Case Name: JOSEPH SPIELBERGER, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA THOMPSON, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1900-12-21
Citations: 131 Cal. 55
Docket Number: Sac. No. 734
Parties: JOSEPH SPIELBERGER, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA THOMPSON, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 131
Pages: 55–63

Head Matter:
[Sac. No. 734.
Department One.
December 21, 1900.]
JOSEPH SPIELBERGER, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA THOMPSON, Appellant.
Action Upon Note—Redemption oe Pledge—Retention at Maker’s Request—Construction of Answer—Nonsuit—Estoppel.—In an action by the assignee of a note which had been pledged by the assignor as security for money which he had paid, but which was retained by the pledgee at the maker’s request, under an answer denying that plaintiff is the holder of the note, an averment that the pledgee held it as trustee for the defendant is equivalent to an averment that it was in the defendant’s possession, and the defendant is estopped from claiming a non-suit on the ground that plaintiff was shown not to be the holder of it.
Id.—Consideration—Dismissal of Action—Payment of Plaintiff’s • Attorney.—A note given for the purpose of securing the dismissal of an action to which the maker was a party defendant, for the amount of the fee of the plaintiff’s attorney, who would not consent to the dismissal until his fee was paid, and which was thereafter dismissed, is upon a sufficient consideration.
Id.—Delay in Dismissal.—The fact that the dismissal of the action was delayed for several months after the execution of the note does not affect the consideration, where it does not appear that plaintiff’s attorney thereafter objected to the dismissal, and where it does appear that the delay was largely occasioned by the maker of the note.
Id.—Intention of Parties—Question of Fact—Findings.—The intention of the parties to the note in executing and receiving it is a Question of fact, and where no fraud appears in its procurement, the findings of the court upon conflicting evidence that it was given in consideration of the dismissal of the pending action will not be disturbed.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Joseph W. Hughes, Judge.
The following are the findings of the court in reference to the settlement and dismissal of the action referred to in the opinion: “That on the fourteenth day of August, 1896, there was pending in this court a certain action, Ho. 6452, in which action Louisa A. Oppenheim was plaintiff and Philip Oppenheim, Emanuel Oppenheim, and California Thompson, defendant herein, were defendants. That in the said action Emanuel Oppenheim had filed a cross-complaint against the said Philip Oppenheim and the said California Thompson. That on said day there was pending between the parties to said action negotiations for a settlement. That the said Emanuel Oppenheim had induced his mother, Louisa A. Oppenheim, to commence the action, and that the defendant herein and her brother, Philip Oppenheim, were anxious that the same should be dismissed and an amicable settlement of the controversy among them had. The said Emanuel Oppenheim agreed to consent to a dismissal of the action, provided that the attorney for plaintiff in that action should be paid his fee, amounting to the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, and the defendant herein agreed to pay the said fee of said attorney from her share in the settlement, and thereupon defendant executed and delivered to the said Emanuel Oppenheim the note described in the amended complaint. That the said note was given for a good and valuable consideration, and so as to induce the said Emanuel Oppenheim to have the said action dismissed. That in consideration of the delivery to him of said note, said Emanuel Oppenheim agreed that he would pay said attorney his fee and obtain a judgment dismissing the said action hereinbefore mentioned. That the said fee of said attorney was paid by the said Emanuel Oppenheim, and the said action dismissed and a judgment of dismissal made and entered on the fourteenth day of March, 1897. That at all the times after the execution of the said note up to the time of the dismissal of said suit the said Emanuel Oppenheim was desirous of dismissing the said action, and appeared in court with his attorney on a number of occasions for the purpose of procuring the dismissal, but that the dismissal; was delayed through the acts and conduct of the attorney representing the defendant, herein in that action. That the defendant herein at no time rescinded the said contract or agreement to dismiss.” Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
McKune & George, for Appellant.
The plaintiff should have been nonsuited for not producing the note at the trial. (Crandall v. Schroeppel, 1 Hun, 557; Van Alstyne v. Commercial Bank, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 449; Kirby v. Sisson, 2 Wend. 551; Poole v. Smith, 1 Holt N. P. 144; Rowley v. Ball, 3 Cow. 303 ; Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend. 173. ) The note was without consideration, there being no promise of the payee, and no prejudice to him or benefit to her appearing to constitute a consideration. (Civ. Code, sec. 605.) The understanding of the parties could be proved by parol to show a want or failure of consideration. (Julliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 534, 535.)
Devlin & Devlin, and Edward J. Dwyer, for Respondent.
The evidence is sufficient to show that Clark held the note as the agent or trustee of the defendant, and his possession as her representative excuses the nonproduction of the note for cancellation. (Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, secs. 1483, 1484; 2 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 293.) The defendant cannot require indemnity, as he could not be injured. (2 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 304.) The law favors the settlement of family litigation, and the settlement and dismissal of such litigation is a good consideration for a bonus. (McClure v. McClure, 100 Cal. 339.)
15 Am. Dec. 266.
27 Am. Dec. 126.

Opinion:
GAROUTTE, J.
Plaintiff, as assignee, brings this action upon a promissory note against the maker thereof. Its execution and delivery are admitted, but various defenses to its payment are made. These defenses will be considered.
1. It is claimed that plaintiff was not the holder of the note, either when the action was brought or the trial had, and for this reason a nonsuit should have been granted. Under the facts disclosed by the record, there is nothing in the point. Before the note was assigned to plaintiff it was placed in the hands of C. W. Clarke as collateral security. The indebtedness for which the note was held as security was paid by plaintiff's assignor, and, under instructions from the defendant, Clarke refused to return the note to him. But, beyond this, defendant alleges in her answer that Clarke held the note as her trustee. If the note was in the possession of her trustee, it was in her possession, and she is foreclosed by her allegation in the answer from successfully urging a nonsuit upon the ground that plaintiff was not the holder of the note at the time of the trial.
2. It is claimed that the note was given without consideration. Let us pause for a moment and look at the facts. The Oppenheims were engaged in litigation regarding certain trust property; some were plaintiffs, others were defendants, still others cross-complainants. The payee and assignor of the note was a son. The drawer and defendant was a daughter. All parties litigant appeared to be anxious to bring the litigation to an amicable conclusion. Plaintiff's attorney in the litigation would not consent to a dismissal Of the actions until his fee was paid; and his objection to a dismissal was a formidable bar in the way, looking toward the accomplishment of the desired end. The evidence at this point is somewhat conflicting as between the assignor of the note and the defendant; but upon this evidence the court found against the defendant's testimony, and we are only concerned in testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aforesaid finding. In substance, the payee of the note testified that he told defendant he had no money with' which to pay the fee of plaintiff's attorney, and she then said: "If I would dismiss the case she would give me a note for fifteen hundred dollars to pay the fee of Mr. Johnson, and would pay the note when she got her money from the estate. The note was given to me in consideration of the dismissal of the cases pending at the time. I immediately took numerous steps and tried numerous times by my attorneys to dismiss the action." It further appeared that the plaintiff's assignor paid the attorney his fee, and some time thereafter the action was dismissed. The dismissal was delayed for some months after the execution of the note, but this delay was largely occasioned by defendant herself. It was essentially a question of fact as to the intention of these two parties, respectively, in the making and receiving the note in controversy. There is no question of actual fraud involved in its procurement. It is not shown but that the attorney was in fact objecting to the dismissal of the action until his fee was paid. And there is no claim that he ever objected to its dismissal after the note was given. From all these facts and circumstances the finding of a sufficient consideration for the giving of the note will be upheld.
3. We find nothing in the offered and rejected documentary evidence which demands a new trial. We do not see that it had any substantial bearing upon the issues of fact under examination.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and order are affirmed.
Van Dyke, J., and Harrison, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.
Beatty, C. J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank, and filed the following opinion on the 19th of January, 1901: