Case Name: PEOPLE v. SCHINZEL (ON REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-10-03
Citations: 97 Mich. App. 508
Docket Number: Docket No. 44156
Parties: PEOPLE v SCHINZEL (ON REMAND)
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Bronson, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 97
Pages: 508–516

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SCHINZEL (ON REMAND)
Docket No. 44156.
Submitted June 22, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided October 3, 1978.
Opinion on remand filed May 19, 1980.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Joseph Schinzel was convicted of second-degree murder, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, James A. Hathaway, J. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of violation of the 180-day rule for bringing a prisoner to trial on an untried warrant, indictment or information. 86 Mich App 337 (1978). The people sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court which, in lieu of granting leave, reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for the taking of testimony at the trial court regarding the cause of the delay in bringing the defendant to trial and for subsequent review of that testimony by the Court of Appeals. 406 Mich 888 (1979). The trial court has taken the testimony and the Court of Appeals has now reviewed that testimony, which indicated that the delay was caused by a congested Recorder’s Court docket brought about by a change in that court’s docketing procedure. Held:
The change in docketing procedures, which resulted in a large increase in the caseload of the trial judge, make the delay in this case an excusable delay. Therefore, there was no violation of the 180-day rule.
Affirmed.
R. M. Maher, P.J., dissented. He would hold that the changeover in docketing procedure could have been accomplished in a manner to ensure compliance with the 180-day rule in those cases in which the defendants were incarcerated and that the delay was, therefore, inexcusable for purposes of the statute. He would reverse and discharge the defendant.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Incarcerated Defendants — 180-Day Rule — Statutes.
Good faith action to commence proceedings on an untried infor mation or indictment against an inmate of a penal institution must be initiated within 180 days of receipt by the prosecutor of the requisite notice or the trial court loses jurisdiction over the matter; once such good faith action is taken, jurisdiction is lost only if the initial action is followed by inexcusable delay (MCL 780.131, 780.133; MSA 28.969[1], 28.969[3]).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 249.
[2, 3, 5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 251.
[4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 242, 547.
2. Criminal Law — Incarcerated Defendants — Delay in Trial — Docket Congestion.
A delay in bringing a prisoner to trial on an untried information or indictment is inexcusable if it results from chronic docket congestion alone; however, a delay resulting from short-term docket congestion attributable to exceptional circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial court is an excusable delay.
3. Criminal Law — Incarcerated Defendants — Delay in Trial — Docketing Procedure — Statutes.
A delay in bringing a prisoner to trial which was caused by a change in docketing procedure in Detroit Recorder’s Court was excusable; therefore, the court did not lose jurisdiction to try the case under the statute which requires that proceedings against an inmate of a penal institution on an untried information must be initiated within 180 days of receipt by the prosecutor of the requisite notice (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
Dissent by R. M. Maher, P.J.
4. Criminal Law — Incarcerated Defendants — 180-Day Rule — Statutes.
The purpose of the requirement that an inmate of a penal institution is to be brought to trial on an untried charge within 180 days of the prosecutor’s receipt of the requisite notice is to give the incarcerated defendant with charges pending against him the opportunity to have all of the sentences run concurrently (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
5. Criminal Law — Incarcerated Defendants — Delay in Trial — Docketing Procedure — Statutes.
A delay in bringing a defendant to trial, caused by a changeover in the docketing system of Detroit Recorder’s Court wherein the assigned judge received an increase in caseload, is not an excusable delay for purposes of the statute which requires that a prisoner with untried charges against him must be brought to trial within 180 days of receipt' by the prosecutor of the requisite notice (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Robert Sheiko, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Gerald M. Lorence, for defendant on appeal.
Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Bronson, JJ.

Opinion:
On Remand
J. H. Gillis, J.
The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, by a Detroit Recorder's Court jury on May 23, 1977. He appealed to this Court arguing, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the asserted violation of the 180-day rule. MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).
In a 2-to-l opinion, this'Court reversed the defendant's conviction and dismissed the charges against him, MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3), ruling that more than 180 days had elapsed from the time of the charge to the trial and that the people had not met the burden of establishing good faith action to comply with MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). People v Schinzel, 86 Mich App 337; 272 NW2d 648 (1978) (J. H. Gillis, J., dissenting).
The people thereafter sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In an order dated March 13, 1979, that Court, in lieu of leave to appeal, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for the making of a testimonial record to determine the cause of the delay between defendant's arraignment and trial. The order further stated that "[a]fter the testimonial record is prepared, the Court of Appeals shall determine whether or not MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1) has been violated". People v Schinzel, 406 Mich 888 (1979).
Pursuant to that order, testimonial hearings were held on April 18 and 25 and May 1, 1979. The transcripts of those hearings having been made available to this Court, we proceed to determine whether the statute has been violated.
Jurisdiction is not lost if the defendant does not go to trial within 180 days. The statutes, MCL 780.131 and 780.133, require only that good faith action to commence proceedings be initiated within the six-month time limit, People v Castelli, 370 Mich 147; 121 NW2d 438 (1963). Thereafter, jurisdiction is lost only if the initial action is followed by an "inexcusable delay". People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300, 303-304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959).
Here, the prosecutor took sufficient good faith action to commence proceedings within the statutory period. The parties do not argue the contrary. The question presented, thus, is whether the delay which followed was such as to excuse compliance with the 180-day limitation. The answer is that it was.
The delay in the present case was occasioned by docket congestion in Detroit Recorder's Court. A delay which results from chronic docket congestion alone constitutes an inexcusable delay. People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266; 249 NW2d 384 (1976). A delay which results from short-term docket congestion, attributable to exceptional circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial court, constitutes an excusable delay. People v Forrest, supra, at 273, ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, § 2.3(b) (1968), People v Asher, 32 Mich App 380; 189 NW2d 148 (1971). We find that the delay here falls within the latter category.
The delay between the original trial date of November 15, 1976, and the eventual trial date of May 17, 1977, was occasioned by the decision of the Recorder's Court bench, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to return to the individual docket system of case assignments.
For the first ten months of 1976, Recorder's Court utilized the central docket system. Under that system, the examining magistrate, after binding a defendant over, would assign the case to a Recorder's Court judge for the purpose of conducting all pretrial proceedings. The case remained on that judge's docket until the parties were prepared to sign a ready-for-trial certificate. The filing of the signed certificate concluded that judge's involvement with the case. The case was then transferred to the central docket and assigned a trial date. On the trial date, the presiding judge would assign the case for trial to any judge who was then available.
The central docket system proved ineffective. In October, 1976, the decision was made to return Recorder's Court to the individual docket system. Under that system the pretrial judge retained the case until trial or other final disposition. The effect of this change in docketing systems was to transfer back to each pretrial judge those of his cases which had been transferred to the central docket. During the three-month period which followed this change, the trial judge in the instant case received back at least 400 pending cases. This influx of cases, of which the defendant's was one, caused the six-month delay in question.
On these facts, we are satisfied that the delay was an excusable one. The people have made an "affirmative showing of exceptional and unavoidable circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial courts". People v Forrest, 273. There was no violation of the 180-day rule. The defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Bronson, J., concurred.
The people, by way of supplemental brief, argue, as they argued when the matter was originally before this Court, that delays attributable to the judiciary are not to be charged against the prosecution. The argument was and still is without merit. People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266; 249 NW2d 384 (1976).