Case Name: LUCILE M. ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OCEAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1959-06-30
Citations: 30 N.J. 245
Docket Number: 
Parties: LUCILE M. ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OCEAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 245–262

Head Matter:
LUCILE M. ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OCEAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Argued April 21, 1959
Decided June 30, 1959.
Mr. Maurice A. Potter argued the cause for plaintiffs-appellants (Messrs. Potter and Fisher, attorneys; Mr. Maurice A. Potter, of counsel and on the brief).
Mr. Robert V. Carton argued the cause for defendants-respondents (Messrs. Stout & O’Eagan, attorneys for Board of Adjustment of Township of Ocean and Township Committee of the Township of Ocean; Messrs. Durand, Ivins & Carton, attorneys for St. Mary’s Church; Mr. Robert V. Carton, of counsel).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEINSTRAUB, C. J.
This is a zoning case. By a vote of 3 to 1, the board of adjustment recommended a variance under subsection (d) of N. J. S. A. 40:55-39 to permit the use of residential premises for a parochial school with living quarters for teachers. The governing body approved. Owners of neighboring property, having failed in their attack in the Law Division, 51 N. J. Super. 69 (1959), prosecuted this appeal. We certified the matter on our motion before the Appellate Division considered it.
The zoning ordinance establishes eight residental and two business districts. The required plot size in residential districts ranges to a maximum of 40,000 sq. ft. in Eesidence A. The property in question, known as Ivy Hedge, is one of some nine separate ownerships comprising a Eesidence A district. Ivy Hedge embraces about 16 acres, fronting on the westerly side of Wickapecko Drive for a distance of about 617 ft. and extending westerly with side lines of 1,022 ft. and 1,059 ft. to a rear line of 339.50 ft. On the same side of the street, a 30-acre tract of vacant land lies north of Ivy Hedge; to the south are two parcels with substantial homes. South of the two parcels last mentioned is a Eesidence E district containing a subdivision development, a women's club, a community day school, and a public school. To the west and south of the rear portion of Ivy Hedge is another subdivision development in a Residence E district. The minimum plot requirement of the Residence E districts is 12,500 sq. ft. On the easterly side of Wickapeeko Drive, across from the premises in question and constituting the balance of the Residence A district here involved, are valuable estates owned by plaintiffs.
The residence on the property in question erected in 1900 contains 17 rooms, plus 6 bathrooms, and 2 powder rooms. The structure is well set back from the property line. The variance is conditioned as follows:
"1. That the exterior of the existing building not be changed or altered;
2. That the property east of the building known as the front yard shall be maintained in its present state of landscaping;
3. That the main entrance and exit for school purposes shall be limited to the extreme westerly portion of the property known as the rear;
4. That any public area, playgrounds, athletic field, etc. be established to the rear of the existing building;
5. St. Mary's Parish would accept the children of Ocean Township who are now attending other parochial schools;
6. That St. Mary's Parish install at its own cost and expense a sanitary sewer line to connect with existing sewer system according to specifications and places as determined by the Township Engineer. Further, that all main lines on existing streets be dedicated to the Township of Ocean; and
7. That the convent and parochial school shall be limited to the existing main building."
The ordinance permits in all districts "apartment houses, garden apartments, apartment hotels, hotels, boarding houses, municipal buildings, churches, public schools, including playgrounds and accessory buildings, public parks, and public playgrounds" upon, however, the recommendation of the board of adjustment to the township committee "under the same procedure as the Board of Adjustment is empowered by law and ordinance to hear cases and make exceptions to the provisions of a zoning ordinance if in its judgment the use will not be detrimental to the health, safety and general welfare of the community and is reasonably necessary for the convenience of the community." A parochial school, however, is not within the category of uses thus permitted. Rather it comes within "private schools or other educational institutions, whether or not conducted for profit," which are authorized in business districts upon prior application to the board of adjustment under the same provisions with respect to "exceptions" quoted above.
A parochial school thus being unauthorized in residential districts, a variance was sought under (d) of N. J. S. A. 40:55-39. The cited statute reads:
"The board of adjustment ^ shall have the power to:
d. Recommend in particular cases and for special reasons to the governing body of the municipality the granting of a variance to allow a structure or use in a district restricted against such structure or use. AVhereupon the governing body or board of public works may, by resolution, approve or disapprove such recommendation.
No relief may be granted or action taken under the terms of this section unless such relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance."
Two critical findings are required by the statute: (1) that the variance "can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance"; (2) that "special reasons" exist for the variance. Both findings were made by the board of adjustment in adequate factual detail and with ample support in the record.
As to the first requirement, the school of course involves no inherent "detriment to the public good." And in the scene before us it was reasonably found that there will be no substantial impairment of the "intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." The ordinance contemplates uses other than one-family homes. As pointed out above, apartment houses, garden apartments, apartment hotels, hotels, boarding houses, churches, public schools and public playgrounds are authorized upon prior application to the board of adjustment. Hence the use here permitted is not dramatically different from those envisioned in the zoning plan. Nor, upon the record, can we quarrel with the finding that neighboring properties will not be injured. Ivy Hedge is a large tract, and the carefully conceived conditions of the variance, see Grimley v. Ridgewood, 45 N. J. Super. 574, 577 (App. Div. 1957), will contain the influences of the school within the perimeter of the property. In affirmative terms, some possible advantages may be added. The variance will preserve the attractive character of the premises against pressures, evident from the subdivision developments mentioned above, to raze a beautiful but uneconomic type of residence and to subdivide the tract. Thus the variance may well prove to be a buffer for the remaining properties in this relatively small Residence A district.
Plaintiffs concentrate their attack upon the second critical finding, the existence of "special reasons." They argue relief may not be granted in the absence of hardship, some zoning burden peculiar to the property in question and not common to the entire district, citing Lumund v. Board of Adjustment, 4 N. J. 577 (1950); and Beirn v. Morris, 14 N. J. 529 (1954). Both cases, however, involved subsection (c) of the statute in which "exceptional and undue hardship upon the owner of such property" is a basis for variance. In Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Ocean Twp., 9 N. J. 64, 77 (1952), it was pointed out that subsection (d) contains no such prerequisite. In Ward v. Scott, 11 N. J. 117 (1952), in which this court divided 4 to 3, Monmouth Lumber was followed, and the claim of unconstitutionality for want of a sufficient standard was rejected. The majority held that "special reasons" gained validating content from the purposes of zoning specified in R. S. 40:55-32. In the second Ward v. Scott, 16 N. J. 16, 18 (1954), the majority view was iterated, and it was pointed out that after the first opinion in that matter the Legislature amended (c) restrictively but did not alter (d). And in Dolan v. DeCapua, 16 N. J. 599 (1954), the court noted that although hardship may constitute a special reason it did not exhaust the subject. Neither Ranney v. Istituto Pontificio Delle Maestre Filippini, 20 N. J. 189 (1955) nor Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N. J. 199 (1956), questioned Ward v. Scott but rather turned upon other considerations including impairment of the zoning scheme. Recently we again expressed adherence to this interpretation of (d). Grundlehner v. Dangler, 29 N. J. 256, 265-268 (1959).
As pointed out in Grimley v. Ridgewood, supra (45 N. J. Super, at page 581), no definition of "special reasons" has been attempted beyond the reference to R. S. 40:55-32. In the nature of the subject, a precise formula is not feasible. Each case must turn upon its own circumstances.
The standard of section 32 here pertinent is the "general welfare." That the education of children directly furthers the "general welfare" cannot be questioned. The education here to be provided is an accepted equivalent of public schooling. A need exists. Presently the community's children of the Catholic faith attend a parochial school in Asbury Park, the facilities of which are hard pressed because of swelling population, as indeed are those of the public school in the township itself.
The local authorities could properly conclude that a special reason for a variance here exists, and since this finding, as well as the equally critical finding that there will not ensue any substantial detriment to the public good or substantial impairment of the zoning plan and ordinance, cannot be denounced as arbitrary or capricious, there is no basis for judicial intervention. Grundlehner v. Dangler, supra (29 N. J. at page 266).
Plaintiffs complain the school will serve the entire parish of which the township is but a part. No infirmity inheres in that circumstance. A municipality may provide cooperatively for the needs of neighboring communities as well as its own. See Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N. J. 154, 162-163 (1957); Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N. J. 320, 328 (1958).
One further matter requires comment. Before the trial court defendants, or one of them, apparently injected a claim, not within the pleadings, that constitutionally the zoning treatment of public and parochial schools must be identical. The trial court apparently read Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N. J. 341, 36 A. L. R. 2d 639 (1953), annotated in 36 A. L. R. 2d 653 (1954), to support that view and intimated that St. Mary's Church could have sought a permit under the terms of the ordinance itself upon an equation of a parochial school with a public school (51 N. J. Super. at page 73). The court, however, then dealt with the cause as one involving a variance and affirmed on that basis.
We express no view of the constitutional issue since it is not necessarily involved. No doubt a municipality may legislatively determine to include public and private schools in a single category for zoning purposes, and Yanow approves that course. But there are differences which may well support another approach. In weighing its obligation to provide public education against some ensuing hurt to residential property, a municipality may decide to accept some detriment in order to furnish such education with reasonable convenience to the several areas of the community. It may, however, be proper to strike a different balance when weighing a detriment to a residential district against the need for a private school which draws its students from the entire community or from beyond its borders. Moreover, the governmental unit is politically responsible to the public for its selection of a school site and hence is alert to the various facets of public interest involved in its decision. If need be, it may resort to eminent domain to secure the appropriate location. On the other hand, a private school may not have an equivalent sense of obligation to consider the interests of others and in any event is limited to parcels available to it by voluntary sale. We need not and hence do not express an opinion upon the question. It may, however, be appropriately noted that here, in dealing with an application for a variance, there was brought to bear the independent judgment of the board of adjustment and of the governing body that the use under the facts is compatible with the total public interest.
The judgment of the Law Division is affirmed.