Case Name: J. K. Glenn v. W. H. Caldwell et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1896-03
Citations: 74 Miss. 49
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. K. Glenn v. W. H. Caldwell et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 74
Pages: 49–59

Head Matter:
J. K. Glenn v. W. H. Caldwell et al.
Unlawful Detainee. Pwchaser at execution sale. Tenant of defendant in execution. Pwrchcmer an assign. Code 1892, § 4461.
Under ¡¡ 4461, code 1892, a purchaser of land at execution sale may maintain the action of unlawful detainer ag-ainst a tenant of the defendant in execution, who “ withholds possession after the expiration of his rig-ht,” the purchaser having' become, by the act of the law, the “assign of him who is so deprived of possession, or from whom possession is so withheld.”
From the circuit court of the second district of Panola county.
Hon. Eugene Johnson, Judge.
Unlawful detainer by appellant against appellees, tenants in possession of one Lee Caldwell. The land in suit was sold under an execution in favor of appellant against said Caldwell, appellant becoming the purchaser on August 7, 1893. The sheriff did not execute a deed thereto until February 14, 1894. The unlawful detainer suit was instituted on November 14, 1894, less than a year subsequent to the execution of the deed, but more than one year subsequent to appellant’s purchase at the sale. The land was incumbered with a deed of trust for a large amount at the time of the sale. The case, by consent, was tried by the court without a jury. Judgment for defendants, and appeal by plaintiff.
/Stone cé Lowry, for the appellant.
There can be no doubt about the right of a purchaser at execution sale to maintain an action of unlawful detainer against the defendant or those claiming under him as' tenants. In Gmnmings v. Kilyoatrio, 23 Miss., 106, the right is clearly implied and recognized. Our statute is much broader now than it was then. Code 1892, §4461. In Ragan v. Harrell, 52 Miss., 818, the argument and holding of the court is as applicable to a purchaser at execution sale as to one at a trustee’s sale, who, the court held, could maintain this form of action. In the case at bar there is clearly privity between the parties, and it has been expressly held, on that ground, under a statute no broader than ours, that the purchaser at execution sale is entitled to the remedy. Liss v. Wilcoxen, 2 Col., 85. In several other states his right to maintain the action has been expressly affirmed. Pensoneau v. Heinrich, 51 111., 271; Johnson v. Baker (111.), 87 Am. Dec., 296; Dortch v. Robinson, 31 Ark., 296; l^eople v. McAclam, 81 N. Y., 287. The states which hold the contrary have statutes requiring that plaintiff must have once been in possession, as in Missouri and Alabama.
L. F. Rainwater, for the appellees.
1. A purchaser at execution sale cannot maintain unlawful detainer, but must sue in ejectment. He does not belong to any of the classes to which that remedy is extended by § 1161, code 1892. The action is possessory, and does not involve title, and there must be “an expiration of the right by contract to hold possession.” Lobdell v. Mason, 71 Miss., 937.
It is held that a purchaser at trustee’s sale may avail of the remedy, but on the ground that the gx-antor’s right of possession, as against the trustee, had expired. This was an expiration of right by contract to hold possession, and was within the statute. Marks v. Howard, 70 Miss., 115; the concluding part of Cummings v. Kilpatrick, 23 Miss., 106.
2. While the sheriff’s deed was delivered to plaintiff within one year anterior to the institution of suit, plaintiff’s purchase at the sale was more than one year prior thereto, and his right to the action was barred under the statute.

Opinion:
Coox'ER, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question presented by this appeal is whether a purchaser of land at execxxtioxx sale may maintain the action of unlawful entry and detainer against the tenants of the defendant in execution. The court below was of opinion that he could not, and, on motion, dismissed the action.
We think he may. The statute, code of 1892, § 4461, provides that £ £ anyone deprived of the possession of land by force, intimidation, fraud, stratagem, stealth, and any landlord, vendor, vendee, mortgagee, or trustee, or cesi/ioi que trust, or other person against whom the possession of land is withheld, by his tenant, vendee, vendor, mortgagor, grantor, or other person, after the expiration of his right by contract, express or implied, to hold possession, and the legal representatives or assigns of him who is so deprived of possession, or from whom possession is so withheld, as against him who so obtained possession, or withholds possession after the expiration of his right, and all persons claiming to hold under him, shall, at any time within one year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, be entitled to the summary remedy herein prescribed."
The only inquiry involved is whether the purchaser at execution sale is an assign of the defendant in execution within the meaning of the statute. It is of easy solution, and, we think, free from doubt. Both the spirit of the statute and its letter embrace such purchaser. At the common law, forcible entry was an offense, and punishable as such. Our statute enlarges the remedy by conferring upon the person whose possession is unlawfully invaded a summary action for the recovery of possession, and this right is given not only to the original owner, but to his legal representative or assigns. Another class of persons, other than those who enter by force, fraud, etc., are subjected to the action — namely, those whose entry is lawful under a contract, express or implied, but who remain in possession after expiration of their right to hold; and, as-against these, the right is given also to the original owner, his. legal representative or assigns. The statute views with equal disfavor him who enters by force, fraud, stratagem, intimida tion or stealth, and him who, entering lawfully under contract, refuses to redeliver possession according to that contract.
As against any person of the enumerated classes, we can perceive no reason why the language of the statute should receive a narrow and restricted construction. Indeed, there is little room for construction; the words are plain and unambiguous. The word assigns '£ comprehends all those who take immediately or remotely from or under an assignor, whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of law." Anderson's Law Dictionary, title Assign; Baily v. DeCrespigny, L. R., 4 Q. B., 186; Brown v. Association, 34 Minn., 547.
There is nothing in the context which limits the meaning of the word assigns to those who take under an assignment by contract as distinguished from those who take under an assignment by operation of law, for the right is given to the legal representatives and assigns, and legal representatives clearly mean those who take by operation of law. But little light is afforded by reference to authorities from other states. The right is a statutory one, and decisions construing statutes different from ours can serve but little purpose in considering our statute.
The question is whether our statute gives the right. If the legislature had designed that the remedy should be limited to assigns by contract, it would have been a simple matter to have said so, but, instead of this, through three codes they have retained the word assigns, and this, in its legal significance, includes as well assigns by operation of law as those by contract.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.