Case Name: Israel Steinhart et al., App'lts, v. Ignatz Gross, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-03-31
Citations: 44 N.Y. St. Rep. 917
Docket Number: 
Parties: Israel Steinhart et al., App’lts, v. Ignatz Gross, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 44
Pages: 917–919

Head Matter:
Israel Steinhart et al., App’lts, v. Ignatz Gross, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed March 31, 1892.)
1. Conversion—Stolen property—Charge as to credibility of thief.
In an action for the conversion of property alleged to have been stolen, the alleged thief was the only witness to substantiate plaintiff on the main point. Held, that the court did not err in cautioning the jury as to the amount of credence to be given to a case supported by evidence of that character.
8. Same—Evidence.
In such a case it is entirely immaterial whether the thief had distributed the property to other persons besides the defendant, and evidence on that point is properly excluded.
Appeal from judgment entered on verdict and from order denying motion for new trial.
Otto Horwitz, for app’lts ; 0. Strauss, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This action, was brought by the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the value of certain property which the plaintiffs alleged belonged to them, and which had been stolen by one of their employees.
The only witness to, substantiate the plaintiff's case upon the main point in issue was the thief; and as' far as the questions involved depending upon his testimony and that of the witnesses upon the part of the plaintiffs were concerned, it was entirely a matter for the jury; and we do not see that the learned court in any way departed from the strict path of duty in cautioning the jury upon the amount of credence which was to- be given to a case supported by evidence of that character.
The only question of law presented upon this trial is the exception taken upon the cross-examination of one of the witnesses called upon the part of the defendant. This witness was called for the purpose of showing the nature of certain packages which had been sent by the thief to the defendant, and after having been examined in chief, upon cross-examination testified to the receipt of certain packages, that she had not seen any other packages, and that as far as she was concerned she had received only one package sent by the thief.
The counsel for the appellants was thereupon proceeding with the cross-examination upon this subject, when the court stated that this had nothing to do with the case. The appellant's counsel stated that the purpose of the examination was to show that this witness, as well as other members of the family, was the recipient of the thief's bounty, as he called it. The court replied that this fact had nothing to do with the case, and that they could not recover unless they showed that the defendant was the recipient of the goods. Thereupon the plaintiffs' counsel stated that he would put one or two questions to take the ruling of the court and then drop the subject
"Q. Is that package you have just spoken of the only package that was sent to your house by this man Weiss (the thief) in the spring of 1890 by express?''
The defendant's counsel did not object to the question, but the court ruled it out upon its own motion. And this is claimed to be error upon two grounds: that it tended to impeach the credibility of the witness by showing that she as well as the defendant had been the recipient of the packages of the plaintiffs' goods through the instrumentality of the thief; and that it would have established the fact that the thief was in the habit of distributing his bounty indiscriminately to the members of the defendant's household.
The first ground now suggested was not named to the court as the reason for the admission of this testimony; and the ground upon which the appellants upon the trial claimed the testimony to be admissible was the second. As to whether this thief had distributed this property to other persons was a question which was entirely immaterial in' the case, and the court was correct in excluding the testimony..
For these reasons we think there is no ground presented show ing error in the trial of the case, and the judgment and order -should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., O'Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concur.