Case Name: Lynwood SLAYDON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Walter HANSFORD and Waffle House Incorporated, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-08-27
Citations: 830 So. 2d 686
Docket Number: No. 2001-CP-01216-COA
Parties: Lynwood SLAYDON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Walter HANSFORD and Waffle House Incorporated, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: Before McMILLIN, C.J., MYERS, and CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 830
Pages: 686–692

Head Matter:
Lynwood SLAYDON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Walter HANSFORD and Waffle House Incorporated, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
No. 2001-CP-01216-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Aug. 27, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 2002.
Pro se, attorney for appellant.
James L. Gray, Picayune, Karl R. Stein-berger, C. Brice Wiggins, attorney, Pasca-goula, for appellees.
Before McMILLIN, C.J., MYERS, and CHANDLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MYERS, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Lynwood Slaydon claims he was assaulted in the Picayune Waffle House by Walter Hansford, an employee of Waffle House, on November 20, 1999. Slaydon claims that he entered the Waffle House and ordered food prepared by Hansford. Slaydon claims that while preparing the food, Hansford urinated and defecated in the food. Slaydon claims that Hansford served him the food and after Slaydon consumed it Hansford informed him that he had urinated and defecated in his food and that he was HIV positive. Slaydon claims that this information caused him to become violently ill and fear that he had contracted the AIDS virus.
¶ 2. Slaydon and Hansford have a great animosity towards one another. Earlier the same year, Slaydon was arrested for attempting to rob and assault Hansford. Hansford later testified against Slaydon resulting in Slaydon's conviction for trespass, attempted robbery and simple assault which was later affirmed by this Court. From that same incident, Slaydon filed a civil action against Hansford for assault and battery that the trial court dismissed as being time barred, which was also affirmed by this Court.
¶ 3. In his present appeal, Slaydon asserts that the incident occurred on November 20, 1999. Slaydon filed his complaint by mail asserting causes of action for both assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress on November 22, 2000. Slaydon attempted to record a default judgment against Hansford for failing to answer the complaint. However, the circuit clerk refused to enter the default as Hansford had filed an answer to the complaint. Hansford attempted to mail a stamped filed copy of his answer to Slay-don via certified mail but Slaydon refused to receive his response. Both Hansford and Waffle House moved the court to dismiss Slaydon's complaint as time barred. The trial court dismissed Slaydon's complaint finding that the statute of limitations for the causes of action raised by Slaydon had run. From the dismissal of his complaint, Slaydon appeals asserting that the trial court erred in denying his request for default judgment against Hansford for failure to answer and dismissing his complaint as time barred. Further, Waffle House filed a cross-appeal asserting that Slaydon does not have the right to file an appeal in forma pauperis. .
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER A JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT AGAINST HANSFORD.
¶ 4. Slaydon first contends that the trial court erred when it refused to enter a judgment of default against Hansford for failure to answer Slaydon's complaint. Hansford was served with process in this civil action on January 19, 2001. Hansford mailed a letter to the circuit clerk answering the allegations contained in Slaydon's complaint that was stamped filed on January 30, 2001. Hansford mailed a copy of his answer to Slaydon via certified mail. Slaydon refused to receive the letter and then petitioned the trial court to enter a judgment of default against Hansford. Hansford had thirty days to answer Slay-don's complaint from the date of service of process. M.R.C.P. 12(a). Hansford timely filed his answer to Slaydon's complaint. Hansford properly attempted to serve Slaydon with a copy of his answer by mailing the copy to Slaydon's last known address. M.R.C.P. 5(b). Slaydon refused to accept Hansford's correspondence; however, service by mail is completed upon the document being mailed. Id. The trial court did not err in refusing to enter a judgment of default against Hansford as Hansford timely answered Slaydon's complaint. This issue is without merit.
2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SLAY-DON'S COMPLAINT AS TIME BARRED.
¶ 5. Slaydon's final contention is that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint against Hansford and Waffle House as time barred. Slaydon asserted in his complaint that the incident occurred on November 20, 1999. Slaydon filed his complaint on November 22, 2000, asserting theories of assault and battery as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. The standard of review for motions to dismiss is "substantial evidence/manifest error." Alexander v. Brown,, 793 So.2d 601, 603(¶ 6) (Miss.2001). The evidence is considered fairly as between the parties. Id. The statute of limitations for assault and battery is one year. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev.1995). The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is also one year. McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So.2d 258, 263(¶ 11) (Miss. Ct.App.2001). The one-year statute of lim- Rations for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress had clearly expired.
¶ 6. Slaydon contends as part of this issue that he was entitled to an additional three days because he filed his lawsuit by mail. Slaydon relies on the provisions of M.R.C.P. 6(e) for this contention. Slaydon's reliance on this rule is, however, misplaced. Rule 6(e) allows parties who are required to do some act within a prescribed period of time to add an additional three days to the prescribed time when the notice or other paper is served upon the party by mail. Civil actions are commenced by the filing of a complaint. M.R.C.P. 3(a). Slaydon commenced his civil action when his complaint was received by the circuit clerk's office on November 22, 2000, more than one year from the alleged incident occurring.
¶ 7. Slaydon also asserts under this issue that his causes of action against Waffle House should not be time barred as he claims they were negligent in supervising Hansford. The employer is responsible for the acts of its employee only where those acts are "committed within the scope of the employment." Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1978). Even by taking Slaydon's allegations as true, Hans-ford's alleged acts were clearly not done in the furtherance of his employment responsibilities and, as such, Waffle House would not be liable. Slaydon alleged acts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress in his complaint. These acts allegedly occurred on November 20, 1999. Slaydon commenced his lawsuit against Hansford and Waffle House on November 22, 2000, more than one year after the alleged occurrence. Slaydon's complaint is time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. This issue is without merit.
3. WHETHER SLAYDON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS.
8. Waffle House filed a cross-appeal asserting that Slaydon does not have the right to appeal a civil case in forma pauperis. Slaydon as a private citizen has the right to commence any civil action without having to pay court costs. Miss. Code Ann.- § 11-53-17 (Supp.2001). The right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases does not extend beyond the initial trial of the matter. Moreno v. State, 637 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1994). In this case the trial court in its discretion granted Slaydon leave to appeal his civil case in forma pauperis. This sets a dangerous precedent and we caution trial courts against granting parties leave to appeal in forma pauperis in civil actions in the future except in those limited areas of the law where such an appeal would be mandated under considerations addressed in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996). Finding that Slaydon's appeal is meritless, however, we will not dismiss the appeal on this ground.
CONCLUSION
¶ 9. The trial court did not err in refusing to enter a judgment of default against Hansford as he timely filed his answer to Slaydon's complaint. The trial court properly dismissed Slaydon's complaint against both Waffle House and Hansford as Slay-don commenced his action after the statute of limitations had expired.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PEARL RIVER COUNTY IS AFFIRMED AS TO DIRECT AND CROSS-APPEALS. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO PEARL RIVER COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. KING, P.J. AND IRVING, J. CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. SOUTHWICK, P.J. CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MCMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, LEE, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.