Case Name: BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. COOK
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-01-14
Citations: 221 S.W. 1049
Docket Number: No. 1638
Parties: BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. COOK.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 221
Pages: 1049–1055

Head Matter:
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. COOK.
(No. 1638.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.
Jan. 14, 1920.
On the Merits, April 7, 1920.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1920.)
1. Associations <§c=31 — -Voluntary unincorporated association not regarded as person or entity in absence of statute.
In the absence of legislation, a voluntary unincorporated association is not regarded by the law as a person or entity, and where such associations engage in business enterprise, the liability of the members to third persons is similar to the liability of partners, and enforceable in the same manner as the partnership liability.
2. Associations <®=o I — Unincorporated associa- . tion an entity in view of statute.
Rev. St. arts. 6149-6154, held to constitute an unincorporated association an entity, at least for the purpose of litigation.
3. Appeal and error <®=s>387(3)— Association with headquarters out of county not required to file bond within time specified, where appellant resides within county.
An unincorporated association not having its headquarters in county in which it was sued was not required to file appeal bond within 20 days after notice of appeal under Rev. St. art. 2084, requiring bond to be so filed when appellant resides in the county, since such association is an entity in view of articles 6149-6154, and as such has its residence at the place of the general headquarters of the governing officers and body.
On the Merits.
4. Insurance @=»762 — Insurance held effective without delivery of certificate.
Where application for readmission and for insurance were accepted by fraternal society, and where applicant was accepted as a member and paid the money entitling him to issuance of the beneficiary certificate, the insurance went into effect upon his admission and payment of the dues for the current month, notwithstanding that certificate itself had not been issued or delivered, in absence of anything in the constitution or application for readmission or for insurance making the delivery of the certificate a condition to the taking effect of insurance, since such insurance contract is not required to be in writing.
5.-Insurance <®=o762 — Local lodge and officers agents of grand lodge in reception and read - mission of members.
The order of which’the grand lodge and its officers are the controlling body acts through the local lodge and its officers in the matter of the reception and readmission of members; the local lodge and its officers being the agents of the grand lodge in such matters.
6. Principal and agent 101 (I) — Agent may waive strict compliance with contract in dealing with party who has no knowledge of limitation of power.
Generally an agent may waive a strict compliance of the terms of a contract in respect to those matters in which he is acting for the principal, provided the other party has no knowledge of any limitation of his power in such matter.
7. Insurance @=762 — Applicant for membership entitled to rely on regularity of proceedings.
Since applicant for readmission to membership is to a large extent dependent upon the officers of the lodge and the members thereof who are inducting him into the order for instructions as to what is necessary to be done in such matters, he has a right to rely on the fact that proceedings to which he submits himself are regular and in compliance with the order.
8. Insurance @=762 — Applicant for readmission may accept construction of constitution by subordinate lodge readmitting him.
Applicant for readmission could rely upon the construction placed on an ambiguous provision of constitution by the subordinate lodge and officers thereof under whose direction he was proceeding in gaining readmission to grand lodge.
■9. Insurance @=763 — Applicant’s signature to constitution of fraternal society as prerequisite to membership held waived.
Where applicant for readmission had submitted to the required medical examination, had been accepted and recognized as a member and elected as such by the subordinate lodge, and had paid subordinate lodge treasurer the necessary dues, his failure to sign the constitution, even though the signing thereof was required by the constitution as a prerequisite to membership, did not preclude him from becoming a member and recovering insurance where he had no knowledge of such requirement, and where subordinate lodge did not require him to sign constitution; such requirement under the circumstances being waived, in view of Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 4847, 4855.
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. E. Whitehurst, Judge.
Action by A. E. Cook against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Wm. H. Atwell, of Dallas, for appellant.
M. M. Plowman, of Dallas, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
BOYCE, J.
The appellee, A. E. Cook, recovered judgment in the district court of Dallas county against the appellant, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and said defendant has prosecuted this appeal. The appellee now moves that the appeal be dismissed because the appeal bond was not filed within the time required by law.
The facts necessary to a decision of this motion are: The appellant, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, is an unincorporated voluntary association of trainmen having an extensive membership throughout the United States, and affords its members insurance against accidents, etc. The organization consists of a grand lodge and such subordinate lodges as are chartered by the grand lodge. It is provided by the constitution that the headquarters of the grand lodge shall be located at Cleveland, Ohio. The officers of the grand lodge have their offices at such place, and the general business of the association is transacted through such officers. There was a subordinate lodge of the Brotherhood located at Dallas, which had president, secretary, treasurer, etc. The term of court at which the judgment was rendered could, according to law, and as a matter of fact did at this partieuar term, continue in sesssion for more than 8 weeks. The appeal bond was filed by appellant more than 20 and less than 30 days after the overruling of the motion for new trial and notice of appeal.
Article 2084 of the Revised Statutes- requires as to the filing of an appeal bond in such case that—
"If the term of the court may by law continue more than eight weeks, the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof shall be filed within twenty days after notice of appeal is given, if the party taking the appeal resides in the county, and within thirty days if he resides out of the county." ,
What, then, is the status of the defendant association, and where is its residence, if it can be said to have a residence? In the absence of legislation, a voluntary association of this character is not regarded by the law as a person or entity. " Burton v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 10 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 31 S. W. 91; Slaughter v. American Baptist Publishing Society, 150 S. W. 226; Home Benefit Association v. Wester, 146 S. W. 1022; C. J. vol. 5, p. 1334. Where such associations engage in business enterprises, the liability of the members thereof to third persons is similar to the liability of partners, and such liability could be enforced in the same manner as a partnership liability. But such associations were not strictly partnerships in fact; the law only applying some of the features of the partnership law to them. In some respects they were like corporations. Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Association, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 375, 72 S. W. 878; Liederkranz Singing Society v. Germania Turn-Verein, 163 Pa. 265, 29 Atl. 918, 43 Am. St. Rep. 798; Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E. 922. In the Pennsylvania case referred to the court said that a voluntary association of this character occupies an intermediate position between a partnership and a corporation. The Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of Ostrom v. Greene, supra, after making the statement that a voluntary association is neither a partnership nor a corporation, says:
In that ease it was intimated that the right to sue and' be sued in the name of its president, conferred by the statute of New York on voluntary associations,' "may be of a corporate nature."
In 1907 the Legislature enacted a law <R. S. arts. 6149-6154) which provides that — •
An unincorporated association "may sue or be sued in any court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject-matter in its company or distinguishing name; and it shall-not be necessary to make the individual stockholders or members thereof parties to the suit."
The law contains other provisions which it is not necessary for us to refer to in this discussion. We think the effect of this law was, at least for the purposes of the litigation, to constitute the association an entity. Judge Brown, in the case of Frank v. Tatum, 87 Tex. 204, 25 S. W. 409, after referring to the statutes of several states which authorize suits to be brought by or against copartnerships in their firm names, says:
"The effect of such statutes is to give to the partnership recognition as 'an entity or distinct legal person, distinct from its members.' "
If the association, for the purposes of 'the suit, is to be regarded as an entity, so that it could be sued by name, then it was contemplated that it should have a residence somewhere. The law in reference to the appeal bond, which we have quoted, makes provision only for a defendant who either resides in the county of the suit or out of it'; there being no provision for appeal by a defendant without a residence. Under the circumstances we think that the residence of the association is to be determined like that of a corporation. In this event its residence would be at the place of the general headquarters of the governing officers and body— in this instance Cleveland, Ohio.
These conclusions result in our holding that the appeal bond was filed within time, and that the motion to dismiss the appeal should be overruled.
<S=»For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
<gz=sFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes