Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George M. ROU, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-11-09
Citations: 366 So. 2d 385
Docket Number: No. 50301
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George M. ROU, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS, OVERTON and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 366
Pages: 385–387

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George M. ROU, Jr., Appellee.
No. 50301.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov. 9, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1979.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Gary L. Conover and Joe Belitzky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee and Stephen L. Boyles, State’s Atty., Palatka, for appellant.
Ben Daniel, Jr., Ocala, for appellee.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
An information was filed in the County Court of Marion County charging Marion County Commissioner George M. Rou, Jr. with a criminal violation of Section 112.-313(3), Florida Statutes (1973). It was alleged that Rou used his official position to secure a "special privilege" for Cedric M. Smith, Jr. by locating a public road adjacent to Smith's property, contrary to the established Marion County road program,- and thereby enhancing the value of Smith's property. The trial judge dismissed the information and held the statute unconstitutionally vague.
By direct appeal we are asked to review the order of the Court. Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1973), provided:
"No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county . . . shall use, or attempt to use, his official position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others, except as may be otherwise provided by law."
We agree with the court below. The statute is unconstitutionally vague and leaves its enforcement to the whims of prosecutors. It does not "conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Lindsay, 284 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.1973). The terms "special privileges or exemptions" afford one no guidelines, no "ascertainable standard of guilt," Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So.2d 102 (1947), no barometer by which a public official may measure his specific conduct.
In this instance, a penalty is sought to be imposed against the accused County Commissioner by virtue of his having placed a public road contiguous to certain private property resulting in improvement to the owner of said property. It is a customary duty of County Commissioners to make determinations relating to construction of new roads and improvement of old ones. In making such determinations certain private owners are benefited instead of others. To say that such decisions are criminal in nature is incredible and justifies the conclusion of many highly qualified citizens to refuse to serve in public office.
It is argued that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officeholder acted with a specific intent of benefiting himself or another in derogation or disregard of the general public welfare. But this is an after-the-fact determination. An adjudication of not guilty may clear the name of the official charged with the ethical violation, but it cannot undo the harm inflicted upon him and his career by such a charge. The public official must be able to gauge his actions against a specific code of conduct, not a loosely worded statement of public policy, no matter how desirable the goal. Clearly such standards can be defined and should be embraced in the body of the law.
But to impose punishment under this statute violates the very fundamental precepts of due process. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, OVERTON and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, C. J., dissents with an opinion, with which SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
. We have jurisdiction under Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.