Case Name: Butler agt. Wentworth
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1854-05
Citations: 9 How. Pr. 282
Docket Number: 
Parties: Butler agt. Wentworth.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 282–287

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
Butler agt. Wentworth.
In an action of slander, the defendant in his answer may deny the charge, and as a further defence set up a justification. That is, the defendant may say this, “ I have no recollection or belief of having so accused you, but secondly, if I did, the charge was true.” Clekke, J., contra, See Ms dissenting opinion.
New- York General Term,
May, 1854.

Opinion:
By the Court—Roosevelt, Justice.
The plaintiff sues for slander, and alleges that the defendant falsely accused him of cheating. The defendant answers—first, I have no recollection or belief of having so accused you; but secondly, if T did, the charge was true. And the question is, does the Code admit of such a mode of pleading.
That it is a natural mode of meeting the complaint, all must admit; that it was a lawful one before the Code, in the form of a notice annexed to the general issue, will also be conceded. Is the Code then a narrowing or a liberalizing system 1 Its well-known origin and history answer this question. It contains, besides, an express provision on this very point. The defendant may, it says, set up " as many defences and counter claims as he may have." Each, of course, should be separately stated, and be consistent with itself; but no rule of law requires that it should be consistent, not only with itself, but with every other defence which a proper forecast may interpose. It may be that, although a person honestly believes he never used the expressions attributed to him, and although, perhaps, in point of fact he never did use them, yet the bystanders, from misapprehension, or some other cause, may have understood him differently. And should these bystanders, called as witnesses on the trial, honestly or otherwise, swear to a mistaken version of the transaction, must the injured party not only submit, as he must, to that injustice, but be deprived also, as a further consequence, of another, and confessedly good defence, namely, a complete justification of the charge, if, in truth, it were ever made 1 So to interpret the Code, and the pleadings under it, would hardly be said to be calculated to promote " substantial justice between the parties." And if there be any one duty more than another enjoined on the judges, under the new system, it is that which is implied in the words just quoted. Substantial justice, as distinguished from artificial niceties and technical refinements, is made the star and compass which, for the future, are alone to guide the course of judicial exploration. For one, I do not regret the change, if change it be. The old light-houses, although at times useful, it must be admitted were the cause of frequent shipwrecks—as many a disappointed practitioner and ruined client could, no doubt, feelingly testify.
My conclusion is, that the decision at special term, allowing the two defences to be separately stated, was right, and ought to be affirmed with costs.