Case Name: In re Estate of Samuel Feder, Deceased-(Paul Feder, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Julian J. Luster, Ext., Respondent-Appellant.)
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1971-10-06
Citations: 2 Ill. App. 3d 28
Docket Number: No. 54560
Parties: In re Estate of Samuel Feder, Deceased—(Paul Feder, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Julian J. Luster, Ext., Respondent-Appellant.)
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 2
Pages: 28–34

Head Matter:
In re Estate of Samuel Feder, Deceased—(Paul Feder, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Julian J. Luster, Ext., Respondent-Appellant.)
(No. 54560;
First District
— October 6, 1971.
DIERINGER, J., dissenting.
Nat M. Kahn, and Smith and Munson, all of Chicago, for Appellee.
Samuel S. Cohon, of Chicago, for Appellant.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE BURMAN
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from an order directing the Executor of the Estate of Samuel Feder to prepare and file a separate accounting for the rents, issues, profits, and avails coUected by him from property commonly known as 615 — 621 Howard Street Evanston, Illinois, and to pay the monies on hand as shown in the accounting to Betty E. Feder, as trustee of four trusts for the benefit of her children.
Samuel Feder died testate on October 17, 1967, and by his Will executed on July 9, 1964, he devised and bequeathed (1) certain personal and household articles to his daughter if she survived him and (2) the residue and remainder of the estate to named trustees for the uses and purposes set forth in a testamentary trust. This trust was divided into two parts: Trust A included only the real estate commonly known as 615 — 621 Howard Street, Evanston, Illinois, and Trust B included aU the rest and remainder of the property given to the trustees and not included in Trust A.
In a Codicil to the WiD executed on October 12, 1967, Samuel Feder provided:
"I direct that upon my death my trustees convey the fee simple title of real estate described in Trust A as foDows:
Thereafter foHowed instructions to convey the property in undivided fourths to Betty E. Feder, as trustee, under four already existing trust agreements. Each of these four trust agreements had one of Mrs. Feder's four children as its sole beneficiary, and each of the four trusts was to receive an undivided one-fourth interest in the Howard Street property.
Samuel Feder, at the time of his death was the sole beneficiary under a land trust which held title to the Howard Street property. After his death, the executor of his estate, Julian J. Luster, took possession of the Howard Street property and collected the rents which are the subject matter of this controversy.
On June 11, 1969, Paul Feder, a son and heir of Samuel Feder, filed a petition seeking an order compelling Julian J. Luster, as executor, to account to his wife, Betty E. Feder, as trustee, for the rents derived from the Howard Street property during the administration of the estate and to distribute to her aU monies on hand as shown in the accounting. The Court, after considering the Petition, the Answer thereto, memoranda and arguments of counsel, entered an order and later an amended order granting the relief sought. When the amended order was entered on August 21, 1969, the estate was solvent, and the time for filing claims had long since passed.
The executor contends that since the testator's interest in the Howard Street property was bequeathed to the testamentary trustees and not directly to Betty E. Feder, as trustee, Mrs. Feder did not become en titled to the income from the property until the testamentary trustees acquired title to the property and were able to convey that title to her. In response to this contention, it is argued that the direction to the testamentary trustees in the Codicil that they should convey title to the property "upon my death" constitutes a specific bequest of the property to Mrs. Feder, as trustee, and that as the recipient of the specific bequest, the rents never became a part of the testator's residuary estate and therefore, she is entitled to all the income derived from the property prior to distribution.
The initial question presented is essentially one of construction. The principal object in the construction of wills and codicils is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the will and codicil as a whole and to effectuate that intention unless it is contrary to some established rule of law or public policy. (Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Ill.2d 197, 117 N.E.2d 769.) This intention is not determined from the language of any particular clause, phrase, or sentence, but from a view of the will and codicil as a whole. (Williams v. Fulton, 4 Ill.2d 524, 123 N.E. 495.) Each word, phrase, and clause in a will, however, should be given effect, if possible (Dillman v. Dillman, 409 Ill. 494, 100 N.E .2d 567), and where one construction renders a portion meaningless and another one gives effect to all tire words used, the latter construction should be adopted. Whitmore v. Stark, 17 Ill.2d 202, 161 N.E.2d 254.
Samuel Feder devised and bequeathed the bulk of his estate to testamentary trustees. The testamentary trust was divided into two parts: Trust A and Trust B. Trust A included only the Howard Street property. Under the Will, as executed on July 9, 1964, the testamentary trustees were to have on-going duties with respect to Trust A; but under the Codicil to the Will executed on October 12, 1967, shortly before he passed away, the only duty given to them with respect to the Trust A was to convey the property included therein "upon my death" to Betty E. Feder, as trustee. The specific use of the phrase "upon my death" in the Codicil evidences an intention on the part of the testator (1) that Betty E. Feder, as trustee should hold title in fee simple and (2) that the beneficiaries for whom she was trustee should derive income immediately upon his death. In order to give effect to this intent, the bequest of the testator's interest in the Howard Street property to testamentary trustees with instructions to convey upon his death, should be construed as a specific bequest to Betty E. Feder, as trustee, which was to take effect on the death of the testator.
Under the construction of the Will and Codicil proposed by the executor, the phrase "upon my death" in the Codicil becomes meaning less surplusage; however, in the construction which we adopt, the phrase is given full effect and meaning within the context of the testamentary scheme.
The directions in the testamentary trust with regard to the Howard Street property necessarily imply that starting on the date of the testator's death, Betty E. Feder, as trustee, should hold title and the beneficiaries for whom she was trustee, should receive income from the property. Due to delays in the administration of the Estate of Samuel Feder, the testamentary trustees did not convey title to the Howard Street property to Betty E. Feder, as trustee, upon the testator's death; and the executor of the estate took possession and collected the rents and income from the property. The inability of the testamentary trustees to convey title upon the death of the testator because of circumstances unrelated to the Will and Codicil does not defeat the implicit right of Betty E. Feder, as trustee, to receive the income from the Howard Street property starting on the date of the testator's death.
It was not necessary for the testator to specifically bequeath the right to income from the Howard Street property during the administration of the estate. Under the terms of the Will and Codicil, the conveyance of the property was directed upon the testator's death. The effect of this direction coupled with the specific nature of the legacy resulted in this legacy being removed from the general assets of the testator's estate. Claims against the estate have long since expired. All death taxes against the estate, as well as all costs, have been paid or provided for.
The trial judge in construing the Will and Codicil and in ordering the executor (1) tire account for the rents derived from the Howard Street property (2) to distribute the net rents to Betty E. Feder, as trustee, was giving effect to the intention of the testator and enforcing the provisions implicit in the Will and Codicil.
The executor next contends that there is no statutory authority for the order requiring him to make a separate and partial accounting and distribution prior to the filing of a general account. Under the Will and Codicil, as construed, Betty E. Feder, as trustee, was to receive title to the Howard Street property upon the testator's death. When the conveyance was delayed, she became entitled to the income earned from the property during the delay. The executor was under a duty to segregate the income collected from the Howard Street property from the general assets of the estate. The Probate Division of the Circuit Court did not need specific statutory authorization to act here because in entering the order it was compelling compliance with the terms of the Will and Codicil.
For the reasons set forth above, the Order of the Probate Division of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
ADESKO, P. J., concurs.