Case Name: Edmund A. RESTIVO, Jr., in His Capacity as General Partner of Sunnybrook Associates v. Gerald R. LYNCH et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1998-01-29
Citations: 707 A.2d 663
Docket Number: No. 96-224-M.P.
Parties: Edmund A. RESTIVO, Jr., in His Capacity as General Partner of Sunnybrook Associates v. Gerald R. LYNCH et al.
Judges: Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 707
Pages: 663–675

Head Matter:
Edmund A. RESTIVO, Jr., in His Capacity as General Partner of Sunnybrook Associates v. Gerald R. LYNCH et al.
No. 96-224-M.P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Jan. 29, 1998.
Michele A. Almon, Michael P. Donegan, Philip W. Noel, Providence, for Plaintiff.
William Conley, Jr., Providence, for Defendant.
Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
LEDERBERG, Justice.
This case came before the Supreme Court on the petition for certiorari of Edmund A. Restiro, Jr. (petitioner), in his capacity as general partner of Sunnybrook Associates, following a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the East Providence City Council (council). In that decision, the council denied the petitioner's request for approval of a subdivision of land in East Providence, Rhode Island. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for certiorari. A summary of the facts pertinent to our decision follows.
Facts and Procedural History
Sunnybrook Associates (Sunnybrook), a Rhode Island general partnership, owns a certain parcel of real estate known as Sunny-brook Estates. On or about August 4, 1993, Sunnybrook submitted a petition seeking approval of a proposed subdivision of Sunny-brook Estates to the city clerk of the city of East Providence (city). Because of concerns about the adequacy of the proposed drainage system for the new development and about the impact of drainage on surrounding property, the city's planning board (planning board), pursuant to § 15-34 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of East Providence (Rev.Ords.1986, § 30-19) and vrith the knowledge and approval of the council, requested that Sunnybrook hire the engineering consulting group Camp Dresser & McKee (CDM) to review the proposed drainage system.
After CDM recommended that the planning board deny Sunnybrook's initial engineering version of the proposed subdivision, given CDM's conclusion that existing drainage difficulties in the area would be exacerbated by the development, Sunnybrook began working with CDM and other city professionals in an attempt to address the concerns of the planning board. A revised subdivision proposal containing modified engineering specifications met with the approval of CDM, and on January 10, 1995, again pursuant to § 15-34, the planning board,, after hearing testimony of environmental and engineering consultants and area residents and after reviewing written comments of city professionals, voted four to one to recommend approval of Sunny-brook's preliminary subdivision "subject to" seven enumerated conditions set forth in a January 12, 1995 memorandum to the council. On March 7, 1995, the council, acting as the city's plan commission under G.L.1956 § 45-23-19, held a hearing on the proposed subdivision. At the conclusion of the hearing, the five-member council voted unanimously to deny the petition.
On March 27, 1995, Sunnybrook appealed the rejection by respondents, Gerald R. Lynch, Norman J. Miranda, Rolland R. Grant, Robert D.. Sullivan and Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., in their collective capacity as the council, to the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 45-23-20. Sunnybrook alleged that the denial was arbitrary, capricious, and characterized by an abuse or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, made in violation of the due process requirements of the Rhode Island Constitution and the United States Constitution, and clearly erroneous in view of the evidence on the record. On November 21, 1995, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the council, finding that "there [was] competent evidence upon which the [council] rested its decision." On December 11, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with this Court, and on April 24, 1996, he filed a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari. The writ was issued on September 19, 1996, and, following a hearing by a panel of this Court, the case was assigned for full briefing and oral argument.
Standard of Review
With respect to proceedings on the "Subdivision of Land," § 45-23-20 provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny person, whether or not previously a party to the proceedings, aggrieved by a decision of a board of review, or by a decision of a plan commission from which no appeal lies to a board of review may appeal to the superior court for the county in which the land is situated . The court shall hear all pertinent evidence and determine the facts, and upon the facts so determined may affirm the decision, or may annul the decision if found to exceed the authority of the plan commission or board of review, or may enter such other decree as justice and equity may require."
It is well settled that the Superior Court does not engage in a de novo review of board decisions pursuant to this section. E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 118 R.I. 276, 284-85, 373 A.2d 496, 501 (1977). Rather, the Superior Court reviews the decisions of a plan commission or board of review under the "traditional judicial review" standard applicable to administrative agency actions. Id. at 285, 373 A.2d at 501. Judicial scrutiny on appeal "is limited to a search of the record to determine if there is any competent evidence upon which the agency's decision rests. If there is such evidence, the decision will stand." Id. at 285-86, 373 A.2d at 501. (Emphasis added.) See also Lett v. Caromile, 510 A.2d 958, 960 (R.I.1986) (observing that decision stands if record contains "any competent evidence," and noting that trial justice "lacks authority to weigh the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or to substitute his or her findings of fact for those made at the administrative level"). This Court's review of the Superior Court decision is limited "to determining whether the trial justice exceeded his or her authority under § 45-23-20." Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993).
Discussion
The claims raised by petitioner were identical to those put forth before the Superior Court, namely, that the council's decision was arbitrary, and capricious and constituted an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, that the council denied petitioner a fair and impartial hearing in violation of the due process requirements of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, and that the council's decision was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence on the record.
In support of his first argument, petitioner maintained that the trial justice "cited but two pieces of competent evidence upon which the Council could have based its decision." The petitioner asserted that, in relying on these pieces of evidence, the trial justice misconstrued the fact that "the pivotal question is not how severe the [water drainage] problem is in the area (a factual question), but whether the proposed subdivision will impact the drainage problem (an engineering question)." We disagree with petitioner's characterization of the "pivotal question" before the trial justice, who did not err in arriving at her decision.
The trial justice addressed the following evidence that was adduced at the council hearing. First, she observed that petitioner's expert, Scott Moorehead (Moorehead), an engineer and professional land surveyor, "conceded that the potential for ground water basement flooding in this particular subdivision was the worst he had worked on for such a wide area." Moorehead's testimony was unequivocal on this point. At the hearing before the council, the following colloquy occurred between Moorehead and a council member:
"Q. Mr. Moorehead, have you been associated with any proposed developments where the .potential ground water basement flooding before the development was built appeared to be worse than the situation here?
"A. Where the existing condition was worse than this?
"Q. Yes.-
"A. I cannot think of one where it was worse on such a wide area."
Second, the trial justice pointed out that "members of the Council also based their decision on personal knowledge of the poor drainage history of the proposed site." The trial justice correctly cited our decision in Perron v. Zoning Board of Review of Burrillville, 117 R.I. 571, 576, 369 A.2d 638, 641 (1977), in which we held that evidence gleaned from the personal observations of zoning board members constituted "legally competent evidence upon which a finding may rest if the record discloses the nature and character of the observations upon which the board acted." See also Dawson v. Zoning Board of Review of Cumberland, 97 R.I. 299, 302-03, 197 A.2d 284, 286 (1964) ("when a board of review has made an inspection of premises and disclosed in the record the conditions and circumstances it observed this court will treat such conditions and circumstances so disclosed as constituting legal evidence capable of sustaining a board's decision in an appropriate case"). The trial justice found, and petitioner's counsel conceded at oral argument, that council members may rely on their own expertise to the same degree and under the same conditions as can members of a zoning board. Contrary to the assertion that the council members here "didn't make any observations" that met the Perron standard, our review of the record revealed that several council members made detailed personal observations. For example, Councilman Miranda stated that he and Councilman Sullivan had traveled to the area of the proposed subdivision on an occasion two days after a rainfall, "and there was no doubt in my mind that that land was [still] wet." Several members of the council reported their personal knowledge that the area of the proposed subdivision was a high-density water area and that neighbors in the area had experienced flooded basements and had expressed concerns about any proposed development in the area. Moreover, Councilman Sullivan disclosed that he had walked the neighborhood in the past and familiarized himself with the problems of the residents in that area.
"I have seen it with my own eyes. They get up during the middle of the night. They open their doors. They see children's toys floating around their cellars. They have the tiles in the basement floor lifted up. They have their rugs curled. They have furniture in and around the area destroyed. Is there a guarantee the city council will give them by approving this subdivision here tonight that those concerns and fears of the neighborhood would be taken care of, I don't think so."
The Superior Court's review of the decision of a board of review or plan commission is circumscribed and deferential as foreordained by our pronouncement in Grossman that "judicial scrutiny of an agency's factfind-ing is limited to determining] if there is any competent evidence upon which the agency's decision rests." Grossman, 118 R.I. at 285-86, 373 A.2d at 501. Moreover, "the trial justice's review should [be] restricted to a search of the record and the search should [be] limited to the discovery of the necessary competent evidence." Id. at 286, 373 A.2d at 501. (Emphases added.) Contrary to petitioner's explicit and implicit assertions, neither § 45-23-20 nor our interpretation thereof in Grossman requires that a- trial justice identify and cite all competent evidence in the record upon which a decision is based, nor do they limit "competent evidence" to evidence that establishes unequivocally that a proposed development will have deleterious effects on the surrounding area. Cf. Grossman, 118 R.I. at 279, 373 A.2d at 498 (holding that an aggrieved party is "not required to prove that his property would in fact suffer the requisite degree of harm before he [can] seek judicial assistance") (citing Jeffrey v. Platting Board of Review of South Kingstown, 103 R.I. 578, 239 A.2d 731 (1968)); see also Zimarino v. Zoning Board of Review of Providence, 95 R.I. 383, 386, 187 A.2d 259, 261 (1963) (defining "reasonably competent evidence" upon which administrative boards may rely as "any evidence that is not incompetent by reason of being devoid of probative force as to the pertinent issues").
The dissent's citation to Jeffrey v. Platting Board of Review of South Kingstown, 103 R.I. 578, 239 A.2d 731 (1968), is misleading in this regard. The Jeffrey Court addressed whether a planning board had abused its discretion when it approved a proposed subdivision plan. The planning board had recommended to its city council that the existing zoning requirement that proposed subdivisions average 20,000 square feet be increased to 80,000 square feet. The planning board then approved the subject proposed subdivision that averaged 40,000 square feet. Id. at 581, 239 A.2d at 734. We upheld the planning board's decision, noting that the board had approved the subject proposal before the city council had voted to change the zoning regulation. Id. at 587, 239 A.2d at 737. It was in the context of the discussion of this narrow issue that the Court reasoned that planning board and city council members must act pursuant to rules and regulations pertaining to subdivisions that they have enacted, "and they have no discretion to disapprove a plat that conforms to those rules." Id. Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, we do not view this language, when considered in its appropriate context, as dictating that a planning board may in no circumstances reject a proposed plan that conforms to existing zoning regulations but might otherwise be problematic. Were we to adopt the dissent's constrained view, we would undermine our holding in Grossman, a decision rendered nearly ten years after Jeffrey. As noted ante, Grossman established that "any competent evidence" in the record will obligate a trial justice to affirm a planning board's decision. The Grossman Court did not hold, and we decline to so hold today, that a trial justice must affirm a planning board's denial of an application only when any competent evidence exists on the record and the proposed subdivision fails to comply with existing zoning regulations.
The evidence specifically referred to in the trial justice's decision as well as additional evidence in the record fully justified the denial of Sunnybrook's proposal for a subdivision that would have intensified the land use in an area plagued with drainage problems. For example, nearby homeowner Donald Barton testified at the council hearing that he experienced chronic problems with basement flooding and poor drainage in his back yard, "especially since the duplexes were added to the end of it." He further testified, contrary to Moorehead's statements to the council, that runoff water does not simply run down the road along which the proposed development would be built, rather "[i]t runs down the road and goes between my house and my next door neighbor who is closer to the development, and it goes into my backyard. From there it can't really go too far until the ground level goes down. So I have a serious problem." Barton related that since the construction of nearby duplexes, every spring the "pond [in my backyard] get[s] bigger and bigger and bigger."
Therefore, on the basis of the record and the well-established standard of review of Superior Court decisions in planning board cases, we hold that the trial justice acted well within the authority conferred by § 45-23-20 in affirming the council's decision.
The petitioner next argued that the council "had concluded prior to the hearing that no further development would be allowed in the area of the proposed subdivision, no matter what project was placed before [it]," and alleged further that the council's "obvious predisposition to deny the Petition [was] indicative of a constitutionally defective hearing, violative of the requirements of due process." By implication, petitioner contended, the trial justice erred in not recognizing the alleged due process violation. We find this claim to be without merit.
The transcript of the hearing before the council revealed that petitioner's proffered exhibits were accepted into the record without objection and that petitioner presented three witnesses, including himself, who were questioned extensively by council members. Furthermore, it was petitioner's then-counsel who indicated to the council members that petitioner would "not [be] agreeable" to the suggestion of Councilman Sullivan that developers post a ten-year bond "to guarantee the neighbors and the City [that] if they had any increase[d] water problems in that area," the developers would correct them. That the council proposed such an alternative undermines petitioner's contention that the council intended to reject all proposals for development in the area in question in any circumstance. Hence, the trial justice correctly determined that petitioner was given "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Millett v. Hoisting Engineers' Licensing Division of the Department of Labor, 119 R.I. 285, 296, 377 A.2d 229, 236 (1977) (quoting Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir.1973)). Consequently, we affirm the trial justice's conclusion that
"[t]he questions and answers provided demonstrate that members of the City Council carefully considered [petitioner's] proposal at the council meeting. The fact that the council could not be persuaded to approve the project is not violative of due process."
The petitioner's final contention was that the council's decision was clearly erroneous because "the only competent evidence on the record relative to the drainage issue," namely, the recommendation of CDM and the testimony of Moorehead, was not "discredited, contradicted, or even questioned," and thus the trial justice erred in failing to acknowledge the council's alleged error. Not only does our discussion of the evidence ante refute this claim, but at the hearing before the council, members clearly questioned and discredited the testimony and evidence put forth by petitioner. For example, in response to questioning from one council member concerning the likely result if one of the four catch basins to be built by Sunnybrook were to become clogged with leaves and other debris, Moorehead stated that "[t]here could be street flooding problems, we certainly could end up with some ponding situation within the streets either within the development or out in the intersection with [the main road]."
Moorehead also testified that Sunny-brook's proposal included replacing about 900 feet of the city's existing drains that were only approximately ten years old and had a life expectancy of "30 to 50 years or more," because the existing pipes "are undersized to accept this development." The following discussion took place relative to the replacement of the pipes:
"COUNCILMAN LYNCH: The maintenance of this drainage system, this elaborate system becomes city property, correct?"
"A. The pipe system will become city property as all the other drains in the city.
"COUNCILMAN LYNCH: So that becomes an additional city maintenance?
"A. That is correct.
"COUNCILMAN LYNCH: If it works or doesn't work, we own it, correct? "
"A. You would own it, yes."
Moreover, according to Moorehead, the houses "will all be built slab on grate since we have only two feet to three feet to the ground water table," thereby indicating that basements could not be built. Finally, Moore-head, perhaps with more candor than he intended, revealed, "As I stated, it is my professional opinion this project will not make — should not make the [drainage] situation worse and in some instances will actually improve the situation." (Emphasis added.)
Although it is true that Moorehead testified before the council that "reports regarding subdrainage have been reviewed by the city staff and Camp, Dressier [sic ] & McKee, and they have agreed with our conclusions that it will help alleviate problems and certainly not increase any existing problems that are there," we are of the opinion that the council could accept the assurances of Moorehead and CDM that Sunnybrook's modified proposal would have no deleterious effects on abutting property; equally permissibly, the council could rely on the competent evidence militating against approval of the proposed subdivision plan. We are constrained to point out that in asserting that "no other competent evidence" existed on the record aside from evidence tending to show that the proposed subdivision would not exacerbate, and might alleviate, existing drainage problems, the dissent disregards, for example, Moorehead's testimony that potential street flooding could result from the clogging of the catch basins to be installed as part of the proposed subdivision, and ignores Moore- head's admission to Councilman Lynch that maintenance of the new piping to be installed as part of the proposed subdivision would become the responsibility of the city.
Our brother erroneously suggests that only expert testimony could competently establish the probability of the exacerbation or alleviation of the drainage conditions in the area of the proposed development. But there is no talismanic significance to expert testimony. It may be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact, Kyle v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 106 R.I. 670, 673, 262 A.2d 636, 638 (1970); Cianciarulo v. Tarro, 92 R.I. 352, 361, 168 A.2d 719, 724 (1961), particularly when there is persuasive lay testimony on the actual observed effects of prior residential construction. The subject matter here was not so arcane that inferences from factual lay testimony could not be drawn by members of the council based, in part, on their own expertise. In Salve Regina College v. Zoning Board of Review of Newport, 594 A.2d 878, 881-82 (R.I.1991), we held that lay testimony regarding traffic data was not competent and had no probative force. Here, lay testimony is competent in respect to the presence of water in one's basement and such lay testimony describing physical facts and conditions does constitute evidence from which the planning board could fairly draw inferences.
Moreover, the petitioner's assertion that his evidence was not questioned is simply erroneous. After the petitioner's witnesses had testified, Councilman Lynch concluded; "[No developer] has ever been able to come before us and guarantee that [its plan] would not have a reversed [sic ] effect on the neighborhood. I thought to myself, God, this is the third drainage plan he had presented to us and McKee the same thing. [T]he salesman selling your houses is not going to explain [the problem] to the people buying it . I am not convinced that this would not have an ill effect on the neighborhood." Councilman Larisa stated: "I don't think the problem is the development. The only real basis we have for objecting to this proposal is we are not convinced it wouldn't make the [drainage] problem worse than it is." And the mayor reasoned: "We have had these engineers up before and they have told us the same thing. People still have water in their cellar. So much for that. We have had other people come up and tell us it is going to work out because I got another drain. I got a new idea. It never did."
In conclusion, therefore, in light of the foregoing analysis, we deny the petition for certiorari, quash the writ improvidently issued, and affirm the judgment of the Superi- or Court, to which the papers in this case may be returned with our decision endorsed thereon.
. The petitioner's appeal subsequently was dismissed on the holding of Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 289 (R.I.1993), that, given the absence of a statutory right of appeal, "we shall review judgments of the Superior Court in planning-board cases only by writ of certiorari."
. The dissent fails to recognize an important distinction in citing to our decision in Salve Regina College v. Zoning Board of Review of Newport, 594 A.2d 878 (R.I.1991). Whereas a trial justice reviewing the decision of a planning commission or board of review pursuant to G.L.1956 § 45-23-20 must affirm the decision of a planning commission or board of review if "any competent evidence" exists on the record to support the decision, see ante, a trial justice reviewing the decision of a zoning board of review operates under a different standard. As the Court correctly observed in Salve Regina, a trial justice conducting the latter review "must examine the entire record to determine whether 'substantial' evidence exists to support the board's findings." Id. at 880 (quoting DeStefano v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 122 R.I. 241, 245, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979)). (Emphasis added.) In granting the petition for certiorari (thereby reversing a Superior Court judgment that affirmed the zoning board's denial of the petitioner's application for a special zoning exception), the Salve Regina Court specifically held that the zoning board's denial "constituted an abuse of discretion by the board and [that] its findings were clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record." 594 A.2d at 882. (Emphasis added.)
. In E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 118 R.I. 276, 373 A.2d 496 (1977), a planning board of review granted property owners' appeal of the approval of a proposed subdivision of property abutting their land. This Court vacated a trial justice's ruling that overturned the planning board's decision to grant the appeal. Id. at 288, 373 A.2d at 502. In that case, the owners of a farm that abutted a proposed subdivision plat contended that the subdivision proposal that had been approved by a planning board did not provide adequate drainage and failed to afford protection to them from the effects of surface-water runoff onto their farm. Id. at 278, 373 A.2d at 498. We found "an abundance of competent evidence to support the review board's finding as to the lack of controls regulating the surface flowage from [the proposed subdivision] onto the farm." Id. at 287-88, 373 A.2d at 502. Notably, the Court identified as "abundant" three pieces of evidence: the fact that the planning board which approved the subdivision had assumed that the engineer who testified in favor of it had based his assessment on the calculation of a twenty-five-year rainfall, whereas he had only utilized a fifteen-year rainfall; the testimony of the son of the farm owners, stating that the construction of nearby housing developments had resulted in the decreased ability of adjoining land to hold water and that he believed the proposed subdivision would adversely effect the value of his parents' farm; and the admission of the engineer that, as a result of the proposed subdivision, more water would end up on a buffer strip intended to prevent seepage onto the farm owners' land. Id. at 286-87, 373 A.2d at 502.
. Although our dissenting brother correctly characterizes Jeffrey 's holding as presented in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 210 (R.I.1997), he again fails to consider the particular and limited context in which Jeffrey was cited. In L.A. Ray, the citation to and characterization of Jeffrey immediately followed our observation of the trial justice's conclusion "that because the only basis for denial [of the plaintiffs' subdivision applications] was the application of the town's invalid referendum amendment, [the] plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of law to final approval of those subdivisions." 698 A.2d at 210. (Emphasis added.)
. As noted ante, the planning board recommended that the council approve Sunnybrook's modified proposal only on condition that
"all the items needing correction or clarification raised in the following [specified] technical staff memorand[a] be addressed prior to petition for final plat approval That any variance(s) necessary for construction be sought and received prior to petition for final plat approval That [Department of Environmental Management] approval be received prior to final plat approval."
The comments in the technical staff memoran-da to which the planning board referred included a September 10, 1993 memorandum from Daniel Pennington, Acting City Engineer, to Julia A. Forgue, Director of Public Works, with the observation: "In the past, the issue of groundwater contamination at the site has been raised and reports have been submitted by the developer pursuant to this issue. This office, however, does not possess the expertise necessary to properly evaluate such reports and will not offer opinions as to their content." An August 18, 1993 memorandum from Kenneth B. Booth, Distribution and Collection Superintendent, to Daniel Pennington, noted that "[t]here is no detail plan showing the trench and bedding for the water main."
. The dissent's stated concern that "an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors' antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997)" invites the very "misleading apples-to-oranges comparison" that the majority is chided for sanctioning. Notably, in L.A. Ray, this Court held, inter alia, that
"the plaintiff [landowners] were denied substantive due process as a result of the illegal, unauthorized actions by agents of the state acting under color of law. Town officials illegally altered a referendum and distributed the 'new,' invalid zoning ordinance to the relevant departments and boards, violated a Superior Court order regarding the plaintiffs' right to a hearing, and directly interfered with the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property interests. Moreover, this egregious conduct was undertaken with express animus toward the plaintiffs and without actual or legal basis." Id. at 214. (Emphases added.)
Moreover, we expressly "note[d] with particularity that our holding in [L.A. Ray] does not portend that every rejection of a development project will support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim," and we observed that "[i]t is evident that this case does not represent the routine developer's claim or zoning denial." Id.
. To the extent that petitioner indirectly raised a claim of a confiscatory taking, we note that other remedies, such as an action in inverse condemnation, are available to him. See, e.g., Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249 (R.I.1997) (the plaintiff, whose application for development of property containing wetlands was denied by Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, brought action in inverse condemnation).
. Councilman Sullivan stated:
"Your professional opinion may not be good enough for these neighbors. They want a guarantee they are not going to get any more water in their cellars. They want a guarantee they can live in peace. They are not going to wake up in the morning from this subdivision causing problems, and they don't want any more problems coming into the area."
. Although we express no opinion in respect to petitioner's claim that the council's request for a ten-year bond was "beyond the statutoiy authority of the council acting in its capacity as Plan Commission Board of Review," we note that the propriety and the necessity for such a request may not be as dubious as petitioner intimates. See, e.g., Zannini v. Downing Corp., 701 A.2d 1016 (R.I.1997) (per curiam) (upholding Superi- or Court judgment of contempt wherein the appellant failed to comply with Superior Court order to install one of two specified drainage systems to afford relief to property owner whose land was damaged by surface-water runoff created by the appellant's development of adjacent property over ten years earlier).