Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. NEW YORK & H. R. CO. et al. v. BOARD OF TAXES et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-12-07
Citations: 67 N.Y.S. 241
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. NEW YORK & H. R. CO. et al. v. BOARD OF TAXES et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 67
Pages: 241–244

Head Matter:
(55 App. Div. 544.)
PEOPLE ex rel. NEW YORK & H. R. CO. et al. v. BOARD OF TAXES et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 7, 1900.)
Taxation—Illegal Assessment— Correction by Mandamus—Other Adequate Remedy.
Mandamus to strike an illegal assessment from the rolls will not He, as an adequate remedy by certiorari is afforded by Laws 1880, c. 269.
McLaughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Application for mandamus by the people, on the relation of the New York & Harlem Railroad Company and another, against the board of taxes and assessments and Thomas L. Feitner and others, commissioners. From an order granting a peremptory writ, respondents appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, McLAUGHLIN, and O’BRIEN, JJ.
James M. Ward, for appellants.
Ira A. Place, for respondents.

Opinion:
RUMSEY, J.
This writ was applied for to compel the tax com-' missioners of the city of New York to strike from the assessment rolls of that city what was said to be an illegal assessment against the property of the relators. In the year 1900 those commissioners assessed the New York & Harlem Railroad Company for that portion of their roadbed, substructures, superstructures, and lands lying in Park avenue between the FortyjSecond Street Depot, in the city of New York, and the northern boundaries of that city. In the same year the state board of tax commissioners made their assessment of the special franchise of the New York <fe Harlem Railroad Company, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 712 of the Laws of 1899. By the terms of that act the real estate of the company situate in the street was to be taxed as a part of the special franchise. That real estate consisted of "all railroad structures, substructures and superstructures, tracks and the iron thereon." Id. § B. So it will be seen that the assessment by the state board of tax commissioners of the special franchise included the same property which had been assessed by the city board of tax commissioners. The law of 1899 above referred to provided that the tangible property subject to the special franchise tax should only be taxable upon the assessment made by the state board of tax commissioners. Id. § 47. The relators claim that under the provisions of that section the commissioners of taxes of the city of New York had no power or jurisdiction to assess that part of their property included within the special franchise, and therefore that assessment was illegal and should "be stricken from the rolls. In making this claim they necessarily assume that the act of 1899 is constitutional, and not only prescribes the action of the state board of tax commissioners, but forbids action with respect to the same property by the city board. We shall assume for the purposes of this decision that that contention of the. relators is correct, and that the assessment by the defendants of their tangible property situated in Park avenue was forbidden by section 47 of that act, and that therefore that assessment was an illegal one, and the relators entitled in some way to be relieved from it,- had they taken proper steps to that end. Conceding this to be the case, the appellants, however, insist that the court should not have granted a writ of mandamus to strike the assessment from the rolls, but should have confined the relators to their remedy by certiorari, which is complete and adequate to give all the relief to which they are entitled; and they seek to have applied the rule that a writ of mandamus will not be granted where there is another plain, adequate, and sufficient remedy to correct the wrong which is sought to be cured by the .mandamus. Upon the assumption that this assessment was invalid, the relators had a plain and sufficient remedy, by certiorari, to correct it. People v. Feitner, 41 App. Div. 544, 58 N. Y. Supp. 648; Id., 44 App. Div. 239, 60 N. Y. Supp. 614. Upon the hearing of a writ of certiorari brought to correct an assessment, the court has jurisdiction to strike it from the rolls; and, if it should be illegal, it would undoubtedly be its duty so to do. There is nothing which could be accomplished by this peremptory writ which could not also be done by an order made upon a writ ' of certiorari. _ There is no reason, therefore, why the relators should be permitted to resort to a mandamus, and for that reason it should not have been granted. Id., 44 App. Div. 239, 60 N. Y. Supp. 614. It is quite true that there are in the books not a few cases in which the remedy sought by this writ has been granted to one who complains of an illegal assessment. These cases have been examined. With one exception, each of them arose before the passage of chapter 269 of the Laws of 1880, which granted a writ of certiorari to review an erroneous, illegal, or void assessment. Before the passage of that act no sufficient means had been provided to review and correct such assessments. It is quite true that a writ of certiorari would lie, directed to the assessors, but there was serious doubt whether upon the return of that writ any more could be done than to determine the jurisdiction of the assessors to act in the premises. People v. Delaney, 49 N. Y. 655; Same v. Betts, 55 N. Y. 600; Same v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. 173. It was difficult to obtain a writ of certiorari against the assessors after the roll had been completed, and before it had become their duty to deliver it to the supervisors; and the courts had held that after the roll had been delivered to the supervisors the power of the assessors over it had expired, and, however erroneous or illegal had been their action, the court was not at liberty to grant any judgment against them correcting the roll. People v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. 173; Same v. Reddy, 43 Barb. 539; Same v. Board of Assessors, 16 Hun, 407. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that a writ of certiorari afforded no sufficient remedy for an erroneous or illegal assessment; and, as no means had been provided by statute, the taxpayer was substantially without relief. It was while the law was in that condition that the courts were moved to grant writs of mandamus to strike from the rolls illegal assessments. People v. Assessors of Town of Barton, 44 Barb. 148; Same v. Olmsted, 45 Barb. 644. In the case of People v. Wilson, 119 N. Y. 515, 23 N. E. 1064, a writ of mandamus was granted to strike out an assessment for repaving levied upon the relator's property, which was outside of the district of assessment established by the board. But in that case it appeared that the 'statute in terms had required the assessors to rectify any error committed in the levying of the tax, where the error was entirely clerical," and it was held that the assessment of the relator's property, which lay outside the "district of assessment," having been done by mistake, was purely a clerical error, and the assessors might be compelled by mandamus to rectify it, as the statute required them to do. That case, therefore, is no authority in a case like this: The principle that a writ of mandamus will not be granted where the relator has a plain, adequate, and sufficient remedy at law to correct the grievance of which he complains is a wholesome one, and .one which is rarely, if ever, to be departed from. It was applied in this court in the case of People v. Feitner, 44 App. Biv. 239, 60 N. Y. Supp. 614, although in that case the relator had lost his remedy by certiorari because -of his failure to pursue it in time. There is a reason why the writ of certiorari should be resorted to, rather than mandamus, to correct an assessment. The court has much greater power in disposing of one of these cases which comes up by certiorari, and is not limited solely to striking out the assessment, but may correct it if the circumstances are such as to warrant anything of the kind.
For these reasons, we think that the court below should not have granted a mandamus in this case, but should have required the relators to resort to the remedy which the law gives them, by a writ of certiorari. The order granting the writ is therefore reversed, and. the motion denied, with $50 costs and disbursements.
YAH BRUNT, P. J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.