Case Name: Alfred G. ZABEL and David H. Russell, Appellants, v. PINELLAS COUNTY WATER AND NAVIGATION CONTROL AUTHORITY, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-01-20
Citations: 171 So. 2d 376
Docket Number: No. 32831
Parties: Alfred G. ZABEL and David H. Russell, Appellants, v. PINELLAS COUNTY WATER AND NAVIGATION CONTROL AUTHORITY, Appellee.
Judges: DREW, C. J., ROBERTS and O’CON-NELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 171
Pages: 376–388

Head Matter:
Alfred G. ZABEL and David H. Russell, Appellants, v. PINELLAS COUNTY WATER AND NAVIGATION CONTROL AUTHORITY, Appellee.
No. 32831.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 20, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1965.
Harris & Harris, St. Petersburg, for appellants.
Page S. Jackson and Julian R. Howay, St. Petersburg, for Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, appellee.
Byron T. Sauls, St. Petersburg, as amicus curiae.

Opinion:
CALDWELL, Justice.
Appellants Zabel and Russell petitioned the Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, appellee, requesting that it fix a bulkhead line and grant them a dredge and fill permit for approximately 11.-5 acres of submerged land in Boca Ciega Bay under the authority of F.S. § 253.122, 253.124, F.S.A. and Chapter 31182, Special Acts 1955. An examiner appointed by the Authority recommended denial of appellants' application. The Authority affirmed the examiner. The Circuit Court of Pinel-las County held the Authority correct in its confirmance and found additionally that appellants had elected their remedy and es-topped themselves from urging unconstitu tionality of the acts under which they were at the same time seeking relief.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the Circuit Court on the merits of the cause but held the lower court erred in holding appellants were barred under doctrine of election of remedies and estopped from raising the constitutional issue. The District Court then proceeded to "deal initially with the matter of constitutionality" and held the acts in question valid "even though title to the submerged lands had been acquired prior to the passage of the acts protested
Appellants assert they were erroneously required by the Authority and the trial court to carry the burden of proof in showing no adverse effect upon the public interest. The question was raised before the Authority, the trial court and the District Court of Appeal and is presented here. Ap-pellee, although assuming that appellants have the burden of proof, has ignored this issue and argues only there is evidence in the record to sustain the findings of the examiner.
The examiner, the Authority and the trial court apparently held the statute required appellants to prove the proposed fill would not materially affect adversely any of the eight specified public interests. It is not clear the statutes do in fact place the burden of proof upon the property owner but, if they do, such requirement would render the statute unconstitutional as to the facts-of this case.
The District Court appears to have agreed with appellants' contention that Chapter 31182 provides for refusal of a permit only where it is shown the proposed fill will have material adverse effect. The court held, under the statute, the Authority was free to make its own determination independent of presumption as to the examiner's findings and reasoned " it is obvious that the determination made [by the Authority] was that the proposed plan would produce materially adverse effects." We agree the Authority could' have made an independent determination but, in doing so, it was required to comply with Chapter 31182 Special Acts of 1955(8)-(e) by reducing its determination to writ ing and filing it with the clerk for the inspection of the public. Our examination of the Minutes of the meeting at which the Authority voted to deny the permit persuades us the Authority did not make an independent determination which was reduced to writing and filed as required but merely accepted the findings and determination of the examiner, which were based upon an erroneous application of the rule relating to the burden of proof.
The examiner found the appellants had failed to prove there would be no adverse •effect but he did not find that the appellee-had proven material adverse effect would result from the proposed fill. He reached these conclusions:
"Based upon the testimony taken before me, and my personal inspections of the proposed dredge and fill site, it is the finding of the Examiner that Applicants have failed to establish that the proposed plan of development will have no adverse effect on the use of the waters of Pinellas County for transportation, recreational or other public purposes, flow of water or tidal currents and erosion and shoaling of channels in the area necessarily affected by the proposed development; further Applicants have failed to establish that the proposed plan of development will have no adverse monetary or other effect upon the uplands surrounding or necessarily affected by said plan of development." (Emphasis supplied)
The examiner did not find, nor could he have on the record, that any material adverse effect on the public interest had been demonstrated. The evidence in the record and as summarized by the District Court in its opinion failed to meet the standard of proof contemplated by the statute.
The burden and the degree of proof required in proceedings such as those involved here are of fundamental importance in view of the property rights involved. The sale of the land by the state to appellants' predecessors in title expressly carried with it by statute the right to bulkhead and fill. This right, a form of property, was at all times a legitimate public concern and as such is subj ect to reasonable regulation under the police power.
Conceding, for the purpose of this cause that, under certain conditions, a police power regulation could, by prohibiting filling or dredging, deprive the owner of any valuable use of his property, it is clear that such regulation can be valid only if a material adverse effect specified by the Legislature is proven. Such regulation, absent proof of an overriding public necessity, constitutes the taking of private property without just compensation.
As previously stated the conveyance from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund carried with it the right to bulkhead and fill. That conveyance is presumptively valid and based upon a determination by the Trustees that the public interest would not be impaired. In Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, 802 (Fla.1957) this court stated:
"[T]he Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund are five constitutional officers of the executive branch of the government. If we are ever to apply the rule that public officials will be presumed to do their duty, it would appear to us to be most appropriate in this instance. Certainly we are not to assume that in the supervision and disposition of submerged lands the Trustees will knowingly ignore the rights of upland owners. It is to be assumed that they will exercise their judgment in a fashion that will give due regard to private • rights as well as public rights. This Board would appear to be the most appropriate repository of the responsibility to be exercised in these matters in the first instance. The exercise of their judgment should not be subjected to adverse judicial scrutiny absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion or a violation of law."
In 1951 the conveyances by the trustees of the lands in question were "ratified, confirmed, and validated in all respects." If, because of the passage of time and changed conditions, the public interest will be impaired by the proposed use of the land tlie burden is on the objectors to demonstrate that fact.
In Gies v. Fischer, this court affirmed the District Court's construction of F.S. §' 253.122, F.S.A. as authorizing the establishment of a bulkhead line only at a point where in fact "a further extension of land or islands outward would be an interference with the servitude in favor of commerce and navigation." and held:
"Under the rule of the cited cases there can be no doubt that in the absence of some overriding necessity a conveyance of public lands or rights in lands which actually results in the impairment of the public servitudes, referred to in the- statute here involved, must fail." (Em- phasis supplied)
The District Court of Appeal correctly held the statute involved to be constitutional but was in error in failing to find that a denial of the permit in this case can be sustained as a valid police regulation only if material adverse effect on the specified public interest is proven. The statutory rights of the appellants to dredge, fill and bulkhead the land, subject to reasonable' limitations, are appellants' only present rights attributable to ownership of the submerged land itself. Those rights may not be arbitrarily denied and the owners deprived of the only beneficial use of their property without compensation.
In Kass v. Lewin this court held:
"The word 'property' in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution includes the right to acquire, use and dispose of it for lawful purposes, and the constitution protects each of these essentials."
In Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, this court sustained an attack on a zoning ordinance as applied to petitioners' property because the ordinance, in reducing the building area on the property to seventeen feet in depth, deprived the owner of its beneficial use. This court held:
"This court is committed to the doctrine that when the application of a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely depriving the owner of the beneficial use of his property by precluding the only use to which it is reasonably adapted, an attack on the validity of the ordinance as applied to the particular property involved will be sustained. State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114; State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4; Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642."
In Beck v. Littlefield this court stated that an ordinance which purported to prohibit the erection of any building on the property in question would clearly "run afoul of the guaranty of due process."
It is our view that a denial of permission to fill in this case amounts to a taking of property without just compensation because it was not established that the granting of the permit would materially and adversely affect the public interest. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is quashed and the cause remanded for disposition consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
DREW, C. J., ROBERTS and O'CON-NELL, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., dissent and concur with ERVIN, J.
. 154 So.2d 181 (Fla.App.1963).
. Id., 154 So.2d at 186, 188.
. Chapter 31182, § 8(e) Special Acts 1955: "That the Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority shall obtain such engineering or other data and hear such testimony under oath as may be necessary to determine.
"1. The effect of the proposed plan or development on the use of said waters in said county for transportation and recreational or other public purposes and public conveniences.
"2. The effect of the proposed plan or development on the free use of the waterways and navigable waters.
"3. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon erosion control.
"4. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon the flow of water or tidal currents in said county.
"5. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon erosion, shoaling of channels, formation of stagnant pockets likely to collect debris and upon extraordinary storm damage.
"6. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon the natural beauty and recreational advantages of Pinellas county.
"7. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon the conservation of wild life, marine life, and other natural resources.
"8. The effect of the proposed plan or development upon the uplands surrounding or necessarily affected by said plan or development.
"The Board, after public hearing, from said date and testimony, shall make findings of fact and determine whether or not the proposed plan or development will materially affect any of the rights- and interests of the public heretofore set out in this section."
. 154 So.2d 181, 185 (Fla.App. 2nd 1963).
. "The Board, after public hearing, from said data and testimony, shall make findings of fact and determine whether or not the proposed plan or development will materially affect any of the rights and interests of the public heretofore set out in this section. Said findings of fact and said determination shall be reduced to writing and shall be filed with the Clerk of the Board and, when so filed, shall be open to the public."
. 154 So.2d 181, 183-184 (Fla.App.2nd 1963).
. See Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Ma. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919), (Riparian rights are property rights that may be regulated but not taken without just compensation.); Gibson v. City of Tampa, 135 Ma. 637, 185 So. 319 (1938) (Right to propagate oysters under leases on oyster beds in Tampa Bay constitutes "property") ; Hamilton v. Williams, 145 Ma. 697, 200 So. 80 (1941) (Right of a property owner to hunt such wild game as is found upon his land is a vested property right).
. In Corneal v. State Plan Board, 95 So.2d 1, 4, 70 A.L.R.23 845 (Ma.1957) this court stated the rule as follows: "While the police power is very broad in concept, this legislative power is fenced about by constitutional limitations, and it cannot properly be exercised beyond such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of individuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the public health, safety and welfare."
. Ibid: "In enacting regulatory measures which protect but do not destroy property, the law need not restrict itself to conditions actually harmful but may require precautions within the whole range of possible danger. But the absolute destruction of property is an extreme exercise of the police power and is justified only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity, unless the state chooses to pay compensation."
. At least one member of the Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, although voting for denial of the permit, recognized possible infringements of rights and stated for the record that "he did hope that if it is possible in the next session of the Legislature there be some addition to the law allowing either the state or the county to condemn privately owned submerged lands in order that the owners can be compensated for the land when there is a negative decision on an application for filling on privately owned submerged lands."
. Fla.Laws, 1917, ch. 7304, § 5 at 117: "Purchaser to have right to bulkhead. — - In case any such islands or submerged lands are sold by the trustees according to the provisions of Sections 1061 and 1062, the purchaser shall have the right to bulkhead and fill in same as provided by Section 2460 of these Revised General Statutes, without, however, being required to connect the same with the-shore or with the permanent wharf."
. Accord, Pembroke v. Pennisular Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249, 258. (1933):
"And, as pointed out in the Deering-Case [Deering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54], it was the intent of the-statute that it should also be their duty, whether objections were made or not made, not to sell and convey if to do so-would 'interfere "with the rights granted to riparian owners by the laws of' Florida, or would be a serious impediment to navigation or public fisheries."
"The presumption is that the trustees, being public officials of the state, complied with their duty under the law, and' that they correctly ascertained the facts; warranting their action. "
. F.S. § 253.12(2), F.S.A.
. 146 So.2d 361 (Fla.1962).
. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, (1957).
. 104 So.2d 572, 578 (Fla.1958).
. 70 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla.1954).
. 68 So.2d 889, 890 (Fla.1953).