Case Name: G. C. Goldman vs. J. M. Gillespie
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1891-01
Citations: 43 La. Ann. 83
Docket Number: NO. 10,703
Parties: G. C. Goldman vs. J. M. Gillespie.
Judges: Breaux, J., dissents.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 83–91

Head Matter:
NO. 10,703.
G. C. Goldman vs. J. M. Gillespie.
Claims to an oitiee, under conflicting commissions, will not bo considered and passed upon in an injunction proceeding, the sole object of which is to maintain the incumbent in possession provisionally until the pretensions of the. adverse claimant, who threatens to induct himself into office and thus oust the defacto oflicer, without legal intervention, are judicially determined.
Such injunction lies at the instance of a member of a board, where it appears that the adverse claimant may, otherwise than by a concurrent action with the other members of the board, induct himself extra judicially in part into office and to some extent oust the incumbent.
It lies also when it is a possibility that the members of the board, though they may actually repudiate the validity of the appointment under which the claimant shelters himself, may recognize his pretension and admit him as a member.
Young, J.. PPEAL from the Ninth District Court, Parish of Concordia.
Felix P. Poehé, Thos. P. Clinton and C. J. Boatner for Plaintiff and' Appellee:
1. An injunction will lie to protect a de facto officer in his possession against the interference of a claimant whose title is disputed, until the latter shall establish his title by the judicial proceeding provided by law. Guillotte vs. Poincy, 41 An. 333, and authorities therein cited.
2. An officer de facto is one who claims an office and is in possession of it, performing its duties under color of an election or appointment, although such an election or appointment be not valid. Wait’s Actions and Defences, Vol. V, p., 7, and authorities cited; Guillotte vs. Poincy, 41 An. 33.
3. One holding over after the expiration of his term of office, and publicly continuing to exercise its functions, is an officer de facto. Am. and Bug. Ency. of' Law, Vol. 5, p. 105; 28 Kans. 286, Morton vs. Lee; 71 Maine 207, Woodside vs. Wagg; 27 Minn. 292, Carli vs. Rheuer.
A general law on the subject of removal of officers is controlled by a subsequent particular law as to the removal of certain officers provided in the particular law. 39 An. 513, State vs. Labatut, and authorities therein quoted. C. C. Art. 23..
5. An act of the Legislature declaring that an officer may he removed on the request of certain persons, means that he shall not he removed without such request. Serg. and ftawlo, Vol. 5, p. 115, State vs. Sherman; Wait’s Actions and Defences, Vol. 5, p. 12.
6. An injunction proceeding to restrain a party from assuming an office is a personal action and must he brought at the domicil of the defendant. O. I\ Art. 162; Stats vs. IL It. Pfceclc, 33 An. 910.
Walter H. Rogers for Defendant and Appellant:
A removal from office is a destitution of office.
A removal creates an absolute vacancy.
Proceedings against a person contemplating a direction of a performance of official duty must be instituted before tlxc court in whoso jurisdiction the duty is to be performed. 33 An. 912.
The Governor has the power to fill vacancies caused by removal. 33 An. 116.
In the exercise of tlio power given to him by law, of removing public officers for certain causes, the Governor is the sole jxidge of the existence of such causes and his action of removal is final. 88 An. 117.
Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 1 Oranche 170.
One duly appointed and commissioned to fill a vacancy becomes the legal incumbent and entitled to discharge the duties of the office. The former incumbent and not the appointee must resort to action at law to determine the right to office. 52 Ala. 66.
One appointed to fill a vacancy caused by removal by the Governor, is entitled to take possession of the office. 11 An. 1097.
A person removed l>y the Governor under his power of removal can not ho a de facto officer.

Opinion:
The opinion of the conrt was delivered by
Bermudez, C. J.
This is exclusively an injunction proceeding.
The fundamental averments upon which the plaintiff relies are simply:
1. That he is a duly commissioned, qualified and inducted member of the Board of Levee Commissioners for the Fifth Louisiana Levee District, and, as such, is in possession of the office, discharging the functions thereof and receiving the perquisites thereto attached; in other words, is a de facto officer.
2. That the defendant, who has been illegally commissioned by the Executive to succeed the petitioner as having been removed, unless restrained by injunction, will soon attempt to assume the functions of said office and claim the perquisites of the same in the place •and to the exclusion of petitioner.
As a corollary, it is charged that, being the incumbent, petitioner-is entitled to a writ of injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with him in his possession of said office and in the discharge of his duties, until after proper proceedings the disputed right to the office shall have been judicially determined.
The prayer is in accord with the averments.
The injunction sought was allowed.
The petition was followed by a supplemental petition. Issue was joined by exceptions and by a general denial, amplified by averments of previous vacancy occasioned by a removal, which denied to the plaintiff the right to aver -himself an encumbent.
The exceptions were overruled, and the injunction issued in limine was allowed to continue until the determination of the pretensions, of the defendant in a proper proceeding.
From the judgments thus rendered the present appeal was taken.
The exceptions were properly overruled. The petition disclosed a cause of action, and the other matters thereby set up appertained to another future suit, and not to that before the court.
The litigants asserted conflicting titles to the office, raising questions involving the power of the G overnor to remove and to appoint a successor.
Whatever the appearances and contentions of the parties were below and here on that subject, it is clear that under the conservative ruling in the case of Guillotte vs. Poincy, 41 An. 333, which is. fully applicable to this ease, as far as the law is concerned, touching the quid judicandum, the respective title of the contestants to the office of commissioner of the Fifth Levee District can not now be. determined.
The facts in that ease are not parallel to those in the present one.
There, Guillotte was an incumbent, and feared that the board of which he was a member would aid Poincy in entering upon the discharge of his duties.
Here, Goldman is also an incumbent, but he does not allege any-fear that the board will recognize Gillespie.
On the contrary, he proves that the board does not admit the validity of the appointment of the defendant.
Practically, the injunction in the Poincy case against the board was a superfluity, as it issued' against Poincy, who could not, while* so enjoined, claim any recognition.
Here, it could not at all issue against the board owing to the stand taken by the commissioners.
For the same reason that it was useless in the Poincy case it would have been unnecessary here.
It is this, that although the board may be unwilling to recognize Gillespie, he may induct himself into office by discharging, otherwise than concurrently with the other members of the board, some of the duties which are, under the law creating the board, susceptible of being performed by a commissioner alone in the district of his residence.
By Section 17 of the act creating the board (Act 44 of 1886, p. 68) the care and police of levees devolves of right on the resident commissioner, who is specially authorized in cases of danger or urgent necessity to order out all, or as many as may be necessary, of the road hands of the parish, and cause them to work on the levees, provision being made for their payment.
It is clear therefore that, unless restrained, the defendant may thus assume the functions of levee commissioner; and were the board to change its attitude and to consider him as entitled to recognition, it might admit him to act as one of the board to the exclusion of the. plaintiff, who is an incumbent.
It may be well to add that in applications for injunctions in cases of this description judges should require the strongest essential showing, for it is a grave thing in itself for an incumbent to resist the appointment of a successor to him by an Executive; otherwise, upon mere routine allegation, every commission, issued by the Governor, even in proper cases, could easily be for awhile nullified.
Judgment affirmed.
Breaux, J., dissents.