Case Name: Thomas SAMMONS and Madeline Sammons, Appellants, v. ADAM GREENFIELD, D.O.; ASG Doctors, Inc. ; and Family Medical Center of Port Richey, Inc., d/b/a Family Medical Centers, Appellees.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2019-05-08
Citations: 270 So. 3d 534
Docket Number: Case No. 2D17-755
Parties: Thomas SAMMONS and Madeline Sammons, Appellants,
v.
ADAM GREENFIELD, D.O.; ASG Doctors, Inc. ; and Family Medical Center of Port Richey, Inc., d/b/a Family Medical Centers, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 534–541

Head Matter:
Thomas SAMMONS and Madeline Sammons, Appellants,
v.
ADAM GREENFIELD, D.O.; ASG Doctors, Inc. ; and Family Medical Center of Port Richey, Inc., d/b/a Family Medical Centers, Appellees.
Case No. 2D17-755
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Opinion filed May 8, 2019
Thomas A. Burns of Burns, P.A., Tampa; and Desiree E. Bannasch of Desiree E. Bannasch, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.
Bryan R. Snyder and Isaac R. Ruiz-Carus of Rissman, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue, McLain & Mangan, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Opinion:
Appellees' motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc is denied. On the court's own motion, the prior opinion dated October 19, 2018, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion is issued in its place. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.
KELLY, Judge.
Thomas and Madeline Sammons appeal from the final judgment entered against them after the trial court dismissed their lawsuit against the appellees, Adam Greenfield, D.O.; ASG Doctors, Inc.; and Family Medical Center of Port Richey, Inc. We reverse.
Mr. Sammons passed away during the course of the litigation against the appellees. The Sammons' counsel filed a suggestion of death but did not serve a motion to substitute the personal representative of Mr. Sammons' estate within ninety days as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(a)(1), nor did counsel seek an extension of time within which to do so. A week after the ninety-day period passed, the appellees moved to dismiss the Sammons' lawsuit with prejudice. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the Sammons presented the court with an affidavit detailing a health issue she had been experiencing and explaining how the condition was responsible for her failure to timely file the motion to substitute. After reviewing the affidavit and hearing argument, the trial court concluded counsel had not shown excusable neglect and granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice because the statute of limitations on the Sammons' claims had expired.
"The courts of this state have a long-standing tradition in favor of the disposition of an action on its merits." Tucker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 552 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citations omitted). Further, this court has recognized that rule 1.260"has been liberally interpreted to permit substitution beyond the ninety-day time period." Id.; see also Mims ex. rel. Mims v. Am. Sr. Living of Dade City, FL, LLC, 36 So. 3d 935, 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (same). Moreover, we have explained that "all doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing trial upon the merits." Tucker, 552 So. 2d at 1179 ; see also Rogers v. First Nat'l Bank at Winter Park, 232 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1970) (explaining that courts should be liberal when determining excusable neglect because "[w]hile our procedural rules provide for an orderly and expeditious administration of justice, we must take care to administer them in a manner conducive to the ends of justice").
With these principles in mind, we conclude that the Sammons' counsel made a sufficient showing of excusable neglect. See City of Ocala v. Heath, 518 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (finding that counsel's illness combined with the effects of his medication made his neglect excusable). Therefore, we reverse the judgment in favor of the appellees and remand for the trial court to vacate the order dismissing the Sammons' complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MORRIS, J., Concurs.
SILBERMAN, J., Dissents with opinion.
The dissent seems to suggest that one can infer from our opinion that the trial court must take "counsel's assertions of excusable neglect at face value." Our opinion should not be read to suggest anything like that as we take no position on that issue one way or another, nor do we need to as the appellees have not contested counsel's assertions-they simply argue that what she asserted does not amount to excusable neglect. Our problem with the trial court's conclusion is that it was a non sequitur.