Case Name: Hampton DUPRE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1967-02-15
Citations: 197 So. 2d 119
Docket Number: No. 1986
Parties: Hampton DUPRE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: HOOD, J., is of the opinion that a re-bearing should be granted.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 197
Pages: 119–123

Head Matter:
Hampton DUPRE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1986.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1967.
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1967.
Donald Soileau, Mamou, for defendant-appellant.
Preston N. Aucoin, Ville Platte, for plaintiff-appeflee.

Opinion:
O.N MOTION TO DISMISS
En Banc.
FRUGÉ, Judge.
The defendant appellant was granted a suspensive and devolutive appeal from a money judgment rendered against it and the record was lodged in this court. The plaintiff-appellee moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was not timely filed.
Judgment for the plaintiff was rendered and signed by the trial judge on November 30, 1966, after petition, answer and trial on the merits. Counsel for both parties were present in court and therefore no issue of notice of signing of the judgment is here presented. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1913.
On that same day, November 30, 1966, the defendant applied for and was granted a suspensive and devolutive appeal to this court, conditioned on its furnishing bond according to law. A suspensive appeal bond in the proper amount was furnished by the defendant on January 5, 1967.
Pertinent articles of the Code of Civil Procedure provide as follows:
Art. 2123. "Delay for taking suspensive appeal.
"Except as otherwise provided by law, an appeal which suspends the effect or the execution of an appealable order or judgment may be taken, and the security therefor furnished, only within fifteen days of:
"(1) The expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, as provided by Article 1974, if no application has been filed timely;
* $ *y>
Art. 1974. "Delay for applying for new trial.
"The delay for applying for a new trial shall be three days, exclusive of legal holidays. Except as otherwise provided in the second paragraph hereof, this delay commences to run on the day after the judgment was signed.
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Since the judgment was signed on November 30, 1966, the delay for applying for a new trial commenced to run on Thursday, December 1, 1966, and expired on Monday, December 5, 1966 (Saturday, December 3, and Sunday, December 4, not being counted). Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure the security for a suspensive appeal must have been furnished within fifteen calendar days of December 5, 1966.
An appeal bond filed on January 5, 1967, was not filed within this fifteen day delay period, and since the. suspensive appeal bond was not timely filed, the appeal can not be maintained as a suspensive appeal and must be dismissed.
We note from the record that the appeal bond was filed well within the 90-day delay provided by LSA-C.C.P. 2087 for the taking of a devolutive appeal and "furnishing security therefor." Normally, under these conditions the appeal would be maintained as a devolutive appeal though dismissed as a suspensive appeal. See Kitchen Center, Inc. v. Treigle, 129 So.2d 95 (La.App.); Hill v. Gandolfo Realty Co., 171 So.2d 684 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1965).
We are also required to dismiss the defendant's devolutive appeal upon noting ex proprio motu an absence of appellate jurisdiction thereof. We are forced to this conclusion because, in the instant case, the motion for appeal to this court was granted by the trial judge "conditioned upon furnishing bond according to law." The amount of security to be furnished for a devolutive appeal is stipulated by LSA-C.C. P. art. 2124:
"The security to be furnished for a devolutive appeal shall be fixed by the trial court at an amount sufficient to secure the payment of costs."
As can be seen from the above quoted notation in the record, the security for a devolutive appeal was not fixed at any specified amount by the trial judge, and under the Supreme Court's ruling in Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ransom, 150 La. 142, 90 So. 548, 549 (1922), this is a total absence of compliance with the statutory requirement of bond, a prerequisite to an appellate court's jurisdiction of a devolutive appeal. There the Supreme Court held that a devolutive appeal for which the amount of security was not specifically fixed was fatally defective and should be dismissed despite the remedial provisions of C.C.P. 5125.
The deprivation of the appellant's day in court because of such an anachronistic technicality is, in our - view, no credit to our system of procedure. However, without a contrary indication from our Supreme Court we are powerless to abrogate the rule. See Roy v. Roy, 138 So.2d 417 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1962).
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the appeal of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, both suspensive and devolutive, is hereby dismissed. The costs of the pro•ceedings in this court are assessed against the defendant-appellant.
Appeal dismissed.
. An appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction of a devolutive appeal when the appeal bond is not timely filed or when there is no order fixing the amount of the bond as required by the Code of Civil Procedure. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ransom, supra; Roy v. Roy, 138 So.2d 417 (La.App.3d Cir. 1962) ; Orrell v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 248 La. 576, 180 So.2d 710 (1965).
. "No appeal, order, judgment, writ, mandate, or process conditioned on the furnishing of security may be dismissed, set aside, or dissolved on the ground that the bond fm-nished is insufficient or invalid unless the party who furnished it is afforded an opportunity to furnish a new or supplemental bond, as provided in Articles 6124 and 5126."