Case Name: VILLAGE OF ORCHARD LAKE v. CONNOR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-04-05
Citations: 124 Mich. App. 550
Docket Number: Docket No. 58733
Parties: VILLAGE OF ORCHARD LAKE v CONNOR
Judges: Before: Bronson, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and J. H. Gillis, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 124
Pages: 550–558

Head Matter:
VILLAGE OF ORCHARD LAKE v CONNOR
Docket No. 58733.
Submitted November 3, 1982, at Detroit.
Decided April 5, 1983.
Leave to appeal denied, 417 Mich__
The Village of Orchard Lake sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting James A. Connor, Dorothy Connor, and Dorothy Connor, doing business as Orchard Lake Boat Livery, from enlarging a nonconforming use of certain property on Orchard Lake as a boat livery. The Oakland Circuit Court, Clark J. Adams, J., entered an order permanently enjoining the Connors from extending or enlarging their nonconforming use of "renting, leasing, storing, anchoring or otherwise permitting the storing or anchoring of power or sail boats in excess of six at any one time”. Subsequently, the Connors kept ten "windsurfers” on their property in addition to leasing space for one powerboat and five sailboats. The Village of Orchard Lake moved in the Oakland Circuit Court to hold the Connors in contempt of court for disobeying the court’s previous order. The court, Robert B. Webster, J., held that the defendants contemptuously violated the court’s order. The defendants appeal. Held:
The trial court’s finding that the defendants were guilty of contempt for violating the court’s previous order should be affirmed. The order was unambiguous and the Connors admitted that a "windsurfer” is a sailboat. Instead of proceeding to store and rent ten windsurfers, the defendants should have moved to have the trial court either modify or clarify its previous order so that there would be no question that they were not enlarging or extending their nonconforming use.
Affirmed.
Bronson, P.J., dissented. He believes that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s wilful disobedience of the court’s previous order was not shown. He also would find that the order that was allegedly violated was ambiguous on its face, requiring an examination of its history to determine the intent of the judge who entered the order. He believes that certain language in the order suggests that the order was intended only to cover cases in which the defendants permitted persons to store their own boats and that any ambiguity in the order should be resolved in the defendants’ favor where there is no question of subterfuge. He would reverse.
References for Points in Headnotes
17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 34.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 5.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 105.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 52.
Opinion op the Court
1. Contempt — Violation op Court Order — Nonconforming Use of Property.
A finding that a party is guilty of contempt of court is proper where that party has violated an order of a court that that party not expand its nonconforming use of certain property and, if the party had a question as to whether his behavior was enlarging or extending his nonconforming use of the property, he should have requested the trial court to modify or clarify its order.
Dissent by Bronson, P. J.
2. Contempt — Criminal Contempt.
Disobedience of a court’s orders may constitute criminal contempt where the disobedience is wilful.
3. Contempt — Power to Punish.
The judiciary’s power to punish for contempt must be applied judiciously and may be used only when the contempt is clearly and unequivocally shown.
4. Contempt — Criminal Contempt.
An essential element of criminal contempt is culpable conduct in wilful disregard or disobedience of the authority or orders of the court or the intent to defy the dignity and the authority of the court; each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt case.
5. Motions and Orders — Expansion of Orders by Implication.
In contempt proceedings charging wilful violation of a court order the order of the court should not be expanded by implication beyond the meaning of its language when read in light of the issues raised and the purpose for which the suit which produced the order was brought.
6. Contempt — Injunctions — Ambiguity.
Any ambiguity in an injunction issued by a court should be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the injunction where there is no question of subterfuge to violate the injunction and the party is charged with contempt of court.
Parenti, Treinen, Hohauser, Greenlees & Bunting, P.C. (by Robert V. Parenti), for plaintiff.
Rabette & O’Dea, P.C. (by P. Kelly O’Dea), for defendants.
Before: Bronson, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and J. H. Gillis, JJ.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, J.
The relevant facts of this case are set forth in Judge Bronson's dissenting opinion. We affirm the trial court's finding that the defendants were guilty of contempt for violating a 1964 court order entered against them which stated in part:
"Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from enlarging or extending their nonconforming use on their real property, or on the waters of Orchard Lake adjacent thereto, by renting, leasing, storing, anchoring or otherwise permitting the storing or anchoring of power or sail boats in excess of six (6) at any one time."
The defendants admitted that a "windsurfer" was a sailboat and that they kept approximately ten windsurfers on their property in addition to leasing space for one powerboat and five sailboats. The defendants rented the windsurfers and gave instructions on their use. Thus, considering the fact that the total number of power and sailboats rented, leased, stored or anchored on the defendants' property exceeded six, we find that the defendants disregarded the 1964 order.
We reject the defendants' claim that they acted in good faith because they believed that the refer ence to sailboats in the 1964 order did not include windsurfers. A belief that the 1964 order did not apply to windsurfers would be unreasonable when, by the defendants' own admission, a windsurfer is a sailboat. Also, the 1964 order clearly prohibited the defendants from enlarging or extending their nonconforming use. In other words, the order was designed to maintain the status quo. We can only conclude that the defendants knew that they were disobeying the 1964 order when they added the ten windsurfers to the six boats already kept on their property because, by storing and renting the windsurfers, defendants were, in effect, enlarging or expanding their operation of the boat livery in violation of the court's order. Instead of proceeding to store and rent the windsurfers, the defendants should have requested the trial court to either modify or clarify the 1964 order so that there would be no question that they were not enlarging or extending their nonconforming use.
Moreover, we find that the 1964 order was unambiguous. We disagree with the dissenting opinion's conclusion that the language of the order suggests that the order did not apply to the storage of the defendants' own boats on their property. We find that the order unequivocally states that the restrictions contained in the order apply to the storage of the defendants' own boats as well as to the storage of boats belonging to other persons.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J. concurred.