Case Name: Reuben Perkins v. Margaret A. Mobley
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1855-12
Citations: 4 Ohio St. 669
Docket Number: 
Parties: Reuben Perkins v. Margaret A. Mobley.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 4
Pages: 669–674

Head Matter:
Reuben Perkins v. Margaret A. Mobley.
"The mother of a bastard child, after the reputed father has been recognized by a justice of the peace, on a complaint instituted by her, under the act for the maintenance and support of illegitimate children, has no power to settle for or release his liability.
'The liability of the father is created by the statute, and designed for the security of the public against the support of the child, by compelling him to make the necessary provision therefor; and can only be settled by the mother, while the complaint is pending before the justice, and upon giving ^security to the township in which she resides against all liability for such support.
Jt is not competent to inquire of the general reputation of a witness sought to be impeached; but the inquiry must be confined to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity.
Petition in error; reserved in the district court of Belmont county.
The object of the petition is to reverse a judgment of the court of common pleas of the same county. The original proceedings were under the bastardy act. The defendant was recognized by the justice to the court of common pleas; and after he had filed his plea of not guilty, and the case was continued for trial, in cdnsid•eration of the payment of one hundred dollars, a paper, of which the following is a copy, was executed:
“State of Ohio. Belmont county, |
“ Court of Common Pleas. j
“Margaret Mobley v. Reuben Perkins.
“Suit pending under the bastardy act. The above case is settled; and I hereby authorize the same to be dismissed at my cost, and that I will not appear and further prosecute the same. This 19th day of September, 1853.
(Signed,) “Margaret Mobley.”
It was refused to dismiss the case, in pursuance of this settlement, and a trial insisted upon. The defendant, therefore, filed a plea of puis darrein continuance, setting up the above settlement .and payment of one hundred dollars, in bar of the further prosecution of the case; to which plea the defendant in error demurred, and the court of common pleas sustained the demurrer, for the ■cause that the complainant, under the bastardy act, could not compromise or release the cause of action. This is assigned as the first cause of error.
The cause was then tried by a jury; and during the progress of the trial, the .plaintiff was examined as a witness, and, as in all such cases, was the principal witness. Samuel A. Talbot was ^called, on the part of the defendant, to impeach the charneter of the plaintiff. He testified that he lived in the plaintiff’s neighborhood, and had known her for several years. The defendant, by his attorney, then asked him the following question: “Are you acquainted with the general reputation of the plaintiff among her neighbors; and if so, what is that reputation?” The counsel for the plaintiff objected to this question, on the ground that it went to general reputation; and the court sustained the objection, and refused the answer to be given. To whieh ruling of the court the defendant and which is as the second cause of error. The jury returned a verdict of guilty; and a motion was made for a new trial, and overruled.
The defendant filed his petition in error in the district court; assigning for error the causes aforesaid.
Miller Pennington., for plaintiff in error, made the following points r
I. The statute clearly makes it competent for the complainant to settle the case, so far as she has any claim. It seems to give a double remedy: 1. Compensation for the injury; 2. Indemnity ta the township against the maintenance of the child. The plaintiff’s settlement, or neglect to bring a suit, or prosecute a suit to-final judgment, does not, of course, prevent the trustees of the township from commencing or prosecuting a suit. She is liable for costs in case of defeat, and receives the benefit of the judgment in ber own right in the event of success. Would it be doubted that,, after judgment, she would have the right to release the defendant from its payment, in whole or in part? Would not her receipt to Mm, in satisfaction of the judgment, be binding?
II. It is said that the object of the statute is to protect the township against the support of bastard children. If this be so, the power is vested in the trustees, and no act of the complainant •can interfere with it. All that is claimed is, that the plaintiff *herself, after settlement, should not have been allowed to take any further steps in the prosecution of the case.
III. The defendant may, from motives of policy, although entirely innocent, prefer to settle with the complainant on the best terms he can. It is said the law abhors litigation and favors compromises.
IY. The court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of Talbot. 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 461; Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio, 24, 44; Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198 ; Rex v. Bisphan, 4 C. & P. 392 ; Hume v. Scott, 3 Marsh. 260; 3 Phil. 786, Cow. & Hill’s Notes; 1 Hall (N. Y.) C. P. 558. The old rule has always been perplexing, and the form of questions under it has given rise to great confusion in the-mind of almost every witness to whom they were propounded.
That which affects the credibility of the witness is material to the issue. Will it be said that the jury would place the same estimate upon the testimony of a witness whose general reputation was bad on account of gross immorality, as they would in a witness- who was unassailable ? If they would not, then the testimony is relevant and should be admitted.
C. C. Carroll, for defendant, made the following points:
1. At common law, no one was bound for the support of a bastard. The object of the statute is not to give damages to the mother or to punish the father, but to enforce the moral duty of the father to support the child. Natural justice requires him to do it. 13 Ohio, 245; Wright, 565 ; 1 Black. Com. 458; 2 Kent’s Com. 222.
II. The whole purpose of the bastardy statutes is to furnish maintenance for the child and indemnity for the public against liability for its support. Our own decisions fully support this position. 9 Ohio, 149 ; 13 Ib. 244; Wright, 464, 564.
III. The money to be paid is not a debt due to the mother, but only a charge for maintenance. Same authorities.
-qy. It is not, therefore, within the power of the mother to discharge the obligation.
Y. It would defeat the leading object of the statute and deprive the public of all security if she had such power.
yi. The question of evidence was properly ruled. 2 Ohio, 18; 5 Ib. 226; 6 Black. 56; 8 Leigh, 542; 7 Black. 84; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 461; 13 Johns. 504; Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 767.

Opinion:
Ranney, J.
A reversal of this judgment is urged upon two grounds: 1. The refusal of the court below to give effect to the accord and satisfaction, interposed by way of plea puis darrein continuance ; and 2. In refusing to admit evidence of the general bad character of the prosecuting witness.
1. A moment's attention to the object and purposes of the proceeding, authorized by the act for the maintenance and support of illegitimate children, will show that no error was committed in sustaining the demurrer to the plea puis darrein. This plea alleged a settlement with the mother of the bastard child, while the cause was pending in the court of common pleas, and the payment to her of the sum agreed to be received in satisfaction. If the suit could be said to be prosecuted for her benefit, and if the remedy was designed to afford her redress, it would seem clear that she could settle the controversy, and effectually bar herself by receiving such satisfaction as she had agreed to accept. But nothing could be further from the purpose of the statute. The law gives her no remedy against her guilty paramour. It regards them as equally in fault, and is only solicitous to provide for the support of the innocent offspring of their guilt. Without the statute, the father could not be reached; his liability is created by the statute, rests upon the moral obligation ]ie is under to support his child; and the whole object of the proceeding is answered when the paternity of the child is judicially ascertained, and this moral duty is enforced in such manner as *to secure the public against the liability of providing for the support of the child. This great leading purpose of the law must be kept constantly in view; and no power in the mother over the proceeding, inconsistent with the right of the child to this support from the father, and consequent indemnity to the public, can be recognized to exist.
In many of the states, begetting a bastard child is made an offense, and punished by indictment; but in this state it is not so. The proceeding, here is not strictly civil or criminal. It neither puniishes a crime, nor gives redress for á civil injury. It is simply a statutory remedy to enforce a high moral duty; and the moral duty ds enforced to prevent a burden, which ought to rest upon the father, ¡from falling upon the public. It may be instituted on the complaint of the mother, or if she neglects it, or fails to prosecute to effect, by :the proper public authorities. At one point in the proceeding a settlement may be made. If, when the accused is brought before the justice, he pays or secures to be paid to the complainant, such gum of money or property as she may agree to receive in full satisfaction, and shall further give bond that the child shall not become .-a township charge upon any township in this state, the justice is .authorized to discharge him from custody on his paying the costs. But to prevent all imposition, the agreement must be made or acknowledged by both parties, in the presence of the justice, who is required to make a memorandum thereof upon his docket. No power whatever is given to the complainant to impair the public security in this settlement. It can not be made until the accused has given security that the public shall not be burdened with the support of the child. If such security is not given, he must bo bound over; and when recognized, no further power is given to settle or compromise the controversy. If found guilty, he shall bo adjudged the reputed father'of the child, and .shall stand charged with the maintenance thereof, in such sum or sums as the court .shall order and direct, with payment of costs of prosecution ; for which he *must give security, or go into custody. It will be observed that no authority is given to take indemnity by bond, to secure the public against the support of the child, after the prosecution leaves the justice. The only indemnity afforded after that time is the sums awarded to be paid, and the stringent modes provided for their enforcement. To allow the complainant to intervene and prevent the recovery, would be to surrender all protection for the public, and to defeat the leading object of the whole statute. We are therefore of opinion, that she has no such interest in the money, required to bo awarded against the reputed father, as to enable her to release his liability before a recovery, or to discharge him from the sum awarded, after the order is made; that the statute definitely appropriates the money to the support of the child, and that it can not be diverted from that purpose. It is ordinarily, and very properly, ordered to be paid' over to the mother, as she continues burdened with the custody and support of the child; but even this is within the sound discretion of the court, which should be exercised with a view to the best interests of the child, and the consequent protection of the public from being made chargeable with its support.
This construction of the statute is not only strongly supported, but we think necessarily follows, from the decisions made by the Supreme Court, in the cases of State v. Mitchell, Wright, 464, and Hawes v. Cooksey, 13 Ohio, 242.
2. The question of evidence, made by the second assignment, has, since the reservation of this cáse, been decided by us in accordance with the ruling of the court below. We are still satisfied with that decision, and it is now unnecessary to repeat the reasons upon which it was founded.
Judgment affirmed.