Case Name: DUNWORTH v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1903-10-24
Citations: 127 F. 307
Docket Number: No. 959
Parties: DUNWORTH v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.
Judges: Before'.JENKINS, GROSSCUP, and BAKER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 127
Pages: 307–311

Head Matter:
DUNWORTH v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
October 24, 1903.)
No. 959.
1. Contributory Negligence — Trial—Direction op Verdict.
Where, in an action for death resulting from defendant’s alleged negligence, it followed as a necessary conclusion and as a matter of law, from the facts disclosed, that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and that there could be no recovery under any proper view" of the facts, it was the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
2. Samis — Railroads—Crossings—Injuries to Pedestrians.
Where a street car conductor left his car at a railroad crossing, and went on the track to see If it was clear, and on seeing a train approaching on one of the tracks stepped hack onto another, and stood there waiting for the train to pass, when he was struck and killed by a train approaching from the rear on such track, which he could have seen if he had looked, and there “was unobstructed space of 10 feet between the crossing gates and the first track in whicli he could have stood in safety, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
3. Same — Negligence of Defendant-Statutory Regulations — Noncompliance.
Where deceased, who was killed while standing on a railroad crossing, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the fact that defendant was at fault for lioncomplianee with statutory regulations did not preclude it from relying on the defense of plaintiffs contributory negligence.
4 Same — Pboximate Cause.
Where, in an action for death of plaintiff’s intestate at a railroad crossing, it- did not appear that decedent’s presence on the track was observed by the locomotive engineer, or'that after seeing him, and after knowledge that he was unobservant of his danger, there was time to avoid the catastrophe, defendant was not liable, notwithstanding plain.tiff’s contributory negligence, on the ground that by the exercise of ordinary care defendant might have avoided the consequences of decedent’s negligence.
Grpsscup, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
This action is brought by the plaintiff to recover damages sustained by reason of the death of her intestate, caused, as alleged, by the wrongful acts of the defendant at a street crossing of its railway. The negligence charged was that the bell of a locomotive engine approaching and crossing South Halsted street was not rung or its whistle sounded, that no headlight was ' exhibited, and that the gates were not lowered. There was a plea of the general issue. At the trial, upon the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff, the court directed the jury to render a' verdict for the defendant, for which supposed error the cause is brought here for review.
The two tracks of the defendant’s railway running east and west intersect 'Halsted street, in the city of Chicago, at right angles, and for a long distance the tracks are straight. The north track is used by west-bound trains; the south track by east-bound trains. Ten feet south of the south rail of the south track are gates, and from eight to ten feet south of the gates, and on the west side of the street, is a small station. From this station the view to the -west along the tracks is unobstructed, the space between the south rail and the gates and the station being unoccupied. At the west line of the street there is a switch track which curves to the south, and then to the west, .running for some distance parallel to the south track, about on a line with the station house. The street car line of the Chicago City Railway Company located upon Halsted street crosses these railway tracks. The deceased was a conductor in the. service of that company. The car upon which he served was on a trip north, and had come to a stop south of the railway gates, to allow the conductor to go forward, according to his customary duty, to ascertain if the way was clear and to signal the car when the way should be clear.' The evidence is contradictory whether the gates were lowered before Dunworth went upon the crossing. As he passed the gates a west-bound freight train was approaching Halsted street from the east upon the north track, and was some 300 feet away. Dunworth went to the north track, and, in the language of a witness for the plaintiff, “when the conductor saw the gates coming down and the train approaching he came back to the south track and" stood on the tracks” He took a position between the rails of the south track, where he remained for from two to four minutes, looking northeast and north, watching the freight train as it approached and was passing. At this time an engine coming from the west approached on the south track at ¿ speed of eight miles an hour, backing up, its bell not being rung or its whistle sounded, and without a headlight on the tender of the engine, and struck and killed Dunworth. This was before the freight train had passed. The time was December 4, 1901, at about 7 o’clock in the evening. The night was dark, but the ground was covered with snow to a depth of two inches, making “it look quite light.” The locality was also lighted by .an electric are light suspended over the center of Halsted street.
. James Hamilton Lewis, for plaintiff in error.
Kenesaw M. Landis, for defendant in error.
Before'.JENKINS, GROSSCUP, and BAKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
JENKINS, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). -If the facts, or the inferences to be drawn from them, with resp'e'ct to''con- tributary negligence, be doubtful, the case is one for the jury. But if from the facts disclosed the conclusion follows as a matter of law that there can be no recovery in any proper view of the facts, it -is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict. Schofield v. Railway Company, 114 U. S. 615, 5 Sup. Ct. 1125, 29 L. Ed. 224; Railway Company v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469, 11 Sup. Ct. 569, 35 L. Ed. 213; Railway Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485; Gardner v. Michigan Central Railroad Company, 150 U. S. 349, 361, 14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. Ed. 1107; Warner v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company, 168 U. S. 339, 348, 18 Sup. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491; District of Columbia v. Moulton, 182 U. S. 576, 579, 21 Sup. Ct. 840, 45 L. Ed. 1237.
The facts in the case at bar are without contention, and were disclosed by the evidence of the plaintiff. It was the duty of the deceased to go upon the crossing to see if a train was approaching from either direction, and to signal the mqtorman if and when the way was clear for the crossing of the street car. But the performance of this duty did not absolve him from the duty of care with respect to his own safety. He was there to look for danger. That was his duty, not only with respect to the service in which he was engaged, but with respect to himself in the performance of that duty. These duties were concurrent. After the gates were lowered* th street car could not cross until after the passage of the freight train. The deceased had then no duty to perform with respect to the street car until the train had passed and".the gates had been raised. Until that should occur, duty to himself, if not to the railway company, required that lie should stand in a place of safety. There were ten feet in width of unobstructed space between the south rail of the south track and the gates, where he could have stood in absolute safety and in full view of the situation. Instead, he took his position between the rails of the south track with his back or side to the west, from which direction alone danger upon that track was to be apprehended, and, without looking to the west, watched the coming and passing of the west bound train upon the north track. This is abundantly proven by the concurrent testimony for the plaintiff. Those speaking to the question, and who' were watching him as he stood there, saw him look but in the one direction. Such conduct can be characterized only as reckless. Without necessity he deliberately placed himself in a situation of known danger. In the open space he would have been immune from danger, and with equal facilities for seeing in both directions. He had no right to stand upon the track. Taking the risk, the consequences should not be imposed upon another. Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 542; Schofield v. Railway Company, 114 U. S. 615, 5 Sup. Ct. 1125, 29 L. Ed. 224; Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379, 19 Sup. Ct. 763, 43 L. Ed. 1014.
It is urged that, because the defendant was in fault for noncom•'pliánce with statutory regulations, contributor}'' negligence of the party injured is unavailing as a defense, and this is said to be stated with absoluteness i-ri Deserant v. Cerillos Coal Railroad Company, 178 U. S. 409, 20 Sup. Ct. 967, 44 L. Ed. 1127. - It was there ruled that the master's liability to furnish a safe working place for his servant is not absolved by the concurrent negligence of a fellow servant. The charge of the trial court there under consideration contained the clause (paragraph 13, p. 417, 178 U. S., page 971, 20 Sup. Ct., 44 L. Ed. 1127) that if the servant knew of the failure of his employer to perform his statutory duty, and still remained in service in the dangerous place, he assumed the risk. This charge was not even excepted to or suggested as erroneous. The case gives no color to the contention of counsel. The contrary principle is sustained by the Supreme Court in the cases above referred to. In Railroad Company v. Houston, supra, the court, referring to failure to sound the whistle or ring the bell, says that such failure did not relieve, from the necessity of taking ordinary precaution for safety; that negligence in these particulars is no excuse for want of ordinary care. The law furnishes no support for the contention of counsel.
It is also said that the contributory negligence of the deceased should not prevent a recovery if the locomotive engineer, in the exercise of ordinary care, might have avoided the consequence of the deceased's negligence; and this under,the modification of the rule as held by the Supreme Court in Inland & Seaboard Coasting Company v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, 11 Sup. Ct. 653, 35 L. Ed. 270; Railway Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485. There are no facts disclosed in this record calling for the application of the modification of the rule. It does not appear that the presence of the deceased upon the track was observed by the locomotive engineer, or that after seeing him, and after knowledge that he was unobservant of his danger, there was time to avoid the catastrophe.' To bring the case within the modification of the rule it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to make a showing calling for its application.