Case Name: The Union Distilling Co., Resp't, v. Henry Ruser, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-06-12
Citations: 39 N.Y. St. Rep. 128
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Union Distilling Co., Resp’t, v. Henry Ruser, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 39
Pages: 128–130

Head Matter:
The Union Distilling Co., Resp’t, v. Henry Ruser, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed June 12, 1891.)
Attachment—Affidavit.
An affidavit was made by a clerk in defendant’s store tl}at Ms,employer being absent from the store on account of illness, his attorney in fact had asked deponent to buy out the stock and goods at a very low price for cash, and upon his saying that it would look like fraud on creditors had called him a fool; and when deponent offered to buy if the creditors were notified, refused to do so, and also stating that defendant’s wife was directed by said attorney to draw all the money from the bank and not to leave any money in the safe, and that she had told a creditor that she had no money, and after paying him twenty-five dollars on account had said when he left the store that that was _ the last payment he would ever get. Held, sufficient to authorize the issuing of an attachment.
Plaintiff obtained an attachment against defendant on the ground that he was disposing of his property with the intention of defrauding his creditors, based upon the following affidavit:
“ Carl Sparr being duly sworn, says that he is acquainted with the defendant above named, and has been a clerk in his store at JSTo. 824 Third avenue, in the city of New York, for several years; that said defendant has been ill for some time past, and is now residing in Denver in the state of Colorado; that defendant’s representative in this city, Ludwig Buser, a brother of said defendant, who has a power of attorney from defendant to transact all business, came to deponent about April 10, 1891, and asked him to purchase all the stock and good will of defendant’s business, offering to sell the same for $1,300, much less than its real value, provided deponent would get the money at once and close the transaction; that deponent and said Ruser knew that several bills were shortly coming due, and deponent told said Ruser that such a transaction would look like a fraud on the creditors, whereupon said Ruser called deponent a fool, and told him that he didn’t know anything; that he should go home and get the money from his, deponent’s, wife, without any delay; but deponent believed that there was an attempt to swindle the creditors, and said he feared trouble, but would take the stock and business, provided the creditors were notified and consented, which offer Ruser declined; that defendant’s wife, who is also in said store, was directed to draw all the money from the bank by said Ruser, and not to leave any money in the safe on said premises; that defendant’s said wife has since carried all the receipts of said business about her person ; that on or about the lltn inst., a collector from Park & Til-ford’s called at said store to collect a bill due to said firm from defendant, and, although defendant’s wife had a considerable amount of money in her possession, she told said collector that she had no money; finally, after she had persisted for some time, she paid him twenty-five dollars on account of his bill, remarking in the hearing of defendant, as the said collector left the store that that was the last payment he would ever get; that many incidents lately occurring in said store, and in the management of the business, have convinced deponent that the defendant has determined not to return to Yew York, and to dispose of his stock and business with intent to defraud his creditors.”
Ludwig Ruser, for app’lt; Samuel E. Duffey, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Patterson, J.
—The motion to vacate the attachment was based on the papers upon which the warrant was granted, and the single question presented on this appeal relates to the sufficiency of the proof before the learned justice by whom the attachment was issued.
The general ground upon which the writ was allowed was that the defendant had disposed, or was about to dispose, of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, and an inspection of the affidavit used on the application shows that facts sufficient to support it were distinctly stated and by an affiant who, from his relation to the defendant and his opportunties of knowing the facts-to which he deposed, was competent to swear to them as within. his personal knowledge. That affiant (Sparr) was a clerk in the employ of the defendant who, being in ill health, went to Colorado, leaving a power of attorney with his brother to transact all business. That brother asked Sparr to purchase the business,, offering to sell it at much less than its real value if payment were made at once. Sparr told the defendant's brother that the proposal had the appearance of a fraud upon the defendant's creditors, and was reproached for his simplicity and told to go home and get the money, but declined to do so unless the defendant's-creditors were notified and consented, but the attorney in fact of the defendant declined to do that.
Thús it appears that the defendant, through his attorney in fact, was attempting in haste to realize money on the defendant's business, but this by itself may not be sufficient to make out a prima facie case. But the affidavit further proceeds to disclose facts-showing concealments of money of the defendant. The affiant swears, as within his own knowledge, that the defendant's wife was directed to draw all money from bank and not to leave any of it in the safe on the premises on which the defendant's business, was carried on ; that the defendant's wife has since then kept all the receipts of the business about her person, and that while having large amounts of money she has told creditors applying for payment of claims that she had none, and, finally, on paying a-trivial amount on account of a bill, she declared in the hearing of the affiant it was the last payment that creditor would ever get.
These facts, thus sworn to by a person cognizant of them, were-sufficient to authorize the judge to exercise his judgment as he •did exercise it, and the order must be affirmed, with costs.
Barrett, J., concurs.