Case Name: Tony L. KIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPD PRINTING & DISTRIBUTING, INC., Defendant, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, f.k.a. IPD Printing Company, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-05-24
Citations: 427 F. App'x 753
Docket Number: No. 10-14621
Parties: Tony L. KIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPD PRINTING & DISTRIBUTING, INC., Defendant, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, f.k.a. IPD Printing Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 427
Pages: 753–755

Head Matter:
Tony L. KIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPD PRINTING & DISTRIBUTING, INC., Defendant, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, f.k.a. IPD Printing Company, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-14621
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
May 24, 2011.
Tony L. Eight, Decatur, GA, pro se.
Rayna H. Jones, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.O., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Tony Eight, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment in favor of R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company ("Donnelley") in his race discrimination suit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In May 2008, Eight filed a pro se Title VII complaint against Donnelley, alleging that he was unlawfully terminated based upon his race. On June 22, 2010, the district court granted summary judgment to Donnelley because Eight failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably. On August 30, 2010, Eight filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied as untimely under its local rules, and on the merits, because Eight failed to present any valid legal or factual reasons why the court's June 22, 2010, order should be reconsidered. On appeal, Eight presents numerous factual and evidentiary objections, contesting those relied upon by the district court, and offering his version of the events that transpired, but does not specifically address the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e) for abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir.2001). Local Rule 7.2E provides that motions for reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice, but whenever a party believes it is absolutely necessary to file a motion to reconsider an order or judgment, the motion shall be filed with the clerk of court within 28 days after the entry of the order or judgment. LR7.2E, N.D. Ga. In addition, a Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The only grounds for granting a Rule 59(e) motion are the submission of newly-discovered evidence or the demonstration of manifest error. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.2007). A motion for reconsideration cannot be used "to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.2005). It is well settled that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2004). And although we read pro se briefs liberally, "issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned." Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008) (citations omitted).
In this appeal, Eight has abandoned all issues because he has failed to set forth any arguments related to the order denying his motion for reconsideration. See Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330. Even if Eight had not abandoned all issues, the district court was correct in finding that Eight's motion was untimely not only pursuant to Local Rule 7.2E, but also under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), because it was filed 41 days after the July 20, 2010, deadline. LR 7.2E, N.D. Ga.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Additionally, the district court properly denied the motion on the merits. Eight merely attempted to relitigate old matters and presented evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. Michael Linet, 408 F.3d at 763. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eight's motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
. As noted, Eight objects on appeal to various facts and pieces of evidence that pertain to the district court's grant of the summary judgment motion. (See generally Blue Brief). However, because this Court dismissed Eight's previous appeal of the grant of summary judgment, we do not consider these arguments, and only address his appeal of the motion for reconsideration.