Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth TAYLOR
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-09-06
Citations: 642 So. 2d 160
Docket Number: No. 94-KK-0696
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth TAYLOR.
Judges: KIMBALL, J., additionally concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 642
Pages: 160–172

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth TAYLOR.
No. 94-KK-0696.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 6, 1994.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Calogero Sept. 30, 1994.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Sharon Leslie Andrews, Asst. Dist. Atty., for applicant.
Blake G. Williams, New Orleans, for respondent.

Opinion:
_JiHALL, Justice.
The issue we are called upon to decide in this case is whether there is an exception to the spousal witness privilege, LSA-C.E. art. 505, that allows one spouse to be compelled to testify against the other when the testifying spouse is the victim of the defendant spouse's criminal act and/or when the criminal act takes place before marriage. The trial court found that the victim spouse could not be compelled to testify and the court of appeal denied the state's writ application. For reasons set forth below, we set aside the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The state contends that beginning at about 7:00 p.m. on May 16, 1993, and continuing until approximately 2:00 a.m. the following morning, Kenneth Taylor, then a New Orleans police officer, assaulted, threatened to kill and brutally beat his then girlfriend, Glenda Richard. He used his fists as well as his police-issue flashlight and 9mm Beretta semi-automatic service weapon to pummel the victim into , a state of semieonsciousness. It is alleged that several times in these hours Taylor placed his Beretta inside the victim's mouth and threatened to pull the trigger. After the beating, Taylor put Richard and the couple's five-month-old daughter into his ear and drove them to the Richard home in Violet, Louisiana. The victim's sister called an Rambulance, and Glenda Richard spent several days at Chalmette Medical Center and Charity Hospital recovering from her injuries. The Internal Affairs division of the New Orleans Police Department investigated the matter and Richard cooperated. She gave a typed statement describing the beating, executed an affidavit setting forth her desire to prosecute, and appeared on videotape. Richard was unable to read her statement because her eyes were swollen shut and because the injuries to her mouth rendered coherent speech difficult, but the video recorded her acknowledgment that the typed statement describing the attack was her own.
Pursuant to a warrant executed at defendant's home, investigators seized his broken police flashlight and bloodied 9mm Beretta. Photographs taken inside depicted bloodstained carpets, towels, walls, bed and a police uniform. Taylor was arrested May 17, 1993, and charged with aggravated battery, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:34. He entered a plea of not guilty and trial was set for December 14, 1993.
On the morning of trial, the victim appeared with her own attorney to advise that she no longer wished to prosecute and, further, that she would not testify against the defendant. When the state's motion for a continuance was denied, it entered a nolle prosequi.
The state later reinstituted prosecution and, following Taylor's arraignment in January of 1994, a status hearing was scheduled for February 24. At the hearing, the prosecution learned that the victim and the defendant were married February 14, 1994. The hearing was continued. The state then filed a motion in limine which sought (1) to bar the victim's assertion of a claim of spousal privilege, and (2) to have her written, oral and video-taped statements declared admissible. The state made an oral motion that the victim be compelled to testify.
When the hearing resumed March 15, the victim appeared, took the stand and was questioned by the court. Mrs. Taylor acknowledged that she had initiated the call to police, that she filed a complaint and that she had identified defendant as the person responsible for her injuries. She remembered having pictures taken of her face and that she had assured the district attorney's office of her willingness to prosecute, but now, she stated, she had changed her mind. The trial judge denied the state's motion with the following remarks:
|a . I think if this woman's crazy enough to want to get beat up by her husband to within an inch of her life, and she wants to go back and marry him, that's her business. And I couldn't stop her if she wanted to get up on a ledge and jump off the building, if I wasn't close to her. It's her life. I've seen the pictures. I think she's crazy. But what am I going to do? I'll deny your Motion in Limine.
No evidence, other than the brief testimony of the victim described above, was presented at the hearing nor was there any discussion or argument on the state's request for a ruling on the admissibility of the victim's statements.
The state applied to the court of appeal for writs seeking a reversal of the trial court's denial of its motion in limine and its request for an order compelling the testimony of Glenda Richard Taylor against her husband. The state's application included a copy of the couple's marriage certificate, as well as an affidavit from Aubrey Richard, the victim's mother, executed March 17,1994, subsequent to the trial court hearing. In the affidavit, Aubrey Richard stated that three days after her daughter and the defendant were married, her daughter moved back home. She also believed that her daughter was afraid of the defendant and afraid to testify against him.
The court of appeal denied the state's writ application without assigning reasons.
We issued a stay order and granted the state's writ application, State v. Taylor, 635 So.2d 1141 (La.1994).
II.
The spousal witness privilege in Louisiana has a long history and can be traced to the common law. In 1805, the legislature adopted the Crimes Act which implemented the common law as Louisiana's criminal law. See Sydney B. Galloway, Evidence — The Husband-Wife Testimony Privilege, 19 La. L.Rev. 427 (1954). The common law provided that the husband and wife were incompetent and disqualified from testifying against one another. By Act 29 of 1886 this principle was codified in Louisiana. The act provided "[t]hat the competent witness in all criminal matters, shall be a person of proper understanding; provided, that the husband Ucannot be a witness for or against his wife, nor the wife for or against her husband, except in such cases as is now provided by law." This same language was carried over in Act 185 of 1902. Since these statutes were based on the common law, the exceptions that were recognized in the common law were also applicable in Louisiana. One of the exceptions from the disqualification of the spouses to testify for or against one another was where the wife had sustained a personal injury from her husband. State v. McDavid, 15 La.Ann. 403 (1860); State v. Pain, 48 La.Ann. 311, 19 So. 138 (La.1896). The rationale for this policy was set forth in State v. Parker, 42 La.Ann. 972, 8 So. 473 (La.1890), where the husband was charged with the attempted murder of his wife. In rejecting the defendant-husband's claims that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the wife, this court held:
The injured person is the wife of the accused. The common law authorities admit the testimony of the wife against the husband for the purpose of proving the crime committed by him on her person. The law's purpose in excluding the testimony is to respect and protect relations of faith, reliance, and confidence between the spouses. When one attempts to destroy the other, the great necessity and importance of the exclusion no longer exists. The rules of evidence in the prosecution of crimes shall be according to the common law, unless otherwise provided. Acts 1805, p. 440. Where a crime has been committed on the person of the wife, she is a competent witness.
By Act 41 of 1904, the legislature added the exception that the privilege did not apply in bigamy cases, but retained the same language as was included in the previous acts. However, a major change occurred when Act 157 of 1916 adopted both the confidential communication privilege and the spousal witness privilege. With regard to the witness privilege, the act stated: "Nei ther husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the other." This same provision was reaffirmed by Act 2 of 1928 and later moved to the Code of Evidence by Act 376 of 1992. Currently, the spousal witness privilege is codified in Louisiana in LSA-C.E. art. 505. The privilege provides:
| BIn a criminal case or in commitment or interdiction proceedings, a witness spouse has a privilege not to testify against the other spouse. This privilege terminates upon the annulment of the marriage, legal separation, or divorce of the spouses.
This privilege is held by the witness spouse and can be waived by her. The statute provides that neither spouse may be compelled to be a witness against the other in a criminal trial. However, the statute does not prohibit a spouse from voluntarily taking the stand against the defendant spouse. State v. Triplett, 313 So.2d 227, 229 (La.1975).
On the other hand, the confidential communication privilege is found in LSA-C.E. art. 504. That article provides in part:
B. Confidential communications privilege. Each spouse has a privilege during and after the marriage to refuse to disclose, and to prevent the other spouse from disclosing, confidential communications with the other spouse while they were husband and wife.
C. Confidential communications; exceptions. This privilege does not apply:
(1) In a criminal case in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse or of a child of either.
This court explained the difference between the two privileges when it discussed LSA-R.S. 15:461, where both privileges were contained before being moved to the Code of Evidence:
This statute, in effect, creates two distinct privileges. The first of these is the privilege which attaches to private conversations between husband and wife and which may be asserted by the defendant-spouse. Secondly, the statute establishes a privilege in favor of a spouse called to testify against the other spouse by providing that neither spouse shall be compelled to be a witness against the other in a criminal proceeding. The exercise of this privilege rests with the testifying spouse alone and may not be invoked by the defendant-spouse.
State v. Bennett, 357 So.2d 1136, 1139-10 (La.1978). The fact that the defendant spouse can invoke the confidential communications privilege led the legislature to create a statutory ^exception in cases where "one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse or a child of either." LSA-C.E. art. 504(C)(1).
By the passage of Act 157 of 1916, and the subsequent acts thereafter, the legislature abrogated the common law rule and the common law exceptions in Louisiana. State v. Dejean, 159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (La.1925). The common law rule that one spouse was incompetent or disqualified from testifying against the other spouse was replaced by a privilege that provided that the spouse could not be compelled to testify, but could voluntarily do so. If a witness spouse voluntarily agreed to testify against a defendant spouse, the defendant spouse could not object unless the testimony included confidential communications and the defendant spouse invoked the confidential communications privilege. The fact that the privilege is vested solely in the witness spouse rendered unnecessary the common law exception in cases where the defendant spouse had caused personal injury to the testifying spouse, because there was no absolute bar to the spouse's testimony, the defendant spouse could not prevent its admissibility, and the victim spouse could voluntarily testify.
Statutory privileges should be given a genuine construction. Although privileges serve to foster a relationship (in this instance the husband-wife relationship), they disserve the truth-seeking function of the adversary trial. Therefore, in determining the applicability of a privilege, a court should determine whether the testimony that is claimed to be privileged is in the class whose exclusion will advance the policy sought to be furthered by the privilege. State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119, 122 (La.1984); State v. Aucoin, 362 So.2d 503, 506 (La.1978). The policies for adopting the witness spouse privilege were an interest in preserving the family unit and "society's desire to preserve the harmony of the existing marriage by preventing ill feeling between the spouses that might result if one were required to give unfavorable testimony against the other." Galloway, supra at 428-9.
III.
The state contends that the court should establish an exception to the spousal witness privilege in cases where one spouse is the victim of abuse by the other spouse, as is the case with the confidential communication privilege, LSA-C.E. art. 504. The state believes that the refusal of this court to apply the exception in LSA-C.E. art. 504 to LSA-C.E. art. 505 would render the exception ineffective, since the testifying spouse could circumvent the exception and ^hinder justice by simply invoking the spousal witness privilege. It is argued that this would contravene the purpose of the evidence statutes "to secure fairness and efficiency in administration of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." LSA-C.E. art. 102.
Additionally, the state argues that the spousal witness privilege should not apply in this case and all cases where the crime occurs before marriage and the marriage between the victim and the defendant is used as a means to foreclose the victim from testifying at the criminal trial.
The state also provides cases and codal provisions from other jurisdictions in support of its proposed interpretation of Louisiana's testimonial privileges. However, no clear or hard and fast rule is discernable, given the differences in other jurisdictions' statutory language, intricacies of evidentiary and procedural rules, and judicial interpretations. Therefore, the bulk of what the state offers from other states provides neither support for its position nor is particularly persuasive.
IV.
LSA-C.E. art. 504 makes an exception where the spouse is the victim for the confidential communication privilege. LSA-C.E. art. 504 makes no such exception for the spousal witness privilege. The reason for the distinction is clear: the confidential communication privilege can be exercised by the defendant, barring the victim spouse from testifying even though the victim spouse wishes to testify; the spousal witness privilege cannot be exercised by the defendant, leaving the victim spouse perfectly free to testify if the victim spouse wishes to do so.
|8The spousal witness privilege, as explained above, has been a part of Louisiana law for a long time, and it was recently affirmed by the legislature when it was considered and included in the Evidence Code adopted in 1992 without any exception as to victim spouses. As a longstanding and recently affirmed legislative enactment, the court would not be justified in reading into the statute an exception purposely omitted by the legislature, regardless of the court's view as to whether or not such an exception represents better policy.
Similarly, the code article makes no exception for acts occurring prior to marriage. It is generally held that the competency of one spouse as a witness depends on the existence of the relationship at the time he .or she is offered as a witness, and not upon whether the relationship existed at the time of the occurrence of the events about which he or she is expected to testify. See State v. Dejean, 159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (La.1925); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 245, p. 249 (1992); Annotation, Marriage for Purpose of Barring Testimony, 13 A.L.R. 4th 1305. There is no exception in the governing Louisiana code article making the spousal witness privilege inapplicable to testimony about acts occurring prior to marriage.
However, the dynamics of spousal abuse and domestic violence cannot be ignored. Fear, self-blame, and other emotional factors often leave a battered spouse unable to make a sound judgment as to whether to testify against an abusive spouse. Exercise of the spousal witness privilege may be the result of coercion, fear, subjugation, or undue influence, perhaps not even consciously recognized by the abused spouse in some circumstances.
Recognizing these dynamics, and the barrier the spousal witness privilege erects to the prosecution of criminal offenses which are, after all, offenses against society as a whole, the privilege has been legislatively abolished in many states, and judicially limited in decisions of other state and federal courts.
While we do not feel justified or empowered to impose by judicial fiat a victim spouse exception to the legislatively established spousal witness privilege, we nevertheless feel justified and even compelled to limit exercise of the privilege where facts and circumstances established by proper evidence indicate the privilege is being exercised because of fear, threats, or coercion, especially where the marriage giving rise to the privilege is itself the result of fear, threats, or coercion or a mere sham confected to make the privilege available. We do not believe it was the legislative intent to make the privilege available under circumstances such as these, where | ¡sanctity of the marriage and marital harmony are hardly served. Also, a defendant should not be able to prevent the introduction of damaging evidence through threats, fear or coercion of a spouse witness anymore than any other witness.
Thus, in a ease where the testifying spouse is the victim of the offense charged, and where the evidence supports a finding that the victim spouse asserting the spousal witness privilege is more probably than not acting under fear, threats or coercion, or that the marriage itself is a sham confected for the purpose of making the privilege available, the purpose of the privilege is not served and may, in the court's discretion, be considered as not applicable.
Applying these precepts to the instant case, we note that the evidence was not fully developed at the hearing held in the district court. Nevertheless, the facts established raise a strong inference of both fear and coercion and a sham marriage. The alleged brutal beating, the initial willingness of the victim spouse to cooperate with the law enforcement authorities, the change of heart on the day of trial, the subsequent marriage after charges were reinstated, and (although the affidavit of the victim's mother is not considered) the lack of evidence that the victim and defendant have actually established a genuine marital relationship, create an inference that circumstances exist that would support the non-applicability of the privilege in this case.
Considering that we pronounce new rules in this opinion that were not available to the parties or the court at the time the hearing was held, we deem it in the interest of justice and the development of the true facts upon which a determination of the applicability of the privilege can be made to remand this ease to the trial court for reconsideration and the taking of further evidence on the issue of whether the privilege is to be applied in this ease and whether the victim spouse can be compelled to testify.
The ruling of the district court is set aside and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
KIMBALL, J., additionally concurs.
ORTIQUE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with reasons.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and will assign reasons.
Justice Marcus not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3. Judge Melvin A. Shortess, Court of Appeal, First Circuit, sitting in place of Justice James L. Dennis.
. LSA-C.E. art. 505 provides: In a criminal case or in commitment or interdiction proceedings, a witness spouse has a privilege not to testify against the other spouse. This privilege terminates upon the annulment of the marriage, legal separation, or divorce of the spouses.
. LSA-R.S. 14:34, Aggravated battery, provides as follows:
Aggravated battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon.
Whoever commits an aggravated battery shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more then ten years, or both.
. Since the district court did not rule on this motion, we will not address it. The state can seek a ruling from the trial court on this motion and a determination if the victim's prior state ments are admissible under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. LSA-C.E. art. 801, et. seq.
. La.Acts of 1805 provided that the rules of evidence in criminal cases "shall be except as is by this act provided for, according to the said common law." Galloway, infra, at 429, fn. 16.
. Section 1 of Act 41 of 1904 provided:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana. That the competent witness in all criminal matters, shall be a person of proper understanding; provided that the husband cannot be a witness for or against his wife, nor the wife for or against her husband, except in such cases as is now provided by law and except in cases where either the husband or wife is on trial for bigamy.
.The confidential communication privilege in Act 157 of 1916 provided that "[p]rivate conversations between husband and wife shall be privileged."
. LSA-R.S. 15:461 provided:
The competent witness in any criminal proceeding, in a court or before a person having authority to receive evidence, shall be a person of proper understanding, but;
(1) Private conversations between husband and wife shall be privileged.
(2) Neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the other.
(3)In the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, a person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness.
. LSA-C.E. art. 102 reads in full as follows:
These articles shall be construed to secure fairness and efficiency in administration of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
. The state cites California and Alaska decisions. However, in California the statute allows for exceptions for physical abuse of the other spouse whether before or after marriage. California Evidence Code § 970. In Alaska the courts are allowed to relax the rules when justice requires. Alaska R.Evid. 505, Alaska R.Crim.P 53.
Mississippi is the only jurisdiction cited by the state where the courts have created an exception when the crime is against the testifying spouse. In Stubbs v. State, 441 So.2d 1386 (Miss. 1983), the injured husband was unwilling to testify for the prosecution against his estranged wife. He relied on Miss.Code § 13-1-5, providing that either may introduce the other's testimony in any proceeding between them but that in all other instances where one is a party litigant, the other is incompetent to testify. The trial court overruled his objection and ordered him to testify. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court looked to its own 1882 decision allowing an injured spouse to testify against the other, and affirmed, holding that such testimony is viewed as emanating from a member of the public rather than a spouse. Id., 441 So.2d at 1388. The court approved the order to compel, as the crime was against public order, an affront to the dignity of the state and held that such spousal "competency ." cannot be waived or affected by a witness's desires or fears, as those are overborne "by the paramount interest of the state in preserving its criminal laws." Id.
For a state law similar to Louisiana's, see Code of Alabama, § 12-21-227 and Arnold v. State, 353 So.2d 527 (Ala. 1977) and Holyfield v. State, 365 So.2d 108 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), writ denied, 365 So.2d 112 (Ala.1978).