Case Name: McLaren v. Fischer
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1899-11-28
Citations: 61 N.Y.S. 808
Docket Number: 
Parties: McLaren v. Fischer.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 61
Pages: 808–811

Head Matter:
McLaren v. Fischer.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
November 28, 1899.)
1. Building Contract—Performance—Delay.
A contractor’s delay of 51 days, in completing alterations in a building, after the expiration of the 3 weeks within which he agreed to make them, is prima facie unreasonable, and places on him the burden of showing conditions justifying the delay.
2. Same—Question for Jury.
A contractor agreed to complete alterations in a building within 3 ■ weeks after commencement, "but by reason of failure of a third person to deliver building material was delayed for 51 days in completing the same. Held, that whether such failure justified the delay was a question of fact for the jury.
Woodward, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Kings county.
Action by Charles McLaren against Adam E. Fischer to recover damages for delay in completing a building contract. From a judgment directing a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and WOODWARD, JJ.
H. T. Ketcham, for appellant.
Charles Strauss, for respondent.

Opinion:
HATCH, J.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice WOODWARD in this case. Before the contract was made between the plaintiff's assignor and Mrs. Lefebvre, the defendant had notice of it, and knew its terms and conditions. By virtue of that contract he must be presumed to have known that plaintiff's assignor had obligated herself to pay damages at the rate of $25 a day during the period covered by the taking down and erection of the party wall. It was in view of this condition that the agent of plaintiff's assignor inquired of the defendant the time which would be necessarily occupied in taking down and putting up the wall; and his answer, in view of the conditions and the obligations assumed, constituted a contract upon his part to tear down and erect a structure within three weeks. Or if it be not held to. be a legal binding contract to perform the work within that time, it at least clearly imposed upon him the duty of performing the work within a reasonable time, as he was bound to make the sum that plaintiff's assignor was required to pay as light as possible. It is clear that the delay of 51 days beyond the period when the wall should have been completed, if unexcused, wras an unreasonable delay; and, such being the fact, the defendant was bound to justify the delay by proof of conditions excusing it, and the burden is upon him to establish the sufficiency of the excuse. Spann v. Transportation Co., 11 Misc. Rep. 680, 33 N. Y. Supp. 566, affirmed on appeal, 157 N. Y. 694, 51 N. E. 1094. The proof in the present case tended to establish that the occasion for the delay was the failure of the iron company to deliver the ironwork required for the building; but whether such delay was the fault of the defendant or of the iron company does not appear, non constat that it might have been wholly the fault of the defendant. But the plaintiff was not bound to establish this fact. When he had given evidence of his contract, and the nonperformance thereof by the defendant, then the law imposed a burden upon the latter of explaining the cause of the delay. Mere failure by a third party to deliver material necessary to complete the work might or might not satisfactorily excuse the performance within the given time, but this becomes a question of fact for the jury. It was not a question which could be disposed of by the court, as the plaintiff made a prima facie case, which, if unanswered, en titled Mm to recover. As I view the evidence, merely showing failure of a third party to deliver materials did not per se answer the case made by the plaintiff. It was, therefore, error to dismiss the complaint, for which the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event. All concur, except WOODWARD, J., who dissents.