Case Name: ALEXANDER JULIO IGLESIAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1988-09-06
Citations: 7 Va. App. 93
Docket Number: No. 0651-86-2
Parties: ALEXANDER JULIO IGLESIAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 7
Pages: 93–131

Head Matter:
Richmond
ALEXANDER JULIO IGLESIAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 0651-86-2
Decided September 6, 1988
Counsel
Michael C. Allen (Englisby, Barnes & Allen, on brief), for appellant.
H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion
ON HEARING EN BANC
COLE, J.
Appellant, Alexander Julio Iglesias, appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. He presents the following questions on this appeal: (1) whether his seizure and detention and the seizure of evidence from his motor vehicle violated rights guaranteed to him under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Virginia constitution; and (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient at law to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with intent to distribute. For the following reasons, we find no error and affirm the conviction.
I.
On July 17, 1985, at approximately 7:30 p.m., three Virginia State Police officers assigned to the narcotics division were stationed at the Interstate 95 toll plaza located adjacent to the Colonial Heights exit ramp. Their purpose was to observe northbound traffic in an effort to identify possible drug couriers. The officer in charge was special agent Stephen A. Berry, assisted by agents Vernon Jones and John Childers.
Berry had been a special agent investigating narcotics crimes for the Virginia Department of State Police for eight years. As part of his training, he had attended a forty hour course with the State Police Academy, a two week training course with the Drug Enforcement Administration, and an additional two week analytical school. Berry had received further specific training in the illegal transportation of narcotics through "drug courier profile" lecture material developed by the Virginia Department of State Police. He had participated in over 300 felony narcotics arrests involving a variety of activities from executing search warrants to making "street buys."
Berry was wearing blue jeans, tennis shoes, and a pullover shirt. His badge was displayed on his belt; his gun was exposed, and he held a walkie-talkie in his hand. He was slightly elevated because he was standing on the barrier between the exact change lanes. This allowed him to see into cars as they went through the toll. From that vantage point, he observed two vehicles approaching. At first glance, the car to his right appeared to be a rental car from Florida because it had no tags or front windshield decals and the front license plate was an advertisement. As the car approached, the driver, later determined to be appellant Iglesias, glanced briefly at Berry, looked quickly away, and then jerked his car over to the extreme left of the toll plaza, as far from Berry as he could get.
Berry testified that Iglesias "didn't pull up [to the toll box], stop, throw his money in, wait for the barrier to raise and go." Rather, Berry said, he rolled through the barrier and threw the toll in without giving the machinery a chance to process the quarter and without giving the gate sufficient time to open so that Iglesias had to slam on his brakes at the gate to avoid hitting it. Officer Jones also testified that he saw the front end of the vehicle "dive" because the gate was down, action which he described as abnormal. Both Berry and Jones shouted at the defendant to stop, but he continued north on 1-95. Berry considered this activity to be a nervous reaction to his presence. He testified that, from his experience as a police officer, rarely did he see cars go through the toll plaza as Iglesias did.
As Iglesias went through the barrier, Berry was able to make further observations: the driver was a male between the ages of 20 and 35, travelling alone; a cooler was on the right front floorboard; no luggage was in the vehicle; and the rear license plate contained the letter "Z," indicating that the car was a rental vehicle from Dade County, Florida.
Their suspicions aroused, Berry, Jones and Childers followed Iglesias in separate unmarked cars. Iglesias glanced in his rear view mirror as he drove in the left lane of 1-95. When Berry, in the lead vehicle, got within seventy-five yards of Iglesias, Iglesias suddenly "jerked" his vehicle over into the right lane in front of a tractor-trailer unit, causing it to slam on its brakes to avoid a collision. Given this dangerous lane change, Berry activated the emergency lights on his car and pulled Iglesias's vehicle off the road.
Upon stopping Iglesias, Berry identified himself as a police officer and obtained Iglesias's driver's license and the car's rental papers. After a brief conversation, Berry asked Iglesias if he was transporting any illegal narcotics. He responded in the negative and said, "go ahead and search the vehicle if you want to." Berry then asked him to produce the keys to the trunk, which he did. Berry asked if everything in the car belonged to him, and Iglesias acknowledged that it did. The trunk was empty.
At the same time, special agent Jones searched the passenger compartment. In the back seat, he found a silver tote bag, unzipped and open, containing a male's personal belongings and a brown package. Jones took the brown package to the rear of the car, where Iglesias and Berry were talking. Berry opened a corner of the package and saw a white, powdery substance which appeared to him to be cocaine. A field test was performed and the substance tested positive for cocaine. Iglesias was then arrested and advised of his Miranda rights.
Iglesias stated that, while in Florida, he had met Jose Martinez. When Martinez discovered Iglesias planned a trip to New York to see his sister, Martinez asked him to deliver a package to New York, for which he would be paid $200. According to his statement, Iglesias did not observe where in the car Martinez had put the package, nor did he know what it contained. Martinez was to call Iglesias in New York, either at his sister's house or her office, to tell him what to do with the package.
A subsequent laboratory analysis indicated the package contained 999 grams of cocaine of seventy-four percent purity. Based on his years of experience in narcotics investigations, Berry estimated that the "street" value of the cocaine was $400,000, and that, when cut and sold in gram quantities, it would yield 4,000 separate sales. He testified that such a quantity, almost 2.2 pounds, was more than would be required for individual usage.
At trial, Iglesias moved to suppress all evidence obtained incident to the stop, contending the stop was illegal because it was not based upon probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion. Over Iglesias's objection, his motion to suppress was denied. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, Iglesias moved to strike the evidence because it failed to show that he possessed or that he had intent to distribute cocaine. The motion was over ruled. Iglesias was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and sentenced to fifteen years, eight of which were suspended. He was also fined $10,000, $8,000 of which was suspended. This appeal followed.
II.
Iglesias contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his seizure and detention because constitutional rights guaranteed him under the fourth amendment and the Virginia Constitution were violated. More specifically, he argues that, absent independent individual indicia of criminal activity, the matching of characteristics of a drug courier profile does not provide sufficient cause for an investigatory stop, and that under the facts of this case, no credible evidence exists from which a suspicion of criminal activity can reasonably be inferred.
It is clear that stopping a motor vehicle on a highway and detaining the driver "constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the . . . detention . . . brief." Lowe, 230 Va. at 349 S.E.2d at 275 (citations omitted). But the fourth amendment does not prohibit all seizures — only those that are unreasonable. As with other categories of police action subject to fourth amendment constraints, the reasonableness of a seizure depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security, free from arbitrary interference of law officers. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
Well established fourth amendment jurisprudence has placed police-citizen confrontations into three categories. First, there are communications between police officers and citizens that are consensual and, therefore, do not implicate the fourth amendment. Second, there are brief investigatory stops which must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant a limited intrusion. Third, there are highly intrusive, full-scale arrests, which must be based on probable cause. United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 700 (1988); United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1986). Because Iglesias did not raise the third type of confrontation in the trial court, we are concerned in this case with only the second type of confrontation, the so-called Terry stop.
There is no "litmus test" for reasonable suspicion. Each instance of police conduct must be judged for reasonableness in light of the particular circumstances. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Supreme Court acknowledged, in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), that courts have used "a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person." It stated that terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" do not provide clear guidance dis-positive of the numerous factual situations that arise:
[T]he essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
In Cortez, Chief Justice Burger set forth the two elements which must be present before a stop is permissible:
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions — inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.

The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Id. at 418.
Falling into this first category of objective observations are the characteristics found in a drug courier profile, "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980); United States v. Clardy, 819 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1987). It is simply an open-ended laundry list of more or less suspicious circumstances, some of which may occur in a particular case. Grant v. State, 55 Md. App. 1,_, 461 A.2d 524, 526 (1983). The "drug courier profile" is a "convenient descriptive term without a great deal of legal significance." Id.
[T]he suppression hearing judge and the reviewing court [must] look at the actual observations testified to on a case-by-case basis and . . . decide whether those observations add up to articulable suspicion, . . . just as if the phrase "drug courier profile" had never been coined. The only legal significance to this umbrella term called "the profile" is that the expertise of the police will be legitimately taken into consideration when we assess the significance of observations that might to the untrained layman seem completely ambiguous. . . . The special significance that a given observation might have to a trained and experienced policeman could always be established on a case-by-case basis, even if the "profile" did not exit.
Id.
The courts must apply objective standards in determining whether the requisite degree of suspicion exists, taking into account that "trained police officers may be 'able to perceive and articulate meaning to given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.' " United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982). Attention must be focused on objective reasonableness rather than on the police officer's subjective intent. As the Supreme Court explained in Terry.
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the law can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evalu ate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)).
In the case at bar, we must examine the whole picture — the totality of the circumstances — to determine whether special agent Berry had specific articulable facts that reasonably warranted a suspicion that Iglesias was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. As stated previously, the matching of an individual and his conduct to the so-called "drug courier profile" may constitute articulable facts upon which a police officer may legitimately rely. From his observation post, Berry observed Iglesias's vehicle headed northbound bearing a Florida license plate containing the letter "Z." This indicated to Berry that this was a Florida rental vehicle from Dade County, which is approximately 1,000 miles from Virginia. Iglesias appeared to be between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, within the age group that Berry's experience and training indicated might be drug couriers. In the vehicle was a cooler. From this fact Berry could infer that Iglesias wanted to avoid stops along the highway. Barry observed no luggage in the vehicle. From this fact the officer or a magistrate could infer that Iglesias was making a quick trip. These characteristics, particularly in combination, should alert a trained officer that transportation of illegal contraband may be occurring and he should be vigilant of the suspect's activities. Additionally, Berry explained that in making the stop he considered what he described as unusual behavior of Iglesias at the toll gate and thereafter. Berry testified that his first impression from this behavior was: "this man doesn't want to get close to me." Furthermore, as Berry followed Iglesias on the highway, Iglesias glanced at him in his rear view mirror and when Berry got within seventy-five yards of him, Iglesias suddenly "jerked" his vehicle over into the right lane of travel so close to the front end of a tractor-trailer unit that it had to slam on its brakes to avoid a collision. Berry testified that, upon a totality of all of these circumstances, he decided to stop Iglesias to investigate further. We find that these circumstances created a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Iglesias was transporting illegal drugs.
We are unaware of any United States or Virginia Supreme Court case which involves the stopping of a motor vehicle on the highways based upon a drug courier profile, but we find support for our decision today from fourth circuit airport drug courier cases which have held that the drug courier profile plus other unusual circumstances can create the particularized suspicion necessary to justify a stop. For example, in United States v. Harrison, 667 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1982), Harrison matched certain characteristics of the drug courier profile: he had arrived from a known "source city;" he was among the last passengers to deplane; he carried no luggage; he appeared nervous and fidgety; and he walked very quickly. In addition, he raised the DEA agent's suspicion by making a peculiar head movement when he saw the agent looking at him, climbing a stairwell two steps at a time, and having a four to six inch bulge on his back beneath his jacket. Id. at 1159-60. The court, in upholding the stop, held: "While any one of these facts alone would not be sufficient to warrant a reasonable suspicion, we find that the combination of factors gave the agents reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop for routine questioning. Id. at 1161. Similarly, in United States v. Alpert, 816 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1987), the court found that "the unusual conduct and dilated pupils of [the defendant] and his companion supplemented the drug courier characteristics observed . . . and provided sufficient justification to stop [him] and investigate further." Id. at 961 (footnote omitted).
Iglesias relies on a number of federal cases in support of his position. However, the facts of those cases are all distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980), an airport detention case, a DEA agent suspected Reid of wrongdoing because he fit certain drug courier profile characteristics: he had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a principal place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the country; he arrived in the early morning when law enforcement activity is diminished; he and his companion appeared to the agent to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together; and they had no luggage other than shoulder bags. The Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the agent could not have reasonably suspected Reid of criminal activity on the basis of the observed circumstances. Id. at 441. The only specific evidence was the defendant's effort to conceal the fact that he was traveling with, another person. Id. Reid does not preclude, however, all reliance on drug courier profile evidence. It simply indicates that such generalized characteristics cannot support a Terry stop without more particularized evidence of wrongdoing. In the present case, Iglesias's unusual conduct at the toll booth and thereafter supplied the particularized evidence which distinguishes this case from Reid.
In Gooding, 695 F.2d at 82-83, another airport detention case, DEA agents relied upon six factors to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing: "Gooding arrived from New York, a source city for drugs; he was dressed casually on a 3:00 p.m. businessmen's flight; he made a telephone call immediately after arriving and subsequently made two other calls; he scanned the concourse after deplaning; he acknowledged the agents' presence in an alleged cat-and-mouse game of mutual surveillance; and two agents said his demeanor appeared distraught and nervous. In a two to one decision, the court held that the first four factors were general characteristics that "presumably innocent persons" would possess and that the last two circumstances were not enough, combined with the first four, to establish "reasonable suspicion of individualized criminal activity." Id. at 83. While the court noted that a "cat and mouse" pattern of mutual surveillance could supply reasonable suspicion, it found that the facts of that case did not establish such a pattern. Id. The court further found that, although "nervous or anxious demeanor" may be relevant to a "reasonable suspicion" inquiry, the facts of that case did not sufficiently establish such a demeanor. Id. at 83-84. In this case, Iglesias's anxious demeanor was much more pronounced than Gooding's: he drove recklessly through the toll gate upon seeing Berry; he continued to glance at Berry in his rear view mirror; and he pulled dangerously in front of a tractor-trailer.
Iglesias further argues that United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986), should control this case because the facts are identical. We disagree. In Smith, the DEA agent stopped Smith because he matched certain characteristics of a drug courier profile: Smith's car was travelling fifty miles per hour at 3:00 a.m.; the car was occupied by two individuals approximately thirty years of age; the car displayed out of state tags; the operator was driving over-cautiously; and when the operator drove past the officer who was stationed on the median strip, he failed to look in the direction of the officer's patrol car. Id. at 706. Based upon these factors, the officer stopped the vehicle, believing that the profile provided adequate grounds for the stop. The court found that these factors did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The only particularized reason given for stopping the car, stated the court, was the driver's failure to look at the patrol car. Id. at 707. The Court held that "[s]uch an action is fully consistent with cautious driving: safety, after all, requires keeping one's eyes on the road." Id. The objective circumstances of erratic driving by Iglesias were not present in Smith's case. Furthermore, at the time the stop occurred in Smith, the opinion states only that the vehicle stopped carried out-of-state tags. The officer did not know what distance it had travelled. Nor did he know it was a rental vehicle until after the stop was made. This is clearly distinguishable from the present case, where the officers observed a Florida rental vehicle 1,000 miles from home.
Finally, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 369 S.E.2d 423 (1988) (en banc), a majority of this court reversed convictions of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute, finding that the stop of the defendants' automobile violated the fourth amendment. In Taylor, a Chesterfield County police officer observed defendant Taylor driving a Florida rental car on northbound Interstate 95. He and the other occupant, defendant Malcolm, were black men appearing to the officer to be between twenty and thirty-five years old. His suspicion aroused, the police officer followed the car in his unmarked car for four to five miles. Although the speed of defendants' car varied, it remained within the speed limit. When the officer pulled parallel to the driver's side of the car, the driver "cut his eyes" toward the officer and decreased his speed. Then, the officer pulled parallel to the passenger side of the car at which time both occupants "cut their eyes" at the officer. At this point, their car was stopped. The officer asked to search the car; the occupants consented, and 173 pounds of marijuana were discovered. Id. at 386-87, 369 S.E.2d at 424.
In reversing the conviction, a majority of this court held that
"particularized suspicion" [as required by Terry] is not achieved by the mere presence of drug courier profile characteristics. More is required to elevate a law enforcement officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' " to a "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity."
[T]he drug courier profile [is] no more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' " This "hunch" may be a useful tool for law enforcement officers in identifying those who should be closely watched, but, without more, cannot be justification for an investigative detention.
Id. at 388-89, 369 S.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the court in Taylor did not rule out the use of "the drug courier profile" in contributing to "particularized suspicion," but simply ruled that the profile alone could not create "particularized suspicion."
The only circumstance in Taylor besides the drug courier profile was the occupants' "cutting their eyes" toward the officer's car which the court found "add[ed] nothing to the supposition that the defendants were engaged in criminal activity" because "[t] he presence of an unidentified motor vehicle alternately tracking the defendants' vehicle from one side to the other for a period of four to five miles on an interstate highway could explain why the defendants, concerned for their own safety, looked in the officer's direction." Id. at 389, 369 S.E.2d at 425. Thus, held the court, "[n] either the drug courier profile nor the officer's other observations provided an objective manifestation that the defendants were, or were about to be, engaged in criminal activity," id., and the evidence seized pursuant to the illegal stop should have been suppressed.
In contrast to the facts of Taylor, the defendant in this case, in addition to meeting several of the characteristics of "the drug courier profile," exhibited behavior more drastic than "cutting [his] eyes." At the toll barrier, Iglesias took steps to avoid the observation by the officer and later he abruptly pulled in front of a tractor-trailer in an apparent attempt to escape the police officer's view. While "the mere observation that a traveler is nervous is not indicative of criminal behavior," id., the operation of a motor vehicle in such a reckless and dangerous manner to avoid the scrutiny and presence of the police, as in this case, combined with the matching of characteristics of the "drug courier profile" is sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We find that these specific and articulable facts, when taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the driver was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, Berry was justified in stopping Iglesias's vehicle in order to inquire about his identity and to obtain an explanation of the suspicious circumstances. Because the officer's initial contact with Iglesias was constitutionally permissible, we find that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress.
III.
Assuming arguendo that the initial stop was permissible, the defendant maintains that the encounter immediately escalated into a full scale seizure requiring probable cause to search. Lacking probáble cause for the search, he argues, the trial court should have suppressed all of the evidence against him. We disagree.
All searches without a valid warrant are unreasonable unless shown to be within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a valid warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). One such exception is consent and the fact of custody alone is not enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced consent to search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976). "[The] burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the voluntariness of any consent. And whether the consent was actually freely given is a question of fact to be determined from 'the totality of all the circumstances.' " Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 678, 239 S.E.2d 112, 117 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930 (1978).
After Iglesias was stopped, he exited his car and walked back toward Berry. Berry identified himself as a police officer and told Iglesias he had been stopped because he matched the characteristics of a drug courier profile. Upon request, Iglesias gave Berry his driver's license and his rental agreement for the vehicle. The car had been rented in Iglesias's own name and was to be returned to LaGuardia airport in New York City. Iglesias was then asked whether he was transporting illegal narcotics in his vehicle. He replied, "No, go ahead and search the vehicle if you want to," and he gave Berry the keys to the trunk. Next, Berry asked, "Does everything in the vehicle belong to you?" Iglesias answered, "Yes, sir." Berry then searched the trunk and special agent Jones searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The uncontradicted evidence in this case establishes that Iglesias voluntarily and intelligently consented to a search of the vehicle. All of the factors that usually bear upon consent weigh in favor of the Commonwealth. The search was not made upon any claim of authority by the police; there was no show of force or coercion and they made no threats; the defendant has claimed no mental or emotional infirmity; and the police did not misrepresent their identity or purpose. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25. In fact, Iglesias first suggested that the police officers search the vehicle, and he has not denied the voluntariness of the consent. Because a valid consent to search obviates the need to secure a warrant, the Commonwealth was not required to prove probable cause.
IV.
Iglesias claims that, even if the initial stop was proper, it immediately escalated into a full scale seizure for which probable cause to arrest rather than reasonable suspicion to stop was required, and that under the facts of this case, probable cause to arrest was not shown. He claims that he was detained by three law enforcement officers in separate vehicles, each displaying a weapon, and that this show of force and other coercive surroundings constituted an arrest. Because there was no probable cause for an arrest, argues Iglesias, his constitutional rights were violated and the evi dence should have been suppressed.
We have reviewed the record in this case, including the brief filed with the trial court, and find no indication that this argument was presented in the trial court. Iglesias made it clear that the basis of his suppression motion was that the evidence was insufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion upon which to stop the defendant's vehicle. The scope of the detention was not presented to the trial court as an issue. Accordingly, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 434-35, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987).
V.
Finally, Iglesias maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine or that (2) he had an intent to distribute it. He argues that the record is completely void of any direct evidence that he knew that the brown package in his vehicle contained cocaine or that he intended to distribute it.
We examine the evidence in accordance with the standard set forth in Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975):
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. We should affirm the judgment unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
"The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was aware of the presence and character of the drugs and that he intentionally and consciously possessed them" to convict him of possession of illegal drugs. Andrews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 179, 182, 217 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975). Possession may be actual or constructive. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 389, 402, 363 S.E.2d 440, 448 (1987). Constructive possession exists when "an accused has dominion or control over drugs." Andrews, 216 Va. at 182, 217 S.E.2d at 814. Such "possession may be proved by 'evidence of acts, declarations or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be fairly drawn that he knew of the existence of narcotics at the place where they were found.' " Id. (citations omitted).
Iglesias was the sole occupant of a motor vehicle which he had rented in his own name and driven from Dade County, Florida, to Colonial Heights, Virginia. He also possessed keys to the motor vehicle and its trunk. After having been stopped by Officer Berry, but before the car was searched, Iglesias stated that everything in the car belonged to him. When confronted with the brown package containing the cocaine, Iglesias stated that he did not know what it was and that he had never seen it before. Finally, he admitted that he was paid $200 to deliver the package to an undetermined person in New York. The package was found in an open tote bag in the back seat which also contained clothing, a toothbrush, and a razor.
The trial court was justified in disbelieving Iglesias when he stated that he did not know of the presence of the cocaine. It was entitled to weigh the contradictory statements made by him, Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 781, 51 S.E.2d 210, 313 (1949), and to infer that he was attempting to conceal his guilt by making inconsistent explanations. Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). Under the facts established by the Commonwealth, the trial court was justified in finding that the defendant was in exclusive possession and control of the cocaine. Therefore, we turn to the issue of intent to distribute.
When the proof of intent to distribute narcotics rests upon circumstantial evidence, the quantity which the defendant possesses may indicate the purpose for which it is possessed. Monroe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 154, 156, 355 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1987). Possession of a quantity greater than that ordinarily possessed for one's personal use may be sufficient to establish an intent to distribute it. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973).
The evidence established that Iglesias was in the exclusive possession and control of 999 grams of cocaine having a street value of $400,000; when cut and sold in gram quantities, it would yield 4,000 separate sales. According to the testimony of an experienced narcotics police officer, this was more than would be required for individual usage. In addition, Iglesias was transporting the cocaine from Dade County, Florida, to New York on 1-95, a recognized route of drug carriers, and a circumstance which the trial court can consider in determining the existence of an intent to distribute. Under these circumstances, we hold that the record contains ample evidence to support the conviction of the defendant for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Koontz, C.J., Coleman, J., Duff, J., Hodges, J., and Moon, J., concurred.
"The Virginia requirements, under our constitution and statutes implementing [it], are 'substantially the same as those contained in the Fourth Amendment.' " Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275 n.1 (1985) (citations omitted). We therefore will discuss only the fourth amendment issues.
This court granted the defendant's petition for appeal on three issues. In his opening brief, the defendant condensed these three issues into two, and altered the language in the first issue. Such an alteration is contrary to accepted practice and is improper. Rule 5A: 12(c); Dudley v. Estate Life Ins. Co. of America, 220 Va. 343, 348, 257 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1979).
See infra part IV of this opinion.
Officer Berry testified that Iglesias was guilty of traffic violations, but he dismissed them in order to pursue the higher drug offense.
Code § 46.1-189 provides that "[Any] person who drives a vehicle upon a highway recklessly so as to endanger life, limb or property of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving." Under Virginia law, violation of this code section is punishable as a Class 4 misdemeanor. Code § 18.2-8; 18.2-11; Code § 46.1-1(40).