Case Name: J. P. Howe et al. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Company, Limited, et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-12-16
Citations: 115 Tex. 158
Docket Number: No. 3858
Parties: J. P. Howe et al. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Company, Limited, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 158–162

Head Matter:
J. P. Howe et al. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Company, Limited, et al.
No. 3858.
Decided June 24,
December 16, 1925.
(274 S. W., 563, 278 S. W., 177.)
Melville E. Peters, for plaintiffs in error.
The court erred in holding that appellants, as trustees and stockholders, are personally liable on the contract of the New-Tex Refining Company and the New-Tex Pipe Line Company. Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Assn., 72 S. W., 875; Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S. W. 343, 348; Wells v. Houston, 23 Texas Civ. App., 629, 57 S. W., 584; Gray v. Cockrell, 49 S. W., 247; Vol. 20 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 7, page 346; Vol. 20 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 15, page 353.
Where, as in the case at bar, certain actions were consolidated for trial, and afterwards certain persons and concerns were permitted to file their pleas of intervention setting up alleged claims against one of the defendants in said consolidated actions not including appellants herein and on the day of trial all parties and intervenors announced ready, it was fundamental error for the court to permit such pleas of intervention thereafter to be so amended as to include as new defendants in said interventions other than defendants in said consolidated actions, including appellants, and then proceed to trial on said day upon suppositious amended pleas and before the filing and presentation of such amended pleas, which amended pleas were not filed until seven or more days after the trial and at a time when such new defendants in said intervention, including appellants, could not answer the allegations in said amended pleas before the trial and could not defend in court as against such allegations, and to thereafter render judgment against such new defendants in such interventions including appellants upon such amended pleas. Arts. 1820, 1827, Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civ. Statutes, 1914; Railway Co. v. Granger, 22 S. W., 70; Hall v. Jackson, 3 Texas, 305; Davis v. McGehee, 24 Texas, 210; Pressley v. Testard, 29 Texas 199; Boettcher v. Prude, 32 Texas, 472; Thompson v. Bohannon, 38 Texas, 241; Kimmarle v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 76 Texas, 686; Railway Company v. Ross, 62 Texas, 447; Interstate Bldg., etc., Assn. v. Bryan, 54 S. W., 377; Shaw v. Lobitz, 35 S. W., 877; Seastrunk v. Pioneer Savings & Loan Co., 34 S. W., 466; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hidalgo, 99 S. W., 426.
Bonner, Bonner & Sanford, for defendants in error.
Our Supreme Court in Sergeant v. Goldsmith D. G. Co., 221 S. W., 258, and by denying a writ of error in Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Association, 72 S. W., 875, and by its notation made in granting the writ of error in Fisheries v. McCoy, 202 S. W., 343, and our several Courts of Civil Appeal in numerous cases, among which might be mentioned Dee v. Taylor-Hanna-James Co., 227 S. W., 361; 205 S. W., 352, 198 S. W., 1047, and 171 S. W., 294, have uniformly and expressly held that shareholders under the facts here set forth are made personally liable for the payment of such debts under the express provisions of Article 6153, Revised Civil Statutes. Connally v. Lyons, 82 Texas, 664, 27 Am. St. Rep., 935; Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164; I. Fletcher Cyc. Corp., p. 33; Sears’ Trust Estates (2 Ed.) p. 123.
Stockholders and members of joint stock associations are personally liable for the debts of such associations, and where a petition properly alleges, and the proof shows them to be such, judgment will be rendered not only against the company, but' the stockholders and members as well, when personally cited. Rev. Stats., Arts. 6152, 6153, 6154.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice GREENWOOD
delivered the opinion of the court.
Several suits were brought by the Keystone Pipe & Supply Company and others against the New-Tex Refining Company and the New-Tex Pipe Line Company and against J. P. Howe and H. C. Meier, who were trustees and shareholders in the two companies, to recover the amount of various debts and to enforce liens. The suits were consolidated and numerous additional parties intervened seeking judgments against the New-Tex Refining Company and J. P. Howe and H. C. Meier upon indebtedness of the Refining Company.
The trial resulted in a judgment described by the Court of Civil Appeals as "long and intricate," under which various plaintiffs and numerous interveners recovered judgment against one or the other company and against J. P. Howe and H. C. Meier. From this judgment Howe and Meier appealed and the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals affirmed' the judgment after slightly reforming it. 242 S. W., 1091 to 1098. The writ of error was granted Howe and Meier.
The principal contention of plaintiffs in error that they should be relieved of personal liability on the contracts of the companies in which they were shareholders cannot be sustained under the rules announced today in the case of Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Texas, 53, and the opinion in that case renders unnecessary any further discussion of this contention.
It appears that the judgment complained of by plaintiffs in error awards a recovery to intervenors Frances G. Brooks, J. H. Grotty, Eva Mae Womack, Southern Oxygen & Hydrogen Company, Martin's Book and Stationery Company, and W. P. Pritchard, against plaintiffs in error, on claims aggregating in excess of two thousand dollars, without any pleadings having been filed in behalf of intervenors when the trial began, and without the plaintiffs in error having been given opportunity to offer any defense to the intervention. Under these circumstances the judgement in favor of these intervenors cannot be sustained on direct attack on appeal. The error in rendering the judgment for the named intervenors was seasonably complained of. Because of such error, the judgments of the District Court and of the Court of Civil appeals must be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court. It is so ordered.