Case Name: Susan Lynn CLEAVES v. James Raymond PARKER and John Edward Parker
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2005-11-16
Citations: 93 Ark. App. 150
Docket Number: CA 05-130
Parties: Susan Lynn CLEAVES v. James Raymond PARKER and John Edward Parker
Judges: Robbins, Bird, Griffen, and Baker, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 150–160

Head Matter:
Susan Lynn CLEAVES v. James Raymond PARKER and John Edward Parker
CA 05-130
217 S.W.3d 136
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 16, 2005
Catlett & Stodola, P.L.C., by: S. Graham Catlett and Paul Charton, for appellant.
Stephen W. Tedder, for appellee John Edward Parker.
Ralph G. Brodie & Associates, Ltd., by: Ralph G. Brodie and Michael K. Cornett, for appellee James Raymond Parker Jr.

Opinion:
David M. Glover, Judge.
Jack Parker, the testator, left a udge. died. Appellant, Susan Cleaves, lived with the testator at the time of his death and was named as a beneficiary in the will. Appellees James Parker and John Parker were the testator's brothers. James was named as executor of the will, and John was a beneficiary under the will. The only portion of the will at issue in this appeal is the final devise. The trial court found that Mr. Parker's chosen language was ambiguous, and after hearing testimony about surrounding circumstances, found that the final provision was a specific, rather than a residuary, devise. The effect of this finding resulted in a pro rata sharing of expenses among the beneficiaries, rather than paying the expenses out of what appellant contends was a residuary devise to appellee John Parker. We reverse and remand.
Standard of Review
Probate cases are reviewed de novo on the record. Balletti v. Muldoon, 67 Ark. App. 25, 991 S.W.2d 633 (1999). However, an order of the probate court will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. Clearly erroneous means that, although there is evidence to support the court's findings, the appellate court, on the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
The holographic will
Mr. Parker's two-page holographic will is reproduced in full as follows:
As earlier stated, the devise that is at issue in this case appears at the very end of the will, just above Mr. Parker's name and the date. The devise provides: "All the remaining monetary assets go to my Brother John to do with as he sees fit." Appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that this devise was specific rather than residuary. We agree.
In the interpretation of wills, the paramount principle is that the intent of the testator governs. Metzgar v. Rodgers, 83 Ark. App. 354, 128 S.W.3d 5 (2003). The testator's intent is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself. Id. However, extrinsic evidence may be received on the issue of the testator's intent if the terms of the will are ambiguous. Id. An ambiguity has been defined as an indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression in a written instrument. Id. The apparent meaning ofparticular words, phrases, or provisions in a will should be harmonized, if possible, to such scheme, plan, or dominant purpose that appears to have been the intention of the testator. Id. When the words of one part of a will are capable of a two-fold construction, the construction that is most consistent with the intention of the testator, as ascertained from other portions of the will, should be adopted. Id.
In Harrison v. Harrison, 82 Ark. App. 521, 526, 120 S.W.3d 144, 147 (2003), we explained the court's role:
The function of a court in dealing with a will is purely judicial; and its sole duty and its only power in the premises is to construe and enforce the will, not to make for the testator another will which might appear to the court more equitable or more in accordance with what the court might believe to have been the testator's unexpressed intentions. "The appellants are correct in the statement that the purpose of construction is to arrive at the intention of the testator; but that intention is not that which existed in the mind of the testator, but that which is expressed by the language of the will." Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431, 112 S.W.2d 417, 418.
Examining the four corners of Mr. Parker's holographic will, we find no ambiguity in the devise in question, and we hold that it is residuary in nature. Black's Law Dictionary defines "residuary devise" as a "devise of the remainder of the testator's property left after other specific devises are taken." Id., page 484 (8th ed. 2004). "The 'residue' of an estate is that which remains after the payment of all costs, debts, and particular legacies." Goforth v. Goforth, 202 Ark. 1017, 1023, 154 S.W.2d 819, 822 (1941). On the other hand, a specific legacy or devise is a gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator's estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other parts of the same kind, and which may be satisfied only by delivery of the particular thing. Goforth, supra.
"The mere enumeration of property in a residuary clause of a will in general terms does not constitute the legacy or devise a specific one. There must be something in connection with the enumeration of property to show that the testator's intention was to make the devise or legacy a specific one before the courts will so declare it. " . 'The general rule is that an enumeration of specific articles in a residuary clause will not make the bequest specific as to such articles unless they are designated in such a way as to differentiate them from the residue. A bequest of all of a man's property is residuary and not a specific legacy, since its import is the same as expressed by the words, 'rest and residue.' "
202 Ark. at 1022, 154 S.W.2d at 822. The Goforth court affirmed the trial court's finding that the following devise was general, or residuary, rather than specific in nature: "I bequeath to my beloved son, Walter Goforth, all of my personal property of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situated left by me at my death."
Here, appellant contends that the devise should be construed to give effect to each of the three essential words. That is, that Mr. Parker intended to devise his remaining assets, which just happened to be "monetary" in nature. We agree. In addition, in the context of Mr. Parker's will, the phrase "remaining monetary assets" does not contain the necessary language of specificity for it to be a specific devise. The devise is immediately preceded by a devise of $20,000 in life insurance proceeds, which, although ineffective, nevertheless tends to explain Mr. Parker's use of the word "monetary" in the devise in question. Further, the devise is placed at the end of the will where residuary clauses are normally placed. Mr. Parker's use of the word "remaining" is certainly residuary in nature. Also, with respect to the other devises in the two-page holographic instrument, all of which were specific, Mr. Parker repeatedly used the word "my," yet did not use that possessory word in the devise in question.
In light of our interpretation of Mr. Parker's holographic will, we also hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the estate's expenses should be shared on a pro rata basis by all of the beneficiaries. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-107 (Repl. 2004) (abatement statute).
For her second point of appeal, appellant challenges the trial court's award of fees to the executor. However, this point was presented as an alternative point of appeal, to be addressed only if the trial court's interpretation of the will were affirmed. Because we are reversing the trial court on the first point of appeal, it is not necessary for us to address appellant's second point of appeal.
We reverse and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Robbins, Bird, Griffen, and Baker, JJ., agree.
Pittman, C.J., Gladwin, Crabtree, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.