Case Name: William Sumner versus Edmund Tileston et al.
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1828-10-30
Citations: 7 Pick. 198
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Sumner versus Edmund Tileston et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 203–212

Head Matter:
William Sumner versus Edmund Tileston et al.
Where the plaintiff, owner of a mill, carried on business in it in company with another person, and agreed to make a deduction from the rent on account of backwater caused by the defendant’s dam, it was held, that in an action by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover damages for the obstruction, such other person was not interested, and therefore was a competent witness.
Where the'plaintiff, in an action of the case to recover damages for an obstruction to his mill, whereby his profits were diminished, declared that he was seised and possessed of the mill, and the evidence was that it was occupied by a tenant at will at a rent reduced on account of the obstruction, it was held that the declaration was supported, for that the possession of the tenant was the possession of the plaintiff, and the injury was consequential upon a wrong done while the plaintiff was in actual possession, and the damage was sustained by him alone. Putnam J, dissenting.
Where the defendant was owner of an existing mill-dam, and the plaintiff rightfully erected a mill-dam above it on the same stream, it was held that the defendant had no right to increase the height of his dam to a level with the plaintiff’s wheel, and thereby to obstruct the wheel by back-water.
Where the plaintiff erected a mill in 1799, and the defendant, who owned a mill lower down on the same stream, was in the habit of raising his dam by means of flash-boards when the water in the stream was low, but within twenty years aftei the erection of the plaintiff’s mill, had been frequently ordered to take down the flash-boards and always acquiesced, claiming no right to keep them up to the injury of the plaintiff, and afterwards admitted that he had no right to keep them up, it was held that this evidence was sufficient to defeat any claim of prescription on the part of the defendant, or to rebut the presumption of a grant.
This was an action on the case. The plaintiff declares, that from August 1,1813, he has been seised and possessed of an ancient mill and dam, in and across Neponset river, and that on that day the defendants wrongfully heightened a dam across the same stream below the plaintiff’s mill, and have ever since kept their dam higher than it ought to have been raised, whereby the wheels of the plaintiff’s mill have been retarded and obstructed, “ and the profits thereof diminished during, all the time aforesaid.”
The cause was tried before Wilde J. In regard to the injury set forth as to the plaintiff’s possessory right, in the diminution of the daily profits of his mill, it appeared, that for a part of the six years next before the date of the writ, he and his son William carried on business in the mill in company, and that he had agreed to deduct something from the rent on account of the back-water caused by the defendant’s dam ; and for the residue of that period, the mill was in the possession of two of his sons, and he had also agreed to deduct something from their rent for the same cause. The defendants contended that the evidence did not support the declaration; but the judge overruled the objection.
William Sumner, the son of the plaintiff, being offered as a witness, xvas objected to by the defendants as interested in the suit, but he was admitted to testify, it appearing that a recovery in this case would in no way affect his interest.
It appeared that the defendants, when the water was low, used flash-boards on their dam, and it was found that this use commenced the year after the plaintiff built his dam and mill, to wit, in 1799, and that the plaintiff owned the land on one side of the river only, xvhen he built his dam, though he had a legal right to place it where he did, and that the flash-boards would raise the water to a level with the bottom of the plaintiff’s wheel when the water in the river was low.
The defendants contended, that by law they had a right to raise their dam or flash-boards to a perfect level with the bottom of the plaintiff’s wheel. But the jury were instructed, that if the defendants had raised their dam or flash-boards within six years so as necessarily to cause back-water to the plaintiff’s mill, it would sustain the action.
The defendants attempted to show a prescriptive right to the use of flash-boards when the water was low ; but it appeared that the plaintiff had sent in 1815 and 1817, and at other times, to have them taken off, and they were taken off, and that the defendants, in 1823, applied to the plaintiff for liberty to put on their flash-boards, saying that they did not claim it as a right, but that they were willing to pay the plaintiff a reasonable compensation for the privilege.
The defendants contended that it should be put to the jury to consider, whether the notice xvas to take off the flash-boards because the water was higher in the river than when it was their custom to keep them on, or whether it was intended that they should put them on no more. But the jury were instructed, that if they believed the evidence showing that the plaintiff had frequently, within twenty years after the flash-boards were first put on, ordered the defendants to remove them, and that the defendants always acquiesced, never claiming the right to keep them up to the injury of the plaintiff, and that afterward they had admitted they had no right to keep them up, this evidence would be sufficient to defeat any right of prescription or to rebut any presumption of a grant.
Oct. term, 1827.
Richardson and Cushing, for the defendants,
to show that the action was not supported, inasmuch as the declaration set forth an injury to the possessory right, and the evidence was of an injury to the reversion, cited Leader v. Moxton, 3 Wils. 461 ; Jesser v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141; Bedingfield v. Onslow, 2 Lev. 209 ; Jefferson v. Jefferson, ibid. 130 ; Panton v. Isham, ibid. 360 ; 1 Chit. PI. 367 ; 2 Wms. Saund. 206, notes 21, 22, and 207 a, note 24 ; Baker v. Sanderson, 3 Pick. 348 ; Bertie v. Beaumont, 16 East, 33 ; Vowles v. Miller, 3 Taunt. 137 ; Martin v. Goble, 1 Campb. 320 ; Fitzsimons v. Inglis, 5 Taunt. 534 ; Stott v. Stott, 16 East, 343 ; Starr v. Jackson, 11 Mass. R. 519, [Rand’s ed. 527, note a.]
The use of the flash-boards began soon after the erection of the plaintiff’s dam, and therefore each party must rest on his natural rights as against the other. Each has an equal right to a fair apportionment of the stream. A trifling damage by one to the other is damnum absque injurió. Platt v. Root, 15 Johns. R. 217 ; Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines’s R. 307 ; Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. R. 321.
The plaintiff and his son William were partners, and might have joined in the action, and the damages recovered would be partnership funds, which each might use ; so that the son was interested, and therefore could not be a witness.
The question ought to have been submitted to the jury, whether the notice from the plaintiff to take off the flash-boards was a prohibition to use them generally, or merely information in regard to the time in which, according to usage, they ought not to be kept up. If the latter were the case, there was evfdence of a prescriptive right. Had there been a grant of a privilege to raise the water to a certain heighjt by flash-boards whenever the water should be low, the defendants would have proceeded in the manner they have done.
Churchill, for the plaintiff.

Opinion:
The opinion of a majority of the Court was drawn up by
Oct. 30th, 1828.
Parker C. J.
William Sumner junior was not an interested witness. He could claim nothing of his father of the damages recovered, because he had suffered nothing. He paid for the use of the mill according to the value of the rent, deducting the obstruction. He can have no action against the defendants for the same reason, viz. that he is not damnified.
The damage to the plaintiff was immediate ; it reduced the value of his property and the rent ; as owner of the property he is entitled to the action. The question only is, whether his proof supports his declaration. He declares he was seised and possessed of the mill ; the evidence was, that part of the time he carried on the mill in company with his son, and for the residue of the time it was carried on by his two sons. It does not appear for what time or under what terms the sons had the use of the mill; it must be presumed therefore that they were but tenants at will. The injury was in fact done while the plaintiff was in possession and before any contract with his sons, for by the contract a deduction was made from the rents to accrue during the time they should hold. The daily diminution of profits was consequential upon a wrong done while the plaintiff was in actual possession. On this ground, and because the damage was only to the plaintiff, we think the proof supports the declaration. In the case of Starr v. Jackson, cited in the argument, the question was merely on the form of the action, whether it should be trespass or case. Here there is no question about the form of the action, but merely whether the evidence shows that the plaintiff was in possession ; technically he was, because the possession of the tenant at will is the possession of the landlord, and is enough to prove the fact alleged of possession : and as to the injury, it is clear that it was done to the plaintiff, and that all the damage was suffered by him. Under these circumstances it would be too strict to put the parties to the expense of another trial if there were a technical error in the declaration ; which however we do not think satisfactorily made out.
It is said that in the case of Baker v. Sanderson, reported in 3 Pick. 348, a different doctrine wras advanced by the Court; but we do not see that case in this light. The second count m the declaration was objected to, because it alleged that uther persons than the then plaintiff were in the actual possession of the mill during part of the time for which damages occasioned by the defendant had been given by the jury 5 but that objection was overruled, because in the same count it was averred that the plaintiff had reduced his rent on that account. Now it is inferred from this in argument, that because in the present case the plaintiff has alleged that he was possessed, this allegation is contradicted by the evidence that the sons during part of the time had the use of the mill; but such an inference is not necessary. The objection was, that the count was bad because it alleged, that during part of the time when the injury happened, the mills were in possession of another. This would have been insuperable, as is stated in the opinion, but for the subsequent averment of the reduction of the rent, for the plaintiff would have himself shown that the lessee, and not he, had suffered the damage.
In the present case the objection is not to the count, but to the evidence. The plaintiff avers that he himself was seised and possessed ; it turns out that for one part of the time one of his sons occupied with him, and that for another part, his two sons occupied without him, not under lease, but as we suppose by some verbal contract. This evidence did not negative his possession, for in law he was still in possession ; and then as to his right to recover under these circumstances, it appearing that on account of the obstruction he had reduced the rent, the case is brought within the principle on which the case of Baker v. Sanderson was decided.
It is perfectly clear, that no prescriptive right to maintain the flash-boards was proved by the defendants ; nor was there any such use as laid a foundation of presumption of a grant; as it was proved that when ordered to be removed they were removed, and as late as 1823 the right of the plaintiff to have them removed was acknowledged, permission having been then asked to raise them, and a compensation offered therefor. The instruction of the judge was certainly correct on this point, and the jury must be understood to have found the fact, that the defendant kept the boards up only by permission of tne plaintiff.
The plaintiff had a right to calculate upon the state of things as they existed when he erected his mill. There was then a dam on the defendants' privilege, but no flash-boards ; nor were there any until a year afterwards. This was then a new obstruction by the defendants contrary to the plaintiff's right and this right was admitted and acquiesced in by the defendants. There is no such right as the defendants claim, to raise by flash-boards the water to a level with the bottom of the plaintiff's wheel. Both parties had a right to use their water privilege. The defendants having first erected their dam to an adequate height for the common state of the water, the plaintiff had a right to work his mill without interruption by any additional dam by the defendants.
The verdict is therefore right, and the judgment will be entered accordingly.
See Anderson v. Nesmith, 7 N. Hampsh. R. 167; Robertson v. George, 7 IN. Hampsh. R. 306; Little v. Palister, 3 Greenl. 6.