Case Name: Antwan JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-07-24
Citations: 963 So. 2d 263
Docket Number: Nos. 1D06-2052, 1D06-2054, 1D06-2057, 1D06-2134, 1D06-2135 and 1D06-2199
Parties: Antwan JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ., concur; THOMAS, J., concurs in result only with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 963
Pages: 263–265

Head Matter:
Antwan JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 1D06-2052, 1D06-2054, 1D06-2057, 1D06-2134, 1D06-2135 and 1D06-2199.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
July 24, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 2007.
Michael Ufferman of the Michael Uffer-man Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Philip W. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation based on his failure to complete a residential drug treatment program. We reverse.
The only evidence of the conduct that purportedly led to appellant's discharge from Phoenix House was hearsay. Hearsay cannot be the sole basis for finding a violation of probation. See Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing revocation of probation where the only evidence that conduct which led to discharge from drug treatment amounted to a "willful" or "substantial" violation of condition of community control was hearsay testimony); Meade v. State, 799 So.2d 430, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ("Finally, both the probation officer's testimony and the treatment counselor's report were hearsay and, because the probation officer neither prepared nor was the custodian of the treatment counselor's re port, the report was not subject to the business record exception. Because this hearsay evidence was the only evidence Appellant was terminated unsuccessfully from the treatment program for willfully failing to participate, it is insufficient to support a finding of violation of probation.") (citations omitted).
The order placing the appellant on probation did not, moreover, specify the time within which he was to complete the treatment program or limit the chances he had to succeed. As we recently said in Campbell v. State, 939 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006): "Courts have held that 'evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion.' " Id. at 244 (quoting Quintero v. State, 902 So.2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)). See also Jones v. State, 744 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("The community control order did not specify the period within which appellant was to complete the program or how many chances he would have to obtain success. Since the order was not specific and appellant has expressed a willingness to complete some form of drug treatment, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking appellant's community control.") (citation omitted).
REVERSED.
BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ., concur; THOMAS, J., concurs in result only with opinion.