Case Name: CALHOUN v. COMMONWEALTH TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03-06
Citations: 109 N.Y.S. 77
Docket Number: 
Parties: CALHOUN v. COMMONWEALTH TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 109
Pages: 77–83

Head Matter:
CALHOUN v. COMMONWEALTH TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
March 6, 1908.)
1. Depositions—Suppression—Grounds—Refusal to Answer Questions.
A deposition may be suppressed for the refusal of a witness examined on commission to answer proper and material questions put to him on cross-examination, though that is not one of the grounds stated for the suppression of depositions in Code Civ. Proe. § 910.
2. Same—Motion to Suppress.
Where a deposition is claimed to be improper, a motion may be made to suppress the same in advance of the trial.
3. Same—Suppression in Part.
Where the refusal of a witness, whose testimony is being taken by deposition, to answer proper questions, has been due to no act or objection of the party calling him, the whole of the witness’ deposition should not be suppressed on that ground, unless it clearly appears that the questions to which answers were refused were material.
4. Same—Evidence—Materiality.
Plaintiff sued for damages for breach of a contract for the sale of certain corporate bonds and stock, claiming that he was prevented from making the sale by certain acts of defendant. In order to show that plaintiff would have succeeded in selling the bonds, he took the deposition of an English stockbroker, who testified that hé had considered plaintiff’s proposition, and that witness and some other persons were disposed to look with favor thereon, but that no decision to purchase was arrived at; the matter being dropped when witness learned that the bonds were being offered from other sources at a less price than they were offered by plaintiff. When asked on cross-examination to give the names of the persons and companies to whom he presented the proposition to purchase the bonds, witness declined to do so, not by reason of any objection of plaintiff, but because witness did not care to give the names of his clients. Held, that the names of such persons were not material, and that defendant was not entitled to have the witness’ deposition quashed because of such refusal.
McLaughlin and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term.
Action by John C. Calhoun against the Commonwealth Trust Company of New York. From an order suppressing depositions of witnesses, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and motion to suppress deposition of one witness denied.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, Mc-LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Charles E. Kelly, for appellant.
D. Cady Herrick, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The plaintiff appeals from an order suppressing the deposition of two witnesses who were examined in England upon an open commission. One of the witnesses has since been re-examined, and the appeal therefor relates only to the deposition of one William Trotter. The plaintiff sues for $825,000 damages. He alleges: That the defendant had been given possession and control and the exclusive right to sell $4,250,000 of the bonds of the United States Shipbuilding Company, and also the right, as an inducement to said sale, to give shares of the preferred and common stock of said company; the said bonds being part of an issue of $16,000,000. That defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff, whereby it agreed to put firmly in his hands, for sale abroad, $3,000,000 of said bonds, and further agreed with him that the remainder of said bonds were and would remain pooled, and'would not be sold or negotiated for less than 95 per cent, of their par value. That plaintiff should receive for his services the difference between 90 and 95 per cent, of said par value of the bonds sold by him, and, in addition thereto, preferred and common stock of the shipbuilding company to the extent, as to each class of stock, of 25 per cent, of the par value of the bonds sold, and that said stock was and would remain pooled, and would not be sold at less than $65 per share for preferred stock and $25 per share for common stock. That plaintiff went abroad, and was engaged in selling and endeavoring to sell said bonds, and would have sold at 95 per cent, the $3,000,000 of bonds intrusted to him for sale had it not been for certain acts done by defendant in violation of its contract. This breach consisted, as alleged, in the sale by defendant to certain persons in New York of all of the shipbuilding bonds in its possession, including those intrusted to plaintiff for sale, at a price far below 95 per cent.
To establish his case, the plaintiff seeks to show, by certain witnesses resident in England, that he had made such progress with his attempts to sell the bonds that he would have succeeded in disposing of all of the $3,000,000 worth if the sale had not been prevented by the acts of which he complains. The William Trotter, whose deposition it is sought to suppress, and who is apparently a very important stockbroker in London, testified as to his interviews with plaintiff, and as to certain negotiations which he entered upon with a view to placing the bonds. The witness testified that, from the statements made to him by plaintiff, he was favorably impressed with the proposition to buy the bonds, and placed the matter before some of his clients, trust companies and others, some of whom expressed an inclination to participate in the purchase if upon further investigation the witness decided to go in himself. He testified very positively, however, that no decision was arrived at by himself or any of those whom he consulted either as to whether any bonds should be taken, or, if any, how many, except that one trust company, the name of which he could not recollect, agreed to take $100,000 of the bonds if the sale went through. The witness appears to have answered the questions put to him fully and with great frankness, until he was asked upon cross-examination to give the names of the persons and companies to yvhom he presented the proposition to purchase the bonds. This he declined to do, not by reason of any objection made by plaintiff, but for the purely personal reason that he did not care to give the names of what he called his clientele, explaining that the matter had come to nothing, not even to a definite offer on the part of any one to take bonds. He testified that he dropped the matter when he learned that bonds were being offered from other sources at a less price than they were offered by plaintiff. Although the refusal of a witness examined on commission to answer proper and material questions put to him upon cross-examination is not one of the grounds stated in section 910 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well settled that a deposition may be suppressed for that reason (Goldmark v. Met. Opera House Co., 67 Hun, 652, 22 N. Y. Supp. 136), and it is proper to make a motion to that effect in advance of the trial as the defendant has now done (Strum v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 77-87; Wright v. Cabot, 89 N. Y. 570). In cases like the present, however, where the refusal to answer questions has been due to no act or objection of the party who calls the witness, the whole deposition should not be suppressed, unless it can be clearly seen that the questions to which answers were refused were material. The plaintiff was attempting to show that he would have succeeded in selling the bonds but for defendant's breach of its agreement. The most that he did show by the witness Trotter was that the witness and some other persons were disposed to look with favor upon the proposition, but that no decision to purchase had been arrived at, and that none would have been arrived at, in any event, without further examination and inquiry as to the organization of the shipbuilding company, its assets, and prospects of success. If Trotter had testified that any of these clients had agreed to take bonds, or had stated that they would take any particular amount, if the organization and assets of the company proved satisfactory, it would have been very material to ascertain who they were in order to test the accuracy of Trotter's evidence. But where there had been nothing but talk, resulting in no definite proposition, it was of slight importance with whom the talk was had, and the questions which sought to elicit their names were not sufficiently material to justify the suppression of the whole deposition because they were unanswered. If, under the same circumstances, the witness had been actually in court, and had refused to answer the questions, while he might have been punished for contumacy, it is doubtful whether the court would have felt justified in punishing the party who called him by striking out his whole testimony. Nor does it appear that the defendant could not have compelled the witness to answer the questions by proper application to an English court. Our own Code provides for such a case, and we have no reason to suppose that the courts in England do not exercise the same authority.
The order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion to suppress the deposition of the witness Trotter be denied, with $10 costs.
PATTERSON, P. J., concurs.