Case Name: HARBISON v. SECRETARY OF STATE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-08-28
Citations: 147 Mich. App. 63
Docket Number: Docket No. 76787
Parties: HARBISON v SECRETARY OF STATE
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and T. M. Burns and C. M. Forster, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 147
Pages: 63–69

Head Matter:
HARBISON v SECRETARY OF STATE
Docket No. 76787.
Submitted October 11, 1984, at Detroit.
Decided August 28, 1985.
Arthur L. Harbison was stopped by police while driving. He refused to submit to a breath-analysis test. The police had a departmental policy that they would not administer a breath-analysis test after a refusal unless it was requested within one hour of a refusal. Harbison was not informed of this policy. The Secretary of State suspended his operator’s license for wrongful refusal to take the breath-analysis test. Harbison appealed and the Wayne Circuit Court, Harry J. Dingeman, Jr., J., affirmed. Harbison appealed. Held:
Even though Harbison thought that once he refused to take the test he could not change his mind, the police were under the obligation to tell him of the department’s policy.
Reversed.
C. M. Forster, J., dissented. He would hold that the police did not have such a duty. He would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Automobiles — Intoxicating Liquors — Blood-Alcohol Test — Statutes.
A person charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be informed that: (1) he has a right to demand a chemical test; (2) if he takes a chemical test administered at the request of a police officer he may have a person of his own choosing administer a test; (3) he has the option to take only the breath test; and (4) he has a right to refuse the test and the consequences of such refusal must be explained to him.
References
Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 296 et seq.
Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 211, 212.
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 ALR3d 745.
Duty of law enforcement officer to offer suspect chemical sobriety test under implied consent law. 95 ALR3d 710.
Construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol present in system. 16 ALR3d 748.
Dissent by C. M. Forster, J.
2. Statutes — Judicial Construction.
An established principle of statutory construction is that the express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.
Robert A. Hadous, for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and E. David Brockman and David K. Foust, Assistants Attorney General, for the Secretary of State.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and T. M. Burns and C. M. Forster, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Arthur Lee Harbison appeals as of right from a circuit court order affirming a decision of the Secretary of State, pursuant to MCL 257.625(f); MSA 9.2325(6), to suspend his driver's license for six months for an unreasonable refusal to take a breath-analysis test. He claims that the decisions of the circuit court and the Secretary of State were inconsistent with the rule stated by this Court in People v Castle, 108 Mich App 353; 310 NW2d 379 (1981).
In Castle, the defendant initially refused to take the test without first consulting with his attorney. The attorney arrived at the police station 70 minutes later and, after consulting with the defendant, requested that a breath-analysis test be administered. Relying on a standard departmental policy, the police refused to administer a test because it had not been requested within one hour of the initial refusal. Defendant had not previously been informed of this policy. This Court held, at 108 Mich App 357:
"Pursuant to the statute, any person charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be informed: (1) he has a right to demand a test, (2) if he takes a chemical test administered at the request of a police officer he may have a person of his own choosing administer a test, (3) he has the option to take only the breath test, and (4) he has a right to refuse the test and the consequences of such a refusal.
"We are guided by these statutory requirements to hold that any person charged with duil must be informed of police regulations and rules, if any, that materially affect him to insure that the accused has an opportunity to make an informed decision. This is particularly so when one considers the impact of the choice and the fact that the person arrested does not have the assistance of. counsel in deciding whether to submit to a test. See Holmberg v 54-A Judicial Dist Judge, 60 Mich App 757; 231 NW2d 543 (1975).
"In this case, defendant was deprived of the opportunity to make a knowing choice of whether to submit to the test when police failed to inform him timely of material departmental policy. We do not intimate an opinion in this decision as to the propriety of the departmental policy. We do say that police policy which prohibits a defendant from demanding a chemical test after a prescribed time must first be explained to the defendant, enabling him to make an informed decision." (Emphasis added.)
Here, as in Castle, the department had a policy of not administering a breath-analysis test if it was not requested within one hour of an initial refusal. It is not disputed that Harbison was not informed of this policy.
Even though Harbison thought that once he refused to take the test he could not change his mind, the police were under the obligation to tell him of department policies. In fact, it is more than likely that, after thinking it over and after the initial trauma of arrest, he would have decided to change his mind.
Reversed.