Case Name: STATE of South Carolina ex relatione Daniel R. McLEOD as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Appellants, v. Colonel W. J. SEABORN, as Director of Law Enforcement of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, Captain J. A. Spell, as District Commander of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, District 1, including Richland County, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, and Sergeant Cletus L. Powell, as Highway Patrolman, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1978-05-11
Citations: 270 S.C. 696
Docket Number: 20684
Parties: STATE of South Carolina ex relatione Daniel R. McLEOD as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Appellants, v. Colonel W. J. SEABORN, as Director of Law Enforcement of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, Captain J. A. Spell, as District Commander of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, District 1, including Richland County, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, and Sergeant Cletus L. Powell, as Highway Patrolman, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, Respondents.
Judges: Littlejohn, Ness, and Rhodes, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 270
Pages: 696–701

Head Matter:
20684
STATE of South Carolina ex relatione Daniel R. McLEOD as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Appellants, v. Colonel W. J. SEABORN, as Director of Law Enforcement of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, Captain J. A. Spell, as District Commander of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, District 1, including Richland County, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, and Sergeant Cletus L. Powell, as Highway Patrolman, and as a Representative of all others similarly situated, Respondents.
(244 S. E. (2d) 317)
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard P. Wilson, Columbia, for appellants.
Asst. Attys. Gen. Marvin C. Jones and F. Kimball Joyner, Jr., Columbia, for respondents.
May 11, 1978.

Opinion:
Gregory, Justice:
This declaratory judgment action was brought by the Attorney General under Section 15-53-10 et seq., 1976 Code of Laws of South Carolina, to determine the propriety of the practice of the South Carolina Highway Patrol assigning supervisory officers to assist arresting officers in the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic violations in the magistrates' courts of this State. The issue is whether this activity constitutes the unlawful practice of law in violation of Section 40-5-310, 1976 Code, and Rule IV of the Supreme Court Rules concerning the South Carolina Bar [Rule IV]. The lower court held the Highway Patrol's activity was lawful and we affirm.
Section 40-5-310 prohibits the practice of law by persons who are not attorneys and provides:
No person shall practice or solicit the cause of any other person in any court of this State unless he has been admitted and sworn as an attorney, under a penalty of five hundred dollars for every cause he shall so solicit, one half to the State and the other half to him that will sue for it.
Rule IV prohibits no more than Section 40-5-310, and we will address the two provisions as one.
The Attorney General contends the Highway Patrol's practice of assigning experienced supervisory officers to assist new or inexperienced officers in the prosecution of traffic misdemeanors in the magistrates' courts is proscribed by Section 40-5-310 and Rule IV and should be enjoined.
In State v. Messervy, 258 S. C. 110, 187 S. E. (2d) 524 (1972), we approved the procedure whereby the arresting patrolman presents the State's case, testifies as prosecuting witness, cross examines defense, witnesses and argues to the jury in the magistrates' courts. We did not consider whether this activity'constitutes the unlawful practice of law because the question was not raised by Messervy's appeal.
Although the Attorney General does not challenge the prosecution of cases by the arresting officer as violating Section 40-5-310, we perceive no distinction for the purpose of this statute between the arresting officer and a supervisory officer assigned to assist the arresting officer.
The policy behind Section 40-5-310 was stated by this Court in State v. Wells, 191 S. C. 468, 5 S. E. (2d) 181 (1939):
. . . [T]he policy of prohibiting laymen from practicing law is not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal profession, nor for its protection, but to assure the public adequate protection in the pursuit of justice, by preventing the intrusion of incompetent and unlearned persons in the practice of law. 5 S. E. (2d) at 186.
When the officers of the Highway Patrol present misdemeanor traffic violations in the magistrates' courts, whether as the arresting officer or a supervisory officer assisting the arresting officer, they do so in their official capacities as law enforcement officers and employees of the State. These officers do not hold themselves out to the public as attorneys, and their activity in the magistrates' courts does not jeopardize the public by placing "incompetent and unlearned individuals in the practice of law." State v. Wells, supra. To the contrary, this activity renders an important service to the public by promoting the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
We can discern no purpose or policy consistent with Section 40-5-310 and Rule IV that would be served by enjoining the Highway Patrol from continuing this activity, and therefore hold the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic violations in the magistrates' courts by either the arresting officer or a supervisory officer assisting the arresting officer does not constitute the unlawful practice of law in violation of Section 40-5-31Ó and Rule IV.
Affirmed.
Littlejohn, Ness, and Rhodes, JJ., concur.
Lewis, C. J., dissents.