Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Joseph Peter MILICE, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1991-01-08
Citations: 401 Pa. Super. 96
Docket Number: No. 2819
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Joseph Peter MILICE, Appellant.
Judges: Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 401
Pages: 96–105

Head Matter:
584 A.2d 997
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Joseph Peter MILICE, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Aug. 21, 1990.
Filed Jan. 8, 1991.
Salvatore F. Bello, Norristown, for appellant.
William Carpenter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Norristown, for Com., appellee.
Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order entered pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq., continuing appellant's involuntary commitment to Farview State Hospital. We affirm.
On February 5, 1988, appellant, without provocation, attacked several of his neighbors, stabbing three adults, chasing and attempting to stab two children and stabbing a dog. As a result, criminal charges were brought and appellant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. After a bench trial on June 30, 1988, appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The Commonwealth then filed a petition to have appellant committed for involuntary psychiatric treatment. After a hearing on August 25, 1988, the court ordered appellant to be committed to Farview State Hospital for a one-year period of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. At the end of this initial commitment, a petition was filed seeking an order for continued involuntary commitment and requesting a transfer to a civil or VA hospital. Hearings were held on August 25, 1989, and October 2,1989, at the conclusion of which the instant order was entered. This appeal followed.
Appellant initially contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to close the hearings to the public. Relying on 50 P.S. § 7304(e)(4), appellant contends that the court was required to close the hearings upon his request. Section 7304(e)(4) provides: "The hearing shall be public unless it is requested to be private by the person or his counsel." Appellant interprets this language to mandate closing the hearing upon the mere request of the respondent. We do not agree.
The common law tradition of open and public trials, in both the civil and criminal areas, is centuries old. See, Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir.1984). In Pennsylvania, this tradition is embodied in Article I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution: "All courts shall be open." The principle of openness is also supported by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.; Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 (1990). Only in rare instances is the public routinely excluded from the courtroom. For example, the Juvenile Act provides that "the general public shall be excluded from hearings under this chapter." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336(d). Even that statute, however, excludes only those persons who have no proper interest in the proceeding. The victim, counsel for the victim and persons accompanying a party or a victim for his or her assistance as well as persons having a proper interest in the proceeding or in the work of the court are properly admitted by the juvenile court. Id. The Rules of Civil Procedure permit the trial court to exclude the public or persons not interested in the proceedings only when the court deems such exclusion "to be in the interest of the public good, order or morals." Pa.R.Civ.P. 223.
In the instant case, the language of the statute itself is mandatory only in stating that the hearing shall be public unless requested otherwise. As noted by our Supreme Court: "If a private hearing is 'requested,' this does not necessarily mean, as a matter of verbal logic, that the request must be honored." Matter of Seegrist, 517 Pa. 568, 574 n. 15, 539 A.2d 799, 802 n. 15 (1988). Absent more explicit statutory language and in light of the lengthy and powerful tradition of openness, we are unable to conclude that the Mental Health Procedures Act mandates closure of a hearing on the mere request of the patient. It was therefore within the discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant appellant's request.
This discretion is not absolute. Katz v. Katz, 356 Pa.Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374 (1986). In Katz, this court adopted the standard set forth in Publicker Industries, supra, that closure is warranted where "disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure." The only reason advanced by appellant herein was that the hearing would involve confidential medical testimony about his mental illness. In any hearing under the Mental Health Procedures Act, the evidence is likely to involve at least some confidential medical testimony. Nevertheless, § 7304(e)(4) specifies an open hearing. Thus, something more must be required in order to demonstrate that the hearing should be closed. In the instant case, the other factors considered by the trial court amply support the decision not to close the hearing. The court first noted that because appellant entered an insanity plea, he himself placed the issue of his mental illness before the court in an open criminal proceeding. Further, the criminal proceeding was widely covered by the press. Therefore, the initial accounts of appellant's mental illness were already public knowledge. Furthermore, although some of the testimony in the current hearing dwelt on specifics of appellant's illness, much of the testimony involved a comparison of the various institutions to which appellant was seeking transfer. Of the experts who testified, two testified only to the respective security and therapeutic aspects of their facilities and two were experts who had previously testified at the criminal trial. Only one of the experts was a treating psychiatrist who had a physician-patient relationship with appellant. The trial court also considered the public interest in the hearing, finding it to be substantial.
"The appellant had engaged in a violent outburst seriously injuring and terrorizing neighbors in the community in which he lived prior to this commitment. There is always a significant public interest in civil commitment proceedings which arise after a criminal acquittal by reason of insanity which is akin to the public interest in criminal trials. The interest in this case was heightened because the victims of the crime were appellant's neighbors and had legitimate concerns about his potential return to their community or to what they perceived would be a less secure facility very close to that community."
Opinion at 15.
Furthermore, the court considered the benefit to appellant should the court decide that a change in treatment facility is appropriate or that continued commitment is no longer required.
"The process inevitably breeds tension between appellant's interest in fully restoring his mental health and returning to the community and public pressure to continue his commitment. Public scrutiny assures that the court's decision to continue commitment is based on the record developed at the hearing. In addition, should the court decide that commitment is no longer indicated, openness serves to put the facts forward, educate the public and allay fears."
Opinion at 16.
We conclude that the trial court considered all the relevant factors in making its decision and did not therefore abuse its discretion in refusing to close the hearing.
Appellant also contends that the trial court's finding that Farview State Hospital provides the least restrictive environment consistent with appellant's needs for treatment was against the weight of the evidence. In its opinion, the trial court has thoroughly reviewed the evidence, the applicable case law and the reasons for its findings. We see no need to add anything to that opinion and therefore affirm this finding based on the trial court's opinion.
Order affirmed.
MONTEMURO, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
. Although the hearings have already been held, this issue falls under the exception to the mootness doctrine being a question capable of replication yet evading judicial review. Matter of Seegrist, 517 Pa. 568, 539 A.2d 799 (1988).