Case Name: William Baldwin and John M. Jaycox, appellants agt. The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York, respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1865-11
Citations: 30 How. Pr. 289
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Baldwin and John M. Jaycox, appellants agt. The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York, respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 289–313

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
William Baldwin and John M. Jaycox, appellants agt. The Mayor, &c., of the City of New York, respondents.
The provision in the fourth section of the act passed April, 1860 (Sess. Laws 1860, p. 772), for i/he appointment of arbitrators, and for an' arbitration, directing that it shall be held for the purpose of adjusting and determining the damages which the contractors, to whom the gate houses and aqueducts were awarded by the Croton Aqueduct board on the 27th October, 1858, might be equitably entitled to recover of the city of Hew York, and if an award made in their favor, directing the comptroller to pay the same, is 'unconstitutional, as violating the provisions of the 1st and 6th sections of the constitution. (Affirming the argu- * meat and decisions in this case in 37 Barb. 440 ; 24 How. Pr• R. 148, Ingraham, X; and 42 Barb. 549, Clerke, X)
Welles, X, dissenting. Holding that such act was constitutionally valid, for the reason,
1st. That it was assented and agreed to by all the parties interested therein, and that the voluntary arbitration which followed was binding upon the city.
2d. That the law" after its passage had been adopted and acted upon by the head of the city government, in writing with the plaintiffs, in creating and organizing the board of arbitration.
3d. That the city authorities have availed themselves of so much of the act and of the 4th section as was beneficial to the city.
4th. By the passage of the act for the tax levy of the city of Hew York, April 25, 1864, providing and appropriating for “ judgments recovered against the city $174,000,99 of which the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was one, which act -was passed upon the application of the-comptroller of the city, and founded upon the budget by him laid before the legislature as the basis thereof.
5th. The defendants are a municipal corporation, constituting abraneh or portion of the government of the state, as applied to the city of Hew York, invested with certain legislative, municipal and administrative powers, as defined in its charter, which is a grant of political power, creating a civil institution to be employed in the administration of the government, and being for public advantage, is to be governed according to the laws of the land.
As it derives its existence and all its powers-from the legislature, and holds all its franchises in subordination to the power which creates it, and subject at all times to legislative interference and control, the legislature may constitutionally direct in relation to its property as perfectly as it can dispose of property owned by the state, as such.
When the state interferes in ah act of government,- as a question or power the people of the whole state represented by their legislature, become the only party besides the plaintiffs; it was therefore competent for it to pass this law, without the assent of the city or its corporation (Darlington agt. The Mayor> of Hew York, 28 How. Pr. R. 352).
New York General Term,
November, 1865.
Before Ingraham, P. J., Clerke and Welles, Justices.
The order appealed from vacates and sets aside a judgment in the action entered June 13th, 1863, and all proceedings thereunder, together with the order of reference entered in said action on the 27th day of February of that year, and all proceedings thereunder, with $10 costs of the motion. This order (the one appealed from) was made in pursuance of an order at special term, held in the first district. on the 24th day of August, 1864, before Mr. Justice J. F. Barnard, founded upon certain affidavits and other papers referred to, on motion of counsel employed by the comptroller of the city of New York, under the fifth section of the act of the legislature, entitled “ an act to enable the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax,” passed April 19th, 1859 (chap. 489, pp. 1123, 1127), and required the plaintiffs to show cause at a special term to be held at the city hall of said city, on the first Monday of September then next, at eleven o’clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as counsel could be heard, why the judgment in the action and the execution theretofore issued thereon, and all proceedings thereunder, and the report of the referee and the order of reference therein, should not be vacated and set aside, and why the defendants should not be permitted to come in and defend said action, and why the defendants should not have such other or further relief as to the court might seem meet, with costs of the motion. The order to show cause, directed that in the meantime, and until the decision and entry of the order of the court upon the motion, all proceedings on the judgment and execution, and the levy thereunder, be, and the'same were, thereby stayed. The decision upon this order to show cause, was postponed from time to time, until November 30th, 1864, when the order appealed froni was made. The action was brought to recover from the defendants the amount of an award of three arbitrators, alleged to have been chosen under and in pursuance of the fourth section of the act of the legislature, passed April 16th, I860," entitled “ an act to facilitate the acquisition of land for a junction gate-house; and to connect the same with the new reservoir and the city mains in the city of New York, and to provide for the settlement of claims for damages connected therewith ” (Laws of 1860, chap. 449, pp. 772-3 and 4).
•Luther ¡R. Marsh, for appellants.
William Fullerton, for respondents.

Opinion:
By the court, Ingraham, P. J.
The question raised in
this case as to the power of the legislature to pass the act directing the arbitration therein, has been fully examined by Clerke, Justice, at special term in this case (42 Barb. 549), and by myself in The People ex rel. Baldwin and Jay-cox agt. Haws (37 Barb. 440; S. C. 24 How. 148). It is unnecessary-to reiterate in an opinion here the views then expressed. The conclusions arrived at in those decisions have not been changed, and we refer to those decisions as containing our opinions on the questions now under discussion.
The opinion of Denio, C. J., in Darlington agt. The Mayor (28 How. 352), contains much not at all necessary to the decision of that case, and the unlimited power claimed in that opinion for the legislature, over the property of municipal corporations, should be authoritatively declared in a case which would make it binding as an authority before it is adopted as law, removing, as in this case, all the protection which the constitution has given to rights to private ; property and to a trial By jury, in cases of disputed claims. I cannot concur in the views expressed by Judge Welles in this case, without abandoning all the rules heretofore adopted for the protection of municipal corporations in their franchises and property., until a direct decision on these points shall have- been made by a higher tribunal.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.
Clerke, J., concurred.