Case Name: Joel Robert WITMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-03-10
Citations: 394 So. 2d 1096
Docket Number: No. VV-320
Parties: Joel Robert WITMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 394
Pages: 1096–1099

Head Matter:
Joel Robert WITMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. VV-320.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 10, 1981.
Stephen L. Gorman, of Gorman & Matthew, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and David P. Gauldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
LILES, WOODIE A. (Retired), Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for extortion. We reverse because the trial court erred by allowing the State to call a rebuttal witness, who was not listed in discovery pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, without conducting an appropriate inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the State's noncompliance. The record clearly reveals that the State failed to list its rebuttal witness. It also reveals that Appellant's attorney had been furnished police reports by the State some time before the trial. These reports show that the rebuttal witness and several other persons filed complaints alleging that the Appellant had made prior similar threats against these parties. The record also reveals that the prosecutor did not anticipate calling the rebuttal witness and, in fact, told Appellant's attorney that he was not going to call her or any of the other complainants. It was only after the Appellant took the stand on his own behalf and testified that he made no threats to others that the State made an attempt to locate and call this particular rebuttal witness. Appellant's attorney timely objected to the State's calling of this witness on the grounds that the prosecution had represented it would not call this witness and that he, the defense counsel, had not had the opportunity to depose this witness. The State contended that the name of the rebuttal witness did not have to be listed in response to the Appellant's demand for discovery. Adopting the State's contention, the trial court overruled the Appellant's timely objection, denied his motion for mistrial, and permitted the witness to testify.
Contrary to the contention of the State, rebuttal witnesses, the necessity for whom the State can reasonably anticipate, are included within the ambit of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220. See, e. g., Lucas v. State, 376 So.2d 1149 (Fla.1979); Hardison v. State, 341 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977); Rowan v. State, 252 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971). While the failure to list a rebuttal witness does not automatically prohibit the use of the witness, it is obligatory for the trial court to make an inquiry to determine whether noncompliance with this rule would result in harm or prejudice to the defendant. Lucas, at 1151; Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971). However, the trial judge erroneously based his denial of the Appellant's objection and motion for mistrial on the fact that rebuttal witnesses are not covered by this rule. When the trial judge so labors under a misapprehension of law, it is difficult to conclude that a sufficient Richardson inquiry has been made, much less that non-prejudice to the Appellant has been shown. It is "... essential that the circumstances establishing the nonprejudice to the defendant affirmatively appear in the record." Richardson, at 775. [Emphasis supplied] Further, we think that prima facie prejudice has been demonstrated, for how could the defendant in an extortion case be more prejudiced than by the prosecutor leading counsel to think that there would be no Williams type evidence from a rebuttal witness and then calling that witness on the ground that the prosecutor was "surprised" by the defendant's denial of various similar threats? Perhaps a recess and deposition was necessary. Perhaps a brief interview would have sufficed. We, however, cannot speculate as to what degree of inquiry was appropriate for this case and thus feel compelled to remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with opinion.
. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959).