Case Name: LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM (LASERS) v. Jane McWILLIAMS, Joelle McWilliams, and Dianne (McWilliams) Sanders
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2008-12-02
Citations: 996 So. 2d 1036
Docket Number: Nos. 2006-C-2191, 2006-C-2204
Parties: LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM (LASERS) v. Jane McWILLIAMS, Joelle McWilliams, and Dianne (McWilliams) Sanders.
Judges: CALOGERO, C.J., and KIMBALL and TRAYLOR, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 996
Pages: 1036–1058

Head Matter:
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM (LASERS) v. Jane McWILLIAMS, Joelle McWilliams, and Dianne (McWilliams) Sanders.
Nos. 2006-C-2191, 2006-C-2204.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 2, 2008.
Hogan & Hogan, Lila Tritico Hogan, Hammond, for applicant in (2006-C-2191).
Jonathan Ralph Schmidt, Hammond, Roland Stephen Stark, Baton Rouge, Joelle McWilliams, in proper person for respondent in (2006-C-2191).
John L. Stone, III, Council for amicus curiae, Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana.
Kenneth Rigby, Council for amicus curiae, Kenneth Rigby.
Katherine Shaw Spaht, council for ami-cus curiae, Katherine Shaw Spaht.
Cynthia Ann Samuel, council for amicus curiae, Cynthia A. Samuel.
Dian Tooley-Knoblett, council for amicus curiae, Dian Tooley-Knoblett.
Beau P. Sagona, council for amicus curiae, Beau P. Sagona.
Roland Stephen Stark, Baton Rouge, for applicant in (2006-C-2204).
Jonathan Ralph Schmidt, Hammond, Hogan & Hogan, Lila Tritico Hogan, Hammond, Joelle McWilliams, in proper person, for respondent in (2006-C-2204).

Opinion:
ON REHEARING
VICTORY, J.
hWe granted a rehearing application in this concursus proceeding to reconsider our opinion on original hearing overruling Johnson v. Wetherspoon, 96-0744 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 203, and holding that a former spouse is not entitled to her community property interest in survivor benefits payable by a retirement plan owned by the former community. After considering the record and the applicable law, we now hold that the former spouse is entitled to her share of the survivor benefits payable under the retirement plan and that the retirement plan should have been ordered to pay these benefits directly to her as directed by judgments dated December 15, 1989 and August 24, 1998, which partitioned the former community. Accordingly, we vacate our decision on original hearing in its entirety, reverse the decision of the court of appeal, and remand this case to the trial court.
| .FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 26, 1969, Joel McWilliams and Dianne McWilliams were married in Louisiana. On January 10, 1972, Joel began working as an engineer for the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development, and became enrolled in the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System ("LASERS"). Joel and Dianne had two children, Jodee, born August 24, 1973, and Joelle, born November 10, 1981. After 18 years of marriage, the community property regime between Joel and Dianne terminated on June 15, 1987, and they were divorced on October 12, 1987. On December 15, 1989, a judgment was signed by the 21st Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, which stated in pertinent part, as follows:
Dianne McWilliams' interest in Joel McWilliams' Louisiana State Employee Retirement System plan is hereby recognized and shall be calculated as follows when and if he retires, terminates employment, or dies: (emphasis added)
Portion of retiremeni/pension attributable to creditable service during existence of community Pension/relirement attributable to total creditable service X50%X annuity (or lump sum payment)
Dianne McWilliams portion shall be paid directly to her from the retirement agency.
On August 24, 1998, the judgment was amended by the 21st Judicial District Court to specify the numerator for the above formula as follows:
Portion of retirement/pension attributable to creditable service from 04/26/69-06/15/87 months, 20 doys) X 6 Pension/retirement attributable to total creditable service (undetermined) X annuity or = Dianne lump sum McWilliams' payment portion
Dianne McWilliams interest m McWilliams' Louisiana State Employee Retirement System plan is hereby recognized and shall be calculated as follows when and if he retires, terminates employment, or dies: (emphasis added)
Dianne McWilliams' portion shall be paid directly to her from the retirement agency.
The judgments also recognized Dianne's interest in Joel's U.S. Army Reserve Retirement Plan and Joel's interest in Dianne's Diocese of Baton Rouge Retirement System Plan. Further, Dianne was ordered to make an equalizing payment of $2,263.50.
On May 15, 1993, Joel married Jane McMahon and after approximately 10 years of marriage, Joel died on May 24, 2003 while still employed by the State of Louisiana.' Following Joel's death, three individuals filed applications for survivor benefits with LASERS: (1) Jane (also naming Joelle as a child of the deceased member and a full time student at Southeastern Louisiana University ); (2) Joelle; and (3) Dianne (also naming Joelle as a child of the deceased). Believing Dianne was entitled to her share of survivor benefits, both by virtue of the community property judgments and the jurisprudence recognizing a former spouse's rights to such assets, |4LASERS invoked a concur- sus proceeding pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 4651 to determine who was entitled to the benefits. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Dianne's interest in the retirement plan would be 24.60 %, that the monthly payments would be $1,144.92 per month, and that the community contributions during the community years to the LASERS plan totaled $25,963.62. Using these stipulations, LASERS either retained the disputed portion of the benefits, $1,144.92 per month, or placed the disputed portion in the registry of the court as required by La. C.C.P. art. 4658 in order to be relieved of liability, and then began distributing the remainder of the survivor benefits to Jane and Joelle in accordance with the percentages set forth in the LASERS Member Handbook and La. R.S. 11:471.
| fiThe district court found that "the funds to be deposited to the registry of this Court by LASERS are survivor benefits rather than retirement benefits," and that the formula set forth in Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978) did not apply to survivor benefits. Instead, the district court held that survivor benefits were governed solely by La. R.S. 11:471 pursuant to which only Jane and Joelle were entitled to the benefits.
Dianne appealed this judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in distinguishing survivor benefits from retirement benefits, and in refusing to give effect to the judgments of the 21st Judicial District Court recognizing Dianne's interest in the LASERS plan when Joel died. In the alternative, Dianne asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to award Dianne one-half of the community contributions made during her marriage to Joel. The court of appeal found that because La. R.S. 11:471, setting forth the provisions relating to the distribution of survivor benefits under LASERS, did not list the former spouse among the categories of individuals entitled to receive survivor benefits, Dianne was precluded from receiving her share of the survivor benefits. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement Systems (Lasers) v. McWilliams, 05-0938 (La.App. 1 Cir.6/9/06), 938 So.2d 782. The court of appeal also relied on its prior decision in Bonfanti v. Percy, 95-1189 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/6/96), 672 So.2d 415, to find that the intent behind survivor benefits is to ensure that family members are not left destitute upon the death of a member. Id. at 785. However, in apparent attempt to fashion an equitable remedy, 17the court found that Dianne was entitled to recoup from LASERS an amount of money equal to 50% of the amount stipulated by the parties to be the total amount of accumulated contributions attributable to the community, $25,963.62. Id. at 786. Thus, the court of appeal ordered LASERS to pay the lump-sum refund of 50% of that amount, $12,981.81, to Dianne's widower and representative of her estate, Richard Sanders. Id. We granted writ applications filed by LASERS and Mr. Sanders. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement Systems (Lasers) v. McWilliams, 06-2191, 06-2204 (La.2/2/07), 948 So.2d 183.
DISCUSSION
LASERS is a comprehensive qualified defined benefit pension and retirement plan under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue code, and its provisions and regulations are outlined in La. R.S. 11:401, et seq. The statute provides that each person who becomes an employee in the state service, except those specifically excluded, shall become a member of the system as a condition of employment. La. R.S. 11:411(1). Under LASERS, any member hired on or before June 30, 2006, shall be eligible for retirement if he has thirty years or more of service at any age, twenty-five years or more of service at age fifty-five or thereafter, or ten years or more of service at age sixty or thereafter. La. R.S. 11:441(A)(1)(a)-(c).
IsLASERS retirement benefits are computed as follows: "[a] member who retires effective on or after July 1, 1973, shall receive a maximum retirement allowance equal to two and one-half percent of average compensation, as determined under R.S. 11:231, for every year of creditable service, plus three hundred dollars." La. R.S. 11:444(A). The member will receive this retirement benefit throughout his lifetime, unless he elects some other option pursuant to La. R.S. 11:446, whereby he receives a reduced retirement benefit and benefits are paid to another person he nominates upon his death. A former spouse of a LASERS member may be the person "nominated" to receive this "surviv- or annuity" following the member's death. La. R.S. 11:446. LASERS also provides for optional enrollment in a Deferred Retirement Option Plan, in lieu of terminat ing employment and accepting a retirement allowance. La. R.S. 11:447-451.4.
If a member dies before he retires, no retirement benefits are payable under La. R.S. 11:441-454. Instead, LASERS sets forth a provision for the distribution of survivor benefits which are payable when a member dies before he retires, and directs LASERS to pay a certain amount of money to the member's surviving spouse, and any surviving minor children or surviving handicapped or mentally disabled children, | pwhich become payable upon application therefor and become effective as of the day following the death of the member. La. R.S. 11:471; see supra note 6, page 1039. La. R.S. 11:471(D) provides the amounts to be paid by LASERS to these beneficiaries is dependent on whether there is a surviving spouse and/or surviving minor or handicapped or mentally disabled children. If no survivor benefits are payable, LASERS must pay to the estate or named beneficiary, which can be a former spouse, a lump-sum refund of accumulated contributions. La. R.S. 11:476. Further, if total monthly benefits paid are not equal to the accumulated contributions of the member, LASERS must pay a lump-sum refund equal to the difference between the two to the beneficiaries or the estate of the beneficiary. La. R.S. 11:475.
The issue presented in this case is whether the exclusion of the "former spouse" from the list of persons to whom survivor benefits are to be distributed under La. R.S. 11:471 operates to deprive a former spouse of her community property interest in these benefits which have been previously recognized by this Court as community property and which have been awarded to her in a valid community property judgment. For the reasons that follow, we hold that La. R.S. 11:471 does not operate to deprive her of her community property rights to these benefits.
"Since colonial days, Louisiana has been a community property state, whose basic policy has always been that the spouses share equally the acquets and gains of either spouse during marriage." Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 59 La. L.Rev. 465, 467 (Winter, 1999). This Court has consistently and faithfully adhered to this cardinal community property principle:
There is nothing more fundamental in our law than the rule of property which declares that this community is a partnership in which the husband and wife own equal shares, their title thereto vesting at the very instant such property is acquired. (Citations omitted).
ImWe have repeatedly adhered to the doctrine that the half ownership of the wife in the community effects, its status not resting upon the mere gratuity of the husband, is entitled to a dignity equal to that of the husband's; and upon its dissolution and liquidation the wife is entitled to secure the delivery of this one-half right and ownership into her own exclusive management and control; and the courts have no discretion or power whatever to award her less.
Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169, 173 (1956).
Our basic policy is reflected in Louisiana Civil Code Article 2338, which defines and classifies community property as follows:
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property.
Accordingly, a long line of cases dating back to 1975 has held that, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2338, the right to share in a retirement plan is a community asset, co-owned by the spouses, and subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La.1975); Sims, supra; Frazier v. Harper, 600 So.2d 59, 62-63 (La.1992); Johnson v. Wetherspoon, supra; Bailey v. Bailey, 97-1178 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 354. As we explicitly stated in Sims, "[a] spouse's right to receive an annuity, lump-sum benefit, or other benefits payable by a retirement plan is, to the extent attributable to his employment during the community, therefore an asset of the community." 358 So.2d at 922 (emphasis added). We summarized the basis behind our community property law principles surrounding retirement benefits in Frazier as follows:
(1) an employee's contractual pension right is not a gratuity, but a property interest owned by him; (2) to the extent that the right derives from the spouse's employment during the existence of the marriage, it is a community asset subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage; (3) the right to share in a retirement plan is a community asset which, at the dissolution of the community, must be so classified — even though at the time acquired or at the time of dissolution of a community, the right has no marketable or redeemable cash value, and even though the contractual right to receive money or other benefits is due in the future and is contingent upon the happening of an event at an uncertain time.
Frazier, supra at 62-63 (citing Sims, supra at 921-22 and T.L. James, supra).
Specifically regarding survivor benefits, T.L. James, and Wetherspoon each held that survivor benefits were community property under La. C.C. art. 2338. T.L. James was a concursus proceeding brought by a private profit sharing and retirement plan to resolve a dispute regarding survivor benefits. There, this Court held that benefits payable under a retirement plan are earned income and not a gratuity, and are therefore community property. Accordingly, T.L. James held that the employee spouse could not contractually name a beneficiary to the surviv- or benefits to the prejudice of forced hems or the community ownership of spouses, both present and former, of the wage earner, because rights of "spouses in community acquisitions are | ^fundamental concepts of our legal system." 332 So.2d at 853 (on rehearing). In Wetherspoon, recognizing this Court's previous decisions that declined to distinguish between retirement and survivor benefits and that held that "any benefit payable by a retirement plan, to the extent attributable to the community, is an asset of the community," we likewise held that survivor benefits were clearly a "benefit payable by a retirement plan". 694 So.2d at 207. Harmonizing the provisions of the Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana ("TRSLA") statute and our community property laws, we held that survivor benefits payable by TRSLA were an asset the community, regardless of the fact that TRSLA, like LASERS, lists only the surviving spouse and surviving minor and handicapped children as survivor benefit beneficiaries. Id. at 211. Thus, T.L. James and Wetherspoon involved contracts or statutes which distributed a community asset to certain beneficiaries to the exclusion of the owner of the community asset, i.e., the former spouse in the case of | ^Wetherspoon, and the current and former spouses in the case of T.L. James. In each case, this Court held that these contracts and statutes could not operate to deprive the owner of his or her property in violation of La. C.C. art. 2338, which classifies those benefits as community property. Courts of appeal have fol lowed T.L. James, Sims, and Wetherspoon and have likewise held that survivor benefits are community property under La. C.C. art. 2888 to the extent attributable to the community to be distributed to the former spouse upon the death of the member. See e.g., Smith v. Smith, 36910 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/14/03), 839 So.2d 1255; Vicknair v. Firefighters' Pension and Relief Fund of New Orleans, et al., 05-0467 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/15/05), 907 So.2d 787, writ denied, 05-2327 (La.5/26/06), 929 So.2d 1233; Succession of Silbemagel, 96-2755 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98)), 708 So.2d 485; see also Herrington v. Skinner, 93-1556 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94), 640 So.2d 748; Kennard v. Kennard, 99-445 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/06/99), 747 So.2d 628, writ denied, 99-3550 (La.2/25/00), 755 So.2d 252; Ordoyne v. Ordoyne, 94-1766 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/7/95), 653 So.2d 839, writ denied, 95-1170 (La.6/23/95), 656 So.2d 1018 (all holding that the former spouse's relinquishment in community property settlement of interest in retirement plan also constituted relinquishment of rights to survivor benefits). In 114fact, only one case and the one relied upon by the court of appeal in this case, Bonfanti v. Percy, 95-1189 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/6/96), 672 So.2d 415, has distinguished survivor benefits from retirement benefits in a public plan and held that survivor benefits are not community property.
Relying on our long-standing community property doctrine and jurisprudence, attorneys, governmental agencies administering public pension plans, and the public have conducted their affairs in the belief that every benefit of a retirement plan, including survivor benefits, acquired in whole or in part with community effort, is community property co-owned by the spouses and to be shared equally. Accordingly, judges have issued judgments and divorcing spouses have entered into settlements whereby benefits in an employee-spouse's retirement plan are partitioned and valued under the Sims formula, or some other manner, to be paid to the former spouse when the employee-spouse retires, terminates employment, or dies. Recognizing this, La. R.S. 11:291 , applicable to LA SERS and all other state and statewide plans and entitled "Community Property Interest," provides:
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any benefit or a return of employee contributions shall be subject to a court order issued by a court upon or after termination of a community property regime, which order recognizes the community interest of a spouse or former spouse of a member or retiree of the retirement system | Kand provides that a benefit or a return of employee contributions be divided by the retirement system with the spouse or former spouse, but only after a certified copy of such order has been received by the retirement system and has been determined by the retirement system to be in compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations governing the retirement system. (Emphasis added.)
La. R.S. 11:291(B). As can be seen, this statute applies "notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary," i.e. La. R.S. ll:471's designation of only the surviving spouse, and surviving minor and handicapped children as statutory beneficiaries. Further, it applies broadly to "any benefit" payable by LASERS, not just retirement benefits. La. R.S. 11:291 recognizes the common circumstance where a former spouse has a community property judgment recognizing her rights to benefits, whether they be retirement or survivor benefits, and mandates that LASERS pay these benefits directly to her, if the court order is certified and LASERS determines that it is in compliance with certain administrative requirements. Accordingly, LASERS statutes, policy, and practice recognize that survivor benefits [1f,are payable to more than one person when a community property judgment is in effect which recognizes a former spouse's rights to such benefits. This practice is so common that LASERS provides "sample court orders" which contain a paragraph allowing the parties to specifically agree to the division of survivor benefits. Likewise, in the LASERS' Membership Handbook, in the section entitled "Survivors' benefits," there is a provision entitled "Benefits payable to more than one person" which states: "Whenever benefits are payable to more than one person due to divorce, or remarriage, the benefit will be split and issued under each recipient's Social Security number. Under La. R.S. 11:291(B), LASERS' actuarial soundness is not affected because it is simply dividing the benefit payable to the statutory beneficiaries with the former spouse. La. R.S. 11:291(B) never requires it to pay more.
Accordingly, in this case, a very specific community property judgment was entered which recognized Diane's interest in the LASERS plan in accordance with the Sims formula. The language and intent of the judgments are clear and unambiguous regarding the words "plan" and "dies," recognizing Dianne's interest in the LASERS plan, not just retirement benefits under the plan, to be calculated and paid by LASERS when and if Joel dies, not just if he retires. Pursuant to La. R.S. 11:291(B), any benefits payable to the surviving spouse and minor child "shall be subject to [this] court order" and LASERS is required to pay the former spouse her share of the benefits as provided by that court order. Because the surviving spouse in this case married a member who had a former spouse entitled by a community property judgment to receive a Sims portion of survivor benefits directly from LASERS, the surviving spouse and minor child's benefit must be split with her according to the terms of that judgment. In this case, Dianne should have been 117awarded the disputed portion of the survivor benefits according to the amount stipulated to by the parties, $1,144.94 per month, payable for 24 months. The lower, courts erred in failing to recognize Dianne's estate's ownership interest in these survivor benefits and in failing to award them to her estate.
Lastly, in an attempt to fashion an equitable remedy after denying Dianne her community property rights in the survivor benefits, the court of appeal ordered LASERS to pay Dianne 50% of the accumulated contributions attributable to the community. This was error. Not only should the court of appeal have found that Dianne was entitled to her share of the survivor benefits, pursuant to La. R.S. 11:475, LASERS may be required to refund accumulated contributions only when "all eligible monthly benefits have ceased." Nothing in the statutes governing LASERS allows the refund of accumulated contributions at the same time LASERS is required to pay survivor benefits, which it is in this case.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana is a community property state. "From the earliest times, the most important legislative policy underpinning the Louisiana community property regime has been that spouses share equally 'the produce of the reciprocal labor and industry' or both 'husband and wife.' " Ross v. Ross, 02-2984 (La.10/21/03), 857 So.2d 384, 392 (citing 16 Spaht & Hargrave, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Matrimonial Regimes, § 3.2 at p. 47 (1997)). This bedrock principle of community property law is found in La. C.C. art. 2338, which classifies "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse" as community property. For 33 years, this Court has consistently held that, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2338, a spouse's right to receive an annuity, lump-sum benefit or other benefit payable by a retirement plan is, to the extent attributable to the community, |isa community asset. T.L. James, supra; Sims, supra; Hare v. Hogkins, supra; Frazier v. Harper, supra; Johnson v. Wetherspoon, supra; Bailey v. Bailey, supra. As a survivor benefit is clearly an "other benefit payable by a retirement plan," it is classified as community property pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2338 and the spouses are co-owners of that benefit. The fact that La. R.S. 11:471, a distribution statute, does not list the former spouse as a mandatory beneficiary of a survivor benefit does not change the classification of that benefit from community property to separate property, and cannot legally serve to deprive the former spouse of her ownership rights to those benefits. While it is laudable for the legislature to provide some benefit for spouses and minor and handicapped children who have lost spouses and fathers while they were employed by the state, this simply cannot be done with a former spouse's property.
In this case, the former spouse has a community property judgment instructing LASERS to pay her judicially recognized share of these survivor benefits directly to her. La. R.S. 11:291(B) applies "notwithstanding" La. R.S. ll:471's designation of only the surviving spouse, and surviving minor and handicapped children as statutory beneficiaries, and provides that "any benefit . shall be subject to a court order issued by a court upon or after termination of a community property regime . which recognizes the community interest of . a former spouse . and provides that a benefit . be divided by the retirement system with . the former spouse." The community property judgment granted to Dianne an ownership interest in Joel's LASERS plan, calculated according to the Sims formula, and directed LASERS to pay these benefits directly to her in the event Joel died. La. R.S. 11:291(B) mandates that LASERS pay Dianne these benefits under these circumstances and LASERS attempted to do so. LASERS then filed a concursus proceeding and began paying the ^benefits to Jane and Joelle after deducting the portion claimed by Dianne. The lower courts erred in failing to recognize Dianne's ownership interest in these survivor benefits, in holding that La. R.S. ll:471's exclusion of former spouses from the list of mandatory statutory beneficiaries deprived her of her community property, and in failing to apply La. R.S. 11:291(B), which clearly directs LASERS to pay a former spouse these survivor benefits when ordered by a community property judgment which meets that statute's requirements. Thus, the trial court's judgment ordering that Jane and Joelle were entitled to "the funds to be deposited to the registry of this Court" pursuant to La. R.S. 11:471 was error. Dianne's estate is entitled to these benefits according to the Sims formula as provided by the community property judgments and in the amount stipulated to by the parties, $1,144.94 per month, for a period of 24 months. Finally, the court of appeal erred in ordering LASERS to pay 50% of the amount stipulated by the parties to be the accumulated contributions attributable to the community in a lump-sum refund to Dianne's estate.
DECREE
For the reasons stated herein, our opinion on original hearing is vacated in its entirety, and the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CALOGERO, C.J., and KIMBALL and TRAYLOR, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
. The court based this calculation on the period of creditable service during the community being April 26, 1969 through June 15, 1987. However, this was an error. April 26, 1969 was the date of the parties' marriage; Joel did not begin his State employment until January 10, 1972. The correct period would have been January 10, 1972 through June 15, 1987 and this correction was a stipulation in the concursus proceeding in the 19th Judicial District Court.
. La. R.S. 1 1:471(E)(3) provides that "surviv- or benefits are payable upon application therefore and become effective as of the day following the death of the member."
. This benefit was payable to Joelle pursuant to La. R.S. 11:477(C)(2) which provides that benefits are paid to surviving children who are full time students until they cease to be full time students or reach the age of 23, which ever is earlier.
. On July 25, 1993, in correspondence with Joel's attorney before any benefits were paid, the attorney for LASERS wrote to him as follows:
. in this instance it appears to us that it was the intent of the parties that any surviv- or's benefits be subject to a community property division. A review of the McWil-liams judgment signed August 24, 1998, reveals paragraph "B," which states:
Dianne McWilliams' interest in Joel McWilliams' Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System plan is hereby recognized and shall be calculated as follows when and if he retires, terminates employment, or dies . (emphasis added).
This language leads LASERS to believe that it was the intent of the parties to divide any payment whatsoever with his former spouse, without regard as to what form the payment might take (it could have been a lump sum) or who the recipient might be. This would include survivor benefits. LASERS, upon request, provides sample court orders for use in dividing benefits. Part of those samples contain a paragraph ("Alternative Clause 3") which, if included, allows the parties to specifically agree to the division of survivor benefits. Although this particular court order did not incorporate the LASERS formulary, it appears to us to contemplate the occasion of payments from LASERS upon the member's death. (Emphasis added.)
.The record is unclear concerning whether LASERS deposited any money into the registry of the court; however, there is sufficient evidence to calculate the disputed portion of benefits claimed by Dianne. The parties stipulated that the portion of Joel's retirement plan attributable to his community with Dianne was 24.60 %, and that, if Dianne is entitled to survivor benefits, her monthly entitlement would be $1, 14.94. Dianne died on May 19, 2005, almost exactly 2 years after Joel's death on May 24, 2003. Thus, Dianne's estate's claim for benefits is $27,478.56, which is $1,144.94 times 24 months.
. The LASERS Member Handbook states:
Survivor benefits cannot exceed 75% of members final average compensation. If there is a benefit for a surviving spouse and qualified surviving children, the surviving spouse receives one-third of the total benefit payable, and the children receive two-thirds of the total benefits. If there is more than one surviving child, the children's portion is divided equally among all children.
. La. R.S. 11:471, entitled "Survivor's benefits," provides:
A. Surviving minor children. Benefits for the surviving children of members shall be calculated as set forth in this Section. The benefit or benefits shall be based on the average compensation of the member. A benefit shall be payable to surviving unmarfted minor children of a member who had at least five years of creditable service, at least two years of which was earned immediately prior to death, and was in state service at the time of death or had twenty years or more of service credit regardless of when earned and whether the deceased member was in the state service at the time of death.
B. Surviving handicapped children. (1) The surviving totally physically handicapped or mentally disabled child or children of a deceased member, whether under or over the age of eighteen years, shall be entitled to the same benefits, payable in the same manner, as are provided by this Section for minor children, if the child was totally physically handicapped or mentally disabled at the time of the death of the member and is dependent upon the surviving spouse or other legal guardian.
(2) The applicant shall provide adequate proof of handicap or mental disability of such surviving child or children and shall notify the board of any subsequent changes in the child's condition to such an extent that the child is no longer dependent upon the surviving spouse or legal guardian and any changes in the assistance being received from other state agencies. The board may require a certified statement of the child's eligibility status at the end of each calendar year.
C. Surviving spouse. A benefit shall be payable to the surviving spouse of a member who had at least ten years of creditable service, at least two years of which was earned immediately prior to death, and was in state service at the time of death or had twenty years or more of service credit regardless of when earned and whether the deceased member was in the state service at the time of death. The surviving spouse must have been married to the deceased member for at least one year prior to the death of the member. The benefit shall be based on the average compensation of the member as set forth in Subsection D of this Section.
D. Benefit. Surviving spouses, minor children, handicapped children, and mentally disabled children who qualify under this Section shall be eligible for benefits as follows:
(1) A minor or handicapped child, or mentally disabled child, when there is no surviving spouse, shall receive the greater of seventy-five percent of the deceased member's average compensation or three hundred dollars.
(2) A surviving spouse, with no surviving minor or handicapped child, or mentally disabled child, shall receive the greater of fifty percent of the deceased member's average compensation or two hundred dollars.
(3) A surviving spouse who has custody of a minor or handicapped child, or mentally disabled child shall receive the greater of twenty-five percent of the deceased member's average compensation or one hundred dollars, and the surviving minor or handicapped child shall receive the greater of fifty percent of the deceased member's average compensation or two hundred dollars.
(4) A surviving minor or handicapped child or mentally disabled child not in the custody of a suiviving spouse shall receive the greater of fifty percent of the deceased member's average compensation or three hundred dollars, and the surviving spouse shall receive the greater of twenty-five percent of the deceased member's average compensation or one hundred dollars.
E.Limitations and application. (1) In the event the deceased member is survived by more than one minor child, handicapped child, or mentally disabled child, such children shall share equally in the benefit.
(2) In no event shall the survivors of a member receive benefits which, in total, exceed seventy-five percent of the deceased member's average monthly compensation.
(3) Qualifying survivor's benefits are payable upon application therefor and become effective as of the day following the death of the member.
. The trial judge stated in oral reasons for judgment that it was "not the proper court to interpret" the 1989 judgment and the 1998 amended judgment issued by the 21st Judicial District Court.
. Dianne married Richard Sanders. She died while this appeal was pending. Her estate, represented by Richard Sanders, was then substituted as a party in these proceedings.
. La. R.S. 1 l:441(A)(l)(d) also provides any member shall be eligible for retirement if he has:
Twenty years of service credit at any age, exclusive of military service and unused annual and sick leave, but any person retiring under this Paragraph shall have his benefit, inclusive of military service credit and allowable unused annual and sick leave, actuarially reduced from the earliest age that he would normally become eligible for a regular retirement benefit under Paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this Subsection, if he had continued in service to that age. Any employee who elects to retire under the provisions of this Paragraph shall not be eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Plan or the Initial Benefit option provided by La. R.S. 11:446(A)(5).
.La. R.S. 11:231 sets forth the definition of "average compensation" in part as follows:
For purposes of retirement benefit computation, average compensation, or its equivalent, shall be based on the thirty-six highest successive months of employment where interruption of service occurred....
. To qualify for a benefit as a "surviving spouse," La. R.S. 11:471 requires the following:
C. Surviving spouse. A benefit shall be payable to the surviving spouse of a member who had at least ten years of creditable service, at least two years of which was earned immediately prior to death, and was in state service at the time of death or had twenty years or more of service credit regardless of when earned and whether the deceased member was in the state service at the time of death. The surviving spouse must have been married to the deceased member for a least one year prior to the death of the member. The benefit shall be based on the average compensation of the member as set forth in Subsection D of this Section.
Further, "spouse" is defined by La. R.S.11:403(26) as a person who is legally married to a member of the system.
. Article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1870) provided, in part, that the partnership or community of acquets and gains consisted "of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife."
. Furthermore, the Sims court explained:
[O]ur courts have uniformly held that, at the dissolution of the community, the non-employed spouse is entitled to judgment recognizing that spouse's interest in proceeds from a retirement annuity, or profit sharing or contract, if and when they become payable, with the spouse's interest to be recognized as one-half of any payments to be made, insofar as they are attributable to the other spouse's contributions or employment during the existence of the community.
Id. at 922. Since Sims, this Court and the Legislature have recognized that the method set forth in Suns for the division of community property is not the only technique that may be applied to divide pension benefits. See Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118 (La.1991); La. R.S. 9:2801.
. The Court in T.L. James pointed out that the former spouse was impleaded as a claimant to the survivor benefits and that "[h]ad she asserted any claim, her community ownership rights to share in the funds would be recognized on the basis of contributions made to the funds during the existence of the first community."
. In Wetherspoon, we expressly rejected the exact argument that was posed in this case, that "... because [TRSLA] directs payment of survivor benefits solely to the surviving spouse, the legislature intended to exclude any and all other claimants." In rejecting this argument, the Wetherspoon decision states:
However, the defendant's petition fails to recognize that La. R.S. 11:768, which provides for the payment of retirement benefits, contains language similar to that found in the survivor benefits statute. La. R.S. 11:768 states: "[u]pon service retirement, a member who retires . shall receive an allowance ."
Thus, were we to subscribe to this reasoning, one would have to agree that the legislature also intended to make "members" a statutorily defined class of persons entitled to retirement benefits, to the exclusion of all other claimants. However, as stated earlier, this interpretation is not tenable in light of this Court's holdings that a former spouse is entitled to her share of the retirement benefits payable to a plan member to the extent those benefits are attributable to time spent and contributions made by the former community.
Id. at 210 (cites omitted). We also pointed out that if La. R.S. 11:762 were interpreted to exclude the former spouse's community property rights, then the only instance where the former spouse would not be entitled to her share of benefits from the retirement plan would be where the member spouse remarries and then dies before he retires.
.Wetherspoon involved an unpartitioned community, wherein TRSLA had been paying survivor benefits to the surviving spouse for ten years before the former spouse filed suit against the surviving spouse seeking her share of the survivor benefits. This Court was then left to decide whether the former spouse was nonetheless entitled to the survivor benefits by virtue of our community property laws and longstanding jurisprudence. This case is distinguishable in that here, the former spouse has a community property judgment partitioning the former community and specifically granting her a Sims share in the LASERS plan in the event of her former husband's death, and she sought these benefits directly from LASERS before they had been paid to the surviving spouse and minor children.
.Also significant is La. R.S. 11:477, entitled "Limitation on Payments of Benefits," which provides:
(E) If by operation of law or by action of the Board of Trustees, a survivor benefit is payable to a specified person or persons, the member shall be considered to have designated such person as an alternative beneficiary thereunder. If there is more than one such person, then the youngest such person shall be considered to have been so designated.
This illustrates that the legislature did not intend that the list of qualified survivors entitled to receive survivor benefits under La. R.S. 11:471 were the only persons ever entitled to receive such benefits, as La.R.S. 11:477(E) envisions that survivor benefits can also be payable to a person "by operation of law," i.e., La. C.C. art. 2338. Such is the case here.
. Bonfanti was not a case involving claims between a spouse and former spouse, but was instead a succession case involving a will and Mr. Bonfanti's mother's inheritance of "one-third of his residuary interest in community property."
. La R.S. 11:291 is found in Title 11 of the Revised Statutes entitled "Consolidated Public Retirement Systems." It is in Title 11 that the LASERS statutes are located. Subtitle I contains the "General and Preliminary Provisions," and Chapter 4 of Subtitle I contains "Provisions Affecting More Than One Sys- lem." Subpart L of Subtitle I is titled "Applicability of Certain Court Orders." It is here that La. R.S. 11:291, titled "Community property interest," is located. Accordingly, La. R.S. 11:291 is a general provision applicable to LASERS as well as the other public retirement plans.
. While federal law, specifically ERISA and REA applicable to federal and private plans, generally preclude the classification of the "qualified joint and survivor annuity" as community property and preempt Louisiana community property law, see Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997), ERISA and REA provide an exception to that preemption where an ex-spouse has a qualified domestic relations order, or "QDRO," establishing her claim to these survivor benefits. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Boggs:
A QDRO is a type of domestic relations order that creates or recognizes an "alternative payee's right to, or assigns to an alternative payee the right to, a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i). A domestic relations order, in turn, is any judgment, decree, or order that concerns "the provisions of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant" and is "made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law)." § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). A domestic relations order must meet certain requirements to qualify as a QDRO. See § 1056(d)(3)(C)-(E). QDRO's, unlike domestic relations orders in general, are exempt from both the pension plan anti-alienation provision, § 1056(d)(3)(A), and ERISA's general preemption clause. § 1144(b)(7). In creating the QDRO mechanism Congress was careful to provide that the alternate payee, the "spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant" is to be considered a plan beneficiary. § 1056(d)(3)(K).
520 U.S. at 846-47, 117 S.Ct. 1754.
. Section (D) of that statute provides that the retirement system may "promulgate rules establishing requirements with which a court order must comply." La. R.S. 11:291(D).