Case Name: MANUEL v. PIERCE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-11-17
Citations: 121 Mich. App. 364
Docket Number: Docket No. 55892
Parties: MANUEL v PIERCE
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and Bronson and J. R. Ernst, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 121
Pages: 364–373

Head Matter:
MANUEL v PIERCE
Docket No. 55892.
Submitted March 15, 1982, at Detroit.
Decided November 17, 1982.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Plaintiff, Phyllis D. Manuel, individually, and as administratrix of the estate of William A. Manuel, III, deceased, and as next friend of Tiffany A. Manuel, Dayton P. Manuel, and Jennifer L. Manuel, minors, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against defendants Dr. James Pierce and Hutzel Hospital alleging medical malpractice. The hospital moved for an accelerated judgment asserting that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of a medical malpractice arbitration agreement executed by the decedent. The trial c'ourt, Victor J. Baum, J., thereafter issued an opinion finding that the medical malpractice arbitration act violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. An order denying the hospital’s motion for an accelerated judgment was then entered by the circuit court. The circuit court also entered an order denying the hospital’s motion for reconsideration. Hutzel Hospital appeals, by leave granted, from the orders denying the motions for an accelerated judgment and reconsideration. Held:
1. The trial court erred in holding the medical malpractice arbitration act to be unconstitutional.
2. When a defendant in a malpractice action moves for accelerated judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has executed an arbitration agreement, the trial court shall conduct a hearing. At the hearing, the defendant must affirmatively show that before signing the agreement, the plaintiff was specifically informed: (1) that the form he was being asked to sign was an arbitration agreement, (2) that by signing the form, he would be giving up his right to trial by jury or a judge, (3) that the arbitration panel that would decide his case would include an attorney, a layman, and a doctor or a hospital administrator, (4) that physicians and hospital administrators on arbitration panels may have an incentive to minimize the number and size of malpractice awards because their malpractice insurance rates are directly affected by those awards, (5) that he did not have to sign the arbitration agreement, (6) that the patient would receive the same quality of medical treatment and would be attended to just as quickly, whether or not he chose to sign the agreement, (7) that doctors and hospitals are not permitted to refuse treatment to patients who do not sign the agreement, and (8) that signing the agreement is entirely up to the patient. If the defendant fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff was so informed (and that he understood the information), the motion for accelerated judgment shall be denied.
References for Points in Headnotes
5 Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award §§ 8, 9.
61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 374.
Arbitration of medical malpractice claims. 84 ALR3d 375.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award § 26.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award § 5.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 149.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award § 41.
61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 376.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §§ 12, 13.
Danhof, C.J., concurred with the holding that reversal is required since he believes that the medical malpractice arbitration act does not violate a malpractice plaintiff’s due process right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. However, he does not agree with the conclusion that it is the defendants’ burden to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement which the plaintiff’s decedent admittedly signed. He would conclude that a prior Court of Appeals case, which held that the burden is on the defendant to prove the validity of the agreement, was wrongly decided. He would reject plaintiff’s contention that the agreement is an unenforceable contract of adhesion.
Bronson, J., concurred on the subject of the proper disposition of a motion for an accelerated judgment based on an agreement to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim where the medical malpractice arbitration act is held constitutional. He also concurred that the prior Court of Appeals opinion, which held that the burden is on the defendant to prove the validity of the agreement, sets forth an adequate procedure for determining if a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He would also hold the agreement is not an unenforceable contract of adhesion. However, he does not agree that the act is constitutional since he believes it fails to provide for a facially fair tribunal.
Reversed and remanded for a hearing.
Opinion of the Court
1. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act — Constitutional Law — Impartial Tribunal.
The Michigan medical malpractice arbitration act does not violate a patient’s due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal and is not unconstitutional (MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq.).
2. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice.
When a defendant in a malpractice action moves for accelerated judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has executed an arbitration agreement, the trial court shall conduct a hearing; at the hearing, the defendant must affirmatively show that before signing the agreement, the plaintiff was specifically informed: (1) that the form he was being asked to sign was an arbitration agreement, (2) that by signing the form, he would be giving up his right to trial by jury or a judge, (3) that the arbitration panel that would decide his case would include an attorney, a layman, and a doctor or a hospital administrator, (4) that physicians and hospital administrators on arbitration panels may have an incentive to minimize the number and size of malpractice awards because their malpractice insurance rates are directly affected by those awards, (5) that he did not have to sign the arbitration agreement, (6) that the patient would receive the same quality of medical treatment and would be attended to just as quickly, whether or not he chose to sign the agreement, (7) that doctors and hospitals are not permitted to refuse treatment to patients who do not sign the agreement, and (8) that signing the agreement is entirely up to the patient; if the defendant fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff was so informed (and that he understood the information), the motion for accelerated judgment should be denied.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Danhof, C. J.
3. Constitutional Law — Arbitration — Right to Trial.
A civil litigant’s decision to agree to arbitration and forego the right of access to the courts is not subject to the same exacting scrutiny as is the decision of a criminal defendant who waives a constitutional right since a person’s decision to agree to arbitration does not involve the complete abandonment of a constitutional right.
4. Arbitration — Courts.
It has long been the policy of the courts of Michigan to encourage arbitration.
5. Contracts — Written Instruments — Execution — Knowledge.
A person who executes a written agreement is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of such instrument.
6. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements — Presumption of Validity.
An agreement to arbitrate a malpractice claim is presumed valid where the disclosure provisions of the agreement comply with the requirements for such agreement provided in the medical malpractice arbitration act (MCL 600.5041[7]; MSA 27A.5041[7]).
7. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements — Validity — Burden of Proof.
The Legislature has evinced a clear intent to place the burden upon the party challenging the validity of a medical malpractice arbitration agreement to demonstrate that the agreement is invalid; there is no constitutional impediment precluding the Legislature from placing such burden of proof on the party seeking to avoid the agreement, therefore, a Court of Appeals case which held that the burden is on the malpractice defendant to prove the validity of the agreement was wrongly decided (MCL 600.5041[7]; MSA 27A.S041[7]).
8. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements — Contracts — Adhesion Contracts.
A medical malpractice arbitration agreement in conformance with the requirements of the medical malpractice arbitration act is not an unenforceable contract of adhesion (MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq.).
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Bronson, J.
9. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act — Due Process.
The Michigan medical malpractice arbitration act is unconstitutional for failure to provide for a facially fair tribunal; the portion of the statute relating to the composition of the arbitration panels violates due process of law by forcing the litigant to submit his or her claim to a tribunal which is composed in such a way that a high probability exists that said tribunal will be biased against the claimant without mandating the use of an arbitration form explicity detailing the nature of the panel’s makeup.
10. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice — Contracts op Adhesion.
The medical malpractice arbitration agreement is not a contract of adhesion; a contract of adhesion is one in which the consumer must accept the agreement presented in order to avail himself of the goods or services desired and in which the consumer really has no opportunity to bargain over terms; although the patient’s situation and the coercive atmosphere inherent in the hospital setting apparently makes it difficult to refuse to sign the arbitration agreement, a patient is not required to sign the same as a condition of admission or treatment.
Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Milestone, Erlich & Rosen (by Steven G. Silverman), for plaintiff.
Kitch, Suhrheinrich, Smith, Saurbier & Drutchas, P.C. (by Donald A. Ducastel and Stephen M. Kelley), for defendant.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and Bronson and J. R. Ernst, JJ.
Circuit judge, siting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
J. R. Ernst, J.
Defendant Hutzel Hospital appeals, by leave granted, from an order denying its motion for an accelerated judgment. In denying the motion, the trial judge held that the medical malpractice arbitration act, MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq., is unconstitutional. I am not convinced that the act is unconstitutional and, therefore, conclude that the trial court's decision must be reversed. At the same time, concern for safeguarding the rights of individuals who seek medical treatment compels me to comment regarding the proper procedure for analyzing a claim that a person has waived his right to bring an action for medical malpractice in a judicial forum. I am in accord with the result reached by this Court in Moore v Fragatos, 116 Mich App 179; 321 NW2d 781 (1982), and adopt the guidelines as expressed in part IV of that opinion.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded so that a hearing may be conducted at which defendant Hutzel Hospital has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiffs decedent was provided with (and understood) the information required by Moore, supra, pp 202-203.
Reversed and remanded.