Case Name: Duncan McArthur v. Sarah Porter, widow, and others
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1823-12
Citations: 1 Ohio 99
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Duncan McArthur v. Sarah Porter, widow, and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 1
Pages: 99–115

Head Matter:
*Duncan McArthur v. Sarah Porter, widow, and others.
Where the vendor of a tract of land, having a lien for the purchase money, obtains a judgment, upon which the land is sold for a sum sufficient to pay the whole amount, the lien does not pass to the purchaser of the land, so as to enable him to set it up against the widow’s estate of dower, but is extinguished by the sale on execution.
The substance of tbe case made in tbe bill and answers, is this : In May, 1797, George Porter, then being unmarried, purchased of Nicholas Talliaferro, part of an entry for land standing in the name of Talliaferro, and gave his bond for the purchase money, reciting that it was given for the purchase money of the land, and specifying that the land was to be held as a security until the bond was taken up. Porter obtained an assignment of the entry and warrant from Talliaferro, had a survey executed, and in August, 1797, obtained a patent in his own name. In April, 1798, he married the defendant, Sarah. In September, 1801, George Porter deceased, and administration upon his estate was granted to Peter Porter. The bond given to Talliaferro not being paid, suit was brought on it against the administrator in the general court of the territory, and at October term, 1802, judgment was rendered and execution awarded. The writ of execution commanded the sheriff to make the debt, charges, and costs of the goods and chattels remaining in the hands of the administrator, and for want of such goods and chattels, to make the same of the lands and tenements. Upon this writ, the sheriff returned that there were no goods, and a levy upon four hundred and fifty-two acres of land, condemned to be sold by a jury of twelve men, and not sold for want of bidders. There were, in fact, no goods. Upon a subsequent execution, the land was sold by the sheriff to the complainant for the sum of $1,521. The money was paid to the .sheriff, and on the 19th December, 1803, the sheriff made the complainant a deed. The judgment was satisfied, and the balance of the money paid over to the administrator, and the complainant obtained possession of the land.
The defendant, Sarah, prosecuted her writ of dower against ■complainant, and recovered judgment for one-third of the prem* ises, and for damages at the rate of thirty-five dollars per year from September, 1802. The bill prayed a perpetual injunction, upon the ground that the bond for the purchase money, under which it was sold upon execution, attached as an equitable lien upon it, which was paramount to the widow’s dower, so that the sale by the sheriff divested her right in equity.
*The bill also claimed that the complainant ought to be considered in equity as the holder of the bond of Talliaferro and the lien connected with it, and that the widow could set up no claim for dower until such lien was discharged; and that after so much of the land was sold as would discharge the lien, she should be endowed of the remainder only.
And it claimed further, that the widow ought only to be endowed of the value of the land and of the improvements, as they were at the death of her husband, not as they were when her recovery was had.
And if the court sustained the recovery of dower, it claimed of Talliaferro, who was made a defendant, that he should refund of the amount received pro rata, and asked a decree to that effect.
The cause was argued at great length by Scott and Grimke for the complainant, and by Brush and Ewing for the defendants.
The points discussed were:
1. Whether, under the territorial law of 1802, the lands of an intestate were subject to be sold on execution upon a judgment against the administrator alone, the heir not being a party?
2. Whether Talliaferro’s bond attached as a lien, in preference-to the widow’s right of dower?
3. Whether the territorial courts have power, as courts of law,, to set up and enforce such lien, by subjecting the widow’s right of dower to the discharge of the lien or purchase money, and what proceeding should have been had for that purpose? But as the-majority of the court have placed the decision of the cause upon grounds not discussed in the arguments, it is deemed unnecessary to report them, especially as they are fully noticed and considered in the dissenting opinion of Judge Burnet.

Opinion:
By the Court :
The view taken of this cause by a majority of the judges, renders it unnecessary to decide upon the validity of the sheriff's sale — the existence of the equitable lien relied upon — or the power of the territorial courts, as courts of law merely, to enforce such equitable lien. Admitting every one of these points to be decided as the complainant contends for, still he has presented no case that entitles him to the relief sought.
George Porter, the deceased, acquired, by his patent, an estate of inheritance in the lands in question. The defendant,- Sarah, by her marriage with George Porter, acquired the right of being endowed in these lands, if she survived her husband. Upon his death, *this right invested her with a complete, perfect, legal estate. If an equitable lien existod upon the lands for purchase money, it belonged to Talliaferro, and to no one else. As to all the world beside, her right was clear and unquestionable at-law. At the sheriff's sale the complainant did not purchase any right or interest that belonged to Talliaferro. He purchased the estate of which George Porter died seized, and nothing more. George Porter held this estate subject to his wife's'claim for dower. In his lifetime, he could not, by any act of his own, discharge the-estate of this claim. The sheriff could sell nothing more than what-George Porter himself could have sold. The land, therefore, was sold by the sheriff and purchased by the complainant subject to this charge of dower. The proseeutiou of this bill, and the arguments in support of it, seem to involve this admission. If the complainant acquired the widow's dower by the purchase at sheriff's sale, it would have availed him as a defense to the action at law. This suit would not be necessary. Where nothing but a legal right was sold, how could he acquire an interest to be set up and established in equity ? The land was sold as assets in thm hands of the administrator, for the payment of the debt due of the-purchase money. It sold for a sum sufficient, and the proceeds were applied in discharge of that debt. By this payment, the lien for purchase money, whatever its character or effect might be, became extinct. It never passed from Talliaferro, but perished in*his hands.
Had the estate of Porter, which was assets in the hands of his administrator, proved insufficient to pay the debt, it would them have been necessary for Talliaferro to have enforced his lien against the widow's dower estate. This could only be done by making the widow a party. Could she have been legally divested of the freehold vested in her by the death of her husband, upon the mere suggestion of an equitable lien, of which she might bo> totally ignorant, without giving her a day in court to defend her right or redeem her land ? Such a principle would be most arbitrary and unjust; it is only by the application of such a principle •that the complainant's claim can be sustained.
It may be asked how the territorial courts, having no chancery jurisdiction, could have proceeded against the widow? It may be answered, that if they could not proceed at all, the consequence would be rather that the widow should hold her estate than that she should lose it, without hearing or judgment. But if everything that was assets in the hands of the administrator had been ^exhausted and the debt not satisfied, a proper process might have been devised to subject the widow's dower, determining, in the first place, that it was liable, and in the next place, •directing how it should be sold. A scire facias setting forth, the whole matter, and calling upon the widow to show cause why her dower estate should not be subjected, might have been a proper course. Such a proceeding would have carried with it some semblance of justice, which is not the character of the doctrine contended for by the complainant.
Adopt this doctrine, and what is the consequence? The equitable lien is a secret circumstance known only to the creditor and debtor — other persons'have no opportunity to obtain a knowl•edge of it. It does not appear upon the records of the court, or in the registry of deeds, nor in the terms of sale. The bidders never hear of it. They bid for the estate, subject to the dower incumbrance, and offer a price accordingly. If it be afterward discovered that the judgment creditor held a secret equitable lien, the purchaser may claim it as his own, and call upon a court of -equity to set it up for him, in destruction of the widow's right— thus acquiring, through the aid of a court of chancery, a valuable interest in the estate, which was not contemplated at the time of purchase, and for which he paid not one cent of consideration.
Such, in the opinion of the court, is the claim of the complainant. He seeks — without the payment of a cent of money, or the performance of a single beneficial act to the estate by way of consideration, under pretense of an equitable lien, which, if it ever existed, he never owned, and which was long since extinguished— to wrest from the widow a valuable legal estate, vested in her by the death of her husband, in absolute right, without hor ever being made a party to the proceedings that thus annihilates her" rights. An attempt of this kind ought not to receive the countenance, much less the aid of a court of chancery.
It is the opinion of a majority of the court, that as the complainant purchased the estate in question, subject to the widow's-dower, her recovery leaves him in full possession of all that ho purchased: As he has lost nothing, he can claim nothing of Talliaferro or of others. His bill must be dismissed, with costs.