Case Name: Maria I. HALLMAN, Appellant, v. Kenneth HALLMAN, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-02-28
Citations: 575 So. 2d 738
Docket Number: No. 89-1285
Parties: Maria I. HALLMAN, Appellant, v. Kenneth HALLMAN, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, COWART, GOSHORN, , HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 575
Pages: 738–744

Head Matter:
Maria I. HALLMAN, Appellant, v. Kenneth HALLMAN, Jr., Appellee.
No. 89-1285.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 28, 1991.
Fernando M. Palacios, Melbourne, for appellant.
William G. Norwich of Gralla and Norwich, Cocoa Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
We have considered this case En Banc in order to maintain consistency with a prior opinion of this court. See Bujarski v. Bujarski, 530 So.2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 537 So.2d 568 (Fla.1988).
The appellant, Maria Hallman, challenges the trial court's award of primary residential custody of the parties' two minor children (one of whom required special tutoring) to the father, the equitable distribution of the marital assets, and the trial court's denial of alimony. We affirm in all respects.
In regard to the award of primary residential custody of the minor children to the father, this was a matter within the trial court's broad discretion, and the instant record does not provide a basis to conclude that such discretion was breached. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
In determining a fair distribution of the parties' marital assets, the trial court allocated $15,000.00 in credit card debts to the husband pursuant to section 61.075, Florida Statutes (1987), which requires the distribution of liabilities as well as assets. Subsection (l)(g) of that section provides that the court must consider, as a relevant factor, "the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement and the production of income . or the incurring of liabilities to both the marital assets and the non-marital assets of the parties."
The record establishes that the marital home of the parties was sold at a loss prior to entry of the final judgment. The husband was allocated some $18,720.00 in debts (including an outstanding obligation of $8,720.00 on the automobile he received) and ordered to pay $2,500.00 of the wife's attorney's fees, a total in excess of $21,-000.00 in obligations. In return, he received the right to an accrued pension, valued at the time of trial at approximately $22,000.00. He was also named primary caretaker for the parties' two minor children.
We have frequently held that an approximate fifty/fifty split of marital assets is equitable. Bain v. Bain, 553 So.2d 1389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Moore v. Moore, 543 So.2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Green v. Green, 542 So.2d 466, 467 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Poe v. Poe, 522 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Laman v. Laman, 490 So.2d 985 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 500 So.2d 544 (Fla.1986); Ente v. Ente, 442 So.2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Yet, the appellant terms the instant distribution "inequitable" because of the husband's superior earning ability. That ability, however, is not a factor for purposes of equitable distribution of assets. As we pointed out in Severs v. Severs, 426 So.2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), the law does not (and cannot consistent with the United States Constitution) give one spouse a vested interest in the other spouse's future earning ability for purposes of distribution of marital property.
The appellant also argues that she was not shown to have dissipated marital assets or income, yet the record shows that she could give no clear accounting for monies she received from the husband to pay family bills. Those unpaid bills ultimately resulted in the $15,000.00 deficit allocated by the trial court to the husband. The appellant states that the husband ceased putting his salary in a joint account with the wife and, instead, deposited $1,050.00 per month into a C & S bank deposit in Charleston, South Carolina; the evidence is that only one-half of the salary was deposited in Charleston, and even that account was used by the husband to pay delinquent marital bills.
In the instant case, the trial court considered the vested pension rights of the husband as a marital asset which was offset by the marital liabilities imposed upon him. This is entirely consistent with the applicable statute, the holding of the Florida Supreme Court in Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So.2d 265 (Fla.1986), and the prior en banc holding of this court in Bu-jarski. No case from any court has ever held that one spouse must automatically be awarded some portion of the other spouse's pension benefits, irrespective of all other equities and the apportionment of other assets and liabilities. Such a myopic approach to equitable distribution of pension benefits and joint liabilities would conflict not only with Diffenderfer and Bujarski, but with the admonition in Canakaris that the trial court has broad discretionary power to utilize various and interrelated remedies to achieve an overall equitable result. Canakaris at 1202.
The trial court's decision not to award alimony is also affirmed. Contrary to the appellant's contention, the instant record does not establish that the wife, who is only 36 years old, has no present or future ability to improve her earning capacity. She testified she made $150.00 to $175.00 a week at a restaurant in a local mall, although at the time of trial below she worked only part-time as a maid. It is apparent her financial status would markedly improve if she were to work full-time.
It is also apparent that another consideration of the trial judge was the financial burden and responsibility imposed upon the husband to establish and maintain a primary residence for the parties' two minor children. The marital residence had been sold and the husband was required to lease housing facilities for his family at an expense of approximately $700.00 per month. He also had to pay the costs of a tutor for the minor daughter, as well as utilities, food and other essentials for the parties' two children.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, COWART, GOSHORN, , HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
DIAMANTIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion with which W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
W. SHARP, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with opinion with which GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents with opinion with which W. SHARP, J., concurs.