Case Name: In the Matter of the Proceedings Pursuant to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of New York in Relation to Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1971-09-23
Citations: 29 N.Y.2d a
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Proceedings Pursuant to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of New York in Relation to Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 29
Pages: ?–?

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW YORK COURT ON THE JUDICIARY
In the Matter of the Proceedings Pursuant to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of New York in Relation to Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District.
September 23, 1971.
Present: Honorable Stanley H. Full, Presiding. Honorable John F. Scileppi Honorable Louis J. Capozzoli Honorable James D. Hopkins Honorable J. Clarence Herlihy Honorable Frank Del Yecchio

Opinion:
Request to Convene Court
On January 18,1971 Hon. Harold A. Stevens, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division -of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, under the authority vested in him by section 22 of article VI of the State Constitution, requested Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld to convene a Court on the Judiciary " to consider matters involving the conduct of Mitchell D. Schweitzer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New Yorh, First Judicial District". A letter of that date from Presiding Justice Stevens to the Chief Judge regd as folloivs:
" The New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control and Effect on Society, of which the Honorable John H. Hughes is Chairman, has conducted Legislative Hearings involving the Honorable Mitchell D. Schweitzer, a Justice of the Supreme Court in this Department. Recently, a more complete transcript of the hearings were sent to me and, I am informed, to you also as Chief Judge.
" Initially, upon receiving a digest of the testimony and with the consent of the Joint Legislative Committee to its release, I referred the matter to the Judiciary Relations Committee of this Department, of which the Honorable William C. Heoht, Jr. is chairman. This Committee was to investigate, study and make a report of its findings to this court. Within the past week an extensive transcript and digest of the legislative hearings was released by the Legislative Committee to the press. Because of the extensive publication of the charges as contained in the transcripts, it has been concluded, after consultation with my Associates, that the effectiveness of any action by the Judiciary Relations Committee has been impaired and that a wider forum is desirable in fairness to the Justice involved and for the protection of the integrity of the courts as well.
' ' Therefore, pursuant to Article 6, section 22, subdivision d, of the Constitution of the State of New York, I respectfully request that you as Chief Judge convene a Court on the Judiciary to consider the charges contained in the Legislative Report against the Honorable Mitchell D. Schweitzer, and make such disposition as in the opinion of such court is warranted. ' '
On January 21,1971, pursuant to Presiding Justice Steven's request and in accordance with section 22 (subd. d) of article VI of the New York State Constitution, Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld convened the Court on the Judiciary. The Court on the Judiciary is composed of Hon. Stanley H. Fuld, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, who is Presiding Officer of the Court on the Judiciary; Hon. John F. Scileppi, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals; Hon. Louis J. Capozzoli, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department; Hon. James D. Hopkins, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department; Hon. J. Clarence Herlihy, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, and Hon. Frank Del Vecchio, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department. Associate Judge John F. Scileppi was designated by order of the Court of Appeals to sit in the place of the Senior Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals due to the latter's absence at the time. Each of these Justices of the Appellate Division was designated as a member of the Court on the Judiciary by a concurrence of a majority of the Justices of his respective Appellate Division.
On February 12, 1971 the court sat, appointed Raymond J. Cannon as Clerk of the Court, and designated Lawrence E. Walsh of New York, New York, an attorney at law, to act as counsel to conduct the proceeding entitled: " In the Matter of the Proceedings pursuant to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of New York in Relation to Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District ".
Three subsequent sessions of the court were held at Albany on March 4, June 11 and September 2, 1971 at which Rules of Procedure were adopted, assistant counsel were appointed, counsel designated to conduct the proceeding was authorized to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers and documents and upon motion therefor an order was entered granting immunity to and directing two witnesses to testify after they had refused to answer questions on the ground that their testimony might incriminate them.
Rules of Procedure of Court on Judiciary
Rule I
The Chief Judge of the State of New York shall act as the presiding officer of this court. The death, sickness, resignation, removal from office, absence from the court or other disability of a member of the court shall not terminate its proceedings. If such a member is a member of the Court of Appeals, he may be replaced by a member of that court to be designated by that court. If such a member is a Justice of an Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, he shall be replaced by another member of the same Appellate Division designated by a concurrence of a majority of the Justices of such Appellate Division. If such member is not replaced within ten days, this court shall proceed to discharge its responsibilities in all respects notwithstanding such vacancy. In the absence, inability or disqualification of the Chief Judge, the Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals sitting as a member of this court shall act as presiding officer, and in his absence, inability or disqualification, the remaining members of the court shall elect a presiding officer.
Rule II
Four members of this court shall constitute a quorum. The affirmative concurrence of not less than four members of this court shall be necessary for a decision of removal, suspension pursuant to Rule X, or any decision finally concluding the proceedings before this court. Any other decision, ruling or determination may be made by a majority of the members present. A member shall not decide or take part in the decision of a question which was argued orally in the court when he was not present and sitting therein as a Judge. If a member is absent from a substantial part of a trial, the remaining members of the court may determine to complete the trial without his participation, in which event he shall not participate therein. A single member of the court may administer oaths and compel the production of books, papers, documents and records and the attendance of witnesses before the court or in any investigation conducted by counsel designated pursuant to Rule VI.
Rule HE
The court shall keep its records and hold its sessions, unless otherwise ordered by the court, at Court of Appeals Hall in the City of Albany. The hearings before this court shall be public. Any term of this court may be adjourned from day to day, or to a specified future day, by an entry in the minutes unless sooner convened by the presiding officer. Any member of this court may so adjourn a term thereof in the absence of a quorum.
Rule IV
The seal of the court shall be two and one quarter inches in diameter and shall consist of the device of the arms of the State of New York surrounded with the inscription: " State of New York Court on the Judiciary ". The clerk of the court shall have custody of the seal.
Rule V
The decisions, judgments, orders, notices and subpoenas of the court shall be attested by the clerk under the seal of the court.
Rule VI
Upon convening of the court, and thereafter as it determines, it may designate an attorney or attorneys at law to act as counsel to conduct the proceeding and designate a clerk, stenographer and such other officers and employees as it may deem necessary and appropriate.
Rule VII
Upon convening of the court or within a reasonable time thereafter, the presiding officer shall furnish to the other members of the court the request, complaint, evidence or information upon the basis of which he convened this court. The court shall thereafter determine whether further proceedings are warranted. If it concludes that they are not, an order shall be entered dismissing the proceeding. If the court concludes otherwise, it may authorize counsel to prepare charges, or it may authorize counsel to conduct such further investigation as it deems appropriate and thereafter to report thereon and to prepare charges. In conducting such investigation, counsel may be authorized to summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him and to compel the production of books, papers, documents and records. At the conclusion of such investigation or upon such date as the court may fix, counsel shall present charges or make such other report as may be appropriate. The court may thereupon determine preliminarily whether the charges state facts sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for removal. It may authorize further investigation prior to the preferral of charges, or order the proceeding dismissed.
Bum V1LL
If it is determined that charges should be preferred and that they are in a form fairly permitting an answer, the following action shall be taken:
(a) Notice of such charges and a copy thereof shall be personally served upon the Justice charged.
(b) The presiding officer shall give written notice to the Governor, the Temporary President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly of the name of the Justice against whom charges have been preferred, a copy of the charges and the date set for hearing them.
(c) A hearing on such charges shall be set not less than sixty days after service on the Justice charged and after the giving of notice pursuant to subparagraph (b).
Bum IX
The Justice charged shall within twenty days of such service file his answer with the clerk of the court and serve a copy upon the counsel designated by the court to conduct the proceeding, or move to dismiss such charges or for a clarification thereof. In the event of such a motion, the court shall make an appropriate determination and allow such further time for answer as it deems proper. If such charges are finally determined by the court to be insufficient to constitute cause for removal, the court shall dismiss them. The presiding officer shall give written notice of such dismissal to the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, and Effect on Society, the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division for the First Department, the Justice charged, the Governor, the Temporary President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly. If the charges are not dismissed, upon the filing of the respondent's answer or the expiration of time therefor, the court shall provide for a trial of the charges on the date set for hearing or any subsequent date which may be fixed by the presiding officer.
Rule X
At any time after service of such charges this court in its discretion may suspend the Justice charged from the exercise of his- office pending the determination of the removal proceeding. Such order of suspension shall remain in effect notwithstanding the commencement of proceedings before the legislature relating to the same charges.
Rule XI
If within thirty days after receipt of the notice to the Temporary President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly pursuant to Rule VIII, a member of the- legislature prefers substantially the same charges against the respondent, the requirement for the respondent to answer shall be suspended and, except as otherwise provided in Rule X, all proceedings in this court shall be stayed pending its further order. If prior to the date set for hearing pursuant to Rule VIII such charges are entertained by a majority vote of the Assembly, such stay shall continue pending the conclusion of the proceedings of the legislature relating to such charges. Upon final determination by the legislature, the proceedings herein shall be dismissed.
Rule XII
1. If any witness refuses to answer a question or to produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be incriminated thereby, the court may, upon request of the counsel designated to conduct the proceeding, if it deems it necessary and proper, order such person to answer the question or produce the evidence, If such person complies with the order, and if, but for this rule, he would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by him, then immunity shall be conferred upon him, as provided in Section 22 (f) of Article VI of the Constitution of the State of New York.
2. " Immunity " as used in this rule means such person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order, he gave answer or produced evidence, and that no such answer given or evidence produced shall be received against him upon any criminal proceeding. But he may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury or contempt committed in answering, or failing to answer, or in producing or failing to produce evidence, in accordance with the order, and any such answer given or evidence produced shall be admissible against him upon any criminal proceeding concerning such perjury or contempt.
Bulb XIII
The fees and mileage of witnesses attending under subpoena shall be the same as provided for witnesses in an action in the Supreme Court in the county in which they are required to appear and such witnesses shall not be entitled to prepayment thereof. The comptroller shall pay such fees and mileage after audit upon the certificate of the clerk.
On September 23, 1971 the Court on the Judiciary met in Albany at which session charges were presented to the court by counsel designated to conduct the proceedings based upon his investigation and, the court having determined preliminarily, pursuant to Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the Court on the Judiciary, that said charges state facts sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for removal of respondent Mitchell D. Schweitzer and are in a form fairly permitting an answer, it was directed that said charges be preferred against Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District, by the service upon him of the Notice of Charges and Charges, with opportunity for him to answer within 20 days.
Charges
I. Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify THE IMPRESSION THAT NATHAN VOLOSHEN COULD IMPROPERLY INFLUENCE HIM AND UNDULY ENJOY HIS FAVOR.
1. From 1960 through 1969, Justice Schweitzer openly and publicly accepted the entertainment and close friendship of Nathan Voloshen. During this period and prior thereto Voloshen's primary occupation was that of a professional influence-peddler.
2. Justice Schweitzer knew, or with the exercise of care should have known, the true nature of Voloshen's business and activities, in that:
(a) Voloshen intensified his cultivation of Justice Schweitzer after Justice Schweitzer became a Judge of the Court of General Sessions. After Justice Schweitzer became a Justice of the Supreme Court, Voloshen entertained him publicly almost weekly.
(b) As early as 1960, Voloshen disclosed the illicit nature of his activities when he, with Justice Schweitzer's knowledge, arranged for Justice Schweitzer to receive a substantial gift of shrubs from Theodore Kordus, a nurseryman who Justice Schweitzer knew was seeking, with Voloshen's assistance, improper governmental influence in connection with a State condemnation proceeding.
(c) Justice Schweitzer knew that Voloshen's " public relations " business consisted of getting favorable action for his clients from governmental agencies and, in connection therewith, cultivating friendship with influential persons in government.
(d) In 1966 and thereafter, Voloshen, who Justice Schweitzer knew was not a practicing attorney in the State of New York, arranged meetings between Justice Schweitzer and lawyers who had matters pending before him and before other Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
3. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the aforesaid facts, Justice. Schweitzer continued his relationship with Voloshen and continued to be his public guest for restaurant dinners and other entertainment.
4. After Voloshen came under investigation for influence-peddling by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and by a Grand Jury of that District, Justice Schweitzer continued to dine with him publicly, to counsel with him, and, on at least one occasion, to participate with him in questioning a witness who was about to testify before the Grand Jury about Voloshen.
5. Between September 1, 1968 and March 11, 1969, after the intercession of Voloshen, Justice Schweitzer intervened with various New York State officials on behalf of Manuel Bello, a prisoner reputed to be an agent of an organized criminal syndicate. After these efforts proved unsuccessful, Justice Schweitzer released the prisoner on specious legal and humanitarian grounds. In order to do this he knowingly misled an Assistant District Attorney by withholding facts in order to get his consent to part of his determination.
6. After a meeting arranged by Voloshen between Justice Schweitzer and defense counsel, Stanley Reiben, Justice Schweitzer on May 12,1969, without any presentence investigation, resentenced and released from prison Raymond Freda, who was serving consecutive sentences for several misdemeanors. Freda had been previously convicted of separate and successive charges of robbery from the person, burglary and bank robbery. Freda was believed by the FBI to be " the most notorious criminal in New Jersey ", and was believed by other law enforcement authorities to be implicated in several bank burglaries and armed robberies in addition to those for which he was convicted and in schooling young persons in criminal practices.
7. By his relationship with Voloshen and by the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to keep his official conduct free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and failed to maintain his personal behavior beyond reproach, in violation of Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
(b) Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify the impression that certain persons could improperly influence him and unduly enjoy his favor, in violation of Canon 13.
(c) Justice Schweitzer permitted private interviews, arguments and communications designed to influhis judicial action, in violation of Canon 17.
(d) Justice Schweitzer used the power of his office and the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others, in violation of Canon 25.
(e) Justice Schweitzer failed to refrain from relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that these relations warped and biased his judgment and prevented his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties, in violation of Canon 26.
(f) Justice Schweitzer accepted presents and favors from a person directly or indirectly practicing before him, in violation of Canon 32.
(g) Justice Schweitzer was not careful to avoid action which might tend to awaken the suspicion that his social relations and friendships constitute an element influencing his judicial conduct, in violation of Canon 33.
(h) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach; he did not administer justice according to law; and he allowed his private interests and those of his friends to interfere with the performance of his judicial duties, in violation of Canon 34.
II. In the case oe People v. Manuel Bello, Justice Schweitzer conspired with Nathan Voloshen to OBSTRUCT JUSTICE AND, IN EURTHERANCE OE THAT CONSPIRACY, DID OBSTRUCT JUSTICE.
8. On October 25, 1967, Manuel Bello pleaded guilty before Justice Schweitzer to the crime of attempted concealment and withholding of stolen securities. On December 11, 1967, he was sentenced by Justice Schweitzer to State prison for a term of from one year and three months minimum to two years and six months maximum. Under, such a sentence he was eligible for parole consideration in ten months.
9. On July 5, 1968, Bello's counsel moved for resentence on the ground that the defendant had been suffering from a chronic coronary ailment, that this fact had not been brought to the attention of Justice Schweitzer at time of sentence and that the defendant was currently suffering from this disease in prison. On July 22, 1968, Justice Schweitzer summarily denied this motion.
10. In late August, 19.68, Voloshen first became active on behalf of Bello. On and after that date he and Justice Schweitzer, with intent to obstruct justice and to obstruct the proper administration of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, the Office of the District Attorney of New York County, and the New York State Division of Parole, and with intent to obstruct and interfere with the administration of law and the proper performance by public servants of their official functions, agreed and conspired to secure Bello's release from prison.
11. Thereafter and in pursuance of that agreement:
(a) In the months of September through November, 1968, Justice Schweitzer, on the basis of substantially the same information submitted to him on Bello's motion for resentence, which he had summarily denied, interceded on behalf of Bello with the Division of Parole and the Commissioner of Correction.
(b) In December, 1968, after having been paid a substantial sum of money on behalf of Bello, Yoloshen retained Henry Blumenthal to represent Bello in bringing a motion coram nobis to set aside his plea of guilty on the claim that Bello had not realized that he had pleaded to a felony.
(c) In mid-January, 1969, Yoloshen arranged a meeting between Justice Schweitzer, Henry Blumenthal and Yoloshen in order to discuss the coram nobis motion to be made before Justice Schweitzer. At this meeting or a subsequent meeting, Justice Schweitzer told Blumenthal that there were no valid grounds for permitting the withdrawal of the plea of guilty, but that Bello might prevail on " humanitarian " grounds.
(d) The motion was submitted by Blumenthal on February 5, 1969 and Bello was ordered to be produced in New York for a hearing on March 11,1969.
(e) While Bello was in New York awaiting his hearing, Bello complained of the subjective symptoms of a heart attack and was sent to Bellevue Hospital, where he was examined and treated by its staff. Blumenthal and Yoloshen arranged to have the prisoner there examined by Yoloshen's personal physician, pursuant to an ex parte order of Justice Schweitzer.
(f) On March 11,1969, the date of the motion, Justice Schweitzer prevailed upon an Assistant District Attorney unfamiliar with the case to undertake to consent to the motion for the withdrawal of Bello's plea of guilty by disclosing to him only those facts favorable to the motion.
(g) After Bello's plea was withdrawn, he again pleaded guilty to the same crime. Although Justice Schweitzer could have reimposed the same sentence or a longer sentence, he resentenced Bello to time already served and released him forthwith. He did this on specious ' ' humanitarian ' ' grounds without any presentence investigation, solely on the basis of the report of Voloshen's personal physician and without questioning any treating physician or examining the records of Bellevue Hospital, which contradicted Bello's medical claim.
12. In his conduct of this case, Justice Schweitzer, pursuant to his agreement with Voloshen, knowingly released a person previously reported to him by the Probation Department and the State Division of Parole to be a reputed member of a criminal syndicate and the operator of a cocktail lounge at which liquor and narcotics were sold to minors. By so doing, he obstructed justice as administered by his own court, obstructed and interfered with the proper administration of law and obstructed and interfered with the administration of the New York State Division of Parole, which had denied parole after a review of Bello's criminal background and medical claims. In so doing, he dealt deceitfully with the Assistant District Attorney who was relying on his candor and obstructed and interfered with the administration of the Office of the District Attorney of New York County.
13. By these acts Justice Schweitzer, with intent to obtain. a benefit for Bello and Voloshen, committed acts relating to his office which constituted an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that these acts were unauthorized, and refrained from performing a duty which was imposed upon him by law and which was inherent in the nature of his office.
14. By his agreement with Voloshen and by the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to avoid infractions of law (Penal Law, § 105.00, 195.00 and 195.05), in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer failed to keep his official conduct free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and failed to maintain his personal behavior beyond reproach, in violation of Canon 4.
(c) Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify the impression that certain persons could improperly influence him and unduly enjoy his favor, in violation of Canon 13.
(d) Justice Schweitzer permitted private interviews, arguments and communications designed to influence his judicial action, in violation of Canon 17.
(e) Justice Schweitzer used the power of his office and the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others, in violation of Canon 25.
(f) Justice Schweitzer was not careful to avoid action which might tend to awaken the suspicion that his social relations and friendships constitute an element influencing his judicial conduct, in violation of Canon 33.
(g) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach; he- did not administer justice according to law; and he allowed his private interests and those of his friends to interfere with the performance of his judicial duties, in violation of Canon 34.
III. In the case of People v. Michael Raymond, Justice Schweitzer and Stanley Polley conspired to OBSTRUCT JUSTICE AND, IN FURTHERANCE OF THAT CONSPIRACY, DID OBSTRUCT JUSTICE.
15. On October 26, 1956 Michael Raymond pleaded guilty before Justice Schweitzer to three counts of grand larceny in the first degree. The amount of the larceny was over $80,000. In order to permit Raymond to make restitution, sentence was adjourned to May 20, 1957 and Raymond was placed under probation supervision. Raymond had submitted securities worth approximately $25,000 to his attorney as part of the restitution and had also deposited with the Probation Department $11,000, part of which consisted of two checks each in the amount of $5,000.
16. In a series of reports submitted by the Probation Department during February, March and May of 1957, Justice Schweitzer was informed that Raymond had only superficially complied with the reporting requirements of the Probation Department, that he had failed to comply with the restitution order that required monthly payments; that he had failed to give credible evidence of legitimate employment, and that while under probation supervision he had been arrested for the issuance of three checks forged under an assumed name. The Probation Department also reported to Justice Schweitzer that the two $5,000 checks given to commence restitution had both been returned for lack of funds. In February the Department requested advice from Justice Schweitzer as to whether Raymond's appearance for sentence should be accelerated and subsequently requested a warrant for Raymond's arrest.
17. In early March, 1957 Raymond met with Stanley Polley, a nonlawyer and personal friend of Justice Schweitzer. On that occasion Raymond agreed to pay Polley to exert improper influence on Justice Schweitzer in order to delay Raymond's commitment and in order to secure a light sentence. Thereafter Raymond did in fact pay Polley $25,000 for this purpose.
18. In early March, 1957 Justice Schweitzer, Stanley Polley and Michael Raymond, with intent to obstruct justice and the due administration of the laws of the State of New York, agreed and conspired to delay Raymond's sentence and to obtain for Raymond a lenient sentence.
19. In pursuance of said agreement:
(a) In early March, 1957, Stanley Polley spoke with Justice Schweitzer by telephone.
(b) In early March, 1957, Stanley Polley and Michael Raymond drove to the Concourse Plaza Hotel at which time Stanley Polley spoke with Justice Schweitzer.
(c) On or about March 11, 1957, Justice Schweitzer granted Michael Raymond a 60-day adjournment of sentence.
(d) From on or about May 13, 1957 to May 23, 1958, Justice Schweitzer granted successive adjournments of the sentence of Michael Raymond in disregard of consistent reports by the Probation Department that Raymond had refused to give them credible evidence of legitimate employment.
(e) On June 25, 1958, notwithstanding consistent adverse reports concerning the activities of Michael Raymond as well as a criminal indictment returned against Raymond for crimes committed during the period of his probation supervision, Justice Schweitzer imposed on Raymond concurrent sentences of only eight months on each of the three counts of grand larceny in the original case and on one count of petty larceny in the subsequent separate indictment, thus enabling Raymond to be paroled in four and a half months.
20. By his agreement with Stanley Polley and Michael Raymond and by the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to avoid infractions of law (former Penal Law, § 580), in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer in his official conduct failed to keep himself free of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of Canon 4.
(c) Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify the impression that certain persons could improperly influence him and unduly enjoy his favor, in violation of Canon 13.
(d) Justice Schweitzer failed to refrain from relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that these relations warped and biased his judgment and prevented his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties, in violation of Canon 13.
(e) Justice Schweitzer was not careful to avoid action which might tend to awaken the suspicion that his social relations and friendships constitute an element influencing his judicial conduct, in violation of Canon 33.
(f) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach; he did not administer justice according to law; and he allowed his private interests and those of his friends to interfere with the performance of his judicial duties, in violation of Canon 34.
IV. In the case op Schine v. Schine, Justice Schweitzer ATTEMPTED TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE.
21. Schine v. Schine, a matrimonial case, was pending in the Supreme Court of New York County in April, 1968, but not before Justice Schweitzer. Mrs. Schine was represented by Jacob Rappoport, a close friend of Justice Schweitzer ; Mr. Schine was represented by Richard Weis.
22. Immediately before trial was to commence, at the request of his friends Jacob Rappoport and Nathan Voloshen, Justice Schweitzer appeared at a restaurant meeting of Weis, Rappoport and Voloshen and attempted to coerce a settlement favorable to Rappoport's client.
23. On April 29, 1968, Justice Schweitzer, in a restaurant and in full view of the parties and their attorneys, made a public display of meeting privately with the Justice assigned to the case, thereby giving the appearance that he was interceding further in the matter.
24. By his relationship with Jacob Rappoport and Nathan Voloshen and the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer in his official conduct failed to keep himself free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify the impression that certain persons could improperly influence him and unduly enjoy his favor, in violation of Canon 13.
(e) Justice Schweitzer used the power of his office and the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others, in violation of Canon 25.
V. Justice Schweitzer improperly interceded with STATE AGENCIES ON BEHALF OF OTHERS.
25. In the case of Manuel Bello, Justice Schweitzer, at the request of Nathan Voloshen, interceded both with the Correction Department to assist Bello to develop evidence favorable to his release and with the Division of Parole to obtain favorable consideration for Bello's release.
26. In the case of Leo D'Angelo, Justice Schweitzer, at the request of his friends William Levine and Henry Garfinkle, interceded with the Division of Parole in order to relax the supervision of D'Angelo's parole contrary to the accepted practice of said Division.
27. In the case of Corey Feldman, who was sentenced in Nassau County by another Judge, Justice Schweitzer, at the request of his friend Samuel Goldberg, interceded with the Correction Department to arrange Feldman's transfer from Elmira Reformatory to Greenhaven Prison.
28. By the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to keep his official conduct free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer suffered his conduct to justify the impression that certain persons could improperly influence him and unduly enjoy his favor, in violation of Canon 13.
(c) Justice Schweitzer was not careful to avoid action which might tend to awaken the suspicion that his social relationships and friendships constitute an element influencing his judicial conduct, in violation of Canon 33.
(d) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach, in violation of Canon 34.
VI. Justice Schweitzer's private business activities WERE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES.
A. Justice Schweitzer Acted Inconsistently With His Judicial Office by Engaging in Money Lending Activities.
29. At least since 1963, Justice Schweitzer was extended substantial unsecured loans by the Royal National Bank, at the prime interest rate or below it, and from time to time reloaned this money at substantially higher interest rates to money lenders, for second mortgages and for taxicab chattel mortgages. He also used the proceeds of these loans to buy securities. In order to borrow for these purposes he made false statements as to the purpose of these loans.
30. By the acts heretofore described :
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to keep his official conduct free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and failed to maintain his personal behavior beyond reproach, in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer incurred obligations which appeared to interfere and be inconsistent with the proper administration of his judicial functions, in violation of Canon 24.
(c) Justice Schweitzer used the power of his office and the influence of his name to promote his own private interests and the private interests of others, in violation of Canon 25.
(d) Justice Schweitzer was not careful to avoid action which might tend to awaken suspicion that his social and business relations and friendships constitute an element influencing his judicial conduct, in violation of Canon 33.
(e) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach, in violation of Canon 34.
B. Justice Schweitzer's Substantial Interests in Taxicab and Finance Companies Were Incompatible With Membership in a Court Before Which Such Enterprises Were Frequent Litigants.
31. Prior to becoming a Judge, Justice Schweitzer was an active taxicab fleet operator. He continued his beneficial interest in a sizeable fleet during the first five years of his service on the Municipal Court. Thereafter, he continued to hold chattel mortgages on a substantial number of taxicabs from time to time. In addition, while on the Supreme Court, he made substantial loans to local finance companies.
32. By the acts heretofore described:
(a) Justice Schweitzer failed to keep his official conduct free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of Canon 4.
(b) Justice Schweitzer incurred obligations which appeared to interfere and be inconsistent with the proper administration of his judicial functions, in violation of Canon 24.
(c) Justice Schweitzer made personal investments in enterprises which were apt to be involved in litigation in the court of which he was a member, in violation of Canon 26.
(d) Justice Schweitzer did not maintain his conduct above reproach, in violation of Canon 34.
VII. Although afforded the opportunity to explain his conduct, Justice Schweitzer has failed to do so AND HE HAS NOT BEEN CANDID IN HIS SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON CRIME, BEFORE THE GrRAND JURY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT Court for the Southern District of New York, and BEFORE COUNSEL DESIGNATED BY THIS COURT.
33. With respect to Nathan Voloshen:
(a) Justice Schwitzer claims that although he had dinner with him almost weekly for over five years he never once inquired as to what Voloshen actually did for his " public relations " clients or for any one of them and that Voloshen never told him what he actually did.
(b) Justice Schweitzer has given conflicting and evasive testimony as to Theodore Kordus ' desire for his assistance, the size of Kordus' gift and the implicit purpose of the gift.
(c) Justice Schweitzer has given conflicting and evasive testimony as to his conversations with Voloshen regarding the case of Manuel Bello in an effort to exclude or minimize his participation with Voloshen in conversations with Bello's lawyer, Henry Blumenthal, and his prior knowledge of the desire of certain Massachusetts Congressmen to obtain favorable consideration for Bello.
(d) In May, 1971, while being examined by the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Justice Schweitzer caused Elmer Reeves, Chief Probation Officer of New York County, to prepare and file an exculpatory statement of Justice Schweitzer's handling of the resentence of Raymond Freda, even though Justice Schweitzer knew that the Probation Department had made no investigation of Freda and that Reeves had no knowledge regarding Freda which would support the statement or the impression intended to be created by the statement.
(e) Justice Schweitzer has given conflicting and evasive testimony in order to minimize his participation with Voloshen in the preparation of Voloshen's attempted defense when under investigation by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
(f) Justice Schweitzer has,_ given conflicting and • evasive testimony with respect to the size and frequency of gifts from Nathan Voloshen.
34. With respect to Stanley Polley and Michael Raymond, Justice Schweitzer has denied any recollection whatever of the Michael Raymond case, although it was pending before him for approximately two full years, from June 25, 1956 to June 25, 1958.
35. With respect to Jacob Rappoport, Justice Schweitzer has given conflicting and evasive testimony in an effort to minimize and distort his participation in Rappoport's effort to use Justice Schweitzer's judicial power and prestige to coerce a settlement from Rappoport's opponent.
36. Justice Schweitzer has given evasive testimony with respect to the extent of his efforts to relax the supervision of Leo D'Angelo's parole.
Lawrence E. Walsh
Counsel
Order of Suspension
Pursuant to the authority conferred on the Court on the Judiciary by section 22 (subd. d) of article VI of the State Constitution and, in accordance with Rule X of the Rules of Procedure of the Court on the Judiciary, it was ordered that Mitchell D. Schweitzer be suspended without pay from the exercise of his office, subject to the right of said Mitchell D. Schweitzer to receive the salary of his office during t%e period of this suspension in the event of the ultimate dismissal of the charges herein preferred or to be preferred, such suspension to become effective immediately upon service of the Notice of Charges, the Charges and the order of suspension. The Order of Suspension recited:
" Upon hearing Lawrence E. Walsh, counsel designated to conduct these proceedings, and upon his report herein and the charges preferred herein, it is hereby
' ' ordered, pursuant to section 22 (subd. d) of article VI of the Constitution a/nd Rule X of the Rules of Procedure of this Court that Mitchell D. Schweitzer be and he hereby is suspended without pay from the exercise of his office pending the conclusion of these proceedings, subject to the right of said Mitchell D. Schweitzer to receive the salary of his office during the period of this suspension in the event of the ultimate dismissal of the charges herein preferred or to be preferred; and it is further
" ordered that such suspension shall take effect immediately upon service of the charges herein with a copy of this order."
Notice op Charges Preferred
By letter dated September 23, 1971 Stanley H. Fuld, Presiding Judge of the Court on the Judiciary, informed the Governor of the State of New York, the Lieutenant Governor, the Temporary President pf the New York State Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly (see N. Y. Const., art. VI, § 22, subd. e) that charges had been preferred against Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District, by the service upon him [on September 23,1971] of a copy of charges for removal; that the Court on the Judiciary, pursuant to Bule VII of its Buies, had determined that such charges stated facts sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for removal of respondent Mitchell D. Schweitzer and were in a form fairly permitting an answer; that the court had directed that a copy thereof be served upon him with an opportunity to answer within 20 days; that the court had ordered that the said Mitchell D. Schweitzer be suspended without pay from the exercise of his office, subject to the right to receive the salary of his office during the period of suspension in the event of ultimate dismissal of the charges preferred or to be preferred, and that the court had set December 13,1971 at 2:00 p.m. as the date for the hearing of the charges. Said letter read as.follows:
" Pursuant to section 22 (d) of article 6 of the Constitution, notice is hereby given that:
" (1) By letter dated January 18,1971, Hon. Harold A. Stevens, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, under the authority vested in him by section 22 (d) of the Constitution requested me as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to convene the Court on the Judiciary to consider matters involving the conduct of Mitchell D. Schweitzer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial District;
" (2) On January 21, 1971, I, as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals convened the Court on the Judiciary as required by section 22 (d) of article 6 of the Constitution;
" (3) The Court on the Judiciary is composed of Hon. Stanley H. Fuld, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, who is Presiding Officer of the Court on the Judiciary; Hon. John F. Scileppi, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals; Hon. Louis J. Capozzoli, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department; Hon. James D. Hopkins, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department; Hon. J. Clarence Herlihy, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, and Hon. Frank Del Vecchio, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department. Associate Judge F. Scileppi was designated by order of the Court of Appeals to sit in the place of the Senior Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals due to the latter's absence at the time. Each of these Justices of the Appellate Division was designated as a member of the Court on the Judiciary by a concurrence of a majority of the Justices of his respective Appellate Division;
" (4) The court sat on February 12,1971, appointed Raymond J. Cannon, Clerk of the Court, and designated Lawrence E. Walsh of New York, New York, an attorney at law, to act as counsel to conduct proceedings entitled: ' In the Matter of the Proceedings pursuant to Section 22 of Article 6 of the Constitution in relation to Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District ';
" (5) Three subsequent sessions of the Court were held at Albany on March 4, June 11 and September 2, 1971 at which Rules of Procedure were adopted, Assistant Counsel were appointed, Counsel Designated to Conduct the Proceeding was authorized to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers and documents and upon motion therefor an order was entered granting immunity to and directing two witnesses to testify after they had refused to answer questions on the ground that their testimony might incriminate them.
" (6) Thereafter, and on September 23, 1971 the said Court on the Judiciary met in Albany at which session Charges were presented to the Court by Counsel Designated to Conduct the Proceedings based upon his investigation and, the Court having determined preliminarily, pursuant to Rule VII of the Rules heretofore adopted, that said Charges state facts sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for removal of respondent Mitchell D. Schweitzer and are in a form fairly permitting an answer, it was directed that said Charges be preferred against Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District by the service upon him of the Notice of Charges and Charges, a copy of each of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, with opportunity for him to answer within twenty (20) days.
" (7) Pursuant to the authority conferred on the Court on the Judiciary by section 22 (d) of the Constitution and, in accordance with Bule X of the Buies of Procedure adopted herein, it was ordered that said Mitchell D. Schweitzer be suspended without pay from the exercise of his office, subject to right of said Mitchell D. Schweitzer to receive the salary of his office during the period of this suspension in the event of the ultimate dismissal of the charges herein preferred or to be preferred, such suspension to become effective immediately upon service of the Notice of Charges, the Charges and thé order of suspension.
" (8) The Court on the Judiciary has fixed December 13,1971 at 2 p.m. as the date for a hearing of the charges in accordance with section 22 (e) of the Constitution."
The order of the court recited:
"Lawrence E. Walsh, ,counsel designated to conduct these proceedings, pursuant to Bule VII of the Buies of Procedure, reported to the Court concerning his investigation and having presented to the Court Charges based upon said investigation,
"And the Court having found preliminarily, and without prejudice to an appropriate motion by respondent to dismiss for lack of sufficiency thereof, that such charges state facts sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for the removal from office of Mitchell D. Schweitzer, that said Charges should be preferred, and that said Charges are in a form fairly permitting an answer, it is hereby
" ordered, that counsel designated to conduct these proceedings be and hereby is directed to have served personally upon Mitchell D. Schweitzer notice of such Charges and a copy thereof, and it is further
" ordered, that a hearing on said Charges shall, be held at the Court of Appeals Hall in the City of Albany on the 13th day of December, 1971, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon or as soon thereafter as the proceedings may be heard."
Motion for Reconsideration
On November 22,1971 the Court on the Judiciary meeting at Albany granted a motion made on behalf of Mitchell D. Schweitzer for reconsideration of the court's decision and order entered September 23,1971 and upon such consideration adhered to the original decision. The order of the court read as follows:
A motion having been made on behalf of Mitchell D. Schweitzer, the respondent herein, for reconsideration of the court's decision and order entered September 23, 1971 insofar as respondent is therein suspended without pay from the exercise of his office of Justice of the Supreme Court, First Judicial District, pending the conclusion of these proceedings, subject to his right to receive the salary of his office during the period of this suspension in the event of the ultimate dismissal of the charges herein preferred or to be preferred, and, upon such reconsideration, for an order striking the provision suspending respondent without pay, and, papers having been submitted in support of the motion and in opposition thereto, it is
Ordered, that the motion for reconsideration be, and the same hereby is, granted and, upon such reconsideration, the original decision is adhered to.
The court's decision Per Curiam read:
Per Curiam.
In its order of September 23, 1971, this court, having found, " preliminarily," that the charges of misconduct filed against the respondent " state fact sufficient, if true, to constitute cause for removal," ordered that he be suspended without pay. The respondent now moves for reconsideration of that order. In our view, section 22 of article VI of the State Constitution, as well as the rules of this court, authorizes the Court on the Judiciary to suspend without pay a Judge or Justice following the filing of charges of misconduct against him. The court does, .of course, have discretion to provide for the payment of salary during the period of suspension on a proper showing. We would only add that, if the facts adduced upon the hearing do not establish cause for removal of the respondent, he will be entitled to his salary from the date of his suspension.
The motion for reconsideration should be granted and, upon such reconsideration, the original decision adhered to.
This reference and all subsequent reference to the Canons are references to the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the New York State Bar Association, January 29, 1909, as amended.