Case Name: RITEN H. SHETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARREN WUNDERLICH et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2006-01-13
Citations: 363 Ill. App. 3d 252
Docket Number: No. 3-04-0828
Parties: RITEN H. SHETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARREN WUNDERLICH et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 363
Pages: 252–259

Head Matter:
RITEN H. SHETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARREN WUNDERLICH et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Third District
No. 3-04-0828
Opinion filed January 13, 2006.
McDADE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Robert A. Bauerschmidt (argued), Gerald G. Goldberg, and Michael K. Goldberg (argued), all of Goldberg & Frankenstein, L.L.C., of Chicago, and Christian G. Spesia, of Spesia, Ayers & Ardaugh, of Joliet, for appellant.
Michael Laux (argued) and Brian C. Fetzer, both of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees.

Opinion:
JUSTICE LYTTON
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Dr. Riten Sheth, filed a complaint against defendants Dr. Warren Wunderlich, Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, and 13 other doctors alleging that they summarily suspended his clinical privileges in violation of Provena's bylaws. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of defendants. We affirm.
Plaintiff is a physician certified in gastroenterology and internal medicine. In June of 1999, plaintiff began working at the OSF St. Joseph Medical Center (Provena). In August 2000, Dr. Wunderlich, as chairperson of the Provena medicine committee, requested that the medicine committee review three of plaintiffs cases. After reviewing the endoscopic care and treatment plaintiff provided to patients in those cases, the medicine committee voted to summarily suspend plaintiffs clinical privileges.
On September 13, 2000, plaintiff appeared before a subcommittee of the medical executive committee and defended himself. On September 19, 2000, the subcommittee voted to lift plaintiffs suspension. Plaintiff was reinstated to his prior position.
Plaintiff filed suit against Dr. Wunderlich, Provena and 13 members of the medicine committee alleging breach of contract, interference with economic advantage, civil conspiracy and violations of due process. Plaintiff alleged that the medicine committee failed to follow the medical staffs bylaws when it voted to summarily suspend him. By May 25, 2004, plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim had been dismissed with prejudice and plaintiffs due process claim had been dismissed as to all defendants except Wunderlich and Provena; six of the defendants had been dismissed from the litigation.
On May 26, 2004, the remaining defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit executed by Dr. Wunder-lich. In paragraphs 1 through 5, Dr. Wunderlich stated that he believed Dr. Sheth should be summarily suspended because he posed a danger to his patients. In paragraphs 6 through 8, Dr. Wunderlich stated that he did not summarily suspend Dr. Sheth himself because he did not know that he had the authority to do so. Finally, in paragraph 9, Dr. Wunderlich concluded: "If I had reviewed and followed the St. Joseph Bylaws in August, I would have summarily suspended Dr. Sheth, unilaterally, based on my review of his records, in particular, cases #21807854, #21842588, and #233137292."
Dr. Wunderlich's deposition testimony supported the assertions contained in his affidavit. Dr. Wunderlich testified that he was unfamiliar with the bylaws on August 30, 2000, and was unaware that as chairperson of the medicine committee, he could unilaterally suspend Dr. Sheth. Dr. Wunderlich testified that he thought Dr. Sheth should have been summarily suspended on August 30, 2000.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 811 N.E.2d 670 (2004). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Green v. International Insurance Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 929, 934, 605 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (1992).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because: (1) the affidavit of Dr. Wunder-lich is insufficient to support summary judgment; and (2) there remain material factual disputes precluding summary judgment, including the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.
1. Wunderlich's Affidavit
Plaintiff argues that paragraph 9 of Dr. Wunderlich's affidavit does not comply with Supreme Court Rule 191 (210 Ill. 2d R. 191). Rule 191 provides in pertinent part: "Affidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment under Section 2 — 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure * shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence *." 210 Ill. 2d R. 191(a). Paragraph 9 of the affidavit states that if Dr. Wunderlich had reviewed and followed Provena's bylaws, he would have summarily suspended Dr. Sheth. This statement is conclusory in nature and, thus, does not satisfy Supreme Court Rule 191.
2. Questions of Fact
Nevertheless, defendants contend that the trial court properly granted summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact in this case, particularly with respect to the proximate cause of plaintiffs alleged injuries.
Proximate cause can be a question of law when there can be no reasonable differences in the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts. Board of Education of Indian Prairie School District No. 204 v. Du Page County Election Comm'n, 341 Ill. App. 3d 327, 333, 793 N.E.2d 954, 959-60 (2003). A defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1999). A defendant's conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent that conduct, the injury would not have occurred. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 258, 720 N.E.2d at 1072.
In this case, defendants' failure to follow the bylaws did not cause plaintiffs alleged injury. In paragraphs 1 through 8 of Dr. Wunder-lich's affidavit and in Dr. Wunderlich's deposition testimony, the following facts are undisputed: (1) Dr. Wunderlich reviewed three of Dr. Sheth's cases; (2) based on his review of those cases, Dr. Wunderlich believed that Dr. Sheth should be summarily suspended; (3) Dr. Wunderlich believed that Dr. Sheth posed a danger to his patients; (4) Dr. Wunderlich brought Dr. Sheth's cases before the medicine committee because he believed that only the medicine committee could summarily suspend Dr. Sheth; and (5) Dr. Wunderlich was unaware that he could unilaterally suspend Dr. Sheth.
We can only draw one reasonable conclusion from these undisputed facts: Dr. Wunderlich's recommendation to the medicine committee to summarily suspend Dr. Sheth was tantamount to Dr. Wunderlich doing it himself. The medicine committee's failure to follow the bylaws did not proximately cause Dr. Sheth's injuries. The trial court cor rectly concluded that plaintiff could not establish that defendants proximately caused plaintiffs injuries and properly granted summary judgment to defendants.
The order of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOLDRIDGE, J., concurs.