Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, v. Maurice H. ROSENBLOOM, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1974-12-05
Citations: 167 U.S. App. D.C. 211
Docket Number: No. 73-2231
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Maurice H. ROSENBLOOM, Appellant.
Judges: Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Judge, United States Court of Claims.
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Volume: 167
Pages: 211–220

Head Matter:
511 F.2d 777
UNITED STATES of America, v. Maurice H. ROSENBLOOM, Appellant.
No. 73-2231.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 19, 1974.
Decided Dec. 5, 1974.
Rehearing En Banc Denied April 1, 1975.
Jacob Sheeskin, Rockville, Md., with whom Harry M. Stern was on the brief, for appellant.
James N. Owens, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Jason D. Kogan, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Judge, United States Court of Claims.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a).

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
The claim of speedy trial denied has been given careful consideration, especially in view of the long time involved. But the case calls for a balancing of factors as appears from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). We are of the view that no significant delay was attributable to negligence or fault on the part of the prosecution, that most of the delay was attributable to the Government's successful interlocutory appeal of a motion to suppress evidence; that there was neither detention nor release on bail, but rather on recognizance; that the defendant's irrational actions contributed materially to the delay in setting of a trial date; that there was no prejudice to the conduct of the defense; and that after the motion to suppress was resolved by an authoritative ruling of this court, there was a further delay of only 4 — 5 months prior to the date set by the judge, with the consent of counsel, for the trial. We do not believe that the possible stress on appellant attributable to the pendency of the charges involved in this case weighs heavily enough to swing the balance of factors toward a dismissal of the indictment for denial of speedy trial.
Affirmed.
The foregoing was originally prepared as a memorandum in support of a judgment, to be sent to the parties and kept in the public files but without publication of printed copies by the court. See Rule 8(b) of the General Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; cf. C. Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 Judicature 195 (1972). The division has agreed to publication in view of the preparation and publication of the dissent. The foregoing has not been recast into the format of a conventional opinion, since this is a field in which each case stands on its facts.