Case Name: PEOPLE v. BARKER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-07-31
Citations: 18 Mich. App. 544
Docket Number: Docket No. 6,167
Parties: PEOPLE v. BARKER
Judges: Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 18
Pages: 544–558

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. BARKER
Opinion of the -Court
1. Indictment and Information — Witnesses—Indorsement—Duty of Prosecution.
Indorsement of the name of a witness on the information, either voluntary or under order, creates a duty in the prosecution to produce such witnesses at trial whieh may not be shifted to the defendant; a criminal defendant may rely on the prosecutor to produce properly indorsed res gestae witnesses and the trial court’s implied assertion that defendant, charged with possession of marijuana, should have found and produced the witnesses in question, who had already been properly indorsed, because he had not been in custody between his arrest and trial, was erroneous (MCLA § 335.153).
2. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Production—Due Diligence.
A showing of due diligence in attempting to produce a witness indorsed on the information by the prosecution will excuse the prosecutor from production of the witness at trial.
3. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Production—Due Diligence.
Prosecution’s failure to produce defendant’s nephews, who were properly indorsed res gestae witnesses at defendant’s trial for possession of marijuana is not excusable nor is due diligence shown where the defendant’s nephews, who were arrested in his ear shortly before marijuana was found in the ear, were not questioned about the marijuana and no attempt was made to locate them for over a year and a half after defendant’s arrest, and the attempt, when finally made, failed to produce the witnesses because of the obsolete addresses relied on by police and. where no, further effort to locate these witnesses has been made (MCLA § 335.153).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 328.
41 Am Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations §§ 56, 60.
[5] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 412.
4. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Production—Retrial—Due Diligence — Presumptions. ..
Prosecution’s failure to use due diligence to produce properly indorsed res gestae witnesses for a criminal trial constitutes reversible error and, if, upon retrial, -the prosecution still does not produce these witnesses and no showing of due diligence is made, the trial court may properly consider that the testimony of such witnesses would have been adverse to the' people’s case.
Concurring Opinion
Levin, J.
5. Constitutional Law — Search and Seizure — Evidence—-Admissibility.
Provisions of the State Constitution which allow any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or dangerous weapon, seized by a police officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in the state to be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings, regardless of the validity of the search and seizure which produced such evidence, is violative of the exclusionary rule handed down by the United States Supreme Court, which is that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible at trial; this exclusionary rule binds all judges in all states notwithstanding anything in any state law or constitution to the contrary through the supremacy clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. (US Const, art 6, §8; Mich Const 1963, art 1, §11).
Appeal from Wayne, Benjamin D. Burdick, .J.
Submitted Division 1 June 12, 1969, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 6,167.)
Decided July 31, 1969.
Application for leave to appeal filed October 3, 1969.
Daniel Barker was convicted of possession of marijuana. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A'. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Ap pellate Lawyer, and Leonard Meyers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Arthur I. Gould, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.
The- defendant’s motion to suppress was heard and denied by a differqiU-dreuit- judge than-ttye one who tried the ease.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, J.
This is an appeal from the Wayne County Circuit Court wherein the trial judge, sitting without a jury, convicted defendant of possession of marijuana, MCLA § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp, § 18.1123), and sentenced him to serve four to ten years in prison.
The record shows that on July 23, 1966, the defendant voluntarily followed his two nephews to Bedford Township Police Headquarters where the boys were questioned about an alleged attempt to commit larceny at the Gay Drugstore in Bedford. From the record on appeal, it appears that when the defendant's nephews were arrested they were in defendant's car and that he followed the police immediately to the station. Further, it appears that he parked his car in front of the police station and went inside to wait for his nephews. While he was waiting, the Bedford police called the Detroit police and discovered that defendant had several outstanding traffic warrants. Defendant was placed under arrest to be held for the Detroit police.
At trial, Detective Sergeant Johnson testified that he "inventoried" defendant's car, while defendant was awaiting removal to Detroit, without defendant's permission. This "inventory", which was in reality a thorough search, produced two cigarettes believed to be marijuana and some little particles thought to be marijuana seeds. These were subsequently analyzed and were found to be cannabis sativa or marijuana.
Defendant filed a timely motion to quash the information and suppress the evidence, and this motion was denied by the Honorable Carl M. Weideman on June 28, 1968. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by Judge Burdick. Defendant appeals from this decision.
The defendant on appeal objects to the failure of the people to produce res gestae witnesses as required. MCLA § 767.40 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.980); People v. Kayne (1934), 268 Mich 186. The people claim that they made a diligent effort to insure the presence of these witnesses and the trial court agreed. "We do not.
Although the defendant and his nephews were arrested on the same day in July of 1966, and all the police officers who might incriminate the defendant were indorsed on the original complaint, it was not until a motion was made by defendant in January of 1968, that the people asked the court to indorse these possibly very important res gestae witnesses.
The record shows that the police made no attempt to question the two boys who were arrested while in defendant's car about the marijuana, nor did they make any effort to find these witnesses for over a year and a half after the arrest of the defendant or to preserve their testimony. When they finally did make an attempt to subpoena the witnesses for trial the police relied on the addresses given to them at the time of arrest and assert that they sought to serve these witnesses only to find that they had moved some months before. 'No further attempt was made to locate these witnesses. Compare People v. O'Dell (1968), 10 Mich App 87.
The indorsement of the name of a witness on the information either' voluntarily ' or under order, as in this' case, creates a duty in the -prosecution' to produce such witness at the trial, and the defendant may rely upon the prosecutor to fulfill the obligation. People v. Lummis (1932), 260 Mich 170, People v. Ivy (1968), 11 Mich App 427, 430.
The trial court here improperly attempted to shift the responsibility for the production''of these-witnesses on to the defendant by its implied assertion that since defendant had not been in • custody thfe entire time between arrest and trial he should have found them and produced them. i
Although' certainly a showing of due diligenOe' in attempting to produce a witness will -excuse the prosecutor from production) People v. Ivy, supra, People v. Kern (1967), 6 Mich App 406, we cannot help but fold that the trial court erred ih its finding that there was due diligence under the facts of this case. See also People v. Tiner (1969), 17 Mich App 18.
This case seems to us to be paradigmatic of the command set down in People v. Kayne, supra, p 194 under which,
"the state is .required to indorse and call the witness or 'witnesses whose testimony is, necessary to protect the accused from, being the victim of ^ false accusation." ' .
Therefore, we must reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. At the retrial, if the people again fail to produce these res gestae witnesses.-and a showing of due diligence is not made,-we'think' it would be proper under People v. Ivy, supra, for..the coujd to consider that the' testimony of such witnesses w-ould. he adverse to the people's case,
Reversed and remanded.
Bitzgerald, J., concurred-.
Among the res gestae witnesses whieh the people failed to produce at trial was the partner of the arresting officer. This officer was not indorsed, however, and defendant failed to make a timely objection. In fact, defense counsel specifically waived the production of this witness. Compare People v. Tiner (1969), 17 Mich App 18.