Case Name: Kraig Alexander WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-08-16
Citations: 258 So. 3d 502
Docket Number: No. 1D17-731
Parties: Kraig Alexander WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 258
Pages: 502–507

Head Matter:
Kraig Alexander WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D17-731
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
August 16, 2018
Rehearing Denied December 13, 2018
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, M. J. Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
B.L. Thomas, C.J.
Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his cause challenge of Juror Gilbreath, who once worked as a prosecutor for the state attorney's office and whose husband is an investigator for that office. We affirm.
Facts
Appellant was charged by information with possession of oxycodone, morphine, heroin, cocaine, and cannabis, and was charged with knowingly driving while license suspended or revoked. During voir dire before trial, prospective juror Gilbreath stated that she had been an attorney for thirty-seven years and that her husband worked for the state attorney's office. In response to questions from the State, Gilbreath stated she currently worked as a family law attorney, was a prosecutor for eight years in the state attorney's office, followed by criminal defense work for two or three years. Gilbreath also stated that her husband is an investigator in the state attorney's office. Gilbreath stated that nothing about her experience as a prosecutor or her husband's employment would affect her ability to be fair and impartial.
Appellant moved to strike Gilbreath for cause, based on her past relationship with the state attorney's office and her husband's current employment with the state attorney's office. The State argued that Gilbreath indicated she could be fair and impartial, and additionally argued that she had also been a criminal defense attorney for two or three years. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to strike. Because Appellant had already exhausted six peremptory strikes, Appellant requested an additional strike, which the trial court denied, stating there was no basis.
Before proceeding to trial, Appellant objected to the jury panel being sworn, based on the court's denial of the cause challenge of Juror Gilbreath. The State again argued Gilbreath's impartiality and her previous criminal defense work. The trial court found there was no reasonable doubt that Gilbreath could be fair and impartial, adding that he had known her for thirty-seven years, that no one challenged her unequivocal statements in voir dire that she could be fair and impartial, and that she had been a well-respected attorney in Jacksonville for many years.
Analysis
"The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a cause challenge is one of abuse of discretion." Ranglin v. State , 55 So.3d 744, 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Singleton v. State , 783 So.2d 970, 973 (Fla. 2001) ). "The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a challenge for cause, and the decision will not be overturned on appeal absent manifest error." Kopsho v. State , 959 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2007).
"The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court." Busby v. State , 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004). "Where the record demonstrates a reasonable doubt about a juror's ability to be impartial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the cause challenge." Carratelli v. State , 961 So.2d 312, 319 (Fla. 2007).
The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that "a law enforcement position inherently creates a disability to serve as a fair and impartial juror." State v. Williams , 465 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 1985). A law enforcement connection, standing alone, is generally not enough to render a potential juror partial to the State. See, e.g. Busby , 894 So.2d at 95 (stating "[t]his Court has consistently held that the mere fact that someone is a correctional officer is not per se grounds for a cause challenge"); see also Blake v. State , 110 So.3d 534, 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding it was error to strike a potential juror who was engaged to a public defender in a different circuit); Livingston v. State , 512 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (holding trial court did not err "in disallowing appellant's challenge to the husband of a former secretary in the state attorney's office, after he had run ou[t] of peremptory challenges").
Reversible error has been found in failing to excuse potential jurors for cause who had connections to law enforcement and made equivocal statements indicating that the connection may affect their ability to be impartial. See Williams v. State , 638 So.2d 976, 977-978 (Fla. 1994) (holding juror who had contacts with U.S. Attorney's Office, stated that he had "deep feelings in this kind of case," and made equivocal statements that "I hope that I can" be impartial and "I'll be impartial because that's my character" should have been stricken for cause); Jefferson v. State , 489 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (finding error in failing to excuse juror for cause who repeatedly made equivocal remarks about whether her husband's career in law enforcement would affect her ability to be impartial).
Appellant cites cases from the Third and Fourth Districts where jurors' employment with the state attorney's office was grounds for reversal. In Bethel v. State , the Fourth District held that a juror who was currently working as an assistant state attorney for the same state attorney's office that was currently prosecuting the case should have been stricken for cause. 122 So.3d 944, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Similarly, in Denson v. State , the Fourth District found reversible error in a trial court's failure to strike for cause a juror who currently was an assistant state attorney and was the supervisor of the assistant state attorney who was trying the case. 609 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). And in Henry v. State , the defendant challenged a potential juror for cause who currently worked as a legal secretary for the state attorney's office. 586 So.2d 1335, 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The potential juror gave equivocal answers to questions about her impartiality, saying "I don't think so" when the trial court asked if her working in the state attorney's office would affect her impartiality. Id. The Third District held that the juror's "employment at the state attorney's office does not provide an inherent reason to preclude her service on the jury," but her employment created some doubt that was not relieved by her equivocal responses. Id. at 1337. The cases above are distinguishable from the present case, however, because in each of the above-cited cases, the juror in question was currently employed by the state attorney's office, and had some connection to the attorney trying the case or was related to someone who participated in the trial.
Here, Juror Gilbreath began her career by working for the state attorney's office for eight years, but afterward moved to criminal defense work for two to three years, and has since been working in family law for the past twenty-six years. Gilbreath's husband worked as an investigator for the state attorney's office, but did not participate in the trial. Juror Gilbreath stated unequivocally that her former employment and her husband's current employment would not affect her ability to be impartial. Conversely, Henry held that a connection to the state attorney's office, on its own, was not enough to establish the lack of impartiality of a juror; rather, the connection, coupled with equivocal statements about impartiality, rendered a juror partial to the State. 586 So.2d at 1337.
Juror Gilbreath's employment with the state attorney's office nearly twenty-seven years earlier, and her husband's employment as an investigator with the state attorney's office, standing on its own, does not establish that Juror Gilbreath was partial to the State. Williams , 465 So.2d at 1230-31. Further, Gilbreath's unequivocal statements that she would not be biased by any connections to the state attorney's office were sufficient to remove any reasonable doubt as to her impartiality.
Appellant also argues that the court abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter by stating that he knew Juror Gilbreath and that she had been a respected attorney for many years. Appellant cites Jones v. State , 54 So.3d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), in which the trial judge suggested a line of questioning to the prosecutor. This court noted that the judge's actions were "ill-advised," but found that the actions did not constitute fundamental error. Id. at 505-06. Here, the trial court's comments that Juror Gilbreath was a well-respected attorney are not as suggestive as the comments in Jones , which this court ultimately held were not in error; thus, there was no error here, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's cause challenge to Juror Gilbreath.
We affirm without comment the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED .
Ray, J., concurs; Wolf, J., dissents with opinion.