Case Name: David REYES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-07-06
Citations: 762 So. 2d 913
Docket Number: No. SC96487
Parties: David REYES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 762
Pages: 913–914

Head Matter:
David REYES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC96487.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 6, 2000.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner,
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Reyes v. State, 742 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), in which the First District certified the same question which it certified in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999):
DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We recently approved the First District's decision in Woods, holding that the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So.2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in Cotton, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the First District's decision in this case.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.