Case Name: Peter GEORGE, Appellant, v. James RADCLIFFE and Performance Concepts, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-10-06
Citations: 753 So. 2d 573
Docket Number: No. 98-4416
Parties: Peter GEORGE, Appellant, v. James RADCLIFFE and Performance Concepts, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: STONE and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 753
Pages: 573–575

Head Matter:
Peter GEORGE, Appellant, v. James RADCLIFFE and Performance Concepts, Inc., Appellees.
No. 98-4416.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 6, 1999.
Opinion Denying Rehearing Jan. 5, 2000.
Keith T. Grumer and Rowena D. Reich of Grumer & Levin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
John R. Hargrove and Cristina M. Pier-son of Heinrich Gordon Hargrove Weihe & James, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lees.
Keith T. Grumer, Maidenly Sotuyo-Ma-caluso and Rowena D. Reich of Grumer & Levin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant, on rehearing.

Opinion:
KLEIN, J.
Appellant was the plaintiff in this case, and the appellees were defendants who filed a counterclaim against plaintiff. The trial court granted defendants' motion for a default judgment on their counterclaim because plaintiff failed to file an answer. We affirm the order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment.
On May 6, 1998, the trial court entered an agreed order allowing amendment of the counterclaim, and on that same date the parties agreed that the litigation would "stand still" until May 29, 1998, the date set for a hearing on another matter. The "standstill" period was not extended. The agreed order required plaintiff to answer the amended counterclaim in twenty days.
Plaintiff did not answer the amended counterclaim, even after expiration of the "standstill" period, and on July 13, 1998, defendants moved for default against plaintiff for failing to answer their amended counterclaim. Plaintiffs counsel telephoned counsel for defendants on July 24 and asked for an extension of time, but defendants' counsel would not agree. The hearing on the motion for default was set for and took place on July 28, 1998, and in spite of the denial of his request for additional time, plaintiffs counsel did not file an answer.
The trial court granted the motion for default, and, three weeks later, plaintiff moved to set the default aside alleging excusable neglect and meritorious defenses. The motion admitted that plaintiffs counsel had telephoned defendants' counsel on July 24 seeking a three day extension to July 31 to file the answer because his secretary was on vacation, which opposing counsel refused to do. Plaintiffs counsel alleged in the motion, and testified at the hearing on- the motion to vacate, that he had an understanding with prior counsel representing defendants, who were replaced on July 15, 1998, that he would have additional time. The trial court denied the motion to vacate.
Our standard of review of an order ruling on a motion to vacate a default judgment is whether there has been a gross abuse of the trial court's discretion. North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So.2d 849 (Fla.1962). We find no such abuse in this case and affirm.
STONE and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.