Case Name: HUMBOLDT LUMBER MANUFACTURERS' ASS'N v. CHRISTOPHERSON et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1896-02-19
Citations: 73 F. 239
Docket Number: No. 183
Parties: HUMBOLDT LUMBER MANUFACTURERS’ ASS’N v. CHRISTOPHERSON et al.
Judges: Before McKEXXA, Circuit Judge, and HAXFOttD and HAW-LEY, District Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 73
Pages: 239–254

Head Matter:
HUMBOLDT LUMBER MANUFACTURERS’ ASS’N v. CHRISTOPHERSON et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
February 19, 1896.)
No. 183.
1. Towage — Negligence of Tug — Crossing Bar. in Hough Weather.
A tug attempting to tow a schooner from the. Pacific Ocean across Humboldt Bar into Humboldt Bay held liable for the loss of the tow by capsizing, on the ground that it was gross negligence to try to cross the bar (the sands of which are shifting and uncertain) at a time when the tide was ebbing at near its maximum velocily of alxrai four knots an hour, and a southeast wind blowing at nine miles an hour, so that heavy seas were breaking on the bar in about seven fathoms of wafer. 60 Fed. 428, affirmed. Hanford, District Judge, dissenting on the evidence.
3. Constitutional Law — Btate Jurisdiction of Coast Waters.
Tlie rights and jurisdiction of the several stab's over (ho sea adjacent to their coasts are those of an independent nation, except as qualified by any right of control granted to the United Stall's by the constitution. And where', by a state’s constitution and laws, her boundaries and those of her counties are three miles from the shore, her statutes giving an ac-lion for death by negligence are operative within such boundaries where death occurs by negligence in the navigation or towage of vessels. 60 Fed. 428, affirmed. 'Manchester v. Massachusetts, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, 13ft U. S. 26 Í. followed and applied.
3. Shipping — Exemptions from Liability — Retroactive Legislation.
The act of February 13, 1893 (27 Stat. 4-15), exempting shipowners from liability for loss resulting from errors of navigation, etc., in certain cases, has no retroactive effect, so as to apply to damages occa. sioned before its passage,
t Damages — Excessive Awards.
§7,000 and §5,000, respectively, held not excessive awards by a court of admiralty for the death by drowning of the master and cook of a, schooner, they being in good health at the time, and earning wages of 8100 and §50 per month, respectively; the master being- 35, and the cook 39, years old. 60 Fed. 428, affirmed.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.
The action grew out of the following facts, as stated by the learned judge who heard the case in the district court:
“On the 16th day of November, 1889, the schooner Fidelity, while being towed from the Pacific Ocean into Humboldt Bay by the steam tug Printer, was capsized on Humboldt Bar. The captain and all hands on board the schooner were drowned, and the vessel itself drifted away, and became a total loss. On March 17,1890, the Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, charterer of the steam tug Printer, filed a petition in this court, setting forth the loss of the schooner Fidelity, and alleging that three separate actions had been commenced against the petitioner in the superior court of Humboldt county by persons claiming damages aggregating seventy-five thousand dollars, charged to have accrued to plaintiffs by reason of the loss of the lives of the master and two of the employés of the schooner Fidelity. Petitioner also alleged that it was informed and believed that other persons would claim damages for the loss of life and property in said disaster, and that it desired to contest its liability and the liability of the steam tug Printer for the loss of the schooner Fidelity, her cargo, master, and crew, and also to claim the benefit of the limitation of petitioner’s liability under the provisions of sections 4282-4289, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Thereupon, an order was entered by the court, citing all persons who had suffered any loss or damage by reason of the loss of the schooner Fidelity to show cause why an appraisement of the tug Printer should not be made, and why the petitioner .should not have such other and further relief in the premises as might be meet and proper, and in the meantime all persons who had brought suits, against the petitioner were restrained and enjoined from the prosecution of the same, as was also the commencement and prosecution of all and any suits against the petitioner as owner or charterer of the steam tug Printer, and in rem against the steam tug Printer, for and on account of any loss or damage arising from the loss of the schooner Fidelity. On May 1, 1890, Henry Wolfe, an administrator of the estate of one who had perished by reason of the disaster, and who, prior to the filing of the petition in this case, had commenced a suit in the’State court for damages accruing to the estate by reason of such loss, filed his answer and exceptions to the petition of the Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, denying, in effect, the jurisdiction of this court, and claiming, further, that, if the court had jurisdiction, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the limited liability act, because the tug Printer, as he alleged, was not engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore was not subject to the national, but to the local, or state, law. The questions raised were argued before the late Judge Hoffman, and on the 7th of May, 1890, the answer and exceptions were overruled. On July 29, 1890, the matter was referred to Southard Hoffman to appraise the value of the tug Printer, and such proceedings were thereafter had that on August 22, 1890, the commissioner filed his report, appraising the value of the tug at $22,500, which appraisement was confirmed by the court on September 5. 1890. On October 6, 1890, an admiralty stipulation in the sum of $22,500 was given and filed. On October 7, 1890, an order was made and filed that a monition -issue against certain persons, therein designated, ‘and against all persons claiming damages for any loss, destruction, damage, or injury suffered by them, or any of them, or suffered by any decedent represented by them, or any of them, by reason of the loss and destruction of said schooner Fidelity,’ citing them to appear before the court and make due proof of their respective claims on or before February 3, 1891. The monition was issued, published, and served as directed by the court, and returned and filed on January 3, 1891. The admission of service as to those on whom the monition was specially directed to be served was filed on Ifebruary 3,1891. February 2,1891, the following answers and claims were filed: Claim of Olivia Christopherson et al., damages for causing death of Captain L. H. Christopherson, who was on the schooner Fidelity when she capsized, and was then drowned, $25,000; claim of Mathilda O. Pederson et al., damages for causing death of Hans O. Pederson in like manner, $25,000; also claims of part owners in the schooner Fidelity, as follows: Geo. W-. Eager, one-sixteenth, $1,200; Wm. Wallace, one-sixteenth, $1,200; Wm. F. McDaniels, one-sixteenth, $1,200; Henry Axton, one-sixteenth, $1,200; J. W. Freese, one thirty-second, $600. No claims were filed by tlie oilier part owners, and no explanation is furnished why they have failed to do so.”
From the testimony in the case the court found as follows:
“That the petitioner was and is a corporation duly created and existing raider the laws of the state of Oalifomia. That at all times mentioned in said petition and claims said petitioner, the Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, was the lessee and charterer of the steam tug Printer. That the said steam tug Printer was of about one hundred tons gross measurement, and enrolled and registered in the United States customhouse in San Francisco, state of California, and within the Northern district of California. That at all times mentioned in said petition and the answer thereto and claims therein, the said steam tug Printer was used by the petitioner for the towage of vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce from the Pacific Ocean to Humboldt Bay, and from Humboldt P>ay to the Pacific Ocean. That on said Kith day of November, 1889, the said steam tug Piinter was commanded by one Robert .1. Lawson as master and pilot thereof, who was then the servant of said petitioner. That on tlie Kith day of November, 1889, said steam tug Printer, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court, upon tlie Pacific Ocean, made fast to the sailing schooner Fidelity, and undertook to tow said schooner over and across said Humboldt Bar and into Humboldt Bay, and that while towing said schooner over said Humboldt Bar said schooner Fidelity, by reason of the carelessness and negligence of said tug, was capsized, and all on board thereof perished, and said schooner Fidelity, with all of her stores and personal effects of the master and crew, became a total lops. That at the time the said steam Lug Printer arrived at said Humboldt Bar and started to tow said schooner Fidelity across said bar, on said 16th day of November, 1889, it was about nine or a quarter past nine o’clock in the morning, and tlie tide had been running ebb about two hours, and was approaching its maximum velocity for that time. That the said schooner Fidelity capsized on Humboldt Bar on said 16th day of November. 1889. That said vessel was inward bound, and at the same time was opposite to the entrance to Humboldt Bay, and at a point, not greater than two miles from the shore. That the disaster occurred within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the state of California. That the said schooner Fidelity capsized at about a quarter past nine o’clock on tlie morning of tlie said 16th day of November, 1889. That on said 16th day of November, 1889, said Humboldt Bar was subject to constant changes by reason of the shifting of the sands beneath the waters thereon, and the navigation of said bar could not be safely undertaken by mariners desiring to enter into or proceed out of said Humboldt Bay over said bar, without the assistance of a tug pilot. Thai, at the time and before the steam tug Printer, commanded by the said Robert J. Lawson, as master and pilot thereof, attempted to tow the said schooner Fidelity across said Humboldt Bar, the said Humboldt Bar was in an exceedingly dangerous condition, there being heavy seas breaking on said bar, in and about seven fathoms of water, the tide ebbing thereon at about its maximum velocity, to wit. about four knots an hour, and a southeast wind blowing at the rate of about nine miles an hour. That these turbulent elements combined caused the said bar to be very rough and dangerous for vessels to cross on tlie said morning of November 16, 1889, at the time the said schooner Fidelity was capsized. That in attempting to cross the said Humboldt Bar on the said 16th day of November, 1889, with the said schooner Fidelity in tow, under the then existing and prevailing conditions, the said petitioner and its said steam tng Printer wore guilty of gross and inexcusable carelessness and negligence, and tlie said schooner Fidelity was capsized and lost, and her said crew drowned, among whom were the said L. H. Oliristopherson and said Hans C. Pederson, by reason of said carelessness and negligence. That the value of the said schooner Fidelity was $12,000, and the verified claims of the part owners presented and filed herein amount to nine thirty-seconds thereof; and the court finds that the part owners in said schooner have sustained damages to the amount of their respective interests, to wit, $3,375. That the claims of the part owners of the schooner Fidelity are as follows: George W. Rager, a one-sixteenth; \Villiam Wallace, a one-sixteenth; William F. McDaniels, a one-sixteenth; Henry Axton, a one-sixteenth; and J. W. Freese, a one thirty-second. That at the time of the filing of the said petition of the Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association for limitation of its liability for the loss of the schooner Fidelity, and at all of the times mentioned in said petition, said George W. Rager was the owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest of, in, and to said schooner B’idelity; said William Wallace was the owner of an undivided one-sixteentli interest of, in, and to said schooner Fidelity; William F. McDaniels was the owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest of, in, and to said schooner Fidelity; said Henry Axton was the owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest of, in, and to said schooner Fidelity; and said J. W. Freese was the owner of an undivided one thirty-second interest of, in, and to said schooner B’idelity. That L. H. Christopherson was the master, and was on board, of the said schooner Fidelity, and was drowned at the time she was lost. That he was thirty-five years of age, and in good physical condition, at the time of his death, and was in receipt of wages to the amount of $100 per month. That he left, him surviving, as his next of kin and only heirs at law, a widow and two children, namely, Olivia Christopherson, his widow, and claimant in her own right, and Harold Christopherson and Lilia Christopherson, his two children, claimants herein. That Hans C. Pederson was the cook, and was on board of the schooner Fidelity, and was drowned, at the said time she was lost. That he was thirty-nine years of age, and in good physical condition, at the time of his death, and was in receipt of wages to the amount of $50 per month. That he left, him surviving, as his next of kin and only heirs at law, a widow and three children, namely, Mathilda O. Pederson, his widow, and claimant in her own right herein, and Peter Adolph Pederson, John L. Pederson, and Henry C.- Pederson, his three children, claimants herein. That the damages sustained by said Olivia Ghristopherson, widow of said L. H. Christopherson, and his two minor children, Harold Christopherson and Lilia Christopherson, by reason of the death of said L. H. Christopherson, caused by the carelessness and negligence of petitioner, as aforesaid, is $7,000. That the damages sustained by said Mathilda O. Pederson, widow of Plans C. Pederson; and his three minor children, Peter Adolph Pederson, John L. Pederson, and Henry C. Pederson, by reason of the death of said Plans C. Pederson, caused by the gross carelessness and negligence of petitioner, as aforesaid, is $5,000.” ' .
Upon which findings it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed: “That the said petitioner, the said Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, as lessee and charterer of the said steam tug Printer, is entitled to the benefits of the limitations of liability provided for and embodied in sections 4282 — 1280 of the Revised Statutes ,of the United States, and the several acts and statutes amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto; and petitioner is liable only to the amount of its interest in said steam tug Printer, appraised and fixed by this court at $22,500.00. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said claimant and respondent Olivia Christopherson, and her minor children, Harold Christopherson and Lilia Christopherson, recover herein against petitioner, said Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, the sum of seven thousand (7,000) dollars, together with legal interest thereon 'from the date hereof. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said claimant and respondent Mathilda O. Pederson, and her minor children, Peter Adolph Pederson, John L. Pederson, and Henry C. Pederson, recover herein against petitioner, said Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, the sum of five thousand (5,000) dollars, together with legal interest thereon from the date hereof. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that claimants and respondents, George W. Rager, William Wallace, William F. McDaniels, Henry Axton, and J. W. Freese, part owners of the schooner B’idelity, recover herein against the petitioner, Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, the sum of three thousand three hundred and seventy-five (3,375) dollars, together with legal interest thereon from the date thereof, the said sum to be proportioned as follows: Two-pinths part thereof, amounting to the sum of seven hundred and fifty (750) dollars, to George W. Rager; two-ninths part thereof, amounting to the sum of seven hundred and fifty (750) dollars, to William Wallace; two¡ainths part thereof, amounting to the sum of seven hundred and .fifty (750) dollars, to William F. McDaniels; two-ninllis jjart thereof, amounting to tlio sum of seven hundred and fifty (750) dollars, to Henry Axton; and a one-uintli part thereof, amounting to the sum of three hundred and seventy-five (375) dollars, to J. W. Freese, it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that claimants and respondents herein recover their costs, taxed at the sum of eighty-two and ninety one-hundredths (82.90) dollars.”
It is not disputed that the place of disaster was on Humboldt Bar, off the entrance to Humboldt Bay, and within two miles of the ocean shore.
S. M. Buck, for appellant
J. N. Gillett, for appellees.
Before McKEXXA, Circuit Judge, and HAXFOttD and HAW-LEY, District Judges.
Rehearing pending.

Opinion:
McKENNA, Circuit Judge,
after slating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
It is con feuded by appellant that: (1) The evidence does not sustain the finding of the court that the officers of the tug Printer were at fault. (2) There can he no recovery for loss of life, as the disaster occurred on the high seas. (3) If there was liability, it arose while transporting property to a port of the United íátates, and hence excused from responsibility for damages by section 3 of the act of congress of February 13, 1893. (4) That the damages assessed for the deaths of Ghristopherson and Pederson are excessive. They were assessed, respectively, as we have seen, at $7,009 and $5,000. The culpability or nonculpability of the master of the tug depends upon the condition of Humboldt Bar at the time he undertook the towage of the Fidelity, and hence to this fact the testimony of the witnesses was addressed. It is conflicting, but the witnesses, if equally competent, do not appear to be equally disinterested. This and other circumstances determine the preponderance of evidence in favor of the findings of the district court. A review of the evidence we shall not undertake;. To be satisfactory, it would necessarily have to be circumstantial, and hence very long. Besides, it is unnecessary. It was done by the learned judge of the lower court, and its substantial accuracy we have verified by an independent examination. It is not disputed that the bar is changeable, and requires constant observation and care. It is not: disputed that at the time the service was undertaken the tide was ebbing, and that this was a more dangerous condition than though it had been flowing. There is some conflict, in the testimony as to its strength, and some as to the wind and roughness of the sea; hut it was established or conceded that if the sea was breaking in seven or eight fathoms of water it was too rough for towage. Of the immediate actors in the incident those on the Fidelity were all lost. Of those on the tug three testified, — the captain, the matt*, and the steward. The two former aver that the bar was not dangerous, and attribute the accident to an unexpected heavy sea, and the deficiency of ballast in the schooner. The steward, however, testified that the bar that morning (to quote his words) "was rough at times, and at times it wasn't." And he further testified that when the passage'of the fear was about to he made he had the following conversation with the captain: "I asked him if he was going in, and he said, 'Yes.' I told him I thought the bar was rough, and he said for me to go about my business." And to the question, "Were you frightened?" he answered: "Well, I didn't like it very much." In many particulars of seamanship and of the perils of the sea the captain and the steward should not be compared, but to judge of the roughness of a sea seems to be within the skill of any seafaring man. The testimony shows that the witness had two years' familiarity with the bar in service on tugboats, — surely long enough to instruct any observation' of its favorable or unfavorable states. Besides, the event confirmed his judgment. We might think this was accidental if there was not corroboration of his judgment by the testimony of ^others, undoubtedly skilled witnesses, who explicitly testify that the bar was too rough to cross. We have selected this testimony for comment because it was given by actors in the circumstances, and hence has importance for that reason; but other parts of the testimony as well justify the judgment of the district court that the master of the tug was culpably imprudent.
To support its second contention, appellant urges that no liability arose at common law from an act causing the death of another, and that there is no act of congress creating the same. There is a statute of the state of California creating such a liability, and it is conceded that the liability may be enforced in a court of admiralty. In addition to the concession of appellant's counsel, see the case of The Willamette (decided by this court Sept. 18, 1895) 70 Fed. 874. But it is contended that the liability may be enforced only when the act complained of occurs on inland waters, and it is claimed that the act complained of in this case occurred on the high seas, and hence outside of the dominion of the California statute. By the constitution of the state (article 21) the western boundary line is three English miles from the shore, and by section 33 of the Political Code the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state extends to this boundary; and by the same code the western line of Humboldt county, in its extent, coincides with the state boundary. Therefore, as far as the latter law is concerned, the place of the disaster which is the subject of this suit was within the territorial limits of the state of California. Is it not so in substance of law, as well as the letter? In Wheat. Int. Law, § 177, the maritime territorial jurisdiction of an independent nation is defined as follows:
"The maritime territory of every state extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea inclosed by headlands, belonging to the same state. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of territorial jurisdiction a distance of a marine league, or as far as a cannon shot will reach from the shore along the coasts of the state. Within these limits its rights of property and territorial jurisdiction are absolute, and exclude those of every other nation."
And in Kent's Commentaries it is laid down that:
"According to the current of modern authority, the general territorial jurisdiction extends into the sea as far as a cannon shot will reach, and no further, and this is generally calculated to be a marine league. "
The jurisdiction of the state of California over the sea is that of an independent nation. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 264, 11 Sup. Ct. 559. In the latter case the contention was presented which is presented in the case at bar. It arose under a statute of a state prohibiting fishing in Buzzard's Bay, except as provided in the act. The defendant violated said act. and was prosecuted and convicted. Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the court, stated, among others, the following, as contentions of the defendant:
i.:? -s * That the proprietary right of Massachusetts is confined to the body of the comity; that the offense committed by the defendant was committed outside of that territory, in a locality where legislative control did not rest upon title in the soil and waters, but upon rights of sovereignty Inseparably connected with national character, and which were entrusted exclusively to enforcement in admiralty courts; that the commonwealth has no jurisdiction upon the ocean within three miles of the shore; that it co-uld not, by the statute in question, oust the United States of jurisdiction. "
And, discussing these contentions, the learned justice said:
"The extent of the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea adjacent to its coast is that of an independent nation, and, except so far as any right of control over this territory has been granted to the United States, this control remains with the state."
And further:
"Within wliat are generally recognized as the territorial limits of states by the law of nations, a state can define its boundaries on the sea, and the boundaries of its counties."
Henry, in his work "Admiralty Jurisdiction and Procedure" (section 12), states the law as follows:
"Sec. 12. But neither the lakes nor the public rivers of the United States are, in a federal sense, highways of the state. A vessel, after leaving a port of a stare on a public river, is on a national highway, subject to state jurisdiction for some limited police purixoses, which are subordinate to the paramount right of navigation, and the navigable rivers aro as much national highways as the high seas are international. The littoral jurisdiction of a state, although extending, for some purposes, beyond low-water mark, is subject to the paramount right of navigation as a highway of the nation, in the same manner as the sea within the three-mile zone from the shore is subject to the right of navigation by foreigners without becoming subject to the local law. Such waters are considered as the common highway of nations, and the jurisdiction of the local authorities exists only for the protection of the coast and its inhabitants. not to subject passing vessels to the local law of the government of the shore."
To sustain this statement the learned author cites the following cases: Reg. v. Keyn, 2 Exch. Div. 63; Collier Co. v. Schurmanns, 1 Johns. & H. 180; The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 336; The Saxonia, Lush. 410. They are English cases, and citing them makes the meaning of the text doubtful. The text seems to make a distinction between national and state authority. If so, it is disposed of by U. S. v. Bevans and Manchester v. Massachusetts, supra. If it mean to deny authority to both the national and state governments, it is opposed to the same cases, and to Wheaton and Kent, and the authorities they cite, and does not appear to be sustained by the cates quoted to support it, except probably the case of The Raxonia. I say probably, because that case has been interpreted as only deciding the applicability of a particular statute. In The Twee Gebroeders, Sir W. Scott speaks of the sea within three miles of Friedland as "waters belonging to Prussia." In Collier Co. v. Schur manns, it was decided that the limitation upon the liability of a shipowner in a case of a collision under one of the merchant shipping acts, applied to a case of damage done to a foreign ship within three miles of the English coast, though foreign ships are not mentioned in the act. It was said in that case, of the three-mile limit:
"It is not questioned that there is a right of interference for defense and revenue purposes, and it is difficult to understand why a country having this kind of territorial jurisdiction over a certain portion of the highroad of nations should not exercise the right of settling the rules of the road in the interests of commerce. An exercise of jurisdiction for such a purpose would be at least as beneficial as for the purpose of defense and revenue."
Reg. v. Keyn occupies about 270 pages of the report; hence it is too long for review, and, besides, was concerned with some questions with which the case at bar is not. It was a criminal case. Keyn was indicted at the central criminal court for manslaughter. He was a foreigner, and in command of a foreign ship passing within three miles off the shore of England, on a voyage to a foreign port; and while within that distance his ship ran into a British ship, and sank her, whereby a passenger on board the latter ship was drowned. The facts of the case were such as to amount to manslaughter by English law. The ultimate question was the jurisdiction of the central criminal court. This depended not only on dominion over the three-mile limit, but upon certain statutes, and on the absence of an enabling enactment. The court was not unanimous on any of the propositions, and the agreement of the majority was only as to the latter; that is, the absence of a statute. The minority of the court was firm in the conviction that the sea within three miles of the coast of England was part of its territory. Lord Chief Justice Oockburn rendered the opinion of the majority, and if it may be said that he accurately opposed the reasoning and conclusion of the minority, he nevertheless based his judgment as well on other grounds, and it was only in the judgment that others of the minority concurred. Lush, J., in his concurring opinion, makes a distinction between the dominion of parliament and the dominion of the common law, and excludes the three-mile limit only from the latter. In concluding, he said:
"Therefore, although as between nation and nation these waters are British territory, as being under the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, in judicial language they, are out of the realm, and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a foreign ship in these waters must, in my judgment, be authorized by an act of parliament."
The lord chief justice also conceded the power of parliament, and jurisdiction for certain purposes, including fishing, finding sufficient, or at least not dissenting from the sufficiency of, the reasoning for the latter. But if the jurisdiction be one of legislative power, if it exist in England it must exist in the United States, disregarding now, as not a condition of our inquiry, the difference between control over domestic and control over foreign ships. If it exist in the United States, it is either in the national or in the state governments. In which it is we have already considered, and can only repeat what Justice Blatchford said in Manchester v. Massachusetts, that the jurisdiction of a state over the sea adjacent to its coast is that of an mdej>endent nation. If there is a limitation of this jurisdiction, it is in the commerce clause of the constitution of the United Riates, under which congress may assume it; but, until congress does assume it, state legislation is valid. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; The Willamette, supra.
To the jurisdiction of the state, besides the citation from Henry, supra, the appellant opposes the cases of Armstrong v. Beadle, 5 Sawy. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 541; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541. If the latter ease is an antagonism to Manchester v. Massachusetts, it will have to yield to the latter. But there is no antagonism. Lord v. Steamship Co. is to be interpreted as applying to the ocean beyond the three-mile limit. In Armstrong v. Beadle the facts were that plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a steamer bound from a port of Oregon to Ban Shancisco. On the voyage she struck a rock "near" Point Arena, in the county of Mendocino, the complaint said, and plaintiff and his wife were ordered to get into a surf boat, with which the steamer was provided, and by its negligent handling Ms wife was thrown into the water. The answer admitted the principal facts, but alleged that while said steamship was proceeding on her voyage, and on the high seas, the said steamship was, by the perils and acciden ts of the seas, forced and cast upon a rock. The opinion of the court was on a demurrer to this answer. The exact locality of the disaster did not appear. The complaint put it "near" Point Arena. The answer put it "on the high seas." But there is nothing further to show whether it was inside or outside of the three-mile limit, or that the fact or the effect of such limit was urged upon the court. Nothing, therefore, can be determined from the case than that it adjudges that the statute had no extraterritorial ('fleet. If it extends further than this, it is inconsistent with Manchester v. Massachusetts.
Against the validity of the statute may be cited Judge Hopkinson's charge to the jury in U. S. v. Kessler, Baldw. 15, Fed. Cas. No. 15,528, and for its validity the case of The Ann (decided by Judge Gtory), 1 Gall. 61, Fed. Cas. No. 397. The learned judge said:
"All the writers upon public law agree that every nation lias exclusive jurisdiction to the distance oí' a cannon allot, or marine league, over the waters adjacent to its shores; and this doctrine has been recognized by the supremo court of the United States, indeed, such waters are considered as a part of the territory of the sovereign."
The appellant further urges (hat if is exempt from liability by section 3 of the act of congress of February 13, 1893 (27 Stat. 445). It reads as follows:
"If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States, shall exercise due diligence to make said vessel seaworthy, and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent or charterers, shall become or bo held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation, or in the management of said vessel," etc.
The acts complained of occurred in 1889, and therefore, if this statute was otherwise applicable in the circumstances of this case,— of which we express no opinion, — the statute would have to be given a retroactive operation to make it so. It is a well-settled rule-of construction that this is not done except under the compulsion of language so clear and positive as to leave no room for doubt that such was the intention of the legislature. There is no such compulsion in the language of the act relied on, and we may not so construe it.
The fourth contention of appellant — that the damages awarded are excessive — needs not much comment. It may be, as counsel urges, quoting Judge Billings in Cheatham v. Bed Biver Line, 56 Fed. 250, that the problem of how long a man's productive life shall be estimated, and at what sum, is one of the greatest uncertainty. But an estimate must be made, and what better can we do than to take the existence and the promise of the qualities and conditions when the life was destroyed. By this test the damages awarded were not excessive. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.