Case Name: Patricia W. BYRD v. Bobby Glen MATTHEWS and Allstate Insurance Co.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1990-11-28
Citations: 571 So. 2d 258
Docket Number: No. 07-CA-58754
Parties: Patricia W. BYRD v. Bobby Glen MATTHEWS and Allstate Insurance Co.
Judges: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 571
Pages: 258–263

Head Matter:
Patricia W. BYRD v. Bobby Glen MATTHEWS and Allstate Insurance Co.
No. 07-CA-58754.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 28, 1990.
Claude W. Milstead, Jack R. Davis, Jackson, for appellant.
Mildred M. Morris, Steen Reynolds Dale-hite & Currie, Jimmie B. Reynolds, Jr., Steen Reynolds Firm, Jackson, John C. McLaurin, McLaurin & McLaurin, Brandon, for appellee.

Opinion:
PRATHER, Justice,
for the Court:
I. INTRODUCTION
A.
This case involves the issue of whether the assumption-of-risk doctrine, a defense available in a personal-injury action, is also available in a spouse's loss-of-consortium action. This Court concludes that permitting its availability would be consistent with established Mississippi case law. In reaching this conclusion, this Court is cognizant of the seemingly-unquestionable viability of the assumption-of-risk doctrine in actions involving a "sports" injury and the questionable viability of the doctrine in actions involving a non-"sports" injury. Compare G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW § 7.4(A)(9), at 230 (1986) (contending that the doctrine is "firmly rooted in sports law"), with Harold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, 266 Cal.Rptr. 734, 218 Cal.App.3d 36, 218 Cal.App.3d 841A (1990) (noting that some states have "decided to retain" the doctrine, while others have either "placed significant limitations" on the doctrine or have altogether abolished it or allowed it to be subsumed by another doctrine such as comparative negligence).
Accordingly, this opinion should be construed as potentially applying only to actions involving the assumption-of-risk doctrine and a "sports" injury. One day, the "right" case or cases will require ultimate disposition of whether the doctrine itself should remain partially or wholly viable and available under all, some, or no circumstance(s).
B.
On April 28, 1984, driver Joe T. Byrd ("Joe") lost control of his car and "spun out" during a race at Jackson International Speedway. At that point, driver Bobby Glen Matthews struck Joe's car and, as a consequence, Joe incurred injuries. Joe subsequently filed a personal-injury action in Rankin County Circuit Court against Matthews and Allstate Insurance (Joe's uninsured motorist carrier). Presiding Judge Alfred Nichols ultimately directed a verdict in the defendants' favor after concluding that Joe's signing of a Release-and-W aiver-of-Liability-and-Indemnity agreement, as well as the assumption-of-risk doc trine, constituted a complete defense. Joe did not appeal; the judgment is final.
Subsequent to the dismissal, Joe's wife, Patricia, filed an action against Matthews and Allstate for loss of consortium. This action was also dismissed via directed verdict. Judge Robert L. Goza based his decision on Patricia's failure to "establish facts upon which [Joe] could recover." Goza explained that Patricia "failed . because the risk to which [Joe] was exposed was a foreseeable risk[, a]nd willing participants in a hazardous activity . assume the ordinary and foreseeable risk incident to that activity." Judge Goza did not base his decision on Joe's Signing of the Release - and - Waiver - of - Liability - and - Indemnity agreement. In reaching his decision, the judge premised: "Although the release itself... is not a bar per se of Mrs. Byrd's claim, nevertheless Mrs. Byrd must establish facts upon which Mr. Byrd could recover, absent the release." Restated, Judge Goza concluded that the assumption-of-risk doctrine — applicable in Joe's negligence action — constituted a defense applicable in Patricia's consortium action.
Patricia appealed and presented numerous issues, only one of which is reached: "Whether an affirmative defense available in a personal-injury action is available in the other family member's action for loss of consortium?"
II. ANALYSIS
In the early consortium case of Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., this Court opined:
Of course, the burden is on the [spouse in the consortium action] to prove that the alleged tort-feasor is guilty of negligence which directly contributed to [his or her] loss and damage, and the contributory negligence of [his or her injured] spouse would be a defense.
213 Miss. 611, 621, 57 So.2d 476, 480 (1952) (emphasis added) (citing numerous authorities). In a more recent case, a unanimous Court opined that consortium actions "are derivative actions subject to all defenses that would have been available against the injured persons." Choctaw v. Wichner, 521 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss.1988) (emphasis added) (citing numerous authorities which hold that a spouse's right to consortium damages is derivative "and that it was only logical that since the [spouse's] . action was derivative he [or she] could have no better standing in court than [the other spouse] had"). In keeping with the dictates of Palmer and Choctaw, this Court holds that the assumption-of-risk defense available against Joe in his personal-injury action was properly deemed available against Patricia in her derivative consortium action. Accord 21 A.L.R.3d 469, 471 ("[Almost a]ll cases from American jurisdictions are unanimous in holding that . the action for collateral damages is derivative in nature and dependent upon the right of the injured spouse to recover, and is therefore subject to the same defenses that are available in the [personal-injury] action.").
The preceding analysis is consistent with § 48 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which recommends:
(1) When a loss resulting from injury to a person may be recovered by either the injured person or another person [e.g., for loss of consortium]:
(a) A judgment for or against the injured party has preclusive effects on any such other person's claim for the loss to the same extent as upon the injured person.
(b) A judgment for or against any such other person precludes recovery by or on behalf of the injured person of any loss that could have been recovered in the first action.
(2) When a person with a family relationship to one suffering personal injury has a claim for loss to himself resulting from the injury, the determination of issues in an action by the injured person to recover for his injuries is preclusive against the family member, unless the judgment was based on a defense that is unavailable against the family member in the second action.
"Comment a " to § 48 of the Restatement explains, that by declaring that the "supplemental" (consortium) claim "should stand or fall with the injured person's claim," its recommendation promotes "consistency and fairness" and prevents dual recovery and repetitive adjudications. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 Reporter's Note, at 32-33 (1982). Notably, the Comment concedes that its solution is "second-best" and that the matter is "better dealt with by rules of compulsory joinder."
III. CONCLUSION
This Court, until otherwise convinced, reaffirms long-established Mississippi case law by holding that a defense available against a plaintiff in his or her personal-injury action (in this case, assumption of risk) is available against the spouse's derivative consortium action. The circuit court, therefore, properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.
AFFIRMED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., dissent.
. The dissent notes that the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that contributory negligence is the "only defense" available in a consortium action. See dissenting at 262 (citing Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc'y and Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee). This statement is misleading because the Wisconsin Supreme Court had abolished the assumption-of-risk doctrine and numerous other defenses prior to the disposition of Arnold and Schwartz. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis.2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970) ("[T]his court has abolished assumption of risk, gross negligence, governmental, charitable, religious and parental immunities."). Thus, it is not surprising that contributory negligence is the "only defense" available in consortium actions in Wisconsin.
The dissent additionally notes that "[t]here are no cases in [Mississippi] where this Court has allowed a nonplaintiff to assume the risk for a plaintiff." See dissenting at 263. The reason why "there are no cases" in Mississippi is because this Court has not addressed an issue like the one involved in the case sub judice.
. This Court has held that negligence and consortium claims should be distinguished in order to prevent duplicative recovery. Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So.2d 13 (Miss.1974). Notably, one author contends that "the only way to eliminate the danger of double recovery altogether would be to require joinder of the [husband and wife's] claims." See Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND.L.J. 590, 626-27 (1976). This issue — ¿a, requiring joinder in order to prevent duplicative recovery (and litigation) — is not involved in the case sub judice and, therefore, is not addressed. Admittedly, this opinion may "motivate" future plaintiff-spouses to join their personal-injury and consortium actions.
Compare Sullivan, When Must Loss-of-Consortium Claim Be Joined with Underlying Personal Injury Claim, 60 A.L.R.4th 1174, 1183 (1988) (author incorrectly notes that, under Mississippi case law, claims by spouses for loss of consortium cannot be joined) (citing Palmer, 213 Miss, at 611, 57 So.2d at 476), with MISS.R.CIV.P. 20 (providing for "permissive joinder of parties").