Case Name: FLUKER v. DE GRANGE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1906-06-22
Citations: 117 La. 331
Docket Number: No. 16,176
Parties: FLUKER v. DE GRANGE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 331–335

Head Matter:
(41 South. 591.)
No. 16,176.
FLUKER v. DE GRANGE.
(June 22, 1906.
On Rehearing, June 28, 1906.)
1. Judgment — Res Judicata.
In a suit to annul a tax sale for irregularities, a judgment dismissing the suit after trial on issue joined by general denial concludes the plaintiff as effectually as if the defendant, in addition to the general denial, had, by way of reconventional demand, asked that his own title be recognized and enforced.
[Ed. Note. — For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, § 1165.]
2. Pleading — Supplemental Answer — Notice.
No law requires that a supplemental answer be notified to the plaintiff otherwise than by its filing.
3. Appeai^-Objeotions in Lower Court— Transfer of Case — Objections Waived.
After trial and judgment it is too late to object that the transfer of the case from one of the divisions to the other of the civil district court, parish of Orleans, was irregular.
[Ed. Note. — For cases in point, see vol. 2, Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, § 1141.]
4. Taxation — Tax Deed — Validity.
When the purchaser at a tax sale made under Act No. 82, p. 104, of 1884, to satisfy taxes of 1879 and previous years, does not pay the taxes of 1880 and subsequent years, but merely promises to pay them, the title he acquires is a mere nullity.
[Ed. Note. — For cases in point, see vol. 45, Cent. Dig. Taxation, § 1469.]
On Rehearing.
5.Vendor and Purchaser — Action for Price — Interest.
In an action to compel a purchaser to accept title to real estate and pay the price, the defendant should be condemned to pay interest only from the date of judgment, where he had reasonable ground to defend the suit.
[Ed. Note. — For cases' in point, see vol. 48, Cent. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, § 933.]
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred Durieve King, Judge.
Action by Calhoun Fluker against Joseph T. De Grange. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Modified and affirmed.
Guy Morville Hornor, for appellant. William Winans Wall, for appellee.

Opinion:
PROVOSTY, J.
This is a suit to compel a purchaser to accept a title which he has refused to accept because of its not being, in his opinion, good.
The property formerly belonged to one J. * Peter Hubert. It was sold at tax sale to the state in 18S4 for the taxes of 1882i Notwithstanding this sale to the state, it was offered at tax sale in 1885, under Act No. 82, p. 104, of 1884, for the taxes of 1872 to 1878, inclusive, and was adjudicated to Joseph Holz. In 1893 the state sold it to W. W. Wall; and the latter at once took actual possession of it, by building around it a substantial wire fence; and he and his vendee, the plaintiff, have been in possession ever since. In 1895 the heirs of J. Peter Hubert filed suit, simultaneously, against Holz and Wall, to annul the tax sale and recover the property. In March, 1898, a judgment was rendered dismissing the suit against Wall. The suit against Holz is still pending. Plaintiff is the vendee of Wall. All the sales above mentioned were duly recorded.
In disposing of the case we shall limit ourselves to two questions: First, whether the heirs of J. Peter Hubert are concluded in their rights by the judgment dismissing their suit against W. W. Wall; second, whether the tax title of Joseph Holz is a serious menace to the title of plaintiff.
Defendant's reasons for doubting that the heirs of J. Peter Hubert are concluded by the dismissal of their suit against Wall, are: First, that the judgment was rendered by the judge of division D, when the suit had been transferred to division E, and had not been retransferred to division D, except by an order of the judge of division D; second, that the original answer of Wall was simply a general denial, without any reconventional demand for the recognition of his title and his supplepaental answer, praying for a recognition of his title, was never notified to the plaintiffs in the suit.
Obviously, it would be too late after judgment for the plaintiffs in that suit to be raisihg these questions. Moreover, we know of no law requiring the answer in a suit to be notified to the plaintiff otherwise than by its mere filing, and we are not advised of the existence of any rule of court so requiring. And, again, we do not see why the dismissal of the suit on a general denial should not operate as res judicata of the issues of the suit.
The second objection, to the effect that the tax sale to Holz is a menace to plaintiff's title, is not better founded. The tax collect- or's deed to Holz recites that the purchaser promised and assumed to pay the taxes due on the property for 1880 and subsequent years; and it is not shown that, previous to the sale by the state to Wall — or since, for the matter of that — these subsequent taxes were paid. Indeed, from the fact that the auditor made the sale to Wall and received payment of these same taxes from Wall, a very strong inference arises that they have not been paid, so strong that the court can safely accept it as proof, in the absence of any effort on the part of defendant to rebut it. This, under settled jurisprudence (Martinez v. Tax Collector, 42 La. Ann. 677, 7 South. 796; Remick v. Lang, 47 La. Ann. 914, 17 South. 461), and numerous other cases, not needing to be mentioned, has the effect of making the Holtz title a mere nullity.
Judgment affirmed.