Case Name: Wright v. Cohoon
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1841-05
Citations: 12 Leigh 370
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Wright v. Cohoon.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 915–917

Head Matter:
*Wright v. Cohoon.
May, 1841,
Richmond.
Will — Construction—Estate Tail† — Case at Bar. — Testator devises the lands to his son E. W. to him and Ms heirs forever: and if his son E. W. should die without lawful issue of a son, then to his son H. W. — Held, E. W. took by the will an estate tail: dissen tiente Ttjoküb, P.
In a writ of right, brought in the circuit superior court of Nansemond, by the plaintiff in error against the defendant, to recover a parcel of 729 acres of land in that county, there was a special verdict stating the case thus: •
Stephen Wright, who died earfy in 1816, by his will devised as follows — “I give to my son Edward Wright the plantation on which I now reside, and also the plantation I bought of James Wilson, to him and his heirs forever — I desire that if my son Edward Wright should die without lawful issue of a son, that the aforesaid lands and plantation to descend and go to my son Henry Wright.” The devisee Edward entered upon the lands devised to him; and by deed, dated the 19th August 1819, sold and conveyed the plantation on which the testator resided to Cohoon, the tenant in this action; and under that conveyance Cohoon took and had ever since held, and now claimed. Edward Wright died in January 1832, '‘without” (in the words of the verdict) “leaving or having had lawful issue of a son or of issue male or female.” The testator’s son Henry Wright was the de-mandant in the action; and the plantation on which the testator resided was the land demanded. The question referred to the court was, whether the demandant or the tenant was entitled?
The circuit superior court held that the law was for the tenant, and gave judgment for him accordingly; to which this court allowed the demandant a supersedeas.
*Robinson, for the plaintiff in error.
The testator certainly did not mean what the words of the executory limitation literally import, that if Edward should die without leaving lawful issue of a son of Edward, that is, without a grandchild or remoter descendant sprung from a son of his own, in, such event the estate should devolve to the testator’s son Henry. Upon that construction, if Edward had died leaving a son, and that son had no issue living at Edward’s death, the son of Edward would have taken nothing. And the construction supposes, that the contingency upon which the testator meant to limit the estate to his son Henry, was the failure of great grandchildren of his own, male or female, sprung from a son of his son Edward; an intention so ■'unusual, and indeed so unnatural and absurd, that the court will not impute it to the testator, if by any reasonable construction it can be avoided. The construction is easy and obvious: the superfluous preposition “of” should be struck out of the limitation, and the will should be understood as if it read, ‘ ‘if Edward should die without lawful issue, a son;” meaning, without a son. And then, the effect will be, that Edward took an estate in fee, with an executory devise over to Henry in the event of Edward dying without a son; and as that event must of necessity be ascertained at Edward’s death or within nine months after, the execu-tory devise was good in its creation, and Henry is now entitled to the estate. In Melson v. Cooper, 4 Leigh 408, the testator devised land to his son W. and his heirs, and if he should die without a son, and not sell the land, then to his son G. ; and Carr and Cabell, J., thought, that a general absolute unlimited power to sell the land was plainly given to W. and that, therefore, he took an absolute fee; Tucker, P., doubted. In that case, but for the power to sell the land, the executory devise to G. limited upon the event of W. dying without a son, would have been held good. In Doe v. Erost, 3 Barn. & Aid. 546; 5 Eng. C. L. R. 373, the testator, having a son and daughter, *and the latter having many children, devised lands to his son W. P. and his heirs, and if W. E. should have no children, child or issue, the said estate was, on the decease of W. É. to become the property of the heir at law, subject to such legacies as W. E. might leave by will to the younger branches of his family : and it was held, that it was to be ascertained at the period of the son W, E.’s death, whether the estate devised to him should then vest in him in fee absolutely or pass over to some other person, and that W. P. took under the will an estate in fee, with a good executory devise to the person who, on the happening of the event con templated by the will (namely, the dying of W. 1?. without issue living at his death) should be heir at law of the testator. In Murray v. Addenbrook, 4 Russ. 407 ; 3 Cond. Eng. Ch. Rep. 729., the testator having bequeathed an annuity to J. W. for life, gave the annuity, upon the death of the annuitant, to the eldest surviving son of the annuitant’s father Sir J. M. and failing issue male of Sir J. M. to his daughters living at the demise of such issue male, in equal proportions; at the death of J. M. the annuitant, his father Sir J. M. had no son living, but he had two daughters: and it was held, that the exec-utory bequest to the daughters of Sir J. M. was well limited, and that in the event that occurred, they were entitled. He cited also Birthright v. Hall, 3 Munf. 536, and Burfoot v. Burfoots, 2 Leigh 119.
Leigh, for the defendant in error.
If the words of the limitation are to be understood to import, that if tne testator’s son Edward should die without issue sprung from a son of Edward, the estate should devolve to the testator’s son Henry, then this would be a devise to Edward in fee, with an executory devise over to Henry limited upon a general failure of issue of any son of Edward; and the executory devise to Henry would be clearly void, as being limited on too remote a contingency.
The jury so understood the words of the limitation ; *for the special verdict find that Edward died “without leaving or having had lawful issue of a son or of issue male or female.” But I agree, that that could hardly have been the meaning of the testator in framing this limitation. What, then, is the true import of the words “if my son Edward should die without lawful issue of a son?” I understand the meaning to be, without lawful issue of the son sex; equivalent to without issue male. Among the various functions of the preposition “of”' in composition, Dr. Johnson says, it is sometimes used as “noting something that has some particular quality,” and sometimes, as “noting species or kind;” but it must be confessed, that the examples he quotes do not exactly, though they do very nearly, indicate the same function of the preposition which I attribute to it in this will. I cannot remember any instance of this form of ex-
pression, in the precise sense I ascribe to it here, in any book. or written instrument; but it is not uncommon in the vernacular speech of Virginia, especially of the people of Eastern Virginia; and was more fre-quent formerly, within my memory, than it is now. It must be familiar to the judges of this court. Taking it, that by “issue of a son,” the testator meant issue ■of the son sex (which I have no doubt is the true explanation of the words) we have a plain case: he devised the estate to his son Edward in fee simple, and if he should die without issue of the son sex, without issue male, then over to Henry. And then, it cannot be doubted, that Edward took an estate tail by the will, with a contingent remainder to Henry. But, suppose the testator had said, as Mr. Robinson insists his words ought to be understood, — “if my son Edward should die without lawful issue, a son, the estate shall go to lmy son Henry”' — would the words ‘ ‘without lawful issue, a son, ’ ’ import the same meaning as the words “without a son?” I rather think the qualification of the word “issue” by the word “son,” would only serve to explain that by the word “issue” first used,s he meant male issue; and then Edward' took an estate tail. But grant all that Mr. Robinson asks; take the will as if it read thus — ‘ ‘I give my son Edward the 'plantation &c. to him and his heirs forever, and if he should die without a son, I give the same to my son Henry” — still, I insist, Edward would take an estate tail. Robinson v. Miller, 1 Roll. Abr. 837; 6 Cruise’s Dig. 303; Robinson v. Robinson, 1 Burr. 38; 3 Bro. P. C. 180; Tomlin’s Edi. ; Wild’s case, 6 Co. 16, b. ; Cook v. Cook, 2 Vern. 545; Merrymans v. Merryman, 5 Munf. 440. If Edward took an estate tail by the will, with a contingent remainder to Henry, the statute for abolishing entails converted Edward’s estate tail into a pure and absolute fee, and cut off Henry’s contingent remainder; and Edward’s conveyance to Cohoon passed the absolute fee.

Opinion:
CABELL and BROOKE, J.,
without stating the reasons of their opinion, said the judgment was to be affirmed.
The principal case is cited in Tinsley v. Jones, 18 Gratt. 299. See foot-note to Callis v. Kemp, 11 Gratt. 78.