Case Name: Gwinn v. Crawford
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1875-12-13
Citations: 42 Iowa 63
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gwinn v. Crawford.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 63–75

Head Matter:
Gwinn v. Crawford.
1. Instruction: incompleteness of. Where an instruction presents a correct general rule of law, and adds thereto one of several qualifications which under certain contingencies might modify the rule, the giving of the one qualification or the failure to give them all does not constitute error justifying a reversal.
2. —:-: -: practice. If an instruction does not fully develop the theory of the law of the case entertained by either party, he should ask a specific additional instruction embodying the principle he deems material.
3.-----:--:--. In an action to recover money alleged to have been extorted by threats and violence, the following was given as a part of an instruction: “ But if you find that the same (the money) was voluntarily given up and paid by plaintiff to defendant on claims which defendant held in his own right against W. E. Gwinn, the husband of plaintiff, you will find for defendant:” Held, that the words “in his own right,” without the addition of language implying that the liability of defendant was not affected by the character in which he obtained the money, did not vitiate the instruction. Beck, J., dissenting.
4.--:-. The first count of a petition claimed to recover money obtained by duress; the second asked, in addition to this amount, dam- ' ages for the violent treatment. The jury found for the plaintiff in a sum greater than the amount alleged to have been obtained by duress: Held, that an instruction presenting the law solely with reference to the recovery of the money, although erroneous, was error without prejudice.
Appeal from Monona Circuit Court,
Monday, December 13.
An opinion reversing the judgment below was announced, filed and recorded in this case at the June term, 1874. In the vacation following, and within the time prescribed, the appellee’s counsel filed a petition for rehearing. A reply thereto was ordered and filed, and we have given to the case a further and more deliberate consideration. The action is at law, and the petition contains two counts. The first count alleged that on December 21, 1871, the defendant, by threats of violence to the person of the plaintiff, caused her, under the duress of such threats, to surrender to him the sum of eighteen hundred and seventy dollars, the individual property of the plaintiff, for which sum, together with interest from the date of surrender, she claimed to recover on this count.
The second count alleged that on the date aforesaid the defendant assaulted and maltreated the plaintiff in a most cruel and inhuman manner; that he imprisoned her in a room in her own house when she was weak in body and enciente, and threatened to strip the clothes from her body, to expose her person, and to take every cent of money she might have, and did actually rob her of eighteen hundred and seventy dollars, and thereby injured lier health, caused her great pain and suffering and the premature birth of her child, which is in a very delicate and unhealthy condition. She asks to recover on this count five thousand dollars damages, together with the eighteen hundred and seventy dollars, interest and costs.
For answer, the defendant denied the allegations of the petition, and for further defense alleged that on December 21, 1871, Wm. E. Gwinn, the husband of plaintiff, was indebted to defendant and to various other persons whose claims he had for collection, together amounting to over three thousand dollars; that said husband pretended to have failed in business, and to be unable to pay his debts; that in fact the said Gwinn had fraudulently and secretly placed in possession of plaintiff a large sum of money for the purpose of keeping it from and defrauding his creditors; that on said date plaintiff had the sum of eighteen hundred and seventy dollars, a portion of said money, concealed on her person, and defendant went to her house to collect said debts, and after considerable delay the plaintiff delivered the said eighteen hundred and Seventy dollars to defendant in part payment of said claims, and accepted a receipt for the same, which is still in her possession. Upon these issues, and in November, 1872, the cause was tried to a jury, who found a verdict for plaintiff for thirty-seven hundred and seventy-two dollars and fifty-five cents, and judgment was rendered thereon. The defendant appeals.
Isaac Pendleton and PT. B. Wilson, for appellant.
To constitute an assault there must be a present purpose to do injury. (2 Whart. Crim. Law, 1241.) The instructions of the court and findings of the jury should have been confined to the issues made by the pleadings. (Pollen v. Wisner & Vanvark, 11 Iowa, 190; Shaw v. Broion, 13 Id., 512.) It is error to instruct the jury to return damages in compensation for mental and bodily suffering and loss of health, when there has been no proof of pecuniary loss suffered thereby. (Gollins v. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; Kendrichson v. Kingsbury, 21 Id., 379.) Plaintiff’s possession of the money being fraudulent, she cannot maintain an action to recover it back (1 Hill, on Torts, p. 124.)
Joy <& Wright and John Currier, for appellee.
Whenever malice or insult has been an ingredient of a wrongful act, exemplary damages may be awarded. (.Anthony v. Gilbert, 4 Blackf., 348; Meyer v. Driscoli, 99 Mass, 281; Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio State, 277.) In trespass for seizing goods in possession of plaintiff, defendant cannot set up the title of a third person to defeat the action. (.DemicTc v. Chapman, 11 Johns, 132; Walpole v. Smith, 4 Blackf., 304.) The decision of the court below will not be reviewed under a general objection-. (Davenport G. <& G. Go. v. Dmenport, 13 Iowa, 229.) Where errors are not clearly assigned in the court below, the Supreme Court will not review the action of the court in overruling a motion for a new trial. (Peale v. Hendershott, 14 Iowa, 40; Stillwell v. Chappell, 30 Ind., 72.) If an instruction which lays down a correct rule of law is not comprehensive enough, the appellant should have asked that it be modified. (Miller v. Bryan, 3 Iowa, 58; Dixon v. Stew-ant, 33 Id., 125.) Whenever the wrongful act is accompanied by aggravating circumstances, they may properly be considered as showing the extent of the injury. (2 Green leaf on Ev., § 272.)

Opinion:
Cole, J.
-Upon the trial the court gave to the jury, among others, instruction No. 2, and by the former opinion of this court the judgment was reversed for an alleged error in that instruction, which is as follows: "The jury may first determine whether defendant made threats of personal violence towards plaintiff, and if so, whether plaintiff gave and surrendered to defendant the money in question through fear of such violence, and if so, whether plaintiff' was then the owner of said money, and if you so find all these issues, then you will find plaintiff entitled to recover the amount of such money with interest at the. rate of six per cent from the time defendant received the same. But if you find that the same was voluntarily given up and paid by plaintiff to defendant on claims which defendant held in his own right against W. E. Gwinn, the husband of plaintiff, you will find for defendant on this count of plaintiff's petition."
As to the correctness of this instruction, so far as it relates to the right of the plaintiff to recover, no objection is made, nor, indeed, can there be. It is insisted, however, and it was so held in the former opinion, that,in the last clause, which says, " but if you find that the same was voluntarily given up and paid by plaintiff to defendant, on claims which defendant held in his own right against W. E. Gwinn, the husband of plaintiff, you will find for the defendant on this count of plaintiff's petition," there was error because it was misleading.
The evidence tended to show that the defendant, at the time he received the money from plaintiff, held a claim against W. E. Gwinn of about eight hundred dollars in his own right, and about three thousand dollars of claims, which he held for collection, as agent of the owners thereof.
The precise point of objection is, that the last paragraph of the instruction limited the jury to the consideration of the claim which defendant held in his own right. There may be several answers to this objection.
First. The court correctly instructed the jury as to what they should find in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and, in the closing paragraph, undertook to state one fact, which if they should find, would require them to return a verdict for defendant. This part of the instruction was correct, but it did not state all of the facts which might also require the jury to find for the defendant. So far as the instruction went, it was correct and not misleading. "We have often held that if the instruction given does not embrace the whole of the law applicable to the case, it is the duty of the party desiring the full or broader instruction, to ask it; and if he fails to do so, he cannot object to that which was given correctly so far as it went. Thus, in Dixon v. Stewart, 33 Iowa, 125, it is said that,'" if in the judgment of defendant, this instruction was not sufficiently explicit, and did not fully develop his defense, he should have asked a specific instruction, embodying his view of the case." And in The State v. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350, the court held that, " when a general rule is correctly given by the instruction, but without qualifications, which are claimed to be material under the actual circumstances of the case, it will not be considered error, unless such qualifications were asked by the party complaining, and refused by the court." See, also, to the same effect, McCausland v. Cresap, 3 G. Greene, 161; Miller v. Bryan, 3 Iowa, 58; Ault v. Sloan, & Id., 508, and other cases. This case before us is one to which the doctrine of the cases cited most fitly applies. Here the court in the first instruction had stated the issues to the jury, and the instruction under consideration was the first given upon the legal rights of the parties. It gives to the jury a statement of the facts necessary for them to find in order to return a verdict for the' plaintiff, and might very properly have stopped there; but the court proceeded to state one fact, which, if the jury should also find, would defeat the plaintiff's right to their verdict.
Now, it is not questioned that, so far as the court gave the law in this respect, it was correct; but it is claimed that the court should also have added after the words, "on claims which defendant held in his own right," the words, "or.as agent of others for collection."
This additional fact might very properly have been added; but it would come quite as properly, and more naturally, in connection with the instruction upon the matter connected with the defendant's right to their verdict. In other words, and in the language of Dixon v. Stewart, supra, if the instruction did not fully develop the defense, the defendant should have asked a specific instruction embodying his view of the case.
Second. This instruction was, by its express terms, limited to the first count of the- plaintiff's petition. That count sought to recover the money simply from the defendant, which he had, as was' alleged in it, obtained from plaintiff by duress. The second count of the petition alleged the violent and forcible taking of the money by the defendant from the plaintiff, and sought to recover the money and damages for the violence and assault committed by defendant in taking it. The verdict of the jury shows that they did not find for plaintiff upon the first count, but that their verdict was based upon the second count; for that they found d amages for plaintiff for a considerable amount over and above the money taken by defendant and the interest thereon. Since, then, the instruction complained of was expressly limited to the first count of the petition, and it is certain beyond dispute that the verdict was rendered upon the second count, it is not possible that the instruction, even if erroneous, could have prejudiced the defendant.
Third. It is claimed in argument by appellant's counsel, as bearing upon the instruction under consideration, that One item of the defense consisted in the averment and claim that the money received by defendant was voluntarily given up by the plaintiff, and that the instruction was erroneous because it limited his right of defense to such money as was voluntarily given up to him on claims held in his own right. But it is clear that if this was erroneous, it did not work any prejudice to the defendant, for that the jury could not have found for the plaintiff under the second count, without first having found that no part of the money was voluntarily given up to him; and this, because the jury must have found, in order to return the verdict they did, that the same was taken by threats and violence from the plaintiff. •
These considerations, without taking time to present others, sufficiently show that the instruction complained of, even if it were erroneous and misleading in itself, did not work any prejudice to the defendant in this case.
As was said in the former opinion, urn do not think that any of the objections to the instructions are well fpun'ded.
After a careful reconsideration of the entire case we are convinced that the judgment should he
Affirmed.