officers pulled him from the car at gunpoint, put him on the ground, and handcuffed him, we still conclude that the pat-down search exceeded the bounds of a Terry search and degenerated into a search for evidence of a crime. The pat-down revealed nothing other than "an unusual bulge," smaller than a golf ball, in defendant's right sock. Deputy DeCamp testified that the bulge "did not feel like a weapon." Since the only possible factual basis for the search, in the absence of an arrest, was officer safety, investigating an "unusual bulge" in defendant's sock that "did not feel like a weapon" went beyond the scope of a search for weapons. Finding no weapons that could threaten the officers' safety, the officers had no factual or legal reason to search further.
The dissent argues that Deputy DeCamp had probable cause to believe that defendant possessed drugs and that the bulge in defendant's sock contained contraband because defendant accompanied someone involved in a drug transaction. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91. Even the State does not go this far. The State denies that it arrested defendant when it removed him from the car at gunpoint and searched him. According to the State, the search was only a Terry search for weapons. Each officer testified that he did not see defendant violate any law before he was removed from the car. Deputy DeCamp testified they had "no concrete evidence" that defendant was involved in Gonzalez's delivery of cocaine. In the absence of evidence or even argument by the State, it is inappropriate for the dissent to claim that probable cause existed. The trial court found that there were insufficient facts to establish any basis for a stop, let alone a pat-down search. The dissent reweighs the evidence and finds that there was probable cause based upon possibilities rather than probabilities. The dissent determines probable cause existed by transferring to defendant the facts relating to the person who actually committed the sale and delivery of contraband. Essentially, the dissent determines guilt by association.
The State argues that the "plain touch" doctrine allowed for the recovery of the cocaine from defendant's sock. Under this doctrine, if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose mass or contour makes its identity immediately apparent, there is no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons, and the item may be seized. People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (1995). The Mitchell court reasoned:
"When objects have a distinctive and consistent shape that an officer has been trained to detect and that officer has had previous experience in detecting such objects, his tactile perceptions can provide him with the same recognition that his sight would have provided." Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 227.
However, this doctrine does not permit a search to exceed the initial intrusion; as soon as the officer is satisfied that the object is not a weapon, a further search to determine the nature or identity of the object, such as through manipulation of the object, is impermissible. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 228-29.
This court dealt with the "plain touch" doctrine in People v. Pratcher, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1063 (2002). In Pratcher, the defendant was searched for weapons after he was pulled over for a driving violation. The arresting officer was "also concerned that defendant might be attempting to conceal contraband." Pratcher, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1065. The officer testified that he felt in the defendant's pants pocket what he "believed * was cannabis because 'it was tightly compressed, soft, pliable. It appeared contained because I wasn't able to spread it out.' " Pratcher, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1065. The officer also stated that he had come into contact with cannabis more than 100 times and had felt cannabis in someone's pocket at least 20 times. Pratcher, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1065. This court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, concluding that the officer continued to search the contents of the defendant's pockets to determine the nature of the object even after he determined that there were no weapons in the pocket. Pratcher, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1069.
While the facts are not identical, Pratcher is instructive. The officer in Pratcher manipulated the item to achieve a better idea that the item was contraband. Based on his prior experience, he then achieved a stronger belief than that of Deputy DeCamp that the defendant possessed contraband. He was able to determine the type of contraband and describe the information upon which he based his belief. Nevertheless, the evidence was suppressed because the search went beyond the scope of its original purpose.
Here, Deputy DeCamp testified that he noticed "an unusual bulge" that did not feel like a weapon. He "believed it was possibly narcotics." However, he did not immediately remove the item; he called Inspector Whowell, who removed the item in the sock. There was no evidence that DeCamp recognized the identity of this bulge, based on its size or feel, from his prior detection of concealed narcotics. He testified that he "believed" that the item was "possibly narcotics." Such nebulous recognition of unspecified "narcotics" is not the type of tactile perception upon which "plain touch" is based.
In comparing this case to Mitchell, the dissent finds "insignificant" the distinction between Deputy DeCamp's testimony that the "unusual bulge" was "possibly narcotics" and the testimony of the officer in Mitchell that what felt "like a piece of rock inside a small baggie" was " 'probably rock cocaine' " (Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 231). See 347 Ill. App. 3d at 394. However, words do have meaning, and possibility versus probability is not a distinction without a difference. At the core of the "plain touch" doctrine is the immediately apparent identity of the object. See Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 225. One can never be 100% positive that what one feels but does not see through someone's clothing is a particular item. However, probability, based on one's prior experiences, is a higher degree of certainty than possibility. Anything is "possible," but not everything is "probable." The dissent would reduce the "plain touch" doctrine to the "hunch touch" doctrine.
DeCamp's supposed perception of the identity of the item is belied by the fact that DeCamp called on Inspector Whowell to remove the item. This break in continuity between DeCamp's search and Whowell's removal of the item also violates the reasoning behind the "plain touch" doctrine. It is the searching officer's "tactile perceptions" that are implicated by this doctrine. The dissent disingenuously asserts that Whowell's removal of the bulge from defendant's sock was nothing more than an opportunity "to verify the reasonableness of Deputy DeCamp's belief that the bulge was narcotics." 347 Ill. App. 3d at 395. The logic undergirding this assertion would allow any number of fellow police officers to try their "tactile perceptions" to "verify" the identity of an item found during a search. "Plain touch" does not allow an officer to call in other officers to investigate a finding; either the initial feel of the item reveals its identity to the officer or it does not. Further investigation by others is not allowed.
Once DeCamp called in Whowell to remove the item, the search was no longer about weapons and officer safety, since DeCamp knew that the bulge was not a weapon. Whowell performed another search of defendant when he took the item from defendant's sock. The search of defendant exceeded the initial intrusion and became "a further search to determine the nature or identity of the object"; this is impermissible. See Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 228. Therefore, the "plain touch" doctrine does not rescue this search from constitutional infirmity. The trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HUTCHINSON, J., concurs.