Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert McCABE, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1985-09-18
Citations: 345 Pa. Super. 495
Docket Number: No. 1654
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert McCABE, Appellant.
Judges: Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and GEISZ, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 345
Pages: 495–507

Head Matter:
498 A.2d 933
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Robert McCABE, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 20, 1985.
Filed Sept. 18, 1985.
Cyrus P. Dolbin, Pottsville, for appellant.
Kate Dreher, Assistant District Attorney, Pottsville, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and GEISZ, JJ.
The Honorable John A. Geisz, Senior Judge, of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

Opinion:
WIEAND, Judge:
Robert McCabe was tried before a jury on charges of robbery, theft by receiving stolen property, criminal conspiracy, and hindering prosecution. The jury acquitted him of theft and conspiracy, was unable to agree upon a verdict on the robbery charge, and found him guilty of hindering prosecution. The trial court subsequently found the evidence insufficient on the robbery charge and granted a post-trial motion for acquittal. The court refused post-verdict relief on the conviction for hindering prosecution and imposed a sentence of probation. On direct appeal, McCabe asks this Court to decide the following issues:
1. May a defendant be convicted of a crime where there is no independent proof of the commission of that crime, but only the Defendant's statement that he committed such a crime?
2. Even where there is no independent proof of the commission of a crime, may a defendant waive the protec tion of the corpus delicti rule, and be convicted upon his own testimony alone?
The information charged appellant with concealing or destroying relevant evidence in the nature of a note found at the scene of a robbery. The police learned of the existence of the note from appellant, who told them he had destroyed it. At trial, the Commonwealth was unable to produce independent evidence that the note existed. Because the Commonwealth was unable to prove the corpus delicti of this offense, the trial court sustained an objection to a testimonial reference to appellant's oral statement by Trooper Bordenaro, a witness for the prosecution. On cross-examination, the witness was asked whether appellant had made a statement in which he denied involvement in the crime, and the witness agreed that he had. On redirect-examination, the witness was asked precisely what appellant had said. He was permitted to testify, over objection, that appellant's statement had included "that he found a note at the robbery scene addressed to Diego Robinson, that he put the note into his pocket and that he later destroyed it. The question and answer [were] permitted because defense counsel had 'opened the door' to the entire conversation between defendant and the officer by inquiring as to that part of the conversation which favored the defendant."
The law is clear that "where one party offers part of a conversation, the other is entitled to bring out the balance____" Commonwealth v. Nelson, 294 Pa. 544, 546, 144 A. 542, 543 (1929). "If a defendant delves into what would be objectionable testimony on the part of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth can probe further into the objectionable area." Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa.Super. 19, 37, 466 A.2d 1039, 1049 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. McCloughan, 279 Pa.Super. 599, 604, 421 A.2d 361, 363 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stakley, 243 Pa.Super. 426, 430, 365 A.2d 1298, 1300 (1976). In the instant case, moreover, the receipt of appellant's statement was harmless. Appellant took the stand in his own defense and testified to the same facts which he had related to Trooper Bordenaro on the night of the robbery. Appellant testified "that at the scene of the robbery he had picked up a piece of paper, put it into his pocket, that he had read the note which was addressed to Diego and had later told the State Police that he had gotten rid of the note—had thrown it in the garbage." The decided cases are uniform in holding that error in receiving an extrajudicial statement of the defendant is rendered harmless if the defendant thereafter takes the stand in his own defense and reiterates or corroborates his statement. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 681, 331 A.2d 193, 194 (1975). Accord: Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 274, 370 A.2d 298, 300 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 466 Pa. 332, 335, 353 A.2d 381, 382 (1976); Commonwealth v. Rice, 271 Pa.Super. 425, 429-430, 413 A.2d 739, 741 (1979).
As a general rule, a naked extrajudicial confession of guilt by one accused of crime, uncorroborated by independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti, is not sufficient to warrant or support a conviction. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1136. Pennsylvania decisions are in accord. Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 365-366, 329 A.2d 258, 274 (1974); Commonwealth v. May, 451 Pa. 31, 32, 301 A.2d 368, 369 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 498, 31 A.2d 155, 156 (1943). "The grounds on which the rule rests are the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed____" Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 134, 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940).
The rule that an extrajudicial confession does not warrant a conviction unless corroborated by independent evidence of a corpus delicti has no application to judicial admissions. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1139. See also: State v. Schomaker, 303 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1981); Com monwealth v. Granese, 37 Montg. 15 (Pa.1920). Judicial admissions are deliberately made under oath during formal proceedings and are generally free from the inherent infirmity of verbal confessions made out of court. 30 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 1139.
Appellant's in-court testimony was neither hasty nor unguarded. It was made after consulting with counsel, was made under oath during trial, and was exculpatory with respect to the more serious charges which had been brought against him. His testimony, which admitted the destruction of evidence, was sufficient, if believed, to warrant a finding that he had concealed and destroyed evidence.
The judgment of sentence is affirmed.
SPAETH, President Judge, files a dissenting opinion.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5105.
. Presumably, this reference by defense counsel was to the crime of robbery.
. These facts are taken from a stipulation entered by counsel for both parties in lieu of a transcribed copy of the notes of testimony.