Case Name: FISH v. VANDERLIP
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-12-03
Citations: 156 N.Y.S. 38
Docket Number: 
Parties: FISH v. VANDERLIP.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 156
Pages: 38–43

Head Matter:
FISH v. VANDERLIP.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 3, 1915.)
1. Insurance <@=>624—Actions—Misjoinder.
Where a number of underwriters insured a vessel, their liability being made several, a complaint, joining actions against two or more insurers, is subject to demurrer for misjoinder of parties.
[Ed. Note—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1557-1070; Dec. Dig. <@=>624.]
2. Judgment <@=>675—Conclusiveness—Matters Concluded.
A party of underwriters insured a vessel by a policy which made the liability of each several, and limited it to their proportionate share. The vessel was destroyed, and in an action against one of them another underwriter, the present defendant, aided in the defense. Held, that as defendant was not a party, and could not properly have been made a party, judgment against plaintiff in that action was not a bar to a subsequent action against defendant for a judgment will not bind one who is neither a party nor a privy.
[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1190, 1191, 1194; Dec. Dig. <@=>675.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
<§=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by J. Albert Fish against Frank A. Vanderlip. From an order sustaining a demurrer to a separate defense, defendant appeals. Affirmed, with leave to file an amended answer.
The opinion of Page, J., is as follows :
A party of 100 underwriters, doing business as “At United States Lloyds,” insured the plaintiff’s yacht in the total sum of $15,000 by a policy pursuant to the terms of which the liability of each subscriber was several, and not joint, and was limited to his proportionate share thereof, to wit, $150. The policy provided that the assurers “do promise and bind themselves severally and not jointly, nor any one for any other, for the true performance of the premises, each one for his own part of the whole amount herein assured only.” The yacht was destroyed by fire, and the plaintiff has instituted separate actions against a large number of the subscribers to recover $150 from each. One of the actions, which was against Douglas F. Cox, has been brought to trial in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, and a judgment on the merits has been rendered in favor of the defendant therein. The defendant herein has interposed as a defense the judgment against the plaintiff in the other action, alleging that it was upon the same policy, for the same loss, and the same issues were raised, and “that the interest of this defendant in the said action against the said Cox was identical with that of the said Cox, and that he, the said Cox, defended the said suit in which he was defendant as aforesaid, under and by the direction of and at the expense and in the interest of each and all of the said subscribers, including this defendant, * * * which facts were known to the plaintiff at the time of the trial of the said action. * * * ” The plaintiff has demurred to this defense, on the ground that it is insufficient in law upon the face thereof, and has brought on the demurrer for argument as a litigated motion.
It is claimed by the defendant that since the defense in the Cox action was to the knowledge of the plaintiff conducted under the direction of all the subscribers to the policy jointly and at their joint expense, the judgment in that action is res adjudicata against the plaintiff in any action brought against any of the said subscribers based upon the same state of facts. The principal case relied upon by the defendant in support of his contention is Greenwich Ins. Co. v. N. & M. Friedman Co., 142 Fed. 944, 74 C. C. A. 114, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit. In that case a number of insurance companies had insured a building under separate, but identical, policies, and subsequently, after a loss hod occurred and actions had been brought against several of the said companies to recover upon the policies, they united in a common plan of defense and appointed a committee and attorneys at their joint expense to conduct tlie defense to each action. In two of the actions a trial was had and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The judgments in these actions were held to be res adjudicaba in subsequent actions against other insurance companies who had joined in the aforesaid common defense.
This case, if it were a controlling authority, would determine the present question, for an estoppel by judgment is mutual, and if a decision for the plaintiff in an action upon the contract of one subscribe!' to the policy would bind the others, a decision against him would conclude him in all the other actions. I am of the opinion, however', that this precedent cannot bo supported in the law of this state and is contrary to the general principles governing an estoppel by judgment. Ordinarily a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction Is binding only upon the parties to the litigation and their privies. There are a few exceptions to this rule in the law of principal and agent and master and servant, or cases where the right of Indemnity exists between persons nominally liable for the same injury; but in these cases the person concluded by the judgment had the right to intervene in the action, control the defense and appeal from the judgment (Castle v. Noyes, 14 N. Y. 329), and it lias been frequently held that, where this right of control and appeal does not exist, the judgment will not bind one who is neither a party to the action nor privy to such a party, even though the defense was in fact conducted or contributed to by the person sought to be estopped. Jackson v. Griswold, 4 Hill, 522; Yorks v. Steele, 50 Barb. 397; Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 549, 8 Sup. Ct. 210, 31 L. Ed. 199; Merchants’ Coal Co. v. Fairmont Coal Co., 160 Fed. 769, 88 C. C. A. 23; Bumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chemical Co. of N. J., 215 U. S. 158, 30 Sup. Ct. 45, 54 L. Ed. 137; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641, 56 L. Ed. 1009, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 875. In Litchfield v. Goodnow, supra, the court said: “Under the term ‘parties,’ in this connection, the law includes all who are directly interested in the subject-matter, and had a right to make defense, or to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judgment. This right involves also the right to adduce testimony, and to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on the other side. Persons not, having these rights are regarded as strangers to the cause. But to give fall effect to the principle by which parties aro held bound by a judgment, all persons who are represented by the parties and claim under them, or in privity with them, are equally concluded by the same proceedings. We have already seen that the term ‘privity’ denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property.”
In (he case at bar the contracts of the various subscribers to the policy were absolutely separate and several, and not joint. They not only could not have intervened in the actions brought against their cosubscribers, but the complaint would have been demurrable for misjoinder of parties, if any two or more of the actions had been joined, in one complaint. Straus v. Hoadley, 23 App. Div. 360, 48 N. Y. Supp. 239. This defendant had a personal interest in the Cox action, but no legal interest therein. He was in no manner in privity with Cox. He could not have assumed control of the suit in his own name, and could not have ajipealed from the judgment, had the plaintiff succeeded. Within the above authorities, therefore, it is clear that, had the plaintiff succeeded in the Cox action, no liability of this defendant or of any of his cosubscribers could have been predicated upon the judgment, and, since estoppel by judgment is always mutual, it must follow that the judgment in favor of Cox is not res adjndicata in this action.
The plaintiff’s motion for judgment sustaining the demurrer to the fifth separate defense contained in the defendant’s answer is granted, with .$10 costs.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J„ and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, SCOTT, and DOWLING, JJ.
H. W. Hayward, of New York City, for appellant.
Jesse W. Tobey, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements on the opinion of Page, J., at Special Term, with leave to the defendant to serve an amended answer, on payment of costs in this court and in the court below.