Case Name: Hinton v. Insurance Co.
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1902-12
Citations: 110 Tenn. 113
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hinton v. Insurance Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 110
Pages: 113–131

Head Matter:
Hinton v. Insurance Co.
(Nashville.
December Term, 1902.)
I. BILLS OF EXCEPTION. Rule limiting time for filing, may be made; a nullity if filed after time or not affirmatively appearing to have been filed within the time.
A general rule or order applicable to all cases, or a special rule or order applicable to a particular case, may be made by the court prescribing a reasonable and limited time for the preparation and filing of bills of exception, during the term; and where such a general or special rule is made, or time for filing the bill of exceptions is extended beyond the -term under the statute providing therefor, it must .affirmatively appear to the supreme court that the bill of exceptions was filed within the time limited, otherwise it will not be considered, and if the record without such bill of exceptions shows no reversible error, the judgment below will be affirmed. (Pos#, pp. 117-120.)
Act cited: Acts of 1899, ch. 275.
Cases cited and approved: Muse v. State, 106 Tenn., 181; Jones v. Moore, 106 Tenn., 188; Wright v. Redd, 106 Tenn., 719; Patterson v. Patterson, 89 Tenn., 151; Mallon v. Mfg. Co., 7 Lea, 62, 66; Sikes v. Ransom, 6 Johns., 279.
3. SAME. Filed during term, if no rule to the contrary, but this is not a matter of right.
While a bill of exceptions may be properly made up at any time during the term, if there be no rule or order to the contrary in the court in which the case is tried, yet a party is not entitled as a matter of right to the whole of the term in which to present it. (Post, p. 118.)
Cases cited and approved: Mallon v. Mfg. Co., 7 Lea, 62, 66; Patterson v. Patterson, 89 Tenn., 151; Sikes v. Ransom, 6 Johns., 279.
3. SAME. Suggestion of diminution of record after decision allowed so as to show bill of exceptions filed within time, when,
Where the court raises the question and determines the point upon the record, without any suggestion or argument of counsel, that the bill of‘exceptions was not filed within the limited time, prescribed by the-lower court, an application by petition to be permitted to suggest a diminution of the record, and that upon the correction of a suggested error in dates being made, the cause be reheard, will be allowed. {Post, p. 121.)
4. SAME. Same. Record corrected upon admission of counsel without actual suggestion of diminution or award of certiorari.
Where the answer to such petition admits its allegations that the mistake alleged existed, it is not necessary that the suggestion of diminution should be actually made or certiorari awarded— the admissions contained in the answer to the petition when taken in connection with the petition, supplying the place of ’both and correcting the record so as to show that the bill of exceptions was filed in time. {Post, p. 121.)
5. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE. Trial before circuit judge without a jury and without legal request for written findings, and weight of his findings and judgment. No remandment, when.
Where_ the case is tried before the circuit judge without the intervention of a jury, and without a legal request for written findings, his judgment and his voluntary findings, if he file any, are to be treated like the verdict of a jury, when attacked on the ground that there is no evidence to support' the findings or judgment. In such case, if there is any evidence to sustain the judgment, and if there be no other reversible error, the supreme court will affirm the judgment, but if there be no evidence to support the findings or judgment, or if they were based upon in competent evidence, or if they are found fatally erroneous upon other grounds, the supreme court will then, upon consideration of the testimony at large, render such judgment as the circuit judge should have rendered, without remandment, except in special cases where a new trial is required to meet the ends of justice. (Post, pp. 128-130.)
Cases cited and approved: Fogg v. Gibbs, 8 Baxt., 469; Wheeler v. State, 9 Heisk., 393; Dawson v. Holt, 11 Lea, 589; Smith v. Hubbard, 85 Tenn., 306; Eller v. Richardson, 89 Tenn., 576; Glasgow v. Turner, 91 Tenn., 163; Simmonds v. Leonard, 91 Tenn., 183; Woodall v. Foster, 91 Tenn., 195; Montague v. Thomason, 91 Tenn., 168; Cowan v. Mfg. Co., 92 Tenn., 376; Settle v. Marlow, 12 Lea, 474; Stephens v. Mason, 99 Tenn., 512.
6. SAME. Requisites and defects of written findings of fact by the trial judge; what the record will be examined for; re-mandment upon reversal, when.
Where, under a proper request, the trial judge has made a decision in writing stating the facts found and the conclusions therein in accordance with the statute, the supreme court can look to the record or bill of exceptions as a part thereof, only for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any evidence to support the findings, or whether there is any error in the admissions or rejection of evidence, or whether such findings contain a substantial and intelligible response to the contentions of the parties as they appear in the evidence considered in relation to the pleadings; and if it appears that the findings .are proper in their technical frame and substance, then the supreme court confining itself wholly to the facts contained in the findings will determine the question of law arising from those facts and either affirm, modify or reverse the judgment of the court below; but if there is no evidence to support the findings, or if the findings do not contain »a substantial response to the request therefor, or if unintelligible, or so framed that no judgment can be safely pronounced therein one way or the other, the supreme court will reverse and remand for a new trial. (Post, pp. 130-131.)
Code cited and construed: Sec. 4684 (S.); 3673 (M. & V.): 2959 (T. & S. and 1858).
Cases cited and approved: McHale v. Wellman, 101 Tenn., 150, 153; Stanley v. Donoho, 16 Lea, 495.
7. CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE. Duty of counsel as to omissions from written findings of fact by trial judge.
It is tbe duty of counsel in tbe court below to call tbe court’s attention to any material facts in tbe record omitted from tbe written findings of fact made in pursuance of a proper request tberefor under tbe statute and ask to bave them incorporated. (Post, p. 131.)
PROM DAVIDSON.
Appeal in error from tbe Circuit Court of Davidson County. — John W. Childress, Judge.
Tip Gamble, for Hinton.
A. F. Whitman, for Insurance Company.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Neil
delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court.
This suit was begun on tbe 22d day of May, 1902, before a justice of tbe peace of Davidson county, on a pol icy of insurance for $156. In that tribunal the cause was decided in favor of the defendant, and from this judgment the plaintiff presented an appeal to'the circuit court of the county.
In that court the cause was again tried, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff on May 26, 1902, for $157.67, being the original sum sued for, with interest, and for all of the costs of the cause. On July 19,1902, a motion for a new trial was made and overruled, whereupon the defendant insurance company prayed and ^as granted an appeal to this court, and was allowed ten days to file a bill of exceptions; but that bill of exceptions was not filed until August 5, 1902, which was seventeen days after July 19th, and seven days beyond the time allowed.
The rule is that, when time is allowed to file a bill of exceptions, and it is not filed until after the time has elapsed, it cannot be looked to on the trial of the cause in this court (Muse v. State, 106 Tenn., 181 61 S. W., 80; Jones v. Moore, 106 Tenn., 188, 61 S. W., 81), and in such a case no other result can follow in this court, so far as depends upon the matters which should be contained in the bill of exceptions, except an affirmance of the judgment of the court below. Wright v. Redd Bros., 106 Tenn., 719, 63 S. W., 1120.
It is true that the cases just cited were addressed to chapter 275, Acts 1899, which was enacted for the purpose of allowing time after the adjournment of court for the preparation of bills of exceptions, while in the case béfore us it does not appear whether the ten days allowed would have carried or did earry the case beyond the adjournment of the term. But the principle is clear that, when time is allowed for the filing of a bill of exceptions, it must affirmatively appear that it was filed within that time; otherwise this court cannot look to it.
Again, if we should concede that the bill of exceptions could be lawfully filed after the expiration of the ten days, and within the term, it does not affirmatively appear that August 5th was within the term; and this fact we should be enabled to determine from the record, but this record we have before us is silent upon the subject. All that we have is that ten days were allowed for the filing, and the filing did not take place until seventeen days had elapsed. So, prima facie, in any event, the bill of exceptions was filed top late, and there is nothing in the record to rebut this presumption against it.
While a bill of exceptions may be properly made up at any time during the term, if there be no rule or order to the contrary in the court in which the case was tried (Patterson v. Patterson, 89 Tenn., 151, 14 S. W., 485), yet a party is not entitled as a matter of right to the whole of the term in which to present it. Mallon v. Tucker Mfg. Co., 7 Lea, 62, 66; Sikes v. Ransom, 6 Johns., 279.
In Mallon v. Tucker Mfg. Co., it was held that a general rule was not unreasonable which fixed fifteen days as the limit within which bills of exceptions were required to be presented after the verdict of the jury, or after the decision of the cause by the judge in non-jury cases. We see ño reason wby an order limiting the time for such preparation and filing may not be made in individual cases, and why, in the absence of a compliance with such order, the right to file may not be denied altogether. Without doubt the right to make such order would be of the greatest service to the parties in many cases where the terms of courts are long, and the facts in the cases supposed are numerous and complicated, and the questions arising-are many; such cases, in short, as would in all probability soon slip from the memory of the circuit judge, and make the preparation of the bill of exceptions a work of an exceedingly uncertain and unsatisfactory nature. Indeed, the conceded right to make such an order giving reasonable time, applicable to all cases, necessarily involves and includes the right to make it in each individual case, on the principle that that which is just as to the whole is just as to each of the parts composing that whole.
Moreover, even in the absence of such general order, no question of unfair discrimination could arise between different cases in the same court, because, while a limiting order may not be made in one case, yet may be made in another, there is always to be determined by this court the question of the reasonableness of the length of time given, which must to a great extent be measured by the nature of the case itself.
Applying the principle to the present case, the court can see that the facts are so few, and the record so small, the time allowed for the preparation of the bill of exceptions was not only reasonable, but most ample.
The bill of exceptions not having been filed in time, this court cannot look to it, and hence, as the record now stands, there is nothing to show error in the judgment of the court below.