Case Name: H.A.S. ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. v. HEMPHILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2016-06-02
Citations: 232 So. 3d 117
Docket Number: No. 2015-CA-00596-SCT
Parties: H.A.S. ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. v. HEMPHILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Judges: WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BEAM, J.; DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, COLEMAN AND MAXWELL, JJ., JOIN IN PART. KING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 232
Pages: 117–148

Head Matter:
H.A.S. ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. v. HEMPHILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
No. 2015-CA-00596-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 2, 2016.
On Remand Oct. 12, 2017.
Rehearing Denied January 11, 2018.
Jira L. Davis, III, attorney for appellant.'
David Bonds Ellis, Danny Alton Drake, Jackson, attorneys for appellee,

Opinion:
MAXWELL, Justice,
for the Court:
¶1. During jury selection,' plaintiff H.A.S. Electrical Contractors (HAS) challenged defendant Hemphill Construction Company's use of two peremptory strikes. HAS argued Hemphill's strikes'were'racially discriminatory,.
¶ 2. HAS's race-based objections triggered a three-step Batson analysis. But the record shows the trial court failed to follow the Batson criteria when analyzing the challenged strike of Juror 7. We remand this case to the trial court for a limited Batson hearing for Juror 7, On remand, the court should determine if HAS can meet its burden .to, prove purposeful discrimination, in Hemphill's exercise of that peremptory strike — i.e" was Hemphill's stated reason for the strike (age) merely pretext for discrimination.
¶ 3. We retain jurisdiction of this case pending the outcome of that hearing. Once the results are certified, we will review the trial court's Batson determination for Juror 7 and address HAS's remaining issues on appeal.
Procedural Background
I. Suit and Countersuit
¶4. This is a breach-of-eontract case involving a subcontract for electrical work for a state park in Waveland, Mississippi. Subcontractor HAS Electrical Contractors, Inc., :Sued contractor Hemphill Construction Company, Inc., for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and conversion, HAS requested $570,678.71 in compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees, costs, and punitive damages. Hemphill countersued, seeking $23,677.04 in damages. Hemphill also asked for attorney's fees and expenses under the subcontract.
II. Jury Selection
¶ 5. The dispute went to a jury trial. The trial court gave both HAS and Hemp-hill four peremptory strikes to use in selecting the twelve-member jury. ; HAS used two of its strikes without objection. The twelve venire members HAS had ac-; cepted were then tendered to Hemphill. Hemphill accepted Jurors 1-3 and 5-6, all white females. Hemphill then used a strike on Juror 7, Don R. Taylor, a black male. HAS interjected, "Judge, we'll just point out that is the first black we have reached on the panel." The court then asked, "Anything further?"
HAS: Judge, we — I guess we would go ahead and ask for a race neutral reason because it is the first black we have reached on panel at this time of the venire.
Court: Well, I don't- see how in the world you can have a pattern after one strike, but I will, as I believe the cases say, that I should ask you for a race neutral reason for Number 7, Taylor.
Hemphill: Your Honor, we — my reason, race neutral or otherwise, was age. We just thought he was — we would prefer not to have an older jury panel.
Court: Any response?
HAS: They had accepted Number 2, who is 68 years old, and Number 5[who] was 62 years old, but they were both white.
Court: All right." Well, I believe that there's not a pattern. That's the first person — that's the first black that's been presented. I don't believe that there's any pattérn possible. The older venire,' whether there's one or two, or three, I don't believe that's a good reason so I'm going to — I'm going to recognize the strike.
¶ 6. Hemphill then accepted Jurors 8, a black female, and Juror 9, a black male. Hemphill also accepted Jurors 11 and 12, both white females. Hemphill then struck Juror 13, Rodney Calhoun, a black male.
¶ 7. Once again, HAS objected:.
HAS: He's only used two strikes and they've both been on blacks, your Honor. And we've only reached four blacks at this timé and he has struck 50 percent of them.
Court: All right.... I'll hear from you on your Batson:
HAS: Judge, of course, he has now struck Mr. Calhoun. The blacks that we have reached on jury venire, Number 7, Don Taylor; Number 8, Kadre-anna Johnson; Number 9, Mr. Anderson, and; Number 13, Mr. Calhoun. Today, he has only used two strikes at the time we were at Juror Number 13, and both of them were on black males, and there has only been four blacks reached on the venire at this time and he has struck 50 percent of them.
Court: All right. I will note for the record that Juror Number 7, that was Dl, is a black male; Juror Number 8, that was accepted, is a black female; Juror Number 9, that was accepted, is a black male, and; Juror Number 13 is a black male. So, to my count, there have been four blacks tendered. He's exercised strikes on two and accepted two. I don't believe that that is a pattern showing discrimination, but I'm going to ask for a race neutral reason relative to Juror Number 13.
Hemphill: He showed his employer as Labor Ready. There's a number of issues here about, in this case, about part-time and temporary employees and we think that would — he would have a bias toward the Plaintiff in this matter.
Court: What says the Plaintiff?
HAS: One second, your Honor. We wouldn't accept that as a race neutral reason, your Honor.
Court: You said you do?
HAS: Do not. Would not.
Court: All right. I do. I'm going to uphold the strike on that.
¶ 8. Neither side used any more peremptory strikes. Jurors 14-17, two white females and two white males, completed the jux-y panel. And Jurors 18 and 19, both white males, were selected as alternates.
III. Verdict and Award
¶ 9. At the end of trial, the jury found in Hemphill's favor on both HAS's claims and Hemphill's counterclaim. While the jury awarded Hemphill no money damages, the trial court awarded Hemphill $90,000 in attorneys fees and expenses. The trial judge based the award on "prevailing party" language in the subcontract.
Issues on Appeal
¶ 10. On appeal, HAS argues for a new trial, insisting the trial judge failed to conduct a proper Batson hearing during jury selection. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). HAS claims the trial court failed to complete the required three-step Batson analysis because it did not consider if Hemphill's stated race-neutral reason was persuasive. Instead, it argues the court wrongly dismissed HAS's Batson challenges for "failure" to establish a pattern of discrimination.
¶ 11. Alternatively, HAS requests we vacate the award of attorneys fees. HAS suggests Hemphill was not the "prevailing party" because the jury awarded Hemphill no money damages.
Discussion
¶ 12. At this juncture, we address the Batson issue only. While we find no Bat-son error connected to Juror 13, we do agree with HAS that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Batson hearing for Juror 7. And we remand for the limited purpose of holding such a hearing.
I. Batson's Three-Part Analysis
¶ 13. The privilege to use peremptory strikes "is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits using peremptory strikes to engage in racial discrimination. Id. While Batson addressed a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes in a criminal case, the same prohibition applies when selecting juries in civil cases. E.g., Burnett v. Fulton, 854 So.2d 1010, 1013-14 (Miss. 2003) (applying Batson to medical-malpractice case).
¶ 14. To safeguard against racial discrimination in jury selection, the United States Supreme Court in Batson .established a three-step process. Pitchford v. State, 45 So.3d 216, 224 (Miss.2010) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712). First, the party objecting to the use of a peremptory strike has the burden to make a prima facie case that race was the criterion for the strike. Second, if the objecting party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the striking party to state a race-neutral reason for the strike. Third, after the striking party offers its race-neutral explanation, the court must determine if the objecting party met its burden to prove purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike — that the stated reason for the strike was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
¶ 15. On appeal, we "afford[ ] great deference to the trial court's findings of whether a peremptory challenge was race neutral . because finding that a striking party engaged in discrimination is largely a factual finding." Berry v. State, 802 So.2d 1033, 1038 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). But to reach that finding, the trial judge must conduct a proper Batson analysis. E.g., Hardison v. State, 94 So.3d 1092, 1099 (Miss.2012) (reversing jury verdict because trial court failed to proceed to step three of Batson analysis after being offered a race-neutral reason for the strike).
¶ 16. Normally, we would begin our review with step one and ask if HAS established a prima facie case that race was the reason for both strikes. But this court follows the United States Supreme Court's procedure in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Pruitt v. State, 986 So.2d 940, 943-44 (Miss.2008). Under Hernandez, "once reasons are offered by the proponent [of the strike], the issue of whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been developed is moot." Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238, 250 (Miss.1999) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859). And we shift our focus to step two. Berry v. State, 802 So.2d 1033, 1037 (Miss.2001).
¶ 17. Here, though the trial court did not buy HAS's discrimination-based objections to striking Juror 7 and Juror 13, the court still required Hemphill to articulate a race-neutral reason for both strikes. So the issue of whether HAS met its burden to establish a prima facie case is moot. We begin our review with step two.
II. Juror 7
¶ 18. All step two required was that Hemphill state á race-neutral reason for the strike. Hardison, 94 So.3d at 1099-1100. Hemphill claimed it struck Juror 7, Taylor, because, of his age — an accepted race-neutral reason. Id. at 1099; see also Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 558 (Miss.1995). This prompted step three of Batson.
¶19. Under this step, once "the [striking] party offers a valid race-neutral reason, the trial judge must allow the strike unless the other party demonstrates that the valid race-néutral reason was a pretext for discrimination." Hardison, 94 So.3d at 1100. One way to "attempt to refute the other party's race-neutral reason [is] by 'pointing out that similar claims can be made about non-exeluded jurors.' " McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166, 172 (Miss.1997). And here, when asked to rebut Hemphill's race-neutral reason, HAS pointed out that two nonexcluded white jurors, Juror 2 and Juror 5, were similar in age to Taylor.
¶ 20. The trial court failed to consider HAS's argument, mistakenly requiring HAS to prove a pattern of discrimination, instead of pretext. This was error. "[0]nly one instance — not a consistent pattern — of purposeful discrimination is enough to prove a discriminatory purpose." McGee v. State, 953 So.2d 211, 215 (Miss.2007). So to meet its burden, HAS did not have to show a pattern. Instead, once Hemphill offered a race-neutral reason for striking Taylor, HAS's burden was, "to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike, i.e., that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination." Pitchford, 45 So.3d at 224.
¶21. Had step three been conducted properly, HAS would have been permitted to argue and develop its theory that Taylor's age was a pretext for discrimination. And Hemphill would have been required to explain why, if it did not want "an older jury," it accepted two white jurors in their sixties. But step three was cut short due to the trial court's erroneous pattern belief. Thus, the record remains unclear on the ultimate question the trial court was tasked with deciding — whether Hemphill's stated reason for striking Taylor was race-neutral or merely a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See Pruitt, 986 So.2d at 944. For this reason, we find remand necessary to afford HAS a full hearing on its claim Hemphill's strike of Taylor was discriminatory.
III. Juror 13
¶ 22. But Juror 13, Calhoun, presents a different story. As with Juror 7, the trial court was not persuaded HAS had made a prima facie case. But as with Juror 7, this issue is moot'because the judge required Hemphill to state a race-neutral reason. Id. at 943-44; Hughes, 735 So.2d at 250. And once again, Hemphill did. Calhoun worked for á teniporary-employment company, and the case involved issues of part-time and temporary employment; Thus, Hemphill was concerned Calhoun would be biased against it. See Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1280 (Miss.1994) (listing employment history and- type of employment as accepted race-neutral reasons).
¶23. Significantly, at this point, the judge gave HAS the opportunity to rebut Hemphill's race-neutral reason and persuade him why the réáson was pretextual. But in contrast, to Juror 7, HAS provided no rebuttal. Instead, HAS simply informed the judge it did not "accept that as a race-neutral reason."
¶ 24. Under step three of Batson, "[t]he burden remains on the opponent of the strike to show that the race-neútral explanation given is merely" a pretext for racial discrimination." Hicks v. State, 973 So.2d 211, 219 (Miss.2007) (citing Berry v. State, 802 So.2d 1033, 1042 (Miss.2001)). And "[w]hen the [objecting party] offers no rebuttal, the court is forced to examine only the reasons given by the' [striking party]." Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1268 (Miss.1991); see also Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 584 (Miss.1988) (finding "the lack of any rebuttal" to the striking party's stated race-neutral reason "significant"). HAS made absolutely no attempt to meet its burden to' prove Hemphill's reason for striking Juror 13 was pretextual.
¶ 25. Thus, we find no error or unclarity here in the circuit judge's accepting Hemphill's Stated reason to strike Juror 13 as nondiscriminatory. Unlike with Juror 7, no" further examination for pretext was required. Bush, 585 So.2d at 1268.
¶ 26. Because the trial court did not err in its Batson analysis of Juror 13, we do not disturb the trial court's determination that the strike of Juror 13 was nondiscriminatory. We remand the question of striking Juror 7 only.
Conclusion
¶ 27. On remand, the trial court should conduct the third step of Batson analysis for Juror 7. HAS should be allowed the opportunity to prove purposeful discrimination — i.e., Hemphill's race-neutral reason for striking Taylor was pretextual. And Hemphill should be permitted to defend its stated reason for striking Taylor— age. But Hemphill is restricted from giving any new, race-neutral reason to justify the strike. Further, to support their arguments, both parties are limited to using the record as it existed at the time of the original Batson hearing.
¶ 28. This court retains jurisdiction of this case pending the trial court's certified results of the Batson hearing. We will then review the trial court's Batson ruling for Juror 7, along with the other appellate issues not addressed in this opinion.
¶ 29. REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BEAM, J.; DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, COLEMAN AND MAXWELL, JJ., JOIN IN PART. KING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J.
. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
.The parties were asked to select from two twelve-member panels. Of the twenty-four potential jury members, four were African-American and the remaining twenty were Caucasian.
. HAS had struck Juror ,4, a white male.
. HAS also had struck Juror 10, a white male.
. Race-neutral reasons previously accepted by this court include, but are not limited to, "age, demeanor, marital status, single with children, prosecutor distrusted juror, educational background, employment history, criminal record, young and single, friend charged with crime, unemployed with no roots in community, posture and demeanor indicated juror was hostile to being in court, juror was late, short term employment^]" and defense distrusted juror. Hardison v. State, 94 So.3d 1092, 1098 (Miss.2012) (quoting Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1242 (Miss. 1995)).
. While the record does not establish Taylor's age, HAS stated in its brief that Taylor was sixty-three years old. And Hemphill has not contested this assertion.
.While the dissent would suggest otherwise, when conducting Batson's third step, the burden remains on the strike's opponent to show the given race-neutral explanation is pretext for discrimination, Hicks, 973 So.2d at 219 (citing Berry, 802 So.2d at 1042). Because HAS's attorney made no attempt to show pretext, under our discretionary review, we do not second-guess the judge's accepting Hemphill's race-neutral reason for striking Juror 13.