Case Name: GEOGHEGAN v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-05-11
Citations: 64 N.Y.S. 630
Docket Number: 
Parties: GEOGHEGAN v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 64
Pages: 630–634

Head Matter:
GEOGHEGAN v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 11, 1900.)
1. Street Railroads—Negligence—Instructions.
In an action for injuries caused by plaintiff’s wagon colliding with a street car while he was driving across defendant’s tracks, an instruction that if, just before the accident, the wagon was driven alongside the track and it was turned into- the track in front of the car, the verdict must be for defendant, was properly refused, since the turning into the track might have been far enough in front of the car to have given the grip-man ample time to stop the car and prevent the accident.
2. Same—Special Damages—Allegation—When Necessary.
Where injuries for which recovery is sought do not necessarily result from those described in the complaint, they must be alleged as special damages; and an injury to plaintiff’s eye could not be recovered for on. an allegation of injury to the head and brain, since it did not necessarily result therefrom.
Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, New York county.
Action by John Geoghegan against the Third Avenue Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRTJNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, McLAUGH-UN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
E. Treadwell, for appellant.
H. C. Smyth, for respondent.

Opinion:
VAN BRUNT, P. J.
This action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff through a collision with one of the defendant's cars at or near Forty-Third street, as the plaintiff was attempting to cross one of the defendant's tracks. The plaintiff claimed: That on the 31st of March, 1897, he was driving a wagon along Third avenue in the early morning,—at about a quarter to 6 o'clock. He was on his way uptown, and had been driving in the tracks of the defendant up to Forty-Second street, where he pulled out to the east side of the street. The car stopped at Forty-Second street. As the plaintiff proceeded uptown his progress was obstructed by some fire trucks, so that he turned back into the tracks before he reached Forty-Third street. He continued on the easterly track of the road until he reached Forty-Fourth street, and about the center of the crossing. At that point he looked back, and saw the cable car about 50 feet or more behind, when he started to pull out. The horse and wagon got clear of the track, with the exception of the hind wheel which was struck by the car, and the plaintiff was thrown out and injured. The defendant claimed: That the plaintiff was driving north on the roadway of Third avenue, alongside of and to the east of the car, between the track and the curb, moving rapidly, his horses at a gallop, when suddenly, without warning, he turned to the westward onto the track, directly in front of the car. As soon, as the defendant's gripman saw the wagon turning in front of him, he released the cable, applied his brake, and did all in his power to stop the car, which struck the left side of the wagon and knocked it against one of the pillars of the elevated railroad, and the plaintiff was thrown out and injured. The complaint alleged that by reason of said collision the plaintiff had sustained severe wounds and bruises to his head, right hip, left arm, back, and other parts of his body; that his spine had been injured, and that his brain had been injured; and that he had been informed and believed that thereby he had sustained other severe internal injuries. The grounds presented upon this appeal are errors claimed to have been made in the judge's charge and refusals to charge, and also in the admission of testimony tending to prove permanent injury to the- eye of the plaintiff, followed by a charge of the court instructing the jury that they might award damages for such permanent injury. It was also claimed that the damages were excessive.
In respect to the errors claimed to have been made by the judge in his charge and refusals to charge, the only ones presented for our consideration upon this appeal are those relating to that part of the charge of the court which referred to the circumstances surrounding the immediate happening of the accident, namely, the turning in or out- of the plaintiff upon or from the tracks of the defendant. And it is urged that the court erred in refusing to charge that if the jury believed that just before the happening of the accident the wagon was driving up the east roadway of Third avenue, between the tracks and the curb, and that it turned into the track, in front of the car, their verdict must be for the defendant. It is clear that this proposition is not well expressed, because it did not contain an element which was necessary to make it a good proposition, namely, that the plaintiff turned into the track in so close proximity to the car that the gripman, using proper diligence, could not avoid a collision. The expression of the request is, "turned into the track in front of the car." It might have been 100 feet away from the front of the car, and the gripman might have had ample time to have stopped the car so as to avoid a collision, and yet the jury were requested to be instructed in that case that the plaintiff could not recover. - It is clear that the court was justified in refusing such a request.
The. exception to the evidence in regard to the permanent injury to the eye seems to be of a more serious character. There was nothing in the complaint which called attention to an injury of that kind. It was clearly in the nature of special damages, and the rule has been recently reiterated in the court of appeals that, unless the injuries for which damages are sought to be recovered necessarily and immediately result from those described in the complaint, they must be specially alleged as special damages, or a recovery cannot be had for such injuries. Kleiner v. Railroad Co., 162 N. Y. 193, 56 N. E. 497. And attention is called in the case cited to that of Uransky v. Railroad Co., 118 N. Y. 304, 23 N. E. 451; the rule being approved that "special damages which are naturally but not necessarily the result of the injury complained of must be specifically alleged." It is clear that these injuries to the eye which were claimed to be established by the evidence in this case were not the necessary result of any of the injuries described in the complaint. Certainly the head could be injured without the eye being affected, and the brain might be injured without the eyes being implicated, and these are the only allegations to which this injury to the eye could be referred. Under the rule suggested, it was necessary, if the plaintiff sought to recover for these special and not inevitable results of the injury, to allege them as special damages. This rule of pleading gives a clear and unmistakable guide to the court in the admission of proof, and to the defendant in his preparation for trial. Injuries which inevitably result from those described in the complaint, and which the defendant must know from the allegations of the complaint bad been suffered, may be recovered for under the general allegations. But, where the injury is of a character which does not necessarily result from that described in the complaint, then the defendant has no reason to expect proof of any such unsuspected injury upon the trial.
We think that for this error the judgment and order must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
RUMSEY and McLAUGHLUST, JJ., concur.