Case Name: Michael LOUISSAINT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-12-20
Citations: 576 So. 2d 316
Docket Number: No. 89-1803
Parties: Michael LOUISSAINT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 576
Pages: 316–319

Head Matter:
Michael LOUISSAINT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 89-1803.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 20, 1990.
On Motion for Rehearing March 21, 1991.
Ronald N. Toward, Bartow, for appellant/ cross-appellee.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Barbara C. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Michael Louissaint appeals a judgment finding him guilty of attempted trafficking in cocaine and determining him to be a habitual offender and a sentence in excess of the guideline range.
Louissaint claims that since the evidence (cocaine) was negligently destroyed before his trial, his conviction cannot stand. We disagree. Here, the trial court followed the procedure set out in State v. Ritter, 448 So.2d 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) and suppressed the testimony of the chemist concerning the nature and weight of the cocaine. As stated in Ritter, the charge of "attempt" does not require proof that the substance involved was actually cocaine. See also United States v. Pietri, 683 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.1982); State v. Cohen, 409 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The conviction is affirmed.
Since the offense was committed prior to October 1, 1988, the sentence is subject to the sentencing guidelines as determined by Whitehead v. State, 498 So.2d 863 (Fla.1986). The only ground listed to justify the departure is that "the defendant is not amenable to previous attempts at rehabilitation." The judge relied on the fact that while on probation for burglary and grand theft, Louissaint committed a second degree felony (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). Louissaint was sentenced to only thirty-four days in jail for that offense and was restored to probation in order to encourage rehabilitation. This extraordinary effort toward rehabilitation was at the request of the probation officer and state attorney. Shortly thereafter, Louissaint committed the present offense while still on probation.
Non-amenability to rehabilitation is not a valid reason for departure when the determination is based on a prior record which has been computed into the guideline sentence. Sellers v. State, 559 So.2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Tapia v. State, 509 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Here, while the court did not determine non-amenability merely because the defendant committed three felonies in a short period of time (all scored), but rather emphasized that the proof of non-amenability was that the present offense was committed "despite these efforts to rehabilitate the Defendant," still the sentencing offense (scored) necessarily was involved in his consideration. Tillman v. State, 525 So.2d 862 (Fla.1988) requires reversal.
The state, although untimely, filed a cross-appeal challenging the court's exclu sion of the chemist's testimony. The state urges that a "bad faith" standard, rather than a "negligent" standard should be used when evidence is lost or destroyed before trial. This issue was decided in State v. Ritter, supra.:
It would be fundamentally unfair, as well as a violation of Rule 3.220, to allow the state to negligently dispose of critical evidence and then offer an expert witness whose testimony cannot be refuted by the defendant. Stipp v. State, 371 So.2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla.1980); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Johnson v. State, 249 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971), cert. dismissed, 280 So.2d 673 (Fla.1973).
The state's other issue on cross-appeal is likewise without merit.
Conviction AFFIRMED; sentence REVERSED and REMANDED for resentenc-ing.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
. It appears that Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(2) is distinguished by its uniform lack of enforcement. There may be practical reasons — as argued by the attorney general's office in its response to our rule to show cause as to why the cross-appeal should not be dismissed — because of the split of responsibility between the state attorney's office and the attor ney general's office in processing appeals to justify a greater period than the rule permits. It would appear to be better practice, rather than merely ignoring the rule, to change the rule. Since the defense raised no objection to the late filing and since we have made no effort to enforce the rule in the past, we decline to enforce it in this case. We suggest, however, that the attorney general consult with the various state attorneys to see if the rule cannot be complied with in the future or modified if appropriate.