Case Name: QI FENG WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-02-07
Citations: 408 F. App'x 506
Docket Number: No. 10-1088-ag
Parties: QI FENG WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 408
Pages: 506–507

Head Matter:
QI FENG WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 10-1088-ag.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 7, 2011.
Peter L. Quan, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Ethan B. Kanter, Senior Litigation Counsel; John M. McAdams, Jr., Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Qi Feng Weng, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China ("China"), seeks review of a March 15, 2010, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Qi Feng Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 15, 2010). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). We review for substantial evidence the BIA's evaluation of country conditions evidence submitted with a motion to reopen. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).
It is beyond dispute that Weng's motion to reopen was untimely, as it was filed almost six years after the agency's order of removal became final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is "based on changed circumstances ai'ising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing," 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), the BIA reasonably determined that Weng failed to demonstrate changed conditions in China.
Contrary to Weng's argument, there is no indication that the BIA ignored any evidence he submitted. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006). In fact, the BIA explicitly referred to Weng's evidence in its decision.
As for the finding on country conditions, the BIA agreed with Weng that Falun Gong practitioners in China endure "severe repression." However, based on the materials in evidence, the BIA reasonably found that this repression has existed since Falun Gong was outlawed in China in 1999, and has not changed since Weng's order of removal became final in 2004. Thus, the BIA reasonably found that Weng had failed to demonstrate changed country conditions as required to overcome the time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).