Case Name: STATE of Tennessee, Respondent, v. William Earl STACY, Petitioner
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1980-06-30
Citations: 601 S.W.2d 696
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Respondent, v. William Earl STACY, Petitioner.
Judges: BROCK, C. J., and COOPER, J., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 601
Pages: 696–708

Head Matter:
STATE of Tennessee, Respondent, v. William Earl STACY, Petitioner.
Supreme Court of Tennessee.
June 30, 1980.
Walter C. Kurtz, Richard McGee, Nashville, Martha Meares, Knoxville, for petitioner.
William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Michael J. Passino, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Ronald A. Webster, Dist. Atty. Gen., John W. Gill, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Knoxville, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
HARBISON, Justice.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Although a number of assignments of error were made in the petition for certiora-ri to , this Court, the petition was granted primarily to consider the sufficiency of the convicting evidence in light of petitioner's defense of lack of mental capacity.
This case involved a planned, deliberate robbery and a murder committed by petitioner in the perpetration of it. Petitioner was driven to the scene of the crime by two other persons. Neither of these individuals claimed mental illness or inability to control his conduct. In the course of attempting to commit the robbery, petitioner shot and killed the intended victim. He was aware of what he had done immediately thereafter, recognized that he had killed the victim, and actively sought to avoid apprehension by the police. He was successful in doing so, even though his two companions were not. Petitioner evaded capture for several weeks. The offense occurred in Knoxville. Petitioner came to Nashville and was seen there on several occasions by persons who had known him previously. He recognized these persons and recalled past events in conversations with them.
Petitioner had a fairly short history of mental illness, dating, not from his childhood, but for a period of about one year prior to the crime in question. There is evidence that he was highly intelligent. It is conceded by counsel for petitioner that there was sufficient evidence to make a jury issue in this case as to whether the accused did or did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Reversal is sought on the other prong of the rules of criminal responsibility as stated in Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); that is, inability of petitioner to control his conduct.
In the opinion of the majority, that issue, like the issue of cognitive capacity, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. There was evidence that the accused, when he had been removed from medication for a considerable period of time, became completely irrational. At the time of the homicide, however, he had been without medication for only a short period of time, if at all, and his conduct on or about the time of the murder does not compare even remotely with the conduct described when he was totally psychotic or out of touch with reality. In our opinion, it was for the jury to determine whether petitioner could or could not control his conduct. If he could not control it at the time when he committed the shooting a few hours earlier, it is difficult to conceive that he could have effectively escaped from a wrecked vehicle and eluded captivity for weeks thereafter — or, at least, a trier of fact might reasonably so conclude from the proof.
The jurors in this case were given full instructions on the rules of criminal responsibility pursuant to Graham v. State, supra. Presumably the facts were fully argued to them, as they were to this Court. The jury and the trial judge, all of whom saw and observed the witnesses, concluded that the accused was not incompetent within the Graham rules, and in our opinion there was ample material evidence to support that conclusion.
Petitioner's case has been before the appellate courts on another occasion. See State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552. (Tenn. Cr.App.1977). His drug therapy was discussed in that case. It is clear both from that opinion and from the record in the present case that his ability to control his conduct varied with the degree and extent of medication which he received and the length of time he was without it. In our opinion, it was for the jury to say whether or not, at the time of the homicide, he had been without medication for a sufficiently long period of time to be unable to control his conduct. The fact that he was seen in Nashville a substantial period of time later and recognized and conversed with persons whom he knew, apparently in control of himself, is evidence from which the jury could have concluded that petitioner was not psychotic or out of control at the time of the homicide involved here.
The testimony of experts offered on behalf of petitioner was opinion evidence only. Its weight and credibility were clearly issues to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions from the trial judge. One of these witnesses, Dr. Luton, did not see petitioner until April 1976, over eight months after the homicide in ques tion. The other, Dr. Siegmann, had observed him during the years 1974 and 1975. He testified that on July 1, 1975, petitioner was discharged from the Forensic Services Unit as being improved. At that time petitioner was on medication. Thereafter he was in custody and in the Eastern State Hospital until July 23, 1975. Dr. Siegmann testified that if petitioner discontinued his medication, his condition "would disintegrate relatively soon again." It was for the jury, in our opinion, to say what "relatively soon" meant and to determine whether the petitioner's condition had deteriorated by July 30,1975, the date of the crime, and the extent of such deterioration, if any. He was out of the hospital and without supervision for only seven days before the murder was committed. Dr. Siegmann did not see petitioner again after July 1 until March 9, 1976, over seven months after the homicide. He expressed the opinion that the accused could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the crime but that petitioner could not control that conduct or conform it to the requirements of the law. He described the conduct of petitioner when he was in a state of disintegration. The jury was entitled to compare that conduct with the demeanor of the petitioner at or about the time of the robbery and homicide. Further, Dr. Siegmann testified positively that petitioner is not mentally retarded and that his intelligence is well above the average range.
In this Court, the evidence must be viewed in its strongest light favorable to the verdict. It is not the function of this Court to draw inferences from testimony in jury cases. That is the province of the jury whose verdict, in our opinion, was justified from the evidence in the record.
The judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the trial court are affirmed at the cost of petitioner.
BROCK, C. J., and COOPER, J., concur.
HENRY and FONES, JJ., dissent.