Case Name: JACKSON v. GREEN ESTATE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2009-07-30
Citations: 484 Mich. 209
Docket Number: Docket No. 136423
Parties: JACKSON v GREEN ESTATE
Judges: YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 484
Pages: 209–246

Head Matter:
JACKSON v GREEN ESTATE
Docket No. 136423.
Argued April 7, 2009
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided July 30, 2009.
Joan B. Jackson brought an action in the Charlevoix Circuit Court against Ronald Green, alleging a breach of contract in the failure to repay loans made pursuant to oral agreements and seeking possession of two parcels of land: one they owned as joint tenants and another they owned as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. The court, Richard M. Pajtas, J., granted Green summary disposition with respect to the land, concluding that the deeds conveying it were valid. The court denied Green summary disposition with regard to the loans, however, concluding that the statute of limitations did not bar Jackson’s breach of contract claim. A jury subsequently found in Jackson’s favor on the breach of contract claim. Jackson appealed the grant of summary disposition in Green’s favor on the issue of the deeds, and Green cross-appealed the denial of his summary disposition motion on the breach of contract claim. Green also filed a separate action to partition the parcels, which was stayed pending the appeal. Green died while the appeal was pending, and his estate was substituted as the plaintiff in the partition action and as the defendant in this case. The Court of Appeals, Markey, EJ., and Meter and Murray, JJ., affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 1, 2008 (Docket No. 269244). The Court held that because of Green’s death and the lack of a partition order, Green’s interest in the parcels of land had reverted to Jackson on his death. The Court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition on the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court granted the estate leave to appeal. 482 Mich 981 (2008).
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Corrigan, joined by Justices Young and Markman, would hold that a joint tenant can sever an ordinary joint tenancy by compelling a partition. The filing of a partition action, however, does not by itself sever a joint tenancy. Until the court enters a partition order, a partition has not been compelled, and the joint tenancy has not been severed. Green’s interest in the parcel that he and Jackson held as ordinary joint tenants thus did not survive his death because no partition order had been entered. The judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue should be affirmed.
Justice Young, joined by Justice Corrigan, would hold that the period of limitations does not begin to run on a breach of contract claim related to oral loans that have no fixed time for repayment until either the lender demands payment, expressly or by filing a complaint, or a reasonable amount of time elapses without a demand. Because the oral loan agreements in this case did not set a time for repayment, they were payable on demand. Thus, Green could not have breached the oral loan agreements until Jackson demanded payment or until a reasonable amount of time had elapsed. What constitutes a reasonable amount of time to demand payment is a factual question for the jury to decide. Jackson did not demand payment until she filed this lawsuit, and the finder of fact properly decided the question. The judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue should be affirmed.
Justice Markman would hold that the statute of limitations bars Jackson’s recovery on all but the last loan made because it was the only one to fall within the six-year limitations period for contract claims. Under Palmer v Palmer, 36 Mich 487 (1877), a note payable on demand is payable at once and without a demand, so the period of limitations runs from the date of the note’s delivery. Because Palmer (a) establishes at least some modicum of certainty with respect to the period within which a lawsuit can be brought, one of the principal purposes of a statute of limitations, (b) has adequately served as the law of this state for well over a century, and (c) should apply equally to written and oral contracts, because the policies underlying statutes of limitations are implicated no less strongly in the latter than in the former circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue should be reversed.
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Kelly, would allow the merits of Green’s partition action to be heard because it is an action that comes within the purview of the survival statute, MCL 600.2921, which provides that all actions survive a claimant’s death. With regard to the statute of limitations issue, Justice CAVANAGH would apply the rule of Smith v Smith Estate, 91 Mich 7 (1892), which held that if a plaintiff failed to make a demand for repayment within a reasonable time, the court will presume that a demand was made at the expiration of a reasonable time and the period of limitations will begin to run at that time. As a matter of law, the reasonable time for making a demand is six years, which is the time equivalent to the period of limitations for bringing an ordinary money claim, and the plaintiff then has six years under the statute of limitations to bring suit. Thus, a plaintiff who does not demand repayment has 12 years to bring a contract action on an oral loan that specified no time for repayment. All of Jackson’s claims were timely made except those for the two loans given more than 12 years before she filed her complaint. The judgment of the Court of Appeals on both issues should be reversed.
Justice Weaver, joined by Justice Hathaway, stated that leave to appeal was improvidently granted because the result the Court of Appeals reached was correct.
Laurie S. Longo and Dickinson Wright PLLC (by John G. Cameron, Jr.) for Joan B. Jackson.
Brown Powers, PLLC (by Bridget Brown Powers and Jennifer J. Schafer), for the estate of Ronald Green.

Opinion:
CORRIGAN, J.
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether an action to partition real estate may go forward when the joint tenant who filed the action died before an order of partition entered. We would hold that title vested in the surviving joint tenant on the decedent's death because the mere filing of a partition action does not sever a joint tenancy and no order granting partition was entered before the death. We would thus affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition and the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the partition issue.
I. PACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
At issue in this case are two parcels of real estate held by plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants and a series of oral loans from plaintiff to defendant. In May 1991, defendant negotiated the purchase of a parcel of land on behalf of plaintiff, and the deed conveyed the land to both parties as joint tenants. In September 1991, plaintiff purchased a second parcel of property, which was conveyed to plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.
In 2004, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action, alleging that defendant had failed to repay the loans. Plaintiff also sought to force defendant to relinquish his right to the two parcels of land. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant regarding the deeds for the properties, holding that the deeds were properly executed and gave defendant valid property interests. Regarding the loans, the court did not accept defendant's argument that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs claim. A jury found that each check plaintiff issued to defendant was a loan, and the court entered judgment on the verdict in plaintiffs favor.
Defendant then filed a separate action for partition of the parcels. At plaintiffs request, the partition action was stayed pending the appeal in this case. Defendant unexpectedly died while the appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals. His estate was substituted as the plaintiff in the partition action and as the defendant in this case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that defendant possessed a valid property interest in the two parcels, but held that because no order severing the joint tenancy had issued in the partition action before defendant died, defendant's interests in the parcels reverted to plaintiff upon defendant's death. The Court of Appeals further held that the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiffs breach of contract action for repayment of the loans because the claim did not accrue until plaintiff demanded repayment by filing her complaint in 2004.
We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a partition action may go forward if a joint tenant dies before the joint tenancy is severed is a question of law that we review de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
III. PARTITION
We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant's interest in the parcel of land automatically reverted to plaintiff when defendant died. Thus, defendant's estate has no interest in the property, and even if defendant's partition action survived his death under Michigan's survival statute, MCL 600.2921, nothing remains to partition.
"The principal characteristic of the joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. Upon the death of one joint tenant, the surviving tenant or tenants take the whole estate." Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 274-275; 454 NW2d 85 (1990). An ordinary joint tenancy may be severed, and the right of survivorship thereby destroyed, by an act of the parties, conveyance by either party, or levy and sale on an execution against one of the parties. Id. at 275.
A party can sever a joint tenancy by compelling a partition. Smith v Smith, 290 Mich 143, 155; 287 NW 411 (1939), quoting Midgley v Walker, 101 Mich 583, 584; 60 NW 296 (1894). Until an order of partition has been entered, however, a partition has not been compelled and, thus, the joint tenancy has not been severed. See Anno: What acts by one or more of joint tenants will sever or terminate the tenancy, 64 ALR2d 918, 956 (explaining that "[i]t is not the filing of the partition action which terminates the joint tenancy, but only the judgment in such action which has that effect") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Indeed, the universal rule in the United States is that a pending suit for partition does not survive the death of one of the joint tenants. See Heintz v Hudkins, 824 SW2d 139, 142-143 (Mo App, 1992), and cases cited therein. "This rule is based on two related concepts: First, the theory of survivorship — that at the moment of death, ownership vests exclusively in the surviving joint tenant or tenants — and second, the doctrine that severance of the joint tenancy does not occur until the partition suit reaches final judgment." Id., citing Cobb v Gilmer, US App DC 398, 400; 365 F2d 931 (1966).
Accordingly, we would hold that the filing of the partition action did not sever the joint tenancy because an order effectuating a partition had not entered at the time of defendant's death. Therefore, regardless of whether defendant's partition action survived his death under the survival statute, his interest in the parcel of land did not.
IV CONCLUSION
We would hold that defendant's filing of the partition action did not sever the joint tenancy because no order granting partition was entered before defendant's death. Thus, title vested in plaintiff when defendant died, and nothing remains to partition. The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the partition issue, and we would therefore affirm its judgment on that issue.
YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.
We also granted leave to appeal to consider whether the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. That issue is addressed in separate opinions by Justices Cavanagh, Young, and Markman.
The defendant's estate was substituted as a party when the original defendant died, but for ease of reference we will refer to both the original defendant and his estate as "defendant."
Jackson v Green Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 1, 2008 (Docket No. 269244).
482 Mich 981 (2008).
Only the parcel conveyed in the May 1991 deed is currently at issue. Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs right of survivorship in the property conveyed in the September 1991 deed.
In addition to an ordinary joint tenancy, Michigan recognizes a distinct category of joint tenancy known as a "joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship," which consists of a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. Albro, supra at 275; see also 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed), § 9.11, p 322. "While the survivorship feature of the ordinary joint tenancy may he defeated by the act of a cotenant, the dual contingent remainders of the 'joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship' are indestructible." Albro, supra at 275-276. The parcel at issue here, the one conveyed in the May 1991 deed, was held under an ordinary joint tenancy.