Case Name: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A REPRESENTATION ELECTION AMONG SUPREME COURT STAFF EMPLOYEES
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-07-27
Citations: 406 Mich. 647
Docket Number: Docket No. 62109
Parties: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A REPRESENTATION ELECTION AMONG SUPREME COURT STAFF EMPLOYEES
Judges: Coleman, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 406
Pages: 647–690

Head Matter:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A REPRESENTATION ELECTION AMONG SUPREME COURT STAFF EMPLOYEES
Docket No. 62109.
Argued February 1, 1979
(Calendar No. 6).
Decided July 27, 1979.
See order on rehearing of December 6, 1979 withdrawing Justice Ryan’s signature from Justice Williams’ opinion and substituting a concurrence in Chief Justice Coleman’s result, post, 690.
Local 586, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, petitioned the Employment Relations Commission for an election, under the public employment relations act, for certification of a collective bargaining representative for certain staff and clerical employees of the Supreme Court in Lansing. The Chief Justice, by letter, advised the Employment Relations Commission that the Court had concluded that the public employment relations act is not constitutionally applicable to employees of the Supreme Court and that the Court considered the matter closed. The Employment Relations Commission decided that it had jurisdiction and ordered an election in the proposed bargaining unit. The Supreme Court ordered the Employment Relations Commission and the petitioning labor union to show cause why the Court should not order the commission to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In an opinion by Justice Williams, joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan, the Supreme Court held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3,12, 27, 31] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 210.
[2] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 65.
[4] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 213.
[5] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 69.
[6, 14, 15] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 102.
[7, 19] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 66 et seq.
[8] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 69.
[9] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 58 et seq.
[10, 11] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 64, 65.
[13] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 210, 225-227.
[16] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 190.
[17, 22] 48A Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 1764 et seq.
[18] 48A Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 1765.
Right of public employees to form or join a labor organization affiliated with a federation or trade union or which includes private employees. 40 ALR3d 728.
[20] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 225.
[21] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 788, 791, 795.
[23] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 227 et seq.
[24] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 58, 75.
[25] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 56.
[26] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 238.
[27] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 212.
[28] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 67.
[29] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 64, 65, 72, 74.
[30] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 219 et seq.
[32] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 234 et seq.
The constitutional provision for separation of powers precludes the assumption by the Employment Relations Commission of jurisdiction over the Supreme Court for the election of a bargaining representative. The Employment Relations Commission case is ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
1. The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate and co-equal under the Constitution. The Supreme Court is charged with superintending the exercise of the judicial power. In this case the Employment Relations Commission is attempting to bring the Supreme Court before it as a party in an action in which the Employment Relations Commission will make a determination and may issue an order affecting the Supreme Court. In short, the Employment Relations Commission is attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the Supreme Court.
2. There is no prior case that has addressed the issue, which may well be because it is so anomalous. It is difficult to envision any comparable situation where a subordinate arm of the judicial branch of government would attempt to exercise an executive power over the Governor or a legislative power over the Legislature. But here an executive agency is attempting to exercise adjudicative authority over the Supreme Court,
3. The conclusion of the Employment Relations Commission that the separation-of-powers provision of the Constitution, Article 3, § 2, does not apply because "clerical employees do not exercise the powers of one branch of government or another” focuses on the wrong point. It is not determinative whether certain Supreme Court employees may be subject to the public employment relations act. The critical fact is that the Employment Relations Commission is attempting to take jurisdiction over the Court as a party defendant, not jurisdiction over certain clerical employees of the Court.
4. Whether the constitutional provision of Article 4, § 48, on the resolution of disputes concerning public employees includes or excludes employees of the Court has nothing whatsoever to do with whether the public employment relations act should be, or can be, interpreted to give the Employment Relations Commission jurisdiction over the Court, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Legislature, in enacting the public employment relations act, has not by specific reference included Supreme Court employees. Since construing the statute to give the Employment Relations Commission such jurisdiction would contravene the constitutional provision for separation of powers, the statute would normally be read as not giving the Employment Relations Commission jurisdiction over the Court.
5. The Constitution does not, as a matter of interpretation or logic, authorize the Employment Relations Commission to take jurisdiction over the Court. No precedent to the contrary has been cited. Common sense as well as good law would say that if a tribunal of the executive department could sit in judgment over the Court, with respect to the issue, the Court would no longer be functioning as the Supreme Court. That would erode a cornerstone of our Constitution and of our system of government.
Chief Justice Coleman wrote separately to add another analysis in support of Justice Williams’ conclusion:
1. The ultimate basis for the apparent jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Commission is the constitutional provision in Article 4, § 48, that the Legislature may regulate the employment relationship of public employees other than those in the civil service. The general provision giving the Legislature that power conflicts with the specific provision in Article 6, § 7, which gives the Supreme Court the power to appoint, remove, and have general supervision over its staff.
2. That there is real conflict between the two provisions is clear and insurmountable when reasonable and plain meaning is attributed to the words of each. The public employment relations act, enacted pursuant to the constitutional provision of Article 4, gives the Employment Relations Commission jurisdiction over virtually all questions that may arise concerning "working conditions”, meaning wages, hours, appointment, removal, and general supervision practices. The Constitution specifically grants the Court the powers of appointment, removal, and general supervision of its employees; it is difficult to find terms clearer to express the intent to give the Court jurisdiction over all "working conditions”. A first principle of constitutional construction, to avoid finding a conflict if possible, is unavailing.
3. Another fundamental rule of constitutional construction is that where there is a conflict between general and specific provisions, the specific provision must control as a limitation on the general provision’s grant of authority. Application of this rule serves another important rule of construction consistently, because neither of the sections is rendered void or ineffective: the general provision in Article 4 is left controlling in all cases where the specific provision in Article 6 and the specific exception in the general provision itself do not apply.
4. This construction also conforms to the rule that requires attention to the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The history of Article 6 in the constitutional convention shows that the framers specifically intended to grant the Supreme Court power, within the budget provided by the Legislature, over the wages paid to its employees and over its own personnel matters. There is no evidence that the framers were even aware of the latent conflict between the two provisions.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of the public employment relations act may not be extended to employees of the Supreme Court staff and the Employment Relations Commission should be ordered to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justice Levin, dissented. He wrote:
1. The question of separation of powers is not involved because of the Constitution itself. The separation of powers clause provides that no person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch "except as expressly provided in this constitution”. The provision allowing the Legislature to enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, Article 4, § 48, which exempts only state civil service employees, must be regarded as the express exception contemplated in the separation of powers clause. Therefore, application of the public employment relations act to the Court’s staff does not violate the separation of powers provision.
2. The constitutional power to "appoint”, "remove”, and "have general supervision” of its staff distinguishes the Supreme Court from other divisions of the "one court of justice”. There is nothing inherent in the collective bargaining process itself that would necessarily intrude upon the constitutionally specified power of the Supreme Court to hire, fire, and supervise its own staff.
3. The scope of bargaining which would otherwise prevail under the public employment relations act may be limited by the Court’s constitutional power to supervise its employees; but the extent and effect of this limitation on its power to bargain is not before the Court in this proceeding. A general duty to bargain does not necessarily involve an unconstitutional intrusion on judicial authority. The constitutional provisions are not in irreconcilable conflict.
Justice Moody also dissented. He wrote:
Ministerial level employees of the Supreme Court are public employees within the constitutional provision on the resolution of disputes concerning public employees and the public employment relations act. As public employees, Supreme Court ministerial level employees have the right to organize and join labor organizations and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.
1. The constitutional provision on the resolution of disputes concerning public employees does not conflict with the Court’s constitutional power to appoint, remove and supervise its staff since the provisions do not relate to the same subject matter. The Court’s power to appoint, remove and supervise its staff is similar to a management rights clause which most employers, public and private, reserve to themselves. It in no way alters the Legislature’s constitutional power to govern the resolution of labor disputes concerning all public employees except those in the state classified civil service.
2. The Constitution defines classified state civil service positions, and specifically excludes from the definition employees of courts of record. Accordingly, Supreme Court employees are public employees subject to the public employment relations act and its administrative agency, the Employment Relations Commission, unless Article 6, § 7, can be interpreted as an exception to the broad, all-inclusive language of the Constitution, Article 4, § 48, which authorizes the act. The Court has previously held that the public employment relations act was intended by the Legislature to supersede conflicting laws and is superimposed even on those institutions which derive their powers from the Constitution itself. The rule of constitutional construction that the specific governs the general as a limitation on it can only be applied when the constitutional provisions are related to the same subject matter and are adopted for the same purpose. The history of the two sections of the Constitution in question shows that they do not deal with the same subject matter; One was intended as a broad grant of legislative authority over all public employee labor disputes except for state classified civil service employees, and the other was primarily a budget-oriented provision which merely extended the appointive power of the Court to its entire staff instead of limiting it to three court officers as in the 1908 Constitution. These provisions were not adopted for the same purposes, and may be enforced without material and substantial repugnancy.
3. The Court has consistently held that a separation of powers problem does not exist with regard to the enforcement of the public employment relations act by the Employment Relations Commission where the statute has been invoked by employees of the lower courts. One of the bases for this holding is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which recognizes that an administrative agency is competent to determine its own jurisdiction in the first instance. The Court has in those other cases, and should in this, accede to that jurisdiction for several reasons.
4. There is no separation of powers problem because control over the labor disputes of public employees, including Supreme Court employees, was specifically granted in the Constitution to the Legislature. By enacting the public employment relations act, the Legislature properly delegated the operational tasks within the public employment sector to its administrative agency, the Employment Relations Commission. Accordingly, pursuant to constitutional approval, the Employment Relations Commission is exercising its legislatively authorized function to direct an election of public employees for the purpose of determining labor organization representation. The action of the commission in ordering the employer, the Supreme Court, to take certain actions, is standard procedure. That the Supreme Court, as the public employer, may be subject to the commission’s jurisdiction on the facts is not the equivalent of the commission exercising powers belonging to the judiciary. To the contrary, the commission is exercising its constitutionally approved, legislatively authorized function.
5. To conclude that the Employment Relations Commission, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in carrying out its function, as do many administrative agencies, is usurping powers that belong to the judiciary, would be in effect to subvert the legislative foundation of administrative commissions and boards such as the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Employment Security Board of Review, and the Civil Rights Commission. These agencies do not perform judicial functions, nor are their actions transformed into judicial functions when the Court is the employer-party in a dispute. The Supreme Court should not assume a position of potentially placing itself beyond accountability regarding civil rights violations, unemployment compensation disputes, workers’ compensation claims, or, as in this case, employment relations. The delicate balance of powers of the three branches of government should not be tilted in favor of judicial omnipotence by its own hand.
6. This does not mean that the actions of an administrative agency such as the Employment Relations Commission, dealing with Supreme Court employees, can never impinge upon the separation of powers. At some time the specific actions of an administrative agency could be an impermissible intrusion into the most basic day-to-day exercise of the constitutionally derived judicial powers. Nevertheless, under the present facts the commission is not exercising powers belonging to the judiciary.
Justice Levin agreed with Justice Kavanagh that legislation authorizing Supreme Court employees to designate or select a collective bargaining representative does not confer powers of the judicial branch on the Employment Relations Commission in violation of the separation of powers section or that it necessarily violates the section of the judicial article empowering the Supreme Court to appoint, remove, and exercise general supervision of its staff and to control budget recommendations and the expenditure of moneys appropriated. He was also in substantial agreement with Justice Moody, but did not agree with his construction of Article 6, § 7. He wrote separately to state his tentative views, although they are not necessary to decision at this time, clarifying the generalization that there may be some limitation on the duty of the Court to bargain, to avoid misunderstanding of his concurrence with the view that the Legislature may require the Court to recognize and bargain with a representative of its employees:
1. The Constitution empowers the Legislature to require collective bargaining between a public employer and its employees, but that and other grants of legislative power are subject to limitations imposed by other, conflicting, provisions. The unique reservation in the Constitution to the Supreme Court of powers to appoint, remove, and have general supervision of its staff, and to control the preparation of budget recommendations and expend for any purpose pertaining to its operations whatever moneys are appropriated, suggests that the framers did not intend that the Legislature could enact laws concerning the subject matter or inhibiting the free and independent exercise by the Court of the power so reserved.
2. The powers reserved to the Court belong to it as it is from time to time composed, and therefore no sitting Court may, by agreement or other action, impair or constrain the power-of a future Court to modify or change any decision which Article 6, § 7, would otherwise empower it to make, just as the Legislature cannot pass a law another Legislature cannot repeal.
3. Thus the Court cannot contract concerning or otherwise limit the free and independent exercise of its powers under Article 6, § 7, and the Legislature may not pass laws concerning or inhibiting the exercise of those powers, and thus cannot require the Court to bargain on their exercise. This probably means that the Court cannot be required to bargain collectively regarding many areas of employee concern, e.g., hiring, tenure, removal, and perhaps even wages and other economic issues requiring the expenditure of appropriations.
Opinion of the Court
1. Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers.
The legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and co-equal under the clear and specific terms of the Constitution (Const 1963, art 3, § 2).
2. Courts — Supreme Court — Superintending Control.
The Supreme Court is charged by the Constitution with superintending the exercise of the judicial power (Const 1963, art 6, §§ 1, 4).
3. Courts — Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers — Administrative Law.
It is anomalous for an agency of the executive branch of government to attempt to exercise adjudicative authority over the Supreme Court (Const 1963, art 3, § 2).
4. Courts — Supreme Court — Employment Relations Commission — Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers.
The Constitution, by its separation of powers provision, considered with the provision giving the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees, precludes the Employment Relations Commission from taking jurisdiction over the Supreme Court; it is not germane whether certain employees of the Court may be subject to the terms of the public employment relations act (Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Const 1963, art 4, § 48; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
Concurring Opinion by Coleman, C. J.
5. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment , Relations.
The general provision of the Constitution giving the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees other than those in civil service conñicts with the speciñc provision which gives the Supreme Court the power to appoint, remove, and have general supervision over its staff; that there is real confíict between the two provisions is clear and insurmountable when reasonable and plain meaning is attributed to the words of each (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
6. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Working Conditions — Words and Phrases.
The Constitution specifícally grants the Supreme Court the powers of appointment, removal and general supervision of its employees; it is difficult to ffnd terms clearer to express the intent to give the Court jurisdiction over all "working conditions” (Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
7. Constitutional Law — Construction.
A first principle of constitutional construction, to avoid finding a conflict if possible, is unavailing where the conflict of a general provision of the Constitution with a specific provision is clear and insurmountable.
8. Constitutional Law — Construction.
A fundamental rule of constitutional construction is that where there is a conffict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision must control as a limitation on the general provision’s grant of authority.
9. Constitutional Law — Construction — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations.
The general provision of the Constitution giving the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees controls in all cases where the specific provision concerning the power of the Supreme Court to appoint, remove, and have general supervision over its staff and the specific exception in the general provision itself do not apply (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
10. Constitutional Law — Construction.
Attention and respect must be paid to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in construing it.
11. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations.
The history in the constitutional convention of the article concerning the courts shows that the framers specifically intended to grant the Supreme Court power, within the budget provided by the Legislature, over the wages paid to its employees and over its own personnel matters; there is no evidence that the framers were even aware of the latent conñict between the provision concerning the Supreme Court employees and another provision concerning the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
12. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations.
The provisions of the public employment relations act may not be extended to be applied to employees of the staff of the Supreme Court (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.45B[1] et seq.).
Dissenting Opinion by Kavanagh, J.
13. Constitutional Law — Separation op Powers •— Public Em- . ployment Relations — Supreme Court — Employees.
Application of the public employment relations act to certain staff employees of the Supreme Court does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Constitution because the constitutional provision concerning the power of the Legislature to regulate the employment relationship of public employees, which exempts only state civil service employees, must be regarded as one of the express exceptions mentioned in the separation of powers clause (Const 1963, art 3, §2; Const 1963, art 4, § 48; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
14. Courts — Constitutional Law — Supreme Court.
The constitutional power to appoint, remove and have general supervision of its staff distinguishes the Supreme Court from other divisions of the "one court of justice” (Const 1963, art 6, §§1, 7).
15. Courts — Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Collective Bargaining.
There is nothing inherent in the collective bargaining process itself that would necessarily intrude upon the constitutionally speciñed power of the Supreme Court to hire, ñre, and supervise its own staff (Const 1963, art 6, § 7; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.4SS[1] et seq.).
16. Courts — Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Collective Bargaining.
The scope of bargaining which would otherwise prevail between the Supreme Court and its staff employees under the public employment relations act may be limited by the Supreme Court’s constitutional power to supervise its employees; but this limitation on its power to bargain is simply acknowledged by the Court and its extent and effect are not decided where that issue is not properly before the Court (Const 1963, art 6, § 7; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
Dissenting Opinion by Blair Moody, Jr., J.
17. Labor Relations — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Constitutional Law.
Ministerial level employees of the Supreme Court are public employees within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution granting the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees and of the public employment relations act (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
18. Labor Relations — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Collective Bargaining.
Ministerial level employees of the Supreme Court, as public employees, have the right to organize and join labor organizations and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining (MCL 423.209; MSA 17.455[9]).
19. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations.
The provision of the Constitution giving the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relationship of public employees does not conffict with the provision concerning the power of the Supreme Court to appoint, remove, and have general supervision over its staff, because the provisions do not relate to the same subject matter; both provisions may be enforced without material and substantial repugnancy (Const 1963, art 4, §48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
20. Courts — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Constitutional Law.
The constitutional power of the Supreme Court to appoint, remove and supervise its staff is similar to an employment contract management rights clause which most employers, public and private, reserve to themselves; it in no way alters the Legislature’s constitutional power to govern the employment relation of all public employees except those in the state classiñed civil service (Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, §7).
21. Administrative Law — Primary Jurisdiction — Employment Relations Commission.
The Employment Relations Commission is competent to determine its own jurisdiction under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
22. Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers — Public Employment Relations — Courts.
The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude the public employment relations act and its administrative agency, the Employment Relations Commission, from regulating the employment of public employees who serve the courts (Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Const 1963, art 4, § 48; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
23. Courts — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Separation of Powers.
That the Supreme Court, as a public employer-party, may initially be subject to the jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Commission is not the equivalent of the Employment Relations Commission exercising powers belonging to the judiciary where the Employment Relations Commission is exercising its legislatively authorized function to direct an election of public employees for the purpose of determining representation by a labor organization (Const 1963, art 3, § 2; MCL 423.212; MSA 17.455[12J).
24. Constitutional Law — Public Employment Relations — Words and Phrases.
"Public employment’’ under the constitutional provision granting the Legislature the power to regulate the employment relation of public employees is clearly intended to apply to employment or service in all governmental activity; it is the entire public sector of employment, as distinguished from private employment, with the sole exception of the state classiñed civil service (Const 1963, art 4, §48; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455[1] et seq.).
25. Constitutional Law — Public Employment Relations.
The Court has previously held that the public employment relations act was intended by the Legislature to supersede conñict-ing laws and is superimposed even on those institutions which derive their powers from the Constitution itself (MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.45B[1] et seq.).
26. Constitutional Law — Administrative Law — Separation of Powers.
To conclude that the Employment Relations Commission, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in carrying out its function as do many administrative agencies, is usurping powers that belong to the judiciary, would be in effect to subvert the legislative foundation of administrative commissions and boards such as the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Employment Security Board of Review, and the Civil Rights Commission; these agencies do not perform judicial functions, nor are their actions transformed into judicial functions when the Supreme Court is the employer party in a dispute (Const 1963, art 3, §2; art 4, §48; art 5, §29; art 6, §28; MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.46^1] et seq.).
27. Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers — Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court should not assume a position of potentially placing itself beyond accountability regarding civil rights violations, unemployment compensation disputes, workers’ compensation claims or public employment relations; the delicate balance of powers afforded the three branches of government should not be tilted in favor of judicial omnipotence by its own hand (Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 29; Const 1963, art 6, § 28).
Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
See headnotes 13-16.
28. Constitutional Law — Public Employment Relations.
The Constitution empowers the Legislature to require collective bargaining between a public employer and its employees, but that and other grants of legislative power are subject to limitations imposed by other, conñicting provisions (Const 1963, art 4, §48).
29. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations.
The unique reservation in the Constitution to the Supreme Court of power to appoint, remove, and have general supervision of its staff, and to control the preparation of budget recommendations and expend for any purpose pertaining to its operations whatever moneys are appropriated, suggests that the framers did not intend that the Legislature could enact laws concerning the subject matter or inhibiting the free and independent exercise by the Court of the power so reserved (Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
30. Courts — Supreme Court — Constitutional Law.
The constitutional powers reserved to the Supreme Court over its staff and budget belong to it as it is from time to time composed, and therefore no sitting Court may, by agreement or other action, impair or constrain the power of a future Court to modify or change any decision which the Constitution would otherwise empower it to make, just as the Legislature cannot pass a law another Legislature cannot repeal (Const 1963, art 6, §7).
31. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Separation op Powers.
The Supreme Court cannot contract concerning or otherwise limit the free and independent exercise of its power under the Constitution to appoint, remove, and have general supervision of its staff, and over its own budget, and the Legislature may not pass laws concerning or inhibiting the exercise of those powers, and thus cannot require the Court to bargain on that exercise (Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Const 1963, art 4, § 48; Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
32. Constitutional Law — Supreme Court — Public Employment Relations — Collective Bargaining.
The Supreme Court probably cannot be required to bargain collectively regarding many areas of its employees’ concern, e.g., hiring, tenure, removal, and perhaps even wages and other economic issues requiring the expenditure of appropriations (Const 1963, art 6, § 7).
Vander Ploeg, Marietti, Mullally, Grimm & Fol-kert for petitioner Local 586, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and George M. Bourgon and Jon M. DeHorn, Assistants Attorney General, for Employment Relations Commission.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
(for dismissal). This is a case of first impression. No Michigan or foreign opinion has been cited to us, nor did our research reveal any, where a quasi-judicial agency assumed to bring the Supreme Court before it for adjudication. However, those are the facts of this case. The Michigan Employment Relations Commission (hereinafter MERC) has attempted to take jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court to determine a union representation election proceeding in which this Court would be a defendant.
We hold that Const 1963, art 3, § 2, headed separation of powers of government, precludes MERC's assumption of such jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court. We do not here consider whether, or to what extent, Const 1963, art 4, § 48 is modified by Const 1963, art 6, § 7. We order MERC Case No. R77 L-572 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Facts
On December 27, 1977, Local 586, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, pursuant to MCL 423.212; MSA 17.455(12), petitioned for an election among certain employees working at the Lansing offices of the Michigan Supreme Court. The proposed bargaining unit included:
"All employees in the general list titles, located in Lansing, Michigan. Court officers, custodians, multilith technicians, secretaries, toll terminal operators and receptionists."
More specifically, the bargaining unit included persons holding the above-designated job categories in the employ of the offices of the Supreme Court Clerk, Reporter, Crier and State Court Administrator.
At the request of the Court, MERC both postponed a pre-election conference originally sched uled for January 16, 1978, and agreed to consider the jurisdictional question that is the subject of this opinion. Prior to MERC's consideration, the Court, through then Chief Justice Thomas Giles Kavanagh, indicated in two separate letters to Charles M. Rehmus, Chairperson of MERC, its conclusion that art 6, § 7 and art 3, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution prohibited the statutory jurisdiction in question.
In a decision dated September 8, 1978, MERC issued a finding that it did have jurisdiction and ordered that an election be conducted. MERC observed:
"Art 3, § 2 (separation of powers provision) can be dealt with summarily on the observation that clerical employees do not exercise the powers of one branch of government or another."
This Court on October 5, 1978, issued an order to MERC and petitioner herein to show cause why this Court should not dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Both MERC and petitioner filed briefs on the matter.
II. Discussion
It is elementary that in Michigan government the legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate and co-equal. In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich 660, 662-663; 255 NW2d 635 (1977). Article 3, § 2 makes this clear and specific. It reads:
"The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution." (Emphasis added.)
The Michigan Supreme Court, of course, is charged with superintending the exercise of the judicial power. Art 6, § 4 and art 6, § l.
What the facts of this case show is MERC attempting to bring the Michigan Supreme Court before it as a party in a lawsuit, in which MERC will make a determination and may cause an order to issue affecting the Michigan Supreme Court. In short, MERC is attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court.
As already indicated, there is no prior Michigan case that has addressed itself to this issue. This may well be because it is such an anomalous situation. It is difficult to envision any comparable situation where a subordinate arm of the judicial branch of government would attempt to exercise an executive power over the Governor or a legislative power over the Legislature. But here an executive agency is attempting to exercise adjudicative authority over the Michigan Supreme Court.
As a further incidental indication of how far out of the order of things it is to have MERC holding court over the Supreme Court, an appeal from the order of MERC is to the Court of Appeals. If MERC has jurisdiction to determine cases with the Supreme Court as a party, then the Supreme Court might be in a position to appeal from the decision of MERC to the Court of Appeals, which again is an inferior tribunal to the Supreme Court. In short, MERC assuming jurisdiction over the Supreme Court puts everything upside-down.
III. Respondents' Arguments
At the outset, it is significant to note that respondents have produced no precedent on the issue of an administrative agency's assumption of jurisdiction over a Supreme Court.
Furthermore, in its opinion asserting its jurisdiction to bring the Supreme Court before it as a litigant, MERC summarily dismissed the separation of powers argument:
"Art 3, § 2 (separation of powers provision) can be dealt with summarily on the observation that clerical employees do not exercise the powers of one branch of government or another."
MERC's conclusion focuses on the wrong point. It is not determinative that certain Supreme Court employees may or may not be subject to the public employment relations act, MCL 423.201 et seq., MSA 17.455(1) et seq. The point is that MERC is attempting to bring the Supreme Court before its tribunal as a party defendant. That is what is critical; it is that MERC is taking jurisdiction over the Supreme Court itself, not certain of its clerical employees.
Likewise, MERC's argument in its brief is beside the point. There MERC argues that because Const 1963, art 4, § 48 does not specifically exclude Supreme Court employees but does exclude state civil service employees, by negative implication Supreme Court employees are included. Whether Const 1963, art 4, § 48 includes or excludes Supreme Court employees has nothing whatsoever to do with whether 1965 PA 379 should be, or can be, interpreted to give MERC judicial jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers established by Const 1963, art 3, § 2.
In addition, the Legislature in enacting 1965 PA 379 pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 48, has not by specific reference included the Michigan Supreme Court. Since an inclusion to give such jurisdiction to MERC would contravene the requirements of Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and be unconstitutional, it would be normal interpretative practice to read 1965 PA 379 as not giving jurisdiction to MERC over the Michigan Supreme Court as in this case.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude that the Michigan Constitution does not, as a matter of interpretation or logic, authorize MERC to take jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court. We have been cited no precedent to the contrary.
It is good common sense as well as good law that if a tribunal of the executive department would sit in judgment over the Supreme Court, with respect to the issue, the Supreme Court would no longer be functioning as the Supreme Court. That would erode a cornerstone of our Constitution and of our system of government. We therefore hold that Const 1963, art 3, § 2, considered with Const 1963, art 4, § 48, precludes MERC from taking jurisdiction over the Michigan Supreme Court.
MERC Case No. R77 L-572 is ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. No costs, a public question.
Coleman, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Coleman, C.J.
I agree with the opinion of Justice Williams and write separately only to add another analysis in support of the same conclusion.
In December of 1977 Local 586 of the Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, hereinafter MERC, for an election among employees of the Michigan Supreme Court for the purpose of being designated the exclusive bargaining agent for our employees, i.e., their union representative. As set forth in the petition the proposed bargaining unit included:
"All employees in the general list titles located in Lansing, Michigan. Court officers, custodians, multilith technicians, secretaries, toll terminal operators and receptionists."
The MERC scheduled a pre-election conference for January 16, 1978. At the request of this Court the conference was postponed pending a determination by MERC as to whether the public employment relations act (hereinafter PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq., is applicable to employees of the Supreme Court in light of Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and art 6, § 7.
On September 8, 1978, MERC issued an opinion holding that ministerial level employees of the Michigan Supreme Court have the right to organize and engage in concerted activity within the meaning of PERA. Accordingly MERC ordered that an election in the proposed bargaining unit should be conducted.
On October 5, 1978 we ordered MERC and the petitioning union to show cause why the Court should not order MERC to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
The apparent basis for MERC jurisdiction is PERA, which provides for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees and specifically provides for the filing of petitions for elections to determine whether there shall be, and, if so, which organization shall be, the exclusive bargaining agent.
The statutory provisions of PERA, in turn, are authorized, in general terms, by Const 1963, art 4, §48:
"The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service."
The employees of this Court are assuredly "public" employees and, as this Court is a court of record, they are not "in the civil service". The Court's employees are not, therefore, exempted from the provisions of PERA by the stated exception concerning civil service.
Thus, the ultimate basis for the apparent jurisdiction of MERC is the constitutional provision that the Legislature may by legislation regulate the employer-employee relationship where public employees, other than civil servants, are concerned. Pursuant to PERA, MERC has exercised jurisdiction over disputes concerning working conditions in general, and specifically over hours and wages, and the appointment and removal of employees.
The general provision in art 4, § 48 to the effect that the Legislature may by legislation regulate the employer-employee relationship of public employees conflicts with the following speciñc provision concerning employees on the staff of this Court in art 6, § 7:
'The Supreme Court may appoint, may remove, and shall have general supervision of its staff. It shall have control of the preparation of its budget recommendations and the expenditure of moneys appropriated for any purpose pertaining to the operation of the court or the performance of activities of its staff except that the salaries of the justices shall be established by law. All fees and perquisites collected by the court staff shall be turned over to the state treasury and credited to the general fund." (Emphasis supplied.)
The importance of constitutional questions and the frequency with which they have arisen in the various states and in the United States courts has resulted in the widespread acceptance of certain fundamental rules of construction which we apply hereafter.
First, that there is real conflict between these provisions regarding control over the limited number of public employees on the staff of this Court is clear and insurmountable when reasonable plain meaning is attributed to the words of each. Under art 4, § 48, PERA gives and MERC exercises jurisdiction over virtually all questions that may arise concerning "working conditions" meaning wages, hours, appointment, removal and general supervision practices. Art 6, § 7 specifically grants this Court the powers of appointment, removal and general supervision and it is difficult to find terms clearer than those of the article itself to express the intent to give this Court jurisdiction over all "working conditions". A first principle of constitutional construction, to avoid finding conflict if possible, is therefore unavailing to solve the problem here.
A second rule, fundamental and well settled, is that where there is a conflict between general and specific provisions in the constitution, the specific provision must control, the specific provision being regarded as a limitation on the general provision's grant of authority. McDonald v Schnipke, 380 Mich 14, 19-20; 155 NW2d 169 (1968); Hart v Wayne County, 396 Mich 259, 273; 240 NW2d 697 (1976). Application of this rule serves another important rule of construction consistently, because neither of the sections is by our construction, rendered void or ineffective: the general provision of art 4, § 48 is left controlling in all cases where the specific provision of art 6, § 7 and the specific exception in § 48 itself, concerning the civil service, do not apply. McDonald and Hart, supra.
In addition this construction conforms to the rule that requires attention and respect be paid to the intent of those who framed the constitution. That the framers specifically intended to grant this Court the power, within the budget provided to it by the Legislature, over the wages paid to its employees and to govern its own personnel matters, is specifically revealed in the legislative history of the constitutional convention. On the other hand, we find no evidence in the legislative history of art 4, § 48 to indicate that the framers were even aware of the latent conflict between that section and § 7 of art 6. For that oversight we express understanding and sympathy. In Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University v Labor Mediation Board, 384 Mich 561, 566; 184 NW2d 921 (1971), we made the same mistake in stating, by way of dictum, that the only exception to the exercise of legislative power given by art 4, § 48 was that of legislative power over the state classified civil service.
It is my conclusion that the provisions of PERA may not be extended to be applied to employees of the staff of this Court and, accordingly, I also would order MERC to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the petition filed with it on December 27, 1977.
Kavanagh, J.
In December of 1977 Local 586 of the Service Employees International Union, AFL- CIO, petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, hereinafter MERC, for an election among employees of the Michigan Supreme Court for the purpose of being certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for our employees, i.e., their union representative. As set forth in the petition the proposed bargaining unit included:
"All employees in the general list of titles located in Lansing, Michigan. Court officers, custodians, multilith technicians, secretaries, toll terminal operators and receptionists."
The MERC scheduled a pre-election conference for January 16, 1978. At the request of this Court the conference was postponed pending a determination by MERC as to whether the public employment relations act (hereinafter PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq., is applicable to employees of the Supreme Court in light of Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and art 6, § 7.
On September 8, 1978, MERC issued an opinion holding that ministerial level employees of the Michigan Supreme Court have the right to organize and engage in concerted activity within the meaning of PERA. Accordingly MERC ordered that an election in the proposed bargaining unit should be conducted.
On October 5, 1978 we ordered MERC and the petitioning union to show cause why the Court should not order MERC to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Because the briefs and arguments of counsel have convinced us we were in error in our original position, we conclude that they did "show cause". We should not, therefore, order MERC to dismiss the petition, and we should obey the order of MERC to hold an election.
Good faith and responsible discharge of our duty, however, oblige us to explain to our employees, the union, MERC, and the people wherein we erred and the reasoning which persuades us to correct our mistake.
Originally we believed that art 3, § 2 precluded the Legislature from exercising any authority over the employees of this separate co-equal branch of government. It reads:
"The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution."
We also felt that art 6, § 7 gave the Court total, exclusive and unalienable control over its staff. It reads:
"The supreme court may appoint, may remove, and shall have general supervision of its staff. "
We were convinced that we had to construct an exemption for our staff comparable to the express exemption of classified civil service employees contained in art 4, § 48 in order to comply with art 3, § 2 and art 6, § 7. The section reads:
"The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service."
We regarded the exemption for our staff necessary to resolve the apparent conflict of legislators exercising dominion over what we considered to be our constitutionally delegated responsibility— namely, regulation of the relationship of this Court and its staff. In other words, we perceived a violation of separation of powers and constructed an exemption to avoid it. We are now convinced that we were confusing two questions — the existence of legislative power and the scope of it.
In the opinion accompanying its decision MERC suggested that no separation of powers question was involved because the employees whose rights under PERA were sought to be enforced were performing ministerial, not judicial, duties, and they did not exercise the powers of one branch of government or another. We are not persuaded that this distinction is significant.
The separation of powers question is not involved because of the Constitution itself. Art 3, § 2 provides that "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution(Emphasis added.) Art 4, §48 provides that the "legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees" exempting only state classified civil service employees. We regard art 4, § 48 as the express exception contemplated in art 3, § 2. Therefore, applying PERA to our staff will not violate the separation of powers provision.
The question remains whether applying PERA to our staff will conflict with the power granted to this Court in art 6, § 7 to "appoint", "remove", and "have general supervision" of its staff. This constitutional power distinguishes our Supreme Court from other divisions of our "one court of justice". We are convinced that there is nothing inherent in the collective bargaining process itself that would necessarily intrude upon the constitutionally specified power of the Supreme Court to hire, fire, and supervise its own staff. As MERC noted the scope of bargaining which would otherwise prevail under PERA may be limited by art 6, § 7.
The extent and effect of this limitation on our power to bargain is not before us in this proceeding. We simply acknowledge it and hold that a general duty to bargain does not necessarily involve an unconstitutional intrusion on judicial authority. We no longer view art 4, § 48 as in irreconcilable conflict with art 6, § 7.
With apology to our employees, the union, MERC, and the people for any inconveniences suffered on account of our original error, we would have today directed our staff to do whatever is necessary to comply with the MERC order of September 8, 1978.
Levin, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Article 6, § 4, headed general superintending control over courts; writs; appellate jurisdiction, provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The supreme court shall have general superintending control over all courts
Article 6, § 1 headed judicial power in court of justice; divisions, provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice, which shall be divided into one supreme court
Article 4, § 48 reads:
"The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service."
Entitled, "An act to amend the title and sections 1, 3, 6 and 7 of Act No. 336 of the Public Acts of 1947, entitled 'An act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide certain disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances; and to prescribe penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act,' being sections 423.201, 423.203, 423.206 and 423.207 of the Compiled Laws of 1948; and to add 8 new sections to stand as sections 9 to 16; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts."
Ford Motor Co v State Tax Comm, 400 Mich 499, 518; 255 NW2d 608 (1977) (Williams, J., dissenting), citing State Bar of Michigan v Lansing, 361 Mich 185, 195; 105 NW2d 131 (1960).
MCL 423.212; MSA 17.455(12).
The classified state civil service positions are defined in Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and therein "employees of courts of record" are specifically excluded from the definition.
The title of PERA provides:
"An act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide review from disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances and the holding of elections; to declare and protect the rights and privileges of public employees; and to prescribe means of enforcement and penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act."
See, generally, MERC Labor Opinions.
See, generally, 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 58-100, pp 230-284.
"I think, really, all this section does that is at all startling or new is to adopt the concept that when the court has money appropriated to it for its operation by the legislature, once the money has been appropriated the court itself will have control over the amount of wages paid to its employees, and so on and so forth, within the limits of the budget.
"This would in some ways make it, as we are informed by representatives of that court, more readily possible for the supreme court to govern its housekeeping affairs and to handle matters of personnel over there. They have rather strange methods of obtaining assistance, and this would make it possible, for example, for them to attract people who are actually people with rather special training, and, in some instances, professional people that are on their staff." (Emphasis supplied.) 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1308.