Case Name: Helen M. CLEMENTS, Appellant, v. MORROW'S NUT HOUSE and Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-05-13
Citations: 598 So. 2d 279
Docket Number: No. 91-00342
Parties: Helen M. CLEMENTS, Appellant, v. MORROW’S NUT HOUSE and Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: BOOTH and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 598
Pages: 279–280

Head Matter:
Helen M. CLEMENTS, Appellant, v. MORROW’S NUT HOUSE and Lumberman’s Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 91-00342.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 13, 1992.
John T. Fryback of John T. Fryback, P.A., Bradenton, for appellant.
Nancy A. Blastic of O’Riorden, Mann, Ingram & Dunkle, P.A., Sarasota, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denying a claim for past and future chiropractic care. In denying the claim, the JCC relied upon the testimony of Dr. Marc Kallins, a physiatrist. Dr. Kal-lins believed that because the chiropractic care had not afforded claimant a "progressive and sustained benefit," that the chiropractic care was not medically reasonable and necessary.
Claimant's entitlement to chiropractic care, however, is governed by Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides in pertinent part:
[T]he employer shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance by a health care provider and for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require,....
The employer/carrier's obligation under the statute extends to the provision of palliative treatment which mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury. Professional Administrators v. Macias, 448 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
The order appealed from is reversed, and this cause is remanded with instructions that the JCC determine whether the chiropractic care sought by claimant was reasonable and necessary palliative care.
BOOTH and SMITH, JJ., concur.
BARFIELD, J., dissents with written opinion.