Case Name: Edward JONES, a minor, by Laura Jones, his mother and next friend, Appellant, v. Junius ROUNDTREE, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1967-01-19
Citations: 225 A.2d 877
Docket Number: No. 3928
Parties: Edward JONES, a minor, by Laura Jones, his mother and next friend, Appellant, v. Junius ROUNDTREE, Appellee.
Judges: Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QÚINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 225
Pages: 877–878

Head Matter:
Edward JONES, a minor, by Laura Jones, his mother and next friend, Appellant, v. Junius ROUNDTREE, Appellee.
No. 3928.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Nov. 28, 1966.
Decided Jan. 19, 1967.
Thurman L. Dodson, Washington, D. C., with whom Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Edward J. Gorman, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Arthur V. Butler, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QÚINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
QUINN, Associate Judge.
Appellant brought suit in June 1965 to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from appellee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle in February 1964. His action was dismissed with prejudice in October 1965 for (1) failing to obey an order of the court directing him to appear for a medical examination, and (2) failing to appear at trial. Subsequent motions to vacate the order of dismissal were denied and he appeals.
The facts of this case are not easily determined. On the one hand, appellant's counsel, Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr., contends that his own injuries and illness prevented him from properly attending to his cases, and that his misprisions were also the result of conflicting engagements, clerical errors, and the general confusion caused by his physical incapacity. On the other hand, appellee's counsel cites a continuous course of conduct on the part of Mr. Johnson which can only be characterized as a flagrant disregard of the court's rules and orders.
That the trial court had the power to dismiss this action cannot be questioned. Nor can we say that under the circumstances the dismissal was an abuse of that court's discretion. Protracting litigation and disregarding the rules and orders of our courts are not to be sanctioned or condoned. We are hesitant, however, to visit the sins of an attorney on his client, especially when that client is a minor.
The record indicates that the conduct of counsel cannot be attributed to appellant. Such "inexcusable" neglect on the part of counsel thus became "excusable" neglect on the part of appellant himself. See L. P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 329 F.2d 234, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964). The trial court therefore erred in denying appellant's timely motion to vacate the dismissal, and its action must be reversed and the cause reinstated. In addition, Mr. Johnson is ordered to pay the sum of one hundred dollars to counsel for appellee as reasonable attorney's fees. The costs of this appeal shall likewise be taxed against him.
Reversed. Cause reinstated.
. Ct.Gen.Sess.Civ.Rule 37(b) (2) provides:
"If a party refuses to obey an order requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following: (iii) An order dismissing the action or proceeding
. Ct.Gen.Scss.Civ.Rule 89(b) provides: "When an action is called for trial and the party seeking affirmative relief fails to respond, an adversary may have the claim dismissed, with or without prejudice, as the court may decide, or may have a trial."
. Ct.Gen.Sess.Civ.Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part: "On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) excusable neglect;