Case Name: Carlos MORALES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-06-07
Citations: 451 So. 2d 941
Docket Number: No. 82-1632
Parties: Carlos MORALES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COWART, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 451
Pages: 941–945

Head Matter:
Carlos MORALES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82-1632.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 7, 1984.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1984.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORFINGER, Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals from conviction and sentences for two counts of robbery. His principal contention is that the evidence does not support conviction for two robberies, because it shows, at most, only one. We affirm.
The charges arose out of an incident which resulted in the taking of a motor vehicle by defendant. The following facts were essentially proved at trial: Carla Tro-fibio and Karen Sue Cox were travelling on 1-95 in Ms. Cox's car. Ms. Trofibio had been driving. When they returned to the car after having stopped for dinner, Ms. Trofibio, still in possession of the car keys, unlocked the passenger door, then went around to the driver's side to unlock the driver's door. As she was doing so, she was approached by appellant who grabbed her arm and struck her on the face with his fist. Ms. Trofibio resisted and tried to run away, but defendant caught her, hit her again and knocked her down, forcefully taking the car keys from her.
As defendant returned to the car, Ms. Cox came around to the driver's side in an attempt to stop him, but he struck her also, knocked her down, entered the car, and drove away. He was apprehended in Bre-vard County a short time later.
In support of his contention that only one robbery was committed, appellant relies on Castleberry v. State, 402 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), but that case is distinguishable. In Castleberry, the defendants entered the home of the victims, held a knife on both occupants at the same time, bound them and proceeded to take personal property, including a car. The court, emphasizing that the holding was limited to the facts before it, held that only one robbery took place because the taking "was the product of the same force and fear." That is not the factual situation here, because separate and distinct force, separated by time and space, was exerted on both victims and separate takings occurred. The first force against Ms. Trofibio resulted in appellant's taking the keys. The second force against Ms. Cox resulted in appellant's taking the car. See Hillman v. State, 410 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
We believe this case to be controlled by the holding in Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla.1983), where the court agreed that two separate robberies had occurred when a single culprit entered a store and demanded money from one cashier, and a moment later from another cashier. The court held that although the money belonged to a single owner, it was taken by force, violence, assault or putting in fear from two separate employees. The court explained:
. The two events were separated in time and each required separate criminal intent. Actual ownership of the money obtained is not dispositive of the question of whether multiple robberies have been committed. What is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction. Id. at 447.
Similarly in the facts presented here, the jury could conclude that two separate and distinct takings occurred by force and violence directed at two people, separated by time and space.
There is another basis for affirmance. In State v. Getz, 435 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1983), the supreme court upheld separate convictions for theft of a firearm and theft of other property worth less than a hundred dollars, taken by one person in a single burglary. The court held that there were two separate crimes committed because the items were covered under separate sections of the same statute; viz: the theft of property was covered by section 812.014(2)(c) and the taking of the firearm was covered by section 812.014(2)(b)3. Using the same analogy, because the crime of robbery involves the taking from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, of property which may be the subject of larceny, the keys taken here would be the subject of larceny under sec. 812.014(2)(c), since no value was proved, and the motor vehicle would be the subject of larceny under section 812.014(2)(b)4. Under the Getz analysis, the statute indicates the legislative intent that theft of these items constitutes separate crimes for which separate sentences may be imposed.
Appellant also contends that the court erred in not limiting the State's interrogation of the two women with respect to the injuries suffered by them in this incident. Over objections on relevancy grounds, the trial court specifically ruled that the probative value of the evidence complained of outweighed any prejudicial effect to appellant, and that it was therefore admissible. The trial court has broad discretion in regard to admissibility of evidence and his rulings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. Edwards v. State, 414 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). No such abuse is demonstrated.
The judgment and sentences are AFFIRMED.
COWART, J., concurs.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J" dissents with opinion.