Case Name: W. M. Scott v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-10
Citations: 89 Tex. Crim. 70
Docket Number: No. 5940
Parties: W. M. Scott v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 70–75

Head Matter:
W. M. Scott v. The State.
No. 5940.
Decided November 10, 1920.
Rehearing denied March 30, 1921.
1. —Swindling—Indictment—Words and Phrases—Rule Stated.
The whole indictment must be looked to if it be claimed that any part thereof lacks certainty, in order to determine whether there be merit in such claim. And where defendant moved to quash in that the indictment was uncertain and indefinite, because it was not clear to whom the pronouns “he” and “his” related, it appeared from the entire pleading that no such uncertainty appeared therein, there was no reversible error.
2. —Same—’-Evidence—-Variance—Time-check.
Where, upon trial of swindling of more than the value of fifty dollars, defendant claimed a variance between the pretense alleged and that proven, but the record showed on appeal that it was both alleged and proven that the defendant represented that the draft or time-check, which was set out in the indictment and offered in evidence, was for eighty-five dollars when in fact it was for only eighty-five cents, there was no variance.
3. —Same—Time-check—Amount Involved—Value.
Where upon trial of swindling the defendant undertook to show that the railway company which issued to him the alleged time-check for eighty-five cents might have owed him more money than that amount, to which an objection was sustained by the court, there was no error, as the inquiry in the instant case was as to the value as to the particular check alleged in the indictment and as to what representations were made by defendant concerning same.
4. —Same—Charge of Court—Requested Charge.
Where, the substance of the requested charge, in sofar as it was correct, was given in the main charge, there was no error in refusing same.
5. —Same—Accomplice—Charge of Court.
Where, upon trial of swindling the evidence showed that there was no sort of pretense of criminality on the part of the companion who acted with defendant, and nothing in the record called for a charge that he was or might be an accomplice, there was no error in the court’s failure to charge on accomplice’s testimony.
6. —Same—Evidence—Charge of Court—Practice on Appeal—Delinquent Child.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of swindling, error was assigned upon the fact that the prosecuting attorney, upon trial of the case, asked the defendant when on the witness stand, if he had not been confined in the reformatory as a delinquent, child, to which objection was sustained by the court and the jury instructed not to consider said question, there was no reversible error, and it is not necessary for this court to -decide as to whether the fact of conviction as a delinquent child is admissible in evidence against the accused after he ceases to be such child.
7.—Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Charge of Court.
Where, upon trial of swindling, defendant claimed that when he passed the alleged check representing the same to be for the sum of eighty-five dollars, that he believed it to be for that amount, instead of eighty-five cents, and the trial court fully submitted this issue to the jury, there was no reversible error.
8.—Same—Rehearing—Bill of Exceptions—Evidence—Lost Check.
Where appellant urged in his motion for re-hearing that this court was in error in sustaining the refusal of the trial court to allow him, on cross-examination of State’s witness, to show whether time-checks are not sometimes misplaced and lost and did not show on the books of the company and that it took months to straighten out such matters, and that defendant might be entitled to more money on his time-check, but the record showed that he did not claim, while on the witness stand, to have lost any time-slips or checks, or that any other witness testified to such fact, the trial court properly refused said testimony besides, the bill of exceptions was defective. Following Hardgraves v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Rep., 325, and other cases.
9.—Same—Practice in Trial Court.
This court cannot sustain the contention that the mere asking of a question, the answer to which would involve a matter not admissible as evidence, would necessitate a reversal; it not being shown that the prosecuting attorney sought to prejudice the accused thereby, and besides, the appellant received the lowest penalty.
Appeal from the District Court of McLennan. Tried below before the Honorable Richard I. Munroe.
Appeal from a conviction of swindling; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Farmer & Farmer, for appellant.
On question of refusing appellant to show that sometimes checks might be lost, etc.: Hardy v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 292; Chenowith v. State, 50 id., 240; Pitts v. State, 132 S. W. Rep., 803.
On question of conduct of State’s attorney in asking appellant whether he had not been formerly convicted as a delinquent child: Wyatt v. State, 124 S. W. Rep., 929; Hawkins v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 261; Brazell v. State, 33 id., 333; Brown v. State, 57 id., 269.
Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
On question of conduct of district attorney: Wright v. State, 140 S. W. Rep., 1107.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted in the 54th District Court of McLennan County, of the offense of swindling of more' than the value of $50, and his punishment fixed at two years confinement in the penitentiary.
It was alleged in the indictment as follows: "The said W. M. Scott did falsely pretend and fraudulently represent to the said Jim De Grazier that he had in his possession a certain valid writing obligatory . . . and did then and there by means of said false pretense and fraudulent representation, fraudulently induce the said Jim De Grazier . to exchange his said eighty-four dollars and fifteen cents for the said pretended writing obligatory," etc.
A motion to quash said indictment was made, upon the ground that it was indefinite and uncertain, in that it was not clear to whom the pronouns "he" and "his," as above set out, related: The whole indictment must be looked to, if it be claimed that any part thereof lacks certainty, in order to determine whether there be merit in such claim. Without setting out the indictment at length, we observe that in other parts thereof it is fully set out that by means of false pretenses De Grazier was induced to part with his said money, and that he did receive from the said Scott said written instrument, falsely represented by the said Scott as valid and valuable. We do not think the indictment either so vague and indefinite as not to put appellant upon notice, or as not to afford him a basis for a plea of jeopardy or former conviction, if needed. We find no variance between the pretense alleged and that proven. It was both alleged and proven that appellant represented that the draft or time-check, which was set out in the indictment, and offered in evidence, was for eighty-five dollars, when in fact it was for only eighty-five cents.
By cross-examination of the State's witness Shook, appellant undertook to show that the Railroad Company which issued to him the draft or time-check for eighty-five cents, might have owed him more money than that amount. Said witness was asked as follows: "Is it not a fact that you oftentimes have time-checks lost or misplaced, and that it takes you months to straighten same out, and that it is probable that Scott could have had more time coming than is shown by your books ?" The inquiry in this case was as to the value of the particular check or draft in question, and as to what representations were made by appellant concerning same. The record discloses no claim advanced by him that he made any statement to De Grazier as to what amount the company owed him, or that he had any reason to believe that they owed him eighty-five dollars. Appellant testified that he was sick a part of January, 1920. The employes of the company for which he was working, were paid semi-monthly. Mr. Shook, who had charge of the books of said company, testified that the gross amount due appellant on January 31, 1920, for the preceding half-month, was $29.60, from which had to be deducted meal tickets signed for by appellant, to the amount of $26.00, leaving an amount due appellant of $3.60; and that $2.75 of that amount was due him as a switchman, and 85 cents thereof as a brakeman; that it being the custom to keep the pay-rolls separately, one time-check for $2.75 as switchman, and one time-check for 85 cents as brakeman, were issued to appellant. Mr, Shook also said that the records of his office showed that appellant worked one day in January, to-wit, the 31st, as brakeman. The record shows that appellant was arrested about February 20, 1920, and that the instant trial was had during the latter part of April of said year. More than two months had elapsed, during which time, appellant admitted on the witness stand, he made no claim that more money was due him by the said company, nor did he introduce any witness, or make any effort to establish said fact on his trial. Mr. Shook had the books of the company for' the entire month of January, and no effort appears to have been made to show therefrom that any more money was 'due appellant than testified to by said witness. The fact that some time-checks might be lost, would be of no value to appellant, in the absence of any evidence making it appear probable that a time-check due him had been lost. The fact that sometimes months were required to straighten out lost time-checks, would avail appellant nothing in the absence of something upon which to predicate a claim of a lost time-check due him. The objection to the question as asked, was properly sustained.
The special charge asked by appellant was not a correct presentation of the law involved. The substance of the same, insofar as it was correct, was given in the main charge, wherein the trial court told the jury that if the prosecuting witness knew when,he parted with his money that the check given him by appellant was for only 85 cents, or if the jury had a reasonable doubt thereof, they should acquit appellant.
Nor was any error committed in failing to instruct the jury as to accomplice testimony, relative to the witness Sorce. Both Sorce and De Grazier were foreigners, and barbers in the city of Waco, the former working in the shop of the latter. Appellant seems to have presented his 85 cents time-check first to Sorce, and after some argument, convinced the latter that the same was for $85; whereupon, both Sorce and appellant made representations to De Grazier relative to the value and amount of said check. There was no sort of pretense of criminality on the part of Sorce. He seems to have been barely able to read a little English. Nothing in the record called for a charge that he was or might be an accomplice.
Error is assigned upon the fact that the prosecuting attorney asked the appellant, when on the witness stand, if he had not been confined in the reformatory as a delinquent child. This was objected to, and the objection was sustained. The jury were instructed both then and in the charge, not to consider said question. The language of Article 1197, of our Code of Criminal Procedure is not clear as to whether the fact of conviction as a delinquent child, is admissible against an accused after he ceases to be such child, but inasmuch as the evidence' in the matter before us was not admitted, it is not necessary for us to discuss that question here. We are unable to see any error in the matter as presented.
It is urged that the evidence is not sufficient to make out a case. Appellant claims that when he passed the check to De Grazier, representing the same to be for $85, he believed it to be for that amount. The trial court fully instructed the jury upon this issue, telling them that if from the evidence they found that appellant so believed at the time he passed the check to De Grazier, and acquired the money of the latter, they should acquit. The jury found against appellant's contention, and we are not inclined to hold their verdict without support in the testimony.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.