Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrone DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-07-22
Citations: 389 F. App'x 616
Docket Number: No. 09-30292
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrone DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges,' and HART, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 389
Pages: 616–618

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrone DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-30292.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2010.
Filed July 22, 2010.
Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Michael Symington Morgan, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Anna Marie Tolin, Law Office of Anna M. Tolin, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges,' and HART, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable William Hart, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Tyrone Davis appeals the 18-year sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. We affirm.
I
Davis concedes that United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691 (9th Cir.2008), forecloses his argument that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level at resentencing. See id. at 697 n. 3.
II
Assuming that breach of the plea agreement is preserved as an issue for appeal, we see no reversible error in the government's presenting evidence of the nature and extent of Davis's drug activities in support of the plea agreement's recommended sentence. The government offered the evidence to counter Davis's argument for a lower sentence based on the disparity between crack and cocaine, and to show that an enhancement for being a manager/supervisor was warranted. No attempt was made to influence the court to impose a greater sentence. See United States v. Allen, 434 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir.2006).
III
Evidence supports the three-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1(b) for being a manager or supervisor of the Seven Deuce Mob's drug operation. The district court is not required to make specific findings of fact for an upward adjustment, United States v. Govan, 152 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.1998), but among other things, Agent Ringer's testimony showed that Davis controlled the source of supply, who was allowed to be there when suppliers were present, and prices; supervised cooking and decided where sales could be made; and was the one to whom other members of the Seven Deuce Mob turned for help when they were in trouble. Davis basically took over his brother's leadership role when his brother was incarcerated. These facts support a finding that Davis was a manager of the enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Egge, 223 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2000).
IV
District courts are directed to " 'impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment...." United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Although we do not "presume . on appeal that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable," id. at 993, "a Guidelines sentence will usually be reasonable, because it reflects both the Commission's and the sentencing court's judgment as to what is an appropriate sentence for a given offender," Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 18-year (216 month) sentence rec ommended by the plea agreement — and within the advisory Guidelines range of 188-235 months — was appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.