Case Name: EMMA ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. BUNKER HILL AND SULLIVAN MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1906-11-24
Citations: 12 Idaho 637
Docket Number: 
Parties: EMMA ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. BUNKER HILL AND SULLIVAN MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
Judges: Ailshie, «T., and Sullivan, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 637–653

Head Matter:
(November 24, 1906.)
EMMA ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. BUNKER HILL AND SULLIVAN MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
[89 Pac. 624.]
Nonsuit — Should Only be Sustained When.
1. A nonsuit should only be granted when- the evidence wholly fails to support the demand of plaintiff.
2. Where the evidence shows that a part of machinery of respondent was in a damaged condition, and that by reason thereof an employee in the discharge of his duty could become entangled in such machinery and lose his life or suffer great bodily injury through no fault of his, it is a prima facie ease, and it is error to sustain a motion for nonsuit.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from District Court of the First Judicial District for Shoshone county. Hon. Ralph T. Morgan, Judge.
Plaintiffs commenced their action to recover $40,000 damages for the loss of life of the husband and father. At the close of the evidence for plaintiffs a motion for nonsuit was sustained and judgment for costs against plaintiffs. The appeal is from an order overruling a motion for a new trial.
Reversed.
F. C. Robertson, Harry Rosenhaupt, Fred Miller and H. P. Knight, for Appellants. ,,
The instinct of self-preservation and the disposition of men to avoid personal harm re-enforce an inference that a person killed or injured was in the exercise of ordinary care. (16 Cye. of L. & Pr. 1056; Texas & G. By. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353, 41 L. ed. 186, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104; Choctow O. & G. G. Go. v. McDade, 191 ü. S. 64, 48 L. ed. 962, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24; Milwaukee N. Y. & St. P. B. Go. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256.)
Knowledge of the risk of the danger to which deceased was exposed is not to be presumed in proof of contributory negligence, but must be brought home to the employee. (Missouri Pac. B. B. Go. v. Lemberg, 75 Tex. 61, 12 S. W. 838; Smith v. Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich. 501, 1 Am. St. Rep. 542, 27 N. W. 662; Wabash B. B. Go. v. McDaniel, 107 U. S. 454, 27 L. ed. 605, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932.)
It is the province of the jury to determine as to the defendant’s negligence under the facts in this case. (Sioux City & Pacific B. B. Go. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. ed. 7,45; Labatt on Master and Servant, 330, and eases cited.)
In the absence of proof that the deceased was guilty of negligence, the jury was authorized to infer the want of any from the circumstances of the case, and the disposition of men to take care of themselves and keep out of difficulty may be taken into consideration by the jury. (Wash. & G. B. Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 401, 21 L. ed. 114.)
In civil cases it is sufficient if the evidence agrees with‘and supports the hypothesis which it is adduced to prove, and it is not necessary that it should exclude other hypotheses in order to enable the plaintiff; to recover, but the case should, be submitted to the jury, and the jury should decide according to the reasonable probability of the truth. ( Greenleaf on Evidence, 5th ed., sec. 13a; Union Stockyards Go. v. Conoyer, 41 Neb. 617, 59 N. W. 950; Scheopper v. Hancock Chemical Go., 113 Mich. 582, 71 N. W. 1081; Woods v. Chicago By. Co., 108 Mich. 396, 66 N. W. 328; Western Travelers’ Aec. Assn. v. Holbrook, 65 Neb. 469, 91 N. W. 276, 94 N. W. 816; Barnowski v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 50 N. W. 989, 15 L. R. A. 33; Lillstrom v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 53 Minn. 464, 55 N. W. 624, 20 L. R. A. 587; Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Huber, 128 Pa. St. 63, 18 Atl. 334, 5 L. R. A. 439; Portland Min. Co. v. Flaherty, 111 Fed. 312, 49 C. C. A. 361; Pruke v. South Park Foundry Co., 68 Minn. 305, 71 N. W. 276; Indianapolis P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Collingwood, 71 Ind. 476; Miller v. Inmen & Co., 40 Or. 161, 66 Pac. 713; Hays v. Galligher, 72 Pa. St. 136; Indianapolis P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 84 Ind. 197.)
The proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is to be determined as a fact in view of all the circumstances attending it as shown by the evidence. (St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Needham, 69 Fed. 823, 16 C. C. A. 457; Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 318, 28 L. ed. 440, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433.)
M. A. Folsom and A. H. Featherstone, for Respondent.
In order to entitle plaintiff to recover for personal injuries, or to recover for the death of one owing the duty of support to plaintiff, it must be shown affirmatively that defendant has been guilty of negligence which resulted in such injuries or death. (Patton v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 661, 663, 45 L. ed. 361, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275.)
The rule requiring the master to supply safe machinery and keep it in reasonable repair does not apply to the defects arising which are not of a permanent character, and do not require the help of skilled mechanics to repair, but which may easily be and usually are remedied by the workmen, and to repair which proper and suitable materials are supplied ; there is no duty resting on the master to inspect during their use those common tools and appliances with which every one is conversant. (Creagan v. Marston, 126 N. Y. 568, 22 Am. St. Rep. 854, 27 N. E. 952; Whittaker v. Bent, 167 Mass. 588, 46 N. E. 121; Wachsmuth v. Shaw Elec. Go., 118 Mich. 275, 76 N. W. 497; Garrigan v. Falls Fiver Go., 158 Mass. 596, 33 N. E. 652.)
The testimony shows that Adams frequently stopped the' machinery and tightened the loose rivets, and that it was his particular duty to supervise the machinery and see that it was in proper repair. If there were defects in the belt, there could be no recovery. (Bedford Belt Go. v. Brown, 142 Ind. 659, 42 N. E. 359; McDermott v. Iowa Falls Co., 85 Iowa, 181, 52 N. W. 181;Beckman v. Consol. Coal Co., 90 Iowa, 252, 57 N. W. 889; Conroy v. Clinton, 158 Mass. 318, 23 N. E. 527; Johnson v. Hovey, 98 Mich. . 343, 57 N. W. 172'; Jennings v. Iron Bay Co., él Minn. Ill, 49 N. W. 685; Maes v. Tex. & N. O. B. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. 725; Minty v. Union Pac. Co., 2 Idaho, 471, 21 Pac. 660.)
Adams knew of the conditions and assumed the risk. No principle of law is better settled in this state than the principle that workmen assume the risk of dangers known to them, or which by ordinary care they might have known. (Drake v. Union Pac. B. Co., 2 Idaho, 487, 21 Pac. 560; Haner v. Northern Pacific By. Co., 1 Idaho, 13, 35 Pac. 700, 122 L. R. A. 725; Holt v. Bailway Co., 4 Idaho, 443, 40 Pac. 56.)
The following cases illustrate the principle that a workman with little experience assumes the risk of ordinary defects : Connelly v. Eldredge, 160 Mass. 566, 36 N. E. 469; Wilson v. Mass. Cotton Mills, 169 Mass. 67, 47 N. E. 506; Sanborn v. Aichinson By. Co., 35 Kan. 292, 10 Pac. 1860; Probert v. Phipps, 149 Mass. 258, 21 N. E. 370; Downey v. Sawyer, 157 Mass. 418, 32 N. E. 654.

Opinion:
STOCKSLAGER, C. J.
Plaintiffs commenced their action in the district court of Shoshone county, alleging the death of Richard Adams on the thirtieth day of November, 1902, while in the employ of defendant corporation, and that his death was the result of the faulty construction and operation of a certain belt used for conveying the ore in the mill or concentrator of defendant, and the careless and negligent use of such belt. It is alleged that said Richard Adams was the husband of plaintiff, Emma Adams, and the father of Ellen C. Adams and Virgil F. Adams, minors. The prayer of the complaint is for $40,000 and costs.
A demurrer was filed to the complaint which is not shown by the record to have been disposed of; hence we assume it was withdrawn, as an answer was filed denying all allegations of the complaint as to negligence on the part of defendant in the equipment or maintenance of the belt and other machinery connected with said concentrator, or that the cause of the death of said Richard Adams was in any way traceable to the condition of the belt or defendant's negligence or carelessness in any manner. On the issues thus joined a jury was impaneled, and when plaintiffs had submitted their evidence a motion for nonsuit was interposed as follows:
"1. Because the plaintiffs have failed to prove a sufficient case for the jury.
"2. Because the plaintiffs have failed to show that defendant was guilty of any negligence causing the death of Richard Adams.
"3. Because the undisputed evidence shows that Richard Adams, deceased, knew the danger or, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have known of the danger and assumed the risk.
"4. Because the undisputed evidence fails to show that the death of Richard Adams was not caused by obvious defects in the machinery used by him, or from hazard incident to the business, or from causes known to exist by him, or which he might have known by the exercise of ordinary care."
The motion was sustained by the court, a judgment entered for costs in favor of defendant, a motion for a new trial was overruled and the appeal is from the judgment. The errors assigned are as follows: 1. That the decision is against law; 2. Errors of law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the plaintiffs; 3. Accident and surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
The only question presented by the record for our deter, mination is whether the evidence was sufficient to support a judgment on the findings of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs in case they sp found on the proofs before them. Appellate courts' do not favor nonsuits; the trend of modern decisions is to discourage them. An analysis of the evidence in this case as shown by the record discloses the following facts:
Deceased was employed by defendant as a guard to protect its property at different times. He was not what is termed a practical'millman, was not foreman of the concentrator at the time of the accident, did not have charge of the repair of the machinery, such work being under the control of the foreman. It was usually repaired at noon or between shifts. Mr. Adams' duty was to place rosin on the belt to keep it from slipping when it was heavily loaded. The belt was used for carrying ore from the ore bins into the concentrator and to prevent the spouts from filling up. Charles LaFevere testified that at the time of the accident the belt was not in good condition. "It had been torn in one place for about seventy feet." It was shown that bolts would become loose in the belt, and this condition could not be detected when the machinery was in operation. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident that resulted in the death of Mr. Adams. It is shown, however, by the evidence of Mr. LaFevere that he saw the body after death. He says: "When I was notified he was killed he had gone around the pulley and was lying on the other side; his head ivas in the pulley like, and his body was pushed up against the timber." By another witness it was shown that portions of cloth that resembled his sweater or jumper were taken from the bolts in the belt. There was other evidence introduced as to the character of the belt and the danger from the loose bolts when the machinery was in operation to anyone who attempted to supply the rosin to keep the belt from slipping when heavily loaded. We are of the opinion that the motion for nonsuit should have been denied. (Later Bros. v. Hayward, ante, p. 78, 85 Pac. 494, and eases cited.)
(April 13, 1907.)
Personal Injury — Negligence op Master — Death op Servant — Presumptions as to Freedom op Servant prom Negligence.
1. In an action against the master for damages caused by the death of the servant as a result of the master's negligence, the presumptions which arise in favor of the instincts of self-preservation and the known disposition of men to avoid injury and personal harm to themselves, constitute a prima facie inference that the servant was at the time in the exercise of ordinary care, and was himself free from contributory negligence. In case where the injury complained of resulted in the death of the injured person, the law presumes that such person exercised the measure of care which it was his duty to exercise.
2. Where the evidence in a personal injury case is so uncertain as to leave it equally clear and probable that the injury resulted from any one of a number of causes that might be suggested, then and in that case a verdict for plaintiff would be pure speculation and could not be sustained; but where the evidence, although circumstantial, is such that it would appear possible that the injury resulted from any one of several causes, and yet it points to the greater probability that it resulted from the specific cause charged by the plaintiff, a nonsuit should not be granted. In the latter case the jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, although it be possible that the injury may have resulted from some other cause. The law does not anticipate or attempt to exclude mere possibilities.
3. If, upon any fair construction that a reasonable man might put upon the evidence, or any inference that might reasonably be drawn therefrom, the 'conclusion of negligence can be arrrived at or justified, then the defendant is not entitled to a nonsuit, but the question of negligence should go to the jury.
4. Where it does not appear that the inspection and repair of the machinery with which the servant was working was a part of the servant's employment, and it also appears that the master was in a more favorable position to know its condition and to inspect and repair it, and the disrepair and unsafe condition of the machinery is shown, and was not obvious to the servant, and injury resulted therefrom, and the servant was not familiar with or accustomed to such machinery, and this was known to the master, such facts make a prima facie showing of negligence on the part of the master.
The judgment is reversed with costs to appellants.
Ailshie, «T., and Sullivan, J., concur.