Case Name: Edward C. St. Clair, Individually and on Behalf of the People of the State of New York as a Citizen and Taxpayer Thereof, Appellant, v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1963-07-10
Citations: 13 N.Y.2d 72
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward C. St. Clair, Individually and on Behalf of the People of the State of New York as a Citizen and Taxpayer Thereof, Appellant, v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 72–82

Head Matter:
Edward C. St. Clair, Individually and on Behalf of the People of the State of New York as a Citizen and Taxpayer Thereof, Appellant, v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
Argued May 6, 1963;
decided July 10, 1963.
J. Clement Johnston for appellant.
I. Plaintiff is an interested person directly aggrieved and has capacity to bring this action; the cases relied upon by defendants have no application. (Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155; Kilbourne v. St. John, 59 N. Y. 21; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 298 N. Y. 516; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N. Y. 512, 339 U. S. 981.) II. This court may entertain this case upon the merits without overruling the Doolittle case. (Matter of Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N. Y. 207; Heim v. McCall, 214 N. Y. 629, 239 U. S. 175; Palmer v. Board of Educ., 276 N. Y. 222; Matter of Tartaglia v. McLaughlin, 190 Misc. 266, 273 App. Div. 821, 297 N. Y. 419; Elkind v. City of New Rochelle, 5 Misc 2d 296, 4 A D 2d 761, 5 N Y 2d 836; Lederman v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 196 Misc. 873, 301 N. Y. 476, 342 U. S. 485; Matter of Peters v. New York City Housing Auth., 9 Misc 2d 942, 307 N. Y. 519; Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contrs. Assn. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N Y 2d 420.) III. This court can and should decide whether this matter is of sufficient public importance to be decided by the courts. (Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan, 22 Misc 2d 776,11 A D 2d 206, 9 N Y 2d 293, 368 U. S. 12.) IV. The rule of the Doolittle case should be modified, at least to the extent necessary for the enforcement of section 8 of article VII of the Constitution. (Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349; Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N Y 2d 195; People v. Spitaleri, 9 N Y 2d 168; Bing v. Thunig, 2 N Y 2d 656; Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N Y 2d 5; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N Y 2d 237.)
Samuel I. Rosenman, George Morton Levy, Sr., Max Freund, Ernest A. Gleit and Fred H. Greene for Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., respondent.
I. As a bettor, St. Clair is not aggrieved by the 1956 law, and he therefore has no standing to attack its constitutionality. (Thompson v. Wallin, 276 App. Div. 463, 301 N. Y. 476, 342 U. S. 801; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; Matter of Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 302 N. Y. 226; O’Kane v. State of New York, 283 N. Y. 439; Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N. Y. 197; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416; Matter of Murtha v. Monaghan, 1 A D 2d 178, 2 N Y 2d 819, 355 U. S. 891; People ex rel. Moffett v. Bates, 276 App. Div. 38, 301 N. Y. 597, 340 U. S. 865; People ex rel. Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Graves, 250 App. Div. 149, 277 N. Y. 723.) II. This case may not be entertained on its merits unless this court changes the long-established rule that taxpayers lack standing to contest the constitutionality of statutes. (Matter of Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N. Y. 207; Heim v. McCall, 214 N Y. 629, 239 U. S. 175; Palmer v. Board of Educ., 276 N. Y. 222; Bull v. Stichman, 189 Misc. 597, 273 App. Div. 311, 298 N. Y. 516; Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contrs. Assn. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N Y 2d 420; Ausable Chasm Co. v. State of New York, 266 N. Y. 326; People v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 187 N. Y. 142.) III. The rule forbidding taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of statutes should not be changed. (Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N. Y. 512; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; Kilbourne v. St. John, 59 N. Y. 21; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N. Y. 318; Thompson v. Wallin, 276 App. Div. 463, 301 N. Y. 476, 342 U. S. 801; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113; Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 192; Adamson v. Union R. R. Co., 74 Hun 3; Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249, 332 U. S. 761; Matter of Blaikie, 11 A D 2d 196; Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N Y 2d 472; Purcell v. Long Is. Daily Press Pub. Co., 9 N Y 2d 255; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349; Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 319 Mass. 672; Barco Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 10 Ill. 2d 157; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N Y 2d 237; Bing v. Thunig, 2 N Y 2d 656; People v. Rosario, 9 N Y 2d 286; Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N Y 2d 372; Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N Y 2d 5; Greenberg v. Lorens, 9 N Y 2d 195.)
Louis Haimoff and Joseph G. Blum for Yonkers Raceway, Inc., respondent.
I. Plaintiff as a citizen and taxpayer does not have capacity to bring this action. (Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N. Y. 512; Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 298 N. Y. 516; Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 320; Kilbourne v. St. John, 59 N. Y. 21; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N. Y. 318; Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N. Y. 506; Matter of Blaikie, 11 A D 2d 196; Smith v. City of Buffalo, 191 Misc. 439; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447.) II. Plaintiff’s participation as a bettor in pari-mutuel pools conducted by harness racetracks is insufficient to vest him with standing to question the constitutionality of section 45-a. (Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan, 9 N Y 2d 293; Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N. Y. 249; People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92; Matter of Northern Bank of N. Y., 267 App. Div. 659, 293 N. Y. 936; Matter of Thalmann, 177 Misc. 1055; Dayton-Goose Cr. Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456.)
Ira R. Morris for Genesee Monroe Racing Association, Inc., respondent.
Plaintiff has no legal capacity to bring this action. (Matter of Blaikie, 11 A D 2d 196.)
Alfred L. Retselt for Buffalo Trotting Association, Inc., respondent.
Plaintiff has no legal capacity to bring this action. (Matter of Blaikie, 11 A D 2d 196.)
Ernest B. Morris for Saratoga Harness Racing Association, Inc., respondent.
Plaintiff has no status, other than that of a citizen and taxpayer, upon which to base an attack on the $54,960.26 payments to Saratoga; his complaint is thus clearly defective on its face. (Matter of Blaikie, 11 A D 2d 196.)
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Paxton Blair and Edward Siegfried of counsel), pro se and for the State Harness Racing Commission and others, respondents.
As a private citizen and taxpayer whose interests are not specifically affected by the statute he seeks to have declared unconstitutional, the plaintiff was rightly held to lack the legal capacity to maintain this action.

Opinion:
Burke, J.
The simple question presented on this appeal is whether the complaint was properly dismissed on the ground that appellant lacks legal capacity to sue.
The appellant, who allegedly placed small wagers —$18 in all — at racetracks of several of the corporate defendants, brought this suit to have the difference paid to the State between the amount of the payments made to the State by such racetracks at the tax rates reduced by an amendment of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law (L. 1956, ch. 837) and the amount which the State would have obtained under the tax rates in effect prior to the effective date of that amendment, and to require payment in the future at the old rates. The respondents, joined by the Attorney-General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appellant lacked standing to dispute the constitutionality of the amendment.
Once again we are presented with an attempt to change the law of this State, which is also the law of the United States of America. We have always held that the constitutionality of a State statute may be tested only by one personally aggrieved thereby, and then only if the determination of the grievance requires a determination of constitutionality. Under that ruling an unaggrieved citizen-taxpayer, such as appellant, lacks standing to challenge a statute's constitutional validity. Appellant's contentions were rejected by this court in the case of Bull v. Stichman (298 N. Y. 516, affg. 273 App. Div. 311). In the Bull case the dissent in the Appellate Division was based on the cases appellant relies upon here (Matter of Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N. Y. 207, and Heim v. McCall, 214 N. Y. 629). This court's unanimous affirmance in spite of the dissent disposed of the theory that the rule regarding taxpayers' cases permitted exceptions.
Thus we have found anew that the rationale propounded in Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County (18 N. Y. 155) and Schieffelin v. Komfort (212 N. Y. 520) remains sound today. It seems to us proper ' ' that the courts of this state have denied the right of a citizen and taxpayer to bring before the court for review the acts of another department of government simply because he is one of many such citizens and taxpayers " (Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520, 537, supra).
As Judge Chase stated in the Schieffelin case:
" Jurisdiction has never been directly conferred upon the courts to supervise the acts of other departments of government. The jurisdiction to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional arises because it is the province and duty of the judicial department of government to declare the law in the determination of the individual rights of the parties.
" The assumption of jurisdiction in any other case would be an interference by one department of government with another department of government when each is equally independent within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution itself." (212 N. Y., supra, p. 530.)
This concept was later advanced by Mr. Justice Black in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. (310 U. S. 113, 132) when he said: " Our decision that the complaining companies lack standing to sue does not rest upon a mere formality. We rest it upon reasons deeply rooted in the constitutional divisions of authority in our system of Government and the impropriety of judicial interpretations of law at the instance of those who show no more than a mere possible injury to the public."
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, without costs.