Case Name: H. Runge & Co. v. John D. Wyatt
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: H. Runge & Co. v. John D. Wyatt.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 291–294

Head Matter:
H. Runge & Co. v. John D. Wyatt.
Where a new county had been created by the legislature, and had been organized, (with the exception that no district court clerk had been elected,) but the county had not been attached to any judicial district, the inhabitants were liable to be sued in the county to which they belonged before the creation of the new county, although it is not an exception under the 1st section of the act to regulate proceedings in the district court. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1423.)
Legislation must be so construed as not to violate the 11th section of the bill of rights, which declares that every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. (Paschal’s Dig., p. 48, sec’. 11, Note 165.)
If there be no tribunal to appeal to, there could be no “due course of law."
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of the district judges.
Bunge & Co; sued Wyatt for a debt. The defendant plead to the jurisdiction, that he did not reside in Bexar, "but Wilson county. The plea in abatement was sustained and the case dismissed, from which the plaintiffs appealed.
The facts were, that the defendant had resided in Bexar for a number of years; that he resided in that part of Bexar which was cut off into Wilson by the act of the 13th February, 1860, (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 426,) and that he continues to reside there; that county officers, except clerk of the district court, had been elected at an election held on the 6th of August, 1860, all of whom had been duly .qualified; that there was no clerk of the district court of Wilson county; and that the county had not been attached to any judicial district.
W. H. Cleveland, for appellant.
—The legislature, in enacting the law that “ no person, who is an inhabitant of this State, shall be sued out of the county where.he has his domicile,” except in the cases therein provided, (O. & W. Dig., Art. 401,) did not provide for a case like the present, and I know of no precedent applicable to such a case.
The intention of the legislature could not have been to exempt any debtor from suit, or to deprive any creditor or other person of his legal remedy, but it evidently was, to give to the debtor, or person sued, the privilege of being sued in the county of his domicile.
W. L. ¿- C. L. Robards, for appellee.
—In the case of O’Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex., 336, “the point of time when the jurisdiction of the mother county ceased ” was when the new county was organized. The court admits that the question was not free from difficulty, and that difficulty arose from the fact that the act was silent upon the subject of organization. In this case there is no difficulty on that subject. The act of 13th February, 1860, sec. 2, p. 107, creating the county of Wilson, which was made part of the statement of facts, provides, That Dr. G-. J. Houston should organize the county, by holding an election at a time and place named by Mm; and it was in proof that all the county officers had been elected and qualified, except the clerk of the district court, on 6th August, 1860, before the suit was commenced. (Sec. 2, p. 107, of Acts.)
In the case cited, the court very properly attempted to supply the defect in the law, by ruling as to the time when the new county should cease to belong to a particular district; but having fixed the time, and the law in this case having fixed the time, place, and circumstances under which the county should be organized, the court will not go further, and say (where there was a casus omissus, and the legislature has failed to attach the county thus organized to any particular district) that the new county still belongs to the judicial district and county whence it was taken. The fact that no clerk was elected cuts no figure in the case, as the law had provided for the election of all the necessary officers in a plain and ample manner, and the election had occurred as required by law.
The hardship of which the appellant complains will not avail, for the sworn plea shows that defendant had, for a' long time, been a resident of that county, and the proof showed that he “ had resided there continuously for several years.” So the plaintiff must have contracted with reference to the facilities or difficulties which might arise to sue and render defendant liable. The object of laws is to protect the rights of all parties, and is not more liberally inclined to suitors than debtors. The relative position of parties should form a part and constitute the inducement to every contract.
We admit that, if suit had been brought before the county was organized, it would have been properly brought; but, having been subsequently, defendant was entitled to his privilege.

Opinion:
Bell, J.
—We are of opinion that the court below erred in sustaining the plea to the jurisdiction. The evidence shows that no clerk of the district court for the new county of "Wilson was elected at the election held in August, A. D. 1860, in pursuance of the provisions of the 2d section of the act creating the county of Wilson. This was doubtless because there was no provision of law authorizing a district court to be held in the new county. The county of Wilson had not been attached to any judicial district in the State. We must therefore conclude, that it was the intention of the legislature that the inhabitants of the new county should, for judicial purposes, remain under the jurisdiction of the mother county of Bexar, until provision should he made by law for the organization of a court of general jurisdiction in the new county.
The constitution provides, that "every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." In the present case, the plaintiffs in the court below could have no remedy by due course of law, if there was no tribunal in which they could make their complaint.
We are of opinion that the suit was properly instituted in the District Court for Bexar county. (See the case of O'Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex., 336.)
Reversed and remanded.