Case Name: Douglas G. COSENTINO, Appellant, v. Phyllis L. COSENTINO, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-07-01
Citations: 986 So. 2d 1065
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-01613-COA
Parties: Douglas G. COSENTINO, Appellant, v. Phyllis L. COSENTINO, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, C.J., IRVING and CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 986
Pages: 1065–1072

Head Matter:
Douglas G. COSENTINO, Appellant, v. Phyllis L. COSENTINO, Appellee.
No. 2006-CA-01613-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
July 1, 2008.
Joseph R. Meadow, Gulfport, attorney for appellant.
Earl L. Denham, Wendy C. Hollings-worth, Ocean Springs, attorneys for appel-lee.
Before KING, C.J., IRVING and CHANDLER, JJ.

Opinion:
IRVING, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Douglas G. Cosentino appeals from an order of the Jackson County Chancery Court ordering him to pay alimony to his former wife, Phyllis L. Cosentino, in the amount of $7,000 per month. The issue before this Court is whether the chancellor on remand adequately considered Ferguson factors six and seven and if so, whether it erred in awarding $7,000 in permanent periodic alimony to Phyllis.
¶ 2. Finding that the chancellor erred, we reverse and render.
FACTS
¶ 3. This is the second time that this case has been before this Court. Our initial opinion is reported at Cosentino v. Cosentino, 912 So.2d 1130 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005) (Cosentino I). Douglas and Phyllis were married for thirty-three years, and from that union, two children were born. The parties agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, and the chancellor divided the marital estate, which was valued at approximately $5.1 million. Phyllis was awarded $2,615,815, and Douglas was awarded $2,560,390. The chancellor also awarded Phyllis $7,000 per month in periodic alimony.
¶4. In Cosentino I, we found that the chancellor failed to address all of the relevant Ferguson factors, namely, factors six and seven. We reversed and remanded "for an appropriate analysis of [those] factors, and if justified, an analysis of the Armstrong factors.... " Cosentino, 912 So.2d at 1133(¶ 12).
¶ 5. Both parties were offered but declined the opportunity to be heard on re mand, so the chancellor issued a ruling based on the evidence that had been presented during the alimony hearing.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶ 6. "Whether to award alimony and the amount to be awarded are largely within the discretion of the chancellor." Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So.2d 513, 517 (Miss.1995) (citing Cherry v. Cherry, 593 So.2d 13, 19 (Miss.1991)). A chancellor's decision to award alimony will not be reversed on appeal "unless it is found to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly in error." Id. (citing McNally v. McNally, 516 So.2d 499, 501 (Miss.1987)). In Ferguson, the Mississippi Supreme Court enunciated factors that a chancellor should consider when dividing a marital estate:
1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:
a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property;
b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and
c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets.
2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise.
3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution.
4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;
5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;
6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties;
7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and,
8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered.
Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928.
¶ 7. We note at the outset that neither party found it necessary to provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing or a copy of the chancellor's opinion wherein she addressed the Ferguson factors. Although we are aware that "[i]t is the duty, of the appellant to provide the record of the trial proceedings wherein the error claimed is brought before this Court[,]" Phyllis was not precluded from doing so. In re V.R., 725 So.2d 241, 245(¶ 17) (Miss.1998). In Cosentino I, we found that the chancellor failed to conduct a "full and appropriate" analysis of Ferguson factors six and seven. Cosentino, 912 So.2d at 1133(¶ 12). Employing the law of the case doctrine, we take judicial notice that we, in Cosentino I, found nothing in the record to justify the chancellor's alimony award. Id. We proceed based on the record certified in this case because, as previously stated, no evidentiary hearing was conducted on remand. Again, we find that, the chancellor failed to justify her alimony award. We will first explain why we find that the chancellor failed to follow our instructions as they relate to factor six and conclude by addressing the chancellor's treatment of factor seven.
• ¶ 8; After this case was remanded for the chancellor to make specific findings, she again failed to provide any justification for the alimony award. In her ruling after remand, the - chancellor addressed factor six by simply stating that: "The marital property had been divided, by agreement, in equal portions to both the husband and the wife. The'portion received by each spouse was in excess of Two Million Dollars."
¶ 9. In Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that:
[T]he character of the parties' assets, i.e., marital or nonmarital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley [v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994)]. The marital property is then equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in fight of each parties' nonmarital property. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse's nonmarital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no rriore need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's nonmarital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony based on the value of nonmarital assets should be considered.
(Emphasis added). The chancellor did not address whether Phyllis's property settlement of more than two million dollars eliminated her need for alimony. The chancellor did not articulate any reason why Phyllis needed more than the $2,615,815 that she was awarded. Inasmuch as alimony should only be awarded when the division of the marital estate leaves one party in a deficit, we find that the record simply does not support the chancellor's award.
¶ 10. As for the chancellor's treatment of factor seven, we also find nothing in the record to support this finding. The chancellor justified her alimony award by stating, inter alia, that:
The husband, Dr. Cosentino, has a flourishing radiology practice from which he earns a large income and shares none of the profits. At the time of trial, he was a sole practitioner in a lucrative practice. Mrs. Cosentino is not employable in her chosen field of medical technology and, at the time of trial in 2003, was 55 years old. She could easily outlive the assets apportioned to her pursuant to the property settlement if she continues to five in the manner to which she became accustomed during the 33[-]year marriage.
Phyllis has not worked in the field of medical technology in excess of 25 years. Her training is obsolete and would require substantial education and retraining before she would be marketable in this occupation. Absent alimony income, Phyllis'fe] only means of income would be that generated from the management of funds she received from the equitable distribution of marital property she equally split with her husband.
Clearly, the chancellor's finding that Phyllis "could easily outlive" her share of the marital estate is speculative at best, as the converse is also true: Phyllis may not outlive her share of the marital estate. The proper question before the chancellor was whether Phyllis needed alimony at the time of the property division, not whether she may need it at some time in the future. We find that the chancellor's alimony award of $7,000 per month is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and is hereby reversed and rendered.
1111. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., CHANDLER, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MYERS, P.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ.
. In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court enunciated eight factors to be considered by trial courts in equitably dividing the marital estate.
. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss.1993).
. In Public Employees' Retirement System v. Freeman, 868 So.2d 327, 330(¶ 10) (Miss.2004) (quoting Moeller v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., 812 So.2d 953, 960(¶ 22) (Miss.2002)), the Mississippi Su preme Court' addressed the law of the case doctrine'as follows:
The doctrine of the law of the case is similar to that of former adjudication, relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the case. Whatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts. This principle expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has previously been decided. It is founded on public policy and the interests of orderly and consistent judicial procedure.