Case Name: Andy BORDACS, as Executor of the Estate of Gladys Bordacs, Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn V. KIMMEL, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1962-04-03
Citations: 139 So. 2d 506
Docket Number: No. 61-362
Parties: Andy BORDACS, as Executor of the Estate of Gladys Bordacs, Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn V. KIMMEL, Appellee.
Judges: Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and HORTON and BARKDULL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 139
Pages: 506–509

Head Matter:
Andy BORDACS, as Executor of the Estate of Gladys Bordacs, Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn V. KIMMEL, Appellee.
No. 61-362.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
April 3, 1962.
Rehearing Denied April 23, 1962.
Shevin, Goodman & Holtzman and J. H. Kaiser, Miami, for appellant.
Claude Pepper and Albert Harum, Miami, for appellee.
Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and HORTON and BARKDULL, JJ.

Opinion:
BARKDULL, Judge.
In this appeal, the appellant-defendant seeks review of a final decree of specific performance and urges many points for consideration.
The primary question to be determined by this appeal is: Did the appellant waive the provisions of § 90.05 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. [commonly known as the "dead man's statute"] by using the depositions of the appellee in support of a motion for summary decree, not only for the purposes of the summary decree hearing but also for the purpose of the final hearing after the summary decree was denied? This question must be answered in the affirmative. The mere taking of a deposition will not waive the protection of § 90.05 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. See: Small v. Shure, Fla. 1957, 94 So.2d 371; 35 Fla.Jur., Witness, § 127. But, after a deposition is taken, if it is used in support or defense of a motion for summary judgment, the protection afforded by the statute is waived. Embrey v. Southern Gas and Electric Corp., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 258; Macknett v. Rogers, Fla.App. 1960, 119 So.2d 72. Once a waiver of the provisions of § 90.05 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is made in a pending cause, it is waived for all further proceedings in the same action. 56 Am.Jur., Waiver, § 24; 92 C.J.S. Waiver p. 1069. Among the other points raised by the appellant is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of a constructive trust, requiring the redelivery of the real property to the appellee. Viewing the evidence with the presumptions in favor of the prevailing party, as we must [Meola v. Sparks, 138 Fla. 364, 189 So. 408; Carolina Lumber Company v. Daniel, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 156; 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, § 314], it appears that the funds which purchased the property in question were earned solely by the appellee and that the appellee paid substantially all the mortgage payments on the property involved. These facts, coupled with the unrefuted testimony that at the time of the conveyance to the deceased the appellee received a deed of reconveyance [which became lost prior to the recording], clearly is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the chancellor that there was, in fact, a constructive trust requiring the re-conveyance of the property to the appellee. The other points raised by the appellant have been examined and found to be without merit.
We therefore affirm the decree of the lower court granting reconveyance of the property involved to the appellee.
Affirmed.