Case Name: HAV-A-TAMPA CIGAR COMPANY, a corporation, v. THOMAS A. JOHNSON, as Chairman of the State Road Department of Florida
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1941-12-19
Citations: 149 Fla. 148
Docket Number: 
Parties: HAV-A-TAMPA CIGAR COMPANY, a corporation, v. THOMAS A. JOHNSON, as Chairman of the State Road Department of Florida.
Judges: BROWN, C. J., and THOMAS, JJ., concur specially.
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 149
Pages: 148–170

Head Matter:
HAV-A-TAMPA CIGAR COMPANY, a corporation, v. THOMAS A. JOHNSON, as Chairman of the State Road Department of Florida.
5 So. (2nd) 433
Bn Banc
December 19, 1941
Rehearing Denied January 12, 1942
Whitaker Brothers, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Donald Carroll, Assistant Attorney General, T. M. Shackleford, Jr., Richard W. Ervin and M. N. Arfaras, for appellees.
Knight & Green, and Worth, Bivens & Lively, as amicus curiae.
STATEMENT
The bill of complaint herein alleges:
“that plaintiff has, ever since its establishment, continuously and still is, using as a medium of advertising, small signs erected and maintained along the various public highways of the State of Florida, with advertising directing attention of the public to and advertising the cigars manufactured by plaintiff.
“. . . that it has expended and has invested at the present time large sums of money in such signs erected and maintained by it along the various public highways in the State of Florida; that it has spent and has invested large sums of money in the purchase, construction-, erection and maintenance of said signs; and likewise it has expended and has invested at the present time large amounts of money in the sites on real estate which it has acquired, either by purchase or lease, whereon said signs are constructed, erected and are being maintained, and said signs constitute, and said sites on said real estate whereon the same -are erected and maintained, constitute a most valuable asset of plaintiff, and if the said signs are de stroyed or displaced or removed, it would seriously impair and cripple plaintiff’s business; that in acquiring the sites where said signs are being maintained, plaintiff selected such sites as would be the most valuable locations for such advertising purposes and at the same time, said sites and signs being maintained by the plaintiff do not in any wise interfere with the view of approaching vehicles, and in no way interefere with the traveling public.
“. . . that Section 9 of Chapter 20446 of the Acts of the 1941 Legislature provides as follows:
“ ‘No advertisement, advertising sign or advertising structure shall be constructed, erected, used, operated or maintained;
“ ‘ (a) Within 15 feet of the outside boundary of a public highway or within one hundred feet of any church, school, cemetery, public park, public reservation, public playground, state or national forest, highway or railroad intersections outside the limits of any incorporated city or town;
“‘(b) Which involves motion or rotation of any part of the structure or displays intermittent lights;
“‘(c) Which uses the word ‘stop’ or ‘danger’ or presents or implies the need of requirement of stopping or the existence of danger, or which is a copy or imitation of official signs;
“‘(d) Which are placed on the inside of a curve or in any manner that may prevent persons using the highway from obtaining an unobstructed view of approaching vehicles.’
“. . . that the defendant, as Chairman of the State Road Department is clothed with the duty and responsibility of enforcing the provisions of said Chapter 20446 and has construed said Section 9 as pro hibiting the erection, maintenance or continuance of any sign within 15 feet of the outside boundary of any public highway, with the exception of such signs as are exempted entirely from the operation of said Act by Section 14 thereof, plaintiff’s signs not being within such exemptions.
“. . . that according to the clear unambiguous language of said Section 9, the only signs prescribed thereby from being erected or maintained within 15 feet of the outside boundary of public highways, are such signs only as are described in sub-sections B, C, and D; that none of the signs owned and being maintained by plaintiff are of such character or description as set forth in sub-sections B and C, nor are any of them located at such place as is described in subsection D, and therefore, none of the signs owned and maintained by plaintiff fall within the description or definition as set out and specified in said sub-sections B, C, and D, and therefore said signs being maintained by plaintiff are not prohibited or proscribed by the provisions of said Section. The defendant, however, is claiming and insisting that notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal provisions of said Section, that said Section does embrace and cover the signs being maintained by plaintiff and is claiming and insisting that said Section 9 embraces and covers all signs, save and except such signs as are specifically exempted from the operation of said Act by Section 14.
“. . . that it owns real estate sites, either by purchase or lease, in Hillsborough County, Florida, of upwards of 75, whereon it has been for a long number of years and is now maintaining medium sized signs', advertising the cigars manufactured by plaintiff; that it likewise owns, either by purchase or lease, in various other counties of the State, a large number upwards of 500 similar real estate sites on which there is being now maintained similar signs, and which have been so owned and maintained by plaintiff for a long number of years; that most of said signs so owned, operated and maintained by plaintiff, located in Hillsborough County, Florida, as well as in the other counties of said State, are located on sites, that is to say, real estate, owned by purchase or lease by plaintiff, and said signs situated within 15 feet of the outside boundary of a public highway; the situation and location being such, however, as to in no wise obstruct or interfere with the view of approaching vehicles or the traveling public in any way.
“. . . that the defendant has employed and designated a large number of persons to aid and assist him in the carrying out and making effective the provisions of Chapter 20446 of the Acts of the 1941 Legislature; that the defendant has issued definite orders and instructions to all such employees and designated persons to immediately, on the day said Act becomes effective, begin tearing down and removing all signs within 15 feet of the outside boundary of any public highway in the State of Florida, including Hillsborough County, with the exception of such signs as are exempted from the operation of said Act, by Section 14 thereof; that under said instructions and orders so issued, the defendant, through his employees and agents, and persons designated by him will enter upon the private premises of plaintiff and remove and destroy the signs now being maintained by it, on said sites in Hillsborough County, Florida, owned by it and located within 15 feet of the outside boundary of the public highways in said County, unless restrained and enjoined by this Honorable Court; that the defendant is not only threatening to enter upon the premises owned by plaintiff and threatening to destroy and remove its private property without- its consent or permission, but actually has issued an order to his employees, servants and designated persons employed by him to aid him in carrying out the provisions of Chapter 20446, to enter upon the premises of all persons, including the plaintiff, who are maintaining signs within 15 feet of the outside boundary of any public highway in the State of Florida (with the exception of such signs as are entirely exempted by said Act by Section 14) immediately upon said Act becoming effective, and plaintiff alleges that the defendant and his employees, agents and designated persons, will so enter upon the private premises of the plaintiff, and will destroy its private property without any right or authority in law, which said act will cause plaintiff to suffer irreparable injury and damage, unless enjoined and restrained by this Honorable Court.
“. . . that the only purpose or use to which it can put said real estate or sites on which said signs are being maintained, is for the purpose it is being used, to-wit: to maintain sign for advertising purposes.
“. . . that the act of the defendant in entering upon the premises of this plaintiff and destroying its private property would not only be in violation of the plain provisions of Section 9, Chapter 20446, but would also be in direct violation of Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, which guarantees to all persons the right of acquiring, possession and protecting property, as well as of Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of said Constitution of Florida, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor that private property be taken without just compensation, and also in direct violation of Section 1, Article 14 of the Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
“. . . that said Act, and particularly Section 9 thereof, does not prescribe or prohibit the signs which are being owned and maintained by plaintiff within 15 feet of the outside boundary of public highways in Hillsborough County, and elsewhere in the State of Florida. Plaintiff further alleges, however, that if the court should hold as the defendant has construed Section 9, to mean that all signs are prohibited (save and except those exempted in Section 14), and that said Section provides that defendant can enter the premises of plaintiff and destroy his vested property rights, then said Section is invalid, unconstitutional and void for the reason that it amounts to the taking of private property without due compensation; and for the further reason that it would amount to the taking of private property without any necessity therefor for the protection of the public safety, health or morals, and would be doing violence to the constitutional guarantees, State and Federal, hereinabove referred to. Also, if the Court places the construction upon said Section 9 as is being placed by the defendant, said Section 9 is void, invalid and inoperative for the additional reason that it is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable for the reason that by Sections 14 and 14-A, certain interests are permitted to maintain advertising and advertising signs within 15 feet of the outside boundary of public highways, while the vested interests and property rights of this plaintiff would be destroyed, and it denied the same privilege and right of such other persons, and therefore it would amount to denying to plaintiff equal protection of the law, and would constitute an illegal and unlawful discrimination.
“. . . that the only signs which it is maintaining are signs advertising its own products; it is not engaged in the business of outdoor advertising within the purview and meaning of said Chapter 20446, and the provisions of said Act are not applicable to the signs being maintained by the plaintiff, and the defendant has no jurisdiction over said signs himself, and no power or authority to do anything in relation to said signs, and no power or authority to require the plaintiff to do anything in order to enjoy its right to maintain its said signs and advertise the manufacture of its own products.
“Plaintiff, being without remedy except in a court of equity, prays:
“First: That this Honorable Court do grant unto plaintiff a temporary injunction or restraining order, enjoining and restraining the defendant, Thomas A. Johnson, as Chairman of the State Road Department of Florida, as well as all of his agents, employees and designated persons, employed to assist him in carrying out the provisions of Chapter 20446 of the Acts of the 1941 Legislature, from entering upon its private premises, consisting of real estate sites located in Hillsborough County, and elsewhere within the State of Florida on which plaintiff is maintaining advertising signs, which are located within 15 feet of the outside boundary of public highway of said County, as well as any other counties in the State of Florida, and also enjoining and restraining said defendant, and all of his agents, employees and designated persons, employed to assist him in carrying out the provisions of Chapter 20446, of the Acts of the 1941 Legislature, from in any wise molesting, injuring or removing or interfering with any of said signs.
“Second: And upon final hearing, that the court make said injunction permanent.”
Motion was filed to dismiss on grounds:
“1. That there is no equity in the bill.
“2. That Chapter 20446, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1941, including the provisions complained of in said Bill of Complaint, is a valid regulation by the State of Florida within its police powers.
“3. That no provision of the Constitution of the State of Florida or of the Constitution of the United States, is violated by said Chapter 20446, or any of the provisions thereof complained of in said Bill of Complaint.
“4. That it is within the.province of the Legislature to regulate the locations of advertising signs and structures within reasonable limits along or near the public highways, and such regulation by Chapter 20446, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1941, is reasonable and valid.
“5. That the public safety, health, morals, welfare and comfort of the people justify the regulations such as are prescribed by Chapter 20446, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1941.
“6. That there is no unlawful taking of property without just compensation by said Chapter 20446, or any of the provisions thereof complained of by said Bill of Complaint, but on the contrary, said law, including the sections complained of, is a reasonable police regulation of the State which the State Legislature was and is authorized to make.
“7. That paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 9 of said Chapter 20446 are separate and distinct prohibitions and plaintiff’s contention that only those classes of signs referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) are required to be erected and maintained outside of the 15 foot setback limit contained in paragraph (a) is contrary to the plain language of said Section.
“8. That the fact that plaintiff employs large numbers of persons in its cigar manufacuring business and has many signs advertising its product along the highways gives it no special privilege, nor does it withdraw the police power of the State to regulate any phase of plaintiff’s business in the public interest.
“9. That the fact that plaintiff is not engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in nowise takes it out from under the provisions of said Chapter 20446, since it regulates all outdoor advertising, and not merely those engaged in such business.”
The following order was made:
“This cause coming on this day upon application by plaintiff for temporary injunction and upon motion to dismiss filed by the defendant to the bill of complaint herein, and same having been argued by counsel.
“It is thereupon Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that said application for temporary injunction be denied and said motion to dismiss thé bill of complaint be and the same is hereby granted. The Court asking plaintiff if they desired to amend said bill, plaintiff having stated that it did not wish to do so, it is thereupon further,
“Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the said bill of complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed.”
Plaintiff appealed.

Opinion:
WHITFIELD, J.:
Appellant in effect contends (1) that Chapter 20446, Acts of 1941, proscribes only such signboards as are described by sub-sections (b), (c) and (d) of Section 9 of the statute and that the maintenance of appellant's advertising signboards is not forbidden by such subdivisions (b), (c) and (d); (2) that if subdivision (a) of Section 9 is applicable to appellant's advertising signboards, then such subdivision (a) violates Sections 1 and 12 of the Declaration of Rights and the due process clause of the Federal Constitution; (3) that if subdivision (a) of Section 9 is construed to prohibit all signs within fifteen feet of the outside boundaries of a public highway, this when construed in connection with Sections 14 and 14-A of the Act, renders such provisions of the Act discriminatory and void.
Appellant's construction of the Act is not in harmony with the obvious intent of the legislature as disclosed by a consideration of the subject matter and objectives of the enactment and the terms and method used in expressing the legislative purposes.
Statutes enacted under the police power should be interpreted to effectuate a lawful purpose that is designed to conserve the safety and general welfare of the public in the use of the public highways. Mere technical errors, if any, in the method of expressing the purpose designed should not effect the enforce ment of a statute to effectuate the law-making purpose as determined by a fair consideration of the entire enactment with reference to its controlling intent.
Organic rights "to acquire, possess and protect property" are subject to the lawful exercise of the inherent sovereign police power of the State to provide for and to conserve the safety, health, morals, comfort and general well being of human life and activities. Private rights may be regulated and restricted for the public welfare and without compensation when not done arbitrarily, needlessly or oppressively. Nuisances caused by the possession or use of property may be abated as provided by valid law without violating organic property rights, when that remedy is necessary to protect public welfare. See State v. Yocum, 136 Fla. 246, 186 So. 448, 121 A.L.R. 270.
The statute in this case is appropriate to accomplish a general public purpose and is not shown to be an arbitrary or unnecessary exercise of the police power of the State.
Exceptions to the operation of the statute contained in 14 and 14-A of the Act (quoted in the statement), are not applicable to subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of Section 9; but such exceptions are applicable to subdivision (a) of Section 9. This does not operate to cause an unjust discrimination against, or an undue burden to, those subject to subdivision (a) of Section 9, taken in connection with the preceding provision of Section 9. This is so for the reason that such exceptions have a substantial basis in practical differences that inhere in the subject regulated; and the exceptions harmonize with the policy and purpose of the enactment under the police power of the State to conserve public safety, which enactment regulates commercial or other advertising, including advertisements of manufactured products, by means of signboards along numerous highways containing matter designed to attract drivers of rapidly moving motor vehicles and others on the highways, thereby increasing the hazards and risks vitally affecting the safety of public travel and transportation on the highways in the State.
Statutes should be interpreted to effectuate the lawmaking intent as shown by the subject, the object and the intendments of the enactment, and by the language used to express a lawful purpose. See Dutton Phos. Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282; Whitaker v. Parsons, 80 Fla. 352, 86 So. 247.
Section 9, Chapter 20446, Acts of 1941, contains general statements (1) of advertising activities that are forbidden, (a) of special classes of forbidden advertising and (3) of the localities in which they are prohibited. The first portion of Section 9 may operate severally with each subdivision (a), (b), (c) and (d). Section 14 of the Act contains exceptions to Section 9 except as to subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of Section 9. Section 14-A contains a separate exception to the provision of the Act.
As shown by the purpose designed and the language and method of expression used, the intent of Chapter 20446 is that the first portion of Section 9 taken with subdivision (a) of Section 9, shall constitute a statutory prohibition or command that no advertisement or advertising sign or structure shall be . . . maintained: (a) within fifteen feet of the outside boundary of a public highway or within one hundred feet of any church, school, cemetery, public park, public reservation, public playground, State or national forest, highway or railroad intersection outside the limits of any incorporated city or town.
But such prohibition contained in the first portion of Section 9, when considered with subdivision (a) of Section 9 is subject to the exceptions as stated in Section 14 of the Act; though the first portion of Section 9, when taken separately with either of subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of Section 9, is not subject to the exceptions contained in Section 14.
If appellant has not violated subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 9, it is immaterial to it whether (b) and (c) are legally operative since such subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 9 do not affect the validity or the operation of other portions of the statute upon the activities of the appellant as shown by the allegations of appellant's bill of complaint. There seems to be no objection to the operation of subdivision (d) of Section 9 of the statute as a proper exercise of the police power of the State.
Allegations of appellant's bill of complaint indicate that the purpose of the plaintiff appellant is to maintain the advertising signboards described in the bill of complaint, near the public highways in the State so that the advertisements of cigars manufactured by the plaintiff may be seen for the plaintiff's benefit by those on the highways.'
A purpose and intent of the statute is to prevent commercial and other advertising signboards being maintained near the public highways so as to attract the attention of drivers of rapidly moving vehicles and others on the public highways in the State, thereby distracting the attention of such drivers and others from necessary continuing attention and care in operating vehicles on the highways. Such signboards obviously increase the hazards and risks of public travel on the highways and clearly justify the statutory regulations under the police power which are here challenged. There are other considerations that justify the enactment of the statute. Modern highways and motor vehicles together with the enormous incréase in travel and transportation in speedy vehicles make it necessary to conserve the safety of highway travel and those who may go upon the highways by all reasonable and appropriate means within the judgment of the lawmakers. See Swisher v. Johnson, filed this term.
Appropriate and reasonable statutory regulations of commercial and other signboard advertising under the police power to conserve the safety and comfort of the traveling public on the highways, do not violate private property or contract rights, even if the use of property and the operation of contracts be restrained by such regulations commensurate with the just requirements of public safety and general welfare, no arbitrary or oppressive exercise of governmental authority being made to appear. There is in such cases no taking of private property for public use without "just compensation" within the intendments of the organic right of eminent domain which is controlled by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, Section 29 of Article XVI of the Constitution not being applicable except in condemnation by "any corporation or individual" when "full compensation" is required.
Affirmed.
BROWN, C. J., and THOMAS, JJ., concur specially.
TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.