Case Name: COWGILL, Adm'r v. BOOCK, Adm'r
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1950-05-16
Citations: 189 Or. 282
Docket Number: 
Parties: COWGILL, Adm’r v. BOOCK, Adm’r
Judges: I concur in Mr. Justice Belt’s opinion and amplify my reasons in the above manner.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 282–316

Head Matter:
Argued March 22,
affirmed May 16;
petition for rehearing denied June 27, 1950
COWGILL, Adm’r v. BOOCK, Adm’r
218 P. (2d) 445
In Bang.
George H. Fraser, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Hart, Spencer, McCulloch, Koekwood and Davies, Hugh L. Biggs, and Manley B. Strayer, all of Portland.
Orval N. Thompson, of Albany, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Weatherford & Thompson, and Willis, Kyle & Emmons, all of Albany.

Opinion:
BELT, J.
This is an action to recover damages resulting from the death of Billie Eugene Parker, a minor seventeen years of age, alleged to have been caused by the gross negligence and intoxication of his father, the deceased George W. Parker, while driving a Plymouth pick-up truck on the South Santiam highway. The cause was submitted to a jury and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff-administrator in the sum of $5,000.00.
The defendant-administrator appeals, assigning error in the denial of the motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. It is defendant's contention that the action can not be sustained for the reasons: (1) An unemancipated minor child can not maintain an action against his parent for a personal tort. (2) There is no substantial evidence tending to show that the decedent-father was guilty of negligence, gross negligence or intoxication which was the proximate cause of the death of his son.
In view of the demurrer to the evidence, the statement of the facts will be made in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It is elementary that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment of the evidence. The defendant offered no evidence.
On August 14,1945, the deceased George W. Parker resided with Ms wife and nine cMldren at Madras in eastern Oregon about nine miles north of Culver. He was a logger and for a few months prior to the accident had lived with his family at Sweet Home in western Oregon. The father, accompanied by his brother and his son Billie, drove from his home at Madras to Culver, where his friend Bert Clayton operated a tavern. It was "V. J. Day" and they were celebrating. Clayton refused to sell the father any beer because the latter was intoxicated to such an extent that he staggered and had some "difficulty controlling his movements"; his eyes were bloodshot; and he was "thick tongued." Upon the refusal of Clayton to sell him beer, Parker became angry and said: " 'I don't have to drink your beer; I have two quarts of whisky in the car. ' ' ' Parker and his brother went to the car and proceeded to drink whisky. They finished the "little bit" in the one-fifth bottle and then opened the second one. Clayton said George Parker and his brother had three drinks of whisky. The son Billie did not drink. George Parker wanted his friend Clayton to go to Sweet Home with him but he refused. According to the witness Clayton, Billie told his father that he did not want to go to Sweet Home, but the father said: " 'Billie, you are going; get in the car.' " Billie wanted to drive but his father said: " 'No, I will do the driving of this car; you get in on the other side.' " Mrs. Bertha Clayton testified that she heard George Parker say that he was going to Sweet Home and that he asked her husband to go with him. She said that the boy asked "if he couldn't stay with us. He didn't want to go with his father." She heard the father say to Billie: " 'You are going with me.' " Mrs. Clayton also testified that George Parker and his brother were both "quite intoxicated" but that Billie did not have a drink.
The Parkers left Culver about 9:30 o'clock in the evening for Sweet Home on the west side of the Cascade mountains. The father was driving, his brother was in the middle, and Billie was on the right side of the seat. This was the last time they were seen alive.
Three days later the deputy coroner of Linn county and a State Police officer found their bodies in the overturned pick-up truck partly submerged in the water of the South Santiam river five miles east of Upper Soda and about one hundred miles from Culver. The car had gone over an almost perpendicular bluff 120 feet high. When the body of George Parker was removed from the car, it was on the left side of the seat; the body of the brother was in the middle; and the body of Billie was on the right side of the seat. It will be recalled that this was the same position in the car that they were in when they left Culver. The watch in the father's pocket — which was under water — had stopped at 12:10. A bottle of whisky about one-half full was found in the ear. The coroner, after having qualified as an expert witness, testified that in his opinion the bodies had been dead at least two days.
Mr. Wayne Huffman, a State Police officer who was with the coroner and investigated the wreck, testified that the accident occurred on a downhill "S" curve in the mountainous section of the highway, which ran in an easterly and westerly direction. The officer testified that the vehicle had run on the shoulder on the north side of the highway for a distance of 50 feet and then went into a small drainage ditch where it traveled for 100 feet and up against the side of a high bank. After leaving the ditch, the vehicle skidded for a distance of 86 feet diagonally across the dry pavement. The officer stated that at the end of the "86 feet of skidmarks," there were "gouge marks" in the pavement indicating that the vehicle had rolled over for a distance of 45 feet before it went "down the bank and into the river." Two tires were "deflated."
It is alleged in the complaint that the decedent George W. Parker "became grossly intoxicated and wholly incompetent to drive an automobile and did by invitation, threat, and command, induce and coerce his said son, Billie Eugene Parker, to enter an automobile" and accompany him over the Santiam highway to Sweet Home. It is further alleged, in substance, that while the decedent George Parker was in such drunken condition, he continued to drive the car "upon a dangerous and curved highway" at a high and dangerous rate of speed and without having it under control. It is further alleged that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Billie Eugene Parker.
This action was brought under the Wrongful Death Statute, § 8-903,"O. C. L. Á. At common law there was no remedy by way of a civil action for the death of a human being, and a cause of action arising out of an injury to a person died with the person. McClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co., 73 Or. 135, 140 P. 64, 144 P. 569; Perham v. Portland Electric Co., 33 Or. 451, 53 P. 14, 40 L. R. A. 799. The purpose of the statute was to give redress for an injury where none existed at common law. The statute created a new right of action for wrongful death with the limitation, " if the former [decedent] might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter [wrong-doer], for an injury done by the same act or omission." If the decedent Billie Parker could have maintained an action, had he lived, against his father for an injury "done by the same act or omission," then the present action will lie; otherwise, it can not be maintained. Perham v. Portland Electric Co., supra; 16 Am. Jnr., Death, 61, § 82. In view of this statutory limitation, we must test the instant cause by the same legal principles that would have been applicable if Billie Parker, had he lived, brought an action against his father for personal injuries caused by gross negligence or intoxication as alleged in the complaint. In other words, if we assume that this minor child was maimed or crippled for life as a result of the gross negligence or intoxication of the father, as shown by the evidence in this case, could the action be maintained ?
There is some substantial evidence to support the allegations of gross negligence and intoxication. When George Parker in his drunken condition drove this automobile, he was engaged in an unlawful act and had utter disregard not only for his own safety but for the safety of those who were riding with him. Section 115-318, subd. (a), O. C.L. A., provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person * who is intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any highway, street or thoroughfare within this state."
Subd. (e) provides:
"If the death of any human being shall be caused by the negligent operation of any vehicle contrary to this act by any person while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, such operator of such vehicle shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by existing law relating to manslaughter. ' '
In State v. Lockwood, 126 Or. 118, 268 P. 1016, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter on account of her having killed a pedestrian while driving an automobile when intoxicated. She denied any knowledge of having struck the young boy whom she killed, yet the conviction was sustained.
This ease is just another example of a terrible tragedy resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor while driving an automobile. Of course, the father did not actually intend to kill his son, but he was nevertheless responsible for the consequences which flowed from his wrongful act. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act. The father knew or ought to have known of the danger in driving at a high speed at nighttime over this mountainous highway when he and his brother were both drunk. The boy no doubt realized the danger of riding with his father under the circumstances. It was against his will to get into the car, but he did so in obedience to his parent. He had good reason to stay with the Claytons at Culver, but the drunk father arbitrarily compelled him to go.
Defendant-appellant concedes that there is evidence of intoxication, but contends that it is entirely speculative from the evidence as to what caused the car to leave the highway and plunge down the steep embankment into the river. More specifically, defendant asserts that there is no evidence that the decedent-father was driving the car at the time of the accident or that he was guilty of negligence or intoxication which was the proximate cause of the death of Billie Parker. We can not agree with this contention. The skid marks and course of the car plainly speak of excessive speed and loss of control of the car. The position in which the bodies were found would indicate that the father was driving the car when it went over the bank. It is also reasonable to assume that the Parkers, when they left Culver at 9:30 in the evening, were enroute to Sweet Home in view of the decedent's request that his friend Clayton accompany him to such place. The stopping of the watch at 12:10 is some evidence that the distance of 100 miles to the place of the accident was, under the circumstances, traveled at a high rate of speed. It is not necessary to establish a cause of action by direct evidence. Negligence may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding an accident. White v. Keller et al., 188 Or. 378, 215 P. (2d) 986; Davis v. Lavenik, 178 Or. 90, 165 P. (2d) 277; Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Or. 486, 163 P. (2d) 936; Greenslitt v. Three Bros. Baking Co., Inc., 170 Or. 345, 133 P. (2d) 597.
We are not impressed with the argument that the evidence of intoxication prior to the happening of the accident is too remote. If Gfeorge Parker was quite drunk at Culver, it is a reasonable inference that he was still drunk at the place of the accident, in view of the fact that the whisky bottle found in the overturned car was only half full. There was also an empty beer bottle in the car. It is entirely reasonable to infer that the celebration was still on!
It is also suggested that the loss of control of the car as evidenced by its course on the shoulder of the highway and in the ditch might have been due to the effort of the driver to avoid striking an animal or a vehicle on the road, or that the driver might have been temporarily blinded by the lights of an approaching vehicle, or that a mechanical defect in the vehicle itself was the cause of the accident. We are aware of the well established rule that negligence can not be predicated upon mere conjecture, guesswork or speculation. Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Or. 357, 97 P. (2d) 527. It is elementary that where evidence shows two or more equally probable causes for injury, for not all of which defendant could be responsible, no action for negligence will lie. However, in the instant case there is no evidence of an animal being on the highway, that the driver was blinded by lights, or of any mechanical defect in.the vehicle. [Reasonable inferences must be drawn from the evidence. There is evidence of intoxication and it is far more probable that such was the proximate cause of the accident than that it was due to any of 'the possible causes suggested by the defendant. We áre concerned with probabilities and not possibilities. It is not necessary to establish proximate cause with certainty. A jury question is presented if there is substantial evidence tending to show the probable cause of the injury.
It was cruel for the father to order his son to ride with him under the circumstances. In our opinion the decedent-father was guilty of wilful misconduct. The Supreme Court of California in Parsons v. Fuller, 8 Cal. (2d) 463, 66 P. (2d) 430, quoted with approval from Norton v. Puter, 138 Cal. App. 253, 32 P. (2d) 172, 174, which defined wilful misconduct as follows:
"Willful misconduct depends upon the facts of a particular case, and necessarily involves deliberate, intentional, or wanton conduct in doing or omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation of the fact, on the part of the culpable person, that danger is likely to result therefrom." Citing numerous authorities.
The court further stated in the Parsons case that:
" £ one who, while driving an automobile, knowingly flirts with danger and, without necessity or emergency compelling him, "takes a chance" on killing or injuring himself and others, who may be so unfortunate as to be riding with him, is guilty of willful misconduct. ' '5
In Durgin's Case, 251 Mass. 427, 430, 146 N. E. 694, the court said:
"Negligence and serious and wilful misconduct are entirely different in kind. The latter 'involves conduct of a quasi criminal nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences.' " (Italics ours.)
In the instant case, the father in driving the automobile while drunk was engaged in an unlawful act. We are concerned here with a case involving more than ordinary or gross negligence. It is one of wilful misconduct of the father whose wrongful act resulted in the untimely death of his young son. The wrongful conduct of the father in driving the automobile while drunk is in no way referable to his duties as a parent. Indeed, in this case there was a clear abandonment of the parental duty.
Does public policy forbid maintenance of the action? Whether an unemancipated child can recover against his parent for a personal tort is a new question in this state. The question was first decided in this country in 1891 in Hewellett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682. In that ease a mother wrongfully and maliciously caused her minor child to be confined in a hospital for the insane. The court without citing any authority or considering the historical background of the nonliability theory held that no recovery could be had for the reason that to permit such an action would violate public policy. The court stated:
"But so long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand."
Hewellett v. George, supra, was followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A. 991, 102 Am. St. Rep. 787, decided in 1903, which held that a father who had brutally beaten his minor child was, on account of public policy, immune from liability for the personal injury sustained, following the reasoning of the Mississippi decision.
In 1905, Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L. R. A. 893, 3 Ann. Cas. 1, 107 Am. St. Rep. 805, an extreme decision, was rendered precluding recovery against a father who had raped his minor daughter. The basis of this decision was that it would be against public policy to permit such an action to be maintained. It is absurd to talk about maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the home when it had thus already been disrupted by such a monstrous crime. Concerning this ease, Harper, Torts, 626, § 285, said:
' ' To deny a recovery in damages to a daughter against a father who has been convicted of raping her on the ground that it would tend to disturb the beauty, tranquility, and sanctity of that home is nothing short of absurdity."
In the last three cases cited, the courts, without referring to any authorities, stated that at common law such actions could not be maintained. There is some authority, however, that at early common law a parent was liable to his child for a personal tort. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055; Briggs v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. 50, 170 A. 871; Prosser, Torts (Hornbook series) 905, § 99; 18 B. U. L. Rev. 468; 7 Pordham L. Rev. 459. See the following English authorities on the subject: 2 Addison, Torts (4th ed.) 727; Eversley, Domestic Relations (4th ed.) 571; Pollock, Torts (12th ed.) 128. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Marchand (1924) 4 D. L. R. 157, 166, the Canadian court permitted recovery "however repugnant it may seem that a minor child should sue his own father" but stated that it was "equally repugnant that a child injured by his father's negligent act, perhaps maimed for life, should have no redress for the damages he has suffered."
Whatever may be the early common rule, we should not be bound thereby unless it is supported by reason and logic. The law is not static. It is a progressive science. What may have been a wholesome common law rule a hundred years ago may not be adapted to the changed economic and social conditions of this modern age. In Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 112, 22 N. E. (2d) 254, 123 A. L. R. 1015, it is said:
1 ' The genius of the common law lies in its flexibility and in its adaptability to the changing nature of human affairs and in its ability to enunciate rights and to provide remedies for wrongs where previously none had been declared. ' '
After Hewellett v. George, supra, was decided, there was built up in this country a mass of authority supporting the nonliability rule. 31 A. L. R. 1157; 71 A. L. R. 1071; 122 A. L. R. 1352. Many of these decisions stem from the Mississippi decision which, in onr opinion, was wrongly decided and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. It is observed that many of the courts that have considered this question have adhered to the hard and fast rule of nonliability regardless of the character of the tort or the difference in the factual situations involved.
It is only in comparatively recent years that dissenting voices have been raised in criticism of adhering to an absolute rule which in some instances has resulted in a denial of justice. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra; Wells v. Wells (Mo. App.) 48 S. W. (2d) 109; vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Clark in Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12; and that of Justice Crownhart in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113. In Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551, the court without a written opinion, by á four-to-three decision — Chief Justice Cardozo • and Justices Crane and Andrews dissenting — held that an action for personal injuries resulting from negligence could not be maintained against a parent by an unemancipated minor child. In the latter decision of Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 429, 40 N. E. (2d) 236, the Court of Appeals followed the Sorrentino decision, but it was careful not to commit itself to an absolute rule of nonliability. The court significantly stated :
"In the absence of statutory sanction, we are not prepared, in cases where wilful misconduct by the parent is not a factor, to inject the disruptive risk of tort liability between parents and their unemancipated children
There is a strong implication that if "wilful misconduct" is involved, the action will lie. See Meyer v. Ritterbush, 92 N. Y. S. (2d) 595, 196 Misc. Rep. 551, decided September 27, 1949.
There is a trend of modern decisions to depart from the general rule of nonliability where the injury sustained by an unemancipated minor child is the result of a wilful or malicious tort. In 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, 736, § 90, it is said:
"However, the rule, despite the long line of authorities supporting it, has been subjected to considerable criticism in some of the more recent decisions, and the tendency seems to be to repudiate or modify it whenever its application is found to be out of line with modern conditions. ' '
In our opinion, the rule should not be considered as an absolute one. As stated in the well considered case of Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S. E. 538: " we must not exalt this rule above ordinary common sense."
Legal writers have complained against the rule as applied to all factual situations in tort actions between a minor child and his parent. 18 B. U. L. Rev. 468; 18 Chi-Kent Rev. 211; 28 Geo. L. J. 430; 26 Geo. L. J. 139; 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030; 1 U. of Newark L. Rev. 97; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 80. Text writers are also critical of the rule. In the interests of brevity we refer to the exhaustive and instructive article on "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation" in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, by Professor McCurdy relative to the authorities, which he states are "meager, conflicting, and obscure."
We appreciate full well that it is a wholesome rule and that it should be the policy of the law to preserve and maintain the security, peace and tranquillity of the home, which indeed is the very foundation upon which our government rests. It is unthinkable that a parent, while -acting within the scope of domestic re lations, should be brought into court to defend against every unintentional personal tort that might be committed against a minor child. It is common knowledge that a parent, in order to maintain discipline and the quiet and peace of the home, is, in the ordinary course of human events, occasionally obliged to administer reasonable corporal punishment to a minor child. However, if from wicked motives a parent should brutally beat his minor child and thus maim him for life, are we to say that he should be immune from liability merely by reason of his parenthood? Is the welfare of society or a wholesome public policy subserved by granting immunity to a parent guilty of such brutality?
Chief Justice Peaslee, in an able opinion in Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, after reviewing the authorities on the highly controversial question involved herein, stated:
"It is conceded of course that parental authority should be maintained. To this end, it is also conceded that the parent should not ordinarily be accountable to the child for a failure to perform a parental duty, and that vindication of personal rights should not be conceded to the child if it would impair the discharge of such duties. Thus far the reasons commonly denominated public policy carry the argument. For mistaken judgment as to the extent of chastisement, or for negligent disrepair of the home the father provides, there is usually no liability. These acts all grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and child. The relation gives rise to the duty alleged to have been violated. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 E. 1.131.
"But there may be acts which clearly are not to be referred to such relation. The father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daughter, ought not to be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace of the home as answers to an action seek ing compensation for the wrong. The relation is rightly fortified by certain rules. Outside that relation, the rules are inapplicable; and any attempt to apply them leads to irrational and unjust results."
Professor William L. Prosser, an eminent authority on torts and now Dean of the School of Jurisprudence at the University of California, in his Hornbook series on Torts at page 897, says:
"Few topics in the law of torts, in view of modern economic, social and legislative changes, display in their treatment greater inconsistency and more unsatisfactory reasoning. ' '
He further states at page 906 :
"The courts which deny the action have relied heavily on the analogy of husband and wife, which seems quite inapplicable because of the difference in the common law concept of the relations, and the absence of statutes to be construed. In addition, they have invented much the same variety of unconvincing reasons as in the case of the marital relation. The danger of 'fraud' has been stressed, although it is difficult to see why it is any greater, as between the parties themselves, than in any other tort action involving an infant; and likewise the possibility that the defendant might inherit the amount . recovered in case of the plaintiff's death, or that the family exchequer might be depleted at the expense of other children — neither of which reasons seems to outweigh the desirability of compensating the injured one for his damage. But again, as in the case of husband and wife, the chief reason offered is that domestic tranquillity and parental discipline and control would be disturbed by the action — and again on the theory that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family and respect for the parent, even though it be rape or a brutal beating, and even though, the relation itself has been terminated by death before the suit. ' '
Various reasons have been given by the courts for adhering to the general rule of nonliability in tort actions by a minor child against a parent, but the basic reason is that it subserves public policy to do so. It is universally held that an unemancipated minor child can recover against his parent for breach of contract or violation of property rights. A wife — who is now on the same legal plane as her husband — may sue the latter for a personal tort. An action in tort was maintained in Rozell v. Rozell, supra, by a minor brother against his minor sister — both of whom were living in the same household. An emancipated minor child can sue his parent for a personal tort. It would seem as a practical matter that the above analogous actions would disturb the peace and tranquillity of the home as much, if not more than the instant action. What could be more disruptive and disturbing to the family relationship than a suit by an unemancipated minor child against his father for breach of trust? If the judgment in this action is sustained, the mother under the law of descent and distribution would inherit the money paid to the estate of her son. There is no reason to believe that the satisfaction of the judgment will result in depletion of the family exchequer. Neither do we think that strained family relations would follow by reason of the prosecution of this action.
In Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. (2d) 461, a minor child eight years of age brought an action under the death statute of that state against his mother to recover for the death of his father alleged to have been caused by her negligent driving of an automobile. In the lower court judgment for defendant was entered on a statutory demurrer, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the judgment and re manded the cause for further proceeding. On appeal it was held that the death statute was "a declaration of public policy on the subject and necessarily displaced any policy to the contrary, if, in fact, it existed." The dissenting opinion of Justice Schaffer stated that he was "unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority that an unemancipated minor can maintain a tort action against his parent. ' '
In Munsert v. Farmers' Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581, 585, 281 N. W. 671, 119 A. L. R. 1390, it was held that a parent may bring an action against an unemancipated minor child whose negligence caused the death of another unemaneipated minor child, both of whom were living in the same home. Construing the Wrongful Death Statute of that state, the court said:
"However it may be as to other actions in tort, we hold that under the death-by-wrongful-act statute the instant action which is under that statute might have been maintained by the parents directly."
After a careful consideration of the authorities, we think the general rule — so well established by the authorities — should be modified to allow an unemancipated minor child to maintain an action for damages against his parent for a wilful or malicious personal tort. The evidence in the instant action certainly shows that the decedent-father was guilty of wilful misconduct. Ordinary negligence or the doing of an unintentional wrong can not be the basis for such an action. To apply a hard and fast rule of nonliability to the facts in this case would, in our opinion, defeat justice and not subserve a sound public policy. What we have said in reference to public policy applies as well had the action been maintained during the lifetime of the decedent minor child. By the wrongful conduct of the father in overstepping the bounds of the family relationship, the peace, security and tranquillity of the home had already been disrupted. When the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself ceases.
The judgment is affirmed.