Case Name: STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v. BAUN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-09-08
Citations: 395 Mich. 28
Docket Number: Docket No. 56119
Parties: STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v BAUN
Judges: T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 395
Pages: 28–47

Head Matter:
STATE BAR GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR v BAUN
Docket No. 56119.
Argued May 6, 1975
(Calendar No. 3). —
Decided September 8, 1975.
A State Bar Grievance Board hearing panel found Leonard A. Baun guilty of misconduct in failing to maintain separate accounts for four estates and commingling estate funds with his personal funds, and suspended him from the practice of law for two years. The State Bar Grievance Board increased the penalty to disbarment. Respondent appeals. Held:
1. The procedures under which the State Bar Grievance Board operates are not inherently biased. The functions of the State Bar Grievance Administrator, the hearing panel, and the State Bar Grievance Board in initiating and prosecuting the proceeding, initially adjudicating it, and reviewing it, respectively, are separate functions performed by different persons, who, absent a contrary showing, are presumed to be fair and honest. The procedure does not deny due process.
2. The State Bar properly requested that respondent take the stand under State Bar Rule 16, § 16.11, after it was advised that the respondent intended to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege. Respondent’s right of refusal to answer questions on cross-examination extends only to those questions which might incriminate him, and he has no blanket right to refuse cross-examination on everything involved in the proceedings, including non-incriminating matters which bear on his fitness as an attorney. Requesting that respondent testify did not put undue emphasis on his taking the stand and invoking his right against self-incrimination, because the State Bar Grievance Administrator had the right to cross-examine him on non-incriminating matters.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 63.
[1, 3, 4] Suspension or revocation of medical or legal professional license as violating due process — federal cases. 9 L Ed 2d 851.
[2] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 12 et seq.
[3, 4] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law §§ 64, 68.
[5] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 67.
Degree or quantum of proof necessary to justify disbarment or suspension of attorney. 105 ALR 984.
[6,11, 12] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 196.
Prejudicial effect of prosecutor’s calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense with which accused is charged. 86 ALR2d 1443.
[7, 8] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 192 et seq.
[8,11,12] 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 194.
Right of attorney to introduce evidence, and to cross-examine, in summary proceeding against him by, or in interest of, his client. 141 ALR 655.
7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law § 68.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 235, 239, 242, 302.
[10,13, 14] 58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 36 et seq.
3. The State Bar Grievance Board is obligated to give findings and reasons for extending the two-year suspension to disbarment, and did not do so. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the board so that it may set forth reasons in support of the order of discipline.
Levin, J., concurred in a separate opinion.
1. He agreed that the respondent in this case cannot predicate error on the ground that he was asked to take the stand because he himself made the hearing panel and Grievance Board aware of his exercise of the privilege in his answers to the request for investigation and the formal complaint, thus bringing it to their attention before and without regard to the request by counsel for the Grievance Administrator. However, he disagreed with the majority opinion that even if calling the respondent to testify was improper, it was harmless because the members of the hearing panel are experienced people who would draw no adverse inferences from his exercise of the privilege. There is no clear and undoubted view among lawyers and judges regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the consequence of its exercise in bar disciplinary proceedings, and we cannot rest comfortably in the notion that all lawyers serving on hearing panels will not draw an adverse inference from an attorney’s claim of the privilege during a disciplinary hearing.
2. Unless counsel for the Grievance Administrator asserts and is able to demonstrate a valid purpose for calling a respondent who he knows will invoke the privilege, the general prohibition against calling upon an opponent in the presence of the trier of fact to waive a legal right is violated. In this case the hearing panel did not err in ruling that Baun was under no obligation to take the stand or answer any questions. Any material question relevant to the inquiry then being conducted might have tended to incriminate him.
Remanded.
Opinion op the Court
1. Attorney and Client — State Bar — Disciplinary Proceedings— Due Process.
The nexus between the State Bar Grievance Administrator, the hearing panel and the State Bar Grievance Board is sufficiently attenuated as to negate a contention by a lawyer subject to disciplinary proceedings that in effect the State Bar Grievance Board requested an investigation, investigated, determined probable cause, charged, prosecuted, and then found respondent guilty, thus denying him the due process of a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.
2. Attorney and Client — State Bar — Disciplinary Proceedings— Due Process.
Absent a contrary showing, the State Bar Grievance Administrator, the hearing panel, and the State Bar Grievance Board, in addition to being functionally separate in disciplinary proceedings, are assumed to be fair and honest — composed of men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances; the risk of unfairness is not intolerably high.
3. Attorney and Client — State Bar — Disciplinary Proceedings— Cross-Examination.
A lawyer’s right of refusal to answer questions on cross-examination in grievance proceedings against him extends only to those questions which might incriminate him, and he has no blanket right to refuse cross-examination on everything involved in the proceedings, including his name, place of practice, date of admission to the bar and other non-incriminating matters (Grievance Board Rule 16.11).
4. Attorney and Client — State Bar — Disciplinary Proceedings— Cross-Examination.
The State Bar Grievance Administrator has the right to cross-examine a lawyer in disciplinary proceedings concerning non-incriminating acts, words, and deeds which bear upon his fitness as an attorney (Grievance Board Rule 16.11).
5. Attorney and Client — State Bar Grievance Board — Increased Discipline — Explanation.
A grievance proceeding is remanded to the State Bar Grievance Board for the purpose of setting forth reasons in support of the order of discipline where the board, without explanation, in creased the penalty the hearing panel imposed, a two-year suspension, to disbarment.
Concurring Opinion
Levin, J.
6. Trial — Witnesses—Privilege—Self-Incrimination—Waiver.
In both civil and criminal cases the general rule is that it is improper to challenge an opponent in the presence of the jury to waive a legal right and a new trial is required where a witness has been called for the purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege against incrimination.
7. Trial — Evidentiary Privilege — Waiver.
It is improper to call upon an adversary in the presence of the trier of fact to waive an evidentiary privilege.
8. Attorney and Client — Ethics—State Bar Grievance Administrator — Witnesses.
A lawyer should neither ask a witness a question solely for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him nor by subterfuge put before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider; these admonitions are binding on the State Bar Grievance Administrator and counsel appointed by him to conduct hearings on charges of unprofessional conduct against other lawyers.
9. Attorney and Client — Disciplinary Proceedings — Privilege— Self-Incrimination — Constitutional Law.
The privilege against self-incrimination applies to a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney and comments concerning a respondent’s silence are prohibited by the Federal and state Constitutions (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, §17).
10. Attorney and Client — Disciplinary Proceedings — Privilege— Self-Incrimination — Adverse Inferences.
There is no clear and undoubted view among lawyers and judges regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the consequence of its exercise in bar disciplinary proceedings, and we cannot rest comfortably in the notion that all lawyers serving on hearing panels will not draw an adverse inference from an attorney’s claim of the privilege during a disciplinary hearing.
11. Attorney and Client — Disciplinary Proceedings — Privilege— Self-Incrimination — Harmless Error — Pleading.
No harm was done when counsel for the State Bar Grievance Administrator in disciplinary proceedings challenged the respondent in the presence of the hearing panel to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination where the respondent expressly exercised the privilege in his answers to the request for investigation and formal complaint, thereby himself bringing to the attention of the hearing panel and the Grievance Board his claim of privilege before and without regard to the request at the hearing that he take the stand.
12. Attorney and Client — Disciplinary Proceedings — Witnesses— Privilege — Self-Incrimination.
Unless counsel for the State Bar Grievance Administrator asserts and is able to demonstrate a valid purpose in disciplinary proceedings for calling a respondent who he knows will invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, the general prohibition against calling upon an opponent to waive a legal right is violated.
13. Constitutional Law — Privilege—Self-Incrimination—Witnesses.
To invoke the privilege against self-incrimination a witness must face a real and appreciable danger of incrimination but, while the court decides whether the privilege is properly invoked, it is the state of mind of the witness which determines whether the danger is real or imaginary.
14. Attorney and Client — Privilege—Self-Incrimination—Danger — Embezzlement—Estates.
An attorney was under no obligation to take the witness stand in a disciplinary proceeding against him or answer any questions where the formal complaint charged that he was short in his accounts and failed to pay over to the successor ñduciary funds belonging to a number of different estates; any material question relevant to the inquiry then being conducted might have tended to incriminate him because he could have been charged with embezzlement.
Louis Rosenzweig, for the State Bar Grievance Administrator.
Watson, Wunsch & Keidan, P. C., Edward Dobreff and Robert J. Lord, for respondent.

Opinion:
M. S. Coleman, J.
Three viable questions are presented by this appeal from a decision of the State Bar Grievance Board.
(1) Was appellant Baun denied due process in that the procedures under which the Bar Grievance Board operate are inherently biased?
(2) After having been advised that the respondent intended to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege, was it error for the State Bar to request that respondent take the stand under State Bar Rule 16, § 16.11?
(Conversely, the Bar Grievance Administrator has cross-appealed to inquire whether the Board erred when it ruled against any cross-examination under § 16.11.)
(3) Did the Board err when it increased the hearing panel's penalty of a two-year suspension to disbarment?
Leonard A. Baun was disbarred by the State Bar Grievance Board after a hearing panel had suspended his license to practice law for two years. The hearings disclosed that Mr. Baun had failed to maintain separate accounts for four estates and had commingled those funds with his personal funds. He had eventually converted $147,-019.14 to his own use. He and his sureties repaid all funds which were so converted.
I.
Attorney Baun submits that he was denied a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. He contends that in effect the State Bar Grievance Board requested the investigation, investigated, determined probable cause, charged, prosecuted, and then found appellant guilty. The Grievance Board maintains that the nexus between the State Bar Grievance Administrator, the hearing panel and itself is sufficiently attenuated as to negate that contention. We agree with the Grievance Board.
In a recent case which is dispositive of this issue, Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), involving the revocation of a medical license, the United States Supreme Court said:
"The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation.

"That the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high."
In the instant case, the State Bar Grievance Administrator found probable cause, prepared, filed and prosecuted the complaint. A hearing panel initially adjudicated the matter and then the State Bar Grievance Board reviewed it. The functions are separate. The people are different in each instance.
Withrow is clear. Absent a contrary showing, the hearing panel, the Grievance Board and the Grievance Administrator, in addition to being functionally separate, are assumed to be fair and honest — composed of "men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances". We have been presented with no special facts or circumstances which suggest that the risk of unfairness is "intolerably high" or that it even minimally exists. We find no denials of due process.
II
Attorney Baun also argues that the mere attempt by the State Bar to call him for cross-examination was prejudicial and violative of his right against self-incrimination. Before Mr. Baun was called for cross-examination, counsel to the State Bar Grievance Administrator had been informed that Baun would invoke his right against self-incrimination. Appellant contends that the only purpose in calling him to the stand was to emphasize that he was invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. This, contends appellant, is akin to a prosecutor arguing to a jury that it should draw an inference of guilt from a defendant's failure to testify.
On the other hand, the Grievance Board contends that the question is not whether appellant can invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, but rather when can he invoke those rights. State Bar Rule 16, § 16.11 permits cross-examination. Respondent's right of refusal extends only to those questions which might incriminate him. The appellant has no blanket right to refuse cross-examination on everything involved in the proceedings, including his name, place of practice, date of admission to the bar and other non-incriminating matters.
We find State Bar Grievance Administrator v Moes, 389 Mich 258; 205 NW2d 428 (1973), coupled with State Bar of Michigan v Block, 383 Mich 384; 175 NW2d 769 (1970), to be controlling. The Block Court said:
"It is not requisite, so far at least in our developing area of ultraism, that a lawyer be proved a criminal before he can be disbarred. It is requisite only that his conduct be that which proves clearly that he is unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
"So far as Michigan is concerned, this Court long since has directed that the circuit court, when it determines and orders discipline of an attorney under Rule 15, should administer such discipline 'as a measure necessary for the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession, and not as punishment for wrongdoing.'
"In the application of Rule 15 to this respondent we find no taint of unconstitutionality."
The Moes Court added:
"Respondent misconceives the office of the Fifth Amendment's privilege. The choice of whether to appear and to offer proofs lies with the one charged, but the obligation to meet charges never entails an obligation of self incrimination."
Here the appellant tried to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in order to shed his obligation to meet charges and answer questions which could have been non-incriminating. True, if respondent were obliged to answer any and all questions asked, some of his utterances might have been incriminating. But the injection of that argument at this stage is inappropriate. The Administrator was precluded from asking any question at all.
Respondent's contention presupposes a blanket immunity from cross-examination. He claims prejudice because of alleged undue emphasis placed upon the mere taking of the stand and the invocation of his right against self-incrimination. But there was no undue influence. The State Bar Grievance Administrator had the right to cross-examine the appellant concerning non-incriminating acts, words and deeds which bore upon his fitness as an attorney to perform the duties and responsibilities entrusted to him.
The hearing panel and State Bar Grievance Board would be no more influenced by his failure to answer some of the questions while on the stand than by Mr. Baun's failure to take the stand. These are experienced people selected for their integrity, objectivity and intelligence. A considerable trust reposes in them and absent a specific showing to the contrary, we cannot find "undue influence" in requesting respondent to take the stand.
In this context, we must keep in mind the purpose of this proceeding, to wit: the ultimate "protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession".
It therefore follows that the board erred in denying all cross-examination of respondent.
Ill
As to the administrator's cross-appeal, we find the error to his case harmless. Respondent was found guilty of the alleged offenses. However, this point of procedure may well be crucial in future matters.
IV
Although the bar grievance procedure withstands the challenges herein, we have not been enlightened by the board as to the findings and reasoning which prompted the extension of the two-year suspension to disbarment. Therefore, pursuant to State Bar Grievance Administrator v Gillette, 393 Mich 26; 222 NW2d 513 (1974), we remand to the State Bar Grievance Board for the purpose of setting forth reasons in support of the order of discipline.
We retain jurisdiction.
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
State Bar Rule 16, § 16.11 provides:
"Respondent shall appear in person before the Hearing Panel at the time and place named by the Hearing Panel, and he shall be subject to cross-examination in like manner as an opposite party under CL 600.2161. Pleadings and proceedings before a Hearing Panel shall conform as near as practicable with requirements of the General Court Rules for trials of non-jury civil causes in circuit courts, except as otherwise provided hereunder."
MCLA 600.2161; MSA 27A.2161 provides:
"In any suit or proceeding in any court in this state, either party, if he shall call as a witness in his behalf, the opposite party, employee or agent of said opposite party, or any person who at the time of the happening of the transaction out of which such suit or proceeding grew, was an employee or agent of the opposite party, shaU have the right to cross-examine such witness the same as if he were called by the opposite party; and the answers of such witness shall not interfere with the right of such party to introduce evidence upon any issue involved in such suit or proceeding, and the party so calling and examining such witness shall not be bound to accept such answers as true."
July 9, 1974.
April 23, 1974.
To the contrary, the most frequent complaint is that lawyers sitting in judgment upon lawyers are likely to be protective.
State Bar Rule 15, § 4 provides in part:
"Discipline for misconduct is not intended as punishment for wrongdoing but is for the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession."