Case Name: George T. FLEMING, Appellant, v. BARNETT BANK OF EAST POLK COUNTY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-05-09
Citations: 490 So. 2d 126
Docket Number: No. 85-1116
Parties: George T. FLEMING, Appellant, v. BARNETT BANK OF EAST POLK COUNTY, Appellee.
Judges: RYDER, C.J., and GRIMES and HALL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 126–129

Head Matter:
George T. FLEMING, Appellant, v. BARNETT BANK OF EAST POLK COUNTY, Appellee.
No. 85-1116.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 9, 1986.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1986.
Gregory J. Orcutt and Brian P. Rush, of Anderson, Thorn, Smith & Orcutt, P.A., Tampa, for appellant.
Roy C. Summerlin and Debra L. Cline, of Summerlin & Connor, Winter Haven, for appellee.

Opinion:
SANDERLIN, Judge.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b), the court determined to consider en banc the effect of a prematurely-filed motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in light of this court's opinion in Johnson v. Mortgage Investors of Washington, 410 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), in which we held that such a motion constituted record activity.
In the instant matter, Barnett Bank of East Polk County filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution on November 9, 1984. There had been record activity up to February 10, 1984, making February 10, 1985, the critical date. At a hearing held after the expiration of one year the trial court dismissed the action. We hold that the mere fact that the hearing took place after the one-year period and no other pleading had been filed in the meantime did not breathe life into the motion such that it could be granted by the court.
The trial court concluded that it had the inherent authority to dismiss the action for lack of due diligence under Shalabey v. Memorial Hospital of the South Broward Hospital District, 253 So.2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). Inherent authority to dismiss an action for lack of due diligence no longer exists. See, American Salvage & Jobbing Co., Inc. v. Salomon, 367 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). There is an exception to the extent that it is authorized by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e). However, under that exception the parties are entitled to reasonable notice by the court of its proposed action. Here the trial court did not act on its own motion and the matter was heard upon the defendant's premature motion and notice. The concern which prompted our en banc hearing is the principle that record activity sufficient to preclude dismissal must be an affirmative act that is reasonably calculated to hasten the suit to judgment. Harris v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 378 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute which is premature does not fall within this category, it does not achieve the termination of the litigation and, for purposes of the rule, the premature motion is a nullity. We therefore recede from the statement in Johnson v. Mortgage Investors of Washington, supra, that a prematurely-filed motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution constitutes record activity. Accordingly, we reverse and direct that the case be reinstated.
RYDER, C.J., and GRIMES and HALL, JJ., concur.
DANAHY, J., concurs specially with opinion.
SCHOONOVER, J., concurs with DAN-AHY, J.
LEHAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
CAMPBELL, J., concurs with LEHAN, J.