Case Name: Jose BRAVO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-03-16
Citations: 682 F. App'x 592
Docket Number: No. 15-73119
Parties: Jose BRAVO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 682
Pages: 592–593

Head Matter:
Jose BRAVO-MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 15-73119
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 8, 2017
Filed March 16, 2017
Jose Ivan Vargas, Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Ivan Vargas, Panorama City, CA, for Petitioner
Surell Brady, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Jose Bravo-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("U") decision denying cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's determination of continuous physical presence. Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006). We review de novo questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency's finding that Bravo-Martinez did not establish the required continuous physical presence and was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, where the Form I-826, Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition, indicates he accepted voluntary departure in 2011. See Ibarra-Flores, 439 F.3d at 618 (voluntary departure interrupts physical presence).
The agency did not violate due process in considering the Form 1-826, where the form was probative to the issue of Bravo-Martinez's continuous physical presence, and where he had the opportunity to raise objections regarding the form before the IJ. See Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[t]he sole test for admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair"" (citation omitted)); Lata v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (to prevail on a due process challenge, an alien must show error and prejudice).
Bravo-Martinez's contention that the Form 1-826 did not properly put him on notice that he was interrupting continuous physical presence by accepting voluntary departure is unpersuasive. See Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 2010) (after accepting voluntary departure, alien can have no legitimate expectation that he could illegally reenter and resume a period of continuous physical presence).
Bravo-Martinez's contention that the BIA misapplied Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales is not supported by the record.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.