Case Name: Anthony M. Dignowitty v. D. C. Alexander et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 162
Docket Number: 
Parties: Anthony M. Dignowitty v. D. C. Alexander et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 162–165

Head Matter:
Anthony M. Dignowitty v. D. C. Alexander et al.
Where parol evidence was admitted to vary a written instrument, the error will not be revised, if the fact proved were immaterial at the time of the trial.
Where a party prayed an injunction on other grounds, and after answer amended, stating that at the time the trustee was proceeding to sell the land, to restrain which the injunction had been obtained, the note was not due, but this amendment came after the note was due, and the defendant pleaded the note and deed of trust in reconvention, there was no error in giving judgment for the defendant, the note being due at the date when these pleadings were filed.
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of the district judges.
Amanda A. Dignowitty, acting as the agent of her husband, A. M. Dignowitty, on 28th February, 1859, prayed for an injunction against D. 0. Alexander and Thomas H. Stabling, to restrain the sale under the deed of trust exe cuted by A. M. Dignowitty to Stribling, to secure payment of a note to Alexander for $500 99, on the grounds, that the consideration of the note was certain city scrip of the city of San Antonio, which amounted to that sum; but that Alexander agreed that Dignowitty should only be liable for the amount which he should realize from the city upon it; and that, owing to an abatement of interest by the city treasurer, he had only received $482 75, and that Alexander had refused to credit the loss, as he had promised to do. And also that Alexander, at the time of the execution of the note, had agreed, that if Dignowitty should be unable to pay at maturity, then he should have six months longer; and, notwithstanding Dignowitty’s inability to pay, Stribling was proceeding to sell the mortgaged property regardless of said agreements. Alexander admitted the execution of the note for $500, which he admitted was given for scrip amounting to $500 99, which amount, he alleged, was due by the city, and Dignowitty agreed to take it at par. He alleged, that if there were any abatement of interest, it was simply because of a charge against Dignowitty for other interest which he owed the city.
Stribling denied all knowledge of the equities claimed, and admitted that he was proceeding to sell the property.
In the amended petition of Dignowitty, filed 20th October, 1859, he alleged that the note was not due until twelve months after its date. The note read as follows:
“ 500. ’ San Antonio, August 19, 1858.
“ Twelve months after date, I promise to pay to the order of D. O. Alexander five hundred dollars, with twelve per cent, interest from date, for value received.
“A. M. Dignowitty.”
The deed of trust recited that the note was due on the 1st day of January, 1859.
Alexander replied, that the note in fact fell due on the 1st of January, 1859, and that the “twelve months” was inserted hy mistake. He plead the note in reconvention, and prayed for a foreclosure of the mortgage and a sale of the properly.
There was a hill of exceptions to parol evidence in favor of Alexander to prove the intention of the parties as to the time of the maturity of the note, and because of the overruling of plaintiff’s motion for continuance.
There was no statement of facts, and therefore the charge of the court was immaterial. The jury found for the defendant for the amount of the note, upon which there were a judgment and a decree of foreclosure, from which Dignowitty appealed.
W. H. Cleveland, for appellant.
—The suit was brought to enjoin a sale under a deed of trust given to secure a note for $500, payable twelve months after date, and which sale was advertised to take place before the maturity of the note. This note is set foz’th in, and made a part of, the defendant’s amended answer.
The court erred in admitting parol evidence to show that the note was payable otherwise than it purported, as parol evidence canziot be admitted to vary, contradict, or add to a written instrument. This ez’ror is matezial, as the question of the time of the maturity of the note determined the suit.
The plaintiff below being surprised hy the defendant’s amended answer, the court erred in refusing a continuance.
I A. Geo. W. Paschal, for appellees.
—The note and deed of trust bore the same date. There is no statement of facts. But we gather from the record that the deed of trust authozized a sale at the time it was proceeding. This is perfectly consistent with a note due four months later, which bore interest from date. The security was only an incident, and the maker could stipulate for its disposition before the maturity of the note.
But whether the parol evidence as to the mistake was properly or improperly admitted, is wholly immaterial. The note was due when the answer for reconvention was filed, and was due on" its face long before the trial. The injunction was properly dissolved, and the judgment rendered on the note, with a decretal order for sale. ¡Nothing was left but a question of costs, about which no error is assigned.
All other" questions were found by special verdict.

Opinion:
"Wheeler, C. J.
—The. only question presented by the record which requires notice is the ruling of the court admitting parol evidence to prove that it was intended by the parties to make the note payable at a different time from that expressed in the note. And in reference to this supposed error, it is only necessary to say, that, if error, it was an immaterial error. The want of maturity of the note was not set up as a ground for staying proceedings until after the maturity of the note according to its terms. ¡Nor was the note set up in the answer and a recovery sought upon it until after its maturity. The note was made to bear interest from its date. It was not material, therefore, whether it was due on the 1st of January 1859, or at twelve months from its date. The ruling in question was not material, as affecting the merits or the question of costs.
There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.