Case Name: Stafford, et al. v. Watson
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1883-05
Citations: 41 Ark. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: Stafford, et al. v. Watson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 17–42

Head Matter:
Stafford, et al. v. Watson.
1. Ejectment: Title derived from common source.
Where the source of title is identical and the parties have no other title to rely on, neither party can go behind the person from whom they hold, or show that his claim is not good.
2. Same : Pleading: Presumption.
Where a complaint in ejectment alleges that the defendant claims title by mesne conveyance from the plaintiff’s grantor,and the answer admits that the defendant has no source of title beyond the common grantor, it will be presumed in the absence of allegation and proof to to the contrary, that the defendant’s title is junior and subordinate to the plaintiff’s.
(Eakin, J. dissenting.)
APPEAL from JctcJcson Circuit Court.
Hon. R. H. Powell, Circuit Judge.
W. R. Goody, for appellants.
1. Plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, if at all, and not for want of title in defendant. 19' Ark., 201,
2. Plaintiff can only have such title as Baldwin and Jago. had under tax deed and that is void upon its face. 29 Ark... 476, 489.
3. There is no allegation that defendant claimed under same title with plaintiff, and as there is no allegation there-can be no proof. 24 Ark., 281; 2 Id., 513; 11 Id.,. 134-, 29 Id., 500.
4. In pleading a party may plead affirmatively, setting-up a defense, or negatively, in avoidance ; this defendant, did, specifically denying plaintiff’s title and right of possession, and that.defendant was illegally in possession. Upon this issue the burden is on plaintiff, and he having failed to show title, must fail. Sedgwick cfi Wait on Trial of Title ■of Land, p. 297; Gantt’s Digest, sec. 4569.
5. It is questionable whether ejectment will lie for an-undivided moiety, under secs. 4314, 4317, Gantt’s Digest.. Partition seems to be the remedy. 31 Ark., 346.
6. Defendants not being trespassers were not- estopped from setting up possession, which is presumed legal until the contrary is shown by title or special right of possession. Sedgwick & Wait, etc., sec. 477.
7. It is clear, that defendants — 1st, had the right to-except to plaintiff’s paper title; 2nd, That the exceptions were well taken; and 3d, That the court erred in overruling the same.
U. M. <& G, B. Rose, for appellee.
There is no motion for a new trial in the bill of exceptions. 36 Ark.. 262, 305; 28 lb., 450, etc.
Both parties claim under a common source of title, and defendants could not allege that it was invalid, if such were- the case. Wilson v. /Spring, 38 Ark., Woolf orle v. Ashby, 2 Met. (it?/.), 289. See aiso lleminglon v. Linthieum, 14 Pet., 93. Plaintiff attempted to follow the course approved by Ch. J. Taney in the case last cited,, but was prevented by the court.
Defendants knowing their title was subordinate to plaintiff’s and derived from the same source, undertook to conceal it, hoping thereby to be allowed to object to the validity of the common title.
The defendants, setting up no title in themselves, and being for the purposes of this suit mere trespassers, they will not be allowed to scan too curiously the title of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff has any title whatever, perfect or imperfect, it is superior to that of the defendants, so far as appears from their pleadings, and cannot ’object to its sufficiency. The saying that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that of his adversary, does not mean that the plaintiff must have a perfect title. It only means that one man having no title at all cannot recover from another equally destitute. But if one man has a title, though an imperfect one, he may recover from a mere trespasser,because the latter cannot expose its imperfections. He is a wrong-doer, and he cannot resist the plaintiff’s claim unless he can show that the plaintiff is a mere wrong-doer like himself. The defendants in this case are, as it were, trespassers who have stolen upon the lands in the night, and the plaintiffs, or any one else having a color of title, can eject them, however defeasible that title may &e.
Say the court in Zeringue v. Williams, 15 La, Ann., 76: “Although it be true that a plaintiff in a .petitory action must succeed on the strength of his own title, and not on the weekness of that of his adversary, yet, when the latter has no title at all, he cannot, as a trespasser, take advantage of any defects in the former’s muniments of title ; in such cases a title apparently good is all that is necessary to maintain a petitory action.”
The tax deed under which the plaintiff claims is prima facie evidence, and the defendant has introduced no evidence tending to establish its invalidity. As was held by this court in Cairo $ Fulton 11. R. Co. v. Parks, 32 Ark., 132, and four subsequent cases, the deed is prima facie evidence that all the proceedings requisite to give validity to the deed have been performed.
U. M. & G, B. Rose, for appellee :
Cite an additional brief. Sedgwick <S> Wait on Titles to Land, secs. 276, 291, 292, 294, 297; Van Horne v. Fonda, 5 John Ch. R., 388; 20 Ark., 402; 14 Peters, 84; 51 Mo., 548; 7 Serg. &R., 230; 31 III., 501; 17 Id., 47-, 41 Id. 516; 6 Cush., 8; 12 Ohio, FT. S.,231.

Opinion:
Smith, J
This was ejectment for an undivided moiety of a quarter section of land. The plaintiff's evidences of title consisted of — 1, A tax deed from the clerk of Jackson county to Baldwin and Jago, dated April 29, 1873 : 2, A deed of trust from Baldwin to a certain trustee for his interest in the premises, executed September 26, 1874, to secure the payment of a debt, with power to the trustee to sell and convey upon default; and, 3, A deed from the trustee to the plaintiff executed in pui-suance of said power. The complaint stated that the defendant was in possession of the whole tract and had refused, after demand made, to admit the plaintiff to the possession of one half of the land and its rents a,nd profits. It also averred upon information and belief that the defendant held under sundry mesne conveyances and licenses from Baldwin.
The answer did not deny that the defendant claimed under Baldwin, and therefore virtually admitted it. Gantt's Dig. sec. 4608. It alleged no title whatever in the defendant, beyond a possession of recent origin, but excepted to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's title deeds. These exceptions were overruled. The cause came on for trial before a jury, and the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment.
No doubt the tax deed standing at the head of the plaintiff's claim of title is bad, if the defendant is in a position to assail it. But it seems to be well established that where the source of title is identical, and the parties have no other title to rely upon, it is not permitted to either to go behind the person from whom they hold, or show that his claim is not good. Both parties claiming under the same right, the plaintiff was not bound to trace back his title beyond the common origin, unless the defendant showed some title in himself aliunde. Riddle v. Murphy, 7 Ser. & R. 230: Jackson v. Hinman, 10 Johns. 292: Fitch v. Baldwin, 17 Id. 165: Douglass v. Scott, 5 Ohio, 124: Ward vs. McIntosh, 12 Ohio State 240: Woolfolk v. Ashby, 2 Met. Ky. 288.
It follows from what we have said, that it was unneccs-2-sary for the plaintiff to deduce his title beyond Baldwin. If the defendant'held a title superior to Baldwin's, or a title derived from Baldwin anterior to that of plaintiff, it devolved upon him to allege it and file the evidence of it. But his answer admitted that his own source of title ascended no higher than Baldwin. And in the absence of allegation and proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that it was junior and subordinate to that exhibited with the complaint.
The answer in truth presented no bar to the action and raised no issue to be tried.
Judgment affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION BY