Case Name: Glenn Wayne SPENCER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David CHESTER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2002-10-17
Citations: 48 F. App'x 87
Docket Number: No. 02-6936
Parties: Glenn Wayne SPENCER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David CHESTER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 48
Pages: 87–88

Head Matter:
Glenn Wayne SPENCER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David CHESTER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 02-6936.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 10, 2002.
Decided Oct. 17, 2002.
Glenn Wayne Spencer, Appellant Pro Se.
Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Glenn Wayne Spencer seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying his motions for reconsideration. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because Spencer's notice of appeal was not timely filed.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court's final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corr., 434 U.S. 257. 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).
The district court's order was entered on the docket on February 19, 2002. Spencer's notice of appeal was filed on May 20, 2002. Because Spencer failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny a certifícate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED.
For the purpose of this appeal we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been given to prison officials for mailing. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).