Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul BARRAGAN-DEVIS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1998-01-20
Citations: 133 F.3d 1287
Docket Number: No. 96-30304
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul BARRAGAN-DEVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: WRIGHT, FERGUSON, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 133
Pages: 1287–1293

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul BARRAGAN-DEVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-30304.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 6, 1997.
Decided Jan. 20, 1998.
Robert M. Leen, Seattle, Washington, for defendant-appellant.
Bruce Miyake (Argued), Assistant United States Attorney, and Ye-Ting Woo (On the Briefs), Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before: WRIGHT, FERGUSON, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion by Judge TROTT; Dissent by Judge FERGUSON.
TROTT, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
Raul Barragan-Devis (Appellant) appeals his jury conviction for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994). He contends the district court erred by failing to inform him of a juror's question, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to suggest a response. Although we agree with Appellant that the district court's handling of the note was error, we affirm his conviction because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Appellant was convicted of intentionally possessing heroin with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 812. During deliberations in Appellant's trial, the jury-sent the judge two notes.
The first note asked whether having possession of the heroin, in the quantity in question, meant that Appellant had the intent to distribute the drug. The judge referred the jury to two appropriate instructions after consulting with counsel.
The second note, a long note containing a question from a lone juror, forms the basis for this appeal. Counsel were not consulted regarding a response and the court, for reasons not explained in the record, did not respond to the note. The text of the note follows:
If it is believed that the defendant had no prior knowledge of the heroine [sic], but did knowingly put it in the chair — must we automaticly [sic] come to the conclusion that he knew it was a sizable amount, and that he would then distribute it? I was not convinced that the defendant was the one who prepared the shoes and asked Medina to wear them across the bourder [sic], and so cannot be sure (from the video, transcripts of; or the rest of testimony or evidence) that the defendant had intention to distribute or whether it was his intention to hide it. I am asked to use common sense to assume that because he hid the shoes and acted suspicious that he is guilty (by the other members of the jury).
It is unclear at what point the parties learned of the second note. Proceedings on July 19, 1996, after the jury had returned its verdict, began with counsel for Appellant asking if the "note from the jury we never did get to see" was "a matter of record at least?" The judge then entered the note in the record and stated that the question in the note "was not answered. At least not by the Court or any of the Court personnel. Maybe some of the jurors did [answer it]." Counsel for Appellant responded: "Apparently." He did not make any objections, nor did he then make a motion for a new trial.
DISCUSSION
A. Error Was Committed
Jury messages should be "answered in open court and . petitioner's counsel should [be] given an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge respond[s]." See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (citations omitted). Although Appellant may not have had a constitutional right to be present while his lawyer discussed the note with the judge, he did have the- Sixth Amendment right to be represented by his attorney at such a conference. See United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir.1986) (holding "constitutionally fatal" the absence of both defendants and counsel in formulating judge's response to jury, without deciding whether defendants personally must be present at conference). 'In this case, counsel for Appellant could have used such a conference to try and persuade the judge to respond. The trial judge's- failure to provide that opportunity was error. Because the error implicates defendant's constitutional rights, we may disregard it only if we deem it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469-70 (9th Cir.1986)(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826-27, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).
B. The Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
While an error was committed, we are convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469-70 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826-27, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In Frazin, we identified three factors useful in ascertaining whether an error is harmless:
First, we consider the probable effect of the message actually sent, second, the likelihood that the court would have sent a different message had it consulted with appellants beforehand and third, whether any changes in the message that appellants might have obtained would have affected the verdict in any way.
Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1470-71. Id.
Applying the factors outlined in Frazin, we are convinced the error was harmless for three primary reasons.
First, the judge sent no message to the jury. The judge did nothing to suggest that a verdict should be returned, nor did he do anything to influence the jury or the inquir ing juror in any way. In addition, the entire jury, when polled, embraced the verdict. The juror who sent the note expressed no dissatisfaction with the result.
Second, even if he had correctly consulted with counsel, the judge would likely have made the same decision: not to respond. The judge knew the jury had the relevant instructions. He had referred the jury to those instructions when he responded to its first note. The content of the note does not reveal any legal disorientation on the part of the juror or the jury, it simply reveals some difficulty in assessing the probative value of the evidence. It is not the role of a judge to help a juror sort out her own deliberative thinking.
Had Appellant timely made a motion for a new trial, the district judge would have had the opportunity to explain his decision to ignore the note. Given Appellant's failure timely to make a motion for a new trial, we are unwilling to assume an inadequate reason for the district judge's decision not to respond — especially in light of the context of the note and his earlier response to the jury. According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, the time to make such a motion expired seven days after the verdict. Under these circumstances, we will presume the best of the district judge, not the worst.
Third, even had the judge been convinced by Appellant to respond, any guidance he was likely to have offered was unlikely to have changed the jury's verdict. At best, he would have referred them again to the instructions and told them that he could not weigh the evidence or decide the case for them. Thus, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In dissent, Judge Ferguson claims the juror's question showed that the jury erected "an automatic conclusion or mandatory presumption of knowledge and intent from a finding of mere possession." We respectfully disagree. We see the question posed by the juror as a simple inquiry regarding the power of certain evidence to support a factual conclusion. Accordingly, this case is not controlled as Judge Ferguson suggests by Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Sullivan dealt with an erroneous jury instruction. Here no one — not a juror, not the judge, not one of the attorneys — ever mentioned the term "presumption." That legal concept never entered this case. The "presumption shoe" simply does not fit.
This case also differs markedly from McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (9th Cir.1997). In that case, a jury deciding whether a convicted murderer should live or die manifested clear confusion regarding a critical point of law on which it had been instructed. Id. at 836-37. The jury in McDowell believed it could not — as a matter of law — consider mitigating evidence. Id. The juror in this case merely could not determine the probative force and value of a certain piece of evidence.
AFFIRMED.
. Appellant also contends that allowing expert testimony regarding the difference between an experienced and inexperienced drug smuggler, which countered part of his defense, was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. The evidence was clearly admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(3) allows- conferences to proceed in the absence of a defendant when they involve discussions of questions of law.