Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. DAVID STEVENSON BREWING CO. v. LYMAN, Com'r of Excise
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01-10
Citations: 73 N.Y.S. 987
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. DAVID STEVENSON BREWING CO. v. LYMAN, Com’r of Excise.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 73
Pages: 987–994

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. DAVID STEVENSON BREWING CO. v. LYMAN, Com’r of Excise.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
January 10, 1902.)
Intoxicating Liquors—License—Rebate—Deputy Commissioners—Receipt— Effect—Mandamus—Burden of Proof.
An applicant for a liquor license rebate, required by statute to show as a condition precedent that he has ceased selling liquor, is not relieved from the necessity of establishing that fact, when denied in mandamus against the excise commissioner to compel the payment of the rebate, by the fact that the deputy commissioner has issued receipts for the unearned portion of' such license, on affidavits showing that the license holder has ceased selling liquors, and other necessary facts, as authorized by Laws 1897, c. 312, § 25, as the action of the deputy is not an adjudication as to the truth of such facts, which is to be determined by the commissioner.
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Mandamus by the people, on the relation of the David Stevenson Brewing Company, against Henry H. Lyman, state commissioner of excise, to compel the payment of a liquor license rebate. From an order of the special term of the supreme court dismissing the alternative writ, the relator appeals.
Affirmed.
On or about the 29th day of April, 1898, the special deputy commissioner of excise for the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, upon payment to-him of the sum of 8800, issued liquor tax certificate No. 3,563 to one John Michels, permitting the traffic in liquors at No. 2068 Amsterdam avenue, in-the borough of Manhattan, city of New York, for the year ending April 30, 1899. Thereafter, and prior to the 1st of March, 1899, the said John Michels duly assigned and transferred to the relator all his right, title, and interest in and to the rebate for the unearned portion of the said liquor tax certificate, and authorized the relator to surrender the said certificate for cancellation at any time, at its option, and created it his attorney to execute all papers necessary for the purpose of effecting such surrender, and to take-such proceedings to recover the amount of such rebate as might be required. On or about the said 1st day of March, 1899, the said special deputy-commissioner of excise was presented with said certificate, and with a petition duly verified by relator as the attorney in fact of the said John Michels, setting forth all the facts required to be shown upon a surrender of a certificate. Thereupon the said special deputy commissioner of excise-duly executed duplicate receipts showing the amount of the rebate, and the other facts required by section 25, c. 312, Laws 1897, and delivered the same,, as required by said act. After 30 days had elapsed since such surrender, the relator demanded from the state commissioner of excise the amount of such rebate, but he refused to pay the same. The relator thereupon moved upon affidavits for a peremptory writ of mandamus. This motion was denied, but an alternative writ was allowed to issue. This writ contained allegations setting forth all the above facts, and also alleged that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors prior to the surrender of the said’ certificate, and that since the surrender he had not been arrested or indicted "for any violation of the liquor tax law, etc. The return denied that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors at the time said surrender of his certificate was made, and denied that he had not been arrested' or indicted for a violation of the liquor tax law since the surrender of the certificate, as alleged in the alternative writ. The return made also the positive allegation that he had been indicted for such an offense. The- issues thus formed by the alternative writ of mandamus and the return thereto were then duly sent to the trial term for trial. When the trial was brought on, the defendant claimed that the burden of showing that Michels had ceased to traffic in liquor rested with the relator. The relator claimed that the burden of showing that it was not entitled to the rebate was with the defendant. The court held that the burden was on the relator to show that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors for the term for which said certificate was issued. To this ruling the relator duly excepted, and put in evidence formal proof to show that he had taken all the steps to entitle it to rebate, and rested. The court thereupon directed the jury to find certain facts, among which was one to the effect that Michels had not voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors under said certificate for the term for which said certificate was issued. Said verdict being certified to the special term, such proceedings were thereupon had that the alternative writ of mandamus was dismissed upon the merits, and from such dismissal this appeal is taken.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and PATTERSON,. O’BRIEN, McEAUGHEIN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Wm. G. McCrea, for appellant.
N. N. Stranahan, for respondent.

Opinion:
VAN BRUNT, P. J.
It does not seem that there was necessarily any question involved upon the trial of the issues raised by the •alternative writ and the return as to upon whom the burden of proof rested as to events -occurring after the surrender of the certificate. The right of the relator to the rebate having been denied by the return, it was bound to show, by proof or admissions upon the record, that the holder of the liquor license and his attorney had done all that the law required as conditions precedent to the right to claim such rebate. It was admitted upon the record that the license had been surrendered and the proper petition filed with -the deputy commissioner of.excise, and that such deputy commissioner had issued the receipt required by law; but the return denied, as it was alleged in the alternative writ, that the holder of the license had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors before the surrender of the certificate, and therefore claimed that the relator was not entitled to recover the rebate. It is to be observed that, to entitle the holder of a liquor license to surrender the same, he must, prior to such tender of surrender, voluntarily have ceased to traffic in liquors. The existence of this fact is a condition precedent to the right to a rebate,'and we cannot find any provision of the statute which makes any action upon the part of the deputy commissioner an adjudication upon that subject. According to the statute, when a petition is presented to the deputy commissioner showing all the facts required to be shown upon such application, he is directed by the statute to issue the receipts required by law. He is not given any power to pass upon the question of the truth of the facts set forth in the petition, and his action in issuing the receipt cannot have that effect. This would seem to be apparent from a reading of the statute. Leaving out those provisions that have no relevancy to the present case, it reads as follows:
"Sec. 25. If a person holding a liquor tax certificate and authorized to sell liquors under the provisions of this act, shall voluntarily cease to traffic in liquors during the term for which the tax is paid under such certificate, such person or their duly .authorized attorney may surrender such tax certificate to the officer who issued the same, and at the same time shall present to such officer a verified petition setting forth all facts required to be shown upon such application. Said officer shall thereupon compute the amount of pro rata rebate then due on said certificate for the unexpired term thereof, and shall execute duplicate receipts therefor. One of such receipts said officer shall deliver to the person entitled thereto, and the other of such receipts he shall immediately transmit, with the surrendered certificate and the petition for the cancellation thereof, to the state commissioner of excise."
There is evidently no judicial duty imposed by the foregoing provision of the law upon the deputy commissioner. When the certificate is presented to him with a petition setting forth all the required facts, he must issue his receipts. There is no power given to him to pass upon the truth of the allegations in the petition, and although undoubtedly, if he refused to issue a receipt, he could not be compelled to do so unless the applicant showed that the conditions precedent to the issuance of a receipt had been fulfilled, yet we cannot find anywhere in the statute any authority upon his part to pass upon that question, or to make any admissions relating thereto which will be binding upon the state commissioner. The state commissioner is the only one who is empowered to act finally in the matter. When the claimant of a rebate comes to him and demands his rebate, he certainly has the right to demand.proof of the fact that the requirements of the law have been complied with. Until they are shown to have existed, no right to a rebate is given by the statute.
The whole foundation of the claimant's demand is based upon the fact that he has, prior to the tender for surrender of his license, voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors. If he has not,' then he has no claim. The statute giving the deputy commissioner no power to pass upon this question or even to demand proof upon the subject, it certainly must have been intended that the officer who is to pay the rebate claimed should have the power to demand proof of the right to such rebate. It seems to me that the right to the rebate is to be construed as resting upon a contract between the licensee and the state. If such is the case, clearly the party claiming must show compliance with all conditions precedent.
There is no question of imputing to a man a crime in requiring him to show compliance with the conditions precedent found in a statute, any more than there would be in requiring a man to prove the execution of a contract which has been denied in an answer to a sworn complaint. The claimant comes into court, and demands his rebate, alleging that he has done everything to entitle him to such rebate. The state commissioner says: "You are not entitled to it because you did not cease to traffic in liquors before you presented your certificate for surrender, which is one of the conditions precedent to your being allowed any rebate." Upon whom does the burden of proof lie? Clearly, the claimant must prove his case, as in the case of any other contract. The case of People v. Lyman, 53 App. Div. 625, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1142, may seem, upon a cursory examination, to be contrary to our view, but no such question was raised in that case, and the remark of the learned justice who wrote the opinion in that case was clearly not considered material.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
PATTERSON, O'BRIEN, and McLAUGHLIN, JJ., concur.