Case Name: Francine G. SCARBOROUGH, for herself and as guardian for Jeffrey Dean Scarborough, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1975-02-03
Citations: 531 P.2d 480
Docket Number: No. 13558
Parties: Francine G. SCARBOROUGH, for herself and as guardian for Jeffrey Dean Scarborough, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 531
Pages: 480–484

Head Matter:
Francine G. SCARBOROUGH, for herself and as guardian for Jeffrey Dean Scarborough, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 13558.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 3, 1975.
James F. Housley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Leonard H. Russon,- of Hanson, Wads-worth & Russon, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
CROCKETT, Justice:
Plaintiff Francine G. Scarborough, for herself and as guardian for her 12-year-old son Jeffrey, sues to recover for injuries he suffered in a fall on the- playground at the Holladay Elementary School of the defendant, Granite School District. Upon the basis of the pleadings, depositions and affidavits, the trial court ruled that because the plaintiff had failed to file a claim as required by Section 63-30-13, U. C.A. 1953, quoted below, her action was barred; and therefore there was no issue of material fact which if resolved in her favor would entitle her to prevail, and entered judgment of dismissal against her. She appeals.
On the morning of February 29, 1972, Jeffrey, and other boys were playing on the ball ground of the School. About a month before, one of the utility poles had been knocked down by maintenance employees while trimming trees; and some dead wires had been left dangling from the remaining poles. It was in playing and swinging with these wires that Jeffrey fell several feet to the ground and suffered the injuries complained of. The principal, William Lee Anderson, was informed, examined and talked to the boy, and permitted him to go to class. About an hour later, Jeffrey developed nausea and began vomiting. His mother was called and she took him home.
Later that day she called Mr. Anderson and talked to him about the apparently serious nature of Jeffrey's injuries, asked for details concerning the accident and responsibility therefor. She avers that he told her that the tree trimming had been done and the wires left in that condition by the utility company, Utah Power & Light Company. Mr. Anderson filed a report of his investigation with the office of defendant, Granite School District. Two days after the accident, plaintiff employed an attorney (not present counsel) to handle this matter. It is alleged that in reliance on Mr. Anderson's statements, the attorney made demand upon the Utah Power & Light Company, and further, that it was not until six months later plaintiff learned that it was not Utah Power & Light Company, but employees of the School District who had done the- work and left the wires in that condition.
The statute of concern here upon which the court based its dismissal is Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953:
A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within ninety (90) days after the cause of action arises .
Plaintiff makes no contention that there was any literal compliance with that statute in the usual form or sense. Her argument is that because of the conversations with the principal, his representations as to who was responsible; and his report to the School District, it should be deemed: (1) that she had made a sufficient "filing" of a claim to satisfy the requirements of the statute; and (2) that the School District should be estopped to assert the protection of the statute.
Oral Statements as a "Filing"
The School District is a political subdivision of the state. Therefore it would normally be immune from suit; and the right to sue- is an exception created by statute. We have consistently held that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. In order to so meet the requirements of the statute quoted above and fulfill its intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim should include these essentials : that it be in writing; that it contain a brief statement of the facts and the nature of the claim asserted; that it be subscribed by the party required to give it and who intends to rely on it; that it be directed to and delivered to someone authorized to or responsible for receiving it; and that this be done within the prescribed time. It should require no exposition to demonstrate that the oral conversation with the school principal, and the fact that he turned in a report to the School District, do not satisfy the foregoing requirements.
The Claimed Estoppel
On her issue relating to estoppel, the plaintiff argues that the conversation with the school principal brings her case within the ruling of this court in Rice v. Granite School District. There are significant differences between this case and that one. There the plaintiff had filed a timely written notice with the School District. The plaintiff's contention was that the insurance adjuster, who was handling the matter for the School District, gave the plaintiff assurances that the case would be settled after the extent of injuries and damages had been determined, and that this lulled her into a sense of security until after the time for filing the suit had expired. Then the School District attempted to assert that as a defense. We remanded for a trial as to the facts.
Here there is no averment that the principal, Mr. Anderson, made any representation, either that the -School District was responsible, or that it would be responsible, to the plaintiff. The best that can be said from the plaintiff's point of view is that he told her either: that the Utah Power & Light Company was responsible, or that he was not sure who was responsible for the condition of the wires. But it is without dispute that he told her that he could not give her any information or do anything about it, and that that would have to be done with Dr. Lloyd of the School District office. Accordingly, he did nothing to delude, dissuade or delay plaintiff or her attorney in the filing of her claim.
From what has been said herein it is our conclusion that the trial court could properly rule as a matter of law that because of the plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the time allowed by the statute; and because there is no basis upon which estoppel against the defendant's reliance on the statute could be made out, that she cannot show entitlement to maintain this action.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
. See Rule 56, U.R.C.P.
. Mr. Anderson denied this, but in view of the rejection of her cause by dismissal, for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling, we accept her averment as the fact.
. Sec. 63-30-2, U.C.A.1953, defines a political subdivision as: " . . . any county, city, town, school district. . . "
. See Sec. 63-30-3, U.C.A.1953.
. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973) ; Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972) ; Hurley v. Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).
. That an oral notice does not suffice as a "filing," but it must be in writing, see Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965; and see 66 C.J.S. Notice § 16, p. 656; and 58 Am.Jur.2d, Notice, p. 505.,
. 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, Sec. 683.
.23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159.