Case Name: THE PEOPLE ex rel. THOMAS STAPLETON and Another, Respondents (Ninth Ward), v. GEORGE H. BELL and Another, Appellants, and five other cases, covering two Districts of the Seventh Ward, one District of the First Ward, Eighth Ward and Twelfth Ward of the City of Troy
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-12
Citations: 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 567
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE ex rel. THOMAS STAPLETON and Another, Respondents (Ninth Ward), v. GEORGE H. BELL and Another, Appellants, and five other cases, covering two Districts of the Seventh Ward, one District of the First Ward, Eighth Ward and Twelfth Ward of the City of Troy.
Judges: Learned, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 61
Pages: 567–577

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE ex rel. THOMAS STAPLETON and Another, Respondents (Ninth Ward), v. GEORGE H. BELL and Another, Appellants, and five other cases, covering two Districts of the Seventh Ward, one District of the First Ward, Eighth Ward and Twelfth Ward of the City of Troy.
Inspectors of election — duty of, to allow votes, believed by them to be illegal, to be sworn in.
Upon an appeal from an order directing that a mandamus issue commanding the defendants, who were inspectors of election, and who, together with the relators, composed the hoard of inspectors for the election district in the ninth ward of the City of Troy, to sign the returns of the said election, it appeared that, upon the close of the polls on the day of election, the hoard counted the ballots, canvassed the votes and proclaimed the results in that district, and that such results, so proclaimed, were correctly stated in returns in the form required by law, but that the defendants refused and still refuse to sign them.
The defendants made affidavits that, “during said election, to deponents’ knowledge, there were at least seventy fraudulent votes offered at said polls. By fraudulent votes deponents mean that persons who did not reside within said election district, and who were not registered and who were not entitled to vote, appeared before the said hoard and fraudulently and falsely represented themselves to he registered voters, which they were not, to deponents’ knowledge. Upon offering said fraudulent votes, deponents would object to their receipt; said persons were challenged and sworn and their answers were unsatisfactory. In many cases opportunity was not given to deponents to question the voters, and the said ballots were not, nor was anyone of them “received ” by said board, or a majority thereof,” but that the relators, contrary to deponents’ protest, put the same into the ballot boxes.
Upon the argument the defendants’ counsel stated the purport of this affidavit to be, that the defendants knew or believed that the seventy votes which were deposited, were deposited by persons who falsely personated persons whose names were on the register for that district.
Held, that the defendants’ claim, in regard to the responses of the parties challenged, . that “ their answers were unsatisfactory,” did not show that their answers were not as full and complete as the law required.
That as the defendants’ affidavit did not state that the questions put to persons challenged were not fully answered as required by the Election Code, it must bo assumed that the answers were full; that if the defendants believed they were false they should have pointed out in what respect the qualifications of the challenged persons appeared to them to he insufficient; that if the parties challenged still persisted in their claim to vote, and made the statement as to residence required by section 7 of chapter 576 of 1880, the inspectors’ disbelief in the honesty of the statement, or in the identity of the person, must yield, and that the votes should be received.
It was claimed by the defendants that these ballots were not “ received,” because the defendants did not consent to their deposit in the ballot-box.
Held, that the presumption was, that the statements made upon oath were true; that'the party challenged must be assumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty; that the inspectors by disregarding the oath of the voter and condemning him as perjured upon their own knowledge, or upon their confidence that they had knowledge upon the subject, would deprive him of the opportunity to prove before the proper tribunal that they were mistaken or ignorant, in other words, deprive him, without due process of law, of the right which he had established according to the forms of the law, and that they would thus arrogate to themselves a jurisdiction which the election laws did not confer upon them and which the Constitution forbade. (Pish, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by tbe defendants from an order made at a Special Term held in Rensselaer county, wbicb was entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe county of Rensselaer on November 18,1889, directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue against tbe defendants, requiring them forthwith to duly sign the last election returns of the election district of tbe ninth ward, in the City of Troy, and to certify to the correctness thereof.
George JB. Wellington, for tbe appellants.
B. A. Parmmter, for tbe relators respondents.

Opinion:
LaNDON, J.:
Tbe relators and tbe defendants are inspectors of election, and together composed tbe board of inspectors for tbe election district in tbe ninth ward of tbe City of Troy at tbe last general election. Upon tbe close of tbe polls on tbe day of tbe election tbe board, thus constituted, counted tbe ballots, canvassed tbe votes and proclaimed tbe results in that district. Thereupon such results were correctly stated in returns in tbe form required by law, and tbe relators signed tbe returns, but tbe defendants refused and still refuse to sign them. Tbe Special Term by mandamus directed tbe defendants to sign tbe returns, and tbe defendants appeal from the order. Tbe order should be af&nned unless tbe facts alleged by tbe defendants in justification of their refusal amount to a sufficient justification.
They make affidavits in their justification that " during said election to deponents' knowledge there were at least seventy fraudulent votes offered at said polls. By fraudulent votes deponents mean that persons who did not reside within said election district, and who were not registered and who were not entitled to vote, appeared before said board and fraudulently and falsely represented themselves to he registered voters, which they were not, to deponents' knowledge. Upon offering said fraudulent' votes deponents would object to their receipt; said persons were challenged and sworn, and their answers were unsatisfactory. In many cases opportunity was not given to deponents to question tbe voters, and tbe said ballots were not, nor was any one of them, received by said board or a majority thereof. Although said ballots were not received by the board and were not given at said election, nevertheless, the said Hassett and Stapleton, tbe other members of said board, contrary to tbe protest of deponents, took said ballots that were not given by any voter, and were not received by tbe board, and put said fraudulent ballots into tbe ballot-boxes in charge of said board at said election. Deponents are prepared to prove each one of the allegations herein made by reliable witnesses. Deponent did not sign the returns referred to in the moving affidavits herein, for the reason that the same are incorrect. There were not given in said district the number of votes therein named, and there were not received by the various candidates the number of votes therein stated, in that there were upwards of seventy votes before referred to that were put into said boxes contrary to the protest of deponents, and without said ballots having been received by the board or a majority thereof."
Upon the oral argument counsel for defendants stated that the defendants knew or believed tha,t these seventy votes were deposited by persons who falsely personated persons whose names were on the registry of electors for that district. Giving to the affidavit this construction, it is proper to examine and ascertain whether the affidavit shows that any of these votes were illegally received. The persons offering them were challenged and sworn and made answer. Their answers were not satisfactory to tho defendants, but that is very far short of a statement that their answers were not as full and complete as the law requires. The case of tho defendants rests upon the position that the defendants were acting Judicially, and that upon hearing the answers of the persons challenged, if defendants did not believe what they swore to, or from their own knowledge of the men and of the facts believed, that they committed perjury, they had the right to decide the case in conformity with their own knowledge and belief, in disregard of tho sworn statements of tho person offering to voto.
. In our opinion such is not the law. The election laws of this State have been framed with tho intent to prescribe as fully as necessary the tests by which the right of a person to vote shall be determined, and to leave as little as possible to the discretion or judgment of the inspectors of election. These officers, as their namo implies, are inspectors, and not judges, of the election. The intent of the statutes is that the inspectors shall follow the dhections presci'ibed, and that by so doing the right to vote of any person whose right is challenged will thereby bo determined; that is, the fact will be so manifest that the inspectora cannot fail to perceive it.
Thus, prior to the day of election, the persons entitled to vote must be registered. This is not conclusive in their favoi', but if the name of any person is omitted or sti'icken from the registry the absence of bis name from the registry on election' day is conclusive against bis right to vote. (Chap. 576, § 6, 20, Laws of 1880, applicable to the City of Troy.)
"When a person oilers his vote, manifestly the first duty of the inspectors is to loolc for his name upon the registry. If it is not there, his vote must be rejected. But in the case be.foro us the persons whoso votes are under consideration gave names which were found upon the registry. The defendants, we presume, challenged these persons because they did not believe them to be the persons of the names they gave, or the persons actually registered. The statutes prescribo a preliminary oath (Election Code, § 260; Laws 1842, chap. 130, tit. 4, § 13), and if the questions put to the challenged person under that oath are not fully answered his vote may bo rejected. (1 id., § 261, 262.) The affidavit does not state that these questions were not fully answered, but does state that the answers were not satisfactory to the defendants. We must presume that the answers were full, but the defendants believed they were false. If the defendants could point out, in any respect, the qualification in which the challenged person appeared to them to be deficient, it was their duty to do so (Id., § 263) and then if he persisted in his claim to vote, the general oath should be administered to him. (Id., § 264.) The defendants allege that they were not, in some cases, given by their associates an opportunity to question the voters, but they do not allege that any statutory question was withheld by the inspectors who did question them. We must presume that all the questions proper to be asked were asked, and that the answers were full.
The answers made by the persons taking these oaths were made under the penalties denounced by these statutes against perjury. The questions permissible are comprehensive enough- to embrace fully the fact of the identity of the person challenged with the registered person whose name he gives as his own. Besides section 7 of chapter 576, Laws of 1880, provides that: "Every elector at the time of offering his vote shall, if required, truly state the street in which he resides, and if the house, lodging or tenement in which he resides is numbered, the number thereof; and in case of the refusal to make the statement as aforesaid the vote of such elector shall not be received." This statement is not required to be made upon oath, but its truthfulness is thus exacted: "Any person who shall willfully make any false statement in relation thereto shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be punished with a fine of fifty dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of ten days, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
The statutes having carefully prescribed the tests to determine the right of any person to vote, the proposition that the inspectors can in addition thereto prescribe or impose such other and further tests as they may deem adapted to the particular case before them, is wholly inadmissible. If the person offering to vote does comply with the statutory tests, the inspectors' disbelief in his honesty or identity must yield, and the vote should be received. There is no allegation that these seventy voters did not comply with the statutory tests, and hence the conclusion follows that their votes were lawfully received, whether the defendants were or were not satisfied, and having been received and counted, the proper returns should be made and signed. It is, however, urged that these ballots were not " received," because the defendants did not consent to their deposit in the ballot-box. To test this question, suppose one of these voters should sue one or all of the inspectors for refusing to receive his vote. He certainly would be defeated, upon the facts here presented, showing its receipt. The proposition that if the inspectors know, of their own knowledge, that the person offering to vote is not the person actually registered, they may disregard his statement and oath and reject his vote, is open to other objections. The presumption is that the statements made upon oath are true, and that the accused voter is innocent until he is proved to be guilty. It is plain that the inspectors who disregard the oath of the voter and condemn him as perjured upon their own knowledge, or upon their confidence of having or' acquiring knowledge, deprive the voter of the opportunity to prove before the proper tribunal that they are mistaken or ignorant; in other words, deprive him without due process of law of the right which he has established according to the forms of law, and that they thus arrogate to themselves a jurisdiction which the election laws do not confer upon them, and which the Constitution seems to forbid. It would be an . extraordinary law which should assume to clothe the inspectors of election with judicial functions, and then add to such functions the power to consider their personal knowledge of the facts as paramount and conclusive evidence of them. Such judges thus empowered would need to be highly endowed with intelligence and virtue. If the inspectors of election are such judges, then, in the final test, the right to vote does not depend upon the written law, but upon the secret consciousness of the inspectors. It is easy to believe that partisan inspectors might not rise to the high requirements of their office, and that if a choice of evils is to be made, reliance upon the law is the lesser evil. We admit that no person can lawfully acquire the right to vote by the false personation of another or by perjury, for these acts are crimes. We admit, also, that every person who sees another engaged in committing a crime may reasonably interpose to arrest and prevent it, but he takes upon himself every risk of mistake, and, of course, the burden of proving before the proper tribunal, if prosecuted, that his interposition was warranted because of the attempted criminal act of the other. It is true that no person abdicates his personal rights by accepting the office of inspector of election; but it is also true that in this proceeding we cannot try any such issues between the inspectors and the accused voters; the latter are not present as parties and are not heard in their own behalf; the issues are not made. Besides the votes were received and not rejected. If they had been rejected, only those received could be returned.
The defendants believe that some of the votes were illegally cast. Belief is not proof. To reverse the order appealed from would be to suppress the vote of the district, and to invite occasion for like suppression in the future in other districts. If any person aggrieved by the returns desires a judicial investigation as to the illegality of any of these votes, the law prescribes the procedure. The law prescribes the punishment for illegal voting. The votes received must be returned. It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed.
In the five other cases herewith argued the orders appealed from are also affirmed.
Learned, P. J., concurred.