Case Name: Katrine SHQUTAJ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-02-21
Citations: 556 F. App'x 15
Docket Number: No. 12-3541
Parties: Katrine SHQUTAJ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, DENNIS JACOBS and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 556
Pages: 15–17

Head Matter:
Katrine SHQUTAJ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 12-3541.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 21, 2014.
Katrine Shqutaj, Sterling Heights, MI, pro se, for Petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; Matthew B. George, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, DENNIS JACOBS and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Katrine Shqutaj, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of an August 15, 2012, order of the BIA, denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Katrine Shqutaj, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 15, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, and may only file one such motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Shqutaj's 2012 motion to reopen was un timely and number-barred, as the BIA issued a final order of removal in her case in 2002 and she previously filed a motion to reopen in 2003. Shqutaj contends, however, that she established changed circumstances excusing the time and number bars, including her daughter's grant of asylum in 2011 and worsening conditions in Albania for Catholics and members of her political party. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Shqutaj's new evidence did not materially affect her eligibility for asylum because it did not rebut the adverse credibility determination the immigration judge ("IJ") made in her asylum hearing in 2002. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam); see also Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir.2007). We have held that a prior adverse credibility determination does not necessarily preclude a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution when the new claim rests on a factual predicate "independent of the testimony that the IJ found not to be credible." See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2006). Shqutaj's 2012 motion to reopen, however, primarily argued that she faced persecution on account of her anticommunist political views, which were the basis for her original asylum claim, and emphasized that her daughter had been granted asylum on the same basis as Shqutaj's prior application, without addressing how her new evidence rebutted the IJ's credibility finding regarding this claim. While Shqutaj argues that the IJ's credibility finding was in error, this issue is not before us, as the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision in 2002 and Shqutaj did not petition this court for review of that decision. See id. at 153 ("[A] motion to reopen does not provide a collateral route by which the alien may challenge the validity of the original credibility determination.").
To the extent that Shqutaj's motion raised a new claim based on her Catholic religion, the BIA did not err in finding that Shqutaj did not submit sufficient evidence in support of this claim. While her motion asserted that she faced persecution as a Catholic, Shqutaj did not submit an affidavit or any documentary evidence establishing that she is Catholic and that she subjectively fears persecution in Albania on this basis. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 584, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984) (counsel's "unsupported assertions" in briefing do not constitute evidence); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant must present credible evidence that she "subjectively fears persecution and establish that [her] fear is objectively reasonable." (citation omitted)). We therefore decline to reach the agency's finding that Shqutaj's evidence did not show a material change in the treatment of Catholics in Albania, as she failed to establish, as a threshold matter, that she had a subjective fear of future persecution on account of her religion. See Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178; INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).