Case Name: IN THE MATTER OF PAUL S. GORSKI, et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA SYMPHONY SOCIETY, INC. and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1983-11-01
Citations: 64 N.C. App. 649
Docket Number: No. 8210SC478
Parties: IN THE MATTER OF PAUL S. GORSKI, et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA SYMPHONY SOCIETY, INC. and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA
Judges: Judge Arnold concurs.
Reporter: North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 649–656

Head Matter:
IN THE MATTER OF PAUL S. GORSKI, et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA SYMPHONY SOCIETY, INC. and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 8210SC478
(Filed 1 November 1983)
Administrative Law 8 8; Master and Servant 8 111 — review of administrative decision by superior court — scope of review exceeded
In reviewing the decision of the Employment Security Commission, the superior court was functioning as an appellate court; therefore, it erred in determining unemployment compensation claims on grounds neither raised nor relied on in the proceedings appealed from.
Judge Becton dissenting.
APPEAL by defendants from Farmer, Judge. Order entered 29 January 1982 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 March 1983.
This case involves the unemployment compensation claims of sixty-two recent employees of the North Carolina Symphony Society, who were employed pursuant to a master contract between the Symphony and the claimants’ union. The contract extended through the 1982-83 concert season, and on April 12, 1981, the Symphony notified the union, as the contract permitted, that the contract was being terminated as of April 26, 1981 because of the Symphony’s inability to obtain necessary operating funds. Thereafter, the appellees filed claims for unemployment compensation with the defendant Commission, and after due notice their claims were heard by a Deputy Commissioner, who, on July 17, 1981, entered an order denying the claims. In doing so, the Deputy Commissioner concluded that the claimants had failed to show by the greater weight of the evidence that they had been available for other “permanent fulltime employment while filing claims for unemployment benefits.” The grounds for this conclusion included findings that the claimants expected to resume their jobs with the Symphony, which was raising funds, scheduling concerts for the next season, and negotiating a new contract with the union, as usual; they had been seeking only part-time and temporary employment in the Research Triangle area, and their seeming search for permanent full time employment as symphony musicians or teachers of music was not a real search for employment, since job opportunities in those fields are almost nonexistent.
Upon claimants’ appeal to the Superior Court being heard, it was found that the appellees “were involved in a group temporary layoff,” under certain regulations adopted by the Commission, and an order was entered directing the Commission to pay benefits for the first four weeks of the layoff, and to determine whether under the regulations actual registration for work was required of appellees as of the first day of the fifth consecutive week of their total unemployment. From this order both the Commission and the Symphony appealed.
Judith E. Kincaid for plaintiff appellees.
Poyner, Geraghty, Hartsfield & Townsend, by Marvin D. Musselwhite, Jr. and Cecil W. Harrison, Jr., for defendant appellant North Carolina Symphony Society, Inc.
V. Henry Gransee, Jr. and Donald R. Teeter for defendant appellant Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.

Opinion:
PHILLIPS, Judge.
In undertaking to decide these claims on grounds neither raised nor relied on in the proceedings appealed from, the Superior Court violated the fundamental rule that an appeal has to follow the trial. Grissom v. N. C. Department of Revenue, 34 N.C. App. 381, 238 S.E. 2d 311 (1977), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 183, 241 S.E. 2d 517 (1978). The course of these claims had been inexorably set in the proceedings appealed from; it could not be changed thereafter. The basis for the claims as filed was not that the claimants had been temporarily laid off, but that their employment with the Symphony had been terminated and they were seeking other permanent full time employment. The evidentiary hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, in accord with the notice to which none of the parties objected, was devoted to only the following issue: "Whether the claimants' [sic] are able to, available for, and actively seeking work without undue restriction or limitation." The forty-eight appellees who presented evidence all attempted to show to the Commission's satisfaction that their employment with the Symphony was over and they were available for permanent employment elsewhere, as the law governing benefits requires; none contended that they were temporarily laid off and not available for permanent employment. The appellants, on the other hand, undertook to show that the appellees did not meet the "available for work" standard established by G.S. 96-13(a)(3), since they expected to continue working for the Symphony, which was already preparing for the next concert season, and their efforts to obtain employment were so limited that they could not be successful. The Commission's decision, following the course the case had taken, was based on eleven findings of fact and numerous conclusions of law, all relating to the one issue raised; and in appealing therefrom, appellees stated for their only grounds that various of the findings were unsupported by evidence, and the conclusions of law that they were not genuinely attached to the work force and available for permanent full time work because of their continuing attachment to the Symphony and the limited market for their job skills were erroneous. Having gone that far on the course selected, the case could not be put on a different course by the Superior Court.
In reviewing the decision of the Employment Security Commission, the Superior Court was functioning as an appellate court. As such, its office was limited to determining two things: first, whether there was evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact, and, second, whether the facts so found sustain the conclusions of law and resultant decision. G.S. 96-15(h)-(i); In re Enoch, 36 N.C. App. 255, 243 S.E. 2d 388 (1978). It had no authority to make new findings, Employment Security Commission v. Paul's Young Men's Shop, Inc., 32 N.C. App. 23, 231 S.E. 2d 157, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E. 2d 396 (1977), but was bound by all findings and conclusions properly made. In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E. 2d 544 (1941).
To what extent, if any, the Superior Court undertook to review the decision of the Commission in the manner required, the record does not show. Since our own review of the record convinces us that the Commission's findings of fact are all supported by evidence and sustain the conclusions and decision made, rather than remand the matter for further proceedings, to the delay, inconvenience, and expense of the parties, we herewith vacate the order appealed from and remand to the Employment Security Commission for the reinstatement of its decision.
Vacated and remanded.
Judge Arnold concurs.
Judge Becton dissents.