Case Name: TEXAS, O. & E. R. CO. v. McCARROLL
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1920-09-21
Citations: 80 Okla. 282
Docket Number: No. 10368
Parties: TEXAS, O. & E. R. CO. v. McCARROLL.
Judges: RAINEX, O. J., and KANE, PITOHEORD, JOHNSON, and McNEILL, JJ., concur; HARRISON, Y. O. J., dissenting.
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 80
Pages: 282–290

Head Matter:
TEXAS, O. & E. R. CO. v. McCARROLL.
No. 10368
Opinion Filed Sept. 21, 1920.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Negligence — “Licensee” — Consent of Owner.
To malte one a licensee upon the premises or property of another, it must be shown that he is there by permission or authority of the owner, or his authorized agent. The permission and authority amounting to a license must be expressly or impliedly granted and mere sufferance or failure to object to one’s presence upon another’s premises is insufficient within itself to constitute a license, unless under such circumstances that permission should be inferred.
2. Negligence — “Invitation.”
Neither sufferance, nor permission, nor passive acquiescence, is equivalent to an invitation.
8. Railroads — Care Required — Boy Riding on Pilot Step of Engine — Invitee.
The permission of a railroad company’s night watchman for plaintiff to assist him in his work, and to ride on the pilot step of a steam engine, did not make plaintiff an in-' vitee, it appearing that the night watchman had no authority to invite plaintiff to assist him or to permit him to occupy a place on the engine pilot.
4.Same — Licensee.
The permission of the railway company’s night watchman, in violation of the rules and regulations of the company and his general instructions, to a 15 year old boy to ride on the pilot step of an engine, operated by the watchman, did not make the boy a licensee.
5. Same-Duty to Trespasser.
Although a trespasser is a wrongdoer, and courts do not ordinarily aid him, nevertheless, the owner of the premises (the railroad company in this case) owes him the duty not to wantonly and willfully injure him, and if discovered in a perilous position, it owes him the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him.
6. Same — Boy Trespasser — Negligence.
If a 15 year old trespasser, riding on the pilot step of an engine on his own volition or with permission of the night watchman in charge of the engine, for the purpose of signaling the watchman, was capable or apparently capable of exercising judgment and discretion and taking care of himself under the circumstances, it was not negligence for the watchman to run the engine.
7. Negligence — Care Required As to Children.
While some authorities, on the supposed analogy to the ■ rule of the criminal law, hold that a child between the ages of seven and 14 years is presumptively incapable of exercising judgment and discretion, and that after he has attained the age of 14 the contrary presumption prevails, it cannot be universally presumed that persons at a definite age, say 14 years, pass suddenly from incapacity td full capacity and discretion. There is no foundation for such a presumption, and the better rule is that it is a question for the jury to determine, without regard to any arbitrary presumption, whether the particular person has capacity to understand the danger and ability to take care of himself under the circumstances.
8. Same — Duty to Trespasser, in Peril.
The age, ability, and competency of a trespasser are immaterial when the master’s servants discover him in a position of peril from which he cannot apparently extricate himself or take care of! himself under 'the circumstances.
9. Railroads — Duty to Boy Riding on Engine Pilot Step — Negligence — Question for Jury.
Whether or not it was negligence to start and run an engine with a boy between the ages of 15 and 16 years standing on the pilot step is a question for the jury.
Ramsey, J., and Harrison, Y. O. J., dissenting.
Error from District Court, McCurtain County; C. E. Dudley, Judge.
Action by Harvey L. MeCarroll, a minor, by his next friend, L. D. MeCarroll, against the Texas, Oklahoma & Eastern Railway Company for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Plaintiff commenced this action by his next friend against defendant to recover damages on account of its engine running over and cutting off bis arm. The record shows that on September 17, 1914, plaintiff was over 15 years of age; that deféndant owned and operated a railroad in connection with its Lumber camp; that after the train men had finished their day’s wort, it was the duty of the night watchman to clean out the engine grates and fill the tender with coal, put in water, and prepare the engine for service next day; the night watchman would run the engine down to the water tank and, after ■taking on water, bring it back to the yard; that he had no assistants and needed none. Plaintiff testifies that he and the night watchman were friends; that the night watchman had boarded in his home while his father and mother lived near the spur track, and that at the time of the injury he was and had been boarding with the night watchman for about two weeks; that he had not had much education, but had been to school; that up to the time he came there, he had not had any experience with engines, machinery, and things of that kind; that after he began boarding with the night watchman he would work with and assist the night watchman on and about the engine; that sometimes he would go down to the engine after the night watchman left the house, and sometimes he would go with the night watchman; that the night watchman would generally take charge of the engine about 6 or 6:30 in the evening; that he had drawn the fire from the engine and made signals to the watchman when running the engine; that he had thrown the switches and coupled the cars; that the watchman had requested him to do these things; that he was not an engineer or fireman at that time and had no experience in those lines; that he remembered when he got his arm cut off; that he went with the watchman to get the water; that nothing was done to the engine before they started down to the water tank; that the water tank was about 300 yards north of the camp; that they had a lantern which he took along, but he does not remember who lit it; that as they went down for the water, they had a fiat car attached to the engine, and that he was swinging on the flat ear -and also standing on between the eugine and flat car; that it was about dark; that the engine and flat car were backed down to the water tank; that he connected the hose to run the water into the engine; that 'he also connected.the hose with the water tank; that the watchman stayed in the cab of the engine; that another boy had the lantern, and that when they got the water in, he went around to get on the pilot step; that as he went around to get on the pilot step, he told the watchman that he would get on the pilot step and see if any cattle got on the track as they went through the camp;' that he got on the pilot step for the purpose of signaling the watchman, as engineer, if anything got on the track; that he got on the right-hand side of the engine, on the pilot step; that the watchman made no objection to his getting on the pilot step; that the pilot step was made of sheet iron, about eight or twelve inches long, and that he stood on it with his back towards the engine ; that the engine started and went about 200 yards before the injury; that he was standing with his back towards the engine, facing the street; that while thus standing he saw a cow on the track ahead, and turned' to signal the watchman or engineer, and as he turned, he lost his “hold someway there and slipped off”; that he was going to signal with his hand; that he knew how to make the signal; that he had learned to make signals from seeing the other fellows; that he was holding on to the hand-hold with both hands until he saw the cow and then let loose with one hand to make the signal, and when he did so, he swung around, and in order to keep from falling in front of the engine, he swung himself back, and fell on the outside so that the engine ran over one arm and cut it off; that he had been sawing timber and working with his father and made a dollar and six bits a day, being the same wages his father received; that he weighed at that time about. 130 pounds; that he had great confidence in the watchman, and that they were friends; that he did not at that time realize that it was dangerous for him to be on the pilot step; that if the watchman had objected to him getting on the pilot step he would have'gotten off; that when they were down at the water tank that evening, the other boy gave the signal with the lantern when to start; that he had before that given the same kind of signals; that before when they had been to the water tank, he had made signals to stop and what place to stop at; that he had made these signals to the watchman; that his object in hanging around the engine was because he had a curiosity to be about them and that he wanted to learn railroading and had told a good many people that he wanted to learn railroading ; that once or twice when starting to go to bed at night (about half way to bed, he says) he would go back and stay around the engine; that on the evening of the injury he was swinging on the front end of the flat car as they backed down to the water tank; that he was hanging on the end thus and was swinging on the car like a brakeman.
The evidence shows that the night watchman knew the boy was on the pilot step when'he started the engine; that he ran the engine at the rate of about 2% miles an. hour; that no defect in the road-bed or engine or pilot stepf caused the boy to fall off; that after the engine started, no act' of the watchman in running the engine caused the boy to fall; that the watchman had no authority, actual or implied, to employ servants or assistants, and that no emergency existed justifying him in using or accepting the services of the plaintiff; that the act of the watchman in permitting the boy to be on or about the engine was in positive violation of the rules of the company and his general instructions.
At the close of the evidence defendant, plaintiff in error, demurred to the evidence on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled and a verdict returned, in favor of the plaintiff.
Ames, Chambers, Lowe & Richardson, H. M. Kirkpatrick, and John S. Kirkpatrick, for plaintiff in error.
Ledbetter, Stuart, Bell & Ledbetter, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
RAMSEY, J.
(after stating the case). Defendant contends that the plaintiff was either a bare licensee or trespasser; that he was of sufficient age to be charged, as a matter of law, with having assumed the risk incident to the dangerous position he occupied on the pilot step of the engine at the time the watchman moved the engine, and that, being a trespasser or licensee, it owed him no duty except that it should not wantonly or willfully injure him, and should exercise ordinary care not to injure him after discovering him in a perilous position. Defendant contends that the watchman's conduct in permitting plaintiff to assist him and occupy the dangerous place on the pilot step of the engine was wholly unauthorized, beyond the scope of his authority, and consequently the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was either the unauthorized conduct of the watchman in permitting the boy to assist him, or the act of the plaintiff in falling off the engine; that it is admitted by plaintiff that the injury was not occasioned by any defect in the road-bed or machinery or method of operating the engine. ¡Defendant cites a number of cases, notably Daugherty v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (Iowa) 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, holding that the master is not liable for the unauthorized acts of his employe in permitting a child to occupy a dangerous position on the master's vehicle or premises. See, also, Foster-Herbert Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh (Tenn.) 91 S. W. 199, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804; Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559, 85 N. W. 1075; Mahler v. Stott, 129 Mich. 614, 89 N. W. 340; Formall v. Standard Oil Co. (Mich.) 86 N. W. 946; Curtis v. Tenino Stone Quarries, 37 Wash. 355, 79 Pac. 955; Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 76 Am. St. Rep. 163; Bowler v. O'Connell, 162 Mass. 319, 44 Am. St. Rep. 359; Flower v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 Pa. 210, 8 Am. Rep. 251; Keating v. Michigan Central R. Co. (Mich.) 37 Am. St. Rep. 328.
WRile sometimes difficult to distinguish a license from an invitation, it is clear from the record in this case that the plaintiff was neither a licensee nor invitee. A license implies permission or authority. The permission and authority amounting to a license must be either expressly or impliedly granted. A mere sufferance or failure to object to one's presence upon another's premises is not sufficient within itself to constitute a license, unless under such circumstances that permission should be inferred. Elliott on Railroads, vol. 3, sec. 1245. Neither sufferance, nor permission, nor passive acquiescence, is equivalent to an invitation. Elliott on Railroads, vol. 3, secs. 1154 and 1249. The permission of the night watchman for plaintiff to assist him and ride on the pilot step of the engine did not make plaintiff an invitee. The night watchman had no authority to invite the plaintiff to assist him or to permit him to occupy the place on the engine pilot step. That is clear. Forbrick v. General Electric Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 36; Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., 101 N. Y. 291, 54 Am. Rep. 718; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175. The measure of the railroad's dluty to an invitee is not involved in this case, and we will pass that by.. It is also clear that the plaintiff was not a licensee. Plaintiff had no permission from anyone having the slightest authority to grant him permission to be on or about the engine, and it is not shown that any authorized agent or servant of the defendant either expressly or impliedly permitted the plaintiff to be on or about the engine, and being there in violation of the rules of the company, he was not a licensee. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1974; Means v. Southern Calif. R. Co., 144 Cal. 473, 1 Ann. Cas. 206; A., T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cogswell, 23 Okla. 181, 99 Pac. 923; Midland V. R. Co. v. Littlejohn, 44 Okla. 8, 143 Pac. 1; Brown v. Boston & M. R. Co. (N. H.) 64 Atl. 194; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Denney's Admr., 106 Va. 383, 56 S. E. 321. Plaintiff was not upon the engine to transact any business between himself and defendant. He got on the engine on his own volition, uninvited, in violation of the rules of the company, and was a trespasser. But whether he was a trespasser or bare licensee makes no difference. If he was a mere licensee, the defendant owed him no legal duty except not to wantonly or willfully injure him and to exercise ordinary care not to injure him when found in a perilous position. Plaintiff's counsel contend that, although the watchman had no authority to permit the boy to ride on the engine, and 'although plaintiff may be treated as a trespasser, nevertheless, the defendant is responsible for the conduct of the watchman in moving the engine with the plaintiff standing on the pilot step; that no matter how the boy got on the engine, whether at the invitation of the watchman or on his own motion, the defendant owed him 'the duty to exercise ordinary care not to injure him; that the watchman in moving the engine was acting in the line of his service and in the scope of his authority, and that when he discovered the boy on the pilot step of the engine, it then became the duty of the watchman to put the boy off, and that the failure to discharge that duty before moving the engine was the proximate cause of the boy's injury. The law is well settled in this state that, although a trespasser is a wrongdoer, and the courts do not ordinarily aid a wrongdoer, nevertheless, the owner of the premises cannot justifiably, wantonly, willfully or maliciously mistreat or injure him; also that the owner of the premises is responsible for the failure to use ordinary care to avoid injuring the trespasser after discovering his perilous position. That rule is pretty well settled in this jurisdiction. Thorp v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 73 Oklahoma, 176 Pac. 240; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Miles, 69 Oklahoma, 170 Pac. 896; Wilhelm v. M., O. & G. R. Co., 52 Okla 317, 152 Pac. 1088. In starting and running the engine, the watchman was undoubtedly within the scope of his duty; he was performing services for his master. No one would deny that it would have been the duty of the watchman to have endeavored to stop his engine before running into a trespasser discovered in a perilous position on the track. While he had the right to presume that the-track was clear, and was under no obligation to keep a lookout for trespassers, as held by this court in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Miles, supra, nevertheless, if he had discovered a trespasser in a perilous position on the track, it would have been his duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid doing him an injury. This brings the case down to the sole issue: Was it negligence on the part of the watchman to move the engine with the plaintiff standing on the pilot step? Now, the plaintiff was required to exercise care and caution, and when he voluntarily assumed that position on the pilot step, if he had capacity to understand the dangers, he assumed the concomitant and incidental perils of one riding on the pilot step of an engine operated under similar circumstances. There is a great number of decisions exonerating the railroad, or owner of the premises, from damages suffered by trespassing children who have reached the age of discretion. If the plaintiff was capable of exercising judgment and discretion and taking care of himself under the circumstances, it was not negligence for the watchman to run the engine. Some authorities, on the supposed analogy to the rule of the criminal law, hold that a child between the age of -seven and 14 years is presumptively incapable of exercising judgment and discretion, and that after he has attained the age of 14, the contrary presumption prevails, although the presumption may be rebutted in either case. Elliott on Railroads, vol. 3, sec. 1261. The pilot step of an engine, especially during switching, is used to stand on while the engine is in motion, and operating an engine with a competent person standing on the pilot step is neither negligence nor evidence of negligence. Of course, an engine within itself is a dangerous appliance. Though intimated by this court in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. v. Wright, 62 Okla. 133, 161 Pac. 1070, that the age of 14 marked the termination of presumptive incapacity to exercise proper judgment, and the beginning of such capacity, the question was not positively passed upon. No one will deny that if plaintiff had been two or three years old, it would have been negligence for the watchman to move the engine with him standing on the pilot 'step. Burk v. Ellis, 105 Tenn. 702, 58 S. W. 855. It would have been negligence for the watchman to move the engine with a very feeble and decrepit old person, incapable of taking care of himself, standing on the pilot step. As a matter of fact, a child ten years old may have more capacity to exercise ordinary intelligence and appreciate danger and take care of himself under such circumstances than another child 14 years old. We do not believe it can be universally presumed that persons at a definite age, say 14 years, pass suddenly from incapacity to full capacity and discretion. We do not think there is any foundation for such a presumption, and believe the better rule is that it is a question for the jury to determine, without regard to any arbitrary presumption, whether the particular person has capacity to understand the danger and ability to take care of himself under the circumstances. Whether or not a servant in charge of an engine exercised ordinary prudence in starting and running the engine with a person standing on the pilot step, and whether or not the person standing on the pilot step was guilty of contributory negligence, are questions for the jury. These ques tions cannot be decided arbitrarily by the age of the person standing on the pilot step. As above suggested,- it would certainly be negligence to run an engine with a two or three year old child- or a very old, feeble, and decrepit person standing on the pilot step. The age, ability, and competency of -a trespasser are immaterial where the master's servant discovers him in a position of peril from which he cannot apparently extricate himself or take care of himself under the circumstances. If the plaintiff, or any other person, had been discovered on the track in front of the engine in a position of peril from which he could not apparently extricate himself, or apparently probably could not extricate himself, then it would have been the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care to avoid running over him or injuring him. Arkansas & L. R. Co. v. Sain (Ark.) 119 S. W. 659.
The majority having reached the conclusion that whether the engineer was negligent or not in running his engine, knowing the plaintiff was on the running board, was a question of fact for the jury, they fully agree with counsel for the defendant that "The question in the case is simply this: Does the evidence furnish sufficient facts under the law to warrant a recovery?" Being thus convinced that it does, and that no other question is argued in this court, it follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
RAINEX, O. J., and KANE, PITOHEORD, JOHNSON, and McNEILL, JJ., concur; HARRISON, Y. O. J., dissenting.