Case Name: ROSENTHAL v. AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CO.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1933-03-02
Citations: 262 Mich. 91
Docket Number: Docket No. 98, Calendar No. 36,648
Parties: ROSENTHAL v. AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CO.
Judges: Fead and Wiest, JJ., concurred with McDonald, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 262
Pages: 91–96

Head Matter:
ROSENTHAL v. AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CO.
1. Vendor and Purchaser' — Forfeiture—Abrogation of Contract Rights.
After notiee of forfeiture of land contract and adjudication based thereon before circuit court commissioner, contract must be considered as entirely abrogated and all rights of respective parties thereunder terminated.
2. Constitutional Law — Judicial Power Vested in Courts.
Constitution expressly vests judicial power in Supreme Court, circuit courts, probate courts, justices of peace, and such other courts as legislature may establish by general law (Const., art. 7, §1).
3. Court Commissioners — Jurisdiction—Statutes.
Jurisdiction in circuit court commissioner is limited to that conferred by legislature; being purely statutory (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14964 et seq.).
4. Vendor and Purchaser — Summary Proceedings — Court Commissioners — Jurisdiction—Rescission.
Where vendee holds over after breaching contract, circuit court commissioner may entertain jurisdiction of summary proceedings instituted by person entitled to possession (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14975), but he has.no jurisdiction in cause of action by vendee electing to cancel or rescind because of vendor’s breach of contract; jurisdiction in such case being in circuit court in chancery.
5. Same — Breach op Contract — Damages—Action at Law. >
If vendee merely seeks damages for breach of land contract, his remedy is by action at law.
6. Same — Pleading—Breach of Contract by Vendor as Defense-Court Commissioner — Jurisdiction.
In summary proceedings before circuit court commissioner by vendor for possession after forfeiture, vendee may not plead in bar thereof breach of contract by vendor, since such issue is not within jurisdiction of circuit court commissioner, because he has no power to render money judgment in such proceeding; and that vendor as well as vendee has breached executory land contract has no bearing on jurisdictional question.
McDonald, C. J., and Dead and Wiest, JJ., dissenting in part.
Appeal from Wayne; Gilbert (Parm C.), J., presiding.
Submitted October 14, 1932.
(Docket No. 98, Calendar No. 36,648.)
Decided March 2, 1933.
Rehearing denied April 21, 1933.
Assumpsit by Julius P. Rosenthal against American Construction & Realty Company, a Michigan corporation, to recover sums paid under a land contract after alleged rescission. Prom order of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Atlas <& Solomon (Samuel A. Kayne, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Milton B. Safier, for defendant.

Opinion:
McDonald, C. J.
This is a suit at law after rescission to recover money paid on a land contract.
On May 27, 1924, the defendant sold certain real estate on two land contracts to Nathan P. Levin, who subsequently assigned his vendee's interest to the plaintiff, Rosenthal. The assignments were consented to by the vendor. Rosenthal made payments for a time, then defaulted. The defendant vendor served notice of intention to forfeit the contracts and later a declaration of forfeiture. Thereafter, summary proceedings for possession were begun and judgment for restitution was entered. After writs of restitution were issued, Rosenthal declared a rescission of the contracts for failure to install improvements in accordance with the provisions thereof and instituted the present suit. The defendant appeared, and, under Court Rule No. 18 (1931) filed a motion to dismiss supported by affidavit. The motion was granted, and the plaintiff has appealed.
The question raised by the motion to dismiss was whether the plaintiff could rescind for breach of provisions in the contracts and maintain a suit for damages after valid forfeiture and judgment in summary proceedings in which proceedings no defense of breach is made.
The plaintiff rescinded on the ground that defendant had breached the contract relative to instalment of certain improvements. If the defendant had breached the contracts he could not have maintained summary proceedings, for if there was a breach there was no cause for forfeiture and no right to possession. The breach was a proper defense in the action before the commissioner for possession. The plaintiff could not withhold that defense and subsequently use it as a ground for. rescission. The validity of the forfeiture was established by the judgment in the summary proceedings. Thereafter, when he attempted to rescind, his interest in the contracts had been terminated. He had nothing to rescind. Blazewicz v. Weberski, 234 Mich. 431; Augustyn v. Zawacki, 250 Mich. 218; Security Investment Co. v. Meister, 214 Mich. 337.
The declaration contains a special count and the common counts in assumpsit. The plaintiff contends that on motion to dismiss it cannot be held that the common counts do not state a cause of action. There is no doubt as to that rule, but where the common counts rest upon the facts averred in the special count the rule does not apply. Lightstone v. Fixel, 227 Mich. 360.
In the instant case, the special count sets up the facts constituting the entire cause of action. The common counts rest on the same facts, which do not state a cause of action. The common counts were not required. The plaintiff does not claim anything beyond what appears in the special count. In these circumstances, the rule that on motion to dismiss it cannot be held that the common counts do not state a cause of action does not apply.
The trial court was right in granting the motion to dismiss. The judgment is affirmed, with costs to' defendant.
Fead and Wiest, JJ., concurred with McDonald, C. J.