Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joshua S. Helmer, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-01-11
Citations: 154 N.Y. 596
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joshua S. Helmer, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 154
Pages: 596–619

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joshua S. Helmer, Appellant.
1. Crimes — Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals cannot review any questions of fact on appeal in a criminal case, except where the judgment is of death; nor can it review any questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, where the Appellate Division has affirmed a conviction, by a unanimous decision. (Canst, art. 6, § 9.)
3. Indictment—Penal Code, § 593. The mere omission of the words “in respect thereto,’’ from an otherwise sufficient indictment, based upon section 593 of the Penal Code, which makes it a crime for an officer of a corporation to knowingly exhibit a false book to any public officer authorized by law to investigate its affairs, “with intent to deceive such officer in respect thereto,” does not invalidate the indictment.
3. Charge to Jury — Error. Where the charge to the jury is erroneous, the verdict must be set aside, unless it is apparent that the error did not and could not have affected the verdict; and it is not for the defendant to show how he was injured by it, but it rests with the prosecution to show that no possible injury could have arisen from the error.
4. Reversible Error in Charge. On a new trial of an indictment based upon section 593 of the Penal Code, charging the president of a state bank with having knowingly exhibited a false tickler or cash book to a bank examiner, the questions most seriously litigated were whether certain entries in the book were false to the knowledge of the defendant and whether, with that knowledge, he exhibited the book to the examiner. The evidence to establish these facts was somewhat circumstantial. The trial court, in charging the jury, after detailing the evidence, added: “ And, as the court at General Term had said, in this case, that was sufficient to satisfy the jury that there was an inspection or presentation of the books to the examiner.” Held, that this constituted reversible error.
People v. Helmer, 13 App. Div. 426, reversed.
(Argued December 3, 1897;
decided January 11, 1898.)
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered February 3, 1897, which affirmed a judgment of a Court of General Sessions, held in and for the county of ¡Niagara, convicting the defendant of exhibiting false books to one of the hank examiners of the state.
The defendant was indicted at a Court of Oyer and Terminer held in and for that county in April, 1894. At the time of the alleged offense he was president of the Merchants’ Bank of Lock-port, which was duly organized under the laws of this state, and was in general charge of its affairs. Among other hooks kept in the bank was one known as the tickler or cash book, which purported to show correctly the cash on hand at the close of business on each day. B. S. W. Clark was a bank examiner duly authorized and appointed to investigate the affairs of that bank. On the morning of the twenty-first of September, 1893, Clark, as such examiner, appeared at its banking office for that purpose. The defendant was present and was informed by the hank examiner of the purpose of his visit and of his desire to count the cash beforp the bank opened for business. The books were thereupon presented, including the tickler or cash book, and the examination commenced. The defendant was present the most of the time until it was concluded.
John Gr. MiUrum, Tracy 0. Becker and Eugene M. Ashley for appellant.
The offense charged in the indictment as to the teller’s tickler is not sustained by any evidence. (Wood v. E. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 196; People v. Rosenlerg, 138 N. Y. 415.) Even if the defendant did exhibit the teller’s tickler to the examiner, and knew that the checks were recorded in it under the head of currency, it was not a false book within the meaning of the statute. (People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137.) The case made, being jierfectly consistent with innocence, it is well settled that a conviction will not be allowed to stand, and the motion to dismiss the indictment and discharge the defendant brings this qiiestion up for review by this court. (People v. Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10; People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137; People v. Owens, 148 N. Y. 648.) Section 592 of the Penal Code does not cover an ordinary examination of the affairs of a bank by a bank examiner. (People v. Molyneux, 40 N. Y. 118; Drake v. State, 144 N. Y. 414; People ex rel. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137.) The defendant was deeply prejudiced by the submission to the jury of the quarterly statement made to the banking department on the 27th day of September, 1893. (Code Crim. Pro. § 527.) The indictment was defective in failing to charge that it was presente d with intent to deceive the bank examiner “ with respect thereto.” (Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. 379.) It was error not to allow the defendant to show his knowledge that during the year 1893 all the banks of the city of Lockport were receiving on deposit and carrying as cash checks of private individuals. (Kerrains v. People, 60 N. Y. 221.)
Albner T. Hopkins and P. F. King for respondent.
The decision of the Appellate Division being unanimous, this court has no jurisdiction to review its decision. (Const. N. Y. art. 6, § 9; Harroun v. Brush El. L. Co., 152 N. Y. 212; People ex rel. v. Cullen, 151 N. Y. 54; People ex rel. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 417; Szuchy v. H. C. & I. Co., 150 N. Y. 220.) The evidence fully sustains the conviction. (L. 1892, ch. 689; People v. Rathbone, 145 N. Y. 434; Dempsey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 146 N. Y. 290; People ex rel. v. Common Council of Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503; Rowland v. Mayor, etc., 83 N. Y. 372; People ex rel. v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375; Penal Code, § 592; Szuchy v. H. C. & I. Co., 150 N. Y. 220; People v. Helmer, 85 Hun, 530; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; People v. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340; People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 144; Poole v. People, 80 N. Y. 645.) The examination of the Merchants’ Bank, it being a corporation, was clearly within both the letter and the spirit of section 592 of the Penal Code. (McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 601; Purdy v. People, 4 Hill, 397; People v. Lambier, 5 Den. 9; People ex rel. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 585; Penal Code, § 611.) Every question of fact was clearly and fairly submitted to the jury. (Szuchy v. H. C. & I. Co., 150 N. Y. 220.) The quarterly report was introduced in evidence and submitted to the jury without objection or exception. Ho question relative thereto can be considered by this court. (Const. N. Y. art. 6, § 9; Szuchy v. H. C. & I. Co., 150 N. Y. 220; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393; People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520; Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364; Abb. Tr. Brief, § 598; Bielschofsky v. People, 3 Hun, 40.) The words used in the indictment convey the same meaning as those used in section 592 of the Penal Code, and are, therefore, sufficient. (People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; Wharton’s Cr. Pr. & P. § 236; People v. Clements, 107 N. Y. 205; People v. Williams, 92 Hun, 354; 149 N. Y. 1; Code Crim. Pro. §§ 282-285, 684.)

Opinion:
Martin, J.
The jurisdiction of this court is limited to the review of questions of law only, and no unanimous decision of the Ajipellate Division that there is evidence supporting or tending to sustain a verdict not directed by the court can be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. (Const. art. 6, § 9; Szuchy v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 150 N. Y. 219; People ex rel. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 417; Harroun v. Brush Electric Light Co., 152 N. Y. 212; People v. Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10, 15.) Consequently no questions of fact, or questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, can be reviewed on this appeal. ,
The indictment was based upon the provisions of section 592 of the Penal Code, which, so far as material, provide that an officer of a corporation, who knowingly exhibits a false book to any public officer authorized by law to investigate its affairs, with intent to deceive such officer in respect thereto, is punishable by imprisonment not to exceed ten years. At the close of the testimony the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that it did not charge a crime. This motion was denied and the defendant excepted. He now contends that the indictment was defective in failing to allege that the tickler or cash book was exhibited by the defendant to the bank examiner with intent to deceive him in respect thereto. The indictment in effect charged that the defendant, as president and director of the Merchants' Bank of Lockport, at the time named, feloniously, willfully, wrongfully and knowingly presented, exposed and exhibited its cash book or tickler to B. S. W. Clark, a public officer duly authorized and commissioned to investigate the affairs of that bank, with intent to deceive such public officer, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. The only omission claimed is of the words "in respect thereto." While it may be that under the strict and technical rules of the common law this indictment might be regarded as defective, yet, under the liberal procedure established by our statutes we think it was sufficient. Under the present practice, an indictment is sufficient if the act or omission, charged as a crime, is plainly and concisely set forth with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment according to the right of the case, and no indictment is insufficient by reason of any imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant, upon the merits. Uor does any error or mistake therein render it invalid, unless it actually prejudices or tends to prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right. (Code Criminal Procedure, § 284, 285, 684.) The purpose of an indictment is to identify the charge against a defendant, so that his conviction or acquittal may inure to his subsequent protection, and to apprise him of the nature and character of the offense chained and of the facts which may be proved, so as to enable him to prepare his defense. When tested by these principles it is obvious that the indictment was sufficient, as there was no defect which affected any substantal right of the defendant. It fairly apprised him of the facts to be proved against him, and so clearly identified the crime charged that a judgment would protect him from a subsequent conviction. Hence, we are of the opinion that the defendant's exception to this ruling was not well taken.
The defendant's counsel also insists that the court erred in admitting in evidence the quarterly report of the Merchants' Bank, showing its condition on the nineteenth day of September, 1893, which was signed and verified by the defendant. It was proved upon his cross-examination, and was obviously admissible to contradict his testimony. As it was, however, received without objection or exception, it presents no question which can be reviewed upon this appeal.
On the trial the questions most seriously litigated were whether certain entries in the tickler or cash book were false to the knowledge of the defendant, and whether, with that knowledge, he exhibited it to the bank examiner. The evidence to establish these facts was to some extent circumstantial. In submitting the case to the jury, the learned trial judge, after charging that there was no direct evidence to show that the defendant exhibited this book to the bank examiner, and that he was in and about the bank and knew the purpose of the visit of the examiner, then added: "And, as the court at General Term had said, in this case, that was sufficient to satisfy the jury that there was an inspection or presentation of the books to the examiner." That part of the charge was excepted to by the defendant, and this exception presents the only serious question in the case. The possible effect of that portion of the charge was to convey the idea that the General Term had determined the precise question which was before the jury. It is manifest that this statement was improper, as the question whether the defendant had knowingly exhibited false books to the examiner was purely one of fact to be determined by the jury from the evidence before it, unprejudiced by any statement as to what another court might have said upon that subject. The obvious conse quence of that portion of the charge was to create a tendency on the part of the jury to rely upon what it may have understood to have been the decision of the General Term, rather than upon the evidence. While it may be that it had no such effect, still, as such a result may have been produced, it cannot be said that the error was harmless. Where a charge is erroneous the verdict must be set aside, unless it is apparent that the error did not and could not have affected the verdict. It is not for the defendant to show how lie was injured by it, but it rests with the prosecution to show that no possible injury could have arisen from the error. (Greene v. White, 37 N. Y. 405; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; People v. Corey, 148 N. Y. 476; People v. Strait, 154 N. Y. 165; People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355.) We are of the opinion that the defendant's exception to the charge was well taken, and as we cannot say that it could by no possibility have prejudiced the defendant, it follows that the judgment must be reversed and a now trial granted.