Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Monya Demonda TOWNSEND, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-03-29
Citations: 472 F. App'x 625
Docket Number: No. 11-30060
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Monya Demonda TOWNSEND, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 472
Pages: 625–627

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Monya Demonda TOWNSEND, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-30060.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2012.
Filed March 29, 2012.
Murguia, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.
Alexander C. Ekstrom, Assistant U.S., USYA-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Gregory Lee Scott, Gregory Scott Law Office, Yakima, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: PAEZ and MURGUTA, Circuit Judges, and TUCKER, District Judge.
The Honorable Josephine Staton Tucker, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Monya Demonda Townsend was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He pled guilty pursuant to a conditional plea that preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.
In the early morning hours of December 13, 2006, the Pasco, Washington Police Department dispatched officers to the Red Lion Inn based on an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a blue shirt was possibly in possession of a firearm. The officers were told to look for a burgundy SUV. The Red Lion Inn was a popular bar where officers often responded to calls regarding fights, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, or gang issues. The tip lacked predictive detail and alone was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-72, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).
When police officers arrived at the scene, Red Lion security personnel pointed toward a burgundy SUV in the hotel's parking lot. The officers observed a crowd approximately fifteen feet away from the SUV. They believed that the passengers inside the SUV were engaged in a verbal altercation with members of the crowd because one of the individuals inside the SUV twice made a "jabbing kind of gesture" and an officer could see that the individual's "mouth [was] going." Due to their vantage point, the officers could not see the SUV occupants' hands. The officers commanded the driver to stop the vehicle. It not stop immediately, but rolled forward at a speed of two to three miles per hour for several feet before coming to a complete stop. At the hearing on Townsend's motion to suppress, the officers acknowledged that they could not identify any criminal activity at the time they stopped the vehicle.
The officers' observations upon arrival at the Red Lion did nothing to assure the tipster's basis of knowledge or veracity. See id. at 270-71, 120 S.Ct. 1375. Nor did the officers observe "some objective manifestation that the person stopped [wa]s, or [wa]s about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Therefore, the Terry stop was unlawful and the district court erred in denying Townsend's motion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. We do not reach Townsend's de facto arrest claim, nor his claim that the gun seized from the SUV was not in plain view.