Case Name: PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-04-17
Citations: 82 Mich. App. 629
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-934
Parties: PEOPLE v HOLLOWAY
Judges: Before: Bashara, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 82
Pages: 629–643

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HOLLOWAY
Docket No. 77-934.
Submitted January 3, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided April 17, 1978.
Bruce Holloway was charged with carrying a concealed pistol and another concealed weapon. Defendant’s motion to suppress the concealed weapons as evidence was denied at the preliminary examination and defendant was bound over for trial. At trial the defendant again made a motion to suppress and the trial judge granted the motion on the basis that private security guards are bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment and the defendant was ordered discharged, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Susan D. Borman, J. The people appeal. Held:
Private security guards who are not acting under "the color of the law” are not bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred in result only:
Security guards act under the color of law and are subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. However, the evidence should not have been suppressed because the search conducted by the security guards was reasonable.
Opinion of the Court
1. Searches and Seizures — Governmental Officers — Private Security Guards — Restraints—Constitutional Law.
The Fourth Amendment restraints on the activities of governmental officers does not extend to searches by private security guards (US Const, Am IV).
Concurrence in Result by N. J. Kaufman, J.
2. Searches and Seizures — Private Security Guards — Color of
State Law — Reasonableness Standards — Police Officers. Private security guards in reality do act under color of state law and, therefore, their actions in searching a person are subject to the same reasonableness standards as are applicable to police officers.
References for Points in Headnotes
68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures § 13.
Private individual: admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence obtained by search by private individual. 36 ALR3d 553.
3. Searches and Seizures — Security Guards — Reasonableness of Search — Suppression of Evidence — Pat-Down Search.
Evidence seized by security guards in a pat-down search of a defendant was admissible into evidence and the trial court should not have ordered the evidence suppressed where, under the circumstances surrounding the encounter between the security guards and the defendant, the search was reasonable.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Maura D. Corrigan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Before: Bashara, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, P. J.
The prosecutor appeals from an order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence and quash the information. Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed pistol and another concealed weapon contrary to MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.
The facts involved are neither complicated nor disputed. A private security guard stationed at a Cunningham's drugstore in the Greyhound Bus Terminal spotted defendant acting in a "suspicious" manner, as if ready to steal some articles. The guard approached the defendant. By this time the guard's partner was already speaking to him. The guard noticed a bulge in defendant's pocket. A pat down revealed a .32-caliber pistol and a concealed knife. The weapons were turned over to the police and defendant was placed under arrest.
Defense counsel argued Fourth Amendment exclusion provisions at the preliminary examination. However, a Recorder's Court judge, sitting as ex amining magistrate, was not persuaded and bound defendant over for trial. The argument was renewed on motion before the trial court. The trial judge granted the motion on the basis that private security guards are bound by Fourth Amendment strictures and therefore the evidence seized by the guard must be suppressed.
The primary issue, then, is whether the Fourth Amendment restraint on the activities of governmental officers extends to searches by private security guards. We hold that it does not and, therefore, reverse the opinion of the trial court.
This Court has very clearly spoken to the issue on more than one occasion. In People v Harry James Smith, 31 Mich App 366, 373-374; 188 NW2d 16 (1971), the Court stated:
"As previously stated, Mr. Gunn was a private guard, not a police officer, nor was he acting under any authority of any police agency. He was, therefore, a private individual. Thus, the evidence obtained is admissible into evidence whether his actions were reasonable or unreasonable."
Again, in People v Langley, 63 Mich App 339, 344; 234 NW2d 513 (1975), we said, relying on People v Smith, supra:
"Admission of evidence obtained by a private individual, not acting under the authority of the state, is not prohibited by the U. S. Const, Am IV, whether his actions were reasonable or not."
The learned trial judge relies on decisions of the United States Supreme Court to find that arrests by private security guards are made under "color of law" and are, therefore, subject to the Fourth Amendment strictures. A review of the cited deci sions leads us to the conclusion that such reliance is misplaced.
In Griffin v Maryland, 378 US 130; 84 S Ct 1770; 12 L Ed 2d 754 (1964), the security guard involved had been deputized by the county sheriff for the express purpose of policing an amusement park where the incident complained of occurred. Williams v United States, 341 US 97; 71 S Ct 576; 95 L Ed 774 (1951), involved a private detective who held a special police officer's card and badge. The detective was accompanied by a city police officer sent by his superior to lend authority to the proceedings. It was under those circumstances that the United States Supreme Court determined that evidence obtained could be suppressed, because it was acquired under "the color of the law". Surely the facts in the foregoing cases are distinguishable from those at bar.
Accordingly, we would adhere to the precepts laid down in Burdeau v McDowell, 256 US 465, 475; 41 S Ct 574, 576; 65 L Ed 1048, 1051 (1921), which have not, so far as our research has shown, been diluted by subsequent decision. The Court stated:
"The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies .
"It is manifest that there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another. A portion of the property so taken and held was turned over to the prosecuting officers of the Federal Government. We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned."
Thus an individual has the right to redress any wrongs which may have been committed by private citizens, be they security guards or not. They can bring civil actions or file criminal complaints against the alleged offenders. It is because the cloak of sovereign immunity is wrapped around law enforcement officials that the Fourth Amendment is applied to their actions (though today a somewhat ragged cloak).
There is a growing feeling among the courts of this country that the exclusionary rule has been stretched far beyond its original and very useful purpose. That frustration was well voiced by Mr. Justice Blackmun in the recent case of United States v Janis, 428 US 433, 459; 96 S Ct 3021; 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976), reh den, 429 US 874; 97 S Ct 196; 50 L Ed 2d 158 (1976):
"In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law enforcement officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now, the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the law enforcement system. In the situation before us, we do not find sufficient justification for the drastic measure of an exclusionary rule. There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We find ourselves at that point in this case."
Finally we note that another panel of this Court, in People v Eastway, 67 Mich 464; 241 NW2d 249 (1976), wrote to the issue here addressed. The holding there, that the Fourth Amendment should apply to private security guards, was only dicta to the law of the case. Nonetheless, insofar as it touches upon our holding, we specifically decline to follow its result or reasoning.
Our resolution of the first issue raised makes it unnecessary to determine whether the private guard's actions were reasonable or justifiable.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.