Case Name: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ni PILKINTON and Mrs. Catherine Pilkinton, Appellants
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1958-02-07
Citations: 310 S.W.2d 304
Docket Number: No. 7625
Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ni PILKINTON and Mrs. Catherine Pilkinton, Appellants.
Judges: McDOWELL and RUARK, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 310
Pages: 304–310

Head Matter:
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ni PILKINTON and Mrs. Catherine Pilkinton, Appellants.
No. 7625.
Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.
Feb. 7, 1958.
Motions for Rehearing or to Transfer Overruled March 3, 1958.
Ni Pilkinton, pro se;
R. D. Moore, West Plains, for respondent.

Opinion:
STONE, Presiding Judge.
Defendants, Ni and Mrs. Catherine (Ni) Pilkinton, appeal from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding them guilty of violation of the so-called compulsory school attendance law [Chapter 164] and assessing the punishment of each defendant at a fine of $10. Section 164.060. (All statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.)
Following a practice neither helpful nor commendable [Mannon v. Frick, 365 Mo. 1203, 1205, 295 S.W.2d 158, 161], the state has filed no brief and rests on a seven-line "motion to dismiss appeal" (unsupported by suggestions or authorities) because of the insufficiency of defendants'appellants' brief under Rule 1.08. (All rule references are to Supreme Court Rules, 42 V.A.M.S.) Defendants, unlearned in the law and appearing pro se both in the trial court and on appeal, admittedly and understandably have found it difficult to prepare a brief satisfying the requirements of Rule 1.08, although we are impelled to observe sympathetically that their brief eloquently bespeaks a purposeful, unflagging, indefatigable industry which some of our brethren of the bar might well emulate in the preparation of briefs. Nevertheless, when defendants' brief is measured by the detailed and exacting, albeit plain and salutary, provisions of Rule 1.08, we necessarily must hold that nothing is presented for appellate review by the "points" stated in defendants' brief, to-wit, that "the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence" [cf. State v. Garrett, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 441, 442(2)], that "a reasonable cross-examination of the state's witnesses was not permitted" [cf. State v. Burns, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 119, 120-121], and that "the court refused defendants' instructions and request for comment on the evidence." Cf. State v. Francies, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 8, 15(19); State v. Tebbe, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 172, 174(3,4). However, it by no means follows that defendants' appeal should be dismissed. For our courts, with their habitually scrupulous and traditionally tender regard for human life and liberty, reserve for imposition only in civil cases the drastic penalty of dismissal of the appeal provided by Rule 1.15; and, where a brief in a criminal case is so defective and insufficient that it is wholly disregarded, the appellate court still examines pursuant to Rule 28.02 what formerly was termed "the record proper" [State v. Rutledge, Mo., 267 S.W.2d 625 (1); State v. King, 365 Mo. 48, 56, 275 S.W.2d 310, 315] and such assignments of error in the motion for new trial as are sufficiently specific to comply with Rule 27.20. State v. Mace, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 99, 101. See also State v. Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d 787, 790. So, the state's motion to dismiss the instant appeal is overruled.
The information filed against defendants charges that "on the - day of October, 1956, Mr. and Mr. N. I. Pilkinton did then and there unlawfully, wrongfully and willfully having custody of Lillie Taylor of the age of 7 years, and having said minor child under their care, custody and control, and having been warned by notice as provided by law under Section 164.010 to 165.090 , fail, neglect and refuse to keep said child in regular daily attendance of public school." The information contained no charge that defendants did not "provide such child at home with such regular daily instruction during the usual hours as shall be substantially equivalent at least to the instruction given the children of like age at said day school in the locality." Section 164.010; now amended Laws of 1957, p. -, S.B. No. 16.
The information is part of what formerly was termed the record proper [State v. Boyer, 342 Mo. 64, 69, 112 S.W.2d 575, 579; State v. Harris, 337 Mo. 1052, 1057, 87 S.W.2d 1026, 1028(5)]; and, in performance of the duty enjoined upon us by Rule 28.02 [see also Section 547.270], the sufficiency of the information to charge an offense is one of the questions into which we should inquire [compare State v. Rutledge, supra; State v. Garrett, supra, 282 S.W.2d loc. cit. 444—consult also State v. Couch, 344 Mo. 78, 79, 124 S.W.2d 1091; State v. Young, 345 Mo. 407, 409, 133 S.W.2d 404, 406(1)], regardless of whether such error has been assigned. State v. Winterbauer, 318 Mo. 693, 697, 300 S.W. 1071, 1073(4); State v. Wolfner, 318 Mo. 1068, 1074, 2 S.W.2d 589, 590(2). And, see State v. Eslinger, 361 Mo. 1062, 1065, 238 S.W.2d 424, 425(2,3); State v. Horn, 336 Mo. 524, 525, 79 S.W.2d 1044, 1045(1); State v. Lettrell, Mo., 39 S.W.2d 556, 557(3, 4); State v. Barr, 326 Mo. 1095, 34 S.W.2d 477, 478(1), 479(3,4).
Under the recent holding in State v. Cheney, Mo.App., 305 S.W.2d 892 (handed down in October, 1957, after trial of the instant case), it is clear that the information under review was insufficient to charge an offense under Section 164.010. It would be a work of super-arrogance for us to plow again the ground so freshly and so well broken in that case.
It follows that the judgment of conviction in the case at bar should be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.
McDOWELL and RUARK, JJ., concur.