Case Name: In the Matter of the Marriage of Larry WEBER, Petitioner on Review, and Marilyn WEBER, Respondent on Review
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2004-05-27
Citations: 337 Or. 55
Docket Number: CC C95-1232DR; CA A113178; SC S49905
Parties: In the Matter of the Marriage of Larry WEBER, Petitioner on Review, and Marilyn WEBER, Respondent on Review.
Judges: Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 337
Pages: 55–83

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted September 4, 2003,
decision of the Court of Appeals reversed; judgment of the circuit court reversed and case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings May 27, 2004
In the Matter of the Marriage of Larry WEBER, Petitioner on Review, and Marilyn WEBER, Respondent on Review.
(CC C95-1232DR; CA A113178; SC S49905)
91 P3d 706
J. Michael Alexander, of Swanson, Lathen, Alexander & McCann, PC, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Gary Zimmer, of Zimmer & Bunch, LLC, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs was Cecil Rennich-Smith.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
DE MUNIZ, J.
Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Opinion:
DE MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this marriage dissolution case is whether, under ORS 107.135, a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's annual income is a substantial change in economic circumstance that permits the reconsideration of a payor spouse's support obligation. Husband, the payor in this case, is a physician. In the months preceding the parties' 1994 marriage dissolution, husband's income had declined significantly due to changes in the medical profession. The parties resolved their divorce by stipulated dissolution judgment. That judgment presumed that husband's reduced income level would continue indefinitely and calculated wife's spousal support based on that amount. Within three years of the parties' marriage dissolution, however, husband's income had returned to the level that husband and wife had enjoyed before husband's income began to decline. In 1999, wife moved to modify the award of spousal support based on husband's increased income, and the trial court granted that motion.
Husband appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Weber and Weber, 184 Or App 190, 56 P3d 406 (2002). This court allowed husband's petition for review. We limit our review to questions of law, ORS 19.415(4) and, on review, we hold that the post-dissolution increase in husband's income is not a substantial change in economic circumstance under ORS 107.135 that permitted the reconsideration of husband's spousal support obligation. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
We state the facts as they were presented in the Court of Appeals' opinion below:
"The parties were married in 1971 while in their junior year of college. At the time of the dissolution in 1995, both parties were 45 years old, and their two sons were 14 and 10, respectively. Wife obtained a master's degree in special education during husband's first two years of medical school. Husband's medical training lasted a total of seven years, and wife provided family support through teaching employment during the remaining five of the seven years. When husband entered the workforce as a physician, the parties agreed that wife would stay at home to start their family and raise the children. Wife was a stay-at-home parent for the remainder of the marriage — approximately 14 years.
"During the last six years of the marriage, husband's professional income, including a $30,000 annual pretax contribution to his retirement plan, averaged more than $260,000 per year. The parties enjoyed a lifestyle commensurate with that level of income, including many vacations, a substantial gift and entertainment budget, and late-model vehicles.
"In 1994, after filing a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage, husband told wife that his income for that year would be drastically reduced because of changes in his practice that had resulted in a substantial reduction in his workload. In a letter to wife, husband stated that his 1994 practice income likely would be less than $150,000 and that 'the bottom [was] not in sight.' Husband's attorney restated that position in two letters to wife's attorney, and husband provided letters from other physicians with whom he practiced affirming that there was little or no expectation that husband's income would return to its previous level.
"Based on the foregoing information, the parties agreed to a stipulated judgment of dissolution that presumed an income level of $150,000 for husband. That presumed income was not explicitly posited in the spousal support provision of the judgment, but the child support worksheet filed with the judgment expressly included it. The judgment presumed that wife's gross monthly income was $823. The parties agreed that husband would pay $3,560 per month in spousal support for four years beginning in June 1995 and that, thereafter, support would continue indefinitely in the amount of $2,500 per month. Husband agreed not to seek a reduction in spousal support for the first four years after the judgment was entered should wife remarry, cohabit with another person, or obtain employment. Husband was required to pay child support for each child until the last day of July following the child's graduation from high school. Thereafter, husband was to be solely responsible for the cost of four years of college for each child. The parties agreed that when the older child graduated from high school, child support would be recalculated without the parties having to show an unanticipated, substantial change of circumstances.
"In September 1999, after the parties' older son graduated from high school, husband filed a motion to modify his child support obligation. In response to that motion, and particularly with reference to the income information provided by husband, wife filed a motion to modify the judgment to increase husband's spousal support obligation. Information disclosed in the modification proceeding showed that husband's income and standard of living had, by 1997, returned to their pre-1994 levels. From 1997 through 1999, husband's pretax income averaged $249,000 and, at trial in this proceeding, husband testified that he expected his year-2000 income to range between $240,000 and $270,000. Husband testified that he had taken several foreign vacations since the dissolution and had purchased a new vehicle. Husband also testified that he had not done any additional training or taken any courses to improve his skills or earning capacity since the dissolution judgment was entered in 1995.
"At the time of the modification hearing in 2000, wife was a half-time public school teacher earning $1,566 per month. Wife also was attempting to establish herself as an artist but had income averaging only $60 per month from that work. In addition, wife had passive income of $220 per month and spousal support of $2,500 per month, yielding total monthly income of about $4,300. Wife testified that her lifestyle had deteriorated since the dissolution; she had taken fewer vacations than before, she had traded her late-model vehicle in for an older car, and she now bought her clothes at resale shops.
"There was no evidence in the modification proceeding that, in negotiating the stipulated judgment of dissolution in 1995, husband had misrepresented his then-current income or that his expectation and assertion that it would not increase in the future were unreasonable."
184 Or App at 192-94.
The trial court granted wife's motion for increased support. In a written decision, the trial court reasoned that it was proper to increase support because an increase would permit wife to enjoy a standard of living not overly disproportionate to the parties' marital standard. In that regard, the trial court wrote:
" 'This is not a subsistence case; it is a standard of living case. Wife is not starving. Husband's monthly expenses reveal a comfortable standard of living, roughly comparable with that of the marriage. Wife lives substantially below the marital standard of living. Now that [h]usband has resumed that lifestyle, [w]ife is entitled to spousal support based on that lifestyle.'"
Id. at 194.
A majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. In its opinion, the majority acknowledged that, in Feves v. Feves, 198 Or 151, 254 P2d 694 (1953), this court had held that a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income ordinarily does not constitute changed circumstances warranting an attendant increase in spousal support. However, the Court of Appeals majority determined:
"This is not an ordinary case. Here, the evidence established that husband had resumed an income level commensurate with the parties' predissolution standard of living and that the resumption was not attributable to any post-dissolution enhancement of husband's own personal qualifications or accomplishments. Thus, wife was not seeking increased support based on post-dissolution income increases (1) that exceeded the marital standard of living; or (2) that wife had not, by reason of her marital contributions to husband's earning capacity, helped produce."
Weber, 184 Or App at 202. From that determination, the majority held that Feves
"does not control where, as here, wife has established that (1) the post-dissolution increase in husband's income was not the product of any post-dissolution enhancement of his personal qualifications or accomplishments and (2) it merely restored husband's income to a level that is consistent with the standard of living that the parties enjoyed during the marriage."
Id. Ultimately, the majority concluded that the trial court did not err in increasing wife's spousal support based on husband's increased post-dissolution income.
Instead of focusing on the modification statute, ORS 107.135, the parties have focused, as did the majority and the dissent in the Court of Appeals, exclusively on the application of this court's decision in Feves Although we ultimately conclude that the Feves decision contributes to our understanding of ORS 107.135 and, therefore, is important to the resolution of this case, we consider it important to highlight the position that Feves and other decisions of this court occupy within the hierarchical order of family law. To the extent that the legislature has enacted pertinent statutes, those statutes are the primary source of law and policy regarding family law issues in Oregon. This court is responsible for applying those legislative directives.
In this case, ORS 107.135(3)(a) and (4)(b) are pertinent to the resolution of wife's motion to modify the spousal support award. ORS 107.135(3) provides, in part:
"In a proceeding under this section to reconsider the spousal or child support provisions of the judgment, the following provisions apply:
"(a) A substantial change in economic circumstances of a party, which may include, but is not limited to, a substantial change in the cost of reasonable and necessary expenses to either party, is sufficient for the court to reconsider its order of support
ORS 107.135(4) also states, in part:
"In considering under this section whether a change in circumstances exists sufficient for the court to reconsider spousal or child support provisions of a judgment, the following provisions apply:
"(a) The court or administrator, as defined in ORS 25.010, shall consider income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources, including but not limited to:
"(A) The reasonable opportunity of each party, the obligor and obligee respectively, to acquire future income and assets.
"(B) Retirement benefits available to the obligor and to the obligee.
"(C) Other benefits to which the obligor is entitled, such as travel benefits, recreational benefits and medical benefits, contrasted with benefits to which the obligee is similarly entitled."
As noted, neither party argues that a particular word or phrase used in the text of either ORS 107.135(3)(a) or (4)(a) compels a particular result in this case. For example, wife does not assert that there has been "a substantial change in the cost of reasonable and necessary expenses to either party," ORS 107.135(3)(a), or that either party's reasonable opportunity "to acquire future income and assets" has changed substantially, ORS 107.135(4)(a)(A). Rather, as we understand it, the basis of wife's claim is the court's power to modify a spousal support award under ORS 107.135(3)(a). We, therefore, must determine whether there has been a "substantial change in economic circumstances of either party" that is "sufficient for the court to reconsider" a previous order of support.
The statutory authority permitting courts to modify a previous spousal support award has existed in this state for well over 100 years. See Corder v. Speake, 37 Or 105, 108, 51 P 647 (1898) (acknowledging that Hill's Annotated Laws § 502 "authorizes the court, upon motion, to set aside, alter, or modify so much of the decree of divorce as relates to the [support] of either party"). Although the legislature had empowered the courts to modify spousal support, nothing in the text of the early statutes explained what circumstances justified a reconsideration of spousal support or what weight a court should accord those circumstances in deciding whether to modify support. Because the legislature had not enumerated those circumstances in the statutes, the courts were left to determine the relevance and weight of the circumstances offered by the parties to justify a reconsideration of a previous spousal support award.
This court did so. For example, in Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or 477, 67 P 508 (1902), this court articulated a formulation of the existing spousal support modification rule:
"Our statute, however, as construed by the decisions above cited, is broad enough to permit of the setting aside, alteration, or modification of the provision made for the maintenance of either spouse. To set aside is 'to annul, to make void': Bouvier, Law Diet. Anything less than an annulment would be an alteration or modification. So it would seem that the court is clothed with power adequate to set aside, as well as to alter or modify, a provision for permanent alimony or allowance as the exigencies of the case may require.
"Notwithstanding, the allowance should be treated as res adjudicata as to the then existing circumstances and conditions, and not subject to annulment or modification, except upon new conditions subsequently arising, or, perhaps, upon facts occurring before the decree, of which the party was excusably ignorant at the time of its rendition!.]"
Id. at 485 (emphasis added). It was only through the adjudication of individual cases over a number of years that this court formulated, refined, and gave content to the "new conditions subsequently arising" rule stated in Brandt. Feves was one of those cases.
When this court decided Feves in 1953, neither the modification statute nor case law provided a definitive answer to the question whether a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income could, without more, permit the court to order an upward modification of support payments. The husband in Feves was a physician who "had not yet become well established in his chosen profession at the time of divorce." 198 Or at 162. When he and his wife dissolved their marriage, the husband agreed, as part of the divorce settlement, to pay monthly support to the wife as long as she remained unmarried; the trial court subsequently incorporated that agreement into the resulting divorce decree. Id. at 153. Eight years later, the parties entered into a second agreement. In it, the husband agreed, among other things, to make a single lump sum payment to the wife, and the wife agreed to forego any further support installments. Id. at 154-55.
In the years between the parties' first agreement and their second, however, the husband had remarried. He and his second wife, through their joint efforts, began to expand the husband's medical practice. Eventually, the husband's annual income substantially exceeded the income level that he and his former wife had enjoyed during their marriage. As a result, over 10 years after the parties had divorced, the husband's former wife sought a reinstatement and increase in alimony "not actually based upon any showing of real need on her part, but rather based upon the proposition that in recent years [the husband] has enjoyed a substantial increase in his annual income." Id. at 162. The trial court agreed with wife that husband's increase in his annual income was a "changed condition[ ]" justifying a modification of husband's spousal support obligation. On appeal, this court rejected that proposition. In doing so, this court also recognized three important principles governing the modification of spousal support agreements.
First, as a general matter, this court observed that agreements regarding spousal support — agreements made without fraud or misrepresentation, entered into freely, and approved by the courts — should be enforced, absent contravening public policy concerns. In that regard, this court stated:
"It is axiomatic that public policy requires that persons of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice; and it is only when some other overpowering rule of public policy intervenes, rendering such agreement unfair or illegal, that they will not be enforced."
Id. at 159.
A second principle that Feves recognized was that the criteria for modifying support awards are different than those used to determine them initially. In that regard, this court acknowledged the validity of the long-standing rule that,
" '[i]n determining the allowances to a divorced [payee spouse] for [ ] support and maintenance and for the care, custody and education of the minor children, it is proper to take into consideration the social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life which [the payee spouse] and [the] children probably would have enjoyed but for the divorce.' "
Id. at 163 (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 183 Or 297, 304, 192 P2d 986 (1948) (emphasis omitted)). The court, however, concluded that different considerations controlled the subsequent modification of those awards:
"In a motion for modification of a decree to increase or decrease the amount of alimony payments the financial status of the [payor spouse] is an important factor to consider in connection with his ability to pay. But his improved financial status, if any, does not of itself ordinarily warrant an increase, and the amount of such increase, if it be determined that an increase is necessary and proper, is usually governed by considerations different from those which apply to an original allowance at time of decree. It is largely governed by the necessities of the former [payor spouse] and the ability of the former [payor spouse] to pay."
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, although the parties' predissolution standard of living is relevant to establish an initial spousal support award, a subsequent upward modification of that award is based more properly on considerations of the payee spouse's increased needs and the payor spouse's concomitant ability to meet them.
Finally, the third principle derived from Feves is that, when a marriage is dissolved, courts should not interpret statutory support obligations in a manner that continues the rights of the parties as if no dissolution judgment had been granted:
"Divorce terminates the marital status. Thereafter, the parties bear no relation to each other. They are as strangers. But for the statute, no obligation whatever would exist for further support and maintenance of the former [spouse].
"It is manifest that this statutory obligation for support and maintenance should not be so interpreted as to continue the rights of the former [payee spouse] just as though no divorce had been granted. The statute does not contemplate a continuing right in [the payee spouse] to share in future accumulations of wealth by [the] divorced [payor spouse], to which [the payee spouse] contributes nothing."
Id. at 164.
In summary, based on the three principles discussed above, Feves held that a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income "does not of itself ordinarily" constitute a "changed condition" justifying a reconsideration of the payor spouse's support obligation. Eventually, that "changed condition" rule evolved to require that a party seeking spousal support reconsideration prove that a substantial change in circumstances had taken place since the original dissolution judgment. See, e.g., Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 354, 571 P2d 277 (1977) (stating principle).
In 1982, this court acknowledged in McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or 772, 652 P2d 1247 (1982), that the legislature's modification statute still did not require a showing of changed circumstances. That requirement, the McDonnal court noted, remained a court-created rule:
"This statute, while granting the court the power to set aside, alter or modify the support provisions of a decree at any time after dissolution, does not specifically require a showing of changed circumstances. It is a rule of case law, not statutory law, that the party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances since the original decree. Prime v. Prime, [172 Or 34, 139 P2d 550 (1943)]; Grove and Grove, [280 Or 341, 571 P2d 477 (1977)]. The rule has become so well established that this court said almost thirty years ago that it had "become hornbook law in this state.' Feves v. Feves, 198 Or at 159. The purpose of this rule has been said to be the avoidance of relitigation of matters settled by the final decree. H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 456 (1968)."
Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
By 1987, however, the legislature had enacted the "substantial change in economic circumstances" phrase into ORS 107.135 (1987):
"(2) In a proceeding under this section to reconsider the spousal or child support provisions of the decree, the following provisions apply:
"(a) A substantial change in economic circumstances of a party, which may include, but is not limited to, a substantial change in the cost of reasonable and necessary expenses to either party, is sufficient for the court to reconsider its order of support."
(Emphasis added.) As noted, that phrase — "[a] substantial change in economic circumstances of a party" — continues in the present version of ORS 107.135(3)(a).
The post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income could be interpreted as a substantial change in economic circumstance if the text of the statute were our sole consideration. However, neither of the experienced counsel in this case has argued at any stage of the proceedings that the rule enunciated in Feves does not provide context and substantive meaning for the current statutory phrase. Nor should they have done so. As part of this court's well-established statutory construction methodology, this court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statutes. See State v. Waterhouse, 209 Or 424, 436, 307 P2d 327 (1957) (stating presumption that statute is enacted "in the light of such existing judicial decisions as have a direct bearing upon it"); see also Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 438, 918 P2d 808 (1996) (citing Waterhouse presumption as part of contextual analysis when this court's earlier decisions have direct bearing on interpretation of later-enacted or amended statutes).
That is the case here. The Feves rule had been in existence for over 35 years when the legislature included the phrase "substantial change in economic circumstances" within the spousal modification statute. See Willis and Willis, 314 Or 566, 569 n 1, 840 P2d 697 (1992) (phrase "substantial change in economic circumstances" added to modification statute in 1987). In light of the above-referenced rule of statutory construction, and in the absence of any argument to the contrary, we are confident that the legislature intended to include the Feves rule within the substantive meaning of the statutory phrase, "substantial change in economic circumstances." Therefore, we conclude that, under ORS 107.135(3)(a), a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income "does not of itself ordinarily" constitute a "substantial change in economic circumstances" requiring a court to reconsider a previous spousal support award. We now turn to a consideration of the rule's application in this case.
As noted, there has been a post-dissolution change in husband's income as that term commonly is understood. As Feves makes clear, however, a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income, unaccompanied by any showing of, for example, a change in the payee spouse's needs, is ordinarily not a substantial change in economic circumstances within the substantive meaning of that statutory phrase. Although wife argues to the contrary, there is nothing factually in this case that is sufficient to preclude the application of the ordinary rule.
It is a reality of married life that a spouse's income may fluctuate over the course of a lengthy marriage. At the time that the marriage is being dissolved, the fact that one party's income has increased or decreased during the marriage and the context in which that fluctuation occurred, are factors that can and should be considered by the parties and the court in determining the financial aspects of the dissolution judgment. Through a variety of property and income arrangements, the parties can account for both the past and future earning potential of either spouse. See Grove, 280 Or at 344 (financial parts of dissolution judgment are worked out together, and none can be considered in isolation, e.g., one spouse may be awarded specific assets as part of property to provide that spouse with income).
The spousal support provisions at issue here were the product of a court-approved stipulated dissolution judgment voluntarily entered into by the parties. The parties' own resolution of the spousal support issue is entitled to great weight. See McDonnal, 293 Or at 779 ("In cases where a support agreement has been incorporated into the decree in lieu of an evidentiary hearing and factual determination by the court the agreement itself is the court's only measure of the equities between the parties. The parties' own resolution of their dispute should be accorded great weight."). All that wife has shown is that, at the time of their marriage dissolution, the parties concluded, based on the available information, that husband's current income reflected husband's future earning potential. That conclusion proved to be wrong. Without more, however, wife has failed to present a factual predicate permitting the court to reconsider the parties previously agreed upon level of spousal support. The trial court's contrary conclusion and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of that conclusion were error.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Although not reported in the Court of Appeals' factual recitation, wife testified at the hearing that she owned and lived in a home worth $400,000, having an equity of $350,000, had a retirement account worth about $500,000, and had various investment accounts worth another $34,000.
Three judges dissented. Weber and Weber, 184 Or App 190, 56 P3d 406 (2002) (Landau, J., joined by Diets, C. J., and Edmonds, J., dissenting).
The dissolution, judgment at issue here was entered in 1994, the motion to modify it was submitted in 1999, and a hearing on that matter was held in 2000. In 2003, provisions were added to ORS 107.135 — not relevant to this case — that resulted in a renumbering of the subsections within that statute. Here, neither party has presented an argument based on the text of any earlier version of ORS 107.135. The relevant subsections of the statute have remained unchanged save for a shift in numbering. As a result, we will refer to the 2003 version of the modification statute throughout this opinion because its relevant provisions remain applicable in this case.
At the time, OCLA § 9-915 provided, in part:
"At any time after a [divorce] decree is given, the court or judge thereof, upon the motion of either party, shall have the power to set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide for the appointment of trustees for the care and custody of minor children, or the nurture and/or education thereof, or the maintenance of either party to the suit
The husband also agreed to pay a substantial increase in monthly child support and to take out an irrevocable life insurance policy on himself, with the parties' child as beneficiary.
Thirty years later, in McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or 772, 779, 652 P2d 1247 (1982), this court again cited that holding, adding:
"Once approved by the court and incorporated into the decree, agreements entered into by the parties are to be enforced as a matter of public policy."
At the time that McDonnal was decided, ORS 107.135(1) (1981) provided, in part:
"The court has the power at any time after a decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage or of separation is granted, upon the motion of either party and after service of notice on the other party in the manner provided by law for service of a summons, to:
"(a) Set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide for the support of a party ."
We note that the statutory phrase "substantial change in economic circumstances" also applies to the modification of child support. However, the criteria for modification of child support are substantially different from that of spousal support, because the family relationships are different. The legislature has enacted other specific statutes with regard to child support and the modification of child support. See ORS 25.270 to 25.290 (setting special formula for child support, entitling child to benefit from the income of both parents to the same extent that child would have benefitted had family unit remained intact; and authorizing child support modification proceedings on two-year cycle).
The dissent argues that we have misread Feves and, in doing so, have created a new and "demanding threshold standard for the reconsideration process," one that, in the dissent's view, "contravenes the plain terms of Oregon's current statute." 337 Or at 80 (Durham, J., dissenting). With respect, it is the dissent that has misread Feves and has failed to appreciate the importance of the principles established in Feves and now embodied in ORS 107.135. To a large degree, the utility of Feves is realized in the fact that it provides a measure of finality and predictability for spousal support judgments, while maintaining the flexibility necessary to meet the genuine needs of former spouses when the circumstances of their post-dissolution lives change significantly — a crucial point that seems to have escaped the dissent. In contrast, the dissent's interpretation of ORS 107.135(3)(a) sacrifices those tenets of finality and predictability in favor of an open-ended invitation to relitigate support judgments any time that market forces provide an economic windfall to one spouse or the other. That is not what the legislature intended.
Although neither party refers to the statute, we note that ORS 107.104(1) provides:
"It is the policy of this state:
"(a) To encourage the settlement of suits for marital annulment, dissolution or separation; and
"(b) For courts to enforce the terms of settlements described in subsection (2) of this section to the fullest extent possible, except when to do so would violate the law or would clearly contravene public policy."
Without regard to the dispute over the legislature's intent, the dissent fails to address the simple proof problem that confronts wife in this case. There simply is no evidence in the record that supports the dissent's conclusion that an "upward adjustment in the spousal support award is well warranted." The parties did not litigate the terms of their marriage dissolution; rather, they created them together, and the court ratified the resulting agreement. No value ever was established with regard to wife's contribution to husband's enhanced earning capacity. In fact, by the terms of that agreement, husband kept his enhanced earning capacity for himself. There was nothing in that agreement indicating specifically what he gave to retain that, its reciprocal value to wife, or whether wife retained future rights therein. On that limited evidentiary record, there is simply no basis from which to calculate a modified award of spousal support that is not arbitrary.