Case Name: Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants; Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with John J. Lordon, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-12-02
Citations: 141 A.D. 429
Docket Number: No. 2
Parties: Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants. Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with John J. Lordon, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 141
Pages: 429–431

Head Matter:
Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants. Eva Roxana Anderson, Respondent, v. Jane Ann Smitley, Individually and as Sole Heir at Law and Next of Kin of John Elmer Ellis, Deceased, etc., and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with John J. Lordon, Defendant.
(No. 2.)
First Department,
December 2, 1910.
Contempt — violating injunctive provision in decree.
Where the final decree in an action to set aside the probate of a will enjoins all parties from “maintaining any action * * * based upon a claim”- that the paper was not the will of the decedent, a party so enjoined who begins a now action which is in effect based upon a claim that the instrument is not the decedent's will is guilty of contempt.
Laughlin, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendants, Jane Ann Smitley, individually, etc., and others, from an order of the Supreme Court made at the New York Special Term aiid entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 24th day of June, 1910, denying the said defendants’ motion to punish the plaintiff for .contempt of a' judgment in the first above-entitled action.
Edward Winslow Paige, for the appellants.
Francis Á. McGloskey, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
We have held in Anderson v. Smitley, No. 1 (141 App. Div. 421), decided herewith, that the injunction contained in the final decree entered on October 13, 1903, in the action then pending, is an effectual bar to the prosecution of the action commenced by plaintiff in May, 1908. It is but a single step further and a necessary corollary to hold that the bringing of the second action is a violation of the injunctive clause of the previous decree, and a contempt of court. The appellants' motion to punish plaintiff as for a contempt must, therefore, be granted, the proceedings on the part of the plaintiff in the second-action stayed, and plaintiff specifically restrained from further prosecuting it.
The Order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted as above indicated.
Ingraham, P. J.; McLaughlin and Dowling, JJ., concurred ; Laughlin, J., dissented.