Case Name: Perry, Ex'or, v. Munger, Adm'r
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1852
Citations: 7 Tex. 589
Docket Number: 
Parties: Perry, Ex'or, v. Munger, Adm'r.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 295–296

Head Matter:
Perry, Ex'or, v. Munger, Adm'r.
The probate law of 1S40 (Hart. Dig.,art. 1010)provided that “claimants shall have twelve months from the date of letters testamentary or of administration to present their demands,” and that claims not presented within that time “ shall be barredthe claimant argued that the above provision allowed twelve months after date of the letters testamentary, &c., for the presentation of a claim which was a subsisting claim at the date of the letters, but would otherwise be barred by the general law of limitations before the expiration of the twelve months: Held, That if such a construction had been adopted at.an earlier period, it might have commended itself at least by its apparent justice; but that the uniform exposition had been to the contrary.
Appeal from Austin. Suit by appellant against appellee on a note dated December 2S, 1S3S, which had been presented for allowance and was rejected. The appellant’s intestate died on the 27th of July, 1844; letters of administration were granted on tlie 8th of October thereafter. Tlie claim was presented within twelve months after the grant of letters of administration. The suit was instituted on the 27th of January, 1845. The case went off on a demurrer to the petition.
J. Sayles, for appellant. This case depends upon the construction of tlie probate law of 1S40. The note upon which suit was brought was not barred at tlie date of the grant of letters of administration, but was barred when presented by the limitation of four years. By the act of 1840, a new period of limitation is substituted when the succession is open. By article 1010, (Hart. Dig.,) the administrator is required to give public notice of his appointment. “And claimants shall have twelve months within which to present their demands, and if not exhibited within' that period, they shall be barred.” All claims, of every date, must be presented within twelve months— thus substituting this period of twelve months for the former laws, or the laws in force as to claims against living persons.
This period of twelve months must be considered as adopted as the “law of limitations” governing open successions, commencing to run from the grant of letters. Tlie general law of limitations declares that certain claims shall be barred by four years; this law, governing successions, declares that all claims shall be barrecl within one year, counting from tlie grant of letters. To what claims shall this rule be applied ? Oiearly to claims existing against the estate at that date ; and as all claims are barred by the lapse of the year, so claimants shall have twelve months within which to present them. If any other construction than this wore given, the rule would operate harshly against claimants.
J. B. Jones, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hemphill, Ch. J.
The position assumed by the appellant, that the term of limitation fixed by the probate law of 1840 is applicable to all claims existing against a succession at tlie time it was opened, and that they are taken out of tlie operation of the general statute of limitations, is quite plausible; and it is apparently just that if the probate law can be invoked to bar a claim at a period earlier than the general term of prescription, the same law should he effectual to exclude the operation of the general statute if by that the claim would be barred at a dace prior to the expiration of the term fixed in the special law; that, in fact, there is one term for claims against an estate, and another for claims between living persons, and they should not be permitted to interfere. If this construction had been adopted at au earlier period, it might have commended itself at least by its apparent justice; but the uniform exposition lias been to the contrary, and it was founded upon the well-established principle at common law that where the statute has commenced to run no supervening disability will stop its course unless under special provision of statute law.
Judgment affirmed.