Case Name: Thomas Wilks, adm'r. of Joseph Robinson, vs. James G. Robinson, ex'or. of Robert Grier
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1832-05
Citations: 3 Rich. 182
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas Wilks, adm’r. of Joseph Robinson, vs. James G. Robinson, ex’or. of Robert Grier.
Judges: Harper, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 182–190

Head Matter:
Thomas Wilks, adm’r. of Joseph Robinson, vs. James G. Robinson, ex’or. of Robert Grier.
Against a note payable on demand, the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the date.
Before Earle, J. at Chester, Spring Term, 1832.
The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows :
“ This was an action of assumpsit on three promissory notes — one dated the 26th April, 1823, for $150, due at one day ; one dated the 30th January, 1824, for $302 12, due on demand; and the third dated 30th January, 1824, for $1079, due at ten days. The suit was brought March 3d, 1830. The statute of limitations was pleaded, and all the notes were barred, except for the evidence on the part of the plaintiff to take them out of the statute, which was to the following effect. Joseph Robinson, the plaintiff’s intestate, was the executor of one Elder, and had lent considerable sums of money of his estate to Robert Grier, the defendant’s testator, for which the large note was certainly-given — and perhaps the others also. A bill to account had been filed by the representatives of Elder against Robinson, and he employed Grier as agent to prepare and conduct his defence. On the 25th November, 1825, while on his way to consult counsel relative to that suit, Grier had a conversation with William Love, in which he stated that he had borrowed from Robinson upward of a thous- and dollars belonging to the estate of Elder, for which Robinson had his note, and he should be very much injured if Robinson did not gain the suit — meaning that he would have the money to pay. Love had frequently before heard him speak of these demands which Robinson had against him. At Spring court, 1825, he said that Robinson held other smaller notes on him, besides the large note. But no acknowledgment was proved subsequent to November, 1825. Robert Grier died 2d September, 1827, and Joseph Robinson died in September, 1829. Allowing to the defendant nine months after the death of his testator, four years did not elapse from the acknowledgment proved by Love, to the commencement of the action. That acknowledgment obviously related to the large note, and as to it, was clearly sufficient to prevent the operation of the statute. There was a payment credited on the note for $150, and the entry was proved to be in the hand-writing of the present defendant, who was the son of the plaintiff’s intestate. Having become interested as executor of Grier, and party to the suit, he could not be sworn, and the highest evidence that could be given was proof of his hand-writing ; and on that I left it to the jury to determine whether there was an actual payment, or whether it was a fictitious entry to save the statute. There was no ground to suspect the latter ; on the contrary, the confidential and friendly relation of the parties was adverse to such a suspicion. The jury found that it was an actual' payment, and being within four years, it saved the statute. The acknowledgment made to Love at Spring court, 1825, clearly related to these small notes, and would have been sufficient to save the statute as to them, but after deducting nine months allowed to defendant, more than four years elapsed before action brought. The note, therefore, payable on demand for $302 12, was barred, and the plaintiff should not recover on it. The jury were misdirected by the court in relation to the time when the statute commenced to run against that note. In the notice of appeal, that is not set down as a ground for new trial, but it was an error in point of law, which should not prejudice the defendant’s legal rights. From the evidence he was entitled to a verdict on that note, and a new trial should be ordered, unless the plaintiff will enter a remittitur on the record for the amount of it. On the other notes the verdict was right.”
The defendant appealed, on the following grounds :
1. Because the proof relied on by the plaintiff was not sufficient to take the notes out of the statute of limitations, and the jury erred in finding for the plaintiff on all three of the notes.
2. Because one of the notes was made payable on demand, and no demand being made of the maker of the note in his life time, the demand on the executor would not supply that deficiency.
3. Because the credit of eight dollars on the note for $150, was insufficient, under the proof, to prevent the bar of the statute.
4. Because the statute commenced to run against the note payable on demand from the date of the note.
5. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
Ernes, for the motion.
-, contra.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Johnson, J.
There is nothing in the conclusion which the jury have drawn from the facts, so much at war with probability and common sense, as to authorize the court to award a new trial on that ground. The question, whether, when a note is payable on demand, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the note, or from the time of the demand, is one of some importance, and not without its difficulty. The statute, P. L. 102, provides that the action of assumpsit shall be brought " within four years next after the cause of such action or suit, and not after and the question must be resolved by the inquiry, when did the cause of action arise? On general principles, I take it to be very clear that where the entire consideration of a promise to pay money is past, and there is no time limited for the payment, and nothing left for the promisee to do or perform, the debt is due in the instant on demand, and if not paid, an action lies presently. Thus if A. promise, in consideration that B. will deliver him a horse, he will pay B. so much, and B. deliver him the horse, he is bound to pay upon request, and if he does not, an action lies immediately; nor need B. make request, for A. knows that the debt is due, and that he is bound to pay, and he is in default if he fail to pay. This is not controverted, but it is said that a promise to pay on demand imposes an obligation or duty on the promisee to make the demand, and hence it is concluded that no action lies until demand made, and consequently, the statute will not begin to run until demand made. That is the case of every debt where no time is fixed for the payment. The debtor ought to pay without request, and is bound to do it upon request. It is an obligation implied by law, without any express stipulation to that effect, as was said in Collins vs. Denning, 3 Salk. 227. The plaintiff there declared on a promise to pay on demand, and that he had demanded it on a certain day, but defendant refused to pay. Defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex annos, and upon demurrer to the plea, it was insisted that it was ill, for it should have been actio non accrevit infra sex annos, because the duty arose from the demand, and not from the promise. But this objection was not allowed, for payment upon demand is no more than what is implied.by law. So in Reynolds vs. Davies, 1 Bos. & Pul. 625, in an action by the indorsee against the maker of a promissory note, it was held that it was not necessary in the declaration to allege or to prove notice of the indorsement to the maker ; and C. J. Eyre said " the promise to pay is to the payee or his order; immediately then on the or der being made to the indorsee, the promise attaches, nor can we add the qualification of notice to a promise which -was not originally qualified with that circumstance." Nor is it necessary in a declaration on a note payable on a day certain, to lay any request at all, for that is implied from the precedent debt, and the bringing of the action. The action itself is a request in law. In Harrison vs. Cammer, 2 McG. 246, it was held that an action brought on the day of the date of a note payable on demand, was well brought, although no demand was made ; the bringing of the action was itself a sufficient demand. In Chit, on Bills, 537, and Ang. on Lim. 182, the rule that the statute begins to ran on a promissory note payable on demand, from the date, and not from the demand, is expressly recognized ; and the point was expressly ruled by the Constitutional court in Woodward vs. Drennan, in 1811, (1 vol. MSS. 430) cited in Harrison vs. Cammer, under the title of Woodward vs. Dunner — and I have looked in vain through our own and the English cases for any direct authority to the contrary. The converse is attempted, however, to be sustained by analogy drawn from the cases in which it has been held that a note payable on demand will not bear interest until demand made, and the cases of Cannon vs. Beggs, 1 McC. 370, and Schmidt vs. Limehouse., 2 Bail. 276, are full upon this point; and certainly there is some force in it. According to general principles, a liquidated debt bears interest from the time it is due, as an account stated, and the statute begins to run from that time, because there is a cause of action. But on looking into the doctrine in reference to this case, I am very much disposed to think, that although there is some diversity, the better opinion is, that they bear interest from the date ; and although I may be disposed to follow these cases as a precedent to which the community can accommodate themselves, it is a sufficient reason for not following up the principle in relation to the statute. It was apprehended, and I fell into that notion upon the first view of the case, that bank notes would be affected by the statute if it began to run from the date. But in some instances, the notes are made payable at the Bank, and in those cases their pro-sentation there is necessary to entitle the holder to sue. Sanderson vs. Bowes, 14 East. 500. There is still a better reason ; it is the universal usage of the banks to issue and re-issue their notes as often as they may have occasion, and every re-publication is a re-assumption of payment; and it is impossible that the holder can know from the date when it was last issued. 16 Mass. R. 65. It is therefore ordered that a new trial be granted, unless the plaintiff enter a remittitur for the amount of the note for $302 12.
Harper, J. concurred.