Case Name: EDWARD MARTIN v. GEORGE H. MATFIELD, ALICE MATFIELD, his Wife, and others
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1874
Citations: 49 Cal. 42
Docket Number: No. 4,424
Parties: EDWARD MARTIN v. GEORGE H. MATFIELD, ALICE MATFIELD, his Wife, and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 42–47

Head Matter:
[No. 4,424.]
EDWARD MARTIN v. GEORGE H. MATFIELD, ALICE MATFIELD, his Wife, and others.
New Turn,.—Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the judgment is not a ground of motion for a new trial. It is insufficiency of the evidence to justify the' verdiet, or other decision oí fact upon which a new trial must be asked.
Gteound oe New Tbiad.—That a judgment is against law is not a ground of motion for a new trial. That a verdict, or other decision of fact is against law, is a ground of motion for a n'ew trial.
Cobkeotion 03? JU33GMENT by Appeal.—If a judgment is other than that resulting from the conclusions of law arrived at by the Court it cannot be corrected by an appeal from an order granting or denying anew trial, but mu^t be reached by an appeal from the judgment.
Appeal from the District Court, Seventeenth Judicial District, County of Los Angelos.
The defendants, Hatfield and wife and Winston, and John King, executed a mortgage to the plaintiff on a tract of land, to secure the promissory note of the husband, Winston, and King. This action was commenced to enforce the mortgage. King died before the suit was commenced, and his administrator was made a party defendant. Mrs. Hatfield answered separately, and alleged that she owned, as her separate property, an undivided one fourth of the land mortgaged, and that she signed the mortgage as an accommodation to the makers of the note, and received no consideration therefor; and that the three fourths undivided of the mortgaged property could be sold separately without injury to the parties, and without pro rata diminution of the price, if sold as a whole; and asking that the interest of the makers of the note in the land be sold first; and if the proceeds were insufficient to pay the debt, that then her undivided one fourth be sold. The Court entered a decree, requiring the interest óf the makers of the note in the land to be sold first, provided it brought enough to pay the debt; but if it did not, that then the entire tract be sold. The defendants other than Mrs. Hatfield and her husband, were dissatisfied with this, and moved for a new trial, which was granted by the Court. She appealed from the order granting a new trial.
The Court gave as a reason for granting a new trial, the supposed error in permitting the interest of Mrs. Hatfield in the land to be sold separately.
The other facta are stated in the opinion*
A. Brunson, for the Appellant.
V. E. Howard and M. J. Newmark, for the Respondents.

Opinion:
By the Court, Wallace, C. J.:
The findings of the Court below were, in substance, that the allegations of the complaint are true in point of fact. The conclusion of law deduced by the Court from the facts as found was, that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought by his complaint. Inasmuch as there is no question as to the sufficiency of the complaint, as the foundation of the relief therein demanded, it is evident that, if an error of law was committed, it must have been committed in some of the proceedings resulting in the findings of fact. Certain of the defendants moved for a new trial, and in their notice of intention they put their motion upon the following grounds: "Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the judgment, and that it is against law." The motion was supported by a bill of exceptions. An order was entered granting the motion, and the defendant Hatfield brings this appeal from the order.
1. The insufficiency of the evidence to justify the judgment is not a ground of motion for a new trial. Such a motion is not directed at the judgment, but at the verdict, or other decision of fact, for a new trial is a re-examination of an issue of fact. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 656.)
2. That a judgment is against law is not ground for a motion for a new trial. A verdict or other decision of fact, may be set aside, and a new trial granted, if such verdict or decision of fact be against law (section 656, supra, subdivision 6); that is, if an error of law be committed resulting in an erroneous decision of fact. If the decree in this case, as entered of record, be other than that resulting from the conclusions of law arrived at by the Court below, we cannot correct it upon this appeal, inasmuch as the appeal is taken only from the order granting a new trial.
Order reversed. Remittitur forthwith.