Case Name: Cashman, Appellant, vs. Ross and others, Respondents
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1914-02-03
Citations: 155 Wis. 558
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cashman, Appellant, vs. Ross and others, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 155
Pages: 558–563

Head Matter:
Cashman, Appellant, vs. Ross and others, Respondents.
January 13
February 3, 1914.
Wills: Construction: Life estate: Testing of remainders: Future division among a class: Partition: TTho may maintain.
1. Where a testator devised lands to his wife during her life and directed that “after her death the said property to be divided equally between my children,” no interest or estate vested in the remaindermen until the death of the life tenant.
2. In such case, where a daughter of the testator died before the widow, the devise to such daughter lapsed and her heir could not, after the death of the widow, maintain an action for partition against the surviving children of the testator.
3. Under sec. 3101, Stats., the estate or interest in lands which will entitle a person to maintain an action for partition must be presently vested in him.
4. When property under a will is to be divided at a specified time in the future among a class, only those thereof who are alive at the time of division can take under the will in the absence of provisions to the contrary.
Timlin, J.., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for St. Croix county: James O’Neill, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action for partition of real estate. Plaintiff alleges that he is a tenant in common with the defendants in certain described lands and, as such, prays for a partition thereof. The evidence shows that in 1882 one Mathias Ross was the owner of the lands in question and that he then made a will reading, “I hereby give and bequeath to my wife, Katie Ross, all my real and personal property (after the payment of my just debts) to have and to hold during her natural life. After her death the said property to be divided equally between my children.” He died shortly after executing the will, and it was admitted to probate July 5, 1882. Katie Ross, his widow, died intestate June 16, 1910. In September, 1905, Margaret Ross, who was a daughter of testator, married plaintiff, and in October, 1905, she died, without issue, leaving plaintiff her sole heir. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence the court granted a judgment of nonsuit, and' the plaintiff appealed.
Spencer Haven, for the appellant.
' Eor the respondents there was a brief by McNally •<& Dour, and oral argument by W. F. McNally and W. T. Hoar.

Opinion:
ViNJE, J.
The sole question presented by the appeal is whether or not under the will set'out'in the statement of facts any estate or interest in the lands vested in Margaret Ross at the death of the testator or before'the death of the life tenant,. Katie Ross. If an estate or interest vested in her, then plaintiff, as her sole heir, is entitled to maintain the action. On the other hand, if.no interest or estate vested in the re-maindermen until the death of the'life tenant, then plaintiff,, since his wife, Margaret', died before the life tenant, has no-interest in the lands, and cannot maintain partition. Sec.. 3101, Stats. 1913, provides that an action of partition may be .maintained "by any person who has any estate in the lands of which partition is sought." This means that' he must have some interest in the lands that has vested prior to the commencement of the action. It is not sufficient that such an interest may vest in him in the future. See Greeney v. Greeney, post, p. 621, 145 N. W. 201, and cases cited. The question must be solved, primarily, by the language of the will itself. If the intention of the testator is clear as to when the estate'vests, the statute relating to the vesting of estates cannot affect it. Morans Will, 118 Wis. 177, 193, 96 N. W. 367. The will of testator contains no words of present gift or devise to the children. It creates a life estate in the wife and then directs that upon the termination of such estate, that is, after her death,-the property is to be divided equally between his children. Respecting the pre cise question here presented, the court in Morans 'Will, supra,, said:
"But where there is a precedent life estate, and the devise or bequest is not direct to those who are to take in remainder, leaving the period of enjoyment to commence only after the ¡termination of a precedent life estate, but the bequest or •devise is in the form of a direction or an expressed purpose ¡that at the termination of the precedent estate the property ;shall be divided between certain persons specified, that circumstance is held to effectually displace the presumption as ¡to immediate vesting, and create the presumption, nothing appearing clearly to the contrary, that the intention of the testator was that the estate in remainder should not' vest until the time for division and distribution should arrive." See pp. 196, 197, and cases cited.
The devise in.t'he instant case meets the conditions of this language. It is not a present devise to the children. It is a direction that after the termination of the life estate the property shall be divided between them, and nothing appears in the will to indicate that any vesting of interest shall precede the right to the enjoyment of the estate.
When property under a will is to be divided at a spebified time in the future among a class, only those thereof who are alive at the time of division can take under the will in the absence of provisions to the contrary. Moran's Will, 118 Wis. 177, 199, 96 N. W. 367; Matter of Baer, 147 N. Y. 348, 41 N. E. 702. We have no provisions in this will disposing of the share of a remainderman who dies before the life tenant. The devise, therefore, to Margaret Eoss lapsed upon her death prior to that of her mother, and her share went to the other children of the testator who survived and not to her husband. The court properly granted a nonsuit.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.