Case Name: SCHER v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-04-11
Citations: 75 N.Y.S. 625
Docket Number: 
Parties: SCHER v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 75
Pages: 625–627

Head Matter:
(71 App. Div. 28.)
SCHER v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 11, 1902.)
1. Privileged Communication—Waiver.
Statement of plaintiff to physician, who treated him after an accident, as to physical trouble he had years before, being privileged, admission of it over objection, notwithstanding plaintiff had been treated by such physician for such trouble some years before, and the physician had written an article as to such trouble, which was published in a magazine, is error; Code Civ. Proc. § 836, requiring the waiver of privilege to be on or at the time of the trial.
2. Admission op Evidence—Prejudicial Error.
There being a sharp conflict in the evidence as to how the accident occurred, erroneous admission of statement by plaintiff as to his condition before the accident is prejudicial, as affecting his credibility.
Patterson, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, New York county.
Action by Israel Scher against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From judgment on verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
The defendant called Dr. Freudenthal, who testified that he observed the plaintiff’s condition in a professional capacity, that he saw him only in a professional way, that the plaintiff came to the witness for treatment, and that the witness prescribed medicine for him. It also appears from the testimony that the doctor had photographed the plaintiff, because of the peculiar nature of the disease from which he suffered, some years before the accident, and subsequently he published an article concerning him in some medical journal, and that the witness exhibited the plaintiff about four or five times publicly to members of the witness’ profession. It was after this testimony was produced and proved that the following question was asked by defendant’s counsel: “Now, then, prior to the preparation of the article published by you in the Medical Journal of February 1, 1896, did this plaintiff tell you that 17 years previously he had severe pains in the legs, lasting day and night, and forcing him to stay abed for fully seven years?” To this objection was taken, upon the ground that the matter was privileged and the information was obtained by the physician in a professional capacity while in attendance upon the plaintiff. ■ The court overruled the objection, upon the ground that, the nature of the plaintiff’s disease having been made public by the consent of the plaintiff, the privilege was waived.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Moses Feltenstein, for appellant.
Theodore H. Lord, for respondent.

Opinion:
O'BRIEN, J.
We think, under the authorities, that the communications made by the plaintiff to the physician were privileged, and there had been no waiver, even if the publication of the article and the public exhibitions were, as testified by the physician, though denied by the plaintiff, with the latter's full consent. On this subject it was said in the case of Holden v. Insurance Co., 165 N. Y. 17, 58 N. E. .772:
"The statute [sections 834 and 836 of the Code of Civil Procedure], as it now stands, in positive and express terms requires the waiver to be made upon or at the time of the trial or examination. The apparent purpose was to protect parties, their representatives and successors, from waivers which should be inadvertently or improperly obtained previous to the trial of an action or the examination of the witness. That in many cases injustice had resulted from such waivers was doubtless the reason which induced the legislature to adopt this amendment, requiring the waiver to be made in the presence and under the supervision of the court before which the trial or examination was had."
There being no waiver "upon the trial or examination," as provided by section 836 of the Code, but, on the contrary, an objection made to the physician's violating the privilege, the ruling admitting the testimony was clearly erroneous.
It is claimed, however, that such ruling was harmless, because the jury found that the defendant was not responsible for the injuries, and, as there was no liability of the defendant, the introduction of the evidence relating to the extent of the injuries could, at most, affect only the credibility of the plaintiff. This, it seems to us, is begging the whole question, as there was a sharp conflict as to the manner in which the accident occurred. It is not, therefore, a strained inference to conclude that the testimony of the plaintiff had a material bearing upon the burden which he had to sustain, of showing the defendant's liability for his injuries; and it is evident that the direct refutation by his physician of what he had stated concerning his physical condition before the accident would tend to discredit his whole case. If upon the extent of his injuries it was shown that- he had testified falsely, which was the tendency of the erroneous evidence admitted, then the jury would have the right, as it would have been the duty of the judge, if requested, to charge, if they believed that the plaintiff's evidence was willfully and knowingly false on one important particular of his case, and they were at liberty, to disregard his entire evidence. It seems to us, therefore, that, upon the question of the defendant's liability, the extent to which the jury would credit the plaintiff's testimony was most material; and, his credibility having been assailed and affected by improper and erroneous evidence, the error committed cannot be regarded as harmless.
We think, therefore, that the judgment appealed from is wrong, and should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and EAUGHEIN, J., concur.