Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd McMELLON
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-01-14
Citations: 295 So. 2d 782
Docket Number: No. 53839
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd McMELLON.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., recused.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 295
Pages: 782–791

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd McMELLON.
No. 53839.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 14, 1974.
On Rehearing June 10, 1974
J. Isaac Funderburk, Abbeville, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appel-lee.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
The defendant, Lloyd McMellon, was charged by bill of information with simple burglary, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:62. He was tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced to serve six years in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, relying upon four bills of exceptions.
The background facts are clear. There was a burglary at approximately 3:00 a. m. on the morning of August 11, 1972 at Landry's Store in Abbeville, Louisiana. Two young boys who witnessed the crime saw a pickup truck parked by the store. Allegedly, one man was loading this truck, and another was inside the cab.
Law enforcement officers took Mc-Mellon into custody at his home about 8:00 p. m., on the same day. The officers took the defendant and a pickup truck that he owned to the Sheriff's office. Officers secured McMellon's permission to search the truck and did so. No pertinent evidence was found.
At about the same time, the police arrested Russell Murphy, a second suspect. Concomitant with this arrest, Murphy volunteered statements incriminating both himself and McMellon.
Murphy also told the police that two screwdrivers and two pairs of gloves which had been used in the burglary were in a toolbox in McMellon's truck. After securing McMellon's consent to a second search, the police re-examined the vehicle and found both the screwdrivers and the gloves.
Murphy pleaded guilty and, at trial, he was called as a state's witness. On the stand, however, he repudiated all prior statements incriminating the defendant.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 2 and 3
Murphy testified that he alone had committed the burglary. When he did so, the district attorney confronted him with the fact that he had made prior inconsistent statements. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved when the trial court permitted the state to impeach its own witness and Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved when the court denied a motion for a mistrial following Murphy's testimony.
LSA-R.S. 15:487 provides:
"No one can impeach his own witness, unless he has been taken by surprise by the testimony of such witness, or unless the witness show hostility toward him, and, even then, the impeachment must be limited to evidence of prior contradictory statements."
The defendant's argument in support of Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is that the State made an inadequate foundation and insufficient showing of surprise or hostility. We disagree.
The record reflects that Murphy made a number of oral statements, asserting that the defendant participated in the burglary. He later signed a formal written statement to the same effect. On the stand, he repudiated the statements and testified that he alone had committed the burglary. He testified against the State. The District Attorney properly pleaded surprise.
We find, therefore, that the state established an adequate predicate to allow impeachment of its own witness by proof of prior contradictory statements. See LSA-R.S. 15:487 and 15:488; State v. Refuge, 264 La. 135, 270 So.2d 842 (1972); State v. Knox, 236 La. 461, 107 So.2d 719 (1959).
As to impeachment, LSA-R.S. 15:493 provides:
"Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his testimony, he must first be asked whether he has made such statement, and his attention must be called to the time, place and circumstances, and to the person to whom the alleged statement was made, in order that the witness may have an opportunity of explaining that which is prima facie contradictory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making such statement, evidence that he did make it is admissible."
Here, the District Attorney did ask the witness whether or not the prior contradictory assertions had been made, furnishing sufficient particulars, as the statute demands. The record contains no indication that the witness misunderstood the contradictory assertions to which reference was made. After the defendant admitted the inconsistent assertions, neither the written statement nor testimony of the police officers who took the oral and written statements was offered.
The defendant complains that, in the examination of the witness, the District Attorney asked him specifically if he had made each of the several major inconsistent assertions composing- the written statement.
We find this complaint insubstantial. As provided in LSA-R.S. 15:493, the wit ness must be afforded an opportunity of explaining assertions that are prima facie contradictory. This can only be done by calling the contradictory assertion to his attention.
We note, moreover, that the defendant interposed no objection to the content of these questions at the time they were propounded. To the contrary, the defense waited until the District Attorney completed the examination and tendered the witness. At this point, he moved for a mistrial. When the motion was overruled, he reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 3.
Article 841 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
"An irregularity or error in the proceedings cannot be availed of after verdict unless it is objected to at the time of its occurrence and a bill of exceptions is reserved to the adverse ruling of the court on such objection."
As to questions propounded during trial, strong reason exists for requiring that the objection be made at the time of the question. Often the question can be withdrawn. See, e. g., State v. Maney, 242 La. 223, 135 So.2d 473 (1961). In other instances, it may be rephrased to remove the objection, either before or after the ruling of the trial judge.
In the present case, the objection raised by a motion for mistrial after the examination had been completed came too late.
We observe that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury, both at the time of impeachment and later in the general charge to the jury, that the impeachment evidence could be considered only on the issue of credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt. See State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971). Thus, undue prejudice as to the guilt issue was avoided.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2 and 3 are without merit.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 1 and 4
Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the denial of a motion to suppress evidence (2 pairs of gloves and 2 screwdrivers) seized as a result of a search of the defendant's truck. Bill No. 4 was reserved to introduction of these items into evidence at trial as well as to the introduction of the items taken in the burglary.
The record pertinent to the gloves and screwdrivers clearly shows that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave his consent to the search of the truck, where these items were found. This consent, moreover, was given after he had been apprised that he was suspected of having committed a burglary. The warrantless search was, therefore, proper. See State v. Nelson, 261 La. 153, 259 So.2d 46 (1972); State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867 (1967).
As to the introduction of the items taken in the burglary, the defendant contends that they were not connected to him. It was, however, incumbent upon the State to prove that a crime had been committed; these articles were evidence of that fact. The question of whether this defendant participated in the crime was a factual matter for the determination of the jury.
These two bills are without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
SUMMERS, J., recused.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
TATE, J., dissents for reasons assigned by BARHAM, J.