Case Name: Margaret THERRIEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-04-29
Citations: 637 So. 2d 288
Docket Number: No. 92-2946
Parties: Margaret THERRIEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 637
Pages: 288–291

Head Matter:
Margaret THERRIEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-2946.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 29, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1994.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Noel A. Pelella, Asst. Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Chief Judge.
Therrien appeals from a restitution order imposed after she pled nolo contendere to eleven counts of attempted computer fraud, ten counts of grand theft, and one count of petit theft. These charges were based on her theft of cash 3 lottery tickets worth in excess of $30,000 from her employer, Delco Oil Company, Inc. The trial court withheld adjudication and placed Therrien on consecutive one-year periods of probation for each offense.
The judge set restitution at $31,800, payable at the rate of $200 per month until November of 1992, and thereafter at the rate of $300 per month. Therrien voluntarily agreed to make restitution as a condition of probation, and she does not challenge the total amount on appeal. However, on appeal, she argues the amount of monthly payments are excessive and beyond her ability to pay. We affirm.
Therrien is fully protected by the principle that one cannot be found to have violated the conditions of community eon-trol/probation requiring payment of costs or restitution if one cannot in fact afford to make such payments. In such case, there would be no willful violation. Jordan v. State, 610 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Kolovrat v. State, 574 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
In order to avoid the possibility of incarceration for stealing in excess of $30,000 from her employer, Therrien agreed to pay restitution and to permit the court to determine the amount and the schedule.
In this regard, the following discussion took place:
COURT: The plea indicates the agreement is that the court will withhold the adjudication of guilt and you will be sentenced to two (2) years community control followed by eight (8) years of probation. And that restitution will be ordered. The amount of restitution and the scheduled payments will be determined by the court. Is that your understanding of the agreement?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Are you satisfied with that? DEFENDANT: Yes.
Section 775.089(l)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1993) provides:
An order of restitution entered as part of a plea agreement is as definitive and binding as any other order of restitution .
Although Therrien did not stipulate as to the amount of restitution, she did agree that restitution would be required and the amount would be determined by the court. She put on evidence as to her financial hardship but the judge had to determine her credibility and decide whether to accept her testimony. The trial judge found that the monthly payments were appropriate even after hearing her testimony. Therrien has failed to show that the court erred in this regard. At the conclusion of the hearing on restitution, Therrien failed to object either to the total amount or the amount of monthly payments. Further, since this restitution is consistent with the negotiated plea, and Therrien has not sought to withdraw her plea, she is now estopped to challenge this restitution on appeal. Armstrong v. State, 620 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). While Therrien does not now contest the total amount, she wishes to be relieved from the pressure of having a minimum payment per month. By releasing her from this monthly obligation, she would be immune from enforcement by violation of probation for nonpayment of any amount excused even if her conditions changed in the future. We prefer to leave in place the incentive for her to make as much of the restitution as she can-leaving the burden on her, if challenged, to prove that she has paid all that she can. § 948.06, Fla.Stat. (1993); Morgan v. State, 491 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. § 815.06, 777.04, Fla.Stat. (1989).
. § 812.014(1) & (2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989).
.- § 812.014(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1989).
. There was evidence that Mr. Therrien "borrowed" money from his mother and a friend to pay the family bills; there was a question of how many winning lotto tickets she took and what happened to the money; and some questions concerning a substantial amount of jewelry she denied owning. The judge could have disbelieved her as to other sources of funds.
. In fact, the judge who originally accepted the negotiated plea, after reviewing the PSI, on his own withdrew the plea agreement and scheduled the matter for trial. It was only after Therrien was able to have that judge disqualified that a substitute judge proceeded under the plea agreement.