Case Name: Richard L. WALTERS and Roberta Walters, Appellants, v. Kirby BLANKENSHIP, Bonnie Blankenship, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-04-28
Citations: 931 So. 2d 137
Docket Number: No. 5D05-1541
Parties: Richard L. WALTERS and Roberta Walters, Appellants, v. Kirby BLANKENSHIP, Bonnie Blankenship, et al., Appellees.
Judges: TORPY, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 931
Pages: 137–145

Head Matter:
Richard L. WALTERS and Roberta Walters, Appellants, v. Kirby BLANKENSHIP, Bonnie Blankenship, et al., Appellees.
No. 5D05-1541.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 28, 2006.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 2006.
Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Orlando, and Douglas M. Bates, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellants.
Jeffrey L. Price and Kristin M. Davis of The Robertson Group, Gainesville, for Ap-pellees McNeely.
Kristen M. Van Der Linde and Blake J. Hood, of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees Weaver.
No Appearance for Appellees Blankenship.

Opinion:
SHARP, W., J.
Richard and Roberta Walters, the plaintiffs below, appeal an order dismissing with prejudice their complaint against their former neighbors: Kirby and Bonnie Blankenship, Thomas and Lynn Klinehofer, Farrell and Sharon McNeely, and Richard and Demetria Weaver (collectively the defendants) for failure to state a cause of action. We conclude the complaint states a cause of action or, at the very least, can be amended to state a cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective business advantage or civil conspiracy. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We begin our analysis by noting we express no opinion as to whether the Walters will ultimately prevail on their claims. At the dismissal stage, our inquiry is solely limited to questions of law. In- conducting this review, we must confíne ourselves to the four corners of the complaint and accept all allegations in the complaint as true. We are not free to speculate as to what may indeed be true or ultimately proven. Parker v. Parker, 916 So.2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
The facts of this ease as set forth in the Walters' complaint are as follows: The Walters owned four luxury condominium units and the defendants also each owned one or more units in the same complex. The Walters subsequently listed their four units for sale through a real estate auction company wherein potential bidders were required to deposit a $50,000 cashier's check as a condition precedent to participation as a bidder at the auction. However, there was no reserve for the auction. Twenty-some bidders deposited the required check.
On the day prior to the auction the Walters assert that defendant Thomas Kli-nehofer confronted another unit owner (not a party to this suit) and stated, "you wait until the day of the sale and see what we are going to do to Dick Walters." On the day of the auction, the defendants placed "for sale by owner" signs in front of their respective units which was prohibited by condominium rules. The auction took place as scheduled.
The Walters' condominium units sold for a total price of $2,066,925. The Walters alleged the combined acts of the defendants placing "for sale by owner" signs in front of their respective units caused catastrophic financial and emotional damage. As a proximate result of these "intentional, spiteful, malicious and non-privileged" acts, each unit offered by the Walters sold at a substantial loss. The defendants allegedly removed all of the "for sale by owner" signs immediately after the last of the Walters' units was sold, which was further evidence that the defendants' acts were "grotesque, macabre, malicious and spiteful."
Based on the above, the Walters filed a complaint against the defendants for tor-tious interference with a prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy to commit the same. The Walters sought compensatory damages in excess of $1.5 million and punitive damages in the amount of at least $4.5 million for the alleged financial losses and emotional distress arising out of the posting of "for sale by owner" signs by the defendants.
The Walters asserted that the presence of "for sale by owner" signs in front of other condominium units lowered the bids and selling prices of their units, causing substantial financial losses. The Walters alleged the defendants knew the Walters were offering all four units for sale at the auction with no price reserve, knew that the auction was non-caneellable and knew that, absent their interference, the four units would sell for substantially higher prices.
The elements of a cause of action based on tortious interference with a business relationship are (1) the existence of a business relationship, (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship, (3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship. Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812 (Fla.1994); Sobi v. Fairfield, Resorts, Inc., 846 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
Here the Walters alleged the existence of a business relationship with the successful bidders, if not all prospective bidders, their neighbors' knowledge of this relationship, their neighbors' intentional and unjustified interference with this relationship by posting "for sale by owner" signs only during the sale of the Walters' units and with the intention of driving down the Walters' sales price and the resulting damage in the form of a much reduced sales price for the Walters' four units. These allegations appear sufficient to us to state a cause of action for tortious interference.
We view these allegations as involving much more than a "mere offer to sell." Once the Walters agreed to the auction without a reserve, they were obligated to accept the offers on their units irrespective of price. More than 20 bidders, each posting a substantial bond, attended the auction and the units were sold for substantial losses. Thus the parties had progressed beyond the stage of a mere offer to sell— the Walters were now obligated to sell their units albeit at greatly depressed prices, as the result of the interference of the defendants.
Nor do we find the defendants had an absolute First Amendment right to post their "for sale" signs. In Americas Homes, Inc. v. Esler, 668 So.2d 239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), we held that homeowners were simply exercising their right to free speech when they placed "for sale" signs on their property even though the signs indicated potential of flooding in the area, and may have decreased home sales.
In that case, however, the homeowners had a legitimate reason for posting their "for sale" signs and were doing so on the advice of their broker. The homeowners had listed their property for sale and shortly thereafter, a flood occurred nearby. Their broker advised the homeowners they would not be able to sell their property unless they fully disclosed the flooding. The homeowners complied with their broker's request by posting a sign which read: "Due to local flooding this property is for sale."
In contrast, here the defendants had no legitimate reason for posting their "for sale" signs. Their units were not for sale and their signs were removed as soon as the last of the Walters' units was sold. According to the Walters' complaint, the defendants posted their for sale signs simply out of malice and spite. See Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1992) (allegations that disgruntled homeowners intentionally and maliciously made false statements concerning developer's operation of planned unit development to third parties and local government officials for purpose of harming developer's economic interests made facially sufficient claim that homeowners abused First Amendment right to petition government and stated claims for tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious interference with advantageous business relationship, and civil conspiracy).
As for the count of civil conspiracy, we conclude it is viable, based either on the underlying tortious interference count or as an independent tort. The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (a) a conspiracy between two or more parties, (b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, (c) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and (d) damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts performed pursuant to the conspiracy. Florida Fern Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So.2d 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
Generally an actionable conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort or wrong. See Florida Fern Growers Ass'n, Inc.; Wright v. Yurko, 446 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). However, an alternative basis for a civil conspiracy claim exists where the plaintiff can show some "peculiar power of coercion" possessed by the conspirators by virtue of their combination, which an individual acting alone does not possess. See Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So.2d 547 (Fla.1977) (jai-alai players stated claim for conspiracy against jai-alai fronton owners who allegedly conspired to prevent players from getting jobs in arenas after a players strike); Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So.2d 164 (Fla.1958) (claim for conspiracy was stated against five kennel club owners who refused the plaintiff greyhound racer privileges at their tracks and used intimidation to drive the plaintiff out of business); Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 342 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (physician stated a claim for conspiracy against a group of anesthesiologists who refused to provide their services to plaintiffs patients, depriving him of his hospital privileges, and thereby driving him out of his practice).
Here it was the concerted nature of the defendants' actions that allegedly caused the resulting losses to the Walters. Had only one defendant put up a for sale sign, that action may have had no significant effect on the auction. However, when the defendants in concert all posted for sale signs, it appeared that five sellers were trying to sell their units in the same condominium and that twice as many units were for sale.
According to the Walters, this was a small condominium complex and the defendants' actions made it appear that a majority of units were now for sale. This greater number of units up for sale suggests something may have been wrong with the condominiums or, at the very least, dramatically increased the supply of units for sale, thus lowering the market value of each unit.
Because we find that the trial court erred in dismissing the Walters' complaint with prejudice, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORPY, J., concurs specially with opinion.
LAWSON, J., dissents with opinion.
. In their complaint, the Walters did not allege the exact number of condominium units. On remand, the Walters should be allowed to amend their complaint to include these allegations.