Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Solomon STEVENS, Respondent; Solomon STEVENS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-03-26
Citations: 714 So. 2d 347
Docket Number: Nos. 90524, 90863
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Solomon STEVENS, Respondent. Solomon STEVENS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 714
Pages: 347–351

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Solomon STEVENS, Respondent. Solomon STEVENS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Nos. 90524, 90863.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 26, 1998.
Rehearing Denied June 15, 1998.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Belle B. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner/Respondent.
Solomon Stevens, pro se, Bushnell, for Respondent/Petitioner.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Stevens v. State, 691 So.2d 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), wherein the district court certified:
Whether State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), must be applied retroactively. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative as explained herein and approve the result in Stevens on this issue.
Stevens was convicted of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). In a subsequent case, this Court ruled that application of these statutes to the crimes of attempted second- and third-degree murder yields absurd results. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995). We limited the statutes' scope to attempted first-degree murder. Id. Based on this ruling, Stevens filed a rule 3.850 motion to correct his sentence, which the trial court denied. The district court applied Iacovone retroactively, reversed the trial court's order denying relief, and certified the above question. Both Stevens and the State sought review.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Iacovone meets the three-part test for retroactive application of a change in decisional law set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980): The decision in Iacovone (a) emanates from this Court, (b) implicates matters that are constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. See Stevens, 691 So.2d at 623-24. Indeed, imposition of a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently "irrational" sentencing scheme "could not withstand a due process analysis" of any sort. State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1995). "The concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases outweighs any adverse impact that retroactive application of the rule might have on decisional finality." Id. at 987.
The present case differs significantly from State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995), which we recently held does not apply retroactively. The statutory offense there, attempted felony murder, had been held by the Court to be a valid offense for years before we concluded in Gray it had become too difficult to apply. Retroactive application would have been inappropriate because persons convicted previously had been convicted of a valid offense. The enhancement provisions here, on the other hand, have been held by the Court to be inapplicable to second- and third-degree murder from the beginning. Persons sentenced under this scheme were subjected to an "irrational" punishment that was invalid ab initio. Retroactive application thus is required under Witt.
Based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the affirmative as explained herein and approve the result in Stevens on this issue.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
HARDING, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Section 784.07 makes the crime of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer a life felony:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825.
§ 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988).
. Section 775.0825 provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer:
Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001 [of the sentencing guidelines],
§ 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988).
.The Court noted the discrepancy that arises when the above statutes are applied to attempted second- and third-degree murder:
The discrepancy recognized by the district court is apparent in this scheme in that the penalty for attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., life or forty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum) is vastly greater than the penalty for completed third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., fifteen years with a fifteen year mandatory minimum). Further, the penalty for attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., life or forty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum) is significantly greater than the penalty for completed second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., thirty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum).
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995). Under such a scheme, "a criminal who attempts to murder a law enforcement officer would have a substantial incentive to complete the act in order to avoid exposure to the harsher penalty. The State's interpretation thus would seem to encourage, not discourage, lethal attacks [against law enforcement officers]. This is an irrational result." Id.
. See State v. Woodley, 695 So.2d 297 (Fla.1997).
. See Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448 (Fla.1984).
. See State v. Wilson, 680 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla.1996) ("[A]ttempted felony murder was a valid offense, with enumerated elements and identifiable lesser offenses, for approximately eleven years. It only became nonexistent' when we decided Gray."). Gray did not implicate matters that were constitutional in nature but rather marked an "evolutionary refinement[] in the criminal law" governing attempts. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929.
. See Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1374 ("We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder.").
. We find that the remaining issues raised by Stevens in his pro se briefs are either procedurally barred or without merit.