Case Name: Henry Wallace Glenn, appellant, v. A. B. Chambers, mayor, et al., appellees
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1953-02-10
Citations: 244 Iowa 750
Docket Number: No. 48228
Parties: Henry Wallace Glenn, appellant, v. A. B. Chambers, mayor, et al., appellees.
Judges: Smith, C. J., and Bliss, Garfield and Wennerstrum, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 244
Pages: 750–758

Head Matter:
Henry Wallace Glenn, appellant, v. A. B. Chambers, mayor, et al., appellees.
No. 48228.
(Reported in 56 N.W.2d 892)
February 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 10, 1953.
Howard M. Hall, of Des Moines, for appellant.
John A. Blanchard and Harris M. Coggeshall, both of Des Moines, for appellees.

Opinion:
Oliver, J.
Plaintiff-G-lenn was a sanitary inspector in 'the health department of City of Des Moines. He was discharged. Later he was reinstated. This appeal results from Glenn's claim against Des Moines for the salary lost by him during the period between his discharge and reinstatement. When it discharged him, the reason the city council assigned therefor was that his appointment had violated soldiers' preference rights of one Bank, under section 365.10, Code of Iowa, 1946 (1950). Glenn appealed to the civil service commission, which upheld his discharge and approved the appointment of Bank to the position under the Soldiers Preference Law. Glenn then secured the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the mayor, city council, civil service commission and city manager, to review the orders removing him. Upon trial, the district court, September 9, 1950, sustained the writ and ordered Glenn reinstated (which was promptly done). The district court adjudged also Glenn was entitled to salary from May 15 to September 9, 1950, the period he was not permitted to work, and ordered payment thereof. Bespondents appealed to this court. On that appeal the errors assigned and argned were (1) error in ordering Glenn's reinstatement and (2) error in ordering payment of his salary while he was discharged.
This court affirmed the judgment reinstating Glenn, holding that, although his appointment was not in - accord with the Soldiers Preference Law, the failure to discharge him during the six-month probationary period under section 365.8, Code of Iowa, 1946 (1950) prevented the setting aside of such appointment. However, this court reversed the judgment for salary for the period of Glenn's discharge.
The opinion, Glenn v. Chambers, 242 Iowa 760, 771, 48 N.W.2d 275, 281, states:
"The decree is affirmed except insofar as it holds plaintiff is entitled to pay from and after the date of his discharge. We do not decide that question because Code section 365.27 and our opinions heretofore cited contemplate the decision in the first instance rests with defendants council and commission and also because payment to Bank does not definitely appear. Plaintiff's right to pay during the period of his removal is left open for future determination in harmony with the views herein expressed.- — -Affirmed in part and reversed in part."
"The views herein expressed" are that payment of salary to a de facto officer during his incumbency is a bar to recovery from a city by the rightful officer of salary for the same period, for the reason that the public should not be compelled to pay twice for the same service.
Tbe opinion states also that tbe payment to the de facto incumbent must be in good faith and that there is no evidence of bad faith here. Furthermore, it must appear that the de facto incumbent was definitely appointed to the position in place of the rightful holder and was not merely one of several men employed to do the same kind of work. "As stated, it is stipulated here that Rank was appointed to fill the vacancy created by plaintiff's discharge." Thus the opinion disposed of all issues of law in the case and left plaintiff's right to the salary for the period of his removal open for future determination by the city council and civil service commission, based upon whether the city had paid Rank's salary for such period.
Thereafter Glenn's claim for the salary was again presented to and denied by the city council. Glenn then appealed to the civil service commission, which, after a hearing, ordered that the claim be allowed in the sum of .$805 plus interest and paid by the city of Des Moines. Then the salary claim was again presented to and denied by the city council.
Glenn then instituted this suit in mandamus to compel the council to comply with the order of Des Moines Civil Service Commission for the payment of the back salary. The district court found plaintiff was not entitled to the back pay allowed by the civil service commission and rendered judgment denying the writ. From this part of the judgment plaintiff appeals. (No appeal was taken from another part of the judgment which allowed Glenn $46 for the expense of a reporter and transcript of the proceedings before the civil service commission.)
We agree with the judgment of the district court. The decision of this court on the first appeal left open only the questioner issue whether the city had paid Rank the salary for the period in question. That question, which had never been in actual dispute, was definitely settled at the last hearing before the civil service commission, by evidence of the payment of such salary to Rank by the city. With that question settled, the directions of this court in the first appeal (Glenn v. Chambers, 242 Iowa 760, 48 N.W.2d 275) required the affirmance by the commission of the order of the city council refusing to pay Glenn's claim. The commission was without power to make the decision and order to the contrary.
In Ronna v. American State Bank, 215 Iowa 806, 810, 813, 816, 246 N.W. 798, 800, the procedendo upon a previous appeal remanded the cause with directions to take "further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court." Thereafter the trial court entered judgment inconsistent with that opinion. Defendants took no appeal from the judgment but applied for an order directing- the district court to obey the procedendo. This court granted the relief, holding defendants could have appealed but were not required to do so. The opinion states :
"When the opinion of this court indicates that the cause is reversed and remanded for a special purpose, the district court, upon the remand, is limited to do the special thing authorized by this court in its opinion, and nothing else.
"That being the situation, the district court, after the remand, had no power or jurisdiction to do anything except enter judgment in accordance with the opinion, which required that the administrator's petition be dismissed at his costs. Hence the district court had no right to enter the judgment it did on the administrator's motion.
"Not having the power and jurisdiction to enter the judgment, the court is hereby ordered and directed to set the same aside, in harmony with the foregoing opinion."
Other similar decisions include: Litchfield v. The Dubuque & Pacific R. Co., 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 270, 19 L. Ed. 150; Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn., 71 N. D. 542, 3 N.W.2d 239; Colter v. Dill, 49 N. D. 902, 193 N.W. 662, 665; Personal Loan Co. v. Personal Finance Co. of St. Paul, 213 Minn. 239, 6 N.W.2d 247; Ex parte Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U. S. 91, 11 S. Ct. 673, 35 L. Ed. 339; Gaines v. Caldwell, 148 U. S. 228, 13 S. Ct. 611, 37 L. Ed. 432; Cowdery v. London & San Francisco Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 73 P. 196, 96 Am. St. Rep. 115, 122; Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 197 P. 1027.
3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, section 1234, states on page 731, " the trial court, upon remittitur, has no power but to obey, the judgment of the appellate court . Proceedings' contrary to the mandate must be treated as null and void."
3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, section 1240, states on page 737: "If, however, in reversing a' judgment, the trial court is directed to hear a new trial upon one issue only, or upon particular issues, it possesses no jurisdiction to grant a new trial generally, or to permit evidence upon other issues to go to the jury; it must obey the mandate of the reviewing court."
There is like language in 5 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, sections 1965 and 1967, pages 1511, 1512, 1514 and 1515.
Appellant would reargue the legal principles and issues involved in the case. These were determined in the first opinion. Therefore, they are the law of the case and will not be here reconsidered. Vogt v. City of Grinnell, 133 Iowa 363, 364, 110 N.W. 603; Shannon v. Gaar, 234 Iowa 1360, 1362, 15 N.W.2d 257, 258; Lawson v. Fordyce, 237 Iowa 28, 32-40, 21 N.W.2d 69.
Appellant contends also that some of the facts are not the same as those pleaded, stipulated and adjudicated in the former appeal. It is sufficient to say the record does not support this contention. — Affirmed.
Smith, C. J., and Bliss, Garfield and Wennerstrum, JJ., concur.
Mulronby, Thompson and Hays, JJ.,. dissent.