Case Name: Angelina BRAGO, Appellant, v. Beth BRAGO, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-08-11
Citations: 604 So. 2d 866
Docket Number: No. 91-1765
Parties: Angelina BRAGO, Appellant, v. Beth BRAGO, Appellee.
Judges: Before FERGUSON, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 604
Pages: 866–867

Head Matter:
Angelina BRAGO, Appellant, v. Beth BRAGO, Appellee.
No. 91-1765.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug. 11, 1992.
Joseph C. Segor, Miami, for appellant.
The Vogelsang Law Firm and Beth Tyler Vogelsang, Miami, for appellee.
Before FERGUSON, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, the paternal grandmother, appeals an order terminating her visitation rights and denying her request for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
After review of the record, we conclude that the only visitation issue properly noticed for hearing before the trial court was the grandmother's motion to enforce the grandparent visitation order. The trial court ruled that it was not in the best interests of the children to enforce visitation at this time. That determination is supported by competent substantial evidence. See Kunst v. Kunst, 551 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); § 752.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). See generally Michael J. Minerva, Jr., Comment, Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their "Bundle of Joy", 18 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 533 (1991). To that extent, the order under review is affirmed. The effect of the order is to suspend the grandmother's visitation rights.
The order is reversed insofar as it terminates all the grandmother's visitation rights. No motion to terminate the grandmother's visitation rights was noticed for hearing. The grandmother objected to the trial court's consideration of termination of her visitation rights and, therefore, the matter was not tried by consent of the parties. Since the grandmother was not properly on notice that the issue would be decided by the trial court, the order must be reversed to the extent that it permanently terminates the grandmother's visitation rights. See Jackson v. Warren, 593 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); see also Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Falkner v. Amerifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 489 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); cf. Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So.2d 235, 237 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). This ruling is without prejudice to the trial court's considering the request to terminate the grandmother's visitation rights, upon reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Scheer v. Scheer, 132 So.2d 456, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
While we affirm the trial court's decision not to appoint a guardian ad litem, this ruling is without prejudice to the parties to raise the issue again as circumstances warrant.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FERGUSON and COPE, JJ., concur.
It should be noted that the February 21, 1989 order granting grandparent visitation stated that the grandmother was to be allowed supervised visitation with the two grandchildren. The order grants no visitation rights to the father's sister and no unsupervised visitation to the grandmother.