Case Name: In re Alvin HILL
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1984-11-14
Citations: 460 So. 2d 792
Docket Number: No. 53795
Parties: In re Alvin HILL.
Judges: PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 460
Pages: 792–811

Head Matter:
In re Alvin HILL.
No. 53795.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 14, 1984.
Percy S. Stanfield, Jr., Stanfield, Carmo-dy, Coxwell & Creel, Jackson, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Justice,
for the Court:
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
Alvin Hill was convicted of capital murder in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County and on November 21, 1980 he was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed Hill's conviction and sentence in Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427 (Miss.1983). We denied Hill's petition for rehearing on May 25, 1983 and his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on November 7, 1983. On February 10, 1984, Hill filed this motion for leave to file petition for writ of error coram nobis. For the reasons stated below, we deny that motion.
For purposes of orderly discussion, we have divided Hill's arguments into three parts: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) constitutional issues; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel.
I.
A.
Hill's first claim is that "Newly discovered evidence reveals that the alleged murder weapon, which was placed in evidence and exhibited to the jury was unquestionably obtained as a result of petitioner's suppressed confession." Hill claims that there was no independent source for the discovery of the revolver and that the admission of that weapon under such circumstances was a violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Hill states that he admitted during intensive interrogation that he committed the robbery and murder in DeSoto County. He claims that he further admitted only to Rick Ward, a DeSoto County investigator, and Bobby Gene Biffle, a DeSoto County Constable, that he returned the murder weapon to Robert Carter, a resident of Memphis, from whom he had borrowed it. That confession was suppressed at trial; however, the gun, which according to a ballistics examination and pathology test was the one used in the shooting of the victim, was admitted as evidence.
Hill claims that the only source of evidence disclosing the whereabouts of the murder weapon aside from that obtained as a result of the confession, was "Sheriff Monteith's bald assertion that, as a result of interviewing Sammie Hampton, he informed the Memphis Police that the weapon was possessed by Robert Carter." On affirmance of Hill's conviction, this Court noted Monteith's actual testimony as follows:
When Sheriff Monteith was called as a witness by the state, the record reveals the following testimony relative to the source of his information about the murder weapon:
QUESTION: Sheriff Monteith, in the course of your investigation, did you have occasion to interview Sammy Hampton?
ANSWER: I did.
QUESTION: As a result of those interviews, did you at any time inform officers of the Memphis Police Department where a possible gun could be found? ANSWER: I did.
Hill v. State, 432 So.2d at 431, 432.
Hill asserts, contra to the trial judge's decision on the issue, that this was not enough to establish an independent source of evidence for admission of the gun. In further addressing this issue on direct appeal, this Court stated:
On the testimony which was before the circuit judge and the record as made, no one could ever know which of these two hypotheses is correct. Argument from now on till doom's day could never give the answer; from this record we are damned to an eternal suspense.
Under these circumstances we are not about to fault a beleagured trial judge, nor can we say he abused his discretion in finding that the information about the gun came from an independent source. On the record before him at trial, and in the motion for a new trial, he had a right to believe the testimony of the officers, and we find no reversible error on this record in his having done so.
432 So.2d at 437.
Hill now comes before this Court claiming that newly discovered evidence based on statements by Monteith and Hampton ends the "eternal suspense" and "conclusively establishes that the firearm was obtained as a direct result of petitioner's suppressed confession." Exhibit I provided by Hill is Hampton's affidavit which states that Hampton never told Monteith the firearm used in the murder of Robert Lee Watkins could be found in possession of Robert Carter or be found by contacting Carter, that he had no knowledge at that time of the weapon's whereabouts, that he was never personally acquainted with Robert Carter, and that he never suggested to Monteith that he speak to Carter in regard to the murder. Secondly, Hill asserts in paragraph 33 of his petition that "Sheriff Monteith is now willing to testify that he had little or no involvement in the investigation of the DeSoto County hi-jacking because the investigation into the Tunica County hi-jacking was his sole responsibility, he has no recollection of how the murder weapon was found, and in fact, he does not recall whether it was recovered at all." There is no attached affidavit supporting Hill's assertion.
The crucial question here is whether what Hill claims is newly discovered evidence actually falls into that category. Guidelines that have been followed by this Court in granting a new trial on newly discovered evidence were set forth in Lang v. State, 230 Miss. 147, 92 So.2d 670 (1957).
We entertain and sustain the petition under Chapter 250, Laws of 1952, as being a petition for leave to file in a trial court a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, and such leave is hereby granted. We recognize that there must be an end to litigation, and a judgment once solemnly entered must not be lightly opened or vacated, and never except for cogent reasons. Such a petition should be confined to the narrowest limits compatible with justice; it will be sustained only if newly-discovered evidence is of such nature that would be practically conclusive that it would cause a different result; it will not be sustained if the petitioner or his attorney knew of the existence of such evidence at the time of the trial, or could have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence; it will not be sustained if the newly-discovered evidence is merely cumulative, or additional to that adduced at trial; it will not be sustained if newly-discovered evidence merely tends to impeach other testimony offered at the trial; and it must be filed as soon as reasonably practical after the discovery of the new evidence.
230 Miss, at 171, 172, 92 So.2d at 675, 676.
In Entrekin v. State, 242 Miss. 262, 134 So.2d 926 (1961), an application for leave to present to the trial court a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence was denied. Affidavits from three people were attached to the application asserting facts involving the conviction. This Court stated that with the "exercise of any diligence whatever" the asserted facts would have previously been disclosed. 242 Miss, at 266, 134 So.2d at 927.
In Johnson v. State, 359 So.2d 1371 (Miss.1978), this Court affirmed the lower court's denial of a writ of error nobis citing Lang. The applicant wished to establish that Willie James Riley and Raymond Simmons left him at a bus station in Georgia and that he did not return with them to Jackson County, Mississippi. The Court stated the following:
Although appellant argues that testimony of Simmons was newly-discovered evidence which was unknown to him at the time of trial, and could not have been discovered with diligence, and that a different result could have been brought about by such testimony, the conditions of Lang were not met. Appellant knew that Raymond Simmons and Willie Riley went with him to Columbus, GA, knew that they were living in Moss Point and were available at the time of trial. He testified at trial that Lonnie Johnson left him at the bus station and the testimony of Simmons may be said to be cumulative."
359 So.2d at 1375.
On the basis of the above authorities, we hold that the appellant's allegations do not represent new evidence that could not have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence at or before the time of trial. Therefore, we find no merit to Hill's first argument.
B.
Hill's next argument is that "newly discovered evidence reveals that the failure of petitioner's trial counsel to raise an objection to the concededly improper questioning of the co-defendant was definitely not a matter of trial strategy." The questioning Hill refers to is reported in the decision on direct appeal as follows:
The state called the co-defendant Gregory Tucker as a witness. During questioning of Tucker, the record reveals the following:
Q. What have you been convicted of? A. Assault and larceny of a person in Tennessee, and manslaughter down here.
Q. Manslaughter down here in connection with what?
A. With this case here.
As petitioner points out, this Court held on direct appeal that the manner in which his co-defendant was questioned constituted error, but reversal was not warranted because Hill's attorneys did not raise an objection.
As to the state's questioning of Tucker about his conviction of manslaughter, this constituted error. See Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss.1969). The error was not as egregious as it would have been had Tucker been a witness for the defense, and the state had brought it out on cross-examination. See Warren v. State, 407 So.2d 100 (Miss.1981); and Henderson v. State, 403 So.2d 139 (Miss. 1981). The state's questioning of Tucker, a state witness, about his conviction of manslaughter was not altogether a one way street benefiting the state. This information enabled the jury to-see that a radically different treatment had been extended by the state to Tucker than that proposed for Hill.
The defense sought mileage out of this concession in cross-examination.
In view of the fact that no objection was made, that Tucker was cross-examined about his plea and conviction, and the defense at least three times in closing argument compared the treatment and punishment of Tucker as opposed to that being sought for Hill. (R. 1075-1076), defense counsel's complaint at this stage appears directed towards a trial strategy in which they were participants. What this amounts to is a trial strategy counsel aided and abetted, and now seek to criticize.
Moreover, counsel did not even see fit to assign this error in their motion for a new trial. If defense counsel did consider that their client was done an injustice in this respect, we cannot understand their failure to mention it in their motion for a new trial.
432 So.2d at 439.
Hill argues there is new evidence to establish that the failure of his trial counsel to object was a result of their ignorance of the law and not trial strategy. As defined by Lang, supra, newly discovered evidence is that which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence either before or at the time of trial. Certainly, trial counsel's ignorance of the applicable law does not fit into this definition and could in no way be construed as newly discovered evidence. Therefore, Hill's second argument is without merit.
C.
Hill's next argument is very similar to the one immediately preceding. Here he argues that newly discovered evidence reveals that this Court's conclusion that his counsel did not consider the prosecutor's final argument to be prejudicial is factually incorrect. In using the same argument he takes the stance that his trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument was wholly inadvertent and was the product of both a misunderstanding between counsel and ignorance of constitutional and criminal law. As we have held that the reasons for a mistake by counsel do not constitute newly discovered evidence, this argument is without merit.
II.
D.
A warrantless search of Hill's pickup truck which revealed a U-Haul rental contract dated July 11, 1979, and bearing Hill's name and the license plate of the rented truck was apparently conducted before Hill confessed to the robbery and murder. At trial there was no request for suppression of the U-Haul contract and the claim was not brought on direct appeal. The failure to raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal procedurally bars it. Pruett v. Thigpen, 444 So.2d 819 (Miss.1984); King v. Thigpen, 441 So.2d 1365 (Miss. 1983); Evans v. State, 441 So.2d 520 (Miss. 1983); Smith v. State, 434 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1983); Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So.2d 906 (Miss.1983); Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So.2d 486 (Miss.1983).
E.
Hill next asserts that the prosecuting attorney used his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the jury in Hill's trial. He specifically points out that at least four of the twelve challenges were exercised against blacks and that the jury was all white.
This Court has held on numerous occasions that exercising peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from jury panel is not error. Hughes v. State, 420 So.2d 1060 (Miss.1982); Gaines v. State, 404 So.2d 557 (Miss.1981); Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss.1979). In Gaines this Court cited to a decision of the United States Supreme Court which supported its conclusion:
We cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular ease is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tante, would no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at a hearing afterwards. The prosecutor's judgment underlying each challenge would be subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity. And a great many uses of the challenge would be banned.
In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes. Any other result, we think, would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it. Hence the motion to strike the trial jury was properly denied in this case. ([Swain v. State of Alabama], 380 U.S. [202] at 221-222, 85 S.Ct. [824], at 837 13 L.Ed.2d [759] at 773 [1964])
Based on these authorities there is no merit to this argument. Furthermore, the issue was not raised on direct appeal and is thereby subject to a procedural bar. See Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; and Wheat, supra.
F.
Hill next argues that the state's failure to produce a penholder pursuant to his request for discovery under Rule 4.06 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice rendered that pen-holder inadmissible. The failure to raise this issue on direct appeal renders it procedurally barred. See Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; and Wheat, supra.
G.
Hill next argues that the prosecuting attorney engaged in acts of misconduct and a pattern of misbehavior during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. First, he complains that the prosecutor asked questions of the victim's wife that were highly prejudicial and made for the purpose of eliciting sympathy for the victim's family. The questions pertained to children of the victim and his wife and their ages, whether he had been a good provider and how close the children were to their father. Petitioner concedes that no objection was made at the time of trial. Therefore, this argument is barred and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra.
Hill also asserts that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct by bringing out a statement made by Hill while in jail. While Hill was being questioned by an FBI agent when he was in the county jail, he was led to believe that his co-defendant, Hampton, inculpated him in the DeSoto County crime. He responded to the FBI agent "Sammy will get his." Hill argues that this statement constituted prejudicial hearsay and misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. Although there was an objection at trial, that objection was on the grounds that the corpus delicti had not yet been established. No other objection to the admissibility of this statement was made either at trial or raised on direct appeal. Therefore, the point is now procedurally barred. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra. Hill's other arguments regarding prosecutorial misconduct are likewise barred.
H.
Hill next argues that he should have been granted a jury instruction which charged that diminished mental capacity was a mitigating circumstance. It is claimed that Hill's IQ of 70 and a head injury sustained prior to the commission of the crime warranted that the jury be instructed to consider his mental capacity as a mitigating circumstance. Hill claims that his trial attorneys will. testify that their failure to request this instruction was inadvertent; however, affidavits supplied by the attorneys do not include such a statement.
Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(f) defines the mitigating circumstance concerning mental capacity in capital cases as when "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." At trial a guidance counsellor from Hill's high school testified that his IQ was about 70, that he was a slow learner, and scored low on achievement tests. She also stated that he had had a car accident in which a friend was killed in 1972. In that car accident Hill sustained a head injury. Thereafter he returned to school and excelled in carpentry work. He went on to graduate and got a college football scholarship. Hill's high school coach testified that after the accident Hill seemed withdrawn. On the basis of this evidence, we find that there was nothing presented which would have warranted an instruction on Hill's capacity to "appreciate the criminality of his conduct" as required by the statute at the time the murder took place. There is no merit to this assignment of error.
I.
The jury was instructed at the sentence phase that it should consider as an aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(f) where the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery as delineated in § 99-19-101(5)(d). Hill claims this violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by giving one aggravating circumstance double weight. This same argument was addressed in Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss.1983), wherein we held:
It is additionally urged that instruction S-4 was improper because it permitted the jury to consider as aggravating circumstance that the capital murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The thrust of this argument is the instruction permits the doubling of aggravating circumstances (saying the same thing twice) when the evidence would permit only one aggravating circumstance. Section 99-19-101(5)(d) lists robbery as an aggravating circumstance which in conjunction with a homicide will elevate it to capital murder. Sub-section (f) gives the aggravating circumstance, "The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain," the same potential of elevating a homicide to capital murder. But we think an indictment, as here, charging capital murder in the course of a robbery permits instructions on both "robbery" and "pecuniary gain" as aggravating circumstances because the evidence supports both as it reveals the robbery was committed for pecuniary gain during the course of which the homicide occurred. They are inextricably intertwined in this case in our opinion. We gather from the argument there ⅛ a belief in some segments of the bar that the death sentence is imposed or is not imposed numerically. However, this belief is contrary to § 99-19-101(2)(b) which provides for a "weighing" by the jury of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the sentencing phase and our decisions accord with this directive.
435 So.2d at 669.
Based on our holding in Tokman, there is no merit to this argument.
J.
Hill next claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in allowing to be submitted to the jury as an aggravating circumstance Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(h) which provides as an aggravating circumstance that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. No objection to this instruction appears in the trial record and the matter may not be raised for the first time here. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra.
K.
Hill next complains that he was provided no notice of "what aggravating circumstances applied or should be considered either prior to trial or prior to the sentencing proceeding." Because Hill failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, the matter is procedurally barred. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra.
M.
Hill next argues that extensive publicity prior to and during the trial denied him a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. At no point prior to trial did Hill's attorneys request a change of venue. Having failed to give the trial judge the opportunity to exercise his discretion in granting a change of venue or to raise this issue on direct appeal, this argument is now barred. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra.
N.
Hill next asserts that the capital murder statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Supp.1983) is unconstitutional in that it does not allow a jury to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to death. In Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 564 (Miss.1982) we addressed this same argument and found it without merit. We are not persuaded here that our holding in Smith should be altered. Therefore, there is no merit to this argument.
O.
Hill next contends that the death penalty is administered and applied arbitrarily, capriciously, and whimsically in the State of Mississippi. On direct appeal this Court proportionately reviewed the inflic tion of the death penalty on Alvin Hill to cases involving similar crimes, facts and defendants. We concluded that "the infliction of the death penalty on Alvin Hill is not disproportionate, wanton or freakish." Hill v. State, 432 So.2d at 443. Therefore, this question has already been decided and may not now be relitigated.
P.
Hill next argues that his death is being exacted pursuant to a pattern and practice of Mississippi prosecuting authorities, courts, juries and governors to discriminate on grounds of race, sex and poverty in the administration of capital punishment. This point was not raised on direct appeal and is therefore proeedurally barred. Pruett, supra; King, supra; Evans, supra; Smith, supra; Edwards, supra; Wheat, supra.
III.
Q.
Hill's final assignment of error is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the standard of review to be applied in ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In that case the United States Supreme Court held that in order to successfully assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must prove that his counsel's performance was deficient and that that deficient performance prejudiced his defense. In proving prejudice "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Applying that standard we are unable to say that petitioner Hill received ineffective assistance of counsel in his defense.
CONCLUSION
Having addressed the points raised by Hill in his motion for leave to file petition for writ of error coram nobis and finding no merit in any of them, we hereby deny that motion.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS DENIED.
PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS and ROBERTSON, JJ., dissent.
I.e., two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance require the imposition of the death sentence or conversely one aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances require a life sentence.