Case Name: ROBERTS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-06-28
Citations: 150 S.W. 627
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROBERTS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 150
Pages: 627–630

Head Matter:
ROBERTS v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 28, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 23, 1912.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 1092 ) — Appeal—Bill of Exceptions — Filing.
Bills of exception bearing no file marks, and not showing that they were ever filed with the clerk of the court, nor when they were .delivered to the clerk, if at all, and not showing when they were presented to and approved by the judge, will not be considered.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2829, 283A-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1092. ]
2. Homicide (§ 340 ) — Appeai^-Harmless-Error — Instructions—Effect of Verdict.
Where accused -upon his trial for murder was found guilty only of murder in the second degree, with punishment of nine years in the penitentiary, his motion for a new trial, complaining of the charge on murder in the first degree, would not be considered.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 715-720; Dec. Dig. § 340. ]
3. Homicide (§ 309 ) — Trial—Instructions —Manslaughter.
Where accused went to funeral exercises in a church, and as one of the mourners started out of the door weeping, and with his hand over his eyes, fired at him three times, two of the shots being fatal wounds, the evidence did not raise the issue of manslaughter; and a refusal to charge thereon, was proper.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 649-656; Dec. Dig. § 309. ]
4. Homicide (§ 340 ) — Appeal—Party Entitled to Allege Error — Error Favorable to Party Complaining.
Where the facts in a trial for' murder would sustain a verdict of murder in the first degree, and the court, by mating its definition of implied malice prominent, aided counsel for accused in getting the offense reduced to murder in the second degree, with almost the minimum penalty, accused could not complain.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 315-720; Dec. Dig. § 340. ]
5. Criminal Law (§ 1129 ) — Appeal—Assignment op Error.
An assignment of error on the ground that a charge was confusing, disconnected, and not applicable to the facts in the case is too general to be considered.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2954-2964; Dec. Dig. § 1129. ]
6. Homicide (§ 151 ) — Evidence—Burden op Prooj^-Depense of Insanity.
Accused setting up insanity as a defense to homicide has the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 276-278; Dec. Dig. § 151. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 48 ) — Responsibility fob Crime — Sanity.
The law does not require, as a condition on which criminal responsibility shall follow the commission of crime, the possession of one’s faculties in full vigor, or a mind unimpaired by disease or infirmity; but the offender can only discharge himself from responsibility by proving that his intellect was so disordered that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, and that it was an act which he ought not to do.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 53-58; Dec. Dig. § 48. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
8. Criminal Law (§ 595 ) — Continuance-Absence of Witnesses.
In a trial for murder, accused, whose principal defense was insanity, moved for a continuance because his sister and her husband, who had been duly summoned, were unable to be present in court by reason of the sister’s expected confinement, as shown by testimony of a physician. Accused expected to prove by the absent witnesses that two or three years prior to the homicide deceased killed accused’s brother, and that, prior to the killing of his brother, accused was of a cheerful, happy disposition, and that since that time there had been • a marked change in his conduct; that he had brooded over his brother’s death, so that his mind was unbalanced, and at the time he killed deceased he did not know right from wrong, and was not responsible for his acts. Held, that the refusal of a continuance •was error.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1323-1327; Dec. Dig. § 595. ]
9. Homicide (§ 169 ) — Evidence—Circumstances Preceding Act.
Evidence that prior to a homicide deceased was kneeling down at the altar crying at a time when defendant was not in the church and did not know what deceased was doing was inadmissible; but the acts and conduct of both parties when deceased came in sight of accused were admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 341-350; Dec. Dig. § 169. ]
10. Criminal Law (§ 530 ) — Evidence-Confessions — Preliminary Evidence.
A county attorney to whom accused made a statement or confession,. reduced to writing, shortly after the homicide, cannot testify as to the contents of the confession, unless it is shown that there was a compliance with the requirements of Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 790, as amended by Acts 30th Leg. c. 118.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1208-1211; Dec. Dig. § 530. ]
11. Criminal Law (§ 402 ) — Documentary and Oral Evidence — Confessions.
Where a confession which complies with the requirements of Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 790, as amended by Acts 30th Leg. c. 118, has been lost, and the evidence shows the loss, and that it could not be found on a diligent search, oral pi’oof of its contents is admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 887, 888; Dec. Dig. § 402. ]
12. Criminal Law (§ 1171 ) — Trial—Argument of Counsel.
A -remark of the prosecuting attorney in a trial for murder, “that they ought to hang the defendant. If they did not do so, and sent him to the penitentiary, the Governor, on some flimsy pretext, would pai’don him, and he would assassinate some other citizens of the state’'— while improper, was not- reversible error, where the jury did not inflict the death penalty.
[Ed. Nóte. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3126, 3127; Dec. Dig. § 1171. ]
Appeal from District Court, Caldwell County; M. C. Jeffrey, Special Judge.
Ollie Roberts was convicted of murder in the second .degree, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
E. B. Coopwood, of Lockhart, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic ana section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was indicted for murder, found guilty of murder in the second degree, and his punishment assessed at nine years in the penitentiary.
The facts would show that deceased had killed appellant's brother some two or three years prior to this homicide; that deceased had left the county and moved to San Antonio, and went back on this trip to attend the funeral and burial of Elwood Johnson; that after the funeral exercises in the church, as deceased started out of the door, appellant fired at him three times, two of the shots taking effect; both being fatal wounds in the opinion of the doctors who were called to attend him. The evidence would show that deceased was weeping,- and had his hand over his eyes, when the first shot was fired, and the others followed in rapid succession. The evidence for the defendant seeks only to show that appellant was insane at the time he did the shooting, offering proof of no other justification.
There are in the record a number of bills of exceptions, and if we were permitted to review them they might present error; hut they bear no file marks, do not show they were ever filed with the clerk of the court, and, if they were delivered to the clerk, when they were so delivered. In an unbroken line of decisions this court has held that the bills must show, on appeal, that they had been filed with the clerk, when approved by the judge, and the date of filing must be shown. These bills do not show when they were presented to the judge, nor when delivered to the clerk, bearing no date and no file marks. Consequently we will not review the bills of exceptions. The statute requires that the bills must be filed with the clerk, and filed within a given time, and this must be evidenced by the file marks of the clerk. The record being in this condition, we cannot review the grounds in the motion for new trial, based on alleged bills of exception.
The defendant being found guilty of only murder in the second degree, and his punishment being assessed at only nine years in the penitentiary, we will not discuss nor pass on those paragraphs in the motion complaining of the charge on murder in the first degree.
The evidence did not raise the issue of manslaughter, and the court did not err in refusing to charge thereon; and the definition of implied malice is in language frequently approved by this court, and the fact that the court repeated this definition in his charge was not hurtful to defendant. The facts in this case would sustain a verdict of murder in the first degree; and if the court, by making the definition of implied malice prominent, aided counsel for appellant in getting the offense reduced to that grade, with almost the minimum penalty, he should not complain. If his client is not insane, as found by the jury, counsel has cause to congratulate himself on the verdict returned.
Appellant complains that the charge on insanity is confusing, disconnected, and not applicable to the facts in the case. The charge is not subject to these criticisms, and the grounds are too general to be considered.
The complaint that it placed the burden on defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane presents no error. This is in accordance with the decisions of this court. Fisher v. State, 30. Tex. App. 502, 18 S. W. 90, and cases cited in section 51, White's Ann. Penal Code.
The special charges requested, instructing the jury that "if defendant was moved to commit the homicide by an uncontrollable impulse" to acquit him, should not have been given. This question is thoroughly discussed in Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 311, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. Rep. 638, wherein the rule laid down as the true rule is that the law does not require, as the condition on which criminal responsibility shall follow the commission of crime, the possession of one's faculties in full vigor, or a mind unimpaired by disease or infirmity. He can only discharge himself from responsibility by proving that his intellect was so disordered that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, and that it was an act' which he ought not to do. See, also, Hurst v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 46 S. W. 635, 50 S. W. 719, and cases cited.
The evidence amply supports the verdict, and judgment is affirmed.