Case Name: PEOPLE v. GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-03-20
Citations: 175 Mich. App. 701
Docket Number: Docket No. 88066
Parties: PEOPLE v GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC
Judges: Before: Sullivan, P.J., and Gribbs and E. C. Penzien, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 175
Pages: 701–713

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC
Docket No. 88066.
Submitted January 20, 1987, at Detroit.
Decided March 20, 1989.
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., was charged with involuntary manslaughter and wilful violation of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act. The charges arose after an employee of the defendant died from cardiac arrhythmia caused by exposure to Freon fumes from a battle tank he had been driving. Freon had been used to degrease the tank’s exterior. The deceased had driven the tank in such a way that his head and shoulders had remained outside the tank’s hatch cover. The district court dismissed the charges against defendant. The Macomb Circuit Court, Ray R. Cashen, J., affirmed. The people appealed by leave granted.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The court did not err in dismissing the miosha violation charge. The rule allegedly violated did not apply to the facts, of the case.
2. The court erred in dismissing the involuntary manslaughter charge. A corporation may be guilty of the crime of manslaughter. The evidence on the issue of gross negligence was conflicting, creating a question for the jury.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
E. C. Penzien, J., dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the court properly dismissed the charge of miosha violation. He believed, however, that a corporation cannot be criminally liable at common law for involuntary manslaughter. He would affirm the dismissal of both charges.
Homicide — Manslaughter — Common Law — Corporations.
A corporation may be guilty of the crime of manslaughter.
References
Am Jur 2d, Corporations § 2141; Homicide § 26.
Corporation’s criminal liability for homicide. 45 ALR4th 1021.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Theodore S. Kli maszewski, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
Michael H. Golde, and Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile, P.C. (by John P. Hancock, Jr.), for defendant.
Before: Sullivan, P.J., and Gribbs and E. C. Penzien, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Sullivan, P.J.
Judge Penzien has laid out the facts in this matter, and they need not be recited here. We agree with his conclusion as to Count n, the miosha count, which should have been dismissed. The manslaughter charge, however, is a different matter. He concludes that a corporation is not sufficiently a "person" to be the perpetrator of a manslaughter. As he correctly notes, the crime of manslaughter is not defined in our statutes but, rather, we are directed to use the common-law definition. People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332 (1980). Case law reveals, however, that the terms "of another" and "person" have been used interchangeably. For example, involuntary manslaughter is defined as the killing of another without malice and unintentionally. Richardson, supra, p 136, quoting People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923). Similarly, in People v Carter, 387 Mich 397, 418; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), manslaughter is defined as the unlawful killing of another without malice, express or implied.
By contrast, the definition applied in People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 331; 28 NW 883 (1886), uses the term "person" instead of "another":
Any person who shall maim or injure any other person . . . and if death ensue from such wounding or maiming, such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter.
See also CJI 16:4:03 ("A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter if he kills an individual . . .").
So manslaughter may be defined in different ways, the killing of another or the killing of a person and the courts over the years have used either term.
Judge Penzien would limit himself to a definition in which the term "another" appears. However, if manslaughter may be defined in different ways, such as the killing of another or the killing of a person, and historically the courts have used either term, we do not believe that we should rely solely on a definition containing the term "another."
Our penal code defines "person," "accused," and similar words to include public and private corporations, unless a contrary intention appears. MCL 750.10; MSA 28.200. After examining the common-law definitions of manslaughter, we are unpersuaded that a contrary intention appears. Consequently, we cannot agree with the dissenting opinion in this respect and reach an opposite conclusion: that a corporation is sufficiently a "person" to be the perpetrator of a manslaughter.
In this case, the district court, affirmed by the circuit court, refused to bind defendant over on the manslaughter charge, finding insufficient evidence of gross negligence. On review, the magistrate's finding will be not disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 385; 301 NW2d 809 (1981). Here, there was conflicting evidence on the issue of gross negligence which created a question of fact, properly resolved by the trier of fact and not the magistrate. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).
In addition, the district court found that Franklin Bryan, Chief of Engineering Services at the Prototype Fabrication Shop, reviewed the safety bulletins covering the procedure involved here with his supervisor and instituted a procedure for flushing the tanks. This testimony was contradicted, however, by two subordinate employees who testified that they had not seen any safety bulletins nor had they received any training regarding the use of Gensolv-D. Therefore, there was a conflict on the issues of whether there was ever a procedure instituted for safely cleaning out the tanks and whether the safety bulletins were ever reviewed.
Similarly, there was also a conflict regarding the testimony of Dr. Spitz as to the cause of death. At one time, Dr. Spitz held that Lee had had an allergic reaction to a nonlethal exposure of Freon. However, Dr. Conolly, a toxicologist, contradicted the entire idea that the victim could have died from an allergic reaction to a nonlethal exposure of Freon.
Also, and most importantly, there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether Dr. Spitz had undertaken procedures to insure that Freon did not escape from the body tissues. The procedures were crucial because, if the specimens were placed in baby food jars, as testified to by Sergeant Bourgeois, an undeterminable amount of Freon may have escaped, thereby opening to challenge the finding of a nonlethal dosage of Freon in the victim's body. Because of the conflict in the evidence, the district court should have bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
Reversed as to Count i, manslaughter, and remanded for trial. Affirmed as to Count n.
Gribbs, J., concurred.