Case Name: Terry Burl CALKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond W. MAY, Defendant-Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1976-02-02
Citations: 97 Idaho 402
Docket Number: No. 11366
Parties: Terry Burl CALKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond W. MAY, Defendant-Respondent.
Judges: McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 402–406

Head Matter:
545 P.2d 1008
Terry Burl CALKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond W. MAY, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 11366.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 2, 1976.
William L. Vasconcellos of Matthews & Lee, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.
Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Gordon S. Nielson, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Justice.
Petitioner-appellant Terry Burl Calkins, an inmate at the Idaho State Penitentiary, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 11, 1973. In his petition he alleged that he was placed in the maximum security unit for "active participation and aggravated assault in the March 7, 1973 riot." He alleges that at the hearing he was denied his right to counsel and that "Mr. Crowl the complaining officer against me was also the judge of the court that found me guilty."
The district court denied the petition in a memorandum decision and order filed April 27, 1973. The district court held that the restrictions complained of could only justify a writ for habeas corpus "where such restrictions involve cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution." Burge v. State, 90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964). The district court concluded that the allegations in the petition did not state grounds for issuance of the writ. The petitioner appealed to this Court and a motion was filed by the state to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was released from maximum security on August 1, 1973. The motion was denied by this Court on December 18, 1974, the order stating that mootness is not a ground for a motion to dismiss an appeal under the law and the appellate rules of this Court. However, the same argument is properly before us on this appeal and merits consideration.
In Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 491 P.2d 733 (1971), we adopted the rule that " 'a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.' " Citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1900, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). We find the rule equally applicable where, as here, the alleged collateral consequences flow not from a conviction, but from prison disciplinary action affecting the terms of the prisoner's present or future restraint.
On oral argument of this matter petitioner's counsel urged that the disciplinary action of the prison authorities may affect the petitioner's eligibility for parole. Certainly, "adverse effects on an inmate's eligibility for parole are within the class of collateral legal consequences which will remove a case from the limbo of mootness." Smith v. State,, supra. Respondent argues, however, that redress of such collateral consequences is beyond the scope of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus, he alleges, merely tests the legality of the restraint, when the restraint complained of ends, there is nothing left for the Court to do.
We disagree. Petitioner's eligibility for parole affects the duration, if not the fact, of his physical restraint and is within the traditional limits of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1935, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Indeed, "by virtue of both precedent and statutory authority, our courts are not limited to a simple remand or discharge of the prisoner, but may 'dispose of such party as the justice of the case may require.' I.C. § 19-4212." Mahaffey v. State, supra.
While the petition herein does not expressly mention the possibility of adverse collateral consequences, it must be construed liberally, especially where prepared by the prison inmate without the assistance of counsel. Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 415 P.2d 679 (1966). Therefore, we find that the possibility that petitioner's parol eligibility would be adversely affected by the disciplinary penalty imposed against him is sufficient to avoid mootness.
The basis of petitioner's appeal is his claim that his disciplinary hearing violated the due process standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Wolff was a class action brought by inmates of a Nebraska prison for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among their allegations was the prisoner's claim that the disciplinary procedures involved in the taking away of "good time" credits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holding that "there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country," the Court in Wolff established the following minimum procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings:
(1) advance written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense;
(2) the factfinders must prepare a written statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action;
(3) the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals;
(4) where the case involves an illiterate inmate or a complex issue, the inmate should be allowed to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff;
(5)the decisionmaker must be "sufficiently impartial to satisfy the Due Process Clause."
In the Wolff case, the disciplinary proceedings in question resulted in a deprivation of a prisoner's "good time." However, as the Court specifically pointed out:
"[I]t would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish between the procedures that are required where good-time is forfeited and those that must be extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good-time, there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction." 94 S.Ct. 2982, n. 19.
In the present case, however, we are foreclosed from reaching the merits of petitioner's appeal by the Court's directive in Wolff that the new procedural rules, even if applicable, are to be applied only in future disciplinary hearings. The Court states:
"Despite the fact that procedures are related to the integrity of the fact-finding process, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, where less is generally at stake for an individual than at a criminal trial, great weight should be given to the significant impact a retroactivity ruling would have on the administration of all prisons in the country, and the reliance prison officials placed, in good faith, on prior law not requiring such procedures. During 1973, the Federal Government alone conducted 19,000 misconduct hearings, as compared with 1,173 parole revocation hearings, and 2,023 probation revocation hearings. We also note that a contrary holding would be very troublesome for the parole system since performance in prison is often a relevant criteria for parole. On the whole, we do not think that error was so pervasive in the system under the old procedures to warrant this cost or result." 94 S.Ct. at 2983.
The decision in Wolff was handed down on June 26, 1974, well after the complained of action in the present case. Consequently, the authority relied upon by the district court in denying the petition was still valid and correctly applied.
The order of the district court is affirmed.
McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN, J., concur.
. The named defendant, Raymond W. May, is no longer a prison official and a proper party to this action. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has filed his brief and made oral argument without raising this issue. Consequently, we deem the petition to be directed against the present prison officials in accordance with I.C. § 5-319 and find that their interests were adequately represented on appeal.