Case Name: Henry CLARK v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-12-16
Citations: 731 So. 2d 1098
Docket Number: No. 96-IA-01284-SCT
Parties: Henry CLARK v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe.
Judges: PITTMAN, P.J., and BANKS, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 731
Pages: 1098–1115

Head Matter:
Henry CLARK v. LUVEL DAIRY PRODUCTS, INC. and James H. Briscoe.
No. 96-IA-01284-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 16, 1998.
Tylvester 0. Goss, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
John D. Price, Jackson,. Attorney for Appellees.

Opinion:
SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. • Henry Clark, the appellant, sued Luvel Dairy Products, Inc., and its president, James H. Briscoe, the appellees, in Hinds County Circuit Court for actionable words, false imprisonment, and defamation. That court ordered venue transferred to Attala County upon the motion of the appellees based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This Court granted interlocutory appeal.
I.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
¶ 2. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "[although the origins of the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] in Anglo-American law are murky, most authorities agree that forum non conveniens had its earliest expression . in Scottish estate cases." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449,, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994). The first Scottish cases dealt with the plea of "forum non competens." The plea, which was normally directed to a lack of jurisdiction, "was sustained in cases where the jurisdiction seemed clear but the parties were nonresidents and trial in Scotland would have been inconvenient." Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conve-niens, 35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, 387 n. 35 (1947) (iciting Vernor v. Elvies, 6 Dict. of Dec. 4788 (1610); Cot. Brog's Heir v. -, 6 Dict. of Dec. 4816 (1639); Anderson v. Hodgson, 6 Dict. of Dec. 4779 (1747)).
¶ 3.. By 1845, Scottish cases discussed the question in terms of one "on the merits" rather than jurisdiction, and the words "inconvenient forum" were beginning to be used. The Latin term "forum non conve-niens" was used by Scottish judges for the first time in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L.Rev. 908, 909 (1947). "Forum non con-veniens" was used by the courts instead of "forum non eompetens" when the court's jurisdiction was clear and "only a question of discretion was involved." Barrett, 35 Cal.L.Rev. at 387 n. 35 (citing Brown v. Cartwright, 20 Scot.L.R. 818 (1883); Williamson v. North-Eastern Ry. Co., 21 Scot.L.R. 421(1884)).
¶ 4. A case which is considered to be a leading case in England dealing with the doctrine is Logan v. Bank of Scotland, 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.1905). In that case, the plaintiff, a domiciled Scotsman, brought an action against the defendant bank, a Scottish corporation with head offices in Edinburgh. The transactions which gave rise to the cause of action took place in Scotland. All the parties involved in the action resided in Scotland with the exception of one of the defendants. The bank had one branch outside Scotland, and it was located in London. The writ of summons in the action was served on the bank in London. The defendants moved to have the action in England stayed on the ground that the action was vexatious and oppressive.
¶ 5. The English court granted the stay. In so doing, the court cited three cases dealing with forum non conveniens, a New York case, Collard v. Beach, 81 A.D. 582, 81 N.Y.S. 619 (1903) (declining jurisdiction of tort action occurring in another jurisdiction between nonresidents), and the Scottish cases of Longworth v. Hope, 3 M. 1049 (1865) (dismissing the plea in a libel action between Englishmen because the libel was published in Scotland), and Williamson v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 11 R. 596 (1884) (sustaining a plea of forum non conveniens where a Scottish resident sued a company located in England for negligence in a death occurring in England). The court noted that the cases "seem to carry the law further in those countries than can be found in any reported case in this country." Logan, 1 K.B. at 148. While noting that the court should stay proceedings on the ground of vexation only with great care, the court held,
Now, it is true that the Courts of this country have not gone so far as to express themselves upon the question of convenience in terms similar to those used in the Scotch' cases, though, as I have already noticed, it may be doubted whether there is any substantial difference between the two. Yet it seems to me clear that the inconvenience of trying a case in a particular tribunal may be such as practically to work a serious injustice upon a defendant and be vexatious. This would probably not be so if the difference of trying in one country rather than in another were merely measured by some extra expense; but where the difficulty for the defendant of trying in the country in which the action is brought is such that it is impracticable to properly try the case by reason of the difficulty of procuring the attendance of busy men as witnesses, and keeping them during a long trial, and of having to deal with masses of books, documents, and papers which are not in the country where the action is brought, and of dealing with law foreign to the tribunal, it appears to me that a case of vexation in some circumstances may be made out if the plaintiff chooses to sue in that country rather than in that where everybody is and where all the witnesses and material for the trial are.
Id. at 151-52. The court further noted that if the one defendant who was an English resident were a real defendant rather than a nominal defendant and it had been necessary to bring an action to join him and the bank in England, then the defendant bank might have had to submit to the action brought in England. Id. at 153.
¶ 6. In the United States, the doctrine of forum non conveniens appeared in the 1800s in the jurisprudence of a few state courts although the phrase "forum non conveniens" was not used. These cases involved suits between aliens on foreign causes of action or parties who were residents of different states. Barrett, 35 Cal. L.Rev. at 387 n. 36. Following a 1929 law review article whose author contended that "all American courts had inherent power to decline jurisdiction under the doctrine" of forum non conveniens, the term "forum non conveniens" began to be used by courts. Id. at 388 (citing Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Lato, 29 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1929)). The doctrine originated in state courts not in federal court. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) ("The doctrine . originated in Scotland . and became part of the common law of many States . "). By 1947, the doctrine had gained acceptance in barely half a dozen states. Barrett, 35 Cal.L.Rev. at 388-89.
¶ 7. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court rendered two decisions which settled the question of the power of the federal courts to apply forum non conveniens. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the Court recognized that a federal court has the discretion to dismiss a case even when it has jurisdiction if the plaintiff has a choice of courts and the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be better served by another forum. To that end, the Court prescribed a number of factors to be used in determining if the case should be dismissed. The Court also approved the dismissal of a case by applying forum non conveniens in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947).
¶ 8. The following year, Congress enacted section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code. The section allows a district court to transfer a civil action to another district court for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955), the Supreme Court discussed the difference between the doctrine of forum non conve-niens as it existed prior to enactment of section 1404(a) and after enactment.
When Congress adopted § 1404(a), it intended to do more than just codify the existing law on forum non conveniens. As this Court said in Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55-61[, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 1207 (1949)], Congress, in writing § 1404(a), which was an entirely new section, was revising as well as codifying. The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer. When the harshest part of the doctrine is excised by statute, it can hardly be called mere codification. As a consequence, we believe that Congress, by the term "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience. This is not to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiffs choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader.
Id. at 32, 75 S.Ct. 544. By virtue of enactment of section 1404(a), the doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal cases has continuing application only where the alternative forum is abroad. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994).
¶ 9. We have recognized the doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases involving out-of-state defendants requesting transfer to another state. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Tircuit, 554 So.2d 878 (Miss.1989); Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557 (Miss.1988); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Stedman, 344 So.2d 468 (Miss.1977); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Moore, 215 So.2d 419 (Miss.1968); Strickland v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 194 Miss. 194, 11 So.2d 820 (1943).
II.
INTRASTATE FORUM NON CONVENIENS
¶ 10. A majority of states have enacted statutes which provide for a change of venue when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. A few states provide for a change of venue by rule. In the absence of statutory authority, the courts in some states have allowed a change of venue under the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens, while the courts in a number of other states have rejected the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens and refused to allow venue to be changed for the sake of convenience.
¶ 11. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens in 1983 in the case Torres v. Walsh, 98 Ill.2d 338, 74 Ill.Dec. 880, 456 N.E.2d 601 (Ill.1983). The court recognized the authority to transfer a case to another county within the same state as existing at common law and that "therefore, statutory authorization is unnecessary as it only recognizes and codifies a right that previously existed at common law." Id. at 605. As the basis for finding that the doctrine of forum non conveniens originated in the common law of England which Illinois adopted as it existed prior to the fourth year of James the First, the court cited cases from England which said that "removal to another county might be had 'for the necessity of an indifferent trial.' " Id. at 605 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court cited the English case of Holmes v. Wainwright, 3 East. 329, 330, 102 Eng.Rep. 624 (1803) to support its adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court said, "The [English] court applied the forum non conveniens doctrine and transferred the case from London to Yorkshire." Torres, 74 Ill.Dec. 880, 456 N.E.2d at 606. The court has continued to apply the doctrine in subsequent cases.
¶ 12. Oklahoma adopted intrastate forum non conveniens in Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484 (Okla.1972). Citing its Code of Civil Procedure, an unreported Oklahoma case, and a case from Kansas involving interstate forum non conveniens which held that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens is a part of the common law of the state of Kansas, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens may under the common law be applied in a proper case.
¶ 13. The Missouri Supreme Court has declined to adopt the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens in the absence of statutory authority. In Willman v. McMillen, 779 S.W.2d 583 (Mo.1989), the court stated that venue is -within the legislature's province. As such, the court "may not engraft upon a statute provisions that do not appear explicitly or by implication from other words in the statute" especially since "[t]he statutory designation of proper venue as the site where the cause of action accrued presupposes legislative determination that it cannot be overly inconvenient for a defendant to appear in that location." Id. at 585-86. The court also rejected the notion that intrastate forum non conve-niens existed at common law. The court said that the part of the English common law which was adopted by Missouri was that existing prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I (1607), and no English cases had been found dealing with the doctrine earlier than an 1803 case. In any event, such cases "would not be dispositive because travel between English counties prior to 1607 would be more analogous to travel between American states than between Missouri counties." Id. at 586.
¶ 14. In First Financial Trust Co. v. Scott, 122 N.M. 572, 929 P.2d 263 (N.M.1996), the Supreme Court of New Mexico expressly disapproved the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens, overruling prior case law in New Mexico which had recognized application of the doctrine since 1985. The court was highly critical of Illinois and Oklahoma which rely on common law as the authority for application of the doctrine. In noting that the Illinois Supreme Court relied on an English case which had involved the transfer of a case from London to Yorkshire as a basis for finding that forum non conveniens existed at common law, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to "find the transfer from a county in southern England to another county in northern England at the beginning of the nineteenth century to be sufficiently analogous to the transfer between counties in the State of New Mexico at the end of the twentieth century." Id. at 267.
¶ 15. With regard to Oklahoma, the court noted that Oklahoma had recognized the doctrine by citing an unreported case which had allowed intrastate forum non conveniens even though acknowledging that the case had no precedential value. Additionally, the court recognized that the doctrine of forum non conveniens existing at common law allowed for the dismissal, not the transfer, of a lawsuit and that the federal statute providing for forum non conveniens was an expansion of the common law doctrine, not a codification. Id. at 265 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981)). In sum, the court stated,
We have been unable to find any persuasive precedent in the common law, of this state or any other, for the continued recognition of this doctrine, and we believe it would be improper to allow [pri- or case law] to stand in light of our analysis.... We are well aware of certain problems that may arise from the absence of a transfer mechanism based upon the convenience of the parties, but it is improper for the judiciary to create such a mechanism when the legislature has determined the policy of this state relative to election of proper venues.
Id. at 267.
III.
ANALYSIS
¶ 16. A review of the history of the doctrine of forum non conveniens reveals no support for the idea that forum non conveniens should apply in an intrastate context. The doctrine grew out of Scottish and English cases which involved parties of or matters in another country and was never applied to parties or matters located entirely within one country.
¶ 17. However, English common law courts did allow a change of venue from one county within England to another for the convenience of witnesses in some situations. Because of the development of venue at common law, the plaintiff had the prima facie power to designate any county in England as the place for trial.
The plaintiffs power of determining the venue was abused. The successive attempts to restrict its exercise indicate that then as now there was temptation to choose the most inconvenient place for the defendant whether or not' it was convenient for the plaintiff. A statute of Richard II attempted unsuccessfully to curb the growth of fictions and keep the venue local. A statute of Henry IV directed that attorneys be sworn that "they make no suit in a foreign county." Various rules of court called for punishment of attorneys for doing so. There was a brief period in which the defendant was permitted to take issue on allegations of venue. This made for delay. Finally, the practice developed of allowing motions to change the venue originally selected by the plaintiff. A stereotyped motion calculated to take care of the clearly vexatious cases dates from early in the seventeenth century. It was available where the cause arose exclusively in one county and the plaintiff had designated another. The plaintiff could prevent the change or change the venue back by undertaking to give material evidence arising in the county where he had laid it. If he failed to make good his undertaking he would be nonsuited.
Later we find the common law courts exercising a discretionary power to change the venue for the convenience of witnesses, in situations where the usual stereotyped motion would not apply. A good illustration of the practice is Holmes v. Wainwright [3 East 328 (1803) ]. The defendant obtained a rule nisi to change the venue from London to Yorkshire upon affidavit that all the witnesses lived in Yorkshire. The plaintiff showed that a particular fact arose in London. On the defendant's agreeing to admit this fact the rule was made absolute. Other cases emphasize the large discretion in the court to condition the granting of the motion on the defendant's abandonment of some of his technical legal rights; to require an undertaking to give judgment as of a particular term [Foster v. Taylor, 1 T.R. 781 (1787) ]; to require a precise showing of the number of witnesses and the nature of the defense [Evans v. Weaver, 1 Bos. & P. 20 (1797) ]; to require the defendant in an action on a bond to withdraw his plea of the general issue and go to trial on another plea characterized as on the merits [Fenwick v. Farrow, 1 Chit. 334 (1819) ]. The defendant had the burden of overcoming the inertia of the court, and where his witnesses lived in one county and plaintiffs in another, so that convenience was equally balanced, the plaintiffs convenience would prevail [Fleche v. Godfrey, cited in Foster v. Taylor, 1 T.R. 781, 782n.(a) (1787) ].
Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial — Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 41, 43-45 (1930).
¶ 18. The development of venue at common law does lend support to the theory that venue can be changed for the sake of convenience. However, the historical development of venue in Mississippi demonstrates that the legislature has rejected that portion of venue as it existed at common law. Pronouncements by this Court concerning both the common law and venue support this view.
¶ 19. The territorial government of Mississippi was established by an act passed in 1798. In 1817, the United States Congress authorized the State Government of Mississippi. "When the Mississippi territory was organized, the ordinance secured the inhabitants in the enjoyment of judicial proceedings, according to the course of common law. Toulmin, Dig. 473; Laws U.S. Vol. 1, 475. This, together with the provision in the constitution of 1817, schedule § 5, has been considered to exclude all English statutes, and to adopt only the common law, and the statutes of our own government, for the determination of the rights of the citizen." Boarman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. 149, 152 (1849).
To the extent that statutes, by their terms and necessary implications, and the common law are not repugnant, they co-exist and will be given effect. The presumption is that the legislature does not intend to make alterations in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either by express terms of by necessary implication, and does not intend to overthrow fundamental principles or to infringe existing rights, without expressing or clearly implying such intention.... And, the rule is stated in 59 C.J. 1040, that: "Statutes are not to be understood as affecting any change in the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated, either by express terms or by necessary implication from the language used...."
Sanders v. Neely, 197 Miss. 66, 82, 19 So.2d 424, 426-27 (1944).
¶ 20. The common law of Mississippi is "different in material respects from that which existed in England, and which exists in many other states of the Union. For instance, the common law of Mississippi does not include the statutes of England in existence at the time of the Revolution, but was adopted independently of such statutes, as the law of this state." City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 14, 177 So. 755, 758 (1937). This Court has stated that "The supreme court has the authority to declare for itself what the common law of this state is. The common law is the perfection of reason, and, when a rule of the common law ceases to be reasonable and just, it is no longer the common law. Those principles of the common law which are unsuited to our conditions, or repugnant to the spirit of our institutions, are not in force in this state. Only such rules of the common law as are adapted to our institutions and circumstances and not repealed by the Legislature or varied by usage are in force." Planters' Oil Mill v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 153 Miss. 712, 717, 121 So. 138, 140 (1929) (citations omitted).
¶ 21. In Noonan v. State, 9 Miss. 562, 573 (1844), the Court had this to say about the common law:
It is said that at the adoption of our constitution, there was included the common law, as a part of the law of the land, and that it would now be an unconstitutional act to alter or repeal by legislature, any principle, rule, or law, that was then a part of the common law. That, indeed, what was the common law at that juncture, was in fact incorporated into our constitution, and consequently not subject to any power short of that of the people themselves, in the exercise of their inherent political power, to alter or abolish their form of government. This view of the subject does not meet the approbation of this court, nor does it for the purpose intended, require its elaborate examination. The language of the constitution rebuts the presumption of such a meaning or intention. That the common law, like the common atmosphere around every living being, is gladly received by all framers of government, is certainly very true, but that it was adopted to remain perpetual, unaltered, and unalterable, and not to be tempered to our habits, wants and customs, we conceive was never designed by the wisdom of those who established our fundamental law.... The common law was the product of the experience of time, and the necessities of men living under a form of government. Many of its rules are now vexatious, and have become unnecessary, and unfitted to our occasions, and are properly repealed when they are found to obstruct the current of justice or the interests of the whole people.
¶ 22. The first statute dealing with venue was contained in the 1807 Statutes of the Mississippi Territory. This statute provided that all civil cases shall be commenced in the circuit court of the county in which the defendant may be found or if a real action, action of ejectment, or trespass quare clausum fregit, then in the county where the cause of action arose. In addition, no free-holder of the territory could be sued out of the county of his permanent residence unless it be one of the actions for which the statute made an exception. The venue statute found in Hutchinson's Code of 1848, one of the first codes following statehood, contains almost the identical language as that of the 1807 statute.
¶ 23. For comparison purposes with the English system, it is important to note that under Mississippi law as enacted both before and after statehood, the plaintiff had no power over the determination of venue. The venue statute was exclusive in that it allowed the action to be brought only where the defendant could be found or, in the case of a free-holder, in the county of the free-holder's permanent residence. By contrast, under the English system, the plaintiff had the prima facie power to designate any county in England as the place for trial. It was because this power was abused by plaintiffs that the practice developed of allowing motions for change of venue by the defendant. While the plaintiff in Mississippi today has more power over the determination of venue, even under existing law, the plaintiffs choice is not unlimited-.
¶24. With regard to venue, this Court has applied the common law in a couple of cases when the venue statutes were silent as to the defendant involved. In Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners v. Kellner, 189 Miss. 232, 251, 196 So. 779, 786 (1940), the Court held that in the absence of a statute prescribing the place of venue for suing a public corporation, the common law would prevail. And in the case of City of Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 258, 196 So. 228, 224 (1940), the Court held that the common law will prevail where the statutes are silent as to the venue of a suit against a municipal corporation. "The common law has been followed in this state, and so far as our reports disclose no municipality has been sued outside .the county of its domicile. Since the filing of this suit the legislature has enacted a statute reannouncing the common law rule, showing it to be the legislative purpose for municipalities to be sued in the counties in which they are located." Id. at 261, 196 So. at 225. 'What was said in Oliver v. Loye, 59 Miss. 820, and in Archibald v. M. & T. R. Co., 66 Miss. 424, 6 So. 238, is properly applied to the case then before the Court, and must be limited to the case which the Court was called upon to decide . The parties in each of the cases mentioned were private parties, and the statute prescribed the venue in such actions; and the venue, of course, was controlled by the statute." Id. at 260-61, 196 So. at 225.
¶ 25. This Court has said that "[vjenue is a function of statute." Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Miss.1992).
A state has the right to fix venue of actions according to its conception of what is necessary to best administer justice in its courts. It is not necessary for it to fix the venue of an action in one particular place. It cannot unreasonably discriminate between classes of defendants, but, having reference to reasonable conditions, it may fix the venue of actions according to its judgment of convenience, justice, etc. The state is the judge so long as it does not unreasonably discriminate between litigants or classes of litigants.
Clark v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 158 Miss. 287, 304, 130 So. 302, 307 (1930).
¶ 26. We have also stated that venue is about convenience. "The legislative prescription implies a legislative finding counties meeting certain criteria will generally be more convenient to the parties." Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1157 (Miss.1992). For instance, "according to our statutes, when a debtor is sued in an ordinary action, not local or otherwise provided for, his convenience is consulted as to where the suit shall be brought and conducted, but when he subjects himself to the extraordinary remedy by attachment, the rights of the creditor are placed above the convenience of the debtor." Baum v. Bumes, 66 Miss. 124, 128, 5 So. 697, 698 (1889).
¶ 27. The choice of venue under the general statute of venue belongs to the plaintiff.
"... [H]is choice must be sustained . unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the factual basis for the claim of venue.... Put otherwise, the court at trial must give the plaintiff the benefit of the reasonable doubt, and we do so on appeal as well." Flight Line, 608. So.2d at 1155.... In promulgating our Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court further has yielded to the legislature's prerogative in matters of venue, allowing it to create a level playing field for both plaintiffs and defendants without encouraging forum shopping.
McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So.2d 652, 656 (Miss.1996). Furthermore, Rule 82(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states, "Except as provided by this rule, venue of all actions shall be as provided by statute."
IV.
CONCLUSION
¶ 28. Our research on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the common law, and the development of venue conclusively establishes the following:
1) The history of the doctrine of forum non conveniens reveals no support for intrastate forum non conveniens.
2) Venue is a function of statute, and reference to common law can only be had where the venue statutes are silent.
3) By enacting a general venue statute which limited venue to the residence of the defendant or the place where the defendant could be found, the legislature effectively repealed the common law with regard to changing venue for the sake of convenience.
4) Venue is a matter of convenience, and the legislative directive with regard to convenience in this state is that counties meeting certain criteria will generally be more convenient to the parties.
5) The issue is one of legislative prerogative, and the Court today does not invade that prerogative.
¶ 29. To the extent that any of our previous decisions indicated that the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens would apply in this state, they are hereby overruled. Giving respect to the plaintiffs choice of forum, we hold the doctrine of forum non conveniens to be inapplicable when the trial court is faced with a choice of venue between two Mississippi counties. As a result, this case must be reversed and remanded to the Hinds County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 30. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PITTMAN, P.J., and BANKS, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion.
SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PRATHER, C.J., and MILLS and WALLER, JJ.
. This is the case on which the Illinois Supreme Court based its finding in Torres v. Walsh, 98 Ill.2d 338, 74 Ill.Dec. 880, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983) that the doctrine of forum non conveniens existed at common law. Not only does the case have nothing to do with forum non conveniens, but the only reason the English court granted the change of venue in this case was that the defendant was willing to admit the only fact upon which the plaintiff based venue in London. Otherwise, the court said, "[W]e should not interfere with the acknowledged general right of the plaintiff to try his cause where any part of the cause of action arose." Holmes, 3 East, at 330.
. Although we have rejected the concept of intrastate forum non conveniens, it is interesting to note that intrastate forum non conve-niens would not have been available under this statute because the doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes the existence of two or more available forums.