Case Name: Mark Anthony TOLBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2019-04-22
Citations: 268 So. 3d 947
Docket Number: No. 1D17-3240
Parties: Mark Anthony TOLBERT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 268
Pages: 947–954

Head Matter:
Mark Anthony TOLBERT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D17-3240
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 22, 2019
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Winokur, J.
Mark Anthony Tolbert appeals a restitution order. Tolbert argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the victim the outstanding balance owed on a loan used to finance the purchase of the vehicle he destroyed. We find that the proper measurement of restitution here was the vehicle's fair market value at the time of the crime. As a result, we reverse.
I.
In April 2016, Tolbert was charged with aggravated fleeing and eluding of a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence causing property damage. Tolbert crashed a 2013 Toyota Yaris, owned by his ex-girlfriend Ms. Schoenfeld, into a ditch. The vehicle was totaled.
In May 2016, Tolbert entered a negotiated plea, which included a reservation of jurisdiction in order to determine the amount of restitution. During the restitution hearing, Schoenfeld testified that she purchased the vehicle three years before the incident for approximately $ 14,000. Schoenfeld claimed that the vehicle was purchased used, in fair condition, and with no structural damage. She also testified that she financed the vehicle's purchase through a bank loan. After the incident, Schoenfeld owed the bank $ 14,694.60 in order to pay off the loan. Schoenfeld's insurance company paid a portion of the payoff amount, with Schoenfeld owing the bank an outstanding balance of $ 11,892.76.
For his part, Tolbert presented the expert testimony of Hunter Livingston, the owner of a local car dealership. Livingston estimated the value of the vehicle at $ 5,850. Livingston also consulted the Kelley Blue Book, a consumer vehicle purchase guide, and estimated the retail value of a 2013 Toyota Yaris at approximately $ 8,000. Livingston opined that the fair market value of Schoenfeld's vehicle was approximately $ 6,100.
At the close of the hearing, the State argued that Tolbert owed Schoenfeld the balance owed on the bank loan. In contrast, defense counsel argued that Tolbert simply owed the fair market value of the vehicle. The trial court then entered a restitution order in the amount of Schoenfeld's outstanding loan balance, $ 11,892.76.
II.
Florida law provides for restitution to a victim for damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, and for damage or loss related to the defendant's criminal episode. § 775.089(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The State has the burden of proving the amount of restitution owed by a preponderance of the evidence. § 775.089(7), Fla. Stat. The amount of restitution ordered must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. D. J. R. v. State , 139 So.3d 458, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Typically, fair market value is the appropriate measure of restitution.
State v. Hawthorne , 573 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1991).
While intended to make the victim whole, "restitution is not intended to provide a victim with a windfall." Rodriguez v. State , 956 So.2d 1226, 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Glaubius v. State , 688 So.2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1997) ). Therefore, restitution may not exceed the damage caused by the defendant's criminal conduct. D. J. R. , 139 So.3d at 459.
III.
A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. First, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's restitution order. The State relies on its introduction of documentation verifying the remaining balance owed on the loan, Schoenfeld's testimony of the approximate purchase price of the vehicle, as well as the condition of the vehicle at the time it was destroyed by Tolbert.
Notwithstanding the credibility and competency of Schoenfeld's testimony and the State's evidence, the State is still required to show a causal relationship between the conduct and the restitution. Hawthorne , 573 So.2d at 333 ; L.A.D. v. State , 616 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The record shows that the State did not meet this burden.
Schoenfeld entered into a loan agreement to finance the purchase of the automobile. Schoenfeld's insurance provider made a partial payment to the bank, but a balance remained. The State, however, did not present evidence connecting the balance owed to Tolbert's criminal conduct. Schoenfeld's loan pre-dated the incident and reflected the money owed to the bank in exchange for the purchase of the vehicle. Even if Tolbert had not destroyed the vehicle, Schoenfeld would still be obligated to pay off the loan. Therefore, the State cannot prove that, "but for" Tolbert's conduct, Schoenfeld would not owe $ 11,892.76.
Second, the State asserts that fair market value is not the only standard for ascertaining restitution. It is true that "a court is not tied to fair market value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts." Hawthorne , 573 So.2d at 333. Deviations from fair market value, however, have been recognized in limited circumstances, such as the "theft of a family heirloom, a new automobile, or an older car that had been repaired shortly before the theft." Davis v. State , 244 So.3d 374, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The common thread of these exceptions is that the value of the stolen property itself consists of more than just its fair market value.
This case does not trigger these exceptions. The loan balance owed is the remaining amount of the purchase price covered by the bank in order to finance Schoenfeld's purchase of the vehicle. The State failed to show that the money owed on the bank loan made the vehicle worth more than just its fair market value. Thus, it was improper for the trial court to order restitution in excess of that value.
IV.
Restitution is designed to compensate a victim for a loss incurred as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct. The task of making of victim whole, however, is constrained by the legal requirements that a victim not receive a windfall and that a defendant not pay in excess of the damage he caused. While it may seem unfair that Schoenfeld owes money on a vehicle she no longer possesses, the balance is a product of Schoenfeld's financial decision. Tolbert's responsibility lies as far as his damage to the vehicle. In this case, that amount is reflected by the vehicle's fair market value. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for restitution proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED .
Winsor, J., concurs with opinion; Makar, J., dissents with opinion.