Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark A. NEALY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-10-21
Citations: 532 So. 2d 1117
Docket Number: No. 87-2295
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark A. NEALY, Appellee.
Judges: SCHEB, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 532
Pages: 1117–1120

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark A. NEALY, Appellee.
No. 87-2295.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 21, 1988.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James A. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and D.P. Chanco, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
Mark Nealy, who was sixteen years old at the time of sentencing, was charged with robbery, kidnapping, and grand theft. Because of his age and the fact that he had never been "locked up like an animal," the trial judge determined that Nealy should be sentenced as a youthful offender under chapter 958, Florida Statutes (1987), to the Department of Corrections for four years, followed by two years of community control for each count to run concurrently.
Nealy agreed to plead no contest on the terms and conditions stated by the court. The state objected to sentencing Nealy as a youthful offender and requested that he be sentenced under the guidelines, which provided for a sentence in the range of seven to nine years' incarceration.
The state contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Nealy without providing a written order setting forth rea sons supporting the downward departure from the sentencing guidelines presumptive range. This contention is without merit because the trial court sentenced Nealy under the Youthful Offender Act. In so doing it could not sentence Nealy to the seven to nine years recommended by the guidelines because the maximum sanction allowed by the Youthful Offender Act is six years. See Allen v. State, 526 So.2d 69 (Fla.1988). Consequently, the trial court was not departing from the guidelines when it sentenced Nealy. Rather, it was sentencing Nealy to one of the sentencing alternatives provided by the Youthful Offender Act.
Notwithstanding our disposition of this appeal, in light of the state's contention, we shall address the interplay between the sentencing guidelines and the Youthful Offender Act.
The state appears to argue that a youthful offender sentence is subject to the guidelines and a downward departure must therefore be supported by written reasons. Section 958.04(3) of the Youthful Offender Act is the only section of the act that refers to the sentencing guidelines. It reads as follows:
The provisions of this section shall not be used to impose a greater sentence than the maximum recommended range as established by statewide sentencing guidelines pursuant to section 921.001 unless reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge which reasonably justify departure. A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to section 924.06 or section 924.07.
The right of appeal by the state was added by the legislature last year. That amendment of section 958.04(3) was the only material change the legislature made to the statute. It did not alter the original wording, which only requires written reasons to be submitted by the trial court when it departs upward from the recommended guidelines range.
As we stated in State v. Diers, 517 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988),
the Y.O.A. is more specific than the guidelines scheme and directs that its penalties are to be imposed "[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law." § 958.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). Second, the legislative amendment to the Y.O.A. specifically provides for a defendant's appeal from an upward departure from the guidelines but is silent on both downward departures and the state's right to appeal.
(Emphasis supplied).
Though the latest legislative amendment of section 958.04(3) has added the right of the state to appeal, it remains silent as to downward departures.
Notwithstanding the silence of the statute on the need for written reasons in support of a downward departure, in light of the Fifth District's holding in Wiedeman v. State, 506 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), that written reasons are required in such circumstances, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as being one of great public importance:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO STATE WRITTEN REASONS WHEN IT IMPOSES A SENTENCE UNDER THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ACT WHICH IS LESS THAN THAT RECOMMENDED UNDER THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES?
AFFIRMED.
SCHEB, A.C.J., concurs.
PARKER, J., concurs specially.