Case Name: Samuel E. Merwin et al. v. Andrew J. Rogers
Court: New York City Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-05
Citations: 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 787
Docket Number: 
Parties: Samuel E. Merwin et al. v. Andrew J. Rogers.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 15
Pages: 787–788

Head Matter:
Samuel E. Merwin et al. v. Andrew J. Rogers.
(City Court, Special Term,
Filed May, 1888.)
Liability op district court judge to action.
The rule that judges are exempt from actions in respect of things done in the exercise of their judicial functions, applies to the highest and lowest officer who sits as a court. Upon this principle a district court judge who adjourns an action improperly is not liable to an action.
Demurrer to complaint.
J. Homer Hildreth, for pl’ff; J. O. de LaMare, for def’t.

Opinion:
MoAdam, 0. J.
—It is elementary that judges are exempt from actions in respect to things done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y., 12. This rule applies to the highest judge in the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court. See cases cited in Conley on Torts, p. 409. The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant, as a district court justice, refused to render judgment on the return of the summons, and adjourned the case to a subsequent day, without requiring the defendant to file a verified answer. It is not necessary to a determination of this action to decide whether the adjournment was warranted or not, for assuming it to have been unauthorized, the act constituted at most an error of judgment, for which no action lies. The justice was called to determine whether the papers before him entitled the plaintiff to a judgment without further proof, and when the application to adjourn was made he was called upon to decide whether the defendant was entitled to the adjournment or not. Whether the power was exercised properly is a question which might be considered upon appeal, but cannot be reviewed in an action against the justice as for alleged misconduct. A power which, when exercised by officers not connected with the judiciary, would be regarded as purely administrative, becomes at once judicial when exercised by a court of justice. Matter of Cooper, 22 N. Y., at p. 82. When jurisdiction once attaches, the court may proceed to almost any length in the exercise of its judicial functions without incurring personal liability. Cow. Tr., § 660, 697. The case of Horton v. Auchmoody (7 Wend., 200), is in some respects singularly similar to the present action, and it was held that the justice was not liable. In addition to this, the plaintiffs appeared on the adjourned day, and on the theory that the justice had not lost jurisdiction, took their judgment and issued execution thereon, and because it proved unproductive, they resort to the present action for damages. The action is ill conceived, will not lie, and there must be judgment for the defendant on the demurrer, with costs.