Case Name: Clifton Jerry LANDRY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1979-04-11
Citations: 583 S.W.2d 620
Docket Number: No. 57533
Parties: Clifton Jerry LANDRY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before DALLY, W. C. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 583
Pages: 620–627

Head Matter:
Clifton Jerry LANDRY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 57533.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 3.
April 11, 1979.
On Rehearing July 18, 1979.
Roy Ahrens, Houston, for appellant.
Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty. Douglas M. O’Brien, and Donald H. Dawson, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before DALLY, W. C. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
CLINTON, Judge.
Appeal is brought from a conviction of forgery by passing. The jury found that appellant had been twice previously convicted of felonies, and punishment was assessed at life.
The single ground of error presented in appellant's original brief contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of an extraneous offense. Appellant was charged with an act of passing a forged check at a bank drive-through window on September 28, 1976. The State introduced testimony from two bank employees concerning an attempt by appellant to pass a check at the same bank on September 24, 1976.
Susanne Christensen testified that she was working in the bank on September 24th when appellant attempted to cash a check made out to "Santokh Sohal." She noticed the check because the Sohal account was "being closed" at that time. The instrument was a payroll check from a landscape company. Christensen asked for identification, and appellant produced a social security card in the name of "Melvin Edwards." She took the check to a bank officer who refused to cash it.
Debbie Kneisel stated that she was also employed at the bank on September 24th. She saw appellant enter the bank that day and pass a check to Susanne Christensen made out to "Mr. Sohal." Kneisel had received a notice that Sohal's account was being closed that day. She advised Christensen of that fact, and further advised her to ask for appellant's identification. Kneis-el saw appellant again on September 28, 1976, when he again attempted to pass a check at the bank.
The State's evidence showed that on September 28, 1976, appellant presented a check at the bank drive-through window. The instrument was a payroll check from the Sunshine Landscape Co. made payable to Santokh Singh Sohal. Upon request for identification appellant produced a driver's license issued to "Melvin Edwards." The tellers called the security officer who attempted to make an arrest, but appellant fled the scene. Appellant was later arrested.
The contention is that the testimony regarding the incident on September 24th was not relevant to any contested issue in the case and its admission violated this Court's decision in Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). Albrecht specified six non-exclusive exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence of extraneous offenses. The State alleges that the evidence was admissible under one of those exceptions described in Albrecht as follows:
"To prove scienter, where intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the state's case and cannot be inferred from the act itself." Albrecht, supra at 100.
The State argues that it was required to prove knowledge that the instrument was forged and the extraneous transaction was relevant on that issue.
Appellant counters first by saying that knowledge is not required to be proven because of the decision in Jones v. State, 545 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). That case held that failure to allege in the indictment that the defendant had knowledge that the instrument was forged can not be raised for the first time on appeal. However, we have held subsequently that knowledge must be proved at trial. In Pfleging v. State, 572 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), we reversed because the evidence was insufficient to show knowledge. Quoting from Baker v. State, 552 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977), we said:
"While the requisite culpable mental state under Section 32.21(b) is 'intent to defraud or harm,' we fail to perceive how such culpable mental state can be shown absent proof of knowledge that the instrument is forged." Pfleging, supra at 519.
See also Lloyd v. State, 574 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978).
Although knowledge must be proven by the State, Albrecht admits another offense when knowledge "cannot be inferred from the act itself." In Ware v. State, 475 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971), we held:
"The fact that appellant offered the forged check in question, made out in a name other than his own, is sufficient to warrant the jury's conclusion that he knew the check was a forgery." Ware, supra at 284.
In this case appellant passed a check made payáble to a name other than his own, and the jury could infer that he had knowledge. The Albrecht case would therefore compel a finding that this extraneous transaction was not admissible on the issue of knowledge.
However, Albrecht includes other exceptions to the general rule, and among those exceptions is the following:
"To show the accused's motive, particularly where the commission of the [extraneous] offense at bar is part of a continuing plan or scheme of which the crime on trial is also a part." Albrecht, supra at 100.
The extraneous transaction and the charged offense both involved efforts by appellant to pass payroll checks from a landscape company at the same bank within four days of each other. Each check was made payable to the same person whose account was being closed. In each case appellant produced identification in the name of "Melvin Edwards." We considered facts that were even less indicative of a common plan in Mendoza v. State, 459 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970), and concluded that "such evidence was admissible . to show common plan or scheme." We conclude that the evidence of the extraneous transaction was admissible on that basis.
Ground of error number one is overruled. Appellant has filed four pro se briefs in which • he raised numerous additional grounds of error. None of those briefs were timely filed. However, we have examined each of the grounds raised in the interest of justice. We conclude that two of those contentions raise issues which merit discussion.
The indictment in this cause alleged that appellant passed a forged instrument, and the judgment reflects that the conviction was based on that theory. Appellant correctly points out that the evidence shows that he presented the forged check, but that he received no money for it. He contends, therefore, that the evidence only proves an attempt to pass a forged check and that the proof fatally varies from the indictment.
Appellant relies on several cases decided under the old penal code. In Byrom v. State, 528 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975), we held that when the indictment alleges passing a forged instrument and the evidence shows only an attempt to pass in which no value was received, the proof is insufficient. That decision was based on the former penal code Article 996, Vernon's Ann.P.C., which defined the offense as either passing or attempting to pass a forged instrument. There are no cases addressing this question under the new code, which provides in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.-21(a)(1)(B) that forgery includes:
"to issue, transfer, register the transfer of, pass, publish, or otherwise utter a writing that is forged . . . ."
The question presented is whether the indictment for forgery by passing under the new code required the State to prove that appellant actually received money for the check given to the bank teller.
The term "pass" is nowhere defined in the penal code. As previously noted, the old code delineated between passing and attempting to pass, which implied that passing was a completed act in which consideration was received. The new code does not make that distinction. While this Court has not directly confronted this issue before, we have examined forgery under the new code and determined that it now covers non-monetary and nonproperty injuries. Martinez v. State, 551 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977). See also, Practice Commentary, V.T. C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.21. We also note that forgery is found in Chapter 32 of the Penal Code, which is the "Fraud" rather than "Theft" Chapter of the Penal Code. These two facts indicate that the gravamen of the offense of forgery under the new code is the perpetration of a fraud rather than the actual control over the property of another.
In construing the word "pass" we are guided by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 1.05, which states that the provisions "shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms." Determining the "fair import" of terms is frequently a difficult and unavoidably subjective exercise, but we can gain some objective insight by examining how other authorities have defined the word.
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) defines "pass" as follows:
"To publish; utter; transfer; circulate; impose fraudulently. This is the meaning of the word when the offense is passing counterfeit money or a forged paper spoken of.
'Pass,' 'utter,' 'publish,' and 'sell' are in some respects convertible terms, and, in a given case, 'pass' may include utter, publish, and sell."
This definition is supported by the language of Section 32.21(a)(1)(B) which lists various methods of transferring a forged instrument, including to "pass," followed by "or otherwise utter a writing that is forged . ." (Emphasis added). The language appears to mean that passing is merely one form of uttering a writing. Black's defines "utter" as: "To put or send (as a forged check) into circulation . To publish or put forth . To offer To utter, as used in a statute against forgery and counterfeiting, means to offer, whether accepted or not, a forged instrument, with the representation, by words or action, that the same is genuine." (Emphasis added).
Another useful description is found in 25 Tex.Jur.2d Forgery § 31 (1961), which states, "An instrument is not passed or uttered until it is actually delivered in such a manner as to make possible perpetration of fraud." The definition uses "passed" and "uttered" synonymously, and seems to emphasize delivery rather than receipt of consideration. Also, 31 A Words and Phrases (1978) states, "Word 'pass' when used in connection with negotiable instrument means to deliver, to circulate, to hand from one person to another." Finally, several federal cases have interpreted passing a forged instrument to mean offering that instrument. United States v. Holmes, 453 F.2d 950 (10 Cir. 1972); United States v. Jenkins, 347 F.2d 345 (4 Cir. 1965); Rader v. United States, 288 F.2d 452 (8 Cir. 1961).
We therefore conclude that "pass" in the forgery statute means to offer the forged instrument, and it does not require a showing that the defendant actually received consideration in exchange for the check. Appellant's ground of error is overruled.
The next contention is that the indictment in this cause is fundamentally defective. The indictment in pertinent part alleged that appellant:
"did then and there with intent to defraud and harm, intentionally forge, by passing to Sharon Weiler, a writing as follows:
[a copy of the instrument is thereafter attached]
the defendant then and there knowing the writing was forged."
Appellant argues that the indictment is fundamentally defective for failure to allege "who did not authorize that act" as stated in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.-21(a)(l)(A)(i).
The starting point for discussing the sufficiency of indictments is American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We held that a "fundamental" defect occurs only when "the indictment failed to allege the constituent elements of the offense sought to be challenged." (Emphasis added) Id. at 603. This seemingly simple formula becomes difficult when assessing the "constituent elements" of an offense. If the matter not alleged is required only for purposes of notice or barring a subsequent prosecution, it must be requested in a motion to quash. It is only when the indictment fails to state an offense, and thereby fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court, that the defect may be raised for the first time on appeal. American Plant Food, supra.
There is no precise formula for distinguishing elements from matters of notice. Some guidance is provided by V.T.C.A. Pe nal Code, Sec. 1.07(a)(13). There are no exceptions that need to be negated in the forgery statute, so subsection (D) is not applicable. As was discussed supra, passing a forged check does not require a completed act in which value is actually received. Therefore, there is no "required result," and subsection (C) is also inapplicable. The "required culpability" refers to the required mental state. As was also discussed previously, that culpability is intent to defraud, and it requires proof at trial of knowledge that the instrument was forged. The question that remains is what constitutes the "forbidden conduct," and how specifically must that conduct be alleged in the indictment in order to state an offense.
The forgery statute is constructed in a manner that makes isolating the "forbidden conduct" an exercise in multiple cross references. The offense itself is set out in V.T. C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.21(b). It is arguable that the forbidden conduct has been adequately stated to charge an offense by simply alleging that the defendant "forged a writing." The question of which type of forgery defined in Sec. 32.21(a)(1) is being alleged in the indictment might well be a question of notice, subject to review and upon a proper motion to quash. However, the facts of this case do not force us to reach that question because the indictment went further in its allegation.
Section 32.21(a)(1) creates three basic types of acts that constitute forgery: (1) to create a forged instrument; (2) to utter a forged instrument; and (3) to possess a forged instrument with the intent to utter it. The statute is peculiar in that Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(A) contains both a definition of the first of these three types of acts, creating a forged instrument, and a three part definition of a forged writing that is incorporated by reference in Secs. 32.21(a)(1)(B) and (C). The indictment in this case alleged that appellant did "forge" by passing a writing. That allegation brings appellant's conduct within the forbidden category of Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(B). The indictment also sets out the writing haec verba, which this Court has consistently held is sufficient to allege that the instrument "purports to be the act of another." Biering v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 331, 263 S.W.2d 558 (1953); Watts v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 303, 158 S.W.2d 510 (1942); Wisdom v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 271, 54 S.W.2d 533 (1932); Huckaby v. State, 45 Tex.Cr.R. 577, 78 S.W. 942 (1904). It is appellant's position that unless the indictment goes further to allege "who did not authorize that act," then the indictment fails to state the forbidden conduct with sufficient specificity as is needed to allege an offense. With this contention we disagree.
It is true that under the former code an indictment had to allege "without lawful authority" or it was "fatally defective." Smith v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 132, 282 S.W.2d 876 (1955). That case was decided prior to American Plant Food, supra.. It was also decided pursuant to the former penal code which listed the various types of forgery in separate statutes. As was previously pointed out, the new forgery statute includes all three types of forgery in one statute, and Sec. 32.21(a)(1)(A) contains both the definition of one of those types of acts as well as a three part definition of what a forged writing is. The question of whether the purported act was authorized is a notice issue relating to which type of forged writing is involved in the case. Therefore, by stating that appellant forged by passing a writing that purported to be the act of another, the indictment sufficiently stated the forbidden act which constitutes an offense. Without an exception as to form contemplated by Article 27.09, Paragraph 2, V.A.C.C.P., the matter of sufficiency of notice as to the "purport" of the forged writing is not presented and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Appellant's ground of error is overruled.
We have reviewed appellant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. For these reasons the judgment is affirmed.
DALLY, J., dissents.
Before the court en banc.
. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 1.07(a)(13) provides:
" 'Element of offense' means:
(A) the forbidden conduct;
(B) the required culpability;
(C) any required result; and
(D) the negation of any exception to the offense."
. It provides: "A person commits an offense if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another."
. It should be remembered that the standard for review of fundamental error in an indictment is much different from that of reviewing questions of adequate notice. In absence of any request by a defendant, we presume there was no problem of notice, and we are concerned only that the indictment allege the bare essentials needed to state an offense. If the State chooses to indict on such a bare-boned indictment, and a proper motion to quash is filed raising a notice issue, then the standard for review becomes much stricter. The question becomes one of constitutional due process and fundamental fairness. See Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).