Case Name: CAMPBELL v. JUDGES' RETIREMENT BOARD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1966-07-19
Citations: 378 Mich. 169
Docket Number: Calendar No. 8, Docket No. 51,134
Parties: CAMPBELL v. JUDGES’ RETIREMENT BOARD.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., aud Smith and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 378
Pages: 169–200

Head Matter:
CAMPBELL v. JUDGES’ RETIREMENT BOARD.
Decision op the Court.
1. Judges — Retirement—Current Salary.
Writ to eompel judges’ retirement board to pay eaeb plaintiff retiree judge 1/2 annual current salary being paid to circuit judge is ordered to issue (CLS 1961, § 38.801 et seq., as amended).
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Smith, and O’Hara, JJ.
2. Judges — Retirement System — Membership.
Membership in the judges’ retirement system is not compulsory but voluntary on the part of the judges (CLS 1961, § 38.801s et seq., as amended).
3. Same — Retirement—Contributions—Contracts—Pensions.
A contract is created by the action of the direction of the judges to have a part of their salaries placed in the retirement fund as a voluntary contribution thereto and as a consideration for the State’s agreement to pay a pension to them, there being a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation (CLS 1961, § 38.801 et seq.).
4. Contracts — Essential Elements.
The essential elements of a contract are parties competent to contract, a proper subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement and of obligation.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3,7-10,12-14,20-25,27-32, 35-40] 30A Am Jur, Judges §65;
40 Am Jur, Pensions §§ 13-20, 24.
[4] 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 10.
, [5, 6,11] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 444 et seq.
([15-1.8] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 201 et seq., 506 et seq., 553 et seq.
[19] 34 Am Jur, Mandamus § 42.
■[.26] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 45, 468.
[33] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
[34] 34 Am Jur, Mandamus § 50.
5. Same — Impairment op Obligation.
The obligation of a contract may not be impaired by State law (VS Const, art 1, § 10; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 9; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 10).
6. Same — Vested Eights.
Vested rights acquired under contract may not be destroyed by subsequent State legislation or even by an amendment of the State Constitution (US Const, art 1, § 10; Mich Const 1908, art 2, §9; Mich Const 1963, art 1, §10).
7. Judges — Eetirement—Contracts—Vested Eights — Amendment op Statute.
Judges who had contributed as members of the judges’ retirement system and who retired under the governing act, ceased to be members of the system, as their contract was completely executed and their rights thereunder, including benefits added by amendment of the statute prior to, and added after, retirement, vested and were not subject to diminution or impairment by subsequent legislative change of the judges’ retirement statute (US Const, art 1, § 10; Mich Const 1908, art 2, §9; Mieh Const 1963, art 1, § 10; PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
8. Mandamus — Judges’ Eetirement Board.
Proceeding to compel judges’ retirement board to pay each plaintiff retiree 1/2 annual current salary being paid to circuit judges does not call for review of the board’s exercise of judgment or discretion, and since no question of fact is presented, a judicial declaration of the law and announcement of plaintiffs’ clear legal rights and defendant’s clear legal duty under the retirement act and constitutional guarantees against impairment of obligation of contract or vested right by statute is called for, hence order of superintending control, superseding writ of mandamus, will afford proper relief (PA 1951, No 198, as amended; PA 1961, No 236, § 555, as amended by PA 1963, No 172; GCR 1963, 711.3).
Separate Opinion.
Kelly and Black, JJ.
9. Judges — Statutory Basis por Provision in Eetirement Contracts.
Provision inserted as final clause in all retirement contracts by the judges’ retirement board purporting to incorporate any statutory amendments into the contract held, wholly void for want of authority in the judges’ retirement act for inclusion thereof (OLS 1961, § 38.801 et seq., as amended).
10. Same — Statutory Basis for Eetirement Contracts.
The form of agreement called for by the judges’ retirement act was designed to bind the signing member “to all provisions of this act” as the act stood at the time of execution of the agreement; not to the act plus all amendments the legislature might decide to enact and place in effect with or without Icnowledge of those affected thereby (CLS 1961, § 38.811, et seq., as amended).
11. Contracts — Impairment of Contract by Statute.
There would be no contractual relationship between a participating member of the judges’ retirement system or a retirant and the State, if the statute permitted the State to impair at will the rights of such member or retirant absent vigilance and written notice (CLS 1961, §38.811, et seq., as amended).
12. Judges — Eetirement System.
Membership of the judges’ retirement system created a valid contract between judges and the State, and the State’s agreement thereunder to pay the judges certain benefits created vested rights for the judges upon their retirement which are enforceable and not subject to impairment or diminution by the State (CLS 1961, § 38.801 et seq., as amended).
13. Same — Judges’ Eetirement System — Vested Eights.
Vested rights which accrue to a member of the judges’ retirement system upon his retirement include not only the benefits provided by statute at the time of entry into the contract and of retirement but also those later added by statutory amendment (CLS 1961, §38.801 et seq., as amended).
14. Same — Added Benefits — Judges’ Eetirement System — Impairment of Contracts.
The legislature may add to, but not diminish, benefits to retired judges under the judges’ retirement act without running afoul of constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts (US Const, art 1, §10; Mich Const 1908, art 2, §9; Mich Const 1963, art 1, §10; CLS 1961, §38.801 et seq., as amended).
15. Appeal and Error — Questions Eeviewable — Administrative Procedure Act.
Bypassing of review as accorded by administrative procedure act is permitted where issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedy thereby accorded is not raised until oral argument on appeal (CLS 1961, § 24.101 et seq.).
Dissenting Opinion
Souris, J.
16. Mandamus — Review op Administrative Decisions — Superintending Control.
The writ of mandamus, here sought to secure review of a decision of the judges’ retirement board, has been superseded by the order of superintending control (GCB 1963, 711.3).
17. Same — Review op Administrative Decision — Certiorari.
Complaint for writ of mandamus which sought review of administrative board’s decision, and granted order to show cause, will be considered as a granted petition for review in the nature of certiorari, where plaintiffs are not entitled to issuance of order of superintending control in the nature of mandamus, because of the importance of prompt and final determination of the issues involved (GCB 1963, 711.3).
18. Administrative Law and Procedure — Review op Administra tive Agency Determination.
The Supreme Court, as a matter of policy, will adhere, in all but extremely rare instances, to the method of review of the decisions of administrative agencies which is provided by. specific statutes and covered generally by the administrative procedure act (CLS 1961, § 84.101 et seq.).
19. Mandamus — Supreme Court Policy.
The Supreme Court, as a matter of policy, will not issue a writ of mandamus or order of superintending control in the nature of mandamus, if there is another adequate remedy available (GCB 1963, 711.8).
20. Judges — Retirement—Hearings—Judicial Review.
Retirees under judges’ retirement act are entitled to hearing before the judges’ retirement board on matter of retirement benefits available under various amendments to the act, as provided by rules of procedure adopted by the board as authorized by the State administrative procedure act, and retirees are also entitled to judicial review of the board’s action by the circuit court (CLS 1961, §§84.104, 84.108; 19.68 AACS, §§B S8.801-B 38.808).
21. Constitutional Law — Applicability op 1963 Constitution.
Decision in mandamus action to determine pension rights of retired judges does not involve consideration of the effect of the provision of the new Constitution requiring that- State pension plans be contractual obligations, since the rights sought to be enforced arose prior to the effective date of that Constitution (Const 1963,. art 9, § 84).
22. Judges — Retirement System — Voluntary Plan.
The retirement system established by the judges’ retirement act is entirely voluntary, in that eligible judges have a choice between electing to become members of the system, and. thereby obligating themselves to make voluntary contributions thereto of a portion of their salaries, or electing not to participate in the pension plan (CLS 1961, §38.801 et seq., as amended).
23. Same — Retirement System — Contracts.
The judges’ retirement act clearly contemplates that a contractual relationship is authorized to be created between the member judges and the judges’ retirement board (PA 1951, No 198).
24. Same — Construction op Statutes — -Voluntary Plan.
Cases involving compulsory retirement systems established by municipalities for the benefit of city employees and holding that a retirement plan established by a public authority, at least prior to effective date of new Constitution, created no contractual rights and obligations whatever and that consequently, the State was entitled to amend such systems at will, Reid, not applicable to judges’ retirement system, a voluntary system which creates a contractual relationship between the member judges and the judges’ retirement board (Const 1963, art 9, § U; PA 1951, No 198).
25. Same — Retirement—Contracts.
The judges’ retirement act creates, upon acceptance by a participating judge, a contract between each of the plaintiff judges and the defendant retirement board, the terms of which must be determined by reference to the judges’ retirement act as it read at the time each became a member of the system (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
26. Statutes — Reservation op Power to Amend — Effect op Amendments.
The judges’ retirement act did not reserve to the State the power to amend the act in such fashion that amendments would become binding upon those judges who theretofore had executed agreements of membership in the system (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
27. Judges — Statutes—Contracts.
Provision inserted in all retirement contracts by the judges’ retirement board which purports to permit a member judge to object to subsequent statutory amendments to the judges’ re tirement aet, in which event the judge’s rights and obligations ■ would be determined by the act prior to its amendment, held, to be a millity, since it is not authorised by the judges’ retirement act, from which must come all authority possessed by the judges’ retirement board to bind the State contractually (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
28. Statutes — Judges’ Betirement System — Constitutional Law —Contracts.
The judges’ 'retirement board does not have statutory authority to agree with judges who become members of the system that the terms of their contract's may be changed from time to time by subsequent statutory amendments of the judges’ retirement act, nor can the legislature directly change ' the-terms of their contracts by amending the statute without violating the contract clauses of our Federal and State Con- . . stitulions (VS Const, art 1, § 10; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 9; Const 1968, art 1, § 10; PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
29. Same — Betirement—Judges.
The legislature may, by amendment of the judges’ retirement act, unilaterally and gratuitously grant to those judges already retired under the act retirement benefits not included in their contract with the judges’ retirement board (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
30. Same — Betirement—Judges—Amendments.
The amendment to the judges’ retirement act which tied pension benefits to the State salary payable to judges in active service, expressly, as an act of grace, extended the additional benefit provided by the amendment to those judges already in retirement, and to those members of the retirement system who subsequently retired but whose retirement contracts were executed before the amendment and, thus, did not include its provisions as a term of their contracts with defendant board (PA 1951, No 198, as amended by PA 1956, No $24).
31. Judges — Bescission of Benefits.
The benefit contained in an amendment to the judges’ retirement act which the legislature granted to retirees notwithstanding * the- judges’ retirement board’s lesser contractual obligation to them, could be, and. by later amendment was, unilaterally rescinded as to retirees and judges who subsequently became members of the retirement system (PA 1951, No 198, as amended, by PA 1956, No 224, and PA 1961, No 169).
32. Same — Rescission of Benefits — Contracts.
The fact that defendant judges’ retirement board paid to each plaintiff retired judge, during his retirement between amendments, an annuity determined as required by earlier amendment which tied pension benefits to State salary payable to judges in active service, established no Contractual right in plaintiff to a continuation thereof after legislative rescission of it (PA 1951, No 198, as amended by PA 1956, No 224 and PA 1961, No 169).
33. Costs — Public Question — Construction of Statutes — -Retirement — Judges.
Costs are not awarded in action to determine pension rights of retired judges under certain amendments to the judges’ retirement act, a question of statutory construction affecting a public interest being involved (PA 1951, No 198, as amended by PA 1956, No ¡224 and PA 1961, No 169).
Dissenting Opinion.
Adams, J.
34. Mandamus — Certiorari.
Mandamus should not be granted, where petition therefor may be treated by Supreme Court, in its discretion, as for writ of certiorari, and the Court then reviews questions of law.
35. Judges — Contracts—Retirement—Statutes.
The relationship between members of the judges’ retirement system and the judges’ retirement board is a contractual one, with the specific contract entered into determinable by the retirement act as it read at the time each judge became a member of the retirement system (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
3 6. Same — Contracts—Retirement—Amendment.
The contract entered into between a judge, as a member of the judges’ retirement system, and the judges’ retirement board may be amended, amendments being initiated by the legislature by amendment of the retirement act, and completed by acceptance through nonrejection of the amendment (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
37. Same — Contracts—Statutes—Amendment—Acceptance.
Amendment to the judges’ retirement aot which was beneficial to the judges who were members of the system, is deemed to have been accepted by plaintiffs who failed to reject the amendment, an amendment of the contract thereby being effected (PA 1951, No 198, as amended by PA 1956, No SS4).
38. Same — Contracts.
The contract of a member of the judges’ retirement system becomes final upon his retirement (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
39. Same — Increase in Payments.
The legislature may, as a matter of grace, increase payments after a judge has retired and also eliminate any such increase in payments (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
40. Same — Retirement Contracts — Amendment of Statutes.
Statutory authority in the judges’ retirement act is wanting for inclusion of final clause in retirement contracts purporting to incorporate any statutory amendments into the contract (PA 1951, No 198, as amended).
Original mandamus by Howard L. Campbell and others against the Michigan Judges’ Retirement Board to require defendant to pay to each of the plaintiff retired judges an annuity of one half of the annual salary currently being paid to the circuit judges.
Submitted June 8, 1965.
(Calendar No. 8, Docket No. 51,134.)
Writ granted July 19, 1966.
Fred Roland Allah en, for plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Eugene Krasicky and James J. Wood, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant.

Opinion:
Dethmers, J.
Plaintiffs had been judges and members of the Michigan judges' retirement system. All of them retired from their judicial offices before January 1, 1960. They brought these original man damus proceedings in this Court on September 29, 1964, to compel defendant board to increase the pension payments to them from the $6,250 per annum they were receiving to $7,500, commencing from September 6, 1963, the effective date of PA 1963, No 172, which raised the salaries of circuit judges from $12,500 to $15,000 annually.
PA 1951, No 198 (CLS 1961, § 38.801 et seq. [Stat Aun 1962 Rev § 27.125(1) et seg.]), created the retirement system for those Supreme Court Justices, circuit judges, recorders judges, and superior court judges who, as the act provided, should elect to become members of the system.
Section 11 of that retirement act provides that members of the system shall be the judges who agree to become members. A written agreement is required on a form to be provided by defendant board. Thus, membership is not compulsory but voluntary on the part of the judges.
Each of the plaintiffs voluntarily executed the necessary form of agreement to become a member and thereafter, through salary deductions by the State, made voluntary contributions to the system in the amounts provided for by the act. By reference, the provisions of the act were made a part of the agreement.
As of January 1, 1960, each plaintiff, having retired, was receiving an annuity of $6,250, being one-half of the amount of the $12,500 salary then currently being paid to circuit judges. This was in accord with the requirement of section 14 of the retirement act as amended by PA 1956, No 224 which called for pension payments in amounts equal to one-half of the salary currently being paid to circuit judges, This 1956 amendment as to amounts of pension payments has been referred to as the escalator clause, because it tied the amount of the pension to the increases which might from time to time be granted in salaries to circuit judges.
In 1961, by PA No 169, the act was again amended, to eliminate the escalator clause. It provided for pension payments in the amount of one-half of the salary being paid by the State to the judge at the time of his retirement.
By PA 1963, No 172, the annual salary to be paid by the State to circuit judges was increased from $12,500 to $15,000. Thereupon defendant board was confronted with the question of whether plaintiffs' rights to an annual pension were to be considered increased in amount by the 1963 salary increase for circuit judges in accord with the escalator clause of the 1956 amendment or barred therefrom by the 1961 amendment eliminating the escalator clause from the retirement act. Acting on the advice of the attorney general, defendant board declined to pay plaintiffs the increase. Hence, this suit.
Plaintiffs' contention is that they acquired a vested interest in the rights conferred by the retirement act, including the 1956 amendment creating rights under the escalator clause. This would apply not only to those retiring during the time the escalator clause stood unrepealed as a part of the statute (1956-1961) but also to those to whom, by the act's own terms, it was expressly made applicable, namely, those who had theretofore retired. These rights, so plaintiffs say, cannot be abrogated by giving retroactive effect to the subsequent 1961 amendment eliminating the escalator clause after plaintiffs already had retired and started receiving benefits in accord with the act.
Defendant submits that no vested or contractual rights are involved; that, therefore, elimination of-the escalator clause was properly within the powers of the legislature; and that, accordingly, plaintiffs' rights to benefits are entirely dependent on section 14 as it now stands, namely, as amended in 1961. For this proposition, defendant urges as authority Brown v. City of Highland Park, 320 Mich 108; Wyrzykowski v. Budds, 324 Mich 731; Attorney General v. Connolly, 193 Mich 499; Attorney General v. Chisholm, 245 Mich 285; Thiesen v. Dearborn City Council, 320 Mich 446. In those cases membership of public employees in the retirement system was a condition of employment, compulsory, and deduction from their pay was mandatory, the deductions being placed in a public fund for financing retirement benefits. This Court held that these were not contributions by the employees of their own money but an-appropriation of what had at all times been public-money, that the employees had not voluntarily entered into an agreement, that, therefore, a contract, for retirement benefits had not been made or consummated between the public employing unit of government and the employees, and so, no question of impairment of contracts could be deemed to be. presented by a diminishing of benefits under the pen-, sion plan. Such decisions relating to retirement plans involving compulsory membership and mandatory contributions to the fund of what was deemed to be public money only, although deducted from salaries, have no application to the instant ease in which membership and contributions to the fund by the judges are voluntary and a written agreement is entered into between the judges who elect so to do and the judges' retirement board acting for the State. Here a contract is created by such mutual action on the part of the two contracting parties, with the judges' own money, earned as part of their salaries, being by their consent and at their direction taken therefrom and placed in the retirement fund as the judges' voluntary contribution thereto and as a consideration for the State's agreement to pay a pension to them. In Johnson v. Douglas, 281 Mich 247, 256, this Court said:
"The essential elements of a contract are parties competent to contract, a proper subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation."
Here the judge voluntarily agrees to enter the system and pay the contributions, he does pay, and the State agrees to pay certain retirement benefits. There is, then, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation. A contract is made. Accordingly, a problem of impairment of contract is involved here, as contrasted with the above cited Michigan cases relied on by defendant.
Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 2, § 9, followed by Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 10, and article 1, § 10, of the United States Constitution, prohibit the impairment by State law of the obligation of a contract. Vested rights acquired under contract may not be destroyed bjr subsequent State legislation or even by an amendment of the State Constitution. See City of Lansing v. Michigan Power Co., 183 Mich 400; Ramey v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 296 Mich 449; Village of Constantine v. Michigan Gas & Electric Co., 296 Mich 719; Michigan Public Service Company v. City of Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309.
In this case plaintiffs, who had been judges and contributing members of the judges' retirement system, elected to and did retire under the governing act. Under that act and particularly section 12 thereof, they, thereupon, ceased to be members of the system. When they so retired and ceased to be members of the system, their contract was completely executed and their rights thereunder became vested. These could not, thereafter, be diminished or impaired by legislative change of the judges' retirement statute. In support hereof see: State v. City of Jacksonville Beach (Fla.), 142 So 2d 349 (affirmed 151 So 2d 430); Bardens v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement System, 22 Ill 2d 56 (174 NE2d 168); Jensen v. Pritchard, 120 Ind App 439 (90 NE2d 518); Clarke v. Ireland, 122 Mont 191 (199 P2d 965); Ball v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers Retirement Fund, 71 NJL 64 (58 A 111); Crawford v. Teachers Retirement Fund Association, 164 Or 77 (99 P2d 729); Board of Trustees of Police Pension & Retirement System v. Kern (Okla), 366 P2d 415.
For annotations of the cases, some involving the compulsory and others the voluntary types of pension systems and, with respect to the compulsory, kind some holding one way and some the other, but holding in the main as to the voluntary kind that', a contract results which may not be impaired nor benefits diminished by the employing governmental unit, see 52 ALR2d 437-482, superseding the previous 54 ALE 943, 98 ALE 505, 112 ALE 1009, and 137 ALE 249.
We hold that a valid contract was entered into between judges and the State, that the State's agreement thereunder to pay the judges certain benefits created vested rights for the judges upon their retirement, that these are enforceable and cannot be impaired or diminished by the State. This should be deemed to include not only the benefits provided by statute at the time of entry into the contract and of retirement, but, also, those later added by statutory amendment. The legislature may add to but not diminish benefits without running afoul of con stitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of a contract.
Question has been raised whether this Court has jurisdiction in this original proceeding for mandamus or, otherwise stated, whether there were methods of review of a decision of defendant "board provided by statute available to plaintiffs so that their prayer for mandamus was inappropriate.
Defendant says, in its brief, "There can be no doubt that this Court may grant mandamus", citing Superx Drugs Corporation v. State Board of Pharmacy, 375 Mich 314, 320. Defendant says further, however, that the essential issue is whether mandamus is appropriate here when plaintiffs could have taken advantage of the administrative procedure act, CLS 1961, §24.101 et seq. (Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 3.560[21.1] et seq.) or RJA, PA 1961, No 236, § 631 (CLS 1961, § 600.631 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A-.631]), and particularly its section 4 providing for a hearing before the retirement board and section 8 allowing review in circuit court. Defendant then again refers to the Superx Case and language in the Court's opinion to the effect that while we may issue mandamus, our policy is to adhere in all but extremely rare instances to the method of review of administrative agencies which is provided by specific statutes and covered generally by the administrative procedure act. Defendant also cites cases for the proposition that mandamus will be allowed only in cases of a clear legal right in plaintiff and a clear legal duty in defendant. Toan v. McGinn, 271 Mich 28; Rupert v. Van Buren County Clerk, 290 Mich 180; Solo v. City of Detroit, 303 Mich 672; Local 321, State, County & Municipal Workers of America v. City of Dearborn, 311 Mich 674; Taylor v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich 440; Leininger v. Secretary of State, 316 Mich 644; City of Jackson v. Commiss ioner of Revenue, 316 Mich 694. These elements, says defendant, do not exist in this case.
Plaintiffs say in their brief:
"This is not a proceeding to collect damages, nor is it a suit to collect a money judgment. In this original proceeding these plaintiffs are asking for specific relief, namely, that this Court shall direct the defendant board, to perform a ministerial duty according to the law, imposed by the provisions of the judges' retirement act, and in the performance of which neither the exercise of judgment nor discretion is involved or required.
"This is therefore not a proceeding comparable to that which this Court has so recently considered in Superx Drugs Corporation v. State Board of Pharmacy, 375 Mich 314. The exercise of discretion is not here present."
We think this is not a case of review of the defendant board's exercise of judgment or discretion. No question of fact is presented. Rather, this case calls for judicial declaration of the law and announcement of plaintiffs' clear legal rights and defendant's clear legal duty under the retirement act and the constitutional guarantees against impairment by legislative act of a contract and the rights acquired and vesting under it and the statute. We may, and in this case should, allow issuance of the writ. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Oakland, 264 Mich 673; People, ex rel. Township of LaGrange, v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich 468; Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich 328; National Bank of Detroit v. State Land Office Board, 300 Mich 240; Porter v. State Land Office Board, 308 Mich 324.
Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought. If necessary, .the writ or order will issue as prayed.. Costs to plaintiffs.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., aud Smith and O'Hara, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.
This aet amended PA 1961, No 236, § 555 (GLS 1961, § 600.555). See Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 27A.555.—Reporter
CLS 1956, §38.814 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.125[14]).— Reporter.
OLS 1961, § 38.814 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.125[14]).—Reporter.
While writ of mandamus was here sought, GCE 1963, 711.3 provides for superseding thereof by order of superintending control, Sueh order should be deemed sought and granted here.