Case Name: Woodson v. Murdock et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1874-10
Citations: 22 Wall. 351
Docket Number: 
Parties: Woodson v. Murdock et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 351–381

Head Matter:
Woodson v. Murdock et al.
1. The provision of the constitution of Missouri, which ordains—
“ The General Assembly shall have no powor, for any purpose whatever, to release tho lien hold by the State upon any railroad — ”
a provision having reference to the statutory liens held by the State on different railroads for the credit of the State, lent to them by the issue of State bonds, the principal and interest of which the railroad companies were to pay — was not meant, in case of a failure by the railroad companies, to prevent the State from making a compromise with any railroad company of any debt due to it or to become due; and on the compromise being effected to release the lien.
2. This view of the meaning of the clause is not altered by reading it in the light of the constitutional ordinance, “ for the payment of State and railroad indebtedness,” adopted at the same time as the State constitur tion, and as part of it, which ordinance, after providing for a sale by the State of any railroad indebted to it, and for the possible case of a purchase by the State of the road, provides further for a sale of the road after the State has so become owner, ordaining in such case—
“ That no sale . . . shall be made without reserving a lien upon' the property and franchises thus sold . . . for all sums remaining due."
This expression is to be regarded — not as having reference to.what the railroad company originally owed the State, that is to say, reference to the debt for which the road was first sold, — but to any portion of the purchase-money which may remain unpaid upon a second sale; a sale by the State, after she has become owner.
3. The provision in the same constitution—
“That no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in its title — ”
is not violated by any act having various details, provided they all relate to one general subject.
Hence where an act was entitled “ An act for the sale of the Pacific Railroad, and to foreclose the State’s lien thereon, and to amend its charter,” held, that after certain sections providing for the sale, a section providing that in certain contingencies no sale should be made, was not a violation of the constitutional provision.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri.
Murdock and others filed a bill in the court below for an injunction to restrain Woodson, governor of Missouri, from advertising for sale, or selling, the Pacific Railroad, under an alleged existing statutory lien in favor of the State of Missouri. The complainants were trustees for the bondholders upon a mortgage upon, the road for $7,000,000, subsequent to the said lien, and dated July 15th. 1868.
The case was thus:
In 1851, and at various times between that year and 1855, the, legislature of Missouri passed acts lending its credit to the Pacific Eailroad, a railroad whose line extends from St. Louis to Kansas City. By the same act it lent its. credit also to two other roads. The object of the legislation was to secure the completion of the roads. The form in which the aid was extended was this: The State made its bonds, some at twenty years and others at thirty years, promising to pay the amount thereof to. the company or its order. Coupons were attached; aud by act of the' legislature, the faith aud credit of the State were pledged for the payment of the interest and the redemption of the principal of the bonds.
The company was, by the act, to make provision for the punctual payment of the interest and principal of the bonds so issued by the State, so as to exonerate the State from advances for that purpose. To secure this undertaking on the part of the company, the act provided that the net tolls and income of the road should be pledged for the payment of interest, and that the acceptance of the bonds, by the company, “should become and be, to all intents and purposes, a mortgage of the road of the company, and every part and section thereof and its appurtenances, to the people of the State, for securing the payment of the principal and interest of the sums of money for which such bonds shall, from time to time, be issued and accepted as aforesaid.”
This was to be the first lien or mortgage upon the road; aud it was further provided by the act that if the company should make default iii the payment of either principal or interest, no more bonds should be issued to it, aud it should be lawful for the governor to sell the road aud its appurtenances, at auction, to the highest bidder, on six months’ notice; or to buy in the same at such sale for the State, subject to such disposition of the road or its proceeds as the legislature might thereafter direct.
Under these provisions as to security the State issued its bonds for the beneft of the Pacific Railroad, to the extent of $7,000,000 or upwards.
The company paid the interest on the bonds up to 1st July, 1859, but since that date had failed to do so.
In 1864, the road not being completed, the legislature of Missouri authorized the company to borrow $1,500,000, payable in four, five, and six years, and to secure it by a first lien on the road west of a place called Dresden, the State waiving, for this purpose aud to this extent, its priority of lien. The bonds given as evidence of this debt were called “Dresden bonds.”
In 1865 — the rebellion being now just closed, and the State, which had been the theatre of contending parties among its own citizens, being left in an exhausted and impoverished way, with its railroads in many cases more or les3 torn up or greatly injured, and the companies to which they belonged in default for what they owed the State — the State adopted a new constitution and a constitutional ordinance; the latter being entitled “For the payment of State and railroad indebtedness.”
This constitutional ordinance was adopted in pursuance of a vote taken under a statute, which enacted:
“ The election shall bo by ballot. Those ballots in favor of this ordinance shall have written or printed thereon the words, ‘Shall the railroads pay their bonds? Yes’ Those opposed to this ordinance shall have written or printed thereon the words, 1 Shall the railroads pay their bonds ? JSTo.’ ”
The new constitution thus ordained :
“No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject embraced in an act be not expressed in the title, such.act shall be void only as to so much thereof as is not so expressed.
“ The General Assembly shall have no power, for any purpose whatever, to release the lien held by the State upon any railroad.”
The constitutional ordinance provided for the levy of a heavy annual tax — 10 per cent, on gross receipts from October, 1864, to October, 1868, and 15 per cent, thereafter— upon the Pacific Railroad and other roads, to be “appropriated to the payment of principal and interest now due, or hereafter to become due upon the bonds of the State, or the bonds guaranteed by the State issued to the aforesaid railroad companies.”
By the fourth section of the ordinance it was provided that,
“ Should either of said companies refuse or neglect to pay said tax as herein required, and the interest or principal of any of said bonds, or any part thereof remain due and unpaid, the General Assembly shall provide by law for the sale of the railroad and other property, and the franchises of the company that shall be thus in default, under the lien reserved to the State, and shall appropriate the proceeds of such sale to the payment of the amount remaining due and unpaid from said company.”
And the fifth section of this ordinance provided that,
“ Whenever the State shall become the purchaser of any railroad, or other property, sold as hereinbefore provided for, the General Assembly shall provide by law in what manner the same shall be sold for the payment of the indebtedness of the railroad company in default; but no railroad or other property or franchises purchased by the State shall be restored to any such company until it shall first have paid in money or Missouri State bonds, or in bonds guaranteed by the State, all interest due from said company. And all interest thereafter accruing shall be paid semi-annaally in advance, and no sale or other disposition of any such railroad ■or other property, or their franchises, shall be made without reserving a lien upon all the property and franchises thus sold •or disposed of, for all sums remaining unpaid; and all payments ■therefor shall be made in money or in bonds or other obligations of .the Staté.”
Iul866 the road was finished and put iu running order to the west line of the State; but in order to effect this the company had in 1865 received aid from St. Louis County, to the amount of $700,000. On the 31st day of March, 1868, the road was iu a bad condition as to repairs and equipments, and the company owed a floating debt of $1,092,848, an unadjusted debt of about $200,000, and the first instalment of the Dresden bonds, amounting to $500,000. Of its stock $3,614,500 was held by citizens and municipalities of Missouri — over $2,000,000 by St. Louis City and County, or taxpayers therein.
Iu this condition of the company as respects its road and its debt to the State and to others, and with the above-quoted provisions of the constitution and constitutional ordinance in force, the legislature, on the 31st of March, 1868, passed an act, entitled “An act for the sale of the Pacific Railroad, and to foreclose the State’s lien thereon, and to amend the charter thereof.”
By section one the governor was directed to sell the road and its appurtenances and all the property belonging thereto, in accordance with the provisions of. section five of an act entitled “An act to expedite the construction of the Pacific Railroad,” &c., approved February 22d, 1851.
The act then proceeded :
“Section 2. Upon a sale of the road, as pi’ovided in the foregoing section, the price and sum for which the same shall be sold shall not be less than 88,350,000, payable to the State treasurer, in the bonds of this State, or in money, within ninety days from the date of sale. No bid, except the bid of the governor on behalf of the State, shall bo accepted, unless there is paid to the State treasurer, who shall attend the sale, an amount of not less than 8300,000, in such bonds or money, as a part of the purchase-money, to be paid when the road is stricken off; and such bonds or money shall be forfeited to the State in case the purchaser or purchasers shall fail to the amount of the purchase-money bid within the time above provided for.
“If said sum of 88,350,000 is not realized at such sale, the governor shall, by himself or agent, buy in the same for and in the name of the State of Missouri.,
“Section 4. Upon the payment of all'the purchase-money, as specified in section two of this act, and upon the delivery of an obligation in conformity with section three of this act, the governor shall execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers, conveying all such right, title, and interest, in and to said Pacific Railroad, its franchises, appurtenances, and the property belonging thereto, as are subject to the lien of this State.”
Then followed section five, upou which the principal question made in this case turned^
“Section 5. If the Pacific Railroad shall, at any time within ninety days after the first day of April, 1868, pay into the treasury of the State the sum of $850,000, in' bonds of this State, or in money, then, and in that event, the governor shall not advertise said road for sale; and if the company shall, within ninety days thereafter, pay into the State treasury an additional sum equal to $5,000,000 in all (the same being either in cash or Missouri State bonds), the governor shall, upon the production of the receipts of the State treasurer for said amounts, execute and deliver to the Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims, title, and interest which the State of Missouri has in and to the said Pacific Railroad, its property and appurtenances; and the said Pacific Railroad Company shall, from and after the delivery of said deed, be fully discharged from all claims or debts duo the State, and all liability growing out of the issue of the bonds of the State to aid in the construction of said road, and no sale shall, in any event, take place under this act.
“ If, however, for any cause, the said company shall be unable to pay the additional sum as herein provided, the governor shall proceed to advertise said road; but if the said company shall, during the pendency of said advertisement, pay into the State treasury the additional sum, with interest thereon from the first day of October, 1868, at the rate of six per cent, per annum, then, and in'that case, no sale of said road shall take place, and the governor shall execute and deliver to the said Pacific Railroad Company the deed of conveyance and release provided for in this act, and the said Pacific Railroad Company shall be ex empt from all the liabilities and obligations herein specified; but in case the said company shall, after tbo payment of $350,000 above stated, fail to pay the additional sum specified (being the remainder of the $5,000,000), then, and in that case, the sum first paid shall be forfeited to the State.”
The company within the ninety days paid iuto the State treasury the $350,000, and within ninety days thereafter the balance of $5,000,000, and received a deed from the governor in pursuance of the act releasing and discharging it and its property from all liens and claims on the part of the State, and from all liabilities growing out of the issue of the bonds of the State to aid iu the construction of its road. The governor’s deed was made July 1st, 1868.
Iu order to take up the “ Dresden bonds,” and to raise the $5,000,000 to be paid to the State, and to put its road in repair, the company, on July 15th, 1868, made a mortgage to Murdock and others (the complainants in the case), as trustees, to secure $7,000,000 of bonds. This mortgage recited the act of March 31st, 1868; and it was the professed intention to make it, after the payment of the $5,000,000 to the State, and upon the payment of the Dresden bonds, a first lien on the entire Pacific road, its property and franchises. Subsequently, on July 1st, 1871, a second mortgage was made by the company for $3,000,000, the* proceeds of which it is alleged were exclusively used in improving the road, and in purchasing rolling-stock. Both of these mortgages were outstanding and unpaid, as also another mortgage for $800,000, secured upon certain lauds in St. Louis, purchased for a station.
Iu March, 1873, the General Assembly of Missouri adopted a concurrent resolution reciting that grave doubts had arisen as to the constitutionality of the act of March 31st, 1868, just quoted, and directing proceedings to protect and enforce all the rights and claims of the State against the road.
Upon this authority the governor advertised the road and its appurtenances for sale under the original statutory lien in favor of the State. This proceeding on the part of the State authorities assumed that the fifth section of the act of March 31st, 1868, was unconstitutional; that the statutory lien of the State was yet in full force, and that it was the first lien on the Pacific road, its property and appurtenances. If this assumption was well founded in point of law, then, of course, the proposed sale, if made, would out off the mortgage to Murdock and the others (the complainants), and the rights of the holders of the $7,000,000 of bonds secured thereby. On the other hand, if the said fifth section-was not unconstitutional, then the State had no lien to be enforced, and the proposed sale, if made, would be wholly nugatory.
The controlling question in the case, therefore, was whether the said fifth section violated either provision of the constitution or violated the constitutional ordinance of the State, as all are above quoted.
It was insisted—
1st, and in regard to the merits, that the transaction authorized by the said section, and carried out under it, evaded that provision of the constitution which ordained that “ the General Assembly shall have no power whatever to release the lien held by the State upon any railroad.” And that the transaction did evade the said provision of the constitution, it was argued, was made more obvious by the provisions in the fifth section of the constitutional ordinance, that when the State sold any railroad for debt due the State and bought it in, and afterwards sold it, it should not be sold “ without reserving a lien upon ail the property, fc., thus sold, for all sums remaining unpaid;” a provision which the counsel insisting on it, interpreted as meaning all those sums “remaining unpaid,” at the time when the sale was made by the State, in the first instance; and not as meaning those sums which might remain .unpaid after making any cash payment on the occasion of the second sale, i. e., the sale made by tbe State after she had by the first sale herself become the owner.
2d, and on grounds more technical, that the said section was unconstitutional, because it made the act in which it was, relate to more than one subject; the subject presented by the said section not being the one embraced in the title.
This title, as the reader will remember, was “An act for the sale of the Pacific Railroad, and to foreclose the State’s lien thereon, and to amend the charter thereof.”
The court below decided that the said section was not unconstitutional by reason of either objection urged against it.
1st. That the transaction under consideration was in effect a sale of the State’s interest to the company for $5,000,000; that the legislature had the power to order a sale, and, not being restrained by the constitution, it necessarily had the power to fix the price and terms of the sale.
2d. That only the general purpose (which was to be a single one) of the act needed to be expressed in it was its title, and that this had been sufficiently done in the present case.
An injunction against a sale by the governor was accordingly decreed. From that decree he took this appeal.
Mr. Britton A. Hill, for the plaintiff in error:
I. The fifth section of the act of 1868 is unconstitutional, because it declares that the governor shall execute to the Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims, title, or interest, which the State of Missouri has in or to the said railroad, its property and appurtenances, on the payment of $5,000,000, when a much larger sum was then due to the State, and for payment of which sum the State held a lien on the road.
This release is in conflict with the article of the constitution of Missouri, which ordains that “the General Assembly shall have no power, for any purpose whatever, to release the lien held by the State upon any railroad.”
Under the constitution, this lieu could not be released without payment of the debt due in full. The $5,000,000 paid to the State treasurer in 1868 extinguished the lieu of the State. to that extent, but the remaining sum due the State continues to be a lien on the road.
The words used in the clause of the. constitution under consideration are clear and definite, admitting of no judicial construction to alter, vary, or affect the plain intent of the people in adopting it.
That the fifth section of the act of 1868 is unconstitutional, is made more plain by the railroad ordinance which is entitled, “An ordinance for the payment of the State and railroad indebtedness,” and which was adopted as a part of the constitution.
The ordinance expressly declares that the railroads shall pay their bouds lent to them by the State, principal and interest, in fall, without any abatement, in money or bonds of the State; that such paymeut of said bonds, principal and interest, shall be enforced; 1st. By levying and collecting a tax of ten per cent, on the gross earnings of the railroads for two years, up to the 1st of October, 1868, and a tax of fifteen per cent, from and after said date, until all of said bouds, principal and interest, are paid in full, in money or bonds of the Slate; 2d. If the said railroads fail to pay the said tax and the principal and interest of all bonds loaned said railroads by the State, then the railroads shall be sold under the lien (of 1851) reserved to the State, and the proceeds of such sales shall be appropriated to the payment of the amount remaining due and unpaid from said railroad companies; and, 3d. If the State buys any railroad at such sale on statutory foreclosure, the General Assembly shall provide by law how the same may be sold for the payment of the debt of the railroad company in default; but no railroad property or franchises so bought by the State can be restored to any company so in default, until it shall first have paid all interest due from said company. And all interest to accrue shall be paid semi-annually, in advance, and all sums remaining unpaid shall be secured by a lien on all the property and franchises so sold or disposed of, and all payments of such liens shall be made in money or in State bonds.
The constitution and the railroad ordinance are to be construed together, as one instrument.
II. The fifth section of the act of 31st March, 1868, is unconstitutional for the further reason that the subject of the section is not expressed in the title of the act, as required by the constitution.
This act of 1868, excluding the fifth section, provides for all the purposes stated in the title, in strict accordance with the constitution and constitutional ordinance, to sell the railroad and appurtenances at public auction, on six months’ notice, to foreclose the lien of the State thereon, and to amend the charter of the company.
But the fifth section is inserted into the act providing for a repeal of all the preceding clauses therein, and to prevent the sale of the road and the foreclosure of the State lien thereon. So far from the subject of said fifth section being embraced in the title of the act, it is directly in conflict with it. The fifth section declares that on the payment of $350,000 into the State treasury within ninety days after the 1st of April, 1868, “the governor shall not advertise said road for sale, and if the company within ninety days thereafter pay into the State treasury an additional sum equal to $5,000,000 in all, the governor shall . . . execute and deliver to the said Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims, title, and interest which the State of Missouri has in and to the said Pacific Railroad, its property and appurtenances . . . and uo sale shall, in that event, take place under this act.”
Iu every respect this fifth section is in conflict with the title of the act, and embraces different and opposite subjects, to wit: To prevent the advertisement and “sale of the road,” and to prevent “ the foreclosure of the State lien thereon;” by releasing that lien for less than one-third the amouut secured to the State by the existing statutory liens on the railroad.
The title of the act is, therefore, plainly contradicted by the subjects embraced in the fifth section. Totally different subjects are stated in the title, and no reader of the title could imagine the subjects embraced in the fifth section.
The title required to embrace the subjects contained in the fifth sectionwould.be: “An act to prevent the sale of the.Pacific Railroad, and to prevent the foreclosure of the State’s lien thereon, by a release of the1 lien of the State for $10,780,000 on the payment of $5,000,000.”
In the Indiana Central Railway Company v. Polls, the cour-t says:
“Every statute must have a title, that title must designate a single subject fbr the sections following it, and that subject must be reasonably particular and not too general, for otherwise the object of the constitutional provision would be wholly thwarted; and a part of the object of that provision was that the title should indicate the character of the sections of the act.”
No case can be found of an enactment held, valid where the subject of a section of an act is in direct conflict with the act arid with the title also; there being in the constitution of the State such a provision as here. In fact the fifth section would repeal the title and all the other sections of the act.
Messrs. W. M. Evarts, J. B. Henderson, and J. Baker, contra:
I. The clause of the constitution first relied on by opposing counsel is:
“ The General Assembly shall have no power for any purpose whatever to release the lien held by the .State upon any railroad.”
This cannot mean that the State, upon payment of thé debt of the railroad eompauy, canuot execute a release of the property from the lieu of the State.
It cannot mean that the State cannot enforce the lien by such methods as seem to promise the best result in value therefrom to the State as creditor, and upon such enforcement to release the property from the lien of the State.
It does not purport to restrict the State in the choice of means or modes of making the most in valae out of the lien, and thereupon of releasing the lien.
It does mean that these liens of the State are not at its disposal for favor or gift or grace. They are to be treated as public property, and dealt with by the General Assembly under the public obligation of preserving and realizing their value to the State.
This clause severs this subject from the general discretion of the supreme law-making power, and confines the discretion to dealing as creditor with debtor, in respect of the property and value involved.
But this lesser discretion is left unhampered, and its exercise can never be the subject of judicial control while it maintains the character of the choice of means to realize the lieu, not to release it without realizing.
The State having full discretion in computing the money value of its lien, had the full power to discharge it upon receiving that computed value.
The elements of this computation ate, in the rough, the value of the property, either for forced sale in the market or to be nursed by the State, and the considerations which should encourage one course for realizing the lien or another. If the State observes this purpose in its legislation, no court can revise its discretion, either in amounts or modes.
The act of the State of Missouri contains plenary evidence that its whole purpose was to measure and secure the best value from the lien in one or the other of three ways.
By a sale of the railroad in the market at a minimum j ,ice limited.
By a purchase by the State at a maximum price of purchase, to wit, the minimum fixed for the sale in the market.
Bv a realization of the value of the lien as thus com puted, as the result of sale or purchase of the property, by receiving from the company a substantial equivalent for what the State would realize by one or the other of the alternative methods.
It is manifest, upon the pecuniary elements of the computation upon which the act proceeds, that it preserves and enforces the lien, and releases it for the computed value— not for grace. ■
The constitution being thus self-luminous — intelligible, we mean, of itself — and not requiring to be read by reflected light from any source, we need not refer, at all, to the constitutional ordinance, within no part of which the facts of the present case come; and which is invoked by the other side only because it is supposed to cast a light upon the constitution, without which the constitution cannot be rightly understood; an assumption which would give a singular and unfortunate peculiarity to the constitution of the State.
II. Nothing appears in the act of 1868 beyond what is indicated in the title.
The company alleges that the State sold its interest in the roád, and that the State’s lien was foreclosed by the act of sale. So far the purposes of the act are indicated by the title, and so far the act cannot be void. Different and incongruous subjects are not brought together in the*act, but the provisions as to the sale of the road, and the foreclosure of the State’s lien thereon, relate to but one subject within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and this subject is expressed in the title.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has decided that this provision of the constitution of its State does not pi’event the uniting in one enactment all those subjects germane to, or connected or congruous with, the general subject-matter of the bill. Thus the reorganization of the State Bank as a National bank, the selling of stock therein belonging to the State, and the investment of the funds derived from such sale, were matters intimately connected and blended, and might be embraced in one bill.
At the time of the execution of the deed of release in July, 1868, the State lien on tho bonds lent to the Pacific Railroad Company was $7,000,000, on which interest had been paid up to the 1st of July, 1859. The amount of interest on these seven millions of bonds from the 1st of July, 1859, to the 1st of July, 1868, at six per cent, per annum, is $420,000 a year, or $3,780,000 for nine years, making $10,780,000 then due the State.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitation, 2d ed., 1871, p. 55 and notes; Opinion of Mr. Justice Bronson in People w. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35; Spencer v. State, 5 Indiana, 76; State v. King, 44 Missouri, 285.
7 Indiana, 681.
State v. Miller, 45 Missouri, 495; The State ex rel, Hickson v. Lafayette County Court, 41 Id. 89; The People ex rel. McConnel et al. v. Hills, 85 New York, 44; The People ex rel. Failing v. The Commissioners of Highways, 53 Barbour, 70; Chiles et al. v. Monroe, 4 Metcalf, 72; Walker, v. Caldwell, 4 Louisiana Annual, 298.
Ct. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Missouri, 578; State v. Miller, 45 Id. 495.
State v. Bank of Missouri, 45 Missouri, 528; and see to the same effect Murphy v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673; People v. Makamoy, 13 Michigan, 495; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280; Morford v. Unger, 8 Id. 82; Whiting v. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Id. 482 ; Supervisors v. People, 25 Illinois, 181; Clinton v. Draper, 14 Indiana, 295; Mosier v. Hilton, 15 Barbour, 657.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice STRONG
delivered the opinion of the court.
It has not been contended here that the complainants are not entitled to the injunction decreed by the Circuit Court, if the act of the Missouri legislature, approved March 31st, 1868, was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power. But it is insisted that the fifth section of that act is in conflict with the constitution of the State, and, therefore, that the arrangement made under it with the Pacific Railroad Company cannot be held to operate as a discharge of the company from the debt due by it to the State, or as a release of the railroad from the lien of the State's mortgage. The question presented, then, is this: Was the fifth section of the act mentioned prohibited by the constitution of the State ? By the first section the governor was directed to sell the Pacific Railroad and its appurtenances, in .accordance with the provisions of section five of the act, and of an act approved February 22d, 1851, entitled "An act to expedite the construction of the Pacific Railroad and the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad." By the second section the price for which the railroad was directed to be sold was required to be not less than $8,850,000 payable to the State treasurer, in bonds of the State or in money, within ninety days from the day of sale. If that sum was not obtained the governor was required to buy in the railroad for the State. By the third section it was made a condition of the sale that the purchaser or purchasers should bind himself or themselves to change the gauge of the road within ten years from the date of sale, so as to conform to the gauge of the Union Pacific Railroad. The fourth section enacted that- upon the payment of all the purchase-money, and upon the delivery of an obligation, in conformity to the require* ment of the third section, the governor should execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers conveying all such right, title, and interest in and to the said Pacific Railroad, its franchises, appurtenances, and the property belonging thereto as were subject to the lien of the State. Then followed the fifth section, which is the one mainly in contest. It enacted that if the Pacific Railroad Company should, at any time within ninety days after the 1st day of April, 1868, pay into the treasury of the State the sum of $350,000, in the bonds-of the State or in money, then, and in that event, the governor should not advertise the road for sale; and if the company should, within ninety days thereafter, pay into the State treasury an additional sum equal to $5,000,000 in all (either in cash or in Missouri State bonds), the governor should, upon the production of the receipts of the State treasurer for the said amounts, execute and deliver to the said Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims, title, and interest which the State of Missouri had in and to the railroad, its property and appurtenances, and that the Pacific Railroad Company should, from and after the delivery of the deed, be fully discharged from all claims or debts due the State, and all liability growing out of the issue of the bonds of the State to aid in the construction of their railroad.
Within ninety days after the passage of this act the company paid into the State treasury $350,000, and within ninety days after such payment $4,650,000 more, in all $5,000,000, the sum specified in the fifth section, and received from the governor a deed conveying all the right, title, and interest of the State, and discharging it from all liens and claims of the State, and from all liability growing out of the issue of State bonds to aid in the construction of its road.
That this was a compromise of the claims of the State against the company; 'practically, a sale to the company of the State's interest growing out of its advanse of State bonds under the statutes of 1851, and the following years, is very plain, and such was its obvious intention. The principal of the debt was not then payable. The bonds issued by the State had not then fallen due. All of them were either twenty or thirty-year bonds, and the company was under no obligation to pay the principal until the bonds became payable. The extent of her obligation was measured by the provisions of the act of 1851. That act required the company to make provision for the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds in such manner as to exonerate the State from any advances of money for that purpose, and, had the interest been paid up to 1868, the State could then have exacted no more. The interest, it is true, was in arrears from July 1st, 1859. To that extent the State had an immediate claim upon the company, but as the whole debt, according to the agreed statement of facts, was $7,000,000, the aggregate of unpaid interest in 1868 was less than $4,000,000. The arrangement then made, by which $5,000,000 was received in full satisfaction, and the deed given, included, therefore, not only interest due, but principal which had not fallen due, and, hence, it may properly be regarded as a commutation or a sale of the rights of the State to the company.
We come then to the question whether anything in the constitption of the State prohibits such a transaction. A new constitution was adopted in 1865, the fifteenth section of the fourth article of which is as follows: " The General Assembly shall have no power, for any purpose, to release the lien held by the State upon any railroad." This provision, it is insisted by the appellants, denied to the legislature the power to make such a disposition of the interests of the State as was made in 1868 in virtue of the fifth section of the act of March 31st of that year.
The language of the prohibition is remarkable. It is not that the General Assembly shall not release the debt due to the State by any railroad company. Legislative control over the debt is left untouched. The provision has reference only to a security for the debt. Had it been intended to put the debt beyond the disposition of the legislature, it would be difficult to find a reason for confining the prohibition to a release merely of the lien. But it is easy to see why it should be ordained that while the debt remained, the security for it should not be given up. And that such was the intention appears quite plainly in view of the state of thiugs which existed when the constitution was framed and adopted. Prior to its adoption it may be said to have become almost a legislative habit to release the liens held by the State upon railroads without discharging the debts. In numerous eases statutes had been enacted by which railroad companies were authorized to borrow money, and to mortgage their roads as security for the loans, the State releasing its lien, to give the mortgagees a priority. The purposes for which these releases were made were various, and they were generally avowed in the statutes. Thus, in 1864 the legislature released the State's lien upon a part of the Pacific road, avowedly for the purpose of enabling the company to complete its main road to Kansas City. At the same time the lien of the State on the North Missouri Railroad was released for several avowed purposes, — to enable the company to complete their main road to the Iowa State line; to enable the company to construct its west branch; and to enable it to build a bridge across the Missouri River. And again, in 1865, February 16th, the legislature released the first lien of the State upon the road of the same company for the same purposes, retaining, however, a second lien. All this took place very shortly before the constitution was adopted. That such releases were contemplated when the convention framed the constitutional inhibition, and when the people ratified it, can hardly be doubted. The constitution was plainly intended to prohibit them, and, therefore, language was employed denying the power to release the lien, and saying nothing of the debt. Certainly there is no expressed restriction of legislative power over the debt itself. If any exists it must be supplied by implication. Keeping in mind, then, that the constitutional prohibition is directed only against a release of liens, what should be regarded as its meaning? We agree it is not to be frittered away by doubtful construction, but like every clause in every constitution it must have a reasonable interpretation, and be held to express the intention of its framers. It must be held to have been intended for the public protection, for the preservation of the public property, and to make available claims the State held against railroads. But if it is to be construed reasonably, and in accordance with what must have been the intentions of those who adopted it, it cannot be construed literally. It cannot mean that the lien of the State upon a railroad shall not he released upon full payment of the debt, to secure which the lien was created. If it does, it is equivalent to a prohibition against the State's receiving payment. Surely it will not be contended to deprive the legislature of power to make use of the lien to enforce satisfaction of the debt, though thereby the lien be discharged. That would be to destroy the value of the lien. Nor can it mean that the lien may not be employed to obtain from the property bound by it all that the property is worth and all that the indebted company can pay, though that be less than the entire amount of the debt. It is not a restriction upon the power of the legislature to make the most which in its judgment is possible from the security. In terms the legislature is left unrestricted as to the mode of receiving payment, or settling with its debtois. Composition, accord and satisfaction, and full payment in cash are left within the legislative discretion, at least so far as the liquidation of the debt is concerned. So there is nothing in the clause of the constitution quoted which can be regarded sis a restriction upon the power of the legislature to sell any claims held by the State against a railroad company. It is not an ordinance that the legislature shall not deal with debts due to the State from railroad companies as it may deal with debts due from other debtors. It is that the lien shall not be released for any 'purpose whatever, that is, for the accomplishment of any object, the legislature might have in view, and unless we can hold this means it shall not be released even by full payment of the debt, it cau mean no more than this, that, while the debt remains, the legislature may not let go the security for it. Such a construction accounts for the peculiarity of the language employed. There is a very palpable distinction between the lien which the State holds upon a railroad aud the debt, obligation, or duty which the lien was created to secure. The two could not have been confounded by the framers of the constitution. If it was intended that, under all circumstances, every dollar due from a railroad company should be exacted, and that no settlement should be made, or sale authorized, without payment of the uttermost farthing, it is incredible that, the constitution would not have so declared. That such was not the intention is plainly shown by the railroad ordinance adopted with the constitution, and a part of the organic law of the State. By that ordinance the legislature was authorized and directed to sell the railroads on' their failure to pay a tax levied, and when the sale should be made to others than the indebted companies, no limitation was directed to be affixed to the price, and such a sale, we have no doubt, would have discharged the road from the State's lien. The State itself was empowered to become a purchaser at the sale at any price at which it could buy, and whenever it purchased, the lien, of course, was merged in the title, and the General Assembly was required to provide by law in what manner the railroad, or franchises, or other property, should be sold for the payment of the indebtedness of the company in default. But the ordinance does not require that at such sale the purchase/from the State shall pay the full amount of that indebtedness. A lien is required to be reserved for all sums remaining unpaid; that is, very clearly, for all that part of the purchase-money from the State at her sale which remain/"unpaid. If- this is not the meaning, the State maj' neve/be able to sell at all, and the plain purpose of the ordinance may be entirely frustrated. And that such is its meaning has been •determined by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The fifth section of the ordinance does, indeed, require that no railroad or other property, or franchise purchased by the State shall be restored to the company in default until it shall have first paid in money, or in Missouri State bonds, or in bonds guaranteed by the State, all interest due from said company, and requires that all interest coming due thereafter shall be paid semi-annually in advance; but even this is no assertion that such a restoration shall not be made for a sum less than the original indebtedness. Whether it may or not it is unnecessary to decide, for the provision applies only to a case where the road has been sold, and where the State has become the purchaser, which is not this case.
Neither the clause in the body of the constitution, therefore, nor any provisions of the railroad ordinance forbid the legislature to sell the railroad, or compromise the debt claimed by the State, for less than the entire indebtedness. It follows, then, that though the legislature had no power to release the lien while the debt remained, it was not prohibited from selling the claim or commuting the debt. And there is no inconsistency in this. The legislature may well have been trusted with the management of the obligation, responsible only to its constituents, while the security for the fulfilment of the obligation may have been withdrawn' from its control. A trustee may have no right to give up a security for a claim, aud yet be at full liberty to settle and adjust the claim itself or to sell it. It need hardly be added that if the legislature had power to accept a commutation of the claim of the State, or to sell the debt for what in its judgment it deemed best for the public interests, it had also power to make a formal relinquishment of the lien after the debt had been liquidated. The constitutional provision was not designed to continue in existence liens that the law had extinguished.
For these reasons we hold that the fifth section of the act of the legislature of March 31st, 1868, was not in conflict with that provision of the constitution which forbids, for any purpose whatever, a release of the lien held by the State upon any railroad.
Nor do we perceive that there is any conflict between it and the railroad ordinance. The appellants insist that the ordinance forbids any sale of a defaulting railroad except at public auction, for a price equal to the full amount of the debt of the defaulting company, and without a reservation of a lien upon the property sold, not merely for the unpaid part of the purchase-money, but for all that remains unpaid of the debt for which the property is sold. Such is not our reading of the ordinance, nor is it that of the Supreme Court of the State. We have already said that the lien required to be reserved is only to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase-money. This is too clear for argument. It is equally clear to us the ordinance does not require that the sale shall be for a price equal to the whole debt, or that it shall be at public auction. The first, second, and third sections impose upon each of three railroad companies, of which the Pacific Railroad Company is one, an annual tax of ten per centum of the gróss receipts, for two years, and fifteen per centum thereafter, until the principal and interest of the bonds for which the companies were liable should be fully paid. Then followed the fourth section, as follows: " Should either of said companies refuse or neglect to pay said tax as herein required, and the interest or principal of any of said bonds, or any part thereof remain due and unpaid, the General Assembly shall provide by law-for the sale of the railroad and other property, and the franchise of the company that shall be thus in default, under the lien reserved to the State, and shall appropriate the proceeds of such sale to the payment of the amount remaining due.and unpaid from said company." There is nothing in this which takes away from the legislature the power to determine the time, the mariner, or the price of the sale which it was directed to cause to be made. It is true the sale is ordered to be made under the lien reserved to the State, referring, doubtless, to the mortgage taken under the act of 1851, and it is also true that by that act it was enacted that if either of tlie companies to which bonds might be issued should make default in the payment of either principal or interest of the said bonds, the governor might sell their road by auction, giving six months' notice, or buy it in for the use of the State, but these provisions were no part of the lien. They were means specified for enforcing it. The legislature was at liberty to provide other means of collecting the debt and enforcing the lien. The sale directed by the ordinance was for non-payment of the tax imposed, and the direction to sell under the lien reserved was simply an order to proceed to collect the mortgage. The lien is not to be confounded vyith proceedings for its foreclosure.
Finally, it is insisted by the appellants that the fifth section of the act of 1868 is unconstitutional because its subject is not embraced in the title of the act, and because the constitution ordains that " no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject be not embraced in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as is not so expressed." The title of the act of 1868 is " An act for the sale of the Pacific Railroad, and to foreclose the State's lien thereon, and to amend the charter thereof." That the subject of the fifth section is embraced in this title is very apparent If the subject is not the foreclosure of the State's lien, it is impossible to say what.it is. And we think it cannot be justly said the act embraces more than one subject. It has many details, but they all relate to one general ' subject, which is the sale of the railroad and the foreclosure of the State's lien thereon.
We cannot sustain this objection.
Nothing, then, in our judgment, warrants the conclusion that the fifth section of the act of March 31st, 1868, was not a legitimate exercise of the legislative power of the General Assembly of the State. It follows that the arrangement made in pursuance of it with the Pacific Railroad Company, and the deed of the governor to the company, extinguished the debt due to the State, and, consequently, put an end to the lien.
The $5,000,000 paid to the State were raised upon bonds of the company and a mortgage, of which the complainants in the court below are trustees. The money was advanced on the faith of the legislation of 1868, and so were $8,000,000 more, for which a subsequent mortgage was given. If that legislation was not unconstitutional, as we have endeavored to show it was not, it would be a gross wrong to the bondholders who thus advanced their money, were the defendants permitted to sell the railroad, its property, and franchises, for the satisfaction of a claim or lien which has no longer any existence.
Decree affirmed.
See 37 Missouri, 129.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 141 et seq.