Case Name: LANCASTER et al. v. RENWAR OIL CORP.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1954-02-26
Citations: 270 S.W.2d 289
Docket Number: No. 14793
Parties: LANCASTER et al. v. RENWAR OIL CORP.
Judges: DIXON, C. J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 289–296

Head Matter:
LANCASTER et al. v. RENWAR OIL CORP.
No. 14793.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
Feb. 26, 1954.
Rebearing Denied July 9, 1954.
Wm. M. Bates, Dallas, for appellants.
Shank, Dedman & Payne, Dallas, J. M. Easterling and B. D. Tarlton, Corpus Christi, George Gilbert, Shreveport, La., for appellee.

Opinion:
CRAMER, Justice.
This suit was filed in the district court by appellants E. L. Lancaster and G. A. Gamble, now deceased, for whom Mrs. Vesta P. Gamble as independent executrix of his estate was substituted, against Ren-war Oil Corporation.
Material to this appeal, appellants' pleadings assert that they "seek the judgment of the court under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Art. 2524-1 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Texas, construing the contract documents attached hereto as exhibits and adjudicating the rights of the plaintiffs against the defendant and the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiffs." The prayer is that "upon final hearing hereof the following relief be granted to the plaintiffs: First: Judgment that they are entitled to receive from the defendant as royalty Veith of the value of the oil, gas and gas distillate produced and marketed by defendant from any wells already drilled or that may hereafter he drilled on the North 320 acres of the A. B. Davis Survey without diminution or reduction on account of the ⅛⅛ royalty promised to the State under the lease to Arkansas Fuel Oil Company or on account of the several unitization agreements made by defendant with the State School Land Board. Second : Requiring the defendant to file herein a full and complete statement showing the quantity of oil, gas and gas distillate produced to date from its Gay Wells, Units Nos. 1, 3 and 4, and the sum realized from the sale of the same to the pipe line company. Third: Judgment against the defendant for Veith of the value of such production with interest on each installment thereof from the date when it became due and payable at the rate of six per cent per annum. Fourth: Judgment against the defendant for all costs incurred in this proceeding. Fifth: For such other further and different relief as the plaintiffs may be entitled to receive at law or in equity."
Appellee Renwar Oil Corporation filed a plea of privilege which, in addition to the usual form, contained a paragraph as follows : "That this is a suit for the recovery of lands and the oil produced therefrom, and to quiet title to same or to prevent or stay waste on land, and said suit involves the title to an interest in lands, which said lands are located in Nueces County, Texas, as is more fully shown by plaintiffs' petition."
The plea was answered by numerous exceptions, a general denial, a specific denial to paragraphs 2 and 5 , and by asserting no question of title is raised, that they are not seeking recovery of land or an interest therein, or to recover oil produced therefrom, or judgment to quiet title, or to prevent or stay wast to said lands, but on the contrary seek a proper construction of the contract documents attached to their petition and for specific performance by defendant of the obligations imposed thereby, to-wit: (1) To pay appellants the money due them thereunder; (2) they, having purchased the oil and gas lease and having drilled thereunder, are estopped to deny they are obligated by the lease to pay the royalty provided thereunder; (3) the action is a personal action only; (4) Ren-war and the Bank designated in the lease as Depository are both residents of Dallas County and the Dallas County Courts have jurisdiction under secs. 5 and 23 of Art. 1995, R.C.S.; (5) the several unitization agreements made by Renwar for pooling part of the leased tract are void and not binding as to them since they did not consent thereto, and because Renwar "committed fraud against plaintiffs by attempting to pool a part of the tract on which they executed such lease with other tracts on which defendant held leases or interests in leases to its benefit and advantage and to the detriment of plaintiffs; and therefore venue lies in Dallas County under sec. 7 of Art. 1995." They also assert that since the action is for the recovery of money the court has jurisdiction of the suit under sec. 10 of Art. 1995, and, that this "is not á title suit is evidenced by the fact the petition contains none of the allegations required for such a suit by Rule 783."
The trial court on the hearing overruled the exceptions and, after hearing the evi dence, sustained Renwar's plea of privilege and entered an order transferring the cause to the district - court of Nueces County; and from that judgment appellants have duly perfected this appeal and here brief two points of error in substance: (1) This suit is brought where Renwar has its domicile seeking only a declaratory judgment, construction of the oil and gas lease executed between the parties, for specific performance of such contract by Renwar, and for debt following the determination of the amount thereof; and (2) the allegations of the petition do not assert an action for the recovery of lands or damage thereto, or to remove an encumbrance from the title to the land, or to quiet title to the land, or to prevent or stay waste on the lands within exception 14, Art. 1995. Therefore the court erred in refusing to hold venue properly lies in Dallas County under Art. 1995.
Appellee Renwar, with five counterpoints, asserts in substance that the judgment below is correct since it appears (1-2) from the petition and exhibits thereto and its controverting affidavits that apppellants' suit seeks recovery of a royalty interest and an accounting for royalty thereunder, and such royalty is land within sec. 14, Art. 1995; also seeks to quiet title to the land involved "by having the court declare the oil and gas lease covering State Tract No. 462 and the several unitization agreements referred to in said petition void and of no force and effect and, therefore, appellants' suit is venuable under Article 1995, subd. 14, in Nueces County, Texas, where the land is situated." (3) Appellants' suit is for the recovery of land and not for specific performance; (4) that appellee, as lessee-assignee from appellants as lessor, is not estopped to question the title of appellants to the area in conflict, being 170 acres of land covered by lease from the State of Texas; and (5) since the undisputed evidence shows appellants did meet the burden of pleading and proving the State and its lessee and assignee were not claiming title to the 170 acres in controversy.
Appellants by supplemental brief "deny specifically the statements made repeatedly in appellee's brief that appellants' petition raises issues of title between them and ap-pellee as to the mineral interest owned by appellants in the A. B. Davis Survey in Nueces County, Texas."
We will consider all points and counterpoints together.
The general rule is that, absent an exception which clearly provides therefor, the defendant shall be sued in the county of his residence. Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co., 150 Tex. 159, 237 S.W.2d 969, 972, and cases there cited. Suits for the recovery of land or damage thereto, or to remove encumbrance to the title of land or to quiet title to land, or to prevent or stay waste on lands, are exceptions, created under Art. 1995, subdv. 14, and as such take precedence over all other permissive subdivisions of the statute. South Texas Development Co. v. Williams, 130 Tex. 217, 107 S.W.2d 378 (Comm.App., opinion expressly approved by our Sup.Ct.); and cases there cited.
The only question raised by the points and counter-points is with reference to the nature of appellants' suit, to-wit: whether or not the relief sought is within subdv. 14, Art. 1995, V.A.C.S.
The prayer in appellants' petition shows the desired relief to be (1) judgment that they are entitled under their contract to receive a royalty ⅜4th of the oil, etc., produced from the land leased by Renwar; (2) an order requiring Renwar to file a statement showing the quantity of oil, etc., produced to date; (3) judgment for ⅜4⅛ of such oil produced, plus interest during the time it was withheld; (4) costs; and (5) such further and different relief to which the facts may show them entitled.
After considering the record as a whole we have reached the conclusion that the relief sought is solely and only for the ascertainment of, and a declaratory judgment as to, the amount of royalty due on oil already produced and severed from the land under the lease, based on the interest owned in the total oil produced and severed from the land. In our opinion, the oil when severed from the land by being reduced to possession by the leaseholder is, as between the lessor and the lessee, personal property, as set out in Cates v. Greene, Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 592, 595, no writ history, by Chief Justice McClendon, as follows:
"It is true that, after the royalty interest in the oil has been severed from the land, it becomes personal property, but until such severance it constitutes an interest in the realty "
Applying the rule here, the relief sought, in paragraph 3 of the prayer, is that after the amount of oil severed from the soil has been ascertained, appellants recover a money judgment for the amount due them for their interest in such severed oil, such oil then being personal property, and not land. It follows that the petition states a cause of action which, if sustained by the evidence, would entitle appellants to a judgment (1) finding the amount of oil royalty due Lancaster et al. from Renwar under the lease and a conclusion of law to the effect that such relief is not within the coverage of sec. 14, Art. 1995, V.A.C.S., or any other section of such Article which places venue of actions involving interests in land in the county where the land is located; (2) an order for discovery to the end that Lancaster et al. may ascertain with certainty the amount of royalty due them; (3) that Lancaster et al. after the amount of oil recovered has been ascertained, he may, on proof of value, recover a money judgment for the value of his interest in such oil so produced; plus (4) his costs; and (5) other ancillary relief, if any, is justified by the facts discovered.
We therefore hold that subdv. 14, Art. 1995, does not apply here, and that venue of this case is in Dallas County, the defendant's residence, and not in Nueces County.
For the reasons stated, appellants' points 1 and 2 are sustained, appellee's counterpoints are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and here rendered overruling appellee Renwar Oil Corporation's plea of privilege.
Reversed and rendered.
. Paragraph 5 being an allegation that no exception to exclusive venue in the county of one's residence exists, "save and except that this is a suit for the recovery of an interest in lands and oil produced therefrom, and to quiet the title to same or to prevent or stay waste on said lands, which lands are located in Nueces County, Texas, by reason of all of which, exclusive venue for the trial of this suit lies in the District Court of Nueces County, Texas, under and by virtue of Section 14 of Article 1995 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925 of the State of Texas."