Case Name: Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1974-06-21
Citations: 228 Pa. Super. 364
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 65
Parties: Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
Judges: Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 228
Pages: 364–371

Head Matter:
Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
Submitted March 11, 1974.
Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Philip D. Freedman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Marion E. MacIntyre, Deputy District Attorney, and LeRoy S. Zimmerman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
June 21, 1974:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.,
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant-appellant's Motions for a New Trial and In Arrest of Judgment based on a claim of newly discovered evidence.
Appellant was convicted at a trial by jury, of four (4) counts of robbery. At the trial, evidence was presented from which the jury was clearly justified in finding that appellant had in fact committed the robbery. Defendant chose not to take the stand, but did present testimony from a cousin and from his mother. From this testimony, the jury could have inferred that appellant was at home in bed at the time of the commission of the crime.
Some weeks after the filing of his Motions, and in support of them, appellant presented as a supplemental reason, an affidavit from his brother, Donald Johnson, in which Donald stated that he, and not appellant, had committed the robbery. Pursuant to the post-trial motions the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing at which Donald testified under oath that he had committed the robbery. The lower court denied appellant's motions. The issue before this court is whether the "confession" by Donald Johnson is after-discovered evidence which should entitle appellant to a new trial.
"In order to justify the grant of a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, the evidence must have been discovered after the trial and must be such that it could not have been obtained at the trial by reasonable diligence, must not be cumulative or merely impeach credibility, and must be such as would likely compel a different result: Hagopian v. Eskandarian, 396 Pa. 401, 407, 408, 153 A. 2d 897 (1959); Commonwealth v. Clanton, 395 Pa. 521, 526, 151 A. 2d 88 (1959); Commonwealth v. Green, 358 Pa. 192, 199, 56 A. 2d 95 (1948)." Commonwealth v. Schuck, 401 Pa. 222, 229, 164 A. 2d 13, 17 (1960), cert. den., 368 U.S. 884, 7 L. Ed. 2d 188, 82 S. Ct. 138. Clearly, the last two requirements of Bchuch are met in this case — the evidence is not cumulative, does not merely impeach credibility, and tlie confession (if believed) would likely have compelled a different result (i.e., acquittal of appellant). Was the evidence actually discovered after the trial however, and was the evidence such that with reasonable diligence it could have been brought out at the trial?
In Commonwealth v. Hayward, 437 Pa. 215, 263 A. 2d 330 (1970), the testimony of defendant's mother revealed that three other people were allegedly in defendant's presence at the time of the crime in a city other than the one in which the crime was committed. None of these three witnesses were called by defendant. After the trial, counsel for the appellant presented affidavits of these three witnesses in an attempt to gain a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence. The Supreme Court said: "We agree with the post-trial motion court that this is not after-discovered evidence, since the identities of these witnesses were known at trial if not before." (At page 217)
In Commonwealth v. Foerst, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 111, 53 A. 2d 847 (1947), this court denied appellant's motion for a new trial where, after conviction for assault and battery at a trial in which the accused had been positively identified, appellant averred that the crime had been committed by four men known to him. Appellant had failed to identify these men because of an alleged professional relationship with them, and the court therefore concluded that "The appellant had his day in court and a fair trial. If he chose to withhold information or evidence — in his possession at the time of trial — which might have resulted in his acquittal, he cannot be heard to complain after a jury has convicted him____" (At 113-114)
In the case before this court, appellant knew of his brother's "confession" before trial and failed or refused to call to the stand a witness known to him, whose testimony might have resulted in an acquittal for appellant. Appellant's contention that the evidence — the confession by Ms brother — was discovered after the trial, is untenable.
As to the second requirement of Schuck, the record indicates that appellant failed to use reasonable diligence to introduce the evidence at trial. Appellant should have called Ms brother as a witness at the trial. From the fact that Donald "confessed" to William, we might conclude that Donald would not have refused to testify if called as a witness. Even if Donald had taken the stand and claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, the jury would have had an opportunity to observe the resemblance, such as there was between Donald and William, and sufficient doubt might have been raised in the jurors' minds that they wouldn't have convicted William. Appellant had the duty to bring forth any evidence in Ms behalf. Not only did appellant fail to use reasonable diligence to bring forth this evidence, but his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that appellant actively sought to repress such evidence. When questioned about Ms reaction to his brother's pre-trial confession to him appellant testified: "I told him, don't worry about it. I'll see what they do in court".
In further support of our decision, we note that in the trial in cMef four (4) witnesses, some of whom knew the defendant, positively identified him. In addition, we might also note that Donald Johnson testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had been wearing a beard at the time of the robbery. The testimony of the victims of the robbery was that the person who took their valuables did not have a beard. The judge at the hearing was certainly justified in discrediting Donald's testimony, and in denying appellant's motions ; Therefore, tMs court will not set aside the order denying those motions. Commonwealth v. Foerst, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 111 (1947).
As the trial judge stated in his opinion denying appellant's Motions for a New Trial and In Arrest of Judgment, appellant would "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds". This court will not sanction such duplicity.
The order of the court below is affirmed.