Case Name: IRWIN v. KLAMATH COUNTY
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1919-09-23
Citations: 93 Or. 538
Docket Number: 
Parties: IRWIN v. KLAMATH COUNTY.
Judges: McBride, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 538–550

Head Matter:
Argued July 16,
affirmed September 23, 1919.
IRWIN v. KLAMATH COUNTY.
(183 Pac. 780.)
Counties — District Attorney Unauthorized to Contract for Services in Procuring Evidence,
1. Laws of 1915, Chapter 141, Seetion 24, requiring district attorneys to proseeute diligently persons violating the act prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, and Section 25, providing for payment by the County Court of expenses and disbursements incurred therein by and under the direction of the district attorney, do not authorize.a district attorney as the county’s agent to make a specific contract for servieés in procuring evidence specifying the amount the county shall pay, in the absence of statutory provision therefor, in view of Section 937, L. O. L., placing the contract power with the County Court. (Per Johns and McBride, JJ.)
Counties — District Attorney Unauthorized to Employ Agents to Ferret Out Violations of Liquor Law.
2. The words “expenses incurred and disbursements made by and under the direction of district attorney,” in Laws of 1915, Chapter 141, Section 25, have reference to ordinary expenses, including amounts actually disbursed, or for which he made himself personally liable, such as hotel bills, railroad fare, etc., incurred while prosecuting violators of prohibition law, but does not include employment of agents by the month to travel over the county to ferret out possible offenders and gather evidence. (Per Bennett, J.)
Bean, J., dissenting.
From Klamatb: Frank M. Calkins, Judge.
Department 2.
The plaintiff alleges that at all times hereinafter stated he was the duly elected, qualified and acting district attorney in and for Klamath County and that as such district attorney and as agent of the defendant, under the provisions of Chapter 141 of Laws of 1915, he employed one Wynn “to do and perform labor for the defendant in and about procuring evidence in the matter of the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors in Klamath County, Oregon, and obtaining and attempting to obtain evidence in prosecuting violators” of the prohibition law, at an agreed and stipulated price of $85 per month from January 19, 1916, to February 19,1916; and from February 19,1916, to May 19,1916, “at the agreed and stipulated price at the rate of $100 per month.”
There are four causes of action, all of a like nature and founded upon similar allegations, making a total of $911.10, assigned to the plaintiff, who was then such district attorney, and for which he prays judgment against the county. It appears from the complaint that ■ the plaintiff as district attorney audited and approved the claims against the county for such alleged services and that the claims were presented to and disallowed by the defendant.
The answer admits that the plaintiff was district attorney at the time alleged, but denies “that John Irwin was the agent of the defendant under the provisions of Chapter 141 of the General Laws of the State of Oregon, for the year 1915, or under the provisions of any other law.” It further denies that he employed Charles D. Wynn or any other person for and on behalf of the defendant, denies every allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint, ‘ ‘ excepting defendant admits that the claim mentioned was filed and that the defendant disallowed the same,” and denies each and every other allegation of the complaint. Similar denials are made to each canse of action.
As a ¡further and separate answer, the defendant alleges that at such times Marion Hanks was the duly elected and qualified county judge; that F. H. McCornack and John Hagelstein were commissioners of such county; that as such officers they had “the general care and management of the county property, funds and business of Klamath County, Oregon”; that C. C. Low was the sheriff and that John Irwin, the plaintiff, was the district attorney; that the defendant never employed Wynn, Otis, Moore or Bardin, the assignors of the plaintiff, or either of them, “to do or perform any labor for the defendant in and about procuring evidence in the matter of the sale of. intoxicating liquors or in obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence in prosecuting violators of the laws of the State of Oregon”; that the plaintiff was never authorized to employ them, and that neither of them ever rendered any service to Klamath County, as alleged or otherwise. As an affirmative defense it is alleged that the officers of Klamath County were at any and all times ready and willing to aid and assist the district attorney in obtaining evidence and prosecuting violators of the prohibition law, and the employment of such individuals for this purpose was unnecessary and unauthorized.
After his motion to strike was overruled, the plaintiff filed a general demurrer to the further ánd separate answer, which was overruled, and the defendant then filed a reply in the nature of a general denial. A jury was waived and trial was had before the court, which found for the defendant. Judgment was en tered against tlie plaintiff for costs, from which lie appeals, assigning sixteen different errors, tlie substance of which is that the court “erred in determining the facts in the case” and “should have rendered judgment for the plaintiff.”
Affiiimed.
For appellant there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. W.H. A. Henner.
For respondent there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. C. J. Ferguson.

Opinion:
JOHNS, J.
The complaint is founded upon a specific contract between the plaintiff as district attorney and agent of the defendant, to recover the agreed' and stipulated price of alleged services rendered by Wynn and others to the defendant. It is contended that the plaintiff as such district attorney had legal authority to make such contracts; that he did make them and that by reason thereof the county is liable for the amount of the agreed price. In a measure this involves the construction of Chapter 141, Laws of 1915, known as the Prohibition Act, and the powers and duties of the district attorney under this act. The primary purpose of this law is to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and to make it the duty of city, county and state officers to see that it is enforced. Section 24' of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the district attorneys in this state to diligently prosecute any and all persons violating any provisions of, and otherwise to enforce, this act in their respective counties"; that for any failure or neglect to perform such duty the officer shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and subjected to fine and imprisonment, and that whenever any prosecuting officer shall fail or iiegiect to enforce these provisions, the Governor, as the chief executive officer of the state, shall appoint prosecutors in his discretion, who shall perform like duties and have like powers as the district attorney. Section 25 provides:
"All expenses incurred and disbursements made by or under the direction of the district attorney, or the prosecutor appointed by the Governor, in obtaining or attempting to obtain evidence, or otherwise, in prosecuting violators of this act, shall be paid by the County Court of the county in which violation shall be alleged to have been committed, upon the voucher of said district attorney or prosecutor appointed by the Governor, out of the general fund of said county."
The alleged services were performed at the instance and request of the district attorney and not by a prosecutor appointed by the Governor.
There was a general denial of the contract and the performance of services. The casé was tried without a jury by the court, which found for the defendant. Assuming, without deciding, that all expenses incurred by the district attorney should be paid by the County Court, the statute does not authorize the district attorney as the agent of the county to make a specific contract for such services or to define 'or specify the amount which the county shall pay, and in the absence of statutory provision the district attorney would not have the legal right to execute a contract which would be binding on the county. Section 937, L. O. L., enacted in 1862, provides that the County Court has the authority and powers pertaining to county commissioners to transact county business and that it shall have "the general care and management of the county property, funds and business where the law does not otherwise expressly provide." Without an express provision in the statute or an authorized contract, a county should be required to pay only the reasonable value of any services or labor performed. In the case of Brewster v. Springer, 80 Or. 68 (156 Pac. 433), upon which the plaintiff relies, the statute expressly provided the compensation in dispute: There is no such provision in Section 25 of the Prohibition Act. If the county is liable for the alleged services, it is liable only for the reasonable value thereof. The plaintiff seeks to recover upon a specific contract for services rendered at an agreed and stipulated price, and does not allege or prove the reasonable value thereof. ,;
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
AeEIRMED.
McBride, C. J., concurs.