Case Name: Peter Fisher v. G. A. Foote
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 311
Docket Number: 
Parties: Peter Fisher v. G. A. Foote.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 311–318

Head Matter:
Peter Fisher v. G. A. Foote.
A judgment in personam operates as a lien, not by reason of the cause of action upon which it was rendered, but by force of a statute which makes judgments a lien upon the real estate of the debtor within the county from the date of its rendition. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 3903, 3954, Notes 935, 936.) But the purchaser at sheriff’s sale takes subject to recorded mortgages in the vendor’s name. The vendor’s lien, not having been asserted, gave no additional effect to the sale under the execution, and the judgment lien being subsequent, and consequently subordinate to the mortgage, the purchaser at the sale under execution took subject to the rights of the mortgagee, and the equity of redemption having been concluded by the decree of foreclosure, it results that the purchaser at the sale under the decree took the title, unaffected by the lien of the judgment and the sale under execution.
Appeal from Collin. The case was tried before Hon. H. M. Burford, one of the district judges.
The case turned upon the facts and the charge of the court.
Foote, the appellee, sued appellant, Fisher, to quiet title to a half section of land, and obtained judgment-, from which Fisher appealed.
On the 22d July, 1855, Fisher sold the land in question to one Moses Brown for $1,000; $500 cash, and note for $500. Brown was about to leave the State, and attempted to sell the land to one John C. Taylor, but Taylor refused to close the trade unless Brown first adjusted and settled his indebtedness upon said land to Fisher. At the instance and with the knowledge of Brown, Fisher agreed to take Taylor’s note for $500, balance of the purchase-money due by Brown' on the land sold by Fisher to him, and to give Brown a receipt therefor, and thereupon Taylor executed the following note, to wit:
“ $500. One day after date, I promise to pay Peter Fisher, Jr., five hundred dollars, for value received of him, bearing ten per cent, interest from date. As witness my hand and
seal, January 2, 1856.
J. C. Taylor, [l. s.]”
And Fisher executed the following receipt, to wit:
“ Received of J. 0. Taylor five hundred dollars for Moses Brown, my account against him in full up to this date, January 2, 1856. Peter Fisher, Jr.”
On the 1st January, 1856, Brown executed a deed to Taylor for the land in question; on the same day Taylor executed a mortgage to Brown to secure the purchase-money on the same land. Taylor having failed to pay the note, Fisher sued and obtained judgment against him in April, 1857; execution issued 6th May, 1857, and returned with payments of $336. Alias execution issued 9th November, 1857; levied on same land 2d December,
1857, and sold 5th January, 1858, to Peter Fisher, the appellant; sheriff’s deed, 6th January, 1858. Taylor having failed to pay the purchase-money to Brown, the latter sued and obtained a decree of foreclosure 19th October, 1857; order of sale 9th November, 1857; levied on same land 20th November, 1857, and sold 5th January,
1858, to appellee, and the sheriff’s deed executed to Foote 6th January, 1858. Foote had full notice of all the facts; of the arrangement between Fisher, Brown and Taylor; of the issuance of the execution; of the levy and sale to Fisher, which took place on the same day, before the sale to Foote.
W. L. G. L. Robarás, for appellant.
—The question arises, 1. Whether the note of Taylor was a lien upon the land.
2. If it were a lien, whether it was superior to that'of the mortgage from Taylor to Brown.
The application of a few plain, well-settled principles will demonstrate that “lien” attaches.
“Equity looks upon things agreed to be done as actually performed; consequently, when a contract is made for sale of an estate, equity considers the vendor as trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the purchaser as trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor.” (2 Sug. on Vend., 171.)
The same principle holds when the vendor has sold and delivered possession before the purchase-money is paid. The purchaser holds the estate in trust for the vendor to secure the purchase-money; or rather, by implication, a trust is created,, and a lien attached upon the land in the hands of the purchaser for the payment of the purchase-money. This doctrine is discussed with great'ability by Justice Wheeler in case of Briscoe v. Bronough, 1 Tex., 330, in which he held, 1. That “ ‘ a vendor has a privilege (lien) over the thing sold; that is to say, the right of requiring the sale of it in order to obtain his payment,’ is a doctrine recognized by the courts of Louisiana as existing in the laws of Spain.. (2 M. R., 209.) And we are told by distinguished jurists that the doctrine of the.vendor’s lien for his purchase-money, as recognized in the equity jurisprudence of England and the United States, was derived from the civil law. (4 Kent, 152-3, note d; 2 Story’s Eq., 642.) ‘There is,’ it has been said, ‘a natural equity that the land should stand charged with so much of the purchase-money as was not paid, and without any special agreement for that purpose.’ (Verm 267; 4 Kent, 152.) It is founded upon an implied trust between the vendor and purchaser. The latter is regarded as the trustee of his vendor, receiving the contract or conveyance, to hold it for the use of the vendor until the purchase-money is paid. The trust attaches to the land, and follows it into the hands of a subsequent purchaser with notice, upon the universally-received doctrine, that he who purchases a trust property, with notice of the trust, is bound by it. This equity mortgage exists in every case of sale where the money is not paid, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties, either expressly or by acts, showing that the lien was not intended to be retained. (Ohio Cond. R., 407.) Prima fade the lien exists, and it lies on the purchaser to show that the vendor agreed to waive it.” (1 Hammond, 318; 4 Kent, 152; 2 Phil. Dig., 711, § 207; 2 Story’s Eq.,' 638; 1 Johns. Ch. B., 308.)
In Garrison v. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. R., 308, it was held, that the vendor has a lien in the estate for the •purchase-money while the, estate is in the hands of the vendee; and, when there is no contract, that the lien hy implication was not intended to he reserved.
“If the consideration is expressed to he paid, and even if a receipt therefor is endorsed upon the back of it, and yet, in point of fact, the purchase-money has not been paid, the lien is not gone, hut it attaches against the vendee, and all persons claiming as volunteers or with notice under him.” (2 Story’s Eq.,' § 1225.)
“This equitable rule prevails against the purchaser and his heirs, and all persons claiming under him with notice, although for valuable consideration.” (2, Sug. on Vend., 74; Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. R., 402, 403.)
“Even when the purchase-money was paid hy hills drawn by the purchaser, and accepted by him and his partner, payable to the seller, the lien was not gone.” (2 Sug. on Vend., 64.)
“ The taking a security is not a waiver. It has been deemed at most as no more than a presumption; under some circumstances, as an intentional waiver of the lien, and not as conclusive of the waiver. The burden of proof rests on the vendee, to show that the vendor agreed to rest on that security and to discharge the lien. Hay, the taking of a distinct and independent security, as, for instance, a mortgage on another estate, or of a pledge on other property, has been deemed not to he conclusive evidence that the lien is waived.” (2 Story’s Eq., § 1226; Dart’s Vend, and Purch., 346.)
How, apply these principles to the facts.
The 1st, 2d, and 3d propositions in the charge of the court seemed to be correct, but the last and 4th proposition is error. It is as follows:
“If you are satisfied, from the proof, that, before Taylor purchased from Brown, Fisher had taken the note of Taylor for the amount owing by Brown on the land, and gave to Taylor, "in consideration of the note, a receipt that he could and did use in his trade with Brown, this, on the part of Fisher, would amount to a relinquishment of his lien on the land sold to Brown, and the same would go into the possession of Brown’s vendee, Taylor, fully discharged from the lien of Fisher.”
“It is a natural equity that the land should stand charged with so much of the purchase-money as remained unpaid,” as this court has held; but it would be an unnatural equity that the lien should not attach under these circumstances.
The 2d proposition follows as a matter of course, that the lien of the note was superior to the mortgage, and the title acquired by Fisher superior to that of Foote, the appellee. (Jordan v. Hudson, 11 Tex., 82.)
The parties occupied this relationship: Fisher held a lien on the land for the $500; Brown held the legal title subject to the lien, and the equity of redemption subject to the mortgage and the vendor’s lien. In the case of Jordan v. Hudson, 11 Tex., 82, the court intimated, that a vendor’s lien could be foreclosed by judgment and sale under the execution. We see no reason why under our system of pleading it should not.
In Hill v. Smith, 2 McLean, 446, the court held, That if the mortgagee purchase an equity of redemption under execution the two estates merge. If a mortgage, then, can be foreclosed by execution, we see no reason why a vendor’s lien, which is in effect a mortgage by implication, cannot be foreclosed by execution. If this be the rule, Fisher, the original vendor and the purchaser under the execution, acquired, the title free and discharged of the mortgage lien.
But granting, for argument sake, that Fisher had released his lien, his judgment attached a lien upon all the property of Taylor to which he held either a legal or equitable title.- The judgment was prior in date to the decree of foreclosure, and attached a lien upon the equity of redemption held by Taylor; and the levy under his execution and sale, which was prior to the levy of sale under the decree of the mortgage and the sheriff’s deed, conveyed to Fisher thi§ equity of redemption of Taylor’s. A sheriff’s deed of an equity of redemption conveys a defendant’s interest, though the deed does not recite, under the statute, that the land is under mortgage. (1 U. S. Dig., 469; Sharp v. Ricks, 1 Dev. & Bat., 613.)
6r. A. Foote, for himself,
argued the facts of the case logically enough for a physician; but as he cited no authorities, even his written argument is not given.

Opinion:
Wheeler, 0. J.
—It maybe admitted that the lien of the vendor, Fisher, for the unpaid purchase-money due from Brown was unaffected by the substitution of Taylor for Brown as the debtor, upon the sale and conveyance of the land from Brown to Taylor. It may be quite true that the lien subsisted, notwithstanding the sale and conveyance, and attached to the land in the hands of Taylor; yet it has not been enforced. Nothing has been done to give it effect. In the rendition of judgment upon the note for the purchase-money the lien was not asserted. The judgment was rendered in personam only, and operated as a lien only from its rendition; not by reason of the cause of action on which it was rendered, but by force of the statute, which made it a lien upon the real estate of the debtor within the county from its rendition. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 1040.) The judgment did not give effect to the vendor's lien. That remained to be asserted, and was ineffectual for any purpose,' affecting the title of the property, until asserted. The judgment lien arose subsequently to the giving of the mortgage, and of course was subordinate to that, and the purchaser at the sale under the judgment took the title subject to the lien of the mortgage. If by his purchase he acquired the equity of redemption, he must have asserted it before it' was cut off by the foreclosure of the mortgage. He, however, did not acquire it, for it had already been concluded by the decree of foreclosure. The vendor's lien, not having been asserted, gave no additional effect to the sale under the execution; and the judgment lien being subsequent, and- consequently subordinate to the mortgage, the purchaser at the sale under the execution took subject to the rights of the mortgagee; and the equity of redemption having been concluded by the decree of foreclosure, it results that the purchaser at the sale under the decree took the title unaffected by the lien of the judgment and the sale under execution. The purchaser at the execution sale acquired no right or interest by his purchase, as against the title of the purchaser at the sale under the decree of foreclosure of the mortgage. Even if the vendor's lien might be enforced by execution upon the judgment, still, being a secret lien, it could not be set up against a purchaser of the land bona fide withoitt notice of the lien; and such the plaintiff appears to have been. There is no evidence that he had notice of the lien, or the consideration of the note on which Fisher's judgment was rendered. He knew of the sale under the execution, and this was notice of the judgment, and all that the record of the judgment disclosed; but the record of the judgment gave him no notice that the note upon which it was .rendered was given for the purchase-money for the land. There was nothing in the record to suggest inquiry upon that subject. He, therefore, must be deemed an innocent purchaser, and, in any point of view, his title is unaffected by the vendor's lien, or by any right of the purchaser at the execution sale. This view of the case is decisive of it in favor of the plaintiff below. This was the superior title, and the judgment was rightly rendered in his favor. The charge of the court, which is complained of, was upon an immaterial matter, and whether correct or not, can have had no influence upon the decision, adversely to any right of the appellant. There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.