Case Name: Denis RETY, Appellant, v. Arthur GREEN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-03-10
Citations: 595 So. 2d 1036
Docket Number: No. 89-2936
Parties: Denis RETY, Appellant, v. Arthur GREEN, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 595
Pages: 1036–1041

Head Matter:
Denis RETY, Appellant, v. Arthur GREEN, Appellee.
No. 89-2936.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 10, 1992.
Kelly, Black, Black, Byrne, Beasley, Bales & Ross and Lauri Waldman Ross, Lisa Bennett, Miami, for appellant.
Daniels & Hicks and Ralph 0. Anderson, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.

Opinion:
On Motions for Rehearing and Clarification
PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of the motion of Denis Rety for clarification and the motion of Arthur Green for rehearing, the court's previous opinion is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted:
The question presented by this appeal is the date from which appellant Denis Rety's judgment against appellee Arthur Green will bear interest. We conclude that the judgment should be entered as of the date of the jury's verdict.
Rety obtained a libel verdict against Green for $12,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. No judgment was entered thereon. The trial court sua sponte entered an order of remittitur and alternative order for a new trial on damages. The remitted amount was $2,550,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. When Rety refused to accept a remittitur, the trial court ordered a new trial on damages and Rety appealed. Rety v. Green, 546 So.2d 410, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 553 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.1989).
This court agreed that a remittitur was appropriate, but found that the trial court's remittitur had been excessive. 546 So.2d at 421. This court concluded that the award should be $5,000,000 instead of $2,550,000. The trial court was directed to enter a modified remittitur accordingly, and to allow Rety a reasonable time within which to accept or reject it. Id. at 421-22. On remand Rety accepted the modified re-mittitur.
After acceptance, Rety contended that the judgment should be entered as of the date of the original verdict, while Green and Southern argued that the final judgment should be dated when actually entered, and not as of any earlier date. The trial court disagreed with both positions and entered final judgment effective the date of this court's published opinion in the earlier appeal. From that ruling both sides appealed.
Under section 55.03, Florida Statutes (1989), interest accrues on a judgment, not on a verdict. Under ordinary principles, interest would run from the date of entry of judgment.
To this general principle the Rules of Appellate Procedure recognize an exception. As amended in 1984, Rule 9.340(c) granted authority to the trial court in some circumstances to enter judgment as of an earlier date.
Rule 9.340(c) provides: "When a judgment of reversal is entered which requires the entry of a money judgment on a verdict, the mandate shall be deemed to require such money judgment to be entered as of the date of the verdict." The theory of the rule is that, but for the erroneous failure to enter judgment on the jury's verdict, judgment would have been entered, and interest would have begun to run, at the time of the verdict. See P. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 14.9, at 242 (1988). When judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 9.340(c), interest runs from the date of the verdict.
The question before us is the application of Rule 9.340(c) to the present case. Green contends that the Rule comes into play only if, after reversal, a judgment is entered in the exact amount of the jury's verdict. Rety argues that the Rule also applies in a case of remittitur.
The jury awarded $20,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against Green. The trial court's order of remittitur reduced the award to $2,550,000. On appeal this court held that the remittitur was too large and the resultant damage award was too low. This court set the aggregate award against Green at $5,000,000 and remanded with directions to give Rety a reasonable time within which to accept or reject the remittitur. Rety timely accepted.
As a threshold matter, the judgment against Green fits within the definitional scope of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(c). This court's ruling was indisputably a "judgment of reversal," id., which reversed the trial court's order of remittitur or new trial. The unresolved question is whether entry of judgment on the reduced amount constitutes "entry of a money judgment on a verdict" for purposes of the Rule. Reasoning by analogy to Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Watkins, 99 Fla. 395, 126 So. 489 (1930), we conclude that it does.
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Watkins, the plaintiff obtained a verdict. Unlike the present case, the trial court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a remittitur or new trial, and on remand the plaintiff accepted the remittitur. 99 Fla. at 398, 126 So. at 490. The supreme court ruled that for purposes of computing interest, the "judgment as thus voluntarily reduced, will stand affirmed as of the date of its original rendition...." Id. The court held that the judgment would bear interest from the date of its original rendition, rather than the date of the remittitur. Id.; see also Gorman v. Largo Hospital Owners, Ltd., 435 So.2d 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), review denied, 446 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1984). See generally Guy v. Eight, 431 So.2d 653, 656 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 440 So.2d 352 (Fla.1983).
We conclude that we should follow, by analogy, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Watkins. The instant case is essentially the same as Watkins. The result should be the same regardless of whether judgment was entered by the trial court prior to remittitur (as in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins) or whether no such judgment was entered (as is the case here). We conclude that the entry of judgment on the reduced jury verdict should "be deemed to require such judgment to be entered as of the date of the verdict." Fla.R.App.P. 9.340(c).
For the reasons stated, the judgment against Green must be reversed insofar as it was entered as of February 14,-1989, and remanded with directions to enter judgment against Green effective the date of the verdict.
We certify that we have passed on a question of great public importance:
Does Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(c) apply where an appellate court-ordered remittitur requires entry of judgment in an amount less than the full amount of the jury's verdict?
Reversed and remanded; question certified.
HUBBART and COPE, JJ., concur.
. During the pendency of this appeal, appellee Southern Commodity Corporation settled with Rety. That judgment will not be discussed further.
. The jury award was composed of:
Compensatory damages (jointly and severally with code-fendant Southern Commodity Corporation) $10,000,000
Punitive damages (Green individually) $ 2,500,000
. The trial court's award was composed of:
Compensatory damages (jointly and severally with Southern Commodity Corporation) $ 2,500,000
Punitive damages (against Green only) $ 50,000
. This court's award was:
Compensatory damages (unchanged) $ 2,500,000
Punitive damages (against Green only) $ 2,500,000
. This was "a repromulgation of former Rule 3.15(a) which was deleted in 1977 as being un necessary. Experience proved it to be necessary." Committee Notes to 1984 Amendment to Fla.R.App.P. 9.340.
. By its terms Rule 9.340(c) does not require that a judgment have previously been entered in the case. The decision in Mabrey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 438 So.2d 937, 939 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), is not to the contrary. Mabrey illustrates one application of the rule, but not the only one. Nor is there any significance in the fact that in Mabrey, a judgment had been entered in favor of defendant. Upon reversal, judgment was entered for plaintiff. Interest ran from the date of the verdict. The date of the reversed defense judgment was immaterial.
. This approach is consistent with the underlying purpose of the rule, for the delay in entry of final judgment occurred because of Rety's rightful refusal to accept an excessive remittitur.