Case Name: John Jones, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1873-01
Citations: 48 Ga. 458
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Jones, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 341–343

Head Matter:
John Jones, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
(Atlanta,
January Term, 1873.)
1. Criminal Law — New Trial — Reasonable Doubt. — This Court will not reverse the judgment of the'Judge of the Superior Court refusing a new trial, simply because, from the evidence, there may arise in a fair mind a reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt.
2. New Trial — Failure to Establish Guilt. — To authorize a new trial on this ground, the failure in the'testimony to establish guilt must be so complete as to make doubt and uncertainty inevitable. If a fair mind may, under the testimony, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdicj is not illegal.
Criminal law. New trial. Reasonable doubt. Before Judge Hopkins. Fulton Superior Court. October Term, 1872.
. Jqhn Jones was placed on trial on an indictment charging him and one Joe Bugg with the offense of robbery, alleged to have been committed upon A. Hartman on September 19th, 1872. The defendant pleaded not guilty;
The evidence made the following case: On September 18th, 1872, as Hartman was proceeding towards Decatur from Atlanta, near the line between Fulton and DeKalb counties, Jog 'Bugg, a colored man, approached and asked him if he knew where he could obtain employment as- a blacksmith. Upon Hartman’s stating that he did not, Bugg produced a small brass lock, which he said he carried as a specimen of his work, at the same time showing to Hartman how he locked and unlocked it with a spring. Whilst engaged in this conversation, another colored man came up, to whom Bugg propounded the *same question as ’ to employment. This individual replied that he knew a man on the Air Dine Railroad who wished to hire a good blacksmith. The new comer had a heavy black beard all around his face, of'the “kinky” order, but not as “kinky” as a negro’s hair. The defendant strikingly resembles this person, with the exception that he has no beard. If the defendant is the same person, the beard was false. The new comer asked to see the brass lock. Taking hold of it, he endeavored to unlock it, but failing, he proposed to bet Bugg $20 00 or $50 00 that he could not unlock it. ' Bugg replied that he had no money, but said that Hartman would bet him that he (Hartman) could unlock it. Hartman, suspecting something wrong, started off, when the man with the beard asked him if he was not going to bet? Upon Hartman’s replying that he was not, this person stated that he was going to have $20 00 out of him. Bugg simultaneously drew and presented his pistol', saying to Hartman that if he left' without handing over $20 00 he would shoot him. Thus intimidated and alarmed for his life, Hartman handed $20 00 to the bearded negro, who immediately went off into the bushes. When this individual was gone, Bugg retired also. - . '
Mrs. A. C. Watts, .who saw the person supposed to.be the defendant as he was approaching Hartman, testified that the resemblance to the defendant in size, color and general appearance was striking. That he had no beard at the time he passed her. That she did not have an opportunity to scrutinize his face, as he held his head down in such a manner as.to conceal it.
Hartman stated that he had no doubt but that the defendant was one of the men who robbed him; that'the beard was false, and used as a disguise.
Joe Bugg, who had previously, during the same term,’ been convicted, testified that the man with the beard was one Lewis Sharp, who had, since the commission of the offense, absconded; that defendant was not with him.
Dorothea Webster testified, that Bugg, defendant, and Sharp were all in a wagon yard together on Decatur .street, in the *city of Atlanta, on the day of the alleged robbery. She further stated facts tending to prove an alibi for defendant.
The jury found the defendant guilty. A motion for a'new trial was made, because the verdict was contrary to -the law and the evidence. The motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted. . '
Thrasher & Thrasher, for plaintiff in error-.
John T. Glenn, Solicitor General, for the Staté.

Opinion:
McCay, Judge.
This case turns solely on the question'whether the verdict of. guilty is so entirely unsupported by the testimony as to make the verdict illegal. It is assumed that if the evidence leaves-the mind of this Court in doubt as to the guilt of the accused, that the verdict is illegal! We do not so understand the rule. If the jury doubt, it is their duty to acquit; but if they have found the defendant guilty, and the Judge has refused a new trial, the evidence must be so . shockingly- insufficient as to' satiy' Court that no reasonable mind could fail to doubt. The object with which we look into the testimony is to determine the state of the mind of the jury. We strive to discover, not so much the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, as whether the jury have made an honest verdict, and have not acted by mistake, passion or prejudice. To apply-this rule to this case, we cannot say that a fair-minded jury might not, from this testimony, have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused. It is a very fair inference that the prisoner put a false beard on his chin after the lady got past him, and had it there when he came up to the person robbed. This supposition would clear up almost all doubt of his guilt, and this supposition is almost inevitable, because of the singular difference of these two witnesses as to the presence or absence of a beard on the same man, at almost the same time. For it is clear that the man the lady saw without a beard was the same man who, with a beard, *aided in the robbery. The evidence of the accomplice is worth very little. Indeed, when the defense failed to show that there was any such man about Atlanta' at that time as he names, referring, as he does, to Rice, and others who knew him, the argument that Sharp' is a myth is very strong. The statement of the colored woman as to Sharp has but little weight, since that the man she testifies was Sharp, depends on the prisoner's and his accomplice's statements, made to her, too, after the arrest. On the whole, while the proof of the identity of the prisoner with the robber is not proven as clearly as identity is sometimes proven, we can easily see how an honest jury might feel no reasonable doubt of that identity.
Judgment affirmed.