Case Name: Christopher BOYD v. Warden, Sci WAYMART; District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-07-31
Citations: 579 F.3d 330
Docket Number: No. 07-2185
Parties: Christopher BOYD v. Warden, Sci WAYMART; District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants.
Judges: Before SLOVITER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 579
Pages: 330–379

Head Matter:
Christopher BOYD v. Warden, Sci WAYMART; District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants.
No. 07-2185.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Oct. 25, 2007.
Reargued En Banc Nov. 19, 2008.
Filed July 31, 2009.
Thomas W. Dolgenos, Esquire (Argued), Susan E. Affronti, Esquire, District Attorney’s Office, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants.
Cheryl J. Sturm, Esquire (Argued), Chadds Ford, PA, for Appellee.
Matthew C. Lawry, Esquire, Billy H. Ñolas, Esquire, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, for Amici Curiae-Appellee, Federal Defender Organization.
Argued Oct. 25, 2007
Before SLOVITER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reargued Nov. 19, 2007
Before SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, McKEE, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
The District Court conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus to Christopher Boyd. The Commonwealth appealed, and after a three-judge panel heard argument, the Court ordered rehearing en banc. We will reverse the District Court's judgment and remand to a different district court judge for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts of this case and the basis of our jurisdiction are set forth in Parts I and II of Judge Hardiman's opinion. For the reasons given in Part III of that opinion, we conclude Boyd's claim was properly exhausted and has not been procedurally defaulted. See Cone v. Bell, — U.S.-, -, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1781, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009).
Furthermore, a majority of the Court finds that Boyd's claim is governed by the test for ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); it is not barred by Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), or Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984).
Although the District Court correctly identified the Strickland test as the rule of decision, it erred in reviewing Boyd's claim de novo. As explained in Chief Judge Scirica's opinion, because the state courts adjudicated Boyd's claim on the merits, federal habeas relief is subject to the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we will remand for the District Court to apply the proper AEDPA analysis, consistent with the instructions in Chief Judge Scirica's opinion. See Chief Judge Seirica Op. at 335-37 & n. 7.
A further word is needed about the appropriate use of evidentiary hearings. The Magistrate Judge in this ease conducted such a hearing, and both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court relied on the evidence adduced therein. Neither they, nor the parties, appear to have queried whether the hearing was permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). As detailed in Chief Judge Scirica's opinion, on remand we instruct the- District Court to address this question in the first instance, and to consider the evidence from the Magistrate Judge's hearing only if that hearing was consistent with AEDPA's statutory strictures.
For reasons also given by Chief Judge Scirica, we conclude the District Court improperly rejected — on a cold record-the Magistrate Judge's finding that Boyd had not demonstrated prejudice as required by Strickland. Although we have no doubts about the district court judge's fairness, we will remand to a different judge to ensure the appearance of impartiality. If the District Court again reaches the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, it should hold its own hearing (subject again to § 2254(e)(2)) if it declines to accept the Magistrate Judge's finding.
. For ease of reference, we use the term "Commonwealth" to denote Appellants Warden, SCI Waymart; the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; and the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.