Case Name: Ernest Elmer CRUME, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1983-10-19
Citations: 658 S.W.2d 607
Docket Number: No. 62626
Parties: Ernest Elmer CRUME, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 658
Pages: 607–612

Head Matter:
Ernest Elmer CRUME, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 62626.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Oct. 19, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1984.
Will Gray, Houston, for appellant.
Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., and Douglas M. O’Brien, Paul Schiffer and Ken Magid-son, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
CAMPBELL, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.05. The trial court assessed punishment at six years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. The appellant in three grounds of error contends that the indictment is fundamentally defective. We disagree and affirm.
The appellant specifically contends that the indictment is fundamentally defective because: it fails to enumerate the specific acts of 'accident and mistake' upon which it relied for conviction; it merely alleges two acts of simple negligence in support of the legal conclusion that appellant acted recklessly; and it combines allegations that appellant committed a felony offense, a misdemeanor offense, or no offense at all. The appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.
The indictment alleges that the appellant:
"Did then and there unlawfully commit an offense hereafter styled the primary offense in that he did while intoxicated operate a motor vehicle and by accident and mistake cause his vehicle to collide with John Oliver Smith, hereafter styled the Complainant, causing the death of the Complainant by reason of the intoxication of the Defendant, and the Defendant did cause his vehicle to collide with the Complainant recklessly causing the death of the Complainant, by failing to guide his vehicle away from the Complainant and by failing to keep a lookout for the Complainant."
The appellant's first ground of error, contending that the failure to enumerate the specific acts of "accident" and "mistake" rendered the indictment fundamentally defective, is without merit. The terms "accident" and "mistake" refer to the state of mind of the appellant and do not require any "enumeration" or other description. See Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
The appellant's next contention, that the allegation of "two purported acts of negligence" insufficiently alleges that the appellant recklessly caused the victim's death, is likewise without merit. The pertinent part of the indictment alleged that the appellant caused his vehicle to collide with the complainant by failing to guide his vehicle away from the complainant, thereby recklessly causing the complainant's death. This adequately informed the appellant of the nature of the reckless act of which he was accused. See Arredondo v. State, 582 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Townsley v. State, 538 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
The question we are faced with, however, is whether the acts of failing to guide his vehicle away from the complainant and failing to keep a lookout for the complainant constitute recklessness. Y.T. C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 6.03, provides that:
"A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's viewpoint."
It is the appellant's disregard of the risk of a resulting death which must rise to the level of a "gross deviation" from an ordinary standard of conduct. See Graham & Utecht v. State, 657 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The acts of failing to guide his vehicle away from the complainant and failing to keep a lookout for the complainant, when coupled with the disregard of the risk of death, are clearly a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would exercise. The allegations of these acts thereby sufficiently allege the manner in which the appellant recklessly caused the death of the complainant. See Townsley, supra, at p. 412.
The appellant contends that the indictment allows the State to prove that the appellant caused the death of the complainant by recklessness, criminal negligence or simple negligence. Article 21.15, V.A.C. C.P., requires that:
"Whenever recklessness or criminal negligence enters into or is a part or element of any offense, or it is charged that the accused acted recklessly or with criminal negligence in the commission of an offense, the complaint, information, or indictment in order to be sufficient in any such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness or criminal negligence, and in no event shall it be sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted recklessly or with criminal negligence."
In Graham & Utecht v. State, supra, this Court held that:
"In order to give full effect to Article 21.15, supra, that provision must be read to require that a sufficient instrument 'must allege with reasonable certainty the act or acts relied upon to constitute [the forbidden conduct committed with] recklessness or criminal negligence.'
U
"It follows then, that it is indeed permissible for the State to allege and prove identical acts — 'conduct'—for both involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, for the only distinction between the two is the 'required culpability' elements of each offense; by definition, this makes the latter a lesser offense included in the former. Article 37.09(3), V.A.C.C.P."
We find it untenable to say that the indictment charged both a felony and a misdemeanor when it patently alleges "recklessness." Moreover, the court's charge to the jury included the lesser offense of. criminally negligent homicide, yet the jury found the appellant's acts consti tuted recklessness, as alleged. This ground of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
.V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.05, provides as follows:
"(a) A person commits an offense if he:
"(1) recklessly causes the death of an individual; or
"(2) by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual.
"(b) For purposes of this section, 'intoxication' means that the actor does not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the voluntary introduction of any substance into his body.
"(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree."
. The "state of mind" herein referred to is not to be confused with the culpable mental states referred to in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Secs. 6.02 and 6.03.
. The words "mistake" and "accident" as used in the statute mean "unintentional" and are often used in connection with each other and are interchangeable. See Thomason v. State, 388 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1964).
. The indictment clearly does allege the two methods of committing involuntary manslaughter pursuant to Penal Code, Sec. 19.05, V.T. C.A. When an offense may be committed in two ways, however, the State may allege both ways in the conjunctive. Vaughn v. State, 634 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) and Sidney v. State, 560 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
. No objection was lodged by the appellant to the court's charge to the jury. S.F. p. 190.
. Although we find no fundamental defect or otherwise reversible error in the indictment, we nevertheless must note that we do not encourage an indictment drafted in this manner and style.