Case Name: The STATE of Texas, ex rel., John F. HEALEY, Jr., District Attorney, Relator, v. Honorable Walter S. McMEANS, Judge, County Court at Law No. 2, Respondent
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1994-04-13
Citations: 884 S.W.2d 772
Docket Number: No. 71715
Parties: The STATE of Texas, ex rel., John F. HEALEY, Jr., District Attorney, Relator, v. Honorable Walter S. McMEANS, Judge, County Court at Law No. 2, Respondent.
Judges: CLINTON, MILLER and OVERSTREET, JJ., join.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 772–782

Head Matter:
The STATE of Texas, ex rel., John F. HEALEY, Jr., District Attorney, Relator, v. Honorable Walter S. McMEANS, Judge, County Court at Law No. 2, Respondent.
No. 71715.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
April 13, 1994.
Judge Baird Filed Opinion Concurring in Denial of Rehearing Oct. 5, 1994.
John F. Healey, Jr., and J. Sidney Crowley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Richmond, for relator.
Charles L. Babcock, N. David Bleisch, Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON RELATOR'S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Relator John F. Healey, Jr., District Attorney of Fort Bend County, seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court directing respondent Walter S. McMeans, Judge of County Court at Law Number Two of Fort Bend County, to vacate his orders granting motions to quash four subpoenas. The subpoenas in question commanded four newsmen to appear and give evidence in a pending criminal prosecution. We will conditionally grant the writ.
The Relevant Facts
Sometime in late 1992 or early 1993, relator presented an information in respondent's court charging Newell Willard Evans, a funeral home operator, with abuse of a corpse. See Tex.Penal Code § 42.10. On June 17, 1993, relator subpoenaed four local television newsmen, commanding them to give testimony and produce any videotapes they had concerning the alleged offense. The news men promptly filed motions to quash on the ground that they had a qualified privilege, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8, of the Texas Constitution, not to testify or produce other evidence at any criminal trial. See 1 J. Strong (ed.), McCormick on Evidence § 76.2 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing alleged "newsman's privilege").
On June 29, 1993, respondent held a hearing on the newsmen's motions to quash. A Fort Bend County assistant district attorney testified at the hearing that he had been assigned to prosecute Evans and that he had reason to believe that the newsmen had heard and videotaped Evans making incriminating statements regarding the alleged offense. The newsmen argued in response at the hearing that they had a qualified constitutional privilege not to give any evidence unless the State could show that it had a compelling need for the evidence. They argued further that the State had not shown such a need. On July 9, 1993, respondent granted the motions to quash.
On July 16, 1993, relator, relying upon Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), asked this Court for a stay of all proceedings in the trial court and a writ of mandamus ordering respondent to vacate his orders granting the motions to quash. On August 16, 1993, we stayed the proceedings below and ordered this case filed and set for submission.
The Law of Mandamus
This Court is empowered by Article V, § 5, of the Texas Constitution to issue writs of mandamus in all criminal law matters. Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy, however, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Perkins v. Third Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Accordingly, mandamus relief is available only when the relator can establish two things: first, that no other adequate remedy at law is available; and second, that the act he seeks to compel is ministerial. Braxton v. Dunn, 803 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). An act is ministerial "when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed . with such certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgment." Texas Dept, of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
Of course, mandamus "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal." Bradley v. Miller, 458 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1970). Thus, mandamus may not be used to give the State a right to appeal that was not granted by the Legislature in Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. But the limitations in Article 44.01 on the State's right to appeal are no impediment to the State's use of mandamus to correct judicial action that is clearly contrary to well-settled law, whether that law is derived from a statute, rule, or opinion of a court. As two eminent commentators have explained: "In limiting the government's right to appeal, ., the legislature has made clear that the government cannot complain of ordinary trial errors, but it cannot have intended that the [government be obliged to submit to arbitrary judges who refuse to behave as judges." W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 27.4 at 1155-1156 (2nd ed. 1992) (some punctuation omitted). In other words, the Legislature, in enacting Article 44.01, cannot have intended that mandamus be unavailable to correct judicial action that ignores clear, binding precedent from a court of superior jurisdiction. Trial judges do not enjoy the freedom to ignore the law.
Application
Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we conclude that relator has es tablished the prerequisites to mandamus relief. First, he has demonstrated that he has no other adequate remedy at law. He cannot appeal respondent's orders under Article 44.01, and if he proceeds to trial without the newsmen's evidence and the jury acquits Evans, he (i.e., relator) will have no appellate avenue available for review of respondent's orders.
Second, relator has demonstrated that respondent has a ministerial duty to vacate the orders granting the motions to quash. This is so because the recognition of a "newsman's privilege" is clearly contrary to well-settled law. Although Article V of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence contains a variety of evidentiary privileges, it does not contain a privilege for newsmen. The privileges that are contained in Article V were not lightly created and were carefully designed to protect important interests which clearly outweigh the competing public interest in the search for truth. Furthermore, under our decision in Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736, which is binding on all lower criminal courts in Texas, newsmen have no constitutional privilege, qualified or otherwise, to withhold evidence relevant to a pending criminal prosecution. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (rejecting claim of newsman's privilege under the First Amendment); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518, 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991) (reaffirming Branzburg); Univ. of Penn. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 200-01,110 S.Ct. 577, 588 (1990) (same).
Even if we were to assume arguendo the existence of a newsman's privilege in some contexts, it, like the presidential privilege implicit in the separation of powers doctrine and Article II of the United States Constitution, would have to yield in the face of the fundamental need, on the part of both the prosecution and the defense, to develop all facts in an adversarial system of criminal justice. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). As the Supreme Court explained in Nixon,
[t]he ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
. [T]he allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.... [T]he constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal ease in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally ftus-trated.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 709, 712-713, 94 S.Ct. at 3108, 3110.
The application of Article Y and Grothe to the facts of this case requires no act of discretion or judgment on the part of respondent; he need only read Article V and Grothe and apply them, just as he might read and apply a statute. In other words, the application of Article V and Grothe to the facts of this case is "ministerial" as we have previously defined that term. That being the ease, respondent is not free to simply ignore the existing law and thereby thwart compulsory process vital to the commencement and completion of a criminal trial.
Conclusion
Relator has established the prerequisites for mandamus relief. As is our custom, we will withhold issuance of the writ and accord respondent an opportunity to conform his actions to this opinion. Only if such action is not taken will the writ of mandamus issue.
MALONEY, J., joins with note: The parties do not address the ramifications of article 18.01(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which precludes the issuance of an evi-dentiary search warrant for articles "located in an office of a newspaper, news magazine, television station, or radio station" except for property or items described in subsections 1-9 of article 18.02. Admittedly an evidentiary search warrant is a much more drastic invasion of privacy than a subpoena; but the Legislature has at least evidenced some intent to maintain the privacy of a news office and its contents in passing article 18.01(e). We might ask if you can't seize it by court order (search warrant), how can you subpoena it by clerk order? However, the implications of article 18.01 are not before us. Accordingly I join the opinion of the Court.
. More specifically, the subpoenas commanded the newsmen to testify and to produce "any coverage shot of the Newell Evans/Larry Bojor-ski body dumping case which occurred during the week of October 12, 1992."
. The First Amendment's guarantee of the freedom of the press was made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707, 51 S.Ct. 625, 267-28, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
. Article I, § 8, provides in relevant part that "no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of . the press."
. We note also that the Legislature has not enacted a statutory newsman's privilege.