Case Name: William G. HORTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-08-31
Citations: 285 So. 2d 418
Docket Number: No. 71-861
Parties: William G. HORTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MANN, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 285
Pages: 418–423

Head Matter:
William G. HORTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 71-861.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug. 31, 1973.
On Rehearing Nov. 2, 1973.
Raymond E. LaPorte, Tampa, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Attv. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
McNULTY, Judge.
Appellant William G. Horton and his brother Leslie were indicted for rape, found guilty after a joint jury trial and mercy was recommended as to William. William appeals directly to this court and raises three points, only one of which is meritorious and requires reversal.
Upon being arrested appellant and his brother were taken to the county jail. They were advised of their constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona and Leslie expressly waived them. William, however, indicated he wanted an attorney; so further interrogation of William ceased at that point. The brothers were then separated and Leslie proceeded to give a statement incriminating both himself and William. Thereafter the detectives brought Leslie back into the room with William and asked Leslie to repeat before William what he had theretofore told them in William's absence. This was done, in the words of one of the officers, so as to " . . . make this statement by Leslie Horton admissible in court." It's apparent from the record that the officers believed that Leslie's statement in the presence of William would make it admissible against William if William stood silent in the face thereof; admissible, that is, under the old "tacit admission" rule. This assumption was, of course, erroneous; but in any case, at that point in time William did not remain silent and after Leslie repeated his admissions in his presence finally said, "That's right. That's what happened", thus, in effect, adopting Leslie's statement.
We interpose to say here that we condemn the tactics used by the officers in separating the two suspects after one had requested counsel and then, after the other had confessed, requiring the latter to confront the first in the manner done here. Apart from the fact that the "tacit admission" rule is no longer valid, we think such a ploy is the equivalent of impermissible. "custodial interrogation" as proscribed by Miranda in the event it elicits a response.
To get on with the facts though, a short time after the aforementioned "interrogation" when the brothers were being booked, William told the officers that he had a change of heart and that he would more fully talk to them. Whereupon, he repeated in detail basically the same story told by Leslie with some minor changes.
Later on that same day an assistant state attorney came to the county jail to investigate the matter and, without knowing of William's prior request for an attorney, he too warned each of the suspects of his rights. This time William signed a waiver card and again recounted the details of the offense charged.
On these facts, the trial judge granted a pre-trial motion to suppress William's statements as being taken in violation of Miranda, stipra. At the joint trial, how'ever, wherein neither defendant testified, the court, over the objection of William, allowed Leslie's statement in evidence which, as noted, incriminated William.
So the battle lines are drawn. Appellant contends that the trial court was correct under Miranda, supra, in suppressing his admissions. But he insists the trial court was in error under the Bruton rule in thereafter admitting Leslie's admissions against him, over his objection, at a joint trial wherein Leslie did not testify, thereby resulting in the denial of his rights of confrontation and cross-examination. The state, on the other hand, argues that the trial court should not have suppressed Wil-iam's statement to begin with because clearly he intelligently, understandingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Thus, it is said, since the suppressed admissions of William were in essence identical to those of Leslie, Leslie's admissions into evidence amounted to no more than allowing William's statement into evidence, which should have been done in the first place. Accordingly, says the state, no prejudicial error was .committed under Bruton in allowing Leslie's statement to be used against William.
However rhetorical the state's argument it is no less sophistic since its major premise must fall. That is to say, it cannot be articulated as a matter of law that the trial judge had to find an intelligent, understanding and voluntary waiver on the part of William. As to this, the state's contention must factually rest: (1) on the apparent adoption by William of Leslie's statement when the latter first repeated it in William's presence; (2) on the fact that thereafter, at the booking desk, William apparently reconsidered and waived his rights to an attorney; and (3) on the waiver card he thereafter signed after having been further fully advised of his rights by the assistant state attorney. Concededly, on these facts the trial judge could have found a valid waiver; and had he done so notwithstanding the existence of the facts and circumstances relating to the aforementioned initial wrongful tactics of the officers, we have no hesitancy in saying we would have been constrained to affirm. But was he bound to so find? We think not.
Stated otherwise, we are more precisely faced with whether, as a matter of law, the trial judge sitting as the trier of fact in a pre-trial proceeding on a motion to suppress, could not have found as he in effect did find here that any waivers by William were not intelligently, understandingly and voluntarily made, or, in the alternative, that they were fatally "poisoned" by the initial wrongful acts of the officers and not sufficiently thereafter purged therefrom so as to render them independently admissible. We cannot so hold. The trial judge heard all the testimony and observed all the witnesses. His conclusions on the critical points find ample support in the record and are therefore beyond our scrutiny.
However, although having acted well within his province in suppressing William's statements under Miranda, supra, we think the trial judge erred thereafter in allowing Leslie's statement into evidence as against William at the joint trial. At that point the discipline of Miranda was out of the picture and the matter became a pure Bruton situation. Bruton, supra, therefore clearly controls here and requires a reversal of the judgment and sentence appealed from. Accordingly, the cause is remanded for a new trial as to appellant William G. Horton.
Reversed.
MANN, C. J., concurs.
LILES, J., dissents.
. (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
. See, e. g., State v. Galasso (Fla.1968), 217 So.2d 326; Jones v. State (Fla.App. 1967), 200 So.2d 574.
. Id.
. Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476.
. See, Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.
. See, n. 4, supra.