Case Name: Mrs. Joseph F. PARTYKA, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Eugene F. Hall, III, Deceased v. YAZOO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 5A's Enterprises, Inc. and Tee Taylor
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1979-09-12
Citations: 376 So. 2d 646
Docket Number: No. 51254
Parties: Mrs. Joseph F. PARTYKA, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Eugene F. Hall, III, Deceased v. YAZOO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 5A’s Enterprises, Inc. and Tee Taylor.
Judges: SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 376
Pages: 646–653

Head Matter:
Mrs. Joseph F. PARTYKA, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Eugene F. Hall, III, Deceased v. YAZOO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 5A’s Enterprises, Inc. and Tee Taylor.
No. 51254.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 12, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1979.
Paul D. Snow, III, Jackson, for appellant.
Riddick & Carpenter, Robert M. Carpenter, Jackson, for appellees.

Opinion:
COFER, Justice,
for the Court:
Appellant, Mrs. Partyka, mother and executrix of the will of Eugene F. Hall, III, (Mr. Hall) brought suit for his death in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. Appellees Yazoo Development Corporation (Yazoo), 5A's Enterprises, Incorporated, and Tee Taylor, incorporated in their answer to appellant's declaration, a special defense that, tersely stated, charged appellant had no standing to sue under Mississippi Code An notated, section 11-7-13 (1972), because deceased left surviving him his wife, Mrs. Hall, who was injured in the same accident and succumbed to the injuries approximately thirty minutes after her husband's death. On a hearing on the defense in advance of the hearing on the merits, the court sustained the special defense and appellant's suit was dismissed. This appeal resulted, appellant assigning two errors:
1. The lower court committed reversible error by sustaining defendants plea in bar because the deferred class of statutory beneficiaries under our wrongful death statute should be entitled to the cause of action and damages for the wrongful death of their blood relative when the only member of the preferred class of statutory beneficiaries is not living at the time suit is filed or recovery is made;
2. A last will and testament should circumvent our wrongful death statute.
The disastrous accident occurred April 21, 1978. Appellant filed suit for the death of her son, Eugene F. Hall, III, on May 4, 1978, the suit being for the benefit of all beneficiaries under section 11-7-13 (statute), and being brought in her individual name. On May 11, 1978, Mrs. Carrie Mae Dearman, mother of Mrs. Hall, having qualified as Mrs. Hall's administratrix, brought a suit for the wrongful death of Mrs. Hall and another suit for the death of Mr. Hall. On discovery of a will which Mr. Hall had made, wherein appellant was named executrix and sole primary beneficiary, which she caused to be probated, and received the court's authority to bring the suit, appellant, on June 20,1978, amended her declaration to sue individually and as executrix. (The amended declaration asserted that the suit was "for herself and on behalf of the heirs at law and/or next of kin of decedent which include his mother, Mrs. Joseph F. Partyka; his father, Eugene F. Hall, II; his half-brother, Jon M. Freemen; his half-sister, Mrs. Janice Kay Beard; his twin sister, Mrs. Gail Verret; and his sister, Mrs. Julie Bennett.")
Mrs. Hall's administratrix did not participate in appellant's hearing on the special plea, but her attorney lent help to defendants in successfully advancing the plea matter.
The important issue herein involved is whether on Mrs. Hall's decease (there were no children born to the decedents) the benefits to which she was entitled on account of Mr. Hall's death became a part of her intestate estate, or whether the second group of beneficiaries named in the statute became, on her death, the parties entitled to maintain a suit and recover the damages for Mr. Hall's wrongful death.
We affirm the lower court.
At the outset, we observe that appellant seems to find support in Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258 (Miss.1973). The crucial decision there was whether the recovery for Mrs. Smith's death went to her heirs (a group of first cousins), by descent and distribution, or whether "general distribution" under the statute would permit its being paid out according to the wrongful death victim's will. This Court held in favor of testamentary disposition, and is not authority here.
Appellant also misconstrues Southern Pine Electric Power Association v. Denson, 214 Miss. 397, 57 So.2d 859 (1952). While it was established in the proof that Mrs. Stringer survived her husband for a very short interval, both having been electrocuted in the same occurrence, the case did not turn on her survivorship, but rather the entire pleadings were cast upon the erroneous premise that their deaths were simultaneous. Survivorship vel non of Mrs. Stringer was not alleged in the pleadings.
The answer thereto did not set up the question of survivorship. It did not aver that the damages were nominal or that they were only for the pecuniary loss and loss of companionship to Mrs. Stringer, as the survivor, for a brief period of time. No affirmative defense whatever was interposed thereto. On the contrary, the answer merely said: "Defendant denies paragraph 8 of the declaration." If such issue had been raised, the burden would have fallen on appellant. Daniels v. Bush, 211 Miss. 1, 50 So.2d 563. (Emphasis supplied.)
Lawsuits must have issues. Those issues must be made by the pleadings. Proof must conform to the issues made by such pleadings. Otherwise lawyers, trying a case, will be like mariners, without any form of compass, sailing an uncharted sea. (Emphasis supplied).
#
It was admitted that the decedent had a life expectancy of thirty years and eight months. There was no proof either as to earning capacity or pain and suffering. Evidence by the plaintiff, without objection, showed that decedent had eight brothers and sisters and that the companionship between him and them was close and fine. Such evidence has considerable probative value if Mrs. Stringer was not the survivor, and if simultaneous deaths are assumed. As we have already said, the question of survivorship is not involved here. (Emphasis supplied). (214 Miss. at 415-416, 57 So.2d at 865).
To suggestion of error [now petition for rehearing] at 214 Miss. 417, 59 So.2d 75 (1952), this Court made the following response:
Even though the proof of the survivor-ship of the wife would have been competent for the purpose in connection with which it was introduced, that is to say as tending to reduce the amount of the actual damages. . . . (Emphasis supplied). (214 Miss, at 420-421, 59 So.2d at 76).
The statute, as it is applied to this cause, provides that, if Mr. Hall left a widow or children or both, or father or mother or sister, or brother, then suit may be brought by one entitled to recover for all entitled to recover, or by the estate's (Hall's) representative for those entitled to recover, and recovery shall be for all interested parties.
The statute fixes and provides for distribution of the recovery, thus:
If the decedent was a married man (as here), the damages shall be equally distributed to his wife and children, and if he has no children (as here) all shall go to his wife.
If the deceased has no wife or children, the damages shall be distributed to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death.
It seems to be undoubted that, if Mr. Hall left a wife and/or children, then such relative or relatives would be entitled to the damages to the exclusion of the deferred relatives — parents, brothers and sisters. Of these preferred relatives, relatives of the first echelon, only his wife survived him; he left only her. Therefore, she, and she alone, was entitled to any recovery for Mr. Hall's death. Mr. Hall left his wife, if ever, at his death. As will be later herein noticed, any interpretation of the statute to the effect that those surviving who sued, or were in being during the suit, or upon recovery, are those left by Mr. Hall would lead to endless confusion and injustice. Nor does the statute even imply that the beneficiary must survive for a prescribed minimum length of time in order to be classified as left.
Mr. Hall had a wife when he died, and left a wife, even though her survivorship was for only a matter of minutes. At his death before her decease she, at once, had a cause of action for his wrongful death. This cause of action was an item of property, an asset, in her estate, on which she could sue.
Section 91-7 — 233 authorized Mrs. Hall's administratrix to commence and prosecute any personal action whatever at law or in equity which the testator or intestate might have commenced and prosecuted.
In Scott v. Munn, 245 Miss. 120, 146 So.2d 564 (1962), Munn sued for damages suffered by his wife growing out of an automobile accident. Munn, the plaintiff died, and the suit was revived in the name of the admin-istratrix of his estate, and was prosecuted to judgment. On appeal here, it was held that the part of the action for medical bills and services of the wife survived his death, but that the claim for companionship and consortium was extinguished by his death and was not a subject for revivor in the administratrix.
Kentucky has a wrongful death statute very similar to ours. Its KRS 411.130(2) provides:
(2). The amount recovered shall be for the benefit of and go to the kindred of the deceased in the following order:
a. If the deceased leaves a widow or husband, and no children or their descendants, then the whole to the widow or husband. . . (Emphasis supplied)

d. If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, then the recovery shall pass to the mother and father of the deceased . . . and if the father is dead and the mother living, the whole thereof shall go to the mother.
e. If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, and if both father and mother are dead, then the whole of the recovery shall become a part of the personal estate of the deceased, and after the payment of his debts the remainder, if any, shall pass to his kindred more remote than those above named, according to the law of descent and distribution.
Sharp's Admr. v. Sharp's Admr., 284 S.W.2d 673 (Ky.1955), decided under the statute just above noticed, is in point here. The Sharps, husband and wife, were in an accident in which the wife was killed, leaving as her survivors her husband, who died twenty-six days later, and her mother, but no child. The husband was survived by children of a former marriage. Mrs. Sharp's administrator settled her death claim, and distribution of the proceeds of the settlement was made to Mr. Sharp's estate, and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
In affirming the award to the husband's estate, the appellate court cited Thomas' Admr. v. Maysville Gas Co., 112 Ky. 569, 66 S.W. 398 (1902), wherein the question of abatement of a cause of action brought by the father for the death of a son, on the father's death, was at issue, and quoted therefrom, "James Thomas being in esse when his son died, his right attached, and, having attached, descended at his death, with his other personal property;" and further, "The law regards that as done which ought to have been done; and, if it is finally held liable, those persons who would have gotten the fund if the claim had been paid off when the right attached are not affected by the fact that they did not survive the final result of the litigation." The appellate court also cited Ky. Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Admr., 169 Ky. 38, 183 S.W. 237 (1916), and of it said, "It was there held that the administrator of the person negligently killed acts as a representative of the surviving designated relative and that if the survivor subsequently dies, recovery goes to the latter's estate and descends as his other personal property."
The court said that Kentucky decisions had clearly recognized "that the person entitled to benefits under the statute was to be determined at the time of the death of the person wrongfully killed," (emphasis by that court); and further:
The statute says specifically that if the deceased "leaves" a widow or husband (and no children or their descendants), then the amount recovered shall be for the benefit of the widow or husband. When could one spouse possibly leave a surviving widow or husband except at the time of death? (Emphasis by that court). To say that the married woman in this case did not leave her husband until the time of the recovery (in this case a settlement made four months after her death) would certainly be a most unusual construction of the word "leave." (284 S.W.2d at 675).
Noting that the underlying objective (as is argued here) is to benefit those relatives who undergo a pecuniary loss, and that, in that case, persons not designated by the statute will ultimately be benefited, and that the statute so recognizes the fact, that court continued:
In addition, we cannot say that a designated beneficiary who dies before the recovery has not been benefited by it, even if, as suggested, the recovery is paid to his creditors. (284 S.W.2d at 675).
Reverting now to the argument of appellant that the mother, father, and siblings of Mr. Hall had, on Mrs. Hall's death, conferred upon them a right to the suit and the recovery, if any, we think that the Kentucky Court summarized well the reason and logic of holding that Mrs. Hall's right in the benefits of the wrongful death went to her estate, rather than the arising by her death of a cause of action by the deferred beneficiaries. We quote further therefrom with approval:
There are endless practical difficulties and uncertainties which would arise if we decided that the beneficiary under the statute could not be ascertained until the time of "recovery." In the first place, would the time of recovery be the date of a judgment, or an agreed settlement, or the time the damages were actually paid? Secondly, we would be forced to create some strange type of floating cause of action vested in the deceased's administrator with an unknown and unascertainable beneficiary. Yet we have recognized that the administrator acts as the representative of some specific beneficiary designated by the statute. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r, 169 Ky. 38, 183 S.W. 237, above cited. Thirdly, the administrator, by his control of the claim, would be in a position to determine arbitrarily in many instances who would be the beneficiary. Fourthly, since the administrator would represent no one in particular prior to the date of the recovery, to whom would he be responsible for enforcement of the claim, if anyone? Other almost insurmountable problems are readily apparent.
We have pointed out the above difficulties simply to indicate the vast uncertainty with which the statute would be fraught if the easily ascertainable time of the wrongful death is not determinative of the beneficiary for whom recovery may be sought. Assuming for the sake of argument that this statute is susceptible of different constructions, clearly that one should be adopted which will avoid uncertainty and confusion. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Section 382. On what we consider sound reason and authority, the trial court correctly adjudicated the issue presented. (Emphasis supplied). (284 S.W.2d at 675).
In White v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 125 Kan. 537, 265 P. 73 (1928), it was concluded that where, in a case such as this, one survives another, but for a moment, an action accrues to the survivor, the determining fact being whether the survivor did survive the decedent and not how long he lived.
We, accordingly, find the first assignment of error to be without merit.
We notice the second assignment that a last will and testament should circumvent the wrongful death statute. If we have correct understanding of this contention, it is that all recoverable under the statute should go to the beneficiary in Mr. Hall's will. If we are correct, we find a complete departure from appellant's argument in her first assignment in which she asserts that "the second most important aspect of our wrongful death statute is to specify exactly who is to recover damages for the wrongful death. The statute is clear that the damages are for the exclusive benefit of certain designated members of the family of the deceased . . ." A similar position is maintained throughout the argument.
A person may not devise or bequeath, so as to be effectual at his decease, that which he does not have. The wrongful death statute creates a new and independent cause of action in favor of those named in the statute. Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 459, 17 So.2d 791 (1944). The cause of action thereby created is not a part of the estate of the deceased (intestate). Byars v. Austin Admrs., 218 So.2d 11, 15 (Miss.1969). If none of the heirs named in the statute survived the wrongful death victim, then the recovery under the statute would become an asset of the estate to be used as any other asset thereof. Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258, 261 (Miss.1973).
Finding no merit in either assignment of error, it follows that the lower courts' decision must be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.
PATTERSON, C. J., and WALKER and BOWLING, JJ., dissent.