Case Name: CITY OF ENID, Oklahoma, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, Defendants/Appellants
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 2006-03-14
Citations: 133 P.3d 281
Docket Number: No. 101,729
Parties: CITY OF ENID, Oklahoma, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, Defendants/Appellants.
Judges: WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 133
Pages: 281–312

Head Matter:
2006 OK 16
CITY OF ENID, Oklahoma, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, Defendants/Appellants.
No. 101,729.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
March 14, 2006.
Tony G. Puckett, Ronald T. Shinn, Jr., McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, OK, for ap-pellee, City of Enid, Oklahoma.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Sandra D. Rinehart, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for co-appellant, Public Employees Relations Board.
James R. Moore, Sue Wycoff, James R. Moore <& Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for appellant, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
Diane Pedicord, Sue Ann Nicely, Oklahoma Municipal League, Oklahoma City, OK, for Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Municipal League.
Larry Derryberry, Caleb J. Muckala, Der-ryberry Quigley Solomon & Naifeh, Oklahoma City, OK, for Amicus Curiae Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
¶ 1 The issue before us concerns the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act (hereinafter the Act). We hold that the Act is a general law of state-wide concern that contains a proper and legitimate classification of municipalities with a population greater than 35,-000. This population classification bears a reasonable relationship to the Act's objective codified at 11 O.S.Supp.2005, § 51-201, "to promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees." The Act grants municipal employees of these municipalities the right to organize and choose representation for collective bargaining, and requires these municipal employers to recognize, negotiate and bargain with the employees' chosen representatives.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 The legislature passed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act during its 2004 session. Administered by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) , the Act defines municipal employers as municipalities with populations greater than 35,000. The parties agree that it currently applies to eleven municipalities in Oklahoma. The classification remains fluid. When municipalities reach the requisite number of residents, the Act applies.
¶ 3 Appellant, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, (hereinafter Union) requested certification from PERB to represent the City of Enid's qualifying employees when the Act became effective (November 1, 2004). PERB gave notice of Union's request to the City of Enid and directed the City of Enid to post the notice on November 4, 2004. PERB's emergency rules provide it must certify Union as representative of the City of Enid's municipal employees unless PERB receives a request from another union within fifteen days. On November 19, 2004, the City of Enid filed an action against PERB and Union for a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions, and declaratory judgment that the Act was special legislation which violated Olda. Const, art. 5, § 46 and 59, and also violated art. 18, § 3(a).
¶ 4 The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 22, 2004. Subsequently, the City of Enid filed a motion for summary judgment that the court ultimately granted. The basis for summary judgment was the court's determination the Act's classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for collective bargaining purposes was arbitrary and thus constituted a special law in violation of art. 5, §46 and 59. The court reasoned that it was not impossible to design a general law, and issued a permanent injunction against PERB. We retained the appeal. Oral argument was heard on May 10, 2005.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5 The issue of the Act's constitutionality is a legal determination. "An ap pellate court claims for itself plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings." Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22, n. 30, 989 P.2d 448, 456, n. 30. Summary judgment is appropriate where it appears there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Daugherty v. Fanners Coop. Ass'n, 1984 OK 72, ¶5, 689 P.2d 947, 949; Crockett v. McKenzie, 1994 OK 3, ¶ 3, 867 P.2d 463, 464. "[T]he inquiry on appeal concerning the propriety of the entry of summary judgment is limited to potential controversies concerning any issue raised by the pleadings." Wabaunsee v. Harris, 1980 OK 52, ¶ 9, 610 P.2d 782, 785. An order that grants summary relief disposes of legal issues. Therefore, on appeal, the review we conduct is de novo. Broum v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, ¶ 5, n. 1, 935 P.2d 319, 321, n. 1; Manley, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22, n. 30, 989 P.2d at 456, n. 30. Accordingly, our standard of review regarding the trial court's order in the instant case is de novo. The burden is on the City of Enid, the entity challenging the Act, to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Act is unconstitutional. See, Hamilton v. City of Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, ¶ 15, 527 P.2d 14, 17, citing and quoting Isaacs v. Oklahoma City, 1966 OK 267, 437 P.2d 229. Otherwise, we will not disturb the presumption of the Act's validity.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
¶ 6 The City of Enid contends the Act is a special law in violation of Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46, and is unconstitutional under art. 18, § 3(a), which allows charter cities autonomous self-governance under the home rule doctrine. It also argues the Act creates a class that lacks a reasonable relation to the Act's subject, in violation of Okla. const., art. 5, § 59. The district court did not address the art. 18, § 3(a) issue in its summary judgment order, from which the instant matter arises, as it was unnecessary for the district court to reach that issue because that court found the Act unconstitutional as a special law.
A. Oklahoma Const, art. 5, § 46
¶ 7 The question for an art. 5, § 46 inquiry is whether the statute at issue is a special or general law. Section 46 enumerates twenty-eight areas in which the legislature is prohibited from passing local or special laws, unless otherwise allowed by another provision in the Oklahoma Constitution. As pertinent to our analysis here in, the prohibition concerns the regulation of the affairs of municipalities.
¶ 8 Since the Act concerns the regulation of certain labor issues of larger municipalities, we determine that the Act indeed concerns one of the twenty-eight subjects set forth in § 46. We must determine whether the legislation at issue is a special or local law. See e.g., Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d 594, 597, citing Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d 816, 822, Guthrie Daily Leader ¶. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 38, 41 P. 635, 639. A general law "relates to persons or things as a class rather than relating to particular persons or things." Grant, 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d at 597, citing Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d at 822. General laws need not operate upon every locality in the state, "but must apply equally to all classes similarly situated, and apply to like conditions and subjects." Grable v. Childers, 1936 OK 273, ¶ 6, 56 P.2d 357, 360. A special law relates to "a part of the entire class of similarly affected persons" and "separate[s] [that part] for different treatment." Grant, 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d at 597, citing Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d at 822.
¶ 9 Under Reynolds, we identify the class by tests developed for each particular subject enumerated in art. 5 § 46. Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18, n. 36, 760 P.2d at 823, n. 36. This Court recognized in Reynolds that civil actions may be classified into specific categories of tort actions of a similar nature for statute of limitation purposes, and that doing so would not a fortiori constitute a special or local law that would violate the strictures contained in § 46. See, Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18, 760 P.2d at 823. The Court stated at footnote 36 that "[t]he test we adopt for identifying the class in measuring the validity of a civil action's limitation by the strictures in § 46 is not necessarily applicable to other subjects enumerated in that section." Reynolds did not concern a popu-
lation-based statute, and in no way precludes the classification of cities into similarly situated municipalities based on population when the legislature, in its wisdom, has a legitimate, reasonable and rational reason to do so.
¶ 10 The City of Enid asks us to interpret art. 5, § 46 in regard to the collective bargaining Act involved here, as an absolute bar, prohibiting legislative regulation of some but not all municipalities. Such an interpretation is unwarranted and is not consistent with our previous case law as to what is or is not considered a general law.
¶ 11 In Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 1926 OK 289, ¶ 9, 247 P. 15, 17-18, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 273 U.S. 647, 47 S.Ct. 246, 71 L.Ed. 821 (1926), the Court stated, "The act in question cannot be said to be more than a reasonable and fair classification of towns in proportion to their population, and a grant of the same privileges to all towns of the same class." The Court held that express authority existed pursuant to art. 18, § 1, for creation of a statute for cities with populations in excess of 1,000 to pave streets and make assessments for that. Edmonds, 1926 OK 289, ¶ 8, 247 P. at 17.
¶ 12 When we analyze § 46 along with the language of art. 18, § 1 under the teaching of Edmonds, we must invoke the "except as otherwise provided" language contained in § 46 , and recognize that not all classification in proportion to population is prohibited. In addressing a claim with significant factual similarities to the instant case, this Court stated In Hamilton v. Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, 527 P.2d 14, the City of Oklahoma City challenged the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Liability Act (11 O.S.1971, § 1751-1766), which provided that cities with over 200,000 population would be liable for their torts arising out of their governmental functions. Oklahoma City and Tulsa were the only dties covered by this legislation. The Hamilton Court observed:
"On the other hand, size may be an important factor in any particular classification scheme based on population. This Court has long recognized that cities having a larger population may have problems much different from less populated counties, insofar as many topics of legislation are concerned."
Hamilton, 1974 OK 109, ¶13, 527 P.2d at 16.
¶ 13 Our next inquiry regarding whether the Act is a general law, as distinguished from a local or special law, concerns whether there is a proper and legitimate classification, whether the classification is arbitrary or capricious, or whether it bears a reasonable relationship to the object to be accomplished. Sanchez v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116, ¶ 14, 418 P.2d 639, 641. "[A] law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted." Grimes v. Oklahoma City, 2002 OK 47, ¶10, 49 P.3d 719, 723, citing Anderson v. Walker, 1958 OK 297, ¶ 16, 333 P.2d 570, 574. Indeed, the class may be very limited, and there may be but one of the class. Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 41, 41 P. 635, 639. The key is that the law be general in its application and embrace all of the given class, as opposed to specific in its application to a particular person or thing. Guthrie Daily Leader, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 41, 41 P. at 639. In the legislation before us, the Act applies statewide through its application to similarly-situated municipalities. It does not apply to one particular municipality, to the exclusion of others. Its application to the class of municipalities over 35,000 is uniform.
¶ 14 Two years after statehood, in Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, 109 P. 544, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a legislative enactment creating a superior court in each county with a population greater than 30,000 -that contained at least one city with a population of 8,000 or more. In holding the statute was not a special law the Court wrote:
"In order for a law to be general in its nature and to'have a uniform operation, it is not necessary that it shall operate upon every person and every locality in the state. A law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted. ⅜ But where a statute operates upon a class, the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary and must be reasonable and pertain to some peculiarity in the subject-matter calling for the legislation. As between the persons and places included within the operation of the law and those omitted, there must be some distinctive characteristic upon which a different treatment may be reasonably founded and that furnish[es] a practical and real basis for discrimination."
Burks, 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23,109 P. at 549.
[13] ¶ 15 Thus, in Burks, the Court created a two-part, rational-relationship test to determine whether a population-based classification was a special or general law. The Court has used this test in numerous cases involving constitutional challenges to population-based legislation under Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46 and 59. It is the appropriate test for today's inquiry, as well.
¶ 16 The Act at issue herein concerns the class of municipalities in the state of Oklahoma with populations greater than 35,000. Before we can deem this legislation unconstitutional, we must determine that the classification of municipalities by population for purposes of municipal employees' collective bargaining rights is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and wholly unrelated to the object of the Act. As stated above, the burden was and is on the City of Enid to show that such is the case. The City of Enid has failed to make such a showing. In contrast, the evidence in this summary judgment record supports the reasonableness of the classification. This evidence includes experts' affidavits regarding the following:
1. Smaller municipalities typically have fewer layers of management. Employees thus have a greater opportunity to deal with management directly. Larger municipalities have a more intricate upper management structure, and employees seldom have contact with bosses. Employees of the larger municipalities have a greater need for an intermediary group to act on their behalf.
2. Smaller municipalities have fewer necessary resources to engage effectively in collective bargaining, whereas larger ones are more likely to have a "critical mass of employees" from which to find individuals to speak in their behalf.
3. Smaller municipalities have smaller budgets, creating special pressure to oppose collective bargaining and avoid demands for higher wages.
4. Larger municipalities are more likely to have personnel departments and-legal staff at their disposal to facilitate the negotiation process, a process that requires a certain level of competence, knowledge, and time to learn about issues and options involved in collective action. Smaller municipalities often lack these personnel departments and legal staff. Accordingly, any bargaining would be less manageable and more cumbersome for smaller municipalities and their employees.
¶ 17 Oklahoma's first legislature contained members who knew the Constitution. At this time, it was common to classify cities based upon population, and many statutes of the first legislature exemplify this. Cities of the "First Class" had a population of 2,000 or more. See, Oklahoma General Statutes 1908, § 699. Legislation determined the salaries of city officials based upon population, such as the city attorney, "police judge," and treasurer. See, e.g., Oklahoma General Statutes 1908, § 839, concerning salaries for those officials in cities with a population in excess of 25,000. Statutes also concerned public contracts of cities with a population in excess of 25,000. See, e.g., Oklahoma General Statutes 1908, § 844-847. More recently, this Court upheld the constitutionality of urban renewal laws that applied to municipalities with populations in excess of 100,000, in Isaacs v. City of Oklahoma City, 1966 OK 267, 437 P.2d 229, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825, 88 S.Ct. 63,19 L.Ed.2d 79 (1967). Classification of municipalities by population is one of those classifications historically recognized as necessary and appropriate in the state of Oklahoma, for purposes of legislation.
¶ 18 In the case at bar, we cannot say that the legislature's population classification of 35,000 is arbitrary or capricious. We determine that a municipality's population is closely related to the object sought to be obtained by the Act. The Act does not violate Oklahoma Const, art. 5, § 46.
B. Oklahoma Const, art. 5, § 59
¶ 19 Regarding Oklahoma Const, art. 5, § 59, we must determine whether any part of the class, (municipalities with a population greater than 35,000) is separated for different treatment in violation of that constitutional provision. Section 59 provides: "Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted." We find no such evidence. The Act grants the same privileges to all municipalities of the same class; it does not violate Oklahoma Const, art. 5, § 59.
C. Oklahoma Const, art. 18, § 3(a)
¶ 20 Oklahoma Const, art. 18, § 3(a) allows charter cities autonomous self-governance under the home rule doctrine. The issue that the Act is unconstitutional under art. 18, § 3(a), is not included in the "Issues Raised on Appeal" filed with the Court by the appellants in their respective petitions in error. The trial court based its decision that the Act was unconstitutional on art. 5, § 46 and 59, and therefore the appellants addressed those issues. The appellee did, however, observe in its response to the petition in error of PERB, that the constitutionality of the Act under art. 18, § 1-3 was raised before the trial court, and the City of Enid asserted in its response that the Act was unconstitutional under art. 18 because it violates the home rule doctrine. If this Court fails to address this issue the trial court would have to determine the constitutionality of the Act based on the home rule doctrine when this cause is remanded.
¶ 21 This Court is generally free to grant corrective relief on any applicable legal theory dispositive of the case and supported by the record when the issue is one of public law. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, ¶ 7, 87 P.3d 572, 578. "[W]here questions of public policy or widespread public interest are involved an appellate court may review a cause on a theory not presented in the trial tribunal." Barks v. Young, 1977 OK 81, ¶ 7, 564 P.2d 228, 229, citing Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 1948 OK 14, 188 P.2d 841. In the context of the case now before this Court, a public law issue relates to the organization of the state in its political or sovereign capacity. The laws concerning the balance of the power between the legislature and the municipalities fall within the body of law known as "public law." Accordingly, we will decide the home rule issue.
¶ 22 Provisions of a city charter that relate to merely municipal matters, and which are adopted and approved in accordance with constitutional provision, supersede all conflicting laws of the state. Fitts v. Allen, 1928 OK 275, ¶49, 281 P. 126, 132. The test of whether or not an act of the legislature impermissibly interferes with the charter of a municipality is resolved by determining if the act relates to purely a matter of municipal and local concern or if it involves matters of the state at large, or affects its people generally. Lackey v. State, 1911 OK 270, ¶ 20, 116 P. 913, 918.
¶ 23 In Midwest City v. Cravens, 1975 OK 22, 532 P.2d 829, Midwest City sought injunc-tive relief against the Public Employees Relation Board to prevent the Board from exercising jurisdiction over the City. The City had refused to negotiate the salary portion of the employment contract with the Midwest City Police Department on the grounds that it called for a reclassification of police personnel, which the City claimed was its sole responsibility under the City's charter. The Fraternal Order of Police, bargaining agent for the Midwest City Police Department, filed a charge with the Public Employees Relation Board against the City, asserting that the City had engaged in unfair labor practices contrary to the Firefighters' and Policemen's Arbitration Law. This Court held that the Legislature had created a vehicle by which the firefighters and police officers could discuss their grievances and terms and conditions of their employment with municipal authorities, but the municipal authorities, under the home rule doctrine, retained the right to make the final decision on all issues presented and discussed. See Midwest City, 1975 OK 22, ¶ 30, 532 P.2d at 833.
¶ 24 This Court cited 11 O.S.1971, § 548.2, which provided that the legislature had declared to be the public policy of this state to accord the firefighters and police officers of any city, town or municipality all the rights of labor, and then the Court cited § 548.4 that specifically referred to the right to bar gain collectively. Midwest City, 1975 OK 22, ¶ 6, 532 P.2d at 831. The Court observed that the Legislature had determined it was of state-wide concern that the firefighters and police officers be accorded the privilege of communicating with their respective employers with a collective voice. The Court agreed and held the Firefighters' and Policemen's Arbitration Law, as construed by the Court, did not contravene Art. 18, § 3 of our Constitution. Midwest City, 1975 OK 22, ¶ 35, 36, 532 P.2d at 834.
¶ 25 This Court observed in City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1990 OK 114, ¶ 11, 845 P.2d 872, 875, that Midwest City declared Art. 18, § 3 was not offended by the statutory requirement of collective bargaining because it was a matter of statewide, rather than purely municipal, concern. Although the City of Enid would have this Court distinguish these cases from this present cause, we note, as we did in Midwest City, that the Legislature has determined promoting orderly and constructive collective bargaining between municipal employers and their employees is a matter of public policy. 11 O.S.Supp.2005, § 51-201, 2004 Okla.Sess. Laws, ch. 62, § 2. We agree and hold the matter is one of state-wide concern and does not contravene Art. 18, § 3.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 Under the evidence in the record before us, we determine that the Act's population classification is not arbitrary or capricious. It is rationally related to the stated purpose of the legislation. We further determine that the Act grants the same privileges to all municipalities of the same class. It manifests uniform application to all class members. Accordingly, we hold that the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act is constitutional under Okla. Const, art. 5, §46 and 59, and art. 18, § 3(a).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES.
WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur.
WATT, C.J., OPALA, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ., dissent.
. 2004 O.S.L. ch. 62, codified at 11 O.S.Supp. 2005, § 51-200 et seq.
. 11 O.S.Supp.2005, § 51-104.
. For purposes of the Oklahoma Municipal Code, a "municipality" is defined as any incorporated city or town. 11 O.S.2001, § 1-102(5).
. 11 O.S.Supp.2005, § 51-202(12).
. § 46. Local and special laws on certain subjects prohibited
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:
The creation, extension, or impairing of liens;
Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts;
Changing the names of persons or places;
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining of roads, highways, streets, or alleys;
Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams, which form boundaries between this and any other state;
Vacating roads, town plats, streets, or alleys;
Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the State;
Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children;
Locating or changing county seats;
Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters;
For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting;
Granting divorces;
Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts;
Changing the law of descent or succession;
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or providing or changing the methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of judgments or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate;
Regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, or constables;
Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes;
Fixing the rate of interest;
Affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability;
Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid into the treasury; Exempting property from taxation;
Declaring any named person of age;
Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any asses sor or collector of taxes from due performance of his official duties, or his securities from liability;
Giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds;
Summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;
For limitation of civil or criminal actions;
For incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements;
Providing for change of venue in civil and criminal cases.
. See fn. 5, supra.
. Hatfield v. Garnett, 1915 OK 70, ¶ 18, 146 P. 24; Board of County Commissioners v. Beaty, 1918 OK 89, ¶ 7, 171 P. 34; Board of Commissioners of Grady County v. Hammerly, 1921 OK 356, ¶ 25, 204 P. 445; Key v. Donnell, 1924 OK 996, ¶ 5, 231 P. 546; Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 1925 OK 1002, V 8, 245 P. 649; Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 1926 OK 289, ¶ 8-9, 247 P. 15; Pointer v. Town of Chelsea, 1927 OK 9, ¶ 7-8, 257 P. 785; Roberts v. Ledgerwood, 1928 OK 723, ¶ 7-10, 272 P. 448; Hudgins v. Foster, 1928 OK 243, 267 P. 645; Gulager v. Bickford, 1930 OK 368, ¶ 11, 293 P. 209, Caddo County v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 1932 OK 69, 7 P.2d 900; Crawford Co. Treas. v. Smith, 1933 OK 158, ¶ 9-15, 19 P.2d 964; Thompson v. Stanley, 1938 OK 488, ¶ 14, 83 P.2d 386; Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, ¶ 10, 86 P.2d 305; Lowden v. Oklahoma County, 1940 OK 134, ¶ 6-9, 100 P.2d 448; Williams v. Hutchens, 1940 OK 266, ¶ 6-8, 102 P.2d 841; Bell v. Crum, 1940 OK 413, ¶ 17-35, 106 P.2d 518; Oklahoma City v. Excise Bd. Of Oklahoma County, 1943 OK 311, ¶ 17, 141 P.2d 805; Haas v. Holloman, 1958 OK 174, UK 14-16, 327 P.2d 655; Hamrick v. George, 1962 OK 247, ¶ 26-32, 378 P.2d 324; Williams v. Johnson, 1964 OK 188, ¶ 13, 396 P.2d 518; Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, ¶ 10-12, 408 P.2d 517; Sanchez v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116, ¶ 17, 418 P.2d 639; Isaacs v. City of Oklahoma City, 1966 OK 267, ¶33, 437 P.2d 229; State ex rel. Nesbitt v. District Court of Mayes County, 1967 OK 228, ¶ 7, 440 P.2d 700 (overruled on other grounds by Palmer v. Belford, 1974 OK 73, 527 P.2d 589); Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 1970 OK 67, ¶ 9-23, 468 P.2d 501; Hamilton v. City of Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, ¶ 11-18, 527 P.2d 14; Maule v. Independent School District No. 9 of Tulsa County, 1985 OK 110, ¶ 12, 714 P.2d 198.
. The Speaker of the House in Oklahoma's First Legislature was William H. Murray, former President of the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention. E. McReynolds, A. Marriott, and E. Faulconer, Oklahoma: The Story of its Past and Present, 314 (1961); 2 W. Murray, Memoirs of Governor Murray and the True History of Oklahoma, § 173-236 (1945).