Case Name: Succession of Joseph Isom FUSELIER
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-12-24
Citations: 325 So. 2d 296
Docket Number: No. 5133
Parties: Succession of Joseph Isom FUSELIER.
Judges: Before HOOD, MILLER, DOMEN--GEAUX, WATSON and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 325
Pages: 296–312

Head Matter:
Succession of Joseph Isom FUSELIER.
No. 5133.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 24, 1975.
Rehearings Denied Jan. 28, 1976.
Writs Refused March 9, 19, 1976.
Edwin A. Stoutz, Jr. and Robert R. Gis-evius, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Tate & Tate by Donald J. Tate, Donald Soileau, Mamou, for defendant-appellee.
Before HOOD, MILLER, DOMEN--GEAUX, WATSON and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
BEER, Judge.
Joseph Isom Fuselier, died on February 2, 1973, at Savoy Memorial Hospital in Mamou, Louisiana. While hospitalized he executed a last will and testament in statutory form dated January 30, 1973. In that will he recognized Linda Marie Fuselier (Mrs. Andre Sharp), as his daughter and bequeathed her one-half of the residue of his estate. The other half was bequeathed to decedent's son Joseph Donald Fuselier who, through his curatrix, Evangeline Le-doux Manuel, challenges the decedent's testamentary capacity and further contends that Linda Marie Fuselier was not the natural child of the decedent, or, alternatively, that .she was his illegitimate daughter.
The executrix, Grace McGee Fuselier, tacitly joins in the contention that Linda Marie Fuselier is the illegitimate daughter of Joseph Isom Fuselier by alleging that she "verily believes that the dispositions in favor of Linda Marie Fuselier are invalid as a legacy under Article 1483 of the Louisiana Civil Code and invalid as an alimentary allowance under the same article, considering the age and station in life of the purported legatee."
After trial of these issues, the district court concluded that Joseph Isom Fuselier had testamentary capacity and determined that Linda Marie Fuselier was the illegitimate child of Joseph Isom Fuselier, holding that Daisy Davis (Fuselier), mother of Linda, was not legally married to Joseph Isom Fuselier at the time of the birth of their daughter. The district court further determined that an alleged putative marriage had not taken place between decedent and Daisy Davis (Fuselier) and thus concluded that Daisy Davis (Fuselier) could not be a good faith partner to a putative marriage. From this judgment Linda Marie Fuselier (Mrs. Andre Sharp) has appealed.
The record does not support the contention that Joseph Isom Fuselier lacked testamentary capacity at the time his will was executed. It is apparent that he was seriously ill and that his physical capabilities were depleted and diminished. It is also apparent that he was receiving medication and doubtlessly was in some way affected thereby. However, many wills are written under just these circumstances and there has been no affirmative showing that should cause us (or the trial court) to reach even the threshold of doubt as to his testamentary capacity when his will was made. Agreeing fully with the trial court's conclusion on this issue and finding nothing in the evidence upon which to seriously base a contrary finding, we move on to a consideration of the legitimacy of Linda Marie Fuselier and her capacity to come to her father's succession.
The record clearly supports the positive conclusion that Linda Marie Fuse-lier is the daughter of decedent and Daisy Davis (Fuselier). The record further supports the factual finding by the trial court that "decedent [Joseph Isom Fuselier] informally acknowledged her [Linda] in actions and conduct, loved her very much, wanted to help her while living and provide for her after his death. . . . " Indeed, this brief description of the relationship between decedent and his daughter is certainly as clear as any we might attempt to phrase after our painstaking review of the extensive record.
The record also fully supports the trial court's finding that Linda's mother, Daisy Davis (Fuselier), initiated a change in the records of her employment with the Telephone Company back in March of 1945 within days after her alleged marriage to decedent. The change was in her marital status—from "single" to "married."
Equally important, in our view, is the factual finding by the trial court, also entirely supported by the record, that Joseph Isom Fuselier was identified as Linda's father (without mention of illegitimacy) on the records of the hospital where she was born and on her birth certificate.
The record further contains unchallenged testimony, from witnesses called by the executrix that decedent had, on various occasions and in various ways, made known his father-daughter relationship to Linda. Burke Pierrottie, who' as Isom's "very good friend" described the time that Isom "made a crack" about him [Mr. Pier-rottie] being a grandfather and then told him of his daughter Linda and her children, pointing out that he, too, was a proud grandfather. Mr. Pierrottie affirmatively testifies that Isom never restricted him in any way from discussing his acknowledgement of fatherhood, did not appear in any way to be ashamed of the fact and, from this, Mr. Pierrottie made the "natural assumption" that Linda was Isom's legitimate child.
The record also contains unchallenged testimony of Linda which confirms that:
(1) She has always believed that she is the legitimate child of decedent;
(2) She has never had reason to doubt the correctness of her birth certificate;
(3) She was always registered at school as Linda Marie Fuselier;
(4) She was never known by any other name until her marriage;
(5) She had a continuing, comfortable, happy relationship with her father, Isom;
(6) She was partially supported by her father during her college career (supplementing a partial scholarship) ;
(7) She received mail from Isom signed, "Love, Dad";
(8) She stayed at "her father's house" when she attended his funeral in Mamou.
Pretrial discovery procedures had largely disclosed most of these contentions and refutation could certainly have been easily accomplished by able counsel if, indeed, such was possible.
Thus, we take note of the fact that the record supports a prima facie showing of the legitimacy of Linda Marie Fuselier without the necessity of making reference to any contested factual issues and we further note that the presumption of legitimacy is a principle of Louisiana law which applies with particular force in favor of the child asserting it. In re Gray's Succession, 201 La. 121, 9 So.2d 481 (1942); Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931); Succession of Gaines, 227 La. 318, 79 So.2d 322 (1955).
In Succession of Curtis, 161 La. 1045, 109 So. 832 (1926), where the legitimacy of a child was at issue, the Supreme Court stated:
" 'A child is presumed to be legitimate until the contrary is shown.' 7 C.J. 940. The presumption of legitimacy is based upon broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
" 'The presumption in favor of marriage and the legitimacy of children is one of the strongest known to the law, and in favor of a child asserting its legitimacy this presumption applies with peculiar force.' "
Essentially the same prima facie showing is evident from the record insofar as the alleged putative marriage is concerned. lit is most unlikely that Daisy Davis (Fuselier) would have been able to detect her own pregnancy somewhat more than nine months prior to the birth of Linda. Hence, there was little reason for her to change her employment records at that time except to reflect the fact that she had good reason to believe she was married. It is certainly reasonable to conclude that the change was made because of the pride and excitement of her marriage and her desire that her employer and fellow employees know about it.
Just as with legitimacy, the law regarding putative marriages presumes good faith on the part of the parties to it and the burden of proof rests on the opponent to prove bad faith. Succession of Navarro, 24 La.Ann. 298 (1872); Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1938); Melancon v. Sonnier, 157 So.2d 577 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963). While affirmative evidence was introduced to show that Daisy Dávis (Fuselier) had acted in good faith, no acceptable evidence was introduced to show that she acted in bad faith, notwithstanding the trial court's doubts about the exact facts of the alleged marriage.
Louisiana law provides that civil effects flow to those who contracted a marriage in good faith and also to the children if both or only one of the parties contracted the marriage in good faith.
"The child of a marriage contracted in good faith by at least one of the parties thereto is legitimate as to both. LSA-C.C. Arts. 117, 118. The burden of proving bad faith on the part of those contracting the putative marriage is upon the party contending that such was entered into in bad faith." Melancon, supra.
We find that the record supports the conclusion—as a matter of law—that a pri-ma facie showing has been made of:
(1) The legitimacy of Linda Marie Fu-selier ; and
(2) The putative marriage between Joseph Isom Fuselier, father of Linda, and Daisy Davis (Fuselier), mother of Linda.
After having carefully and conscientiously overseen the compiling of the record regarding these issues, the able district court apparently fell into an error which is best evidenced by its own observations to the effect that it (the court) felt obliged to "strain[ed] to permit the daughter [Linda Marie Fuselier] to . prove [her] legitimacy . . .
In short, the trial court mixed up the presumptions that should have been applied. Once the prima facie showing of legitimacy was established, as it clearly and emphatically was in several well recog nized ways , the burden of proof shifted to those attacking the legitimacy of Linda Marie Fuselier and it became necessary for them to prove, by a preponderance of admissible evidence (not innuendo or suggestion or observations of counsel) , that Linda Marie Fuselier was, indeed, illegitimate.
We take note of the fact that although Louisiana's strong presumption of legitimacy properly stems from long-established moral considerations, it is peculiarly emphatic in this State because of the overriding possibility of a harsh and unjust result from just such application of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1483 as has been done here. The awesome possibility that a legitimate child could, without that strong presumption of legitimacy in his favor, find himself barred from coming to the succession of his own parent is so morally, socially and ethically revolting as to require that such presumption, in civil succession matters, be as ingrained and as fundamental as the presumption of innocence in criminal matters. Only by such presumption can the law do its full duty to protect a Louisiana child's acknowledged basic right to inherit from its parent. We can think of no civil law result more unsatisfactory or more contrary to bedrock moral principles than one which could relentlessly deprive a child of the right to inherit from its parent by the imposition of a stringent requirement that he affirmatively carry the burden of proving his legitimacy. Indeed, such a requirement would, we believe, be as untenable to the legal principles of our State as would be the continued incarceration of an innocent man until he affirmatively carries the burden of proving his innocence.
Based upon this, and acting in response to the clear call of our Civil Code and the general body of our law to be ever zealous in guarding the inheritance rights of children, our courts have, properly, protected and vigorously defended ' the presumption of legitimacy.
Thus, while Louisiana has steadfastly maintained its Civil Code-based right to bar illegitimate children from succession rights in certain particularized circumstances , its judicial system has clearly done its effective best to' guard against the possibility of a grave injustice by recognizing, in the strongest terms, the presumption of legitimacy.
As we carefully review the record in our search to determine if it supports a finding that those who attack the legitimacy of Linda Marie Fuselier have carried their burden of proof, we conclude that it does not. The contrary is, in fact, the case. Thus, we are unable to agree with that portion of the judgment which deprives Linda Marie Fuselier. of the bequest in her favor of one-half of the remainder of her father's estate.
Accordingly, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Evangeline dated October 21, 1974 be amended to hold that Linda Marie Fu-selier is the legitimate child of Joseph Isom Fuselier and has the capacity necessary to receive, and shall receive, the property of her father, Joseph Isom Fuselier, under and in accordance with the terms of his testament dated January 30, 1973; and
Thus amended, the judgment, which is correct in all other respects, is affirmed.
Cost of this appeal to be borne jointly by appellees.
Amended and affirmed.
DOMENGEAUX, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. The dispositive provisions of the will are as follows:
"1.
"To my beloved wife, Grace McGee, I give and bequeath all of my interest in our present residence, including house and lot, and all appurtenant structures; in all household furnishings and appliances situated therein at my death; and in all motor vehicles and sporting equipment which I may then own; and all funds then on deposit or in my possession.
"2.
"The remainder of my estate I give to my son Donald Fuselier and to my daughter Linda Marie Fuselier (Mrs. Andre Sharpe [sic]), or, if they predecease me, to their deeendants [sic] by root, in equal portions.
"3.
"Should the bequest to my said daughter fail, then I desire that the disposition to her be treated as the establishment by me of the measure of alimony and support to which she is entitled under the law, and — to the extent that it is not so treated — I give and bequeath to my said wife the portion destined for my daughter under this will.
"4.
"The legitime of my forced heirs shall be satisfied first from my movable property."
. LSA-C.C. Article 1483 provides as follows:
"Natural children or acknowledged illegitimate children can not receive from their natural parents, by donations inter vivos or mortis causa beyond what is strictly necessary to procure them sustenance, or an occupation or profession which may maintain them, whenever the father or the mother who has thus disposed in their favor, leaves legitimate children or descendants.
"Those donations shall be reducible in case of excess, according to the rules laid down under the title: Of Father and Child."
. See: Succ. of Thomas Rockwood et al., 231 La. 521, 91 So.2d 779 (1956); Succ, of Anderson, 176 La. 66, 145 So. 270 (1932); Succ. of Jacotsen, 182 La. 151, 161 So. 185 (1935); Jackson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940); In re Gray's Succession, 201 La. 121, 9 So.2d 481 (1942).
. See: Cameron v. Rowland, 208 La. 663, 23 So.2d 283 (1945).
. The ratio deoidenti of this opinion obviates the necessity of considering the constitutional issue that might otherwise need to be dealt with in this case. However, by use of this footnote the author of this opinion (who has spoken for a majority of the court above but who now speaks only for himself) takes the liberty of making the following observations:
I believe that Article 1483 of the Louisiana Civil Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the United States. Notwithstanding the 5 to 4 vote of the Supreme Court of the United States in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971) (wherein Mr. Justice Harlan cast the fifth vote in a concurring opinion) I believe the facts of this case would have provoked a totally different result and I believe that Mr. Justice Harlan would have decided Latine differently if, as in this case, the decedent had specifically and categorically bequeathed his estate to his only beloved daughter by clear, unequivocal testamentary disposition.
In Latine, Mr. Justice Brennan speaking for Justices Douglas, White, Marshall and himself inveighs against the "[discarded] moral prejudices of bygone centuries" which expresses my own feeling in far more eloquent terms than I could have authored.
These observations do not detract in any way from my admiration of those gifted French lawyers, judges and legal scholars who were the redactors of our Code. They were worldly and worldly-wise during their moment in history and their codification of the law in such critically important and complicated areas as legitimacy and succession rights has, in many important ways, withstood the relentless and inexorable tests of time.
Yet, I believe that our Civil Code must be interpreted in the bright reflected light of the Constitution and I believe that the eon- stitutional safeguard of equal protection connotes an ever changing, always vibrant quest for fairness and impartiality in the administration of justice. When I apply that criteria to Joseph Isom Fuselier's great effort to call his only daughter, whom he obviously loved and admired, to his succession, I would conclude that his explicit testamentary desire should prevail, regardless of Linda's legitimacy.