Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ARTHUR HUMPHREYS, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1968-06-26
Citations: 101 N.J. Super. 539
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ARTHUR HUMPHREYS, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 539–559

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ARTHUR HUMPHREYS, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued April 8, 1968 —
Decided June 26, 1968.
Before Judges Conford, Collestee and Labkecque.
Mr. Frank V. Walsh, Jr., assigned counsel, argued the cause for appellant.
Mr. William L. Boyan, Assistant County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent {Mr. Vincent Panaro, County Prosecutor, attorney).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Collester, J. A. D.
Defendant Arthur Humphreys, Jr. appeals from convictions of breaking and entering with intent to steal (N. J. S. 24:94-1), carrying weapons in an automobile without first having obtained a permit to do so (N. J. S. 24:151-41), and unlawful possession of a narcotic drug (N. J. S. A. 24:18-4). Two others, James Thomas and Roy Goins, were jointly indicted with defendant Humphreys for the first two offenses. On the day of the trial a severance was granted to Goins, who was unavailable. Thomas, who was jointly tried with Humphreys, was also found guilty, but this appeal is by Humphreys alone.
The State's proofs established that during the morning business hours of November 14, 1966 Goins drove his car, in which the defendant and Thomas were passengers, into a parking lot near the State Labor and Industry building in Trenton. State Trooper Thomas Carr, who was on the 12th floor of the building maintaining a surveillance of the lot with the aid of binoculars, saw Goins leave his parked car and walk over to a white Buick automobile parked four or five cars away. The Buick was owned by Marie Doran, an employee of the Division of Employment Security, who had parked it in the lot earlier when she went to work. Carr said Goins looked into the Buick and then walked back to his own vehicle. Thereafter Goins again approached the Buick but returned to his own car when another automobile entered the parking lot. Goins opened the trunk of his car, went to the driver's side and then returned to the Buick. Carr observed Goins poking what appeared to be a wire coat hanger through the window of the Doran car. The trooper contacted a patrol car by radio and directed it to block the exit. When another automobile drove into the lot Goins stopped working the wire through the car window, returned to his own car and attempted to drive out of the exit. He was intercepted by the police. An examination of the Buiek showed the door was ajar and the latch lifted up. There were scratch marks on the rubber sealer between the windows.
A search of the Goins car revealed a rolled up wire coat hanger concealed under the front seat where the defendant had been seated. The three men were taken to the police headquarters in the State Capitol for questioning.
Thereafter, Carr with two other officers returned with Goins to the parking lot where the latter's car was parked. After Carr entered the vehicle he noticed a pearl-handled .38-calibex revolver protruding from the back of the rear seat. An examination indicated it was cocked and fully loaded. A further search revealed a .32-caliber loaded pistol concealed underneath the rear seat. When Goins was questioned about the guns he professed to have no knowledge of who owned them. Sometime later he said they belonged to him.
A further search of the vehicle turned up marijuana seeds in the console compartment between the front bucket seats and an envelope containing marijuana under the floor mat on the driver's side of the car. A search of Thomas uncovered a paper bag containing marijuana. An examination of vegetative matter found in Humphreys' shirt and jacket pockets revealed that ;t was marijuana.
Defendant denied that he committed the crimes charged in -the indictments. He testified that he asked Goins why he was going into the parking lot and that Goins replied he was going there to urinate. He said he had no knowledge of where Goins went after he left the car and denied that he ever saw the wire hanger or the guns. He further denied that he ever had marijuana in his possession.
I
The first point urged by defendant for a reversal pertains to his conviction of carrying weapons in an automobile without having first obtained a permit to carry the same. N. J. S. 2A :151-41. He alleges the court erred by including in its charge to the jury the provisions of N. J. S. 2A :151-7, which are as follows:
"The presence of a firearm in a vehicle is presumptive evidence of possession by all persons occupying the vehicle at the time."
Since no objection was made to the charge, as required by R. R. 3:7-7(b), no basis for appellate review exists unless the alleged error in the charge qualifies as plain error. R. R. 1:5-1 (a); State v. Corby, 28 N. J. 106, 108 (1958).
Defendant contends that by charging the statutory presumption the court vitiated his constitutional presumption of innocence and that, in any event, the statute should not have been applied to the facts of the case.
It is, of course, well settled that a person accused of crime enters upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence and that he can be convicted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, that presumption of innocence may be overcome, not only by direct proof, but, in many eases, when the facts are not enough, by the weight of a countervailing legislative presumption. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 184-185, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. Ed. 904 (1925). The Legislature may declare that certain facts create a presumption which, if reasonable, requires an explanation by the accused. In order that a legislative presumption that one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue does not constitute a denial of due process of law, it is only essential that there shall be a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. Yee Hem v. United States, supra, at p. 183, 45 S. Ct. 470; Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943) ; see also State v. Giordano, 121 N. J. L. 469 (Sup. Ct. 1939); State v. Lisena, 129 N. J. L. 569 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affirmed 131 N. J. L. 39 (E.& A. 1943).
N. J. S. 2A:3 51-7 is a legislative evidentiary rule which provides that the presence of a firearm in a vehicle is presumptive evidence of possession by all persons occupying the vehicle. There is a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. It does not shift the burden of proof of guilt nor deprive a defendant of due process. It means only that the accused must go forward with an explanation to rebut the presumption. State v. Laster, 69 N. J. Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 1961). When the accused offers evidence to rebut the presumption the issue ordinarily is a matter for determination by the jury. The only exception would be where the court concluded that reasonable men could not differ in accepting as true the evidence adduced by the defendant to overcome the statutory presumption, in which case the court would enter a judgment of acquittal. We conclude that N. J. S. 2A,: 151-7 is constitutionally valid. See State v. Blanca, 100 N. J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1968), decided April 2, 1968. Cf. People v. Russo, 303 N. Y. 673, 102 N. E. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1951), affirming 278 App. Div. 98, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 603 (App. Div. 1950); People v. Terra, 303 N. Y. 332, 102 N. E. 2d 576 (Ct. App. 1951).
In support of his contention that the statutory presumption was not applicable to the facts in this case defendant places reliance on State v. Lewis, 93 N. J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1966), certiorari denied 386 U. S. 986, 87 S. Ct. 1297, 18 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1967). That case is distinguiáhable on the facts. There, a gun was found concealed in the pocket of a jacket on the front seat of a car in which Lewis and six others had been riding. The jacket was not shown to be Lewis'. Lewis had been sitting in the back seat and was not in the car when the jacket and gun were found.
In the present case the evidence showed that defendant had been riding on the front passenger seat of the car before he was taken into custody. When Trooper Carr thereafter returned to the car with Goins he sat in the same seat. The trooper's testimony indicates that while so seated he observed the .38-caliber revolver to be clearly visible, protruding from the back seat of the car. A factually similar case is State v. Blanca, supra, where this court held that the trial judge did not commit error in charging the provisions of N. J. S. 2A :151-7.
We hold that it was not error to charge the statutory presumption. If defendant desired further elaboration on the issue of possession, he should have requested it. Instead, he made no objection, apparently relying upon the strength of his own proofs and the court's instructions to the jury that the presumption, as charged, did not relieve the State of its obligation to prove defendant's guilt of unlawful possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. The credibility of the proofs was for the jury, which could have concluded that defendant had acted as a lookout for Goins and that the guns in the car were for the use of all the occupants. We find no plain error.
TI
Points II and III urged by defendant for reversal concern the indictment of breaking and entering the Doran car with the intent to steal. Since both defendant and the co-defendant Thomas remained in the Goins' car while Goins sought to open the caT door of the Doran car, the court told the jury they were being charged as aiders and abettors under N. J. S. 2A: 85-14. The court charged the jury in part as follows:
"Any person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, evidences or procures another to commit a crime is punishable as a principal.
This means that not only is the person who actually commits the criminal act responsible for it but those who are there knowingly aiding and abetting are also responsible even though they did not actually commit the act.
If you find that either defendant who is alleged to have aided and abetted this crime or either of these crimes had no knowledge of the planning or committing of the crime or crimes, then, of course the defendant lacked any criminal intent and is not guilty.
No objection was made to the charge. However, defendant now urges the court committed plain error in charging the law relating to aiding and abetting because the evidence showed only that he was present during the commission of the crime by Goins and the State failed to prove that he actually participated and aided and abetted in the crime itself.
The undisputed rule is that those who aid or abet in the commission of a crime are principals and all are equally guilty. It is also generally accepted that proof that a person is present at the commission of a crime without disapproving or opposing it, is evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is competent for the jury to infer that he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same. State v. De Falco, 8 N. J. Super. 295, 299 (App. Div. 1950) ; State v. Smith, 32 N. J. 501, 521 (1960).
In this case the evidence indicated that the wire coat hanger used by Goins to open the car door was found under the seat occupied by defendant and that a loaded revolver was in plain view on the rear seat. These facts, together with other testimony referred to at the outset of this opinion and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, clearly warranted the court's charge relating to aiding and abetting. There was no plain error.
Defendant also contends that the court committed plain error in charging (as set out above) that he could not be convicted if he had no knowledge of the planning and committing of the crime because that would indicate a lack of criminal intent. He argues that such language suggested to the jury that mere knowledge of Goins' commission of a crime, without defendant's participation, was sufficient to justify a conviction. We do not believe that the jury would see the implication now suggested by defendant in lifting this sentence out of its context in the charge. In any event, we find no plain error requiring a reversal.
Ill
After defendant was taken into custody the pockets of his. shirt and jacket were turned inside out and the contents thereof, which included vegetative matter, were subjected to microscopic and chemical analysis which indicated the presence of particles of marijuana. Defendant argues that the quantity of marijuana found was so minute as not to constitute possession of a narcotic drug proscribed by N. J. S. A. 24:18-4.
. Defendant places reliance on Pelham v. State, 164 Tex. Cr. R. 226, 298 S. W. 2d 171 (Ct. App. 1957); a factually similar' case, where scrapings from the accused's pants pocket on microscopic examination revealed the' presence of marijuana. The court- there said that the use commonly made of marijuana is to smoke it in cigarettes — that it is not taken - internally or by hypodermic needles as are other narcotics. In construing the statute the Texas court concluded that to constitute the unlawful act of possessing marijuana there must be possessed an amount sufficient to be applied to the use commonly made thereof and that the infinitésima] quantity found in the scrapings did not establish possession of a narcotic within the meaning of the statute.
The rationale of the Pelham case has been rejected by other courts which hold that the quantity of marijuana found in the possession of the accused is irrelevant. Duran v. People, 145 Colo. 563, 360 P. 2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Mickens v. People, 148 Colo. 237, 365 P. 2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1961), and see Annotation, "Narcotic-Possession-What Constitutes," 91 A. L. R. 2d 810, at pp. 829-830 (1963); contra cases, ibid., at pp. 830-831.
In our State the general rule is that the quantity of narcotic drugs found in a person's possession is immaterial. State v. McDonald, 92 N. J. Super. 448, 450-452 (App. Div. 1966) (heroin). We see no logical reason to draw a distinction between drugs which are taken internally and marijuana which is smoked. The statute, N. J. S. A. 28:18-4, denounces the possession of any quantity of an illicit narcotic drug.
Affirmed.