Case Name: Marshall et al. v. Moseley
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1860-03
Citations: 21 N.Y. 280
Docket Number: 
Parties: Marshall et al. v. Moseley.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 303–319

Head Matter:
Marshall et al. v. Moseley.
Apportionment of Rent.—Parties.
Rent is not apportionable between the executors of tenant for life, and the remainder-men; and this, notwithstanding the tenancy for life is created as a provision for a widow.
Several persons interested, as tenants in common, in a sum of money in the hands of the defendant, may join in an action for its recovery.
Appeal from the general term of the Superior Court of the city of Buffalo, where there "was an affirmance of a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
This was an action for money had and received, brought by the devisees in remainder, under the will of Bela D. Coe, deceased, against the executor and residuary legatee of the widow, to whom the testator had given an estate for life, to recover the rents of the real estate which accrued after the decease of the tenant for life, and were collected by her executor.
'"'The defendant, who had intermarried with the widow, claimed to apportion the rents for the current quarter, which became due after the death of the tenant for life; and also contended that the plaintiffs could not maintain a joint action to recover the fund in his hands. On these grounds, he moved for a nonsuit, on the trial, which Avas refused, and the plaintiffs had a verdict and judgment; and, after an affirmance at general term, the defendant took this appeal.
Sprague, for the appellant.
Ganson, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Comstock, C. J.
Mrs. Coe, by virtue of her husband's Avill, had a life-estate in the premises, out of which the rents in question accrued, and the plaintiffs owned the remainder in fee. She died April 5th, 1855, the leases being then unexpired; on the first of May following, the rents became due for the preceding quarter of a year. The defendant is the executor and residuary legatee of Mrs. Coe, and having collected the rents for- the whole quarter, the principal question in the case is, whether he is entitled to apportion them, by dividing the fiuar^er *into *wo periods °f t-ime, one before and the other after her death, and by retaining in his own hands the portion which accrued before that event. . .
As rent follows the reversionary estate, the law allows it to be apportioned, where that estate becomes divided amongst different owners; this is according to the maxim, " accessorium sequitur naturam sui principalisThus, if a reversion descend, on the death of the ancestor who gave the lease, and the coparceners or heirs make a partition, the rent will be apportioned in favor of each of them. So, if the reversion be severed by will, or even, by conveyance of the owner, the same result will take place. (2 Platt on Leases 131, 132, and cases cited.) But the same reasons never existed for apportioning rent on the principle of time, where the tenant was bound to pay it at stated periods. The sum accruing between each of the times of payment was a single entire debt, and was due only on the condition precedent of the tenant being entitled to enjoy the premises for the time in respect to which it was payable. If, therefore, a person having a life-estate, with. no power to make a lease to continue longer than during his life, should make a lease for years, reserving rent half-yearly, and should die in the middle of a half-year, the rent, according to the principles of the common law, would be lost for the half of a year. The executor or representative of the lessor could not recover it, because, by the nature of the contract, the lessor was not -entitled to it, except in the sums and at the times specified in the lease. His successor in the reversionary estate could not claim it, for the additional reason, that the reversion was not his, until the lease itself' •was terminated by the death of the life-tenant who gave-it. If the lessee continues to hold afterwards, such holding is necessardy under some new contract with the party on whom the estate has devolved. (Woodfall's Land, and Ten. 248; 1 Salk. 65; 1 P. Wms. 892; 2 Id. 501, 502; 1 Man. & Gr. 589; 13 N. H. 343; 11 Mass. 493.)
If, however, the lease continues, although, intermediate the days of payment, the reversion passes wholly into new hands, the obligation of the lessee to pay rent continues also. Thus, *in the middle of a quarter, ^ ' the lessor may convey the whole estate which is under the lease, or it may be sold under execution or mortgage, or he may die, leaving it to descend to his heirs, or he may dispose of it by will. The lease itself is unaffected by these events, and the rent is, therefore, payable as though they did not occur; but it is payable only in the sums and at times specified in the demise. The reversion maybe transmitted-to a new owner, during a period between the days of payment, but such an event does not divide the obligation of the tenant; the accruing rent follows the reversion 'wheresoever that goes, and neither the former owner nor his representative can recover any portion of it. Being recoverable only in a single sum. and not until the prescribed day of payment, the common law gives it to him who is the reversioner atv that time, and no case can be found where a court of equity has adopted a different rule. Says Mr. Woodfall. (Law of Landlord and Tenant 248), " at'common law, rent cannot be apportioned, but the reversioner becomes entitled to the accruing rent from, the rent-day antecedent to the decease of the tenant for life, whose representative was entitled to the arrearages due at some rent-day before the death of the testator,.or the intestate; for the= law does not apportion rent in- point of time, nor does equity." (See also 2 Greenleaf's Cruise, p. 116, § 44, 45, 46; Ex parte Smyth, 1 Swanst. 337, and note; and other cases cited supra.)
It is true, there are in the English books some cases of a peculiar kind, where, on the death of a tenant for life, before the day of paying rent for the current quarter or other period, the rent has been divided between his representative and the remainder-man; but these are all cases in which the lease terminated on the decease of the life-tenant ; either because he had no power to lease, so as to affect the remainder-man, or because, if such a power was .given to him, it had been defectively executed, and the lessee, holding the premises until the rent-dajq voluntarily paid the whole to the person who succeeded to the estate. In all the cases of this kind, the lessee was not, at common law, bound to pay at all for so much of the time since the last rent-day, as had elapsed ^before the death of the tenant for life, but having conscientiously paid for the whole time, the person Avho took the estate in remainder Avas held by the courts of equity •to have received for the use of the executor of his life-tenant, so much of the rent as accrued beyond his decease. (Ex parte Smyth, supra; Paget v. Gee, 1 Amb. 199.) In these instances, the rent actually paid Avas apportioned or divided on the principle of time; but cases of this kind have no tendency to show that such an apportionment can be made, when the lease remains as before, notAvithstanding a change of parties entitled to the rents takes place intermediate the rent-days. The lessee, in that case, is bound to pay for the Avhole time, and the reversioner, or remainder-man, takes the rent as an entire sum due to him by the terms of the contract.
The Avell-ascertained rules of the common laAv are, therefore, opposed to the claim of the defendant to retain any portion of the rents received by him for the quarter during which his testator, the life-tenant, died. The leases Avere.not determined by that event, and the plain tiffs, who as remainder-men succeeded tb the reversion, Avere entitled to the Avhole of those rents. It has also been observed, that the courts of equity have never departed from the rule of hnv on this subject. •
It seems hardly necessary to say notv, that there is no legislation of this state Avhich the defendant can invoke in support of his claim. In England, one of the rules of laAv in regard to apportionment of rent Avas abrogated by an act of parliament, passed in the reign of George II. That statute. (2 Geo. II., c. 19), after noticing that, by the existing rule, rents Avere frequently lost, where a lessor having only a life-estate died before or on the day Avhen it Avould be payable, declared, that Avhen any tenant for life should happen so to die, his executor or administrator might recover the Avhole rent in arrear, in case such death took place on the day fixed for payment, or if it happened before that day, then a proportion, according to time, making all just alloAvances, &c. That legislation, with some change in phraseology, has been folloAved in this state. Our statute (1 R. L. 438; 1 R. S. 747, § 22) provides that AAdien a tenant "x"for life, Avho shall have demised lands, shall die before the day Avhen any rent is to become due, his executors' may recover "the proportion of rent Avhich accrued before his death." In the case provided for, therefore, rent can be apportioned in opposition to the rule of the common laAv, and a recovery had, Avhere, but for the statute, the rent would be lost. But the statute does not include the present case: the leases in question Avere not given by a tenant for life, but by the OAvner of the fee, and the disputed rent Avas not liable to bo lost, because the plaintiffs, succeeding to the reversion, could recover the Avhole of it by action founded on the very leases themselves. The English statute, like ours, Avas enacted to remedy the apparent injustice of the rule Avhich absolved a lessee from paying any rent, where his interest Avas determined betAveen the rent-days, by the expiration of a life-estate on which the lease depended.
More recent legislation in England has gone still further. The-statute of 4 Win. IV., c. 22, after reciting that by law rents due at fixed periods were not apportionable, and after reciting the inconvenience of that rule, proceeds to declare that all rents made payable at such periods, under any instrument executed after the passing of the act, should be apportioned, so that on the termination, by death or any other means, of the estate of the person entitled to the rents, such person, or his representative, should have a nortion of such rents, according to the time elapsed since the last period of payment. By a further provision, the entire rent is to be received and recovered from the tenant, by the person who would be entitled to recover it, if the act had not been passed, and is to be held by him subject to apportionment, which can be enforced against him by suit at law, or in equity. It will be seen, that this statute recognises the old rule, while it declares a new one for future leases, and that it also carefully protects the tenant against more than one action for the entire rent.
We have no such legislation in this state. If we should adopt the principle of that statute, in regard to apportionment, without legislative interference, we should not only change the existing law, but the change must be made without the protection to tenants which English ^statute secures. If we declare rent tobe apportionable in cases like the present, it will' follow, according to our rules of pleading and practice, that each party entitled to a share may sue the tenant to recover it. To illustrate, if the defendant has no interest in the rents now in question, then he cannot retain the portion in his hands; if he has an interest, then, to that extent, he could, under our practice, recover so much as belonged to him, by suit against the tenants, if they had not paid these rents. And I think, that even a notice to the tenants of his claim to a share, would take away from them their right to pay the entire sum to the persons who, as remainder-men, would be entitled to the other share. To conclude, on this point, we find that the rule of law denying apportionment in a case like this, has never been shaken; and whatever may be the arguments, founded in justice or expediency, in favor of a different rule, we think those, arguments should be addressed to the legislature, rather than to the courts.
The life-estate and the remainder in fee, between which the apportionment is claimed, were created by the will of Mr. Coe, by whom the leases were given, and it has been insisted, that we ought to construe the will favorably to his widow, and on that ground allow the apportionment to take place. But we see no room for any construction which will take the case out of the general rule of law. Of course, the life-estate given was intended by the testator as a part, and perhaps the principal part, of the provision made for his widow, but it was given simply as a lilo-estate, with remainder over to the plaintiffs; and it does not appear even to have been in lieu of dower in any other real estate -which he may have owned. The widow became entitled to the rents as incident to her life-estate in the reversion; but as that estate terminated between the periods for payment, the rent accruing, but not yet due, became at once annexed to the estate of those who succeeded her in such reversion. No part of it could be severed at that point of time; to make an exception, in such a case, to the general rule, would be virtually to deny the existence of the rule altogether. It may be well to observe, that rents are unlike annuities, and unlike *the interest of money; they issue out of land, and are a part of the land; they are less capable of division, or apportionment, according to a precise measure of time, because the value of the tenant's enjoyment may be quite different at different periods of the year, and the value, moreover, may very much depend on the enjoyment for the full time-specified in the lease.
It was also claimed in the argument, that an amicable apportionment of the rents in question was made between the defendant and the other parties interested—they allowing him to retain, without objection, such portion as accrued before the death of Mrs. Coe—and that this arrangement ought to be held conclusive; but we think that nothing 'was done having any legal significance. If the plaintiffs had collected the rents from the tenants, and then, under a mistake of the law, had voluntarily paid to the defendant the share which he claimed, it is quite likely they could not recover the money back. But such are not the facts; the defendant appointed an agent, who collected the entire rents of the quarter for him, and he then divided them according to time, and paid over to the plaintiffs so much as accrued after the death of the tenant for life. The most that can be said is, that they received so much of the fund, without claiming, at the time, any more. I do not doubt, that all the parties misapprehended the rule of law on the subject, but I see nothing in the facts which extinguished the right of the plaintiffs to the whole rent. Their right of action against the defendant .arose, when he received the whole, and nothing afterwards happened which impaired that right; their acceptance of a portion of the sum which belonged to them, without making further claim, at the time, clearly could have no such effect.
The remaining question is, whether the plaintiffs can maintain the action jointly? We are of opinion, that they can. If the rents had not been collected from the tenants, the plaintiffs, to whom it belonged, as tenants in common of the reversion, might have joined in an action to recover it. This rule appears to be extremely well settled; the only doubt suggested by the ^authorities being, whether they could sever in their suits, if they had elected to do so. (Sherman v. Ballou, 8 Cow. 304; Decker v. Livingston, 15 Johns. 482; Decharms v. Horwood, 10 Bing. 526; Martin v. Crompe, 1 Ld. Raymond 350; Hill v. Gibbs, 5 Hill 56.) These authorities will also show that the plaintiffs, having the same common interest in the money Avliich the defendant received, as rent Avliich belonged to them, can unite in their action to recover it out of his hands; and this Ave think is also clear on principle. We are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.
Remedied by act of 1875, c. 542 ; which, however, has no retroactive effect. Irving v. Rankine, 13 Hun 147.