Case Name: George HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1988-10-12
Citations: 532 So. 2d 602
Docket Number: No. 56781
Parties: George HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: As to Part I: PRATHER, GRIFFIN, ZUCCARO and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 532
Pages: 602–617

Head Matter:
George HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 56781.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 12, 1988.
Travis T. Vance, Jr., Eugene A. Perrier, Vicksburg, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF MURDER AGAINST APPELLANT.
Under this assignment of error, appellant contends that the court erred (1) in denying his request for a directed verdict of not guilty and a peremptory instruction of not guilty, (2) in refusing to reduce the charge to manslaughter, and (3) in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Appellant addresses Assignment I in two pages of his brief and cites two cases in support thereof, i.e., Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68 (Miss.1985); and Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203, 209 (Miss.1985).
The two cases cited by appellant correctly state the law. He quotes the following paragraph from Edwards:
If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, granting the motion is required. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion — that is, evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense — the motion should be denied.
469 So.2d at 70.
Also, appellant cites Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203 (Miss.1985), which stated as follows:
Where a defendant has requested a peremptory instruction, the trial court must consider all of the evidence — not just the evidence which supports the State's case — in the light most favorable to the State. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). The State must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Glass v. State, 278 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss.1973).
467 So.2d at 208.
There are several versions as to what occurred prior to and at the time of the homicide. Neither the wisdom of Solomon nor the combined intellect of an appellate court could decide the issue of guilt. Only a jury from the county at large, after observing the demeanor of the witnesses, hearing the testimony, and considering all the evidence under proper instructions on the law from the trial judge, could resolve that issue. This is as it should be. An appellate court should not and cannot usurp the power of the fact-finder/jury where, as here, the evidence is so conflicting.
In Griffin v. State, 480 So.2d 1124 (Miss.1985), and in cases previous and subsequent to Griffin, this Court stated the standard as follows:
Hammond v. State, 465 So.2d 1031 (Miss.1985), stated the rule with reference to granting directed verdicts and peremptory instructions of not guilty in criminal and civil cases as follows:
The rule in regard to a peremptory instruction is the same in criminal and civil cases, the rule being that when all the evidence on behalf of the State is taken as true, together with all sound reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom if there is enough to support a verdict of conviction, the peremptory instruction must be denied. 465 So.2d at 1035.
480 So.2d at 1126.
In Smith v. State, 463 So.2d 1102 (Miss.1985), this Court stated:
We have often stated that where the testimony is in conflict, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and worth to be given that testimony. They may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject the utterance of any witness.
463 So.2d at 1103.
Eight (8) witnesses testified for the State, and six (6) witnesses testified for the defendant. Evidence favorable to the State reflects that on January 20, 1985, around 8:15 p.m., Johnny Jenkins, the deceased, his wife, Clara, and friends left the Jenkins house after watching the Super Bowl football game and went to Henrietta's Cafe, a/k/a The Washington Cafe, in Warren County; that George Harris, appellant, approached Johnny Jenkins about a Super Bowl bet to which Jenkins responded either with a denial that they had a bet, or with a claim that he had won the bet; that appellant pushed or hit Jenkins first; that a fight ensued and bystanders pulled the two men apart; that appellant pulled a knife and said, "I'll be back to get you" and ran out the door; that Jenkins, his wife and friends, decided to go to another cafe, i.e., Mr. K's, but it was closed, and they returned to Henrietta's Cafe and went inside; that later Jenkins and his friends went outside where appellant was encountered near the cafe steps; that appellant made the following threatening statements to Jenkins, "Johnny, I want your curl" or "I'm gonna mess your curl up if I don't get my $10.00," referring to Jenkins' hair; that Jenkins and friends left and were moving toward Jenkins' car parked beside the cafe when appellant said something to Jenkins as they were walking away; that Jenkins broke from the group, made a running jump through the air as if to kick appellant, that Jenkins did not have a gun or any weapon; that appellant shot three times with a .22-caliber pistol, two bullets hitting Jenkins in the chest and one in the abdomen, which resulted in Jenkins' death.
Some witnesses testified that appellant was walking behind Jenkins, taunting him; that appellant pointed the gun at Jenkins from the top of the cafe steps; that when appellant and Jenkins confronted each other outside, appellant said, "I'm gonna' get you;" that Jenkins ran toward appellant and "played like he was going to do a kick on him and hit him;" that appellant "just came out of his pocket and just aimed at Jenkins and started shootin';" and that appellant fired at least the first shot through his coat pocket.
In Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042 (Miss.1979), the Court said:
No formula dictates the manner in which jurors resolve conflicting testimony into findings of fact sufficient to support their verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and observing the witnesses as they testify, augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A reviewing court cannot and need not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict.
373 So.2d at 1045.
In Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss.1980), the Court commented on the jury's scope:
The jury has the duty to determine the impeachment value of inconsistencies or contradictions as well as testimonial defects or perception, memory and sincerity-
381 So.2d at 989.
The jury was thoroughly instructed on murder, self-defense, and manslaughter. Two strong instructions on manslaughter were granted at the request of the State, as well as a form of the verdict on manslaughter (S-2, S-5 and S-6). The court granted, at the request of the appellant, two strong instructions on self-defense (D-2 and D-4), a strong instruction on the State's burden of proof (D-8), and a strong instruction on manslaughter (D-10).
We are of the opinion that the facts of this case presented a guilt issue of murder to the jury through proper instructions, and that the jury verdict of guilty is supported by the evidence.
HAWKINS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY LIMITING APPELLANT'S VOIR DIRE OF POTENTIAL TRIAL JURORS.
Harris next assigns as error that the court improperly sustained objections to questions he asked prospective jurors.
The following questions were allowed without objection by the State:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if his Honor Judge Clements, at the conclusion of the trial, gives you an instruction on self defense and defines what the law of self defense is, can I rely on each and every one of you to read that instruction and to apply that instruction to the testimony and to the evidence in reaching your decision? Can I depend on you to do that? Will each of you do that? If the law tells you that you must acquit, if that be the circumstances, can you acquit the defendant of the charge in the indictment? And the word, "acquit" means, can you find him not guilty? Can you do that?

Will any of you gentlemen or ladies ignore or put aside the defense of the defendant? And, we are asserting the defense of self defense, but will you consider that defense along with the other evidence and other testimony submitted by the state? Would you consider the defense? Will each of you do that?
(Vol. I, pp. 49-50)
The questions to which the court sustained the State's objections follow:
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence, that the defendant was confronted with a situation that warranted the use of force in the protection of his well being, and that it was imminent that his life was in grave danger, and that he was justified in using the necessary force to repel his assailant, the deceased, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty?
(Vol. I, p. 47)
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence and by the testimony that the defendant had reasonable grounds to apprehend a design on the part of the deceased to do bodily harm, or to take the defendant's life, and the defendant tried in every way possible to avoid the confrontation, but the deceased was persistent in his attacks on defendant to do him bodily harm, thereby placing the defendant in grave danger of his life, and the defendant was justified in using only that force necessary to repel the defendant, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty?
(Vol. I, p. 48)
Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence, by the testimony, that the danger to the Defendant was actual, present, and urgent, and that the Defendant used no more force than was necessary to protect his well being; can the Defendant then depend on you to bring in a verdict of not guilty?
(Vol. I, p. 48)
If it is shown to you by the evidence, or if there arises from the evidence in this case, a reasonable doubt in your mind that the defendant did not intend to kill the deceased, but merely intended to protect his own life, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty?
(Vol. I, p. 48)
The trial judge explained his rulings: The Court is telling you that you cannot ask questions of fact couched in hypothetical terms of the law that have not been given to the jury at this point, be cause it's not limiting the defendant's right in any manner to voir dire the jury as to whether or not they will follow the law as given to them by the Court at the conclusion of the trial as to self defense. The Court further would state for the record, that although the Court does not intend at this juncture, or any other juncture, to tell Counsel how to present his case or practice law, there are ways that questions can be asked to the jury to find out their feelings and their state of mind in the voir dire as to the defense of self defense, but they cannot, in the Court's opinion, be asked in the manner presented here in Chambers.
(Vol. I, p. 49)
A trial judge in questioning prospective jurors has the essential responsibility of selecting individuals who can impartially evaluate the evidence offered in court and apply the law given through court instructions to what they determine are the facts in the case.
The parties' counsel each knows more about the facts of the case and his own client than does the trial judge. It is therefore perfectly proper for counsel to ask further questions beyond the court's inquiries reasonably necessary to assure himself and the court that the jurors selected will give his client the benefit of every right to which he is entitled under the law, as well as to reveal or signify particular antipathies that could prejudice his client before any proposed juror. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579 (1938).
All of this is in keeping with the trial objectives of selecting a jury which can even-handedly weigh the adduced evidence and fairly and rationally apply the law given by the court to what they find to be the facts. Governed by a wise and liberal discretion of an experienced trial judge, a wide latitude should be allowed counsel to gain knowledge of jurors' attitudes towards the issues to be tried, and also towards special matters which likely will come up in a trial which reasonably could unduly influence some of the jurors, or indicate bias or hostility. Counsel should also be permitted to ask questions which give some measure of the competency or capacity of jurors to decide the issues in the case. Such questions should be permitted not only to challenge prospective jurors for cause, but to give trial counsel clues from which they will exercise peremptory challenges. Murphy v. State, 246 So.2d 920, 921 (Miss.1971); Atlanta Joint Terminals v. Knight, 98 Ga.App. 482, 106 S.E.2d 417 (1958).
This is the extent of the rights of litigants in the jury selection process. While it is no doubt true that most of the questions asked of prospective juries will be the same, repeatedly asked in hundreds of cases, the selection of a jury should by no means be purely by a rote or "boiler plate" inquiry by court or counsel. Because the line between a proper and improper question is not always easily drawn, it is manifestly a process in which the trial judge must be given a considerable discretion. Murphy, 246 So.2d at 922. And, while the trial judge should be lenient in seeing that these requirements are fulfilled, no court is required to permit trial tactics which go beyond them.
Many able trial attorneys attempt the apocryphal yet sage battle tactics of Nathan Bedford Forrest to "git thar fustest with the mostest." Subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, they attempt to get a leg up on the opposing side at the very first opportunity. Thus, in their voir dire questions they emphasize or reiterate points already made, as well as attempt to exact promises or pledges from the jury, and otherwise lead the jury to prejudge the case. A trial court is not required to, nor should it permit voir dire questions which go beyond the basic purposes of the jury selection process.
This, in effect, is the meaning and objective of Rule 5.02 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice:
Rule 5.02
VOIR DIRE
In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney shall direct to the entire venire questions only on matters not inquired into by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked.
Beginning with Phenizee v. State, supra, this Court has repeatedly admonished and condemned attempts in voir dire questioning to exact a promise or commitment from jurors on how they will decide a particular case. Williams v. State, No. DP-56 (Miss. Oct. 7, 1987); Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 938 (Miss.1986); West v. State, 485 So.2d 681 (Miss.1985); Murphy, supra; See also Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538, 331 S.E.2d 561 (1985). Bowens v. State, 116 Ga.App. 577, 158 S.E.2d 420 (1967); Palmer v. State, 532 P.2d 85 (Okla.1975); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 7 (1965).
Indeed, in Stringer, supra, we reversed because of an accumulation of several errors, including the error of permitting the prosecution over objection to ask questions seeking a commitment from the jurors. Questions such as these are never necessary to accomplish the basic purpose of securing fair and impartial juries.
Defense counsel in this case had no right to particularize what the facts would show and then ask the jurors if they would return a verdict of not guilty. The circuit judge properly sustained the State's objections to such questions.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
As to Part I: PRATHER, GRIFFIN, ZUCCARO and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent by separate written opinion.
As to Part II: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents without written opinion.
. For example, no prospective juror would have the ability to base his decision solely upon the evidence offered in court if he were an eyewitness to the event.
Nor would a prospective juror have an ability to impartially evaluate the case if he had such entrenched feelings about the subject matter of the case that he could not follow the law given by the court.
. In Phenizee v. State the error was egregious because the prosecution attempted to get a jury commitment to return a death penalty sentence, when the law of this State gave the jury the sole and absolute discretionary authority to sentence the accused either to death or life imprisonment.