Case Name: John B. Stryker vs. Peter Vanderbilt
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1856-06
Citations: 25 N.J.L. 482
Docket Number: 
Parties: John B. Stryker vs. Peter Vanderbilt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 482–505

Head Matter:
John B. Stryker vs. Peter Vanderbilt.
1. Fraiid in the consideration of thS contract cannot be set uphs a defence th a códrt of law to an action up&á a sealed instrument.
■3. The time for the performance of a contract, either by deed Or iby .parol, may be enlarged ;by parol.
3. If, at a public sale, the owner fraudulently represents to a bidder, that others are bidding, and thereby induces him to raise hit bid, the owner cannot'enforce the sale aild recover thO purchase price. — Per Émeh, J.
;On demurrer to pleas.
Lawrence Y. Stryker, of the county of Somerset, died intestate. The administrator of his estate, Stephen Stryker, died leaving the estate unsettled.
John B. Stryker, the administrator of Stephen Stry key’s estate, became also the administrator of the estate of Lawrence Y. Stryker, left unadministered by Stephen Stryker, deceased.
Stryker ». Vanderbilt.
It being shown to the Orphans Court that the personal estate of said Lawrence Y. Stryker was insufficient to pay his debts, an order was made directing the said John B. Stryker to sell certain real estate of which said Lawrence Y. Stryker died seized. In pursuance of said order, said real estate was sold at a public sale, and bid off, by Peter Yanderbilt, at $44.75 per acre, subject to a mortgage encumbrance of $2400, which was to be assumed by the purchaser, as a part of the purchase money. The .said Yanderbilt signed a certificate under seal, by which he covenanted and agreed to pay the purchase money by a time therein named, and receive his deed, according to the conditions of sale.
The sale was confirmed by the Orphans Court; but the purchaser failed to pay the money, and receive his deed, according to his agreement.
The Orphans Court ordered the property to he resold.
On the second sale, the land sold for $279.32 less than on the first. To recover this sum, and also to recover the interest on the purchase money, agreed to be paid by Yanderbilt, from tbe time bo agreed to pay it to the time the purchase money on the second sale was paid (amounting to about $600), John B. Stryker brought an action of eovenant'on the said sealed certificate.
The defendant pleaded several pleas — -the second, fourth, fifth and sixth of which were as follows :
Second plea. And for a further plea in this -behalf) as to the said breach of covenant above assigned by leave, &e,, the said defendant .says, that the plaintiff .ought not, &c., because, ho says, that the said certificate in the said declaration mentioned was obtained from the said defendant by the plaintiff, and others with him, by fraud, covin, and misrepresentation; that is to say, that the said plaintiff and the cider of the said sale, in the said certificate mentioned, falsely and fraudulently represented and pretended to the defendant, at the said sale, that some other person was in good faith bidding at said sale of said property against the defendant, and thereby falsely and fraudulently induced the defendant to increase and multiply his bids by several, to wit, five bids, from the sum of forty dollars per acre, to the sum of forty-four dollars and seventy-five cents per acre for said farm ; whereas the defendant in fact says, that there was no bona fide bidder against the defendant at said sale, who bid more than forty dollars per acre for said property; and so, the defendant says, that confiding in the said representation of the plaintiff and of the said crier, and supposing the fictitious and false bids of the said crier to be real, the defendant was led to raise his bids on said property, from forty dollars per aci’e to forty-four dollars and seventy-five cents per acre, and that said defendant was thus fraudulently led to sign his name to the said certificate, wherefore the said defendant says, that the said sale and the said certificate were and are both void in law, and this he, the said defendant, is ready to Verify: whereupon he prays judgment if the plaintiff ought to have and maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him.
Fourth plea. And for a further plea in this behalf, as. to the breach of covenant above assigned by like leave, &c., the Said defendant says, that the plaintiff ought not,. &c., because protesting that said declaration and the matters therein contained are not sufficient in law, &c., and to which the defendant is not obliged, nor by the law of the laird bound to make an answer; nevertheless, for plea in this behalf, the defendant says, that it was stipulated by the plaintiff, in the said conditions of sale in the said declaration of the plaintiff mentioned and set forth, among other things, that there was then, to wit, on - the tenth day of March, in the year 1853, a subsisting lien on the said premises sold, as the plaintiff hath in his' said declaration set forth, to the defendant amounting to the snm of $2400 by bond and mortgage, and that the said lien by the said bond and mortgage might and would remain on said premises, so that the purchaser would be required to pay, on securing the proper deed for the said premises, only the balance of the purchase money, after deducting the said sum of $2400, the amount alleged to be due on said bond and mortgage, according to the tenor and effect of the said condition of sale and of the covenant of the defendant as aforesaid; and that it was further publicly announced by the plaintiff, at said sale, in the presence of the bidders and of the defendant, as part of said condition, that the said lien by said bond and mortgage belonged to, and was held by one James Bishop; and the defendant avers, that afterwards, to wit, on the first day of May, A. D. 1853, in Somerset aforesaid, the plaintiff met the defendant, in pursuance of the said conditions of •sale, and demanded of him the sum of $3849.18, as the balance claimed to be due him from the defendant on the •said sale of the premises aforesaid, and represented that the sum of $2400, above mentioned, being the residue of the total amount of the purchase money or price of said -farm and premises, was the precise amount of the encumbrance by bond, and mortgage there and then being on said farm and premises, and that the same would remain thereon, according to the tenor and effect of the said condition of sale; and further, that the plaintiff then and there offered to give to the defendant, upon the defendant paying the plaintiff the sum of $3849.18, a certain paper, which the plaintiff called a deed for said farm; and the defendant further avers, that instead of the facts being as they were represented by the plaintiff, both when signing ' the said conditions of sale, on the tenth day of March, in the year last aforesaid, and also when demanding the said sum of money last aforesaid, to wit, on the first day of May, A. D. 1853, in this behalf, there were three several bonds and mortgages held by three different individuals, to wit, one by James Bishop, one by George Hulse, and one by Henry 13. Johnson, bearing different dates, and amounting in the aggregate, with interest due thereon, to a larger sum than was stipulated and represented by the plaintiff in the said condition of sale, to wit, to the sum of $2800; and the defendant avers, that the said several persons holding the said several bonds and mortgages, to wit, on the first day of May, A. D. 1853, wore unwilling to allow their said mortgages to remain any longer on said premises as a lien, but that they severally demanded payment of the sums of money secured by lien on said farm as aforesaid immediately thereafter, and that they severally notified the defendant, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, in Somerset aforesaid, that they would proceed to foreclose their said several mortgages on said farm immediately thereafter, unless the money should be paid to them, severally, according to the tenor and effect of the same, of which the plaintiff had notice, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, wherefore the defendant says, that although he was ready and willing to comply with the said conditions of sale, and to keep his covenant with the plaintiff in all things whereof the plaintiff hath above complained againsi- : m according to the true intent, tenor, and effect of the said conditions of sale and of the said certificate, yet the plaintiff hath failed to keep his part of the said condit ens - f sale, and hath failed to make good and time the stipulations and agreements by him made to the deia cant in the said conditions of salo aforesaid, and which were conditions precedent to the defendant’s said covenant and by reason whereof the defendant was not bound Ks p;y the amount of $3849.98 to the plaintiff, demanded as aforesaid, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, while the said several mortgages were still remaining a lien on said farm, amounting to the sum of $2800, while immediate payment thereof was demanded by the several holders of the same, and this he, the said defendant, is ready to verify ; wherefore he prays judgment if tlie said plaintiff ought to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him.
Eifth jdea. And for a further plea in this behalf, as to the said breach of covenant above assigned by like leave, &c., the said defendant says, that the plaintiff ought not, &c., because he says, that although the plaintiff did, on the second day of May, A. D. 1853, in the office of the plaintiff, in the township of Montgomery, in the county of Somerset aforesaid, offer to the defendant to deliver to him the said deed for tlie said farm and premises, and demanded of the defendant the sum of $3849.98, as in tlie declaration of the plaintiff is set forth, yet the defendant avers, that the plaintiff then and there refused to allow the defendant to submit the same deed to any person learned in the law for inspection, so that the defendant could be assured that the said deed was a good and sufficient deed, and according to the tenor and effect of tlie said conditions of sale, although the defendant requested the plaintiff to allow him and liis counsel to inspect,said deed upon accejjting the same, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid ; and the defendant further avers, that the defendant, at the same time and place last aforesaid, requested the plaintiff to exhibit to him some evidence that the said Orphans Court had ajiproved of the said sale according to the said conditions of sale in the said declaration of the-plaintiff set forth, but that the plaintiff then and there refused to show to the defendant any certificate or proof whatever that the said sale had been approved by said court, by reason whereof the defendant was prevented from complying with said conditions of sale, and from keeping and performing his part of the covenant by him to be kept and performed, and this he is ready to verify ; wherefore he prays judgment if the plaintiff ought to have, &c., maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him.
Sixth plea. And for a further plea in this behalf, as to the said breach of covenant above assigned by like leave, &c., the defendant says, that the plaintiff ought not, &c , because, he says, that heretofore, to wit, on the second day of May, A. D. 1853, at the office of the plaintiff, in the township of Montgomery, in the county aforesaid, before the said conditions of sale and the alleged covenant were performed, and while the same were in force, the said defendant and the said plaintiff, for divers good reasons and considerations then thereto moving, and especially that some more accurate and satisfactory arrangement would. be made by the plaintiff respecting the encumbrance of mortgages on said farm, mentioned in the said conditions of sale, then and there mutually agreed to enlarge and extend the time of complying with said conditions of sale, in the plaintiff’s declaration set forth, from the day last aforesaid until, to wit, the 28th day of the same month, and then and there mutually agreed to postpone, and then and there did postpone, the execution of the said sale and purchase.of the said farm and premises until the said 20th day of May aforesaid, and did then and there agree that the said conditions of salo and the said certificate should continue in force, and bo equally binding on both parties thereto, until the day last aforesaid, as fully as the same were binding, to wit, on the second day of May aforesaid; and the defendant avers that, confiding in the good faith and promise of the plaintiff as aforesaid, in pursuance of the said condition of sale and of the said subsequent agreement to enlarge the timo' of complying with said conditions,. to wit, on. the said 20th day of May last aforesaid, the defendant wont to the office of the plaintiff, in the township of Montgomery aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, and tendered himself to the plain tiff ready to comply with said conditions of sale, and to accept of a good and sufficient deed from the plaintiff, and to pay him the sum of money required by the terms of the said conditions of sale and the certificate of the defendant aforesaid to he paid, and to do all things which he, the defendant, was bound to do in the premises, according- to the true intent and meaning, tenor and effect, of the said conditions of sale, and of the said certificate of the defendant thereon, and then and there requested the plaintiff to do his part of the said agreement, and to deliver to him a good and sufficient deed for the said farm and premises, in conformity with the said conditions of sale, &a. And the defendant avers that the plaintiff then and there wholly refused to deliver sueli deed to the defendant, and wholly failed to keep and perform his part of the said agreement of sale; hut, on the contrary, the defendant avers that the plaintiff, disregarding his said promise, to wit, on the 13th day of May, in the year last aforesaid, applied to the Orphans Court of the said county of Somerset to have the sale revoked and set aside, and that the said court did, on the day and year last aforesaid, set aside and revoke the said sale, in pursuance of said application of the plaintiff, so that, by reason of the conduct of the plaintiff and of the action of the said Orphans Court, the defendant was disabled and prevented from keeping his said covenant with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had disabled himself from conveying any title of said farm to the defendant; and this he, the defendant, is ready to verify ; wherefore he prays judgment if the plaintiff ought to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof ap-ainst O him.
To which pleas the plaintiff filed the following demurrers :
And the said plaintiff, as administrator as aforesaid, as to the said pleas of the said defendant, by him secondly, fourthly, fifthly, and sixthly above pleaded, saith, that the same and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above pleaded and set forth, are not sufficient in law to bar or preclude him the said plaintiff, from having or maintaining his aforesaid action thereof against him, the said defendant, and that the said plaintiff is not bound by law to answer the same, and this he, the said plaintiff, is ready to verify; wherefore, for want of sufficient pleas in this behalf in the said plaintiff, as administrator as aforesaid, prays judgment and his damages by him sustained on occasion of the breach of covenant in the said declaration mentioned to be adjudged to him, &c.
And the said plaintiff, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, states and shows to the court here the following causes of demurrer, that is to say: to the said plea by the said defendant fourthly above pleaded, that the said plea is double, and contains a two-fold answer to the said declaration, in this, to wit, that the said defendant hath thereby pleaded and alleged, that it was stipulated in the condition of sale set forth in the plaintiff’s declaration, that there was a lien upon the said premises amounting to $2400 only, whereas in fact the said lien amounted to a larger sum, to wit, the sum of $2800; and also, that the said defendant hath thereby pleaded and alleged that it' was publicly announced at the said sale by the plaintiff, in presence of the bidders, that the said lien by bond and mortgage belonged to, and was held by one James Bishop, whereas in fact there were three several bonds and mortgages held by three different individuals, to wit, James Bishop, George Hulse and Henry D. Johnson; and also, that it was stipulated by the said conditions of sale that the same lien of $2400 might remain a lien on the premises,. and the purchaser pay only the balance of the purchase money: whereas, in fact, the said mortgagees were not willing that the said sums of money should remain a lien upon the said pre mises, and insisted upon payment thereof, and also that the said plea is evasive, argumentative, and in other respects multifarious and defective.
And the said plaintiff, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, states and shows to the court here the following causes of demurrer to the said plea by the defendant fifthly above pleaded, that is to say, that the said plea is double, and contains a two-fold answer to the said declaration in this, to wit, that the said defendant hath thereby pleaded and alleged, that although the plaintiff offered to the defendant, on the said 2d day of May, A. D. 1853, upon receiving payment of the purchase money, a deed for the said promises, yet that the plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to examine the said deed or to submit the same to any person learned in the law for inspection ; and also, that the plaintiff, though requested by the defendant, refused to exhibit any proof that the said Orphans Court had opposed the said sale;. and also, that the said last mentioned plea is in other respects multifarious and defective.
Argued November term, 1855, before the Chief Justice, and Elmer, Potts, and Haines, Justices,
by G. H. Brown, in support of demurrer, and Hageman contra.
Brown cited
3 Chitty's Pl. 963, (5th Am. ed.); 6 Munf. 364; 13 Johns. R. 430, Dorr. v. Munsell; 3 T. R. 440, Hayne v. Maltby ; 2 Johns. R. 177, Vrooman v. Phelps ; 1 Zab. 18, Rogers v. Colt; 1 Zab. 713 (same case); 3 Bing. N. C. 928, Stowell v. Robinson; 5 Scott 196; 5 Ad. & El. 61, Harvey v. Graham ; Smith on Con. 20; 2 Man. & Gr. 729, West v. Blakeway ; 2 Wils. 376, Rogers, v. Payne; 2 Man. & Gr. 459; 16 Wend. 532; 1 Wash. 170, Baird v. Blairgrove; 2 Wend. 587, Langworthy v. Smith; 15 Johns R. 200, Hasbrouck v. Tappen; 9 Wend. 68, Blood v. Goodrich; 13 Wend. 71, Delacroix v. Bulkley ; Sugden on Vendors 87, (old ed.)
Hagermam cited
Arch. Civ. Pl. 195 ; 1 Chitty’s Pl. 499, 505.; 4 M. & S. 338; 12 J. R. 430 ; Coxe 178, Armstrong v. Hall ; 1 South. 148, 361; 6 Halst. 110, Barrow v. Bispwham ; 10 Serg. & R. 25 ; 2 Kent’s Com. 464; 23 Wend. 260, Sanford v. Handy; 2 Parsons on Con. 280 ; 2 Bouvier’s L, Dict. “Puffer”; Chit. on Con. 298; 3 Bing. 368 ; 6 T. R. 644; 8 Ib. 93 ; 2 Kent's Com. 537, 539 ; 1 Parsons on Con. 417, 418 (note c.); Dart on Vendors 89 ; 8 How. U. S. R. 134, Veasie v. Williams; 16 Penn. St. R. 200, Stains v. Shore; 1 Brown’s R. 346, Donaldson v. McRoy ; 14 Penn. St. R. 446; Saxton 274, 280 ; Saxton 321, Rodman v. Zilley; 3 Green’s Ch. 141, Van Houten v. McCarty; 1 Zab. 597, Oliver v. Phelps; 4 Zab. 140, Hogencamp v. Ackerman; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 235; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 304; Dart 451 (note 2) ; 4 Zab. 333: 1 Harr. 274.

Opinion:
The Chief Justice.
The demurrer to the second plea raises the long agitated question, whether fraud in the consideration of a deed is a good defence at law. The question is not whether a court of common law has jurisdiction over questions of fraud, or power to relieve against it. That is conceded. The difficulty grows out of the familiar principle, that a seal imports a consideration ; and where the contract is in itself leffal, the amount or value ^of the consideration cannot be inquired into in a court of law: and inasmuch as an averment of fraud in the consideration of the contract necessarily involves an inquiry into the consideration upon which the deed is founded, that defence cannot be set up without a violation of well settled principle.
" In contracts under seal," says Chancellor Kent, " a consideration is necessarily implied in the solemnity of the instrument, and fraud in relation to the consideration is held to be no defence at law, though fraud in relation to the execution of the - specialty, and going to render it void, is a good defence." 2 Kent's Com. 464.
In Armstrong v. Hall, Coxe 181, Mr. Justice Clietwood, after stating that the reason given for admitting the plea in Collins v. Blanturn, (2 Wills, 347) was that the bond was void ab initio, adds, " But where the obligation lias been executed upon a contract, which the parties might legally enter into, but it afterwards appears that they were induced by deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation, that the bond is void of itself, or that the party shall he permitted to set up a parol agreement dehors the bond, and thus go into the consideration of the instrument in a court of common law, is a doctrine which, I think, is not warranted by any legal authority; and if it had been correct and agreeable to law, I cannot believe that the books would not have contained a case to support it. The proper remedy for the defendant in this case appears to me to be, to apply to a court of chancery, or the more easy and less expensive remedy, by an action on the case in the nature of a deceit."
In New York it has been uniformly held, in a long succession of eases, that fraud in the consideration of a sealed instrument, the contract itself being one which the parties might legally enter into, cannot he inquired into in a court of law. Vrooman v. Phelps, 2 Johns R. 177; Dorr v. Munsell, 13 Johns. R. 430; Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cow. 506; Champion v. White, 5 Cow. 509; Dale v. Roosevelt, 9 Cow. 307; Belden v. Davies, 2 Hall's S. C. Rep. 433.
The statement of Mr. Justice Chet wood, that no ancient case can he found, where the consideration of a sealed instrument has been inquired into in a court of law, on the ground of fraud in the consideration, seems to ho well founded ; yet there are certainly modern authorities which maintain that doctrine.
Many of the cases will he found cited in 3 Cowen's Ph. on Ev. 1448, note 969. Mr. Justice Cowen, after citing authorities in South Carolina, which hold the defence admissible at law, adds, " This doctrine, however, seems entirely anomolous. With respect to other states, it may be laid down as a general rule, and we believe will be found sustained by all the cases, that, independent of any statutory provision, no fraud whatever can be set up in a court of law to affect the operation of a sealed instrument, save such as relates to the execution."
In this state, some of the earlier cases hold the defence to be admissible.
In Barrow v. Bispham, 6 Halst. 117, Mr. Justice Ford rested the practice adopted in that case upon the equitable control of the court over its judgments ; and in Pennsylvania, though the defence is admitted at law, it is considered as a mere equitable defence, permitted to prevent a failure of justice, there being no court of equity in that state. Stubb's Adm'r v. King, 14 Serg, & R. 208.
In Rogers v. Colt, 1 Zab. 19, this court held that executed contracts under seal, where the party has received the benefit of his agreement, cannot be disaffirmed at law on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations. This ease was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, on the broad ground, that in. an action on a sealed instrument, no fraud can be set up in a court of common law as a defence to the action, except such as relates to the execution of the instrument. And in the susbsequent case of Staats v. Freemum, the defence was overruled at the circuit, and the party compelled to resort to equity for relief.'
No great principle is involved in the question. The •controversy relates merely to the tribunal in which the party defrauded shall have relief. The principle, that fraud vitiates a contract, is admitted. But in attempting to administer relief in, a court of law, another well settled principle is encountered, vis. that a seal imports a consideration, which cannot be gainsaid at law. The only inquiry is, whether the latter principle shall be abandoned, or the party complaining be required to go. into equity for relief, it is important that the question should be at rest. I apprehend no evil result from adhering to the rule adopted by the Court of Appeals, and am accordingly of opinion that the plea should be overruled.
The fourth and fifth pleas are bad for duplicity. They severally set up two distinct matters, each of which requires a separate answer, and each of which, if it constitute any defence whatever, would bar the action. 1 Chit. Pl. 564.
The sixth plea is, that the time for the performance of the covenant was enlarged by parol' agreement of the parties, and that the defendant was ready, and offered to perform the covenant on his part, at the time thus designated for performance.
In Chit. on Con. (9th ed.) 105, the rule is stated • to be, that in the case of a specialty, a subsequent agreement not under seal, dispensing with or varying the time or mode of performing an act covenanted to be done, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the specialty for nonperformance of the act in the manner prescribed." This statement is in accordance with the ancient maxim fi: the law, " unum quodque ligamen dissoluitur eo ligamine uo ligatur." Rogers v. Payne, 2 Wils. 376 ; West v. Blakeway 2 Man. & Gr. 729.
The weight of authority, however is, that a parol agreement, enlarging the time for performing a contract under seal, may avail as an excuse for nonperformance at the day specified in the original agreement. Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. R. 528 ; Longworthy v. Smith, 2 Wend. 587; Mead v. Degolyer, 16 Wend. 632 ; 3 Cowen's Ph. on Ev. 1479, note 987.
In Cox v. Bennet, 1 Green 165, it was held, that the time fixed for the payment of money due on bond might be extended by an agreement not under seal. And the Chief. Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, " the party to whom a condition or covenant is to be performed may, by acts as well as words, enlarge the time of performance." There was no pretence that the bonds were avoided by the parol agreement.
It was suggested by counsel, upon the argument, with much apparent force, that this construction will entirely defeat the plaintiff's right of recovery. For the covenant being altered by subsequent parol agreement, no action of covenant will lie upon the written contract, but the plaintiff can maintain assumpsit only upon the parol agreement, and the parol agreement, being for the sale of land, will be void under the statute of frauds.
The answer to the objection is, that a subsequent parol agreement, not contradicting the terms of the original contract, but merely enlarging the time of execution, is good, even in the case of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing. Cuff v. Penn, 1 Maule & Sel. 21; Chit. on Con. (1st Am. ed.) 27, (9th Am. ed.) 125, note ; Cummings v. Arnold. 3 Metc. 486. A different doctrine is held in Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68.
But, however this may be, it must be regarded as set tied, that the time for the performance of a contract either by deed or by parol, may be enlarged by parol.
The demurrer to the sixth plea is overruled.
Justices Potts and Haines concurred.