Case Name: JOSEPH V. DiTROLIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LEONARD ANTILES, PETER BOORJIAN, DOMENIC FALCONE, OLEH BACHYNSKY, AND THE MONTCLAIR UROLOGICAL GROUP, P.A., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1994-09-27
Citations: 276 N.J. Super. 234
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOSEPH V. DiTROLIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LEONARD ANTILES, PETER BOORJIAN, DOMENIC FALCONE, OLEH BACHYNSKY, AND THE MONTCLAIR UROLOGICAL GROUP, P.A., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 276
Pages: 234–269

Head Matter:
647 A.2d 1318
JOSEPH V. DiTROLIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LEONARD ANTILES, PETER BOORJIAN, DOMENIC FALCONE, OLEH BACHYNSKY, AND THE MONTCLAIR UROLOGICAL GROUP, P.A., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued November 30, 1993
Decided September 27, 1994.
Before Judges MICHELS, SKILLMAN and KESTIN.
Frank R. Ciesla argued the cause for appellant (Giordano, Hallemn & Ciesla, attorneys, Mr. Ciesla and John F. Varley, III, of counsel and on the brief).
Glenn A Clark argued the cause for respondents Antiles, Boorjian, Falcone, and Bachynsky (Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hy-land and Perretti attorneys, Edward A. Zunz Jr. and Mr. Clark, of counsel, Mr. Zunz, Mr. Clark and Debra H. Azarian, on the brief).
David P. Weeks argued the cause for respondent Montclair Urological Group (MacKenzie, Welt, Maher, North & Weeks, attorneys, Mr. Weeks, of counsel, Jonathan W. Philipp, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KESTIN, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the trial court on entire controversy grounds, R. 4:30A, by reason of his failure to have joined the defendants as parties in an earlier lawsuit. The trial court also based its dismissal on plaintiffs failure to comply with R. 4:5 — 1(b)(2). Other grounds for dismissing plaintiffs suit raised in defendants' motion for summary judgment were not addressed by the trial court.
In 1984, plaintiff was admitted to the medical staff of Mountainside Hospital (Hospital) as a provisional staff member in the Department of Urology (Department), ie., subject to supervision and observation by active staff members. The Hospital's bylaws provided that such an appointment was for a two-year term, whereupon the individual could either be promoted to the position of active staff member in the rank of associate attending physician, with no supervision, or reappointed for a single additional term as a provisional staff member with supervision. In due course, in 1986, plaintiff applied for appointment as an active staff member.
At that time, the individual defendants in this action comprised both the Department and its Credentials Committee. Three of them, defendants Antiles, Boorjian and Falcone, practiced together as shareholders of defendant Montclair Urological Group (Group). Defendant Bachynsky practiced at the same address, but not as a member of the Group.
When plaintiffs 1986 application for appointment to the active staff came before the Hospital's Staff Membership and Credentials Committee (M & C Committee), the Department recom mended against appointment as an active staff member and for continued appointment as a provisional staff member under supervision and observation. In their review of plaintiffs record, the members of the Department determined "that Dr. DiTrolio has not done a sufficient number of cases to have supervision and observation removed. Therefore, he is not eligible to be promoted to Associate Attending." The Department, however, also recommended that plaintiff be permitted to perform four specified procedures without supervision or observation. The M & C Committee accepted these recommendations.
The following year, on August 20, 1987, plaintiff once again requested promotion from provisional to associate attending status; and, once again, the Department recommended against the promotion, citing seven cases that "typified Dr. DiTrolio's inability to perform up to the standards of the Mountainside Urology Department." The M & C Committee, of which defendant Antiles was a member, on February 16, 1988, accepted the Department's recommendation that plaintiff "not be reappointed to the [Hospital] medical staff because of his inability to maintain adequacy of medical care in the [Department]." The committee further recommended that plaintiff "however continue with his current privileges until due process is completed."
In a letter dated February 17,1988, plaintiffs attorney requested a hearing pursuant to the Hospital's bylaws regarding plaintiffs "application for promotion to associate attending status . and removal of all departmental observation and supervision," asserting "that the Membership and Credentials Committee has failed to submit to the Medical Board a recommendation regarding Dr. DiTrolio's application for promotion from provisional to associate attending status." Based on this request, an ad hoe committee of the Hospital's medical staff (Ad Hoc Committee) was constituted. It conducted hearings on nine days between May 18 and July 5, 1988, focusing
primarily on seven eases presented by the Membership and Credentials Committee to support its recommendation. However, extensive material was also presented, and considered by the Committee, relating to the supervision of Dr. DiTrolio since his admission to the Staff, as well as the functioning of the Department of Urology and the review process carried out by the Membership and Credentials Committee.
The Ad Hoc Committee found that the care provided by plaintiff in the seven reviewed cases "was generally acceptable and does not justify a recommendation for non-reappointment." This Committee also determined, because plaintiff had not had an opportunity to demonstrate competence at the Hospital in three areas of complex urological surgery, that before unsupervised surgical privileges be granted with respect to radical nephrectomy, open ureteral procedures, and total cystectomy, plaintiff
present evidence, such as two or three cases in each category, done at another hospital for review of adequacy by an Ad Hoc Committee. This Committee should include at least one urological consultant from another hospital. In the event that this material is not available, an outside urologist should be hired by the hospital to supervise these cases done at Mountainside Hospital. This consultant should report directly to the Medical Staff President.
In its review of the seven cases presented, the Ad Hoc Committee heard medical testimony on behalf of the M & C Committee from the four individual defendants. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf and also presented the testimony of Drs. Selwyn Freed and Joseph J. Seebode. The Ad Hoe Committee summarized its review of each of the seven cases and concluded, with respect to all, that plaintiff's overall management of the cases had been acceptable.
The Ad Hoc Committee also stated some concerns about "the procedures followed by the Department of Urology and the Membership and Credentials Committee in this case," but noted that "the [Ad Hoc] Committee cannot conclude that there was intentional wrongdoing." The specific concerns were:
1. Department of Urology meetings were held in the Chairman's office, rather than in the hospital. Because departmental meetings are official hospital business, they should be conducted on the hospital premises.
2. Assigning supervision has apparently been at the sole discretion of the Chairman. A specific procedure for assigning supervision should be included in the Department rules, and all active members of the Department should be included to provide broadened assessment of competence.
3. The Committee is concerned that Dr. DiTrolio was not adequately informed and properly counseled at the time criticisms of his work apparently arose. It is extremely important that if alleged deficiencies exist, they be discussed openly and constructively with the physician under supervision at the time they occur, not only in fairness to the physician, but in order to maintain and improve patient care in an ongoing basis.
4. The Committee is concerned that specific criteria for advancing a physician from the Provisional Staff or removing supervision and observation do not exist. Each Department should establish such criteria, which should be included in Department Rules and Regulations and which should include a reasonable number of cases, by category, to be reviewed, particularly in departments doing technical procedures. The total period of supervision and observation should not be inordinately long and generally should be completed well before initial application for promotion to the active Staff.
5. Supervision should only be reinstituted in accordance with the due process in our By-laws.
6. To foster professional and administrative vitality within each department, directors should not serve more than two consecutive 2-year terms during any 8-year period.
7. To promote impartiality, the Membership and Credentials Committee should not consist of Department Directors. The Chairman should be an At-Large member of the Medical Board and other members appointed by the President of the Medical Staff or elected by the Medical Staff as a whole.
8. The Committee is concerned about the process which was followed in the Membership and Credentials Committee. Since serious criticism of a physician could affect his or her hospital privileges, it is imperative that the basis of that criticism be meticulously explored. Written procedures for this process should be established, which should include a factfinding committee which would be empowered to perform a complete investigation and make recommendations to the full Committee.
9. The hearing process in our By-laws should be reviewed and revised.
10. A member's file should be available to him.
The Hospital's Medical Board then reviewed the matter based upon the reports of the M & C Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as statements from plaintiff, defendant Antiles, and a Dr. Holtz. The Medical Board concluded that plaintiff "should be appointed as an Associate Attending at Mountainside Hospital." It differed with the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee in respect of the seven cases that had been reviewed, however, determining
that in two cases . Dr. DiTrolio deviated from the standard of good urological treatment and that the remaining five cases were not clear deviations from accepted urological standards. It was further felt by the Medical Board that these two cases over a period of four years do not represent sufficient deviation from good standard of care to justify non-appointment to the Active Staff____
The Medical Board concluded further:
Since Dr. DiTrolio has not done any major intra-abdominal or retroperitoneal cases during the four years of his staff appointment at Mountainside Hospital, he should be supervised on each of these major cases as he does them in the near future. Provided they are properly managed, three cases each of trans-abdominal renal surgery, ureteral surgery and bladder surgery should be adequate for evaluation of Dr. DiTrolio's abilities in such cases.
The supervision of Dr. DiTrolio for trans-abdominal renal surgery, ureteral surgery and bladder surgery should be performed by a member of the Mountainside Hospital Department of Urology.
Dr. DiTrolio shall be permitted to do all other urological procedures without supervision.
It is important to provide supervision within the department in this manner so that there is a continuum of responsibility within the Department of Urology at Mountainside Hospital. Quality assurance is a function of the department in which. a physician works. Dr. DiTrolio must be brought into the department as a responsible and responsive member so that the Department of Urology can continue to be a strong, viable specialty at Mountainside Hospital.
Plaintiff then, pursuant to the Hospital's bylaws, requested "appellate review by the [Hospital's] Board of Trustees" of the Medical Board's decision that the continuing supervision of plaintiffs performance in the specified procedures be performed by the .Department of Urology. The Board of Trustees appointed an Appellate Review Committee which reported on February 2,1989.
The Appellate Review Committee rejected as inadequate or immaterial some new evidence proffered on behalf of the M & C Committee focusing on a factual element of one of the seven review cases, as well as some allegations raised by plaintiff "that certain individuals on the Medical Staff attempted to bring pressure on . a member of [the Appellate Review] Committee." The Appellate Review Committee saw itself as confronted with "two substantive issues . 1) Whether it should accept the finding of the Ad Hoc Hearing Committee and the Medical Board that Dr. DiTrolio be appointed as an Associate Attending; and 2) what terms of supervision, if any, should be imposed on Dr. DiTrolio if he is reappointed." As to the first issue, the committee concluded that plaintiff "should be reappointed to the Medical Staff with the rank of Associate Attending in the Department of Urology."
With respect to the second issue, the Appellate Review Committee, notwithstanding its awareness of periodic disagreements between plaintiff and his supervisors within the Department, recognized, as had the Medical Board, "the benefits to the patients that have resulted from the supervision provided by the members of the Department." The Committee went on to note that
the Department of Urology is responsible, in the first instance, for reviewing the quality of care of its members and for making recommendations to the Board of Trustees, through the appropriate Medical Staff committees, concerning the privileges and rank of its members. While it is true that there have been some conflicts between Dr. DiTrolio and his supervisors, the Committee expects that both Dr. DiTrolio and the Department members who act as supervisors will act professionally and responsibly to assure the quality of patient care in the Hospital. The Committee expects that supervision of Dr. DiTrolio can and will be carried out in the future appropriately in accordance with the regular procedures of the Department and the Rules and Regulations of the Medical staff.
The Appellate Review Committee concluded in this connection that
[supervision for Dr. DiTrolio should be continued for the following classes of cases: a) trans-abdominal renal surgery, b) ureteral surgery, and c) bladder surgery. Supervision should be provided by the Department of Urology in accordance with the regular procedures of the Department and the Rules and Regulations of the Medical Staff. Such supervision should include observation, as that term is defined in the Medical Staff By-laws.
Supervision for three cases in each class should be adequate for evaluation. Dr. DiTrolio should be permitted to do all other urological procedures without supervision.
On February 13,1989, the Board of Trustees adopted the findings and conclusions of its Appellate Review Committee.
Plaintiff then filed suit against the Hospital and its Board of Trustees in the Chancery Division alleging the foregoing facts and seeking purely equitable relief. New personal references to any of the defendants in this action are to be found in the first complaint. That complaint sought a review of the Hospital's procedures as they had been applied to plaintiff and an order embodying the essential terms of the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations concerning continuing supervision in the three classes of cases at issue. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that he had been subjected to an unfair procedure; that he had been denied his "right to due process under the Bylaws and New Jersey case law"; and that the basis of the Medical Board's decision was inadequate, rendering its "actions, findings and recommendations . arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious."
After almost a year, during which depositions were taken of the four individual defendants in this action, plaintiff agreed to dismiss the then pending action without prejudice; and also agreed not to institute any new action against the Hospital and its Board of Trustees based upon the foregoing allegations or any conduct of those defendants preceding February 8, 1989. The stipulation of settlement also contained the following provisions:
The plaintiff, by entering into this Stipulation of Settlement and by having this action dismissed without prejudice, in no way is limited in pursuing an action(s) against any individuales) or entity(ies) other than the defendants in this action nor shall the Stipulation of Settlement or Dismissal Without Prejudice constitute collateral estoppel.
The filing of the Dismissal Vyithout Prejudice and this Stipulation shall in no way affect the plaintiffs rights with respect to future applications for full privileges without supervision at the Mountainside Hospital in Montclair.
Within days after the effective date of the stipulation of settlement, plaintiff filed this suit against the four individuals who comprised the Hospital's Department of Urology at the time of the acts complained of, as well as the professional association of which three of them were members. The allegations in the second complaint focus entirely on the conduct of the individuals named as defendants. With attendant factual detail, plaintiff alleges intentional and malicious interference by defendants with plaintiffs business and professional relationships with the Hospital and its personnel; their bad faith in abusing the authority vested in them as the only members of the Hospital's Urology Department and its Credentials Committee; defendant's abuse of Hospital and committee procedures and improper use. of influence with various Hospital entities and staff persons; their unreasonable interference in plaintiffs relationships with his patients; their misrepresentation to Hospital bodies and others of facts and conclusions concerning the adequacy of plaintiffs performance in the Hospital; and their intentional and malicious interference with plaintiffs business and professional relationships with other hospitals and professional boards. The causes of action fall within four categories: interference with business and professional relationships, and with prospective economic advantage; defamation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and conspiracy to monopolize the practice of urology at the Hospital.
The gravamen of this complaint bears only indirectly upon the results reached by the various Hospital bodies; rather, the focus is instead upon the improper conduct of the defendants in conveying false or misleading information to influence the attitudes of others so as to prevent plaintiffs reappointment to the Hospital staff and other positions, and with the malicious intent "to improve their competitive position against the plaintiff in the practice of Urology at the Hospital." Plaintiff seeks money damages, compensatory and punitive, for injuries to his reputation and his economic well-being and for emotional distress.
In dismissing this complaint, the trial court held that plaintiff had been obliged to amend his previous complaint when, two months after it was filed, the Supreme Court in Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989), expanded the application of the entire controversy doctrine. Plaintiff does not appeal from the "retroactive" application of Cogdell, see Reno Auto Sales, Inc. v. Prospect Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 N.J.Super. 624, 581 A.2d 109 (App.Div.1990), but, instead, raises the issue whether the rule enunciated in Cogdell applies at all in the facts of this case.
The currently prevailing standard defining the entire controversy doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in Cogdell, represents an expansion of the doctrine as previously understood. Formerly, "the . doctrine had applied only to bar later litigation of claims between those already parties to an action," Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:30A (1994), or, at furthest reach, to "bar an independent action against a party whose interest in that action was the same as that in a pending action but who had not been joined in the pending action." Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 14, 560 A.2d 1169 (citing Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 476 A.2d 250 (1984)). In Cogdell, the Court took the step presaged in Crispin, when it addressed the question "whether the failure to join such a party in an action, once that action has been concluded, can serve to bar a subsequent litigation against that party involving the same legal controversy." Supra, 116 N.J. at 15, 560 A.2d 1169. The Court declared
We thus conclude that the entire controversy doctrine appropriately encompasses the mandatory joinder of parties. Accordingly, we now hold that to the extent possible courts must determine an entire controversy in a single judicial proceeding and that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims between the parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material interest in the controversy.
[Id. at 26, 560 A.2d 1169.]
The Court also observed that this "mandatory joinder rule . is not unbounded," id. at 27, 560 A.2d 1169, echoing its dictum in Crispin, supra, 96 N.J. at 354-55, 476 A.2d 250, that "[t]he entire controversy doctrine does not demand monolithic adjudications" where the policy reasons for its articulation are not well served by requiring joinder of claims or parties.
We are here confronted by the need to apply the considerations governing the application of the two-pronged rule of Cogdell. Since that decision was announced, some nineteen reported cases on the trial and appellate levels have dealt with the expanded entire controversy doctrine and related issues. Some have involved joinder of claims between identical parties; others have encompassed party joinder. In seven of these cases, the doctrine has been seen as precluding a subsequent suit. See Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran and Ciesla, 274 N.J.Super. 405, 644 A.2d 626 (App.Div.1994); Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J.Super. 458, 637 A.2d 546 (App.Div.1994); Busch v. Biggs, 264 N.J.Super. 385, 624 A.2d 1017 (App.Div.1993); Burrell v. Quaranta, 259 N.J.Super. 243, 612 A.2d 379 (App.Div.1992); Union City Assocs. v. City of Union City, 247 N.J.Super. 249, 588 A.2d 1279 (App.Div.1991); Gross v. Cohen DuFour & Assocs., 273 N.J.Super. 617, 642 A.2d 1074 (Law Div.1993); Mortgageling Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 262 N.J.Super. 178, 620 A.2d 456 (Law Div.1992). In twelve cases, a subsequent suit has been seen as permissible, notwithstanding the operation of the doctrine and related principles. See Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 591 A.2d 592 (1991); Liebeskind v. Mayor of Bayonne, 265 N.J.Super. 389, 627 A.2d 677 (App.Div.1993); Schechter v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 264 N.J.Super. 299, 624 A.2d 625 (App.Div.1993); Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 257 N.J.Super. 6, 607 A.2d 1314 (App.Div. 1992); Ric-Cic Co. v. Bassinder, 252 N.J.Super. 334, 599 A.2d 943 (App.Div.1991); La Mar-Gate, Inc. v. Spitz, 252 N.J.Super. 303, 599 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1991); Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J.Super. 256, 597 A.2d 1101 (App.Div.1991); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 113, 597 A.2d 543 (App.Div.1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 375 (1992); Milone v. Nissan Motor Corp., 250 N.J.Super. 371, 594 A.2d 642 (App.Div.1991); Reno Auto Sales, Inc. v. Prospect Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra, 243 N.J.Super. 624, 581 A.2d 109; Lickfield v. Lickfield, 260 N.J.Super. 21, 614 A.2d 1365 (Ch.Div.1992); Kimmins Abatement Corp. v. Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., Inc., 253 N.J.Super. 162, 601 A.2d 256 (Law Div.1991).
The common perception running through all of these cases, as well as Cogdell itself, is that the entire controversy doctrine is not to be applied automatically to preclude a subsequent suit simply because claims between identical parties not pleaded in an earlier action were raised in a subsequent suit or because the defendants in the later suit had some interest in the issues raised in the prior action. Rather, in common with other discretionary standards, a particularized evaluation is required to determine whether the policies sought to be fostered by the doctrine require its application as a preclusive principle when balanced against a litigant's right to tailor separate causes of action in ways that do not impose substantial unfairness upon other parties, unreason ably fragment litigation, or negate the fair demands of judicial economy or efficiency. See Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 22-24, 560 A.2d 1169. This is evident from the fact that the Supreme Court framed the question addressed in Cogdell in terms of the quality of the defendants' interests in the earlier litigation and whether the second suit was effectively part of "the same legal controversy." Id. at 15, 560 A.2d at 1171.
In Cogdell itself, the plaintiffs, having lost their medical malpractice suit against two physicians, filed a new claim against other members of the operating team, several administrators of the hospital in which the alleged malpractice occurred, and the hospital itself. Both the damage remedy sought in the second action and the injury upon which it was based were the same as in the first suit and the conduct pleaded as the basis of the tort alleged was part of the very same scenario as that depicted .in the .first suit, albeit with a focus on different tortfeasors.
Here, on the other hand, the remedies sought in the two lawsuits were very different. The relief pursued in the first action was by way of vindicating plaintiffs rights concerning the adequacy of the Hospital's procedures for passing upon applications for staff positions as those procedures were applied to him. See Guerrero v. Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976); Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 212 N.J.Super. 83, 514 A.2d 53 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 32, 526 A.2d 126 (1986). Inescapably, the clash between the parties had subcurrents of personal interest and economics, but it occurred within an institutional mainstream, embodying professional status and health care quality concerns as its primary elements. The second suit is a matter of personal vindication only. Plaintiff seeks damages in tort and related causes of action against particular persons involved in the process by reason of their individual and collective conduct and motivations attributable to them. Fault, especially in the tort sense, i.e., breaches of duties owing between individuals, was not at issue in the first suit. The focus in the first action was plaintiffs status. The issues bore upon the Hospital's procedures, on the relationship between committees and other bodies functioning under the Hospital's aegis in the decision-making process, and on the integrity of the result reached. Unlike the second suit, it did not seek recompense for injuries to person or property; and the specifics of conduct attributable to particular individuals or their motivations had limited bearing.
In Cogdell terms, therefore, neither the controversies nor the interests of the parties defendant in the respective suits were the same, even though both actions stemmed from related facts. The soundness of the procedures leading to the decision on plaintiffs application for staff membership, or that of the decision itself, was a very different issue from whether the conduct of some of the individuals involved was malicious and self-serving as alleged by plaintiff. If plaintiff had been accepted into staff membership with no supervision, as he sought, the predicate for his cause of action against these defendants would still have existed, notwithstanding a likely limitation on the damages that could be claimed; nor would a denial of staff membership by sustainable procedures have had a necessarily validating or invalidating effect on his tort action. Given the non-eongruent legal relationship between the causes of action in the respective suits, it cannot be said that participation in the first suit by defendants "would have resulted in a fuller and fairer presentation of the relevant evidence and would have enabled [a finder of fact] to make a more informed and complete determination of liability." Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 25, 560 A.2d 1169. The relevant proofs in the two cases would have been too different for such a conclusion to be drawn. Given the nature of the respective proceedings, we cannot conclude that joinder "would have assured an ultimate determination [of either set of claims] that would be [more] comprehensive, just and conclusive as to all persons implicated in the controversy," ibid., than would have occurred without joinder. Ineluctably, two separate controversies existed, not one with two facets.
As regards the second policy upon which Cogdell is grounded, party fairness, there can be no basis for concluding here, as the Supreme Court did in Cogdell, that "[t]hese defendants may well have concluded by the termination of the prior action that they were no longer targets." Ibid. As is evident from the statement of Francis A. Wood, M.D., to the Appellate Review Committee on January 10, 1989, while the Hospital's internal processes were in progress and months before the first suit was filed, plaintiff had made no secret of his intention to proceed individually in damages against the defendants. Thus, when defendants were deposed in the first action, they had ample notice and opportunity to protect their personal interests. Nor is this a situation, as in Cogdell, where individuals who might have jointly participated in the events leading to an alleged injury have lost the "opportunity to persuade a jury that will be determining their liability that the former defendants are to be blamed." Ibid. The causes of action pleaded by plaintiff against the respective defendants had no essential legal relationship, only a factual one.
Finally, in the Cogdell policy sense, it cannot be said that this action "though technically separate .and independent, is in truth not much more than a re-run of the earlier suit," id. at 26, 560 A.2d 1169, thereby causing a wasteful or inefficient use of judicial resources. To be sure, because both causes of action stem from the same factual scenario, some elements of proof will be the same in this ease as would have occurred in the prior action had it proceeded to trial; but the rule of Cogdell was not meant to suggest that all causes of action arising from a common fact situation are necessarily tied together in the legal sense into a single controversy. The existence of common fact bases is only one factor of several that determines whether a single controversy exists; and the needs of judicial economy and efficiency cannot be used to stretch the concept beyond the point that fairness requires. Cf. Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., supra, 124 N.J. 398, 591 A.2d 592. It is also logical, as Judge SWllman suggests in his concurring opinion, that considerations of efficiency and economy alone should weigh differently in a situation such as this, where a settlement of the first suit was effected within a year, than they would if that action had proceeded through trial on the merits to a conclusion by the entry of judgment.
It is clear from both the terms and tone of Cogdell that not every plaintiff who has claims against multiple defendants arising from a common fact situation is required to assert those claims in a single lawsuit. In order for the right to assert claims to be transmuted into a requirement that they be asserted simultaneously, an unavoidably contingent relationship between the separate causes of action must exist to the extent, either, that a full and just result cannot be achieved in one suit without simultaneous consideration of the issues raised in the other, or the demands of fairness in consideration of all parties requires that the matters be addressed together, or the needs of judicial economy in avoiding truly duplicative efforts dictate such a result. The test to be applied goes beyond a shared involvement in the underlying facts to require an objectively ascertainable practical commonality between the legal issues as well.
We conclude, therefore, that the complaint in this matter embodies a different controversy than that which was previously dismissed without prejudice and with an express reservation of rights concerning other potential defendants. The policy considerations that inform R. 4:30A as elucidated in Cogdell furnish no reasons strongly militating in favor of applying the preclusive effect of the entire controversy doctrine to this plaintiff in the circumstances presented.
We reach a similar conclusion concerning the trial court's alternative ground of dismissal pursuant to R. 4:5 — 1(b)(2):
Each party shall include with the first pleading a certification as to whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, or whether any other action or proceeding is contemplated; and, if so, the certification shall identify such actions and all parties thereto. Further, each party shall disclose in the certification the names of any other party who should be joined in the action. Each party shall have a continuing obligation during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in the original certification, (emphasis added by trial court).
Although dismissal is an appropriate sanction for failure to comply with the rule, Tall Timbers Property Owners Ass'n v. Tall Timbers, Inc., 217 N.J.Super. 119, 122, 524 A.2d 1315 (App.Div.1987), distinguished in Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, supra, 116 N.J. at 27, 560 A.2d 1169, that sanction should not be applied automatically without full • consideration of the dynamics of the individual case. The purpose of the rule is "to implement the philosophy of the entire controversy doctrine in respect of successive litigation involving an overlap, albeit not a congruent overlap, of parties," Tall Timbers, supra, 217 N.J.Super. at 124, 524 A.2d 1315, and "to provide notice to all parties in each action that there are other actions pending involving the same controversy," Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 4:5-1 (1994), so that such other parties may "take whatever . steps may be appropriate to protect their respective interests." Ibid.
Where the entire controversy doctrine does not apply to bar a second cause of action, and where the notice purpose of R. 4:5-1(b)(2) is unnecessary because, as here, defendants were or ought to have been fully aware that plaintiff intended filing suit against them and do not contend that they were unaware of the terms of the settlement of the prior action as they were developing, the violation of the rule is only technical and imposition of a dismissal sanction is inappropriate. We do not, of course, address other grounds for dismissal raised by defendants which the trial court did not consider.
Reversed and remanded.
We do not regard Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., supra, 212 N.J.Super. 83, 514 A.2d 53 and Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 87 N.J.Super. 486, 210 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1965), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 47 N.J. 92, 219 A.2d 505 (1966), as bearing upon the resolution of this issue, as does Judge Michels in his dissenting opinion. The decisional principle in Zoneraich was collateral estoppel. In Falcone, an entire controversy-claim joinder case, the plaintiff had failed in his first lawsuit, to assert all related claims against the named defendants and sought to litigate those remaining claims in a second lawsuit against the same defendants. Aside from these considerations, we regard pre-Cogdell cases to be of little value in applying the policies driving newer concepts of mandatory party joinder, a doctrinal variation which has not yet seen substantial development. For this reason, and because every significant difference in case dynamic may command a different result in entire controversy terms, we do not rely on Gareeb v. Weinstein, 161 N.J.Super. 1, 390 A.2d 706 (App.Div.1978), which Judge Michels has seen fit to distinguish.