Case Name: DANIEL v. MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-01-11
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 27
Docket Number: 
Parties: DANIEL v. MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 27–32

Head Matter:
(116 App. Div. 780)
DANIEL v. MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.!
January 11, 1907.)
Master and Servant—Contract of Employment—Term of Employment-Wrongful Discharge.
A contract of employment stipulated that either party might terminate it by a notice of 30 days. Thereafter the contract was extended for a year from a specified date. Similar renewals were subsequently made, the last renewal extending the contract for a year after a specified date. Meld, that the master was liable for discharging the employé before the expiration of the year.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, «Master and Servant, § 11.J
Jenks, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County. >
Action by Walter Travers Daniel against the Manhattan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff granting insufficient relief, both parties appeal. Affirmed.
See 94 N. Y. Supp. 49.
The action was for damages for breach of a written contract of employment of the plaintiff by the defendant to solicit insurance, dated February 15th, 1894.
The contract contained no fixed term of employment, but was by its terms terminable by either party by a notice of 30 days.
It was afterwards amended in writing several times, and the plaintiff continued in the employment until discharged on April 6th, 1900, by a notice of 30 days.
An amendment of February 15th, 1897, provided that "The contract between the parties hereto dated February 15th, 1894, is hereby extended from the 1st day of March, 1897, to the 1st day of March, 1898, subject to the fol lowing modificationsand then followed certain amendments in respect to plaintitf’s compensation and making his agency exclusive.
An amendment of February 17th, 1898, provided “that the amendments to said contract contained in that certain agreement in writing dated New York, February 17th, 1897, is hereby extended to cover the period of one year, viz., from March 1st, 1898, to March 1st, 1899.”
On March 1st, 1899, the parties added the following to the last amendment given above, viz.: “The amendments to said contract and the said contract so amended is by mutual agreement extended until March 1st, 1900.”
Finally on February 24th, 1900, the parties made the following- agreement of extension:
“The contract between the parties dated February 15th, 1894, as amended by written amendment' dated February 15th, 1897; also by one dated June 22d, 1898; also by one dated May 1st, 1890; also by one dated February 17th, 1896, which latter shall take the place of the agreement to pay fifteen per cent. (15%) advance contained in the contract; also by one dated May 18th, 1894—is hereby extended, as is also the amendment of February 15th, 1897, for one year after March 1st, 1900, all other amendments having lapsed.”.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, and MILLER, JJ.
George W. McKenzie, for plaintiff.
Edward S. Rapallo, for defendant.

Opinion:
GAYNOR, J.
The duration of the plaintiff's employment was fixed by a clause in the original agreement that either party might terminate the agreement by a notice of 30 days. Three several times that agreement as theretofore amended was in terms "extended" from the 1st day of March in one year to the same day in the following year, the final agreement of extension being dated February 24th, 1900, and providing that the said agreement as amended (all of the amendments being enumerated) "is hereby extended for one year after March 1st, 1900."
The duration thus fixed was different to that first fixed; it is inconsistent with it; both cannot exist together. If the contract was to continue to- be terminable by either side at will on a notice of 30 days, what was the - meaning of extending it for a year? If the contract could still be terminated at will—if that was the intention—the words of extension for a fixed period were used to mean nothing.
The contract was extended a year from March 1st, 1900, and the defendant is liable for damages for discharging the plaintiff before the year was up.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment and order affirmed, without costs.
HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and HOOKER and MILLER, JJ., concur.