Case Name: ANDREW KREIN, Respondent, v. W. W. ROW, Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1922-06-17
Citations: 48 N.D. 1125
Docket Number: 
Parties: ANDREW KREIN, Respondent, v. W. W. ROW, Appellant.
Judges: BirdzEll, C. J., and Gracb, J., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 1125–1130

Head Matter:
ANDREW KREIN, Respondent, v. W. W. ROW, Appellant.
(189 N. W. 105.)
Judgment — affidavits of merits not impeached on motion to vacate default; affidavit excusing default on motion to vacate default held sufficient.
In May, 1921, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment for over $1,500. This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate the default. The order of this court is that the default be vacated and that defendant may serve his proposed answer, and that the lien of the judg ment herein remain and may be enforced to the extent of any Judgment recovered on a trial of the action.
Opinion filed June 17, 1922.
Appeal from an order of the District court of Cavalier county; Kneeshaw, J.
Order reversed and modified.
Grimson & Snowfield, for appellant.
“It was held in an abuse of discretion to set aside default suffered by defendant because an attorney had erroneously advised him that service upon him was void.” Crebler v. Eidelbush, 24 Wis. 162.
“Where on claimining paramount title to mortgage land neglected to answer a bill of foreclosure because advised by counsel that the mortgagor’s answer presented a complete defense, it was held proper to set aside his default and let him answer.” Wickle v. Lake, 21 Wis. 410, 94 Am. Dec. 552.
In New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island the courts are unanimous in holding “That a judgment may be set aside when taken as a consequence of the negligence or inattention of the attorney.” See 23 Cyc. 941.
“Courts almost universally favor a trial on the merits and when there has been a reasonable excuse shows by default there should be no objection for such trial for those who are reasonably diligent.” Barto v. Sioux City Elec. Co. 93 N. W. 268.
Price & Pierce, for respondent.
“The moving party must show: 1, that he has a good defense upon the merits, and 2: A reasonable excuse for the mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect which occasioned the default, and 3: reasonable diligence in presenting the application to vacate after knowledge of the judgment.” Bank v. O’Laughlin, 164 N. W. 135, 37 N. D. 532.
“Under the express terms of the statute, § 7483, C. L. 1913 an application to vacate a default judgment on the ground of mistake, surprise cr excusable neglect is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court on the particular facts of the case. And consequently its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plain that its dis cretion has been abused.” Wakeland v. Hanson, 36 N. D. 129, 161 N. W. ion.
In the case of Murphy v. Minot Foundry Co. 24 N. D. 185, 139 N. W. 518, it is held: “On the question of whether the defense may be interposed or not its interposition is a matter in the discretion of the trial court instead of a matter of strict legal right. Hunt v. Swanson, 15 N. D. 5x2, 108 N. W. 41.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate the default herein. The motion is based on a regular affidavit •of merits and on a proposed verified answer and an affidavit excusing the default. The action is on a promissory note made by defendant to the plaintiff on October 14, 1920, for $1,485 and interest. On March 29, 1921, the summons and complaint were served on defendant. On May 17, 1921, judgment by default was entered. In September, 1921, •defendant moved to vacate the default. The proposed answer shows that prior to October 14, 1920, at Langdon, N. D., the plaintiff and defendant had been in partnership in the garage business; then they agreed to dissolve the partnership; the plaintiff did transfer to defendant his interest in the partnership property, and in writing agreed with said Row that "he shall not, for a period of five years, become interested in the ownership of any garage in the city of Langdon, without the written consent of W. W. Row"; that, contrary to the agreement, in the month of April, 1921, the plaintiff did open a garage in Langdon, and since then has continued to operate the same to defendant's damage, $2,500; that the note in question was given in consideration of said agreement, and that the good will of the garage business was the real consideration for the promissory note; that before the entry of judgment Row consulted with Price & Pierce, stating the facts aforesaid, and was told by them that he would have to pay the note because he had made default in payment, according to the-terms of the contract; that he relied on their advice, and because of it failed to answer or to consult with any other attorney until September 15, 1921.
Now, while defendant does make a complete affidavit of merits and a proposed verified, answer showing a meritorious defense, it is true that he is contradicted by other affidavits, both in regard to the excuse for his default and the merits of defense. But the rule is that on a motion to vacate a default the affidavit of merits may not be impeached, and the court should not try out the merits of the defense. Bank v. Brandon, 19 N. D. 489, 126 N. W. 102, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 858; Westbrook v. Rice, 28 N. D. 325, 148 N. W. 827; Sargent v. Kindred, 5 N. D. 8, 19, 20 63 N. W. 151.
. The excuse or reason for the default appears quite probable, though by no means conclusive. However, an error in granting a trial while retaining the lien of the judgment cannot injure the plaintiff in excess of the cost of the trial, while an error in denying a trial may injure defendant more than $1,000. Hence the order is that the default be vacated and a trial granted, with leave to serve the proposed answer, and that the lien of the judgment herein remain, and that it may be enforced to the extent of any judgment that may be recovered on a trial of the action.
Order reversed and modified, without costs.
BirdzEll, C. J., and Gracb, J., concur.