Case Name: BAILEY et al. v. DOBBS et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1971-07-15
Citations: 227 Ga. 838
Docket Number: 26573
Parties: BAILEY et al. v. DOBBS et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Felton and Hawes, JJ., who dissent in part.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 227
Pages: 838–845

Head Matter:
26573.
BAILEY et al. v. DOBBS et al.

Opinion:
Undercofler, Justice.
Appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, were formerly Chief of Police, Assistant Chief of Police and Captain of Police of the City of Covington. They filed this action against the City of Covington, its mayor, council and city manager alleging that they were illegally discharged from their positions of police officers. This appeal is from the trial court's denial of appellants' motions for summary judgment, injunction, mandamus and declaratory judgment. The trial court certified the questions raised for immediate review.
The complaint alleged that at a meeting of the mayor and council on July 6, 1970, four of the six councilmen adopted a resolution over the veto of the mayor, directing that the city manager discharge the appellants as employees of the City of Covington; that on the following day, the appellants were discharged by the city manager; and that such discharge is contrary to the city charter of Covington.
Complainants allege also that they were denied due process of law because they were discharged without notice and hearing.
The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. There is no cross-appeal from this judgment. Held:
1. "To entitle one to the writ of mandamus it must appear that he has a clear legal right to have performed the particular act which he seeks to have enforced. Code § 64-101; Adkins v. Bennett, 138 Ga. 118 (1) (74 SE 838); Veal v. Washington County Board of Education, 211 Ga. 204 (84 SE2d 565); Carr v. Sparks, 213 Ga. 606 (100 SE2d 583)." Garrett v. Board of Commissioners, 215 Ga. 351 (1) (110 SE2d 626). Mandamus shall not lie to control the acts of a "public officer who has an absolute discretion to act or not, unless there is a gross abuse of such discretion. . ." Code § 64-102.
The charter for the City of Covington was amended by the General Assembly in 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, p. 3072) and 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 2437). It provides that the city manager is authorized "to appoint, prescribe the duties or supervise and remove all adminstrative employees Twith certain exceptionsl." The same paragraph dealing with the city manager also provides that neither the council nor any of its committees shall direct or request the appointment of any person to nor his removal from office by the city manager.
Section 2-7 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Covington provides in part: "Police Department, Appointment. . . all of such appointments shall continue at the pleasure of the City Manager who shall have the right and power to suspend any one of such appointees if deemed in the best interest of the city to do so."
Neither the charter nor the ordinance requires notice and hearing before discharge.
In Wright v. Gamble, 136 Ga. 376, 378 (71 SE 795, 35 LRA (NS) 866, AC 1912C 372), this court stated: "It seems now to be the universally accepted rule, that, where the tenure of the office is not prescribed by law, the power to remove is an incident to the power to appoint. . . In such a case no formalities such as the preferring of charges against, or the granting of a hearing to the incumbent, are necessary to the lawful exercise of the discretionary power of removal." See also 56 AmJur 2d 364, §333.
The record shows that on July 6, 1970, a resolution of the city council was passed directing the city manager to discharge the appellants as city employees and that it was passed pursuant to a previous suggestion of the city manager requesting a resolution on the subject. The city manager by affidavits showed that the employees were discharged in the exercise of his discretion, in the best interest of the city and the police department, and that he was not coerced.
The fact that the city council recommended the discharge of these employees would in no way alter the fact that the city manager by affidavit showed that their discharge was an exercise of his discretion and was not the result of coercion.
Since the charter and the ordinance of the City of Covington allow the city manager to control city employees in his discretion mandamus will not lie. Conneff v. Hill, 225 Ga. 583 (170 SE2d 421).
2. The appellants contend that the appellees should be enjoined from illegal interference with their rights to occupy the respec tive positions as police officers for the City of Covington.
Argued June 14, 1971
Decided July 15, 1971
Rehearing denied July 30, 1971.
Heard & Leverett, E. Freeman Leverett, for appellants.
Campbell & Campbell, R. P. Campbell, W. K. Campbell, for appellees.
The discharge of the appellants from their positions as police officers of said city has already taken place and the appellants no longer hold these positions. Therefore, the injunctive relief sought on motion for summary judgment was properly denied since the question is now moot.
3. The declaratory judgment relief sought by the appellants was properly denied. The complaint in this case shows that the rights of the parties have already accrued. As this court held in Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487 (2) (117 SE2d 336): "And where, as here, the petition shows that the rights of the parties have already accrued and no facts or circumstances are alleged which show that an adjudication of the plaintiffs' rights is necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their interests, the petition fails to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment." See also Farmers Union Warehouse of Metter v. Bird, 224 Ga. 842 (165 SE2d 148).
4. The material averments of the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are disputed by the deposition of the city manager. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment was properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Felton and Hawes, JJ., who dissent in part.