Case Name: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-04-12
Citations: 183 N.C. 300
Docket Number: 
Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 183
Pages: 300–303

Head Matter:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY.
(Filed 12 April, 1922.)
1. Constitutional Daw — Statutes—Retroactive Daws — Vested Rights_ Curative Statutes.
Where a statute is void only because of a neglected omission of formal constitutional requirements, and is of a subject-matter within its authority, the observation of these requirements in a later act amending the first one cures the defect therein and gives validity thereto, in the absence of intervening rights to the contrary.
2. Same — Schools—Bonds—County Commissioners.
In a suit by the commissioners of a school district within a county under the provisions of C. S., 5681. to compel the county commissioners to deliver to it certain school bonds for negotiation that the voters of the district bad approved at an election held according to the statutory provisions affecting them, it appeared that the issue was in the sum of $75,000, or $50,000 in excess of the amount authorized by O. S., 5678, and that the original act had not been passed in accordance with the requirement of our Constitution, Art. II, see. 14, but was later ratified by the Legislature in conformity therewith. There being no intervening vested rights: Held, the former infirmity of the bonds was cured by the later act, and a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was a proper one.
Appeal by defendants from Gcdvert, •/., at March Term, 1922, of JOHNSTON.
Controversy without action, submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, to ascertain and determine the validity of certain school bonds, authorized by the voters of Four Oaks School District in Johnston County.
From a judgment sustaining the validity of said bonds and directing that they be delivered as required by C. S., 5681,'the defendants appealed. The essential facts are stated in the opinion.
H. B. Marrow for plaintiff.
J. A. Narron for defendants.

Opinion:
Stacy, J.
On 12 April, 1921, a majority of the qualified voters of Four Oaks School District, known as Ingrams, No. 8, situated in Johnston County, in an election duly called, under article 39, chapter 95, of the Consolidated Statutes, and amendatory act thereto, chapter 91, Public Laws, extra session 1920, authorized the board of county commissioners of said county to issue bonds not to exceed in amount the sum of $15,000, for the purpose of building, rebuilding, and repairing the schoolhouses of said district and furnishing the same with suitable equipment. C. S., 5676. The validity of said bonds, having been called in question, this proceeding is brought to ascertain and determine their legal status.
It is conceded that chapter 91, Public Laws, extra session 1920, was not passed in accordance with the requirements of Article II, section 14, of the Constitution, and is therefore invalid. It is further conceded that under C. S., 5678, the amount of bonds for any township or school district, authorized by an election, such as the instant one, may not exceed the sum of $25,000. But it is contended that the Legislature, on 19 December, at its extra session 1921, passed an act conforming in all respects to the requirements of Article II, section 14, of the Constitution, specifically ratifying and confirming the results of the election in question, and validating the issuance of the said bonds up to the amount of $75,000.
Tbe only question presented for consideration is whether tbe bonds, in excess of $25,000 and up to $75,000, could be validated by tbe curative act of tbe special session of 1921. It is conceded tbat tbe election in all respects was regular, and tbat a majority of tbe qualified voters cast their ballots in favor of issuing tbe bonds, not only for tbe maximum amount allowed under C. S., 5678 (tbe validity of wbicb is incontestable), but also for the full amount authorized and voted upon under color of chapter 91, Public Laws, extra session 1920.
Tbe original power of tbe Legislature to pass tbe amendatory act of 1920 is admitted, and, as now advised, we see no valid reason why tbe law-making body could not ratify and confirm tbat wbicb it bad tbe power to authorize in tbe first instance, and wbicb power it actually did attempt to exercise. Subject to certain exceptions, tbe general rule is tbat tbe Legislature may validate retrospectively any proceeding wbicb it might have authorized in advance. Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N. C., 157; Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C., 472; Cooley on Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 531; 6 A. & E. (2 ed.), 940; Sechrist v. Comrs., 181 N. C., 514. "The Legislature may ratify and confirm any act wbicb it might lawfully have authorized in tbe first instance, where tbe defect arises out of tbe neglect of some legal formality and tbe curative act interferes with no vested rights." Steger v. Building Asso., 208 Ill., 236.
Where the Legislature has undertaken to pass a law, clearly within its power to enact, and by reason of some defect in its passage tbe statute, is rendered ineffectual, we see no reason why tbe Legislature, in tbe absence of any opposite intervening rights, could not, by subsequent enactment, ratify and confirm tbe results of such proceedings as in good faith have been taken and bad under tbe prior defective act. This is tbe prevailing rule, and it seems to be in accord with tbe general trend of authorities on the subject. Anderson v. Wilkins, supra, and cases there cited. Belo v. Comrs., 76 N. C., 497; 12 C. J., 1094; 6 R. C. L., 321.
Speaking to a similar question in Thompson v. Lee County (Iowa), 3 Wall., 327, it was said by tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States: "If tbe Legislature possessed tbe power to authorize tbe act to be done, it could, by retrospective act, cure tbe evils wbicb existed, because tbe power thus conferred bad been irregularly executed. The question with tbe Legislature was one of policy, and tbe determination reached by it was conclusive." See, also, Erskine v. Netson County (N. Dak.), 27 L. R. A., 696, and note.
Again, in Grenada County Supervisors v. Brown, 112 U. S., 261, it was held tbat a municipal subscription to tbe stock of a railroad company, in aid of tbe construction of said road, made as a result of an election, called without proper authority previously conferred, might be confirmed and legalized by subsequent legislative enactment, unless such legislation were prohibited by the Constitution of the State, and when that wbicb was done would have been legal had it been done under legislative sanction previously given. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, said: "Since what was done in this case by the constitutional majority of qualified electors, and by the board of supervisors of the county, would have been legal and binding upon the county had it been done under legislative authority, previously conferred, it is not perceived why subsequent legislative ratification is not, in the absence of constitutional restrictions on such legislation, equivalent to original authority." And to like effect is the decision in Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S., 120.
Under the foregoing principles, we think the judgment of his Honor sustaining the validity of the bonds in question should be upheld.
Affirmed.