Case Name: William T. Walton and Eliza D. Walton, Resp'ts, v. The Agricultural Insurance Company, of Watertown, N. Y., App'lt
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-10-22
Citations: 26 N.Y. St. Rep. 780
Docket Number: 
Parties: William T. Walton and Eliza D. Walton, Resp’ts, v. The Agricultural Insurance Company, of Watertown, N. Y., App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 26
Pages: 780–787

Head Matter:
William T. Walton and Eliza D. Walton, Resp’ts, v. The Agricultural Insurance Company, of Watertown, N. Y., App’lt.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed October 22, 1889.)
Insurance (Fire) — Evidence.
The policy was upon property of the husband and ran to him and his ■wife. After it was made the property was conveyed to the wife through a third person, without notice to the wife, by which transfer the policy by its terms became void. In an action to recover on the policy, Held, that evidence to show that defendant’s solicitor was informed that such transfer was intended and that the policy was drawn to both so as to cover the wife’s interest after the transfer was made* was inadmissible, as it contradicts the express terms of the policy.
(Bradley, Haight and Brows, JJ., dissent.)
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the supreme court, in the second judicial department, affirming a judgment at circuit, and an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The action was brought, upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, to recover the sum of $500 for loss sustained by the burning of a barn, a quantity of hay and grain and two horses. The policy of insurance contained the following condition: “ If
the said property be sold or conveyed or if the interest of the parties therein be changed in any manner, whether by the act of the parties or by operation of law; * * * then, and in every such case, and in either of said events, this policy shall be null and void until the written consent of the company at the home office is obtained.”
At the time of the application for and issuance of the policy, William T. Walton was the owner of the premises insured. About five months thereafter he conveyed said property to a third person, who on the same day duly conveyed the same to Eliza D. Walton, the wife of William.
Notice of these transfers was never given to the defendant, neither was the written consent of the company at the home office obtained. William T. Walton, against the objection of the defendant, testified that he told the agent at the time the application for insurance was made that as soon as he had finished repairing the buildings he should convey the property to his wife, and that he wanted a policy so made out as to cover his interest now and the interest of his wife after conveyance made. That the agent replied that he could accomplish that result by making the policy out to William T. Waitón and wife. It was thereupon arranged that such a policy should be applied for and he signed an application to the company. The evidence was duly objected to by the defendant and an exception taken to its admission. Northrup, the agent, contradicted Walton’s testimony in such respect. But that question was determined in favor of theplantiffs in a special finding made by the jury.
The agent or solicitor who made out the application was not a general agent and did not have authority to issue policies. His duty was to make out applications for insurance and forward them to the home office of the company where they were passed upon. If rejected the matter was at an end. If accepted, a policy of insurance was made out and forwarded to the agent for delivery on receipt of premium.
Respecting the extent and limitation of the authority of the agent to represent the defendant, the policy in question provided as follows: “ Agents of the company are permitted to give the consent of the company to assignment of policies. But no agent of the company is permitted to give consent of the company in any other cases required by the provisions of this policy, or to waive any stipulation or condition contained herein; but in all cases where the consent of the company is required by this policy, other than consent to the assignment of the policy, such consent must be obtained at the home office of the company.”
The trial court charged the jury as a matter of law that the conveyance from husband to wife through a third person did not vitiate the policy, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. Defendant excepted. The jury rendered ,a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $535.50. And the judgment entered thereupon was subsequently affirmed at general term. The ■defendant appeals to this court.
A. H. Sawyer, for app’lt; W. W. Westervelt, for resp’ts.
Reversing 40 Hun, 636, mem.

Opinion:
Parker, J.
The contract of insurance upon which the plaintiffs base their right to recover in this action provided that if the property insured be sold or conveyed, or if the interest of the parties be .changed in any manner, the policy shall be null and void, until the written consent of the company at the home office •shall be obtained.
Subsequent to the issuance of the policy, the property was conveyed by Walton, through a third person, to his wife without the written consent of the company. Thus, by the terms of the contract, the policy of insurance became of no effect. Upon the trial, the plaintiffs sought to relieve themselves from the effect of the violated condition by the introduction of oral evidence tending to show that Walton informed the defendant's solicitor of his intention to convey to his wife after a few months, and requested that the policy be so drawn as to cover his interest before conveyance, and that of his wife afterwards, and that the solicitor informed him that he could accomplish that result by issuing the policy to William T. Walton and wife. The evidence upon that subject was seasonably objected to by the defendant, but was received by the court, and the jury, in a special finding, found the fact to be as contended for by the plaintiffs.
The question presented, therefore, is, can the plaintiffs be permitted to show, in contradiction of the express terms of the con- tract, that it was orally agreed before its making and delivery that they should be permitted thereafter to do an act which the contract forbids?
This is not an action brought to so reform a contract as that it shall be made to voice the agreement which the parties intended to make.
On the contrary, it is based on the policy as it was written, and cannot be maintained by evidence that the contract was intended to be a different one, fora policy of insurance is presumed to embrace the entire agreement of the parties. The precedent oral agreement cannot be regarded as a part of the policy, or in any wise effective as a contract. Like other written contracts, the oral agreement preceding its execution and delivery is presumed to have become merged in it, and its terms cannot be controlled or varied by parol evidence. Pindar v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 47 N. Y., 114; Rip ley v. Ætna Ins. Co., 30 id., 136; Alston v. Mechanics' Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Hill, 329.
The cases of Van Schoick v. Niagara Ins. Co., 68 N. Y., 434; Woodruff v. Imperial Ins. Co., 83 id., 135; and Short v. Home Ins. Co., 90 id., 16, are not in conflict with this rule.
True, oral evidence was received in each of those cases. It was not received, however, for the purpose of contradicting the written agreement, or to show that the parties made a different contract than the one expressed, but to demonstrate that the insurer at the time of the issuance of the policy had knowledge of the facts, the existence of which were asserted upon the trial to constitute a breach of warranty. Upon such proof was predicated an estoppel against the insurer. It was held in effect that if the insurer receive pay for a policy of insurance, knowing it to be invalid when issued, he shall be deemed to be estopped from insisting upon its invalidity. The object of this rule is to prevent fraud and to render it impracticable for insurers to attempt the acquisition of premiums upon policies known to be invalid when issued. The principle of those cases cannot be applied here. The act which the contract declares shall vitiate the policy had not been performed when the policy was issued. It was not an existing fact. The policy was therefore valid at the time of its issuance and so remained until the property was conveyed without the consent of the defendant. Certainly the facts here disclosed fail to suggest a fraud which will estop the defendant from interposing as a defense the warranty against a conveyance of the property. As the defendant is not estopped and the action is brought upon the contract as it was written, it follows that the admission of paroi testimony to vary or contradict one of its provisions was error.
Judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.