Case Name: Michael Francis BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John SALAZAR, Warden, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-05-05
Citations: 431 F. App'x 579
Docket Number: No. 08-56548
Parties: Michael Francis BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John SALAZAR, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: RYMER, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 431
Pages: 579–580

Head Matter:
Michael Francis BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John SALAZAR, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 08-56548.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 20, 2011.
Filed May 5, 2011.
Jan Burns Norman, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Michael Francis Brown, pro se.
Raquel M. Gonzalez, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: RYMER, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Michael Francis Brown appeals from the district court's order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we vacate and remand.
Brown contends that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because it was induced by a misrepresentation that he would receive a sentence of no more than five years in prison. He argues that the 20-year prison sentence he received violates his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Brown has never received an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty plea, despite providing: (1) detailed allegations in his pro se habeas petitions to the California Supreme Court and the District Court, (2) supporting declarations from three attorneys who witnessed the underlying events, (3) a corroborating letter from his trial court counsel, and (4) requests for an evidentiary hearing with each habeas petition he filed.
If true, Brown's allegations are sufficient to warrant habeas relief. An involuntary guilty plea is "a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Accordingly, the California Supreme Court's summary denial of Brown's petition was an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. - (2011); see also Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 75-76, 97 S.Ct. 1621; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).
The district court abused its discretion by denying Brown's habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his plea. See Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005) ("[Wjhere the petitioner establishes a colorable claim for relief and has never béen afforded a state or federal hearing on this claim, we must remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing."); see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561—62 (9th Cir.1987).
VACATED AND REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.