Case Name: Lewis Porter, impleaded, with another, v. Peter J. G. Hodenpuyl
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1860-11-14
Citations: 9 Mich. 11
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lewis Porter, impleaded, with another, v. Peter J. G. Hodenpuyl.
Judges: Manning and Ciiristiancy, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 11–21

Head Matter:
Lewis Porter, impleaded, with another, v. Peter J. G. Hodenpuyl.
A surety who, after time given by the creditor to the principal, promises to pay the debt with full knowledge of the facts, is liable without any new consider^ lion for the promise.
7he action in such case is upon the original obligation, and not upon the new pro* mise.
Heard June ls¿.
Decided November 14th.
Assumpsit on a promissory note, of which the follow* ing is a copy:
“$549. Sixty days after date for value received, we or either of us jointly promise to pay, to the order of J. S. Nevius, five hundred and forty-nine dollars, payable at the banking office of Wm. J.’ Wells, Grand Rapids.
Grand Rapids, May 28, 1857.
II S. Watrous,
lewis Porter, Surety.”
The note was endorsed by Nevius to the plaintiff in May or June, 1858.
Porter alone defended. He proved that Watrous made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, October 9, 1857, and ho also proved by Charles C. Miller, that in a conversation between Nevius and Porter, in the fall of 1857, after the assignment, Nevius requested Porter to pay the note; that Porter told Nevius he supposed the note had been paid, and asked Nevius why he had not informed him of its non - payment; that Nevius replied that Watrous had requested him not to inform Porter thereof, and not to trouble him, and that at Watrous’ request he had extended the time for the payment of the note two or three times, and had been paid for such extensions interest at the rate of three per cent, per month; that Porter told Nevius if be, Nevius, had informed him when the note became due that Watrous had not paid it, he, Porter, would then have paid it, and that at that time he would have secured himself against Watrous. This witness heard another conversation between the same parties in the spring of 1857, in which Nevius asked Porter if he had made up his mind as to ’ paying the note, and what he would do about it, and Porter replied he was not holden on the note; that the extensions given to Watrous, had destroyed his, Porter’s, liability thereon. The testimony of this witness was corroborated by James Pierce, who heard the same conversations.
To rebut this evidence, the plaintiff called Nevius, who. testified that he had a conversation with Porter a short time after the Watrous assignment, in the presence of Mr, Eggleston and Mr. Foster. Eggleston or Foster, referring to the assignment, asked if witness was one of the fortunate or unfortunate ones. Porter said witness was one of the fortunate ones. “I do not recollect the words he used. He said he was on the note, or had endorsed it, I do not recollect which, and that it would be paid.” “ He said I might come and get some clothing on it if I wished. I do not know whether Porter then knew of the extensions, or any portion of them, which had been granted.”
Plaintiff then offered to show that Nevius informed Porter all about the extensions, and that Porter afterwards, promised to pay the note. To this, defendant objected; 1st: that the new promise could not be shown under the pleadings: 2d: that it was a promise to pay the debt of a third person, and must be in writing; 3d: that the action is on a joint promise of Watrous and Porter, and the -promise sought to be proved is the individual promise of Porter alone; 4th: that the promise is one made to Nevius alone, and is not negotiable; 5th: that it was a promise without consideration, and void. These objections were ’overruled, • and Nevius testified that he informed Porter of the extensions in October or November, 1857; that after the interview when Eggleston and Foster were present, he called at Porter’s store to see about the payment; that Porter did not want to pay then, but would pay it if witness would put it off six or eight months, and offered to turn out collaterals.
The witness further testified that Porter found fault with him for not letting him know the note had not been paid, and said the note would have been paid if witness had notified him. Witness then told him of the extensions ; how Watrous came to his house and said he could not pay the note when it was due, and witness asked for a new note, which Watrous said he could not give; that he did not want to go to Porter, and said the note would be paid in thirty days. Witness further told Porter that the interest had been paid up to the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth of September, on these extensions, and that the note was extended thirty days each time. He did not then tell Porter how much was .paid for the extensions. At the next interview, a week or ten days afterwards, witness called upon Porter to see at what time he would pay the note, and offered to wait sixty or ninety days; Porter would not accept the offer, but said he would pay in some six or eight months. Witness said he could not wait so long. At this conversation Porter asked' witness what rate of interest he had been receiving, and witness told him he had been receiving three per cent, a month for the extensions. A few days afterwards he called upon Porter again, to see if he would not shorten the time, and Porter told him he might sue the note. Before witness left, he asked Porter when he would pay the note: Porter said he would pay it some time in June. In June, witness had a conversation with Porter, who then said he had found he was not liable on the note. Porter’s promise to pay was made after witness had correctly informed him about the extensions.
The Circuit Judge charged the jury, that a valid agree-, ment made by and between the creditor and the principal debtor to extend the time of payment of the debt, without the knowledge or assent of the surety, is not a discharge of the surety by the act of the creditor, but by operation of law: that a subsequent promise by the surety, he at the time of making the same having a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the extensions and of the consideration thereof, would be a waiver of such discharge : that such promise being proved to have been made after the extensions, and after full information as to all the facts, would leave the surety liable upon the original obligation; that the action in such case need not be upon the subsequent promise, but upon the original obligation, which, being negotiable, could be prosecuted by a third person legally holding the paper as well against the principal as against the surety; the surety being the only person who could, in the first instance, claim advantage from the extensions, and he would, by such promise, .waive that advantage.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
-S’. ¡S. Eggleston., for plaintiff in error:
The new promise could not be shown, under the pleadings:— 3 Wend. 131; 1 Hill, 535.
The promise was void for want of consideration. The rule of law is that, when a party is released or discharged by the act of the creditor, there remains no consideration for the new promise. But when the remedy is suspended by some positive rule of law, or by the interposition of some statutory prohibition, a consideration remains which will support a new promise. — 6 Barb. 549; 24 Me. 561; 22 Me. 475; 7 Conn. 57; 13 Johns. 257; 3 Pick. 207; I Met. 520; 1 Hill, 533; 9 Watts, 396. Here it must be assumed that Nevius knew the legal effect of his act, and the’discharge is as much his act as if it had entered into their conversation. Porter being thus discharged, his obligation could only be re-created by a new promise for a new consideration, and in writing. Counsel also cited and commented on Story on Notes, §486; Ibid. §275; Burge Suretyship, 209; 6 Met. 553; 1 Turn. and Russ. 395; 13 East, 417; 23 Wend. 379; 3 Mich. 188.
G. Y. N. Bothrop, for defendant in error:
The new promise was a waiver of the discharge. — 12 East, 38; 12 Wheat. 183; 12 Pet. 497; 12 Mass. 52; 8 Pick. 1; 23 Wend. 379; 9 Ala. 622; 13 N. H. 240.
The action was correctly brought on the note. — 13 N. H. 240; 23 Wend. 411, per Bronson J.

Opinion:
Campbell J.:
The only question in this case is, whether, after time given by a contract . with the principal, a surety who promises to pay with full knowledge of the facts, is liable without a new consideration for his promise.
It is claimed that having been absolutely discharged by the extension of time, the surety's promise is at an end; and several cases are cited to show that, where an end has been put absolutely to an obligation, no new one can be created without a new consideration.
It is unnecessary to refer at length to these authorities, or to examine into their qualifications; for the rules applying to sureties have been so long and so uniformly settled on their own basis, that any attempt to unsettle them would be unauthorized, and would only lead to confusion.
The doctrine that a surety is discharged by the extension of time to his principal, or by any other modification of the contract assured, is not a common law doctrine in its origin, and arose from the practice of Courts of Equity in relieving sureties against liability under such circumstances. There are some cases, even yet, where a court of law can not give complete relief for such causes. The general doctrine, however, has for a long time been allowed to prevail in common law courts; and such a defense may always 'be entertained where the suretyship appears on the instrument sued upon,'' and in many cases where it does not appear.
But it has always been confined to cases where there has been neither prior nor subsequent assent given by the surety. And in every case where, with knowledge of the facts, a surety recognizes his liability, and promises to pay the debt, such promise is applied to the original debt, and requires no new consideration. This has been expressly decided repeatedly, and is recognized without exception by all the respectable text writers. — Mayhew v. Crickets, 2 Swanst. 185; Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 454; Stevens v. Lynch, 12 East, 38; Bank v. Johnson, 9 Ala. 622; Fowler v. Brooks, 18 N. H. 240; Sigourney v. Wetherell, 6 Met. 553; Tebbetts v. Dowd, 23 Wend. 379; Smith Merc. L. 554; Edwards on Bills, 171; 1 Pars. on Cont. 512, note (x); Chitty on Bills, 448; 2 Lead. Ca. in Eq. Part 2, 363, 383; Burge on Suretyship, 209.
The charge of the court was correct, and the judgment should be qffirmed.
Manning and Ciiristiancy, JJ., concurred.