Case Name: WEI XING LIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-02-13
Citations: 597 F. App'x 13
Docket Number: No. 14-30
Parties: WEI XING LIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, SUSAN L. CARNEY, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 597
Pages: 13–14

Head Matter:
WEI XING LIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-30.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 13, 2015.
Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Justin R. Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sharon M. Clay, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, SUSAN L. CARNEY, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Wei Xing Lin, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a December 20, 2013, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen deportation proceedings. In re Wei Xing Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2013). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to fíle a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lin's motion to reopen, filed in 2013, was untimely, because his order of deportation became final in 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Lin moved to reopen, however, to apply for asylum based on his practice of Christianity, contending that because conditions in China have worsened for Christians, his motion was not subject to the time limitation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
The BIA determined that Lin had failed to show changed country conditions, and substantial evidence supports that determination. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).
The reports Lin cites are inconsistent regarding whether country conditions have changed from year to year, stating both that "[t]he government's respect for and protection of the right to religious freedom deteriorated," and that "[t]he government continued to restrict the growth of unregistered Protestant church networks." Lin reads these reports as indicating a worsening of conditions; the BIA read them as indicating continuity. Both readings are reasonable, and under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the BIA's reading. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir.2007).
Because the BIA's finding that Lin failed to establish materially changed country conditions is dispositive, we need not review the agency's finding that Lin failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief from deportation. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of deportation in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.