Case Name: Richard Wade COOEY, II, Plaintiff Arthur Tyler; Intervenor-Appellant, v. Ted STRICKLAND, et al.; Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-09-23
Citations: 345 F. App'x 971
Docket Number: No. 08-4203
Parties: Richard Wade COOEY, II, Plaintiff Arthur Tyler; Intervenor-Appellant, v. Ted STRICKLAND, et al.; Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: GIBBONS, ROGERS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 345
Pages: 971–972

Head Matter:
Richard Wade COOEY, II, Plaintiff Arthur Tyler; Intervenor-Appellant, v. Ted STRICKLAND, et al.; Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-4203.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Sept. 23, 2009.
Before: GIBBONS, ROGERS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Arthur Tyler appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to Ohio's method of execution. Upon examination of the record and briefs, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not necessary. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).
Tyler was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death on January 19, 1986. On April 25, 2007, he filed an inter-venor complaint in a § 1983 lawsuit challenging Ohio's protocol for lethal-injection brought by fellow death-sentenced inmate, Richard Cooey. After this Court held that Gooey's challenge was time-barred, Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey I), 479 F.3d 412, 424 (6th Cir.2007), the district court dismissed Tyler's complaint on the same grounds.
Tyler argues that his claim is not barred under Cooey II for the following reasons: (1) Cooey II was wrongly decided; (2) Cooey II, even if correctly decided, does not apply to Tyler; (3) Cooey II borrowed the statute of limitations from the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, under which Tyler's claim is timely; (4) Tyler is entitled to equitable tolling; and (5) the continuing-violations doctrine precludes application of the statute of limitations to method-of-execution challenges. Further, Tyler argues that he is entitled to further factual development of the statute of limitations question.
A thorough review of the record reveals that Tyler's arguments are nearly identical to those considered and rejected by this Court in appeals by other death-sentence inmates who had also intervened in Cooey II. See Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.2009); Getsy v. Strickland, 577 F.3d 309 (6th Cir.2009), reh'g en banc denied, 577 F.3d 320 (6th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 40, 174 L.Ed.2d 618 (2009). The reasoning set forth in Broom, Getsy, and Cooey I is binding on this panel and, to the extent the eases have already addressed Tyler's arguments, we adopt their reasoning here. Tyler's other arguments not directly addressed by this Court in those cases were raised before the district court. See Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065844, at *1 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 25, 2008) (incorporating by reference the reasoning of Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 25, 2008)). Upon review of the district court opinion, we find it to be correctly decided and affirm the reasoning therein.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.