Case Name: Frederick K. Dunn, App'lt, v. The New Haven Steamboat Co., Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-12-29
Citations: 35 N.Y. St. Rep. 251
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frederick K. Dunn, App’lt, v. The New Haven Steamboat Co., Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 35
Pages: 251–255

Head Matter:
Frederick K. Dunn, App’lt, v. The New Haven Steamboat Co., Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed December 29, 1890.)
1. Carriers—Negligence — Liability eor loss oe brorerty or bassenger by theet.
Plaintiff was a passenger from New York to New Haven on defendant’s steamer. On retiring to his berth he placed his vest under Ins pillow. In it was seventy-three dollars in money, a gold watch, a silver watch, a gold pen and pencil and some railroad tickets. While he slept these were stolen. Upon defendant’s request the court charged the jury that if they found that it was a negligent act for plaintiff to have this amount of money in his berth, instead of giving it to the employes of the company to take care of, the plaintiff could not recover. Held, error; as if this was negligence it in no waj contributed to the loss of his effects, other than money.
2. Same—Charge.
Plaintiff’s counsel asked the court to charge that plaintiff had a right. when retiring to retain such articles as those above mentioned. The court replied: “He has a right to carry them with him on his trip but not to retain them in his berth.” Held, that this was error; because the statement was unqualified, was among the last statements made to the jury by the_ court and would commonly be understood by jurors to me in that plaintiff, since he had retained the articles in his berth, had no right to complain if they were stolen; it did not cover the possible carelessness or negligence of defendant’s servants.
(Van Brunt, P. J.,' dissents.)
Appeal from a judgment on the verdict of a jury, and an order denying a new trial
Hyland & Zabriskie, for app’lt; William J. Kelley, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Daniels, J.
The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's steamer from the city of New York to New Haven. He paid his passage money, and received a ticket for the trip, with the number of his berth on its back. He testified that he had with him when he retired $73 in bills, a gold watch worth $60 or $70; a gold pen and pencil for which he paid $3; railroad tickets for which he paid $6 or $7, and a silver watch he had repaired for his brother for which no value was given, and that these articles were in his vest, and placed under his pillow. And that when he awoke in the morning the vest and these articles had been stolen. This evidence was not contradicted.
It was charged in the complaint that the loss was owing to the negligence of the persons in charge of the steamer, which was denied by the defendant. And whether the charge had been sustained was a question for and submitted to the jury. In its submission by the court the legal rules on which the action depended were plainly and clearly brought to the attention of the jury. But, as is usually the fact, that satisfied neither of the counsel. And each requested further instructions, some of which they were not entitled to have submitted to the jury. Among these requests was one by the defendant's counsel, in which the court was asked to charge:
That if the jury believe the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in disposing of his property in the way he did it is a bar to his recovery.
And that was answered by the court: I so charge. If you find that it was a negligent act for him to have this amount of money in his berth, under the circumstances, instead of giving it to the employes of the company to take care of, if you find affirmatively that that was negligence, then the defendant is entitled to a verdict
And to that the plaintiff excepted. It did not follow, even if it was negligent for the plaintiff to have this money, which amounted to $73, in his berth, that he should be thereby defeated altogether in his action. Yet the court so instructed the jury. The direction gave them to understand that the plaintiff must be defeated, if it was negligent for him to have that money in his berth, even though the theft had resulted from the carelessness and inattention of the persons in charge of the business of the steamer. This was an erroneous direction. For such negligence on his part in no way contributed to the residue of the loss, or affected his right to recover the value of the gold watch, the gold pen and pencil, and the railroad tickets which it was not negligent to carry in this manner.
The court was also requested by the plaintiff's counsel to charge that a passenger on such a steamboat has a right when he retires to retain such articles as those the plaintiff had in his possession at the time of retiring. That the court at first left "it to the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances, that would be justified." The counsel then asked the court again to charge that proposition. And the response was: " He has a right to carry them with him on his trip, but not to retain them in his berth." And to that the plaintiff's counsel excepted. The jurors may be assumed to have been men of plain sense and experience, who would not consider the charge qualified with these particular directions with the legal acumen of persons having a long course of professional training. But they would be very liable to be impressed with the conviction that the plaintiff had no ground of action, because of his improper conduct in taking these articles into his bertn. The statement was without qualification that he had no right to retain these articles in his berth. And it followed from that direction, as jurors would commonly understand it, that he had no right to complain of their loss by theft. These directions were so plainly given that the jury was not liable to misunderstand them, or to fail to act upon them. And their attention would not be diverted from them by what had been very properly said to them previously in the charge. They were the last directions, and as they were so plainly given must have improperly determined the jury against the plaintiff.
The judgment and order should, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial directed, with costs to the plaintiff to abide the result.
Brady, J., concurs.