Case Name: STRACHAN v. MUTUAL AID AND NEIGBORHOOD CLUB, INC.
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-02-06
Citations: 81 Mich. App. 165
Docket Number: Docket No. 31118
Parties: STRACHAN v MUTUAL AID AND NEIGBORHOOD CLUB, INC.
Judges: Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and Bashara and P. R. Mahinske, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 81
Pages: 165–189

Head Matter:
STRACHAN v MUTUAL AID AND NEIGBORHOOD CLUB, INC.
Opinion of the Court
1. Judgment — Res Judicata — Contested Issue.
Res judicata is a jurisprudential doctrine founded upon the premise that litigation of a controversy must have a termination point; the doctrine becomes applicable when an adjudicatory proceeding on a contested issue has progressed to a final determination and all available courses of appeal have been exhausted or not pursued within the prescribed time limits.
2. Judgment-Administrative Law — Res Judicata — Final Judgment.
Res judicata is applicable to administrative proceedings that are adjudicatory in nature and from which an appeal is provided, where the Legislature intends that the tribunal’s judgment is to be final absent an appeal.
3. Appeal and Error — Administrative Law — Civil Rights Commission.
A plaintiff who has failed to appeal from a final order of the Civil Rights Commission is precluded from further litigation of the issues determined by that order.
References for Points in Headnotes
47 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 457.
Judgment as res judicata pending appeal or motion for a new trial, or during the time allowed therefor. 9 ALR2d 984.
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 551, 552.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 499-513.
Validity and construction of labor legislation prohibiting discrimination on account of age. 29 ALR3d 1407.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 404.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 446, 452, 495, 500, 501.
Res judicata effect of judgment dismissing action, or otherwise denying relief, for lack of jurisdiction or venue. 49 ALR2d 1036.
Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment. 83 ALR2d 977.
Dismissal of civil action for want of prosecution as res judicata. 54 ALR3d 473.
Judicial qualification of provision of Rule 41(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply with federal rules or court order, and certain other dismissals operate as adjudication upon merits. 5 ALR Fed 897.
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 595.
Dissent by P. R. Mahinske, J.
4. Civil Rights — Employment—Age Discrimination — Civil Rights Commission — Circuit Courts' — Jurisdiction.
The right to obtain and retain employment without discrimination on the basis of age is a civil right which is enforceable concurrently before the Civil Rights Commission and in the circuit court.
5. Judgment — Res Judicata — Requirements.
Three requirements must be satisñed in order for a former judgment to be a bar to a subsequent action: (1) identity of subject matter, (2) identity of parties or their privies, and (3) a judgment on the merits.
6. Judgment — Res Judicata — Dismissal—Lack op Jurisdiction— Court Rules.
An involuntary dismissal which is not for lack of jurisdiction operates as an adjudication on the merits and bars a plaintiff from bringing a second action unless it is speciñed that the dismissal is without prejudice; the corollary to this rule is that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the merits (GCR 1963, 504.2).
7. Judgment — Dismissal—Administrative Law — Jurisdiction— Court Rules.
The dismissal of a case on the basis of a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and not on the merits of the plaintiff’s allegations, was a dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction” within the meaning of a court rule governing the effect of an involuntary dismissal upon a subsequent action between the same parties (GCR 1963, 504.2).
8. Administrative Law — Exhaustion op Remedies — Circuit Court • — Jurisdiction.
Failure of a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies deprives a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction.
9. Judgment — Jurisdiction—Res Judicata.
A judgment made on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction, while not on the merits and not conclusive on the merits, is conclusive as to the jurisdictional question presented and the jurisdictional issue may not be relitigated. 10. Judgment — Jurisdiction—Res Judicata — Erroneous Judgment.
Generally, a decision of a court that it is without jurisdiction to hear a matter acts as a bar to the bringing of another action even if that decision is erroneous; this rule is, however, subject to exceptions under proper circumstances.
11. Judgment — Res Judicata — Administrative Law — Exhaustion of Remedies — Jurisdiction—Circumstances.
A dismissal by a circuit court on the basis that the plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies where she had also filed a complaint to the Civil Bights Commission which had not yet been adjudicated when the plaintiff filed her complaint in circuit court is not res judicata as to a second complaint filed after the commission dismissed the matter where the jurisdictional question and the circumstances were different at the time of filing the second complaint.
12. Administrative Law — Review—Civil Rights Commission — Exhaustion of Remedies — Statutes-—Rules.
A final decision or order of the Civil Bights Commission is subject to direct review by the courts; the filing of a motion or application for reconsideration or rehearing is not required prior to seeking a consideration of the matter by a circuit court (MCLA 24.301; MSA 3.560[201], 1970-1971 AACS, R37.7[a], 1967 AACS, R37.18[aj).
Appeal from Wayne, Peter B. Spivak, J.
Submitted June 21, 1977, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 31118.)
Decided February 6, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Charlotte Strachan filed a complaint with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission alleging that her employment with Mutual Aid and Neighborhood Club, Inc., was wrongfully terminated. While this action was pending, she filed a complaint in circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the same alleged unlawful discrimination. The circuit court granted a summary judgment for defendant. The Civil Rights Commission dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff did not appeal from that order but instead filed a second complaint in circuit court based upon the same allegations. Accelerated judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Haynes & Donnelly, P. C., for plaintiff.
Keller, Thoma, Toppin & Schwarze, P. C. (by Michael L. Smith), for defendant.
Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and Bashara and P. R. Mahinske, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
Plaintiff appeals a circuit court order granting defendant's motion for an accelerated judgment.
After being discharged from her employment with defendant, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission claiming that her termination constituted an unlawful employment discrimination on account of age and sex. While the proceedings were pending with the commission, plaintiff instituted suit in the circuit court seeking relief for the same alleged unlawful discrimination. This action was dismissed "with prejudice" on defendant's motion for accelerated judgment, which contended that plaintiff failed to first exhaust her administrative remedies before the commission. No appeal of the circuit court's order of dismissal was taken by plaintiff.
Subsequently, the commission dismissed plaintiff's action due to insufficient evidence to sustain the charge. Review of this determination was not pursued by plaintiff. Instead, she filed a second suit in the circuit court. This proceeding was dismissed on defendant's motion for accelerated judgment, which was based on the claim that plaintiff's suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff thereafter perfected this appeal.
Resolution of this controversy does not require us to review or pass upon the propriety of the first circuit court order of dismissal. Rather, it is apparent from the proceedings below that plaintiff had an opportunity to completely litigate the merits of her claim before the commission. Having failed to appeal its decision, the plaintiff is barred from collaterally attacking that determination by another proceeding. Accordingly, the order granting defendant's motion is affirmed.
Res judicata is a jurisprudential doctrine founded upon the premise that litigation of a controversy must have a termination point. Otherwise, judicial resources would be unnecessarily expended, and the rights of litigants would be subjected to interminable contest.
The doctrine of res judicata becomes applicable when an adjudicatory proceeding on a contested issue has progressed to a final determination, and all available courses of appeal have been exhausted or not pursued within the prescribed time limitations. Thereafter, that issue becomes settled and may not be relitigated between the same parties in a collateral proceeding, absent some compelling equity not here pertinent. See Howell v Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), Gursten v Kenney, 375 Mich 330; 134 NW2d 764 (1965). Further, this doctrine is applicable to administrative proceedings that are adjudicatory in nature and from which an appeal is provided, where the Legislature intends that the tribunal's judgment is to be final absent an appeal. Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Assoc v City of Detroit, 399 Mich 449, 457-458; 249 NW2d 121, 124-125 (1976).
All proceedings initiated by plaintiff had the purpose of seeking relief for an alleged unfair employment practice, as provided in § 3a of the Michigan State Fair Employment Practices Act, MCLA 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq. Any relief to which the plaintiff could establish legal entitlement was obtainable from the commission pursuant to its legislatively created powers. MCLA 37.5(h); MSA 3.548(5)(h). However, the commission, after hearing witnesses and reviewing other evidence, issued an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint; an order from which no appeal was perfected.
MCLA 37.4; MSA 3.548(4) provided as follows:
"The commission shall investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by the constitution of this state, and shall secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination. A complaint alleging an unlawful discriminatory practice is subject to the same procedure as a complaint alleging an unfair employment practice under Act No. 251 of the Public Acts of 1955, being sections 423.301 to 423.311 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court for the county of Ingham, the circuit court for the county wherein the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred or where the person, firm or corporation against whom the complaint was filed, resides or has his principal place of business. If an appeal is not taken within 30 days after the service of an appealable order of the commission, the commission may obtain a decree for the enforcement of the order from the circuit court which would have had jurisdiction of the appeal." (Emphasis added.)
Evident from the language used is a legislative intent that an unappealed order of the commission becomes final. After 30 days from receipt of the commission's order, if no appeal has been taken, enforcement of the order may be obtained merely by showing service of a regularly entered order and the jurisdiction of the commission and circuit court. Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the commission's order of dismissal became final when plaintiff failed to seek review within the prescribed time period. The circuit court order granting an accelerated judgment was a proper resolution of this case, albeit based upon the res judicata effect of a prior circuit court order on which we express no opinion as to propriety. Nevertheless, since the commission's order is final, plaintiff is precluded from further litigation of the issues determined by that order.
Affirmed.
D. C. Riley, P. J., concurred.
The applicable portion provides as follows:
"It is an unfair employment practice:
(a) For any employer, because any individual is between the ages of Í8 and 60, or because of the sex of any individual, to refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate against him with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Any such refusal to hire or discrimination shall not be an unfair employment practice if based on law, regulation, the requirements of any federal or state training or employment program or on a bona fide occupational qualification. It shall not be an unfair employment practice to refuse to select an individual over the age of 35 because of his age for an apprenticeship or an on-the-job training program intended to have a duration of more than 4 months." MCLA 423.303a; MSA 17.458(3a). It should be noted that at the time of the plaintiffs discharge she was 58 years of age.
Since repealed by 1976 PA 453, effective March 31, 1977.
That section provided that the commission is empowered:
"To hold hearings, administer oaths, issue preliminary notices to witnesses to appear, compel through court authorization the attendance of witnesses and the production for examination of any books, papers or other records relating to matters under investigation or in question before the commission, take the testimony of any person under oath, and issue appropriate orders. The commission may make rules as to the issuance by individual commissioners of preliminary notices to appear."
We construe the term "appropriate orders" to include any monetary recompense to which a complainant may be entitled as a result of the unfair employment practice. Our conclusion is aided in substantial part from insight provided by § 605 of the new Michigan Civil Rights Act, which delineates the permissible scope of commission orders. That section states in pertinent part:
"(2) Action ordered under this section may include, but is not limited to: (i) Payment to the complainant of damages for an injury or loss caused by a violation of this act, including a reasonable attorney's fee." MCLA 37.2605(2)(i); MSA 3.548(605)(2)(i). Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction of actions for violations of the act rests concurrently with the commission and circuit courts and that civil damage remedies may be pursued in the courts "in addition to the remedial machinery provided by statute". Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537, 560; 189 NW2d 243, 255 (1971).
Notwithstanding the statutory term "tried de novo", this provision has been held to limit review by the circuit courts to an appeal in the nature of certiorari of the record developed from the commission's proceedings. Accordingly, the circuit court's review is limited to ascertaining if the commission's determination is based upon legal error or arbitrary action. Ross v Taylor Township School Board, 377 Mich 15; 138 NW2d 402 (1965), Lesniak v Fair Employment Practices Commission, 364 Mich 495, 505-506; 111 NW2d 790, 796 (1961).
We recognize that the decision in Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), permitted maintenance of a circuit court action subsequent to an unappealed commission order of dismissal. However, that case is distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar. In Pompey the commission's order dismissed the action because commenced after the statute of limitations had expired. Such dismissals are not on the merits for res judicata purposes, since the running of the statute of limitations merely bars access to the forum and is not a determination of the merits of the claim. See Malesev v Garavaglia, 12 Mich App 282; 162 NW2d 844 (1968).
Further, where two or more forums have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a controversy, a judgment by one forum is conclusive as to all other forums with concurrent jurisdiction. Theisen v City of Dearborn, 5 Mich App 607; 147 NW2d 720 (1967), remanded on other grounds, 380 Mich 621; 158 NW2d 483 (1968).