Case Name: Joe M. CREEL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Ann CREEL, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-12-18
Citations: 378 So. 2d 1251
Docket Number: No. 78-2079
Parties: Joe M. CREEL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Ann CREEL, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: Before PEARSON, HUBBART and SCHWARTZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 378
Pages: 1251–1254

Head Matter:
Joe M. CREEL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Ann CREEL, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 78-2079.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 18, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1980.
Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole and Mark V. Silverio, Miami, for Joe Creel.
Sinclair, Louis, Siegel & Heath and John L. Zavertnik, Miami, for Judith Ann Creel.
Before PEARSON, HUBBART and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

Opinion:
PEARSON, Judge.
The appellant Joe M. Creel and the appel-lee Judith Ann Creel were married for 16 years. At the time of the dissolution of their marriage, there were two children aged 4 and 6 years. There was extensive discovery and a lengthy trial, at the conclusion of which the judge entered a judgment dissolving the marriage and providing that the wife should have custody of the parties' children, and that the husband should pay child support in the sum of $625.00 per month per child. The wife was awarded lump sum alimony in the sum of $15,000.00 and the husband's interest in the marital home. In addition, she was given rehabilitative alimony at the rate of $500.00 per month for two years. By separate order, the court awarded the wife $7,000.00 attorneys fees to be paid by the husband. The husband has appealed all of the above financial provisions, and the wife has cross-appealed urging that the trial judge erred in failing to award her permanent instead of rehabilitative alimony and in failing to award her an interest in certain real property purchased by the husband during the marriage.
I.
The husband's principal argument in his appeal is that the trial judge misconceived-the evidence and erroneously determined that the husband's income from his dental practice was much higher than it actually was. In presenting his argument to this court, the husband has advanced ten points. In the face of this broad attack upon the judgment of the trial court, we feel that it will be unnecessary to discuss each point separately. We point out that we have examined the record in the light of the briefs and find there is evidence to support the trial judge's findings.
Concerning the husband's contention that the wife was not entitled to lump sum alimony in the parties' jointly owned marital home, we hold that under this record we are bound by Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1977), and the pronouncements of the Florida Supreme Court in such cases as Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So.2d 56 (Fla.1977); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976); and the dissent of Hubbart, J., in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 352 So.2d 867 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in its opinion on petition for certiorari at 371 So.2d 672 (Fla.1979). Similarly, with regard to the contention that the child support is excessive, see Herzog v. Herzog and Shaw v. Shaw, supra. Therefore, we must affirm these two points.
We fail to find error in the order of the trial court awarding the parties' country club membership to the wife, as this item of personal property was offset by others awarded to the husband. Also, the husband stipulated in the record that he had no objection to the wife's receiving this membership.
The husband's sixth point presents a question of the appropriateness of an order directing him to pay the wife's attorney fees to the extent of $7,000.00. Although the wife received substantial assets in the judgment below, nevertheless, a review of these awards reflects that her position is not, in fact, similar to that of the husband for purposes of making attorney fee payments. See the principle of law in Turney v. Turney, 149 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). In this regard, the $15,000.00 in lump sum alimony was earmarked by the court for repairs to the marital home and for purchasing an automobile for the wife. This, along with the husband's interest in the marital home, which the wife was awarded as lump sum alimony, are not of a nature to be considered as readily accessible financial sources for payment of attorneys fees. Also, there is the additional fact that the husband has been, and is, continuously generating earned income, while the wife does not, and has not for several years. When considering all these factors in the aggregate, there is created a set of circumstances impelling the affirmance of the award of attorneys fees as set out in the judgment appealed. This determination is in accord with the proposition that the courts should consider ". . . the financial resources of the parties as reflecting one party's need for, and the other party's ability to pay, reasonable attorney's fee." Ludemann v. Ludemann, 317 So.2d 860, 861 (Fla.4th DCA 1975). See generally, Speight v. Speight, 319 So.2d 197 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); and cf. Ritter v. Ritter, 362 So.2d 384 (Fla.3d DCA 1978).
The seventh point on appeal urges that it was error to include in the judgment a provision that the husband should hold the wife harmless on a $13,500.00 note jointly executed by the parties to the husband's father. A review of the record concerning this loan shows that the money advanced by the husband's father was in effect an advancement for living expenses and to enable the parties to purchase a home. The home was later sold and the proceeds went into the home which has, by this same judgment, been awarded to the wife. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to hold that the husband benefited to a greater degree than the wife from the loan, and there is no equitable basis in the record upon which the husband should be required to absolve the wife from responsibility thereon. It is incumbent upon the trial court, in determining on whose shoulders the debts of the marriage should fall, to consider carefully the various equities of the parties as established by the evidence. See the principle stated in Italiane v. Italiane, 342 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Fla.4th DCA 1977).
II.
The wife's cross-appeal urges error in the trial court's failure to award permanent instead of rehabilitative alimony. There have been cases before this court in which we have found that the evidence did not support rehabilitative alimony. See McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So.2d 673 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); and Goldstein v. Goldstein, 310 So.2d 361 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). The holdings in these cases are not applicable to the facts of the case at bar because there is evidence in the present record which, if believed by the trial court, supports his findings that the wife (the appel-lee/cross-appellant) is in fact capable not only of rehabilitation in the business and professional world, but also of earning a substantial income even though burdened with the care of two small children. We feel that the decision of the trial judge on the type of alimony to be awarded is especially within his province. The same principles requiring us not to retry the issue of the amount of alimony and child support also require us to hold that there is no error under this point. See Herzog v. Herzog and Shaw v. Shaw, supra, and cf. the principles of law in Lee v. Lee, 309 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
The second point on cross-appeal urges that the trial judge erred in failing to award the wife a special equity in the husband's interest in the Transue Trust property. The record, viewed in the light of the argument of the parties on this point, demonstrates no basis for a declaration of a special equity in the wife in these investments by the husband. Under such circumstances, it would have been error for the trial court to have awarded the wife an interest in this property. See Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976); Tanner v. Tanner, 194 So.2d 702 (Fla.2d DCA 1967); and Roberts v. Roberts, 101 So.2d 884 (Fla.2d DCA 1958).
III.
In accordance with the above disposition of the various points raised in the appeal and cross-appeal, we hereby affirm the judgment, except for the requirement that the husband hold the wife harmless on the $13,500.00 note.