Case Name: HARRIS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-04-17
Citations: 148 S.W. 1074
Docket Number: 
Parties: HARRIS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 148
Pages: 1074–1086

Head Matter:
HARRIS v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 17, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, June 26, 1912.)
1. Criminal Law (§§ 121, 1150 ) — Appeal-Change of Venue — Discretion of Trial Court.
An application for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will be affirmed on appeal unless an abuse'appears.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 241, 3044; Dec. Dig. §§ 121, 1150. ]
2. Jury (§ 97 ) — Trial—Jury —Challenge for Cause.
Under Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 673, providing that a juror may be challenged for cause for prejudice or bias in favor of or against defendant, it would not be ground for challenge for cause that the juror had been told by his brother, who served as juror in a previous trial of the same indictment, that accused was guilty, where he stated that his brother’s opinion would not influence him.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 431^433, 435-437; Dee. Dig. § 97. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 1166% ) — Review — Harmless Error.
Unless by the trial court’s improper refusal to sustain a challenge for cause against a juror an objectionable juror was forced on accused because he had exhausted his peremptory challenges, the error is harmless.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. § 1166%. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 476 ) — Opinion Evidence-Expert Testimony.
A physician, who has been practicing for a number of years, may give his testimony as an expert as to the nature of a blow which crush ed deceased’s skull.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1062; Dec. Dig. § 476. ]
5. Witnesses (§ 240 ) — Examination—Leading Questions.
In a prosecution for murder, where a witness testified that he was present when a vest was taken out of accused’s trunk and identified it as belonging to deceased, it was not error for the prosecuting officer, after inquiring if any of deceased’s clothing had been found in accused’s trunk, to show him the vest and ask whether it belonged to deceased.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 795, 837-839, 841-845; Dec. Dig. § 240. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Appeal—Bill of Exceptions.
• In a prosecution for murder, a bill of exceptions to the admission of testimony, merely showing that over accused’s objection the state asked a witness whether, when he was in a certain person’s office, he did not state that deceased was about the same size as that person, presents nothing for review, not showing that the testimony was material.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
7. Criminal Law (§§ 419, 420 ) — Evidence-Admissibility.
In a prosecution for murder, where it appeared that S. tried on a vest, which was found in accused’s trunk after the' killing, and which a witness claimed belonged to deceased, the witness, who was identifying 'the vest, might properly be asked if hq did not when in S.’S' office say that deceased was about the same size as S.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 973-983; Dec. Dig. §§ 419, 420. ]
8. Cbiminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Necessity.
A bill of exceptions to the exclusion of testimony is insufficient, when it'does not show what the answer of the witness would have been.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
9. Cbiminal Law (§ 1110 ) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Requisites.
A bill of exceptions cannot be aided by the statement of facts, but must be so explicit as to enable the court on appeal to understand fully the state of facts upon which the correctness of the ruling depends.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2903-2917, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1110. ]
10. Cbiminal Law (§ 471 ) — Opinion Evidence — Expebt Testimony.
The question whether an ordinary article of apparel has been washed is not a subject for expert testimony.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1059; Dec. Dig. § 471. ]
11. Witnesses (§ 240 ) — Examination — Leading Questions.
In a prosecution for murder, where it appeared that deceased wore a truss, a witness, who examined deceased’s trunk, may state if he found a truss therein, and the prosecuting attorney may properly present a truss to him for identification.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 795, 837-839, 841-845; Dec. Dig. § 240. ]
12. Witnesses (§ 240 ) — Tkial — Examination op Witness — Leading Questions.
In a prosecution for murder, questions whether witness recognized a vest as belonging to any one, and whose property she recognized it to be, are not leading.
[Ed. Note. — For other caaes, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 571; Dec. Dig. § 240. ]
13. Homicide (§ 162 ) — Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for murder, where it appeared that deceased wore a truss, and that after the killing a truss was found in accused’s trunk with a blue stain on it, evidence that deceased wore blue shirts which faded was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 303; Dec. Dig. § 162. ]
14. Cbiminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Appeai>-Bill op Exceptions.
In a prosecution for homieide, bills of exception to a refusal to strike out testimony that, after the first search of accused’s trunk, a truss and an undershirt with blood on it were found, the searches taking place after accused was in prison, are insufficient to present any matter for review, not showing how the finding of those articles connected accused with the offense.
[Ed. Note, — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. | 1091. ]
15. Cbiminal Law (§ io92 )— Bill op Exceptions — Al>pbo val.
Approval by the trial court of a bill of exceptions which mereiy recites the objections urged by accused, and does not purport to set out the evidence, only certifies the grounds of objection, and not that the grounds were true and that the facts stated were proven.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2828-2833, 2919, 2920; Dec. Dig. § 1092. ]
16. Cbiminal Law (§ 1144 ) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Requisites.
The appellate court will not indulge in inferences to aid the bill of exceptions.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. £§ 2736-2764, 2766-2771, 2774r-2781, 2901, 3016-3037; Dec. Dig. § 1144. ]
17. Cbiminal Law (§ 1110 ) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Requisites.
A bill of exceptions cannot be aided by a statement in reply to motion for new trial or by statement of facts.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2903-2917, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1110. ]
18. Cbiminal Law (§ 404 ) — Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for homicide, where it appeared that the first search of accused’s trunk showed that there were undershirts in it, an undershirt with human blood on it, found at a search after accused’s imprisonment, was admissible in evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 873, 891-893, 1457; Dec. Dig. § 404. ]
19. Cbiminal Law (§ 1090 )— Appeal — Presentation to Court below op Grounds poe Review — Bill op Exceptions — Necessity.
In the absence of a bill'of exceptions, the appellate court cannot review the question as to service on accused of a copy of the indictment.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2789, 2803-2827, 2927, 2928, 2948, 3204; Dec. Dig. § 1090. ]
20. Criminal Law (§§ 1038, 1056 ) — Appeal — Presentation to Court Below op Grounds poe Review — Bill op Exceptions —Necessity.
In a criminal prosecution, where the court charged on the doctrine of reasonable doubt, the failure to charge on the question of alibi, though there was evidence tending to prove ac-\ cused’s alibi, is not error, in the absence of a special request or exception reserved at the time of the giving of the charge.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2646, 2668, 2670; Dec. Dig. §§ 1038, 1056. ]
21. Criminal Law (§ 784 ) — Teiaj>-Chaege —Circumstantial Evidence.
In a prosecution for homicide, where the state relied on circumstantial evidence, a charge that, to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to the conclusion to be established must be proven by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the facts must be consistent with each other, and that the main fact to be proved and the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature leading to the moral certainty of accused’s guilt, is proper.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1883-1888, 1922, 1960; Dec. Dig. § 784. ]
22. Criminal Law (§ 1159 ) — Appeal—Evidence — Suppiciency.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court can only determine whether the evidence au thorized the deductions drawn by the jury, and whether, if the facts shown by the state were true, they sustained the verdict.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. 1159. ]
23. Criminal Law (§. 1169 ) — Appeal — Harmless Error.
The erroneous admission, in a prosecution for homicide, of the finding of a truss in accused’s trunk, similar to one worn by deceased, is harmless, where evidence of the finding of a blood-stained shirt in the trunk and other articles of deceased’s clothing were properly admitted and thus connected accused with the killing.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 754, 3088, 3130, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
24. Criminal Law (§ 404 ) — Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for homicide, where it appeared that, the morning after the killing, accused’s trunk had been found and a vest belonging to deceased had been found therein, the vest was admissible in evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 873, 891-893, 1457; Dec. Dig. § 404Í ]
25. Criminal Law (§ 1168 ) — Appeal — Harmless Error.
In a criminal prosecution, the erroneous refusal of the trial court to strike the testimony of two witnesses is not prejudicial, where other testimony of the same nature was admitted without objection and no motion to strike it was made.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3124, 3125, 3129-3136, 3144; Dec. Dig. § 1168. ]
26. Homicide (§ 234 ) — Prosecution — Evidence— Sufficiency.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence held sufficient to support a conviction.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 482-493; Dec. Dig. § 234. ]
27. Criminal Law (§ 1109 ) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Excuse.
It is no excuse for the insufficiency of bills of exceptions to show that they were prepared by one not an attorney, owing to the illness of accused’s counsel.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2897, 2898, 2900, 2902, 3204; Dec. Dig. § 1109. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Washington County; Ed. R. Sinks, Judge.
Andrew Harris was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
R. Lyles, of Cameron, and Mathis & Teague, of Brenham, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic ana section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. This is the second appeal in this case; the opinion of the court on the former appeal being reported in 137 S. W. 373.
On this trial appellant filed an application for a change of venue. Evidence was heard, and from a careful review of same we cannot say the court erred in overruling the plea. This is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and, unless on appeal it is clear that the court has abused his judicial discretion, his ruling will be sustained. Tubb v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 617, 117 S. W. 858; Bohannon v. State, 14 Tex. App. 302; Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 10, 17 S. W. 430; Dupree v. State, 2 Tex. App. 613.
In examination of the juror Loesch, he answered all the statutory questions in a way that would show he was a 'qualified juror. On cross-examination it developed that his brother had been a juryman when appellant was tried before, and that this brother had told him that appellant was guilty. However, he stated this would have no influence with him and he had no opinion in the case. Appellant challenged the juror for cause, which challenge was by the court overruled, when appellant peremptorily challenged him. There is no evidence that any objectionable juror was forced on appellant by this action of the court; in fact, in the order of the court approving the bill he says that only one juror was chosen after appellant exhausted his challenges, and if this juror was objectionable to appellant it was not made known to him. The fact that one of his brothers had been on the jury that had formerly tried appellant, and had told Mr. Loesch that in his opinion appellant was guilty, would not be a ground of challenge for cause under article 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the juror answers that he has no bias or prejudice in favor of or against the appellant; that from hearsay or otherwise he has formed no conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the appellant; and that what his brother had told him would have no influence with him in deciding the case. Had the juror been really disqualified, under the decisions of this court, this matter would present no error, as it is not made manifest by the record that an objectionable juror was forced on appellant. Hudson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 323, 13 S. W. 388; Rippey v. State, 29 Tex. App. 37, 14 S. W. 448; Sutton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 20 S. W. 564; Kramer v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 84, 29 S. W. 157; Jordan v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 224, 38 S. W. 780, 39 S. W. 111.
While the witness Dr. P. D. Barnhill was testifying, the state was permitted to prove by him that deceased's skull was crushed, and in answer to the question, "What sort of blow would be necessary to produce that?" was permitted to state, "Take a tremendous blow." The objection was that it was a matter of opinion. The witness was a practicing physician and had been so for a number of years, and as such he would be permitted to give his opinion as an expert.
It appears from the record that the evening of the arrest, or the morning thereafter, a trunk was searched in the house where appellant resided, and in which clothes were found with his name thereon, and in the trunk a certain vest was found that Mr. Koch and others testified was the vest of one of the deceased persons — Mr. Rudolph's vest. In examination of the witnesses, the prosecution would hand the vest to a certain witness and ask them if they had ever seen the vest, and the witnesses were permitted to answer that it was Mr. Rudolph's vest. The objection urged was, instead of handing the vest to the witness, the witness should have been required to describe the vest owned by Mr. Rudolph before handing it to the witness. The witnesses had testified they were present when the vest was taken out of the trunk, and identified it as the vest belonging to one of the deceased parties, and the bills present no error. Kidwell v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 264, 33 S. W. 342.
While the witness John Koch was testifying, he was asked: "Did you up there in Mr. Searcy's office state that Mr. Rudolph was about the size of Mr. Searcy?" and he answered, "Yes, sir." This was objected to on the ground that it was hearsay, as appellant was not present in Mr. Searcy's office when the remark was made. The bill is incomplete, in that it does not show in what connection the testimony was offered. In Thompson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 208, 15 S. W. 206, It was held that a bill of exceptions to be considered must sufficiently set out the proceedings and attendant circumstances to enable the court to know certainly that error has been committed. So far as this bill discloses, that may or may not have been material testimony. Certainly, under the qualification of the court the bill presents no error, as the testimony would be admissible, as it was shown that Mr. Searcy tried on the vest, and this was intended to show that the witness had thus described deceased prior to the time he tried on the vest.
In another bill it is complained that Sam Craig, a witness for the state, on cross-examination was asked if he (Craig) had not made a complaint against a negro named Richard Stilwell, charging him with the same offense, which question was objected to by the state. The bill does not disclose what the answer of the witness would have been, and is therefore insufficient to present any question for review. Love v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 27, 29 S. W. 790; White v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 625, 25 S. W. 784; Childers v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 392, 35 S. W. 654; Adams v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 285, 33 S. W. 354; Cooksie v. State, 26 Tex. App. 72, 9 S. W. 58. This court cannot surmise what the answer of the witness would have been, nor its materiality if the witness had answered that he did make such a complaint.
In another bill it is complained that this witness was asked "if that undershirt and this jumper had been washed?" to which he answered, "Yes, sir," which was objected to on the ground that he was not an expert. These questions and answers are all that are in the bills. The connection is not ' shown. It does not appear by them what shirt and jumper the evidence had reference to, who owned them, where they came from, or any other fact that would enable us to pass on the matter intelligently. In McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351, 43 S. W. 93, it was held that a bill of exceptions cannot be aided by the statement of facts filed. They should be so explicit as to enable the court on appeal to fully understand g.11 the facts upon which the correctness or error of the rulings depends; otherwise they will not be considered on appeal. Livar v. State, 26 Tex. App. 115, 9 S. W. 552, and cases cited in section 857, White's Annotated Code of Crim. Proc. As to whether an article has been washed or not is not one of expert testimony. It is a matter within the knowledge of all mankind, and any witness would be permitted to state whether or not a given article had the appearance of being washed. Sections 511 and 512, Wharton's Law of Evidence.
Bill No. 10 complains: "That while the state's witness Adolph Krueger was upon the stand, upon direct examination, the following questions were asked said witness: 'Q. What did you find in the trunk that time, Mr. Krueger? A. I opened the trunk, as I opened the trunk there was a little box in there, on top. I set the little box out, raised it out, and there was a truss laying right on top. (Here counsel handed witness truss.)' Counsel for defendant objected to state's counsel handing the witness the truss for the reason that defendant is entitled to have him describe the truss that he found; but to give him the truss and ask him to examine it is putting the answer right in the witness' mouth. The witness ought to be first made to describe the truss, and. then let counsel hand him the truss." This is all the bill. It does not show whether any other question was asked the witness. The witness would certainly be permitted to state what he found, if the evidence was admissible for any purpose. As presented in this bill, there is no error in the bill, even if counsel handed the witness a truss and he testified that it was the truss he found in the trunk, which fact the bill does not make manifest, and we cannot aid it by reference to the statement of facts or by indulging in inference. Attaway v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 475, 20 S. W. 925; Gonzales v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 25 S. W. 781; Hooper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 614, 16 S. W. 655; Eldridge v. State, 12 Tex. App. 208; Walker v. State, 9 Tex. App. 200; McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351, 43 S. W. 93.
Bill No. 13, as qualified by the court, would complain of the following questions to the witness Mrs. Annie Weyand and her answers: "State whether or not you recognized this vest as belonging to anybody? A. Xes, sir. Q. Whom did you recognize it as being the property of? A. To my father." These questions were not subject to the objection that they were leading.
While the witness Mrs. John Koch was testifying, she was permitted to state she had made her husband some shirts out of cloth, and he wore them, and they stained his underclothing blue. In the bill it is not shown in what connection this testimony was offered, and the bill is incomplete in a number of respects; but, if we turn to the testimony of the witness, it appears she testified: "I was present when my mother bought some cloth out of which shirts were to be made. I bought some from the same piece. Made by husband some shirts out of it. My husband wore them, and they stained his underclothing blue. My mother made her cloth into shirts for my father. He wore the shirts, and worked in those shirts. They were made out of the same cloth as my husband's shirts. There is a blue stain on the truss (referring to the truss introduced in evidence). The stain on the truss is the same as the stain on my husband's underwear." The evidence is thus shown to be admissible and very material, for the state had shown that Mr. Rudolph (deceased) wore a truss; that this truss was found at the house where defendant resided, and was stained blue. The state was seeking to connect defendant by circumstances with the death of Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph, and this would be a cogent circumstance to be considered by the jury, if the truss was admitted in evidence.
These are all the bills, except Nos. 8 and 11, and in their brief counsel for defendant seem to rely mainly on them, and we will copy them in full. No. 8 reads: "Be it remembered that upon the trial of the above styled and numbered cause, in this court, on this the 25th day of September, A. D. 1911, the following proceedings were had, to wit: After the witness Sam Craig had testified as to the different searches made, defendant, by counsel, moved the court to strike out the testimony of Mr. Craig in reference to finding the vest in a trunk the morning after the defendant was arrested; also in reference to finding an undershirt and jumper at a second search of that trunk, after a first search had already been made and the articles were not there; and also in reference to a third search when they found a truss after a first and second search had already been made — for the reason that the defendant was in jail in a different county during the time each and every one of these searches were being made, and the defendant could not be responsible for the action of anybody else in going and putting articles in the trunk in his absence, and if it was done it would lay a predicate for the purpose of manufacturing testimony against any man charged with a crime, and especially when this defendant was in jail. Which objection the court overruled, and the defendant then and there excepted to the action of the court in not withdrawing said testimony from the jury, and here now tenders this bill of exception, and prays that the same may be examined, signed, and by the court approved and ordered filed as a part of the record in this cause."
Bill No. 11 reads: "Be it remembered that upon the trial of the above styled and numbered cause, in this court, on this the 25th day of September, A. D. 1911, the following proceedings were had, to wit: After the witness Adolph Krueger had testified as to the different searches made, 'the defendant, by counsel, moved the court to strike out the testimony of Mr. Koch with reference to finding the vest at the first search the morning after the defendant was arrested and in jail in a different county, and further to strike out the testimony in reference to finding a truss in the same 'trunk in which he found the vest some two weeks or ten days after the defendant was arrested and was in jail in a different county, for the reason that the defendant could not be responsible for the action of anybody else in going and putting articles in his trunk in his absence, and if it was done it would lay a predicate for the purpose of manufacturing testimony against any man charged with crime, and especially when this defendant was in jail at the time the searches' were made. Which objection was, by the court, overruled and to which action of the court, in not withdrawing said testimony from the jury, defendant, by counsel, excepted, and here now tenders his bill of exception, and prays that the same may be examined, signed, and by the court approved and ordered filed as a part of the record in this cause."
Under the decisions of this court, these bills are insufficient to present any- question for review. Without reference to the statement of facts, and without indulging in inference, we could not and would not know in what these articles would and could tend to connect defendant with the commission of any offense, and, if so what offense. The bills do not show whether the state was endeavoring to prove that the vest belonged to defendant or deceased, or in what way the state would seek to make use of this vest in any way detrimental to the defendant. The bills do not by their allegations exclude every theory upon which the testimony would and could be held to be admissible. Had the testimony of these two witnesses been stricken from the record, there was testimony of other witnesses in the record to the same facts in the record to which no bills of exception were reserved — Mr. Koch, Sheriff Scarborough, and others.
It has been held by this court that the approval by the judge of a bill of excep tions, which merely recites the objections as they were urged by defendant, and does not purport to set out the evidence itself, only certifies the grounds of the objections, and not that the grounds were true, or that the facts stated were proven. Mootry v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 450, 33 S. W. 877, 34 S. W. 126; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 340, 5 S. W. 215; Bigham v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 453, 37 S. W. 753; Ezzell v. State, 29 Tex. App. 521, 16 S. W. 782; Huffman v. State, 28 Tex. App. 174, 12 S. W. 588. The rule governing bills of exceptions as held by this court was announced in Ferguson v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 152, 136 S. W. 465, and also ip the following decisions, where it was held: "The allegations of a bill of exceptions should be full and explicit so that the matters presented to the court on appeal for revision may be comprehensible without recourse to inference. Eldridge v. State, 12 Tex. App. 208; McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351 .[43 S. W. 93]. They should be so explicit as to enable the court on,appeal to fully understand all the facts'upon which the correctness or error of the rulings depends; otherwise they will not be considered. Livar v. State, 26 Tex. App. 115 [9 S. W. 552]; Walker v. State, 19 Tex. App. 176; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 341 [5 S. W. 215]. A bill of exceptions must set out the proceedings in the court below sufficiently to enable the court, on1 appeal, to know that an error has been committed. Thompson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 208 [15 S. W. 206]. It must be so full in its statements that in and of itself it will disclose all that is necessary to manifest the supposed error. Tweedle v. State, 29 Tex. App. 586 [16 S. W. 544]; Quintana v. State, 29 Tex. App. 401 [16 S. W. 258, 25 Am. St. Rep. 730]; Hooper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 614 [16 S. W. 655]; Wilkerson v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 86 [19 S. W. 903]. Bills of exceptions must state enough of the evidence or facts proved to render intelligible the ruling excepted to. Ballinger v. State, 11 Tex. App. 323; Ferguson v. State [61 Tex. Cr. R. 152], 136 S. W. 465. See the following eases, where the bills of exceptions were held insufficient and defective: Chapman v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 167 [39 S. W. 113]; Jordan v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 224 [38 S. W. 780, 39 S. W. 111]; Kalsky v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 247 [39 S. W. 362]; Howerton v. State, 43 S. W. 1018; Miller v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 47 [35 S. W. 391]; Yungman v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 80 [31 S. W. 663]; Bryant v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 394 [33 S. W. 978, 36 S. W. 79]; Rodgers v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 612 [31 S. W. 650]; Thompson v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 217 [26 S. W. 198]; Walker v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 359 [26 S. W. 507]; Wilson v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 22 [22 S. W. 39]; Mealer v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 102 [22 S. W. 142]; Simms v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 277 [22 S. W. 876]; Burge v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 359 [23 S. W. 692]; Martin v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 441 [24 S. W. 512]; Loakman v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 561 [25 S. W. 22]; White v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 625 [25 S. W. 784]; Coyle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 604 [21 S. W. 765]; Browder v. State, 30 Tex. App. 614 [18 S. W. 197]; Schoenfeldt v. State, 30 Tex. App. 695 [18 S. W. 640]; Jacobs v. State, 28 Tex. App. 79 [12 S. W. 408]; Jackson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 143 [12 S. W. 701]; Huffman v. State, 28 Tex. App. 174 [12 S. W. 588]; Walker v. State, 28 Tex. App. 503 [13 S. W. 860]; Graham v. State, 28 Tex. App. 582 [13 S. W. 1010]; Hughes v. State, 27 Tex. App. 127 [11 S. W. 34]; Cooksie v. State, 26 Tex. App. 72 [9 S. W. 58]; May v. State, 25 Tex. App. 114 [7 S. W. 588]; Woodson v. State, 24 Tex. App. 153 [6 S. W. 184]; Buchanan v. State, 24 Tex. App. 195 [5 S. W. 847]; Gilleland v. State, 24 Tex. App. 524 [7 S. W. 241]; Cooper v. State, 22 Tex. App. 419 [3 S. W. 334]; House v. State, 19 Tex. App. 227; Counts v. State, 19 Tex. App. 450; Bryant v. State, 18 Tex. App. 107; Pierson v. State, 18 Tex. App. 524; Yanez v. State, 6 Tex. App. 429 [32 Am. Rep. 591]. Inferences will not be indulged to supply omissions in bills of exceptions. Davis v. State, 14 Tex. App. 645. On appeal, the court will not supply omissions in bills of exceptions, nor aid such bills by inference or presumption'. McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351 [43 S. W. 93]; Attaway v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 475 [20 S. W. 925]; Gonzales v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 611 [25 S. W. 781]; Hooper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 614 [16 S. W. 655]; Eldridge v. State, 12 Tex. App. 208; Walker v. State, 9 Tex. App. 200. A bill of exceptions cannot be aided by statements in reply to a motion for new trial, nor by the statement of facts. McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351 [43 S. W. 93]; Howerton v. State, 43 S. W. 1018."
Other cases might be cited, and under the rules there announced the two bills above do not present the matters in a way we can pass on, whether or not the testimony should have been admitted without reference to the statement of facts, and then to pass on the question we would have to read all the evidence. These bills only show that defendant moved to strike out certain testimony for reasons named: That defendant was in jail in a different county at the time each of the searches was made, and defendant could not be responsible for some one else placing articles in his trunk during his absence. These were the grounds of objection, and the signature of the judge only proves that the defendant made this motion on these grounds, but verifies nothing else, and does not verify that' the articles were found at different searches, where the property was found, nor when found. However, we have read this entire record, as we do in every case that comes to us, and if, under our decisions, we were permitted to aid the bills of exceptions by réferenee to the statement of facts, we would find that Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph were found one morning in the smoking ruins of their home; that their bodies were burned below the waist; that their heads were crushed; that some time thereafter suspicion rested on defendant, and he was arrested. He was arrested at night, and the next morning a trunk in the house where he resided was searched, and in that trunk a vest was found that Mr. and Mrs. John Koch and Mrs. Weyand identify as the vest worn by the deceased. They were present when the vest was found, and it being found in a trunk in the house where defendant resided at the time of his arrest, and in which trunk clothing with defendant's name thereon was found, the vest and the fact of where it was found would be admissible in testimony. These witnesses say that at this time they were looking for articles belonging to the deceased, and, at the time, they found undershirts and other men's clothing in the trunk, which were placed back therein. Sheriff Scarborough says he returned the next day and again searched the trunk; other witnesses would place it some days later. The sheriff says he found an undershirt in the trunk with blood on it. The witnesses who first searched the trunk say there were undershirts in the trunk, but they did not notice that one had blood on it. Sheriff Scarborough found one with blood on it.
This would be admissible in evidence. The witnesses who first searched the trunk do not exclude the idea that the undershirt with blood on it was in the trunk at the time they looked, for they say there were undershirts in the trunk, and they were looking at that time for articles belonging to the decedents. The fact that those who first searched the trunk did not notice blood on any of the undershirts would go to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility. The truss, however, stands in a different relation, and, if the bill of exceptions presented, the matter properly, we would hold that it should not have been admitted, for it must have been placed in the trunk after the arrest of defendant. The testimony would exclude the idea that the truss was in the trunk when it was searched the morning after defendant's arrest. However, under the decisions of this court the bill as drawn does not present this in a way that we would be authorized to reverse the ease on account of admitting it in evidence, as it is not properly before the court under the bill, and the facts we find in the statement of facts are not in the bills of exception. See, also, James v. State, 138 S. W. 612.
Neither can we review the question in regard to service on- defendant of a copy of the indictment, as no bill of exceptions was reserved in regard to the matter.
The complaint of the omission in the charge of the court cannot be sustained. While it is true, as stated by defendant, in the motion, that Bill Isaacs testified he saw the fire when the house was burned, and it was about 9 o'clock at night, and Link Black testified that defendant came to his house after dark and remained there about two hours, yet this would not exclude the idea that defendant could have committed the crime; but, if this testimony would present the issue of an alibi, defendant requested no such charge, and this court in a well-considered opinion in the case of Jones v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 131, 110 S. W. 741, 126 Am. St. Rep. 776, has held that when no exception was reserved at the time the charge was given, and no special charge requested, where the court submits the issue of defendant's guilt and charges the doctrine of reasonable doubt, this would of necessity include a finding by the jury as to whether the defendant was present and committed the crime, and a failure to charge on alibi would not be error.
The complaint that the court failed to submit the issue of whether or not the remains found were those of Mrs. Rudolph is not well founded. The court instructed the jury: "If you do not find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the said Mary Rudolph is dead, and that defendant unlawfully killed her, you will return a verdict of not guilty."
The only other complaint as to the charge is to the paragraph on circumstantial evidence. The court charged the jury: "In this case the state relies for a conviction of the defendant upon circumstantial evidence alone. The court therefore, instructs you that, to warrant a conviction of the defendant on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to the conclusion sought to be established must be proved by competent evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt; all the facts (that is, necessary facts to the conclusion) must be consistent with each other, and with the main fact sought to be proved, and the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature, leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused, and no other person, committed the offense charged against him." This Charge has frequently been approved by this court. Barr v. State, 10 Tex. App. 510; Reeseman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 430, 128 S. W. 1129; Jones v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 491, 30 S. W. 1059, 31 S. W. 664; Smith v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 621, 33 S. W. 339, 34 S. W. 960; Rye v. State, 8 Tex. App. 160; Ramirez v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 455, 66 S. W. 1101; Bell v. State, 71 S. W. 24.
The only remaining assignment relates to the insufficiency of the evidence. The evidence would convince one that Mrs. May Rudolph and her husband were foully murdered by some one while quietly resting at their home near the little town of Carmine; that whoever committed the crime burned tbe bouse in tbe bope of biding their crime in tbe asbes of tbe bouse, and, it was hoped, tbe asbes of tbeir bodies. Enough of tbe bodies escaped tbe flames for the children to positively identify one of the corpses as that of tbeir mother. Tbe testimony of the guilt of defendant is dependent entirely on circumstances; but juries of that county have twice sat in judgment on this ease, and each time have returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and in passing on tbe record we are not to decide what would be our finding were we in tbe jury box, but only to decide would tbe evidence authorize tbe deductions drawn by tbe jury, and, if tbe facts proven by tbe state are true, do they sustain the verdict? Taking tbe fact that, when defendant was arrested, the pants he had on at that time bad on them splotches of blood, that physicians say was human blood, and in the record there is-no explanation of bow it came there unless, when with some heavy instrument tbe heads of the- victims were crushed, splotches of blood scattered on this clothing; that tbe vest found in tbe trunk wherein defendant's clothing was found, three of deceased's children say was tbe property of deceased; and the other facts and circumstances in evidence — we cannot say tbe verdict is unauthorized. And in this connection we might say that, while we have declined to consider that bill which refers to admitting testimony in regard to admitting the truss in evidence, had it been excluded, it could and would not have changed the result. The vest and the undershirt were properly admitted, and these would make this connecting link as complete and as forceful as does the evidence with the truss therein.
There being no error in the record that we can sustain, the law giving to the juries the right to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, the judgment is affirmed.