Case Name: Hoose vs. Sherrill and others
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1836-10
Citations: 16 Wend. 33
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hoose vs. Sherrill and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wendell's Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 33–48

Head Matter:
Hoose vs. Sherrill and others.
Where a. justice of the peace justifies in an action oí false imprisonment, under an execution on a judgment rendered by him, and in his plea sets forth that the first process in the suit before him was by summons, it is not necessary for him to allege that the defendant in such process was a. freeholder or an inhabitant having .a family in the county where he resides, or to negative the fact that he was a non-resident.
Where the first process is by summons when it should have been by warrant, the proceeding is not coram non judice, nor is the defendant remediless ; advantage may be taken of the error by objection before the justice on the return of the summons, and if he err in deciding such objection, a certiorari lies.
Mr. Justice Bronson dissented ; see his opinion.
False imprisonment. The plaintiff declared in the usual form-for an assault, battery and false imprisonment, against the defendant Sherrill and two other persons. Sherrill alone appeared to the action, and pleaded that at the time when, <fec. he was a justice of the peace of the county of Tompkins, empowered to take cognizance of and to try actions for the recovery of demands of the value of fifty dollars or under, that the trustees of the village of Ithaca applied to him to issue a summons against the plaintiff, according to the provisions of the act to incorporate the village of Ithaca, for an alleged violation of an ordinance or by-law of the village ; that he accordingly issued a summons, in due form of law, to a constable of the county, commanding him to summon Hoose to appear before him, at his office, on the sixth day of June then next, to answer to the trustees of the village in a plea of debt. That the summons was duly returned by the constable, personally served, and on the day appointed the trustees appeared and declared in debt for a penalty of five dollars, for the violation of a village ordinance in relation to the market. That the cause was then adjourned, on the application of the trustees, until the next day, when, after hearing the evidence given in the cause, he rendered judgment in favor of the trustees for $5 debt and S3,24 costs, and in pursuance of the provisions of the act entitled “ An act to amend the act entitled an act to incorporate the village of Ithaca,” he ordered Hoose to be imprisoned in the common jail of the county of Tompkins for 30 days, unless the penalty and costs were sooner paid; and on the 10th July, 1834, at the request of the trustees of the village, he issued an execution on the judgment, commanding any constable of the county to levy the amount of the judgment of the goods and chattels of Hoose, and to bring the money before him, &c. and for want of goods and chattels whereon to levy, to take the body of Hoose and convey the same to the keeper of the common jail, who was commanded to receive Hoose and keep him until duly discharged according to law; and on the back of such execution made an endorsement, certifying that the judgment on which the same had issued was rendered for the violation of an ordinance of the trustees of the village of Ithaca in relation to the market, and directing the keeper of the jail to keep Hoose in close custody in the jail of the county, for 30 days, unless the judgment should be sooner paid. Which execution was delivered to Van Kirk, one other of the defendants, a constable of the county, to be executed; who, for want of goods and chattels whereon to levy, arrested Hoose and conveyed him to the jail of the county, where he delivered him to Cary, the remaining defendant in this cause, the keeper of the jail, who received Hoose and detained him three days, when he was discharged by the trustees of the village, which are the several supposed trespasses, &c. concluding with a verification and prayer of judgment. To this plea the plaintiff interposed a general demurrer, and the defendant joined in demurrer.
M. T. Reynolds, for the plaintiff,
contended that the plea was defective; that the defendant had failed to show that he had obtained jurisdiction of the "person of the plaintiff previous to the rendition of the judgment and the issuiug of the execution ; that he was bound to aver not only that he issued a summons and that it was duly served, but that such process was the species of process which he was authorized to issue in the case. This he could do only by averring that the plaintiff was a resident of the county in which the process "issued, for if a non-resident, the statute positively prohibited the issuing of a summons, 2 R. S. 228, § 13, 17-He insisted that in reference to courts of limited jurisdiction, no presumptions were to be indulged; but their authority must be clearly shown. He also urged that the plea was bad in not stating the time of the issuing of the summons» so that the court might judge whether it was in due form.
C. P. Kirkland, for the defendant,
referred to the act incorporating the village of Ithaca, Session laws of 1821, p. 222, § 6, and the act amending the same, Sessions laws of 1828, p. 150, § 11, and contended that sufficient was alleged to show that the justice had jurisdiction as well of the subject matter as of the person of the plaintiff; and that in the absence of all allegation to the contrary the court would presume that the process of summons was the proper process in the case, and that it was regular in its form.

Opinion:
By the Court, Nelson, C. J.
A justice has jurisdiction to issue a summons as the first process in the commencement of a suit before him, in all cases where the defendant is a freeholder or an inhabitant having a family within the county where the justice resides, 2 R. S. 227, § 13. Whether it was or was not the appropriate process in this particular case cannot affect this general jurisdiction. If a summons be issued in a case in which it is not the appropriate process, the objection, to be available to the defendant in such process, must be taken before the justice, and if he errs in his decision, the remedy of the party is by certiorari; the proceeding will not be coram non judice. The general power will protect the magistrate and all officers concerned in the execution of the process from being treated as tres passers. The case of Rogers v. Mulliner, 6 Wendell, 597, is an authority for this principle: see also Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wendell, 170. The summons was personally served, and whether there was a sufficient number of days between its issuing and the day of its return, is not material as it regards the defence in this case. The defect, if one exist, would go only to the regularity of the process, and not to the jurisdiction of the justice ; it might be cause for reversal of the judgment, but does not render the process a nullity. The plea sets forth abundant facts to show jurisdiction of the subject matter ; it refers to the statute giving the penalty for which the plaintiffs declared, and also to the remedy thereby prescribed. It also shows that the justice, had jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff*. There must be judgment for the defendant, with leave to the plaintiff to amend.
Mr. Justice Co wen concurred.