Case Name: Mosaic Templars of America v. Crook
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1926-02-15
Citations: 170 Ark. 474
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mosaic Templars of America v. Crook.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 474–478

Head Matter:
Mosaic Templars of America v. Crook.
Opinion delivered February 15, 1926.
Carmichael S Hendricks, for appellant.
Compere é Compere, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, J.,
(after stating the facts). The first contention of counsel for the defendant for a reversal of the judgment is that the plaintiff is precluded from recovery under the terms of the policy and the by-laws, which it is claimed became a part of it. The Legislature of 1917 passed an act relating to the regulation and incorporation of fraternal beneficiary associations. Section 6 of the act is now § 6074 of Crawford & Moses' Digest. It provides that the payment of death benefits shall be confined to certain designated relatives or dependents of the members. This statute has been construed as having only a prospective operation, and as not affecting the rights of beneficiaries in policies issued prior to the passage of the statute. Mosaic Templars of America v. Bean, 147 Ark. 24, and International Order of Twelve Knights and, Daughters of Tabor v. Rosenberg, 163 Ark. 594.
The benefit certificate or the policy sued on in this case was issued prior to the passage of the statute, and it is conceded that the plaintiff is not precluded from recovery under it. It is insisted, however, that he is barred of recovery under the policy itself and the by-laws of the order. As shown in our statement of facts, the policy contained a provision that it was subject to such laws of the defendant as might then be in force and such others as should be enacted in the future.
It is claimed that, under this clause of the policy, as construed in connection with § 6 of the by-laws, the defendant is barred of recovery. It will be remembered that § 6 provides that the payment of death benefits shall be confined to such beneficiaries as are permitted in the statutes of the State, and that it was passed in 1917. The exact time in that year that the change was made is not certain, but the change was made in order to conform to the statute. Prior to that time there was nothing in the constitution or the by-laws of the order which precluded the insured from making the plaintiff her beneficiary. It is well settled that contracts are to be construed in the light most favorable to the insured, and, when that is done, in view of the object sought to be accomplished, it seems to us that the defendant was act ing for the future only, and not for the past, when the change was made in the by-laws. In other words, they changed the by-laws so that in the future policies should not be issued to those persons who were prohibited by statute from being named as beneficiaries. There is no reason apparent to us why the same rules applying to the construction of statutes should not be applied to the construction of the by-laws as to policies which had already been issued. It will be remembered that the plaintiff was named in the policy as beneficiary in 1911, before the passage of the act of 1917 enumerating the persons who might be designated as beneficiaries. We are of the opinion that § 6 of the by-laws was not intended to operate upon policies which had been issued prior to its adoption, and that the plaintiff continued to be the beneficiary named in the benefit certificate.
It is also contended that the will or assignment, as it is called, did not in a proper and legal manner designate the plaintiff as a beneficiary. The will is copied in our statement of facts, and need not be repeated here. The plaintiff was sometimes known as Leaster Crook, as it appears in the will or assignment. This instrument also shows that it was signed by Henrietta McCloud at the beginning of it and not at the end, as is usually done. That the signature appears at the beginning instead of the end of the writing is unimportant if it appears that the writer intended to sign the instrument and become bound by its provisions. Lee v. Vaughan's Seed Store, 101 Ark. 68.
According to the testimony of Minnie Peoples, she was the presiding officer of the lodge at the time Henrietta McCloud assigned the policy of the plaintiff, and C. F. Newton was the scribe of the lodge; C. F. Newton wrote the name of Henrietta McCloud in the will or assignment while she held the pen. C. F. Newton, Betty Lyons and the witness were all present and witnessed the signature. This was done in open lodge at the request of Henrietta McCloud, in order that Lecester Crook should receive the insurance at her death. The testimony of Betty Lyons was to the same effect. This testimony shows that the requirements of the order as to the designation of the beneficiary were substantially complied with.
It follows that the judgment will be affirmed.