Case Name: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, Petitioner, v. SAND KEY ASSOCIATES, LTD., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-07-09
Citations: 512 So. 2d 934
Docket Number: No. 66372
Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, Petitioner, v. SAND KEY ASSOCIATES, LTD., Respondent.
Judges: SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., and ADKINS, J. (Retired), concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 512
Pages: 934–947

Head Matter:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, Petitioner, v. SAND KEY ASSOCIATES, LTD., Respondent.
No. 66372.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 9, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1987.
Steven A. Been, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept, of Natural Resources, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Richard J. Salem of Richard J. Salem, P.A., Tampa, and William J. Kimpton of Dunbar, Kimpton, Burke, Boyer, Roman and Schafer, P.A., Clearwater Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition to review Sand Key Associates, Ltd., v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 458 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), in which the district court upheld the constitutionality of section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981), determined that it did not apply to the accreted land of the waterfront property owned by Sand Key Associates, and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Pursuant to section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981), is the state entitled to accreted land of only the upland owner of the improved property or to the accreted land of all upland littoral owners, whether or not they participated in or contributed to the improvement?
Id. at 371. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and approve the district court decision. We answer the question by holding that section 161.051 applies to accreted land of an upland owner who caused the accretion and does not apply to an upland owner who did not participate in the improvements which caused the accretions.
The issue in this cause is narrow, but has broad ramifications for Florida's waterfront owners. It concerns the state's right to claim title to land accumulated on waterfront property when the accumulation occurred slowly and imperceptibly and was not caused by the waterfront owner.
Sand Key began this action by filing suit to quiet title to lands it alleged had gradually and imperceptibly accumulated over ten years on its beachfront property. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund claimed that public beach ren-ourishment, authorized under chapter 161, Florida Statutes, created the accreted lands out of submerged sovereignty lands, and that, pursuant to section 161.051, these accreted lands remain state property. The trial court entered a partial final summary judgment in favor of the Trustees. Before its ruling, the trial court found: (1) a public entity had constructed a jetty; (2) Sand Key's waterfront property extends approximately one-half mile south of this jetty; (3) "the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of soil to [Sand Key's] upland was the result of accretion"', (4) "neither [Sand Key] nor anyone acting on its behalf . caused or contributed to [the] accretion." (Emphasis added.) The trial court then upheld the constitutionality of section 161.051, and construed it, in accordance with the Trustee's interpretation, to mean that
the State of Florida validly holds title to all accretion to the upland, whether proximate or remote, of any person which results from works and/or projects specifically described in the said statute, and not only to accretion to the upland of a person who has constructed or installed such a work or project.
(Emphasis added.) The trial court concluded by denying Sand Key possession of the accreted land.
The district court reversed, holding:
To the extent that section 161.051 applies to other upland littoral owners who neither participated in nor contributed to the improvement, the statute is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. The presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute explicitly so states....
Section 161.051 does not explicitly state that it applies to all upland littoral owners. Therefore, construing the statute strictly, we hold that it applies only to the upland owner of the improved property. Section 161.051 does not affect Sand Key's vested right to accretion on its property.
458 So.2d at 371 (citation omitted). The district court concluded that the trial court judgment "effectively divested Sand Key of its littoral rights without compensation" and held that "the disputed five acres of accreted property, all future accretions on the property and all property rights incident thereof belong to Sand Key." Id.
In this proceeding, the Trustees raise three claims of title to the accreted lands. First, they claim that all accretions caused in part by some type of artificial construction are state property, asserting that, although Florida's waterfront property owners are entitled to accretions and relictions which result from natural causes, they are not entitled to accretions or relictions that result only in part from artificial causes. Second, the Trustees assert that, even if prior law granted waterfront owners title to artificially caused accretions, section 161.051 changed the law and established an exception to the right to the accretions. Third, the Trustees contend that Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927), controls under these circumstances and mandates state ownership of the accretions. Under each contention, the Trustees assert that the state owns the accreted land and that this Court need not consider whether the affected waterfront owner contributed to causing the accretion.
We find the Trustees' contentions are without merit. They disregard Florida case law establishing and applying common law riparian and littoral rights, misconstrue section 161.051, and misinterpret Martin v. Busch.
Common Law Definitions and Principles
Because of the Trustees's position, it is appropriate to review common law definitions and principles. The term "riparian owner" applies to waterfront owners along a river or stream, and "littoral owner" applies to waterfront owners abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. Cases and statutes, however, have used "riparian owner" broadly to describe all waterfront owners. "Accretion" means the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of water. "Reliction" or "dereliction" is an increase of the land by a gradual and imperceptible withdrawal of any body of water, "Avulsion" is the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream. "Gradual and imperceptible" means that, although witnesses may periodically perceive changes in the waterfront, they could not observe them occurring. See generally Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979); F. Maloney, S. Plager & F. Baldwin, Water Law and Administration-The Florida Experience 385-92 (1968); 65 C.J.S.. Navigable Waters § 81, 86, 93 (1966). In Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 32 S.Ct. 340, 56 L.Ed. 570 (1912), the United States Supreme Court, in defining this phrase, explained:
[For the change to be perceptible, it] is not enough that the change may be discerned by comparison at two distinct points of time. It must be perceptible when it takes place. "The test as to what is gradual and imperceptible . is, that though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on."
Id. at 624, 32 S.Ct. at 346, quoting County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68, 23 L.Ed. 46 (1874) (citations omitted).
This Court has expressly adopted the common law rule that a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high water mark on navigable waters. State v. Florida Natural Properties, Inc., 338 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976); Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla.1957); Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919); Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918). We have also held that riparian or littoral rights are legal rights and, for constitutional purposes, the common law rights of riparian and littoral owners constitute property. Hayes; Brickell; Thiesen; Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, Inc., 397 So.2d 1155 (5th DCA 1981). Riparian and littoral property rights consist not only of the right to use the water shared by the public, but include the following vested rights: (1) the right of access to the water, including the right to have the property's contact with the water remain intact; (2) the right to use the water for navigational purposes; (3) the right to an unobstructed view of the water; and (4) the right to receive accretions and relic-tions to the property. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 88 S.Ct. 438, 19 L.Ed.2d 530 (1967); County of St. Clair; Hayes; Brickell; Thiesen. In Brickell, we said these riparian or littoral rights are "property rights that may be regulated by law, but may not be taken without just compensation and due process of law," Brickell, 77 Fla. at 561, 82 So. at 227, and we recently reaffirmed that principle in Florida National Properties, Inc.
The common law right of a riparian or littoral owner to accretions or relictions has a significant historical foundation. Blackstone set forth this right:
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to make terra firma; or by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and impercetible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoining.... [T]hese owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss.
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *261-62 (emphasis in original). In Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67, 17 L.Ed. 818 (1864), the United States Supreme Court recognized accretions and relictions as a vested property right:
Almost all jurists and legislators . both ancient and modern, have agreed that the owner of the [waterfront property] . is entitled to these additions. By some the rule has been vindicated on the principle of natural justice, that he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs, imposed by the contiguity of waters, ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; by others it is derived from the principle of public policy, that it is the interest of the community that all land should have an owner, and most convenient, that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore itself.
Many decisions of this Court have accepted the common law principle that title to additional lands caused by accretions and relic-tions is vested in owners of abutting waterfront lands. Florida National Properties; Brickell; Thiesen; Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fla. 549, 57 So. 428 (1911); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909). See also Ford v. Turner, 142 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); Paxson v. Collins, 100 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Mexico Beach Corp. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 97 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957).
Ownership of Artificial Accretions
We first address the Trustees' contention that the state owns all accretions from artificial causes. It is significant to note that the law, as it has developed, does not distinguish between natural and artificial accretions or relictions when the abutting waterfront owner did not cause the improvements which resulted in the formation of additional land. A recent A.L.R. annotation summarized: "[I]t is also a widely accepted proposition that the fact that such [accumulations] were initiated, accelerated, or otherwise influenced by artificial, man-made structures has no effect on the general rule of accretion and reliction." An-not., 63 A.L.R.3d 249, 255-56 (1975). More than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court addressed this question and stated:
Whether it is the effect of natural or artificial causes makes no difference. The result as to the ownership in either case is the same. The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested right. It is an inherent and essential attribute of the original property. The title to the increment rests in the law of nature. It is the same with that of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and of the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase. The right is a natural, not a civil one.
County of St. Clair, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 68-69 (emphasis added). More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in addressing the same type of question, in Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Association, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961), stated: "The fact that 'the building of the breakwaters by public authority may have aided the operation of natural causes in the deposit of the accretions . does not modify the general rule that the littoral proprietor is entitled to his proportionate share of such accretions.'" Id. 173 N.E.2d at 275 (quoting Burke v. Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 63, 186 N.E. 277, 279 (1933)).
Our Second District Court of Appeal considered title to artificially caused accretions in Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.2d 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). In that case, accretion resulted from offshore wooden groins placed as part of a public beach stabilization program. The court rejected an argument to distinguish between natural and artificial accretions and awarded the accreted property to the upland littoral owner. As the court explained: "Were the state to gain title to this accreted land, we believe that riparian titles around the state would be in jeopardy of unmarketability." Id. at 213. Speaking about this rule, a Florida commentator on water rights states:
The reasoning supporting this rule becomes obvious when the equitable rights of the riparian owner are examined. It would be unjust to allow one to lose his riparian rights merely because a nearby owner erected a groin or dike.
F. Maloney, Water Law and Administration 389.
In the instant case, the trial court expressly found that neither the waterfront owner nor anyone on its behalf constructed the jetty which, together with natural causes, caused the accretion. The law is clear that, under these circumstances, the riparian or littoral owner has a vested right to new lands formed as a result of the accretion or reliction. The fact that such accretions or relictions occurred in part because of artificial improvements does not affect the owner's title to those lands provided the owner has not constructed the improvements which caused the accretions.
We note, however, that the common law has never allowed a waterfront owner to receive title to artifically created accretions when he caused those additions to his land by improvements. In this circumstance, title to the accreted land remains with the sovereign. The district court in Medeira Beach explains: "[S]ince land below the ordinary high water mark is sovereignty land of the state, to permit the riparian owner to cause accretion himself would be tantamount to allowing him to take state land." 272 So.2d at 212. In that case, before determining the waterfront owner was entitled to the accreted land, the district court noted that the owner was not responsible for the placement of wooden groins which caused the accretions.
Right to Artificial Accretions under Section 161.051, Florida Statutes (1981)
The Trustees' second contention is that, even if the law prior to 1961 awarded waterfront owners title to artificial accretions, the enactment of section 161.051 modified that rule of law to direct that all artificially-caused accretions belong to the state. Before construing this statute, we should first review legislation regarding waterfront owners' rights.
In 1856, the Florida Legislature expanded waterfront owners' rights by modifying the common law rule concerning artificial additions to waterfront property in the enactment of the Butler Act. Ch. 791, Laws of Fla. (1856). This "Act to benefit Commerce" provided that the State of Florida, in consideration of this benefit, would divest itself of all right, title, and interest to lands covered by water lying in front of land of a citizen vesting title in riparian proprietor owners and "giving them the full right and privilege to build wharves into streams or waters of the Bay or Harbor as far as may be necessary . and to fill up from the shore, bank or beach, as far as may be desired, not obstructing the channel." In 1921, this Act was amended to specify that this grant of title did not affect submerged lands "until actually filled in or permanently improved." See ch. 8537, Laws of Fla. (1921). In 1957, this public policy was changed because of concern for the rights of the public in submerged sovereignty lands and these additional statutory riparian and littoral rights were repealed. See ch. 57-362, Laws of Fla. Section 161.051 was enacted in 1965 as part of the chapter entitled "Beach, Shore and Preservation Act," and has as its intent the regulation of construction, reconstruction, and other physical improvements on waterfront properties.
The Trustees contend that section 161.-051 does not distinguish between owners who caused the accretions through artificial means and owners who benefited from artificial accretions but had no control over the improvements. Section 161.051 provides:
161.051 Coastal construction by persons, firms, corporations, or local authorities. — Where any person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or any public agency shall construct and install projects when permits have been properly issued, such works and improvements shall be the property of said person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or any public agency where located, and shall thereafter be maintained by and at the expense of said person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or other public agency. No grant under this section shall affect title of the state to any lands below the mean high-water mark, and any additions or accretions to the upland caused by erection of such works or improvement shall remain the property of the state- if not previously conveyed. The state shall in no way be liable for any damages as a result of erections of such works and improvements, or for any damages arising out of construction, reconstruction, maintenance, or repair thereof, or otherwise arising on account of such works or improvements.
According to the Trustees, the second sentence of the Act was intended to apply to accretions of property owners who had no control over the improvement.
We find the district court's construction of the statute correct and reject the Trustees' contention that the legislature intended to usurp vested rights from unsuspecting waterfront owners. We find the statute is intended to apply only to persons or entities seeking to construct coastal improvements, and, by its terms, sets forth the following four objectives. First, when the state approves construction on submerged sovereignty land, the builder owns the improvements and must maintain them. Second, a permit granted to build improvements on submerged sovereignty land does not convey the underlying sovereignty land. Third, any additions or accretions to the land of the permittee that are caused by the improvement do not add to the permittee's lands. Fourth, the state is not liable for any damages resulting from the improvements constructed on its sovereignty lands by the permittee.
The Trustees construe the second sentence out of context to the statute as a whole. The second sentence was intended to apply only to the permittee's "additions or accretions to the upland" that were caused by permitted improvements. While the statute allows the construction of improvements on submerged lands, it was intended to make clear that the original common law would apply to accretions artificially caused by the land owner, and that title to those accumulations would remain in the state.
In our view, section 161.051 was intended to codify common law principles and was not intended to deprive unsuspecting waterfront owners of their rights to accretion and reliction caused by artificial improvements for which they were not responsible. Along Florida's waterfront, state and local governments permit construction of many jetties, groins, docks, seawalls, and other improvements which result in accretions to both public and private lands. To accept the Trustees' view would lead to the unjust result that improvements authorized by the state for one waterfront owner, which cause accretions to another waterfront owner, would divest from the second unsuspecting owner his vested riparian or littoral rights. Without question, the Trustees' interpretation would have a disastrous effect on many unsuspecting waterfront owners and would necessitate a finding that this is a taking by the state of vested riparian and littoral rights without compensation.
The Application of Martin v. Busch
The Trustees' final contention is that Martin v. Busch controls this case. They assert that Martin holds that the upland owner takes title to bottom land uncovered by reliction only when the reliction is due to natural causes, not when land is reclaimed by artificial means through government drainage operations, and that Justice Brown's concurring opinion, in referring to the riparian rights doctrine of accretion and reliction, supports their contention that upland owners have no right to artifically caused accretion. The Trustees' reliance on Martin is clearly misplaced because the property owner in that case did not claim title on the basis of riparian rights to accretions and relictions. Martin's sole issue was a boundary dispute, and the parties were arguing over which survey should be used to identify the ordinary high water mark. We held that
the conveyance . covered only an estimated acreage of unsurveyed swamp and overflow lands
and
the swamp and overflowed lands covered by the conveyance from the State Trust ees did not extend below ordinary high water mark of the navigable lake,
and
the averments of the answer cannot vary the terms of the conveyance by the State Trustees and cannot affect the legal status of the sovereignty lands that were not included and could not lawfully be included in or covered by the conveyance of swamp and overflowed lands made by the State Trustees to complainant's predecessor in title.
93 Fla. at 575-76, 112 So. at 287.
The portion of the opinion relied on by the Trustees relates to a general statement concerning water rights, rather than the holding in the case. To understand that portion of Martin taken out of context by the Trustees, it is necessary to quote portions preceding and subsequent to the relied-upon language:
The subsequent vesting of title to sovereignty lands in the Trustees for State purposes under the Acts of 1919 or other statutes, does not make the title to sovereignty land inure to claimants under a previous conveyance of swamp and overflowed lands by the State Trustees who then had no authority to convey such sovereignty lands and did not attempt or intend to convey sovereignty lands.
A riparian owner is one who owns to the line of ordinary high water mark on navigable waters.
Riparian owners in this State usually have title to ordinary high water mark of navigable waters; the lands below such mark belong to the State by virtue of its sovereignty, and are not held for ordinary private ownership purposes.
If to serve a public purpose the State, with the consent of the Federal authority, lowers the level of navigable waters so as to make the water recede and uncover lands below the original high water mark, the lands so uncovered below such high water mark, continue to belong to the State. Reliction is the term applied to land that has been covered by water, but which has become uncovered by the imperceptible recession of the water.
The doctrine of reliction is applicable where from natural causes water recedes by imperceptible degrees, and does not apply where land is reclaimed by governmental agencies as by drainage operations. 29 Cyc. 354 see Baumhart v. McClure, [21] Ohio [App.] [491], 153 N.E.Rep. 211.
The Riparian Acts of 1856 and 1921 apply only to "any navigable stream, bay or the sea or harbor." The latter statute by express provision does not "apply to lakes, except tide water lakes," and Lake Okeechobee is not a tide water lake. Sec. 6, Chapter 8537.
Chapter 7892, Acts of 1919, validated all land surveys approved by the Chief Drainage Engineer for the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, and does not validate any other surveys. The authority given by the Trustees to survey the line of high water mark of the navigable lake and the survey made must be held to mean ordinary high water mark in the absence of a contrary showing.
93 Fla. at 573-74, 112 So. at 287 (emphasis added).
This part of the opinion sets forth general water law principles. The underlined portion of the opinion explains that the state, for a public purpose, may lower the level of navigable waters by drainage without losing title to the uncovered sovereignty lands. It then defines reliction as occurring by the imperceptible recession of the water and concludes that reclamation by a drainage operation is not reliction by "imperceptible degrees." The case cited, Baumhart v. McClure, explains the distinction between upland property that disappears under the water suddenly and property that disappears slowly and gradually and then reappears. It also states that a party claiming accreted land has the burden of establishing that an accumulation actually occurred slowly and imperceptibly.
We reject the Trustees' contention that the dicta in Martin means that riparian owners are divested, not only of their riparian or littoral right to accretions, but also of their property's waterfront characteristics. This Court expresses no such intent in Martin v. Busch, and, in fact, the concurring opinion of Justice Brown states that Martin does not involve the rights to accretion and reliction. We conclude that Martin v. Busch does not establish any basis for the state to claim title to accretions not caused by the upland riparian or littoral owner. Our subsequent decisions show there was no intent to change common law principles regarding the right to accretions and relictions. See, e.g., Forman v. Florida Land Holding Corp., 121 So.2d 784 (Fla.1960).
Conclusion
The trial court found that the subject additional lands resulted from "accretion" and occurred "gradually and imperceptibly." We hold that the upland waterfront owner, Sand Key, is entitled to the accretion because it did not participate in the improvements which, together with natural causes, resulted in the accretion. Our holding does not change the existing law or interfere with the state's basic responsibility to hold submerged sovereignty lands in trust for its people. Further, our holding recognizes the principle that waterfront owners cannot claim title to accretions which they have caused.
For the reasons expressed, we approve the district court decision and its construction of section 161.051, Florida Statutes.
It is so ordered.
SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., and ADKINS, J. (Retired), concur.
EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which McDONALD, C.J., concurs.