Case Name: David Glenn BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; Mark Peterson; Karen Zelis; Douglas MacMaster, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-12-20
Citations: 671 F. App'x 623
Docket Number: No. 15-15093
Parties: David Glenn BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; Mark Peterson; Karen Zelis; Douglas MacMaster, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 671
Pages: 623–623

Head Matter:
David Glenn BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; Mark Peterson; Karen Zelis; Douglas MacMaster, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-15093
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 16, 2016 San Francisco, California
Filed December 20, 2016
David Glenn Brown, Pro Se
Peter P. Edrington, Attorney, James Marzan, Esquire, Attorney, Edrington, Schirmer, & Murphy LLP, Pleasant Hill, CA, Julia Levitskaia, Attorney, Archer Norris PLC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Contra Costa County, Karen Zelis, Douglas MacMaster
Peter P. Edrington, Attorney, James Marzan, Esquire, Attorney, Edrington, Schirmer, & Murphy LLP, Pleasant Hill, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Mark Peterson
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
David Brown appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment against his claim of workplace racial harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Nearly all of the alleged workplace incidents are race neutral, and the record provides no reason to infer that they had anything to do with Brown's race. The few alleged incidents that were arguably related to Brown's race were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) ("A violation is not established merely by evidence showing sporadic use of abusive language, [race]-related jokes, and occasional teasing." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, regardless whether Brown subjectively perceived his environment to be racially abusive, he cannot prevail. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 799 & n.6.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. By failing to present any argument regarding his other claims, Brown has waived any challenge to the district court's' earlier dismissal of such claims or to the court's denial of Brown's request to file a sixth amended complaint. See, e.g., Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).