Case Name: Theresa Elias, Plaintiff, v. The City of Rochester, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900
Citations: 49 A.D. 597
Docket Number: 
Parties: Theresa Elias, Plaintiff, v. The City of Rochester, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 597–609

Head Matter:
Theresa Elias, Plaintiff, v. The City of Rochester, Defendant.
Negligence—what is “ actual notice” to a city board of a defect in a street, which will sustain an action for injury caused thereby.
jNotice of a defect in a street given to an employee of the executive board of the city of Rochester — the body having charge of the streets —at his station in the outer office of the board, constitutes a sufficient compliance with section 218 of the charter of the city, which provides: “The city of Rochester shall not be liable for any injury caused by such sidewalk or any roadway being out of repair, or unlawfully obstructed, or dangerous from snow or ice, unless actual notice of the unsafe or dangerous condition thereof has been given to the city officers having charge of the highways a reasonable time before the happening of any such injury,” where it appears that it was a long-established custom, recognized by the executive board, for such notices to be given to any employee of the board in attendance on the outer office, and that the employee-in question had frequently received complaints.
Evidence that the notice was given to the clerk during the time such notices were usually given; that he took a pad and commenced to write, and while writing asked the complainant where the defect was, and after receiving the information continued to write, warrants a finding that the clerk made a memorandum of the notice, and that such notice was given to the executive board. McLennan, J., dissented.
Motion by the plaintiff, Theresa Elias, for a new trial upon a case containing exceptions, ordered to be heard at the Appellate Division in the first instance, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court after a trial before the court and a jury at the Monroe Trial Term.
The plaintiff was injured by falling on a defective sidewalk on Smith street in the city of Rochester, October 24, 1896. Section 218 of the city charter (Chap. 14, Laws of 1880, as amd. by Laws of 1890, chap. 561, § 27) provides: “ It shall in all cases be the duty of the owner of every lot or piece of land in said city to keep the sidewalks adjoining his lot or piece of land in good repair, and to remove and clean away all snow and ice and other obstruction from such sidewalk. The city of Rochester shall not be liable for any injury caused by such sidewalk or any roadway being out of repair, or unlawfully obstructed, or dangerous from snow or ice, unless actual notice of the unsafe or dangerous condition thereof has been given to the city officers having charge of the highways a reasonable time before the happening of any such injury.”
The witness Wier testified that in June, 1896, he noticed the defect in the walk where the accident occurred ; that the walk was of plank and there was a hole about three or four feet in length and three or four inches wide caused by a piece of plank being out; that he went to the office of the executive board and complained to a clerk in attendance and he thus describes what took place there: “ I went into the reception room where the clerk was. There was a counter running across in front. There were two persons behind the counter. This gentleman had his hat and coat off ; the other gentleman was writing at a table, I think. This one with Ms hat a/nd coat off oame to the ooimter. This was in the latter part of July or first of August. This gentleman had been behind the counter four or five weeks when' I had been there. I asked him if the members of the Executive Board were busy and he said they were. I said there was a defective walk on Smith street that I nearly broke my neck at. He did some writing and then asked where it was, and I told him on Smith street between Grape and Magne. • I told him there was a piece out of the walk, that I caught my foot in there. Then he did some writing, and came back and asked this question, while he was writing, and then went back to write again, and I passed out of the office.”
Later the witness testified that this complaint was made in 1895, but he stated that the defect he described to the clerk continued without repair until after the accident to the plaintiff and he identified this as the same place where plaintiff received her injuries.
The precise point of the nonsuit apparently was that the complaint made to the clerk by Wier was not actual notice within the city charter.
G. L. Meade, for the plaintiff.
Porter M. French, Corporation Counsel, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Spring, J.:
To the executive board of the city was commited the charge of the streets. Its duties were numerous and the details were necessarily intrusted to agents to carry out and to execute its orders. It did not in fact ordinarily receive complaints of defective streets. The practice appears to have been that these notices were given to clerks. The board was in session daily in a room provided for that purpose. Its meetings were to consider and perform the general duties devolving upon it. These meetings were not public. The board was not in session to enable citizens to run in before it and advise its members personally that a stone was upheaved on the sidewalk in Main street, that there was an accumulation of snow on East avenue, or a plank out on Smith street. The whole time of the board would be occupied in listening to petty complaints of that character if the " actual notice " contemplated by the statute was restricted to a personal interview with the board. To give practical effect to this requirement the board had an outer office. In this were clerks and employees, and to this room the public were admitted. Each individual who had a complaint to make as to the condition of the streets, made it to one of these employees who received them on behalf of the executive board. Nor was any particular one of these employees especially charged with the performance of this duty. Any one of them in attendance received these complaints. Originally they were noted down on a blotter prepared for the purpose. Later this was abandoned and a pad used. This room was an adjunct of the main office, and the proof is that it was here, and to these employees without variation, that the notice of defective streets was given. By long practice, by unquestionable recognition, the board had accepted this as the mode by which the actual notices should be given, so that the public by its action was led to believe that a notice so tendered was a compliance with the statute.
The board was responsible for the mode of carrying out the statute. It first put a practical construction upon it and the publics conformed to it. The evidence shows that Roswell Clark was employed in this office by the executive board. Complaints were frequently made to him as the employee or representative of the board. In fact they were made to whomsoever took them behind this counter. The complainant in every case would not know each clerk or employee, or his relation to the board. He only knew that this was the place to present complaints to the board, and the medium was the clerk or attendant behind the counter. The notice in this case was given the same as in others. There was no departure from the uniform course of procedure. In Sprague v. City of Rochester (159 N. Y. 20) this same provision of the charter was under discussion. At the time of the alleged notice in that case there was a superintendent to whom was generally committed the actual control of the streets as an administrative function. There were, however, two foremen in charge of sidewalks, and a like number looking after the streets, and under each of these were inspectors who did the work of repairing, and without communicating with the executive board. The notice was given to one of these inspectors, and the court held this was adequate. They were not officers provided for by the charter. They were simply employees provided for by the executive board to máke effective its execution of the obligations intrusted to it. As was said in that case at page 26 : " While the foremen may not be city officers in one sense, they are in another. The duties of the board are so numerous and important as to embrace a large part of the government of the city. Obviously the Legislature did not contemplate that these three men should look closely after details, but that they sliould take general charge, give general directions, and to a great extent delegate their powers to subordinates. In no other way could the work of the city be done. It is not reasonable to believe that the Legislature intended that personal notice of every defect in the entire system of sidewalks-should be given them in order to enable citizens to obtain redress for injuries owing to a failure to repair," and the court further held that the section should receive a strict construction against the city, as it creates a new rule in limitation of the general -liability imposed upon the municipality. As I view that case, it is in line with the present one. The foreman of the streets possessed power delegated by the board, and his official functions were recognized by the body under whom he acted. In this case Clark was. an employee of the board, acting within the recognized scope of his authority, at the place provided by the board, and in the manner usual in the execution of duties of this kind in that office. If an employee on the street can receive actual notice on behalf of the board, because as a subordinate he actually makes repairs, by parity of reasoning, an employee in the office, chargeable with that duty, can likewise bind the city by accepting notice of the defect.
The case of McNally v. City of Cohoes (127 N. Y. 350) simply held that the fact that the superintendent of streets passed over the defective walk did not meet the actual notice required by the city charter. There was no actual notice to any one in that case. The object of the provision was to obliterate the doctrine of constructive notice, and there is no contention in this case that the requirement of actual notice can be disregarded. The pivotal point is whether the notice proved comes within a reasonable construction of the statute. W as it " actual notice " within the fair intendment of the law?
Again, it is a circumstance to be observed that the charter expressly vests authority in the board to " employ such assistance -x- -x- -x- as ^ may see fit " (Laws of 1880, chap. 14, § 152). This explicit warrant implies what is obvious, that the board, with its important functions, was to perform them largely through its agents or servants.
While the law seems to me clear that this is the reasonable interpretation of the statute, it is unnecessary to go to that extent in this case. The proof shows that the notice was given to Clark in the office during the time such notices were accustomed to be given ; that he took one of the pads and commenced to write, and during1 his writing asked of the complainant what particular part of the walk was defective, and the information was given and he continued to write. Two facts the jury might find from what occurred in the office : First, that Clark .made a memorandum of the complaint ] and, second, that this was turned over to the board. Undisputed, the presumption is that the usual practice was conformed to, or, at least, it was for the jury to determine whether the notice reached the board or not. The board possessed the knowledge. It was for its membei's to acquaint the jury with the real fact as to receiving the notice, if its actual reception were important. The jury, under the evidence as it stood, could have found that the board was made the final repository of this information in accordance with the mode in vogue by its assent. It was error to take that question of fact from the jury.
The jfiaintiff's exceptions should be sustained, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the plaintiff to abide the event.
All concurred, except McLennan, J who dissented in an opinion,