Case Name: John R. LANE, Jr., Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below)
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1981-12-03
Citations: 428 N.E.2d 28
Docket Number: No. 1180S424
Parties: John R. LANE, Jr., Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Judges: GIVAN, C. J., and DeBRULER and PI-VARNIK, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 428
Pages: 28–33

Head Matter:
John R. LANE, Jr., Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 1180S424.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Dec. 3, 1981.
Nancy L. Broyles, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
HUNTER, Justice.
John R. Lane, Jr., was convicted by a jury of two counts of robbery, a class B felony. Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years with the Indiana Department of Corrections. In his direct appeal, he presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to grant defendant's motion for mistrial based on the alleged improperly tainted jury;
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and
3. Whether the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant upon two counts of robbery for his conduct, which constituted only one offense.
The record reveals that on September 6, 1979, the Union Federal Savings and Loan branch office at 6200 East 46th Street in Indianapolis was robbed at gunpoint. In the early afternoon hours, a tall black male entered the bank and approached teller Denise Roger's window counter. Rogers, who was in conference with fellow employees Lillian Oancea and Sharon Kirk in a back room, left the room to attend the man. The man pointed a handgun at her and directed her back into the other room with her fellow employees. He then ordered Lillian Oancea to the outer room, where, at gunpoint, he ordered Oancea to give him the money. She complied, taking the cash inventory from each of the teller windows individually assigned to her and Rogers. He then ordered Oancea, together with the two employees in the back room,' into the furnace room, and fled.
I.
Defendant claims the trial court erred when it refused to grant his motion for mistrial made at the outset of trial. His motion was predicated on the fact that one of the jurors sworn for the trial was aware that a prospective witness for the defense was facing charges on an unrelated offense in another trial that same day. In response to the motion, the trial court proposed the juror in question be discharged from duty and replaced with the alternate juror. The record reveals that both the state and defendant's counsel expressly and unequivocally agreed that the court's proposed remedy was agreeable.
Defendant cannot now complain of a course of action in which he acquiesced and induced the trial court to take. Jolly v. Modisett, (1971) 257 Ind. 426, 275 N.E.2d 780. His acquiescence rendered the motion for mistrial moot, as the trial court correctly noted for the record.
II.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. His argument is two-pronged: (1) he maintains the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the person who entered the savings and loan association and, at gunpoint, took the money, and (2) he asserts the evidence was insufficient to establish that United States currency was taken "from the person or presence of Denise M. Rogers," as the state had alleged in the charging instrument.
It is well settled that when the sufficiency of evidence is raised as an issue on appeal, this Court will not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the state, together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. If, from that viewpoint, there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the fact-finder's conclusion, it will not be set aside. Moon v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 740; Henderson v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 334, 343 N.E.2d 776.
The testimony regarding the identification of defendant as the perpetrator was conflicting. Consistent with our standard of review, the record does reveal that savings and loan association employees, Rogers, Oancea, and Kirk, each made unequivocal in-court identifications of defendant. Rogers and Oancea also made unequivocal pretrial photographic identifications.
In support of his argument, defendant relies on discrepancies between defendant's appearance and physical descriptions the women gave to police and at trial, such as facial hair. Similar discrepancies in the women's descriptions of his clothing and automobile are relied on by defendant to buttress his argument. These contentions strike at the credibility of the witnesses. The jury had the opportunity to view the physical evidence; we are not at liberty in these circumstances to supplant our subjective evaluation for the conclusion of the jury, for it is well established that identification testimony need not be unequivocal. Lottie v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 124, 311 N.E.2d 800; Wilson v. State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 476, 360 N.E.2d 1010.
Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish that United States currency was taken "from the person or presence of Denise M. Rogers," as the state alleged in the charging instrument, presents a somewhat more arguable question. The evidence is uncontro-verted that Denise Rogers was not present in the general area of the tellers' windows when Oancea took the money from each of the teller's cash drawers and handed it to defendant. Rather, at that moment, she was in the back room of the savings and loan association. The evidence does not reveal whether the door joining the two rooms was open or closed, but Rogers' testimony was that she could not view defendant and Oancea during that period. It is uncontradicted that money was taken from her assigned teller's window.
In the subsection of its brief devoted to arguments concerning defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, the state has presented no analysis concerning this aspect of defendant's evidentiary claims. In its subsection devoted to defendant's claim of sentencing error, however, the state has presented the following argument:
"The evidence establishes that defendant threatened both Denise Rogers and Lillian Oancea with a gun. The fact that he threatened both bank tellers is indicative of his intent to take money from them. Following the spirit of the law, Miss Rogers' presence was established at the commencement of the crime; when defendant drew his gun and threatened her."
In response to defendant's claim that his conduct constituted only one offense rather than two, the state also argues, albeit impliedly, that Williams v. State, (1979) Ind., 395 N.E.2d 239, is contrary to the "spirit" of the robbery statute. In Williams, this Court held that an individual who robbed a business establishment, taking that business's money from four employees, could be convicted of only one count of armed robbery. Id.
The issues before us consequently are inextricably intertwined. We therefore consolidate them for purposes of discussion. In addition, to facilitate clarity, we reiterate the elements of robbery as statutorily defined:
"A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person:
"(1) by using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
"(2) by putting any person in fear; "commits robbery, a Class C felony. However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon, and a Class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any other person." Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, supra.
Notwithstanding the state's failure to expressly argue the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, it could be said that the "taking" was from the presence of Rogers. Groce v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 582, 236 N.E.2d 597; Paulson v. State, (1979) Ind. App., 393 N.E.2d 211. Those decisions were predicated upon the rationale that "presence" is broadly defined to encompass objects of value which, but for the intimidation of the person, would be within his or her control. Id. Accordingly, taking an object from another room has been held to constitute a taking from the presence of a person. Groce v. State, supra; Paulson v. State, supra.
Still, we are not persuaded that the application of Williams v. State, supra, to the circumstances present here would defeat the "spirit" of the robbery statute, as the state asserts. The state argues that the fact that defendant "threatened both bank tellers is indicative of his intent to take money from them." The defendant's intent, quite obviously, was to take the bank's money; he took no personal property of either Rogers or Oancea.
It is on this basis that the rule of Williams v. State, supra, is predicated. Were we to overrule the Williams rule, the implication would be that defendant's act of replacing Rogers with Oancea was, under the state's rationale, the factor which transformed his conduct into two armed robberies rather than one. Furthermore, under the rationale of the state, coupled with Groce v. State, supra, and Paulson v. State, supra, the state could conceivably have charged defendant with a third armed robbery: that of Sharon Kirk. She was manager of the branch savings and loan association and remained in the back room throughout the robbery. With her access to the tellers' drawers, together with the fact that defendant pointed the handgun at her, it would follow that a third robbery also occurred were Williams v. State, supra, to be overruled. We do not believe the robbery statute was intended to provide multiple punishments for conduct which amounts to a single unitary transaction.
We are consequently persuaded that the circumstances here buttress our conclusion that the rule enunciated in Williams v. State, supra, perpetuates rather than circumvents the spirit of Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1, supra. In addition, the rule is consonant with the proposition that doubts in the enforcement of the criminal code are to be resolved against the imposition of a harsher punishment. Bell v. United States, (1955) 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905; Williams v. State, supra. We thus reaffirm Williams v. State, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conduct constituted only one armed robbery offense. The conviction and sentence imposed under Count I are affirmed; the conviction and sentence imposed under Count II are hereby vacated.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
GIVAN, C. J., and DeBRULER and PI-VARNIK, JJ., concur.
PRENTICE, J., dissents with opinion.