Case Name: MITCHELL v. WILKERSON; FOLDEN v. KENNEDY et al.; ROWE v. KENNEDY et al.; GARNER v. KENNEDY et al.; NEELY v. PARKER et al.; AMOS v. PARKER et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1988-10-06
Citations: 258 Ga. 608
Docket Number: 45899; 46027; 46028; 46029; 46051; 46052
Parties: MITCHELL v. WILKERSON. FOLDEN v. KENNEDY et al. ROWE v. KENNEDY et al. GARNER v. KENNEDY et al. NEELY v. PARKER et al. AMOS v. PARKER et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Weltner, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 258
Pages: 608–611

Head Matter:
45899.
46027.
46028.
46029.
46051.
46052.
MITCHELL v. WILKERSON. FOLDEN v. KENNEDY et al. ROWE v. KENNEDY et al. GARNER v. KENNEDY et al. NEELY v. PARKER et al. AMOS v. PARKER et al.
(372 SE2d 432)

Opinion:
Clarke, Presiding Justice.
Each of these cases involves recall elections and in each case the officeholders attack the constitutionality of the recall statute. The trial court held the statute constitutional. We disagree and reverse.
In 1978, the Georgia Constitution was amended to authorize the General Assembly to provide by general law for the recall of public officials who hold elective office. The amendment also states, "The procedures, grounds, and all other matters relevant to such recall shall be provided for in such law." Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. II, Par. IV. Acting pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly enacted a recall statute in 1979. OCGA § 21-4-1 et seq. The statute does not specify grounds for a recall election but provides that the application for a recall petition must include among other things,
the specific reason or reasons advanced by the sponsors for the support of the recall. Such reason or reasons shall be limited to not more than six lines on the application and shall be typed, printed, or reproduced by the election superintendent on the face of each application issued. . . .
This constitutional attack on the statute presents a forthright question: whether the legislature must specify in the statute grounds for a recall or whether it is adequate to require the applicants for a recall petition to select and recite the grounds. We find the language of the constitutional provision to be plain upon its face. The Constitution says certain things shall be provided for by law. Among those things are the grounds for the recall. We view this as a mandate which the General Assembly may not escape. Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary defines "ground" as "the fundamental cause, reason or motive for an action. ." The statute does not specify the fundamental reason or motive upon which a petition for recall can rest. Instead, it attempts to authorize the applicant for recall to designate and specify the reasons for a recall. We perceive no distinction between grounds and reasons. The basic expression of the people's will occurs in the ratification of the Constitution. In constitutionally expressing their will, the people imposed upon the legislature a limitation of its right to enact a recall statute. That limitation is the requirement that grounds for the recall be stated in the act. The statutory attempt to transfer the selection of the reasons to the applicant amounts to an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72 (77 SE2d 723) (1953). The absence of a specification of grounds in the statute causes the statute to fall short of that which is required of the General Assembly by the constitutional provision and results in a fatal infirmity. We hold that the statute violates Art. II, Sec. II, Par. IV of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.
Having held the statute unconstitutional, we do not reach the other issues in these cases.
Judgments reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Weltner, J., who dissent.