Case Name: STATE v. MERLO
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1919-06-18
Citations: 92 Or. 678
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. MERLO.
Judges: McBride, C. J., and Moore and Harris, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 92
Pages: 678–726

Head Matter:
Argued May 21,
affirmed June 18,
rehearing granted October 8, 1918.
Argued on rehearing April 2,
reversed July 1, 1919.
STATE v. MERLO.
(173 Pac. 317; 182 Pac. 153.)
Witnesses—Showing Inconsistent Statement—Party Introducing Witness.
1. Under Section 861, L. O. h., authorizing the party producing a witness to show he had made statements inconsistent with his testimony, as provided in Section 864, the state could call the attention of its witness to a prior inconsistent statement, together with the circumstances of time and place and persons present, to refresh his memory and induce him to correct his testimony or explain the inconsistency; the things to be avoided being showing his bad charac ter, and introducing as substantive evidence unsworn or prior statements of witness.
[As to proof of prior contradictory statements, see note in 82 Am. St. Rep. 39.]
Criminal Law — Trial—Objections to Evidence.
2. Objection “irrelevant, immaterial, and not in rebuttal” goes to the introduction of the evidence on rebuttal, and does not, as is necessary for review, raise the question of it being evidence of another crime.
Criminal Law — Trial—Objections to Evidence.
3. Objection “irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent and not proper rebuttal, and witness has not shown sufficient qualifications,” ean only be considered on the ground of evidence not being proper rebuttal. ,
Criminal Law — Order of Introduction of Evidence — Discretion of Court.
4. Order of introduction of evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Criminal Law — Harmless Error — Departure from Code Procedure.
5. Under Section 1538, L. O. L., departure from a mode of proceeding, even if prescribed by the Code, is not ground for reversal unless it appear that substantial rights of defendant have been prejudiced.
Criminal Law — Recalling Witness — Discretion.
6. Leave to recall a witness being by provision of Section 862, L. O. L., in the sound discretion of the trial eourt, it is only for abuse thereof that its ruling can be disturbed.
Criminal Law — Credibility of Witnesses — Instructions—“Falsely.”
7. The court need not add the word “willfully” to the instruction prescribed by Section 868, subdivision 3, L. O. L., “that a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others,” “falsely” importing this, and not being of the same import as “mistakenly.”
Criminal Law — Appeal—Harmless Error — Constitution.
8.. Article VII, Section 3, of the Constitution as amended in 1910, at least accentuates the law as it stood in regard to prejudicial error, in favor of an affirmance unless actual prejudicial error appears.
ON REHEARING.
Witnesses — Impeachment of Character of Own Witness.
9. In view of Section 861, L. O. L., a party who produces a witness of bad character cannot show the bad character of that witness and thus relieve himself from the injurious effects of any unfavorable testimony given by such witness.
Witnesses — Impeachment—Inconsistent Statements.
10. Under Section 861, L. O. L., if the witness fails to testify as he was expected to do, but does not give testimony prejudicial to the party calling him, then the party producing the witness cannot impeach him by showing prior inconsistent statements.
Witnesses — Impeachment of Own Witness — Inconsistent Statements.
11. Under Section 861, L. O. L., where a presumably truthful person makes a statement and afterward as a witness makes an inconsistent statement to the surprise and prejudice of the party calling him, then the party calling the witness is not at fault, and should be permitted to repair the damage.
Witnesses — Impeachment—Inconsistent Statements.
12. In prosecution of wife for killing her husband, testimony of a state witness, who had stated that defendant and deceased quarreled, that he did not know who started the quarrels was not affirmatively prejudicial to the state, and such as to authorize the state, under Section 861, D. O. L., in impeaching the witness by evidence of prior inconsistent statements.
Criminal Law — Leading Questions — Reversible Error.
13. In prosecution for murder, that the state, after one of its witnesses had stated that he did not know whether defendant wife or the victim, her husband, started quarrels when “they used to quarrel,” elicited testimony from the witness that he had made a contradictory statement before the grand jury held not to require reversal, in view of Section 1626, L. O. L., as to errors nor affeeting substantial rights, and Section ¿58 as to leading questions; the witness being reluctant.
Criminal Law — Limited Use of Testimony.
14. Where a party is permitted to refresh the recollection of his own witnesses by directing attention to prior inconsistent statement, the court should inform the jurors that prior statement eannot be considered as substantive testimony.
Criminal Law — Improper Cross-examination — Harmless Error.
15. Assuming that cross-examination of defendant’s witness with reference to whether defendant had the reputation of getting “drunk” was objectionable, answers of witness, “I don’t think so,” were without prejudice to defendant.
Witnesses — Quarrelsome Disposition of Accused.
16. In prosecution for murder, where the witness in question had given testimony on direct examination, from which it could be argued that the victim, defendant’s husband, was either alone responsible for quarrels with defendant or an aggressive participant, the district attorney was well within the limits of Section 860, L. O. L., when he asked defendant’s witness on cross-examination whether the quarrels began when defendant discovered that the husband did not have “ lots of money.” 0
Witnesses — Impeachment—Immaterial Matters. ,
17. The general rule is that when a cross-examination elicits from a witness matter that is immaterial or irrelevant the party conducting the cross-examination is concluded as to such matter, and cannot impeach the credibility of the witness by showing contradictory statements.
Criminal Law — Erroneous Admission of Testimony — Harmless Error.
18. In prosecution for murder, held that defendant was not prejudiced by reason of introduction in evidence of testimony as to her intoxication on the day of the homicide in rebuttal instead of in chief. (
Criminal Law — Evidence of Independent Crime — Reversible Error.
19. In prosecution of defendant wife for the killing of her husband, permitting a witness to state wiat he had heard about the time defendant got a revolver and was going to kill “his únele” was reversible error.
From Washington: George E. Bagley, Judge.
Department 2.
The defendant, Eosa E. Merlo, was indicted for the crime of murder in the second degree for the killing of her husband, Joseph Merlo. She was tried and convicted of manslaughter, and from the judgment of ‘sentence appeals. The testimony of the plaintiff consisted of evidence tending to show the death of the victim, its cause, the nature of the wounds, the range of the bullet and description of the condition of the premises, of the various threats on the part of the defendant to take the life of her'husband, statements of the defendant herself in relation to the homicide and in relation to evidence leading up to it and testimony tending to show the quarrelsome inharmonious life that the couple had led for some time prior to the homicide.
Affirmed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Huston <& Huston and Mr. Harry T. Bagley, with oral arguments by Mr. Samuel B. Huston and Mr. Bagley.
For the State there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Edmund B. Tongue, District Attorney.

Opinion:
BEAN, J.
In the examination of thq witnesses for the state, it appears some evidence crept into the record tending to show that at times defendant was in the habit of using intoxicating liquor. Louis Merlo, a witness for the state, being interrogated as to Quarrels between the decedent and the defendant, was asked through an interpreter and answered as follows:
"Ask him what they quarreled about?"
Ans. "Every time Bosie drank there was quarrels."
Ques. "Every time Bosie drank there was quarreling?"
Ans. "Yes, sir."
"When Letizia Partipillo, a witness for the state, was testifying and was being cross-examined by the attorney for the defense, the following questions were given and the following answers made. Beferring to the deceased, the following question was asked:
"Never drank?"
Ans. "We used to drink at the table a little wine but he was nev,er drunk here or in the old country."
Ques. "And Bosie was always drunk?"
Ans. "Yes, sir, especially when she would go to Beaverton or Portland, or to her father's house she would never come home until half-past 1 or 2 o 'clock after midnight."
Ques. "And your father never got drunk?"
There was no objection to this testimony, and it is referred to as an introduction or foundation for some of the other evidence in regard to the use of intoxicating liquor by the defendant.
The defense was that the killing was> done in self-defense. Upon the trial of the case, the state called as a witness, one Luigi Beggi, who testified that he ate his meals with defendant and her husband; that the defendant and the decedent used to quarrel; that he did not know who started the quarrel. The witness was then asked by the district attorney:
"Q. Do I understand you to say that you don't know which one generally started the quarrel and when they quarreled?
"A. No.
"Q. You remember of being in the grand jury room, don't you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When this case was being investigated, you remember that time?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the grand jury and myself being present, didn't you at that time and place in the first part of November, I think it was, make this statement?
"A. Yes, sir, I know it.
"Q. All the time they had troubles, Eosa all the time, started, she started first. Sometimes Joe run outside sometimes. She drink too much."
The defendant by her attorney objected as follows:
"I object to that as being apparently and' plainly an attempt to impeach their own witness, ' ' and added: "He has not testified to anything against the prosecution and he has simply failed to testify as strongly as was wanted and I do not think they can impeach their witness that way."
These objections were overruled and exception allowed, and the examination by the district attorney proceeded.
"Q. Didn't you say at that time and place?
"A. I think so.
"Q. You say you said that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Was it true? (This question was again objected to, but the objection was overruled and the witness answered), 'I guess so.' .
"Q. Was it not true?
"A. Well, that is true."
It will be seen that the method of examination pursued with the witness served apparently to refresh his memory. No hearsay nor unsworn statements were admitted. Section 861, L. O. L., provides:
"The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may contradict him by other evidence, and may also show that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, as provided in Section 864. ' '
The state called the witness and under this section it was entitled, when the district attorney was surprised by the unexpected and unfavorable testimony, to call the attention of the witness to prior statements which were inconsistent with his present sworn testimony, together with the circumstances of time and place and persons present according to Section 864, L. O. L., in order to refresh the recollection of the witness and induce him to correct his testimony or explain the apparent inconsistency, and to ask the witness if he made such previous statements. Whether or not the examination of the witness was strictly within the rule in the cases of: Langford v. Jones, 18 Or. 307, 326 (22 Pac. 1064); State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 104 (43 Pac. 947); State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Or. 509, 512 (112 Pac. 424); there was no attempt to show the bad character of the witness. No unsworn or prior declarations of the witness were admitted. No substantive evidence was received in that manner. These are the shoals to steer clear of in such matters: Wigan v. La Follett, 84 Or. 488, 496 (165 Pac. 579). None of the fatal results followed. It served as in the nature of a leading question to the witness tending to bring out the truth: State v. Deal, 43 Or. 17 (70 Pac. 534). There was no reversible error in permitting such examination.
The most serious contention of the defendant is that: The state was allowed on rebuttal, to offer evidence that the defendant had been guilty of an independent crime. Luigi Beggi was a witness for the state. He was recalled as a witness on rebuttal, and testified through an interpreter, as follows:
"Q. Ask him if he knows anything about the time Bosa got a revolver and was going to kill his uncle?"
The defendant objected to this as irrelevant, immaterial, and not in rebuttal of any issue in this case, the objection was overruled and the exception allowed and the witness answered, "Yes, sir."
"Q. Ask him to tell the jury about that.
"A. Yes, Davy's brother was cleaning land, and1 Bosa came up and told him, Bosa said if he would not take back the words he said she would shoot him."
There is nothing in this testimony or in the objection thereto, to attract the attention of the trial court to the fact that it was the intention of the district attorney to elicit evidence pertaining to any other crime than that charged in the indictment, or that the witness referred to any threat made by the defendant except against the decedent. In other words, it does not appear that the decedent, Joe Merlo, was not an uncle, or a so-called uncle, of the witness, Luigi Beggi. The testimony interpreted from Italian to English is difficult to understand. As near as we can tell from a careful examination of the evidence, the witness Beggi understood that' the question objected to referred to Bosa Merlo's uncle although the gender does riot so indicate. It would seem as though the mind of the trial court should have been directed to the objection to the evidence as now made. The objection plainly goes to the introduction of the evidence upon rebuttal: See State v. Goddard, 69 Or. 73 (133 Pac. 90, 138 Pac. 243, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 146); Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 75 Or. 588 (144 Pac. 574, 147 Pac. 756, 760, par. 6); Filkins v. Portland Lumber Co., 71 Or. 249 (142 Pac. 578, 579); Shandrew v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 142 Fed. 320 (73 C. C. A. 430). The specific objection to evidence that it was not proper rebuttal waives any other objection and no other objection should be considered on appeal: Ladd & Bush v. Sears, 9 Or. 244; Hildebrand v. United Artisans, 50 Or. 159, 166 (91 Pac. 542). It would seem unnecessary to observe that before this court can review a ruling of the trial court, such ruling must be made. To suggest the application of'the principle is sufficient. It is also complained by defendant that the state was allowed to introduce evidence of other threats by the defendant on rebuttal. The state called in rebuttal one Mike Partipillo, who testified as to threats made by defendant to kill the decedent.
The witness Partipillo testified that upon an occasion at the Good Samaritan Hospital when other people were present he heard Eosa Merlo make certain threats against her husband. These threats had already been testified to by other people who were there at the hospital at the time, on the state's direct case. Partipillo's testimony was merely cumulative. He had been subpoenaed and it was his duty to have been in court at a time when his testimony could have been taken while the state was engaged in putting in its case in chief, but he' was not present. He did not arrive in court until the prosecution was engaged in putting in its rebuttal. His testimony was objected to upon the ground that it was not proper rebuttal. When this objection was made the district attorney stated to the' court:
"We intended to pnt this witness on in the direct case hut he didn't get out on the train and we rested our case without him."
Upon the statement of the district attorney, the objection was overruled and the court allowed his testimony to be taken.
Mrs. Martha Hansen, a witness for the state, testified in effect that she had met the defendant getting off the train at the station of Santa Rosa a short time before the murder and that at the time the defendant got off she appeared to be in an intoxicated condition. The objection of the testimony is as follows:
"Object as irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent and not proper rebuttal, and the witness has not shown sufficient qualifications to be able to testify."
This is practically the same objection as that made when Beggi was recalled. These objections can only be considered on the ground that it is not proper rebuttal. Therefore, all of this testimony introduced upon rebuttal may be considered at the same time. The order of the introduction of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Section 1538, L. O. L., provides:
"Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code, in respect to any pleadings or proceedings, nor any error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it have actually prejudiced the defendant, or tend to his prejudice in respect to a substantial right."
Under this section a deviation from the mode prescribed by the Code would not be a ground for a reversal unless it appear that the substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced: State v. Remington, 50 Or. 99, 102 (91 Pac. 473); State v. Walton, 50 Or. 142, 152 (91 Pac. 490, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811); State v. Gulliford, 76 Or. 231 (148 Pac. 876); Article VII, Section 3, of the Constitution.
The permission for recalling the witness Beggi to the stand and receiving the testimony of the witnesses Partipillo and Hansen were matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. And in the absence of an abuse of such discretion, we do not feel authorized to disturb the ruling: Section 862, L. O. L.; State v. Robinson, 32 Or. 43, 51 (48 Pac. 357); State v. Isenhart, 32 Or. 170, 173 (52 Pac. 569); State v. Goff, 71 Or. 352 (142 Pac. 564).
Error is predicated upon the instruction of the court to the jury that, "a witness shown to be false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others." Section 868, L. O. L., subdivision 3, requires the court to instruct the jury on all proper occasions:
'That a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in' others."
It is not necessary that the court should add the word "willfully" to the language of the statute. The word "falsely" as used in the statute, providing that if a witness is found to have sworn falsely in any material part of his testimony he is to be distrusted in others, is not of the same import as mistakenly, and the phrase as used in the statute is of the same meaning as though the word "willfully" were used: State v. Meyers, 59 Or. 537, 545 (117 Pac. 818); State v. Goff, 71 Or. 352, 364 (142 Pac. 564); People v. Righetti, 66 Cal. 184 (4 Pac. 1063, 1185). There was no error in giving this charge in the language ,of the Code.
An extended examination of the testimony is necessary in order to determine whether or not the exceptions taken upon the trial of the cause and now assigned as errors, constitute sufficient ground for a reversal of the case. After such an examination, and waiving the form and substance of the objection as to evidence of an independent crime, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed; that a remand of the case and a retrial thereof, upon substantially the same testimony would produce the same result. There can be no question but that the amendment of Article VII of the Constitution in 1910 changed, or at least accentuated the law as it stood before in regard to prejudicial errors, in favor of an affirmance of a judgment, unless actual prejudicial error appears.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed.
McBride, C. J., and Moore and Harris, JJ., concur.