Case Name: Russell Robert RILEY, Appellant, v. Jo Boyd RILEY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-06-27
Citations: 131 So. 2d 491
Docket Number: No. C-139
Parties: Russell Robert RILEY, Appellant, v. Jo Boyd RILEY, Appellee.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 131
Pages: 491–499

Head Matter:
Russell Robert RILEY, Appellant, v. Jo Boyd RILEY, Appellee.
No. C-139.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
June 27, 1961.
Petition for Rehearing Stricken Aug. 31, 1961.
Merritt, Jackson, Anderson & Henderson, Pensacola, for appellant.
Fisher & Hepner, Pensacola, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.
Defendant husband has appealed from a final decree awarding to his plaintiff wife a divorce, custody of their two minor children ages five and eight years, and requiring that he pay as alimony the monthly sum of $133.33, and an equal amount for the support and maintenance of each of the children. In addition the decree makes a division of real and personal property owned by the parties, provides that the husband shall keep in effect any and all insurance on himself previously procured for the benefit of the wife and minor children, and requires the husband to designate the two children as beneficiaries in all of the insurance policies mentioned therein.
On appeal the husband urges, without citing any authority to support his position, that the chancellor was without power to require him to maintain in effect insurance policies on his life in which his children are named as beneficiaries. He contends that such provision is contrary to public policy and constitutes an abuse of judicial power, for which reasons the decree should be reversed.
At the outset it should be emphasized that the purpose of that provision of the decree here assaulted is not to require the husband to build and maintain an insurance estate for the benefit of his children payable to them upon his death, regardless of their circumstances or the age which they might have attained at the time this contingency occurs. It seems to be the general rule that a court has no power to require a divorced father to build an estate payable to his children upon his death. Thus it has been held erroneous as an abuse of judicial power to require a divorced father to provide for an insurance estate payable to his child or children after majority; to place capital stock of private corporations in trust payable to his children after they reach their majority; or to make an irrevocable will in favor of his children which would devolve to them after his death. Since the foregoing principle of law is not involved in the case we now consider, we pre-termit any opinion with regard to the soundness of the conclusions reached thereon by courts of other jurisdictions.
It seems patently clear that the sole purpose of the provision under attack is to provide security for payment of the support and maintenance of appellant's minor children as required by the decree. The question with which we are confronted is whether a chancellor has the lawful power to require a divorced father to furnish security for payment of support and maintenance of his minor children.
In considering this question, we are first confronted with the established rule of law prevailing in Florida that a father's obligation under a divorce decree to furnish support and maintenance for his minor children terminates upon the father's death. The harshness of this rule, and the inequities which flow therefrom are pointed out in the able dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas in the Flagler case. The highest civil and moral responsibility of a father is to provide support and maintenance for his minor children. The intervention of death does not terminate the children's need for sustenance which continues during the helpless stage of their minority. Although the law will permit a general creditor to enforce payment of a continuing obligation against the estate of a deceased father, it does not afford the same protection to a helpless child. In the event of the father's death, the rule of law presently in effect in this state places the burden of supporting and maintaining the minor children of a deceased father on someone not obligated to bear it, or on the public, in the event the father leaves no estate or disinherits his children by will. Although this rule may well comport with the law of the jungle, its proper place in a modern civilized society is subject to question. Irrespective of our personal views regarding its soundness, this principle is nevertheless the law of Florida and must be respected until changed by proper authority.
Our existing statute dealing with the power of a court respecting the care and custody of minor children provides that in any suit for divorce the court shall have the power to make such orders touching the maintenance of children of the marriage, and what, if any, security to be given for the same, as from the circumstances and the nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just.
It is the authority conferred by this statute that courts of chancery derive their power to require of divorced fathers security for the payment of support and maintenance granted minor children. It is because of the personal tragedies that often result from the above mentioned rule pronounced by the Supreme Court in the Guinta and Flagler decisions that chancellors have frequently utilized the authority granted in the cited statute by requiring divorced fathers, under proper circumstances, to furnish such security as is necessary to assure continued payment of support and maintenance for children duing their minority.
The power of a chancellor to exercise such authority under proper circumstances lias been uniformly approved. In Lindley an appeal was taken from a final decree granting the wife a divorce and custody of two minor children. Among other things, the decree required the husband to convey to his wife his one-half interest in an eight-unit apartment building which had been purchased by the parties at a cost of $80,000. This provision was made as a partial lump sum settlement of the wife's claim for alimony, as the decree further provided that her interest in the property was burdened with the specific requirement that she apply one-half of the net income derived therefrom toward the support and maintenance of the minor children. In the event the property was sold, the decree required the wife to invest one-half of the net proceeds from the sale, which investment should be used to provide support and maintenance for the children during their minority or until marriage at an earlier date. In addition to this provision, the decree also required the husband to maintain unencumbered a policy of insurance on his life payable to the two children until the youngest becomes twenty-one years old. Both provisions of the decree were assigned as error. On appeal that part- of the decree transferring the husband's interest in the apartment building to his wife was affirmed. With regard to the insurance requirement, the Supreme Court held that in consideration of the impact which the other approved provisions of the final decree would have upon the financial status of the husband, and the remoteness of tangible benefits accruing to the children as a result thereof, under the circumstances prevailing in the case it would be inequitable to impose this additional requirement upon the husband. This decision clearly recognizes the power of a chancellor to require a divorced father to maintain in effect insurance on his life payable to his children as security for their support and maintenance. It was only because of the fact that security for the children's support and maintenance was otherwise provided for in the decree, and the additional security requirement relative to the maintenance of life insurance would have a serious impact on the father's financial condition, that the insurance requirement was held to be inequitable and an abuse of discretion. The insurance provision of the decree was accordingly reversed.
This question again arose in the Bell case decided by the Third District Court of Appeal. The facts in Bell bear a striking resemblance to the facts in the case we now review. There the wife was awarded a final decree of divorce, the custody of and support for their two minor children. In settling the interest of the parties in property accumulated by them during marriage it was decreed, among other things, that real estate located in New York, title to which was vested in the husband and wife as an estate by the entirety, should be immediately sold and the proceeds equally divided between the parties. The decree further required the husband to continue in full force and effect certain insurance policies on his life, the beneficiaries therein to remain as stated in the insurance company's records on a date preceding the institution of the divorce suit. On appeal the husband contended that the chancellor erred both in ordering that the property in New York be immediately sold, as well as in making such a generous allowance to the wife as alimony in view of the requirement that he maintain in effect insurance policies on his life of which the wife was beneficiary. In considering these two assignments of error the District Court, in an able opinion by Judge Pearson, held that the chancellor was without authority to order the New York property sold, so the provision of the decree relating to this item was held to be erroneous. With regard to the husband's contention that the court erred in fixing the amount of alimony awarded his wife in view of the requirements respecting insurance as stated above, the District Court, without further elaboration, merely held that the record reveals the matters complained of were patiently tried by the chancellor and that there is sufficient evidence in the testimony to support the chancellor's findings. The remaining portions of the decree, including the provision relating to insurance, were a&rmed. This case approves the power of the chancellor, under proper circumstances, to require a divorced father to maintain in effect insurance on his life as security for the payment of support and maintenance decreed to be paid his wife and children.
On the basis of the foregoing authorities we conclude and so hold that a chancellor, under proper circumstances which render it equitable and just, may require a divorced father to maintain insurance on his life as security for the payment of maintenance and support awarded his minor children.
We next turn to the question of whether under the facts in the case the insurance requirement contained in the decree appealed constitutes an abuse of discretion, and should be reversed. -The evidence reflects that appellant father is a colonel in the United States Marine Corps. Such occupation is admittedly hazardous and materially impairs appellant's life expectancy. He presently earns $1449.68 a month, of which only $400 is required for alimony, support and maintenance for his wife and children. The children are five and eight years old respectively and their need for future sustenance will continue for many years. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the amount of insurance premiums the appellant will be required to pay in order to maintain in effect the life insurance policies mentioned in the decree will have a detrimental impact upon his financial condition, or work upon him an undue hardship. As the children approach or reach their majority, or otherwise become self-sufficient, the chancellor may upon proper showing modify the questioned provision of the decree so as to reduce the amount of insurance appellant will be required to continue in effect as security for the support and maintenance of the children. If and when the time arrives when appellant is no longer obligated to support his children, the decree may be modified so as to completely eliminate the insurance requirement provision. We therefore conclude that appellant has failed to clearly demonstrate that the portion of the decree complained of is inequitable and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
We have carefully considered the remaining assignments of error but find them to be without substantial merit. The decree appealed is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concurs.
'STURGIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
. 27B O.J.S. Divorce § 319(5); Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal.App.2d 443, 126 P.2d 357; Mahaffey v. First National Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So.2d 756.
. Rex v. Rex, 331 Mich. 399, 49 N.W.2d 348.
. 27B O.J.S. Divorce § 319(5); Kunc v. Kunc, 186 Okl. 297, 97 P.2d 771.
. Flagler v. Flagler, Fla.1957, 94 So.2d 592; Guinta v. Lo Re, 1947, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So.2d 704.
. F.S. § 65.14, F.S.A.
. Lindley v. Lindley, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 17.
. Bell v. Bell, Fla.App.1959, 112 So.2d 63.