Case Name: John Burke for the use of Thomas Harrison against Richard Allen
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1802-03
Citations: 3 Yeates 351
Docket Number: 
Parties: *John Burke for the use of Thomas Harrison against Richard Allen.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Yeates)
Volume: 3
Pages: 350–362

Head Matter:
*John Burke for the use of Thomas Harrison against Richard Allen.
B. mortgages land to K., and the same not being recorded in six months, sells the same land to A. and receives a bond in part payment, and then assigns over the bond informally to H. Á. does not record his deed in six months, and K’s. mortgage is first recorded, which was the first notice either to A. or H. of the mortgage. •Adjudged that the mortgage cannot be set up as a defence against the equitable as-signee of the bond. Alitsr as to B. the obligee.
This suit was tried at bar last September term. It was debt on a bend dated 23d April 1796, conditioned for the pay ment of 337I. 10s. in six several instalments, which was informally assigned to Harrison, on some day previous to the 21st January 1797, and whereon the assignee had received from the obligor 50 dollars on the 2d February, and 150 dollars on the 24th April 1797. It was given in part consideration of certain lands sold and conveyed to Allen by Burke on the same 23d April 1796, but the deed for the premises was not recorded until the 12th February 1798.
But prior to this date, on the 8th October 1795, Burke had mortgaged the premises to Elizabeth Kintzing, to secure the payment of 200I. and interest, which mortgage was recorded on the 25th January 1798.
Neither Allen nor Harrison knew of the mortgage until the recording thereof, which gave them constructive notice thereof.
It was agreed on the trial, that a verdict should pass for the plaintiff for the penalty, subject to the court’s opinion, on the following reserved point: Whether the plaintiff is entitled against the defendant to recover the whole amount of the bond on which the suit is brought; or, whether the mortgage to Elizabeth Kintzing shall be deducted if less ; and if the said mortgage exceeds the balance due on the said bond, whether the same is not a good defence against the plaintiffs’ demand ? If the court’s opinion shall be in favour of the plaintiff, then judgment to be entered for him ; but, if otherwise, then a judgment of nonsuit to be entered.
The point reserved was fully argued by Messrs. Hallowell and Condy for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Ingersoll and T. Ross for the defendant, last December term.
The counsel for the plaintiff urged, that the real parties in' the present suit were Harrison and Allen; Kintzing had been since called in, and all the parties were now before the court, as on a bill of interpleader before the chancellor. If the contest was merely between Burke and Allen, there is no doubt but the latter would prevail; but Harrison and Kintzing were equitable claimants without legal rights. An interference of interests took place upon the assignment of the bond. When Allen purchased the premises, above six months had elapsed after the date of the £ 1 ^mortgage which was unrecorded, and therefore being 35 J ignorant thereof, he took the lands unincumbered. He had made two payments to Harrison, and thereby acknowledged the debt. Nothing ex post facto could revive the incumbrance. But it will be relied on, that the mortgage was entered of record eighteen days before the defendant’s deed. This we contend is of no avail. The act of 28th May 1715, 1 St. Laws 112, fully provides for the cases of mortgages, which remaining unrecorded for six months, are utterly void as to third persons. The act of 18th March 1775, only respects absolute conveyances, and not mortgages. Under the former the possession is changed, but not under the latter, The words of the ist section, 1 St, Laws 703, “ all deeds and conveyances; &c. whereby the same “may be any way affected in law or equity/’ See., may be satisfied, by referring them to articles of agreement. The defendant’s deed is within that law, and being unrecorded for six months, would be void against subsequent deeds and mortgages without notice. This case is distinguishable from Levinz v. Will, 1 Dali. 434. To give the mortgage operation would materially injure an honest assignee, who is entitled to recover what appears on the face of the bond to be due at the time of the assignment. Ib. 28. Here Harrison expended his money on the credit of Allen, but Kintzing gave credit to Burke for two years and three- months, to the detriment of innocent persons. She disregarded a duty which the law called on her to discharge, and must abide by the consequences. The claims of creditors shall not prevail against the equity of the wife, to have a settlement made on her, at least adequate to her fortune. 2 Atky. 417. Nor the assignees of the husband, he being a bankrupt. 1 Wms. 382, 459. Cox’s note. But if the husband assign the fund for a valuable consideration, the assignee shall hold it discharged of the equity in favour of the wife. 2 Vern. 270. 1 Fonbla. 90.
The defendant’s counsel contended, that he was entitled to defaulk the mortgage/at the time of the bonds being assigned. 1 St. Laws 65. 1 Dali. 28. What ought not to be paid shall be considered as paid. Ib. 257. An assignment is in fact no more than an agreement that the assignee shall have the same benefit in the thing assigned, as the original party. The as-signee must take it, subject to all its equity. Doug. 614. 10 Mod. 450. 2 Vern. 692. The assignees of a bankrupt stand in the same situation as the bankrupt where there has been no collusion. 1 Atky. 160. 2 Term Rep. 462. Though the words of the recording act of 1715, are very strong, that mortgages shall be of no effect unless recorded within six months, yet it was determined in Levinz v. *Will already cited, that though r* not recorded in due time, they may be available against L the mortgagors, and their creditors. But the words of that act are, “ no deed or mortgage, or defeasible deed in the nature of “mortgages, shall be good or sufficient, &c. unless,” &c. Now these expressions will equally include the deed to Allen, ás the mortgage to Kintzing. If however the construction which has been said to have obtained of that law, should confine the clause to mortgages alone, still the act of 1775 comprehends the case of a mortgage equally as a deed, the words being “ all deeds and “ conveyances of or concerning any lands, tenements or heredi-taments, whereby the same may be any way affected in law or “equity, shall be acknowledged and recorded, &c., or shall be “adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, whose deed shall be first recorded.” A subsequent mortgagee is expressly named, so must necessarily a prior mortgagee be included. The deed first entered on record shall take effect, and Kintzing’s deed of mortgage was first recorded. Hence the mortgage will be an incumbrance on the lands, which the defendant will be bound to satisfy. It will remain on record and affect his title materially. No earthly power can compel the mortgagee to enter satisfaction. It will-be observed, that in the 3d section of the last law, there is a proviso, that the act shall not extend to any lease not exceeding 2 r years, where the actual possession goes along with the lease. The exception proves the rule.
It has been asserted, that Harrison is the real plaintiff ; but it cannot be pretended, that he could support the action in his own name. The declarations of a plaintiff, though only a trustee, may be given in evidence, to defeat his action. 7 Term Rep. 663-6. Burke has behaved villainously, and it is admitted that the defence would be good against him. Why not also against his assignee, to whom he can communicate no more right than he possessed himself ? Which of the two innocent persons should suffer by his misconduct ? The plaintiff cannot succeed at law; and the payments made by the defendant can have no effect against him, when he had no notice of the mortgage, and was ignorant of his rights. Plarrison therefore has no superior equity to Kintzing. Both appear to be honest creditors. She did not record her mortgage in six months; the same default must be ascribed to Allen, as to his deed. But the first mortgage was recorded, and if the equities are equal, the law must prevail. This court will not add to the penalties prescribed by the legislature, against an innocent creditor. A deed, which is void as a common law conveyance, may operate as a -*• f i *covenant to stand seized to uses. 2 Wils. 22, 75. A defective surrender for want of presentment within 12 months, held good against creditors and assignees. 1 Cha. Ca. 170. 2 Vern. 564. Here Harrison succeeds to all the rights of Burke, but is subjected to all the equity to which he was subject.
Curia advisare vzdt.
And now this term, the court proceeded to deliver their opinions seriatim.

Opinion:
Shippen, C. J.
Elizabeth Kintzing, though a bona fide creditor, lost the surety of her mortgage, as to all other persons except Burke, and those who were in pari delicto, by not recording her mortgage in six months. Allen was an innocent purchaser, ignorant of the mortgage. He therefore shall not suffer by her default, who by not recording in time, put it in the power of Burke to deceive him. As to Harrison, he was an innocent assignee of Burke; and though in general, an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor, yet this appears to me one of those cases, where an assignee stands on better ground, than the as signor. Because otherwise, he would be a sufferer, not by the roguery of Burke alone, but by the negligence of Kintzing, who now claims an equity at his expence.
As to Allen's losing the land by not recording his deed within six months, he does not by this revive the right of Kintzing, but would have subjected himself only to the claim of a subsequent purchaser, who recorded before him. Then as Kintzing could not avail herself of her mortgage as against Allen, and he must pay the amount of his bond to somebody, it must be to •Harrison the innocent assignee.
Yeates, J.
The true construction of the recording laws, will in my idea, in a great degree, determine the point reserved, in this case.
The mortgage by John Burke to Elizabeth Kintzing is dated 8th October 1795, and was not entered on record, until 2 years, 3 months and 17 days after it was executed. The mortgaged premises were conveyed by Burke, the nominal plaintiff, to Richard Allen the defendant, on the 23d April 1796, and this deed was not entered on record, until 1 year, 9 months and 20 days had expired, being 18 days after the mortgage was recorded. .
Hence it is contended, that the mortgage shall prevail, on the ground of its being first recorded. And if it is an existing le*gal incumbrance, affecting the defendant's lands, there ,-¥ can be no question, as to its being entitled to be defaulked [*355 out of the present bond.
The 8th section of the law of 28th May 1715, (1 St. Laws 112) is as follows: "No deed, or mortgage, or defeasible deed "in the nature of mortgages, hereafter to be made, shall be " good or sufficient, to convey or pass any freehold of inheritance, " or to grant any estate therein for life or years, unless such "deed be acknowledged or proved and recorded, within six "months after the date thereof, where such lands lie, as herein "before directed for other deeds."
It is objected, that the conveyance to the defendant is comprehended in this description. But it is to be observed, that the words, in the nature of mortgages, run through the whole sentence, and the latter word is in the plural number; they limit and controul the generality of the preceding expressions. Besides, other deeds in the close of the section, contradistinguish the objects of it, from the deeds in general provided for in the preceding parts of the law ; and the uniform construction of the act, since it has passed, has been, that in this particular, it solely relates to mortgages, and defeasible deeds in their nature. It would be highly dangerous at this time, to adopt the words in a different sense, whereby many titles might be affected.
The first section of the law of 18th March 1775, (1 St. Laws 703,) enacts, that deeds and conveyances of lands, which shall not be recorded in the proper county within six months after their execution, " shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against "any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable considera- " tion, unless such deed or conveyance be recorded before the "proving and recording of the deed or conveyance under which "such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim." The reason of the provision is manifest, because if in consequence of the neglect of the grantee to record his deed within the time appointed, other persons have been induced to pay and expend their money ignorantly and without notice of the former conveyance, the loss should fall on the first grantee only, who has caused the same. But a prior mortgagee, who could not possibly suffer by,a want of knowledge of the subsequent deed's being executed, is neither within the words nor spirit of the provision. The terms, subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, are repeated, and there is no appearance in any part of the act of any intention of the legislature to make any alteration of the former act, as to the invalidity of mortgages not recorded within the six months, or to revive them against subsequent bona fide *356] *purchasers if they were first put on record. That act has fully provided for the case of mortgages unrecorded.
I conclude, therefore, that the mortgage to Elizabeth Kintzing does not bind the lands conveyed to Richard Allen, though it would have been effectual against John Burke himself, the mortgagor, if the same was in his hands, agreeably to the authority of Levinz v. Will, (1 Dall. 134,) on this plain ground, that in such case no one would be injured thereby.
I readily agree with the counsel, that if Burke was the real plaintiff, the defalcation contended for would certainly take place, and that an assignee is subject to all the equity which subsisted between the original parties. I lay no stress whatever on the circumstances of the payments of 50 dollars in February 1797, and of 150 dollars in April following, by Allen to Harrison. Such acknowledgments of the debt, or even an express promise to pay the obligation would not conclude the defendant, if made in a state of ignorance of a subsisting defence. 5 Burr. 2670. 1 Vern. 32. 1 Vez. 126, 400. 1 Fonbla. 106. 1 Espin. Ni. Pri. 174. 1 H. Bla. 64. But if Harrison had been led by the assertions or promises of Allen to take the assignment and pay his money, then the defendant would have made himself liable, because his declarations and engagements would form a new contract between him and the assignee, and he would not be permitted to injure an innocent stranger. This doctrine was laid down on full consideration, by Judge Smith and myself at Reading, at Nisi Prius in September 1799, between Ludwig assignee v. Croll, and was again asserted by Judge Smith at the sittings in Philadelphia, between Cairnes for the use of Olden v. Field and Harlan, and afterwards on a motion for a new trial, was assented to by the whole court, March term 1800.
In this case, I view Thomas Harrison as the true and real plaintiff, the legality and equity of whose demand is now before the court. The decisions of courts of law formerly were extremely narrow and contracted as to the assignment of choses in action; but they will now take notice of a trust, and see who is beneficially interested. And why not of an equity ? says Ashurst, J. 1 Term Rep. 619; and in the elaborate argument of Mr. Justice Buller, in Master v. Millar, he observes that the good sense of the rule, that a chose in action cannot be assigned or granted over to another is very questionable. In early as well as modern times, it has been so explained away, that it remains at most only an objection to the form of the action, in any case. The courts of law will take notice of the assignment of choses in action, though they adhere to the formal objection, that the *action shall not be brought in the name of the assignor; [*357 but there is no use in preserving the shadow when the substance is gone, and that it is merely a shadow is apparent from the later cases, in which the court have taken care that it shall never work injustice. 4 Term Rep. 340, 341.
The defendant Allen is bound to perform his contract and pay the stipulated price, but not beyond it. Whom then ought he to pay ? Has Mrs. Kintzing or Mr. Harrison the superior equity, or best founded claim to the money ? The former relied on the lands as her security, and at one time had a lien on them, but afterwards permitted it to slip through the fingers ; and if my ideas of the two recording acts are correct, the lands in the defendant's hands cease to be chargeable with the mortgage. She neglected to perform a duty which the law imposed upon her, and if any injurious consequences result from her laches, she only is blameable. On the other hand, Harrison purchased the bond, relying on the credit and responsibility of Allen and is guilty of no default whatever. When he took the assignment before 21st January 1797, no incumbrances appeared on record to put him on his guard against Burke, and it is admitted that neither he nor Allen knew of the mortgage executed by Burke, until the same was recorded.
On the whole, I think the claim of Harrison much superior in point of equity to that of Kintzing, and that the money intended to be secured by the mortgage of the latter should not be deducted from the sum due on the bond.