Case Name: Randall Jack CROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-07-27
Citations: 374 So. 2d 519
Docket Number: No. 51838
Parties: Randall Jack CROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 374
Pages: 519–525

Head Matter:
Randall Jack CROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 51838.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 27, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1979.
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, William P. White, III, Chief Asst. Public Defender, and Clark K. Zolezzi, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ALDERMAN, Justice.
Randall Cross appeals his conviction. of the crime of disorderly intoxication in violation of section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of this statute as applied to Cross, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. We hold that this statute is constitutional as applied to Cross and affirm his conviction.
Cross was charged by information with being intoxicated and causing a public disturbance, contrary to the provisions of section 856.011(1). The record reveals that while on routine patrol at 2:30 a.m., a deputy sheriff approached Cross and his companion, who were standing on a sidewalk in a commercial district, to inquire into their activity. When questioned by the officer as to the contents of a bag into which he was peering, Cross threw the bag through the window of the police cruiser, striking the officer in the face. After the officer exited the police cruiser, Cross proceeded to loudly and profanely abuse the officer. Several persons were drawn to the scene of the incident by this conduct. After Cross had been seated in the police car, he continued to curse and to threaten the officer personally, telling him repeatedly that he would get him and that he would burn the officer's house with his family in it.
Cross does not attack the facial validity of this statute but only challenges its constitutionality as applied to him under the particular facts of this case. Although conceding that he was intoxicated, Cross alleges that the State's case against him for violation of section 856.011 was based on his utterance of words protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Consti tution of the United States and article I, section 4, of the Florida Constitution.
We do not agree with Cross that, under the facts of this case, section 856.011(1) was applied to him in an unconstitutional manner so as to intrude upon his first amendment freedom of speech rights. Viewing what happened objectively, rather than from the subjective viewpoint of the particular law enforcement officer who encountered Cross, we conclude that Cross was intoxicated, that his conduct was not protected speech, and that he created a public disturbance. See S. H. B. v. State, 355 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1978), in which we held:
[ M]ere words, when used as a tool of communication, are constitutionally protected. But the protection fails when, by the manner of their use, the words invade the right of others to pursue their lawful activities. As we said in White [White v. State, 330 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1976)]: "It is the degree of loudness, and the circumstances in which they are uttered, which takes them out of the constitutionally protected area." We note that appellant's conduct consisted of more than words — e. g., running through the halls of a school in session, disobeying the lawful and reasonable requests of school officials, and repeated loud utterances. The totality of these acts, in the context in which they were performed, constitutes a willful disturbance of a school by appellant, in violation of Section 871.01, Florida Statutes.
355 So.2d at 1179.
Furthermore, contrary to Cross' assertion, we find that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support his conviction under section 856.011. We have also considered Cross' final point on appeal and find it to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, C. J., concurs specially with an opinion.
SUNDBERG, J., concurs in result only.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides:
No person in the state shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of another person or property, and no person in the state shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place or in or upon any public conveyance and cause a public disturbance.