Case Name: SEGARS v. PARROTT
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1898-12-03
Citations: 54 S.C. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: SEGARS v. PARROTT.
Judges: Messrs. Justices Pope and Gary, and Judges James Aid-rich, Ernest Gary, J. C. Klugh, W. C. Benet, and R. C. Watts, concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 1–79

Head Matter:
SEGARS v. PARROTT.
1. New Counties. — Constitutional ancPstatutory provisions as to the formation of new counties stated.
2. Ibid.' — Elections.—The result of an election on the establishment of a new county can only be determined by the canvass of the returns of the managers, in the same way that such returns in general elections are canvassed.
3. Ibid. — Ibid.—Legislature—Constitution — Statutes. — Section 5 of 22 Stat., 64, construed to mean that the legislature is limited in determining the result of an election on the formation of a new county to ascertaining whether such result has been obtained as provided in sections 3 and 4. Rule of construction as to statutes alleged to be unconstitutional stated. Mr. Justice Jones and Judges Buchanan and Townsend dissent.
4. Ibid. — Legislature—Constitution.—If section 5 of the act of 1896 (22 Stat., 64,) be construed to mean that the legislature may judicially determine the result of an election for the establishment of a new county, it must be held unconstitutional.
5. Ibid. — Elections—Appeal.—Does an appeal lie from the board of county canvassers to the State board of canvassers in an election on the establishment of a new county?
6. Elections — Boards oe Canvassers. — Remedies suggested against the return of boards of canvassers, if illegal or erroneous as matter of law, or if fraudulent.
7. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jones concurred in by Judge Townsend, as to construction of sec. 5 of 22 Stat., 64.
8. Dissenting opinion of Judge Buchanan, in which is discussed: (a) Dissent to construction of sec. 5 of 22 Stat., 64. (b) That there is no ground for injunction, (c) That this Court has no jurisdiction of this case, (d) That the Court, en banc, must decide whole case, and not isolated portions selected by Supreme Court.
9. DEE County. — The act creating Dee County, 22 Stat., 908, declared unconstitutional.
Proceeding in original jurisdiction for injunction by the following petition:
The State of South Carolina, in the Supreme Court. April term, 1898. J. R. Segars, jr., J. J. Fields, S. T. Gardner, R. M. Jones, B. R. Gatlin, and R. M. Cooper, petitioners, against J. L. Parrott, John C. Shaw, J. P. Kilgo, E. E. Tiller, A. E. Skinner, A. M. Lee, R. E. Cams, W. W. Heron, J. W. Gardner, J. E. McCutchen, S. F. Moore, and Wm. Kelley, as commissioners of Lee County, respondents.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of South Carolina: The plaintiffs above named, who bring this action as well for themselves as for all others, citizens of the territory embraced within the boundaries of the so-called county of Lee, as may come and contribute to the expenses of this action, petition and say:
1. That within less than two years last past, certain citizens of the counties of Sumter, Darlington, and Kershaw, in said State, filed their petitions with the governor of this State, praying for the creation of a new county from the three counties above named, and showing compliance with the requirements of sections 1 to 6, inclusive, of article VIT. of the Constitution of this State, and of the act of the legis lature regulating the formation of new counties. The boundaries of the said proposed new county were' described in said petition as follows, that is to say: In the old county of Darlington: “Beginning at a point on Lynch’s River, where the Darlington and Chesterfield County line intersects with said river; thence up said county line 7-^ miles; thence due south to the head of Sparrow Swamp; thence down said swamp to the crossing of the M. & A. Railroad; thence S. 30 W. to Lynch’s River; thence down said river to Sander’s Bridge.” In the old county of Sumter: “Beginning at San der’s Bridge, on Lynch’s River; thence from Sander’s Bridge S. to W. to Black River; thence due west to the M. & A. Railroad, near Wheeler’s Mill; thence down south side of said railroad to Scape O’er Swamp; thence up said swamp to McGrit’s Branch; thence up said branch to Mechanicsville; thence due west to public road leading from Sumter to Camden; thence up said road to the Sumter and Kershaw County line; thence up said county line to Beaver Dam Branch.” In the old county of Kershaw: “Beginning at Beaver Dam Branch, on the Sumter and Kershaw County line; thence up said branch to the 10-mile post on the public road leading from Bishopville to Camden; thence N. 10 W. to the 9-mile post on the public road leading from Stokes’ Bridge, on Lynch’s River, to Camden; thence N. 20 W., crossing the Tiller’s Ferry Road near the 10-mile post; thence N. 20 W. to the ‘Wire Road;’ thence along said road to Lynch’s River, at Young’s Bridge; thence down said river to its intersection with the Darlington and Chesterfield County line.”
2. That in compliance with the prayer of said petitions and with the requirements of law, the election prayed for was afterwards ordered by the governor of this State and held, and the result of said election was declared to be that the said proposed new county had failed to receive the requisite number of favorable votes in all of the three sections of the three counties, respectively, embraced within the said three old counties. The name proposed for said new county was “Salem County,” which will be hereinafter so called as a designation of said proposed new county.
3. The said Salem County was never created and established by any act of the General Assembly.
4. That thereafter, certain citizens of the same counties of Sumter, Darlington, and Kershaw, in said State, filed their petitions with the governor of this State, praying for the creation of a new county from the three counties in thio section above named, which petition showed on its face compliance with the requirements of sections 1 to 6 inclusive of article VII. of the Constitution of this State and of the act of the legislature regulating the formation of new counties. The boundaries of said proposed new county were as follows: “Section 1. That a new judicial and election county to be known as Lee County is hereby formed, with the following boundaries, to wit: Beginning at a point 2-J miles below DuRant’s Bridge, on Lynch’s River, running from said point to a due west line crossing the W., C. & A. R. R. to the M. & A. R. R. at Wheeler’s Mill; thence along the south side of the said M. & A. R. R. a distance of three miles; thence .north forty degrees W. to the Bradford Springs Road; thence due west to the Camden and Sumter Road, and along said road to the Kershaw County line; thence up said county line to Beaver Dam Branch; then up said branch to the io.-mile post on the public road leading from Bishopvi-lle to Camden; thence north 10 degrees west to the 9-mile post on the public road leading from Tiller’s Ferry, on Lynch’s River, to Camden; thence east along said road to Tiller’s Cross Roads; thence due east to a point on Lynch’s River, one mile above Tiller’s Ferry, on said river; thence to a point where the dividing line between Darlington and Chesterfield Counties touches Lynch’s River; thence along said dividing line miles to a point; thence due south to the head of Sparrow Swamp, near Liberty Hill Church; thence down said swamp to a point where the line dividing Lamar and Cypress Townships intersect Sparrow Swamp; thence up said dividing line to Lynch’s River; thence down said river to the beginning point; and the county seat is hereby established at Bishopville.”
5. That in compliance with the prayer of said petitions and with the requirements of law, the election so prayed for was afterwards ordered by the governor and held, and the result of said election, in the sections of the counties of Sumter and Kershaw, respectively, embraced within the area of said new county, was, as reported by the managers of election within said areas, and as declared by the commissioners of election for said two old counties, favorable to the creation of said new county; but the result of said election in the county of Darlington, embraced within the area of said new county, was, as returned by the managers of election within said last named area, and as declared by the commissioners of election for said old Darlington County, unfavorable to the creation of said new county, in that, as so reported and declared, it failed to obtain two-thirds of the qualified electors of said embraced area of Darlington County in favor of such new county. The name proposed for said last mentioned new county was “Lee County,” which will be hereinafter so called as a designation of said proposed new county.
6. That the result of said last mentioned election was certified in legal form by the commissioners of election for said three old counties to the secretary of State, and by him was submitted to the General Assembly at its next session — all of which proceedings were conformable to law.
7. That the General Assembly, at its said session, passed an act, which was entitled “An act to establish L.ee County,” and said act was duly approved by the governor on the 19th day of February, 1898. The said act of Assembly purports to create and' establish the said county of Lee, designating the same boundaries as are set forth in paragraph four of this petition, providing for the election of county officers and others at the general election in November next, locating it in the Third Circuit and in the Seventh Congres sional District, and making- 'other provisions for the full operation of a county government.
That the said act also contains the following provisions: “Section 2. That J. L. Parrott, Jno. C. Shaw, J. P. Kilgo, E. E. Tiller, A. E. Skinner. A. M. Lee, R. E. Cams, W. W. Heron, J. W. Gardener, J. E. McCutchen, S. F. Moore, and Wm. Kelley are hereby appointed commissioners for said county of Lee, and they and their successors in office are hereby authorized to have the boundaries of said new county marked as now surveyed, and to provide a court house and jail by the erection of suitable buildings at the county seat, and to receive and accept in the name and for the new county of Lee any bonds, money, lands or other gifts donated or hereafter given to have erected the said public building's. Provided, That when the supervisor for said county is elected and qualified, and county commissioners are appointed and qualified, the above named commissioners shall turn over to the county board of commissioners, all the public buildings, if then completed, and, also, all bonds, obligations, lands or money in their hands and belonging to the said county of Lee, and then their powers and duties shall cease, and the county board of commissioners shall succeed to all the rights and powers of said commissioners.”
9. That the said Salem County and the said Lee County embraced much of the same territory in each of the three old counties of Sumter, Darlington and Kershaw, the same territory embraced in both of said proposed new counties being not less than four-fifths of the entire territory that was embraced in each of the said counties of Salem and Lee. Maps of said Salem County and Lee County are herewith filed, and marked respectively, “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B.” About twenty-five square miles of territory in Kershaw County included in Salem County and omitted from Lee County is largely sandhills of little value and few inhabitants. And the election on the question of forming Lee County was held within one year of the prior election on the question of forming Salem County.
10. That upon the establishment of the said Lee County, county officers for such new county, including clerk of court, sheriff, probate judge, treasurer, auditor, supervisor, commissioners of election and others, will be required; additional buildings, such as court house, jail and poor house, must be erected; terms of court must be held, and jurors therefor summoned and empanelled, books for registration transcribed, and an adjustment of indebtedness between the new county and the old counties made — all or some of which will involve an expenditure of money over and above what would be required if such new county be not established, and the money so expended must be raised by taxation of taxable property within the limits of said new county.
11. That the commissioners appointed by the said act of Assembly of 1898 are authorized and empowered to do acts and make contracts which will involve the expenditure of money, which, under the said act, would be a charge upon all of the taxable property of said Lee County, to wit; to have the boundaries of said new county marked as now surveyed, and to erect suitable buildings for court house and jail at the county seat.
12. That your petitioners are citizens, electors, freeholders and taxpayers of the territory embraced within the said Lee County, opposed to the creation of said county; and they submit, as matter of law, that as such opponents, they should make known their opposition, and take action to prevent the formation of such new county before the same has been fully established. And they further submit that the said act of the General Asesmbly is null and void, for the reason that the said Lee County did not receive the favorable vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors voting in each section of said proposed new counties, as reported by the managers of election, and as determined by the commissioners of election for the several old counties- from which this new county was proposed to be taken; and for the fur ther reason that an election on the question of forming Lee County was held less than four years after the four-fifths of the territory embraced therein had voted upon the formation of a new county, as hereinabove set forth in section 2.
Wherefore your petitioners pray that the defendants, as commissioners of Lee County, may be enjoined from doing or performing any act or duty imposed upon them by the terms of said act of Assembly of 1898. And your-petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray and so forth.
In response to the rule to show cause, the respondents appeared and demurred to the petition. After argument the Court handed down the following order on 13th May, 1898:
This was a petition, addressed to this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, praying for an injunction to restrain the respondents from doing any act or performing any duty imposed upon them by the terms of an act entitled “An act to establish Lee County,” approved 19th day of February, 1898, upon various grounds set forth in the petition. One of these allegations is that the proposition to establish Lee County did not receive the favorable vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors of the sections of the several counties proposed to be cut off for the purpose of forming said new county. To this petition the respondents have filed a demurrer, thereby admitting- all the material allegations contained in the petition. The particular allegation above referred to having been thus admitted, it is manifest that the petitioners have stated a case which entitles them to the relief demanded, because it thus appears that one of the constitutional requirements necessary to authorize the formation of a new county has not been complied with. And if this be so, then the act purporting to establish Lee County is without constitutional authority, and hence the respondents have not been invested with any legal authority to do any of the acts or perform any of the duties provided for by said act; and hence the petitioners are entitled to an order of injunction restraining the respondents from doing the act or performing the duties provided for in such act. Under this view it becomes unnecessary to consider the other point made, as to whether the former election to determine the question as to the establishment of Salem County forbids an election to determine whether Lee County, which is claimed to be substantially the same, in less than four years after the former election; and the Court is not to be understood as deciding anything either one way or the other as to that point.
As to what may be termed the formal objections to the petition, and as to the objection to the jurisdiction of this Court, it is sufficient now to say that we do not consider any of these objections as tenable. The reasons for these conclusions will hereafter be set forth in an opinion which will be subsequently prepared and filed.
It is, therefore, ordered, that the demurrer filed by respondents be overruled, with leave to answer over if they shall be so advised.
The respondents show for cause why the injunction prayed for in the petition should not be granted, and demur to the petition, and will move the Court at the hearing to dismiss the same, on the following grounds:
First. Of law, in that:
1. The case made by the petition is not properly cognizable by any court of justice.
2. This Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the petition, in that: i: That the subject matter thereof, submitted to the judgment of this Court, is purely political and a public matter. 2. That the petition seeks to enjoin the respondents, who are the mere agents of the legislature, appointed by it, in the exercise of its rightful power, to perform the duties by the act imposed.
3. That this Court is without jurisdiction of the case made by the petition.
4. That this Court is without jurisdiction to grant in this proceeding and in this mode, the injunction prayed for in the petition.
5. That the case made by the petition is not the subject of equitable cognizance, and if the subject matter of the petition be cognizable by this Court, yet the -petition does not allege sufficient grounds for the equitable interference of the Court, in that: 1. It does not show that the petitioners have any such rights in the subject matter as entitle them to the injunction sought against the defendants. 2. It does not show that the petitioners have suffered or will suffer irreparable or other injury from the action of the defendants, in the' discharge of their duties. 3. The only wrong it alleges to the petitioners is one not peculiar to the petitioners, but is common to all of the citizens of Lee County. 4. It seeks, in effect, to enjoin the collection of taxes.
6. That the facts stated in the petition do not state a cause of action, but to the contrary show that the respondents have no power to impose upon the petitioners the burden complained of.
7. That the facts stated in the petition do not warrant the granting of the injunction.
8. That the existence of all the matters of fact required by the Constitution of this State, as precedent to the creation and establishment of Lee County, has been res judicata since February 19th, 1898, on which day the governor of the State approved the act of the General Assembly of the State, entitled “An act to establish Lee County;” and these actions of the legislature and executive departments of the State are final and conclusive.
9. That there is a defect of parties in this proceeding, in this: 1. That the State of South Carolina is not made a party, either as petitioner or respondent. 2. That the counties of Lee, Sumter, Kershaw, and Darlington, respectively, are not made a party, either as petitioner or respondent.
10. That petitioners have a full, complete and adequate remedy at law.
Second. As matters of fact, the respondents show for cause why said injunction should not be granted, the fol lowing, which they ask should be considered by the Court, in the event that the cause shown as matter of law should be held so insufficient to prevent the granting of the injunction as to require further cause shown, viz :
i. That the statement as to the election, made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of'the petition, is incomplete and incorrect; and respondents aver that not only in the Sumter and Kershaw sections, but also in the Darlington section of Lee County, more than two-thirds of the votes cast were cast in favor of the formation of Lee County; they admit that the election so prayed for as alleged in paragraph 5 of the petition was held, and the name proposed for the new county was Lee County, but they deny each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph of the petition; that they further deny the allegations of paragraph 6 of the petition, and say that in Darlington County there were only two voting precincts for said election, one at Cypress and one at Ashland; that the managers at Cypress duly held said election and duly delivered to the commissioners of election, the poll list, the boxes containing the ballots and a written statement of the-result of the election at that precinct, showing that more than two-thirds of the votes there cast, were in favor of the formation of Lee County, and that the commissioners of election for Darlington County at their first meeting thereafter, canvassed the return of the managers of this precinct and declared the result of the election there in accordance with the said return. That the managers of election at Ashland precinct did not deliver to the commissioners of election the poll list, the box containing the ballots, or the written statement of the result of the election, as required by statute, nor did they return the vote there cast; but two days after the election, at Darlington Court House, not at Ashland, they prepared an illegal, unauthorized and incorrect paper, alleging it to be a statement of the vote cast at that precinct, and attached thereto an affidavit of one of the managers stating that a written statement of the result of the election had been put in the ballot box, and that the box and contents were stolen on the night of the election; that upon such paper presented by the managers, the commissioners of election, at their subsequent meeting, declared the result of the election at Ashland to be against the formation of Lee County, notwithstanding that protest had been made against the making of such declaration, and notwithstanding the fact that more than two-thirds of the votes cast at Ashland precinct had been cast in favor of Lee County, which fact was fully proved before the General Assembly, and the truth of which these respondents here allege and aver. That at such second meeting the commissioners of election illegally declared the election at Cypress to be null and void; and never certified to the secretary of State the result of the election at such precinct, in tabulated statement of the vote cast thereat, as required by law, nor in any other form except that they sent up to the secretary of State the tabulated statement of the vote cast at'that precinct made b3r the managers, a copy of which is herewith exhibited marked “B.”
2. That no election upon the question of forming the same proposed new county, now Lee County, was held in four years before, or at any time before the election, upon the question of the formation of the county, now Lee County, and each and every allegation of the petition which is, or can be construed to be, the contrary of, or inconsistent with this allegation, is denied.
3. Answering paragraph io of the petition: They deny that any additional expense would be incurred by establishing a new county, and allege: That the land for the public building sites has been donated, and the town of Bishopville has agreed to erect the court house and jail at its own cost; and the buildings would have been in the course of erection had it not been generally rumored since the legislature adjourned, that some proceeding would be taken to enjoin the commissioners from carrying on said work. They deny that any extra tax would have to be levied upon the petitioners or upon any other citizen of Lee County, over and above the present rate of taxation, for or on account of any ex-i pense incurred or burden imposed by reason of the formation of Lee County, but, in the opinion of the respondents, the taxes will be less than the rate now existing, for the reason that the area embraced in Lee Cqunty, is for the most part far away from the county seats of the respective counties of Darlington, Sumter, and Kershaw, and much nearer to Bishopville, the county seat of Lee County, and there will be a large amount saved annually in witness and jurors fees on account of the shorter distance to be traveled in attending court; and the salaries of the various officers in Lee County, are only about one-half of the sums paid to the officers of the three old counties named, and there will be a large saving to the taxpayers on that account.
4. Answering paragraph eleven of the petition the respondents say: That they have been directed'by the act creating Lee County to mark out the boundaries of the new county, and to receive donations in lands, money and bonds, for the erection of a court house and jail, and have been directed to erect the said buildings,but they deny that any authority has been conferred upon them to create any debt, or to impose any burden upon Lee County, or upon any taxpayer therein.
5. Answering paragraph twelve of the petition: They admit that the petitioners are citizens, electors, freeholders and taxpayers in Lee County, opposed to its creation, but they deny each and every other allegation of said paragraph.
6. Further answering the petition, they say: That the territory embraced in the county of Lee is not the same as embraced ill the county of Salem; that the following changes were made, viz: Fifty-three square miles of territory of Kershaw County, and twenty-three square miles of territory in Darlington County embraced in Salem County were left out of and are not embraced in Lee County; and fifty-five square miles of Sumter County not embraced in Salem, is embraced in Lee County; that the Kershaw territory left out, embraces farming lands of average quality and population; that the territory left out in Darlington County em braces a'fine farming section, having within it the town of Lamar; and the territory taken in from Sumter County embraces a fine farming section and also has two villages (Magnolia and Lynchburg) within its area; and they submit in further relation thereto the affidavit of John H. Pate, and crave that the same may be read as a part hereof.
7. That all the allegations of the petition as to matters occurring prior to the passage of the act to establish Lee County were duly presented to the General Assembly by those opposed to the creation of this county, and full testimony taken and full argument of counsel heard in support of their force and effect; and it was after such presentation, evidence, and argumént that the act to establish Lee County was enacted by the General Assembly upon full debate and consideration had.
8. That the petitioners with full notice at the time of all of the various steps being taken to establish and put in ope■ration Lee County, and with full opportunity to test the validity of the same, have waited until this time to move in the matter, and, until after various citizens of Lee County and the adjoining counties from which it was formed, and other portions of the country, in consequence of full reliance upon the validity of the act, have entered into various contracts of the gravest consequence, both executory and executed, their interests under which would be afflicted by granting the injunction most seriously to their detriment, without fault or remissness on their part; and the respondents charge that such delay in seeking redress is such laches as bars the petitioners of the equitable relief sought.
9. The respondents charge that the petitioners have so participated by their votes, and the exercise of their influence against the formation of Lee County in the election on the question of the formation thereof, and the action following thereon, as to estop them from the equitable relief sought on the ground alleged.
10. That before this proceeding was instituted, the gov ernor, in the exercise of his executive authority and in pursuance of the act creating Lee County, had appointed three supervisors of registration for Lee County, and these supervisors had entered upon and had been for some time discharging their duty as such supervisors; that the citizens of said Lee County, recognizing its existence, and in the exercise of their political rights as such citizens, had assembled in public county convention, and elected delegates to the State political convention, to which these delegates were without objection admitted as equal representatives of the people; and that at least one of the auditors of the old counties from which Lee County was formed, had “made up a set of books for Lee County,” as required by the act creating the county.
The petitioners demurred to the original return, but after the amended return was filed, by permission of the Court, this demurrer was withdrawn, and the following traverse filed:
And now come the petitioners aforesaid, by leave of the Court first had and obtained to traverse the amended return, for traverse thereof allege and say, that the injunction prayed for in their petition ought not to be refused by reason of any matters and things set up in the said amended return, because
i. These petitioners, reiterating the truth, completeness, and correctness of all the allegations contained in the 5th and 6th paragraphs of their petition, deny every allegation of the return inconsistent therewith, and specifically deny so much of the allegations of paragraph 1 of the return as alleges that “in the Darlington section of Lee County more than two-thirds of the votes cast were cast in favor of the formation of Lee County,” and that “more than two-thirds of the votes cast at Ashland precinct had been cast in favor of the formation of Lee County.” They admit the allegations of the return as to Cypress precinct, but allege that the commissioners of election for Darlington declared said election illegal for failure of the managers of election to re quire of the voters the production of a registration certificate and proof of their payment of poll tax due and payable six months next preceding said election,- sending up, nevertheless, to the secretary of State the return of the managers of election at said precinct. They also admit that the managers of election of Ashland precinct (which was the only other voting precinct in Darlington County at said election) did not deliver to the commissioners of election the original poll list and other papers stated in the return, but allege that all such original papers were duly written and signed on the day of election and put into the custody of one of the managers (who was in favor 'of the formation of Lee County), and were never thereafter seen by the other two managers, nor by the commissioners' of election for Lee County. These petitioners admit the allegations of the return as to the later and substituted return of the managers of election for Ashland precinct and of the action of the commissioners of election thereon, except the allegation that the substituted statement of the vote at Ashland precinct was an “illegal, unauthorized, and incorrect paper,” averring as a further fact that the said commissioners considered and overruled the protest alleged in the return and transmitted to.the secretary of State their statement, showing that a two-thirds affirmative vote was not cast at said precinct in this election. And these petitioners allege that the papers forwarded by the commissioners of election to the secretary of State fully showed that the aggregate vote of the only two election precincts in Darlington County was short of a two-thirds affirmative vote. They further admit that the General Assembly thereafter passed the act creating Lee County, after hearing affidavits pro and con as to the result of said election, and in disregard of the result reported to that body by the commissioners of election of Darlington County. But petitioners submit and aver that the General Assembly are not empowered under the Constitution of this State to- create a new county upon ascertainment by them of the result of an election therefor on evidence by affidavit or otherwise than by the submission to them of returns of the proper election boards, showing that two-thirds of the electors voting in each section of the proposed new county had voted in favor of such new county, and that, therefore, any inquiry and ascertainment by evidence other than the returns of the proper election board, is not proper in this proceeding.
2. These petitioners admit the allegations of paragraph 7 of the return, but allege that the “full testimony” therein' referred to, was testimony by affidavits only, afid they aver as they have hereinabove averred as to the powers of the General Assembly in such matters.
And all matters of traverse herein, these petitioners are ready to verify.
After full argument, the Court on 13th June, 1898, handed down the following order:
A difference of opinion having arisen amongst the Justices of this Court as to what issues of fact in this case shall be referred to the referee for his determination, and two of the said Justices having expressed a desire that all of the Circuit Judges shall be called to the assistance of this Court for the determination of that matter, in accordance with the provisions of section 12, of article V., of the Constitution of this State: It is ordered, that the Chief Justice, or in his absence the presiding Associate Justice, be authorized and requested to call to the assistance of the Supreme Court all of the Judges of the Circuit Court, to meet in the Supreme Court room at Columbia, on Tuesday, the second day of August next, at 10 o’clock A. M., for the purpose of hearing and determining the matter above stated. It is further ordered, that, for the purpose of preserving the status quo pending this litigation, the respondents be restrained and in - joined from doing any of the acts or performing any of the duties required- of or imposed upon them by the provisions of an act entitled “An act to establish Lee County,” approved 19th of February, A. D. 1898, until otherwise ordered by this Court.
Previous to the assembling of the Court en banc, the respondents filed in the Supreme Court the following petition:
The humble petition of the respondents most respectfully showeth unto your Honors:
1. That they are informed by your Honors’ order June 13, 1898, that a difference of opinion has arisen among your Honors as to what issues of fact in this cause shall be referred to the referee for his determination, of so decided and so serious a nature that all of the Judges of the Circuit Court have been called to the assistance of the Supreme Court for the purpose of hearing and determining the matter above stated.
2. That the petitioners in the cause, J. R. Segars et al., have in their petition raised for adjudication two most grave questions of constitutional law, challenging the constitutionality of the “Act to establish Lee County,” and have in their traverse sought to raise another yet graver question of constitutional law, challenging the constitutionality of the “Act to provide for the formation of new counties, and the changing of county lines and county seats, and consolidation of counties.”
3. That what issues of fact should be so referred to the referee can, it is respectfully submitted, be best rightly determined, with full and proper advisement by the Court so constituted, only in the light of their conclusions upon these grave questions of constitutional law necessarily involved in and lying at the core of the cause.
4. Wherefore, and inasmuch as there has as yet been not only no order as to what issues of fact shall be referred to the referee, but no order that any issues shall be referred to him, or what shall be his duties, if he shall be appointed, and inasmuch as the decision of these constitutional questions is of the gravest moment not only to the parties and the county of Lee, but also to the commonwealth, the respondents pray your Honors, that the order of June 13, 1898, may be so enlarged as that the Judges of the Circuit Court may be called to the assistance of the Supreme Court for the purpose of hearing and determining the entire cause, and +hat respondents be heard before the bar of your Honors in support of this petition, at such time as your Honors shall appoint, with like leave to the petitioners in the cause to be heard pro or contra, as they may be advised.
And the respondents shall ever pray.
The Court en banc assembled in the Supreme Court room ■on August 2, 1898 (all Justices present, and all Circuit Judges sitting except Judge Gage), and after full argument filed the following order on August 5, 1898:
The Circuit Judges having been called to the assistance of the Supreme Court for the purpose of determining what issues of fact, presented by the pleadings, should be referred to a referee for his determination, and having this day appeared in response to the call of the Chief Justice, the Court as thus constituted proceeded to the hearing of the matter thus referred to it. After hearing the argument of counsel and after full conference, the majority of the Court as thus ■constituted reached the conclusion that the only issues of fact which should be referred to the referee are the following, viz: 1st. Whether the board of commissioners of election for Darlington County certified the result of the election held in those portions of said county proposed to be cut off for the purpose of forming the proposed new county of Lee, under the order of his excellency the governor, in tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct, and transmitted the same to the secretary of State. 2d. If so, whether it appears from such statement that two-thirds of those voting at such election were in favor of the establishment of Lee County. The reasons for this conclusion will be stated in an opinion which! will hereafter be prepared and filed.
On same day an additional order was filed, appointing James F. Rhame, Esq., referee to take the testimony on the .issues indicated and to report his conclusions.
Messrs. Boyd & Brown, E. K. Dargcrn, and Robt. W. Shand, for petitioners.
Messrs. Purdy & Reynolds, Leroy F. Youmans, and Thomas S. Moorman, for respondents.
December 3, 1898.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court en banc
was delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice McIver.
This was a proceeding instituted in the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, mainly for the purpose of testing the legality of the establishment of Lee County, formed from certain portions of territory cut off from the counties of Sumter, Kershaw, and Darlington. In the petition it is alleged, amongst other things, that while the result of the election, ordered by the governor, in those portions of Sumter and Kershaw counties cut off from said counties, and embraced-within the area of the said new county, "was, as reported by the managers of elections within said areas, and as declared by the commissioners of election for said two old counties, favorable to the creation of said new county; but the result of said election in the county of Darlington, embraced within the area of said new county, was as returned by the managers of election, within said last named area, and as declared by the commissioners of election for said old Darlington County, unfavorable to the creation of said new county, in that, as reported and declared, it failed to obtain two-thirds of the qualified electors of said embraced area of Darlington County in favor of such new county." These allegations are made in the fifth paragraph of the petition, and in the twelfth paragraph it is again alleged that the proposition to establish Lee County "did not receive the favorable vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors voting in each section of said proposed new county, as reported by the managers of election, and as determined by the commissioners of election for the several old counties from which this new county was proposed to be taken." In the sixth para graph of the petition it is alleged: "That the result of said last mentioned election was certified, in legal form, by the commissioners of election for said three old counties to the secretary of State and by him was submitted to the General Assembly at its next session."
The respondents in their amended return say: "That the statement as to the election made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition is incomplete and incorrect; and respondents aver that, not only in the Sumter and Kershaw sections, but also in the Darlington section of Lee County, more than two-thirds of the votes cast were cast in favor of the formation of Lee County; that they admit that the election so prayed for, as alleged in paragraph 5 of the petition, was field, and the name proposed for the new county was Lee County; but they deny each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph of the petition." And they then proceed to allege that in Darlington County there were only two precincts at which an election was held, to wit-. "Cypress" and "Ashland;" that the managers at Cypress duly held said election and duly delivered to the commissioners of elections, the poll list, the box containing the ballots and a written statement of the result of the election at that precinct, showing that more than two-thirds of the votes there cast were in favor of the new county; and that the commissioners of election for Darlington County, at their first meeting thereafter, canvassed the return of the managers for that precinct and declared the result of the election there in accordance with said return; that the managers of election at Ashland precinct did not deliver to the commissioners of elections the poll list, the box containing the ballots or the written statement of the result of the election, as recpiired by statute, nor did they return the vote there cast, but two days after the election, at Darlington Court House — not at Ashland — they prepared an illegal, unauthorized and incorrect paper, alleging it to be a statement of the vote cast at that precinct, and attached thereto an affidavit of the managers, stating that a written statement of the result of the election had been put in the ballot box, and that the box and contents were stolen on the night of the election; that upon such paper presented by the managers, the commissioners of election, at their subsequent meeting, declared the result of the election at Ashland to be against the formation of Lee County, notwithstanding that protest had been made against the making of such declaration, and notwithstanding the fact that more than two-thirds of the votes cast at Ashland precinct had been cast in favor of the formation of Lee County, which fact was fully proved before the General Assembly, "and the truth of which these, respondents here allege and aver." It is further alleged in the return of respondents that at the second meeting of the commissioners of election, they illegally declared the election at Cypress to be null and void, and never certified to the-secretary of State the result of the election at such precinct in tabulated statement of the vote cast thereat, as required by law, nor in any other form. In that portion of the origi - nal return of respondents which has not been amended, they say, in answering the twelfth paragraph of the petition, that "They admit that the petitioners are citizens, electors, freeholders and taxpayers in Lee County, opposed to its creation, but they deny each and every other allegation of said paragraph."
After hearing the petition and return, as amended, and after full argument of, counsel, it appearing that certain issues of fact were presented by the pleadings, which it was necessary should be referred to a referee to hear and determine, a question thereupon arose as to what issue or issues of fact should be referred to the referee, and there being a difference of opinion amongst the members of the Supreme Court as to that question, and two of the Justices of this Court having expressed a desire that all of the Circuit Judges should be called to the assistance of the Supreme-Court, for the purpose of determining that question, in accordance with the provisions of section 12 of art. V. of the-present Constitution, an order to that effect was accordingly- passed on the 8th of June, 1898, and in pursuance of that order the Circuit Judges have been called.in by the Chief Justice.
For a proper determination of the question thus presented to the Court, as at present constituted, it will be necessary to consider, briefly, what is the law with respect to the formation of new counties in this State. It seems that, prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, there was no constitutional limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to provide for the formation of new counties. But by section 3 of art. II. of the Constitution of 1868, the General Assembly was specifically vested with the power to organize new counties, with these limitations, however, that "no new county shall hereafter be formed of less extent than 625 square miles, nor shall any existing counties be reduced to a less extent than 625 square miles." The present Constitution, in art. VII. places still further limitations upon the power of the General Assembly to establish new counties. The only one of these additional limitations necessary to be considered for the purpose of deter- - mining tire question now before us, is that contained in section 2 of that article, whereby it is provided that "iNo section of the county proposed to be dismembered shall be thus cut off without consent by a two-thirds vote of those voting in such section." But the Constitution nowhere provides how the election for this purpose, which is required by section x of the same article, shall be held, or how its result should be ascertained, and hence that must be provided for by the General Assembly. Accordingly that body, at its first session after the adoption of the present Constitution passed "An Act to provide for the formation of new counties, and the changing of county lines and county seats, and consolidation of counties," approved 9th March, 1896 — 22 Stat., 64. That act, after providing in the first and second sections for the holding of an election to determine whether any proposed new county shall be established, proceeds in the third section to provide as follows: "For the purpose of such election, the commissioners of election'for each old county proposed to' be cut shall appoint three managers for each voting place in the area of the old county proposed to be cut off, not more than two of whom shall be in favor of the proposed new county or against it, and shall deliver to them the books of registration for those voting places, which the registration officers shall turn over to the commissioners on demand. Such election shall be conducted in the same manner as general elections in this State, and all persons entitled to vote under the Constitution and laws of this State, at general elections, shall be entitled to vote at such election." The provisions of the fourth section of said act are as follows: "The commissioners of elections for each old county proposed to be cut shall canvass the returns of the managers of each precinct in their county at which such election has been held, as such returns in general elections in this State are canvassed, and shall certify the result thereof in tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct to the secretary of State, who shall transmit a tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct of an old county proposed to be cut off, to both branches of the General Assembly at its next session." Then follows the fifth section in these words: "The General Assembly at its next session shall create such new county, if two-thirds of the qualified electors voting at such election shall vote in favor of the establishment of such new county, and if all the constitutional requirements for the formation of new counties have been complied with, of all which such General Assembly must judge."
From this review of the legislation, both constitutional and statutory, it is apparent that one of the essential constitutional requirements for the formation of a new county is that: "No section of the county proposed to be dismembered shall be thus cut off without consent by a two-thirds vote of those voting in such section" (sec. 2, of art. VII). But as the Constitution makes no provision whereby it can be ascertained whether such consent has been manifested by a two-thirds vote of those vot ing in the section of an old county proposed to be cut off, in favor of the formation of the proposed new county, it was necessarily left for the General Assembly to make such provision. This has been done by sections 3 and 4 of the act above quoted, whereby it is substantially provided in section 3 that managers of election shall be appointed for each voting place in the area of the old county proposed to be cut off, by the commissioners of elections for such old county; that such election shall be conducted in the same manner as general elections in this State; and that all persons who, under the Constitution and laws of this State, are entitled to vote at general elections, shall be entitled to vote at such election. And in the fourth section it is further provided, sub • stantially, that the commissioners of election for each old county proposed to be dismembered shall canvass the returns of the managers of each precinct in their county where such election shall be held, as such returns in general elections are canvassed, and shall certify the result thereof in tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct to the secretary of State, who shall transmit a tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct of an old county proposed to be cut off, to both branches of the General Assembly at its next session. This, it seems to us, is the only mode prescribed by law, whereby the essential fact can be ascertained, to wit: whether two-thirds of the vote cast at such election in that portion of an old county which it is proposed to cut off for the purpose of forming a new county were cast in favor of the formation of such new county; and it is, therefore, the only mode by which that essential fact can be properly ascertained. Hence the only issues of fact necessary to be referred to the referee for his determination are whether the commissioners of elections for the county of Darlington (no question having been raised as to the result of the election in the counties of Sumter and Kershaw) have certified the result of the election in tabulated statement of the vote at each precinct of said county at which such election has been held, to the secretary of State, and whether such tabulated statement has been transmitted by him to the General Assembly at its session next following the election; and whether it does or does not appear from such tabulated statement that two-thirds of the votes cast in that portion of the county of Darlington proposed to be cut off for the purpose of forming the new county of Lee were in favor of the formation of such'new county; for until this essential fact is ascertained in the only mode prescribed by law, the General Assembly would have no power to pass an act for the formation of Lee County.
It is contended, however, that, by the terms of the fifth sec tion of the act above quoted the General Assembly has constituted itself the final judge of whether the necessary two-thirds vote was cast in the county of Darlington in favor of the formation of Lee County, and that by "An Act to establish Lee County," approved the 19th of February, 1898 — 22 Stat., 908 — it has finally determined that question. In the first place, it seems to us that the language used in sec. 5 of the act of 1896, above copied, is susceptible of two constructions — one of which would be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the other would bring that section into direct conflict with the provisions of that instrument. In this state of things the rule is well settled that such a construction of an act should be adopted as would avoid any conflict with the Constitution, rather than a construction which would bring about a conflict with the Constitution. It may be that the General Assembly only intended, by the language used in that section, to declare that it should have the power to determine whether the result of the election had been ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, to wit: by the mode prescribed by the two preceding sections, 3 and 4, hereinabove copied, and this is the construction which must be adopted.
The construction contended for by the respondents is that, by the terms of the fifth section, the General Assembly has been invested with full power to determine finally whether this constitutional requirement as to the two-thirds vote as well as all the other constitutional requirements, have been complied with. If this be the proper construe • tion of the language used in sec. 5, then it is a mani fest attempt on the part of the General Assembly to assume and exercise judicial powers, which is plainly forbidden by the Constitution (sec. 14, art. I). For it is alleged in paragraph 7 of the original return: "That all the allegations of the petition, as to the matters occurring prior to the passage of the act to establish Lee County, were duly presented to the General Assembly by those opposed to the creation of this county, and full testimony and full argument of counsel heard in support of their force and effect; and it was after such presentation, evidence and argument, that the act to establish Lee County was enacted by the General Assembly, upon full debate and consideration had." That this was an exercise of judicial power on the part of the General Assembly is obvious, and it is equally obvious that it is in open violation of the section of the Constitution last cited, which reads as follows: "In the government of this State the legis • lative, executive and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." Indeed, if the hearing and deciding a question as to the result of an election, upon evidence and argument, is not the exercise of judicial powers, it would be difficult to conceive what would constitute the exercise of such power. It necessarily involves the hearing of evidence and the determination of questions both of fact and law arising out of such evidence. We have no idea, therefore, that the General Assembly ever intended, by the terms of section 5 of the act of 1896, above referred to, to invest itself with judicial power; and if it did, then that section of the act is clearly unconsti • tutional, and, therefore, null and void. That this was the view of the framers of the Constitution, is clearly shown by the fact that by sec. 11 of art. III. of the Constitution, it was thought necessary to invest the General Assembly in express terms with power to pass upon the election returns and qualifications even of its own members, for that section provides as follows: "Each house shall judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members." And again, by section 4 of art. IV., to confer upon the General Assembly the power to determine "contested elections for governor." In these two cases, and in these only, is the General Assembly invested with power to determine the result of any popular election; and they are not only not invested, with any power to determine the result of any other popular election, but they are forbidden to assume or exercise such a power in any other case by the terms of sec. 14 of art. I., above quoted.
If it should be said that, under the views above presented, the board of commissioners of election would be invested with the power to determine finally the result of any election, such as that which is under consideration here, without any right of appeal to any other tribunal, and that the General Assembly could scarcely have intended any such re-suit; to this several answers may be made. First. If the language used in sections 3 and 4 of the act of 1896 above quoted requires such a construction, then ita lex scripta est would be a complete and sufficient answer. Second. If, however, the langauge used in those sections is susceptible of the construction that the General Assembly intended to confer a right of appeal to the board of State canvassers, as in other elections, then the objection falls to the ground, as there was, in this case, no appeal to the board of State canvassers. While, for the reason just stated, it is not necessary now to decide whether the construction suggested is the proper one, it may be not amiss to say that there is much in the language used to warrant such a construction. By sec. 174 of the Rev. Stat. of 1893, the commissioners of election are declared to be the county board of canvassers, and by section 175 it is declared that such board of county canvassers "shall have the power, and it is hereby made their duty, as judicial officers, to decide all cases under protest or contest that may arise, subject to appeal to the board of State canvassers." And in sec. 186, the board of State canvassers, it is declared, "Shall have power, and it is made their duty, as judicial officers, to decide all cases under protest or contest that may come before them on appeal from the decisions of the county board of canvassers;" and in several cases it has been held that the decisions of the board of State canvassers are final and not reviewable by appeal to this or any other Court, and at most can only be reviewed under a writ of certiorari, issued by this Court, for errors of law—Ex parte Riggs, 52 S. C., 298. It is true, that the statutory provisions just cited originally applied only to the election of certain officers, therein specified; but by an act approved 2d March, 1896 — -22 Stat. 55 — it is declared: "That all laws now of force relating to the formation of county and State boards of canvassers, and defining their powers' duties and liabilities, be and the same are hereby continued of force, and applicable to all elections (italics ours) held under the Constitution ratified on the 4th day of December, 1895, until repealed or amended by the General Assembly." The election now under consideration being an election held under the present Constitution, it seems clear that the powers and duties conferred upon the county boards of canvassers and the State board of canvassers by those sections of the Rev. Stat. which have been cited, are applicable to this election. It seems to us that the words used in the third section of the act of 1896, "Such election (that is, this election, ) shall be conducted in the same manner as general elections in this State," and the words used in the fourth section of that act, requiring that the commissioners of election, who, as we have seen, constitute the board of county canvassers, "shall canvass the returns of the managers of each precinct in their county at which such election has been held as such returns in general elections in this State are canvassed," may be construed as implying an intention on the part of the General Assembly that an election of this kind shall be conducted in all respects as general elections are conducted, in which, as we have seen, the right of appeal from the decision of the board of county canvassers to the State board of canvassers, is secured. See Blake v. Walker, 23 S. C., at page 525, where similar language has been construed.
But even if there is no right of appeal from the return made to the secretary of State by the commissioners of elections, it does not follow that there is no remedy for a grossly erroneous or perhaps fraudulent return of the commissioners of elections; and least of all it does not follow' that this remedy is in the action of the General Assembly, by assuming and exercising a power which the Constitution, in express terms, prohibits it from exercising. It may be that the return of the commissioners of elections, if illegal or erroneous as matter of law, would be remedied on writ of certiorari, as in the case of Ex parte Riggs, supra; or it may be that if such return is alleged to be fraudulent, it might be set aside and declared void by an action for that purpose. But, however this may be, it seems to us clear that the General Assembly has no power either to set aside or disregard such return; and that until it is set aside or annulled in some form of proceeding recognized by law, it must be regarded as showing conclusively the result of the election.
For the foregoing reasons we cannot adopt the construction of sec. 5 of the act of 1896, contended for by the respondents, as such a construction w'ould bring the act into direct conflict with the Constitution; and, on the contrary, we must adopt the construction of sec. 5 therein, above first suggested, as that will avoid any conflict between the act and the Constitution.
From this it follows that the only questions of fact necessary to be referred to a referee are (1) • whether the board of commissioners of election for Darlington County certified the result of the election held in those portions of said county proposed to be cut off for the purpose of forming the proposed new county of Lee, under the order of his excellency, the governor, in tabulated statement of the vote at each pre cinct, and transmitted the same to the secretary of State; (2) if so, whether it appears from such statement that two-thirds of those voting at such election were in favor of the •establishment of Lee County.
The judgment of this Court, as at present constituted, in accordance with the foregoing views, has heretofore been .announced in a short order heretofore filed.
Messrs. Justices Pope and Gary, and Judges James Aid-rich, Ernest Gary, J. C. Klugh, W. C. Benet, and R. C. Watts, concur.