Case Name: FRANKS v. DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited; DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited v. FRANKS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1920-03-01
Citations: 146 La. 803
Docket Number: No. 22489
Parties: FRANKS v. DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited. DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited v. FRANKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 146
Pages: 803–811

Head Matter:
(84 South. 101.)
No. 22489.
FRANKS v. DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited. DAVIS BROS. LUMBER CO., Limited v. FRANKS.
(March 1, 1920.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staf.)
1. Courts <&wkey;224(ll) — Amount in CONTROVERSY IIBLIV WITHIN JURISDICTION OB SUPREME Court.
Though defendant, whose separate action against plaintiff to restrain him from interfering with the cutting of timber alleged that the timber was of the value of $1,000, and that the damages amounted to $200, which sums taken together were not sufficient to ■ give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the appeal, yet, as it' appeared that defendant had rights of way over the land in question which were used in the cutting of timber on other lands, etc., it will be deemed that there was sufficient amount in controversy for the Supreme Court to entertain jurisdiction of defendant’s appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, whose action to reform a timber deed was consolidated with defendant’s action.
2. Evidence <&wkey;434(ll) — Fraud in timber DEED MAY BE SHOWN BY PAROL.
Where it was asserted that a timber deed or contract did not express the intention of the parties as a result of the fraud of defendant, evidence of such fraud will not be excluded on the ground that the deed was the best evidence of the agreement.
3. Evidence &wkey;397(2) — That writing expresses CONTRACT PRESUMED.
In the absence of a reasonably strong showing of fraud or error, a written instrument signed by the parties will be presumed to constitute the agreement between them.
4. Reformation of instruments <&wkey;45(7)— Evidence held not to snow that plaintiff FRAUDULENTLY INSERTED PROVISION IN DEED.
Where plaintiff asserted that through fraud of defendant he was induced to sign a timber deed which allowed ten years for removal, although the parties had agreed on only two, held, that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding in favor of plaintiff, whom it appeared did not read the deed.
5. Logs and logging <&wkey;3(l) — Provision in TIMBER DEED FOR EXTENSION OF TIME ON GRANTEE’S PAYMENT OF TAXES VALID.
A provision in a timber deed which allowed ten years for removal to the effect that, if removal was not completed within the ten-year period, the grantee might have additional time on paying taxes, is valid, being supported by the„consideration of the deed, and not objectionable on the theory that the grantee might never be called on to pay taxes.
6. Logs and logging <&wkey;3(l) — Provision allowing INDEFINITE TIME FOR REMOVAL OF TIMBER IS NOT OBJECTIONABLE, AS COURTS MAY FIX TIME.
A provision in a timber deed allowing ten years for removal that, if the grantee did not remove within that time, he might have additional time on the payment of taxes, is not open to objection on the ground that it was indefinite or unlimited; for the owner might ap ply to the courts to fix a reasonable time for the cutting of timber.
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; J. E. Reynolds, Judge.
Action by Dr. J. Pranks against the Davis Bros. Lumber Company, Limited, which was consolidated with an action by the named defendant against the plaintiff. Fronj a judgment for plaintiff in the original action, the defendant appeals.
Judgment annulled and reversed, with directions.
Stubbs, Theus, Grisham & Thompson, of Monroe, for appellant.
J. Rush Wimberly, of Arcadia, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAWKINS, J.
On February 16, 1916, Dr. J. Franks, alleging himself to be the owner of the S. y2 of N. W. yé and N. E. % of N. W. % of section 17, township 16 north, range 4 west, together with the timber thereon, obtained from the court below a writ of injunction restraining Davis Bros. Lumber Company, - Limited, from cutting and removing the timber from said lands. He prayed that the writ he sustained, and that he recover the sum of $300 as the value of timber already removed. This writ was issued on the order of the clerk, in the absence of the judge.
February 19, 1916, the defendant in the case just mentioned filed another suit, in which it claimed the ownership of the timber on the said described lands, and obtained from the judge a writ of injunction, prohibiting the said Dr. J. Franks from interfering with it in the cutting and removal of said timber. It alleged the value of the timber as $1,000, and that the rights of way through, over, and across said lands for the purpose of removing other timber which it owned in that vicinity were well worth the sum of $2,000. It asked that the injunction be perpetuated, and that it recover the sum of $200 as damages for attorney's fees.
Certain preliminary pleas and exceptions were filed and considered by the lower court, but have not been pressed here, and, besides, we do not think they have sufficient merit to warrant our discussing them. We.think the disposition made thereof by the lower court was proper.
In answer to the first suit the defendant therein, Davis Bros. Lumber Company, Limited, claimed the ownership of the timber, which it admitted it was cutting, under a deed from Franks giving an original • period of ten years in which to cut and remove the same, with an additional indefinite term upon, payment of the taxes on the land. The petition to which this answer was filed did not mention or attack the said timber deed in any way.
For answer to the second suit the defendant Franks admitted having signed., the timber deed' to • Davis Bros. Lumber Company, Limited, but averred that the period for removal stipulated therein was two years from November 1, 1905, and that this time had long since expired. Franks also made part'of his answer copy of a petition filed by him in July, 1907, attacking the said timber deed on the ground that the time for removal agreed on was two instead of ten years, and in which he had prayed that the said deed be annulled, and in the alternative .that it be held to grant two years from November 1, 1905, for the removal of the timber.
With the issues thus made up, the cases were consolidated, went to trial, and the lower court rendered judgment, first in favor of Davis Bros. Lumber Company, sustaining the timber deed as written, but on a second hearing reversed its former decree, and gave judgment in favor of Franks, decreeing him to be the owner of the timber, susfaining his injunction, and dismissing his demands for the timber which had already been cut.
Defendant appealed, and plaintiff has appeared and moved to dismiss the appeal on tlie ground of want of jurisdiction ratione materise.
On tlie Motion to Dismiss.
It is true that the value placed upon the timber by the appellant in its pleadings, $1,000, and the damages claimed, $200, do not amount to enough to give this court jurisdiction on appeal; but we must also consider the allegations with reference to the rights of way for reaching timber on other lands, as Seriously made, for it appears to us that they might, under proper conditions, easily possess that value. These rights being inseparably tied up with the question of whether or not Davis Bros. Lumber Company, Lim-itéd, still had the right to cut and remove the timber on the lands in dispute at the time of the filing of this suit, we think the value of the property and rights involved are sufficient to give this court jurisdiction.