Case Name: ARTHUR J. CONNELLY, Respondent, v. THE MANHATTAN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-06
Citations: 67 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 495
Docket Number: 
Parties: ARTHUR J. CONNELLY, Respondent, v. THE MANHATTAN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Yan Brunt, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 67
Pages: 495–504

Head Matter:
ARTHUR J. CONNELLY, Respondent, v. THE MANHATTAN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Midence — a physician, testifying as an expert, cannot give an opinion, upon the physical condition of a patient, based in part upon the testimony of witnesses.
Upon tlie trial of an action for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by tiie plaintiff, a physician testified that he first saw the plaintiff about two weeks after the accident, and that he was then suffering from meningitis. He then stated that he had heard the plaintiff’s testimony given upon the trial as to the manner of the accident, and was allowed to testify that the injuries received in the manner described by the plaintiff were quite sufficient to produce the results discovered by the witness upon his examination of the plaintiff.
Held, that the testimony was improper and should have been excluded.
That an expert witness should not be permitted to give an opinion based upon facts testified to by others, but must, if required, give the precise state of facts, as he supposes and believes such facts to be, upon which he rests his opinion, or must give his opinion in answer to a question stating such facts.
Barrett, J., dissenting on the ground that the plaintiff’s testimony as to the manner of the accident would admit of but one conclusion as to how it happened.
Appeal by the defendant, The Manhattan Railway Company, from a judgment entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York on the 20th day of December, 1889, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial at the New York Circuit before the court and a jury, at which a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000 ; and also from an order denying its motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial entered in said office on the 6th day of January, 1890.
Bramard Tolies, for the appellant.
Ghaimeey Shaffer, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Baetlett, J.:
There is evidence enough in this case to sustain the judgment, and I should be in favor of affirmance were it not for an error which it seems to me was committed by the learned trial judge in the admission of testimony. Dr. Adolph M. Lesser was examined as a witness to prove the extent and nature of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. He testified that he first saw the plaintiff about a fortnight after the accident and found him then suffering from meningitis. Tiie witness was then asked by Mr. Shaffer, who represente'd the plaintiff upon the trial, to what lie attributed this Meningitis. This question was objected to by the defendant's counsel on the ground that it allowed the witness to accejfi or reject such facts as he saw fit, and because the form of the question was improper, and the opinion of the witness should be asked on facts stated, it being admitted that the witness had no knowledge of the pla.int.iff until after the accident. The objection was overruled and the defendant's counsel excepted, and the witness answered: " I have heard a portion of the plaintiff's testimony." What next followed is shown by this extract from the appeal book:
"The plaintiff in this case claims to have been thrown down in a car of the elevated railroad, on his back. Did you hear his statement of the manner in which he was thrown down? A. Yes, sir; I heard that."
Thereupon the court put the following question:
" Q. Were those injuries, received in the way in which he lias stated, sufficient to produce the results and conditions you discovered on your examination."
Counsel for defendant objected to the question on the ground stated to the question put by Mr. Shaffer to the witness. The court overruled the objection and counsel for defendant duly excepted.
"A. It was quite sufficient to produce that injury; to produce meningitis. It was quite sufficient to produce Mr. Connelly's difficulty."
The witness then went on to say that meningitis was a progressive disease, and there can be little doubt that his testimony on this subject tended to augment the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
I do not see how the evidence thus admitted can be distinguished from that which led to the reversal of the judgment in Page v. Mayor (32 N. Y. State Rep., 563) and The People v. McElvaine (121 N. Y., 250). The objection to the question allowed to be answered was that it permitted the witness to assume for himself, from the testimony of the plaintiff, the facts upon which he based his opinion, without informing the jury what he supposed or believed such facts to be. No doubt it is not an uncommon practice in examining medical witnesses to ask them whether they have heard the testimony of the person who has deposed to the circumstances under which injuries were received, and if he answers in the affirmative, to inquire as to. his opinion upon the testimony so given. This practice, however, which is usually resorted to for the purpose of facilitating the progress of the trial, can only be justified where no objection is made. The party against whom the evidence is offered is entitled, if he so desires, to have an explicit statement made to or by the expert witness of the precise state of facts upon which his opinion is based ; and it seems to me clear that this rule was disregarded in the admission of the evidence to which reference has been made on the trial of the case at bar.
For these reasons I think we ought to reverse the judgment and order a new trial.
Yan Brunt, P. J., concurred.