Case Name: Emily LANE, a Minor, by Thomas L. Lane as Father and Next Friend, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Jack WEBB, Appellee, Cross-Appellant
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1969-01-06
Citations: 220 So. 2d 281
Docket Number: No. 45123
Parties: Emily LANE, a Minor, by Thomas L. Lane as Father and Next Friend, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Jack WEBB, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
Judges: ETHRIDGE, C. J., and RODGERS, PATTERSON and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 220
Pages: 281–286

Head Matter:
Emily LANE, a Minor, by Thomas L. Lane as Father and Next Friend, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Jack WEBB, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
No. 45123.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 6, 1969.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 17, 1969.
Carothers & Fedric, Grenada, for appellant.
Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, L. F. Sams, Jr., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
BRADY, Justice:
From a judgment in the Circuit Court of Grenada County in the sum of $1,450 rendered in favor of Emily Lane, a minor, both appellant and appellee prosecute this appeal. A terse résumé of the facts in this cause reveal that on Saturday, April 9, 1966, about 12:30 P.M. the appellant, Emily Lane, an eight and one-half year old girl, along with her first cousin, Andy Lane, a minor male child, had left the rear of the home of appellant's father and was proceeding onto the campus of the Jones Road Elementary Public School in order to play. The record shows that the western boundary of Jones Road Elementary Public School, hereinafter called Public School, or approximately twenty feet thereof, had been blacktopped and had been used and was being used by school buses and other persons in the transportation of children to said school. At the north end of said roadway gates had been built and at one time were closed during school hours in order to prevent the motoring public from utilizing the same when the school was in session. The proof shows, however, that after school hours and on days when the school was not in session the roadway was used generally by persons who lived south of the school in the vicinity of said road. There is a sign on the gate on which is written: "School playground, no through traffic, 7:00 a. m. until 4:30 p. m."
Immediately west of the roadway appellant's father, Thomas L. Lane, had built his home. Immediately north of his home was the home of a Mr. Dwight Sheppard; immediately north of the Sheppard home was the home of a Mr. James; and north of the James home was the Arnold home. The record discloses that Mr. Sheppard and Mr. Lane had been riding in Mr. Sheppard's car and Mr. Sheppard had picked up and placed in his car a gasoline driven garden tool. He had parked his car a disputed distance north of the approximately twenty-one feet wide joint driveway which extends between the lots owned by Mr. Lane and Mr. Sheppard. Mr. Lane had gone into his home and was eating his lunch, and at the same time Mr. Sheppard was operating his gasoline driven garden tool. The sound of tires sliding on the roadway or the sound of the brakes being applied attracted the attention of both Mr. Lane and Mr. Sheppard. Mr. Lane testified that his little girl was struck on the south side of the joint driveway approximately thirty feet from where Mr. Sheppard had parked his car. Mr. Lane testified that he did not see the car at the exact moment it struck the appellant but he testified that almost instantly after he heard "squalling brakes" she was struck on the south side of the driveway, which is twenty-one feet in width, and she was knocked a distance of fifty-five feet. He testified that he instantly looked out of his west window and saw someone, whom his wife identified as being their daughter, rolling under the car. He further testified that the car proceeded approximately ten feet beyond where she lay after the accident. He testified that the Sheppard car was parked ten or twelve feet north of the driveway, which distance appellee estimated to be five to five and a half feet.
Mr. Sheppard, who was operating his gasoline driven garden tool, testified that when he heard the noise of tires sliding he knocked his implement out of gear. He was facing the opposite direction, and he turned around and saw the little girl rolling, or tumbling in the air. The car driven by appellee was going south and the little girl was in the air in front of the car. Mr. Sheppard testified that the Webb car was somewhere in the area of the driveway which separated his home from Mr. Lane's home. He testified further that when the car stopped, the car was beyond her body which was lying off to the side in a ditch.
Mr. Lane testified that approximately twelve to fifteen children were playing in the playground located northeast of the Sheppard home; Mr. John B. James who resides in the second lot north of Mr. Lane's home testified that it is some twenty or twenty-five feet from the eastern edge of the roadway across from his property to the swings on the playground and that children were playing on the west side of the road in the back yard of the playground. He, too, testified that he heard someone scream and heard brakes on a car and he went to his back door to see what had happened. He did not see the accident. He testified that four of his wife's nieces and one nephew from his home were playing at the swings approximately twenty feet from the eastern edge of the roadway on the school grounds.
A young man by the name of Mark Mc-Clamrock testified that he was standing on the front porch of his home which faces north and which is south of the school when he heard the brakes squeal. He turned around when he heard the tires, and he testified "I saw the little girl hit by the car." He was seventy-five yards away. He ran to where she was. He testified that appellant was behind the car which had passed on south beyond where she was lying.
Mr. John S. Nail was-driving a car north on the roadway and was being watched by the appellee as he was driving south as he approached the Sheppard car. Mr. Nail testified that the appellant came out from behind Mr. Sheppard's car when appellee was three, four or maybe five feet from her. When approximately a hundred or a hundred and fifty feet away from the point of impact, Mr. Nail saw the appellant standing behind the Sheppard car. He testified she was a foot and a half or two feet behind the Sheppard car when he saw her prior to her jumping out in front of the appellee's car. He stated that the car ran over her legs and that she was lying some six or seven feet north of appellee's car when it stopped. Mr. Nail testified that there were children on both sides of the road.
The record discloses that appellant sustained an obvious fracture about two inches long of the skull above the right eye of her forehead and that there were severe lacerations to the forehead. She was hospitalized in the Grenada Hospital for six days and treated by Dr. W. B. Hunt, who testified that she was in a state of shock. She had a fracture of her left arm above the wrist and a fracture of the arm at the elbow. She had numerous cuts, bruises and abrasions. She made fourteen trips to Memphis, Tennessee, where she was treated by a plastic surgeon, Dr. DeNere. She was hospitalized three days in Memphis for plastic surgery. Mr. Lane testified that in the treatment of his daughter he had spent the sum of $1,109 in doctors', hospital, nurses' and medical expenses. He estimated also that his traveling expenses computed at ten cents per mile at the government allowed rate would amount to $280. In spite of plastic surgery the record also shows that appellant will have a permanent scar on her forehead.
The two issues involved in this case are simply that the verdict is so grossly inadequate, and that it evinces bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury and' the trial court should have therefore granted the appellant a new trial on damages only. On cross appeal appellee urges that the trial court should have granted the appel-lee a peremptory instruction. We do not find that there is any merit in this assertion claimed by appellee because there are presented for determination by the jury material conflicts in evidence.
A careful review of the record together with the briefs in this cause convinces us that the jury was justified in returning a verdict in favor of the appellant. Included in the material factual issues presented by the evidence is the issue of whether or not the appellee was operating his car in a reasonably safe and prudent manner over the roadway at a time when the evidence discloses that children were playing on both sides of the roadway within a short distance thereof. Furthermore, the question of whether the appellee by the exercise of reasonable care could or should have seen the little girl, Emily Lane, is an issue of fact for determination by the jury in that the testimony places her within a distance of from two to twelve feet behind Mr. Sheppard's car. If the jury concluded that she was standing some ten or twelve feet south of this car it follows that the appellee could have seen her much sooner and could have brought his car to a stop much quicker than he could have, had she been standing directly behind the car a distance of two feet. Moreover, the jury had the right to determine whether or not after applying his brakes the appellant's car traveling at a rate of ten to fifteen miles per hour would have propelled or rolled appellant a distance of fifty-five feet or some distance less than that and, whether or not at that speed his car would have still gone twelve feet farther south of where her body lay, thereby presenting the issue of speed for consideration by the jury. The cases are legion which hold that material disputed facts are for determination by the jury. We cannot say that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the testimony or that the verdict evinces bias, passion or prejudice, insofar as appellant's negligence is concerned. Therefore the verdict of the jury as to negligence on the part of the appellee is affirmed. Although on this record the appellant could not be guilty of contributory negligence, the fundamental issue remains: Was the appellee guilty of negligence proximately causing the accident and injuries? Compare Agregaard v. Duncan, 252 Miss. 454, 173 So.2d 416 (1965); Morris v. Boleware, 228 Miss. 139, 87 So.2d 246 (1956); Hines v. Moore, 124 Miss. 500, 87 So. 1 (1920) [a child of eight is prima facie incapable of exercising judgment or discretion — rebuttable by showing exceptional capacity].
The proof in this case reveals that Emily sustained a fracture of'her left arm above the wrist and at the elbow. She likewise sustained a two inch fracture of the frontal skull, a severe laceration of the forehead which required thirty-seven stitches, and multiple bruises and contusions to her body. The proof is evident that she underwent considerable physical pain and she will always have a scar on her forehead. When compared with the foregoing injuries and suffering the exiguous verdict of fourteen hundred and fifty dollars rendered by the jury is grossly inadequate and evinces bias, passion and prejudice on its part insofar as its award of damages to this little girl is concerned. This cause is therefore remanded, but as to damages only. In considering the question of damages, the relevant facts on a retrial of this cause may be developed. Vaughan v. Bollis, 221 Miss. 589, 73 So.2d 160 (1954).
On direct appeal, reversed and remanded as to damages only; on cross-appeal affirmed as to liability.
ETHRIDGE, C. J., and RODGERS, PATTERSON and SMITH, JJ., concur.