Case Name: Debra Ann CHRISTENSON-SULLINS and Ryan Sullins, her husband, Appellants, v. Emily M. RAYMER and Terry J. Thorton, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-09-06
Citations: 765 So. 2d 955
Docket Number: No. 1D99-2583
Parties: Debra Ann CHRISTENSON-SULLINS and Ryan Sullins, her husband, Appellants, v. Emily M. RAYMER and Terry J. Thorton, Appellees.
Judges: BENTON, J., CONCURS; MINER, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 765
Pages: 955–962

Head Matter:
Debra Ann CHRISTENSON-SULLINS and Ryan Sullins, her husband, Appellants, v. Emily M. RAYMER and Terry J. Thorton, Appellees.
No. 1D99-2583.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 6, 2000.
Stephen K. Moonly and Cheryl A. Roberson of Bledsoe, Schmidt, Lippes, Moonly & Roberson, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants.
Harold H. Catlin, Jacksonville, for Ap-pellees.

Opinion:
BROWNING, J.
Appellants, Debra Ann Christenson-Sul-lins (Christenson-Sullins) and her husband, Ryan Sullins, appeal the trial court's imposition of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Emily M. Raymer (Raymer). We reverse.
On April 21, 1998, an automobile owned by Raymer, collided with a vehicle driven by Christenson-Sullins, damaging Chris-tenson-Sullins' vehicle and injuring Chris-tenson-Sullins. It was assumed and agreed by the parties that Thorton was the person driving Raymer's vehicle. However, the driver of the vehicle fled the scene of the accident, abandoned the vehicle, and was never positively identified.
It is undisputed that Raymer loaned her car to Lynda Bisel (Bisel), that Bisel kept the car at her home, and that Thorton was Bisel's boyfriend and resided with Bisel. Bisel testified that, on the day of the accident, she came home and took a nap. When she awoke, the car was gone, but she did not call the police to report the car was stolen. Raymer's affidavit indicated that when the police informed her that her car had been involved in an accident and that a man had been driving, she tried to locate Bisel. She went to Bisel's house, but no one was home. She found Bisel playing darts at a bar approximately two blocks from her home.
Bisel's deposition indicated she had previously permitted Thorton to drive Ray-mer's vehicle, but upon learning Thorton did not have a valid driver's license, she expressly forbade him to use the car. On the date of the accident, Thorton did not have Bisel's permission to use the vehicle, and Thorton had never taken Raymer's car without Bisel's permission after he had been forbidden to use it. Raymer's affidavit in support of summary judgment indicated that Bisel was an insured driver on Raymer's auto insurance policy; and that Thorton did not have Raymer's authorization or consent to operate'Raymer's vehicle; and that Thorton was not listed on the application for insurance as a driver of the vehicle and was not allowed to operate the vehicle.
Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, an owner who gives authority to another to operate the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated safely. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993). Knowledge and consent constitute an essential element in establishing liability of the owner and must be proven before the owner can be subjected to liability for damages proximately caused by the negligence of the driver. See Tribbitt v. Crown Contractors, Inc., 513 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). However, "the essential authority or consent which underlies the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is simply consent to the use or operation of [the vehicle] beyond [the owner's] own immediate control." Tribbitt, 513 So.2d at 1086, quoting Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959). When control is voluntarily relinquished to another, only a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve the owner of responsibility for a vehicle's use or misuse. See Susco, 112 So.2d at 832; Tribbitt.
In the case at bar, Raymer consented to the operation of her car beyond her immediate control by permitting Bisel to use her car. Thus, Raymer is liable for damages caused by the use of her car unless a species of theft or conversion is shown. See Susco; Tribbitt. Although Thorton did not have permission of éither Raymer or Bisel to use Raymer's car and was expressly instructed not to use the car, the record does not show a total absence of a genuine issue of fact entitling Appellees to summary judgment as a matter of law. The record shows Bisel failed to call the police upon discovering the car had been taken without her permission, and was so unconcerned about the allegedly unauthorized use of the car she left her home to frequent a local bar and play darts before discovering the location of the car, which could be interpreted by a jury as inconsistent with Thorton's having taken the car by conversion or theft, and consistent with the absence of a conversion or theft of the car by Thorton. The significance of these facts should be weighed by a jury, and not the trial court. Because an issue of fact remains as to whether Ray-mer's vehicle was stolen or converted, summary judgment was improper.
In making this determination, on a very close question, we are reinforced by the rule governing summary judgments requiring that every possible inference must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666 (Fla.1985).
Judge Miner in his forceful and highly persuasive dissent maintains that Thor-ton's use of Bisel's vehicle constitutes a species of conversion or theft as a matter of law under Pearson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 187 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), and the trial court should be affirmed. Except for the case of Thomas v. Atlantic Associates, Inc., 226 So.2d 100 (Fla.1969), we would agree with Judge Miner and make his dissent the majority opinion. Howéver, in Thomas the Florida Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment that was specifically based upon Pearson. Thomas involved the use of a car by a 13-year old child admittedly without the permission of her parents. The court; in construing Pearson, concluded that it was not controlling, and drew a distinction between a member of a household's use of a car without permission, and that of a house guest in "stealing into his host's bedroom and appropriating the keys to a car" and thereby using the car without permission as occurred in Pearson. See id at 103. We conclude that Thorton's actions in the instant case are sufficiently related to the facts in Thomas to. preclude summary judgment against Plaintiffs, and impel us not to adopt the well-expressed rationale of the dissent.
Furthermore, we cannot agree with the dissent that the actions of Bisel in failing to report to authorities that the car used ,by Thorton had been taken, and Bisel's obvious lack of concern about the taking of the car as evidenced by her frequenting a bar and engaging in a dart game before the car had been located, do not create a conflict in the evidence that precludes entry of summary judgment. A jury would have every right to disbelieve Bisel in view of her obviously inconsistent actions with her verbal testimony. Accordingly, Bisel's testimony is not uncontroverted as asserted by the dissent. In fact, the court in Dooley v. Harris, 714 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), cited by Judge Miner in his dissent, pointed out in affirming a summary judgment in favor of the owner of a car, that the owner had reported the person exercising the unauthorized use of the car to the police department. It, therefore, stands to reason that if reporting the unauthorized use of the car to the police department is evidence supporting a determination of conversion or theft, the failure to report the unauthorized use of Raymer's car is evidence of the absence of a conversion or theft. Of course, a jury might determine Bisel's conduct to be consistent with her verbal testimony. However, that prerogative is vested with the jury after hearing testimony about the circumstances and observing the demeanor of the witnesses.
For the reasons stated, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BENTON, J., CONCURS; MINER, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.
. Affidavits of Bisel and Raymer were submitted in support of Appellee's motion for summary judgment. However, both affidavits are defective as they are not under oath. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Only the deposition of Bisel provides a basis for this opinion.
. It is interesting to note that in Thomas the late Judge Rawls, a former member of this court and sitting on the Supreme Court by special assignment, dissented on the rationale of Pearson that is also the basis for Judge Miner's dissent.