Case Name: Harold TUTHILL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-09-15
Citations: 518 So. 2d 1300
Docket Number: No. 86-847
Parties: Harold TUTHILL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 518
Pages: 1300–1305

Head Matter:
Harold TUTHILL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 86-847.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 15, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1988.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Beth C. Weitzner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Doran and Ralph Barreira, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
In 1983, following entry of his nolo con-tendere plea to the charge of committing a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child, appellant Harold Tuthill was sentenced to a four-year term of probation. In 1984, the state filed a new information and an affidavit alleging that Tuthill violated his probation by committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a minor. At the conclusion of a probation violation hearing, the trial court revoked probation and sentenced Tuthill to serve fifteen years in the state penitentiary. The state then entered a nolle prossequi of the information charging the substantive offense that formed the basis of the probation violation. In the ensuing appeal, this court ruled that Tuthill "was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on the question of the severity of the sentence to be imposed." Tuthill v. State, 478 So.2d 409, 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 484 So.2d 10 (Fla.1986). Although we affirmed the trial court's revocation of probation, we remanded the cause to the trial court for resentencing. Tut-hill.
On remand, the trial judge recused himself from the case. A successor judge conducted a hearing and imposed sentence. Deviating from guidelines' recommendations, the trial court sentenced Tuthill to a term of fifteen-years' imprisonment. The trial court's reasons for deviating from the guidelines recommendations were:
1. That the defendant was placed on probation in case number 83-6740 for Lewd and Lascivious Act [sic] Upon a Child.
2. That the defendant was found to be in violation of his probation before Judge Mastos and came before this Court for sentencing following the recu-sal of Judge Mastos.
3. That the substantive offense which was the basis of the probation violation was substantially similar to the charge on which the defendant was placed on probation.
4. That the new offense occurred within six months of the defendant being placed on probation.
Tuthill raises two points on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court committed reversible error in basing its departure from the recommended sentence on an offense which did not result in conviction. Second, Tuthill maintains that he is entitled to withdraw his election to be sentenced under the guidelines because changes in the law have deprived him of the right to appellate review of his sentence. We agree and reverse.
Our disposition of this cause turns on the issue of Tuthill's entitlement to withdraw his election to be sentenced under the guidelines. When Tuthill chose to be sentenced under the guidelines and forfeited his right to parole, he was entitled to appellate review of his sentence. Subsequent to that election, however, the legislature amended the statute governing guidelines sentences, § 921.001(5), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986), and eliminated appellate review of the extent of the trial court's departure from sentencing guidelines. Recently, however, in Miller v. Florida, — U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), the Supreme Court of the United States declared modifications in sentencing guidelines to be substantive changes subject to ex post facto doctrine. "[A] change in the law that alters a substantial right can be ex post facto 'even if the statute takes a seemingly procedural form.' " Miller, — U.S. at —, 107 S.Ct. at 2453 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed. 2d 17, 23 n. 12 (1981)). Under Miller's pronouncement, Tuthill is entitled either to withdraw his election or to rely on the guidelines law in effect when he made his election: legislative modifications limiting the extent of appellate review contradict the voluntariness of his election to be sentenced under the guidelines. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
As for the sentence imposed, the state maintains that the egregious circumstances surrounding the probation violation warrant departure from the guidelines. State v. Pentaude, 500 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987). In Pentaude, the supreme court held that when " 'the underlying reasons for violation of probation (as opposed to the mere fact of violation) are more than a minor infraction and are sufficiently egregious, [the trial court] is entitled to depart from the presumptive guidelines range and impose an appropriate sentence within the statutory limit.' " Pentaude, 500 So.2d at 528 (quoting State v. Pentaude, 478 So.2d 1147,1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). Pentaude delineates some of the factors which may constitute clear and convincing reasons for departure beyond the next cell:
The trial judge has discretion to so depart based upon the character of the violation, the number of conditions violated, the number of times he has been placed on probation, the length of time he has been on probation before violating the terms and conditions, and any other factor material or relevant to the defend-' ant's character.
Pentaude, 500 So.2d at 528.
In imposing sentence on Tuthill, the trial court correctly pointed to the character of the probation violation rather than the mere fact of the violation; however, unlike the defendant in Pentaude, Tuthill was never convicted of the substantive crime on which the probation violation was based because the state dropped that charge. It is well established that "[Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to the instant offenses for which convictions have not been obtained." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(ll). Recent cases have reiterated that principle. Clark v. State, 490 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mack v. State, 489 So.2d 205, 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); see Williams v. State, 500 So.2d 501 (Fla.1987). Cf Cahill v. State, 505 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (where defendant is convicted of second crime while on probation, and second crime is of same type as first crime for which he was put on probation, trial court may depart from guidelines); Gissendaner v. State, 504 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (where defendant who pled nolo conten-dere to offense which was same kind of offense for which the defendant had been placed on community control, trial court's departure from the guidelines is justified). Thus, in the absence of a conviction to support departure from the guidelines, the court's primary reason fails.
Next, we consider the trial court's reliance on the timing of the probation violation as a reason for departure. Although, under some circumstances, the timing of an offense may constitute a valid ground for departure, see Swain v. State, 455 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), here the record reveals that there is some uncertainty as to when the probation violation occurred and that conflicts concerning the date were not resolved in accordance with the requisite reasonable doubt standard. State v. Mischler, 488 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1986) (" '[C]lear and convincing reasons' require that the facts supporting the reasons be credible and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.")- Thus, the remaining reason for departure fails, too. The invalidity of the trial court's reasons for departing from the guidelines mandates reversal.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result only.
. See abo Spivey v. State, 481 So.2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), where this court held that a defendant's violation of probation by committing two new offenses within one month after being placed on probation constitutes a clear and con- vincing reason for departure from the guidelines.