Case Name: Edward T. CUTLER, Appellant, v. Cynthia CUTLER, In re The Estate of Edith Alice Cutler, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-09-03
Citations: 994 So. 2d 341
Docket Number: No. 3D04-3070
Parties: Edward T. CUTLER, Appellant, v. Cynthia CUTLER, In re The Estate of Edith Alice Cutler, Appellee.
Judges: Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE, GREEN, RAMIREZ, WELLS, SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, CORTINAS, ROTHENBERG, LAGOA and SALTER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 994
Pages: 341–353

Head Matter:
Edward T. CUTLER, Appellant, v. Cynthia CUTLER, In re The Estate of Edith Alice Cutler, Appellee.
No. 3D04-3070.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 3, 2008.
Billbrough & Marks, and G. Bart Billb-rough and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellant.
Brian R. Hersh and Andrew Teschner; Shutts & Bowen and William Jay Palmer, for appellee.
Goldman Felcoski & Stone and Robert W. Goldman, Naples; Brigham and Moore and John W. Little, III, West Palm Beach, as Amicus Curiae.
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE, GREEN, RAMIREZ, WELLS, SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, CORTINAS, ROTHENBERG, LAGOA and SALTER, JJ.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, REHEARING EN BANC, CLARIFICATION, AND CERTIFICATION
WELLS, Judge.
Appellant seeks rehearing, rehearing en banc, clarification, and certification of this Court's opinion filed February 28, 2007. We grant the motion for rehearing en banc, withdraw our prior opinion, and substitute the following modified opinion in its stead.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Edward T. Cutler appeals from an order declaring a devise of property to Cynthia Cutler, his sister, to be homestead property and exempt from the decedent's debts. While we affirm that portion of the order confirming that the devised property retained its homestead character even though titled in a trust at the time of the decedent's death, we reverse that portion of the order finding it exempt from the decedent's debts.
II. FACTS
In October 2003, approximately eight months before her death, Edith Cutler created a land trust for estate planning purposes. Edith, a widow with two adult children, named herself and her two children, Edward and Cynthia, co-trustees of the trust and conveyed her residence and an adjacent vacant lot to the trust subject to a life estate in herself. Edith was the sole beneficiary of this trust and retained the right to withdraw and appoint the principal of the trust to or for her benefit at any time. The trust also provided that the remainder interests in these properties, which were titled to the trust, would be distributed to Edith's estate upon her death:
[T]he entire remaining Trust Estate, including without limitation any accumu lated income, shall be distributed to the Estate of the Settlor to be administered and distributed as any other part of the Estate of the Settlor.
On the same day on which this trust was created, Edith deeded her residence and the adjacent vacant lot to it. She also executed a will, in which she specifically devised the residence titled to the trust to her daughter, Cynthia; she specifically devised the adjacent vacant lot titled to the trust to her son, Edward. She also directed that her debts be satisfied equally from both properties should the funds in her estate be insufficient to satisfy those debts:
[Article VI: I leave] all of my right, title and interest in the home in which I now live . to my daughter, CYNTHIA.... [Article VII: I leave] all of my right, title and interest in the . the vacant real property located next to my home in which I now live . to my son, EDWARD....
[Article XII: I direct that] [a]ll claims, charges and allowances against, and costs of administration of [ ] my Estate . shall be paid out of the residuary portion of my Estate to the extent that gift suffices. The balance of such items shall be paid out of and shall reduce equally the gifts under Article VI (the gift of my home to Cynthia .) and Article VII (the gift of the vacant real property next to my home to Edward .) herein.
(Emphasis added).
On June 6, 2004, Edith died. Because estate funds were insufficient to satisfy all of Edith's creditors, Edward sought to have the two parcels devised to Edith's estate abate "equally" in accordance -with his mother's express wishes. Cynthia objected. The trial court concluded that the residence retained its homestead status while titled in the trust and passed to Cynthia where it remained exempt from Edith's creditors after her death. Edward appealed. While we agree that the residence retained its homestead status even though titled in the trust, we do not agree that it passed to Cynthia free of the obligations Edith validly impressed upon it.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The property titled in the trust retained its homestead status.
To qualify for protection under Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, a parcel of property must meet constitutionally defined size limitations and must be owned by a natural person who is a Florida resident who either makes or intends to make the property that person's residence. Art. X, § 4(a), 4(a)(1) Fla. Const. (1985); Estate of Van Meter, 214 So.2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), approved 231 So.2d 524 (Fla.1970) (permanent "residence"); Raulerson v. Peeples, 77 Fla. 207, 81 So. 271 (1919)("owner"). See generally John F. Cooper and Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Florida Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 618-619 (4th ed. 2006).
Edward claims that the residence devised to Cynthia does not qualify as homestead property because it was not owned by a "natural person" at the time of Edith's death. We disagree.
This court, and other district courts of appeal as well, have confirmed that property held in trust may be impressed, legally speaking, with the character of homestead. Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (stating "[t]he constitutional provision does not designate how title to the property is to be held") (internal citations omitted), rev. denied, 879 So.2d 621 (Fla.2004); HCA Gulf Coast Hosp. v. Estate of Downing, 594 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (devise of house to spendthrift trust found to be irrelevant for purposes of homestead under Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution (2003)).
This court has also confirmed that the Florida Constitution does not limit the types of interests that may qualify for homestead protection. See Callava, 864 So.2d at 431 (confirming that the Florida Constitution does not limit the estate that must be owned to qualify for homestead protection). As our sister court in Southern Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So.2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), has stated:
The Constitution limits the homestead land area that may be exempted, but it does not define or limit the estates in land to which homestead exemption may apply; therefore, in the absence of controlling provisions or principles of law to the contrary, the exemptions allowed by section 1, article 10 [now Article X, section 4], may attach to any estate in land owned by the head of a family [now natural person] residing in this state, whether it is a freehold or less estate, if the land does not exceed the designated area and it is in fact the [natural person's] home place.
S. Walls, Inc., 810 So.2d at 570 (quoting Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 221, 143 So. 223, 226 (1932) (Whitfield, J., concurring)).
Based on the terms of the trust involved in this case, the remainder estate in Edith's residence titled in Edith's trust was correctly determined by the lower court to qualify for homestead protection.
B. The constitutional exemption from creditors' claims did not inure to Cynthia's benefit following Edith's death.
While we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the property devised to Cynthia was Edith's homestead, we cannot agree that the constitutional exemption from creditors' claims inured to Cynthia's benefit.
It is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that "the primary objective in construing a will is the intent of the testator." McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d 341, 344 (Fla.2005) ("a person can dispose of his or her property by will as he or she pleases so long as that person's intent is not contrary to any principle of law or public policy" (citing Mosgrove v. Mach, 133 Fla. 459, 182 So. 786, 791 (1938))); Marshall v. Hewett, 156 Fla. 645, 24 So.2d 1, 2 (1945) ("In will construction the primary objective of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the testator. In the ascertainment of such intention the will in its entirety will be considered, and when once the intention has been discovered the wording of the will be given such liberal construction and interpretation as will effectuate the intention of the testator so far as may be consistent with established rules of law.") (citation omitted); Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ("The polestar in construing any will is to ascertain the intent of the testator.").
In this case, the trust agreement expressly stated that the corpus of the trust, that is, the interests in Edith's residence and the adjacent vacant lot, were to pass to, and be administered as part of, her estate upon her death. Edith's will provides that the interest in her residence held by the trust should be passed to her daughter and that the interest in the adjacent vacant lot should pass to her son. She also directed that her debts be satisfied equally from both properties should the funds in her estate be insufficient to satisfy those debts.
In City National Bank of Florida v. Tescher, 578 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1991), the Florida Supreme Court held that property protected under article X, section 4(c) may be devised in a will to anyone if the owner is survived by neither spouse nor minor child. Warburton takes Tescher one step further and holds that homestead property not devised to a specific beneficiary passes to the residuary and retains article X, section 4 protection if the residuary beneficiaries are also qualified for protection. Warburton, 919 So.2d at 341; see also Snyder v. Davis, 699 So.2d 999, 1003-04, 1005 (Fla.1997) (confirming that homestead property not devised specifically becomes part of the residuary and will continue to be protected under article X, section 4 if the residuary beneficiary is also entitled to protection). Warburton also confirms that a testator may direct that homestead property be used after death in the same manner the testator could have used such property while alive. Warburton, 919 So.2d at 347.
This is not a recent development. It has long been recognized that the owner of homestead property may devise that property in a manner that terminates the protections accorded by article X, section 4. In Estate of Price v. West Florida Hospital, Inc., 513 So.2d 767, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court confirmed that where a testator directs the sale of homestead property and distribution of the proceeds, the proceeds lose their homestead character and become part of the estate subject to administrative costs and creditors' claims. As the court explained, this is because the same result would have obtained had the testator sold the property and either gifted or used the proceeds while alive. Id. ("[I]f Mrs. Price had sold her house during her lifetime and distributed the proceeds to her two children, those proceeds would unquestionably lose their homestead character and would be subject to the claims of her creditors."); see Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that because a will specifically directed that homestead property be sold and the proceeds placed in the residue for distribution along with other assets, it lost its homestead character); see also Thompson v. Laney, 766 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (confirming that where a will directs that homestead property be sold and the proceeds distributed, the proceeds lose their homestead protection).
Although Edith did not direct that her home be sold, she did direct, in a specific manner, that it be used to satisfy her debts. This was the equivalent of ordering it sold and the proceeds distributed to pay debts, actions which Price and its progeny confirm results in loss of homestead protections. While the benefits of homestead protections vest in a qualified beneficiary at the moment of a testator's death, the property in this case passed into the beneficiary's hands impressed with the obligation to pay the testatrix's debts, an obligation that deprived the property of homestead protection under article X, section 4.
This is, of course, wholly consistent with article X, section 4 which expressly confers the power on the owner of homestead property to sell, mortgage, or give it away. See Art. X, § 4(a)(2)(c), Fla. Const. ("The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse."). If a homestead owner (with no spouse and children) can sell, mortgage or give homestead property away while alive and use the proceeds from any such transaction as he or she sees fit, that same owner may give the property away upon death and order it to be used to satisfy debts even if such a devise means the property will no longer enjoy homestead protection.
In this case, rather than selling or mortgaging her homestead interests while alive and using the funds recognized to pay debts, Edith devised her homestead property to her daughter and expressly directed that this devise be used to satisfy a portion of her debts. This devise is wholly consistent with Tescher, Snyder, and Warburton and with article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution and should be given effect.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, if it was legally permissible for Edith to have left her properties to someone outside of her family not qualified for homestead protection, which would make this property subject to payment of debts, we see no reason why she could not lawfully leave it to her heirs with the provision that the properties be available to satisfy her debts. While we are hard put to imagine a situation where the desire to satisfy one's debts is deemed anything but laudable, we reach our conclusion today not out of concern for Edith's creditors, but out of consideration for Edith's legal right to have her wishes followed in the absence of any constitutional impediment. See Tescher, 578 So.2d at 703. We therefore grant rehearing en banc and reverse that part of the decision below concluding that the constitutional exemption from the claims of decedent's creditors inured to the property Edith Alice Cutler devised to Cynthia Cutler.
COPE, GREEN, RAMIREZ, SUAREZ, CORTIÑAS, ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ., concur.
. See generally Direction in will for payment of debts and expenses as subjecting exempt homestead to their payment, 103 A.L.R. 257 (1936) ("Express directions in a will for the payment of the testator's debts before devises shall take effect generally result in the subjection of a devised homestead, which would otherwise be exempt, to the payment of such debts.").
. See In re Estate of Hamel, 821 So.2d 1276, 1279-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (confirming that the proceeds from the sale of homestead property completed after a testator's death remained protected in the hands of adult children to whom the property was devised in the residuary estate and observing that "[gjenerally, property rights passing by virtue of the death of a person vest at the time of death. The same has been held true for homestead. If the property is homestead on the date of death, the homestead protection is impressed upon the land and the protection from creditors' claims inures to the benefit of the heirs to whom the property is devised.") (citations omitted); Thompson, 766 So.2d at 1088 (confirming that the recipient of a specific devise of homestead property "was entitled to sell the homestead property and its contents and keep the proceeds of the sale [secure from creditors]," because the will had not "specifically require[d] that the property be sold"); see also Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 696-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that "a general direction" in a trust document to pay the claims and expenses of the grantor's estate, does not subject protected homestead property to creditors claims).
. We find this analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850 (Fla.2007). In DeMayo, the Court decided that a client's waiver of the constitutional homestead exemption in a retainer agreement with a law firm, which allowed the law firm to enforce a charging lien against all of tire client's property, including his homestead, was unenforceable. The Court came to this conclusion in good measure based on the reasonable fear that such a waiver could unwittingly become an everyday occurrence, in effect eviscerating this important right. Thus, the Court observed in part that "[wjhile the exemption can be waived in a mortgage, for over a hundred years we have held that it cannot be waived in an unsecured agreement." DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850, 852. DeMayo relied in part on Carter's Administrators v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570 (1884), wherein the Court many years ago observed that "the very nature of the transaction [a mortgage or bill of sale] implies the exercise of discretion and the contemplation of inevitable consequences." It is clear to us that the execution of a will, with its statutorily imposed safeguards, demonstrates that same "contemplation of inevitable consequences." Thus, when a waiver of homestead exemption is expressed in a will, and the rights of neither a spouse nor a minor child are at issue, that intentional waiver should be given effect.