Case Name: MANALAPAN HOLDING CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HAMILTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1982-04-02
Citations: 184 N.J. Super. 99
Docket Number: 
Parties: MANALAPAN HOLDING CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HAMILTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 184
Pages: 99–123

Head Matter:
MANALAPAN HOLDING CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HAMILTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued February 17, 1982
Decided April 2, 1982.
Before Judges MATTHEWS, PRESSLER and PETRELLA.
William C. Baggitt, III, argued the cause for the appellant.
Douglas K. Wolfson argued the cause for the respondent (Greenbaum, Greenbaum, Rowe & Smith, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the majority was delivered by
PRESSLER, J. A. D.
This is an action in lieu of prerogative writs. Defendant Planning Board of Township of Hamilton appeals from a summary judgment declaring the preliminary subdivision application filed by plaintiff Manalapan Holding Co., Inc. (developer) approved pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(c). The issue raised by this appeal raises important questions concerning the construction of that statute and its relationship to N.J.S.A. 40:27-6.3.
Plaintiff is a land developer owning a parcel of land some 45 acres in size in Hamilton Township, which it proposes to develop for single-family residential use. In April 1980 it submitted a sketch plat to the township's land use coordinator, who referred it for review and classification to the township's Development Review Advisory Board (DRAB). DRAB, a committee established by the township's land development ordinances, consisted of five voting members, three of whom are members of the planning board and two are members of the board of adjustment. In addition, those municipal officials whose duties implicate land development are designated as nonvoting members of DRAB. These officials include the township engineer, planner, health officer, land use coordinator, construction official, environmental commission chairman and administrative officer. The functions assigned to DRAB by the ordinance include review of development applications for compliance with ordinance provisions, recommendation for classification of all applications, determination of required planning board and board of adjustment action, discussion with applicants of the technical aspects of the proposed plat, and recommendation of ultimate action to the planning board and board of adjustment.
DRAB considered plaintiff's sketch plat on April 23, 1980 and classified the proposed development as a major subdivision. The minutes of that meeting further indicate DRAB's view of the general acceptability of the plan subject, however, to some specific recommendations regarding sewering and road alignments and locations. It was further then noted that county approval would be required for the proposed storm drainage detention basin.
Plaintiff proceeded accordingly and on June 30, 1980 submitted its formal application for preliminary major subdivision approval to the planning board, which in turn referred it to DRAB. On July 23, 1980 DRAB considered the application, together with memoranda thereon submitted by the engineering and planning departments, and voted unanimously to deem the application complete and to forward it to the planning board for public hearing and consequent action. The minutes of that meeting of DRAB also note the necessity for ultimate county approval of the retention basin as well as sewer capacity approval from the sewer department. It further appears that plaintiff, on the same day it submitted its application to the planning board, also submitted appropriate applications to the Mercer County Planning Board and the New Jersey Division of Water Pollution Control.
The planning board scheduled a public hearing on the application for August 7,1980. Plaintiff's representatives were present at that meeting and ready to proceed. There were, however, a number of other items on the board's agenda, and in view of its policy of adjourning at 11:30 p. m., it became evident that consideration of this application would not be reached. Accordingly, plaintiff's representative asked that the matter be carried to the next planning board meeting and that it then be accorded a preference status on the agenda. The next scheduled hearing of the planning board was September 11, 1980. Prior to this date, however, the county planning board had apparently advised the township's land use coordinator that while it generally approved the preliminary subdivision application, it nevertheless was insisting upon provision of an on-site storm water detention facility, and accordingly it had approved the application subject to that requirement. The county board further advised that it would not grant final approval until it had reviewed and approved the plans and calculations for such a facility.
Apparently as a result of this advisory statement from the county planning board, the township planning board decided not to go forward with the scheduled September 11 hearing. While the record is not altogether clear as to how that decision was reached and communicated, the minutes of the planning board for that meeting make clear that the cancellation of the hearing on the application had preceded the convening of the meeting, and the certification of plaintiff's general counsel and vice-president submitted to the trial court alleges that
Representatives of the Township had previously informed us of their policy of not proceeding with applications for development until such time as county approval had been received. Presumably in accordance with that policy, representatives of the Township Planning Board contacted me and informed me that the application would not be heard at the September 11, 1980, planning board meeting. Our application for development was in fact taken off the agenda.
On October 7,1980 plaintiff submitted to the planning board a revision of the plan which accorded with the county planning board requirements and with some apparently routine recommendations previously made by the land use coordinator respecting corner lot lines and storm sewer alignment. The planning board's next regular meeting was October 16, 1980. Although hearing on plaintiff's application had not been scheduled for this meeting, a resolution was then adopted fixing October 30, 1980 as the date of a special meeting for hearing thereon. On Octobér 24, 1980 the planning board secretary, on instruction from the land use coordinator, telephoned plaintiff's representative requesting consent to an extension of the statutory time period. Such consent was not, however, given. Plaintiff then delivered a letter to the planning board on October 30, 1980, advising that the 95-day time period, prescribed by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(c) had expired on October 26, 1980, and accordingly its application was required to be deemed approved. The letter further pointed out that
The plans have been reviewed by your professional staff and has received favorable review. Therefore we do not feel that approval of these plans is detrimental to the Township and will not cause any harm to the public. We look forward to proceeding toward final approval at a later date.
The response of the planning board was to adopt a resolution at the October 30, 1980 meeting providing that "no plans for final approval will be accepted unless and until they provide us with the information requested and unless and until they submit themselves to a public hearing for preliminary approval." Accordingly, plaintiff instituted this action seeking a declaration of its rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D~48(c). The trial court ultimately determined on summary judgment motion that the statutory time period had expired and hence that plaintiff's preliminary subdivision application was entitled to be deemed approved. The planning board appeals.
The sole question before us is whether the trial judge properly determined that the statutory 95-day period had expired prior to October 30, 1980. We are satisfied that this determination was correct.
N.J.S.A. 40:55D 48 governs the procedure for preliminary major subdivision approval. Subparagraph (a), after requiring the local ordinance to state with reasonable specificity the information required to be submitted by a developer on his subdivision application, then requires that
If the application for development is found to lie incomplete, the developer shall be notified in writing of the deficiencies therein by the board or the board's designee for the determination of completeness within 45 days of submission of such application or it shall be deemed to be properly submitted.
Subparagraph (b) of N.J.S.A. 40:551) 48 requires the submission of an amended application and a new proceeding in the event the planning board, after public hearing, requires substantial amendment in the layout of improvements. It further stipulates that if the proposed sulxlivision complies with the local ordinance and the applicable provisions of state statute, the planning board is obliged to grant preliminary subdivision approval. Finally, subparagraph (c) provides, in relevant part, that
Upon the submission of a complete application for a subdivision of more than 10 lots, the planning board shall grant or deny preliminary approval within 95 days of the date of such submission or within such further °time as may be consented to by the developer. Otherwise, the planning board shall be deemed to have granted preliminary approval to the subdivision.
Finally, the definitional section of the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq., defines a "complete application" as
. an application form completed as specified by ordinance and the rules and regulations of the municipal agency, and all accompanying documents required by ordinance for approval of the application for development, including where applicable, but not limited to, a site plan or subdivision plat; provided that the municipal agency may require such additional information not specified in the ordinance, or any revisions in the accompanying documents, as are reasonably necessary to make an informed decision as to whether the requirements necessary for approval of the application for development have been met. The application shall not be deemed incomplete for lack of any such additional information or any revisions in the accompanying documents so required by the municipal agency. An application shall be certified as complete immediately upon the meeting of all requirements specified in the ordinance and in the rules and regulations of the municipal agency, and shall be deemed complete as of the date it is so certified by the administrative officer for purposes of the commencement of the time period for action by the municipal agency. [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3]
We are persuaded that pursuant to this statutory scheme, plaintiff's application must be deemed to have been complete no later than July 23, 1980. Not only was plaintiff never advised of any deficiencies in its application vis-á-vis local ordinance requirements but it was expressly advised on July 23, 1980 by the "Board's designee for the determination of completeness" that its application was complete. Consequently, the 95-day period expired on October 26, 1980. Since the planning board had taken no action by that date, the statutory approval mechanism was triggered. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g). And see Gridco, Inc. v. Hillside Tp. Zoning Bd., 167 N.J.Super. 348, 352-353 (Law Div.1979); Aurentz v. Little Egg Harbor Tp. Planning Bd., 171 N.J.Super. 135 (Law Div.1979).
It is the planning board's contention that the application could not be deemed complete until plaintiff had acquired county planning board approval of its storm water detention facility. In our view, this argument misconceives the relationship between municipal and county land development functions. As we read N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(a) in the light of the definitional provision above quoted, we conclude that the completeness of a municipal land development application must be measured by the requirements of local ordinance. We are aware that in respect of particular land developments, approval by other governmental agencies may be required in respect of specific aspects of the project at some point in the planning or construction stage. But these are aspects of the project over which those other governmental agencies have jurisdiction and that jurisdiction, while complementary to municipal jurisdiction, may nevertheless not be indirectly abrogated by the municipality in its preliminary subdivision procedures. We do not address the question of whether a municipality could provide in its subdivision ordinance that a subdivision application will not be deemed complete until the developer submits those other required governmental approvals which are relevant to that planning stage of the project. The simple fact here remains that this township's ordinance did not so require, and it is only information required by the ordinance that can be insisted upon for a completeness determination.
The planning board further argues that the time provisions prescribed by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(c) must be regarded as modified by the earlier legislative enactment of N.J.S.A. 40:27 - 6.3. That section provides in relevant part that
Each subdivision application shall be submitted to the county planning board for review and, where required, approval prior to approval by the local municipal approving authority. County approval of any subdivision application affecting county road or drainage facilities shall be limited by and based upon the rules, regulations and standards established by and duly set forth in a resolution adopted by the board of chosen freeholders. The municipal approval authority shall either defer taking final action on a subdivision application until receipt of the county planning board report thereon or approve the subdivision application subject to its timely receipt of a favorable report thereon by the county planning board.
We are, however, satisfied that the deferral option accorded to a municipality by this provision pending required county planning board approval has itself been implicitly repealed by the Municipal Land Use Law.
We note first that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37(c) provides that "the municipal planning board shall condition any approval that it grants upon timely receipt of a favorable report on the application by the county planning board or approval by the county planning board by its failure to report thereon within the entire time."
It is evident that the statutory approval mechanisms of the Municipal Land Use Act were intended to preclude the practices to which municipalities theretofore resorted to endlessly protract final determination of land development applications with the consequent result of undue harassment of developers and substantial economic prejudice to their legitimate development plans. The automatic statutory approval was, therefore, designed to encourage prompt consideration and disposition of applications for the advancement of the interests of both the developers and the public. See, generally, Levin v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 82 N.J. 174, 179 (1980). And see Lizak v. Faria, 180 N.J.Super. 248 (Ch.Div.1981); Burcam Corp. v. Medford Tp. Planning Bd., 160 N.J.Super. 258 (Law Div.1978), aff'd as modified 168 N.J.Super. 508 (App.Div.1979). It is in view of this essential purpose that the complex of land use statutes must be construed. In our view, it would abrogate the intention of the automatic approval provisions of the statutes which explicitly require the municipal agency to take action within a prescribed time if they were construed to permit the municipal agency unilaterally to extend the statutory time period by deferring action. We, therefore, regard N.J.S.A. 40:55D-37(c) and N.J. S.A. 40:55D-48(c), construed in pari materia, as controlling and as having by implication repealed any inconsistent provision of N.J.S.A. 40:27-6.3. Accordingly, a municipality may conditionally approve a preliminary subdivision application pending county approval. It may also, of course, deny approval. But it may not defer action if the consequence of the deferral is the Unilateral extension of the 95-day statutory period.
The planning board further argues, and our dissenting colleague agrees, that plaintiff's actions in respect of the scheduled August 7 meeting somehow operated to extend the statutory time period. The contention seems to be that plaintiff either consented in advance to an extension of the statutory time or agreed to a tolling of the time by asking that the matter be carried over. In our view, neither consequence may be fairly ascribed to that event. It is perfectly clear that at the August meeting it became obvious that, by reason of time constraints and the press of other business, plaintiff's application would not be reached. Rather than waiting until 11:30 p. m. for the inevitable adjournment, its representative sensibly requested a preference rescheduling. At that point, most of the 95-day period remained and timely rescheduling of the hearing posed no problem to either side. To infer from these circumstances, particularly in view of the actual rescheduling then arranged for, that this unexceptionable course of conduct in any way affected the statutory time period is contrary to common sense and the obvious import of the situation. We are, furthermore, satisfied that the planning board itself did not then regard the adjournment as having any such consequence. Rather, it made clear by its consequent rescheduling of the hearing for September 11, 1980, and its cancellation thereof, that irrespective of plaintiff's view of the matter, it did not in any event intend to proceed with the application until compliance with its unjustified demand that county approval of the storm water detention facility first be obtained. We are, moreover, persuaded that a fair and contextual scrutiny of the record does not reasonably support any other interpretation of the events of August 7 and thereafter.
Finally, the planning board argues that despite the completeness resolution of July 23, 1980, and despite its failure to have advised plaintiff in writing of any deficiencies vis-á-vis its own land use ordinances, plaintiff's application was not complete until October 7, 1980, when it submitted a revision of its plan in accordance with the county's requirements. Considering the definition of completeness above quoted in light of the operative facts, we are constrained to disagree. If the October submission had any effect at all, it would have been to permit the planning board to give final rather than conditional approval to the application. Plaintiff's right to definitive planning board action was triggered by the July 23, 1980 completeness determination and could not thereafter be adversely affected by proof of compliance with the requirements of other governmental agencies. We also regard N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(b) as inapposite in this respect. First, that section speaks only to a substantial amendment of the plan, and there is no suggestion here that the revisions of October 7, 1980 constituted a substantial amendment. Indeed, the only proofs in the record are to the contrary. More significantly, however, the provision addresses only such amendments as are required by the planning board itself as a result of and subsequent to hearing. Since there was no hearing here, the provision obviously does not apply.
We are further constrained to note that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the proposed subdivision failed in any respect to comply with all municipal land use requirements applicable to that developmental phase. Again, the contrary is true. Thus, if N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48(b) is applicable at all, its applicable provision is the mandate that subdivision approval be granted to such complying applications. We are hence satisfied that the invocation of the automatic approval provision of the statute does not in any way prejudice the public interest here.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.