Case Name: Hernan PEREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-12-27
Citations: 536 So. 2d 359
Docket Number: No. 88-169
Parties: Hernan PEREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 536
Pages: 359–361

Head Matter:
Hernan PEREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-169.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 27, 1988.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Henry H. Harnage, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Nancy Wear, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
One point raised in this appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine merits discussion: whether the warrantless search of a vehicle was based on a valid and voluntary consent. We conclude that there is no basis in the record to reverse the trial court's finding that the defendant gave a voluntary and intelligent consent.
The defendant, Perez, was stopped following a lengthy surveillance of suspicious activities in a busy Kendall shopping center. He readily produced a driver's license upon request. The facts after that point are disputed. The officer contends that he told Perez that he was conducting a narcotics investigation and that Perez verbally agreed to a search and opened the trunk of the automobile without a specific request to do so.
When presented with a consent to search form which explained that consent could be withheld, the defendant replied that "on the advice of counsel" he would not sign anything. Otherwise there was no withdrawal of, or limitation placed on, the already given verbal consent. The officer unzipped the portfolio case which the defendant had placed under the front passenger seat and discovered two clear cellophane-wrapped kilos of cocaine.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress Perez testified that although he was cooperative he did not verbally consent to a search and that the officer conducted the search after he refused to sign a consent to search form.
In resolving the dispute the trial court was required to consider all the facts and circumstances and to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. The settled law governing review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is that the ruling comes to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court, but, rather, should defer to the trial court's authority as a factfinder. Wasko v. State, 505 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Fla.1987); DeConingh v. State, 433 So.2d 501 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 228 (1984); Rodriguez v. State, 189 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848, 88 S.Ct. 66, 19 L.Ed.2d 116 (1967). Review of the record shows that the case was based on sharply conflicting testimony on the consent question, which was solely for the trial judge and then the jury — not this court — to resolve. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).
AFFIRMED.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and FERGUSON, J., concur.
. An undercover officer in a pickup truck was surveilling a shopping center at Kendall Drive and Southwest 117th Avenue when he saw a Latin male (not the defendant) make and receive several phone calls, in a 10-15 minute span, at a pay phone outside a convenience food store. Upon completing the last call the subject walked to his car, entered, drove around the lot twice, then parked the car against the curb with the engine running.
Several minutes later, as the officer watched, the defendant approached the parked car, got in, and talked as the car was driven around the lot. When the car stopped the defendant, who had entered the car empty-handed, exited with a portfolio-type briefcase. He walked over to an old automobile, opened the passenger door, placed the case partly under the seat, and slid across to the driver seat.
. We do not say, contrary to what is said in the concurring opinion, that the initial stop was justified. It is not necessary to reach that question.