Case Name: State of Connecticut v. Michael L. Paulette
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1969-03-05
Citations: 158 Conn. 22
Docket Number: 
Parties: State of Connecticut v. Michael L. Paulette
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 22–29

Head Matter:
State of Connecticut v. Michael L. Paulette
King, C. J., Alcorn, House, Cotter and Thim, Js.
Argued January 9
decided March 5, 1969
James D. Cosgrove, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Edward J. Daly, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John D. LaBelle, state’s attorney, and George D. Stoughton, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion:
Thim, J.
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the court committed error by admitting a doctor's report into evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to § 52-180 of the G-eneral Statutes, the pertinent portion of which is set forth in the footnote.
The defendant was charged with rape, and, at the trial, the state sought to introduce a doctor's report which set forth the results of a vaginal examination which had been made of the complaining witness. Shortly after the alleged rape had occurred, the complaining witness was examined at the police station by a police physician. The police physician opined that seminal fluid existed in the posterior vaginal vault; he suggested, however, that a smear of fluid should be obtained to determine whether his opinion was correct. Shortly thereafter, a vaginal examination was conducted at McCook Hospital, and a specimen of fluid was taken from the victim.
During the course of the trial, Dr. G-erald Skopek, the technical director of the laboratory at McCook Hospital, took the witness stand. He had in his possession a four-by-five-inch card containing the name of the complaining witness, her age, sex and the date and time of day when the specimen of fluid was taken from her. On the front of the card there appeared the date, June 14, 1967, a check mark alongside of the phrase "special stain for sperm" and the word "over" written in pencil. The front of the card was signed by a Dr. Buloang. On the reverse side of the card there was written in pencil "many spermatozoa are present. B. Hough." No date appeared on the reverse side of this card.
The director of the hospital laboratory testified that Dr. Hough, a pathologist, had made the report and that it was a record kept in the regular course of hospital business. Moreover, the director testified that the report concerned an examination performed by Dr. Hough and laboratory work done at the hospital in the early morning hours of June 14,1967, on the complaining witness, that the report was kept in the same manner as were all other pathological records, and that such records were retained on file for seven years. Dr. Hough was unavailable to testify because he was out of the country. The defendant objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that the signature of Dr. Hough had not been verified, that the initials "M.D." did not follow the signature, that the record was hearsay, and that it was not made in the regular course of hospital business.
There is no merit to the first two grounds of the objection because the director of the hospital laboratory verified the signature which appeared on the report as being that of Dr. Hough, and he also stated that Dr. Hough is a medical doctor.
The report was not inadmissible because it was hearsay. Section 52-180 of the General Statutes permits the admission of business records as an exception to the hearsay rule, and the statute expressly provides that business records which satisfy its requirements shall not be rendered inadmissible by reason of the failure to produce as witnesses the persons who made the records. State v. Ferraiuolo, 145 Conn. 458, 464, 144 A.2d 41; D'Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 62, 97 A.2d 893.
The trial court could have reasonably and logically concluded that it was the regular business of the laboratory at McCook Hospital to make medical tests and to keep records of the results of such tests and that the results of such tests were recorded within a reasonable time after the tests had been conducted. Thus, the report was admissible under §52-180 of the General Statutes. Szela v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Conn. 714, 723, 146 A.2d 910; Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 60, 192 A.317.
In his brief, the defendant claims that the state offered no evidence to establish the time that Dr. Hough recorded the results of his examination of the stain which had been taken from the rape victim. We do not consider this claim on appeal because the defendant did not raise it at the trial. Practice Book §652; State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 232, 149 A.2d 698; Brown v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 290, 294, 141 A.2d 634; Salvatore v. Hayden, 144 Conn. 437, 443, 133 A.2d 622.
There is no error.
In this opinion King, C. J., Alcorn and House, Js., concurred.
"Sec. 52-180. admissibility of business entries and photographic copies. Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any aet, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to make such writing or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. Such writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a party's failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party's failure to show that such persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affeet the weight of such evidence, but not to affect its admissibility. . . . The term 'business' shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind."