Case Name: JULIUS EDWARD NELMS v. MABEL BLACKWELL NELMS
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1959-05-06
Citations: 250 N.C. 237
Docket Number: 
Parties: JULIUS EDWARD NELMS v. MABEL BLACKWELL NELMS.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 250
Pages: 237–245

Head Matter:
JULIUS EDWARD NELMS v. MABEL BLACKWELL NELMS.
(Filed 6 May, 1959.)
1. Courts § 14—
Blie General County Court of Wilson County is given statutory jurisdiction 'of actions for divorce and alimony concurrent witL that of the Superior Court. G.S. 7-279(6).
3. Divorce and Alimony § 6—
"Bhe statutory provision that in an action for divorce ‘the summons ■shall be -returnable to the court of the county -in which either the plaintiff <xr defendant resides, relates to venue and is not jurisdictional. G.S. 50-3.
3. Same: Courts § 14: Venue § 3—
Motion for change of venue as a matter of right must ibe ¡made in writing within thirty days after service -of summons, G.'S. 1-125, and where, in an action for divorce instituted in a general counltjy count of a county of which neither of the parties is a resident, defendant demurs to the ■complaint -cm the ground of want of jurisdiction hut does -not move for change of venue until after the expiration of thirty days from the service of summons, change of venue ¡as a matter of right is waived. G.S. 1-83.
Bobbitt, J., concurring.
'Pabkeb, J., dissenting.
JSiggins and Moobe, JJ., concur in dissent.
Appeal by defendant from Fountain, S. J., at September-Octoiber 1958 Civil Term of WilsoN.
Civil action to dissolve absolutely the bonds of matrimony existing between-the plaintiff and the defendant, on the grounds of two years’ separation.
These facts are not controverted:
(I) That -on 13 March, 1958, plaintiff, a resident of Pitt County, instituted this action and filed complaint -therein in 'the General County Oourt of Wilson County against defendant, a resident of Nash County, all in North Carolina;
(II) That summons and complaint were served on defendant on 14 March, 1958; ,
■■ ■=--(III) That on 11 April, 1958, in said General County Court, defendant demurred- to the complaint filed in this action, and “moves' for a dismissal” for that (1) Dissolution by divorce of the marriage between plaintiff and defendant is the subject of this -action; (2) It appears u-po-n the face of the complaint that plaintiff is a resident of Pitt County and defendant a resident of Nash County, and that neither is a resident of Wilson Oounty; and (3) This court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action.
(IV) That ion 9 May, 1958, the Judge of said General Oounty Court, after hearing thereon, overruled the demurrer so filed by defendant and -so -ad-judged. And, on -same day, defendant excepted there,to a¿nd appealed to Superior Court of Wilson Oounty, and -on ©u-ch appeal defendant assigned a-s error the rendering of the judgment set out in the record, /aind the court, -being of opinion that the demurrer ishould.be -overruled, so adjudged, -and remanded the cause to the General County Court of Wil-son Oounty for further orders. Defendant objected and excepted.
(V) Thereafter -on 21 June, 1958, in ¡the said General County Court defendant moved the -court that the cause he removed to Nash County for ¡trial for the reason that Wilson County i-s not the proper -county for the trial, of -this action, -and Nash-County is a -proper county, and •in -support -of isu-ch motion showed to the c-o-urt:
' “1. That plaintiff ie not -a resident of Wil-son C-ounty, North Carolina,.and alleges in his verified complaint that h-e is a resident of Pitt County, North Carolina.
“2. That -the defendant is a resident of Nash County, North Carolina, as alleged in the complaint.
“3. That -this -action seeks to dissolve by divorce ¡the marriage of plaintiff and -defendant -and such marriage -is the' -subject of this action. That Wil-son Oounty is not the proper county for the institution -and prosecution o'f this action, that Nash County -i-s -a p-rop-er one and -the defendant -demands that this -action be -transferred to Nash County for trial -as provided by law -in -su-oh -cases.”
(VI) 'That the clerk of the said General Oounty Court, upon hearing thereon, being of opinion that -the motion to remove should be denied, entered -order on 21 August, 1958, that the motion be denied.
(VII) That on appeal from the order of the clerk, the Judge of -said .General ■ Oounty Court found facts -substantially as -hereinabove re-'láted, and further that defendant has fil-ed no -answer -and, thereupon concluded (paragraph 7) -that the time for -answering for the purposes 'of the motion for change of venue had expired; -and -being of opinion that defendant had waived her right -to have the cause removed to Nash County, entered an order dated 15 September, 1958, affirming the .said order oí the clerk, and denying defendant’s motion. ;'
Defendant excepted thereto and appealed to Superior Court of Wilson County, assigning as error (the following:
“1. The oourt erred in its findings and conclusions of law as set forth in paragraph 7, ‘the time for .answering for the purpose of the motion for change of venue has expired.’ ... 1
“2. That the court erred in its conclusions of law as set forth'.-in paragraph 7 that ‘the court is of the 'opinion that the defendant has waived her right to have this cause moved to Nash County.’
“3. The oourt erred in rendering the judgment set out in the record.” (VIII) The cause thereafter earning on for hearing and being heard in Superior Court on the appeal from General County Court as aforesaid, Fountain, S. J., being of 'opinion that the first exception of the defendant should be allowed for that the time for .answering has not expired, and further being of opinion that the second and third exceptions should be denied for that, 'in the opinion of the 'court, defendant has waived her right to remove the 'cause to Nash County, ordered and decreed that the order of the Judge of the General Gounty Court of Wilson Gounty dated 15 September, 1958, be -affirmed.
Defendant excepts thereto, and -appeals to Supreme Court and assigns error.
Finch & Narron for plaintiff, appellee.
Hooks ■& Britt for defendant, appellant.

Opinion:
WiNBORNE, C. J.
The General Assembly of North Carolina has declared (1) specifically —that the General County Oourt in W-ilsofi County shall have jurisdiction to try -(actions for divorce, according to ¡the oourse and practice o-f the .Superior Oourt in such action. P. L. 1931, Chap. 61, Sec. 1 (h); (2) expressly — that the jurisdiction of'the General County Court -in civil actions shall be concurrent with the Superior Oourt in all actions -and proceedings for divorce and alimdhy, or either, G.S. 7-279 (6); (3) that in. all proceedings for divorce-,the summons shall -be returnable to the 'count of the county in which either the -plaintiff or -defendant resides, G.S. 50-3 Venue; and (4) that if the county designated for the purpose of 'summons .and complaint is not the proper one, the action may be tried therein unless .the defendant, before the time for answering expires, demands in writing that the trial be conducted in the proper county, -and the place of trial is thereupon .changed by consent of the parties, or by order of the court. G.S. 1-83. "i
And in respect ,to tibe statute G.S. 50-3, decisions oí this Count hold that its provisions are not jurisdictional, but relate to venue, McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E. 2d 138, and may be waived.
Furthermore, it is ¡provided in G.S. 1-125 that "¡the defendant must appear -and demur or .answer within thirty (30') days after .the service of summons'upon him, .or within thirty (30) days after the final determination of a motion to remove as ¡a matter of ¡right ." In the light'of the .provisions of this statute, it would seem that in a case where defendant claims right of removal .as a matter .of right the first move of defendant is motion for change of venue— and that .upon failure to so move .the right is waived.
And if an action for divorce be instituted in any other county in the State the action may be tried therein unless the defendant demands in writing that'the trial be had in the proper county. Smith v. Smith, 226 N.C. 506, 39 S.E. 2d 391, citing Davis v. Davis, 179 N.C. 185, 102 S.E. 270.
Indeed .in McLean v. McLean, supra, this Court in opinion by Devin, J., later C. J., had this to say: "The mere fact of instituting suit for divorce in a county other than that of plaintiff's residence would not be regarded 'as .affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the action on proper service, but rather as affecting the question of venue."
Moreover, in Waters v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540, 94 S.E. 2d 640, Rodman, J., interpreting for the Court the phrase "shall have jurisdiction over the entire county in which said court may be established" .appearing in G.S. 7-265, made this pertinent observation: "Had it been the intention of the Legislature to limit the jurisdiction of the General County Court to causes of action arising in the county, it would have been simple and appropriate for it to have inserted such a provision in S. 14 of the Act, prescribing the jurisdiction of the court. G. S. 7-279. No .such limitation appears." To the contrary the General Assembly has made express provisions for change of venue in 'appropriate cases. G.S. 7-286.
In the- light of the provisions of these statutes applied to the facts appearing upon .the face of the record on this appeal, the Court is of opinion -and holds that the judgment from which appeal is taken is proper, and should be affirmed.
Affirmed.