Case Name: Weber versus Reinhard and Eisenhard, Supervisors, &c.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1873-03-24
Citations: 73 Pa. 370
Docket Number: 
Parties: Weber versus Reinhard and Eisenhard, Supervisors, &c.
Judges: Before Read, C. J., A&new, Sharswood, Williams and Mercur, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 73
Pages: 370–378

Head Matter:
Weber versus Reinhard and Eisenhard, Supervisors, &c.
1. An act (April 14th 1868) provided that in addition to taxes then collectible, owners of ore-beds in Saucon township should pay to the supervisors 1J cents for every ton of ore mined and carried away with teams over the roads in the township, to be paid at the end of each six months and in default of payment to be collected as debts of like amount. Held, that the act is constitutional.
2. The court cannot pronounce a tax unconstitutional on the mere ground of injustice and inequality.
3. The owner of the land had leased it for a term of years: Held, that he and not the lessee was liable for the tax.
4. Durach’s Appeal, 12 P. F. Smith 491; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 15 P. Smith 146; Washington Avenue, 19 P. F. Smith 352, followed.
March — 1878.
Before Read, C. J., A&new, Sharswood, Williams and Mercur, JJ.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh county: No. 71, to July Term 1871.
This case was commenced March 5th 1870, before a justice of the peace, at the suit of James Reinhard and Benjamin Eisenhard, supervisors of Upper Saucon township, against Charles B. Weber, for the recovery of taxes imposed by the Act of April 14th 1868 (Pamph L. 1127).
The act provides: “ That in addition to the taxes collectible under existing laws, the owner or owners of ore-beds, situated in Upper Saucon township, Lehigh county, shall from and after the passage of this act, pay to the supervisors of the roads in said township one and a half cent for each and every ton of ore mined and carried away with teams over the public road,in said township, which said payments shall be made at the end of every six months after the passage of this act; and in default of payment the same to be collected as debts of like amount are collectible by law; Provided, That the said supervisors shall appropriate to the same purpose, and render an account in the same manner for the funds coming in their hands under this act, as they are required by law with respect to other funds coming to their hands by virtue of their office.”
The plaintiff’s claim was for iron-ore carted from the ore-beds .of defendant over the 'public roads in said township, to wit: $37.02 for ore so removed up to October 14th 1868, arid $38.08 for the same from October 14th 1868 to October 14th 1869, with interest, together amounting to $78.82. The justice entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $78.82, and the defendant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas.
The plaintiffs then filed an affidavit of claim, referring to the above-given Act of Assembly and averring that “the defendant is the owner of an ore-bed situated in said township; that since the passage of said act there has been mined and carried away with teams over the public roads in said township, from the ore-bed of said defendant, the following quantities of iron ore during the times following, to wit: From April 14th 1868, to October 14th 1868, inclusive, 2468 tons 13 cwt.; from October 14th 1868 to October 14th 1869, inclusive, 2539 tons 13 cwt.;, that the tax on the first-mentioned quantity (2468 tons 13 cwt.) at 1§- cents per ton, is $37.02, and upon the last-mentioned quantity (2539 tons 13 cwt.) is $38.08 ; that the tax due as aforesaid, after the same became due and before the bringing of this suit, was duly demanded by said plaintiff of said defendant, but that the said defendant has neglected and refused to pay the same or any part thereof; that the sums aforesaid, with interest from the time when they respectively became due as aforesaid, to date (May 14th 1870), to wit, seventy-nine eighty-five hundredth dollars (79.85), is now due and owing in manner aforesaid by said defendant to said plaintiff.”
The defendants put in the following affidavit of defence: * * *
“ An act was passed by the legislature of Pennsylvania, and approved April 14th 1868, entitled ‘ An act authorizing the supervisors of Upper Saueon township, Lehigh county, to collect an additional road tax on ore beds,’ enacting that the owners of ore beds in said township shall pay to the supervisors therein one and a half cent, for each and every tone of ore mined and carried away with teams over the public roads in said township. Said defendant is the owner of an iron ore-bed in said Upper Saueon township, which he has let to the Bethlehem Iron Company by article of agreement dated August 18th, A. D. 1864, and said ore-bed has been ever since and is now, worked by said company, under said lease or article of agreement; said iron company mine and cart away all the ore raised from the ore-bed on said farm, and the said defendant does not mine or cart away any of the ore, nor does he keep or own any teams or wagons or horses for the purpose of carting ore from said ore-beds. The farm owned by said defendant in which said ore-bed is situated, and said ore-bed are already separately assessed and taxed as follows: Said farm is valued for the purpose of taxation at §4825, and said ore-bed at §3000. The taxes due and to be paid are as follows: Road tax on farm §19.30, on ore-bed §12; school tax on farm §14.47, on ore-bed §9; county tax on farm §24.12, on ore-bed §15. According to the terms of said agreement with the said The Bethlehem Iron Company, said defendant has no control whatever over said ore-bed, but the same has been leased to the said iron company for a period of twenty years, and the term of said lease has not yet expired; that at and before the time of bringing of this suit, said ore-bed was and is now under the sole control, management and ownership of the said Bethlehem Iron Company, who dig, mine and cart away all the ore that is taken away therefrom.
“ And further, said Act of Assembly, by virtue of which said tax is assessed, is null and void, because it is in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Pennsylvania.”
The court (Longaker, P. J.) directed judgment to be entered against the defendants, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence, for the amount of the plaintiffs’ claim with costs.
This was assigned for error by the defendant on the removal of ;he record to the Supreme Court by writ of error.
P. J. More and Woodward, for plaintiff in error. —
This imposition is an excise rather than a tax. There is no provision for assessment, and no provision for appeal from an assessment however arbitrary. If an excise, it cannot be enforced; if a tax it is so unequal and unjust, and its mode of enforcement so uncertain the courts will refuse to carry it out: Philadelphia Association v. Wood, 3 Wright 73; Durach’s Appeal, 12 P. F. Smith 491.
P. Albright, for defendants in error.
In taxing, things may be classified, and if the tax is on all of a class it may be composed of one or many : Durach’s Appeal, supra. He cited also Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris 147 ; Speer v. School Directors, 14 Wright 150; Pittsburg and C. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 16 P. F. Smith 73.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered, March 24th 1873, by
Sharswood, J.
Hammett v. Philadelphia, 15 P. F. Smith 146, was twice argued, each time before a full bench, and was a well-considered case. The principle of it has since been reaffirmed in Washington Avenue, 19 P. F. Smith 352. It did not question the constitutional right of the legislature to confer upon muni-cipal corporations the power of taxing properties benefited by local improvements for the cost of making or maintaining them, but placed upon it the just and salutary restriction that it should be limited to the special benefits conferred by the improvements, and not extend beyond them; that the legislature could not authorize a tax to be levied on particular property in a designated locality for a general purpose, to which the whole community ought equally to contribute. Such a tax was in effect only a mode of taking private property for public use without making compensation. An examination of the facts will evince that the judgments in those cases have this extent — no more. The opinion in Hammett's case had been published immediately after the first argument, though not reported until after the second. It was cited, and was the main reliance of the appellant in Durach's Appeal, 12 P. F. Smith 491, which settled, however, the principle which seems to us to be decisive of the main question raised on this record, to wit, the constitutionality of the tax imposed upon the owners of ore-beds in Upper Saucon township, Lehigh county, by the Act of Assembly of April 14th 1868 (Pamph. L. 1127). It was there held that while the legislature cannot, under the name of taxation, take private property for public use without compensation, and that therefore a special tax on individuals or particular properties would be unconstitutional, yet in the exercise of the power of taxation, persons and things may be legitimately classified — some kinds may be assessed and others not — and that even special exemptions are not unconstitutional. , There is n'o provision in the Constitution that taxation shall be equal. Sound policy requires that it should be so as far as possible. But perfect equality is not possible. Indeed, if this were necessary there could be no taxation, except such as would include every person and every thing, which would manifestly be impracticable and unjust.
It is gravely contended, however, that this court has the power to set aside unjust, unequal and improper legislation relating to taxation, and Philadelphia Association v. Wood, 3 Wright 73, is relied on as establishing this position. There are many things contained in the opinion in that case entirely aside from the point decided, and therefore mere obiter dieta. All that was determined was that an Act of Assembly which required all agencies for foreign insurance, trust and annuity companies in the city of Philadelphia to pay two per cent, of their gross premiums to an association for the relief of disabled firemen, was not taxation at all; it was taking the property of A. and giving it to B., whether for a charitable or any other mere private purpose it mattered not. No doubt after money raised by taxation has reached the public treasury it may be appropriated by the legislature to charities or individuals. It was admitted, indeed, that the tax in that case would be clearly constitutional, if it had been levied for and paid into the public treasury, and the idea that the court could pronounce a tax unconstitutional on the mere ground of injustice or inequality was expressly repudiated.
It has been urged, however, grounded upon an opinion expressed by Chief Justice Lowrio, in the case last cited, that it is not competent for the legislature to provide for the collection of taxes by action in the courts ; that it would turn the courts into tax collectors. But all personal actions are processes for the collection of money, and the courts are no more collectors of taxes in the one case than they are collectors of private claims in the other. It is the sheriff who is the collector when it is adjudged that the tax or debt is due, and surely there is nothing incongruous in that. He is the best and most efficient of all collectors, and never objects to the performance of that function, for he is well paid for it. All that the courts are required to do is to decide w'hether the debt or tax is payable by the defendant, and what the amount of it is. That is a purely judicial transaction. This mode of enforcing the payment of taxes may be unusual, but what provision of the Bill of Rights or of the constitution of government does it infringe? As well might it be maintained that fines, forfeitures and penalties could not thus be enforced, and of examples of these the statute-book is full. So municipal liens for taxes and assessments have been collected by actions of scire facias in the courts, and no one has ever thought that it wras unconstitutional. No doubt the legislature might provide a summary process in all cases of public claims. But what right has the citizen to complain if instead of this he is secured a trial by jury to ascertain his liability before he can be compelled to pay ? He would have better ground to complain if it had been denied to him.
It is also maintained, and in this contention it must be admitted that there is much plausibility, that there are difficulties in carrying this Act of Assembly into execution, by reason of the want of any provision for the ascertainment and assessment of the amount payable by each owner of an ore-bed. It would have been better if the legislature had provided that the owner should make a return of the number of tons hauled over the public roads, and in default of his doing so, authorized the supervisors to assess the amount. But can we set aside an Act of Assembly, because its machinery is lame and imperfect? Our duty is to execute the legislative will in the way prescribed, when that way is constitutional, though a much better way might have been devised. We are bound to give the - act a reasonable construction, ut res magis valedt quam pereat. When the owner refuses or neglects to pay the tax, the legislature has imposed upon the township the burden of proving by evidence, satisfactory to a jury, all that is required to fix liability upon the owner of the ore-bed. This may be unwieldy, but it is surely not unjust to the tax-payer. He can save himself from the costs of a suit, by a tender, in time, of the amount actually due. It is not a case where a valuation of property is required. It is a fixed rate upon the number of tons, and that the owner may be presumed to know, or to have the means of ascertaining, whether he is a landlord, or himself.the actual occupant. It is not, indeed, expressly provided that the supervisors shall ascertain and assess the amount. But they must do so in order to maintain their suit, and recover a judgment; and they must do more; they must prove it by competent evidence. In this case, as appears by the affidavit of claim filed, there was a demand of a certain sum, and the plaintiff in error did not deny in his affidavit that the amount was correct.
Nor can it be doubted that the plaintiff in errof is liable for the tax. He admits himself to be the pwner of the ore-bed, and in the sense of tax laws of this Commonwealth, the owner of lands is always the landlord, and not the tenant, when they are occupied under a lease. See Act of April 6th, 1802, sect. 8, 3 Smith 516 ; Act of April 3d 1804, sect. 6, 4 Smith 203 ; Act of April 15th 1834, sect. 46, Pamph. L. 518; Caldwell v. Moore, 1 Jones 58.
'It is unnecessary to consider the contention, that the imposition of this tax impairs the obligation of the contract between the landlord and tenant, for it is too clear for argument, that a tax upon the subject-matter of a contract, by whichever party it is made payable, can never produce that effect. Judgment affirmed.
Read, C. J., and Williams, J., concurred in this opinion, except as it relates to the extension of Hammett v. The City, beyond the case itself.