Case Name: Louisa Carlson, Resp't, v. Maria Louisa Winterson, App'lt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-12-03
Citations: 64 N.Y. St. Rep. 113
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louisa Carlson, Resp’t, v. Maria Louisa Winterson, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 64
Pages: 113–116

Head Matter:
Louisa Carlson, Resp’t, v. Maria Louisa Winterson, App’lt.
(New York Common Pleas, General Term,
Filed December 3, 1894.)
1. Witness—Impeachment—Reputation.
A witness, in order to testify to the general character of another, must show that he is familiar therewith.
2. Same—Specific acts.
Proof of the commission of a specific act of forgery is incompetent to discredit a witness.
3. Same.
A person cannot testify that he would not believe a witness under oath, unless it is shown that he knows his general character.
4. Trial—Objection.
An objection to a question previously excluded need not repeat the-ground thereof.
5. Same—Jurors.
It is improper to ask jurors whether the fact that a witness had been in the penitentiary would so prejudice them that they would not believe him.
Appeal from a judgment of the city court, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff.
E. F. Bullard, for app’lt; Hector M. Hitchings, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Bischoff, J.
Upon the trial the plaintiff produced a paper, dated August 28,1891, which in form purported to be the defendant's note, whereby, for value received, sheqpromised to pay, to the order of one Tengzelins, $500, thirty days after date. Tengzelins, called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he received the-note from the defendant in payment for services to be rendered by 'him in the investigation of the financial ability of one Collingwood, against whom she at the time asserted a claim, and that he-transferred the note to plaintiff in payment of a precedent debt. Defendant admitted Tengzelins' employment for the purposes mentioned, but denied that she executed or delivered the note produced, and contended that her promise to pay Tengzelins forms services was contingent upon the collection of her claim against Collingwood. The only substantial contest between the litigants; was with regard to the genuineness of the note. Upon evidence, to the sufficiency of which neither party at any time objected, the-jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Hence, for the purposes of this appeal, we may consider only rulings made during the trial, and to which due exception was taken. Schwinger v. Raymond, 105 N. Y. 648; 7 St. Rep. 544; Smith v. Pryor, 30 St. Rep. 553; Gundlin v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 59 St. Rep. 208.
The issue was substantially one of veracity between the plaintiff's witness, Tengzelins, and the defendant. Evidence of Tengzelins' reputation as a person of bad character generally was, therefore, admissible to impeach his credibility as a witness in this action (1 Greenl. Ev. § 461; 1 Rice, Ev. p. 630; Wright v. Paige, 3 Keyes, 581, 586, etc.; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 257; Wehrkamp v. Willett. 4 Abb. Dec. 548, 556), the credibility of a. witness always being in issue. Pharo v. Beadleston, 2 Misc. Rep. 424 ; 50 St. Rep. 609. To an inquiry of Forwood, called by the defendant for the purpose of discrediting Tengzelins, concerning the latter's general reputation, the plaintiff's counsel objected, on the ground that the evidence called for was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial, unless confined to reputation for veracity, and "that"no foundation has been laid." The last objection specifically raised the question of the witness' competency in the absence of evidence that he had knowledge concerning the subject-matter of the inquiry. It was thereupon incumbent upon the defendant, before proceeding with the inquiry, to establish the witness' competency (1 Greenl. Ev. § 461; 1 Rice. Ev. p. 630; Wright v. Paige, 3 Keyes, 581, 586, etc.); but, though admonished by the learned trial justice in that respect, the defendant's counsel omitted even the effort to do so. The evidence was thus properly excluded. To two subsequent inquiries of the same witness,— one as to the "general reputation " of Tengzelins, the other as to his " general reputation as to moral character,"—both of which were excluded, the plaintiff's counsel did not renew his objection that the witness was incompetent; but, having otice made the proper objection, he was not called upon to repeat it every time his adversary chose to renew his futle efforts to elicit the testimony excluded, from the same witness.
A further inquiry of the same witness, and tending to show that Tengzelins had forged his name to a note, was also properly excluded, under objection by the plaintiff's counsel that the evidence was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Evidence of specific acts of moral obliquity are inadmissible for the purposes of discrediting a witness. Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97, 104; Wehrkamp v. Willett, supra; 1 Rice, Ev. p. 629. Without evidence of Tengzelins' reputation, and of the competency of the witness called to discredit him, the exclusion of the inquiry as to whether or not he (the witness) would believe Tengzelins under- oath was obviously proper.
Upon Tengzelins' cross-examination by the defendant's counsel he admitted that he had suffered a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary. The record of his conviction, however, was not produced, and, against objection, Tengzelins was permitted, upon redirect examination, to testify that his imprisonment was upon his conviction of a forgery,involving $2.80. The admission of this last-mentioned testimony is claimed to have been error. Without discussing the proposition, the alleged error is so palpably harmless that a reversal of the judgment should not result.
The judgment of the general and trial terms of the court below should be affirmed, with costs.
Daly, Oh. J., concurs.