Case Name: POZEPKA v. AMERICAN GLUCOSE CO.
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-01-15
Citations: 31 N.Y.S. 1019
Docket Number: 
Parties: POZEPKA v. AMERICAN GLUCOSE CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 31
Pages: 1019–1021

Head Matter:
POZEPKA v. AMERICAN GLUCOSE CO.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term.
January 15, 1895.)
Negligence—Pleading.
In an action for the death of plaintiff’s intestate, caused by the burning of defendant’s building, in which plaintiff was at work, the complaint alleged that the fire originated by reason of defects in the building. No other fire was alleged to have been started. Then followed a separate allegation that the taking fire and the burning of the building were due wholly to the negligence of defendant. Held, that the allegation as to negligence applied to the alleged defective condition of the building. White, J., dissenting.
Action by Josephine Pozepka, as administratrix, etc., against the American Glucose Company. Defendant demurs to the complaint.
Overruled.
Argued before TITUS, C. J., and WHITE and HATCH, JJ.
Ullman & Ullman, for plaintiff.
Rogers, Locke & Milburn (L. L. Babcock, of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
HATCH, J.
The complaint alleges that'the fire originated in the dynamo room of the structure burned, by reason of defects in the appliances and machinery operated therein, and by reason of the defective insulation of the wires conducting the electrical current to the electric lights, by reason of which defects the woodwork of said dynamo room was set on fire. This is the only fire alleged to have been started, and it resulted in the destruction of the building. This is followed by a separate allegation that the taking fire of the building, and the burning, were due wholly to the carelessness and negligence of the defendant. The latter is not to be treated as a separate, general allegation of negligence, independent of the facts before alleged. The facts are stated, showing how the fire originated, and the allegation of negligence is of that fire. Consequently, such allegation applies to the specific acts alleged, and characterizes them as negligent. There was but one fire, and its manner of starting is stated. It resulted in the destruction of the building from which the injury was sustained. The fire was therefore the direct and proximate cause of the injury. The allegation of negligence on the part of the engineers does not negative the allegation of negligence as totlm cause of the fire. There was no failure of duty on their part, which caused the fire to start; they simply made no attempt to put it out when they might have done so. Their failure in this regard,, even though it be called a "proximate cause" of the burning, does not aid defendant; for it would then be only one of two proximate causes, and within the rule laid down in Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83, the defendant would still be liable. Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 283. The fact is not changed that the fire originated from the negligence of defendant. The case, as thus presented by the pleading, shows that the fire was caused by the negligent acts of the defendant, and was the proximate cause of the injury; that the negligence of" the coemployés, in failing to put the fire out, wTas, at most, concurrent with the negligence of defendant. But the latter fact does not render the pleading bad, as such negligence does not exonerate the defendant for its act of negligence. Ellis v. Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 546. The pleading is inartificially drawn, but a cause of action is sufficiently well stated to resist a demurrer. Judgment should therefore be ordered for the plaintiff on the demurrer, with costs, with leave to-the defendant to answer within 20 days on payment of costs.