Case Name: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert KAFKA, Defendant and Appellant
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1978-04-06
Citations: 264 N.W.2d 702
Docket Number: No. 12246
Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert KAFKA, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: DUNN, C. J., and PORTER and MORGAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 264
Pages: 702–707

Head Matter:
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert KAFKA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12246.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
April 6, 1978.
Peter H. Lieberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.
Steven M. Johnson of Brady, Kabeiseman & Reade, Yankton, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
WOLLMAN, Justice.
Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he was found guilty by a jury on a charge of third degree burglary. We affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could reasonably have found that on the night of January 7, 1977, defendant and one Marvin Peterson drove in defendant's pickup truck to the Pioneer Lime Company plant located in Yankton County. Defendant and Peterson lifted the locked perimeter fence gate off its hinges. Defendant drove his pickup onto the plant grounds. The two men took some truck tires that were located on the premises and placed them in the pickup. Both men broke the lock on the door to a grease shack and then entered that structure, from which they removed some items of personal property. Defendant then held open a window in the scale house while Peterson crawled inside. Peterson removed some tools and other items of personal property from the scale house and both men carried these items to the pickup. The two men then drove back to Yankton with their spoils, where they unsuccessfully attempted to sell the truck tires.
Testifying in his own behalf, defendant admitted driving to the lime plant premises with Peterson on the night in question but denied that he had entered any buildings or that he had intended to help commit a burglary. He testified that it was Peterson who had opened the gate and who had placed the items of property into the pickup and that he, defendant, believed that that property rightfully belonged to Peterson, who had formerly worked for Pioneer Lime Company.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested lesser included offense instruction based upon SDCL 22-32-16, which provides:
"Every person who under circumstances not amounting to any burglary enters any building or part of any building, booth, tent, warehouse, railroad car, vessel, or other structure or erection with intent to commit felony, larceny, or malicious mischief, is guilty of a misdemean- or."
Defendant argues that our decision in State v. O'Connor, 86 S.D. 294, 194 N.W.2d 246, incorrectly states the test to be applied in determining whether an offense is necessarily included within another offense. We need not decide this question, however, for under the alternative holding in the O'Con-nor case defendant was not entitled to the lesser included offense instruction. Either defendant was guilty of third degree burglary as defined in SDCL 22-32-9, or he was not guilty of anything, for defendant's own testimony compels a finding that items of property were carried from the buildings to the pickup truck. In addition, a company employee testified that other than the tires, the missing property had been taken from the two buildings. In a word, the circumstances of the alleged offense amounted either to third degree burglary or they constituted no crime whatsoever. A trial court is not required to instruct on matters that find no support in the evidence, State v. Kapelino, 20 S.D. 591, 108 N.W. 335; State v. Johnson, 81 S.D. 600, 139 N.W.2d 232; State v. O'Connor, supra; State v. Zemina, 87 S.D. 291, 206 N.W.2d 819. Under no reasonable view of the evidence would a conviction of the offense defined in SDCL 22-32-16 have been warranted. State v. Crofutt, 76 S.D. 77, 72 N.W.2d 435. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction.
In addition to being found guilty on the third degree burglary charge, defendant was subsequently adjudged by the trial court to be a habitual offender, defendant having waived a jury trial on that issue. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the manner in which it arraigned defendant under the habitual offender statute and asks that the additional sentence entered by reason of his having been adjudged a habitual offender be set aside. Although we agree that the trial court erred, we do not agree that the error was so prejudicial as to require that the sentence be set aside.
SDCL 23-32-9 provides that when a defendant is charged as a habitual offender under SDCL 22-7 the information shall be in two parts, the principal offense to be stated in the first part and the allegations concerning the former conviction or convictions in the second part. SDCL 23-32-10 provides that before a defendant is required to enter a plea on the first part of the information he shall be informed by the court of the contents of the second part. In Black v. Erickson, 86 S.D. 86, 191 N.W.2d 174, we held that where, as here, the fact of the prior conviction or convictions was known to the state at the time the information charging the principal offense was filed, the state must file the habitual offender portion of the information along with the information charging the principal offense and that the trial court must inform the defendant of the contents of the habitual offender charge before the defendant is called upon to plead to the principal charge. Because that procedure had not been followed in the Black case, we upheld the grant of habeas corpus relief.
We conclude that the facts in the instant case are not so sufficiently analogous to those in the Black case as to require the relief asked for by defendant. Following the reading by the state's attorney of that portion of the information that stated the principal offense, the following exchange occurred between the trial court and the defendant and his attorney:
"THE COURT: Very well, having heard the Information read to you, Mr. Kafka, do you understand the contents of the Information?
MR. KAFKA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Very well, I'll ask you, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty to this Information?
MR. KAFKA: Not guilty.
THE COURT: Very well, you can proceed with the arraignment. We can arraign him on part two at a later time. My understanding, Mr. Johnson, is you waive the two-day requirement of the trial on that after you've been given a copy?
MR. JOHNSON: Could I take a look at it?
THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, we will.
THE COURT: Very well, you can furnish a copy of that at a later time. We can arraign him on it at a later time unless you proceed to waive your right to have a copy during this arraignment with the understanding that the Deputy State's Attorney will furnish you one as soon as possible.
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, we could do that.
THE COURT: Very well, you can go ahead and arraign him on this Information, at this time, and you can furnish him with a copy after you're done arraigning him; and there is a copy machine right behind you.
(At which time Part 2 of the Information is read)
THE COURT: Very well, Mr. Kafka, having heard this Information read to you, do you understand the contents of this Information?
MR. KAFKA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Very well, now I'll ask you, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
MR. KAFKA: Not guilty.
THE COURT: Very well, we're ready for trial."
Unlike the situation in the Black case, defendant in the instant case pleaded not guilty to the principal charge. Defendant contends that he had been informed by the state's attorney that if he would plead guilty to the principal offense the habitual offender charge would be dismissed and that had the trial court informed him of the contents of the habitual offender portion of the information and its consequences he would have pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea bargain. There is nothing in the record to substantiate defendant's argument, however, and we agree with the state that the trial court's failure to comply strictly with the requirements of SDCL 23-32-10 does not render the conviction on the habitual offender charge void. We cannot refrain from commenting, however, that given our decision in the Black case, which was filed some five and one-half years prior to the arraignment in the instant case, we cannot understand the failure of the state's attorney and the trial court to comply strictly with the requirements of SDCL 23-32-9 and 23-32-10. If there is an area of criminal procedure that a prosecutor must tread with caution lest he be trapped by whatever remains of the technical requirements of pleading and practice, it is in the area of alleging and proving prior offenses under the habitual offender statutes. The error complained of should never have occurred.
The judgment is affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and PORTER and MORGAN, JJ., concur.
ZASTROW, J., concurs specially.