Case Name: TAYLOR v. NICHOLS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-11-10
Citations: 119 N.Y.S. 1042
Docket Number: 
Parties: TAYLOR v. NICHOLS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 119
Pages: 1042–1044

Head Matter:
TAYLOR v. NICHOLS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 10, 1909.)
1. Evidence (§ 318*)—Hearsay.
In a suit by the trustee to recover a fraudulent preference given to one .who w-as -not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding, the schedules filed and evidence.given by the bankrupt in the proceedings for discharge are - hearsay as to the defendant, and inadmissible to establish insolvency at the time of the transfer.
[Ed. Note.—Eor other'cases, see Evidence, Dec. Dig. § 318.*]
2. Witnesses (§§ 321, 400*)—Impeachment.
One cannot impeach his own witness or prove contradictory statements as to matters upon which the witness has been examined.
[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Witnesses, Cent Dig. §§ 1094, 1099-1100, 1268, 1269; Dec. Dig. §§ 321, 400.*]
John M. Kellogg, J., dissenting.
*For other cases see same topic & § numbeb in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907; to date, & Rep'r Indexes
Appeal from Trial Term, Delaware County.
Action by Frank A. Taylor, as trustee in bankruptcy, against Jesse M. Nichols. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
- Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE,- and SEWELL, JJ.
F. W. Welsh, for appellant.
Wesley Gould (C. L. Andrus, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
SMITH, P. J.
This action is apparently brought under section 60 of the-bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445]) to recover from the defendant the sum of $500, as having been paid to him by one William H. Nichols, an insolvent, within four months from the date of his insolvency, and-as having been received by the said defendant with knowledge of the fact that it" was -intended to give to him a preference as a creditor. Two facts were required to be proven in order to justify the judgment rendered: First, that at the time of the transfer William H. Nichols was insolvent; and, second, that this defendant had reasonable ground to believe that the transfer was made with intent to give him a preference. Both facts have been found by the learned trial judge, and upon them he has directed the judgment against the defendant from which this appeal has been taken.
The judgment is challenged by the deféndant for various reasons. Ainong others, it is claimed that illegal evidence "was received over his objection to establish the" insolvency of William H. Nichols at the time of the transfer. With the petition filed by the said Nichols to obtain his discharge from bankruptcy, he filed certain schedules of his assets and liabilities, and in the proceedings which resulted in his discharge he gave certain evidence as to his condition upon January 26th, when it is claimed the fraudulent preference was given. These schedules and part of the evidence so given by him in the bankruptcy proceeding were offered in evidence by the plaintiff upon this trial, for the purpose of establishing the insolvency of the said Nichols at that time. To this offer the defendant objected that as to him they were hearsay, and that he was not bound by these declarations. The objections were overruled, the evidence was admitted, and the defend'ant excepted to the ruling.
We are unable to see upon what ground this evidence was competent. It was the declaration of the bankrupt in a proceeding in which it does not appear that this defendant was a party. As to this defendant the evidence would seem clearly to be hearsay and inadmissible. Burnham v. Brennan, 74 N. Y. 597; Schreyer v. Citizens' National Bank, 74 App. Div. 478, 77 N. Y. Supp. 494; Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. Y. 300, 30 N. E. 105; Lent v. Shear, 160 N. Y. 462, 55 N. E. 2. Upon the record it appears that the plaintiff's counsel contended that this was proper evidence in contradiction of the witness William H. Nichols, who had been upon the stand. This witness had been called by the plaintiff and testified in behalf of the plaintiff. It is elementary that you cannot impeach your own witness or prove contradictory statements as to matters upon which you have examined him. It follows that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur, except KELLOGG, J., dissenting in opinion, and SEWELL, JJ., not voting.