Case Name: James L. MORGAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1978-10-04
Citations: 571 S.W.2d 333
Docket Number: No. 54482
Parties: James L. MORGAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: W. C. DAVIS, J., not participating.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 571
Pages: 333–335

Head Matter:
James L. MORGAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 54482.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Oct. 4, 1978.
Kent A. Caperton, Bryan, for appellant.
W. T. McDonald, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bryan, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the court revoking the appellant's probation. The trial judge found that the appellant had violated a condition of his probation, and sentenced the appellant to five years in the Texas Department of Corrections.
On October 22, 1975, the appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of felony theft. The appellant was assessed a ten-year probationary term.
At the outset, we recognize fundamental error. Article 40.09(13), Vernon's Ann.C. C.P. Omitting the formal portions, the in dictment to which the appellant pleaded guilty states that the appellant:
. . did then and there unlawfully exercise control over property, other than real property, to wit: One (1) Whirlpool Dishwasher of the value of in excess of $200 knowing said property to be stolen and with intent to deprive the owner, Frank Hurta, of said property . .
In Ex Parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we interpreted Section 31.03(a) and (b), and determined that the offense of theft is comprised of four different sets of possible elements:
"(1) a person
"(2) with intent to deprive the owner of property
"(3) obtains the property
"(4) without the owner's effective consent; or
"(1) a person
"(2) with intent to deprive the owner of property
"(3) obtains the property
"(4) which is stolen property
"(5) from another
"(6) knowing it is stolen; or
"(1) a person
"(2) with intent to deprive the owner of property
"(3) exercises control over the property, other than real property
"(4) without the owner's effective consent or
"(1) a person
"(2) with intent to deprive the owner of property
"(3) exercises control over the property, other than real property
"(4) which is stolen property
"(5) obtained by another
"(6) knowing it was stolen."
In Ex Parte Cannon, supra, we also stated that:
"An indictment for theft which does not allege all of the elements of one of these methods is fundamentally defective, since 'Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.' " (Emphasis in original).
See also Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
The indictment fails to set forth all of the elements of one of the four methods. It does not satisfy the first and third methods because it fails to allege that the obtaining or exercising of control was without the owner's effective consent. Cf. Reynolds v. State, supra. It also fails to satisfy the second method because instead of alleging that the appellant obtained the property, it alleged that the appellant exercised control over the property.
Moreover, the indictment fails to satisfy the second and fourth methods because it does not state that the property is stolen property or that it was obtained by or from another person.
Thus, it is clear that the indictment is fundamentally defective. See Article 27.08, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.; American Plant Food Corporation v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). It is well established that where an indictment is fun damentally defective the original conviction based on that indictment will be set aside in an appeal from a probation revocation proceeding. Huggins v. State, 544 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
The judgment is reversed and the prosecution under this indictment is dismissed.
W. C. DAVIS, J., not participating.
. Section 31.03, V.T.C.A., Penal Code.
. The trial judge, as mentioned above, reduced the appellant's term of imprisonment from ten years to five years when he revoked the appellant's probation. See Art. 42.12, Section 8(a), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
. In Ex Parte Cannon, supra at 273-4, we stated:
"Nor did the indictment allege that the property was stolen or that the appellant knew the property was stolen. Moreover, the indictment did not allege either that the appellant obtained the property from another or that he exercised control over the property, other than real property, obtained by another. These are essential elements of theft under subsection (b)(2), see Pool v. State, 528 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and are required to be alleged in an indictment alleging either of the methods of committing theft under this subsection."
Thus, although the indictment in the present case does allege that the appellant knew the property was stolen, it fails to allege from whom the appellant obtained the property and that it was stolen property. Thus, even if we were willing to hold that an allegation of knowledge of the stolen property also satisfies the requirement of an allegation that the property was stolen, the indictment fails to allege that the appellant obtained it from another person.