Case Name: MASON v. THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-10-06
Citations: 110 Mich. App. 76
Docket Number: Docket No. 49848
Parties: MASON v THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 110
Pages: 76–91

Head Matter:
MASON v THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
Docket No. 49848.
Submitted April 9, 1981, at Lansing.
Decided October 6, 1981,
Leave to appeal applied for.
Walter Mason, an employee of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, suffered a back injury during his employment. He had previously suffered 12 other work-related back injuries. He was placed on sick leave and, a few weeks later, was discharged from his employment for having falsified the accident report. Mason brought an action against the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that the railroad’s negligence had led to his injury. The Genesee Circuit Court, Robert M. Ransom, J., entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals, alleging several errors. Held:
1. Defendant alleges that the trial court improperly precluded reference at trial to the plaintiffs discharge and to a subsequent administrative proceeding upholding the discharge. The defendant failed to make an adequate offer of proof to justify admission, however, and the justifications advanced by defendant on appeal were not presented to the trial court. The court did not err in excluding the evidence regarding the discharge.
2. The trial court did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof in its jury instructions regarding the apportionment of damages between this injury and the prior injuries.
3. The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing evidence concerning the prior injuries but precluded defen dant from showing that the prior claims had been settled is not supported by the record. The jury was made aware of the fact that plaintiff had been compensated for the prior injuries. The jury was repeatedly instructed that only the damages arising from the last injury were to be considered. Further, the issue of apportionment is not properly preserved for appeal, nor was the fact of the settlements relevant to the apportionment issue.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 6] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 251, 252.
53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant §§ 383, 385.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 251, 252.
53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant §§ 45, 46, 383.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 881.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 2, 251, 252.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 891.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 251.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 923.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 303, 304.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 624, 626.
4. Defendant failed to establish a proper foundation for admission of a memorandum made by plaintiff’s former supervisor, who was deceased at the time of trial. Exclusion of the memorandum was not error.
5. The jury verdict was not excessive.
6. Certain remarks of plaintiff’s counsel during closing argument were not so prejudicial that they could not have been cured by an instruction to the jury had an objection and request for such a curative instruction been made.
Affirmed.
Cynar, P.J., dissented from the majority’s holding that preclusion of evidence regarding the settlements of the prior injury claims was not error. He would hold that the fact of the prior injuries and the fact of the settlements were relevant to the issue of apportionment of damages between the prior injuries and the injury giving rise to this action, and that exclusion of this evidence was error requiring reversal. He would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Evidence — Relevant Evidence.
Evidence that a plaintiff in a case arising out of a work-related injury had received settlements for several previous, similar injuries was not relevant to the question of apportionment of damages where the jury was cautioned that they were to consider only the latest injury in setting damages; therefore, exclusion of evidence of the settlements was not error.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Cynar, P.J.
2. Evidence — Work-Related Injury — Discharge From Employment.
The fact that a claimant seeking damages for injuries suffered while in the course of his employment as a railroad brakeman was subsequently discharged from that employment for cause was properly excluded from evidence at trial where the discharge was not relevant to the fact that the injury prevented him from working.
3. Evidence — Relevant Evidence — Offer of Proof.
Failure of a party to offer proof at trial to show the relevancy of certain evidence precludes appellate review of the party’s claim that the trial court erred in excluding that evidence.
4. Appeal — Jury Instructions.
The Court of Appeals reviews jury instructions as a whole; further, failure to object at trial to a jury instruction precludes appellate review of the instruction.
5. Evidence — Admission of Evidence — Judge’s Discretion.
Admission of evidence rests in the discretion of the trial court and its determination will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion.
6. Evidence — Relevant Evidence — Abuse of Discretion.
Evidence that a plaintiff in a case arising out of a work-related injury had suffered several previous similar injuries and had made settlements for those injuries was relevant to the issue of damages, and the trial court abused its discretion where it allowed introduction of evidence showing the occurrence of the prior injuries but precluded evidence of the settlements.
7. Statutes — Evidence — Deadman’s Statute — Rules of Evidence.
The deadman’s statute has been abrogated by adoption of the rule of evidence pertaining to the competence of witnesses to testify (MRE 601).
8. Appeal — Argument of Counsel.
Appellate review of allegedly improper but unobjected-to argument is limited to a determination of whether the statements of counsel were so extremely prejudicial that even a correction by the trial court would not have undone the harm.
Peter R. Barbara & Associates, P.C. (by Peter R. Barbara and Frank G. Becker), for plaintiff.
Cross, Wrock, Miller & Vieson (by W. Robert Chandler and Michael A. Holmes) (Robert A. Straub, of counsel), for defendant.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.

Opinion:
Bronson, J.
We concur with all portions of Judge Cynar's opinion except the analysis contained in part III. Our reasons will be detailed below.
It is true, as Judge Cynar notes, that the trial court ruled that evidence concerning prior settlements was inadmissible. The fact is, however, that this information did come to the jury's attention. On cross-examination of plaintiff, defense counsel asked him, without objection, whether he had been compensated for his time off due to the previous injuries. Plaintiff answered in the affirmative. Additionally, the testimony of one of defendant's agents, elicited by defense counsel, to the effect that he did not know if the previous claims had been settled was allowed to stand.
The dissent states that the trial court erred reversibly in not allowing further testimony concerning the previous settlements because the jury was instructed that it should apportion damages between the June 9, 1975, injury and the previous accidents if possible. The jury was repeatedly instructed that only the damages arising from the June 9, 1975, accident were compensable and damages resulting from the earlier injuries were not compensable. Given this instruction, we are unable to see how the jury's knowledge of the exact contours which the settlements took had any bearing on the jury's ability to apportion damages caused by the June 9th accident and the previous ones. The dissenting opinion takes the unusual approach of assuming the jury ignored repeated cautionary instructions concerning the apportionment of damages.
We also note that defense counsel did not attempt to present the evidence of settlements on the basis that they were somehow material to the apportionment issue. Instead, defense counsel's position was based solely on the premise that it would be highly prejudicial if the fact of settlement were not admitted into evidence because the jury might speculate that plaintiff was never compensated for his prior injuries. We also note that plaintiff never made an offer of proof in accordance with MRE 103(a)(2). It is not obvious to us what form any testimony concerning prior settlements would have taken, particularly as the one agent of defendant asked about prior settlements stated that he had no knowledge of them. Thus, we do not believe the apportionment aspect of this issue is properly preserved for appeal. Furthermore, as noted above, we do not believe the fact of the prior settlements of claims arising out of accidents not the basis of the suit was relevant to the apportionment question. The fact of the prior settlements did not make it more probable that damages could be apportioned between the accident which was the basis of the suit and the earlier mishaps. See, MRE 401.
We have already touched upon the second reason, and the one properly preserved for appeal, advanced by the defendant for reversing this case, to-wit: that the jury might speculate that plaintiff was uncompensated for the previous injuries if evidence of the settlements were not admitted. We reiterate our belief that whether or not plaintiff was compensated for the other accidents was immaterial to the apportionment question. At issue was the extent to which plaintiff's injuries were a product of the June 9, 1975, mishap and to what extent the injuries were caused by previous accidents. The extent of the injuries caused by the various mishaps was in no way altered whether plaintiff received nothing or millions for the previ ous injuries. As noted previously, the trial court was very careful to instruct the jury that damages were only to be awarded in respect to the injuries suffered on account of the June 9, 1975, occurrence. Unless we assume the following, the preserved basis for appeal presents no basis for reversal: (1) that the jury ignored the court's instructions that only injuries attributable to the June 9th accident were compensable, (2) that the jury actually found that the injuries sustained by plaintiff could be apportioned between the June 9th mishap and the earlier accidents, and (3) that the jury refused to apportion the damages because it believed plaintiff had never been compensated for the injuries attributable to the earlier accidents except to the extent of lost wages. We might add that it was defense counsel who explicitly elicited from plaintiff the fact that he had been compensated to the extent of wages. Upon receiving this answer no further questions were asked concerning the settlements. In any case, we are unwilling to make the assumptions necessary to justify reversing this matter.
This case was well tried by experienced counsel and was well conducted by an excellent trial judge known for his expertise in tort law. Particularly in light of the trial court's expert handling of this litigation, we conclude that the dissenting opinion assumes far too much on far too little record evidence. As we read the trial transcript, the court bent over backwards to instruct the jury properly on the use of the evidence of prior accidents and on apportionment of damages. Nothing in the record lends support to the assumption that the jury refused to follow the court's clear and repeated instructions.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff-appellee.
D. F. Walsh, J., concurred.