Case Name: Mary BENNETT, as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond , Bennett, deceased, Appellant, v. NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY, a foreign corporation; United States Gypsum Company, a foreign corporation; and Georgia-Pacific Corporation, a foreign corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-06-11
Citations: 491 So. 2d 1161
Docket Number: No. 85-1697
Parties: Mary BENNETT, as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond , Bennett, deceased, Appellant, v. NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY, a foreign corporation; United States Gypsum Company, a foreign corporation; and Georgia-Pacific Corporation, a foreign corporation, Appellees.
Judges: SCHEB, A.C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 491
Pages: 1161–1162

Head Matter:
Mary BENNETT, as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond , Bennett, deceased, Appellant, v. NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY, a foreign corporation; United States Gypsum Company, a foreign corporation; and Georgia-Pacific Corporation, a foreign corporation, Appellees.
No. 85-1697.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
June 11, 1986.
Rehearing Denied July 18, 1986.
Mark H. Perenich of Perenich & Carroll, P.A., Clearwater, for appellant.
Sharon Lee Stedman of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, Orlando, for appellee National Gypsum Co.
Rex E. Delcamp of Glenn M. Woodworth, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellee U.S. Gypsum Co.
J. Michael Nifong and Gregg R. Schwartz of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey, Miami, for appellee Georgia-Pacific Corp.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Mary Bennett's fourth amended complaint which was grounded on the tort theory of product liability. It is appellant's contention that the trial court erred since she sufficiently alleged a "market share" theory of products liability. Alternatively, she contends that she has sufficiently set out a cause of action based on the traditional theory of strict liability. We disagree with appellant's first contention but agree with her second.
There is no cause of action founded on a "market share" theory of product liability in a case where, as here, appellant identified appellees as the manufacturers of the asbestos products to which her deceased husband was fatally exposed. Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla.1985). Even though that be so, we reverse because appellant has sufficiently alleged the proper elements of a cause of action based on the traditional theory of strict liability. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976); Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 285 So.2d 7 (Fla.1973); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(b).
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the complaint and for further proceedings.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.