Case Name: CRAIG v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-10-16
Citations: 151 S.W. 804
Docket Number: 
Parties: CRAIG v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 151
Pages: 804–805

Head Matter:
CRAIG v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 16, 1912.
Rehearing Denied Dee. 18, 1912.)
Criminal Law (§ 1166%*) — Appeai>—Prej-udice — Rulings on Jurors. ,
At the commencement of the trial of accused for perjury, his counsel asked the jurors whether they heard comments of the court, before the case was called for trial, with reference to perjury while sentencing another person convicted of a different crime. A number of the jurors, having answered in the affirmative, also stated, in answer tp a question of the district attorney, that the court’s remarks would have, no effect on them in giving defendant a fair trial. The court, overruled defendant’s objection. to the jurors, and he was required, after exhausting his peremptory challenges, to accept three of them as members of the jury. Held that, no prejudice having been shown, such facts were insufficient to constitute reversible error.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3125; Dec. Dig. §, 1166%.*]
Appeal from District Court, Hunt County; R. L. Porter, Judge.
Dabney Craig was convicted of perjury, and lie appeals.
Affirmed.
S. D. Stinson and Evans & Carpenter, all of Greenville, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
Appellant was convicted of perjury and given the lowest penalty — two years in the penitentiary.
This is a companion case to that of Moore v. State, 144 S. W. 598. That case and this all grew out of the same transaction, at the same time, between the same parties. Practically the only difference between the two is that one is a charge against Moore and the other against appellant. Every question that is raised, or attempted to be raised, in this case, was substantially raised, or attempted to be raised, in said Moore Case, supra, except one which will hereafter be noticed. Therefore, instead of taking up the several questions and again discussing or deciding them, we refer to the said Moore Case, supra.
The only question that is raised in this case which was not raised in the Moore Case is this: By appellant's bill No. 1 it is shown that, after both parties announced ready and they were engaged in questioning the jurors of the panel for the week, the appellant asked them this question: "Were you present in court on the day that the court was sentencing a young man, who had been convicted of breaking a house to steal whisky, this week, and heard the court make the following remarks:. 'Young men very often engage in violations of law, and then go before the grand jury and swear falsely about it. When a man has no regard for his honor and oath, he is mighty near a lost proposition, and that worries me to see young man after young man go before the grand jury and perjure himself.' " To which question the jurors, 18 in number, whose names are given, answered that they were present and remembered hearing said remarks of the court. The district attorney then asked them: "Would said remarks of the court affect you in passing on this case, or. can you give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, as if you had never heard said remarks?" To which question each of the jurors answered that such remarks would not affect him, and that they would give the defendant a fair trial. The defendant objected to the qualification of each of these jurors on account of the above and moved the court to excuse them from the panel and not require him to exhaust his peremptory challenges. The court overruled this, and the defendant then challenged peremptorily only three of these jurors, leaving him but seven peremptory challenges remaining, which he was compelled to and did exhaust on talesmen summoned and tendered him on said panel, and that there was thus left on said panel three of the said eighteen, naming them, who were impaneled and served as jurors in the trial of the case. The court qualified this bill by stating this: "The remarks complained of in the bill are fragments of a talk I gave a young man 2 or 3 days before this case' was called, in passing sentence upon him for breaking a house to steal whisky. The talk I made the young man had no reference whatever to this case or any other case on the docket, and was made for the purpose of admonishing him, when he served out his time, to-shun bad habits and company, such as gambling and whisky drinking, and to try to make a useful and honorable citizen.- Each of the jurors on the panel stated very positively that said remarks would have no effect or bearing whatever upon them in passing upon the guilt or innocence of this defendant, and that they could and would try the case as though they had not heard the remarks. X felt satisfied at the time that said jurors would not be influenced by said remarks, and I still believe that they were not. Understanding the matter as I do, I cannot see how counsel could seriously insist upon this bill."
This bill does not show, or attempt to show, that appellant was in any way injured by having to take as jurors the said three who heard said remarks of the court. Clearly they are not shown to in any way be disqualified to serve, but, on the contrary, so far as this bill shows, they were each qualified to serve. The court did not err in refusing to sustain appellant's objections to. said jurors.
The evidence in every way clearly and unquestionably showed the guilt of appellant, and the charge of the court correctly and aptly submits every question necessary or proper to be submitted under the law and evidence.
The judgment will be affirmed.