Case Name: Succession of Josephine Hale Ames, Wife of Hugh O. Ames. On Opposition to Tableau. H. O. Ames, Executor, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1881-11
Citations: 33 La. Ann. 1317
Docket Number: No. 8022
Parties: Succession of Josephine Hale Ames, Wife of Hugh O. Ames. On Opposition to Tableau. H. O. Ames, Executor, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 1317–1332

Head Matter:
No. 8022.
Succession of Josephine Hale Ames, Wife of Hugh O. Ames. On Opposition to Tableau. H. O. Ames, Executor, Appellant.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Differently from an Administrator, a testamentary Executor can appeal officially as Executor, from a judgment rendered against liim and in favor of the succession.
On the Merits.
The Opponents, beiDg both forced heirs and assignees of some particular legatees, have the right to contest all the debts and charges on the Tableau, and are not limited to the contestation of such only as affect their legitime.
An Executor is not entitled to favor in the assertion of merely technical pleas tending to exclude from judicial determination questions affecting the lawful distribution of the estate administered by him.
The rule of exclusion of the husband’s testimony against his wife, C. O. 2281', applies only during the existence of the marriage. This question is settled by previous decisions.
The husband cannot claim from the estate of his deceased wife, payment of a contract formed between her and him during marriage.
Demand of delivery or payment of a special legacy, to entitle the legacy to interest, is expressly dispensed with when the legatee is himself the Executor. C. 0.1628-30.*
The husband is not entitled against his deceased wife’s estate to remuneration for services rendered to her during marriage.
A disguised donation'from the wife'to the husband,- is not reducible to the disposable portion, but is absolutely null and void.
APPEAL- from the Civil District. Court for the parish of Orleans. Tissot, J.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Hudson & Fearn for the Appellees:
It is only where a judgment is rendered by which a succession can he aggrieved, that a succession representative can, in his official capacity, appeal from the same.
Wliere the judgment disallows a claim placed on the tableau as due to the executor personally, he should appeal in his personal capacity and, failing to do so, tbe costs of appeal taken by him in his official capacity should not he paid by the succession.
Creditors, whoso claims have been disallowed, cannot make themselves parties to tbe appeal without taking an appeal in their own names and giving bond.
D. C. & L. L. Labait for the Appellant:
First — “The right of appeal is constitutional and will not be dismissed unless appellees are clearly entitled to dismissal,”
Second — Tbe authorities in relation to the right of appeal by syndics and administrators do not apply to testamentary executors, because tbe latter represent tbe will of tbe testator and are bound faithfully to carry out bis desires, while tbe former are mere stakeholders and have no interest to disturb the order of payment made by tbe court; parties aggrieved have their right of appeal individually.
Third — The will of a testatoris the law to govern a testamentary executor, and the succession is aggrieved by a decision which in effect annuls a provision of the will and diverts a part of the estate to a different party from those named by tbe testator, and deprives the executor of the power of executing it as therein directed.
Fourth — Á1L parties interested, if not appellants are appellees, when by motion and bond filed tbe court grants the appeal.
On the Merits.
Hudson & Fearn for Opponents and Appellees:
When parties who are forced heirs, and also the transferees of the residuary legatees, describe themselves individually by name, and as forced heirs, in an opposition to the executor’s account, praying for all “general and equitable relief,” and evidence is reoeived without objection, to show th'eir character as transferees of the residuary legatees, the law, pleadings and proof justify a judgment in accordance therewith, dismissing an exception to their want of capacity. 14 An. 864.
Such a judgment dismissing the exception is fully sustained, when the evidence received without objection shows that the exceptor had full knowledge, personally and by participation in judicial proceedings of record, of the possession of the two capacities by the opponents, and had dealt with them judicially as such. For the object of pleading is notice, to prevent surprise, and to enable tbe party to meet tbe issue tendered. C. M. 650; 4 ÍT. S. 280; 7 ÍT. S. 354 ; 17 X. 238; 5 An. 531, 673 ; 23 An. 676.
Tbe executor, v?hen ho presents his account and tableau, is simply a plaintiff against all the world having an interest to oppose it. Opponents are defendants, and their oppositions are in the nature of answers, requiring no special allegations to authorize the introduction of evidence tending to disprove the correctness of the account. 28 An. 607; 29 An. 521; 30 An. 270; 10 An. 80.
Forced heirs, as such, have an interest to oppose all debts placed on the tableau, when not due or prescribed; for all such debts tend to diminish their legitime, which is measured, not to the entire estate without reference to its debts, but to a quantum fixed after deducting all the debts. 28 An. 607; 32 An. 303, State ex rel. Ames, Executor, vs. Judge of Second District Court.
Residuary legatees, or their transferees, have also an interest to oppose debts placed on the tableau, when not due or prescribed; for all such pretended debts directly tend to diminish the residuum of the estate coming to them under the will.
When the evidence shows that a claim in favor of the executor, individually, rests exclusively on his testimony to show a contract between his deceased wife, the testatrix, to pay him for services to another, the claim must be refected, because of the incapacity of husband and wife to make such a contract, and also, because the promise to pay the debt of another must be in writing, C. C. article 2278, -ÍTo. 3; C. C. 2446; 2 An. 484; 1 R. 219 ; 6 L. 349 ; 6 R. 276 ; 1 An. 303 ; 4 An. 71.
A wife, having children by a former marriage, who contracts a .second marriage, is incapable, in law, of giving by testament to her husband, more, in any case, than the usufruct of one-fifth of her estate. Any disguised donation made to the husband of property in full ownership is absolutely and radically null and void. C. O. articles 1752,1754 ; 2 An. 42; 15 An. 287.
Such disguised donations, being fraud on the law and contrary to public order and morals, is so absolutely null, that it will be treated as non scripium; and the nullity of the donation may be invoked both by forced heirs and any other parties in interest, as the residuary ' legatees or their transferees. C. C. article 1519; 15 An.-600; 16 An. 245.
D. C. & L. L, Labatt for the Executor, Appellant:
First — An opposition by forced heirs is not the proper form of proceeding to assail the administration of their ancestor’s succession. It can only be done where injury is alleged and proven, and by petition and citation.in a direct action.
Second — Parties appearing as litigants, asserting rights flowing from a capacity disclosed under special allegations, and with a prayer for general relief, cannot be relieved from laches or neglect, in failing to set up other rights not disclosed, so as to evade the consequences of a final homologation of an account never opposed by and binding upon them, as to those rights.
Third — Where the machinery for asserting legal right? are disregarded, and parties mistake the remedies to which they are entitled and are concluded by solemn adjudication of a competent court, they cannot, in another form, require the courts to relieve them from • the consequences of their own errors or mistakes.
Fourth — A remunerative donation by one of the spouses in the last will, the payment of which is taken out of the disposable portion, is not within the prohibition against giving or bequeathing more than a usufruct of one-fifth to the surviving spouse. See 2 Rob., p. —.
Forced heirs are nothing more than creditors of their ancestors’ succession, and if there is ample to pay them, are without legal interest to maintain a suit to annul, or to oppose an account or final tableau. Rachel vs. Rachel, 4th An. 501; 8 An. 21.
The acquisition by forced heirs of the title of residuary legatees to the residuum, after full administration, confers no greater or other rights than those from whom they acquired.
The prayer for general relief, applicable to particular pleadings, as forced heirs, cannot be interpreted to permit the presentation of other rights, derived from other parties, so as to open a final judgment of homologation and evade the consequences of the law as to such transferrors. 4 An. 216.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Bermudez, C. J.
A motion to dismiss the appeal taken by the executor of the deceased, is made by her forced heirs, on the ground : "that the judgment appealed from is one in favor of the succession, which is benefited and not aggrieved thereby, and that said executor cannot be permitted to use his official capacity for his individual advantage when he only is the one aggrieved by the judgment."
The executor claims that the judgment affects not only himself, but also three other parties, a creditor and two legatees, and insists that he has a right to appeal from the judgment, both as concerns himself and those parties, in his official capacity and for their common good.
The authorities relied upon by the movers, 19 L. 278, 11 An. 177,12 An. 774, 82 An. 889, can receive no application in the case before us. It is evident from the very terms of the motion to dismiss, that it is based mainly on the ease in 32d A. R., in which the language used by the movers was employed by the Court.
The duties and rights of executors are in this respect different from those of administrators of successions.
The appointment of an executor by a testator is a mandate, anomalous in this, that it begins when other mandates, intended to be exercised at a different time, terminate; i. e., at the death of the principal. Marcadé; vol. 3, p. 104; Art. C. N. 1025. When it is accepted, it is a contract binding on the conscience of the executor, the effect of which he is not lightly to disregard. Mourlon, vol. 2, p. 444 (5); Art. 1034, C. N; Coin Delisle, p. 487, No. 11. By such an appointment, the testator constitutes the executor a mediator between the various parties who may have an interest in his succession, whether under the will, or under the law. Duranton, No. 390. The instructions of the principal to his agent in such a case are peremptory, when their execution infringes no prohibitory law. They generally are : You shall pay my debts, as well those existing before, as those arising after, my death. You shall next pay or satisfy my special legatees, and, otherwise, carry out my intentions. You shall next and last, deliver the residue of my estate to such person or persons as it accrues to, under my will, or under the law, or both.
The executor who has the seisin, represents the active and passive mass of the succession, all the assets, all the liabilities, the entire residue. Where he happens to be a creditor, a legatee, he represents himself as such, officially, as effectually as he is authorized to represent others similarly situated. His trust of executor, of confidential agent and mandatory, charged with the execution of the sacred behests of the departed one, and to be held as such as long as they contravene no prohibitory law, — derives from the testator and not from the law, and cannot place him in duriori casu. He cannot be required to distinguish himself, as a creditor, as a legatee, from himself, as an executor, 3 An. 174, representing as he does all the creditors, all the legatees, and eventually the heirs, be they legal or testamentary. Coin Delisle D. & T. p. 486, No. 3; Merlin Rep. Vo. Ex. Test. No. 2; Grenier, No. 327; Toullier, No. 577; Duranton, No. 390, 392; Dalloz, ch. 8, Sec. 1, No. 1; Ricard, part 2, No. 66; Pothier, Disp. Test. Art. 2, ch. 5, p. 360; Furgóle, Nos. 20, 21, 23; C. N. 1025; R. C. C. 1658, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1672; C. P. 123; 3 An. 172; 10 R. 194; 1 An. 92; 4 An. 571; 7 L. 389; 26 An. 312; 23 An. 369; 12 An. 611.
It is & personal mandate, intransmissible in principle, but which, under special legislation in this State, can be, in certain cases, provisionally delegated. R. S. 2349. The powers which are conferred upon him, even where the heirs have taken away from him the seisin of the estate, by furnishing him funds to pay the debts and legacies, continue and last during all the time which is necessary to ¡wind up the estate and to execute the will of the deceased, which is to him, the law. Bicat testator et exit lex. O. P. 123 ; R. C. 0.1658,1676,1680,1673; O. N. 1051; R. S. 1471.
He gives no security, but can be required to do so, not only by the creditors of the deceased, or of his succession, by persons claiming property in kind, found among the assets of the succession, but also by the forced heirs of the deceased, when their legitime may be affected. R. C. G. 1677-, 1673; Succession Turnell, and authorities there cited. 32 An. 1218.
The functions of administrators are not at all of the same origin and of the same duration as those of executors. They are conferred by law and are restricted to a liquidation of the estate, and to the application of its funds to the payment of its creditors. That result once accomplished, their duties are at an end; they turn over to the heirs of the deceased what may remain in their hands, after payment of the liabilities. They do not represent the mass of the succession; they have no mandate of the deceased to execute. Where they are individually concerned as creditors, and their claims are not admitted, the authorities are that, if they appeal, they must do so in their individual capacity. This case in the 32d An. p. 889, was one of that description. Code Practice 123.
Upon a motion to dismiss, which involves the right of an executor to appeal from a judgment which modifies an account of his administration, we' cannot be expected, particularly in a case the transcript of which contains no less than 823 pages, to go behind the motion of appeal and inquire into the correctness of the judgment complained of, in order to ascertain the effect of such an appeal. It may, however, happen that, on the trial of the case on its merits, if we find that the executor should not have been permitted to appeal as he has done, we may summarily dispose of the case. As at present advised, and in a succession in which the assets have been appraised at more than $150,000, we do not feel authorized to dismiss the appeal. 26 An. 312; 1 An. 414; 2 An. 387; 4 An. 534.
It is, therefore, ordered that the motion to dismiss herein be accordingly overruled.