Case Name: Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1963-07-02
Citations: 412 Pa. 1
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 404
Parties: Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
Judges: Before Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Keim, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 412
Pages: 1–10

Head Matter:
Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
Argued September 27, 1962.
Before Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Keim, JJ.
reargument refused August 7, 1963.
J ohn B. Hannum, with him Theodore 0. Rogers, and Pepper, Hamilton & Seheetz, for appellant.
Samuel J. Halpren, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
July 2, 1963:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Me. Justice Cohen,
This is an appeal from a conviction of simple assault and battery arising out of a fight between appellant and a police officer on a public highway. At appellant's trial, each of the men maintained that the other was the instigator of the altercation. On this key factual issue, two women who were driving on the highway corroborated the police officer's testimony. At this point in the trial, appellant's counsel requested the trial judge to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel the E.B.I. to turn over statements given to it by the two women. Upon being questioned as to the purpose of this production, counsel replied that the statements given to the F.B.I. did not include "any observation of who struck the first blow" and thus could be used to impeach the testimony of the two women. The trial judge refused to issue the subpoena after being informed by a representative of the F.B.I. that the Bureau would not produce the reports because they contained confidential information, the disclosure of which would threaten the security of the Justice Department.
The jury decided the factual question of who instigated the fight adversely to appellant and the Superior Court affirmed the conviction. We granted allocatur because of appellant's claim that the refusal to issue the subpoena deprived him of due process of law contrary to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957). After considering appellant's arguments, we find that the Jenehs doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case.
In Jenehs, the United States Supreme Court held that a conviction could not stand where defense counsel was denied access for impeachment purposes to certain F.B.I. reports. In setting forth the rationale for its decision, the Court stated: " '[S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. . . .'" (353 U. S. at 671). With regard to the problem of disclosing secret information, the Court concluded that the federal government must either reveal the information or abandon the prosecution. Appellant asserts that tbe Jenchs decision controls this case.
Although we are in complete agreement with the salutary principle of the Jenchs case, we find that it has no application to the instant case.
In the first place, it was the F.B.I. and not the Commonwealth which denied appellant access to the information in question. Ironically, the F.B.I. entered this case and made its investigation during which the statements were secured solely because of appellant's claim that the arresting officers had violated his civil rights. The Commonwealth is no more to blame for the unavailability of the F.B.I. reports than if a witness beyond the reach of process refused to voluntarily appear and testify on behalf of appellant. Consequently, the unfairness which troubled the Jenchs court is not present here.
In addition, we fail to perceive how the defense was harmed by the nonproduction of the F.B.I. reports. The two witnesses gave a statement to the district attorney which also did not include an observation as to who struct the first blow. This statement was given to appellant. Therefore, even if reports of the state police were involved, the offer of proof would not justify the disclosure of confidential information. Cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U. S. 367 (1959).
It is true that certain remarks made by the plurality opinion in Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A. 2d 835 (1961), lend support to the position taken by appellant. These observations which were based on a misapplication of the Jencks case were unnecessary to the result in Schlesinger and, to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding here, they are expressly disapproved.
Order affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell disqualified himself because his daughter-in-law was a character witness.
The statements had been secured by the F.B.I. during its investigation of appellant's claim that the arresting officers had violated his civil rights.
In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that the Jenchs decision was based on the Court's power "to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in the federal courts", and hence was not necessarily one of constitutional dimension. The Court in Palermo held that the subsequent Act of Congress (18 U.S.C. §3500) and not Jenchs now governed federal prosecutions. In other instances, however, it has been held that the suppression of evidence by the prosecution violates due process of law. See Brady v. Maryland, 31 U.S.L. Week 4435 (May 13, 1963) ; United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F. 2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953). Since we hold that the Jenchs rationale is inapplicable to the in stant case, we need not concern ourselves with the correctness of appellant's contention that this case is one of constitutional dimension and hence "controlled" by Jencks.
When we are confronted with a subpoena for the production of important impeaching statements in the possession of the Commonwealth, we wiU then be forced to decide the following difficult questions with which other jurisdictions have struggled: what foundation defendant must establish as to the existence and relevancy of the alleged statements; what role the courts should play in determining the Commonwealth's claim that the statements either are not relevant or contain privileged information; what penalty should be invoked for noncompliance by the Commonwealth. See People v. Wolff, 19 Ill. 2d 318, 167 N.E. 2d 197, 199-202 (1960).