Case Name: PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. CITY OF RUGBY, PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1921-03-04
Citations: 47 N.D. 301
Docket Number: 
Parties: PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. CITY OF RUGBY, PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.
Judges: Bikdzell, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 301–304

Head Matter:
PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. CITY OF RUGBY, PIERCE COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.
(181 N. W. 954.)
Infants — city held not liable for mothers’ pension allowances payable by county.
Section 2508, Comp. Laws 1913, has no application to the payment by a county of allowances for mothers’ pensions (Laws 1915, chap. 185), and a city is not liable for 25 per cent of such allowances paid by the county.
Opinion filed March 4, 1921.
Action in District Court, Pierce county, Burr, J., to recover proportionate amounts paid for mothers’ pensions by the county.
Affirmed.
Harold B. Nelson, for appellant.
To sustain the charge of double taxation it must be shown that the second tax was imposed upon the same property, hy the same state or government, during the same taxing period. 37 Cyc. 753, and cases cited.
Taxation of lands constituting a portion of the capital stock of banks and the taxation of the stock itself is not double taxation, likewise, the taxation of railway right of way, as such, and the taxation of elevator sites upon the right of way was not double taxation. Ee First Nat. Bank, 25 N. D. 625; Northern P. E. Co. v. Morton County, 32 N. D. 627; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Douglas County, 26 N. W. 878.
L. B. Nostdal, for respondent.
Tho constitutional inhibition against special legislation does not prevent classification, but such classification must be natural, not arbitrary ; it must stand upon some reason, having regard to the character of the legislation of which it is a feature.
It is not the form, but the effect of a statute which determines its special character. Edmonds v. TIerbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970.
“The object and meaning of these constitutional provisions (Const. §§ 11 and 20) has been passed upon so often, and is so well understood that a discussion of the subject is unnecessary.” Beleal v. Northern P. R. Co. 15 N. D. 318, 108 N. W, 33; 15 N. D. 327, 108 N. W. 36.

Opinion:
Robinson, Ch. J.
The plaintiff brings this action against the city of Rugby to recover $148.25, being 25 per cent of the sum paid by the county of Pierce on pensions to mothers residing in the city of'Rugby. In counties having a township organization it seems that each township is charged with the necessary relief of its poor. Each township supervisor is an overseer of the poor and the board of county commissioners has the power to reduce or increase any allowance for aid made by an overseer of the poor, and in such cases it is provided the township in which the poor person has a legal residence shall pay 25 per cent of the sum allowed, and the county shall pay the balance. Comp. Laws, § 2508. The statute does in no manner refer to allowances made under the Mothers' Pension Act. By that act it is provided: "In every county of the state every woman who has one or more children under fourteen years of age, dependent upon her for support, shall receive an allowance of not more than $15 a month for each child, such sum to be paid out of the county treasury." Laws 1915, chap. 185. The allowance is made by the county court upon conditions prescribed by the statute. The Mothers' Pension Act is complete in itself. The sum which is allowed becomes a county charge and is levied the same as other county charges against all the taxable property of the county, and in every city and township of the county. Certain it is the statute imposes no liability upon any city or township for the payment of mothers' pensions. There is no claim that the city of Rugby has in any way contracted to pay the 25 per cent in question or that it has incurred any liability by reason of going into the business of growing children and caring for their mothers. That might not be considered a business enterprise.
In truth, there is nothing in the complaint nor in the evidence which begins to state in any way a cause of action against the city of Rugby.
Judgment affirmed.
Bikdzell, J., concurs.