Case Name: James Edward HOPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-12-03
Citations: 339 So. 2d 1152
Docket Number: No. 76-865
Parties: James Edward HOPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: McNULTY, C: J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 339
Pages: 1152–1153

Head Matter:
James Edward HOPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 76-865.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 3, 1976.
Jack 0. Johnson, Public Defender, Bar-tow, and A. Wayne Chalu, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
By information filed on July 15, 1962, appellant was charged with breaking and entering and grand larceny. He pleaded guilty on January 9,1964 and was placed on five years probation. On September 27, 1967, a warrant issued charging appellant with probation violation in that he left his approved residence without permission. On May 14, 1976, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of violating probation and was sentenced to fifteen years with credit for time served.
Appellant now appeals contending his probation could not be revoked on the basis of a nine-year-old warrant. We disagree.
It is clear that upon expiration of the probationary period the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the person of the probationer unless in the meantime the process of the court has been set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1963). Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300 (Fla.1962).
It is our opinion that the processes of the trial court had been set in motion by the warrant for appellant's arrest which was issued within the period of probation. Thus, revocation, though late in the coming, was timely initiated. Further, the sentence is not excessive as the maximum imprisonment authorized by statute at the time of conviction was fifteen years. Section 810.-01, Florida Statutes (1961).
Accordingly, the order of the lower court is affirmed.
McNULTY, C: J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.