Case Name: EVERSMAN v. CONCRETE CUTTING & BREAKING
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2000-07-27
Citations: 463 Mich. 86
Docket Number: Docket No. 109977
Parties: EVERSMAN v CONCRETE CUTTING & BREAKING
Judges: Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Weaver, C.J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 463
Pages: 86–110

Head Matter:
EVERSMAN v CONCRETE CUTTING & BREAKING
Docket No. 109977.
Argued March 7, 2000
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided July 27, 2000.
Harry Eversman sought worker’s compensation for injuries suffered when he was hit by an automobile while crossing a road in Pennsylvania. Because the plaintiff had traveled there for a job assignment, he claimed that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. A magistrate awarded benefits, concluding that because the plaintiff’s work required him to travel to the area where the accident occurred, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission reversed, holding that the plaintiffs activities on the day of his injury presented a deviation from the special mission so great that it dwarfed the business purpose of the mission and thus broke the nexus between plaintiffs employment and his subsequent injury. The Court of Appeals, Reilly, P.J., and Mackenzie and B. K. Zahra, JJ., held that MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) did not preclude benefits, and in an opinion per curiam reversed the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission. 224 Mich App 221 (1997) (Docket No. 183948). The Court found that Eversman was a traveling employee, who was considered to be continuously within the scope of employment during the trip, except when a distinct departure for a personal errand can be shown. The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Weaver, joined by Justices Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff was injured while engaged in activities the major purpose of which were social or recreational, and, thus, was not covered under MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
1. An employee who seeks worker’s compensation must show by competent evidence not only the fact of an injury, but also that the injury occurred in connection with employment, i.e., arose out of and in the course of that employment. MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) provides that an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which was social or recreational is not covered under the act.
2. In applying the social or recreational test of subsection 301(3), it is not necessary to examine the purpose of a special mission, work-day’s activities, or an out-of-town trip; rather, the major purpose of the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time of the injury is to be considered. In this case, regardless of whether the plaintiff was on a special mission or working as a traveling employee, his recovery is precluded under the plain language of MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3).
Reversed.
Justice Cavanagh, concurring in the result, stated that the plaintiff was engaged in the pursuit of activities with a major social or recreational purpose when he was injured, and his injury was not sufficiently connected with or caused by his employment. Compensation may be denied if the circumstances indicate that an injury did not occur in the course of employment, if no connection or nexus between the employment and the injury can be shown, or if the employee deviates from the employment relationship to the extent that there were risks so unrelated to the employee’s business that it dwarfed the business purpose of the trip. Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs decision to return to a bar after a long day of drinking, and then to cross a well-traveled highway in the dark unquestionably increased the risk of injury, so unrelated to the business that the business purpose of the trip was dwarfed. Thus, the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of his employment because the nexus between employment and injury was broken, and, similarly, he was not injured in the course of employment because his activities lost their business character and were no longer a circumstance of employment.
However, the majority announces a rule that is impermissibly broad. Rather, the case should be examined under MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1) in addition to MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3), and should address whether the traveling employee doctrine should be adopted in Michigan. Under the traveling employee doctrine, employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises are held to be within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home are usually held compensable. If the Supreme Court were to adopt the traveling employee doctrine, subsection 301(3) would be inapplicable to traveling employees. Because the employee would be continuously within the scope of employment, it would be illogical to conduct a subsection 301(3) analysis because there would be no need to determine whether the employee is presumed to be in the course of employment. A more logical approach would be to proceed under subsection 301(1). Under the traveling employee doctrine, the traveling employee would generally be considered to be in the course of employment for subsection 301(1) purposes, but could be removed from subsection 301(1) coverage if a distinct departure on a personal errand is made. The employee could also be removed from the coverage of subsection 301(1) if the injury does not “arise out of” employment. If, however, the traveling employee doctrine were rejected, the result would be that traveling employees would have no special status. In that case, a plaintiffs claim could be barred by the social or recreational exemption of subsection 301(3) as long as the employee fell into one of the three categories covered by the presumption of the first sentence of subsection 301(3). If the employee did not fit into one of the subsection 301(3) categories, the subsection 301(1) “arising out of and in the course of employment” test would apply. However, if the employee did fit within one of the categories of subsection 301(3), then the employee could potentially be denied benefits under the social or recreational test of subsection 301(3) in addition to the “arising out of or in the course of’ test of subsection 301(1).
The majority separates the last clause of subsection 301(3) from the whole of the statutory text, and concludes that benefits may be denied whenever an employee is engaged in a social or recreational activity, an analysis that is dangerously overbroad. It is not clear that subsection 301(3) is designed to preclude recovery in every situation where an employee is engaged in an activity with a major social or recreational purpose. Similarly, the majority opinion could be read as barring recovery for any type of unfortunate injury that occurs as a result of an on-the-job mishap. ■
Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that the analysis of whether injuries caused by activities an employee pursues while traveling for an employer are compensable under the wdca should focus on whether the activity was incidental to traveling. In this case, the major purpose of the plaintiff’s activities on the day and at the time of his injuries was not recreational or social; therefore, his injuries should be presumed to arise out of and in the course of employment. Because there is no evidence that the plaintiff was injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct, MCL 418.305; MSA 17.237(305) does not bar worker’s compensation benefits.
The traveling employee doctrine is well recognized in worker’s compensation law. Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises are held to be within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries aris ing out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels and eating in restaurants away from home are usually held compensable. It is appropriate to apply the doctrine to this case.
The major purpose of activities incidental to travel for an employer is not, by definition, social or recreational. Traveling employees have been recognized as being subject to unique circumstances for purposes of worker’s compensation benefits. The majority appears to believe that employees who have been sent to an out-of-town work site are expected to do their jobs and nothing else. Such an unreasonable limitation should not be imposed on employees who must travel as a requirement of their employment.
Wheeler Upham, P.C. (by Gary A. Maximiuk and Jack L. Hoffman), for the intervening plaintiff-appellee Auto-Owners Insurance Company.
Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski) for the defendants-appellants.
Amici Curiae:
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Mitchell J. Wood and Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for Second Injury Fund.
Martin L. Critchell for Michigan Manufacturers Association and Michigan Self-Insurers Association.

Opinion:
Weaver, C.J.
The question presented in this worker's compensation case is whether compensation for plaintiff's injury was barred by MCL 418.301(3); MSA ÍT^ST^OIXS) where plaintiff was struck by a car as he returned to his motel after spending six hours visiting bars, drinking alcoholic beverages, playing pool and eating a meal. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission denying plaintiff benefits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Eversman worked for Concrete Cutting & Breaking as a heavy equipment operator. Eversman's work often required him to travel to job sites outside Michigan. On July 11, 1990, Eversman and a co-worker traveled from Indiana to Pennsylvania for an assignment. The following day they reported to work at 7:00 A.M., but were unable to work because of rain. Eversman and his co-worker stayed at the job site for two hours, then left for the day.
At approximately 3:00 P.M., Eversman and his coworker left their hotel and visited two bars, where they drank beer and played pool. They briefly returned to their motel room to eat food they had brought with them and drink more beer. Next, they went to a bar across the street from the motel, where they ate chicken wings and drank beer. When his coworker went back to the motel room, Eversman stayed in the bar. At about 10:00 p.m., Eversman was hit by a car while crossing the divided highway that separates the motel from the bar. Eversman suffered a traumatic brain injury with various complicating injuries and fractures. A blood test administered at the hospital determined that Eversman had a blood alcohol level of 0.23.
Eversman filed a worker's compensation claim. The magistrate awarded benefits, concluding that because Eversman's work required him to travel to the area where the accident occurred, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The wcac reversed, holding that
plaintiff's activities on the day of his injury presented a deviation from the special mission so great that it dwarfed the business purpose of the mission and thus broke the nexus between plaintiff's employment and his subsequent injury. [1995 Mich ACO 289, 295.]
The Court of Appeals held that MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) did not preclude benefits in this case, and reversed the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission. The Court of Appeals found that Eversman was a "traveling employee" and that traveling employees "are considered to be continuously within the scope of their employment during then-trip, except when a distinct departure for a personal errand can be shown." 224 Mich App 221, 225; 568 NW2d 387 (1997).
This Court denied defendant's motion for leave to appeal. 459 Mich 919 (1998). On reconsideration, leave to appeal was granted. 461 Mich 881 (1999).
ANALYSIS
Under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act,
[a]n employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the ii\jury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. [MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1).]
It is well settled that an employee who seeks worker's compensation must show by competent evidence not only the fact of an injury, but also that the injury occurred in connection with his employment, arising out of and in the course of that employment. Calovecchi v Michigan, 461 Mich 616, 622; 611 NW2d 300 (2000); Hills v Blair, 182 Mich 20, 26; 148 NW 243 (1914).
The primary purpose of the worker's compensation act is to provide benefits to the victims of work-related injuries by allocating the burden of these payments to the employer, and, therefore, ultimately, to consumers. Simkins v General Motors Corp (After Remand), 453 Mich 703, 711; 556 NW2d 839 (1996). An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment will be eligible for compensation regardless of whether the employer was at fault. In return, the employer is immunized from tort liability because the worker's compensation act, under MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1), provides that this compensation is the exclusive remedy for a personal injury, except for an injury resulting from an intentional tort. Simkins, supra at 711.
A
Eversman has urged this Court to adopt the rule that employees traveling on business trips are deemed to be continuously within the scope of their employment during the trip, except when a distinct departure for a personal errand can be shown, citing Larson, Workers' Compensation Law. In the instant case it is not necessary for us to decide whether to adopt the traveling employee doctrine. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume that Eversman was within the scope of his employment on the trip to Philadelphia. Regardless of whether Eversman was on a special mission or working as a traveling employee, his recovery is precluded under the plain language of MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3).
B
The relevant portion of MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) was enacted by 1980 PA 357, effective January 1, 1982. In 1981, the Legislature amended the language of the second and third sentences of subsection 301(3) to its current form:
Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act. Any cause of action brought for such an injury is not subject to section 131.
This Court has never addressed the second and third sentences of subsection 301(3). The Court of Appeals has applied the "social or recreational" test of subsection 301(3) in only two published cases: Nock v M & G Convoy, Inc (On Remand), 204 Mich App 116; 514 NW2d 200 (1994), and Angel v Jahm, Inc, 232 Mich App 340; 591 NW2d 64 (1998).
In Nock, supra, a Pittsburgh truck driver went to a bar in Detroit with fellow truck drivers, and was injured in a fight outside the bar. Although the driver was required by his employer to stay overnight in Detroit, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's injury arose out of a social or recreational activity. Id. at 121. The Court of Appeals affirmed the wcac's denial of benefits.
In Angel, supra, the plaintiff was on an educational cruise sponsored by his employer. He was injured while riding a rented motorbike around the island of Martinique during his free time. The Court of Appeals held that there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the magistrate's finding that the plaintiff was not engaged in "an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational" when he was injured, and reinstated the magistrate's grant of benefits. Id. at 344.
In applying the social or recreational test of subsection 301(3), the Court does not need to examine the purpose of the special mission, the work-day's activities, or the out-of-town trip, but rather must consider the major purpose of the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time of the injury.
The Nock panel was correct in holding that when the plaintiff was injured in a fight outside a bar, his injury occurred during the pursuit of an activity whose main purpose was "recreational or social." We question the Corut of Appeals discussion of subsection 301(3) in Angel, and its conclusion that there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the magistrate's finding that the plaintiff was not engaged in "an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational" when he was riding a rented motorbike around the island of Martinique during his free time. Although the cruise itself was work related, renting and riding the motorbike during free time appears to be a social or recreational activity.
Determining the "major purpose" of an activity can often be a difficult exercise. Here, however, there can be no question that the major purpose of Eversman's activities was social or recreational. At the time of the accident Eversman was ending ¿ six-hour span of visiting bars, drinking beer, and playing pool. There is some dispute over whether Eversman's intoxication contributed to his injuries. However, intoxicated or not, the major purpose of Eversman's activities was social or recreational. Eversman was given the day off. No work-related activities were expected of him; his time was his own. He played pool and drank beer, visiting several bars in the process. Eversman argues that because it was necessary for him to eat dinner, the visit to the bar for chicken wings and beer was not a social or recreational activity. We disagree. Examining the totality of circumstances surrounding Eversman's activities during the six-hour episode, we conclude that his conduct fell within the exception set forth in subsection 301(3).
c
The plaintiff urges us to read subsection 301(3) as requiring the deviation analysis set forth in Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich 444; 320 NW2d 858 (1982). In Bush, this Court addressed an employee's deviation from his employment where, at the end of an out-of-town business trip, the employee had spent seven hours dancing and drinking at various bars and nightclubs. After leaving a restaurant, Bush was shot to death, apparently during an armed robbery attempt. Id. at 448. The Court held that although Bush had been on a special mission for his employer, his deviation from employment "was so extensive that the business character of the return trip had dissolved so that when decedent returned to his homeward course he was no longer in the course of employment." Id. at 450. In making this determination, the Court considered "whether the deviation of decedent Bush was so extensive, in that it lasted for such a long time and incurred substantial increases in danger to decedent unrelated to his employment, that the business character and purpose of the trip dissolved prior to the injury." Id. at 450.
This deviation inquiry is not necessary for the application of subsection 301(3). Under the plain language of the statute, the relevant inquiry is whether plaintiff's injury occurred during the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which was social or recreational.
CONCLUSION
Eversman was injured while engaged in activities the major purpose of which were social or recreational. Therefore he was not covered under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission denying plaintiff benefits.
Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Weaver, C.J.
MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) reads in full:
An employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises where the employee's work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his or her working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment. Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act. Any cause of action brought for such an injury is not subject to section 131.
On appeal to this Court, Auto-Owners Insurance Company is the intervening plaintiff-appellee. When Eversman and Concrete Cutting & Breaking reached a settlement, Auto-Owners Insurance moved to intervene. The Court of Appeals granted its motion, substituting Auto-Owners Insurance as plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals stated:
Because of the facts and nature of this case, there can be no merit in defendants' arguments based upon MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) . MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) precludes benefits for an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity for which the major purpose is social or recreational. While eating, drinking, and sleeping are personal activities, under plaintiff's circumstances — those of a traveling employee — these activities were within the continuity of plaintiff's employment. [224 Mich App 221, 228; 568 NW2d 387 (1997).]
Although defendant had briefed the subsection 301(3) issue, the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission did not reach it.
At that time the second clause of subsection 301(3) read:
Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred exclusively in the pursuit of a social or recreational activity is not covered under this act. Any cause of action brought for such an injury is not subject to section 131. [Emphasis added.]
We do not consider Thiede v G D Searle & Co, 278 Mich 108; 270 NW 234 (1936), relevant to our interpretation of the statute because Thiede was decided some forty-four years before the enactment of 1980 PA 357.
In Allison v Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co, 183 Mich App 101; 454 NW2d 162 (1990), the Court of Appeals declined to apply the earlier version of the "social or recreational" test, because the plaintiff was ii\jured in 1979 and the statute did not take effect until 1982. The Court of Appeals held that the statute applied prospectively from its effective date.
The concurrence argues that the "social or recreational" test of subsection 301(3) should be applied only when one of the presumptions set forth in the first sentence of subsection 301(3) also applies. This reading of subsection (3) is too narrow. The second sentence of subsection 301(3) says "Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act." (Emphasis added.) The concurrence reads the sentence as if it terminated with "under this subsection." The concurrence, post, pp 100-101, and the dissent, post, p 106, assert that "the first sentence of subsection 301(3) embodies a presumption, while the second sentence limits the presumption." Post, p 101. If this were so, then the "social and recreational" test would not preclude recovery, but only render the presumption inapplicable — a clear contradiction of the language of the statute. We also note that this interpretation seems inconsistent with other portions of the concurrence. See post, pp 102-103.
The question is whether the employee was injured while engaged in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational. MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3). The test is not, as the dissent would have it, whether the employee was injured while pursuing "reasonable and necessary personal activities." Post, p 109.
Moreover, the dissent focuses on whether plaintiff was intoxicated and if the intoxication caused his injury. This is, again, off target. A worker is not allowed benefits if injured while engaged in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational, whether that activity is barhopping or bowling or even hang gliding.
However, we do not decide whether the plaintiff in Angel was entitled to benefits.
The injury in Bush took place before the effective date of subsection 301(3), so the "social or recreational" test of subsection 301(3) was not applicable, and not addressed.