Case Name: COCHRANE et al. v. KIP et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-06-18
Citations: 46 N.Y.S. 148
Docket Number: 
Parties: COCHRANE et al. v. KIP et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 46
Pages: 148–158

Head Matter:
(19 App. Div. 272.)
COCHRANE et al. v. KIP et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 18, 1897.)
Wills—Construction—Vested Remainders.
The will of S., after making certain devises and bequests, left the residue of his property in trust to make certain dispositions of the income during the life of his daughter, and then provided that at her death, “to close this trust,” the executors and trustees should convey and transfer the estate remaining in then* hands to such of his grandchildren as should then be living, except his granddaughter F., naming seven such grandchildren, and gave, devised, and bequeathed the same to such seven grandchildren, but if any of said grandchildren should die previous to the death of his daughter, leaving issue him or her surviving, such issue should take the share to which the parent would have been entitled. By a codicil to this will, the testator directed that his granddaughter F. should be included in the division of his estate with his other grandchildren. Held that, by such will and codicil, vested remainders in the property were given to the eight grandchildren, ' but subject to be divested by the death of any grandchild, either with or without issue, during the life of the testator’s daughter, the interest of such grandchild vesting at his' or her death either in the issue, if any, or, if there were none, in the other grandchildren. Ingraham and Rumsey, JJ., dissenting, and holding that the interest of each grandchild was divested only upon death leaving issue, but, upon death without issue, vested absolutely, and passed to the heirs and next of kin of such grandchild.
Appeal from special term.
• Action by John W. Cochrane and others, executors and trustees of the will of Adam W. Spies, deceased, against Sarah Ann Kip and others. From a judgment entered on a decision of the court, Arthur O. Humbert, individually and as administrator of the estate of Florence Adele Humbert, deceased, appeals.
Modified.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, WILLIAMS, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Elihu Root, for appellant Arthur C. Humbert, individually and as administrator.
Geo. B. Adams, for defendant William Rudolph Kip, and guardian ad litem for infant defendant Garret Berg Kip.
Charles Steele, guardian ad litem for infant defendants French.
Frank L. Hall, for plaintiff executors and for defendant executors.
Henry C. White, for defendants Kip.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The action was brought to procure the construction of the will and codicils of Adam W. Spies, and to determine the rights and interests of the parties in the property left by the testator. The questions involved in this action relate to the twelfth clause of the will and the fourth clause of the codicil. The will was executed in July, 1881, and the second codicil July, 1890. By the will, the testator made certain specific devises and bequests, and then gave all the residue of the property to the executors and trustees named in the will, in trust to make certain specific disposition of the income during the lifetime of his daughter Sarah A"nn Kip, and then, by the twelfth clause, he provided as follows:
"At the death of my said daughter Sarah Ann, to close this trust, I direct that my executors and trustees convey and transfer all of my estate, both real and personal, then remaining in their hands, to such of my grandchildren as shall then be living (except my said granddaughter Sarah Ann French), viz. Arthur De Witt Cochrane, Cornelia Elizabeth Schell, Henry Spies Kip, Garret Berg Kip, William Rudolph Kip, and Florence Adele Kip, equally, share and share alike; and I hereby give, devise, and bequeath the same to such seven grandchildren, but if any of said seven grandchildren shall die previous to the decease of my daughter Sarah Ann, leaving issue him, her, or them surviving, then I direct that such issue shall take the share to which thenparent would have been entitled hereunder (if living) under this clause of my will, said share to be received by said grandchildren or their descendants free from any control or claim of any husband that she or they may have at any time."
By the fourth clause of the second codicil he further provided as follows:
"Fourth. I hereby direct that my said granddaughter Sarah Ann French shall be included in the division of my estate as mentioned in the 12th clause of my said last will and testament, and shall share therein equally with my other seven grandchildren; I hereby directing that said 12th clause of said will shall apply to her and her heirs as though she had been originally named therein."
The testator died May 31, 1891, leaving, him surviving, his daughter Sarah Ann Kip, a widow, with four children, viz. Florence Adele Humbert, Henry Spies Kip, William Rudolph Kip, and Garret Berg Kip; also three grandchildren, the children of his deceased daughter Hilda M. S. Gochrane, viz. Sarah Ann French, Adam W. S. Cochrane, and Arthur De Witt Cochrane. Sarah Ann French, at the testator's death, had two children living, viz. Seth B. French and Hilda Cochrane French, and another child has been born to her since, viz. Ellen Mercer French. Testator also left, him surviving, another grandchild, the child of his deceased daughter Mary S. Barnes, viz. Cornelia Elizabeth Schell. These eight grandchildren were the persons named in the will and second codicil, and it will be observed that the eighth grandchild, Sarah Ann French, excepted in the twelfth clause of the will, but brought within its provision by the fourth clause of the second codicil, had at the time of the testator's death two children living, and one has been born since. The trial took place in October, 1896. The codicil was made in July, 1890. At the time of the trial, the children of the eighth daughter, Sarah Ann French, were seven years and five years and nine months of age, respectively. None of them had been born, therefore, when the will was made (1881), and only one of them when the codicil was made in 1890. A second one was born after the second codicil was made, and before the testator's death, and the third had been born since testator's death. The grandchild Florence Adele Humbert was married after the death of the testator, and died soon after, in October, 1895, intestate, leaving, her surviving, a husband, the appellant, but no children. The daughter of the testator, Sarah Ann Kip, and the other seven grandchildren, are still living.
The practical question involved in this action was whether the appellant, after the death of his wife, had any interest personally or as administrator of his wife's estate in the property disposed of by the twelfth clause of the will and the fourth clause of the second codicil. The parties seem to agree that the provisions of the will and codicil in- question gave to the eight grandchildren vested remainders in the property. The only question is as to when and for what reason such remainders were divested and passed to other parties. The appellant claims such remainders were divested only by the death of the grandchild, leaving issue, before the death of Sarah Ann Kip; while the respondents claim that the remainders were divested by the death of the grandchild with or without issue before the death of Sarah Ann Kip. If there were issue, the interest went to the issue; if no issue, the interest went to the surviving grandchil- . dren and their descendants. In this case there were no issue. The appellant claims, therefore, that the remainder never became divested, but at the death of his wife became vested absolutely, and the interest passed to her heirs and next of kin; while the respondents claim that the remainder became divested at the death of Mrs. Humbert, and passed to the seven surviving grandchildren and their descendants. It is not disputed that the testator might legally have disposed of the property in either way. The only question is what disposition he did make. It is a question of the construction of the language used. If the real intention of the testator is apparent, effect should be given to such intention, without regard to technical rules or the use of particular words. It seems to us there can be no doubt as to what the testator's intention was. He commenced the twelfth clause of the will by the declaration that he desired to close the trust at the death of his daughter Sarah Ann Kip, and for that purpose he directed his executors and trustees to dispose of the residue of his property remaining in their hands at that time. How ? By conveying and transferring it to such of his grandchildren as should then be living equally, share and share alike; and the only limitation of this direction is found after the word "but," a little further on in the clause, viz.:
"If any of the grandchildren shall die previous to the decease of my daughter Sarah Ann, leaving issue him or her or them surviving, then I direct that such issue shall take the share to which their parent would have been entitled if living."
Here is an intention, expressed as clearly as language could do it, to give the whole property to such grandchildren as should be living when liis daughter Sarah Ann died, unless some of the grandchildren should have died before that time, leaving issue, in which case the issue should take the interest the parents would have taken if they had lived. This language is too plain to be disregarded or set aside by any technical rules of construction or fine-spun arguments founded upon decisions in other cases. It is not reasonable to suppose that the testator would so plainly express his design, and still mean by the other words in this clause of the will to entirely change the disposition so clearly indicated. He says: "I hereby give, devise, and bequeath the same to such seven grandchildren." By this language he clearly meant to give to such grandchildren the same interest he had already indicated so plainly. Expressed more clearly, the clause would have read: "I hereby give, devise, and bequeath such interest in the property to such seven grandchildren." The word "same," as used in the will, clearly means, not "such property," but "such interest in the property," as already indicated; and the interest so given to any grandchild was subject to be divested by the death of the grandchild before the death of Sarah Ann Kip, so that the surviving grandchildren would take it unless such deceased grandchild left issue, and in that event the issue would take such interest. Such a construction as this would give a reasonable effect to the whole of this clause of the will, and carry out the clear intention of the testator. The construction contended for by the appellant would render all the language in the clause directing the disnosition of the property by the executors and trustees at the death of Sarah Ann Kip nugatory. It could never have been intended to express the intention of the testator so plainly as this clause does it as to the disposition of the property at the death of Sarah Ann Kip, and then render all this language nugatory, by inserting the words as to present gift. The present gift was not intended to be contradictory of such clearly expressed intention, but in harmony with it; and the construction we have given alone will accomplish such intention. We think no force should be given to the word "heirs," in the fourth clause of the codicil. Evidently, the only purpose of the testator in making that codicil was to include his eighth grandchild, Sarah Ann French, in the disposition of the property covered by the twelfth clause of the will. He could have had no thought then of changing the clause in the will in other respects, or of giving any construction to any language in the will. The words "issue" and "descendants" were used interchangeably in the twelfth clause of the will; and the word "heirs," in the codicil, was evidently used as a synonymous term. It was not used in any technical sense, and no argument should be based upon the use of this word "heirs" to change the reasonable construction already given by us of the twelfth clause of the will.
We think the decision of the trial court was right, and that the judgment entered thereon should be affirmed, with costs.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.