Case Name: Alice NAKSHIAN v. W. Graham CLAYTOR, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Navy, et al., Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1980-02-19
Citations: 202 U.S. App. D.C. 59
Docket Number: No. 79-1672
Parties: Alice NAKSHIAN v. W. Graham CLAYTOR, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Navy, et al., Appellants.
Judges: Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, and TAMM, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Volume: 202
Pages: 59–70

Head Matter:
628 F.2d 59
Alice NAKSHIAN v. W. Graham CLAYTOR, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Navy, et al., Appellants.
No. 79-1672.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 28, 1979.
Decided Feb. 19, 1980.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1980.
Michael Jay Singer, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Carl S. Rauh, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the briefs were filed, and Robert E. Kopp, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellants.
Terry Coleman, Washington, D. C., for appellee. Patricia J. Barry, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, and TAMM, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge J. SKELLY WRIGHT.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Chief Judge:
This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), is from a District Court order denying the Government's motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial in her action against the Secretary of the Navy for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1976), as amended by Pub.L.No.95-256, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 6,1978), 92 Stat. 189-193. It raises questions concerning the right to a jury trial in an ADEA action against the federal government. District Judge Oberdorfer certified the issue for interlocutory appeal, and we granted the Government's petition for interlocutory review.
I
Appellee was a 62-year-old civilian employee of the United States Department of the Navy at the time she brought this action in the District Court under Section 15(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976), against the Navy for alleged age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. She requested a jury trial. The Government moved to strike the request on the grounds that Congress, in authorizing ADEA actions against the federal government, did not specifically authorize jury trials and, therefore, that jury trials are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity-
The District Court denied the Government's motion, suggesting in its memorandum opinion that this result followed from the Supreme Court's decision in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). In that case the Supreme Court held that there is a right to jury trial in an ADEA suit brought against private employers pursuant to Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976), of the Act. The Supreme Court noted that Congress had expressly provided that the enforcement of the ADEA would be in accordance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1976), and it has long been settled that there is a right to a jury trial in actions brought against private employers under the FLSA. The Supreme Court inferred from this that Congress must have intended to provide for a similar jury trial right in actions brought against private employers under the ADEA. In addition, the Court found the use of the term of art "legal relief" in the wording of the statute significant. In the Court's view it provided further evidence of Congress' intention to provide for jury trials since it is settled that in cases in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to jury trial.
The District Court pointed out that the same "legal relief" language that the Supreme Court found significant in Lorillard is used in Section 15(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976), which authorizes suits against the federal government. The court also noted that as originally enacted the ADEA did not apply to the Government. In amending the Act in 1974 to make it applicable to the Government, Congress made few changes in the Act. Indeed, it used the exact same language in Section 15(c), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c), as it had used in Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). This, in the court's view, indicated that Congress intended suits against the Government to be on equal footing with suits against private employers. Finally, the court observed that if Congress had intended to preclude jury trials in ADEA suits against the federal government it would have done so.
II
The Government rejects the District Court's analysis. It argues that since the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial applies only to "suits at common law," and at common law suits against the Government were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the right to jury trial therefore does not apply to actions against the Government under Section 15(c) of the Act. It further notes that Congress may, in waiving the Government's sovereign immunity, dictate the particular terms and conditions under which a suit against it may be brought. From these premises the Govern ment purports to draw the conclusion that the availability of jury trial in actions against the Government requires a specific statutory provision to that effect; that a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). It then examines the language and legislative history of the ADEA for such an explicit grant of a right to jury trial and, not surprisingly, is unable to find any.
The Government also rejects the suggestion that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lorillard supports the inference that there is a jury trial right in ADEA actions against the Government. It notes that the FLSA right to a jury trial on which the Court relied in Lorillard was in fact based on the Seventh Amendment. Since the Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits against the Government, this supports the inference that there is no right to jury trial in ADEA actions against the Government. Similarly, it contends that the jury trial connotation of the term "legal relief" derives from the Seventh Amendment and therefore cannot apply to actions against the Government. Finally, the Government maintains that Congress' response to the Lorillard decision supports its position. In 1978 Congress amended Section 7(c) by enacting language that expressly provides for jury trials in ADEA actions brought against private employers. Since no similar action was taken with respect to Section 15(c), the Government argues that Congress did not intend to allow jury trials in ADEA actions against the federal government.
Appellee does not dispute the Government's claim that the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial does not apply to actions against the Government, or the claim that Congress may prescribe the procedure to be followed in a suit when it waives the Government's sovereign immunity. She does, however, reject the Government's claim that there is a right to sovereign immunity from jury trial which may be inferred from these two premises. In her view the Government confuses the well established principle of sovereign immunity from suits without its consent with an unrecognized principle of sovereign immunity from jury trials. Appellee argues that there is no automatic presumption against jury trial in actions against the Government and no unequivocal grant of a right to jury trial need be found. Rather, the issue is an ordinary one of statutory interpretation— whether or not Congress intended that employees who bring ADEA actions against the Government should have a right to jury trial. To support her claim that Congress intended to grant a right to jury trial in ADEA actions against the Government, appellee looks to the language and legislative history of the ADEA.
She notes that, as originally enacted, neither the FLSA nor the ADEA applied to the Government. In 1974 Congress simultaneously amended both statutes to extend their coverage to federal employees. It amended the definition of "employee" in Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1976), to include federal employees. In addition, Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976), which creates a private right of action for unpaid wages and liquidated damages, was revised to provide that "[ajction to recover such liability may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction ." (Emphasis added.) Appellee maintains that the manner in which federal employees were brought under the FLSA makes it clear that Congress wanted the same procedures to apply to their lawsuits as had previously been applied in suits against private employers. Appellee concludes that federal employees have a right to jury trial in FLSA suits against the Government, and points out that the court so held in Carter v. Marshall, 457 F.Supp. 38 (D.D.C.1978).
Appellee argues that given this, the result in the instant case flows ineluctably from the Lorillard decision. Lorillard held that Congress intended that the ADEA be enforced in accordance with the procedures of the FLSA. Since, as just shown, Congress intended to grant a right to jury trial in all FLSA actions, including those brought by federal employees, we must presume that Congress intended to grant a similar right in ADEA actions against the federal government. Appellee notes that Congress viewed the application of the ADEA to the federal government as a "logical extension of the decision to extend FLSA coverage to Federal employees." S.Rep.No.93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974). Moreover, the original exclusion of federal employees from the coverage of the ADEA was an oversight which was due to the fact that in 1967 when the ADEA was enacted most Government employees were not covered by the FLSA. Id. This close linkage between the FLSA and the ADEA, appellee maintains, supports the inference that Congress wanted FLSA procedures, including the right to jury trial, to apply in ADEA actions against the Government.
Appellee also finds support for her position in the language of the ADEA. Lorillard relied in part on Section 7(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures [of the FLSA].
(Emphasis added.) By referring to the entire chapter, Section 7(b) explicitly applies to actions brought under Section 15 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. When Congress added Section 15 to the Act in 1974 it would have amended Section 7(b) if it did not want FLSA procedures to apply in actions against the Government. Since it did not, it must be assumed that Congress' intention was that FLSA procedures, including the right to jury trial, should apply in ADEA actions.
Furthermore, appellee notes that the same term of art "legal relief" that the Supreme Court found significant in Lorillard appears in Section 15(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c), and therefore gives rise to the same jury trial inference that the Supreme Court drew in Lorillard. Appellee rejects the Government's attempt to distinguish Lorillard by arguing that the term was significant in that case only because of the Seventh Amendment. Appellee points out that Lorillard was not decided on the basis of the Seventh Amendment. Regardless of how the term "legal relief" acquired its jury trial gloss, the holding in Lorillard was that its use implies that jury trial was intended.
Finally, appellee contends that the very fact that Congress vested jurisdiction in the District Court rather than the Court of Claims supports the inference of a right to jury trial. She notes that the Supreme Court has intimated that when Congress confers jurisdiction over actions against the United States in the District Courts, it may be inferred that it intended to provide for jury trials. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 41 S.Ct. 569, 65 L.Ed. 1084 (1921); Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494, 45 S.Ct. 175, 69 L.Ed. 401 (1925). And Congress has shown that it is aware that a right to jury trial may be inferred when jurisdiction over actions against the United States is vested in the District Courts by expressly providing that there be no jury trial in most of these cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) (providing that most actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976) shall be tried by the court without a jury). The absence of any such provision in the ADEA is further indication that jury trial was intended.
Ill
The first issue that we must resolve is whether the Government is correct in arguing that there is a sovereign immunity from jury trial that can only be waived by explicit statutory language or legislative history.
In our view the Government's argument rests on a serious misconception. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the Government without its consent. Congress can waive this immunity by authorizing such suits. In so doing it can specify the procedures to be followed, including whether the case is to be tried to a jury or to the court. In the absence of an explicit statutory provision, it is the task of the courts to determine what type of trial— jury or court — Congress intended to authorize.
By authorizing ADEA suits against the Government, Congress waived the Government's sovereign immunity, although it did not explicitly state what trial procedure is to be used in such cases. This does not, however, create an automatic presumption against jury trial in such cases. Rather, it presents us with an ordinary question of statutory interpretation — whether or not Congress intended that employees who bring ADEA actions against the Government should have a right to demand that the case be tried to a jury. Our task then is to see "if [the] statute, expressly or by fair implication so provides." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2314 at 69 (1971) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). See also 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 38.31[2] at 236 (2d ed. rev. 1979).
Courts can, and do, infer a congressional intention to allow jury trials in actions against the Government in the absence of explicit statutory authorization. For example, in United States v. Pfitsch, supra, 256 U.S. 547, 41 S.Ct. 569, 65 L.Ed. 1084, the Supreme Court concluded that actions brought against the Government under the Lever Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), may be tried to a jury even though the statute did not provide for jury trials. Similarly, although the War Risk Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 445 (1952) (now codified at 38 U.S.C. § 784 (1976)), did not, as originally enacted, provide for jury trials, it was construed by the Supreme Court to import "the usual procedure in actions at law for money compensation," including trial by jury, in actions against the Government. Law v. United States, supra, 266 U.S. at 496, 45 S.Ct. at 176; accord, Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 n.18, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 1086 n.18, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943).
We therefore agree with the District Court that appellee may demand a jury trial for her suit if there is enough evidence to support an inference that Congress intended to provide for jury trials in ADEA actions against the Government. Our review of the statute and legislative history persuades us that Congress did so intend.
First, we agree with appellee that the very fact that Congress gave jurisdiction over ADEA suits against the federal government to the District Courts rather than the Court of Claims supports the inference that there is a right to jury trial in such cases. As a leading authority has stated:
Congress may confer jurisdiction of actions against the United States upon a district court sitting as a court of law (or equity), as a court of claims, and as a court of admiralty. And the particular grant of jurisdiction will determine the method of trial, court or jury, in the absence of some express provision dealing with the method of trial. Thus, absent a provision as to the method of trial, a grant of jurisdiction to a district court as a court of law carries with it a right of jury trial.
5 J. Moore, supra, ¶ 38.32[2] at 236 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); accord, 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2314 at 69 n.43. The Supreme Court's conclusions in United States v. Pfitsch, supra, and Law v. United States, supra, that actions against the Government could be tried to a jury were based on this reasoning.
Our belief that Congress intended to provide for jury trials is strengthened by Congress' choice of language in drafting the statutory provision. Congress used the term of art "legal and equitable relief" (emphasis added) in authorizing actions against the Government under Section 15(c), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c), the same term it employed in authorizing actions against private employers under Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). As appellee points out, the Supreme Court held in Lorillard v. Pons, supra, that the use of this term of art indicates an intention to provide for jury trials. To be sure, Lorillard involved a suit against a private employer. However, we must assume that Congress meant to confer the same rights when it used the same term in authorizing suits against the Government. Therefore, we may infer that, by authorizing "legal relief" in ADEA actions against the Government, Congress was exercising its power to place such suits within the class of suits to which the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee applies. Cf. Galloway v. United States, supra, 319 U.S. at 388-389, 63 S.Ct. at 1086 ("Whatever force the [Seventh] Amendment has [in a suit against the Government] is because Congress, in the legislation cited, has made it applicable.") (footnote omitted).
We are not persuaded by the claim by the Government (and the dissent) that the 1978 amendments to the ADEA show that Congress did not intend to allow jury trials in actions against the-Government. Congress amended Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), to expressly provide for jury trials in actions against private employers. Pub.L.No.95-256 § 4, 92 Stat. 190, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 6, 1978). The Government and the dissent suggest that if Congress had intended to allow jury trials against the Government, it would also have amended Section 15(c), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c). However, the legislative history of the amendment and the context in which it was enacted demonstrate that Congress was merely acting to reaffirm its intention to provide for jury trial whenever the issue was in doubt.
The jury trial issue was raised on the floor of the Senate after the House had already passed the bill. Senator Kennedy offered the amendment on October 19, 1977 —before Lorillard was decided. He noted that three of the four circuits that had considered the issue had ruled in favor of jury trials, that the amendment would clarify the issue, and that jury trials were particularly appropriate in age discrimination cases. The amendment was immediately adopted without debate. The bill was reported by the Conference Committee shortly after Lorillard was decided. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate amendment, and indeed expanded the amendment to provide for jury trials in actions for liquidated damages, an issue that the Supreme Court had left open in Lorillard.
Thus what we see is Congress reiterating its belief in the appropriateness of jury trials in ADEA actions and acting to confirm the right whenever doubt appeared— first when there was conflict among the circuits on the jury trial issue, and later to resolve the question left open by Lorillard. The legislative history of the amendment speaks only in terms of confirming the right to jury trials in age discrimination cases. No attempt was made to draw a distinction between public and private employers. That only Section 7(c) was amended is easily explained by the fact that the cases which prompted congressional action were brought against private employers.
Our reading of the legislative history of the 1978 amendment is consonant with a statement placed in the Congressional Record on September 5, 1979 by Congressman Pepper, Chairman of the House Committee on Aging and a member of the Conference Committee on the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. Congressman Pepper stated:
Those who participated in the House and Senate debates [on the amendment] would be surprised to learn that legislative efforts to confirm the right to a jury trial have been construed as a denial of that right. It would be indefensible to deny Federal employees the right to a jury trial. Under any legislative enactment in the field of civil rights, the Federal Government should be the leader not a grudging participant. As chairman of the Committee on Aging, I will continue to watch developments in this area, and will ask for further delineation of the right of Federal employees to a jury trial if conflicting judicial interpretations are not resolved in favor of a jury trial.
125 Cong.Rec. E4258 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1979).
IV
The issue presented by this case is whether an employee who brings an ADEA action against the federal government may demand a jury trial for her suit. We agree with the District Court that a congressional intention to confer a right to jury trial in such cases may be inferred from the language and legislative history of the ADEA.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) a District Court may certify, and the Court of Appeals may thereupon permit, appeals from interlocutory orders which involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and immediate review of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
. That section provides:
Any person aggrieved [by age-based discrimination] may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
. It has long been settled that actions in the Court of Claims are tried without a jury. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 426, 26 L.Ed. 189 (1880).
. The Government and the dissent insist on an "express statement or clear implication," dissenting opinion, 628 F.2d at 67, before they can find that there is a right to jury trial in an action against the Government. This view seems to be based on the supposition that there is a presumption against jury trial in actions against the Government even where sovereign immunity has been waived. The source of this supposition is not clear, but it appears to be connected with a misunderstanding of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See dissenting opinion, 628 F.2d at 70. Since sovereign immunity bars all actions against the Government — actions tried to the court as well as those tried to a jury — it is difficult to see why this doctrine should create a presumption against any particular method of trial. Indeed, if there are to be any presumptions, it would seem that the preference for jury trials in our jurisprudence would support a presumption in favor of such trials. In any event, once Congress has waived the Government's immunity, and where it has not explicitly specified the trial procedure to be followed, sovereign immunity drops out of the picture. Courts must then scrutinize the available indicia of legislative intent to see what trial procedure Congress authorized.
. Thus in our view the dissent misses the point when it suggests that the jury trial connotation of the term "legal relief" is inapplicable in this case because the Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits against the Government. Dissenting opinion, 628 F.2d at 69. Congress undoubtedly can, and in this case did, authorize "legal relief" in actions against the United States.
. Senator Kennedy observed:
[Jjuries are more likely to be open to the issues which have been raised by the plaintiffs. Sometimes, a judge may be slightly callous, perhaps because he is protected by life tenure, or because he is somewhat removed from the usual employer-employee relationship. The jury may be more neutral in such circumstances.
sH sfc
It seems to me to be wise to insure that particular protection to those who are subject to age discrimination.
123 Cong.Rec. S17297 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
.H.R.Rep.No.95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978).
. Id.; see note 5 supra.