Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. MASTERSON v. MARTIN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-05-21
Citations: 45 N.Y.S. 577
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MASTERSON v. MARTIN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 45
Pages: 577–585

Head Matter:
(17 App. Div. 555.)
PEOPLE ex rel. MASTERSON v. MARTIN et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 21, 1897.)
1. Policemen—Dismissal—Review.
The action of the board of police commissioners in dismissing an officer for alleged misconduct will be reversed where the witnesses against the officer, after giving part of their testimony, did not appear to complete it, and could not afterwards be found, and the officer did not call any witnesses because the trial commissioner stated that he would recommend to the board that the testimony given be stricken out, and that he therefore did not desire to hear any further testimony, but such testimony was not stricken out, either because the commissioner did not recommend it or because the board overruled him, and the officer was not present at the hearing before the board.
2. Same—Record—Proceedings before Trial Commissioner.
On certiorari to review the decision of the board of police commissioners dismissing relator from the police force, relator contended that, after the evidence against him had been given, the trial commissioner stated that he did not wish to hear any further evidence, because he intended to move, at the hearing before the board, to strike out the evidence which had been given, and that relator, relying thereon, did not examine his witnesses. The return of the proceedings before the board showed that such motion had been made by the trial commissioner, but neither the return nor the stenographer’s minutes showed that the trial commissioner had stated that he would move to strike out the evidence against relator. Held, that a return by the trial commissioner was properly required as to what occurred on the hearing before him.
Rumsey and Ingraham, JJ., dissenting.
Certiorari by Eugene A. Masterson to review the proceedings of James J. Martin and others, police commissioners of New York City, dismissing the relator from the police force.
Reversed.
There were a number of charges against the relator any of which, if properly established, would justify his dismissal from the force. The hearing on the charges was begun before one of the commissioners alone on June 20, 1894, and another session was had on July 5th, when, the two principal witnesses, Guy and Browne, called to support the charges, not having completed their testimony, witnesses were directed to attend without further notice. On the subsequent session,—July 11th,—owing to the absence of one of these witnesses, the other was ordered to notify the complaint clerk so that he could get the absent one, and a day was then to be fixed for the hearing. At last, on September 19th, a hearing was had, when the complaint clerk swore to futile efforts made to get either of these witnesses to attend, and his inability to serve them with a subpoena. It appears that the witness Browne had asked for an adjournment to get Guy; that Guy’s testimony was not finished, and at his request, when under cross-examination, the hearing was adjourned; and that, notwithstanding promises of Browne, and many attendances by the relator, neither Browne nor Guy ever appeared to finish their examination. A motion was made that Guy’s testimony be stricken from the record for his failure to come back. The commissioner stated that he would make such recommendation to the board, and at a full meeting of the board thereafter he did recommend that the evidence of Browne and Guy be stricken out, and the charge dismissed. It appears by the minutes of the trial that, after the motion was made to strike out, the relator’s counsel stated: “There are, if necessary, three or four witnesses who would substantiate the officer’s testimony; but I don’t think it necessary to call them.” It was insisted that this last statement followed an assurance given by the trial commissioner that he intended to recommend the dismissal of the complaint, and that he did not desire to hear any more testimony. Neither in the stenographer’s minutes of the trial nor in the return first made did this statement by the commissioner appear: and, with a view to showing to the court what actually occurred both upon the trial and before the full board,—about which there was also a dispute,—the relator sought to have the minutes of the trial and the record of the subsequent proceedings before the' board, as they appeared by the return made to the writ, corrected. In doing so he encountered considerable difficulty, because the board at the time of the dismissal was composed of an entirely different set of commissioners from those in office at the time the return was made to the writ. There was, in such return, an evident mistake, namely, a statement that “at a' meeting of your respondents at which all of your respondents were present, the relator was sentenced unanimously.” This was not the fact, for the reason that the board was differently constituted. The return in other parts shows that those making it had no knowledge of what took place, but were wholly dependent on the records for their information. To get the facts as claimed by the relator before the court, affidavits were filed by both sides with the board then in office, and making the return, and these were made a part of the return, and the court was asked to consider them, “in order not to do possible injustice to the said relator.” A further return was ordered by the special term on an application made; and, this not being sufficient to bring out all the facts as claimed by the relator, another order was made that the former commissioner, who tried the relator, be made a party defendant, and make a return herein. By the original return it appeared, according to the records of the board, that the trial commissioner recommended the granting of the motion of counsel to strike out and the dismissal of the charges; but in the judgment of dismissal itself it appeared that all the commissioners present, including the trial commissioner, voted “Aye.” By the return of the trial commissioner, however, it appears that he voted “No”'upon the question whether the said charges were true, and against the dismissal of the said relator, and in favor of the dismissal of the charges, and that the statement in the judgment of dismissal that he voted “Aye" is untrue. On'' the other hand, to support the entry in the judgment, we have certain affidavits filed by the prosecution, and the records of the police department. The first affidavit by the stenographer was directed to showing the correctness of his notes, and that the trial commissioner’s recollection was in fault. The same stenographer, however, later made another affidavit, which is part of the second return, in which he says that, after reading the commissioner’s affidavit, he is unable to deny what the commissioner swears to, and admits that frequently he did not take down the statements of commissioners on trials of policemen, and may not have done so in this case. The affidavits of the clerk and deputy clerk of the board are to-the effect that the minutes of the board show that the.relator was dismissed by the unanimous vote of all the commissioners, and a copy of the resolution is annexed to the clerk’s affidavit. By the affidavit and the return of the trial commissioner .it further appears that, on' the motion being made to strike out, he considered it should be granted, and stated that he would recommend to the full board that iU ought to be granted, and had done so afterwards at the full board; and that at the last hearing, being informed that additional witnesses were present for the relator, he stated that, inasmuch as he intended to recommend the dismissal of the complaint, he ' did not desire to hear any more testimony.
Argued before RUMSEY, WILLIAMS, O’BRIEN, INGRAHAM, and PARKER, JJ.
Louis J. Grant, for relator.
Theodore Connoly, for respondents.

Opinion:
O'BRIEN, J.
Were there no questions presented but those relating to the merits, we could easily dispose of this appeal. We have frequently held that the good of the service requires that a wide discretion should be vested in the commissioners; and their judgment, unless there is an absence of evidence to sustain it, will not be disturbed. This is but a corollary of the rule that the board of police, being the statutory judges of offenses against discipline and efficiency of the force, their finding on the facts, though the evidence is conflicting or contradictory, is conclusive. We have not, therefore, referred to the merits, nor do we think a discussion thereof proper, because the principal question is, was the relator dismissed" after a fair trial? Justice requires upon a trial that the hearing shall be full and fair; and where it appears that through design or inadvertence this has not been accorded, or where, by the action of the judge, or in reliance upon his assurance, the accused has been induced td withhold testimony in his favor,, and is thereby prejudiced, it is but right that a judgment against him, upon such facts appearing, should not stand. In reaching a conclusion here as to whether the relator was misled or prejudiced, we should carefully note the distinction between the dispute which has arisen as to the facts themselves appearing on the trial and those which relate to the subsequent proceedings before the board of police, when the trial commissioner made his report, and when the relator, not being present, was dismissed. There is an undoubted conflict between the record of what took place at the meeting of the police board and the recollection of the trial commissioner, which we think it unnecessary to decide; because, if it is shown that the trial commissioner assured the relator that he would move to strike out the testimony of the two principal witnesses against him, and recommend a dismissal of the charges, and that, therefore, he had no desire to hear any more witnesses; and that after-wards, when, with his associates, at the board meeting, he overlooked his promise, and forgot or neglected to fulfill it,—it was as prejudicial to the relator as though he had informed his associates fully of the facts, and had recommended and voted for a dismissal of the charges, and been voted down. For, if the trial commissioner, by assurances that it was unnecessary, had induced the relator to withhold evidence of witnesses then in court, who might have proved his innocence, then clearly he was not fairly tried; and upon a statement of such facts to the board they should, if they, differed with the trial commissioner, have afforded the relator the opportunity to produce such witnesses before deciding that he was guilty. If, on the other hand, the trial commissioner did not fully apprise them of what he had done on the trial, or of the assurances given by him to the relator that it was unnecessary to call any more witnesses, and the board, without being so informed, proceeded to judgment, then we must reach the same result, because their determination to dismiss was reached in ignorance of the facts. Except as affecting the credibility of the trial commissioner, what occurred before the full board, or what appears by its records, is, to a great extent, immaterial. The question is, what took place upon the trial? not, what occurred at the subsequent meetings of the board? The relator was not present at such meetings, and was not in a position there to protect his rights; and if the trial commissioner neglected to present the facts fully, or, having fully presented them, if he was voted down, we think that justice in either case requires that the judgment of dismissal should not stand. This brings us, threfore, to what we regard as the crucial question in the case, and that is as to whether the trial commissioner upon the trial gave such assurances that, relying thereon, the- relator was induced to withhold witnesses who were in court, and whom, for that reason, he did not call to prove his inqocence.
Upon this question, as to what occurred upon the trial, while the stenographer's minutes do not show that any assurances were given, it was because of that fact that the many proceedings were taken which have resulted in presenting the affidavits of the stenographer and the return of the trial commissioner. This course was deemed necessary because the commissioners in office at the time the first return was made were no more cognizant of what took place upon the trial than were the associates of the trial commissioner who' made the final return; and the only doubt created or question raised as to what took place upon the trial is that presented by the presumption of the correctness of the stenographer's minutes, supplemented by the affidavits of the stenographer, as contrasted with the return and affidavit made by the trial commissioner. There was. no other way of disposing of the question as to the fullness of the stenographer's minutes and their accuracy, than- to require a return by the trial commissioner. Such return, supplemented as it is by corroborating affidavits, we think should be taken as true. The commissioner states under oath what the relator insists then occurred,—that at the last hearing, being informed that additional witnesses were present, he stated that, inasmuch as he intended to recommend the dismissal of the complaint, he did not desire to hear any more testimony. It will be noticed that while the stenographer in his first affidavit endeavored to uphold the accuracy of his notes, and was inclined to think that the commissioner's recollection was in fault, he receded from this position in his subsequent affidavit by saying that he was unable to deny the truth of the commissioner's statement, and admitted that frequently he did not take down statements made by commissioners on trials of policemen, because he did not regard them as part of the minutes of the trial, and that he may not have done so in this particular case. The commissioner is corroborated, moreover, by the record of the board of police, from which it appears that at a meeting of the full board he did recommend both striking out and that the charges be dismissed. It thus appears that the minutes of the trial, in consequence of Commissioner Sheehan's refusal .to hear testimony, does not contain all the evidence of the relator; and also that the only commissioner who took the evidence-and was acquainted with all the facts and circumstances recommended that all the material parts of the evidence be stricken out. We concede that, if all the evidence was in the record, the other commissioners would not be bound by the views of the trial commissioner as to the disposition to be made of the motion, nor bound to sustain his views that the charges should be dismissed. But where, as here, it appears that the relator was led to close his case without calling three or four witnesses then present in court, because the commissioner stated that he would recommend the board to strike out the testimony, and for that reason would not hear any more testimony, it would be unjust for the commissioners, with or without knowledge of the fact of what .took place at the trial, and in the absence of the relator. to refuse to grant the motion to strike out, and proceed to pass judgment of dismissal. The course for the commissioners to have taken would have been, with the knowledge of the facts before them, to send the case back, and afford the relator the opportunity to put in any further testimony he might have to offer. It may be that these hearings are not to be technically regarded as common-law trials; but on any trial, common-law or otherwise, if, as in this case, the accused is not accorded a full and fair trial, then the course taken resulting in his conviction is against all rules, and the very spirit of justice.
Our conclusion is that the action of the respondents should be annulled, with costs, and the relator restored to his office.
WILLIAMS and PARKER, JJ., concur.