Case Name: Gloria PARTLOW, Personal Representative of the Heirs of the Estate of Sonya L. Partlow, Deceased, Appellant, v. Rickey McDONALD, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-09-23
Citations: 877 So. 2d 414
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01309-COA
Parties: Gloria PARTLOW, Personal Representative of the Heirs of the Estate of Sonya L. Partlow, Deceased, Appellant, v. Rickey McDONALD, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., MYERS and GRIFFIS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 877
Pages: 414–425

Head Matter:
Gloria PARTLOW, Personal Representative of the Heirs of the Estate of Sonya L. Partlow, Deceased, Appellant, v. Rickey McDONALD, Appellee.
No. 2002-CA-01309-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Sept. 23, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2003.
Certiorari Denied July 15, 2004.
Brian H. Neely, Tupelo, attorney for appellant.
Brian Douglas Mayo, and Wade G. Man- or, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
Before KING, P.J., MYERS and GRIFFIS, JJ.

Opinion:
GRIFFIS, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. Sonya Partlow was struck by a vehicle operated by Rickey McDonald and subsequently died. The heirs of Partlow's estate filed a wrongful death action. In a bench trial, the lower court granted McDonald's motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On the evening of August 10, 1998, Rickey McDonald left his employment and traveled toward his home. He turned onto the entrance ramp to Highway 45 and, while he was about to merge into traffic on Highway 45, McDonald's van struck Sonya Partlow.
¶ 3. Gloria Partlow, as the personal representative of Sonya Partlow's estate, filed a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Lee County. The plaintiff alleged that McDonald was negligent because he failed to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian, to keep a proper lookout, to exercise reasonable care, and to maintain control of his vehicle. The plaintiff also alleged that McDonald violated various traffic laws and that his acts were wilful, wanton and reckless. A bench trial was held on May 1, 2002.
¶ 4. Preston "Buddy" Irving, the Tupelo police officer who responded to the scene, testified that McDonald was at the scene when he arrived and that his van was parked on the shoulder of the highway. Officer Irving testified that the area of impact was in McDonald's lane of traffic. Further, the officer testified that he observed some skid marks in the north and south lanes of traffic, but could not say for sure that McDonald's vehicle had made them. Officer Irving testified that there were no other witnesses to the accident and that McDonald tested negative for alcohol or drug use. He also testified that the speed limit on Highway 45 was 65 miles per hour and that no speed limit was posted on the entrance ramp. Based on his investigation, Officer Irving testified that McDonald was traveling at a speed of 55 miles per hour.
¶ 5. McDonald testified that he was going about 45 miles per hour on the entrance ramp to Highway 45. McDonald testified that his headlights were on, and he saw nothing in front of him on the entrance ramp. When he got to the top of the ramp, McDonald testified that he turned his head to the left to view the oncoming traffic in preparation to merge. When he turned his head back around, McDonald said he saw "the image of a hand. And as soon as I seen it, it hit my windshield." McDonald further testified that after his van made contact with the decedent's body, his finger got caught in the steering wheel and he lost control of his van. McDonald's van crossed the median into the other lane of traffic before he regained control.
¶ 6. After McDonald presented his case, Partlow made a motion for a directed verdict on liability. McDonald countered with his own motion for directed verdict asserting that Partlow had failed to make a prima facie case for negligence. The judge granted McDonald's motion for directed verdict. Aggrieved, Partlow has appealed to this Court. Partlow assigns several errors to the lower court; however, we find the only issue dispositive of this appeal is whether or not it was proper for the trial court to grant McDonald's motion for directed verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. In a non-jury trial, such as this case, the appropriate motion is not a motion for directed verdict pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50; instead, the correct motion is a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Buelow v. Glidewell, 757 So.2d 216, 220(¶ 12) (Miss.2000). In Mississippi Real Estate Commission v. Geico Financial Services, Inc., 602 So.2d 1155, 1156 n. 1 (Miss.1992), the Mississippi Supreme Court reasoned:
Technically and procedurally, the court granted a dismissal on the merits pursuant to Miss.R.Civ.P. 41(b) since this was a non-jury trial. A directed verdict under Miss.R.Civ.P. 50 is limited in use to "cases tried to a jury with a power to return a binding verdict." Comment, Miss.R.Civ.P. 50; Mitchell v. Rawls, 493 So.2d 361, 362 (Miss.1986).
Therefore, we will consider this appeal based on the correct standard of review, which under Rule 41(b) is different than the standard of review applicable to a motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50. Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 369 (Miss.1992); Mitchell v. Rawls, 493 So.2d 361, 362-63 (Miss.1986); Davis v. Clement, 468 So.2d 58, 61-62 (Miss.1985). In considering a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), the trial court should consider "the evidence fairly, as distinguished from in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," and the judge should dismiss the case if it would find for the defendant. Corson, 612 So.2d at 369 (emphasis added). On appeal, we must apply the substantial evidence/manifest error standard to an appeal of a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Id.
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting McDonald's motion to dismiss under Rule 1.1(b).
¶ 8. Partlow argues that the trial court erred in granting McDonald's motion based on Smith v. Walton, 271 So.2d 409, 409 (Miss.1973). In Smith, a man was struck and killed by an automobile as he was walking on the right shoulder of the highway with his back to traffic. Id. A judgment was rendered for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because of an erroneous jury instruction. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the law regarding the duties and rights of drivers and pedestrians along Mississippi's highways. The court noted the following:
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, and his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal. The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them.
Id. at 413 (quoting Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 696, 160 So.2d 685, 687 (1964)). The court in Smith also cited Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-1112 (Rev. 1996) which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.
¶ 9. Partlow argues that McDonald failed to pass a three-prong test cited in Smith regarding the liability of a driver towards a pedestrian along the highway. The three parts of this test include: (1) the driver must have kept a reasonable lookout; (2) the driver must have been traveling at a reasonable and proper rate of speed under the prevailing weather conditions; and (3) he must have given warning of his approach if found to be reasonably necessary. Smith, 271 So.2d at 413-16.
¶ 10. Under the first prong of Smith, Partlow argues that McDonald failed to keep a proper lookout because Sonya Part-low was walking on the side of the road, and McDonald had a duty to be on the lookout for pedestrians on the shoulder. She also claims that McDonald breached his duty to keep a proper lookout because he turned to see if there was oncoming traffic. Partlow points to the fact that after impact the decedent's body was lying on the shoulder of the road. This is the only evidence presented by Partlow to support her claim that the decedent was walking on the shoulder of the highway.
¶ 11.- After reviewing the record, we find the evidence presented does not support Partlow's contention. Officer Irving, a Tupelo police officer and accident recon-structionist, testified that the point of impact was in McDonald's lane of traffic. He also testified that the decedent's body was thrown one hundred five feet after impact. Partlow offered no evidence to dispute this testimony. In reviewing the entirety of the record and the evidence presented, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the decedent was in McDonald's lane of traffic when she was struck. Nothing in the record supports Partlow's contention that the decedent was walking on the shoulder of the highway.
¶ 12. Partlow also relies on McDonald's own testimony to support her claim that he failed to keep a proper lookout. McDonald testified that when he got to the top of the entrance ramp, he "turned back to the left and turned back, [to the front]." He testified that "it wasn't three or four seconds I had my head back to the left. I turned around and that's when I seen a hand." The plaintiff claims this admission by McDonald proves he breached his duty to keep a proper lookout.
¶ 13. We disagree. The duty to keep a proper lookout also includes looking out for other cars on the road. See Dennis v. Bolden, 606 So.2d 111, 113-14 (Miss. 1992); Jobron v. Whatley, 250 Miss. 792, 798, 168 So.2d 279, 280 (1964). When a driver is merging into oncoming traffic, it is necessary to turn and look for other cars already on the highway before merging. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-805 (Rev. 1996). The trial court properly found that McDonald was acting as a reasonably prudent driver, and we see no error in its decision.
¶ 14. For the second prong of Smith, Partlow contends that McDonald's speed on the acceleration ramp could not have been reasonable because there was no posted speed limit. McDonald testified he was traveling about 45 miles per hour. Officer Irving testified that he estimated McDonald's speed to be approximately 55 miles per hour. The posted speed limit on Highway 45 is 65 miles per hour. The purpose of the entrance ramp is to allow a car to accelerate to the appropriate speed to merge with oncoming traffic. The lower court was correct in determining that McDonald's speed was reasonable and that he breached no duty to the decedent.
¶ 15. As to the final prong of Smith, the duty to give a warning of approach if necessary, Partlow fails to describe how this element was violated. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining McDonald breached no duty to the decedent. Furthermore, sufficient evidence existed to support the lower court's ruling.
¶ 16. The relevant facts of this case present several duties by both the pedestrian and the driver. Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-1105 (Rev.1996) provides: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway." This statute, considered concurrently with the supreme court's ruling in Smith, establishes that while the driver of a vehicle has a duty to exercise ordinary care on highways and watch for pedestrians walking along the side, pedestrians also have a duty to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic if they wish to cross a highway.
¶ 17. In Hornburger v. Baird, 508 F.Supp. 84 (N.D.Miss.1980), the federal district court agreed with this conclusion. In Homburger, the decedent was walking in the middle of a road in Inverness, Mississippi. Id. at 85. A truck driven by the defendant approached the decedent from the rear and a collision occurred. Id. The court found that the defendant negligently operated his truck at a greater rate of speed than was proper. Id. at 86. However, relying on Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-1105, the court found the decedent negligent as well and determined:
The decedent was at or near the center of the road when he either fell into or was struck by the left front fender of defendant's truck. The collision occurred at a point in the roadway where there was not a marked crosswalk or an intersection. Under such circumstances, decedent owed a duty to yield the right-of-way to defendant's truck. Decedent failed to perform this duty and was negligent in that regard. This negligence proximately contributed to his injuries and death.
Id. at 86-87. The court found the negligence of the defendant and decedent combined to bring about the injury and death of the decedent and found they were guilty of negligence in equal degrees. Id.
¶ 18. Applying this legal analysis to the case at bar, we find McDonald breached no duty to the decedent. He was traveling at a proper rate of speed, and ascertained that the road was clear before he began to merge onto Highway 45. He then looked for oncoming traffic and in that instance the decedent crossed the road striking McDonald's vehicle. The judge in the lower court stated, "[T]he defendant in this case did not in fact breach his duty. He acted within what this court considers to be a reasonable fashion under the circumstances." We find substantial evidence existed to support the lower court's conclusion that McDonald acted as a reasonable, prudent driver under the circumstances. The judgment of the lower court dismissing the action against McDonald is affirmed.
¶ 19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., AND SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ" CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, P.J.
. The comment to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50 states that "Rule 50 applies only in cases tried to a jury with a power to return a binding verdict. It does not apply to cases tried without a jury nor to those tried to the court with an advisory jury."