Case Name: John Rubideaux v. Jack Vallie
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1873-07
Citations: 12 Kan. 28
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Rubideaux v. Jack Vallie.
Judges: (All the justices concurring.)
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 31–34

Head Matter:
John Rubideaux v. Jack Vallie.
July Term, 1873.
1. Courts: Jurisdiction: Indians. John Rubideaux, a Miami Indian chief, bought a piece of land in Miami county of Jack Yallie, and in consideration therefor gave to Yallie an instrument in writing substantially a promissory note. After maturity of the note Yallie sued Rubideaux thereon in the district court of Miami county. Held, that said court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.
2. -. There is no law of the United States nor of this state that authorizes Indians to purchase lands in Kansas, and then to refuse to pay for the same. Neither is there any law that prohibits the courts of Kansas from taking jurisdiction of the persons and property of Indians found within the territorial boundaries of this state, except while such Indians or property are actually situated on a reserve excluded from the jurisdiction of the state.
Error from Miami district court.
Yallie sued Rubideaux on the following instrument:
“$1,900. Paola, May 6, 1871.
“On or before September next after date I promise to pay Jack Yallie or order nineteen hundred dollars, value received, with interest at ten per cent, from first of July, 1870, till paid. This note is given to secure payment of purchase money for the [describes 275 acres of land,] all in Miami county, Kansas.
“John Rubideaux.”
The district court, at the May term, 1872, gave judgment against Rubideaux for the amount due on the note.
B. F. Simpson, for plaintiff in error.
The court erred in sustaining the demurrer. In the ease of Jones v. Eisler, 3 Kan. *134, the same facts are not set up by way of defense as in this action. The decision in that case seems to be based upon the fact that the contract was not *void because not prohibited by the non-intercourse act of 1834,-but that case was decided upon the express ground that the courts of this state have jurisdiction over the person of the Indian. Now, we claim that the ruling of the supreme court, of the United States in .the Kansas Indian Cases, 5 Wall. 737, reversing this court on the question of the power of the state to tax certain Indian lands, virtually destroys the case of Jones v. Eisler as authority. This is a case in which a person exempted by treaty stipulations and acts of congress from the jurisdiction of the state of Kansas, and exempted by a constitutional provision from the jurisdiction of the United States, (twelfth amendment to the constitution; Miami Indians are not taxable,) is sought to be made subject to the laws of the state by an action in its-courts, — a person who cannot vote, who cannot hold office, whose property located within the territorial limits of the state is not subject to taxation, to sale, levy, execution, or forfeiture, who resides on land expressly declared by the act of admission to form no part of the state of Kansas; and that the constitution of the state shall not impair any right pertaining to the person or property of the Indian. If such a person, in the language of a distinguished jurist, possesses “the unquestionable right to be sued,” it is a remarkable example of' fractional jurisdiction, because the laws of the state of Kansas providing remedies for the collection of debts can alone operate on the persons of Indians. The Miami nation is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Kansas can have no force, and which the citizens-of Kansas have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Miamis, or in conformity to treaties or acts of congress. 10 U. S. St. at. Large, 1093; Worcester v. State, 6 Pet. 515; Kansas Indian Cases, supra. All executory contracts made and entered into by any Indian for the payment of money or goods shall be deemed to be null and. void, and of no binding effect whatever. 6 St. at Large, 204; Act of March 3, 1847, § 3. The distribution of the property of a deceased Miami Indian cannot *be controlled by the state laws. Its distribution depends upon the customs and usages of his-tribe. U. S. v. Shanks, 15 Minn. 369, (Gil. 302;) Jackson v. Good-ell, 20 Johns. 193. It would seem that the district court could not-obtain jurisdiction of the person or the property of the plaintiff in error.
W. R. Wagstaff, for defendant in error.
The single question presented in the case is, was the ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer in accordance with law? We submit that the ruling of the court is fully supported, as appears by the law as given in the following cases decided in this court: Swartzel v. Bogers, 3 Kan. *374; Blue-Jacket v. Johnson Co., Id. *299; Miami Co. v. Wan-zop-pe-ehe, Id. *364; Jones v. Eisler, Id. *134; Mc-Cracken v. Todd, 1 Kan. *161; Wiley v. Keokuk, 6 Kan. *110. In the ease of Hunt v. State, 4 Kan. *64, the court holds, substantially, that the tent of the Wea, in Miami county, is entitled to no higher consideration than the church, school-house, and court-room; that the Big Indian belonging to the confederate tribes of Kaskaskia, Peoria, Piankeshaw, and Wea Indians is subject to the same jurisdiction and laws as Frenchmen from Paris, a Portuguese, an Englishman, or a Spaniard. From the authorities cited we conclude the district court, in sustaining the demurrer, is sustained by the rulings of the supreme court on like issues, and therefore right.

Opinion:
Valentine, J.
John Bubideaux, a Miami Indian chief, bought a piece of land in Miami county of Jack Vallie, and in consideration thereof gave to Vallie an instrument in writing, substantially a promissory note. After maturity of the note Vallie sued Bubideaux thereon in the district court of said county. Bubideaux answered, and in his answer he sets up substantially the following facts as a defense to the plaintiff's petition, to-wit: "The defendant is a member of the Miami tribe of Indians by birth and blood. Said Miami * tribe of Indians still maintain tribal relations with the government of the United States. At the time of the execution and delivery of said note, and for a long time prior thereto, and at the commencement of this action, and now, the Miami Indians did and do maintain their tribal organization and relations with the government. Said Miami Indians are a united tribe, and are dependent on the government for protection and vindication of their rights. In the year 1854 they made and concluded a treaty, in their tribal capacity, with tba government. The defendant, under the second article of said treaty,, was assigned land in severalty; was entitled to and received annuities; was elected to and discharged the duties of one of the chiefs of' said tribe; and was and is in all respects a member of said tribe.. The said Miami tribe of Indians never abandoned their tribal organization, but still adhere to and maintain the same. They have elective chiefs and an elective council, meeting at stated periods, keeping a record of their proceedings, with powers regulated by custom, by which they punish offenses, adjust differences, and exercise a general oversight over the affairs of their nation. They are under the charge of an Indian agent, appointed by the government of the United States, and such agent has a general supervision of their conduct. The father and mother of the defendant were members of the said tribe of Miami Indians, and since his birth he has always lived with and among said tribe, has been enrolled as a member of said tribe, received, occupied, and enjoyed land under and by virtue of treaties made and concluded by and between the government and said tribe. He has never withdrawn from said tribe, or abandoned it or in any manner or for any purpose dissolved his connection with said tribe. He is under the protection of the laws of the United States, and of the rules, regulations, customs, habits, and laws of the said Miami tribe of Indians. He is not subject to the jurisdiction, orders, judgments, or decrees of this court, and this court has no jurisdiction over his person or property."
The district court of Miami county has undoubtedly, as *we think, jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions involved In this controversy, notwithstanding that the defendant below (plaintiff in error) is a chief of the Miami tribe of Indians. We know of no law of the United States or of this state that authorizes an Indian to purchase land in Kansas, and then to refuse to pay for the same. Neither do we know of any law that prohibits the state of Kansas from taking jurisdiction of the persons and property of the Indians found within the territorial boundaries of the state, except while such Indians or property are actually situated on a reserve excluded from the jurisdiction of Kansas; and there are no such laws. Every man, resident or non-resident, citizen, alien, or foreigner, if he comes within the jurisdiction of Kansas, is subjected to her laws, and if he contracts debts is required to pay them.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
(All the justices concurring.)