Case Name: PEOPLE v. COPE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-06-25
Citations: 18 Mich. App. 14
Docket Number: Docket No. 4,286
Parties: PEOPLE v. COPE
Judges: Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 18
Pages: 14–20

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. COPE
Opinion op the Court
1. Arrest — Validity—Absence op Warrant.
Arrest without warrant for assault held, valid and reasonable where arresting officers knew of the shooting involved, had received information from other officers who had seen defendant in the area of the shooting and recorded the license number of his car, had traced the license number to defendant and had a witness’ description of the car from whieh the shots were fired that fit defendant’s car.
2. Searches and Seizures — Absence op Warrant — Waiver.
Defendant’s claim that the testimony of the arresting officer as to a gun found in his home during a search should be suppressed as evidence held, not valid where defendant, without coercion, waived the issuance of a search warrant and by consent permitted the search of his premises after being informed that the officers were looking for a gun.
3. Assault and Battery — Injuries—Testimony.
Testimony by complaining witness as to the extent of her injuries is properly admissible to show the aggravated nature of the assault in a prosecution for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
Opinion Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part Levin, J.
4. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Due Process — Evidence —Admissibility—Search and Seizure.
Due process requires that all parties in a crimmal prosecution have the right to he heard at an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of an arrest, search and seizure without a warrant; it was erroneous and a denial of this constitutional right for the trial cou/rt to deny defendant’s motion to quash evidence seized by police after hearing only the people’s witness, without allowing defendant to present evidence to support his motion and opposition to the people’s proofs.
References por Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 3, 440.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § § 27-29.
'2] 47 Am Jur, Searches and Seizures §§ 16, 71.
’3] 6 Am Jur 2d, Assault and Battery § 48.
>] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 410-418, 425-426.
'5] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 425, 426.
’01 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 411, 412, 425.
5. Evidence — Criminal Law — Motion to Suppress' — Discretion op the Court.
A motion to suppress evidence presents an issue to be decided by the court alone, who, in malcing its determination, must often resolve sharply disputed issues of fact by receiving testimony from both parties.
6. Criminal Law — Evidence — Self-Incrimination — Privilege ■— Waiver.
A criminal defendant has the right to testify on the issue of admissibility of evidence that was allegedly the subject of an improper search and seizure without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, and a ruling barring defendant from testifying at the evidentiary hearing and stipulating that any further evidence on the admissibility factor would have to be presented at trial, without clarification, could be talcen to mean that if defendant wished to be heard, he must talce the stand and waive his privilege against self-incrimination.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Vincent J. Brennan, J.
Submitted Division 1 May 13, 1969, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 4,286.)
Decided June 25, 1969.
Rehearing denied August 5, 1969.
Leave to appeal granted. Court of Appeals decision reversed and case remanded to Recorder’s Court with instructions December 31, 1969.
See 383 Mich 757.
Randell Cope was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Gahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Angelo A. Pentolino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Owen J. Galligan, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
Fitzgerald, P. J.
Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and sentenced to prison. On appeal, he presents three claims of error.
First, and most substantial, is the question of whether there was a valid arrest of defendant so as to permit a reasonable search of his apartment incident to the arrest.
A brief review of the events will detail the information available to the authorities before the arrest:
(1) Defendant's car, a 1965 dark colored Plymouth, was investigated at about 8:30 p.m. on August 14, 1965, by the Detroit police who were checking the ages of persons seen drinking.
(2) The police recorded the license number of the vehicle.
(3) The same automobile was seen parked in the same spot approximately one hour later (9:30 p.m.).
(4) The police saw the same Plymouth parked in a lot at the intersection of Evergreen and Warren in the vicinity of Rouge Park at approximately 12:30 a.m. of August 15, 1965.
(5) Charlestta Henderson was shot at 1:40 a.m. of August 15, 1965, in Rouge Park.
(6) A witness to the shooting described the automobile from which the shooting came as a "late model Plymouth."
(7) No other automobile of similar description was seen or checked by the police during that time.
(8) Defendant's name was obtained by tracing the license number through vehicle registration.
Based on the above, defendant was arrested. He agreed to a search of his premises. A gun was found in a refrigerator freezer which was later identified as the weapon involved in the shooting. .
The question, therefore, is whether the arrest was valid. This Court, in People v. Wolfe (1967), 5 Mich App 543, set out guidelines regarding arrests:
"It is the function of the court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would justify 'a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that an offense has been committed, in order to determine whether there has been a valid arrest without a warrant."
Thus,
"An officer must reasonably believe and not merely suspect that the person arrested has committed a felony before the officer may make an arrest without a warrant."
The facts recited above created more than mere suspicion. These facts would create a reasonable belief in a man of reasonable prudence that defendant had in fact committed the crime. See People v. Crawford (1969), 16 Mich App 92.
Second, defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to permit him to present testimony at the pretrial hearing on the invalid search and arrest.
The hearing on the motion to suppress consisted of the testimony of the arresting officer. He testified that he was admitted to defendant's apartment and allowed to search the premises without any threats or any other deceitful or artful measures. He further stated that he asked defendant if they could search for a gun and defendant said, "Yes, go ahead." Subsequently the revolver was found.
Defendant's objection is that he was not allowed to testify in his own behalf. It is clear that defend ant had a complete right of cross-examination of arresting officer Evans. The only thing that defendant could have possibly said was that he did not give the police permission to search. One may waive the issuance of a search warrant and by consent permit the search of his premises. People v. Weaver (1928), 241 Mich 616, and this is clearly what defendant elected to do.
The third matter on appeal relates to incidents during the trial. Defendant claims that allowing the complaining witness to testify as to the seriousness of her injuries was prejudicial. The case of People v. Sutherland (1895), 104 Mich 468, which allows such testimony to show the aggravated nature of an assault is directly on point and dispositive of this issue.
Other objections and portions of the prosecution's closing argument relating to specific questions have been examined and deemed not prejudicial.
Affirmed.
T. M. Burns, J., concurred.
MCLA § 750.84 (Stat Ann 1962 liev § 28.279),