Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ray SMITH
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-05-12
Citations: 744 So. 2d 73
Docket Number: No. 98-KA-0366
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ray SMITH.
Judges: Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., Judge Pro Tempore PHILIP C. CIACCIO.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 744
Pages: 73–80

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ray SMITH.
No. 98-KA-0366.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 12, 1999.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 1999.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Darryl W. Bubrig, Sr., District Attorney, 25th Judicial District, Parish of Plaque-mines, Pointe-A-La-Hache, Louisiana, and Gilbert V. Andry III, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel For PlaintiffAppellee.
William R. Campbell Jr., Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel For Defendant/Appellant.
Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., Judge Pro Tempore PHILIP C. CIACCIO.

Opinion:
hBAGNERIS, Judge.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 13, 1996, defendant, Ray Smith, was charged by bill of information with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, to which defendant pled not guilty. Defendant filed 'motions to suppress evidence and identification, which were denied. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. The sentence was to be served consecutive to any other sentences the defendant was serving.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 8, 1996, Deputy Don Savasta-no testified that he instituted a traffic stop of defendant for speeding. After pulling over, defendant exited his vehicle and walked swiftly towards the deputy. Defendant met the deputy at the driver's rear corner of the vehicle. Savastano informed defendant he was speeding and requested defendant's drivers license, registration and proof of insurance. Defendant gave Savastano his driver's license and told the deputy the other documents were in the glove compartment. Defendant walked back to the vehicle | ¡.and asked the female in the front passenger seat to get the documents out of the glove compartment. Savastano looked into the vehicle to observe opening of the glove compartment for his safety, upon which he observed rolling papers on the console and burn holes on the driver's side seat. He took the documents from defendant, called headquarters and requested a driver's license and motion check on defendant. Sa-vastano learned that defendant's driver's license was expired and two warrants were issued for his arrest. He then placed defendant under arrest. The deputy conducted a pat down search of defendant and requested a K-9 unit. He issued to the defendant citations for speeding and driving with an expired license, and then placed defendant in the police vehicle.
After placing defendant in his vehicle, Savastano asked the two passengers to exit defendant's vehicle. The deputy then removed five fishing poles and a bag of shrimp from the vehicle. The K-9 unit arrived ten minutes later. A search of the vehicle by the K-9 unit revealed the presence of contraband or narcotics in the vehicle. Sergeant Savastano, wife of Deputy Savastano, conducted a pat down search of the female passenger for narcotic substances. Deputy Savastano then searched the vehicle and found a thirty-eight caliber Charter Arms snub nose revolver under the front driver's seat. He opened the gun and found four bullets in The vehicle was registered to the weapon. Lillian Smith, defendant's mother.
Sergeant Angelica Savastano of the Plaquemines Parish Sheriffs Office K-9 unit testified that she was called to a traffic stop on August 8, 1996, to assist with a K-9 search. During the search, the dog walked around the vehicle and gave positive alerts on the outside and inside of the vehicle. Deputy Savastano conducted a search of the vehicle and found a weapon. Sgt. Savastano retrieved money from the glove compartment during her search of the vehicle, which she l3turned over to the evidence custodian. The Sheriffs Office filed for drug arrest forfeiture as to the money.
Sergeant Curtis Bowers examined defendant's fingerprints and determined that defendant's fingerprints were the same as the fingerprints on the certified documents from two Orleans Parish convictions for possession of cocaine. The documents reflected that defendant had been convicted of possession of cocaine on February 24, 1989, in case number 330-252 and on August 16, 1990, in case number 340-065. The officer also testified that the weapon found in the vehicle had been stolen in July of 1996 from a residence in Meraux, Louisiana.
Tammy Patín, the female passenger in defendant's vehicle, testified that on August 8, 1996, defendant and his nephew picked her up at approximately 6:00 a.m. to go fishing. Ms. Patín stated that she did not bring the weapon with her, nor did defendant's nephew. In fact, Ms. Patín did not see the weapon in the vehicle. She further testified that neither she nor the defendant's nephew moved anything in the vehicle when the officer stopped them. She denied putting any money in the glove compartment. She indicated that defendant's nephew did not take any money or food stamps into the ear.
Lillie Mae Smith, defendant's mother, testified that she owns the vehicle that defendant was driving on August 8, 1996. Ms. Smith stated that she did not own a gun .and that no one ever gave her a gun or took a gun to her house. She indicated that the money found in the vehicle did not belong to her. Nor did she put the rolling papers in the car. She does not smoke, but defendant smokes only Camel cigarettes. Ms. Smith allowed her husband, defendant, her daughter and her other son to use the vehicle. Ms. Smith's daughter never showed the witness a gun or spoke to the witness about a gun or leaving money, in the car. The witness further | ¿stated that she never saw defendant with the gun found in the vehicle. However, she did not know if defendant put the gun in the car. She stated it was possible that someone else put the weapon in the vehicle.
Errors Patent
A review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the trial court sentenced defendant to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. The statute under which the defendant was convicted (La. R.S. 14:95.1) also requires the imposition of a fine of "not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars." The trial court failed to impose a fine upon the defendant as required by the statute. Thus, the sentence imposed is illegally lenient. On appeal, this Court will not correct errors favorable to a defendant where the issue is not raised by the State. State v. Fraser, 484 So.2d 122 (1986). As the state has not raised any errors on appeal, the sentence will not be modified. No other errors patent was found.
Assignment of Error Number 1
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of prejudicial other crimes evidence. He contends Sgt. Savastano's testimony that the money seized from the vehicle was the subject of drug forfeiture proceedings constituted prejudicial other crimes evidence. Defendant suggests that the testimony about the money was introduced to prove his character as a drug dealer. The trial transcript does not support this argument.
The testimony concerning the money was elicited from Sgt. Savastano during defendant's cross-examination of the officer. Defendant asked the officer if she had found the money in the glove compartment of the vehicle. The officer | ¡^responded that she had. She further testified that she turned the money over to the evidence custodian. Defendant then questioned the officer about whether the money was brought to court for trial. The officer answered that photocopies of the money had been brought to court for trial but not the actual money. On redirect examination, the officer testified that the money was not in court, as it was the subject of a drug forfeiture proceeding. The defendant objected to the testimony. However, the trial court allowed the testimony, as defendant raised the issue during his cross-examination of the witness.
The testimony elicited from the witness did not' cast defendant as a bad person. The witness' testimony explained the absence of the money at trial, which issue was raised by defendant during his cross-examination of the witness. As defendant raised the issue during his cross-examination of the witness, the state was entitled to clarify the issue on redirect examination. La. .C.E. article 611.
Further, the testimony of Sgt. Savastano concerning the status of the money was not inadmissible other crimes evidence. Sgt. Savastano testified that the -money was recovered during her search of the vehicle that was conducted after the K-9 unit search revealed positive alerts for contraband and/or narcotics. Thus, the recovery of the money was an integral part of the offense. La. C.E. article 404 allows for the introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding." The trial court did not err when it allowed the officer to testify as to the status of the money. Therefor, we find this assignment is without merit.
| ^Assignment of Error Number 2
Defendant further avers that the state did not produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the state did not produce sufficient evidence to show that he had possession of the weapon. We are persuaded by defendant's argument.
When assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987).
In addition, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982). The elements must be proven such that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. La. R.S. 15:438 is not a separate test from Jackson v. Virginia, supra, but rather is an evidentiary guideline to facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard. State v. Jacobs, supra.
In the instant case, the State was required to prove the following elements: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) conviction of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) general intent to commit the 17offense. La. R.S. 14:95.1; State v. Husband, 437 So.2d 269, 271 (La.1983); State v. Jones, 544 So.2d 1294, 1295 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989). General intent is present when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(2). General criminal intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. State v. Jones, 544 So.2d at 1295. The very doing of the acts that have been declared criminal shows generál criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction. Id.
Constructive possession, as opposed to actual possession, is sufficient to satisfy the possession element of La. R.S. 14:95.1. State v. Day, 410 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Silva, 447 So.2d 1242 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984 ), writ denied, 452 So.2d 173 (La.1984). Constructive possession exists if the thing is subject to the dominion and control of the accused. State v. Edwards, 354 So.2d 1322 (La.1978); State v. Silva, 447 So.2d at 1244. A defendant's dominion and control over a weapon is sufficient to constitute constructive possession even if it is only temporary in nature and even if the control is shared. State v. Washington, 605 So.2d 720, 722 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), writ denied, 610 So.2d 817 (La.1993).
In State v. Washington, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by the police because they suspected that it had been used in the commission of a crime. After the driver and defendant were asked to exit the vehicle, a firearm was. found in plain view on the floorboard of the passenger side. The Second Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction reasoning that the defendant would likely have had his foot touching the weapon, particularly in light of the driver's testimony that he had not stopped the car so suddenly as to cause the gun to come into view from ^underneath the seat. Because of these circumstances the court found that the defendant had constructive possession over the weapon.
The Fifth and Third Circuits have also affirmed convictions of defendants who were found to be in constructive possession of a firearm. State v. Francis, 95-194 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/28/95), 665 So.2d 596 (finding the driver in constructive possession of a weapon found on the driver's floorboard); State v. Armentor, 94-745 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So.2d 1187, unit denied, 95-0557 (La.6/30/95), 657 So.2d 1027, (finding the passenger in constructive possession of a weapon after a search of his person produced twenty rounds of ammunition.)
In the present case, we do not find that the evidence produced at trial proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had constructive possession of the firearm. The weapon, found under the driver's seat, was not in plain view and was only discovered after a search conducted by a K-9 unit, unlike Washington and Francis. Furthermore, the testimony elicited at trial does not establish that defendant had constructive possession of the gun. Defendant's mother, owner of the vehicle, testified she did not own the gun and had never seen it. She further stated that she allowed four members of her family, in addition to friends, use her vehicle. Any one of these people could have placed the gun in the car. Defendant's passenger testified that she did not become aware of the gun until it was produced during the search of the vehicle. Moreover, when searched, defendant did not have any ammunition on his person, as in Armentor. We therefore find such evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction.
Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence.
REVERSED.
BYRNES, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS.