Case Name: MEHLMAN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-04-26
Citations: 244 S.W. 602
Docket Number: No. 6932
Parties: MEHLMAN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 244
Pages: 602–603

Head Matter:
MEHLMAN v. STATE.
(No. 6932.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 26, 1922.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1922.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;370 — Evidence that accused had received other stolen goods admissible to show knowledge: >
Evidence that accused had received stolen goods, both prior and subsequent to the offense under prosecution, held,, admissible to show guilty knowledge.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Receiving stolen goods <&wkey;>3, 7(6) — Immaterial whether recipient of stolen property knows owner or not; allegation of theft from particular person must be proved.
Where the state, in a prosecution for receiving stolen property, defined by Pen. Code 1911, art. 1349, alleges that the property was stolen from a particular person, it is necessary for it to make proof of that fact, 'but it is unnecessary to prove that the accused, in receiving the goods, knew from whom it was stolen.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;5l I (4) — Testimony of accomplices as to burglary sufficiently corroborated in a prosecution for receipt of. stolen goods.
Testimony of accomplices that they committed burglary, in prosecution for the receipt of stolen goods, held sufficiently corroborated by testimony of the owner that on the night alleged his store was burglarized and property of like kind and character was stolen.
Appeal from Distinct Court, Ellis County; W. L. Harding, Judge.
Mike Meblman was convicted of fraudulently receiving stolen property, and be appeals.
Affirmed.
Tom Wbipple, of Waxahacbie, for appellant.
R. 6. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for tbe State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
Appellant appeals from a judgment of conviction of tbe offense of fraudulently receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor. It is charged that he received property from Jess Lee Jones and Burnice Winn. Tlie defense urged is that be received tbe property from Winn, and not from Jones, and that be did not know it was stolen. Jones and Winn both testified that the property was stolen and that they together sol'd it to tbe appellant.
Appellant, in bis confession and testimony, admits that be received tbe -property, and that Jones was present, but denies that be received it from Jones. There was testimony to tbe effect that on other occasions appellant had received stolen property from both Jones and Winn and others, who acted with Winn on different occasions. There is nothing in tbe nature of testimony in tbe instant ease, as revealed in the bills of exceptions, which differentiates it from tbe rule which sanctions proof of other criminal transactions in solving tbe issue of guilty knowledge in prosecutions for this offense. On tbe subject Mr. Wharton says:
"In -prosecutions for receiving stolen goods, guilty knowledge is the gist or substance of the offense to be established by the prosecution, and evidence of collateral offenses is admissible to establish such knowledge." Wharon's Crim. Ev. vol. 1, § 35, p. 135.
See, also, Morgan v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 9, 18 S. W. 647; Kaufman v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 438, 159 S. W. 58; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 355, 5 S. W. 215.
There was no error in refusing to instruct tbe jury to acquit unless tbe appellant knew that the property was stolen from Coleman. It was enough if be knew it was stolen. It was not necessary that tbe name of tbe owner should be charged or proved. See Penal Code, art. 1349, defining the offense; and for form of indictment, see Branch's Ann. Tex. Penal Code, § 2530.
Tbe other complaints made by the appellant of the manner of tbe trial have been considered,' but a discussion of them is deemed unnecessary. Suffice it to say that from them we discern no error.
Tbe judgment is affirmed.
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