Case Name: Keane v. Fisher & Co.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1852-06
Citations: 7 La. Ann. 334
Docket Number: 
Parties: Keane v. Fisher & Co.
Judges: Eustis, C. J. and Rost, J. We concur in this opinion.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 334–336

Head Matter:
Keane v. Fisher & Co.
The claim was for more Ilian $500, and proved by only one witness. The application of defendants to the court, to instruct the jury on certain questions of law, as set forth in the record, cannot be construed into an admission of fact by the defendants, and treated as a circumstance corroborating the testimony of the single witness.
The affidavit by which the plaintiff obtains the arrest of the defendants, will not be received as a circumstance corroborating the testimony of a single witness, in an action to recover of the defendants 'a claim of over $500.
The defendants asked the charge of the court to the jury on many points, twelve of which implied a sale from tho plaintiff to the defendants, and each therefore was a circumstance corroborating the positive testimony of the witness to the plaintiff’s claim. Per Preston, J. dissenting.
THIS case was tried by a jury before the'Fifth District Court of New Orleans,
Buchanan, J.
Race and Foster, for plaintiff.
J. Ad. Rozier, for defendants.

Opinion:
By the court:
Slideli,, J.
I find only one witness to prove the claim, and I do not discover any corroborating circumstance established by any other testimony or evidence. I do not conceive that the application of the defendants to the court, to charge the jury on certain questions of law, as set forth in the record, can be construed into an admission of facts by the defendants, and so be treated as a circumstance corroborating the testimony of the single witness.
I do not concur in the opinion of the district judge, that the oath of the plaintiff, annexed to the petition, by which he obtained the arrest of the defendants, can be treated as a corroborating circumstance; nor, in his opinion, that the plea of the defendants involves an admission of the purchase of the sugar.
In my opinion, therefore, the judgment should b'e reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial, the costs of the appeal to be paid by the plaintiff.
Eustis, C. J. and Rost, J. We concur in this opinion.