Case Name: The People, ex rel. Belden, v. The Contracting Board
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1863-09
Citations: 27 N.Y. 378
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People, ex rel. Belden, v. The Contracting Board.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 378–387

Head Matter:
The People, ex rel. Belden, v. The Contracting Board.
■Proposals for a contract, requiring as security the certificate of a bank that it holds a deposit of $4,000 “ in cash,” are satisfied by a certificate of the deposit of $4,000, without further specification.
The law requiring the canal contracting board to award contracts for repairs to “ the lowest bidder who will give adequate security,” and it having made an award, a lower bidder who has given the security ■ required is not entitled to a mandamus.
Though the practice of issuing a peremptory mandamus in the first instance is not to be commended, it is within the power of the court; and the objection, that an alternative writ should have first issued, is not available on error.
This proceeding came up on appeal by the defendants from the order of the Supreme Court, at general term, in the third district, affirming an order of the special term, awarding a peremptory mandamus against the defendants, commanding them to forthwith proceed and award to the relator, and to enter into, a contract with him for the repairing and keeping in repair, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the contracting board, and with the terms of his proposal for such work, that portion of the canals of this state, and of the public works connected therewith, known as the Cayuga and Seneca canal.
The affidavits upon which the order for the mandamus was made showed that on the 27th of May, 1862, the defendants, composing the contracting board of the state, in pursuance of the provisions of chapter 105 of the Laws of 1857, advertised for proposals to be received until the 27th day of June, at 1£ o’clock, p. M., for furnishing all the materials, and performing all the work necessary to put and keep in good repair, during four and a half years from the 1st day of July then next, the Cayuga and Seneca canal.
Among'the provisions of the notice, were the following: “All proposals for the above described work, must be accompanied by a certificate of deposit in some banking insti tution in good credit, within this state, certifying that the sum of four thousand dollars in cash has been deposited in said institution, to the credit of NT. S. Benton, auditor.”
“ NTo proposal will be considered, unless in strict conformity with this notice.”
The notice required the proposals also to be accompanied by bonds for the performance of the work, with two or more sureties, which bonds were to be executed and authenticated, and the responsibility of the sureties attested, in a manner specially pointed out; and specifications and forms of the con tract were mentioned as ready for examination at the place ■ appointed for receiving the proposals.
On the 27th of June, and before the expiration of the time . appointed for that purpose, the relator presented a proposal to do the work, which was accompanied by a certificate of-deposit, in the following words and figures:
“ $4,000. Certificate of Deposit.
“ STATE OR NEW YORK,
“Salt Springs Bank of Syracuse,
“ Syracuse, June 27<7i, 1862.
“A. 0. Belden has deposited in this bank, four thousand dollars, payable to the order of N. S. Benton, auditor, on return of this certificate. T. W. Truesdell, Teller.”
In all respects, othér than the form of the certificate, the proposal, and the papers which accompanied it, were in accordance with the terms of the notice. It was shown by the affidavits, both on the part of the plaintiffs and of the defendants, that the proposal of the relator was rejected on the ground that it did not appear, from the certificate of deposit produced by the relator, that the deposit was made in cash; and the contract was awarded to George M. Case, whose proposal for the work was the lowest which the board regarded as in accordance with the requirements of the printed notice, but not so low, by fifty dollars a year or more, as that of the relator.
From the affidavits on the part of the defendants, it appeared that the deposit made by the relator, was made in a check of J. J. Belden for four thousand dollars, upon the same bank which issued the certificate of deposit; also, that on the 30th day of June, a contract was executed between the contracting board and Case, for said work and repairs to be done and performed by him. during four and a half years, from July 1st, 1862, of which contract duplicates were filed in the canal department, as required by law; that on the said 1st day of July, he commenced the work, pursuant to the contract, and was still in performance thereof.
No alternative mandamus was issued, but the defendants having appeared and filed affidavits in answer to the affidavits on the part of the plaintiffs, and both parties having been heard, a peremptory mandamus was ordered in the first instance, at the special term. From an affirmance of that order, the defendants brought the present appeal.
F. Kernan, for the appellants.
L. Tremain, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Emott, J.
The Constitution of this State (article 7, § 3), as amended in 1854, declares that "all contracts for work or materials on any canal shall be made with the person who shall offer to do .or provide the same at the lowest price, with adequate security for their performance." The act of 1857 (vol. 1, p. 214) provides that the contracting board " shall have power, and it shall be their duty to let by contract, under such regulations as said board shall prescribe, to the lowest bidder or bidders, who will give adequate security for the performance of the contract," the repairs of any completed section of the canal. Under this law, the contracting board advertised for proposals to keep the Cayuga and Seneca canal in repair for four years and a half. This notice indicated the form and character of the. security, which the board would consider adequate, that is, it stated that every proposal must be accompanied by a certificate of deposit in some bank in good credit; that four thousand dollars in cash had been deposited therein to the credit of the auditor, which would be retained as security for the- performance of the contract. The relator made a proposal which was somewhat lower in price than that of any other person, but it was not accepted. A contract was made with one Case, who seems to have been the next highest bidder. The relator delivered with his proposal a certificate that he had deposited in the Salt Springs Bank of Syracuse four thousand dollars, payable to the order of IT. S. Benton, auditor, but the certificate did not state in so many words that he had deposited such amount in cash. Case, whose bid was accepted, delivered a similar certificate, containing, however, the words " in cash." It is to be inferred, although it is not distinctly stated that this difference in the form or phraseology of the certificate was the reason assigned for rejecting the' relator's bid, and accepting a higher one. I confess I should be unable to justify such a decision, and I can hardly suppose that it was the true and only ground of the action of the board.
Yet I think the Supreme Court ought not to have compelled the board, by mandamus, to reverse their action, or to make a contract with the relator, after they had already made another contract with another person. The powers conferred upon the board necessarily involved and implied an exercise of discretion, although it seems exceedingly clear what decision their duty required them to make in this case. But they are to determine who is the lowest bidder, and what is adequate security; or if the amount and character of the security required is fixed by general regulation, then the contracting board are to decide whether the security offered in any given case conforms to the regulations. The principle is well settled, that whenever the act requires the exercise of discretion, this remedy will not lie. There must be a clear legal right not merely to a decision in respect to the thing sought, but to the thing itself. (People, ex rel. Lynch, v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend., 680, 686; 19 Johns., 259; Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. U. S., 272.) The right in the case before us seems exceedingly plain, but it is after all' only a right to a correct decision. The relator has no contract, no right to any specific act free from all discretion in the contracting board. If we may interfere here, we may do so whenever the contracting board decides incorrectly as to the respective amounts of proposals, or the character of securities.
If the case were clearer to my mind than it is, in favor of the jurisdiction to grant a mandamus, I should still feel bound to rpthhold it, and that, although the relator should have no other remedy, which I, by no means, admit. The writ of mandamus is to some extent, at least, in the discretion of the court to grant or refuse; especially where, as in this case, no property of the relator has been taken or affected, and his claims rests altogether upon the interests of the State to have its work done by the lowest bidder, and not upon a legal right on his part. (People v. Canal Board, 13 Barb., 450, and cases cited.) The only legal right of the relator in such a case, if he could have any, would be to damages for refusing him the contract. But it' appears in this case that the contracting board have made a contract with another person, one Case,already mentioned, and that he is engaged in the work. This individual would certainly be entitled to compensation for his work; and the only result of ordering a second contract for the same work, would be to subject the State to the payment of double compensation. I should not be inclined to issue a writ which would produce such a result, simply to correct a decision of these officers, even though flagrantly improper. There must, after all, be some discretion left to public officers, and a power to do wrong as well as right. The courts cannot correct all the evils incident to the administration of government under an elective system, especially where the judiciary itself is elective.
The judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, and judgment ordered for the defendants.
Denio, Ch. J., Davies, Wright, Balcom and Marvin, Js., were also for reversal—Denio, Ch. J., and Balcom, J., on the ground, among others, that the board, having executed a contract, could not execute another unless the first were abso lately void; and they thought it good for the purpose of giving the relator his action against the members of the board.