Case Name: JACKSON v. EGAN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-05-26
Citations: 123 N.Y.S. 297
Docket Number: 
Parties: JACKSON v. EGAN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 123
Pages: 297–301

Head Matter:
JACKSON v. EGAN et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
May 26, 1910.)
Mechanics’ Liens (§ 196 )—“Oontbactok”—“Mateeiaiatan.”
Under Lien Law (Consol. Laws, c. 33) § 2, providing that the term “contractor” means a person who enters into a contract with the owner of real property for the improvement thereof, and the term “materialman” means any person, other than the contractor, who furnished material for such improvement, a person who furnishes material, who also agrees with the owner of the real property to use that particular material in the.erection of any structure on it, ceases to be simply a “materialman,” and be comes a “contractor,” and the lien of one so agreeing to install his material is deferred to the lien of a mere materialman subsequent in time.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Mechanics’ Liens, Dec. Dig. § 196.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1534-1537; vol. 8, p. 7616; vol. 5, p. 4409; vol. 8, p. 7718.]
Thomas, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Action by Benjamin E. Jackson against Andrew Egan and others, involving priority of mechanics’ liens. Erom orders in favor of defendant De Dong, defendants Robins and the Brooklyn Builders’ Supply Company appeal.
Affirmed.
See, also, 134 App. Div. 986, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1130.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and JENKS, BURR, CARR, and THOMAS, JJ.
Herbert Reeves, for appellant Robins.
W. C. Damron, for appellant Brooklyn Builders’ Supply Company.
Mortimer M. Menken (Howard T. Cole, on the brief), for respondent
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
While injustice may result- from affirming these orders, we can see no escape therefrom. The statute relating to mechanics' liens defines the words "materialman" and "contractor." If we transpose the order in which these definitions appear therein, it may assist in understanding it. The term materialman "means any person other than a contractor who furnishes material" for the improvement of real property. This would indicate that a person who furnishes material may, under certain circumstances, be a contractor. The term contractor "means a person who. enters into a contract with the owner of real property for the improvement thereof." Therefore, if the. person who furnishes material also agrees with the owner of real property to use that particular material in the erection of - any structure upon it, he ceases to be simply'a materialman, and becomes a contractor.
We do riot claim that this exhaustively points out the difference between these two classes, but it is sufficient for the purposes of this case. De Long and the Brooklyn Builders' Supply Company were therefore materialmen, and Robins was a contractor. As De Long's lien was prior in point of time to that of the Brooklyn Builders' Supply Company, he is entitled to the surplus money as against it; and because he is a materialman, and not a contractor, he has a preference over Robins, notwithstanding Robins' lien was prior in point of time to his.