Case Name: FRANCIOSI v. PAROLE BOARD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2000-02-01
Citations: 461 Mich. 347
Docket Number: Docket No. 113550
Parties: FRANCIOSI v PAROLE BOARD
Judges: Cavanagh, Kelly, Taylor, and Markman, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 461
Pages: 347–351

Head Matter:
FRANCIOSI v PAROLE BOARD
Docket No. 113550.
Decided February 1, 2000.
On application by the plaintiff for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Sabatino Franciosi appealed in the Wayne Circuit Court a decision by the Parole Board denying him parole. The court, Pamela R. Harwood, J., remanded the matter to the Parole Board for a new interview, and indicated that Mr. Franciosi could be represented by an attorney, ruling that MCL 791.235(6); MSA 28.2305(6), which prohibits attorneys from representing prisoners during parole interviews, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, and that MCL 791.206(2); MSA 28.2276(2) and 1996 AACS, R 791.7765 require that all members of a Parole Board panel meet in collegial discussion before issuing a decision. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals, Michael J. Kelly and Doctoroff, JJ. (Young, P.J., concurring), reversed. 231 Mich App 607 (1998) (Docket No. 195864). The plaintiff seeks leave to appeal.
In a memorandum opinion, signed by Justices Cavanagh, Kelly, Taylor, and Markman, the Supreme Court held,-.
MCL 791.235(6); MSA 28.2305(6), does not prevent a lawyer from attending and participating in a parole interview in the same manner that a nonlawyer could. However, a lawyer cannot act as a legal representative of a prisoner during a parole interview.
Affirmed.
Justice Corrigan, joined by Chief Justice Weaver, dissenting, stated that the case is moot because the plaintiff has been paroled. In any event, the majority’s construction does not comport with the plain language of the statute. The Legislature’s intent could not be clearer: a person representing a prisoner at a parole interview may not be an attorney. An attorney representing another person in a formal interview with a public official necessarily must be said to be acting as a legal representative. Finally, the statute has a rational basis, because it is rational to conclude that the presence of an attorney might hinder the free flow of information between a prisoner and his interviewer.
Justice Young took no part in the decision of this case.
Neal Bush for plaintiff-appellant.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Chester S. Sugierski, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for defendantappellee.

Opinion:
Memorandum Opinion. Sabatino Franciosi appealed from an adverse decision of the parole board. He alleged that MCL 791.235(6); MSA 28.2305(6), which bars an attorney from acting as a prisoner's representative at his parole interview, violates federal and state guaranties of equal protection of the law. He challenged a second parole board practice as violative of MCL 791.206(2); MSA 28.2276(2) and 1996 AACS, R 791.7765(1). Under the practice, two agreeing members of a three-member panel of the parole board decide a prisoner's eligibility for parole, without the third member's participation. Finally, plaintiff challenged as inadequate the reasons cited by the board for denying him parole.
The Wayne Circuit Court found for plaintiff on all three issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the first two issues and found it unnecessary to address the third. In re Parole of Franciosi, 231 Mich App 607; 586 NW2d 542 (1998). Plaintiff appeals.
We issue this memorandum opinion for the limited purpose of clarifying the Court of Appeals holding regarding the first issue.
We affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals with the understanding that the statute does not prevent a lawyer from attending and participating in a parole interview in the same manner that a nonlawyer could. However, a lawyer cannot act as a legal representative of a prisoner during a parole interview. See MCL 791.235(6); MSA 28.2305(6).
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals as clarified.
Cavanagh, Kelly, Taylor, and Markman, JJ., concurred.
Although plaintiff has apparently been paroled, we issue this opinion because the issue is capable of repetition while evading our review, the issue has been briefed, defendant has not argued the case is moot, and the Court of Appeals opinion is published. Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175, 201, n 29; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).
Our clarification is consistent with the position asserted by defendant in its brief on appeal, to wit: "There is no dispute that [attorney] Mr. Bush could appear in his role as a private citizen as a representative of a prisoner."