Case Name: Myrtle HAZEN, Claimant-Appellant, v. The GENERAL STORE, Employer, and Transit Casualty Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1986-10-21
Citations: 111 Idaho 972
Docket Number: No. 15768
Parties: Myrtle HAZEN, Claimant-Appellant, v. The GENERAL STORE, Employer, and Transit Casualty Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 111
Pages: 972–1000

Head Matter:
729 P.2d 1035
Myrtle HAZEN, Claimant-Appellant, v. The GENERAL STORE, Employer, and Transit Casualty Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 15768.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Oct. 21, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1986.
Richard S. Owen, Boise, for claimant-appellant.
John W. Barrett, of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendants-respondents.
1986 OPINION NO. 14, ISSUED JANUARY 31, 1986, IS WITHDRAWN, AND THIS OPINION IS SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR.

Opinion:
BAKES, Justice.
The basic tenet of appellate review is that on appeal the record is to be construed most favorably to the party which prevailed below. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 689, 604 P.2d 51, 53 (1979); Furness v. Park, 98 Idaho 617, 570 P.2d 854 (1977); Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 585, 548 P.2d 80, 85 (1976).
Viewing the record most favorably to the respondent, which the foregoing cases have uniformly held that we must do, the record reflects the following. Appellant, who was 61 years old at the time, had been working several months for her employer as a gas station cashier. In early 1983, Hazen's em ployer expanded operations by constructing a convenience store at the same location. Hazen's regular duties in the store included lifting cases of beer and pop and moving them when stocking the merchandise. Each of these cases weighed approximately 30-35 pounds. In addition, the convenience store had a fountain, and the cashier clerk, such as the claimant, was responsible for moving cylinders of pop.
The claimant's testimony indicated that during mid-May of 1983, shortly after the grand opening of the convenience store, Hazen began to notice that in the evenings after work she was tired and ached all over, and had a sharp pain in her right leg. The pain continued for several weeks after its initial onset, and during that time she had discussions with her supervisor about the pain she was experiencing. During those discussions she never attributed the tiredness and the pain in her leg and back to her work, or any accident occurring during her work. At that time Hazen and her supervisor believed that the type of shoes which Hazen was wearing in her work was causing the problem, and Hazen purchased a pair of shoes with arch supports. However, the new shoes did not alleviate the problem. Nevertheless, the pain and tiredness were not so severe that appellant's ability to perform her job duties was affected.
In August of 1983 the appellant went to see a chiropractor, Dr. George Squires, Jr. She told the chiropractor that she had no idea what the cause of the pain was. Based upon information supplied by Hazen, the chiropractor's health insurance claim form stated that Hazen's problems were not work-related, but rather had come on gradually over a long period of time.
In late August of 1983, the chiropractor referred claimant to a neurologist who performed a CAT scan and myelogram. Hazen was advised by the neurologist, Dr. Michael O'Brien, that she had a herniated disk and needed surgery. The surgery was performed on August 29, 1983. Up to that time, claimant had never asserted that her medical problem was work-related, or that it resulted from an accident which she had incurred during her employment.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that claimant ever filed a notice of injury or claim for compensation in writing with the Industrial Commission within sixty days, as required by I.C. § 72-701. However, on October 21, 1983, claimant, through her attorney, filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission. In the application for hearing, the claimant stated that the date of the accident and injury was between July 9th and July 16th, 1983. In December of 1983, an amended application for hearing was filed with the Industrial Commission. In this amended application for hearing, the claimant alleged that her accident and injury occurred between May 13th and May 23rd of 1983, claiming it resulted from lifting heavy crates and cases of pop. Claimant specifically pinpointed these dates, alleging that her condition resulted from lifting cases of pop during the convenience stores grand opening which was held during mid-May of 1983.
At the hearing before the Industrial Commission, depositions of three doctors, including the examining chiropractor and the neurologist, were submitted to the commission. The third deposition was of Dr. Ercil Bowman, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, who testified that "there does not appear to be any specific incident which caused this lady to have a herniated disk which is documented by the record." It was his opinion, as found by the commission, "that the claimant had a gradual onset of disc disease from wear and tear or the ordinary activities of life." Dr. Bowman also testified that, "My opinion is that the activity in May did not lead to the surgery." He further testified that claimant's X-rays indicated that her back problems were most likely the result of the aging process.
The Industrial Commission apparently chose to believe the testimony of Dr. Bowman and found that claimant's herniated disk was not the result of an accident, but had come on gradually over a long period of time and, as Dr. Bowman testi fied, was the result of the aging process. That finding by the commission was based upon the expert testimony of Dr. Bowman. Dr. Bowman's testimony was corroborated in part by claimant's own testimony and the record in this case, which suggests that throughout the period from May of 1983, until after her surgery on August 29, 1983, the claimant at no time attributed her problem to her employment, or an accident which occurred during her employment. That corroborative evidence includes the testimony of her employment supervisor and the history taken by Dr. Squires, the chiropractor, and Dr. Bowman, the neurosurgeon.
Accordingly, construing the record most favorably to the respondent in this matter, as we must, there is more than sufficient substantial, competent evidence to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission "that the claimant's herniated disk was not the result of an accident but rather occurred over a longer period of time" and, as Dr. Bowman testified, as "the result of the aging process."
Claimant argues, nevertheless, that the commission erred in Conclusion of Law No. 1 in its interpretation of our prior case of Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983). In Conclusion of Law No. 1, the commission held, relying on the Wynn case, that "the Supreme Court has retained the requirement that in order to constitute an accident the claimant must show that he suffered his injury at a particular time and at a particular place." What the Court in Wynn actually held was that the claimant in that case had actually shown, and the record was uncontroverted, that he had had an accident at a particular time and a particular place. Accordingly, to the extent that the commission may have stated in Conclusion of Law No. 1 that the Wynn case required a claimant to show that he had suffered his injury at a particular time and at a particular place, that was not an accurate statement of the law set out in the Wynn case.
Ordinarily, if we were of the view that that possible erroneous interpretation of the Wynn case affected the commission's finding as to whether or not an accident had occurred, we would remand the matter to the commission with directions to make new findings based upon the proper interpretation of the Wynn case. However, a careful reading of the commission's findings discloses that any misunderstanding by the commission that an accident must be identified as to a particular time and place, rather than "reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred," did not materially affect the commission's findings in this matter. The commission's finding that the claimant's condition is the result of the aging process, and was not the result of her employment, is adequately supported both by the testimony of Dr. Bowman and by the fact that the claimant asserted that her problem was not work-related for four months after the time when she now says that she incurred the industrial accident. Therefore, whether or not the commission felt that an accident had to occur at a particular time, rather than merely be reasonably located as to time and place, does not change the effect of the commission's determination that claimant's problem came on gradually as the result of the aging process and the wear and tear from the ordinary activities of life, and not the result of her employment.
Accordingly, viewing the record most favorably to the respondent, it is apparent that the commission's determination that the claimant's condition was the result of the aging process, rather than her employment, was not adversely affected by any possible misunderstanding of a proper interpretation of the Wynn case. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the commission, for which there is substantial competent evidence in the record.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.
. The dissenting opinion of Justice Huntley views the record most favorably to the appellant in arriving at his conclusions. For example, there was substantial evidence from several sources that, during the four month period after the grand opening in mid-May, the claimant did not assert that she had had an accident, nor did she assert that her back problems were work related. In discussions with her employer and with the chiropractor as late as the latter part of August, 1983, four months after the grand opening, claimant was still relating that her condition had come on gradually and that she had no idea of the cause of the pain. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion states, in footnote 1, that "Hazen consistently maintained that the injury occurred during the grand-opening----"