Case Name: Archibald Barber, Plaintiff in Error, vs. The State of Florida
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1853
Citations: 5 Fla. 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: Archibald Barber, Plaintiff in Error, vs. The State of Florida.
Judges: 
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 199–210

Head Matter:
Archibald Barber, Plaintiff in Error, vs. The State of Florida.
After the testimony in a ease lias been closed, neither party has the right to reexamino a witness, or to Introduce any new evidence, but when through the inadvertence of counsel, or other cause, the rigid enforcement of the rule would defeat the ends of justice, it is tlio duty of the Judge to relax it, whenever it can be done, without injustice to the adverso party.
Per Thompson, J. — Such relaxation rests in the sound discretion of the Judge, and if be errs in admitting or refusing to admit the testimony ottered, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment and correct the error.
Error to the Circuit Court of Duval County.
This was an indictment against Archibald Barber for an assault and battery.
It appears from the record, that upon the trial of this case in the Circuit Court, the State having closed, and the prisoner having offered no evidence, prisoner’s counsel contended in his argument to the jury, that the prosecution had not proved the time when the offence charged in the indictment was committed, and ashed the Court to charge the jury that in such case the prisoner was entitled to a verdict.
The solicitor for the State insisted that the time had been proved by the witness, Beers, and asked to have the witness recalled to state what he had said as to time; the witness having been recalled could not say whether he had stated the time or not. Whereupon, the solicitor for the State conceded the point in question, and moved the Court for leave to introduce the witness, to prove the time, to which prisoner’s counsel objected. The Court having overruled the objection, the witness was introduced and the time proved. To all of which prisoner’s counsel objected and excepted, and assigned the same for error.
McQueen McIntosh for the Plaintiff in Error.
In the trial of a criminal cause, when the solicitor for the State has announced that the prosecution has closed, and counsel for the prisoner has made his argument before the jury, and asked the charge of the Court, a witness cannot be recalled to remedy defects in the evidence adduced by the prosecution, and which have been disclosed by prisoner’s counsel. Prisoner, in such a case, was entitled to all the benefits arising from the defence made by his counsel, and it was error in the Court to permit the defective testimony to be supplied with new evidence. Odronaux vs. Helie, 3 Sand. Ch. R., p. 512; Jones vs. Relf, 10 Miss., 623, cited from 2d U. S. Dig., 350; Hathaway vs. Hemmingway, 20 Conn., 191, cited from 5 U. S. Dig., 440; May vs. The State, 5 Miss., 71, cited from 5 U. S. Dig., p. 155, § 271; 1 Philips Ev., p. 305, and authority cited in note t.; The Queen’s case, Brod. & Bing 6 Eng. Com. L. Rep., 294.
The above case is quoted in Ros. Crim. Ev., marginal page 170, and in 15 Petersd. Abr., page 425.
If the principle advocated is sustained by the cases cited in civil proceedings, it should with greater propriety be considered the rule of conducting the examination of witnesses in criminal trials. 4 Chitty Black., mar. p. 356.
There can be no discretion, where there are general fixed-rules to control the manner of proceeding, and that discretion which places it in the arbitrary will and. power of Inferior Courts to prejudice the rights of parties before them, should be discountenanced by Courts holding their decisions in review. Hawkins vs. the State of Georgia, 11 Geo. Rep., p. 92; Bouvier’s Law Dic., 328-329, title, discretion ; Jacob’s Law Dic., title, discretion; 1 Campbell’s Lives of the Lord Chan:, pp. 33-34.
J. P. Scmderson for the State.
The examination of witnesses is to be conducted in such a manner as to elicit the truth, without taking any unfair •advantage. The Court will not close the mouth of a witness because counsel ommitted to ask a material question 'at first — -the usual course is to suggest the question to 'the Court, which will exercise its discretion in putting it to the witness. 1 Starkie’s Ev., 150, Ed. 1826; Aldred vs. Halliwell, 1 Starkie R., 117, 2 E. C. L. R., 53; 3 Chitty’s Genl. Prac., 901-3, cases cited and note.
The Court may, at its discretion, allow a witness to be examined by cither party, over and over again, at any time during the to-ial before verdict, and this as well in criminal cases as civil. State vs. Silver, 3 Dev., 332; Ereleigh vs. State, 8 Miss., 606, cited 5 U. S. D., 985, sections 627-28-29; 1 Phil. Ev. 212, n., 1st Ed.
And even as to new matter. Curren vs. Connery, 5 Binney, 488; 3 U. S. Dig., 709, § 544, ibid., 708, § 511; U. S. vs. Wilson, 1 Bald., 38.
The time and manner of examining witnesses is in the discretion of the Court, before which the trial takes place. People vs. Mather, 4 Wend., 229, cited 3 U. S. D. 709, § 543; Law vs. Merrills, 6 Wend., 268, cited 4 N. Y. D., 1316, § 469; Duncan vs. McCollough, 4 S. & R., 480, cited 3 U. S. D., 708, § 506.
After plaintiff has closed his case, he will be permitted to remedy a defect in his evidence, if such defect arose through the inadvertency of his counsel. 1 Arch. Prac., 194; 1 Starkie R., 117; Giles, Assignee of Hills, vs. Powell, 12 E. C. L., 560; Walls vs. Atchison, ibid., 566.
And even though the counsel for the prosecution has closed his case, and the prisoner’s counsel points out a defect in the evidence, the Court is at liberty in its discretion, to put what question it jileases to remedy the defect and remove the objection. Rex vs. Remnaut, 1 B. Crown Cases. 136.
Upon a trial for murder of a male child, the counsel for the prosecution concluded his case without asking the sex of the child, and the Judge would not jeermit him after-wards to call a witness to jirove it, and in consequence of the omission, directed the jury to acquit the prisoner. But to the honor of that Judge it ought to be stated, that he declared afterwards in private, his regret for his conduct. This case is well remembered, but it ought never to be cited, but with reprobation. 4 Christian Blk., 356, note.
So, after defendant’s counsel had summed uj>, and while the ¡plaintiff’s counsel were summing up, defendant’s counsel discovered some written evidence, which they wished ,to submit to the jury, and which the Judge refused. On. an application for a new trial, the Court said, the evidence was material, that the Judge had a discreüonto admit the evidence, and it ought, in sound, discretion, to have been received — and a new trial was granted on that ground. Mercer vs. Sayer, 7 J. R., 306.
This is an assignment of error upon the exercise of a discretionary power by the Court, which this Court will cautiously examine into, on appeal. 1 U. S. D., 169, §§ 111, 112, 113, and 114; People vs. Mather, 4 Wend., 247, cited 4 N. Y. D., 1316, § 247.

Opinion:
ANDERSON, C. J. :
This case is brought up by agreement as upon writ of error from the Circuit Court of Duval County. On the trial of the plaintiff in error on an indictment for assault and battery, the solicitor of the State omitted to prove the time when the offence charged was committed, till the prisoner's counsel, on the solicitor announcing that he had closed, addressing the Court in the defence, aslced the Court to charge the jury, that the prisoner was entitled to a verdict on account of the omission.
The solicitor of the State then moved the Court for leave to introduce a witness to prove the time ; to which prisoner's counsel objected. The Court overruled the objection, the witness was introduced, and the time was proved. This ruling of the Court is assigned for error.
It is undoubtedly true, that after the counsel for the prosecution has closed his case, and counsel for the accused has been beard in the defence, the former has not the .right to recall a witness or to examine a new one. This is ¡in accordance with well settled rules of practice in relation to the examination of witnesses. Bnt it is incorrect to consider the right of counsel and tbe duty of a Judge as alike regulated by the same inflexible rules. The province and peculiar office of the latter, is to ascertain and establish the truth, and the policy of the law therefore, wisely confides to him the right so to use the necessary rules of practice, as not to allow the letter to thwart and defeat their spirit.
"When, the Judge perceives that in consequence of the inadvertence of counsel or other cause, the rigid enforcement of the rules would defeat the great object for which they were established, it is his duty so. to relax them (when it can be done without injustice to any) as to make them subserve their true purpose, which is to aid the Court and the parties before it in determining and adjusting their respective rights.
The security which we have from any injury growing out of this license, arises from this distinction — that counsel have no right to examine witnesses out of the prescribed order ; it is only a permission which may be awarded or refused by the Court, as the Judge may perceive that it can or cannot be allowed with justice to all parties.
In the case before us, the solicitor had no right to recall the witness Beers — his rights are regulated by the rule, and according to its terms the witness could not be recalled. But the Judge had the right to recall or to permit the solicitor to recall him when, as in this case, it was obvious no injustice could "be done to the other party by the relaxation of the rule. Such we understand to be the practice in all the best regulated Courts, and it appears to us that the practice is in accordance with the purposes for which Courts of Justice are established. We conclude, thcrpfpre, that there was no error in the ruling of the Court.
Per. curiam. Bet the judgment be affirmed,