Case Name: GANTZ v. CITY OF DETROIT (ON REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-11-12
Citations: 65 Mich. App. 380
Docket Number: Docket No. 12062
Parties: GANTZ v CITY OF DETROIT (ON REMAND)
Judges: Before: Bronson, P. J., and M. J. Kelly and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 65
Pages: 380–395

Head Matter:
GANTZ v CITY OF DETROIT (ON REMAND)
Opinion op the Court
1. Municipal Corporations — Civil Service — Residency Rule— Question op Law — Remand.
The question of whether a municipal civil service commission has power to enforce its residency rule by vacating the position of a civil service employee who violates that rule is a question of law where the employee stipulated he was a nonresident; the question cannot possibly generate issues of fact for which remand should be made to take testimony or make a record.
2. Municipal Corporations — Civil Service — Employees—Discharge op Employee — Department Head — Residence—Eligibility por Employment — Approval op Payroll — Vacation op Position — Disciplinary Matters.
The Detroit Civil Service Commission does not discharge an employee as would a department head; when an employee who is required to reside within the city limits ceases to be a city resident, he becomes ineligible for continued employment, and the commission has a duty to refuse to approve the name of the ineligible employee on the payroll and to vacate the employee’s position; disciplinary matters are left with the department heads, however, the commission retains the right to police the administration of requirements of eligibility for continued employment.
Concurrence by M. J. Kelly, J.
3. Constitutional Law — Procedural Due Process — Municipal Corporations — Residency Requirements — Superintending Control — Injunction—Dismissal and Nonsuit.
There was no denial of procedural due process to a city employee who was required to reside within the city limits where his position as a city employee was declared vacant because he did not comply with the residency requirements, he sought superintending control and injunctive relief against discharge, he stipulated at a hearing that he was not a resident, and the judge dismissed plaintiffs complaint.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-5] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Service § 21.
[6] 24 Am Jur 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit §§ 56, 57.
[7] 73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment § 12 et seq.
[8, 9] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Service §§ 6, 8.
[10] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Service § 38.
[11] 73 Am Jur 2d, Stipulations § 8.
[12] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Service § 47.
4. Municipal Corporations — Remand—Discharge—Residency Requirements — Stipulation.
There would be no effect in sending a case back on remand where a nonresident city employee sought relief against discharge for failure to comply with requirements for residency within the city limits but stipulated to nonresidency; the ultimate fact is uncontested.
5. Estoppel — Stipulation—Nonresidency—Discharge—Residency Requirements — Civil Service — Material Prejudice.
By stipulating to the determinative substantive fact of nonresidency, a plaintiff who sought relief against discharge for failure to comply with requirements for residing within the city limits must be estopped from asserting lack of compliance with adjectival, temporizing matters; the allegation that a civil service commission failed to follow its own rules should not be addressed where it is clear that if the civil service commission, the city and other parties together followed the proper procedures, the result would be the vacation of plaintiff’s job or his dismissal from it.
Dissent by Bronson, J.
6. Dismissal and Nonsuit — Failure to State Claim — Court Rules.
Dismissal is treated as one for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted where plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed without taking testimony and without submission of affidavits from the parties; when considering a dismissal upon that ground, the factual allegations of the plaintiff are accepted as true along with any conclusion reasonably drawn therefrom (GCR1963, 117.2[lj).
7. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Failure to State Claim — Issues of Fact — Court Rules.
Summary judgment on the pleadings is not proper on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action where resolution of the legal issue may depend on factual context (GCR 1963, 117.2[lj).
8. Municipal Corporations — Civil Service — Material Prejudice— Dismissal and Nonsuit.
A city civil service board must follow its own rules and reversal of its orders will occur if failure to follow those rules results in "material prejudice”; therefore, a plaintiffs action, which alleged that the Detroit Civil Service Commission failed to follow its own rules in two respects, was improperly dismissed since a showing of "material prejudice” at trial requires reversal where the plaintiffs version of the facts supports a valid cause of action.
9. Dismissal and Nonsuit — Summary Judgment — Fair Hearing— Due Process — Burden of Proof — Civil Service — Court Rules.
A plaintiffs version of the facts supports a valid cause of action where he alleged in his complaint that he was denied a fair hearing and his right to procedural due process because the burden of proof was reversed at a civil service hearing and he was prevented from cross-examining the witnesses against him because no witnesses were called to the hearing; therefore, plaintiffs cause of action was legally sufficient to survive dismissal under a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the opposing party failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (GCR1963, 117.2[lj).
10. Dismissal and Nonsuit — Due Process — Evidence—Civil Service.
The due process requirement of a full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence mandates consideration of more than the report of the fact finder whose decision is being reviewed; therefore, a plaintiffs allegation that a municipal civil service commission relied totally upon a hearing officer’s report and did not independently review the evidence was legally sufficient and the trial judge improperly dismissed the action prior to the presentation of evidence.
11. Stipulations — Courts.
A trial court may not accept a limited stipulation and extend its legal effect beyond what was reasonably contemplated by the party making it because to do so would unduly inhibit the future use of a valuable procedural device at the trial court level.
12. Dismissal and Nonsuit — Injunction—Discharge—Nonresidence — Stipulations—Summary Judgment — Admission.
Sua sponte dismissal of a complaint to enjoin enforcement of discharge for nonresidence on the basis of a "special” stipulation of nonresidency made by plaintiff’s counsel at a show cause hearing was improper where the allegations in the complaint were legally sufficient to avoid summary judgment, the sufficiency of the complaint was not in issue at the show cause hearing, and plaintiff had no intention of making a general admission.
Appeal from Wayne, Victor J. Baum, J.
Submitted October 13, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 12062.)
Decided November 12, 1975.
Complaint by Michael A. Gantz against the City of Detroit and others for injunctive relief from his discharge from employment. Complaint dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded, 48 Mich App 305 (1973). Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court, 392 Mich 348 (1974). Then by order the Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals, 392 Mich 369 (1974).
Trial court affirmed.
Schlussel, Lifton, Simon, Rands & Kaufman, for plaintiff.
Michael M. Glusac, Corporation Counsel, and John R. McKinlay and Francis J. Pipp, Assistants Corporation Counsel, for defendants.
Before: Bronson, P. J., and M. J. Kelly and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
On Remand
O'Hara, J.
This case is before us under the following order of remand:
"On order of the Court, an application for rehearing having been filed herein, this Court recognizes that it erred in not noticing that the stipulation of non-residency was 'special'. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its opinion and reversal of the Court of Appeals but vacates its affirmance of the trial court order. This cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of these facts and the Court's opinion at 392 Mich 348 (1974). Costs to defendants-appellants for proceedings in this Court only." 392 Mich at 369.
It is somewhat difficult to be sure exactly what issues this Court is required to discuss.
Mr. Justice Williams, who authored the original majority opinion, states:
"The issue before this Court, specifically reserved for consideration in Williams v Detroit Civil Service Commission, 383 Mich 507, 513; 176 NW2d 593 (1970), is whether the Civil Service Commission has power to enforce its residency rule by vacating the position of a civil service employee who violates that rule." Gantz v Detroit, 392 Mich 348, 353; 220 NW2d 433 (1974).
Mr. Justice Levin in the original dissenting opinion writes:
"The question addressed by this Court 'is whether the Civil Service Commission has power to enforce its residency rule by vacating the position of a civil service employee who violates that rule.' " (Emphasis in original.) 392 Mich at 363.
Then, if I follow Justice Levin correctly, he makes the point that there is no practical difference between the status of a discharged employee and one whose position is vacated. The basic point he makes, as I understand it, in the balance of the opinion, is that there is a world of difference between the power to set up standards for employment, in the first instance, and the power to terminate that employment for stipulated lack of residency.
I am unable to apprehend how this question can possibly generate issues of fact for which remand should be made to take testimony or make a record.
The question is purely and simply one of law. The involved employee certainly knew this. He stipulated he was a nonresident. If he had not been there would have been no lawsuit. Plaintiff challenged the legality of this requirement as a condition of continuing employment. He had every incident of due process that could be afforded. He not only had notice, but an invitation to comply with the residence requirement voluntarily without any penalty. He had representation by counsel. He was free to make any sort of record he chose to.
Lawsuits ought to end sometime. This one has been going on for four years. The issue, as above noted, is one of law. I am more persuaded by the ratio decidendi of the majority than I am by that of the minority view. I am particularly impressed by the closing paragraphs of the majority opinion.
"The Civil Service Commission does not discharge an employee as would a department head. When an employee ceases to be a resident, he becomes ineligible for continued employment; the commission has a duty to refuse to approve the name of the ineligible employee on the payroll and to vacate the employee's position. Disciplinary matters are left with the department heads; however, the Civil Service Commission retains the right to police the administration of requirements of eligibility for continued employment." 392 Mich at 362-363.
I do not know of anything else I can discuss. I feel I have followed the order of remand, and amplified the reasons for my original holding. I adhere to that position.
I vote to affirm the trial judge.
For the history of the present case, see 48 Mich App 305; 210 NW2d 459 (1973); rev'd 392 Mich 348; 220 NW2d 433 (1974); remanded 392 Mich 369; 224 NW2d 278 (1974).
It should also be noted that the order of remand in the instant case was inadvertently set forth at page 219 following the Supreme Court's opinion in Goodwin, Inc v Orson E Coe Pontiac, Inc, 392 Mich 195; 220 NW2d 664 (1974). In like manner the order of remand in Goodwin, supra, was erroneously printed at page 369 following the Gantz opinion. By the time this opinion is available to the Bench and Bar the appropriate changes may have been made in the permanent volume of 392 Michigan Reports.