Case Name: Theresa Jean NORRIS, Appellant, v. Darrell TREADWELL, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-06-23
Citations: 907 So. 2d 1217
Docket Number: No. 1D04-3983
Parties: Theresa Jean NORRIS, Appellant, v. Darrell TREADWELL, Appellee.
Judges: VAN NORTWICK, J., concurs, and KAHN, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 907
Pages: 1217–1220

Head Matter:
Theresa Jean NORRIS, Appellant, v. Darrell TREADWELL, Appellee.
No. 1D04-3983.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 23, 2005.
David R. Black of Harrell & Johnson, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Francis J. Milon of Harris Brown, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HAWKES, J.
Appellant, Theresa Norris, lost at trial in her claim for personal injuries. Appel-lee, Darrell Treadwell, previously made an offer of judgment pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2004). Since the judgment was one of "no liability," the statute entitles Treadwell to an award of reasonable fees and costs.
Norris now seeks relief from her obligation to pay Treadwell's attorney's fees. Norris makes a technical argument that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 creates a very narrow "window" that only opens upon the formality of the filing of the judgment and closes 30 days later. Norris reasons that, since Treadwell's motion was served after the jury verdict but before the judgment was filed, it was outside this narrow window. Norris concludes that, by definition, the motion was untimely and must be denied.
Alternatively, Treadwell urges a reading under which the rule simply establishes a deadline for filing the motion. Having examined the law prior to the adoption of Rule 1.525, we conclude Treadwell's position represents the better view. We therefore affirm.
RULE 1.525
The Florida Supreme Court adopted Rule 1.525 to establish "the time for serving motions for attorneys' fees and costs." Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 773 So.2d 1098, 1098 (Fla.2000). Rule 1.525 provides: " Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal." (Emphasis added).
Rule 1.525 eliminates uncertainty as to the timeliness of motions for fees and costs. See, e.g., Carter v. Lake County, 840 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Ulico Cas. Co. v. Roger Kennedy Constr., Inc., 821 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Prior to the rule's adoption, a motion for fees and costs was required to be filed within a "reasonable time" after final judgment. See Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1991). This "reasonable time" standard led to a great deal of uncertainty in determining the timeliness of a motion, and therefore the obligations of a party. See Shipley v. Belleair Group, Inc., 759 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (contrasting seemingly inconsistent decisions regarding the reasonable time standard and opining that the "uncertainty created by this case law suggests that a rule of procedure concerning such motions might be appropriate").
In our view, the primary evil to be addressed by the supreme court's adoption of Rule 1.525 was the uncertainty created by excessive tardiness in the filing of motions for fees and costs. Decisions in which the courts found a motion untimely under the "reasonable time" standard generally note prejudice or unfair surprise. See, e.g., Graef v. Dames & Moore Group, Inc., 857 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Bal Bay Realty, Ltd. v. Pepsomers Corp., 833 So.2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
In contrast, we have found no cases where an appellate court applied the "reasonable time" standard to a motion served before entry of judgment, and found prejudice or unfair surprise to a party, so as to conclude the motion was untimely. In fact, it is hard to imagine a situation where a motion for fees and costs, filed after an adverse jury verdict, but before filing the judgment, could ever be prejudicial or cause unfair surprise to the losing party.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the purpose of Rule 1.525 is fully accomplished by an interpretation that establishes the latest point at which a prevailing party may serve a motion for fees and costs. The party seeking fees may serve a motion as soon as entitlement is established. The motion, however, must be served no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment. Here, the jury-verdict triggered entitlement. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting fees and costs to Treadwell. In doing so we certify direct conflict with Swann v. Dinan, 884 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
VAN NORTWICK, J., concurs, and KAHN, J., dissents with opinion.