Case Name: Billie Lee SABLE, Respondent-Appellant, v. Jean SABLE, Petitioner-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1987-04-22
Citations: 506 N.E.2d 495
Docket Number: No. 64A03-8607-CV-196
Parties: Billie Lee SABLE, Respondent-Appellant, v. Jean SABLE, Petitioner-Appellee.
Judges: STATON, J. concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 506
Pages: 495–498

Head Matter:
Billie Lee SABLE, Respondent-Appellant, v. Jean SABLE, Petitioner-Appellee.
No. 64A03-8607-CV-196.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
April 22, 1987.
John M. Lyons, Lyons and Truitt, Valparaiso, for respondent-appellant.
Eugene C. Ryding, Portage, for petitioner-appellee.

Opinion:
GARRARD, Presiding Judge.
This is a marriage dissolution case in which the husband appeals that portion of the final decree awarding the wife half of the future pension payments to be received by the husband. It is undisputed that the husband's survival was a necessary condition to receipt of future payments.
Under prior versions of the marriage dissolution act it seems clear the award could not be sustained. See, e.g., Sadler v. Sadler (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1305; Hiscox v. Hiscox (1979), 179 Ind.App. 378, 385 N.E.2d 1166.
In 1985, however, the legislature again amended the statutory definition of property, IC 31-1-11.5-2, to provide:
"(d) The term 'property' means all the assets of either party or both parties, including:
(1) A present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits;
(2) The right to receive pension or retirement benefits that are not forfeited upon termination of employment, or that are vested, as that term is defined in Section 411 [26 U.S.C. Section 411] of the Internal Revenue Code, but that are payable after the dissolution of marriage; and
(8) The right to receive disposable retired or retainer pay, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 1408(a), acquired during the marriage, that is or may be payable after the dissolution of marriage."
Since the amendment expressed no effective date and contained no emergency clause, it became effective upon the promulgation of the Acts on September 1, 1985.
The wife commenced this action on July 25, 1985. Final hearing was had and the decree was entered April 9, 1986. Since the husband does not dispute the court's power to enter the order made under the 1985 amendment, the question is whether the court could properly apply that amendment to this proceeding. The husband urges it could not.
One of the traditional exceptions to the general rule that statutes operate prospectively is that a remedial statute must be construed to effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot (1887), 113 Ind. 373, 14 N.E. 586. Accordingly, remedial statutes will be applied ret rospectively to carry out their legislative purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional guarantee. Malone v. Conner (1963), 135 Ind.App. 167, 189 N.E.2d 590; In re Smith (1945), 115 Ind.App. 494, 60 N.E.2d 147. A statute will usually be regarded as remedial when it is plainly intended to cure a defect or mischief which existed in a prior statute. W.H. Dreves, Inc. v. Oslo School Twp. (1940), 217 Ind. 388, 28 N.E.2d 252; see also 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes Section 11, pp. 275-176.
Considering the history of the definition of property in the Dissolution Act and its interpretation by the courts, we are led to the clear conviction that the 1985 amendment is remedial legislation. Accordingly, the wife was entitled to its benefit unless its application would deny some vested right of the husband's.
The statute, of course, has no application to the pension rights between the husband and his former employer. It operates only as to the remedy the court may utilize.
Husband's right was to have the court divide the property of the parties in a just and reasonable manner considering the factors enumerated in the statute. 'IC 831-1-11.5-11.
He had no vested right to have his pension payments considered as non-property, or more precisely, as property not acquired prior to final separation. Al though it is not controlling, it need not be ignored that because of the nature of dissolution proceedings, the wife might have dismissed her action and then recommenced it after the effective date of the amendment. Had she done so the amendment would clearly apply even though the separation date remained the same as before.
The amendment is remedial and was properly considered and applied by the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
STATON, J. concurs.
BUCHANAN, J., dissents and files separate opinion.
. The original version did not define property, but we construed the Act to require a vested interest in an asset. Hiscox, supra. The 1980 amendment added a definition of property to include a present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits, but the definition was interpreted as merely reflective of our prior decisions. Sadler, supra.
. Decisions under the prior law recognized that the court might consider the impact of prospective pensions or retirement pay in determining what was a "just and reasonable manner" of dividing the parties' other assets. See Goodwill v. Goodwill (1978), 178 Ind.App. 372, 382 N.E.2d 720.
. "As has often been declared, there can be no vested right in remedies, provided they are not so changed as to be rendered nugatory. Hence it is that whatever belongs to the remedy merely is within the control of the Legislature, subject only to the limitation that an adequate and reasonable mode of enforcing the right must remain or be provided which leaves the value of the contract without substantial depreciation or impairment."
Glick v. Department of Commerce (1979), 180 Ind.App. 12, 16, 387 N.E.2d 74, 77; see also Speidel v. State (1979), 179 Ind.App. 392, 394, 386 N.E.2d 180, 182.