Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Annette Lee McADAMS and Travis Richard Harper, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-01-11
Citations: 559 So. 2d 601
Docket Number: Nos. 89-770, 89-785
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Annette Lee McADAMS and Travis Richard Harper, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: DANIEL, C.J., and GOSHORN, J„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 559
Pages: 601–603

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Annette Lee McADAMS and Travis Richard Harper, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 89-770, 89-785.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 11, 1990.
On Motion for Rehearing En Banc April 19, 1990.
Rehearing Denied April 23, 1990.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Dee R. Ball, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant/cross-appel-lee.
Richard S. Rhodes, Orlando, for appel-lees/ cross-appellants.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
The State appeals that portion of an order suppressing appellees' conversation recorded while they were in the back seat of a patrol car, and appellees appeal that portion of the order refusing to suppress statements given during the booking procedure prior to Miranda warnings. We reverse the order granting suppression of the taped conversation and affirm the order denying suppression of the booking information.
McAdams, Harper and a co-defendant were arrested as the result of an undercover narcotics investigation. Prior to receiving Miranda warnings they were asked, consistent with the routine booking procedure of the arresting agency, for their names, ages, current address and social security numbers. The officers also inquired about the location of a white automobile which undercover officers had ob served the day before the arrest. Although Harper refused to answer, Mc-Adams stated that it was at the address given as Harper's residence. After receiving Miranda warnings, appellees elected to make no statements. Appellees were then placed in the back of the patrol car where, in the presence of a wireless transmitter, they began to discuss six ounces of cocaine located in Harper's home. Based on this information, a search warrant was obtained for the Harper residence, and cocaine and marijuana were found. The white automobile was subsequently seized.
Generally, recorded conversations of defendants in the back seat of a police car do not violate defendant's statutory or constitutional rights because there can be no expectation of privacy in a police car. Brown v. State, 349 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078, 98 S.Ct. 1271, 55 L.Ed.2d 785 (1978); DiGuilio v. State, 451 So.2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), approved and remanded, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). Appellees rely on State v. Calhoun, 479 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), but Calhoun is distinguishable on its facts. In Calhoun, the defendant asked to speak to his brother in privacy after having been given his Miranda warnings. He and his brother were taken into an interview room and left unattended. There was a video camera hidden in the ceiling. In holding that the officers had fostered a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court suppressed the video tape. In the case at bar, the officers did nothing to foster an expectation of privacy and Calhoun is inapplicable.
Concerning the cross-appeal, basic identification data required for booking is not generally subject to Miranda. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2nd Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090, 96 S.Ct. 884, 47 L.Ed.2d 101 1976. We reject appellees' claim that since Harper's address was used in obtaining the search warrant the booking information was used in an investigative manner and therefore should be suppressed. While it is true that after the recorded conversation the address took on added significance, this does not mean that booking information otherwise appropriate should now be suppressed. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent police misconduct. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Therefore, we must look to the circumstances at the time of the inquiry to determine if Miranda warnings are required. Since the address had no particular significance at the time of the inquiry, Miranda warnings were not required.
In any event, an address is the type of information that would be readily available through independent sources or would inevitably be discovered once the recorded conversation was reviewed. See State v. McLaughlin, 454 So.2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED.
DANIEL, C.J., and GOSHORN, J" concur.