Case Name: Richard Vincent PAEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-12-06
Citations: 943 So. 2d 919
Docket Number: No. 2D04-2318
Parties: Richard Vincent PAEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SALCINES, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 943
Pages: 919–938

Head Matter:
Richard Vincent PAEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D04-2318.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 6, 2006.
Eli D. Stutsman, pro hac vice, Portland, OR (withdrew after briefing); John P. Flannery, II, pro hac vice, of Campbell Miller Zimmerman, Leesburg, VA (substituted as counsel of record); and Robert W. Attridge, Jr., of Attridge, Cohen, Lucas, Jefferis, Green & Magee, New Port Rich-ey, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky and Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
WALLACE, Judge.
Richard Vincent Paey appeals multiple judgments and sentences entered by the trial court after a jury trial. Mr. Paey raises six issues on appeal. We affirm without discussion on five of the issues, but we write to explain why Mr. Paey's twenty-five-year mandatory minimum prison sentences are constitutionally permissible.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shortly before his graduation from law school in 1985, Mr. Paey was involved in a calamitous automobile accident. As a result of the automobile accident and subsequent failed back surgeries, Mr. Paey suffers from severe and unremitting back pain. In 1990, Dr. Stephen Nurkiewicz began treating Mr. Paey in New Jersey, where the Paey family then lived. Dr. Nurkiewicz prescribed oxycodone (Perco-cet), hydrocodone (Lortab), and diazepam (Valium) for Mr. Paey to treat his chronic back pain. At the end of 1994, the Paey family moved to Pasco County, Florida. However, Dr. Nurkiewicz continued to act as Mr. Paey's treating physician, and Mr. Paey returned to New Jersey on several occasions for office visits. On December 26, 1996, Dr. Nurkiewicz treated Mr. Paey for the last time. During this last office visit, Dr. Nurkiewicz gave Mr. Paey a prescription for oxycodone and a prescription for hydrocodone to be used in January 1997.
In 1997, Deputy Sheriff Bobby Joe Wright of the Pasco County Sheriffs Office investigated an allegation of drug trafficking involving Mr. Paey. Deputy Wright had been contacted by a local pharmacist who was concerned that Mr. Paey was abusing prescription drugs. On February 24, 1997, Deputy Wright observed Mr. Paey fill a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone at the pharmacy where the pharmacist who had contacted the deputy was employed. On March 5, 1997, Deputy Wright interviewed Dr. Nurkiewicz in New Jersey concerning how frequently he prescribed medications to Mr. Paey. Dr. Nurkiewicz denied issuing, writing, authorizing, or signing prescriptions for Mr. Paey after Mr. Paey's last office visit. Af-terwards, Deputy Wright obtained and executed a search warrant for Mr. Paey's home. The search resulted in the seizure of the following items: miscellaneous pieces of paper cut into the size of prescription forms; blank prescription forms with Dr. Nurkiewicz's name and address at the top; three prescription bottles; and an address book containing Dr. Nurkiewicz's name, phone number, and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of six pharmacists from three different pharmacies. The testimony of these pharmacists established very substantial prescription activity by Mr. Paey during February and March 1997. On February 5, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone, a prescription for 100 pills of hydrocodone, and a prescription for 80 pills of diazepam. On February 7,1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone and a prescription for 80 pills of diazepam. On February 20, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone and a prescription for 100 pills of hydrocodone. On February 24, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone. On February 27, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone, a prescription for 100 pills of hydrocodone, and a prescription for 80 pills of diazepam. On March 6, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxycodone and a prescription for 80 pills of diazepam. On March 10, 1997, Mr. Paey filled a prescription for 100 pills of oxyco-done and a prescription for 100 pills of hydrocodone. To summarize, Mr. Paey filled prescriptions for 700 oxycodone pills, 400 hydrocodone pills, and 820 diazepam pills over the course of thirty-four days. Dr. Nurkiewicz, the State's key witness, testified that he did not write any of these prescriptions.
A jury found Mr. Paey guilty of seven counts of trafficking in oxycodone, four counts of possession of hydrocodone, and four counts of obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge. The trial court sentenced Mr. Paey to a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for each trafficking count in accordance with section 893.185(l)(c)(l)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). For each possession count and obtaining by fraud count, the trial court sentenced Mr. Paey to imprisonment for one year and one day. The trial court designated all of the sentences to be served concurrently.
Mr. Paey argues that the mandatory minimum sentencing framework in section 893.135(l)(c)(l)(c) violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the cruel or unusual punishment clause of a former version of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. We disagree. However, before we proceed to our analysis, we pause to explain how Mr. Paey could be convicted of "trafficking in illegal drugs" under section 893.135(l)(c)(l) in the absence of proof that he sold any illegal drugs. As used in section 893.135(l)(c)(l), "trafficking in illegal drugs" is a term of art. Under this statute, a person need not sell anything to commit the "trafficking" offense. In addition to selling, purchasing, manufacturing, delivering, or importing a proscribed substance, a person may commit the offense by knowingly being in actual or constructive possession of an enumerated controlled substance in a quantity equal to or greater than a weight designated by statute. In Mr. Paey's case, there was no evidence that he was knowingly selling, manufacturing, or delivering oxycodone. Instead, Mr. Paey was convicted of trafficking in oxycodone because the State proved that he knowingly possessed at least four grams of oxycodone or four grams of any mixture containing oxyco-done. Thus Mr. Paey's lengthy prison sentences are based on a jury verdict that he knowingly possessed at least twenty-eight grams of oxycodone or twenty-eight grams of any mixture containing oxyco-done. See § 893.135(l)(c)(l)(c).
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The Case Law
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Historically, the Eighth Amendment has protected individuals with respect to the method of punishment, not the length of a period of incarceration. Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 760 (Fla.2002) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)). The United States Supreme Court has not reached a consensus on the standard to be applied in assessing the constitutionality of long prison sentences. See generally Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Supreme Court's history of analyzing Eighth Amendment issues). However, in 2003, a majority of the Court agreed that "[tjhrough th[e] thicket of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle emerges as 'clearly established'" — that a "gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003).
As a review of the Supreme Court cases on Eighth Amendment questions reveals, successful proportionality challenges in noncapital cases have been exceedingly rare. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), the Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for a three-time offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment even though the triggering offense was a conviction for felony theft by obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Two years later, in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982), the Court held that a sentence of two consecutive terms of twenty years' imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana and distribution of marijuana was constitutional. The first and only case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a prison sentence because of its length was Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). The defendant in Solem, who had previously been convicted of six nonviolent felonies, was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for writing a "no account" check for $100. Id. at 279-81, 103 S.Ct. 3001. The Court's proportionality analysis was "guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292. The Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was "the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct" and was "significantly disproportionate" to the crime. Id. at 303.
Since Solem, the Court has heard only two cases in which a sentence has been challenged on proportionality grounds. The Court upheld both sentences, without agreeing on a rationale. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), the defendant was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without parole. A majority of the court concluded that the sentence imposed did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 994-96, 1009, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, opined that proportionality review should apply only in death penalty cases. Id. at 994, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, interpreted the Eighth Amendment as forbidding only extreme sentences that are " 'grossly disproportionate' " to the crime. Id. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001). Looking at the three criteria used in Solem, Justice Kennedy concluded that the second and third factors, which involve an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparison, should be used only in the rare instance in which an inference of gross proportionality exists based on the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the sentence. Id. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680. The four-member dissent criticized Justice Kennedy for abandoning the second and third factors because it "makes any attempt at an objective proportionality analysis futile." Id. at 1020, 111 S.Ct. 2680.
Twelve years after Harmelin, the Supreme Court could still not reach a rationale for an Eighth Amendment analysis that would command a majority in Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179. The defendant in Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for shoplifting three golf clubs, each valued at $399. Id. at 18, 123 S.Ct. 1179. Because of his prior convictions, the defendant was sentenced to prison for twenty-five years to life under California's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law. Id. at 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179. Writing for a plurality of three, Justice O'Connor applied Justice Kennedy's analysis in Harmelin and concluded that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 23-30, 123 S.Ct. 1179. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment but argued that prison sentences should not be subject to a proportionality analysis. Id. at 31-32, 123 S.Ct. 1179. The dissenters argued that Ewing was one of the rare cases in which a court can say that the "punishment is 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id. at 37, 123 S.Ct. 1179.
The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the decisions in Solem, Harmelin, and Ewing as requiring that at a minimum a prison sentence must be grossly disproportionate to the crime to constitute cruel and unusual punishment solely because of its length. Adaway v. State, 902 So.2d 746, 750 (Fla.2005). This conclusion is directly supported by the majority opinion in Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, in which the Court stated that the one principle clearly established in its case law was that a gross proportionality analysis is applicable to sentences for terms of years. Based on these principles, Mr. Paey must demonstrate that his sentences are grossly disproportionate to his convictions for his sentences to constitute cruel and unusual punishments that violate the Eighth Amendment.
B. Mr. Paey's Case
We conclude that Mr. Paey's mandatory minimum sentences of twenty-five years' imprisonment are not grossly disproportionate to his crime of trafficking in oxycodone. As a reviewing court, we are required to grant substantial deference to the broad authority that the Florida Legislature possesses in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Beginning in Rummel, the Supreme Court has stressed the important role that a legislature plays in the criminal justice system by noting that for crimes punishable by terms of imprisonment, "the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U.S. at 274, 100 S.Ct. 1133. Justice Sca-lia's discussion in Harmelin of why a legislature is in the best position to assess the gravity of a crime is particularly pertinent to Mr. Paey's case:
But surely whether it is a "grave" offense merely to possess a significant quantity of drugs — thereby facilitating distribution, subjecting the holder to the temptation of distribution, and raising the possibility of theft by others who might distribute — depends entirely upon how odious and socially threatening one believes drug use to be. Would it be "grossly excessive" to provide life imprisonment for "mere possession" of a certain quantity of heavy weaponry? If not, then the only issue is whether the possible dissemination of drugs can be as "grave" as the possible dissemination of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no? The members of the [ ] Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the streets....
501 U.S. at 988, 111 S.Ct. 2680.
The Florida statutes addressing the subject demonstrate that the legislature considers oxycodone to be a potentially dangerous substance. Section 893.03 contains standards and schedules for controlled substances. Oxycodone, a derivative of opium, is listed as a Schedule II substance. § 893.03(2)(a)(l)(o). "A substance in Schedule II has a high potential for abuse" and "abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." § 893.03(2)(a). Because of oxyco-done's high potential for abuse and the effects of such abuse, the Florida Legislature could rationally conclude that the threat posed to the individual and to society by possession of at least twenty-eight grams of oxycodone is sufficient to warrant the deterrent and retributive effect of a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence.
To support the argument that his twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences are cruel and unusual punishments, Mr. Paey points to the fact that he had no prior criminal history and that his crime was not a violent crime. However, it is not unconstitutional to impose a mandatory term of imprisonment without regard to the absence of prior convictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Additionally, the lack of violent behavior does not always determine the strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275, 100 S.Ct. 1133. The Supreme Court has declared that the "[possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent 'one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.' " Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989)). Thus the Florida Legislature could reasonably decide that trafficking in oxycodone is serious enough to warrant a significant term of imprisonment even in the absence of a prior offense or violent behavior. Consequently, the circumstances that Mr. Paey relies upon to argue that his sentences are unconstitutional do not persuade us to engage in "the basic line-drawing process that is 'properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.' " Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 703 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76, 100 S.Ct. 1133).
At oral argument, the State directed our attention to Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir.2001), in which the Eighth Circuit held that a life sentence for the delivery of .238 grams of cocaine base violated the Eighth Amendment. We conclude that the facts in Henderson are distinguishable from the facts in Mr. Paey's case. As described by the Eighth Circuit, the amount of drugs that Henderson sold was "extraordinarily small," weighing "less than one-quarter of a gram." Id. at 710. Here, the amount of oxycodone which Mr. Paey possessed that was sufficient to qualify him for each of his seven trafficking convictions was not extraordinarily small. Florida's statutory scheme fixes the severity of the punishment for trafficking offenses to three categories determined by the weight of the illegal substance involved. Under section 893.135(l)(c)(l), the three weight categories are: (1) four to fourteen grams, (2) fourteen to twenty-eight grams, and (3) twenty-eight grams to thirty kilograms. See § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(a)-(c). Mr. Paey's convictions for trafficking were based on his possession of thirty-three grams of ox-ycodone for each illegal prescription that he had filled. Because the amount of oxycodone that Mr. Paey possessed fell into the highest weight category under subsection (l)(e)(l), we cannot conclude that Mr. Paey possessed such an extraordinarily small amount of oxycodone that his crime should not be considered severe.
Mr. Paey's case is also distinguishable from Henderson based on the type of sentence imposed. Henderson was sentenced to life imprisonment. 258 F.3d at 707. According to the Eighth Circuit, the life sentence meted out to Henderson was the harshest sentence that could then be imposed in Arkansas, other than a death sentence for the crimes of capital murder and treason. Id. at 711. In Arkansas, an offender sentenced to life imprisonment was not eligible for parole unless the governor commuted the sentence to a term of years in the exercise of clemency. Id. The Eighth Circuit used this fact to liken Henderson's case to Solem, the only Supreme Court case declaring a term of imprisonment unconstitutional. Id. at 711-12. In Solem, the Supreme Court discussed the difference between the normal expectation of parole eligibility and the bare possibility of commutation. 463 U.S. at 300-03, 103 S.Ct. 3001. The Court relied on this difference to distinguish the life sentence without possibility of parole imposed in Solem from the life sentence with possibility of parole upheld in Rum-mel and to hold that the life sentence without possibility of parole was disproportionate. Id. at 303, 100 S.Ct. 1133. Based on the analysis in Solem, the Henderson court concluded that Henderson's life imprisonment sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed. 258 F.3d at 711-12.
Mr. Paey's case is distinguishable from Henderson's because Mr. Paey did not receive a life sentence. Mr. Paey's twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences are considerably less severe than a life sentence with the possibility of parole and are substantially less severe than a life sentence ivithout the possibility of parole, which appears to have been imposed in Henderson. Because of the substantial difference in the facts of the two cases, we find Henderson to be unpersuasive on the Eighth Amendment issue in Mr. Paey's case.
The twenty-five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence the Florida Legislature prescribed in section 893.135(l)(c)(l)(c) for trafficking in twenty-eight or more grams of oxycodone falls within, the outer limits of a rational weighing of the alternatives concerning an appropriate prison term for this offense. This is not one of those rare cases in which the sentence imposed is so grossly disproportionate in comparison to the crime committed that it is cruel and unusual. For this reason, we hold that Mr. Paey's sentences for trafficking in oxycodone do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
III. FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
We turn now to consider whether Mr. Paey's sentences violate the former version of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. This provision provided: "Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden." Art. 1, § 17, Fla. Const. (1997). Because the Florida Constitution prohibited "cruel or unusual" punishments, some have argued that it provided greater protection than the protection provided in the "cruel and unusual" punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla.1993). However, the Florida Supreme Court has never concluded "that the difference between the federal 'and' and the Florida 'or' was constitutionally decisive." Adaway, 902 So.2d at 752. Consequently, our supreme court has never outlined the parameters of Florida's former cruel or unusual punishment clause. Id.; see also Hale, 630 So.2d at 526 (declining "to delineate the precise contours of the Florida guarantee against cruel or unusual punishment").
The Florida Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory minimum sentences of section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes (1979), violated the Florida Constitution in State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514 (Fla.1981). In Benitez, the court noted that it had consistently upheld minimum mandatory sentences, regardless of their severity, against constitutional attacks. Id. at 518; see also Hall, 823 So.2d at 761. Like the United States Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to the principle that the legislature, and not the judiciary, determines maximum and minimum penalties for violations of the law. Benitez, 395 So.2d at 518; see also Hale, 630 So.2d at 526. While admitting that the penalties imposed in section 893.135 are severe, the Benitez court concluded that they are not cruel or unusual in light of "their potential deterrent value and the seriousness of the crime involved." 395 So.2d at 518.
Mr. Paey makes the argument that his sentence is unconstitutional because the weight of the actual amount of oxycodone that he possessed was, in each instance, substantially less than twenty-eight grams. As we explained previously, Mr. Paey was convicted on seven counts of trafficking based on his possession of 33 grams of oxycodone for each illegal prescription that he had filled. At trial, the pharmacist witnesses testified that each oxycodone pill is comprised of 5 milligrams of oxycodone and 325 milligrams of acetaminophen, totaling 330 milligrams per pill. Because each prescription was for 100 pills, the total weight of each prescription was 33,-000 milligrams or 33 grams. Although the substantial majority by weight of each prescription was composed of acetaminophen, under section 893.135(l)(c)(l) an individual can be found guilty of trafficking in oxyco-done for possessing "any mixture" containing oxycodone that weighs at least four grams. The statute's language prompted the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that the total weight of an oxycodone tablet should be multiplied by the number of tablets in the possession of the accused to determine whether the weight of the substance meets the threshold for trafficking purposes. State v. Travis, 808 So.2d 194 (Fla.2002) (approving Eagle v. State, 772 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)). The State's calculation of the aggregate amount of ox-ycodone that Mr. Paey possessed was consistent with Travis. Thus Mr. Paey's argument on this point is without merit.
Based on our supreme court's holding in Benitez and the seriousness of Mr. Paey's trafficking offenses, we conclude that the sentences imposed on him do not violate the former version of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the unusual circumstances present in this case, reasonable people might come to different conclusions about the wisdom of the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences that the trial court was required to impose on Mr. Paey. Although Mr. Paey is responsible for his actions, his history of chronic pain and consequent need for analgesics has resulted from circumstances largely beyond his control. These factors — combined with Mr. Paey's age and other persistent health problems — naturally evoke sympathy for what he has endured and concern for his future welfare. Nevertheless, this court's function is limited to determining whether the trial court committed legal error in connection with Mr. Paey's trial and sentencing. In our system of government, which is characterized by a separation of powers, the power to grant pardons and to commute sentences is the prerogative of the executive branch, not the judiciary. See ch. 940, Fla. Stat. (2005). Thus Mr. Paey's argument about his sentences does not fall on deaf ears, but it falls on the wrong ears.
For the reasons already stated, we conclude that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, and we affirm Mr. Paey's judgments and sentences.
Affirmed.
SALCINES, J., Concurs.
SEALS, JAMES H., Associate Judge, Dissents with opinion.
. The statute provides, in pertinent part: "Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any morphine, opium, oxycodone, hydroco-done, hydromorphone, or any salt, derivative, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in s. 893.03(l)(b) or (2)(a), • or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any such substance, but less than 30 kilograms of such substance or mixture, commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as 'trafficking in illegal drugs.' "
. We commend John M. Klawikofsky, the assistant attorney general who argued this case for the State, for his professionalism in call-tag to our attention an authority that could be interpreted as being adverse to the State's position.
. As explained below, the weight of oxyco-done that Mr. Paey possessed for purposes of determining a punishment under section 893.135(l)(c)(l) is determined by multiplying the total weight of an oxycodone tablet by the number of tablets Mr. Paey possessed.
. It is true that when Benitez was decided in 1981, section 893.15(l)(c)(l) did not include oxycodone as a controlled substance for which someone could be convicted of "trafficking in illegal drugs." In 1995, the Florida Legislature added oxycodone to the list of controlled substances in section 893.135(l)(c)(l) in response to several cases in which individuals avoided trafficking convictions for oxycodone under this section. These individuals were able to avoid trafficking convictions under this section because oxycodone — a derivative of a controlled substance already listed in the section — was not expressly enumerated. Fla. H.R. Comm, on Health Care, HB 1385 (1995) Staff Analysis (May 12, 1995) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Library Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.) (amending section 893.135(l)(c)(l)). Because the legislative history suggests that section 893.135 was not originally drafted to exclude oxycodone from the list of controlled substances, we find the principles promulgated in Benitez for the 1979 version of section 893.135 that did not include oxycodone to be equally applicable to the 1996 version of the statute under which Mr. Paey was convicted.
. The Benitez court inexplicably used the terminology "cruel and unusual" despite the fact that article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution used the phrase "cruel or unusual" in 1981. Because there is no dispute that the "cruel or unusual" clause applied in Benitez, we will construe the court's holdings as consistent with the applicable constitutional clause.
. At the time of trial in 2004, Mr. Paey also suffered from multiple sclerosis, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, Raynaud's disease, knee problems, depression, arachnoiditis, and lumbar radiculopathy. Although Mr. Paey was generally confined to a wheelchair, he occasionally used crutches or braces. Mr. Paey is currently forty-eight years old. He will be sixty-nine before he will be eligible for release from prison in 2029.