Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Mary GUILLORY
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-04-06
Citations: 404 So. 2d 453
Docket Number: No. 80-K-2692
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Mary GUILLORY.
Judges: MARCUS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 404
Pages: 453–460

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Mary GUILLORY.
No. 80-K-2692.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 6, 1981.
On Rehearing Sept. 28, 1981.
Alcide J. Gray and M. Joy Clemons of Gray, Clemons & Spruel, Lake Charles, for defendant-relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard Knapp, Dist. Atty., Wayne Frey and Abbott Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
BARRY, Justice Ad Hoc.
The defendant was convicted of resisting arrest in violation of R.S. 14:108 and presents two assignments of error urging double jeopardy and imposition of an excessive sentence.
Police had set up a blockade around a two block area searching for four armed men in a stolen vehicle. The defendant lived within this sealed-off area and she and her brothers attempted to walk past the police, but were told they could not pass because of the danger.
The defendant told the police she had two small children at her house and she was allowed to pass. However, her two brothers were stopped and the defendant returned and shoved one of the police from behind during an argument. She was then placed under arrest along with her brothers.
The charge was presented by affidavit which did not name the officer who was resisted nor his official capacity. After the State called three witnesses the prosecutor requested that he be allowed to amend the affidavit, but this request was objected to by the defendant. The trial judge denied the request to amend but ordered a mistrial, sua sponte. The defendant also objected to the mistrial.
A new affidavit was filed including the officer's name and his official capacity. Defendant filed a motion to quash alleging double jeopardy, but this motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The defendant was found guilty and presents two assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying the motion to quash the second affidavit based on the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The Louisiana Constitution provision against double jeopardy is implemented by La.C.Cr.P. Art. 591:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense except, when on his own motion a new trial has been granted or a judgment has been arrested or where there has been a mistrial legally ordered under the provisions of Article 775 or ordered with the express consent of the defendant.
The State contends the judge was authorized to grant the mistrial sua sponte under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 775(3) which reads:
(3) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law;
The Official Revision Comment to that article states:
(g) A substantial defect in the indictment would constitute the third listed ground for mistrial, i. e., "a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law." See Article 859(1) Grounds for Arrest of Judgment. Similarly, Art. 487, which states the effects of defective indictments, concludes " After the trial begins a mistrial shall be ordered on the grounds of a defect of substance."
Apparently the trial court felt a mistrial was appropriate under earlier jurisprudence which required that a defendant be informed of essential facts constituting the offense. State v. Spina, 261 La. 397, 259 So.2d 891 (1972). Also, this court had held that a charge brought under La.R.S. 14:108 must name the official who was resisted and his capacity. State v. Moore, 311 So.2d 875 (La.1975); State v. Dozier, 258 La. 323, 246 So.2d 187 (1971).
However, the requirements of Moore and Dozier are no longer necessary. Where the indictment has failed to sufficiently inform the defendant of the specific conduct alleged to have produced a violation, the proper remedy was not a motion to quash, but rather a bill of particulars. State v. Gaieny, 376 So.2d 1240 (La.1979).
When the State attempted to amend the affidavit under the mistaken belief it was necessary, defense counsel opposed the amendment and cited Moore and Dozier, supra. The record shows this defendant was personally acquainted with the officer she is alleged to have resisted.
It therefore follows that the erroneous position urged by the defendant in opposition to the proposed amended affidavit amounted to tacit consent and reason and cause for the mistrial. We find that' the defendant's strategy left no alternative but for the trial judge to declare a mistrial. See State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584 (La.1981). Thus, LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 591 did not bar retrial.
This assignment is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
Defendant was sentenced to "ten (10) days in jail, plus $250.00 fine or 60 days in jail, plus 75 days in jail with the 75 day sentence suspended and the defendant placed under unsupervised probation for a period of two years".
Defendant urges that the terms of the sentence are illegal and that the trial judge failed to follow the guidelines in C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1.
The defendant argues that many mitigating factors outlined in La-.C.Cr.P. Art. 894.-1(B) are present in this case, and if they had been considered by the trial court, the result would have warranted a suspended sentence.
The record reflects that the trial judge stated he considered the case according to the provisions of Article 894.1, but the only reference we find in the record to that consideration was specific mention of the seriousness of the crime. Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the various mitigating circumstances argued by the defendant. And we agree that the trial judge failed to adequately comply with the mandatory requirements of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1 which requires that the sentence be individualized. State v. Jackson, 360 So.2d 842 (La.1978); State v. Cox, 369 So.2d 118, 121 (La.1979).
As noted above, defendant's sentence mandates jail, a fine or jail in lieu of the fine, a suspended jail term plus unsupervised probation.
The penal provision of LSA R.S. 14:108 provides:
Whoever commits the crime of resisting an officer shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
Thus, the aggregate of the sentence is within the statutory provisions; however, in a misdemeanor case jail time cannot be a condition of probation, C.Cr.P.Art. 895, and probation cannot exceed one year, C.Cr.P. Art. 894. See State v. Upton, 382 So.2d 1388 (La.1980). Clearly, defendant's sentence is illegal and must be vacated.
We therefore vacate defendant's sentence and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing, C.Cr.P. Art. 882, in accordance with the provisions of C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1.
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.
MARCUS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents from setting aside sentence and assigns reasons.
Judges Jim Garrison, Lawrence A. Chehardy and Denis A. Barry of the Fourth Circuit participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc, joined by Justices Calogero, Marcus, Blanche and Lemmon.