Case Name: STATE EX REL. TWIN CITY BUILDING & INVESTMENT COMPANY v. JAMES G. HOUGHTON, AS INSPECTOR OF BUILDINGS OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1919-10-24
Citations: 144 Minn. 1
Docket Number: No. 21,104
Parties: STATE EX REL. TWIN CITY BUILDING & INVESTMENT COMPANY v. JAMES G. HOUGHTON, AS INSPECTOR OF BUILDINGS OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 144
Pages: 1–24

Head Matter:
STATE EX REL. TWIN CITY BUILDING & INVESTMENT COMPANY v. JAMES G. HOUGHTON, AS INSPECTOR OF BUILDINGS OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.
October 24, 1919.
No. 21,104.
Eminent domain — public use — restricted residence district.
Condemnation cannot be had for a use which is not public, and the condemnation of property against its use for an apartment building, as provided 'by Laws 1915, c. 128, is not for a public use. [See Paragraph 2 below.]
January 23, 1920.
Subject act expressed in its title.
1. The subject of Laws 1915, c. 128, relating to restricted residence districts in cities of the first class, for the establishment of which condemnation is provided, is sufficiently expressed in its title within the constitutional requirement, though the subject of condemnation, is not mentioned in it.
Prohibition of apartment houses constitutional..
2. Laws of 1915, c. 128, provides for restricted residence districts in cities of the first class in which certain classes of buildings shall not be erected. Such restricted district is established by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and apartment houses, among other classes ot buildings, are prohibited therein. The Constitution permits the taking or destruction or damage of private property for public use alone. It is held that the restriction as applied to an apartment house is based upon a public use and that the statute providing for condemnation is constitutional.
Upon the relation of the Twin City Building & Investment Company the district court for Hennepin county granted its alternative writ of mandamus directed to James G. Houghton, as inspector of buildings of the city of Minneapolis, commanding him to issue to relator a permit and license to install electric wiring in a certain building, or show cause why he had not done so. The matter was heard before Molyneaux, J., who sustained plaintiff’s demurrer to the return of respondent and ordered that the permit issue. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, the inspector of buildings appealed.
Reversed on reargument.
C. D. Gould and R. S. Wiggin, for appellant.
The answer set up that on February 23, 1918, relator applied for a permit to build a three-story apartment house at a cost of about $50,000; that on March 8, 1918, the city council passed a resolution pursuant to Laws 1915, p. 180, e. 128, designating the block in which relator’s land was situated as a restricted residence district, and directed the building inspector not to issue any permit for the building of any structure prohibited under the resolution; that relator was informed immediately of the action of the council, but made application to the building inspector for a permit for electric wiring in such building which was refused; that no work had been done in construction of the building, and the premises were still vacant and unoccupied.
Chapter 128, p. 180, Laws 1915, is constitutional, and the protection of the public health, safety, convenience and welfare is a public use. The right of eminent domain may be exercised to protect the public health' and provide for the public convenience and welfare. Lien v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 80 Minn. 58, 62, 82 N. W. 1094. The particular kinds of business prohibited by this act: Coalyards, public garages, public stables, dyeing, cleaning and laundering establishments, bill-boards 'and blacksmith shops, have all been held to be such as might be prohibited in any particular district, in the exercise of the police power, even without compensation. Is it not a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain to protect a particular part of the public from the encroachment of such business as the courts say may be protected in the exercise of the police power? In State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, the court was careful not to decide whether a mercantile establishment could be prohibited.
The question what is a public use is a question for the court, but necessity or expediency in the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the public use is a question for the legislature. Lewis, Em. Dom. (3d ed.) § 251. See also section 271; Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 480, 55 N. E. 77; In re City of New York, 57 App, Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196, 200, affirmed 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108; Shoemaker, v. H. S. 147 U. S. 282, 297, 13 Sup. Ct. 361, 37 L. ed. 170. If the public health, safety, convenience and welfare are protected by the creation of restricted districts, public money may be expended in securing the benefit thereof.
For a use to be public it is not essential that the entire community or any considerable portion of it should directly enjoy or participate in the improvement, for the benefits from it will inure to the use and benefit of the parties concerned, considered as members of the community or of the state, and not solely as individuals, and it is not fatal to the act if private interests be advanced. Sisson v. Supervisors, 128 Iowa, 442, 454, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L.R.A. 440; State v. Board of Co. Commrs. Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 338, 92 N. W. 216.
John E. Samuelson, Leonard McHugh and M. T. O’Donnell, as attorneys for the city of Duluth, filed a brief as amici curiae.
The city council of Duluth began proceedings under the act of 1915 to establish a residence district by passing the necessary resolution on June 30, 1919, appointing appraisers and directing the necessary steps to be taken to complete the restrictions, when a property owner in the proposed district filed his complaint to restrain the city from establishing such district and secured an order temporarily restraining the city from proceeding further in the matter, and after a hearing upon an order to show cause the presiding judge announced he would await the decision of the supreme court in this present case.
A. Where police power is not broad enough, eminent domain may be resorted to. It would seem that the only objection to such restrictions which the court found in the act of 1913 arose from the failure to provide compensation for the prohibition. State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017. The legislature of 1915 passed the present act to cure this defect. The police power may be evoked without giving compensation, while the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised without giving compensation. The one is usually called a regulation, the other a taking. But either power must be exercised for the public need. If a regulation or restriction on the use of property goes beyond the limits prescribed for the police power, it then falls within the realm of eminent domain. Therefore there is no logical reason why such regulation or restriction may not be imposed under the power of eminent domain, so long as it satisfies the constitutional requirements of giving compensation and being exercised by due process of law.
B. Powers granted by the act of 1915 are for a public use. Public use is the employment or application of a thing by the public, or use by the public. Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co. 97 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405. Our court qualifies its definition of a public use by giving it the conception of benefit, of public utility and of general welfare. If the charter of the company named had not limited the power of the company to furnishing water from the wheels thereof, the court undoubtedly would have sustained the use as a public use. In the case of Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 395, the question of public use did not arise. The public welfare and convenience require that there should be parts of the city wherein the members thereof can erect homes, knowing that they will be able to get away from business buildings and crowded flat buildings and enjoy their homes without annoyance. It cannot be denied that there is a great demand for such places to erect residences, such demands being evidenced by the fact that the state legislature has twice enacted legislation on these lines, and that the councils of St. Paul, Minneapolis and Duluth have promptly taken advantage of such laws to create such districts. It is not necessary that it should be a use for the entire public. Lien v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094.
Public use may exist in the form of a prohibition of a private use. There are countless cases where the police power has been legally used to serve public uses through prohibition, restriction on the use of private property. There are cases where eminent domain has been used to serve public purposes through a negative use. Attorney General v. 'Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77; In re City of New York, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196, affirmed 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108. Restriction of flats from an exclusivo residential district serves a public use. Yery fine residences are usually surrounded by spacious lawns and plenty of shrubs and trees. Such a district serves the same public use for which parks are created. They are in reality parks maintained at private expense. Every citizen takes pride in such districts and visitors to the city take away with them a fine picture of such city, owing to such districts. Such a restricted residence district prevents congestion which is another public use of health and general welfare.
In the construction of constitutional limitations the courts must keep pace with the times and recognize changing conditions and growing interests. In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 H. S. 575, 31 Sup. Ct. 299, 55 L. ed. 341, upon petition for rehearing, the language of Justice Holmes was that certain cases were cited to show that among public uses for which property might be taken, not for a private me, were some which, if looked at only in their immediate aspects, might seem to be private. This case is of that character.
A. B. Darelius, for respondent.
The act of 1915 is invalid because it contravenes article 4, § 27, and article 1, § 13, of the state Constitution. The condemnation of private property, or rather the taking away the right of the property owner to improve his property in his own way is not embraced within, or suggested by, the title of the act. The title gives no suggestion of the right of the city to take property in connection with the creation of such residence districts. State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 395, 397 (524). Section 13 of article 1 prohibits the taking of private property except for a public use. Private property cannot be taken for a private use. State v. District Court, 133 Minn. 221, 158 N. W. 240. Sections 22 and 23 of 10 R. C. L. enumerate what is a public use. The taking of relatorts property does not come within either of the classes enumerated. City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 11, 90 N. W. 312; Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454. Appellant does not contend that the erection of an apartment house on the designated premises will constitute a nuisance, a menace to health or be dangerous to life or limb or even offensive to aesthetic taste. If it is a benefit at all to exclude such improvements, it is purely a private benefit.
It is simply to prevent overcrowding and congestion in, .the larger cities. To prevent the building of undesirable and unhealthy structures, the shutting out of light and air, the housing act of 1917 (chapter 137, page 185), was enacted by the legislature.
Baldwin, Baldwin & Holmes filed a brief as amici curiae.
Unless the taking be for a public use the act of 1915 is invalid, as otherwise it violates article 1, § 7, of the state Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, both relating to due process of law. By the restriction neither the public, nor its agents, have the right to enter upon, use or enjoy these premises in any way, nor to regulate their use save by the prohibition of these harmless projects. What is secured is the right to prohibit, not a right to use. Put in another way, the city has sought to acquire the right to pass what is essentially a police ordinance, held invalid as to such projects under the police power. See 1 Minn. Law Rev. 490. Is the expansion of the police power beyond its constitutional limits the taking or damaging of property “for public use?” See State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, for a satisfactory definition of the limits of police power applicable here.
Minnesota is expressly committed to the doctrine that “public use” means actual “use by the public.” Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co. 97 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405. Hence it is obvious that as this -right involves no user or taking possession by the public or its agents it cannot be acquired as a public use. What interest or benefit has anyone in this project except the immediate landowners of the residence district involved, and possibly of the immediately adjacent property? But if none but the immediate neighborhood is benefited, then under the rule the use is not a public use.
Reported in 174 N. W. 885 and 176 N. W. 159.

Opinion:
The following opinions were filed October 24, 1919:
Dibell, J.
Mandamus on the relation of the Twin City Building & Improvement Company against James G. Houghton, inspector of buildings of Minneapolis, to compel him to issue a building permit. There was an answer to the alternative writ to which a demurrer was sustained and judgment was then entered for the relator from which the defendant appeals.
The question is upon the right of the relator to construct a three-story apartment building upon property which he owns in Minneapolis. His right to do so is conceded, unless he is prevented because of certain proceedings taken by the common council of Minneapolis, pursuant to Laws 1915, p. ISO, c. 128, resulting in the designation of block 8 in J. T. Blaisdell's Revised Addition to Minneapolis as a restricted residence district in which the construction of such a building is prohibited. The relator owns lot 13 and the south 34.9 feet of lot 12 in this block and purposes erecting an.apartment building. Sections 1 and 2 of the act of 1915 are as follows:
Section 1. Any city of the first class may, through its council, upon petition of fifty (50) per cent of the owners of real estate in the district sought to be affected, designate and establish by proceedings hereunder restricted residence districts within its limits wherein no building or other structure shall thereafter be erected, altered or repaired for any of the following purposes, to-wit, hotels, restaurants, eating houses, mercantile business, stores, factories, warehouses, printing establishments, tailor shops, coal yards, ice houses, blacksmith shops, repair shops, paint shops, bakeries, dyeing, cleaning and laundering establishments, bill-boards and other advertising devices, public garages, public stables, apartment houses, tenement houses, flat buildings, any other building or structure for purposes similar to the foregoing. Public garages and public stables shall include those, and only those, operated for gain.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to exclude double residences or duplex houses, so-called, schools, churches, or signs advertising for rent or sale the property only on which they are placed.
No building or structure erected after the creation of such district shall be used for any purpose for which its erection shall be prohibited hereunder.
The term "council" in this act shall mean the chief governing body of the city by whatever name called.
. See. 2. The council shall first designate the restricted residence district, and shall have power to acquire by eminent domain the right to exercise the powers granted by this act by proceedings hereinafter defined, and when such proceedings shall have been completed the right to exercise such powers shall be vested in the city.
If under this statute the relator's property can be condemned against its use as a site for an apartment building, it is not aggrieved, and the only question which we find necessary to determine is whether there is a public use upon which to rest a condemnation.
The right to condemn private property for public use is not questioned. It is an attribute of sovereignty. The private owner holds his property subject to the superior right of the state to take it for public use, but it cannot take it except for public use. The payment of compensation gives no right. It is a condition to the exercise of the right. Whether the use is a public use is a judicial question. The courts are charged alike with the duty of giving effect to the sovereign right to take and of protecting the individual against an appropriation for other than a public use.
The right of the owner to use Ms property as he sees fit, if he does not unjustly injure others, is as much unquestioned as is the sovereign right to take it for public use. It is fundamental in our government. It makes ownership valuable and attractive. It is a right cherished as an incident of our free institutions. Its exercise is an affirmation of the equality of all before the law and a denial of class superiority. Of course the private owner may be restricted in the use of his property without its appropriation by condemnation. He is only one of the community. He must yield to its welfare. He must not use his property so as unnecessarily or unjustly to interfere with others. He must not create a nuisance. His protected private right is subject to the exercise of the police power resident in the state to prohibit, and this without compensation, a use of his property which injuriously affects the public health or safety or general convenience and welfare of the community.
The use to wMch the relator purposes putting its property is legitimate. Not all people can live or wish to live in detached houses. Some from choice and some from necessity seek apartments. It is true that apartment buildings are not welcome in exclusive residence districts. Their appearance is not liked. They bring more people into the neighborhood and their presence there and their going and coming is thought by some undesirable. It is not sought to prohibit apartments, nor to prevent people living in them. It is proper enough that apartments be located elsewhere and that people live in them there, for the living conditions they offer are wholesome and the people who use them are good people. They are banned because of the environment. An apartment building does not affect the public health or public safety or general well being so that it may -be prohibited in the exercise of the police power. This we take to be the effect of our decisions. State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, L.R.A. 1917F, 1050; State v. City of Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. W. 477. If such a building affects the public health or safety or well being of the community within the meaning of the police power, it can be outlawed by ordinance or statute without condemnation and accompanying compensation, and there is no need of condemnation against a nuisance. It is only when something rightfully belonging to another is to 'be taken from him in the exercise of the superior sovereign right for a necessary public use that resort need be had to condemnation.
By the condemnation which the statute provides neither the city nor the general public gets a physical use of the condemned premises. They cannot use them in any way. They do not wish to use them in the ordinary sense. They do not want them used for an apartment. They cannot go upon them. The so-called use is negative; it prevents an otherwise lawful use by the owner and in no other way is it a use at all. He still owns the land, and <jan keep people off it. He may leave it vacant. He may build any kind of a building which he chooses except one forbidden by the statute. A fifty per cent vote, with the approval of the common council, has made it so if it is so. It is not so unless the use is public.
When once the principle is announced, that a residence district may be created by the common council upon a majority vote of the owners and the land condemned against the use of the property for an apartment building, the way is open for the condemnation, upon legislative authori zation, of property in exclusive residence districts against a use for substantially any class of dwellings then thought to be not in keeping with community surroundings. It may reach the humble and shabby dwelling, for such a dwelling may be found objectionable as readily as an apartment. And when the humble home is threatened by legislation upon aesthetic grounds, or at the instance of a particular class of citizens who would rid themselves of its presence as not suited in architecture or in other respects to their own more elaborate structures, a step will have been taken inevitably to cause discontent with the government as one controlled by class distinction, rather than in the interests and for the equal protection of all. It is not believed that the public welfare can be promoted by such legislation.
We do not overlook nor discourage the tendency to extend the power of restriction of the use of city property through the exercise of the police power in aid of more wholesome and sanitary, living conditions. The housing act of 1917, not yet construed, is an illustration. Laws 1917, p. 185, c. 137. The act of 1915, as applied to the situation before us, has no purpose to improve housing conditions. The tendency noted is illustrated in State v. Houghton, 142 Minn. 28, 170 N. W. 853, where we held that the exclusion of a factory manufacturing cereal products from a restricted residence district, created pursuant to Laws 1913, pp. 102, 618, cc. 98, 420, was sustainable under the police power, though the district was sparsely settled, and though the property was naturally suited for the use of such a factory located as it was on a railway line, but the use of the factory involved substantial physical discomfort and annoyance to the residents. In many ways, not worth the while mentioning here, one may, by legislation under the police power, be restricted in the use of his property. Dunnell, Minn. Dig. and 1916 Supp. § 1603, et seq. And as a matter of private right, without legislation under the police power, we sustain an interference by injunction with the operation of a stone quarry so conducted as to bring substantial physical discomfort and annoyance to nearby residents. Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co. 143 Minn. 374, 173 N. W. 805. And in the same way we sustain a restrietion of the use of property for stabling purposes. Lynch v. Shiely, 131 Minn. 346, 155 N. W. 958.
The case before us is not in principle nor in facts like In re City of New York, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196, where there was a condemnation for the purpose of widening a street by adding a strip on each side, which was not to be used for purposes of travel but for ornament and beauty, with a reservation of a limited use in the owner. Nor is it like Bunyan v. Commissioners, 167 App. Div. 457, 153 N. Y. Supp. 622, where land used as a stone quarry along the Palisades of the Hudson was condemned for the purpose of preserving the scenic beauty of the river and the park. Nor is it like Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 47 L.R.A. 314, where a statute limiting the height of buildings about Copley Square and providing for compensation was sustained. Nor is it like U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co. 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427, 40 L. Ed. 576, where there was a con-'d emnation for preserving, improving and ornamenting the battle-field of Gettysburg. These uses were public.
No question is made of the right under proper authorization to condemn property for boulevards or for pleasure drives or for public parks or for public baths or for public playgrounds or for libraries and museums or for numerous other purposes which contribute to the general good and well-being of the community. In such cases there is a public use. In the condemnation here we see none. The desire of exclusive residence districts to preserve their environment is worthy enough. In condemning property against a building which is in itself proper and useful and offends only because it is out of harmony with the neighborhood surroundings we do not find a public use. We recognize that what constitutes a public use changes from time to time. Many uses recognized as public now were not thought so some years ago. We think the use here claimed as public is, within the meaning of the law of eminent domain, private. Considerable is made of the requirement of compensation, the provision for getting which, it may be remarked in passing, is made studiously difficult, but without a public use a provision for compensation is unimportant.
Numerous helpful briefs have been filed by counsel not appearing for the parties to the record but representing those having interests which will be affected by the decision. They have had attentive consideration. We have not mentioned all of the questions argued. Whether aside from the want of a public use there is anything in this ingeniously drastic statute which makes it invalid we do not inquire and our decision is limited to the precise facts before us. A condemnation against an apartment house is not for a public use.
Judgment affirmed.
[See third paragraph on page 21.]