Case Name: James Randy FUTRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-11-05
Citations: 627 So. 2d 26
Docket Number: No. 92-2355
Parties: James Randy FUTRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 627
Pages: 26–27

Head Matter:
James Randy FUTRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-2355.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 5, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1993.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Asst. Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for appellant.
James Randy Futrell, Zephyrhills, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
James Randy Futrell ("Futrell") appeals his convictions and sentences for second degree murder with a firearm in count I, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in count II, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in count III. Fut-rell was sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines to concurrent terms of 27 years imprisonment on each count. We affirm the convictions for counts I and III, but vacate the sentences and remand for resen-tencing. We vacate the conviction and sentence for count II.
The conviction for second degree murder in count I is affirmed, but the sen- tenee is vacated as discussed below. The conviction and sentence in count II must be vacated because convictions for both second degree murder with a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony constitute double jeopardy. See Cleveland v. State, 587 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1991); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 574 So.2d 142 (Fla.1990).
Futrell's sentence of 27 years in count III, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, must also be vacated since it is in excess of the statutory maximum. The maximum sentence for this second degree felony is punishment by a term not exceeding 15 years in the Department of Corrections ("DOC"). See § 790.28(3) and 775.082(3)(e), Fla.Stat. (1991). The maximum sentence that can be imposed is 15 years, unless the court determines that Futrell is a habitual felony offender.
This case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. A new guideline scoresheet must be prepared since the former scoresheet scored the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as an additional offense. That conviction has now been eliminated and the points scored must be removed. The new scoresheet should reflect a total of 223 points instead of 226 points for a recommended guideline sentence of 12-17 years and a permitted sentencing range of 7-22 years instead of a recommended range of 17-22 years and a permitted sentence of 12-27 years. Consequently, Futrell's sentence in Count I of 27 years in the DOC constitutes a departure from the sentencing guidelines without written reasons because the permitted range is 7-22 years rather than 12-27 years. However, because the trial judge was not aware that the sentence imposed was a departure sentence, the trial judge is given the opportunity to provide valid written reasons for a departure sentence. Dow v. State, 610 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), cause dismissed, 621 So.2d 432 (Fla.1993) (citing State v. Vanhorn, 561 So.2d 584 (Fla.1990)).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
. § 782.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. § 790.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1991).
.§ 790.23(1), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. It should be noted that defendant's conviction for second degree murder was enhanced from a first degree felony to a life felony because of the firearm. See § 782.04(2) & 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.988(a).