Case Name: Peak v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1960-01-11
Citations: 240 Ind. 334
Docket Number: No. 29,722
Parties: Peak v. State of Indiana.
Judges: Achor and Landis, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 240
Pages: 334–359

Head Matter:
Peak v. State of Indiana.
[No. 29,722.
Filed January 11, 1960.
Rehearing denied March 10, 1960.]
Frank I. Hamilton, of Greensburg, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Owen S. Boling, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Arterburn, C. J.
The appellant Peak was charged under Acts 1905, ch. 169, §491, p. 584, being §10-3603, Burns' 1956 Eeplacement, with making a false certificate as a Notary Public to a deed purported to be executed by Dean Burton to Lawrence A. Peak and Geneva A. Peak, the parents of the appellant Peak. He was tried by jury, found guilty as charged and sentenced to not less than one [1] nor more than three [3] years in the Indiana State Prison and fined in the sum of one thousand dollars [$1,000.00].
The error first assigned is that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment. The points urged by the appellant are that the indictment "fails to set forth that the notary did not see the party execute the document and that the party failed to acknowledge the execution." (Our italics.)
The statute upon which the prosecution was based contains no requirement that the notary see the party execute the deed.
The statute reads as follows:
"Falsely attesting acknowledgment. — Whoever, being a notary public or other officer authorized to take and certify acknowledgments of conveyances, mortgages or other instruments of writing, shall append his signature as such officer when no official seal is required, or who shall append his signature or affix his official seal when such seal is required by law to be affixed to the certificate of acknowledgment of any conveyance, mortgage or other instrument of writing required to be recorded in this state, or which can not be legally recorded therein without acknowledgment and certificate thereof, when at the time of such signing or sealing, the grantor, mortgagor or other party executing such deed, mortgage or other instrument had not first acknowledged the execution thereof before such notary public or other officer as aforesaid, shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the state prison not less than one [1] year nor more than three [3] years, and fined not less than ten dollars [$10.00] nor more than one thousand dollars ,[$1,000.00]." Burns' §10-3603, 1956 Repl.
Further, the indictment does contain the allegation that the grantor (Dean Burton) "had not acknowledged the execution" of the deed.
The indictment reads as follows:
"The Grand Jury for the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that ROBERT A. PEAK on or about the 6th day of January, A.D. 1955, at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, being then and there a Notary Public in and for the State of Indiana, and authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds in Marion County in said State, did then and there feloniously append his signature as such officer and affix his official seat to a certain regular and legal form of acknowledgment purporting to be the acknowledgment of one Dean Burton, before the said defendant, as such Notary Public, to a certain false, forged and counterfeit deed of conveyance of real estate, situate in the County of Marion, State of Indiana, and bearing the date of the 6th day of January, 1955, purporting to be signed and executed by said Dean Burton to Lawrence A. Peak and Geneva A. Peak, Husband and .Wife, in the words and figures following.
In Witness Whereof, the said Dean Burton, unmarried hereunto set his hand and seal, this 6th day of January, 1955.
_(Seal) Dean Burton (Seal)
_(Seal) Dean Burton (Seal)
State of Indiana, Marion County, ss:
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, this 6th day of January, A.D. 1955, personally appeared the within named Dean Burton, unmarried. Grantor in the above conveyance, and acknowledged the same to be his voluntary act and deed, for the uses and purposes herein mentioned. I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my official seal.
My Commission Expires:
August 28, 1958 Robert A. Peak
Robert A. Peak
Notary Public
when in fact the said Dean Burton had not executed said deed and had not acknowledged the execution thereof before the said defendant, as he, the said defendant, then and there well knew, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ John G. Tinder
Prosecuting Attorney
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit."
It is further urged that there is no allegation that the appellant certified to the acknowledgment nor that the deed was an instrument entitled to be recorded.
The entire certificate of the notary is set out verbatim in the indictment and this eliminates the necessity of allegating a conclusion as to its legal significanee. 1 R. S. 1852, ch. 23, §28, p. 232, being §56-130, Burns' 1951 Replacement.
The same conclusion must be reached with reference to a failure to state that the deed was entitled to be recorded. All courts of this State take judicial notice of the statute which entitles a deed of conveyance to be recorded. 1 R. S. 1852, ch. 23, §18, p. 232, being §56-123, Burns' 1951 Replacement; 1 R. S. 1852, ch. 23, §34, p. 232, being §56-136, Burns' 1951 Replacement; 8 I. L. E., Criminal Law, §114, p. 212.
The court did not err in overruling the motion to quash.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial, wherein he says the court abused its discretion in overruling his motions for continuances. There is a failure to set forth the facts in sufficient details or authorities in support thereof. There is no showing of an abuse of discretion by the court. Hartsfield v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 616, 94 N. E. 2d 453; Rose v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 44, 36 N. E. 2d 767; Krupa v. State (1927), 198 Ind. 695, 154 N. E. 666; Liese v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 250, 118 N. E. 2d 731.
Error is also claimed in the refusal to give Instruction 1 tendered by the appellant.
This was a peremptory instruction in the following form:
"DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION
NO. 1
You and each of you are instructed that the State of Indiana has introduced no evidence whatsoever that the Defendant appended his signature or affixed his official seal to the deed described in the indictment, when at the time of such signing or sealing, the grantor had not first acknowledged the execution thereof before said Defendant, a Notary Public. You are, therefore, instructed and directed by this court to find the Defendant not guilty of the charge in the indictment."
The following is a part of the testimony of Virgil Smith:
"Q. I ask you whether or not at the time you affixed this signature of Dean Burton, whether or not Robert Peak acknowledged and swore you to this deed?
"A. He sure did. He made me hold up my hand and swear to it.
"Q. Made you hold up your hand and swear to it?
"A. Yes, sir."
Peak testified:
"Q. Who signed that? (the deed)
"A. Virgil Smith.
"Q. Did you acknowledge that signature?
"A. I did.
"Q. Tell the jury exactly what you did?
"A. I had Virgil Smith to hold up his right hand and I said 'Mr. Burton, do you swear that that's your signature and that it is your act and deed?' He said, T do,' and I acknowledged it. I signed my name and put the seal on."
In view of the above evidence the court could not give the peremptory instruction without misstating the evidence and committing error. Pierson v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 206, 131 N. E. 397; Miller v. The State (1898), 144 Ind. 401, 43 N. E. 440; Cole v. State (1922), 192 Ind. 29, 134 N. E. 867.
We come now to the most strongly contested phase of this case, namely that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.
The gist of the charge is that the appellant Peak, as a Notary Public, affixed his official seal and certificate of acknowledgment to a deed that one Dean Burton had executed "when in fact the said Dean Burton had not executed said deed and had not acknowledged the execution thereof before the said defendant as he the said defendant, then and there well knew . . ."
The evidence at the trial was that one Nile Teverbaugh originally purchased the real estate in question while head of the right-of-way department of the State Highway Commission of the State of Indiana; that although the real estate involved in the transactions pertained to the right-of-way for Madison Avenue, he made the purchase as a private transaction and had the deed made to Dean Burton named as grantee therein, who he testified was his grandson, 4-5 years of age. Teverbaugh stated that he intended to have the deed made to such grandson for personal reasons. Virgil Smith, a member of the State Highway Commission from June, 1954 to May, 1955 and chairman of the Commission from the latter date until January, 1957, under whom Teverbaugh worked, learned of this private transaction and insisted on purchasing the real estate for his own personal benefit from Teverbaugh for $3,000. Teverbaugh testified he finally threw the original deeds (with Dean Burton named therein as grantee) to Smith on a davenport in his apartment and took $3,000. from Smith for the property. No guardian was appointed for or deed made by the grandson Dean Burton to Smith, although the testimony reveals he knew the grandson and had seen him ten to twelve times.
Virgil Smith then told the appellant, a friend and attorney of long standing, that he had some real estate, the title to which he desired to place in another's name and gave him the deeds and requested appellant to prepare a deed for the property in question to be executed by Dean Burton, and find some one whose name could be used as grantee also, other than Smith. Appellant prepared the deed accordingly and then went to Smith and asked him where he could find Dean Burton to take such grantor's signature and acknowledgment of execution. Smith then stated to the appellant that "I am Dean Burton and I will sign and execute the deed." Appellant says that he thereupon, as a lawyer, made some investigation and found in American Jurisprudence that the use of fictitious names in business transactions was permissible. He also read therein the following statement:
". . . in the absence of a statute or judicial adjudication to the contrary, there is nothing in the law prohibiting a person from taking or assuming another name, so long as he does not assume a name for the purpose of defrauding other persons through a mistake of identity." (Our italics.) 38 Am. Jur., Name, §11, p. 601.
He thereupon took Smith's signature and acknowledgment and certified the same accordingly. Appellant, with Smith's understanding, placed his (appellant's) parents' names in the deed as grantees.
The question thus presented is: did the named grantee, Dean Burton, acknowledge the execution of the deed in question as certified by the certificate of the appellant Peak as a notary public, or was it false by reason of no such acknowledgment of its execution having been taken by the appellant?
If this were all the testimony in the case, a prima facie case was made out under the wording of the statute by the State. The evidence is undisputed that the signature on the deed in question was not that of Dean Burton, the purported grantor and the one who owned the property and to whom the original deed was made. There is no evidence that either he or his guardian ever acknowledged the deed.
The substance of the appellant's defense is that although the criminal statute is unqualified and contains no worded exceptions therein providing for the use of assumed or fictitious names, nevertheless this court should imply such an exception on the basis of the common-law right to use an assumed name under circumstances where no fraud is intended. When we give consideration to the limited situations in which an assumed or fictitious name may be used at common law, we find that it is narrowly limited to an honest transaction involving no fraud. Every statement that we have been able to find relating to the use of an assumed or fictitious name by a person in taking title to property is always qualified by the provision that it cannot be done for the purpose of fraud.
Appellant cites the case of Leroy v. Wood (1943), 113 Ind. App. 397, 47 N. E. 2d 604, where it is held in a partition suit that a husband and wife may take title in the assumed name of Ming instead of their true name of Wood. However, even in that case, the court recognizes that if the name were used in a fraudulent scheme the rule would be different, saying (at p. 401) :
"The appellant asserts that the deed shows on its face that it was made for the purpose of some sort of concealment and for some purpose other than to advance the common family interest. The complaint is silent as to their reason or purpose in taking the title in a fictitious or assumed name and there is no claim that if some sort of concealment was in fact intended it was fraudulent or harmful to anyone or that it was designed to or did work any injustice of any kind. The appellant's brief speaks of undue influence, but there is no allegation thereof or reference thereto in the complaint."
The use of fictitious names is not to be encouraged by the courts. It lends itself too readily to fraud by reason of concealment involved and thus is too likely to be used against a public interest or a private interest, particularly those of creditors or other interested parties. It is well settled the law does not countenance or permit the use of a fictitious or assumed name in the execution of a fraudulent scheme. 65 C. J. S., Names, §9, p. 9; 38 Am. Jur., Name, §11, p. 600; 21 I. L. E., Names, §3, p. 246; Rerick v. Ireland (1921), 76 Ind. App. 139, 131 N. E. 527; 1 Am. Jur., Acknowledgments, §188, p. 397; 1 C. J. S., Acknowledgments, §144d., p. 909.
Applying that test here in this case, it is plain that the evidence shows that the name of Dean Burton was used by Virgil Smith with fraudulent intent and purpose. All the evidence points to the fact that he, as Chairman of the State Highway Commission, was using his position in this particular transaction to buy the property through the use of a fictitious name and then sell it to the State of Indiana at a considerable profit. The use of a fictitious name in this case was not authorized at common law under the circumstances. 211. L. E., Names, §3, p. 246; 65 C. J. S., Names, §9, p. 9; 38 Am. Jur., Name, §11, p. 600.
The appellant Peak, however, urges upon us a still further exception to the statute, namely, that even though Virgil Smith had no legal right to use a fictitious name to commit a fraud under the circumstances, still the criminal statute is not applicable to the appellant because the appellant was innocent of any wrong-doing and had no knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that Virgil Smith was acting fraudulently in the use of a fictitious name.
The jury had the duty here to determine that question from all the evidence. In doing so the members of the jury could use their own personal experiences and knowledge of every-day matters in affairs of this sort. McDonald v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 441, 118 N. E. 2d 891; Beavers v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 549, 141 N. E. 2d 118; Heyverests v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 359, 174 N. E. 710; Bottorff v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 540, 156 N. E. 555; Pantlow v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 207, 166 N. E. 651.
The average person views with suspicion any use of a fictitious name. Even appellant Peak admits his uncertainties in this regard when he hesitated long enough to go to the law library. It is true a fictitious name may be used honestly in one's private affairs, but its very use puts on notice, a person who has. knowledge of such use, that there is a purpose to conceal something. If it involves a public official, as appellant Peak well knew in this case, who is dealing* in property connected with this person's official duties as highway commissioner, there is every reason to conclude the motive is not in the public interest. Such concealment cannot be condoned nor approved. We do not believe that the appellant Peak was no naive as an attorney as not to suspect the illegality involved in the use of the fictitious name. Both Peak and Smith had known each other for about thirty years, and resided in the same small town for about the same period. He knew Virgil Smith was married, yet Peak prepared the deed and acknowledgment which stated that Dean Burton was an unmarried man. Peak's testimony when asked to recount what he did before he prepared the deed is:
"A. Well, there was a couple of things that were done. One, upon Mr. Smith giving me these two deeds, I asked the name of Dean Burton's wife and Mr. Smith said he was unmarried. He was single. I stated, also, that the title should be checked . . ."
It was later that Peak testified that he asked Smith where he could find Dean Burton to get his signature and acknowledgment. When Smith said "I am Dean Burton," Peak saw no reason to change the deed to show Dean Burton as Virgil Smith was a married man.
The law cannot countenance a transaction and stamp with approval its legality, which eliminates the necessity of a wife signing a deed. If it did, it would offer an easy, evasive and fraudulent method of eliminating a wife's statutory interest in her husband's real estate. A wife would rarely be able to discover such transfers made in a fictitious name by her husband without her signature. Courts do not lend themselves for the approval of that kind of chicanery. Appellant as a lawyer knew that.
If these facts alone were all that were before the jury, in our opinion it would have been sufficient for any reasonable person to arrive at the conclusion that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the illegal use of the fictitious name by Smith. However, there are additional factors herein that support the conclusion arrived at by the jury, namely, the active participation of the appellant in the fraudulent transaction. The evidence shows that he furnished his own parents' names as grantees and that $25,800. was paid by the State in the summer of 1955 to the parents for the real estate. Appellant took charge of the money; paid $3,000. to Smith as a return of the consideration for the deeds — later cashed a check for $19,800. and delivered the proceeds to Smith, leaving on deposit $3,000. to pay federal and state taxes.
It is further shown that he participated in the proceeds and profits from the fraudulent transaction to the extent of $1,000 and $100 expenses paid to him by Smith personally. It is common knowledge that the services of a scrivener in making a deed or a notary public taking the acknowledgment of same are not computed at such high figures. Jurors know these every-day facts. We on the Court cannot ignore such facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
It is clear Peak and Smith used Peak's parents as "dummies" in the transaction. Although the deed was made January 6, 1955, it was not put on the public record by Peak until June 21, 1955 for the public eyes to see. This was shortly before the State purchased the property.
Ted Knapp and Robert Gray as witnesses in substance testified that during their investigation of the transaction in 1957 upon inquiry appellant Peak told them that he knew "Dean Burton"; that he met him in the Claypool Hotel; that he checked the title to the real estate in question at the court house; made a deal to purchase the property from him for $3,000. and got the blank forms of deeds from a stationery shop for that purpose. He told these witnesses that he checked Dean Burton's license number at the time to see if the signature was the same as on the deed. Peak described Dean Burton as a man weighing about 170 pounds, 5' 10" or 5' 11", dark hair, graying slightly and he knew Virgil Smith, and that Dean Burton was not Virgil Smith.
Why should Peak tell such a story if he was convinced of his own innocence and the right of Virgil Smith to use the name of Dean Burton in conveying the real estate? The jury had the right to draw its conclusions from this attempt to conceal the crime charged and that appellant knew Virgil Smith was not Dean Burton and could not use such a name in the transaction.
Peak was not an ignorant man. He had a college education, legal training and was a man of maturity. Peak was not compelled to acknowledge the deeds. He could have refused when asked by Smith to make the acknowledgment of the ficti tious name. He did not. Instead he prepared the deed, furnished grantees, made out the acknowledgment and took the money consideration for the sale made to the State. With all the knowledge of the surrounding circumstances he participated in the profits and attempted to conceal the true nature of the transaction from the beginning, when he knew it was all connected with highway right-of-way matters. These facts should dispose of the question of the guilty knowledge of appellant Peak.
We cannot override the finding of the jury and say that the evidence shows without contradiction that appellant Peak acted ignorantly and innocently. The jury under the circumstances had the right to draw the contrary conclusion. 8 I. L. E. Criminal Law, §402, p. 458; Smith v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 629, 21 N. E. 2d 709; Lucas v. State (1910), 173 Ind. 302, 90 N. E. 305.
The law does not permit the use of a fictitious name to perpetrate a fraud. There was no license in the law for the use of the name Dean Burton in such transaction by Virgil Smith. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the appellant knew the use was illegal and Virgil Smith had no right to use the name Dean Burton fictitiously in the execution of the deed.
Finally appellant urges that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial based upon the affidavit of the appellant which stated in substance that one of the jurors was guilty of misconduct which the appellant in his affidavit stated he learned after the trial from reading in a newspaper. The newspaper account stated that a juror had said they convicted the defendant "because we couldn't free one man and displease the whole community" and that the "whole'public would suffer" if Peak were turned loose. It is apparent that this affidavit is based upon hearsay obtained through a newspaper. It is well settled that hearsay is not sufficient grounds for impeaching the verdict of the jury. Hutchins v. The State (1898), 151 Ind. 667, 52 N. E. 403; Varner v. State (1929), 89 Ind. App. 293, 166 N. E. 292; 9 I. L. E., Criminal Law, §764, p. 289.
The judgment is affirmed.
Achor and Landis, JJ., concur.
Bobbitt, J., dissents with opinion.
Jackson, J., not participating.