Case Name: NELSON BENNETT CO. and ALEXANDER TOPONCE, Respondents, v. TWIN FALLS LAND & WATER CO. et al., Appellants
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1907-12-30
Citations: 13 Idaho 767
Docket Number: 
Parties: NELSON BENNETT CO. and ALEXANDER TOPONCE, Respondents, v. TWIN FALLS LAND & WATER CO. et al., Appellants.
Judges: Ailshie, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 767–793

Head Matter:
(December 30, 1907.)
NELSON BENNETT CO. and ALEXANDER TOPONCE, Respondents, v. TWIN FALLS LAND & WATER CO. et al., Appellants.
[92 Pac. 980.]
Appeal — Adverse Party — Service op Notice.
1. Revised Statutes, section 4808, requires that a notice of appeal shall be served upon the adverse party. “Adverse party,” as used in this section, means any party who would be prejudicially affected by a reversal of the judgment, a party who has an interest in conflict with a reversal of the judgment.
2. Where R. and O. were made defendants in an action to recover for labor and to foreclose a lien, and facts are not alleged showing an indebtedness due said R. & O., or that they claimed or were entitled to a lien, and they filed no pleading in said cause, or set forth their lien in any manner, and the court made no finding in their favor, or against them, and the judgment in no way granted them any right or gave them anything, or denied them any claim or right, and it affirmatively appears from the record that such parties would not be prejudicially affected by a reversal of the judgment: Held, that even though they appeared by general appearance only, in said action, they were not entitíed to any notice of an appeal from the judgment.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from the District Court of Fourth Judicial District for Cassia County. Hon. Lyttleton Price, Judge.
Action to foreclose laborer’s lien. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Motion to dismiss appeal.
Motion overruled.
Henderson, Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette, and S. H. Hays, for Appellants.
It nowhere appears that Ryberg & Carleson ever filed any pleadings or took part in the case in any manner. Appellant never at any time was served with pleadings on the part of Ryberg & Carleson, nor was it required to serve any plead ings upon them.' So far as it appears from this record, they were mentioned in the complaint as being parties who had some possible claim against Nelson Bennett Company, and a possible lien of some sort for work not described upon property not described, but were made parties in order that if they chose they might appear and have their rights litigated with those of Nelson Bennett Company, the original contractors. They are not adverse parties to the suit who could be in any manner affected by a modification or reversal of the decree herein. The allegations of the complaint are not sufficient to even bring them into court as parties adversary to the plaintiff Nelson Bennett Company, or to any other party in the suit.
Under the circumstances, Ryberg & Carleson were unnecessary parties, and as such, even under the rule adhered to in Idaho, California, and Oregon, it was not necessary to serve them with notice of appeal, since no personal judgment was sought against them and no relief was asked or granted in respect to them. (Hand Mfg. Co. v. Marks, 36 Or. 523, 52 Pae. 512; Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Delahunt, 36 Or. 402, 51 Pac. 649.)
The supreme court of California indicates in Williams v. Mining Assn., 66 Cal. 195, 5 Pac. 85, and in Vincent v. Collins, 122 Cal. 387, 55 Pac. 130, that it is parties whose rights have been ascertained and fully determined by the judgment who must be served with notice of appeal, and that otherwise the appellate court would have no jurisdiction to modify or reverse the judgment. (Kenney v. Parks, 120 Cal. 22, 52 Pac. 40.)
The supreme court of this state has fully considered the true construction to be given to section 4808. (Aulbach v. Dahler, 4 Idaho, 522, 43 Pac. 192.)
In the case at bar, however, there was not only no judgment rendered against Ryberg & Carleson to be affected by this appeal, but there were no allegations in the complaint indicating that any judgment could be entered or could stand if rendered. The latest case in this court is Titiman v. Alamance Min. Co., 9 Idaho, 240, 74 Pac. 529. The court restates tbe doctrine as to tbe requirements of section 4808 as to service of notice of appeal, and explains the latter portion of the opinion in Aulbach v. Dabler. It adheres to the re-, quirement that notice of appeal must be served upon every party who would be affected by a modification or reversal of the judgment appealed from.
It cannot be claimed that the rights of Byberg & Carleson, if they ever had any, can be prejudiced by any modification or by the reversal of the judgment and decree herein. There certainly is nothing in the suit at bar which would operate by way of estoppel against Byberg & Carleson, either in behalf of Toponee, Twin Falls Land and Water Company or Nelson Bennett Company.
Marshall K. Snell, Bertha M. Snell, and H. H. Henderson, for Bespondents.
No notice of appeal was served upon defendants Byberg & Carleson, and the time for giving such notice having long since expired, this court has acquired no jurisdiction of this cause of appeal, for any decision it might render herein would affect such parties, and therefore, this appeal should be dismissed. (Titiman v. Alamance Min. Go., 9 Idaho, 240, 74 Pae. 529; Baker v. Drews, 9 Idaho, 276, 74 Pae. 1130.)
In the cases cited in which this court has made its rule, there was no appearance on the part of the particular parties referred to, but the court nevertheless held that having been .shown to be adverse parties who would be affected by a reversal or modification of the decree appealed from, they should have been served with notice of appeal. In the ease .at bar, the defendants Byberg & Carleson and Filer & DeLong were doubly entitled to notice of appeal, not only because they were interested or adverse parties in the contemplation of the law, but also because they had duly appeared, filed their appearance, had their attorneys of record, and were entitled to notice under section 4892, Bevised Statutes of 1887.
The amended complaint (paragraphs 20, 51-53) affirmatively shows Byberg & Carleson had a valid and existing prior lien, and appellant admits this in its answer (196, 216) and does not deny that they are necessary parties (199).
The ease of Mills v. Smiley, 9 Idaho, 317, 325, 76 Pac. 783, 325, distinguishes and clarifies the rule laid down in the Titimcm-Alamance case.
Every defendant who has appeared in an action is entitled to notice of all subsequent proceedings, of which notice is required to be given. (Rev. Stats., sec. 4892; Cummings v* Steele, 6 Idaho, 666, 59 Pac. 15.)
The term “adverse party” is further defined in Kerns v. Morgan, 11 Idaho, 580, 83 Pac. 954, as “a party to the original action.”
“In the matter (appeal) the appellant cannot choose for himself against whom he will proceed for a review on appeal; he must conform to the requirements of the statute.”' (Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice, sec. 536.)
“"When a defendant has appeared in an action he is entitled to notice of all subsequent proceedings had therein which in any respect affect his rights and interests.” (2 Eney. of PL & Pr. 604.)
“The record must affirmatively show the service of the notice of appeal on the adverse party or his attorneys. ’ ’ This provision is mandatory, and the record must affirmatively show that it has been complied with to give this court jurisdiction. (Adams v. McPherson, 2 Idaho, 855, 27 Pae. 577.)
In California, Oregon, Utah and Montana, a similar, and in some cases an identical, statute as to service of notice of appeal exists, and we cite the following leading cases: Bank of Ogden v. U. S. Sav. & Loan Co., 13 Utah; 189, 44 Pac. 1043; Stephens v. Stevens, 27 Utah, 261, 75 Pac. 619; Senter v. Be Bernal, 38 Cal. 637; 0 ’Kane v. Daly, 63 Cal. 317; Millikin v. Houghton, 75 Cal. 539, 17 Pae. 641; Reed v. Allison, 61 Cal. 461; Toy v. Railway Co., 75 Cal. 542, 17 Pac. 700; Hibernia Sav. Soc. v. Lewis, 111 Cal. 519, 44 Pac. 175; Bullock v. Tayler, 112 Cal. 147, 44 Pae. 457; Bowering v. Adams, 126 Cal. 653, 59 Pac. 134; McDonald v. Backus, 45 Cal. 262;. Moody v. Miller, 24 Or. 179, 33 Pac. 402; The Victorian, 24 Or. 121, 41 Am. St. Rep. 838, 32 Pac. 1040; Osborn v. Bogus, 28 Or. 302, 37 Pac. 456; Jackson Co. v. Bloomer, 28 Or. 110, 41 Pac. 930; Power & Bro. v. Murphy, 26 Mont. 387, 68 Pac. 411; Lancaster v. Maxwell, 103 Cal. 67, 36 Pac! 951; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Go. v. Fisher, 106 Cal. 224, 39 Pac. 758.

Opinion:
STEWART, J.
The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal herein npon the ground that notice of appeal was not served upon Ryberg & Carleson, defendants named in the complaint. Revised Statutes, section 4808, requires that a notice of appeal shall be served upon the "adverse party" or his attorney. If Ryberg & Carleson were adverse parties within the meaning of this statute, then the appeal should be dismissed, as it is admitted a notice of appeal was not served upon them.
"Adverse parties upon whom notice of appeal must be served are such parties as a reversal of judgment would affect." (Aulbach v. Dahler, 4 Idaho, 522, 43 Pac. 192; Titiman v. Alamance Min. Co., 9 Idaho, 240, 74 Pac. 529.) The words "would affect," as used in these two decisions, mean "adversely affect." The statute intends that a notice of appeal should be served upon all parties who have an interest in conflict with a reversal of the judgment, or whose rights would be adversely affected by a reversal of such judgment. (Hayne on New Trial and Appeal, sec. 210; Foley v. Bullard, 97 Cal. 516, 32 Pac. 574; United States v. Crooks, 116 Cal. 43, 47 Pac. 870; Elliott v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. 501, 103 Am. St. Rep. 102, 77 Pac. 1109; 2 Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice, pp. 1143-1146; 1 Words and Phrases, p. 224; The Victorian, 24 Or. 121, 41 Am. St. Rep. 838, 32 Pac. 1040.) Where default is entered and the rights of the defendant cannot be prejudicially affected by further proceedings in the case, he is not entitled to any notice of such further proceedings. (23 Cyc. 754.)
Looking into the record for the purpose of determining the question as to whether or not it affirmatively appears that Ryberg & Carleson were adverse parties within the meaning of the statute, or would be prejudicially affected by a reversal, we find that Nelson Bennett Company commenced an action against the Twin Falls Land and Water Company, a corporation, Alexander Toponee and Ryberg & Carleson, and Walter G. Filer and Martin B. DeLong, trustees, demanding judgment against the defendant Twin Falls Land and Water Company for $185,705.62, and interest and attorney fees and costs, and for a decree of court that plaintiff have a lien upon the canal of said defendant described in the complaint, and that said property may be sold under the decree of the court to satisfy said lien and judgment, and that all liens against said property be litigated and determined in this action; that Walter G. Filer and Martin B. DeLong, trustees, be decreed to have no right or claim in or to said property. The only allegations in this complaint as to the defendants Ryberg & Carleson are found in paragraph 20 of the complaint, as follows: £ ' That the defendants, Charles Ryberg and Gus Carleson, as Ryberg & Carleson, were likewise subcontractors under this plaintiff, and performed labor and furnished materials in the building of a certain portion of said canal; and as such they did heretofore and on September 24, 1904, file a lien with the county recorder of said Cassia county, Idaho, claiming the, sum of $5,856.33 due them for work, and plaintiff alleges in respect thereto that said work was performed within the distance and upon that portion of the canal covered by this plaintiff's lien and described in this complaint, and is included herein, and that any amount which may be found due said Ryberg & Carleson upon their said lien is included in the amount due and owing this plaintiff, as principal contractor, and can and should be litigated and determined herein; that whatever amounts are found due and payable said Ryberg & Carleson should be satisfied out of the property included in and covered by this plaintiff's lien; that plaintiff has paid to said defendants Ryberg & Carleson all amounts by it, the said plaintiff, received from the defendant Twin Falls Land & Water Company on account of and allowed for said work of Ryberg & Carleson under the contract of employment between said Ryberg & Carleson and this plaintiff; and whatever amount is found to be due upon the lien and claim of said Ryberg & Carleson should be deducted from the amount herein found due plaintiff, and decreed and distributed to said Byberg & Carleson in this action."
The Twin Falls Land and Water Company answered in this action and with reference to the allegations set forth against Byberg & Carleson, admitted that Byberg & Carleson were subcontractors under Nelson Bennett Company in the performance of certain work, but whether they were subcontractors under the work mentioned in the complaint and answer in this action, upon which the lien of Nelson Bennett Company was founded, they have no knowledge and therefore deny. They further admit that Byberg & Carleson filed a lien against the property and that they are now claiming and demanding payment of the sum of $5,856.33 from the defendants, alleging such amount is due from Nelson Bennett Company on account of work and labor performed, but as to the lien, they have no knowledge, neither do they know whether the plaintiff paid Byberg & Carleson, and therefore they deny every allegation in respect to Byberg & Carleson made by Nelson Bennett Company in its complaint.
Alexander Toponee filed a cross-complaint in this action but does not mention, in any way, the names of Byberg & Carleson. The cause was tried and the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in which the only reference to Byberg & Carleson is found at folio 536 of the transcript, as follows: "Said Nelson Bennett Co. being an original contractor, and the said Alexander Toponee a subcontractor, and thereupon the hearing and trial of the above consolidated causes was commenced January 23rd, 1906, and had before the court without a jury, at which trial plaintiff Nelson Bennett Co. appeared by its attorneys, Marshall K. Snell, Bertha M. Snell and H. H. Henderson, and plaintiff Alexander Toponee appeared by his attorneys, Henderson & McMillan, and the defendants Byberg & Carleson failed to appear and were in default."
It may be stated, however, in this connection, that there is on file a written appearance on the part of Byberg & Carle son by their attorney, but that such written appearance is the only paper filed in said cause by said Ryberg & Carleson.
Again, at folio 589, in its twenty-third finding, the court finds: "The court finds that the defendants Ryberg & Carleson, subcontractors under said Nelson Bennett Co., failed to appear herein or to "prosecute their lien and are in default. ' '
Again, at folio 610, in conclusion of law No. 5, the court finds that the defendants Ryberg & Carleson are in default. ' ' In the decree the names of Ryberg & Carleson were not in any way mentioned. Thus it will be seen that the pleadings do not put in issue any claim of Ryberg & Carleson. They do not appear in the action except by a general appearance. They failed to answer or file a cross-complaint, setting up any claim of lien or asking for any judgment. The court did not find that there was any sum due them; did not find that they had filed or were entitled to any lien upon said property, and made no finding whatever giving them any affirmative relief against the plaintiff or any of their codefendants. The court did not enter any decree against them in any way whatever; did not adjudge any rights in their favor or against' them. So it will be seen that so far as the record in this case is concerned, Ryberg & Carleson, after the allegations in the complaint, were dismissed from further consideration in said cause; that the only reference to them thereafter was to the effect that they had made default and failed to prosecute their lien or any claim. By the judgment and findings, therefore, they were given nothing. They had no interest whatever in the judgment. A reversal of the judgment could not possibly have given them any less. They could not possibly have been prejudicially affected, because they had nothing by the judgment or decree and they could not have been given less by any future judgment that might have been rendered upon a retrial,. even had the cause been reversed. They have no interests in the case which are adverse to, or in conflict with those of the appellant. They have no interest in sustaining the decree because the decree gives them nothing. They would not lose anything even though the appellant should prevail on appeal. They were not interested in sustaining the judgment from which the appeal was taken. They are not adverse parties within the meaning of the statute, and consequently are not entitled to notice of appeal.
It is contended, however, that inasmuch as the evidence of Ryberg & Carleson was used to prove the claim of Nelson Bennett Company against the Twin Falls Land and Water Company, and as the claim of Nelson Bennett Company covered the work done by Ryberg & Carleson, and as Nelson Bennett Company recovered in the action, they thereby recovered also the amount claimed by Ryberg & Carleson and for that reason they were interested in the judgment. Ryberg & Carleson, however, are making no claim against Nelson Bennett Company. The court did not find that Nelson Bennett Company were indebted to Ryberg & Carleson in any sum. The contractual relations between Ryberg & Carleson and Nelson Bennett Company were not necessarily involved in this suit. In an action to recover by Nelson Bennett Company against the Twin Falls Company, Ryberg & Carleson were not necessary or proper parties except by reason of the fact that a lien was claimed upon the property of the Twin Falls Land and Water Company. Had Nelson Bennett Company sued Twin Falls Company upon the contract alone, without claiming any lien, Ryberg & Carleson would not have been necessary or proper parties. Inasmuch as they made no claim of lien in this action, and the court did not find they had any lien, and did not find that there was any sum due them from Nelson Bennett Company, and did not adjudge that any part of the money realized under the judgment be distributed to them, they had no interest whatever in the judgment, and it was immaterial to them what further proceedings were taken on the part of the judgment debtor. They could not secure in any future proceeding in said case any less right, or any less interest than was given them by the judgment entered in said cause from which the appeal, was taken. They would be in no way prejudicially affected by a reversal of said judgment.
The motion, therefore, to dismiss the appeal will be overruled.
Ailshie, C. J., concurs.
Sullivan, J., dissents.