Case Name: In re SILVER SANDS R.V. RESORT, Debtor. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Appellant, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees; In re Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Debtor. G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley, Appellants, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-02-01
Citations: 636 F. App'x 950
Docket Number: Nos. 13-60025, 13-60026
Parties: In re SILVER SANDS R.V. RESORT, Debtor. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Appellant, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees. In re Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Debtor. G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley, Appellants, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees.
Judges: Before: KOZINSKI and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and BENSON, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 636
Pages: 950–955

Head Matter:
In re SILVER SANDS R.V. RESORT, Debtor. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Appellant, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees. In re Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Debtor. G & G Real Estate Investment; Chad Mestler; Jessica Mestler; Stuart Schneider; Janine Schneider; Phyllis Gorby Kelley, Appellants, v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC; Silver Sands R.V. Resort, Appellees.
Nos. 13-60025, 13-60026.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 15, 2015.
Filed Feb. 1, 2016.
Ralph Dunlap Harris, Esquire, Howard C. Meyers, Esquire, Burch & Cracchiolo, PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Appellant.
Darek S. Bushnaq, Gregory Alan Cross, Esquire, Heather Deans Foley, Venable LLP, Baltimore, MD, Lori L. Winkelman, Quarles & Brady LLP, William Novotny, Timothy Jay Thomason, Esquire, Sophia Varma, Dickinson Wright/Mariscal Weeks, Phoenix, AZ, William M. King, Esquire, Mesa, AZ, for Appellees.
Before: KOZINSKI and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and BENSON, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Dee V. Benson, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, and G & G Real Estate Investment, et al., appeal the bankruptcy court's order and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ("BAP") holding that CWCapital Asset Management, LLC, held a superior lien against property located in Mesa, Arizona, owned by Silver Sands R.V. Resort. We review the bankruptcy court's decision de novo. Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (In re Hashim), 213 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.2000). We review its findings of fact for clear error, and we review de novo questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact, including whether the historical facts satisfy the relevant legal rule. Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. The bankruptcy court properly concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction. Under Arizona law, there must be a bona fide dispute regarding the claim that is meant to be settled. Baker v. Emmerson, 153 Ariz. 4, 734 P.2d 101, 104 (Ariz.Ct.App.1986). Here, there was no such dispute.
2. The bankruptcy court erred in holding that no bailment relationship was created by the delivery of the check to Capmark. Although there was no express or implied bailment, there was a constructive bailment.
The party seeking to establish a constructive bailment must show that the circumstances surrounding the putative bail-ee's possession of personal property were sufficient to give rise to a duty to use due care in handling the property. See, e.g., Alitalia v. Arrow Trucking Co., 977 F.Supp. 973, 980 (D.Ariz.1997); Chesterfield Sewer & Water, Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of N.J., 57 Ill.App.2d 90, 207 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1965); Hadfield v. Gilchrist, 343 S.C. 88, 538 S.E.2d 268, 272 (S.C.Ct.App.2000); Aegis Investigative Grp. v. Metro. Gov't, 98 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002). An agreement between the putative bailor and bailee is not necessary to create a constructive bailment when a person comes into lawful possession of personal property of another and when justice so requires. But the bankruptcy court incorrectly equated the requirement of "justice" in this context with a typical balancing of equities. Instead, the inquiry is, more narrowly, whether the circumstances surrounding possession and control over the property were such that they required the putative bailee to use due care — irrespective of any negligence by the putative bail- or that led to the putative bailee's possession. See, e.g., Chesterfield, 207 N.E.2d at 86 (noting that a constructive bailment arises when one lawfully acquires another's personal property "and holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of.justice, to keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Aegis, 98 S.W.3d at 163 (describing the same requirement); Hadfield, 538 S.E.2d at 272 (explaining that a constructive bailment arises when one lawfully acquires another's personal property "and holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes on the recipient of the property the obligation to keep it safely and redeliver it to the owner"); 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 13 (2015) (stating that a constructive bailment requires lawful possession of chattel "and the duty to account for it as the property of another").
Thus, a consideration of who is more blameworthy — a balancing of equities in the usual sense — is irrelevant. Rather, the question is simply whether the circumstances established a duty on the part of the Trust to use due care to safeguard the funds and to return those funds to their rightful owner. We answer "yes." Cap-mark deposited the check into a "suspense account," thereby taking full control of the funds (which were substantial) while simultaneously recognizing that the money was not theirs to keep. On remand, the bankruptcy court should consider in the first instance whether the duty of due care was violated.
3. The bankruptcy court did not rule on Bayview's conversion claim. Because there are factual issues to resolve the bankruptcy court should consider this claim in the first instance. See Carter v. Anderson (In re Carter), 182 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir.1999) ("Remand is appropriate when the bankruptcy court's factual findings are silent or ambiguous as to a material factual question." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir, R. 36-3.