Case Name: William HANES, Appellant, v. David DORMIRE, Superintendent, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-02-15
Citations: 240 F.3d 694
Docket Number: No. 99-3942
Parties: William HANES, Appellant, v. David DORMIRE, Superintendent, Appellee.
Judges: Before BOWMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and O’BRIEN, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 240
Pages: 694–724

Head Matter:
William HANES, Appellant, v. David DORMIRE, Superintendent, Appellee.
No. 99-3942.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: June 16, 2000.
Filed: Feb. 15, 2001.
Richard H. Sindel, Clayton, MO, for Appellant.
Cassandra K. Dolgin, Asst. Atty. General, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for Appel-lee.
Before BOWMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and O’BRIEN, District Judge.
. The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
William Hanes appeals from the order of the District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court issued a certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 on a single issue, namely whether Hanes's counsel was constitutionally ineffective in preparation for trial. We affirm.
I.
A jury found Hanes guilty of the first degree murder of John F. Barlow. In short, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Hanes and Robert Sprouse, who testified against Hanes at trial, inject ed Barlow with a cleaning fluid called En-ergine and then robbed Barlow's apartment. Hanes admitted to being at the apartment at the time of the murder and to taking some of Barlow's property, but claimed that Sprouse committed the murder while Hanes was waiting outside the front door to discuss a business deal with Barlow and that he did not know what Sprouse used to kill Barlow. Other than the testimony of Sprouse, the key evidence against Hanes was police testimony that he told police that Energine was used to kill Barlow, and that only after Hanes provided this information were the police able to determine the exact cause of death.
II.
Because Hanes's habeas petition was filed in 1995 before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), this appeal is subject to pre-AEDPA standards of review. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Owens v. Dormire, 198 F.3d 679, 681 n. 2 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1265, 120 S.Ct. 2725, 147 L.Ed.2d 988 (2000). Accordingly, we "give deference to the findings of the state court and the burden is on the petitioner to 'establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination of the state court was erroneous.' " McDowell v. Leapley, 984 F.2d 232, 233 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)). As is always the case, we review the District Court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See id.; Couch v. Trickey, 892 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1989).
The Missouri Court of Appeals addressed Hanes's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in affirming the circuit court's denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. With respect to Hanes's claim that his counsel was ineffective in preparation for trial, the court described, and adopted, the motion court's factual findings as follows:
The motion court found that trial counsel obtained copies of all police reports and provided the reports to mov-ant's mother with the understanding that she would give them to movant and that trial counsel met with movant four times for a total of more than two hours in jail and two other times at the County Courthouse and spoke with movant on the phone numerous times. The motion court further found that, during the course of these conversations, trial counsel discussed the state's case and possible defenses and that trial counsel believed from movant's comments that he was aware of the contents of the police reports. The motion court found that trial counsel conducted an independent investigation of the case and personally interviewed the state's witnesses, lay witnesses and movant's co-workers. These findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
. The motion court found that prior to trial movant and his counsel discussed witnesses to be called at trial, and counsel decided to call six witnesses who he felt would benefit movant. The motion court further found that counsel discussed other potential witnesses and their testimony with movant but chose not to call additional witnesses as matters of trial strategy.
Hanes v. State, 825 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo.Ct.App.1992). The District Court's description of the post-conviction record is substantially the same. Having performed yet a third thorough review of the post-conviction record, we are satisfied that the state court factual findings are entitled to deference in accordance with the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
Given these findings, we must decide whether Hanes's allegations amount to constitutionally defective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Hanes must show that his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694,104 S.Ct. 2052.
First, we deal with Hanes's allegations that his counsel was ineffective in fading to fully and adequately consult with him. Specifically, Hanes alleges that his counsel failed to consult with him in sufficient time to prepare a defense, failed to adequately inform him of possible defenses to the charges, failed to provide him with information concerning the nature of the allegations against him, and failed to discuss with him police reports and other disclosed materials obtained. While there was conflicting evidence on some of these allegations — mainly on whether counsel adequately discussed the case with Hanes — we believe, as we stated earlier, that there was sufficient evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing to support the state court's finding that "trial counsel discussed the state's case and possible defenses and that trial counsel believed from movant's comments that he was aware of the contents of the police reports." Hanes, at 637.
Counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he provided copies of the police reports to Hanes's mother, that she indicated that she would provide copies to Hanes, and that "when [he] did review the matter with [Hanes] either at the courthouse itself or at the jail, [he] was assured that [Hanes] understood both the nature of the charges against him and, generally speaking, what evidence they had against him." Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing at 348-49. Counsel also testified that he reviewed the reports and potential witness testimony with Hanes:
. We had reviewed the reports. We had ample opportunity to know what each of the witnesses were going to say and what answers we were going to try to present in answer to them .
. Sir, I can remember sitting in a conference room with Mr. Hanes again reviewing the witnesses that were going to come and specifically dealing with the questions that were going to be raised about the Energine .
Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing at 370. We do not believe that counsel's several meetings with Hanes before trial at the St. Louis County Jail, the courthouse, and over the telephone in which he discussed the charges and the evidence with Hanes were constitutionally insufficient.
Second, Hanes alleges that counsel failed to contact witnesses necessary to the defense. Hanes provided long lists of potential witnesses to counsel. Of those potential witnesses, only four testified at the post-conviction hearing as to what their testimony would have been at trial: Alison Hanes, Virginia Hanes, Gary Seiner, and Gary Smith. Hanes's wife, Alison Hanes, was prepared to testify that a life insurance policy on her had lapsed in order to rebut evidence that Hanes planned to kill her in order to obtain insurance proceeds. Hanes's mother, Virginia Hanes, was prepared to testify to an alternate version of an ambiguous statement that the State argued was tantamount to a confession. Hanes's friend, Gary Seiner, was prepared to testify that Hanes often went to Chicago to visit him in order to rebut Sprouse's testimony that Hanes went to Chicago to sell stolen property. Finally, Sprouse's short-term roommate, Gary Smith, was prepared to testify that Sprouse threatened him.
We do not believe that counsel's failure to consult with these potential witnesses prior to trial amounts to constitutionally defective assistance of counsel. "Decisions relating to witness selection are normally left to counsel's judgment, and 'this judgment will not be second-guessed by hindsight.' " Williams v. Armontrout, 912 F.2d 924, 934 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc) (quoting Frank v. Brookhart, 877 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1092 (1991). While some of the potential witnesses' testimony could have been helpful in rebutting or clarifying some collateral evidence, we do not believe any of the proffered testimony was so important as to put counsel's failure to consult with or call these witnesses outside the wide bounds of strategic choices that counsel is afforded. The testimony of Alison Hanes was unnecessary as allegations that Hanes plotted to kill her for insurance money never reached the jury. See Trial Transcript at 292-94. The testimony of Virginia Hanes could have clarified Hanes's statements to her on the phone, but the state's interpretation of the conversation as a confession was obviously debatable, and counsel attacked that interpretation in closing argument. The testimony of Gary Seiner could have provided an alternate explanation for Hanes's trips to Chicago, but would not have directly contradicted Sprouse's testimony that Hanes sold stolen property there — a matter that was, at most, peripheral to the central issues at trial. Finally, although counsel failed to consult with Gary Smith before trial, he was at the trial and did testify that Sprouse threatened him.
In any case, the main strategy employed by counsel was to attack the credibility of Sprouse, who in fact had rather serious credibility problems. Given the nature of the case, essentially a swearing match between Hanes and Sprouse over who planned and carried out the murder after both men admitted to being at the scene and stealing the victim's property, we believe this strategy was reasonable. Counsel discussed this strategy, with Hanes and, in fact, did considerable preparation for this aspect of the trial, including taking Sprouse's deposition:
. We [Hanes and his counsel] spent a lot of time talking about the credibility of Mr. Sprouse. I know I talked to Mr. Hanes [sic] mother and father repeatedly about Sprouse's lack of credibility. We also did some background work on Mr. Sprouse and in taking his deposition
. As I recall, at that time I had several associates and we reviewed — if I'm not mistaken, Mr. Sprouse had faked his own death and I think we came into possession of that information and we used that not only — I know we used it at the time of the trial or attempted to set it into the evidence to destroy his credibility in that regard.
Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing at 350-51. Overall, then, we cannot say that counsel's consultations with Hanes and his decision to not contact several potential witnesses, especially given his main trial strategy of attacking Sprouse's testimony, fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Even assuming that counsel was ineffective, we believe that there is not "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. None of the allegations of ineffective assistance that are before us had any effect on the central evidence against Hanes — that the police were able to determine the exact cause of death only after hearing the name of the poison, Energine, out of Hanes's own mouth. At the post-conviction hearing, counsel stated:
The problem that we had throughout the trial [was] the fact that the Medical Examiner's Office claimed that the only way they knew to look for the cleaning fluid in the blood system came from Mr. Hanes. And the testimony of the officers who were involved originally and the Medical Examiner's Office when they came on gave us a hurdle that was rather difficult because they indicated prior to talking to Mr. Hanes they had not been able to determine cause of death and that it was only through a comment from him that led them to the testing for the cleaning fluid in the blood.
Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing at 361. Hanes's statement that Ener-gine was the name of the poison both implicated him in the murder and directly contradicted his story that he was outside the apartment at the time and did not know how Barlow had been killed. Given this strong evidence, we believe Hanes cannot show prejudice within the meaning of Strickland and thus cannot satisfy the second part of the Strickland test.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
. The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
. This is our characterization of the issue. The District Court referenced part (d) of the eighth argument in Hanes's petition in issuing the COA, and thus the certificate covers the substance of the following allegations:
Trial counsel failed to consult with Petitioner in sufficient time to prepare a defense. Specifically, counsel met with Petitioner only twice, for a total of one hour, prior to the trial. Counsel also failed to adequately inform Petitioner of possible defenses to the charge, and failed to contact witnesses provided by Petitioner and necessary to present a defense to the allegations. Trial counsel also failed to provide Petitioner with information concerning the nature of the allegations against him and failed to discuss with Petitioner police reports and other disclosed materials that he had obtained.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 24; see also Hanes v. Dormire, No. 4:95CV2402 CDP, at 20-21 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 29, 1999).
The Supreme Court has spoken recently on the COA issue, and has determined that when a petitioner seeks to appeal the dismissal of a habeas petition after the effective date of AEDPA (April 24, 1996), the right to appeal is governed by the COA requirements found at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), whether the habeas petition was filed in the district court pre- or post-AEDPA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1600, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Because Hanes filed his Notice of Appeal in October 1999, AEDPA's COA requirements govern his appeal. See id.
. After Sprouse confessed to his involvement in the murder, the Clayton Police Department had Sprouse confront Hanes in their presence. According to the testimony of Captain James Humphrey, one of the officers present at the confrontation, when Sprouse told Hanes that he had told police that Hanes jumped on Barlow and injected him in the arm with a needle, Hanes responded, "I didn't jump on his chest, that [Sprouse] premeditated the plan to murder." Trial Transcript at 451. Captain Humphrey further testified that when he asked Hanes what was injected, Hanes stated, "Energine," thus directly contradicting his story that he was not involved and did not know what had been used to murder Barlow.
.'' In deciding this case, we have reviewed the sealed transcript of an in camera examination of Sprouse's counsel for its bearing on the ineffective assistance claim before us. Sprouse's counsel had indicated that she had reason to believe that Hanes's counsel was ineffective, but refused to explain further due to her obligation under the attorney-client privilege. Sprouse was deceased, having died in 1988. The District Court held an in camera examination of Sprouse's counsel to determine whether it was necessary to abrogate the privilege in order to protect Hanes's constitutional rights. The court refused to abrogate the privilege and then sealed the examination transcript. Because we believed this ruling could have had some bearing on the ineffective assistance claims before us, we reviewed the transcript. Having done so, we are convinced that the privilege should remain in force and the transcript remain sealed.
. The District Court described the record as follows:
The post-conviction hearing record shows that trial counsel met with petitioner before trial at least two times for a total of two hours at the St. Louis County Jail, two other times at the courthouse, and spoke with petitioner on several other occasions over the telephone. Counsel also met With petitioner at the jail two days after the trial had begun. Trial counsel provided copies of the police reports to petitioner's mother and relied on her to give copies to petitioner. Trial counsel testified at petitioner's post-conviction hearing that, during his meetings with petitioner, he specifically discussed with him all the evidence against him and possible defenses, discussed the police reports, and discussed and explained the same to petitioner's family.
Hanes, No. 4:95CV2402 CDP, at 17-18.
. Hanes called his mother from the police station to tell her that the police would be coming for a suitcase filled with the victim's property. Captain Humphrey testified that at the close of the conversation Hanes stated, "no, mom, that is not all. It's worse. Please tell Alison to bring my medication and please send my prayerbook and pray for me." Trial Transcript at 452-53. At closing argument, the state argued that an innocent man would have told his mother that he didn't commit the crime. Virginia Hanes was prepared to testify that Hanes said, "oh, Mom, Mom. They're accusing me." Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Hearing at 169.
. Attempts by the prosecution to put this evidence in front of the jury met with repeated objections by defense counsel that were sustained each time. Trial Transcript at 292, 294, 503-505, 559-563. Only once was an objection to a tangentially-related question overruled. Trial Transcript at 294 (allowing prosecutor to ask Sprouse if Hanes had threatened other people, to which Sprouse responded that Hanes had threatened his wife). Also, at one point during Sprouse's testimony he answered an improper question to which defense counsel immediately objected; that objection was sustained. Trial Transcript at 292 (responding to prosecution's question, Sprouse stated that Hanes told him of plans to kill his wife and in-laws). These instances do not amount to the trial court's having allowed evidence of a plot by Hanes to kill his wife for insurance money to come before the jury, as suggested by the dissent.