Case Name: John Stoney, vs. The Union Insurance Company
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1825-11
Citations: 3 McCord 387
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Stoney, vs. The Union Insurance Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 387–394

Head Matter:
John Stoney, vs. The Union Insurance Company.
Where the assured undertake to state all tbc circumstances which can affect the risk, they must do so fully faithfully. The rule admits of no exceptions. It cannot be said aí'.cr a loss has taken place, that the insurers knew ihefact, and therefor^ it was not Communicated,
go, on a policy41 at and from charleston to Marseilles,the fact that the vessel had been laden at Havana, and only touched at Charleston, not having been mentioned in the offer, was held to avoid the policy, although the underwriters may have known the fact. Havana being a belligerent port, and the danger increased thereby-. JVbtt, J. dissenting.
Thw was au action on a policy of insurance, tried before Mr* justice Huger at Charleston. Verdict for the plaintiff.
Á motion was made in the appeal court to enter up a nonsuit, or for a new trial upon the following grounds:
1st. Because the voyage, iusured, being, by the policy, an original voyage, “ at and from Charleston,” and the voyage sailed on being one from Havana to Marseilles, touching st Charleston, the risk insured never attached.
2nd. Because, if the policy could be extended to the Voyage sailed on, there was a concealment of the material fact, that the vessel was loaded at Havana, a belligerent port; and the offer being silent on the subject, though professing to disclose all material things, proved a misrepresentation on the part of the insured, which the constitutional court had already decided to be fatal to the insurance.
3rd. Because the presiding judge charged the jury that they had the privilege of judging, from the newspapers and other evidence, whether the company had a knowledge of the facts of the voyage having commenced at Havana and ofthe cargo being laden there; and lhatif they knew it, no disclosure to them was necessary: whereas it is contended that the decision of the constiutional court has settled that the insurer is not to be affected by a presumptive knowledge of any private thing not contained in the offer, which offer cannot be altered by parol or presumptive testimony.
4th. Because the presiding jir’ge told the jury they might judge of the fact and find if they pleased that the concealment was immaterial, notwithstanding the constitutional court had already decided that it was material in this very case, and had set aside the former^erdict on that very ground.

Opinion:
Colcock, J.
This is the second time this case has beeu before us. (Harpers L. R. 235.J I si^j] express no opinion on any of the grounds but the third; on which a new trial must be granted. On this ground a new trial was formerly granted, and there has been no new evidence gwen to vary the case. V> here the assured undertake to state all the circumstances which can affect the risk, they must do so fully and faithfully. The rule admits of no exceptions. It cannot be an excuse to say (when a loss has taken place) that the insurers knew such a fact, and, therefore, it was not communicated. It is asked, why tell a man what he already knows? The answer is very plain and forceable, because you have uxpressly undertaken to do so; and from the nature of the Contract, and the relative situation of the parties, it is necessary that you should do so. The case illustrates the usefulness and propriety of the rule. It is said the underwriters knew that this vessel had come from the Havana, and had been loaded there. Now let it be conceded for a moment that they did know it — they also knew that her cargo might have been discharged here and reshipped, and that then this would have been the port of departure, and the sailing from hence, the commencement of the voyage, and have brought the case within the language and meaning of the offer. Here it is urged that if it be admitted that the underwriters knew the fact of the arrival of the vessel from the Havana, and her having been loaded there, that then they should have enquired as to the other facts. But it must be perceived that this is at once destroj ing the effect of the rule, and imposing on the underwriters a duty which the insured, by the contract, had undertaken to perform. The law on this point is well established, and after what has been said in the former opinion delivered in this case, it is not deemed necessary to add any further observations. The verdict is a violation of the law in this most important provision and strikes at the very foundation of the contract of insurance. It has been suggested that the jury may have thought the fact hot material, but it cannot be believed that any twelve impartial men possessed of ordinary understanding can think it was unimportant, that this vessel had shipped her cargo at a Spanish port, when it was incontrovertibly proved that the Spanish Patriot vessels were cruising in the Mediterranean and actually capturing Spanish vessels and goods at 'hat time. And in addition to this, there was an expression of an opinion by every witness conversant with mercantile affairs, that it was an important fact and did increase the risk.
The motion is, therefore granted. •