Case Name: Irene R. Lacks, Respondent, v. Harold G. Lacks, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1963-02-28
Citations: 12 N.Y.2d 268
Docket Number: 
Parties: Irene R. Lacks, Respondent, v. Harold G. Lacks, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 268–276

Head Matter:
Irene R. Lacks, Respondent, v. Harold G. Lacks, Appellant.
Argued January 8, 1963;
decided February 28, 1963.
Monroe J. Calm and Herbert 8. Greenberg for appellant.
I. Plaintiff may not have reformation of the contract insofar as it relates to payments for her support while living with defendant because such contract violates section 51 of the Domestic Eelations Law and is unenforcible. (Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N. Y. 337; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lester, 239 App. Div. 422; Haas v. Haas, 298 N. Y. 69; Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 284 N. Y. 268; Adler v. Zimmerman, 233 N. Y. 431; O’Mara v. Dentinger, 271 App. Div. 22; Metcalf v. Metcalf, 274 App. Div. 744; Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F. 2d 90; Adams v. Union Dime Sav. Bank, 144 F. 2d 290, 323 U. S. 751.) II. Plaintiff may not have reformation for defendant’s alleged fraud in misrepresenting to her the meaning of specific provisions of the agreement except upon allegations and proof of facts, here lacking, establishing absence of negligence on her part and necessary and justified reliance by her on such misrepresentations. (Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N. Y. 159; Metzger v. Ætna Ins. Co., 227 N. Y. 411; Porter v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 292 N. Y. 176; Amend v. Hurley, 293 N. Y. 587; Lucio v. Curran, 2 N Y 2d 157; Ross v. Food Specialties, 6 N Y 2d 336; Dunckel v. Parsons, 274 App. Div. 539; Viskovich v. Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 A D 2d 67; First Nat. Bank of Odessa v. Fazzari, 10 N Y 2d 394; Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N. Y. 142; Sterling Ind. v. Ball Bearing Pen Co., 298 N. Y. 483.) III. The charge, common to all of the counts, of ‘6 the fraud of defendant in concealing his knowledge ” of the contract provisions sought to be reformed is insuEcient. (Perin v. Mardine Realty Co., 5 A D 2d 685, 6 N Y 2d 920.) TV. The cause of action as a whole fails to set forth facts suEcient to justify reformation. (Ross v. Food Specialties, 6 N Y 2d 336.)
Irving 1. Erdheim and Fred Lichtblau for respondent.
I. Appellant, having availed himself of the very agreements here in question, having affirmed them by declaration and by acts, has waived any defenses he has to them and is estopped from asserting their invalidity. (Rothschild v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 204 N. Y. 458; Parsons v. Lipe, 158 Misc. 32, 243 App. Div. 681, 269 N. Y. 630.) II. The agreements sought to be reformed do not conflict with the prohibition of section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law. (Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N. Y. 337; Haas v. Haas, 298 N. Y. 69; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lester, 239 App. Div. 422; Whedon v. Whedon, 247 App. Div. 463; Landes v. Landes, 94 Misc. 486; Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635; Marks v. Marks, 127 Misc. 416; Borax v. Borax, 4 N Y 2d 113; Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y. 381; Sommer v. Sommer, 87 App. Div. 434; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 186 App. Div. 77, 229 N. Y. 255.) III. Respondent was not required to plead facts alleging an absence by her of negligence at the time she entered into the agreements, (Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N. Y. 159; Matter of Smith, 243 App. Div. 348; Albany City Sav. Inst. v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40; Smith v. Smith, 134 N. Y. 62.) IV. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a danse of action for reformation. (Metzger v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 227 N. Y. 411; Porter v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co,, 292 N. Y. 176; Clearview Associates v. Clearview Gardens First Corp,, 285 App. Div. 969; Buckley v. 112 Cent. Park South, 285 App. Div, 331; Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 1 A D 2d 688.)

Opinion:
Vah Voorhis, J,
In an endeavor to compromise marital differences and to adjust property interests, these parties entered into an agreement on December 17,1959, which was modified by a supplemental agreement on April 22,1960. This appeal, under the certified question, concerns solely whether the third cause of action is sufficient in law. Except as hereafter stated, the objections by appellant to the sufficiency of the third cause of action in the complaint relate to matters of evidence rather than pleading. That cause of action asks for reformation of these agreements in many respects, including reformation of paragraph " Fourth " of the second agreement, which, in turn, revised paragraph " Fourth " of the original agreement. This paragraph is challenged by appellant as being void as against public policy. It originally provided for the payment of $30,000 per pnnm by the husband to the wife ' ' for her personal use and maintenance " unless and until the wife should institute a legal proceeding against the husband for separation or divorce. The amount was increased to $37,500 by the amending agreement and this provision is sought to be varied in other respects by the reformation which is asked under the third cause of action. The husband contends, on this appeal, that an agreement by a husband is void to pay an annual sum to the wife in lieu of her support and maintenance while they are living together as husband and wife. That contention is correct (Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N. Y. 337). Reformation is not granted of void provisions in contracts, nor are contracts reformed by fashioning them so that they will become void (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F. 2d 90; 76 C. J. S., Reformation of Instruments, p. 336; Metcalf v. Metcalf, 274 App. Div. 744). Consequently the third cause of action would be insufficient in law if it concerned merely the reformation of this clause in the agreements. It is difficult upon a motion of this character to determine whether this portion of these contracts is so integral a part of them as to vitiate them in their entirety. If this clause be severable, it is possible that other paragraphs in the agreements may be capable of reformation in the manner applied for by plaintiff on other aspects of the third cause of action. Whether these agreements are divisible in this respect, with the consequence that this void portion would be severable, or whether the contracts are entire, is a matter to be decided after a trial rather than upon a motion addressed to the pleadings. If any portion of a cause of action is sufficient, it should not be dismissed on motion (Abrams v. Allen, 297 N. Y. 52). Without determining the severability of this void clause at this stage in the litigation, the order appealed from should be affirmed, without costs, and the certified question answered in the negative,