Case Name: VALENTINE et al. v. STEWART et al.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1860
Citations: 15 Cal. 387
Docket Number: 
Parties: VALENTINE et al. v. STEWART et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 387–406

Head Matter:
VALENTINE et al. v. STEWART et al.
A statement on motion for a new trial, regularly settled and signed by the Judge, and containing all the grounds of the motion, but without any specification thereof, may be. amended by the Judge, so as to insert a specification of the grounds of the motion, after the time for filing a statement has passed.
Such an amendment, adding no facts or exceptions, cannot affect the merits, and its allowance is in furtherance of justice, and matter of discretion, not of power.
There were pending before the Board of U. S. Land Commissioners three cases— No. 558, Nos. 45 and 812. The claimants in No. 558 entered into a written agreement with V., the claimant, and B., his attorney of record in cases Nos. 45 and 812, by which the former agreed to pay to V. a certain portion of the proceeds of the sales of that portion of the claim No. 558, known as the Miranda claim, the parties agreeing to appoint an agent to go on and make sales. Contemporaneous with this agreement was another between the same parties, by" which V. and B. agreed to withdraw and discontinue claims Nos. 45 and 812 before said Board, and also to cause to be withdrawn the depositions of Theodore Miranda and Francisca Miranda, taken before a Commissioner in said case, No. 558, and on file therein; and to use their “ best endeavors to procure the confirmation of said claim No. 558.” B. was the attorney for the Miranda claim, which was for the same land as claim No. 558. To defeat claim No. 558 he acted for the U. S. Law Agent, in taking said depositions, which were important to the Government in defeating claim 558, and he attempted to carry out his agreement to withdraw said depositions—though he was not directly retained by the Government. V. and B. sue for the specific execution of the agreement. Held, that such agreement is against public policy, and cannot be enforced; that B. could not, without a violation of his duty to the Government as an attorney, carry out such agreement.
An attorney after once acting as such in the prosecution of a suit, and having opportunities for knowing the facts of his client’s case, cannot go1 over and render assistance to the adverse side, and then enforce, in a Court of Equity, a contract based on such assistance.
An attorney, when acting for his client, is bound to the most scrupulous good faith. Even where the attorney purchases the subject of the suit, the client may set the purchase aside at will, unless the attorney show by clear and conclusive proof, that no advantage was taken, that everything was explained to the client, and that the price was fair and reasonable.
Held, further, that the depositions having become regularly a part of the re&rds of the Land Commission, and the Government being thus entitled to use them, like other public archives, the agreement to withdraw them, and thus to interpose obstacles to the exercise of this right of the Government, is contrary to public policy and void, and this, whether the depositions were true or false, or whether the Government would be benefited or not by their possession.
There is no difference, in principle, between a contract to keep a witness out of the way, and an agreement to suppress and get from the archives or offices of the Government a deposition—a knowledge of which may be important to the Government.
If any part of the consideration of an agreement be void, as against public policy, the whole contract fails.
Courts should, of their own motion, dismiss a case based upon a consideration which contravenes public policy, whether the parties to the suit take the objection or not.
Appeal from the Seventh District.
The facts appear in the opinion of the Court. Plaintiffs appeal.
Shafter & Heydenfeldt, for Appellants.
I. The facts set up in this bill were sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to a decree of specific performance—a contract made by the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs, concerning land, and various breaches of that contract. It has at no time been contended, that the facts alleged did not sustain the prayers for relief, and as the Court below was with us on this point we need not argue it here. The contract and breaches were admitted by the answers, and unless the matters set up in the answers were sufficient to avoid the ease made in the bill, the plaintiffs 'were entitled to a decree.
II. The defendants set up various allegations of fraud, mistake, &c., in respect to the plaintiffs’ title; all these defenses were bad in law, and the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree prayed for upon the pleadings alone. As the Court below were with us also in this respect, we need not argue this point.
III. The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs fully sustained the allegations of their complaint. The evidence introduced by the defendants entirely failed to sustain the allegations of their answers in avoidance of the plaintiffs’ case.
Upon the pleadings and proof the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to a decree in their favor, and on this point also the Court below was with them.
IV. But the Court below founded its decree upon supposed fact or facts, no where alleged in the pleadings. This was clearly erroneous. A Court of Equity cannot found its decree upon a fact not alleged in the pleadings, however clearly it may be made out in evidence. (Insham v. Child, 1 Brown R. 92; Sydney v. Sydney, 3 P. Wms. 264; Whaley v. Norton, 1 Ver. 483; Clarke v. Turton, 11 Vesey, 240; De Tastel v. Le Taverner, 1 Keene, 170; Hall v. Maltby, 6 Price, 240; Mulkholand v. Hendrick, 1 Molloy, 359; Farrel v. — , 1 Molloy, 353; Malcine v. Scott, 3 Hare, 63; Whitely v. Martin, 3 Beav. 226; Graham v. Oliver, 3 Beav. 124; Fitzgerald v. O’Flaherty, 1 Molloy, 347; Smith v. Burnham, 3 Simons, 612; James v. McKennon, 6 Johns. 562; Forsyth v. Clarke, 3 Wend. 653; Stuart v. Mech. & Farms. Bank, 19 Johns. 505; Beach v. Fulton’s Bank, 3 Wend. 584; Wright v. Dame, 22 Pick. 55; Shelby’s Ex’rs. v. Shelby’s Devisees, 1 B. Mon. 278; Thompson v. Thompson, 2 B. Mon. 174; Wesley v. Thomas, 6 Harris, 224; Watkins v. Stocket Adm’rs. 6 Harris, 435; Booth v. Booth, 3 Litt. 67; Governeur v. Elenendorf, 5 J. C. R. 82; Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 189; Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342; Buck et al. v. McCaughty, 5 Men. 220; Morrison’s Ex’rs. v. Hart, 2 Bibb. 7; Limaster v. Burckhardt, 2 Bibb. 26; Smith v. Smith, 4 J. Ch. R. 286; 1 Conn. 734; Ontario Bank v. Root, 3 Paige, 478; Gaylord v. Couch, 5 Day, 229; Gregory et al. v. Powers’ Heirs, 3 Litt. 339; Gowen v. Price, 1 Bibb. 175; Parrys v. Mansfield, 6 Simmons, 565; Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Swanston, 472; Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 14 Johns, 42; Ex’rs. of Everton v. Miles, 6 Johns. 142; Lyon v. Tallmage, 14 Johns. 516; Denn v. Mason, 4 Conn. 428; West v. Hall, 6 Harr. & Johns. 223; Smith v. Clarke, 12 Vesey, 480; Williams v. Llewellyn, 2 Younge & Jervis, 69; Stanley v. Robinson, 1 Russ & Mylne, 529; Holden v. Hearne, 1 Beaven, 445.)
V. The facts assumed by the Court below as the foundation of its opinion and judgment are neither alleged in the pleadings nor made out in the evidence. (Phil. Ev. Cowen & Hill’s Notes, 3 vol. 459, note 285; Greenl. Ev. sec. 41; M. Leod v. Wakely, 3 C. P. 322; 6 Munroe, 116; Greenl. Ev. sec. 35 ; Brightley’s Digest, 112-37; 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 40; Story on Agency, sec. 462-478; McLeod v. Wakely, 3 C. & P. 311; Hurne v. Long’s Reps. 6 Mon. 116; Rex v. Inh. of Tuyning, 2 B. & A. 336; 10 Adol. & Ellis, 248; Chitty on Contracts, 675; Henden v. Simpson, 2 P. Dow, 731; 10 A. & E. 821; Edwards v. Grand Junction R. R. Co. 7 Sim. 337; 1 Mylne & C. 650; Simpson v. Lord, Howden, 1 Keen. 583; S. C. on Appeal, 3 Mylne & Craig. 101; Vauxhall Bridge v. Earl Spenser, 2 Maddox, 527; S. C. on Appeal, 1 Jac. 64; Chitty on Con. 59; 1 Par. on Con. 382, 383.)
A doubtful matter of public policy is not sufficient to invalidate a contract ; an agreement is not void on this ground, unless it expressly and unquestionably contravenes public policy, and be manifestly injurious to the interest of the State. (Chitty on Con. 663; 2 Burg. 242; 9 Mon. 464; 1 Ball & B. 338; Chitty on Con. 659; Id. 79; Goldshede v. Swan, 1 Exch. 154; 2 Par. Con. 78; Ex’rs. of Chamber v. Smith, 3 Desau, 12; Bartin v. Rushton, 4 Desau, 373; Shelby’s Heirs v. Shebly’s Devisees, Coke, 181; Meredith v. Meredith, 1 A. L. Marsh, 600; 3 Cowens & Hills; Phil. on Ev. 459, note 285; Id. 649.)
VI. But it is contended, that an exception exists in respect to contracts against public policy, and that whenever it appears to a Court that a contract which is brought before it is against public policy, it will refuse to entertain any suit upon it.
There is no such exception. It is true, that when it so appears to the Court, the Court will eject the cause ; but then, nothing appears to the Court that is not on its record. But if it is meant to assert, that a Court will decide a contract to be turpis contractus, when no fact is alleged upon the record which makes it so, there is no foundation for the assertion. Nearly all the cases which we have cited are cases where it was urged that the contract was illegal on the ground of fraud or some other wrong, and many of the cases are those in which it was alleged that the contract was void, as against public policy.
VII. The Court below erred in the principles of law upon which it based its decree. (Johnson v. Marriott, 2 Dowl. P. C. 343 ; 4 Tyr. 78; 2 M. & Scott, 568; 1 Jacob, 300; 8 Sim. 262; 19 Ves. 261; 9 Bing. 1.)
But even if the evidence of the two depositions is received, and the fullest effect given to it, there is no turpis contractus proved. A contract may be unlawful on either of three grounds. 1. That the thing promised is forbidden. 2. Or if that is not forbidden, then that the consideration is forbidden. 3. Or if neither are forbidden, then on the ground that neither the consideration or promise can be executed by the party, by reason of his peculiar character or position.
The contract here is free of illegality on all of these grounds. There is no pretense of any illegality in the contract set up in the complaint; but it is contended, that the contract set up in the answer forms the consideration of the other, and that one of the promises contained in it is illegal. But nothing in this contract is illegal.
1. The promise of Brooks to discontinue the Miranda claim is not forbidden. No public policy required its prosecution ; its discontinuance could work no harm to the Government—all the harm would fall on the head of the claimant.
2. The agreement to withdraw the depositions was not unlawful in itself. The agreement was, in effect, to move for leave to withdraw. The making of such a motion is not forbidden. It is not a malum in se. It is not a malum prohibitum. It might be unwise, bootless, impracticable, but it was not unlawful.
3. But it is said, that although the act was lawful in itself, still the promise to perform it was unlawful, because the intention of it was to suppress evidence. It is of no moment with what intention a man agrees to do a lawful act. But there could have been no intention to suppress evidence, for the depositions were not evidence. It was a fraud upon the Court and the party to take and file them, and their removal was remedial of that wrong. Nor can it be said, that the agreement had for its object to suppress a clue to testimony, for this assumes that the clue was a secret clue, known only to the confederate. But the Comissioner, Lott, took the depositions, and the Law Agent was present on behalf of the Government, and besides, the application was to be made, and was made, at a public session of the Board, when the attention of the Law Agent, and of all the Board was particularly directed to them.
If, then, there was any illegality, it must be on the ground that Mr. Brooks stood or had stood in a position—bore or had borne a character that made it unlawful for him to agree to discontinue the suit, and withdraw the depositions, though it might have been lawful for another. It is not contended that he could not agree to withdraw the Miranda claims, but it is contended that he could not agree to withdraw the depositions in the Ortega suit—for he stood, or had stood in a position of public trust; he had himself acted as Law Agent in taking the depositions. He had acted for the Government in the case, in the matter of taking the depositions.
It is not pretended that he was ever Law Agent de jure; neither was he Law Agent de facto. (Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. 431; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585.) He “did not exercise the office”— “ under color of an appointment, by the appointing .power; ” nor was there that “ public acquiescence ” which the rule requires.
Affirmatively, he was what his acts import—not general employer and general employee, even in that suit, but special employee in a particular transaction. But even that limited service so performed for the agent, was not service rendered in the case, but out of it. Nor was the service performed for the Government, or in aid of the law or of its just administration, for the depositions were illicit, and they were illicitly there against the law, and therefore, against the will of the Government—subversive of public justice, instead of being promotive of- it; against public policy, instead of following its lead. It was not for the Government, for another reason, it never could be beneficial to it. It follows, therefore, that Brooks never did occupy the position which the Court below assigned him. In all that he did, he acted as the attorney of Valentine.
It does not follow from these facts, that the plaintiff was associated with the Law Agent, or that any trust or confidence was reposed in him, or that he was retained generally in the case. The giving of the notice in the name of the Law Agent, and at his request, was a mere clerical act, which implies no confidence or trust. He was bound to do that act properly, but he was under no obligation whatever to render any other, or even that service, a second time. He had a perfect right to accept employment from the other side the next moment. So in regard to the attending for him on the examination of the two witnesses. It was a mere friendly act, which any lawyer renders for another whenever that other happens to be engaged otherwise, and we do not see how a general retainer in the cause can' be presumed from it.
But if it should be conceded that Brooks, by serving the notice, and taking depositions at the Agent’s request, after the case was finally submitted to the Board, acted for the Government, the question comes, did any relation of trust exist at the date of the contract ? That is the factum, probandum, and they have the burden. They cannot show that such relation then existed, for they have not shown that a relation ever existed, giving rise to a presumption of continuance. What is a relation or status ? Permanency is of the essence of it—as the relation of father and son, husband and wife, guardian and ward, etc. The presumption of continuance goes upon a status proved. (1 Greenl. on Ev. secs. 41, 42; McLeod v. Wakeley, 3 C. & P.; 14 E. C. L. 322, 311.) But the presumption of innocence overcomes even this.
If it could be presumed from these two acts, that the plaintiff was retained generally, as an associate of the Law Agent, upon the days of the happening of these acts, the Court cannot therefrom presume that the retainer continued. On the contrary, the Court is bound to presume that that connection had terminated. We admit that, as a general rule, a condition shown to exist once is presumed to continue, but this presumption gives way before the presumption of innocence. But here a dissolution of the relation is proved. Brooks elected to dissolve it, and gave the Agent notice in fact. The Law Agent made no objection. He responded to it, by recognizing and dealing with him as an adversary.
But assuming that Brooks was under some sort of obligation as to the depositions, however slight and shadowy, the contract would not, even then, be unlawful, unless it was understood that the removal was to be effected by violence or guile. But there is no pretense that the removal was to be effected by unlawful means. This is not to be presumed, and the burden of proof is on the defendants. It was to be done, and was done in public session of the Board, and Howard approved of the course pursued. The Law Agent was present for the Government, not objecting to the right or propriety of Brooks’ making the motion, but opposing it on its merits.
D. O. Shattuck, for Respondents.
I. If any part of the entire consideration of a contract is illegal, or against sound morals or public policy, the whole is void. (Crawford v. Morrill, 8 Johns. 253; Carleton v. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Hinde v. Chamberlin, 6 Id. 225; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Donallen v. Lennox, 6 Dana, 91; Himeburg v. Summer, 9 Vt. 28; 1 Chitty’s Prac. 832-836; Howden v. Simpson, 10 Adol. & Ellis, 821; Abbé v. Marr et als. 14 Cal.)
II. A Court is the guardian of sound morals and public policy, as it is of its own jurisdiction, and whenever it is called upon to enforce a contract, which upon its face or by the evidence adduced, is found infringing upon either of them, it will be noticed, and the Court will refuse its aid to enforce it. (Barth v. Nutt Adm’r. 4 Pet. 184; Craig v. State of Missouri, Id. 410; Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. [1 Barber] 269-277; Holman v. Johns, 1 Cowp. 343; Niles v. Clarke, 20 Wend. 30-31-32, 24; Thalimer v. Brinkerhoff, 20 Johns, 384.)
III. The contract now sought to be enforced, is'against public policy and sound morals, and is void. (Comyn on Con. 53, citing, 1 Leonard, 180; Woods v. McCann, 6 Dana, 266; Fuller v. Dana, 18 Pick. 472; Pingay v. Washburn, 1 Ark. 264; Sharpe v. Teese, 4 Halst. 352; Craig v. The State of Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Bartle v. Colman, 4 Id. 184; Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87; Chitty on Con. 573.)
Crockett & Crittenden, also for Respondents.
The only question is, whether the fact appearing by evidence properly given under the issues raised by the pleadings, that the consideration was an immoral one and the contract one which is against public policy, the Court should refuse to enforce performance where the objection is not specifically raised and made a ground of defense.
Upon that question, we submit that the authorities heretofore cited by respondents are conclusive. As Lord Mansfield says in Holman v. Johnson (Cowp. 343); “The principle of public policy is this—Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.”
Where the objection exists and comes to the notice of the Court, the defendant’s express waiver of it would be ineffectual.
It is not his interest which the Court seeks to protect. It only is to vindicate the law and enforce sound morality.
The distinction which exists between cases of this sort and those in which there is fraud upon the rights of the individual alone, is perfectly clear.
In the latter class of cases, the fraud is a defense only when it is made one by the pleadings, and it may be waived by the defendant, and is waived when not distinctly set up.
Many authorities are quoted in appellants’ brief, to the point that fraud is not to be presumed, but that innocence is presumed till rebutted. But it never was intimated as a principle of law that innocence was to be presumed when fraud was proven. The respondents rely upon no presumptions, but upon positive and satisfactory proof, or rather, the Court below decided not upon presumption but proof.
The idea that Brooks appeared for Valentine is preposterous. Valentine was not a party, and the Board had refused, they say, to allow him to become a party. There were but two parties—Charles White on one side, and the United States on the other. Brooks certainly did not appear for White. He must therefore have represented the United States.
It is wholly immaterial whose interest he was serving by his appearance, or who paid him for it. In a controversy between A and B, it may be C’s interest that A should succeed; suppose that interest should induce him to employ counsel to appear for A, and counsel so employed and paid by C should appear and conduct A’s suit, would the same counsel be permitted to swap sides and agree to undo all that he had done for Á, merely because he had become A’s counsel under the employment of C and for C’s interest ?
It is unnecessary to follow the appellant’s counsel through his several ingenious subdivisions of the grounds of the illegality of a contract. The Court will perceive that the mode of reasoning there indulged in would enable a person to prove any thing. In reply to the whole of it, we say the contract on the part of Brooks was unlawful, because he undertook to do that which he was prohibited from doing by law, and by every principle of fairness and honesty. He had been the attorney of the United States, in that capacity he took the depositions and he agreed to support them; Ingenuity is absolutely wasted in attempting to uphold such a contract.
We do not contend that he was ever Law Agent de jure, or defacto, but that he was the attorney of the United States. It makes no difference whether the United States ever had, or had not, any Law Agent, nor whether Brooks had authority to appear or not. He did in fact appear, and he is estopped by his own act from saying that he was not the attorney of the Government in this matter.
Notwithstanding the appellants’ counsel have cited authorities upon the point, we shall not discuss the question whether or not an attorney who has been employed by one party and conducted his cause, can accept a retainer, and appear for the other side, or whether if he should do so it is only a matter between himself and his former client, but not in violation of any rule of public policy or fair dealing. If the rule be as stated by appellants’ counsel, it is time it should be changed, and we feel assured it would be. But we apprehend that this Court, in declaring such not to be the rule, will only be doing what has often been done before.

Opinion:
On motion to reject the statement, Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court
Field, C. J. and Baldwin, J. concurring.
A motion is made in this case to reject the statement on the motion for a new trial. The judgment was rendered on the eighteenth of October, 1858, and within two days thereafter plaintiffs served a notice of their intention to move for a new trial. On the fourth of December, a statement on the motion for a new trial was settled and signed by the Judge, and this statement being regular on its face, the signature of the Judge is presumptive evidence of the regularity of the previous proceedings. To rebut this presumption, and establish the invalidity of the statement, the defendants bring up a bill of exceptions subsequently signed by the Judge, showing that the original statement did not contain a specification of the grounds of the motion, and that such specification was inserted by way of amendment, after the time for filing a statement had elapsed. Passing by the question as to the admissibility of this mode of assailing the statement, we think the bill of exceptions fails to disclose any error or omission affecting its validity. The original statement was incomplete, but it was not a nullity." It was perfect except in the particular referred to, and contained, in fact, all the grounds of the motion. It omitted merely the formal requisite of a specification of those grounds. In that respect alone, it was amended; not a fact or exception was added. Nothing additional was interposed that could in any manner affect the merits of the motion. The amendment was clearly in furtherance of justice, and its allowance by the Judge was a matter of discretion, and not, as we think, a question of power. Johnson v. Whitlock (3 Kern. 344) is a strong case in support of this position. The Court say: " If this statement has been imperfectly made, we have no doubt of the power of the Supreme Court to direct a resettlement, and reform the proceedings in any manner not inconsistent with the actual finding of the Judge or Referee upon the facts. The facts, as found, cannot be changed and found differently; nor can leave be had to insert exceptions never in fact taken; but within these limitations it will always be proper to move in the Supreme Court, not to turn the case into a bill of exceptions—a proceeding which has no existence under the code—nor into a special verdict, but so to amend the case itself as to fitly present the questions which are to be examined in this Court."
It follows that the statement was properly made and settled, and the motion to reject is denied.