Case Name: Donald Elliot SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee; Louis Albert SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1977-02-16
Citations: 547 S.W.2d 6
Docket Number: Nos. 51370, 51371
Parties: Donald Elliot SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. Louis Albert SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 547
Pages: 6–18

Head Matter:
Donald Elliot SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. Louis Albert SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Nos. 51370, 51371.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 16, 1977.
Rehearings Denied March 9, 1977.
Polk Shelton, Austin, for Donald Elliot Smith.
Laird Palmer, Austin, for Louis Albert Smith.
Richard A. Fielder, Dist. Atty., Lockhart, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
These are appeals from convictions under the former Penal Code for robbery by firearms. Appellants were tried jointly. The jury assessed each appellant's punishment at ninety-nine years' imprisonment.
The appellants' first ground of error asserts that their confessions were improperly admitted into evidence. Appellants contend that their confessions were shown to be involuntary and that the State failed to rebut sufficiently this showing as required by our decisions in Sherman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 532 S.W.2d 634, and Farr v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 519 S.W.2d 876.
We agree with this contention insofar as it relates to the admission of Louis Albert Smith's confession. We hold, however, that Donald Elliot Smith's confession was properly admitted into evidence.
LOUIS ALBERT SMITH'S CASE
Louis Albert Smith, in the company of his attorney, surrendered to the F.B.I. in New Orleans on May 29,1973. After being charged with robbery he was placed in the New Orleans House of Detention for confinement. He signed written statements confessing to the robbery for F.B.I. agents P. M. King and B. S. Thomas on June 5 and June 6, 1973.
Louis Smith testified that prior to meeting with the F.B.I. agents and giving the first statement he was taken upstairs in the House of Detention and beaten and threatened by New Orleans police, who told him he would be returned to Texas and receive worse treatment if he did not sign a statement confessing to the Texas robbery. During the meeting on June 5, at which he signed the first statement, the F.B.I. agents presented him with the prepared statement and promised him he would receive a probated federal sentence in New Orleans if he signed it, and that he would remain in federal custody instead of being returned to Texas. Smith testified he thought the meeting with the F.B.I. and the prepared F.B.I. statement were a continuation of what he had been told by the New Orleans police during his previous beatings.
After signing the first statement he was returned to his cell, and then late that night or about 3:00 a. m. the next morning he was taken back upstairs by the local police and beaten and threatened again because, according to Smith, the first statement he had signed was the wrong statement. He met again with the F.B.I. agents on June 6 and signed the second statement confessing to the robbery and, additionally, to a rape committed during the robbery. Smith also testified that he signed the statement only because he was beaten by the New Orleans police and was threatened by them with further beatings if he would not sign.
Agent King, on being called as a witness for the State, testified that he and Thomas interviewed Louis Smith at the New Orleans House of Detention on June 5 and 6, 1973. He testified that during the June 5 interview Smith stated that he wanted to get the matter cleared up, that he signed a waiver of rights form, and that physically he appeared normal. After giving and signing the June 5 confession, according to King, Smith was told by the agents that they did not believe it in its entirety because the rape was not admitted. Smith allegedly replied, "All right, I'll admit the rape but I'll talk to you tomorrow and give you a statement tomorrow." The June 5 interview was then terminated. On June 6, King testified, Smith "came voluntarily, read his [waiver of rights] form, signed it, and proceeded to give us the story."
On cross-examination King stated that he had no knowledge of whether Louis Smith was coerced, beaten, or threatened by law enforcement officers before the interviews in an attempt to induce him to sign any statements.
Agent Thomas testified that he and King interviewed Louis Smith at the New Orleans House of Detention on June 5 and 6. He corroborated King's testimony that on June 5 Smith signed the waiver of rights form and said he wanted to clear the record and get the matter straightened out, and that after taking the June 5 statement the agents indicated they did not believe it entirely, prompting Smith's reply, "Well, if you don't believe me completely, come back tomorrow and I'll give you a statement to set the record straight." He testified the June 6 statement was taken after Smith signed another waiver of rights form, and that Smith said he was making the statement on the advice of his lawyer and because he wanted to get the matter resolved and wanted the truth to come out. On cross-examination Thomas testified that he had no knowledge of what was said to Smith or done to Smith while confined in the New Orleans House of Detention, and that he did not know whether any threats were made or any effort made to abuse or coerce Smith into giving a confession. No New Orleans officers testified.
This record demonstrates that the admission of Louis Smith's confession falls directly within the rule that required reversal in Farr v. State, and Sherman v. State, supra, in which it was stated:
"It has long been the law of this State that whenever the testimony of the accused as to alleged coercive acts is undisputed, then as a matter of law, the confession is inadmissible. [Citations omitted.]" Farr, at 880.
"Neither of the officers who testified at the hearing denied or could deny either assertion because there was no showing that either was present when the statements were allegedly made.1 Cochran, who could have denied the assertions, inexplicably failed to testify. Therefore, under any standard of the State's burden of proof, the trial court abused its discretion in overruling appellant's motion to suppress because appellant's allegations of coercion were not contradicted.2
"1 Cf. Farr v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 519 S.W.2d 876, 880 n. 4: 'Had the police officers testified and denied any coercion or someone present at this incident denied any use of force, thus contradicting appellant's testimony, the trial judge as trier of fact could have determined the confession to be voluntary.' (Emphasis added)
"2 It should be understood that if the State had presented a reasonable explanation of Cochran's failure to testify, such as his death or their inability to locate him, the trial court would have been free to disbelieve appellant's testimony. When the State neither placed Cochran on the stand nor explained his absence, the obvious inference is that he did not testify because he could not deny appellant's allegations. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 523, 19 L.Ed.2d 634 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). No such inference could be made, however, if there were an explanation of the absence of the witness." Sherman, at 636.
Louis Smith's contention must be sustained because his allegations of coercion were not rebutted by the State. His conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
DONALD ELLIOT SMITH'S CASE
Donald Elliot Smith was arrested on the afternoon of May 23, 1973, near Slidell, Louisiana, in connection with a Mississippi robbery. F.B.I. agent Thomas observed appellant at the scene of the arrest. He was taken to a local jail for the night, and the next day was returned to the vicinity of his arrest to search for hidden money from the Mississippi robbery. On the afternoon of that day, the 24th, appellant approached F.B.I. agent Thomas, who was accompanying appellant and local police officers on the search, and orally confessed to the Texas robbery. The next day Thomas took a detailed oral confession to the Texas robbery from the appellant. Later that day he was driven from Slidell to Jackson, Mississippi, where on the 26th he met with a Texas Ranger and two deputy sheriffs from Caldwell County who took a written confession. It was this confession that was introduced against him at trial and is now challenged as being the result of beatings and threats.
Donald Smith testified to the following mistreatment. On May 23 after his arrest he was beaten by local Louisiana officers in the car on the way to the jail. During the night of May 23 — 24 he was beaten at the jail. At 3:00 a. m. on May 24 he was transferred to another jail and beaten. During the search for the money on May 24, according to appellant's testimony, he was beaten some more. He also testified that no F.B.I. agent was present during this search. On May 25 he was again taken on a search for the money and again beaten, this time in the presence of the F.B.I. agent, who offered to protect him if he would answer questions. He testified, "I gave him [Agent Thomas] a statement to stop them [the Louisiana officers] from killing me." He also testified that he refused to sign this statement. After being taken to Jackson, Mississippi, appellant gave the Texas peace officers a statement after they told him, according to the appellant, "You'll never have to come to Texas no more. All we need this information for is to close our records out," and "We know all of this anyway, we know what you did anyway, because you've already told us what you did. We just need this, something to close our records out."
The State, in its effort to establish the voluntariness of the confession, called the three Texas officers who went to Jackson and F.B.I. agent Thomas who was present during some of the events in Louisiana. No Louisiana officers were called.
In direct conflict with appellant's denial of his presence on May 24, agent Thomas stated he accompanied the expedition on its search for the money throughout the day. Late that afternoon, according to Thomas, appellant "called me over and indicated that he wanted to talk to me alone." He further testified:
"I remember Donald Smith telling me that he felt that he was in a lot of trouble because of the Mississippi bank robbery and that he wanted to help himself — he couldn't find the money, he had misplaced it — and to help himself get out of this trouble, to show that he was in good faith, that he would tell me about some other things that he had done. When he told me this I told him that he was not required to do that, and I orally advised him, you know, of his pertinent legal rights, as per the F.B.I. policy.
"Q. And what did he tell you?
"A. Donald Smith told me initially about several local armed robberies that he had committed in and around New Orleans, and then he told me that he had robbed a bank in Lockhart, Texas, along with a friend of his named Louis Smith."
According to Thomas, appellant's first oral confession to the Texas robbery was at ap pellant's invitation and on appellant's initiative.
After verifying that there had been a bank robbery in Lockhart, Thomas interviewed appellant again on May 25 and took a detailed statement from him about the Texas robbery. He testified that at this-interview appellant again seemed eager to talk. Contradicting appellant's claim that he refused to sign this statement, Thomas testified that it was never presented to appellant to sign, and that it was first typed out from his notes after he returned to his office.
Thomas also testified that although he did not examine appellant for evidence of physical abuse, his physical appearance was the same on the 24th and 25th as it was at his arrest on the 23rd, except that after the first day he was dressed in jail clothes.
With respect to the meeting with the Texas officers in Jackson, Mississippi, the State produced testimony from officers Davis, Brown and Gallat. During the initial warnings to appellant in Jackson, according to Davis, "I also remembered telling him, 'Now, have you been made any threats or promises in regards to this?', and he stated that he had not . . . " Brown gave the following testimony on cross-examination:
"Q. Was he eager to talk to you?
"A. Seemed to be.
"Q. Really wanted to tell you about it?
"A. Well, I'd say he talked very voluntarily.
"Q. Very voluntarily?
"A. (No reply)
"Q. You've testified that he was very cooperative and wanted to talk to you.
"A. Yes, sir."
On direct examination Gallat denied that there was any evidence at all that indicated to him that the statement was not voluntary. On cross-examination he gave the following testimony:
"Q. And you have no knowledge, do you, of anything that anyone, any law enforcement officer, might have said or done to Donald Elliot Smith that might have forced or induced or coerced him into making this statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. If anyone did anything like that, you don't know anything about it?
"A. I don't know anything about it, only what happened the day we were there.
"Q. And nothing happened then?
"A. And nothing happened that day, no.
"Q. Did he seem to be co-operative with you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did he seem to be eager to talk to you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Really wanted to talk to you, didn't he?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Matter of fact, he wanted to tell you everything about the case?
"A. Yes, sir."
The testimony of agent Thomas sufficiently contradicts Donald Smith's claims of coercion and mistreatment in Louisiana. The last alleged beating of the appellant outside of Thomas' presence occurred at 3:00 a. m. on the 24th. The confession, however, was not given until the 26th.
Thomas' testimony that he observed the appellant on May 24 contradicted the appellant's testimony that no F.B.I. agent was present on that day. He denied appellant's alleged beatings and other coercive acts and statements during the day on May 24 and May 25 when Thomas was present. Thomas also contradicted the appellant's testimony that he refused to sign a statement. According to the agent, the statement was never presented to the appellant. Furthermore, Thomas stated that the appellant was eager to talk about the bank robbery and initiated the conversation in regard to this subject.
Further support for the conclusion that appellant's confession was not involuntary can be drawn from the evidence elicited from the Texas officers. Their testimony is sufficient to contradict appellant's allega tions that promises were made to him in Jackson.
In Farr v. State, supra, we stated:
"It is well settled that the 'totality of the circumstances' is to be examined to determine if a confession is voluntary. E. g. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); Akridge v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 928 (1973). In the case at bar, there was 'no break in the stream of events' from the initial coercion to the giving of the confession. In fact, the contrary is shown. Hernandez was present to continue the coercive influence at the time the confession was taken. From these facts, we are unable to conclude that the confession was voluntarily made as a matter of law."
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the taking of Donald Smith's confession both shows a significant break in the stream of events and supports our conclusion that it was voluntary. His first ground of error is overruled.
We now address the remaining grounds of error in the appeal of Donald Smith.
The second ground of error asserts that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for mistrial made after the introduction of an extraneous offense into evidence. Appellant is complaining of the fact that his confession contained a statement that he had smoked some "grass."
Appellant's brief, however, does not direct us to the portion of the record where an objection was made to the introduction of this part of the confession. He has failed to preserve error for review. See Prine v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 509 S.W.2d 617.
Appellant's next ground of error complains of the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial made after the State introduced evidence of a rape which occurred during the robbery. He also urges that the prosecutor's reference to this rape during jury argument was improper, and claims the State's action violated the court's order granting a motion in limine as to such matters.
This contention is without merit. Normally, evidence of an extraneous offense is not admissible unless it meets the requirements developed by this Court in Albrecht v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 97. Such requirements were met in the case at bar. Furthermore, objection to the evidence did not assert violation of the motion in limine nor did it complain of denial of an opportunity to prepare a defense to the rape charge.
The rape occurred during the commission of the bank robbery and was perpetrated by a party to the offense charged in the indictment. See, Waffer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 659. It was not error to admit evidence of the rape, and, once admitted, it was not error for the prosecutor to comment on such testimony during his jury argument. The third ground of error is overruled.
The fourth ground of error alleges that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for discovery of all reports and other materials relating to the alleged rape. Appellant states that this motion was denied because the court ruled prior to trial that the State would not be allowed to introduce any evidence of the rape at trial. Appellant asserts that he was denied a fair trial once evidence of the rape was admitted.
The motion for discovery requested:
"The name and address of any and all Doctors, pathologists, chemists or technicians, who took part in any examination of the body of J_W_V_ or of any particles, organs, or fluids removed therefrom."
The prosecutor informed the court that this information could not be inspected until it arrived from Washington. He also stated that it would not arrive until the rape case was set for trial.
Initially, we observe that the appellant, in his brief, complains that he was not allowed discovery of reports and all other materials relating to the alleged rape. The motion for discovery, however, did not request this information. The pre-trial motion does not contain the same request as that urged on appeal.
The record also indicates that the State was not in possession of any reports, materials, or names of persons conducting the examination at the time the motion for discovery was made.
The appellant has failed to establish that the reports and other material relating to the rape existed at the time the motion for discovery was entered. See, Spaulding v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 919. We overrule the fourth ground of error.
Ground of error number five contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce hearsay testimony of Joe Davis that he had been told by one Joseph Dutrey that Donald Smith had given Dutrey some of the money taken in the robbery. The portion of the record cited by the appellant to substantiate this contention, however, contains the testimony of F.B.I. agent Thomas. We have, nevertheless, examined the page of the record complained of in regard to appellant's claim. No hearsay testimony is contained thereon. Furthermore, the objection was sustained and no further relief was requested. The fifth ground of error is overruled.
Appellant's final argument urges that the trial court committed error by allowing the prosecutor to violate the "best evidence rule." Two State witnesses entered testimony concerning the serial numbers on the money taken during the bank robbery. Appellant claims that the "best evidence rule" was violated because the money was not introduced by the State.
We do not agree. One State witness, an employee of the bank, stated that she personally knew the serial numbers on the currency taken during the robbery. She then stated the numbers on the stolen money. Another witness for the State then testified in regard to the serial numbers on the currency recovered by the authorities. The numbers on the recovered currency matched those on the money taken in the robbery.
Both of these witnesses had first-hand knowledge of the serial numbers on the currency. It was not necessary for the State to introduce the actual money taken during the offense.
The "best evidence rule" pertains to writings or documents. One commentator has stated:
"The specific context in which it is generally agreed that best evidence principle is applicable today should be definitely stated and its limits clearly defined. The rule is: in proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are material, the original writing must be produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent." McCormick on Evidence, Sec. 230, p. 560 (2nd Ed. 1972).
The rule requiring the "best evidence" has no applicability to the circumstances of the case at bar. The final ground of error is overruled.
The judgment in Cause No. 51,371 (Louis Albert Smith) is reversed and the cause is remanded.
The judgment in Cause No. 51,370 (Donald Elliot Smith) is affirmed.