Case Name: Catherine THOMPSON, Mother and Next Friend of Alex Thompson III, a Minor v. Robert T. LOVE and Delta Medical Center
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1995-09-28
Citations: 661 So. 2d 1131
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-00201-SCT
Parties: Catherine THOMPSON, Mother and Next Friend of Alex Thompson III, a Minor v. Robert T. LOVE and Delta Medical Center.
Judges: HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P JJ, and PITTMAN and SMITH, JJ, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 661
Pages: 1131–1137

Head Matter:
Catherine THOMPSON, Mother and Next Friend of Alex Thompson III, a Minor v. Robert T. LOVE and Delta Medical Center.
No. 92-CA-00201-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 28, 1995.
William C. Walker, Jr., Oxford, Frank H. Shaw, Jr., Steele & Shaw, Kosciusko, for Appellant.
Richard O. Burson, L. Carl Hagwood, Campbell DeLong Hagwood & Wade, Green-ville, Rachael Hetherington Lenoir, George Q. Evans, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Jackson, for Appellee.

Opinion:
JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice,
for the Court:
INTRODUCTION
This case presents the Court with an important public and social policy issue of first impression for Mississippi concerning the ability of a minor child to recover for his loss of parental consortium from a third party tortfeasor who has injured his parent. Our national research discloses that the jurisdictions across the country appear to be divided on the cause of action with only a few jurisdictions, Mississippi included, which have not yet confronted the issue.
While we do not hold that the cause of action is without merit, we do hold that the creation of such a cause of action could best be handled by the legislature's ability to enact the legislation if it so chooses. Therefore, constrained by the lack of statutory or case precedent in our jurisdiction and our reluctance to judicially create the cause of action, we defer the creation of the cause of action to the legislature. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment since it was proper as the law existed in this state then and now.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
On August 5, 1986, Alex Thompson (hereinafter Alex) sustained injuries in a fight and was admitted to the emergency room of Delta Medical Center for treatment. Alex was diagnosed as having a fractured mandible and was admitted as a patient to Delta Medical Center by Dr. Robert T. Love. Thereafter, Alex suffered from an upper airway obstruction from the injuries to his face, jaw, and neck which caused him to sustain hypoxic brain damage while under the care of the defendants. Alex Thompson III (hereinafter Alex III) asserts that his father will be permanently and totally disabled for the remainder of his life.
Thelma Parker, Alex's mother and the conservator of his person and estate, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Love and Delta Medical Center on July 11, 1988. The defendants denied any negligence on their part. The parties entered into a settlement agreement before the case went to trial. The settlement agreement provided, among other things: (1) $355,000.00 lump sum payment; (2) $4,500.00 per month for the life of Alex; and (3) $100.00 per month as child support for the life of Alex III, to continue until Alex III reached the age of twenty-two on June 11, 1988. Thelma and Alex's complaint was dismissed with prejudice on October 18, 1989.
Thelma Parker, as conservator of Alex's person and estate, executed a release and assignment with the settlement agreement. The terms of the settlement agreement and release provided that all possible claims by Alex and his estate were compensated, discharging and holding harmless the defendants from any further litigation from Alex or his estate regarding the alleged medical malpractice. On February 28, 1991, the Chancery Court of Washington County held that the agreement did not require the signatures of Alex Ill's mother or Alex III. The chancellor held the provision in the agreement whereby Alex III was to receive $100.00 a month until age twenty-two was a third-party beneficiary contract for his father's child support needs. Therefore, the provision was under Alex's rights and Alex III was merely an intended beneficiary, according to Chancellor Nathan P. Adams, Jr.
Thereafter, Cause No. 91-12,281(B) was filed in the Washington County Circuit Court on August 23, 1991, by Catherine Thompson, Alex's wife, on behalf of her minor son, Alex III. The complaint named Robert T. Love and Delta Medical Center as the defendants alleging their combined negligence as the direct and proximate cause of Alex Ill's loss of parental consortium. The complaint sought compensation for loss of parental consortium and the net cash value of his father's life.
The defendants filed a Motion To Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary Judgment on November 1, 1991, alleging Alex Ill's claim was not recognized in Mississippi and any such cause of action was previously settled under his father's settlement. Alex III responded on November 12,1991, with Plaintiffs Response To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss or in the alternative For Summary Judgment, alleging Alex Ill's claim was not settled previously and was viable under Mississippi law. The defense filed a rebuttal motion alleging that Mississippi does not recognize such a cause of action, that Alex Ill's claim was previously settled, and to permit Alex III to recover would amount to double recovery.
On February 3, 1992, the Honorable Eugene Bogen granted the defendants' summary judgment motion finding that Missis sippi does not recognize the minor's cause of action for loss of parental consortium. Finding that Mississippi has not yet recognized the claim by either statutory or ease law, we affirm and defer to the legislature on this important issue of whether the state will permit such a recovery.
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
The issue presented to the Court is a public and social policy question of first impression concerning tort liability in Mississippi. The issue stated succinctly is:
WHETHER MISSISSIPPI RECOGNIZES A CAUSE OF ACTION PERMITTING A CHILD TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM WHEN THE PARENT IS INJURED BY A TORTFEASOR'S NEGLIGENCE LEAVING THE PARENT IN A PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED CONDITION, AND IF SO, WHETHER THE CHILD'S CAUSE OF ACTION INCLUDES DAMAGES FOR THE NET CASH VALUE OF THE PARENT'S LIFE EXPECTANCY?
As previously mentioned, we choose not to judicially create the cause of action and instead defer its creation to the legislature because of the nature and far reaching importance of the issue and lack of present authority in this state regarding such a cause of action.
The plaintiffs acknowledge the lack of Mississippi precedent and accordingly use the authority of other jurisdictions permitting such a claim. The primary ease relied upon by Alex III is Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okl.1990). Williams was a case of first impression presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court on summary judgment which established that a "minor child may maintain a cause of action for the permanent loss of parental consortium through its guardian ad litem or next of Mend when a parent is negligently injured by a third party." Id. at 1138. The facts of Williams and this case are very similar.
The minor's complaint for loss of parental consortium damages in Williams was dismissed for failure to state a claim because Oklahoma did not have either a statute or any ease law concerning the claim. Her single mother was permanently and totally disabled from medical malpractice. The Williams court reserved judgment on the issue of liability but reversed the summary judgment and acknowledged the minor's loss and cause of action. We prefer to allow the legislature to address the creation of this cause of action instead of following the Williams court .
The defendants' most persuasive argument is that the issue presented is one of public and social policy which should be handled by the legislature instead of the Court. Concerns of the defendants in allowing the Court, instead of the legislature, to decide this issue include: (1) the possibility of increased litigation and multiple claims; See DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055, 449 N.E.2d 406, 407, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983); Gray v. Suggs, 292 Ark. 19, 20, 728 S.W.2d 148 (1987); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 862 (1977). But also see contrary holdings on same concern permitting the claim in Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.1990); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo.1990); Belcher v. Goins, 184 W.Va. 395, 401, 404, 400 S.E.2d 830, 836, 839 (1990); Hay v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, 145 Vt. 533, 540, 496 A.2d 939, 943 (1985); Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 358 Pa.Super. 505, 512, 517 A.2d 1348, 1351 (1986); (2) inclusion of this type of claim would hinder and complicate the settlement of personal injury claims; See Gray v. Suggs, 292 Ark. 19, 20, 728 S.W.2d 148 (1987); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 862 (1977); (3) increased liability by a defendant tortfeasor resulting in higher insurance premiums borne by the public; Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 862 (1977); (4) difficulty in assessing damages to the child which in the defendants' words would "not compensate for the loss of the relationship with the parent", since the child could not spend it until the age of majority anyway; See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 862 (1977); Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 233 (Colo. 1986). But also see contrary holdings on same concern permitting the claim in Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo.1990); Villareal v. State, Dept, of Transportation, 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213, 218 (1989); (5) emotional distress upon the child resulting from the additional necessary scrutiny into the child's relationship with the parent; See Dearborn Fabricating & Engineering Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind. 1990); and (6) difficulty for a jury in distinguishing between the losses of the parent and that of the child which may result in a double recovery even if decided in one trial; See Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 233 (Colo.1986); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858, 862 (1977). But also see contrary holdings on same concern permitting the claim in Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo.1990); Villareal v. State, Dept, of Transportation, 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213, 218 (Ariz.1989).
Additional logistical problems which the Court is alleged to be unable to handle, unlike the legislature, include: (1) longer statute of limitations problems; (2) compulsory joinder problems (remedied in Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Washüd 131, 691 P.2d 190,195 (1984)); See Byrd v. Matthews, 571 So.2d 258, 261 (Miss.1990) (wherein the Court encouraged, but did not require because the issue was not before the Court, plaintiff spouses to join their causes of action in order to avoid duplicative recovery and litigation) and (3) deciding who would be included under the cause of action (remedied in Belcher v. Goins, 184 W.Va. 395, 401, 404, 400 S.E.2d 830, 836, 839 (1990)) and the ability to locate them.
Although the jurisdictions across the country differ on allowing the claim, most permitting the claim do agree that the amount recoverable is limited to the child's loss of companionship and society in the form of emotional damages as opposed to economic damages which are for the injured party alone. Williams at 1135. This would inherently prohibit the recovery of the net cash value by a child for the loss of the parent's life expectancy.
The Oklahoma statutes, as are the Mississippi statutes, were silent at the time on the issue of loss of parental consortium when the parent does not die. The Oklahoma court felt there was no logical distinction for "allowing children to recover for the loss of consortium a child suffers through the actual death of a parent under 12 O.S.1981 § 1053 (the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Statute) and refusing to allow recovery for loss of consortium when for all practical purposes the parent is in a state which equates death." Id. at 1136. Williams concluded by stating that "refusal to recognize the claim amounts to acknowledging an 'immunity' for the tortfea-sor — he/she may, with impunity, injure the child by depriving him/her of the love, society, care and protection of the parent." Id. at 1138.
The present state of the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute, ease law, and the absence of a statute regarding loss of parental consortium creates the exact anomaly confronted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Williams. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.1994); McGowan v. Estate of Wright, 524 So.2d 308, 311 (Miss.1988). Accordingly, the legislature may wish to address this issue and simultaneously address all concerns under the cause of action and efficiently and effectively establish the parameters of the cause of action. Therefore, the Court does not rule upon the merits of the issues in the present ease and instead only rules upon the validity of the lower court's grant of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The issue before the Court is one of first impression and the nature of it is best resolved through a balancing of interests. On the one hand, there are the interests of a child who has been permanently deprived of the companionship, guidance and love of his parent because of his incapacity to meet these needs of the child. On the other hand, are the interests of judicial economy, the legislature, and the possible ramifications upon the public from recognition of the claim.
The essence of a loss of parental consortium claim is a public and social policy decision, and this Court finds that the legislature is in the best position to weigh the interests involved. Therefore, we leave it to the legislature, if it so chooses, to determine if the State of Mississippi will permit a minor child to recover for loss of parental consortium.
As for the case sub judice, the Court refrains from any ruling upon the liability of the defendants under these particular facts. Mississippi did not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium when the trial court's decision for summary judgment was rendered and we do not now create it judicially. Therefore, the trial court's decision was proper as the law existed when the ruling was made and as of now since the legislature has not yet had an opportunity to address these concerns.
JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P JJ, and PITTMAN and SMITH, JJ, concur.
McRAE, J, dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ.
. Note the authorities cited under the Discussion of Issues. See also, Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690, 11 A.L.R.4& 518 (1980); Still by Erlandson v. Bap tist Hospital Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn.App. 1988).
. However, any subsequent legislative action will not affect this case.