Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-02-25
Citations: 234 So. 2d 651
Docket Number: No. 38981
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 234
Pages: 651–659

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
No. 38981.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 25, 1970.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 1970.
Richard E. Gerstein, State’s Atty., and Jack R. Blumenfeld, Asst. State’s Atty., for appellant.
Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., and Thomas P. Abbott, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on appeal from the Order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, validating special county building certificates of indebtedness in the amount of $7,600,000.00 for the purchase and improvement of facilities to be used as a youth hall and juvenile court complex. Appellant and Appellee agree that the questions before us are:
1. Will the issuance of the youth hall and juvenile court complex certifi cates of indebtedness, without approval at a freeholders' election, violate Article VII, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution?
2. Is the levy of the special building tax for the payment of the youth hall and juvenile court complex certificates of indebtedness excluded from, and not subject to, the millage limitations contained in Article VII, Section 9, subsection (b), of the Florida Constitution of 1968?
On June 18, 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, enacted Ordinance 69-34 entitled:
"An Ordinance authorizing the construction of a new youth hall and juvenile court complex, the issuance at one time or from time to time of not exceeding $7,600,000 special county building certificates of indebtedness for payment of the cost thereof, and the levy of a building tax not exceeding one-fourth of a mill annually for ten consecutive years for the payment of such certificates of indebtedness and the interest thereon." (e. s.)
Florida Statute § 135.01, F.S.A., relied on as authority for the issuance of the certificates of indebtedness, provides:
"Whenever any board of county commissioners shall deem it necessary to erect or repair any courthouse, jail, or other county building, erect an addition or additions to any courthouse, jail or other county building, they shall give notice for thirty days in some newspaper published in said county, or in some newspaper published in the judicial circuit, if there be none published in the county, that at the next regular meeting of the board after the publication of the said notice, such question or questions, will be acted upon by said board. If, at said meeting, a majority of said board shall determine that it is necessary to erect, repair, or build addition or additions to, such building or buildings, they may levy a building tax not exceeding five mills per annum, for not more than thirty consecutive years in lieu of all other county building tax. The tax levied shall be assessed and collected at the same time and'in the same manner as other state and county taxes are levied and collected."
Prior to January 7, 1969, the effective date of the new Constitution, this Court, in a number of cases, upheld the financing of essential government requirements under Florida Statute § 135.01, and its predeces-. sors, without freeholder vote. These cases are relied on by appellee.
The question is whether Section 12 of Article VII of the new Constitution, F.S.A., has superseded our prior decisions and rendered Florida Statute § 135.01, F.S.A. invalid.
Section 12 of Article VII, of the Constitution provides as follows:
"Local bonds. — Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve months after issuance only:
"(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation; or
"(b) to.refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate."
(e. s.)
Appellee contends that Section 12 of Article VII, of the new Constitution does not differ in any material way from former Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution of 1885 and should be construed as was the prior provision to allow the certificates of indebtedness under consideration.
The prior constitutional provision effective from 1930 until January 7, 1969 provided :
"The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing State bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection, and the Counties, Districts, or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law; but the provisions of this act shall not apply to the refunding of bonds issued exclusively for the purpose of refunding of the bonds or the interest thereon of such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities."
We are unable to agree with appellee's contention that "except for refinements of language" the old and new sections do not differ as related to the instant case. The new Constitution expressly provides for the issuance of certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates "only to finance capital projects authorized by law and only when approved by vote of the electors vaho are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. " The prior Constitution did not mention certificates of indebtedness or tax anticipation certificates, but referred only to bonds requiring approval of freeholders.
The present Constitution is clearly more restrictive and expresses the will of the people that financial arrangements of the type formerly upheld in the Tapers v. Pichard line of cases be no longer permitted. The language of Section 12, Article VII is plain. In Ervin v. Collins we held:
"We are called on to construe the terms of the Constitution, an instrument from the people, and we are to effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document. We are not permitted to color it by the addition of words or the engrafting of our views as to how it should have been written. As pointed out by the chancellor, it must be presumed that those who drafted the Constitution had a clear conception of the principles they intended to express, that they knew the English language and that they knew how to use it, that they gave careful consideration to the practical application of the Constitution and arranged its provisions in the order that would most accurately express their intention."
We hold, therefore, that Florida Statute § 135.01 is invalid and the certificates of indebtedness proposed to be issued thereunder cannot be issued without approval of freeholders as provided by Section 12 of Article VII, Florida Constitution of 1968.
Appellant contends that the levy of the special building tax to pay the certificates of indebtedness is subject to the millage limitations of Section 9(b), Article VII of the new Constitution. This Court has recently had occasion to consider the provision in question in State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson. Since the certificates of indebtedness here under consideration can only be issued upon approval of the freeholders, the tax levied to pay the certificates is. in addition to, and not included within, the 10 mills allowed for county purposes under Section 9(b), of Article VII.
This Court is mindful of the urgent need for expanded juvenile court and youth hall facilities in Dade County. This need is clearly established in the record. We are not, however, permitted the luxury of an elastic interpretation of a clear constitutional provision.
Accordingly, the final decree validating the bonds is reversed.
It is so ordered.
DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C. J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.
. Tapers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39 (1936) ; Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So.2d 799 (1941); State v. Lafayette County, 55 So.2d 799 (Fla.1952) ; State v. Sumter County, 60 So.2d 529 (Fla.1952) ; State v. St. Johns County, 60 So.2d 530 (Fla.1952) ; State v. County of Palm Beach, 89 So.2d 607 (Fla.1956) ; State v. County of Dade, 92 So.2d 186 (Fla.1957); State v. County of Santa Rosa, 105 So.2d 365 (Fla.1958) ; State v. Lee County, 121 So.2d 788 (Fla.1960); Kearney v. County of St. Lucie, 126 So.2d 140 (Fla.1961).
. Mize v. County of Seminole, Florida, Fla., 229 So.2d 841, opinion filed September 24, 1969.
. 85 So.2d 852, 855, 59 A.L.E.2d 706 (Fla. 1956).
. "Advalorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment of bonds and taxes levied for periods not longer than two years when authorized by vote of the electors who are the owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation, shall not be levied in excess of the following millages upon the assessed value of real estate and tangible personal property : for all county purposes, ten mills; for all municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; and for special districts a millage authorized by law approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. A county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes."
. 230 So.2d 130, opinion filed November 3, 1969.