Case Name: RUDNIK v. MAYERS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-05-04
Citations: 387 Mich. 379
Docket Number: No. 8; Docket No. 53,186
Parties: RUDNIK v MAYERS
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black and T. E. Brennan, JJ., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 387
Pages: 379–392

Head Matter:
RUDNIK v MAYERS
Opinion of the Court
1. Zoning — Ordinances—Recording—Estoppel.
Failure of municipal officials to follow the recording requirements of a zoning ordinance should not be held to estop them from enforcing the other provisions of the ordinance.
2. Abandonment — Property—Rights—Words and Phrases.
Abandonment of property or a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession, and control, and with out vesting ownership in any other person; the necessary elements of abandonment are intent and some act or omission on the part of the owner or holder which clearly manifests his voluntary decision to abandon.
References for Points in Headnotes
1, 5] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 228.
2] 58 Am Jur, Zoning §§ 153, 154.
3' 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 254.
4’ 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 153 et seq.
6] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 184.
7] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 215.
8' 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 14.
9] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 154.
3. Zoning — Nonconforming Prior Use — Abandonment—Intent— Proof — Building Permits — Mandamus.
Pacts which would support an inference of intention to abandon a prior nonconforming use under a zoning ordinance must be established in a mandamus action to compel the issuance of a building permit and there were none in the record where the defense was grounded on that which plaintiff’s grantor did or did not do; the intent of the grantor was the crucial nonproved element of the ease and she was not called as a witness.
Dissenting Opinion
Adams, Swainson, and Williams, JJ.
4. Zoning — Nonconforming Use — Abandonment—Evidence.
Evidence was clear that nonconforming use of property, a cottage, was abandoned where the last known tenant had left in 196$, as of 196S the building was uninhabitable and no attempts were made to change this uninhabitable condition, a red tag was placed on the property by a county building inspector to signify that the cottage was unsafe and unfit for oceupaney, and when plaintiff purchased the property he did not use the building as a dwelling.
5. Zoning — • Nonconforming Use — Abandonment — Townships — Recording — Estoppel.
Township’s failure to follow the provisions of its zoning ordinance which required the recording of nonconforming uses and the discontinuance of them neither validated nor eliminated a nonconforming use and there were no exceptional circumstances to take a case out of the general rule that the failure of township officials to perform their functions cannot estop the township from enforcing its ordinance where improvements to a cottage were so slight that the township had no notice of plaintiff’s intent to resume a nonconforming use and, when plaintiff requested a building permit, the township promptly denied it and informed him that the nonconforming use had been abandoned.
6. Vendor and Purchaser — Property—Zoning—Ordinances.
A purchaser is presumed to buy property with knowledge of zoning ordinance requirements concerning the land’s use.
7. Deeds — Grantee — Grantor — Zoning — Nonconforming Use — Abandonment.
A grantee can take no more than what his grantor had; if a nonconforming use had been abandoned, a purchaser could not obtain what his grantor did not have to sell.
8. Zoning — Nonconforming Use- — Constitutional Law.
The right of government to zone, and consequently to limit property owner’s use of his land, is well established; however, zoning must permit the continuance of any existing nonconforming use; any elimination of a nonconforming use that would constitute a taking of property without just compensation is constitutionally forbidden.
9. Zoning — Nonconforming Use — Abandonment—Evidence.
Zoning ordinance provision that terminates a nonconforming use if the same is discontinued for three months, even as a rule of evidence, cannot be sustained as fair and reasonable; while an owner of property might decide to abandon a nonconforming use within such a short period of time, there are also many reasons why he would not make such a determination because the use might not be utilized due, for example, to- depressed times, inability to secure a tenant or some other reason.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 2, J. H. Grillis, P. J., and Bronson and O’Hara, JJ., reversing and remanding Washtenaw, John W. Conlin, J.
Submitted December 8, 1971.
(No. 8
December Term 1971,
Docket No. 53,186.)
Decided May 4, 1972.
27 Mich App 560 affirmed.
Complaint by Benjamin Rudnik against the Clerk of Northfield Township and the Washtenaw County Building Inspector for mandamus to compel certification of a construction plan and the issuance of a building permit. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
L. Edwin Wenger (Larry D. Vande Vrede, of counsel), for plaintiff.
William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Karl V. Fink, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff Washtenaw County Building Inspector.
Reading $ Etter, for defendant Clerk of North-field Township.

Opinion:
T. G. Kavanagh, J.
Plaintiff purchased a lot with a cottage on it on Whitmore Lake in the summer of 1965. At the time of this purchase the cottage was vacant and in need of various repairs. Certain of these repairs were performed by plaintiff that summer. The following year plaintiff applied to the Northfield Township for a building permit in order to repair the structure's foundation which had become unsafe over the years due to runoff rain from the road in front of the cottage. He was informed no permit would be issued him as his lot size did not conform to the minimum necessary footage for building purposes.
Plaintiff commenced mandamus proceedings in Washtenaw County Circuit Court to compel issuance of the permit.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that while the lot size did not conform to the township ordinance use for a cottage it qualified as a nonconforming use having been so used prior to the passage of the zoning laws of the township, and plaintiff was therefore entitled to the permit.
Defendant's answer relied on Northfield Township Ordinance, art V, § 5.04, which reads:
"NON-CONFORMING USE — TERMINATION OF:
"When a non-conforming use of building or land is discontinued through vacancy, lack of operation or otherwise, for a continuous period of three (3) months, thereafter no right shall exist to maintain on said property a non-conforming use."
The defendants contended that pursuant to that section because the premises in question had remained vacant for the period of three months the prior nonconforming use was lost because of abandonment.
Testimony was received from several township officials as well as plaintiff. The trial court found the prior nonconforming use of the premises had been abandoned by his grantor pursuant to § 5.04, supra. Further, the court found the township was not estopped from claiming loss of nonconforming-use status because it had failed to record the required record of such status loss for the doctrine that the plaintiff is presumed to know the law.
The Court of Appeals reversed holding the trial court inappropriately applied the "presumed knowledge of the law" doctrine in this case and said further:
" the township board and the zoning board cannot wilfully ignore an important part of its own ordinance and thereby deprive plaintiff of rights conferred by another part of the same ordinance."
This Court granted defendants leave to appeal.
On appeal the defendants pose two questions:
I. Does the failure of township officials to comply with the requirements of § 7.01 and 7.02 of the Northfield Township Zoning Ordinance estop defendants and their respective municipalities from asserting that plaintiff's nonconforming use was discontinued or abandoned under § 5.04 of the same ordinance ?
II. Has plaintiff demonstrated the clear legal right necessary to entitle him to obtain a writ of mandamus ?
We agree with the defendants that the failure of the municipal officials to follow the recording requirements of the ordinance should not be held to estop them from enforcing the other provisions of the ordinance.
What we find controlling, however, is the trial judge's finding that plaintiff's grantor had abandoned the nonconforming use of the premises.
Section 5.04 speaks of the termination of status when the nonconforming use is "discontinued".
"In interpreting the term 'discontinued' the courts take a very liberal attitude toward the restrictive nature of the provisions in zoning regulations dealing with the resumption of nonconforming uses and hold that the word 'discontinued' is synonymous with 'abandoned.' " 18 ALR2d 725, § 3, p 729.
The trial court recognized this and found the "property was abandoned".
" 'Abandonment' of property or a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession, and control, and without vesting ownership in any other person." 1 CJS, Abandonment, § 1, p 4 (emphasis added).
The necessary elements of "abandonment" are intent and some act or omission on the part of the owner or holder which clearly manifests his voluntary decision to abandon.
It has been stated:
" asa general rule that the abandonment of a nonconforming use and the consequent termination of any legal right thereto results, generally speaking, from a concurrence of facts, circumstances, and the intention of the owner of the premises or other person entitled to the use." 18 ALR2d, 725, § 4, p 730, and cases cited thereat.
And further:
"Since intention is a necessary element in the concept of abandonment, it follows that lapse of time is not per se decisive of whether a nonconforming use has been abandoned, it being merely one of the factors which may evidence such an intention." Ibid, at 731.
Additionally it may be stated:
" as a well-settled rule that a temporary cessation of a nonconforming use or the temporary vacancy of buildings used for a nonconforming use does not in itself operate to effect abandonment of the nonconforming use, where the circumstances, conditions, and statements of the owner are consistent with or evidence of an intention not to abandon the nonconforming use." 18 ALR2d 725, § 6, p 733, citing "Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co. (1928) 245 Mich 261, 222 NW 86; Civic Asso. of Dearborn v. Horowitz (1947) 318 Mich 333, 28 NW2d 97."
The defense in this case is grounded on that which plaintiff's grantor, Mrs. Leece, did or did not do. Mr. Hanselman, defendant city building inspector, testified he had observed the premises on many occasions and because of the nonoccupancy and the state of disrepair of the property he concluded it was abandoned. His testimony together with the terms of the ordinance led the trial court to conclude the property had been abandoned.
In its opinion the trial court also stated that the then owner, Mrs. Leece, attempted to give the property to the township. There is no competent evidence in the record to support this statement.
The intent of Mrs. Leece was the crucial non-proved element of this cause. She was not called as a witness, and while intention to abandon can be inferred, facts which would support this inference must be established. There are none in this record.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated herein.
Costs to the plaintiff.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black and T. E. Brennan, JJ., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J.