Case Name: WILLIAM W. SCRIVER and JOHN W. ROBERTS, Respondents, v. ELI B. SMITH, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1883-05
Citations: 37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 129
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM W. SCRIVER and JOHN W. ROBERTS, Respondents, v. ELI B. SMITH, Appellant.
Judges: Bookes, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 37
Pages: 129–138

Head Matter:
WILLIAM W. SCRIVER and JOHN W. ROBERTS, Respondents, v. ELI B. SMITH, Appellant.
Govmant of warranty — what constitutes a breach of it.
The defendant conveyed to the plaintiffs by a deed containing a covenant of warranty certain premises upon which was a grist and flouring mill, which had water-power and mill privileges appurtenant thereto. One Douglass owned the premises next below those so conveyed and had erected a dam thereon. At the time the deed was given, this dam did not back the water upon the premises conveyed to the plaintiffs, but Douglass had, and afterwards exercised, a right to raise the dam eight and one-half inches higher, whereby the water was thrown back upon the plaintiffs’ premises, injuring their mill privileges and the foundation of their buildings and overflowing a portion of their land.
JSeld, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the damages so sustained, in an action against the defendant, for a breach of the covenant of warranty contained in the deed. (Learned, P. J., dissenting.)
Appeal from an interlocutory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, entered upon an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint.
The complaint sets up that on the 25th day of March, 1875, the. defendant conveyed to the plaintiffs in fee a certain parcel of land which contained a water-power and grist mill, with the water-power and mill privileges appurtenant thereto. It avers that the value of the premises consisted almost wholly in their use for such purposes, and that the premises were bought by plaintiffs for such purposes, as was known to defendant.
It sets forth a covenant of warranty contained in the deed, the latter being attached to the complaint. The covenant is in the usual form. The grantor covenants “ that the premises thus conveyed in the quiet and peaceable possession of the parties of the second part ” he will forever warrant, etc.
The plaintiffs aver that they have not been permitted peaceably to occupy and enjoy, but on the contrary that one Douglass, who, at the time of the making of the said deéd and continually from thence until the time of the eviction was the lawful owner of a certain mill dam on the river 'next below the premises, had a right to raise the dam eight and one-half inches above the height at which it was maintained at the time of the conveyances. That he did subsequently so raise the dam as he had a right to do, without permission of plaintiffs, and did thereby cause the water of said river to set hack upon the premises so conveyed and to hood a portion thereof and to impede the discharge of water from plaintiffs’ wheel pit and raceway, and the operation of plaintiffs’ mill, so as to reduce the mill’s working capacity, and the earnings thereof, and to cause its foundations to settle, and to evict the plaintiffs from a portion of said premises and deprive them of the use and enjoyment thereof.
The complaint further alleged that an action had been brought by the plaintiffs at the defendant’s request, against Douglass to test his right to increase the height of the dam in which he recovered a judgment establishing his right so to maintain the said dam.
To this complaint the defendant demurred, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. .
W. P. Cantwell) for the appellant.
Edma/rd E. James, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Boaedman, J.:
Neither Adams v. Conover (87 N. Y., 422), nor Green v. Collins (86 id., 246), seem to me strictly to apply to the ease before us. One Douglass here owned a water-power, dam, etc., next below the premises conveyed by defendant to plaintiffs by warranty deed. At the time such deed was given the dam of Douglass did not back water upon the premises described in the deed, but the right existed, and was afterwards exercised by Douglass, to raise his dam ten inches, whereby the water of the river was thrown back upon said premises. Was the exercise by Douglass of this conceded right such an act as gave to plaintiffs the right of action under the covenant of warranty, and for quiet enjoyment contained in defendant's deed to them. ' ' •
It is not whether the plaintiffs took an apparent easement to discharge a sewer upon a stranger to the deed as in Green v. Collins, nor whether they took an apparent easement to maintain water upon the lands of a stranger to the deed. The question here presented is whether the plaintiffs are entitled' to have, possess and enjoy what they bought. The lands are described in the deed by metes and bounds. The vendor has given the common covenants of warranty, and for quiet and peaceable possession of the premises cenveyed. The adjoining owner below establishes and exercises his legal right to flood a portion of said lands with water by his mill dam. The principle would be the same if his right authorized him to flood every rod of the land conveyed to the plaintiffs. Would such an act, legally done, constitute a breach of the defendant's covenant ? Is the plaintiff, in legal effect, deprived of the possession, of the use, of the enjoyment of such lands as are under water by virtue of Douglass' right? If the plaintiffs' possession is taken away by a paramount title the action will lie for a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. It is as effectually taken away in this ease at the election of Douglass as though he had the title in fee simple. To the extent that the lands deeded by defendant to plaintiffs are taken possession of by Douglass to maintain his dám and sustain his head of water, the plaintiffs are injured and have their action for the breach of the covenant. It has been so decided in an analogous case in this department in Rea v. Minkler (5 Lans., 196). That was a private right of way over the lands, a much less obnoxious disturbance of possession than the present. The case of McMullin v. Wooley (2 Lans., 394) relates to carrying water in pipes underground where the Use and occupation of the lands are not sensibly affected. So) of Whitbeck v. Cook (15 Johns., 483), relating to a highway of which the owner has the use, possession and. title subject only to the public right of way.' It is difficult to reconcile or distinguish all cases to be found in the books on this subject. But it seems proper to follow the decision of our own court until it is overruled.
This conclusion, I insist, is just and reasonable. It gives to the parties what they had a right to expect under their contract. It gives to the plaintiffs what they bought, or damages for its loss. It subjects the defendant to liability for selling what he did not own, and agreeing that plaintiffs should have and enjoy it. Many cases indicate that the plaintiffs should have required covenants of seizin or against incumbrances in order to maintain an action for such cause as this. The old English law was very technical in its requirements. To a considerable degree those technicalities are still retained. But there is a growing tendency to disregard unmeaning and useless rules, and to search for and administer justice when it can be done. This is an appropriate case for the exercise of any legal power the -court may possess in giving a remedy, if the wrong shall be made to appear, rather than turn the plaintiffs out of court upon a technicality.
The interlocutory judgment should be affirmed, with -costs, with the usual leave to answer, etc.
Bookes, J., concurred.