Case Name: Frederick A.R. HEURING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-10-13
Citations: 495 So. 2d 893
Docket Number: No. BH-20
Parties: Frederick A.R. HEURING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 495
Pages: 893–895

Head Matter:
Frederick A.R. HEURING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. BH-20.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 13, 1986.
Larry D. Simpson of Davis, Judkins & Simpson, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and John M. Koe-nig, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
BARFIELD, Judge.
Frederick A.R. Heuring appeals from convictions and sentences for sexual battery of his stepdaughter. Although we find no reversible error, we feel obliged to comment on two issues raised by appellant.
The State offered the testimony of appellant's adult daughter that she had been sexually battered by appellant when she was between the ages of seven and fifteen, approximately twenty years before the current offenses. Appellant's counsel objected on the basis that the testimony was too remote and contends on appeal that there is nothing unique about appellant's use of familial authority to forcibly commit sexual battery on young female family members. We disagree and hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence.
Remoteness may relate to passage of time or to present relationship with an issue. If mere passage of time were determinative of remoteness, we would hesitate to consider twenty-year-old incidents relevant. In determining whether evidence is too remote to be relevant, and therefore admissible, the court must consider not the passage of time alone, but the effect of the passage of time on the evidence. Remoteness in terms of the passage of time precludes the use of evidence that has become unverifiable through loss of memory, unavailability of witnesses and the like. It may also suggest that the absence of similar conduct for an extensive period of time indicates that such conduct is no longer characteristic of the accused. But it is not the propensity towards such conduct that is relevant. It is the manner of perpetrating the crime which is relevant.
In this case, the type of crime committed can occur only generationally. The appellant twice had the opportunity to sexually batter young females under his familial authority and did so in like manner on each occasion. The daughter's memory of the incident and its details lost nothing through the passage of time. Appellant took the position that he never sexually battered any child, not that he couldn't remember.
Appellant asserts that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his motion to dismiss the information and for a twelve person jury on the basis that he was charged with a capital offense. The ques-. tion of entitlement to a twelve member jury has been resolved against appellant's position in State v. Hogan, 451 So.2d 844 (Fla.1984). The analysis used in Hogan would appear to apply equally to the question of charging the offense of sexual battery under section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977-1983), by information as opposed to indictment. This court has previously decided the issue adversely to appellant in Cooper v. State, 453 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). As in Cooper, we again certify to the Supreme Court the following question:
IN A PROSECUTION FOR SEXUAL BATTERY UNDER SECTION 794.-011(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1977-1983), WHERE DEATH IS NOT A POSSIBLE PENALTY BECAUSE OF THE HOLDING IN BUFORD V. STATE, 403 S0.2d 943 (Fla.1981), MAY THE STATE PROCEED BY INFORMATION INSTEAD OF INDICTMENT?
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
SMITH, J., specially concurs with written opinion.