Case Name: Lucius M. PENDLETON and the Travelers Insurance Company v. Elbert D. SMITH, Sr.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-05-08
Citations: 674 So. 2d 434
Docket Number: No. 95-CA-1805
Parties: Lucius M. PENDLETON and the Travelers Insurance Company v. Elbert D. SMITH, Sr.
Judges: Before CIACCIO, PLOTKIN and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 674
Pages: 434–441

Head Matter:
Lucius M. PENDLETON and the Travelers Insurance Company v. Elbert D. SMITH, Sr.
No. 95-CA-1805.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 8, 1996.
James J. Morse, New Orleans, for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
Morton H. Katz, Steve Herman, Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, New Orleans, for Defendani/Appellant.
Before CIACCIO, PLOTKIN and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
hCIACCIO, Judge.
We granted plaintiffs' application for rehearing in this vehicular collision case to consider the propriety of the trial court's judgment granting subrogation in favor of Travelers Insurance Co. and against defendant Elbert D. Smith, Sr. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Lucius M. Pendelton and The Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") filed the instant suit against Elbert D. Smith, Sr. on June 7, 1994. Plaintiffs alleged that on June 11, 1993, Smith was operating a vehicle on Chef Menteur Highway at its intersection with Iroquois Street when Smith collided with a Buick owned by Lucius M. Pendelton and operated by Gloria Gibson. At the time of this accident, Travelers was the collision and uninsured motorist insurer of Pendelton, and both Pendelton and Gibson made claims under the Travelers' policy. Travelers paid $2,852.00 in property damages to Pendelton (who paid a $200.00 deductible), and $10,-000.00 to Gibson for personal injuries suffered in the accident.
In their petition, plaintiffs alleged that Smith was solely at fault in causing the collision, and that Travelers was subrogated to the rights of recovery of Pendelton and Gibson against Smith. Pendelton sought recovery of his $200 deductible. Travelers sought recovery of the $12,852.00 it paid to Pendel-ton and Gibson. Following a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded both Pendel-ton and Travelers the sums sought.
l2Smith filed a devolutive appeal from the trial court's judgment. In this appeal, Smith asserted a single assignment of error:
The trial court erred in finding that legal subrogation has occurred in favor of an insurance company who failed to prove that it had a legal obligation to render performance to a party who was not an insured under the terms of the policy in question.
Smith does not assign as error nor does he present an argument regarding that portion of the judgment rendered in favor of Lucius Pendelton or the portion of the judgment rendered in favor of Travelers in subrogation of the property damage claim paid to Pendel-ton. That portion of the trial court's judgment will therefore not be considered. Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3.
In his brief to this court, Smith assigns as error only the portion of the judgment which awards judgment to Travelers for the sum paid in subrogation of Gibson's personal injury claim. The propriety of that portion of the judgment will be addressed herein.
Smith claims that Travelers is not entitled to legal subrogation because Travelers failed to prove "that Ms. Gibson was either the named insured, a family member of the named insured, or a person occupying a covered automobile with permission to do so."
LSA-C.C. art. 1825 defines subrogation as "the substitution of one person to the rights of another," and provides that subrogation takes place by written contract or by operation of law. In the instant case, Travelers claims that Gibson is a third party who had a right to seek recovery of her damages against Smith. Travelers claims that it became subrogated to those rights when it paid Gibson under the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy l3issued to Pen-delton by virtue of the following contractual provision in the policy:
If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for whom payment was made has a right to recover damages from another, we shall be subrogated to that right .
Smith claims however that Travelers failed to prove that its payment to Gibson was made "under the policy" because the record is devoid of evidence that Gibson was an "insured" under the policy or that Gibson was driving the automobile with Pendelton's permission. We disagree.
There is no dispute that Gloria Gibson was not a named insured in the Travelers policy. However, Travelers paid the claim of Ms. Gibson based on the "Uninsured Motorists Coverage D" section of the policy, which provides in part as follows:
A. We will pay damages which an "insured" is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle" because of "bodily injury":
1. Sustained by an "insured"; and
2. Caused by an accident.
"Insured" is defined in the coverage as either the named insured or a family member, or any other person "occupying" the covered vehicle. Smith contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial that Gibson was occupying the vehicle covered by the Travelers policy.
The record in the instant case contains the Travelers insurance policy which provided coverage to a 1987 Buick owned by Lucius Pendelton. The record also contains a Proof of Loss and Subrogation Agreement which provides that a settlement was paid to Pen-delton for damage to a 1987 Buick sustained during an accident on June 11, 1993. Although the trial court awarded subrogation in favor of Travelers for these property damages, Smith 14did not assign as error the judgment awarding property damages to the subrogee. That portion of the judgment is now final.
In addition, the record contains the deposition testimony of Gloria Gibson. Ms. Gibson stated in her deposition that she was involved in an accident on Chef Menteur Highway on June 11, 1993 at which time she was driving a Buick owned by her husband. Although she did not state the name of her husband, she stated that the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident was Elbert Smith.
In addition, although Smith did not testify at trial, Smith admitted in his answer that he was involved in an automobile accident on June 11, 1993 on Chef Menteur Highway. Further, defendant in his answer averred as follows:
IX.
This accident was caused by the negligence of Gloria Gibson as it is imputed unto Lucius M. Pendelton and Travelers Insurance Company in the following nonexclusive particulars:
1. Failing to see what she should have seen
2. Failing to keep a proper lookout
3. Failing to keep her vehicle under proper and/or adequate control
4. Striking a stopped vehicle
5. Failure to yield, and
6. All other acts of negligence and omissions as shall be shown at the time of this trial.
X.
Defendant, Elbert D. Smith, Sr., pleads the comparative and/or contributory negligence of Gloria Gibson as it is imputed unto Lucius M. Pendelton and The Travelers Insurance Company in the particulars as recited in the proceeding page.
We find that these allegations that the negligence of Ms. Gibson is imputed to Pen- delton constitute a judicial admission by the defendant that Gloria Gibson was occupying the vehicle with which defendant collided. IsFurther, considering Ms. Gibson's deposition testimony that she was driving a Buick owned by her husband and the contents of the insurance policy and subrogation agreement relating to coverage and payment for a Buick owned by Lucius Pendelton, we find ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Gibson was occupying Pendelton's vehicle at the time of the accident.
Smith next contends that there was insufficient evidence presented that Ms. Gibson was operating the vehicle with the permission of the insured. Smith argues that under these circumstances, there is no coverage for Ms. Gibson's claims under the policy, relying on the following exclusion contained in the subject policy:
Exclusions
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for "bodily injury" sustained by any person:
4. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so.
However, a defendant's answer must set forth any matter constituting an affirmative defense. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1003 and 1005. Reliance upon an exclusion in an insurance contract is considered to be an affirmative defense, which must be specially pleaded in defendant's answer. In the absence of such a pleading, no proof can be offered in connection with the exclusion. Tudury v. Cooperative Cab Co., 265 So.2d 307, 312 (La.App. 4th Cir.1972); Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar Services, Inc., 526 So.2d 824 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writs denied, 530 So.2d 84, 87, 91 (La.1988).
Irjn the present case, defendant's answer does not contain any reference to the above-cited exclusion contained in the subject policy. Defendant did not raise this issue until the conclusion of the trial when he sought a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Under these circumstances, where the pleadings fail to include this defense, defendant is precluded from offering proof in connection with this exclusion. Accordingly, we find no error of the trial court in finding that Travelers was entitled to sub-rogation against defendant Smith.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment in favor of plaintiffs Lucius M. Pendelton and Travelers Insurance Company and against defendant Elbert D. Smith, Sr. is affirmed. Our previously rendered opinion in this matter is hereby vacated. Defendant is to bear all costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.
PLOTKIN, Judge, dissents with reasons.
. Although in our earlier opinion we addressed the issue of the lack of evidence offered at trial regarding Smith's uninsured status, this issue was not assigned as error by appellant, nor was it argued in brief. Defendant contends in his brief in opposition to the application for rehearing that his sole assignment of error included this claim. On further review, we find this claim was not specifically assigned. Nevertheless, Rule 2-12.4, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal states that the court may consider as abandoned any specification or assignment of error that has not been briefed.
The Travelers policy issued to Pendelton contained uninsured motorist coverage, and Travelers made payment to Ms. Gibson pursuant to these provisions. A claim that Smith was not uninsured under the terms of the policy defeats plaintiffs' demand on the merits, and is therefore an affirmative defense which must have been raised in the defendant's pleadings. A review of the record indicates that this issue was not raised by defendant in his answer or at any other time, and defendant is therefore precluded from relying on this defense. To the extent we held otherwise in our earlier opinion, that holding is in error.