Case Name: LANE v. MONTGOMERY ELEVATOR COMPANY
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1997-02-24
Citations: 225 Ga. App. 523
Docket Number: A96A1942
Parties: LANE v. MONTGOMERY ELEVATOR COMPANY.
Judges: McMurray, P. J., Pope, P. J, Johnson, Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ, concur. Andrews, C. J, Birdsong, P J., and Beasley, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 225
Pages: 523–529

Head Matter:
A96A1942.
LANE v. MONTGOMERY ELEVATOR COMPANY.
(484 SE2d 249)

Opinion:
Judge Harold R. Banke.
Vernice L. Lane sued Montgomery Elevator Company ("Montgomery") to recover for injuries allegedly sustained in an elevator accident occurring at Macon Northside Hospital, formerly known as Charter Northside Hospital (the "Hospital"). Lane alleged that Montgomery negligently installed, operated, and maintained the elevator at issue. Lane appeals the summary judgment in favor of Montgomery.
To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must show that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). Viewed in that light, the evidence was as follows. Lane, a licensed practical nurse, was sent to another floor to obtain some medical supplies. When she arrived at the ground floor, the elevator malfunctioned, stopping several inches above the designated floor. As Lane exited, she did not observe the drop-off and she fell forward injuring her back and leg.
Lane contended that the cause of the accident was Montgomery's failure to properly maintain and adjust the leveling vein of the elevator that malfunctioned. Lane testified that the subject elevator had failed to level properly on other occasions prior to the incident at issue here. Ralph Pate, a deputy state inspector from the Georgia Department of Labor, testified that a properly working elevator would not stop short of its intended floor and the failure to stop properly indicates a malfunction. The repair and maintenance records show some leveling problems with the Hospital elevators less than five months earlier.
It is undisputed that Montgomery installed the elevator at issue and provided certain maintenance and repair services under a contract between Montgomery and the Hospital. In moving for summary judgment, Montgomery primarily argued that Lane failed to offer any evidence of a negligent act or omission on its part which caused the elevator not to level at the time in question. Montgomery contended that a state inspection just prior to the incident showed no problem with the elevator at issue and a state inspection afterwards was similarly favorable.
Montgomery's employee, elevator mechanic Fred Blume, testified that the elevator was shut down and removed from service almost immediately after Lane's fall until the completion of a state inspection by Pate, five days later. On that day, Blume and Pate jointly performed tests on the elevator and could not find any reason for the apparent malfunction. According to Pate's official report it was "not clear what caused occurrence." Pate approved the elevator's return to service. According to a Department of Labor semi-annual report completed two days prior to the incident, elevator #1 passed its inspection with no violations noted. Held:
1. Montgomery claims that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and fact because pursuant to its contract with the Hospital, the Hospital had sole liability for the operation and use of the elevator equipment and because Lane failed to produce any evidence that it failed to exercise due care in its inspection and maintenance of the elevator. We disagree.
A building owner, here presumably the corporation owning the Hospital, "owes a duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers and cannot delegate this duty to an independent contractor engaged to repair the elevator. [Cits.]" Gaffney v. EQK Realty Investors, 213 Ga. App. 653, 655 (445 SE2d 771) (1994); OCGA § 46-9-132; see Hughes v. Hosp. Auth. of Floyd County, 165 Ga. App. 530, 531 (2) (301 SE2d 695) (1983). Under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4), an employer is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who is performing the employer's nondelegable statutory duty. Perry v. Soil Remediation, 221 Ga. App. 386, 388 (2) (471 SE2d 320) (1996). Nevertheless, Montgomery, regardless of its contractual obligations to the Hospital, had a duty not to act negligently toward Lane and other elevator users. See Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga. App. 1, 4 (4) (470 SE2d 474) (1996); Chapman v. Turnbull Elevator, 116 Ga. App. 661 (158 SE2d 438) (1967); see Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F2d 655, 665 (IV) (11th Cir. 1988); see 26 AmJur2d 283, Elevators & Escalators, § 20 (1996).
Georgia has not addressed the issue of whether Montgomery, in its capacity as the elevator maintenance contractor, is held to the same duty as the premises owner, that of extraordinary diligence. Other jurisdictions are divided on the issue. See, e.g., Tait v. Armor Elevator Co., 958 F2d 563, 567 (3rd Cir. 1992). However, even if Montgomery's duty to Lane is one of ordinary care, such a standard would be heightened due to the inherent risk of injury posed to those traveling on an elevator. See Millar Elevator Svc. Co. v. O'Shields, 222 Ga. App. 456 (475 SE2d 188) (1996). For these reasons, we reject Montgomery's contention that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Having addressed the legal issues, we next examine the parties' evidentiary burdens. State law requires that "[a]ny elevator . . . involved in an accident described in subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section shall be removed from service at the time of the accident. The equipment shall not be repaired, altered, or placed back in service until inspected by a certified inspector for the enforcement authority." OCGA § 8-2-106 (c). If it is proven that Montgomery violated OCGA § 8-2-106 (c), then such conduct would constitute a form of spoliation of evidence, because by working on the elevator, the evidence would have been tampered with, altered or destroyed. See Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 220 Ga. App. 539, 542 (469 SE2d 783) (1996) (destruction of electrical parts and other items removed after fire before opponent's opportunity to examine same necessitates remedial action); compare OCGA § 24-4-22. See, e.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering &c. Corp., 982 F2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992) (rebuttable presumption created against party who destroyed boat and space heater may be insufficient to cure prejudice to other side); Northern Assur. Co. v. Ware, 145 FRD 281 (D. Me. 1993) (plaintiff's expert's destruction of physical evidence before its examination by opposing party precluded use of expert's testimony).
Spoliation or destruction of evidence creates the presumption that the evidence would have been harmful to the spoliator. Greer v. Andrew, 138 Ga. 663, 664 (3) (75 SE 1050) (1912); Bennett v. Assoc. Food Stores, 118 Ga. App. 711, 716 (2) (165 SE2d 581) (1968). Proof of such conduct would raise a rebuttable presumption against Montgomery that the evidence favored Lane, a fact rendering summary judgment inappropriate. American Cas. Co. &c. v. Schafer, 204 Ga. App. 906, 909 (3) (420 SE2d 820) (1992).
In this case, Montgomery's service records create material issues of fact as to whether Montgomery obeyed the law. One record shows that elevator #3 experienced a blown fuse in a control circuit several hours after the accident at issue. If the elevator had been removed from service, it is not clear how it could have experienced a blown fuse. Further, the time inscribed on the service ticket for that service call is after the accident, creating the impression this elevator was not removed from service.
Another Montgomery service record dated October 12, three days after the accident and two days before the state inspection, shows that one of Montgomery's elevator mechanics performed routine maintenance on elevators #1 through #3, including the subject elevator. Such maintenance, by the mechanic's own admission, encompassed among other things, greasing, oiling, inspecting motor brushes, generator brushes, contacts on relays and fixing whatever needed repair. Although Blume testified that he did not touch the elevator until after the state inspection, the service record directly contradicts this testimony.
If Georgia law permitted repairs and maintenance to be performed prior to the time of the state inspection, plaintiffs would never be able to show what malfunctioned and caused their injuries. Thus, the fact that Tate, the state inspector, could not identify precisely what caused the misleveling can hardly be surprising in light of the evidence that Montgomery's employee subjected the elevator to maintenance procedures before the state inspection. Whether Montgomery tampered with the evidence must be resolved by a jury.
Also, we find it perplexing that the evidence Montgomery provided is inconsistent as to whether the elevator at issue is #1 or #3. The state inspection report which Montgomery offered from two days before the accident was for elevator #1. However, Montgomery's repair ticket denoted the elevator involved in the accident as elevator #3. Montgomery's repairman, Blume, claimed that despite the fact that the service ticket on which he had described the accident specified the elevator as being #3, it was really #1. According to Montgomery's service record, the state inspector conducted tests on elevator #1 not elevator #3, even though it was elevator #3 which Blume reported as malfunctioning and which was supposedly removed from service after Lane fell. Further, the service records fail to support Montgomery's assertion, as well as Blume's testimony, that Montgomery performed routine maintenance on the elevators approximately once every week. These records raise issues regarding whether Montgomery violated OCGA § 8-2-106 (c) and also whether the state actually inspected the elevator which malfunctioned. The conflict in the evidence is troublesome and cannot be deemed dispositive for summary judgment purposes, regardless of whether spoliation of the evidence occurred.
Notwithstanding the dissent's claim to the contrary, Sparks v. MARTA, 223 Ga. App. 768 (478 SE2d 923) (1996) does not demand a different result. In Sparks, no evidence was presented that the service company tampered with the escalator before the defense expert examined it. OCGA § 8-2-106 (c). Nor was there confusion about which escalator malfunctioned or the applicable service records for the malfunctioning escalator. Here, Montgomery's service records showing the performance of some monthly routine maintenance do not prove that such maintenance was properly performed and that Montgomery complied with the applicable standard of care for elevator servicers.
Considering the inconsistent evidence presented by Montgomery as to whether the elevator at issue was elevator #1 or #3 and in light of the service records showing that the elevator may have been placed back in service, and may have been repaired and altered in violation of state law, we find that summary judgment was inappropriate. Because material issues of disputed fact remain unresolved, we reverse summary judgment. Lau's Corp., 261 Ga. at 491.
2. Lane contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without unsealing and by apparently failing to consider certain depositions. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires a consideration of the entire record by the trial court. Where the record shows that a deposition was not considered below, it may be considered on appellate review to determine the existence of genuine issues of disputed material fact. Taylor v. Schander, 207 Ga. App. 627, 628 (2) (428 SE2d 806) (1993). The testimony of Blume, Lane, and Pate demonstrates the existence of material issues of disputed fact as determined in Division 1.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
McMurray, P. J., Pope, P. J, Johnson, Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ, concur. Andrews, C. J, Birdsong, P J., and Beasley, J., dissent.
Montgomery's evidence is inconsistent as to whether the elevator involved in the accident was elevator #1 or elevator #3. For example, Blume, Montgomery's elevator mechanic, testified that although he denoted the malfunctioning elevator as elevator #3 on the repair ticket, it was really elevator #1. It is not clear whether he or others confused the numbering on other occasions. At Pate's deposition, Montgomery's counsel asked Pate to assume the elevator at issue was staff elevator #1.
Despite the inconsistent numbering of the elevators, the misleveling elevator at issue here and the elevator repaired on the same day were both designated as elevator #3 in Montgomery's service records.