Case Name: CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, a municipal corporation (on the relation of Edwin A. Baetzman, as Intervenor/real property in interest), Appellant, v. Delores A. BARTON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-04-21
Citations: 414 So. 2d 542
Docket Number: No. 81-437
Parties: CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, a municipal corporation (on the relation of Edwin A. Baetzman, as Intervenor/real property in interest), Appellant, v. Delores A. BARTON, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 542–544

Head Matter:
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, a municipal corporation (on the relation of Edwin A. Baetzman, as Intervenor/real property in interest), Appellant, v. Delores A. BARTON, Appellee.
No. 81-437.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 21, 1982.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1982.
C. Allen Watts of Watts & Biernacki, P. A., DeLand, for appellant.
Thomas D. Wright, New Smyrna Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
In the City of New Smyrna Beach, a finger-shaped portion of a beachfront R-l zone protruded into a trapezoidal R-3 zone which also fronted on the beach. The city rezoned the finger from R-l to R-3, thereby decreasing the minimum lot width for a single-family dwelling within the finger of land from one hundred feet to fifty feet (see diagram).
The circuit court struck down the rezoning ordinance, holding that it did not further the public health, safety or welfare. The present rule of law in Florida is that a court may not invalidate an ordinance rezoning property unless the enacting body's action was not "fairly debatable;" in other words, the ordinance must be upheld so long as an arguably reasonable basis exists to support the ordinance. Town of Indialantic v. Nance, 400 So.2d 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). It is said that the purpose of this rule is to prevent a court from substituting its judgment for that of the zoning authority. Broward County v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 875 So.2d 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 755 (Fla.1980). The city introduced testimony in the circuit court to show that it rezoned the property because it had determined that, since the rezoned area was bounded on one side by the ocean and on two out of the remaining three sides with fifty-foot lots, the land rezoned would be more compatible with its surroundings if it were likewise subject to fifty-foot lot restrictions. The property classification of this land is not so clear that the circuit court, or this court, can say, as a matter of law, that the city's action was not "fairly debatable."
Accordingly, we reverse.
REVERSED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.