Case Name: William H. EVANS, Appellant, v. Andrea M. PIOTRACZK, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-12-11
Citations: 724 So. 2d 1210
Docket Number: No. 97-3464
Parties: William H. EVANS, Appellant, v. Andrea M. PIOTRACZK, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 724
Pages: 1210–1214

Head Matter:
William H. EVANS, Appellant, v. Andrea M. PIOTRACZK, Appellee.
No. 97-3464.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 11, 1998.
Richard H. Ford and Michael R. D’Lugo, of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham, & Ford, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant William H. Evans.
W. Marvin Hardy, III, and David B. Fal-stad, of Gurney & Handley, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
After several months of litigation during which discovery was conducted, the defendant in a construction defect law suit brought in new attorneys. Shortly after being retained, the new attorneys filed a request for a continuance as well as an offer of judgment in the amount of $100. Ultimately the action went to trial and a defense verdict was entered which was sustained by this court. The defendant below then sought attorneys' fees based on his offer of judgment. The trial court rejected the claim for fees on the basis that the offer was not made in "good faith" under "the rationale of this Eagleman ease." Because the court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Eagleman v. Eagle-man, 673 So.2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we reverse for further consideration.
Even though the court in Eagleman sustained a denial of attorneys' fees based on a $100 offer, it did not hold that the amount of the offer in that case, in and of itself, justified a finding of bad faith. The court stated that an offer of judgment need not equate with the total amount of damages that might be at issue; the question to be considered by the court in determining good or bad faith is whether the offer bears a reasonable relationship to the amount of damages suffered and a realistic assessment of liability. In our case, the new attorneys represented that before they agreed to take the case, they talked to the previous lawyers, the insurer, and the prospective client and became familiar with the potential damages (which they set at $3,000) and the risk of liability (which they set at 5%) and decided on the offer of $100.
Eagleman suggests that the approach taken in this case was the appropriate one in determining what a good faith offer should be. In response to this argument in favor of the award of attorneys' fees, the court stated:
[Based on the Eagleman case] the court obviously has discretion in this matter. And I'd just as soon not even try and weigh those factors that Mr. DeLugo pointed out about ten thousand dollars and the three thousand dollar difference between the thirteen thousand dollars and the three to five percent of that. I just don't think that the hundred dollar offer at the time it was made and the circumstances it was made was in good faith.
The trial judge apparently reads Eagle-man as giving him unbridled discretion to find that a minimal offer is made in bad faith. Instead Eagleman recognizes that depending on the circumstances of a particular case, a minimal offer might well be justified and thus the court must look to the relative amount of potential damage and factor in the risk of liability in determining whether the offer is in good faith. The court in this ease simply, and as a matter of record, refused to do so. It is suggested that perhaps the judge didn't believe that the lawyers went through the analysis as represented by them. But there is no indication in the record that he refused to consider their argument on that basis. If that is his basis, he should so state when he reconsiders this issue on remand.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The court did not bother to indicate what "circumstances" he believed justified a finding of bad faith.