Case Name: ESTEP v. WATKINS
Court: High Court of Chancery of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1828-08-06
Citations: 1 Bland 486
Docket Number: 
Parties: ESTEP v. WATKINS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided in the High court of chancery of Maryland. [1811-1832]
Volume: 1
Pages: 486–490

Head Matter:
ESTEP v. WATKINS.
A purchased of B a tract of land, the legal title to be conveyed when the purchase money was paid; for which he gave his bond: after which B died, and his widow had her dower in the land. Held, that A was entitled to a deduction from his bond to the amount of the value of the widow’s dower.
When a case is set down for final hearing on bill and answer, without replication, all the facts set forth in the answer are taken to be true.
Every decree stands for what it purports to be until regularly revised or reversed.
The case, as set forth in the bill, must, at the final hearing, appear to be such an one as falls within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery.
The assignee of a bond takes it subject to all equities, whether he has notice of them . or not.
This bill was filed on the 21st of December 1827, by Rezin Estep, against Rachel H. Watkins, Benjamin Watkins, and John Claytor,
It is stated in the bill, that Charles D. Hodges, being seized of certain parcels of land, by his- bond with a collateral condition, contracted, in consideration of the sum of $3,000 to convey them to this plaintiff, who to secure the payment of that amount as the purchase money, gave his bond to Hodges, who assigned it to Benjamin Hodges, who assigned it to Jficholas Watkins of Thomas, to whom this plaintiff made assignments of sundry bonds and notes which he Watkins received as payment of this plaintiff’s bond; that afterwards Charles D. Hodges died intestate, leaving a widow Elizabeth who was entitled to dower in the lands, and six children, Elizabeth the wife of John Randall, Mary Ann, Lucinda, Margaret, Ellen, and Charles, his heirs at law; that the widow married this defendant Claytor; that this plaintiff on the 15th of February 1815, filed his bill in this court against this widow with her husband Claytor, and these heirs, with Benjamin Hodges and Jficholas Watkins of Thomas, to obtain a title to the lands he had so purchased, which bill the defendants thereto answered; and the case having been submitted, it was on the 22d of May 1815 decreed, that this plaintiff should pay two-thirteenth parts of three thousand dollars to John Claytor and Elizabeth his wife in lieu of her dower in those lands; and, on the payment, by this plaintiff, to Jficholas Watkins of Thomas, of the balance appearing to be- due on this plaintiff’s bond, after deducting the two-thirteenth parts allowed in lieu of dower, that the heirs of the late Charles H. Hodges should convey the lands to this plaintiff; that Jficholas Watkins brought suit, in the name of the administrator of the late Charles H. Hodges, on the .bond so given by this plaintiff; and, in September 1817, recovered judgment for the whole amount thereof; that this plaintiff paid to Nicholas Watkins the full amount due to him, after deducting the two-thirteenths awarded to Claytor and wife, which he also paid according to the terms of the decree; that Nicholas Watkins is dead intestate, and administration on his estate had been granted to these defendants Rachel H. Watkins and Benjamin Watkins, who have revived the judgment recovered by their intestate, to be released on the payment of $892 '75 with interest from the 2d of October 1827 and costs; upon which they threatened to issue execution. Whereupon the plaintiff prayed for an injunction.to stay proceedings at law, &c.; which- was granted as prayed.
The defendant Claytor by his answer admitted the allegations and facts set forth in the bill so far as he was concerned.
The defendants Rachel H. Watkins and Benjamin Watkins put in their joint answer, in which they also admitted the facts and circumstances set forth in the bill. But they averred, “ that the said bond was assigned to their intestate during the lifetime of the said Charles D. Hodges; that their intestate paid the full amount due on the bond at the time of the assignment to him; that he had no knowledge of any deduction to be made therefrom in any event whatever: and these defendants do positively deny, that their intestate received bonds or notes in payment of the aforesaid bond; but they aver, that the bonds and notes which he did receive were received to be applied when collected towards the payment of the said bond; and that their intestate did, after due diligence in the collection of the said bonds and notes, apply what had been so collected to the diminution of the amount due on the bond, and credit was therefore given to the complainant. These defendants also aver, that the complainant’s bill, mentioned in his present bill, to which their intestate was a defendant, was answered by him under a full belief and with an understanding by him and the complainant, that the said suit should not affect the interest of their intestate in the aforesaid bond, and should only operate to enable the complainant to obtain a conveyance'for the land he had purchased; that their intestate relying on this understanding, and believing his interest was not to be damnified, employed no counsel nor made any defence, but suffered the counsel for the complainant to draw his answer, and the proceedings to be as hastily determined as possible; and that when the decree was passed in the said case, it was not considered as at all affecting the interests of their intestate, either by him or by the complainant. These defendants fmther aver, ihat long subsequent to the passage of the decree aforesaid, their intestate, wishing to close this transaction relative to the bond aforesaid, brought áuit against the complainant; that the complainant, aware of the understanding, previously here stated, and of his liability to their intestate, gave their intestate a judgment for the amount then due on the bond on his allowing all the credits which the complainant was then entitled to. These defendants also state, that at the April term of Ann Arundel county court, their intestate, in order to recover the balance then due on the aforesaid bond, instituted proceedings to revive the judgment aforesaid against the complainant; and that in consequence of the death of their intestate pending the proceedings aforesaid, these defendants appeared to the said suit, after which such proceedings were had, that at the October term of the said court for 1827, a judgment was obtained against the complainant in favour of the defendants for the amount then ascertained to be due. These defendants do positively deny that their intestate in receiving the sums of money in part payment of the bond aforesaid, ever did receive the same as a satisfaction thereof, or ever did admit that the bond was paid; but on the contrary always considered the complainant liable to him for the amount of the last aforesaid judgment ; and that the complainant himself ever did, until a short time before the judgment aforesaid was about to be revived, consider himself, as these defendants believe, so liable to their intestate.”
Upon a motion to dissolve the injunction on the coming in of these answers, it was continued until the final hearing or further order.. After which the case was set down for final hearing by the plaintiff on the bill and answers; and the solicitors of the parties were fully heard.
6th August, 1828.

Opinion:
Bland, Chancellor.
This case having been set down for hearing on the bill and answers alone, without any general replication, — the answers must therefore be taken to be true in every particular, as well as to the matters alleged by way of avoidance as to those directly responsive to the.bill. That is, the defendants are to be allowed the benefit of every fact advanced by them as a defence in their answers, as fully as if it had been put in issue by the plaintiff's general replication, and the defendants had established it by proof.
But these administrators rest their defence on the fact, that there was " an understanding by him, (their intestate,) and the complainant, that the said suit, (in which the decree of the 22d of May 1815, was passed,) should not affect the interest of their intestate in the aforesaid bond, and should only operate to enable the complainant to obtain a conveyance for the land he had purchased." In other words they admit, that the decree of the 22d May 1815, as it stands, is a sufficient basis for the plaintiff's equity; but they attempt to circumscribe its operation by setting up a previous understanding or agreement of the parties to it, as to what was intended to be its extent and. effect. But no decree can he thus collaterally affected or impeached. Every decree stands, and must he allowed to stand, for what it purports to be on its face, until it has been revised or reversed in a solemn and proper manner. Therefore, rejecting this ground of the defence, as being utterly inadmissible, even supposing the fact of the alleged understanding to he true, there is nothing in the answers which is at all at variance with the case presented by the bill.
It is certainly true as urged by the defendants' solicitor, that even at the hearing, the plaintiff's case, as stated by himself, must be shewn to have in substance, or in some essential bearing of it, such a character as wdll confer jurisdiction on a court of chancery; it must appear to be an equitable as contradistinguished from a mere legal cause of action. The bill must itself shew why it was necessary, or allowable for the plaintiff to leave the ordinary legal- tribunals and come into a court of chancery to seek relief. It seems to have been formerly understood, that if it appeared upon the face of the bill, that the plaintiff's remedy was properly at law, — as where the hill was for the recovery of a debt due by bond, — if the defendant answered and confessed the bond, he could not demur to the relief; because, admitting the debt, he ought to pay it, and not proceed to litigate it in either forum; or if the plaintiff was proceeding for the recovery of damages, the defendant might demur; because the court could not settle the damages: but if he answered, he could take no advantage of it at the hearing; for having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, it would have the quantum of damages adjusted in a feigned action at law. The rule now however is, that if the defendant could have demurred to the hill, because of its not presenting a case of an equitable character, but, instead of doing so, has answered it, the court will not make a decree for relief at the final hearing,
The case exhibited by this bill is, however, one of which a court of chancery may properly take cognizance. It is admitted on all hands, that the assignee of a bond takes it subject to all the equity to which the obligor is entitled, whether he has notice of that equity or not. The contingency which gave rise to this obligor's equity was of such a nature, that on its happening, he could only obtain the relief to which he was entitled in a court of equity, He therefore came here and obtained relief accordingly, even against the assignee and the then holder of his bond, the intestate of the only two of these defendants who now resist his equity. After which that assignee, availing himself of the legal form of his claim, obtained a judgment at law, which this plaintiff, from thepeculiarly equitable nature of his defence, was unable to prevent. I am therefore of opinion that this injunction must now be made perpetual, as well because this court should be consistent with itself, as because this plaintiff should have assured to him the full benefit of that to which he has been declared, by the decree of the 22d May 1815, to be equitably entitled.
Whereupon it is Decreed, that the injunction heretofore granted in this case be and the same is hereby made perpetual, and that the said defendants pay to the said complainant his costs, to be taxed by the register.
The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decree.
3 Blac. Com. 448.
2 Mad. Chan. 537; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 204;
Gilb. For. Rom. 51, 53; North v. Strafford, 3 P. Will. 150; Pickering's case, 12 Mod. 171.
Barker v. Dacie, 6 Ves. 686; Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 446; Brace v. Taylor, 2 Atk. 253; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 638; Utterson v. Mair, 2 Ves. jun. 97; Brooke v. Hewitt, 3 Ves. 255; Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 245; Piggot v. Williams, 6 Mad. 95; Gover v. Christie, 2 H. & J. 67; Taylor v. Ferguson, 4 H. & J. 46; Pollard v. Patterson, 3 Hen. & Mun. 85; Yancy v. Fenwick, 4 Hen. & Mun. 423; Martin v. Spier, 1 Hayw. 370; Hart v. Mallett, 2 Hayw. 136; Dickens v. Ashe, 2 Hayw. 176.
Mole v. Smith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 645.