Case Name: Rembrandt Peale v. J. Edward Addicks, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1896-03-30
Citations: 174 Pa. 549
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 55
Parties: Rembrandt Peale v. J. Edward Addicks, Appellant.
Judges: Before Stebrett, C. J., Green, Williams, Mitchell and Dean, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 174
Pages: 549–553

Head Matter:
Rembrandt Peale v. J. Edward Addicks, Appellant.
Promissory notes — Defenses—Taking note after maturity.
A person who takes a bill or note after it is due, takes it subject to all objections in respect of want of consideration or illegality, and all other objections and equities affecting the instrument itself and to which it was liable in the hands of the person from whom he takes it.
In an action upon a promissory note against an indorser, where the plaintiff’s statement shows that the plaintiff received the note after maturity, an affidavit of defense is sufficient which avers that the defendant indorsed the note as an accommodation to plaintiff’s assignor, and to enable him to raise money upon the note at his bank, and that defendant received no consideration for his indorsement.
Argued Jan. 27, 1896.
Appeal, No. 55, Jan. T., 1896, by defendant, from order of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., June T., 1895, No. 281, making absolute a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
Before Stebrett, C. J., Green, Williams, Mitchell and Dean, JJ.
Reversed.
Dean, J., dissents.
Assumpsit on a promissory note against an indorser: ■
Plaintiff’s statement was as follows:
Plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of $1,501.54, together with interest thereon, from the 21st day of April, 1895, all of which is justly due from the defendant to the plaintiff upon a promissory note, drawn by the Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Company to the order of “ Ourselves,” and indorsed by the said Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Company and the defendant for $1,500, dated January 18, 1895, payable three months after date.
The following is a copy pf said promissory note,:
“$1500.00 Woodbridge, N. J., Jan. 18,1895. '
“Three months after date, the Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Co., promises to pay to the order of Ourselves, Fifteen Hundred Dollars, at The First National Bank, Jersey City, N. J. Value received.
“ Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Co.
“ No. 60, Due April 21st. Geo. A. Kelly, Treasurer.
“ (Countersigned) J. Edward Addicks, President.
“ (Indorsed),
“ Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Co.
“ Geo. A. Kelly, Treasurer.
“ J. Edward Addicks.
“ Jno. W. Peale.”
Said note was indorsed by defendant and delivered to John W. Peale for a valuable consideration before maturity. It was subsequently indorsed and delivered by said John W. Peale, after maturity for a valuable consideration to the plaintiff, and is now in the possession and ownership of the plaintiff. Said note was duly protested for nonpayment, the costs of protést being $1.54.
Plaintiff therefore claims of defendant the said sum of $1,501.54, together with interest thereon aforesaid..
The affidavit of defense set forth:
That the Staten Island Terra Cotta Lumber Company, of which the deponent is the president, entered into a contract with John W. Peale by which the said John W. Peale was to deliver coal to the said company and to receive in payment therefor notes of the company without an indorser.
That this contract was carried out for some time by the delivery of coal, and the payment therefor by the notes of the company.
Subsequently, to wit, a short time before the indorsement of the note in suit, and during the running of said contract, the said John W. Peale stated to the said company that he was unable to use their notes unless they were indorsed, and suggested their indorsement by this deponent, but upon the matter being submitted to him by the company, he refused to indorse the same without some consideration.
Subsequently the said John W. Peale applied to him requesting him to indorse the notes and stating that he was not in any way fearful of the payment of the same by the company, but that he desired to use the same with his banks, which would not accept them unless they were indorsed by this deponent, stating at the same time that he would extend them when they came due as far as he was able to.
That for some time this deponent refused, but subsequently, as an accommodation to Mr. Peale solely and to enable him to raise money upon the said notes with his banks, he indorsed the said notes but received therefor no consideration whatever, and avers that it was distinctly understood hy the said John W. Peale that the notes were indorsed solely for his accommodation without value and for specific use with his banks.
That the note in suit was one of the notes which was executed in pursuance of the above facts.
That the present plaintiff received the same after maturity, as appears by the amended statement.
See the next preceding case.
The court made absolute a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
.Error assigned was above order.
O. Berkeley Taylor, for appellant.
John Gr. Johnson, for appellee.
March 30, 1896 :

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Cegdee Justice Stebbett,
This case was argued with number 209 July term, 1895— John W. Peale against same defendant — supra, p. 543, in which an opinion has just been filed. In principle, the eases are substantially the same. The only alleged difference, that need be noticed, is that in the case referred to the suit was brought by the person for whose accommodation the indorsement by the defendant was made. Li this case, the plaintiff is the immediate indorsee of that person, and received the note from him after maturity. If this be so, he is in no better position than the accommodated indorsee — the plaintiff in the other case: Clay v. Cottrell, 18 Pa. 408; Bower v. Hastings, 36 Pa. 285; Wilson v. Savings Bank, 45 Pa. 488; Hoffman v. Foster, 43 Pa. 137 ; Chester v. Dorr, 41 N. Y. 285. In one of these cases,— Bower v. Hastings, — it was held to be a good defense, in; an action by an indorsee against the maker of a promissory note, "that it was made for the accommodation of the payee, without consideration, and negotiated by him when overdue." The fact that the note in suit was indorsed and delivered to the plaintiff, after maturity, by the party for-whose accommodation the indorsement was made, is distinctly set forth in plaintiff's statement, and also in the affidavit of defense.
Again, as was said in Wilson v. Savings Bank, supra, " A pe'rson who takes a bill or note after it is due, takes it subject to all objections in respect of want of consideration or illegality, and all other objections and equities affecting the instrument itself and to which it was liable in the hands of the person from whom he takes it." The fact that defendant's indorsement was without consideration, and made at the request of John W. Peale, by whom the note was indorsed and delivered to plaintiff after maturity, sufficiently appears in the affidavit of defense.
. • We: think the learned court erred in holding that the .affidavit of defense is insufficient, as well as in assuming the sufficiency of plaintiff's statement.
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.