Case Name: James David LEE and Brenda Knight Lee v. K-MART CORPORATION, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-12-26
Citations: 483 So. 2d 609
Docket Number: No. CA 84 0389
Parties: James David LEE and Brenda Knight Lee v. K-MART CORPORATION, et al.
Judges: Before GROVER L. COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, COLE, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SA-VOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and JOHN S. COVINGTON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 483
Pages: 609–626

Head Matter:
James David LEE and Brenda Knight Lee v. K-MART CORPORATION, et al.
No. CA 84 0389.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 26, 1985.
Writ Denied March 7, 1986.
Calvin Fayard, Jr., Denham Springs, Paul H. Dué, Baton Rouge, Joseph Simpson, Amite, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Felix Weill, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant, K-Mart Corp.
Before GROVER L. COVINGTON, C.J., and LOTTINGER, EDWARDS, COLE, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SA-VOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and JOHN S. COVINGTON, JJ.

Opinion:
CRAIN, Judge.
This is a suit for damages in tort by a husband and wife alleging the wife slipped and fell in the shopping area of a self-service store. The husband sought to recover for medical expenses and loss of consortium, and the wife sought damages for her injuries. A trial by jury ended with the following verdicts: (1) the store owner was negligent, the negligence was a cause of the accident and damages, and the store's degree of negligence was 50%; (2) the wife was contributorily negligent, her negligence was a cause of the accident and damages, the wife's degree of negligence was 50% and the wife did not assume the risk of the accident; (3) the wife's damages were $60,000; and (4) the husband's damages were $10,000. The husband and wife filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNV) contending the defense of contributory negligence was not applicable in slip and fall cases. The district court granted the JNV and rendered a judgment in favor of the husband and wife for full damages. The store owner took this suspensive appeal. The husband and wife did not appeal or answer the appeal.
FACTS
On October 13, 1980, Mrs. Brenda K. Lee, accompanied by her two year old daughter, Jamie, went to the K-Mart Corporation (K-Mart) store in Denham Springs, Louisiana, to buy some cleaning supplies and children's books. At the store, Mrs. Lee obtained a shopping cart, placed Jamie in the basket seat on the cart and began her shopping. Mrs. Lee got the cleaning supplies and proceeded to the aisle where the children's books were located. Mrs. Lee fell while reaching for a book. As a result of the fall, Mrs. Lee sustained a concussion and a neck injury. The cause of the fall is contested by the parties.
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
In the motion for JNV, the plaintiffs contended Dulaney v. Travelers Insurance Company, 434 So.2d 578 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983) was authority for excluding contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in all "slip and fall" cases. The trial court agreed and awarded full damages despite the jury verdict assessing Mrs. Lee with 50% contributory negligence. K-Mart contends this ruling was error because (1) the statements relied on in Dula-ney are dictum; (2) the dictum in Dulaney is not a correct statement of law; and (3) Dulaney is factually distinguishable from the instant case.
Mrs. Lee was in the shopping area of a self-service store when the accident occurred. Her duty to discover potential dangers in her pathway was substantially reduced because the shopping area, by design, required her to focus her eyes upon the display cases rather than on the walking surface. However, if Mrs. Lee's version of events is accepted by the finder of fact in the trial court, then, by her own admission, she observed books on the floor in the area where she subsequently fell. Mrs. Lee observed a potential danger in her pathway (even though she may not have had a duty to look for it) but, nevertheless, proceeded to the place where the potential danger was located and slipped and fell (possibly as a result of the danger). This case is distinguishable from the ordinary "slip and fall" where the injured party did not observe the potential danger and was under no legal duty to do so. Mrs. Lee's contributory negligence is not in failing to see what she should have seen, but in failing to take reasonable precautions to avoid a potential danger after she saw the danger. In this factual posture, contributory negligence is applicable. When a person actually knows of a potential danger, he (or she) must take reasonable steps to avoid the danger. Rapattoni v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, 378 So.2d 953 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1979); Alford v. Pool Offshore Company, 661 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.1981). The ruling of the trial court was in error in granting the JNV.
K-Mart also questions the validity of the jury verdict in several assignments of error.
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
K-Mart contends the jury was improperly constituted when the trial court overruled its challenge for cause of a prospective juror, Thomas Tillman. K-Mart used a peremptory challenge to exclude Mr. Tillman and lost the right of using this peremptory challenge on another juror. K-Mart based its challenge for cause on La.C.C.P. art. 1765(2) which provides a juror may be challenged for cause "[w]hen the juror has formed an opinion in the case or is not otherwise impartial, the cause of his bias being immaterial."
Voir dire examination elicited from Mr. Tillman the fact that his wife had been in an automobile accident and had a continuing disability as a result. Although Mr. Tillman indicated he was willing to try very hard to be fair and impartial, his responses show he was biased and could not be impartial on the issue of quantum. Plaintiffs attempted to rehabilitate Mr. Tillman but were unsuccessful. This bias justified a challenge for cause, and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse Mr. Tillman on K-Mart's challenge for cause.
This assignment of error has merit.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF CASH REGISTER RECEIPTS TO'ESTABLISH VOLUME OF BUSINESS
During the trial, counsel for the plaintiffs called Yvette Cox as a witness under cross-examination. Cox testified that on the date of the accident in 1980, she was working in the K-Mart store as an area supervisor. Subsequently, at an unspecified date in 1981, she became an assistant manager and remained in that position until sometime in 1983 when she became a merchandiser. One of her duties when she was an assistant manager was to check the daily cash register receipts. During her cross-examination, she was asked if she had "any idea how much K-Mart grosses in a day there, at that store". Counsel for the defendant objected to the relevance of this testimony. Counsel for the plaintiffs responded this evidence was relevant on the issue of the reasonableness of the measures taken by K-Mart to protect its customers from foreign objects on the store floor. Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 326 So.2d 486, 488 (La.1976) wherein the following appears:
The circumstances that determine the reasonableness of protective measures include the type and volume of merchandise, the type of display, the floor space utilized for customer service, the nature of customer service, and the volume of business. [Emphasis added].
Plaintiffs' counsel asserted the evidence (gross sales) would show volume of business. Counsel for the defendants responded that volume of business meant "the number of people coming into the store" and the evidence sought would not show that. The trial court overruled the objection.
In Ketcher v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, 440 So.2d 805, 810 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writs denied, 444 So.2d 1220, 1222 (La.1984), appears the following:
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073 (La.1982). Whether evidence is relevant is within the discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of this discretion. State v. Chaney, 423 So.2d 1092 (La.1982).
See also Arledge v. Bell, 463 So.2d 856 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1985); Moore, Romero & Co. v. Nan Corporation, 458 So.2d 675 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984).
The testimony of Cox does not show gross sales, only daily cash register receipts. The daily cash register receipts do not show refunds or losses. The daily cash register receipts do not reflect the number of customers in the K-Mart store. (Obviously, number of customers and net profits would be relevant on the issue of volume of business.) Further, Cox did not testify about daily cash register receipts at the time of the accident in 1980. Her testimony was limited to the receipts on the opening day of the store in 1979 and the time when she was an assistant manager from 1981 to 1983. However, we cannot say that this evidence of cash register receipts does not have any tendency to show the economic ability of K-Mart to provide protective measures. In this posture, we cannot say the trial judge clearly abused his discretion.
This assignment of error is without merit.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACCIDENTS
Evidence of prior accidents or the lack thereof is admissible to show whether a thing or place which caused injury was dangerous and/or whether the defendant had knowledge of the dangerous condition. Ketcher, 440 So.2d at 810-811. At issue in the instant case is whether evidence of subsequent accidents or dissimilar accidents is admissible for a relevant purpose. The weight of authority in the United States appears to be that evidence of other similar accidents (prior and subsequent) is admissible to (1) show the existence of a dangerous physical condition, situation or defect, Walsh v. Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 4 So.2d 553 (La.App.Orl.1941), (2) show a continuing defect or condition, or a continuing course of negligent action or conduct caused injury, (3) show the cause of the accident or injury and (4) rebut a claim of impossibility, Auzene v. Gulf Public Service Co., 188 So. 512 (La.App. 1st Cir.1939). E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 299, pp. 473-476 (2nd ed.1972); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 234, pp. 645-654 (1966); 1 S. Garde, Jones on Evidence, § 420 (6th ed.1972); 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence, § 305-309, pp. 350-355 (1964). Prior other accidents are relevant to show knowledge or failure to take precautionary measures; subsequent other accidents are not relevant to show knowledge or failure to take precautionary measures; subsequent other accidents are not relevant for these purposes. However, evidence of other accidents is only relevant where such accidents are closely related in circumstances to the accident, injury or hazard in the instant case. Lincecum v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 452 So.2d 1182 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 476 (La.1984); Wilson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 401 So.2d 500 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1981); Keen v. Pel State Oil Company, Incorporated, 395 So.2d 866 (La.App.2nd Cir.1981), writ denied, 401 So.2d 355 (La.1981); Miller v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 349 So.2d 1353 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1977), writs denied, 352 So.2d 235 (La.1977). Thus, to be relevant the other accident should occur at substantially the same place and under substantially the same conditions and must be caused by the same or a similar defect, danger, act or omission. Evidence of other accidents occurring at substantially different places or under different circumstances or conditions is irrelevant and inadmissible.
Yvette Cox was allowed (over objection) to testify about an accident where an elderly woman who had suffered a stroke was left alone leaning on a shopping cart by her son and daughter-in-law and fell when the shopping cart gave away. This incident occurred by the front door of the store. (The record does not reflect when this incident occurred.) Obviously, this is not a similar accident because it did not involve a foreign substance or object on the floor which caused a shopper to "slip and fall". Admission of this evidence was error.
Cox was then allowed to testify about an accident where a lady fell on the concrete on the driveway outside of the store. (The record does not reflect when this accident occurred.) This is not a similar accident because the accident occurred outside the store. The duties of store owners and shoppers outside the shopping area are different from the duties" inside the shopping area. Bolin v. National Tea Company, 359 So.2d 690 (La.App. 1st Cir.1978), writ denied, 362 So.2d 577 (La.1978). Further, Cox's testimony does not establish what caused the lady to fall. Finally, Cox indicated she was not present, when this accident occurred and, thus, her source of knowledge of the accident is information from third persons and hearsay. Admission of this evidence was error.
Cox then testified about an accident she observed when a young, mentally retarded girl fell in the stationery department. (The record does not reflect when this accident occurred.) Cox's testimony does not show, what caused the girl to fall. A necessary predicate to the introduction of other accident evidence is that the cause of the accident was the same or similar to the accident in the instant case. Failure to establish this predicate renders the evidence inadmissible. Admission of this evidence was error.
Plaintiffs contend the above evidence was admissible to impeach (apparently by contradiction) the testimony of Cox and Parrott. As indicated above, the evidence is irrelevant. It is well settled that witnesses cannot be impeached on collateral and irrelevant matters. La.R.S. 15:494; State v. Rittiner, 341 So.2d 307 (La.1976); State v. Paul, 439 So.2d 610 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
This assignment of error has merit.
ADMISSIBILITY OF SUIT RECORDS TO PROVE OTHER ACCIDENTS
Defendant also claims it was error to admit suit records to prove other accidents. Without going into the question of admissibility of suit records for that purpose, the accidents which the records were used to prove were inadmissible for the reasons given above. This assignment also has merit.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN SUBSTANCES AND OBJECTS ON FLOOR AFTER MRS. LEE'S FALL •
Julius Bombet, a staff investigator for the plaintiffs' attorneys, was allowed to testify over objection that on May 20, 1982, at 1:30 p.m., he went to the K-Mart store. Mrs. Lee showed Bombet where she fell and Bombet observed a book on the floor in that general area. Bombet also observed a game on the floor in another aisle and a pink liquid on the floor in a third aisle. Bombet took photographs of the book, game and liquid which showed the aisles and areas where he observed them. These photographs were allowed into evidence over objection.
Dennis R. Howard, an expert safety consultant, was allowed to testify over objection that he went to the K-Mart store on November 1, 1982. Mrs. Lee showed him where she fell. Howard noted several items on the floor that could have presented slipping hazards, but he did not make a note of what these items were. Howard returned to the K-Mart store at 10:40 a.m. on May 16, 1983, and remained until 11:40 a.m. Howard went to the children's book area and observed a swimming pool with a five foot diameter obstructing the aisle. He also observed a child's toy with wheels on the floor. During the hour that Howard was in the store, tissue paper, plastic straws, cellophane and several smaller pieces of debris accumulated on the floor. Howard did not observe any cleaning being performed. In other areas of the store, Howard observed water, dirt from potted plants and other items on the floor.
K-Mart contends the above evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial. K-Mart further asserts the photographs were taken too long after the accident to be admissible and do not accurately reflect the condition of the aisle when Mrs. Lee fell.
In their petition, the plaintiffs allege K-Mart was negligent by failing "to make reasonable inspections to insure that the floor of the store was in such a condition that it would be of no risk and cause no harm to customers." K-Mart denied this allegation. In Brown v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 452 So.2d 685, 687 (La.1984), the Court observed that a store operator has a "twofold duty to discover and to correct dangerous conditions reasonably anticipated in its business activity" and "lack of inspections and other preventive measures results in the failure to discover, dangerous conditions and contributes substantially to the causation of the ensuing fall and injury." Yvette Cox testified the floor maintenance and inspection procedures were the same from the time the store opened for business in November of 1979 until the time of trial in May of 1983. The plaintiffs were not required to rely solely on the testimony of K-Mart employees to test the adequacy of K-Mart's inspection procedures. Since those procedures were the same on May 20, 1982, November 1, 1982, and May 16, 1983, as they were on October 13, 1980, evidence of those procedures (or lack thereof) on the later dates is independently relevant to show how effective the procedures were on the earlier date. Since this evidence has direct relevance, the admissibility of photographs of what was observed is not controlled by the proximity of the date of the photographs to the date of the accident. The rulings of the trial court on this evidence were correct.
These assignments of error are without merit.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
K-Mart contends on appeal the trial court erred in giving repetitious, confusing, misleading and incorrect jury instructions. K-Mart also contends the trial court erred in omitting special jury instructions it submitted which contained essential legal principles applicable to the case.
K-Mart argues the placement of its special jury instruction No. 2 on burden of proof, after plaintiffs' special jury instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 on K-Mart's duty, implies K-Mart had the burden of going forward with evidence to prove it exercised reasonable care and made reasonable efforts to keep objects off the floor. K-Mart also argues that plaintiffs' requested instructions are taken directly from Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.2d 282 (La.1975) and Gonzales, 326 So.2d at 488, and are correct statements of the law applicable in "slip and fall" cases. Secondly, these instructions are not repetitious and serve to fully expound on the duty owed by a store owner. Although it might be more orderly to discuss burden of proof with the jury before discussing the defendant's duty, we cannot say that not doing so was prejudicial error.
K-Mart argues that plaintiffs' special jury instructions Nos. 7 and 8 on the shifting of the burden of proof are incorrect statements of the law. Before the burden of proof shifts to K-Mart, plaintiffs must show that Mrs. Lee did not see the foreign substance or object on the floor. Gonzales, 326 So.2d at 488. This element of plaintiffs' burden of proof is not contained in these instructions and, thus, the instructions are incorrect statements of the law. However, this error was cured when the trial court gave K-Mart's special jury instruction No. 2, which included that statement.
K-Mart argues that plaintiffs' special jury instructions Nos. 9 and 10 on adequate protective measures are incorrect statements of the law. Instruction No. 9 is taken directly from Gonzales, 326 So.2d at 488, and was properly given by the trial court. Instruction No. 10 was not objected to by K-Mart at trial. La.C.C.P. art. 1793 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.
Because K-Mart failed to timely object to instruction No. 10, it cannot now raise this objection on appeal. Dunaway v. Rester Refrigeration Service, Inc., 428 So.2d 1064 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writs denied, 433 So.2d 1056, 1057 (La.1983).
K-Mart argues that plaintiffs' special jury instructions Nos. 4, 6 and 11 are not statements of law, but are comments on the evidence by the trial judge which are prohibited by La.C.C.P. art. 1792 which provides as follows:
In his charge to the jury the judge shall instruct the jurors on the law applicable to the cause submitted to them, but he shall not recapitulate or comment upon the evidence so as to exercise any influence upon their decision as to the facts.
Although K-Mart raised objections at trial to these instructions, its objections were general and did not specifically assert the objection now raised on appeal. La.C.C.P. art. 1793 requires an objection to state the basis of his objection. Gryder v. Travelers Insurance Company, 193 So.2d 532 (La.App. 1st Cir.1966). The purpose of this requirement is to give the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its decision and timely correct any error. Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies Inc., 321 So.2d 844 (La.App. 1st Cir.1975), writ denied 325 So.2d 279 (La.1976). Since K-Mart made only general objections and did not raise the specific ground now being raised on appeal, it has failed to comply with the requirements of La.C.C.P. art. 1793 and may not now complain on appeal. Lea, 321 So.2d at 857; Gryder, 193 So.2d at 534.
K-Mart contends the trial court erred by refusing to give its special instruction No. 3 which would have explained to the jury one of its primary defenses — that the foreign substance had not been on the floor for a sufficient period of time to constitute constructive notice of its presence. In Brown, 452 So.2d at 686-687, the Supreme Court ruled "[t]he critical effect of the partial shifting of the evidentiary burden was the virtual elimination of proof of actual or constructive knowledge as an element of plaintiff s case" and "[t]he more appropriate inquiry is whether the store operator took reasonable steps to fulfill its twofold duty to discover and to correct dangerous conditions reasonably anticipated in its business activity." According to Brown, K-Mart's constructive notice was irrelevant, and no prejudice occurred when the trial court refused to give K-Mart's special jury instruction No. 3.
K-Mart contends the trial court committed error by not giving its requested special jury instruction No. 8 on obvious conditions. Initially, we note the requested instruction is not a completely accurate statement of the law for "slip and fall" cases. The cases cited as authority by counsel for K-Mart are not "slip and fall" cases. Further, the concept contained in instruction No. 8 is adequately covered by the instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk given by the trial court. A trial court need not give requested special charges when the subject matter thereof is covered in the general charge. Lincecum, 452 So.2d at 1191; Webb v. Insurance Company of North America, 396 So.2d 508 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981).
K-Mart argues plaintiffs' special jury instructions Nos. 30 and 31 violate La.C.C.P. art. 1792 because they are not statements of the "law applicable" to the case, but rather are "comment(s) upon the evidence." This ground of objection is raised for the first time in brief on appeal. As such, K-Mart has again failed to comply with the requirements of La.C.C.P. art. 1793 and has waived its right to complain.
FORM OF JURY VERDICT
K-Mart contends the trial court's special verdict form submitted to the jury on the issues of Mrs. Lee's contributory negligence and assumption of the risk violated La.C.C.P. art. 1811. Specifically, K-Mart argues the trial court erred by adding the language "which would operate to reduce her claim for damages" to the question concerning Mrs. Lee's contributory negligence and "so as to bar plaintiffs from recovering anything" to the question concerning Mrs. Lee's assumption of the risk. K-Mart contends additional language was unnecessary and prejudicial.
The form of a verdict is within the discretion of the trial judge. Courtney v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 447 So.2d 504 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1359 (La.1984). The provisions of La.C. C.P. art. 1811 (prior to its amendment in 1983) do not prohibit the addition of such language and K-Mart does not contend the additional language is an incorrect statement of the law. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
K-Mart contends the trial court committed error by submitting to the jury, and allowing recovery for, Mr. Lee's claim for loss of consortium. (Plaintiffs' special instruction No. 33).
Mrs. Lee's accident occurred on October 13, 1980. The cause of action for loss of consortium was not created until the passage of Act 202 of 1982 which amended La.C.C. art. 2315 effective Sep tember 10, 1982. Act 202 created a new cause of action, was substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. La.C.C. art. 8; Evans v. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 471 So.2d 965 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985); Abadie v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 464 So.2d 979 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985); Coates v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 444 So.2d 788 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984); Tessier v. H.S. Anderson Trucking Co., 713 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.1983).
This assignment of error has merit.
The jury awarded Mr. Lee a lump sum of $10,000. In the petition, Mr. Lee claimed damages for loss of consortium and medical expenses. At the trial, Mr. Lee presented evidence showing medical expenses of $12,138.09, drug expenses of $227.56 and children day care expenses of $513. These expenses total $12,878.65. Because this award was not itemized in the jury verdict, we do not know how much the jury allocated for loss of consortium or how many (or much) of the other expenses were disallowed. (The jury may have found that some of the expenses were not related to the K-Mart accident.)
DECREE
We have determined that the trial court erred in granting a JNV. We must, therefore, set aside the JNV and consider the validity of the original jury verdict. We have also determined the trial court committed errors in both jury selection and the admissibility of evidence. However, except for its instruction on consortium the jury instructions given by the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the applicable law. Consequently, our duty is to review the record and affirm the jury verdict if it is supported by the admissible evidence. Stark v. Kelly, 435 So.2d 552 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), Bush v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 264 So.2d 717 (La.App. 1st Cir.1972). Our review of the record indicates this is the case. Even though the jury was erroneously instructed it could grant Mr. Lee damages for loss of consortium, the award given was a general damage award of $10,000. The record will support a jury verdict in this amount to Mr. Lee for medical expenses. Even though a peremptory challenge was used to excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause there is no evidence of jury misconduct nor that impartial justice has not been done. Nothing in the record indicates the verdict should not be given full weight as the fair and impartial finding of the trier of fact. Bossier v. DeSota General Hospital, 442 So.2d 485 (La.App.2d Cir.1983), Broussard v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 376 So.2d 532 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1979).
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting a JNV and reinstate the original jury verdict. All trial costs are assessed to appellant. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
LANIER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
WATSON and CARTER, JJ., dissent for the reasons assigned by LANIER, J.
COLE, J., would affirm the judgment of the trial court granting a JNV, finding no negligence on their part.
WATKINS, CARTER and LANIER, Judges, dissenting.
. K-Mart exhausted all its peremptory challenges during the voir dire.
. La.C.C.P. art. 1793 was amended by Acts 1983, No. 534, § 7.
. La.C.C.P. art. 1792 was amended by Acts 1983, No. 534, § 7.
. By Acts 1983, No. 534, § 8, the subject matter of La.C.C.P. art. 1811 is now contained in La.C. C.P. art. 1812.
. The verdict form submitted to the jury on these two questions provides the following:
2. Was plaintiff, Brenda Knight Lee, guilty of contributory negligence which would operate to reduce her claim for damages?
3. Did plaintiff, Brenda Knight Lee, assume the risk of this accident so as to bar plaintiffs from recovering anything?
.Since neither party questions the legal correctness of the instruction, and since the jury found no assumption of risk, we do not consider whether assumption of risk would legally bar any recovery.
. We find no abuse of the trial judge's great discretion in setting expert witness fees and taxing costs. Whipple v. Smith, 428 So.2d 1114 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 154 (La.1983).