Case Name: ARMANDO CAMPOS AND PURESA CAMPOS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1983-12-01
Citations: 192 N.J. Super. 251
Docket Number: 
Parties: ARMANDO CAMPOS AND PURESA CAMPOS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 192
Pages: 251–272

Head Matter:
ARMANDO CAMPOS AND PURESA CAMPOS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 20, 1988
Decided December 1, 1983.
Before Judges MICHELS, KING and DREIER.
Erwin N. Griswold, pro hac vice, of the District of Columbia, Ohio and Massachusetts Bar, argued the cause for appellant (Ribis, McCluskey, Ruane & Graham, attorneys; Jerome J. Graham, Jr. of counsel; Victor E. Schwartz, Patrick W. Lee, Kathryn Kelly, Elizabeth L. West and George C. Jones on the brief).
William H. Sheil argued the cause for respondents.
Buttermore, Mullen, Jeremiah and Phillips, filed a brief amicus curiae for Washington Legal Foundation (Daniel J. Popeo of counsel; William S. Jeremiah and Nicholas E. Calió of the District of Columbia Bar on the brief).
Young, Rose, & Millspaugh, filed a brief amicus curiae for National Machine Tool Builders’ Association (Frederick W. Rose on the brief; Mark J. Nuzzaco of the Oregon Bar of counsel).
Connell, Foley & Geiser, filed a brief amicus curiae for Armstrong Rubber Company, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Dun-lop Tire & Rubber Corporation, General Tire & Rubber Company, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Uniroyal Tire Company (John B. Lavecchia of counsel and on the brief).
Kronisch & Schkeeper, filed a brief amicus curiae for Association of Trial Lawyers of America, New Jersey Affiliate (Allan Roth of Bendit, Weinstock & Sharbaugh, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MICHAEL P. KING, J.A.D.
In this products-defect failure-to-warn case plaintiff Armando Campos was awarded a verdict of $255,000 for injuries to his right arm. The product allegedly causing the injury was a three-piece wheel-rim assembly manufactured by defendant Firestone and sold to plaintiff's employer. In response to two special questions the jury found no design defect but did find that defendant failed to adequately warn of the product's potential danger. Post-trial motions for judgment were denied and Firestone appeals. The key issue on this appeal is whether Firestone violated any legal duty to this plaintiff to warn of the product's danger. We conclude that it did not and that judgment should have been entered for Firestone.
Plaintiff was injured on November 1, 1978 while working as a tire mechanic for Theurer-Atlantic, Inc. in Newark. He was inflating a Dunlop truck tire on a Firestone rim assembly. Just before the accident he had assembled a tire on a standard three-piece truck rim. After placing the tire and rim assembly into a steel safety cage, he was in the process of inflating the tire within the steel safety cage.
The purpose of the steel safety cage, as conceded by plaintiff's own expert, was to prevent the metal rim components from striking anyone in the event the rim components separated under pressure during inflation. Separation under pressure could occur if the rim parts were defective or were not properly assembled by the mechanic. In addition to the steel safety cage, plaintiff used a clip-on air chuck. The purpose of this clip-on chuck was to permit the tire mechanic to stand away from the steel safety cage during inflation, another safety precaution against injury from rim separation.
Plaintiff was an experienced tire mechanic. He had changed eight truck tires an hour, eight to ten hours a day, six days a week for over seven years. He knew the procedures for safety during inflation: assembly in the steel safety cage, use of the clip-on chuck and standing away from the cage.
While inflating the tire, plaintiff saw the lock-ring component of the rim assembly separating, that is, "coming out." He reached inside the safety cage and his right hand and arm were seriously injured when struck by the lock-ring. Plaintiff admitted that he knew such conduct was dangerous and that separation under pressure could cause serious injury. Moreover, six years before, plaintiff had caused the same type of accident and had been injured at work when he had reached inside a safety cage during inflation of a tire and rim assembly. Plaintiff admitted that after the first accident he had been reinstructed in the use of the safety cage and the clip-on air chuck and had been told specifically by his superior to "stand back" while inflating a tire.
Both plaintiff's expert, Brenner, and Firestone's expert, Lee, testified that these standard safety devices—the steel cage and clip-on chuck—were adequate and would prevent injury during a separation of rim components under pressure. Firestone specifically recommended use of the cage and chuck in product catalogues distributed to its customers. Plaintiff's employer had been periodically provided with these catalogues before the accident. In addition, Firestone provided plaintiff's employer with a wall chart printed by the Department of Transportation describing these safety procedures for assembling and inflating multi-piece rims.
There was no written or pictorial warning about the danger of reaching into the cage on either the tire rims or on the safety cage. The safety cage was not designed, manufactured, nor sold by Firestone. Because plaintiff was illiterate in both English and his native Portuguese, any printed warning would have been ineffective. Plaintiff's safety expert, Brenner, theorized that some type of international graphic symbol could have been used by Firestone to portray the danger of putting one's arm in the safety cage when separation was imminent. He, however, admitted the doubtful efficacy of such a picture or symbol in the circumstance of this case.
He said:
Q. [by defense counsel] Take a stop sign, I guess it's hexagonal, eight-sided, and it says, "Stop" on it—
A. And it's red.
Q. And it's red.
A. That's correct.
Q. Is that the kind of signal we're talking about?
A. That is a form of symbol. The "Do Not Smoke" sign, which has a cigarette and a red line across it is another type of symbol.
Q. Now, how would those kinds of symbols have helped Mr. Campos in the situation he was in where he's observing a forcible separation of a truck rim in a cage airing the tire?
A. Not very much. A little perhaps. That is, if there was a reminder in graphical form against putting his hands in telling him that explosive separations can take place, and he's instructed verbally by somebody in his own native tongue as to what that symbol means. Then at least that amount of information has been provided to him.
I don't think it's going to be very effective beyond a certain point because this particular incident situationally starts before the tire even gets into the cage. It starts either on the assembly line or it starts when the man is assembling it and doesn't assemble it correctly. I certainly agree that the warning graphical which the man, let's say, understands, is not—it's better than nothing, but not very much better.
Q. Is it better than the pain caused by a prior injury in terms of suppressing his instincts for putting his hands in the cage?
A. No.
Brenner, a mechanical and safety engineer, considered plaintiff's conduct characteristic of industrial accidents that occur where a worker instinctively reacts to an imminent mishap and ignores obvious danger.
Freund v. Cellofilm Property, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981), is the seminal case in this jurisdiction treating the failure to warn and its relationship to strict liability. The Court concluded "generally that in inadequate warning design defect cases, a strict liability charge should be given." Id. at 241. Such charge must make clear that "the warning must be sufficient to protect any and all foreseeable users from hidden dangers presented by the product." Id. at 243.
Freund was followed by Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982). The Court there held that an independent contractor who rebuilds part of a machine given him by the plaintiff's employer may be held strictly liable for injuries sustained by a foreseeable user resulting from a failure to warn of dangerous propensities. In Michalko the Court expressly reserved the apparent question presented to us, i.e., whether adequate warnings to the purchaser of an industrial product, which will foreseeably be used by trained and experienced industrial workers, will provide a legal or factual defense to the manufacturer in a strict-liability failure-to-warn case. Id. at 403, n. 5. In Michalko the general duty was restated:
Hence, a manufacturer is under a duty to warn owners and foreseeable users of the dangers of using a particular machine if, without such a warning, the machine is not reasonably safe. A manufacturer which does not caution against the dangers inherent in the use of its product should be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from the absence of such warnings, [at 403]
Our courts have generally established a manufacturer's duty "to warn of concealed dangers" which might result in "foreseeable injury." Martin v. Bengne, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 366-367 (1957) (duty to warn consumer of flammability of Ben-Gay vapors); Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J.Super. 311, 320 (App.Div.), certif. den. 81 N.J. 50 (1979) (duty to warn consuming public of risks of prolonged use of over-the-counter drug, aspirin). See 2 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 388(b) at 301 and § 402A, Comment (j) at 353 (1965). Our cases to date have not explicitly considered the duty to warn in the context presented in the case before us, i.e., a skilled industrial worker who proceeds in disregard of obvious safety procedures to confront a known hazard. We conclude that where the hazard is obvious and avoidable, written or symbolic warnings as suggested here become much less relevant and ineffective, especially where the warning will convey the same or less potential for restraint than the user's own experience where that experience is foreseeable from the manufacturer's vantage.
Our warning cases to date suggest the duty is not absolute or totally co-extensive with all risks. In Lewis v. Zapolitz, 72 N.J.Super. 168 (App.Div.), certif. den. 37 N.J. 226 (1962), this court found no duty to warn of the potential hazards of a plastic slingshot saying "danger was or should have been as apparent to the buyer as the vendor. It would be difficult indeed to conceive of a 12-year-old boy who was unacquainted with the use of so common an article. Under such circumstances there would ordinarily be no duty to provide a warning." Id. at 178. A very recent decision of this court treats the duty to warn in a products context where the hazard is open, obvious and common knowledge. In Height v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 190 N.J.Super. 7 (App.Div.1983), plaintiff was operating a motorcycle made and sold by defendant when he crossed the center line of a roadway and collided head-on at a speed of 40 miles per hour with an oncoming vehicle. Vaporized or liquid gasoline from the cycle's damaged fuel tank sprayed on him and caused burns. The jury, as in the case before us, found no design defect or manufacturing defect in the propulsion system and found the product reasonably suitable for anticipated use. In seeking a reversal from the adverse verdict plaintiff made this claim.
On appeal, as we have noted, plaintiff does not challenge the jury determination that there was no design defect in the fuel system or fuel tank. Rather, he contends that he was entitled to a jury instruction that defendants might be found liable for breach of a duty to provide a warning of the hazard of ignition of gasoline spraying onto the clothing of the motorcycle operator in the event of a collision. Plaintiff does not specify a proximate cause relationship between the lack of a warning and the burns suffered by him. Nor was any such relationship established in our view. The trial record is barren of any evidence that a warning would have made the fuel system safer or enabled plaintiff to do anything to prevent his burns other than to avoid a high-speed crash, a mishap involving grave danger of which he had knowledge without a warning. [Id. at 9-10]
In rejecting this contention this court ruled:
Judicial authorities relied on by plaintiff thus are inapposite. All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo.App.1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J.Super. 311 (App.Div.1979), certif. den. 81 N.J. 50 (1979).
Under the developing law in this field, failure to provide an adequate warning may amount to a design defect subjecting the manufacturer or distributor of a product to strict tort liability. But the manufacturer or distributor has been exempted from strict tort liability for failure to provide a warning of a danger within common knowledge and understanding, 2 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402A, Comment (j) at 353 (1965); 2 Hursh and Bailey, American Law of Products Liability, 92 ed. 1974, § 8.14 and 8.15. For example, strict liability has been rejected for failure of a manufacturer to provide a warning that a motor vehicle may skid on a slippery road surface in low gear or upon braking. Zidek v. General Motor Corp., 66 Ill.App.3d 982, 23 Ill.Dec. 715, 384 N.E.2d 509 (Ill.App. 1978). [Id. at 10]
The general rule in this area is stated by Prosser:
One limitation commonly placed upon the duty to warn, or for that matter the seller's entire liability, is that he is not liable for dangers that are known to the user, or are obvious to him, or are so commonly known that it can reasonably be assumed that the user will be familiar with them. Thus there is certainly no usual duty to warn the purchaser that a knife or an axe will cut, a match will take fire, dynamite will explode, or a hammer may mash a finger. [Prosser, Law of Torts, § 96 at 649 (4 ed. 1971) ].
This principle applies in either negligence or strict liability contexts. Id. at 659, n. 73. See also 63 Am.Jur.2d, Products Liability, § 52 at 60.
Other authorities holding that there is no duty to warn where the danger is obvious and the user knowledgeable include, e.g. Strong v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8 Cir. 1981) (Nebraska law); see also Brown v. Link Belt, 666 F.2d 110 (5 Cir.1982) (Louisiana law); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5 Cir.1976); Mach v. General Motors Corp., 112 Mich.App. 158, 315 N.W.2d 561 (App.1982); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash.App. 701, 603 P.2d 839 (App.1979). The prevailing view and the leading federal cases are given in Strong at 686-688. The plaintiff's decedent in Strong, a construction supervisor for a natural gas company, was killed when natural gas, released when a plastic coupling shrank and "pulled out" of an adjoining pipe, exploded as he was checking the leak. The evidence showed that the decedent had twice before repaired "pull-outs" of this type with defendant's plastic couplings at other sites and knew of the danger involved. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a directed verdict for defendant.
In Driekosen v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 158 Neb. 531, 547-548, 64 N. W.2d 88, 97 (1954), the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the definition of negligent failure to warn found in Restatement of Torts § 388 (1934). This is essentially the same as the current version found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965):
One supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Subsection (b) of this test has been interpreted to mean that there is no duty to warn if the user knows or should know of the potential danger, especially when the user is a professional who should be aware of the characteristics of the product. See Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464-465 (5th Cir.1976); Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856, 860 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Lockett v. General Electric Co., 376 F.Supp. 1201, 1208-1209 (E.D.Pa. 1974) , aff'd 511 F.2d 1394 (3rd Cir.1975); Bryant v. Hercules, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 241, 247 (W.D.Ky.1970). Other courts, including this one, have stated substantially the same position, although without explicit reference to the Restatement. See Kerber v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.1969); Thibodaux v. McWane Case Iron Pipe Co., 381 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir.1967); Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 872, 75 S.Ct. 108, 99 L.Ed. 686 (1954); Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 268 F.Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y.1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1967).
In the realm of strict liability there is a similar principle providing that a manufacturer has no duty to warn when the dangers of a product are within the professional knowledge of the user. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d at 465-467; Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d at 860.
See also Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co., 576 F.2d 97,101-102 (5 Cir.1978) ("it is generally held that there is no duty to warn when the danger or potentiality of danger is obvious or is actually known to the injured person"); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 159-160 (8 Cir.1978), cert, den., 439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 187, 58 L.Ed.2d 173 (1978) (no warning required for plaintiff who had actual knowledge that if he leaned too far forward on chair equipped with casters, chair would tip forward); Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Products Co., 529 F.2d 108, 111 (7. Cir.1976) (no duty to warn when "danger or potentiality of danger is known or should be known to the user"); Ward v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1188 (5 Cir.1971) (no duty to warn experienced user not to place hand into meat grinder); Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419, 421 (8 Cir.1969) (worker reached into wrong part of moving machine contrary to instructions); Huff v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 94 Ill.App.3d 1091, 419 N.E.2d 561, 567 (App.Ct.1981) (construction worker who knew that wet concrete is caustic was not entitled to a warning to that effect).
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205-206 (1982), recently discussed "risk spreading" and "accident avoidance" as reasons justifying the expansion of the doctrine of strict liability for injuries caused by consumer products. "Risk spreading" is the rationale that the price of the product should reflect the total product cost, including injuries caused by defective products. But in the case before us only the plaintiff's impulsive act in the face of obvious danger caused the accident. The jury found that there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the product, either in design or manufacture. Nor does the "accident avoidance" policy prong support plaintiff's position. Even his own expert conceded that a pictorial warning on the rims or elsewhere was not "going to be very effective" to restrain him from doing what he did. Nor is this a ease where an industrial employee was literally chained to a dangerous machine without meaningful choice and no viable economic alternative but day-to-day exposure to serious physical hazard. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 167-168 (1979). Our Supreme Court recently said in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 (1983):
Proof that the product was defective requires more than a mere showing that the product caused the injury. The necessity of proving a defect in the product as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case distinguishes strict from absolute liability, and thus prevents the manufacturer from also becoming the insurer of a product. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Birnbaum, "Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligent [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence," 33 Vand.L.Rev. 593, 600 n. 32 (1980). [at 179-180]
There is no duty in our law to create a product that will insure against injury to the most indifferent, adventurous or foolhardy. If there were, we suspect that there would be fewer useful products in the marketplace. We are satisfied that Firestone as a matter of law breached no duty to warn plaintiff in this situation. The recommended safety equipment was in use. The risk was well known and further advertisement would have been superfluous and unnecessary. The hazard was avoidable by exercise of common sense. Moreover, proper use of the product required no exposure to the particular hazard which injured plaintiff. Even the warning recommended by plaintiff's expert would have, had concededly very speculative, if any, efficacy in the circumstance. We cannot agree with the dissent which holds in effect that any product capable of causing harm, no matter how obvious, must contain written and pictorial or graphic warnings and that without such warnings the issues of strict liability and proximate cause are always for the jury.
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff is vacated and judgment is entered in favor of defendants.