Case Name: BASKIN & SEARS, Mary Louise McManus, David I. Cohen and Susan W. Laatsch, Co-Executors of the Estate of Owen B. McManus, Deceased; Pittsburgh National Bank and Brandt, Milnes, Rea & Wagner, Appellants, v. EDWARD J. BOYLE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation; Edward J. Boyle, III; Michael D. Boyle and David Deasy, individually; and David M. Kaufman, Esquire, Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1984-11-20
Citations: 506 Pa. 62
Docket Number: No. 77 W.D. Miscellaneous Docket, 1983
Parties: BASKIN & SEARS, Mary Louise McManus, David I. Cohen and Susan W. Laatsch, Co-Executors of the Estate of Owen B. McManus, Deceased; Pittsburgh National Bank and Brandt, Milnes, Rea & Wagner, Appellants, v. EDWARD J. BOYLE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation; Edward J. Boyle, III; Michael D. Boyle and David Deasy, individually; and David M. Kaufman, Esquire, Appellees.
Judges: . Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 506
Pages: 62–74

Head Matter:
483 A.2d 1365
BASKIN & SEARS, Mary Louise McManus, David I. Cohen and Susan W. Laatsch, Co-Executors of the Estate of Owen B. McManus, Deceased; Pittsburgh National Bank and Brandt, Milnes, Rea & Wagner, Appellants, v. EDWARD J. BOYLE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation; Edward J. Boyle, III; Michael D. Boyle and David Deasy, individually; and David M. Kaufman, Esquire, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 8, 1984.
Decided Nov. 20, 1984.
Richard B. Tucker, Jr., Pittsburgh, for Pittsburgh National Bank.
Louis C. Long, Pittsburgh, for Baskin & Sears, Mary Louise McManus, David I. Cohen & Susan W. Laatsch, Co-Executors.
Herman C. Kimpel, Pittsburgh, for Brandt, Milnes, Rea & Wagner.
Patricia Liptak, Pittsburgh, for Edward J. Boyle Company and David Deasy.
. Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ZAPPALA, Justice.
Appellees Edward J. Boyle, III, Michael D. Boyle, David Deasy and Edward J. Boyle Company initiated an action in trespass and assumpsit in the civil division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas based upon the planning and administration of the Estate of Edward J. Boyle, Jr. After the decedent's death on September 20, 1975, his will was admitted to probate. The decedent, who was the sole shareholder of the Edward J. Boyle Company, bequeathed his stock in the company to his sons, Edward J. Boyle, III and Michael D. Boyle, and to David Deasy. The will provided further for a bequest of the decedent's estate which would qualify for the maximum marital deduction to Pittsburgh National Bank as the trustee of a revocable life insurance trust.
The debts of the decedent at the time of his death resulted in the insolvency of his estate. To satisfy the outstanding obligations, the decedent's daughters, the named beneficiaries of the residual trust created by the trust agreement, authorized the trustee to make an unsecured loan of $200,000.00 to the estate from the trust. The loan was made and was used to pay the estate debts. The stock was transferred unencumbered.
Exceptions to the executor's First and Final Account and to the trustee's First and Partial Account were filed by a trust beneficiary, however, contending that the unsecured loan depleted the interests of the beneficiaries. The ensuing litigation was resolved by the execution of a family settlement agreement. Subsequently, the Orphans' Court confirmed the executor's account and entered a decree of distribution.
The complaint sets forth allegations of negligent estate planning and administration, unfair trade practices, malpractice, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the foregoing transactions. Preliminary objections were filed by the defendants raising, inter alia, a question of jurisdiction. The defendants asserted that § 711 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code ("PEF Code"), Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 2, as amended, 20 Pa.C.S. § 711, required that the jurisdiction of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas over this matter be exercised through its orphans' court division. The administrative judge of the civil division entered an order transferring the action to the orphans' court division for disposition. Following the transfer, however, the plaintiffs' petition to retransfer the action to the civil division was granted by Judge Schwartz of the orphans' court division. The order was subsequently certified by Judge Schwartz for interlocutory appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311. The Superior Court denied the defendants' petition for permission to appeal. We granted permission to appeal.
Section 711 of the PEF Code enumerates the matters in which the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas shall be exercised through its orphans' court division. The administration and distribution of the real and personal property of decedents' estates and testamentary trusts are specifically enumerated in subsections (1) and (2) of § 711. The plaintiffs' action is only collaterally related to the administration and distribution of the decedent's estate and the revocable life insurance trust. As such, the action does not fall within the orphans' court's mandatory exercise of jurisdiction as set forth in that section. Section 712, relating to the non-mandatory exercise of jurisdiction through the orphans' court division, provides
[t]he jurisdiction of the court of common pleas over the following may be exercised through either its orphans' court division or other appropriate division:
Sic *
(3) Other matters. — The disposition of any case where there are substantial questions concerning matters enumerated in section 711 (relating to mandatory exercise of jurisdiction through orphans' court division in general) and also matters not enumerated in that section.
Although the defendants' preliminary objections purportedly raised a question of.jurisdiction, it is clear that the civil division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over the instant action under § 712(3). The action was properly brought in the civil division. It is also apparent from a review of the complaint that the civil division is the appropriate division for resolution of the issues raised therein. The issue of which division was proper to hear the action is not a question of jurisdiction or of venue. Defendants' preliminary objections raising the jurisdiction issue were improper.
The issue presented by this appeal is the propriety of the order of the orphans' court returning the action to the division in which it was originally commenced. In order to resolve the issue, we must first analyze whether the original transfer of the action to the orphans' court division was proper. Section 952 of the Judicial Code, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S. § 952, states,
"The divisions of a court of common pleas are administrative units composed of those judges of the court responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the busi ness of the court. In a court of common pleas having two or more divisions each division of the court is vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court, but the business of the court may be allocated among the divisions of the court by or pursuant to general rules."
Absent a general rule which allocates these matters to a particular division of the court, an administrative judge of one division does not have the authority to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a matter which is properly before the court. Nor may § 712 reasonably be interpreted to create such authority. The commentary to § 712 indicates that subsection (3) was "... intended to avoid multiple actions in different divisions in a case involving two or more questions, one of which would ordinarily be decided by the orphans' court division and the other by the trial or family division." Inasmuch as the administrative judge of the civil division lacked the authority to refuse to entertain the action, the order transferring the action to the orphans' court division was a nullity. For this reason, Appellants' contention that the matter could not have been transferred back to the civil division by the orphans' court division must necessarily fail. The order of court retransferring the action to the civil division was valid.
To hold otherwise would effectively deprive the Appellees of their constitutional right to a jury trial. The transfer of this action from the civil to the orphans' court division is more than a mere change in form as the Appellants seem to suggest. Although a unified court system has been established, significant differences, which are not matters of administrative convenience, exist in the practice in the orphans' court that would affect this action. Rule 3.1 of the Supreme Court Orphans' Court Rules states,
[ejxcept where otherwise provided by a rule adopted by the Supreme Court, or by an Act of Assembly or by general rule or special order of the local Orphans' Court . the pleading and practice shall conform to the pleading and practice in equity in the local Court of Common Pleas.
The most striking difference between pursuing the action at law in the civil division and proceeding in the orphans' division is in the right to a jury trial. The submission of any or all issues of fact to a trial by jury rests in the discretion of the court if the action is commenced in the orphans' court division. Pa.R.C.P. 1513. Article I, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution "... has been construed as requiring the right to trial by jury in all matters in which the right to a jury trial has been recognized at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1790. (Citation omitted)". Parker v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978). The right to a jury trial in this matter may not be circumvented by a transfer from one division of the court to another.
The order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas entered on March 8, 1983 is hereby affirmed.
FLAHERTY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
PAPADAKOS, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
. The Appellants contend that Judge Schwartz lacked the authority to retransfer the action, asserting that it was an improper review of an interlocutory order by another judge of the same court. Where, as here, the civil division judge lacked the authority to transfer the matter to another division, this argument, and the case law cited in support thereof, are inapplicable.