Case Name: Laverne Edward BELK, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 2017-12-15
Citations: 905 N.W.2d 185
Docket Number: No. 16-0304
Parties: Laverne Edward BELK, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
Judges: All justices concur except Waterman and Zager, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 905
Pages: 185–198

Head Matter:
Laverne Edward BELK, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
No. 16-0304
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Filed December 15, 2017
John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Nicholas E. Siefert and John McCormally, Assistant Attorneys General,, for appellee.

Opinion:
WIGGINS, Justice.
A prisoner appeals the district court's dismissal of his amended application for postconviction relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss alleging the prisoner failed to make a viable claim under the postcon-viction-relief act. The district court agreed and found as a matter of law the prisoner had not stated a claim for'postconviction relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(a) (2013). Although we agree with the district court's reasoning to some extent, we conclude the prisoner should have been given the opportunity to pursue his claim under section 822.2(l)(e). Therefore, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand the ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Proceedings.
On April 23, 2013, Laverne Edward Belk filed his application for postconviction relief. On September 3, Belk amended his application for postconviction relief. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(a), he alleged that his sentence violated the United States-and Iowa Constitutions, namely the Equal Protection Clause, prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, the Due Process Clause,- and the Ex Post Fac-to Clause. Relevant to this appeal,' the substance of Belk's amended application alleged the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) violated his liberty interest in obtaining parole because of the IDOC's failure to provide-the sex offender treatment program (SOTP) in a timely manner.
Specifically, Belk argued it was the policy of the IDOC to delay his access to SOTP until he was close to his tentative discharge date. He further contended he is currently eligible for parole but has no meaningful chance for parole unless the IDOC recommends parole without the SOTP prerequisite. According to Belk, his tentative discharge date is October 22, 2019, but the IDOC will not offer him SOTP until sometime in 2017. Belk argued the district court should require the IDOC to recommend him for parole without the condition of completing SOTP. He has requested SOTP to no avail prior to the filing of both his initial and amended applications.
In response to Belk's amended application, the State filed a motion to dismiss. The substance of the motion is that an application under chapter 822 is not the proper vehicle to contest the denial of his parole by the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP). The State also filed a motion for summary judgment.
On. July 3,2014, the district court denied the State's motion to dismiss, finding Belk was not contesting the IBOP's agency action in denying him parole. Rather, the district court found Belk alleged the IDOC deprived him of his liberty or property interest that is actionable under the post-conviction-relief act. The district court also denied the State's motion for summary judgment.
The case proceeded to trial on October 13, 2015. At the onset of the trial, the State renewed its motion to dismiss and its motion for summary judgment. The court reserved ruling on these motions until it received the parties' posttrial briefs.
The court entered its order on January 29, 2016, The court did not reach the merits of the claim. Rather, it decided the case by ruling on the State's renewed motion to dismiss. The court ruled as a matter of law that Belk had not stated a claim for post-conviction relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(a).
Belk appeals.
II. Issue.
Belk raises one issue on appeal. He claims the district court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss. He contends the IDOC's policy of refusing to provide timely SOTP substantially deprives him of his liberty interest, and thus we should allow him to pursue a remedy through postconviction relief.
III. Standard of Review.
A postconviction proceeding is a civil action. Mabrier v. State, 519 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1994). We review civil motions to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Iowa 2004).
IY. Analysis.
If the application for postconviction relief on its face shows no right of recovery under ' any state of facts, the court should grant a motion tci dismiss. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f); see Rees, 682 N.W.2d at 79. Almost every case will survive a motion to dismiss under notice pleading. Rees, 682 N.W.2d at 79. The application does not have to allege ultimate facts supporting each element of the cause of action, but it "must contain factual allegations that give the [State] 'fair notice' of the claim asserted so the [State] can adequately respond to the application," Id, The application meets the "fair notice"-requirement "if it. informs the [State] of the [events] giving rise to the claim and of the claim's general nature." Id. We view the applicants allegations "in the light most favorable to the [applicant] with doubts resolved in that party's favor." Geisler v. City Council of Cedar Falls, 769 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Iowa 1994)).
The application alleges the district court has convicted and sentenced Belk for a public offense. The gravamen of his complaint is that his sentence violates a liberty interést: the IDOC's failure to provide him with SOTP in a timely manner prolongs his incarceration because without the completion of SOTP, he argues, the IDOC refuses to recommend him for parole.
As a general doctrine, "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released from prison prior to the expiration of a valid sentence." State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2000); accord State v. Wright, 309 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Iowa 1981) (holding the defendant does not "have a constitutional right to parole"); State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Iowa 1969) (holding the granting of parole "is a matter of grace, favor, or forbearance" and "[i]t is not a matter of right"). The power to grant parole, much like the power to grant probation, is granted by statute — it is not a power the judiciary wields. See Wright, 309 N.W.2d at 894.
Although prisoners do not have a constitutional right to parole, a state may choose — but is under no duty — to establish a parole system. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d at 667-68 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)); accord Heidelberg v. Ill. Prisoner Review Bd., 163 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). "Under such a system, states have authority to shorten prison terms based on good behavior." Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d at 668 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). "[Ojnce a [state] scheme is implemented^] prisoners are imbued with a liberty interest to which the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause attach." Id. (citing Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1261).
However, the mere presence of a parole system does not automatically mean a prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2418, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). Rather, the existence of a protected liberty interest in parole depends on the state's parole statute. The following cases illustrate this principle.
In Greenhottz, the United States Supreme Court held the Nebraska statute created an expectation of parole protected by the Due Process Clause. Greenhottz, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. The Nebraska statute provided,
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a)There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will, substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.
Id. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2106 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114(1) (1976) (emphasis added)). Additionally, the statute also' provided a list of factors that the board must consider, as well as one catchall factor that allows the board to consider other criteria it deems important. Id. at 11 & n.5, 16-18, 99 S.Ct. at 2106 & n.5, 2108-09 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § -83-1,114(2)).
In holding, the statute created a constitutionally. protected liberty interest, in parole, the..Court noted, the .mandatory language — "it shall order" — and the presumption the statute created that the board must grant parole unless it finds one of the four reasons for deferral. Id. at 11-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. While recognizing the amount of subjectivity injected into parole decisions and the amount of broad discretion within the statutory authority of the board, the Court nevertheless held inmates in Nebraska had a lib erty interest in early release. Id. at 12-13, 99 S.Ct. at 2106-07.
Allen is an important case because the language of the applicable Montana statute in that case resembles that of the relevant Iowa statute. In Allen, the United States Supreme Court examined whether the then Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, created a liberty interest in parole. Allen, 482 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2419-20. The Montana statute provided,
(1) Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole . any person confined in the Montana state prison or the women's correction center . when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community[.]
(2) A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
Id. at 376-77, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985) (emphasis added)).
Based on the mandatory language "shall," the Court reasoned the Montana statute at the time created a presumption that the board would grant parole "when the designated findings [were] made." Id. at 377-78, 107 S.Ct. at 2420. Moreover, the Court reasoned, the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, mandated the board to "assess the impact of release on both the prisoner and the community." Id. at 379-80, 107 S.Ct. at 2421. Particularly, the Court explained both statutes emphasized the importance of "the prisoner's ability 'to lead a law-abiding life' " and "whether the release can be achieved without 'detriment to . the community.' " Id. at 380, 107 S.Ct. at 2421-22 (first quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114(1)(a) (1981); and then quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201(2) (1985)). After noting the similarities between the two statutes, the Court held the Montana statute created a liberty interest in parole. Id. at 381, 107 S.Ct. at 2422.
From Greenholtz and Allen, a court can conclude if the statute mandates that a parole board must release an inmate if the inmate meets certain statutorily created criteria, then a protected liberty interest in parole exists. In contrast, if the statute grants the parole board discretion to make the ultimate parole decision, even if the inmate meets the criteria, then the inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in parole. See Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The hallmark of a statute that has not created a liberty interest is discretion" such that "[w]here the statute grants the prison administration discretion, the government has conferred no right on the inmate.").
We have allowed postconviction-relief actions to challenge SOTP classification decisions, work release revocations, and disciplinary actions involving a substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests. Pettit v. Iowa Dep't of Corr., 891 N.W.2d 189, 193-96 (Iowa 2017) (discussing SOTP classification); Maghes v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 235-42 (Iowa 2009) (examining revocation of work release); Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 98-100 (Iowa 1984) (discussing administrative segregation).
In Davis, a prison disciplinary committee found an inmate guilty of violating a penitentiary rule and penalized him for thirty-six months in administrative segregation, plus loss of television, radio, and tape player privileges. Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 98. Without specifying which provision specifically applies, we held applicants may bring claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings under what is now chapter 822 when the actions of prison officials involve a substantial deprivation of liberty or property rights. Id. at 99. We reasoned "[i]t would be unwieldy to require separate actions and different procedures to review prison disciplinary proceedings depending on the type of punishment imposed." Id. Moreover, we stated,
In many of the prison disciplinary proceedings in which judicial review will be sought, forfeiture of good and honor time will be involved but will be coupled with other means of discipline which can be characterized as a substantial deprivation of liberty or property but which are not expressly mentioned as a subject for review under, [chapter 822]. We therefore approve, litigating all such claims involving substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests pursuant to the procedures of [chapter 822]....
Id.
In Maghee, we held an inmate properly brought a postconviction-relief action pursuant to what is now section 822.2(l)(e) to challenge the revocation of..his work release after violating a prison rule. Maghee, 773 N.W.2d at 230, 235. We reasoned, "There is simply no principled reason to distinguish a transfer from work release to a secure institution from a transfer from the general prison population to segregation when both are based on rule violations." Id. at 237-38. "[W]e think a more manageable and consistent review process results when all transfer decisions áre subject to .the same postconviction-relief method of review."'Id. at 238.
In Pettit, a prisoner sought to contest the IDOC's decision requiring him to take SOTP. Pettit, 891 N.W.2d at 192. After going through the prison adjudicative process, he filed a chapter 17A action. Id. We found that "[t]he result of an inmate not participating in SOTP is a loss of the accrual of earned time." Id. at 194. We found because the classification could extend the prisoner's time in prison due to a loss of earned time if he did not participate in SOTP, the proper method to contest the IDOC's SOTP classification was through a postconviction-relief action under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(f) (and possibly 822.2(1)(e)). Id. at 195 & nn.3-4.
In light of the foregoing authorities, we conclude an inmate may proceed under' Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(e) when alleging an unconstitutional deniál of his or her liberty interest based on the IDOC's failure to offer SOTP when SOTP is a necessary prerequisite to parole. That section applies when "the person is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint." Iowa Code § 822.2(l)(e).
The State argues that an administrative appeal, followed by judicial review pursuant to chapter 17A, is the proper way to proceed. However, it seems logical for postconviction-relief proceedings to be available for SOTP denials as it is available for SOTP classifications. See" Pettit, 891 N.W.2d at 194. Prisons need clear rules for where and how prisoners can raise different kinds of complaints. In any event, as the district court pointed out, Belk's complaint is really with the IDOC rather than the IBOP.
Viewing the allegations of the amended application under notice pleading in the light most favorable to Belk, we find the amended application gives fair notice of Belk's claims to the State. The substance of his amended application alleged- he had a protected liberty interest in obtaining parolp. Moreover, Belk alleged the ID.OC's decision to delay his access to SOTP.un-constitutionally violated this interest when the IDOC would not recommend parole because of his failure to complete..SOTP. Additionally, Belk alleged the IDOC does not offer SOTP to male sex offenders unless they near their tentative discharge dates. That is not the case for female sex offenders. Taking these allegations as-true, a court could find Iowa's parole law creates a liberty interest. If the court so finds, the court must then consider whether the IDOC's actions as alleged has unconstitutionally violated this liberty interest. Belk is entitled to proceed with his action to prove, these allegations.
Again, it is important to note, Belk's claim is not about the actions of the IBOP in denying him parole. Rather, Belk is claiming the actions of the IDOC — in. delaying his access to SOTP based on his tentative discharge date and then recommending against his parole to the IBOP because of his failure to complete SOTP— has unconstitutionally violated his protected liberty interest.
We conclude .Belk's amended application should not have been • dismissed outright for failure to state a claim because, in fact, he had stated a claim under Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(e). Notably,. Belk's amended application cited only Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(a), although his original application also cited section 822.2(l)(e). We believe section 822.2(l)(a) is inapposite because Belk' is not complaining about his "conviction or sentence." Iowa Code § 822.2(l)(a). Hence, we could potentially affirm on the basis that Belk has not relied on the correct section, but this would simply trigger the filing of another postconviction-relief action under section 822.2(l)(e).
Additionally, until today, there 'was no settled precedent on what avenue for relief, if any, was potentially available for an inmate in Belk's situation. Accordingly, we conclude this case should be reversed and remanded so Belk has an opportunity to amend his application to proceed under section 822.2(l)(e). Both here and below, the State took the position that postconviction relief was not available at all and thus there is no unfairness to the State in reversing for further proceedings under, section 822.2(l)(e).
V. Disposition.
We reverse the district court judgment dismissing Belk's amended application. On remand, Belk should be given an opportunity to amend his :application to seek relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(l)(e). If he does, the court must decide if the parole system in Iowa, together with the IDOC's actions, unconstitutionally interfered with a liberty interest that would allow Belk to obtain relief. We are not commenting on the merits of Belk's claims under section 822.2(l)(e). Rather, we have reviewed his allegations under the standard of notice pleading in the light most favorable to him. In other words, we have decided this opinion within the parameters of the standard of review governing a- motion to dismiss.
Because the court held a hearing, the court may decide the issue under the record made if possible, but in its discretion, the court may request further testimony or briefs from the parties.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Waterman and Zager, JJ., who dissent.
. The due process protections afforded for an inmate's liberty interest in parole is minimal. See Pando v. Brown, 87 F.Supp.3d 963, 964-65 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting California has created a parole scheme that creates a liberty interest in parole, however, '[t]he United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that, in the parole context, a prisoner has received adequate process when he has been allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied" (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (per curiam))).
. There does not appear to be any Iowa case applying the Cronkhite rule.
. The Montana legislature subsequently amended its parole scheme to make a grant of parole discretionary. See Worden v. Mont. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 289 Mont. 459, 962 P.2d 1157, 1165 (1998).
. Davis implies the proper provision of what is now section 822.2 is section 822.2(1)(e). See Maghee, 773 N.W.2d at 238 (noting a transfer from the general prison population to segregation, as was the case in Davis, is a decision that falls within what is now section 822.2(l)(e), which provides postconviction review if the inmate "is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint").