Case Name: BARNETT BANK OF MARTIN COUNTY, N.A., Barnett Banks, Inc., and Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., Petitioners, v. RGA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Saul R. Spector, Marianne Spector and Anthony Carpentier, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-28
Citations: 606 So. 2d 1258
Docket Number: No. 92-1975
Parties: BARNETT BANK OF MARTIN COUNTY, N.A., Barnett Banks, Inc., and Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., Petitioners, v. RGA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Saul R. Spector, Marianne Spector and Anthony Carpentier, Respondents.
Judges: DOWNEY, and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 1258–1260

Head Matter:
BARNETT BANK OF MARTIN COUNTY, N.A., Barnett Banks, Inc., and Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., Petitioners, v. RGA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Saul R. Spector, Marianne Spector and Anthony Carpentier, Respondents.
No. 92-1975.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 28, 1992.
Gary M. Carman and Gayle E. Miller of Baker & McKenzie, Miami, for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Esco of Gaebe, Murphy, Mullen & Antonelli, Coral Gables, for respondents/RGA and Carpentier.
Gregory C. Picken, West Palm Beach, for respondents/Spectors.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This petition arises from four consolidated cases in Martin County Circuit Court that involve certain loan transactions between petitioner Barnett Bank of Martin County, N.A., as lender, and SRS Equity Inc. and RGA Development Company or Saul R. Spector, respondents, as borrowers. Saul R. Spector, Marianne Spector and Anthony P. Carpentier are alleged to be guarantors of the subject loans. The cases having been consolidated for discovery purposes, the trial court appointed a special master to hear numerous discovery issues that arose. The special master issued a first report and recommendations on several pending items, including a motion for protective order filed by petitioners Barnett Bank of Martin County, N.A., and Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., on or about May 1, 1992.
In the motion for protective order, petitioners Barnett Bank of Martin County, N.A., and Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., stated that on April 27, 1992, counsel for respondent Saul Spector had noticed some thirty-eight depositions, which petitioners alleged were noticed solely because the persons listed were, or are, members of certain committees or hold a directorship of Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., or Barnett Bank of Martin County, N.A., or have only been involved in the case since the institution of the litigation. Petitioners argued in this motion that it was evident from the nature of the short time scheduled for these depositions (one-half hour for most, one hour for some) that the sole purpose for the depositions was harassment and annoyance. The special master completed his first report and recommendations, which he served by mail on May 29, 1992. On June 3, 1992, the trial court rendered its order on the special master's first report and recommendations. Said order is the subject of the instant petition for writ of common law certiorari.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.490(h) provides that a party may serve exceptions to a master's report within ten days from its service upon a party. It is reversible error to enter an order on a master's report within said time without consideration of timely filed exceptions. See Kay v. Kay, 430 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). See also Elliott v. Elliott, 478 So.2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Wyman v. Wyman, 430 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Berk v. Berk, 423 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Nevertheless, the order under review was entered upon a master's report within the ten day period without ruling on timely filed exceptions.
Respondents do not disagree with the foregoing; however, they contend that the doctrine of acceptance of benefits precludes petitioners from relying upon rule 1.490. We agree with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Niles v. County of Volusia, 405 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So.2d 471 (Fla.1982), that the doctrine applies only to final adjudications on the merits, which renders the doctrine inapplicable here. Accordingly, we deny the motions to dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari.
We grant the petition for writ of certio-rari and quash the order under review and remand the cause with directions to reconsider the petitioners' application for protective order.
DOWNEY, and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
POLEN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.