Case Name: Tyndale Palmer, Appellant, v. George E. Matthews and Charles E. Austin, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898
Citations: 29 A.D. 149
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tyndale Palmer, Appellant, v. George E. Matthews and Charles E. Austin, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 29
Pages: 149–159

Head Matter:
Tyndale Palmer, Appellant, v. George E. Matthews and Charles E. Austin, Respondents.
Libel — competency of a letter written by plaintiff to defendants — cross-examination of the plaintiff as to other suits for the same libel.
In an action for libel brought against the proprietors of a newspaper, the plaintiff upon his cross-examination was asked in reference to similar actions brought by him against other newspapers for the publication of the same article, after a letter, written by the plaintiff to the defendants, had been offered by the defendants and received in evidence, without objection, in which the plaintiff inclosed some clippings from other newspapers, and wrote, “ I am prepared to demonstrate to you, as I already have done to the counsel of the papers which I inclose, that the charges made were absolutely baseless, and that, in addition to the ordinary injuries always arising from such false and infamous charges, my business interests received a direct injury from your publication. The financial loss to me from the publication as a whole was most serious. However, I do not expect any one paper to bear it all, but only its due proportion.” The letter in question was one of a series of five written' by the plaintiff to the defendants, four of which the plaintiff had already read in evidence.
Held, that, under the circumstances, it was entirely proper for the defendants to complete the series bjr introducing the letter which was omitted; and, having done so, to cross-examine the plaintiff respecting its contents;
That the plaintiff, having, in answer to an inquiry as to how many papers the article had been published in, replied that he did not know, it was proper for the defendants to refresh his recollection by asking him how many papers he had brought actions against.
Hardin, P. J., and Follett, J., dissented'.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Tyndale Palmer, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 19th day of May, 1897, upon the verdict of a jury for six cents damages, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 24th day of May, 1897, denying the plaintiff’s motion for .a new trial made upon the minutes. .
The defendants are the proprietors of a daily newspaper published in the city of Buffalo, known as the Illusimated Buffalo Express, and, on the 2d day of October, 1892, they caused to be published therein an article concerning the plaintiff, of which the following is a copy, viz.:
“ They Stole §440,000.
“ Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 1. The theft of $440,000 from The Auer Incandescent Light Company by Tyndale Palmer, a former Philadelphia newspaper man, in which he was joined by a hotel keeper named Freitas, of Rio Janeiro, has just been brought to-light.
“ The company is owned solely by A. 0. Granger, the president,, and ex-Senator Gazzam, the vice-president. They formed the South American Welsbach Incandescent Light Company, and sent young Palmer to Rio to boom the invention. He and Freitas sold the patent rights for §510,000 in gold, and upon Palmer’s return he reported the sale as having been made for §80,000, of which §10,000' was expended in his salary, expenses and commission.
“ The theft was not learned until two other men were sent to Brazil on a second mission, although reports had reached the ears of the company. Palmer was sent to England to negotiate securities of one of ex-Senator Gazzam’s iron companies, and, upon demanding a higher commission, was dismissed. Palmer cannot be returned from England, but action is being taken to recover sums which he expended in buying farms for relatives. The second trip was made to Brazil to ‘sell improvements on the original Welsbach invention which caused the title to be changed to the Auer Company.’ ”
The publication of this article was admitted by the defendants in their answer, but they alleged by way of mitigation that the same was furnished to them by an association known as “The United Press,” which was engaged in the business of collecting and transmitting news by telegraph to its subscribers and patrons; that they received the article in the regular course of business, and, in common with many other newspapers throughout the country, published, the same in good faith and in reliance upon its accuracy and truth.
The issues thus joined were tried at the Erie Trial Term, and the trial resulted in a verdict for six cents damages in favor of the plaintiff. From the judgment entered thereon as well as from an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the minutes,, this appeal is brought.
Tyndale Palmer, appellant, in person.
Charles B. Wheeler, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Adams, J.:
Several exceptions to the rulings of the trial court are pressed upon our attention by the plaintiff, who appeared in person upon the argument of this appeal, and it is claimed that they present error which requires a reversal of the judgment and order appealed from. But after careful examination of the same we find ourselves unable to acquiesce in this contention.
To our view the most serious question which the case presents is that raised by exceptions to certain inquiries put to the plaintiff upon his cross-examination relative to similar actions brought by him against other newspapers for the publication of this identical article.
It appears that, before the present action was commenced, the plaintiff demanded of the defendants that they retract the alleged libel and compensate him. for the injury which he claimed to have sustained in consequence of its publication. This demand was in the form of a letter, which was followed by several other letters written by the plaintiff and sent to the defendants, in one of which, under date of July 17,1891, were inclosed some clippings, from other newspapers, and in regard to which the plaintiff wrote as follows, viz. : " I am prepared to demonstrate to you, as I already have done to the counsel of the papers which I inclose, that the charges made were absolutely baseless, and that, in addition to the ordinary injuries always arising from srich false and infamous charges, my business interests received a direct injury from your publication. The financial loss to me from the publication as a whole was most serious. However, I do not expect any one paper to bear it all, but only its due proportion. * "x" * "
This letter was offered by the defendants and received in evidence without objection during the plaintiff's cross-examination, and it was followed by inquiries to which we have already adverted and which simply called for a statement as to tire number of papers he had brought actions against for publishing this same article.
The plaintiff bases his contention that the admission of this class of evidence was error upon the assumption that it was received by way of mitigation. In this, however, he is clearly mistaken, for the learned trial court was particular to say that it was admitted only by way of cross-examination, and in his charge to the jury neither this nor any other circumstance save the absence of express malice and the source from which the defendants received the article was alluded to as mitigating in its character. The sole question, therefore, as we regard it, is, was the evidence thus objected to properly received in connection with the cross-examination of the plaintiff ?
Subject to certain well-defined limitations, the range and extent of a cross-examination are generally within the discretion of the trial judge, and a court of review ought not to interfere unless it is made to appear that this discretionary power has been abused. (Foster v. Tanenbaum, 2 App. Div. 168; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393.)
That 'the record in this case does not disclose any such abuse of power is, we think, perfectly apparent. In one of the letters written by the plaintiff under date of November 30, 1893, which was introduced in evidence by him, he alludes to the fact that other papers had published the libel, and claimed that it in no wise affected his right of action against the defendants. In the subsequent letter of July 17, 1891, he not only incloses clippings from some of those papers, but informs the defendants that all he asks of them is that they shall bear their due proportion of the pecuniary compensation he was seeking to obtain through the medium of his various actions.
This last-mentioned letter was one of a series of five written by the plaintiff to the defendants, four of which he had already read in evidence. In these circumstances we think it was entirely proper for the defendants to complete the series by introducing the one which had been omitted; and having done that, to cross-examine the plaintiff respecting its contents. In pursuing this course, the plaintiff's attention was directed to the statement in his letter that this particular article had been published by other papers, and, upon his conceding that such was the fact, he was asked how many papers had published it, to which he replied that he did not know. Up to this point there certainly can be no doubt as to the propriety of the questions put to the plaintiff, and liad he answered the last one it would perhaps have been all that the defendants were entitled to. But, inasmuch as he disclaimed any knowledge upon the subject of the inquiry, we are unable to see why it was not perfectly legitimate for counsel to pursue it, and, in order to refresh the recollection of the witness, ask him how many papers he had brought actions against. The answer to this question furnished some information as to the number of papers which had published the article, and while it may, as is claimed, have had a tendency to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery, that circumstance does not make its reception error, provided it was competent for any purpose.
As has been well said by an eminent jurist, "A party who seeks to testify in his own behalf must take the risk if there are vulnerable joints in his harness." (People ex rel. Phelps v. Oyer & Terminer County of N. Y., 83 N. Y. 461.)
One of the principal objects of a cross-examination is to expose these " vulnerable joints," and it matters not whether they are the result of defective character, contradictory statements or declarations against interest, their discovery is one of the risks which a party assumes when he takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf. As has been already intimated, this is the only question which we deem it necessary to discuss, and as it, to our mind, presents no error, our conclusion is that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Green and Ward, JJ., concurred; Hardin, P. J., and Follett, J., dissented.