Case Name: Andrew J. Ross, Respondent, v. Francis C. Mather, Appellant
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1872-09
Citations: 51 N.Y. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: Andrew J. Ross, Respondent, v. Francis C. Mather, Appellant.
Judges: All concur for reversal except Lott, Ch. C., dissenting.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 108–116

Head Matter:
Andrew J. Ross, Respondent, v. Francis C. Mather, Appellant.
(Argued May 10,1872;
decided September term, 1872.)
In an action where fraud is the basis of the complaint a recovery cannot be had for a breach of contract.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged in substance that defendant having offered to sell him a horse which was lame, warranted and falsely represented that the lameness was in the foot only, resulting from an injury while in pasture, and was of a temporary character; that relying upon said warranty and representations, he purchased ; that the horse was in fact lame from a diseased gambrel joint, which defendant well knew. Plaintiff proved a warrant/ and breach thereof, but gave no evidence tending to show fraud. Held (Lott, Oh. 0., dissenting), that the gravamen of the action was fraud, not a breach of warranty, and plaintiff could not recover upon proof of the latter only. Williamson v. Allison (2 Bast, 446), disapproved.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the seventh judicial district, in favor of plaintiff, entered upon an order denying motion for a new trial, and directing judgment upon verdict. (Reported below, 47 Barb., 582.)
The action was brought to recover damages upon sale of a horse.
The summons in this case stated that the plaintiff would apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint.
The complaint alleged in substance the sale of a horse by the defendant to the plaintiff, which was lame in one hind leg; that on the sale the defendant warranted, and falsely and fraudulently represented, that the lameness resulted from an injury to his foot; that it was in his foot, and nowhere else; when his foot grew out that he would be well, and that he had only been lame for two weeks; that the plaintiff, relying upon this warranty and representations, and believing them to be true, purchased and paid for the horse. It was further alleged that at the time of this warranty, and false and fraudulent representations, the horse was not lame in his foot, but in his gambrel joint, which had been for more than two weeks badly diseased, and from which his lameness originated, which the plaintiff, at the time of the sale and of making such warranty and representations, well knew; that the horse was of little value; and that by means of the premises the defendant falsely and fraudulently deceived him in the sale of the horse to the damage of $500; and he demanded judgment for $500 and costs. -
The answer admitted the Sale of the horse and the payment of the price, and denied all the other allegations of the complaint.
On the trial the plaintiff stated that he expected to prove a warranty only; that he did not expect to prove any false or fraudulent representations, or that the defendant intended to deceive or did knowingly or fraudulently deceive the plaintiff, and that he should only claim to recover damages for a breach of the contract of warranty.
The defendant then moved that the plaintiff be nonsuited, on the ground that the cause of action stated in the complaint is for fraud and deceit, and not for breach of a contract of warranty. The judge denied this motion and the defendant excepted. A cause of action upon a warranty was then proven, but no evidence was given tending to prove fraud or any intention to deceive. The defendant then renewed his motion for a nonsuit upon the grounds before stated, which was denied, and he excepted. Exceptions were ordered to be heard at first instance at General Term.
Murray & Greene for the appellant.
This action being for deceit in the sale, and not on a contract, fraud, is the gravamen of the action, and must be proved. (Meyer v. Amidon, 45 N. Y., 169; Oberlander v. Speiss, id., 175 ; Marsh v. Falker, 40 id., 562; Marshall v. Gray, 57 Barb., 414; Moore v. Noble, 53 id., 425 ; Weed v. Case, 55 id., 534; Chitty's Pleadings, 679; Gutchers v. Whiting, 46 Barb., 139; Code, §§ 140, 141, 167, 171, 179, sub. 4, 288; Edic v. Crim, 10 Barb., 445; Chambers v. Lewis, 11 Abb., 210; Piser v. Stearns, 1 Hilt., 86; McGovern v. Payne, 32 Barb., 83; Patterson v. Patterson, 1 Abb. Pr. [N. S.], 262; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y., 250; Belknap v. Seeley, 14 id., 147.)
E. A. Raymond for the respondent.
This action is abundantly sustained as an action founded upon an express warranty. (Weall v. King, 12 East, 452; Jones v. Bright, 2 Bing., 533; Fowler v. Abrams, 3 E. D. Smith, 1.) The allegations of fraud are surplusage and need not to have been proved. (Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446; Defrieze v. Trumper, 1 J. R., 274; Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 30 Conn., 271; Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend., 106 ; Holman v. Dord, 12 Barb., 336; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y., 607; Brady v. Bissell, 1 Abb. Pr., 76; Roth v. Palmer, 27 Barb., 652.) The complaint may be amended now to sustain the judgment if necessary. (Harrower v. Heath, 19 Barb., 331; Clark v. Dales, 20 id., 67; Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y., 240; Lounsbury v. Purdy, 18 id., 515.)

Opinion:
Hunt, C.
The complaint contains all the elements of a complaint for a fraud. It must be held to be such unless the, distinction between the two forms of action is at an end. While it contains all that is necessary to authorize a recovery upon a contract, it contains much more. These additional allegations are so important and are stated in a manner so logical and orderly, that they determine the character of the action. In addition to what is necessary to sustain an action upon contract, the complaint alleges: 1. That the defendant "fraudulently represented " that the lameness arose from an injury to his foot, and was temporary only. 2. That the plaintiff relied upon the warranty not only, but upon said representations, and believing them to be true,- made the purchase. 3. That at the time of the warranty not only, but of the false and fraudulent representations, the horse was lame in his gambrel joint and not in his foot. 4. That at the time of making , the false and fraudulent representations, the defendant well knew that the lameness was not in the hind foot, but was in the gambrel joint, which had been badly diseased for more than two weeks, which was also well known to the defendant. 5. That by means of the premises, the defendant falsely and fraudulently deceived the plaintiff in the sale of the horse, to his damage of $500.
Ho allegations could have been inserted which would have more clearly constituted a case of fraud. That there was a warranty as well as representations, or that both are alleged to have existed, does not alter the case. Fraud may be based upon a warranty or upon representations, or upon both together. They may exist severally or together, and either or both may be the subject of fraud, and of an action for damages for fraud.
If the plaintiff had been able to establish a fraud in the sale, I cannot doubt that he would have been permitted to prove it under this complaint. I do not see upon what ground an objection could have been made to it. So if the allegations of the complaint had been positively stated and had been verified, an order to hold to bail must have been granted upon an application made to the proper officer. (Code, § 179, 188.)
I do not find any authorities in the courts of this State which sustain the position that this complaint may be considered as an action for a breach of warranty. Hone of the cases cited by the respondent's counsel are to that effect.
In Moore v. Noble (53 Barb., 425), the complaint alleged that the defendant falsely and fraudulently represented the horse to be of a certain value and guaranteed him to be sound and free from disease. The court held it to be an action for a fraud, and that to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must prove the scienter. (See also Marshall v. Gray, 57 Barb., 414; McGovern v. Payn, 32 id., 83.)
Walter v. Bennett (16 N. Y., 250) and Belknap v. Sealey (14 id., 147) are hardly authorities on the question of whether the complaint in this action is in tort or assumpsit. They are authorities on the proposition that where the complaint is for a tort, the plaintiff establishing a case in assumpsit merely cannot recover.
The precedent in 2 Chitty's Pleadings (679, 8th Am. ed., from 6th Lond. ed.) and the case of Williamson v. Allison (2 East, 446), are chiefly relied on by the respondent. The precedent cited in Chitty, which is for " a false warranty of a horse," does not sustain the claim. It omits the important allegation that the seller well knew the representation to be untrue. The precedent also at p. 279, " on a warranty of a horse to be sound," omits the same allegation. Both of these precedents contain the allegation used in all the old forms of assumpsit, that the defendant not regarding his promise, fraudulently intending to injure the plaintiff, craftily and subtly deceived the plaintiff.
The case of Williamson v. Allison is nearer to the point. The court hold that where all the allegations are made which are necessary to sustain an action in tort, if a warranty is also alleged, the tort may be disregarded and a recovery had in assumpsit. Dowdny v. Mortimer, cited in the same authority, held that the scienter must be proved, and in that case no express warranty was alleged. In my opinion, this case is not in accordance with the authorities and practice of this State, and should not prevail.
The view of this pleading which I have taken is in accordance with our improved system of pleading, abolishing all prior forms and requiring the party to make a " statement of the facts constituting the cause of action." (Code, § 142.) In the present case, the plaintiff made a statement of facts which did not constitute his cause of action. The Code never intended that a party who had failed in the performance of a contract merely, should be sued for a fraud, or that a party who had committed a fraud should be sued for a breach of contract, unless the fraud was intended to be waived. The two causes of action are entirely distinct, and there can be no recovery as for a breach of contract, where a fraud is the basis of the complaint. (See authorities, supra.) Connaughty v. Nichols (42 N. Y., 83) is the only authority cited to the contrary,, and it does not sustain that position.
The judgment should therefore be reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event.