Case Name: Terry SHIELDS and Robert Helmka, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1990-03-20
Citations: 565 So. 2d 473
Docket Number: No. 21179-CA
Parties: Terry SHIELDS and Robert Helmka, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before MARVIN, FRED W. JONES, Jr., and HIGHTOWER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 565
Pages: 473–481

Head Matter:
Terry SHIELDS and Robert Helmka, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 21179-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
March 20, 1990.
On Rehearing Aug. 22, 1990.
Charles C. Grubb, City Atty., Lydia M. Rhodes, Asst. City Atty., Shreveport, for defendants-appellants.
Ronald J. Miciotto, Shreveport, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before MARVIN, FRED W. JONES, Jr., and HIGHTOWER, JJ.

Opinion:
MARVIN, Judge.
In this civil service appeal arising out of the termination of two police officers for drinking in uniform while serving as "security" at a high school alumni reunion at a Shreveport motel, the district court, while commending the Chief and the Civil Service Board of Review for removing the officers from active duty, found that the discipline was excessive and not in "good faith" and remanded for "more appropriate disciplinary action." LRS 33:2501.
This appeal by the City and the Board questions the authority or the scope of review of the district court and the correctness, in fact and in law, of its judgment. See LRS 33:2501 E(3); Newman v. Department of Fire, 425 So.2d 753 (La.1983), citing LRS 49:964 G(5).
We affirm.
FACTS
The Board's factual findings are not contested. The officers accepted the opportunity to serve as private security for pay at the party after their regular duty hours ended. A city ordinance apparently requires security at some private parties.
Refusing, instead of accepting, drinks that were offered them by the party-goers, they drank whiskey which they purchased from a nearby liquor store, having driven there in a marked police car while in uniform. As the party began to wind down, one of the officers went to sleep in a corner area of the lobby of the motel. The officers were paid and departed when the party ended. The party-goers who testified at the board hearing complimented the conduct and demeanor of the officers at the party.
A report about the officers' drinking, however, provoked a pre-disciplinary hearing by the Chief of Police. The Chief placed them on administrative leave and directed them to the Employee Assistance Program "to find out about their drinking problem." This program is available to City employees who seek assistance in coping with personal problems, including alcoholism, that interfere with their City duties. There, each officer revealed his respective lengthy abuse of alcohol while off duty. This abuse was confirmed by an independent chemical dependency service, which opined that both officers were alcoholics. Three days after the service rendered its reports, the Chief fired the officers for "drinking on duty."
On appeal by the officers, the Civil Service Board, after an evidentiary hearing, upheld the termination of each officer by a vote of 3-2. The appeal to the district court followed. Evidence before the board included a psychiatric opinion elicited by each officer that he had an alcohol dependency problem.
The district court effectively found that the officers' drinking at the party did not cause them or the department specific impairment or detriment, but only general detriment because they were deemed to have been "on duty" while on the private security assignment in uniform, contrary to department and statutory regulations. See LRS 33:2500A(6). This conclusion is supported by the record.
Legal "cause" for discipline, however, is not questioned by the officers or the district court. We shall assume, as did the district court, that legal cause for some discipline was warranted in that "the conduct of the employee impaired the efficiency of the public service." Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So.2d 5, 9 (La.1962).
The district court commended the action of the Chief in removing the officers from active law enforcement. The record and the district court's reasons for judgment suggest the conclusion that most City employees with a drinking problem would be offered some rehabilitative assistance under the City's program before being terminated. The district court's reasons also suggest that all employees, including police officers, should be encouraged to reveal their abuse of alcohol and to seek assistance from the City's program.
REVIEW OF BOARD DISCIPLINE
The trial court considered the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Craighead v. Administrator, Dept. of Empl. Security, 420 So.2d 688 (La.App. 2d Cir.1982), writ denied. Those authorities afford some relief to some employee-alcoholics in other situations, but are only remotely analogous and shall not be discussed because they are not directly applicable to the specific issues presented in this appeal.
When a civil service employee appeals disciplinary action taken against him by the appointing authority (here, the Chief of Police), the Board is "confined to the question of whether the action . was made in good faith for cause set forth in the provisions of this Part." § 2501 B.
An appeal of the Board's decision "shall be confined to a determination of whether the decision made by the board was made in good faith and for cause under the provisions of this Part." § 2501 E(3). The statutory standard for appellate judicial review of actions under civil service laws is more detailed in LRS 49:964(G):
The court may affirm the decision . or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, or conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(6) Manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable,'probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge of the credibility of witnesses by firsthand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency's determination of credibility issues.
See Newman v. Department of Fire, supra, City of Kenner v. Pritchett, 432 So.2d 971 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983).
In Newman, the authority of a court to modify civil service disciplinary action by remanding was recognized, but the court's modification was not upheld because it was not shown that the discipline was arbitrary or capricious. In City of Kenner, the district court's modification of the civil service board's discipline was upheld. We agree that a "chief of police . has the discretion to take disciplinary actions where there exists sufficient cause . and is answerable for departmental actions. Because an officer is the first to be terminated for violation of departmental rules does not alone constitute bad faith_ However, each case is subject to the scrutiny of appellate review and must be decided ac cording to the particular facts of that case." 432 So.2d at 974.
LRS 33:2501 E(3), confining court review to determining whether the discipline was imposed in "good faith for cause," should be read in the light of LRS 49:964(G), which details the permissible extent of court review.
Disciplinary action against a civil service employee will be deemed arbitrary and capricious unless there is a real and substantial relationship between the improper conduct and the efficient operation of the public service. The appointing authority must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct did in fact impair the efficiency and orderly operation of the public service. Newman, 425 So.2d at 754.
Thus, the critical question in this appeal from the district court's judgment is not whether that court has authority to review civil service discipline, but whether that court's judgment is correct in concluding expressly that the Board did not act in "good faith" (LRS 33:2501) and, impliedly, that the Board was arbitrary and capricious or abused its discretion (LRS:49:964(G)) in upholding the termination of the officers. Stated simply, the question is how substantial the relationship is between the improper conduct and the "efficient operation" of the department, or whether the board's discipline (punishment) fits the civil service employee's infraction or violation (crime). Newman, at p. 754.
Here the officers were "drinking while in uniform . technically deemed to be 'on duty.' " Their conduct at the private security assignment received the compliments of the party-goers who testified. They did not flaunt their drinking, but nonetheless, the fact that they purchased whiskey which they drank while in uniform, generally discredited the police department.
We shall not speculate whether their discipline would have been something less than termination if the evidence showed that they were not otherwise abusive of alcohol while off-duty. This record shows that this evidence apparently stemmed from the Chief's direction that they be "evaluated" by the City's Coordinator of the Employee's Assistance Program "to find out about the officer's drinking problem." It is to the credit of the officers that they revealed their abuse of alcohol when off-duty. All employees should be encouraged to make such revelations.
We see no reason why a police officer who reveals his or her abuse of alcohol, or drinking problem, should be treated differently from other employees. All employees should be encouraged to seek rehabilitative help in this respect. This is not to say, however, that in other circumstances a police officer or fireman whose conduct impairs the efficiency of the public service should not be terminated. See McIntosh v. Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, 389 So.2d 410 (La.App. 2d Cir.1980), writ denied. Each case must be decided on its own circumstances. City of Kenner, supra.
We have summarized the express and implied reasons of the district court for finding that the termination of the officers was not in "good faith" and remanding for imposition of some lesser discipline. There are no credibility disputes in this record.
The preponderance of the evidence, especially in light of the 3-2 vote of the Board, establishes that the City did not show that there was a real and substantial relationship between the officers' conduct at the party and the efficient operation of the police department. The punishment was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion and did not fit the violation. Discipline less than termination should have been imposed.
DECREE
The district court's judgment is affirmed. To the extent authorized by law, costs are assessed to appellants.
HIGHTOWER, J., dissents with written reasons.