Case Name: ROMAIN v. FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2009-03-31
Citations: 483 Mich. 18
Docket Number: Docket No. 135546; Calendar No. 5
Parties: ROMAIN v FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Judges: Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh, Weaver, and Hathaway, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 483
Pages: 18–33

Head Matter:
ROMAIN v FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 135546.
(Calendar No. 5).
Argued January 21, 2009
Decided March 31, 2009.
David and Joann Romain brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company, IAQ Management, Inc., and Insurance Services Construction Corporation, seeking recovery of damages related to a mold remediation of the plaintiffs’ home. The court, John A. Murphy, J., summarily dismissed IAQ from the action after concluding that IAQ did not owe the plaintiffs a duty under either the contract involved or general negligence principles. Insurance Services subsequently filed a notice under MCR 2.112(K), naming IAQ as a nonparty at fault. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the notice, concluding that a nonparty must be a proximate cause of the injured party’s damage for the nonparty to be at fault. Insurance Services sought leave for an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied in an unpublished order, entered November 21, 2007 (Docket No. 278591). Insurance Services sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court issued a memorandum opinion denying leave to appeal on July 23, 2008, but then vacated the opinion with an order granting leave to appeal. 482 Mich 992 (2008).
In an opinion per curiam signed by Chief Justice Kelly and Justices Cavanagh, Weaver, and Hathaway, the Supreme Court held:
IAQ did not owe the plaintiffs a duty, and thus its conduct could not have been a proximate cause of the damage the plaintiffs sustained. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the notice, because a nonparty at fault must be a proximate cause of the damage sustained by the injured party. Kopp v Zigich, 268 Mich App 258 (2005), incorrectly stated that the comparative-fault statutes, MCL 600.2957 and 600.6304, do not require proof of a duty before fault can be apportioned and liability allocated, and that holding is overruled. Jones v Enertel, Inc, 254 Mich App 432 (2002), an earlier decision by which the Kopp Court was bound, correctly stated that, under Michigan law, a duty must be proved before the issue of fault or proximate cause can be considered. A legal duty is a threshold requirement before there can be any consideration of whether a person was negligent by breaching that duty and causing injury to another.
Affirmed.
Justice Young, joined by Justices CORRIGAN and Markman, dissenting, stated that the majority conflates the common-law concepts of proximate causation and negligence, that duty and proximate causation are two separate elements of a negligence claim and differ from the concept of fault, and that the comparative-fault statutes, MCL 600.2957 and 600.6309, do not require proof of a duty before a person may be found to be a proximate cause of an injury and allocated fault. By requiring a duty as a precondition of determining fault or proximate causation, the majority imports principles of common-law negligence into the statutes, a result that the statutes did not contemplate. The trial court’s order striking the notice of nonparty at fault should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings at which the relative fault of Insurance Services and IAQ can be considered.
Negligence — Duty — Proximate Cause — Nonparties at Fault.
Unless a nonparty owed an injured party a duty, its conduct cannot be a proximate cause of the damage sustained by the injured party, and it cannot be considered a nonparty at fault for purposes of MCR 2.112(K), the court rule permitting a court to assess the fault of a nonparty.
Blake, Kirchner, Symonds, Larson, Kennedy & Smith, EC. (by Kevin T. Kennedy, Rebecca S. Austin, and Christopher W. Bowman), for David and Joann Romain.
Cardelli, Lanfear & Buikema, EC. (by Anthony F. Caffrey III), for Insurance Services Construction Corporation.
Amici Curiae:
John A. Braden for himself.
Dickinson Wright FLLC (by Ehillip J. DeRosier, Trent B. Collier, and Doron Yitzchaki) for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.
Clark Hill PLC (by David D. Grande-Cassell and Kristin B. Bellar) for the Michigan Manufacturers Association.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The Wayne Circuit Court summarily dismissed IAQ Management, Inc. (IAQ), from this action because IAQ did not owe plaintiffs a duty under the contract involved or under general negligence principles. Thereafter, defendant, Insurance Services Construction Corporation, filed a notice under MCR 2.112(E) naming IAQ as a nonparty at fault. Because IAQ did not owe plaintiffs a duty, IAQ's conduct could not have been "a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party." Therefore, the circuit court properly granted plaintiffs' motion to strike the notice of IAQ as a nonparty at fault because a nonparty at fault must be a proximate cause of the damage sustained by the injured party. We affirm the circuit court's ruling.
We write briefly to eliminate a conflict between two published Court of Appeals opinions. Specifically, we overrule the statement in Kopp v Zigich that "a plain reading of the comparative fault statutes does not require proof of a duty before fault can be apportioned and liability allocated." That is an incorrect statement of Michigan law. In Jones v Enertel, Inc, the Court of Appeals held that "a duty must first be proved before the issue of fault or proximate cause can be considered." Under the "first out" rule of MCR 7.215(J)(1), the Kopp panel should have followed Jones or declared a conflict under MCR 7.215(J)(2). Because the Kopp panel did not declare a conflict, Jones is the controlling precedent and proof of a duty is required "before fault can be apportioned and liability allocated" under the comparative fault statutes, MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304.
In addition to being the controlling precedent under the court rules, Jones correctly stated Michigan negligence law; Kopp did not. As noted by this Court in Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp:
"In a common law negligence action, before a plaintiffs fault can be compared with that of the defendant, it obviously must first be determined that the defendant was negligent. It is fundamental tort law that before a defendant can be found to have been negligent, it must first be determined that the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff."
The same calculus applies to negligent actors under the comparative fault statutes. A common-law negligence claim requires proof of (1) duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation, both cause in fact and proximate causa tion; and (4) damages. Therefore, under Michigan law, a legal duty is a threshold requirement before there can be any consideration of whether a person was negligent by breaching that duty and causing injury to another. Thus, when the Legislature refers to the common-law term "proximate cause" in the comparative fault statutes, it is clear that for claims based on negligence " 'it must first be determined that the [person] owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.' " Additionally, MCL 600.6304(8) includes in the definition of fault "a breach of a legal duty . . that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party." Before there can be "a breach of a legal duty," there must be a legal duty. Without owing a duty to the injured party, the "negligent" actor could not have proximately caused the injury and could not be at "fault" for purposes of the comparative fault statutes.
Affirmed.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh, Weaver, and Hathaway, JJ., concurred.
MCL 600.6304(8).
MCR 2.112(H).
Kopp v Zigich, 268 Mich App 258, 260; 707 NW2d 601 (2005).
Jones v Enertel, Inc, 254 Mich App 432, 437; 656 NW2d 870 (2002).
MCL 600.2957(1) provides:
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each person shall be allocated under this section by the trier of fact and, subject to [MCL 600.6304], in direct proportion to the person's percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault under this subsection, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of each person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, named as a party to the action.
MCL 600.6304(1) requires the fact-finder to make findings indicating the total amount of damages and each person's total percentage of fault. MCL 600.6304(8) defines "fault" to include "an act, an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party." (Emphasis added.)
Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 99; 485 NW2d 676 (1992), quoting Ward v Kmart Corp, 136 Ill 2d 132, 145; 554 NE2d 223 (1990).
Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993).
Riddle, supra at 99 (citation omitted).