Case Name: SMITH v. JONES
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-08-04
Citations: 382 Mich. 176
Docket Number: Calendar No. 5, Docket No. 51,752
Parties: SMITH v. JONES.
Judges: T. E. Brennan, C. J., and Dethmers, J., concurred with. Kelly, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 382
Pages: 176–209

Head Matter:
SMITH v. JONES.
Decision of the Court.
1. Automobiles — Mitigation of Damages — Exemplary Damages— Joint Tort-Eeasors.
Judgment for defendants in actions by husband and wife against operator and owner of car which injured the' wifé when ear was driven against poreh where she was sitting with her children is reversed per T. E. Brennan, C. J., and Dethmers, Kelly, T. M. Kavanagh, and Adams, JJ., for improper instruction as to mitigation of damages; per T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., additionally, for refusal to allow jury to consider question as to whether defendant owner’s actions amounted to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct on his part as a joint tort-feasor with the driver and ' for refusal to charge the jury as to exemplary damages; and per Black, J., for refusal to submit to jury issue as to whether both defendants were joint tort-feasors according to common-law standards.
References for Points in Headnotes
Decisions of the Court.
[1] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§-598, 599.' 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 200-202,-205. ■.
Separate Opinions.
[2] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545.
[3] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 598.
[4] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 200-202, 205.
L5, 6, 8] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 579.
[7] 39 Am Jur, New Trial §§ 26-29.
[9] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 236, 244.
[10] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 12.
[11] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 487-..
[12,13,16] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 487, 598.
Separate Opinion.
T. E. Brennan, G. J., and Dethmers and Kelly, JJ.
2. Appeal and Error — Saving Question for Review — Motion for New Trial.
A motion for new trial is not necessary to preserve for Teview alleged errors ruled on by the trial judge.
3. Automobiles —• Negligence — Owner Liability — Gross Negligence— Instructions to Jury.
Trial court was correct in refusing to instruct jury as to gross negligence and exemplary damages in action founded on owner liability statute since statute which malees owner liable for negligence of one driving automobile with his consent does not impute driver’s gross negligence to owner (CLS 1961, §857.401).
4. Damages — Personal Injuries — Mitigation.
A plaintiff in a personal injury action is under a duty to mitigate personal injury damages by obtaining proper medieal or surgical treatment.
5. Same — Instructions—Personal Injury — Mitigation.
Instruction to jury which included statement that plaintiff’s physieian in his deposition had recommended surgery for plaintiff was erroneous since it presented a factual issue as to Xilaintiff’s duty to mitigate her damages by obtaining medical treatment, an issue not presented by the evidence.
6. Trial — Instructions—Evidence.
An instruction to a jury assuming the existence of evidence not presented in the case is erroneous and it is impossible to determine on review the effect of such an instruction on the minds of the jury.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[14, 15] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 524, 572, 599, 674, 675.
[17] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 564.
[18, 19] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 243, 244, 249-251.
[20] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages § 263.
[21] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 243, 249.
| 22] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages § 237.
[23] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages § 251.
[24] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 244, 246.
[25] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages § 270.
[26] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 994-1006.
[27] 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages §§ 345, 361.
[28] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 599.
7. New Trial — Error.—Different Result.
A new trial is justified if error committed is such that the result might well have been different if the error had not been committed.
8. Damages — Instructions — Personal Injury — Previous Condition.
Instructions to jury in personal injury action that they could find no damages for injured plaintiff if they found that injuries of plaintiff were related to an earlier condition were erroneous where no evidence of lasting effects of the previous condition had been presented.
9. Same — Exemplary Damages — Automobiles — Negligence — Personal Injury.
Exemplary damages have been allowed in varied fact situations in this State but have never been allowed in a claim for personal injuries suffered in an automobile eollision.
10. Automobiles — Negligence—Guest Passenger — Common Law— Statutes.
The legislature has extensively provided for rules of the road for automobiles because the common law developed before the automobile; thus, in automobile accident cases, except for guest passenger actions, the Supreme Court has abided by the legislative enactments and rules in determining questions of negligence instead of requiring the trial court to first determine if there were negligence and then the amount or hind of negligence.
11. Same — Gross Negligence — Guest Passenger — Exemplary Damages' — Recovery.
Gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct are referred to by the legislature only in the guest passenger act and this provision was not for the purpose of giving an injured guest an added right to exemplary damages but was intended to limit recovery by the guest passenger to situations where there was proof of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct (CLS 1961, §£57.401).
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ.
See headnot.es 2, 4-8.
12. Automobiles — Statutes — Negligence — Owner's Liability — Gross Negligence — Imputed Negligence.
Statute imposing liability upon the owner of an automobile for the negligence of one driving an automobile with the owner’s consent does not impute driver’s gross negligence to the owner (CLS 1961, §857.401).
13. Same — Statutes—Guest Passenger — Gross Negligence.
State statute imposes civil liability on the owner of a motor vehicle which causes injury while being negligently driven by another only where the operation is with the owner’s consent and in the ease of guest passengers, only if the injury was caused by gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of the vehicle (CLS 1961, § 857.401).
14. Same — Owner’s Control — Joint Tort-Peasor with Driver.
An owner’s stipulation that a driver could use the owner’s vehicle only when accompanied by the owner allows a jury to conclude that the owner had the right of control of the vehicle at all times and that he was a joint tort-feasor with the driver upon the occurrence of an accident (CLS 1961, §857.401).
15. Same — Eight op Control — Liability por Negligent Operation —Owner’s Duty.
Light of control of a motor vehicle rather than actual exercise of control determines owner’s liability for negligent operation of an automobile and the fact that an owner refrained from directing or encouraging reckless operation of his automobile does not change liability, for it is the owner’s duty to exercise reasonable care to control conduct of third persons using his property for the protection of others where he knows of, or as a reasonable man should know of, the necessity of doing so (CLS 1961, §857.401).
16. Same — Construction op Statutes — Guest Passenger — Gross Negligence.
The guest passenger statute reference to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct is a test as to whether there was wilful and wanton disregard for public safety m the operation of a motor vehicle; thus, where an automobile in which the owner was riding crashes into a porch of a house, a jury could find wilful and wanton misconduct and disregard for the safety of the public if a guest passenger was .involved; likewise, such conduct may be found by the jury to be wilful and wanton with regard to the occupants of the porch (CLS 1961, §857.401).
17. Same- — Negligence—Concerted Action — Joint Tort-Peasor— Guest Passenger Act.
Injuries suffered by plaintiff, when an automobile operated under the supervision and presence of its owner crashed into t]ie porch on which plaintiff was seated, could be found by a jury to be the result of concerted action of the driver and owner of the vehicle, and both parties could be held liable as joint tort-feasors for all acts caused by the negligent driving, for the misconduct was no different in causal relation to the injuries of plaintiff than it would be under the guest passenger act (CLS 1961, §257.401).
18. Damages — Exemplary Damages — Injuries to Feelings — Malice — Recklessness.
Damages for injury to the feelings of a person injured are recoverable in addition to damages to person, property, or reputation, where there is malice or wilful or wanton misconduct, carelessness, or negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others.
19. Same — Exemplary Damages — Injuries to Feelings — Gross Negligence.
Amount of damages recoverable for injured feelings, which includes shame, mental anxiety, insulted honor, suffering, and indignation consequent on the wrong, may be increased by the vindictive feelings, or degree of malice, recklessness, gross carelessness, or negligence of defendant.
20. Same — Actual Damages' — Exemplary Damages — Instructions.
An increase in damages dependent upon conduct of defendant must be considered as actual damages although usually spoken of as exemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages; however, the amount to be recovered as exemplary damages must rest in the fair and deliberate judgment and discretion of the jury acting upon their sense of justice in view of the circumstances and as aided by instructions from the court which tend to prevent fanciful damages or those so remote as not fairly resulting from the injury.
21. Same — Exemplary Damages — Injuries to Feelings — Physical Injury — Limitation.
Exemplary damages may be awarded m a proper case for injury to the feelings of plaintiff, but the right of recovery is restricted to the person who has received the physical injury.
22. Same — Exemplary Damages — Punishment'—Recovery.
Exemplary damages are not allowed in order to punish defendant, but the right to recover such damages arises out of the outrageous nature of defendant’s acts.
23. Same — Exemplary Damages — Intent to Injure — Negligence.
Exemplary damages may be awarded despite defendant’s lack of intent to do injury to a specific person, where the act done, from its nature, must be expected to result in mischief or where the negligence is so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others.
24. Same — Exemplary Damages — Injuries—Bight to Becovery— Violation op Law.
Plaintiff may recover damages for both physical and mental injury suffered when defendants ran an automobile into the porch upon which plaintiff was seated, where defendants had deliberately flaunted the law by driving while drinking and driving in a reckless manner.
25. Same — Exemplary Damages — Pleading—Complaint.
Exemplary damages do not have to be specially pleaded; thus, where the complaint avers the gross negligence and wanton misconduct of defendants and that plaintiff suffered personal injuries, both physical and mental, which caused past and future pain and suffering, the complaint is sufficient to award exemplary damages.
26. Automobiles — Evidence—Personal Injury — Jury.
Testimony by a mother that she was sitting on the porch with her two small children when a car ran into the porch, that blood was running down her leg and that she thought one of the children was under the car held, testimony sufficient for a jury to find that the mother suffered both physical and mental injury.
27. Damages — -Exemplary Damages — Automobiles—Negligence—■ Appeal and Error — Gross Negligence — Jury Question.
Trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury as to exemplary damages and in refusing to alloio the jury to consider whether the action of the owner of an automobile in loaning his vehicle to. another, with the stipulation that it could only be used in the presence of the owner, amounted to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct by the owner when the driver, accompanied by the owner, crashed into plaintiff’s porch and negligently injured plaintiff.
Separate Opinion.
Black, J.
28. Automobiles — Appeal and Error — Negligence—Gross Negligence — Common Law — Joint Tort-Eeasors — Jury Question.
Trial judge erred in refusing to allow a jury to consider whether the action of an owner of an automobile in loaning his vehicle to another, with the stipulation that it could only be used in the presence of the owner, rendered both the driver and the owner joint tort-feasors according to common-law standards, when the driver accompanied by the owner crashed into plaintiffs’ porch and negligently injured plaintiff wife.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 3, Quinn, P. J., and Fitzgerald and Holbrook, JJ., affirming Kent, Vander Wal (John H.), J.
Submitted November 12, 1968.
(Calendar No. 5, Docket No. 51,752.)
Decided August 4, 1969.
6 Mich App 92, reversed and remanded.
Complaint by Ollie Mae Smith and Ollie Z. Smith, her husband, against Louis Jones and Heriberto Miranda, for personal injuries and medical expenses caused by automobile driven by Jones and owned by Miranda. Verdicts and judgments for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed to Court of Appeals.
Affirmed. Plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Marcus, McCroskey, Libner, Beamon, Williams & Dilley, for plaintiffs.
Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan (Edward D. Wells, of counsel), for defendant Heriberto Miranda.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
Plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith was injured on July 11, 1963, when an automobile owned by defendant Heriberto Miranda, and driven by named defendant Lonis Jones, struck the front porch of plaintiffs' residence where Ollie Mae Smith had been seated, causing a piece of wood to strike her on the leg.
Plaintiffs filed complaint against both Miranda and Jones seeking damages for injuries, pain and suffering, impairment of earning capacity, and the medical expense for care and treatment of Ollie Mae incurred by her husband, Ollie Z. Smith. Jones was never served with process.
A jury returned verdicts against defendant, Miranda, awarding Ollie Mae Smith $2,500, and her husband, Ollie Z. Smith, $719.85 for expense incurred in the care and treatment of his wife.
Judgments were entered on the verdicts and the trial court file discloses payments thereof to the Kent county clerk, who is holding same in escrow pending final determination of the case.
Plantiffs did not file a motion for new trial and appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, stated (p 94):
"Plaintiffs appeal and assert a multitude of- errors, some of which would clearly require reversal if the jury verdicts had not been in plaintiffs'- favor. However, plaintiffs recovered and they made no claim below nor do they claim here that the verdicts were inadequate or against the weight of the evidence. No motion for new trial on the basis of inadequacy was made in the trial court. Since the errors complained of would only be prejudicial with respect to the amount of the verdicts, we believe Davis v. Jermstad (1957), 350 Mich 439, is disposi-tive of this appeal and we decline further comment on the errors asserted by plaintiffs."
Plaintiffs sought in the Court of Appeals and are presently seeking a decision reversing the trial court's instruction on damages. Davis v. Jermstad, supra, is not "dispositive of this appeal." In Davis. we held that (p 444) "the charge as given to the jury carefully and fully covered the material issues in the case."
In Bunda v. Hardwick (1965), 376 Mich 640, 672, we held that a motion for new trial was not necessary to preserve for appellate review alleged errors ruled upon by the trial judge.
We will consider in this appeal two claimed instructional errors, both of which were extensively discussed and argued in the "Proceedings In Chambers" by plaintiffs and defendant Miranda, namely:
(1) Was error committed by the trial court's refusal to permit the jury to consider the gross negligence of defendant Miranda and an award of exemplary damages to plaintiffs; and
(2) Did the trial court err in permitting the jury to consider and determine issues upon which no evidence was submitted.
1.
Plaintiffs call attention that:
"Both the unserved defendant, Jones, and Miranda were charged with wanton misconduct. The charge against Jones was based upon his manner of operating the Miranda vehicle immediately prior to and at the time of this collision. The charge against Miranda was based upon his knowingly permitting an intoxicated person to operate his automobile."
Plaintiffs analyze our decisions of the past by stating that "at first blush, it might appear" that our decisions before 1948 would sustain the trial court's refusal to. permit the jury to consider exemplary damages, but that our decisions subsequent to 1948 establish the Court's error.
The Peyton v. Delnay and Karney v. Upton Cases, upon which plaintiffs rely, involved actions under the guest portion of the statute and not under the ownership liability provisions involved in this appeal.
In the Peyton Case, defendant claimed that if the driver was guilty of gross negligence, then under our Wiecsoreh and Geib decisions the owner would not be liable under CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2101), holding that only ordinary negligence would be imputed to the owner.
.This Court, in rejecting plaintiff's claim, and explaining the difference between the Wiecsoreh and Geib Cases and the Peyton Case, said (p 248):
"Appellants rely for a contrary view upon Wieczorek v. Merskin, 308 Mich 145; and Geib v. Slater, 320 Mich 316. Neither was a case involving suit by a guest passenger. Neither held that where the operator (driving with the owner's consent) was found guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct that this acted to relieve the owner of liability."
That the Karney v. Upton decision did not overrule' Wieczorek or Geib is evidenced by the following from that decision (p' 265) :
"It may be noted that the recent decision of this Court in Peyton v. Delnay, 348 Mich 238, is squarely in point. See, also, Wieczorek v. Merskin, 308 Mich 145."
. Under our decisions of the past, which we are reaffirming in the present appeal, we hold that the trial court did not commit error in refusing to instruct on gross negligence and exemplary damages.
2.
We next consider the court's instructions regarding plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith's duty to minimize her damages by obtaining proper medical or surgical treatment. That such a duty exists is well established.
A review of plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith's efforts to obtain such treatment discloses that within one hour after defendant's car struck the porch a neighbor drove her to the Grand Rapids Butterworth Hospital Emergency Department, where X-rays were taken which disclosed no broken bones in the leg; that two weeks later because of continuous pain she sought aid from Dr. Jones, of Grand Rapids, who prescribed the use of an elastic bandage to wrap the leg, some pills, and instructions to keep off the leg as much as possible and keep it elevated; that on August 23, 1963, she went from her home in Grand Rapids to the office of Dr. Lauretti, in Muskegon, who diagnosed her complaint as being a thrombophlebitis of the left leg, because either the nerves of the leg were somewhat inflamed or the diameter of the vein was smaller than ordinary; that because Dr. Lauretti felt physiotherapy was necessary, she went to a Mr. Beam, a physiotherapist in Grand Rapids, 19 times between September 4, 1963 and October 16, 1963, where whirlpool treatments and massage were administered; that Dr. Lauretti again examined plaintiff on October 18 and November 19, 1963, and on January 2, 1964; that her next visit to a doctor was on April 2, 1965, to a Dr. Johnston; that Dr. Johnston, on Angnst 23, 1965, operated and tied off a vein in plaintiff's leg.
Plaintiff was examined as a witness at the trial and on direct examination related her visits to Dr. Lauretti. Plaintiff's cross-examination was confined to a few questions in regard to a knee injury she received in 1961, and a swollen leg resulting from medical treatment in 1958. Nothing was said by plaintiff on direct examination that even implied that Dr. Lauretti had recommended surgery, and the only question about Dr. Lauretti which defendant asked her on cross-examination was whether her attorney told her "to see Dr. Lauretti in the fall of 1963 so you made two or three trips over there" to Muskegon.
In the opening statement to the jury, defense counsel stated:
"It is our claim and our theory that she knew she needed the operation as of January, 1964, and if it had been done at that time she would have been completely cured at least within a couple of months."
An extended discussion and argument between counsel took place in the judge's chambers previous to instructing the jury. It was plaintiffs' counsel's contention that there was no testimony that Dr. Lauretti ever advised plaintiff, or her counsel, that surgery was necessary.
The court read aloud to counsel from Dr. Lau-retti's deposition as follows:
"Q. Does it respond readily to conservative treatment?
"A. If it doesn't — sometimes it does. But most often it doesn't. And if it doesn't then you have to think of other things.
"Q. Such as what?
"A. Surgery."
and then asked defendant's counsel,
"Do you claim that that [surgery] was-conveyed to her?"
Defendant's counsel answered:
' "No, but I claim the law is, if she feels, if the jury finds she failed to procure necessary treatment for whatever reason, if she failed to act as a reasonably prudent person, failed to procure medical treatment and the jury so finds, she cannot recover."
The court specifically charged the jury:
"In his deposition, the doctor from Muskegon [Dr. Lauretti] then recommended surgery. Whether that was communicated to the plaintiff or not is part of that deposition that was read to you."
The record sustains plaintiffs' contention that:
"Upon examination of the record, it is evident that there was no reference at all made to any knowledge on the part of Mrs. Smith that she should have sur7 gery, nor of any opinion being expressed by Dr. Lauretti that she should have had surgery prior to the actual date of surgery. The most that is found in the record is a statement in Dr. Lauretti's deposition that was read into evidence at the trial, wherein he said upon cross-examination by Mr. Souter [defendant's attorney] : •
" 'Q. So that the next recommendation at that point would normally be surgery?
'"A. Yes.'
"This is not a statement by Dr. Lauretti that, at the time he last saw Mrs. Smith in January of 1964, he recommended surgery. It is merely an answer to Mr. Souter's question that ordinarily at the point to which Mrs. Smith's case had progressed, he would recommend surgery. The trial record is totally devoid of any indication that Dr. Lauretti ever made any recommendation of surgery, or, in fact, that Mrs. Smith ever had any idea that surgery might be required prior to the initial examination by Dr. William L, Johnston."
" We do not agree with defendant that "The jury might infer that the doctor had recommended surgery to plaintiff and she did not want it," nor do we agree with defendant's conclusion that: "Even if there were no evidence at all on the point, which is strenuously denied, then an intelligent jury would not make an erroneous finding on the point anyway."
Hospital records were introduced disclosing that five years before the accident here involved, plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith was hospitalized with chest pains of pleuritic nature and that on discharge (July 8, 1958) the summary sheet stated: "Final diagnosis atypical pneumonia. Thrombophlebitis." Further, that on June 12, 1961, plaintiff again came to the hospital complaining of her left knee which had. been injured two weeks earlier in an automobile accident. In this regard plaintiff testified her left knee hit the dashboard of the car in which she was riding at the time of that accident.
The only medical testimony was given by Dr. Lauretti and Dr. Johnston.
The questions asked Dr. Lauretti on cross-examination in regard to either of the above mentioned hospital recorded incidents were confined to the following :
"Q. Would the fact that she had had, assuming that there had been a diagnosis of, a diagnosis of thrombophlebitis in 1958, would this be significant to you at all?
"A. I don't know that it would, because an accident the way she described, causing pain and swelling, at least I would think along the lines of an aggravation.
"Q. You mean that there had been a condition that this may have aggravated?
"A. Yes."
On direct examination, Dr. Johnston, after stating he had reviewed the above mentioned hospital records, and that those records disclosed there was no further finding of any thrombophlebitis after 1958, was asked whether he attached any significance to the 1958 thrombophlebitis with respect to the present case. He answered:
"Well, what I found at surgery certainly could have initiated with her initial injury. I have no way of evaluating what she had in 1958 but the fact that she went from 1958 until 1963 without any swelling, pain, cramps or any other diagnosis in the innumerable hospitalizations and innumerable clinic visits is pretty conclusive that this process she had in 1958 had subsided completely. It must have been a localized process, it did not ascend up her leg or give her enough scarring to produce this picture."
On cross-examination of Dr. Johnston, the following questions were asked and answers given:
"Q. Well, assuming she had the phlebitis that the hospital records show in 1958, do you mean that this would have completely cleared or disappeared?
• "A. Yes.
' "Q. Do you feel that 1958 phlebitis was not significant then?
"A. I don't think it has any relationship to this [case]
The court in its instructions to the jury in regard to defendant's claim, said:
"It is the claim of the defendant that what injuries Mrs. Smith complained of were not caused by this piece of wood coming in contact with her leg.
"It is the further claim of the defendant that she had a thrombus condition, thrombophlebitis condition back in 1958; that she was in an automobile accident in 1961 and that her thrombosis or thrombophlebitis was not the direct result of any negligence on the part of either Mr. Jones or Mr. Miranda."
Further on in the instructions, the court stated, and again reiterated that the jury could find that plaintiff was not entitled to any damages even though the evidence proved defendant's negligence.
The only evidence introduced other than that of the doctors, that could in any way throw any light upon the question as to whether plaintiff's operation was caused by the act of defendant or because of her condition previous to said act, was the testimony of the plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith, which refuted defendant's claim.
"An instruction not based on the evidence is erroneous in that it introduces before the jury facts not presented thereby, and is well calculated to induce them to suppose that such state of facts in the opinion of the court is possible under the evidence and may be considered by them." 53 Am Jur, Trial, § 579, pp 455, 456.
In Fortner v. Koch (1935), 272 Mich 273, 283, we held that it is impossible to determine the.effect upon the minds of the jury resulting from an instruction erroneously assuming the existence of certain facts.
We have also held that if the error is such that the result might well have been different if not committed, a new trial is justified. Rouse v. Gross (1959), 357 Mich 475, 481,482.
Applying these above mentioned tests, we con: elude that a new trial should be granted because of instructions which permitted the jury to consider and determine issues upon which no evidence was submitted.
Reversed and remanded for new trial. Costs to appellants.
ADDENDUM
This addition to my opinion is written subsequent to receiving Justice Adams' and Justice Black's opinions.
The common-law liability of defendant Miranda was not considered in my original opinion because it was not raised in either the trial of this case or in the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiffs, in their brief, admit that even though the evidence would sustain an instruction in regard to "the wanton misconduct of defendant Miranda," and an instruction in regard to "imputation of the wanton misconduct of defendant Jones to defendant Miranda," there still would remain the "critical issue" in regard to exemplary damages, by the statement to this Court:
"However, if the Court determines that the question of gross negligence should have been presented to and decided by the jury, then plaintiffs' entitlement to exemplary damages becomes a critical issue in the case."
Admitting that if the Court' approves submitting to the jury the question of exemplary damages, it will be doing so for the first time, plaintiffs state:
"Although there are numerous Michigan cases involving the allowance of exemplary damages under varied fact situations, there are none directly in point with reference to a claim for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision."
The cases cited by Justice Adams do not refute this statement.
The common law came into existence and was developed before the day of the automobile. Realizing this, the Michigan legislature has by enactment extensively provided for the "rules of the road" in regard to driving, stopping, and parking. Up to now we have abided by those rules in determining the question of negligence in automobile accident cases and have not placed the burden upon the trial court or jury to first determine whether there was proof of negligence and then determine the amount or kind of negligence except in guest passenger eases. Determining the question of the amount of negligence is a major problem which has been proven by the guest passenger cases that have been appealed to this Court.
The only legislative reference to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct is in the guest passenger statute and this provision was not included for the purpose of giving to the injured guest an added right to exemplary damages, but was inserted in a restrictive sense, namely: that no guest passenger could recover damages unless there was proof of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct.
Nothing has been presented since my original writing that causes me to conclude differently than I did then, i.e.:
"Under our decisions of the past, which we are reaffirming in the present appeal, we hold that the trial court did not commit error in refusing to instruct on gross negligence and exemplary damages."
T. E. Brennan, C. J., and Dethmers, J., concurred with. Kelly, J.
Smith v. Jones (1967), 6 Mich App 92.
Wieczorek v. Merskin (1944), 308 Mich 145; Geib v. Slater (1948), 320 Mich 316.
Peyton v. Delnay (1957), 348 Mich 238; and Karney v. Upton (1958), 353 Mich 262.
48 ALR2d 346, 349, 350; Poikanen v. Thomas Furnace Co. (1924), 226 Mich 614; Kricinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co. (1916), 192 Mich 687.
"If you should find that her injuries were the result of her condition in 1963, was the result of what happened in 1958 or 1961, and what happened in July 1963 had nothing to do with her condition of course then she cannot recover the damages that I have outlined to you, because, this defendant would be liable for only the direct results or responsible for the damages that are directly traceable to the aeeident that happened on July 11, 1963."
"But, if you should find that her condition in July and subsequent months was a direct eause or relate back to what happened in 1958 and 1961 then of course they were not the direet result of this accident on July 11, 1963.
"If on the other hand you find these injuries that she complained of, were not caused by, — were not directly caused by the negligence of Mr. Jones, if any, and that was solely due to her condition in 1958 or 1961, of course then her resulting injuries and damages were not a direct cause of this accident and she cannot recover,"