Case Name: Tanya EALY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-12-29
Citations: 630 So. 2d 857
Docket Number: No. 93-93
Parties: Tanya EALY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: YELVERTON, KNOLL, THIBODEAUX, WOODARD and DECUIR, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 630
Pages: 857–861

Head Matter:
Tanya EALY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-93.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 29, 1993.
Robert C. Thomas, Natchitoches, for Tanya Ealy et al.
George P. Hebbler Jr., New Orleans, for The Hertz Corp.
Peggy Dean St. John, Alexandria, for Allstate Ins.
Charles B. Bice, Winnfield, for Charles Tomlinson.
Before: YELVERTON, KNOLL, THIBODEAUX, WOODARD and DECUIR, JJ.

Opinion:
YELVERTON, Judge.
This ease is a matter of interpreting a contract. The contract was between Sam Ealy and Hertz Corporation. Ealy rented a van from Hertz and signed a contract called a rental agreement. The contract gave Ealy limited protection against liability to third parties.
Sam Ealy was driving the van in Vernon Parish when he had a wreck. Elejah Ealy, child of Tanya and Michael Ealy, was killed. Sam Ealy was also killed in the accident.
The child's parents sued Hertz for damages for Elejah's wrongful death. Hertz put up $20,000, claiming that that was its liability protection limit per accident. Hertz relied on language in the contract which fixed its liability protection limit as the same as the automobile financial law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred. The plaintiffs claimed that Hertz's contractual liability for death caused by Sam Ealy was unlimited. They claimed that only Hertz's liability for bodily injury and property damage was limited to the Louisiana statutory minimum.
In the trial court both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial judge granted Hertz's motion, holding that Hertz owed $20,000 and no more. The trial court reasoned that a fair reading of the rental agreement in its entirety revealed that Hertz's liability for death was limited by the Louisiana statutory ^minimum just as its liability for bodily injury and property damage was limited.
The parents of the child appealed. We affirm.
The liability protection provision contained in Paragraph 10 of the rental agreement between Hertz and Sam Ealy provided, in part:
(a) Hertz will indemnify, hold harmless, and defend You and any Authorized Operators FROM AND AGAINST LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES, EXCLUDING ANY OF YOUR OR ANY AUTHORIZED OPERATOR'S FAMILY MEMBERS RELATED BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION RESIDING WITH YOU OR THEM. For bodily injury and property damage the limits of this protection, including owner's liability, are the same as the minimum limits required by the automobile financial responsibility law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred
Reading the contract between Sam Ealy and Hertz as a whole, it is clear that bodily injury was intended to include death. The clarity as to this intention is achieved in two ways. First, the expressed limits of the protection offered for bodily injury and property damage are "the same as the minimum limits required by the automobile financial responsibility law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred ." The accident here occurred in Louisiana, and our state law on the subject, La.R.S. 32:861 and 900(B)(2), requires limits of $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident; $20,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and $10,000 because of bodily injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident. By making its coverage the same as the minimum limits required by Louisiana's automobile financial responsibility law, Hertz contracted to include death as well as bodily injury. Therefore, its limitation of liability applied to death claims as well as bodily injury claims.
The second way that the rental agreement clarifies the limitation on its coverage is in its offer of optional additional coverage up to $1,000,000. The rental agreement, explaining the availability of supplementary coverage, contains this language:
LIS [Liability Insurance Supplement] provides protection from third party automobile claims for the difference between the liability protection limits provided under Paragraph 10 of the Agreement and a maximum combined single limit of One Million ($1,000,000) Dollars for bodily injury, including death and property damage, (underlining ours)
We quote with approval the following reasons for judgment given by the trial court explaining its interpretation of this lan-. guage and the rental agreement as a whole:
The words of a contract must be given their general, popular and prevailing meaning. C.C. Art. 2047. Any ambiguity in an insurance contract is to be construed against the insurer, the author of the agreement, and in favor of the insured. That rule, however, is inapplicable if dependent on strained construction. Wallace v. Huber, 597 So.2d 1247, 1249 (3rd Cir.1992). A contract must be interpreted as a whole, and all provisions thereof must be construed together to ascertain the true intent of the parties. C.C. Art. 2050; Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (3rd Cir.1972).
Construing all pertinent provisions of the contract together, I am of the opinion that the limitations provided included death. To hold otherwise would lead to an inequitable and absurd result. C.C. Art. 2046.
The rental agreement gave Sam Ealy no reasonable basis for believing that liability protection was limited for personal injury and property damage, but unlimited for death claims. The intent of the parties was that the limitation would apply to all claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants' costs.
AFFIRMED.
THIBODEAUX, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
KNOLL, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by THIBODEAUX.