Case Name: MOSIER v. CARNEY; SMITH v. KING; DOOD v. MOSHER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-12-07
Citations: 376 Mich. 532
Docket Number: Calendar No. 11, Docket No. 50,142; Calendar No. 56, Docket No. 50,360; Calendar No. 52, Docket No. 50,410
Parties: MOSIER v. CARNEY. SMITH v. KING. DOOD v. MOSHER.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 376
Pages: 532–607

Head Matter:
MOSIER v. CARNEY. SMITH v. KING. DOOD v. MOSHER.
Decision of the Court.
1. Husband and Wipe — Interspousal Immunity prom Tort.
Judgments in actions between spouses, or the legal representatives of their estates, in which recovery was denied plaintiff because of interspousal immunity from tort are reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 5, 6] 27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife § 589.
38 Am Jur, Negligence § 2.
17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation § 560.
27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife § 602.
27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife § 584.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 573.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
[11, 19, 27] 27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife §§ 589, 594.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 6.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 13.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
[16, 37, 48] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 74.
Liability of parent or person in loco parentis for personal tort against minor child. 19 ALR2d 423.
'20] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 67.
'21, 23, 26, 32, 33] 27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife §§ 589, 593.
'22, 24] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 344-346.
’25] 22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife § 589.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 198.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 45.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 80.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 186, 231, 232.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Souris, and Adams, JJ.
2. Husband and Wife — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is a creation of the common law, not codified in this State, and should be changed to avoid continuing injustice.
3. Negligence — Definition.
Negligence is basically a question of reasonable behavior in the circumstances.
4. Husband and Wife — Torts—Compensation—Alimony.
Alimony is a device whereby a spouse is obliged to discharge an obligation of support, and not a means of recompensing one spouse for tortious injuries endured during marriage.
5. Same — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Divorce—Criminal Daw.
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is incongruous with the right of a spouse to divorce or to subject the mate to criminal prosecution for torts committed during the marriage, which are disruptive of the marital relation.
6. Same — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Collusion.
Abolition of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity should not be delayed because its abolition would increase the possibility of collusion, since skillful cross-examination and perceptivity of triers of fact make success of collusion unlikely.
7. Same — Common Law — Disability to Maintain a Suit by Married Woman.
The judicially created personal disability of a married woman to maintain a suit in her own name at common law does not support the proposition that she has no legal existence during coverture.
References for Points in Headnotes
'34] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § § 223, 224.
'35] 22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 80.
36] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § § 198, 233, 234.
>8] 22 Am Jur 2d, Death §§ 73, 80.
^39] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 198.
'40, 46] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 183.
‘41, 42] 20 Am Jur, Evidence § 211.
'43] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 233.
Comment Note. — Right of court in overruling earlier precedent to apply new rule prospectively and adhere to old one as regards past transactions. 85 ALR 262.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 80.
22 Am Jur 2d, Death § 73.
8. Same — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Collusion—Disruption op Marital Relation.
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, exemplified in Band-field v. Bandfield, 117 Mich 80; Harvey v. Harvey, 289 Mich 142; Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich 402; and Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich 669, is not followed in cases where one of the spouses is deceased, since there is then no possibility of collusion, nor in action for personal injuries inflicted prior to marriage, since there is no disruption of the marital relation, collusion and disruption heretofore having been assigned as reasons for pursuing such doctrine.
9. Courts — Facts.
Cases must be decided on the facts presented, not abstractions.
10. Husband and Wipe — Torts—Collusion—Death.
An action for personal injuries may be maintained by one spouse against the estate of the other spouse for the gross negligence of the latter, where the circumstances giving rise to the cause of action have terminated the marriage by death, there no longer being any possibility of interspousal collusion, hence, public policy presents no bar.
11. Same — Antenuptial Tort — Collusion.
Public policy does not require that an action based on alleged negligence of the defendant be dismissed merely because after the action was commenced, the parties chose to marry each other, adversary proceedings and detection by triers of fact being a sufficient protection against collusion or other improper conduct (CL 1948, § 750.422).
12. Death — Construction op Statutes.
The death act is a remedial statute and is to be liberally construed since it was intended to remedy unconscionable results reached in litigation under the common law whereby it was financially less burdensome to tort-feasors to Mil than merely to maim their victims (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
13. Same — New Action.
One suing under the wrongful death act is not suing upon a right accruing to the decedent but rather upon a new cause of action specifically created as a remedy for those who suffer loss because of decedent’s death (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
14. Same — Personal Immunity op Decedent.
Those injured by the death of person who was hilled by the wrongful act of defendant are not barred from recovery from defendant under the death aet because a purely personal immunity of the deceased might have barred suit by the deceased (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
15. Same — Purposes of Death Act.
The purpose of the wrongful death act was to impose liability in case the death of a person was by the wrongful act of another, hence, where one spouse has fatally injured the other spouse, the personal representative of the latter would not be barred by reason of the fact that deceased had been married to the defendant (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
16. Costs — Public Question — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
No costs are allowed in 3 eases, wherein the doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity has been materially limited i/n application, a question of public importance being involved.
Separate Opinion.
Smith. J.
17. Husband and Wife — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Death— Evidence.
Abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in this State is effective to permit wife to sue estate of deceased husband for injuries received as a result of his alleged wilful and wanton misconduct in driving on a long trip without proper rest, failing to heed warnings, refusal of assistance, and driving car at a dangerous and urilaioful speed, proving such conduct and recovering damages, there being no marriage now to defend.
18. Same — Death—Interspousal Tort Immunity — Recovery for Children.
Abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in this State is effective to permit personal representatives of estate of mother to sue father for wrongful death of mother so as to recover damages on behalf of children only for the loss of their mother allegedly caused by gross negligence of the father and concurring negligence of another driver.
19. Same — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Premarital Tort.
Abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in this State is effective to permit plaintiff husband to sue defendant wife for tortious injury sustained by him prior to their marriage, the fact finder’s scrutiny being sufficient to protect against collusion by persons having substantial identity of economic interest.
20. Courts — Decisions.
Courts must render judgments "between parties when the latter call upon the courts for such purpose and the matter is within the court’s jurisdictional competence.
Dissenting Opinion.
Kelly, J.
21. Husband and Wipe — Statutes—Interspousal Tort Action.
Statutes and amendments thereto, pertaining to actions by and against married women, enacted during a period of more than a century have not accorded her the right to sue her husband for recovery of damages for injury resulting to her from an interspousal negligent tort (CL 1948, § 557.1 et seq.; § 618.6; CLS 1961, § 600.8001).
22. Statutes — Common Law.
The legislature is presumed to have had the common law in mind when it enacts a statute in derogation of the common law, hence, the statute will be read along with the provisions of the common law.
23. Husband and Wipe — Wipe’s Tort Action Against Husband.
Statute providing that a married woman may sue or be sued “whenever a cause of action shall accrue to, or arise against” her did not enable her to maintain an action in tort against her husband for injuries she received by his negligence, since no such action accrued to her at common law (CL 1948, § 618.6).
24. Same — Statutes—Interspousal Tort Immunity.
Sevised judicature act provision that “actions may be brought by and against a married woman, as if she were unmarried,” rephrasing prior provisions, did not change the previous immunity doctrine, and, since it was not given retroactive effect, could not apply to S claimed torts occurring before the revised act‘became effective (CL 1948, §618.6; CLS 1961, §600-.8001).
25. Same — Statutes—Common Law — Negligence.
Neither statutes nor the common law justify an action by the wife, or the administrator of her estate, against her husband, or the administratrix of his estate, for recovery of damages for injuries she had sustained due to his negligence (CL 1948, § 557.1 et seq.; § 618.6; CLS 1961, § 600.8001).
26. Same — Common Law- — Abrogation op Interspousal Immunity.
Adrogation of the common-law rule of interspousal immunity from recovery for tort should better be left to the legislature’s determination because of the many ramifications involved, such as insurance and collusion, conceding the Supreme Court had the right to change such common-law rule in order to avoid continuing injustice.
27. Same — Common Law — Antenuptial Torts.
Neither husband nor wife could, at common law, sue the other for injuries due to torts committed before or during their marriage.
28. Death — Interspousal Tort Immunity — Legislature—Courts.
Legislative error in overlooking interspousal tort immunity provision in enacting the wrongful death act is a matter for correction by the legislature, not the Supreme Court by way of elimination of the error through a liberal construction (CL 1948, §§ 691.581, 691.582).
29. Same — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
The wrongful death act presupposes ability on the part of the deceased to have maintained an action and thereby indicates a legislative intent not to abrogate the common-law rule of interspousal immunity from liability for tort (CL 1948, §§ 691.581, 691.582).
Dissenting Opinion.
Black, J.
30. Courts — Precedents—Overruling.
A precedent involving the construction of a long-standing statute should not be overruled merely because adherence thereto may not be pleasing, especially where it amounts to judicial amendment of an otherwise unamended statute, since to do so would constitute an outright usurpation of all lawmaking power (Const 1963, art 3, § 2).
31. Same — Overruling op a Precedent.
A precedent, especially one involving the interpretation of a long-standing statute, should be overruled, if at all, explicitly and prospectively.
32. Husband and Wipe — Construction op Statutes.
The legislature has accepted various unanimous and long-standing decisions interpreting provisions of statutes relating to married women as not permitting the maintenance of interspousal tort actions (CL 1948, §§ 612.5, 612.6).
33. Same — Interspousal Tort — Defense of Husband Preserved.
The accrued right of a husband to defend an action for negligent injuries he inflicted upon his wife prior to the effective dale of the revised judicature act has been expressly preserved by statute (CL 1948, §§ 612.5, 612.6; CLS 1961, §§ 600.2001, 600.9905).
34. Statutes — Intent.
Legislative intent is determinable properly by what was at the time of enactment rather than what might appear at a much later time by hindsight.
35. Death — Wife’s Action for Husband’s Negligence.
The wrongful death act presupposes ability on the part of the deceased to have maintained an action if death had not ensued and conferred no right of action upon the administrator of the estate of a wife to sue for negligent injuries which her husband inflicted upon her (CL 1948, §§ 612.5, 612.6, 691.581).
36. Statutes — Amendment—Courts.
Statutes should not be amended by judicial order, especially not by nunc pro tunc amendment.
37. Costs — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
Aro costs are allowed in 3 cases, wherein the doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity has been involved.
38. Death — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
The wrongful death statute, as it stood before adoption of the revised judicature act, did not create an exception to the normal immunity from suit between husband and wife (CL 1948, § 691.581).
39. Statutes — Legislative Acquiescence in Construction.
The doctrine that the legislature has acquiesced in the Supreme Court’s construction of a statute by reason of not maMng any change in the statute over a long period of time should apply irrespective of which class of persons may have been favored by the interpretation.
40. Courts — Common Law — Stare Decisis — Construction of Statutes.
The Supreme Court’s primary "duty is that of reporting precedential]\y, for the guidance of the people of the State, the common law of the State, and of ascertaining precedentidlly the legisla tively intended meanings of statutes enacted by the legislature, a purpose that is not effected when a long-standing interpretation of a statute or common-law rule is overturned.
41. Common Law — Maxims—Presumptions.
Dveryone is presumed to Tcnow the law, and ignorance of the law is not listened to as an excuse at court.
42. Same — Maxims.
It is vital to continuity of the great experiment of government by law and justice under law that the law be stable, and that there be common understanding of the law as written, since citizens are required to observe, learn, and conform thereto.
43. Courts — Overruled Precedents.
The overruling of a long-standing judicial construction of a statute should not be given retroactive effect.
Separate Opinion by O’Hara, J., Dissenting in Part.
44. Husband and Wipe — Torts—Automobiles.
A suit may be maintained, predicated upon injuries to one spouse during marriage arising out of an alleged wrongful act of the marital partner when the allegedly wrongful act resulted in the termination of the marriage by death, but only when the wrongful act alleged is the negligent operation of the family automobile.
45. Death — Accrual op Action to Administrator.
The fact that a wife, now deceased, could not have asserted her cause of action if death had not ensued would not preclude the administrator of her estate from asserting an action under the death act since the bar to asserting the cause of action was peculiar to the wife and not to the accrual of the cause of action itself (CL 1948, § 691.581).
46. Courts — Overruling Precedents.
Courts must weigh the merits and demerits of the matter of overruling of long-standing common-law precedents.
47. Same — Abrogation op Interspousal Tort Immunity — Death— Automobiles.
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity from liability is abrogated as to instant, pending, and future cases arising from negligent operation of family automobiles and in which the marital relation is terminated by death.
48. Costs — Interspousal Tort Immunity.
No costs are allowed in 3 cases, wherem the doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity is materially limited in applicalion.
Mosier v. Carnet:
Appeal from Genesee; Parker (Donn B.), J.
Submitted January 9, 1964.
(Calendar No. 11, Docket No. 50,142.)
Decided December 7, 1965.
Case by Charles B. Mosier, administrator of the estate of Maxine Symons Carney, deceased, against Admiral Equell Carney, surviving spouse of the deceased, and John Akers under the death act for damages arising from collision of automobiles August 22, 1958. Motion to dismiss as to defendant Carney granted. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Leitson, Dean, Dean & Abram (Robert M. Abram, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Morrissey, Bove & Yeotis (John P. Bove, of counsel), for defendant Carney.
Smith v. King:
Appeal from Oakland; Dondero (Stanton G.), J.
Submitted May 6, 1964.
(Calendar No. 56, Docket No. 50,360.)
Decided December 7, 1965.
Case by Mamie Solomon Smith against Willa Mae King, administratrix of the estate of John P. Smith, deceased, for personal injuries sustained while a passenger in automobile of deceased spouse involved in a one-car accident July 4, 1960, in the State of California. Action dismissed on motion. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Adams & Wade (William E. Wade, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Howlett, Hartman & Beier, for defendant.
Dood v. Mosher:
Appeal from Kent; Hoffius (Stuart), J.
Submitted January 7, 1965.
(Calendar No. 52, Docket No. 50,410.)
Decided December 7, 1965.
Complaint by Bernard Dood against Dorothy Mosher for personal injuries sustained May 16, 1962, when he stepped on rusty nail on defendant’s premises while a boarder at her home. Following commencement of suit parties were married. On motion, summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings
Hayes & Davis (Kenneth T. Hayes, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Luyendyh, Hainer, Hillman, Karr & Dutcher (Bichard B. Baxter and Robert N. Hammond, of counsel), for defendant.
ALL THREE CASES:
Opinions entered applicable to all three cases. Each case reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Amici Curiae :
Negligence Law Section, State Bar of Michigan (.Richard 8. Miller, of counsel), advocating that the doctrine which prevents husband and wife from suing one another to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted by the other be overruled, retroactively.
Negligence Law Section, State Bar of Michigan (Altaro J. Alteri, of counsel), advocating that no change in the rule of interspousal immunity he made.

Opinion:
Souris, J.
(for reversal). Four times in the published reports of this Court we have directly or indirectly denied the right of one spouse to sue the other for recovery of damages for injuries resulting from an interspousal negligent tort. We said that at common law such a suit could not be maintained, and we found no statute which we thought would authorize such a suit. That the time has come for a reconsideration of this area of the law is indicated by the fact that we now are called upon to decide these three cases, each originating in a different circuit court and each involving the successful assertion of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity as a defense. In view of the importance of the legal principles involved, we requested the negligence law section of the State bar association to submit a brief amicus. Indicative of the present ambivalence of thought upon this question is the fact that two briefs were in fact submitted by the bar, one advocating and the other opposing the repudiation of the defensive doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. We acknowledge their assistance in our resolution of the issue as presented by the three cases before us for decision.
At the outset we note that the felt need for reexamination of the common law defense of inter-spousal tort immunity has not been confined to Michigan. Indeed, at least 32 jurisdictions either have completely, or at least in certain fact situations, abolished the defense. A sampling of such cases is collected in the appendix which follows this opinion. We note also that the common-law doctrine has received virtually universal excoriation from the legal scholars who have given consideration to it. See the selective bibliography included in the appendix.
While most of the cases cited in the appendix which have rejected the common-law doctrine pur-, port to base their holdings upon so-called married women's acts, it is evident from many of the opinions that the courts had concluded that the immunity defense no longer had any valid basis in logic, fact, or policy. The fact that virtually the same statutory language is subject to varying interpretations by these courts suggests strongly that the actual basis for many of their decisions is a reappraisal of the common law and its rejection because no longer applicable to the facts of modern civilization.
We shall pursue a more forthright course in our disposition of the cases at bar. Since the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is a creation of the common law and since such doctrine has never been codified in this State, it is our duty to re-examine it and, if necessary to avoid continuing injustice, to change it. We shall analyze our four pertinent precedents and, in our effort to understand them, we shall examine in the process other earlier decisions of onr own and other courts. "To the reader my advice is, that in reading of these or any new reports, he neglect not in any case the reading of the old boots of years reported in former ages, for assuredly out of the old fields must spring and grow the new corn."
I.
In Bandfield v. Bandfield (1898), 117 Mich 80 (40 LRA 757, 72 Am St Rep 550), the first of our four precedents, plaintiff married defendant in 1879, obtaining a divorce from him in 1897. Thereafter she began suit to recover damages from defendant for infecting her with a venereal disease in 1893. In affirming dismissal of her suit on demurrer, this Court briefly considered and rejected as inapplicable the legislature's modifications of the legal consequences of the marital relation as embodied in the married women's acts.
The Court based its decision upon the following expressed considerations:
"The result of plaintiff's contention would be another step to destroy the sacred relation of man and wife, and to open the door to lawsuits between them for every real and fancied wrong, — suits which the common law has refused on the ground of public policy. This Court has gone no further than to support the wife, under the married woman's act, in protecting her in the management and control of her property. It has sustained her right to an action for assault and battery, for slander, and for alienation of her husband's affections against others than her husband. Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich 215; Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich 145; Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich 371. At the same time, it has held that the wife could not enter into a partnership or other business with her husband, and thus become responsible for the contracts and debts of her husband. Artman v. Ferguson, 73 Mich 146 (2 LRA 343, 16 Am St Rep 572); Edwards v. McEnhill, 51 Mich 160. Personal wrongs inflicted upon her give her the right to a decree of separation or divorce from her husband, and our statutes have given the court of chancery-exclusive jurisdiction over that subject. This court, clothed with the broad powers of equity, can do justice to her for the wrongs of her husband, so far as courts can do justice, and, in providing for her, will give her such amount of her husband's property as the circumstances of both will justify, and, in so doing, may take into account the cruel and outrageous conduct inflicted upon her by him, and its effect upon her health and ability to labor. 2 Am & Eng Enc Law (2d ed), 120; How Stat § 6245. In the absence of an express statute, there is no right to maintain an action at law for such wrong. We are cited to no authority holding the contrary. We cite a few sustaining the rule: Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me 304 (24 Am Rep 27); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb (NY) 641; Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182; Schultz v. Schultz, 89 NY 644; Cooley, Torts, p 228; Schouler, Domestic Relations (4th ed), § 52; Newell, Defamation, Slander and Libel, p 366; Townshend, Slander and Libel (2d, 3d, and 4th ed), § 300." 117 Mich 80, 82, 83.
The Court's fear of frivolous suits hardly seems to be a realistic one. Thus, with regard to torts based upon an allegation of negligent conduct during marriage, the fact finder would be quite justified in taking into account the fact that the alleged negligent conduct occurred during marriage. Negligence is, after all, basically a question of reasonable behavior in the circumstances, and it may well be that conduct which would be actionably negligent as between strangers would not be so as between spouses.
"It must be true that when a man and woman marry their reciprocal rights and duties are different toward each other than toward third persons. The extent of the difference under the existing law must be developed by time and experience." Wait v. Pierce (1926), 191 Wis 202, 217 (209 NW 475, 480, 48 ALR 276, 285).
"Undoubtedly there is conduct tortious when engaged in by a third person, which would not be tortious between husband and wife because of the mutual concessions attending their relationship and implied in the marriage contract." Courtney v. Courtney (1938), 184 Okla 385, 403 (87 P2d 660, 669).
We shall not comment upon-Bandfield's somewhat ludicrous juxtaposition of the argument that inter-spousal tort suits should not be permitted because of their potential for disruption of marital harmony with the helpful hint that, while one who has been tortiously injured by his spouse should not'be permitted to disrupt the marriage relation by suing for damages, he may nonetheless achieve redress by means of a divorce. Not only is that argument absurd, but also it is patently legally faulty, insofar as it suggests that alimony may be awarded to compensate for a tortious personal injury which has not impaired the injured spouse's ability to labor. How Stat, § 6245 specifically provided that "if the estate and effects awarded to the wife shall be insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of herself and such children of the marriage as shall be committed to her care and custody, the court may further decree to her such part of the personal estate of the husband and such alimony out of his estate real and personal, to be paid to her in gross or otherwise as it shall deem just and reasonable, having regard to the ability of the husband and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case." Alimony was at the time of Bandfield, and is today (CLS 1961, § 552-.23, as last amended by PA 1964, No 11 [Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 25.103]), a device whereby a spouse was obliged to discharge an obligation of support, and not a means of recompensing one spouse for tortious injuries endured during marc riage. See Cummings v. Cummings (1883), 50 Mich 305; Johnson v. Johnson (1956), 346 Mich 418.
It is also of interest to note that two of the three jurisdictions cited by Band field in support of its holding have since modified their positions. New York now permits by statute interspousal suits, while Maine permits the defendant in a negligence suit by a wife to implead the husband for purposes of contribution. See appendix. Thus, the Maine court's current attitude (see Bedell v. Reagan [1963], 159 Me 292 [192 A2d 24]) is somewhat different from that which existed in 1877 at the time of Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me 304 (24 Am Rep 27), wherein the court dismissed an interspousal suit in these terms: "As said by Settle, J., in State v. Oliver, 70 NC 60, 'it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.' " 67 Me 304, 307. Subsequently, even North. Carolina renounced its former rule in favor of one permitting a wife to maintain a tort suit against her husband. Roberts v. Roberts (1923), 185 NC 566 (118 SE 9, 29 ALR 1479).
We do not consider it necessary, in the context of the cases we are here called upon to decide, in two of which the marriage relation was already ended before suit was commenced and in the third the marriage was contracted notwithstanding the pendency of the litigation, to consider further the a priori argument that to permit interspousal personal tort suits would rend the gossamer fabric of marital felicity.
In Harvey v. Harvey (1927), 239 Mich 142, the second case in which our Court considered inter-spousal tort immunity, a wife passenger sought to recover against her husband driver for injuries incurred in an automobile accident. Plaintiff argued that an amendment to the married women's act should be construed to permit such suits, but this Court rejected the argument. It is evident from the Court's opinion that aside from its narrow interpretation of the statute the Court believed that no such right of action based solely upon the common law should exist either, primarily for two reasons:
First, the Court observed that "we can conceive of circumstances where liability insurance, carried by the husband, might prove the moving factor [in the initiation of a suit]", 239 Mich 142, 146. Implicit in the Court's speculation is the assumption that to permit such suits would be to promote collusion between spouses in the bringing of suit. We are not persuaded that the possibility of such collusion justifies the judicial concern expressed for it. For over half a century, in an increasing number of States and in the United Kingdom, intersponsal tort suits have been permitted in varying degrees and no evidence yet has been adduced to show that the administration of justice has been perverted thereby. The possibility of collusion exists in any lawsuit, and while conceivably it might be somewhat greater when the opposite parties are husband and wife and an insurer lurks in the background, skilled cross-examination and the perceptivity of our triers of fact make its success unlikely. To suggest otherwise is to reject the effectiveness of our adversary system for making fact determinations, a radically extreme position we are not yet ready to take.
The shibboleth of collusion between spouses, to which there was direct allusion in Harvey v. Harvey, has been raised often as an obstacle to suits between spouses and, as well, in other suits in which the marriage relation is involved. Thus, in Glover v. Alcott (1863), 11 Mich 470, the Court stated that a wife could not carry on a general trade or business on credit. Mr. Justice Christiancy noted that while the object of the married women's act was benevolent, and "while it should be fairly and liberally construed for these purposes, the greatest care and circumspection are required to guard, as far as possible, against its being made a mere cloak for the frauds of the husband upon his creditors, of which it is peculiarly susceptible; and which it was no part of the legislative design to facilitate." 11 Mich 470, 485, 486. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Campbell expressed more confidence in our trial system:
"Fraud, in such cases, is a question of fact, and not of law. I think in the case before us the court below presented the whole case to the jury with great fairness. The peculiar character of the transaction was fully commented on, and their attention was called to every thing which could throw light on the case. The real facts are such as to require from a jury a much sharper scrutiny, and are much more suspicious, than if the married relation did not exist. This, however, was fairly laid before them, and we must presume their deliberate conclusion was arrived at by regarding it." 11 Mich 470, 494.
The correctness of Justice Campbell's views is borne out by subsequent decisions of this Court, vitiating Justice Christiancy's holding, and the resultant absence of the forewarned economic chaos predicted to accompany such collusive suits. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Cooley's opinion in Tillman v. Shackleton (1867), 15 Mich 447 (93 Am Dec 198).
Second, in addition to decrying the dangers of collusion, the Court in Harvey v. Harvey based its decision upon the thesis that a married woman has no legal existence during coverture. In support of this thesis, it turned to the common and statutory law of Virginia, as construed by its court:
"In Keister's Administrator v. Keister [123 Va 157, 160, 161, 96 SE 315, 1 ALR 439], supra, the court stated that the statute of Virginia provides:
" 'A married woman may contract and be contracted with, sue in the same manner and with the same consequences as if she were unmarried, whether the right or liability asserted by her, shall have accrued before or after the passage of this act,'
and, in holding the statute does not confer upon a married woman a right of action against her husband for a personal tort, so well considered the subject involved in the case at bar that we make liberal quotation therefrom:
" 'The primary inquiry confronting us in the instant case, therefore, is whether the married women's statute in Virginia, the portion of which relied on by the plaintiff in error is quoted above, confers- upon married women during coverture the substantive civil right essential to support a cause of action in a suit at law for damages instituted during the coverture by a wife against her husband, for an assault upon her committed by the husband during the coverture?
" 'The substantive civil right in question is a legal existence — a legal personality — of a married woman, separate and apart from the legal personality of her husband, during coverture. Such a right a married woman had not and has not at common law.' " 239 Mich 142, 147, 148.
The assertion that at common law a married woman had no legal existence during coverture is one to which any perceptive analysis of the cases gives lie, and yet it has been made by jurists of some notoriety:
"By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband. Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch 15, p 442 (1 Cooley [4th ed 1899], p 387).
Illustrative of the attitude of many nineteenth century American courts is the case of Ritter v. Ritter (1858), 31 Pa 396:
"One of the favourite maxims of the common law is, that marriage makes the man and woman one person in law, and of course it excludes the possibility of a civil suit between them. Now this characteristic of the contract may be considered a fiction, an absurdity, a fossil, or whatever else the necessities of the new era may denominate it, but it is in exact accordance with the revealed will of God, was de signed for the protection of the woman, and leads to that identification of sympathies and interests, which secures to families and neighbourhoods the blessings of harmony and good order.
"It is doubtless competent for the legislative power to change and modify the qualities of the marriage relation, perhaps to abolish it altogether; but if the history of the human race teaches any lesson whatever, it is, that concubinage is the alternative of marriage. In just so far as you impair the one, you encourage the other. In just so far as you sever the material interests of husband and wife, you destroy the sympathies which constitute the oneness of the relation, and degrade the divine institution to mere concubinage.
"Nothing could so complete that severance and degradation, as to throw open litigation to the parties. The maddest advocate for woman's rights, and for the abolition on earth of all divine institutions, could wish for no more decisive blow from the courts than this. The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a new era indeed — an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and murders.
"But will the courts expose this fundamental relation to the consequences of unbridled litigation? Never." 31 Pa 396, 398.
Notwithstanding such bold proclamations, we have examined the status of married women at common law to determine whether there was indeed such a legal unity of husband and wife at the common law.
It cannot be doubted that superficially, at least, the common-law treatment of torts involving a married woman can be explained upon the basis that during coverture the wife had no legal personality. Thus, procedurally the husband had to join or be joined in tort suits by or against his wife. If, however, the wife were legally extinct in such circumstances, it would be logically inappropriate to speak of her committing a tort since, her personality being-extinct, she should be viewed as but the alter ego of her husband. Despite the esoteric talk of "unity" the common law in practice has been quite realistic and very early recognized that a wife can commit a tort:
" Si brief de trespas de batery soit port envs le baron et la femme, supposant que eux deux duissent auer bate le pi', et le baron appiert et la femme nemy, le baron respond sans la feme, pur ceo q lact est port auxibien de son tort, come de la torte de la feme." Y.B. 36 Hy VI p I pl I (Wight ed, 1601).
Similarly, when a tort was committed against a wife, although the common law procedurally required that the husband join in the suit, it in fact recognized that the cause of action inhered in the wife and not in the husband, which would be the case if the wife's personality were not legally cognizable. This certainly is the purport of Weller v. Baker (1769), 2 Wils KB 414 (95 Eng Rep 892):
"Lastly, it was objected that the husbands and wives ought not to have joined in this action. In answer to this, it is very difficult to reconcile all the cases in the books touching this matter of joinder in action; at present it is sufficient for us to say that this action is not grounded on any contract express or implied, but the husbands are joined to assert the right and interest of their wives, which has been disturbed and injured by the defendant; whatever be the nature of this right, interest, or employment, it is her own, the husband hath nothing at all to do with it, he only joins for conformity; Wherever the wife is the meritorious cause she may join in action: a very strong case to this purpose is 2 Sid 128, and so is Oro Jac 77 which was case by baron and feme upon an assumpsit for curing a wound by the wife, and alleged in facto that she cured it, resolved she was the cause of the action, and so the action brought in both their names was well enough. The case, of Holmes and Wife v. Wood was an action upon the case wherein the plaintiffs declared upon a quantum meruit for a cure done by the plaintiff's wife; and upon another count for medicines and plasters found and provided for the defendant; upon a general demurrer it was objected that the wife could not join, for that she was not; the sole cause of the action, because the medicines and plasters were the husband's own property, and the damages could not be severed; and of that opinion was the Court; but they said that if the action had been brought for the labour of the wife only, she might well have joined." 2 Wils KB 414, 423, 424.
If an action sounding in tort were brought against husband and wife, predicated upon an act of the wife, the substantive superfluity of the husband is shown further by the fact that the action would not abate upon the husband's death.
"Ejectment. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved, that the husband was dead since the Nisi Prius and before the day in banco. The question was, whether the bill should abate in all, or should stand against the wife ?—And because it is in nature of an action of trespass, and the wife is charged for her own fact, it was adjudged, that the action continued against the wife, and judgment should be entered against her sole, because the husband was dead." Rigley v. Lee and His Wife (1614), Cro Jac 356 (79 Eng Rep 304).
When a woman married, her personal property became the property of her husband. The choses in action possessed by an unmarried woman were, of course, personalty, and among such choses in action might be included a cause of action in tort. The choses in action which a woman took with her into marriage became her husband's only if he reduced them to possession during coverture. If he did not do so, they remained the woman's when she was released from coverture. The rights inhered in the woman, and although during coverture the husband could bring suit, his suit properly viewed would be derivative depending for its vitality upon subsistence of the marital relationship.
Thus, it was indeed an egregious error for this Court in Harvey to embrace so heartily the Virginia court's statement that a married woman (p 148) "had not and has not at common law" a legal personality or existence apart from that of her husband. In the context of the issue we here consider, it would be proper to say that a married woman was under a judicially created personal disability to maintain suit in her own name, but it is ignoring legal reality to say that a married woman had no legal existence. Pollock and Maitland's considered conclusions are of value:
"In particular we must be on our guard against the common belief that the ruling principle is that which sees an 'unity of person' between husband and wife. We do not treat the wife as a thing or as .somewhat that is neither thing nor person; we treat her as a person. Thus Bracton tells us that if either the husband without the wife, or the wife without the husband, brings an action for the wife's land, the defendant can take exception to this 'for they are quasi one person, for they are one flesh and one blood.' But this impracticable proposition is followed by a real working principle: 'for the thing is the wife's own and the husband is guardian as being the head of the wife.' The husband is the wife's guardian: — that we believe to be the fundamental principle; and it explains a great deal, when we remember that guardianship is a profitable right." 2 History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2d ed 1899), pp 405, 406.
The third case to present the issue of interspousal tort immunity to this Court was Riser v. Riser (1927), 240 Mich 402 (27 NOCA 518). Defendants, husband and wife, invited plaintiff and her husband to accompany them in defendant's' vehicle on a short automobile jaunt. Plaintiff's husband drove on the return leg of the journey and while he was driving an accident occurred in which plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, and this Court held that defendants' motion for dismissal should have been granted:
"Plaintiff might not recover in tort damages against her husband for her injuries occasioned by his negligence. See Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, where the matter is considered at length. As plaintiff may not recover against her husband, the driver of the car, she cannot recover against the owners, defendants, for whom he drove.
" 'The liability of the owner of a motor vehicle for damages caused by the negligent operation thereof by another person, rests upon the doctrine of agency, express or implied.
" 'The liability is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the servant is not liable the master is not liable. Hence the master may not be liable for injuries sustained by the wife of the driv er.' Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa, 1278 (201 NW 20, 37 ALR 161)." 240 Mich 402, 404.
But for subsequent developments, the case would be of little interest since it does not discuss inter-spousal suits except for its citation to Harvey. The Court in Riser reasoned that since plaintiff could not sue her husband for his negligence, she could not sue defendants either, as whose agent plaintiff's husband was acting in driving, despite the existence even then of the owner liability act, PA 1915, No 302, § 29. However, in Moore v. Palmer (1957), 350 Mich 363, four members of the Court (and subsequently a majority, see e.g., Kiefer v. Gosso [1958], 353 Mich 19) held that liability under the owner liability act is not predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
"We hold that the language referred to in Geib v. Slater [320 Mich 316] and Riser v. Riser [240 Mich 402], holding the Michigan owner liability act to be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior is expressly overruled." 350 Mich 363, 394.
Thus, since the decisions in Moore and Kiefer, defendants in a suit like Riser could not take advantage of the husband's immunity from suit to escape liability under our statute. As we have noted, see appendix, such a result is not unusual in States which claim continuing adherence to the immunity doctrine as applied to suits between spouses. Thus, the law in Michigan presently presents the anomaly that while a wife may not allege and prove the negligence of her husband in a suit against him, she may do just that in a suit against the owner of a vehicle her husband was driving. The similar illogic of railing against suits by wife against husband as disruptive of marital tranquillity (or conducive to interspousal collusion) and at the same time permitting the wife to sue the husband's employer upon the basis of the husband's negligent injury of the wife, was commented upon in 1 Harper and James, Torts (1956), pp 646, 647:
"The problem has been raised from time to time in jurisdictions which do not allow tort actions between spouses whether the wife is also precluded from a recovery from the husband's employer when the injury was caused by the husband in the course of his employment. The logic of the situation would call for a denial of recovery because the husband would be liable to indemnify his employer. Presumably domestic harmony would be impaired if the wife recovered from him in this circuitous manner quite as much as if she had sued him directly. And if the employer were insured, the insurance company would be subrogated to the employer's claim against the husband. Some cases so hold. But an impressive array of authority has rejected the logic and allowed the wife to recover. 'A trespass, negligent or willful, upon the person of the wife, does not cease to be an unlawful act, though the law exempts the husband from liability for the damage. Others may not hide behind the skirts of his immunity.' In the Schubert Case [Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co. (1928), 249 NY 253, 256, 257 (164 NE 42; 64 ALR 293)], Judge Cardozo met the problem of indemnity in the following way:
" 'The master who recovers over against the servant does not need to build his right upon any theory of subrogation to a cause of action once belonging to the victim of the injury. A sufficient basis of [for his] recovery is the breach of an independent duty owing to himself. The servant owes the duty to the master to render faithful service, and must an swer for the damage if the quality of the service is below [lower than] the standard.' "
Finally, this Court last considered the issue of interspousal tort immunity in Kircher v. Kircher (1939), 288 Mich 669 (7 NCCA NS 72). There plaintiff sought to recover against her husband for injuries caused by his alleged negligence in the State of Colorado, which State then already permitted interspousal tort suits. This Court denied such relief in a brief opinion referring to the precedent cases just discussed and noting that such suits are "contrary to public policy in this State".
II.
The time has come to turn to the facts of the cases now before us, for it is to facts and not abstractions to which ultimately we must direct our attention.
In Smith v. King plaintiff wife sought to recover against the estate of her husband for injuries incurred when an automobile operated by her husband and in which she was riding was involved in an accident, allegedly as a result of the deceased husband's gross negligence. From the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff has appealed.
In such circumstances, we can see no reason why suit should not be permitted. Collusion between the spouses is impossible and death has already destroyed "the sacred relation of man and wife", so that "public policy" does not enter as a bar.
In Dood v. Mosher, plaintiff Bernard Dood was residing as a boarder in the home of defendant Dorothy Mosher when, on May 16, 1962, he was injured by stepping on a rusty nail while walking around an outbuilding at defendant's home. On July 16, 1962 plaintiff gave written notice to defendant of this injury, which required hospitalization and resulted in plaintiff's loss of work for six months. On April 3, 1963 plaintiff filed suit against defendant, she was served on April 4th, and the parties were married on April 5th. Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Here again, we can conceive of no public policy which should bar such a suit. The parties, aware of the pendency of the suit, nonetheless chose to be married. How, then, could it be said that permitting such suit to be maintained would disrupt the marriage? Indeed, were we to require dismissal of such suits upon the marriage of the parties, would we not discourage a relationship we are told it is the law's policy to encourage? Perhaps more pertinent is the allusion in Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich 142, 146, to the possibility of collusion in such circumstances. Like Justice Campbell in Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich 470, discussed supra, we are content to leave to the adversary proceedings and the triers of fact the detection of such untoward, and, indeed, criminal, conduct on the part of the parties litigant.
Finally, we turn to Mosier v. Carney. There, plaintiff is administrator of the estate of Maxine Carney. She was killed, while a passenger in a car driven by her husband, when that car collided with a vehicle driven by John Akers. Suit was brought under the wrongful death act (CL 1948, § 691.581-691.583 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.711-27.713], now CLS 1961, § 600.2922 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A.2922]) on behalf of Mrs. Carney's minor children alleging negligence on the part of defendant Akers and gross negligence on the part of defendant husband. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant husband's motion to dismiss as to him.
It is argued that this action was improperly brought under the wrongful death act which permits an action
"Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death, shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof." CL 1948, § 691.581 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.711). CLS 1961, § 600.2922 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A.2922) eliminated the parentheses and substituted a coma after "would".
Defendant reasons that Mrs. Carney could not have sued her husband had she lived and that, therefore, her estate may not do so after her death. We must remember that the wrongful death act is a remedial statute and thus should be and has been liberally construed by us. See Merkle v. Township of Bennington (1885), 58 Mich 156 (55 Am Rep 666). The purpose of the statute is, of course, obvious: it was intended to remedy unconscionable results reached in litigation under the common law whereby it was financially less burdensome to tortfeasors to kill than merely to maim their victims.
One who sues under the wrongful death act is not suing solely for a wrong done to the decedent but rather, as well, upon a new cause of action specifically created as a remedy for those who suffer loss because of decedent's death. Ford v. Money's Estate (1930), 251 Mich 461 (70 ALR 1315); and see In re Olney's Estate (1944), 309 Mich 65, which reaffirmed Ford after the 1939 amendment (PA 1939, No 297) to the wrongful death act.
In certain instances wo have held that a plaintiff could not recover under the wrongful death act because his decedent could not have maintained an action and recovered damages had he lived. However, an examination of those cases discloses that there would have been ¡pme substantive defect inherent in the decedent's hypothetical cause of action. We have never held that because a purely personal immunity might have barred suit by decedent, those injured by his death would also he barred from suit.
Thus, we have said that the contributory negligence of a deceased, the presence of which would be a substantive defect in a suit by him, would bar recovery under the wrongful death act. See e.g., Baader v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co. (1924), 228 Mich 104. Other cases, however, demonstrate that this Court has avoided construing the legislative language so technically as to defeat the manifest purpose of the act, namely, to give a cause of action for the benefit of certain designated classes of surviving relatives of a wrongfully killed decedent. For example, in Lincoln v. Detroit & M. R. Co. (1914), 179 Mich 189 (51 LRA NS 710), defendant sought to defeat plaintiff's cause of action for recovery of the earnings potential of his deceased minor son by arguing that had the son survived he "could not have sued the defendant for the recovery of his earning power, for that belonged to his parents". 179 Mich 189, 194. Such an interpretation was, strictly speaking, open to the Court, but it rejected it, considering the act in these terms:
"1. We summarize the following from the American authorities: The death loss act of the English statute of 1846 (St 9 & 10 Vict No 93), commonly called 'Lord Campbell's act,' and the various laws of a similar kind that have been modeled after it, gave a new cause of action unknown to the common law, for the benefit of certain designated classes of surviving relatives. Such relatives do not take the cause of action for damages to the deceased by transfer to them by operation of law, or otherwise, but are enabled by the statute to recover the pecuniary loss to themselves caused by the wrongful taking off of the decedent, the continuation of whose life would have been beneficial to them. The action accrues to the surviving beneficiary mentioned in the statute by reason of the death of the injured person caused by the wrongful act of another. It is strictly not proper to say that it is a cause of action which survives; it is rather a new action given by CL 1897, § 10427 and 10428 (5 How Stat [2d ed], § 13702, 13703), which can be brought, not for the benefit of the estate but solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute. The above sections, when compared with CL 1897, § 10117 (5 How Stat [2d ed], § 12761), are made plain. They refer to entirely distinct losses recoverable in different rights. Section 10117 refers to the right of the deceased for the loss and injury occasioned to him. Sections 10427 and 10428 refer to the right of the surviving relatives as beneficiaries for the loss to them. Both are dependent on the injury. The language of one provision is that 'actions for personal injuries shall survive,' and of the other 'in case of the death of a person by the wrongful act of another.' Section 10117 creates no new liability, but prevents the lapsing by death of an old one, while sections 10427 and 10428 create a new liability, one not known to the common law." 179 Mich 189, 195, 196.
The Court held that since the minor could have recovered damages for wrongful injury had he survived, his parents could recover damages of a different nature for loss of his earning power.
The Court's discussion of the fateful words "if death had not ensued" persuades us that it interpreted them as barring suit on a decedent's death only if there were some substantive defect in de cedent's case. Thus, the Court discussed contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule as instances when suit by surviving relatives would be barred.
We must never lose sight of the fact that the legislature under the wrongful death act sought to impose liability in case of the death of a person by the-wrongful act of another. None of the Michigan interspousal tort cases we have considered challenges the apodictic fact that one spouse may injure another wrongfully and fatally. Indeed, they all admit that one spouse may injure another tortiously, but bar the suits on other grounds.
We do not believe the legislature intended that in such cases as Mosier, the administrator's suit, any recovery upon which will inure to the benefit of decedent's minor children, should be defeated merely because earlier cases in this Court indicated that had decedent survived she would have been barred from suing her husband. There have been pleaded wrongful acts of defendant resulting in decedent's death. Nowhere in his pleadings does defendant aver any fault on the part of his deceased wife which might have constituted a substantive defect to suit by her. Rather he relies entirely upon the bar raised by his alleged personal immunity from suit by her.
In this regard, we are in accord with the supreme court of Minnesota which, although acknowledging that interspousal suits are forbidden there, held, in the face of an asserted defense of interspousal tort immunity, that under a wrongful death act similar to Michigan's a suit might be brought against the estate of a husband for damages sustained by the wife. Poepping v. Lindemann (1964), 268 Minn 30 (127 NW2d 512). In concluding that the language of the Minnesota wrongful death act giving an action "if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived" did not bar plaintiff's action, the Minnesota court relied upon and quoted from its earlier decision in Shumway v. Nelson (1961), 259 Minn 319, 322, 323 (107 NW2d 531):
" 'This clause refers to the facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action, as well as any facts or circumstances pertaining to any permissible defenses such as contributory negligence, rather than to the person by whom the action could be maintained.
" 'This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that upon death of one spouse the rationale of the marital-immunity doctrine loses whatever force it might otherwise have had. Where the marriage has been terminated by death any danger of domestic discord arising from the enforcement of the action has, likewise, terminated. We do not believe that we should ascribe to the legislature an intent to extend the intrafamily immunity doctrine to situations where its existence is without any reasonable justification.' " Emphasis added by Poepping, 268 Minn 30, footnote, 35 (127 NW2d 512, footnote, 515, 516).
Summary.
We have examined the Michigan precedents and have found nothing in them which logically militates against permitting prosecution of the suits here involved. Indeed, as we have seen the "reasoning", if it may be called that, of those cases, has no applicability in the fact circumstances of these instant cases of first impression. It is appropriate to add that what we have said here concerning the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity must be considered in light of these same fact circumstances. "We this day hold: (1) that a suit may be maintained predicated upon injuries to one spouse during marriage arising out of an allegedly wrongful act of the marital partner, when the allegedly wrongful act resulted in termination of the marriage by death; (2) that a suit commenced before marriage of the parties thereto may be maintained by one spouse against the other for an alleged ante-nuptial tort.
These cases are reversed and remanded to the trial courts for further proceedings. No costs, a question of public importance being involved.
Appendix.
The jurisdictions which have abolished the defense of interspousal tort immunity in whole or in part may be classified as follows:
(1) Those in which the courts have permitted interspousal suits in general; e.g., Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1955), 142 Conn 573, 579 (116 A2d 169, 172), "It is, and for many years has been, the law of Connecticut that a wife may bring and maintain an action against her husband to recover for personal injuries caused by his negligent act or acts in this State"; Gilman v. Gilman (1915), 78 NH 4 (95 A 657, LRA 1916B, 907), "If a married woman is either injured or damaged by another's illegal act, the statute gives her a remedy even though that other is her husband"; Brandt v. Keller (1953), 413 Ill 503 (109 NE2d 729), holding that in all cases a married woman may sue and be sued as if she wore unmarried; the legislature subsequently added to the Illinois married women's act the proviso "that neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture." Nonetheless in Calvert v. Morgan (1963), 41 Ill App 2d 23 (190 NE2d 1), the Illinois appellate court permitted the administrator of a deceased wife's estate to sue, for the benefit of the wife's children, the estate of her husband, who had murdered her and killed himself. Accord, Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson (1951), 212 Miss 335 (54 So 2d 476); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice (1932), 62 ND 191 (242 NW 526), wife may sue husband for personal tort; reserved question of whether husband has like right; Scotvold v. Scotvold (1941), 68 SD 53, 66 (298 NW 266, 272), "a civil action is maintainable in this jurisdiction between husband and wife for damages for personal tort committed by one against the other"; Prosser v. Prosser (1920), 114 SC 45, 47 (102 SE 787, 788), "by a liberal and not by a strict construction the code of procedure was enacted to give to a wife every remedy against her husband for any wrong she might suffer at his hands"; Penton v. Penton (1931), 223 Ala 282, 285 (135 So 481, 483), an action "may be maintained by the wife against the husband for his actionable simple negligence"; Katzenberg v. Katzenberg (1931), 183 Ark 626 (37 SW2d 696), and Leach v. Leach (1957), 227 Ark 599 (300 SW2d 15), wife may sue husband, and husband may sue wife, for negligent injuries; Rains v. Rains (1935), 97 Colo 19, 25 (46 P2d 740, 743), "We hold that in this State a wife may sue her husband for personal injuries caused by the negligence of her husband"; Courtney v. Courtney (1938), 184 Okla 395, 404 (87 P2d 660, 670), "one spouse may sue the other for the recovery of damages for personal injury resulting from the negligence of the latter"; Self v. Self (1962), 58 Cal 2d 683 (26 Cal Rptr 97, 376 P2d 65), and Klein v. Klein (1962), 58 Cal 2d 692 (26 Cal Rptr 102, 376 P2d 70), abolishing the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity as to intentional and negligent torts, respectively; Cramer v. Cramer (Alaska, 1963), 379 P2d 95, 97, wife may "bring an action against her husband, during coverture or thereafter, for a tort to her person caused by his negligent conduct while the parties were married to each other"; Damm v. Elyria Lodge No 465 (1952), 158 Ohio St 107, 116 (107 NE2d 337, 342), court held that wife might maintain negligence action against voluntary unincorporated association of which deceased husband had been member, noting that, "No statute expressly prohibits actions by a wife to recover damages from her husband for personal injuries inflicted upon her by him." See, also, Jaeger v. Jaeger (1952), 262 Wis 14 (53 NW2d 740), where the Wisconsin supreme court interpreted the laws of Arizona as permitting interspousal negligent tort suits.
(2) Those which permit interspousal suits when the marital relation has been, or is in the process of being, dissolved or permit suits against a third party even though the suit is predicated upon a spouse's negligence, e.g., Johnson v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co. (1958), 394 Pa 116, 119 (145 A2d 716, 717), although interspousal tort suits may not be maintained during coverture, widow may maintain negligent tort suit against husband's personal representative, since, husband being dead, public policy of "preserving domestic peace and felicity" could not be subverted thereby; Long v. Landy (1961), 35 NJ 44 (171 A2d 1), essentially similar to Johnson, supra; Pelowski v. Frederickson (1962), 263 Minn 371, 375 (116 NW2d 701, 704), sustaining third party action by defendant, in suit by widow, against estate of widow's husband, for contribution or indemnity, general immunity doctrine inapplicable where "death has intervened to forever circumvent all possibility of marital discord"; Poepping v. Lindemann (1964), 268 Minn 30 (127 NW2d 512, 516), notes that Minnesota has in past applied immunity doctrine, but finds it inapplicable on the facts since "the cause of action which arises when one spouse sustains personal injury by reason of the conduct of the other can be asserted against the estate of the latter"; Ennis v. Truhitte (Mo 1957), 306 SW2d 549, wife may sue administrator of husband's estate for negligent injuries inflicted by husband; Lorang v. Hays (1949), 69 Idaho 440 (209 P2d 733), wife may maintain action against divorced husband even though tort complained of was committed during coverture, tenor of opinion is that actions should also be permitted during coverture; Kowaleski v. Kowaleski (1961), 227 Or 45, 61 (361 P2d 64, 71), wife may sue husband's employer for husband's negligence since "husband's personal immunity should not extend to his employer"; see 227 Or 51 (361 P2d 67) for citations of cases in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, and Vermont with similar holdings; Johnson v. Ottomeier (1954), 45 Wash 2d 419 (275 P2d 723), immunity rule does not operate to abate suit for benefit of wife's children by wife's personal representative against husband's estate under wrongful death act; Goode v. Martinis (1961), 58 Wash 2d 229, 236 (361 P2d 941, 945), tenor of general discussion is critical of immunity doctrine, but court limits holding to availability of suit in case of "an alleged intentional tort committed by one spouse against the other during the pendency of previously initiated divorce proceedings when the parties are legally separated"; Gremillion v. Caffey (La App 1954), 71 So 2d 670, while wife could not sue husband in tort during marriage, she could do so after divorce for tort committed during marriage but after a legal separation; Bedell v. Reagan (1963), 159 Me 292 (192 A2d 24), forbids suits between husband and wife but permits defendant in suit by wife to implead husband for contribution, wife's injuries having been received- in automobile accident wherein conceivably both husband and defendant were negligent; Taylor v. Patten (1954), 2 Utah 2d 404 (275 P2d 696), wife may recover damages from husband for injuries intentionally inflicted upon, her during interlocutory period of divorce action.
(3) Those which permit suits for antenuptial torts: Brown v. Gosser (Ky, 1953), 262 SW2d 480 (43 ALR2d 626), permits suit by wife against husband for antenuptial tort, suit having been begun prior to marriage, tenor of opinion is wholly to reject common-law immunity rule; Hamilton v. Fulkerson (Mo 1955), 285 SW2d 642, wife not barred from continuing to maintain suit against husband for antenuptial tort; dictum (p 647) that Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co. (1936), 339 Mo 582 (98 SW2d 645), which held that while wife could not sue husband, she could sue his employer for injuries done her as result of husband's negligence during scope of his employment, "clearly indicates that this court must have recognized that there were no considerations of public policy weighty enough to prohibit a wife's suit against her husband for a personal tort even though committed during marriage."; O'Grady v. Potts (1964), 193 Kan 644 (396 P2d 285), existence of common-law immunity rule does not bar action by wife against husband for alleged antenuptial tort; Curtis v. Wilcox, [1948] 2 KB 474, overruling Gottliffe v. Edelston, [1930] 2 KB 378, permitted suit by wife on antenuptial tort, but Baylis v. Blackwell, [1952] 1 KB 154, denied right of husband to maintain similar suit.
(4) Those which anomalously permit wives hut not husbands to sue: Roberts v. Roberts (1923), 185 NC 566 (118 SE 9, 29 ALR 1479), and Scholtens v. Scholtens (1949), 230 NC 149 (52 SE2d 350); Wait v. Pierce (1926), 191 Wis 202 (209 NW 475, 48 ALR 276), and Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1944), 246 Wis 228 (16 NW2d 787, 160 ALR 1402).
(5) In New York, inter spousal tort suits are authorized by statute, but not if the defendant is insured unless the policy so states.
#
This passage in 1 Harper and James, Torts (1956), pp 645, 646, is representative of the scholarly consensus on the subject of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity:
"The rule denying recovery has been applied literally and blindly in many cases where the reason for the rule could not possibly apply inasmuch as there was no home to disrupt and no domestic harmony to disturb. The divorce cases are typical examples. So, too, are cases in which the wife's administrator seeks to recover for her wrongful death. This rule has been applied even when the wife was murdered by her husband and where the wife's administrator sued the husband's administrator.
"But a strong and probably increasing minority view permits the wife to sue her husband for such harms, especially if they are intended wrongs. A few liberal decisions have permitted the action for the husband's negligence. This result seems eminently desirable. The metaphysical and practical reasons which prevented such actions at common law are no longer applicable. The danger to the family peace and tranquillity here, as in the case of suits by an infant against his parent, has been grossly over-emphasized. Sound policy and ordinary fairness commend the right of the wife to recover for tortious invasions of her interests in personality by her husband. While as much might be said to favor an action by the husband for a harm to his person by his wife, he did not have such an action at common law and no statutes purport to enlarge his rights against his wife. But the statutes under which a married woman is liable generally for her tort are not likely to be interpreted to make her immune to her husband, and liability to him should no doubt accompany the converse rule of liability on his part for bodily harm inflicted by him on her."
See, also, Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts (3d ed 1964), pp 879-885; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv L Rev 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Villanova L Rev 303 (1959); Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 Cal L Rev 461 (1922); Morris, What Price Marriage?, 1946 Insurance LJ 911; Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 Georgetown LJ 697 and 893 (1939); Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 Ind LJ 290 (1935); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 Vanderbilt L Rev 823 (1956); Comment, 23 Yale LJ 613 (1914); Comment, 33 Yale LJ 315 (1924); Comment, 26 Ill L Rev 88 (1931); Comment, Tort Liability Within the Family Area—A Suggested Approach, 51 NW UL Rev 610 (1956); Notes: 34 Harv L Rev 676 (1921); 48 Harv L Rev 849 (1935); 26 Colum L Rev 895 (1926); 35 Colum L Rev 781 (1935); 48 Colum L Rev 961 (1948); 27 Yale LJ 1081 (1918); 28 NCL Rev 109 (1949); 22 Cornell LQ 274 (1937); 24 Mich L Rev 618 (1926); 37 Wash L Rev 233 (1962).
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.
Bandfield v. Bandfield (1898), 117 Mich 80 (40 LRA 757, 72 Am St Rep 550); Harvey v. Harvey (1927), 239 Mich 142; Riser v. Riser (1927), 240 Mich 402 (27 NCCA 518); and Kircher v. Kircher (1939), 288 Mich 669 (7 NCCA NS 72).
Article 3, § 7, Constitution of 1963: "The common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to tbis Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed." See Schedule, § 1 of the Constitution of 1908 for the predecessor of the foregoing.
Preface to the First Part of the Reports of Sir Edward Coke (Browne's Eng ed in 13 parts), pp 1727-1738; (seven volumes).
Dean Prosser was not so charitable:
"The chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however, is that personal tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the home, which is against the policy of the law. This is on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of peaee and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy — and this even though she has left him or divorced him for that very ground, and although the same courts refuse to find any disruption of domestic tranquillity if she sues him for a tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecution against him. ' If this reasoning appeals to the reader, lot him by. all means adopt it.
"The devastating attack on the old rule found in a number of recent decisions seems to leave no possible justification for it except that of historical survival." Handbook of the Law of Torts (3d ed, 1964), § 116, pp 883, 885.
In the judicature act of 1915. See CL 1948, § 612.6 (Stat Ann § 27.658), the provisions of which are now incorporated in CLS 1961, § 600.2001 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2001).—Reporter.
See, generally, the definitive discussion of "The Married Woman" in 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1st ed, 1909), pp 404-416.
If a writ of trespass for battery be brought against the husband and the wife, supposing that they both might have beaten the plaintiff, and the husband appears and the wife not, the husband answers without the wife, inasmuch as the action is brought as well for his tort, as for the tort of the wife. (Translation furnished.)—Reporter.
Manby v. Scott, 2 Sid 109, 128 (82 Eng Rep 1000, 1011), and Bradford v. Budsingham, Cro Jac 77 (79 Eng Rep 65).—Reporter,
The Riser Court purported to quote from the cited Maine ease. An examination of that ease discloses that the allegedly quoted material is not to be found therein.
The provisions of section 29 are incorporated in the present Michigan vehicle code, PA 1949, No 300, § 401 (CLS 1961, § 257.401 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2101]).—Reporter.
" 'You are to be in all things regulated and governed,' said the gentleman, 'by fact. We hope to have, before long, a board of faet, composed of commissioners of fact, who will force the people to be a people of fact, and of nothing but fact.' " Dielcens, Hard Times (Oxford Univ Press ed, 1955), ch 2, p 7.
CL 1948, § 750.422 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.664).
See, also, Johnson v. People's First National Bank & Trust Co. (1958), 394 Pa 116, 121 (145 A2d 716, 718); Long v. Landy (1961), 35 NJ 44, 50, 51 (171 A2d 1, 4); Germillion v. Caffey (La App 1954), 71 So 2d 670, 672.
See, also, Johnson v. Ottomeier (1954), 45 Wash 2d 419 (275 P2d 723); Welch v. Davis (1951), 410 Ill 130 (101 NE2d 547, 28 ALR2d 656); Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson (1951), 212 Miss 335 (54 So 2d 476); Fitzpatrick v. Owens (1916), 124 Ark 167 (186 SW 832, 187 SW 460, LRA 1917B, 774).
Ill Anno Stat, c 68, § 1.—Reporter.
See 23A McKinney's Consol Laws of NY, General Obligations Law, § 3-313; and 27 McKinney's Consol Laws of NY, Insurance Law, § 167, subd (3).