Case Name: LOFTIS v. LOFTIS
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1976-04-06
Citations: 236 Ga. 637
Docket Number: 30833
Parties: LOFTIS v. LOFTIS.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who concurs specially and Jordan and Ingram, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 236
Pages: 637–641

Head Matter:
30833.
LOFTIS v. LOFTIS.

Opinion:
Gunter, Justice.
This appeal raises the issue of the power of the trial judge to grant a divorce when both parties to the marriage contend in verified pleadings filed in the case that each respectively has grounds for divorce. •
In this case the husband filed a complaint for divorce on the ground that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The wife filed responsive pleadings in which she denied this allegation contained in the husband's complaint, but she sought a total divorce against the husband on the ground of cruel treatment.
The trial judge conducted a hearing and entered a temporary order covering all issues between the parties other than divorce. The temporary order was entered on November 12, 1975.
The trial judge then, on November 18,1975, entered a final judgment of divorce, granted to both of the parties, pursuant to the husband's motion for judgment on the pleadings. This judgment reserved for decision all other issues in the case for the ultimate trier of fact.
The wife has appealed and enumerated one error in this court: "The lower court errored in its judgment, entered November 18, 1975, in granting appellee a divorce on his motion for judgment on the pleadings, and holding that the allegations contained in the pleadings in the case demonstrated the equivalent to mutual declarations by the parties of an inability to cohabit as husband and wife with no prospects of reconciliation."
The trial judge in rendering his decision in this case relied on and cited two decisions of this court. Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254 (210 SE2d 754) (1974) and Marshall v. Marshall, 234 Ga. 393 (216 SE2d 117) (1975).
In Friedman we held that since the appellant-wife had contended in her pleadings that the marriage was irretrievably broken, she could not complain of the divorce judgment that had been rendered.
In Marshall we held: "In the present case the wife alleged cruel treatment on the part of the husband which has made it impossible for her to continue to live with him. This was equivalent to allegations of her inability to cohabit with her husband and the absence of prospects for a reconciliation. This case, therefore, is controlled by the rulings in Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254, supra."
The trial judge had before him the verified complaint of the husband which contended that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The trial judge also had before him the verified answer and cross complaint of the wife which, though it denied in the answer the allegation of irretrievable brokenness, affirmatively sought a total divorce from the husband on the ground of cruel treatment. With these verified contentions by both parties before him, the trial judge concluded that they were the equivalent of the inability of the parties to cohabit and that there were no prospects for a reconciliation.
Submitted February 16, 1976
Decided April 6, 1976.
Valíanos, Joh & Homer, John A. Joh, III, for appellant.
Dewberry & Avery, Charles Richard Avery, for appellee.
We think the trial judge was correct.
Where both parties by verified pleadings seek a total divorce, and the verified pleadings of one party assert that the marriage is irretrievably broken, it is not error for the trial judge to grant a divorce to both parties on the ground of irretrievable brokenness.
If one party asserts that the marriage is irretrievably broken, and the other party asserts that he or she is entitled to a total divorce, the trial judge has the power to grant a divorce to both parties without fixing or placing fault on either party. Code § 30-116.
This does not mean that, in the trial of other issues between the parties reserved for decision, either party is prevented from submitting relevant evidence to show, as he or she contends, the real cause of the separation and divorce. The fact finder, whether it be judge or jury, may consider such evidence in rendering a decision on the other issues between the parties.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who concurs specially and Jordan and Ingram, JJ., who dissent.