Case Name: Monica Diaz BARRIGA FIGUEROA as parent and natural guardian of Brayan Martinez, a minor, Appellant, v. Consuelo PRIETO MARISCAL, individually and the marital property thereof, if any, Respondent.
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 2018-04-03
Citations: 414 P.3d 590
Docket Number: No. 34671-4-III
Parties: Monica Diaz BARRIGA FIGUEROA as parent and natural guardian of Brayan Martinez, a minor, Appellant,
v.
Consuelo PRIETO MARISCAL, individually and the marital property thereof, if any, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 414
Pages: 590–598

Head Matter:
Monica Diaz BARRIGA FIGUEROA as parent and natural guardian of Brayan Martinez, a minor, Appellant,
v.
Consuelo PRIETO MARISCAL, individually and the marital property thereof, if any, Respondent.
No. 34671-4-III
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.
FILED APRIL 3, 2018
Ned Stratton, Anderson Law, 5861 W. Clearwater Ave., Kennewick, WA, 99336-1849, for Appellant.
Steven M. Cronin, Attorney at Law, 115 N. Washington St., Ste. 3, Spokane, WA, 99201-0657, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION

Opinion:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
¶1 Monica Diaz, as parent and guardian for her son Brayan Martinez, appeals from a defense verdict finding Consuelo Prieto not negligent for driving over and fracturing Brayan's lower right leg. Ms. Diaz primarily argues that the trial court erred in admitting the personal injury protection (PIP) application to her insurer. She argues that the PIP application was hearsay and confidential work product.
¶2 We hold that the PIP application was not hearsay because it was an admission by a party opponent under ER 801(d)(2)(iv). However, we hold that the trial court erred when it failed to extend work product protection to the PIP application and that this error was prejudicial. We therefore reverse the jury's verdict and grant Ms. Diaz a new trial.
FACTS
¶3 On October 30, 2013, Ms. Prieto was driving her minivan southbound on North Cedar Avenue in Pasco, Washington. Her teenage daughter, Melissa Guzman, was riding in the front passenger seat. There were vehicles, including an orange pickup, parked on the right side of the road. As Ms. Prieto passed the orange pickup, she heard a noise on the passenger side of her van and felt her van jump a little. She stopped, got out, and saw eight-year-old Brayan Martinez lying near the pickup and next to his bicycle. It was evident that Brayan's lower right leg had been run over by one of the minivan's tires. Melissa called 911. Brayan was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries.
¶4 A police officer arrived at the scene to investigate and prepare a report. The officer spoke to a few people, including Ms. Prieto and her daughter. No one the officer spoke to actually saw what happened. Nevertheless, the officer's report indicated that Brayan had ridden his bike from between two parked cars and into the road.
¶5 Ms. Diaz, a monolingual Spanish speaker, contacted a law firm and sought its assistance in making a claim under her insurance policy to pay for medical expenses. On November
21, 2013, Ms. Diaz met with an employee of the law firm who spoke Spanish. Following this meeting, a legal assistant asked Ms. Diaz to sign a blank form that the assistant later completed. The form was an application for PIP benefits. Although PIP benefits are available regardless of fault, the form had a line that required the applicant to provide a brief description of the accident. The legal assistant used a copy of the police report to complete the form. The legal assistant wrote:
Vehicle was traveling on North Cedar when child on a bike rode into road. There were 2 parked cars on the road creating a blinde [sic] spot for the driver. Child was struck and had right leg ran over.
Ex. 101 at 1.
¶6 Ms. Diaz, on behalf of her son, brought suit against Ms. Prieto. Ms. Diaz hired an accident reconstruction expert to assist in establishing liability. The expert, Patrick Stadler, met with Brayan at the accident scene to determine how the accident happened.
¶7 Brayan explained that prior to the accident, he rode his bicycle from the sidewalk into the roadway in front of the orange pickup to make U-turn type maneuvers. Defense counsel later deposed Brayan. Brayan's statements during the deposition varied enough that Mr. Stadler determined he should meet with Brayan again. Brayan's second explanation to Mr. Stadler was that his shoelace became tangled in his bike chain and that the bike came to rest near the front of the orange pickup. He was stopped and leaning over his bike with his right leg extended out in the road when the minivan ran over his leg. Brayan did not mention the shoelace becoming stuck during his initial interview with Mr. Stadler.
¶8 The case proceeded to trial. During opening statements, Ms. Prieto referred to the PIP application. After opening, Ms. Diaz orally requested that the PIP application be excluded:
Your Honor, . in defendant's opening [defense counsel] brought up some piece of evidence that I think he might try to bring up again.
[The] Personal Injury Protection application. The personal injury protection application is .
. a first-party application and privilege is not waived when you submit something to first-party insurance. And, in fact, first-party insurance is not supposed to share the PIP file with defense without permission of plaintiff.
In this case, [defense counsel] somehow got a copy of the PIP application. This raises a number of concerns. .
So even though [defense counsel] already referenced it in his opening, and I objected to it then, I would move to exclude any further reference to this Personal Injury Protection application.
RP at 119-21.
¶9 In response, defense counsel argued:
First of all, this document is not privileged. .
.
The PIP insurance coverage is, in essence, a no fault benefit provided on the insurance policy insuring Ms. Prieto. Okay?
So it's her insurance company that's providing this benefit of medical coverage to Brayan.[ ]
RP at 121-22.
¶10 The trial court then heard voir dire testimony from Ms. Diaz. Ms. Diaz explained that her attorney's legal assistant directed her to sign the blank PIP application. The trial court determined that the form was prepared by plaintiff's agent, constituted an admission against interest, and therefore denied Ms. Diaz's request to exclude it. The trial court stated that the document was not privileged but provided no analysis in making its conclusion.
¶11 During trial, Mr. Stadler opined that Brayan could not have been struck while riding his bike. His opinion was based on the fact that the frame of the bike was not damaged and that Brayan's injuries did not include any impact or sliding on the pavement. It was his opinion that Brayan had been stationary and adjacent to the orange pickup when Ms. Prieto's minivan ran over his extended right leg.
¶12 Ms. Diaz asked one of her medical experts how Brayan had described the accident. On cross-examination, Ms. Prieto asked the expert about statements in the medical records that indicated Brayan had ridden his bike out into the road. Ms. Diaz objected on the basis of speculation and hearsay. The trial court noted that the expert had reviewed and relied on the medical record, and overruled the objection on the basis that Ms. Diaz had opened the door during her questions to her expert.
¶13 Defendant's accident reconstruction expert, Eric Hunter, testified that it would have taken Ms. Prieto 1.6 seconds or less to stop once she saw an object in the roadway. He also testified that accident reconstruction experts rely on police reports when forming opinions and that he relied on the police report for this accident. Ms. Prieto began reading the police report into evidence, and Ms. Diaz objected. The trial court overruled the objection but qualified its ruling by saying the jury would be instructed that the police report was admitted only for a limited purpose and could not be considered as substantive evidence. Ms. Prieto did not continue reading the police report. Rather, she then focused on the description of the accident contained in the PIP application.
¶14 After both sides presented their evidence and closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict finding Ms. Prieto not negligent. Ms. Diaz moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial court denied her motion. Ms. Diaz appeals.
ANALYSIS
THE PIP APPLICATION
¶15 Ms. Diaz argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the PIP application. She argues that the PIP application was hearsay and was confidential. We review these two claims independently.
1. The PIP application was not hearsay
¶16 The trial court's factual determination regarding whether a statement falls within a hearsay exception will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Statev.Strauss, 119 Wash.2d 401, 417, 832 P.2d 78 (1992).
¶17 The unrefuted evidence established that a legal assistant for Ms. Diaz's attorney prepared the PIP application based on the police report, and the police report was not based on eye-witness evidence. Ms. Diaz argues that the PIP application has multiple levels of hearsay, is speculative and, for these reasons, the trial court erred in admitting it. We disagree.
¶18 ER 801(d) defines certain statements that are not hearsay. That rule provides in relevant part: "A statement is not hearsay if . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . a statement by the party's agent or servant acting within the scope of the authority to make the statement for the party." ER 801(d)(2)(iv).
¶19 Ms. Diaz hired an attorney to assist her in making a PIP claim. A legal assistant for the attorney completed the PIP application. During oral argument, Ms. Diaz conceded that a legal assistant could speak for a law firm by virtue of being part of that firm. This is dispositive. We conclude that the legal assistant was a speaking agent for Ms. Diaz and that the statement contained in the PIP application was made within the legal assistant's scope of authority.
¶20 Ms. Diaz implies that because the legal assistant's statement was derived from the police report instead of from Ms. Diaz, the statement was not admissible. She offers no authority for this. ER 801(d)(2)(iv) does not explicitly require that the agent or servant have firsthand knowledge or direct knowledge from the party. Nor does the rule explicitly require the agent's statement to be nonspeculative. The vast majority of jurisdictions and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require firsthand knowledge as a requirement for the admissibility of an admission. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 255, at 139-40 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Washington courts have relaxed the rules regarding personal knowledge with respect to admissions by an agent of a party because a strict rule totally excluding the admission would be worse than allowing the trier of fact to hear the admission. 5B KARL B. TEGLAND, WASH. PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 801.38, at 406-07 (6th ed. 2016). Here, the trial court properly found that the legal assistant was an agent of Ms. Diaz and that her statement was within the scope of her agency. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the PIP application was not hearsay.
2. The PIP application was confidential work product
¶21 Ms. Diaz argues that the trial court erred in admitting the PIP application because the application was confidential work product. We agree.
¶22 Ms. Diaz cites Harris v. Drake, 152 Wash.2d 480, 99 P.3d 872 (2004). There, Harris was injured when Drake rear-ended him. Id. at 484, 99 P.3d 872. Harris cooperated with his insurer's request to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) in conjunction with Harris's application for PIP benefits. Id.
¶23 Later, in litigation between Harris and Drake, Drake sought to have the PIP IME doctor testify about his earlier IME report. Id. Drake did not obtain the IME report through Harris or Harris's attorney. Id. Harris objected to the doctor testifying. Id. The trial court eventually agreed with Harris that the doctor could not testify. Id. at 485, 99 P.3d 872. Harris prevailed, and Drake appealed.
¶24 In affirming the trial court, the court noted that an insured was contractually required to cooperate with his insurer or risk losing coverage. Id. at 488, 99 P.3d 872. The court determined that this contractual obligation creates a reasonable expectation in the insured that his statements to his insurer would be kept confidential. Id. The court concluded that the trial court properly gave work product protections to the IME report and properly excluded the PIP IME doctor from testifying. Id. at 488-89, 99 P.3d 872.
¶25 Like Harris , in the present case, Ms. Diaz had a contractual obligation to cooperate with her insurer, which included an obligation to complete the PIP application. She therefore had a reasonable expectation that her PIP application would be kept confidential and not be shared with opposing counsel. It would work an injustice to permit Ms. Prieto to surreptitiously obtain Ms. Diaz's PIP application and use it against Ms. Diaz simply because the two shared the same insurance company. The injustice is more pronounced given that the description of the accident in the PIP application was taken from a police officer's speculation, unsupported by any eyewitness, and inconsistent with the physical evidence. We hold that the trial court erred when it declined to give work product protections to the PIP application.
3. The trial court's error in admitting confidential work product was prejudicial
¶26 An erroneous evidentiary ruling does not result in reversal unless the error was prejudicial. Driggs v. Howlett, 193 Wash. App. 875, 903, 371 P.3d 61, review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1007, 380 P.3d 450 (2016). Here, Ms. Prieto repeatedly claimed throughout trial that Brayan was hit after he rode his bicycle between two parked cars and into the road. She repeated this claim in her opening statement, during the examination of several witnesses, and throughout her closing argument. Her claim was based almost entirely on the PIP application.
¶27 An argument can be made that the error in admitting the PIP application was not prejudicial because the same evidence was admitted from the police report and at least one medical record. Had Ms. Prieto made this argument, we would have rejected it.
¶28 First, the trial court refused to admit the police report as substantive evidence. Second, the police report was not read into the record or admitted into evidence. Third, Ms. Prieto focused almost entirely on the PIP application, not the police report or the medical records. Viewing the evidence as a whole, we believe that the improper admission of the PIP application was prejudicial. Given our resolution of this issue, we need not consider Ms. Diaz's other claims of error.
¶29 Reversed.
I CONCUR:
Fearing, J.
We granted oral argument and asked questions to shed light on these statements by counsel. During oral argument, defense counsel admitted that he did not receive the PIP application through discovery, and that both parties had the same insurance company. Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, Barriga Figueroa v. Prieto Mariscal, No. 34671-4-III (Jan. 31, 2018) at 23 min., 57 sec. to 24 min. 52 sec., https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/appellateDockets/index.cfm?fa=appellateDockets.showDateList& courtId=a03& archive=y. Because only Ms. Diaz and her insurer had the PIP application, and because Ms. Diaz did not provide the PIP application to defense counsel, we infer that defense counsel received the PIP application directly from the parties' shared insurance company.
Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, supra, at 2 min. 37 sec. to 3 min. 17 sec.
Ms. Diaz cites Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987) for the proposition that the agent must have authority to speak for the principal. Here, Ms. Diaz's law firm had authority to speak for Ms. Diaz by completing the PIP application.
Ms. Diaz fails to cite Lockwood for the proposition that an agent's statement must not be based on speculation. Lockwood notes, "arguments for exclusion of evidence [under ER 801(d)(2) ] have been based on the theory that statements of an agent without firsthand knowledge could too easily be based on rumor or speculation to be routinely admitted." Id. at 263, 744 P.2d 605. Lockwood did not accept the argument, but instead noted the argument did not apply because the agent's statement was based on scholarly papers. Id.
Courts interpreting the parallel federal rule, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) have held that admissions are granted generous treatment when determining admissibility and guarantees of trustworthiness are not required. Aliotta v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801, Advisory Committee Note).
The concern noted in Lockwood can be allayed in two ways. First, a trial court can exclude a speculative statement under ER 403 for a variety of reasons. Second, even if the trial court admits a speculative statement, the statement's opponent can present evidence that questions the statement's accuracy. Here, Ms. Diaz presented significant evidence that called into question the statement's accuracy.
Ms. Diaz did not assign error to the trial court's ruling that the PIP application was not confidential work product. But she raised this argument in her opening brief, she cited relevant authority in support of it, and Ms. Prieto responded to it. The issue therefore is appropriately before us. See State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995) ; see also Tham ThiDang v. Ehredt, 95 Wash. App. 670, 677, 977 P.2d 29 (1999) ; Viereck v. Fibreboard Corp., 81 Wash. App. 579, 915 P.2d 581 (1996).
The dissent argues that excluding the PIP application interferes with the search for the truth. Dissenting opinion at 597-98. Although excluding work product sometimes interferes with the search for the truth, that is not the case here. Ms. Diaz signed a blank PIP application. That application was later completed by a legal assistant, who merely wrote down what a police officer had written in his accident report. The officer spoke to three people, none of whom saw what happened. Had the officer testified, his belief that Brayan rode his bike out into the road would have been stricken as hearsay and speculative.