Case Name: John H. Maginnis, an Infant, App'lt, v. The City of Brooklyn, Resp't
Court: Brooklyn City Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-10-28
Citations: 26 N.Y. St. Rep. 689
Docket Number: 
Parties: John H. Maginnis, an Infant, App’lt, v. The City of Brooklyn, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 26
Pages: 689–690

Head Matter:
John H. Maginnis, an Infant, App’lt, v. The City of Brooklyn, Resp’t.
(City Court of Brooklyn, General Term,
Filed October 28, 1889.)
1. Municipal cobpobations — Negligence—Bbidges.
A city is not bound to put up such, an obstruction at the entrance to a draw bridge that a boy cannot climb over or creep under it.
3. Same.
Plaintiff got upon a draw bridge while it was open by creeping under the gate, and his foot was crushed by the closing of the draw. The gate was sufficient to protect foot travelers, but had a space at the bottom of twenty inches. Meld, that defendant was not guilty of negligence in providing an insufficient barrier, and that no recovery could be had.
Appeal from judgment entered upon aí nonsuit.
Plaintiff was on his way to a school and got upon the bridge in question after the gates had been closed, by creeping under them. The draw was open to allow a vessel to pass, and in swinging to it caught the plaintiff’s foot and crushed it.
Wm. G. Cooke, for app’lt; Almet F. Jenks, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Clement, Ch. J.
We have carefully examined the record in this case, and conclude that the facts are substantially the same as on the former appeal. 16 RY. State Rep., 720. It now appears that the plaintiff crawled under the gate and in that way got upon the bridge, but our decision was not placed solely on the ground that there was no proof on that point,'for we then said "If we assume that the boy did get upon the bridge by reason of the fact that there was a space of sixteen inches between the gates and the surface of the street, even then, we think that the complaint should have been dismissed." The proof in the present case is that the space between the gates and the street was twenty and one-balf inches, and that they could have been constructed so that such space would have been eight or nine inches less. On the first hearing, we held that if the distance was sixteen inches, as it then appeared, plaintiff could not recover for the reason that there was no proof that the city could have provided a safer gate, and on ibis hearing we are asked to hold that the city is liable because they did not provide gates that could be lowered so as to leave only a distance of eleven or twelve inches. If the gates had been constructed in the manner which the counsel for the appellant contends they should have been, the plaintiff, or any other child would not have been prevented from creeping under them. There is no proof in the case that the gates are not those ordinarily used.
We think also that our decision can be placed on another and broader ground. The gates were amply sufficient to protect foot travelers on the highway, and the city was not bound to put up such an obstruction that a. boy could not climb over or creep under it. The authorities cited by the corporation counsel seem in point on this question. Oil City Bridge Co. v. Jackson, 59 Am. Rep., 104; Gavin v. Chicago, 97 Ill., 66; Gregory v. The Inhabitants of Adams, 14 Gray, 242. Iff boys were in the habit of getting on the bridge when it was about to be turned, and were permitted so to do by the keepers, then it may be that the keepers should have exercised a higher degree of care in closing the bridge than otherwise the law would exact of them, so as to avoid injury to those on the bridge, and if a child was injured, a cause of action might exist against the city for negligence of the keepers; but no such claim was made in the complaint or on the trial of this action. There was no negligence on the part of the city " in providing an insufficient barrier or safeguard to keep children and others off said bridge while the bridge was being swung," as alleged in the complaint.
For the reasons above set forth, and on our former opinion, we decide that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.
Osborne, J., concurs.