Case Name: PEOPLE v. CHAMPION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1992-12-11
Citations: 198 Mich. App. 299
Docket Number: Docket No. 129919
Parties: PEOPLE v CHAMPION
Judges: Before: Taylor, P.J., and Brennan and Marilyn Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 198
Pages: 299–302

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v CHAMPION
Docket No. 129919.
Submitted July 14, 1992, at Detroit.
Decided December 11, 1992;
approved for publication February 17, 1993, at 9:05 a.m.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 442 Mich 873.
Michael Champion was convicted by a jury in the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit, Terrance K. Boyle, J., of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of breaking and entering. He was then found guilty of being an habitual offender, third felony, and was sentenced to sixty to ninety years’ imprisonment. He appealed, alleging violation of his constitutional right to a twelve-person jury.
The Court of Appeals held:
The trial court erred in allowing the defendant to stipulate that the jury could consist of eleven jurors before a jury of twelve was impaneled. MCR 6.410(A) permits such a stipulation only after a jury of twelve or more jurors has been impaneled.
Reversed.
Taylor, P.J., dissenting, stated that a defendant should not be allowed to prevail with regard to an alleged error that defense counsel deemed proper at trial. In addition, if error occurred in this case, it was harmless.
Criminal Law — Trial — Jury — Fewer Than Twelve Jurors.
The parties in a criminal trial, with the court’s consent, may stipulate that the case may be decided by a specified number of jurors less than twelve; such a stipulation must occur after a jury of twelve or more jurors has been impaneled and before a verdict is returned (MCR 6.410[A]).
References
Am Jur 2d, Jury §§ 124, 125, 128, 130, 132.
Statute reducing number of jurors as violative of right to trial by jury. 47 ALR3d 895.
Sufficiency of waiver of full jury. 93 ALR2d 410.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecut ing Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Janet A. Napp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by P. E. Bennett), for the defendant on appeal.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Brennan and Marilyn Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(c); MSA 28.788(2) (l)(c), two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and one count of breaking and entering, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. The trial court then found defendant guilty of being a third-felony offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was sentenced to sixty to ninety years' imprisonment. He appeals as of right, and we reverse.
Defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a twelve-person jury because his waiver of a full jury was coerced and because his waiver was taken before twelve jurors were impaneled. MCR 6.410(A) provides in pertinent part:
After a jury of 12 or more jurors has been impaneled and before a verdict is returned, the parties may stipulate with the court's consent to have the case decided by a specified number of jurors less than 12.
In the present case, the trial court allowed defendant to stipulate that the jury could consist of eleven jurors before a jury of twelve was impaneled. Accordingly, we find that reversal is warranted. As a result of our disposition of this issue, we need not address defendant's remaining issues.
Reversed.