Case Name: Marlin Leon WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-05-02
Citations: 981 So. 2d 554
Docket Number: No. 2D06-2973
Parties: Marlin Leon WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: KELLY and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 981
Pages: 554–557

Head Matter:
Marlin Leon WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 2D06-2973.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 2, 2008.
Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Shelton S. Bridges, IV, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard E. MacDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Marlin Leon Wiggins' petition for writ of prohibition was previously denied by order with opinion to follow. This opinion sets forth the basis for the denial of the petition seeking relief from the trial court's order granting the State's motion for extension of the speedy trial period. The denial is predicated on the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion.
Review of a trial court's decision concerning an extension of the speedy trial period pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. See Routly v. State, 440 So.2d 1257, 1261 (Fla.1983) ("[T]he trial court's determination of exceptional circumstances is a matter of discretion based on the facts presented below."); Burns v. State, 433 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) ("A trial judge has enormous discretion in deciding whether to grant an extension of the speedy trial time limitations."). "This means that the trial judge's ruling may be disturbed only if we conclude that it was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable," which requires that we determine that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial judge." Westberry v. State, 700 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (citing Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980)).
In light of the delays occasioned by the State's efforts to obtain Mr. Wiggins' presence in Hillsborough County, together with its actions to obtain blood and saliva samples from Mr. Wiggins, the trial court's decision to extend the speedy trial period based on exceptional circumstances was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.
The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those involved in Sullivan v. State, 728 So.2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and Clark v. State, 873 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), cases upon which the dissent relies. In Sullivan, 728 So.2d at 292, the extension was inappropriate because the State made a "minimal showing" based on conclusory assertions concerning the unavailability of witnesses. In Clark, 873 So.2d at 599, the extension was erroneous because "a speedy trial can[not] be trumped by the unavailability of a nonessential witness." Here, the importance of the blood and saliva samples and DNA evidence — which were the basis for the extension — is unquestioned.
Petition denied.
KELLY and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
LaROSE, J., dissents with opinion.