Case Name: James P. GRANT and Audrey S. Grant, Appellants, v. Bobby STRICKLAND et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-06-30
Citations: 385 So. 2d 1123
Docket Number: No. NN-205
Parties: James P. GRANT and Audrey S. Grant, Appellants, v. Bobby STRICKLAND et al., Appellees.
Judges: LARRY G. SMITH, J,, specially concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 385
Pages: 1123–1130

Head Matter:
James P. GRANT and Audrey S. Grant, Appellants, v. Bobby STRICKLAND et al., Appellees.
No. NN-205.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 30, 1980.
W. J. Oven, Jr., Tallahassee, for appellants.
John H. Cotten of Cotten, Shivers, Gwynn, Daniel, Kelley & Arrington, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from a final judgment following a non-jury trial denying their claim that they had acquired by adverse possession without color of title a certain strip of land located in Wakulla County, Florida. We affirm.
Because appellants' claim is not under color of title, it was necessary that they establish continuous, unbroken adverse possession for a period of seven years by clear and convincing evidence showing either that the boundary strip they claim was substantially enclosed or usually cultivated or improved. Additionally, since appellants did not show that they returned the disputed land for taxes, it was necessary that their adverse claim mature seven years before June 5, 1939, the date the statute was amended requiring the land to be so returned.
Although appellants argued the disputed strip was cultivated for the required seven years, evidence on that point was conflicting, at best, and, as it was a question for the trier of facts, we do not disturb the trial court's finding. One claiming adverse possession must prove each essential element of the claim "by clear and positive proof . . . ." The claim cannot be "established by loose, uncertain testimony which necessitates resort to mere conjecture." Appellants' claim is based primarily upon the fact that a substantial fence ran along the property's northern boundary for more than seven years. While their evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the fence ran north of the true boundary separating the parties' properties for the requisite seven-year period, there was no showing by clear and convincing proof that either appellants' property or the disputed strip was protected by a substantial enclosure on all sides during the period. Appellants' witnesses testified without contradiction that their predecessors' fence ran along the south edge of a county road as far back as 1912 and until 1921; yet their testimony conflicted on whether the fence was joined by fences or natural barriers on other sides of the disputed property.
To enclose is variously defined as "a: to close in . . .: surround . .; specif.: to fence off or in (common land) in order to appropriate to individual use . " The statute's requirement that land claimed adversely be substantially enclosed is not complied with when it is fenced on only one of its borders. Natural barriers, such as navigable water, may suffice to provide part of a substantial enclosure. There may also be gaps in the enclosure; such interruptions however do not dissipate the substantial character of the enclosure so long as "there was for the full statutory period a conspicuous effort to maintain a fence around the land . for the obvious purpose of exercising rights of ownership" to the exclusion of all others (e. s.). The evidence here was lacking that appellants or their predecessors made a "conspicuous effort" to enclose the disputed land so as to provide notice that their possession was to the exclusion of the rights of all others.
From this record we cannot say that the trial judge, acting as trier of fact, erred in concluding that appellants had not overcome the statutory presumption that one holding "legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed of it within the time prescribed by law."
LARRY G. SMITH, J,, specially concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents.
. Section 95.18(1), Fla.Stat. (1975).
. Hyer v. Griffin, 55 Fla. 560, 46 So. 635 (1908).
.Section 95.18(2), and see § 95.16(2).
. Ch. 19254, Section 1, Laws of Florida (1939).
. Compare, Kerrigan v. Thomas, 281 So.2d 410, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
. Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57, 64 (Fla.1958).
. Id.
. The dissent's assertion that it is unfair or without basis in Florida law to require either that the boundary strip be "substantially enclosed" or that the appellants' lands contiguous to the disputed strip be substantially enclosed with it is not well taken. Proof of adverse possession under color of title is met with proof that lands of the claimant contiguous to the disputed strip were substantially enclosed with the disputed strip for the statutory period. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. California Chemical Co., 210 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Kerrigan v. Thomas, 281 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Meyer v. Law, 287 So.2d 37 (Fla.1973); 1974 Laws of Florida, § 74-382; Seddon v. Harpster, 369 So.2d 662, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Surely proof requirements under § 95.-18 are no less exacting.
. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unab. ed. 1967).
. See Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912); Porter v. Lorene Invest. Co., 297 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
. Tampa Mortg. & Title Co. v. Smythe, 109 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959).
. Baugher v. Boley, supra, at 984.
. The question of whether a fence constitutes a substantial enclosure is normally one for the jury. Wilson v. Tanner, 346 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
. Section 95.13.