Case Name: JOHN L. SMITH v. GEORGE COFRAN
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1867
Citations: 34 Cal. 310
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN L. SMITH v. GEORGE COFRAN.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 310–320

Head Matter:
JOHN L. SMITH v. GEORGE COFRAN.
San Francisco Street Improvements—Assessment for—by Whom Made.—By the legislative Acts of 1862 and 1863, concerning street improvements in San Francisco, it is made the duty of the Superintendent of Streets, in the first instance, to make the assessment for street improvements, and deliver the same, with a warrant attached, to the contractor, authorizing him to collect the money from the owners of the lots liable therefor.
Idem—Remedy for Incorrect or Illegal Assessment.—By the provisions of said Acts, the assessment for street improvements and the warrant for the collection of the money from the owners of the lots, chargeable therefor, are required to be put in the hands of the contractor, who then has fifteen days from the date of the warrant within which to examine it, and if found -in any respeet to be incorrect or illegal, it is made his duty to apply to the Board of Supervisors, by appeal, to have it corrected and made legal. Idem. — This power of correction conferred on the Board of Supervisors extends to a ease where an assessment had been made by the Superintendent against a person not then living, and not to the owner of the lot, or unknown ownej< was, therefore, illegal and void.
Idem.—Said statutes make it the duty of the contractor, if he have an% ob^ptS6ns to the assessment, made by the Superintendent of Streets, for incoitectness or illegality therein, to appeal to the Board of Supervisors for their corr/cjioil if he fails to avail himself of this means of protection afforded him by*faw, in' case the assessment be incorrect or void, it is as much his own negmet as qf_Jhe^ Superintendent of Streets, and he cannot hold the latter responsible^ for the result.
On Petition for Rehearing :
Legality op Street Assessments.—To render an assessment for street improvements valid, the various acts prescribed by the statutes must, in all essential particulars, bo strictly performed. Among other essential things, the statute requires the assessment to show the name of the owner of each lot or portion of a lot, if known to the Superintendent making such assessment; and if unknown to him, the word e< unknown ” shall be written opposite the number of the lot. There is no authority for making an assessment strictly in rem without reference to the owners of lots, either known or unknown, nor without showing a compliance with said requirement in respect to the names of lot owners and any lot, the owner of which is not designated in the assessment either by name or as “ unknown,” will be unaffected by it, as will, also, the owner himself, because not made a party to the assessment.
Idem.—With respect to such owner, not made a party to the assessment, it is no assessment; and this, whether as, in case no appeal be taken, the failure to make the proper entry of his name, or of the word “ unknown ” on the assessment was the neglect alone of the Superintendent of Streets ; or in case of such appeal, of the Board of Supervisors. In either case, such owner and his property are absolutely unaffected by the assessment, and he is under no obligation to take any steps, by appeal or otherwise, to avoid incurring personal liability or the incumbrance of his property by way of lien for such assessment.
Appeal from the District Court, Twelfth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
To the complaint of the plaintiff, filed in this cause, a demurrer was interposed by defendant on the ground that the facts therein stated did not constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by the Court below, and judgment final thereon entered for defendant, and plaintiff appealed therefrom to this Court.
The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sharpstein Hastings, for Appellant, argued:
That the act of the respondent, as Superintendent of Streets, in making the assessment in question, was purely ministerial, and therefore he is liable to plaintiff for his failure to comply with the requirements of the law, whereby the assessment was rendered illegal, and resulted in the loss to plaintiff of the amount of the assessment to Davis’ property ; and cited Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal. 587; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 297; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117; Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 75; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. (1 Smith) 316; The People v. The Supervisors of Chenango Co., 1 Kern. 573; Freeman v. Kenny, 15 Pick. 44; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 494; Dickinson v. Billings, 4 Gray, 42; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, 630; Wilson v. The Mayor of New York, 1 Denio, 599; The Rochester White Lead Co. v. The City of Rochester, 3 Comst. 466; Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 94; and Brown v. Lester, 13 S. & M. (Miss.) 392.
They further argued that the acts, resulting in the defects or illegality of an assessment, from which a party aggrieved must appeal to the Board of Supervisors, in order to save his legal rights, are of a judicial character solely, and such as the Board may make valid by affirming, and become res adjudicata when passed on by the Board; that plaintiff did not, therefore, fail in his duty in not appealing to the Board of Supervisors, because the defects in the assessment, caused by the neglect of duty on the part of the respondent, complained of, being a failure to perform a ministerial duty, the Board would have been powerless to remedy the defects in the assessment in question on appeal; and cited Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 86.
As to the general rules governing the liability of officers, appellant’s counsel cited Bac. Abr., art. “ Office and Officers,” o, and cases there cited; Lick v. Madden, 25 Cal. 209.
C. H. Parker, for Respondent.
I. The act of respondent complained of is a judicial or quasi-judicial act. (Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117; Vail v. Owen, 19 Barb. 22; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419; Hill v. Sellick, 21 Barb. 207; 29 Cal. 85; Griffith v. Follett, 20 Barb. 629.)
Ho private action will lie against an Overseer or Commissioner of Highways for neglect to keep the public bridges in repair (Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 John. 451;) nor would it at common law. (Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, and 23 Pick. 226.) The neglect complained of must be willful or malicious. There is no such allegation in the complaint; mere negligence, however gross, can never be equivalent to malice. (Morse v. The Auburn and Syracuse R. R. Co., 10 Barb. 621.)
The making of an assessment, as provided for by section nine, page three hundred and ninety-seven, statutes of 1862, is a quasi-judicial act; it is not a “purely ministerial” act.
II. The remedy by appeal to the Board is exclusive of all other remedies, on the well settled principle that where the right and the remedy are given by statute, the remedy provided by statute can alone be pursued. (7 Cal. 129; 6 Cal. 42; 3 Cal. 243; 5 Cal. 195-210; 9 Cal. 267; Smith on Statutes, Secs. 661, 667.)
HI. All parties interested must take notice of the records and proceedings of the Board and Superintendent. They are public records. (24 Barb. 427; Sec. 19 of said Act.) “ The only thing for the contractors to look to is, to see that the proceedings are all regular.” (Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 84.)
IV. The decisions made by the Board concerning the subject matter of street improvements, in pursuance of a power vested in them, etc., is final and conclusive. (Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 87, and cases there cited.)

Opinion:
By the Court, Sawyer, J.:
In Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal. 537, we held that the street assessment then and noxy in question created no charge against Davis, the owner of the land, or the land, because made against another party not then living, and not against the owner, or unknown owners, as required by the statute. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion in that case.
Smith, the plaintiff in the former action, now sues to recover the amount of the assessment from the defendant, Cofran, the Superintendent of Streets for the City of San Francisco, who made the assessment, on the ground that it was his duty, under the statute, to state in the assessment the name of the true owner, if known, and if not known, to designate him as " unknown," and that in consequence of his neglect to name the true owner, or designate him as unknown, the assessment was void, and the plaintiff lost that portion of the sum due him apportioned to the lot sought to be charged.
Under the view we take, it will be unnecessary to determine whether the making of the assessment as a whole, or the particular act of stating in the assessment the name of the owner taken by itself, is purely a ministerial act, or wholly or partly judicial in its character. If the Superintendent erred in this particular, the Act itself, under which the proceeding was had, provides a remedy' for correcting the error.
The assessment is made by the Superintendent and delivered to the contractor, with a warrant attached, authorizing him to collect the money. (Laws 1862, p. 397, Secs. 9, 10.) " The contractor or his assigns," aggrieved " by any acts or determination of the Superintendent in relation thereto, or having, or making any objection to the correctness or legality of the assessment, shall within fifteen days after the date of the warrant appeal to the Board of Supervisors," etc., and " the said Board may correct, alter, or modify said assessment in such manner as to them shall seem just, and may instruct and direct the Superintendent to correct said warrant, assessment or diagram in any particular, and to make and issue a new warrant, assessment and diagram to conform to the decisions of said Board in relation thereto, at their option." (Laws 1863, p. 530, Sec. 12.) Under these provisions of the statute, the assessment and warrant, after having been completed by the Superintendent, are put into the hands of the contractor, and he has fifteen days from the date of the warrant within which to examine it, and if found in any respect to be incorrect or illegal, to apply to the Board of Supervisors by appeal to have it corrected and made legal. The authority to correct, we think, clearly extends to defects of the kind in question.
All the means open to the Superintendent for determining the correctness and legality of the assessment and warrant are equally open to the contractor, and an opportunity is afforded to examine the proceedings, and apply for correction if found to be incorrect or illegal. Moreover, as we have said, it is provided that the " contractor having or making any objection to the correctness or legality of the assessment shall appeal to the Board of Supervisors," etc. Thus if he has objections of the kind in question, he not only has an opportunity, but it is made his duty, to have them obviated in the mode prescribed. If he fails to avail himself of the means of protection afforded by the law, the loss in consequence of defects of the kind under consideration results as much from his own negligence, as from that of the Superintendent. We are of opinion " that the remedy for such defects is the one prescribed by the statute, and that the contractor cannot neglect to avail himself of the remedy provided, and then hold the officer liable for the result. The cases cited by appellant are of an entirely different complexion.
Judgment affirmed.