Case Name: Commonwealth, v. Sauders, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1957-10-07
Citations: 390 Pa. 379
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 185
Parties: Commonwealth, v. Sauders, Appellant.
Judges: Before Jones, C. J., Bell, Chidsey, Musmanno, Arnold, Jones and Cohen, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 390
Pages: 379–398

Head Matter:
Commonwealth, v. Sauders, Appellant.
October 7, 1957:
Argued April 15, 1957.
Before Jones, C. J., Bell, Chidsey, Musmanno, Arnold, Jones and Cohen, JJ.
Jacques H. Geisenberger, with him Theodore L. Brubaker, for appellant.
William G. Storb, District Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell,
The defendant, Mary E. Sauders, alias Mary E. Sauder, was indicted for the murder of William (Will) Glasgow, and was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree with the recommendation of life imprisonment. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were filed by counsel for the defendant. The motion for a new trial was not pressed at the time of argument in the Court below; nevertheless the motion in arrest of judgment and the motion for a new trial were dismissed by the lower Court.
The very important question raised in this case is whether the evidence, which was solely circumstantial in character, was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of first degree murder.
On May 3, 1855, the date of the murder, and for a considerable period of time prior thereto, the defendant and William Glasgow, the victim, lived together, admittedly without benefit of clergy. The evidence produced by the Commonwealth clearly established that William Glasgow was murdered by being struck over the head with some blunt instrument as he lay in his bed in the very small one room house occupied by the victim and the defendant. The murder weapon was never found. Dr. O'Donnell testified that any normal adult, male or female, could have inflicted the fatal wounds if the murder weapon was heavy enough.
There was no eye witness of the murder and the exact time of death was unknown. According to the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant was the last person known to have seen Glasgow alive. At 8 p.m. on the evening of May 3, 1855, a neighbor, Thomas Hardin, informed Glasgow that the defendant was called on Hardin's telephone. Between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. of that same evening, defendant left the house where she and the deceased lived. She then entered a taxicab which she had ordered and which had been parked in front of the residence. The taxi was driven by James T. Browning (called "Brownie" by the defendant). There was no evidence of any one else having seen the decedent until 2:00 p.m. the following day when he was found murdered by Hardin. Dr. Stahr, the Deputy Coroner, testified that in his opinion the death occurred somewhere between 8 and 20 hours before the body was discovered.
Upon discovery of the murder, Hardin called the police. Upon arrival, the police found the victim's body lying in a pool of blood on his (and defendant's) bed. Clothing hanging on pegs near the bed and other objects near the bed were spattered with blood. The foot end of the bed and the ceiling of the room were similarly spattered with blood. According to State Policeman Charles Simmons (the investigator), the room in which he found the decedent was not disorderly and did not show any evidence of a struggle. He also found a poeketbook under the pillow on which decedent was lying. It contained a $100 bill and a $5 bill. Simmons was the first to interview the defendant on the evening of May 4, 1955, at which time the defendant was taken into custody. He testified, inter alia, as follows:
". . . one of the first things she asked me she said, 'Did you find Will's pocket book, he had a $100.00 bill in it and a $5.00 bill in it.' I said now where could it have been, and she said it was in his pocket book under his pillow, then I asked her several different questions, and then she turned to Brownie and said, 'Don't you remember my calling back and telling Will to put the cat in, didn't you hear him answer me?', and Brownie said 'No'. Mrs. Sauders was fairly well intoxicated as she sat there, and we took her into custody at that time. . . .
"(Q) Did you question her at a later date? (A) I questioned Mrs. Sauders a number of times. (Q) What, if anything, did she tell you happened? (A) Well, the money angle was one of the first things she talked about, and when questioned how she came about this money, she said Will had given her $238.00 to buy a monument for her son who had died, and that she had $5.00 of her own. Later when she figured out what she had spent of the money, she had spent the ma jority, and wliat we recovered, was approximately $438.00 which, is about $200.00 in excess of the amount she admitted he gave her. (Q) What did she say about that? (A) She was confused, and said she didn't know what he gave her, she always had this answer."
The Commonwealth proved that the clothing hanging near the body as well as a great number of other objects situated near the bed were spattered with a pattern of blood droplets. The most incriminating evidence, as far as the defendant is concerned, was that bloodstains were found on the dress and coat which she was wearing when she left the residence on the evening of May 3, 1955. Peter Striekler, an expert chemist, testified that the dress and coat worn by the defendant contained the same pattern of blood droplets as were found on other clothing in the vicinity of the victim, and that this blood was human blood. The defendant admitted that the bloodstains found on the front left shoulder area of her dress and on the lower portion of the right sleeve and on the left front chest area of her coat were the blood of William Glasgow, the victim.
Defendant gave conflicting stories concerning how the bloodstains had gotten on her clothes. First, she told Officer Simmons that the bloodstains on her dress were received when she accompanied Glasgow to a doctor's office after Glasgow was involved in an automobile accident. When subsequently confronted with the falsity of her story of accompanying Glasgow to a doctor after an automobile accident which occurred several months prior to the murder, she then said that a man by the name of George Streeter had come to the house on the evening of Mag S, 1955, and had struck Glasgow in the face thus causing his nose to bleed and the blood spattered on her dress and coat. Defendant did not produce the George Streeter whom she impli caled and could not identify a man named Streeter who was produced by the State Police. An exhaustive search by the State Police failed to disclose any other George Streeter such as described by the defendant. Officer Simmons further testified that the defendant stated at one time that she would take the entire blame for the crime because she hated to see "Brownie [James T. Browning, the taxicab driver] burn . he is too young to die."
The Hiltons and the Hardins lived in the (same) house which adjoins that of the victim. Thomas Hardin testified that after 10:00 p.m. on the evening of May 3, 1955, he failed to see anyone around the Glasgow or Sauder residence, and likewise failed to hear any noise therein. He reiterated this testimony with regard to two periods during the early morning hours of May 4 when he arose to feed his newly born baby. Ruth Ann Hilton, age 12, recalled seeing the arrival of the taxicab driven by Browning, and stated that she did not see anyone else around the victim's residence that evening. Elizabeth Hilton testified that she did not hear or see any disturbance around the premises that night, and that her dog, who generally barked quite loudly when strangers approached, failed to bark on that evening. Leroy Hilton, the husband of Elizabeth Hilton, corroborated this testimony insofar as the dog was concerned.
Defendant consistently denied her guilt. According to her testimony on direct examination, she last saw William Glasgow when leaving their room on May S to take the (Browning) taxicab (between 9:30 and 10 :Q0 p.m.). Glasgow had been lying in bed, so defendant testified, before Streeter's arrival. Defendant testified, inter alia, as follows:
"A. When George [Streeter] came, in I was ready to go to town, and he said, "Are you going away'? I said yes. Will [Glasgow] spoke up and said 'Will you take somebody like that along with you?' I said no, I didn't know if I was even going, and Will made remarks about him and said if I was going with somebody like that just give him back the money and we will go again, and he and George had an argument and George slapped him on the face and Will got up and sat on the front of the bed, and I got up and I took hold of Will and I told him to sit down. George had brought two bottles of beer along ivith him to make certain he had something in the house to drink. I said you take your beer and get moving and I walked Will over and he sat down on the bed again, and after that there I got the telephone call. . . .
"Q. And you say George Streeter struck him? A. Yes, struck him right around the mouth across the Aose. Q. Did that cause anything? A. Causing the hose to bleed. Q. What did you do after that? A. Well Will and he got up, his nose was bleeding, he bleeds very easily, and that's how I got the blood on my shoulder. I said, 'Now Will, sit down'. He crossed over and got the beer and he was standing pretty close, and I told him to get going and T said you don't need to bother coming back anymore, just like that. .
"Q. After George slapped Will on his nose and his nose started to bleed, what happened then, what did you do? A. I told George to get going. Q. And did he? A. Yes, he went, yes. . . .
"Q. This was going on while you were taking care of Will's nosebleed? A. Yes. Q. You left him take off? A. George left right away and I finished cleaning Will up. Q. Then you say you had this blood splashed over your dress? A. I knew the blood was there, Will told me to go and change my dress. Q. Who told you? 'A. He did, he told me to change, but I said I would just keep this on it didn't hurt anything."
Defendant then testified that Glasgow had asked her to turn off the television receiver since he was "going to lie down and go to sleep". At this time Glasgow had on his pajamas tvith a pair of pants pulled over top of them. She then left their home between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. and got in the (Browning) taxicab. Defendant then related a night and day of carousing in various bars and cafes in the City and County of Lancaster, having been driven there by Browning who corroborated her testimony in this respect. During the course of this carousing, defendant spent a considerable sum of money, admittedly the money of the victim. She testified that she spent part of the money for a new dress. On a later occasion, when asked about this dress by Officer Simmons, defendant replied (according to Officer Simmons): "I knew Will was dead and I wanted to go to the funeral home." The evidence shows that the defendant was not apprised of the death of Glasgow by outside sources until after she had purchased the dress.
In her oral statements to the police immediately after being taken into custody and in a written statement which she made, defendant related in great detail her activities on the day preceding the murder, the night of May 3, 1955, and the following day. It is significant that in these initial oral and written statements, the defendant failed to mention George Streeter in any way whatsoever. It was only after the defendant was confronted with the pattern of blood spatters on her dress and coat, that the name of George Street-er was mentioned. On cross-examination, the defendant was confronted with the written statement which, incidentally, was at variance with several statements that she had made on direct examination. The defend ant was asked why she did not mention George Street-er at the time the written statement was executed. Defendant answered that she was afraid "that George would do something to me". Upon further questioning in this matter, defendant was again asked why she did not tell them about George Streeter in the statement. She replied "Well, I figured they could find it out for themselves, that's what they are for."
From the time of her arrest throughout the course of the trial, defendant, we repeat, has staunchly maintained her innocence and denied having committed the murder or having any knowledge concerning it.
Was the evidence sufficient in law to justify a verdict of first degree murder?
A jury can believe all or a part of or none of a defendant's testimony or of the testimony of any witness for the Commonwealth or for the defense: Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 422, 106 A. 2d 820; Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 50, 103 A. 2d 694; Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A. 2d 743.
In Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464, the Court said (page 508) : ". . . Proof by eye witnesses or direct evidence of the corpus delicti or of identity or of the commission by the defendant of the crime charged is not necessary. '. . . It is clearly settled that a man may be convicted on circumstantial evidence alone, and a criminal intent may be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which are of such a nature as to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A. 2d 820; Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A. 2d 743; Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 600, 98 A. 2d 733; Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 A. 1070; Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 61 A. 2d 309': Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, 348, 106 A. 2d 587."
In Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 123 A. 2d 435, the Court said (page 445) : ". . . All that is required is that, the evidence being circumstantial, the circumstances proved should be such as reasonably and naturally to justify an inference of the guilt of the accused, and of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Commonwealth v. Marino, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 327, 334, 16 A. 2d 314, 317; Commonwealth v. Bausewine, 354 Pa. 35, 41, 46 A. 2d 491, 493; Commonwealth v. Carey, 368 Pa. 157, 163, 164, 82 A. 2d 240, 242; Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 427, 106 A. 2d 820, 828."
In Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 51) : "A variety of definitions of 'reasonable doubt', all expressing substantially the same thought, have been approved by the appellate Courts— see Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 3 A. 2d 398. A standard and approved form of charge on this point would be: 'The defendant comes before you presumed to be innocent and the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt fancied or conjured up in the minds of the jury to escape an unpleasant verdict; it must be an honest doubt arising out of the evidence itself, the kind of doubt that would restrain a reasonable man (or woman) from acting in a matter of importance to himself (or herself)."'
In Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 524) : ". . . false or contradictory statements by the accused are admissible since the jury may infer therefrom that they were made with an intent to divert suspicion or to mislead the police or other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence, and hence are indicatory of guilt: Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 601, 98 A. 2d 733 . . ." See to the same effect: Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 A. 161; Commonwealth v. Danarowicz, 294 Pa. 190, 144 A. 127; Commonwealth v. Hadok, 313 Pa. 110, 169 A. 111; Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 328, 195 A. 62; Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d 389; Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A. 2d 155; Catheart v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 108, 113; McMeen v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 300, 306, 9 A. 878; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 162 Pa. 63, 29 A. 280; Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326, 146 A. 905.
We have reviewed the evidence and the law as we are required to do by the Act of February 15, 1870 "in order to determine whether the ingredients necessary to constitute murder in the first degree have been proved to exist": Commonwealth v. Leamer, 386 Pa. 485, 126 A. 2d 409; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A. 2d 274; Commonwealth v. Bibalo, 375 Pa. 257, 100 A. 2d 45. Reviewing and analyzing the evidence in the light of the above mentioned authorities, the evidence is sufficient in law to justify the jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Judgment and sentence affirmed.
P. L. 15, §2, 19 PS §1187.