Case Name: PEOPLE v. CUELLAR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-05-01
Citations: 144 Mich. App. 187
Docket Number: Docket No. 75906
Parties: PEOPLE v CUELLAR
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and R. L. Evans, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 144
Pages: 187–191

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v CUELLAR
Docket No. 75906.
Submitted October 5, 1984, at Lansing.
Decided May 1, 1985.
Alberto Cuellar, Jr., was convicted on his pleas of guilty of larceny in a building and of being a third-time felony offender, Bay Circuit Court, William J. Caprathe, J. Defendant’s guilty pleas were offered simultaneously, pursuant to a single plea agreement, in a single proceeding during which the trial court advised him one time of his rights pursuant to GCR 1963, 785.7. Defendant appealed, alleging that the habitual offender conviction should be set aside because the trial court did not separately advise him of his rights. Held:
The trial court’s single recitation of rights to the defendant was not improper. The trial court clearly referred to defendant’s plea as an offer of two pleas and the defendant offered the pleas simultaneously pursuant to a single plea bargain.
Affirmed.
R. L. Evans, J., dissented. He would hold that it is essential that the record affirmatively show that the defendant was informed that the rights recited to him applied to both the substantive offense and to the habitual offender charge. The record herein contains no such affirmative showing, thus he would reverse the habitual offender conviction.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Habitual Offenders — Recital of Rights.
A trial court’s single recital of rights to a defendant who was pleading guilty in one proceeding to both a substantive charge and to an habitual offender charge was proper where the trial _court clearly referred to the plea as an offer of two pleas and the defendant pled guilty to the two charges simultaneously pursuant to a single plea bargain.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 473 et seq.
Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 17 et seq.
Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to prior convictions. 17 ALR3d 1265.
Dissent by R. L. Evans, J.
2. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Habitual Offenders — Recital of Rights.
It is essential that the record affirmatively show that a defendant was informed that the rights recited to him by the judge applied to both the substantive offense and the habitual offender charge where the defendant pleads guilty to both a substantive offense and to an habitual offender charge in a single proceeding.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, George B. Mullison, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas J. Rasdale, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Herb Jordan), for defendant on appeal.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and R. L. Evans, JJ.
Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was convicted on his pleas of guilty of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, and of being a third-time felony offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was sentenced to a term in prison of from five to eight years and appeals from his convictions as of right. We affirm.
Defendant submitted both guilty pleas at the same proceeding. He argues on appeal that his habitual offender conviction should be set aside because the trial court failed to separately advise him under GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(c). While we agree that in accepting a plea of guilty to an habitual offender charge the trial court must advise the defendant of the rights waived as enumerated in GCR 1963, 785.7, People v Brownridge, 414 Mich 393, 397-398; 325 NW2d 125 (1982), we conclude upon a reading of this plea-taking transcript that the trial court complied with that court rule in accepting the defendant's supplemental plea. Throughout the entire plea-taking proceeding, the trial court clearly referred to the defendant's plea as an offer of two pleas, at all times separately referring to the habitual offender plea. Unlike the defendant in Brownridge, defendant in this case simultaneously pled guilty to the principal and supplemental charges at a single proceeding pursuant to a single plea bargain. We conclude that the trial court's single recital of rights in this context was proper. People v Voss, 133 Mich App 73, 76-77; 348 NW2d 37 (1984). We further note that defendant was represented by able counsel and, in return for his plea, obtained dismissal of a pending absconding charge and another supplemental information.
Affirmed.