Case Name: HERMES GRAIN COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. J. I. HAILEY, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1968-11-27
Citations: 435 S.W.2d 181
Docket Number: No. 431
Parties: HERMES GRAIN COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. J. I. HAILEY, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 435
Pages: 181–187

Head Matter:
HERMES GRAIN COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. J. I. HAILEY, Appellee.
No. 431.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Corpus Christi.
Nov. 27, 1968.
Schneider & Schneider, R. E. Schneider, Jr., George West, for appellants.
Keys, Russell, Watson & Seaman, R. Kinnan Golemon, Corpus Christi, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
SHARPE, Justice.
This appeal is from an order of the district court of Live Oak County, Texas, overruling appellants' pleas of privilege to be sued in Lavaca County, Texas. In the lower court appellee, J. I. Hailey, was plaintiff and appellants, Hermes Grain Company, a corporation, Maurice P. Hermes and Margaret Hermes, husband and wife, were defendants. The parties will sometimes hereafter be referred to as in the trial court. Plaintiff sought to sustain venue in Live Oak County under subdivision 23, Art. 1995, Vernon's Ann.Civ. St., against the corporate defendant and under subdivision 29a as against the two individual defendants.
Plaintiff sued the three defendants on an open sworn account for grain allegedly sold to them during the first three months of 1967, the balance claimed being $9,264.38. Defendants' pleas of privilege alleged that the domicile of the corporation and the residence of the individual defendants was in Lavaca County, Texas. Plaintiff's controverting plea was defective and the trial court allowed him to amend. After such action the defendants also amended their pleas of privilege, including therein a sworn denial of the justness of plaintiff's sworn account.
Appellants assert seven points of error. The first six points contend in substance that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to establish that the grain was sold to the defendants jointly, or to Maurice P. Hermes individually or jointly with the corporation, or to Margaret Hermes jointly with the corporation. The seventh point asserts that the trial court erred in permitting appellee to amend the affidavit to his original controverting plea.
The only evidence offered by plaintiff concerning the sale of the grain in question was certain requests for admission made by plaintiff and the defendants' answers thereto, which were stated to the trial court by counsel for plaintiff (the requests for admissions and answers not appearing separately in the record), and the testimony of plaintiff. Mrs. Margaret Hermes was also called as a witness by plaintiff, but her testimony did not relate to the account sued upon.
The statements of counsel concerning the requests for admission and the answers thereto were as follows:
"MR. DONNELL: Request Number 1 and the answer thereto; that Hermes Grain Company is a Texas corporation having been incorporated under the laws of this state on March 19, 1965. And Question Number 2, that the name and address of the regular agent here is Margaret Hermes, P.O. Box 87, Yoakum, Texas. Number 3, sometime immediately prior to January 16, 1967, Margaret Hermes was an agent of Hermes Grain Company, and the Plaintiff, J. R. Hailey, telephoned the place of business in Live Oak County, Texas, concerning the purchase of grain belonging to plaintiff. With reference to such telephone conversation you are asked to admit the following that — a. That during the telephone conversation it was agreed by plaintiff and Margaret Hermes, as agent for Hermes Grain Company, that the Hermes Grain Company would purchase as buyers certain grain from plaintiff and by that defendant. That defendant, Hermes Grain Company, commenced receiving grain at plaintiff's place of business in Live Oak County, Texas on January, 1967, that defendant, Hermes Grain Company, professed to pay plaintiff, on demand, the reasonable value for shipment of grain which he was to receive after that shipment and that admitted that the amount paid for the grain is the amount shown on Plaintiff's Petition filed herein. 4. That subsequent to the telephone conversation between Margaret Hermes, agent for Hermes Grain Company, and plaintiff set forth the above, and in furtherance of the agreement made between such parties, over such telephone conversation, the agent received grain in Live Oak County, Texas on the occasions and amounts shown below. Your Honor, there then is about twenty days that rather than reading, if the Court and counsel will allow me, dealt and admitted that grain, on the days and in the amounts was received in Live Oak County, is that all right, Mr. Schneider?
"MR. R. E. SCHNEIDER: Yes sir.
"MR. DONNELL: 5. That reasonable value of such shipment of grain which were delivered to grain company by plaintiff, is $21,181.73. That admitted that the Hermes Grain Company has in fact paid to plaintiff the sum of $11,917.-35 at payment for the shipments of grain which were delivered to defendant in Live Oak County, Texas between the dates of January 16, 1967 and January 25, 1967, inclusive. That said sum of $11,-917.35 was the reasonable value of said shipment' for grain delivered during the period between January 16 and January 25, 1967. That is admitted. Number 7. That for the shipments of grain delivered after January 25, the reasonable value was $9,264.38. That is admitted. Number 8. That the defendant is to pay the sum of $9,276.37 for the shipments of grain which were delivered to Hermes Grain Company in Live Oak County, Texas, between the day of January 26 and March 6, 1967. That is admitted. And the additional sum of $300 paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, making the unpaid balance $8,964.38, which I believe Mr. Golemon and Mr. Hailey agree is proper. There is a $300 credit not given, but it is another matter inquired about in Number 8, or admitted in Number 9, dated May 15. This one asks if a signature is that of Margaret Hermes and whether it was in answer to the demand letter written by Mr. Hailey's attorneys. It was mailed, through the U.S. Mails, to Mr. Hailey's attorneys and did refer to the $9,264.38 owed on grain delivered at January 26. That is admitted, Your Honor, except that again there is a $300 difference in the figures and by the terms of that letter. It is very short.
"(Whereupon, at this time Mr. Donnell read the letter to the Court.)
"MR. DONNELL: Your Honor, the last request concerns another letter written by Mrs. Hermes, addressed to Mr. Hailey and requests whether or not the signature is hers, whether it was addressed to him and mailed in the mails, and referring to the same nine thousand figures that is admitted with the exception again, that $300 error, making the balance $8,964.38. That is $9,264.38 over request to admissions and answers thereto and offer them collectively into the record, Your Honor.
"MR. R. E. SCHNEIDER: No objection."
J. I. Hailey, the plaintiff, testified in substance that his dealings concerning the grain in question were all with Mrs. Hermes, beginning in January, 1967; that the first part of the grain was paid for and the last part was not; that the trucks that picked up the grain all had "Hermes Grain Company" on them. On direct examination Mr. Hailey testified in part as follows:
"Q Mr. Hailey, who did you sell your grain to?
A I sold it to Mrs. Hermes.
Q Was there any other understanding that she was selling it to anybody else, or was there any other condition ?
A Well, I understand whatever—
Q — Were there any conditions attached to the sale other than the price condition?
A That was all."
It is apparent that plaintiff proved a cause of action for venue purposes under subdivision 23, Art. 199S, V.A.C.S., against the corporation based upon plaintiff's requests for admissions and defendants' answers thereto. However, plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for venue purposes under subdivision 29a of that statute against the two individual defendants. Plaintiff wholly failed to prove a joint sale to the corporation and either or both of the individual defendants. Plaintiff did not have any dealings with Maurice P. Hermes concerning the sale of grain. Plaintiff's only testimony relating to Mr. Hermes was that the latter drove a truck to load some of the grain.
The testimony of plaintiff that he sold the grain to Mrs. Margaret Hermes is not sufficient to support a finding that it was sold jointly to her and the corporation. Furthermore, a finding that the grain was sold only to Mrs. Hermes would not support venue in Live Oak County. The only manner in which plaintiff's testimony can be reconciled with the requests for admissions and answers thereto (which plaintiff offered in evidence) is that Mrs. Hermes was acting as agent for the corporation in connection with the sale of the grain.
Under the rules announced in Ladner v. Reliance Corporation, 156 Tex. 158, 293 S.W.2d 758 (1956), plaintiff failed to establish that the individual defendants (or either of them) were jointly liable with the corporation and that they were necessary parties to the suit filed in Live Oak County, Texas.
The case of Dina Pak Corporation v. May Aluminum, Inc., 417 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi 1967, n.w.h.) involved similar contentions to those made here. The plaintiff there sought to maintain venue in the county where the suit was filed against the corporate defendant under subdivision 23, and against an individual defendant under subdivision 29a, Art. 1995, V.A.C.S., and the trial court agreed. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court which overruled the plea of privilege filed by the corporation, but reversed and rendered judgment that the plea of privilege of the individual defendant be sustained, holding that he was not shown to be a necessary party under subdivision 29a. Chief Justice Green, speaking for the Court, discussed the applicable rules under subdivision 29a, citing Ladner and other authorities. We believe that the holdings and reasoning in Dina Pak are also applicable here. See, also, McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 1, Sec. 4.36, pages 544 and 550.
Appellants' seventh point of error complains of the trial court action in allowing plaintiff to amend his controverting plea and particularly the affidavit thereto which was defective because it did not state that the allegations of the petition or controverting plea were true. The amendment was allowed prior to the hearing of defendants' pleas of privilege after defendants had pointed out the defects. Error is not reflected by such action. See M. C. Winters, Inc. v. Lawless, 407 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1966, wr. dismissed).
The judgment of the trial court overruling the plea of privilege of Hermes Grain Company, a corporation, will be affirmed. The judgment overruling the pleas of privilege of Maurice P. Hermes and Margaret Hermes will be reversed and judgment here rendered that the cause as to them will be transferred to the district court of Lavaca County, Texas.
Affirmed in part. Reversed and rendered in part.