Case Name: Lunce, Reynolds v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1954-10-18
Citations: 233 Ind. 685
Docket Number: No. 29,135
Parties: Lunce, Reynolds v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 233
Pages: 685–693

Head Matter:
Lunce, Reynolds v. State of Indiana.
[No. 29,135.
Filed October 18, 1954.
Rehearing denied December 8, 1954.]
James C. Cooper, Public Defender, and Perry W. Cross, Deputy Public Defender, for appellants.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Frank E. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Flanagan, C. J.
Appellants were charged with the offense of robbery as defined by Burns' 1942 Replacement, §10-4101. They were found guilty by a jury.
The only question presented to us is whether due process of law was denied appellants because they were represented by incompetent counsel. Reliance for reversal is placed upon the decision in Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N. E. 2d 848.
The case of Wilson v. State should be read in the light of its own factual background. It should not be used as an excuse to ask this court to review the wisdom of the strategy of each lawyer who tries a law suit.
The court in the Wilson case made it clear (page 83 of 222 Ind., page 856 of 51 N. E. 2d) when it said:
"We do not hold that a defeated litigant in every or the usual case where his attorney has ignorantly or carelessly failed to save and present an error may nevertheless have it reviewed and made the basis of reversal of the judgment. Ordinarily procedural rules must be observed by litigants and may not be ignored by reviewing courts. To hold otherwise would invite appeals and violate precedents that have given necessary order and stability to our appellate practice. . . . When, as here, there has been such a lack of representation as to be equivalent to or worse than no representation whatsoever and as a result thereof the judge misused the opportunity thus given to impress upon the jury his view that the defendant was guilty and ought to be convicted, we are left with no alternative but to exercise the power that is in this court to remand the cause for such a trial as will not deny but will afford to the accused the protection guaranteed by our Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the United States."
No good would result from setting forth the many minor errors with which appellants' lawyer is charged of having been guilty. It is sufficient to say that they did not approach anything that would permit the conclusion that "there has been such a lack of representation as to be equivalent to or worse than no representation whatsoever."
Judgment affirmed.
Bobbitt and Draper, JJ., concur.
Emmert, J., dissents with opinion in which Gilkison, J., concurs.