Case Name: ANGELO LAVERONE v. G. MANGIANTI et al.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1871
Citations: 41 Cal. 138
Docket Number: No. 2,395
Parties: ANGELO LAVERONE v. G. MANGIANTI et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 138–143

Head Matter:
[No. 2,395.]
ANGELO LAVERONE v. G. MANGIANTI et al.
Ferocious Doe.—The owner of a ferocious dog, knowing the vicious propensities of the animal, keeps it at his own risk, and is responsible for any injury inflicted by it upon a person who is free from fault.
By Crockett, J., dissenting:
Idem.—The owner of a dangerous or ferocious dog is liable for such damages only as result from his negligence in keeping it.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
The facts are stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett.
Botts & Wise, for Appellants.
A man may lawfully keep a fierce dog for the protection of his house, knowing that he will bite, provided he keeps him under proper restraint, and with due care. (Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 Carr. & Payne, 297.)
Quint & Hardy, for Respondent.
It is admitted that the dog was a ferocious animal, and accustomed to bite mankind, and, further, that the defendants knew it. The scienter being established, the law ere ates a liability on the part of the owners. (1 Abbott’s Forms, 442, Note 1; Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500; Auchmutz v. Ham, 1 id. 495; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Str. 1264; McCoskill v. Elliott, 5 Strob. 198; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496; Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. R. 482; Norris Peak, 487 S. C.; Blackman v. Simmons, 3 Carr. & Payne, 138; Popperell v. Rine, 10 Cush. 509.)
There are three, and but three, allegations necessary to be made and proved in this case:
> First—That the dog was vicious, and in the habit of (biting mankind.
Second—That the owners (defendants) knew it.
Third—That he bit and injured the plaintiff.

Opinion:
By the Court, Rhodes, C. J.:
It is insisted, on behalf of the defendants, that a person may lawfully keep a ferocious dog—one that is accustomed to bite mankind. That position may be conceded, and it may also be conceded that he has the same right to keep a tiger. The danger to mankind and the injury, if any is suffered, comes from the same source—the ferocity of the animal. In determining the responsibility of the keeper for an injury inflicted by either animal, the only difference I can see between the two cases is, that in case of an injury caused by a dog, the knowledge of the keeper that the dog was ferocious, must be alleged and proven, for all dogs are not ferocious; while in the case of a tiger, such knowledge will be presumed from the nature of the animal. This knowledge, however established, whether by evidence or by pre-. sumption, is the same in substance, and works the same results. When the facts in two or more cases are alike, the law will pronounce similar judgments. It will not be doubted that for an injury inflicted by a tiger, his owner will be responsible, and in my opinion there is as little reason to doubt that the owner of a dog, which he knows to be ferocious, is equally liable for a similar injury occasioned by it. In either case, the owner, knowing the vicious propensities and ferocious nature of the animal, keeps it at his own risk, and he should bear the responsibility for any injury inflicted by it upon a person who is free from fault.
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.