Case Name: CITY OF ROSWELL et al. v. OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2001-07-02
Citations: 274 Ga. 130
Docket Number: S01A0117
Parties: CITY OF ROSWELL et al. v. OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs specially and Corley, J., who dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 130–136

Head Matter:
S01A0117.
CITY OF ROSWELL et al. v. OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.
(549 SE2d 90)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Chief Justice.
The City of Roswell enacted a temporary moratorium on applications for billboard signs after its sign ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional. During the month that the moratorium was in effect, Outdoor Systems filed four applications to construct billboard signs within the city. When the city failed to approve the applications, the billboard company filed a petition for mandamus, which the trial court granted. We granted the city's discretionary application to consider the trial court's ruling that the moratorium was void because the city failed to comply with the notice provisions of OCGA § 36-66-4 (a) of the Zoning Procedures Law. Because the city's temporary moratorium was not a "final legislative action," it was not a "zoning decision" as defined in the Zoning Procedures Law and the city did not have to comply with the statute's notice and hearing requirements. Therefore, we reverse.
The trial court in a different case involving another outdoor advertising company struck down the City of Roswell's sign ordinance as unconstitutional in November 1999. In response, the Roswell city council passed a resolution that imposed a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for signs exceeding 128 square feet in size or 12 feet in height. The purpose of the moratorium was to give the city time to draft and enact new sign regulations. The resolution provided that the moratorium would expire on January 1, 2000, or the date that the city council repealed the prohibition, whichever occurred first. After the moratorium went into effect, Outdoor Systems filed building permit applications seeking to construct outdoor advertising signs at four locations in the city. When the city did not grant the requested permits, the company sought mandamus, claiming a vested right in the issuance of the sign permits.
1. The Zoning Procedures Law defines a "zoning decision" as a "final legislative action by a local government", that results in the adoption of a zoning ordinance, grant of a special use permit, or amendment to a zoning ordinance that changes the ordinance's text, rezones property, or zones annexed property. Construing the statutory definition in this case, we hold that the city's temporary morato rium on billboard sign applications is not a "final legislative action." The city imposed a brief ban on sign applications lasting approximately one month. It did not permanently suspend all applications or prohibit them for a long time. Moreover, it enacted the moratorium as an emergency measure to preserve the status quo for 30 days pending its enactment of a- new ordinance. Because the moratorium was temporary, limited in scope to billboards exceeding a specific size, and enacted in response to a court order invalidating existing sign regulations, we conclude that it was a reasonable interim action and therefore exempt from the procedural requirements of OCGA § 36-66-4.
2. The legislative intent in passing the Zoning Procedures Law supports excluding temporary, reasonable moratoria from the statute's notice and hearing requirements. OCGA § 36-66-4 mandates hearings whenever a local government proposes taking action that will result in a zoning decision. The purpose of the law is to afford due process to the public when local governments regulate the use of property through the exercise of their zoning power. We have previously rejected the argument that the notice and hearing requirements apply to every step in the process from an application to a zoning ordinance, concluding that the statute requires "one hearing during the continuous course of a zoning matter before the local government." Requiring a public hearing on a city's decision to suspend permit applications for one month, an intermediate step in the legislative process, would not give affected persons a meaningful opportunity to be heard on any new substantive proposals. Rather, the purpose of the law would be better met by giving affected persons the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations, as occurred here when the city council held a public hearing on December 20 on proposed amendments to its zoning ordinance related to sign regulations.
In conclusion, neither the statutory language nor purpose behind the Zoning Procedures Law requires a local government to hold a hearing on a temporary moratorium that is reasonable. Because the City of Roswell did not have to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 36-66-4 in briefly suspending its acceptance of applications for large billboard signs, the city's moratorium is valid.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs specially and Corley, J., who dissents.
See SMD v. City of Roswell, Civil Action Number E-65358 (Fulton County Superior Court Nov. 18, 1999).
OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) (A) - (E); see Atlanta Bio-Med v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga. 594, 596 (408 SE2d 100) (1991) (county's rescission of an amendment to a county zoning ordinance is a "zoning decision"); Northridge Community Ass'n v. Habersham At Northridge, 257 Ga. 722, 723 (363 SE2d 251) (1988) (consent order between county and developer entered in a court case about a specific piece of property is not a "zoning decision").
See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 125 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. 1963) (ruling void "hold order" on issuing building permit that had been in effect for nine years).
Cf. Davidson Mineral Properties v. Monroe County, 257 Ga. 215, 216 (357 SE2d 95) (1987) (county resolution enacting a moratorium on commercial development "is not a temporary measure to maintain the status quo" but establishes a system requiring the permission of the board of commissioners).
See generally I Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 11.04 (2001) (listing cases exempting interim zoning and building moratoria from the procedural requirements applying to ordinary zoning ordinances and also cases holding interim zoning and stop-gap ordinances invalid as a result of procedural defects).
See OCGA § 36-66-2 (a).
See City of Cumming v. Realty Development Corp., 268 Ga. 461, 464 (491 SE2d 60) (1997).