Case Name: PEOPLE v. HARRELL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-21
Citations: 398 Mich. 384
Docket Number: Docket No. 56582
Parties: PEOPLE v HARRELL
Judges: Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 398
Pages: 384–409

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HARRELL
Docket No. 56582.
Argued April 5, 1976
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided December 21, 1976.
Rehearing denied 400 Mich 951.
Walter Harrell, Jr., was convicted by a jury in Jackson Circuit Court, Gordon W. Britten, J., of assaulting a police officer, and fleeing and eluding a police officer. The Court of Appeals, McGregor, P. J., and R. B. Burns and O’Hara, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 13068). At trial defense counsel submitted to the court 120 questions to be asked of the veniremen on voir dire ostensibly directed to uncovering possible racial prejudice. The trial court limited the voir dire on this subject to seven specific questions. Defendant appeals. Held:
The scope of voir dire examination of prospective jurors is within the discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be set aside absent abuse of discretion. The Fourteenth Amendment requires the trial judge to interrogate jurors on the subject of racial prejudice after the defendant’s timely request where there is a significant likelihood that absent the interrogation the jury would not be impartial, but the judge need not ask every question dealing with racial prejudice that the defense might wish to be asked. Many of the 120 questions proposed by defense counsel were repetitive of the questions contained in the Juror Personal History Questionnaires and the questions the court asked and many were not proper for voir dire. The questions asked were sufficient to afford defense counsel information necessary to challenge prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for cause.
Affirmed..
Justice Levin, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Williams, dissented. When there are special circumstances indicating the presence of racial overtones, as in this case, so that there is reason to believe that the jurors might be prejudiced for or against a litigant, the inquiry must extend beyond a mere empty and perfunctory exercise. The defendant was enti tied to have the court put to the jurors individually questions tending to ferret out any subtle subjective bias entertained by a member of the panel, thereby providing a basis for intelligent exercise of both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. The questions which were- asked suggested the "correct” answers, and few prospective jurors would answer so as to show prejudice unless overtly prejudiced and proud of it. Such questions provide no insight into the latent prejudices of veniremen, prejudices which affect the juror’s perceptions and perspectives but which even the juror may not realize exist. When searching questions are necessary, they should be separately addressed to each juror to avoid the sense of insulation from individual responsibility that group response seems to provide.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-9] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 200.
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 1072 et seq.
Right of counsel in criminal case personally to conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. 73 ALR2d 1187.
54 Mich App 554; 221 NW2d 411 (1974) affirmed.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Trial.
Examination of prospective jurors may be conducted by the court or, in its discretion, by counsel; the scope of voir dire examination of jurors is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion.
2. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to interrogate jurors in a criminal case on the subject of racial prejudice after a defendant’s timely request where there is a significant likelihood that absent the questioning the jury would not be impartial, but the judge need not ask every question dealing with racial prejudice that the defendant requests.
3. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice.
A trial court’s voir dire of prospective jurors in a trial of a black defendant for assaulting and fleeing white police officers contained sufficient questions regarding racial prejudice to afford defense counsel information necessary to challenge prospective jurors where the court used 7 of 120 questions proposed by defense counsel, many of the other questions were repetitive of the ones used in the Juror Personal History Questionnaires, and many were not proper for voir dire.
Dissenting Opinion
Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams and Levin, JJ.
4. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice.
Refusal to ask probing questions to enable a litigant to exercise intelligently his rights of challenge on voir dire examination is an abuse of the judge’s discretion where there are signiñcant racial overtones in the case.
5. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice — Constitutional Law.
Voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice is not constitutionally required by the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the states are free to allow or require questions not demanded by the Federal Constitution, and the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant (US Const, Am XIV).
6. Criminal Law — Trial—Jury—Voir Dire.
Examination of prospective jurors, if done by the judge, should put all reasonable questions suggested by counsel; although the scope of voir dire is largely in the discretion of the trial court and should be kept within reasonable bounds, it should be broad enough to enable the attorneys to ascertain certain information as will permit them to develop a basis for challenging the jurors for cause as well as for exercising the right to peremptory challenges.
7. Constitutional Law — Jury—Voir Dire.
A litigant’s right to trial before an impartial jury requires that he be given an opportunity to obtain the information necessary to challenge prospective jurors for cause or peremptorily (Const 1963, art 1, § 14).
8. Criminal Law- — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice.
Conclusory questions on voir dire of prospective jurors which suggest the answers do not furnish any basis for the often intuitive exercise of the right of peremptory challenge; questions are inadequate unless they tend to reveal latent prejudices which the juror may not easily acknowledge to himself or others that may inñuence his deliberations and decision.
9. Criminal Law — Jury—Voir Dire — Racial Prejudice.
A black defendant is entitled to have the court put to prospective jurors individually questions tending to ferret out any subjective bias entertained by a member of the panel where the defendant was arrested on the doorstep of his home following a police chase, and at the time of arrest and at the trial the matter had polarized into a confrontation between whites (the police officers) and blacks (the defendant, his family and other witnesses); the special circumstances of the case indicate the presence of racial overtones and the inquiry must extend beyond a mere empty and perfunctory exercise, although the court is not obliged to ask all the questions propounded by defense counsel nor to ask them in the exact form in which they were submitted.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Bruce A. Barton, Prosecuting Attorney, and James M. Justin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Marshall S. Redman) for defendant.

Opinion:
Coleman, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of assulting a police officer, MCLA 750.479; MSA 28.747, and fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCLA 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1). On December 23, 1971, defendant was sentenced to 6 months in jail and $150 costs, or an additional 30 days in jail on one count, and a suspended sentence of $100 fine and $100 costs on the other count.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. This Court granted leave to appeal limited to the two questions considered herein.
Defendant is a young black man and most of the police officers involved in the incident are white. Prior to trial, defense counsel submitted 120 questions to be asked during voir dire. In lieu of the defendant's 120 questions, the trial judge announced that he would utilize seven of the defendant's questions to cover any bias or racial prejudice in the proposed jurors.
Issues
1. Did the trial court's refusal to submit 120 questions to the jury on voir dire deny defendant a trial by a fair and impartial jury by preventing a meaningful exercise of challenges for cause?
2. Did the trial court's refusal to submit 120 questions to the jury on voir dire deny defendant a trial by a fair and impartial jury by preventing the intelligent use of peremptory challenges?
Discussion
In Michigan, the examination of prospective jurors may be conducted by the court or, in its discretion, by the attorneys. The scope of voir dire examination of jurors is within the discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be set aside absent an abuse of that discretion. Voir dire affords attorneys an opportunity to elicit sufficient information to develop a rational basis for excluding veniremen whether for cause or by peremptory challenges.
Relying on Ham v South Carolina, 409 US 524; 93 S Ct 848; 35 L Ed 2d 46 (1973), and related Federal appellate decisions, the defendant maintains he had a constitutional right to voir dire the veniremen further on racial prejudice. Although it is true that the Ham decision held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the trial judge to interrogate jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice after the defendant's timely request, Ham does not stand for the proposition that the trial judge must ask every question dealing with racial prejudice that the defense might wish to be heard.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated:
"We agree with the dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that the trial judge was not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner. The Court in Aldridge was at pains to point out, in a context where its authority within the federal system of courts allows a good deal closer supervision than does the Fourteenth Amendment, that the trial court had a broad discretion as to the questions to be asked,' 283 US, at 310; 51 S Ct, at 471 [75 L Ed 1054 (1931)]. The discretion as to form and number of questions permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is at least as broad. In this context, either of the brief, general questions urged by the petitioner would appear sufficient to focus the attention of prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain." 409 US 527.
While concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority's decision in Ham, Justice Marshall stated:
"I do not mean to suggest that a defendant must be permitted to propound any question or that limitless time must be devoted to preliminary voir dire. Although the defendant's interest in a jury free of prejudice is strong, there are countervailing state interests in the expeditious conduct of criminal trials and the avoidance of jury intimidation. These interests bulk larger as the possibility of uncovering prejudice becomes more attenuated. The trial judge has broad discretion to refuse to ask questions that are irrelevant or vexatious. Thus, where the claimed prejudice is of a novel character, the judge might require a preliminary showing of relevance or of possible prejudice before allowing the questions." 409 US 533.
Footnote 2 at 409 US 533 specifically holds:
"I also agree with the majority that the judge may properly decline to ask the question in any particular form or ask any particular number of questions on a subject."
In its most recent pronouncement in this area, the Supreme Court of the United States, by Justice Powell, held that voir dire about racial prejudice is not constitutionally required absent circumstances comparable in significance to those existing in Ham, supra. Ristaino v Ross, 424 US 589; 96 S Ct 1017; 47 L Ed 2d 258 (1976). Defendant Ross was a black man who was charged with two other blacks for the armed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to murder of a white man employed by Boston University as a security guard. The trial judge refused to pose a question directly related to racial prejudice during the voir dire of the veniremen.
The Court's opinion said Ham "reflected an assessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice", the jury would not be impartial:
"The circumstances in Ham strongly suggested the need for voir dire to include specific questioning about racial prejudice. Ham's defense was that he had been framed because of his civil rights activities. His prominence in the community as a civil rights activist, if not already known to veniremen, inevitably would have been revealed to the members of the jury in the course of his presentation of that defense. Racial issues therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Further, Ham's reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury might harbor. In such circumstances we deemed a voir dire that included questioning specifically directed to racial prejudice, when sought by Ham, necessary to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury be impaneled."
Unlike Ham, "the need to question veniremen specifically about racial prejudice" did not rise "to constitutional dimensions" in Ristaino.
Although the questions were not constitutionally required in Ristaino, footnote 9 of the opinion said "the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant". The states "are free to allow or require questions not demanded by the Constitution".
In the instant case, the following colloquy took place between defense counsel and the trial judge in chambers:
"Mr. Hayes: Could you indicate to me which ones you are going to use?
"The Court: 25, 26 and 27, 91 and 92, 105 and 106 with additions making them to conform to the Court rulings.
"Mr. Hayes: May I ask — why you have rejected all the questions which I believe go to the essence of the matter, Your Honor?
"The Court: The court will give the voir dire. I think the court's voir dire will cover any bias or prejudice any jurors may have — that is the purpose of it — it is hot to choose a jury which is biased or [sic] your viewpoint or the prosecution's, but to get a jury which is unbiased and unprejudiced, and I think the court's voir dire will fairly cover it. Knowledge of your instructions are [sic] contained in the court questionnaire signed by the jurors, and it would be repetitious to go into them— many of them are of the nature not proper for voir dire. These are not given."
During the voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions:
"Have any of you had any dealings or experiences with black persons that might make it difficult for you to sit in impartial judgment on this case? By 'you' I mean also members of your immediate family, your spouse, your children?
"(none)
"The Court: Will the fact that defendant is black in any way affect your judgment in this cause?
"(none)
"The Court: Would any of you give more credence to the testimony of a white person than you would give to the testimony of a black person, everything else being equal?
"(none)
"The Court: That is give two persons of equal stature and so forth upon the stand, equal appearance, and one is a white skin, one has a black skin, would that in any way prejudice you in either way?
"(none)
"The Court: Would any of you give the police officers any more credence in their testimony than you would a person who is not a police officer, because of the fact that the witness was a police officer?
"(none)."
Our examination of the 120 questions proposed by counsel discloses that many are repetitive of the court questionnaire and many are not proper for voir dire.
In the instant case, the trial court followed the course of action recommended by the United States Supreme Court in Ristaino, supra. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. The trial court's voir dire contained questions regarding racial prejudice which were sufficient to afford defense counsel information necessary to challenge prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for cause. Defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury was protected by the judge's questioning.
The defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
54 Mich App 554; 221 NW2d 411 (1974).
394 Mich 812 (1975).
GCR 1963, 511.3.
Corbin v Hittle, 34 Mich App 631; 192 NW2d 38 (1971); People v Brown, 46 Mich App 592; 208 NW2d 590 (1973).
2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 465.
GCR 1963, 510.
Many of defendant's proposed questions are irrelevant, vague or inconsequential (e.g.):
"61. Did you ever take the position 'where there is smoke there must be some fire someplace'?
"62. Have you ever watched the Perry Mason show?
"67. Have you ever made a statement to anyone that Negroes should be able to help themselves just like anybody else does?
"70. Do you think there is any difference between black people and white people?"
The defendant was allowed five peremptory challenges in the instant case. GCR 1963, 511.5; MCLA 768.12; MSA 28.1035. However, the defense counsel utilized only four of his peremptory challenges and expressed his satisfaction with the panel at the close of the voir dire.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Const 1963, art 1, § 17.