Case Name: Sandra JARVINEN, Appellant, v. HCA ALLIED CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-11-01
Citations: 552 So. 2d 241
Docket Number: No. 88-2764
Parties: Sandra JARVINEN, Appellant, v. HCA ALLIED CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Appellee.
Judges: WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 552
Pages: 241–244

Head Matter:
Sandra JARVINEN, Appellant, v. HCA ALLIED CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Appellee.
No. 88-2764.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 1, 1989.
Certification Denied Nov 21, 1989.
Charles C. Powers of Charles C. Powers, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Alexander D. DelRusso of Levy, Kneen, Boyes, Wiener, Goldstein & Kornfeld, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing appellant's complaint against appellee. We affirm.
Appellant, Sandra Jarvinen, filed a three-count complaint against Hospital Corporation of America, Rodney Dorsette, and ap-pellee, HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc. Count I was the only count against appellee, HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc. and it alleged the following:
13. That the Plaintiffs [Jarvinen's] employment with the Defendant, HCA ALLIED CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., was terminated at the direction of the Defendant, HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA.
14. That the Plaintiffs employment with HCA ALLIED CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC. was terminated in retaliation because the Plaintiff had testified as to facts which were true, but were perceived by the Defendants as detrimental to the Defendant's defense of the claims of Raul Romaguera, M.D.
15. That the termination of the Plaintiffs employment as a direct and proximate result of testimony under subpoena which was true, but perceived as detrimental, is in violation of the public policy of this state that witnesses testify truthfully and without coercion, intimidation, or threat of adverse consequences.
16. That the Defendants' actions were malicious with intent to harm and penalize the Plaintiff for actions of the Plaintiff which were compelled pursuant to law.
17. As a direct and proximate result, the Plaintiff has suffered loss of earnings and earning capacity in the past and in the future, great mental and emotional anxiety and distress, humiliation, embarrassment and loss of enjoyment of life.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants for compensatory damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on past loss of earnings, and costs on this action and further demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as of right.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, to strike, or for more definite statement as to all counts of the complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to Count I by order dated August 3, 1988. A final judgment in favor of appellee, HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc., was then rendered by the trial court.
The Florida Supreme Court in DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1980), affirmed the Third District Court of Appeal's reasoning and decision in DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), wherein the trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause was affirmed on the ground that—
The established law is that where the term of employment is discretionary with either party or indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate it at any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employment contract. The employment agreement in the case at bar having been for an indefinite time, Pub-lix could terminate DeMarco for any reason without incurring liability.
(Citations omitted.) The facts in DeMarco involved the discharge of an employee for failing to withdraw a personal injury lawsuit he filed on behalf of his daughter against his employer.
The parties to the case at hand agree that Jarvinen was an at-will employee of HCA. Applying the reasoning stated by the Third District and approved by the Florida Supreme Court in DeMarco, no action for discharge, retaliatory or otherwise, could be maintained against HCA. Also see Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983) (Florida does not recognize an exception to the at-will doctrine in the form of a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge) and Wynne v. Ludman Corporation, 79 So.2d 690 (Fla.1955) (employee at-will could not maintain action against employer for breach of employment contract).
Those Florida cases that do exist on wrongful discharge from employment have consistently declined to recognize a cause of action for the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee. See Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.