Case Name: Lucius G. Fisher vs. Stephen Cobb
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1834-04
Citations: 6 Vt. 622
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lucius G. Fisher vs. Stephen Cobb.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 622–628

Head Matter:
Lucius G. Fisher vs. Stephen Cobb.
Orleans,
April, 1834
Actual possession of personal properly is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain trespass against any person except the legal owner.
Whore the defendant, a sheriff’s deputy* with process, attaches property in the possession of the legal owner, as the property of another, and leaves it with the owner, who insists upon his right, but agrees to re-deliver the same to the officer; and while in this situation, the plaintiff, another sheriff’s deputy, with process against «he same debtor, attaches the same property, and carries it away; an“d while in the jtfaintiff’s possession the defendant seizes the property, and sells it upon his execution — Held, That the plaintiff was entitled to recovei the value in an action of trespass.
This was trespass for a horse — issue of fact closed to the court by consent.
It was admitted by the parties, that tlie horse in question belonged to one William Clark. — That the plaintiff and defendant were both deputies under the sheriff of Orleans, and that each bad, in April last, a legal writ of attachment against Alexander Willson, the former owner, by which they had attempted to attach and hold said horse as his property. The value of the horse was also admitted to be twelve dollars and fifty cents. The only additional evidence was the testimony of said William Clark, who testified, that previous to either of the attachments, he had purchased the horse of Willson, who lived in St^pstead, at the price of ten dollars, and had paid for it; and that when said attachments were attempted, he had the horse in possession at his house in Derby ; — that in April last, the defendant came to the witness, while at work in his sugar place, and inquired if witness was keeping said horse for Will-son, saying he had just before seen it; — that witness told him that he owned the horse, and should claim it as owner, having bought and paid for it; — that defendant said he should attach it as Willson’s, and accordingly made out and delivered to witness a copy of bis writ against Willson, with his return, certify ing the attachment in common form; — that defendant requested witness to receipt the horse, which Jhe, witness, refused to do; and defendant then requested witness to keep it for defendant two or three days, till he could provide some other place for keeping; — that witness thereupon told defendant he would not dispose of the horse, nor put it out of the way during that time ; but that if other attachments should be made, he could not prevent them; — that he-contracted no other or further responsibility to the defendant at that time; and the defendant went away; — that towards evening of the same day* the plaintiff came to attach the horse as Willson’s; — that witness notified him of his purchase — threatened to sue him if he persisted, and also informed him of the defendant’s attachment, -and what had passed between witness and defendant; — that plaintiff proceeded to attach — left a copy with wjtness as defendant had done, and took the horse away ; — that within two days after, defendant came after the horse, and learning what had happened, went and re-took the horse from the plaintiff; — that soon after this, witness received the horse of defendant, to keep and re-deliver on execution in that suit, and kept it, without further claim or interference from the plaintiff, till after judgment recovered, and execution issued, in the suit wherein defendant had made the attachment as aforesaidand then, on the requisition of defendant, witness returned said horse to defendant, who sold him on said execution ; — that in the mean time witness had sued the plaintiff in trespass for said horse, and recovered a judgment for ten dollars damages and his costs — insisting on his purchase from Willson as the ground of recovery; which judgment the plaintiff paid and satisfied after the sale of said horse by defendant as aforesaid.
The court decided that upon the admissions aforesaid, and the facts detailed in said testimony, the plaintiff was hot entitled to recover; and accordingly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. To which decision and judgment, the plaintiff excepted. Exceptions allowed, and the cause passed to- this court for further adjudication.
Mr Reclfield for plaintiff.
— The property being left by the defendant in the possession of the real owner, it cannot be said that Cobb had the custody of it. He had no writ against the owner — had not made himself liable to the owner by any interference whatever, and the person who owned the property stood upon bis right as owner, and absolutely refused to become t.he bailee of Cobb.
Clark being the owner of the property, Fisher was a trespasser by taking it; and being a trespasser, he acquired a right to hold the property against all except the owner; and by the' judgment against him he acquired full title to the same. An'd Cobb, in taking the property from Fisher, can only justify by virtue- of process against the owner, or as servant of the owner, which is not pretended.
ít is difficult to conceive how Fisher, by one taking, could have made himself twice liable to persons claiming in different rights; and Cobb’s right is derived from a source where no rights exist.
If the defendant, recovers, Fisher pays twice for the horse— once to the owner, for which he acquires title as an equivalent — once to Cobb, who was a mere stranger; or to the creditors of one, who had no interest in the property, and is himself without remedy.
Mr. Leslie, contra.
— It is contended that the act of Cobb, in the first instance, in the capacity of deputy sheriff created in him a lien as against Willson, the debtor, and all subsequent attaching creditors of Willson; — that Clark, agreeing or consenting that the property might remain in Iris possession, made him the bailee of Cobb, to a certain extent, and so much so that the property was in the custody of Cobb at the time Fisher made his attachment.
If the property was in the custody of the law by the act of Cobb, he had a right to re-take it from Fisher; and of course, had a right to follow up his attachment to a sale of the property on execution, which he did. Fisher being a mere stranger to Cobb, cannot bind him by the judgment between him and Clark, nor in any manner affect the lien first created.
If Fisher has any remedy, it is against Clarkv

Opinion:
The opinion of the court' was delivered by
Mattocks, J.
— The case shows that" defendant took thé horse from the possession of the plaintiff. Actual possession of personal property is sufficient to maintain trespass against any person but the legal owner, and according to some authorities, even if the possession is illegal — and according to all, if the possession is under an assertion or color of right. — 1 Chitty, 168. — 1 Swift, 53Í.
The plaintiff then, acting as an officer, and attaching the horse as the property of Willson, and taking if from the' possession of Clark into his own keeping, until the trespass complained of, is entitled' to recover against a stranger.
The next question is, whether the defendant was justified in taking the horse from the plaintiff by any previous act or doing of his. If the property had been Willson's, then the question would have been, whether it was necessary for the defendant,when he made the- attachment, to have removed the property from Clark's, in whose possession it was- found,' in order to perfect the lien as against the subsequent attachment made by the plaintiff — ¿-both parties being .deputy sheriffs — the same as if it had been attached and left in the possession of the debtor. But as the horse was not the property of Willson, the debtor, but of Clark, no right or lien was acquired by either attachment; and as the defendant, when he made the attachment, did not' take possession of the property, his attachment was a perfect' nullity — it was not everi a trespass. Clark asserted his claim to the property; and his adding that he would not put it out of the way, nor dispose of it, for two or three days,was not a relinquishment of his claim.- The plaintiff after-wards, by attaching and taking the horse away, was a trespasser, although under claim of right, and as such, was liable in law to Clark, the owner, for the value of the horse. — • Therefore, only by Clark, or by process of law against Clark,could the horse be lawfully taken from the plaintiff. It is not perceived that there was any manner of'right in-the defendant to take it from the plaintiff; and can it affect the case that the defendant, after the trespass, advertised'and sold the horse on" the execution against Willson,- and that, pendihg the advertisement of sale, at the request of the defendant, Clark kept the horse and re-delivered it at the sale ? It is not in the case that-Clark relinquished his claim to the property which had been' before asserted to both' plaintiff and defendant ; and on what principle can it, in law, be an extinguishment of his right and property in the horse — having given warning to all concerned of his ownership ? The suit of trespass in favor of Clark against the plaintiff, going on in- the mean time, and a recovery, and afterwards payment of the judgment by the plaintiff, seem to ' have no bearing in- the case other than as a public declaration by him that he persisted in his claim to the horse; and, if known to the defendant, might have been a further warning to him not to convert the horse by a sale. The recovery in that case was no rule of damages in this; but the value of the horse, and the ground of the plaintiff's claim, as before mentioned, was his liability to Clark. The payment of the judgment since does indeed place the equity of the case very strongly with the plaintiff, for now Clark's claim is extinguished; and by no possibility can the defendant be liable to him; and the plaintiff having paid for the property, it would be unjust that the defendant should retain the avails of it, or the creditor, for whom he acted; so that the effect of the plaintiff's recovery in this suit will be to leave all parties in statu quo, save the costs.
Judgment of the county court is reversed.