Case Name: Bowers H. Leonard, Pl'ff, v. Robie Clough and DeWitt C. Clough, Def'ts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-04-16
Citations: 37 N.Y. St. Rep. 814
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bowers H. Leonard, Pl’ff, v. Robie Clough and DeWitt C. Clough, Def’ts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 37
Pages: 814–819

Head Matter:
Bowers H. Leonard, Pl’ff, v. Robie Clough and DeWitt C. Clough, Def’ts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed April 16, 1891.)
Pixtures—Severance from realty.
Defendants conveyed to their daughter certain premises on which was a portion of a barn, which was not attached to the realty but built upon stones sunk in the ground and which could be removed without injury to the soil. At the time of the conveyance the daughter told defendants that the barn was theirs, and they continued to occupy it, and subsequent grantees of the daughter, including the plaintiff, were notified that the barn belonged to defendants. In an action for removing .said barn, Held, that the barn by its nature and mode of construction was capable of being treated as personal property and of being reimpressed with that character by agreement, and that defendants had a right to remove the same.
(Dwight, P. J., dissents.)
Motion for a new trial on case and exceptions ordered to be heard at the general term in the first instance in a cause tried in Cayuga county.
Amasa J. Parker, for pl’ff; Payne & O'Brien, for def'ts.

Opinion:
Corlett, J.
The defendants were the owners of a lot of land situated in the city of Auburn, about four rods in width, upon which there stood a frame barn sixteen feet in width and twenty-four feet in length. It was a small structure built upon stones sunk in the ground. It was not attached to the stones or the ground, and the evidence tended to show that it was so built that it could be removed without injuring the soil or disturbing the foundations upon which it rested. Soon after Mrs. Bobie Clough became the owner of this land she deeded to her daughter, Mrs. Gilbert, a portion of the lot, which conveyance included two-thirds of the barn.
The grantor, Mrs. Clough, testified that at the time of the execution of the deed to her daughter, and after its delivery, the grantee stated: "How, pa and ma, the barn is yours; there can nobody interfere." The grantee, Mrs. Gilbert, on this subject testified that on the same occasion she received the deed she told her father and mother that the barn was theirs. After that the grantors occupied the barn, and each grantee from Mrs. Gilbert had notice before they took a conveyance that the barn belonged to the defendants.
In the case of the plaintiff, the evidence as to whether he received such notice was conflicting, but the jury found in favor of the defendants' contention.
It does not distinctly appear, nor is the point material, whether the original grantor and grantee had an understanding or agreement before the execution and delivery of the warrantee deed that the barn should remain the property of the grantors, but it does appear that immediately after the execution and delivery, and on the same occasion, the grantee stated to the grantors that the barn was theirs, which would naturally imply that there was either an express or implied understanding before the execution of the deed that such should be the case.
The plaintiff's contention is that the barn was a part of the real . estate and that it passed by the deed. This undoubtedly would be so in the absence of facts showing a different understanding or agreement
In Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y., on page 348, the court say: "It will readily be conceded that the ordinary distinction between real estate and chattels exists in the nature of the subject and cannot in general be changed by the convention of the parties. Thus it would not be competent for parties to create a personal chattel interest in a part of the separate bricks, beams or other materials of which the walls of a house were composed. But it is otherwise with things which, being originally personal in their nature, are attached to the realty in such a manner that they may be detached without being destroyed or materially injured, and without the destruction of or material injury to the things real with which they are connected, though their connection with the land or other real estate is such that in the absence of an agreement or of any special relation between the parties in interest they would be a part of the real estate."
On. page 349 the court say: " If the subject which would otherwise be real estate can be made personal by the creation of special relations between the parties, it is clear that the same parties may effect the same thing by express agreement,"
In Tyson et al. v. Post, 108 N. Y., 217-221; 13 N. Y. State Rep. 503, the court say, " There can be little doubt, however, that the machinery, shafting, rollers and other articles became as between vendor and vendee, and mortgagor and mortgagee, fixtures and a part of the realty. Citing McRea v. Central Nat. Bank, 66 N. Y., 489. But as, by agreement, for the purpose of protecting the rights of vendors of personalty, or of creditors, chattels may retain their character as chattels, notwithstanding their annexation to the land in such a way as in the absence of an agreement would constitute them fixtures, citing Ford v. Cobb, supra, and Sisson v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y., 542, so also, it would seem to follow, that by convention the owner of land may reimpress the character of personalty on chattels which by annexation to the land have become fixtures according to the ordinary rule of law, provided only that they have not been so incorporated as to lose their identity and the reconversion does not interfere with the rights of creditors or third persons."
The materials out of which this barn was constructed were originally personal property, and the bam erected in the form it was might remain such if originally so intended. Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y., 278, and the cases above cited. Kinsey v. Bailey, 9 Hun, 452.
In Batterman v. Albright, 122 N. Y., 484-490 ; 34 N. Y. State Rep., 131, the court say, "And if the right of the plaintiff in the present case had been acquired to the trees prior to the mortgage, a different question would have been presented. In that event, the sale upon the execution and purchase by the plaintiff may have, so far as essential, been treated as a sverance of the growing trees from the realty."
In the case at bar it could never have been intended by the grantor or grantee that the barn should be occupied in common.. A joint ownership would be useless to either party. Confusion might have been avoided by a reservation in the deed. But it was competent for the parties to treat the barn as personal property. It was so regarded between the original grantor and grantee. The defendants occupied and exercised dominion over the barn after their deed. The plaintiff, as the jury found, had notice that the barn after the deed was personal property with the right on the part of the original grantors to remove it. Every subsequent grantee including the plaintiff had notice of that fact. The plaintiff's right was acquired after the agreement or arrangement to treat the bam as personal property, and he, therefore, occupies the position stated in the quotation from 122 N. Y.
This barn in view of its mode of construction was in its own nature capable of being treated as personal property and was not, within the exception stated in the 20th of New York, incapable of being retained or changed into personal property.
The judge in the Tyson case, above cited, states, in substance, that although the barn was real estate, it could by agreement be impressed with the character of personal property. Such was the arrangement and intention in the case at bar, of which the plaintiff had full notice before he took his deed.
The submission of the case to the jury by the trial justice was correct, and their findings under the instructions given correct
Alleged errors in the admission or rejection of evidence are entirely immaterial as the questions involved in them would only become important in case the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The same is true as to the time of removal; it was entirely immaterial whether it was removed by night or day.
The motion for a new trial should be denied.
Macomber, J., concurs.