Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin SANCHEZ-PACHECO, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-09-19
Citations: 75 F. App'x 680
Docket Number: No. 02-35520; D.C. Nos. CV-01-62221-MRH, CR-97-60108-MRH
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin SANCHEZ-PACHECO, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 75
Pages: 680–681

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin SANCHEZ-PACHECO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-35520.
D.C. Nos. CV-01-62221-MRH, CR-97-60108-MRH.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 8, 2003.
Decided Sept. 19, 2003.
William E. Fitzgerald, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David B. Thompson, Law Office Of David B. Thompson, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before ALDISERT, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Benjamin Sanchez-Pacheco appeals from the district court's denial of his § 2255 petition, arising from his conviction on methamphetamine-related charges. We affirm.
Petitioner's counsel was not deficient in failing to move for recusal of the trial judge. See Strickland, v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (setting forth two-part test for determining whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel). Counsel made a reasoned and reasonable tactical decision in advising Petitioner to have a bench trial and to do so before this judge.
Additionally, even if counsel's performance was somehow deficient, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice, the second part of the Strickland test. A recusal motion probably would not have been successful. The knowledge of Petitioner's initial wish to plead guilty was acquired in the judge's judicial capacity. See United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1988) (noting that a party cannot attack a judge's impartiality based on information learned while acting in the judge's official capacity). Moreover, there is no evidence of a deep-seated antagonism that would have made fair judgment impossible. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (stating standard).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.