Case Name: H. C. HENDRICKSON v. W. J. BANNITZ
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1935-05-31
Citations: 194 Minn. 528
Docket Number: No. 30,397
Parties: H. C. HENDRICKSON v. W. J. BANNITZ.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 194
Pages: 528–531

Head Matter:
H. C. HENDRICKSON v. W. J. BANNITZ.
May 31, 1935.
No. 30,397.
G. J. Foley, for appellant.
Gustav G.- Axelrod, for respondent.
Reported in 261 N. W. 189.

Opinion:
Julius J. Olson, Justice.
Action to recover upon a promissory note. Defendant denied execution thereof and averred that at the time of its alleged making "plaintiff exhibited a ring to defendant and placed the value of the same in the sum of three hundred fifty ($350) dollars. That thereupon defendant stated that he desired to show said ring to his fiancée and desired to take the same from the store for that pur pose. That pursuant to said request the plaintiff permitted the defendant to take the ring and at said time had defendant sign a slip of paper which defendant was of the opinion was a receipt for said ring or a memorandum to the effect that said ring Avould be returned in the event defendant's fiancée was not satisfied with the same." At the trial defendant testified:
"He Avanted to know Avlien I was going to be married, and I said I didn't know. I told him I was going with a young lady that I was in hopes I Avould marry, and he suggested that I buy a diamond ring for her. I said I didn't know Avhether she would accept a diamond ring, I had not even proposed to her. I said, 'I am not making very much money, and Í couldn't afford a ring.' I said, 'I am going to talk it over with her.' He said, 'Why don't you take a diamond ring down, and maybe that will sell her on the idea.' * ':f I had no knoAvledge of diamonds, and he picked out a diamond ring and he says, 'There is a diamond ring valued at $300,' he told me at that time. 'Now,' I says, 'I don't know Avhen I can bring this ring back.' I didn't knoAV whether I could get down to Water Aúlle this week or next week. And he says, 'That is all right. Bring it back as soon as you have talked it over with her.' He put the ring in a box and wrapped it up, and just as I was ready to leave he says, 'W. J.'—he always called me W. J.—• he says, 'I Avould like to have something to show that I gave you that diamond ring in the event that.you are killed or something serious happens, I Avould like to have you sign a receipt to indicate, as evidence that I let you use that diamond ring.' And I signed that slip of paper. I kneAV Mr. Hendrickson real Avell, and I signed a little slip of paper. There Avas nothing on the slip of paper that I signed at that time—"
Defendant took the ring to his fiancée and talked matters over with her. They both came to the conclusion that the ring was too expensive and that defendant could not afford to buy such a costly present, so they both Avent to plaintiff's store and returned the ring. 'This was about a week after it Avas turned over to defendant. At .that time plaintiff" tried to sell a ring more suitable to their financial capacity to pay, but nothing came of it. Plaintiff's testimony is that defendant selected the ring, gave his promissory note for it, went away with it, and about a week later came back, having changed his mind, and said he did not want it. Upon these conflicting issues the case was submitted to the jury. The jury found for defendant. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, and plaintiff appeals.
The assignments of error raised in the court below are: (1) That the verdict is contrary to law; (2) that it is not justified by the-evidence; (3) errors of law occurring at trial and excepted to thereat; (á) that the verdict Avas'the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Upon appeal plaintiff assigns as. error: (1) The denial by the trial court of his motion for a directed verdict; (2) denial of his motion for judgment notAvithstand-ing the verdict; (3) failure of the court to charge the jury that' proof of failure or Avant of consideration rested upon defendant; and (4) that the court erred in admitting testimony to vary the-terms of a Avritten instrument. From AAdiat has been stated it seems clear that the verdict is not contrary to law, nor can it be said to be contrary to the eiddence.
Plaintiff did not assign as error below failure to charge in respect of burden of proof; hence that alleged error cannot now be considered. This is likewise true regarding the assignment that the court erred in admitting testimony to vary the terms of a AAU'itten instrument, i. e. the promissory note. 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed.) § 358a and 359, and cases cited.
There is no quarrel Avith plaintiff's statement of the laAv that "a parol, contemporaneous agreement is inoperative to vary or contradict the terms Avhich have been reduced to Avriting." Mc-Creight v. Davey Tree Expert Co. 191 Minn. 489, 254 N. W. 623. But that rule does not aid him because "parol evidence is admissible to show that an instrument Avas delivered to take effect and become operative only on the happening of a certain contingent future event." 2 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. & Supp. 1932) § 3377; Skelton v. Grimm, 156 Minn. 419, 195 N. W. 139.
Fact issues alone were presented. In a charge free from criticism on the part of counsel for either party the jury determined the facts contrary to plaintiff's contentions. The trial court having approved thereof and there being ample evidence to sustain the same, we are not at liberty to interfere.
Judgment affirmed.