Case Name: Henry A. JONES, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Scott TURNER, Warden; A.J. Malfi, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-09-14
Citations: 449 F. App'x 701
Docket Number: No. 09-56592
Parties: Henry A. JONES, Jr., Petitioner— Appellant, v. Scott TURNER, Warden; A.J. Malfi, Respondents—Appellees.
Judges: Before: SCHROEDER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and McCUSKEY, Chief District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 449
Pages: 701–702

Head Matter:
Henry A. JONES, Jr., Petitioner— Appellant, v. Scott TURNER, Warden; A.J. Malfi, Respondents—Appellees.
No. 09-56592.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 31, 2011.
Filed Sept. 14, 2011.
Anne Hwang, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Santa Ana, CA, Elizabeth Newman, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Lise S. Jacobson, Steven Taylor Oetting, Esquire, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before: SCHROEDER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and McCUSKEY, Chief District Judge.
The Honorable Michael Patrick McCuskey, Chief District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Central Illinois, Urbana, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Appellant Henry A. Jones appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition as untimely, rejecting Jones's argument for equitable tolling based on his mental impairments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 2258, and we affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition.
Jones contends that his mental illness, low cognitive ability, and learning disability considered together are extraordinary circumstances that entitle him to equitable tolling. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Jones's numerous pro se filings during the statute of limitations period show that these impairments did not make it impossible for him to timely file his habeas petition. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1080, 1034 (9th Cir.2005), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2006). This finding was not clear error.
In the alternative, Jones asks that we remand this case to apply the two-part test recently articulated in Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1101 (9th Cir.2010). We have reviewed the record, and conclude that a remand is unnecessary because there is nothing in the record that would yield a different result under the standard articulated in Bills. The district court found that Jones was able to file a habeas petition despite his mental impairments, and that he did not demonstrate that he needed to rely on other inmates to do so. The record supports these findings.
Finally, Jones's argument that he could not file his petition "on his own" under Bills because he relied on sample forms and filing directions provided by others is foreclosed by Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that a pro se petitioners lack of legal sophistication does not warrant equitable tolling).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
. We do not reach Jones's arguments that he is also entitled to statutory tolling. Even assuming that Jones was entitled to all the statutory tolling he argues for, his petition is not timely without equitable tolling based on his mental impairments.