Case Name: THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE
Court: High Court of Chancery of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1826-02-17
Citations: 1 Bland 595
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided in the High court of chancery of Maryland. [1811-1832]
Volume: 1
Pages: 595–686

Head Matter:
THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE
The circumstances and causes which led to the adoption of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights relative to judicial independency. The manner in which the several provisions of that article were introduced and established.
A salary once given to, or which has become legally vested in a Chancellor or judge cannot, during the continuance of his commission, be in any way constitutionally withheld or diminished.
The General Assembly are constitutionally bound to give a salary to a Chancellor or Judge, which shall be secured to him during the continuance of his commission; but they may, by temporary appropriations, or in any other form, provide for the payment of such a salary.
This was a controversy which originated between the House of Delegates and the Senate, at the December session 1824, of the General Assembly of Maryland, respecting the salary of the Chancellor. No charge or imputation, of any kind whatever, was made, by either house, against the Chancellor; nor does it appear, that any complaint had been made, to either house, against him, by any one; except that contained in a petition presented by Hugh Thompson to the Senate without any previous application to the Chancellor, praying to be permitted to appeal from an order which had been passed by the Chancellor on the 12th of February 1825, in the case of McKim v. Thompson. Although the Chancellor was not, in any way, directly made a party to this controversy between the then two houses of the General Assembly; or notified by either house of its existence; yet as his interests were deeply involved, he was thereby virtually made a party; and therefore, at the next session of the General Assembly, he claimed the right to appear, to defend his interests and to maintain his constitutional independency. Accordingly he presented the following memorial, and on the third day after the commencement of the session furnished each member with a printed copy thereof.
By a note to the case of McKim v. Thompson, [ante, 171,) the reader has been referred to this case. The mere principles of law involved in that case can have no bearing upon this. In those respects the two cases can have no sort of connexion with each Other. But on an attentive consideration of the various movements in the December session of 1824, of the General Assembly, as carefully stated in the following memorial, it cannot fail to be perceived, that, for some time previous to the passing of the order of the 12th of February 1825, in the case of McKim v. Thompson, and at that time, an exceedingly angry excitement prevailed against the Chancellor, who had been appointed no longer than the month of August previous. When or how that excitement originated, or of its authors, or causes, there can be no occasion here to take any notice whatever. For, in the consideration of great constitutional principles, it is proper, that we should, as far as practicable, put aside all personal animosities, jealousies, and griefs, and coniine ourselves to the examination of the manner in which the case illustrates the bearing of those great principles. It is therefore only of importance, that it should be here recollected, as a matter of history, that such an excitement did then prevail, and was then in active operation, when Thompson, by his petition, complained to the Senate, that the Chancellor’s order of the 12th of February 1825 was unjust, and prayed, that some provision should be made for allowing him the benefit of an appeal. It is in these respects only, that the two cases have a connexion and association with each other; and that the facts and circumstances of each should be recollected and taken together for the purpose of enabling the citizen to form a correct estimate of the value of those provisions of our constitution which declare, “that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be for ever separate and distinct from each other,” and “ that the independency and uprightness of judges are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people.”
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND.
The Memorial of Theodobick Bland, Chancellor of Maryland, respectfully represents,
That at the last session of the General Assembly of Maryland, the House of Delegates asserted the right to reduce the salary of the Chancellor, either by a direct enactment, repealing all laws passed since the year 1785, which had made provision for its payment ; or by refusing to continue the appropriation that had been made, from time to time, for that purpose during the last six and twenty years. This assertion of right, on the part of the House of Delegates, wrns opposed by the Senate, on the ground, that when the present Chancellor came into office, his salary having been ascertained by law, and secured to him, by the Declaration of Rights, during the continuance of his commission, the legislature had not the constitutional power to reduce that salary in any manner whatever, during that period. In consequence of which controversy between the two branches of the legislature, the Chancellor has been totally deprived, since the close of the last session, of the salary which had been thus ascertained and secured to him during the continuance of his commission.
But, however ruinous this controversy may have been, and may still be to the Chancellor individually; yet, when contemplated in all its bearings, hisfate becomes a matter of comparatively minor consideration. There are matters involved in it, vitally affecting the constitution, and the safeguards of the people’s rights, of infinitely greater moment than the mere personal wrongs of the Chancellor. Its great importance seems to require, and will certainly excuse the giving of a condensed account of its origin, progress and termination.
It had been the uniform practice of the General Assemby, for about twenty years past to pass a bill at each session, by which it was enacted, in general terms, that all acts' which would then expire should be continued over to the next session. This had been found an easy and safe mode of continuing all acts of all descriptions, not intended to be repealed or made perpetual. But, at the last session, the subject was taken up with more apparent care, by a bill which proposed to review, and to continue or perpetuate each temporary act by name. On the 9th day of December, 1824, soon after the commencement of the session, it was moved in the House of Delegates, that a committee should be appointed to inquire what laws would expire with that session ; and a committee was accordingly appointed ; who on the 14th of the same month reported a bill, which, on the 17th, was ordered to a second reading; that is, to be put upon its passage, on the 17th of the next month. But, on the same day, this bill, instead of being suffered to lie over to the appointed time, was recommitted ; and did not again make its appearance in the house until the 8th of February following. After which, it was suffered to lie upon the table unnoticed until the very last day of the session, when it was called up to a second reading; and, while on its passage, it was proposed to insert a clause continuing the act of 1798, ch. 86, which made provision for the payment of the Chancellor’s salary; but the proposition was rejected, and the bill thus passed and sent to the Senate. This bill, proposing to. continue or perpetuate each temporary act by name, requiring much consideration, and omitting all provision for the payment of the Chancellor’s salary, the general appropriation for which, during the last twenty-four years had been continued or renewed by each continuing act, was, without hesitation, rejected by the Senate.
It appears, that, on the 14th day of December last, an order was passed by the House of Delegates, calling on the register in chancery, to report “ at as early a period as possible, the number of' cases remaining in said court undetermined, and the length of time they have remained there; also the number of cases in which the papers have been lost; and the number of decisions made within the two last years, ending on the first of November, 1824.” This call was answered on the 20th of the same month. On the answer being read, it was immediately referred to the committee of grievances and courts of justice; which, it would seem, might have been considered the best and most correct disposition that could have been made of it: but, in a few hours after, that reference was reconsidered, and it was referred to a select committee.
In this place it will be necessary to remark, in order duly to appreciate what followed, that by the standing rules, and the long established usages of the House of Delegates, no member is allowed to introduce any bill, upon any subject whatever, without having first obtained leave; and the House having referred that leave to a committee to inquire, to digest the subject, and to report accordingly — and in cases when a petition or memorial is presented to the House, or a communication is made to it, such petition, memorial, or communication may be, and most usually is, as a matter of course, referred to a committee with leave to report by bill, or otherwise. But, in such case, the bill reported must have a direct, and immediate relation to the subject referred to the committee. These two are the only modes by which any bill can be brought into the house.
It does not appear, from the votes and proceedings, what the register did say to the House; but it is difficult to comprehend how any thing which he could have said, in answer to the questions the House had propounded to him, could warrant this special com mittee in reporting a bill to alter and abolish a most important part of the constitution ; and, also, in reporting a bill for the purpose of reducing the Chancellor’s salary below what had been constitutionally secured to the Chancellor for the time being, for the last two-and-thirty years. -But so it was : this committee to whom the register’s communication was referred, found it perfectly applicable to these subjects, and pregnant with both of those very important bills. And, accordingly, on the 21st of January, seemingly as a report in part, they introduced the bill proposing to abolish the office of Chancellor; and on the next day they made a further report, by presenting the bill, by which it was intended to assert and establish the right to cut down the Chancellor’s salary at pleasure.
The first of these bills was expressed in these words: “ An act to repeal all such parts of the constitution and form of government, as relate to the appointment of a Chancellor. — Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That all those parts of the constitution and form of government, which require the appointment of a Chancellor be, and the same are.hereby repealed.” This is the whole of it. There was no clause directing the publication of it for the purpose of apprizing the people, that it was intended to take effect as an alteration of the constitution; without which it could never operate as such; and without which no bill intended as an alteration of the constitution had ever before been reported or passed.
It is no where said, or intimated, whether the ultimate object of this bill was to expunge from our code the whole of the principles of equity or not; or whether it was intended to have no separate court of chancery; or to have suchjjourts, but no Chancellor; or where or how those powers and duties, now held and discharged by the Chancellor, were to be deposited and administered. The first sections of the' act of 1804, ch. 55, framed the present six judicial districts ; and then the same act declared that the General Court should be abolished. The act which destroyed the General Court began by providing an ample substitute. But by this act, for abolishing the office of Chancellor, there would have been an effectual pulling down; but no building up of any kind whatever.
On contemplating this short bill many inquiries suggest themselves ; as, whether it would be expedient to eradicate from our code every principle of equity or not ? whether, if those principles are to remain, they can be administered easier, more speedily, and cheaper than they are at present ? whether it would be better, and cheaper to have six, or eight chancellors than one chancellor? The late General Court was deemed a grievance and abolished; because, at great expense and inconvenience, it dragged witnesses and jurymen from all parts of the State to the seat of government. But the Court of Chancery, like the Court of Appeals, does not call for witnesses or jurymen from any part of the State. It brings before it nothing but the record, documents, and papers belonging to the case. The lawyers may attend in person, or they may send their arguments in writing. These are some of the thoughts suggested by this bill, on which reflections might be carried out to a considerable extent.
This bill to abolish the office of chancellor was appointed to be read a second time on the 28th of the same month on which it was brought into the House; but, from -some cause or other, it was unattended to on that day, and was not called up until the Monday forenoon of the 7th of February, when it was passed, apparently, as a matter of course, without debate, by a vote of 33 to 23, and sent to the Senate — in which house, on the 9th of the same month, it was taken up and read a second and third time, by a special order, and rejected. Upon the whole, then, on considering this first one of the suggestions which originated from the communication of the register in chancery, it would seem not to have been intended as a regular attack, but as a mere demonstration, as nothing more than a sort of preparatory feeling of the antagonist.
The second bill from this committee, by which it was intended to reduce the salary of the Chancellor, was entitled, “ An act to ascertain and fix the salary of the Chancellor.” The place in wdiich it was intended to express the amount of the salary was, as is usual in like cases, left blank, to be filled up on the second reading; and consequently, there was nothing on the face of it, as reported, which involved any constitutional question; or which intimated, that such a one was to be propounded. This bill was ordered to be put on its passage, on the first day of February following ; but, that day was suffered to pass by, and it was not called up until the 21st of February; when, by a vote of 36 to 26 the blank was filled up with “ the sum of twenty-two hundred dollars ,” as the amount of the Chancellor’s salary, and the bill was thus passed, and sent to the Senate.
It will be proper here to recollect, that when the present Chan eellor was appointed, his salary, by the act of 1798, ch. 86, then, at least, undeniably in force, was fixed at the sum of thirty-four hundred dollars per annum; and that the act of 1792, ch. 76, had, previously to the year 1798, fixed the Chancellor’s salary at the sum of twenty-five hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents; and, consequently, by the passage of this bill, the House of Delegates, practically asserted the power, at once, to reduce the Chancellor’s salary below what had been secured to the several Chancellors during the continuance of their commissions for the last thirty-two years.
The Senate conceiving the reduction of the Chancellor’s salary, in any form, to be a direct violation of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights, took up this bill, on the 23d of the same month, and rejected it “ unanimously.” Thus, at this late day of the session, this great constitutional question, relative to the security of judicial salaries, was, for the first time, fully and openly presented to the Assembly; and the two Houses were fairly at issue.
On the 25th day of February, the Delegates passed the civil list bill, in which they reduced the Chancellor’s salary to twenty-five hundred and thirty-four dollars. This was rejected by the Senate on the same ground of its being an unconstitutional reduction. As has been stated, the long special continuing act, omitting to continue the appropriation for the payment of the Chancellor’s salary, having been passed by the Delegates, and sent to the Senate on the 26th of February, the very last day of the session, was, by that body, read and rejected at once. On the same last day, the Delegates passed a resolution directing, that the Chancellor should be paid the sum of twenty-five hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents and one-third of a cent, “ as a compensation for his services during the present year.” This was a twofold reduction ; it was less in amount than the existing salary, and shorter in time than during the continuance of his commission. It was doubly objectionable; and, was therefore rejected by the Senate without hesitation. — The Delegates then, immediately introduced and passed a bill continuing all acts, in general terms, which would expire with that session, except the act of 1798, ch. 86, and also except the act of 1797, ch. 71; which bill the Senate, after much hesitation, consented to pass.
On the 26th of February, the Senate sent the following message to the delegates. “ Gentlemen of the House of Delegates. The Senate have again rejected the bill entitled, An act to pay the civil list and other expenses of civil government, and also the resolution relative to the Chancellor’s salary. We dissented from this bill yesterday, because the salary provided for the Chancellor was in our opinion, insufficient, and because we considered it a violation of the spirit and intention of the constitution and bill of rights. It is known to your honourable body, that but a few days ago, the Senate unanimously rejected the bill from your house to reduce the salary of the Chancellor, and to-day, at the very moment we are about closing the session, when many of our members are absent, who are known to have been opposed to any reduction of the salary of that officer, we are presented with another bill from your house, in which you have thought proper to make no provision to pay the Chancellor any salary whatever. If your honourable body will send us a hill to continue in force the act entitled a supplement to the act, entitled,, An act for establishing and securing the salary of the Chancellor, we will at once pass the civil list bill; otherwise we cannot, under any circumstances whatever, consent to that bill. The Senate regret the difference of opinion that has arisen between the two houses in relation to this matter; but they owe it to themselves, and to the people of Maryland, after the repeated expressions of their opinion on this subject, to adhere to the course they have taken.” This message expresses concisely the opinions of the Senate upon this subject.
On the same day the Delegates returned, the general continuing act to the Senate for their reconsideration, with the following message: — “Gentlemen of the Senate — We find ourselves driven to the painful necessity of dissenting from the amendment to the continuing act proposed by your honourable body. We conceive, that we cannot, in conscience, longer continue to the Chancellor the profuse and enormous salary which he now enjoys ; we conceive that duty requires us to reduce it, and that there is nothing in our declaration of rights or constitution to inhibit it. What we have already refused to do directly, by at least four or five different votes of this House, we cannot consent to do indirectly; we stand pledged to our consciences to maintain in every constitutional way, the- ground we have occupied. We regret that this proposition has been so often coupled by your house with acts or propositions of a wholly different character, and in no wise dependent upon it. If your House has resolved to reject every continuing act, unless it also continues the acts giving the Chancellor his present salary; and that the whole of the temporary laws of our State, some of which are of a highly important character, shall be set afloat, because your'wishes in regard to the Chancellor’s salary cannot' be gratified ; we must lament that you have adopted what to us seems an extraordinary principle, that the wheels of government shall stand still for the sake of a single individual. It seems to us to amount to a declaration, that you are determined not to concur with us in doing acts which both of us admit to be right and proper, because of a difference of opinion as to other acts of a wholly different character; we cannot be deterred from doing what we believe to be right, lest injurious consequences might result from it. With us, the rule has been adopted and adhered to in this instance, that we must pursue the right, so far as we can ascertain it, and if pernicious consequences flow from it, we must leave it to the people of this State to determine whether it is the consequence of our acts, or of your opposition to them. We therefore again return to you the general continuing act, in the hope that you will reconsider and pass it in its original form with its excepting clauses.”
Late in the evening of the same day, the last one of the session, the Senate assented to the general continuing act in the form in which it had been sent to them by the Delegates, with the following message explanatory of their considerations and motives. “ Gentlemen of the House of Delegates — The Senate have again received the bill entitled an act to continue in force the acts of Assembly which would expire with the present session, and also your accompanying message. The sentiments of the Senate have undergone no change in regard to the subject in controversy between your honourable body and themselves, but actuated alone by a desire to terminate the session, which has been already too long protracted, they have passed the said bill; content to leave the decision of the question to the people of Maryland.”
The Delegates, as will be seen by their vote of the 21st of February, passing the bill to reduce the Chancellor’s salary to twenty-two hundred dollars, could not have rested their pretensions upon any distinction between the act of 1798 and 1792; or upon any notion about the temporary nature of the one act, and the permanent character of the other; because, the salary awarded to the Chancellor, by that vote, was much less than had been allowed to him by either of those acts. And the resolution which they passed and offered to the Senate for fixing the Chancellor’s salary at “ the sum of twenty-five hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents and one-third of a cent, as a compensation for his services during the present year f -without any reference to any antecedent law, clearly shows, that they held the Chancellor’s salary to be reducible at their pleasure.
But, if those acts leave any doubt upon the mind as to the meaning and intention of the Delegates, that doubt must be completely removed by an attentive perusal of their, before recited, message of the 26th of February, returning the general continuing act. In that message there is no such thought expressed as, that they could not constitutionally repeal a permanent act, fixing the Chancellor’s salary: it is not there even intimated, that they only found themselves at liberty to reduce that salary, because it was given by the act of 1798, which act they believed to be temporary ; nor is if to be inferred, from any thing said or done by the Delegates, as recorded, that they understood, that if the act of 1798 were suffered to expire, the act of 1792 would be virtually revived; and that it was their intention, in that way, to reduce the Chancellor’s salary. On the contrary, the Senate having complained, in their message of the 26th of February, that “at the very moment they were about closing the session, when many of their members were absent who were known to have been opposed to any reduction of the salary of that officer, they were presented with another bill from the Delegates, in which they had thought proper to make no provision to pay the Chancellor any salary whateverThe Delegates, in opposition to the Senate, broadly and boldly, without qualification, or restriction, in their message of the same day, say, “ we conceive that we cannot in conscience, longer continue to the Chancellor the profuse and enormous salary which he now enjoys; we conceive, that duty requires us to reduce it, and that there is notldng in our declaration of rights or constitution to inhibit it
Hence, it is most manifest, that the Delegates asserted and maintained the absolute right to cut down the Chancellor’s salary at their pleasure, without limitation or restriction. And, rather than be disappointed in the exercise of that asserted right, they determined to close the session without making any provision whatever for the payment of the Chancellor’s salary. On the other hand, the Senate planted themselves upon the constitutional ground, that the salary given to the Chancellor by the act of 1798, ch. 86, was, by the Declaration of Rights, secured to him during the continuance of his commission; and, during that period could not be touched.
How it happened that so great a question as this, relative to the constitutional right of the General Assembly to reduce, or to •withhold, at pleasure, the salary of the Chancellor, should have been so postponed, so crowded into the very last day, and thrown in among the fragments and leavings of a long and laborious session, does not very clearly appear. But such was the fact. The special continuing act; the civil list bill; the general continuing act; the separate act and separate resolution for reducing the Chancellor’s salary ; in short, every act in any way touching upon, or exclusively embracing the subject was, by some unlucky mischance, huddled together at the close of the session, in a manner exceedingly unfriendly to calm deliberation and sound constitutional legislation upon a matter so vitally important.
These considerations, and the deep interest which the Chancellor has in having this great constitutional question fully determined, after the most mature deliberation, have induced him to embrace the earliest opportunity of laying before the General Assembly all those circumstances and arguments which might, in any manner, be likely to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion. The Chancellor is perfectly confident, that his case, so far as it respects himself only, will be heard and investigated with as much care, and as impartial a disposition to do him justice, as would be bestowed upon that of any other of the citizens of Maryland. But upon this occasion, from the peculiar and important nature of his case, he respectfully asks and hopes for more. He flatters himself, that every member of the General Assembly will bestow upon it that close attention which its important bearing upon the independency of the judiciary, upon the separation of the departments of government, and the great interests of the people so very strongly require.
It seems, that the formation of the government of our country, like that of England, has not been so much the result of profound political research as of happy coincidences: if much is to be attributed to patriotism, to virtue, and to wisdom, still more must be conceded to fortune, and a favourable concurrence of circumstances. The English American colonists claimed the benefit of the whole of the English .code of laws; and especially those parts intended for the preservation of the rights and liberties of the citizen; and they adopted, in substance, the English system of government. In this general translation and adoption, some parts of the code were improved, others neglected; and portions of the system of government were better here; others not so good as in England. The representation of the people, in the popular branch of the colonial legislatures, was every where more equal and better than that of the people of England in the House of Commons of their parliament.
But the judicial department, in all the colonies, was poorly and badly organized. Yet, for the most part, it was so composed of justices, requiring the concurrence of juries, as to sympathize immediately with the people ; and to act, most generally, according to the interests of the colonists, regardless of those of the mother country. After an angry struggle of many years it had been found, that the mere appellate power of the king in council, which had been established from the very beginning, was not alone sufficient, so to control the colonial tribunals, as to induce them to execute the acts of navigation and trade. Accordingly, for the purpose of affording judicial protection to the interests of the mother country in the colonies, courts of vice-admiralty, with jurisdiction over each colony, were finally established about the year 1700; by whose powers the acts of trade were punctually executed. The judges of these courts were appointed and paid by the king during pleasure; and, were besides allowed sundry fees and perquisites of office. When England attempted to lay internal taxes upon the colonies, jurisdiction in cases arising under the laws passed for that purpose was given to those admiralty tribunals, in like manner as had been done in cases of external revenue.
To oppose this attempt to lay internal taxes upon America, a colonial Congress was convened at New York, on the 7th of Octo ber, 1765. And, on the 19tb of the same month, they agreed to and published “ a Declaration of the rights and grievances of the colonists in Americain which, among other things, the late extension of the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts, was enu merated as one of their grievances, In the year 1767 the British Parliament passed those other acts, for laying internal taxes upon tbe colonists, commonly called the revenue acts. Upon these acts reaching this country, the Massachusetts Assembly, on the' 11th of February 1768, addressed a circular letter to the speakers of the other assemblies, stating the grounds of their opposition to them; that they had forwarded petitions and -remonstrances against the late duties ; and then say, that “ they have also submitted it to consideration, whether any people can be said to enjoy any degree of freedom, if the crown, in addition to its -undoubted authority of constituting a governor, should also appoint him such stipend as it shall judge proper, without the consent of the people, and at their expense ; and whether, while the judgest of the land,, and other civil officers in the province, hold not their commissions during good behaviour, their having salaries appointed by the crown, independent of the people, hath not a tendency to subvert the principles of equity, and endanger the happiness and security of the subject.” This letter, by the express command of the British minister, was by Governor Sharpe of Maryland, in a message of the 20th of June 1768, to the House of Delegates, denounced as a dangerous and factious attempt to disturb the public peace ; and the House was requested “ to take no notice of it, which would be treating it with the contempt it deserves.” In reply to which message, the House, among other things, say, “ be pleased to be assured, that we cannot be prevailed on to take no notice of, or to treat with the least degree of contempt a letter so expressive of duty and loyalty to the sovereign, and so replete with just principles of liberty. ” Immediately upon the receipt of which reply the House of Delegates was prorogued by the governor.
The attention of the colonists of this country having been thus, for the first time, solemnly drawn to the nature and importance of judicial independency, the subject was universally and thoroughly discussed ; and soon became familiarly and perfectly understood. If England had seen, and ascertained the necessity of a dependent and subservient judiciary to enforce the acts of trade, and the acts for raising an internal revenue ; the colonies, on the other hand, now saw as clearly, and became as thoroughly convinced, that an impartial, firm, and independent judiciary was no less necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties. It was agreed, on both sides, that laws, whether good or bad, were futile without suitable agents to execute them. In consequence of the opposi tion which the colonists made about this time, England withdrew her pretensions for a season, but soon after renewed them in another form.
To oppose this renewed attack another colonial Congress was assembled at Philadelphia, who on the 14th of October, 1774, agreed to and published, “ a declaration and vindication of the rights and liberties of the English colonies in North America.” This second colonial Congress is universally acknowledged to have been one of the most enlightened, illustrious, and patriotic bodies of men ever convened in any age or nation. Upon the subject of judicial independency théir language is strong and unequivocal. After enumerating the several acts of Parliament by which the jurisdiction of the colonial tribunals was superseded; and that of the subservient vice-admiralty, and other courts substituted in its place, among other causes of complaint, this Congress thus conclude their Declaration of Rights: “ To these grievous acts and measures Americans cannot submit, but in hopes their fellow subjects in Great Britain will, on a revision of them, restore us to that state in which both countries found happiness and prosperity, we have, for the present, only resolved to pursue the following peaceable measures. 1. To enter into a non-importation, 'non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement or association. 2. To prepare an address to the people of Great Britain, and a memorial to the inhabitants of British America. And 3. To prepare a loyal address to his majesty; agreeable to resolutions already entered into.” In their address to the king, prepared and published in pursuance of this resolution, they complain, among other things, that “the judges of admiralty and vice-admiralty courts are empowered to receive their salaries and fees from the effects condemned by themselves A And, in the same address, they further complain, that “ the judges, of courts of common law have been made entirely dependent on one part of the legislature for their salaries, as well as for the duration of their commissions. ”
This Congress asserted and maintained the rights of their fellow-citizens as Englishmen; and, following the example of" their ancestors in like cases,” had recourse to precedent as well as to argument. In the English statute book they found the most unequivocal authority in favour of that judicial independency, to the benefits of which, they thus contended the colonists were fully entitled. By the famous English statute, passed in the year 1700, (13 W. 3, c. 2,) for the better securing the rights and liberties of the subject, it is enacted and declared in these words; “ that judges’ commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, (during their good behaviour,) and their salaries ascertained and established ; but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament, it may be lawful to remove them.”
Not quite two years after the meeting of the second Colonial Congress, the United States declared themselves independent; and, in their Declaration of Independence, among the wrongs they charge upon the British king, and as one of “ the causes which impelled them to the separation,” it is alleged, that “ he has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure, of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.''
After all these ample discussions and close investigations of the rights of the people, and after the publication of all these solemn acts, the convention of Maryland was convened, in the month of August, 1776, to establish a form of government for the State.' The great field of politics had been fearlessly and diligently explored in every direction; and the soundest and most approved political axioms were laid before that convention. It appears, that none of those principles and solemn acts, in which their fellow-citizens had taken a deep interest, were overlooked, or suffered to escape their attention — of which the following comparison will afford one, among the many.proofs, that might be adduced.
In the Colonial Declaration of Rights of the 14th October, 1774, among other things, it was declared, “ that the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law. That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respectively found to be applicable to their several local and other circumstances.” By the third article of the Declaration of Rights of this State, it is declared, “ that the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the' course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and whieh by experience have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances.”
This coincidence, of sense and language, could not .have been merely accidental; it therefore proves, that those several antecedent declarations of the rights, and of the independence of the people of this country, were the sources whence many of the provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were almost literally taken; that the complaints of the grievances, arising from a dependent and subservient judiciary, as expressed in the previous Declarations of 1765, of 1774, and of 1776, were then actually before the Maryland convention; and, that the judicial independency, spoken of in our constitution, was intended to be analogous to, but more perfect, than that specified in the English statute of 1700, which had become so well understood, and was so solemnly and generally approved. In a word, it is manifest, from all the public acts, discussions, and circumstances of those times, that the thirtieth article of our Declaration of Rights must be regarded as the condensed expression of those opinions and principles, relative to judicial independency, to establish and sustain which all united America fought, bled, and triumphed.
Such is the history of this provision of our Declaration of Rights, relative to judicial independency. Let us now attentively consider the article itself; first as relates to its general character, and then-analyze and investigate its several parts. The article is in these words:
“ That the independency and uprightness of judges are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people; wherefore, the chancellor and all judges ought to. hold commissions during good behaviour: and the said chancellor and judges shall be removed for misbehaviour, on conviction in a court of law, and may be removed by the governor, upon the address of the General Assembly: provided, that two-thirds of all the members of each house concur in such address. That salaries, liberal, hut not profuse, ought to he secured to the chancellor and the judges, during the continuance of their commissions, in such manner, and at such time as the legislature shall hereafter direct, upon consideration of the circumstances of this State. No chancellor or judge ought to hold any other office, civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”
The objecis contemplated by this article are the personal qualifications of an individual. It looks altogether to man as a moral agent; and proposes to sustain and fortify those excellencies and capacities which fit him to be entrusted with judicial power; and to provide against those passions and frailties which may occasion an abuse of such power. This general character of this article will he more distinctly understood by contrasting it with some other provisions of the constitution, which speak of collective bodies, of divisions, and of departments of power.
Thus, it is declared, “ that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be for ever separate and distinct from each other.” In this there is no reference to personal and moral qualities; it speaks merely of the artificial political divisions of power; and directs each one of them to confine itself within its own proper sphere. Again, it is said, “ that no aid, charge, tax, burthen, fee or fees ought to he set, rated, or levied under any pretence, without the consent of the legislature ; that $10 law to attaint particular persons of treason or felony ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter; that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted by the courts of law.” These restrictions relate to the executive, legislative, and judicial powers respectively ; they refer to masses of power, or modes of authority; and declare, that they shall be restricted to a certain extent, and confined within certain boundaries.
This thirtieth article does not speak of the quantity, quality, or extent of judicial, or any other sort of power; laying aside every thought upon those subjects, it gives us to understand, that be the extent and nature of the judicial power what it may, it is of vital importance to have suitable agents to execute it. This article contemplates the moral and intellectual qualities of the man who is the public agent. “ The independency and uprightness of judges;” that is, the firmness, the honesty, the skill, and the resolution with which the men appointed to fill judicial stations, will resist all threats, temptations, and undue influence. It is these personal and moral qualities which “ are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people.” To sustain these qualities, and to prevent a deviation from these moral principles, is the sole object of this article; and is that which gives to it its peculiar features and character.
After having thus distinctly indicated the human excellencies which are required for judicial stations, this article then proceeds to prescribe the mode in which those excellencies shall be sustained. It directs the manner in which deviations from them may be corrected and punished; and then concludes by removing from about the judicial office one class of the temptations by which it had been previously beset. That is, the judge is to be supported in the firm, independent, and impartial discharge of his official duty, by being commissioned during good behaviour; and also by having his salary secured to him during the continuance of that commission; he is to be punished for misbehaviour by removal; and he is not, as formerly, to be exposed to the temptation to go astray by being allowed to receive fees or perquisites of any kind.
But, upon the present occasion, it is that portion of the provisions of this article, relating to judicial salaries, which alone claims our special attention. It is declared, “ that salaries liberal but not profuse ought to be secured to the chancellor and the judges.” The authors of this article were perfectly well acquainted with the condition of this country under the colonial monarchy. The Declaration of Independence had proclaimed, that “ he (the British king,) has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.” And when the authors of this article meditated on the subject of judicial salaries, the picture of the past oppressive prodigality, and a cheering hope for the future were before them; the contrast pressed upon their minds, and their thoughts, thus influenced, were happily expressed in the four words, “ liberal but not profuse.” But this expression gives no positive direction. It merely indicates an opinion, that the future judicial officers of the State should be compensated according to the just and liberal principles of the republic; not in the profuse manner in which they had been maintained under the late monarchy, and nothing more. It lays down no positive rule, and therefore gives no command.
The salaries, it is said “ ought to be secured.” It will be sufficient to observe here, that the word “ ought ” frequently occurs in this Declaration of Rights, and is always .used in the imperative sense of the word, “shall” Thus, it is said, “that no soldier ought to be quartered in any house,” &c. “ that no person ought to hold at the same time more than one office,” &c. The manifest and settled meaning of which is, “ that no soldier shall,” &c.; “ that no person shall,” &c. Such also is the meaning of the word “ought” in the article under consideration; the clear sense of it is, that the salaries “ shall be secured,” &c.
It is said, that the salary shall “be secured to the chancellor;” that is, according to the universally received meaning of the word “secured,” the salary shall be “ ascertained, made certain,.put out of hazard, protected, made safe, and insured,” to the chancellor. And even yet more; it is said, that salaries shall be secured to the chancellor and judges “ during the continuance of their commissions.” Thus, after expressing an opinion, that the salary should be just in amount, and declaring, that it shall be secured, the term and duration of that security is distinctly specified, in a manner which it is utterly impossible to pervert, or to misunderstand. The English statute of the year 1700, as we have seen, had declared, that the judges’ salaries should be “ascertained and established.” Had this article said nothing more than, that the salary should be“ secured,” it might have been considered as ambiguous ; and there might have been found some grounds on which plausibly to contend, that the salary was sufficiently “ secured,” if it were fixed by the legislature from one term of years to another, or from year to year. But all such obscurity has been completely removed by this distinct specification of the duration of the security intended. The security and certainty of the salary is to be co-extensive with that of the commission; or, in the words of the article, which cannot be made plainer, the salary is to be secured to the chancellor “ during the continuance of his commission.” Let us proceed again with our commentary,
A salary, just in amount, shall be secured to the Chancellor during the continuance of his commission, it is said, “ in such manner, and at such time as the legislature shall hereafter direct, upon consideration of all the circumstances of the State.” Thus, after having conveyed an adequate idea of what should be the amount of the salary; and having imperatively directed that it shall be provided; and when provided, that it shall be secured; and then, to remove all ambiguity, having designated the duration of that security; it would seem, that nothing was left for implication ; and consequently, that nothing further was necessary to be said upon the subject. But, had the clause stopped at that point, it might have been asked, In what manner shall provision be made for the payment of this salary ? Under the government just then abolished, judicial salaries were provided for in various ways. Sometimes “in such manner and at such time” as the lord proprietary ; as the king; as the parliament; as the colonial legislature ; or as one of the branches of the colonial legislature thought proper to direct; and that too, in most instances, without the least “ consideration of the circumstances of the State.”
But, this last provision has removed even this doubt, by expressly investing the legislature with the power to create, or to set apart any particular fund, and to malee appropriations, in such manner as they may think proper, for the payment of this peculiarly and clearly defined salary of a chancellor or a judge. But, the amount of the salary being once designated by the General Assembly, whether by law, resolution, or in any other legislative way, that amount, so designated, is, by this article of the Declaration of Rights, secured during the continuance of the commission; and nothing remains at the discretion of the legislature but the mode of making provision for its payment.
If the correctness and utility of provisions, such as these, concerning judicial salaries, could be supposed to stand in need of any testimonials in their favour from actual practice; or, if their perspicuity could be made more clear by illustrative examples, the immediately antecedent occurrences in our own country would furnish the. most ample exposition of their bearing and tendency; and the most unanswerable proofs of their utility and value. The colonial Congress of 1774, that most. illustrious body of men, deliberately and solemnly declared to their then king, that in the colonial courts of admiralty justice had been perverted, because the judges were “empowered to receive their salaries and fees from the effects condemned by themselves;” and they further declared, that the administration of justice, in the colonial courts of common law, was no less partial and impure, because the judges of those courts had been “ made entirely dependent on one part of the legislature for their salaries, as well as for the duration of their commissions.” And, among the causes which impelled us to the separation from the mother country, it is charged, that the king had made the judges dependent on his will alone for “ the amount and payment of their salaries.”
These are some of the great lessons of our revolution. They were among the axioms deemed unquestionable in those times. It had been sorely and deeply impressed upon the minds of all the people of America, that a dependent judge was the fit instrument of an oppressor; that an independent judge was a proper and necessary guardian of a freeman’s rights; that judges, like other men, were frail, and always found to be entirely subservient to those on whom they were dependent for their salaries, and their bread; and that wise and salutary laws were a mockery, without firm and impartial judges to administer them.
Having thus traced the origin, history, and nature of the security of judicial salaries ; and having carefully considered that article <of the Declaration of Rights in which their security is particularly provided for, declared, and defined; as well according to its general character, as the meaning of each phrase and sentence; let us now inquire what has been the operation of those constitutional provisions, and the actual practice under them, from the time the government of the Republic was organized, down unto the twenty-sixth day of February last, when the tinhappy deviation complained of took effect.
It should be recollected, that soon after the commencement of our revolutionary struggle, the proprietary government of Maryland ceased to exist; and, during a period of about two years, was succeeded by a government made up of mere voluntary associations ; of district and county committees, arranged, by common consent, under the superintendence of a General Convention and a Council of Safety. That by the direction of one of those conventions, a new convention was elected and assembled in August, 1776, “ for the express purpose of forming a new government by the authority of the people only,” who, in the name of the people drew up and adopted, “ the Declaration of Rights, and the Constitution and form of Government of the State of Maryland.” The manner in which this new government was organized, and when, and how its principles began to operate, should also be recollected.
The General Assembly, to be called together under the new constitution, and which met, for the first time, on the 5th day of February, 1777, was charged with the creation, and establishment of the executive, and judicial departments. The governor and council were elected on the 14th February, 1777, but did not qualify until the 20th of March following. After which, the Council of Safety, which had exercised both executive and judicial functions in cooperation with the General Assembly, was dissolved ; and, all its authority, except the power of banishment, was lodged with the newly formed executive. The Chancellor, the Judges of the General Court; and of the Admiralty Court; the Justices of the Peace, who formed the County Courts; and the Attorney General, were appointed by the legislature on the 3d of April 1777. An act was passed declaring, that the courts of justice should be opened on the first of July in the same year; but the Court of Chancery was not, in all respects, accessible to suitors until some time after. It was determined, at this first session of the Assembly, that the Court of Appeals should be constituted of five distinct judges, who, owing to the circumstances of the State, were not appointed by the legislature until the 12th of December, 1778; but the act authorizing them to appoint their clerk did not pass until the 5th of May, 1780. Hence it was not until after that period, that the judicial department could be said to be completely, and in all its branches, prepared and ready for the administration of justice.
But, this government was framed during the heat of a most distressing and perilous war; when the movements of the best established political institutions might have been interrupted by the rude collisions of the times< It could not, therefore, be supposed, that every principle of the newly written constitution was, at once, fully to operate; and, that all its provisions were to be, from the very outset, exactly observed. Maryland, never having been the immediate seat of war, during our revolutionary conflict, had not felt any of those dreadful calamities, that are always exhibited on such a theatre. But, the people were exposed to frequent predatory incursions; and, in other respects, had their full share of burthens and sufferings.
After the disastrous battle of Camden, when the enemy, flushed with victory, began his march towards this State, all its energies were aroused, and all its resources called forth to meet and repel the approaching danger. The government was put into a condition to disperse, to fly, and to reassemble in a place of safety. The payment of all drafts upon the treasury was prohibited, that the public finances might be husbanded for the occasion. . It was resolved, that a request be sent to the general court to adjourn; the expected interruptions of the usual and periodical movements of judicial proceedings were provided against; and the executive was armed, for the season, with a vigour far beyond the temperate restrictions of the newly adopted constitution. But, fortunately, this awfully threatening cloud broke before it reached us ; and we suffered nothing from the bursting of that storm, the terrifying advances of which, had stimulated every nerve in the State. The capture of the British army at Yorktown relieved our apprehensions, without, however, allowing any immediate relaxation of our efforts. Better times were approaching, but their tardy development was accompanied with such alternations of hope, doubt, and fear, as to forbid those retrenchments, -which would certainly have been made on a strong assurance of peace. The signature of the preliminary treaty of peace was not formally announced to the legislature until the 8th day of May, 1783.
The independence and freedom of Maryland were thus finally recognized and established; but the State was left in debt, and in poverty. We commenced a new era, with a new set of political institutions, founded on principles original in themselves, or never before so connected and tried. The several public functionaries were called to their respective stations; and the constitutional principles and restrictions, applicable to each, began to operate. Maryland, with her confederates, then, but not until then, set out upon that career of prosperity to which there is no parallel among the nations of the earth.
Hence it appears, that our government was not brought forth at once, complete in all its parts; that it was not the work of one election, of one, or of two sessions ;' of one or two years; but, that it was created and established by parts, as times, means, and circumstances would dllow. But, the matter, now under consideration, does not involve an inquiry into the manner in which all the several parts, and provisions of our constitution were put into operation. The present subject necessarily carries our investigations no further than to the judiciary; and to but one single question relative to that department; that is, when and how those judicial salaries were ascertained and settled, which are required by the Declaration of Rights to be secured to the chancellor and to the judges during the continuance of their commissions.
A salary is a compensation for services rendered; it is the periodical payment of a certain value, in money, for work and labour done. The provision of the Declaration of Rights, which commands the legislature to secure to the chancellor and judges their salaries, must have been predicated upon the capacity of the State to effect the security required. If no revenue could be raised, in money, no salary could be paid in money. And, if the money, or the circulating medium of the country had no value; or a value continually fluctuating, and which it was impossible to ascertain, it would be impossible to fix and secure a salary of any value to any officer; since there was not any such money or standard by means of which any amount in value could be ascertained and secured. These propositions are self-evident.
The salaries of the chancellor and judges were not secured, as required by the Declaration of Rights, until the year 1785. The causes of their not being so constitutionally secured, before that period, were the fluctuation and depreciation of the circulating medium.of the country; the actual poverty of the State; and the very greatly embarrassed condition of its finances. These facts shall be established; and it will then be shown, that the General Assembly, themselves, referred to those circumstances as the foundation of their reasons for not securing the salaries of the chancellor and judges, as they were required to do by the Declaration of Rights.
During the first nine years of the republic the salaries of the chancellor and judges were, none of them, ascertained and secured, according to the Declaration of Rights. They were all, alike, settled by annual appropriations, given at the pleasure of the legislature; at first, by mere resolutions; and then by the bill for the payment of the civil list; and their amount varied according to the opinions of the legislature, and the. circumstances of the State. In the year 1777, soon after a chancellor was appointed, it was directed, that a yearly salary should be paid to him at the rate of three hundred founds current money. For the year 1778 he was to receive a yearly salary of seven hundred and fifty founds common money. It was declared, that for the year 1779 he should be allowed twelve hundred and fifty founds. For the year 1780 it was determined, that a salary of twelve thousand five hundred founds per annum should be allowed the chancellor. For the year 1781 his salary was fixed at six hundred founds, to be paid ip Spanish milled dollars at seven shillings and sixpence each, or in gold, or other silver in proportion, or in hills of credit at the fassing value. The provision for the payment of judicial salaries, during each of these five first years, was made simply by a resolution passed at the last session of each previous year. As a compensation to the chancellor, for his services for the year 1782, he was to be paid seven hundred and fifty founds in bills of credit of the last emission at par, or in wheat, at seven shillings and six pence per bushel. For the year 1783 his compensation was fixed at six hundred pounds. For the year 1784 it was, in like manner, settled at six hundred pounds ; and it was declared, that for the year 1785, the chancellor shall be allowed a salary of six hundred and fifty pounds current money. The provision for the payment of the salaries of the chancellor and judges, for each of those four years, was made by an act passed annually, and usually entitled “ an act to settle and pay the civil list.”
Hence, it appears, that during a period of nine years, all judicial salaries were in a most unstable, and insecure condition. The chancellor’s salary, within that time, fluctuated from three hundred pounds to twelve thousand five hundred pounds, in nominal amount; and, except for the years 1783 and 1784, it was continued at the same amount no two years in succession. The causes of these variations, and of this uncertainty, will be found in 'the then condition of the circulating medium; and in the low, distracted state of the public finances; not in any mere caprice of the legislature; or in any strange whims of theirs about the court of chancery; for, during that period, the court continued its course steadily, and was then acknowledged to be one of the most valuable tribunals of Maryland.
“ These United States (said the Congress of the Union) having been driven into this just and necessary war, at a time when no regular civil governments were established of sufficient energy to enforce the collection of taxes, or to provide funds for the redemption of such bills of credit as their necessities obliged them to issue, and before the powers of Europe were sufficiently convinced pf the justness of their cause, or of the probable event of the controversy, to afford them aid or credit; in consequence of which, their bills increasing in quantity beyond the sum necessary for the purpose of a circulating medium, and wanting at the same time specific funds to rest on for their redemption, they have seen them daily sink in value, notwithstanding every-effort that has been made to support the same, insomuch, that they are now passed by common consent, in most parts of these United States, at least thirty-nine fortieths below their nominal value, and still remain in a state of depreciation, whereby the community suffers great injustice, the public finances are deranged, and the necessary dispositions for the defence of the country are much impeded and perplexed.” Such was the declaration of Congress in March, 1780, the correctness of which was solemnly acknowledged by the Maryland legislature in the June following.
But, even as early as February, 1777, the General Assembly of Maryland had declared, that the quantity of paper then in circulation greatly exceeded the medium of commerce. In the early part of the year '1779, wheat sold for fifteen to twenty pounds per bushel; and in the year following it sold as high as thirty pounds ten shillings per bushel, in the then currency of the State. At the close of the year 1779, a committee of the Delegates stated, “ that every necessary of life had risen to forty prices at least.” Paper money continued to depreciate so rapidly, that in March of the year 1781, it passed at one hundred and thirty for one, and soon after, some kinds of it, ceased to circulate at all.
At the close of the year 1781, the pecuniary resources of Maryland appear to have sunk to their lowest point of depression. Every, effort had been made to prevent a total bankruptcy, but without effect. The State seems to have been forced into an open and solemn acknowledgment of its utter inability to pay its debts for some time to come. The money of the country, under the various denominations of provincial bills, continental bills, convention bills, state continental money, state money, black money, and red money, which had, from time to time, been issued — and had, so far, been one of the most potent means of sustaining the cause of our independence, had so sunk in value, as it increased in quantity, as to have become at length absolutely worthless, and no longer to be respected, in any shape, as money. It wrns estimated, that the whole amount of coin, then in this State, did not exceed one hundred thousand pounds; and that it would be impossible to collect by taxation a sufficiency to answer the demands upon the government. A committee of .the- Delegates, in December 1784, stated, that the great fluctuation, and inequality in the valuation, from 1778 to 1782, inclusive, of the property in the State, especially of land, rendered it impossible for the legislature to ascertain the sum that any tax would produce.
Finding it impossible to bring money into the treasury, of sufficient value to meet the exigencies of the times, the General Assembly, at their first session in the year 1780, authorized and required the payment of taxes in wheat, flour, beef upon the hoof, pork, and tobacco, at specified rates. The resolute freemen of those days appear to have cheerfully paid into the treasury their last dollar; and then to have contributed with alacrity, under all the wasteful disadvantages of such a mode of contribution, a share even of their provisions for the support of those who had taken the field in the common cause. These taxes in kind, or these “ specifics,” as they were called in those days, were collected in many different warehouses, and places of deposite throughout the State; and, as circumstances required, were distributed and handed over to the army, or the public creditors, or sold to raise money to meet instant and pressing demands. And, as we have seen, it was made optional with the chancellor, in the year 1782, to draw his salary in bills of credit of the last emission, or 'in wheat, one of those specifics. Such was the general pecuniary and fiscal poverty, and embarrassment of the first years of the republic, that, at the April session of 1782, an act was passed declaring, that no suit should be brought for the recovery of- any debt unless the debtor had neglected to pay interest, or had refused to deliver any property he might have for sale, to his creditor in payment at a fair valuation ; and further, that the time from thence until the first of January, 1784, should not be estimated in the limitation to the prosecution of suits.
About the close of the year 1783, there being every reason to hope for a rapid restoration of a sound circulating medium, with which the taxes might be paid, and the treasury replenished, the law allowing the payment of taxes in kind was abolished; and the specifics on hand were ordered to he sold. The finances of the State in fact recovered, as was expected; but they were not so soon cleared of all embarrassment, and re-established upon so regular and permanent a basis, as to enable the General Assembly, immediately, to determine what amount of salaries could, with propriety, be secured to the judicial officers during the. continuance of their commissions, as was required by the constitution,
On the 23d of December, 1777, the Senate sent to the House •of Delegates a message expressed in these words: Gentlemen, We have returned with our negative the bill, entitled an act fot the payment of the journal of accounts ; the low state of tho treasury, and the certainty of very great and speedy demands thereon, for effecting the several matters ordered in the course of this session, have induced us to defer the payment of the' journal, to a time when the money can le' taken from the treasury with less detriment to the public. We are willing to concur with a resolve for paying the clerks and other officers of the two Houses, the sums respectively due to them on the journal.This proposi-tion was at once assented to, and a resolution to that effect was brought in and passed both Houses. This resolution furnishes a most refreshing instance of the lofty, disinterested patriotism of the revolutionary legislators of Maryland. But those were times of peculiar emergency and distress. And this resolution shows how deeply the public exigencies were felt, when legislators themselves found it necessary to set an example of the retrenchment and economy they enjoined, by abandoning their own compensation, while every other officer was paid to the full extent to which the acts of the State had induced him to expect to receive.
During the whole of this distressing period, and under every aspect and change of circumstances, the legislators of the Republic appear to have been actuated by a strong sense of justice, and a firm determination to compensate every one for his services to the full extent of their worth, and of the ability of the State to pay. But while they were thus making every possible effort to render to every individual his due, and to comply with the provisions of that constitution which they had just adopted, and had declared, should be sacred; they felt the necessity of having it distinctly understood, that it was not their intention, directly, or indirectly, to plight the faith of the State for the payment of any salary which might burthen and embarrass its finances after the return of peace. Accordingly, when they fixed the salaries of all officers upon the high nominal scale of the year 1780; and the chancellor’s salary, as we have seen, was fixed at twelve thousand five hundred pounds ; the General Assembly resolved : “ That whatever salaries may be given to the officers of the civil list, in continental currency, shall be subject to the control of the General Assembly, and shall stand no longer than till the further order .of the said General Assembly.”
It may then be safely assumed, as a fact incontrovertibly established, by the acts of the government, and the history of the times, that, whatever may have been the intentions or the wishes of the General Assembly, during the first nine years of the Republic, it was utterly impracticable, within that time, to comply with that provision of the Declaration of Rights, which requires the legislature to secure to the chancellor a salary during the continuance of his commission. But, however strongly and clearly this may be deduced from the facts and circumstances of those times; yet, if it rested on deduction only, and there were, in all that period, no express declarations of the wishes, understanding, and intention of the legislature to be met with, there might, perhaps, be found, somewhere, room to'urge a cavil, or to press an inference, that the Declaration of Rights had been construed to allow the legislature a discretionary power over judicial salaries; that it allowed them to temporize, and to diminish at pleasure, the salaries of the chancellor and judges. But the public acts, the repeated solemn messages, and the unequivocal language of the two branches of the General Assembly, have absolutely and positively precluded every doubt and cavil upon the subject.
At November session, 1782, the Senate, on the 11th of December, sent to the House of Delegates the following message: — “ Gentlemen — The bill entitled, an act to settle and pay the civil list, and the other expenses of civil government, may be considered by you as a money bill, to which our assent or dissent only can be given; and as you might have deemed it improper in us to make any alteration, we have returned it with a negative; we might otherwise have offered .such amendments as would have met with your approbation; we are therefore under the necessity of communicating to you, by message, the reasons of our dissent.
“ You will readily believe, gentlemen, that we do not mean to leave the officers of government unprovided for; on the contrary, we would willingly bestow upon them liberal, though not profuse salaries; but when the weight of taxes, already so severely felt by the people, is likely to continue, and even to be increased by a heavy accumulating interest upon a large debt, for which no funds are yet provided, and our quota of the continental debt and interest remains also unprovided for, the strictest economy in all our affairs is certainly become necessary; we therefore think that the salaries of the gentlemen of the council might be lowered to three hundred pounds each, the auditor-general three hundred and fifty pounds, and his deputy one hundred and fifty pounds; and'the clerk of the council two hundred pounds ; the treasurer’s office, we are of opinion, may well be executed for six hundred pounds to the principal, out of which he might employ assistant clerks.
“We have another objection to the bill, more weighty than that already mentioned. The independency of the judges is essential to the impartial dispensation of justice; this principle cannot be questioned, and is recognized by the Declaration of Rights; for, in pursuance of the principle that declaration provides, ‘ that salaries liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the chancellor and judges during the continuance of their commissions.’ Their salaries have hitherto been settled annually by the civil list bill; and consequently cannot be said to be secured to them during the continuance of their commissions. — It may not be improper to settle annually the salaries of officers annually chosen; nothing at least in our Constitution expressly militates against an annual regulation of the salaries of such officers ; but an annual regulation of the judges’ salaries, is repugnant, as we conceive, to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, which meant that they should really be independent, and superior to every undue influence. In ourjudg • meni, no influence over them, would be more dangerous than-that of the legislature, arising from, the hope of increasing, or the apprehension of decreasing salaries ; an influence of this land would have a tendency to introduce the greatest evil in government, an accumulation and union in the same persons, of the legislative and judicial powers, so wisely and expressly proscribed by our Constitution.
“ The perplexities and confusion of the times may apologize m some degree, for past inadvertency; for we are convinced, a deliberate violation of the Declaration of Rights was never intended by the legislature in any point, much less in one so essential. However, as the enemy hath some time since changed an offensive into a defensive war on this continent, as now a regular and effectual administration of law and justice hath taken place amongst us, it is become the duty of the General Assembly to establish permanent salaries, and to secure a punctual and fuE payment of them to the judges.
“ We therefore deem it both expedient and necessary that a biE, distinct from the civil list bill, should originate in your House for that purpose; such a biE wiE meet with our ready concurrence; provided, that the salaries of the judges be liberal, compared with the present exigencies of the State; for what might now be esteemed liberal under those exigencies, may not appear so hereafter, wffien, from a happy change of circumstances, the resources of the people shall be greater than at present. In this point of view, we consider the salaries settled on the judges by the present biE, as sufficiently liberal.
“If on a revision of the subjects of this message, your ideas should coincide with ours, as to the quantum of the salaries proposed by us to be altered, and settled annuaEy on aE the other civE officers of government, except the judges, a bill originated by you for that purpose will have our ready assent.”
To this message from the Senate, the Delegates on the 12th of January, 1783, sent the following answer: “May it please your honours, We cannot but consider the bill for the payment of the civE list as a money biE, and therefore subject to no amendment by your honours. By a rule of this House, before any person is named to any office or appointment, to which any salary or allowance is annexed, the allowance or salary is first ascertained. The reason of' this provision is obvious, to prevent any opinion that the salary is given to the person and not to the office, and the choice of the officer removes all suspicion of partiality or prejudice. We do not think the salaries allowed by onr bill profuse or extravagant, and we cannot go into a reconsideration of them without departing from our rule, and subjecting ourselves to a censure we would wish to avoid.
" We agree with your honours, that the salaries to the chancellor and judges ought not to he settled hy an annual regulation, but ought to be secured to them during the continuance of their commissions ; and, as soon as we can furnish a permanent and perpetual fund out of which their salaries can be paid, we will send you a distinct bill for that purpose, and we hope this will be in our power before the expiration of the year; we have returned your honours the bill, and hope it will meet your assent.”
In reply to which the Senate, on the 14th of the same month, sent to the Delegates the following message: “ Gentlemen, We have reconsidered and sent you the civil list bill with our assent; you have laid us under the disagreeable necessity either of lengthening the session for some days, at a time when every gentleman expects to rise, or assenting to what we do not approve; we must therefore declare to you, that we shall hereafter adhere closely to our propositions, and have only at this time assented to the bill to prevent the further continuance of the session, or the confusion which would arise from leaving the civil officers without any provision.”
From these messages it clearly appears, that both branches of the General Assembly agreed, that the salaries of the chancellor and judges ought to be secured, and that the legislature could not constitutionally diminish or withhold them at pleasure. But the Delegates, it seems, could not be persuaded, that the State then had it in its power, or could raise the funds to secure those salaries as required by the Constitution. These messages need no comment. Yet it will be well to recollect, that some of those, who approved those messages, had been themselves distinguished members of that convention which framed the Constitution.
At the November session of 1783, this subject was again taken up, and a committee appointed by the House of Delegates; “ to consider what arrangements might be necessary and proper with regard to the civil establishment; who reported, “ that the chancellor, the judges, and other officers on the civil establishment holding commissions during good behaviour, ought to be rendered independent by having salaries annexed to continue during their continuance in office,” which report was concurred with. In consequence of which the same committee made a further report to the House, specifying sundry articles as being, in their opinion, “ proper objects of taxation for establishing permanent funds, for the payment of moneys that become due on the civil list.” But on the second reading of this report, the laying of taxes on the proceedings in courts of law and equity, which was considered as the most productive of the ways and means for raising the proposed fund, was rejected; and the aggregate of the residue not being sufficient for the payment of the civil list, the whole project failed. Hence, owing solely to the declared inability to provide funds, the judicial salaries were again settled for the current year and no longer.
At the next session leave was given, in the House of Delegates, to bring in a bill to establish a permanent fund for the payment of salaries to the chancellor and judges, during the continuance of their commissions; and a bill was accordingly reported to the House; but it seems to have been virtually superseded or negatived by the civil list bill, in which, as reported, the salaries of the chancellor and judges were to have been secured to them, “ during the continuance of their commissions ;” but, those words were stricken out on the second reading, by a majority of only one vote,' and the bill was thus passed, bestowing the judicial salaries “ for the current year only.” At this session the propriety of giving to judicial salaries the requisite constitutional security had been introduced and pressed upon the attention of the General Assembly by the Intendant of the Revenue in the conclusion of his report, in which he says, “ Permit an old servant to recommend to your most serious consideration, the increasing of the chancellor’s and the judges of the General Court’s salaries. Their present allowance will not support them, whilst provisions and other necessaries continue at their present prices. Your lives, liberties and properties, depend much more upon the abilities ánd integrity of gentlemen who fill these judicatories than perhaps at first view may be imagined. These officers ought to be put above want, and whatever is given ought to be absolute, and without control, and not be obliged to look up annually to the legislative body for their next year’s support. The increase I would recommend would be £150 to each, amounting in the whole to only £600; a small tax upon law proceedings would bring in much more than this sum to the treasury.”
At the session of the General Assembly held in November, 1785, there were convened, as our statute book will show, the most worthy and enlightened body of legislators Maryland ever saw.. On the 24th of November of that session, the Senate sent the following message to the House of Delegates :
“ Gentlemen, We think it a duty incumbent on us to call your attention to the state of our judiciary department. The thirtieth article of our bill of rights, for very obvious and important reasons, enjoins that the chancellor and judges should be independent, not only by holding their commissions during good behaviour, but also by having proper salaries secured “to them during the continuance of their commissions. It is the duty of the legislature both to fix the salary of the chancellor and judges, and to provide funds by a permanent law for the regular payment of such salaries. This duty has not been complied with ; md instead of being in that state of independency required by the bill of rights, and strongly dictated by the first principles of free governments, the chancellor and judges have hitherto remained dependent for their salaries upon the annual votés of the legislature. This House have been of opinion for a considerable time past, that there was no circumstance which would justify the legislature in delaying to make the provision required by the constitution; and our opinion hath been ineffectually communicated to a former House of Delegates; but we trust, gentlemen, you will concur with us in sentiment, that this very important subject ought to be properly attended to early in this session; and that you will in due time send us a bill for fixing the salaries of the chancellor and judges, during the continuance of their commissions, and for the payment of those salaries with certainty and regularity. The experience of past sessions induces us to apprehend we may find ourselves under the necessity of determining too hastily, matters, by which the welfare of this State in particular, and of the United States in general, may be essentially affected, and which consequently demand the maturest consideration.
“ Towards the close of each session, when from its length and the approaching severity of the season the House of Delegates have been usually anxious to rise, the most important part of the public business hath been transmitted to the Senate. As the Constitution does not allow "this House to propose amendments to money bills, the evil consequence must readily occur, if we should think it- necessary to dissent to them at a time when the House of Delegates will not agree to continue sitting to reassume the discussion of the subject' matter of such bills, or even to enter into a consideration of such amendments as the Senate may propose to others. We therefore request that such important bills as are intended to be offered for our consideration by your House, may be sent to us so early in the session, that a fair opportunity may •be given to us of considering them with that deliberation which every interesting act of legislation requires.”
This message not having produced all the good effects desired, the Senate, on the 19th of January following, wrote again to the Delegates as follows: “ Gentlemen, Upon reading your bills to establish permanent salaries for the governor, chancellor, and judges, we are of opinion the provision proposed to be made for them is not a sufficient compensation for their services, nor will it enable them to support with dignity the rank to which their superior trusts entitle them. The greatest security which a people can enjoy under any government, results from a strict and impartial administration of justice. The independence of the magistrate invested with this important trust, has been the first care of the legislator, who wished the government to be permanent and the people happy. By a liberal provision being made to the chancellor and the judges, they can dedicate their whole time and abilities to the service of the public. Gentlemen of merit and knowledge will be thereby induced to engage in this most important trust, and their personal character and abilities will give weight to their decisions, and security to the government. We are very sensible, that the state of our finances requires economy, but flatter ourselves you will upon reconsideration, think with us, that the salaries of the officers referred to in this message may be enlarged, without incurring a censure for profusion. As there are no funds particularly provided for the payment of those salaries, it would be very agreeable to us to mortgage all the unappropriated revenues of the State for the payment of them. We have sent you the bills for reconsideration, in hopes, that you will consent to an enlargement. The- following salaries would meet our perfect approbation: To the Governor ¿61200. To the Chancellor ¿61000. To the Judges of the General Court, each ¿6850. Judges of the Court of Appeals,' each ¿6500. Judge of the Court of Admiralty ¿6500.
“We. submit to your consideration the propriety of passing a law to lessen the number of the Court of Appeals to three, when, circumstances admit. If upon reconsidering the subject, you do mot think it proper to make any further allowance, or to make the funds more certainly productive of a sufficient sum to pay salaries, we wish you to return us the bills, that we may determine ora them.”
To this message from the Senate, the Delegates on tire 23d of the same month made the following reply: “ May it please your honours — This House have considered your message of the 19th instant, by James Lloyd, Esquire. We are very desirous of making a liberal provision for the governor, the chancellor, and the judges; and wish the circumstances of our people would justify this House in acceding to the salaries proposed by the Senate. If time will permit, we shall attempt to provide particular funds, to secure the payment of the salaries established by our bill. It will always be in the power, as it will certainly be in the inclination of the legislature, to make such alterations in the present salaries, as the ability of government will permit.
“ As the chancellor must necessarily have great trouble, from the number of disputes relative to the gi'ants of lands, we are willing to make him compensation ; and to add a clause to the bill for the civil list, allowing him the sum of-for the next year.
“ This House will consent to limit the number of judges in the Court of Appeals ; and that when any vacancy may happen, the number shall not exceed three, until the abilities of the State will justify an increase of the establishment.”
Soon after the sending of the last of these messages, on the 7th of February, 1786, the act of 1785, ch. 27, received the assent of both Houses, and became a law. This is the first legislative act which secured to the chancellor and judges their salaries during the continuance of their commissions.
This review, which We have taken of the first nine years of the Republic, shows, that during the whole of that time, that provision of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights, which requires the legislature to secure to the chancellor and judges their salaries during the continuance of their commissions, was waived. But the reason why it was so left dormant and inoperative, is most satisfactorily shown. The causes were imperative and uncontrollable; they amounted almost to a physical impossibility to give effect to that provision of the Declaration of Rights. Such causes have, at various times, been held to be an allowable excuse, for the widest departures from some of the most important provisions of the Constitution. Thus, in the year 1780, when this State was imminently threatened with being made the immediate seat of war, the governor was invested with the dangerous power of seizing any persons he suspected of treachery to the country, and of having them tried and executed according to martial law. Nothing could justify, but the times seemed to excuse the measure,
No one can loot over, and meditate upon the condition and circumstances of Maryland during the first nine years of the Republic, and say that it would have been entirely safe, and proper, and just, either to the State, or the officer, to have, at once unchangeably secured to the chancellor and the judges their salaries, during the continuance of their commissions. Nor can any one, after attentively perusing the before recited messages and acts of the General Assembly, assert, that the legislature, previous to the year 1785, ever intended to claim, in any way, any discretionary power whatever, to unsettle, to diminish, or to withhold, the whole or any part of the salary of the chancellor or of a judge.
On the contrary, these two positions are most clearly and incontrovertibly established: first, that the salaries of the chancellor and judges were not secured during that period, because, and only because, of the then circumstances of the State. And secondly, that the legislature always expressly admitted the full force of the constitutional obligation; but, alleged the circumstances of the State as the only reason for their not securing those salaries as they were required. Therefore, any legislators who would now assume all, or any of that discretionary power, then exercised over the salaries of the chancellor and the judges, must produce reasons as cogent, an excuse as self evident, and show the present operation of causes as powerfully overruling and imperative as those which then existed.
The act of 1785, ch. 27, carefully recites the provision of the Declaration of Rights respecting judicial salaries ; distinctly recognizes the constitutional obligation the legislature were under to secure to the chancellor and the judges Salaries, cluring the continuance of their commissions; and then gives to the chancellor a salary of six hundred and fifty pounds per annum during the continuance of his commission. The appropriation, or provision made for the payment of this salary is to be found in the third section of this act, and is expressed in these words; “ the said salaries shall be paid quarterly, out of the supplies raised every year, until the General Assembly shall make other provision for payment; and the said salaries, for the ensuing year, shall be paid out of the arrearages of taxes due for the year seventeen hundred and eighty-five.” By the act of 1792, ch. 76, it was declared, “ that the chancellor shall be entitled to receive, for all duties and services whatever, prescribed, or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of nine hundred and fifty pounds current money, during the continuance of his commission, to be paid quarterly. By the four last sections of this act, an appropriation or provision was made for the payment of that salary out of a particular fund, to be raised by taxes on proceedings in chancery and the land office, and money arising from the sale of vacant land; which was to be specially set apart for that purpose. This appropriation, or special fund was temporary, and limited to five years, was continued, by-the act of 1797, ch. 51, for seven years longer; and was then virtually applied to general purposes, by operation of the act of 1798, ch. 86, and expressly so applied by the acts of 1804, ch. 64 and 108. By a resolution passed at November session, 1796, an addition of two hundred dollars was made to the chancellor’s salary for the ensuing year. The appropriation for the payment of this sum was general without specification. By the act of 1797, ch. 71, it was declared, that the chancellor “ as chancellor and judge of the land office shall be entitled to receive four hundred and fifty-six dollars and'fifty-seven cents, in addition to the permanent salary fixed by law.” The appropriation and provision for the payment of this addition was made by the second section of this act in these words; “ the said sum shall be paid at the same time, and in the same manner during the continuance of this act, as his permanent salary is by law directed to be paid.” By the act of 1798, ch. 86, it is declared, “ that the chancellor shall be entitled to receive, for all duties and services whatever, prescribed or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds current money and no more.” The appropriation, and provision for the payment of this salary is general; it is “ to be paid quarterly by the treasurer of the Western Shore.” There is no designation of any fund as in the act of 1785, or in that of 1792.
It appears then, that the salary of the chancellor has grown up and increased with the wealth, business, and population of the State from 1785 to 1798. It has never, during the last forty years, been in any manner diminished, nor at any time, prior to the 21st of February in the year 1825, been attempted to be diminished. That the amount, thus, from time to time, given to the chancellor was secured to him during the continuance of his commission, has never, from any thing that appears in the votes and proceedings of the General Assembly, or in our statute book, been at any time called in question previous to the last session of the legislature. If the General Assembly have any discretionary power to withhold, or to diminish the chancellor’s salary, it cannot, as we have seen, arise from any thing contained in the Declaration of Rights; nor can it be sustained by any precedents of cases in which any previous legislature have distinctly asserted and main tained any such constitutional power. If then, any colourable pretext for the exercise of such a discretionary power to withhold or to diminish the chancellor’s salary is any where to be discovered, it must, it is presumed, be sought for among the implications, inferences, and deductions to be gathered from- some one, or all of the acts passed since the act of 1785, which, in any way, give to the chancellor a compensation for his services. Let us then carefully consider these acts.
The House of Delegates, of the last session, seem to have deemed it necessary, not only to except, from the operation of their general continuing act, the law of 1798, ch. 86; but also, that of 1797, ch. 71. The last mentioned act was expressly limited, in its duration, to the 20th of October, 1800,- and until the end of the next session of Assembly that should happen thereafter; when, even if it had not been virtually repealed by the act of 1798, ch. 86, it must have expired of itself, so far as such an act could constitutionally expire ; since there is no law to be found, by which it has ever been continued, either generally or specially. Therefore, this act might have been, very safely and prudently, passed over by the Delegates, without at all enfeebling the force of any argument they could possibly have urged in support of the right they had assumed to reduce the chancellor’s salary. But, since the act of 1797, ch. 71, has been thus invoked into this controversy, an explanation may be deemed necessary.
The Court of Chancery of this State is, in all respects, substantially analogous to that of England; but, in Maryland, the chancellor has long been invested with certain powers, and a jurisdiction, which are exercised in a name and character, altogether peculiar to this State; and that is, “ as judge of the land office?’ Before the revolution the lord proprietary was the o-wner, in his individual and private capacity, of all the land and territory in Maryland; which he sold or gave away at pleasure. Not long after the settlement of the province was commenced, a land office was established, through which any person might obtain a title for any vacant land, on complying with the established conditions and regulations. As the settlements extended, and the sales of land were multiplied, numerous controversies arose as to the formality and correctness of the incipient and original titles, thus obtained from the proprietary. For the purpose of determining these controversies, a judge of the land office was appointed, about the year 1680 ; and the chancellor of the province was charged with the determination of those matters, either as judge, or as assistant of the judge of the land office.
On the revolution, although all the powers, rights, and property of the proprietary devolved upon the State, or were abolished and confiscated, there was no express provision in the constitution for a judge of the land office. But, as it would seem, it was clearly understood, that the chancellor of the State, of course, succeeded to, and might rightfully exercise all the power and authority of judge of the land office, which had, at any time, belonged to the chancellor of the proprietary government. And this additional capacity and character, of the chancellor of this State, was distinctly recognised and confirmed by the act of November, 1781, ch. 20, s. 6. The chancellor of Maryland is then, by virtue of his office, judge of the land office ; and, as such, he is invested with jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases, as to the equitable right, or incipient title acquired under warrants and certificates of survey, which may become the subject of contest in the land office. This jurisdiction of the chancellor, at first, extended over the whole State; but, by the act of 1795, ch. 61, s. 5, a judge of the land office, for the Eastern Shore, was directed to be appointed; who was -clothed with all the original jurisdiction exercised by the chancellor on that shore ; reserving, however, an appeal to the chancellor. And, by the act of 1795, ch. 70, it was declared, “ that the judge of thq land office for the Eastern Shore should receive a salary of one hundred and fifty pounds per annum, during his continuance in office which salary has been regularly paid to that officer ever since. -
Thus, it is obvious, that the two offices .and functions of chancellor, and judge of the land office, have long been united in, and exercised by the same individual. The provision of the Declaration of Rights, relative to the independency and uprightness of judicial officers, speaks only of the chancellor; of his holding a commission during good behaviour; and' of his salary being secured to him during the continuance of his commission. But, his other character, of judge of the land office, is no where noticed in the Declaration of Rights or Constitution, in any manner whatever. The office of chancellor, having been created by the constitution, the executive is bound to appoint a chancellor; and the legislature is, in like manner, bound to secure to him a salary during the continuance of his commission. But, the constitution being wholly silent as to a judge of the land office, the executive and legislature are under no such constitutional obligation to I appoint and provide for such an officer. This was always the clear and distinct understanding of the General Assembly.
At the session of 1785, when the legislature were about to pass that act, which first secured to the chancellor his salary during the continuance of his commission, it will be seen, by the before recited message from the Delegates, that this distinction between the chancellor’s' two characters was adverted to as a matter then familiarly and well understood. For, it is evident, that their disinclination to give a higher salary, at that time, arose from the conviction, that whatever salary they should give him as chancellor, must be given during the continuance of his commission, during which period it could not be diminished or revoked; and,, being unwilling so to pledge the State, at that time, for the payment of an amount which they admitted was then reaspnable, they gave him an addition to his salary in another character; that is, as judge of the land office ; in which form, that addition was-always subject to be renewed, reduced, or withdrawn at pleasure. The chancellor was thus, at the session of 1785, for the first time, separately compensated in each of his two distinct characters. By 'the 27th chapter of that session, a salary was secured to him during the continuance of his commission, as chancellor ; and by the 174th chapter of the same session, he was additionally compensated , for his services, as judge of the land office, for the current year. In the one character his. salary, being secured by the Declaration of Rights, was intangible, in the other, his compensation was renewable from year to year, and to any amount, at the pleasure of the legislature.
By the act of 1785, ch. 74, the sum of two hundred pounds was given to the chancellor, as judge of the land office, for the then ensuing year. The sum of one hundred pounds was given to him, in the same character, by the civil list bill of each successive year until 1792 ; when his salary, as chancellor, being increased, his compensation, as judge of the land office, was discontinued until the year 1797; when an addition was again made to his salary of four hundred and sixty-six dollars and fifty-seven cents, in the twofold character of chancellor and judge of the land office. And at the next session of the legislature, the character of judge of the land office was again dropped, and the whole, with a still further addition, was put together and given in the constitutional character of a salary to the chancellor; similar to that described by the act of 1792, to which this act, for greater certainty, was by its title declared to be “ a supplement.”
In every instance, from the year 1785 to the present time, where's it was the express intention of the legislature to give an additional compensation to the chancellor, during their pleasure, it was given to him as judge of the land, office. And in all instances, where it was intended to compensate him according to' the terms of the Declaration of Rights, the salary was given to him as chancellory. This is manifest from all the acts, and the whole course of legislative proceedings from that time down to the 21st of February 1825. For, it certainly could hot have been the intention of the Assembly of 1798 to loosen and set afloat the whole of the chancellor’s salary ; to be paid or not according to the mere whim or caprice of every succeeding body of legislators, in utter contempt of the constitution ; after the very solemn, and repealed declarations as to the constitutional obligation the legislature was under to secure it to him during the continuance of his commission, that had been so carefully expressed and recorded.
But, it may be said, that if the act of 1798 is suffered to expire, the act of 1792 will be virtually revived; and, from the nature of the last mentioned act, it cannot be repealed; and, therefore, the salary cannot be reduced below what the act of 1792 has given. This position concedes the point, that the legislature is limited in its control over a part of the amount of the salary. Now, if the General Assembly had intended, by the act of 1798, to hold a discretionary power oyer the sum of three hundred and twenty-five pounds, which is the difference between the salary given by the act of 1792, and that given by the act of 1798, why was not the well known and established precedent followed, of giving that additional sum to the chancellor annually as judge of the land office ? But the manner, and the character in which the salary was given, have left not the least doubt about the meaning of the General Assembly, in passing the act of 1798. The act of 1797, ch. 71, having added to the chancellor’s salary, in a dubious form, by giving the addition to him “as chancellor and judge of the land office,” it was not perfectly certain, that the indicated character “ as chancellor,” would, when qualified by the expression, “ and judge of the land office,” draw after it the constitutional security to the whole or only to a part of this addition; and, therefore, to remove this doubt, and to clear away all ambiguity, at the following session, by the act of 1798, ch. 86, the whole was given to the chancellor, as chancellor; manifestly with the intention of drawing over the whole salary, that constitutional guarantee and security which indisputably and rightfully belonged to such a salary when given to the chancellor as chancellor.
That this was the distinct understanding of those legislators who passed the act of 1798, will be placed beyond all manner of doubt, by .comparing the phraseology and allusions of the act of 1792, with those of the act of 1798. Prior to the year 1792, the chancellor had received some additional compensation as judge of the land office ; and, it is to that, which the act of that year refers by the expressions, "for all duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law.” In other words, that legislature meant to say, that the chancellor shall no longer be compensated in two different characters ; the one part of the compensation to be secured according to the constitution, and the other during pleasure; but, that the whole should be constitutionally given and secured to him as chancellor. By the act of 1797, ch. 71, a part of the chancellor’s compensation was given to him “ as chancellor and judge of the land office.” And, therefore, when, by the act of 1798,’ch. 86, the legislature declare, “ that the chancellor shall be entitled to receive jfor all duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds,” they meant precisely the same thing, by those identical same words, that was meant by the legislature of 1792; that is to say, that the whole of the chancellor’s compensation, as well that which had been constitutionally secured to him, as that which had been, until then, bestowed upon him during their pleasure, should all, henceforth, be secured to him during the continuance of his commission.
The last House of Delegates, in excepting the act of 1797, ch. 71, from their general continuing' law, evidently acted under the impression and belief, that whatever salary was given to the chancellor, as chancellor, was secured to him during the continuance of his commission. For, if they were not so impressed, why did they in express terms refuse to continue that law, which had never been continued; and, by its own limitation, had expired more than twenty years previous to that time ? But seeing, that the additional salary, given by the act of 1797, ch. 71, was given to the chancellor, “ as chancellor and judge of the land office;” and apprehend ing, that although it was, in some respects, temporary in its terms; and although it had never been continued by any legislative act; yet, that it would be virtually continued by operation of the constitution ; they, therefore, deemed it necessary, expressly and by name, to except this act out of the operation of their general continuing law.; or, in other words, to discontinue it; and, as they believed, to make such a declaration respecting it as would be equivalent to an absolute .repeal. If such was their understanding of the act of 1797, when taken in connection with the constitution— and it is difficult to perceive how they can be otherwise understood— the last House of Delegates were certainly correct in considering both of these acts; as well that of 1797, as the one of 1798; as well that which had not, as that which had been. continued, as standing in the way of the execution of their resolution to reduce the chancellor’s salary. But the act of 1798, .ch. 86, virtually and effectually, repeals all antecedent acts which had been passed for ascertaining and fixing the amount of the chancellor’s salary; and is, itself, firmly and immovably sustained by the Declaration of Rights ; and needs no continuing, or other act, for the mere purpose of designating what shall be the amount of the chancellor’s salary.
So much then, as to all those acts, which speak of, or in any manner have heretofore, compensated the chancellor in his character of judge of the land office. The whole of them might have been passed over in silence, if the Delegates of the last session had not invoked them into this controversy. But, it is believed, that, in whatever manner they may be considered, nothing can be deduced from them, which can, in anyway, impair the right which the present chancellor has to the salary designated by the act of 1798. Let us now proceed to the consideration of those acts of Assembly under which the chancellor has been heretofore, and until the 26th day of February last, compensated for his services as chancellor.
Whatever inference may be deduced from the language of the first section of the act of 1798; and, however conclusive it may seem to be, that any salary given to the chancellor, as chancellor, must be, and is secured to him, by virtue of the Declaration of Rights, during the continuance of his commission ; yet, it may be said, that in this instance, and from this act of 1798, no such inference can be deduced; no such intention can be ascribed to the legislature who passed it. Because, by the second sec tion it is expressly declared, that “ this act is to continue and, be in force till the twentieth day of October, eighteen hundred, and until the end of the next session of Assembly which shall happen thereafter. ” In consequence of which limitation, it was, by the act of 1800, ch. 87, continued to the 30th of October, 1805, and the next session of Assembly thereafter; and has been continued from time to time since, until the 26th day of February, 1825; — which express limitation, and reiterated continuances do, in the most positive and distinct manner, exclude every thing like a perpetual character from this act, in every manner and form whatever.
If this act related to the salary of the State’s agent; the adjutant general; or any other salary, which the legislature may give or take away at pleasure; or, if it related to any subject, the power of legislating on which was restricted, in no manner whatever, by the constitution, then it could not be denied, that this act would be altogether temporary in its nature; and, unless continued or otherwise provided for, would expire at the appointed time. But, this act of 1798, is in no respect a law of that description. It relates to a salary, the security and duration of which is fixed by the Declaration of Rights. The legislative' power over the subject of this law is, expressly and positively restricted and limited by the constitution; — and being an act of this latter description, it must be .construed and governed accordingly.
Respecting judicial salaries, there are three distinct positions, which have been, long since, clearly established; and which have grown up and become incorporated with our political system. The first, regards the amount of such a salary; the second its duration ; and the third the appropriation, or provision for its payment. To keep our ideas clear upon any subject, and to reason correctly, we should carefully designate things, that differ, by appropriate names. We think only through the medium of words; and, according to one of the ablest and the best of the English lawyers, “ the names of things are, for avoiding confusion, diligently to be observed.” The amount; the duration; and the appropriation for the payment of a judicial salary, are the three distinct points, which it is necessaiy, constantly, to bear in mind, while considering this subject. The first is partially regulated by the constitution; the second is specifically and exactly defined by it; and the third is at the discretion of the legislature; subject to cer tain qualifications, arising out .of the constitutional provisions affecting the two first points.
The Declaration of Rights directs, that a salary shall be secured to the chancellor. A salary is a specified -annual sum of money. The constitution is silent as to the amount of the sum thus directed to be secured; hence, the ascertaining and fixing that amount, necessarily, and is expressly devolved upon the legislature. It belongs, exclusively to the General Assembly to say what shall be the amount of the salary. But, along with this discretionary power, as to the amount, the Declaration of Rights has imposed an obligation, not only to give a salary, but to. secure it. The manifest and necessary consequence of its being secured, is, that the amount, once specified, may be increased, but cannot be diminished. A salary, being a particular amount or sum of money, to be secured, must be so in. ev'efy part and for the whole : — It must be preserved entire, without the least subtraction or diminution; otherwise, it cannot, in any sense, be said to be secured. But, a salary may be increased indefinitely; because no addition can, in any way, impair the security of any amount which had been previously given. Let us illustrate this -by example.
The legislature, in 1785, secured to the chancellor a salary of six hundred and fifty pounds, and, in 1792, they increased his salary to nine hundred and fifty pounds,- which they, in like manner, secured to him. Now, it is obvious, that the addition of the three hundred pounds necessarily left the security of the six hundred and fifty pounds, which had been previously given, wholly unimpaired ; that salary was still, in every sense, secure ; since it is certain, that the greater always includes .the less. But suppose the salary given, in 1785, had been nine hundred and fifty pounds ; and, in 1792, it had been reduced to six hundred and fifty; it is manifest, that such a reduction would have been a violation of the security of the salary of nine hundred and fifty pounds. Hence it is clear, that the legislature are under a constitutional obligation to give a salary; that it is perfectly discretionary with them to determine, in the first instance; or, while the judicial office is vacant; or, when it shall become so; what shall be the amount of the salary; and, that when they have determined the amount, they cannot render it insecure by withholding it altogether, or in any manner diminishing its value. The legislative discretion over the amount of the chancellor’s salary is, thus, partially restricted and controlled. The Assembly may fix it, at any amount; but, when fixed, although it may be increased; it cannot be, in any manner, diminished, to the prejudice of any chancellor, during the continuance of his commission.
This restriction, as to duration, which prevents the diminution of judicial salaries, if it were indefinite, might, possibly, become the means of accumulating the most serious burthens upon the State. But, it is not indefinite; it has been expressly limited to the period during which the officer holds his commission ; which is, in effect and at most, no' more than during the short period of the latter years of the life of a single individual. It is declared, that the salary of the chancellor shall be secured to him during the continuance of his commission. This restriction, upon the legislative authority, in this particular, is complete, absolute, and entire. No mere legislative act can. either invigorate or enfeeble the force of this, or any other constitutional provision. The recital of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights as in the act of 1785, ch. 27, may be considered as a declaration, that the legislature then acted in special obedience to the command of that article; but, it neither adds to, nor subtracts any thing from its force. It is the article, not the act, which binds every future legislature. The whole force of the restriction, upon the discretionary power of the General Assembly, in this particular, arises from the operation of the constitutional provision ; not from any thing that can be said in a mere legislative act. It is very clear, therefore, that whatever expressions are to be found in any of the acts, relative to the duration of the chancellor’s salary, are mere surplusage. Those laws are, so far, a mere dead letter; if they conform to the constitution, it is well; if not, they are absolutely void.
The third and last point relates to the appropriation or provision for the payment of judicial salaries. As to this, there are no two ideas more clear, or more easily understood than the contracting of a debt, and the making provision for its payment. This distinction, as regards the public, between the obligation by which a debt is secured; and the appropriation to pay it, is a practical one, which has been, from the very beginning, interwoven with all our fiscal concerns. During our revolution, the General Assembly were, in many instances, negligent of their appropriations, and made them too general and vague; but, at the close of the war, they were reminded of the importance of having them distinct and specific, by the Intendant of the revenue, who said to them, in his report of the 14th of May, 1783, to the House of Delegates, that “ as peace is now established, he begs leave humbly to suggest the propriety of appropriating all moneys in such manner, that the application and payment thereof cannot be mistaken by the treasurer.” And,- profiting, by this intimation, the legislature, in one of their acts of that session,'say, that “ it is of singular consequence, that all and ey érf’appropriation should be executed agreeably to the order and 'intent -of the General Assembly; and that the Assembly should be enabled,,at.each session, to judge of the state of said appropriations,” &c.- A multitude -of instances might be adduced, from our statute book, of specific appropriations of particular funds, and of designated portions of the publie moneys being applied to the payment of particular debts. The warm party controversies about specific appropriations, under the federal government, which once pervaded the Union, is within the recollection of every one.
But, as this distinction, between the contract, and the appropriation, has an important bearing upon the subject now under consideration; it is of “ singular consequence,” that it should be exemplified, illustrated, and fully understood, as regards judicial salaries. The General Assembly of November 1785, secured the chancellor’s salary, according to the Declaration of Rights, during the continuance of his commission. And, in the before recited message of the Delegates to the Senate, of the 23d of 'January of that session, they say, “ If time will permit, we shall attempt to provide particular funds to secure the payment of the salaries established by our bill;” that is, by the act of 1785, ch. 27. It appears, that after that bill became a law, which was on -the 7th of February 1788, “ leave was given to bring in a bill to provide, •and appropriate a permanent fund for the payment of the salaries to the chancellor and judges.” But, it seems, as had been -expected, there was not time, during that session, to provide a fund, as was proposed; and the subject was not -called up again. By the third section of the act of 1785, ch. 27, -it was declared, that the salaries of the chancellor and judges should be paid “ out of the surplus raised every year, until the General Assembly shall make other provision for payment.” Thus, the constitutional obligation to pay the chancellor his salary, during the continuance of his -•commission, is, most clearly and distinctly, recognised by the acts -of that session; and yet, the same enlightened legislators, no less clearly and distinctly, claim, recognise, and reserve to the General Assembly a complete discretionary power over the appropriation9 the mode of makiDg provision for payment.
By the act of 1792, ch. 76,, it is declared, that the chancellor’s salary shall he paid to him “ during the continuance of his commission.” And, by the third section of the same act, it is declared, that to “ secure'the punctual payment of said salary,” certain taxes on proceedings in chancery and in the land office should he levied and collected; and, if they should not bring into the treasury a sufficiency, “ the deficiency should be made up out of any moneys in the treasury arising, or to arise from the sale of vacant lands.” And then, by the fifth section, it is declared, that “ the said taxes shall be collected and paid for five years after the end of the present session of Assembly, and no longerThis, then, is a clear instance of the express constitutional continuance of the salary, and the actual limitation of the fund, out of which it was to he paid; of a salary given during the continuance of the commission, and of a temporary appropriation for its payment,
It may, therefore, be laid down, from the whole course of the 'government; and from these solemn and well considered acts of the legislature, as a firmly established constitutional principle, that the chancellor’s salary is a debt due to him from the State; guaranteed, not by any act of Assembly, but by the constitution ; the appropriation for the payment of which is to be made by the legislature ; that is, the amount being fixed, it is to be paid, to use the words of the Declaration of Rights, “ in such manner, and at such times as the legislature shall hereafter direct.” Bearing in mind these three important, and settled distinctions, between the amount, the duration, and the appropriation for a judicial salary, let us now proceed cautiously to consider the act under which the present chancellor claims his salary.
The council proceedings will show, that on the sixteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and twenty-four, the present chancellor was unanimously appointed by the governor and council; and, that, on the eighteenth day of the same month, he took the oaths of office, had the great seal of the State delivered to his keeping, and entered upon the duties of his office. What was then the salary assigned to the chancellor, he contends does now, constitutionally, belong to him; on the ground, that whatever was then declared, by law, to be the amount of the chancellor’s salary, was, by force and operation of the Declaration of Rights, secured to the chancellor, who then came into office, during the continuance of Ms commission.
The present chancellor claims his salary under and by virtue of the act of 1798, ch. 86, and the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights. This act of Assembly is entitled “ A supplement to the act entitled an act for establishing and securing the salary of the chancellor.” And it is enacted, “ that the chancellor shall be entitled to receive, for all duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds current money, and no more, to be paid quarterly by the treasurer of the Western Shore.” And then immediately follows the second section limiting the duration of the act in these words; “ This act to continue and be in force till the twentieth day of October, eighteen hundred, and until the next session of Assembly which shall happen thereafter.”
The limitation of this act operates so far, and so far only, as it is compatible with the Declaration of Rights. In so much as it contravenes the constitution, it is a nullity; but, in other respects, it may be allowed to operate according to the express or implied intention of the legislature. This act specifies the amount of the chancellor’s salary; and, that amount, not by the act, but by the Declaration of Rights, is secured to the chancellor during the continuance of his commission. So far, then, the constitution expressly cuts off and prevents the operation of the limitation of the second section. But, upon other matters, this limitation may have its full effect. Upon the general appropriation, or authority to pay that amount out of any money in the treasury of the Western Shore, it may and does operate; because, as to the fund to be appropriated, and as to the mode of making provision for payment, the legislature has a discretionary power; and, as to that, they may make an express reservation of the right to appropriate at pleasure, as was done by the act of 1785 ; or, they may make a special, and, also a limited, appropriation, as was done by the act of 1792. Because, as we have seen, the amount, and duration of the salary being wholly distinct from the appropriation, or “ the provision for payment,” as it is called by the act of 1785, the two first are secured, during the period specified by the constitution ; and the other is at the pleasure of the legislature.
The three acts of 1785, of 1792, and of 1798, are, then, all of them in their objects, intentions, and principles precisely alike, in every particular. They, each of them, bestow upon the chancellor a specified amount of salary; which was, in each instance, by operation of the Declaration of Rights, secured to the chancellor during the continuance of his commission; and, in each instance, the legislature reserved, or expressly exercised a discretionary power over the appropriation, or " provision for payment.” And these distinct ideas, in this train of thinking, were obviously, as the acts them selves prove, present to the minds of the legislature during the passage of each one of them.
The General Assembly of 1785, distinctly inform us, in every way, by their messages, by the 'acts which they proposed to pass, and by the act which they actually did pass into a law, that they could only fix the amount of the chancellor’s salary; that when they bad so fixed it, that amount was secured by operation of the Declaration of Rights ; but, that the appropriation might be made in such manner as they thought proper; and, accordingly, they expressly declared, that their gen eral, appropriation should remain only until they " make other provision for payment.'' The evidences as to the opinions of the General Assembly of 1792, are not so various and large; but, they are no less distinctly expressed in the act which they passed upon the subject. Their act recites, that the salary which they gave was secured by the constitution; and, then it asserts and exercises a discretionary power over the appropriation, by setting apart a particular fund, and limiting its continuance to five years, and no longer.
There is sufficiently unequivocal evidence, that the same distinct ideas were present to the minds of the General Assembly of 1798; and, that they too acted under the influence of the same opinions. Their act upon this subject is entitled, “ Ji supplement to the act, entitled an act for establishing and securing the salary of the chancellor.” Thus'expressly referring to that law, in which all those ideas and distinctions, and all that train of thinking upon this subject, which had been so thoroughly discussed and considered, at the session of 1785, and reconsidered, and reaffirmed at the session of 1792, were strongly and clearly recalled, and placed before the minds of the legislators of 1798.
And why was this done ? Why was the act of 1798 called “ A supplement ” to that of 1792? Why were the previous legislative acts thus referred to ? Surely, it could not have been done for the purpose of bringing before the eyes of the legislators of 1798, an example of the prostration of any of the securities of good government. It certainly could not have been done, for the purpose of reading them a lesson, as to the mode, and the pretexts, and the expedients under which the constitution might be evaded or violated. It could not have been intended to read the most solemn recognitions of constitutional principles for the purpose of obliterating or smothering them. It would be monstrous to suppose, that any legislators would invoke, and place upon their tables, the clearest evidences of the chancellor’s constitutional independency, for the express purpose of prostrating it; and of making him the mere supple creature of either branch of the Assembly ; and that too, not by a bold and open movement, which struck down his rights at a single blow; but, by the low and crawling contrivance of a temporary act; which, while it offered an ostensible extension of bounty, covertly and in reality bought out the chancellor’s independency, the chief stay, the pride, and the only blessing of his high and laborious station. No such designs can, or ought to be imputed to the legislators of 1798.
On the contrary, those legislators could have had no other intention, in thus announcing their act as “ A supplement ” to that of 1792, than to assert, by the very first word they recorded upon the statute book, that they followed the example, and legislated under the same impressions, and according to the samé principles, that their predecessors had done. They meant to say, that they adopted the principles of the act of 1792 ; that as that act conformed to the Declaration of Rights, in giving to the chancellor a salary during the continuance of his commission; so this, their act, should give him a salary for a similar duration. That as the act of 1792 had made only a temporary provision for the payment of the amount then given ; so this, their act, should, in like manner, temporarily provide for the' payment of that they gave. The act of 1792 gave the less, this the greater amount; the act of 1792 set apart a particular fund for payment; this act, in general terms, directs, that the amount given shall be “paid by the treasurer of the Western Shore.” These are the points of similarity and of difference between these two acts. The latter is, then, in sense and substance, honestly and fairly “ A supplement,” to the former. It follows, therefore, that the present chancellor is now, and will be entitled, during the continuance of his commission, to demand and receive, annually, by virtue of this act of 1798, and of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights, the sum of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds current money.
These three distinct ideas of the amount, the duration, - and the provision for payment of judicial salaries have been continually, under all circumstances, and on every change, carefully borne in mind by the representatives of the- people of Maryland. After the alteration of the judicial system of this State, made by the act of 1804, ch. 55, was confirmed, the legislature passed the act of 1805, ch. 86, entitled “ An act to establish permanent salaries for the judges of the six judicial districts of this State.” The preamble of which recites, that “ whereas by the thirtieth section of the Declaration of Rights it is declared, that salaries liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the judges during the continuance of their commissions.” Hence, it appears, that the very same legislative body, who ratified that alteration of the constitution by which the present judicial system was established, gives us distinctly to understand, that no alteration whatever was made as to the security, or duration of judicial salaries; since they refer to the original article of the Declaration of Rights, as the foundation of that security and duration. And they thus, implicitly, but strongly, give us to understand, that they chose rather to recur to first principles, and to rest judicial independency upon the more broad and firmly established doctrine of 1776, than upon any provision contained in the amendment they had so recently adopted; and by which it was declared, that “ the salaries of the said judges shall not be diminished during the period of their continuance in office.” But it is remarkable, that in the enacting clauses of this act, there is not one syllable, indicating, in any way, either the security, or the duration of the salaries given. In the first clause, the annual amount only, and nothing more, is specified. After which, in a separate clause, it is declared, that “the treasurer of the Western Shore shall be and' he is hereby authorized and directed, to pay quarterly, out of any unappropriated money which may be in the treasury, to each of the said chief judges and to each of the said associate judges, or his order, the salary which he is entitled to receive by law.”
The sense and understanding of the legislature, as expressed by this act, deserve particular attention. By the preamble which may sometimes be called in to clear away an ambiguity, but cannot in any case be allowed to control the enacting clauses of a law; the section of the Declaration of Rights, in obedience to which the act was made, is referred to in general terms; but, the enacting clauses of the law use none of its expressions, nor do they adopt or deny any of its principles. The act merely designates the amount of the salaries; and then makes a general appropriation out of which the treasurer of the Western Shore is directed to pay quarterly. Whence, then, is derived the security, and specific duration of these judicial salaries ? The preamble of this act correctly recites the sense and substance of what is required by the Declaration of Rights ; but, it does not itself require, command, or enact any thing. And, in the enacting clauses, there is not one word which expresses or suggests a single idea upon the subject of their security or duration. But read the law, and the thirtieth section of the Declaration of Rights together, and there is no room for any doubt whatever. The amount, specified by the law, is secured, by the constitution, to each judge, during the continuance of his commission. So, there is nothing in any part of the law itself, that declares, or from which it may be inferred, that it cannot be repealed or altered at the pleasure of any succeeding legislature. But, the nature and character of the subject, for which it provides, inevitably and necessarily carries us to the constitution, where we find that positive, mandatory clause, which prohibits the withholding or diminishing of the salaries of the judges during the continuance of their commissions.
The security of these judicial salaries, given by this act of 1805, ch. 86, therefore, is expressly rested upon exactly the same basis, which sustains the salary given to the chancellor, by the act of 1798. The only difference between the two acts, is as to the manner in which the foundation of their security and duration is referred to. The preamble of the act of 1805 leads us to the foundation of the security and duration of the judges’ salaries, by a direct reference to the Declaration of Rights. The act of 1798, in a different manner, but, with equal certainty, leads us to the same immovable basis, whereon we find the security and duration of the chancellor’s salary reposes. The act of 1805 makes a general appropriation, and directs the treasurer of the Western Shore to pay quarterly. But, as to this, these salaries might have been made payable, as by the act of 1792, out of a special fund, to be collected from taxes on proceedings at law or the like; or the appropriation, whether general or special, might have been limited to five years, as by the act of 1792, or to two years, as by.the act of 1798, or even from year to year, as by the several acts continuing the act of 1798, passed since the year 1805. There is then, in point of principle, when taken in connection with the Declaration of Rights, no difference whatever between any two of these laws relative to judicial salaries. They are all, alike, controlled by the constitution, which specifies the security and duration of judicial salaries; and, in each the appropriation is suited to the occasion, to the convenience of the State, or to the then opinion of the General Assembly.
It may, probably, be said, that the suffering of the act of 1798 to expire, or, by the refusal of the legislature to continue it, the act of 1792 was virtually revived and again in force. There is not one syllable to be found recorded in the votes and proceedings, of the last session of either branch of the General Assembly, going to show, that such was the understanding and belief of the legislature. , But, supposing such to have been their opinion, the position is not correct, even on common law principles ; and is utterly untenable according to our constitution. It is an established rule of the common law, that by the repeal of a repealing statute, the original act is virtually revived. But, that is not the case now under consideration. It is this: The statute of 1798 professes to repeal the prior act of 1792, by substituting other provisions, as to the whole subject, for which that act had provided : and, then the act of 1798 is, in general terms, limited to two years. Now, in such ease, it has been adjudged, that the prior act does not revive after the repealing act is spent; unless the intention of the legislature, to that effect, be expressed. In this instance no such intention has been expressed; and, consequently, upon common law principles, neither of those acts are now in-force ; and our statute book presents an entire blank so far as regards the chancellor’s salary.
But, let it be conceded for a moment, and by way of argument, that the effect of discontinuing or suffering the act ’ of 1798 to expire, would be, that the act of 1792 would be revived-. — It certainly will not be contended, that the effect of this constructive revival of the act of 1792 would be a complete revival of the whole of it, including all such clauses as had been repealed or •altered by any perpetual and now subsisting law. By a virtual revival of a law nothing more has been'ever understood to be thus revived, than that which would have continued in force, had it not been for the law, which was repealed or had expired. This is the principle of a constructive revival, it goes no further. Now let us inquire, and endeavour to ascertain, on how much of the act of 1792 a constructive revival would, at this time, operate.
The two first sections of the act of 1792, specify the amount and duration of the chancellor’s salary; but, they make no provision whatever for its payment. By the four last sections a particular fund was to be raised, for that purpose, from taxes on proceedings in chancery and the land office. From that fund, the treasurer was directed to pay the chancellor’s salary, if it should be adequate; if not, the deficiency was to be made up, not generally out of any money in the treasury ; but “ out of any moneys in the treasury arising or to arise from the sale of vacant land”— and, it was declared, that “ the said taxes shall be collected and paid for five years after the end of the present session of Assembly and no longer.” By the act of 1797, ch. 51, every part of this act “ relative to the said taxes and duties,” was continued during the term of seven years, and until the end of the next session of Assembly; and by the act of 1804, ch. 108, “ the fifth section” of the act of 1792, ch. 76, was “ enacted into a permanent law;” provided “ that it should be subject to any alterations which have been made therein since the passage of it.” But by the act of 1804, ch. 64, passed previous to the last mentioned act of the same session, a new mode is prescribed of collecting the taxes imposed by the act of 1792, ch. 76 ; and, the several sheriffs are directed to collect, “ and to pay the same to the treasurers of the respective Shores, as the case may be.” By virtue of which law, those taxes, when paid to the treasurers of the respective Shores, immediately become a part of the general funds of the State ; and are not now, as formerly, paid to the treasurer of the Western Shore only, and by him kept “ apart from all other money to be applied towards the payment of the salary of the chancellor.”
These taxes on proceedings in chancery and the land office, of the Eastern Shore, are, therefore, now paid to the treasurer of that Shore; who, after making sundry disbursements, pays the annual general balance to the treasurer of the Western Shore — so that the treasurer of the Western Shore has, now, no means of ascertaining the amount of the whole fund which had been created by the act of 1792 ; since the two treasurers are as wholly distinct, in regard to their accounts, disbursements, and responsibility, as if they belonged to different governments. The treasurer of the Western Shore cannot, now, ascertain what deficiency he should make up out of money arising from the sale of vacant land; and, conse quently, has been virtually deprived of the authority to pay the chancellor’s salary out of that particular fund, as was prescribed by the act of 1792. This special fund, created by the act of 1792, for the payment of the chancellor’s salary, has, then, been totally broken up, abrogated and abolished; because, the moneys arising from the taxes, imposed by that act, have been permanently diverted from their original destination, by a perpetual law which mingles them with the general mass, and subjects them indiscriminately to the general demands upon the treasury. There has been no law passed since 1792, authorizing either of the treasurers of the State to pay to the chancellor, in any other manner, the amount of the salary given him by that act.
Hence, it follows, that if it were even admitted, as it cannot be, that the act of 1792 would be virtually revived by the expiration of the act of 1798, there is nothing now left, of the act of 1792, on which a mere constructive revival can operate, but those parts of it which fix the amount of the chancellor’s salary; because, the residue of it, which created a fund out of which the salary was directed to be paid, has been altered, and the fund otherwise applied by subsisting perpetual laws. The appropriation to pay, under the act of 1792, having been thus altered and repealed, the chancellor, it is evident, can be in no better situation, as matters now stand, under the act of 1792, than under the act of 1798. He would be alike without any legislative warrant to demand payment of the sum specified by either of those acts as the amount of the chancellor’s salary.
But, it may be said, that this discretionary power, as to appropriations for the payment of judicial salaries, virtually gives to the legislature a control over the whole subject. To a certain degree, this must be admitted. Legislators are under an imperfect, not a perfect obligation to make appropriations for the payment of such salaries.; or in other words, they are morally and religiously obliged to obey the constitution. They are morally bound by their duty to their country; and they are religiously bound by their promissory oaths, which they take before they can be admitted to their seats. But, the obligation, thus imposed upon them, is not a perfect one ; because, they cannot be personally coerced by any superior power, as by a court of justice, to comply with that obligation. Legislators, who violate the constitution, may incur the displeasure of the people ; they may feel their moral dignity somewhat lessened and disturbed; and they may have some very annoying and compunctious visitings of conscience. But the force of the imperfect obligation, im posed upon them, will end there. The injured citizen may complain, but he can do no more than complain; he will be without redress.
The salary claimed by the present chancellor is a debt due to him from the State. The law of 1798 has ascertained its amount, and the Declaration of Rights has declared it shall be secured to him ; and further, that it shall be secured to him during the continuance of his commission. It is a debt due to him from the State, and continually growing due to him, during that period of time— and the State is as much bound to pay that debt, in one form or other, as it can be bound to pay any debt whatever. The State cannot now be sued ; nor could its property, like that of a tardy or a fraudulent debtor, at any time be taken and sold to pay its debts. The legislature have the strength, the physical power to disregard the constitution ; to wrong an individual; to refuse to appropriate money to pay a debt; to refuse to make provision for the payment of a salary. But, to do so is contrary to, and a violation of their moral, their religious, and their constitutional obligation.
Each legislator has, like every other citizen, a deep interest in the preservation of the constitution in all its perfection and integrity. Institutions,.that cease to command respect, are soon treated with contempt, and become exposed to the assaults of every rude intruder — one violation sanctions another; and every breach, however small, weakens the political edifice; one constitutional pillar after another may be loosened from its base until all are tumbled into ruins. That which is now the case of the chancellor may soon become the case of every judge in the State. From one department ruin may be visited upon another, until all the divisions of the government are removed, and every check and balance, intended to guard and protect the rights of persons and of property, against the wayward and inordinate passions, and designs of the few, shall be wholly destroyed.
The House of Delegates are the peculiar guardians of the treasury of the State. They alone appoint the treasurer, who holds his office at their pleasure. Hence it is obvious, that any person or officer, whom they may order their treasurer not to pay, will not be paid; no matter who he may be, or what may be the merits of his claim. In such case, the Delegates need not resort to any expedient or indirect movement to attain their object. It is only necessary, that they should boldly and firmly give the order: and, if their treasurer hesitates, the same majority who gave the order, can at once remove him and appoint a more subservient officer, If a House of Delegates, capriciously, and without any just cause, were to refuse to make the necessary appropriation for the payment of the salary of the chancellor or a judge; the neglect, or the wrong might he corrected in the course of one year, or by the next election; but if the Senate, at the commencement of their term, were, in like manner, to refuse their assent to the making, renewing, or continuing a provision for the payment of a judicial salary; the officer must either resign or remain unpaid for five years, before it would be in the power, even of the people, to correct the procedure.
All the judges under the federal government are precisely in the same predicament, in relation to Congress, that the chancellor of Maryland is, in relation to the General Assembly of the State, under the act of 1798. None of the various acts of Congress, which ascertain and fix the salaries of the judges of the United States, in the acts themselves, make any appropriation of money for the payment of those salaries. The appropriation, for that purpose, is always made by separate laws; and is uniformly included, as one of the distinct items, in the annual appropriation acts passed by Congress. Hence, either the Senate or the House of-Representatives, might, at once, stop the salary of all the judges, or of any one of them, by refusing their assent to the whole or any part of that annual appropriation. And, consequently, all or any of those judges, might thus, by the negative of one branch, be deprived of his salary. The appropriation, for the payment of the chancellor’s salary, under the act of 1798, had been made or renewed from time to time for twenty-four years previous to its being stopped by the sole negative of the House of Delegates, on the 26th day of February last. Is there any thing •to prevent that from being done by one branch of the legislature of the Union, which has, thus, actually been done by one branch •of the General Assembly of Maryland ? It is impossible to draw a distinction between these two cases of the federal judges, and the State chancellor. They are exactly parallel and strongly illustrative of each other. Both of them, alike, conclusively show, that it is no less unconstitutional to withhold, or to diminish a judicial salary, by suffering a law to expire, than by an absolute and direct repeal of a legislative act. If the treasurer of Maryland conceives, as it appears he does, that the appropriation for the payment of the chancellor’s salary, made by the act of 1798, has been discontinued, or suffered to expire; the two branches, and every member of the General Assembly are constitutionally bound to revive and renew the appropriation for that purpose, in some form or-other.
There is, as we have seen, nothing to be found recorded in the votes and proceedings of the last session, which show, that it was the understanding and belief of either branch of the Assembly, that the act of 1792 was a permanent act, one which could not be constitutionally repealed, during the continuance of the chancellor’s commission; and, that the act of 1798 was altogether temporary in its character, and might therefore be suffered to expire. But, let it be conceded, that such was the understanding of the Delegates. If this position is correctly understood, it amounts to no more than this: Where a salary is given to the chancellor by a law, which is not limited in duration, it cannot be constitutionally repealed for the purpose of diminishing that salary. If this be the position claimed by the Delegates, every thing for which the chancellor and Senate contend, is admitted. But it seems, there is a nice distinction between the repealing of a law, and the suffering of a law to expire. What is it ? Does it amount to any thing more than a distinction between an act of commission, and an act of omission ? The law, having declared the amount of the chancellor’s salary, the legislature cannot constitutionally diminish it by repealing that law; but they may do so by sirffering it to expire: — that is, the legislature commit a violation of the constitution, if they do -pass an act to diminish the salary; but if they diminish it by omitting to pass an act, they do not violate the constitution. . This opinion, then, can have no other foundation, than the distinction between an act of commission and omission. Let us examine it.
The great object of the constitution is judicial independency; and, therefore, it is commanded by the Declaration of Rights, that the chancellor’s salary shall be secured ‘to him during the continuance of his commission. The mode of obeying this command is a matter of no 'importance; and therefore, the mode is submitted entirely to the discretion of the legislature. But any act, either of commission or of omission, which disobeys this command, and which prevents the attainment of the object contemplated, is alike a violation of the constitution. Suppose the legislature should, by an act, without making any provision whatever for payment, fix the amount of the salary of the chancellor; and then, by another act, provide a fund for its payment; and,'after-wards, were to repeal the latter act, without making any other provision for payment. It is presumed, that no one could hesitate in pronouncing such conduct a gross violation of the constitution. Then suppose, the act, making provision for payment, were limited to two years ; and the assembly were to neglect to continue it, or to make any other provision for payment; such legislative omission, would have precisely the same effect as the act of commission ; and, therefore, the violation of the constitution would be no less palpable. The salary of the chancellor is to be ^secured to him; that is, it shall not, at any time, on purpose, or by neglect, be withheld or diminished, during the continuance of his commission. This, the constitution has .declared, shall not be directly and pwposely done by the General Assembly; and surely, what is prohibited, and, therefore, cannot be directly done, can never be accomplished by any contrivance or indirect movement; and it would be hopeless to attempt to maintain, that what cannot be constitutionally effected by the whole General Assembly, may nevertheless be fairly brought about by either the Senate, or the House of Delegates alone.
There is a consistency and a harmony in our constitution, which can, in no respect, be disturbed without being productive of some pernicious consequences. The several parts, and the whole together, have been, and are still further susceptible of being amended, improved, and re-invigorated; but, the collision of one part against another, has never failed to be attended with the most serious mischief. The breaking of a single chord produces the harshest dissonance throughout. The Declaration of Rights declares, “ that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be for ever separate and distinct from each other.” This division and separation is the peculiar characteristic and great excellence of our government. It is the grand bulwark of all our rights, and every citizen has the deepest interest in its most sacred preservation. Each of these several departments should be kept, and should feel it to be its highest honour, to keep strictly within the constitutional boundaries assigned to it. The legislature should not encroach upon the judiciary, nor upon the executive; nor should either of those departments trench upon each other, or upon the legislative.
Commissions during good behaviour, and salaries secured during the continuance of those commissions, constitute that strong well marked boundary between the judiciary and the other two departments. Thus founded and sustained, the judges are, and can be — and without it they cannot be — a firm, efficient, co-ordinate check and balance in the government. It is this independency of character, that enables the judiciary to shield the citizen against unconstitutional legislation; and against unwarranted wrong and violence from the wealthy and the influential.
But, it would be a mockery to expect of judges who are dependent upon legislators for their continuance in office, perhaps for their bread, a firmness and independency necessary for such purposes. No judge, thus dependent, would have the boldness to thwart a House of Delegates in their most ill-advised and wanton sports with the constitution. The sage declaration of the patriots of 1776, “ That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and as such accountable for their conduct,” would be smothered or forgotten. The Senators would not dare to consider themselves as a co-ordi irate branch of the General Assembly; as “ trustees of the public.” They would learn, with' suitable and becoming modesty, without opposition or inquiry, to register the edicts of the “ immediate representatives of the people;” and the judges, holding their commissions only during good behaviour, would be taught to rely more on the extent, and the power of their family connections, and the number of their friends among “ the immediate representatives of the people,” than upon their temperate habits and honourable deportment; upon the skill and diligence with which they discharged their official duties; and upon the constitutional safeguards with which they were surrounded.
Legislative assumptions of original or appellate judicial power would be applauded as commendable efforts to reach the justice of the case-; poetical imaginations would be taken for historical facts ; and the most incoherent verbiage, respecting the true intent and meaning of the great charter of our rights, would be contemplated with approbation, as eloquent commentaries, founded in the soundest sense and the closest logic. Contracts might be impaired; individual rights might be legislated away, from haste, from mere ignorance, or a worse cause. And it would be in vain for the citizen to seek, or to expect justice, from a dependent’, interested, and intimidated judiciary. The theories of our constitution might remain ; but, in practice, its principles would be destroyed. The judges of our republic would not, as under the colonial establishment, be reduced to a subserviency to a foreign king ; they would not be subjected to precisely the same kind of corrupting judicial dependence, so strongly denounced by the sages of the revolution ; but in principle, the subserviency to which they would be subjected, would be the same: and in practice, no less pernicious and absolutely hostile to the temper and spirit of our constitution. Our government would, in a short time, cease to be a government of divisions, and restrictions of power; of checks and balances ; and, losing every other feature, would become, at once, a government consisting altogether of a House of Delegates elected annually.
But, there is not, nor there cannot be, any just foundation for these painful forebodings, these gloomy anticipations. The aberrations of the day are not proofs of the waywardness of the times; nor is the conduct of a house, characteristic of a branch of the General Assembly of the State. The people of Maryland are not unmindful of the principles of their fathers. There is a mass of integrity and sound sense among them which no “ trustee of the public” can elude, or will dare openly to defy and insult. The people constitute that august American tribunal, in the last resort, before which every case may be brought, and whose final determination is altogether irresistible.
This interference with the duration of judicial salaries has another obvious and direct tendency, no less hostile to the principles of our constitution; The appointing power is lodged, exclusively, with the governor and council. But, if the General Assembly can, at pleasure, withhold or reduce a judicial salary, it is evident they may, in that manner, come into direct collision with the appointing power of the executive. If the person, appointed to a judicial office, happens to be displeasing to the legislature, his salary may be, at once, withdrawn or reduced so as to force him to resign. And what is most odious, in this kind of collision, is, that this unjustly excited and misguided feeling .of the legislative body may be aroused by persons who are not members of it; by persons who are not of either house; but, who have influence and a knack at intrigue. Such malcontents may work upon the honest indolence of members, and urge them on, unthinkingly, to effect the ruin of the best of men, and the most sacred of institutions, merely to gratify some smuggled and vile malignancy, which they dare not have the impidence to exhibit openly before the public.
The executive alone are responsible for the appointments they make; and the legislature have no right, and ought not to interfere in any way whatever. They have no right to look beyond the official behaviour of those in office. It is their constitutional-right to inquire whether a public officer behaves himself well or not; and, if he does not, to proceed against him. Let legislators now put the question to .their constituents, to any competent and credible witnesses. Has the chancellor, have the judges discharged their several duties as they ought, as was required of them by the law and the constitution; have they behaved themselves well ? If they have not, it is the solemn and sacred duty of legislators, from which, according to the principles of the constitution, they ought not to shrink, to call th'e alleged delinquent before them to answer for his conduct; and, on finding the charges against him sustained, to remove him from office. But, beyond this, the General Assembly have no right to go. In all other respects, the chancellor and judges are independent of legislators, and legislators of them.
From what has been said it appears, First, That the House of Delegates, of the last session, assumed,the power to- reduce the chancellor’s salary at pleasure, which was opposed by the Senate, as far as it was in their power; on the ground, that it could not be, in any manner, constitutionally diminished during the continuance of his commission.
Second, That the provision, requiring the salaries of the chancellor and judges to be secured to them during the continuance of their commissions, was suggested to the American people by the great national controversy, which terminated in their independence, as a necessary safeguard of their rights ; and, after more than ten years consideration, was carefully inserted in the Déclaration of Rights of Maryland.
Third, That the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights is, in every particular, clear and unambiguous; in all respects much more so than the corresponding English statute of the year 1700; and this article positively obliges the legislature to give a salary to the chancellor, and to secure it to him during the continuance of his commission, without diminution. '
Fourth, That, owing,to the revolutionary war, and the pecuniary and fiscal embarrassments of the State, during the first nine years after the establishment of the Republic, no salaries, of any kind, could be regularly paid; and, therefore, no salary was constitutionally secured to the chancellor during that time.
Fifth, That, during that time, the General Assembly repeatedly and solemnly alleged .the inability of the State, as the sole and only reason why they did not secure to the chancellor a salary as they were required to do by the constitution.
Sixth, That the chancellor’s salary, from the November session of 1785, to December session 1824, has been several times added to and increased; but never, in the least, or in any way, diminished, or attempted to be diminished.
Seventh, That the distinction between the constitutional salary of the chancellor, and the compensation, which was, for many years, given to him as judge of the land, office, is clear ; and one, that has been always well understood. The one must be, and is secured during the continuance of his commission ; but the other had been given during the pleasure of the legislature.
Eighth, That the act of 1798, ch. 86, is not an ordinary act of legislation ; but, is one which must be controlled, and is continued by force and operation of the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights.
JVinth, That the distinction between the amount, the duration, and the appropriation for the payment of the chancellor’s salary is clear; and one, which has been continually acted upon and is well established.
Tenth, That the act of 1798, ch. 86, by referring to all those antecedent acts and laws which recognise this distinction, between the amount, the duration, and the appropriation for the payment of a salary, is manifestly predicated upon it. And, therefore, it was clearly understood and intended, that it would and should be continued in full force, as to the amount of the salary, by operation of the Declaration of Rights; and, that the appropriation for payment only would require to be continued or provided for in the same, or in some other way.
Eleventh, That on the discontinuing or suffering the act of 1798, ch. 86, to expire, the virtual revival of the act of 1792, ch. 76, would not follow, as a necessary consequence, even according to the common law, much less according to the constitution.
Twelfth, That the appropriation or provision for the payment of the chancellor’s salary, made by the act of 1792, ch. 76, having been repealed by a perpetual law, even if all other parts .of it were permitted virtually to revive, no salary could be now paid to the chancellor under it.
Thirteenth, That the legislature are under a moral, a religious, and a constitutional obligation to make a regular appropriation, either general or special, for the ¡Dayment of the chancellor’s salary, as designated by the act of 1798, ch. 86.
Fourteenth, That the harmony of the constitution would be destroyed, by withholding or diminishing the chancellor’s salary; the three departments brought into collision; and the Delegates would finally become triumphant over all.
Fifteenth, That the appointing power might be virtually annihilated, by this mode of withholding or diminishing the salary of the chancellor, or a judge.
From all which, it clearly follows, that the present chancellor was, and is now constitutionally and legally entitled to ask, demand, and receive of the State of Maryland, a salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds, current money, during the continuance of his commission.
Under this firm conviction, after the sixteenth day of May last, when the first quarter of his salary became due, after the end of the' last session of the General Assembly, the chancellor drew a draft for eight hundred and fifty dollars, the amount thereof, on the treasurer of the Western Shore, in favour of the cashier of the Farmers Bank of Maryland, in the same manner in which he had obtained payment of the previous quarter of his salary. This draft the treasurer refused to pay; giving for answer, that “ as the General Assembly, at its last session, refused to continue the law of 1798,- or the act of 1797, which gave to the chancellor an increase of salary, I am not authorized to pay this order ; or, on account of his salary, more than is alloioed by the act of 1792, to wit: — at the rate of ¿6950 per annum.” From which it appears, that the treasurer either construed the law for himself, or followed that which he supposed to be the construction given to the law and the constitution by the House of Delegates. After the 16th day of August last, the chancellor drew another draft, in the same manner, for the payment of the quarter of his salary, which became due on that day, which was, in like manner, rejected. And, after the 16th day of November last, the chancellor had a third draft presented to the treasurer, for a third quarter of his salary, which had then become due, the payment of which was refused, in the same manner, and for the same reasons.
To have accepted the amount, which the treasurer proposed to pay, under the act of 1792, ch. 76, would have been a total abandonment of the ground taken by the Senateand it might have been construed into a clear admission by the chancellor, that the House of Delegates, or the legislature could, constitutionally, diminish the chancellor’s salary at their pleasure. Such an abandonment he could not make — and he felt himself forbidden from making >ny such admissions. He deemed it a sacred respect he owed to the Senate, a co-ordinate branch of the “ trustees of the public,’’ not to abandon the ground they had taken in his behalf; and, he held it to be a proper regard to himself, and a solemn duty he owed to the constitution, not to make any such admissions ; or to suffer any act of his to influence or embarrass the consideration or determination of this, the most important question, that has ever yet been presented to the General Assembly of Maryland.
It is not in chancery as at common law, where the court’s docket exhibits a complete list, and a full account of all its business. A court of chancery does not, like a court of law, move forward all its business from term to term, from stage to stage, and periodically ; it is continually open ; always accessible ; and may be, at any time, engaged in business; it has no recesses, no resting places. There are many cases in chancery, which, although soon brought to a termination, in relation to the immediate object for which they were instituted; yet, as to other purposes may be opened and reopened; and, from the nature of things, and to answer the purposes of justice, must be kept open and depending for many years. The adjustments under the late Spanish treaty called up, and recently gave rise to much litigation, in cases that had slumbered for nearly tlmty years ; and, in which the parties, or their survivors had been dispersed over half the Union.
The labours of the chancellor are not, like those of a judge of a court of common law, spread out and displayed before the public, by calling in witnesses and jurymen to be present and to partake in them. The whole weight of his duties fall upon himself, and upon himself alone. The anomalies and the intricacies in the administration of justice are poured out upon him; and he is left unaided and alone to ascertain the course which justice requires to be pursued, according to the established principles of equity as they arise out of the complicated facts of each case. The chancery is the great property court of the State. And a vast proportion of the individual rights to the soil of Maryland are only to be found in that court. Perhaps, it would not be hazarding too bold an assertion to say, that one half of all the titles to lands in Maryland, when traced from the present holder to their origin, will be found to have some one or other of the links, in the chain of title, resting in the court of chancery,
It would be foreign to the constitutional question, now under consideration ; and it would be invidious to contrast the duties of the chancellor with those of any common law judge in the State. But, there are those, who mistake the object of the act of November 1809, ch. 181, requiring the number of days each judge of the several courts of law, attends in their respective courts, to be certified annually to the General Assembly; and, under that mistake, they have taken up an opinion, that judicial labour was a sort of job work, the value of which might be estimated by the number of days the labourer was employed. To those, it may be satisfactory to learn, that the business of the court of chancery has latterly very much increased, and continues to increase; and, that its records will show, that the present chancellor has, either in the way of a formal session of a court, or otherwise, been called upon about three hundred different days of the last year, to transact business which had been brought before him from almost all the different counties of the State.
It is because of the continual calls to which a chancellor must always hold himself accessible, and because of the nature, and the peculiarly heavy pressure of the duties imposed upon such an officer, that the salary of the chancellor of England, and of every State in this Union, has always been double, or at least one-third more than that of any other judicial officer. And it is for the same reasons, that the salary of the chancellor of Maryland, from the first settlement of the country, up to this time, has always been in a similar proportion higher than that of any other judicial officer of the State.
Under a proud confidence, that his whole character and conduct, public and private, will bear the closest and severest investigation, the chancellor deems it wholly unnecessary to say one word respecting himself.. When he accepted the office of chancellor of Maryland, he read in the statute book, and in the Declaration of Rights of the State,' that a salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds per annum was secured to the chancellor during the continuance of his commission. The faith of the State was, as he was thus led to believe, publicly and solemnly pledged to whoever should be appointed chancellor. May he now be permitted, respectfully, to ask — has that faith been kept ?
The chancellor now claims the payment of his salary, under the act of 1798, ch. 86, at the rate of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds per annum, for the past year, or so much as has become due and remains unpaid; with legal interest on such portions as have been demanded and withheld. And he also claims the benefit of some such provision as the General Assembly may now think proper to make, for the regular quarterly payment of that amount hereafter, during the continuance of his commission. “ It is justice that establisheth a nation.” The chancellor asks no more than justice. His case is with you.
THEODORICK BLAND,
Chancellor of the State of Maryland.
Annapolis, 26th December, 1825.
This Memorial, was presented and read in the House of Delegates, on the third day after the commencement of the session, and referred to a committee; who made a report thereupon. After which, the matter having been considered, was called up, discussed, and finally passed upon by each House.' Whence it may be fairly assumed, that the following resolutions, recognizing the chancellor’s claims, may be considered as a deliberate and final judgment of the General Assembly of Maryland affirming, in substance and in general terms, the leading and material principles set forth and asserted by the chancellor in his Memorial. Considered in this point of view, this is a case of much and lasting importance as regards the judiciary in general as well as in relation to the chancellor in particular.
17th February, 1826.
It may be well here, once for all, to remark, that it has' been deemed unnecessary to malee any special reference to the journals of either house for what, as in this instance, is stated in this memorial to have been done by the House of Delegates, or by the Senate; because the date given in the text will, in every instance, be found to be of itself a sufficient reference, as all the movements of the two houses are placed upon their respective journals in chronological order.
The injustice done to an individual is sometimes of service to the public. Facts are apt to alarm us more than the most dangerous principles, (Junius, Let. 41.) The oppression of an obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, which is frequently considered as another magna charta, (3 Blac. Com. 136.) In speaking of constitutional law, we, in this country, always refer to our written constitutions, or fundamental laws paramount to legislative acts. This is a distinction which, as it has been truly said, is not likely to last long in States where the power of the legislature, like that of the British parliament, is omnipotent, ( Coop. Just. 404.) In Maryland the great facility with which the constitution may be altered gives to the General Assembly almost unlimited power in all respects; and particularly over the executive and judicial departmenis of tire government; and produces too general an indifference to the existing provisions of the constitution.
In the Virginia convention of 1829 it was moved, that a clause should be inserted in the new constitution providing “ a mode in which future amendments shall he made therein,” upon which John Randolph, among other things, said,
“I do not know a greater calamity that can happen to any nation, than having the foundations of its government unsettled. It would seem as if we were endeavouring to corrupt the people at the fountain head. Sir, the great opprobrium of'popular government, is its instability. It was this which made the people of our Anglo-Saxon stock cling with such pertinacity to an independent judiciary, as the only means they could find to resist this vice of popular government. By such a provision as this, we are now inviting, and in a manner prompting the people, to be dissatisfied with their government. Sir, there is no need of this. Dissatisfaction will come soon enough. I foretell, and with a confidence surpassed by none I ever felt on any occasion, that those who have been most anxious to destroy the constitution of Virginia, and to substitute in its place this thing, will not be more dissatisfied now with the result of our labours, than this new constitution will very shortly be opposed by all the people of the State. Sir, I see no wisdom in making this provision for future changes. You must give governments time to operate on the people, and give the people time to become gradually assimilated to their institutions. Almost any thing is better than this state of perpetual uncertainly. A people may have the best form of government that the wit of man ever devised; and yet, from its uncertainty alone, may, in effect, live under the worst government in the world. I will do nothing to provide for change. I will not agree to any rule of future apportionment, or to any provision for future changes called amendments to the Constitution. They who love change — who delight in public confusion — who wish to feed the cauldron and make it bubble — may vote if they please for future changes. But by what spell — by what formula are you going to bind the people to all future time ? Quis custodiet custodes ? The days of Lycurgus are gone by, when he could swear the people not to alter the Constitution until he should return animo non revertendi. I have no favour for this Constitution. I shall vote against its adoption, and 1 shall advise all the people of my district to set their faces — aye—and their shoulders against it. But if we are to have it — let us not have it with its death warrant in its very face: with the facies hypocratica — the sardonic grin of death upon its countenance.”
The question on the proposition to insert a clause providing for future amendments was then immediately taken and decided in the negative, ayes,twenty-five, noes, sixty-eight. — (Debates Virg. Con. of 1829, page 789.)
“ The whole fabric of English liberty rose step by step, through much toil, and many sacrifices ; each generation adding some new security to the work, and trusting that posterity would perfect the labour as well as enjoy the reward. A time perhaps was even then foreseen, in the visions of generous hope, by the brave knights of parliament, and by the sober sages of justice, when the proudest ministers of the crown should recoil from those barriers, which were then pushed aside with impunity.” — (2 Hal. Mid. Ages, 179, Phil, edit.)
The navigation acts, first introduced, in the year 1651 by the famous Long Parliament, with the intention of securing to England a monopoly of the trade of her colonies, (3 Godw. Com. Eng. 3S2 ; 1 Blac. Com. 418 ; Pown. Adm. Colo. 123, 4th edition, 1768 ;) being very injurious to their interests were warmly opposed by them; insomuch so, that those laws remained almost as a dead letter, {Pown. Adm. Colo. 109,) until, with a view to sustain the supremacy and monopoly of the mother country, a statute was passed in the year 1696, (7 fy 8 W. 3, c. 22, s. 7,) sanctioning the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies; which tribunals, although some extensions of their jurisdiction were for a time disputed, it seems to have been finally admitted, about the year 1700, might lawfully take cognizance of all cases arising under the statutes passed by the parliament of England for the regulation of the external trade of this country, (2 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 187, 193 ; 2 Hutch. His. Mass. 74, 78.)
Before the revolution commenced there had been established a vice-admiralty court for New Hampshire; another for Massachusetts and Rhode Island, (Chal. Pol. An. 282; 2 Chal. Opin. Mm. Law, 208;) a third for Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, (1 Smith’s His. N. York, 383;) a fourth for Pennsylvania and Delaware, (2 Chat. Opin. Em. Law, 190;) a fifth for Maryland, (1715, eh. 48, s. 7; 1763, ch. 18, s. 97 §- 98; Kilt. Rep. 163 ;) a sixth for Virginia, (3 Virg. Stat. 17S ;) a seventh for North Carolina, (1 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 278;) an eighth for South Carolina, (6 State Trials, 157,) and a ninth for Georgia, (Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 135.) These vice-admiralty courts were not only invested with authority to take cognizance of the ordinary instance and prize cases ; but also with jurisdiction, according to the course of admiralty proceeding, without a jury, in all revenue cases; and of all prosecutions for the breach of the laws of navigation and trade ; and also of the statutes for the preservation of pine trees for the use of the navy, (2 Hutch. His. Mass. 228; Town. Aim. Colo. 312; 1 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 111, 119; 9 Anne, c. 17; 8 Oeo. 1, c. 12, 2 Geo. 2, c. 35.) The colonists insisted, that their superior courts of common law had a superintending power, similar to that exercised by the English courts of Westminster Hall, to control and check the undue extension of the jurisdiction of these Vice Admiralty courts by writs of prohibition; but this was a controverted point which was never finally settled.- — (2 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 208.)
Appeals, from the tribunals of the last resort in the colonies to the ldng in council, seem to have been coeval with the regular organization of the colonial governments. Appeals from the courts of Virginia were taken to the ldng in council soon after that colony was placed under the government of the king; and before that time they were carried to the treasurer and council of the Virginia company in England, (Chai. Pol. An. 38, 41.) At the time of settling the colonies in this country, there was no English judicatory besides those within the realm of England; except those of Guernsey and Jersey, the remnants of the Dutchy of Normandy. According to the custom of Normandy, appeals lay to the duke in council; and upon that ground, appeals lay from the judicatories of those islands to the king of England, as duke in council; and upon that general precedent, without perhaps attending to the fact of the appeal being to the ldng, in his character of duke of Normandy, it was held, that an appeal should be allowed from the judicatories of the colonies to the ldng in council, (Pown. Aim. Colo. 61, 112.)
• But England claimed an absolute supremacy over all her colonies, (Chal. Pol. An. 684, 690 ;) and, for the purpose of sustaining that supremacy, it was finally settled, as an inherent right, as well of the subject to prosecute as of the sovereign to receive appeals, without any reservation of such right in the colonial charters; for, as was said, without such appeal, the law made for, or permitted to a colony might be insensibly changed within itself without the assent of the mother country; and judgments might be given in the colonies to the disadvantage, or the lessening of the supremacy of the mother country, or to make the superiority to be only of the ldng, not of the crown of England, (Chal. Pol. An. 304 ; Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 27; 5 Erante. Works, 355; Vaug. Rep. 290,402; Show. P. C. 33; 1 P. Will. 329 ; 2 Meriv. 143.) And as in many cases for the want of a full and accurate knowledge of the peculiar- law of the colony it might be difficult or impossible for a party to obtain any benefit by an appeal, without a special verdict, it was thought, that it might be proper to authorize andrequire the judges in all important cases to compel the jury to find a special verdict. (1 Chai. Opin. Em. Law, 185.) Hence with a view to obtain relief by appeal, it appears, that during the provincial government of Maryland, much apparently unnecessary matter, such as acts of Assembly, &c., was introduced into the record in the form of bills of exceptions and special verdicts, (1 H. £ McH. 67 ; 2 5. §- McH. 279.) But it was not easy to induce the colonists to submit to this general supremacy as a fundamental principle in their connexion with the mother country; because it mortified their pride, and was, in all cases in which the right of appeal was exercised, attended with much delay, expense and vexation, ( dial. Pol. Jin. 295,343,490, 678 ; 1 Ram. U. S. Ill; 1 Relic. N. Hamp 247.)
Appeals lay from the highest court of record in each of the colonies to the king in council, in all civil cases, where thfc land or other thing in controversy amounted to three hundred pounds sterling or upwards in value, (X Smith’s Sis. N. York, 384; Pawn. Jldm. Colo. 61, note; 3 Virg. Stat. 550 ; Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 225 ; 1 S. § MeS. 44, 77, 80, 90, 504 ; 2 S. 4 McS. 324, 346; 1702, ch. 1, s. 20 ; 1773, ch. 7, s. 5 §• 6 ;) and in prosecutions for misdemeanors, where, on conviction, the fine imposed exceeded the value of two hundred pounds sterling, (Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 224.) But if the matter in question related to the. talcing, or demanding of any duty payable to the king, or to any fee of office, or annual rent, or the like, where the benefits subsequently accruing from the same title might be bound, or because of the peculiar circumstances of the case, an appeal might, at the discretion of the king in council, be allowed, though the value then immediately involved was less than three hundred pounds sterling. (Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 224 ; 2 dial. Opin. Em. Raw, 177.) An appeal could only be taken from the colonial court of the last resort; and what court that was depended upon the nature of the case; and upon the constitution of the judicial department of the colony. An appeal lay in some cases from peculiarly constituted tribunals ; (1702, ch. 1, s. 20 ; 1726, ch. 9 ; 1 II. 4‘ McS. 409, 509,) or direct from the colonial court of chancery, (Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 26 ;) but if the case might have been carried to a higher colonial court, the appeal could only be taken from such court of last resort of the colony, (2 dial. Opin. Em. Law, 175.) In Maryland in a case in the court of chancery upon a petition by the defendant praying an appeal to the king in council, the prayer was on the 1st of March 1738 rejected. “ The said prayer, being (as it was said) contrary to his majesty’s instructions to grant an appeal to his majesty from any other court, but from the court of appeals which is the supreme court of this province, to which court ho may appeal, and from thence to his majesty, if he think fit.” — {Chan. Proc. lib. I.R. No. 4,fol. 60.)
In admiralty cases, if the decision was given by the governor and council, or other colonial court of last resort, then the appeal wa3 direct to the king in council; but if the sentence was passed by a vice-admiralty court, constituted by the king in the colony, then the appeal was to the high court of admiralty of England; and from thence the case might be taken by appeal to the king in council. — (2 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 227, 22S.) No case could however be transmitted for difficulty; but must be determined by the court below one way or the other__(2 Ld. Raym. 1448.)
An appeal to the king in council w'as required to be made within fourteen days after the judgment or decree of the colonial court was rendered ; and the appellant was required to give good security to prosecute his appeal with effect, or to pay all costs and damages in case the decision should be affirmed, (1773, ch. 7, s. 5 4' 6; 3 Virg. Stat. 550.) The mode of ascertaining the value of the thing in controversy was regulated by the king’s instructions; or by the rules of the superior colonial courts. A transcript of the record of the colonial court was made out by its clerk, who made affidavit, that the copy was a true one, and that it had been compared with the original. — {Stokes’ View Brit. Col. 225.) ■
When the record thus authenticated reached the king in council, it was almost as a matter of course referred to a committee to consider and report upon the matter. Whereupon the committee appointed a time and place for the hearing, of which they gave notice to the parties personally or by publication ; after which and upon making up their opinion they reported accordingly. But the course of proceeding before the king in council; the judgment of that tribunal, and its mandate with which the case was sent back to the colonial court may be better understood by a perusal of the following extract from the records of the High Court of Chancery of Maryland, in the case of Powlson v. Forwood.
“ Memorandum. — This 22d day of February 1725, his Honour the Chancellor acknowledges to have received of Mr. Plater by order of his Honour the Governor copies of several orders of the king and council, to wit, one of the 11th of August 1720; one other of the 30th of April 1724; and one other of the 4th of July 1724; and prdered the same to be entered in the proceedings of this court to avail so far as they ought; which orders are in the'words following, viz:
“At the Council Chamber,Whitehall, the 11th August 1720, present their excellencies the Lords Justices, &c. (Here follow the names of the members of the council.)
“ Upon reading this day at the board a report from the Right Honourable the Lords of the committee for hearing appeals and complaints, Etc., from the plantations, dated the 4th of this instant in the words following, viz : Whereas by an order in council of the 26th instant referring to this committee -the humble petition of Jonathan Forwood, complaining of several unjust proceedings against him, and his agents in the courts of judicature in the Province of Maryland at the suit of one Gilbert Powlson master of the ship Dolphin, touching an agreement entered into between them, for the said Powlson to transport from England to the said Province and to Virginia, one hundred and thirty-one servants; on account whereof, the petitioner alleges, the said Powlson has obtained two attachments against his effects there, one of them for one hundred and sixty pounds which he actually received, and the other for seven hundred pounds for which he has sold good part of the petitioner’s effects in his hands; and humbly praying to be relieved in the premises. g
“ Their Lordships this day took the same into consideration, and having heard the petitioner by his counsel therein, do agree humbly to report their opinion, that upon Mr. Forwood’s giving such security as the Governor and Council of Maryland shall think sufficient to answer the said Powlson's demands, his goods in specie shall be restored to him, or, in case they are sold, he shall be paid the money arising from the sale thereof; and that thereupon the Provincial Court do proceed to hear and determine the cause or causes with liberty for either party to appeal therefrom.
“Their excellencies the Lords Justices in Council taking the said report into consideration are pleased to approve thereof, and to order as it is hereby ordered, that upon Mr. Forwood’s giving such security as the Governor and Council of Maryland shall think sufficient to answer the said Powlson’s demands, his goods in specie shall be restored to him, or in case they are sold he shall be paid the money arising from the sale thereof; and that thereupon the Provincial Court do proceed to hear and determine the cause or causes with liberty for either party to appeal from such determination ; whereof the deputy governor, or commander in chief for the time being of the Province of Maryland, and all others whom it may concern are to take notice, and govern themselves accordingly.”
“ At the court of St. James’s, the 30th day of April 1724. Present, the King’s most Excellent Majesty, ,&c. (here follow tire names of the members of the council.) Upon reading this day at the board a report from the Lords of the committee for hearing appeals, complaints, See. from the plantations, &c. (here follows the report of the committee in, relation to other matters in the before mentioned case of Powlson v. Forwood.)
“His Majesty in council talcing the said report into consideration, is pleased to approve thereof, and accordingly to enforce the said order of the 11th of August 1720, and to that end his Majesty is hereby pleased to order, that the Deputy Governor of the said Province of Maryland do command the courts there to carry the said order into immediate execution, by causing speedy restitution to be made the said petitioner of his effects, or, in .case they are sold, immediate payment of the money arising therefrom. And his Majesty taking particular notice, that the said Deputy Governor hath not complied with the said former order in council, is hereby further pleased to order and require him forthwith to send an account to this board why the said order was not carried into execution, together with his reasons for the same'.”
“ At the court at Kensington, the 4th day of July 1724. Present, the King’s most excellent Majesty, &e. (here follow the names of the members of the council.) Upon reading this day at the board a report from the right honourable the Lords of the committee for hearing appeals from the Plantations dated on the 17th of June last in the words following, viz : (here follows the report in relation to the before mentioned case of Pmolson v. Forwood, which concludes in these words, to wit:)
“ Their Lordships having heard counsel on behalf of the appellant, none appearing for the respondent, notwithstanding the usual time for his appearing according to the rules of this board was expired, and although the usual notice was affixed on the exchange of London, do agree humbly to offer it as their opinion to your Majesty, that the said judgments of the 20th of September 1720, and the 7th of May 1723, should be reversed and set aside; and that the appellant be restored to all he hath lost by means of the said judgments.”
“ His Majesty in council taking the said reports into consideration is pleased to approve thereof, and to order as it is hereby ordered, that the said judgments of the 20th of September 1720, and the 7th of May 1723 be reversed and set aside. And that the appellant be restored to all he hath lost by means of the said judgments whereof the deputy governor or commander in chief for the time being of the said Province of Maryland, and all others whom it may concern are to take notice and govern themselves accordingly.” — (Chan. Proco, lib. I. R. No. 1 ,fol. 57; 1692, ch. 17, note ; Bacon’s Laws of Maryland.)
If the appellant failed.to transmit a properly authenticated transcript of the record; -or to proceed with his appeal within one year alter it had been allowed in the colony, the appeal might be dismissed, (2 Ld. Raym. 1447.) No costs were allowed on the final determination of such appéals, or at least not as a matter of course, (4 Ball, app. 25; 2 Ld. Raym. 1447.) In all cases a decision by the Mng in council was final and conclusive; and there was no instance of a rehearing of any such appeal, (1 Ves. 455.) An opinion seems to have been entertained by some, that the king in council might of himself, and directly, issue an execution; and have a writ of sequestration in execution of his final judgment sent to the governor of the colony, ( Gilb. For. Rom. 215 ; 2 P. Will. 262.) But no coercive process was ever attempted to be issued by the' king in council against a colony itself; and if it had been •attempted there is every reason to believe, that it would not have been endured, ■(2 Hutch. His. Mass. 204.)
1 Niles’s Reg. 13, 65.
Votes and Proceedings House Delegates, 22d June 1768, and the Council proceedings of the samo time. 1 Pith. His. 458, 461.
The Journals of Congress, 14th October, 1774.
Hastings v. Plater. — This bill was filed on the 13th of February 1735, by Samuel Hastings, Samuel Minskie, and John Evitt, against Benjamin Tasker, George Plater, and Onorio Rozolini, executors of Rebecca Calvert deceased, who was administratrix of Charles Calvert deceased.’ The bill states, that the late Richard Smith, in his lifetime formed a plan for causing a ship to be built by subscription in the city of Annapolis, in which each subscriber was to hold a share in proportion to the sum by him subscribed; that, having obtained from several persons subscriptions to a large amount, he employed the plaintiffs to build a ship as proposed, and engaged Patrick Simpson, since deceased, to take charge of her when built as master: that the plaintiffs in compliance with their agreement built and launched a ship, which was called the Maryland Merchant, and the greater part of her rigging, tackle, and furniture, were bought and set up in her, and several officers and sailors-were hired to navigate her on her intended voyage; but Smith having received all or the greatest part of the subscription money, embezzled so much of it, that he was unable to fit her for sea; that he had not paid these plaintiffs for their work and labour, and had besides involved them and Patrick Simpson in liabilities for several considerable sums of money on account of the ship ; that the subscribers and contributors to the building of the ship in this state of things, seeing their prospects of deriving any advantage from their subscriptions to be almost hopeless, and feeling kindly disposed to enable these plaintiffs if practicable to obtain some reimbursement for their losses, transferred and assigned all their interest in her, except some sails paid for on account of D. Dulany, to the value of ¿6120, to these plaintiffs and Patrick Simpson. That afterwards some of the seamen, who had been hired on account of the ship, instituted a suit in the vice-admiralty court of this province before the Honourable Charles Calvert then judge of the said court, against the ship and taclde, &c., and by a decree of that court she was condemned and sold for the sum of £600, which was brought in and deposited with the said judge of the vice-admiralty court; out of which the seamen’s wages having been paid there was left a balance of £ 309; after which Patrick Simpson was paid £ 102, and William Cummings £ 6, leaving a residuum of £201; to which these plaintiffs are entitled as assignees of the subscribers. That Charles Calvert the Judge having that money in his hands died intestate, and administration on his estate having been granted to Rebecca Calvert, she thus obtained it; after which she by her last will appointed these defendants her executors and died, and these defendants having taken upon themselves the execution of her will, thus became liable for that amount to these plaintiffs : Whereupon they prayed that the defendants might be compelled to pay them the said sum of money, &c.
On the 17th of February, 1735, the defendant Benjamin Tasker disclaimed any interest in, or any authority to intermeddle with the money mentioned in the complainant’s bill, he having before the Commissary General entered on record his renunciation of the executorship of the testament of Rebecca Calvert deceased; and he also disclaimed any right whatever to the administration of the estate of Charles Calvert deceased. The two other defendants by their answer admitted the facts set forth in the bill; but they averred, that the said Charles and Rebecca had made no profit from the money in their hands; that they as well as these defendants had always been and were then ready to pay the same to any persons justly entitled to it, and to whom they could be safe in paying it, &c. The case was thus submitted on bill and answer.
17th February, 1736. — Ogle, Chancellor. — Decreed, that the defendants George Plater and Onorio Rozolini do pay and deliver unto the complainants the said sum of £201 currency, upon such security being given to the master of this court as he shall judge sufficient by a bond of the penalty of £400 currency, payable to him, with condition to pay and satisfy to any person or persons such proportion of the said £201 as such person or persons shall appear to be justly entitled to after deduction of costs expended in this suit by both parties, which is hereby ordered and directed to be paid out of the said sum of £201 currency. — {Chan. Froce. lib. 1. R. No. 2, fol. 761.)
The Long Parliament, says the historian of the Commonwealth of England, deserves to be for ever held in grateful remembrance for the great improvements we derive from them in points most essential to the independence and freedom of man in society. Among which is that which relates to the tenure by which the judges, who are appointed to determine questions of law between man and man, and between the sovereign and the subject, hold their offices. One of the earliest decisions of that parliament was the vote condemning the judgment which had been given for the king in the matter of ship money. And shortly after, January 1643, the house of Lords appointed a committee to consider, among other things, of the judges holding their places durante beneplácito. The next day they deputed seventeen of their body to present their humble desire to the king, that the twelve judges, and the attorney of the court of wards, might hold their places by patent, quamdiu se bene gesserint. They accordingly waited on Charles with their request; to which he signified his assent. Agreeably to this decision, in the petition of both houses of parliament presented to the king at Oxford, at the close of the first campaign of the civil war, they make it one of their demands, that the twelve persons whom they name for the office of judges, as well as all the judges of the same courts for the time to come, should hold their places by letters patent quamdiu se bene gesserint. — (Godw. Com. Eng. b. 3, c. 29.)
Immediately after the king had been put to death it was enacted by the Long Parliament, that the commissioners of the great seal should also hold their offices during good behaviour, (3 Godw. Com. Eng. 11.) But this important improvement as to the tenure by which the judges and chancellor were to hold their offices, was, on the restoration of Charles the second, entirely put aside, and nothing more said upon the subject until some time after the English revolution of 1688, when it was enacted by the statute of the 12 & 13 W. 3, c. 2, that the judges should hold their commissions during good behaviour; still however leaving the Chancellor to hold, as formerly, during pleasure.
In an opinion of tire attorney and solicitor general D. Ryder, and W. Murray, given on the 22d of June 1753, to the commissioners of trade and plantations respecting an act passed by the General Assembly of Jamaica, providing, that all the judges of the supreme court of judicature of the island should hold their offices quamdiu se bene gesserint, they say, that “ it directly affects the royal prerogative, in a point oí' great moment, and for which no occasion is pretended to^be given, by tlie abuse of any power committed to the governor; or, if there had been any, it would be much more suitable to his majesty’s honour and dignity, to reform it, by his own authority, Hilly sufficient for that purpose, in such manner, as to his royal wisdom should seem meet, than by the interposition of an act of Assembly; nor does it appear to us, that in the situation, and circumstances, in which this island, or the other American plantations, stand, it would be advisable, either for the interests of the plantations themselves, or of Great Britain, that the judges in the former should hold their places quamdiu se bene gessennt.” — (2 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 105.)
“The next general point yet undetermined, (said Governor Pownall in 176S in speaking of the colonial governments,) the determination of which very essentially imports the subordination and dependence of the colony governments on the government of the mother country,-is, the manner of providing for the support of government, and for all the executive officers of the crown. The freedom and right efficiency of the constitution require, that the executive and judicial officers of government should he independent of the legislative ; and more especially in popular governments, where the legislature itself is so much influenced by the humours and passions of the people; for'if they do not, there will he neither justice nor equity in any of the courts of law, nor any efficient execution of the laws and orders of government in the magistracy; according, therefore, to the constitution of Great Britain, the crown has the appointment and payment of the several executive and judicial officers, and the legislature settles a permanent and fixed appointment for the support of government and the civil list in general. The crown therefore has, a fortiori, a right to require of the colonies, to whom, by its commission or charter, it gives the power of government, such permanent support appropriated to the offices, not the officers of government, that they may not depend upon the temporary and arbifcrazy will of the legislature.”
And again he says, “ the point then of this very important question comes to this issue, whether the inconveniences arising, and experienced by some instances of misapplications of appropriations, are a sufficient reason and ground for establishing a measure so directly contrary to the British constitution: and whether the inconveniences to be traced in the history of the colonies, through tire votes and journals of their legislatures, in which the support of governors, judges, and officers of the crown will be found to have been withheld or reduced on occasions, where the assemblies have supposed that they have had reason to disapprove the nomination, — or the person, or his conduct; — whether, X say, these inconveniences have not been more detrimental, and injurious to government; and whether, instead of these colonies being dependent on, and- governed under, the officers of the crown, the sceptre is not reversed, and the officers of the crown dependent on and governed by the Assemblies, as the colonists themselves allow, that this measure renders the governor and all other servants of the crown dependent on the Assembly.” — (Pown. Adm. Colo. 76, 78; Smith’s His. N. York, 118; 1 Pitk. His. 126 ; 7 Mass. His. Sod. 129.)
This peculiar expression in the twelfth article of the Declaration of Eights, refers to that controversy which originated in the year 1770, between the Proprietary Governor Eden, and the House of Delegates, as to the- power claimed by the Governor and Council to settle the rate of officers’ fees by proclamation without the consent of the people through their Delegates. This claim of the last provincial governor was strikingly analogous to that set up by the mother country to levy taxes by act of parliament without the consent of the representatives of the colonists. It is to this claim of settling the fees by proclamation, that the first legislative enactment of the republic upon the subject of fees alludes by declaring, that officers’ fees can be rated, regulated and established by act of Assembly only. — (October 1777, ash. 10; Biog. Sign. I). Inde. Life of Carroll.)
It is said, that during the rude ages of all nations those intrusted with the administration of justice were compensated for their trouble by fees and perquisites paid by the suitors, (Smith’s Wea. Nat. b. 5, c. 1 ,pt. 2.) This mode of remunerating the judges for their services still continues to a great extent in England, although they have for a long time past had certain salaries allowed them by act of parliament.
But all exactions or fees paid by the suitor, in whatever form they may be imposed, are, in truth, taxes; and taxes of the most unequal and unjust kind. Dr. Franklin in his examination before the House of Commons in 1786, in answer to the question, Is the American stamp act an equal tax on the country t said, he thought not, because the greatest part of the money must arise from lawsuits for the recovery of debts, and be paid by the lower sort of people, who were too poor easily to pay their debts. It is therefore a heavy tax on the poor and a tax upon them for being poor. And further, that such a tax would not be a means of lessening the number of lawsuits; because as the costs all fall upon the debtor, and are to be paid by him, they would be no discouragement to the creditor to bring his action, (4 Prank. Wor. 12S; Smith’s Wea. Nat. b. 5, c. 2, app. to art. 1 &2.)
The Congress of 1774 in their address to the king, among other things, complain, that the judges of admiralty and vice-admiralty were empowered to receive their salaries and fees from the effects condemned by themselves, (Jour. Cong. 26th October, 1774.) The ground of this complaint was not merely, that those judges were permitted to take fees from suitors, for that was then allowed to almost all the judges of the colonies; but that those fees, being taken from the property condemned by themselves, gave an undue bias to their minds, and the authority to take them operated as a continual temptation to condemn where there was no sufficient cause.
Under the Provincial Government of Maryland a great variety of fees were allowed and directed to be paid to the chancellor, which must have formed a very considerable portion of the annual emoluments of his office. — (1715, ch. 25, s. 2; 1763, ch. 18, s. 83.)
After the Declaration of Independence, the General Assembly recite, that “ whereas it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights, that the chancellor or judge of the admiralty should take fees or perquisites of any kind; and it is apprehended, that private individuals who have business done for them in the chancery court or court of admiralty, or who may have the great seal affixed to any patent commission, or other paper, for their benefit, should pay for the same and then enact, that certain fees in chancery, and for the great seal, should be paid, and-that the register should every half year pay the same to the treasurer for the use of the public. — (October 1777, ch. 13; November 1779, ch. 25, s. 22.)
It is remarkable, that the fees collected under this law should always have been accounted for as so much money arising from seals and taxes ; that fees thus levied should have been at all times regarded by the English authorities as taxes which formed a part of the public revenue, ( Smith’s Wea. Nat. b. 5, c. 1, pi. 2 ; Warrington v. Mosely, 4 Mod. 320;) that the people of Maryland in their then late controversy with Governor Eden, respecting his cl.aim of settling these same kind of fees by proclamation, should have insisted, that they could be considered in no other light than as taxes; and yet, that in the passage of this law, directing them to be collected and paid into the treasury for no avowed or conceivable political purpose, it should not have occurred to them, that this partial mode of taxation was in direct violation oí that article of the Declaration of Rights which declares, “ that the levying taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished; that paupers ought Hot to be assessed for the support of government; but every other person in the State ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes, for the support of government, according to his actual worth, in real or personal property within the State; yet fines, duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid, with apolitical view, for the good government and benefit of the community.” — (Sloane v. Pawleit, S Mod. 18; Vattel, b. 2, s. 240,252.)
Under the clause, which declares, that ilo Chancellor or Judge ought to receive fees or perquisites of any kind, it is evident, that at least as regards them, justice must'be administered gratis, however much or improperly it may be otherwise encumbered with costs and expenses. But, as has been said, it was not so much to diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were prohibited from receiving any present, or fee from the parties. Eor, upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary, that the judicial should be separated from the executive power; but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power.' The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment of liis salary should not 'depend upon the good will, or even upon the good economy of that power. — (Smith’s Wea. Nat. b. 5, c. 1 ,pt. 2.)
It seems to be a generally received opinion, that the Chancellor and Judges have, each of them, an estate, or a vested interest in their respective salaries, ( Whittington v. Polk. 1 H. (§- J. 236 ; Coop. Just. 599.) This estate in a judicial salary is, however, one of a very peculiar’ character ; it is not subject, before it becomes due, to be disposed of at the pleasure of the holder. It is like a limited and qualified estate in an annuity. As where an annuity charged upon land was granted by Oliver to Emsonne, in consideration of his, Emsonne’s, giving his counsel to Oliver; it was held, that the trust and confidence which Oliver reposed in Emsonne for his advice, being incidental to the cause for which the annuity was granted it could not be assigned to another or forfeited. (Oliver v. Emsonne, Dyer, lb.; 1 H. Plac. 627, note ; Maund’s Case, 7 Co. 112 ; Co. Litt. 144 b. note 1.) So that looking to the peculiar cause of the grant it appears, that even in the case of an annuity granted by one person to another, the grantee may have vested in him nothing more than an inalienable and qualified estate.
Butin deciding upon the nature of a public grant, the great object of public policy in making the grant must be attended to. The general intent pervades the whole ; and each yearly payment of the salary must be subject to it. The public has a deep interest in the due and appropriate application of judicial salaries as well as in their regular continuance and payment; because they are given for services rendered to the State of the most precious nature, by a class of the most important “ trustees of the public.” Such salaries are granted to support the dignity of the State, and the administration of justice; and therefore no judicial salary can be sold, assigned, mortgaged, or transferred, either by the act of the party, or by operation of law as in cases of insolvency; because the public policy by which any such voluntary or involuntary alienation is prohibited is incidental to the cause for which it is granted; and cannot be separated from it. One of the special objects in giving such a salary is to enable the judge continually, and at all times to discharge his duties to the public without interruption from any pecuniary embarrassment; for, although mere insolvency cannot be considered, in all cases even as a deviation from duty, much less a crime ; yet if a judge, because of his insolvency, be restrained from performing the labours assigned to him, such a failure of duty may be deemed a misbehaviour in office within the meaning of the Constitution. ( Griesley’s Case, 8 Co. 82 ; Crouch v. Martin, 2 Vem. 595; Mithwoldv. Waldhank, 2 Ves. 238; Flarlyv. Odium, 3 T. it.681; Ledderdale v. Montrose, 4 T. it. 248; Barwick v. Reade, 1 if. Blac. 627; Arhucklev. Cowtan, 3 Bos. § Pul. 322; Slone v. Ledderdale, 2 JLntr. 533 ; Monys v. Leake, 8 T. it. 411; Ex parte Parnell, 1 Swan. 436; Pow. Mort. 80, note C.; 1814, ch. 113, s. 4; Jlct Cong. ISth March, 1818, ch. 18, s. 4; Lowe v. Moore, 1 McCord, 243.)
“ Judges (it is said by a sensible Reviewer,) should be placed above pecuniary difficulties ; their minds should not be diverted from their important duties, by the pinching of want, or the necessity of devising ways and means to eke out a living for their families. Sueh a situation both lessens respectability and invites temptation, Bring the administrators of the law, through whose sanctions alone the sovereignty of Iho people is heard, into contempt, and the law itself will soon become odious— render the law and its tribunals odious, and you prepare the people to despise the yoke and to embrace any change which would afford a prospect of relief. Let it be borne in mind by those in whose hands are our destinies, our legislators, that the most distinguishing and delightful characteristic of our people, is their cheerful submission to the law: to that they universally bow down with obedience, and upon that foundation, mainly, stand our republican institutions. Eveiy thing which tends to shake it, a patriot should deprecate; and we know nothing more surely calculated to produce that lamentable effect, than the reduction of the salaries of the judges to a bare subsistence, by which these offices will ere long be thrown into the hands of inferior men, or will render those of a superior character who imprudently accept them, the victims for life of debasing want.” — (3 Southern Review, 446.)
In England there are two modes of constituting a chancellor, either hy letters patent, which is rarely used, or by delivery of the great seal, which delivery is to be entered upon record. But it must be recollected, that if the great seal be delivered by the Icing, although the person to whom it is so delivered is thereby constituted Chancellor, yet he cannot alone seal writs therewith, or at all; except in the presence of some of the masters in chancery, until he has regularly taken the oaths of office. And it is said, that it is not inconsistent for the Lord Chancellor also to hold at the same time the office of Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. — (1 Harr. Pra. Chan. 68; 1 Newl. Chan. 1; 4 Inst. 87; 3 Bloc. Com. by Chitty, 47.)
“In all the king’s governments so called, (of the colonies, said Governor Pownal in 1768,) the governor, or the governor and council are the chancellor, or judges of the court of chancery. But so long as I understand that the governor is, by his general instruction, upon sound principles of policy and justice, restrained from exercising the office of judge or justice in his own person, I own I always considered the governor, taking up the office of chancellor, as a case labouring with inexplicable difficulties. How unfit are governors in general for this high office of law; and how improper is it that governors should be judges, where perhaps the consequence of the judgment may involve government, and the administration thereof, in tile contentions of parties. Indeed the fact is, that the general diffidence of the wisdom of this court thus constituted, the apprehension that reasons of government may mix in with the grounds of the judgment, has had an effect that the coming to this court is avoided as much as possible, so that it is almost in disuse, even where the establishment of it is allowed. But in the charter governments, (New England and Pennsylvania,) they have no chancery at all.” “ This introduced a practice, (in New England,) of petitioning the legislative courts for relief, and prompted those courts to interpose their authority. These petitions becoming numerous, in order to give the greater despatch to such business, the legislative courts transacted such business by orders or resolves, without the solemnity of passing acts for such purposes ; and have further extended this power by resolves and orders, beyond what a court of chancery ever attempted to decree, even to the suspending of public laws, which orders or resolves are not sent home for the royal assent.” — (Pawn. JLdm. Colo. 110; See Constitution of New Jersey, art. 8.)
Upon a complaint made, on the 6th of November 1785 to the General Assembly of New York, they, among other things, resolved, “ that a court of chancery, in this province, in the hands or under the exercise of a governor, without consent in General Assembly, is contrary to law, unwarrantable, and of dangerous consequence to the liberties and properties of the people.” — (1 Smith’s His. N. York, 386.)
Under the proprietary government of Maryland the chancellor of the province was sometimes constituted by a formal commission from the Lord Proprietary; ( Chan. Proc. lib.P. L.fol. 488,717.) but most usually, as it would seem, by a delivery of the great seal by the Lord Proprietary in person, or by, or in the presence of the council. The governor for the time being was, in several instances, by the same commission also constituted chancellor and keeper of the great seal of the Province. The first provincial governor, by his commission bearing date on the 15th of April 1637, was constituted governor, lieutenant general, chief captain, and commander, as well by sea as by land, and also chancellor, chief justice, and chief magistrate within the province, (1 Boz. His.'Mary. 291.) A similar commission was granted by the Lord Proprietary on the 18th of September 1644. (Land Records, lib. 1, folio 195.)
But although for some time after the settlement of the country, the governor was invested with a variety of military and civil offices, yet he was not permitted to act of himself in all respects and alone in any one of them. As governor there were few powers which he could exercise without the advice and consent of the council who were placed about him; and as chancellor he could do no act but as a court sitting with his assistants. (1 H. 4- McH. 6 fy 165; 4 H. % McH. 477.) In a petition in the case of Nicholas Painter and wife against Samuel Lane in chancery addressed to the Lord Proprietary in June 1681 it is said, “ that the court of chancery is and ought to be always open as to the proceedings therein ; but your lordship having not yet empowered your chancellor or chief justice of your said court to answer petitions or make orders touching the proceedings, as is used in England, without a full court of four at the least; your petitioners are therefore necessitated to apply themselves to your lordship and humbly pray, that your lordship would please to order that the defendant may put in his answer*by a certain day,” &c. Which was accordingly ordered by the lord proprietary himself. (Chan. Proc. lib. C. D. fol. 306.) But it appears, that William Holland was by a commission from the lord proprietary, under his great seal at arms, bearing date on the 27th of February 1719, attested by-his governor, constituted chancellor of the province, with full power to do, perform, hear and determine all such matters and things as to the office of chancellor of right belonged or appertained. After which the chancellor of Maryland always sat as sole judge, without assistants; and his court was thenceforward in all respects as accessible for all persons as the chanceiy court of England.— ( Chan. Proc. lib. P. L. fol. 488, 717.)
During the short time that the government of the province was taken immediately into the hands of the king, it does not appear how the chancellor was appointed. Although it seems to have been most usual to constitute the same person both gwernor and chancellor, as in the case of John Hart who was governor and chancellor, ( Chan. Proc. Kb. P. L.fol. 74, &c.) yet it was not always done, for it appears, that different persons were sometimes appointed to fill each office, (1697, eh. 6, s. 6,) but however that might have been,'it is certain, that the two offices were always considered as being entirely separate and distinct in their nature.
It appears, that Robert Eden, the last provincial governor of Maryland, (who was brother-in-law of the then Lord Baltimore, and a lieutenant in the Coldstream regiment of guards,) was commissioned as governor, with the approbation of the king, (as was required by the statute of 7 8 W. 3, c.22, s. 16,) by the lord proprietary; which commissionhe produced to the provincial council who thereupon administered to him the oaths appointed to be taken by the governor. Immediately after which his predecessor, Horatio Sharpe, delivered to him the great seal of the province, whereupon the oath of chancellor was administered to him, Eden, by the members of the council then present; all of which was entered of record in the book of the council proceedings. — {Comi. Pro. lib. N. folio 32, 45, 47.)
By the Declaration of Rights it is declared, that the chancellor and judges ought to hold commissions during good behaviour; and the Constitution also declares, that they shall hold their commissions during good behaviour; that the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, may appoint the chancellor and all judges; that the council shall have power to make the great seal of this State, which shall be kept by the chancellor, for the time being, and affixed to all laws, commissions, grants and other public testimonials as has been heretofore practised in this State ; that every bill passed by the General Assembly, when engrossed, shall be presented by the speaker of the House of Delegates in the Senate to the governor for the time being, who shall sign tire same and thereto affix the great seal, in the presence of the members of both houses; and that all public commissions and grants run thus: “ The State of Maryland,” &c. and shall be signed by the governor, and attested by the chancellor xmth the seal of the State annexed, except military and militia commissions, which shall not be attested by the chancellor, or have the seal of the State annexed.
Some of these constitutional provisions are apparently incompatible with each other. It is declared, that the great seal shall be kept by the chancellor; and also, that the governor shall affix it to all engrossed bills, &c.; consequently, during the time that the governor has the great seal in his possession, for that purpose, it cannot be said to'be kept by the chancellor. The chancellor is, therefore, the keeper of the great seal at all times, and for all purposes ; except for that particular occasion of affixing it to engrossed bills when it is taken possession of and kept by the governor. {Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. 234.) It is however declared, that all public commissions shall be signed by the governor, and attested by the chancellor with the seal of the State annexed. But it is obvious, that the chancellor himself can have no such commission, since it would be absurd to direct, that a commission should be made to him signed by the governor, and attested by himself with the great seal annexed of which he himself is declared to be the keeper. And although it is also declared, that the great seal shall be affixed to all commissions as heretofore practised ,• and it may have been the practice, in some cases, to constitute the provincial chancellor by commission; yet it was a commission, not under the great seal of the province, but under the lord proprietary’s “ hand and greater seal at arms,” like that of the commission to the governor. — ( Com. Pro. lib. N. folio 45.)
The chancellor of Maryland, therefore, cannot, according to the provisions of the form of government of the State, be constituted by letters'patent or a public commission in like manner as the other judicial officers of the State are constituted. But, when the office of chancellor becomes vacant, the great seal is taken into custody and kept by the governor; and when a person is appointed to fill the vacant office, he is constituted chancellor by having his appointment recorded in the council proceedings, {Const, art. 26;) and by having the prescribed oaths of office administered to him, by the governor, at the time of delivering to him the great seal of the State, {February 1777, ch. 5, s. 2 ; Votes Pro. H. Del. 14Z7t March, 1777.) The chancellor’s holding of a commission, therefore, must necessarily consist merely in the holding of the great seal under the authority of his appointment as recorded in the council proceedings ; and thus, in this respect, and in point of form at least, it differs from all other commissions spoken of in the Constitution.
For what is stated in this paragraph, see the Votes and Proceedings of the two Houses of the General Assembly; and the acts of February 1777, ch. 8 § 15; October 1777, ch. 19, and March 1780, ch. 23.
The battle of Camden was fought on the 16th of August 1780 ; and the British army was captured at Torktown on the 19lh of October 1781. (2 Sam. His. U. S. 349 4- 454 ; See the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Delegates of the 3d of January, the 2d February, and the 25th, 23th, and 30th of May, and the 3th of June of the year 1781; the 15th of May 17S2 ; and the 8th of May 1783; with the acts of May 1781, ch. 1, 5,12 and 13, and November 1781, ch. 5.) The necessity of immediately reinforcing the army and filling its ranks seems to have been deemed so urgent, that the acceptance of able bodied slaves as recruits was authorized with the consent of the owner. — ( October 1780, ch. 43, s. 4; 2 Life J. Jay, 31.)
Resolutions of the 14th of April 1777; the 16th of December 1777; the 12th of December 1778; the 29th of December 1779, by which also the Chancellor was allowed £875 for his past services of that year; and the 6th of January 1781; and the acts of November 1781, ch. 29; November 1782, ch. 28; November 1783, ch. 31; and November 1784, ch. 68.
The Journals of Congress of the 18th of March 1780; and the act of June 1780, ch. S.
The authority for what is stated in this and the three preeeeding paragraphs, relative to the paper currency and the pecuniary condition of the country in general, may he found in the history of the Union and in the proceedings of Congress; (2 Ram. His. XJ. S. cha. 18; Jour. Cong. 25th February, and 26th August, 1780.) And that for what relates to Maryland in particular has been derived from the public acts of her government; (Febinary 1777, ch. 3, 9 § 21; October 1777, ch. 18 ; October 1778, ch. 18 ; March 1779, ch. 16;" July 1779, ch. 22 ; November 1779, ch. 42; March 1780, ch. 25 and 31; June 1780, ch. 29 ; November 1781, ch. 29 and 30; and November 1782, ch. 33 ; and the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Delegates of the 12th of November 1777; of the 21 st and 25th of March, the 12th August, and the 11th and 21st December of the year 1779; of the 24th §• 25th April, l(iih May, 1st # 7th November, and 16th December of the year 1780 ; of the 26th of January, and 3d June 17S1-; of the 14th December 17S2; and of the 15th December 1784.) The salaries of the governor and council, of the year 1780,'were directed to be paid in wheat at £22 10s. 0d., per bushel; and the salaries of all other civil officers at a rate of exchange varying from forty for one to sixty-five for one.— ( Votes Pro. H. Del. 29th January, 1781.)
On the recommendation of Congress, the General Assembly, in order to sustain the credit of the then circulating paper currency of the country, proposed, by their act of June 1780, ch. 18, to reduce the quantity by talcing up the State’s quota of the bills then in circulation by a new emission of bills; for the redemption of which certain funds of the State should be pledged; and, in case those new bills should depreciate, it was provided, that such depreciation should be adjusted by the chancellor and judges, who should publish their determination in the Annapolis and Baltimore newspapers for the information and government of all concerned. After which, at the next session, the subject having been brought before the House of Delegates, they appointed a committee to inquire into, and report the state and credit of the paper money, particularly of the new bills emitted in pursuance of the law made at the then last session of the Assembly; who thereupon reported, on the 7th •of November 1780, that they had inquired into the credit of the continental, convention, and state money; and had found, that the continental and convention money had depreciated to eighty for one; and that the circulation of the state money issued under the late act of Assembly had at that time totally stopped. — (Votes §• Pro. H. Del. 7th November, 1780.)
It was soon after enacted and declared, that the commissioner appointed to adjust the pay due to the officers and soldiers of the troops of this State should be governed by the following scale of depreciation; that is to say, in 1777 for January and February, one and a half; March, two; April, May, and J une, two and a half; J uly, August, September, October and November three ; and December four; in 1778 for January four, February and March five, April six, May five, June and July four, August, September, and October five, November and December six; in 1779 for January eight, February ten, March ten and a half, April seventeen, May twenty-four, June twenty, July nineteen, August twenty, September twenty-four, October thirty, November thirty-eight and a half, December forty-one and a half; in 17S0 for January Forty and a half, February forty-seven and a half, March and April sixty-one and a half) May fifty-nine, June and July sixly-one and a half, August and September seventy, October seventy-five, November eighty, and December ninety; in 1781 for January one hundred and ten, February one hundred and twenty, March one hundred and thirty; and of the State emissions of June 1780, compared with specie, April to the 20th day three and one half, to the 30th day four, May to the 10th day five, to the 20th day six, to the 30th day six and one-half, and in June six and one half. ( October S.7S0, ch. 3S, s. 9 ; May 1781, ch. 17, s. 2; and ch. 35, s. 2.)
In order to do justice to the public creditors of the State and to prevent their suffering any loss by depreciation of our paper money, it was moreover enacted and declared, that in the payment of the public debts evidenced by the various kinds of Certificates for money lent, services performed, property purchased, or taken, &c., adopting the scale prescribed by Congress so far as it went, all such certificates of public debt should be paid according to tire following scale of depreciation; that is to say, in 1778 from the first of March one and three-quarters, from the first of September four; in 1779 from the first of March ten, from the first of September eighteen ; in 1780 from the 18th of March forty; and after that day as in the abovementioned scale. (Jour. Cong. 28th June, 1780 ; May 1781, ch. 17, s. 2.) The purchase money of confiscated property and the taxes were, nevertheless, in some cases and in some proportions received in bills of credit and certificates at their nominal value. — (October 1780, ch. 38, s. 11; May 1781, ch. 20, 25,36 and 37, §-<r.)
These legally established scales of depreciation it must, however, be recollected, relate only to claims against the State ; as to private contracts and debts due from one citizen to another, the proper, allowance for depeciation seems to have been considered as a fact to be adjusted in each case by the court of justice before which the case was brought, (Chaplinen. Scott, 4 H. McH. 94.) The American army in these years was not only deficient in clothing, but in food. The seasons both in 1779 and 1780, were unfavourable to the crops. The labours of the farmers had often been interrupted by calls for militia duty. The current paper money was so depreciated as to he deemed no equivalent for the productions of the soil. (Ram. L. Washington, ch. 6 fy 8.) From this state of things it is evident, that the community must have suffered great injustice ; and that the public finances beihg totally deranged, all the operations of the government connected with this subject must have been very much impeded and perplexed. — (Message from the Senate, Votes % Pro. H. Del. 10th May 1780 ; Hoye v. Penn, ante 41, note.)
Votes & Pro. H. Del. 24th December, 1779.
June 1781, eh. 12, and November 1781, ch. 5, notes Hanson’s Laws of Maryland. It seems that Maryland was not singular in thus leaving -her judges without any properly settled salaries during this period of public distress. In a letter of the 23d of February 1782 to 6. Clinton, governor of New York, from John Jay, he says: '“Mr. Benson writes me that your judges are industriously serving their country, but that their country had not, as yet, made an adequate provision for them. This is bad policy, and poverty cannot excuse it. The bench is at present well filled; but it should be remembered, that although we are told that justice should be blind, yet there are no proverbs which declare that she ought also to be hungry.” i(2 Jay's Life, 93.)
On running the eye over the acts and titles of acts passed by the General Assembly under the provincial government of Maryland, in Bacon’s revision, it cannot but strike the attention of every one how large a proportion of them, even those of the most important character, were limited in their operation to a specified period of time, and that too, of a very short duration. This temporary mode of legislation must have been attended with very considerable inconvenience. But it appears to have been resorted to by the colonists as the only means of defending their lights and interests against the undue exercise of the royal and proprietary prerogatives. It will be recollected, that any act, after it had been passed by the General Assembly, however beneficial or necessary to the people, might be annulled by being dissented from by the lord proprietary or by the king; and therefore, to keep the proprietary or the king within reach of the people and dependent upon them by rendering it necessary to convene their representatives at short intervals to reenact or continue laws necessary for the support of the government; (7 Mass. Sis. Sod. 129;) and to extract from the proprietary or Icing the assent to new laws which might be called for by the people, it was deemed expedient, by the General Assembly, to limit their legislative enactments to a very short duration. Indeed it is said, that some of the colonial General Assemblies, in order to preserve their independence of the Icing, had done almost every act of legislation, by votes or orders, even to the repealing the effects of acts, suspending establishments of pay, paying services, doing chancery and other judicatory business, &c. having their effect without being reduced to the form of acts, or being submitted for the allowance or disallowance of the crown. (Powti. Adm. Col. 75.) This practice of the colonial legislatures, of passing temporary laws and special orders was strongly condemned in England as a pernicious evasion of the king’s prerogative of approving or disapproving of all their legislative enactments ; and the governors were accordingly positively instructed to give their assent to no such acts or orders. (2 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 58 ; Pown. Adm. Colo. 75 ; 1 Chal. Opin. Em. Law, 350.) But, it seems, this inconvenient practice had become so much a habit in Maryland, that it has been too long continued; since the revolution, by which the causes that had suggested and rendered it expedient, have been completely removed.
Cunningham v. Browning, ante 299.
This distinction between the duration of a judge’s salary and an appropriation, for its payment, is also strikingly exemplified by the last act of parliament passed in the year 1760, (1 Geo. 3, c. 23,) in relation to the commissions and salaries of the English judges ; by which, after reciting, that the king had declared, that he looked upon the independency and uprightness of judges as essential to "the impartial administration of justice, as one of the best securities to the rights and liberties of his subjects, and as most conducive to the honour of his crown; it was .enacted, that the commissions of judges should continue in full force during their good behaviour notwithstanding the demise of the king; provided that it should he lawful for the king-to remove any judge upon the address of both houses of parliament: And that such salaries as were settled upon judges by act of parliament, and also such as should be granted to them by the king should he paid to them so long as their commissions should remain in force. And then it was further enacted, “ That such salaries of judges as are now or shall become payable out of the annual rent or sum granted for the support of his majesty’s household, and of the honour and dignity of the crown, shall, from time to time, after the demise of his majesty, or any of his heirs and successors, he charged upon and paid and payable out of, such of the duties or revenues granted for the uses of the civil government of his majesty, his heirs and successors, as shall he subsisting after every such demise respectively, until some further or other provision be made by parliament for the expenses of civil government; and from and immediately after the malting of such provision, and during the continuance thereof, such salaries shall be paid and payable out of all or any of the moneys which shall be applicable to such uses and expenses as aforesaid.”
Lord Coke, in speaking of the court of exchequer, informs us, that “ the chief baron is created by letters patent, and the office is granted to him quamdiu se bene gesserit, wherein he hath a more fixed estate (it being an estate for life,) than the justices of either bench, who have their offices hut at will: and quamdiu se bene gesserit must he intended in matters concerning his office, and is no more than the law would have implied, if the office had been granted for life. And in like manner are the rest of the barons of the exchequer constituted, and the patents of the attorney general and solicitor, are also quamdiu se bene gesseril.” — (4 Inst. 117.)
But notwithstanding what is here said by Coke, it would seem that any of these officers might have been removed at the pleasure of the king, without the institution of any judicial proceeding, or the interposition of parliament; for all the lawyers and historians of England speak of the constitutional independency of the judges as an improvement which was not finally established until the year 1700, long after the death of Coke, {ante 615, note {h.); 3 Hal. Const. Hist. Eng. 262; Sniollel’s Hist. Eng. ch. 6, 14, &. 16.) It is most likely, that the provision of our original constitution, (art. 40,) which declares “ that the chancellor, all judges, the attorney general, .&c. shall hold their commissions during good behaviour,” &c. was Suggested by what is here said by Lord Coke ; which provision as to the attorney general has, however, been since altered, 1816, ch. 247, confirmed by 1817, ch. 69.
Warren v. Wendle, 3 East, 205; The King ¶. Rogers, 10 East, 569.
1765, ch. 33, note,per Hanson, Chancellor.- — It may be necessary to remark, that the repealing clause of this act, notwithstanding its expiration, is still in force. There is an evident and material distinction between a temporary act containing a repealing clause, which act is suffered to expire, and an act made for the purpose of repealing another act, which is afterwards' itself repealed. In the first case, the legislature declares its intention, that an act be done away and rendered void, and there is no proceeding of the legislature afterwards to restore life to the act repealed. In the .second case, the legislature expresses the same intention, but afterwards by doing away and rendering void the repealing act, its intention cannot be construed otherwise than to give new life to the act repealed. — (Hanson's Laws of Maryland.)
“The executive, in our governments (said Mr. Jefferson in March 1789,) is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years. That of the executive will come in its turn ; but it will be at a remote period. I know there are some among us, who would now establish a monarchy. But they are inconsiderable in number and weight of character. The rising race are all republicans.”— (2 Jeff. Con-. Let. 191; Coop. Just. 438.)
By the act of 182,4, ch. 125, the treasurer of the Western Shore was authorized to pay over annually to the managers of the Washington monument lottery, all the surplus that should be received from the State lotteries over and above the net sum of twelve thousand dollars, until the debts then due should be paid and the monument completed; provided that the managers should relinquish their right to draw any lottery under the authority previously granted to them. The relinquishment was accordingly made as required. After which the propriety of continuing this adjustment or contract with the managers being under the consideration of the General Assembly, and before they had come to any determination upon the subject, the House of Delegates alone, passed the following order:
“ Ordered, That the treasurer of the Western Shore be and he hereby is required to withhold payment under the act of December session 1824, chapter 125, during the continuance of the present session of Assembly.” — (Jour. Souse Del. Stk February, 1827.)
But perhaps not feeling altogether confident of the propriety of this order, on the next day a joint resolution in the same words was passed and sent to the Senate for their assent. The matter seems to have been afterwards adjusted, for nothing further appears to have been done in this way.
Take for example the act of Congress of the 23d September 1789, ch. 18, which, without any reference to the constitution or to the continuance of the judicial salaries, merely declares, after specifying the amount to each, that the allowance to the several judges shall commence from their respective appointments, and he paid at the treasury quarterly; and the act of the 14th of March 1794, ch. 6, which declares, that there be appropriated for the compensations granted by law to the chief justice, associate judges, district judges, and attorney general, forty-three thousand two hundred dollars.
It has been said, that most of the estates in England, oncean thirty years, pass through the Court of Chancery. — (16 Howell’s State Tri. 417.)
The following table.presents at one view the annual amount of all judicial salaries in Maryland, from the year 1773, to the year 1S25 inclusive, translating those formerly given in the money of account of the State into dollars and cents.
The facts exhibited by this table suggest many matters for reflection; some of which it may be well here to notice. There was nothing in the frame of the provincial government which made it incompatible for one judicial officer to hold at the same time any other similar office, or indeed almost any other kind of office ; or which prohibited his taking fees or perquisites of any kind; and it was in fact quite common for the same person to have a plurality of offices and to receive a variety of fees and perquisites as such. The last provincial governor was chancellor and also ex officio chief judge of the Court of Appeals, (1713, ch. 4, s. 6; 1729, ch. 3,) and consequently the aggregate amount of his salary as governor, chancellor, and judge must have been at least $5066, besides fees and perquisites; yet at that time there was not half the amount of population and wealth in Maryland, that there is at present, (1825.)
The Declaration of Rights declares, that no person ought to hold, at the same time, more than one office of profit; and that no chancellor or judge ought to hold any other office civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind. Consequently the authority of the chancellor and judges of the republic is limited to a single judicial office, and their official emolument is confined strictly to the salary allowed bylaw to that single office. It seems to have been deemed, by the first General Assembly of the Republic, “ a matter of the highest importance to keep the court of the last resort totally distinct from all inferior jurisdictions.” ( Votes § Pro. Sen. 29th March 1777.) But by the amendment of the constitution, of the year 1805, the principle which had thus rigidly prohibited the holding of a plurality of offices was departed from or modified. The chief judges of the six judicial districts, it is directed, shall compose the court of appeals ; and thus, as under the provincial government, the same person holds two distinct judicial offices; that is, he is chief judge of a district of county courts, and also a judge of the court of appeals.
By adverting to the salaries which had been assigned to each of these offices down to 1S01 it will be seen, that the salary now allowed to them, as thus combined in the same person, is nearly the same as the aggregate amount which had been allowed to them when held separately, and by distinct persons. Thus demonstrating it to have been the intention of the General Assembly, in giving a salary of only $2200, to preserve a similar proportion between the compensation of the judges of the courts of original and appellate jurisdiction ; that is, estimating about fourteen hundred dollars as a proper allowance for the discharge of the duties of the former, and only eight hundred dollars for the performance of the latter. It is then remarkable, that at all times, and under every change of circumstances in Maryland, the compensation allowed to the judges of the court of the last resort has been very small in comparison with that which has been paid to those of the courts of original jurisdiction. This, it is evident, has not been the result of prejudice or accident; and therefore, the causes of it deserve to be inquired into and considered.
In England the House of Lords is the court of the last resort. Its members receive no compensation for the discharge of their judicial duties ; and those of the judges in office, or the ex-judges who sit there, as peers of the realm, receive no compensation whatever for their services there. But the chancellor and judges of the courts of original jurisdiction of Westminster Hall have very great salaries ; and besides, are allowed to receive a very large amount of fees and perquisites. (Smol. Hist. Eng. ch. 16.) It is said, that in old times writs of error in England were rare, for that men when judgment was given against them by course of law were satisfied without prying with eagles eyes into matters of form, or the manner of proceeding, or of the trial, or insufficiency of the pleadings, &.C., to the intent to find error to force the party to a new suit, and himself to a new charge and vexation. — (Iiiggin's Case, 6 Co. 46.)
The court of the last resort of the State of New York, is, in some respects, apparently so strikingly analogous to that of England as to have been looked upon, by some, as a mere adoption of the frame and principle of the ultimate tribunal of that country. How that may have been is, however, unimportant as regards the matter now under consideration. The New York court of last resort is composed of the Senate aided by and together with the chancellor or the judges. The senators are compensated for their attendance by an allowance of so much for each day’s attendance; and the chancellor and judges are paid as judges o'f the courts of original jurisdiction; but receive nothing in addition for the discharge of their duties in this appellate court.
This ultimate tribunal of New York, if not the very best, is admitted on all hands to be fully equal to any court of last resort in the Union. Its business has never been suffered to accumulate or fall unreasonably behind hand ; and the reports of its decisions are received every where as illustrations and guides of the highest respectability. It was organized in 1776; and, on being reviewed, by the convention, called together in 1821, for revising the constitution, it was continued and reestablished without a dissenting voice. (JDebates New Yoik Convention, 1821.) The senators bring into it a mass of sound common sense by which cases are met upon their merits; the propensity to overmuch technicality is checked; and there is besides, found among the senators a degree of legal science often supeiior to that of the bench, and always sufficient to keep down the mere esprit du corps of the regular judges. The senators come from, and at short intervals return to the people ; and hence it has been truly and emphatically called “ the court of the people and as such its proceedings attract much and general attention; and have necessarily a widely extended publicity which does not always follow, and can rarely be given to the proceedings of a court attended by none but lawyers, and whose decisions are selected and reported for their use only. — (Debates N. York Conv. 517, 609, 611.)
Although in cases of family disputes in chancery, to save the feelings of the parties and with their express consent, the matter may be privately heard; {In the matter of Lord Portsmouth, Coop. Rep. 106,) yet in all other cases the matters in controversy must be heard in open court; for, publicity in judicial proceedings is of the very greatest importance ; “ it is one of the best securities for the honest exercise of a judge’s duty, that he is to exercise that duty in public.” (Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russell, 9.) Publicity is also one of the best shields which a skilful and impartial judge can have against the assaults of parly, of prejudice, or of intrigue. It is to the enlightened and powerful public opinion to which the judges of Westminster Hall are constantly exposed, and by which they are always held responsible and protected, that their great diligence as well as their luminous and impartial judgments are to be ascribed. — {Debates Virg. Con. of IS2.9, page 734.)
But whatever may be the composition or structure of a court of last resort, it is important, that it should have assigned to it no duties but such as are properly appellate, as regards the substance of the case, or the points involving the merits which have been controverted and adjudicated upon by the court of original jurisdiction. According to a well regulated course of judicial proceeding the parties to a controversy should have the means, and be allowed an opportunity of bringing before the court of first resort all their allegations and proofs in any way pertinent to the subject in litigation. And, when the case has been so prepared for final decision, the judgment should, as nearly as practicable, be pronounced upon the merits, or upon those points on which the parties themselves have relied as involving the merits.
To allow the revising court to reverse the judgment of the tribunal of original jurisdiction, because of any mere technical objection ; would be, nine times in ten, to put aside the real merits in dispute for the purpose of correcting a mere matter of form which had either been deemed unworthy of attention in the court below, or which might have been at once amended there had it been noticed in time ; or to allow the revising court to reverse the original judgment on any other ground of merit, than that which had been specially taken in the court below, would be, in effect, to allow the appellate court to assume original jurisdiction by bringing before it a controversy which in truth, never existed; or a new point of controversy which, if it had been presented to the court below, might have been shewn to have had no just foundation whatever.
The sending of a case back, for amendment and further proceedings thereon, almost always involves a virtual admission, that an appeal had been taken which ought never to have been allowed; either because the objection should have been made and removed in the court below; or if not there made, should have been treated above as having no just foundation; or because the error was of such a technical nature as not in any way materially to affect the merits. But the greatest evils of an ill defined power in the appellate court to remand a case in equity are those which must inevitably arise from having the judgment of that court sent, without rule or guide, on a rambling excursion through the case in search of those loose conjectures, ambiguous inferences, or latent evidences in relation to some supposed merits, for the purpose of letting in which the case should he sent back for alteration, (Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 245,) by which means a controversy, all the facts of which were from the outset fully known to all concerned, may be varied and vexatiously continued to no purpose; or a false colouring may be given to it by a parly who has thus ascertained at-wtiat point his proofs were weak or insufficient.
It is universally admitted that the consent of parties cannot give to a court jurisdiction of a case of which it has no cognizance; and yet it seems to have become quite common of late to agree to tire passing of a decree pro forma merely for the puipose of appealing, and thus in effect transferring the original jurisdiction to the court of appeals and sinking the court of first resort into a mere ministerial agent.
It is obvious then, that proper appellate judicial duty must be much less complicated and laborious than that which is original; because after all the circumstances of the controversy have been brought before the first court and the points in dispute have been there specially designated, discussed and decided upon, the case must have been considerably reduced in its compass, and the question to be determined in the ultimate tribunal must have been so fully developed that there can be then no very heavy obstacles to remove, nor any great difficulty to encounter in coming to a correct conclusion. Considering these matters, in this point of view, it is perfectly clear, that the judges of the court of last resort with less, or certainly with a no greater requisite degree of skill, have nothing like the same amount of judicial duty to perform as the judges of the courts of original jurisdiction.
It is evident, that a court of ultimate resort constituted, like that of England or of New York, of a great number of members, tire majoriiy of whom may not be lawyers by profession, would find it utterly impracticable to deal with, or to endure any thing like the distracting- complexity of original jurisdiction, or to exercise any thing more than a simple and proper appellate authority. But it has been found, that an appellate tribunal constituted even of a few members, each of great legal ability, may be crushed, or totally obstructed in its course either by allowing every suitor, at his own pleasure, to crowd into it with his appeal, or by casting into it complicated controversies to be there first dealt with as by a court of original jurisdiction. — ( Tucker’s Letter, 2 Mun. Sep. intro. 17; Debates Virg. Con. 1829,page 760.)
It must have been owing to this comparative view of the nature and amount of the skill and labour which liad been in fact, or could only with propriety be required of or assigned to the judges of the ultimate court, that the judicial salaries in Maryland have, in this respect, been always graduated; estimating the labour of a law judge in each of the six judicial districts, into which the State was divided, as being for some time more than equal, and as being for some years past not far short of being equal to double the amount of that of a judge of the court of last resort. Delay, vacillation, or obscurity in the proceedings ahd adjudications of a court of ultimate resort, to which a suitor may, without restraint, appeal, cannot fail very considerably to retard the administration of justice; to render it extremely expensive, and oppressive to the poor; and very injuriously to disturb its course in every inferior branch of the judicial department. (Debates N. York Conv. 1821, p. 607.) It was with a view to prevent these evils, that the various statutes of amendment and jeofail have been made; that the forms and ceremonies of judicial proceedings have been adjusted, so as not on the one hand altogether to disappoint the eagerness of a plaintiff for an expeditious termination of his suit, while on the other, an honest defendant might be secured from oppression by allowing him a reasonable time to prepare, his defence, and to have the merits of his case deliberately discussed in the court of first resort; and that so many limitations and checks have been imposed upon the range of the right of appeal.
Considering these as the fa-ue causes of greater salaries having been always given to tile judges of the courts of original jurisdiction; they shew, that the right of appeal should be kept within its proper range; that the court of last resort should be permitted to exercise’ no original jurisdiction whatever; and that any material departure from these principles, which have every where, and at all times, been regarded as fundamental, would sink (lie courts of original jurisdiction into the condition of mere preparatory tribunals, or ministerial agents of the court of appeals, thereby depriving the litigants of the important benefit of a first, full, and open discussion, with a succeeding careful and critical revision of their controversy as contemplated by the constitution, and finally turn awry and subvert the whole judicial department of our government.
But although this comparative view of the requisite amount of the skill and labour of the judges, of the original and appellate tribunals, may sufficiently account for the difference, which has always been made, in the salaries of the judges of those courts; yet, considering the court of chancery as one of original jurisdiction, it will be necessary to advert to other circumstances to account for the difference between the salaries of the chancellor and of the judges of the common law courts o first resort; and even between the salaries of the judges of whole districts of such courts, and that of the chancellor.
Our code of laws is, in many respects, very peculiar in its principles; but, its great, and principal peculiarity arises from lire judicial machineiy by which it is administered.
That part, called the common law, as contradistinguished from equity, is administered by courts composed of a judge and a jury. It is presumed, that the judge knows the law ; but, that the jury do not; and, therefore, it is the province of the judge to expound and declare the law to the jury, who are called upon to say, by their unanimous verdict, whether, by applying the law, as thus declared, the plaintiff should obtain what he asks or not. But a jury, being composed of twelve men, not lawyers, gathered from the people for the occasion, the whole matter in controversy must be reduced to a single point, or so presented as to place it in their power to put their unanimous verdict into the form of a general affirmative or negative response. A learned and experienced judge might find no great difficulty in so framing his judgment as to grant relief, in every way, suited to the most complicated case, that could be presented to him; but twelve men, unlearned in the law, would, in the same case, find it exceedingly perplexing, or altogether impracticable, unanimously, to agree upon any adequate complex form of granting relief; and, therefore, a jury cannot, with propriety be called upon, in any case, even although it should involve a complicated title to property, for more than a general affirmative or negative verdict; or for a special verdict, finding the truth of the facts, leaving the conclusion of law to be pronounced by the judge. — (3 Jeff. Corr. Lett. 2.)
Hence it is that all judicial proceedings, according to the course of tire common law, have a perpetual tendency to rigid exactness and precision; so as to be easily explained to, and applied by a jury; or, at least, so as to enable the judge to pronounce a formal judgment, as the general conclusion of law from the facts as found by the jury ; either in the form of a general, or a special verdict. And, as it would be attended with great expense and inconvenience to keep constantly together a sufficient number of the people to compose juries ; and to have witnesses kept long in attendance in order to testily orally before them; without all which the administration of justice, according to the course of the common law, could not proceed; the courts of common law have always been limited in their sittings to particular times or terms.
On the other hand, that branch of our code, called equity, is administered by a court of chancery, without the assistance of a jury, upon the written allegations and proofs laid before it. And, therefore, although a court of chancery, for the return of process and the more orderly conducting of its business, in other respects with convenience to its suitors, has regular terms ; yet it is always open to meet and provide for the peculiar exigencies of every case, “ for conscience and equity is always ready to render to every one his due.” (1 Rep. Cha. The Earl of Oxford’s Case, 6.) The high court of chancery of Maryland, may indeed, not only like that of England, be said to be always open in a sense, though not always, equally accessible, because of the other necessary avocations of the chancellor, and because of its long vacations, (2 Newl. Chan. 400 ; 2 Ves. fy Bea. 351;) but, to be in fact always open, and in truth always equally accessible, because of the chancellor’s having no other official duties to perform, and because of there being no vacations other than those intervals between its regular periodical terms or sittings for the return of process and the hearing of cases. For, seeing the great importance of having the chancellor always in place, the General Assembly, during several of those years, that the judicial salaries remained insecure, directed, that so much should be paid to the chancellor, “ if he shall reside at the seat of government.”' — (1782, c. 2S; 17S3, c. 31; 1784, c. 68.)
The judgments of the courts of common law are always drawn up by their clerks according to precise forms ; and, therefore, it is a general rule, that where the case is of such a nature, or the relief sought is so complex as, that no adequate redress can be given by any of the fixed forms of common law judgments, the party may obtain relief in chancery, where the orders and decrees of the chancellor, although regulated by well settled principles, are always accommodated to the anomalous or peculiar nature of the cases of which his court takes cognizance. And because of the complex or peculiar frame of a great proportion of such orders and decrees they can only, according to the practice in Maryland, be drawn up by the chancellor himself.
Looking to the exact and reduced form into which a case must necessarily be presented in order to obtain a concise decision, according to a settled form, from a tribunal composed of a judge and jury on the one hand; and to the anomalous and complex frame of the cases, and of the orders and decrees thereupon in chancery, on the other, it has been very strongly, if not conclusively, argued, that the trial by jury itself, in controversies as to the right of property, must be altogether abandoned, or certainly could not exist in its purity and vigour, without the helping hand of a court of chancery. — (Southern Review, Feb. 1829, art. 3.; The Federalist, No. S3.)
Junius, in his letter of the 14th of November 1770 to Lord Mansfield, says, “ Instead of those certain, positive rules, by which the judgment of a court of law should invariably be determined, you have fondly introduced your own unsettled notions of equity and substantial justice. Decisions given upon such principles do not alarm the public so much as they ought, because the consequence and tendency of each particular instance is not observed or regarded. In the meantime, the practice gains ground; the court of king’s bench becomes a court of equity; and the judge instead of consulting strictly the law of the land refers only to the wisdom of the court, and to the purity of his own conscience.”
Lord Redesdale speaking of the same judge says, “Lord Mansfield had on his mind prejudices derived from his familiarity with the Scotch law, where law and equity are administered in the same courts, and where the distinction between them which subsists with us is not known, and there are many things in his decisions which shew that his mind had received a tinge on that subject not quite, consistent with the constitution of England and Ireland in the administration of justice. It is a most important part of that constitution, that the jurisdictions of the courts of law and equity should be kept perfectly distinct; nothing contributes more to the due administration of justice. And though they act in a great degree by the same rules, yet they act in a different manner, and their modes of affording relief are different; and any body who sees what passes in the courts of justice in Scotland, will not lament that this distinction prevails. But Lord Mansfield seems to have considered, that it manifested liberality of sentiment to endeavour to give the courts of law the powers which are vested in courts of equity; that it was the duty of a good judge ampliare jurisdictionem. This I think is rather a narrow view of this subject; it is looldng at particular cases rather than at the general principles of administering justice, observing small inconveniences and overlooking great ones.” — (Shannon v. Bradstreet, 1 Scho. <§- Lefr. 66 ; Sugden’s Letters, 4.)
As has been observed in relation to this matter by our own great sage, “ the only natural improvement of the common law, is through its homogeneous ally, the chancery, in which new principles are to be examined, concocted, and digested. But when, by repeated decisions and modifications, they are rendered pure and certain, they should be transferred by statute to the courts of common law and placed within the pale of juries.” — (4 Jeff. Corr. let. 104.) And in relation to those alterations of our code, so frequently made by the most crude and ill digested scraps of legislative enactment, he observes, that “the instability of our laws, is really an immense evil. I think it would be well to provide in our constitutions, that there shall always be a twelvemonth between the engrossing a bill and passing it; that it should then be offered to its passage without changing a word; and that if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage, it should taire two-thirds of both houses, instead of abare majority.” — (2 Jeff. Corr. let. 117.)
In these points of view then, a court of chancery is not only a useful, but an indispensable part of our judicial system. And, when the proper judicial duties of a chancellor are thus compared with those of a judge of a court of common law; and especially with those which are, alone, properly assignable to a court of the last resort, it cannot fail to strike every one, that those of a chancellor, independently of all his other irregular and incidental duties, must require a vast deal more skill and labour than those of a common law judge in any situation whatever; and that the larger amount of salary which has, at all times, been allowed to the chancellor affords the most satisfactory proof, that this matter has been always so distinctly understood by the people of Maryland.
Jour. H. Del. 28th December, 1825, and 24th January, 1826.

Opinion:
By the General Assembly of Maryland,
Resolved, That the salary of the Chancellor shall be three thousand four hundred dollars during the continuance of the commission of the present chancellor, and no longer; and after the expiration of his commission, such salary shall be provided for the succeeding chancellor as the legislature shall then think proper to fix and establish.
3d March, 1826. By the General Assembly of Maryland, Resolved, That the treasurer of the Western Shore pay unto the order of Theodorick Bland, the sum of three thousand four hundred dollars for his salary as chancellor for the year ending on the sixteenth day of February 1826; and the salary of the present chancellor, as declared by a resolution passed at this session of the General Assembly, shall be paid to him quarterly by the treasurer of the Western Shore, during the continuance of his commission and no longer.