Case Name: WILLCOX, IVES & CO. v. JEFFCOAT
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1926-06-01
Citations: 135 S.C. 149
Docket Number: 12004
Parties: WILLCOX, IVES & CO. v. JEFFCOAT
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 135
Pages: 149–155

Head Matter:
12004
WILLCOX, IVES & CO. v. JEFFCOAT
(133 S. E., 463)
March, 1922.
Messrs. Graydon & Graydon, for appellant,
Messrs. Bfird & Carroll and Timmerman & Graham, for respondents,
June 1, 1926.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Acting 'Associate Justice R. O. Purdy.
An opinion was written in this case by Mr. Justice Eraser, who' died before the case was finally passed upon, and the case was reargued. The following is the opinion as written by Mr. Justice Eraser, and which we adopt.
"This is an action on two notes given for fertilizer. The defendant pleaded payment of one note and failure of consideration on the other, and counterclaim for damages on account of deleterious matter, to wit, trona potash, which actively damaged the crop. The verdict was for the plaintiff on one note, and the defendant appealed.
"The first assignment of error is the exclusion of evidence.
"The defendant's witness was on the stand, and stated that he farmed adjacent land; that the kind of land was the same, the seasons were the same and the work was the same. The only difference was that he used fertilizer that had no potash in it, and the defendant used fertilizer with this trona potash. His Honor, the trial Judge, excluded the evidence on the ground that the conditions were not the same in that the fertilizer was not the same. That was the point in the case. The results were different, and the only difference was the potash. The defendant was trying to show that there were two differences, the potash and the result, and they were asking the Court to find from that fact that the injury to the crop was due to the presence of the potash. This was error.
"The next assignment of error is in the admission of evidence.
"When the defendant was on the stand, the plaintiff's counsel read a letter to the defendant, and he was asked, on cross-examination, if he had recieved such a letter, and he replied that he had received it. The letter was not offered in evidence. Tater, in the course of the trial, the-defendant asked that it be stricken out. His Honor said it was too late, inasmuch as no objection has been made at the time. This was harmless, if error. The letter was not in evidence and could not be referred to in argument, and the jury had already heard it.
"The other exceptions refer to a refusal to grant a new trial. A new trial must be ordered anyway, and these exceptions raise questions that are academic."
It will be noted that the eighth exception was not specifically passed upon. That exception is as follows :
"Because his Honor erred in refusing to charge the fol lowing proposition of law, submitted by the defendant, to wit: 'The failure or refusal of a party to produce evidence peculiarly within his knowledge and control, which would have an important bearing upon the facts in dispute, warrants the inference that it would be unfavorable to his contention.' "
This was modified.
The basis of the exception is that his Honor modified this request, by leaving it to the jury to say whether or not such failure warrants the inference that it would be unfavorable to his contention.
This Court, by Mr. Justice Cothran, in Smith v. Southern Railway Company, 121 S. C., 94, said, in reference to the failure of the plaintiff to produce information in order to make his claim more definite:
"All of this information was necessarily in the power of the plaintiff to furnish. The presumption is, that having it and not producing it, the information was to his detriment."
It would appear that unless the principle so declared be overruled we are bound by that decision, and the plaintiff was-entitled to have the charge as requested.
The exceptions referred to- by Justice Fraser and the eighth exception should be sustained, the judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.
Reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.
Messrs. Justices Marion and Cothran dissent.