Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory R. HOLMES
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-12-19
Citations: 354 So. 2d 1282
Docket Number: No. 60106
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory R. HOLMES.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 354
Pages: 1282–1288

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory R. HOLMES.
No. 60106.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 19, 1977.
George S. Hesni, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William L. Brockman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
SUMMERS, Justice.
Appellant Gregory R. Holmes was charged with the armed robbery of Enos Jones on October 29, 1974. La.Rev.Stat. 14:64. A jury found him guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve years.
Defendant entered the "Our Place" bar on Thalia Street in New Orleans on the night of October 29, 1974, bought a coke and BC powder and left. Twenty minutes later he returned with a nickel-plated pistol, pointed it at the owner-bartender and ordered her not to move. He then approached Enos Jones and demanded his money and his watch. After taking Jones' money he ordered Jones to sit down and put his head on the table. Defendant then robbed another patron in the bar in the same fashion. The resistance of a third customer and the interference of the proprietor's dog prevented defendant from completing a third robbery. As defendant left the bar, he shot at the dog and missed.
Jones rushed out after defendant and was in time to see him enter the passenger side of a Mustang as it drove off.
Assignment 1
It is asserted that the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the identification of defendant and in denying defendant's motion for discovery. Three issues are raised in this connection.
First, the defense contends that his arrest was unlawful and the taint of that illegality rendered his line-up identification inadmissible; second, he was improperly denied the right to be represented by his retained counsel at his line-up; and, third, he was improperly denied pretrial discovery.
Another robbery by a Negro male in October 1974 occurred at "Koocheey's Bar" on Allen Street. A confidential informer contacted Officer Walker on November 10, 1974 and told him that a Negro male residing at 359 Magnum Street committed that robbery. He described the perpetrator as standing 5' 11" in height with a slim build, bush hair and being approximately twenty years old. The informer said he drove a dark green Mustang, 1965 or 67, with license number 212B742. The informer led the officer to the Magnum Street address and pointed out the dark green Mustang parked nearby.
A surveillance of that address was established by the police and that afternoon they observed a man fitting the description furnished by the informer and a witness enter the car and drive off. He was followed by the police who shortly thereafter pulled him over and arrested him for the Koocheey Bar robbery. In a search of the suspect's person the police seized a matchbox of heroin from his pocket.
In a separate bill of information defendant was charged with possession of heroin. A motion to suppress the heroin as evidence was filed in that proceeding and the motion was granted.
In the meantime, defendant appeared in a line-up in connection with the Koocheey Bar robbery. Witnesses gave such an unsatisfactory identification that the District Attorney's Office refused the charge in volving that robbery. However, the police brought the witnesses and victims of the October 29 robbery in "Our Place" to view the defendant in the same line-up. These witnesses identified defendant as the robber and he was charged with the robbery of Jones in the proceedings which are the subject of this appeal.
The arrest
The defense contention that there was no probable cause to arrest defendant is apparently based upon the fact that the trial judge sustained the motion to suppress in connection with the charge of possession of narcotics.
Sustaining the motion to suppress in the possession of the narcotics case is not determinative of the validity of the arrest in the case at bar. Especially is this so when the trial judge assigned no reasons for his ruling on that motion. Reference to the transcript of that hearing would indicate that the motion could probably have been granted because of an illegal search and seizure, not because of an illegal arrest.
In any event the motion to suppress in this ease must stand upon the record and issues presented here. The validity of an arrest must be determined by the provisions of Article 213(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that authority an officer may make a warrantless arrest for a felony committed out of his presence if he has "reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense." Reasonable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonable trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify an average man of caution in the belief that a felony has been committed. State v. Phillips, 347 So.2d 206 (La.1977); State v. Linkletter, 345 So.2d 452 (La.1977) and State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966).
On the facts recited it is submitted that the information furnished by the confidential informer which was independently verified by the police against the information contained in the police report of the robbery provided reasonable cause to arrest without a warrant. The line-up was therefore not tainted by an illegal arrest.
Counsel at the line-up
The officers conducting the lineup were aware of the fact that defendant had retained counsel and they made reasonable efforts to contact him so that he could attend the line-up; however, defense counsel asserts he did not receive the message because he was elsewhere at the time. In view of retained counsel's absence an attorney was appointed to assist and advise defendant at the line-up. Appointed counsel did therefore attend the line-up.
Absence of retained counsel at a pre-in-dictment line-up does not deprive the defendant of rights which would warrant reversal of his conviction. Neither the federal nor state constitution guarantees the accused the right to counsel at a pre-indictment line-up. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); State v. Taylor, 347 So.2d 172 (La.1977). While recognizing the doctrine of these cases, counsel seeks to invoke the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964) holding that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory our adversary system begins to operate and at that time the accused is entitled to a lawyer.
The rule of Escobedo is not pertinent to the facts in this case. The line-up being conducted was investigatory in character, prior to indictment. Furthermore, the Es-cobedo rule is intended to apply to confessions and inculpatory statements, not to line-up identifications. The decisions in Kirby v. Illinois, supra, and State v. Taylor, supra, fix the rule to be applied to line-ups.
Discovery
Pretrial discovery of statements taken from potential witness was not permitted at the time defendant's motion for discovery was filed. State v. Gray, 286 So.2d 644 (La.1973).
This assignment of error is without merit.
Assignments 2 and 3 are not briefed or argued and are considered abandoned.
Assignment 4
When the defendant was arrested he had $128 in his pocket. Testimony had also established that he was unemployed. A defense objection was made at the trial when the prosecutor sought to question the arresting officers about this money, arguing that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for its introduction. The jury was retired and defense counsel restated his objection asserting that the money was seized fifteen days after the crime, there was no evidence connecting the money with the robbery, and the money stolen in the robbery was in twenty dollar denominations, whereas the money the State sought to introduce was in ones, fives and tens.
The arresting officers did identify the money as that recovered from defendant at the time of his arrest. This identification did support a claim that the money was relevant to the proof that defendant was in possession of money when he was arrested, although he did not work, leaving the inference that the money was obtained from the robbery. It is of course arguable that the time lapse since the robbery and the dissimilarity in the denominations of the bills make it highly unlikely that the money found on defendant was obtained as a result of the robbery. As tenuous as the relevancy may be it is not illogical. The weight to be given to the evidence is a matter for the jury to decide. State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971).
In defendant's brief it is contended that the money was improperly introduced in evidence for still another reason: The money was seized incident to an unlawful arrest and as such is inadmissible. Inasmuch as this contention is made for the first time in brief, it cannot be considered. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 841.
Assignment 5
The defense asserts that the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury when he stated in rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument:
"It's a coincidence that Gregory Holmes was driving a dark Mustang. It's a coincidence that Gregory Holmes was wearing plaited hair. It's a coincidence that Gregory Holmes, who doesn't work, was in possession of a hundred and twenty-eight dollars. It's a coincidence that where Gregory Holmes lives there's a gun that matches the description of the perpetrator's gun. It's a coincidence that one shot was fired; and it's a coincidence that the gun was missing one bullet."
The basis of defendant's contention is that there was no evidence that the gun had been fired. Reference is made to testimony at the hearing on a motion for a new trial to the effect that the gun was inoperable when tested by police.
Several witnesses testified that defendant fired his gun once before leaving the bar. And officers seized a gun with only one bullet missing from the six bullet chamber during a search of defendant's home. The prosecutor's argument was therefore a permissible comment upon the evidence. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 774.
Assignment 6
In a motion for a new trial defendant alleges that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence; that newly discovered evidence mandates a new trial; that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; and that the prosecutor improperly commented in rebuttal argument that the gun had been fired.
An allegation that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence presents nothing for review in this Court. We have reviewed the trial judge's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress and found it free of error. A review of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument and the trial judge's ruling on the defense objection that there was no evidence to support the statement that the gun had been fired has resulted in sustaining the ruling of the trial judge. We find that there was evidence to support the claim that the gun had been fired.
Only defendant's allegation that the gun was inoperable, a fact discovered after trial, which is said to be newly discovered evidence, has not been reviewed on this appeal.
A firearms expert did testify that the gun introduced as evidence at the trial was inoperable due to a defective trigger return spring and a bent ejector. He also testified that the gun could have become inoperable by being dropped.
The gun was seized almost two weeks after the offense. It may have become inoperable during that time. The trial judge could reasonably conclude that this evidence would not have changed the verdict. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 851; State v. Credeur, 328 So.2d 59 (La.1976).
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
DIXON, J., dissents.
CALOGERO, J., dissents, finding merit in assignment of error # 1 (defendant was improperly denied representation by his retained counsel at his line-up.)
DENNIS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.