Case Name: Elizabeth HALL, et al., Petitioners, v. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA, S. A. ("HELICOL"), Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1982-07-21
Citations: 638 S.W.2d 870
Docket Number: No. C-243
Parties: Elizabeth HALL, et al., Petitioners, v. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA, S. A. (“HELICOL”), Respondent.
Judges: Concurring opinion by CAMPBELL, J., in which McGEE, J., joins.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 638
Pages: 870–883

Head Matter:
Elizabeth HALL, et al., Petitioners, v. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA, S. A. (“HELICOL”), Respondent.
No. C-243.
Supreme Court of Texas.
July 21, 1982.
Dissenting Opinion Oct. 6, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1982.
Helm, Pletcher & Hogan, George E. Pletcher, Houston, for petitioners.
McCamish, Ingram, Martin & Brown, James E. Ingram, John McCamish, Jr., and Barry A. Chasnoff, San Antonio, for respondent.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
WALLACE, Justice.
Our opinion of February 24,1982, is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted therefor.
Elizabeth Hall and the other plaintiffs in the trial court (Hall) are the survivors of four citizens of the United States killed in a helicopter crash in Peru while working in that country constructing a pipeline. Hall sued Helicol, the owner and operator of the helicopter which crashed, in Harris County, Texas, in four separate causes of action. Helicol entered a special appearance in each of the actions, to contest the jurisdiction of the Texas court pursuant to Rule 120a, Tex. R.Civ.P., all of which were overruled by the respective trial courts. The four actions were consolidated for trial resulting in a judgment for Hall. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 616 S.W.2d 247. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The only issue before us is whether under the facts of this cause of action, was Helicol amenable to jurisdiction in Texas. Therefore, this Court must decide whether the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol was consistent with the requirements of due process of law under the Constitution of the United States.
In 1974, Petro Peru, the Peruvian state owned oil company, made a contract with Williams-Sedco-Horn, (referred to as Consorcio in their contract), a joint venture based in Houston, Texas, to construct a pipeline from the interior of Peru to the Pacific Ocean. The defendant, Helicol, was brought into the project by Williams-Sedco-Horn to provide necessary transportation of workers and supplies, by helicopter, to regions where there were no roads. Helicol was originally contacted by a Williams executive who had contracted with Helicol in the past. In response to that contact, the general manager of Helicol flew to Oklahoma, and then proceeded to Houston, Texas to negotiate with the three members, of the joint venture. After reaching agreement on all terms of the contract in Houston, those terms were related to Helicol's office in Peru. The contract in its final form was approved by the Peruvian Air Force as required by Peruvian law, typed in Spanish and executed by representatives of all parties in Peru. Helicol did not maintain an office in Texas, had no designated agent for service of process in Texas, was not authorized to do business in Texas, performed no helicopter operations in Texas, and did not recruit employees in Texas.
The deceased workers here in question, were not Texas residents, but were all United States citizens. They were hired by Williams-Sedco-Horn, in Houston, Texas, and sent to Peru to work on the pipeline. The workers were killed in the crash of a Bell helicopter, owned and operated by Hel-icol in Peru, during their transportation pursuant to the contract between Helicol and Williams-Sedco-Horn.
In addition to negotiating this contract, Helicol committed all of the following acts in Texas:
a. Purchased substantially all of its helicopter fleet in Fort Worth, Texas;
b. Did approximately $4,000,000 worth of business in Fort Worth, Texas, from 1970 through 1976 as purchaser of equipment, parts and services. This consisted of spending an average of $50,000 per month with Bell Helicopter Company, a Texas corporation;
c. Negotiated in Houston, Harris County, Texas, with a Texas resident, which negotiation resulted in the contract to provide the helicopter service involving the crash leading to this cause of action (previously mentioned), and wherein Helicol agreed to obtain liability insurance payable in American dollars to cover a claim such as this.
d. Sent pilots to Fort Worth, Texas to pick up helicopters as they were purchased from Bell Helicopter and fly them from Fort Worth to Columbia;-
e. Sent maintenance personnel and pilots to Texas to be trained;
f. Had employees in Texas on a year-round rotation basis;
g. Received roughly $5,000,000 under the terms and provisions of the contract in question here which payments were made from First City National Bank in Houston, Texas; and
h. Directed the First City National Bank of Houston, Texas to make payments to Rocky Mountain Helicopters pursuant to the contract in question. (Involved leasing of a large helicopter capable of moving heavier loads for Williams-Sedco-Horn.)
We hold that these contacts constitute sufficient minimum contacts to find Helicol amenable to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts.
In their briefs before this Court, all parties agreed that our opinion in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1977) controlled the disposition of this case.
In U-Anchor, we stated:
Article 2031b provides that a nonresident entering into a contract with a Texas resident performable in part by either party in Texas shall be deemed to be doing business in Texas.... We agree that in this respect, as well as with the respect to 'other acts that may constitute doing business,' Article 2031b reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit. We let stand the statement in Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, writ ref'd n. r. e.) 'that the reach of Art. 2031b is limited only by the United States Constitution.' . Furthermore, such a construction is desirable in that it allows the courts to focus on the constitutional limitations of due process rather than to engage in technical and abstruse attempts to consistently define 'doing business.'
In the U-Anchor opinion we specifically adopted the above language from Hoppenfeld. Also in U-Anchor, this Court approved the three-prong test set out in O'Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.1966). That three-prong test is:
(1) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
The second prong of the O'Brien test requiring that the cause of action must arise out of the contacts with the forum state, has been the subject of some controversy ever since the O'Brien test was adopted. The second prong is useful in any fact situation in which a jurisdiction question exists; and is a necessary requirement where the nonresident defendant only maintained single or few contacts with the forum. However, the second prong is unnecessary when the nonresident defendants presence in the forum through numerous contacts is of such a nature, as in this case, so as to satisfy the demands of the ultimate test of due process. Accordingly through the statutory authority of Art. 2031b Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. there remains the single inquiry: is the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the requirements of due process of law under the United States Constitution? This inquiry is frequently put into the following terms: "... due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).
The U. S. Supreme Court has broadened the parameters of due process to allow inquiry into other "relevant factors." Recently in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) the Supreme Court reiterated that the relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Citing, International Shoe, supra. In looking to this reasonableness, the U. S. Court stated that the burden on the defendant:
. while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, 78 S.Ct. 199 [201] (1957); the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, [436 U.S. 84] at 92, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690 [at 1696], at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 97 S.Ct. 2569 [2583, n. 37] (1977); the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, at 93, 98, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690 [at 1696, 1700].
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. at 564. Therefore, our inquiry can go beyond the substantial contacts which Helicol maintains in Texas, and we may also look to this State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; and Hall's interest in effective and convenient relief.
Texas has an interest in adjudicating this dispute. Hall is not a Texas resident, but is a citizen of this country. More importantly, Hall was hired in Houston, Texas, by a Texas resident. It cannot be questioned that this forum has an interest in protecting the employees of its "residents" (Williams-Sedco-Horn). This is especially necessary in light of the fact that Texas is the headquarters of countless international companies, and as a member of the "interstate judicial system," this State has an interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies and in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. (See above quote, citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra.)
Hall has a genuine interest and desire in obtaining convenient and effective relief. The U. S. Supreme Court directly considered the plaintiff's interest involved in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). In McGee, a California resident was suing a Texas insurance company as a beneficiary under a life insurance policy. The defendant's only contact with California had been its mailing of the policy to the state, and its receipt of premium payments from the decedent. The U. S. Supreme Court addressed the relative convenience of the parties and based their decision allowing maintenance of the suit in California on the State's interest in providing effective redress, and the fact that an individual claimant could not overcome the difficulties of maintaining an action in a foreign forum "... thus in effect making the company judgment proof." 355 U.S. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. The Court did recognize the inconvenience that this worked on the defendant, but based on the contacts of the defendant, due process would not be offended. Admittedly this cause does not fall precisely within the facts of McGee, it does fall within its spirit.
Based on the considerations of the above discussion and looking to the requirements of the U-Anchor test, we find that Helicol's numerous and substantial contacts do constitute "doing business" in this State and the trial court's actions do not offend due process.
The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Concurring opinion by CAMPBELL, J., in which McGEE, J., joins.
Dissenting opinion by POPE, J., in which GREENHILL, C. J., and BARROW, J., join.
. Williams-Sedco-Horn is a joint venture composed of Williams International Sundamerica-na, Ltd., a Delaware corporation headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Sedeo Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation, and Horn International, Inc., a Texas corporation.