Case Name: Edward Foote et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. William S. Roberts, defendant and appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-10-21
Citations: 7 Rob. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward Foote et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. William S. Roberts, defendant and appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 30
Pages: 17–25

Head Matter:
Edward Foote et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. William S. Roberts, defendant and appellant.
1. The court, in lank, will not weigh the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the justice by whom the action was tried came to a correct conclusion; nor will it disturb a judgment, when there is any evidence to sustain it, even if, upon examination, it might think a different conclusion should have been reached. It is well settled that a finding upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed by an appellate court. McCura, J. dissented.
2. It is not a valid objection, that a part of the plaintiffs’ claim is not embraced by the pleadings, where the justice finds that such claim was sustained by the proof. The court, at general term, has the right, either to treat the complaint as amended in such particulars, as the court at special term would have allowed, or to conform the pleadings to the facts as found by the justice.
(Before Monell, Garvin and McCunn, JJ.)
Heard February 12, 1867;
decided October 21, 1867.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered upon a decision of the chief justice, by whom this action was tried, without a jury.
There were three causes of action stated in the complaint, as follows:
First. That the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendant, undertook to roll into gun barrels, straighten, cone-seat, splice and anneal, five tons of iron, containing about eleven hundred skelps; to roll and cone-seat each of such skelps for $1, anneal the same for six cents per barrel, and splice and straighten such of them as were found to require to be straightened or spliced, for fifteen cents for each barrel spliced, and one cent for each barrel straightened, which sums the defendant agreed to pay; that the plaintiffs agreed with the Trenton Iron Company to do such work at such prices; that the defendant refused to pay such sums, and the plaintiffs were sued therefor, and were obliged to pay, with costs and legal expenses, a certain sum ($1584.52,) which, with interest, the plaintiffs claimed to recover.
Second: That the defendant gave to the plaintiffs an order to import for him fifty tons of gun iron, at twelve "and a half cents per pound, which order the plaintiffs accepted, and under which they sold and delivered to the defendant a certain number of (286) bundles of gun iron, of a certain aggregate weight (29,859 pounds.) That 317 pounds were returned.
Upon this cause of action the plaintiffs claimed to recover a certain sum ($6284.21) with interest.
Third. That the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendant, undertook to roll into gun barrels, and to cone-seat, anneal, straighten and splice about a certain number -of (2680) skelps, at the prices stated in the first cause of action. That the plaintiffs agreed with the Trenton Iron Company .to do such work at such prices. That the defendant refused to pay such sums, and that the plaintiffs were compelled by suit to pay therefor a certain sum ($3304.43) - which, with interest, the plaintiffs claimed to recover.
The defendant, by his answer, claimed as a part of the agreement, stated in the .first cause of action, that the plaintiffs were to allow for work put upon them by the defendant, which proved to be defective, $1 for each-barrel. That of the 1100 barrels delivered, 325 were returned as defective; that the cost of each of said barrels returned was $2.36, in the aggregate $767; that upon 145 of such barrels, the defendant had put work, amounting to $145, the whole aggregate being $912, leaving due to the plaintiffs only the sum of $254.
As to the second cause of action, the defendant admitted the order for the fifty tons of gun iron; bqt averred that before any irón was imported thereunder, he countermanded the whole of said order. He denied that such iron was delivered, or any part thereof, or that the number of tons, mentioned in the third cause of action, were imported, or were delivered to him under such order or otherwise. He also denied the allegations in the third cause of action.
The action being tried by the chief justice, without a jury, he found as facts: That the plaintiffs agreed to pay $2.36 for each defective skelp. That there was no agreement to pay the plaintiffs for straightening or splicing. That 180 of the 1100 barrels, mentioned in the first cause of action, were returned to the plaintiffs as defective. He further found, that the defendant agreed to purchase the iron skelps mentioned in the third cause of action at the prices therein mentioned; and that the plaintiffs were to allow him' $2.36 for each defective barrel. That the whole of said 2680 skelps were delivered by the defendant, of which 963 were returned by him as defective. He deducted $424.80 from the aggregate price for the 1100 skelps, for defective barrels, and $2273.88 from the agreed price for the 2680 skelps, also for defective barrels. He gave judgment for the balance, with interest from the commencement of the suit. The claim ,stated in the second cause of action was wholly disallowed by him.
The defendant appealed.
A. J. Vanderpoel, for the appellant.
George Bliss, for the respondent.

Opinion:
By the Court, Monell, J.
The principal question in this case is, whether there is any evidence to support the judgment. The court in bank will not weigh the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the learned justice came to a correct conclusion; nor will we disturb a judgment when there is any evidence to sustain it, even where, upon examination, we might think a. different conclusion should have been reached. It is well settled that a finding 'upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed by an appellate court. (Hall v. Morrison, 3 Bosw. 520. Morris v. Second Avenue Railroad Co., 8 id. 679. Bearss v. Copley, 10 N. Y. Rep. 93. Woodruff v. McGrath, 32 id. 255.)
The contract fo roll, cone-seat an d anneal the 1100 skelps, was admitted by the defendant, with some qualification or alteration of its terms. The number found to have been defective was 180. • That number seems to be quite as large as the defendant could have expected under the evidence. The only question in respect to the five tons, was the number of condemned guns ; when that was ascertained, the amount due to the plaintiffs was easily determined.
The real controversy in regard to the thirteen tons of skelp iron was, not whether there was a sale of it to the defendant, coupled with an agreement on his part to pay for rolling, cone-seating and annealing; but whether upon the transfer of his contracts by the defendant to Robinson, he (Robinson) did not assume the defendant's contracts with the plaintiffs, and was not accepted by them as their debtor. [After examining the conflicting evidence upon this point, the court proceeded.]
Upon all this conflicting evidence, the justice found against the defendant; and after allowing at the rate of $2.36 for defective barrels, gave judgment in the plaintiffs' favor for the balance. .
As to the objection that the claim to recover for the thirteen tons was not embraced by the pleadings, it is enough to say that the justice has found the claim was sustained by the proof; and we have the right either to treat the complaint, as amended, in such respect as the court at special term would have allowed, (Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. Rep. 237,) or now to conform the pleadings to the facts as found by the justice. (Pratt v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 21 N. Y.. Rep. 305.) The question arising under the thirteen ton contract was fairly litigated, and the judgment in respect to it should not be disturbed on merely technical grounds.
I think the allowance of interest was correct, and that none of the exceptions taken by the defendant can be sustained.
I am in favor of affirming the judgment, with costs.
Garvin, J. concurred.