Case Name: PEOPLE v. SANDERS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-11-27
Citations: 43 Mich. App. 698
Docket Number: Docket No. 12581
Parties: PEOPLE v SANDERS
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Bronson and Targonski, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 43
Pages: 698–710

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SANDERS
Decision of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Defendant Testifying — Impeachment—Previous Arrests — Use of Misdemeanor Conviction for Impeachment Purposes.
The defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder is reversed and remanded for a new trial because manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor’s persistent questioning of the defendant concerning a prior arrest, per Targonski, J.; and because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction of a simple misdemeanor as a test of the defendant’s credibility in a murder trial, per Bronson, J.
Opinion of Targonski, J.
2. Appeal and Error — Issue Not Raised on Appeal — Miscarriage of Justice.
The Court of Appeals, upon discovering an error on the record which requires reversal, may consider an issue not raised on appeal to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
3. Criminal Law — Defendant Testifying — Credibility—Impeachment — Previous Arrests.
The prosecutor may not ask a defendant testifying at his own trial, for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s credibility as a witness, if he has been arrested for a crime where the arrest has not resulted in a conviction.
4. Homicide — Defendant Testifying — Previous Convictions — Admissibility.
Admission in evidence in a trial for first-degree murder of proof of a misdemeanor conviction of the defendant of the crime of being a disorderly person was error where the prosecution had introduced the evidence for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant's testimony because the danger of prejudice exceeded the probative value of the evidence.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 5, 9] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 964.
58 Am Jur 2d, New Trial § 5.
[3, 4, 6-8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 358.
Concurrence by Bronson, J.
5. Appeal and Error — Criminal Law — Defendant Testifying — Impeachment — Previous Arrests — Issues Not Raised on Appeal.
A prosecutor’s single improper reference to a previous arrest to impeach the credibility of a defendant testifying at his own trial, where no scheme, design, or concerted effort by the prosecution to place undue emphasis upon the arrest to prejudice the defendant is shown on the record, must be viewed as an inadvertent error insufficient to require reversal by the appellate court sua sponte where the issue was not raised by the defendant on appeal.
6. Criminal Law — Defendant Testifying — Previous Convictions— Admissibility — Statutes.
The language of the statute permitting introduction into evidence ofprevious convictions of a defendant testifying at his own trial requires a trial judge to exercise bis discretion by balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect ofproffered convictions to determine admissibility (MCLA 600.2158).
7. Criminal Law — Defendant Testifying — Previous Convictions— Admissibility — Misdemeanors.
The admission of previous convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant testifying at his own trial constitutes a greater danger of prejudice to the defendant as the convictions proffered approach the category of simple misdemeanors.
8. Homicide — Defendant Testifying — Previous Convictions — Admissibility — Disorderly Person.
A misdemeanor conviction of being a disorderly person should not be admitted in a murder trial to test the credibility of a defendant testifying at the trial because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its relevancy.
Dissent by Lesinski, C. J.
9. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Issues Not Raised on Appeal.
The Court of Appeals should not raise a ground for reversal sua sponte to avoid a miscarriage of justice where there is no miscarriage of justice because the record is replete with evi dence that is clear, convincing, and sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Appeal from Jackson, Charles J. Falahee, J.
Submitted Division 2 March 7, 1972, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 12581.)
Decided November 27, 1972.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Paul Sanders was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Bruce A. Barton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert; F. Biewend, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, for the people.
Jerome A. Susskind, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Bronson and Targonski, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant ^to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Targonski, J.
On the evening of August 22, 1970, defendant and the deceased, Nathaniel Douglas, were in a bar in Jackson. The defendant and the deceased got into an argument over a loan. A fight ensued. The force of the defendant's blows made the deceased back up through a pair of swinging doors. At this time the defendant allegedly pulled a gun and shot the deceased, fatally injuring him.
At the trial four witnesses, who were present at the bar at the time of the shooting, testified that the defendant shot the decedent as he was backing up. The defendant testified that he killed the decedent unintentionally and was acting in self defense.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, a violation of MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549. Defendant was sentenced by the court to serve from 15 to 25 years imprisonment.
A review of the record discloses an error which was not raised on appeal. However, since this error requires reversal, it is within the power of this Court to consider this issue and to avoid a miscarriage of justice. People v Brocato, 17 Mich App 277. (1969); People v Mattice, 38 Mich App 333 (1972).
During the trial, the prosecutor, while questioning the defendant, asked him if he had been arrested for a robbery in Trenton, New Jersey. Even after the defendant had denied this, the prosecutor pursued this line of questioning by asking him if he wanted to reconsider the answer. Also, in the course of questioning the defendant with reference to misdemeanor violations, the prosecutor managed to work into the record the matter of an incident in Jersey City wherein it appears the defendant was arrested as a disorderly person but was not convicted, according to the testimony.
This Court stated in People v Brocato, supra, 302-303:
"We now hold that a defendant testifying at his own trial may not be asked if he has been arrested or charged with crime, where the arrest or charge has not resulted in a conviction and where the only purpose of the questions is to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness. Where credibility is the only issue, the probative value of arrests and charges, unsubstantiated by a conviction, is slight at best. When weighed against the great danger that the jury, despite careful instructions, might misapply such evidence, the scales of justice tip in favor of exclusion. United States v Beno, 324 F2d 582 (CA 2, 1963)."
The holding of this Court in Brocato is applicable to the present case. The sole issue here for the jury to decide was which witnesses were to be believed. It was a matter of the credibility of the witnesses which is the essence of the holding in Brocato, supra. Furthermore, in the instant case, the apparent purpose of the prosecutor's questioning was obviously to impeach the defendant's credibility.
The facts here are distinguishable from those present in People v Osgood, 24 Mich App 705 (1970). In Osgood the prosecutor asked the defendant if he had been convicted. In the present case the defendant was specifically asked if he had been arrested. Even when the answer was in the negative the prosecutor continued to pursue the area of arrest only.
People v Peay, 37 Mich App 414 (1971), is also distinguishable from the present case. There the trial court allowed the prosecution to question the defendant concerning a prior arrest but it was shown on appeal that this was due to an inadvertent error. Further, the prosecutor in that case immediately ceased to question the defendant after he had denied ever being arrested for the particular crime.
In this case the prosecutor, by the innuendo of the language he employed, did not cease this line of attack. As a result I believe a manifest injustice resulted, necessitating reversal.
Further, under the facts of this case, admission of proof of conviction on a charge of disorderly person on the issue of defendant's credibility in a first-degree murder case created a situation where the danger of prejudice exceeded the probative value of this line of inquiry. Hence I conclude that the admission of proof of this misdemeanor convic tion must be considered error for the reasons and on the basis of the authorities cited by Judge Bronson in his opinion.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.