Case Name: GORHAM, Appellant, v. SWANSON et al, Respondents
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1969-04-23
Citations: 253 Or. 133
Docket Number: 
Parties: GORHAM, Appellant, v. SWANSON et al, Respondents.
Judges: Before Perry, Chief Justice, and McAllister, Sloan, O’Connell, Goodwin, Denecke and Holman, Justices.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 253
Pages: 133–144

Head Matter:
Argued March 6,
reargued October 7, 1968,
affirmed April 23, 1969
GORHAM, Appellant, v. SWANSON et al, Respondents.
453 P2d 670
Duane Vergeer, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Vergeer, Samuels, Cavanaugh & Roehr and Walter H. Sweek.
Richard Bryson, Eugene, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Calkins & Bryson.
Before Perry, Chief Justice, and McAllister, Sloan, O’Connell, Goodwin, Denecke and Holman, Justices.

Opinion:
McAllister, j.
This is a third party action by a surviving spouse for the alleged wrongful death of a workman and raises again the application of the "joint supervision or control" and the "pickup or delivery" provisions of ORS 656.154.
The decedent, Wayne E. Gorham, was employed as a truck driver by Wilhelm Trucking Company. On July 9, 1966, while his truck was being loaded with lumber at defendants' sawmill in Noti, decedent was fatally injured and died leaving the plaintiff widow surviving him. Both of the employers, Wilhelm Trucking Company and Swanson Bros. Lumber Co. were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law of which ORS 656.154 is a part.
The truck was being loaded with about 15,000 feet of lumber banded with steel bands into separate bundles, each about 36 inches wide and each weighing about 4,000 pounds. Both the truck and trailer were to be loaded with three bundles, two side by side on the bottom, with a third bundle centered on top. There were four bundles 16 feet or longer for the bottom of the loads and two bundles 14 feet or shorter for the top.
The bundles were being placed on the truck by means of a lift truck with 42-inch forks operated by Wilbert Adank, a mill employee. As the first step in the loading the truck driver placed on the beds of the truck and trailer 2x4 crosspieces, on which to set the bundles of lumber. As Adank placed the bundles, on the truck the decedent helped by spotting the loads. Adank testified:
"Q Earlier you said that Mr. Gorham was spotting the load as you were loading it. What did you mean by that?
"A Well, he sees that they are put on the truck where he wants them for weight distributed where he wants it for his axle weight, and so forth.
"Q Would you describe how he does that?
"A Well, he just tells you how far to go in with them, and where to set them down, where he wants the end of his load, and so forth.
"Q Did he signal to you in any way to do anything?
"A Well, he tallied or hollered at me there different times where he wanted it, but I couldn't see where he was standing."
After the bottom bundles were loaded the truck driver climbed up and placed crosspieces on which to place the top bundles. It was necessary to place the top bundles as close to the center of the truck as possible. The forks of the lift truck were not long enough to center the lumber with one set. It was necessary to set the bundle down and pull the forks part way out, pick the bundle up again and move it forward. In the process of attempting to center the top bundle the lumber shifted, the bands broke and the spilled lumber injured the decedent. The truck driver was helping Adank to center the top bundle when the accident occurred. Adank testified:
"Q Why were you moving it [the bundle] over this way?
"A That is where he wanted it.
"Q That is where who wanted it?
"A The truck driver.
"Q As a matter of fact, did you ever get it over as far as lie wanted it?
"A Not as far as I know, no.
"Q And once again how did lie signal you to move it over?
# # #
"A He just hollered to bring it in further."
If the loading had been completed the driver would have then fastened the load onto the truck with chain or cable binders.
The trial court found that both employers had joint supervision and control over the loading operation and that the operation was not a pickup within the meaning of ORS 656.154 (3). The trial court entered judgment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.
This case is indistinguishable on the facts from many of our prior cases, particularly those arising out of the loading or unloading of logs by the joint efforts of the truck driver and an employee of the logger or sawmill operator. See: Beers v. Chapman, 230 Or 553, 370 P2d 941 (1962); Nelson et al v. Bartley et al, 222 Or 361, 352 P2d 1083 (1960); Claussen v. Ireland, 216 Or 289, 338 P2d 676 (1959); and Long v. Springfield Lumber Mills, 214 Or 231, 327 P2d 421 (1958). Those cases are controlling on the issue of joint supervision and control. 'Whether a truck and trailer are loaded with six bundles of lumber, each weighing about two tons, or an equal number of logs would seem to be of no significance.
In 1959 ORS 656.154 was amended by adding subsection 3, which is commonly called the pickup and delivery amendment, reading as follows:
"No person engaged in pickup or delivery of any goods, wares or merchandise to or from the premises of any employer other than his own shall be deemed to have joint supervision or control over the premises of a third party employer."
"We have construed that amendment in three cases and held that it did not apply to operations such as took place in this case: Boling v. Nork, 232 Or 461, 375 P2d 548 (1962) (loading logs); Childers v. Schaecher Lbr. Co., 234 Or 230, 380 P2d 993 (1963) (unloading logs); Hadeed v. Wil. Hi-Grade Concrete Co., 238 Or 513, 395 P2d 553 (1964) (unloading ready mix concrete).
We decided Boling v. Nork in 1962. After carefully considering the legislative history of the amendment, its key expressions of "pickup or delivery" and "goods, wares or merchandise" and our prior decisions, we expressed with particularity what in our best judgment was the legislative intent of the enactment. We said:
"We believe that if the Assembly had intended the words 'pickup or delivery' to apply to operations such as loading logs, unloading logs, and like activities which ordinarily require the massing of men and machinery for such purposes, it would have used language clearly describing such activities. The words 'pickup or delivery' do not describe the combination of heavy machinery and rigorous labor involved in logging operations either at the landing in the woods or at the pond where the logs are eventually dumped. The ordinary meaning of the words 'pickup or delivery' cannot be extended to cover the combined efforts of the workmen in this case.
"We hold that ORS 656.154(3) was intended to, and does, codify the rule found in Johnson v. Timber Structures, supra, in that ordinary pickup-and-delivery situations, as those words are commonly understood, do not bring the premises under the joint supervision and control of any other employer than the one upon whose premises the pickup or delivery is being made. The amendment does not cover logging operations as they are commonly conducted in the industry, and as they are described in the cases we have cited." 232 Or at 465-466.
Our 1962 interpretation of ORS 656.154 (3) in Boling v. Nork, supra, was followed in Childers v. Schaecher Lbr. Co., supra, decided in 1963, and Ha-deed v. Wil. Hi-Grade Concrete Co., supra, decided in 1964.
It is argued that we erroneously construed the pickup or delivery amendment in Boling v. NorJc and that we should re-examine the question and overrule the three cases interpreting that amendment. For the reasons hereinafter set out we decline to do so.
In the first place we think our interpretation of the amendment was proper. The amendment, ORS 656.154 (3), was enacted by Oregon Laws 1959, ch 504, sec 1. The phrase "pickup or delivery" can be interpreted either broadly or narrowly. It is manifest from the legislative history that the legislature intended the phrase to be interpreted narrowly. The amendment was incorporated in House Bill 252, introduced by Representative Whelan at the request of the AFL-CIO. The measure, as introduced, read as follows:
"No person engaged in pickup or delivery of any goods, wares or merchandise to or from the premises of any employer other than his own, or engaged in worJc incidental to such pickup or delivery, shall be deemed to have joint supervision or control over the premises of a third party employer." (Emphasis added.)
The sponsors obviously intended to insure that pickup or delivery received the broadest possible interpretation by coupling it with the phrase "or engaged in work incidental to sncli pickup or delivery." The measure was opposed in the Senate however and the opposition centered on the phrase "or engaged in work incidental to such pickup or delivery." It was not until that phrase was deleted that the measure was enacted into law. The only purpose of stripping out the "incidental" phrase was to narrow the meaning of the remaining phrase "engaged in pickup or delivery."
In the second place the legislature has met in three biennial sessions since our interpretation of ORS 656.154 (3) in Boling v. Nork. No change has been made in the statute by the legislature at any of those sessions. If we misinterpreted the statute the legislature could have and may in the future amend the statute to reject our interpretation and clarify its purpose. In the face of the legislative history of the amendment and the passage of three regular sessions without legislative criticism of our interpretation we prefer to adhere to our interpretation of the amendment and leave any change to legislative action.
Plaintiff argues that the tariff under which this lumber was being shipped required the defendants to do the loading. We think the applicability of the statute must be determined by what was being done by the workmen at the time of the injury. It is clear from the evidence that the loading involved in this case was being conducted in accordance with the usual practice at defendants' mill.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Extracts at hearing before Senate Judiciary Committee, April 27 and 28, 1959:
"Mr. Wm. Morrison, an attorney, Portland, stated there is danger in the clause, 'incidental to employment'. This would ruin loggers, and run them, right out of business, he felt."
"Mr. Pete Brooks, Oregon Auto Insurance Company, said that his company was opposed to language 'or engaged in work incidental to pickup and delivery'. Mr. Franklin said they would concede that that could be stricken, but did not think it would cause the dire results that they thought it would. Atkinson vs. Fairview Farms is a case where a man was delivering milk to Fairview Farms, and he helped the man do some little chore, and the Supreme Court said he was engaged in something more than pickup and delivery."
"Senator Francis inquired if it did not leave a great area where there still is some doubt. Mr. Franklin said it would only apply to the one area."
"Senator Francis inquired if the language 'or engaged in work incidental to such pickup or delivery' were deleted, what would the status be. Mr. Franklin said if that were deleted, under the Supreme Court decisions, he would be covered under the State Industrial as well as for third party claims." "Senator Lewis moved that the language on lines 20 and 21 on page 1 of the printed bill ', engaged in work incidental to such pickup or delivery,' be deleted. Senator Dimick seconded the motion. Motion carried unanimously."