Case Name: LLOYD HENNINGSEN AND IRA AYERS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, RANDOLPH EQUITIES, A PARTNERSHIP, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1986-11-24
Citations: 214 N.J. Super. 82
Docket Number: 
Parties: LLOYD HENNINGSEN AND IRA AYERS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, RANDOLPH EQUITIES, A PARTNERSHIP, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 214
Pages: 82–95

Head Matter:
LLOYD HENNINGSEN AND IRA AYERS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, RANDOLPH EQUITIES, A PARTNERSHIP, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 17, 1986
Decided November 24, 1986.
Before Judges FURMAN, DREIER and STERN.
Richard I. Clark argued the cause for appellants (Dolan & Clark, attorneys; William M. Cox and Richard I. Clark, on the brief).
John P. Jansen argued the cause for the respondent Township of Randolph (Villoresi & Jansen, attorneys; Paula J. DeBona and John P. Jansen, on the brief).
Martin Newmark argued the cause for the respondent Randolph Township Board of Adjustment (Broderick, Newmark, Grather & Aspero, attorneys; Alan J. Baldwin and Martin Newmark, on the brief).
Ronald F. Pitman argued the cause for the respondent Randolph Equities (James, Wyckoff, Vecchio & Pitman, attorneys; Richard L. Schneider and Ronald F. Pitman on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FURMAN, P.J.A.D.
Defendant Board of Adjustment granted defendant Randolph Equities a use variance, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), for a two-story 17,718 square foot office building on two lots in a residential zone at the intersection of State Highway Route 10 and the Dover-Chester Road.
On appeal by nearby resident objectors, the Township Mayor and Council affirmed on the record before the Board of Adjustment. The objectors instituted this prerogative writ action before the appeal to the governing body was decided and subsequently amended their complaint to include a challenge to that decision on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious, barred by res judicata and tainted by conflict of interest of the Mayor and other members. The issue of conflict of interest was also raised on the original complaint to review the Board of Adjustment grant of approval, based upon the financial involvement in the project of the Board of Adjustment attorney, who disqualified himself. From judgment upholding the grant of the variance on the record before the Board of Adjustment, the objectors appeal. We are informed that construction has not proceeded pending appeal. We reverse.
The subject property is zoned for single-family residential use. A combined professional office or studio and single-family dwelling use is permitted if no more than one person not residing on the premises is employed there. Other permitted uses include farms, roadside stands selling farm and garden products, greenhouses, nurseries, golf courses and parks.
The two lots are part of a 23-lot residential subdivision approved some years ago. Single-family dwellings have been built on the other 21 lots, generally to the north and east of the subject property and fronting on Dover-Chester Road or connecting streets. Only one other lot in the subdivision, to the east of the subject property, has frontage on Route 10.
Except for the subject property, Route 10 is zoned at its intersection with Dover-Chester Road for regional business use. That zone extends in a strip along Route 10 across from the subject property. The environs are otherwise zoned for residential use, along Route 10 to the west, along Dover-Chester Road and in residential enclaves to the north. Route 10 itself in the vicinity has experienced diversified commercial, office and educational development. A bank, a gasoline service station, a real estate office and the county college are nearby. Traffic is heavy on Route 10.
In granting the use variance to Randolph Equities, the Board of Adjustment concluded that a special reason existed for a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) and that the use variance could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good or substantial impairment of the intent and purpose of the zoning scheme. In our view, the conclusion that the so-called negative criteria were met was reasonably based in the record. We disagree that a special reason was established, as that prerequisite for a subsection (d) variance has been defined in the case law.
According to the Board of Adjustment, the present zoning has, for all reasonable purposes rendered the parcel "economically useless;" the proposed use would serve as an "excellent transition or buffer between the highway commercial applicants and the nearby residences;" it would "promote the statutory purposes of zoning, including promoting a desirable visual environment and providing sufficient space for appropriate commercial uses;" and the site is particularly well suited for the office use applied for. On appeal, the Mayor and Council reached no separate findings and conclusions.
The trial judge, in upholding the grant of the variance, sustained the Board of Adjustment's conclusions as reasonable on the record, in particular that the subject property was not "realistically developable" for residential use and that an office use would fit in and relate well to the "economic realities of development along Route 10 and to the need for some kind of buffering and protection" for the residential properties to the north.
Randolph Equities' proposed office use is not a use like a school or a hospital inherently promoting the general welfare and, hence, per se a special reason for a N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) variance, see Black v. Montclair, 34 N.J. 105 (1961) and Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245 (1959). According to Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 279 (1967), a use other'than one inherently promoting the general welfare may provide a special reason for a subsection (d) variance if the use serves the general welfare because it is particularly fitted to the location for which the variance is sought. We view the requisite showing as dual: a use promoting the public health, safety or welfare and particular suitability of the proposed site.
An applicant to qualify for a subsection (d) variance need not prove a zoning burden, that is, inutility of the premises for any use permitted under the zoning ordinance, Black and Andrews, supra. If required to prove such a zoning burden, Randolph Equities failed in its proof: no testimony or evidence in the record precluded reasonable suitability of the subject parcel for other permitted uses, such as professional office combined with dwelling, greenhouse, nursery or roadside farm and garden stand.
Several prior decisions have upheld or ordered use variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) or its predecessor statute other than for uses such as schools or hospitals inherently promoting the general welfare: Kramer v. Bd. of Adust., Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268 (1965) (fireproof hotel to replace dangerous structure); Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16 (1954) (supermarket in developing area); Kessler v. Bowker, 174 N.J.Super. 478 (App.Div.1979) certif. den. 85 N.J. 99 (1980) (expansion of nonconforming retail appliance shop making the property safer for children by removing an attractive nuisance); Scheff v. Township of Maple Shade, 149 N.J.Super. 448 (App.Div.1977), certif. den. 75 N.J. 13 (1977) (liquid propane gas storage facility serving an area); Yahnel v. Bd. of Adjust, of Jamesburg, 79 N.J.Super. 509 (App.Div.1963) certif. den. 41 N.J. 116 (1963) (building to house telephone service equipment); Hudanich v. Avalon, 183 N.J.Super. 244 (Law Div.1981) (seven stores on a pier to replace a structure declared unsafe); Rolfe v. Borough of Emerson, 141 N.J.Super. 341 (Law Div.1976) (school bus garage facility); Brunetti v. Mayor, Coun., Tp. of Madison, 130 N.J.Super. 164 (Law Div.1974) (moderate income multi-family housing in a municipality with a need for such housing); and Wickatunk Village, Inc. v. Tp. of Marlboro, 118 N.J.Super. 445 (Ch.Div. 1972) (private sewage treatment plant for mobile home park).
Although it has been said that a special reason is one which advances the purposes of zoning, Kohl, supra 50 N.J. at 276, Kessler, supra 174 N.J.Super. at 485, no reported decision has upheld or ordered a use variance for any purpose of zoning as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2 or its predecessor statute, except promotion of public health, safety or general welfare or securing safety from fire or other danger. We do not preclude the possibility that in an appropriate case a special reason for a use variance may be established based upon one or more of the other zoning purposes set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2. On the record this is not such a case.
The common rationale of the reported decisions is that a special reason for a use variance must promote public health or safety or otherwise serve a public need at an advantageous site. On this record, the suitability for office use of the subject property, on a busy highway and with access from a less traveled intersecting road, is not seriously challenged. But the record is devoid of any finding of a need for an office building or office space in that location or anywhere else in the township or area. The proposed use would be a commercial enterprise for profit, not per se contributing to the public health or safety or otherwise serving a public need.
The special reasons advanced by the Board of Adjustment are inadequate as a matter of law. Accordingly, the presumption of validity of municipal factfinding decisions is inapplicable, Kramer, supra 45 N.J. at 296. Multiple other uses, both permitted and not permitted in this residential zone, would, like the proposed office use, serve as a buffer to the nearby residences and not be aesthetically unsightly. Those factors do not qualify by themselves as a special reason or reasons entitling an applicant to a subsection (d) variance; if they did, zoning use restrictions would be substantially nullified. In Kohl, 50 N.J. at 277, the Supreme Court stated:
To justify the extensive expansion contemplated here by the increase in attractiveness of the property would open the way for any land to be used for any purpose, so long as the negative criteria are satisfied, if the facilities housing the use make the premises prettier than formerly. Such result would be contrary to established fundamentals of sound zoning.
In Mahler v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 94 N.J.Super. 173, 184 (App.Div.1967), aff'd o.b. 55 N.J. 1 (1969), we commented:
It is obvious that almost all lawful uses of property in our society serve in greater or lesser degree the promotion of the general welfare. If the social benefits of any individual use were, on the basis of the general welfare concept, to be regarded as an adequate special reason for a (d) use variance, we would have, in effect, the untoward and clearly unintended consequence that variances could be awarded indiscriminately merely because they did not offend the negative criteria of the statute.
That a parcel of land is zoned so as to preclude its most profitable use or even any economically feasible use has not been held in any reported decision to justify a subsection (d) variance; alleviation of economic hardship is not a purpose of zoning or by itself a special reason for a use variance. Cerdel Const. Co., Inc. v. East Hanover Tp., 86 N.J. 303, 307 (1981); Degnan v. Monetti, 210 N.J.Super. 174, 184 (App.Div.1986); Bern v. Fair Lawn, 65 N.J.Super. 435, 450 (App.Div.1961).
The power to grant use variances should not be exercised solely to correct improper zoning. A property owner whose property is zoned into economic inutility has other available remedies: attacking the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance as applied to his property or inverse condemnation. A M G Associates v. Tp. of Springfield, 65 N.J. 101, 111-112 (1974); Sheerr v. Evesham Tp., 184 N.J.Super. 11, 33 (Law Div.1982).
Moreover, Randolph Equities acquired the subject property with its principals' full knowledge of the applicable zoning limitation against commercial use. Even if economic hardship were available as a special reason for a use variance, Randolph Equities should be barred because its economic hardship was self-induced. Wilson v. Mountainside, 42 N.J. 426, 452 (1964); Degnan, supra; Geo. F. Barnes Land Corp. v. Wyckoff Tp. Bd. of Adj., 174 N.J.Super. 301 (App.Div.1980);
Because we reverse for insufficiency of Randolph Equities' showing of a special reason for a use variance, we need not and do not decide its alternative arguments for reversal: res judicata and conflict of interest.
We reverse.