Case Name: Freddie HEURING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-03-15
Citations: 559 So. 2d 207
Docket Number: No. 73987
Parties: Freddie HEURING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 559
Pages: 207–210

Head Matter:
Freddie HEURING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 73987.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 15, 1990.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1990.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Deputy Public Defender, and Lawrence E. Korn, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and John M. Koenig, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The district court certified the following question of great public importance:
WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE FOR A SPECIFIC TERM OF YEARS, WHICH, IN THE EVENT OF EARLY RELEASE THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF GAIN-TIME OR OTHERWISE, SHALL BE FOLLOWED BY A PROBATIONARY PERIOD COMMENCING UPON THE DEFENDANT'S RELEASE FROM PRISON AND CONTINUING UNTIL A DATE CERTAIN IS AN AUTHORIZED SENTENCE?
Heuring v. State, 539 So.2d 590, 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the negative and quash the decision of the district court.
Following reversal of an earlier conviction and remand of the case by the First District Court of Appeal, Heuring entered into a plea agreement with the state. The state agreed to nolle prosequi one count of sexual battery, proscribed by section 794.-011(2), Florida Statutes (1983), in return for Heuring's plea of nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(4)(e). The agreement also provided that the court could exceed the sentencing guidelines. Heuring was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-five years with credit for 992 days previously served, subject to the condition that should he be released early from incarceration, he would be placed on probation for the remainder of the twenty-five-year sentence. The district court affirmed the plea agreement and the departure sentence, but certified conflict with Easton v. State, 472 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (probation order erroneous where defendant sentenced to twenty-two years' imprisonment with gain-time portion to be spent on probation).
In State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925, 926 (Fla.1989), we ruled:
Section 944.275(1), Florida Statutes (1987), authorizes the Department of Corrections (department) to grant "gain-time in order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior, to provide incentive for prisoners to participate in productive activities, and to reward prisoners who perform outstanding deeds or services." A prisoner who is released early because of gain-time is considered to have completed his sentence in full. Receipt of gain-time is dependent on a prisoner's behavior while in prison, not on satisfactory behavior once the prisoner has been released from incarceration. Therefore, accrued gain-time is the functional equivalent of time spent in prison.
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.)
Under this analysis, once a prisoner is released from the remaining period of incarceration due to gain-time, that remaining period of the sentence is extinguished. No part remains to be completed in the form of probation or community control. As noted above, "accrued gain-time is the functional equivalent of time spent in prison." It logically follows that time spent in prison cannot also be spent on probation.
We answer the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the district court below, and approve that of the court in Easton.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
GRIMES, J., dissents with an opinion.