Case Name: Paul MOSELEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIMORTGAGE INC., Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-12-22
Citations: 671 F. App'x 1008
Docket Number: No. 15-35210
Parties: Paul MOSELEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIMORTGAGE INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, LEAYY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 671
Pages: 1008–1009

Head Matter:
Paul MOSELEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITIMORTGAGE INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-35210
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 14, 2016
Filed December 22, 2016
Paul A. Moseley, Pro Se
Bradley Lloyd Fisher, Attorney, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee
Before: WALLACE, LEAYY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Paul Moseley appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging state and federal claims aris- mg from defendant's alleged improper failure to discharge his mortgage loan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moseley's claim under Washington Uniform Commercial Code § 3-603 because Moseley is neither an indorser nor an accommodation party under the deed of trust, and because a personal check with "ETF Only" written on it does not constitute an unconditional tender. See Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.3-603(b) ("If tender of a payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made . and the tender is refused, there is a discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having right of recourse with respect to the obligation to which the tender relates." (emphasis added)); id. § 62A.3-204(b) (defining "indorser"); id. § 62A.3-419 (discussing "accommodation party"); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.3-106(a) ("[A] promise . is unconditional unless it states . an express condition to payment...."); Jones v. Best, 134 Wash.2d 232, 950 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1998) (en banc) ("We have held that tender of the amount due must be unconditional in order to stop interest from running.").
We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court's award of attorney's fees. See Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 719 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A] supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorney fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal." (citation and emphasis omitted)).
Moseley's motion to strike CitiMort-gage's answering brief, filed on November 9, 2015, and request for a mandatory judicial notice, filed on December 4, 2015, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.