Case Name: County of Cameron v. Will Wilson, Attorney General of Texas
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1959-07-08
Citations: 160 Tex. 25
Docket Number: No. A-7101
Parties: County of Cameron v. Will Wilson, Attorney General of Texas
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 160
Pages: 25–38

Head Matter:
County of Cameron v. Will Wilson, Attorney General of Texas
No. A-7101.
Decided July 8, 1959.
(326 S.W. 2d Series 162)
Gibson, Spence & Gibson, of Austin, and F. T. Graham, of Brownsville for relator.
Will Wilson. Attorney General of Texas, Howard W. Mays and Robert T. Lewis, Assistants Attorney General, for respondent.

Opinion:
MR. Justice Norvell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an original proceeding in which Cameron County, relator, seeks a writ of mandamus to require Honorable Will Wilson, Attorney General of Texas, respondent, to approve $80,000.00 in revenue bonds which relator proposes to issue pursuant to the provisions of Art. 6079c, Vernon's Ann. Texas Civ. Stat., for the purpose of making additions to existing trailer park facilities in Isla Blanca Park on Padre Island. Respondent has specified three reasons for declining to approve the bonds, namely:
1. Article 6079c is unconstitutional because it is a local and special law and hence prohibited by Article 3, Sec. 56 of the Texas Constitution.
2. Article 6079c does not comprehend the construction of trailer park facilities as an authorized purpose for which revenue bonds may be issued.
3. The operation of trailer park facilities financed by revenue bonds is not "county business."
The authority primarily relied upon as supporting the proposition that Article 6079c is invalid is the decision of this Court in Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Texas 370, 150 S.W. 2d. 1000, opinion by Chief Justice Alexander. In holding invalid a population bracket law which applied only to El Paso County, this Court said:
. "Section 56, Article III, of the State Constitution, Vernon's Ann. St., reads, in part, as follows:
" 'Sec. 56. The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing :

" 'Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school district;
" 'Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts;
$
" 'And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted;
"The purpose of this constitutional inhibition against the enactment of local or special laws is a wholesome one. It is intended to prevent the granting of special privileges and to secure uniformity of law throughout the State as far as possible. It is said that at an early period in many of the states the practice of enacting special and local laws became" an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests, and encouraged the reprehensible practice of trading and "logrolling." ' It was for the suppression of such practices that such a provision was adopted in this and many of the other states of the Union. 25 R.C.L., p. 820, Sec. 68.
"Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a sustantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification."
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 148 Texas 537, 227 S.W. 2d 791, this court, speaking through Chief Justice Hickman, said:
"The primary and ultimate test of whether a law is general or special is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification made by the law, and whether the law operates equally on all within the class. Bexar County v. Tynan, 128 Texas 223, 97 S.W. 2d 467; Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Texas 370, 150 S.W. 2d 1000; 1 Sutherland (2d Ed.), Statutory Construction, Sec. 203."
Both cases cited were "population bracket" cases which the Court held to be special laws as they applied to one county only. The classification involved in the Rodriguez case is not without interest and affords an illustration of the type of act generally held invalid as a local and special law. We quote from the opinion:
"In order for the provision of the Act to be applicable to a particular suit for delinquent taxes, all of the following conditions must exist, and the absence of any one of them would render it inapplicable: (a) The tract must be in a county bordering on the Rio Grande; (b) must be in excess of 1,000 acres; (c) must be owned by ten or more persons in undivided interests; and (d) title to all or a portion thereof must emanate from a grant from the King of Spain."
The classification to which the Attorney General objects is that contained in Article 6079c, Sec. 1 which is as follows :
"The provisions of this Act are applicable to all eligible counties. An 'Eligibile' County is one which borders on the Gulf of Mexico within whose boundaries is located any island, part of an island, or islands, suitable for park purposes. The suitability of such island, islands, or part of an island for park purposes shall be conclusively established when the Commissioners Court of such County shall have made a finding in an order passed by it that such island, islands, or part of island is or are suitable for park purposes."
A statute under constitutional attack is to be construed as valid if reasonably possible, Duncan v. Gabbler, 147 Texas 229, 215 S.W. 2d 155. It would do violence to obvious intent of the Legislature to construe the Act so as to embrace islands in rivers or fresh water lakes and thus encompass its destruction. Article 6079c, Sec. 2 provided that, "any Eligible County" for the purpose of improving, equipping, maintaining, financing, and operating any such public parks or park owned by such county, may by order passed by the Commissioners Court create a Board to be designated "Board of Park Commissioners, ." The words, "such public parks or park" must necessarily refer to island parks situated in the Gulf of Mexico as indicated by Article 6079c, Sec. 1.
In order to come within the provisions of the Act, a County must (1) border on the Gulf of Mexico, (2) embrace within its boundaries an island or part of an island situated in the Gulf, which (3) is suitable for park purposes.
1 The maintenance of public parks on islands in the Gulf of Mexico is undoubtedly a matter of interest to people throughout the State. The Gulf Coast is one of our most popular recreational areas. Each year large numbers of people from all parts of Texas and the United States avail themselves of the opportunities afforded there for fishing, boating and swimming in the ocean. In a number of decisions it has been said that a statute is not local or special within the meaning of the Constitution even though its enforcement or operation is confined to a restricted area, if persons or things throughout the State are affected thereby or if it operates upon a subject in which the people at large are interested. See Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw, 125 Texas 268, 83 S.W. 2d 629; Stephenson v. Wood, 119 Texas 564, 34 S.W. 2d 246; Reed v. Rogan, 94 Texas 177, 59 S.W. 255; Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, Texas Civ. App., 284 S.W. 2d 275 (wr. ref. n.r.e.); King v. Sheppard, Texas Civ. App., 157 S.W. 2d 682 (wr. ref. w.m.).
2 Where the operation or enforcement of a statute is confined to a restricted area, the question of whether it deals with a matter of general rather than purely local interest is an important consideration in determining its constitutionality. When a statute grants powers to or imposes duties upon a class of counties, the primary and ultimate test is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification and whether the law operates equally on all within the class.
All counties in Texas are authorized by Arts. 6078 and 6081e, Vernon's Ann. Texas Civ. Stat., to acquire and improve land for use as county parks and to issue tax bonds for such purposes upon a favorable vote of the qualified property taxpayers. The statute now under consideration confers upon the Texas Coastal Counties the additional power to finance improvements of their Gulf island parks by means of revenue bonds. Relator argues that a properly developed Gulf island park is quite different from the ordinary county park in that the former is patronized by many people who do not reside in the county while the latter is used largely by local inhabitants. We recognize that demand for the conveniences usually provided by county parks may be greater along the coast than in many inland areas. It also is reasonable to expect a relatively larger number of nonresidents to be served by a park located near the ocean than by one situated in a section less richly endowed with natural attractions that draw visitors from distant points.
3 The presence or absence of such natural attractions might well constitute a proper basis for classification in a statute dealing with the financing of county parks. A law which permitted the counties along the coast to issue revenue bonds for the development of their parks would not be invalid because similar authority was not granted to every one of their inland counterparts. In fact, if large number of nonresidents of a particular county make use of its park facilities, it would seem that the sale of revenue bonds as distinguished from tax bonds would be an entirely suitable way to provide and pay for such recreational advantages.
The fact that Article 6079c is applicable only to island parks does not render the Legislative classification unreasonable. The coastal geography of Texas affords a reasonable distinction between the island park on the one hand and the mainland park on the other. Most any map of the State discloses that the greater part of the Gulf Coast is bordered by islands or island-like peninsulas. Most mainland beaches on the Gulf proper occur opposite openings in the island chain, where cities and towns are located, largely because of the existence of these passes into the open sea. Here there is no need for special financial arrangements for the construction of beach facilities. Because of the existence of large populations close by, the development of mainland beaches has naturally taken place. The development of the island beaches is another matter.
Padre Island with which we are here concerned lies within the Counties of Nueces, Kleberg, Kenedy, Willacy and Cameron. It is 110 miles long and contains approximately 135,000 acres of land. The southern tip of the island is not far distant from Brownsville while the northern end is near the city of Corpus Christi. There are no large centers of poulation having access to the island situated near the coast between Brownsville and Corpus Christi. Padre Island is a typical example of the barrier beach. Its wide, clean beaches, composed of fine sand and broken shell which slope gently upward from the sea to the sand dunes near the central portion of the island provide almost ideal conditions for swimming, surf fishing and similar recreations. But of more importance, this is a primitive and wholly undeveloped expanse of beach area, and has remained so largely because of its distance from and inaccessibility to large centers of population. While similar conditions undoubtedly exist as to other island beaches, the same cannot be said of the mainland shore line park. As heretofore pointed out, these mainland beaches, being situated opposite to or in close proximity to the passes to the sea are generally near population centers. Island parks are different from mainland parks, both as to physical characteristics and degree of development for public use. We cannot say that the classification made by the Legislature, which is based upon this distinction, is unreasonable and hence void.
4 The applicable rule is that "when a law duly enacted is attacked as unconstitutional, the law is presumed to be valid and doubts as to its constitutionality should always be resolved in favor of constitutionality." As pointed out in Duncan v. Gabler, 147 Texas 229, 215 S.W. 2d 155, 158, "This rule has peculiar importance in testing the validity of a state law, for 'the legislative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is intrusted with general authority to make laws at discretion.' Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 175." Before an enactment grounded upon this legislative discretion be nullified as coming within the proscription of Article 3, Sec. 56 of the Constitution, it must clearly appear that there is no reasonable basis for the classification adopted by the Legislature to support the Act. This lack of reasonable basis should be a substantial thing and not something merely apparent but not real. We recognize in the Legislature a broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes. Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Texas 370, 150 S.W. 2d 1000. Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. Such legislation is not only common, but is generally for the public good, or at least has been so declared by the legislative branch of government. The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, Sec. 56 of the Constitution.
In our opinion, the Attorney General's second reason for declining to approve the bonds is not well taken. We are cited to no authorities which hold or indicate that the construction of trailer park facilities is not comprehended by Article 6079c. As above pointed out, a county may establish and maintain a public park. As an incident thereto, it may construct and maintain toilets and sanitary facilities. It may also provide parking space for motor vehicles and electricity for lights, fans and other mechanical appliances. A trailer park is nothing more than a place where parking space, sanitary facilities and electricity are sup plied to those who make use of house trailers while traveling about the country for recreational or business purposes. At the present time, Cameron County operates such a park on Padre Island known as Isla Blanca Park and now desires to improve and enlarge the facilities used in connection therewith.
5 Likewise the third objection to the legality of the bond is untenable. As we understand the argument, it does not seriously dispute the premise that a county may establish and operate public parks. The acquiring and maintaining of public parks is a legitimate field of state governmental authority. See, King v. Sheppard, Texas Civ. App., 157 S.W. 2d 682, wr. ref. w.o.m.; Schooler v. State, Texas Civ. App., 175 S.W. 2d 664, wr ref., w.o.m., relating to the Big Bend National Park. Counties are "essentially instrumentalities of the State. They are the means whereby the powers of the State are exerted through a form and agency of local government for the performance of those obligations which the State owes the people at large." Bexar County v. Linden, 110 Texas 339, 220 S.W. 761. Both the constitutional and statutory grants of power to counties are broad and comprehensive. Article 5, Sec. 18 of the Texas Constitution in part provides:
"The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners' Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business as is conferred by this Constitution, and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed."
It was directly held in Malloy v. Galveston County, Texas Civ. App., 42 S.W. 2d 163 that the acquisition of land for a county park constituted a public purpose under Article 6078, Vernon's Texas Stats. This court refused an application for writ of error. See also, Article 2351, Vernon's Ann. Texas Stats.
A distinction is, however, attempted between public parks financed by the sale of tax supported bonds (Article 6078) and those established through the use of revenue bonds. (Article 6079c). It is stated in the brief that:
"Even though it be conceded that the ownership and operation of a public park by a county, using tax funds only, is the exercise of a governmental function, Article 6079c, supra, purports to grant to certain counties the authority to construct and operate a revenue producing facility in ¿ county park, producing net revenue for the service of revenue bonds which, being a proprietary function, is forbidden to a county upon constitutional grounds."
We are unable to follow the suggested distinction. If the maintenance of a park be "county business," it remains so regardless of whether the tax bond method or the revenue bond device is utilized. The distinction between a proprietary and a governmental function while important in determining the tort liability of a city, town or village, is largely beside the point in determining the question now before us.
From what has been said it follows that the writ of mandamus should issue as prayed for. It is accordingly so ordered.
Opinion delivered July 8, 1959.