Case Name: ROY D. PRICE, Appellant, v. THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1954-03-31
Citations: 42 Cal. 2d 577
Docket Number: L. A. No. 22934
Parties: ROY D. PRICE, Appellant, v. THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 577–601

Head Matter:
[L. A. No. 22934.
In Bank.
Mar. 31, 1954.]
ROY D. PRICE, Appellant, v. THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and D. W. Brobst for Appellant.
Robert W. Walker, Frederic A. Jacobus and J. H. Cummins for Respondent.

Opinion:
SCHAUER, J.
This case presents the question of the availability in California of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a ground for refusal by a court to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action which arose outside the state's boundaries. We have concluded that upon a proper showing and within the limitations imposed by the privileges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2) the doctrine may be applied in this state.
Plaintiff filed this action in the superior court in Los Angeles, under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.), hereinafter termed the FELA, to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him on two different occasions while employed by defendant railroad company in interstate commerce. Both accidents occurred in New Mexico. Defendant answered with a general denial, and also pleaded contributory negligence by plaintiff, and a settlement and release agreement made with plaintiff in New Mexico with respect to the first accident. Defendant further pleaded a special defense based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and in addition moved under that doctrine to dismiss the complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, judgment of dismissal was entered accordingly, and this appeal by plaintiff followed.
From the pleadings and affidavits upon which defendant's motion to dismiss was based, the following facts appear: Plaintiff was a resident and citizen of the State of New Mexico both at the time of the accidents and when this action was brought in Los Angeles. Defendant is a Kansas corporation doing business in both New Mexico and California. All of the witnesses to the accidents reside in New Mexico rather than in this state. In order to defend the action in Los Angeles defendant will be compelled to attempt, at great expense and inconvenience, to bring approximately 18 witnesses distances of some 900 to 1,000 miles from three cities in New Mexico, and to pay their travel, lodging, meals, and miscellaneous expenses and for their time, including professional fees of some five doctors who treated plaintiff in New Mexico. It was uncertain, however, whether any of the doctors would find it possible to leave their practice to attend a trial in Los Angeles, and if not'then defendant would be obliged to present their testimonies by deposition, at the loss of the effectiveness of their personal appearance as witnesses. Defendant estimated that the trial would last approximately five to seven days and that the total extra cost of defending the action in Los Angeles rather than in New Mexico would be $4,650. During the years 1947 through and including October 30, 1952, the firm of attorneys which filed this action for plaintiff filed in the superior court in Los Angeles some 67 actions against defendant based upon causes of action arising in other states under the FELA, and also filed 21 of such imported cases in the federal district courts in this state. None of the above related facts are denied by plaintiff or his counsel.
As declared in Leet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008], "The rule of forum nonconveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere." And in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 330 U.S. 501, 504, 507 [67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062], it is stated that ' ' As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandéis, the rule is: '. . . Courts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal. ' Canada Malting Co., Ltd., v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. [1932], 285 U.S. 413, 422, 423 [52 S.Ct. 413, 76 L.Ed. 837]: . . . The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." (See, also, cases cited in dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner (1941), 314 U.S. 44, 55 [62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28, 34,136 A.L.R. 1222].) It is conceded that under section 6 of the FELA (45 U.S.C.A. § 56 ) the California court has jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the parties involved in this action.
In the Leet case we held that a court of this state having jurisdiction over an action under the FELA could not refuse to exercise it. Our holding was based primarily upon our view that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miles v. Illinois Central R. R. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698 [62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129], was "completely decisive that the doctrine of forum nonconveniens is no justification for a state court to refuse jurisdiction of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Likewise, it is conclusive that the state court must take jurisdiction. It has no choice in the matter and no rule or policy on its part alters the situation [pp. 612-613 of 25 Cal.2d] . . . From the foregoing it is clear that the California court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trials of the above entitled causes and was required to exercise such jurisdiction. [P. 616] ." It now appears, however, that since our decision in the Leet case the United States Supreme Court has considered the question in Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield (1950), 340 U.S. 1 [71 S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3, 6], and has declared that the Miles case did not limit "the power of a State to deny access to its courts to persons seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act if in similar cases the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts and enforces its policy impartially . so as not to involve a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the Constitution," and that if a state court held to the contrary "because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of that compulsion." The court further expressly recognized the power of each state "According to its own notions of procedural policy . . . [to] reject, as it may accept, the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] for all causes of action begun in its courts," including those arising under the PELA, so long as it discriminates against neither citizens of sister states nor PELA actions.
In other words, as declared in the Mayfield case, in refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a state may not, by reason of the privileges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2), allow suits in its courts by its own nonresident citizens' ' for liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act arising out of conduct outside that State and discriminatorily deny access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another State. But if a State chooses to ' [prefer] residents in access to often overcrowded Courts' and to deny such access to all non-residents, whether its own citizens or those of other States, it is a choice within its own control. This is true also of actions for personal injuries under the Employers' Liability Act. Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. [1929], 279 U.S. 377, 387 [49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed 747]. Whether a State makes such a choice is, like its acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a question of State law not open to review" by the United States Supreme Court, provided the state ' enforces its policy impartially . so as not to involve a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the Constitution." (Pp. 3-4 of 340 U.S.) In the Douglas case the court declared (p. 387 of 279 U.S.), "There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned. ' '
It is unquestioned that the courts of this state have accepted and exercised jurisdiction over transitory causes of action, which arose outside of California in favor of citizens of other jurisdictions, nonresident in California, whether based on the common-law or a statute of a sister state or a statute of the United States (see Schultz v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1953), 118 Cal.App.2d 169, 178 [257 P.2d 1003], and authorities cited in footnote 17, 118 Cal.App.2d 178), provided the law of the sister state is not in direct conflict with the express provisions of the law or the public policy of California and is not contrary to fundamental principles of justice or good morals, or injurious to the welfare of the people. (Loranger v. Nadeau (1932), 215 Cal. 362, 366 [10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264] ; Hudson v. Von Hamm (1927), 85 Cal.App. 323, 326- 331 [259 P. 374]; Thome v. Macken (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 76 [136 P.2d 116].) California courts have also accepted jurisdiction of FELA cases both as to causes of action which arose in this state, and as to those which arose outside California in favor of nonresident noncitizen plaintiffs against a foreign corporation doing business in this state. (See Leet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 605; Estate of Waits (1944), 23 Cal.2d 676, 678-679 [146 P.2d 5].)
It is thus clear that this state has no policy, either statutory or court made, of discrimination against either non-citizens of California or against FELA actions in determining when a nonresident of this state will be given access to state courts to litigate a cause of action which arose elsewhere, and any contrary implications in Schultz v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1953), supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 169, 179, 181, are disapproved. The Leet case, discussed hereinabove, appears to have presented the first instance in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been considered and discussed by this court, and as already mentioned we rejected it in connection with the FELA litigation there involved because of our belief that we were so compelled by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Miles case. But since that court, in the Mayfield case, has now lifted that compulsion (if it ever intended any), we perceive no reason why the doctrine should not be available in this state, upon a proper showing and without discrimination against either noncitizens of California or against FELA cases. So far as concerns the FELA, Congress in 1948 empowered the federal district courts to transfer "any civil action," including those based on the FELA, to any other district or division where it might have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404; see Ex parte Collett (1949), 337 U.S. 55 [69 S.Ct. 944, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207,10 A.L.R.2d 921] ; Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. (1949), 338 U.S. 263 [70 S.Ct. 26, 94 L.Ed. 55] ; Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1953), 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 749, 97 L.Ed. 1094].) Although there is no statutory authorization for such transfer by state courts, and although under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a cause arising outside California will be dismissed rather than transferred, we are of the view that the injustices and the burdens on local courts and taxpayers, as well as on those leaving their work and business to serve as jurors, which can follow from an unchecked and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action for trial in this state (see discussion 35 Cal.L.Rev. 402-415) require" that our courts, acting upon the equitable principles and within the constitutional limits hereinabove stated, exercise their discretionary power to decline to proceed in those causes of action which they conclude, on satisfactory evidence, may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. (See Leet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 605, 609.) A contrary policy would result in the anomaly that a federal district court situated in California could in the interest of justice transfer to another district or division an FELA action filed here, whereas regardless of the equities involved state courts would be powerless to decline to exercise jurisdiction over comparable actions brought in those courts. We are persuaded that such a result would be promotive of neither fairness, justice, nor congressional intent when removal power was bestowed Upon the federal district courts.
With respect to particular situations in which a court is justified in dismissing an action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it was pointed out in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), supra, 330 U.S. 501, 507-509, in sustaining the power of a federal district court in New York to dismiss a diversity of citizenship case based upon a tort which occurred in Lynchburg, Virginia, that "Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with a discretion to change the place of trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice. The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in exercising its power. But the problem is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.
"Wisely, .it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.
"If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
"Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." In determining that in applying the doctrine the district court had exercised a sound discretion, the court noted that defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in both Virginia and New York, and (pp. 509-511) that neither the plaintiff nor any witness, with the possible exception of experts, lived in New York; that no one connected with plaintiff's side of the case save counsel for plaintiff resided there; that plaintiff's only justification for seeking trial in New York was the argument, rejected by both the district court and the United States Supreme Court, that the size of the recovery sought by him (some $400,000) might more readily "stagger" a jury from Lynchburg, Virginia, than one from New York; that Lynch-burg, the source of all proofs for either side, except possibly experts, was some 400 miles from New York; and that "to fix the place of trial at a point where litigants cannot compel personal attendance and may, be forced to try their cases on deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to court, jury or most litigants."
As already noted hereinabove, in the present case plaintiff does not controvert the facts alleged by defendant as a basis for invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Moreover, the only ground urged by plaintiff for trial in this state is his claim of an absolute right thereto, a right which, as we have seen, has been negated by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Mayfield case. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that although as in the Gulf Oil Corp. case (330 U.S. 501, 507-509) from which we have just quoted, there is no "express [statutory] criteria to guide the . . . [trial] court in exercising its power," nevertheless that court here" properly acted within its discretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The difficulties and inconvenience to defendant, to the court, and to jurors hearing the case, of attempting to proceed where witnesses are not amenable to process, and where testimony may have to be presented by deposition, are apparent. The added expense to defendant of either attempting to bring witnesses from New Mexico to Los Angeles or of having to take their depositions, when not counterbalanced by even a claim of advantage or convenience to plaintff, was another factor properly to be taken into consideration. And as already mentioned, the expense and burden resulting to local taxpayers, courts, and jurors, of providing a forum for the trial of imported cases also weigh against plaintiff.
The suggestion (although not advanced by plaintiff here) that the doctrine should not apply because if an action filed by a nonresident plaintiff is dismissed by the California courts his rights may be barred by limitations statutes is without merit; if plaintiff chooses without justification to bring his action under circumstances warranting application of the doctrine it is a deliberate risk assumed by him and he must be prepared to meet any losses sustained as a result. Moreover, as to FELA cases, any such risk could be obviated by filing in a federal district court, in which the action would be subject to removal "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," rather than to dismissal (28 U.S.C.A. §1404). In the present case, however, the statute of limitations will, on February 15, 1954, have run with respect to the first cause of action and, solely in order to avoid on plaintiff's behalf the bar of the statute of limitations, defendant has entered into a stipulation with plaintiff that the judgment of the trial court herein shall be reversed as to the first cause of action. In view of such stipulation and of the fact that until this present decision it had been declared to be the law of this state (in Leet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 605, 609) that our courts were compelled to reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens with respect to FELA cases, and in order that as to the first cause of action plaintiff may not through reliance upon the Leet decision be barred by the statute of limitations, we have concluded that the judgment should be reversed as to that cause of action.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment' is reversed as to .the first cause of action, and is affirmed as to the second cause of action, neither party to recover costs on appeal.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
In diminution of damages under the comparative negligence doctrine applicable to FELA actions. (45 U.S.C.A. § 53.)
Section 56: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.
"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States."
As noted hereinabove, removal power was by statute given to the federal district courts the following year (1948).