Case Name: A.J. STOVALL, Appellant v. W.L. HAYES and Holly Springs Tire, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-06-17
Citations: 984 So. 2d 1079
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-02144-COA
Parties: A.J. STOVALL, Appellant v. W.L. HAYES and Holly Springs Tire, Appellees.
Judges: Before LEE, P.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 984
Pages: 1079–1086

Head Matter:
A.J. STOVALL, Appellant v. W.L. HAYES and Holly Springs Tire, Appellees.
No. 2006-CA-02144-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 17, 2008.
Latrice Westbrooks, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
Kent E. Smith, Justin Strauss Cluck, Holly Springs, attorneys for appellees.
Before LEE, P.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ.

Opinion:
LEE, P.J.,
for the Court.
FACTS
¶ 1. A.J. Stovall began experiencing problems with his 1998 Plymouth Dodge Neon in April 2005. A dispute over the bill for repairs made to the car led to this suit.
¶ 2. After attempts at several other automotive shops to get his Plymouth Dodge Neon repaired, Stovall took his car to Holly Springs Tire in Holly Springs, Mississippi. A mechanic at Holly Springs Tire, Greg Wilson, told Stovall he could fix the car. Upon Wilson's statement, Stovall told him, "if you can fix it, then fix it." Stovall left the car at Holly Springs Tire the following Monday, August 15, 2005, and picked it up later that day. When Stovall picked up the car, he talked to William Hayes, the manager. Hayes gave Stovall a receipt for $162. The receipt was for wiper blades, a thermostat, and coolant in the air conditioner. Although he felt some of the purchases were unnecessary, Stovall did not complain about the receipt and paid for the parts and repairs. Stovall left the shop, and before driving too far from Holly Springs, the car began running hot again. He had it towed back to Holly Springs Tire. Wilson did more diagnostic testing and determined that the car needed a water pump. Stovall purchased the water pump, which Wilson installed. Wilson then informed Stovall that the water pump did not correct the problem and that the car needed a new timing belt.
¶ 3. Stovall purchased and delivered a timing belt to Holly Springs Tire. Once the timing belt was replaced, Wilson ran another test on the car and determined that the car's head gasket needed to be replaced. Stovall purchased and delivered the head gasket, which fixed the car's problem of running hot. The cost of the additional labor was not discussed. Sto-vall's car remained at Holly Springs Tire for the next two weeks.
¶ 4. According to Stovall, he initially told Wilson that he did not want to spend much money on the ear. Stovall testified that he asked for a flat rate for the repairs to the car. He stated that Wilson quoted him a price of $200. Stovall also stated that before he paid the $200 he wanted to test drive the car for two days. Stovall said Wilson accepted his terms by saying, "deal." Wilson denied ever quoting Sto-vall a price for the repair. Wilson and Hayes testified that all estimates are handled by Hayes and that the mechanics are not authorized to give estimates.
¶ 5. When Stovall went to pick up his car, he was given a bill for $868.22. Sto-vall took the bill to Wilson to dispute the amount. Wilson sent Stovall to Hayes who reduced the bill by $200. Stovall refused to pay.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 6. On September 30, 2005, Stovall filed a replevin action in the Marshall County Justice Court against Hayes and Holly Springs Tire. The justice court ruled in favor of Hayes and Holly Springs Tire and ordered Stovall to pay $400 for the return of his car. Stovall appealed the decision to the Marshall County Circuit Court. After a hearing, the circuit court found that the oral contract was modified by a subsequent course of dealings and course of conduct. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Hayes and Holly Springs Tire in the amount of $868.22 and ordered that Stovall be given possession of the car.
¶ 7. Stovall now appeals asserting the following issue: whether the circuit court erroneously found that mutuality of consent existed between Stovall and any representative of Holly Springs Tire to modify their original agreement to repair the car for $200. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. In reviewing the decision of a trial judge sitting without a jury, this Court may only reverse when the findings of the trial judge are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Singley v. Smith, 844 So.2d 448, 451(¶ 9) (Miss.2003). A circuit judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference as a chancellor; his or her findings will not be overturned if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Additionally, when sitting as the finder of fact, the trial judge has the sole authority for determining the credibility of witnesses. Yarbrough v. Camphor, 645 So.2d 867, 870 (Miss.1994).
DISCUSSION
¶ 9. Stovall argues that he made a verbal contract with Wilson to make any necessary repairs to his car for $200, and this contract was not modified by any subsequent dealings. Stovall also argues that Wilson had apparent authority to act as an agent for Holly Springs Tire, and Stovall relied to his detriment on representations made by Wilson. Hayes and Holly Springs Tire argue in response that Hayes, as the manager, was the only one authorized to give price quotes, and no discussion regarding price took place between Stovall and Wilson.
¶ 10. The circuit court found as follows: The agreement, if any, that was entered into couldn't have plausibly deemed [sic] to have included the various and sundry changes in the scope of the work in connection with the repair of the car and any express or implied agreement that was modified by the subsequent course of dealings and the course of conduct of the plaintiff and defendant....
¶ 11. When the discussion, if any, of Stovall paying a set price of $200 took place, the item needing to be replaced was a timing belt. The mechanic later discovered that the head gasket, not the timing belt, was the problem. Stovall admits a mutual agreement was made that the part which needed to be replaced differed from the original agreement. However, Stovall argues that, regardless of the change in work that needed to be done, there was no mutuality of consent to change the price.
¶ 12. "Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or modified by subsequent agreement of the parties." Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So.2d 726, 731 (Miss.1992) (quoting 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 574 at 373-75 (1960)). In order for such a subsequent agreement to effect a modification, it must meet the requirements for a valid contract. Singing River Mall Co. v. Mark Fields, Inc., 599 So.2d 938, 947 (Miss.1992). A valid contract requires an offer and acceptance. R.C. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Office Sys., 622 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Miss.1993). Failure to communicate acceptance of an offer is fatal to creation of a valid contract. Id.
¶ 13. Presented with conflicting evidence, the circuit court did not rule on whether an oral contract was formed setting a price of $200. This Court also finds it unnecessary to determine if a contract was formed. Even if an oral contract was formed, the original terms of the purported contract were modified when the mechanic discovered the head gasket, rather than the timing belt, needed to be replaced. No agreement was made as to price once the parties agreed to the replacement of the head gasket.
¶ 14. Stovall argues that the following evidence showed his lack of mutual consent to change the price: "(1) he continuously asked if the charge will [sic] still be $200 and (2) the price of $868.22 was reduced by $200." We cannot find these two assertions to be evidence of lack of mutual consent. First, no evidence was presented that Stovall "continuously asked" if the charge would be $200. Stovall testified that he would stop by the shop to ask when the car would be ready, but he did not testify that he discussed a price. Second, his testimony that Hayes offered to reduce the bill by $200 does not show that they agreed to a set price of $200. To the extent Stovall may be asserting that he is entitled to a $200 reduction from the price of $868.22 due to Hayes's offer to reduce the bill, we And that argument without merit. Hayes's offer to reduce the bill was an attempt to settle the dispute. Stovall did not accepted the offer and instead instituted litigation. We cannot find that Hayes can be bound by the offer at this point. We find Stovall's assertions to be without merit.
¶ 15. We find the circuit court's decision was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous in finding that an oral contract setting a price for services at $200, even if formed, was modified by the subsequent agreement for additional services.
¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY ROBERTS, J.