Case Name: Frederick Lang v. L. H. Pike
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1875-12
Citations: 27 Ohio St. 498
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frederick Lang v. L. H. Pike.
Judges: Scott, Chief Judge, Day, and Wright, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 27
Pages: 498–511

Head Matter:
Frederick Lang v. L. H. Pike.
L. recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace against J. P. and S. P.( who jointly appealed the action to the Court of Common Pleas. Pike, as surety on the undertaking in appeal, in the undertaking, says: “I promise and undertake that the said appellants, if judgment be adjudged against them on the appeal, will satisfy such judgment and costs,” etc. In the appellate court L. obtained a judgment against J. P. only. J. P. being insolvent, L. brought this action against Pike, surety on the undertaking in appeal. Held—
1. A surety, on an undertaking for appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, taken in conformity to the statute, where the terms thereof are clear and certain, may stand upon the terms of his undertaking.
:2. Pike is not liable on his undertaking, as surety, to satisfy a judgment against J. P. only.
Error to the District Court óf Lucas county.
In February, 1867, plaintiff, Lang, recovered a judgment in a justice’s court of Lucas county against Joseph Pfeffer .and Sabina Pfeffer for $39.35, and costs of suit. Desiring to appeal the action to the Court of Common Pleas, they jointly procured L. II. Pike, the present defendant, to become their surety on the docket of the justice for appeal, the undertaking is in conformity to the statute, and is as follows:
' “ Whereas, on the 12th day of February, 1867, the said Frederick Lang obtained a judgment against the said Joseph .and Sabina Pfeffer, on this docket, for thirty-nine and thirty-live one hundredths dollars and three dollars and fifty cents ■costs, and the said Joseph and Sabina Pfeffer intending to Appeal therefrom'to the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas county; how, therefore, I, L. H. Pike, of Toledo, do hereby, pursuant to the statute in such ease made and provided, promise and undertake that the said appellants, if judgment be adjudged against them on the appeal, will satisfy such judgment and costs, not exceeding eighty-six dollars. And I do also undertake in said sum that the appellants will prosecute their appeal to effect without unnecessary delay.
« L. H. Pike.”
“ Executed and acknowledged before me, and surety approved, this 19th day of February, 1867.
Otto Reidemeister, J. P.”
In the appellate court plaintiff' recovered a money judgment against Joseph Pfeffer alone, Sabina was discharged. An execution on this judgment against Joseph Pfeffer was returned indorsed, “ Wholly unsatisfied for want of goods and chattels whereon to levy belonging to said Joseph Pfeffer.” Thereupon, this action was instituted upon the undertaking for appeal. The foregoing facts appear in the petition. To the petition defendant interposed a general demurrer; demurrer overruled, and exception taken to the judgment overruling the demurrer. On leave defendant filed an amended answer; this was demurred to, and demurrer sustained; exception taken to the judgment sustaining this demurrer. The answer admits the execution of the undertaking for the appeal, but denies that by reason of any judgment on the undertaking for appeal defendant became indebted to the plaintiff; it alleges for further defense that prior to the commencement of the action before the justice, Sabina was the wife of Joseph Pfeffer; that she owned real estate in the city of Toledo in her own right, which she and her husband conveyed to plaintiff by deed containing the usual covenants ; that the action was brought to recover taxes claimed to have been paid by plaintiff after conveyance to him, and which wrere alleged to be a lien upon the land when conveyed to plaintiff by Joseph and Sabina, also for a claim held by plaintiff against Joseph alone ; that on the trial judgment was rendered against both for the whole amount of the plaintiff’s claim. From this judgment they jointly appealed, and the undertaking was given on such appeal, etc. Joseph ex. cepted to the judgment rendered against him. Motion by him for new trial; motion overruled, and judgment overruling motion for new trial excepted to. No bill of ex ceptions. To reverse the several judgments on the demurrers and the final judgment, a petition in error was filed in the Disti'iet Court, in which Pike avers that there is error in said record and proceedings in this, viz. :
I. That the court erred in overruling the demurrer of this plaintiff to the petition in said action.
II. That the court erred in sustaining the motion to strike out part of the plaintiff’s answer.
III. That the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the second cause of defense in the answer in said cause.
IV. That the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the amended answer therein.
V. That the court erred in rendering a judgment for said Lang, when it should have been in favor of this plaintiff', according to the law of the case.
VI. That the court erred in overruling the motion for and in refusing to grant a new trial.
In the District Court the judgment of the Common Pleas was reversed. Lang, the plaintiff' here, as well as in the action below, prosecutes here a petition in error seeking to reverse the judgment of the District Court for the following errors, as he alleges :
I. Because said District Court erred in reversing the judgment and' decision of the Court of Common Pleas.
II. Because said District Court erred in rendering judgment against this plaintiff'.
III. Because said district Court erred in rendering judgment in favor of said defendant.
IV. Because judgment was rendered by said District Court in favor of said Pike, when it should have been given in favor of this plaintiff, defendant below, according to the law of the land.
Ritchie, Howe § Ritchie, for plaintiff in error:
The surety in this ease was liable. Emerick v. Armstrong, 1 Ohio, 513; 1 Wend. 90; Ewers v. Rutledge, 4 Ohio St. 210; Secrest et al. v. Barbee & Royston, 17 Ohio St. 425; Bentley et al. v. Dorcas et al., 11 Ohio St. 398; Hood v. Ma this, 21 Mo. (6 Bennett) 308; 4 Abb. (N. Y.), App. Dec. 172; 3 Keyes, 636; 17 How. 394; 24 How. 467; Cass v. Adams, 3 Ohio, 223; 11 Ohio St. 408; 1 Ohio, 172.
Pike 8f Hall, for defendant in error :
The liability of a surety is never to be extended beyond the strictest letter of the obligation in which they have entered. State v. Cutting, 2 Ohio St. 1; McGovney v. The State, 20 Ohio, 90, and cases cited; State v. Corey, 16 Ohio St. 17; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comstock, 514; Chase v. Reis, 10 Cal. 517.
"We insist, therefore, thafit is bad logic and worse law, that in a joint appeal from a joint judgment, rendered in a joint action, the surety, in the appeal from that judgment only, can be made liable for a several judgment against ■one alone in a several action, and on a several cause of action, where it is admitted that but one could possibly be made liable.

Opinion:
Ashburn, J.
The record in this case presents but a single question for the decision of the court, namely: Where there is a joint judgment against two defendants, and both appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, and in that court judgment is rendered against one of the defendants only, is the surety of both, on the undertaking for appeal, liable for the payment of such judgment ?
The District Court answered this question in the negative, and, we think, correctly. No principle is more firmly .settled in this state than this, that sureties may stand on the very terms of a statutory bond or undertaking. So clearly has this doctrine been announced and acted upon, that it maybe regarded as entering into the condition of such an undertaking, that it will not be extended by the courts beyond the necessary import of the words used. It will not be implied that the surety has undertaken to do more, or other, than what is expressed in such obligation. In our judgment, it would not be wise, by reason of anything we find in this undertaking, or the facts as shown by the record, to make innovation upon this recognized rule of the law. When applied, in some cases, the rule may appear harsh or even defective, yet it will be more conducive to the general welfare to follow its lead than to unsettle the rule.
This undertaking reads : "Now, therefore, I,L. H. Pike, of Toledo, do hereby, pursuant to the statute in such ease made and provided, promise and undertake that the said appellants, if judgment be adjudged against them on the appeal, will satisfy such judgment," etc. The record shows that Joseph and Sabina Pfeifer appealed jointly from a judgment rendered against them jointly; and Pike promised and undertook if suck a judgment was rendered against them in the appellate court, he would pay suck judgment if tkey failed to do so. The length and breadth of his promise in the undertaking on appeal was that he would pay any judgment rendered against both of them— not separately, but jointly. He can not, then, be held for the separate default of Joseph. To hold differently would be enlarging the terms and changing the conditions of the undertaking, thereby virtually making, by construction, a new undertaking for the parties, and holding Pike responsible for conditions not in his contract.
In the language of eminent judges of our own state,. " the liability of a surety in an undertaking is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of his contract." And while " it has been the uniform object of our courts to support bonds executed under the provisions of the law, where, by a reasonable interpretation, such bonds can be made to meet the intention for which they were required to be taken," yet, in all cases where interpretation becomes necessary, the " undertaking is to receive a strict interpretation, and not to be extended beyond the fair scope-of its terms."
In cases where the terms of the undertaking are so explicit that interpretation is not required, courts will not undertake to render that more clear to the mind which is-already positively clear to the understanding. In a judicial sense, the office of interpretation is to make plain that which is not obvious. "Where, however, the conditions of the undertaking, as in this ease, are obvious, no work of interpretation is required. Here the work of the jurist is to apply the undertaking to its proper subject-matter, and then let it speak for itself. Thus applied, it plainly says : Pike will pay any joint judgment rendered in the appellate court — auy such judgment as shall be rendered there against Joseph and Sabina Pfeifer, but not one that shall be rendered against either alone.
The purpose of the condition in the undertaking is to define and limit the liability of the surety in case of the default of the principal obligor. And when so defined and limited, the surety may demand that he stand upon the words of the undertaking. I will adopt as my own the comprehensive language of Judge Read in the case of the State v. Medary, 17 Ohio, 565 : " The bond speaks for itself, and the law is that it shall so speak, and that the liability of the sureties is limited to the exact letter of the bond. Sureties stand upon the words of the bond, and if the words will not make them liable, nothing can. There is no construction, no equity against sureties. If a bond can not have effect according to its exact words, the law does not authorize the court to give it effect in some other way in order that it may prevail." This doctrine applies as well to statutory undertakings as it does to bonds. Pike undertook to respond to-a joint judgment in the appellate court, and to no other, on default of Joseph Pfeifer and Sabina Pfeifer doing so.
It is thought by "a member of the court that the ruling in the case of Bently et al. v. Dorcas et al., 11 Ohio St. 398, is in conflict with our holding in this case. We think not. The facts in the respective cases are such that each may rest upon its own merits. The case in 11 Ohio St. was a joirit and several bond, with a condition joint in form, given on an appeal from a decree in chancery involving a trust fund. The condition was that " if Lake, Bently, Barkly, and Bushnell shall pay the full amount of the condemnation in the District Court, and costs in case, a decree shall be .rendered therein in favor oí the appellees," etc. They made themselves jointly responsible to pay any decree in favor of the appellees, and the court in holding them all liable simply required them to stand upon the terms of their bond — the court gave the bond application in accordance with its express condition and legal scope. The undertaking we have under consideration is not conditioned, as that was, to pay a judgment in favor of appellees, but to pay any judgment that should be adjudged against appellants.
It is thought the rulings in 3 Keys (N. Y.) 636 ; 17 How. Pr. 394, and 24 Ib. 467, are in conflict with the ruling in this case. The decisions in these cases are made upon the terms of the New York statute providing for appeal and stay of execution provided for in the same undertaking, and that statute is essentially different in its phraseology from our statute providing the terms and conditions of an undertaking for an appeal. They are, touching the question under consideration, giving construction to section 335 of the New York code, which reads : "If the appeal, be from a judgment directing the payment of money, it shall not stay the execution of the judgment unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant by at least two sureties to the effect that the judgment appealed from, or any part thereof, be affirmed, the appellant will pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment, or the part of such amount as to which the judgment shall be affirmed, if it be affirmed only in part."
This section is construed by the New York courts, and in 17 Howard the court, by Brown, J., says : " The part of the judgment referred to in section 335 of the code and in the written undertaking is not limited to the money which is the subject of the recovery. The thing to be recovered, whether money or other personal property, is a part of the judgment, and so are the person-or persons from whom it is recovered. Both the money adjudged to the plaintiff', and the person or persons who are.adjudge.d to pay.it are material and essential parts of the judgment; and a judgment is affirmed in fart and reversed in fart when it is affirmed as to one and reversed as to the other."
Such a construction is consistent with the peculiar terms of the New York statute above quoted, and the conditions of the undertakings for appeal had in virtue of it. But the terms of our statute are so unlike the New York statute, that a decision construing the one can afford no direction in construing the other. Upon our examination of these cases, we find nothing that militates against the conclusion we have arrived at.
Judgment of the District Court affirmed.
Scott, Chief Judge, Day, and Wright, JJ., concurred.