Case Name: James DITTO, Jr., Independent Executor of the Estate of James Ditto, Sr., Petitioner, v. DITTO INVESTMENT COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1958-01-22
Citations: 309 S.W.2d 219
Docket Number: No. A-6449
Parties: James DITTO, Jr., Independent Executor of the Estate of James Ditto, Sr., Petitioner, v. DITTO INVESTMENT COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 309
Pages: 219–227

Head Matter:
James DITTO, Jr., Independent Executor of the Estate of James Ditto, Sr., Petitioner, v. DITTO INVESTMENT COMPANY, Respondent.
No. A-6449.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Jan. 22, 1958.
Cantey, Hanger, Johnson, Scarborough & Gooch, Jack C. Wessler & Carlisle Cravens, Fort Worth, Black & Stayton, Austin, for petitioner.
McGown, Godfrey, Logan & Decker, Winfred Hooper, Jr., and John W. Mc-Mackin, Fort Worth, for respondent.

Opinion:
SMITH, Justice.
Ditto Investment Company, respondent, sued James Ditto, Independent Executor of the Estate of James Ditto, Sr., on a claim for medical services allegedly rendered by Dr. H. Howard Ditto to his uncle, James Ditto, Sr., and for attorneys' fees. The claim of Dr. Ditto against the estate of his uncle is based upon an alleged oral agreement by James Ditto, Sr. that Dr. Ditto's medical bill would be paid out of Ditto, Sr.'s estate after his death. Dr. Ditto is the only living witness to the alleged agreement and it is conceded that without his testimony the agreement cannot be proved.
On December 11, 1956 the parties appeared and announced ready for trial. A jury was empaneled and sworn, and, thereafter, in the regular order of procedure, the respondent tendered Dr. Ditto as a witness. Thereupon, the petitioner requested of the court and was granted permission to examine the witness on voir dire out of the presence of the jury. The evidence elicited at this time and later on (January 21, 1957), in connection with the Bill of Exception, was, in substance, as follows:
The claim was for medical services rendered over a period of a little over five years; that James Ditto suffered from several different ailments, and that in his capacity as a physician numerous house calls, for the purpose of treating the deceased, were made; that medical treatment was given during said period of time, and that all such services were rendered pursuant to the oral agreement between James Ditto and the witness, Dr. Ditto; that, in accordance with the agreement, the witness, after the death of James Ditto, filed his claim in the sum of $19,280 with the independent executor of the estate. The claim was in all respects rejected. Without question, the provision of Article 3716, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, would have compelled a trial court to sustain an objection based on that article to the testimony of the witness had he brought the suit in his own behalf. Dr. Ditto was so advised by counsel of his choice. The witness testified that, upon advice of counsel, he transferred the entire claim as a gift to his wife, and that no consideration was paid; that no gift tax was paid and no federal gift tax return was .made by Dr. Ditto; that Mrs. Ditto formed a corporation, and the expenses in the. sum of $260 incurred in forming the corporation, Ditto Investment Company, were paid out of the joint bank account of Dr. and Mrs. Ditto; that after the corporation was formed and immediately after Dr. Ditto had assigned the claim to his wife, she, in turn, joined by her husband, without consideration, transferred the claim to the corporation. The witness also testified that he is to pay the corporation's attorneys' fees; that the corporation is represented by the same attorneys he originally consulted. At the conclusion of this evidence, the petitioner objected to its introduction before the court and jury on the ground that it was violative of Article 3716, supra. Upon the respondent's declination to offer further evidence, the trial court discharged the jury, and on January 21, 1957 entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Civil Appeals has reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause to that court for a new trial. 302 S.W.2d 692.
Preliminary to a consideration of the question involved, we direct attention to the fact that although this was a jury trial and not a trial by the court, the respondent, after the petitioner's objection had been sustained and judgment had been entered, requested the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court, in response to such request, filed findings and conclusions and no objections to these findings of fact were made by the respondent. The filing of such findings and conclusions was neither necessary nor proper. There is no authority for the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law under the circumstances we have here. See Rule 296, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Cox v. Rhodes, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 924, no writ history.
The sole question on this appeal is whether or not the evidence affords a rational basis for the inference that the transfers of the claim as above outlined did not divest Dr. Ditto of his beneficial interest in the claim. In other words,' did the evidence show that Dr. Ditto's testimony was barred by Article 3716, supra. The question of the competency of the witness was one for the trial court to determine, and when objection is made, as it was here, it is proper for the court to hear the objection and the evidence and enter its ruling thereon. We are of the opinion from all the facts and circumstances in evidence that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the objection to the evidence. Therefore, the excluded testimony was inadmissible, and the take-nothing judgment was proper. See Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291; O'Brien v. First State Bank & Trust Co. of Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 556, wr. dism.
The judgment of .the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed.