Case Name: Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1886-06-21
Citations: 69 Iowa 296
Docket Number: 
Parties: Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern R’y Co.
Judges: Adams, J., dissenting
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 69
Pages: 296–307

Head Matter:
Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern R’y Co.
1. Personal Injury in Iowa: assignment of damages in state where such assignment is yoid: action on in iowa. Where a personal injury is inflicted in Iowa, a cause of action arises thereon which is assignable under the laws of this state, and if the assignment is made and delivered in a state where such assignment is void, still an action may he prosecuted thereon in this state.
2. Assignment: to prevent removal to federal courts: right of action by assignee. The holder of a claim against a citizen of another state may assign it to a citizen of the same state for no other purpose than to defeat a transfer of the action on the claim to the fed eral courts; and sucli motive for the assignment is lawful, and will not defeat an action thereon brought by .the assignee in the state courts.
8. Champerty and Maintenance: assignment: collateral ciiampeiítous contract: wno may plead. This action was brought by plaintiff as assignee of C. upon a claim for damages against the defendant. The assignment was in the usual form, but at the same time when it was made and delivered the plaintiff executed and delivered to C. the following writing: “In consideration of the assignment to me by C. of his claim for damages, (describing it,) I hereby agree to dispose of the entire amount realized on said claim as follows: For my own compensation in and about the prosecution of said claim, and for the use of any advance of money I may make, I am to retain thereof the sum of fifty dollars. I am also to retain all sums of money that I may advance in the prosecution of said claim. Next, I agree to pay out of the proceeds of such recovery the reasonable fee of the attorneys and agents employed to prosecute said claim, or such fee therefor as may be agreed upon, if an agreement for a specific amount be agreed upon, and the balance of said recovery I agree to pay to said C.” Whether said collateral agreement was champertous, and whether, if it was, it invalidated the assignment, which, considered alone, was free from champerty, are questions discussed pro and con., (see opinion,) but not decided by the court; but he.ld that, if the collateral agreement was champertous, that fact could not be pleaded by defendant to defeat the action upon the assignment, it being a stranger to the champertous contract, and not injuriously affected by it. Adams, Ch. J., and Roth-rock, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Polh Circuit Court.
Monday, June 21.
Plaintiff, as assignee of one Darby Carr, brings tbis suit to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by said Darby Carr while in defendant’s employ as a laborer on -a gravel train, and which was occasioned, as it is alleged, by tlie negligence of his co-employes. Tliis appeal is from the order of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to certain counts of defendant’s answer.
JSÍ. M. Hubbard and Whiting S. Clcvrh, for appellant.
Kourse i& Kauffman, for appellee.

Opinion:
Reed, <7.
It is alleged, in the third paragraph of the answer that the assignment by Carr to plaintiff of the claim on which the action is brought was executed, delivered and.aecepted by plaintiff, and its acceptanee took effect, in the state of Illinois, and that by the common law, which is in force in that , . " . . . state, the assignment ot said cause ot action is void. The question raised by the demurrer to this paragraph is whether the plaintiff is precluded by these' facts from recovering on the cause of action sued on. The assignment under which plaintiff claims is Set out in the petition, and it is of a cause of action which is alleged to have arisen under the laws of this state in favor of an employe of defendant on account of a personal injury sustained by him in consequence of the negligence of a co-employe.
It may be conceded for the purposes of this case, we think, that a claim for damages arising out of a personal tort, and having its origin where the common law is in force, is not assignable before being reduced to judgment. The ground upon which it is held that such claim is not assignable is that it is a mere personal claim in favor of the injured party, and that it does not become part of his estate, or descend to his representatives, but terminates at his death; and consequently it has no value which can be so estimated as to form a consideration for a sale, and there is in it no element of property to make it the subject of a grant or assignment. See Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 566; People Tioga v. Common Pleas, 19 Wend., 73. The contract of assignment of such claim between parties otherwise competent to contract is void at common law, then, not because of any incapacity of the parties to enter into the contract, but because the claim itself is not the subject of contract. Under the statute of Iowa, however, such claims are given a character entirely different from that sustained by them when arising under the common law. They are not merely personal claims in favor of the parties sustaining the injuries, and they do not terminate with their death, but become a part of their estates and descend to their representatives, and actions thereon may be maintained by the representatives. Code, § 2525-2527; Carson v. McFadden, 10 Iowa, 91; McKinley v. McGregor, Id., 111; Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Id., 550. They are also assignable under the law of this state. Weire v. City of Davenport, 11 Iowa, 49; Gray v. McCallister, 50 Id., 497.
If Carr, plaintiff's assignor, had a valid claim for damages on account of the alleged injury, such claim liad the qualities of a property right or interest. It constituted a part of his estate, and was capable of being transferred within tiie state by assignment, and at his death it would have descended to his representatives, and his assignee or representative could have maintained an action in his own name for its enforcement. It seems to us that the mere carrying of this claim into another state could not have the effect to change its character or take from it any of its qualities, but that it would retain its properties notwithstanding the removal of the person in whose favor it arose to another state or country; and that, as it had the properties- which rendered it assignable imparted to it by the laws under which it arose, it would retain those properties when taken beyond the jurisdiction of those laws, and would be assignable anywhere.
The other questions raised by the demurrer are the same as those determined in Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 64 Iowa, 513, and the ruling of the circuit court thereon is in accord'with our holding in that case.
Affirmed.
Adams, J., dissenting