Case Name: Adams and others vs. Green and others
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1861-03-04
Citations: 34 Barb. 176
Docket Number: 
Parties: Adams and others vs. Green and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 176–186

Head Matter:
Adams and others vs. Green and others.
As between the executor and the heir or devisee of a vendor, a contract for the sale of land is personal estate, and goes to the executor, and not to the heir or devisee.
Hence, in an action by the devisees of the vendor, against the vendee, to recover the balance of purchase money due upon the contract, the executor of the vendor should be joined as plaintiff. Johnson, J. dissented.
APPEAL by the defendants from an order made at a special term, overruling a demurrer to the amended complaint. On the 5th of November, 1847, Abner Adams and the defendant Green made and executed the agreement set forth in the complaint, whereby Adams covenanted to convey the premises therein described to Green, his heirs and assigns, on payment of $1050 and interest, in ten installments, the last of which became due on the 1st day of January, 1857. All the payments were-to be made “previous to the party of the first part executing a deed to the party of the second part.” Green entered into possession, and afterwards transferred his interest in the contract to the defendant Wadhams, who leased the premises to the defendant Smith. In January, 1848, the vendor died/ leaving a will, by which he devised to his two sons, the plaintiffs, the land and the contract. Green and his assigns made default in their payments, and the contract has been violated for years on their part. ' By the will Myron Adams, one of the plaintiffs, was appointed executor, and this action was originally commended by him, praying for a foreclosure of the contract, a sale of the premises to pay the amount due, and judgment for the deficiency against Green. To this original complaint the defendants demurred, and alleged as the grounds thereof, 1st. That it did not appear the plaintiff had any interest "in the subject matter of the action. 2d. It appeared that other parties should be plaintiffs, 3d. That the facts and circumstances alleged in the complaint,, were not sufficient in law to maintain the action. The demurrer was sustained by Judge Johnson, at special term, on two grounds, as appears by his written opinion: 1st. Because the fee of the land was in the devisees of the vendor, subject to the contract, and was not assets in the hands of the executor, by our statute, 2d. Because, in any view, the heirs or devisees of the vendor held the land in trust for the purchaser, or his assigns, and should as such be parties to the action. Upon that decision the complaint was amended, and put in its present form. In the amended complaint,, the plaintiffs sued as devisees, and Myron Adams was not joined in his character of executor of the vendor. The complaint set forth the above facts, and alleged that the defendant Green had not complied with the conditions of said contract, but had made default in the payment of the sums therein agreed to be paid, nor had any person paid said sums; and that there is now actually due and unpaid the sum of $200, and interest thereon from the 9th day of March, 1857, and which the plaintiffs, befóte the commencement of this action, had repeatedly demanded of each and all of the defendants. The plaintiffs therefore prayed that the defendants might discover whether there is or are any, and what liens or incumbrance upon, or affecting their or either of their interests in or to said contract, or the premises therein described, subsequent to the date of said contract; and if so, in whom the same is vested, and that an account might be taken by and under the direction of the court of what is due and owing to the plaintiffs for principal and interest on said contract; and that the said defendants Green and Wadhams might be adjudged to pay to the plaintiffs what should be found to be due on taking the said account, together with the costs of this action, or in default thereof, that the defendants and all persons claiming under them, or either of them, might be absolutely debarred and foreclosed of and from all right and equity of redemption in or to said premises, and every part thereof, and that they might deliver up to the plaintiffs the said contract and all other papers in their custody or power relating to or concerning said premises, or any part thereof, and that the plaintiffs might have further or other relief, &c. To this complaint the defendants demurred and alleged, 1st. That the plaintiffs have no interest in the contract. 2d. That other-parties should be plaintiffs. 3d. Ho performance on the part of the vendor is shown. 4th. Ho tender of a deed is shown. 5th. The facts and circumstances are not sufficient to maintain the action. '
G. H. Mumford, for the appellant.
D. C. Hyde, for the respondents.

Opinion:
E. Darwin Smith. J.
In the case of Moore v. Burrows we were prepared at the last December term to decide that as between the executor and heir of a vendor, a con-, tract for the sale of lands was personal estate, and went to the executor and not to the heir. Before the decision was announced this case came on for argument, and as my brother Johnson was not satisfied with the proposed decision of that case we allowed the argument in this to proceed as though the question were an open one, and retained that case, with this, under advisement for further consideration. In looking into the case anew and reviewing the aúthorities, I am unable to come to any other conclusion upon the question than that which is expressed in the opinion in that case. The legislature of this state have impliedly if not expressly asserted the rule to be as stated in Moore v. Burrows, in section 99, art. 7, chap. 1st of part 3d of the revised statutes, (3 R. S. 275, 5th ed.) which is as follows"The supreme court or a county court shall have power to decree and compel a specific performance by any infant heir or other person of any bargain, contract or agreement, made by any party who may die before the performance thereof, on petition of the executors or administrators of the estate of the deceased, or of any person or persons interested in such bargain, contract or agreement, and on hearing all parties concerned and being satisfied that the specific performance of such bargain, contract or agrees ment ought to be decreed or compelled." This provision im-r pliedly assumes that the purchase money is personal estate, and goes to the executor or administrator. It is in effect a provision whereby they may, upon the payment to them of the purchase money, execute the contract of the vendor by procuring a conveyance from his heirs to the vendee. The question was expressly decided in the case of Farrier, v. The Earl of Winterton, by Lord Langdale, master of the rolls, reported in 6 Jurist of 1842, p. 204. The question was whether the devisee of the land contracted to be sold by the testatrix in her lifetime, or the personal representatives, were entitled to the purchase money remaining unpaid on a contract for the sale of the land. It was held that the devisee had no interest in the purchase money, but that the money in question belonged to the personal representatives. (See also 2 Story's Eq. § 790; Hill v. Ressegieu, 17 Barb, 166; Lewis v. Smith, 5 Selden, 502; Roberts v. Merchants, 1 Hare, 547; S. C. 23 Eng. Ch. 547.) In the last mentioned case the administrator of a vendor who had died intestate filed his bill against the purchaser, for a specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. It was objected that the heir was a necessary party to the suit. It was held that the objection was a valid one, and that the purchaser in such a case, when sued for a specific performance of his contract, is entitled to have the question of the validity of the contract decided in the presence of the vendor, or if the vendor be dead, in the presence of the party who represents him. In this case the action is brought without making the executor a party. Calvert, on Parties in Equity, (p. 293,) says that "when a.vendor dies after having entered into an agreement to sell, and makes a devise of all his real estate, both the real and personal representatives are necessary parties, the former that they may convey the property contracted for, and the latter that they may give a discharge for the purchase money." It follows from these authorities that the demurrer in this case is well taken, on the ground that the executor is a necessary party to the suit. Judgment should therefore be given for the defendant, on the demurrer, with leave to the plaintiff to amend by adding the proper parties, on payment of costs.
Knox, J. concurred.
Ante, page 173.