Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mike NEWELL, Defendant-Appellant; STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melody JANES, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1989-04-13
Citations: 115 Idaho 1133
Docket Number: Nos. 17078, 17079
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mike NEWELL, Defendant-Appellant, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melody JANES, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BAKES, HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ. concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 1133–1137

Head Matter:
772 P.2d 1227
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mike NEWELL, Defendant-Appellant, STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melody JANES, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 17078, 17079.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
April 13, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 31, 1989.
Gunn & Hoff, Caldwell, for appellant Newell.
DeMeyer & DeMeyer, Middleton, for appellant Janes. Virginia R. DeMeyer argued for both appellants.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Kane, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent. Michael J. Kane argued.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an interim appeal from an order of the trial court which denied a motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. The only question presented here is that presented and ruled upon by this Court in State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983), i.e., the sufficiency of the information presented to a magistrate to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
During April 1986, Detective Alan Creech was personally visited at the Nam-pa Police Department by a person who refused to identify himself. That informant stated that he wanted to offer information about drug dealing by a particular person at a particular location. The informant stated that he had been in the residence of the drug dealer. He stated he had personally observed the buying, selling and using of illegal drugs. The informant stated the alleged dealer's first name and her former last name. He described the dealer's appearance and former employer, together with the approximate ages of her two children residing with her. He stated the location and surrounding of the alleged dealer's residence. He stated the former employer of the alleged drug dealer. The informant gave a description of a man who lived in the residence and also described that man's automobile.
The informant described in detail the items to be found in the residence in question. He advised that he had been at the residence on a particular date and at that time had observed a small suitcase containing methamphetamines and several pounds of marijuana, and that the suitcase was located under the coffee table in the living room. Additionally, he described the existence of several pounds of psilocybn mushrooms, a set of scales and other assorted equipment used in the preparation and distribution of drugs, together with IOU slips indicating money owed the suspect through the sale of drugs.
The detective thereafter, by personal investigation, confirmed all of the information given him by the informant regarding the location and appearance of the residence in question, and noted that during the times he had visited the area that there had been vehicular traffic to and from the residence, which in his opinion was consistent with a drug operation. The detective actually approached the house and in response to knocking on the door, was greeted by a male individual of the description provided by the informant. It was the opinion of the detective that the man was either drunk or under the influence of drugs.
Thereafter Creech applied for a search warrant and gave an oral affidavit in support of its issuance. The magistrate issued a search warrant which was executed, and a search conducted. As a result thereof defendant Newell was arrested and charged with possession of heroin, and defendant Janes was arrested and charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. A motion to suppress all that evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant was denied by the district court. This appeal results. The sole question presented is whether there was substantial evidence for the magistrate's ruling that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.
A substantially similar question was presented and resolved by this Court in the recent case of State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). There the Court pointed out that "[i]n reviewing the findings of a magistrate, our function is limited to ensuring that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. (Citation omitted.) Moreover, great deference is to be paid such determinations by reviewing courts." (Citation omitted.) See also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Lang, law enforcement officials had received a telephone call from an anonymous caller giving information about the alleged future transportation of drugs between Florida and Boise, Idaho. The Court in Lang, 105 Idaho at 683, 672 P.2d at 561, noted the decision of Illinois v. Gates, stating "Gates abandoned the two-pronged test of probable cause established in Aguilar v. Texas [citation omitted] and Spinelli v. United States [citation omitted], in favor of the more flexible 'totality of the circumstances' analysis."
We emphasize that the circumstances of the instant case are similar to Lang in that the search was conducted pursuant to the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. The only question presented is the sufficiency of the information furnished to the magistrate. As stated by this Court in Lang:
Our experience with the real-life application of the two pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli leads us to conclude that its unduly technical approach restricts the work of law enforcement, without affording a concommitant enhancement of protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The "totality of the circumstances" approach enunciated in Gates, together with the interposition of a magistrate between officer and citizen will secure the constitutional guarantee, while insuring that inferences from the evidence are drawn by a neutral and detached mind, "instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." (Citation omitted.) The approach in Gates affords the magistrate the opportunity "to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." (Citation omitted.) We thus abandon the test of Aguilar and Spinelli and adopt the "totality of the circumstances" analysis as the standard by which the magistrates of Idaho will determine the existence of probable cause.
Our decision today represents a major shift in our law of search and seizure; however, no purpose would be served by a lengthy exposition of all the reasoning behind the policy change, as all the arguments are reviewed thoroughly by the United States Supreme Court in Gates.
Lang, 105 Idaho at 684, 672 P.2d at 562.
We hold that the circumstances and the decision of the Court in the instant case is substantially indistinguishable from our decision in State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983). Hence, we affirm.
BAKES, HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ. concur.