Case Name: PEOPLE v. ROGERS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1991-09-19
Citations: 438 Mich. 602
Docket Number: Docket No. 88086; Calendar No. 5
Parties: PEOPLE v ROGERS
Judges: Griffin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 438
Pages: 602–626

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ROGERS
Docket No. 88086.
Argued April 3, 1991
(Calendar No. 5).
Decided September 19, 1991.
James A. Rogers was charged under the Michigan Vehicle Code in the Cheboygan District Court with operating a snowmobile along the shoulder of a highway while intoxicated, second offense. The court, Harold A. Johnson, J., dismissed the charge. The Cheboygan Circuit Court, Robert C. Livo, J., affirmed. The Court of Appeals, Maher, P.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., and Sawyer, JJ., reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that a person who is intoxicated or has an impermissible blood-alcohol content while operating a snowmobile upon a highway or other place open to the general public may be prosecuted under the Michigan Vehicle Code as an ouil offender (Docket No. 112678). The defendant appeals.
In opinions by Justice Mallett, joined by Justice Boyle, and by Justice Brickley, joined by Justice Griffin, the Supreme Court held:
The ouil provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code may be applied to a person who operates a snowmobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicants.
Justice Mallett, joined by Justice Boyle, further stated:
The general provisions of the Michigan Vehicle Code contemplate all vehicles, including those for which no license is required, that are operated on a highway; the specific and narrowly tailored terms of the ouil provisions apply to persons who operate snowmobiles on public highways while under the influence of intoxicants.
Under the Vehicle Code, the term "vehicle” includes every device which transports or draws people or property upon a highway, except those exclusively moved by human power, those moved on stationary rails, and mobile homes. MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 proscribes operating a vehicle on a high way or other place open to the public while intoxicated. A snowmobile is a vehicle that, while generally prohibited from operation on a highway, may do so under limited circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, the defendant’s snowmobile is a vehicle to which the terms of the ouil statute literally apply.
References
Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 299.
Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI. 56 ALR4th 1092.
What is a "motor vehicle” within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated. 66 ALR2d 1146.
The ouil statute is not more general than the snowmobile act, or separate and distinct from the Motor Vehicle Code. The ouil provision proscribes operation of any vehicle upon a highway while intoxicated. Because snowmobiles may be operated on highways under limited circumstances, the snowmobile act proscribes operation of a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated. The Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act overlap, and each shares a common application to snowmobiles when operated on highways; each may be read in pari materia. Where there are two applicable statutes, the prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement officer, has the right to exercise broad discretion in determining under which of the statutes to prosecute.
The fact that no license is required to operate a snowmobile does not make it any less a motor vehicle. Nor does it remove snowmobiles from all other applicable provisions of the Vehicle Code. The ouil statute and its penalties are applicable to the defendant.
Justice Brickley, joined by Justice Griffin, further stated:
The purposes of both the Motor Vehicle Code’s ouil provisions and the snowmobile act are promoted by permitting an intoxicated person who operates a snowmobile on a highway to be charged under the ouil provisions.
A snowmobile, under both the Motor Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act, is a vehicle to which certain provisions of the Vehicle Code may be applied, including its ouil provisions, when it is driven on a highway. The statutes may be read in pari materia to provide that while the snowmobile statute regulates the operation of a snowmobile while intoxicated when it is both on and off a highway, the Vehicle Code’s ouil provisions supplement those regulations when snowmobiles are driven on a highway.
Affirmed.
Justice Riley, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh and Justice Levin, dissenting, stated that the definition of a vehicle, § 1(e) of the snowmobile act, MCL 257.1501(e); MSA 9.3200(l)(e), raises serious questions concerning the application of § 625 of the Motor Vehicle Code to snowmobile operators.
Encompassed within the span of sections of the Motor Vehi cle Code set out in § 1(e) of the snowmobile act is § 625, the provision pertaining to driving while intoxicated. While § 1(e) casts doubt on the application of § 625, the fact that the Legislature provided penalties for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in the snowmobile act is persuasive evidence that it does not apply. Both statutes address driving while intoxicated, but § 15(b) of the snowmobile act is more specific than § 625. Assuming a snowmobile is a vehicle under § 625, the provisions conflict and the more specific § 15(b) controls. Provisions of the criminal procedure act and the Revised Judicature Act additionally support operation of the provisions of the snowmobile act independent of § 625.
Intoxicating Liquors — Snowmobiles — Motor Vehicle Code — Penalties.
The ouil provisions of the Vehicle Code may be applied to persons who operate snowmobiles on the public highways while under the influence of intoxicants (MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, Joseph P. Kwiatkowski, Prosecuting Attorney, and Catherine Michelle Cas-tagne, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Daniel Loznak for the defendant.

Opinion:
Mallett, J.
INTRODUCTION
We granted leave to determine whether it is lawful to charge one who is operating a snowmobile while intoxicated with a violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. The district court dismissed the ouil charge, and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that a person who is intoxicated or has an impermissible blood-alcohol content while operating a snowmobile upon a highway or other place open to the general public may be prosecuted as an ouil of fender pursuant to MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
On February 25, 1988, two state police troopers observed a snowmobile traveling on southbound US 23. The troopers stopped the snowmobile because the operator was driving on the shoulder of the highway.
As the driver got off the snowmobile, the trooper smelled intoxicants and noticed that the driver had trouble gaining his balance. When the driver failed several sobriety tests, he was arrested and taken to the state police post in Cheboygan. His blood-alcohol level was 0.23 percent.
The defendant was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense (ouil). MCL 257.625(5); MSA 9.2325(5). A bench trial was held June 3, 1988 in 89th District Court. On July 6, 1988, the judge dismissed the charges because there is a specific statute prohibiting the operation of a snowmobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCL 257.1515; MSA 9.3200(15). The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal and reversed. This Court granted leave to appeal on October 24, 1990. 436 Mich 880.
i
Under MCL 257.79; MSA 9.1879, " '[vjehicle' means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices exclusively moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and excepting a mobile home . . . ."
The ouil statute in question proscribes operating a vehicle on a highway, or other places open to the public while intoxicated. MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. A snowmobile is a vehicle generally prohibited from operating on a highway, except, under limited circumstances. Montgomery v Dep't of Natural Resources, 172 Mich App 718, 722, n 1; 432 NW2d 414 (1988). Accordingly, we find that defendant's snowmobile is a vehicle to which the terms of the ouil statute literally apply.
ii
Having determined that the ouil statute is facially applicable in the instant matter, we now turn to consider the question whether persons operating a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated, can be properly charged with a violation of the Vehicle Code.
Defendant was charged with ouil pursuant to the terms of the Michigan Vehicle Code. The code provides:
A person, whether licensed or not, who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within the state. [MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1).]
However, defendant maintains that he should have been charged under a different portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code which proscribes operating a snowmobile upon a highway while intoxicated. The snowmobile act provides:
A person shall not operate a snowmobile . . . [w]hile under the influence of intoxicating liquor; a controlled substance as defined in section 7104 of Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, as amended, being section 333.7104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws; or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance. [MCL 257.1515(l)(b); MSA 9.3200(15)(l)(b).]
Defendant further maintains that the snowmobile statute has a regulatory scheme separate and distinct from the general Motor Vehicle Code. As such, the more specific snowmobile act, rather than the general Motor Vehicle Code, proscribes operation of a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated.
The Court of Appeals held that a person who operates a snowmobile upon a highway while intoxicated may be prosecuted under the ouil statute. The Court disagreed with defendant and stated that the ouil statute could not be characterized as more general than the snowmobile act.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. We are unable to say that the ouil statute is more general than the snowmobile act; nor is the snowmobile act separate and distinct from the general Motor Vehicle Code.
The ouil provision of the Vehicle Code pro scribes operation of any vehicle upon a highway while intoxicated. MCL 257.625(5); MSA 9.2325(5). In addition, because snowmobiles, albeit under limited circumstances, may be operated on highways, Montgomery, supra, it can be said that the snowmobile act proscribes operating a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated.
The Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act overlap in that each shares a common application to snowmobiles when operated on highways. Therefore, the Motor Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act are statutes that can be read in "pari ma-teria."
"Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose; and although an act may incidentally refer to the same subject as another act, it is not in pari materia if its scope and aim are distinct and unconnected. It is a well-established rule that in the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times, and contain no reference to one another."[ ]
Further, we have held that when there are two applicable statutes, as in this case, "the prosecutor is the chief law enforcement officer . . . and has the right to exercise broad discretion in determining under which of two applicable statutes a prosecution will be instituted."
Therefore, in the instant matter, when defendant drove his snowmobile on the highway while intoxicated, his conduct was within the ambit of both MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 and MCL 257.1515(l)(b); MSA 9.3200(15)(l)(b). Accordingly, the prosecutor has broad discretion to determine under which of the two applicable statutes to prosecute.
The question whether a person who is intoxicated while operating a snowmobile on a highway may be prosecuted as an ouil offender is one of first impression under Michigan jurisprudence. Consequently, we may look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
In Melby v Comm'r of Public Safety, 367 NW2d 527 (Minn, 1985), the defendant was apprehended by the police after operating his snowmobile with a blood-alcohol concentration level above 0.10 percent. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the defendant's driving privileges under the implied consent law. The Dakota County Court rescinded the revocation. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the county court's decision and reinstated the commissioner's revocation of the defendant's driving privileges. The court held that Minnesota's implied consent statute applied to snowmobiles operated on a street or highway. Id. at 529.
In Pahl v Comm'r of Public Safety, 398 NW2d 67 (Minn App, 1986), the respondent's driving privileges were revoked for an implied consent violation following a snowmobile accident on a lake. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the implied consent laws applied only to snowmobiles operated on streets and highways, and not to snowmobiles operated on lake surfaces. Id. at 72.
These Minnesota court decisions explicitly provide that implied consent laws are applicable to persons who operate snowmobiles upon a highway while under the influence of intoxicants. In the instant case, however, defendant maintains that the ouil statute is inapplicable since the snowmobile act prohibits the conduct, and therefore is controlling. To support this contention, defendant looks to State v Gobeli, 342 NW2d 898 (Iowa, 1983), and urges this Court to adopt its logic.
We find Gobeli distinguishable from the instant matter. Unlike this case, Gobeli concerned whether the defendant could be convicted of driving with a suspended license for operating a snowmobile along the shoulder of a city street and crossing a highway while his driver's license was already suspended. The defendant in Gobeli was charged with operating a snowmobile without a license where the snowmobile statute did not require a driver's license for its operation. That is not this case. Here, defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle has no bearing on his ability to operate a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated.
In the instant matter, defendant makes much of the fact that operating a snowmobile requires no license from the Secretary of State. He asserts that since no license is required, it would be "anomalous" to apply the provisions of the Michigan Vehicle Code to this case. We find this argument unpersuasive. Under the Michigan Vehicle Code, one need not be licensed.
A person, whether licensed or not, whose blood contains 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public . [MCL 257.625(2); MSA 9.2325(2). Emphasis added.]
Similarly, the Attorney General concluded in May, 1985, that a go-cart operated on a highway was a motor vehicle, and that the Secretary of State was required to post on the driving record a conviction for operating a go-cart on a public highway in violation of the Vehicle Code. Thus, one's driving record would be affected by an offense committed while operating a motor vehicle for which no operator's license is required. A go-cart and a snowmobile are both motor vehicles for which no operator's license is required under the Vehicle Code. Therefore, to say that one's driving record would be affected when operating a go-cart on a public highway, but not when operating a snowmobile is incongruous.
A license from the Secretary of State is not required to operate all types of motor vehicles. But this does not make a motor vehicle any less a motor vehicle. Removal of a snowmobile from the operation of Vehicle Code sections requiring licensing does not mean it is removed from all other applicable sections. We find that the ouil statute and its penalties are applicable to the defendant in this case. Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Our decision recognizes that the general provisions of the Vehicle Code contemplate all vehicles —including those for which no license is required —operated upon a highway. Further, the specific and narrowly tailored terms of the ouil provision apply to persons who operate snowmobiles on public highways, while under the influence of intoxicants. Thus, the ouil provision is applicable to defendant in this case. We therefore would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Boyle, J., concurred with Mallett, J.
These circumstances include: (1) travel to the extreme right in single file; (2) necessity of crossing a bridge or culvert after stopping and yielding the right of way; (3) necessity of getting from one area to another, but only if the snowmobile crosses at right angles to the highway after stopping and yielding the right of way; (4) travel on a county road not normally snowplowed for vehicular traffic; (5) in emergency under authority of a local law enforcement officer; (6) government-approved prearranged special events of limited duration; (7) local ordinance allowing snowmobile egress and ingress. MCL 257.1512(a) through (h); MSA 9.3200(12)(a) through (h).
People v Rogers, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 20,1989 (Docket No. 112578).
See also MCL 257.1512; MSA 9.3200(12).
Palmer v State Land Office Bd, 304 Mich 628, 636-637; 8 NW2d 664 (1943).
Id. at 636.
See Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 683; 194 NW2d 693 (1972); People v Ford, 417 Mich 66, 84; 331 NW2d 878 (1982).
Undisputed facts indicated that the defendant operated his snowmobile on the roadway and in a public street during a police chase. See id. at 528, n 2.
The Dakota County Court rescinded the revocation by holding the snowmobile at the time of the arrest was not operated on a street or highway. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed because "the decision that respondent was not operating the snowmobile on a street or highway was clearly erroneous." Melby at 528.
See Minn Stat 169.123.
See also State v Woodruff, 81 Or App 484, 487; 726 P2d 396 (1986), wherein the Oregon Court of Appeals held that an implied consent law did not apply to bicyclists, but only to a person " 'who operates a motor vehicle.' " See Or Rev Stat 487.805(1) (repealed).
The Iowa court held that charges could not be brought under the general motor vehicle code for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. Id.
OAG, 1985-1986, No 6292, p 64 (May 8, 1985).
The California Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion with regard to vehicle registration.
[N]ot all motor vehicles are required to be registered . . ., the mere fact that a motor vehicle is thus exempt does not make it any the less a motor vehicle.
[Travelers Indemnity Co v Colonial Ins Co, 242 Cal App 2d 227, 238; 51 Cal Rptr 724 (1966), overruled on other grounds Argonaut Ins Co v Transport Indemnity Co, 6 Cal 3d 496; 99 Cal Rptr 617; 492 P2d 673 (1972); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Jacober, 10 Cal 3d 193; 110 Cal Rptr 1; 514 P2d 953 (1973).]