Case Name: Robert Paul FUHRER, d/b/a Robert Paul Fuhrer Co., Appellant, v. William L. RINYU and Altype Mortgage Service Co., Inc., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1982-10-28
Citations: 647 S.W.2d 315
Docket Number: No. 2356cv
Parties: Robert Paul FUHRER, d/b/a Robert Paul Fuhrer Co., Appellant, v. William L. RINYU and Altype Mortgage Service Co., Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before NYE, C.J., and YOUNG and GONZALEZ, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 647
Pages: 315–319

Head Matter:
Robert Paul FUHRER, d/b/a Robert Paul Fuhrer Co., Appellant, v. William L. RINYU and Altype Mortgage Service Co., Inc., Appellees.
No. 2356cv.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.
Oct. 28, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1982.
Second Motion for Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1983.
Brian J. Almengual, Lapin, Totz & Mayer, Houston, for appellant.
Jerry Hamilton, Houston, for appellee.
Before NYE, C.J., and YOUNG and GONZALEZ, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
This is an appeal in a suit to enforce a foreign judgment. Robert Paul Fuhrer, d/b/a Robert Paul Fuhrer Co., appellant-plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the Common Pleas Court, Wayne County, Michigan, against William L. Rinyu and Altype Mortgage Service Co., Inc., appellee-defend-ants. Appellant then brought suit in Harris County, Texas against appellees based on the Michigan judgment. Appellees defended this suit on the basis that the Michigan judgment was void for the reason that service obtained on them in the Michigan proceeding was invalid.
In a trial without a jury in Texas, appellant's entire case consisted of the authenticated copy of the judgment from the Michigan court and an order authorizing issuance of an alias summons and service upon defendants by first class mail. Prior to the issuance of this order, the Michigan court had found that the appellees were willfully evading service of process. In the trial in Texas, Rinyu testified that he was not "served" with process. The issue, however, is not whether appellees had notice of this suit in Michigan but whether appellees successfully rebutted the presumption of regularity of the Michigan judgment. We reverse and render.
On March 17, 1975, summons and pleadings were mailed to Altype Mortgage Service Company at its last known address in Michigan (appellee was an officer of Altype at the time in question). This mail was by certified mail, return receipt requested. It was returned undelivered. Appellant learned that Altype had gone out of business and that Rinyu had moved to Texas so on March 10,1975, appellant's attorney sent summons and pleadings to the Sheriff of Harris County requesting service on both defendants at either of two addresses. The first such address was 3101 Las Palmas in Houston and the second address was 5353 Dora Lane in Houston. The Sheriff's return indicated that despite diligent attempts, service could not be affected on either defendant at either of the two addresses.
On May 2, 1975, appellant's attorney mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the summons and pleadings to W.L. Rinyu at both addresses. The documents sent to the Las Palmas address were refused. The documents sent to Dora Lane were returned indicating that the addressee was unknown. Along with mailing the documents by certified mail, return receipt requested, appellant's attorney mailed them by regular, first class mail to the Las Palmas address pursuant to a specially drafted order executed by the Michigan court, authorizing the issuance of an alias summons and service upon defendant by first class mail. This order was introduced into evidence in the Texas trial. It reads in pertinent part: "(3) That a copy of the alias summons and pleadings may be served on the individual defendant, William L. Rinyu, by mailing the same to him at 3130 Las Palmas, Houston, Texas 77000, and that the same shall be deemed to be service of process in this manner." This letter was not returned.
It is well settled that when a final judgment of another state rendered by a court on the merits is properly authenticated, it must be given full faith and credit by every other state. This judgment is entitled to the same presumption of regularity in jurisdiction as a domestic judgment and such presumption can be overthrown only by clear and convincing evidence of want of jurisdiction. The burden of proof with respect to the jurisdiction of the court of a sister state to render judgment is ordinarily on the party claiming want of jurisdiction. Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garman v. Reynolds, 284 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd); Mendlovitz v. Samuels Shoe Co., 5 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1928, no writ); 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 893 (1947).
The Michigan judgment appears on its face to be a valid, final and subsisting judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The introduction of an authenticated copy of that judgment made a prima facie case for appellant. Appellees then had the burden to establish that the Michigan court did not have jurisdiction. This they failed to do. Appellees offered no evidence to refute the findings of the Michigan court authorizing substituted service or the recitals in the judgment, nor did they show that the substituted service was invalid. There was no showing that the Michigan judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion or that the substituted service violated due process of law. We are therefore obliged by law to give full faith and credit to this Michigan judgment. Under these facts, it was error for the trial court to render judgment for appellees.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and here rendered for appellant in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars and No/100 ($2,000.00) with 5% interest per an-num from February 7, 1975.