Case Name: Commonwealth versus Thomas W. Hooper
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1827-03
Citations: 5 Pick. 42
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth versus Thomas W. Hooper.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 42–43

Head Matter:
Commonwealth versus Thomas W. Hooper.
A signboard erected at a person’s place of business, giving notice that lottery tickets are for sale there, is an advertisement, within the meaning of St. 1825 e. 184.
Such a signboard erected before the passing of that statute, if continued up after wards, is a new advertisement, by which the penalty of the statute is incurred.
In an information upon that statute, for advertising lottery tickets, it is not necessary to allege by name, nor, on the trial, to prove by name, what kind of lottery tickets the defendant advertised, nor, that they were advertised as being for sale within the county in which the information is filed.
An information founded upon a single statute, is not vitiated by concluding contra formam statutorwn.
This was an information filed in the Municipal Court, upon St. 1825, c. 184, which prohibits advertising lottery tickets for sale. [See p. 41.]
The defendant having been convicted in this Court, moved for a new trial, first, because the chief justice charged the jury, that any written or printed paper, or painted board, at the defendant’s place of business, giving notice that lottery tickets were for sale, was an advertisement within the meaning of the statute. S. D. Parker, of counsel for the defendant, now contended that advertisement, in our statutes, has a technical meaning, being used only with reference to advertisements in newspapers. St. 1817, c. 190, § 10.
Secondly, because the jury were instructed, that an old permanent signboard, giving notice that lottery tickets were for sale, erected before the passing of St. 1825, c. 184, if continued up after the passing of that act, was a new advertisement every day, and rendered the defendant liable ^.0 penap;y 0f the statute.
Thirdly, because they were instructed that it was not necessary to allege by name in the information, nor to prove by name on the trial, what kind of lottery tickets the defendant advertised for sale. See Rex v. Trelawney, 1 T. R. 222. To this it was answered by the counsel for the government, that if the tickets advertised were tickets in an authorized lottery, the burden was on the defendant to show that fact in his defence.
The defendant likewise moved in arrest of judgment, first, because only the St. 1825, c. 184, gives the Municipal Court jurisdiction of the subject matter of this information, and yet the information alleges the supposed offence to have been committed against the form of the several statutes in such case made and provided. See St. 1817, c. 191; St. 1822, c. 90; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 292; Metcalf’s Yelv. 116. In answer to this objection it was said, that the Municipal Court had jurisdiction of the case as well by St. 1812, c. 133, as by the statute of 1825; and further, that the Court would refer the conclusion contra formant statutorum to the statute which might be applicable. 2 Hawk. c. 25, § 117.
Secondly, because the information does not allege that the tickets were advertised to be sold in Boston, or in the county of Suffolk, and because it does not state by name the kind of lottery tickets, nor in what lottery they were issued or were made. See 1 T. R. 222.
Morton, (Att. Gen.) and Davis (Sol. Gen.) for the commonwealth.
See Revised Stat. c. 132, § 4.
See State v. Follet, 6 N. Hamp. R. 54.

Opinion:
All the foregoing objections were overruled at this term, except the one respecting the conclusion contra formam statutorum; and at March term 1828, that likewise was disallowed, the chief justice observing, that although the information was founded upon one statute only, it did not follow that the conclusion was fatal; that they were not bound by authorities on the point, the decisions being contradictory, and they were not inclined to favor the objection.
See Revised Stat. c. 137, § 14; People v. Walbridge, 6 Cowen, 512; 1 Chitty on Crim. Law, (3d Amer. ed.) 290, n. (74) But see State v. Cassel 2 Harr. & Gill, 407; 1 Chitty on Crim. Law, (3d Amer. ed.) 292.