Case Name: Wm. Williams, Sheriff, v. B. C. Jones
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1834-06
Citations: 2 Hill 431
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. Williams, Sheriff, v. B. C. Jones.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 431–432

Head Matter:
Wm. Williams, Sheriff, v. B. C. Jones.
Before Mr. Justice Evans, at Lancaster, Fall Term, 1833.
in an action “ounds bond'll-lodging- as a condition, that ‘’J,® 0acbt¡£y¡¡¡¡j} the limits, a ag-commissioner or special baiican-Carol Sanction} JCd ifonodwjuf out theffimtsbe- $ uCarresuind discharge, it is Condlüuñ which cannot be cured
?hars(' of fl'aucl panied with some trin™c*hopower of the com. Sin>Aírcoascsi caso'afte/such súsVámed“hfsde-cisión win not toMngoing^o-tut thoemerem' ing of suggest u^p^ted “by any evidence, umcommissioií ®r of jurisdio-
This was an action on a prison bounds bond. One Saun. dors had obtained a judgment against Needham A. Bryan on which a ca. sa. issued, and Bryan was arrested on the 21st April. On the same day he entered into this bond with the defendant as his security, with the usual condition to remain within the prison limits, &c. Bryan filed a schedule of his éstate with the clerk, and on the 7th May applied for his discharge under the Prison Bounds Act. The plaintiff filing ob-jeetions which charged fraud in the schedule, undue prefer-once, and that Bryan had gone without the limits, the case was continued over until the 9th May ; no evidence being then given to sustain the objections filed, and no other cause shewn than the mere filing of the suggestions, the commission-cr of special bail ordered Bryan to be discharged. The al-lodged breaches of the condition of the bond were, 1. That Bryan had gone beyond the limits between the 21st April (the time of the arrest) and the 9th of May, when he was discharge-cd. 2, A breach oi the bond in Jfcsryans going beyond the limits after the discharge, which was contrary to law and therefore void. Much evidence was given in support of the first ground which it is unnecessary to notice. After the plaintiff closed, the defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground: 1. That the commissioner of special bail properly discharged Bryan, no cause being shewn, and the discharge barred the right of the plaintiff to recover on the bond. 2. That the commissioner of special bail had the power to decide whether Bryan had broken the prison rules, and having by his order for discharge decided that question in his favor, that decision is conclusive against the plaintiff. His Honor overruled these grounds, and the jury under his charge found for the plaintiff the full amount of the execution on which Bryan had been arrested. The defendant appealed, on the grounds taken below.
Mr. Justice Evans, in his report to this Court, made the following remarks on these grounds :
These grounds go on the supposition that the discharge is an estoppel to plead any breach of the bond prior to the dis charge. This might perhaps have been the case if the discharge had been by a coart of general jurisdiction, having authority to try all the questions made in the suggestion. But I apprehend the commissioner of special bail has no such power . jjjg jurisdiction is confined to his schedule alone.
I charged the jury that if Bryan had gone without the limits at any time between the 21st of April and the 9th day of May, it was a breach of the condition of the bond, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover, notwithstanding the subsequent discharge by the commissioner of special bail; such discharge did not cure the breach of the bond already committed.
My charge was in conformity with the case of Carwile v. Robinson and others, Harp. 35, and the opinion of the Appeal Court in this case, wherein the authority of Carwile v. Robinson is recognized. I told them if a serious charge of fraud appeared, the power of the commissioner of special bail ceased. He had no right to decide the schedule was false, nor had he a right to decide on the weight of evidence, that it was true ; and if he persisted in deciding the case, after evidence of fraud in the schedule was given, his decision w'as void and would not justify the defendant in going beyond the bounds. I told them, however, expressly, that the ipse dixit of the attorney or written allegations, or the swearing a witness without examining him, or proving any thing by him, would not oust the commissioner of his jurisdiction ; on this point, however, it did seem to me the plaintiff had wholly failed in his proof. His counsel contended before the commissioner of special bail, that his filing a suggestion was sufficient, and so far as appeared, no evidence whatever was offered to impeach the schedule.
Williams, for the motion.
Clarke and Clinton, contra.
Columbia, May Term, 1832, on appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Richardson.
Johnson, J. delivered the following opinion of the Court. The case of Robinson and Carwile (State Rep. 35) is decisive of this. It is there ruled that under the Prison Bounds Act a commissioner of special bail has no authority to try the question whether a schedule rendered by a debtor in execution, is fraudulent or not. That must be tried by a jury, and the commissioner has no jurisdiction over it. The plaintiff ought then to have been permitted prove that the suggestion of fraud in the schedule was seriously made, and that the competency of the commissioner to try it was also objected to, because, if he took on himself to determine a matter over which he had no jurisdiction, any order which he might make would be absolutely void.
O’Neall and Harper, Js. concurred.

Opinion:
Per Curiam,
We concur with the presiding judge in the questions of law in this case.