Case Name: T. D. TAYLOR v. SUPERIOR MOTOR COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1947-04-30
Citations: 227 N.C. 365
Docket Number: 
Parties: T. D. TAYLOR v. SUPERIOR MOTOR COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 227
Pages: 365–368

Head Matter:
T. D. TAYLOR v. SUPERIOR MOTOR COMPANY.
(Filed 30 April, 1947.)
1. Constitutional Law § 8a—
An Act of Congress in exercise of powers conferred by tbe Constitution is supreme. U. S. Constitution, Art. YI, Sec. 2.
2. Emergency Price Control § 4—
Proper regulations promulgated under tbe Emergency Price Control Act bave tbe binding effect of law.
3. Courts § 13—
State courts bave concurrent jurisdiction for tbe enforcement of civil remedies under tbe Emergency Price Control Act. -
4. Emergency Price Control § 4—
Tbe Emergency Price Control Act continues in force for tbe purpose of sustaining any proper suit with respect to rights or liabilities' accruing thereunder prior to tbe cessation of its price fixing provisions.
5. Emergency Price Control § 6—
A complaint alleging violation of regulations duly promulgated under authority of tbe Emergency Price Control Act, 60 USCA, 901, held sufficient as against demurrer.
6. Appeal and Error § 39f—
An exception to tbe charge will not be sustained when tbe charge is free from prejudicial error when read contextually.
7. Emergency Price Control § 7—
In an action to recover -the penalty for violation of regulations promulgated under tbe Emergency Price Control Act, tbe admission in evidence of tbe regulations set out in Federal Register is permitted by statute. 44 USCA, 307.
8. Emergency Price Control § 9: Courts § 3a—
The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction and has the power to award plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees authorized by the Emergency Price Control Act.
Appeal by defendant from Olive, Special Judge, at November Term, 1946, of MeckleNbueg.
No error.
Plaintiff instituted tbis action under tbe Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, to recover damages for violation by defendant of tbe maximum price permitted in tbe sale of a used automobile.
Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that be purchased of defendant a used automobile in March, 1946, at tbe sale price of $958.87, to which was added a charge of 25% or $239.72 for warranty that tbe automobile, was “in good operating condition” as’defined in Maximum Price Eegulations No. 540; that tbe automobile was not as warranted and not in good operating condition in material respects, and defendant failed to make repairs or replacement in accordance with tbe warranty, and that consequently the amount charged and paid for tbe warranty was to that extent in excess of tbe permitted maximum price; that tbe automobile was not used for business purposes, nor was plaintiff engaged in selling cars. Plaintiff asked to recover treble damages and for counsel fees.
Tbe defendant offered evidence tending to show that tbe automobile was as warranted and that plaintiff completed tbe transaction with knowledge of tbe condition of tbe automobile; that plaintiff used it for business purposes; and that if tbe defendant charged in excess of the maximum price tbis was not done intentionally or willfully or without taking practical precaution not to violate tbe regulations, and that plaintiff was in no event entitled to recover more than tbe amount of the warranty.
Issues were submitted to tbe jury and answered in favor of plaintiff determining that the defendant sold tbe plaintiff a used motor vehicle in violation of tbe Maximum Price Eegulations No. 540 as amended. Plaintiff’s damages were assessed at $391.85. Judgment was rendered on tbe verdict for tbe amount fixed by tbe jury, and for tbe further sum of $100 attorney’s fees fixed by tbe court.
Defendant excepted and appealed.
David H. Henderson for plaintiff, appellee.
Basil M. Boyd for defendant, appellant.

Opinion:
Devin, J.
According to tbe regulations duly promulgated under authority of tbe Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, fixing maximum prices for used passenger automobiles, tbe seller was allowed to include in the maximum price an additional amount when the used car was warranted, but tbis permission was conditioned on the used car being in good operating condition as therein defined. 10 Fed. Register 11558, Part 1360, Art. II, sec. 5(b)(3), sec. 7 (b), (M. P. R. No. 540). Plaintiff's action is bottomed upon the allegation, and the evidence offered in support, that the automobile purchased by him from the defendant was warranted and a specific amount paid therefor, and that the failure of the automobile to be in good operating condition as warranted breached the warranty and constituted the charge therefor an amount in excess of the maximum allowed under the regulations issued by authority of the Price Control Act, and that in consequence he was entitled to recover three times the amount of the overcharge. 50 USCA, sec. 901; Maximum Price Regulations, 540; Emergency Price Control Act, sec. 205(e).
The controversy as to the material facts upon which plaintiff's asserted cause of action was made to depend was resolved below in favor of the plaintiff by the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court thereon. From this conclusion the defendant has appealed, assigning errors in several particulars.
In the first place defendant questions the jurisdiction of the court, and also demurs ore ienus to the complaint as insufficient to state a cause of action. However, it is well settled that an Act of the Congress in exercise of the powers conferred by the Federal Constitution is supreme. Art. VI, sec. 2. And proper regulations authorized under the Act have the binding effect of law. These are the tools used to effectuate the policy and purposes of the Act. Emergency Price Control Act, sec. 2a; Standard Comp. Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U. S., 571.
Concurrent jurisdiction for the enforcement of the civil remedies under the Emergency Price Control Act is expressly conferred upon state courts, and state courts may not refuse to enforce a claim growing out of a valid Federal law. Testa v. Katt, 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Op., 776; Mondou v. R. R., 223 U. S., 1; McGuinn v. McLain, 225 N. C., 750, 36 S. E. (2d), 377; Swink v. Horn, 226 N. C., 713, 40 S. E. (2d), 353. Notwithstanding the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, ceased 30 June, 1946, to be effective as fixing maximum prices for the sale of used automobiles, yet by force of the statute as enacted its authority was continued in force as to rights or liabilities incurred prior to its termination, for the purpose of sustaining any proper suit or action with respect to any such right or liability. 50 USCA, sec. 901(b), 150 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Porter, 156 F. (2d), 541. We think the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the cause of action, and that the complaint is sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
Defendant noted exception to certain instructions of the trial judge to the jury, hut an examination of the entire charge, in the light of the criticisms noted, leads us to the conclusion that the court's instructions to the jury were free from error. The form of the issues was agreed to, and thereunder all the controverted questions of fact were fairly submitted to the jury, with correct interpretation of the statutes and effective regulations. Admission in evidence of'the regulations set out in Federal Register was permitted by statute. 44 USCA, sec. 307.
The allowance of reasonable attorney's fees, authorized by the Federal statute, must be upheld. As was said by Justice Denny in Hilgreen v. Cleaners & Tailors, Inc., 225 N. C., 656, 36 S. E. (2d), 252, "The statute authorizes the court to award reasonable attorney's fees, and the Superior Court, being a court of general jurisdiction, has the power to award such fees." See also Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N. C., 617, 27 S. E. (2d), 644.
In the trial we find
No error.