Case Name: Betsy DOBRICK and Dennis Dobrick, Her Husband, Appellants, v. DISCOVERY CRUISES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-06-19
Citations: 581 So. 2d 645
Docket Number: No. 90-2345
Parties: Betsy DOBRICK and Dennis Dobrick, Her Husband, Appellants, v. DISCOVERY CRUISES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN, DELL, STONE, WARNER, POLEN and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 581
Pages: 645–647

Head Matter:
Betsy DOBRICK and Dennis Dobrick, Her Husband, Appellants, v. DISCOVERY CRUISES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.
No. 90-2345.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 19, 1991.
Harry M. Hausman of Cohn, Hausman & Cohn, P.A., Pembroke Pines, for appellants.
Domingo C. Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Horr, Aronson & Blanck, P.A., Miami, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
EN BANC OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
PER CURIAM.
The Notice of Appeal in this ease purports to appeal an order denying a motion for rehearing. We treat this as an appeal from the underlying disposition of the case, rehearing of which was sought by the motion. See Austin v. B.J. Apparel Corp., 527 So.2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
The further difficulty is that the underlying disposition was an order granting a motion for summary judgment. This court, in Russell v. Russell, 507 So.2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), pointed out that an order simply granting a motion, as, for example, a motion to dismiss, did not constitute a final appealable order. Taking this logic one step further, we held that in the absence of an appropriate final order or judgment the appeal would be dismissed. Thus the appellant would thereafter be required to return to the lower tribunal, obtain a final, appealable judgment and file a new notice of appeal, if so inclined.
In White Palms of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Fox, 525 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), we applied this concept to an order which granted motions for summary judgment.
We recede from the second aspect of Russell and now hold that where an appeal has been filed prematurely in cases such as this one the appeal will not be dismissed, but the appellant will be given an opportunity to obtain a final, appealable order, and thereafter proceed in this court without the necessity of filing a new appeal. In so holding, we revert to the philosophy of Sloman v. Florida Power and Light Co., 382 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), which, by necessary implication, we rejected in Russell.
We certify the following questions to the supreme court as being of great public importance:
Whether an order simply granting a motion to dismiss (either with or without prejudice) or granting a motion for summary judgment, is a final, appealable order; and if it is not
Where a notice of appeal is filed prematurely, may the district courts of appeal provide an opportunity for the appellant to obtain a "final judgment" in the lower tribunal rather than simply dismissing the appeal, either under an extension of the rationale of Williams v. State, 324 So.2d 74 (Fla.1975), or by virtue of its inherent judicial power, or upon some other rationale?
We deny the motion to dismiss.
HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN, DELL, STONE, WARNER, POLEN and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion, with which LETTS and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.