Case Name: KELLER INDUSTRIES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LeNora VOLK and John Volk, Jr., Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-06-21
Citations: 657 So. 2d 1200
Docket Number: No. 93-0754
Parties: KELLER INDUSTRIES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LeNora VOLK and John Volk, Jr., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: WARNER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 657
Pages: 1200–1208

Head Matter:
KELLER INDUSTRIES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LeNora VOLK and John Volk, Jr., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
No. 93-0754.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 21, 1995.
Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc and Clarification Denied Aug. 17, 1995.
Robert H. Schwartz of Gunther & Whitaker, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Elliot H. Seherker and Arthur J. England, Jr., of Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A., Miami, and Dianne J. Weaver of Weaver, Kuvin, Weaver & Lipton, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Opinion:
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal by defendant from an adverse final judgment and from the trial court's order denying its motion for new trial. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the final judgment. We reverse and remand for new trial on the main appeal, but find no error on the cross-appeal and affirm as to it.
On October 26, 1986, Mrs. Volk was severely injured when a stepladder manufactured by defendant allegedly collapsed and closed on her lower leg, causing compound fractures of the right fibula, tibia and fibula distal end, with surgery required to reattach the broken bones. This acute injury occasioned a serious bacterial infection in the leg, compelling Mrs. Volk to employ a full-leg cast for almost three years. Mr. and Mrs. Volk sued the manufacturer on the theories of negligence and strict liability. Following a jury verdict, the trial court entered final judgment for Mrs. Volk of $1,415,176.49 and for her husband of $90,000 and denied defendant's motion for new trial. It also denied plaintiffs' motion to enter judgment without reduction for the jury's finding of ten percent comparative negligence.
Unfortunately, the case must be retried because the trial court's ruling concerning one expert witness was unduly exclusionary. We agree with appellees that the trial court's ruling pertaining to Doctor Hyde was correct. Florida Marine Enter, v. Bailey, 632 So.2d 649 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 641 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1994). Moreover, as to Mr. Ver Halen, we also agree that the trial court properly excluded his midtrial revelation of how the accident occurred. Grau v. Branham, 626 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). However, the trial court went too far in striking all of Mr. Ver Halen's testimony.
Mr. Ver Halen's deposition was first taken by appellees in March 1992. Mr. Ver Halen had no opinion as to how the accident had occurred, but testified extensively concerning his opinion that the accident could not have occurred in the manner suggested by the appellees' expert, Mr. Harrenstein. Additionally, the witness was not asked by appel-lees' counsel whether the stepladder complied with then governing or accepted standards. When the witness informed counsel that he had relied upon Underwriters Laboratories' (UL) "acceptance file for this product," the following exchange occurred:
Q. . Have you utilized the UL acceptance report in any fashion in coming to any opinions you're going to give us here today?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's put that aside.
Pull out all the correspondence and put it together, would you? We'll go in categories.
Trial commenced in November 1992 and, during this proceeding, the trial court allowed appellee another opportunity to depose Mr. Ver Halen. Because he had developed midtrial an opinion pertaining to the cause of the accident, the trial court completely excluded Mr. Ver Halen as a witness. Appellant then proffered the following testimony:
Q. What standards do either ANSI or UL apply to a Model 727 Keller ladder that was manufactured in October of 1976?
A. Okay. ANSI 1956 covered stepstools. Particularly, the '72 omits stepstools.
Q. You said 1956?
A. Correct.
The '72 standard omits stepstools. Within the confines of ANSI, you would have to look at the '56 standard.
And in that regard, Underwriters Laboratories continued to include stepstools in their 184 standard for portable metal ladders, and I think it was the third edition that was in effect at the time this particular product came into being, which, I think, has an effective date of something like 1970 or '71.
Q. My question was, Mr. Ver Halen: Do you have an opinion as to whether the 727 stepstool that was manufactured in October of 1976 meet all applicable UL codes on the date of its manufacture?
A. It did.
Q. Further, do you have an opinion — You have expressed an opinion that the ANSI codes did not apply to stepstools in 1972.
A. The '72 version of ANSI excluded stepstools.
Q. Assume, hypothetically, that that standard applied, the 1972 ANSI standard.
A. Okay.
Q. Did this ladder also comport to that standard with reference to the spreader bars?
A. Okay. With reference to the spreader bars, yes, it did.
The lone exception where it would not meet that, ANSI at that particular time required 12-inch spacing on steps, which is a variation between stepladders, which stepstools at 9-inch spacing wouldn't met [sic]. ANSI rectified that in the '92 codes.
Q. A subsequent ANSI code bears an effective date of what, the one after 1972?
A. It became effective October of 1982.
Q. Let's assume — and I think I know from the deposition of LeNora Volk — that she purchased the ladder either in late '81 or early '82.
Was the 1982 — approved-only 1982 ANSI standard applicable to this ladder either on the date of its manufacture or the date of the sale to Mrs. Volk?
A. It was not effective for the stepstools on either date, if I assume that she purchased it in early '82. The effect date was October of '82, so it would have been late '82.
Q. So my question is: In your opinion, based on your expertise, did that standard, which is a voluntary standard, have any applicability to either the manufacture or the sale date of this particular ladder, Exhibit 4?
A. No.
Q. What about the subsequent UL standard?
A. The subsequent UL standard came into effect in, I believe it was, 1980, and that would have been in effect at the time it was sold not at the time it was manufactured.
Q. In your opinion, does this ladder, Exhibit, comport with the standards in the 1980 UL code as it relates to the spreader bars?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. So, even if it were applicable to the date of sale, it nevertheless met — the ladder nevertheless comported to the standard set out in the UL standard?
A. With regard to the spreader bars?
Q. Spreader bars, yes.
In another important facet of the proffer, Mr. Ver Halen again refuted the causation theory advanced by appellees' expert and explained his reasons for rejecting their position. This proffered testimony was critical to appellant's defense and the trial court erroneously wiped it out after (1) appellees' previous failure to inquire about compliance with standards, (2) the trial court's permitting an additional deposition of Mr. Ver Halen and (3) appellees' knowledge well in advance of Mr. Ver Halen's opinion regarding their expert's testimony. All of this becomes significant in light of the fact that Mr. Ver Halen became appellant's only witness on liability.
A trial court clearly may exercise its discretion in imposing sanctions. Clarke v. Sanders, 363 So.2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). In this case, however, the trial court, by excluding the foregoing testimony, engaged in judicial overkill. One of a party's most important due process rights is the right to call -witnesses. LoBue v. Travelers Ins. Co., 388 So.2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. denied sub nom. Bumes v. Stafford-Lobue, 397 So.2d 777 (Fla.1981). A trial court should only exclude witnesses under the most compelling of circumstances. Id.; First Republic Corp. of America v. Hayes, 431 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla.1983). This is particularly so when the exclusion would be of a party's most important witness. LoBue, 388 So.2d at 1351. Thus, it is critical for the trial court to exercise extreme caution when excluding a party's only witness.
It is plain from the record that the trial court here was upset because of its perception that Mr. Ver Halen had no opinion on the cause of the accident when deposed in March 1992, but after the trial began, he formulated one. Instead of prohibiting him from giving that opinion, the trial court improperly erased him from the proceedings. The trial court could have prevented any prejudice to appellees by barring testimony concerning the cause of the accident, but also could have stopped short of eviscerating appellant's defense by allowing Mr. Ver Halen to otherwise testify.
While there are instances which permit some leeway on remand, such as amendments to pleadings, the dictates of justice demand that we "freeze frame" these proceedings to the extent possible in order to prevent appellant from circumventing the decision of this court and obtaining a second bite of the apple. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Dyess, 588 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 599 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1992). Accordingly, the pleadings are to remain unchanged and upon retrial appellant may not utilize Dr. Hyde as a witness nor elicit from Mr. Ver Halen his affirmative opinion regarding causation.
Because the case must be retried, we feel it necessary to discuss the role of pre-acci-dent, postmanufacture remedial measures. In this case, appellants' stepladder was manufactured in 1976. A new design was incorporated in 1982, but the accident did not occur until 1986.
Section 90.407, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
90.407 Subsequent remedial measures. — Evidence of measures taken after an event, which measures if taken before it occurred would have made the event less likely to occur, is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
(Emphasis added). We have located no Florida case expressly ruling upon the meaning of "event" as applied to a strict liability claim where a change was made after manufacture, but before the accident. However, persuasive federal cases lead us to conclude the accident is the "event."
Section 90.407 and part of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 are almost identical.
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Fed.R.Evid. 407 (1991) (emphasis added). The Florida Legislature did not incorporate the last sentence of rule 407. However, Florida courts have engrafted this part of the federal rule onto the Florida statute. In Currie v. Palm Beach Co., 578 So.2d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), this court explained:
In a negligence action, section 90.407, Florida Statutes (1988), clearly prohibits use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures as an admission of prior negligence. Voynar v. Butler Mfg. Co., 463 So.2d 409 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla.1985). There are, however, certain circumstances which justify the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. For example, where one party takes the position that it was not possible to correct a certain condition before the operative event, evidence of subsequent re medial measures is admissible on the issue of the feasibility of taking precautionary measures. American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So.2d 459, 465 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1982).
Id. at 763. The Voynar court extended the application of section 90.407 and its "recognized exceptions" to strict liability cases. Because of the similarity between Florida's statute and the federal rule, we find guidance from federal cases interpreting rule 407.
In Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir.1991), involving the exclusion of a pre-accident, postmanufacture design modification, the court held:
Under 407, only measures which take place after the "event" are excluded. The term "event" refers to the accident that precipitated the suit. Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n. 1 (5th Cir.1989); Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir.1988).
Id. at 1523. Therefore, design changes made after manufacture, but before the accident are not "subsequent remedial measures" and do not come within the purview of section 90.407.
In the present case, the lawyers and trial court inserted section 90.407 into the case, then entered the thicket of "feasibility" contemplated by the last sentence of the federal rule. Nonetheless, before an exception may be employed, the statute that invokes it must be applicable. Here, the statute does not apply to the pre-accident design change. Thus, the feasibility exception to section 90.407 may not be utilized. Having concluded neither the rule nor the exceptions thereto apply to pre-accident redesigns, the issue remaining to be resolved is whether the design change is admissible.
The Raymond court explained that pre-accident design modifications made after the date of manufacture are relevant in determining the defectiveness of a product. Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1523-24; Chase, 856 F.2d at 21-22 (holding pre-accident, postmanufac-ture design changes not within the ambit of 407 and explaining they may be otherwise admissible). However, because the design change must have been feasible at the time of manufacture, if the improvement could not have been made when the product was manufactured, then the improvement is, as a matter of law, irrelevant to the issue of defectiveness. Roberts, 901 F.2d at 44. In this case, the later-incorporated design change could have been implemented at the time of manufacture.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the pre-accident, postmanufacture design change, nor in instructing the jury upon same. While there may be circumstances which require the application of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1991), the record in this case does not so require.
With respect to the cross-appeal, any error was invited by appellees/cross-appellants, whose verdict form was used by the jury. Having invited the error, they cannot now complain. Held v. Held, 617 So.2d 358, 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also Springer v. Morris, 58 So.2d 859, 861 (Fla.1952). Because of the necessity for a new trial, this issue should become moot upon remand.
WARNER, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
.The Fifth Circuit held in Roberts that a post-manufacture, pre-accident addition of a warning device was irrelevant because the device had not been developed at the time of manufacture. The court places its reliance upon its earlier opinion in Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.1983), wherein the court had noted: "Alternative designs may indicate that the product was unreasonably dangerous ., but only if they were available at the time of manufacture." We agree. Had the later-model stepladder been impossible to manufacture at the time the subject stepladder was manufactured, it would be irrelevant. Accord Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (holding, before the creation of section 90.407, a pre-accident design change not relevant to defectiveness of valve where the improvement was based on technology not available at the time of manufacture), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.1978).
. Appellant agreed to stipulate that the "alternative design to the 327, which is on the table, which is the only one that will be demonstrated, was feasible both financially and under engineering principles at the time that its predecessor, the 727, was manufactured...."
. Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
90.403 Exclusion on grounds of prejudice or confusion. — Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. This section shall not be construed to mean that evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible.