Case Name: Ignacio HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. Richard ROTH, as Sheriff of Monroe County, etc., Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-29
Citations: 890 So. 2d 1173
Docket Number: No. 3D04-869
Parties: Ignacio HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. Richard ROTH, as Sheriff of Monroe County, etc., Respondent.
Judges: Before RAMIREZ and SHEPHERD, JJ., and COBB, WARREN H., Senior Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 890
Pages: 1173–1179

Head Matter:
Ignacio HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. Richard ROTH, as Sheriff of Monroe County, etc., Respondent.
No. 3D04-869.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 29, 2004.
Charles M. Milligan, Key West, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Thomas G. Mielke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before RAMIREZ and SHEPHERD, JJ., and COBB, WARREN H., Senior Judge.

Opinion:
SHEPHERD, J.
Ignacio Hernandez petitions this court for an original writ of habeas corpus. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(3). We deny the writ.
I. Facts
On February 19, 2004, Petitioner was arrested and charged by information with possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and battery on a law enforcement officer. On February 20, 2004, Petitioner made his first appearance and was released on bond with the special condition that he undergo urinalysis three times a week — through pretrial services — to test for the presence of illegal drugs. On March 4, 2004, Petitioner moved to modify (i.e. rescind) the special condition. On March 30, 2004, the court held a hearing and denied the motion. The State opposed the motion because the defendant was alleged to have battered a police officer, was found in possession of a large quantity of cocaine (23 grams in 35 individual baggies) and had collected nine previous felony and eight previous misdemeanor arrests, albeit being but 22 years of age. On April 15, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant writ.
II. Standard of Review
Matters relating to the setting of bail and the conditions attached to a defendant's pre-trial release on bail are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rodriguez v. McRay, 871 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Because trial judges are in a superior position to determine what conditions will be required to ensure that the defendant will appear in future proceedings and that the defendant is not a risk to the community, a defendant seeking a writ of habeas corpus "must adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial court's order." State ex rel. Smith v. Untreiner, 246 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (affirming bail conditions).
III. Discussion
The Florida Constitution makes provision for pre-trial release of almost all ar-restees. Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.131(a) reads in pertinent part: "Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions." The key phrase is reasonable conditions. Section 903.046 of the Florida Statutes provides a broad, non-exclusive list of factors that the legislature instructs the court "shall consider" in determining the conditions of bail. It includes, inter alia, the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the defendant's ties to the community, and any "past conduct" of the defendant. Furthermore, subsection (k) even more broadly authorizes the trial court to consider "any other facts that the court considers relevant." Id. These wide-ranging factors are consistent with the trial court's difficult task of balancing the defendant's constitutional right to pre-trial release with the need to protect the community and ensure the defendant's appearance at future proceedings.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that the defendant undergo urinalysis. The Petitioner argues that "it is clear that [thrice-weekly] urinalysis and reporting to pre-trial services is not one of the conditions set forth in the rule." Petitioner is factually correct, but incorrect to suggest that that fact is of any legal consequence. The legislative directive is broad and nonexclusive. It wisely leaves the ultimate decision relating to conditions of release to the sound judgment and experience of the trial judge.
Aside from the issue of reasonable bail conditions, the trial court's decision to require urinalysis has support in a separate law. Section 903.047 mandates that: "As a condition of pretrial release . the court shall require that . the defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind ." § 903.047(1)(8), Fla. Stat. (2004). The additional condition requiring urinalysis in issue here not only meets the requirements of the pre-trial release statute, but more generally assures that the defendant complies with the law as a whole while on release. See Williams v. Spears, 814 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute and noting that "a release on bond (or other pretrial release)) is a release on good behavior"). Possessing illegal drugs, whether they are on your person or in one's body, is a crime. Bail may not be used to punish a pretrial defendant, Rodriguez, 871 So.2d at 1003, but it cannot be said that requiring a drug offender arres-tee to be closely monitored for the use of illegal drugs constitutes punishment. Finally, we note that "the object of bail in a criminal case is to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer ." Id. The condition of pretrial release challenged here is entirely consistent with this principle.
Petitioner's reliance on Glinton v. Wille, 457 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), is inapposite. In Glinton, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to sell marijuana. As a condition of bond, the court ordered the defendant to stay out of a "field" at a certain address. The "field" was a hotspot for drug and criminal activity. The appellate court noted that the restriction was designed to prevent the defendant from selling drugs. But it also necessarily included a prohibition on otherwise lawful conduct (i.e,, entering the "field" was not itself criminal). Here, the restriction does not prohibit the Petitioner from engaging in any lawful activity. Rather, it merely reflects the'appropriate and common sense judgment of the court below to provide itself with measurable certainty that the defendant is not tempted by illegal activity Of a type for which the court had ample reason to be concerned while awaiting trial.
Petitioner further argues that his special condition violates the rule in Harp v. Hinckley, 410 So.2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Harp, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a writ of habeas corpus because the trial judge, with knowledge of the petitioner's indigent status, purposefully set bond at $10,000 to keep the petitioner imprisoned while awaiting trial for attempted murder. Id. at 621, n. 2. There, the appellate court justly concluded' that the trial judge violated the petitioner's right to pre-trial release. Unfortunately for the Petitioner, the Harp facts have no bearing on the present petition. The special condition requiring urinalysis imposed on the Petitioner was not designed to keep the Petitioner in jail.
III. Conclusion
The trial court's decision to require urinalysis as a condition of pretrial release was within the court's discretion and reasonable.
The writ of habeas corpus is denied.
COBB, WARREN H., Senior Judge, concurs.
.Petitioner did not seek to alter the amount of his bond. Thus, the only issue before this court is the special condition.
.The statute does not limit its scope to monetary conditions. It specifically refers to "bail or other conditions."
.For example, this court has previously affirmed the imposition of "house arrest" and wearing an electronic security bracelet as a condition of release even though they are not expressly included in the statute. Alvarez v. Felton, 639 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). See also Williams v. Spears, 814 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (affirming pretrial services in lieu of bond); Houser v. Manning, 719 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (affirming the additional condition to "not use, possess, or carry a firearm, gun, weapon, or ammunition").