Case Name: WYNN v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1972-09-28
Citations: 127 Ga. App. 463
Docket Number: 47154
Parties: WYNN v. THE STATE.
Judges: Eberhardt, P. J., Deen and Stolz, JJ., concur. Clark, J., concurs specially. Bell, C. J., Pannell, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 463–468

Head Matter:
47154.
WYNN v. THE STATE.

Opinion:
Hall, Presiding Judge.
The defendant appeals from his conviction for the possession and sale of narcotics.
1. The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial. Out of the hearing of the jury, defendant's counsel informed the court that the defendant intended to make an unsworn statement. After the jury returned to the room the defendant took the stand. At that point the trial judge addressed the defendant: "Now the law gives the defendant in a criminal case the right to appear and be sworn as a witness in his own defense. And, in that event, your lawyer will be permitted to ask you appropriate questions and the district attorney will be permitted to cross examine you on relevant matters. That testimony will be given under oath. Or, the defendant is given the opportunity of making an unsworn statement. In that event, as the term implies, you will not be sworn and you will be permitted to make to the court and jury just such statement as you deem proper in your own defense. You would not be asked any questions by your attorney and you would not be subject to any cross examination by the district attorney. I wanted to be certain that you understood your options and your legal and constitutional rights. As I understand from your attorney, Mr. Calhoun, you have elected to make an unsworn statement. Now is that your choice?"
After the court's statement, counsel for the defendant made a motion for a mistrial which was overruled. The defendant contends that this statement was prejudicial comment on his failure to testify under oath.
The court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial. "The mere fact that the jury is made aware that the defendant is making an unsworn statement does not result in reversible error. See Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319 (7) (144 SE2d 372); Hammond v. State, 225 Ga. 545, 546 (170 SE2d 226). Indeed, a jury composed of intelligent persons would be presumed to be aware that the defendant has not been sworn." Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703 (2) (177 SE2d 79). While Lynch v. State, 108 Ga. App. 650 (134 SE2d 526), supports the appellant's contention, it must yield to the above decisions by the Supreme Court. Code Ann. § 2-3708.
As to the other language in the statement of the trial judge, see Harris v. State, 118 Ga. App. 769 (3) (165 SE2d 462); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) (165 SE2d 183); Jackson v. Brown, 118 Ga. App. 558 (164 SE2d 450). It should also be noted that, unlike most of the cases cited, this one does not involve a charge of the court to the jury but a statement by the trial judge informing the defendant of his rights under the law of Georgia. As to past confusion on this subject, see Dukes v. State, 109 Ga. App. 825, 829 (137 SE2d 532); Williams v. State, 220 Ga. 766 (141 SE2d 436); Williams v. State, 111 Ga. App. 588, 592 (142 SE2d 409).
Argued May 3, 1972
Decided September 28, 1972
Rehearing denied October 31, 1972
Calhoun & Kernaghan, William C. Calhoun, for appellant.
R. William Barton, District Attorney, for appellee.
2. The other enumerations of error are without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Eberhardt, P. J., Deen and Stolz, JJ., concur. Clark, J., concurs specially. Bell, C. J., Pannell, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.