Case Name: Michael Joseph McFADDEN, Sr., etc., et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, etc., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-12-24
Citations: 499 So. 2d 920
Docket Number: No. 85-1451
Parties: Michael Joseph McFADDEN, Sr., etc., et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, etc., Appellee.
Judges: UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 499
Pages: 920–926

Head Matter:
Michael Joseph McFADDEN, Sr., etc., et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, etc., Appellee.
No. 85-1451.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 24, 1986.
Deborah C. Edens and John R. Over-chuck, of Maher, Overchuck, Langa and Lobb, Orlando, for appellants.
Ernest H. Eubanks, of Pitts, Eubanks, Hannah, Hilyard & Marsee, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORFINGER, Judge.
Michael J. McFadden, as personal representative of the estate of Brendan McFadden, appeals from the final summary judgment entered in favor of appellee Orange County. Appellant contends that the final summary judgment based upon , the doctrine of sovereign immunity was erroneously entered. We affirm.
About 8:45 P.M. on April 11, 1980, twelve-year-old Brendan McFadden, decedent, and his thirteen-year-old brother, Dennis, were attempting to cross Fairbanks Avenue (State Rd. 424A) from the northwest quadrant of the intersection to the southwest quadrant of the intersection on their way to the Majik Market, when Brendan was struck and killed by an automobile westbound on Fairbanks. Brendan had pushed a pedestrian cross button and when the traffic lights for eastbound traffic on Fairbanks showed red, the boys started to cross the street. The traffic lights are phased so that westbound through and left-turning vehicles on Fairbanks have the green light while eastbound vehicles on Fairbanks have red. The vehicle which struck the decedent came through on a green light.
The pedestrian cross button on the northwest corner activated by Brendan only provides protection for a pedestrian crossing from the northwest to the northeast quadrant. The pedestrian button for crossing Fairbanks from north to south is on the northeast corner. As indicated on the diagram, the intersection had crosswalks painted on the street on the north, east and south only. There was no crosswalk between the northwest and southwest quadrants of the intersection. Dennis testified in his deposition that he and his brother were quite familiar with the intersection and had crossed there many times before, and they did not follow the pedestrian crosswalks because it was "harder" and would involve backtracking. There was no "walk/don't walk" device facing the boys as they crossed where they did.
The evidence shows that Orange County had responsibility for the maintenance of the signals pursuant to a maintenance agreement between Orange County and Florida Department of Transportation (D.O.T.). Orange County could make minor modifications in the timing, that is, Orange County could add a few seconds to a movement or reduce by a few seconds the time allotted, but it could make no changes in the phasing, indications, or deflections of the signals. Orange County had no authority to change the timing of the lights at the intersection to alter the red/green phasing on Fairbanks. Only D.O.T. could do this.
Appellant argues that Orange County knew that a dangerous condition existed at the intersection and that its failure to warn of the known dangerous condition was not a planning level protected action. Decisions relating to the installation of appropriate traffic control methods and devices are discretionary decisions which implement police power and are judgmental, planning level functions to which absolute immunity attaches. Department of Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071, 1077 (Fla.1982). Appellant recognizes this principle but relies on the exception announced in City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So.2d 1082 (Fla.1982), that
a governmental entity may not create a known hazard or trap and then claim immunity from suit for injuries resulting from that hazard on the grounds that it arose from a judgmental, planning-level decision. When such a condition is knowingly created by a governmental entity, then it reasonably follows that the governmental entity has the responsibility to protect the public from that condition, and the failure to so protect cannot logically be labelled a judgmental, planning-level decision.
Id. at 1086. Therefore, argues the appellant, Orange County had a duty to warn of this known dangerous condition.
The argument is not persuasive here. First, even assuming that the condition was a hazard or trap, a matter which we do not decide, there is no evidence what soever that Orange County created that condition. On the contrary, the evidence shows without dispute that it did not. It is undisputed that Orange County neither designed nor installed the traffic signals or pedestrian control devices at the intersection nor did it have any authority to modify the timing or phasing of the traffic lights of which the appellant complains. Second, notwithstanding the statement to the contrary in the dissenting opinion, there is no evidence that Orange County was aware of the existence of any hazard at this intersection. There was no evidence of any prior accidents or complaints or any other indication that would have placed Orange County on notice that a hazard existed. Certainly, Orange County's traffic engineers knew of the sequencing of the lights. But that in itself is not notice that a hazard exists. There is no evidence of any malfunction of the traffic lights at the time of the accident, and even appellant's traffic expert conceded that none existed.
Reliance by the dissent on Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983) is misplaced. The allegations in Ralph were that the City maintained the beach as a public resort; that it invited the plaintiff and other bathers to use the beach; that it permitted motor vehicles to drive in an area where sunbathers were lying on the beach although it could have supervised the traffic and directed the vehicles to other areas; and that it breached its duty to the plaintiff by failing to warn sunbathers of the danger which existed because of inadequate supervision of the mixture of people and vehicles. Thus, in Ralph, it was alleged that the governmental agency did create the hazard on the beach and had the power to correct it. This power and authority, if not the creation, gave rise to the duty to warn. See also Harrison v. Escambia County School Board, 434 So.2d 316 (Fla.1983) (the plaintiff must allege the existence of an operational level duty on the part of the governmental entity to warn the public of a known condition which, created by it and not readily apparent, constitutes a trap for the unwary). Because the undisputed evidence shows that Orange County neither created the condition complained of nor had any power or authority to alter the condition, no operational level duty to warn existed.
Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, there is no case in Florida imposing a duty upon a governmental entity to warn of a hazard or trap which it neither created nor could control. In Neilson, the plaintiff alleged that a hazard existed where certain streets merged, confusing travellers into believing that they could traverse the intersection without danger from crossing vehicles, and that the intersection was not properly controlled by traffic signals. The dictum in the case concerning the duty to warn relates to the creation of the hazard. The intersection had been designed and constructed by the defendant. In Collom, the hazard or dangerous condition had been created by the City of St. Petersburg. Thus, any reference to a duty to warn was in the context of the creation (or possibly the control) of a known hazard by the entity, not just an abstract duty. This is emphasized in Ralph, where the court, quoting from Collom says:
We hold that when a governmental entity creates a known dangerous condition, which is not readily apparent to persons who could be injured by the condition, a duty at the operational-level arises to warn the public of, or protect the public from, the known danger. The failure to fulfill this operational-level duty is, therefore, a basis for an action against the governmental entity. [Emphasis in original].
471 So.2d at 2.
In suggesting that the governmental entity has a duty to warn of a known hazard or trap even where the entity has not created the danger, the dissent does not address the question of the power or legal authority of the entity to give such warning. Only D.O.T. has the authority to erect "signs, signals, markings and other traffic control devices" on a state highway. § 335.09, Fla.Stat. (1985). Any traffic sign erected on a state highway by someone other than D.O.T. is unauthorized, and thus prohibited by section 316.0765. We should not attach liability to a governmental agency for failure to do that which it is legally prohibited from doing. Thus we find no operational level duty to warn imposed on Orange County.
AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. This suit was initially filed against Margarita D. Tous, the driver of the car which struck the decedent, and Jorge Tous, the co-owner of the car. Orange County and the Florida Department of Transportation (D.O.T.) were later joined as defendants. Settlement was made with the Tous' and they were dismissed from the action. D.O.T. successfully sought severance and transfer of the case against it to Leon County. See Florida Department of Transportation v. McFadden, 432 So.2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
. The statement in the dissent that Orange County's traffic engineers knew that "pedestrians normally can and do rely on red lights at intersections to cross streets" is incorrect. One of the traffic engineers was asked if pedestrians could normally assume that when the red light appeared for eastbound traffic on Fairbanks it would be safe to cross the highway. The exact response was:
My experience and feeling is that in the absence of the crosswalk, that's the number one clue that things are not as they should be for crossing. And secondly, if you're going to cross the street, whether [sic] there is no protection of even the painted crosswalk, my feelings are that each one is expected to observe the traffic more importantly than the signal.
That is to say, if a Mack truck's bearing down on you, obviously you should not step off the curb.
He further testified that he did not consider it advisable to rely on the red traffic signal when crossing a street.