Case Name: CRAIG vs. CALLAWAY COUNTY COURT
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1848-07
Citations: 12 Mo. 94
Docket Number: 
Parties: CRAIG vs. CALLAWAY COUNTY COURT.
Judges: Judge Napton concurring, the judgment is affirmed.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 94–102

Head Matter:
CRAIG vs. CALLAWAY COUNTY COURT.
1. Payments of interest by one of several joint obligors in a bond, before the statute of limitations attaches, takes it out of the statute as to the others.
2. A bond made payable to the justices of the countycourt, by their names, for the use of the county, should be sued upon in the names of the surviving justices to whom it was executed: Choses in action do not go in succession.
3. A co-security not a party to the suit is a competent witness against his co-security.
APPEAL FROM CALLAWAY CIRCUIT COURT.
Sheley & Jones for appellant.
1st. The bond having been made payable to the present plaintiffs in their official capacity, suit should have been commenced in the name of the present justices of the county court.
2d. In order to take a case out of the statute of limitations, there must be such a promise, coupled with the original consideration, would create a new and subsisting debt. 6 Mo. Rep. p. 21.
3d. The promise or undertaking of one of two joint obligors, will not take the case out of the statute of limitations as to the other. Hathaway vs. Haskel, 9 Pick. R. 42; Exetor Bank vs. Sullivan, 6 N. H. Rep. 124; Bell vs. Morrison 1 Peters Rep. 356, 374; Kelly vs. Sanborn, 9 N. H. Rep. 46 ; Story on contracts, side page 708; 5 Greenleaf 140; 17 Serg & Rawle 126, 29, 4. Daniel Nolly, being a co-obligor, and treasurer of the county, was an incompetent and illegal witness, being interested in the event of the suit.
5th. The indorsement upon a bond or note by the obligee or holder, that payments had been made thereon, Í3 not in evidence as against the obligors,
Reed & Hardin for appellee.
1st. The motion to dismiss this cause from the docket was properly overruled. The general principle of the common law is, that no other person than the obligee in the bond can be the nominal plaintiff. The legal interest in the bond having been vested in Conger and Craig, the action must be brought in their names. I Chitty’s Plead. 2,3. The statutes of this State provide however, that such suits may be brought in the name of the county, or of the person to whom the bond was made for the use of the country. Either mode may be adopted at the discretion of the person having control of the action. Rev. Code 1845, p. 289-90, sec. 3,4.
2d. Daniel Nolly is a competent witness for appellees. Although co-security with appellant, he is no party to the record; and in testifying for appellees, he testifies against his own interest. Upon the recovery and payment of the judgment, he will be liable to appellant for contribution. But he was admitted to testify under the provisions of this statute of practice at law. Revised Code 1845, p. 833-34, secs. 26,27. It has already been determined that he could be used by appellees under the provisions of this statute. Callaway county court vs. Craig, 9 Mo. R. 846.
3d. The endorsements on the bond of payments of interest, were properly admitted in evidence. Appellees had no personal interest in the debt. The bond was executed to them as officers of the county court. If they had any interest, however, their remedy was not impaired by the statute of limitations at the date of the endorsements. Hence there was no inducement for them to cause false endorsements to be made. But Nolly states that the endorsements were made on the days they bear date.- He was county treasurer and as such officer held the bond, and was the proper and only person that could receive and endorse payments. From these considerations, the court sitting as a jury might readily infer the fact of actual payments of interest. 1 Greene Evidence pages 138-39,148-53; 17 John’s Rep. 181 Roseboom vs. Billington; 2 Campbell 321; Rose vs. Bryant 32, Eng. Com. Law 175.
4th. If any legal objection could be taken to the question asked of the witness Henderson, the evidence thus drawn out could have had no weight, the court sitting as a jury, for it was in effect excluded from their consideration by the refusal of the 4th instruction of appellees.
5th, Payments of any part of interest or principal by one of several obligors in a bond or note before the statute of limitations attaches will prevent the statute from, running as to the others. Whitney vs. Whitcomb Douglass 629; Sigourney vs. Druny and others 14 Pick R. 387.
6th. The promise of one out of several obligors of a note or bond before the statute of limitations attaches to pay the debt, takes it out of the statute as against the others and may be given in evidence on a separate action against any of them, although he has made no promise, and only signed the instrument as surety. Douglass 629; 9 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 413 ; 15 Johns Rep. 3 ; 2 Pick. 581; 4 Pick. 381.

Opinion:
Scott, judge,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a suit begun before a justice of the peace on a bond executed by N. Craig and Daniel Nolly as sureties for John H. Cook, payable to the justices of the county court for Callaway by their names, and for the use of the county. The suit was brought in the names of the surviving justices to whom the bond was given. These justices were not in office at the beginning of the suit. The defence was the statute of limitation. To repel the bar of the statute D. Nolly, the co* security, and who was no party to the suit, and the treasurer of the county was introduced as a witness, who proved the endorsements of the payment of interest on the bond before the expiration of the time in which suit might be brought on it. The endorsements were made by the witness on Cook's occount. Nolly was objected to as an incompetent witness. A paper called a bill of discovery, sworn to by N. Craig was read in evidence by which the whole case is entirely made out. This paper was objected to as evidence by Craig, but no objection was specifically stated.
The instructions will not be noticed as they do not affect the case, which was argued, and evidently turns on the effect of the partial payments made by Cook in removing the bar of the statute of limitation.
This case is distinguishable from those of Bell vs. Morrison 1 Pat., and Levy vs. Cadet 17 Ser. and R. In them it was held correctly that after the dissolution of a partnership, there was no authority in one partner by an acknowledgment to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations. It will be observed that in both of these cases the admission was not made by the part payment- of an existing debt not barred, but by declarations. Although there is no authority in a partner to revive a debt after a dissolution, yet there is both a legal and moral obligation resting on a debtor to pay his debt before it is barred by the statute. In the one case a man acts voluntarily and without authority, in the other, under obligation, does what he has promised to do, and for the performance of which his surety is liable. Greenleaf says, 1 vol. sec. 174, the act of making partial payments within six years, by one of several joint makers of a promissory note, takes it out of the statutes of limitations. This, he observes, though much discussed, and sometimes questioned, seems now to be clearly established. A case has not been found which would warrant us in holding that a partial payment before the statute attaches is not a bar. The Code Napoleon expressly provides that the acknowledgment of the principal debtor shall interrupt the prescription against a surety. So our Statute provides that nothing in the act requiring a written promise to revive a debt barred by the statute shall in anywise impair the effect of a partial payment of a debt made by any person. Thus giving a legislative sanction to the rule. The neglect or omission of a creditor to sue his principal debtor does not relieve the surety. It is the duty of the surety to see that the debt is paid, for which he is bound. He knows that on his faith credit was given. Courts will not, by construction enlarge the liabilities of sureties. But every consideration forbids the indulgence of niceties by which they may be discharged from the responsibilities to the ruin of those who gave credit on their undertaking, and but for whom the credit would never have been given. We sympathise with sureties, who pay debts for which they have received no consideration, but those who are enforcing the collection of such debts are but repossessing themselves of what, on all principles of right and justice, belongs to them, and should meet with no other embarrassments than those created by a strict regard to law and justice.
The 4th sec. of the act concerning counties, Dig. 290, shows the suit was properly brought in the names of the justices to whom the bond was payable. The mode adopted was in conformity to general principles. Choses in action does do not go in succession.
Daniel Nolly was competent. He admits himself to occupy the same position upon the paper that Craig does : in aiding a recovery against Craig, he therefore acts in opposition to his own interest; for a recovery against Craig will authorize him to call upon Nolly for contribution. When a paper is offered in evidence, if any objections exist to admissibility, it has been frequently held by this court that such objections must be stated specifically, otherwise they would not be noticed in error.
Judge Napton concurring, the judgment is affirmed.