Case Name: Miguel Angel Mendoza LEON, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-11-25
Citations: 623 F. App'x 473
Docket Number: No. 13-74154
Parties: Miguel Angel Mendoza LEON, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 623
Pages: 473–474

Head Matter:
Miguel Angel Mendoza LEON, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-74154.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 18, 2015.
Filed Nov. 25, 2015.
James B. Rudolph, Esquire, Rudolph, Baker & Associates, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.
OIL, Hillel Ryder Smith, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Miguel Angel Mendoza Leon, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's continuous physical presence determination. Serrano Gutierrez v. Muka-sey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir.2008). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that Mendoza Leon's voluntary return to Mexico interrupted his period of continuous physical presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 619-20 (9th Cir.2006) (in order to interrupt the accumulation of continuous physical presence, the decision to accept voluntary .return in lieu of a hearing before an immigration judge must be knowing and voluntary). Mendoza Leon does not dispute that he signed a voluntary return form that stated he was giving up the right to a hearing before an immigration judge, the record indicates that he was informed of his rights pursuant to the voluntary return form, including his right to appear before an immigration judge, and he provided inconsistent testimony as to whether he had been informed of his right to appear before an immigration judge. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that Mendoza Leon's decision to accept voluntary return was not knowing and voluntary. See Za-rate v. Holder, 671 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir.2012) ("Under the substantial evidence standard, a petitioner can obtain reversal only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion." (internal citation omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.