Case Name: In the Matter of the Adoption of Benjamin Eder and Dylan Eder, Children. Robert L. EDER and Michelle Longo Eder, Respondents, v. Anita WEST, Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1990-10-17
Citations: 104 Or. App. 84
Docket Number: A414; CA A50557
Parties: In the Matter of the Adoption of Benjamin Eder and Dylan Eder, Children. Robert L. EDER and Michelle Longo Eder, Respondents, v. Anita WEST, Appellant.
Judges: NEWMAN, J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 104
Pages: 84–94

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted February 26,
affirmed October 17,
reconsideration denied December 19,1990, petition for review allowed February 19,1991 (311 Or 166)
In the Matter of the Adoption of Benjamin Eder and Dylan Eder, Children. Robert L. EDER and Michelle Longo Eder, Respondents, v. Anita WEST, Appellant.
(A414; CA A50557)
799 P2d 192
James F. Young, Coos Bay, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Oregon Legal Services Corporation, Coos Bay.
Stephen A. Lovejoy, Lincoln City, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Jenny Cooke, Portland.
NEWMAN, J.
Edmonds, J., dissenting.

Opinion:
NEWMAN, J.
In this adoption proceeding, father and his wife petitioned the court to allow wife to adopt father's two sons from his previous marriage to mother. The court concluded that mother had wilfully neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the children for the year next preceding the petition and that, therefore, the adoption did not require her consent. ORS 109.324. Mother appeals the judgment. On de novo review, we affirm.
Father and mother obtained a dissolution judgment in July, 1983. The court awarded custody of their two sons, Benjamin, then three years old, and Dylan, then nine months old, to father, subject to visitation by mother. The court awarded custody to father, because it was concerned about the effect of mother's emotional instability on the children's emotional development. In July, 1984, father moved to modify the judgment, because Benjamin had begun to display regressive behavior after visitations with mother, such as bed wetting, and because he had reported to father that mother had sexually abused him.
In September, 1984, the court modified the dissolution judgment to prohibit all visitation between mother and both children, except for telephone visitation supervised by father. After a hearing, it found that mother was not believable, that she was unstable and paranoid and that she had engaged in "sexually oriented acts" with Benjamin. The court ordered:
"Any change or modification of the terms of this Order will only be by the approval of the court and after [mother] has had psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist acceptable to the court and such therapy or further evaluation as may be recommended."
In December, 1984, mother entered a plea of no contest to sexual abuse in the second degree for the acts that she committed against Benjamin in July, 1984. She received a suspended sentence and five years probation. One condition of probation was that she not have contact with Benjamin until further order of the court.
f In January, 1985, mother met twice with Dr. Kjaer, a psychiatrist whom she chose and the court approved, for an evaluation. His diagnosis was: "borderline personality; acute situation reaction; normal grief response (to the divorce and withdrawal of children); possible manic depressive (bipolar) disease; and pedophilia (by history)." He recommended long-term psychotherapy and stated that she must "accept the reality of her misbehavior." Mother strongly disagreed with that diagnosis and refused to seek treatment from Kjaer, because it would require her to admit that she had sexually abused her child, which she continued to deny. Over the course of the next three years, she filed numerous motions to change psychiatrists and to modify the restrictions on visitation. Although she saw Dr. Collins, a psychiatrist in New Mexico, approximately four times in April, 1985, the court did not approve him, because he stated that he accepted mother's denial of the sexual abuse and that he would not be treating her for that.
The court dismissed all of mother's numerous motions to allow visitation, because she continually failed to obtain the therapy that was a prerequisite to visitation. Although mother wrote letters to the children, they often contained inappropriate and unrealistic remarks, in particular that she would be with the children soon, when, in fact, she knew that she could not see them until she had obtained appropriate treatment. One letter to Benjamin referred to the "warm cozy bed" that Mother had for him in her home. Father edited the letters before they were read to the children.
Mother is a self-employed artist whose work is exhibited in several galleries. Her annual income is approximately $7,000, of which approximately $4,000 is attributable to payments that she receives from the dissolution settlement. She also receives some barter income. Mother was not ordered to pay support for the children. She sent them gifts for birthdays and holidays and occasionally enclosed five or ten dollars, also as gifts.
In November, 1987, mother attempted to establish telephone contact with Dylan and moved the court to hold father in contempt for denying telephone visitation. The court declined. In March, 1988, mother again moved for appointment of a new counselor, because Kjaer had informed the court that he would not provide further evaluation of mother. The court ordered that there be no telephone visitation. Father and mother submitted a list of mutually acceptable therapists, and the court ordered that the Center for Behavioral Intervention (Center) replace Kjaer as the court approved mental health professional for evaluation and treatment of mother for her sexual misconduct with Benjamin and her other psychological problems.
In June, 1988, mother went to the Center on three occasions for psychological evaluation. The Center's diagnoses and conclusions were consistent with those of Kjaer. The report concluded that mother was not treatable at the Center because of her total denial of the sexual abuse, her lack of motivation and her uncooperativeness. It also made recommendations for restrictions that the court should place on visitation, if it should choose to modify its decision that "sex offender specific treatment" be a precondition to visitation with the children.
On August 8, 1988, mother filed a motion to modify the dissolution judgment to allow visitation, in accordance with the guidelines that the Center articulated. On August 12, 1988, father and his wife filed the petition for adoption. After a consolidated hearing on both matters, the court allowed the adoption by wife, father retaining his status as father of the children. It ruled that mother's consent to the adoption was not required, because she wilfully and without just and sufficient cause had neglected her children by failing to do the one thing that would allow her to regain visitation with them, that is, to obtain treatment.
Mother assigns that ruling as error. She argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence that she had neglected the children, because she did all that she could to increase her access to them through the courts. She also argues that she did not neglect them by nonsupport, because the dissolution judgment did not order her to pay support.
Under ORS 109.324, the court may dispense with the requirement of parental consent to an adoption if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has wilfully neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for one year preceding the petition. Chaffin v. Palumbo, 99 Or App 312, 316, 781 P2d 1247 (1989). The court must apply the statutory criteria with discretion, not mechanically. Swarthout v. Reeves, 26 Or App 763, 767, 554 P2d 617 (1976). To evaluate whether a parent's behavior constitutes neglect, the court should focus on the presence or absence of minimal expressions of concern, which are ordinarily measured in terms of money payments and personal contacts. Chaffin v. Palumbo, supra, 99 Or App at 315; Mead v. Roberts, 74 Or App 238, 242, 702 P2d 1134 (1985). The absence of expressions of minimal concern may be tempered by facts that show that a parent's financial hardship resulted in an inability to provide financial support or that show that lack of visitation resulted from unwarranted constraints imposed by the custodial parent. Chaffin v. Palumbo, supra, 99 Or App at 315; Mead v. Roberts, supra, 74 Or App at 242.
We do not consider it evidence of neglect that mother made no financial contribution, apart from token gifts, to the children's support, because the dissolution judgment did not obligate her to do so, and she had very limited financial resources. See DaCosta v. Adams, 67 Or App 84, 87, 677 P2d 65 (1984). We do, however, attach significance to mother's failure to see her children during the statutory period, as well as during the preceding three years. Although mother argues that the judicial restriction on visitation was a "constraint" that excused her lack of contact with the children, it was her own misconduct that necessitated that restriction in the first place, and she refused to do the things that could have led the court to remove that restriction — to acknowledge responsibility for her sexual abuse of Benjamin and to obtain sex offender treatment. Mother had engaged in sexually oriented acts with Benjamin, had been convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree for the acts that she had committed against Benjamin in July, 1984, and had not obtained the therapy that the court required for her emotional and psychological problems, because she refused to accept responsibility for the sexual abuse of her child. Her lack of visitation was without just and sufficient cause and resulted from her misconduct and subsequent failure to take actions that would have opened the door to resuming visitation. We conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of wilful neglect. The adoption did not require her consent.
Affirmed.
ORS 109.324 provides:
"If either parent is believed to have wilfully deserted or neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for one year next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption and such parent does not consent in writing to the adoption, there shall be served upon such parent a citation in accordance with ORS 109.330 to show cause why the adoption of the child should not be decreed. Upon hearing being had, if the court finds that such parent has wilfully deserted or neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for one year next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, the consent of such parent at the discretion of the court is not required and, if the court determines that such consent is not required, the court shall have authority to proceed regardless of the objection of such parent. In determining whether the parent has wilfully deserted or neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the child, the court may disregard incidental visitations, communications and contributions. This section does not apply where consent is given in loco parentis under ORS 109.316 or 109.318."
Throughout this litigation, mother has lived in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in various locations in Oregon.
At the same proceeding, the court also heard a motion to modify the terms of mother's probation. It denied both motions. The only issue in this appeal is the adoption.