Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Donald PECKENSCHNEIDER, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1975-12-17
Citations: 236 N.W.2d 344
Docket Number: No. 58299
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Donald PECKENSCHNEIDER, Appellant.
Judges: MOORE, LeGRAND, REES and UH-LENHOPP, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 236
Pages: 344–356

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Donald PECKENSCHNEIDER, Appellant.
No. 58299.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 17, 1975.
John J. Carlin, Carlin & Darbyshire, Davenport, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas Mann, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward N. Wehr, County Atty., and A. Fred Berger, Jr., Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Justice.
This appeal challenges the propriety of the trial court's refusal to grant probation under § 789A.1(2), The Code. We affirm.
Donald Peckenschneider (defendant) entered a guilty plea to a charge of receiving stolen goods in violation of § 712.1, The Code. There is no claim the proceedings did not comply with the rules laid down in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) and Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974). Defendant limits his challenge to the trial court's refusal to grant what is commonly called a "bench parole." Section 789A.1(2) provides in material part: "By record entry at time of or after sentencing, the court may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it may require."
The record would have supported the grant of probation if the trial court had so chosen. In accordance with a plea bargain the county attorney did not oppose defendant's request. Probation was recommended in a presentence investigation report prepared and submitted at the trial court's request by the Iowa Bureau of Adult Correction Services.
The recommendation was based on a careful study of defendant by the bureau's parole agent. The State in no way disputes the facts outlined in the report and the trial court seems to have taken them as true. Defendant was 52 years old and married. His two daughters were 12 and 8 years of age. The family lived in the rural community of Donahue, Iowa, where they owned their own home.
Defendant's background was entirely rural. He had been self-employed during most of his life. From 1966 to February of 1975 he operated a tavern and restaurant in Donahue. The parole agent concluded:
"The present offense represents a radical departure from a lifetime which could be considered as exemplary until now. It must be assumed' that, under the forces which operate in and around pool halls and. like recreational facilities, the opportunities, and the temptations, for criminal activity can overcome a person's sense of fitness and propriety developed over long periods of self-discipline.
"This appears the only logical explanation for a sudden reversal of pattern evident in this case. Mr. Peckenschneider is quite remorseful, mainly because of the ugly stain on an otherwise bright shield. It is the opinion of this writer, following the interview, that Mr. Peckenschneider will suffer more in his own conscience than he would from any formalized penalty, and the chances for a recurrence should be completely nil.
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"It is recommended that this man be granted probation."
The trial court expressed only one reason for determining to decline the recommendation for probation. The sole expressed reason was to deter thefts in the community. The record discloses the following:
"THE COURT: I pondered over this thing for a long time, and if we didn't have receivers, we wouldn't have so many break-ins. We are having an epidemic of break-ins in this town, as Mr. Berger will verify. Is that right?
"MR. BERGER [Prosecutor]: Yes, there is a rash of crime going on that is unprecedented in this community.
"THE COURT: And these fellows wouldn't be breaking into homes and stores if they couldn't find a person to buy these things. Mr. Peckenschneider was fully aware of that, and at the time he pled guilty, I forewarned Mr. Peckenschneider that if he was pleading guilty in the hopes of getting a parole from me, that he shouldn't plead guilty. Do you remember that, Mr. Peckenschneider?
"[DEFENDANT]: I don't know if those were your exact words.
"THE COURT: I cannot condone this thing, because we are having an epidemic of break-ins, and they wouldn't be breaking in if they couldn't sell the things they stole, and we have got to put a stop to it in this town. If I condone it, there will be more break-ins. And therefore, I refuse to give you a parole at this time.
The record did not bear out the trial court's claim to have forewarned defendant he should not plead guilty in the hope of obtaining a parole.
Defendant's challenge is twofold. He asks us to repudiate our established scope of review in criminal sentences and adopt the ABA Standards of Appellate Review of Sentencing. In the alternative defendant argues the trial court's refusal to grant probation was an abuse of discretion.
I. It should first be conceded one might well question the validity of positiñg a probation question within the ambit of sentencing. Sentencing and probation are elsewhere thought to be distinct concepts. It is generally held denial of probation is not appealable, at least in the 'absence of statute. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1656, pp. 1019-1020.
Our own review of criminal sentences proceeds from an Iowa statute which we have interpreted to govern our reviews both of sentence and of probation. Section 793.-18, The Code, provides:
"If the appeal is taken by the defendant, the supreme court must examine the record, without regard to technical errors or de fects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties, and render such judgment on the record as the law demands; it may affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment, or render such judgment as the district court should have done, or order a new trial, or reduce the punishment, but cannot increase it."
Because the mandate of § 793.18 directs our review to judgment and not merely sentence, we review the trial court's denial of probation. The scope of our review was described in State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa 1969). We said:
"What is commonly called a 'bench parole' is authorized by [section 789A.1(2), The Code]. This section to the extent applicable here provides: 'The trial court may suspend the sentence and grant probation to said person during good behavior. [Section 789A.7] provides for the custody, care and supervision of the person to whom probation is granted by a parole agent or agency designated by the court.
"Section [789A.1(2)] says the court 'may' suspend sentence. The granting of a suspended sentence and parole is a matter of grace, favor, or forbearance. It is not a matter of right. (Authorities).
" Trial courts have broad discretion in the granting or withholding of bench paroles and an appellate court will seldom interfere with their determination of such matters. There is, however, a duty to consider and determine an application for parole. State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 11 N.W.2d 407. See also second appeal in the same case, 234 Iowa 1047, 14 N.W.2d 676.
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"From these pronouncements it is clear that a trial court has a duty to hear an application for parole but has wide discretion in what must be considered in granting or denying the application." 168 N.W.2d at 39-40. See also State v. DeVan, 205 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Iowa 1973).
The provisions of § 793.18, The Code, which allow us to reduce a sentence imposed by a trial court were adopted in 1860. Iowa seems to have been the first state to allow appellate review of legally valid sentences challenged on appeal as being excessive. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 671 (1962).
Actions of a judge pronouncing sentence were of considerably more importance to a convicted criminal prior to 1907 when our indeterminate sentence law was enacted. Acts of the 32nd G.A., 1907 Regular Session, ch. 192, § 9, now § 789.13, The Code. Even so we exercised our power to reduce sentences sparingly. During the 47 year period from 1860 to 1907 we reduced sentences in only a handful of cases. The State of Iowa v. Madden, 35 Iowa 511 (1872); The State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa 11, 18 (1876); The State v. Thompson, 46 Iowa 699, 700 (1877); The State v. Doering, 48 Iowa 650, 652 (1878); The State v. Moody, 50 Iowa 443, 446 (1879); The State v. Sullivan, 51 Iowa 142, 148, 50 N.W. 572, 574 (1879); The State v. Fields, 70 Iowa 196, 198, 30 N.W. 480, 481 (1886).
Our scope of review as developed accommodates the purpose and effect of the indeterminate sentence law. In 1907 (except for the crimes excluded in § 789.13, The Code) the responsibility of determining the length of a prison sentence was shifted from the trial court to the board of parole. State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1196, 152 N.W.2d 277, 279 (1967) and authorities. It remains for the trial court to determine for most felonies, including receiving stolen goods under § 712.1, The Code, whether the convicted person receives an indeterminate prison sentence or jail sentence or fine or some combination of such punishments. Section 789.15, The Code. Under § 793.18, The Code, we have retained authority to reduce the punishment thus imposed but not to determine the length to be served under an indeterminate sentence.
In a long line of cases we have consistently said the determination of whether to sentence a defendant to jail or assess a fine rather than sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Jennings, 219 N.W.2d 1,1-2 (Iowa 1974); State v. DeVan, 205 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Iowa 1973). These cases also note the trial court has similar discretion on the question of probation.
We have demonstrated a growing reluctance to interfere with the trial court's discretion. The reason for that reluctance is apparent. The statutory scheme outlined in the indeterminate sentence act is complemented by specific powers given the parole board. Under § -247.5, The Code, power is given the board of parole to determine whether a parole should be granted any inmate, other than those serving life terms. Under § 247.7, The Code, the board of parole may, upon recommendation of the trial judge and prosecuting attorney, grant parole prior to commitment.
We pass the serious question of whether the ABA Standards of Appellate Review of Sentencing in fact contemplate a review of a denial of probation. We decline to adopt the standards. Our review, as developed under § 793.18, The Code, is sufficient, especially in view of the indeterminate sentence act.
.Defendant's first assignment is without merit.
II. A much more difficult question is presented under defendant's second assignment, the claim the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant probation. Defendant argues that because the trial court mentioned only the deterrent effect of his declination of probation we must assume he ignored all other criteria.
Other criteria for such a determination are listed in § 789A.1, The Code. They include opportunity for rehabilitation of the defendant, the protection of the community from further'offenses by the defendant and others, the age of the defendant, his pirior record of convictions, his employment circumstances, his family circumstances, the nature of the offense committed, whether a dangerous weapon or force was used in the commission of the offense, and such other factors as are appropriate.
It is not clear from the remarks of the trial court that he was prompted to his denial solely in the hope his act would deter others in the community from committing crime. His remarks may have indicated this hope was the decisive reason rather than, as defendant suggests, the exclusive reason for his denial. While the record is certainly not strong it cannot be said there were no other factors for the trial court to consider. For example other charges against defendant were dismissed. On review we believe the case falls within the scope of the trial court's discretion.
This is not to imply it would be inappropriate for the board of parole to grant defendant a parole before commitment or a parole at the earliest time after commitment under the statutory authority mentioned in the preceding division. Defendant appears to be an excellent parole risk. But, under our statutory scheme, it is for the parole board and not for us to act.
Affirmed.
MOORE, LeGRAND, REES and UH-LENHOPP, JJ., concur.
McCORMICK, MASON, RAWLINGS and REYNOLDSON, JJ., dissent.