Case Name: DEPENDENTS OF THOMPSON v. JOHNSON FUNERAL HOME et al.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1934-01-24
Citations: 205 N.C. 801
Docket Number: 
Parties: DEPENDENTS OF THOMPSON v. JOHNSON FUNERAL HOME et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 205
Pages: 801–809

Head Matter:
DEPENDENTS OF THOMPSON v. JOHNSON FUNERAL HOME et al.
(Filed 24 January, 1934.)
1. Master and Servant It a — Evidence held to show that employer regularly employed less than five employees.
Where in a hearing before the Industrial Commission the employer testifies that he employed three men other than himself, and another witness testifies that at the time of the injury in suit there were two men working besides the employer and that the other employees were on vacation, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the Industrial Commission that the parties were bound by the Compensation Act, since the evidence tends to show that the employer regularly employed less than five employees and the act expressly excludes casual employees, and there being no contention that the parties had elected to be bound by the act in the manner therein prescribed. N. C. Code of 1931, sec. 8081 (u), (b).
2. Master and Servant P i — Where the evidence is insufficient to support jurisdictional finding the award should he vacated or set aside.
Where on appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission it appears that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the Industrial Commission that the parties were bound by the Compensation Act, the evidence tending to show that defendant employer regularly employed less than five employees, appellant’s demurrer to the jurisdiction should be sustained and the award should be vacated or set aside, although appellant did not attack the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission in the hearing before it, nor will the Supreme Court on appeal remand the cause for further jurisdictional findings, the record disclosing that the question was passed upon by the Industrial Commission, and there being no motion in the Superior Court to remand after the filing of appellant’s demurrer.
3. Pleadings B d—
Jurisdiction may not be conferred upon a court or commission by waiver or consent of tbe parties, and a demurrer to the jurisdiction may be filed at any time.
Clabkson, J., dissenting.
Appeal by defendants from Warlich, J., at May Term, 1933, of Ibedell.
Proceeding under "Workmen’s Compensation Act to determine liability of defendants to dependents or next of kin of J. Fred Thompson, deceased employee.
Tbe bearing commissioner found as a fact, wbicb was later adopted and approved by tbe full Commission, tbat “tbe parties to this cause are bound by tbe provisions of tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Law, and tbe Sun Indemnity Company is tbe insurance carrier.”
On appeal to tbe Superior Court, tbe defendants for the first time challenged tbe jurisdiction of tbe Industrial Commission to bear and consider the matter on tbe ground tbat tbe Johnson Funeral Home was not subject to tbe provisions of tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act, for tbat, said employer “has regularly in service less than five employees in tbe same business within this State.” N. C. Code of 1931, sec. 8081 (u), (b) ; chap. 120, sec. 14, Public Laws, 1929.
Tbe only evidence in tbe record bearing upon tbe point, is the following :
Latta Johnson (employer) : “I was present at tbe Funeral Home on tbe night of 18 August, and at tbat time, Fred Thompson and I were on duty.
“Q. How many men did you keep on duty all tbe time at your place of business?
“A. I have employed three men- other than myself, and I try to keep at all times, until a reasonably late hour in tbe evening, two men on duty to take care of tbe work.”
N. M. Smoot: “I was working at tbe Funeral Home on tbe 19th, but there was no one there on tbe 19th for several days during tbat period except Mr. Thompson, Mr. Johnson and myself. Tbe other employees were on their vacations.”
From a judgment upholding tbe award of tbe Commission, tbe defendants appeal, assigning errors.
Z. V. Turlington and Jach Joyner for plaintiffs.
Cochran & McCleneghan and David J. Craig, Jr., for defendants.

Opinion:
Stacy, C. J.
It was said in Dependents of Poole v. Sigman, 202 N. C., 172, 162 S. E., 198, tbat if tbe facts found by the Industrial Commission are jurisdictional, and there is no evidence tending to support the findings, the award should be set aside and vacated.
We do not find on the record evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the parties to the present proceeding are subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Chap. 120, Public Laws, 1929; Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N. C., 500, 163 S. E., 569.
It is provided by section 14 of said act that the same shall not apply to "casual employees, . . . nor to any person, firm or private corporation that has regularly in service less than five employees in the same business within this State, unless such employees and their employer voluntarily elect, in the manner hereinafter specified, to be bound by this act."
The evidence of the employer is, that "I have employed three men other than myself." This is less than five. The testimony of the witness Smoot that "the other employees" (in addition to the deceased and himself who were working with Mr. Johnson at the time) "were on their vacations," does not show that the employer had "regularly in service as many as five employees in the same business within this State," so as to bring the parties, nothing else appearing, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. C. S., 8081 (k) ; Hanks v. Utilities Co., 204 N. C., 155, 167 S. E., 560. And it is not contended that they have voluntarily elected to be bound by the act in the manner specified therein. Southerland v. Harrell, 204 N. C., 675, 169 S. E., 423.
It would seem, therefore, that the demurrer to the jurisdiction is well taken. Barham v. Perry, ante, 428.
In opposition, however, the plaintiffs insist, first, that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the Commission, and, second, "but if the court should be of opinion that the record is silent on the jurisdictional question, then the cause should be remanded to the Industrial Commission for a finding on this particular point." Butts v. Montague Bros., 204 N. C., 389, 168 S. E., 215; Francis v. Wood Turning Co., 204 N. C., 701; Hollowell v. Dept. Con. and Dev., 201 N. C., 616. The record is neither sufficient nor silent on the point. It shows that the jurisdictional question was the subject of inquiry before the hearing commissioner and that his finding was approved by the full Commission. Plaintiffs have had their day in court, and they have failed to make out their ease. There was no motion in the Superior Court to remand when the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission was first challenged. Butts v. Montague Bros., supra. Nor is the suggestion made here except as a dernier ressort. Ordinarily, parties to a suit are allowed but "one bite at the cherry." Having tried and failed, they are not entitled, as a matter of right, to go back and "mend their licks." Furthermore, it seems quite improbable that the plaintiffs would be able to show jurisdic tion, even if given another chance, unless the employer, who appears to have qualified as administrator of the employee's estate and is now appealing from the judgment, should change his testimony. There comes a time when litigation should end.
Speaking to a similar situation in Trust Co. v. Leggett, 191 N. C., 362, 131 S. E., 752, Adams, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, observed:
"The plaintiff says the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court and should not now be considered; but it has been held that a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction may be made for the first time in the Supreme Court. Tillery v. Benefit Society, 165 N. C., 262; McDonald v. MacArthur, 154 N. C., 122." See, also, Finley v. Finley, 201 N. C., 1, 158 S. E., 549; Power Co. v. Peacock, 197 N. C., 735, 150 S. E., 510.
Jurisdiction, not given by law, may not be conferred on a court or commission, as such, by waiver or consent of the parties, Reid v. Reid, 199 N. C., 740, 155 S. E., 719; Saunderson v. Saunderson, 195 N. C., 169, 141 S. E., 572; Springer v. Shavender, 118 N. C., 33, 23 S. E., 976, 54 A. S. R., 708, 33 L. R. A., 775; 7 R. C. L., 1039.
Reversed.