Case Name: STATE v. ALLEN MOSES
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1934-10-10
Citations: 207 N.C. 139
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. ALLEN MOSES.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 207
Pages: 139–141

Head Matter:
STATE v. ALLEN MOSES.
(Filed 10 October, 1934.)
1. Arson. O c — Evidence held sufficient to be submitted to .jury in this prosecution for arson.
Evidence that fire in defendant’s bouse started in a closet in wbicb was banging a quilt soaked in kerosene, that kindling wood was on the floor of tbe closet, that tbe closet bad no ceiling, but opened at the top into the attic where were found several articles of clothing smelling of kerosene, and a bucket containing kerosene and a bucket containing paper, rags, and cloth smelling of kerosene, that defendant did not phone the fire department from the house, but first gave the alarm to his children, and that one of them summoned the fire department through the city alarm system, and that defendant was being pressed to pay installments on the mortgage on the house, and was threatened with foreclosure, with other incriminating circumstantial evidence, establishes motive and an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, and that the fire was of incendiary origin, and is held sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a prosecution under C. S., 4245.
2. Criminal Law I j—
Upon defendant’s motion as of nonsuit only the incriminating evidence need be considered. C. S., 4643.
3. Criminal Law G n—
An accumulation of independent incriminating circumstances may be sufficient when taken together to warrant the submission of the case to the jury, although each single circumstance, when standing alone, is insufficient.
Appeal by defendant from Parker, J., at May Term, 1934, of Wayke.
No error.
Langston, Allen & Taylor for appellant,
Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Seawell for the State.

Opinion:
Sci-ieNCKj J.
Tbe bill of indictment charges that tbe defendant "did unlawfully, wilfully, wantonly and feloniously, being tbe occupant of a building used as a dwelling-house, for a fraudulent purpose, set fire to, burn, caused to be burned, aid, procure tbe burning of tbe aforesaid building," in breach of C. S., 4245.
Tbe assignments of error present tbe single question as to whether bis Honor erred in overruling tbe motion of tbe defendant to dismiss tbe action and for judgment of nonsuit, properly made and renewed under C. S., 4643.
Tbe State's evidence tends to show :
That about 5:30 o'clock on tbe evening of 28 January, 1934, tbe dwelling-house owned and occupied by tbe defendant was partially burned, that when tbe city firemen arrived at tbe bouse in response to an alarm given over tbe city system, they found tbe fire burning in a closet in which was a step-ladder six or eight feet high, on which a quilt was banging, which quilt was soaked with kerosene, and on'the floor of tbe closet kindling wood; that tbe closet bad no ceiling and opened at tbe top into tbe attic; and that in tbe attic was a pair of overalls, a jumper, and part of a quilt, all of which smelled of kerosene, and also a bucket containing kerosene and a charred keg contained paper, rags, and cloth which bad tbe odor of kerosene.
That the'defendant first gave tbe alarm of fire to bis two children, a daughter and son, who were tbe only other members of bis family in tbe bouse at tbe time, and that tbe son ran to a nearby fire alarm box and summoned tbe fire department, which responded immediately and came to tbe bouse and extinguished tbe fire; and that later tbe defendant stated be did not use tbe telephone in tbe bouse to give tbe alarm because be did not think of it; that tbe defendant some several days after tbe fire made tbe remark to an investigating officer of tbe State "that it would have been a God's blessing to him if it bad burned up."
That tbe defendant at tbe time of tbe fire bad $5,500 fire insurance on tbe building and furniture; that be owed a balance of $1,500 due on a mortgage on tbe bouse, and bad been urged to catch up with tbe payments due thereon, and warned that be would have to vacate tbe bouse unless tbe payments were made.
Tbe defendant testified himself and offered other evidence in bis own behalf to the effect that be was innocent of tbe crime charged, and knew nothing of bow tbe kerosene got into tbe bouse, or of tbe origin of tbe fire; and, to tbe further effect that tbe chimney, which was contiguous to the closet where tbe fire was found, bad boles in it between tbe brick where the mortar was faulty, through which sparks could have come and set fire to the closet.
We think the State's evidence, when given a liberal and reasonable construction, was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, and that therefore the court should not have withdrawn it from the jury. The defendant's brief, in support of his motion to' dismiss the action, seems to be based somewhat upon the conception that the evidence taken as a whole did not warrant a conviction, but in passing upon this motion we need consider only such evidence as was favorable to the State, without regard to that upon which the defendant relied. S. v. Martin, 182 N. C., 846.
The State's evidence in this ease is sufficient to establish a motive and an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, that,the fire was of an incendiary origin, and many other damaging circumstances tending to show defendant's guilt. However, it is not the fact of motive, or of opportunity, or of incendiary origin of fire, or of any other single circumstance taken by itself, but it was all of these circumstances, considered as a whole and in their relation to each other, that made it incumbent upon the court to submit this case to the jury. These related circumstances likewise warranted the jury in deciding the issue against the defendant. S. v. Clark, 173 N. C., 739.
When each circumstance going to make up the evidence relied upon depends upon the truth of the preceding circumstance, circumstantial evidence may be likened unto a chain, which is no stronger than its weakest link; but, as in this case, when there is an accumulation of circumstances which do not depend upon each other, circumstantial evidence is more aptly likened to the bundle of twigs in.the fable, or to several strands twisted into a rope, becoming, when united, of much strength. S. v. Shines, 125 N. C., 730.
No error.