Case Name: Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Dale Warren Courson, deceased, Appellee; Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-06-15
Citations: 177 So. 2d 33
Docket Number: Nos. G-54, G-55
Parties: Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Dale Warren Courson, deceased, Appellee. Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, Appellee.
Judges: RAWLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 177
Pages: 33–43

Head Matter:
Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Dale Warren Courson, deceased, Appellee. Marvin GRESHAM, W. E. Rion, J. N. Anderson, S. K. Lindsey, and Harry Edwards, as and comprising the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, and Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. Clifford C. COURSON, Appellee.
Nos. G-54, G-55.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
June 15, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1965.
Gray, Chandler, O’Neal, Carlisle & Avera, Gainesville, for appellants.
Nichols, Gaither, Beckham, Colson & Spence, Miámi, for appellee.

Opinion:
STURGIS, Chief Judge.
On March 1, 1963, Dale Warren Courson, the 11-month-old child of appellee Clifford C. Courson, plaintiff below, died in consequence of having been strangled on a cord around his neck from which was suspended a pacifier. The strangulation occurred in a day nursery maintained at the Alachua General Hospital in Gainesville, Florida, for the convenience of its employees, who paid a fee for the service. Two negligence actions were filed, consolidated for trial in the court below, and resulted in final judgments for plaintiff from which appeals were taken and are consolidated for the purpose of review.
In one case (our file No. G-54) the plaintiff (appellee), as administrator of the estate of his deceased child, was awarded a jury verdict for $25,000.00 damages against the members of the Board of Trustees for the Alachua General Hospital, in their relation as such, and also against Alachua County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, defendants (appellants), based on a claim for damages to decedent's prospective estate and for his funeral expenses. A motion to vacate said judgment was denied but motion for a new trial was granted contingent upon a remittitur of $20,000.00, to which plaintiff consented.
By the other suit (our file No. G-55) plaintiff Courson, proceeding individually, sued said defendants under Section 768.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., for the wrongful death of his said child, claiming damages for the loss of the child's services during minority and for past and future mental pain and anguish of his surviving parents. In this action the jury returned a verdict of $100,000.00 for plaintiff and motions to vacate the judgment, for a remittitur, and for a new trial were denied by an order in which the trial judge said:
" it is the opinion of this Court that this case was very capably and fairly tried by counsel for both sides and the Court feels that the verdict rendered by the jury in this case was a result of careful and deliberate consideration by the jury of the factual disputes that existed as to the material issues in this cause, and it is the position of the Court that these matters were fairly determined by the jury
Defendant-appellants' points on appeal (1) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's finding of negligence on the part of the defendants, and (2) challenge the verdict of $100,000.00 in the father's action on the ground that it is excessive. We find no merit in the first contention. Our conclusion with respect to the second, however, impels a summary of the facts.
Mr. and Mrs. Courson were married in 1956. He has a Doctor's degree in education and is employed at the P. K. Yonge Laboratory School in Gainesville, Florida. His wife, a medical technician, was employed by the defendant hospital. Their first and only natural child, Dale, was not born until March 24, 1962. In November of 1957 Mrs. Courson, being concerned with her failure to conceive, consulted with a specialist in obstetrics to see what might be done to induce pregnancy; she thereafter had considerable medical treatment and study of her condition, and in April of 1959 underwent surgery to aid her in having children.
In the summer of 1961 the defendant hospital established a day nursery in which a fee was charged to care for children of its daytime employees. The children were divided into three age groups, generally referred to as "crib babies," "toddlers," and "older children." The crib babies were kept separate from the other children in a room equipped with seven baby cribs and a playpen. Normally the day nursery had five employees in all. On the day of the accident there were only four employees working in the nursery, two of whom, Mrs. Rhoda Mullis and Mrs. Betty Smith, were caring for the crib babies at the time the accident to plaintiff's child was discovered.
The events leading up to the accident were as follows:
Mrs. Courson, an employee of the hospital, first brought Dale to the day nursery on Monday, February 25, 1963, and continued to do so each day until his death on the following Friday, March 1. Each morning before leaving him at the nursery she placed a string around his neck with a pacifier attached thereto and it remained there each day until she picked him up after work in the evening. No one at the nursery informed her that the pacifier 'and string were dangerous and she did not consider them so. She did not instruct any of the nursery personnel to- remove them. On February 27, Mrs. Mullis, the employee in charge of the nursery, wrote Mrs. Courson a note asking her not' to visit the child during her lunch hour because it upset him. -
On March 1 Mrs. Mullis completed feeding Dale at 11:50 a. m. and was preparing to put him in his crib when she was- visited by the defendant's Director of -Nursing Service, a Mrs. Morrison. -About ten minutes later Mrs. Morrison left and Mrs. Mullis then called Mrs. Smith into the crib room, washed Dale's face, and put him down in his crib. When Mrs. Smith came into the crib room Mrs. Mullis took some soiled diapers out of the room and washed them, then checked on the other children in the nursery and about fifteen minutes later returned. At that time Mrs. Smith was changing a baby's clothes. Mrs. Mullis walked over- to the crib adjoining Dale's where she picked up a child and took it to a counter in -the room to feed it. At about that time a Mrs. Davis came into the crib room and asked Mrs. Smith to see the Courson baby. Mrs. Mullis then heard Mrs. Davis inquire, "Is he choked?" and immediately looked around and saw Mrs. Smith with the Courson child in her arms. The child was forthwith taken to the emergency room of the hospital for treatment.
Mrs. Davis testified that she visited the nursery around the noon hour to check on her child; that when she went into the crib room Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Mullis were there, Mrs. Mullis preparing to feed a baby; that she asked Mrs. Smith where the Courson child was and seeing that it was lying on its stomach, walked around the crib to see its face, saw the string around its neck and noted that it was caught on a knob on a corner of the crib. She stated that it was only on close inspection when she bent over to see Dale's face that she saw the string and that she then assisted Mrs. Smith in taking the child to the emergency room.
Dr. Murphree, a practicing physician, testified that a few minutes before 12:30 p. m. on that day he observed a visual emergency signal and answered the call by going to the emergency room where he found Dale on the emergency room table; that Dale had no pulse or respiration and there were marks on the front half of his neck; that measures were taken which restored the heart beat and respiration and the child was eventually transferred to the University of Florida Medical Center where he died about 7:00 or 7:30 o'clock the next morning. Dr. Murphree testified that the mark on its neck was obviously from a string of some sort and the cause of death was lack of breathing for too long a period of time.
There was in effect on March 1, 1963, a regulation of the Child Care Center Board for Alachua County as follows:
"There shall be adequate and competent adult staff members to care for the children at all times, with a minimum of two adults, two adult members on duty at all times."
Dr. Edward G. Byrne, the Alachua County Health Officer, testified that in his opinion the nursery area where the children were kept should be under observation at all times and that one adult for eight infant crib children was an adequate ratio. On March 1, 1963, during the critical period involved, there were seven children in the crib room and either Mrs. Mullis or Mrs. Smith was physically present.
Subsequent efforts of Mr. and Mrs. Courson to have other children had proved unsuccessful; however, they adopted a male child (Christopher) who was 9J/2 months of age at the date of the trial. Following Dale's death Mrs. Courson lost 22 pounds but had regained 8 pounds prior to the trial. Mr. Courson testified that following Dale's death his room at their home was kept locked for three or four months, that his wife was very nervous, easily upset, and cried easily, but that her mental and emotional condition improved after they adopted Christopher.
It is established that Mr. and Mrs. Cour-son were in a state of emotional shock after learning of Dale's accident and following his death were distraught; that Mrs. Cour-son required sedatives and tranquilizers in large dosages and could not rest; that they were competent parents and had a happjr home. On the date of the trial Mrs. Cour-son was 33 years of age and Mr. Courson 31.
As hereinabove noted, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the issue of liability. Where the exercise of ordinary care is required, negligence is commonly defined as the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, or the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not have done under the circumstances, resulting in injury to another. 23 Fla.Jur., p. 254. We are also mindful of the rule of foreseeability adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Stark v. Holtzclaw (1925), 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330, 41 A.L.R. 1323, quoting with approval from Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, text 7, 9, 29 S.Ct. 321, 53 L.Ed. 671, as follows:
" [o]ne is held responsible for all the consequences of his act which are natural and probable, and ought to have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man."
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"But even where the highest degree of care is demanded, still the one .from whom it is due is bound to guard only against those occurrences which can reasonably be anticipated by the utmost foresight. It has been well said that 'if men went about to guard themselves against every risk to themselves or others which might by ingenious conjecture be conceived as possible, human affairs could not be carried on at all. The reasonable man, then, to whose ideal behavior we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither neglect what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events that are barely possible. He will order his precaution by the measure of what appears likely in the known course of things.' Pollock on Torts (8th ed.) 41."
The question of negligence involved on the trial of these cases was strictly a question of fact to be resolved by the jury and this court will not undertake to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, especially where supported by the trial court's denial of appellants' motion to set aside the verdict. What is and what is not negligence in a-particular case is generally a question for the jury. Sprick v. North Shore Hospital, Incorporated, 121 So.2d 682 (Fla.App. 1960); Atkins v. Humes, 110 So.2d 663, 81 A.L.R.2d 590 (Fla. 1959).
With reference to the administrator's suit, in which appellee consented to a remittitur of $20,000.00, thus reducing the jury's award of $25,000.00 so as to limit the final judgment to $5,000.00, we hold that the reduced judgment, which is based on the claim of decedent's estate for the prospective value of the estate, together with damages for funeral expenses, is not so excessive as to warrant reversal or the imposition of an added remittitur. Appellants' second point of law involved presents a more vexatious problem.
With reference to appellee's claim under Section 768.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., appellants insist and we agree that the $100,000.00 verdict was not supported by the evidence and is so excessive as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, bias, or some other improper motive.
There are two elements of damage recoverable under F.S. 768.03, F.S.A.: (1) the father's loss of the services of his child until the child would have become 21 years of age; (2) the value of the parents' mental pain and anguish occasioned- by reason of the death of their child. In 1935, Mr. Justice Terrell, speaking for the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85, suggested that unless the deceased child had some extraordinary income-producing attributes, the cost of maintaining it to maturity would normally exceed the value of any services which might likely be rendered by the child to the parent. We are persuaded that a jury not unduly swayed by passion, prejudice, bias, or some other unlawful motive, would necessarily reach a similar conclusion; and a careful search reveals that the record herein is devoid of any evidence supporting the premise that the plaintiff parent would have reaped any monetary benefits from the services of the decedent had he lived. In the cited case, which involved the wrongful death of a 16-year-old son, Mr. Justice Terrell said:
"In cases where damages for mental pain and suffering are allowed, it must bear some reasonable relation to the facts, the status of the parties, the amount allowed as compensatory dam ages, and the philosophy and general trend of decisions effecting such cases. When we say that the amount allowed must bear some reasonable relation to such factors, we do not mean that it must he equal to, be twice these, or bear any other arbitrary relation to them, but what we do mean is that these and other cognate factors are proper elements on which the allowance may be predicated. It cannot be predicated on the basis of restitution."
On rehearing granted in that case, the Supreme Court ordered a remittitur of $3,000.-00 on a $10,000.00 verdict.
The general rule, as stated in 9 Florida Jurisprudence at page 518, is:
" that the finding of the jury will not be set aside as excessive, except in extreme cases, as where it is the result of passion, prejudice, partiality, sympathy, undue influence, or other corrupt cause or motive, or where the court can clearly see that the jury has committed some palpable error or has totally mistaken the rules of law by which the damages, in the particular case, were to be measured. On the other hand, it is the plain duty of the court to see that the just limits are not exceeded, particularly where it is obvious that, in determining the amount of the verdict, the jury were not governed by the evidence or the proper charges of the court thereon, or by any reasonable estimates or computations, and the amount awarded is manifestly excessive."
As we have said, there is no evidence whatever upon which to predicate damages for loss of decedent's services, nor was any evidence presented as to the standard of living of decedent's family or the cost of maintaining decedent for the twenty years that would have elapsed if he had lived to attain majority. It is obvious, therefore, that the $100,000.00 verdict must primarily be related only to the past and future mental pain and suffering of Mr. and Mrs. Courson resulting from the wrongful death of their child. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to them, the record reveals:
When the accident to Dale was discovered Mrs. Courson was called to the emergency room of the hospital and Mr. Courson was called there from his work. They did not remain in the room where Dale was being treated but were kept in a waiting room and later sent home. However, they went to the University of Florida Health Center when Dale was transferred there, where they were seen by Dr. Carl Herbert, a gynecologist. He found Mr. and Mrs. Courson to be in a state of emotional shock, tremendously disturbed and upset. He saw them later at their home and attended the child's funeral with them. As heretofore noted, Mrs. Courson required heavy dosages of sedatives and tranquilizers to help get sleep and rest and she and Mr. Courson were both distraught. Three weeks later Mrs. Courson called on her gynecologist and expressed a desire to undergo any treatment that might help her to again become pregnant.
Mrs. Courson returned to work on March 25, 1963, some 24 days after Dale's death. The family pediatrician, Dr. Kokomoor, testified that although Mrs. Courson lost weight and appeared to be haggard after Dale's death, her condition improved almost immediately after adoption of the new baby and that she appeared to have returned to her normal self. There was no testimony that either Mr. or Mrs. Courson required any medication or medical treatment beyond the time of the funeral. The within summarized evidence concerning damages, as testified to solely by the plaintiff, his wife, and Dr. Herbert, is all that was presented to the jury. It was also confronted with argument of counsel for plaintiff to the effect that the case was worth $100,000.-00 damages.
Appellants' brief asserts and appellee's brief does not refute that the only reported case in this jurisdiction involving the wrongful death of a child of the age of plaintiff's deceased son is Thigpen v. City of Miami, 148 Fla. 304, 4 So.2d 365 (1941); City of Miami v. Thigpen, 151 Fla. 800, 11 So.2d 300 (1942), which was before the Florida Supreme Court on two occasions and in which the supreme court entered a remittitur of $2,000.00, reducing the judgment to the sum of $8,000.00.
Until quite recently the highest verdict approved by a court in this jurisdiction in an action by a father for the wrongful death of his child was $45,000.00. See Coast Cities Coaches Inc. v. Donat, 106 So.2d 593 (Fla.App.1958). It is significant that the plaintiff father in Donat presented substantial evidence to the effect that his mental condition was altered and impaired as a result of the untimely and tragic loss of his 6-year-old child. In Holland Paving Co. v. Dann, 169 So.2d 849, decided November 24, 1964, our Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order granting a new trial in the father's suit as administrator of the estate of his deceased child in which the verdict of $10,000.00 was held by the trial court to be excessive, and affirmed a judgment of $50,000.00 in the companion suit of the plaintiff father, individually, for the wrongful death of his child. Said judgment appears to be the largest money judgment in a suit of such nature ever sustained by an appellate court of this jurisdiction. Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida was dismissed without opinion (February 1965), 173 So.2d 145.
We have affirmed the $5,000.00 judgment entered in the suit of the administrator (our file No. G — 54), being constrained to do so only in the light of the remittitur imposed by the trial court the effect of which was to reduce from $25,000.00 to $5,000.00 the excessive verdict of the jury therein. The action of the trial court in ordering the $20,000.00 remittitur in that suit, which was consented to by the appellee, is to some extent persuasive, especially in the light of the hereinabove discussed verdicts of our appellate courts in similar cases, that the jury's verdict for $100,000.00 in the father's suit, individually (our file No. G-55), was induced by passion, prejudice, bias or some other improper motive. We are fortified in this conclusion by the fact, as appears by the record, that in each case here reviewed the jury verdict was in the exact amount suggested by counsel for plaintiff in the course of oral argument to the jury and does not appear elsewhere in the trial proceedings. A verdict is not per se excessive because the jury awards the full amount of damages suggested by counsel for the prevailing party, but we would be exceedingly naive should we fail to recognize that as a matter of practice the advocate usually suggests to the jury a figure for damages substantially in excess of the amount that is clearly supportable by the evidence and likewise in excess of the amount which he deems to be supportable in point of law should the jury happen to return a verdict approaching the amount suggested.
Persons who have suffered the heartaches and anxiety occasioned by the untimely death of a loved one know that there is no conceivable basis by which the appellee and his wife could be adequately compensated in money damages for their loss. Parenthetically, the' appellate courts have been and always will be unable to devise a measure or scale by which to fix with mathematical certainty the minimum and maximum limits of the verdict which a jury may lawfully return in the suit of a surviving parent for the wrongful death of his child under the facts and circumstances peculiar to a particular case. In appeals testing the amount of the verdict and judgment there is no better criterion available than as stated by Mr. Justice Terrell in Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, supra, and it must of necessity be applied here. In that context, if the verdict and resulting judgment do not bear a reasonable relation to the philosophy and general trend of prior decisions in such cases, the judgment must either be set aside and a new trial awarded or a remittitur imposed reducing it to an amount which the appellate court in the exercise of its discretionary powers and in good conscience deems sustainable. Faced with those alternatives, having in mind the philosophy and trend of the decisions in this jurisdiction, and having duly noted the amount of damages sustained by the appellate courts of Florida in like actions, it is the judgment of this court that the sum of $50,000.00 is the maximum amount of damages that the jury under the facts of this case was warranted in awarding to appellee, individually, in his suit under Section 768.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., for the wrongful death of Dale Warren Cour-son.
The judgment for plaintiff-appellee in the case identified by our file No. G-54 is affirmed. If the plaintiff-appellee in the case identified by our file No. G-55 will enter a remittitur for $50,000.00, the judgment in that case will be permitted to stand for the balance; otherwise it will be reversed for a new trial.
RAWLS, J., concurs.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
. Winner v. Sharp, (Ma.1949) 43 So.2d 634.