Case Name: XINWA CHANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPLUS HEALTH PLAN, NYC Health and Hospital Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-01-13
Citations: 590 F. App'x 74
Docket Number: No. 14-665-cv
Parties: XINWA CHANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPLUS HEALTH PLAN, NYC Health and Hospital Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 590
Pages: 74–75

Head Matter:
XINWA CHANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPLUS HEALTH PLAN, NYC Health and Hospital Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-665-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 13, 2015.
Xinwa Chang, pro se, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Francis F. Caputo, Benjamin Welikson, of Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Xinwa Chang, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order in which it granted summary judgment in favor of her employer with respect to her employment discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), Title VII, and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
Chang does not dispute the district court's ruling that the only adverse actions not barred by the statutes of limitations are her unpaid suspension and termination. United States v. Greer, 285 F.Bd 158, 170 (2d Cir.2002) (normally failure to include argument in appellate brief waives argument on appeal). Accordingly, we review only whether those adverse employment actions constitute discrimination under the ADA, Title VII, or the NYCHRL.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawling] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 'Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
Upon such review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants for the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and order. We have considered all of Chang's remaining arguments, including those regarding the exhibits, and notice about the deadline for the parties to file a final pretrial order, and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment.