Case Name: La Iad DeLANCEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl R. DeLANCEY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1986-02-06
Citations: 110 Idaho 63
Docket Number: No. 15792
Parties: La Iad DeLANCEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl R. DeLANCEY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 110
Pages: 63–67

Head Matter:
714 P.2d 32
La Iad DeLANCEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl R. DeLANCEY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15792.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 6, 1986.
Larry C. Ashcraft, Mountain Home, for defendant-appellant.
Francis H. Hicks, Mountain Home, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
HUNTLEY, Justice.
Respondent La lad DeLancey obtained a default divorce from appellant Earl R. De-Lancey, Jr., who neither appeared nor had representation in the divorce proceedings. The Decree of Divorce, which La lad's attorney drafted, distributed a pickup truck to Earl and a car to La lad. The decree obligated Earl to pay community indebtedness on the car of $6,300, to be paid , in monthly installments of $197, with the further proviso that Earl pay $100 per month alimony upon completion of the car payments.
The DeLanceys had purchased the car during their marriage. At the time of purchase Earl bought a policy on the car, naming himself as the insured. At the divorce proceeding La lad failed to ask the court to order a modification of the policy replacing Earl as the named insured with herself.
After La lad obtained the car as her sole and separate property pursuant to the decree, an accident destroyed the car. Earl received the insurance proceeds for the car's book value, less the deductible. He paid $5,515.77 to the lienholder, discharging the debt on the car, and gave the remaining $1,384.23 to La lad. Earl then discontinued his $197 monthly payments on the car. La lad had paid one insurance premium; the one immediately preceding the accident.
La lad went to magistrate court demanding Earl show cause for his discontinuance of the $197 monthly payments to La lad. The magistrate judge (who signed the original decree) found the decree unambiguously obligated Earl to pay the debt on the car. The court held Earl's obligation terminated with the debt.
However, the district court to which La lad appealed reversed the magistrate court. It reasoned La lad's payment of a single insurance premium entitled her to the insurance proceeds because she must have "continued the insurance to insure that her car would be replaced; and not to pay off her former husband's debt, in the event of a loss such as occurred here." (Emphasis in original.)
La lad considers herself entitled to the insurance proceeds under two alternative theories. First, she argues that the court which issued the decree intended her to have a car, or the money to buy a new one if the car were wrecked. Second, she argues her payment of a single insurance premium entitles her to the insurance proceeds. We deal with each issue in turn.
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
La lad argues that the magistrate who entered the Decree of Divorce intended La lad to have a car. After the accident, she had neither a car nor money to pay for a new one, which in her view violated the intent underlying the decree. To resolve this issue we must interpret the Decree of Divorce.
The same rules of construction applicable to contracts and written documents in general apply to our interpretation of the decree. Evans v. City of American Falls, Idaho, 52 Idaho 7, 18, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932). Our standard of review of the lower courts' interpretation of the decree depends upon whether the decree is ambiguous. Interpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. Cf. Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1978) (contract case); Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344, 349 (1982) (contract case). On the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law. Cf. Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984) (contract case); Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corporation, Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1978). Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law. See, Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 789, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980) (contract case).
We turn to the decree's relevant provisions to determine whether the decree is ambiguous. If a document is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation, then it is ambiguous. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). Certain provisions in the decree distribute one vehicle to each party: a pickup truck to Earl and a Ford Mustang automobile to La lad. A subsequent provision states:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That the defendant shall pay the community indebtedness of the parties including the following:
Pioneer Federal Credit Union, encumbrance on 1981 Ford Mustang — Amount: $6,300.00. Monthly payment: $197.00. (Emphasis added.)
These provisions unambiguously distribute the car to La lad and obligate Earl to pay the specified debt thereon owed to the specified lienholder. The decree is not reasonably subject to any other interpretation.
La lad argues the trial court's interpretation of the decree violated its underlying intent. The trial court held Earl's obligation under the decree was discharged upon his payment of the lien on the car with the insurance proceeds. Under this determination La lad would have neither a car nor the money to obtain one, which La lad asserts violates the intent underlying the decree; that each party have a vehicle.
However, a court should construe judgments to give effect to every word and part. Boundary County, Idaho v. Woldson, 144 F.2d 17, 20 (9th Cir.1944) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 843, 65 S.Ct. 678, 89 L.Ed. 1405 (1945). The decree directs Earl to pay the "indebtedness" of the parties owed to "Pioneer Federal Credit Union" for its "encumbrance" on the car. This language conditions Earl's obligation to La lad upon the existence of a debt on the car. Since the insurance proceeds discharge the debt, the obligation of Earl based on that debt was also discharged. For this court to find Earl still obligated to La lad for payments on the car, as La lad urges, would require us to ignore the plain language of the decree or supply additional terminology. We cannot interpret the decree to place on Earl an obligation not required by the decree. Cf. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960) (contract case).
II. PREMIUM PAYMENT
Earl contends on appeal that because the decree said nothing about insurance, the policy naming Earl as the insured remains unmodified and gives Earl the right to the insurance proceeds. Earl denies La lad's payment of a single premium entitles her to the proceeds, regardless of her intent in making the payment.
The district court cited no authority for its holding that La lad's payment of a single premium entitled her to the insurance proceeds. This court can find no authority for the district court's holding. In fact, the general rule is that one not a party to an insurance contract who voluntarily pays premiums acquires neither an interest in the proceeds nor a right to reimbursement of the premiums. Proudley v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., 345 Pa. 385, 29 A.2d 48, 50-51 (1942); Feely v. Lacey, 133 Mont. 283, 322 P.2d 1104, 1111 (1958). On the other hand, equity may reimburse the payor of premiums for the amount of the premiums if she reasonably believed herself to be a beneficiary under the policy. Perry v. Perry, 484 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Mo.1972). La lad did not raise the issue of her entitlement to the reimbursement of her single premium payment either in the courts below or in this Court. We therefore decline to rule on that matter. The only situation we find in which a third party's payment of insurance premiums might entitle her to the proceeds occurs where the premium amount was misappropriated from the third party and paid without her consent. Even in these cases the third party has a right only to those proceeds in proportion to the premium payments. Re Clark, 69 Misc. 527, 127 N.Y.S. 888, 890 (1910); M. Rhodes, 6 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 31:173 at 214-15 (2d rev. ed. 1985). La lad does not allege the premium payment in her name was made with misappropriated funds or otherwise without her consent. Therefore, the district court erred in holding La lad entitled to the insurance proceeds. Reversed. Costs to appellant. No attorney fees awarded.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.