Case Name: Carolyn Sue PANZICO, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child, Jennifer Powell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dianne PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-05-10
Citations: 658 So. 2d 1310
Docket Number: No. 26232-CA
Parties: Carolyn Sue PANZICO, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child, Jennifer Powell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dianne PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before MARVIN, LINDSAY, BROWN, WILLIAMS and STEWART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 658
Pages: 1310–1315

Head Matter:
Carolyn Sue PANZICO, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child, Jennifer Powell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dianne PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 26232-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 10, 1995.
Writ Denied Sept. 29, 1995.
M. Randall Donald, Monroe, for appellant.
Hayes, Harkey, Smith & Cascio by Charles S. Smith, Monroe, for appellee.
Before MARVIN, LINDSAY, BROWN, WILLIAMS and STEWART, JJ.

Opinion:
liBROWN, Judge,
On Rehearing.
We granted rehearing in this matter to revisit the issue of whether Danny Knight was covered by the automobile liability insurance policy issued to the parents of Shane Aeree. Shane Aeree was 16 years old and was allowed to use his step-mother's vehicle on the night of the accident pursuant to a "hopeful admonition" against allowing others to drive. Danny Knight, also 16 years old, was given permission by Shane to use the car to run an errand. The accident arose out of Knight's use of the vehicle. We reverse and render.
DISCUSSION
Insurance Coverage
In Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 241 La. 186, 127 So.2d 734 (1961), the Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated the rule regarding second permittees. The policy issued to the owner of the vehicle in Rogillio provided omnibus coverage to "any other person using such automobile, provided the actual use thereof is within the permission of the named insured." The court found that permission of the minor son was insufficient to extend coverage as an omnibus insured to the operator of the vehicle. Permission, either express or implied, had to be given to the operator by the named insured.
The supreme court set forth the standard regarding implied permission in American Home Assurance Co. v. Czamiecki, 255 La. 251, 230 So.2d 253 (1969). The court held that if it was reasonably foreseeable that the first permittee would allow others to operate the vehicle, then permission would be implied and omnibus coverage would apply.
American Home Assurance Co., supra, was factually distinguished by the court in Hughes v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co., 340 So.2d 293 (La.1976). In Hughes, the court found coverage under the omnibus clause where the named insured had given his friend unrestricted use of his vehicle. Thus, noted [2the court, the possibility that the friend would allow another person to drive the vehicle was clearly foreseeable.
In his concurrence in Hughes, Justice Tate wrote that an omnibus clause should be construed as providing coverage whenever initial permission is found. If the named insured has given initial permission, then the actual operation of the vehicle is within this permission, whether by the first permittee or by a second permittee to whom the first permittee entrusted the use of the vehicle. Hughes, 340 So.2d at 295 (Tate, J., concurring) (Emphasis added).
Justice Tate opined that the court in Rogil-lio and American Home Assurance Co. erred in limiting the initial permission doctrine by requiring a showing of express or implied permission by the insured to the first permit-tee for use of the vehicle by a second permit-tee.
After-the-accident reconstruction of the terms of the initial permission should not deprive of the protection of the policy a person injured by the vehicle or one operating it with the consent of a first permit-tee empowered with the apparent authority (through its owner-permitted custody) to entrust its operation to this second per-mittee.
Hughes, supra at 296.
In subsequent second permittee cases, reasonable foreseeability was the test for determining whether there was implied permission and thus omnibus coverage. See Morgan v. Matlack, Inc., 342 So.2d 167 (La.1977); Malmay v. Sizemore, 493 So.2d 620 (La.1986); King v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 549 So.2d 367 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 552 So.2d 387 (La.1989); Solice v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 488 So.2d 1159 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986).
In Perkins v. McDow, 615 So.2d 312 (La. 1993), there was a move toward a broader view of what is reasonably foreseeable. In Perkins, though the named insured had expressly prohibited his adult son from letting others use the |3car, the court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that the initial permittee would lend the car to another driver. The following is excerpted from the supreme court's opinion in Perkins:
Coverage is extended under the omnibus clause so long as the operator of the vehicle had the named insured's permission to use the vehicle, regardless of whether its use at the time of the accident was within the contemplation of the named insured at the time permission was granted, and even when a deviation is in violation of the specific instructions of the [named] insured . This liberal initial permission rule was motivated by a desire to not only protect the operator of the automobile from liability but also to protect persons injured by the operator.
Id. at 315. (Emphasis added).
Justice Watson concurred, writing that because of the myriad of problems associated with the permissive use clause, it should be found contrary to public policy. Perkins, 615 So.2d at 317 (Watson, J., concurring).
The Louisiana Supreme Court rendered Norton v. Lewis, 623 So.2d 874 (La.1993), only six months after Perkins, supra. In Norton, the court noted that the word "permission" in an omnibus clause of a liability policy should be construed in its broadest possible sense and that permission, once established, was to be given a wide and liberal meaning in determining coverage. The court then explained:
[T]he narrower "minor deviation" and "conversion" rules followed by some jurisdictions, which make coverage turn on scope of the permission given in the first instance, render coverage uncertain, foster unnecessary litigation, and do not comport with our state's legislative policy of assuring an available fund for the innocent victims of automobile accidents.
Norton, 623 So.2d at 875.
Shane had been given permission to use the vehicle to go on a date. The date, however, was broken and Shane picked up Danny Knight. They "cruised" and eventually met some girls. Knight, who had driven the vehicle in the past, used the car to run an errand.
_JjA parent of a teenager commonly grants the use of a car to the teenager from time to time. As the teenager gains experience, the frequency of use increases. A gen eral admonition not to let anyone else drive is not, by itself, determinative of omnibus permission coverage. In this instance, the parental instructions given initially warned against allowing someone else to drive, and drinking and imposed a curfew. These instructions were not given each time the car was used. Clearly, discretion was expected and implied.
Applying the principles set forth by the supreme court in Perkins and Norton, we find that Danny Knight was an omnibus insured under the State Farm automobile liability policy issued to the Aerees.
Damages
Based upon our conclusion that Danny Knight was an omnibus insured under the Acree's automobile policy, we must therefore determine the damages sustained by plaintiff, Jennifer Powell.
We initially note that plaintiff settled her claim against Danny Knight, his father and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Mr. Knight's homeowner's insurer, for $22,500. It was stipulated that the remaining defendants were entitled to a set-off in this amount against any damage award rendered in excess of the settlement figure.
In making an initial award of damages at the appellate level, we are not limited to an award of either the lowest or highest amount we would affirm. Instead, we set the award in an amount which is just compensation for the damages revealed by the record. Wall v. American Employers Insurance Co., 386 So.2d 79 (La.1980); Whitaker v. Mulli-nax, 628 So.2d 222 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993); Morris v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 582 So.2d 1349 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So .2d 1119 (La.1991).
| ¿General Damages
Immediately following the accident, plaintiff, Jennifer Powell, was taken by ambulance to the St. Francis Medical Center emergency room, where she was treated and released. Approximately two months later, plaintiff consulted Dr. Ronald Woods. His initial impression was that plaintiff was suffering from cervical, thoracic or lumbar spine strain. Plaintiff saw Dr. Woods from February 1989 until August 1991 with complaints of back pain. Treatment included anti-inflammatory injections, prescriptions for muscle relaxers and pain medication, and physical therapy. Dr. Woods noted that plaintiffs complaints were fairly consistent over the course of treatment.
Plaintiff was evaluated on two occasions by Dr. J.E. Smith, an orthopedic specialist. In his deposition, Dr. Smith stated that she had either fibrositis or fibromyalgia, which is a non-specific illness characterized by intermittent back pain. Fibromyalgia has an undetermined duration and is frequently precipitated by trauma. Both doctors opined that plaintiffs complaints were consistent with injuries sustained as a result of trauma, though neither would definitively attribute plaintiffs continued complaints of back pain to the accident.
Plaintiff testified that normal activities or increased physical activity can cause her pain, for which she takes ibuprofen or tyle-nol. According to plaintiff, she has continued her daily routine, which includes working full-time as a dental assistant and attending Northeast on a part-time basis.
There is no mechanical rule for determining general damages; the facts and circumstances of each case control. Estate of Thomas v. State, D.O.T.D., 604 So.2d 617 (La.App.2d 1992), writ denied, 608 So.2d 167 (La.1992). Factors to be considered in assessing quantum for pain and suffering are severity and duration. Glasper v. Henry, 589 So.2d 1173 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, ¡ g594 So.2d 1315 (La.1992); Miller v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 527 So.2d 989 (La. App. 3d Cir.1988), writ denied, 531 So.2d 763 (La.1988).
We feel that an award of $25,000 in general damages will compensate plaintiff, Jennifer Powell, for her injuries.
Medical Expenses
The record reveals that plaintiff incurred medical expenses in the amount of $5,010.83. This amount is recoverable in full. Thames v. Zerangue, 411 So.2d 17 (La.1982).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment against defendants and in favor of plaintiff, Jennifer Powell, in the amount of $7,510.83 ($30,010.83 less set-off in the amount of $22,500.00), together with legal interest from the date of judicial demand. Costs of this appeal are taxed against defendants. REVERSED and RENDERED.
STEWART, J., dissents with reasons.
LINDSAY, J., dissents.
. For cases involving general damage awards in similar, though more severe circumstances, see Kessler v. Southmark Corporation, 25,941 (La. App. 2d Cir. 09/21/94), 643 So.2d 345 ($75,000); Spurrell v. Ivey, 25,359, 25,360 (La.App. 2d Cir. 01/25/94), 630 So.2d 1378 ($30,000); Partner v. Anderson, 513 So.2d 471 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987) ($45,000); Fontenot v. Boehm, 512 So.2d 1192 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987) ($50,000).