Case Name: Commonwealth versus Thomas Andrews
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1806-03
Citations: 1 Tyng 14
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth versus Thomas Andrews.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 22–37

Head Matter:
Commonwealth versus Thomas Andrews.
Goods are stolen in New Hampshire, and brought into tills state: indictment lies against the receiver of them here.
Receiver of stolen goods sentenced to pay the treble value.
The indictment set forth that one Amos Tuttle, at Boston, in the county of Suffolk, feloniously stole certain goods, the property of Moses Dow ; and that the defendant, Andrews, “ at Boston, aforesaid, in the county of Suffolk, aforesaid, on the same second day of July, did abet and maintain him, the said Tuttle, in committing and perpetrating the said felony and theft, and there, after the said goods and chattels were stolen, as aforesaid, knowingly did receive all the same goods and chattels of him, the said Tuttle, knowing the same to have been stolen, taken, and carried away, as aforesaid, against the peace,” &c.
It appeared, in evidence, that Tuttle stole the goods at Bedford, in the state of New Hampshire, and immediately brought them tr Dunstable, in Massachusetts, and there concealed them in a wood. He was pursued, arrested, carried back to New Hampshire, and there committed to prison. By information obtained from him while in prison, by one Symonds. whom Tuttle believed to be an accomplice, but who, in fact, was the agent of a voluntary association instituted for detecting thieves, &c., and bringing them to punishment, the goods were found, and, with Tuttle’s consent, carried to Groton, in the county of Middlesex, and afterwards to Harvard, in the county of Worcester. * In the mean [ * 15 ] time, Symonds, for a sum of money much less than the value of the goods, procured from Dow a bill of sale, or release of his right in them, without disclosing to him that he had them in possession, and with the sole view, as he testified, of procuring the conviction of And.reivs, whom he and his associates believed to be in the practice of receiving stolen goods. Tuttle, having been liberated on bail, in company with Symonds took the goods at Harvard, brought them to Boston, and there sold them to Andrews, the defendant, in a manner, and under circumstances, which showed satisfactorily that he must have known them to have been stolen. The defendant was convicted; and now Parsons and Otis, of counsel for him, moved for a new trial, as on a verdict against evidence.
Otis.
Each of the United States was originally wholly independent of the others. The courts of one independent state never animadvert on crimes committed in another, unless in virtue of some national compact. The federal constitution, the only compact between the several states, expressly excludes the idea of such a jurisdiction By art. 4, sect. 2, “ A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and he found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.” And this provision of the constitution not only excludes, in fact, the idea of such a jurisdiction, but entirely takes away any pretence of the necessity of assuming it, from an apprehension that crimes may go unpunished.
Was it ever known that one, stealing goods in France, and bringing them into England, was held to be amenable to the laws of the latter country as an offender ? The law which provides that, where a stroke is given in one county, from which death follows in another, the offender may be tried in the latter county, can by no construction be extended to the case of countries under distinct and independent jurisdictions. In the case of Butters & Al., the court refused to take cognizance of *the [ * 16 ] offence, which was stealing goods at sea and bringing 'them into the county, because the original taking was not a felony committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
Before the statute of 13 Geo. 3, c. 31, the courts of me part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain could not take cognizance of a larceny committed in the other part, although the goods stolen were brought into the first. Great confusion would arise in these states from this assumption of jurisdiction. The same offences are punished with different degrees of severity in the different states.
But it is suggested that the second taking by Tuttle, in company with Symonds, was a new theft from Dow. If this is so, then Tuttle may be twice indicted and punished for stealing the same goods. But we say that, in any view of the facts, there is no evidence of a theft by Tuttle in Suffolk, which the indictment alleges. Symonds and Tuttle brought the goods to Boston, under a sale from Doiv, and if that sale is considered void, as a real transfer of the property, it must be allowed, at least, to operate as a license to Symonds, and to have made him the agent of Dow. If the possession of Tuttle, when with Symonds, was felonious, the possession of Symonds was so likewise ; and he and his associates, amongst whom are several respectable magistrates, are all guilty.
But the present defendant knew nothing of this second taking; and if the taking in New Hampshire was no offence against our laws, he knew nothing of the real felony, from which the criminality of his conduct is to be inferred.
Davis, (Solicitor-General.)
This point has been repeatedly decided. The case of the Commonwealth vs. Thomas Cullens settles it. The case of Paul Lord, in the county of York, was similar. He broke open a shop in Somersworth, (New Hampshire,) and stole goods, which he brought into Berwick, in the county of York. He was indicted for stealing in York. This question was then made, and argued by Mr. Parsons for the prisoner. [ * 17 ] It was determined by the whole Court,- * five justices being present, that he might be convicted of the larceny, although not of breaking the shop. (The Chief Justice recollected this case, as stated.)
The reason that a felon, stealing goods in one county and bringing them into another, may be indicted in the second county, applies equally to stealing in one state and bringing them into another, viz., that every moment’s continuance of the trespass is as much a wrong, and may come under the word cepit as truly, as the first taking. It is true that one giving a stroke, in one state, of which the party dies in another, cannot be indicted where the death happens; and the reason is, that there is no continuance of the action, as in the case of stealing. The court refused cognizance in the pirates’ dose because the Admiralty had complete jurisdiction of the offence, and there was no hazard of a failure of justice. The statute of 13 G. 3 was expressly made to remove a doubt stated in the preamble. But the decisions of this Court, which have been quoted, show that no doubts have been entertained here. As to the knowledge which Andrews had of the circumstances, it is not conceived necessary, in order to fix the charge upon him, to show that he was minutely acquainted with the history of the transaction, or even that he should be told, in so many words, that the goods had been stojen. It is enough that he had sufficient ground, from the manner of the communication, to believe them stolen.
Though the indictment lays the offence to have been committed against a statute, yet, if the facts alleged, and which are found by the verdict, constitute an offence at common law, the conviction may be supported, and the Court will not suffer the crime to go unpunished.
Sullivan, (Attorney-General.)
Unless we have proved a theft by Tuttle, and a receiving by Andrews, both in the county of Suffolk, I concede that the indictment has not been supported. I acknowledge, too, that if the theft had been laid to be committed in New Hampshire, and the receiving by the present * defendant in this county, it would have been bad, and [ * 18 ] Andrews could not have been convicted. I agree, too, that, unless we have shown that the defendant knew the goods to have been stolen in this state, he is not legally convicted. But I contend that, every moment that Tuttle had the goods in possession, he was feloniously stealing them. The law considers them in the possession of the proprietor until he is legally divested of that possession. We introduce the transactions which took place in New Hampshire for no other purpose than to show the animum furandi with which Tuttle first became possessed of the goods. The same disposition continues in him until he delivers them to the defendant in Boston. There only we allege the crime in each of them, and we say that this whole transaction, so far as we ask the animadversion of the Court upon it, took place in the county of Suffolk.
Parsons, in reply.
The question is, whether a person stea.ing goods in New Hampshire, and bringing them into this state, becomes a felon, by our law, as soon as he passes the divisional line of the two states. A few decisions of this Court are not to make the law, unless those decisions can be reconciled to the principles of the common law.
The true reason why the court refused to take cognizance of the offence committed by the pirates (3 Inst. 113) was, that the Admiralty would still have had jurisdiction, and the defendants might have been twice punished for the same fact.
The suggestion, in the preamble to the statute 13 G. 3, tho. doubts had existed, is nothing more than courtly language. No such doubts will be found in the reports to have existed. No such jurisdiction was ever assumed.
A conviction in one county might be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for the same offence in another county, in the same kingdom or state; but it would be otherwise in distinct and independent states.
Did Tuttle acquire a new felonious possession when, with Symonds, he retook the goods at Harvard ? If a thief, hav- [ * 19 ] ing delivered * possession of the goods stolen to an accomplice, afterwards retakes them, he has committed but one felony. So, if he mistakes another for his accomplice. If both these transactions had taken place in the same county, would there have been any pretence for saying that Tuttle had committed two felonies? The principle of law, respecting goods stolen in one county and carried into another, relates merely to the jurisdiction of different courts, acting under'the same authority, and governed by the same rules.
That a continued possession of stolen goods is a continued taking, is nothing more than the language of reporters. It is a fiction of law, and ought not to be carried farther than the purposes of sub stantial justice require and will support it.
The defendant ought to have been proved to have known that the goods had been stolen in violation of the laws of this state. He might otherwise" well suppose he was committing no offence himseli against those laws. Though the transfer from Dow to Symonds may have been void as between the parties, yet, if the goods had afterwards been- stolen from Symonds, would it be competent for the thief, in that case, to allege this, and avail himself of it? If not, will not the Court allow the present defendant to set up that sale in his rindication? The counsel for the prosecution ought not to be permitted to go into the consideration of the validity of that sale, in order to convict the defendant, who was not knowing to the in validity of the transaction.
3 Inst. 113.
1 Hawk. P. C. 237, c. 33, § 53.
1 Mass. T. R. 116
Hawk. P. C. 217 c. 33, § 52
1 Hawk. P. C. 209, c. 33, § 5—13.

Opinion:
Parker, J.
I hold myself bound by the authority of Cullen's case, and that of Paul Lord, unless I were convinced that those decisions were against law! If solemn and repeated determinations of this Court are to be disregarded, I know not how we are to govern ourselves.
But upon principle, independently of these cases, it appears to me that the common-law doctrine respecting counties may well be extended, by analogy, to the case of states, united, as these are, under one general government.
In this case, however, I see nothing to induce the Court to say that the second taking by Tuttle, at Harvard, was not felonious.
*The point on which the court refused cognizance of [ * 20 j the pirates' case, mentioned in 3 Inst., was that, the Admiralty having jurisdiction of the offence, there was no danger that the criminals would escape unpunished, In the case at bar, on the contrary, if the defendant is discharged from this indictment, he can be convicted nowhere.
- All that can be inferred from the statute of 13 G. 3 is, that there were doubts, or different opinions, on the question. If there had been a decision against the jurisdiction, it would not have been said that doubts existed, but that the law needed alteration.
Different opinions may have been held also in this country, but the two cases which have been cited (and several others- of like kind are in the recollection of some of the Court) ought to settle the point.
I am satisfied with the verdict, and against granting a new trial.
Sed vide Nightingale vs. Adams, 1 Show. 91. — Rex vs. Anderson, 2 Russelen Cr. 176.