Case Name: George G. Plummer v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-01-14
Citations: 86 Tex. Crim. 487
Docket Number: No. 5591
Parties: George G. Plummer v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 487–497

Head Matter:
George G. Plummer v. The State.
No. 5591.
Decided January 14, 1920.
Rehearing denied February 18, 1920.
1.—Assault to Murder —Insanity—Evidence—Non-expert Witnesses.
Where, upon trial of assault to murder, the principal defense was insanity of the defendant, it was reversible error to refuse defendant’s witnesses who were well acquainted with defendant, to testify that they observed defendant's physical and mental condition the morning after the difficulty, and to narrate this condition and to give their opinion as to defendant’s mental condition at said time.
2. —Same—Rule Stated—Insanity—Non-expert Witnesses—Physical Condition.
The exact inquiry in a case of mental soundness, vel non must apply to the particular act charged, but it is always permissible to ask the witness the general question as to the mental soundness or unsoundness of an accused, and to prove the same by non-expert witnesses, whose evidence has disclosed facts and opportunities for observation upon which such testimony may be predicated, and to show the physical condition of the patient as part of the inquiry.
3. —Same—Evidence—Insanity—Opinion of Witness.
Upon trial of assault with intent to murder, it was reversible error to permit State’s witnesses, without qualifying as non-expert witnesses as to facts and opportunities of observation, to testify that they saw nothing in defendant’s acts or conversation upon seeing him once, to indicate that his mind was other than normal.
4. —Same—Charge of Court—Insanity.
Great care should be taken in the court’s charge on the question of insanity to avoid repetition and the insertion of unnecessary details.
5. —Same—Bill of Exceptions—Statement of Facts—Rule Stated.
A bill of exceptions should be sufficient without the aid of the statement of facts to disclose the error complained of. Following: Davis v. State, 14 Texas Crim. Rep., 645; However, the rules of construction will not be given an effect so restrictive as to defeat the purpose of the law requiring bills of exception.
6. —Same—Statement of Facts—Rule Stated.
In a criminal case is is necessary to read the statement of facts on appeal to determine the sufficiency of the evidence before an affirmance can be ordered, and to consider the legal questions presented in the light of the facts.
7. —Same—Rules of Practice—Arbitrary Requirements.
Rules of practice are not intended to incumber the court with technical and arbitrary requirements, or to enjoin such rigid adherence upon them as precludes their observance by reasonable and substantial compliance. Following: Railway v. Pemberton, 106 Texas, 466, and in the instant case the bills of exception with reference to the defendant’s mental condition will be given consideration.
8. —Same—Means of Observation—Insanity—Rule Stated—Predicate—Opinion of Witness.
The fact that no conversation with the defendant was detailed by defendant's witnesses, whose opinion was excluded, is not controlling, as the deportment, conduct, employment, manner of speech, habits, and all traits and demeanor are proper elements in a predicate for non-expert opinion. Following: Turner v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Rep., 97, 133 S. W. Rep., 1054, and other cases.
9.—¡Same—Gase Stated—Means of Observation—Insanity—Opinion of Witness,
Where one of defendant’s witnesses would have testified that he observed the accused the day after the shooting; that in his eyes was a vacant stare; that they were almost expressionless; that he did not appear to be conscious of what was going on, and another witness would have testified that defendant appeared physically collapsed, nervous and weak, pale and no color in his face, and both would have expressed the opinion that his mind was unsound basing the same on long years of acquaintance and observation, their testimony should have been admitted. Following: Williams v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 348, and other cases, and this although the facts and details set out in the bill of exceptions were meager, and the exclusion of the same was reversible error.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Tarrant. Tried below before the Hon. George E. Hosey, judge.
Appeal from a conviction of assault with intent to murder; penalty, seven years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
In addition to what has been said in the opinion of the court, and to show the immediate facts surrounding the case, it may be further stated that defendant’s family consisted of himself, his wife and two children, one a son of about fourteen years and one a daughter of about seven years of age; that according to the defense testimony the husband and wife had lived together amicably for some eighteen years, and until about three weeks before this that at this time defendant was still suffering from the enfeebling effects of an attack of the influenza and that he was irritable from loss of sleep; that he was constantly worried over domestic troubles, fearing a separation of his family; that on Friday night, before the shooting on the following Sunday night, his wife left their home with the little, daughter in company with one of her kinswomen, after the latter and the defendant had had a wordy altercation (in which the lady used vigorous terms and defendant accused her of breaking up his home), and that the wife refused to return and live with him although he and the young son followed her at once and urged her to do so. and continued their efforts in this direction the following day; that about nine o’clock on the Sunday night following her departure, while his wife and her two lady companions were at defendant’s home for the purpose of getting her clothes which she had left behind, defendant suddenly entered the house and asked his wife, “What does this mean?” and after being told by her that she came for her clothes, drew an automatic pistol and shot her in the breast, firing another shot at her as she ran away, which took effect in her left hip, and still another shot after she had fallen in the yard, which took effect in her heel; that he then lay down by her side and asked her whether she was hurt, and addressed terms of endearment towards her, until he was arrested and taken away,
It was on the morning following the shooting that the witnesses Estes and Finney, saw defendant in jail and observed his collapsed physical and mental condition, to which they offered to testify and which was ruled out by the court. The defendant’s wife testified as to threats by and intolerable conduct of defendant and that she left him on that account. One of her lady companions also testified for the State, and the young son testified in behalf of his father, who also testified, among other things, that he did not threaten his wife, and did not know that he shot her; the main facts as above stated not being materially variant.
Baskin, Eastus & Ammerman, for- appellant.-—
On question of non-expert testimony on insanity: Thomas v. State, 40 Texas, 60; Holcomb v. State, 41 id., 125; McClackey v. State, 5 Texas Crim. App., 20; Webb v. State, 5 id., 596; Williams v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 348.
On question of objections to opinions of State’s witnesses: Merritt v. State, 39 id., 70; McLeod v. State, 31 id., 332; Ellis v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 86; Henderson v. State, 49 id., 512; Wells v. State, 50 id., 511; Sims v. State, 50 id., 563; Betts v. State 48 id., 522; Lee v. State, 43 id., 285; Burton v. State, 51 id., 196; Cox v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 471, 132 S. W. Rep., 125.
Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, Jesse M. Brown, District Attorney, for the State.—
Cited: Betts v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 522; Wells v. State, 50 id., 499; Williams v. State. 37 id., 348; Burks v. State, 50 id., 185; Taylor v. State, 49 id., 7, and cases cited in the opinion.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
—Appellant was convicted in the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County, of the offense of assault to murder, and his punishment fixed at seven years in the penitentiary.
The facts are rather lengthy, and, inasmuch as a statement of them is not necessary to dispose of the case, we will not discuss them further than to say that the evidence shows almost without contradiction, that appellant shot his wife, and inflicted serious injury upon her at the time charged in the indictment.
Appellant's principal defense was insanity. He placed on the stand a number of witnesses on this proposition—among them, one John Estes, who testified that he had known the appellant for twenty-four years intimately; that appellant had gone to school to him when a boy, and that he had known him well ever since. Mr. Estes testified that on the occasion of the trouble, which was the the basis of this prosecution, at the solicitation of appellant's brother, he went to the county jail, where appellant was confined, and there saw and attempted to talk with him. This witness was asked by appellant's counsel to state appellant's physical condition, but upon the State's objection, he was not allowed to narrate the same. In stating his purpose for asking for such evidence, appellant sets forth that he proposed to follow up same by asking this same witness his opinion as to appellant's mental condition at said time; and sets forth what the witness would have testified, both as to his physical condition, and being then of unsound mind. The court refused to allow said question, cither as to bis physical condition, or to permit said witness after detailing the manner and appearance of appellant at said time to say that in his opinion he was then of unsound mind. Such refusal of the trial court is here presented by two bills of exception. The court's action was erroneous in each instance. The exact inquiry in such case as to the mental soundness, vel non, must apply to the particular act charged, but it is always permissible to ask the witness the general question as to the mental soundness or unsoundness of an accused, and to prove the same by unexpert witnesses, whose evidence has disclosed facts and opportunities for observation, upon which such testimony may be predicated. As insanity is a disease of the brain, caused by some physical or mental disorder, it is always permissible to show the physical condition of the patient, as a part of the inquiry.
What we have just said is true as to the evidence of the witness Finney, as appears in appellant's bill of exceptions No. 8. This witness, after stating that he had known appellant all his life: that he made his bond, and kept him in his home for several days thereafter, was asked to describe appellant's physical and mental condition while in his said home; to which objection was made by the State, and sustained by the court. Appellant states in his bill, which was duly approved, that if allowed to answer, said witness would have stated such physical conditions as described in said bill, and would have further stated that in his opinion, appellant was of unsound mind during said time. This was clearly admissible.
It is difficult to comprehend the view of the trial court. State's witnesses Wilburn, Mrs. Rosenback, and county attorney Brown, each of whom appears to have seen appellant but once, were permitted, over objection, to state that they saw nothing in appellant's acts or conversation on said occasion, to indicate that his mind was other than normal. Appellant's objection to this evidence was that said witnesses had not been shown to have had sufficient opportunities for observation, and that their answers were but opinions. Most testimony of a non-expert witness resolves itself into an opinion when the direct question is put, but just why the evidence of Estes and Finney, who had known appellant all his life, and offered to give their opinions as to his mental soundness, was rejected, and the opinions of said State witnesses, who only saw him the one time, were admitted, is not quite clear.
Nor are we cpiite in agreement with the form of questions propounded to these State witnesses. We do not think the same presents a proper point of interrogation. Substantially, these witnesses were asked if on the occasion testified about, they saw or heard appellant do or say anything which indicated that his mind was other than normal, and there the inquiry practically began and ended. The real question is. whether or not the mind of thie accused, at the moment of the commission of the offense, is sound or otherwise, as to the act charged; and that is the usual, customary, and settled point of inquiry. .Normality of mind Is not the test of legal responsibility, either under our statutes or decisions. If it be desired by either side to put in evidence the opinions of non-experts 'that on a given occasion an accused talked and acted as he usually did, and that there was nothing in his acts or conversation different from his customary conduct, it must be shown as a predicate that the witness had at least a reasonable acquaintance with the accused, and had some opportunity to observe how he acted and talked on other and ordinary occasions.
We are not to be understood as holding that a non-expert witness may not be able to intelligently answer from the acts and conversation of a person with whom he had been but once, that in his opinion, such acts and conversation as he observed and heard showed such person to be in the opinion of witness of unsound mind, or the contrary; but we are laying down the rule that when either party resorts to testimony that the conduct or the conversation of a given person on a given occasion in the opinion of the witness, was normal or abnormal, usual or unusual, that such opinion is inadmissible, unless such witness qualifies by showing himself to' have had reasonable opportunities for knowing the normal and usual attitude, acts, and conversation of the party inquired about. None of said witnesses mentioned, to whom said question was put by the State, showed any reasonable acquaintance with appellant when his mind was in its' usual and normal condition, and none of them testified to sufficient facts to justify a comparison between his mind on said occasion and when his brain was in its usual and normal condition. The fact that insanity was the defense, makes such errors more material.
The charge of the trial court on the question of insanity, is of unusual length. Great care should be taken to avoid repetition and the insertion of unnecessary details.
For the errors indicated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.