Case Name: Ralph JAUBERT v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY of the State of Louisiana
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-11-11
Citations: 323 So. 2d 212
Docket Number: No. 6991
Parties: Ralph JAUBERT v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY of the State of Louisiana.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and MORIAL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 323
Pages: 212–217

Head Matter:
Ralph JAUBERT v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY of the State of Louisiana.
No. 6991.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 11, 1976.
Ovide M. Tregle, Jr., Robert B. Chopin, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellee.
Foye L. Lowe, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and MORIAL, JJ.

Opinion:
MORIAL, Judge.
The Department of Public Safety (Department) appeals a decision of the district court restraining, enjoining and prohibiting it from interfering with plaintiff's driving privileges. We reverse and remand.
When arrested by law enforcement officers on December 22, 1973, Ralph Jaubert refused an Implied Consent Sobriety Test. LSA-R.S. 32:661 et seq. Upon receipt of the sworn report (LSA-R.S. 32:667) of the law enforcement officers, the Department of Public Safety notified Jaubert of the suspension of his driver's license for a period of six months. Jaubert requested an administrative hearing. LSA-R.S. 32:668. At this hearing, Jaubert, his son who was with him at the time of his arrest, and his wife were the only persons to testify. Submitted at the hearing were an un-sworn arrest report and the arresting officers' LSA-R.S. 32:667 conclusionary re-part which stated in part: "That he [they] had reasonable grounds to believe that Ralph D. Jaubert had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. " After the hearing, the Department sustained the suspension. Ralph Jaubert filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (LSA-R.S. 32:668, LSA-R.S. 32:414, subd. E) seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Department from suspending his license.
When the trial began, the court heard plaintiff's testimony on the merits which consisted primarily of evidence on the issue of reasonable grounds. LSA-R.S. 32:667-668. Thereafter, the parties stipulated that reasonable grounds was the only issue to be determined. After hearing a portion of the Department's testimony on that issue, objection was made which was sustained. The court curtailed testimony of the arresting officers and stated that it would be excluded on the basis that they had not appeared at the administrative hearing. The district judge concluded that the judicial hearing (LSA-R.S. 32:668, 32:414, subd. E) was limited to a review of the administrative proceedings within the Department and was not a trial de novo.
LSA-R.S. 32:668, subd. B provides:
"If the suspension or determination that there shall be a denial of issuance is sustained after such a hearing, the person whose license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege has been suspended or to whom a license or permit is denied shall have the right to file a petition in the appropriate court for a review of the final order of suspension or denial by the State Department of Public Safety in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in R.S. 32:414 in the cases of suspension, revocation and cancellation of licenses."
Judicial review is provided for in LSA-R.S. 32:414, subd. E the pertinent part of which states:
" Any person denied license or whose license has been suspended, can-celled or revoked shall have the right to file an application within thirty days thereafter for a hearing before the district court of the parish in which the applicant resides, and such court is vested with jurisdiction to set the matter for hearing in open court upon ten days written notice to the department, and thereupon to determine whether the person is entitled to'd license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license under the provisions of this Chapter, and appeal from the district court may be taken to any court of competent appellate jurisdiction, (emphasis supplied).
The petition filed by the plaintiff pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:414, subd. E brought this case before the district court under its exclusive original jurisdiction. See Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971). Although a prior administrative determination of suspension had been made by the Department, LSA-R.S. 32:414, subd. E provides for the court " to determine whether the person is subject to suspension, Neither LSA-R.S. 32:414 nor LSA-R.S. 32:668 places any restriction or limitation on the scope of the original judicial hearing therein granted. The court is not restricted to a review of the findings of the Department. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, LSA-R.S. 49:951 et seq., which provides:
Ҥ 964. Judicial review of adjudication
A. A person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudicatiqn proceeding is entitled to judicial review under this Chapter whether or not he has applied to the agency for rehearing without limiting, however, utilisation of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy and would inflict irreparable injury." (emphasis supplied)
The hearing is a civil action amenable to the rules of procedure and proof for such actions. Meyer v. State, Dept. of Public Safety Lic. Con., etc., 312 So.2d 289 (La.1975). However, we conclude that the application for a court hearing to challenge the Department's suspension of a drivers license does not shift to the plaintiff the burden of showing the absence of reasonable grounds. The burden of affirmatively proving reasonable grounds is initially on the Department (LSA-R.S. 32:668) and remains with the Department throughout the court hearing. In the absence of a showing of reasonable grounds, the Department had no legal basis to proceed further (to place the plaintiff under arrest, etc., LSA-R.S. 32:667) and to invoke the serious action of suspension of plaintiff's license to drive. See: Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254 So.2d 515, 518 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1971).
The court hearing that we conclude is required by LSA-R.S. 32:414, subd. E does not allow for the Department to carry its burden of proving reasonable grounds solely on the basis of a sworn report of a law enforcement officer which contains the statutory conclusionary statement that " he had reasonable grounds % ‡
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for a trial not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
REDMANN, J., dissents with written reasons.
SCHOTT, J., dissents with written reasons.