Case Name: SPANNELL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1918-03-27
Citations: 203 S.W. 357
Docket Number: No. 4660
Parties: SPANNELL v. STATE.
Judges: PRENDEÍRGAST, J. I concur in the conclusions of Judge MORROW in his opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 203
Pages: 357–365

Head Matter:
SPANNELL v. STATE.
(No. 4660.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 27, 1918.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 8, 1918. Concurring Opinion, May 10, 1918.)
1. Homicide <&wkey;17 — Murder — Malice — -Involuntary Killing of Another.
If defendant with malice shot at another and unintentionally killed his own wife, he is guilty of her murder.
2. Homicide <&wkey;125 — Excusable oe Justifiable Homicide — Accident.
If one killed his assailant in lawful self-defense, and in doing so accidentally killed his own wife, he is not guilty of the murder of either.
3. Criminal Law &wkey;>200(l) — Formes Jeopardy.
Where defendant in shooting man whom he killed, accidentally killed his own wife of whose murder he was acquitted, he cannot he prosecuted under a separate indictment for the murder of the other, for, since both resulted from the same act, there could be but one offense.
4. CeimiNal Law @=739(4) — Murder—Killing or Owe While Shooting at Another —Single Act — Proof.
Where two persons were killed in one transaction, the fact that more than one shot was fired does not, as a matter -of law, render it insusceptible of proof that both were killed by one act, in one case intentional and in the other accidental, since a series, of shots may be fired with one volition.
5. Criminal Law @=330 — Former Jeopardy —Evidence—Burden or Proof.
The burden is upon the accused to prove his defense of former jeopardy.
6. Criminal Law @=739(4) — Former Jeopardy — Evidence—Identity or Act — Question for Jury.
The question whether accused, who had been acquitted of murdering his own wife, had killed her accidentally while shooting in self-defense at another, or whether the killings were separate acts, held sufficiently raised by accused’s testimony to require submission to the jury.
7. Criminal Law &wkey;295 — Evidence — Former Jeopardy — Identity or Offenses.
Where one on trial for murder alleged the killing was in self-defense, that while so defending himself he accidentally killed his own wife, of whose murder he was acquitted, evidence that both offenses were the result of a single act and volition was admissible.
8. Homicide @=163 — Character of Deceased — Evidence—Admissibility.
Accused’s .attempt to prove the character of deceased, for whose murder he was being tried, by evidence of certain vile remarks by deceased concerning women, was improper; evidence of particular acts being inadmissible for that purpose.
9. Criminal Law @=36d(1) — Former Jeopardy — Evidence—Admissibility.
Where defendant pleaded former jeopardy, in that in killing deceased he had accidentally killed bis own wife, for whose murder be was acquitted, proof of the homicide of his wife, which was a part of the res gesta?, was essential under the plea, and not to be excluded under the rule rejecting evidence of other crimes.
10(. Homicide &wkey;169(3j — Evidence—Admissibility,
While the conclusion of deceased’s wife that defendant’s wife went upstairs for a specific purpose was not admissible without evidence of defendant’s knowledge thereof, yet what then took place upstairs, being the basis of defendant’s charge of misconduct of deceased toward his wife, and which led to the trouble and homicide, was admissible.
On Motion for liehearing.
11. Criminal Law <&wkey;295 — Former Jeop-' ardy — Bes Judicata — Evidence of Identity of the Crime.
Upon plea of former jeopardy, the record of the former trial does not control to the extent that it is res judicata as a question of law, hut parol evidence should be heard to show identity of the offenses.
Appeal from District Court, Coleman County; J. O. Woodward, Judge.
H. J. Spannell was convicted of murder, and appeals.
Reversed.
Anderson & Upton, of San Angelo, L. A. Dale, of El Paso, Williams & Williams, of Waco, and Critz & Woodward, of Coleman, for appellant. Wright & Harris, of San Angelo, Snodgrass, Dibrell & Snodgrass, and J. K. Baker, all of Coleman, Walter U. Early, of Brownwood, W. Van 'Sickle, of Alpine, and E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen.; for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
Appellant was convicted of the murder of M. C. Butler.
Appellant, his wife, and deceased were in an automobile together at night, and Major Butler and Mrs. Spannell were killed. Appellant claimed, and testified, that Major Butler assaulted him, and that several shots were fired by him at Major Butter with no intent to injure Mrs. Spannell. He was indicted in separate indictments for each of the homicides, was tried and acquitted for the murder of his wife, and filed in this case a plea of former acquittal based upon the proposition that the two homicides, resulting from a single act and volition, constituted but one offense. The court's refusal to submit* the plea to the jury is made the basis of complaint.
If in shooting at Major Butler with malice appellant unintentionally killed his wife, he would be guilty and could be prosecuted for murdering her. Richards v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 38, 30 S. W. 805; McCullough v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R" 128, 136 S. W. 1056, in which the court says:
"If appellant shot at Ollie Jamison with either his express or implied malice, and killed his wife without intending to kill her, his offense would be murder in the second degree."
If in defending his life against an unlawful attack by Major Butler appellant accidentally killed his wife, he was guilty of no offense. Plummer v. State, 4 Tex. App. 310, 30 Am. Rep. 165; Clark v. State, 19 Tex. App. 495; Vining v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 316, 146 S. W. 912. From the Plumm6er Case, supra, we quote, as follows:
"We take the law to be that if the jury believed that the defendant found himself in a condition where he would have been justified in taking the life of Smelser in order to save himself from death or the infliction of great bodily harm, and, in so defending himself from such danger, he, by mistake or accident, shot Mrs. Smelser, then he would not only not be guilty of an assault with intent to murder Mrs. Smel-ser, but he would not be guilty of any offense whatever."
See Lankster v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 603, 56 S. W. 65.
If he shot at Butler and in the same act killed Mrs. Spannell unintentionally, his guilt or innocence of each of the homicides would depend on whether in shooting at Butler he acted with malice or in self-defense. Assuming that the shots were fired at Butler only, and killed Mrs. Spannell, appellant having no i.itent or volition to injure her, to determine whether he ivas guilty or innocent on his trial for her murder it was necessary to decide whether in shooting at Butler he acted in self-defense or with malice. On this state of facts the decision that he was innocent of the murder of Mrs. 'Spannell necessarily involves the finding that appellant's act in firing at Butler was not such as to constitute murder.
It follows that, whether in shooting at Butler appellant acted with malice, or was justified, if in the same act, with no volition to injure his wife, he killed her, there could he but one offense, and the state, prosecuting under separate indictments for each of the bomb-cides, would be concluded as to both by the judgment rendered in one of them. Cook v. Stated 43 Tex. Cr. R. 185, 63 S. W. 872, 96 Am. St. Rep. 854; Rucker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 551; Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 466, 46 S. W. 639; Herera v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 607, 34 S. W. 943; Moore v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 166, 25 S. W. 1120; Carson v. People, 4 Colo. App. 463, 36 Pac. 551; Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909, 51 S. W. 789, 59 S. W. 524, 45 L. R. A. 216, 90 Am. St. Rep. 275; Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 437, 29 L. Ed. 684; Scott v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 310, 81 S. W. 950. In Rucker's Case, supra, this court held that the rule inhibiting the indictment for two felonies in the same count did not render invalid an indictment which in a single count charged the accused with the murder of two persons by the same act, citing numerous authorities, among them Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. Rep. 369, quoting from it, as follows:
"If it be true, as we suppose it is, that the killing of two or more persons by the same act con stitntes but one crime, then it follows that the state cannot indict the guilty party for killing one of the persons, and after conviction or acquittal indict Mm for the killing of the other; for the state cannot divide that which constitutes but one crime, and make the different parts of it the bases of separate prosecutions."
Where two persons are killed or injured in one transaction, the fact that more than. one shot was fired does not, as a matter of law, render it insusceptible of proof that they were both killed by one act. A series of shots may constitute one act, in a legal sense, where they are fired with one volition. In cases where two persons have been killed or wounded by a series of shots, and under the general issue of not guilty it is urged as a defense that one of the homicides or injuries resulted from shots aimed at one striking another, the issue of singleness of the act and intent bringing the double result has not been made to depend on the number of shots fired. This is illustrated in Lankster v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 603, 56 S. W. 65, and in Plummer v. State, 4 Tex. App. 310, 30 Am. Rep. 165, in each of which two shots were fired, and in the McCullough Case, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 136 S. W. 1055, several shots were fired. In Cook v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 185, 63 S. W. 872, 96 Am. St. Rep. 854, where the question of the identity of the act and volition resulting in two injuries was raised on plea of former acquittal, the court uses th'e following language:
"The evidence shows that two shots were fired. According to the evidence of the defense, both of these shots were fired at Goodman. According to the evidence of the state, one of the shots was fired at the deceased, Hargrove. Then it becomes a question of fact, and the court should have admitted the evidence under defendant's plea, and then have charged the jury that if they believed from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant shot at deceased, and_ not at Goodman, then they would find against appellant's plea of former acquittal, and proceed to consider whether or not defendant was guilty of any offense under other portions of the charge. Where there is one act, one intent, one volition, as is evidenced by the testimony of appellant in this case, then appellant cannot be convicted upon an act, intent, and volition for which he had been previously acquitted."
We do not understand the Ashton Case, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 482, 21 S. W. 48, the Augustine Case, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 59, 52 S. W. 77, 96 Am. St. Rep. 765, and the Keaton Case, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 627, 57 S. W. 1125, as varying from this view. In each of them the plea was denied upon the ground that the two homicides were the result of separate acts, hut the principle controlling them is thus stated in the Ashton Case, supra:
"The true test in such cases must be that, if the intent to kill the one is an intention formed and existing distinct from and independent of the intention to kill the other, the two acts cannot constitute a single offense."
Lillie's Case, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 615, 187 S. W. 482, is apparently in conflict with the case of Cook v. State, supra, and other eases cited in connection therewith. In the Lillie Case, however, the point passed upon was the refusal of a charge submitting the issue of former conviction. While the facts raised the issue, there was not, as in this case, specific testimony of intent of the accused to injure hut one of the parties. If th'e Cook Case had been cited it is probable that the court would have held the charge proper. From the fact that it is nob- cited either in the brief or the opinion, we draw the inference that it was not the intention of the court to over-' rule it.
Counsel for the state are correct in stating that the burden was upon appellant to prove his plea. Fehr v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 35 S. W. 381, 650, and Bishop's New Crim. Proe. p. 634, vol. 2, from which we quote as follows:
"The identity of the parties and of the offense, the defendant taking, as just said, the burden of proof, is shown by parol. It is so even though the two indictments are alike. A common method is to produce the testimony of persons who were present at the previous trial as to what was there investigated, and if it appears to be within the present indictment, a prima facie case is made, to be overcome only by proof from the other side of the diversity of the two offenses. Such witnesses need not be those of the former trial, the calling of whom is not indispensable even though they are' within reach of process."
Major Butler and Mrs. Spannell were both killed by pistol shots. Persons reaching them immediately after the shooting found three wounds, apparently fired at close range, in the head of Mrs. Spannell, each of them from a 38 caliber pistol, and in tbe body of Butler they found two similar wounds and one fired from a 45 caliber pistol. Appellant claimed that while he was driving the automobile, sitting on the front seat, Major Butler and Mrs. Spannell sitting on the back seat, he was assaulted by Butler; that he got hold of the larger pistol which was in the car, and that in the struggle with Butler it was fired once, when he lost possession of it; that he was thrown out of the car, and fired at Butler several shots from the smaller pistol, having no desire or intent to shoot his wife.
The state claimed that the physical facts were such as to justify the court in deciding the issue raised by the plea against appellant without submitting it to the jury. They direct attention to the fact tk'at there was evidence that appellant got out of the car during the struggle and fired a number of shots thereafter; that some shots were fired before he got or was thrown out of the car; that some of the wounds on Mrs. Spannell bore evidence of powder burns; that the wound inflicted upon Butler with the big pistol would have disabled him so that he could not have continued to fight as appellant claims he did; that there was evidence that Mrs. Span-nell spoke to appellant after he was out of the car, from which the state draws the inference that she was killed after Butler was killed by a separate act and separate volition. We think that appellant's testimony, in connection with the circumstances attending the transaction, was such as to require the court to submit his theory to the jury. In Wilson v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 355, 156 S. W. 1185, the question of mistake of identity of the person killed was supported by appellant's testimony alone, and a reversal resulted because it was ignored by the court. In McCullough v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 136 S. W. 1055, the issue as to whether appellant fired at another in self-defense when he killed his wife, as he claimed, unintentionally, was held raised by his testimony. In Koller v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 496, 38 S. W. 44, the opinion states that the state produced strong testimony to show an intent to kill on the part of appellant, who was charged with murder, and concludes with the following statement:
"He had a right to testify to his intention. He denies any such intention; hence we cannot assume that" it "was false."
When, an accused avails himself of the privilege of testifying given by article 790, C. C. P., he becomes a witness, and his credibility is for the jury. Vernon's O. O. P. p. 709. In Branch's Ann. P. C. § 1884, is listed many cases holding that an accused may testify to his intent and motive. See Berry v. State, 30 Tex. App. 423, 17 S. W. 1080; Lewallen v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 412, 26 S. W. 832; Kinnard v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 276, 33 S. W. 234, 60 Am. St. Rep. 47; Matthews v. State, 42 S. W. 375; Turner v. State (Civ. App.) 51 S. W. 366; Murmutt v. State, 67 S. W. 509; Pratt v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 227, 96 S. W. 8; Money v. State, 97 S. W. 91. Mr. Wharton in his work on Evidence, vol. 1, § 431, lays down the same proposition.
We do not think that the distinction 'with reference-to carving, which is made with reference to the pleas of former jeopardy and former acquittal, and discussed in Wright v. State, 17 Tex. App. 158, justified the refusal Of the trial court to submit the issues raised by appellant's plea to the jury. In Wright v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 629, 40 S. W. 491, the authorities touching this distinction are reviewed and the rule recognized, as we understand it, that if the two alleged offenses are a result of a single act and volition the plea of former acquittal is available. The distinction mentioned was not considered by the court to render the plea presented in Cook's Case supra, inoperative. That was a plea of former acquittal on the facts raising the same legal propositions that must control in this case.
If Major Butler killed Mrs. Spannell, or if appellant, with separate acts and volition, killed her, the offenses were not identical. The statute (article 572, O. C. P.) designates as the special pleas available former conviction, former - acquittal, which include former jeopardy. Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345. We infer that the plea of res adjudicata, in so far as it is distinct from these, is not to be entertained. This per force of the statute (article 572), supra, which names as one of the two special pleas permitted, "that he has been before acquitted by a jury of the accusation against him, in a court of competent jurisdiction, whether the acquittal was regular or irregular." It is the judgment of acquittal for the identical act and volition which will operate to sustain his plea, and the evidence, lack of evidence, or reasons which impelled the court to enter the judgment are not important further than as they bear on the issue of identity.
The doctor who examined the body of Mrs. Spannell immediately after the homicide went into details in the description of the wounds, which perhaps would not have been permissible except by reason of the issues raised by the plea of former acquittal on the question as to whether the homicides were the result of separate acts. The state was entitled to have the condition of the bodies and the wounds thereon accurately described. It relied, in part, upon the physical facts to which the doctor's testimony related in part to rebut the appellant's theory and evidence to the effect that the shots that killed Mrs. Spannell were fired at Butler with no intent to injure her.
Appellant's attempt to prove certain vile remarks attributed to Major Butler concerning women was a means of proving character not sanctioned by the law as construed by the decisions of this court. Coffee v. State, 1 Tex. App. 550; Brownlee v. State, 13 Tex. App. 257; Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35, 5 S. W. 523.
The proof of the homicidé of Mrs. Span-nell was a part of the res gestee and not to be excluded under the rule rejecting proof of other crimes. It was an essential part of the evidence on the plea of jeopardy.
The conclusion of Mrs. Butler that shortly before the homicide Mrs. Spdnnell went upstairs to wash her hands on account of having handled a letter possibly infected with tuberculosis is not, we think, admissible against appellant in the absence of evidence of his knowledge of this purpose. What took place upstairs on the occasion mentioned was a part of the case, because appellant based his complaint of Major Butler, in part, upon his misconduct toward Mrs. Spannell upon that occasion, and it was the subject of the conversation which he claims took place in the automobile immediately preceding the homicide, and basis of a statement he claims his wife made to him immediately before he and Mrs. Spannell and Major Butler got into the automobile touching insulting con-, duct and words of Major Butler, which was the immediate cause of the difficulty which resulted in the homicide. It was therefore permissible for the state to prove by Mrs. Butler what, in fact, took place.
The failure of the court to admit evidence and submit to the jury the issues raised by the plea of former acquittal requires a reversal of the judgment, which is ordered.
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