Case Name: In re PETITION OF JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, Husband and Wife, to Adopt Baby Boy, a Minor
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1993-08-18
Citations: 254 Ill. App. 3d 405
Docket Number: No. 1—92—1552
Parties: In re PETITION OF JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, Husband and Wife, to Adopt Baby Boy, a Minor.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 254
Pages: 405–434

Head Matter:
In re PETITION OF JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, Husband and Wife, to Adopt Baby Boy, a Minor.
First District (3rd Division)
No. 1—92—1552
Opinion filed August 18, 1993.
TULLY, P.J., dissenting.
Loren L. Heinemann, of Orland Park, for appellant.
Richard A. Lifshitz and Carolyn E. Winter, both of Chicago, for appel-lees.
Richard is a fictitious name which we are using to make reference to the baby boy who is the subject of this case.

Opinion:
JUSTICE RIZZI
delivered the opinion of the court:
John and Jane Doe filed a petition to adopt a newborn baby boy, Richard. Richard's biological mother, Daniella Janikova (Daniella), and father, Otakar Kirchner (Otakar), were not married. Daniella executed a consent to have Richard placed for adoption four days after he was bom. Daniella, however, did not tell Otakar. Otakar was told that Richard died shortly after his birth. Daniella did not tell Otakar that Richard was living and had been placed for adoption until Richard was 57 days old. After he discovered that Richard had been placed for adoption, Otakar opposed the adoption on the basis that he did not consent. Otakar and Daniella then got married. The adoption case proceeded to trial. The trial court found that Otakar was an unfit person to have a child and therefore his consent for the adoption of Richard was not required. (750 ILCS 50/8, 14 (West 1992).) The trial court then entered a judgment of adoption, with John and Jane Doe adopting Richard. Ota-kar has appealed from the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption. We affirm.
Otakar, age 36, and Daniella, age 25, are emigres from the former republic of Czechoslovakia. Otakar arrived in the United States in 1986, and Daniella arrived in 1988. In the fall of 1989, they met while working together at a restaurant. They then began living together in an apartment in Chicago. In June of 1990, Daniella became pregnant and she and Otakar were advised that the baby was due to be bom on March 16, 1991. Around July of 1990, Daniella stopped working and became a full-time student to become a beautician. She was dependent solely upon Otakar for financial support.
Otakar and Daniella continued to live together, and Otakar paid for Daniella's prenatal care. They planned that the baby would be bom at St. Joseph's Hospital in Chicago, which is only one block from where they lived.
In January of 1991, Otakar returned to Czechoslovakia for a vacation and to attend to family matters related to his gravely ill grandmother. He remained in Czechoslovakia about 13 days. While Otakar was in Czechoslovakia, however, Daniella received a telephone call from Otakar's aunt. She told Daniella that Otakar had been seeing his former girl friend in Czechoslovakia and that they had married and were on their honeymoon. Daniella became upset. She telephoned Otakar in Czechoslovakia and told him that she did not want to see him anymore. Otakar told Daniella that the story his aunt told her was not true. Nevertheless, Daniella moved out of the apartment and into a shelter for abused women located in Chicago.
While she lived at the shelter, Daniella decided that she would place the baby for adoption. Daniella told her friend, Roberta Scholes, of her plan. Scholes contacted a lawyer for Daniella. Meanwhile, on February 8, 1991, Otakar returned from Czechoslovakia and went to his apartment, where he found that Daniella had moved out and taken all of her belongings.
On February 11, 1991, Daniella met with the lawyer and John and Jane Doe about the proposed adoption. Daniella refused to disclose the name of the baby's biological father to the Does or their lawyer.
There were several meetings between Daniella and the Does and their lawyer. At the meetings, Daniella stated that she knew who the biological father of the baby was, but she did not want to disclose his identity because she feared that he would assert his parental rights.
In mid-February 1991, Daniella left the shelter and went to live with her uncle in his house in the Village of Hillside. Otakar knew that Daniella was living at her uncle's house. Otakar telephoned Daniella several times, but she refused to speak to him or return his calls.
Otakar claims that he asked mutual friends to talk to Daniella on his behalf, but Daniella refused their efforts. In addition, during the latter part of February 1991, Otakar gave $500 to a mutual friend, Selva Duran, and asked her to give the money to Daniella. Daniella, however, refused to take the $500.
During the latter part of February, Daniella met with Otakar twice. First, they met at a restaurant. The following day, approximately February 28, 1991, Daniella went to Otakar's apartment where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Otakar asked Daniella to return and live with him in the apartment, but she refused. The next day, Daniella telephoned Otakar and told him that she did not want to see him again. Nevertheless, Otakar made numerous telephone calls trying to reach Daniella at her uncle's house, to no avail.
On March 16, 1991, Daniella went to Alexian Brothers Hospital in Elk Grove Village, Illinois, and Richard was bom. Daniella refused to name or identify the biological father of the child. Meanwhile, on March 16, 1991, Otakar had made inquiry about Daniella at St. Joseph's Hospital because when they were living together that is where he and Daniella had planned to have the birth of the baby. He was told that Daniella had not been admitted into the hospital. Otakar checked with St. Joseph's Hospital for several days and each time he was told that they had no record of a Daniella Janikova.
On March 20, Daniella executed a document entitled "FINAL AND IRREVOCABLE CONSENT TO ADOPTION," for Richard, at the Cook County Department of Supportive Services. (See 750 ILCS 50/9, 50/10 (West 1992).) On the same day, the Does filed a petition for adoption, which averred that the biological father of the child was unknown. Also, a statutory notice by publication was made in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, with the averment that the biological father of the child was unknown. (750 ILCS 50/7 (West 1992).) March 20, 1991, was also the day that Richard was placed to live with the Does.
Otakar had not been told that Richard had been placed for adoption. On March 20, 1991, Otakar spoke with Daniella's uncle on the telephone. Daniella's uncle told Otakar that the baby had died three days after birth. Daniella's uncle had lied about what had occurred at the direction of Daniella. Daniella's uncle spoke to Otakar subsequently on two other occasions, and each time he told Otakar that the baby had died. It appears, however, that Otakar did not believe that the baby had died. On about March 26, Otakar telephoned Daniella at her uncle's house and left a message on the answering machine: "I don't believe the baby died."
Otakar claims that on many occasions after work at around 3 a.m., he went to Daniella's uncle's house, where Daniella was living. He looked into Daniella's parked automobile to see if there was an infant's car seat or baby bottles; he also went through the garbage cans at the curb of the house to see if there were any diapers or other similar items. Otakar also claims that he made inquiry at some hospitals seeking information about Daniella and the birth of the baby, to no avail. He also claims that some friends helped him in searching through official public records for a birth or death certificate. They found nothing.
At some time between May 5 to May 10, 1991, Selva Duran told Otakar that the baby did not die but was placed for adoption. This is the first time that Otakar had been told that the baby had been placed for adoption. Otakar did not see or speak to Daniella, however, until May 12, 1991; he had not seen or spoken to Daniella since March 1, 1991. When Otakar went to his apartment after work on May 12, 1991, he found that Daniella had moved back into the apartment, and she told him that the baby had been adopted. Otakar testified: "She said she made a mistake and she can't do nothing anymore because she signed away her whole rights."
On May 18, 1991, more than two months after Richard was bom, Otakar spoke to a lawyer for the first time about this matter. On June 6, 1991, Otakar filed an appearance in the adoption proceeding, and on June 13 he sought leave of court to file an answer. On June 15, 1991, the trial court struck Otakar's answer on the basis that he had no standing in the adoption proceeding.
On September 12, 1991, Otakar and Daniella married. On September 23, 1991, Otakar filed a petition to declare paternity. The paternity action proceeded to trial on December 9, 1991, and on that day there was a finding that Otakar was the biological father of Richard.
On December 23, 1991, the Does filed an amended petition to adopt. The amended petition alleged that Otakar was an unfit person to have a child and that therefore his consent for the adoption of Richard was not required. (750 ILCS 50/8, 14 (West 1992).) The amended petition alleged that Otakar was unfit for the reason that there was a "failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new bom child during the first 30 days after its birth." 750 ILCS 50/1(1) (West 1992).
The adoption trial started on May 5, 1992. On May 6, 1992, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Otakar had failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during the first 30 days after the birth. In making its ruling, the trial court stated:
"That brings me to the conclusion that the law must be strictly complied with, and that the law provides for some interest in the reasonable degree of interest for the child in the first thirty days of the child's existence. Had Mr. Kirchner, instead of probing through garbage bags, gone to [legal counsel] at that juncture there would be no such proceedings here. She would have been in Court, that is Daniella Janikova, and she would have been telling the world where the child was and disclosing what interests Mr. Kirchner had in this child. Instead of that in all this time that he wasted trying to contact hospitals, and, again, looking through garbage, he found nothing.
Daniella, of course, testified here in open court that she deliberately lied about the birth of the child in suggesting the death of the child, unconscionable behavior.
So it is going to be the finding of this court that there is clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable degree of interest indicated by Mr. Kirchner in the first thirty days of the life of this child."
On May 8, 1992, the trial court entered an order that Otakar was an unfit person to have a child and that therefore his consent for the adoption of Richard was not required, and that his parental rights were terminated. On May 13, 1992, a judgment for adoption of Richard was entered, with the irrevocable consent to adoption executed by Daniella on March 20, 1991, but without the consent of Otakar. See 750 ILCS 50/14 (West 1992).
Otakar filed a notice of appeal on May 8, 1992. On appeal, Otakar claims that the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption should be reversed, and that Richard should be turned over to live with him and Daniella.
Richard has lived continuously with John and Jane Doe since March 20, 1991, four days after his birth. He is now, August 18, 1993, two years and five months old.
Fortunately, the time has long past when children in our society were considered the property of their parents. Slowly, but finally, when it comes to children even the law has rid itself of the Dred Scott mentality that a human being can be considered a piece of property "belonging" to another human being. To hold that a child is the property of his parents is to deny the humanity of the child. Thus, in the present case we start with the premise that Richard is not a piece of property with property rights belonging to either his biological or adoptive parents. Richard "belongs" to no one but himself.
Of course, in any parental relationship a parent and a child both have rights, vis-a-vis each other, which are protected under the law. In an adoption, custody or abuse case, however, the child is the real party in interest. Since the child is the real party in interest, it is his best interest and corollary rights that come before anything else, including the interests and rights of biological and adoptive parents.
Here, by inherent necessity, whether or not raised by the embroiled and warring biological and adoptive parents, the best interest of Richard surfaces as the paramount issue in the case. If there is a conflict between Richard's best interest and the rights and interests of his parents, whoever they may be, the rights and interests of the parents must yield and allow the best interest of Richard to pass through and prevail. This tenet allows for no exception.
A child's best interest is not part of an equation. It is not to be balanced against any other interest. In adoption cases, like custody and abuse cases, a child's best interest is and must remain inviolate and impregnable from all other factors, including the interests of the parents. (In re Ashley K. (1991), 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 879, 571 N.E.2d 905, 923; 705 ILCS 405/2-14(a) (West 1992); 750 ILCS 50/20a (West 1992).) In recognition of this fact, the Adoption Act provides:
"Best interest and welfare of child — Construction of Act
* The best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act." 750 ILCS 50/20a (West 1992).
Attempting to resolve what is the best interest of an infant is obviously a wrenching ordeal. In cases like the present, however, if one focuses on the child while disregarding the tendentious arguments of the biological and adoptive parents, he is left with the unquestionable conclusion that resolution of the issue of parentage quickly is foremost in the best interest of the child. Also, serious delay in resolving the child's parentage not only frustrates the best interest of the child, but it can cause grave harm to the child.
The best interest of children was recently considered by the Illinois legislature when it amended the Juvenile Court Act to place the best interest of children paramount to the rights and interests of parents. The Juvenile Court Act, as amended, reads as follows:
"Date for Adjudicatory Hearing.
(a) Purpose and policy. The legislature recognizes that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the family and that it frustrates the best interests of the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for children in need. The purpose of this Section is to insure that, consistent with the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96 — 272, as amended, and the intent of this Act, the State of Illinois will act in a just and speedy manner to determine the best interests of the minor, including providing for the safety of the minor, identifying families in need, reunifying families where it is in the best interests of the minor, and, if reunification is not in the best interests of the minor, finding another permanent home for the minor." Pub. Act 88 — 7, eff. June 24, 1993 (amending 705 ILCS 405/ 2-14 (West 1992)).
The Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96 — 272, as amended, to which the Juvenile Court Act makes reference, reads as follows:
"The term 'case review system' means a procedure for assuring that—

(C) with respect to each child, procedural safeguards will be applied, among other things, to assure each child in foster care under the supervision of the State of a dispositional hearing to be held * no later than eighteen months after the original placement *, which hearing shall determine the future status of the child (including, but not limited to, whether the child should be returned to the parent * [or] should be placed for adoption *) *." 42 U.S.C. §675(5)(C) (1988).
We extrapolate and infer from the Juvenile Court Act, as amended, and the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96 — 272, as amended, that after a newborn child has been placed for adoption and lives continuously thereafter for longer than 18 months with his adopting parents who adopt or have adopted him pursuant to a judgment of adoption, it would be contrary to the best interest of the child to remove him from his home and family by disturbing the judgment of adoption.
The present case vividly illustrates why it would be contrary to the best interest of the child to remove him from the parents who adopted him if he has lived with them continuously for the first 18 months of his life. Richard is now two years and five months old. The only parents that he has ever known are John and Jane Doe. He has not touched or seen Daniella since four days after his birth, and he has never spoken a word to her. Nor has he ever touched, seen or communicated with Otakar. In fact, he is totally unaware of the existence of Daniella and Otakar.
The fact that we have the Adoption Act in Illinois is a recognition in the law that it takes more to being a parent than being one of the sexual partners to the physiological formation of a child. Since Richard was a newborn, John and Jane Doe have done everything with Richard that is the essence of being parents, and Richard has done everything with them that is the essence of being a son. Contrariwise,-since he was a newborn, Daniella and Otakar have done nothing with Richard that is the essence of being parents, and he has done nothing with them that is the essence of being a son.
There comes a point when we should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men and women. (See Watts v. Indiana (1949), 338 U.S. 49, 52, 93 L. Ed. 1801, 1805, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 1349; People v. Gilliard (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 799, 807, 445 N.E.2d 1293, 1300.) Plainly, it would be contrary to the best interest of Richard to "switch" parents at this stage of his life. We must therefore act accordingly. Courts are here to protect children — not to victimize them.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that it would be contrary to the best interest of Richard to disturb the judgment of adoption. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption for the reason that it would be in the best interest of Richard and he is the real party in interest.
We also affirm the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption for another reason. There is clear and convincing evidence that Otakar was an unfit person to have a child because he failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during the first 30 days after the birth. (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(l), 8(1) (West 1992).) His consent to the adoption was therefore not required. 750 ILCS 50/14 (West 1992).
One may rightfully infer that a man who has a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of his newborn child would have assiduously tracked what was happening during the pregnancy and the birth of the child. It follows that when a court is considering whether a biological father has demonstrated a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of his newborn child during the first 30 days after the birth, the court may consider what occurred during the entire pregnancy and birth as going to the weight and credence of the testimony and evidence in the case.
Here, we must bear in mind that Otakar had returned from Czechoslovakia and was living in Chicago more than a month before Richard was bom. Although he and Daniella were not married, he knew the due date for the birth of Richard. Yet, he did virtually nothing that a responsible unwed man would do if he expected that a woman would soon give birth to his child. It is no solace for Otakar to claim that the mother did not answer his telephone calls and he let it be. More needed to be done to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility for the welfare of one's expected child.
Specifically and most telling, Otakar knew where the mother lived but never went to her residence to speak to her directly and confront her about the welfare of his expected child. Moreover, he did not write to the mother about his concern for the welfare of his expected child; he did not contact the physician whom the mother had been seeing for prenatal care to obtain information and express his concern for the welfare of his expected child; he did not show any effort to participate in giving his expected child a first name or surname; and he did not consult a lawyer or any public legal agency to determine his rights and responsibilities as an unwed father with respect to the birth, care or custody of his expected child.
In addition, an unwed man who sincerely believes that he was one of the sexual partners to the physiological formation of a child may file a lawsuit to determine legally whether he is the father and assert his parental rights before the child is bom. (750 ILCS 45/7 (West 1992).) Otakar did not file such a lawsuit. Had he done so, he could have asserted his parental rights for Richard from the moment Richard was bom. It is no excuse for Otakar to claim that he did not know the law, since he did not bother to seek legal advice.
Thus, the record clearly shows that although Daniella did not return Otakar's telephone calls shortly before Richard was bom, Otakar was content "to just let his child be bom" without any interest, concern or responsibility as to the care, custody or welfare of the child. This fact goes to the weight and credence of the testimony and evidence as to what occurred within the first 30 days after the birth of Richard.
Otakar's conduct within the first 30 days after Richard was bom is consistent with his lack of interest and concern shortly before Richard was bom. Otakar claims that on March 16, 1991, the day Richard was bom, he went to St. Joseph's Hospital and was told that Daniella had not checked into the hospital that day. He checked with St. Joseph's Hospital for several days and each time he was told that the hospital had no record of a Daniella Janikova.
On March 20, 1991, Otakar spoke with Daniella's uncle on the telephone and Otakar was told that the baby had died three days after birth. Otakar spoke to Daniella's uncle subsequently on two other occasions and on each occasion the uncle told Otakar that the baby had died. On or about March 26, 1991, however, Otakar telephoned Daniella's uncle and left a message on the answering machine stating that he did not believe that the baby died.
Otakar claims that on several occasions he went to Daniella's uncle's house, where Daniella was living, and looked into Daniella's car to see if there were any objects that would ordinarily be used by an infant. He also went through the garbage cans at the curb of the house looking for diapers or other objects that might be used by a baby. In addition, Otakar claims that he made inquiries at a few hospitals to see if Daniella had been admitted. He also claims that he had some mutual friends attempt to speak to Daniella on his behalf, and that some friends aided him in searching through official public records for birth or death certificates.
There is no evidence that Otakar did anything else until May 12, 1991, or the first 57 days after Richard was bom, to determine whether Richard was living or dead. Specifically, Otakar did not go to the mother's residence to speak to her directly and confront her about the birth, care, custody or possible death and funeral arrangements and burial of his child. Moreover, he did not write to the mother about the birth, care, custody or possible death and funeral arrangements and burial of his child; he did not contact the physician whom the mother had been seeing for prenatal care concerning the birth or possible death of his child; and he did not consult a lawyer or any public legal agency to determine his rights and responsibilities as an unwed father with respect to the birth, care, custody or possible death and funeral arrangements and burial of his child.
In addition, Otakar's self-serving statements about looking in the mother's car and in garbage cans lack credibility and are not convincing. The statements were not corroborated and they are inexplicable. According to Otakar, although he knew where she was living and was in front of her residence on several occasions, he never rang the mother's doorbell or knocked on her door to speak to her directly and confront her about the birth or death of the baby. Why would a father who was truly concerned about the life, welfare or death of his baby not have rung the doorbell or knocked on the door?
Judging from what Otakar did and did not do, Otakar was apparently content to go on with his life never truly knowing whether he had a child who was living or had a child who had died. Surely, the scant and churlish effort made by Otakar to discover whether his child was alive or dead does not demonstrate "a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new bom child during the first 30 days of its birth." 750 ILCS 50/1© (West 1992).
Our conclusion is in accord with the conclusion of the guardian ad litem for Richard. The guardian ad litem participated in all of the lower court proceedings, including the trial. At the conclusion of the evidence, the guardian ad litem advised the trial court as follows:
"The legislature has acknowledged that all decisions under the Adoption Statute must keep an eye to what is in the child's best interest, but in weighing best interest, as counsel for the petitioner has argued, the Court cannot look at which home might be a better home. That is not an issue. The Court must evaluate the statutes, however, with recognition of the fact that we are dealing with a baby here. We are not dealing with a trophy which is to be passed from person to person. We are dealing with a child who on account of the actions of the mother of the child was placed into a home straight from the hospital where that baby was bom. That is a fact which was established by the evidence which was presented in this case.

I believe that the evidence which has been adduced before this Court has established by a clear and convincing standard that Mr. Kirchner is an unfit person under this section of the Adoption Act.

I believe consequently that the Court can determine that Mr. Kirchner is not required to consent to this adoption pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 40, Section 1510."
After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the statements and conclusion of the guardian ad litem.
We therefore affirm the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption for the reasons that Otakar was an unfit person to have a child and his consent to the adoption was not required. See 750 ILCS 50/8(1), 14 (West 1992).
Finally, we are constrained to address another matter in this case. Richard's story is the account of a helpless child caught in the quagmire of a judicial system that in attempting to resolve his problem became part of his problem. It has taken two years and five months for this case to sluggishly move through our judicial system. In a case of this nature, where plainly time is critical, it is a sad commentary on our judiciary.
It shamefully took one year and almost two months from the time that the petition for adoption was filed to the time that the judgment of adoption was entered. It has shamefully taken one year and three months from the time that the notice of appeal was filed to decide this case in the appellate court.
It is surely imperative that the judiciary have enough judges and proper judicial case management in place at both the trial and appellate levels so that "time" does not become a factor in the decisional process of a case. Every effort must be made to see that we do not have any more cases in Illinois where it takes two years and five months to determine the lawful parentage of a young child. Moreover, the judiciary must come to grips with the fact that the psyche of our society can ill afford cases where children are "switched" parents after the first 18 months of their life.
Accordingly, the judgment of adoption and the orders inherent to the validity of the judgment of adoption are affirmed for the reasons stated.
Affirmed.
CERDA, J., concurs.
On the issue of the best interest of the child, the parties have referred to In re Adoption of Syck (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 255, 562 N.E.2d 174, for the proposition that the best interest of the child should not be considered when determining whether a parent is unfit. Syck, however, is distinguishable and not controlling here. In Syck, there was no judgment of adoption entered; the child was not a newborn, but rather was eight years old; the issue of unfitness did not relate to the first 30 days after the child's birth, as does the present case; and the issue of unfitness involved section l(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b)), rather than section 1(D)(1) (750 ILCS 50/l(D)Q). Also, after Syck was decided, the Illinois legislature has made it the public policy of Illinois that the best interest of the child must be considered and be paramount to the interests of his parents in making a permanent home for the child. (See 705 ILCS 405/2 — 14 (West 1992), amended, effective June 24, 1993.) Moreover, our holding as to the best interest of the child is consistent with what the Illinois Supreme Court has stated:
"In Giacopelli v. The Florence Crittenton Home, 16 Ill. 2d 556, we stated at 565: 'It is always recognized that a natural parent has a superior right to the custody of his child. That right, however, is not absolute and must yield to the best interest of the child. Such superior right only obtains when it is in accord with the best interest of the child.' [Citations.]
The best interest of the child is the standard and it is not necessary that the natural parent be found unfit or be found to have legally forfeited his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest of the child that he be placed in the custody of someone other than the natural parent. [Citations.]
*'The parents' natural rights must give way to the welfare and best interest of the child." People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 201, 209, 247 N.E.2d 417, 421.
In determining whether the biological father was unfit pursuant to the Adoption Act, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in In re Abdullah:
"Moreover, the paramount consideration in this case is what will happen to Hannibal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 1525.) His best interest must be considered, and further delay in the disposition of this case is not in his best interest. Hannibal is already 6 years old. His future should be settled as quickly as possible." In re Abdullah (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 300, 310, 423 N.E.2d 915, 920.
The Adoption Act itself recognizes time limitations in adoption proceedings, even in actions based on fraud and duress. The Adoption Act provides: "No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption, including an action based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date the consent or surrender was executed." 750 ILCS 50/11 (West 1992).
Although the interest of Daniella is not legally an issue, one can hardly blink at the reality of her interest in the case. After refusing to identify Otakar as the biological father of Richard and signing a final and irrevocable consent to adoption, she lied about Richard's birth. She attempted to obtain a fake death certificate for him. She later had her uncle tell Otakar that Richard died. Subsequently, however, she married Otakar. Now, both Otakar and Daniella wish to have the judgment of adoption vitiated. In such instances, courts should not favor any interest that the biological mother may have in the case, and should view her testimony as would Diogenes.
The attorneys are not blameless for the delay. No attorney in this case has ever filed a motion to advise the court of the exigent nature of the case or to have the case expedited. As a result, this case just "hung around" on the court's case calendar in the trial court and in the appellate court as if it were not a case involving an exigency.