Case Name: Bennett FULBRIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2001-03-01
Citations: 41 S.W.3d 228
Docket Number: No. 2-99-018-CR
Parties: Bennett FULBRIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
Judges: Panel A: CAYCE, C.J., LIVINGSTON, J., and DAVID L. RICHARDS, J. (Sitting by Assignment).
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 41
Pages: 228–241

Head Matter:
Bennett FULBRIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
No. 2-99-018-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
March 1, 2001.
Cheyenne Minnick, Fort Worth, Attorney for Appellant.
Tim Curry, Criminal District Attorney; Charles Mallín, Chief, Appellate Division; Sylvia Mandel, Trey Loftin, and Steven Jumes, Assistant District Attorneys of Tarrant County, Attorneys for Appellee.
Panel A: CAYCE, C.J., LIVINGSTON, J., and DAVID L. RICHARDS, J. (Sitting by Assignment).

Opinion:
OPINION
CAYCE, Chief Justice.
Introduction
Appellant Bennett Fulbright appeals his conviction for driving with a suspended license. After a jury trial, his sentence was assessed at 150 days' confinement and a $100 fine. On appeal, appellant complains the trial court improperly permitted him to represent himself. Appellant asserts the court failed to adequately admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so his waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily. Appellant also contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint standby counsel. We will affirm.
Procedural Background
Appellant was charged by complaint and information with the offense of driving while license suspended. On July 31, 1998 he appeared at a pretrial hearing and announced he was not ready for trial. Appellant stated he was representing himself because he could not afford an attorney. The judge continued the trial until September 14, at which time he apparently appointed a Fort Worth attorney, Ed Jones, to represent appellant. No record was made of that hearing. At an October 26 hearing, appellant informed the trial court that he did not want Jones to represent him, so the court removed Jones from the case. At appellant's request, the court allowed appellant to represent himself and reset the trial for November 5.
On November 4, appellant filed a motion requesting public funds to hire an attorney of his choice to act in an advisory role. The following day, appellant appeared without counsel and reiterated his desire to represent himself. In response to the trial court's inquiries about his background, appellant stated that he was a 40 year old unemployed computer programmer with a degree in computer science and engineering from the University of Texas at Arlington and work towards a master's degree from the University of Houston. Appellant indicated that he had represented himself once before in municipal court for driving without insurance, did not have mental or emotional problems, and was not representing himself out of duress or coercion. Appellant stated that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or the range of punishment, so the trial court explained that appellant was being charged with driving while his license was suspended on or before August 17, 1997 and that the punishment range was three to 180 days in jail and up to a $500 fine. The trial court also told appellant a lawyer might aid him in understanding these things. In response to the court's further questioning, appellant stated that he was "not completely" familiar with the rules of evidence governing trial procedure, but did understand his right to a trial by jury and knew the possible dangers associated with representing himself.
Regarding his right to an attorney, appellant explained to the court that he did not want a lawyer to represent him, but wanted to represent himself with assistance from court-appointed standby counsel. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and appellant:
THE COURT: Is there anyone or anything forcing you to give up your right to have a lawyer to represent you?
MR. FULBRIGHT: I don't want a lawyer to represent me.
THE COURT: So nobody's forcing you to give up that right for a lawyer to represent you?
MR. FULBRIGHT: Right.
THE COURT: No one's promised you anything to give up the right to have a lawyer represent you?
MR. FULBRIGHT: I was not promised anything.
THE COURT: You understand that if you couldn't afford a lawyer to represent you, you understand that the Court could appoint one to represent you? You understand that?
MR. FULBRIGHT: Right.
THE COURT: In fact the Court did. Okay. Knowing all that stuff, do you still wish to give up your right to have a lawyer represent you [in] this case?
MR. FULBRIGHT: Right.
THE COURT: Take a look at that. There's two places to sign.
MR. FULBRIGHT: Is this saying I give up right to assistance of counsel?
THE COURT: You have the right to have a lawyer to represent you.
MR. FULBRIGHT: As long as I retain the right to assistance of counsel, then I might have a problem. If it's saying I give up the right to assistance of counsel, then I have a problem with that and won't sign.
THE COURT: Your right to a lawyer to assist you, I'm using your semantics, you want Ed Jones to?
MR. FULBRIGHT: I've got a problem with the way this thing's worded. It says, 'You have told this Court that you do not wish to have this Court appoint a lawyer to help." Well, I do need help and I've motioned for help.
What I don't want the lawyer to do is take over my powers of representation. I need advice and assistance of counsel, but I don't need him to take away my powers of representation, my control over decisions like what kind of defense to present to the jury or whether to make a request for continuation. I want to retain that control.
THE COURT: So you want Mr. Jones to come in here and sit by you and assist you?
MR. FULBRIGHT: I want assistance of counsel, and I tried to explain—
THE COURT: You want Mr. Ed Jones in here or you don't want him in here?
MR. FULBRIGHT: If that's the only assistance of counsel I can get, then I want him in here.
THE COURT: In that regard, you understand if the Court allows you standby counsel, that you've got to make all the tactical decisions. They can't talk.
MR. FULBRIGHT: That's better than nothing.
THE COURT: Why do you want a lawyer if you don't want him to do anything?
MR. FULBRIGHT: I do want him to give advice, but I don't want him to take away my final decision as to what's said or goes forward in terms of motions and that type of thing. I want to have the final say-so on whether or not a motion gets made and I want to be able to talk to the jury myself. I don't want to be misrepresented, and my understanding—
THE COURT: Your right to a lawyer to assist you—
MR. FULBRIGHT: The lawyer may act as counsel—
THE COURT: You want to use these words, "representation" and "assistance." I asked you if you wanted me to appoint a lawyer to assist you, and that is a lawyer to represent you. You want to use those as different semantics, but they're synonymous.
MR. FULBRIGHT: The law books I've studied especially with regard to Texas, the way I understand it, I can have assistance of counsel without having that counsel take your powers of self-representation away.
THE COURT: You can have what's called standby counsel.
MR. FULBRIGHT: Well, I need some standby.
THE COURT: And you're requesting that?
MR. FULBRIGHT: As long as I'm not by doing so giving up my powers of self-representation. I need all the help I can get without giving up my powers of self-representation. And what would you do if you were in my shoes?
THE COURT: I would have taken a lawyer to represent me.
The trial court then agreed to reappoint Jones as standby counsel and reset the trial for November 19.
Before voir dire on November 19, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: We were here two weeks ago, discussed Mr. Fulbright, options of self representation. Mr. Fulbright does not want an attorney to represent him, wants to represent himself. And I had considered on that date to appoint some standby counsel, but on Monday I had — Monday the following week, I had contacted Mr. Fulbright through his — through my court reporter, told him that I was not going to appoint him standby counsel, that he had to make a decision of self representation or representation by a lawyer. And you're choosing self representation; is that's [sic] correct, Mr. Fulbright?
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct.
THE COURT: However, you do not choose to sign the waiver that I gave you regarding self representation; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: I found some problems. Statements in the waiver that seemed to commit me to thing— things that I didn't think were true. But I'll make a statement that I'm representing myself. In fact, I made a motion for clarification of rights and status of the parties, where I motion, and I think I be acknowledged on the status. So if my motion had been granted, then I don't think this issue would even be a question.
THE COURT: Okay. But you don't want to sign the waiver, but you are—
THE DEFENDANT: Not that particular form, but I'll sign you a statement of status saying I'm self representing myself.
THE COURT: Okay. And you understand the dangers? We have discussed those on numerous occasions.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
On the day of trial, appellant prepared and signed a declaration, which states in relevant part:
1). I, Bennett Stephen Fulbright, am representing myself and speaking by and for myself in this case and knowing ly elected to do so, but have also requested expert assistance.
2). I am financially unable to hire the services I feel I need to fully prepare and conduct my defense, or to do this by myself. I have no job or signiificant [sic] available fundes[.]
During voir dire, the judge informed the jury that appellant was entitled to an attorney, but had chosen to represent himself, and all rules of evidence, procedure, and court would apply to him.
Appellant participated in both phases of his trial, conducted voir dire, gave opening and closing statements, cross-examined and presented witnesses, and made and responded to objections. In addition, he filed numerous pre- and post-trial motions.
Waiver of Counsel
In his first two points, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel because he never waived his right to counsel and because he was never adequately admonished about the dangers of self-representation. In his third point, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to appoint standby counsel. Because the issues are intertwined, we address them together.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provide that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to assistance of counsel. This right may be waived, and a defendant may choose to represent himself at trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). However, a waiver of the right to counsel will not be lightly inferred, and the courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against the validity of such a waiver. Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). A waiver of counsel must be made competently, knowingly and intelligently, and voluntarily. Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625-26 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929, 119 S.Ct. 335, 142 L.Ed.2d 276 (1998). The decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se is made knowingly and intelligently if it is made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626; Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The decision is made voluntarily if it is uncoerced. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626.
No formulaic questioning is required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. See Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583. However, a trial court can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all circumstances surrounding the waiver. Id. A defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; see also Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
The record must reflect that the trial court thoroughly admonished the defendant. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n. 8. The record must be sufficient for a reviewing court to make an assessment that the defendant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of the self-representation. Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585; Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
In this case, the record shows the trial court adequately admonished appellant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that he intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel and instead chose to represent himself. While a detailed record of specific admonishments is one way to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver, and may be the better practice in most situations, there is "no formulaic questioning to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver." Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583. We hold the admonishments were sufficient under the circumstances here, given appellant's sophisticated background, his high level of education, his skills, and his experience representing himself in similar cases. The record also shows appellant's waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary and not coerced.
Appellant asserts, incorrectly, that he was entitled to court-appointed standby counsel because he was indigent and refused to waive his right to counsel, either orally or in writing. The requirement of a written waiver is imposed by statute, not by the state and federal constitutions. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(g) (Vernon Supp.2001). A written waiver is not required where, as here, the record shows the defendant did everything constitutionally required to waive counsel and assert his right to self-representation. Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 430-31 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Moreover, appellant never deviated from his position that he wanted to represent himself in every stage of his trial and to make all of the tactical decisions in the case. Appellant only wanted a lawyer or legal assistant to "work under [his] command." It is well established that an accused has no right to this type of hybrid representation, although the trial court has the discretion to permit it. Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Further, accepting an offer of standby counsel that is later retracted does not, under circumstances such as those here, waive a previously asserted right to self-representation. Id. at 93.
If a trial court refuses to appoint standby counsel or withdraws an offer of standby counsel, a defendant must choose between two mutually exclusive rights: the right to self-representation without standby counsel or representation by counsel. There is no middle ground. Id.; see also Burgess, 816 S.W.2d at 428-29. While appellant desired the aid of standby counsel, once the trial court informed him that standby counsel would not be available, appellant clearly restated his intention to represent himself. Based on these facts, we hold appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. If the trial court had refused to allow appellant to represent himself due to his insistence on standby counsel, appellant would now be complaining that the trial court violated his right to self-representation. An accused's constitutional rights to represent himself or to choose his own counsel cannot be manipulated in such a manner as to throw the trial process into disarray. Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 520 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 834, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); see also Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
Harm Analysis
In addition, even if the trial court's admonishments had been insufficient, any error would be harmless. In cases of alleged constitutional error, we apply Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a). The question here is whether the trial court's alleged failure to admonish appellant more fully was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). We must reverse the trial court's judgment unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to appellant's conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a); see also Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh'g) (stating that constitutional errors should be analyzed in the same manner as under former rule 81(b)(2)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999).
It is clear that appellant intended to represent himself, with or without standby counsel, and irrespective of the trial court's admonishments or advice that he choose to be represented by counsel. Appellant had previously represented himself in municipal court and, at the time of his trial, was also representing himself in a Dallas case. Appellant had a history of firing court-appointed attorneys in this and other cases. Also, appellant stated he wanted to represent himself because "I don't feel like I'm getting the representation I need or the type of work I need from attorneys, and the attorneys that would be of my choice I can't afford." Based on this record, we hold that the trial court's failure to admonish appellant more thoroughly was not a factor in his decision to waive counsel and represent himself. Nor was it a factor in the outcome of appellant's trial. Under the facts of this case, the outcome of the trial would be no different had appellant been more thoroughly admonished and, as a result, decided not to represent himself. Indeed, the entire record demonstrates a complete absence of harm to appellant. Accordingly, we hold beyond a reasonable doubt the alleged error did not contribute to appellant's conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a).
Because the trial court admonished appellant adequately concerning the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation under the unique facts of this case, and because it is clear from the record that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, we overrule appellant's first two issues. Because the trial court did not err by refusing to appoint standby counsel, we overrule issue three.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
DAVID L. RICHARDS, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
. The motion, entitled "Motion to Facilitate Obtaining of Expert and Investigative Assistance" reads in pertinent part:
Accused desires and needs expert legal assistance because he is unable to work by himself to properly prepare and present his theories of the case, evidence, and motions under the severe conditions imposed upon him.... The fund is requested for utilization in hiring a legal assistant to work under my command and provide me with counsel of my choice and secretarial and investigative services needed for defense.
WHEREFORE it is prayed that this Court authorize the payment of a fee for the use in the purposes herein requested, with the understanding that the counsel is to be one of Accused's choice and will not act in anything other than a strictly advisory capacity and strictly under the command of the Accused and no one else.
. The record also shows appellant was representing himself in a Dallas case.
. We respectfully decline to follow our sister court's holding that this type of error is "categorically immune to harmless error analysis." Manley v. State, 23 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex.App. — Waco 2000, pet. ref d).