Case Name: Anthony C. MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 2010-12-07
Citations: 328 S.W.3d 700
Docket Number: No. SC 90918
Parties: Anthony C. MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
Judges: PRICE, C.J., WOLFF, BRECKENRIDGE and FISCHER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 328
Pages: 700–705

Head Matter:
Anthony C. MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. SC 90918.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Dec. 7, 2010.
Gwenda R. Robinson, Public Defender’s Office, St. Louis, for Moore.
Jamie P. Rasmussen, Attorney General’s Office, Jefferson City, for the State.

Opinion:
MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.
Anthony Moore was late in filing his Rule 29.15 motion. He contends that his appellate counsel for his direct appeal abandoned him by not timely telling him that the mandate from his appeal had been issued. The State argues that appellate counsel has no duty to provide timely notification. Pursuant to Rule 30.24(b), the clerk of the appellate court sent Moore notice of the mandate being entered, and he does not refute receiving that notice. The judgment of the motion court dismissing his untimely Rule 29.15 motion is affirmed.
I. Background
Moore was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At the sentencing proceedings, the judge informed Moore of his right to seek post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. The judge explained that there are three bases for filing a Rule 29.15 motion to set aside the sentences: (1) if they violate the constitution or laws of the United States or of Missouri; (2) if the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentences; or (3) if the sentences exceeded the maximum allowed by law. Further, the judge told Moore that if he appealed, the Rule 29.15 motion would be due 90 days after the mandate from the court of appeals issued. Moore asked what form he should use to file the motion, and the judge instructed him to use Criminal Procedure Form 40, which could be obtained at the department of corrections. Moore indicated that he understood his right to file the motion.
After the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, it issued its mandate October 16, 2008. See State v. Moore, 264 S.W.3d 657 (Mo.App.2008). Moore filed his Rule 29.15 motion 218 days later. Along with the motion, he filed a letter and an affidavit from the attorney who represented him on direct appeal. The appellate attorney's affidavit stated that she told Moore in a letter mailed Mahch 13, 2009, that the mandate had been issued in his direct appeal. The letter reminded him of the 90-day deadline to file a Rule 29.15 motion but acknowledged that the deadline, January 14, 2009, had passed two months ago. The appellate attorney recommended that if Moore wished to seek post-conviction relief, he should file a Rule 29.15 motion as soon as possible. Moore did not file his Rule 29.15 motion until May 22, 2009, more than two months later.
The court dismissed the Rule 29.15 motion for being untimely. This appeal follows.
II. Standard of Review
Review of a Rule 29.15 judgment is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, there is a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. McFadden v. State, 256 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Mo. banc 2008).
III. Analysis
Moore claims that the motion court erred in dismissing his Rule 29.15 motion because his appellate counsel for his direct appeal failed to timely inform him of the mandate's issuance, which excused his tardy filing. His claim relies on prior cases in which courts have held that, due to third-party interference, the untimely filing was excused. See McFadden, 256 S.W.3d 103; Nicholson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 369 (Mo. banc 2004); Spells v. State, 213 S.W.3d 700 (Mo.App.2007).
As Moore was instructed by the trial court, Rule 29.15(b) requires that the post-conviction motion be filed within 90 days after the date the court of appeals issues its mandate affirming the judgment or sentence. The original motion must give the court notice that movant seeks post-conviction relief. Bullard v. State, 853 S.W.2d 921, 922-23 (Mo. banc 1993). Legal assistance is not required for the original motion. Id. at 923. If the motion is filed by an indigent self-represented movant, the court will appoint counsel. Rule 29.15(e). The appointed counsel will have the opportunity to file an amended motion that alleges sufficient facts and all claims for relief. Id.
If the movant fails to file the motion within the 90-day time limit, there is a complete waiver of the right to seek Rule 29.15 relief and a complete waiver of all claims that could be raised in the post-conviction motion. Rule 29.15(b); see also Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Mo. banc 2009) (noting that a claim that could have been raised in a Rule 29.15 motion but was not cannot be raised in a petition for habeas corpus). While the rule does not carve out exceptions that excuse late filings, court decisions have created two: (1) when post-conviction counsel abandons the movant; and (2) when rare circumstances outside the movant's control justify late receipt of the motion. McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 108-09.
Under the first exception, abandonment traditionally excuses a late filing in two situations: (1) when post-conviction counsel fails to file an amended motion and the record shows the movant was deprived of meaningful review of the claims; or (2) when post-conviction counsel files an untimely amended motion. Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 57. A third type of abandonment occurs when post-conviction counsel's overt actions prevent the movant from filing the original motion timely. See McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 109 (post-conviction counsel, despite promising to file mov-ant's pro se motion, failed to do so timely).
There was no abandonment in this case. Abandonment has been found to occur when post-conviction counsel improperly acts or fails to act to the movant's detriment. See Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 57; McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 109. Moore's complaint is directed toward his appellate counsel, who he says abandoned him by failing to timely inform him when the mandate was issued. However, appellate counsel has no duty to represent a movant in post-conviction relief filings. There is nothing in the record that indicates appellate counsel agreed to inform Moore when the mandate was issued. Further, appellate counsel has no obligation to notify the defendant of his post-conviction rights under Rule 29.15 or of the mandate's issuance.
The judicial branch is already obligated to inform the defendant of such information. Under Rule 29.07(b), the trial court must conduct a post-sentencing hearing in which it questions the defendant concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel. The court must also advise the defendant of the right to proceed under Rule 29.15. Here, the transcript indicates that the trial court informed Moore of his right to file a Rule 29.15 motion by using Criminal Procedure Form 40 within 90 days of the appellate court mandate's issuance. Moore indicated in open court that he understood those rights.
Under Rule 30.24(b), the clerk of the appellate court has the duty to inform the appellant of the mandate's issuance by sending a copy of the mandate for the appellant to the department of corrections. The appellate docket sheet reflects an entry that the mandate was sent October 16, 2008. It is presumed that the clerk of the appellate court sent a copy of the mandate to Moore, and he does not refute that he received it.
The second judicially created exception to Rule 29.15 occurs, "in very rare circumstances . [in which] our courts have found an improper filing, caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant, justified a late receipt of the motion by the proper court." McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 108; see Nicholson, 151 S.W.3d at 371 (motion that was timely filed in the improper venue must be transferred to the proper venue as if it were filed there originally); Spells, 213 S.W.3d at 701-02 (a motion was timely where the movant sent it to the court's previous address and the post office received it before the deadline for filing a Rule 29.15 motion). There were no rare circumstances in this case that justify Moore's failure to prepare and send the original motion before the expiration of 90 days.
The motion court's dismissal of the original motion was not clearly erroneous. The judgment is affirmed.
PRICE, C.J., WOLFF, BRECKENRIDGE and FISCHER, JJ., concur.
STITH, J., concurs in separate opinion filed.
TEITELMAN, J., concurs in the opinion of STITH, J.
. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 10.
. Moore also argues that the motion court erred in dismissing the motion because it had no "jurisdiction" over the untimely motion. Relying on Webb ex rel. J.C.W. v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009), Moore asserts that the time limits in Rule 29.15 amount to restrictions on "authority," not "jurisdiction." This assertion is correct. However, there is no significance to the motion court's use of improper terminology in its judgment dismissing the motion. The motion court was correct in dismissing the untimely motion because, under Rule 29.15(b), the court had no "authority" to hear the case.