Case Name: BARASCH v. KRAMER et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-02-26
Citations: 115 N.Y.S. 176
Docket Number: 
Parties: BARASCH v. KRAMER et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 115
Pages: 176–185

Head Matter:
(62 Misc. Rep. 475.)
BARASCH v. KRAMER et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
February 26, 1909.)
1. Sales (§ 263 )—Wabbanty of Title.
The owner of premises in which laundry tubs were Installed entered into an agreement to sell the premises, and the contract provided that the sale was to include all the personal property contained in the premises and used in connection therewith. In pursuance of -such contract, the owner conveyed the premises and their appurtenances to the other party by a.full covenant warranty deed. Held that, whether or not the tubs passed by the conveyance, the owner warranted his title thereto, since, if they were fixtures, they were covered by the covenant in the deed, and, if not, a warranty of title would be implied by their sale as personal property.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 749; Dec. Dig. § 263.*]
2. Lis Pendens (§ 7 )—Commencement of Action—Necessity of Filing Action Papers.
The rule that every person is privy to a judgment who, after the bringing of an action, has succeeded to an estate or interest held by one who was a party to the judgment therein, does not apply in the state of New York, where actions in courts of record are commenced by a summons issued out of an attorney’s office, of which no record is made in the office of the clerk of court, and which is followed by a complaint, which need not be, and in most cases is not, filed until the judgment roll is made up, and hence no lis pendens is created, which will bind the purchaser to a judgment in a suit, unless there be a process and a bill or complaint on file in which the claim upon the property is set forth.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Lis Pendens, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-15; Dec. Dig. § 7.*]
3. Indemnity (§ 14*)—Warranty of Title—Satisfaction of IncumbranceRecovery Over—Judgment.
Though a seller of property may satisfy a claim of a purchaser for defect in title to some of the property sold without awaiting legal action to compel such satisfaction, and can recover from the person from whom he himself purchased the property, provided the latter’s title was in fact bad, still, in order to do so, he must affirmatively establish thd defect in the title by proof independent of a judgment in an action involving the same property to which his grantor was neither a party, nor called in to aid in its defense, and the fact that he believed or had reasonable cause to believe his grantor’s title was bad did not entitle him to recover from his grantor what he had paid the purchaser.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indemnity, Cent. Dig. § 41; Dec. Dig. § 14;* Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 1279, 1280.]
4. Sales (§ 472*)—Conditional Sales—Record of Bill of Sale—Execution in Duplicate—Effect.
Under section 115 of the lien law (chapter 418, p. 541, Laws 1897). providing that the sections relating to the filing of certain conditional bills of sale shall have no application to a conditional sale of household goods, if the contract for sale is executed in duplicate, and one duplicate delivered to the purchaser, the effect of the record or delivery of a duplicate is not to establish either the existence or the validity of the conditional bill of sale upon the merits, but simply to leave the matter open to proof upon the merits, and to save the bill of sale from the rule which would otherwise render it invalid against subsequent purchasers from the buyer, regardless of what its merits might be.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 1370; Dec. Dig. § 472.*]
5. Sales (§ 472*)—Conditional Sales—Title to Goods—Presumptions.
Where a contract of conditional sale binds the purchaser to pay for the goods within 60 days, and provides that the title shall remain in the seller until full payment, the presumption as to a subsequent purchaser of the goods, who was a total stranger to the original transaction, and to whom the original purchaser transferred them long after the expiration of the 60 days, is that payment was made as agreed upon in the original contract and that the title had passed to the vendor therein.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent Dig. § 1376; Dec. Dig. § 472.*]
6. Trial (§ 54*)—Reception of Evidence—Limitation of Purpose.
Lack of evidence to rebut a presumption in favor of a purchaser of personal property that title thereto had passed to the purchaser’s vendor from his prior vendor was not supplied by evidence of a judgment in an action to which he was not a party, holding otherwise, where counsel stated that the judgment was offered in evidence solely for another pur pose, since, where a party so limits the purpose for which his evidence is introduced, ,the adverse party is entitled to rely upon its effect being similarly limited.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 126; Dec. Dig. § 54. ] Ford, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.
Action by" Sigmund W. Barasch against Osher Kramer and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before GIEGERICH, HENDRICK, and FORD, JJ.
Morris A. Rabinovitch (Charles Schwick, of counsel), for appellants.
Feltenstein & Rosenstein (Abraham Rosenstein, of counsel), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § numbeb in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to- date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
GIEGERICH, J.
The action is to recover damages for breach of warranty of title upon the sale by the defendants to the plaintiff of certain laundry tubs contained in the premises No. 319 East Seventy-Fifth street, in the borough of Manhattan, New York City. The case was submitted upon stipulations and concessions made in open court, from which the following appear to be the material and undisputed facts:
On February 28, 1903, one Lottie Kurzynski was the owner of the premises in question, and entered into an agreement with the Union Granite Company by which the latter made a conditional sale of certain laundry tubs, which were afterwards installed in the house, and still remained there at the time of the trial of this action. By that agreement the purchaser undertook to pay for the tubs within 60 days after their delivery, and title was to remain in the vendor until final payment. On March 8, 1903, this agreement was duly filed in the office o"f the register of the county of New York, and it was duly refiled on or before March 8, 1904. Subsequently to March 8,1904, but within a year thereafter, the vendor of the tubs, or its assignee, commenced an action against the purchaser and the then owner of the premises to recover the tubs or their value. On February 16, 1905, after several mesne conveyances, the defendants became the owners of the premises for value and without notice of the pending action or the claims upon which it was based. On October 17, 1905, the plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing with the defendants for the purchase of the premises in question for a certain price, and this contract provided that the sale was to include "all personal property contained in said premises and used in connection therewith." On December 1, 1905, the defendants, in pursuance of the contract just mentioned, conveyed the premises and their appurtenances to the plaintiff by a full-covenant warranty deed; the tubs being then installed in the house. Thereafter the plaintiff entered into a contract of sale, similar in its terms to the one last mentioned, with one Fannie Weinfeld, and later conveyed the premises and their appurtenances to her by a full-covenant warranty deed, and she was still the owner when this action was commenced. Neither the plaintiff nor Mrs. Weinfeld had any knowledge or notice of the then pending action in replevin to recover the tubs when they took title, and both were bona fide purchasers for value. On October 15, 1906, and subsequently to the conveyance to the present owner, Mrs. Weinfeld, judgment was entered in the replevin action in favor of the plaintiff therein for the recovery of the tubs or their value. This judgment was entered upon the default of the defendants in the action, who had answered, but did not appear when the cause was called for trial. The defendants in this action were not parties to the replevin action. Thereafter execution was issued upon the judgment in the replevin action, and the present owner of the property, Fannie Weinfeld, in order to prevent the removal of the tubs, paid to the sheriff the sum of $150, which, upon her demand, the present plaintiff repaid to her. The value of the tubs was at all times $143.
Upon these facts the trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $143 and costs, and I think it is obvious that the judgment must be reversed. The record does not inform us whether the tubs were in any way affixed to the realty, to enable us to judge whether, as between grantor and grantee, they would pass by a conveyance of the land. If so, they were covered by the covenants in the deeds; and, if not, a warranty of title would be implied upon their sale as personal property, so that the same result would follow in either case upon a failure of the title. But the difficulty with this case is that there is no competent evidence that the defendants' title was defective. The judgment in the replevin action, which was recovered in the Supreme Court, is not evidence against them, and their counsel so insisted on the trial. The plaintiff's counsel argues that the judgment was admissible against- the defendants, and cites 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L. (1st Ed.) p. 139, which lays down the principle that:
"Every person is privy to a judgment who has succeeded to an estate or interest held by one who was a party to the judgment, this succession taking place after the bringing of the action."
The rule so laid down is not the law in this state, and would be a harsh and illogical rule in any state having a practice similar to ours, where in courts of record the action is commenced by a summons, which is issued, not out of court, but out of an attorney's office, and of which no record is made in the office of the clerk of the court, and which is followed by a complaint, which need not be filed, and, as a matter of fact in the vast majority of cases, is not filed, until the judgment roll is made up, notwithstanding the imperative form of the provisions of section 824 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires the filing of the summons and of each pleading in an action within 10 days after the service thereof. There is no penalty for a failure to comply with such direction, however, and it is a matter, of' common knowledge that both the summons and the complaint are retained in the office of the plaintiff's attorney until the judgment roll is made up, when for the first time they are filed in court.
When actions could be commenced only by process issued out of the court, and a record was made of such process, and when the pleadings were required to be filed, and were filed, in the court, it was entirely fair to charge a purchaser of personal property with notice that a suit affecting the title to such property had been commenced against his vendor. Under our present method of practice, however, the facts on which such a rule was based have ceased to exist, and for the reasons pointed out and discussed at great length in Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585, that old common-law rule is not in force in this state, and no lis pendens is created which will bind a purchaser' to a judgment in a suit unless there be a process and a bill or complaint on file in which the claim upon the property is set forth. Further, on the question of privity, see Campbell v. Hall, 16 N. Y. 575; Zoeller v. Riley, 100 N. Y. 102, 2 N. E. 388, 53 Am. Rep. 157; Masten v. Olcott, 101 N. Y. 153, 4 N. E. 274.
It is a part of the case of the one seeking to introduce a judgment as evidence to show the filing of the summons and complaint (Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 612) prior to the date of the acquisition of title by the purchaser against whom the judgment is sought to be introduced in evidence. Furthermore the plaintiff's counsel expressly restricted the purpose for which he offered the judgment in evidence to showing:
"That there was made upon him [plaintiff] a demand; that he had reasonable cause to believe that he or his subsequent grantee, to whom he had given a deed, would be imperiled or prejudiced in his rights;' and it is offered merely and only for the purpose of proving that plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe that his claim or title had been attacked and could pay the claim."
While the plaintiff undoubtedly had the right to satisfy the claim of his grantee without awaiting legal action to compel such satisfaction, and could recover from his grantor provided the latter's title was in fact bad (Sweetman v. Prince, 26 N. Y. 224, 232; Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283, 286, 100 Am. Dec. 482; Bordwell v. Collie, 45 N. Y. 494, 497), the question is, not what he believed or had reasonable cause to believe, but what the fact was, and the plaintiff must affirmatively establish the defect in his grantor's title by independent proof, when that grantor was neither a party to a prior action in which the question was determined nor called in to aid in its defense (Id.).
The respondent appears to place some reliance upon section 115 of the lien law (chapter 418, p. 541, of the Laws of 1897), which was in effect at the time of the transaction in question, and which provides that the sections relating to the filing of certain conditional bills of sale shall have no application to a conditional sale of household goods, "if the contract for the sale thereof is executed in duplicate and one duplicate thereof delivered to the purchaser," which delivery of a duplicate was admittedly made in this case. Conceding all this, however, does not help the plaintiff's case. The question of fact would still remain whether the title continued in the vendor, or whether it had passed to the vendee through the performance by the latter of the condition of the bill of sale, above referred to, that payment should be made within 60 days after the delivery of the articles and that title was to remain in the vendor until final payment. The only effect of the proper filing of the conditional bill of sale in an ordinary case, or of the delivery of a duplicate in the cases provided for under section 115, above referred to, is to save the bill of sale from the rule which would otherwise render it invalid against subsequent purchasers, regardless of what its merits might otherwise be. The effect of such recording or such delivery of a duplicate is not to establish either the existence of the validity of the conditional bill of sale upon the merits, but simply to leave the matter open to proof upon the merits.
The next question that arises, therefore, is what presumption is to be indulged in, in a case of this kind, where a contract to which both the plaintiff and the defendants are strangers is introduced in evidence, and where the terms of that contract bind the purchaser to pay for the goods within 60 days and that title shall remain in the seller until final payment. I think the inference which ought to be drawn under such circumstances is that the contract between such strangers was performed, and that payment was made as agreed upon, and that the title passed out of the vendor into the vendee. The lack of evidence on this point is not supplied by the judgment in the replevin action, because that was offered, in the language of the plaintiff's counsel, used at the time it was admitted in evidence, "merely and only for the purpose of proving that he [the plaintiff] had reasonable ground to believe that his claim or title had been attacked, and that he had reasonable ground to pay the claim."
We do not now have to pass upon the question whether, if the judgment had been offered and admitted for all purposes, it would have been binding upon the defendants upon any theory of notice of the pendency of the action by reason of the provisions of chapter 503, p. 1162, of the Laws of 1905, which, in repealing section 115, above referred to, expressly provided that such repeal should not affect any action or proceeding pending at the time the repeal took effect, which was on September 1, 1905, on which date the said replevin action, as above shown, was pending. As the judgment was offered only for a limited purpose, the defendants were entitled to rely upon its effect being similarly limited, both in the court below and on appeal. It is manifest that any other rule would lead to surprise and injustice.
My conclusion is that neither the fact of the delivery of the duplicate conditional bill of sale to the purchaser nor the judgment rendered in the replevin action, limited as the latter was in the purpose for which it was admitted, afford any evidence that there was a breach of warranty of title on the part of the defendants, and the judgment must therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event.