Case Name: Guy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1972-10-20
Citations: 84 N.M. 321
Docket Number: No. 953
Parties: Guy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee.
Judges: HENDLEY, J, concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 84
Pages: 321–324

Head Matter:
502 P.2d 1011
Guy MILLER, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Cross-Appellee.
No. 953.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Oct. 20, 1972.
Tandy L. Hunt, Donald C. Turpén, Turpén, Hunt & Booth, Albuquerque, for plaintiff and cross-appellant.
Frank H. Allen, Jr., Dale W. Elc, Mod-rail, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Albuquerque, for defendant and cross-appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
COWAN, Judge.
Plaintiff Guy Miller filed suit against the defendant seeking a judgment declaring valid three life insurance policies issued by defendant to plaintiff but later cancelled by defendant. The plaintiff prayed for $10.00 nominal damages because of the attempted cancellation of the policies and, in addition, for compensatory and punitive damages "caused by the defendant's unscrupulous dealings with plaintiff." During the pendency of the action Guy Miller died and his wife was substituted as party plaintiff.
At the plaintiff's suggestion, it was agreed by the court and opposing counsel that the case would first be tried on the question of liability. Then, if the defendant was found liable for compensatory and punitive damages, the issue of amount of damages would be heard.
At the conclusion of the first part of the trial the court announced that it would award $10.00 nominal damages and hold the three insurance policies to be valid but would deny compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendant initially appealed that part of the judgment declaring the policies to be valid and plaintiff cross-appealed on the damage issue. Prior to perfection, defendant vacated its appeal, but plaintiff retains her position as cross-appellant.
She first asserts that the court erred in not allowing her to present evidence upon the issue of compensatory or punitive damages. This point is without merit. The first hearing was, by agreement, limited to the question of liability. The record does not indicate that plaintiff was restricted in presenting any of her evidence on the issue of liability. During the post-trial argument, she made a tender of evidence but this evidence went to the issue of damages rather than to liability. Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that she knows of no evidence on the liability issue other than that already presented at the trial. The court's refusal to find liability disposed of the damage issue. Archuleta v. Johnston, 83 N.M. 380, 492 P.2d 997 (Ct.App.1971).
Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in "not allowing the production of evidence on the mental suffering and punitive damages resulting from the tortious breach of a life insurance contract." Again we disagree with her position. Such evidence, going to the issue of damages, would be pertinent only if the court first found defendant liable for compensatory or punitive damages.
The plaintiff requested a conclusion that she was entitled to nominal damages in the sum of $10.00, which the court adopted. She also requested findings of fact supporting her position on the liability of the defendant for compensatory and punitive damages, which the court refused. Such refusal constituted findings to the contrary. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hesselden Construction Co, 80 N.M. 121, 452 P.2d 190 (1969).
The plaintiff has not attacked the sufficiency of the evidence nor any of the court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. Neither has she put in issue the court's refusal of any of her requested findings or conclusions. The court's findings and conclusions are, therefore, deemed true and controlling. Anderson v. Jenkins Construction Co, 83 N.M. 47, 487 P.2d 1352 (Ct.App.1971).
Plaintiff's last contention is that defendant's appeal was frivolous under § 21-2-1 (17) (3), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4). The rule in this state is that doubts as to the frivolous nature of an appeal will be resolved in favor of the appellant. Roger v. Garde, 33 N.M. 245, 264 P. 951 (1928). In so viewing the record plaintiff's contention is not substantiated by the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
HENDLEY, J, concurs.
SUTIN, J, specially concurring.