Case Name: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Charles BLUNT, Defendant and Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 2010-07-16
Citations: 785 N.W.2d 909
Docket Number: No. 20090110
Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Charles BLUNT, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: [¶ 41] DANIEL J. CROTHERS and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., and KIRK SMITH, S.J., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 785
Pages: 909–929

Head Matter:
2010 ND 144
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Charles BLUNT, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20090110.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
July 16, 2010.
Cynthia Mae Feland (argued) and Lloyd Clayton Suhr (on brief), Assistant State’s Attorneys, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Michael Ray Hoffman, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
SANDSTROM, Justice.
[¶ 1] Charles Blunt appeals from an order deferring imposition of sentence entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of misapplication of entrusted property. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] Blunt was the Executive Director of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") from 2004 to 2007. The State Auditor's Office conducted a performance review of WSI in 2006. The Auditor's report questioned the use of public funds at WSI, noting more than $18,000 in expenditures which allegedly failed to comply with constitutional provisions, state law, and policies of the Office of Management and Budget. See State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135, ¶ 2, 751 N.W.2d 692.
[¶ 3] As a result of the Auditor's report, Blunt was charged with two counts of misapplication of entrusted property in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(1). Count I charged Blunt with a class B felony for misapplying more than $10,000 in WSI funds for gift certificates given to WSI employees; food, beverages, flowers, balloons, decorations, costume rentals, ornaments, and gifts for WSI meetings; and food and convention expenses provided to legislators. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(2)(a) (misapplication of entrusted property exceeding $10,000 is a class B felony). Count II charged Blunt with a class C felony for misapplying more than $500 in WSI funds for illegal bonuses paid to three high-ranking WSI executives. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(2)(b) (misapplication of entrusted property exceeding $500 but less than $10,000 is a class C felony).
[¶ 4] Following a preliminary hearing, the district court concluded the State had failed to establish probable cause and dismissed the complaint. We reversed and remanded on appeal, concluding "the district court erred in concluding there was not probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed or that Blunt had committed it." Blunt, 2008 ND 135, ¶ 32, 751 N.W.2d 692.
[¶ 5] On remand to the district court, the State filed an information and Blunt was arraigned. After the arraignment Blunt filed numerous motions, including a motion for a bill of particulars. In its response to this motion, the State noted, in addition to evidence of the gift certificates, meeting expenses, expenditures on legislators, and employee bonuses, it intended to present evidence at trial that Blunt: (1) had illegally authorized payment of sick leave to a WSI executive who was resigning but was not sick; (2) had failed to recoup relocation expenses owed to WSI by this same executive; and (3) had illegally committed $150,000 in grant money to the North Dakota Firefighter's Association under a grant program that did not exist.
[¶ 6] Prior to trial, Blunt moved to bar the State from aggregating the value of multiple items misapplied so as to reach the $10,000 threshold for a class B felony, arguing that each item allegedly misapplied was a separate offense. He requested the district court rule that only an individual item allegedly exceeding $10,000 is relevant to prove a class B felony. The district court ruled that the State was allowed to include the value of all items misapplied to reach the grading thresholds under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(2).
[¶ 7] The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Blunt moved for a judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. The district court concluded the State had presented insufficient evidence to go to the jury on the allegations regarding the grant money, but "everything else" should go to the jury:
The grant program.... I'm going to grant the motion in regards to the grant program. We'll have to figure out how to address that. But that amount will not be considered by the Jury, as I'm going to dismiss that portion of the allegation, is one way to put it, I guess....
So, I guess, I don't — I'm finding there is insufficient evidence for that portion of it to go to the Jury. But everything else is going to stay. So simply, that portion will be out. But we'll go forward on the others with that, then.
After the district court ruled on Blunt's N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 motion, the State questioned whether the court could dismiss only that part of the charge in Count I involving the grant money and argued that the entire count should be submitted to the jury. The following colloquy then occurred between the court and the attorney for the State:
THE COURT: But, guess what, that's the way it is. I mean, I don't think you proved that portion of it. You charge it out that way. If I say, oh, that can go forward, too, where am I at when they come back guilty?....
THE COURT: So I think it's appropriate and it's carved out of there. I'm going to say they can't consider that amount . in coming to a conclusion on Count I.
MS. FELAND: So then am I under the understanding it is part of the Court's ruling, since the Court has said that there will be no comment about that, that includes comments from either side? So there is no discussion about the grants for all practical purposes, as if it never existed as part of this charge. It that what I'm understanding?
THE COURT: It is going to be in the closing instructions that they can't consider those amounts.
[¶ 8] At the close of all the evidence, Blunt moved the court "to enter the judgment of acquittal granted as to Count I" under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29, and the State again argued that the grant money allegations should be submitted to the jury. The district court again denied Blunt's motion on all allegations other than the grant money and reiterated its conclusion:
I'm indicating there is insufficient evidence to go before the Jury to find a conviction on the Firemens Fund grant program as an offense. And that's how I'm going to rule. And I'm going to issue an instruction along those lines that they are not -to consider that in considering Count I.
In its closing instructions, the court instructed the jury:
Evidence not Considered
As a matter of law, the Court has determined, you are not to consider any evidence of the Fireman's grant funds in reaching your verdict.
[¶ 9] The jury found Blunt guilty on Count I and not guilty on Count II. Blunt filed a post-trial motion, arguing that the district court's granting of a part of his N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal required acquittal on all of Count I. The court denied the motion. The court entered an order deferring imposition of sentence, and Blunt appeals.
[¶ 10] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(b). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-01-12 and 29-28-06.
II
[¶ 11] Blunt contends the district court erred when it did not grant a judgment of acquittal on all of Count I after concluding there was insufficient evidence to allow allegations regarding the grant money to go to the jury. Blunt contends the district court's action constituted an acquittal on Count I and any further prosecution on that Count was barred.
[¶ 12] Under N.D.R.CrimJP. 29(a), the district court is authorized, upon the defendant's motion, to "enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Thus to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, "a trial court must find the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offenses charged." State v. Maki, 2009 ND 123, ¶ 7, 767 N.W.2d 852 (quoting State v. Kautzman, 2007 ND 133, ¶ 10, 738 N.W.2d 1); see also State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 254; State v. Hammeren, 2003 ND 6, ¶ 6, 655 N.W.2d 707. When considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, "the trial court, upon reviewing the evidence most favorable to the prosecution, must deny the motion if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable mind could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Hammeren, at ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Steinbach, 1998 ND 18, ¶ 16, 575 N.W.2d 193).
[¶ 13] Blunt contends that because the district court stated it was grant ing the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the grant money, the court's action constituted an acquittal of the offense charged in Count I. In determining what constitutes an acquittal, however, the label used by the district court is not conclusive, and "we look at the substance of the judge's ruling to determine whether it actually represents a resolution of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." State v. Deutscher, 2009 ND 98, ¶ 8, 766 N.W.2d 442 (quoting State v. Jackson, 2005 ND 137, ¶ 5, 701 N.W.2d 887). In United States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106, 112 (1st Cir.2006), the court, interpreting Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 in a case in which the trial court purported to grant a "partial" judgment of acquittal on a portion of a single-count indictment, concluded:
[T]he question of what constitutes a "judgment of acquittal" is not governed either by the form of the trial judge's ruling or by his characterization of it. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); [United States v.] Martin Linen [Supply Co.], 430 U.S. [564,] 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349 [51 L.Ed.2d 642] [ (1977) ]. Rather, a reviewing court "must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349; see Gonzalez [v. Justices of the Mun. Ct.] 420 F.3d [5,] 8-9 [ (1st Cir. 2005) ]. A resolution in the defendant's favor of a necessary factual element of the offense is a definitive determination that the defendant cannot be convicted.
[¶ 14] In Blunt, 2008 ND 135, ¶ 7, 751 N.W.2d 692, we identified the elements of the offense of misapplication of entrusted property under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(1):
(1) the disposal, use, or transfer; (2) of any interest in property; (3) which has been entrusted to the defendant; (4) as a fiduciary or in his capacity as a public servant; (5) in a manner he knows is not authorized; (6) and that he knows to involve a risk of loss or detriment to; (7) the owner of the property or the government.
See also State v. Barendt, 2007 ND 164, ¶ 10, 740 N.W.2d 87 (recognizing and listing the "seven elements" of misapplication of entrusted property under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07).
[¶ 15] On Count I, the State provided multiple evidentiary bases and legal theories to support its allegation that Blunt had misapplied entrusted property in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(1). Included in Count I were the State's allegations regarding gift certificates, meeting expenses, legislator expenses, sick leave, and relocation expenses. To find a violation under Count I, the jury did not have to find the State proved each and every one of the instances of improper expenditures alleged in Count I. The State is not required to prove multiple transactions to establish an offense under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(1), as long as all seven elements of the offense are present. State v. Jelliff 251 N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D.1977). Removing the allegations regarding the grant money from the jury's consideration did not result in there being insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of the offense charged. See Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶ 11, 774 N.W.2d 254; Maki, 2009 ND 123, ¶ 7, 767 N.W.2d 852. There was ample evidence remaining which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to establish the essential factual elements of the offense and support a conviction of misapplication of entrusted property. See Hammeren, 2003 ND 6, ¶ 6, 655 N.W.2d 707.
[¶ 16] A review of the entire record demonstrates the district court's intent was not to grant a judgment of acquittal on Count I, but rather was to preclude the jury from considering evidence of the grant money in determining whether Blunt had misapplied entrusted property. The court in its discussions with counsel on the record expressly stated its intent that the remaining allegations would be submitted to the jury, and the court's final instructions directed the jury not to consider any evidence relating to the grant money when reaching a verdict.
[¶ 17] Blunt essentially argues the State is required to prove each and every factual allegation and legal theory precisely as pleaded in the complaint or information, or the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal. This Court, however, "has consistently held the State need not prove every allegation in the complaint or information, but is required to prove only the elements of the offense charged." State v. Trosen, 547 N.W.2d 735, 740 (N.D.1996); see also State v. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d 817, 823 (N.D.1989) ("[T]he State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every factual allegation set forth in the criminal complaint."). Courts in other jurisdictions have further concluded a trial court has the authority to withdraw from the jury's consideration particular factual issues or legal theories that are not supported by the evidence and submit the remaining factual issues and legal theories to the jury. See, e.g., Pacheco, 434 F.3d at 112-14; United States v. O'Shea, 426 F.3d 475, 479 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 104 (10th Cir.1980); State v. Mogan, 627 A.2d 527, 528 (Me.1993); State v. Hogan, 194 Neb. 207, 231 N.W.2d 135, 140 (1975). Such a ruling merely "narrow[s] the scope of the facts that the jury could find in deciding whether to convict on the offense charged." Pacheco, at 114. As explained by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bums:
It is clear that a court may withdraw from jury consideration indictment counts unsupported by evidence. The fact that here the court withdrew one of two charges contained in a single count is inconsequential. The controlling principle is that "'... a portion of an indictment that the evidence does not support may be withdrawn from the jury, and this is not an impermissible amendment, provided nothing is thereby added to the indictment, and that the remaining allegations charge an offense.' (C. Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure 274-75 (1969).)" United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.1975).
Bums, 624 F.2d at 104-05 (citation omitted).
[¶ 18] Similarly, in Hogan, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded:
In this case the court amended count II from a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, to a charge of simple possession of marijuana. The action, for all practical purposes, withdrew from the jury the issue of whether or not the possession was with intent to deliver. While a court has no power to dismiss a part of an offense or direct a verdict of acquittal on one or more degrees of a crime, an attempt to do so will be treated as withdrawing the issue from consideration by the jury. A trial court is bound to submit to the jury only such degrees of the crime as find support in the evidence. Here the evidence did not support the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and the court was fully justified in withdraw ing the issue of intent to deliver from the jury. The offenses involved were based upon the possession of marijuana at a given time and place and the change in the charge could not have created any confusion as to the nature and cause of the accusation nor created any difficulty in defending against it. The action was clearly to the defendant's benefit and his contention of error is unsupportable.
Hogan, 231 N.W.2d at 140 (citation omitted).
[¶ 19] Under analogous circumstances, this Court considered a similar argument in State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D.1983). Morris had been charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. The jury convicted Morris of the lesser-included offense of possession of marijuana. On appeal, Morris argued the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and the case should not have been submitted to the jury. This Court concluded:
One might wonder what difference it makes whether the trial judge granted or denied Morris's motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the major offense charged, i.e., possession with intent to deliver, because Morris was not convicted of the major offense charged; he was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession. Had we decided that Morris's motion for acquittal of the crime of possession with intent to deliver should have been granted, Morris would have had us use this decision as a premise in a more elaborate argument: namely, once the trial judge decides a jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence at trial that the accused is guilty of the major offense charged, and therefore the motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted, the trial judge should not let the case go to the jury even if there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find the accused guilty of a lesser included offense.
Morris's conception of the procedure a trial judge should follow if a motion for acquittal is granted is not correct.
A trial court's granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the major offense charged does not preclude submission of the case to the jury on the basis of the lesser included offense instruction unless, of course, the granting of the motion for acquittal extends to the lesser included offense.
Therefore, even if Morris's motion for judgment of acquittal of the crime of possession with intent to deliver should have been granted, we still would find no reversible error on the trial court's part in submitting Morris's case to the jury because Morris was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession and there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty to the crime of simple possession.
Morris, at 55-56 (citations omitted).
[¶ 20] The same rationale applies in this case. The district court determined there was insufficient evidence to support one of the underlying factual bases or legal theories in Count I, but there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty based upon the remaining factual allegations and legal theories underlying Count I. Rather than submit the unsupported theory to the jury and risk having a verdict that may be based upon an unsupported factual finding, the court merely instructed the jury not to consider evidence of the grant money and removed the issue from the jury's consideration. Under the circumstances in this case, the court's actions were proper and did not require an acquittal on Count I.
Ill
[¶ 21] Blunt contends the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on "reasonable doubt" and allowed the jury to convict him on a burden of proof below that which is constitutionally required.
[¶ 22] The district court gave the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt, NDJI Criminal K-1.10 (2004):
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The State must prove all of the essential elements of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, if you have a reasonable 'doubt that the Defendant committed the crime, then you must find the Defendant not guilty.
The State is not required to prove guilt beyond all doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt.
You should find the Defendant guilty only if you have a firm and abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt based on a full and fair consideration of the evidence presented in the case and not from any other source.
[¶ 23] Blunt contends the instruction as given did not specifically inform the jury that the proof required was greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard or the clear and convincing evidence standard, did not define proof beyond a reasonable doubt in terms of possibilities and probabilities, and did not advise the jury it needed to "reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused." He contends the court should have given his requested instruction, which stated:
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is a higher standard of proof than proof by the "greater weight of the evidence" used in most civil cases, and proof by "clear and convincing evidence" used in civil cases of higher importance such as termination of parental rights or civil commitment. In terms of possibilities and probabilities, you can believe that the accused is possibly or even probably guilty without reaching the very high level of probability of guilt required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To reach that level, you need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused. To convict, your belief has to be beyond all reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the State is not required to prove guilt beyond all doubt. Everything is open to possible or imaginary doubt, or fanciful conjecture. You should not imagine doubt to justify acquittal. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason after you have given full and fair consideration to all the evidence. A reasonable doubt can arise from the evidence itself, from a lack or insufficiency of evidence, or from no evidence proving an essential element of the crime charged.
[¶ 24] We review jury instructions to determine whether, as a whole, they fairly and adequately advised the jury of the applicable law. State v. Zajac, 2009 ND 119, ¶ 12, 767 N.W.2d 825; State v. Haugen, 2007 ND 195, ¶ 6, 742 N.W.2d 796; Hawes v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2007 ND 177, ¶ 4, 741 N.W.2d 202. The district court is not required to instruct the jury in the exact language requested by a party if the instructions given are not misleading or confusing, and if they fairly advise the jury of the law on the essential issues of the case. Zajac, at ¶ 12; Haugen, at ¶ 6; Hawes, at ¶ 4.
[¶ 25] In State v. Schneider, 550 N.W.2d 405, 408 (N.D.1996), we noted we have "long recognized the difficulty in defining reasonable doubt and [have] neither required nor prohibited such a definition." See also State v. Jahner, 2003 ND 36, ¶ 14, 657 N.W.2d 266. We have also noted the United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach:
The United States Supreme Court has stated "[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). "[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Id. (citations omitted).
Jahner, at ¶ 13.
[¶ 26] In Schneider, we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction "correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury" and "informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury." Schneider, 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 1239). Blunt has recognized the holding in Schneider but asks us to revisit the decision in that case, raising similar challenges to the pattern jury instruction and relying primarily on statements, but not the holding, in Victor. We reject the invitation to deviate from the holding and rationale expressed in Schneider, and we adhere to the Court's conclusion in that case. We conclude the jury instructions given in this case fairly and adequately advised the jury of the applicable law on the essential issues of the case, including reasonable doubt, and were not misleading or confusing.
IV
[¶ 27] Blunt contends the district court erred in allowing the State to aggregate the amounts of the individual instances of misapplication of property alleged in Count I to satisfy the $10,000 threshold for a class B felony under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(2)(a).
[¶ 28] Section 12.1-23-07(2), N.D.C.C., provides for grading of misapplication of entrusted property on the basis of the value of the property involved:
Misapplication of entrusted property is:
a. A class B felony if the value of the property misapplied exceeds ten thousand dollars.
b. A class C felony if the value of the property misapplied exceeds five hundred dollars but does not exceed ten thousand dollars.
c. A class A misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied exceeds two hundred fifty dollars but does not exceed five hundred dollars.
d. A class B misdemeanor in all other cases.
[¶ 29] Prior to trial, Blunt moved to bar the State from aggregating the value of multiple instances of misapplication of property. The district court concluded the aggregation provision contained in the theft grading statute, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-05(6), applied. The district court also relied on this Court's holding in State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D.1977), that the State may elect to charge each misapplication of entrusted property as a separate offense or the State may charge all misapplication of entrusted property as a single offense. Referring to Jelliff, the district court concluded on the record, "I think the Supreme Court meant that the State could choose either to do it in a course of conduct and aggregate the offenses or as in this case they could have charged out individual items." The district court allowed the State to charge the multiple instances of misapplication of entrusted property as a single offense and to aggregate the amounts to reach the grading thresholds specified in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07(2).
[¶ 30] The longstanding holding of this Court in Jelliff is dispositive of the issue on appeal. Additionally, the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07 supports affirming the district court, as does the legislative history.
A
[¶ 31] This Court's opinion in Jelliff is dispositive of this case. Jelliff was decided in the immediate aftermath of the 1975 effective date of North Dakota's new Criminal Code and interpreted the specific provision Blunt was convicted of violating, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07. Thomas Jelliff was the Grand Forks County state's attorney. He had engaged in a series of transactions diverting funds in an office trust fund to his personal use or benefit. Some of the acts occurred before North Dakota's new Criminal Code became effective on July 1, 1975, and other transactions occurred after that date. Jelliff was charged under the new law, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07, which became effective July 1, 1975. The defendant Jelliff argued that all the acts — all the misapplication of entrusted property— constituted a single offense and that since some of the conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute, the prosecution was impermissible. In essence, Jelliff argued that the misapplication had to be charged cumulatively as in this case. Thus disposing of the issue, this Court held the prosecution could elect "to prosecute as one offense a continuous series of acts" or could prosecute each act individually. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d at 7. This Court said:
Although the lower court did not specifically state the basis of its decision to dismiss, we could speculate that the court must have concluded that, because statutory violations can occu,r either by single acts or a continuous series of acts, the prosecution had elected to prosecute as one offense a continuous series of acts and that, therefore, the prosecution is barred because some of the acts in the series occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. We reject this analysis because no such election has been shown and, in fact, the complaint alleges only a single statutory violation on or about July 28,1975.
Id. (emphasis added).
[¶ 32] Thus this Court held that misapplication of entrusted property could be charged as single acts or as a continuous series of acts. In Blunt's case, the prosecution elected to charge a continuous series of acts. In the Syllabus by the Court, the official holding of the Court under the constitutional provision then in effect, N.D. Const. § 102 (1889), this Court in Jelliff held:
3. Under the provisions of § 12.1-23-07, NDCC, each misapplication of entrusted property can be considered a separate offense.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This Court did not say that each misapplication must be considered a separate offense. For a third time, this Court in Jelliff emphasized the elective nature of the prosecution's decision to prosecute as single acts or as a continuous series of acts:
A determination that the statute contemplates a series of transactions exclusively, rather than single instances of forbidden conduct, would lead to the unreasonable conclusion that anyone who had misapplied entrusted property before the effective date of the statute could, as part of the same series of transactions, continue to violate the statute with impunity after the statute has become effective.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Again this Court's opinion emphasizes the elective choice of the prosecution.
[¶ 33] On the basis of this Court's holding in Jelliff, the district court must be affirmed.
B
[¶ 34] In addition to this Court's holding in Jelliff, the plain language of the statutes supports affirming the district court's judgment. The district court did not need to look to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-05(6), the aggregation provision contained in the theft grading statute, and the provision on which the dissent focuses, in order to consider the cumulative value of the property misapplied. Even accepting Blunt's position that the section 12.1-23-05(6) aggregation provision does not apply at all to misapplication of entrusted property, the section 12.1-23-07 misapplication offense itself is cumulative and is based on a usually ongoing relationship of trust. Although thefts may be random and unrelated, or part of an ongoing course of conduct, misapplication of entrusted property is predicated on a normally ongoing relationship of trust that relates to property entrusted to the person "as a fiduciary, or in the person's capacity as a public servant or an officer, director, agent, employee of, or a person controlling a financial institution." Section 12.1-23-07, N.D.C.C., provides:
1. A person is guilty of misapplication of entrusted property if the person disposes of, uses, or transfers any interest in property that has been entrusted to the person as a fiduciary, or in the person's capacity as a public servant or an officer, director, agent, employee of, or a person controlling a financial institution, in a manner that the person knows is not authorized and that the person knows to involve a risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to the government or other person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
2. Misapplication of entrusted property is:
a. A class B felony if the value of the property misapplied exceeds ten thousand dollars.
b. A class C felony if the value of the property misapplied exceeds five hundred dollars but does not exceed ten thousand dollars.
c. A class A misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied ex ceeds two hundred fifty dollars but does not exceed five hundred dollars.
d. A class B misdemeanor in all other cases.
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07 (emphasis added).
[¶ 35] By definition, the offense is based on a relationship of trust. The plain language of the grading provisions encompasses the property misapplied. "Property" encompasses both the singular and the plural. The North Dakota Century Code itself instructs in the rules for interpreting the code that "[w]ords used in the singular number include the plural and words used in the plural number include the singular, except when a contrary intention plainly appears." N.D.C.C. § 1-01-35. There is no contrary intent that appears. The plain language of the statute relates to "the value of the property misapplied," not to each item of property misapplied. The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07 encompasses the value of the property Blunt misapplied — not the value of each individual item of property Blunt misapplied. A contrary result would require reading into the statute words— "each item of' — that are not there, and would require ignoring the ongoing relationship of trust.
C
[¶ 36] In addition to this Court's dis-positive decision in Jelliff and the further support of the plain statutory language, the legislative history is also supportive. Nowhere does the legislative history state that each item of property misapplied must be individually charged.
[¶ 37] Although the legislative history offers support for the premise that the aggregation provision of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-05(6) applies to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07, as the district court said, that is not particularly important to the resolution of this case. More importantly, in 1989, when the legislature added graduated penalties for misapplication of entrusted property, State v. Jelliff had long been decided. And the legislature is presumed to have been aware of this Court's opinion in Jelliff that the prosecution could elect to charge misapplication of entrusted property either as single acts or as a series of acts. See, e.g., City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 376 (N.D.1994) (stating that where courts of North Dakota have construed a statute and the construction is supported by long acquiescence on the part of the legislature, it is presumed that the interpretation of the statute is in accordance with legislative intent). Nothing in the 1989 legislative history reflects any intent that each instance of misapplication must be separately charged. See 1989 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 167, § 1 (adding the grading provisions to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-07); Hearing on H.B. 1059 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 51st N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 10,1989) (stating the bill provided for additional classifications for the grading of misapplication of entrusted property, but making no reference to separately charging each instance of misapplication); Hearing on H.B. 1059 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 51st N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 21, 1989) (same); Report of the N.D. Legis. Council 160-61 (1989) (reporting the committee recommended the amendment to provide for additional classifications for the grading of misapplication of entrusted property, but making no reference to separately charging each instance of misapplication); Minutes of Interim Law Enforcement Comm. (June 23,1987; Oct. 20,1987; Jan. 12, 1987; May 10, 1988; and Sept. 23, 1988) (reflecting the bill was introduced as part of the effort to provide protective services to vulnerable adults).
D
[¶ 38] As this Court said in Jelliff:
We have held repeatedly that statutes must be construed to avoid ludicrous and absurd results, and that courts endeavor to construe statutes so as to effectuate the legislative purposes which prompted their enactment. Certainly a construction of a criminal statute which nullifies its punitive provisions contravenes the purpose of the enactment and leads to illogical and absurd results.
251 N.W.2d at 7 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 39] Section 12.1-23-07, N.D.C.C., misapplication of entrusted property, under this Court's holding in Jelliff, under the plain language of the statute, and under legislative acquiescence in its subsequent enactment, permits consideration in a single count all the property misapplied. The evidence presented here supports the jury's verdict that the value of the property misapplied by Blunt exceeded $10,000.
V
[¶ 40] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and find them to be either unnecessary to our decision or without merit. We affirm the order deferring imposition of sentence.
[¶ 41] DANIEL J. CROTHERS and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., and KIRK SMITH, S.J., concur.
[¶ 42] The Honorable KIRK SMITH, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of KAPSNER, J., disqualified.