Case Name: Gilbert v. Danforth
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1852-10
Citations: 6 N.Y. 585
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gilbert v. Danforth.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 535–544

Head Matter:
Gilbert v. Danforth.
Contract for delivery of specific articles.
Where a note is given, payable in specific articles, by a day named, to bo selected by the payee, his omission to select, within the time, does not discharge the maker from liability on the contract; the former may select and demand payment, according to the tenor of the note, at a future day.
Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, in the third district, where a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, had been affirmed, and a motion for a new trial denied.
This was an action of assumpsit, to recover a balance alleged to be due upon a contract in writing, in the words following
“ For value received, I promise to pay Martin Gilbert, three hundred and sixty-two dollars and fifty cents, in castings, such as said Gilbert shall select and direct, such as are cast at the Middleburgh furnace, which I agree to deliver at Gilbert’s dwelling-house, at Ghent, in Columbia county, at 4| cents per pound, to be delivered within, or by the 1st day of March next, and agree to deliver some castings as it may be convenient for me to deliver soon; said Gilbert to give timely notice what castings he will select or want; and in default thereof, I agree to pay the money for such part as is not paid in castings.
June 8th, 1843. Teros. P. Danforth.”
In some of the counts of the declaration, it was averred, that the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant, what castings he would want, according to the tenor and effect of the contract and that the defendant did not, by the 1st March 1844, nor at any time afterwards, deliver the same, * kqc i or Pay the money; in others, it was *averred, -* that on the 5th March 1847, the plaintiff, gave notice to the defendant, what' castings he would want, according to the tenor and effect of the note, and requested him to deliver the same, or pay the money, and that although a reasonable time had elapsed, the defendant had not' done so; the declaration also contained the common counts. The defendant pleaded the general issue.
On the trial, before Harris, J., the plaintiff showed that on the 5th March 1847, he had requested the defendant, in writing, to deliver certain described castings, to the amount of the balance due on the note, within a reasonable time; and he gave evidence tending to show that the castings so selected were such as were cast at the Middleburgh furnace. The plaintiff having here rested his case, the defendant’s counsel moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that the contract required the plaintiff to give notice of his selection of the articles, prior to the 1st March 1844, which had not been done, nor any excuse shown for the omission to do so. The motion for a nonsuit was, however, denied, and an exception taken.
_|; *The defendant then showed ■ that in October ” ^ 1843, he had urged the plaintiff to let him know what castings he wanted, as they could not be made in a few weeks, and he wished to send them before the roads became bad, so as to avoid any default in the delivery. That some castings were, accordingly, selected and delivered — the last, on the 16th March 1844. No further demand was made until March 1847, when the defendant had ceased to have any interest in the Middleburgh *furnace.' The amount due on the note, with °°° -1 interest after three months from the last de mand (which it was agreed was a reasonable time for delivering the castings selected) was $175.
The learned judge charged the jury that the time specified in the note for the delivery of the castings, was for the benefit of the plaintiff; that if the plaintiff did not give notice before the 1st March 1844, what castings he would want, then, the defendant could have called upon the plaintiff to make a selection, and upon his neglecting to do so, the defendant would have had a right to select the articles himself, and to tender them in discharge of the note; that the plaintiff had a right to give notice, after the 1st March 1844, what castings he would want, and the defendant was bound to deliver them, in a reasonable time; that if the articles mentioned in the plaintiff’s notice were not such as were cast at the Middleburgh furnace, the defendant should have so informed the plaintiff. To which charge, the defendant’s counsel excepted.
The jury, under the instruction of the court, having given a verdict for the plaintiff, for the balance due upon the note, and the judgment entered thereon having been affirmed at general term, and a motion for a new trial denied, the defendant took this appeal.
Hill, for the appellant.
Reynolds, for the respondent.

Opinion:
*Welles, J.
— By the contract upon which the " ^ action was brought, the defendant was bound to pay the plaintiff $362.50, by the first day of March succeeding its date (March 1844), in such castings as were made at the Middleburgh furnace, at 4J cents per pound; the plaintiff having the right to select the castings, which the defendant was bound to deliver at the dwelling-house of the latter. A portion of the castings were selected by the plaintiff and delivered to him by the defendant; the last payment was made on the 16th of March 1844. In March 1847, more than three years after the contract, by its terms, was to have been performed, the plaintiff demanded thy balance, specifying the particular kind and description of castings which he required, all being within the description provided for in the contract, which the defendant neglected to deliver.
It is claimed, that the contract imposed no duty upon the defendant to perform it, except within the time designated; and as the plaintiff had the right of selecting the particular kind of castings to be delivered, and # -i having, in reference to the balance *not delivered, -1 neglected to make such selection, by the time mentioned, the contract is at an end, and should be treated as if fully performed on the part of the defendant. This, however, cannot be so; the defendant was bound, by the agreement, to pay a certain amount, in a certain kind of property, which he has not done. The provision allowing the plaintiff the right to select and direct the particular description of castings to be delivered, was a privilege which it was competent for him to waive, without impairing the other provisions, or affecting the defendant's obligation to pay the amount; and admitting that such privilege continued no longer than to a reasonable time before the expiration of the period allowed by the contract for payment by the defendant, to enable him to deliver such as the plaintiff might select, the most that can be claimed for the defendant, in case the plaintiff neglected to exercise the right of selection within that time, is, that he had waived it, and the privilege of making the selection was thereby transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant; but it by no means absolved the defendant from making payment at all. His duty to deliver the requisite amount of cast mgs would remain, and would only be affected in regard to the particular kind to be delivered.
But it is not necessary, in this case, to decide how long the plaintiff's right of selection continued, as the defendant is clearly in default, in respect to the amount not paid, in delivering castings selected by either himself or the plaintiff; although, I am of opinion, that if the plaintiff intended to avail himself of that right, he was bound to exercise it in time to afford the defendant an opportunity to comply, by the day mentioned in the agreement for that purpose, or the day to which the parties agreed to extend the time of performance. (8 Day 327.) If the plaintiff's right of selection had terminated by lapse of time, or otherwise, the defendant should have paid the balance of the amount due, in castings of his own selection.
It is insisted, that the defendant was forbidden by the plaintiff to deliver any castings, except such as the plaintiff should select, and the selection not having been made within the time *provided by the . ^ contract for their delivery, the defendant is ex- *- cused from further performance. Assuming, that the plaintiff's right to select terminated with the time allowed the defendant for making payment, if the defendant wished to discharge himself from the obligation, he had it in his power to do so, by delivering the amount remaining due, in a reasonable time after the day fixed by the contract for payment, in any kind of castings therein described. If such right did not then terminate, but continued indefinitely, the defendant could have put an end to it, at any time afterwards, by requiring him to make the selection, and in his default, could have made the payment according to his own selection.
The directions of the plaintiff to the defendant, not to deliver any castings until he had notice from the plaintiff of the kind he wanted, were before the payment was due, and can be regarded in no other light than an admonition to the defendant to observe the provisions of the agreement, and not to disregard the plaintiff's right of selecting for himself.- This view of the conduct and motives of the plaintiff, derives strength from the fact, that the defendant had been pressing him to select the castings, long before they were due, and had proposed to deliver certain kinds of castings, which the plaintiff had not called for. It would be torturing language, to construe these declarations of the plaintiff, under such circumstances, into.a rescission of the agreement; and it must amount to that, in order to excuse the defendant from his obligation to pay the balance. The 'judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.