Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. SANDERS v. GRANT, Mayor
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-06-30
Citations: 24 N.Y.S. 776
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. SANDERS v. GRANT, Mayor.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 24
Pages: 776–780

Head Matter:
(70 Hun, 233.)
PEOPLE ex rel. SANDERS v. GRANT, Mayor.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
June 30, 1893.)
Exhibition op Children—Consent op Mayor.
Pen. Code, § 292, “relative to the licensing of children in theatrical exhibitions,” as amended by Laws 1892, c. 309, prohibits the exhibition of any child under the age of 16 years “either * * * 3. In singing; or dancing; or playing upon a musical instrument; or in a theatrical exhibition; or in any wandering occupation;* * *. But this section docs not apply, to the employment of any child as a singer or musician in a church, school or academy; or in teaching or learning the science or practice of music; or as a musician in any concert, or in a theatrical exhibition, with the written consent of the mayor of the city.” Held, that the mayor cannot consent to a theatrical exhibition which includes singing or dancing by such child.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
■ Mandamus proceeding by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of Alice Sanders, to compel Hugh J. Grant, as mayor of the city of New York, to give his consent, under chapter 309 of the Laws of 1892, to the appearance of Zelda Sanders, relator’s daughter, aged 11 years, in a certain theatrical entertainment in which such child is .desired to sing and dance. From -an order denying her application for a peremptory writ, on order to show cause, relator appeals.
Affirmed.
This case was heard with the Stevens Case, 24 N. Y. Supp. 780, and five like, cases, at special term, by Mr. Justice BEACH, and his determination was announced in a single opinion, which is as follows:
Prior to the act of 1892, and under section 292 of the Penal Code, the written consent of the mayor could be given to the employment of a child in certain ways mentioned. By the act of 1892, entitled “An act to amend section 292 of the Penal Code, relative to the licensing of children in theatrical exhibitions,” the consent of the mayor was extended to include such exhibitions. The third subdivision of section 292 specifies certain of the prohibited acts in these words: “Third.—In singing or dancing, or playing upon a musical instrument, or in a theatrical exhibition, or in any wandering occupation.” The question raised in these proceedings is whether or not the mayor can grant a consent for a “theatrical exhibition” which includes “singing” or “dancing" by the child. I am of the opinion that he cannot. The intent of the legislature is to be ascertained, and, when settled, followed by the cotut, in construing the enactment. But this intent is not to be gathered from the shifting uncertainties of outside opinion or circumstances, likely to be modified or wholly changed when subjected to proof and judicial examination, but rather from the signs and indications furnished by legislation upon the particular subject then under legislative consideration. Judicial construction is seldom assisted by that applied to other enactments, which is always influenced or controlled by particular verbiage. Such are the cases of Society v. Diers, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 216; Bell v. Mahn, 121 Pa. St. 225, 15 Atl. Rep. 523. There is no doubt that the court can disregard the exact and literal wording of a legislative act, if, upon a survey of the whole act, and the purpose to be accomplished or the wrong to be remedied, 'it is plain that such exact, or literal rendering of tlie wording would not carry out the intent of the legislature. Bell v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 139, 144, 11 N. E. Rep. 495. This principle is not directly applicable to the question at bar, because exact and literal wording is not opposed to plain intent. The point involved here relates to the inclusive power of the term “theatrical exhibition,” relative to “singing" or “dancing.” These terms are used in the act under review, and the court, to ascertain the legislative intent, is remitted to the use by the legislature of those terms, and the legal effect of that use. The original act, and the act as amended, contained specified prohibited acts. These under the present section, and included in paragraph three, are plainly five in number-. First, “singing;” second, “dancing;” third, “playing upon a musical instrument;” fourth, “in a theatrical exhibition;” fifth, “in any wandering occupation.” The answer to parts of the argument urged by learned counsel for the defendant and relators is the obvious deduction from the particular specifications that each has a distinct and separate significance, and therefore no one is inclusive of any other. The final clause of the amendment, “but no such consent shall he deemed to authorize any violation of the first, second, fourth or fifth subdivisions of this section,” is of little aid to judicial construction. The third subdivision is not named, but the reason for its omission is that a violation of its parts was authorized when consent of the mayor was obtained. This applies only to the term “theatrical exhibition,” leaving singing, dancing, playing upon a musical instrument, and wandering occupation in the same status as the other subdivisions. The substitution of the word “dancing” for “dancer" seems to indicate an intention to enlarge the scope of a prohibition beyond a signification applicable only to a professional. It is also apparent that the third subdivision was properly omitted, because it includes what is subject to a consent by the mayor, to wit, playing on a musical instrument at a concert, and theatrical exhibitions. The court is of opinion that the tenor of the act, its title, and specific designations, by explicit words, will not permit the inclusion of singing and dancing by the words “theatrical exhibition.” There are under the latter term many acts not harmful or inappropriate, within the limit of children’s efforts, and such may be permitted. Those of singing and of dancing are excluded, in the wisdom of supreme legislative authority, which cannot and should not be overruled by the courts, especially when exercised with the humanitarian object of protecting those who, from youth and consequent inexperience, are unable to guard and protect themselves. The motions for a mandamus are denied, the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari discharged, and the prisoner remanded.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O’BRIEN and LAWRENCE, JJ.
Myer J. Stein and Wales F. Severance, for appellant.
William H. Clark and Elbridge T. Gerry, for respondents.

Opinion:
LAWRENCE, J.
It is too late to question the constitutionality of section 292 of the Penal. Code, and of chapter 309 of the Laws of 1892, amending the same. The opinion of Mr. Justice BEACH at the special term fully answers all the questions sought to he raised upon this appeal, and, concurring, as I do, in the views expressed by him, I am of the opinion that the order denying the motion of the relator for a writ of peremptory mandamus should be affirmed.