Case Name: SUPER SERVICE MOTOR FREIGHT CO., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1965-08-13
Citations: 350 F.2d 541
Docket Number: No. 15872
Parties: SUPER SERVICE MOTOR FREIGHT CO., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 350
Pages: 541–551

Head Matter:
SUPER SERVICE MOTOR FREIGHT CO., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15872.
United. States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 13, 1965.
Frederick B. Abramson, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Rosen-thal, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Kenneth Harwell, U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief, for appellant.
John K. Maddin, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., Gracey, Buck, Maddin & Cowan, Nashville, Tenn., on brief, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
Here plaintiff, a common carrier truck line, brought suit against the United States of America to recover charges for freight it had hauled. The United States defended by asserting setoff and counterclaim for damages which exceeded plaintiff's charges.
The damage was done to a camera which the United States shipped from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. On arrival it was found to be damaged beyond repair.
It is conceded that if the United States prevails on the setoff and counterclaim, the damage of $3,515.45 would wipe out the $3,144.56 of freight bills and leave plaintiff owing $370.89.
Plaintiff's proofs tended to show that the camera had been negligently packaged for shipment.
Defendant's proofs tended to show that the package had been negligently handled.
The trial judge set forth this legal standard for determining the issues:
"(4) The burden is on the shipper to show that the article was delivered to the carrrier in good condition and arrived in a damaged condition. This establishes a prima facie case for the shipper.
"(5) The burden is then on the carrier to show that the damage resulted from a cause which is within the common-law exceptions, e. g., that the damage was the result of the shipper's defective packaging. Having brought the case within this ex ception to its absolute liability, the carrier need go no further. The burden is then on the shipper to prove that notwithstanding the defective packaging, the injury was the proximate result of negligence or lack of due care on the part of the carrier: »
As we read the District Judge's findings, he assumed that the shipper had carried its burden of proving delivery to the carrier in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and damages. He found that the carrier had then carried its burden of proving that the packaging was defective. He then found that the shipper had failed in carrying a reshifted burden of proof that the damage was due to the carrier's negligence in handling rather than to its own negligence in packaging.
We do not think, however, that this second shift of the burden of proof referred to in the District Judge's opinion is an accurate statement of the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964), which was announced after the decision of the District Court in the present case.
Section 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as amended, (the Carmack Amendment) provides:
"Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation from a point in one State or Territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another State, Territory, District of Columbia, or from any point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign country shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; " 49 U.S.C. § 20(11).
With respect to this statute the Supreme Court of the United States has said:
"It is conceded that § 20(11) codifies the common-law rule making a carrier liable, without proof of negligence, for all damage to the goods transported by it, unless it affirmatively shows that the damage was occasioned by the shipper, acts of God, the public enemy, public authority, or the inherent vice or nature of the commodity. " Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 165-166, n. 9, 76 S.Ct. 244, 247, 100 L.Ed. 173 (1956).
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, supra, the Supreme Court said:
"Accordingly, under federal law, in an action to recover from a carrier for damage to a shipment, the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he shows delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages. Thereupon, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show both that it was free from negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 492, 32 S.Ct. 205, 207, 56, L.Ed. 516; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Collins [Products] Co., 249 U.S. 186, 191, 39 S.Ct. 189, 190, 63 L.Ed. 552; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. A. F. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U.S. 416, 420-423, 46 S.Ct. 318, 319-320, 70 L.Ed. 659; Thompson v. James G. McCarrick Co., 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 897, 900." Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Elmore & Stahl, supra, 377 U.S. at 138, 84 S.Ct. at 1145.
Thus once the shipper has proved a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the carrier and remains there.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Stahl case in reaching the same conclusion in L. E. Whitlock Truck Service, Inc. v. Regal Drilling Company, 333 F.2d 488 (1964), saying:
"Thus the Carmack Amendment codifies the common law rule of the carrier's liability, and the federal law applies. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 84 S.Ct. 1142 (1964); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, supra. The Supreme Court has held that a carrier is not an absolute insurer, but is liable if the shipper makes a prima facie case and the carrier does not meet its burden to show both its freedom from negligence and that the loss was due to one of the causes excepted by the common law rule. The cases involving perishable goods are not distinguished from those where durable goods are transported. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, supra.
"Thus to establish the carrier's liability, it is necessary only for the claimant to show the carrier's receipt of the shipment in apparent good order, and the delivery or release of the shipment by the carrier in damaged condition. This being shown, the prima facie case is established and the burden is on the carrier to prove that the shipment was not delivered in good order, that it was delivered by it in good condition, or that the excepted causes were applicable, and it was free of negligence." 333 F.2d at 491.
Although we recognize that contrary views have been expressed in earlier decisions, this court is bound by the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this subject in the Stahl case.
The cases relied upon by appellee we view as ones wherein the carrier clearly established that the damage was occasioned by the shipper's own negligence. See Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Williams, 128 Minn. 514, 151 N.W. 419, L.R.A.1915D, 1077 (1915); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 832 (C.A. 6, 1959); Blytheville Cotton Oil Co. v. Kurn, 155 F.2d 467 (C.A. 6, 1946).
Since the Stahl case — which we consider controlling of this ease — has been decided since the District Court's judgment, we remand for further consideration and findings in the light of the Stahl case and this opinion.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court.
. See e. g. Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 304, 55 S.Ct. 194, 79 L.Ed. 373; 14 Am.Jr.2d, Carriers, § 528-530, 626-627; Annotations, 53 A.L.R. 996; 81 A.L.R. 811; 106 A.L.R. 1156 and 115 A.L.R. 1274.