Case Name: MASTERS v. DeKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2010-11-22
Citations: 288 Ga. 241
Docket Number: S10A0905
Parties: MASTERS v. DeKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS.
Judges: Ml the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 288
Pages: 241–244

Head Matter:
S10A0905.
MASTERS v. DeKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS.
(703 SE2d 320)

Opinion:
Melton, Justice.
In 1978, Sandra H. Masters and her husband purchased a home in DeKalb County, and they lived there with their children until they separated in 1992. At that time, Masters' husband moved out of the house, and Masters remained. The parties have lived separately since 1992, but they have never divorced. In 1998, Masters' husband deeded his interest in the house to Masters, and she applied for and received a homestead exemption on the property the following year. Meanwhile, by 2001, Masters' husband had acquired another home in Glynn County, and he applied for and received a homestead exemption on that property as well.
In 2008, the DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors (Board) learned about the Glynn County homestead exemption, and the Board decided to rescind Masters' DeKalb County exemption retroactively. The Board then charged Masters with back taxes for the years 2002 through 2007. In addition, the Board prohibited Masters from receiving any future homestead exemption on the DeKalb property as long as one existed on the Glynn County property of Masters' husband. Although Masters paid the back taxes assessed against her, she subsequently filed suit against the Board, contending, among other things, that the statute providing for homestead exemptions is unconstitutional based on equal protection grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board, and Masters appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
1. Masters contends that, because Section 48-5-40 (1) (A) (i) of the homestead exemption statute defines an applicant, in part, as a "married individual living with his or her spouse," a married couple who live in separate residences cannot apply for a homestead exemption. As a result, Masters contends that the statute contains an equal protection violation. As the trial court found, however, the homestead statute treats all married persons equally. There is no question that the statute was intended to afford one exemption to all married couples, whether living together or separately. The statute clearly states: "Only one homestead shall be allowed to one immediate family group." OCGA § 48-5-40 (1) (G). A husband and wife qualify as such a group. Furthermore, the statute explicitly indicates that a homestead subject to an exemption may include a home "[w]here a husband or wife occupies a dwelling and the title of the homestead is in the name of the wife." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 48-5-40 (1) (E). In addition, the statute defines a home "[occupied primarily as a dwelling" to mean that an "applicant or members of his family occupy the property as a home." OCGA § 48-5-40 (6) (A). Both of these provisions contemplate that a home inhabited by a married person separated from his or her spouse may be subject to a homestead exemption. The partial definition of applicant in OCGA § 48-5-40 (1) (A) (i) does not alter this fact. Contrary to Masters' arguments, the statute does not prevent a married person living separately from his or her spouse from applying for a homestead exemption, and, as shown by the provisions above, the statutory text presumes that married persons living separately will have the same rights to an exemption as those living together. Therefore, the statute extends one exemption to each married couple, whether living together or separately, and, as a result of this equal treatment of all married couples, Masters' equal protection argument necessarily fails. See, e.g., Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375 (3) (490 SE2d 68) (1997).
2. This does not mean, however, that Masters' homestead exemption was properly taken away from her. Under the analysis of the Board, Masters' pre-existing homestead exemption was automatically nullified by her husband's later request and approval for a homestead exemption on a different house in a different county. This does not automatically follow from a finding that any married couple is entitled to only one homestead exemption, especially under facts like those currently before us. To the contrary, the facts here show that the homestead exemption on the home in which Masters resided had been in place for at least four years before her husband filed for a second homestead exemption on his home. In addition, there was no mutual intent between the parties to transfer the homestead exemption to another county; instead, Masters' husband intended to create a new, additional exemption. Under these circumstances, there is no legal authority to allow Masters' husband, years later, to nullify the pre-existing exemption. In other words, at the time that Masters' husband applied for a homestead exemption, there was already a valid exemption in place. As a result, the exemption request of Masters' husband should not have been honored, and Masters' valid, pre-existing homestead exemption should not have been rescinded by the Board. Therefore, the trial court's ruling in this case must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Ml the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.