Case Name: Jane LASCHKE and Rudolph Laschke, Appellants, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., a foreign corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; and Liggett Group, Inc., a foreign corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-04-16
Citations: 872 So. 2d 344
Docket Number: No. 2D02-1804
Parties: Jane LASCHKE and Rudolph Laschke, Appellants, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., a foreign corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; and Liggett Group, Inc., a foreign corporation, Appellees.
Judges: SALCINES, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 872
Pages: 344–350

Head Matter:
Jane LASCHKE and Rudolph Laschke, Appellants, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., a foreign corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Co., a foreign corporation; and Liggett Group, Inc., a foreign corporation, Appellees.
No. 2D02-1804.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 16, 2004.
Howard M. Acosta, St. Petersburg; Kent G. Whittemore and Bruce H. Denson of Whittemore, Denson, P.A., St. Peters-burg; and Charles P. Schropp of Schropp, Buell & Elligett, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.
Stephanie E. Parker of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Atlanta, Georgia; and Benjamin H. Hill, III, and Troy A. Fuhr-man of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Kenneth J. Reilly of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Miami; and C. Lawrence Stagg and Margaret D. Mathews of Aker-man, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Lorillard Tobacco Co.
William A. Gillen, Jr., of Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.
Wayne Lee Thomas, Tampa, for Appel-lee Liggett Group, Inc.

Opinion:
DAVIS, Judge.
Jane Laschke and her husband, Rudolph Laschke, challenge the trial court order dismissing with prejudice their product liability suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Lorillard Tobacco Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as successor by merger to the American Tobacco Company; and Lig-gett Group, Inc. (collectively "the tobacco companies"). In dismissing the Laschkes' action with prejudice, the trial court found that actions taken by Mrs. Laschke amounted to a fraud on the court. Because we conclude that dismissal with prejudice was too harsh a sanction, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In 1996, the Laschkes filed suit against the tobacco companies for damages' Mrs. Laschke sustained as the result of laryngeal cancer. The suit alleged that Mrs. Laschke had smoked cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies from 1956 to 1995 and that in 1995 Mrs. Laschke was diagnosed with cancer. The complaint further alleged that the cancer was the result of her cigarette smoking.
During the discovery phase of the proceedings, Mrs. Laschke apparently telephoned her oncologist's office and requested that he make a note on her medical records that her cancer was the result of cigarette smoking. She made this request of the doctor's nurse, who in turn talked to the doctor. Through his nurse, the doctor informed Mrs. Laschke that he did not retroactively change charts. However, he did state that he would testify on her behalf at trial. The nurse memorialized Mrs. Laschke's request and the doctor's response on a "sticky note" and placed the note in the file with the medical records.
After obtaining a complete copy of Mrs. Laschke's medical records from the doctor, the tobacco companies found the note. The appellees took Mrs. Laschke's deposition three years after the date of the telephone call. During that deposition, Mrs. Laschke denied asking anyone to change the medical records in any way and denied asking that something be added to the records to show that her cigarette smoking was the cause of her cancer.
The tobacco companies then moved to dismiss the Laschkes' suit alleging that Mrs. Laschke had committed fraud on the court by attempting to have her medical records "altered, defaced or falsified." To support the request for dismissal as a sanction for the alleged misconduct, the tobacco companies submitted portions of the depositions of Mrs. Laschke and the oncologist's nurse.
Because it concluded that the inappropriate request to change the medical records, together with Mrs. Laschke's untruthful. denial of the request made while under oath, constituted fraud on the court, the trial court granted the tobacco companies' request to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The Laschkes now appeal the final judgment entered based on this ruling.
On appeal, the Laschkes argue that the facts of this case as presented in their motion for reconsideration do not support the finding of fraud and ask this court to reverse the trial court's ruling. We note that, due to some procedural issues not addressed herein, most of these facts were not before the trial court at the time of its ruling. It is not necessary, however, for us to address the Laschkes' argument as to the disputed facts because we conclude that, accepting the facts as found by the trial court, it was error to grant the dismissal with prejudice.
Although the trial court entered a detailed order and closely examined the case law regarding this issue, subsequent to the dismissal of the Laschkes' suit below, this court adopted a stringent standard as to what level of misconduct will justify the extreme sanction of dismissal. In Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court followed the test set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):
The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sen-tiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).... Because "dismissal sounds the 'death knell of the lawsuit,' courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious." Id. at 1118. The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court, or where a party refuses to comply with court orders. Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, however, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances. Id.; Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Application of this test to the facts as found by the trial court here suggests that dismissal was too harsh a sanction. The facts, as found by the trial court, do not clearly and convincingly show that Mrs. Laschke's attempt was one that, if she had been successful, would have interfered with the trier of fact's ability to impartially adjudicate the issues between the parties nor would it have unfairly "hampered" the appellees' presentation of their defense. Accordingly, the trial court, having decided this matter without the benefit of Jacob, erred in granting the dismissal with prejudice.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
SALCINES, J., Concurs.
COVINGTON, J., Dissents with opinion.