Case Name: William H. COYLE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-06-06
Citations: 785 So. 2d 1254
Docket Number: No. 4D00-4744
Parties: William H. COYLE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Respondent.
Judges: STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 785
Pages: 1254–1260

Head Matter:
William H. COYLE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Respondent.
No. 4D00-4744.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 6, 2001.
William H. Coyle, Fort Lauderdale, pro se.
Dina Athanasopoulos, Assistant City Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
William Coyle seeks review of a circuit court order that denied his request for belated review of a 1996 county court conviction. We find evidence to support the Commissioner's findings, and deny relief.
In December 1996, William Coyle was found guilty of trespass. In November 1998, and the beginning of 1999, Coyle filed motions in the county court seeking a new trial and to set aside his conviction. The county court denied those motions in March 1999.
On February 5, 1999, Coyle filed a "Motion for Leave to Proceed to Appeals Court." The records provided to this court do not include an order disposing of that motion.
Coyle sought review in the circuit court of the March 1999 order, and also filed a petition for belated appeal. The trial court denied relief. Coyle sought review in this court.
Our concern arose from Coyle's allegation that "no notice of right to appeal" was provided by the county court. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.670. There is no dispute that Coyle was seeking relief beyond the two-year period as set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(4). Rule 9.141(c)(4) provides as follows:
(A) A petition for belated appeal shall not be filed more than 2 years after the expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal from a final order, unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner
(i) was unaware an appeal had not been timely filed or was not advised of the right to an appeal; and
(ii) should not have ascertained such facts by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The rule provides that the two-year time period shall not begin to run prior to January 1, 1997. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4)(C). The committee notes to the former rule 9.140(j)(3) state that such language was to ensure that defendants convicted "before the effective date of the rule will not have their rights retroactively extinguished but will be subject to the time limits as calculated from the effective date of the rule unless the time has already commenced to run under rule 3.850." See Patterson v. State, 736 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(en banc).
In Patterson, we permitted belated review of a 1992 order denying post-conviction relief wherein the defendant was not advised of his right to appeal. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(g). The defendant's petition was timely filed under rule 9.141. We declined to engage in a laches analysis because of the adoption of rule 9.141, and its specific time limitation. Compare Nava v. State, 652 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(permitting belated review of 1989 order where State failed to prove laches and specific prejudice to bar delayed belated review).
We recognized in Patterson that our decision was of very limited application as the two-year window created by rule 9.141 had already closed. Hence, no petition for a belated appeal from an order entered earlier than January 1, 1997, could be entertained unless it was filed prior to December 31, 1998, or unless the petitioner could establish relief from the two-year •period.
Since Coyle's petition was filed after December 1998, we remanded Coyle's case to the circuit court for fact finding with respect to the "reasonable diligence" component of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(3). See Coyle v. Walker, 767 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). After considering the Commissioner's report, the circuit court concluded that Coyle "with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained his appellate rights." Wé now deny relief as the transcript of the Commissioner's hearing supports that finding.
STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. The current rule is 9.141. At the time Coyle was convicted, the rule was 9.140(j)(3).