Case Name: FLORIDA PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation d/b/a The Florida Times-Union, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-01-27
Citations: 706 So. 2d 54
Docket Number: No. 97-1822
Parties: FLORIDA PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation d/b/a The Florida Times-Union, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 706
Pages: 54–57

Head Matter:
FLORIDA PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation d/b/a The Florida Times-Union, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-1822.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 27, 1998.
George D. Gabel, Jr., Brooks C. Rathet, and Suzanne M. Judas of Gabel & Hair, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
Florida Publishing Company, a corporation doing business as The Florida Time's Union (Florida Publishing), appeals from the denial of a request for a writ of mandamus which determined that an executed search warrant and accompanying material is exempt from the public records law pursuant to section 119.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, because it constitutes active criminal investigative material. The sole task before us is to construe rule 2.051, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, relating to access to records of the judicial branch and to determine whether the rule exempts from disclosure those materials which are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 119.07(3), Florida Statutes (1995). We find that rule 2.051(c)(8), Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, specifically adopts the statutory exemptions, and we affirm.
Rule 2.051(c)(8) in pertinent part provides,
(e) Exemptions. The following records of the judicial branch . shall be confidential:
(8) All court records presently deemed to be confidential . by Florida Statutes .
In interpreting a statute, rule, or any document, the first rule of construction is to give the language contained in the document its plain and ordinary meaning. See Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So.2d 826, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County, 642 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla.1994); State v. Williams, 667 So.2d 191, 194 n. 4 (Fla.1996). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resorting to other rules of interpretation and construction. Tallahassee Mem'l, supra at 830.
The explicit language in rule 2.051(c)(8) adopts items made exempt by Florida Statutes.- Appellant argues, however, that chapter 119, Florida Statutes, is not applicable to the judiciary, and under the separation of powers doctrine, only the judiciary has the inherent power to maintain its records and to determine the manner of access to these records. We have no argument with either of these concepts; however, neither precludes the judiciary from adopting legislative statements or expressions of policy as part of rules governing matters within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1992). The supreme court has chosen to do so; it is, therefore, unnecessary for us to go any further.
Affirmed.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
VAN NORTWICK, J., dissents with written opinion.
. It is important to note what issues are not being considered by the court. We first find it unnecessary to determine whether applying the statutory exemption to executed search warrants would implicate First Amendment considerations, because appellant conceded that they are not pursuing that argument. We are also not presented with the issue of whether the materials in question actually constituted active criminal investigative material or whether the trial court erred in not conducting an in-camera inspection, as these issues were not raised by appellant. It is also unnecessary for us to address the state's argument that the records sought were not judicial records in light of our holding that the' statutory exemption applies whether or not the documents sought were, in fact, judicial records.
. The dissent concludes that subparagraph (c)(6) of rule 2.051 is dispositive of the question before us. This subparagraph cannot be read apart from the other language contained in the rule. Rule 2.051(c)(6) must be read together with sub-paragraph (c)(8) of that rule. Our interpretation gives effect to both subparagraphs. Under the expressed language of these subparagraphs, all unexecuted search warrants are confidential. Matters relating to executed search warrants, however, are only confidential if there is an applicable exemption, for instance, if the requested material contains active criminal investigation information.
. To support these arguments, appellant relies on Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So.2d 32 (Fla.1992), and Times Publ'g Co. v. Ake, 645 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), aff'd, 660 So.2d 255, respectively.