Case Name: SUNNYVALE MARITIME CO., INC., Appellant, v. Elsa Delfina Montoya GOMEZ, as Widow and Personal Representative of Jose Luis Gomez-Duarte, deceased, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-01-31
Citations: 546 So. 2d 6
Docket Number: No. 87-866
Parties: SUNNYVALE MARITIME CO., INC., Appellant, v. Elsa Delfina Montoya GOMEZ, as Widow and Personal Representative of Jose Luis Gomez-Duarte, deceased, Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 546
Pages: 6–10

Head Matter:
SUNNYVALE MARITIME CO., INC., Appellant, v. Elsa Delfina Montoya GOMEZ, as Widow and Personal Representative of Jose Luis Gomez-Duarte, deceased, Appellee.
No. 87-866.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 31, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 1989.
Schreiber, Rodon Alvarez and Gerhart Schreiber, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Brett Rivkind, William Huggett, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment for the plaintiff in a negligence action brought under the Jones Act. Although the defendant challenges the propriety of the judgment on several grounds, in our view only one merits discussion. We affirm.
The defendant contends that the records of the Prince Lara Hospital, Puerto Cabel-lo, Venezuela (at which the plaintiff's decedent was first cared for and later, after his release and return, died) were not properly authenticated and were therefore erroneously admitted. This lack of proper authentication, says the defendant, arose from the plaintiff's non-compliance with the procedure for self-authentication of foreign documents set out in Section 90.902, Florida Statutes (1987), that is, the failure to show that final certification of the hospital records was made by one of the members of the diplomatic service enumerated in the statute.
In our view, the flaw in the defendant's argument lies in treating self-authentication as the exclusive method of authentication. Self-authentication is, instead, merely a streamlined alternative to the more tedious authentication procedure; while documents must be authenticated to be admitted, they need not be seZ/authenti-cated.
Section 90.901, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that the authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence "sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Since traditional methods of authentication (e.g., testimony or other extrinsic evidence) "may prove troublesome, time consuming, and expensive," McCormick on Evidence § 228, at 699 (3d ed.1984), Section 90.902 permits evidence to be "self-authenticated" when "the document itself discloses sufficient information to be admitted without further proof of its genuineness." C. Eh-rhardt, Florida Evidence § 902.1, at 585 (2d ed.1984). Accordingly, self-authentication is said to be an "exception" to the general requirement of authentication. 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 902.02 (2d ed.1988); C. Ehrhardt, supra § 902.1, at 585. See McCormick on Evidence § 228, at 699-700 (self-authentication is an "escape from authentication requirements").
Federal decisions interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902 (upon which the Florida rules are based) quite clearly hold that self-authentication is only one of several ways to authenticate documents. "The FRE offers generous opportunity to authenticate by presentation of sufficient evidence to support the authenticity of a document. Alternatively, if 902(3) is met the document is self-authenticating." United States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir.1982) (emphasis added). "Documentary evidence introduced in federal courts must be authenticated under the provisions of Rules 901 or 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir.1980) (emphasis added). See also First National Bank v. M/V Lightning Power, 851 F.2d 1543, 1548 (5th Cir.1988) (document was "neither self-authenticating nor authenticated by the testimony"); United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1494 (8th Cir.1987) (although document is not self-authenticating, it is admissible under other procedures for authentication); In re Bobby Boggs, Inc., 819 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir.1987); Ogden Environmental Services v. City of San Diego, 687 F.Supp. 1436, 1437 n. 1 (S.D.Cal.1988).
In the present case, the trial court ruled that the medical records were adequately authenticated by (a) the affidavit of the director (custodian) of the medical records of the hospital who testified that the 54 pages of hospital medical records were exact duplicates of the originals of the records which could not be released from the hospital; (b) the testimony of the medical director of the hospital who certified that the records were true and correct copies of the originals; and (c) the testimony of the marine investigator who had trav-elled to the hospital and obtained true and accurate copies of the original records that were at the hospital. This ruling should stand as there is competent evidence in the record to support it. Bury v. Marietta Dodge, 692 F.2d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir.1982). See United States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.1982).
Lastly, we note that the trial judge's admission of the medical records did not conclusively establish their authenticity. The Law Revision Council Note to Section 90.901 points out that the "admission into evidence of a matter merely indicates initial sufficiency for presentation to the trier of fact. Once the matter is in evidence the opposing party is free to challenge its genuineness. The court or the jury may find it to be not genuine." See also M. Graham, Handbook of Florida Evidence § 901.0, at 761 (1987) ("The ultimate decision as to whether a person, document, or item of real or demonstrative evidence is as purported is for the trier of fact."). Thus, the trial court's ruling that authenticity had been shown was necessarily reinforced by the jury's factual finding — implicit in its verdict for the plaintiff — that the documents were authentic. In our view, neither the jury's finding nor. the trial court's ruling should be disturbed.
Affirmed.
FERGUSON, J., concurs.
. Section 90.902, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part:
"Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required for:
"(3) An official foreign document, record, or entry that is:
"(a) Executed or attested to by a person in his official capacity authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation; and
"(b) Accompanied by final certification, as provided herein, of the genuineness of the signature and official position of:
"1. The executing person; or
"2. Any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the execution or attestation.
"The final certification may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. When the parties receive reasonable opportunity to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official foreign documents, the court may order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them in evidence by an attested summary with or without final certification."