Case Name: CENTURY MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Petitioner, v. Angel B. MARIN, M.D., Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-10-09
Citations: 686 So. 2d 606
Docket Number: No. 95-1097
Parties: CENTURY MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Petitioner, v. Angel B. MARIN, M.D., Respondent.
Judges: Before JORGENSON, COPE and GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 686
Pages: 606–613

Head Matter:
CENTURY MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Petitioner, v. Angel B. MARIN, M.D., Respondent.
No. 95-1097.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 9, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1997.
Patino & Associates, PA and Hicks, Anderson & Blum, P.A. and Alyssa Campbell, Miami, for petitioner.
Charles B. Patrick, P.A. and Charles Patrick, Miami, for respondent.
Before JORGENSON, COPE and GREEN, JJ.
Jorgenson, J., did not hear oral argument.

Opinion:
COPE, Judge.
Century Medical Centers, Inc. petitions for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of an order compelling discovery. Century contends that the order infringes the peer review privilege created by subsection 766.101(5), Florida Statutes (1998). We deny certiorari, with the proviso that petitioner Century Medical Centers, Inc. need not disclose any matters which would reveal the deliberations of the peer review committee.
The plaintiff, Dr. Angel Marin, sued Century for breach of an employment contract to provide medical services. In its affirmative defenses, Century stated:
5. As a second affirmative defense, Defendant, CENTURY, states that Plaintiff, ANGEL B. MARIN, was terminated "with cause, ["] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment contract attached to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and therefore this Defendant is not liable.
6. As a third affirmative defense, this Defendant states that the Plaintiff breached the duty attributable to him under the contract, and therefore Defendant, CENTURY, was justified in terminating Plaintiff from employment under the contract; where Plaintiff failed to materially carry out the terms and conditions of the contract attached to Plaintiffs Complaint and exhibits thereto, and therefore Defendant ⅛ not liable.
11. As a further affirmative defense, this Defendant states that the Plaintiff, ANGEL B. MARIN, M.D., was terminated based upon actions of Defendant's quality assurance medical review committee (peer review), and no cause of action for damages may arise against the Defendant; pursuant to Florida Statute § 766.101, CENTURY MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., and members of its peer review committee are immune from liability or money damages for any acts or proceedings undertaken or performed within the scope of the function of the committee, and the Plaintiffs claims are barred and/or this Defendant is not liable to Plaintiff.
By these affirmative defenses, Century asserted two distinct things.. First, Century contended in paragraphs five and six that the doctor had breached material terms of the employment contract. Second, Century also claimed that it discharged Dr. Marin in response to an action taken by the peer review committee. By this Century evidently means that the peer review committee revoked Dr. Marin's credentials, or recommended that he be discharged. Thus Century staked out two distinct lines of defense: (1) that Dr. Marin materially breached the employment contract, and (2) (alternatively) that the peer review committee took action against Dr. Marin.
The trial court ordered Century to answer the following interrogatories propounded by Dr. Marin:
2. Please state the factual basis for paragraph # 5 of your Answer wherein you state that the Plaintiff, ANGEL B. MARIN, M.D., was terminated with cause in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment contract.
(a) Please give the names and addresses of any witnesses you are aware of who can substantiate said facts.
(b) If there is any documentation to support that affirmative defense presently in your custody, please give the name and address of the person who has custody of the document.
3. Please state the factual basis for the affirmative defense raised in paragraph # 6 of your Answer that states that the Plaintiff breached the duty attributable to him under the contract and that he failed to materially carry out the terms and conditions of the contract.
(a) Please give the names and addresses of any witnesses you are aware of who can substantiate said facts.
(b) If there is any documentation to support that affirmative defense presently in your custody, please give the name and address of the person who has custody of the document.
Century objected that these interrogatories infringe the peer review privilege, but the trial court overruled the objection.
We conclude that the interrogatories are perfectly proper. See Mount Sinai Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Bernstein, 645 So.2d 530, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). They are directed to Century's claims that Dr. Marin breached the employment contract. Obviously if Century intends to try to prove at trial that Dr. Marin breached the employment contract, Dr. Marin is entitled to full discovery on that point. If Century referred the matters constituting the alleged breach of contract to the peer review committee for consideration, that does not create any blanket exemption for Century from discovery. Century must answer the interrogatories, but has a privilege not to disclose the deliberations of the peer review committee. Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111 (Fla.1992).
Century objects to the portion of the trial court order compelling Century to produce the following documents:
A copy of any and all written or verbal complaints or grievances filed with Century Medical Centers, Inc., at any time against Angel B. Marin, M.D., by any patient or subscriber or other person prior to April 13,1993.
The trial court order compelling production is correct. If a patient complained to Century about Dr. Marin, the record of that complaint must be produced. If Century referred the complaint to the peer review committee for consideration, the fact of the referral, and the deliberations of the committee, need not be disclosed. However, the fact that a patient complaint is referred to the peer review committee does not render the patient complaint immune from discovery. The complaint is discoverable; the deliberations of the peer review committee are not.
In the present lawsuit, Dr. Marin is preparing to defend against Century's claim that he materially breached his contract to provide medical services. In order to prepare his defense, one of the things Dr. Marin wants to know is whether any patients complained about him to Century. If anyone complained about Dr. Marin, Dr. Marin •wants the opportunity to investigate those complaints now — and not hear about them for the first time at trial. Similarly, if Century's discovery response is that no one complained about Dr. Marin, that is information which the jury may be entitled to hear at trial.
The discovery request must be evaluated in the context of the facts of this case. In Dr. Marin's sworn answers to interrogatories, Dr. Marin claims that he was discharged from Century as a cost cutting measure. In answering Century's interrogatories, Dr. Marin said:
They terminated my contract before completion without just cause and asked me to sign a letter requesting review of their decision which was backdated before the date of termination. A representative of Century also contacted me by phone after the termination asking if I would do surgery for them for less money than my contract.
Dr. Marin says, in other words, that the claims of substandard performance and peer review problems are all a charade. According to Dr. Marin, the best evidence that Century regards him as a qualified physician is that after discharging him, Century attempted to hire him back—provided that he would accept lower compensation. Against that defense, it is particularly pertinent, at least for discovery purposes, for Dr. Marin to find out if there were patients who complained about him.
Century relies on the Fourth District decision in Palm Beach Gardens Community Hospital, Inc., v. O'Brien, 651 So.2d 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In that case plaintiffs sued the defendant hospital and defendant physicians for the death of their child while in the hospital's care. Plaintiffs sought a list of prior incidents at the hospital involving the same physicians. From the wording of the opinion, it appears that the responsive information was to be found only in the files of the peer review committee, which files were not discoverable. In the present case, by contrast, this discovery request is directed to Century, not its peer review committee. Patient complaints directed to Century fall within the scope of permissible discovery under the circumstances of this ease.
Century objects that the court directed it to answer the following interrogatory:
Please give the name and address of the person who was employed by Century Medical Centers, Inc. at or about the time of the termination of Dr. Marin's contract and who was most knowledgeable about the circumstances surrounding the termination.
This interrogatory is proper. Century must designate the corporate representative or representatives with most knowledge regarding the termination. If at deposition Century believes that the peer review privilege is being invaded, an appropriate objection can be made at that time.
Century objects that the trial court ordered it to answer the following interrogatory:
Please give the names and addresses of any other physicians who were under contract with Century Medical Centers, Inc., and whose contracts were terminated for any reason for the six (6) month period before April 13, 1993 and for the six (6) month period after April 13,1993.
Century argues that the interrogatory requests irrelevant information. We disagree. The interrogatory "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
Century also contends that a response to this interrogatory would unduly infringe other physicians' privacy interests. On the contrary, the fact that a physician becomes affiliated with a particular health maintenance organization, or ceases affiliation with a particular health maintenance organization, is hardly confidential information. To the contrary, this is the type of information which would be widely disseminated to patients and staff.
Century relies on American Health Plan, Inc. v. Kostner, 367 So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). That ease is distinguishable. The interrogatories in that case required American Health Plan to disclose "the names of the subscribers to petitioner's health plan whose contracts for health services were terminated by petitioner for misrepresentation or omissions of medical information made in their applications_" Id. at 276-77. This court quashed the order compelling discovery because (1) the discovery would unduly infringe patient privacy rights; (2) the information sought was not relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and (3) the interrogatories were unduly burdensome because they would require the review of more than three thousand files in order to find the requested information. Id. at 277. No comparable interests are involved in the present ease.
Century complains about a portion of the trial court order compelling Century to provide certain information regarding Medicare or Medicaid billings which used Dr. Marin's provider number. The record reveals that Century answered the interrogatory, thus mooting the issue.
In sum, there was no departure from the essential requirements of law in the compelling of the above discovery. We deny certio-rari with the caveat, as explained above, that the deliberations of the peer review committee are not to be revealed.
JORGENSON, J., concurs.
. It should be noted that Cruger dealt with documents which were exclusively intended for review by the peer review committee — i.e., credentialing information. Those are not the facts of this case.
. If a patient complained directly to the- peer review committee, then that complaint would be exempt from disclosure. See Cruger, 599 So.2d at 115.
. The interrogatory does not ask Century to disclose solely those persons who were terminated for cause, nor does it ask for any specification of the reason for termination.