Case Name: Jerry COLE, Sue Bratcher and Kathlyn McGriff, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Myrtle (Jones) TODD and Standard Home Shopping Service Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1977-11-30
Citations: 355 So. 2d 292
Docket Number: No. 49692
Parties: Jerry COLE, Sue Bratcher and Kathlyn McGriff, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Myrtle (Jones) TODD and Standard Home Shopping Service Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before PATTERSON, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 355
Pages: 292–298

Head Matter:
Jerry COLE, Sue Bratcher and Kathlyn McGriff, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Myrtle (Jones) TODD and Standard Home Shopping Service Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 49692.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 30, 1977.
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1978.
Miller & Miller, Harold Leon Miller, Pearl, Robert L. Williams, Water Valley, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, C. Michael Ellingburg, John M. Roach, Jackson, Alfred G. Nicols, Jr., Brandon, for defendants-appellees.
Before PATTERSON, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
Jerry Cole, Sue Bratcher and Kathlyn McGriff appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County which dis missed their cause against Myrtle (Jones) Todd and Standard Home Shopping Service Corporation for the wrongful death of their father, J. C. Cole. The judgment resulted from a jury verdict for the defendants although there is no evidence disputing the fact that a vehicle driven by Mrs. Todd struck and killed Cole.
The primary assignments of error concern the court's refusal to grant a peremptory instruction for the plaintiffs, to sustain a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to find the jury's verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
At approximately 8:50 p. m. on June 12, 1975, Mrs. Todd, while about the business of Standard Home Shopping Service Corporation, was driving a 1973 Ford Econoline van east on Highway 80 in Pearl, Mississippi. According to her, she was proceeding at twenty-five or thirty miles per hour with her headlights on in clear weather when the following occurred:
. I remember I was facing Highway 80 East and was going down the road past the Kentucky Fried Chicken or somewhere along there and I heard a thump and I don't know, I turned and I go down to see what it was and from there I don't know, I don't know, I saw it was a person, that's all I know.
Q. You don't remember anything—
A. I didn't see anyone.
Q. You don't, you didn't see anyone?
A. No sir.
Q. You don't remember what you did after that time?
A. No sir.
An employee in the nearby Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant observed, intermittently, for about two hours, a person later determined to be J. C. Cole, as he sat and stood on the shoulder of the road near the intersection of Highway 80 and Valent-our Road. Her testimony was that Cole acted "weird." She saw a white van pull to the edge of the highway and observed the driver looking back. Immediately thereafter she noticed a man lying on or near the road and watched the van as it sped through a red light and passed from view.
An officer promptly arrived on the scene and found Cole lying unconscious about eighteen inches from the edge of the traveled portion of Highway 80 and bleeding from the right side of his head and right arm. At the time Cole was wearing a light lavender shirt and dark colored trousers. The officer observed no skid marks at the scene. Cole died from his injuries some fourteen hours later.
The right rear-view mirror of the van driven by Mrs. Todd was found to be broken and was removed for examination. The record does not disclose the distance the mirror projected from the van's side although it does appear from photographs that the projection was no more than ten or eleven inches. The laboratory test of the rear-view mirror revealed bloodstains upon it although they were too small for confirmation as human blood.
Mrs. Todd testified she did not remember her activities after the accident. However, out of the jury's presence an employee of the police department testified that Mrs. Todd turned herself in on June 14,1975, for hitting a man, stating "she had heard it on the news" and "couldn't live with herself any longer knowing that she did it." At the time she made an oral statement and wrote the following:
I had finish (sic) 4A Route at Flowood going to Brandon to do a callback. I didn't see anyone. I heard a noise hit the side of the truck. I turned around and come down little street to see what it was. I saw it was a person I just went out of mine (sic). I called Mr. Thrash this morning seven o'clock. Mr. Thrash advised me to turn myself in. I'm not sure of the time about 9:00 or 9:30 p. m.
Objections were interposed to both statements which were sustained in part, the court permitting into evidence the written statement with the exception of the reference to a Mr. Thrash and the time and excluding all of the oral statement except "I hit the man."
Although we are loath to disturb a jury verdict, the evidence leaves no alternative to setting it aside because there is no evidence contrary to Mrs. Todd's testimony concerning the accident and it is sufficient, in our opinion, to establish a case of liability as a matter of law.
In Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So.2d 685 (1964), we stated:
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, "and his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal." The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. Hence a motorist is guilty of negligence where he strikes a pedestrian walking along the highway, where in the exercise of reasonable care he should have but did not see him and could have avoided the accident. (248 Miss. at 696-697, 160 So.2d at 687)
And in Robertson v. Welch, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So.2d 491 (1961), a motorist negligently struck two pedestrians while they were crossing a highway in a closely built-up area. After noting that the accident occurred in the late hours of a rainy night while the motorist had his headlights on, this Court reversed a jury verdict for the defendant and entered judgment for the plaintiffs, stating:
. Since he had lights on his car, it is incredible that he did not see these people, if he was in fact looking. . (242 Miss, at 117, 134 So.2d at 493)
Appellees' defense was that Cole was intoxicated and his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. There was evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Cole was intoxicated, but without more, this does not absolve their liability. In Robertson, supra, we held intoxication did not release the motorist from compliance with the law or from the observance of reasonable rules of care. We held:
. Intoxication, either in whole or in part, does not place the addict beyond the protection of the law. After all, such an unfortunate has rights just as any other human being or member of society. (242 Miss, at 118, 134 So.2d at 494)
The record reveals that Mrs. Todd was driving at slow to moderate speed with unobstructed vision when Cole was struck. The area was developed and some of the nearby business establishments were lighted. Indeed, the employee of the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant testified, without objection, that she believed there was a light near the area where Cole was standing. Considering the condition of the highway, the unobscured vision of the driver as well as the nearness of Cole to the traveled portion of the road, we conclude that reasonable care dictates that Mrs. Todd should have seen Mr. Cole. We are fortified in this conclusion by the absence of any statement by the driver that she did not have an excellent view of the highway and its periphery. The only explanation that we fathom for the accident is that she was not maintaining a proper lookout for pedestrians and this negligence was the proximate cause of Cole's death. We are of the opinion the trial court erred in not granting the plaintiffs' motion for a peremptory instruction.
The next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in not allowing Mrs. Todd's statements to the police into evidence. We think they were admissible because they impeached her prior testimony of not remembering anything concerning the accident subsequent to it, thereby affecting the credibility of her testimony. In brief, her testimony was that she hit the man, panicked, fled the scene and remembered nothing afterward. However, the statements to the police reveal that she did remember, though belatedly, and sought legal advice.
The other numerous assignments of error are found to be without merit and since they are largely procedural and not likely to recur, we decline comment upon them.
We are of the opinion the trial court erred in not granting a peremptory instruction for the plaintiffs on the question of liability. The cause is reversed and remanded on the sole question of damages.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur.