Case Name: William F. Henderson v. Solomon Van Hook
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 453
Docket Number: 
Parties: William F. Henderson v. Solomon Van Hook.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 453–455

Head Matter:
William F. Henderson v. Solomon Van Hook.
In a proceeding to revive a judgment against a party and the representatives oí his co-defendant, although the co-defendant did not appeal, the court took jurisdiction as to matters appertaining only to the defendant who did not appeal.
Where the executrix was brought in by scire facias to revive a judgment, and ' she plead a will, giving the names of the legatees and devisees, and which will directed that no proceedings should be had in the probate court, except to probate the will and file an inventory, wherefore she insisted that the devisees were necessary parties, the court sustained a demurrer to the answer, and also a judgment of revivor against the estate.
To take the administration of the estate out of the probate court, it is not enough that the will contains a provision which the statute contemplates, but it is also necessary that the persons entitled to the estate should give their assent, otherwise the estate must be settled in a probate court. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1371, Note 515.)
Appeal from Navarro. Thé case was tried before Hon. John Gregg, one of the district judges.
This case was reversed at a former term, because the representatives of Edward H. Tarrant had not been made parties. (See 24 Tex., 358.)
Solomon Van Hook, for the use of Thomas D. Van Hook, sued William E. Henderson, averring that, on 10th October, 1856, Solomon Van Hook recovered a judgment against Henderson and Edward H. Tarrant for the sum of $2,598 73, with interest at 12 per cent, thereon; that no execution had issued thereon, whereby the judgment became dormant; and he prayed for a scire facias to revive against Henderson, not making parties of the representatives of Tarrant, who, he averred, was dead.
Henderson demurred, on the ground that the representatives of Tarrant had not been made parties. The plaintiff amended, and prayed that Mary Tarrant Hawkins, executrix of Tarrant, and J. E. Hawkins, the husband, be made parties.
The parties plead the general issue, and also plead the will of Edward H. Tarrant, whereby it appeared that he made bequests to his widow, Mary Tarrant Hawkins, and also to his children named in the plea; and that he directed that no proceedings should be had in the county court, except to prove the will and file an inventory, as directed by the statute. "Wherefore she said that she was improperly made a party, and that the legatees, under the will, ought to have been made parties. The plaintiff demurred to this answer. The court sustained the demurrer, and rendered a personal judgment against Henderson and against Mary Hawkins, executrix of Edward H. Tarrant, with an order that it be certified to the probate court for enforcement. Ho other facts were proved, except the judgment declared on. Henderson appealed, and assigned for error the overruling the answer of his co-defendant, the executrix of Edward H. Tarrant, and the rendering judgment against his estate.
The appellee suggested delay, which opened all errors in the case as to the appellant.
Roger Q. Mills, for appellant.
— 1.The transcript does not contain the mandate of this court when this cause was before it, and reversed and remanded; and the trial below was without authority, and therefore void. . The court will take judicial notice of its own records, and they show that this cause was reversed and remanded at the last term of this court. The court below, it seems, tried the cause without the mandate, and, consequently, without jurisdiction, and the judgment is a nullity.
2. The judgment sustaining exceptions to the answer of defendants was erroneous. All the legatees and distributees of Tarrant should have been cited. (Wood v. Means, 23 Tex., 484.) It is true, Mrs. Hawkins does not appeal, but Henderson had the judgment in this cause reversed at the last term, because Tarrant’s representatives were not cited below; and, if he had a right to have them cited, he has the right to have the proper parties cited, and the service legally made, which has not been made in this case.
3. The judgment was not warranted by the, evidence. The statement of facts shows, that the appellee only offered in evidence the judgment. He should have proved, in addition, that execution had not issued within “ a year and a day.” This was the main fact that gave the court the right to revive the judgment, and there is no evidence that the former judgment was dormant. This could have been proved by the records of the court.
G. M. Winkler, for the appellee, suggested delay.

Opinion:
Wheeler, G. J.
—Prima facie, we think it is to be taken that the proper parties are before the court. To take the administration of the estate out of the probate court, it is not enough that the will contains the provision which the statute contemplates. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 822.) It is further necessary that there should be the assent of the persons entitled to the estate under the will. Unless they have complied with the provisions of the statute, the estate must be settled in the probate court, as in other cases. (Hogue v. Sims, 9 Tex., 546.) The assent of the legatees is not averred in the answer, and we think it fair to conclude, that the estate was being administered in the probate court.. If so, the executor was the proper party. To authorize a reversal, it ought to appear that the proper parties were not before the court. We think it does not so appear.
Judgment affirmed.