Case Name: Philip Patrick ads. John Wilson
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1818-01
Citations: 1 Nott & McC. 112
Docket Number: 
Parties: Philip Patrick ads. John Wilson.
Judges: Nott, Colcock and Cheves, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 67–69

Head Matter:
Philip Patrick ads. John Wilson.
On an account for work and labor, a consent by plaintiff to deduct a per centage off tbe amount, is not obligatory, unless it formed a part of tbe original agreement, or some consideration moved to it.
Tried before Mr. Justice Smith, at Charleston, January, 1816.
The plaintiff, who was a carpenter, had performed work, and furnished materials for the defendant, which by admeasurement, and at the customary prices, amounted to $1495. This action was brought to recover $301, which the plaintiff claimed as a balance due on the account.
*The defence set up was, that the plaintiff had agreed to deduct twenty per cent, from the amount of the bill, which would leave a very inconsiderable balance due. To support this defence, a witness was called, who proved, that after the work had been performed, the defendant said to the plaintiif, “You know you agreed to deduct twenty-five per cent, from your billto which he replied, that he had no recollection of any such agreement; and besides, he did not know that wages and materials would come so high. Defendant then said, What are you willing to deduct ? he replied, “ Say fifteen per cent.” The defendant then proposed to split the difference, and to deduct twenty per cent., to which the plaintiff said, “ Try that,” but upon making this calculation, it appeared that only a balance of a few dollars would remain due, which the plaintiff refused to accept. On this evidence the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, for the balance claimed by him to be due ; and a motion was now made on the part of the defendant, for a new trial, on the ground that the facts proven were sufficient evidence of an agreement on the part of the plaintiff'to deduct twenty per cent, from the aggregate amount of his bill. At any rate, it was conclusive, that there was an agreement to deduct fifteen per cent.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Johnson, J.
Agreeably to the admeasurement and usual prices of work, it will not be denied that the defendant incurred a debt to the whole amount of the plaintiff's bill; and he now attempts to reduce that amount, by setting up an agreement between them, that a certain per centage was to be deducted from the amount of the bill. There is no question that the plaintiff was competent to enter into such a contract, and if it had formed a part of the original agreement he would have been bound by it. The acquiescence of one party to a statement by the other, and under some circumstances his silence might be construed into an acknowledgment* of the truth of the statement; but in this case, so far from acquiescing or assenting to the statement made by the defendant, the plaintiff expressly denies his recollection of the existence of any such agreement. And his assenting to make a calculation, at a deduction, first at fifteen per cent, and then at twenty, at the request •of the defendant, evidently appears to have been a mere project to see what the result would be; and his immediate refusal to accept the balance found to be due on this calculation, furnishes the strongest ground to believe, that in assenting to its being made, he did not intend to consider himself bound by it. Independent of this conclusion resulting from the facts, I am inclined to think there is a legal objection to the defendant's availing himself of this ground of defence. There is no evidence, as I before remarked, that a deduction from the usual prices formed any part of the original agreement, except the mere assertion of the defendant himself, which is certainly no proof; and if after the debt was incurred, the plaintiff had consented to make a deduction, he would not be bound by it, unless there had been some consideration moving to it, and none has been pretended to exist in this case.
Let the motion for a new trial be dismissed.
Nott, Colcock and Cheves, JJ., concurred.