Case Name: The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York agt. The Second Avenue Railroad Company
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1861-06
Citations: 21 How. Pr. 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York agt. The Second Avenue Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 257–271

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York agt. The Second Avenue Railroad Company.
Where the common council of the city of Hew York, by resolution and agreement, enter into a contract with a railroad company, allowing such company to run their oars through certain streets of the city, prescribing the regulations to which the latter shall be subject, requiring no further license, and reserving no right to require one, they are excluded by their contract from afterwards enacting that a license shall be a condition (under a penalty), to entitle the company to run their cars. (This appears to be adverse to the principles laid down in the precede ing case of Britton agt. The Mayor, §c., of New York. Ingraham, J., dtissentingy whose views seem to correspond with the case of Britton¡ supra.)
New York General Term, June, 1861.
Before Clerke, Sutherland and Ingraham, Justices.
Appeal, by plaintiffs, from judgment at special term, overruling demurrer to answer.

Opinion:
By the court, Clerke, P. J.
This action is brought to recover from the defendants, as owners of' a certain railroad car, a penalty of fifty dollars for running it below One Hundred and Twenty-fifth street without a certificate of license, according to an ordinance of the common council requiring every passenger railroad car running below that street to pay into the city treasury annually the sum of fifty dollars, " for a license or certificate of such payment, to be procured from the mayor," under the penalty of fifty dollars for every car run contrary to the regulation, to be recovered of the proprietors of the car by the corporation attorney, as in case of other penalties.
The defendants set out at length the agreement between their assignors and the corporation, entered into on the 15th of December, 1852, by which they were authorized to lay rails in certain streets and run their cars thereon; and they allege that they have constructed their railroad in pursuance of said agreement, that they have in all respects complied with its terms and conditions, and claim that they have full authority under the agreement to run their cars without paying fifty dollars annually for a license.
The agreement contains no stipulation on the part of the defendants or their assignors to pay any license for running their cars, nor does it require any additional action, or any further assurance or authority, to enable them to do what this agreement, of itself, expressly and unconditionally per mits, unless it may be considered that the resolution of the common council, recited in the agreement and made a part of it, imports a liability to pay any sums which the common council may thereafter think proper to impose. This resolution requires that the parties shall, before the permission takes effect, enter into an agreement with the mayor, &c., of the city of New York, binding themselves "to abide by and perform the stipulations and provisions therein contained, and also all such other regulations or ordinances as may be passed by the common council relating to the said railroad."
A demurrer to the answer as not constituting a defence, was overruled at special term.
I. Without, at present, considering the effect of the reservation contained in the resolution above referred to, the first question which presents itself is, whether the corporation could, without such a reservation, require the defendants to take out and pay for a license after the execution of the agreement.
If an agreement of this kind were entered into, on behalf of a sovereign state possessing the power of imposing imposts or taxes for the support of government, the mere permission to do a certain thing would not exempt the grantees from liability to any tax, to which persons in a similar occupation were made liable, even after the permission were given. All citizens are liable to contribute to the support of the government which protects them; they cannot be exempted from this except by a special provision of law; and it would be just as reasonable to suppose, because a state conveyed land in fee simple absolute, with covenants, that it exempted the land from taxation, that the owner should be thereafter exempted from taxation, as to suppose that a permission like that involved in the present case exempted the defendants from the payment required, if it was imposed by an authority possessing the taxing power.
But no municipal corporation of the present age, at least in this country and in England, possesses any such power. The supreme legislature of the state could not constitutionally delegate it. The common council has full authority, indeed, by virtue of the charters of James II. and Queen Anne, to make laws, orders and ordinances for the good-rule, oversight, correction and government of the city, and may impose and tax reasonable fines and amerciaments against and upon all persons offending against such laws, orders and ordinances. It may, consequently, limit and prescribe the rate of speed, designate the stations or places where they should stop, and require them to adopt some method by which their approach may be made known to persons crossing the street; and as it may be indispensable to the public safety and convenience, that railroad cars should, like other vehicles, be subject to supervisory regulation, it may ordain that they should be licensed; and if the company should neglect to take out the license, that they should be subject to a penalty. But, if the common council enter into a specific agreement with a company, prescribing the regulations to which the latter shall be subject, requiring no further license, and reserving no right to require one, I think they are excluded by their contract from afterwards enacting that a license shall be a condition to entitle them to run their cars. This contract is nothing more or less than a license.
This does not, in any respect, gainsay the doctrine laid down in the Brick Presbyterian Church agt. The Mayor, &c., of New York (5 Cow., 538,) and in Coates agt. The Mayor, &c., of New York (7 Cow., 585.) I do not deny that no contract entered into by the corporation can curtail or supersede its action as a legislative body, within the sphere of its legislative powers. But I do deny that the right to establish ordinances, &c., for the good rule and government of the city, and to provide penalties for their breach, confers any right to impose a tax. In the language of a former counsel of the corporation, I may reiterate that the common council may provide that vehicles of a certain description shall be used, rates of speed may be limited, the particular places in which they shall stop may be designated, and penalties may be imposed for any breach of these regulations. This, however, is a very different power from that which provides that vehicles may be run, if a certain sum shall be paid; otherwise they shall not run. This is only a taxing power in the guise of establishing ordinances for good rule and government. Thus, as I have already said, the corporation may ordain that all public vehicles shall be licensed, and if their proprietors should neglect to take out this license, that they should be subject to a penalty. But if they ordain that the proprietors shall pay a license fee for the privilege of running, and not as a penalty for disobedience, it-is an attempted exercise of the taxing power, which no subordinate legislative body under our institutions can possess. The license to run, in the present instance, had been granted by solemn agreement, and, of course, in running pursuant to that license or agreement, the defendants violated no ordinance, so as to have made themselves liable to the imposition of a penalty.
II. Is any such right reserved in the agreement under consideration in the present case?
A resolution, as we have before noticed, was passed during the negotiation between the parties, that the assignors of the defendants should bind themselves to abide by and perform the stipulations and provisions contained in the agreement, and " also all such other regulations or ordinances as may be passed by the common council relating to the railroad."
Now, if the agreement, of itself, confers the right to run in a certain manner through a specified portion of the city, no subsequent enactment can curtail this right. The agreement itself, I repeat, is a license. By this agreement the common council has thought proper to give the defendants liberty, or license, to run their cars. It could not, there fore, have been in the contemplation of either of the parties to the agreement, that any further license should be necessary. The license given by the agreement was unqualified; and, therefore, the ordinance incorporated into that agreement by which the defendants are bound to abide by all other regulations or ordinances, as may be thereafter passed by the common council, could not have included a regulation or ordinance requiring any additional license. If this was intended the requirement should be expressed in specific terms.
Preceding the introduction of this resolution, provisions were set forth relative to the mode of laying the rails, keeping the streets in and about them in repair, confining the propelling power to horses, regulating the number of times the cars should be run during the day, and between what hours, and providing that they should be run as much oftener as public convenience may require, " under such directions as the common council may from time to time prescribe; " also, prescribing limits to the rate of fare, and reserving to the corporation the right to regulate the fare, for the whole length of the road, when completed to Harlem river.
Immediately following this comes the resolution, that the parties shall, in all respects, " comply with the directions of the' street commissioner and of the common council, in the building of the road, and in other matters connected with the regulation of the road." This is followed by the ordinance on which I have been commenting; and I have no doubt that the words " other regulations and ordinances," which it contains, meant such ordinances or regulations as the common council may afterwards think necessary for the regulation of the road, in regard to the public safety and convenience. It gives the common council, the power, in certain respects, to make further necessary or expedient provisions for the regulation of the road; it by no means imports a right to nullify the license, which the agreement itself gives.
It reserved the right, in short to regulate the mode of running, not to nullify the privilege of running altogether; for this would be the effect of allowing the common council to impose a license fee upon the company; it would be allowing the plaintiffs to say, We now order you no longer to run your cars unless you pay us a heavy fine or penalty, although we have already promised that you should run without requiring the payment of any sum. If they have the right to impose the payment of fifty dollars, they have the right to impose any greater sum, which may be so oppressive as to make it no longer worth while to continue running the cars, and thus in effect rescinding the agreement, without any violation of it on the part of the defendants. The power to impose this fine not being reserved in the agreement, and the common council not having the power to impose a tax, the claim of the plaintiffs is therefore not sustained. The plaintiffs cannot object to the assignment of the agreement by the original parties, to the defendants. Since the date of the assignment the defendants have constructed the railroad, have, in all respects, complied with the terms and conditions of the agreement,, and, during a period of several years, have been recognized and dealt with by the plaintiffs as the proprietors of the road and the assignees of the original parties.
The order of the special term should be affirmed with costs, and there should be judgment of dismissal of the complaint.