Case Name: Romeo VEGA and Martha Vega v. ESTATE OF Martha D. MULLEN
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-03-20
Citations: 583 So. 2d 1259
Docket Number: No. 07-CA-59600
Parties: Romeo VEGA and Martha Vega v. ESTATE OF Martha D. MULLEN.
Judges: Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON and BANKS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 583
Pages: 1259–1275

Head Matter:
Romeo VEGA and Martha Vega v. ESTATE OF Martha D. MULLEN.
No. 07-CA-59600.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 20, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1991.
James R. Hayden, Hattiesburg, for appellants.
Samuel E. Farris, Hattiesburg, for appel-lee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON and BANKS, JJ.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice,
for the Court:
INTRODUCTION
Romeo and Martha Vega appeal from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Forrest County canceling a deed in their favor. At issue are questions of undue influence and failure of consideration. Concluding that the challenged judgment is the result of manifest error as to undue influence and failure of consideration, we reverse and remand for further consideration of the issue of damages. Subsequent to the final entry of judgment below, Martha D. Mullen died. Pursuant to his request, Samuel E. Farris, Executor of Mrs. Mullen's estate, has been substituted as a party in her place.
FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellee Martha D. Mullen was an eighty-eight (88) year old widow at the time of the trial and eighty-six (86) at the time she executed the deed in question. She was the mother of three children, Mrs. Mildred Dunn, Mrs. Emily Puclyouski, and Mr. T.A. Kyle. (Mr. Kyle died three months prior to the filing of the Complaint to Cancel the Deed.) Prior to March 17, 1986, Mrs. Mullen was the sole owner of a house and two (2) acres of land valued at approximately sixty thousand dollars ($60,-000.00). Although it is not legally relevant, it is interesting that the land was given to Mrs. Mullen by Martha Vega.
Defendant-Appellant Martha Vega is the wife of co-appellant Romeo Vega, the granddaughter of Martha Mullen, and the daughter of Mildred Dunn.
In addition to suffering the normal ravages of age, Mrs. Mullen suffered numerous afflictions including hearing and sight impairments, heart problems, diabetes, arteriosclerosis, and arthritis. She was dependent on the aid of a walker but remained in a wheelchair most of the time. In August 1984, a stroke hospitalized Mrs. Mullen for approximately three (3) weeks. Although there was no paralysis, because of her physical infirmities, it was no longer feasible for her to live in her home alone. Mrs. Mullen continued to manage her own personal financial affairs, including maintaining bank accounts and paying bills.
Her children were advancing in age and of poor health as well, but each shared the responsibility of caring for Mrs. Mullen. According to testimony, Mrs. Mullen was difficult to care for and difficult to please. She lived with her elder daughter Mrs. Dunn until Mrs. Dunn's second daughter moved from home because the daughter could no longer take her grandmother's verbal abuse. Because Mrs. Dunn was unable to care for her mother alone, Mrs. Mullen moved to Mrs. Puclyouski's home.
Testimony indicates that Mrs. Mullen had been at her younger daughter's home only a few months when she began expressing unhappiness and displeasure at being there. Mrs. Beverly Williamson, the nurses aid who had been attending Mrs. Mullen three (3) times a week and who was still Mrs. Mullen's aid at the time of trial, testified that Mrs. Mullen expressed her unhappiness. Mrs. Williamson added that there was evidence that the only baths Mrs. Mullen received were those she received on Mrs. Williamson's visits. There were questions about whether Mrs. Puclyouski fed her mother properly and there was testimony that Mrs. Puclyouski did not allow her mother to watch television.
Mrs. Mullen testified that she was not dissatisfied living with Mrs. Puclyouski. She disputed that she called Mrs. Vega and asked to go home as indicated by Mrs. Vega and added that it was at Mrs. Vega's urging that she left her daughter's to return to her home.
In any event, it is undisputed that in October 1985, Mrs. Vega offered to have the utilities turned back on at her grandmother's house which had been vacant for sometime, to leave her home, and to take her grandmother from Mrs. Puclyouski's to Mrs. Mullen's home for a two week vacation. Mrs. Vega, her husband and her son lived in Purvis where they owned a double-wide mobile home and sixty (60) acres of land on which they raised horses for sale. Mrs. Vega left her family and her business to stay with Mrs. Mullen for what was intended to be a two-week vacation for Mrs. Mullen as well as her aunt Mrs. Pu-clyouski. When the two-week period expired, Mrs. Mullen did not want to return to her daughter's. Upon her grandmother's insistence Mrs. Vega joined by her husband remained with Mrs. Mullen in her home. The Vegas left their son in Purvis to attend to the horses.
Mrs. Vega testified that she bathed Mrs. Mullen daily, prepared all of her meals, picked up her medicine, and monitored her constantly. On numerous occasions the Vegas attempted to leave and return home, but on the insistence of the family and Mrs. Mullen, they remained in Mrs. Mullen's home and continued to care for her. Mrs. Mullen testified to the contrary suggesting that Mrs. Vega failed to feed her properly and verbally abused her.
Three (3) months after Mrs. Vega began caring for her grandmother, the Vegas sold their horse farm. Mrs. Vega sold her small car and bought a larger car in which Mrs. Mullen would be more comfortable. The relationship between Mrs. Vega and her grandmother continued to deteriorate, however, and shortly after the sale of the farm, the Vegas wanted to leave again. They went as far as to rent a house but were stopped from moving by Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Puclyouski. According to testimony by both Mrs. Vega and Mrs. Mullen, in an attempt to stay under her granddaughter's care, Mrs. Mullen told Mrs. Vega, who was characterized by Mrs. Mullen and other family members as Mrs. Mullen's favorite granddaughter, "let me make you a will to my property and you take care of me."
Early in March 1986, Mrs. Mullen requested Glenn White, an attorney whom she considered to be her lawyer, to come to her house to talk with her about preparing a will. Mr. White was then the District Attorney and was not engaged in the practice of law. He brought Jeff Stewart, a practicing lawyer, to Mrs. Mullen's home. Mr. Stewart was instructed to prepare the proposed will as directed by Mrs. Mullen, leaving the house and real property to Mr. and Mrs. Vega and dividing her personal property among her children. He was to return with the prepared will when called by Mrs. Mullen. He prepared the will but was never called by Mrs. Mullen. At the time of trial, the will had never been executed.
Approximately one week after Mr. White and Mr. Stewart visited with Mrs. Mullen in her home, Mr. Kyle came from Louisiana to meet with his mother and his sisters to determine the future care of Mrs. Mullen. She had become so unbearable that the Vegas wanted to leave again. Mrs. Mullen testified that the four of them met alone in her home on Sunday, March 16, 1986. She and her children discussed her condition and the undesirable possibility of putting her in a convalescent home. Neither of the Vegas was present during this meeting.
Upon the suggestion of Mr. Kyle, Mrs. Mullen and her family agreed that Mrs. Mullen would deed her property to the Vega's reserving a life estate therein in exchange for their continued care of her and continued maintenance of the property. This agreement was reduced to a writing signed by Mrs. Mullen and each of her children. It is as follows:
I, Martha D. Mullen do hereby deed this property to Romeo & Martha Vega. That this is my home that they will take care of me as long as I live. They will pay the bills and up keep of this property and pay all the bills (light bill, water bills, Grocery bills etc. that I just pay for my doc bills & medicine. Any time they don't want to take care of me this deed is null & void. The. children are here and signing this to make sure that this is carried out. (Errors in the original.)
The next day, Monday, March 17, 1986, was Mrs. Dunn's birthday. Mrs. Vega testified that she suggested that Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Mullen and she go for a steak. She testified that Mrs. Mullen requested that while they were out that they also see an attorney to draft the deed discussed the previous evening. Because she would be in her wheelchair, Mrs. Mullen asked that Mrs. Vega find an attorney that would be easily accessible to her.
Mrs. Mullen, Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Vega went to the office of William (Billy) Andrews, III, an attorney in Purvis, Mississippi. Mrs. Vega testified that James Cook of Hattiesburg was her regular attorney and that the only prior dealing she had had with Mr. Andrews arose with regard to the selling of their farm. Mr. Andrews repre sented the doctor who purchased the farm. Neither Mrs. Dunn nor Mrs. Mullen had any prior dealings with Mr. Andrews. She indicated that she chose Andrews because of the accessibility of his office to a wheelchair.
Mr. Andrews testified that Mrs. Mullen, Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Vega came into his office to have a deed drafted. After receiving the document that contained Mrs. Mullen's desires and wishes, Mr. Andrews stated that Mrs. Mullen reiterated that she wanted a deed transferring her property to the Vega's reserving a life estate and providing that they take care of her and maintain the property.
Because Mrs. Vega was not Mrs. Mullen's daughter, Mr. Andrews indicated that he discussed in detail her wishes and explained the difference in a will and a deed. Additionally, he took notes of the meeting which were introduced into evidence. At no time during the discussion did he detect health problems that impaired Mrs. Mullen's decision-making capacity, nor did Mrs. Mullen ever mention that she had asked Mr. Stewart to draft a will.
Mrs. Mullen told Mr. Andrews that she had discussed the deed with her children, prayed about it, and decided that executing the deed was what she wanted to do. His professional opinion was that Mrs. Mullen knew exactly what she was doing at the time she executed the deed. Though Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Vega accompanied Mrs. Mullen, no one but Mrs. Mullen and Mr. Andrews were in his office during the discussions.
Mrs. Mullen stated in her testimony that she understood the arrangement with her granddaughter to be contractual. Contradicting the testimony of Mr. Andrews, Mrs. Mullen testified that she did not understand what she was doing at the time and suggested that it was because of her failing health, generally, and her sight impairment specifically. Mrs. Mullen added that she executed the deed because it was what Mrs. Vega wanted.
Approximately one year later, Mr. Kyle died. During his funeral, Mrs. Dunn became ill and required hospitalization. Because there was no one to stay with her mother, Mrs. Vega took Mrs. Mullen to Mrs. Puclyouski's until Mrs. Dunn would be released from the hospital. Mrs. Vega testified that she intended to take her mother back to Mrs. Mullen's home where she would care for both her mother and her grandmother and that she had an additional bed set up in the house for her mother. Mrs. Dunn corroborated this testimony.
When the hospital released Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Vega took her mother to Mrs. Mullen's home. It was at that juncture that the Vegas began driving a tractor trailer for a living. There is a sharp dispute over whether Mrs. Vega reneged on her agreement to care for Mrs. Mullen or whether Mrs. Mullen simply refused her care. Mrs. Vega testified that, although she left, she continued to pay all of the bills and provide for the upkeep of the house. She stated that they left their twenty-two (22) year old son at home to help Mrs. Dunn and to help with Mrs. Mullen, if she ever returned.
Mrs. Mullen claimed that the Vegas had begun a pattern of verbal abuse after they received the deed in question. She described an altercation with Romeo and Martha Vega in which she was pushed down. Martha's version was that Mrs. Mullen was verbally abusive, became upset and when she was restrained from leaving the house for her own safety, she pushed Mrs. Vega down with her walker. Mrs. Mullen denied any verbal abuse. An independent witness testified that the Vegas treated Mrs. Mullen very well and any mistreatment that she observed was at the hands of Mrs. Puclyouski. That witness, Mrs. Williamson, also testified that Mrs. Mullen had offered to make it worth her while if she would support Mrs. Mullen at the trial.
The relationship deteriorated between Mrs. Mullen and the Vegas, however, it is clear that Mrs. Mullen refused to return to the home after she left during Mrs. Dunn's surgery. Mrs. Dunn remained in the house for seven (7) months until she bought a mobile home and moved next door to the house. The Vega's son noticed, thereafter, that some of the personal belongings in the house were disappearing and asked his par ents what should be done. The Vegas instructed their son to change the locks on the doors. According to her testimony, the purpose of changing the locks was not to keep Mrs. Mullen out, but to keep the house intact as she had left it. Mrs. Mullen's testimony indicated that she could not have entered the house had she wanted because of the changed locks.
In August 1987 Mrs. Mullen filed a Complaint to Cancel the Deed. In her complaint Mrs. Mullen alleged (1) that at the time of the execution of the deed she was physically and mentally incapable of understanding her act; (2) that a fiduciary relationship existed between her and the Vegas and that the deed was a product of undue influence; (3) that the Vegas committed fraud upon her by inducing her to execute the deed by false promises to take care of her for the remainder of her life and to maintain the property; and (4) that the deed was without consideration.
ISSUES
Scope of Review.
This Court must accept the Chancellor's findings of fact "where they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987) (citing Anderson v. Burt, 507 So.2d 32, 36 (Miss.1987); Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 814 (Miss.1986); Gilchrist Machinery Co., Inc. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss.1986); Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d 683, 685 (Miss.1983); Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 707-09 (Miss.1983); Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss.1978)).
After reviewing the entire record if substantial evidence does not support the assertion that the Chancellor's findings were manifestly wrong, this Court is bound to affirm the trial decision. Holliman v. Charles L. Cherry & Assocs., Inc., 569 So.2d 1139 (Miss.1990); Walters v. Patterson, 531 So.2d 581 (Miss.1987); Brown v. Williams, 504 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Miss.1987); Harkins v. Fletcher, 499 So.2d 773, 775 (Miss.1986); Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 329 (Miss.1986); Country Club of Jackson v. Saucier, 498 So.2d 337 (Miss.1986).
I. THE CHANCELLOR WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG IN SETTING ASIDE THE WARRANTY DEED DUE TO THE FAILURE OF ROMEO AND MARTHA VEGA IN OVERCOMING THE BURDEN OF PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE.
The parties do not dispute that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between the Appellee, Martha Mullen, and the Appellants, Romeo and Martha Vega. The law in Mississippi is clear that the existence of such a fiduciary or confidential relationship gives rise to the presumption of undue influence; therefore, the Vegas, as the proponents of the deed, were required to overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Miner v. Bertasi, 530 So.2d 168, 170 (Miss.1988); Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583, 584 (1926); Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 250 (1858).
This case is governed by this court's prior pronouncements and in Mullins, supra, and Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575 (Miss.1984). What is necessary to overcome a presumption of undue influence when the circumstances give rise to such is evidence of:
(1) good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary;
(2) grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and
(3) grantor's independent consent and action.
The key to this case is that since Murray, the Court has made the test less rigid and modified the third factor by eliminating the requirement that the donor receive advice from an independent competent person. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1193 (Miss.1987). Now, rather than requiring the independent advice of a competent person, the Court requires a showing of the grantor's "independent consent and action" based on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
The Chancellor placed great emphasis on the fact that Attorney Andrews was not selected by Mullen and had had prior dealings with the Vegas. In the view of the lower court, the Vegas could not overcome the presumption of undue influence because Andrews was not shown to have been independent. That view is erroneous because we modified the independent advice requirement in Mullins and adopted a more flexible approach. We must, then, examine the evidence in light of that approach.
According to the record, the substantial weight of evidence satisfies the good faith requirement. Testimony was undisputed that Mrs. Mullen, along with her three children, initiated seeking preparation of the deed on March 16, 1986. Prior to March 16, when Mrs. Mullen met with her children, she had already initiated solely on her own the drafting of a will in which the property in question was to be left to Mrs. Vega. On March 16 she and her children discussed their alternatives determining that the most favorable option was to deed the property to Mrs. Vega, reserving a life estate for Mrs. Mullen. In exchange Mrs. Vega would care for her grandmother and maintain the property. Mrs. Vega was not present during this discussion.
The instrument was executed at the office of attorney William Andrews, III. Although Mrs. Vega and Mrs. Dunn accompanied Mrs. Mullen to his office, she was left alone with Mr. Andrews to discuss the deed. Mr. Andrews testified that he received thirty-five dollars ($35.00) for drafting the deed, but his receipt did not note which party actually paid for the service. Testimony also supported the openness given the execution of the instrument. There were no secret deliberations or any covert activity. Mrs. Mullen and her children planned and agreed to the deed. There was full disclosure prior to the execution of the instrument.
Likewise, the second element, "grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences," is satisfied by overwhelming evidence. Mrs. Mullen remained in complete control of her finances at all times. According to testimony, she maintained her own bank accounts and paid her own medical bills. These facts are undisputed. In fact, the approximate value of the property in question was based on Mrs. Mullen's own estimate.
There is no evidence to indicate that Mrs. Mullen did not understand who her heirs were. In the will she asked Mr. Stewart to draft, she left her real property to Mrs. Vega and the contents of her home, her personal property, to be divided among her children. The deed left the will predominantly unchanged. There were no non-relative beneficiaries mentioned at any time during the proceedings. Thus, a reasonable inference could be drawn that there were no non-relative beneficiaries to be included. Finally, Mrs. Mullen knew who controlled her finances — she did.
The last factor is the main issue involved in this appeal. Whether there is a showing "by clear and convincing evidence that the grantor/testator exhibited independent consent and action." Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d at 1193. In Mullins, the Court affirmed a valid inter vivos gift from the grantor, holding the proponent overcame presumption of undue influence. The grantor had expressed his intent to convey the property to the grantees in repayment for their taking care of him two years prior to the drafting of the deed. There was also testimony that the grantor knew what he was doing on the day he executed the deed. This Court held that was sufficient to establish his independent consent. Id. at 1195-96.
In this case, it is undisputed that Mrs. Mullen expressed her intent to convey the property to Mrs. Vega several weeks prior to the execution of the deed. When Mr. White and Mr. Stewart came to her home to discuss the drafting of her will, Mrs. Mullen expressed her intentions to everyone present. Most importantly, all of Mrs. Mullen's children, her natural beneficiaries, discussed the proposed action with her and agreed to it. Additionally, Mr. Andrews testified that on March 17, 1986, when the deed was executed, Mrs. Mullen knew what she was doing. She told him she had discussed it with her family, had prayed about it and was sure that she wanted to execute the deed. Mr. Andrews also testified that he took great pains in explaining the difference in a will and a deed so that there would be no mistakes. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the Vega's rebuttal of the presumption of undue influence.
Again, in Mullins, the Court refers to the three-pronged test and concludes that these
prongs should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements that ought be rigidly exacted in every case. Undue influence is a practical, non-technical conception, a common sense notion of human behavior . common sense counsels against rigid, inflexible multi-part tests, particularly as the parties our law saddles with proof of the negatives are laymen, not legal technicians.
Id. at 1194. Applying this reasoning, it appears clear that the overwhelming weight of evidence viewed in its entirety rebuts the presumption of undue influence. For the foregoing reasons we find merit in this assignment of error.
II. THE CHANCELLOR WAS MANIFESTLY WRONG IN SETTING ASIDE THE WARRANTY DEED DUE TO LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
The Warranty Deed reads
[g]rantors [sic] herein reserves and excepts unto herself a life estate in and to the above described property. The Grantees [Romeo and Martha Vega] herein agree to care for the Grantor [Mrs. Mullen] herein and maintain and pay the upkeep on the home located on the property conveyed herein during the life of the Grantor.
The Vegas contend that the remedy for failure to support as recited in the deed, if such exists, is a suit for damages for breach of the agreement to support and not cancellation of the deed. Mississippi case-law agrees.
It is well settled that the failure of a grantee to perform a contractual obligation in a deed to support and maintain the grantor does not invalidate a voluntary conveyance, but would give rise to an action for damages caused by the alleged breach of the obligation. Leggett v. Graham, 218 So.2d 892, 894-95 (Miss.1969); Old Ladies Home Ass'n v. Platt, 252 Miss. 260, 172 So.2d 770 (1965); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 233 Miss. 621, 103 So.2d 399, 401-02 (1958); Wilson v. Combs, 203 Miss. 286, 33 So.2d 830, 831 (1948). See also Covington v. Butler, 242 So.2d 444, 446-47 (Miss.1970).
The Chancellor erred in his determination that even if the deed were valid, absent any undue influence, it must be set aside for failure of consideration. Clearly, the Vegas undertook the obligation to support and maintain Mrs. Mullen and to maintain the property. If there is any failure of consideration at all, the result is to be addressed by awarding damages, the alternative relief for which Mrs. Mullen prayed, rather than a cancellation of the deed. It is at least arguable, that the Chancellor found that the Vegas ceased to perform their contractual duty of care in February 1988 when they went on the road. We cannot say that such a finding, if made, was clearly erroneous. We must, therefore, remand for further consideration of that issue and the assessment of damages, if necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment entered by the Chancery Court and remand this matter to that court for further findings as to whether there has been a breach of contract and, if so, what damages, if any, were proven.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ., concur.
. To constitute sufficient grounds for setting aside a deed, weakness of intellect must be accompanied by some other factor such as inadequate consideration or existence of a confidential relationship. Cunningham v. Lockett, 216 Miss. 879, 63 So.2d 401, 404 (1953); Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 606, 39 So.2d 257, 260-61 (1949). Here the chancellor made no finding as to whether Mrs. Mullen suffered from a mental weakness affecting her ability to understand the nature and consequences of her actions. The weight of the evidence is to the contrary. Because the confidential relationship is conceded, Mrs. Mullen's mental capacity is considered in determining whether the presumption of undue influence has been overcome.