Case Name: James J. O'Dea agt. Mary O'Dea
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-12
Citations: 1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 271
Docket Number: 
Parties: James J. O’Dea agt. Mary O’Dea.
Judges: Ruger, C. J., Rapallo, Andrews and Earl, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 271–289

Head Matter:
COURT OF APPEALS.
James J. O’Dea agt. Mary O’Dea.
Jurisdiction in Divorce Proceedings — Effect of a foreign Divorce.
Where defendant, a resident of Canada, was married in 1844 to K. in this-state, and lived with him until 1860, when she returned to Canada, and he went to Ohio and there obtained a divorce for desertion. A copy, of the summons was sent to her by mail, and she was present at the taking of the deposition, but took no part in it. She afterwards married plaintiff, he knowing the fact of her former marriage, and he now asks a divorce on the ground that she had a husband living at the time of her marriage.
Held, that the divorce obtained in Ohio was without jurisdiction, and so null and void, as was also the marriage in this state, and the divorce should be granted (Danfort, Miller and Pinch, JJ., dissenting).
Decided December, 1885.
It appears by tbe complaint that the parties intermarried in this state on the 30th day of August, 1866, and from that time, until shortly before the commencement of the action in 1880, lived and cohabited together asman and wife. The husband. sued to have the marriage contract declared void, and the marriage annulled, upon the ground that at the time it took place -a former husband of the defendant was living, and the marriage with bim tben in full force. Tbe defendant, by answer, - denied all tbe criminatory allegations. Tbe referee before whom tbe issue was tried found, upon evidence sufficient, if admissible, that in July, 1844, tbe defendant resided in, and always before that time bad been a resident of Toronto, Canada West, but at 'that date was married in-Lewiston, in this state, to one K., and lived witb bim as bis wife until January, 1860, when she left bim and returned to Toronto, where she continued to reside -until 1865, and be removed from this state “ to, and became a resident of, Cuyahoga county, in tbe state of Ohio,” where, in March, 1864, and after a residence of more than one year, be - commenced an action in tbe court of common pleas of that - county “ for tbe purpose of obtaining a divorce from tbe defend- . ant in this action, for tbe reason, as stated in tbe petition tben filed, that she bad been willfully absent from him for three years or more; that a copy of this petition, and of tbe summons issued thereon, were, on tbe 24th of March, 1864, sent by mail to tbe defendant at Toronto, where she tben resided, and were received by her soon after; that by said summons she was re- ■ quired to answer in tbe action by tbe 9th day of April, 1864; that a notice of tbe fihng of tbe petition, and of tbe purpose thereof, -and that said petition would be for bearing at tbe May term of said court of common pleas, and that depositions would be taken in Toronto at a time and place mentioned, were duly published in a newspaper in said Cuyahoga county; “ that on •the 20th day of April, 1864, depositions in said action were taken in pursuance of said notice; that tbe defendant was present when such depositions were taken, but took no part, personally - or by counsel, at tbe taking of tbe same; that no other service of tbe process or proceedings in tbe action was made upon tbe • defendant than is above stated; and that such service, so made, ■was, according to tbe laws of tbe state of Ohio, a legal service -upon tbe defendant, but that she never in any way appeared in ■said action.” It also appeared that on tbe 24th day of May, 1864, the Obio court, upon tbe proofs, found tbe facts stated in ■the petition to be true. That tbe defendant was willfully .absent from tbe petitioner without cause, for more than three years anterior to tbe filing of tbe petition, and bad at all times remained so willfully absent from him, and therefore it was •decreed that tbe marriage contract alleged in tbe petition, and theretofore existing between tbe parties, be and the same was “ declared annulled, canceled, and void, and no longer binding •on tbe parties,” and each “was restored to tbe rights and privileges of unmarried persons.” Tbe referee further found that tbe ■defendant afterwards married tbe plaintiff, and lived with him -•as above stated. It appeared from uncontradicted evidence that be knew tbe person be was about to marry bad been a wife, and was not a widow; that be also knew of tbe divorce proceeding during its pendency, and in 1864 was informed of tbe result, but tbe referee finds that’“be bad no knowledge of tbe particular manner or circumstances under which the divorce was obtained;” and that when tbe plaintiff and defendant married, BL was living in Obio, and is still living there. As conclusions of law tbe learned referee found that tbe court “ of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, never acquired jurisdiction over tbe person of tbe defendant in tbe proceeding prosecuted in that court, and therefore that tbe decree made :and entered in it was without jurisdiction, and so void and of no effect.” He directed judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff, ■declaring bis marriage with tbe defendant to be illegal and void. After judgment, it was reversed by tbe general term, and a new •trial granted. From that order tbe plaintiff appeals.
George J. Greenfield, for appellant
Be Lancey Orittenden, for respondent

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
We think the Case of Baker (76 N. Y., 78) is conclusive on tbe question brought up by this appeal, viz.: Whether the court in the state of' Ohio had jurisdiction to try the issue raised by the petition of EL, as between him and his-, wife; she then being a non-resident of Ohio, and never a resident of that state, nor at any time there served with process of the court There are some differences in the details of the-circumstances of the two cases, but we think not enough to lead to any change in the result, nor sufficient to require a reconsideration of the law affecting it. The Baker Case was of great, importance, involving, as it did, the liberty of a citizen. It was most fully argued, and we do not perceive that the discussion in the case at bar has developed any new principle, or brought to light any authority which was not then weighed by us. We-do not think the question can be more fully investigated. Concerning the result there was, it is true, a dissent by the late learned chief judge, and the opinion recognized the fact that in other states judgments contrary to the authorities followed in this state had been rendered. This conflict of opinion, however much to be regretted, continues, and it yet remains for some ultimate authority to relieve the point from the difficulties now attending it, and determine the civil rights of parties whose-relations, as legally defined by different state tribunals, are-liable to be regarded on one side of the state line as matrimonial, and on the other side as meretricious.
Adhering, however, to the rule established in this state, a majority of the court are of opinion that the order appealed from should be reversed, and the judgment of the special term affirmed, but without costs.
Ruger, C. J., Rapallo, Andrews and Earl, JJ., concur.