Case Name: HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP et al. v. VOYLES
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1979-03-16
Citations: 149 Ga. App. 517
Docket Number: 56804
Parties: HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP et al. v. VOYLES.
Judges: Deen, C. J., Webb, P. J., Smith and Banke, JJ., concur. Underwood, J., concurs in the judgment only. Quillian, P. J., Shulman and Birdsong, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 149
Pages: 517–524

Head Matter:
56804.
HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP et al. v. VOYLES.

Opinion:
McMurray, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court which affirmed an award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation (now Board of Workers' Compensation). The administrative law judge determined that based upon evidence the employer was subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Georgia and carried insurance under a standard form workmen's compensation policy for any exposure. On October 13, 1976, the claimant and another person were running siding and cornice for the employer on a clubhouse. For this work they were jointly paid $25 per square for siding installed and $1 per running foot for cornice installed. From payments made to them he deducted the sum of 41/2 cents from each dollar for the stated purpose of workmen's compensation coverage. They had been working for him for approximately three years and deductions had been made during this time for workmen's compensation coverage. They had no written contract for the work being performed by them, but there were no other deductions from payments due them. From other facts he determined that the claimant was injured on the job which arose out of and in the course of his employment and that he was totally incapacitated to work from October 13,1976, to the date of the hearing. He then found that after careful consideration of the relative nature of the work and the fact that the employer had in fact been making a deduction from their payments for the specific purpose of providing workmen's compensation coverage he concluded and found as fact that the employer was estopped to deny that he is the employer of the claimant for compensation purposes. Having made a determination that the claimant was an employee for compensation purposes of the employer he then found that the insurer was also liable as it insures employer for his exposure under the workmen's compensation law of Georgia. Upon de novo consideration of all evidence the board adopted the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge as its findings and conclusions with one dissent. Whereupon the employer/insurer appealed to the superior court. Held:
The record contains evidence which supports the findings of the Board of Workers' Compensation that claimant was an employee of insured for workers' compensation purposes. The record is unclear as to the degree of control exercised by the insured over the claimant employee except for reference to the fact that insured inspected the work completed by claimant and his companion Stone. Although the record contained repeated references using the terms contractor and subcontractor there is little which effectively delineated whether claimant was an independent contractor or servant. It is true the evidence was amply sufficient for the board to have so found but they did not find he was an independent contractor. The employee testified that he and another were "subbing" the work, that is, getting so much a square for siding and so much a foot for cornice work. The testimony also shows claimant had worked exclusively for the insured for a period of three years during which "workmen's" compensation insurance had been deducted from his compensation. Both his testimony and that of the employer as to deductions from his pay on workers' compensation, as well as the intentions of the parties (employer and employee) shows evidence of a master-servant relationship rather than an employer-independent contractor relationship. Any doubt on this question must be resolved in favor of claimant's status as an employee rather than an independent contractor, inasmuch as the findings of the, board must be affirmed under the "any evidence" rule. Carroll v. Mission Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 262 (248 SE2d 542).
Code § 114-607 would apply where an insurer issues to an employer subject to this title a policy of compensation insurance covering an employee or employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions. However, it is our view that under the findings of the Board of Workers' Compensation that claimant is an employee of the insured, this provision (Code § 114-607) is not necessarily applicable because this employee is not ordinarily exempt. The "relative nature of the work" as found by the board was easily ascertainable as creating the master-servant relationship rather than an employer-independent contractor relationship.
The Board of Workers' Compensation adopted from the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge (made the findings of the majority of the board with one dissent) that the employer is estopped to deny that he is the employer of the claimant for compensation purposes. This refers not necessarily to Code § 114-607 but to the equitable principle that where a party by his declaration leads another to act or fail to act in reliance upon those declarations he may not later disavow them. See Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 760 (4) (141 SE2d 536); Reeves v. Matthews, 17 Ga. 449, 452 (3).
Here we have evidence of an employer deducting from the worker's pay a fee for workers' compensation insurance over an extended period of time. It is implicit in the circumstances that the worker relied upon the declaration that he is to be covered by workers' compensation insurance. It would contravene any sense of justice to allow the employer to disavow his declaration that the worker is covered by this insurance. Indeed, the substance of the employer's testimony is that he thought the employee was covered by workers' compensation insurance. The employer is bound for workers' compensation regardless of whether or not he carried insurance coverage.
It is admitted here that the employer was subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and that he carried workers' compensation insurance. See Code Ann. § 114-602 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 528, 529; 1963, pp. 141,154; 1972, pp. 929, 930). Certainly the admissions of the employer should bind him whether or not the insurer would be bound by law. Code § 114-607 requires that no policy of insurance shall be issued unless it contains the agreement of the insurer that it "will promptly pay to the person entitled to same all benefits conferred. . .'' and "... be construed to be a direct promise. . .to the person entitled to compensation. . ." Such policy of insurance shall be construed as an agreement to pay compensation, and an insurer who issues the policy "covering an employee or employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions shall not plead the exemption as a defense." It is noted here that the policy was not produced in evidence, although it was admitted that there was coverage for the employees of the employer, the insurer contending that in its audit it did not charge a premium for the claimant. Thus, even if the claimant be considered to be an employee "ordinarily exempt" from the provisions of the law (which was not necessarily the finding of the board) the board did not err in finding the insurer "also liable as it insures. . [the employer]. . .for his exposure under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Georgia."
Argued November 6,1978 —
Decided March 16,1979 —
Rehearing denied March 30, 1979 —
Brackett, Arnall & Stephens, H. P. Arnall, H. A. Stephens, Jr., for appellants.
Kenneth J. VanderHoff, Jr., Jane Kent Plaginos, for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, C. J., Webb, P. J., Smith and Banke, JJ., concur. Underwood, J., concurs in the judgment only. Quillian, P. J., Shulman and Birdsong, JJ., dissent.