Case Name: The Board of Supervisors of the County of Kent v. The City of Grand Rapids, George E. Pantlind, Et Al. [Two Cases.]
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1886-04-29
Citations: 61 Mich. 144
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Board of Supervisors of the County of Kent v. The City of Grand Rapids, George E. Pantlind, Et Al. [Two Cases.]
Judges: Sherwood, J., concurred. Ciiamplin, J., did not sit.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 144–174

Head Matter:
The Board of Supervisors of the County of Kent v. The City of Grand Rapids, George E. Pantlind, Et Al. [Two Cases.]
Equity — Bill to declareright of county to parcel of land once used for county-seat purposes— Where controlled by city in which situated, under claim of right in the city, for thirty years, bill was dismissed — Dedication of land for county-seat purposes — Removal of county-seat therefrom, and sale of court-house to owner.of fee, divest county of all claim to the land —Title of county under dedication not beneficial except for county purposes — Fee ancillary to the trust created — If land conveyed by unlimited grant, adverse possession for thirty years by city renders application of county for equitable relief rather late.
1. Where a city has had peaceable control for over thirty years of a parcel of land once claimed by a county for county-seat purposes, such con trol being under claim of right in the city, and not simply to give police protection to said land as public grounds, a bill in equity by the couuty to declare its right to the land under its original claim is filed too late, and will be dismissed.
2. A parcel of land was dedicated to a county for county-seat purposes, a court-house erected thereon and used for some years by the county, when the county-seat was removed from the land, and the county sold the court-house to the owner of the fee, abandoning all control of the site.
Held, that the title in the county under the dedication was not beneficial, except so far as the purposes were county purposes; that the fee was ancillary to the trust, and could give no further proprietary right.
Held, further, that on the removal of the county-seat from the land, and the recognition of such removal by the county by the sale of its court-house to the owner of the fee, it lost all interest in the land, and ceased to have any proprietary rights under the dedication.
Held, further, that had the land been conveyed to the county by unlimited grant, it would have remained county property until in some way transferred, but that even in such a case, after nearly thirty years’ adverse possession and claim (see head-note 1), it would be rather late for the county to ask for equitable relief.
Appeal from Kent. (Montgomery, J.)
Argued April 19, 1886.
Decided April 29, 1886.
Bill filed to determine complainant’s right to an alleged eonrt-house square. Defendants appeal.
Decrees reversed and bills dismissed.
Tlie facts are stated in the opinions.’
[The importance of these cases and of the principles involved seems to call for full extracts from the briefs of counsel, which are given below. — Reporter.]
Isaac M. Turner and M. J. Smiley, for complainant:
1. A bill in equity is the proper remedy in this case.
a — Because the complainant was in actual possession at the-time of beginning the suit, and might maintain such a bill to quiet its title and establish its equitable right in the property, under IIow. Stat. § 6626.
b — But independent of the statute the present bill may be maintained. All equitable remedies relating to the title to- land, existing before tlie statute, are still in force and available independently of it, and irrespective of tlie question of possession: Ormsby v. Barr, 22 Mich. 85.
Although the bill contains the requisite allegations for a bill to quiet title, the suit is really one to establish the complainant’s right to use the land for public purposes, and the question of possession is unimportant: Jones v. Smith, 22 Mich. 365; Village of Mankato v. Willard, 13 Minn. 28.
Where a party has an equitable cause of action against another, coming within any recognized rule of equitable jurisdiction, such right can be enforced in equity whether complainant is in possession or not. No statute was needed to enable any one to sue in equity upon an equitable cause of action, and in such case possession is not important, and has never been required: King v. Carpenter, 37 Mich. 366; Geney v. Maynard, 44 Id. 580.
According to the complainant’s theory, an action of ejectment could not be maintained, because it alleges and claims that it is already in possession, and that whatever seeming or actual possession the city has, or has had, was not adverse, but consistent with the right claimed in the bill by the complainant. See Mankato v. Willard, 13 Minn. 28.
The ownership of the fee by the defendants is not inconsistent with the right claimed by the complainant, and is not in dispute, nor is the right of possession, except for the purposes of the public claimed in the bill.
The necessity of a resort to equity arises from the nature of the controversy. It is claimed in the bill that the land in controversy has been dedicated to a public use according to the rules of the common law; and in such case it is weil settled that the fee does not pass, but the right to use for the public purpose does. See Washb. Eas. & Ser. p. 155.
Both parties claim to be in possession, which claims arise from a public use of the property. The complainant claims that the said use is consistent with its rights, and the defendants claim it is inconsistent.' The complainant desires to appropriate the property to the particular public use intended by the dedication, by erecting extensive and costly buildings upon it for the use of the county, and it cannot safely proceed to do this while the defendants make claim to the property inconsistent with this right. As has been stated, ejectment will not lie, and equity seems to be the proper jurisdiction in which to have the complainant’s rights ascertained, settled, and decreed. The alleged dedication occurred many years .ago, and the complainant will soon be without witnesses to prove the facts necessary to sustain it. Morgan v. R. R. Co., 96 U. S. 716; Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566; Trustees. etc., v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510; Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Penn. St. 186; Hayes v. Livingston, 34 Mich. 395.
2. The property in question was dedicated for court-house purposes. All that is required to make a valid dedication is an offer on the part of the owner of the land, and an acceptance of it on the part of the public: Morgan v. R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 716.
Whether the owner intends to make a dedication must be determined from his acts. All that is required is the assent of the owner, and the use of the premises for the purposes intended by the appropriation: Morgan v. R. R. Co., 96 U. S. 723; and dedication may be of a park or public square as well as of a street: Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6 Peters, 431; White v. Smith, 37 Mich. 291.
The ancient plats in use in the public offices, although insufficient to show a statutory dedication, are proper evidence, and tend to show a common-law dedication: Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Wharton (Penn.) 469; Washb. Eas. & Serv. 203; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498.
3. Mere non-user is not an abandonment, and after acceptance by the public something more is required to extinguish the public right: Ward v. Ward, 7 Exch. 838.
In the case of apublic way or right, no length of time during which it may not have been used will operate of itself to prevent the public from resuming the right if they think proper: 2 Greenl. Ev. § 665; nor are private easements lost by non-user for twenty years, unless the right as well as the possession is interrupted: Id.
Mere suspension of the exercise of a right is not sufficient to prove an intention to abandon it, and even where the suspenseis long continued, it is not an abandonment where the party indicates during the period his intention of preserving it-: Washb. Eas. & Serv. p. 544; but there must be abandonment and non-user of such a character and duration as to show an intent to abandon the easement: Washb. Eas. & Serv. p. 551.
4. In cases of dedication, the owner retains the right to use the land in any way compatible with the full enjoyment of the public easement: Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521; State v. Catlin. Id. 530.
In Carter v. Portland, 4 Oregon, 348, it is said : “ As regards the improvement and use of public parks or squares, it is sufficient if they are put to the use to which they are dedicated when the public convenience requires. The dedication having been made, etc., we are not sure it could have been lost by non-user for twenty years, except so far as it was ousted by an adverse use for that period. To say that a dedication made when the site of the town is new would be lost if not followed by immediate or continued use, would deprive the dedication of its intended value.
“ The local authorities or the corporate guardians are the ones whose duty it is to improve, adorn, and embellish the property, and they are the judges when the public pleasure demands the use of the lands dedicated. The original owner, though he has the naked fee, has no right whatever to interfere with the premises, except where the use becomes impossible, or where the authorities seek to put the premises to some other use than that to which they were originally dedicated ; then he, as well as other lot-holders, may proceed in equity to enforce the use according to the original dedication.”
See, also, Hardy v. Memphis, 10 Heisk. 127, where it was held that misappropriation of the land to purposes not contemplated by a dedication does not work an abandonment or forfeiture, but only entitles the proprietors to tile a bill to enjoin the improper use. On page 136 it is said: “ In' some cases an abandonment of an easement may be presumed or inferred from non-user, but rarely, if ever, unless there has been such a use by the owner of the premises in or over which the easement has beeu enjoyed as to indicate a claim of right which is adverse to the enjoyment of the easement.”
In Rowards Exs. v. Portland, 8 B. Monroe, 232, it is held that public ground being dedicated in a town to public use, the right is not lost for want of use, but exists to be used as the public convenience may require; also, that the use by the town and the general public is sufficient to preserve the preexisting right from any presumption of abandonment, or of ouster and loss, by mere constructive possession or claim against it. See, also, 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 222, notes to Dovaston v. Payne.
In Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Peters, 507, it is held: “ That if ground be dedicated for a particular purpose, and the city authorities appropriate it to an entirely different purpose, it might afford ground for the interference of a court of equity to compel a specific execution of the trust, by restraining the corporation, or by causing a removal of the obstructions; but even in such a case the property dedicated would not revert to the original owner. ■ The use would still remain in the public, limited only by the conditions of the grant.”
If buildings are erected on the space dedicated, or grants of part thereof are made by the one who t originally made the dedication, the vested rights of the public are not thereby affected: New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet. 662.
The city charter has always contained provisions similar to the present one, viz.: “ That the common council shall have the care and supervision of the highways, streets, lands, alleys, parks, and public grounds in said city, and it shall be their duty to give directions for the repairing, preserving, improving, cleaning, and securing of such highways, * '* parks, and public grounds, and to cause the same to be improved,” etc. (title 3, secs. 35,43; title 6..sec. 1); and it is under supposed authority arising from similar provisions that the city has assumed to improve these public grounds, and not under the claim of ownership.
The city, in September, 1850, fully acknowledged the occupancy and right of the county, and offered to quitclaim to the commissioners appointed to locate a county-seat for Kent county, all its right to “ the court-house square, and now occupied by said county.”
October 6, 1856, the city offered all of its right to the county, for the purpose of locating the court-house thereon ; and it cannot be fairly urged that the action of the city in taking care of the land and keeping it open for a public park has extinguished the public right.
J. W. Ransom, for City of Grand Rapids:
The bills filed are bills to quiet title, and complainant cannot have the relief asked for, because the county, as appears by the record, is not in the actual and exclusive possession of the premises as averred in the bill, and not in actual possession as required by law: How. Stat. § 6626. (See note, page 173. — Reporter.)
The statute authorizes bills of this character only in cases where complainant is in the actual possession of the premises, and can be sustained only on the ground that complainant has no other means of bringing his title into adjudication.
The record shows that complainant claims that it has the right to possess this square for the purposes of a county-seat, and to erect county buildings thereon, and this claim can be adjudicated in an action of ejectment; for ejectment is a possessory action simply, and we insist that the nature of the claim of right to possession for the purposes indicated, as disclosed by the testimony, can be shown at law as well as in equity, in an action of ejectment. If the possession sought were a partial possession, or if it were a possession jointly with the defendant city, the remedy at law might be inadequate ; but the possession sought is absolute, exclusive, and unlimited, and because it is to be devoted to a particular use makes it none the less absolute and exclusive. Therefore we insist the remedy at law is perfect. Devaux v. Detroit, Harr. Ch. 98; Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 11 Mich. 255; Moran v. Palmer, 13 Id. 368-78; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Id. 324; Woods v. Monroe, 17 Id. 238-245; King v. Carpenter, 37 Id. 366; M. E. Church v. Clark, 41 Id. 738.
The only possession which complainant has had, for over thirty years, was for a few days while its counsel was preparing and filing these bills. At that tim'e it caused a tight board fence to be built around it, for no other purpose than to afford a foundation for the bills; and this was promptly removed as soon as it came to the notice of the city authorities.
This action on the part of complainant was a trespass upon the defendant city’s possession. It was a possession, if it may be called such, which was unfairly gained, for no other purpose than to support these bills, and is unavailing for that purpose: Stetson v. Cook, 39 Mich. 754.
We submit that the bills in these cases should be dismissed, so far as the defendant city is concerned, with costs, because:
1. The county (through its board of supervisors), after its right to occupy the square had been brought into dispute, having elected to end the controversy by a surrender and abandonment of the same in 1850, and having surrendered and abandoned the same finally at that time, and the city having entered into the possession and control of the same, and fitted the same up as a public park, for general public uses as such, and expended moneys thereon in beautifying it and making it attractive to the public as a public resort, and having possessed, managed, and controlled the same for more than thirty years, — complainant is now estopped from resuming possession thereof.
2. The defendant city has been in the open, peaceable, quiet, and uninterrupted possession of the premises, adverse to complainant, for over thirty years, and therefore has a prescriptive title thereto, and the right of possession thereof, for the uses and purposes of a public park, against complainant and all others.
3. The defendant city has been in possession of the north half of the premises in question for over thirty years by grant', from Louis Campau, the original proprietor thereof, received! from said Campau while he was in the actual possession thereof ; and is entitled to hold the same under said grant, as well as by a dedication thereof, or an offer of dedication, for general public uses by said Campau, if the same was effectual for any public use.
4. Complainant has shown no title to the premises, legal or equitable.
5. It is not shown that any portion of said square was ever dedicated to the uses of complainant, or to the county of Kent, and the dedication, or offer of dedication, if effectual, was for general public uses.
6. There is no evidence that the county seat of the county of Kent was ever located on the premises in question by any lawful authority.
7. The evidence shows without contradiction that the county seat of tlm county was located elsewhere than on the premises in question by competent authority, viz., on land owned by George Kendall, at the southeast corner of Fountain and Barclay streets, in Grand Rapids, in 1850; and it was also located on the west side of Grand river, in 1851, by the act and vote of the board of supervisors.
John E. More, for defendant Pantlind :
The right to the enjoyment of an easement, whether public or private, may be lost by abandonment. To constitute an abandonment that will destroy the right, there must be an intent to abandon on the part of the owner of the easement. The abandonment may be either active or passive. It is passive when the intent is evidenced only by non-user; it is active when the ceasing to use the easement is accompanied or followed by acts which clearly and unequivocally show an intent to abandon it.
A passive abandonment 'for less than twenty years would probably not destroy the right, while an active abandonment for a year might effectually cut it off.
In the case at bar, the county ceased to use the easement it now claims at least as early as 1852, and has never resumed the use of it. The non-user continued for a period of over twenty-nine years prior to the filing of the bill, and were there no further evidence of an intent to abandon, the right would be destroyed.
Any other rule would be unjust and inequitable. The dedication of the south half of the square, if made, was made for a specific public use, viz, for a court-house.
It cannot be presumed that the motives of the proprietors in offering the land were wholly unselfish. They owned a considerable tract of what was then suburban land adjoining the square, the value of which would be enhanced if the offer were accepted and the purpose carried out. It was not an absolute gift, but an offer to convey upon consideration of the performance of the condition attached. The offer impl ies that the proprietors had an interest in the accomplishment of the intended purpose. The purpose of the offer could not be accomplished by an acceptance and temporary use, but only by the continued and permanent use of the land for a courthouse.
Has the county performed the condition of the offer, or paid the consideration for the laud ?
True, it accepted the offer and built the court-house, but before any of the . expected benefits and advantages which moved the proprietors to make the offer had been realized, and while their adjacent lands were still unoccupied and unimproved, the county abandoned the site, and has never since occupied it. Being so long in default, what right has the county to equitable relief?
It will be remembered that the weight of evidence indicates that the court-house stood on the north half of the square, and that the south half was wholly unoccupied, and that immediately after the county ceased to use the square, Oampau, the proprietor of the north half, took possession of it, and held it until he sold it to the city, in 1852, since which time the city has claimed to hold it adversely to the county.
Non user so long continued, accompanied by the resumption of possession by the original proprietor, defeats the right to the easement.
It has been determined by this Court that if the public fails to accept a dedication within a reasonable time, the right is lost, and the land reverts: Sinclair v. Comstock, Har. Ch. 412-13; Cass Co. v. Banks, 44 Mich. 476; and the same rule should apply to an intentional abandonment.
See note, page 173.

Opinion:
Campbell, C: J.
These cases relate to the claim of the county of Kent to what was originally known as the courthouse square in Grand Kapids, and the bills were filed to quiet its title against the city of Grand Kapids as setting up ownership in one-half by title absolute, and in the other as possessed by dedication, and against various persons setting up title to the south half as never lawfully dedicated to any use. In brief, the claim of the county is claimed to have arisen out of a location of the county-seat, by the territorial authority, on this square, by desire or acquiescence of the' first proprietor, and its subsequent recognition by his grantees, who platted and sold lands recognizing the public purposes^of the square.
The north half is claimed by the city as grantee of Louis Campau, who owned the platted lands, and after the county had, as the city insists, relinquished such rights as it may have had, sold the property to the city. The south half is claimed by the city by dedication to public uses, and against both city and county is claimed under the original holders as not dedicated, or, if dedicated, relinquished.
The relinquishment is claimed to have been made out by an official removal of the county-seat from the square, and acquiescence in it.
In the view we take of the case, no good purpose would be served by a minute consideration of the circumstances of the original dedication. The facts are clearly shown that, instead of a general location of a county-seat in a town, village, or other public subdivision, the square in question was chosen by territorial authority, and so treated by the landowner and his successors in the title, whose interests were no doubt promoted by it. The land was built upon and actually and openly used for the seat of justice for many years, and, so far as the original land-owners and their successors were concerned, it would no doubt have been perpetually continued so without opposition had there been no disturbance from other sources.
For reasons which apparently sprang from local jealousy and contention, action was obtained from the Legislature, in 1850, whereby commissioners were again appointed by the State to establish the seat of justice of the county. This they did upon another parcel of land owned by Mr. Kendall, and the governor made proclamation accordingly. In Octo ber, 1850, after that designation, the supervisors took some-steps to have the new ground which Mr. Kendall had deeded prepared, but seem to have had some idea that they were-not yet shut out from all control of their own choice of places, and accompanied this action with a saving clause-against any obligation to build on it.
During the succeeding session of the Legislature, in 1851, when means of communication seem to have been imperfect, the board of supervisors supposed they had prevailed on the Legislature to remove the county seat to still another place offered to be given by George Coggeshall, and took action,, depending on the fate of that measure, which came to nothing. A strife arose between east and west side, and a good deal of disputing and counteraction went on. But no one supposed the county-seat had not been removed from the square now in controversy. In June, 1851, a motion was made to remove the site or location for the county buildings " to the lands proposed to be deeded to the county of Kent by Louis Campau, and which is known as the north half of the court-house or public square, upon which the present courthouse stands." This was lost, but not from any apparent doubt in regard to the necessity of some restoring action if they desired to keep it. In October, 1851, a resolution was adopted accepting a conveyance from George Coggeshall, and locating the site for county buildings on the west side of Grand river, as had before been done in contemplation of getting suitable arrangements with Mr. Coggeshall and Mr. Turner.
In January, 1852, further resolutions were passed to remove doubts concerning the effect of the various removals on the titles of lands before devoted to county purposes. The first of these resolutions declared that the new removal had vacated the former removal to the Kendall lot, and directed a quitclaim and reconveyance to Mr. Kendall. The second directed a sale of the old court-house on the square now in controversy. This was sold to Louis Campau, who owned the fee, and this sale was approved, and the money appropriated to expenses of the new jail.
In the latter part of the same year, 1852, Mr. Campau conveyed to the city the north half of the square for $500, with the right to remove the old court-house. The city had already claimed it as a public ground, dedicated to such uses as gave them control of it, and this settlement was the result of an arbitration. At this time, or earlier, the whole square was taken possession of by the city as public ground. From that time to this the city has claimed, improved, and possessed it, although at one time a claim for public assessments seems to have been made against the county. We have not deemed it necessary to examine into this transaction for reasons which will appear hereafter.
On several occasions since 1852, the supervisors have-taken action at their meetings upon the question of their rights ovér this square. The reports made have usually been adverse to such rights. But no measures have ever been taken to put back the county-seat there, and these suits are the first legal measures begun to reclaim the property, although in 1881 an attempt was made to recover it by assuming possession and fencing it, which was at once resisted, and the fence taken down by the city. These suits were then brought.
In our opinion, there are two fatal objections to the present proceedings. One is that the city has had peaceable control for over 30 years, and when the bill was filed had been in possession nearly that time. It is no doubt true that such control might be entirely consistent with keeping it for the county, or any other lawful public use, as the city is placed in a position to give police protection to any public grounds not otherwise guarded. But in this case the custody has been under claim of right in the city itself. This would be adverse to the county right, and the bill is filed too late.
The other objection is equally fundamental. Assuming, what we need not pass upon, that there was once such a dedication as made the county statutory trustee for the public uses declared by the platting, that title in the county was not beneficial, except so far as the purposes were county purposes, and the fee was merely ancillary to the trust, and could give no proprietary right further. When the county-seat was legally removed from this land, it is difficult to see what right the county had to occupy it any longer for a seat of justice. When the county recognized this removal, and sold its building to the owner of the fee, it lost its last interest in land or building. Once lost, it could not be reclaimed without something equivalent to anew grant, and a right to have its county-seat put back. Neither of these conditions has ever existed.
In our opinion, the county, when the county-seat was 'removed, ceased to have any proprietary rights under the dedication. Had the land been conveyed by grant, it would have remained until in some way transferred, unless the grant itself was limited. But even in such a case, after nearly 30 years' adverse possession and claim by the city, it would be rather late to ask aid from equity.
In the present suits we are not called on to settle the conflicting pretensions of the defendants. We have therefore avoided discussing their claims of title after the removal of the county-seat, which occurred so many years ago.
The bills must be dismissed, with costs of both courts:
Sherwood, J., concurred. Ciiamplin, J., did not sit.