Case Name: Statt BERGER, d/b/a Statt's Plumbing, Appellant (Defendant/Cross-Claimant), v. TETON SHADOWS INCORPORATED, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant/Cross-Claimant)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1991-11-05
Citations: 820 P.2d 176
Docket Number: No. 90-31
Parties: Statt BERGER, d/b/a Statt’s Plumbing, Appellant (Defendant/Cross-Claimant), v. TETON SHADOWS INCORPORATED, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant/Cross-Claimant).
Judges: Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 820
Pages: 176–180

Head Matter:
Statt BERGER, d/b/a Statt’s Plumbing, Appellant (Defendant/Cross-Claimant), v. TETON SHADOWS INCORPORATED, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant/Cross-Claimant).
No. 90-31.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Nov. 5, 1991.
Steven R. Helling of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellant.
R. Michael Mullikin of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for appellee.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
MACY, Justice.
Appellant Statt Berger appeals from the district court's judgment awarding damages to Appellee Teton Shadows Incorporated resulting from a fire at a condominium project in Teton County. Berger and Teton Shadows stipulated that Teton Shadows' damages totaled $120,000. At the conclusion of a two-day bench trial, the district court found, inter alia, that Berger's negligence caused the fire, and it granted judgment in favor of Teton Shadows for the full $120,000. Berger does not appeal from the district court's finding of negligence. Berger's appeal, instead, focuses upon the district court's interpretation of the parties' written agreement.
We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Berger raises the following issues:
1. Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee judgment against Appellant for damages caused by fire, in light of Ap-pellee's contractual agreement to provide fire insurance?
2. Did the trial court err in allowing a subrogated claim by Appellee's insurer in light of Appellee's contractual agreement to provide fire insurance and further in light of Appellant's claim of being a co-insured under Appellee's insurance policy, since the policy provided coverage for the personal property of others, including Appellant?
3. Did the trial court err in not entering judgment in favor of Appellant and against Appellee for the damages sustained by Appellant as a result of the fire, in light of Appellee's contractual agreement to provide fire insurance?
Teton Shadows responds with the following issues:
1. Whether Teton Shadows contractually waived the right to pursue a claim for ordinary negligence against Berger (or agreed to indemnify Berger for his own negligence) as to any loss due to Berger's negligence for either the insured portion of the claim, the uninsured portion of the claim or both.
2. Whether Berger was a "co-insured" under or a party to the policy of Farm Bureau so as to preclude recovery by Farm Bureau of its subrogated interest in the claim of Teton Shadows for the negligence of Berger.
3. Whether Berger is the real party in interest with regard to any claim seeking to recover amounts paid to Mateosky in settlement of Mateosky's claim against Berger for negligence.
4.Whether Berger stated a claim under any judicially recognizable theory upon which relief could be granted for the recovery of amounts paid by CIGNA (his insurance company) to Mateosky based on a claim that Berger was negligent.
Teton Shadows, owner/general contractor, hired Berger as a subcontractor to do the plumbing on the project. The terms of their agreement were set out in a written contract. The dispute centered on the contract provision, "Owner to carry fire, tornado and other necessary insurance." Berger argued that this provision required the owner (Teton Shadows) to insure the project against fire and, thereby, shifted the risk of loss to Teton Shadows' insurance carrier. Teton Shadows claimed that, notwithstanding this provision, Berger was still responsible for the damages which resulted from his negligence.
In True Oil Company v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo.1989) (citations omitted), we reviewed this Court's role in contract interpretation:
The determination of the parties' intent is our prime focus in construing or interpreting a contract. "If an agreement is in writing and the language is clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be secured from the words of the agreement." Nelson v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo.1987). When the language is clear and unambiguous, the writing as a whole should be considered, taking into account relationships between various parts. Contract construction and interpretation are done by the court as a matter of law.
It is also true in contract interpretation that, " 'Ambiguity . is not generated by subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning [the contract's] meaning.' " Ricci v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wyo.1986).
In a Florida case with facts nearly identical to those in this case, the plumber's alleged negligence caused a fire which damaged the owner's insured property. Housing Investment Corporation v. Carris, 389 So.2d 689 (Fla.App.1980). The owner's insurance carrier paid the loss and sought subrogation. The Florida court denied subrogation because the parties' contract provided, " 'Owner to carry fire, tornado, and other necessary insurance.' " Id. at 689. The court reasoned:
[T]he parties foresaw the possibility of loss by fire arising from construction work and . the contract provision was for the purpose of providing protection from that risk by use of insurance.
Id. at 689-90. The Florida court discussed the rationale for parties shifting the risk of loss to the insurance carrier:
The owner had, as all owners always have, the right to insure his own property for his own exclusive benefit without the consent or agreement of the contractor or anyone else. Therefore, the only reasonably conceivable purpose of a construction contract provision placing an obligation on the owner to carry insurance is to benefit the contractor by providing him protection and exculpation from risk of liability for the insured loss. Although the contractor was not named as an insured, nor does the contract require this to be done, the contract insurance provision is valuable to the contractor for the very purpose this case exemplifies and serves to limit the owner to insurance proceeds even though the loss was caused by the negligence of the contractor.
Id. at 690.
In this case, the parties' contract was unambiguous. The contract provision, owner to carry fire insurance, clearly expressed the parties' intent to shift the risk to Teton Shadows' insurance carrier. We agree with the Florida court's reasoning and hold that Teton Shadows is limited to the proceeds of its insurance policy for its recovery. The district court's $120,000 judgment for Teton Shadows is reversed.
Because the parties' contract was unambiguous, we do not need to decide whether Berger was a co-insured under Teton Shadows' builder's risk policy. As to Berger's third issue, the district court did not err in denying Berger's cross-claim against Teton Shadows for damages. Berger does not cite any authority or present a cogent argument to support his claim that Teton Shadows agreed to insure against the losses which Berger suffered due to the fire. Bland v. State, 803 P.2d 856 (Wyo.1990).
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
THOMAS, J., dissenting, with GOLDEN, J., joining.
GOLDEN, J., dissenting.
. Teton Shadows' insurance company, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Com pany, paid $103,000 of the loss under its builder's risk policy, leaving $17,000 unpaid as an uninsured loss. Teton Shadows' risk policy included fire insurance. This appeal involves both Farm Bureau's subrogated claim of $103,-000 and Teton Shadows' uninsured loss (non-subrogated claim) of $17,000.
. The parties' contract consisted of Berger's proposal to furnish materials and labor and Teton Shadows' acceptance of the proposal.
. This provision is identical to the one at issue in this case.