Case Name: Vincent UNTO, Appellant, v. MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, INC.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1961-06-16
Citations: 293 F.2d 26
Docket Number: No. 13460
Parties: Vincent UNTO, Appellant, v. MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, INC.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 293
Pages: 26–28

Head Matter:
Vincent UNTO, Appellant, v. MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, INC.
No. 13460.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued June 5, 1961.
Decided June 16,1961.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 29, 1961.
Morris M. Shuster, Philadelphia, Pa. (Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
John J. Guilfoyle, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa. (T. E. Byrne, Jr., Krusen, Evans & Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS, KALODNER and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered on a verdict for the defendant in a civil action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while serving as a seaman aboard the defendant's vessel, S. S. Mormactide. The plaintiff based his claim upon the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel and the negligence of its officers and crew.
The plaintiff first asserts that the trial judge erred in admitting tv/o documents in evidence, one a receipted bill for professional services rendered to the plaintiff by Dr. Carino Cramer of Santos, Brazil, and the other a report of the illness of the plaintiff made by the chief mate of the Mormactide. The receipted bill was a record of a payment made by the defendant in the regular course of its business and the illness report was made by one of its employees also in the regular course of business. Both were produced from the defendant's records. We are satisfied that both were properly admitted in evidence.
The plaintiff's other contention is that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury. He asserts that the jury was told that the negligence complained of by the plaintiff must have been the proximate cause of his injury in order to entitle him to recover on that ground, whereas they should have been told that the plaintiff was entitled to recover if the defendant's negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the
injury. The fact is, however, that the trial judge at least twice in the course of his charge gave the jury substantially the latter instruction. Moreover a reading of the entire charge satisfies us that the jury must have understood the trial judge's reference to "proximate cause" in this sense since he gave them no other definition of the phrase. They, therefore, could not have been aware of the more restricted technical legal meaning sometimes given to the phrase. We conclude that there was no reversible error in the charge.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.