Case Name: JEROME v. HAWLEY et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-11-15
Citations: 131 N.Y.S. 897
Docket Number: 
Parties: JEROME v. HAWLEY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 131
Pages: 897–900

Head Matter:
JEROME v. HAWLEY et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 15, 1911.)
1. Negligence (§ 93*)—Imputed Negligence—Driver oe Vehicle—Guest.
Defendant H. having accepted an invitation of his codefendant, W.,‘to take an automobile drive, and the automobile becoming disabled, H. was offered assistance by P., driving another automobile. H. procured a rope, with which the two machines were connected, and in this way the disabled machine was towed back to the city. W. rode in the disabled machine, while H. rode as the guest of P.; and while P.’s machine was going from one side of the street to the other, plaintiff, riding a bicycle, was struck by the rope and injured. Held that, since H. at the time of the accident was the mere guest of P., without any control over his actions, the latter’s negligence was not imputable to him.
’ [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 147-150: Dec. Dig. § 93. ]
2. Municipal Corporations (§ 705*)—Use of Streets—Injuries—Proximate Cause.
The negligence of the driver of the disabled car in omitting promptly to follow straight behind the leading machine was an intervening cause, so that any negligence of defendant H., in procuring the rope and in the manner in which the cars were connected, was not the proximate cause-of the accident. |
fP- Note.—For other cases, see Municipal '.Corporations, Dec. Dig. §• 705. ]
Betts, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Albany County.
Action by Joseph Jerome, an infant, by Arthur Jerome, his guardian-ad litem, against Peter L. Hawley and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, defendant Hawley appeals. Reversed.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, SEWELL, BETTS,, and HOUGHTON, JJ. I
Robert ,W. Fisher, for appellant. '
Walter H. Wertime, for respondent ■
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes:

Opinion:
SEWELL, J.
The action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1910,. the appellant, having accepted the invitation of one Porter H. Wager,, was riding with him and others in his automobile. They had gone-about three miles from Cohoes, when the machine became disabled. Adam Peets, who was proceeding in the opposite direction in his automobile, offered to assist them. The appellant procured a rope 50 feet long, with- which the two machines were connected, and in this way the disabled machine was towed back to Cohoes, 40 or 50 feet in the rear of the other. Wager and one of his party rode in his machine, while the rest of his party including the appellant, I rode with Peets. The- . evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to' show that they started down Columbia street on the left-hand side; that they soon turned to-the right-hand side and after going a short distance—
"the first one shoots to the left again, and left the other on the right side.. The rope was crossing over Columbia street, slantways on Columbia street. The rope was tied on each one of the autdmobiles. The rope struck the bicycle.- That knocked the bicycle down, and b£ fell to the ground."
The plaintiff testified that he was going down the track on Columbia, street, in the same direction as the automobile-}—
"and somebody hollered to look out for an automobile, and I got out of the-way.. The first automobile went by, and when I turned my bicycle half way I got hit by something and went down on the groujid. After I fell, somebody picked me up, and I noticed the automobile back. There was am automobile about five or six feet behind me." j
The court charged the jury that there was I no dispute in the testimony that the lamps upon the machine werei not lighted, and left it to them to say whether the defendants, in the exercise of reasonable-care, ought to have had the lamps lighted, and whether any signal ought to have been given, under the circumstances of the case, by the parties operating the machine and whether any signal was given.
The theory upon which the action was tried and subniitted to-the jury was that the appellant was liable to the plaintiff, not only for the negligence of the owner of the car in whjch he was a passenger, but for the negligence of the owner and driver of the car in tow. I know of no principle upon which the appellant can be held liable under the circumstances surrounding the driving of the cars on this occasion. The uncontroverted facts show that the appellant did not employ, pay, direct, or control the driver of either car in any way. His only connection with the accident was the fact that he was a passenger, and procured the rope and assisted in tying it to the cars. It is also to be observed that, independent of the fact that the driver of the car, in which the appellant was riding as his guest, was not under the direction or control of the appellant, so that his negligence, if there was any, cannot be imputed to the appellant, we have the undisputed fact that the negligence of this driver in operating his car was not the cause of the accident. His car was seen by the plaintiff, and had passed him when the accident occurred.
If it be assumed, for the purposes of the argument, that the defendant was negligent in procuring the rope, and is chargeable for the manner in which the cars were connected, it is clear that this negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The negligence of Wager, the driver of the car in tow, was an intervening and the responsible cause of the accident. It was his omission to recross the street and to follow straight behind the other car. Neither the defendant nor the driver of the forward car was bound to anticipate that he would continue in the same direction and thereby cause the rope to sweep the street, without which the accident would not have happened. In this respect this case is not distinguishable on principle from Leeds v. New York Telephone Company, 178 N. Y. 118, 70 N. E. 219, where an intervening force came in upon the existing situation and produced the plaintiff's injuries.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
SMITH, P. J., and HOUGHTON, J, concur.