Case Name: Larry Allen GARRETT, Appellant, v. Nancy Gale GARRETT, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-12-01
Citations: 652 So. 2d 378
Docket Number: No. 94-1047
Parties: Larry Allen GARRETT, Appellant, v. Nancy Gale GARRETT, Appellee.
Judges: JOANOS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 652
Pages: 378–382

Head Matter:
Larry Allen GARRETT, Appellant, v. Nancy Gale GARRETT, Appellee.
No. 94-1047.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 1, 1994.
Opinion Denying Rehearing and Certifying Question March 6, 1995.
Gary A. Benson, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Nancy N. Nowlis, Jacksonville, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court lawfully acquired personal jurisdiction over appellant pursuant to Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993). We find that the criteria of the statute were not met, and that the trial court could not properly exercise personal jurisdiction and adjudicate the issues of child support, alimony, and equitable distribution of property.
The parties were married in Florida and lived in Florida from 1974 to 1986. The parties owned property in Florida during that time. They had a minor child born in Jacksonville in 1978. The husband was also born and raised in Jacksonville, Florida. The parties lived in Jacksonville until 1986 when they moved to Texas. In July 1991, the parties separated. The wife/appellee returned to Florida in 1992, where she presently resides with one of the parties' children. The husband has extended family that continues to live in Jacksonville; the husband periodically comes to Jacksonville for family visits and business trips. On November 17, 1993, the wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in Florida. The husband, now a resident of Indiana, was personally served in Indiana with the petition for dissolution of marriage. The husband responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to quash service of process, asserting that the jurisdictional basis alleged by the wife was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the husband in Florida. The lower court denied the husband's motion to dismiss and to quash service, determining that Florida has personal jurisdiction over the husband. That order is being appealed here.
The applicable statutory provision, section 48.193(l)(e), provides as follows:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
(e) With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in the state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
In Shammay v. Shammay, 491 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), the court interpreted this section as follows:
We construe this section to mean that the defendant's residency in this state must proximately precede the commencement of the action.
Id. at 285.
Long-arm jurisdiction may be exercised only if the cause of action is based on conduct or omissions of the nonresident respondent that arose out of the residency in Florida; if the residency was sufficiently connected to the cause of action, based on the totality of the circumstances; or if the residency proximately preceded the commencement of the action.
Brenda M. Abrams, Florida Family Law § 51.30, at 51-25 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
In Soule v. Rosacco-Soule, 386 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and Bofonchik v. Smith, 622 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), this court adopted the proximity requirement announced in Shammay, supra, and rejected the position that merely because a defendant resided in Florida sometime prior to the commencement of the action, personal jurisdiction could be invoked under Florida's long arm statute.
In Bofonchik, supra, this court found that appellant's residence in Florida from 1984 to 1986 was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction in his wife's action for child support filed in 1989.
Appellee argues, however, that the determination of proximity is not merely a temporal determination, but must be "determined in light of the totality of the circumstances." Shammay, supra at 285. In Durand v. Durand, 569 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla.1991), the court found long arm jurisdiction over the husband who had not resided in the state for some six years prior to the commencement of the action. The third district based its determination on the totality of the circumstances, which included the fact that the marital home remained in Florida, the breakup of the relationship occurred in Florida, the wife and children continued to reside in Florida after the breakup of the marriage, and the parties continued to have joint ownership of realty in Florida. We find, however, that the facts in this case are substantially different from the facts in Durand.
In the instant case, both parties voluntarily left Florida to set up their marital residence in Texas, no real property was jointly owned in Florida, and the parties resided together in Texas for over five years prior to the separation which led to the breakup of the marriage.
On the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that there was insufficient proximity or connection to support a finding of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(l)(e), Florida Statutes. We, therefore, vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., dissenting with written opinion.
. The appeal does not address the issue of whether the trial court may proceed to hear the child custody issue pursuant to § 61.132, Fla.Stat., as this issue was not raised by the parties.