Case Name: RUFUS E. ELDRED, Appellant, v. SOLOMON WARNER, Administrator of the Estate of George M. Newsome, Deceased, Respondent
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1875-01
Citations: 1 Ariz. 175
Docket Number: 
Parties: RUFUS E. ELDRED, Appellant, v. SOLOMON WARNER, Administrator of the Estate of George M. Newsome, Deceased, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 175–226

Head Matter:
RUFUS E. ELDRED, Appellant, v. SOLOMON WARNER, Administrator of the Estate of George M. Newsome, Deceased, Respondent.
Where Two Persons doing Business as Partners Agree in Writing that, in case of the death of either of them, the survivor shall settle the business of the partnership, and after paying the just debts of the partnership and of the deceased, shall have all the remaining property of every kind for his sole use and benefit, without any process of law whatsoever, accounting only to the creditors of the partnership and of the deceased partner, a complaint filed, after the death of one of the parties, in the district court by the survivor, setting up the agreement and asking that the administrator of the deceased party he required to turn over to him all the property in his possession belonging to the estate of the deceased, and offering, on the part of the plaintiff, to perform all the terms and conditions of the agreement, is not demurrable on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court of the first judicial district, county of Pima, sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The facts are fully stated in the dissenting opinion delivered by Chief Justice Dunne.
McCarty, Ciarle, and C. W. C. Boiuell, for the appellant.
The only and main objection to the complaint in the court below was as to the sufficiency in law of the agreement or compact set forth in the complaint.
It is alleged by the respondent that the said agreement or compact is not an agreement or compact recognized by law, but if it be anything at all under the law, it is a will. In order to show that such compact or agreement is not a will but a contract, let us in .the first place consider the contract in question in the light of a contract relating exclusively to realty, that is, as if the subject-matter were real instead of personal property. Let us also present to ourselves at first cases upon which the law is plain and undoubted, and then by illustration and analytical reasoning, and a knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attendant upon the case at issue, endeavor to bring it within the rule.
It is well understood that contracts for the sale of land founded upon a valuable consideration, where no fraud or other destroying agency appears, are always held valid and will be enforced in equity. A valuable consideration may be money, marriage, etc., or it maybe an exchange. Now if A., for example, should enter into a written contract with B. to sell to B. a certain piece of land, at a certain given time, upon the payment by B. to him of the sum of one hundred dollars, just as soon as that certain time has arrived, and B. has made said payment or offered so to do, a court of equity would certainly compel A. to execute a deed of the land in question to B.
This must be admitted to be a plain case, upon which the authorities are unanimous. The contract would be what is deemed an executory contract, until the time named in the contract had arrived, when it would immediately by operation of law become converted into an executed contract, and an action thereon for specific performance would lie. Now let us proceed a little further in our course of illustration and reasoning, and by changing to a slight extent the terms of said contract, advance a step toward the conclusion at which we are desirous of arriving. Instead of a certain time named, we will insert the words “when peace shall be declared,” making the contract, or in other words its perform anee, depend entirely upon a contingency. Here we have a contract whose performance is based upon a contingent event, upon an uncertainty; for peace might never be declared, and the contract remain forever a dead letter. Still it is based upon a valuable consideration, at the same time is perfectly valid, and only awaits the happening of the contingency named to don the robes of an executed contract, upon which an action for specific performance would lie, and whicfi equity is bound to enforce.
Let us go a step further: suppose A., in consideration of one hundred dollars, contracts in writing with B. that upon A.’s death certain land shall belong to and vest in B. Now we are all aware that nothing is more certain than death, but in law it is deemed a contingency, because of the uncertainty of the time of its happening. Now both-of the last two contracts are based upon contingencies, upon the happening of which—the “ declaration of peace ” in the one, and the fact of death in the other—they become executed contracts, and may and must be enforced in equity. A person may dispose of his property in any way or manner he desires ; he may, if not laboring under any legal disability, enter into any contract for the disposal of his property, either before or after his death, as he wishes. The law does not and can not restrain him in this particular, unless it be done in subversion or in fraud of the rights of others.
A person desirous of disposing of his property after death may make a will, but most certainly the law does not limit him to that particular form or method of procedure. He has the right to say in what form his property shall be after death, and to whom it shall go. And we claim that if a valuable or legal consideration be apparent upon the face of a contract made and signed by him, he may dispose of such property by such contract as well as by will. If he desires to make a contract with B. that upon the payment of a certain sum, after the death of B., certain property shall belong to him, it is a good and valid contract, and the law will enforce it. In such case it is merely a change in the form of property. His legal representatives will be obliged to conform to the terms of the contract, and especially in case it was further provided that B. should pay the debts of A. over and above the certain consideration named. The rep resentatives of A. will not be allowed to object in the ease named. They are merely beneficiaries at best; the decedent has chosen to change the nature of his property by contract, and beggars can not be choosers. The above cases are plain and simple, and so tangible in fact that they may be readily grasped by any legal mind. Eor that purpose we have selected them, and the conclusions we have drawn from them we consider correct and incontrovertible. We desire them viewed stripped of every species of fraud, and the parties to them of every legal disability.
The law is an affectionate guardian, and will always follow the wishes and intention's of the parties with whom it has to deal, unless its rules are openly violated and trampled upon. Now in the examples before cited, real property alone has been the subject-matter of the contract. Would not the same cases apply and the same rules follow if it were personal properly? We contend that they would.
The only distinction is the character of the property. Contracts relating to realty may be enforced in equity; so may those relating to personalty, under certain circumstances. Those circumstances in general, and especially those concerning the particular question at issue, will hereafter be considered in detail. But assuming, for the purposes of this argument, that all of the required circumstances were connected with this contract, whose subject-matter is personalty, we are forced to find that the law regarding the right and the remedy is just the same whether the subject-matter be real or personal property. We have seen cases where contracts could be conditional upon death and be performed thereafter.
And here we will remark, that in accordance with the preceding argument it could be no objection to say that because a contract can not be performed by its conditions during the life of a party making such contract, that it can not be performed after death.
All contracts of insurance depend upon a contingency, and that contingency is death. We will review this point more particularly hereafter. If a party may confer a benefit upon his legal representatives, whether it be by will, contract, or otherwise, he may also impose a responsibility to the extent of the value of his property. This responsibility may be imposed by the decedent, either by an obligation incurred and fixed during his life-time, or by an obligation incurred during his life-time but to take place after death. It is but the following out of his intentions, concerning which the law is so careful, and of which it is such a faithful guardian. Let us advance a step further. Though joint tenancy has been abolished by the statutes of numerous states, still at the same time no one will deny that a contract declaring an ownership in land in the nature of a joint tenancy can be created and enforced in law. For instance, A. and B. are owners of contiguous pieces of land of equal value; thus being, they enter into a mutual written contract, the terms of which are, that upon the death of one the whole of the land shall go to and vest in the survivor. In such case the parties might not be styled in law joint tenants, but their ownership of the land under the contract would be quasi joint tenancy, and would be enforced under the law of England and the United States. Here the contract is again executory, the consideration being in the nature of an exchange. It is also a contingent contract, dependent upon the death of one of the parties; but immediately upon the happening of the death it becomes an executed contract in favor of the survivor. Can any one deny the validity of this contract ?
It can not be said to be contra bonos inores, no more so than .that contract whereby a creditor insures the life of his debtor. They are of one and the same nature, so far as public policy and public morals are concerned. Will any one deny but that a contingent cross-remainder created by will may be vested in two persons ? Certainly not. Then what are the relative conditions of the two parties enjoying a contingent cross-remainder? Stripped of all verbiage, they are exactly similar to those of A. and B. above named. In the latter case they are created by the act of a third party, -whilst in the former they are created by the willing act of the parties themselves. Then most certainly if the conditions of a contingent cross-remainder may be thrust upon parties, they perhaps unwilling, then in all law and reason those same conditions may be created by deed or contract; between parties perfectly willing.
We think that we have satisfactorily disposed of all ob jections that might arise to such a contract, and proved plainly that it would be considered and held valid in law and equity. Such being the case, if the legal representative of the deceased party should refuse to comply with the terms of the contract, an action for specific performance thereof would lie against it there. Of course a joint tenancy or a contingent cross-remainder in relation to personal property might not have existed under the common law, but we contend that the same general principles of the law govern and determine such matters, whether they relate to real or personal property. Those principles are the foundation upon which all laws concerning contracts are based, and they govern from the foundation to the turret. And if all the acts necessary to be done in relation to contracts of a personal nature are done, the same right and the same remedy are applicable. We have thus far shown that under existing conditions and circumstances the laws which govern specific performance, in cases where realty is involved, apply to cases where personal property alone is the subject of controversy. Let us now consider those conditions and circumstances as far as they apply to the case at issue. Specific performance of contracts relating to personalty is decreed by courts of equity: 1. When there is no speedy or adequate remedy at law; 2. When the party applying cannot be compensated by damages; 8. When the value of the property in controversy, in contemplation of the party so applying, is far above the actual price or money worth. We will consider the last reason first.
It is alleged in the bill that the appellant and the said George M. Newsome, deceased, were partners; that a great deal of affection existed between them; that the appellant sets a far higher price upon the diamonds mentioned and described in the bill than their actual value, even if that value could be ascertained.
The degree of affection with which he held the memory of George M. Newsome, or’ the diamonds in controversy, as mementos of the deceased, is not a subject for inquiry; it is sufficient in this case if it be alleged in the bill. The second ground for equitable interposition upon which we have chosen to stand is that the appellant, if forced to maintain his action at law and await there his remedy, could not be compensated in damages. It is a well-established principle that when a party at law can not obtain a righteous judgment, or where the subject-matter in controversy is of such a character that the real and intrinsic value can not be ascertained, there, in such event, equity reaches forth her hand and grants relief. It is averred in the bill that the diamonds in controversy are exceedingly valuable, but that their value can not be ascertained without the aid of an experienced lapidary and that such experienced lapidary is not within the jurisdiction of the court; that if the court should refuse to interpose, money damages would not compensate him for his loss.
Equity does, and must to a great extent, adapt herself to the particular circumstances of every case that comes before her. The appellant, if he should be compelled to proceed at law alone for his relief, might probably suffer irreparable loss, and yet at the same time might be fully and duly compensated. But a court of equity does not act upon conjecture, nor trust to probabilities or possibilities, but acts at once in such a case as this and thereby prevents any possibility of a loss or injury. The third and last ground upon which we rely is, that there is no speedy or adequate remedy at law; the objection to this ground, if any there be, is disposed of in the same manner as the last. Eor most certainly if a party can not be compensated by damages, his remedy can not be adequate. Eor those reasons, we deem the action well brought and that specific performance will lie.
How let us descant more fully upon the consideration of the agreement in question. In Beckley v. Newland, a case cited in 1 Story’s Equity, section 343, note, the court decided that the “reciprocal benefit of the chance ” was a sufficient consideration. If that case be law—and we have- discovered no other yet which overrules it—the question of consideration, as far as it relates to this case, is decided, for this case presents a stronger front than that in Beckley v. Newland. In the latter it rested entirely upon the whim of Turgis. He might have so disposed of his property by will as to completely disinherit both of his sisters named in the case. It all rested in chance.
The cage in question presents a far different view. There is no fraud shown or pleaded, there is no undue influence manifested by either party to the agreement. The law will presume, and must presume, that they entered upon the compact in question fully cognizant of all matters and property pertaining thereto. That they considered and determined the consideration expressed, fully ample and sufficient. As they were then, so, by the presumption of law, they are today. If the consideration was sufficient then, it is sufficient now. The question as to whether they or either of them could have disposed of their property during their life-time by sale or barter, or after death by will, does not arise in this case, for such facts, if they exist at all, are not of record and can not be considered.
George M. Newsome enjoyed the benefit of the agreement during his life-time,'and if God in his wisdom had so ordained that the appellant in this case should be the first to die, then in such event he would have reaped the advantages of the compact. He enjoyed the benefit of the chance, and in accordance with the case of Beckley v. Newland, before cited, such was the consideration. Let us illustrate further: Suppose A. and B. should deposit with a third party the sum of one thousand dollars each, together with a written agreement to the effect that whenever one should die the survivor should be authorized to receive the whole amount deposited, viz., the two thousand dollars. Would not such agreement be binding after the contingency had happened, namely, the death of either of the parties ? Most assuredly we contend that it would, and the person surviving would be allowed to receive the money. But let us place it in a stronger light: Eor instance, the same sum of money should be deposited by A. and B. in the manner above stated, only excepting that the agreement was that upon the death of either of them the whole sum of two thousand dollars should go to the legal representatives of the party first dying. This would certainly be perfect, valid, and legal, for it is upon this principle that are based all the mutual protective associations that to-day are organized and working in the various states of the Union and recognized by law. If the latter illustration be founded on good law—and such fact can not be doubted—then the former one must necessarily be correct. It is in the nature of a quasi insurance. Now let us go a step further: If the above illustration be based upon correct principles of law, then most certainly the one which is about to be presented must follow in its wake. Suppose A. and B., instead of depositing the two thousand dollars before mentioned, should merely deposit an agreement in writing, wherein each gave this written promise to pay to the survivor the sum of one thousand dollars. Here they do not deposit money but its representative in paper. Is not this a valid contract ? Most certainly you can not discriminate between the former illustration and this one; the law and the principle are just the same in both. Then if this be law, is not the agreement in controversy legal ? There is no difference between the cases. Here is the agreement, here is the property, the representation of money. You may style it a case of quasi insurance if the term may be allowed, the only difference being, that the dead pays to the living, instead of the living to the dead.
It is not necessary that an instrument disposing of property after death should be a will, nor is such an instrument construed as a will, as will be seen by the following cases: vide 2 Story’s Eq., sec. 786; De Beil v. Thomson, 43 Eng. Ch. 468; S. C., 3 Beav. 469.
J. E. McCaffry, for the respondent.
The complaint filed herein is in the nature of a bill in equity for the specific performance, by an administrator, of the terms of an instrument executed by the deceased in his life-time, and claimed by plaintiff to be an executory contract or compact, but showing upon its face that it was intended for the mutual will of deceased and plaintiff.
The instrument is set forth at length in the transcript. The appeal is from the order of the district court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.
The instrument in question, if valid for any purpose, can only be considered as a will. 4 Kent’s Com. 633; Schumaker v. Schmidt et al., 4 Am. Rep. 135, 137, 139, 140; Brewer, Admr, v. Baxter et al., 5 Id. 530, 532; Bedfield on the Law of Wills, c. 2, sec. 2; Martindale v. Warner, 15 Pa. St. 479, 480. And it can not in any event be considered as a claim against the estate. Probate Laws of Arizona, secs. 128,130, 131, 133, 139, 140, 145, 147, 150, 220; Fallon v. Butler, 21 Cal. 31, 32, 33. If it be a will, it must first be presented to the probate court of the proper county. Probate Laws of Arizona, secs. 3, 4, 12, 13, 294; Pond v. Pond, 10 Cal. 500. As the jurisdiction of the district court is not original, but appellate. Comp. Laws, 376, secs. 13, 14. But the instrument can not be considered as a valid will. Copip. Laws, 250, sec. 5; Alter's Appeal, 5 Am. Bep. 434, 435, 436.

Opinion:
By Court:
An appeal from a judgment in the first judicial district, county of Pima, and territory of Arizona, wherein said Bufus E. Eldred was plaintiff, and the said Solomon Warner, administrator of the estate of George M. Newsome, deceased, was defendant. The appeal is from the judgment entered in this cause on the fourteenth day of October, A. D. 1874, that the demurrer filed in said cause be sustained. It is now, on motion of McCarty and Clark for the appellant, after hearing James E. McCaffryfor the respondent, adjudged that the said judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the said district court for further proceedings.