Case Name: M. G. Dikes v. Alsey S. Miller et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 281
Docket Number: 
Parties: M. G. Dikes v. Alsey S. Miller et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 281–291

Head Matter:
M. G. Dikes v. Alsey S. Miller et al.
A release by a grantee of land, of the 3d June, 18-13, was operative and effectual to divest the title of the grantee.
It is held, that the United States, in their political capacity, may enter into contracts, may take a bond, and may receive real or other property as a security for a debt in cases not previously provided for by law. The power exists as an incident to the general rights of sovereignty; and the Government, being a body politic, may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, and through the instrumentality of the proper department to which those powers are confided, enter into contracts not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise of those powers. It does not require legislation to empower the proper department to act in making the contract or receiving the security. The power exists as an incident to sovereignty, and may be exercised by the proper department, if not forbidden by legislation.
The commissioner of the general land office would seem to be the proper officer to accept the relinquishments of title in a case like the present. This is the department or office in which to preserve the evidences of the public lands and land titles of the State. And upon the principle of the decisions to which we have referred, in the absence of any legal provision or prohibition, he must be deemed to have authority to accept the relinquishment of title on behalf of the State.
■Having parted with his title, the grantee, Wickson, had nothing to convey by his subsequent deed to Arrington. That being but a quit-claim deed, and the conveyance from Arrington to the plaintiff being also by a quitclaim deed, the latter took the risk of the title.
The original was an archive, and the copy, certified as such by the keeper of the records, was admissible in evidence. But, if not an archive, the original could not be removed from the office. Its non-production was accounted for; and its execution and contents fully proved by the production of the best evidence of which the nature of the case was susceptible.
Appeal from G-onzales. The case was tried before Hon. Fielding Jones, one of the district judges..
Dikes sued Miller and Heill in an action of trespass to try title. The case is reported in 24 Tex., 424, 425, and 11 Tex., 209. It was reversed on various grounds. As intimated in 24 Tex., the case finally turned upon the effect of a voluntary relinquishment by a grantee of land to the State, and the delivery of the deed to, and filing it with, the commissioner of the general land office.
On the 1st of May, 1831, Byrum Wickson, "a colonist of Green De Witt, received a grant to the land in controversy. On the 3d of June, 1843, Wickson relinquished the land to the republic of Texas, by deed of that date, for the recited consideration that the grantee had subsequently obtained a grant for a league of land on file. He doubtless relinquished the first grant with a view to make good the second. The relinquishment was proven, as a sworn copy, by the deposition of the commissioner of the general land office, and by certificate of the keeper of the archives, under the statutes. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 3713, 3806, Dotes 840, 889.)
Wickson, on the 15th September, 1844, conveyed the land to William W. Arrington. Arrington conveyed to Dikes on the 6th of May, 1848.
The defendants relied on the anterior conveyance by Wickson to the State, and a junior patent by the State to himself, dated 28th July, 1848, and issued upon the hypothesis that Wickson’s relinquishment to the State restored the land to the vacant domain.
The plaintiff excepted to the proof‘of the Wickson release to the republic,, both as to the mode of proof and the legal effect. The strength of the case is presented in the following instructions given by the court:
.“In this ease, gentlemen, I charge you, that the deed of relinquishment introduced by defendant, by which B. Wickson, the person under whom plaintiff claims, does in law divest the said Wickson, and those claiming under him, of any title, and you should find for the defendant; and I charge you that his title, as shown', is good and valid.”
And in the following special charge, asked by the defendants:
1. “The plaintiff can only recover upon the strength of his own title.
2. “ The deed of Byrum Wiekson, dated the 3d day of June, 1843, operated as a release of his interest to the State, and divested his title, after which he had nothing to convey to Arrington.
3. “This deed to Arrington, being a quit-claim, put him and Dikes upon inquiry, and they are estopped by the release of the 3d June, 1843.
4. “The defendant’s patent and possession are a good defense, and, title being proved out of the plaintiff he cannot recover against said possession.”
The arguments of the counsel are reported at greater length because of the novelty of the principle.
Under the charge, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants; from which the plaintiff appealed.
William H. Stewart, for appellant.
—This suit was instituted many years ago by Dikes, appellant, to recover, in an action of trespass to try title, a quarter of a league of land, originally granted to Wiekson, as a colonist, in De Witt’s colony. The plaintiff deraigned title from the government through the old grant to Wiekson, as a colonist, and the deed from Wiekson to Arrington, and the deed from. Arrington to appellant; the date of the said colonist grant being 1831, the date of Wickson’s deed to Arrington 1844, the date of Arrington’s deed to Dikes, appellant, 1848; all of which were duly recorded in the proper county about the date of them execution. The defendant claimed through a junior patent from the State to himself in 1848, and also relied on the purported relinquishment of Wiekson to the government, dated in 1843. Bill of exception was taken to the ruling of the court permitting the relinquishment to be read in evidence, but all the other deeds were read without objection.
The court having charged the jury to find for the defendant, there were a verdict and judgment for the defendant, which appellant seeks to reverse on appeal.
1. The certified copy of the relinquishment was inadmissible in evidence for the reasons stated in the bill of exception. Certified copies of the records of all public offices, &c., are admissible in evidence, but the document, although deposited in the land office, was improperly there, and constituted no portion of the records thereof. As to what documents were archives of the office, and as to what papers shall form the records of the general land office, see Hart. Dig., Arts. 1786, 1819, 1820, 1835, 1842. Certified copies of papers, not archives or records of the general land office, are not admissible in evidence. (Paschal v. Perez, 8 Tex., 256.)
2. A patent for land already granted is void, and if the relinquishment should be deemed an abandonment of the land, then the question presents itself, if it be analogous to a derelict or waif, as intimated by the court in argument on the former appeal of this case, which of the two claimants contending for the derelict is entitled thereto, the elder or the junior claimant? Surely the elder. And, further, if derelict property may be taken by the first finder, surely it may be resumed by the original owner before any claim of subsequent possessor. To apply these, propositions: The deed of Wickson to Arrington was prior to defendant’s claim; so was the deed from Arrington to Dikes prior to defendant’s claim, taking the record and statement of facts in this case as it now stands before the court.
But the land, having been previously granted and titled by the government, was not subject to location and patent, and hence the contest in this case could not arise between plaintiff and defendants as to the right to the derelict; but, where the plaintiff has abandoned his lands, the government alone would have the right to controvert the plaintiff’s claim. Even escheats and forfeitures cannot be set up by defendants without some law to that effect.
3. Although it be conceded that one may abandon land as he might a chattel, yet he may again resume the same, there being no intervening rights, as in the case presented by the record.
4. If the relinquishment be viewed-in the light of a bond or contract for title, this court lias decided repeatedly, where the obligee has failed to comply with his part of the bond, the obligor may resume the land, and declare the contract at an end for the non-compliance, of the obligee. The consideration recited in the relinquishment having .failed in the estimation of Wickson, he had a right to resume his former possession, and alienate the same to another .who would comply.
5. Again, neither Arrington nor Dikes had any notice of the relinquishment, as the same was not recorded at the time of their purchase, and the State, or those claiming under the relinquishment, must be the sufferers of them own laches, in not having placed the same on record in the county where the land lies, and in such case the purchaser without notice will be protected against one claiming under even prior unrecorded deed or relinquishment.
6. The appellees, LTeill and Miller, had notice, before their purchase or location, that Wickson had conveyed the land to Arrington, and that Arrington had conveyed to appellant, for the deeds, being properly upon record in the county where the land lies, were sufficient notice to them.
7. The depositions of Crosby and Long ought not to have been let in, for the reasons assigned in appellant’s bill of exceptions.
8. If the relinquishment, as is believed, was not an archive or record of the general land office, and if the relinquishment did not divest the title, yet its execution and genuineness were not proven; for, if the original relinquishment itself had been before the court, it could not have been introduced in evidence upon proof simply of the handwriting of the subscribing witnesses to the relinquishment. Some proof even then would have4 been required of the handwriting of the grantor himself, before the paper could have been read in evidence. The original deed of relinquishment itself could not have been even admitted, to record upon proof simply of the handwriting of the subscribing witnesses. (Hart. Dig., Art. 2792.)
9. How came the relinquishment in the land office; when did it get there; was it such an instrument as belonged to the custody of the commissioner of the general land office; was it such an instrument as the commissioner could give certified copies of; was the instrument ever recorded; was there any notice of the paper being filed among the papers in the cause; was the genuineness and' execution of the instrument proven; was any basis laid for the introduction of secondary evidence; was there any proof of the execution of the original relinquishment; was not the paper a copy, and not the original; could the original itself have been read in evidence under such proof?— are questions amongst others presented in the bill of exceptions, which forbid the letting in to the jury the copy of relinquishment. If the relinquishment even did divest the title of Wickson, it could not have been proper to let in the copy in evidence.
10. If the government could avail itself of an escheat or abandonment, it is not to- follow that individuals may avail themselves of all the pleas which the government could if it were a party.
I A. Geo. W. Paschal, for appellee.
—This is “Monsieur Tonson come to town again.”
Upon the return of the case to the District Court, the plaintiff proved the grant to Byrum Wickson, and the deeds from Wickson to Arrington, and from Arrington to Dikes, and closed. The defendants proved the prior release by Wickson to the State, by laying the predicate for the copy as secondary evidence. The court, in effect, charged the jury that the deed of Wickson to the State, dated the 3d day of June, 1843, operated as a release of his interest to the State and divested his title, after which he had nothing to convey to 'Arrington.
This deed to Arrington being a quit-claim, put him and Dikes upon inquiry, and they are estopped by Wickson’s release; that the defendants’ patent and possession are a good defense; and, title being proven out of the plaintiff, he cannot recover against said possession.
There were a verdict and judgment for the defendants.
The parties agreed that'the very questions to be decided are, first, as to the correctness of the ruling upon the bill of exceptions; second, as to the correctness of the instructions given and refused, and as to the legal effect of the release; .third, as to the correctness of the ruling overruling the motion for a new trial, which bring back the same questions.
The naked questions for consideration are :
1. Did the court err in admitting the secondary evidence of a release?
2. Was it the proper legal effect of the release that it divested the title of Wickson?
3. It being a quit-claim title through which Dikes claimed, is he not estopped by the release ?
All these points were decided by this court for the defendants at the last term, (24 Tex., 424,) and are now here for reconsideration. Crosby and Long proved that the subscribing witnesses reside out of the State, and proved the genuineness of the release; also proved that the document is an archive, bound in a volume in the land office, which the defendants could not control; they also proved that the witnesses, Ward and Daniels, resided out of the State. The plaintiff proved that Ward, one of the witnesses, had been back in Texas a few days, and then absconded, and was at the time out of the State.
The secondary evidence was entirely admissible. Indeed, if the document had the legal effect to divest the title of Wickson, it was an archive of the land office, in the custody of the commissioner, and a certified copy was - not only legal, but the only possible evidence. (Hart. Dig., Arts., 744, 2750, 2751; Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 70, 71, Hotes ■ 250, 251.)
The proof of a sworn copy was also admissible, the original being beyond the control of the plaintiff. But the original being beyond control, there were no degrees of secondary evidence. (Lewis v. San Antonio, 7 Tex., 288.)
This brings us to the very pith of the case, as to the legal effect of a release, which declares, that in consideration of having received a league head-right, and being entitled to but one, “he therefore relinquishes, transfers, and donates the before-described land to the republic of Texas, that it may be declared' vacant, or be disposed of as the government may see fit.”
That the ownership, of property carries along the right of disposal, even to the manumission of a ‘slave, (which is against public policy,) has been decided by this court, upon the very highest authority. (Jones v. Laney et al., 2 Tex., 343; McCutchen et al. v. Marshall, 8 Pet., 238.)
This being an admitted principle, the release operates as an abandonment of the title, and the capacity of the State to take is hardly a question. The title would certainly operate until the legislature should refuse to accept the title. Wickson could not control the land merely because the legislature had not acted. He understood that the commissioner of the general.land office had the power to accept the title, and the dee’d will be taken according to his understanding. (Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex., 358; Hart. Dig., Art. 169.) In this case, the right of the county to take was put upon the ground that it was a public corporation. Certainly it is not more so than a State. And the rule quoted from Vidal v. Girard’s Exrs., 2 How., 187-8, certainly establishes the principle, that if the trust be contrary to the character of trusts which the State may .exercise, (and this cannot be predicated of a State,) still this will not render the “ donation” void, but only create the necessity of appointing a trustee. The ability of the State, which is the owner of a vast public domain,-to take by donation, cannot be questioned.
A principle in this case seems to be, whether the commissioner of the general land office had the right to receive the deed, in order to settle the right, without any legislative act authorizing it.
The very nature of sovereignty authorized the receipt of the conveyance, and there is a class of cases which hold that the proper department may take the conveyance, unless there be a statute prohibiting it. (Neilson v. Lazon et al, 12 How., 107; Dugan’s Ex. v. The United States, 3 Wheat., 172; United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet., 117; United States v. Brady, 11 Pet., 343; United States v. Sim, 15 Pet., 290; United States v. Lane’s Admr., 3 McLean, 365.)
These cases are certainly analogous in principle.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—When this cause was before us on a former appeal, we intimated an opinion, that the deed of relinquishment of the 3d of June, 1843, was operative and effectual to divest the title of the grantee, Wickson, and vest it in the government. (24 Tex., 417.) We are now referred by counsel for the appellee to a series of cases decided by the courts of the United States which strengthen this opinion. Thus, it is held that the United States, in their political capacity, may enter into contracts, may take a bond, and may receive real or other property as a security for a debt, in cases not previously provided for by law. This power exists as an incident to the general right of sovereignty; and the Government, being a body politic, may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, and through the instrumentality of the proper department to which those powers are confided, enter into contracts, not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise of those powers. It does not require legislation to empower the proper department to act in making the contract or receiving the security; the power exists as an incident to sovereignty, and may he exercised by the proper department, if not forbidden by legislation. (Dugan's Ex. v. United States, 3 Wheat, 172; United States v. Tingey, 5 Peters, 114; United States v. Bradley, 10 Peters, 343; United States v. Sim, 15 Peters, 290; Neilson v. Lazon, 12 Howard, 107; United States v. Lane's Admr., 3 McLean, 365.)
It is undoubted that the State has the capacity to take by deed or devise. (Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex., 350.) _ The commissioner of the general land office would Seem to be the proper officer to accept the relinquishment-of title in a case like the present. This is the department or office in which to preserve the evidences of the public lands and land-titles of the State. And upon the principle of the decisions to which we have referred, in the absence of any legal provision or prohibition, he must be deemed to have authority to accept the relinquishment of title on behalf of the State. On the authority of these decisions, and upon the considerations heretofore adverted to, (24 Tex., 423,) we think it safe to conclude, that the deed of release in question was effectual to pass the title and revest it in the State; at least, that it was sufficient to divest the title of the grantee, which is sufficient for the disposition of this case.
Having parted with his title, the grantee, Wickson, had nothing to convey by his subsequent deed to Arrington. That being but a quit-claim deed, and the conveyance from Arrington to the plaintiff being also by a quit-claim deed, the latter'took the risk of the title. (Id., 425, and cases cited.) Hot having acquired the title, it is plain that £.e cannot maintain the action; and there is therefore no error in the charge of the court.
The proof of the deed of release was objected to on vari ous grounds; "but the objections were overruled, and we think rightly. The original was an archive, and the copy certified as such by the keeper of the records was admissible in evidence. But, if not an archive, the original could not be removed from the office. Its non-production was accounted for, and its execution and contents fully proved by the production of the best evidence of which the nature of the case was susceptible. The evidence produced was not such as presupposed the existence of better evidence within the power of the party. It was the best and only evidence of which the case was susceptible, and was.therefore the "best evidence," within the meaning of the rule upon that subject. (1 Greenl. Ev., §. 82.)
We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment, and that it be
Affirmed.