Case Name: Margerie GREEN, Appellant, v. Elmer G. GREEN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-12-03
Citations: 501 So. 2d 1306
Docket Number: No. 83-2236
Parties: Margerie GREEN, Appellant, v. Elmer G. GREEN, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 501
Pages: 1306–1313

Head Matter:
Margerie GREEN, Appellant, v. Elmer G. GREEN, Appellee.
No. 83-2236.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 3, 1986.
Rehearing and/or Certification Denied March 4, 1987.
Sylvan B. Burdick of Burdick & Daves, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Larry Klein of Klein & Beranek, P.A., and Sidney A. Stubbs, Jr., of Jones & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
UPON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
EN BANC.
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage. The majority of the original panel which considered the appeal believed the final judgment should be reversed. Appellee sought rehearing en banc, contending affirmance was necessary to maintain uniformity in this court's decisions. The bases for the alleged conflict were Beville v. Beville, 415 So.2d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Burrows v. Burrows, 384 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Since commencing consideration en banc we have had the benefit of the supreme court's opin ion in Noah v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1986), which was not available to either the trial judge or the original panel. We grant appellee's motion for rehearing en banc, vacate this court's original opinion and substitute this opinion.
It is apparent from a review of the extensive final judgment in this case that the trial court directed substantial attention to the factors of adultery and the parties' incompatibility. The original panel in this case was concerned about the weight accorded by the trial court to these factors. We share those concerns and conclude that the weight and consideration given to the issue of adultery by the trial court exceeded the limits permitted by Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979). See also Noah v. Noah.
In this case, unlike Williamson, the court is not faced with the problem of having to decide which of the two spouses ought to bear the loss under circumstances where there is not enough to go around. Here, not only is there enough, but it is undisputed that the husband is a millionaire with an income well in excess of $300,-000 per year. The parties shared a married life for twelve years and, although Mr. Green was considerably older than his wife, there were two children born of this marriage. Mrs. Green did not complete high school, worked as a waitress, hostess and sales clerk prior to the marriage, and had not worked during the course of their marriage.
The children in this case were raised in a lifestyle totally different from the one they will have to share under the court's award. While the husband, with his income of almost $7,000 per week, and his assets in the millions, will continue to enjoy a lifestyle that enables him to risk $50,000 per year gambling, the wife and children will be living on an income of $1,500 per month child support and an additional $1,000 per month of rehabilitative alimony for seven years. In fairness, we note that the wife, additionally, received as lump sum alimony a new home with respect to which she is not obligated to pay the principal and interest on any mortgage. However, she will have to maintain that home in all respects from taxes to maintenance. It is also significant that the wife will not receive her fifty percent interest in the marital home of the parties inasmuch as the trial court recognized a special equity in the husband arising from his investment in that home of funds acquired prior to the marriage. The result of this will be that the wife will receive barely more than one-fifth of the equity when the home is sold.
The trial court specifically did not fashion any equitable distribution at all of the husband's property, although the wife has no separate property other than her joint interest in their home. Further, it is obvious that none of the funds allocated to the wife as rehabilitative alimony will be available for rehabilitation purposes since obviously these will have to be utilized, together with the child support, to try to maintain a reasonable economic life for the children. It is not clear what rehabilitation was intended, but we note that whether a spouse can actually be rehabilitated to become self-supporting is a factor the trial court should consider in determining whether rehabilitative or permanent periodic alimony is more appropriate. See Allison v. Allison, 491 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
In Williamson, a case that did not actually involve adultery, the supreme court emphasized the importance of the facts, and how they relate to the economic conditions of the marriage whenever adultery or fault becomes a factor in justifying a distribution or award that would be otherwise inequitable. The Williamson court, in discussing the role to be accorded to adultery or fault in determining alimony pursuant to section 61.08 Florida Statutes, and after recognizing the discretion of the trial court to consider the conduct of the parties in deciding the issues of alimony under some circumstances, said:
[I]t must be remembered that the primary standards to be used in determining a proper alimony award are the demonstrated need of the spouse seeking alimony and the demonstrated ability of the other spouse to pay. . We do not suggest that these factors may in any way be ignored. As we previously pointed out in Vilas v. Vilas, 153 Fla. 102, 13 So.2d 807 (1943), alimony is not a weapon to be used solely to punish an errant spouse.
367 So.2d at 1018.
The supreme court, in Williamson, cautioned against unnecessary and overexten-sive inquiry into adultery when not needed in order to do economic justice between the parties. The court emphasized in Williamson that consideration of fault is appropriate where there are "difficult economic circumstances facing both parties." Id. at 1019.
Nothing said in Williamson should be construed to permit evidence of adultery to create an imbalance between the parties with respect to need and ability to pay where economic hardship is not a factor. The supreme court made it clear that we should use great caution when dealing with any type of fault, including adultery, in order to avoid retreating from the sound policy basis reflected in our no-fault system. Id. at 1019. The court, in Williamson, concluded that:
For a trial court to perform routinely a balancing act with testimony of alleged marital misconduct of the parties would be a step backward to the days of threats and insinuations which plagued our courts before our no-fault system was enacted and would be directly contrary to express legislative policy. Therefore, we hold that section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which permits a trial court to consider "any factor to do equity and justice between the parties," does not permit a court to conduct an inquiry into every aspect of the marital conduct of the parties as a matter of course. Whether such an inquiry is proper will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Today we hold only that where an analysis of the need of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay demonstrates that both parties will suffer economic hardship as a result of any division of available resources the court might make, the court may then consider, as an equitable circumstance under section 61.-08(2), Florida Statutes (1975), any conduct of either party which may have caused the difficult economic situation in which they stand before the court.
Id. at 1019.
It is interesting to note that although the Williamson case predated Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), it is perfectly consistent with that decision in its emphasis on arriving at a financially equitable result.
Williamson v. Williamson should not be read to recognize broad discretion in the trial court in determining the weight to be given evidence of adultery in fashioning alimony under circumstances where it will not result in a financially equitable award. Therefore, applying the standards of Williamson and Canakaris together, we conclude that the trial court in this case abused its discretion.
The supreme court has recently addressed this issue in Noah v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1986), where it approved the opinion of this court (although the opinion was quashed on other grounds) reversing an unequal distribution of assets as part of an equitable distribution to the wife, in part because her husband had been unfaithful. Again, in Noah, the supreme court recognized that consideration of adultery, where appropriate under section 61.-08, Florida Statutes (1985), should be limited and not punitive. In Noah, it was determined that the trial court improperly emphasized the husband's considerable adultery, resulting in a disproportionate and inequitable distributional scheme in violation of the principles of Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So.2d 203 (Fla.1985), and Cana-karis.
In Noah, the court emphasized, as it had in Williamson, that the "primary standards to be used in fashioning an equitable alimony award are the needs of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay." Noah at 1127.
The supreme court in Noah, after discussing its great concern that there may be developing an undue emphasis upon fault at the trial court level, said (repeating a portion of the language quoted above):
In response to this alleged trend, we repeat our admonition in Williamson:
"For a trial court to perform routinely a balancing act with testimony of alleged marital misconduct of the parties would be a step backwards to the days of threats and insinuations which plagued our courts before our no-fault system was enacted and would be directly contrary to express legislative policy."
Id. at 1127 (quoting Williamson, 367 So.2d at 1019).
It is apparent, from a review of the record and judgment in this case, that adultery and fault became one of the central issues determining the financial award. It has, therefore, received undue weight resulting in an inequitable judgment. As a result the wife has been shortchanged. See Canakaris v. Canakaris; McSwigan v. McSwigan, 450 So.2d 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Priede v. Priede, 474 So.2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); and the dissenting opinion of Judge Cowart in Tuller v. Tuller, 469 So.2d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The issue of fault, removed by the legislature as a requirement for dissolution of marriage, should not be expanded beyond that expressly intended by the legislature, in deciding the economic issues between the parties whose union is ending.
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of the trial court and remand for reconsideration of the issues of child support, alimony and equitable distribution in accordance with this opinion.
HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur specially with opinions.
WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion in which GUNTHER, J., joins.
The husband's 1981 Federal Income Tax return showed income of $304,000. His 1982 income estimate was $346,000.