Case Name: Rachael Zuckerman, as Administratrix, etc., of Abraham Zuckerman, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York City Railway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-08
Citations: 117 A.D. 378
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rachael Zuckerman, as Administratrix, etc., of Abraham Zuckerman, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York City Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 378–379

Head Matter:
Rachael Zuckerman, as Administratrix, etc., of Abraham Zuckerman, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York City Railway Company, Appellant.
First Department,
February 8, 1907.
Evidence — erroneous admission of prior statements to corroborate witness;
Although a witness on cross-examination has been asked if he did not make a certain oral statement concerning an accident, having denied'that he "did, it is error to permit him on redirect examination to testify as to what statement he did make; and where the witness was an important one in establishing the plaintiff’s casé, and the statement testified to was in corroboration of his direct testimony, the error is ground for a reversal.
Appeal by the defendant, the New York City Railway Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 14th day of April, 1906, upon the verdict of a jury for $6,000, and also from an order, entered in said clerk’s office on the 24th day of April, 1906, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
■Charles F. Brown, for the appellant.
Thomas J. O’Neill, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam :
In this action for damages resulting from the death of plaintiff's ' intestate, the principal question of fact was whether the deceased had come to his death by leaving the car while it was running at full speed, or whether he had been thrown to the ground by the negligent starting of the car while he was alighting. An important witness for the plaintiff was one Hetsch, who professed to have seen the accident. Upon cross-examination he was asked whether he had not made, certain statements both at the coroner's inquest and to certain policemen. He denied that he had made the statements con eerning which he was interrogated. Upon his redirect examination, under the objection and exception of the defendant, the witness was .permitted to testify as to what he did say to the policeman some time after the accident happened. This was clearly error, for nothing is better settled than that the evidence of a witness upon the trial cannot be corroborated by proof of statements previously made by him. (Dechert v. Municipal Electric Light Co., 39 App. Div. 490, 496.) The questions put to the witness on cross-examination did not open the door to the introduction of the objectionable evidence, for the witness denied having made the contradictory statements concerning which he was then asked. There was, therefore, no room for the application of the rule that a witness who has been required to give a part of a statement or conversation, may be permitted to give the whole thereof. (Sexton v. Onward Construction Co., 93 App. Div. 144.) In view of the weight undoubtedly given by the jury to the testimony of this witness, and the general character of his evidence, we cannot say that his self-corroboration did. not influence the verdict.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.-
Present — Patterson, P. J., McLaughlin, Houghton, Scott and Lambert, JJ.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event. Order filed.