Case Name: Virginia K. Getman DONOHUE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard E. GETMAN, Defendant and Appellee
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1988-11-30
Citations: 432 N.W.2d 281
Docket Number: No. 15836
Parties: Virginia K. Getman DONOHUE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard E. GETMAN, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 432
Pages: 281–285

Head Matter:
Virginia K. Getman DONOHUE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard E. GETMAN, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 15836.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs Sept. 2, 1988.
Decided Nov. 30, 1988.
Albert C. Jones and Krista H. Clark of Dakota Plains Legal Services, Mission, for plaintiff and appellant.
Richard L. Johnson, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion:
MILLER, Justice.
Virginia Getman Donohue appeals from an order which set Richard Getman's child support payments at $120 per month. We reverse.
PACTS
Richard and Virginia were divorced in 1982. At that time, Richard received physical custody of their three children. Both parties subsequently remarried, and their new spouses either have custody of or pay child support for children from prior marriages.
In 1986 the trial court reexamined the custody situation and awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties' three children to Virginia. The court denied Virginia's request for child support, finding that Richard did not have the means or ability to make support payments.
Shortly thereafter, Virginia petitioned the trial court for child support based on the guidelines set forth in SDCL 25-7-7, since Richard was receiving worker's compensation and social security disability benefits totalling $1,405.33 per month. The trial court found that Richard is totally disabled within the meaning of worker's compensation and social security law. Richard has a severe degenerative condition of the spine and a herniated disc; as a result, he suffers pain, has occasional blackouts, and is experiencing atrophy of his arms. Richard has undergone surgery at least four times due to these problems, and his present wife cannot work because she must stay at home to take care of him. The trial court also found that the children of Richard's new spouse are experiencing medical problems which will require surgery, and Richard will be obligated to pay those medical bills. The trial court concluded that even though the statutory guidelines would require Richard to pay between $539 and $578 per month in child support (based on a monthly income of $1,405.33), he should pay only $120 per month. The trial court gave the following reasons for its deviation from the guidelines: Richard's medical condition and total disability; his monthly expenses and large indebtedness; his future medical expenses; his inability to hold any kind of gainful employment; and the medical condition of his stepchildren, which will require further expenditures of money.
ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by deviating from the child support guidelines found at SDCL 25-7-7?
DECISION
This court will not disturb an award of child support unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion. Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984); Rykhus v. Rykhus, 319 N.W.2d 167 (S.D.1982). Virginia argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to enter findings with regard to all five factors listed in SDCL 25-7-7 before deviating from the guidelines. Virginia also contends that it was an abuse of discretion to allow expenses from Richard's second family to be used as a reason for deviation from the guidelines. We agree.
SDCL 25-7-7 states in part:
These guidelines shall be used in setting child support. Deviation from the guidelines may be made only upon the entry of specific findings based upon the following factors:
(1) Financial condition of the parents, including, but not limited to, income of a new spouse or contribution of a third party to the income or expenses of that parent;
(2) The standard of living of the child;
(3) The age and special needs of the child;
(4) The effect of provisions relating to custody and visitation; or
(5) Child care, (emphasis added)
Very recently, in Bruning v. Jeffries, 422 N.W.2d 579 (S.D.1988), we addressed the guidelines set forth in SDCL 25-7-7 and stated:
As the above quoted portion of SDCL 25-7-7 indicates, there may be no deviation from the guidelines unless there is an entry of specific findings regarding the five listed factors. The question becomes whether Secretary (and hearing examiner) must consider these factors in every case he hears. We conclude, from a reading of this statute in its entirety, that the legislature intended that these factors be considered in each proceeding.
422 N.W.2d at 580. (emphasis added)
Here, the trial court entered findings regarding the financial condition of Richard and his second family, but none on the financial condition of Virginia or the other four factors listed in SDCL 25-7-7. We hold that the failure of the trial court to address these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. The trial courts of this state must consider the totality of both parents' financial condition and the needs of the children, as required by SDCL 25-7-7, before deviating from the statutory guidelines. Bruning, supra.
Furthermore, it is well settled that a parent's responsibility to support his children is paramount; other debts are secondary. This includes obligations resulting from remarriage. Brunick v. Brunick, 405 N.W.2d 633 (S.D.1987). See also Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka, 310 N.W.2d 160 (S.D.1981); Park v. Park, 309 N.W.2d 827 (S.D.1981). In this case the trial court failed to address the financial needs of Richard's natural children, while focusing on the needs of Richard's stepchildren by his second marriage and his other debts. The trial court then used the stepchildren's needs as a basis for reducing Richard's support for his natural children. This is contrary to our holdings in Brunick and Park and constitutes a further abuse of the trial court's discretion.
We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand for reconsideration of Richard's child support obligations pursuant to SDCL 25-7-7.
WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.