Case Name: MOORE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1941-01-15
Citations: 150 S.W.2d 91
Docket Number: No. 21380
Parties: MOORE v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 150
Pages: 91–94

Head Matter:
MOORE v. STATE.
No. 21380.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 15, 1941.
On Motion to Reinstate Appeal Feb. 19, 1941.
Rehearing Denied April 30, 1941.
Dawson & Hatten, of Houston, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
CHRISTIAN, Judge.
The offense is negligent homicide; the punishment, confinement in jail for five months.
The recognizance merely shows that appellant has been convicted. It fails-to state that the conviction was for a misdemeanor. It being defective in the respect mentioned, this court is without jurisdiction.
The appeal is dismissed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
On Appellant's Motion to Reinstate the Appeal.
CHRISTIAN, Judge.
The record having been perfected, the appeal is reinstated and the case considered on its merits.'
The information and complaint embraced two counts, the first charging: negligent homicide of the-first degree and the second, negligent homicide of the second degree. The verdict of the jury was as follows: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged and assess his punishment at five months in the county jail." The judgment of the court followed the verdict of the jury and failed to show whether appellant was guilty of negligent homicide of the first or second degree. The transcript fails to show that a charge was given to the jury. Appellant contends that the verdict is fatally defective in that it is not shown whether the conviction was for negligent homicide of the first or second; degree. Although we have no charge to-aid us in determining which count of the complaint and information was submitted to the jury, it is observed that appellant made a motion to quash both counts on the-ground, among others, that they were vague and indefinite. We gather from the order of the court relative to the motion, thht the first count was quashed and that the motion was overruled as to the second count. It seems to follow that only the count charging negligent homicide of the second degree was submitted to the jury.. This count was amply supported by the evidence, it being shown that appellant, while-driving at approximately seventy miles an. hour on the Katy Highway in Harris. County, negligently ran into the automobile occupied by Mrs. H. G. Cole and fatally-injured her. Not only does the testimony support the second count but the record discloses that the first count had been quashed. Under the decision of this court in C. E. Evans v. State, 147 S.W.2d 794, delivered January 22, 1941, this court is warranted in reforming the judgment so as to show that appellant is guilty of negligent homicide in the second degree.
Appellant contends that there is no proof in the record showing that the accident occurred on a public highway as alleged. We are unable to agree with this contention. The first witness for the state testified that the collision occurred on the Katy Highway in Harris County. A deputy sheriff testified that he was on the Katy Road when the collision occurred, where he had arrested a party for exceeding the speed limit. The officer referred to the road as a highway. This officer testified that a fellow officer investigated the collision while he (witness) "took charge of traffic, directed the traffic." Throughout the testimony the road is referred to as a highway. Another officer testified: "I am a deputy sheriff of Harris County assigned to the highway patrol I was out on the Katy Road when a collision occurred in which Mrs. Cole was injured. At the time of the collision we were stopped right there, on the Katy Road. I had stopped a fellow because he was speeding and was giving him a ticket."
In 21 Texas Jurisprudence, page 529, it is said: "The term 'highway' denotes a road over which the public have a right of travel, as distinguished from a way which some persons, but not the public generally, may use." We take the following from 19 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 460, "The term 'highway' imports in law a road, the use of which is in the public." We think the proof sufficient to show that the highway in question was a public highway. See Blackman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 20 S.W.2d 783, and Smith v. State, 130 Tex.Cr.R. 117, 92 S.W.2d 1046.
A careful examination of all of appellant's contentions leads us to the conclusion that reversible error is not presented.
The judgment is reformed so as to adjudge appellant guilty of negligent homicide of the second degree.
As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.