Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff Appellee, v. Justin GRAS, First National Bank of Shreveport, Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Justin Gras and Mrs. Eugenie Torr Gras, Substituted Defendants, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1961-04-12
Citations: 131 So. 2d 628
Docket Number: No. 9469
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff Appellee, v. Justin GRAS, First National Bank of Shreveport, Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Justin Gras and Mrs. Eugenie Torr Gras, Substituted Defendants, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 131
Pages: 628–635

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff Appellee, v. Justin GRAS, First National Bank of Shreveport, Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Justin Gras and Mrs. Eugenie Torr Gras, Substituted Defendants, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 9469.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
April 12, 1961.
On Rehearing June 16, 1961.
W. Crosby Pegues, Jr., D. Ross Banister, Glenn S. Darsey, Braxton B. Croom, Richard Alsina Fulton, by B. B. Croom and J. S. Moore, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, by S. E. Cook and Sidney Galloway, Shreveport, for appellee.

Opinion:
BOLIN, Judge.
The State of Louisiana, through The Department of Highways, expropriated 157.30 square feet of land located at the intersection of Caddo and Common Streets in the City of Shreveport which belonged to the defendants. This small parcel was a portion of a larger tract measuring approximately one hundred twenty feet on Caddo Street with a depth of one hundred seventy-five feet. The land taken was necessary for the purpose of "rounding a corner" in the construction of a highway by the plaintiff. As the portion taken encroached upon a frame residence, the entire building was included in the expropriation. The structure in question was approximately fifty years old and had been utilized as Negro rental property.
Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 48:441 to 48:460, the two experts appointed by the plaintiff estimated the just compensation due for the property taken to be Two Thousand Eight Hundred and No/100 ($2,800) Dollars and such amount was deposited in the registry of the court. The defendant not being satisfied with this appraisal, filed an answer in which he prayed that such award be increased to the sum of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and 12/100 ($5,-736.12) Dollars. The original defendant, Justin Gras, died before the trial and The First National Bank of Shreveport, executor of his estate, and his widow were joined as parties defendant. Judgment was rendered in the district court rejecting the demands of the defendants and fixing the value of the property at the sum of Two Thousand Eight Hundred and No/100 ($2,-800) Dollars in conformity with the estimate made by the plaintiff's appraisers. From this judgment, the defendants have perfected this appeal.
Counsel for the defendants in thei'r brief assign the following errors as having been committed by the lower court:
1. In completely disregarding all the testimony of defendants' witnesses.
2. In adopting the testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff which was based upon sales of property not comparable to that owned by the defendants.
In an effort to prove the amount of compensation due for the property, the plaintiff offered the testimony of Mr. Lawrence L. May and O. L. Jordan, both of whom were legally qualified appraisers and experts in real estate values in the vicinity of the subject property. The defendants presented the testimony of seven witnesses. While none of these witnesses could be classified as expert appraisers, the record indicates that at least several of them had extensive dealings in property similar to that involved herein.
In rendering judgment, the trial judge assigned brief written reasons in which we find the following:
"No legally qualified appraisers testified for the defendants but they offered the testimony of several persons supposedly familiar with this particular type of property.
"After reading all of the testimony of all of the witnesses in the case, considering their experience, knowledge of the facts, and their reasons for their conclusions, we must accept the value of $2,800.00 as being the true value of the property in question."
From the above language, defendants strenuously contend before this court that our esteemed brother below completely disregarded all testimony offered by them touching upon the value of the property in dispute; that such actions on his part were erroneous and contrary to the well established jurisprudence of our state. In support of this contention, we have been cited to the following cases: Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 1954, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541; State v. Landry, 1951, 219 La. 456, 53 So.2d 232. We are in complete accord with the general principle of law as enunciated in the cited cases that, in arriving at an award of just compensation, the opinions of all qualified expert witnesses should be considered and such evidence should not be arbitrarily rejected. However, if the expert testimony impresses the court unfavorably it may be disregard ed. State of Louisiana through Department of Highways v. Hub Realty Co., 1960, 239 La. 154, 118 So.2d 364, and the cases cited therein.
From our study of this record, we are not convinced that the district court arbitrarily refused to consider the evidence introduced by the defendants. We interpret the opinion of the district judge to mean that in his opinion "no legally qualified appraisers testified for the defendants", but he gave consideration to the testimony of all the witnesses, and took into consideration their experience, knowledge of the facts, and their reasons. We can find no fault- with such methods. While the experts tendered by the defendants might not have been classified "legally qualified appraisers", their testimony was rightfully considered by the court, but the weight given such testimony was gauged accordingly.
There is no dispute as to the law applicable to the amount of compensation due herein. LSA-R.S. 48:453 provides as follows :
"The market value is determined as in general expropriation suits but as of the time the estimated compensation was deposited in the registry of the court.
"Damage to the remainder of the property is determined as of the date of the trial.
"In either case the defendant has the burden of proving his claim."
In connection with estimating the value of the property, LSA-R.S. 19:9 provides as follows:
"In estimating the value of the property to be expropriated, the basis of assessment shall be the value which the property possessed before the contemplated improvement was proposed, without deducting therefrom any amount for the benefit derived by the owner from the contemplated improvement or work."
The amount due the owner of property in expropration proceedings is the "market value" or the price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and a willing purchaser, taking into consideration all available uses to which the land might be put, as well as all factors which leads to a replacement of the loss caused by the taking. This means substantially that the owner should be placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have been had his property not been taken. State through Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 1958, 234 La. 51, 99 So.2d 20, and cases cited therein.
It is likewise the general rule that where the expropriation involves a "partial taking", the land owner is entitled to severance damages to any remaining property. In the event such is allowable, the measure of compensation is the diminution in the market value of the remainder of his property as damages. Thomas & Warner, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 1956, 230 La. 1024, 89 So.2d 885, together with the cases cited therein.
Where severance damage is claimed by the land owner to the remaining property, it is the established law of this state that special benefits to the remainder of such property may be set off against such damages. Louisiana Highway Commission v. Grey, 1941, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654; State v. Cooper, 1948, 213 La. 1016, 36 So.2d 22.
After a careful review of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the lower court has correctly applied the law to the facts of this case as we have found them. We can certainly find no error in that portion of the award made for the property actually taken. Inasmuch as the judgment did not include anything for damages to the remainder of defendants' property, we have given this matter careful consideration. After an analysis of all the testimony, we have concluded as did the lower court, that the property remaining was worth more after the taking than before. Under the cases previously cited by us, this should be taken into consideration and the defendants are not thereby entitled to an award for severance damages.
Having found no manifest error in the method used by the lower court in fixing the amount due the defendants, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed at appellants' cost.
Affirmed.