Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William CASWELL, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1983-07-22
Citations: 316 Pa. Super. 462
Docket Number: No. 2615
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William CASWELL, Appellant.
Judges: Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 316
Pages: 462–475

Head Matter:
463 A.2d 456
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William CASWELL, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted April 7, 1982.
Filed July 22, 1983.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 20, 1984.
John Joseph Cerra, Carbondale, for appellant.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, Scranton, for Com., appellee.
Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence issued by Munley, J., on October 5, 1981. The appellant, William Caswell, was convicted in a jury proceeding and found guilty of robbery, receiving stolen property, and conspiracy. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied and this appeal followed.
On February 16, 1980, the Giant Market located in Scranton, Pennsylvania, was held up by three men, apparently wearing false mustaches and beards. One of these men was identified as the appellant. At trial, the dairy manager testified that one of the men had a gun and that one was heavy-set. The manager of the store, Mr. Yaninek, testified that the appellant had the gun and announced that a hold up was taking place. He then directed Mr. Yaninek to open the store safe. The appellant then placed a good deal of money into a shopping bag. After the robbery, Mr. Yaninek described to the police the person who took the money from the safe as a heavy-set man weighing about 230 pounds with a mustache and goatee. At a police line-up on May 20, 1980, Mr. Yaninek also identified the appellant, although through an error he circled the wrong number on the paper given to him by the police. Additionally, at trial, the store manager unequivocally testified with respect to the appellant: "I'm positive that was the man."
The appellant was also identified by Barbara Zlotnicki, the head cashier in the store. She was a short distance from the appellant who held a gun on her and the manager as he removed money from the safe and placed it in a shopping bag. At trial she described the appellant's appearance as follows:
Q. How was he dressed?
A. Well, he stuck out like a sore thumb. He had a sweatshirt on and he had a cap on, a ski cap. And he had a hood on the sweatshirt and the hood was down. He had a ski cap that came down over his eye and covered right to the back of his head.
Q. What do you mean by over his eye?
A. Well, above his eyebrow, is what I meant. It was right above his eyebrow, went right around his head. And he had a fake mustache and a fake goatee on.
Q. How do you know it was a fake mustache and fake goatee?
A. The mustache was on like scotch tape or something. It was coming off on the side. It just appeared to be. It wasn't real at all.
Q. Did you see his hair at all, the hair on his head?
A. Part of it was hanging down over his ears and over the back, over the collar of his coat and sweatshirt.
Q. What color?
A. Sort of a darkish-brown, brassy-type.
Q. Pardon?
A. It was sort of like a brassy brown or something. That didn't look real either.
Q. What do you mean, it didn't look real?
A. It looked like it was dyed or something. It was hard to tell. It needed to be cut or trimmed or some thing. It looked like—it could have been a wig or it could have been his own hair pulled down by the hat, but whatever—
Ms. Zlotnicki had observed the appellant from a distance of two and a half to three feet for about three minutes in a brightly lit office.
One witness, Sharon Edmondson, also an employee of the store, testified that a heavy-set man, with a gun, was one of the robbers and that he "took" the manager into the office. She was in the presence of the heavy-set man for only a "second" and did not see his face. She did not identify the appellant at trial as being involved in the crime.
On appeal, appellant challenges the validity of his identification and the effectiveness of trial counsel for not raising this issue in post-trial motions. Initially, the guidelines for identification are as follows:
[T]he factors relevant to determining the reliability of the identification are:
. the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.
Commonwealth v. Ransome, 485 Pa. 490, 496, 402 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1979), quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977).
As previously indicated, two of the witnesses had ample time to view the appellant at close range and in a well-lighted area. A third witness, Sharon Edmondson, did not identify the appellant at trial, but gave a general physical description which harmonized with the testimony of the other two witnesses.
Appellant contends that because of inconsistencies brought out on cross-examination, trial counsel should have requested the court to rule on whether the identification was based on suggestive pre-trial identification procedures. We have reviewed the record, and we find that this argument is without merit.
The mere fact that the defense counsel's cross-examination may have provided some basis for the jury to question the validity of the identification by these witnesses, did not provide a basis for suggesting that there was any reason why this testimony was inadmissible and, therefore, subject to a motion to suppress.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 489 Pa. 285, 306, 414 A.2d 70, 80 (1980).
Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for not raising this issue at trial nor in post-trial motions because it had no underlying merit. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for not raising frivolous claims. Commonwealth v. Hosack, 485 Pa. 128, 401 A.2d 327 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rice, 456 Pa. 90, 318 A.2d 705 (1974).
Appellant's next contention is that the lower court erred in admitting certain incriminating statements which he made. Appellant was arrested on April 29, 1980 and taken to the police barracks. While he was waiting to be processed, Detective Klee and Trooper Carlson read him his rights and appellant stated that he understood them. He then indicated that he did not wish to talk. Approximately forty-five minutes later, appellant was advised by Detective Klee as to why he was arrested. He responded that he was a gentleman bandit and that he never hurt anyone. Thereafter, Trooper Carlson initiated a conversation with appellant and the incriminating statements ensued.
Once a criminal defendant tells the police that he does not want to talk to them about the crime, the interrogation must cease. Commonwealth v. Walker, 470 Pa. 534, 368 A.2d 1284 (1977). However, the United States Supreme Court in the very case establishing this rule of law stated: "In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). Therefore, to hold under the facts of this case that the appellant's interview with the police was constitutionally defective would undesirably restrict the use of confessions as an element of law enforcement.
After reviewing the record, we hold that the appellant waived his Miranda rights, because his statements were voluntary under the meaning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-5, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-5, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981):
We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police, (emphasis added.)
In the instant case, appellant expressed his desire to remain silent. Then, when he volunteered that he was the gentleman bandit and never intended to hurt anyone, he initiated the discussion in which he made the incriminating statements. Under the meaning of Edwards, those statements were voluntary.
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has developed the rule of law that voluntary statements constitute a waiver of Miranda rights. In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 279, 361 A.2d 282, 289-90 (1976), our Supreme Court stated:
Although there is no single litmus paper test for determining the voluntariness of a confession, it must establish that the decision to speak was a product of a free and unconstrained choice of its maker.... All attending circumstances surrounding the confession must be considered in this determination. These include: the duration and methods of the interrogation; the length of delay between arrest and arraignment; the conditions of detainment; the attitudes of police toward defendant; defendant's physical and psychological state; and all other conditions present which may serve to drain one's power of resistance to suggestion or to undermine one's self-determination. (Citations omitted.)
See also, Commonwealth v. O'Bryant, 479 Pa. 534, 539-40, 388 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1978); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 482 Pa. 496, 507-8, 394 A.2d 431, 437-8 (1978).
In the instant case, the interview seems to have commenced approximately 45 minutes after the appellant was given his Miranda warnings. The appellant did not request the assistance of counsel before he made any statement. Nor does it seem that he requested at any time that the interview be terminated. In fact, his statements to the police suggest that he was alert and responsive. Also, there are no hints of threats or physical violence by the police during the interview. Therefore, the appellant's incriminating statements were the product not of police compulsion, but of his own free will. Accordingly, we hold that the lower court did not err in permitting these statements at the trial.
Appellant's next contention is that Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 1100 was violated because trial was not started prior to the run date of October 26, 1980. The appellant was arrested on April 29, 1980. His trial finally commenced on November 18, 1980. In the interim, on October 17, 1980, the Commonwealth filed a petition for an extension of time to commence trial. Because of various continuances re quested by the appellant or his counsel, the hearing on the Commonwealth's petition was not held until November 7, 1980. Accordingly, the appellant contends that because the hearing was held after the run date, his speedy trial rights were violated. Our review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that it was the appellant's requests which occasioned the delay in scheduling the hearing. See, Commonwealth v. Lane, 245 Pa.Super. 146, 369 A.2d 335 (1976). Additionally, there is no requirement that the hearing on an extension petition be held prior to the run date. See, Commonwealth v. Wroten, 305 Pa.Super. 340, 451 A.2d 678 (1982); Commonwealth v. Fairley, 298 Pa.Super. 236, 444 A.2d 748 (1982).
Appellant's last contention is that the verdict is contrary to the law and not supported by the evidence. The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Stockard, 489 Pa. 209, 413 A.2d 1088 (1980); Commonwealth v. Jones, 291 Pa.Super. 69, 435 A.2d 223 (1981); Commonwealth v. Allen, 287 Pa.Super. 88, 429 A.2d 1113 (1981).
At trial, the Commonwealth produced four witnesses to the crime. Two of those witnesses positively identified the appellant from the scene of the crime, at subsequent line-ups, and in court. There is no question that the appellant was at the scene and that he participated in the robbery. Such eyewitness identification clearly supports the verdict and is not contrary to law. Accordingly, we find appellant's final contention to be without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
. Appellant was also convicted of various crimes in another robbery. On appeal to this court his conviction was affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Caswell, J. 903/82, No. 2255 Philadelphia 1981.
. We decline to view the facts of the instant case in light of Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159, 401 A.2d 1148 (1979). In Rose, no interrogation took place after the defendant decided to remain silent. Then police confronted him with a ballistics report and other facts which connected him with other crimes. After his Miranda warnings were readministered, he made a statement concerning the crime. We cannot say that the sine qua non of a legitimate confession's admissibility is that the appellant's Miranda warnings must be readministered. That is especially so in the instant case in which the intervening time period was so short. See, Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971) (eight hour-old warnings not stale); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 445 Pa. 8, 282 A.2d 276 (1971) (five hour-old warnings not stale); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449 Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972) (55 minute-old warnings not stale); Commonwealth v. Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 296 A.2d 777 (1972) (two hour-old warnings not stale).