Case Name: Kathy W. ANDERSON, et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-04-08
Citations: 642 So. 2d 208
Docket Number: No. CA 93 1102
Parties: Kathy W. ANDERSON, et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before CARTER, GONZALES and WHIPPLE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 642
Pages: 208–215

Head Matter:
Kathy W. ANDERSON, et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
No. CA 93 1102.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
April 8, 1994.
Reasons for Grant of Rehearing Aug. 25, 1994.
John W. deGravelles, Baton Rouge, Donald Cascio, Denham Springs, for appellant, Kathy W. Anderson, et al.
Ben Day, Baton Rouge, for appellee, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Calvin E. Hardin, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellee, Shelby Ins. Co.
Donald R. Smith, Baton Rouge, for appel-lee, Allstate Indem. Co. (Allstate Ins. Co.).
Before CARTER, GONZALES and WHIPPLE, JJ.

Opinion:
izGONZALES, Judge.,
FACTS
Plaintiffs, Kathy and Marc Anderson, are appealing the granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment on the issue of uninsured motorist coverage. On March 15, 1991, Mr. Anderson visited his State Farm agent for the purpose of adding his 1989 Chevrolet pickup truck to his existing State Farm automobile coverages. Because the truck was an additional vehicle rather than a replacement vehicle, a new insurance policy was written, with an effective date of February 19, 1991, the date he purchased the truck. Mr. Anderson signed a form indicating he rejected uninsured motorist coverage. On June 14,1991, Mr. Anderson was involved in an automobile accident in which his ear was hit by an uninsured/underinsured motorist. The Andersons, individually and on behalf of their two minor children, filed suit against various parties including State Farm to recover for their injuries and losses as a result of the automobile accident. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Mr. Anderson had rejected uninsured motorist coverage.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Andersons are appealing that judgment. They make two assignments of error.
1. The trial court erred in granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment when the evidence in the record shows that Mr. Anderson was not given the opportunity to make an informed, conscious choice as to whether he wanted uninsured/under-insured motorist coverage on his automobile policy.
2. The trial court erred in granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment when the evidence in the record shows that State Farm's rejection form did not meet the requirements of La.R.S. 22:1406(D) by offering Mr. Anderson the three options required by law.
Appellate courts should review the granting of a summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors, 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991). Under La.C.C.P. art. 966, a motion for summary judgment should be granted only if lathe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 195, 197 (La.1992). The liberal construction of the UM statute requires that the statutory exceptions to the coverage requirement be interpreted strictly. The insurer bears the burden of proving that the insured rejected UM coverage in writing. Roger v. Estate of Moulton, 513 So.2d 1126, 1130 (La.1987).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE INFORMED CHOICE ISSUE
State Farm filed into the record a request for admissions and attached a copy of Mr. Anderson's insurance policy, including the uninsured motorist rejection form at issue, and an affidavit by the insurance agent. The affidavit by State Farm agent Steve Yarbor-ough states:
Prior to Mr. Anderson's execution of this rejection form I discussed with him in detail all the coverages on all his vehicles, what these coverages provided, and the cost of adding or dropping the various coverages. At the time he rejected the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage on the 1989 Chevrolet pick-up Mr. Anderson was aware, and indicated his awareness, of what those coverages provided, and he indicated to me that he wished to reject those coverages entirely, whereon Mr. Anderson executed the rejection form to do so.
A request for admissions is considered a pleading, therefore these items attached to this pleading were properly before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment.
However, a review of the record shows that the only countervailing "affidavit" from Mr. Anderson, found at page 163 of the record, is defective. This "affidavit" is not signed or notarized, and further, is attached to plaintiffs memoranda in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. An affidavit which is not signed and notarized | ^cannot be considered by the trial judge. Porche v. City Of New Orleans, 523 So.2d 2, 3 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). Unsworn and unverified documents are not of sufficient evidentiary quality to be given weight in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Landry v. Stein, 497 So.2d 1075, 1077 (La. App. 5th Cir.1986); Continental Casualty Company v. McClure, 313 So.2d 260, 262 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975). Moreover, memo-randa are not considered pleadings under La.C.C.P. art. 852; consequently, attachments thereto should not be considered by the trial court in resolving motions for summary judgments. Dyes v. Isuzu Motors, Limited In Japan, 611 So.2d 126, 128 (La. App. 1st Cir.1992).
There was no properly executed affidavit creating a material issue of fact as to whether Mr. Anderson made an informed choice. The affidavit of the State Farm agent which establishes that the agent discussed with Mr. Anderson all the options available to him, and that Mr. Anderson then rejected uninsured motorist coverage, is not disputed by any valid countervailing affidavit. Therefore, this assignment of error has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE THREE OPTIONS ISSUE
Mr. Anderson cites Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 195, 198 (La.1992), which provides that:
The UM statute provides that UM coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits is automatic unless such coverage is completely rejected or the lower limits are selected. The statute thus provides the insured with three options: UM coverage equal to bodily injury limits in the policy, UM coverage lower than those limits, or no UM coverage. A rejection on a form that prohibits the insured from choosing limits below liability coverage or which automatically chooses a certain lower amount for the insured, does not meet the statutory requirements because it forecloses options available to the insured by law.
In Tugwell, the court found an umbrella liability policy application form which only provided a space for the insured to reject coverage completely did not provide the insured with the option of choosing limits lower than the liability coverage; therefore, the policy | efailed to meet the requirements of the statute. In another case relied on by Mr. Anderson, Henson v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 585 So.2d 534, 539 (La.1991), the court held that "the insurer must place the insured in a position to make an informed rejection of UM coverage." In Henson, the rejection language was not conspicuous on the application, and there was no separate signature line for the insured to sign or initial and thereby indicate a specific intent to reject UM coverage. The court held that Mr. Henson merely signed the completed application form and did not affirmatively make any specific indications regarding the rejection of UM coverage. We also note that in Henson, the insurance agent did not testify at trial.
The form used by State Farm and signed by Mr. Anderson is shown below.
We find, that, under the facts of this case, the form used provided the required three options for the insured. Mr. Anderson could simply sign the form, thus triggering automatic uninsured coverage in the amount of the bodily injury liability coverage; or check the first box, selecting uninsured motorist coverage with lower limits, filling in the blanks for the desired amount; or check the second box, rejecting uninsured motorist coverage completely. We do note that the sentence "I acknowledge and agree that I have Isthe right to be provided with Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage in amounts not less than the limits of my automobile bodily injury liability insurance and:" could be considered confusing if the facts of the case indicated that Mr. Anderson had conveyed to the insurance agent the desire to purchase uninsured motorist insurance in an amount equal to his bodily injury liability insurance. However, the affidavit of State Farm's insurance agent establishes that the agent discussed the options available to Mr. Anderson and that Mr. Anderson affirmatively rejected uninsured motorist coverage. The box for rejection of uninsured motorist coverage is checked off, and the form is signed by Mr. Anderson.
Under the facts of this case, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the rejection of uninsured motorist coverage by Mr. Anderson, and that State Farm was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court judgment is affirmed. Costs are assessed against the appellants, Kathy and Mare Anderson.
AFFIRMED.
WHIPPLE, J., dissents for reasons assigned.
. A footnote to this memorandum states "The attached affidavit form is submitted unsigned but will be submitted in proper form in the same sum and substance at or before argument." However, a thorough search of the record reveals no other affidavit.
We also note that a footnote to Mr. Anderson's brief states: "While the affidavit of Marc Anderson which is included in this record is unsigned, the parties to this appeal have stipulated that this was, indeed, the affidavit that was present in the record and considered by the Trial Court in rendering its decision."
While the parties have stipulated that this unsigned, unnotarized document was the one presented to the trial court, they cannot, by stipulation (or waiver) endow this document with evi-dentiary weight which it does not possess.