Case Name: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Margaret ALLMARAS, Deceased Anthony Allmaras, Daniel Allmaras, David Allmaras, Geri Allmaras, Russell Allmaras, Shelly Schullum, Timothy Allmaras and Todd Allmaras, Petitioners and Appellants, v. Robert E. Manly, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Allmaras, and Linda Allmaras, Respondents and Appellees
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 2007-08-22
Citations: 737 N.W.2d 612
Docket Number: No. 20060380
Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Margaret ALLMARAS, Deceased Anthony Allmaras, Daniel Allmaras, David Allmaras, Geri Allmaras, Russell Allmaras, Shelly Schullum, Timothy Allmaras and Todd Allmaras, Petitioners and Appellants, v. Robert E. Manly, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Allmaras, and Linda Allmaras, Respondents and Appellees.
Judges: [¶ 26] DALE V. SANDSTROM, and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 737
Pages: 612–627

Head Matter:
2007 ND 130
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Margaret ALLMARAS, Deceased Anthony Allmaras, Daniel Allmaras, David Allmaras, Geri Allmaras, Russell Allmaras, Shelly Schullum, Timothy Allmaras and Todd Allmaras, Petitioners and Appellants, v. Robert E. Manly, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margaret Allmaras, and Linda Allmaras, Respondents and Appellees.
No. 20060380.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Aug. 22, 2007.
David R. Bliss, David R. Bliss, P.C., Bismarck, ND, for petitioners and appellants.
Daniel J. Frisk (argued) and Don R. Grande (appeared), Don R. Grande, P.C., Fargo, ND, for respondents and appellees.

Opinion:
VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Anthony Allmaras, Daniel Allmar-as, David Allmaras, Geri Allmaras, Russell Allmaras, Shelly Schullum, Timothy All-maras, and Todd Allmaras ("the petitioners") appealed from a district court order denying their petition for allowance of a claim in Margaret Allmaras's estate. We conclude the record contains insufficient evidence about whether the conservator properly deposited the funds at issue into a general guardianship account. In particular, we cannot determine from the record whether the conservator appropriately considered any known estate plan of Margaret Allmaras as required by statute. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
[¶ 2] At the time of the events relevant to this dispute, Margaret Allmaras was an elderly woman in her early 80s. Although Margaret Allmaras never had any children, she had twenty-one nieces and nephews who were the children of her three brothers, Jerome Allmaras, Gerard Allmaras, and John Allmaras. Jerome Allmaras had thirteen children. Gerard Allmaras and John Allmaras had eight children between them, and these eight nieces and nephews of Margaret Allmaras are the petitioners in this case.
[¶ 3] On August 7, 2000, Margaret All-maras executed a general durable power of attorney appointing her brother, Gerard Allmaras, and her sister-in-law, Lorraine Allmaras, as her agents. Lorraine Allmar-as was the wife of Margaret's brother John Allmaras. In the appointment document, Margaret Allmaras granted her agents "full power and authority to act on [her] behalf," including the power to "[c]onduct any business with any banking or financial institution with respect to any of [her] accounts." Each agent was granted the power to act independently of the other.
[¶ 4] About a month later, on September 15, 2000, Margaret Allmaras executed a will. In the will, she acknowledged the existence of nonprobate cash accounts and investments. Her will gave "all of my cash accounts, insurance proceeds or investments which are not co-owned or jointly owned, in equal shares to the children of my deceased brother, Jerome Allmaras."
[¶ 5] In the twenty years before her death, Margaret Allmaras accumulated a large number of certificates of deposit ("CDs") at three different banks, Western State Bank in Devils Lake, Security State Bank in New Rockford, and Bremer Bank in Carrington. On December 12, 2000, she consolidated some of these CDs into a large CD account at Bremer Bank in Car-rington. The CD was a single-party account worth $83,531.11, payable on death ("P.O.D.") to all twenty-one of Margaret Allmaras's nieces and nephews.
[¶ 6] Margaret Allmaras was admitted to a nursing home in early 2001. About six months later, Lorraine Allmaras began exercising her power of attorney to take funds from Margaret Allmaras's financial accounts, including the CD account at Bremer Bank. Between about June 2001 and June 2002, Lorraine Allmaras wrongfully withdrew the entire $83,531.11 in the Bremer Bank CD account for her own use. In early 2003, Gerard Allmaras, the other attorney-in-fact, discovered this misappropriation and reported it to Robert E. Manly, Margaret Allmaras's attorney. Later that year, in December 2003, a guardianship and conservatorship was established for Margaret Allmaras, and Guardian and Protective Services of Bismarck ("GAPS") was named her guardian and conservator. Lorraine Allmaras was criminally prosecuted for the theft, and in October 2004 she pled guilty and was ordered to pay $105,665.33 in restitution "to the Margaret Allmaras Guardianship/Conservatorship."
[¶ 7] On April 21, 2005, about one week prior to Margaret Allmaras's death, Lorraine Allmaras repaid the stolen funds. GAPS received the restitution and deposited it into Margaret Allmaras's guardianship account. GAPS did not return the money to the form it had been in before the theft, a CD account with Margaret Allmaras's twenty-one nieces and nephews as P.O.D. beneficiaries. Margaret Allmar-as died on April 28, 2005, at the age of 84. Shortly thereafter, her will was admitted to probate, and attorney Robert Manly was appointed as personal representative of the estate.
[¶ 8] The eight petitioners filed a claim against the estate, seeking a share of the $83,531.11 which was stolen by Lorraine Allmaras. The petitioners claimed that the guardian and conservator should have returned the funds to their original form as a CD account with all twenty-one nieces and nephews named as P.O.D. beneficiaries, rather than allowing the funds to pass to only the thirteen nieces and nephews under Margaret Allmaras's will. The personal representative denied the claim.
[¶ 9] The petitioners requested a hearing before the district court on the matter. At the hearing, Robert Manly was the only witness. Manly was Margaret Allmaras's longtime attorney, and he drafted her power of attorney and her will. He testified that Margaret Allmaras was a very intelligent person who was in declining health by the year 2000. He stated that she was mentally competent at the time she executed her power of attorney and her will, but that she didn't have "quite as much fire and spunk." With regard to her estate plan, Manly explained that he only knew about Margaret Allmaras's will and not her other jointly owned accounts. In her will, Margaret Allmaras favored the thirteen children of her brother Jerome All-maras because "[t]hey were a large family" and "[s]he felt that she should do something for them."
[¶ 10] When he was questioned about the CD accounts, Manly testified that Margaret Allmaras never consulted him about them, but that he knew some joint accounts existed. However, he did not know how much money she had in her nonpro-bate accounts or exactly whose names were on them. Manly explained that his clients usually discuss nonprobate property with him as part of their estate plan, but that Margaret Allmaras never did. He stated, "I didn't know what she was doing with her joint accounts, she never volunteered, I just felt it wasn't my business to ask." Petitioners' counsel asked Manly whether he ever notified the criminal court or GAPS that the restitution paid by Lorraine Allmaras came from a P.O.D. account. Manly gave the following response:
A. I didn't know, no, when it was paid. Although they knew that, I'm not sure if they would have had knowledge that the money they were getting back was, you know — They were more concerned I think with getting the money back in Margaret's account than worrying about, you know, where it came from. There was other funds that came in that were repaid. There was 110,000, approximately, and there was about 85,000 out of this certificate, so I don't know what they were thinking. They simply put it into Margaret's guardianship account without taking any action on it.
There was no testimony from any representative of GAPS about the manner in which the restitution funds were handled prior to Margaret Allmaras's death.
[¶ 11] After considering the evidence, the district court held that the personal representative properly denied the petitioners' claim to a share in Margaret All-maras's estate. The district court found that the CD account, along with its P.O.D. provision, was destroyed when Lorraine Allmaras withdrew the money, and that GAPS properly deposited the restitution into an account for the benefit of Margaret Allmaras. The district court stated, "The conservators and guardians, once that agency became appointed those moneys easily could have been used to care for Margaret and they would have lost — they may have even been used in total for her care had she lived longer.... " The district court concluded that because the funds were properly held in the guardianship account, they passed under Margaret All-maras's will to the thirteen children of her brother Jerome Allmaras.
II
[¶ 12] The district court has discretionary authority regarding the management of a protected person's estate, and the court's decisions on those matters will only be reversed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Guardianship of Thomas, 2006 ND 219, ¶ 13, 723 N.W.2d 384; Conservatorship of Stensland, 526 N.W.2d 485, 486 (N.D.1995). A district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Thomas, at ¶ 7.
[¶ 13] The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which is fully reviewable on appeal. Estate of Gleeson, 2002 ND 211, ¶ 7, 655 N.W.2d 69. We interpret uniform laws in a uniform manner, and we may seek guidance from decisions in other states which have interpreted similar provisions in a uniform law. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-13; see, e.g., Estate of Zimmerman, 2001 ND 155, ¶ 14, 633 N.W.2d 594.
[¶ 14] Petitioners argue that they should receive a share of the $83,531.11 which Lorraine Allmaras repaid as restitution because they were P.O.D. beneficiaries on the CD account bearing those funds prior to the theft. Essentially, petitioners claim that either the conservator or the supervising court should have returned the restitution money to its pre-theft form. The respondents, Linda Allmaras and Robert Manly, contend that the conservator acted properly when it deposited the restitution into the guardianship account for the benefit and care of Margaret All-maras, and that petitioners are not entitled to a share of the money under Margaret's will.
[¶ 15] This case involves the intersection of two major statutory schemes, the statutes governing conservatorships and the statutes governing payable-on-death accounts.
[¶ 16] Chapter 30.1-29, N.D.C.C, governs the appointment and operation of conservatorships, which are designed to protect the property of persons under disability. Chapter 30.1-29 is part of our enactment of the Uniform Probate Code. Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 70-71 (N.D.1993).
[¶ 17] A conservator is a fiduciary and therefore owes a high degree of good faith to the ward, the estate of the ward, and other persons interested in the estate. See N.D.C.C. § 30.1-29-17; Stensland, 526 N.W.2d at 486. In administering the protected person's estate, the conservator has the discretion to exercise a broad range of powers. See N.D.C.C. § 30.1-29-24; Kinney, 495 N.W.2d at 71. Section 30.1-29-24, which delineates the powers of the conservator, provides in relevant part:
2. A conservator has power, without court authorization or confirmation, to invest and reinvest funds of the estate as would a trustee.
3. A conservator, acting reasonably in efforts to accomplish the purpose for which the conservator was appointed, may act without court authorization or confirmation, to:
a. Collect, hold, and retain assets of the estate including land in another state, until, in the conservator's judgment, disposition of the assets should be made, and the assets may be retained even though they include an asset in which the conservator is personally interested.
e. Invest and reinvest estate assets in accordance with subsection 2.
f. Deposit estate funds in a bank including a bank operated by the conservator.
g. Acquire or dispose of an estate asset including land in another state for cash or on credit, at public or private sale, and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset.
See also Kinney, 495 N.W.2d at 71 (noting that N.D.C.C. § 30.1 — 29—08(2)(c) gives the supervising court similarly broad powers over a protected person's estate); Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 600-01 (N.D.1990) (holding probate court has authority to consider action to rescind a conservator's deed after death of the protected person because issues are incidental to court's jurisdiction over decedent's estate). The conservator is to expend or distribute funds "reasonably necessary for the support, education, care, or benefit of the protected person," taking into account various factors including the size of the estate, the probable duration of the conservator-ship, and the protected person's accustomed standard of living. N.D.C.C. § 30.1-29-25(1)(b).
[¶ 18] However, although conservators are vested with broad discretionary powers, they cannot invest and distribute assets of the estate without regard for the protected person's estate plan. Section 30.1-29-27 provides:
In investing the estate, and in selecting assets of the estate for distribution under subsections 1 and 2 of section 30.1-29-25, in utilizing powers of revocation or withdrawal available for the support of the protected person, and exercisable by the conservator or the court, the conservator and the court should take into account any known estate plan of the protected person, including the protected person's will, any revocable trust of which the protected person is settlor, and any contract, transfer, or joint ownership arrangement with provisions for payment or transfer of benefits or interests at the protected person's death to another or others which the protected person may have originated. The conservator may examine the will of the protected person.
Thus, a conservator has discretionary authority to manage the protected person's property and finances, subject to the conservator's fiduciary responsibilities and taking into account any known estate plan of the protected person. See Kinney, 495 N.W.2d at 71-72. The language of § 30.1-29-27 specifically includes P.O.D. accounts which were originated by the protected person as part of an estate plan.
[¶ 19] Chapter 30.1-31, N.D.C.C., governs nonprobate transfers on death, including P.O.D. accounts. See Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 107-109 (N.D.1994) (discussing generally our statutory provisions governing nonprobate transfers at death). The statutes dealing with P.O.D. accounts contain some fairly straightforward principles which are applicable in this case. Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-08(3), "[a] beneficiary in an account having a P.O.D. designation has no right to sums on deposit during the lifetime of any party." See also N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-02(6) (defining "party" as a person who has a present right to payment from the account other than as a beneficiary or agent). The P.O.D. account funds belong to any surviving beneficiaries only upon death of the sole party or the last survivor of two or more parties. N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-09(2)(b); see also Lexer, 524 N.W.2d at 110. "Rights at death under section 30.1-31-09 are determined by the terms of the account at the death of a party." N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-10(1).
[¶ 20] In Estate of Lahren, 268 Mont. 284, 886 P.2d 412, 414 (1994) (citations omitted), the Montana Supreme Court explained the effect of these uniform act provisions in the context of a certifícate of deposit account with P.O.D. beneficiaries:
A P.O.D. designation provides that the beneficiary receives an interest in the CD only at the death of the depositor. The P.O.D. certificate of deposit is akin to an insurance policy — the proceeds cannot be claimed by the beneficiary until death. At any time before the depositor's death, the depositor can change the beneficiary or withdraw the account and use the funds. However, the P.O.D. beneficiary has no such right.
Therefore, a P.O.D. beneficiary has no present interest in the account, no right to prevent the depositor from removing the account funds and effectively destroying the beneficiary designation, and no right to preclude the depositor from changing or removing the beneficiaries on the account.
[¶ 21] Petitioners argue that under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12, the conservator may withdraw funds from a nonprobate account with a P.O.D. designation only if there is a necessity for the funds and the other assets of the estate are insufficient. Section 30.1-31-12(1) provides:
If other assets of the estate are insufficient, a transfer resulting from a right of survivorship or P.O.D. designation under sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 is not effective against the estate of a deceased party to the extent needed to pay claims against the estate and statutory allowances to the surviving spouse and children.
In Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 109 (N.D.1994), we explained the purpose and effect of this statutory provision:
Relief from the nontestamentary transfers authorized by NDCC Chapter 30.1-31 is enabled by NDCC 30.1-31-12, if the assets of the estate are insufficient to pay the claims against the estate and the statutory allowances for the surviving spouse and children. According to the Editorial Board Comment, that section gives a remedy to creditors, the surviving spouse, and minor children to assure them that effective nonprobate transfers at death cannot reduce their essential protections if those transfers would have been testamentary.
Section 30.1-31-12, by its plain language, does not require a conservator to exhaust all other assets of a protected person's estate before withdrawing the funds from a nonprobate financial account with P.O.D. beneficiaries. Petitioners' argument regarding the operation of this statute is without merit.
[¶ 22] Applying these principles to the case at hand, the petitioners, as P.O.D. beneficiaries, had no present interest in Margaret Allmaras's CD account when it was still intact prior to the theft. Margaret Allmaras could have withdrawn the funds at any time or removed the petitioners as beneficiaries, and the petitioners would have had no cause for complaint. However, this case is complicated by Lorraine Allmaras's theft of the CD account funds, which destroyed the P.O.D. designation on the account without any action on the part of Margaret Allmaras. When Lorraine Allmaras repaid the money as restitution, it was paid to the Margaret Allmaras Guardianship/Conservatorship.
[¶ 23] At this point, the actions of GAPS, Margaret Allmaras's guardian and conservator, become relevant. Under the provisions of N.D.C.C. eh. 30.1-29, the conservator had broad discretionary powers to administer Margaret Allmaras's estate, including the power to invest or deposit the restitution funds. However, the conservator did not have completely unfettered discretion to act on her behalf. Section 30.1-29-27 provides that the conservator should take into account any known estate plan of the protected person when investing and distributing estate assets.
[¶ 24] The issue in this case is whether the conservator appropriately considered any known estate plan of Margaret All-maras. If Margaret Allmaras needed the restitution funds in order to provide for her care and support, the conservator likely acted in a proper manner when it simply deposited the funds into a general account. However, the record contains little evidence about the actions or the rationale of the conservator. Robert Manly testified that he did not know what the conservator was thinking when it deposited the restitution funds. Neither the petitioners nor the respondents called a representative of GAPS to testify about the manner in which the restitution was handled. The district court speculated that the conservator needed the money to care for Margaret Allmaras, but the record does not reveal whether the funds were actually needed for Margaret Allmaras's care and support, whether other readily accessible funds were available, and, significantly, whether the conservator took her estate plan into account as required by statute.
[¶ 25] Although the conservator clearly had broad discretion to act on behalf of Margaret Allmaras, we cannot determine from the record the manner in which the conservator exercised its discretion in this case. We do not know whether the conservator was aware that the twenty-one nieces and nephews had been beneficiaries on a P.O.D. account and ever considered returning the assets to that form, or even whether the conservator knew it had the power to do so. Therefore, we reverse the district court's order and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Margaret Allmaras's conservator properly exercised its powers under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-29.
[¶ 26] DALE V. SANDSTROM, and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., concur.