Case Name: Sims White against James Chambers
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1796
Citations: 2 Bay 70
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sims White against James Chambers.
Judges: Present, Burke, Grimke and Bay.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 70–76

Head Matter:
Sims White against James Chambers.
Charleston District,
1796.
Battery of a slave is ao-tionable by the master ; slave0 himself no* such'^aíí tl0If a slave is insolent to a freeman, he ought in the first place, to complain to the master or other person having charge of such ntSgro slave? who ought to give him redress. But if the master, or person having charge of such slave, refuse redress, then application should be made to a civil magistrate, who was boupcl to redress the injury. But he ought not to take revenge by his own arm.
SPECIAL action on the case, for beating the plaintiff’s negro man. r.
It came out in evidence on the trial, that the negro in question, had the care of his master’s fishing canoe on Sulli-varfs island, when the defendant went down to the landing P^ace where it was, and said he would take it, and go out fishing in it. The negro told him he could not have it, as a ° his master had given him orders to let no one take it away, as he was in the constant habit of using it himself, and he expected him down every minute to go out in it. The defendant, however, persisted in taking it away, and the negro in obeying his master’s orders in refusing to let him have it, upon which some high words passed between them on both sides, whereupon the defendant struck him a blow with his fist, and then took up a paddle, which was in the canoe, and knocked him down, and afterwards beat him very severely, which laid him up for several days before he was able to go about his master’s business again.
It was therefore for this injury done to his servant, that the master brought the present action.
The defence set up by the defendant was, that the negro was insolent to him, and that the beating was not more than proportioned to the nature of such insolent language. And further, that from the evidence offered in this case, the plaintiff could not maintain this action for a personal injury offered to the person of a negro, though it was admitted that if the plaintiff had declared, per quod servithnn amish, he might have supported the action for the loss of his la-bour, but not for any violence offered to his person ; for it is this loss of labour, which alone entitles the master to his right of action. That the plaintiff had declared for the per-* sonal injury done to his slave, and not for the loss of his services.
Upon the first ground of defence, the defendant alleged, that from the great number of slaves in this country, and their proneness to rudeness and improper behaviour, it was necessary that the freemen of Carolina should, at all times and in all places, possess a power to check them, whenever they were disposed to be forward or unmannerly, and to chastise them for insolent language whenever it was offered by them. And unless this speedy and summary mode of redress was allowed, this class of people could never be kept in order and due subordination. And that m the present case, the defendant had done np more than give the plaintiff’s negro a moderate chastisement for a very great degree of insolent and abusive language, which he had given on the occasion.
s Mm. tit. Master and Mervant, s68. 10 ci. 131.
Upon the second ground of defence, the defendant’s counsel contended, that a master could not maintain this action for a violence offered to a servant. A personal action could only be maintained by the party suffering the injury. It could not be transferred to a third person. And for the same reason it died with the party injured : it did not survive to his executor.
It was true, he admitted, that a servant might by the ... . , common law maintain an action for a battery, at the same time, that the master brought his for the loss of labour. But in this state, slaves possessed no civil rights. They could support no action in their own rights either by the common law, or any statute in existence here.
For the plaintiff it was argued in reply, that if the doctrine contended for by defendant, was to be established in this state as law, it would place the slaves of the planters and householders, at the mercy of every violent or vindictive man who might choose to give vent to his brutal resentments against this class of people.
. That the policy of our laws admitted of slavery, but the ■wisdom of our laws, at the same time required that the slaves of the country, should have every degree of protection, that their situation would possibly admit of. It was admitted, that they could not maintain actions for injuries in their own rights, so that they could no: defend themselves, by civil actions for redress of injuries offered to their persons. But this, it was urged, imposed an additional obligation on the part of their owners to step forward and afford them that protection. That the common law of England, from whence we borrowed our common law system, never had contemplated the condition of slavery, and therefore never had provided a remedy for injuries done to slaves. As, however, the laws of our state do allow and tolerate it, a redress ought to be established in all cases, proportioned to the evil.
It is a well known maxim, that there can be no injury without a remedy. Negroes are obliged to obey the orders of their masters in all lawful occupations. If, therefore, any violence or injury is done towards them, while they are fulfilling this duty, reason and justice require that their owners and proprietors should shield them from the unlicensed abuse of their persons, which can only be done in a peaceable way by civil suits, for this offence offered to their masters, through their slaves.
As to the necessity of enforcing due subordination among them, and compelling them to behave with due submission to their superiors, the law had provided a remedy, by application to a civil magistrate, who was authorized, in a very summary manner, to call to his assistance two freeholders, who had a right to order a slave to be chastised in a reasonable degree, to repress all improper conduct on the part of unruly and turbulent charac¡ers among them ; and that was the line of conduct, which every peaceable citizen should pursue in such case for insolence or improper conduct. And as this was generally done with temperance and cool deliberation, the example was more likely to have the effect, than by a freeman’s putting himself upon a footing with a negro, and taking satisfaction with his own arm.
But in the present case the plaintiff denied that his negro had behaved amiss on the present occasion. He had only obeyed his orders in keeping the canoe from being taken away, so that the defendant was the aggressor in the first instance, and as to the ill language alleged from the negro, there was nothing but the bare allegation of the defendant for it, which was no evidence in this court, in this action.

Opinion:
The presiding Judge charged the jury in favour of the plaintiff's right of action in a case of this kind ; and also, against the right of an individual's taking satisfaction by his own arm in the first instance, (unless violence had been offered to him,) before he had applied to the master or owner of such slave, or to a magistrate for redress. And. they found a verdict, for Si. sterling, and costs of suit.
Se psgfi 99. of the Public La-mmfSouth Carolina,
Upon a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trials Hearly the same grounds were taken, which had been urged on both sides, on the trial of the issue before the jury, when after argument the court determined, tha. this action ought to be supported from the necessity of the case, even if there had been no precedent to warrant it. The late chief justice had however informed them, that siriiilar actions had been supported by the.king's judges, many years ago, under the colonial administration ; and no doubt was entertained by them previous to the revolution, but that it well lay for this injury. Here, they said, were ancient precedents in its support.
Taking it upon principle, there could be no doubt upon the subject. Every injury must have a remedy. This was one of a serious nature and called for redress. If the common law of England had tolerated slavery, a remedy would doubtless have been provided by it, for injuries done to that class of people, in all parts of the British dominions. In the act of the legislature, however, extending that system to Carolina, then a province to Great Britain, there is a proviso or exception as to all those parts of it, zohich were in» . . ' . , . consistent with the particular constitutions, customs and LAWS 0† this (then) province, which left an opening for this part of the provincial constitution and custom of tolerating slavery, and every thing relative to the government of slaves in Carolina. One part of this custom orlaw of the then province, denied to slaves civil rights, but then it allowed to their masters or owners, every right for redress of injuries done to their persons, which was necessary to afford them protection. Hence the origin of the right of supporting the action now contended for. And the reason of the thing justified the adoption of such a principle in Carolina. The master enjoys the fruits of the labour of his slave. He is bound to obey his orders and injunctions, and as obedience and protection seem in the nature of things, to be reciprocal duties, he is bound in return to protect his slave from personal injuries, which can only be done in a peaceable manner by suit at law.
Compensation for the bare loss of labour, is not an adequate remedy, because very often an injury offered to a slave, in the execution of his master's commands, is a direct injury offered to the master who gave the orders, or an affront offered to his authority, which would too often lead on to quarrels and bloodshed, if some adequate remedy was not provided for this kind of injury offered to a slave. They were, therefore, all of opinion, that the action will lie by the master, for a battery committed on his slave, which had been sanctioned by precedent, as well as by the natural principles of justice and reason ; and that no inconvenience could arise from such a right, for the damages in every such case would always be under the good sense and control of the juries of the country, who would ever be able to apportion them to the nature and circumstances of the case.
That as to the other ground taken in this case, they thought the best rule would be, in all cases where a slave, behaved amiss, or with rudeness or incivility to a free white man, to complain to the master, or other person having the charge of such offending slave, who, if he was actuated by curtesy and civility to his neighbour, would on such application, give him the necessary satisfaction for every insult or piece of improper conduct which a slave had offered: and that this was the most likely means of preserving peace and good order in a neighbourhood, or in the community in general, without taking redress by his own arm, which the principles of the law would not justify. But if upon such reasonable application to the owner, or person who had the charge or government of such slave, he. was refused reasonable satisfaction; then, upon an ap> peal †0 a Cxvil magistrate it was his duty to see that repa~ ration was made, according to the nature and circumstances of the case.
Rule for new trial, discharged.
Present, Burke, Grimke and Bay.