Case Name: Jon C. OWEN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appelle-Plaintiff
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2003-09-30
Citations: 796 N.E.2d 775
Docket Number: No. 57A05-0302-CR-77
Parties: Jon C. OWEN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appelle-Plaintiff.
Judges: SHARPNACK, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 796
Pages: 775–780

Head Matter:
Jon C. OWEN, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appelle-Plaintiff.
No. 57A05-0302-CR-77.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Sept. 30, 2003.
Jon C. Owen, Kendallville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy At torney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BAKER, Judge.
We are asked today to settle an issue of first impression in Indiana: Is a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that has been registered as a truck a "truck" for purposes of Indiana's seatbelt statute?
Appellant-defendant John C. Owen, Jr., appeals his conviction for Failure to Wear a Seatbelt While Operating a Passenger Motor Vehicle, a class D infraction. Specifically, Owen claims that the statute under which he was convicted expressly exempts trucks and that his vehicle, a 1992 Chevrolet Blazer, is a truck. We hold that if an SUV is registered as a truck, then for purposes of Indiana's seat-belt statute, it is a truck, and we therefore reverse.
FACTS
The facts reveal that on May 24, 2002, Officer Michael McCann of the Kendall-ville Police Department was conducting a seatbelt checkpoint in that city. Officer McCann noticed that Owen, while driving his Blazer, was not wearing his seatbelt. Officer McCann asked Owen for his operator's license and registration and explained why Owen had been stopped. Owen responded that he did not regularly wear a seatbelt because his Blazer had a truck license plate. Officer McCann acknowledged that the Blazer had a truck plate and was registered as a truck, but described the Blazer as an SUV in the ticket he issued to Owen.
After a bench trial commencing November 8, 2002, the trial court found that Owen's Blazer was not a truck. Appellant's App. p. 4. Furthermore, the trial court found Owen in violation of the seat-belt statute and ordered that Owen pay $83.50 in fines and court costs. Owen filed a motion to correct error, which was denied on January 15, 2008. Owen now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Owen claims that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) allows SUV owners to register their vehicles as either passenger cars or trucks. Owen registered his vehicle as a truck and received a truck license plate. Thus, Owen contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his Blazer is not a truck and that the seatbelt statute applied to his vehicle. The State agrees that the sole question on appeal is one of law. Appellant's Br. p. 6; Appellee's Br. p. 4. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether an SUV may be classified as a truck under Indiana Code section 9-13-2-123.
We note that unless the statute indicates otherwise, we give the statute's language its plain, ordinary meaning. Glotzbach v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Though "courts rather than administrative agencies must resolve questions of statutory construction," we note that "an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight." State v. Hensley, 716 N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
Our seatbelt statute requires that a driver and front-seat passenger in a "passenger motor vehicle" keep their seatbelts fastened. I.C. § 9-19-10-2. The term "passenger motor vehicle" is defined as "a motor vehicle designed for carrying passengers." Ind.Code § 9-13-2-128. However, the statute goes on to state that "for purposes of IC 9-19-10, the term [passenger motor vehicle} includes buses, school buses, and private buses, and excludes trucks, tractors, and recreational vehicles." Id. (emphasis added). A "truck" is defined by statute as "a motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property." Ind.Code § 9-13-2-188. A panel of this court recently held that a key question in determining whether a vehicle was a truck was whether it was "designed for transportation of property." State v. Price, 724 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
The State argues that SUVs, such as Owen's Blazer, "are vehicles designed for carrying passengers, rather than vehicles designed or used primarily for the transportation of property." Appellee's Br. p. 4. Specifically, the State points out that in a decision interpreting Georgia's seatbelt statute-which is nearly identical to Indiana's-the Georgia Court of Appeals held that SUVs were not trucks. Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga.App. 857, 524 S.E.2d 313, 321-22 (1999), rev'd on other grounds, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 543 S.E.2d 21 (2001). The Georgia Court of Appeals held as follows:
While SUVs have a pickup truck chassis, the body is that of a passenger vehicle, fitting the definition of "passenger car" in terms of passenger capacity. "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. Thus, SUVs more closely fit the definition of a "passenger car" than a "truck" and replace most station wagons as dual purpose vehicles.
Id. Thus, the State asks us to declare that SUVs, by their very nature, are not trucks even though they may have truck license plates and may be registered as trucks.
Owen counters that his Blazer was designed primarily for the transportation of property, which is why he registered the Blazer as a truck and obtained a truck license plate. At trial, Owen introduced the warranty card that he received when he purchased his Blazer. The card's heading read, "1992 Chevrolet Light Duty Truck Warranty and Owner Assistance Information." Appellant's Ex. 4 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Owen testified that the back seat "can be folded flat so the entire back is flat," thereby making it easier to transport cargo. Tr. p. 22. Owen also stated that the spare tire is mounted on the outside of the Blazer to create additional "cargo space on the inside." Tr. p. 22. Owen-who works as a sports director for the YMCA-also testified on cross-examination that he uses his Blazer to transport sports equipment:
That would have been all of September, all of October. Um, soccer and football's off-site, so for the entire eight weeks my car is being used as a, um, transportation back and forth for the soccer goals, balls, flag footballs, the pylons, end zones, all the markings and what-have-you.
Tr. p. 23.
Both parties concur that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), which issues Hi-cense plates in Indiana, allows SUV owners to register their vehicles as either trucks or passenger cars as long as certain statutory requirements are satisfied. Appellant's Br. p. 8; Appellee's Br. p. 9. Thus, the BMV-a State agency-seems to agree with the proposition that an SUV may be "a motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property." I.C. § 9-13-2-188. If the BMV believed otherwise, it would not sanction the practice of registering SUVs as trucks.
We also note that the State benefits from giving SUV owners this choice, as the registration fee charged by the BMV for "all passenger cars" is $20.75, while the registration fee charged for "trucks" such as Owen's with "declared gross weight not to exceed 7,000 lbs." is $29.75. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Charges by Branch Pursuant to Acts of the Indiana General Assembly, at http://www .in.gov/bmy/platesandtitles/feee-hart.pdf (last visited July 21, 2008). It would be incongruous to hold that the State-which allows SUV owners the choice of registering their vehicles as trucks and profits therefrom-may also punish an SUV owner for exercising that choice.
Finally, we note that the State contends that allowing SUV owners the choice of whether to register their vehicles as either trucks or passenger cars gives SUV owners the chanee to "opt out" of Indiana's seatbelt law. Appellee's Br. p. 9. Be that as it may, such concerns are best left for our General Assembly to address, as the role of the courts is not to weigh the merits of public safety enforcement mechanisms and adopt certain safety schemes.
In sum, the definition of "truck" does not necessarily exclude SUVs, and if an SUV owner has paid the fee for a truck plate, then by law he drives a truck that is specifically excluded from the seatbelt law. If an SUV owner does not have a truck plate, then by law he does not drive a truck but instead drives a passenger vehicle that is subject to the seatbelt law.
Because Owen licensed his Chevrolet Blazer as a truck, we must conclude that the seatbelt statute does not apply here. As a result, his conviction cannot stand.
Reversed.
SHARPNACK, J., concurs.
BROOK, C.J., dissents with opinion.
. We wish to make clear that the appellant in this case, Jon C. Owen, Jr., is represented by his father, attorney Jon C. Owen.
. Ind.Code § 9-19-10-2.