Case Name: Miles THOMASON v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2005-05-25
Citations: 91 Ark. App. 128
Docket Number: CA CR 04-667
Parties: Miles THOMASON v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Pittman, C.J., Gladwin & Vaught, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 128–138

Head Matter:
Miles THOMASON v. STATE of Arkansas
CA CR 04-667
208 S.W.3d 830
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered May 25, 2005
Bill Luppen, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att’y Gen., by: DavidJ. Davies, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Terry Crabtree, Judge.
At a bench trial, the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Miles Thomason, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and of the simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm. Appellant was sentenced to a total of ten years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm in part and reverse and dismiss in part.
Appellant made timely directed-verdict motions below; however, the circuit judge denied them. Motions for directed verdict are challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Tester v. State, 342 Ark. 549, 30 S.W.3d 99 (2000). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Garner v. State, 35 Ark. 82, 131 S.W.3d 734 (2003). Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001). This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002).
For appellant's first point on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver marijuana. It is unlawful for anyone to possess marijuana with intent to deliver. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401 (a) (Supp. 2003). Intent, however, can seldom be proved by direct evidence and must be inferred from facts and circumstances. Johnson v. State, 6 Ark. App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686 (1982). The fact that evidence is circumstan tial does not render it insubstantial. Conley v. State, 308 Ark. 72, 821 S.W.2d 783 (1992). As such, a jury may consider possession, along with any other pertinent fact, in determining whether an appellant possessed the specific intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance. Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783, 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978).
Officer Andy Moore, a thirteen-year veteran of the Little Rock Police Department with nine years of specialized drug training with the DEA, testified at trial that he responded to appellant's home on May 6, 2003. Several citizens previously reported appellant outside his home firing a gun into the air. Upon appellant's consent, Officer Andy Moore searched the premises. During the course of his search, Moore discovered ten plastic bags of marijuana, totaling 26.2 grams, in the room that appellant indicated was his bedroom. Each individual baggy found in appellant's bedroom weighed approximately 2.6 to 2.7 grams, which according to the officer, is the common weight of a "nickel" bag for purposes of resale.
Additionally, Officer Moore's search uncovered an unloaded Mac-90 (semi-automatic rifle) under the sofa in appellant's living room and an unloaded twelve-gauge shotgun under the mattress of the unoccupied middle bedroom. Another officer found a .30 caliber rifle and a Ruger 22 in a storage shed in the backyard of appellant's property. Further, twenty-nine rounds of ammunition were found in the storage shed of the same caliber as the Mac-90 firearm.
We hold that the foregoing evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The officers found ten individual "nickel" bags of marijuana in appellant's bedroom whose total weight amounted to slightly less than the presumptive weight (one ounce) for possession with intent to deliver. In some instances, where narcotics are packaged for individual sale, a conviction for possession with the intent to deliver may be sustained even when the weight of the contraband is less than the presumptive amount. See Hurvey v. State, 298 Ark. 289, 766 S.W.2d 926 (1989); Blockman v. State, 69 Ark. App. 192, 11 S.W.3d 562 (2000). In Hurvey, supra, the supreme court upheld Hurvey's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver based upon evidence that Hurvey carried only five individual packages of cocaine.
In the case at bar, appellant had twice as many packages as Hurvey, and appellant was in possession of four firearms. It has been recognized that a logical connection exists between the possession of drugs and firearms. Young v. State, 77 Ark. App. 245, 72 S.W.3d 245 (2002); see Jackson v. State, 52 Ark. App. 7, 914 S.W.2d 317 (1996). Furthermore, evidence of appellant's possession of a firearm is relevant to prove intent to deliver. Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 42 S.W.3d 474 (2001); Young, supra. See Wright v. State, 327 Ark. 558, 940 S.W.2d 432 (1997); Hendricks v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 871 S.W.2d 362 (1994). As such, we believe that sufficient evidence supports appellant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
For appellant's second point on appeal, he maintains that sufficient evidence does not support his conviction for the simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-106 (Repl. 2002). In order to sustain a conviction for simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, the State must show possession of a firearm by the accused and a nexus between the firearms and the drugs. See Cherry v. State, 80 Ark. App. 222, 95 S.W.3d 5 (2003). It is a defense to a prosecution for simultaneous possession if the defendant was in his home and the firearm was not readily accessible for use. See Rabb v. State, 72 Ark. App. 396, 39 S.W.3d 11 (2001). We have defined "readily accessible for use" to mean "for use" as a firearm and have held that "an unloaded weapon with no ammunition is not useable as a firearm." Id. at 403, 39 S.W.3d at 16. In this instance, appellant was found in his home, and none of the firearms on his property were loaded. Only ammunition for the Mac-90 was discovered on appellant's property; it was in a storage shed in his backyard. Therefore, we cannot say that appellant was in possession of a firearm that was readily accessible for use. Consequently, we must reverse and dismiss appellant's conviction for simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms.
Affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part.
Pittman, C.J., Gladwin & Vaught, JJ., agree.
Bird and Baker, JJ., concurring in part; dissenting in part.