Case Name: George O. PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-02-19
Citations: 282 So. 2d 483
Docket Number: No. 52404
Parties: George O. PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana et al.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 282
Pages: 483–491

Head Matter:
George O. PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana et al.
No. 52404.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 19, 1973.
On Rehearing Aug. 20, 1973.
David L. Morgan, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Stanford O. Bardwell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for def endants- respondents.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Justice.
The plaintiff, Parker, seeks reversal of an adverse judgment rendered by the district court and affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeal, denying him recovery for a knife-attack by a fellow prisoner at Louisiana State Penitentiary. See La.App., 261 So.2d 364 (1972). We granted certiorari to review the conclusion reached by both lower courts that the failure of the penal authorities to isolate the plaintiff or otherwise prevent the attack did not warrant recovery under the existing circumstances. 261 La. 824, 261 So.2d 230 (1972). After review, we affirm.
No major dispute exists as to the facts. Several important facts have been stipulated; others are reasonably clear from the evidence.
The stipulation and evidence reflect that Parker and Edmonson, his assailant, were classified as homosexuals at the Louisiana State Penitentiary. They were assigned to Camp H, used primarily for homosexuals. Both had records of violence; Parker himself was serving a sentence for fatally stabbing a male paramour.
At one time, Parker and Edmonson had a homosexual relation. A third prisoner intervened and disrupted the relationship. Moved by jealousy, Edmonson threatened the plaintiff.
Once threatened, the plaintiff reported his fears of bodily harm to his keepers on more than one occasion. In response to these reports, Captain Couvillion of the penitentiary staff summoned both Parker and Edmonson to his office, interrogated and counselled them, and, as the trial court found, "felt that they left his office as friends." Weapon searches were conducted regularly.
On the night of September 15, 1969, as a protective measure, the penitentiary em ployees searched Edmonson and his dormitory area for weapons but found none. Early the next morning', an inmate guard opened the door leading from the second floor of the dormitory to allow the kitchen personnel to come downstairs to bathe before leaving for work. While the door was open, Edmonson also made his exit; he entered the first floor dormitory, in which plaintiff slept, and stabbed him with a 16-inch homemade knife, inflicting serious injuries.
The Court of Appeal found no actionable negligence on the part of the penal authorities and rejected plaintiff's demands. In this Court, plaintiff first contends that L'SA-R.S. 15:853 establishes a rule of absolute liability for injuries to prisoners in the custody of the penitentiary.
That statute provides:
"A. The superintendent shall exercise the following powers:
"(d) Subject to the provisions of Subsection B. of this Section, he shall have general management and control over the convicts committed to the penitentiary, their custody, discipline, welfare, and safety. He shall make adequate provision for the segregation of young short-term first offenders as provided by law."
It is true the statute vests in the Superintendent the general management and control of the prisoners, including power to superintend their custody, discipline, welfare, and safety. We fail to detect in the statute, however, any provision making the superintendent absolutely liable for personal injuries sustained during imprisonment. We conclude that such a construction is unwarranted.
The applicable rule has been frequently stated. A penal institution is not an insurer of an inmate against attacks by other inmates. The standard is that of reasonable or ordinary care. The majority rule is that in order to hold the penal authorities liable for an injury inflicted upon an inmate by another inmate, the authorities must know or have reason to anticipate that harm will ensue and fail to use reasonable care in preventing the harm. St. Julian v. State, La.App., 98 So.2d 284 (1957); 60 Am.Jur.2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 17, p. 821 (1972); 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 13, p. 866; Annot., Prison-Assault by Prisoner, 41 A.L.R.3rd 1024, 1028-1029 (1972).
The record in the present case supports a finding that the penal authorities received notice that the plaintiff feared an attack from Edmonson. Such a notice alone, however, is insufficient to support liability under the above rule. Scores of reports of this kind are received weekly in the prison environment. For liability, the law requires at least adequate reason to anticipate harm and failure to take reasonable action to avert it.
Apart from the periodic search for weapons and routine security, the prison authorities here counselled both prisoners. From the conference, the authorities concluded that no harm was intended. The search for weapons was fruitless.
Plaintiff makes three basic charges of negligence. The plaintiff first asserts that Gordon Knox, an inmate guard, failed to keep the door leading from Edmonson's upstairs dormitory locked. The evidence, however, is quite clear, as found by the lower courts, that the purpose of the door was to prevent escape during the nighttime to the outside of the dormitory, not to keep the prisoners apart. The door had to be opened for the early workers to bathe, to return to their quarters, and to leave for their assigned duties. At the beginning of the work day, the movement of prisoners was permissible. The prisoners had access to each other at other times. We conclude that there was no negligence.
The second allegation is that the prison failed to provide a security system sufficient to prevent the acquisition or making of the crude knife, the hiding of the weapon, and the attack itself. The record reflects that the weapon problem is common to all penal institutions. Despite all reasonable precautions, the acquisition of such weapons cannot be completely prevented. As Deputy Warden Lloyd W. Hoyle, explained:
"Anything that's laying loose, or anything that's not bolted down and secured is a possible weapon in a penitentiary Oh there's millions of ways. I've seen them rub steel on concrete and rocks and everything else. It's a tedious chore, but a tedious chore doesn't bother these men." (Tr. pp. 222, 223.)
The record reflects that the prison employees made periodic searches for weapons and conducted a fruitless search of the assailant's dormitory area the night before the stabbing. To require more would be tantamount to imposing absolute liability.
The final and more weighty argument is that the prison officials were guilty of negligence in failing to isolate plaintiff or at least place him in separate facilities from Edmonson.
The question is a close one. In essence, however, the plaintiff complains of an error of judgment. The administrative decision against isolation was based upon a satisfactory interview with the prisoners and a fruitless search for weapons. Although by hindsight we now know that the decision was wrong, hindsight is not the test. To the contrary, the decision must be tested by the information, alternative courses of action, and circumstances existing at that time. Testing it on this basis, the trial court found that the failure to isolate did not constitute negligence.
In accepting the trial court's findings, the 'Court of Appeal stated:
"The expressions of fear must be viewed in the atmosphere in which they were presented before they can be used as a basis of knowledge that harm was imminent. Prisoners afflicted with homosexual tendencies are a constant source of difficulty for prison officials. Their presence among ordinary prisoners is a disruptive influence, to say the least. They are assigned to one camp to prevent the worsening of a generally tense, overcrowded and unruly situtation. These prisoners are, in many instances, emotionally disturbed in addition to their sexual perversion. The record reflects that those in charge of Camp H are confronted, on a daily basis, with petty quarrels, jealousies, trivial bickering and, indeed, reported threats of violence. Rumors run rampant within the confines of the camp and the officials necessarily, in time, become skeptical of each reported probability of trouble. Most reports received by them of such probable occurrences are unfounded, as indicated by the fact that Camp H had only two stabbings other than this one in all of 1969."
We find, as did the lower courts, that the steps taken by the authorities which included a conference with the prisoners and a search for weapons, were reasonable under the circumstances. An absolute requirement of isolation or reassignment to avoid liability in such cases would, create chaos in prison administration.
We have examined the numerous assignments of error and find no merit in them. Tragically, plaintiff's injury was the product of an environment in which violent, disturbed, and sexually abnormal men are-crowded into a single prison unit under conditions that are far less than ideal. As the record shows, no degree of caution can altogether prevent such occurrences.
For the reason assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BARHAM, J., dissents.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
.The stipulated facts are as follows:
1. Plaintiff was stabbed on September 15, 1969, while an inmate confined in Section H, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana.
2. Plaintiff was paroled from the penitentiary on September 21, 1969, by virtue of good time behavior (Act 426 of 1964).
3. Plaintiff was stabbed while in his bunk asleep at approximately 4:45 o'clock A.M. by inmate Willie Edmonson.
4. The knife used by Edmonson was approximately sixteen inches in length and made within the confines or homemade within the confines of the penitentiary.
5. Prior to being confined at Angola, plaintiff's last place, of employment was Brennan's Restaurant in New Orleans, and he was employed as a busboy at a minimum salary of $1.50 per hour.
6. As a direct result of the stabbing incident of September 15, 1969, plaintiff was hospitalized in Earl K. Long Hospital at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from 9/15/69 to 11/19/69.
7. Plaintiff is presently and has been since his release from Earl K. Long Hospital the recipient of welfare from the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare in the amount of $66.00 per month, plus Federal food stamps of $24.00 per month, all of which is based upon the Department's computed need of $103.00 per month.
8. As of May 10, 1971, plaintiff is unemployed.
9. Inmate Willie Edmonson was disciplined on October 9, 1967, for cutting inmate Shelton Batiste.
10. On January 26, 1968, Edmonson was disciplined for hitting Shelton Batiste with a brick.
11. On December 17, 1968, Edmonson was assigned to CBB-LD for administrative investigation involving the cutting of inmate Robert Bradley on December . 16, 1968.
12. On September 15, 1969, Edmonson stabbed plaintiff, George O. Parker.
13. Edmonson was disciplined on December 2, 1970, for fighting with inmate Curtis Dandridge. Both inmates had a knife.
14. Homemade weapons are a constant problem because of the shortage of supervision and the open dormitories that the prisoners live in. In spite of constant shakedowns, inmates do manage to fashion weapons from scrap iron and other materials.
15. Inmates are given body searches upon their return to the Camp H compound fenced area.
16. Periodic searches of inmates' barracks for contraband or weapons are conducted.
17. Primarily, homosexuals are assigned to Camp H.
. Because of our conclusion, we do not reach the question of whether the State is liable for the negligence of. prison trusties. But see Dauzat v. Crites, La.App., 237 So.2d 697 (1970); Trahan v. State, La.App., 158 So.2d 417 (1963).