Case Name: Howard K. HILL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William VARNER, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1955-11-29
Citations: 4 Utah 2d 166
Docket Number: No. 8377
Parties: Howard K. HILL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William VARNER, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: WADE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 4
Pages: 166–175

Head Matter:
290 P.2d 448
Howard K. HILL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William VARNER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 8377.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1955.
George B. Handy, Ogden, for appellant.
Richard W. Brann, Ogden, Amicus Curiae, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDonough, chief justice.
Defendant, upon a counterclaim tried to the court, recovered judgment against plaintiff for damage to his truck in a collision; but the lower court held that inasmuch as he had not proved the amount of his loss with reasonable certainty that he was entitled only to nominal damages of $5. Defendant appeals, alleging that the damages awarded are inadequate.
There is apparently no question as to the fact that appellant sustained a compensable injury. Witnesses testified that the truck was "wrecked"' and "damaged," that "a wheel was bent back underneath, the fender was ripped, the bumper was broken," and the appellant testified in his own behalf that damage included the front bumper, front fender, front wheel and tire and rim, axle, spring, front grill, frame and steering rod. Respondent, who was present at the accident, neither proffered contradictory evidence nor attempted impeachment of this evidence, and thus we accept the extent of damage delineated as true. However, the appellant was not very helpful to the íower court in offering evidence as to the amount of money which would compensate him for his loss: he testified, as owner of the vehicle, that the truck was worth $1,200 before the accident and $700 after the accident; he testified, as an experienced automobile mechanic, that the cost of repairing the truck would be $500; and he testified that as a result of the accident he had given up an independent hauling business which netted him $40 to $50 per day. He offered neither independent opinions as to the values nor an itemization as to the cost of repairing the various parts, except that a new axle would cost approximately $30 or $40, by which the court could test the validity of his opinions.
Furthermore, his credibility probably-suffered somewhat in the view of the court from the facts of self-interest, vagueness,- and the improbability inherent in his testimony that he was unable to obtain the money necessary to repair his truck or rent another to mitigate damages and continue a profitable business which had netted him nearly $1,000 per month for the prior six months. Certainly the trial court, as trier of the fact, was justified in not accepting as true, though uncontradicted, his evidence as to his damages for loss of use of the vehicle. However, as stated above, there is nothing in the record refuting the facts of physical damage which the trial court determined was due to respondent's negligence. It is not within our province to determine just what amount would compensate appellant for his injury; the question to be decided is whether, under the state of proof, appellant was entitled to more than nominal damages as a matter of law.
The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party, Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., Utah, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273, and the proper measure of damages for injury to personalty not entirely destroyed is the difference between its value immediately before and immediately after injury, Angerman Co., Inc., v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 209 P. 169, 79 A.L.R. 40. In some instances, proper repair will restore the market value of the property, but the plaintiff can recover, not only the reasona-. ble cost of repairs, but also depreciation in market value, if any, after repair, Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 P. 676. In the present case, it is apparent that appellant regards his damaged truck as being capable of complete repair, for his testimony as to the diminution in value and cost of repair are the same.
The real difficulty in this case is whether damages have been proved to the degree of certainty required in cases of this type. The rule is stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 912:
"A person to whom another has tortiously caused harm is entitled to compensatory damages therefor if, but only if, he established by proof the extent of such harm and the amount of money representing adequate compensation with such certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit."
Respondent cites to us two West Virginia cases in which the proof of loss through damage to automobiles was based upon a general, unitemized estimate and verdicts awarded substantial damages in accordance with the estimates. On appeal by the losing parties, the Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed and granted new trials on the grounds that the evidence*was insufficient to sustain the judgment for damages. Ripley v. C. I. Whitten Transfer Co., 135 W.Va. 419, 63 S.E.2d 626; Tingler v. Lahti, 87 W.Va. 499, 105 S.E. 810.
This court, in Orient Mining Co. v. Freckleton, 27 Utah 125, 74 P. 652, while sustaining a decree quieting title to water in plaintiff, reversed and remanded the case on the issue of damages awarded in the amount of $250, ordering that the lower court take further evidence on the question.
It is obvious that monetary loss because of injury to a chattel is capable of more certain proof than is the loss incurred because of a trespass to a water right or elements involved in bodily injury, and plaintiff should be held to that higher degree of proof. However, here we have an instance of substantial damage proved but only nominal damages awarded, where the general knowledge of the trier of the fact and all men must indicate a loss beyond the mere invasion of a legal right for which nominal damages are generally awarded. In all cases where damages are in dispute, the injured party is ofttimes inclined to exaggerate his claim and the tortfeasor to minimize it, the trier of the fact must resort to his own general knowledge of values in order to conclude the litigation. IX Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2570. One of the illustrations included in The Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 912, supra, indicates that the rule of certainty should not be applied contrary to the dictates of reason:
Illustration 1, p. 578. "A intentionally kills 'B's dog. No evidence is in-r troduced as to the value of the dog. B is entitled only to nominal damages, unless the description of the dog by witnesses is such as to indicate that it has some substantial value."
Although the amount of damages to be awarded is a question of fact, appellant has shown that he is entitled to some compensatory damages.
The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages alone. Each party to bear his own costs.
WADE, J., concurs.