Case Name: Raymond A. MIX, Petitioner-Contestant, v. John BLANCHARD, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, Nominal-Respondent
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-09-10
Citations: 318 So. 2d 125
Docket Number: No. 7299
Parties: Raymond A. MIX, Petitioner-Contestant, v. John BLANCHARD, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, Nominal-Respondent.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ., and FRANK V. ZACCARIA, J. Pro Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 125–130

Head Matter:
Raymond A. MIX, Petitioner-Contestant, v. John BLANCHARD, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, Nominal-Respondent.
No. 7299.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 10, 1975.
Writ Refused Sept. 18, 1975.
See also, La.App., 318 So.2d 130.
James A. McPherson, New Orleans, for plainti f f-appellant.
Okla Jones, II, Anthony W. Skidmore, New Orleans, John Blanchard, in pro per. for John Blanchard, defendant-appellee.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ., and FRANK V. ZACCARIA, J. Pro Tem.

Opinion:
STOULIG, Judge.
Plaintiff, Raymond A. Mix, a candidate for the office of representative from the 93rd Legislative District for the State of Louisiana, has appealed a judgment dismissing his suit challenging the eligibility of respondent John Blanchard, also a candidate for the same office. Plaintiff alleges Blanchard has no "actual domicile" in the 93rd District and therefore fails to meet one of the requisites for candidacy outlined in LSA-Const. Art. 3, § 4(A) (1974), which provides:
"An elector who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided in the state for the preceding two years, and been actually domiciled for the proceeding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature."
Defendant filed qualifying papers giving his domicile as 4105 Melpomene Street, but plaintiff contends his "actual domicile" is 6109 Campus Boulevard (outside the 93rd District).
In support of his claim, plaintiff proved Blanchard:
1. bought a home at 6109 Campus Boulevard in 1969 and his wife (from whom he is neither separated nor divorced) and his three children have continuously lived there since its acquisition;
2. claimed a 1975 Homestead Exemption on the Campus Boulevard property;
3. has a listing in the New Orleans telephone directory at the Campus Boulevard address;
4. has no telephone listing registered in his name at the Melpomene qualifying address;
5. lists his "home address" as 6109 Campus Boulevard with the Custodian of Notarial Archives for Orleans Parish;
6. has utility meters in his name at the Campus Boulevard address; and
7. has registered at the Campus Boulevard address two automobiles used by his family.
Defendant does not challenge any of these proofs; however, he testified that it is his intent to maintain his domicile on Melpomene Street until the day he dies. He was born in this house and lived there until he left the New Orleans area for Chicago in the early 1960s. When he returned in 1966, he declared he reestablished his domicile with his wife and children on Melpomene Street and has voted continuously in this district since that time. When he moved his family to Campus Boulevard in 1969, he testified he left furniture at the Melpomene address and has continued to reserve for his personal use two rooms with a private entrance on one side of this double house. He further stated he sleeps in these quarters three or four nights a week and spends weekends "at home" with his family.
Despite defendant's declarations of in-ord is considered in its entirety, the evi-Melpomene Street, his actions contradict his self-serving testimony. When the rec-tent to maintain a lifetime domicile at 4105 dence is overwhelming that Blanchard maintains his principal establishment on Campus Boulevard. LSA-C.C. art. 38 defines domicile this way :
Despite defendant's declarations of intent to maintain a lifetime domicile at 4105 Melpomene Street, his actions contradict his self-serving testimony. When the record is considered in its entirety, the evidence is overwhelming that Blanchard maintains his principal establishment on Campus Boulevard. LSA-C.C. art. 38 defines domicile this way:
"The domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment.
"The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected."
The quoted article of the Constitution upon which plaintiff bases his challenge uses the terminology "actually domiciled." As we view it, in light of the quoted definition the word actually serves to emphasize the residency aspect of domicile. It is interesting to note the dialogue among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in drafting this article. It is apparent the delegates intended to limit candidacy for political office to citizens who actually live in the district they aspire to represent. The newly drafted constitutional article was designed to eliminate a system under which candidates would establish a "political domicile" from which to seek office even though they chose to live and maintain their families in another area, and were not truly representative of the district from which they sought election.
In our opinion the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the factual conclusion that Blanchard's domicile is located at 6109 Campus Boulevard where he maintains his wife and children and sleeps several nights each week. As a corollary to this conclusion we necessarily hold that 4105 Melpomene Street is another residence maintained for political purposes.
For the reasons assigned it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition of plaintiff-contestant Raymond A. Mix against the candidacy of respondent-contes-tee John Blanchard and against the defendant Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee be reversed.
It is further ordered and decreed that respondent-contestee John Blanchard is hereby declared to be ineligible to be a candidate for election as a member of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana representing the 93rd District of the State of Louisiana in the primary and general elections to be held in 1975.
It is further ordered and decreed that the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee be and it is prohibited from certifying respondent-contestee John Blanchard to be qualified as a candidate for election as a member of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana representing the 93rd District of the State of Louisiana in the primary and general elections to be held in 1975.
Reversed and rendered.
REDMANN, LEMMON, GULOTTA and BOUTALL, JJ., dissent with written reasons.
MORIAL, J., recused.
. Clearly 6109 Campus Boulevard is the matrimonial domicile of Mr. and Mrs. Blanchard.
. Thomas Casey, a member of the legislative committee, explained to the delegates why the word "domicile" was used rather than "residence." We quote in part: " The concept was advanced, and incidentally was adopted with only one dissenting vote, with the thought in mind that we would hope to avoid abuses by candidates for the legislature who attempt, or who rather actually reside or are legally domiciled in one area of a district or city or state or what have you, and through other means establish a residence in another legislative district. For instance, a person may have his home, have a homestead exemption, rear his children, and actually live in a home in one area of a city or a parish, and then have a business, let's say a barroom, in another area, a different legislative district, and have a cot on the second floor and he might sleep on that cot once a week or twice a week, register to vote in that area where he has his business, and then run for election in that area; in an area where in fact he does not actually live with his family and is not actually domiciled. We have attempted to do this to prevent just that thing. A person who lives with his family in one area could theoretically have many, many residences, five or six, and therefore have the option, through these means, and I feel they could be devious means, to establish other residences merely for the purpose of running in a certain legislative district. That was the whole thinking behind this. The word domicile is really where a person intends to have his main home, to rear his children, to register to vote, where he goes to church, where he associates with many of his friends and neighbors and things of that type, where his children may go to school. Various criteria such as that are things that the court looks at and not just how much time you might happen to spend in a particular residence, if you have more than one residence. " (Emphasis added.)