Case Name: William Matthews v. American Cent. Ins. Co.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-10-16
Citations: 75 N.Y. St. Rep. 716
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Matthews v. American Cent. Ins. Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 75
Pages: 716–735

Head Matter:
William Matthews v. American Cent. Ins. Co.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
October 16, 1896).
1. Insurance—Conditions of policy—Death of insured.
Noncompliance with the requirements of a policy that immediate notice of loss shall be given to the insurer, and an inventory furnished within 60 days after the fire, and that no action shall be brought on the policy unless commenced within 12 months next after the fire, is not excused by the fact that the fire occurred after the death of insured, and that, by reason of a contest of her will, letters were not issued to the executor until two years afterwards. Adams and Ward, JJ., dissenting.
2. Limitation of actions—Running of statute.
A claim against an insurance company for a loss occurring after the death of the insured, not being a cause of action which accrued to him, is not affected by Code Civ. Proc. § 402, extending the time within which an action may be brought after the death of the person in whose favor the claim exists.
Action by William. Matthews, as executor of the last will and testament of Caroline Silvernail, deceased, against the American Central Insurance Company on a fire insurance policy. A verdict was directed in favor of plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial on exceptions ordered to be heard in the appellate division in the first instance. Granted.
August 1, 1889, the defendant, by a New York standard policy, insured Caroline Silvernail, for three years, against damage by fire, to an amount not exceeding $1,050, on the following property : $400 on her frame dwelling-house ; $450 on her frame barn and sheds attached; ,$200 on her produce in the barn and sheds. December 2, 1891, the insured died, leaving a last will and testament by which she devised her farm on which the insured buildings were situated to her executor for five years ; then to be sold, and the avails, after the payment of debts, divided among her three children. April 20, 1892, the barn, sheds, and their contents were destroyed by fire. It is- conceded that the property destroyed was of the value of $612. Shortly after the death of the testatrix the executor named in the will delivered it to the surrogate of the county, and declined to take any steps in respect to probating it; but afterwards, and before the fire, lie filed a petition, asking that the will be admitted to probate. Some of the heirs contested the will. A litigation ensued, and May 15, 1894, the will was admitted to probate, and letters issued to William Matthews, the executor nominated therein. July 11,1894, the-plaintiff verified the proofs of loss, which were mailed to and received by the defendant, July 23, 1894, at its principal office,, at St. Louis, Mo. October 29, 1894, this action was begun.
I. N. Ames, for defendant; J. F. Parkhurst, for plaintiff.

Opinion:
FOLLETT, J.
—This action is defended on three grounds : (1) That it was not begun within twelve months next after the fire; (2) that written notice of the loss was not immediately-given ; (3) that a verified statement of theloss ivas not furnished within 60 days after the fire. The following are the provisions of the policy" under which these defenses arise :
"If fire occur the insured shall give immediate notice of any loss thereby, in writing, to this company ; protect the property from further damage ; forthwith separate the damaged and undamaged personal property ; put it in the best possible order ; make a complete inventory of the same, stating the quantity and cost of each article, and the amount claimed thereon; and Avithin sixty days after the fire, unless such time is extended in Avriting by this company, shall render a statement to this company, signed and sworn to by said insured. * " * Ho suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced Avithin tAvelve months next after the fire."
It is settled in-this state that parties to contracts may prescribe the time within Avhich either party must, if ever, bring actions to enforce the contracts, and that such stipulations are not against public policy and are valid. This rule has often been applied in favor of insurers and against the insured. Wilkinson v. Insurance Co., 72 N. Y. 499. And it has also been applied against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Wright v. Association, 43 Hun, 61; affirmed 118 N. Y. 237; 28 S. R. 817. The plaintiff seeks to evade the effect of this stipulation by availing himself of the exceptions contained in chapter 4 of the Code of Oivil Procedure (" Limitations "), but when the parties limit the time, by contract, Avithin which an - action must be brought thereon, their rights are to be determined by the contract, and the statute of limitations has no application. The statute so provides :
" Sec. 414. The provisions of this chapter apply, and constitute the only rules of limitation applicable, to a civil action or special proceeding, except in one of the folloAving cases : (1) A case Avhere a different limitation is specially prescribed by law, or a shorter limitation is prescribed by the Avritten contract of the parties."
In Wilkinson v. Insurance Co., supra, the plaintiff sought to escape the effect of the stipulation by reason of a proAÚsion in the Eevised Statutes saving the rights of parties from the effects of those statutes Avhen they Avere stayed by an injunction from bringing an action. The court said:
" This provision does not aid the plaintiff. The exception has no application Avhere a limitation is prescribed by the contract of parties, but only applies to cases goArerned by the limitation in the general laAV."
In Riddlesbarger v. Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386, the plaintiff attempted to escape the effect of such a stipulation by invoking an exception contained in the statute of limitations of the state of Missouri, where the contract Avas made and sought to be enforced. The court held that the statute had no application to the case, saying:
" In the second place, the rights of the parties flow from the contract. That relieves them from the general limitations of the statute, and as a consequence from its exceptions also."
The section of the Code above quoted, and the two cases cited, one in the court of appeals in this state, and the other in the supreme court of the United States, Avould seem to be sufficient authority on this proposition.
Again, the fire occurred April 20, 1892,—4 months and 18 days after the death of the insured (plaintiff's testatrix), and no cause of action accrued to her; and this case does not fall Avithin any of the exceptions of chapter 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("Limitations"), extending the time in which actions may be brought by the representatives of .decedents on causes of action accruing before death. The delay in bringing this action Avas not induced by any act on the part of the defendant, but Avas due solely to the neglect of those who should have procured the appointment of a representative for the insured. Mo reason is given Avhy a temporary administrator Avas not applied for and appointed pending the contest over the Avill. Had this been done, proof of loss might have been given, and an action brought Avithin the period prescribed by the policy.
The defendant's exceptions should be sustained, and, as a neAV trial Avould be unavailing, the complaint should be dismissed, Avith costs.
IIARDIN, P. J., concurs.