Case Name: Ifrain MONTE DE OCA, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee; Richard Snell, Appellant, v. Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-22
Citations: 897 So. 2d 471
Docket Number: Nos. 3D03-661, 3D03-1468
Parties: Ifrain MONTE DE OCA, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee. Richard Snell, Appellant, v. Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J. and COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, FLETCHER, RAMIREZ, WELLS, and SHEPHERD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 897
Pages: 471–479

Head Matter:
Ifrain MONTE DE OCA, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee. Richard Snell, Appellant, v. Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees.
Nos. 3D03-661, 3D03-1468.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 22, 2004.
# 3D03-661: Diane H. Tutt (Davie) and Sharon C. Degan, for appellant Monte de Oca.
# 3D03-661: Akerman Senterfitt and Marcy Levine Aldrich and Nancy A. Coo- perthwaite and Jason Kellogg, for appellee State Farm.
# 3D03-1468: Boies, Schiller & Flexner and H. Stephen Rash and Steven W. Davis and Orion G. Callison, III, for appellant Snell.
# 3D03-1468: Akerman Senterfitt and Marcy Levine Aldrich and Jason Kellogg and Nancy A. Copperthwaite, for appellees Allstate.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J. and COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, FLETCHER, RAMIREZ, WELLS, and SHEPHERD, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
In these cases, consolidated for rehearing en banc, Ifrain Monte de Oca and Richard Snell appeal from trial court orders dismissing with prejudice their class action complaints against, respectively, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, and Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
Monte de Oca [the Insured] had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm. In February, 2001 the Insured's auto was involved in an accident with another vehicle. In accordance with the insurance policy's collision coverage provisions State Farm paid the Insured the full amount of his property damage, minus the $500 deductible set out in the policy.
State Farm pursued a subrogation claim on Monte de Oca's behalf. The sub-rogation claim was resolved on the basis that both drivers were 50% negligent, consequently each insurer recovered only half of its subrogation demand. State Farm reimbursed the Insured half ($250) of his $500 deductible.
The Insured filed this action against State Farm, seeking the balance ($250) of his deductible. The Insured sought to bring this suit on behalf of himself and all other State Farm insureds, nationwide, for whom State Farm had provided collision coverage, who were paid by State Farm after their vehicle was damaged in an accident with another automobile, and who did not receive back 100% of their deductible from the subrogation claim money that State Farm received from either the other driver or that driver's insurance carrier.
On State Farm's motion the trial court entered final judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice on the bases that the Insured's complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the case could not be maintained as a class action. The Insured argues here that his complaint does state a cause of action under the common law "made whole" doctrine and is appropriate for a class action. We conclude that the complaint does not state a cause of action, thus it is not necessary to deal with the class action issue.
The purposes of subrogation are'(l) to prevent over compensation to an insured, and (2) to assure that a wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm will not receive the windfall of being absolved from liability merely because the insured has obtained and paid for insurance for his or her own benefit. 3 Conn. Ins. L.J. 105, 107-08. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Sorge v. National Car Rental Sys., 182 Wis.2d 52, 512 N.W.2d 505 (1994), made it quite clear: The purpose of subrogation is to prevent a double recovery by the insured, who is to be made whole, but not more than whole.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Lexow, 602 So.2d 528, 529-30 (Fla.1992), the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the application of the made whole rule in Florida:
"Using the common law subrogation principle, endorsed by Florida courts, the district court reasoned that the insured was entitled to be made whole before the subrogated insurer could participate in the recovery from a tortfea-sor."
The rule was discussed by the First District Court of Appeal in Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The court quoted 16 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 61:18 (2nd ed.1964):
"[A] wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm should not receive the 'windfall of being absolved from liability because the insured had had the foresight to obtain, and had paid the expense of procuring, insurance for his protection; since the insured has already been paid for his harm, the liability of the third person should now inure for the benefit of the insurer." [e.s.]
The Insured is demanding the second $250 of the deductible based on his contention that without his receiving it he has not been made whole. However, it is to be recalled " that the Insured is a "wrongdoer" — actually one of the two wrongdoers — as the Insured and the other driver were both 50% comparatively negligent. As we previously observed, Florida Farm Bureau v. Martin, supra, a wrongdoer legally responsible for harm should not receive a windfall of being absolved from liability.
The Insured, as a wrongdoer legally responsible for 50% of the harm, is not entitled to be totally absolved from liability and must not receive a windfall. His liability as a 50% comparative wrongdoer is for half of the deductible. Under this formula Monte de Oca, and Snell under his facts, have been made whole and thus have no cause of action. We affirm the orders in both cases.
Affirmed.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY, GERSTEN, and GREEN, JJ., concur.
. Our discussion of Monte de Oca's situation applies to Snell except where we otherwise indicate.
. Subrogation is generally defined as
"The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, . so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation tp the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities."
Black's Law Dictionary 1595 (4th ed.1968).
In relation to insurance,
"Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer."
John Dwight Ingraham, Priority Between Injured and Insured in Subrogation Recoveries, 3 Conn. Ins. L.J. 105, 106-07 (1996-97) quoting 16 George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance § 61.1 (Ronald A. Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., rev. ed. (1983)).
. Allstate offered to refund Snell 75% of his deductible based on its recovery of 75% of its subrogation demand.
. The made whole doctrine, or rule, simply stated is:
"Under common law subrogation the sub-rogor (here the insured) must be mad[e] whole before the subrogee (insurance company) may recover anything from the tort-feasor."
Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis.2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512, 514-15 (1977).
. See Schonau v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., - So.2d - (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) in which the 4th DCA has recently reached, the same conclusion.