Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1979-12-06
Citations: 93 N.M. 700
Docket Number: No. 4169
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: LOPEZ, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 700–704

Head Matter:
604 P.2d 838
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sammy M. BARELA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 4169.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Dec. 6, 1979.
Daniel A. Bryant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Alamogordo, for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas A. Sandenaw, Jr., Alamogordo, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
WOOD, Chief Judge.
The State sought the forfeiture of a pickup truck under § 30-31-34, N.M.S.A. 1978. Although quasi-criminal, and gauged by standards applicable to a criminal proceeding, this was a civil proceeding. State v. Ozarek, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209 (1978); In re One 1967 Peterbilt Tractor, Etc., 84 N.M. 652, 506 P.2d 1199 (1973). On the basis of the affidavit submitted by the State in support of the petition for forfeiture, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Barela, the person to whom the pickup was registered. The State appeals. The issue is the meaning of the statutory forfeiture provision; specifically, whether it applies to the facts in this case.
The facts in the affidavit, undisputed, are:
1. On November 2, 1978, Barela told Gunter, an undercover police officer, that Barela had 17 pounds of marijuana for sale at $85 per pound. Gunter told Bare-la he wanted to purchase a pound the following day.
2. On November 3, 1978, Gunter told Barela that Gunter was ready to make the purchase. Barela asked Gunter to accompany him to Barela's home to pick up the marijuana.
3. Barela and Gunter drove to Bare-la's home in the pickup sought to be forfeited.
4. The marijuana was in the kitchen of Barela's home; Barela sold Gunter a pound of marijuana in the kitchen.
5. Barela and Gunter left Barela's home in the pickup and returned to the location where the two had met. On this return trip, the marijuana was in Gunter's possession.
Section 30-31-34(A), supra, provides for the forfeiture of controlled substances manufactured, distributed, dispensed or acquired in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. No claim is made that the marijuana did not come within this provision.
Also subject to forfeiture, under § 30-31— 34(D), supra, are
all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described in Subsections A or B .
Neither § 30-31-34(B), supra, involving raw materials, products and equipment, nor § 30-31-34(G), supra, involving exclusions from forfeiture, are involved in this case.
Section 30-31-34(D), supra, pertains to:
(1) Conveyances used to transport for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.
(2) Conveyances intended to be used to transport for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.
(3) Conveyances used to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.
(4) Conveyances intended to be used to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale, property described in Subsections A and B.
Each of these four items involves transportation. Transportation for what purpose? "For the purpose of sale." The sale of what? "Property described in Subsections A and B."
Section 30-31-34(D), supra, required that the transportation aspect of the statute must be transportation of the marijuana for the purpose of sale. The briefs discuss "facilitation" of transportation. We are not concerned with facilitation because the transportation aspect of the statute relates to the transportation of the "property" (the marijuana) for the purpose of sale. There are no facts indicating the pickup was in any way involved in any transporting of the marijuana for the purpose of sale.
The State contends this view of the statute is too restrictive, that § 30-31-34(D), supra, is sufficiently similar to federal statutes that interpretations of federal statutes should apply to the New Mexico statute. A federal statute pertaining to forfeiture of carriers transporting contraband articles, 49 F.C.A. § 781(a) (1954) makes it unlawful "to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article." A federal statute pertaining to forfeiture in connection with controlled substances, 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(a)(4) (1972), subjects to forfeiture "[a]ll conveyances . . . which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) . . . ."
Both federal statutes are much broader than the New Mexico statute. For example, compare the language in 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(a)(4) — "to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described" — with the language in § 30-31-34(D), supra — "to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described . . . ." Because the federal statutes are not similar to the New Mexico statute, federal decisions interpreting the federal statutes are not helpful in determining the applicability of the New Mexico statute to the facts in this case.
The opinion in United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, Etc., 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) states that the broad language of 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(a)(4) "patently indicates the congressional intent to broaden the applicability of the forfeiture remedy it provided." The history of the New Mexico statute shows a legislative intent to restrict the applicability of the forfeiture provision. As originally enacted by Laws 1972, ch. 84, § 33, the statute read: "[T]o facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of property described . ." (Our emphasis.) The emphasized language "or receipt" was removed from § 30-31-34(D) by Laws 1975, ch. 231, § I-
The deletion of "or receipt" from the statute supports our view that the transportation aspect of § 30-31-34(D), supra, pertains to the transportation of the controlled substance for purpose of sale. This view is consistent with the statement in State v. Ozarek, supra: "Forfeitures are not favored at law and statutes are to be construed strictly against forfeiture." Such a strict approach to the meaning of § 30-31-34(D), supra, is appropriate because forfeiture is quasi-criminal in character with the object of penalizing for the commission of an offense against the law. State v. Ozarek, supra.
The summary judgment is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LOPEZ, J., concurs.
SUTIN, J., dissenting.