Case Name: Frances ORTIZ, as next of kin and guardian of the heirs of Israel Ortiz, deceased, Respondent, v. Bryan Lee GAVENDA, et al., pet., Appellants
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1999-03-18
Citations: 590 N.W.2d 119
Docket Number: No. C5-97-1427
Parties: Frances ORTIZ, as next of kin and guardian of the heirs of Israel Ortiz, deceased, Respondent, v. Bryan Lee GAVENDA, et al., pet., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 590
Pages: 119–127

Head Matter:
Frances ORTIZ, as next of kin and guardian of the heirs of Israel Ortiz, deceased, Respondent, v. Bryan Lee GAVENDA, et al., pet., Appellants.
No. C5-97-1427.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
March 18, 1999.
Stitch, Angelí, Kreidler, Brownson & Bal-lou, P.A., D. Scott Ballou, Leo I. Brisbois, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Sawicki, Neese & Phelps, P.A., Paul J. Phelps, Woodbury, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
STRINGER, Justice.
We granted review to determine whether the amendment and relation back principles generally applicable to pleadings under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a wrongful death claim brought under Minn. Stat. ch. 573 (1998). The trial court concluded that the statutory time limit of three years for bringing the action in the name of the trustee in Minn.Stat. § 573.02 (1998) was a condition precedent to maintaining a wrongful death action and therefore the consequences of failing to bring the action as required by the statute could not be circumvented by application of the amendment and relation back rules. The court of appeals reversed. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the ruling of the trial court.
Israel Ortiz was severely injured on September 24, 1993 when the motorcycle he was driving collided with a truck driven by Bryan Gavenda and owned by Gavenda's employer, Frito Lay, Inc. Israel Ortiz died from those injuries on December 11, 1993. On June 6, 1995 his widow, Frances Ortiz (Ortiz), served a complaint on Gavenda and Frito Lay (collectively Gavenda) asserting a wrongful death claim and seeking damages as the "Trustee for the heirs of Israel Ortiz." Ga-venda's answer to the complaint denied liability and alleged that Ortiz's claim "failed to comply with the provisions of Chapter 573 of Minnesota Statutes" — the chapter governing wrongful death actions.
On November 15, 1995 Ortiz signed a petition to have herself appointed trustee for the next of kin of her deceased husband as required by Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 3 (1998). Although the petition and an accompanying Consent and Oath form were properly signed and duly notarized, a legal assistant for Ortiz's attorney inadvertently failed to submit the documents to the court and, as a consequence, Ortiz was not appointed trustee. The mistake went unnoticed when Ortiz's complaint was filed with the Anoka County District Court on December 6,1995.
The oversight came to light and Ortiz filed her petition to be appointed trustee on January 8, 1997, but by then more than three years had elapsed since her husband's death. The trial court appointed Ortiz trustee on January 16, 1997 and Ortiz then moved to amend her complaint to reflect the appointment arguing that the amended complaint should relate back to the date of her original complaint. Gavenda acknowledged that no prejudice would be suffered from the requested amendment, but argued that the statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 was jurisdictional and could not be waived for equitable reasons. Gavenda moved to dismiss arguing (1) that Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1, required Ortiz to bring the suit as trustee for her deceased husband's next of kin within three years of his death and (2) that because Ortiz was not appointed trustee within this time period, she lacked standing to bring the action and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear her claim.
The trial court denied Ortiz's motion to amend and granted Gavenda's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that "because Plaintiff had not been duly appointed trustee by the court within three years of decedent's death for prosecution of the Complaint, this action is barred pursuant to a § 573.02 subd. 1 statute of limitations, particularly in light of Regie de l'assurance du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987)." (emphasis in original).
On review, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, concluding that Gavenda would suffer no prejudice by reason of amending the complaint and, as the duly appointed trustee, Ortiz was the real party in interest in any wrongful death action arising out of her husband's death. Ortiz v. Gavenda, 574 N.W.2d 764, 766-69 (Minn.App.1998). The court rejected Gavenda's assertion that the time limit in Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 was an absolute jurisdictional bar as calling for "too technical an application of the [statute's] limitations period" and held that Ortiz's amended complaint could relate back to the date of filing of her original complaint. Id. at 766, 769.
On appeal to this court Gavenda argues that compliance with the 3-year time limit of Minn.Stat. § 573.02 is an absolute condition precedent to bringing a wrongful death action and that because Ortiz was never appointed trustee, no wrongful death claim was commenced within the statutory time period. Therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear her suit.
A wrongful death claim is purely statutory, as common law recognized no such actions on the theory that a claim for personal injuries died with the victim. See Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350-53, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357-58 (1961); Cashman v. Hedberg, 215 Minn. 463, 466, 10 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1943). In Minnesota, actions for wrongful death are prohibited by Minn.Stat. § 573.01 except as provided for in Minn.Stat. § 573.02:
Subdivision 1. When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in subdivision 3 may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived . [An] action under this section may be commenced within three years after the date of death provided that the action must be commenced within six years after the act or omission. The recovery in the action is the amount the jury deems fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss resulting from the death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin .
If an action for the injury was commenced by the decedent and not finally determined while living, it may be continued by the trustee .
⅝;
Subdivision 3. Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin, the court having jurisdiction of an action falling within the provisions of subdivisions 1 or 2, shall appoint a suitable and competent person as trustee to commence or continue such action and obtain recovery of damages therein.
Minn.Stat. § 573.02 (1998) (emphasis added).
Ortiz concedes that she did not bring her wrongful death action as the duly-appointed trustee for her husband's next of kin within three years of his death, but argues that she should be allowed to amend her complaint to reflect her current capacity as the now duly-appointed trustee and that, based on the provisions of Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 and 17.01, her amendment should relate back to the date of her original complaint. Rule 15.03 provides that "[wjhenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Rule 17.01 requires that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Rule 17.01 further states:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
In common law claims we have applied these rules to permit untimely amendments to relate back to the date of the original complaint so long as the defendants had adequate notice of the new claim and would not be unfairly prejudiced by the amendment. See Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 22-23, 232 N.W.2d 227, 231 (1975) (affirming the trial court's use of Rule 15.03 to permit relation back of an untimely amendment adding a plaintiff).
We begin our analysis with the observation that the limitation provisions in a statutorily created cause of action are jurisdictional, requiring dismissal for failure to comply — they do not have flexible parameters permitting them to be ignored if their application is "too technical," as the court of appeals held. Over one hundred years ago we held that because the wrongful death statute itself made no exceptions to the time limit for bringing a wrongful death action, no exceptions could be made by construction. See Rugland v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386, 15 N.W. 676 (1883). Since Rugland, we have consistently reaffirmed the importance of filing a wrongful death action within the time fixed by Minn.Stat. § 573.02:
This period fixing the time within which the right of action for wrongful death may be exercised is not an ordinary statute of limitations. It is considered a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action, and the lapse of such period is an absolute bar. It conditions the right.
Berghuis v. Korthuis, 228 Minn. 534, 536, 37 N.W.2d 809, 810 (1949); see also Bonhiver v. Fugelso, Porter, Simich and Whiteman, Inc., 355 N.W.2d, 138, 141 (Minn.1984); Cashman, 215 Minn. at 469, 10 N.W.2d at 391-92. Similarly, in Bonhiver, we emphasized the high standard of strict compliance with the statute: "Because the right to maintain an action for wrongful death is created by statute and is in derogation of the common law, the requirements of the statute have generally been strictly construed." 355 N.W.2d at 141. Moreover, as a general rule, mere mistake does not toll a statute of limitations. See Sollar v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 237 Minn. 170, 175, 54 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1952).
Strict compliance with § 573.02 is the underpinning of our decision in Regie de I'assurance Auto, du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987), where we held that because appointment of a trustee was a con dition precedent to bringing a wrongful death action under Minn.Stat. § 573.02, an action filed without it was a "legal nullity." In Regie an insurance company (the Regie) had filed an equitable subrogation action in its own name to recover from the appellant certain payments it had made to the surviving spouse of a Minnesota woman killed when riding in a car struck by the appellant's truck. Id. at 86. Although the Regie's original equitable subrogation action was commenced within three years of the decedent's death, the Regie had brought the action in its own name rather than as trustee as required by Minn.Stat. § 573.02. Id. at 87. The trial court ruled that because the Regie's claim for damages resulting from the death of its insured was governed by Minn.Stat. § 573.02, the Regie lacked capacity to bring the suit in its own name. Id. Relying on Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.01, the court allowed the Regie a reasonable time to petition to become the appointed trustee and permitted the suit to continue even though more than three years had passed since the decedent's death. Id. We reversed on appeal, holding that the relation back doctrine was inapplicable because when the Regie initially brought suit in its own name rather than as trustee for the decedent's next of kin, the suit was a "legal nullity" — therefore "nothing existed to which the attempted amendment, now brought in the name of the Regie as trustee, could 'relate back.' " Id. at 92.
Ortiz argues that Regie should be distinguished on equitable grounds of lack of prejudice, but no matter how compelling the circumstances for equitable intervention, equity cannot breathe life into a claim that has never been anything more than a "nullity." The court of appeals' effort to distinguish Regie on the basis of its origins in subrogation is equally without substance because the nature of the clam is immaterial where the original filing has no legal effect. See Regie, 399 N.W.2d at 92; see also Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 323-24, 107 N.W.2d 531, 534 (1961) (rejecting an assertion that the decedent's sole beneficiary rather than the trustee was the real party in interest in a wrongful death action).
We reaffirmed Regie's holding in In re Gilliard, No. C2-91-1811, 1992 WL 121622 (Minn.1992), where we again ruled that "Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subd. 3 (1990) requires the appointment of a trustee prior to the expiration of the 3-year statute of limitations, not the mere filing of a petition therefor within the statutory period." Id. at *1 (emphasis in original). We observe that in the 11 years since Regie, and indeed in the hundred-plus years since Rugland, the legislature has never indicated dissatisfaction with our consistent interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 573.02's time limit as a strict condition precedent to maintaining a wrongful death action.
Finally, our emphasis on historical precedent should not obscure the sound legal and policy reasons for requiring the commencement of a wrongful death action by a court-appointed trustee. Rule 144 of our General Rules of Practice provides a comprehensive framework for the appointment of a trustee to bring a wrongful death action under Minn.Stat. § 573.02 and to protect the interests of those entitled to share in a monetary recovery. The trustee should not have interests conflicting with those entitled to a recovery, see Bachman v. Lieser, 289 Minn. 298, 299-300 n. 1, 184 N.W.2d 11, 13 n. 1 (1971), and Minners v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 284 Minn. 343, 344 n. 2 170 N.W.2d 223, 224 n. 2 (1969), and should be removed if not acting in the best interests of the heirs and next of kin. See In re Wrongful Death of Carlson, 427 N.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Minn.App.1988). The appointment of a trustee under Minn.Stat. § 573.02 is an exercise of the fundamental legal principle that those entitled to recovery as a result of the wrongful death shall be represented by the trustee without compromise.
The court of appeals is reversed.
. Circumstances may be different where a defendant has fraudulently concealed the existence of a course of action. See DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn.1982).
. The dissent acknowledges that this court's rulings in Regie and Gilliard cannot be distinguished, but argues that despite the doctrine of stare decisis, in the interests of justice they should be overruled. Reference to Mr. Justice Harry Blackmun's quote in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972), from a dissent of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter seems particularly appropriate:
The Court decided as it did in the Toolson [v. New York Yankees Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64 (1953)] case as an application of the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine is not, to be sure, an imprisonment of reason. But neither is it a whimsy. If stare decisis be one aspect of law, as it is, to disregard it in identic situations is mere caprice.
Id. at 277, 92 S.Ct. 2099 (quoting United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 249-50, 75 S.Ct. 259, 99 L.Ed. 290 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Ortiz's failure to comply with the clear dictate of the wrongful death statute is indeed regrettable, but to overrule over one hundred years of jurisprudence in order to provide relief for the unfortunate consequences of failing to file the petition for trustee appointment is surely "mere caprice."