Case Name: Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr. v. Janet Mary Mire, Wife of Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1989-09-28
Citations: 550 So. 2d 1237
Docket Number: No. 89-CA-0226
Parties: Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr. v. Janet Mary Mire, Wife of Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, C.J., and WILLIAMS and PLOTKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 550
Pages: 1237–1243

Head Matter:
Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr. v. Janet Mary Mire, Wife of Sidney A. ROVIRA, Jr.
No. 89-CA-0226.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 28, 1989.
Writ Denied Dec. 1, 1989.
James Derbes, Derbes & Waldrup, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Pat M. Franz, Metairie, for defendant-ap-pellee.
Before SCHOTT, C.J., and WILLIAMS and PLOTKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHOTT, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal by the husband from a judgment which found him to be at fault and the wife to be without fault, awarded the custody of three minor children to the wife, and awarded her child support totaling $1,250 per month and permanent alimony of $650 per month. Appellant claims the child support and alimony awards are excessive and argues for changes in the judgment because of federal income tax considerations.
The parties were married in 1965 and had seven children. They separated in September, 1982 and the husband filed suit for divorce in April, 1988. At the time of the trial in October, 1988 three of the children were minors, eight, eleven, and fifteen years of age respectively. In 1987 the husband earned $46,231 and expected about the same in 1988. The wife has never been employed.
Appellant's first argument is that the award is unfair to him because after payment of income taxes, alimony, and support, he is left with less spendable money than his former wife or each child. This problem is not novel and was undoubtedly considered by the trial judge in the exercise of her discretion. This fact standing alone does not mandate a reduction in the awards. Similarly, guidelines of the Department of Health and Human Resources for amounts of child support do not control the trial court. If properly presented to the trial judge, they may be considered along with other relevant facts in the exercise of her discretion. Finally, appellant makes much over the fact that two adult children live with the wife, one with a two year old child, and that they pay their mother monthly room and board of $150 and $160 respectively. This too was undoubtedly considered by the trial court in making the awards. We are not persuaded by these arguments that the trial judge abused her discretion considering all the circumstances such as the fact that appellant lives with his mother so that his expenses for board and lodging are relatively low and the fact that he is the recipient of some assistance from his other relatives.
The most difficult issues raised by appellant stem from the income tax consequences of the judgment. The family home owned by the community is occupied by the wife and children. Under the judgment she is required to make the mortgage payments of $581.00. Under the income tax laws, the interest on these payments is deductible from her income if she itemizes deductions. The income tax laws also provide that the spouse who has custody of the children has the right to claim the children as exemptions. Appellant contends that these tax benefits which are available to the wife are being wasted because she has little income whereas the benefits would be of value to him.
Appellant's solution with respect to the mortgage payments is to reduce the wife's alimony by $581 leaving her with $69 and to oblige him to make the payments. However, the practical effect of this would be to increase appellant's taxable income by $581 and enable him to deduct from his income only the small portions of the payments applied to the interest on the loan. Consequently, appellant would incur a greater tax liability than he has now.
Appellant's argument concerning the tax exemptions for the minor children has merit. Since appellee has no income other than the $7800 annual alimony she is receiving, she has no use for the $5,850 in exemptions for her children. On the other hand the allocation of the exemptions to appellant would probably result in a saving of $1,638. Although the custodial parent has the right to claim the exemptions the Internal Revenue Code permits the custodial parent to execute a waiver of tax exemptions which enables the non-custodial parent to claim them. In Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (W.Va.1987) the court concluded that a state court had the power tó award the dependency tax exemption by ordering the custodial parent to execute the waiver required by the Internal Revenue Code. We agree with the reasoning employed and conclusion reached by the West Virginia court. An opposite conclusion would result in a waste of money for the entire family unit. Therefore, we have resolved to remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of accomplishing this transfer of the tax exemptions. We have noted that the loss of the exemptions.by the appellee may result in some small additional tax liability for her. If so the trial court may wish to adjust the awards so as to maintain the same level of after-tax income she is presently enjoying.
Appellant's final argument is that appel-lee should be required to take a job and contribute to her own support. Appellee has a high school education and took an accounting course at a business college. She has never worked and has not attempted to find employment since the separation. In determining the entitlement and the amount of alimony, the trial court should consider the time necessary for the recipient to acquire appropriate education, training or employment and should consider her earning capacity in light of other circumstances. C.C. art. 160. It does not appear that the trial judge made these considerations in making the award.
In deciding how to correct this error we recognize that appellee will probably experience some difficulty in finding employment considering her lack of education and experience and her family situation in having to look after the three minor children. On the other hand, the grant of alimony on a indefinite basis without requiring appellee to look for employment or even seek education or training to make herself employable seems inconsistent with art. 160. Consequently, we have resolved to terminate appellant's obligation to pay alimony to appellee one year after our judgment becomes final. This is subject to appellee's right to return to the district court and seek an extension of the permanent alimony upon proof of entitlement based upon all of the considerations set forth in art. 160 including those involving her obligation to seek further education and training and her efforts to seek suitable employment.
Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of enabling the trial court to order appellee to sign the form required by the Internal Revenue Service to waive the tax exemptions for her children thereby enabling appellant to claim these exemptions. On remand the trial court may adjust appellee's income from alimony to compensate her for any loss of income with results from her loss of the exemptions. The judgment appealed from is otherwise affirmed but is amended to terminate appellant's obligation to pay alimony to appellee one year after our judgment becomes final, reserving appel-lee's right to seek continued alimony upon proof of entitlement in accordance with law and the views expressed herein. All costs including costs of this appeal are assessed against appellant.
AMENDED AND REMANDED.
PLOTKIN, J., dissents in part and concurs in part, with reasons.