Case Name: PEOPLE v. ROBERTS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-11-28
Citations: 87 Mich. App. 262
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-3280
Parties: PEOPLE v ROBERTS
Judges: Before: Allen, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 87
Pages: 262–269

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ROBERTS
Docket No. 77-3280.
Submitted April 6, 1978, at Lansing.
Decided November 28, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Millando L. Roberts was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of larceny in a building. The Genesee Circuit Court, Earl E. Borradaile, J., sentenced the defendant to a term of four years in prison, with credit for time served. The defendant appeals, alleging 1) that the circuit court failed to inform him of the elements of the offense, 2) that the court failed to inform him that defense witnesses would be produced at court expense, and 3) that the determinate term of imprisonment was improper because it was not in compliance with the indeterminate sentence statute. Held:
1. The first two allegations do not amount to error, and they are certainly not reversible error.
2. The determinate sentence was improper as there is no statutory authority for such a sentence. Thus the sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to circuit court for resen-tencing. On resentencing, the defendant should be given an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term.
Remanded for resentencing.
Allen, P.J., dissented. He would hold that the indeterminate sentence statute applies only to those "convicted for the first time” and that the defendant’s determinate sentence was proper. He would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Sentences—Indeterminate Sentences — Determinate Sentences — Statutes.
There is no statutory authority for giving a convicted defendant a determinate sentence; therefore, where a judge sentenced a defendant to a jail term of only the maximum term allowed for the crime for which the defendant was convicted, with no minimum term, the matter should be remanded for resentenc-ing in accordance with the indeterminate sentencing statute (MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080).
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 540, 592.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 614. 39 Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 20.
39 Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 20.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 324-327, 339.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 348.
2. Criminal Law — Sentences—Indeterminate Sentences — Prior Convictions — Statutes—Court Rules.
Indeterminate sentences are mandated for all convicted defendants, without reference to the number of prior convictions that a defendant may have; where a defendant is charged in a supplemental information as a second, third or fourth offender the maximum sentence may be enhanced accordingly but the sentence must still comply with the indeterminate sentencing act (MCL 769.8, 769.10, 769.11, 769.12; MSA 28.1080, 28.1082, 28.1083, 28.1084, GCR 785.8[3]).
3. Criminal Law — Sentences—First-Time Offender — Prior Felony Convictions — Supplemental Information.
A defendant must be sentenced as a first-time offender, even where the defendant has prior convictions, where the prosecutor has elected not to file a supplemental information charging the defendant as a second, third or fourth offender.
4. Criminal Law — Sentences—Indeterminate Sentences — Allowable Minimum Term — Statutes.
An indeterminate sentence should have a minimum term of years not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of years given (MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080).
Dissent by Allen, P. J.
5. Criminal Law — Elements of Offense — Explanation to Defendant — Court Rules.
The speciñc elements of an offense with which a defendant is charged need not be stated or explained to a defendant (GCR 1963, 78B.7[l][a]).
6. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Supplying Witnesses at Court’s Expense — Information to Defendant.
There is no requirement that a defendant be expressly informed that defense witnesses will be provided at the court’s expense.
7. Criminal Law — Sentences—Indeterminate Sentences — First-Time Offenders — Prior Convictions — Statutes.
An indeterminate sentence is required for a person who is "convicted for the first time”; it is not required for a defendant who is convicted for a second or subsequent time (MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Appellate Division, for the people.
Rosenberg, Hartsook & Spuhler, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Allen, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, J.
Defendant was charged with and pled guilty to the offense of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment with credit for time served, and appeals by right. For the purposes of this opinion, we adopt the further statement of facts and errors involved set out in the dissent.
We concur with our brother Allen that the errors claimed in regard to the plea-taking procedure lack merit. The conviction should be affirmed.
We disagree that the sentence too should be affirmed.
By a 1902 amendment of the Constitution of 1850, the Legislature was given the authority to establish indeterminate sentences. They did so by 1903 PA 136. The subsequent amendments indicate no departure from the indeterminate nature of the sentencing scheme. Nowhere can there be found specific statutory authority for a determinate sentence and, failing this, the sentence rendered in this case must fall.
The dissent makes a good argument for the literal interpretation of the language of MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080, limiting its application to a person "convicted for the first time". However, such an interpretation then renders meaningless MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082 (second felony conviction), MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083 (third conviction), and MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084 (fourth conviction). In each of those subsequent sections the Legislature very clearly provided what the punishment could be for somebody convicted of subsequent felonies. It is interesting to note that even those subsequent sections, although increasing the allowable maximum, all provide for indeterminate sentencing. In other words, for the second conviction (MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082) it is provided, "may be placed on probation or sentenced to imprisonment for a term not more than 1-1/2 times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of such offense or for any lesser term in the discretion of the court".
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the dissent's reading of MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080, is correct, GCR 1963, 785.8(3) requires the sentencing judge to "state the minimum and maximum sentence imposed by the court". The literal language of the rule established by the Supreme Court, which would take precedence over inconsistent legislation in matters of practice and procedure, Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), People v Joker, 63 Mich App 421; 234 NW2d 550 (1975), clearly mandates an indeterminate sentence, without reference to number of previous convictions. At the very least, GCR 1963, 785.8(3) indicates the correct interpretation to be given the sentencing statute in issue.
The annotations are replete with citations which indicate that to charge someone as a second, third, or fourth offender a supplemental information must be filed and a trial had, if necessary, on that supplemental information. Upon conviction the specified penalty can be imposed. The dissent suggests that this can be done without any supplemental information and without any adjudication of any prior convictions. To do so, we are persuaded, would shortcut a legislative scheme designed to be implemented by the prosecutor. The Legislature has provided a relatively simple method for the prosecutor to reach a second, third, or fourth-time offender, and to increase his punishment. If the prosecutor elects not to so charge but instead simply charges as a first-time offender the only punishment authorized by the Legislature is an indeterminate sentence. The court cannot exceed this authority and the limitations specified in People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), apply.
We accordingly vacate the sentence heretofore imposed and remand to the trial court for resen-tencing pursuant to the Tanner opinion.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.
1905 PA 184:1921 PA 259:1927 PA 175.
See MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, In re Brazel, 293 Mich 632; 292 NW 664 (1940), and People v Parker, 50 Mich App 537; 213 NW2d 576 (1973).
It is interesting to note that Tanner was 23 at the time he was sentenced for manslaughter, which was taken as an included offense of the crime charged, first-degree murder. Tanner had two prior convictions: attempted larceny from a building and unarmed robbery. Records and Briefs, Supreme Court, 4 December term 1971, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, 3 and Appendix, 4a.