Case Name: Corey Terrell STUDEMIRE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-05-23
Citations: 955 So. 2d 1256
Docket Number: No, 4D05-4019
Parties: Corey Terrell STUDEMIRE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: STEVENSON, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 955
Pages: 1256–1261

Head Matter:
Corey Terrell STUDEMIRE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No, 4D05-4019.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 23, 2007.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Lindsay Hanson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
STONE, J.
We deny Studemire's motion for rehearing, but withdraw the previous opinion of April 11, 2007, and replace it with the following:
Studemire was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. He challenges an order denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police and the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
On New Year's Day, after 1:00 a.m., Officer MacVane, while patrolling within the city limits, heard gunshots being fired and proceeded to an area from which he believed the shots originated, where he found Studemire and another man, Chap-pelle. They were standing in a driveway by a vehicle. There were bullet casings and shotgun shells on the ground. Chap-pelle admitted to MacVane that he was the person who fired the shots and produced a shotgun. Chappelle also acknowledged having other guns on the premises and consented to the officer's search of the house, where the officer found two more guns.
Additional police officers arrived at the scene. One asked for Studemire's identification, to which he replied he had none. When the officer inquired as to his name, Studemire gave him a false name. MacVane then asked him to identify himself, and, again, Studemire gave a false name. After MacVane confronted him, Studemire gave a second name, an alias under which he had been previously convicted. MacVane decided to detain Stude-mire, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of his patrol car. The record is silent as to whether MacVane conducted a pat-down of Studemire.
While this was going on, the other officers found an automatic handgun lying in plain view on top of the passenger side front tire of the vehicle. MacVane asked if the handgun had been discharged by Stu-demire. Studemire, who had been read Miranda rights, replied in the affirmative and also admitted that he was a convicted felon. Studemire later signed a written confession admitting that he and other persons fired the guns.
During trial, Studemire moved to suppress all statements made after he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.
Clearly, MacVane had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The question in this case is whether MacVane's actions in placing Studemire in handcuffs and placing him in the back of the car escalated the detention to a de facto arrest, for which probable cause is necessary.
The use of handcuffs does not automatically turn an investigatory stop into a de facto arrest. Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Fla.1992) (citations omitted)(emphasis added) ("Courts have generally upheld the use of handcuffs in the context of a Terry stop where it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers' safety or to thwart a suspect's attempt to flee."); Curtis v. State, 748 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("officer may detain the individual even at gunpoint and/or by handcuffs for the officer's safety without converting the Terry stop into a formal arrest").
We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Studemire was lawfully detained and that the temporary detention was not converted into a de facto arrest by handcuffing him and holding him in the police car. We note that Officer MacVane testified that part of the reason Studemire was handcuffed was because
it would have, been better, for officer safety, to make sure that he was handcuffed. Had he been an escaped prisoner from some other jurisdiction and wanted to run somewhere else on the property and grab a gun and shoot us; we were detaining him for our safety, and to also conduct his — to conduct our investigation as to his identity and this investigation in this whole shooting.
We recognize that the officer's testimony regarding his concern for safety would be, to some extent, impeached if he failed to frisk Studemire before entering the house. This fact, however, was taken into consideration by the trial court. Further, the determinative factor is not the officer's belief, but what the objective facts present to a reasonable officer. The test for evaluating an officer's acts based on concern for safety is not the officer's subjective thoughts, but the rational inferences that a reasonably prudent person would draw under the circumstances. Snelling v. State, 591 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Graham v. State, 495 So.2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); United States v. Yeomans, 211 Fed.Appx. 753 (10th Cir.2007).
Notwithstanding the possibility that Officer MacVane failed to frisk Studemire, the objective circumstances at the scene presented valid and reasonable concern for officer safety. Guns were recently fired; there were multiple guns on the premises, some loaded; the other person at the scene acknowledged firing a shotgun; there were numerous, and a variety of, shell casings on the ground; at least one weapons offense had already occurred; and firearms matching the shell casings, other than the shotgun, had not yet been found. Patently, there was a realistic threat that other weapons were outside the house and the other officers were searching the area. Additionally, Studemire was uncooperative and had already given two false names.
Therefore, we conclude that the motion to suppress and the motion for judgment of acquittal were properly denied.
As to other issues raised, we find no reversible error or abuse of discretion.
STEVENSON, C.J., concurs.
POLEN, J., dissents with opinion.
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).