Case Name: Laurie HOBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-05-29
Citations: 576 F. App'x 678
Docket Number: No. 12-35198
Parties: Laurie HOBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 576
Pages: 678–679

Head Matter:
Laurie HOBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-35198.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted May 13, 2014.
Filed May 29, 2014.
Laurie Hobson, Boise, ID, pro se.
Kenneth C. Howell, Hawley Troxell En-nis & Hawley, Boise, ID, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Laurie Hobson appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in her action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in Hobson's quiet title action because Hobson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the loan had been repaid. See Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236, 249 P.2d 814 (1952) ("A mortgagor cannot without paying his debt quiet title as against the mortgagee." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Hobson does not have standing to challenge defendant Wells Fargo Bank, NA's assignment of the property after the foreclosure sale because she no longer had an interest in the property. See Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 211 P.3d 106, 113 (2009) (stating that, except for limited circumstances not relevant here, a foreclosure "sale is final once the trustee accepts the bid as payment in full"); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (requirements to establish standing).
Hobson's contentions regarding the legal authority of defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), which was the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender in the deed of trust, to assign the deed of trust to Wells Fargo, are unpersuasive, as they were recently rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Edwards v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 300 P.3d 43, 49 (2013) ("[Hjaving MERS the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the requirements of a deed of trust under Idaho law.").
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.