Case Name: Steven D. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-05-04
Citations: 638 So. 2d 532
Docket Number: No. 94-00608
Parties: Steven D. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PATTERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 638
Pages: 532–534

Head Matter:
Steven D. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-00608.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 4, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1994.

Opinion:
PARKER, Acting Chief Judge.
Steven D. Young appeals the denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. We conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that Young was barred procedurally on grounds two and three in his motion. We, however, reverse as to ground one and remand to the trial court to determine if the court imposed three consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for crimes occurring in a single criminal episode.
Young was convicted and sentenced in 1982 for two counts of robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault. His sentences in- eluded the stacking of three mandatory minimum three-year sentences, for a minimum of nine years, pursuant to section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1981).
In Young's motion to the trial court, he alleged that these three crimes involved a single criminal episode of brandishing a gun and robbing a store manager and a store cashier of money contained in a cashier drawer and safe. Young further alleged that this amounted to a single forceful taking, which should subject him to only one minimum mandatory sentence. In support of his position, he cited the cases of Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983), Bass v. State, 530 So.2d 282 (Fla.1988), and Daniels v. State, 466 So.2d 1262 (1985).
The cases which Young cited support his position; that is, the imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences is illegal if the evidence supports the allegation that these crimes did occur in a single criminal episode. Further, although Young's sentences were imposed before Palmer, the supreme court has held that it would be manifestly unfair to treat prisoners sentenced before Palmer differently from those sentenced after Palmer. Bass, 530 So.2d at 283.
We, therefore, conclude that we must reverse the trial court's order denying relief as it relates to the issue of stacked mandatory minimum sentences. We remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Young's allegations concerning a single criminal episode are supported by the evidence. Although we note that Young has completed the full nine years of the mandatory sentences, we cannot say that this matter is moot because of the possible effect of the award of gain time in the prison system if the trial court should determine that six years of the mandatory sentences were illegal.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with directions to the trial court.
PATTERSON, J., concurs.
ALTENBERND, J., dissents with opinion.