Case Name: STATE of Louisiana et al. v. PLACID OIL COMPANY et al., Intervention of Texaco, Inc.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-12-03
Citations: 300 So. 2d 154
Docket Number: Nos. 53294, 53295
Parties: STATE of Louisiana et al. v. PLACID OIL COMPANY et al., Intervention of Texaco, Inc.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 300
Pages: 154–180

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana et al. v. PLACID OIL COMPANY et al., Intervention of Texaco, Inc.
Nos. 53294, 53295.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 3, 1973.
On Rehearing June 10, 1974.
Rehearings Denied Aug. 30, 1974.
Dissenting Opinion Sept. 20, 1974.
W. Scott Wilkinson, Wilkinson, Carmo-dy & Peatross, Shreveport, Armand A. Gutierrez for Placid Oil Co. and others.
Wiley G. Lastrapes, William J. Conrad, New Orleans, Charles F. Bailey, Bailey & Hollier, Lafayette, for Texaco, Inc., inter-venor-respondent.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kenneth Dejean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ernest R. Eldred, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Nora K. Duncan, Sp. Counsel, Baton Rouge, for State of La.; A. N. Yiannopoulos, Baton Rouge, of counsel.
Kennedy J. Gilly, John C. Christian, John T. Nasser, III, Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer & Pierson, New Orleans, for J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.
Booth Kellough, Liskow & Lewis, Charles C. Gremillion, New Orleans, for Gulf Oil Corp.
Frank C. Allen Jr., James H. Roussel, New Orleans, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
This is an action by the State of Louisiana and its mineral lessee, Gulf Oil Corporation, involving an area of land located below the ordinary high water mark of a body of water in St. Mary Parish known as "Six Mile Lake" adjacent to Sections 49, 50 and 68, Township 15 South, Range 11 East. State seeks to be declared owner of this land; additionally, plaintiffs seek an accounting of the proceeds of three oil wells drilled thereon by Placid Oil Company and designated as S. G. Todd Wells 3, 4 and 5. Made original defendants were Placid Oil Company and its assignee, J. Ray McDermott & Company, Inc. Pursuant to exceptions of non-joinder of indispensable parties filed by Placid and McDermott, numerous alleged owners (from whom Placid acquired mineral leases) were also made party defendants. Texaco, Inc., which owns an undivided one-half of Section 68, and certain parties claiming interests in Section 68 adversely to Texaco, intervened asserting interests in opposition to State-Gulf. The conflicts between Texaco and its adversaries concerning Section 68 have been compromised. Some dispute exists among defendants regarding their ownership of subject sections; however, it was stipulated that this matter would be deferred for determination at a future date between the parties in interest. Thus, all parties, including Texaco as intervenor, are aligned as defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' claims.
Exceptions of no cause and no right of action, res judicata, judicial estoppel and stare decisis were overruled by the trial court, which rulings were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Since we will dispose of this case on the merits and will render judgment in favor of exceptors-defendants, the merits of the exceptions filed by them are of no moment.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants and against State-Gulf, rejecting their- demands and decreeing the land area bounded on the south by the traverse line abutting Sections 49, SO and 68, Township 15 South, Range 11 East, St. Mary Parish, and north to the ordinary low water mark of Six Mile Lake to be the property of the riparian landowners of these three sections. It further decreed the ordinary low water mark of Six Mile Lake as of July 8, 1963, the date of the filing of this suit, to be a line having an elevation of +.11 feet above mean sea level subject to changes, if any, in said line, as may subsequently result from accretion, re-liction or dereliction. It further ordered that State Lease No. 2963 dated April 18, 1956 to Gulf Refining Company and State Lease No. 3643 to Placid Oil Company be cancelled and annulled insofar as said leases purport to cover and affect any of the property as described in the judgment and the subject of this suit. The trial court further rendered judgment against State-Gulf, in solido, taxing as court costs for expert witness fees for Placid the sum of $31,733.29 and in favor of Texaco the sum of $31,345.94. No mention was made by the trial judge of Act 341 of 1952, R.S. 9:1151. The judgment of the trial court contained other decrees not pertinent to this appeal.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in holding that Six Mile Lake constitutes a stream as opposed to a lake, thereby making applicable the rules of property provided in Articles 455 and 509 of the Civil Code. Having arrived at that conclusion, the Court of Appeal then held: (a) that the portion of the area in dispute identified and referred to as the "Woodland Tract" comprised a part of the bank of Six Mile Lake; that, under the provisions of Article 455, C.C., the banks of streams belong to the riparian owners; and that such construction of said Article 455 coincides with the rule of property contained in Article 509, which gives allu-vion to the owner of land adjacent not only to a river but also to a stream; (b) that the portion of the area in dispute referred to as "Barnett's Cove" properly constitutes alluvion or accretionary build-up of a land mass which is attached to and belongs to the riparian landowners; (c) that the portion of the area in dispute identified as the "Island Area" is land formed not as an island which subsequently attached to the shore, but as alluvion which belongs to the riparian owners; (d) that method of ascertaining the ordinary low water mark in the area in controversy adopted by the trial court was well founded; (e) that the award for court cost and expert witness fees incurred by Placid ($31,733.29) and by Texaco ($31,345.94) was correct, such costs being assessed, in solido, against State-Gulf with Gulf to pay any portion thereof that the State was exempt from paying by law. (R.S. 13:4521) The Court of Appeal further held that the trial court erred in failing to give effect herein to Act 341 of 1952 (R.S. 9:1151) with respect to the lease by the State to Gulf dated April 18, 1956, and rejected Placid's claim of the unconstitutionality of this Act. The Court of Appeal reversed that part of the judgment which orders State Lease No. 2963 dated April 18, 1956 to Gulf cancelled and remanded the suit to the trial court for the limited purpose of establishing the ordinary low water line in the area in controversy as of April 18, 1956 in order to determine the effect of State Lease No. 2963 to Gulf on land areas located on the water side of the ordinary low water line as determined to have existed on said date. The remand also included an accounting for the value of oil and gas which may have been produced from or attributable to the land areas in question as well as ascertaining the rights, if any, for reimbursement for allocable drilling and operational costs of any of the three wells in question. Similarly, that part of the judgment of the trial court which recognized Placid, Mc-Dermott and Texaco as the owners of mineral leases affecting all the property de scribed in such judgment was likewise reversed and remanded for the purpose of determining what part, if any, of the land in question is validly covered by State Lease No. 2963 as established by the ordinary low water mark as same is determined to have existed on April 18, 1956. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from was affirmed. 274 So.2d 402.
State and Gulf each separately applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari or review which was granted. 275 So.2d 778 (La.1973).
Relators, State of Louisiana and Gulf Oil Corporation, assigned as errors in the opinion and decree of the Court of Appeal the following:
1. The holding that Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake is a stream within the meaning of that term as used in Louisiana Civil Code Article 509.
2. The holding that the title to banks of streams belongs to the riparian owner under the provisions of Article 455 and that Article 509 grants title to alluvion to the riparian owner.
3. The holding that the areas herein identified as Barnett's Cove and the Island Area, which areas were formerly a part of the bed of Grand Lake, were formed by accretions classified as alluvion and subject to the application of Article 509.
4. The holding adopting a method for determining the ordinary low water mark in the area involved, which method is indefinite in that it, even by admission of its proposer, is not based on an objective criterion but could have as many different results as persons applying it.
5. The holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in taxing as costs expert witness fees in the amount of $63,079.23 which included allowances for travel, room and board in excess of those permitted by R.S. 13:3661, as well as payment for services for assistance by experts to counsel in preparation and trial of the case as distinguished from the expert's preparation to and testifying as an expert witness.
6.The additional holdings of the Court of Appeal, such as the cancelling of the lease granted by the State of Louisiana to Gulf on April 18, 1956, insofar as it covers any portion of the area in dispute, which result from the previously assigned errors.
State-Gulf assert in the first assignment of error that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake is an "other stream" within the meaning of Article 509 of the Civil Code.
It is well settled that the beds or bottoms of all navigable waters in the State, whether lakes, rivers or streams, belong to the State by virtue of its inherent sovereignty. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919).
We are satisfied from our examination of the record that Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake was a navigable body of water at the time Louisiana was admitted into the Union in 1812. Therefore, if Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake is classified as a lake, the State would own the bed or bottom up to the ordinary high water mark by virtue of its sovereign rights. State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924).
( With respect to the beds or bottoms of navigable rivers and streams, the State holds in her sovereign capacity only the land that is covered by water at its ordinary low stage. Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922). Furthermore, the land lying between the ordinary low water mark and the ordinary high water mark is called the bank of the stream and belongs to the owner of the adjacent land, subject to the use by the public. Articles 455 and 457 of the Civil Code. Wemple v. Eastham, supra.
The laws of this State governing accretions and derelections are set forth in Arti- cíes 509 and 510 of the Civil Code, which provide as follows:
"Art. 509. The accretions, which are formed successively and imperceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of a river or other stream, are called alluvion.
"The alluvion belongs to the owner of the soil situated on the edge of the water, whether it be a river or stream, and whether the same be navigable or not, who is bound to leave public that portion of the bank which is required by law for the public use."
"Art. 510. The same rule applies to derelictions formed by running water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores and encroaching on the other; the owner of the land, adjoining the shore which is left dry, has a right to the dereliction, nor can the owner of the opposite shore, claim the land which he has lost.
"This right does not take place in case of derelictions of the sea."
It is well settled that, under Article 509, accretions formed successively and imperceptibly on the shores of rivers or other streams, whether navigable or not, belong to the owners of the property to which they attach, but this is not the law in the case of lakes, bays and arms of the sea. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La.Ann. 837 (1882); Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936); Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d 61 (1943); Esso Standard Oil Company v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So.2d 236 (1957).
Accordingly, we must determine whether Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake was a river or stream, or a lake at the time of the State's admission to the Union in 1812. In the event it was a river or stream, Article 509 would be applicable; whereas, if it were a lake, Article 509 would not apply.
In order to make this determination, we must first refer to the law and jurisprudence of this State. As previously indicated, the statutory law dealing with accretion and dereliction is set forth in Articles 509 and 510 of the Civil Code. Hence, we must examine the cases which have interpreted these codal articles in an attempt to determine the type of body of water which would constitute a river or other stream under Article 509.
Many cases have been cited to us for our consideration, but, after reviewing them, we find only the following decisions involved the issue of the classification of a water body for application of our laws of accretion and dereliction. These are: State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931); Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936); Ameranda Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d 61 (1943) ; Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Case, 210 La. 630, 27 So.2d 431 (1946); Esso Standard Oil Company v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So.2d 236 (1957); and State v. Cockrell, 162 So. 2d 361 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1964), writ refused 246 La. 343, 164 So.2d 350 (1964).
State-Gulf contend that the rule in Erwin properly sets forth the law of the State insofar as expansive water bodies are concerned regardless of their other characteristics as running bodies of water with substantial capacity to create accretions and derelictions. Further, they contend that the Amerada cases and the Esso case are distinguishable as they involve lesser water bodies and that Cockrell is in direct conflict with Erwin and should be overruled.
Erwin involved Calcasieu Lake, a large body of water in Cameron Parish, which is approximately 18 miles long and varies in width from 414 miles to about 12 or 14 miles. The Calcasieu River entered in from the north and came out of its southern end on its way to the Gulf of Mexico. The opinion states that there is a channel through the lake through which there is a perceptible current when the river is high due to heavy rains; however, in ordinary stages of the water in the river there is, if any, only an almost imperceptible current in the channel. The issue presented in this case was the ownership of that part of the lake formed by the erosion of the soil since admission of Louisiana to statehood. The Court concluded that resolution of this issue depended upon the applicability of Articles 509 and 510. Conceding that these articles do not apply to lakes, the Court proceeded to determine whether Calcasieu Lake was a lake or a river within the contemplation of the laws governing accretion and dereliction. The Court considered the historical background of Civil Code Articles 509 and 510 (including the articles of the French Code from which they are derived) and acknowledged that in France, Calcasieu Lake would probably be considered a section of the Calcasieu River and subject to the laws of alluvion and dereliction. However, without assigning reasons for doing so, the Court dismissed that consideration and disposed of the issue in the following words: " In our opinion, however, the better view — with reference to the laws, governing alluvion and dereliction — is to regard such a vast expanse of water as Calcasieu Lake as being in fact a lake, although a river empties into the sea through it." The Court concluded that Calcasieu Lake was a true lake and that Articles 509 and 510 covering al-luvion and dereliction had no application to the case but decided, nevertheless, that the submerged lands belonged to the riparian owners. On rehearing, the Court held that the lake was not an arm of the sea and reiterated its previous views.
We find that Erwin adopts an unworkable and arbitrary standard for classifying water bodies with no real relationship with the meaning and purpose of Articles 509 and 510. The use of such a standard would make it next to impossible to determine when a water body was wide enough to be classified as a lake and narrow enough to be considered a river or stream.
Miami Corporation v. State followed Erwin in 1936. The issue involved was the ownership of land which had become part of the bed of a navigable water body along the shore of Grand Lake in Cameron Parish. The factual situation in Miami was almost the same as in Erwin except that the water body involved was Grand Lake, through which the Mermentau River flows on its way to the sea. Miami reversed Erwin by deciding that the bed or bottom of Grand Lake, a navigable body of water, including the submerged lands in controversy, belonged to the State of Louisiana, by virtue of its sovereignty, it being a public thing and insusceptible of private ownership under Articles 450 and 453 of the Civil Code. The Court then stated that: " Having reached the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of articles 509 and 510 of the Revised Civil Code to this case." Thus, the lake-stream issue was not presented in that case for the obvious reason that the rule announced by the Court applied to any navigable water whether it was a lake, stream or otherwise.
Defendants urge that the rule of State v. Erwin, with respect to the definition of a lake as distinguished from a river or stream, appears to have been clearly overruled by subsequent decisions, primarily Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, hereinafter referred to as "First Amerada," Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Case, hereinafter referred to as "Second Amerada," Esso Standard Oil Company v. Jones, and State v. Cockrell. We agree.
First Amerada was decided by this Court in 1943. It dealt with the ownership of accretions which had attached to the shore of the Arm of Grand Lake in St. Martin Parish which lies north of and empties into Grand Lake with which we are presently concerned. The lake-stream issue was squarely presented to the Court in that case, and we feel that its pronouncement thereon, which has been subsequently followed in other decisions of this Court, is determinative of the legal principle on this point in the instant case. The Court held the body of water involved therein to be a stream to which the provisions of Article 509 applied, and on that finding, awarded the disputed land to the riparian owner. The Court quoted extensively from the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court. In deciding that the Arm of Grand Lake was a stream within the meaning of Article 509 as distinguished from a lake to which this article would not apply, the Court clearly defined a lake as a body of water which is more or less stagnant and is supplied by drainage. On the other hand, a river was distinguished from a lake in that it flows, more or less, in a permanent bed or channel between well-defined banks, with a current, whereas streams are bodies of flowing waters including rivers. The Court concluded that, since the Arm of Grand Lake was a flowing body of water, it constituted a stream within the meaning of Article 509. The Court was convinced that the provisions of Article 509 were intended to apply to such bodies of flowing water which had the capacity to form accretions.
We note the following appropriate language from First Amerada:
"It will be noted, from an examination of the quoted portion of his opinion, the trial judge holds that the body of water known as the arm of Grand Lake can not be classified as a river, because it does not possess well defined banks or walls as are required of rivers, and, on the other hand, that it can not be classified as a lake, because its waters are not still or dead and they are not supplied from drainage as is required of lakes. However, his holding is that the arm of Grand Lake is a body of flowing water, and therefore it constitutes a stream within the meaning of the term, 'or other stream' referred to in Article 509 of the Civil Code. He reasons very logically that the 'other stream' referred to in the article includes streams falling into the category of rivers. This inclusion covers the case here, because the stream involved possesses all the characteristics of a river in its ability to remove and deposit the soil.
" sji
"The trial judge held that the arm of Grand Lake is a stream of flowing water and that Article 509 of the Civil Code applies to the alluvion on its banks. Regardless of the characterization of the water as a river or merely as a flowing stream, the conclusion reached by the trial judge is correct."
It can readily be seen that the Court clearly distinguished a lake from a river "or other stream" and defined the meaning of the term "or other stream" referred to in Article 509 as a body of flowing water with the ability to remove and deposit soil. Furthermore, it is apparent that the Erwin principle had been abandoned.
The Second Amerada case (1946) involved part of the identical alluvion formation involved in First Amerada, but it was contended th^.t Article 509 did not apply because the build-up was not on the shore of the Arm of Grand Lake, but rather on the shore of Grand Lake itself. The Court concluded that, since the alluvion area in dispute was a continuation of the alluvion area in First Amerada, title thereto would be governed by the Court's decision in the former case. This case affirmed the Court's previous ruling in First Amerada and lends additional support to that decision.
The rule of First Amerada was again approved by the Supreme Court in Esso Standard Oil Company v. Jones, in 1957. The case involved a change of the Mississippi River channel from Deer Park Bend to Glasscock Cut-Off by artificial means. In determining the applicability of the rule of alluvion in Article 509, the Court again followed the rule set forth in First Amera-da and held that, since the waters of Deer Park Bend contained a natural current capable of carrying alluvion and depositing it along its banks, it was a stream as distinguished from a lake. The Court approved and adopted the reasons of the trial judge as the opinion of that Court, from which we quote the following pertinent part:
" 'In the present case at the present time there is not a constant or continuous flow at low water around the bendway every day in every year, but definitely the bendway is not a lake. When it does flow it is not drainage and the bendway gets its water from the main body of the Mississippi River. A stream is not required to flow every minute of the time. In this case the bendway is characterized by definite banks on each side, a definite bed, a natural current always downstream with the main body of the Mississippi River being the source of water supply. The current is capable of carrying alluvion and of depositing it along the banks. These characteristics fulfill every possible requirement of a stream and prevent the Deer Park Bend channel from being classified as a lake or pond up to this time. That location may change some time in the future becoming a dead lake, but it had not done so at this writing. "
It was within this background that the Cockrell case was presented in 1964. The identical lake-stream issue was before the court. This time it involved alluvion which had formed on the shore of Six Mile Lake in St. Mary Parish. In view of the ruling of First Amerada in 1943, which was approved three years later in Second Amerada, and again fourteen years later in Esso, the result of Cockrell could be readily predicted. The First Circuit Court of Appeal held:
"We conclude, therefore, Six Mile Lake is a stream as distinguished from a lake considering it is shown to be a body of water containing currents of sufficient velocity to carry alluvial materials. Moreover, the record conclusively shows the flow of water entering Six Mile Lake and causing its currents is not the result of drainage but the natural movement or flow of the waters of the At-chafalaya River passing through the waterway known as the Atchafalaya Basin on its way to the sea. Because the banks of Six Mile Lake are not well defined as in the case of rivers, the body of water in question must be characterized as a stream rather than a river. Technically speaking, Six Mile Lake appears to be a segment of the Atchafalaya River. The record in the case before us leaves not the slightest doubt but that Six Mile Lake does in fact annually carry off a substantial portion of the tremendous volume of water flowing to the sea through the Atchafalaya River. It further appears beyond question, this condition antedated 1812 and has continued to the present time.
"It follows, therefore, Six Mile Lake was a stream in 1812 within the meaning and intendment of the term 'other stream' as used in Article 509, LSA-C. C., consequently the provisions of said article are applicable to the case at bar as held by the learned trial court.
We are here again presented with a review of the lake-stream issue dealing with the same body of water which was involved in the Cockrell case. We have carefully re-examined the jurisprudence with respect to this issue and reach the same inescapable conclusion. Nothing new or different has been presented in this case which has not been argued before and reviewed in our previous decisions. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule of the Erwin case, insofar as it holds that a body of water is a lake, even though water runs and flows through it with sufficient capacity and velocity to carry alluvion, to which the laws governing alluvion and dereliction (Articles 509 and 510) have no application, has been clearly overruled by subsequent decisions of this Court. We further hold that the rule first enunciated in First Amerada and approved and' affirmed in Second Amerada, Esso and Cockrell is now affirmed by us in this case: that a body of water through which a current flows or runs with such capacity and velocity and power as to form accretions is characterized as a river or stream, depending upon all attending circumstances, for the purpose of applying the rules of accretion and dereliction set forth in Articles 509 and 510 of the Civil Code.
Having determined the legal definition of a river or stream for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 509 and 510, we must next decide whether Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake factually falls within this definition.
We reiterate at the outset that the identical issue was presented in Cockrell, as Six Mile Lake was there involved as it is herein. The present action constitutes practically a re-trial of that case. The plaintiffs in this case are the identical plaintiffs in the Cockrell case. The areas in controversy in the two cases are practically the same, as the well in the Cockrell case was located approximately 4500 feet east of S. G. Todd Well No. 3, which is in close proximity to S. G. Todd Wells Nos. 4 and 5 (three wells involved in this case). Generally, the same experts who testified in the Cockrell case testified in the present case: notably, Dr. Reinhard A. Steinmayer; Dr. John P. McDowell; Dr. Willis A. Eggler; and Mr. Philip Whitaker.
Based upon a study of ancient documents, maps and journals, we are convinced that the Atchafalaya River in 1812 and prior thereto carried waters through Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake to the Gulf of Mexico. This has been previously recognized by the courts of this State. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, supra; State v. Cockrell, supra. We further find that Six Mile Lake was a stream in 1812 when the State of Louisiana was admitted into the Union and has remained as such until the present time. A careful review of the voluminous record makes it amply clear that Six Mile Lake has all the physical characteristics of a running stream with the power, force and velocity to carry sediment and to form alluvion and is, therefore, a true stream within the meaning of Articles 509 and 510 as defined by the jurisprudence of this State. In arriving at these conclusions, we were much impressed and relied heavily on the testimony of Professor R. A. Stein-mayer, Dr. J. J. McDowell and Dr. W. A. Eggler. We have refrained from detailing the evidence upon which the foregoing conclusions are based as it has been ably set forth in an exhaustive review of the testimony and evidence by the trial judge in his fifty-five page well-reasoned opinion, as well as in the learned opinion of our brethren of the First Circuit Court of Appeal. Hence, a repetition thereof would serve no useful purpose.
It is contended in- the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the banks of a stream belong to the riparian owner under the provisions of Article 455 and that Article 509 gives alluvion to the owner of the land adjacent to a river or stream. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code on the subject are Articles 455 and 509.
Article 455 provides as follows:
"The use of the banks of navigable rivers or streams is public; accordingly, everyone has a right freely to bring his vessels to land there, to make fast the same to the trees which are there planted, to unload his vessels, to deposit his goods, to dry his nets, and the like.
"Nevertheless, the ownership of the river banks belongs to those who possess the adjacent lands."
State-Gulf contend that Article 455 recognizes that river banks only are owned by the riparian owners, thereby impliedly reserving to the State the banks of other wa ter bodies not expressly mentioned, including streams. Such argument has no valid basis either considering Article 455 alone or when read in pari materia with Article 509.
The first paragraph of Article 455 provides that the use of the banks of navigable rivers or streams is public. This provision is consistent only with the private ownership of the banks of both rivers and streams. If the State already owns the banks of navigable streams within its borders, there would be no necessity for such a provision with respect to streams as obviously the banks would be already subject to public use. Therefore, the second paragraph which provides that, nevertheless, the ownership of the river banks belongs to those who possess the adjacent lands, obviously refers to both navigable rivers and streams. Such construction of Article 455 coincides with the rule of property contained in Article 509 which gives alluvion to the owner of land adjacent not only to a river but also to a "stream." This issue was raised in connection with the area referred to as the Woodland Tract. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeal that this area is composed of bank as opposed to alluvion, and inasmuch as Six Mile Lake has properly been classified as a stream, the bank thereof belongs to the riparian owner under Article 455.
In the third assignment of error, State-Gulf urge that even if Six Mile Lake is classified as a stream rather than a lake, the areas identified as Barnett's Cove and the Island Area were not formed by accretions and should not be considered allu-vion, as that term has been defined in Article 509. State-Gulf's primary contention in reference to Barnett's Cove is that this area did not fill in successively and imperceptibly by natural processes, but rather was created artificially as the result of dredging operation conducted in Wax Lake Outlet. In affirming the findings of the court below on this point, we quote with approval the conclusion of the Court of Appeal:
"Our review of the record satisfies us that the trial judge committed no manifest error in concluding that the preponderance of the evidence supports defendants' contention that the area comprising 'Barnett's Cove' properly constitutes allu-vion or accretionary build-up of a land mass which is attached to and belongs to the riparian landowners. In making this determination, the trial judge relied heavily on the expert testimony of defendants' witness, Dr. McDowell. Dr. McDowell testified that while some of the alluvion was undoubtedly comprised of dredge spoil material, nevertheless, this material was deposited as a result of the natural effects of running water rather than as a result of having been pumped into or placed directly in the 'Barnett's Cove' area. While this testimony is contradicted in certain respects by expert and lay testimony offered by State-Gulf, we find no manifest error committed by the trial judge in resolving this issue adversely to State-Gulf."
It is well established in our jurisprudence that as long as the formation of the alluvion or batture is successive and imperceptible, it is immaterial that acts of man contributed to the formation of the allu-vion. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall 46, 90 U.S. 46, 23 L.Ed. 59; Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, supra; Esso Standard Oil Company v. Jones, supra; State v. Cockrell, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that, even though the dredging of Wax Lake Outlet may have contributed to the formation of the accretion in Barnett's Cove, the buildup was nevertheless successive and imperceptible and, under Article 509 and the cases interpreting that article, the accretion belongs to the riparian owners.
The remaining area of contention is that area referred to as the Island Area. It is the same area on which the Cockrell well was located. No well constituting a basis for this action is located on the Island Area, but ownership of this area has been again placed at issue in the instant case. We are concerned with the ownership of the accretionary area under the application of either Article 509 or 512, which latter article provides as follows :
"Islands and sand bars, which are formed in the beds of navigable rivers or streams, and which are not attached to the bank, belong to the State, if there be no adverse title or prescription."
State-Gulf concede that, if this area of accretion first manifested itself above low water and formed successively and imperceptibly to the shore of a river or stream in accordance with Article 509, it would be alluvion and would belong to the riparian owner; but if the accretion first manifested itself above low water as an island or sand bar formed in the bed of a navigable river or stream and not attached to the bank, it belongs to the State under Article 512. There is no dispute over the fact that this accretionary area built "successively and imperceptibly;" the sole issue is whether it commenced at the shore and built outward to its present northern extremity or whether it originally emerged as an island or sand bar. While defendants urge that the record clearly establishes that this land mass built from the shore outward, alternatively, they argue that, even if the accretionary area was originally formed as an island or sand bar and subsequently attached to the shore, a literal 'reading of Article 512 would result in the divestiture of the State's title to the island by its subsequent attachment to the shore.
A substantial part of the testimony in evidence introduced in this case was in connection with this Island Area issue. It is interesting to note that the same "island" theory with respect to the same build-up was presented and rejected in the Cockrell case on the basis of the testimony of expert witnesses, Dr. J. P. McDowell and Dr. Willis Eggler who also testified on behalf of the defendants in this case. After evaluating and analyzing the conflicting expert testimony and other evidence in the record, we conclude that the courts below correctly resolved this issue by finding that the accretionary area referred to as the Island Area was built up successively and imperceptibly from the shore outward to its present northern extremity in Six Mile Lake. Accordingly, this area is owned by the riparian owners under the provisions of Article 509. In arriving at this conclusion, we were more impressed with the, expert testimony of the witnesses presented by the defendants than those offered by State-Gulf. Having thus concluded, it is unnecessary for us to consider defendants' alternative argument.
The fourth assignment of error is leveled at the method employed by the courts below in determining the ordinary low water line. The trial judge adopted and the Court of Appeal affirmed the method of calculation employed by defendants' engineer, Philip Whitaker. Mr. Whitaker's method is set forth in the opinion of the trial judge as follows:
"He first obtained a complete set of gauge records of the U. S. Corps of Engineers of the Verdunville Gauge as recorded during the period of 1933 to 1962 and from these records the daily highs and lows were tabulated, and from that tabulation a graph was drawn * to show visually the water surface from year to year and to determine a low water season and a high water season during each particular year. He then averaged out the daily lows during the low water seasons over the entire thirty year period. The result showed an ordinary low water line of +0.26 mean sea level, less the stipulated dinary low water mark at Wax Lake stream gradient of 0.15, indicating an or-Outlet of +.11 feet above mean sea level. The low water mark as determined by this method is plotted on Exhibit I-19."
State-Gulf contend that this method is objectionable because it is calculated on what Mr. Whitaker calls the "low water season" and averages the daily lows during that season. The complaint is that there is no formula or objective method in deter mining the "low water season," but rather it represents a completely subjective method in the selection of the low water season each year.
We disagree with this contention. A reading of the record clearly demonstrates that the method employed by Mr. Whitaker was the fairest and most reasonable method proposed. Accordingly, we conclude that the method of determining the ordinary low water line accepted by the courts below is well-founded and is approved by us upon review.
The fifth assignment of error is predicated on the complaint that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the excessive expert witness fees allowed by the trial court. Placid was awarded $31,733.29 and Texaco, the sum of $31,345.94.
The statutory authority for fixing compensation of expert witnesses is R.S. 13:3666, which provides in pertinent part:
"A. Witnesses called to testify in court only to an opinion founded on special study or experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations, and to state the results thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the value of time employed and the degree of learning or skill required."
While we recognize that experts are entitled to not only a fee for their appearance in court, but also an award for their preparatory work, these fees must be reasonable and somewhat in line with the fees heretofore allowed by the courts of this State. Recreation and Park Commission v. Perkins, 231 La. 869, 93 So.2d 198 (1957).
We likewise realize that valuable acreage and oil and gas production are involved in this litigation. Furthermore, the issues are technical and complicated, and required special skill and training on the part of those who gave expert testimony.
With the foregoing in mind, we have reviewed the testimony of the expert witnesses during the trial on -the merits, as well as during the hearing to tax costs, and have studied the invoices and statements which were filed into evidence. We conclude therefrom that the awards allowed by the courts below are excessive. This conclusion is based primarily on our finding that there was an excessive amount of costs and time expended in preparation of trial which includes field trips, engineering and survey work, conferences, reports and time waiting to testify. This preparatory work strikes us as being out of proportion to the time and scope of the testimony presented at the trial. Accordingly, we reduce the expert witness fees to the following: Dr. John P. McDowell, $2,800.00; Dr. Willis A. Eggler, $2,300.00; Dr. R. Kazmann, $350.00; Prof. R. A. Steinmayer, $3,700.00; William Clifford Smith of the firm of T. Baker Smith & Son, Inc., Civil Engineers and Surveyors, $9,000.00; Philip Whitaker of the firm of F. Shutts' Sons, Civil Engineers, $12,500.00; Louis C. Peters of the firm of Barnett & Peters, Consulting Foresters, $2,700.00.
The effect of these reductions will reduce the total awards of expert witness fees to Placid from $31,733.29 to $18,150.-00, and to Texaco from $31,345.94 to $15,200.00. Furthermore, we find that the assessment of court costs against State-Gulf, in solido, with Gulf to pay any portion thereof that the State is exempt from paying by law (R.S. 13 :4521) is correct.
In the sixth assignment of error, State-Gulf pray that this Court modify the judgment of the Court of Appeal in accordance with their assigned errors. As set forth above, we have reviewed each of the assigned errors, but have found merit only in the fifth assignment of error. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeal will be amended only to that extent.
The Court of Appeal found merit in the contention of State-Gulf that the trial judge erred in failing to give effect herein to Act 341 of 1952 (R.S. 9:1151) with respect to the lease by the State to Gulf dated April 18, 1956. '
Act 341 of 1952 (R.S. 9:1151) provides as follows:
"In all cases where a change occurs in the. ownership of land or water bottoms as a result of the action of a navigable stream, bay or lake in the change of its course or bed, or as a result of accretion, dereliction, or other condition resulting from the action of a navigable stream, bay or lake, the new owner of such lands or water bottoms, including the state of Louisiana, shall take the same subject to and encumbered with any oil, gas and/or mineral lease covering and affecting such lands or water bottoms, and subject to the mineral and royalty rights of the lessors in such lease, their heirs, successors and assigns, the right of the lessee or owners of such lease and the right of the mineral and royalty owners thereunder to be in no manner abrogated or affected by such change in ownership."
Placid contended that if the foregoing statute be found applicable, it is unconstitutional in that it violates its constitutional rights against deprivation of property without due process and impairment of the obligations of a contract. The Court of Appeal correctly rejected this contention and found Act 341 of 1952 constitutional and applicable in this case.
Hence, in accordance with Act 341 of 1952, any changes in the ownership of land or water bottoms after April 18, 1956, the date of the lease from the State to Gulf, is subject to and encumbered with said mineral lease insofar as it covers such lands or water bottoms as is clearly set forth in said statute.
The Court of Appeal then properly reversed the judgment of the district court to the extent that it cancelled and annulled State Lease No. 2963 granted to Gulf on April 18, 1956, insofar as it purports to affect the property described in the judgment and remanded the case for the limited purpose of establishing the ordinary low water line in the areas in controversy as of April 18, 1956 in order to determine the effect of State Lease No. 2963 to Gulf on land areas located on the water side of the ordinary low water line as determined to have existed on that date. The case was further correctly remanded for the purpose of ascertaining whether any judgment should be rendered against Placid and in favor of State-Gulf for the value of oil and gas which may have been produced from or attributable to the land areas in question located on the water side of the ordinary low water line as same is determined to have existed on April 18, 1956, as well as ascertaining the rights, if any, of Placid to be reimbursed for allocable drilling and operational costs of any of the three wells in question. The Court of Appeal further properly reversed that part of the judgment of the district court which recognized Placid, McDermott and Texaco as the owners of mineral leases affecting all of the property described in the judgment and remanded same for the purpose of determining what part, if any, of the land area in question is validly covered by State Lease No. 2963 dated April 18, 1956 to Gulf Refining Company, that is, on the basis of the ordinary low water line as same is determined to have existed on April 18, 1956.
Placid alternatively argues in its brief to this Court that, if it be determined that all or any part of the area in controversy is owned by the State of Louisiana as opposed to the riparian owners, who are Placid's lessors, it is the position of Placid that Gulf does not hold a valid lease from the State and that any part of the area in controversy owned by the State is covered and included in State Lease No. 3643 granted-by the State to Placid on February 24, 1960. This issue was determined adversely to Placid by the Court of Appeal. We have reviewed the ruling of the Court of Appeal on this point and agree with its conclusion. Accordingly, the southern boundary of the Gulf lease, as corrected, is the original meander line; however, its effect, as previously indicated, extends only to the ordinary low water line as such is determined on remand to have existed as of April 18, 1956.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in all respects except as to the assessment of expert witness fees which is amended as hereinabove set forth.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents.
. Application for writ of review was denied without dissent by this Court with the following notation: "On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in the judgment complained of." 246 La. 343, 164 So.2d 350 (1964),