Case Name: David B. FULCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-03-10
Citations: 875 So. 2d 647
Docket Number: No. 3D03-872
Parties: David B. FULCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, FLETCHER, and WELLS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 875
Pages: 647–650

Head Matter:
David B. FULCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D03-872.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 10, 2004.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 23, 2004.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Marni Bryson (Ft. Lauderdale), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, FLETCHER, and WELLS, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
David Fulcher entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to three counts of attempted sexual battery on a minor, and one count of lewd assault. The judge sentenced Ful-cher to eight years in state prison on each count, to be followed by ten years of probation, all counts to run concurrently. Fulcher served five years and three months of his prison sentence and was released into probation. Subsequently, Fulcher admitted violating his probation by possessing alcohol and by having unsupervised contact with two children. At the probation violation hearing the judge revoked Fulcher's probation and sentenced him to thirty-six months of state prison on all four counts, with credit for 504 days served in jail. The court did not award Fulcher any credit for time spent in prison on his original sentence, and in neither the written admission nor the plea colloquy was the issue discussed. Fulcher argues that he is entitled to credit for the five years and three months he served in prison on the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence. With application of this credit to his current sentence of three years, Fulcher asserts that he is entitled to immediate release.
We agree that when a defendant is given a split sentence, serves time in prison, is released on probation and subsequently violates that probation, she or he is entitled to credit for time served in prison on the original sentence, especially in the absence of any documentation establishing a waiver of credit during a negotiated plea for the probation violation See Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332 (Fla.1995); Wells v. State, 751 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The record before us contains no documentation that Fulcher waived his entitlement to credit for prison time served. However, for Fulcher to receive the "windfall" of immediate release by application of five year's credit for time already served would be an absurd result. We therefore affirm denial of relief.
FLETCHER and WELLS, JJ., concur.