Case Name: JOHN F. CELL, Appellant, v. DANIEL DRAKE, JOHN DRAKE, SAMUEL DRAKE and SUSAN DRAKE FLAGLER, Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1940-03-22
Citations: 61 Idaho 299
Docket Number: No. 6674
Parties: JOHN F. CELL, Appellant, v. DANIEL DRAKE, JOHN DRAKE, SAMUEL DRAKE and SUSAN DRAKE FLAGLER, Respondents.
Judges: I join Justice Budge in the opinion that no good purpose will be served by remanding the ease for further findings, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 299–313

Head Matter:
(No. 6674.
March 22, 1940.)
JOHN F. CELL, Appellant, v. DANIEL DRAKE, JOHN DRAKE, SAMUEL DRAKE and SUSAN DRAKE FLAGLER, Respondents.
[100 Pac. (2d) 949.]
Fisher & Coffin, for Appellant.
S. L. Tipton, for Respondents.

Opinion:
GIVENS, J.
Statements of the facts of the ease appear in the opinions of Ailshie, C. J., and Morgan, J.
I concur with Morgan, J., as to the statute of limitations.
It seems to me the remaining and pivotal point in this case is whether there was an irrevocable delivery of the deed by the grantor during her lifetime either to the grantee or to someone else for his benefit, intending then to pass title, though reserving possession during her lifetime. (16 Am. Jur. 516-521.)
.The complaint alleged the delivery of the deed by Mrs. Sandlin to appellant. It is further alleged appellant put and kept the deed in his secret box in the house where both were living and so far as he knew it remained there until surreptitiously removed. The court found: "That said deed was not during the lifetime of Clara S. Sandlin (grantor), delivered to appellant." The court had the right to believe Judge Dunbar and disbelieve appellant, and on such a premise the above finding is correct so far as it went. But if the point be correct that it is not only a question of whether irrevocable delivery had or had not been made to the grantee, but that the second contingency must also be determined, that is, whether there was irrevocable delivery to a third person for the grantee, the above finding is insufficient.
Appellant's cause of action was to quiet his title based on a deed. The testimony of Judge Dunbar was admitted without objection and aside from the testimony of appellant himself, is uncontradicted. If appellant's testimony was true the deed was delivered to him. If Judge Dunbar's testimony was true it was not delivered to appellant but to Judge Dunbar for appellant and there is- evidence it was so delivered. If either event transpired and the grantor's intention was irrevocable, title passed to appellant.
The proof of delivery as made by the testimony of Judge Dunbar did not conform to the specific allegations of the complaint. Under similar situations this court has held that though there was no motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof, if no objection was made to the introduction of the particular evidence (and none was made herein), the complaint will be deemed amended. (Sarvis v. Childs Bond etc. Co., 49 Ida. 79, 87, 286 Pac. 914, citing and relying on Hayes v. Flesher, 34 Ida. 13, 17, 198 Pac. 678.)
The cause should be reversed and remanded for the learned trial court to hear further evidence if either party so desires and make a specific finding as to whether or not the deed was delivered irrevocably to Judge Dunbar for appellant. (Jensen v. Bumgarner, 25 Ida. 355, 137 Pac. 529; American Min. Co., Ltd., v. Trask, on rehearing, 28 Ida. 650, 156 Pac. 1139; Sarret v. Hunter, 32 Ida. 536, 185 Pac. 1072; Muckle v. Hill, 32 Ida. 661, 187 Pac. 943; Turner Agency v. Pemberton, 38 Ida. 235, 221 Pac. 133.)
AILSHIE, C. J.
To my mind, the test to be applied to this case is: Did the grantor reserve any right to recall the deed from the possession of the depositary ? If she did, there was no delivery and the conveyance failed. If she did not reserve the right to reclaim it, the title passed, subject to grantor's life estate therein. This question cannot be answered by what she thereafter did in reclaiming the deed but it must rather be answered by ascertaining what she had a legal right to do. The testimony on this particular issue is as follows:
Judge Dunbar says:
"A.....She had made a will, and in this will this man, Mr. Cell — by the terms of it he would have received this property on her death, and she came to me and told me she thought it would be more economical or better if she had a deed, and that was the theory on which that deed was made.....
"Yes, I went to her house. I had been requested to go.
"Q. What did you do there?
"A. Well, I had prepared a deed for her, to Mr. Cell, and I took the deed over there, and she signed it and acknowledged it before me as a notary, .
' ' Q. Did yon give — turn the deed over to Mr. Cell ?
"A. No, sir, I did not turn the deed over to Mr. Cell, but what happened was this, that when the deed was acknowledged, and signed, we called in Mr. Cell into the room, and told him about it, and I showed him the deed, and then Mrs. Sandlin said to me, ' Mr. Dunbar, I want you to take this deed and put it in your safe and keep it in your safe, and at any time after my death that Mr. Cell asks for it, why, give it to him.' " (Italics supplied.)
Now it seems clear, from the testimony of Judge Dunbar, Avho drew the deed and took the acknowledgment, that his instructions were: "Take this deed and put it in your safe, and keep it in your safe, and at any time after my death that Mr. Cell asks for it, why give it to him. ' '
Judge Dunbar further says:
"I showed him the- deed . I explained to him that Mrs. Sandlin had made this deed and he understood then that it was to be delivered to him after her death."
It appears to me that the positive instruction given to Judge Dunbar, to keep the deed in his safe until after Mrs. Sandlin's death, and to deliver it to Cell after Mrs. Sandlin's death, precludes any intention, either express or implied, that Mrs. Sandlin reserved the right or privilege of recalling the deed at any time prior to her death; and of course she could not do so afterward. The instruction is plain and unambiguous.
Under a well recognized line of authorities in this country, a deed to real property may be executed and placed in the hands of a depositary or escrow holder for delivery io the grantee after the death of the grantor, and constitutes a present passage of title with a reservation of a life estate in the grantor. (Showalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 160 Pac. 1042; Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 Pac. 287, 40 Am. St. 415, 19 L. R. A. 242.)
The rule is well stated by the supreme court of Washington in the case first above cited, wherein it is said:
"When, however, the grantor delivers the deed to a third person in escrow to be held until the grantor's death and then delivered to the grantee, the grantor retaining no dominion or control over it, the delivery is valid, and an immediate estate is vested in the grantee at the date of the delivery of the escrow, subject to the grantor's life estate."
Here it seems that the intention of the grantor at the time of the execution of the deed is unmistakable, that she clearly intended to part with possession and control of the deed and still retain possession of the realty during her lifetime. If that be true, then she could not later change the legal effect of the transaction by changing her mind and recovering possession of the deed from the depositary. (Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756; Burgess v. Fowler, 200 Ala. 196, 75 So. 954; St. Clair v. Marquell, 161 Ind. 56, 67 N. E. 693; Johnson v. Cooper, 123 Kan. 487, 255 Pac. 1112; Cook v. Sadler, 214 Mich. 582, 183 N. W. 82; Dickson v. Miller, 124 Minn. 346, 145 N. W. 112.)
The fact that the depositary returned the deed to the grantor on demand does not affect the legal status whatever. He was bound by the instructions given him at the time the deed was deposited with him. (Johnson v. Fleming, 301 Ill. 139, 133 N. E. 667; Thompson v. Calhoun, 216 Ill. 161, 74 N. E. 775; White v. Watts, 118 Iowa, 549, 92 N. W. 660; Johnson v. Cooper, supra; Temple v. Coleman, (Tex. Civ. App.) 245 S. W. 264; Loomis v. Loomis, 178 Mich. 221, 144 N. W. 552; Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah, 236, 177 Pac. 763; Maxwell v. Harper, supra.)
Bespondent contends that the case of Gonzaga University v. Masini, 42 Ida. 660, 249 Pac. 93, tends to support the judgment herein. A careful analysis and understanding of that case will disclose that it does not support the contention here made. The really controlling question in that ease was written on the face of the deed as follows:
"This deed is given and of no effect until after my death and is not to he recorded until after my death." (Italics supplied.)
By the terms written on the face of that deed, no title could pass until after the grantor's death. (Gonzaga University v. Masini, 42 Ida. 660, 668, 249 Pac. 93.) In the concluding part of the opinion (p. 677) Chief Justice Lee, who wrote the case, said:
"I have confined the citation of authorities to that class of eases wherein there was a limitation clause in the deed with regard to -when the same should become effective, similar to the one in the instant case. It is generally held, as a matter of law, that such instruments do not become effective, or pass any interest of the grantor if delivery takes place after his death, and this is true without regard to what was the intent of the grantor. Practically all of the authorities say that the grantor, having expressed his intention by such words of limitation, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict the terms of the grant as the grantor himself fixed them." (Italics supplied.)
I am in entire accord with the rule stated in the Gonzaga-Masini ease and feel confident this case does not come within the authority of that case.
Apparently all the justices are in substantial accord as to the law governing the delivery of an executed deed to a depositary for subsequent delivery to the grantee after the death of the grantor. The majority are agreed that the judgment must be reversed, while Justices Budge and Morgan hold that it should be affirmed. Two of the majority think that the reversal should be accompanied with instructions to enter judgment for appellant, but a majority are not so agreed.
In view of the difference of opinion, as to the effect of the evidence in the case, we have concluded to reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court, with instructions to hear any further evidence that either party may desire to submit, on the question of the delivery of the deed to the depositary; and the intent of the grantee as to whether she intended at the time of execution and delivery of the deed to reserve the right to recall or revoke it; and to make findings and to enter judgment accordingly. It is accordingly so ordered, with costs to follow the result of case in the lower court.
I am authorized to say that Justice Holden concurs with me in this opinion.