Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY WAYNE HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1990-03-27
Citations: 196 Ill. App. 3d 298
Docket Number: No. 3-88-0650
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY WAYNE HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 196
Pages: 298–306

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY WAYNE HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District
No. 3—88—0650
Opinion filed March 27, 1990.
HEIPLE, P.J., dissenting.
Dan W. Evers, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.
Raymond Kimbell III, State’s Attorney, of Galesburg (Nancy Rink Carter, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE WOMBACHER
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Harrison, entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of murder and home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9—1(a)(1), 12—11). The trial court sentenced him to a term of natural life imprisonment for murder and a concurrent extended term of 40 years' imprisonment for home invasion. The defendant appeals the length of his sentences.
The evidence presented to the defendant's sentencing hearing established that during the early hours of November 28, 1987, a man (Chasek) approached the defendant about committing a burglary to obtain money. The defendant agreed to participate. Chasek told the defendant that they were going to "break into an old lady's house, and that if she was home, she probably wouldn't hear," as she was "hard of hearing." The defendant and Chasek went to the victim's house. The defendant broke a window in the garage, and Chasek gained entry into the house.
The victim, 87-year-old Helen Fey, lived alone. Apparently Mrs. Fey heard the noise in the garage. After the two men entered the house, they encountered Mrs. Fey, who was standing between the kitchen and the living room. Chasek grabbed the victim and took her into the bedroom. He threw her on the bed and held her there. For approximately five minutes the defendant searched the victim's house for money while Chasek restrained the victim.
The defendant failed to locate any money and returned to the bedroom. The defendant then restrained the victim for approximately 10 minutes while Chasek searched the house. While the defendant was restraining the victim, he placed a pillow over her face for about 10 seconds to quiet her. After Chasek failed to locate any money, he returned to the bedroom. The defendant released the victim, and she started to get up off the bed. Chasek then shoved the victim to the bed and began striking her on the head with his fist. After Chasek hit the victim several times, the defendant indicted that Chasek had done enough and they should leave. The two left the victim in the bedroom and searched the house for another 10 minutes. The two then exited the house.
The autopsy report of the coroner's physician, Dr. John G. Dietrich, was admitted into evidence. The report stated that the cause of the victim's death was multiple head injuries. In addition, the report revealed that the victim had received multiple contusions on her forearm, hand, shoulder, and leg. The report further indicated that it was possible the forcible restraint of the victim had contributed to her death. However, the parties stipulated that Dr. Dietrich would testify that he could not state with a reasonable degree of medical or pathological certainty that forcible restraint had contributed to the victim's death.
On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to natural life imprisonment. He contends that not one of the aggravating factors under section 9—1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9—1(b)) was present.
Section 5 — 8—1(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005—8—1(a)(1)) provides that a defendant may be sentenced to natural life imprisonment if the court finds present any of the aggravating factors listed in section 9 — 1(b) of the Code. Section 9 — 1(b)(6) lists as an aggravating factor:
"6. [T]he murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5 — 2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was * home invasion *." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9—1(b)(6).)
Section 9—1(f) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9—1(f)) further provides:
"Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt."
We are of the opinion that the State met its burden of proof in regard to the elements of sections 9 — l(b)(6)(a)(ii) and 9 — 1(b)(6)(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9—1(b)(6)(a)(ii), 9—1(b)(6)(c)).
In regard to section 9 — 1(b)(6)(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9\—1(b)(6)(b)), the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "in performing the acts which * resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual, * the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual."
The focus is on the defendant's state of mind at the time he was inflicting the physical injuries upon the victim. The inquiry is whether the defendant, at the time he was inflicting physical injuries on the victim, had the intent to either kill the victim or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim.
In the instant case, it is uncontested that the only physical contact the defendant had with the victim was when he restrained her for approximately 10 minutes. During this time, the defendant also held a pillow over the victim's mouth for 10 seconds to quiet her. We do not believe that these actions evinced either an intent by the defendant to kill the victim or that the defendant acted with the knowledge that his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that an aggravating factor existed and vacate the sentences of natural life imprisonment for the murder conviction and the concurrent extended term of 40 years' imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. The cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
We are of the opinion that because the issue may arise in the cause as remanded, we will address the defendant's second issue.
The defendant's second argument is that the trial court improperly considered the victim impact statements of the victim's children. The State responds that the defendant has waived this argument, because of his failure to object to the State's motion to take judicial notice of the statements and his failure to raise the issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We agree with the State that the defendant's failure to fulfill those procedural prerequisites constituted a waiver of the defendant's right to raise this issue on appeal. (See People v. Gardner (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 763, 527 N.E.2d 155; People v. Favelli (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 618, 531 N.E.2d 386.) Nevertheless, we also find that the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of the children's victim impact statements. (See People v. Cissna (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 398, 524 N.E.2d 268.) Accordingly, the defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the statements is without merit.
For the reasons listed above, the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed in part and vacated in part; and the cause remanded for resentencing.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part and cause remanded for re-sentencing.
SCOTT, J., concurs.