Case Name: Catherine RIVARD, et al. v. PETROLEUM TRANSPORT CO., INC., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-09-28
Citations: 663 So. 2d 755
Docket Number: No. 95-CA-0431
Parties: Catherine RIVARD, et al. v. PETROLEUM TRANSPORT CO., INC., et al.
Judges: Before LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 663
Pages: 755–769

Head Matter:
Catherine RIVARD, et al. v. PETROLEUM TRANSPORT CO., INC., et al.
No. 95-CA-0431.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 28, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1995.
Fred T. Hinrichs, Christovich & Kearney, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellant Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association.
Robert M. Murphy, Thomas Keasler Foutz, Gauthier & Murphy, Metairie, for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
Before LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
WALTZER, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 29 November 1983, Vincent Rivard's wife and minor children filed suit for damages caused by his wrongful death against Gulf Outlet Fuel and Marine Supplies, Inc. (Gulf Outlet), owner of the tractor in which Vincent was riding at the time of his death; Petroleum Transport Company, Inc. (PET-CO), owner of the tractor's trailer, and their liability insurer, Transit Casualty Insurance Company (Transit Casualty), alleging that the vehicle's braking system was defective.
On 10 August 1984, plaintiffs amended their petition to add as defendants the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and the City of New Orleans. On 3 December 1985, Transit Casualty was declared insolvent and placed in liquidation. Subsequently, Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) was substituted as defendant.
On 19 December 1985, plaintiffs amended their petition to add as defendants Betts Industries, its insurer and Fruehauf Corporation. Betts and its insurer settled plaintiffs' claims and were dismissed.
On 2 March 1986, plaintiffs amended, adding the State through the Department of Transportation and Development as the entity charged with ownership, custody and control of the exit ramp.
IgOn 15 January 1987, plaintiff amended adding allegations against Fruehauf, which subsequently settled plaintiffs' claims and was dismissed.
On 14 October 1988, PETCO and LIGA filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Vincent was an unauthorized passenger or trespasser in the PETCO vehicle, without PETCO's knowledge or consent. On 6 January 1989, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave of court to amend their petition to add a claim against Transit Casualty/LIGA as omnibus insurer of PETCO's driver, alleging that Vincent's death was caused by the driver's negligence. No new parties were sought to be added, but Transit Casualty's capacity was enlarged. The trial court denied the motion to amend, and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of PETCO and LIGA. Plaintiffs applied for supervisory writs from this Court, which, on 5 October 1989, granted the writ, reversing that portion of the judgment denying plaintiffs' motion to file the supplemental petition and remanding the case to the trial court.
On 14 November 1989, plaintiffs filed their amending petition. LIGA plead prescription as an affirmative defense.
On 29 November 1990, this Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of PETCO, but vacated that portion of the judgment dismissing the insurer because of this Court's grant of supervisory relief allowing plaintiff to amend to add a claim against the insurer as omnibus insurer for PETCO's driver.
On 4 March 1993, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against LIGA, decreeing that LIGA is the omnibus insurer of PETCO's trailer driven by PETCO's driver, and that LIGA stands fully in Transit | ⅞Casualty's shoes. LIGA's liability was held to extend to $149,-000 per person, rather than the occurrence, with a cap of $500,000, the limits of the Transit Casualty policy.
On 22 February 1994, trial on the merits was held, and the matter was taken under submission. On 11 October 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against LIGA in the following amounts:
Catherine Rivard $120,000
Matthew Rivard 95,000
Joseph Rivard 95,000
David Rivard 95,000
Paul Rivard 95,000
TOTAL $500,000
From this judgment, LIGA appeals. On 7 April 1995, LIGA filed a Peremptory Exception of Prescription in this Court. By order of this Court dated 20 April 1995, the exception was referred to the pending appeal. We deny the exception and affirm the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 14 August 1983, Vincent Rivard was killed while riding as an unauthorized guest passenger in a 1981 Mack tractor, which was being driven by Ralph Tate, during the course and scope of Tate's employment with PETCO. Tate was also killed in the accident.
The testimony adduced at trial established that Tate was attempting to exit the Pontchartrain Expressway onto Airline Highway. Tate's tractor was pulling a trailer containing 8,370 gallons of gasoline. As Tate began to maneuver the curve of the exit ramp, the tractor turned over and struck a concrete embankment. The gasoline spilled out of the trailer onto the ramp and was ignited. Tate and his passenger were killed as a result of the fire.
|4The parties do not contest the trial court's factual finding that the substantiated testimony more probably than not showed that the sole cause of the accident was Tate's fault in driving at an excessive rate of speed.
LIGA'S EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
LIGA's prescription argument is predicated on the fact that the supplemental petition alleging LIGA's liability as omnibus insurer of PETCO's driver, Tate, was filed after the one year prescriptive period had lapsed. LIGA contends that the trial court's finding that Tate's negligence was the sole cause of the accident precludes a finding of solidary obligation with the timely sued defendants, and thus prescription was not interrupted. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Company, 314 So.2d 350 (La.1975).
Our review of the record in this case reveals that LIGA's contention to be without merit. LIGA's reliance on the Trahan case is misplaced. The issue considered in Tra-han was whether one law suit, litigated to completion in favor of all named defendants, interrupted prescription as to an otherwise untimely separate second law suit filed against essentially different defendants. Plaintiffs therein relied on La.C.C. art. 2097, which provides that suit against one solidary debtor interrupts prescription against all sol-idary debtors. The Court held that without solidarity, prescription was not interrupted.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs amended their petition in the SAME case to add LIGA, already a named defendant under the policy of insurance issued by its predecessor in favor of PETCO, as successor omnibus insurer under that SAME policy for acts of negligence of their insured, the PETCO driver.
|sSix years after having ruled in Trahan, the Louisiana Supreme Court made clear that the Trahan rule was inapplicable to suits wherein plaintiffs amended their petition. In Langlinais v. Guillotte, 407 So.2d 1215, 1218-19 (La.1981), a unanimous Supreme Court reversed dismissal of an amending petition, holding, inter alia, that a timely filed tort suit against a person in his individual capacity as the owner and purported operator of a vehiclfe and against his insurer interrupts prescription on a claim asserted by plaintiff in an amended petition against the same defendant for his vicarious liability and as administrator of his minor daughter's estate alleging that the daughter, not the father, was the negligent driver of the vehicle. The Supreme Court held:
The legal issues presented in Trahan concerned whether one law suit, litigated to completion in favor of all named defendants, interrupted prescription as to an otherwise untimely second law suit filed against essentially different defendants. The issues considered were whether prescription was interrupted as to the second law suit under La.R.S. 9:5801 (which provides that the filing of one law suit interrupts prescription affecting the cause of action therein sued upon against all defendants) and whether La.C.C. 1097 (which provides that suit against one solidary debtor interrupts prescription against all solidary debtors) supported plaintiffs contention that the first suit interrupted prescription on the second suit.... The issue presented in the case presently before us, involving only one law suit, is whether La.C.C.P. art. 1153 allows plaintiffs amended petition to relate back to the date the original petition was filed, thus avoiding the prescriptive bar to the amended claim. That issue was not under consideration in either Trahan or Sizeler [v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 102 So.2d 326 (La.App.Orl.1955) ].
This Court held to the same effect in Garrett v. Diaz Drayage Co., 442 So.2d 860, 861 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983), wherein plaintiff sued Fireman's Fund as insurer of Diaz Drayage Company, the owner of the offending vehicle. After the prescriptive period, plaintiff amended to add as defendant Diaz Cartage Company, the actual owner of the vehicle. The trial court found prescription had run and |6dismissed plaintiffs amended suit against the insurer and Diaz Cartage. This Court reversed, holding in pertinent part:
The Trahan case is factually distinguishable from our case because here we are dealing with an amended petition and not a separate suit which has been finally decided. As explained by the Supreme Court in the ease of Baker v. Payne & Keller of La., Inc., 390 So.2d 1272 (La.1980), the statement in Trahan was made in explaining why C.C. Article 2097 did not require a finding that the first suit interrupted pre scription against the new defendant and their insurers in the second suit. The insureds named in the first suit had been absolved of liability and could not be soli-dary debtors with the insured in the second suit.
Thus, the proper standard to be applied to the ease at bar is found in the jurisprudence explicating the requirement for relation back of an amended pleading, not of a new lawsuit.
Generally, tort actions prescribe one year from the date of the offense or quasi-offense. La.C.C. art. 3536. The burden of proof rests upon the party pleading prescription. Langlinais v. Guillotte, 407 So.2d at 1216.
La.C.C.P. art. 1153 provides:
When the action or defense asserted in the amended petition . arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the filing of the original pleading.
In Baker v. Payne & Keller of La., Inc., cited in the Garrett opinion, plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against her deceased husband's employer and its insurer, Maryland Casualty Company, alleging that the accident was caused by the employer's failure to provide a safe place to work, safety procedures and medical and emergency treatment. The suit was held to be barred by the exclusivity of the worker's compensation remedy, and after the one year prescriptive period had passed, plaintiff amended to add executive defendants and Maryland Casualty as their liability insurer. The Louisiana Supreme Court held:
|7It is well established that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 permits amendment despite technical prescriptive bars where the original pleading gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the amended claim or defense arises. In his article, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 Tul.L.Rev. 211, 233 (1969), Justice Tate states: "... The article deliberately adopts no test of identity of cause or legal theory between the original and amending petitions; the amendment's thrust need only be based upon or factually relate to ('arise out of) the 'conduct, transaction or occurrence' originally alleged. If the original timely •pleading gives actual notice to a party that a formal claim or defense is being made based upon a particular fact situation, no essential protective purpose of a prescriptive statute is violated by permitting relation back of a postprescription amendment based on the same factual situation. Through the original pleading the opponent knows that judi-. cial relief is sought arising from the general factual situation alleged, and he is put on notice that his evidence concerning it should be collected and preserved...."
Where there is "some factual connexity between the original and amended assertions, together with some identity of interest between the original and the supplemental party," amendment should be allowed. 43 Tul.L.Rev. at 234. The only difference between the original and the amended petition is the inclusion of the allegation that Maryland was the insurer of certain of Payne and Keller's employees as well as insurer of the corporation. The transaction or occurrence giving rise to the demand for payment remains unchanged. Since the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice, and Maryland clearly had notice of the plaintiffs suit against it and the occurrence upon which the demand was based, the running of prescription as to Maryland was interrupted. Baker v. Payne & Keller of La., Inc., 390 So.2d at 1275. (Emphasis in original.)
In Langlinais, the Court held that the original pleading gave fair notice "of. the general fact situation out of which the amended claim arose, and that there is sufficient factual connexity between the original and amended assertions, together with some identity of interest between the original and the supplemental party, such that the amendment should be allowed to relate back...." Langlinais v. Guillotte, 407 So.2d at 1217. Relation back against Guillotte and State Farm was allowed because the original petition gave them notice of the fact that Langli-nais sought to recover for injuries suffered as a result of a certain automobile accident in volving a vehicle owned by Guillotte and insured by State Farm.
lain Langlinais, the Court cited a portion of Justice Tate's article that is particularly applicable to the case at bar:
The fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is only to afford a defendant security of mind and affairs if no claim is made timely, and to protect him from stale claims and from loss or non-preservation of relevant proof. They are designed to protect him against lack of notification of a formal claim within the prescriptive period, not against pleading mistakes that his opponent makes in filing the formal claim within the period.
Langlinais v. Guillotte, 407 So.2d at 1218.
Our Circuit accepted Justice Tate's view:
Article 1153 is designed to permit an amendment if the original petition gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the amended claim arises. The out of time amendments need only be based on or factually relate to the conduct or occurrence already alleged. The defendant [in the ease at bar, LIGA], through the original pleading, knows the general factual allegations and is put on notice that he should protect his rights. Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 TuLL.Rev. 211, 233 (1969).
Masson v. Champion Ins. Co. 591 So.2d 399, 402 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991).
The police report shows excessive speed and driver error as the cause of the accident.
On 20 January 1984, Transit Casualty itself alleged Tate's fault in its answer to the original petition, alleging his excessive speed, failing to maintain control, failing to maintain a proper lookout and failing to use ordinary and reasonable precautions dictated by the circumstances.
On 4 May 1984, NOPSI sued Transit Casualty for damages to NOPSI equipment and property allegedly caused by. Tate's negligence. Later that month, NOPSI moved to consolidate its suit with the Rivard case.
On 18 June 1984, Fruehauf raised Tate's negligence in its answer to Transit Casualty's Third Party Demand.
|9Ten months after Transit Casualty's judicial allegation of Tate's fault, six months after Transit Casualty's having received notice from NOPSI of its allegation of Tate's fault, and five months after Transit Casualty's having received notice from Fruehauf of its allegation of Tate's fault, the prescriptive period ran.
Article 1153's liberal application is well settled:
La.C.C.P. art. 1153 is to be applied liberally and without restriction by technical rules. (Citation omitted.) The article only requires that the action arise from the occurrence "attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Prescription statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished by it. (Citation omitted.) . The allegations in the original petition were sufficient to put Champion on notice of the facts surrounding the collision with Champion's insured.... La. C.C.P. art. 1153 should be liberally applied so that amendments relate back as long as they are based on the general fact situation originally pleaded. This is true even if a new and independent cause of action is pleaded, the amendment entirely changes the legal theory of the action, adds another claim arising out of the same occurrence, changes the capacity of the parties, adds or drops parties. Tate, 43 Tul.L.Rev. at 231.
Masson v. Champion Ins. Co., 591 So.2d at 403. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, the amended petition changes the capacity of the insurer, but is brought under the same PETCO policy. The insurer was put on notice of this death claim from the original timely filing on 29 November 1983, and was free to investigate the claim and preserve all evidence between that date and the filing of the amending petition on 15 January 1987. It wrote the insurance policy; it knew or should have known that the driver of the PETCO vehicle was its insured under the omnibus coverage it provided to PETCO.
Dismissal of the claim against LIGA advances no interest protected by the laws on prescription. We find nothing in the record to show that Transit Casualty/LIGA is prejudiced by allowing the amended petition to relate back to hothe filing of the original petition. Under Baker and Langlinais, the exception of prescription is without merit. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial judge committed reversible error in holding that LIGA's maximum exposure was the $500,000 limit of the Transit Casualty policy, rather than the statutory limitation of $300,000 found in La.R.S. 22:1382.
LIGA contends, essentially, that the 1990 amendments to La.R.S. 22:1382(A)(l)(a)(iii) creating a statutory cap of $300,000 per accident or occurrence should be applied retroactively to this 1983 accident. However, prospective operation of statutes is a general rule, and, as a general rule, is respected by the courts. Dixon, Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 La.L.Rev. 1661, 1665 (1982).
Planiol aptly articulates the rationale behind this general rule: "a fact and an act are governed by the law under whose aegis they took place.... [T]he solution cannot change on account of the circumstance that when the court rules, the law governing such a fact or such an act is no longer the same." 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, Sec. 243A (La.St.L.Inst.Trans.1959).
Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La.1992).
La.C.C. art. 6 provides that absent contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. The 1990 amendment does not provide for retroactive application. The question for this Court is whether the $300,000 cap is substantive or procedural. The Cole decision provides the proper analysis to guide this Court in making that determination:
"Generally, the determinative point in time separating prospective from retroactive application of an enactment is the date the cause of action accrues. Once a party's cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested property right that may not constitutionally be divested." Id.
| nThe Third Circuit rejected retroactive application of the amendment, holding the cap to be substantive and, as such, to be applied prospectively only. Richard v. Teague, 92-17 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 636 So.2d 1160, writ denied 94-1934 (La. 11/11/94), 644 So.2d 388, reconsideration denied 94-1934 (La. 12/16/94), 648 So.2d 384; Saffel v. U.S. Indem. Assur. Group, Inc., 609 So.2d 278 (3 Cir.1992), writ denied 613 So.2d 1003 (La.1993) and writ denied 613 So.2d 992 (La.1993); Veillon v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 608 So.2d 670 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992).
In a similar case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the amendments to La.R.S. 22:1386(A) requiring claimants to exhaust remedies against a solvent UM insurer before proceeding against LIGA were substantive.
If the 1992 amendment is applied retroactively in the case sub judice, the plaintiff will lose previously vested substantive rights.
Habeney v. Bellow, 94-1600 (La. 10/28/94), 645 So.2d 624, 625.
The Supreme Court held that retroactive application of limitations on an insured's preexisting claims would unconstitutionally disturb the insured's vested rights.
The Rivards' cause of action, once accrued, became a vested property right. To apply the 1990 limitation to this 1983 accident would unconstitutionally, without due process of law, divest the Rivards of their property right which vested six years previously. This assignment of error is without merit.
USECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court committed reversible error in awarding excessive amounts for loss of consortium to each of the four plaintiff children.
The parties stipulated that the widow would testify that she loved her husband, that they had a good marriage, a good union, that Vincent loved his children and that she suffered economic losses as a result of his death as well as love and affection. They stipulated further that each child would testify that they loved their father and that they lost economic support as well as love and affection when he died, and that it affected or impacted their lives. The birth certificates introduced at trial show that at the time of Vincent's death Matthew was 11, Joseph was 9, Paul was 8 and David was 7. The plaintiffs' economist reported estimated loss of support capacity prior to trial of $165,523 and from trial of $265,894. LIGA did not offer contrary evidence. In addition to the $431,-417 economic loss, we note that four young boys will be without the care, nurture and affection of the most significant male in their lives, their father. Each child will enter adolescence and grow to maturity without the counsel and support of his father.
The trial court awarded the uncontrovert-ed economic loss, $431,417, together with $50,000 for Vincent's pain and suffering as he died in the inferno created by LIGA's insured. In addition, he awarded loss of consortium damages to the widow in the amount of $240,000, and to each of the Rivard sons in the amount of $190,000. LIGA was cast in judgment for these sums as proportionally reduced by application of the $500,000 policy limit.
|i3LIGA suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in making its awards for loss of consortium, citing Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976) and Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). We disagree.
Our initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries and their effects under the particular circumstances on the particular injured persons is a clear abuse of the "much discretion" of the trier of fact. Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959, 200 So.2d 127 (1967); Ballard v. National Indem. Co. of Omaha, Neb., 246 La. 963, 169 So.2d 64 (1964); Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149 (1963). Only after such a determination of an abuse of discretion is a resort to prior awards appropriate and then for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993) cert. den. — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994); Coco, supra; Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So.2d 278 (La.1974); Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 294 So.2d 803 (La.1974).
The standard for appellate review of general damage awards is difficult to express and is necessarily non-specific, and the requirement of an articulated basis for disturbing such awards gives little guidance as to what articulation suffices to justify modification of a generous or stingy award. Nevertheless, the theme that emerges from Gaspard through Coco and Reck to Youn is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiffs under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., supra.
| uThe awards to the decedent's four sons are not obviously the result of passion or prejudice, and they bear a reasonable relationship to the elements of the proved damages. While a rational trier of fact could have decided that a lower award would be more appropriate, we cannot conclude from the entirety of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court, that a rational trier of fact could not have fixed the awards of general damages at the level set by the trial judge or that this is one of those exceptional cases where such awards are so gross as to be contrary to right reason. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d at 1261; Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.1987).
The standard of review for damage awards requires a showing that the trier of fact abused the great discretion accorded in awarding damages. In effect, the award must be so high or so low in proportion to the injury that it "shocks the conscience." Moore v. Healthcare Elmwood, Inc., 582 So.2d 871 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991). Applying these principles to the record, we find the trial court's award to be amply supported. We find no abuse of the trial court's great, even vast discretion.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: The trial court committed reversible error in awarding judicial interest from the date of original judicial demand rather than from date of judicial demand against Ralph Tate and LIGA.
La.R.S. 13:4203 provides that legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand on all judgments sounding in damages, "ex delicto", which may be rendered by any of the courts. LIGA contends that judicial demand was not made on Transit Casualty until it was sued in its capacity as omnibus insurer of | iSPETCO's driver. We have already held that the amending petition alleging the driver's fault relates back to the plaintiffs' original petition. LIGA's predecessor was a named defendant as PETCO's insurer. In its answer, it alleged the driver's fault was the cause of plaintiffs' decedent's death. LIGA argues that interest should run from the date of judicial demand on Tate; however, Tate was never a named defendant; judicial demand has never been made on Tate. Transit Casualty was named as a defendant in the original suit. The supplemental petition at issue herein relates back to that original petition. We find nothing in the authorities cited by LIGA that would justify the interest limitation it seeks. LIGA relies on the lack of solidarity between Tate, PETCO, the City, the State and Frue-hauf, as it did in its exception of prescription. LIGA ignores the fact that Transit Casualty was itself an original defendant, albeit in a different capacity, and is solidarity liable with its omnibus insured driver. LIGA's third assignment of error likewise lacks merit.
CONCLUSION AND DECREE
Having found LIGA's exception of prescription and assignments of error to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
LOBRANO, J., dissents with reasons.
. Plaintiffs alleged the State was negligent in its construction, design and maintenance of the exit ramp. The State made no general appearance and was voluntarily dismissed. Plaintiffs alleged the City was negligent in its failure to prohibit trucks from using the entrance ramp. The City was dismissed with prejudice on a motion for summary judgment.
. Rivard v. Petroleum Transport Co., Inc., 571 So.2d 174, 175 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990).