Case Name: James E. Nutwell, and others vs. George W. Nutwell
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1877-06-14
Citations: 47 Md. 35
Docket Number: 
Parties: James E. Nutwell, and others vs. George W. Nutwell.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Bowie, Stewart, Robinson and Alvey, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 35–53

Head Matter:
James E. Nutwell, and others vs. George W. Nutwell.
CHANCERY SALES.
Writ of Habere Facias Possessionem — Act of 1861, eh. 283— Answers in Chancery — Pemiirrers.
By a fair and liberal construction of the Act of 1864, ch. 283, it would seem to be clear that the proceedings authorized by that Act, where the sale has been made under a decree of a Coui't of equity, may be taken in the cause in which the decree was passed, and that a separate and independent proceeding at law is not in such cases necessary or proper.
Such proceeding, as to sales under decrees, is but a substitute for the less summary proceeding, previously resorted to by purchasers, to obtain possession of land purchased under decrees.
The Act does not in any manner lessen or affect the right of the party against whom the proceeding is taken to resist and defeat the application for the writ by showing sufficient cause against it.
A petition was filed by the purchaser at a trustee’s sale for a writ of hab.fac. pass.; to compel delivery to him of the land sold, and which the parlies in possession refused to deliver up to the purchaser. The parties in possession answered the petition, alleging matters which, if true, would make the delivery to the purchaser a fraud upon their rights. The petitioner demurred to the answer, and the demurrer being sustained, on appeal it was Hillb :
1st. If the parties in possession, acquired title to the land, or to the possession thereof, subsequent to the decree, whether from the purchaser or other person capable of imparting it, such right or title may well bo set up in answer to an application to compel them to surrender the possession; and it matters not that such right or title be only of an equitable nature.
2nd. The demurrer to the answer admits its allegations to be true, in which case every principle of justice remonstrates against the issuing of the writ.
3rd. Every application for the writ under this Act involves necessarily, to some extent, an inquiry into the nature and character of the holding by the party sought to be ousted.
4th. The decision on such applications is by no means of a definitive character. It only binds to the extent and effect of granting or refusing the writ. The refusal of the writ will only conclude the appellee as to this particular form of remedy.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, in Equity.
On the 10th of March, 1871, John E. Hurst and others, creditors of a certain John S. E. Nutwell, of Anne Arundel County, deceased, filed a creditors’ bill for the sale of the 'realty of the said Nutwell, to pay his debts. The administrators and heirs-at-law of the deceased were made parties defendants- to the suit. A decree for the sale of the realty was passed, and Frank H. Stockett appointed trustee, who made the sale and returned George W. Nutwell as the purchaser. No cause to the contrary having been shown, the sale was ratified. The accounts of the auditor, distributing proceeds of sale, were filed and ratified, and the purchaser received a deed of the land purchased from the trustee. The children and heirs-at-law' of the aforesaid John S. E. Nutwell, deceased, held possession of the land so purchased by George W. Nutwell from the trustee, and refused to deliver up to him possession thereof. Accordingly, on the 22nd of June, 1875, a petition was filed by the purchaser for a writ of habere facias possessionem,, to obtain possession of the land. The heirs-at-law answered this petition, setting forth in detail facts, which if true, proved that though George W. Nutwell was the nominal purchaser, they (the heirs-at-law) were the real purchasers, and that George W. Nutwell was attempting the perpetration of a fraud in his effort to get possession of the land. To this answer, the petitioner demurred, on the ground that such matters could not be taken into consideration in this proceeding, but would form, if true, proper ground for proceeding against the petitioner by original bill. The demurrer was sustained, and an order passed directing the clerk to issue the Avrit of hab. fac. poss., as prayed.
In passing this order, the Court below (Miller, J.,) delivered the following opinion :
“ In this case the purchaser has applied, under the Act of 1864, ch. 283, for a writ in the nature of a writ of habere facias possessionem, to put him in possession of the land he purchased from the trustee under the decree. To the answer showing cause against this application, the purchaser has demurred, and the demurrer has been argued.
iCIt appears from the proceedings in the cause, that a bill was filed in the usual form by creditors, for the sale of the real estate of John S. E. Nutwell, deceased, to pay his debts. The administrator and heirs-at-law of the deceased were made parties defendants to the suit. The cause regularly proceeded to decree, the trustee sold the land and reported George W. Nutwell as the purchaser ; the sale was duly ratified, no cause to the contrary having been shown; accounts were stated distributing the proceeds of sale, which were also duly ratified and confirmed, and the purchaser has received his deed for the land from the trustee. No objection to these proceedings were made by any of the defendants, and so far as the legal title to the land is concerned, it has become completely vested in the purchaser. The parties holding possession and refusing to deliver it up, are the children and heirs-at-law of the deceased, who were defendants to the suit, and whose interests in the land the decree in express terms directed should be sold.
“ That the Act of 1864 applies to such a case, I have no doubt. It provides, among other cases, that whenever any lands or tenements should be sold under the decree of any Court of this State, and the debtor named in such decree, or any other person holding under such debtor, or by title subsequent to the date of the decree, shall be in actual possession of the land and tenements sold, and shall fail or refuse to deliver possession of the same to the purchaser thereof, the Court of the county where the lands may be situated, shall, on application in writing, verified by the affidavit of the purchaser, unless good cause to the contrary be shown by the debtor, or other person concerned, issue the writ, directing the sheriff to deliver possession of the said lands and tenements to the purchaser thereof. This Act is an extension of the Act of 1825, ch. 103, (Code, Art. 75, sec. 64,) and enlarges the cases in which a writ of this nature may be issued. Its purpose is the same, and it must receive the same liberal construction which has been given by the Courts to the previous law. In speaking of the Act of 1825, the Court of Appeals, in McMecIien vs. Mormon, 8 G. & J., 74, have said: ‘ This Act of Assembly is remedial in its character, and, therefore, should be liberally construed, in order to carry into full effect the designs of the Legislature. The evil intended to be remedied was, that debtors and those claiming under them after a sale of their lands by the sheriff, held on to their possession until ousted by the tedious process of ordinary judicial proceedings, thus against every principle of law and equity, without the ability of making ultimate indemnity for their wrong doings, depriving purchasers for years of all enjoyment of the lands they had honestly paid for, during which interval it is more than probable that those lands were greatly diminished in value by a most severe and exhausting cultivation. The necessary consequence of such a state of things must be the sacrifice of the interests of creditors by depreciating the value of that fund from which the payment of their debts is to be sought.’ And in that case the Court held the law applied where an equitable estate in lands was sold under fieri facias. Upon this liberal principle of construction, I have no doubt that heirs-at-law of a deceased debtor, leaving real estate liable to be sold for the payment of his debts, who .are made parties defendants to a creditors’ bill for that purpose, are to be regarded as debtors named in the decree, within the purview and design of this statute, and that they, and all persons claiming under them by title subsequent to the date of the decree, are parties meant to be affected by the writ. The object of the law and the writ is to carry into effect as against them, the decree of the Court in a summary way, without putting the purchaser to his ejectment, or other ordinary judicial proceeding. If a case is made out, coming within the provisions of the statute, the Court has no discretion, but is commanded to issue the process, unless good cause be shown to the contrary. What, as a general rule, such ‘ good cause ’ may be, has not, so far as I am aware, been determined by judicial authority ; but I am well satisfied the grounds taken, and the causes shown in the answer to the application, are wholly insufficient. This case has been ended, and the law provides the writ simply for the purpose of carrying into full effect the final and absolute decree of the Court by a summary process, and obviates the necessity of an action of ejectment or other proceedings at law, to enable the purchaser to obtain possession of the property. The title of the purchaser to the land cannot be litigated in such a case, and none of the defences set up in this answer could avail the defendants in an action of ejectment by the purchaser. No rule of equity practice would, as it seems to me, justify or admit of a controversy of this character to be engrafted upon this case at this stage of it, and delivery of possession to be deferred until it could be heard and determined. If these defendants can establish their pretensions, as set forth in this answer, and make out a case for the specific execution of any contract between the purchaser and themselves, respecting this land, or a resulting trust in their favor, or show that the purchaser was their agent, and bought the land for them, or are entitled to equitable relief on any other ground, I am very clearly of opinion, they must seek such relief by original bill. Upon the merits of their case, if presented by such a bill, this is not the place to express an opinion. With the relief which may he prayed or granted under» such a bill, the order to issue the writ on this application, and even its issual and execution, will in nowise interfere, nor place the defendants, so far as I can see, in any worse position in respect thereto. At all events, I am satisfied no good cause has been shown why the writ should not issue as prayed, and I shall pass an order sustaining the demurrer, and directing it to issue.
“It is thereupon, this 24th day of July, 1875, adjudged and ordered, that the demurrer to the answer of the defendants referred to in the aforegoing opinion be, and the same is hereby, sustained; and it is further adjudged and ordered, that a writ in the nature of a writ of habere facias possessionem, he issued by the Clerk of this Court, as prayed in the application therefor by George W. Nutwell, the purchaser of the land from the trustee.”
Erom this decision and the order thereon passed, the respondents appealed.
The record in this case was not sent up to the Court of Appeals until more,than twelve months after the time of the appeal prayed. Accordingly the appellee filed in the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal. This motion the Court overruled, they being of opinion that the delay in sending up the record was not the fault of the appellants.
The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Bowie, Stewart, Robinson and Alvey, J.
Alex. B. Hagner, for appellants.
The order of the 24th day of July, 1875, directing “ a writ, in the nature of a writ of habere facias possessionem.” to issue, should be reversed :
1. Because the petition was filed and the order passed on the equity side of the Court, which had no jurisdiction, as a Court of equity, to issue the writ.
The writ of habere facias possessionem is a judicial writ of a Court of law, and never was a process recognized in Chancery tribunals. Such was undoubtedly the law before the Act of 1864, ch. 283, (Morrill vs. Gelston, 32 Md., 116,) and this Act is an amendment to Art. 75 of the Code of P. G. L., relating to pleading, practice arid process in Courts of law, and has no application to Courts of equity, in which Courts, such subjects are regulated by Art. 16 of the Code.
2. Because the writ ordered by the Court is not the appropriate process to put George W. Nutwell in possession of the lands. The writ of hab. fac. poss., lies to recover possession of a chattel interest or term of which the plaintiff was formerly possessed. The proceedings show that Nutwell has never been in prior possession of the land and that they are estates of freehold. The proper writ to compel the delivery of freehold estates recovered is habere facias seseinam. 3 Black. Com., 412, Appendix iii, sec. 4 ; 4 Com. Dig., 112, Execution, (A. 2), (A. 5) ; 2 Bac. Abridg., 717, Execution, ch. 5 ; Morrill vs. Gelston, 32 Md., 116 ; 2 Ev. Harr., 357, 440, 507, 516, 355-6, 443, 508.
3. Because the writ can only issue on the application of the purchaser whenever, 1st, “the debtor named in the decree,” or 2nd, “whenever any other person holding under such debtor, by title subsequent to the date of the decree,” shall be in possession of the land, &c.
It is insisted that the appellants do not occupy the position of either of the classes of persons thus specially described in the law.
4. Because, if the Court below was authorized to examine into the averments of the answer, there can be no doubt that its allegations, all of which are admitted to be true by the demurrer, do “show good cause to the contrary” in opposition to the “application in writing” of Geo. W. Nutwell. The answer sets forth circumstantially, the facts connected with the entire transaction, and discloses the details of an abominable fraud attempted to be practised by this uncle against bis brother’s children. The answer was filed as the proper mode for showing cause why the writ should not be issued, and its sufficiency for that purpose is the present inquiry. The refusal to issue the writ can in no degree prevent Nutwell from offering any proof he may have to disprove these allegations hereafter, upon further proceedings between the parties.
Frank H. Stockeit, for appellee.
1. The remedy of the appellants for the grievances complained of in their answer, if there be such, must be by original bill.
2. Though Courts of equity had not power previous to 1864, to issue the writ of hab. fao. poss. in such cases as the present, that power has been expressly conferred upon them by the Act of 1864, ch. 283, and that power has been twice sustained by this Court in cases by no means so clear as the one at bar.
(1.) The case of Dill vs. Satterfield, 34 Md., 52; and ' (2.) the case of Meloy vs. Squires, 42 Md., 378.
In the last named case, the proceedings were in the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County, as a Court of equity. After the sale had been ratified, the possession of the land being refused, the purchaser applied, under the proceedings in that cause, for the writ of hab. fao. poss. to the Circuit Court, which was granted, and that order was sustained by this Court on appeal.
These two decisions were made under the provisions of the Act of 1864, ch. 283, which had so greatly enlarged the remedial jurisdiction of Courts of equity in such cases, but those cases were no stronger under that law than the case now presented to this Court. On this point, the appellee refers to the argument of the Judge, in the opinion which the Circuit Court delivered, as conclusive.

Opinion:
Alvey, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By a fair and liberal construction of the Act of 1864, ch. 283, it would seem to be clear that the proceedings authorized hy that Act, where the sale has been made under a decree of a Court of equity, may be taken in the cause in which the decree was passed ; and that a separate and independent proceeding at law is not, in such case, necessary or proper. Such proceeding, as to sales under decrees, is but a substitute for the less summary proceeding previously resorted to by purchasers, to obtain possession of land purchased under decrees ; but the Act does not in any manner lessen or affect the right of the party against whom the proceeding is taken to resist and defeat the application for the writ by showing sufficient cause against it.
And it would seem to he equally clear that the heirs-at-law of the original debtor, who were parties to the cause in which the decree was passed, and who retain the possession of the estate devolved on them by descent, may be considered debtors within the reason and purview of the Act. They are debtors in respect of the land descended, and if they do not pay such debts, they will be deprived of the land by proceeding to have it sold for the debts ; and the decree for sale is conclusive against their right to hold the land under the title derived from the ancestor, after sale and ratification.
But if the parties in possession, though concluded as to the title descended from their ancestor, acquire title to the land, or to the possession thereof, subsequent to the decree, whether from the purchaser or other person capable of imparting it, such right or title may well be set up in answer to an application to compel them to surrender the possession. And it matters not that such right or title he only of an equitable nature.
In this case, if the party returned as the purchaser hy the trustee had made a lease of the land to the parties in possession, or had entered into an explicit agreement to sell the land to them, and they, being in possession, had, in execution of the agreement, paid a considerable portion of the purchase money, and such dealing between the parties in respect to the land was so clearly proved as to leave no doubt upon the subject, we can hardly suppose it possible that the right so acquired would not afford an answer to an application1 for the writ to remove the parties from the possession. And if an answer in. such case, why not in this P Here, the parties claim to be rightfully in j>ossession, and they are called in to answer the application for the writ in the nature of a writ of habere facias possessionem, and to show cause why the writ should not issue. What can be the meaning of the Act, if it cannot be shown that the party applying for the writ is not entitled to the possession as against those holding it ? No right is set up by the parties proposed to be removed that has been in any manner determined by the decree, or by any order made in reference to the sale. The appellants allege, that while the appellee has been reported the purchaser of the land, he was so reported by and through an understanding and arrangement with them, that the land should be and was bid in for them, and that they were to retain it, and pay a certain amount for it; and that such understanding has been recognized and acted on for a considerable time by all parties concerned, and that the appellants, in pursuance of and compliance with such understanding, have actually paid a considerable sum on the purchase ; and that the attempt to oust them of the possession of the land is a fraud upon their rights. And instead of meeting 'these allegations by denial or explanation-, the appellee has demurred to them, and he thereby admits the allegations as made in the answer. Now, if these allegations are taken as true, as they'must be, as the case now stands, every principle of justice would seem to remonstrate against the issuing of the writ.
And it will not do to say that this is not the proper proceeding in which to try the question of right as between the parties . While that may be true as a general proposition, yet the rights of the parties must be considered in order to determine how and in what character, and under what title, the party in possession holds as against the party asking the aid of the Court. Gowan vs. Sumwalt, 1 Gill & J., 511; Cook vs. Brice, 20 Md., 397. And to show the necessity of this, we may state a case within the very letter of the statute. Let us suppose it to be alleged that the party in possession holds under the debtor by title subsequent to the date of the judgment or decree, under which the land wras sold, and such party, upon being called in to show cause against the issuing of the writ against him, should allege that the title under which he holds was not subsequent, but prior to the judgment or decree, or derived from some other source than the debtor ; surely, in such case, the writ would not be allowed to go as matter of course, but it would be necessary to determine the question, before issuing the writ, whether the party sought to be oirsted really held a title derived from the debtor subsequent to the date of the judgment or decree. Indeed, every application for the writ under the Act necessarily involves, to some extent, an inquiry into the nature and character of the holding by the party sought to be ousted.
But the decision on these applications is by no means of a definitive character. It only binds to the extent and effect of granting or refusing the writ. Parties are entitled to more formal and solemn proceedings for the ultimate and definitive adjudication of their rights. And in this case, the refusal of the writ will in no manner prejudice the appellee in his resort to the ordinary remedies for recovery of the land. If he has the deed from the trustee, he can institute an action of ejectment for the recovery of the land at once, and that will necessitate the filing of a bill in equity by the appellant for the enforcement of the understanding set up in the answer to the present application. The refusal of the writ now asked for, if it should be refused upon further disclosure of the facts, will only conclude the appellee as to this particular form of remedy.
(Decided 14th June, 1877.)
It follows that the order appealed from must be reversed, and that the demurrer to the appellants' answer be overruled, and the record remanded for further proceedings.
The motion to dismiss the appeal must be overruled. The delay in sending up the transcript was imputable to no fault or neglect of the appellants.
Order reversed, and record remanded.