Case Name: CASSIDY v. McGOVERN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-10-03
Citations: 86 Mich. App. 321
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-2507
Parties: CASSIDY v McGOVERN
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Bashara and R. M. Maher, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 86
Pages: 321–331

Head Matter:
CASSIDY v McGOVERN
Docket No. 77-2507.
Submitted May 4, 1978, at Grand Rapids.
Decided October 3, 1978.
Leo T. Cassidy was injured in a collision between his car and an automobile owned by Seaton Industries, Inc., and driven by Terrance McGovern. Leo and his wife, Ardith M. Cassidy, brought an action for damages under the automobile no-fault act. Prior to trial, defendants admitted liability, reserving for trial only the issues of damages and whether plaintiffs met the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement under the no-fault act. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Judgment for defendants, Emmett Circuit Court, Martin B. Breighner, J. Plaintiffs appeal, raising several issues. Held:
The question of serious body impairment can either be a question of law or of fact under the no-fault act. If a trial judge denies a motion for a directed verdict and sends the issue to the jury under the mistaken belief that he cannot determine the issue as a matter of law, he has used an erroneous standard and the case should be remanded.
Remanded for further proceedings.
Bashara, J., concurred, except he would hold that the question of whether plaintiffs met the threshold requirements of the no-fault act was properly submitted to the jury.
Opinion of the Court
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 6] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 654.
[2, 3, 12] New Topic Service, No-Fault Insurance §§ 1 et seq.
[4] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 714.
[5] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 624, 625.
[7] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 256.
[8] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 975.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 785 et seq.
[9] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 251.
[10] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 622.
[11] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 608.
1. Trial — Instructions to Jury — Requested Instructions — Party’s Theory — Refusal to Give — Appeal and Error.
A trial court does not err in refusing to charge as to a particular party’s theory of another case.
2. Automobiles — Insurance—No Fault — Torts—Serious Bodily Impairment — Jury Question — Legal Question.
The question of whether a particular impairment satisfies the threshold requirement of the no-fault act for a serious impairment of bodily function is not always a question for the fact finder; there are cases in which the trial court can rule, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff’s injury is so minor that it fails to reach the threshold of a serious impairment; there are also cases in which, as a matter of law, the threshold of a serious impairment is reached by the very nature of the injury, and where reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether the threshold is met and where the trial judge should not give the issue to the jury for determination.
3. Automobiles — Insurance—No Fault — Torts—Serious Body Impairment — Jury Question — Legal Question — Use of Erroneous Standard — Remand.
The question of serious body impairment under the no-fault act can either be a question of law or of fact; where a trial judge misinterpreted this rule and thought he was forced to send the issue to the jury and denied a motion for a directed verdict because he did not perceive the possibility of determining the issue as a matter of law, he used an erroneous standard and the cause should be remanded with instructions that he is not forced in all circumstances to send the issue of serious impairment to the jury and may grant a directed verdict if the nature of the injury complained of was such as to meet the threshold of a serious impairment as a matter of law.
Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part by Bashara, J.
4. Trial — Instructions to Jury — Statutes—Appeal and Error.
It is not necessarily error to refuse to mention the existence of a statute in charging a jury provided the judge states the law as embodied in the statute.
5. Appeal and Error — Comments of Counsel — Failure to Object-Manifest Injustice.
Failure to object to opposing counsel’s allegedly improper argument to a jury precludes appellate review in the absence of manifest injustice.
6. Trial — Instructions to Jury — Theory of Case — Ambiguous Theory — Inapplicable Theory.
A trial court does not err in refusing to charge as to a particular party’s theory of another case, especially where the theory may be ambiguous or inapplicable.
7. Trial — Insurance—Instruction to Jury — Reference to Insurance — Statutes.
An instruction to a jury to disregard any consideration of insurance is not an abuse of trial court discretion because references to an insurer or the question of carrying insurance during trial is prohibited by both statute and common law; the instruction is also proper where the existence of insurance is totally irrelevant to the issues involved (MCL 500.3030; MSA 24.13030).
8. Evidence — Photographic Evidence — Automobiles—Trial—Admissibility — Prejudice.
Photographic evidence of vehicles subsequent to a collision can properly be excluded from trial where the evidence has little relevance, and there is a danger of undue prejudice.
9. Evidence — Determination of Relevancy — Admissibility—Judge’s Discretion — Abuse of Discretion — Appeal and Error.
Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are matters within the discretion of a trial court and the Court of Appeals will not reverse unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion.
10. Appeal and Error — Judge’s Trial Statements — Judge’s Trial Decisions — Judge’s Discretion — Abuse of Discretion — Manifest Injustice.
Failure to object or to move for a mistrial on the basis of a judge’s trial statements, decisions, or the conduct of a trial, precludes reversal by the Court of Appeals except where there is a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge or manifest injustice can be shown.
11. Instructions to Jury — Judge’s Discretion — Manner and Style.
A trial judge is allowed great discretion in the manner and style of his charges to a jury.
12. Automobiles — Insurance—No Fault — Torts—Serious Bodily Impairment — Jury Question — Legal Question.
The question of whether a particular impairment satisñed the threshold requirement of the no-fault act for a serious impairment of bodily function generally is submitted to the trier of fact to determine whether a particular injury is serious or permanent; where legal interpretation of these no-fault terms approaches or breaches permissible limits, the interpretation becomes a question of law for the court; however, where it cannot be said with any conñdence that interpretation of the term "serious impairment of body function" approaches or breaches the permissible limits, the question is properly submitted to the jury.
John D. Hayes, for plaintiffs.
Gillett & Carpenter, for defendants.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Bashara and R. M. Maher, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The concurrence/dissent adequately states the facts in this case and satisfactorily disposes of most of the issues facing us. We differ on two points, however. Plaintiffs in this case argue that the trial court erred in refusing to include in its instructions the holding of McKendrick v Petrucci, 71 Mich App 200; 247 NW2d 349 (1976). As our brother does, we reject plaintiffs' argument basically because a "trial court does not err in refusing to charge as to a particular party's theory of another case". But in discussing McKendrick, we must not de-emphasize the language concerning "particular body function". While the language is not part of the holding of the case, it does have a significance which our brother seems to deny.
The choice of the words "particular body function" was not inadvertent: the McKendrick Court interpreted the statute as not requiring impairment of the total body function, e.g., through a life-sustaining organ such as the heart or liver. The Court chose the word "particular" to suggest that impairment of one specific body function comes within the ambit of the statute. The very nature of the impairment at issue in McKendrick, tendonitis of the biceps tendon of plaintiff's right arm, implies that the Court was referring to a particular body function, not simply "body function". Although not the holding of the case, we believe it is one of its important implications and should not be obscured.
On a second issue we differ more fundamentally with our brother. Plaintiff argued that as a matter of law he satisfied the threshold requirement of the no-fault act for serious impairment of bodily function. He therefore moved for a directed verdict. In denying the motion, the trial judge stated:
"Mr. Hayes [plaintiffs' attorney], the McKendrick case defeats your argument. It is very clear in the McKendrick case that the Court has decided that the issue of serious impairment of body function is a fact question for the jury, and your motion is denied."
McKendrick does not conclude that every question of whether a particular impairment falls under the act must be submitted to the fact finder. In Vitale v Danylak, 74 Mich App 615; 254 NW2d 593 (1977), this Court, consistent with McKendrick, allowed a trial judge to rule by summary judgment that plaintiff's injuries (a stiff neck) did not, as a matter of law, meet the standard of serious impairment of body function. The Vitale Court stated that no specific "permissible limits" had been drawn but that the Court was of the opinion that "if any class of cases could approach such limitation, the case at bar must be included in that class".
Just as there is a class of cases, of which Vitale is representative, in which the trial court can rule as a matter of law that plaintiff's injury is so minor that it fails to reach the threshold, so there is a class of cases in which, as a matter of law, the threshold of serious impairment is reached by the very nature of the injury, i.e., reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether the threshold is met. In such a case, the trial judge should not give the issue to the jury for determination.
The trial judge in the instant case used an erroneous standard. He thought, because of a misinterpretation of McKendrick, that he was forced to send the issue to the jury. He did not perceive that McKendrick does not foreclose the possibility of the court determining as a matter of law that the threshold was reached. In denying plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict, the judge here was unaware of this alternative.
We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to the judge that McKendrick does not force him in all circumstances to send the issue of serious impairment to the jury. He should recognize that he may grant a directed verdict for plaintiffs, if the nature of Leo Cassidy's injury was such as to meet the threshold of serious impairment as a matter of law.