Case Name: Dexter BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-08-10
Citations: 794 So. 2d 671
Docket Number: No. 5D99-2203
Parties: Dexter BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PLEUS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 794
Pages: 671–674

Head Matter:
Dexter BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D99-2203.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 10, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 2001.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Belle B. Schumann, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, J.
This case reflects the hazards of judicial plea negotiations. The supreme court held in State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507 (Fla.2000), that Florida recognizes a form of judicial plea negotiation even over the objection of the State. The form approved is that the court may make a pre-trial evaluation of what an appropriate sentence for the offense would be regardless of whether the defendant pleads or goes to trial, based on the information then available to the judge. Warner cautioned that judges should neither state nor imply that the sentence would vary depending on the choice made by defendant.
In our case, after apparently reviewing the scoresheet, the court commented:
COURT: So I think 30 years is a fair offer, considering what you would do is over 100 years, and this isn't your first robbery.
Frankly, I think — Good God, he's got numerous armed robberies.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: They all arise out of one plea.
COURT: Well, there you go. They all count, though. I think 30 years is a steal. He certainly won't get that low if he goes to trial. His record is horrendous.
The defendant chose to go to trial and, wouldn't you know it, the judge's prediction came to pass. Instead of thirty years, the defendant was sentenced to seventy-five. Appellant claims on appeal that when the defendant rejects the court's offer and is subsequently convicted, if the court exceeds its former offer, a presumption of vindictiveness arises and such presumption was not overcome in this case.
In McDonald v. State, 751 So.2d 56, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the court held that "when the judge has been involved in the plea negotiations and then later imposes a harsher sentence, the sentence is presumed to be vindictive." That is a reasonable method of dispelling a defendant's legitimate fear of retribution should he exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial. The supreme court may well have had such a presumption in mind when it required that "[a] record must be made of all plea discussions involving the court." See Warner, 762 So.2d at 514. During the discussion leading up to the offer the court should state the facts relied on by it in making the offer. Those facts can then be compared with any "additional facts emerging prior to sentencing" to see if the harsher sentence is justified. In any event, if the trial court elects to sentence more harshly based on additional facts which may emerge prior to sentencing, should the judge not at least put on record what the additional facts are and how those facts changed the judge's view? If the judge can change his or her mind merely by saying that after hearing the testimony he or she is convinced that a harsher sentence is justified, then there is no protection against vindictiveness in rejection of plea cases.
Whether we call it an unrebutted presumption or merely hold that the court has failed to explain on the record what information it had at sentencing that it did not have at the time of the plea offer and how such information would have made a difference, the result is the same. The State suggests that the court was concerned about the timing of the offense in connection with the defendant's release from prison and was also concerned about the number of offenses. But this information was before the court at the time of its offer. It is less a reason than an excuse.
We are concerned, as was the McDonald court, as to an appropriate remedy. We reject the remedy chosen by McDonald which was setting the sentence itself. But we agree with McDonald that it would be a hollow victory for appellant if we, after accepting his argument that the record does not dispel the aura of vindictiveness or explain the harsher sentence, merely return the matter to the trial judge to belatedly "make record findings supportive of the more severe sentence." See Fraley v. State, 426 So.2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Further, remanding the case with instructions to assign it to another sentencing judge would ignore the problem created by the initial offer in this case. The new judge would not know what prompted the original offer and thus would not know what new facts may have been discovered after the plea offer which might justify a harsher sentence. This is not a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty and was then sentenced more harshly than the judge promised so that a withdrawal of plea would cure the problem. Here, since the court has shown no reason why its pretrial evaluation of the appropriate sentence for the offense was in error, the better solution appears to be to accept the court's initial assessment of a proper sentence. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court to sentence the defendant in accordance with its prior plea offer.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.
PLEUS, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. See Warner, 762 So.2d at 514.