Case Name: William Garvin et al. vs. Robert Lowry
Court: High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1846-01
Citations: 7 S. & M. 24
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Garvin et al. vs. Robert Lowry.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 24–27

Head Matter:
William Garvin et al. vs. Robert Lowry.
The authority of an attorney upon a general retainer, to collect money, extends no further than to receive the amount in legal currency; if he accept anything else, without special authority, the client may refuse to acknowledge it as a payment, and may, where the payment was on a judgment, re-issue the execution ; where therefore an attorney at law received of his client’s judgment debtor the notes of third persons, and receipted for them as cash to the debtor, the creditor, it was held, might still proceed with the execution against the debtor, unless the debtor could show that the attorney was authorized to make the arrangement ; and the attorney’s statements at the time that he was so authorized, will not be evidence of such authority ; especially where the attorney, in his deposition, states that he has no recollection of having had a special authority.
Where the charge of-the courtis in accordance with the law, hut the jury find contrary thereto and to the testimony ; and the court below refuse to grant a new trial; this court will interpose and grant the new trial.
Before a client can be held, by acquiescence therein, to have ratified the act of his attorney, which was beyond the scope of his authority as such, it must he shown that the act was made known to him, and what course he adopted when informed of it.
In error from the Tishamingo circuit court; Hon. Stephen Adams, judge.
William Garvin and others, partners under the style of Gar-vin, Carson, & Co. sued Robert Lowry, in March, A. D. 1843, in an action of debt upon a judgment record from Tennessee. The defendant plead payment, and offered as evidence, in support of his plea to the jury, six receipts from Micajah Bullock, who was the attorney, who recovered the judgment in Tennessee. These receipts were for an amount sufficient to cover the judgment, and purport to be for money received from the defendantby Bullock. The plaintiff read Bullock’s deposition, which proved, that although the receipts call for money, yet one was given for a fifty dollar bank note of Mississippi, at fifty per cent, discount, which proved to be entirely worthless, and was returned to the defendant; and that the other receipts were given for promissory-notes due to the defendant, which he was to collect and apply to satisfy the judgment; upon which notes some money had been collected, but that it was doubtful whether the remainder could be collected in a reasonable time, if at all. Bullock also states that he has no recollection that his clients, Garvin, Carson & Co. ever authorized him to receive anything but money in satisfaction of the debt. The defendant then introduced two witnesses, who proved that at the -time of settlement, Bullock informed him, that he, Bullock, had full authority to settle the debt in any manner which he might think proper and right, that the claims recovered by Bullock for which the receipts were given, were taken as an unconditional payment. These receipts were given at various times in 1840, the last on the 24th October, of that year. On cross-interrogatory the defendant’s witnesses stated that Bullock was an honorable man, and an excellent lawyer. This was all the proof. The court then, at the request of appellant’s counsel, instructed the jury, 1st. That a receipt, purporting upon its face to have been given for money, may be explained by parol testimony. 2d. That a receipt made by the attorney of a party, for anything other than money, is not binding upon the principal without his authority to receive the thing for which the receipt was given. The jury found for defendant and the motion by plaintiffs for a new trial being overruled, they prosecuted this writ of error.
Wood and Walter, for plaintiffs in error.
The following principles of law are applicable to, and must decide this cause :
1. An attorney for the collection of a debt, has but a limited authority or agency. He cannot compromise the claim. 3 How. 314; 2 J. J. Marshall, 69, 70, 71.
2. Whenever the declarations or statements of an agent are beyond the scope of his agency or authority they do not bind his principal. 3 Phil. Ev. 185. And this though they should be contained in the agent’s sworn bill in chancery. Leeds v. Marine Insurance Co. 2 Wheat. 380.
3. Neither the declarations of a man or his acts, can be given in evidence to prove his agency. 3 Phil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill’s notes,) 189 ; Plumsted’s Lessee v. Rudebuck, 1 Yates, 502.
W. and A. Yerger, for defendant in error.
The court certainly did not err in refusing a new trial. The jury were well warranted, from theproof, thatBullockwasauthor-ized to settle with defendant in the manner proved. Bullock did not state that he was not authorized, but merely that 11 he did not recollect7’ whether he was or not authorized to do so. Two of the witnesses of defendant prove, that when the settlement was made three years before, Bullock then said he was authorized so to settle, and the plaintiff himself proved Bullock to be a man of strict integrity, accurate business habits, &c.; all of which, coupled with the fact that plaintiff waited three years after the settlement before complaining of it, and that he has ratified Bullock’s acts so far as to take the money, which was procured by means of that settlement,— all certainly forbid the jury to find any other verdict than they did. But even if it were doubtful which way the jury ought to have found, or if this court on the evidence would have found the vérdict the other way, still this court will not reverse, it being a settled rule of law that a new trial will not be granted after the verdict of a jury, upon the ground that the verdict was against evidence, unless there was no evidence at all to justify the finding, or the preponderance against the verdict was very great. 3 How. 319; see Bilbie v. Lumleij, 2 East; but particularly 12 Johns. R. 300.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Clayton
delivered the opinion of the court.
The principles which govern this case are very familiar, and have been frequently recognized by this court. The authority of an attorney upon a general retainer to collect money, extends no farther than to receive the amount in legal'currency. If he accept anything else, without special authority, the client may refuse to acknowledge it as payment, and re-issue the execution.
In this case the attorney received the notes of third persons, and gave a receipt for them as so much cash. These notes have not been paid to him. There is no proof that he had any special authority to receive these, or that the plaintiff recognized the payment.
The attorney, in his deposition, says, he does not recollect that he had any special authority for such purpose, but two other witnesses state that at the time of the transaction he represented that he had such authority. This contradictory testimony may detract from the credibility of the attorney, but cannot establish the fact that he had the necessary authority. Something more than his mere declaration is required. The character of the attorney for integrity and veracity is proven to be very good.
The charge given by the court was in accordance with the principles above stated, but the verdict is in opposition to the charge and to the testimony. The court overruled a motion for a new trial. There is nothing to sustain the finding, for even if the evidence of the attorney be rejected, still there is nothing to warrant the verdict. If he made a false representation of his authority, and thereby induced Lowry to make the settlement, he is liable to him for any loss sustained. But the plaintiffs are not bound by the act, according to the present state of the testimony. Something is said of the acquiescence of the plaintiffs in the act; it is not shown, when the transaction became known to them, or what course they adopted when informed of it. Knowledge or notice of a transaction is necessary to constitute a ratification by acquiescence.
On the whole, we think it more conducive to the ends of justice, that a new trial should be had, and the judgment will be reversed and new trial awarded.