Case Name: BENJAMIN S. MILLS, as Executor, etc., of CLARISSA DARLING, Deceased, Respondent, v. LESTER H. DAVIS, as Executor, etc., of ELIZABETH JAYNE, Deceased, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-07
Citations: 48 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 415
Docket Number: 
Parties: BENJAMIN S. MILLS, as Executor, etc., of CLARISSA DARLING, Deceased, Respondent, v. LESTER H. DAVIS, as Executor, etc., of ELIZABETH JAYNE, Deceased, Appellant.
Judges: Dykman, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 48
Pages: 415–417

Head Matter:
BENJAMIN S. MILLS, as Executor, etc., of CLARISSA DARLING, Deceased, Respondent, v. LESTER H. DAVIS, as Executor, etc., of ELIZABETH JAYNE, Deceased, Appellant.
Evidence — admissibility of proof as to indorsements of payments on a note, to remove the bar of the statute of limitations — testimony as to the time when an indorsement of a payment was made on a note — when it is not inadmissible under Code of Oivil Procedure, sec. 829.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, as the executor of Clarissa Darling, deceased, to recover the amount due upon a promissory note for $300, dated November 17, 1864, made by the defendant’s testatrix, to the order of the said Clarissa Darling. The maker of the note died in 1884. The defendant having pleaded the statute of limitations as a defense to the action, the plaintiff was allowed, against the defendant's objection and exception, to prove by his own testimony and that of his wife, that indorsements of the payment of interest were made upon the note during the lifetime of the maker by the plaintiff, as the agent of the payee, during her lifetime, and thereafter by him as executor.
Held, that neither the plaintiff nor his wifé were disqualified by section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure from testifying as to the time at which the indorsements were made.
That the indorsements were admissible as being in the nature of declarations against interest, without proof that they were made in the presence of the debtor, or at the exact time at which the payments were made. (Barnard, P. J., dissenting.)
Boseboom v. Billington (17 Johns., 182); Bisley v. Wightman (13 Hun, 163) followed ; McLaren v. McMa/rtin (36 N. Y., 88) distinguished.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered in Rings county upon the report of a referee.
The action was brought to recover the amount alleged to be due on a promissory note for $300 made by Elizabeth Jayne, the defendant’s testatrix, to the order of one Clarissa Darling, the plaintiff’s testatrix, which was duly presented to the defendant and by him disputed and duly referred. pursuant to the statute. The defense is that the note is without consideration, and that a recovery is barred by the statute of limitations. The note is dated November 17, 1861, and has upon it six different indorsements of interest, one of which was made by plaintiff, as agent of the payee, during her lifetime and all the others by himself as executor of the payee’s estate and during the lifetime of the maker. It was not shown that it was ever produced to the maker thereof, or that she ever paid a dollar on it, or that in any way she ever recognized it or knew that any indorsements had been made upon it.
Thomas J. Ritoh, Jr., for the appellant.
Thomas S. Strong, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Cullen, J.:
The indorsements of the payment of interests, if proved to have been made at or about the time they bear date, were competent evidence to take the note out of the statute of limitations. (Roseboom v. Billington, 17 Johns., 182; Risley v. Wightman, 13 Hun, 163.) Neither the plaintiff nor his wife were disqualified from testifying, as to the time indorsements were made. The indorsements, though evidence of a personal transaction with the deceased debtor, were not themselves such transactions. For to make them competent evidence, it was not necessary to show that they were made in the presence of the debtor, nor at the exact time of the payment by the debtor. The theory on which such indorsements are admitted in evidence is not that the debtor was cognizant of them, but that if made before the obligation was outlawed, they are in the nature of declarations against interest. The rule allowing such indorsements as evidence, though severely criticised, seems settled by authority here and in England. The case of McLaren v. McMartin (36 N. Y., 88) is not in conflict with it. The note in that caso, even accepting as the fact the payment of 'interest indorsed on it, was outlawed before the death of the testator. It was held that the administrator could not, by a subsequent payment, revive the debt. The remarks of the learned justice delivering the opinion that the indorsements written by the payee were mere declarations in his own favor were obiter, and possibly may have referred to the fact that there was no evidence as to the time the indorsement was made. However, the case was decided upon the other ground.
The note jprima facie imported a consideration. If given without consideration, as claimed by defendant on this appeal, the defendant should have requested the referee so to find. There was no such request, and there is no exception in the case that presents this question to us for review. Tke judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Dykman, J., concurred.