Case Name: Heather A. LYNCH, Appellant, v. Adel D. TENNYSON, Richard A. Tennyson, American Liberty Insurance Company, The City of Casselberry and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-12-15
Citations: 443 So. 2d 1017
Docket Number: Nos. 82-1237, 82-1563
Parties: Heather A. LYNCH, Appellant, v. Adel D. TENNYSON, Richard A. Tennyson, American Liberty Insurance Company, The City of Casselberry and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Appellees.
Judges: ORFINGER, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 443
Pages: 1017–1024

Head Matter:
Heather A. LYNCH, Appellant, v. Adel D. TENNYSON, Richard A. Tennyson, American Liberty Insurance Company, The City of Casselberry and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Appellees.
Nos. 82-1237, 82-1563.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 15, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1984.
Paul H. Bowen of Swann & Haddock, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Marón E. Lovell of Marón E. Lovell, P.A., Orlando, for appellees Adel D. Tennyson, Richard A. Tennyson, and American Liberty Ins. Co.
H. David Luff of Sanders, McEwan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for appellees City of Casselberry and U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
This appeal arises from a rear-end vehicle collision in Seminole County on May 16, 1980. Since the plaintiff/appellant, Heather Lynch, suffered an adverse summary judgment on the liability issue below, we review the record from the most favorable factual basis inferentially available to her.
Lynch was travelling east on Red Bug Road following an automobile driven by A. Tennyson, with a distance of some four to five car lengths between them. Tennyson stopped suddenly, having collided with the rear of the car in front of her. The traffic ahead of Tennyson had stopped because an emergency vehicle, a fire engine from the City of Casselberry, had pulled out into Red Bug Road in front of a car preceding Tennyson and Lynch. Lynch skidded into Tennyson. No brake lights were ever apparent to Lynch, according to her sworn statement.
The issue presented to the trial court at summary judgment hearing was whether or not Lynch was the sole cause of the last collision, as a matter of law, thereby discharging Tennyson and Casselberry from liability. It is beyond dispute that Lynch was negligent as a matter of law, and such has been conceded on appeal. Cf, Baughman v. Vann, 390 So.2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
A summary judgment is not proper if the facts and evidence are reasonably susceptible of conflicting inferences. Rogers v. Parker, 241 So.2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). This court has recently stated that:
The movant for a summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine issue of materia] fact. Once he tenders competent evidence to support his motion, the opposing party must come forward with counter evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue. Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368 (Fla.1979). Courts will not be disposed to grant a summary judgment unless a movant can show unequivocally that there was no negligence, or that the plaintiffs negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So.2d 29 (Fla.1977). Similarly, a question of proximate cause must generally be resolved by the trier of fact from all the facts and circumstances in a particular case, and where questions of negligence or contributory negligence are close, any doubt should always be resolved in favor of a jury trial. McCabe v. Walt Disney World Co., 350 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). See Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 349 So.2d 1187 (Fla.1977). Negligence must be shown to be a proximate cause of the injury, and proximate cause does not equal possible cause, nor does it cover every possibility that may indeed occur. Stanage v. Bilbo, 382 So.2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Goode v. Walt Disney World Co., 425 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). It is not necessary at a hearing on summary judgment for the non-moving party to produce evidence to prove its case as it would at trial; available inferences may allow the case to survive a motion for summary judgment. Platel v. Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida, 423 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
From the facts in this case, there is an available inference that Tennyson was driving too close to the car in front of her and, consequently, came to a sudden and unexpected stop when she ran into its rear, thereby contributing to some degree to the second impact by Lynch's vehicle. See Bialek v. Lensen, 421 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Whitworth v. Cuchens, 397 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Chiles v. Beaudoin, 384 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lubliner v. Gabrilowitz, 393 So.2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Revellino v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 229 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Pagan v. Holman, 195 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
In respect to the summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Casselberry, no argument has been presented to this court, either in appellant's written brief or oral argument, to indicate the factual nature of any negligence by the City of Cas-selberry. The vague negligence allegation against Casselberry was stated in the third amended complaint thusly:
12) Defendant, THE CITY OF CAS-SELBERRY, acting by and through its agents, servants or employees acting within the scope of their agency, service or employment, carelessly and negligently operated an emergency vehicle owned by such Defendant City on or about May 16, 1980, on Red Bug Road in Casselber-ry, Florida. Such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of an auto collision wherein Plaintiff was injured.
13) Defendant, THE CITY OF CAS-SELBERRY, had a duty to operate their emergency vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway and to give adequate warning to all other vehicular traffic along the emergency route.
14) Defendant, THE CITY OF CAS-SELBERRY, breached such duty to Plaintiff by negligently operating their emergency vehicle without due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway and by failing to adequately warn all other vehicular traffic along the emergency route, thereby causing a multiple car collision wherein Plaintiff was injured.
Formal assignments of error are no longer required. Fla.R.App.P. 9.040. It is required, however, that the brief of an appellant contain an argument with regard to each issue. Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(b)(4). The issue of the negligence vel non of the City of Casselberry has not been addressed by the appellant before this court. Even in the absence of a rule requiring that errors be assigned, professional advocacy necessitates that errors relied on for reversal should be stated in the brief, with the points argued. Florida Citrus Comm. v. Owens, 239 So.2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); cert. denied, 242 So.2d 873 (Fla.1971); Anderson v. State, 215 So.2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Cf, Health Clubs of Jacksonville v. State, 381 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 389 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1980).
The appellees, Casselberry and its carrier, have contributed to the confusing posture of this case by failing to raise the appellant's omissions adverted to above, either by motion to strike appellant's brief in regard to said appellees or in their answer brief, which is devoted to a discussion of the law of Florida relating to the presumption of negligence arising from a rear-end collision. The appellant attempts to raise one issue — the sufficiency of Casselberry's motion for summary judgment per Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) — for the first time in her reply brief, which is improper.
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the Tennysons and their carrier, American Liberty Insurance Co., is reversed. The summary judgment in favor of the appellees, City of Casselberry and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., is affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORFINGER, C.J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.