Case Name: John H. Dwight et al., Resp'ts, v. Howard G. Badgley, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-01-12
Citations: 58 N.Y. St. Rep. 585
Docket Number: 
Parties: John H. Dwight et al., Resp’ts, v. Howard G. Badgley, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 58
Pages: 585–589

Head Matter:
John H. Dwight et al., Resp’ts, v. Howard G. Badgley, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed January 12,1894.)
1. Contract—Gaming.
No recovery can be had for money advanced and services rendered under a contract, which, at time of its execution, defendant stated to plaintiff’s agent, was a gambling contract.
3. Same—Intent.
The intent, with which the parties acted, may be inferred from the course of dealing between them.
Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict directed by the court and from ah order denying a motion for a new trial. ..
Leavitt & Leavitt (Edwin B. Leavitt, of counsel), for app’lt;
Wolff & Hodge, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Follett, J.
Hodge, the plaintiffs' principal witness, and- with whom the defendant had his transactions, was the Hew York agent of the plaintiffs. He testified:
"In these transactions I was associated with Dwight and Gillette as broker, and I received my commission from them; and in each one of these transactions I was paid my commission by Dwight and Gillette, the plaintiffs."
The defendant testified:
" Q. What was your intention in regard to these transactions, and to the delivery of this wheat, and the purchase and sale of it, at the time you made these transactions ? A. My intention was entirely to buy and sell on options, and to adjust the differences. Q. Between the market price of buying and the market price of selling? A. Yes; that was distinctly stated to Mr. Hodge. Q. Did he state that to you ? A. That was distinctly understood. Q. Was there anything said in regard to how the profits or losses should be adjusted? A. Most assuredly. Q. What was said ? A. I cannot remember the specific conversation, but the substance of it was he would buy and sell on options, and the difference I should have, if any, in my favor. " A. But, if it was a loss, you should lose what you put up? A. Yes. Q. And that was so in regard to each one of these transactions ? A. Yes; each and every one.
Here is positive evidence that it was distinctly stated between the plaintiffs' agent and the -defendant that the contracts were to be gambling contracts. The knowledge of the plaintiffs' agent is their knowledge, and it is binding on them; - It is conceded that none of the grain mentioned in these transactions was" ever delivered, and there is no evidence that the plaintiffs owned any grain, or that they purchased any for delivery to the defendant. All of the purchases were for future deliveries, and the statements of the transactions rendered by the plaintiffs, and their bill of particulars, corroborate the testimony of the defendant that the transactions were intended by both parties to be wager contracts. The plaintiffs' agent did not deny that he had the conversation with the defendant, as testified by the defendant. It is true that he testified that he intended that the grain should be delivered. It is competent for a person to testify that he engaged in a transaction in good faith, or with a particular intent; but, if the transaction be such that from it or from the other evidence in the case, a different - intent may be fairly inferred, the question with what intent is one for the j ury. If the testimony of a party that he committed an act which, if done with a lawful intent, would be innocent, but, if with an unlawful intent, a crime, is to be held to be conclusive, convictions in criminal cases in which intent is a material fact will be quite difficult. The intent with which these parties bought and sold may be inferred from the course of dealing between them. Kenyon v. Luther, 4 N. Y. Supp. 498 ; 19 St. Rep. 32. I think the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury, and that the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.