Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. GARY TWIGGS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2016-03-22
Citations: 445 N.J. Super. 23
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. GARY TWIGGS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: Before Judges REISNER, LEONE and WHIPPLE.
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 445
Pages: 23–48

Head Matter:
135 A.3d 981
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. GARY TWIGGS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted February 9, 2016
Decided March 22, 2016.
Before Judges REISNER, LEONE and WHIPPLE.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for appellant {Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
Cooper Levenson, P.A., attorneys for respondent (Steven E. Rosenfeld, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WHIPPLE, J.A.D.
The State appeals from an April 27, 2015 order dismissing an indictment charging defendant with conspiracy to commit robbery. The trial court dismissed the indictment because the State initiated its prosecution beyond the time permitted by the criminal statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6. Contrary to the State's argument, we hold that the statutory tolling provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6, for situations in which "the actor" is identified by means of DNA evidence, refers to the individual whose DNA is analyzed. It does not apply to a third party identified by that individual. Consequently, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record. On June 16, 2009, defendant met S.T. in a Wildwood Crest parking lot to purchase 150 tablets of prescription painkillers. As defendant and S.T. talked in the parking lot, a man wearing a mask approached, pointed a handgun at S.T. and defendant, and ordered them into defendant's vehicle. After defendant and S.T. entered the vehicle, the masked man demanded their money, cell phones, and the drugs that S.T. was about to sell to defendant. After the man left with the money, cell phones, and drugs, S.T. attempted to chase him on foot but was unable to apprehend the masked gunman.
S.T. reported the robbery of his money and cell phone to the Wildwood Crest Police Department (the Department), which initiated an investigation. Several officers went to the scene of the crime and found a mask and gloves, which S.T. identified as belonging to the gunman. The officers submitted the gloves and mask to the New Jersey State Police DNA Laboratory (the DNA Lab), which extracted and analyzed DNA samples from hair found on the articles found at the scene. No DNA matches were available in the DNA Lab's database at that time, however. The DNA Lab entered the DNA profile into the Combined DNA Information System (CODIS).
Meanwhile, S.T. and defendant submitted to multiple interviews at the Department. During these interviews, S.T. admitted to police that he and defendant had met for the purpose of conducting a drug sale. Defendant denied S.T.'s account of the incident, leading police to suspect that he was involved in the robbery. S.T. also told police that he personally believed defendant was involved in planning the robbery. After sending the mask and gloves to the DNA lab for inspection in July 2010, the Department did not receive any further evidence until 2014.
On July 2, 2014, the Department received information from the DNA Lab that it had matched DNA from the crime-scene with DNA taken from Dillon Tracy after he was arrested for a different offense in 2014. Tracy's DNA profile matched the profile of the hair on the mask found in 2009, which the DNA Lab had entered into CODIS. Upon receiving this information, the Department obtained a warrant to take a DNA sample from Tracy. Defendant's DNA was not found or matched with a CODIS sample at any point during this investigation.
When officers met with Tracy on July 19, 2014, he initially refused to discuss the 2009 robbery. However, on September 16, 2014, Tracy told police that he was the masked gunman who robbed defendant and S.T. Tracy also told police that defendant arranged the robbery so they could both share in the drugs that Tracy planned to steal. Tracy told police he stole defendant's money and cell phone to make defendant appear to be a victim, and that he threw his gun away after the robbery was completed. Defendant was arrested on September 17, 2014 and charged with conspiracy.
On December 2, 2014, the grand jury indicted defendant and Tracy. The indictment charged both defendant and Tracy with second-degree conspiracy under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 a to commit first-degree robbery in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 a. The indictment also charged Tracy with first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 a; unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 b; and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 a. Tracy subsequently pled guilty to each of these charges. On January 22, 2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the State's claim was barred by the general criminal statute of limitations. The trial court heard argument on the motion on April 14, 2015 and granted defendant's motion to dismiss because the State initiated its prosecution outside of the time permitted by the statute of limitations. The trial judge found that the prosecution was initiated more than five years after the June 16, 2009 incident because the grand jury proceeding did not start until December 2, 2014. The State appealed.
The State raises a single issue on appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED WAS INCORRECT AND THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE DEFENDANT'S INDICTMENT.
II.
We review the trial court's dismissal of the indictment de novo. A trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 80, 110 A.3d 841 (2015) (quoting Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)).
The sole issue on appeal is the trial court's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), the criminal statute of limitations. When interpreting statutes, our "overriding goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164, 923 A.2d 217 (2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005)). The best indicator of that intent is "the plain [statutory] language chosen by the Legislature." State v. Perry, 439 N.J.Super. 514, 523, 110 A.3d 122 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 306, 118 A.3d 348 (2015) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010)). We thus read the text of a statute in accordance with its ordinary meaning unless otherwise specified. Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (explaining that "words and phrases [in statutes] shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.").
In cases where a plain reading of the statute "leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources." D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A.2d 217 (citation omitted). If, however, the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we may turn to extrinsic evidence to determine the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Ibid. Turning to such extrinsic evidence is also necessary if a plain reading of a statute renders an absurd result at odds with the Legislature's intent. Ibid. (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492, 874 A.2d 1039); State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586, 95 A.3d 721 (2014) (citation omitted). Such extrinsic evidence includes "legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction." DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93, 874 A.2d 1039 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75, 861 A.2d 123 (2004)). Such evidence aids us in elucidating the Legislature's intent. We may not "rewrite a statute or add language that the Legislature omitted." State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488, 120 A.3d 170 (2015) (citations omitted).
Finally, in criminal cases where the statutory language is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is unhelpful in determining the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute, we apply the rule of lenity. We note that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed. D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A.2d 217 (citing State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17, 519 A.2d 322 (1987)). In so doing, where ambiguity in statutory language persists after reference to the statute's language and extrinsic evidence, we resolve the ambiguity "in favor of anyone subjected to [that] criminal statute." Ibid. (citations omitted).
III.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 provides the time limitations within which a prosecution for a crime must be commenced. The crime at issue here is conspiracy to commit robbery. Because the statute of limitations does not provide a separate limitations period for conspiracy crimes, the general limitations period applies. The State must thus commence a prosecution against a criminal defendant within five years of the date that each element of the crime has been completed. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1), (c). N.J.S.A. 2C:1- 6(c), however, provides an exception to the categorical bar against prosecution of such crimes after the passage of five years. Specifically, the statute provides that
[t]ime starts to run on the day after the offense is committed, except that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis, time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.
The State asserts that this exception applies here, because defendant's prosecution was the result of obtaining DNA evidence. The State argues that the exception tolled the commencement of the statute of limitations period. The State argues that the exception overrides the five-year limitations period. We disagree.
A.
We first read the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) to derive the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Perry, supra, 439 N.J.Super. at 523, 110 A.3d 122. The language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) supports defendant's reading of the statutory exception: that it only applies to persons whose DNA directly identifies them as criminal actors, and does not apply to those who are later named by those same criminal actors. First, the statutory language at issue specifically refers to the identification of "the actor." The term "actor" in this case refers only to an individual who committed a criminal offense, and who is "identifie[d] . by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). The natural and plain reading of this language is that the exception only applies to those criminal offenders who are directly identified by such evidence. See State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482, 950 A.2d 879 (2008) (explaining that we give statutes "their ordinary and commonsense meaning.") (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492, 874 A.2d 1039).
This reading is supported by other language in the statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) provides that the statute's time limitations do not begin to run "until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence." This language demonstrates that the Legislature intended for the exception to apply when DNA evidence could be compared against physical evidence to establish the identity of a criminal offender. In this case, there is no such physical evidence or DNA evidence establishing defendant's identity as a criminal offender; the only evidence that the State derived from the DNA evidence was Tracy's identity, and, subsequently, his confession that he and defendant conspired to commit robbery. There is no physical evidence implicating defendant against which to compare DNA evidence, and accordingly, the statute forecloses tolling the statute of limitations for a prosecution against defendant.
We note here that, had there been no DNA evidence in this ease, no exception to the statutory limitations period would apply. We cannot discern any legislative intent to relax the limitations period merely because a person identified by DNA evidence implicates a third party in a confession, when that third party's involvement is not itself supported by direct DNA evidence. To hold otherwise would be to override the entire limitations period for any party accused of a crime when any single defendant names another party in a confession. We thus reject the State's argument.
B.
Although the plain language of the statute supports defendant's interpretation of the statute, we also examine the extrinsic evidence in light of the State's argument that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous. When examining extrinsic evidence, we may look to several sources to clarify the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute, "including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction." DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93, 874 A.2d 1039 (quoting Faugno, supra, 182 N.J. at 75, 861 A.2d 123).
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 was first enacted in 1978. The exception to the statute of limitations pertinent to this appeal was first introduced in 2000; the exception was enacted by the Assembly and Senate in 2002. A. 2658, 209th Leg. (N.J.2002); S. 1516, 209th Leg.2d Sess. (N.J.2002). Both versions contained the same language now reflected in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), which amended the statute to read as follows:
[E]xcept that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis, time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.
[Ibid.]
This language, ultimately included in the statute, replaced other language introduced earlier in the amendment's life cycle. The earlier proposed language read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:l-6 or any other law to the contrary, if the identity of the person who commits a crime is unknown when the crime is committed and physical evidence is collected which can be tested for its DNA characteristics and used to identify the person who committed the crime, a prosecution for the crime may be commenced at any time.
[S. 1516, 209th Leg., 1st Sess. (2000).]
The most specific indication of the Legislature's intent in this case is the statement accompanying the amendment that the Legislature passed. The statement accompanying the earlier language provided that "[t]his bill would remove time limitations on the prosecution of crimes when the person who committed the crime is unknown at the time, but DNA evidence collected at the crime scene can be used to identify the person at a later date." Sponsors' Statement to S. 1516 (Sept. 14, 2000). The substitute version of the amendment, which was ultimately adopted, was accompanied by a new sponsors' statement which provided that the substituted amendment would "toll the applicable statute of limitations for the commission of a crime in certain cases until the State is in possession of DNA or fingerprint evidence taken from the suspect." Sponsors' Statement to S. 1516 (Jan. 3, 2002). No other amendment to the DNA evidence exception to the statute of limitations has since been proposed or enacted.
In using extrinsic evidence to interpret statutory language, our Supreme Court has cautioned that, although helpful, such evidence has limitations. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 499, 874 A.2d 1039 (citing Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 584-85, 118 A.2d 28 (1955)). Such evidence represents the will of only a few lawmakers, and may also be "contradictory, ambiguous, or otherwise without substantial probative value in determining legislative meaning." Ibid. (quoting Deaney, supra, 19 N.J. at 584-85, 118 A.2d 28). Accordingly, the court must exercise "considered judgment" when considering such evidence. Ibid.
In this case, we conclude that the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-6(c) supports the defendant's interpretation of the statute. Although there are competing versions of the legislative history, we focus on the 2001 sponsors' substituted statement, which accompanied the amendment adopted by both of our State's legislative bodies. The legislative intent in passing the bill, according to the substituted statement, was to "toll the applicable statute of limitations for the commission of a crime in certain eases until the State is in possession of DNA or fingerprint evidence taken from the suspect." Sponsors' Statement to S. 1516 (Jan. 3, 2002) (emphasis added). This language clearly demonstrates that the Legislature intended for the exception to apply when DNA evidence directly identifies a suspect, and not when DNA implicates another suspect, who in turn implicates a defendant. In this case, there was no evidence "taken" from defendant; the DNA evidence and physical evidence in this ease only identified Tracy as a criminal actor. The legislative intent in this case mirrors the meaning we gleaned from the plain text: the DNA evidence exception only applies when the DNA evidence can be compared against physical evidence that directly identifies a defendant as a criminal actor.
Although the language of the original sponsor's statement and the substituted statement changed before the ultimate enactment of the DNA exception, the substituted language does not defeat this reading. The original sponsors' statement was more specifical ly focused on the criminal defendant in a particular criminal case than the current language, noting that "[t]his bill would remove time limitations on the prosecution of crimes when the person who committed the crime is unknown at the time, but DNA evidence collected at the crime scene can be used to identify the person at a later date." Sponsors' Statement to S. 1516 (Sept. 14, 2000) (emphasis added). The language in the current statement, however, does not shift the focus of the statute away from the suspect; rather, the substituted language specifically notes the time at which the exception to the statute of limitations is triggered. See Sponsors' Statement to S. 1516 (Jan. 3, 2002) (noting that the exception only triggers when the State is "in possession of DNA or fingerprint evidence taken from the suspect."). We accordingly conclude that the legislative history supports the trial judge's reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c).
The State relies on State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 766 A.2d 1141 (2001), arguing that Rumblin's construction of the term "actor" in another section of the Criminal Code would provide a broad scope under which the DNA exception to the statute of limitations would operate.
We reject the State's argument. In Rumblin, our Supreme Court explained how provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (the No Early Release Act (NERA)) interacted with accomplice liability provisions in our criminal code. Rumblin, supra, 166 N.J. at 551, 766 A.2d 1141. The Court explained that the term "actor" was synonymous with the term "defendant" for purposes of NERA, which includes those who did not directly perpetrate criminal activity. Id. at 556, 766 A.2d 1141. The State's reliance on Rumblin, however, is misplaced because of the different contexts of the word "actor" in each statute. In NERA, the word "actor" is placed next to words in which accomplices could easily be understood to be actors; for example, NERA would apply to actors who "cause" death, or an actor who engages in criminal enterprise with others. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. As the Court noted in Rumblin, such a definition is plausible when "viewing the term in its proper syntax[.]" 166 N.J. at 556, 766 A.2d 1141.
The syntactical usage of the term "actor" is not the same in the contexts of NERA and N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). NERA subjected convicted criminal defendants to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier if a criminal "actor" caused death, serious bodily injury, used or threatened the use of a deadly weapon, or committed aggravated sexual assault. Rumblin, supra, 166 N.J. at 553, 766 A.2d 1141. The Rumblin Court's focus on the word "actor" led it to conclude that the terms "actor" and "defendant" were synonymous for NERA purposes only. Id. at 555-56, 766 A.2d 1141. The focus of the Court's inquiry was whether an "actor" could only be a principal in a crime, or if an accomplice to a crime could also be an "actor" for NERA purposes. Ibid. Such construction is sound given the syntactical use of the word "actor" in NERA; the term "actor" generally refers to all those involved in criminal activity in the NERA context.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) uses the term "actor" in a different context, both syntactically and lexicologically. In the context of the statute of limitations, the term "actor" is used directly in conjunction with phrases discussing the identification of that actor "by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis," or "by means of comparison to the physical evidence." The use of the phrase "actor" in this instance is more specific than the use of the term in NERA and Rumblin, supra. Rather than referring generally to those who perpetrate violent crime, an "actor" in this instance is a person who is directly identified by DNA evidence and physical evidence. Despite the construction in Rumblin, the two uses of the term "actor" are different enough to merit two different analyses because of the separate contexts in which the statutes operate. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument in this regard.
C.
Finally, although we need not reach the issue of the rule of lenity, we comment briefly on its application. The Supreme Court has provided that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed. D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A.2d 217 (citing Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 17, 519 A.2d 322). We apply standard canons of statutory interpretation when construing such statutes, and we resolve any ambiguity in a criminal statute "in favor of anyone subjected to [that] criminal statute." Ibid. (citations omitted). The rule of lenity only applies when the statutory text itself is ambiguous, and the use of extrinsic aids has not provided guidance. Ibid. Accordingly, it only applies when other canons of statutory interpretation fail to yield a clear result.
The rule of lenity would foreclose us from adopting the State's reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) if any ambiguity remained after analyzing the plain statutory text and available extrinsic evidence. The trial court's reading of the statute is the narrowest reading available because it strictly limits the use of DNA evidence to persons who the DNA evidence directly identifies; such a reading does not permit the State to initiate prosecutions against those who are not directly implicated in criminal activity by DNA evidence.
Affirmed.
In the context of this case, S.T. was a crime victim, and his identity is irrelevant to our decision.
We note an additional practical consideration which supports the logic of this statutory construction. The reliability of DNA evidence justifies tolling the statute of limitations for an actor whose DNA is later implicated as evidence of a crime. See State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 158-59, 699 A.2d 596 (1997) (explaining that DNA is generally reliable evidence that remains durable over an extended period of time). This rationale, however, does not apply with respect to a third party whom that criminal actor implicates by confession; a co-defendant's incriminating statements about a third party are not rendered significantly more reliable by DNA evidence of the co-defendant's guilt.
NERA has been amended since our Supreme Court announced its decision in State v. Rumblin, and the text no longer contains the term "actor." In amending the statute, the Legislature noted in its Statement that the purpose of the amendment was to "specifically enumerate those violent first and second degree crimes" to which NERA must be applied. Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee's Statement to A.B. No. 3201 (2001). Accordingly, we refer to the 2000 version of NERA when considering the context of the word "actor" for NERA purposes.