Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. EMMANUEL BAPTIST PRESCHOOL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1990-04-09
Citations: 434 Mich. 380
Docket Number: Docket No. 79024
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v EMMANUEL BAPTIST PRESCHOOL
Judges: Riley, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, Archer, and Griffin, concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 434
Pages: 380–479

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v EMMANUEL BAPTIST PRESCHOOL
Docket No. 79024.
Argued January 6, 1988
(Calendar No. 4).
Decided April 9, 1990.
The Department of Social Services brought an action in the Ingham Circuit Court against the Emmanuel Baptist Bible Church and its preschool and day-care center, seeking a judgment declaring the defendants to be subject to the requirements of the childcare organization act, 1973 PA 116, and seeking to enjoin the defendants from operating a childcare center without a license from the dss. The defendants asserted that the Legislature had improperly delegated licensing authority to the dss, that the act was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to them, and that certain administrative rules pertaining to the running of the preschool and the day-care center infringed upon their First Amendment rights. The court, Thomas L. Brown, J., although finding that the defendants’ preschool and day-care center constituted religiously grounded activity, held that the defendants were required to obtain a license to operate the programs on the ground that the state’s compelling interest in protecting children in childcare centers outweighed the defendants’ interest in being free from state regulation. The court further held that administrative rules relating to director qualifications, program content, and corporal punishment, as well as statutory provisions relating to inspection of financial records, should not be applied to the defendants; rather, the state should develop and employ less intrusive means of regulating church-operated daycare centers. The Court of Appeals, Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and D. P. Kerwin, JJ., aflxrmed the licensure requirement, but reversed the trial court’s ruling on exemptions (Docket No. 77946). The defendants appeal.
In a memorandum opinion:
The Supreme Court unanimously held:
I. The Department of Social Services regulation prohibiting corporal punishment is justified by a compelling state interest and may be enforced.
With regard to the following issues a majority of the Court held:
II. The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution do not prevent the state from compelling the defendants to conform to the licensure requirements of the childcare organization act.
m. The state may not enforce the accreditation aspects of the program director qualifications rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5104(2)(a), since to do so would violate the defendants’ free exercise of religious beliefs.
IV. The state may not enforce the program content rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5106(l)(c), because the rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Justice Cavanagh, stated that the state may require the defendant preschool to obtain a license pursuant to the terms of the childcare organization act; that the Department of Social Services either must exempt the defendants from the program director qualifications rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5104, insofar as it requires that the director obtain minimal educational training only from a state accredited college or university, or must undertake an independent evaluation of the credentials of the program director to determine whether his qualifications satisfy the minimal educational criteria set forth in the administrative rule; that the program content rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5106, is unconstitutionally vague on its face and may not be enforced against the defendants; that in order to protect members’ rights of association under the First Amendment, the Department of Social Services, in applying the provisions of the act which give it authority to inspect financial records, may not request information from the defendants that reveals the source or identity of their financial support; and that the administrative rule prohibiting corporal punishment, 1980 AACS, R 400.5107, is justified by a compelling state interest and thus is enforceable against the defendants.
In analyzing a claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the first inquiry is whether the claim is rooted in religious belief. While a religious belief must be based on more than purely secular or philosophically based personal beliefs, religiously motivated conduct need not stem from adherence to the tenets of a particular religion to enjoy Free Exercise Clause protection. A court should inquire into whether the belief is genuine or sincere, but need not decide the truth or reasonableness of the belief. The court must accept an organization’s good-faith characterization of its activity as being grounded in religious belief. The party asserting the claim must show that a particular regulation burdens its practice of religion. A claimed burden may be deemed to be constitution ally insignificant, but only if the claimant’s beliefs do not create an irreconcilable conflict between the mandates of the law and religious duty, or if the legal requirement does not directly coerce the claimant to act contrary to religious belief. Once it is established that a significant burden has been imposed by civil authority on the practice of a sincerely held religious belief, the state must prove a compelling interest that justifies both any direct burdens on religiously motivated conduct and any imposition upon individuals of a hard choice between religious belief and conformity to the legal obligation.
In this case, the burden of the licensure requirement is both direct and coercive so as to trigger strict scrutiny. The state met its burden of showing a compelling interest of the highest order in the general licensure requirement sufficient to justify the burdens on the defendants’ free exercise of religion. It has also satisfied the burden under strict scrutiny of proving that the licensure requirement is the least restrictive alternative capable of accomplishing its objective. Thus, the defendants’ request for exemption need not be granted. The department’s program director qualification rule, however, is unconstitutional as applied to the defendants, and the dss either must grant the defendants an exemption or undertake an independent evaluation of the defendants’ program director’s credentials to determine whether they satisfy the minimum criteria of the rule. The program content rule also is unconstitutional in that it is vague, fails to provide fair notice of expected conduct, is overbroad, and confers unstructured and unlimited discretion upon dss officials.
Justice Griffin, joined by Chief Justice Riley and Justice Levin, stated that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, precludes the state from compelling the defendants to be licensed under the childcare organization act and exempts the defendants from the provisions of the act which gives the dss authority to inspect the defendants’ finances in connection with the operation of their preschool/day-care program. In addition, the Department of Social Services administrative rules relating to director qualifications and program content should not be enforced against these defendants. The administrative rule relating to corporal punishment is constitutional.
In analyzing free exercise challenges, strict scrutiny is required. Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972), remains good law and should be applied as directed in Sheridan Road Baptist Church v Dep’t of Ed, 426 Mich 462 (1986). The childcare organization act requires licensing of childcare facilities by the Department of Social Services and provides for criminal sanctions. In this case, it is not disputed that the defendants’ objection to licensing is grounded in sincerely held religious belief. The record demonstrates that the defendants’ practice of their religion is burdened by the act’s licensing requirement. Under the strict scrutiny standard, the state does not meet its burden merely by showing a compelling interest in the general subject matter of a regulation; to override claims of religious exemption, it must demonstrate a compelling need to apply the regulation in a particular case.
In this case, the defendants concede that the state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of young children is of the highest order. They do not object to regulations that directly relate to health, fire, sanitation, and other safety requirements. Rather, they reject the proposition that the state has constitutional authority to license a ministry activity. Nothing in the record indicates that exempting the defendants from the licensing requirement would impose a grave and immediate danger to the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of the children involved. In addition, the record warrants the conclusion that the state’s legitimate purposes could be achieved in this case by utilizing a less obtrusive form of regulation than licensing. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause precludes the dss from requiring the defendants’ preschool and day-care programs to be licensed under the childcare organization act.
With respect to the administrative rule for selecting program directors only from accredited colleges, the dss failed to show any compelling basis for its refusal to recognize in these defendants an exemption from the requirement. As applied to the defendants, the rule should be held to be unconstitutional. The regulation requiring a program of daily activities providing opportunities for emotional development of children in childcare programs, including positive self-concept, is unconstitutionally vague on its face and should not be enforced. The defendants also should be exempted from the provisions of the act regarding financial disclosure. The dss effectively conceded that it does not have a compelling interest in initial financial disclosure of license applicants and that it is able to make a determination regarding whether basic services are being provided at childcare centers without financial inspection. Application of the provisions to the defendants would violate their right to free exercise of religion. In regard to the regulation prohibiting corporal punishment, however, the state’s interest is clear and compelling and should be applied to the defendants despite the possible burden on religious conduct.
Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Brickley, stated that the dss, consistent with constitutional guarantees, may require the defendants to comply with the licensure requirements of the childcare organization act and certain administrative rules promulgated under its authority in order to operate their preschool and day-care programs. Licensure and regulation are part of a neutral legislative scheme to provide minimum standards to protect young children being cared for outside their own homes.
Before a court applies the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest, and no less restrictive alternative formulation, it must evaluate the significance of any burden on the activity in question. In weighing the state’s interest and the claimant’s request for exemption, circumspection is the watch word. The existence of an effect on a sincerely held religious belief does not in and of itself require the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest.
Although the United States Supreme Court consistently has reiterated the strict scrutiny test, its application, other than in government benefit cases or in Yoder, suggests a distinct, although not fully articulated methodology. Rather than employing a mechanistic approach, the Court has engaged in a multifactored balancing process.
Yoder involved not merely an effect on religious activity, but a compulsion by the state to coerce the plaintiffs to act contrary to their religious beliefs. This case, however, involves a neutral regulation which indirectly conflicts with the defendants’ belief and does not impose a burden which is significant in light of constitutional guarantees. On the basis of the minimal and indirect burden the licensure requirement imposes on the defendants’ exercise of religion, the substantial state interest in protecting the health and welfare of preschool children being cared for outside their homes, and the logical nexus between the interest to be attained and the means of attaining it, or on the basis that there is no less restrictive alternative to satisfy the state’s compelling interest, the state, consistent with constitutional guarantees, may require the defendants to comply with the licensure requirement.
The decision of the Court of Appeals that the defendants must operate a licensed day-care center and comply with the regulation prohibiting corporal punishment should be affirmed. Those portions of its opinion addressing the regulations regarding program director qualifications, financial inspection, and program content should be vacated. The issue of program director qualifications is not ripe for review, the question regarding financial inspection is moot, and the program content rule is void on its face on the ground of overbreadth.
Justice Archer, concurred with Justice Boyle’s analysis and resolution of the issues regarding licensing, the program director, and financial disclosure, but concurred with Justice Cavanagh with regard to the program content issue.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
150 Mich App 254; 388 NW2d 326 (1986) affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Christopher D. Dobyns, Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
Boothby, Zipriek & Yingst (by Lee Boothby and James M. Parker) for the defendants.

Opinion:
Memorandum Opinion. We granted leave in this declaratory judgment case to decide whether the State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, may constitutionally require the Emmanuel Baptist Bible Church and its preschool to obtain a license and comply with certain administrative rules in order to operate their preschool and daycare programs. Defendant objects to the license requirement and to certain administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the childcare organization act, 1973 PA 116, on the ground that the statute and rules violate its constitutional rights to religious freedom contained in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The particular rules objected to are Rule 400.5104, which sets educational qualifications for program directors; Rule 400.5106, which requires day-care centers to provide a program for emotional development of children "including [a] positive self-concept;" and Rule 400.5107, which prohibits corporal punishment. The defendant also objects to § 2(3)(c) and 5(1) of the act, MCL 722.112(3)(c); MSA 25.358(12)(3)(c), and MCL 722.115(1); MSA 25.358(15)(1), to the extent that the provisions give the dss authority to inspect the financial records of the defendant.
From September 15, 1974, to June 1, 1979, the church's preschool was licensed by the dss to operate as a "childcare center" under 1973 PA 116 to care for twenty children from two and one-half through six years of age. During those years the format of the church's preschool and day-care programs varied somewhat. Initially, the preschool program was operated on a half-day, morning basis. By the time of application for the second renewal of a license in 1975, the defendant operated a full-day program, presumably as a day-care center, along with the preschool half-day program. In 1978, twenty to forty children were in the preschool and about ten children remained in the afternoon for day care.
On May 18, 1978, the defendant was issued a two-year license by the dss. However, on May 3, 1979, the principal of the Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, Mr. Mark Asiré, informed representatives of the dss that the defendant no longer wanted its preschool and day-care center to be licensed. This assertion was subsequently confirmed by the church's pastor, Rev. Harold E. Asiré. On November 8, 1979, the dss "closed" the license of the preschool to operate as a childcare center, effective June 1, 1979. However, the church continued thereafter to conduct its preschool/day-care programs until the time of trial in December, 1982. From 1980 to 1982, twelve to twenty-eight children were in defendant's preschool or day-care programs.
The dss filed the instant action against defendant on April 29, 1980, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant is subject to the requirements of the childcare organization act, 1973 PA 116, and. seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining defendant from operating or maintaining a childcare center without a license from the dss. Defendant raised as affirmative defenses that the Legislature had improperly delegated licensing authority to the dss, that the act was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to defendant, and that the administrative rules enumerated above infringed upon its First Amendment rights.
Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a written opinion on January 19, 1984. The court specifically found that defendant's preschool and day-care programs constituted "religiously grounded" activity. Nevertheless, it held that defendant was required to obtain a license to operate its preschool/day-care programs on the ground that the state had a compelling interest in protecting children in childcare centers which outweighed defendant's interest in being free from such state regulation.
The trial court also decided, however, that the administrative rules relating to director qualifications, program content, and corporal punishment, as well as the statutory provisions relating to inspection of financial records, should not be applied to this defendant. The court held that the state "should develop and employ less intrusive means of regulating a church-operated day-care center . In all other respects Defendant Church should be required to obtain a license from [the] dss and to comply with reasonable regulations of fire, safety and health requirements of the Act."
On appeal in the Court of Appeals, the dss challenged that portion of the trial court's order which held that defendant was exempt from particular rules and statutory provisions. Defendant filed a cross-appeal challenging the underlying licensing requirement of the act.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with the circuit court that the defendant's "claim is undoubtedly rooted in [its] fundamentalist Christian doctrine. Moreover, regulation poses some burden on the free exercise of religion . . . ." 150 Mich App 254, 264; 388 NW2d 326 (1986). However, the Court of Appeals found that the state's interest in protecting children outweighed the burden imposed on the defendant's First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals thus affirmed' the trial court's requirement of licensure but reversed the trial court's ruling on exemptions. We then granted leave to appeal. 428 Mich 909 (1987).
A unanimous Court holds that the regulation prohibiting corporal punishment is justified by a compelling state interest and may be enforced.
A majority of the justices is of the opinion that
(1) The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the state from compelling the defendant to conform to the licensure requirements of the childcare organization act.
(2) The state may not enforce the accreditation aspects of the program director qualification rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5104(2)(a), since to do so would violate the free exercise of religious beliefs of the defendants.
(3) The state may not enforce the program content rule, 1980 AACS, R 400.5106(l)(c), since the rule is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally overbroad.
The Court does not decide whether the financial disclosure provisions violate the defendants' rights of the free exercise of religion and freedom of association, since the state has not exercised its statutory authority to compel financial disclosure, making these issues unripe for review.
At least four justices concur in every holding statement.
Riley, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, Archer, and Griffin, concurred.
For convenience, the entities are sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "defendant" or the "church."
As amended by 1978 PA 438; 1980 PA 32, 232, 510; 1981 PA 126; 1984 PA 139. MCL 722.111 et seq.; MSA 25.358(11) et seq.
1980 AACS, R 400.5104.
1980 AACS, R 400.5106.
1980 AACS, R 400.5107.
The administrative rules which govern childcare centers were promulgated pursuant to authority granted in the childcare organization act, MCL 722.112; MSA 25.358(12), effective June 4, 1980. 1980 AACS, R 400.5101 etseq.