Case Name: Johanna Freeman v. William Price
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1831-01
Citations: 2 Bail. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: Johanna Freeman v. William Price.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 115–116

Head Matter:
Johanna Freeman v. William Price.
To say of a woman, “she is a strumpet,” is actionable under the act of 1824, without laying special damages.
On the trial of an action for slander, a witness cannot be aslced, if he had never heard of any thing derogatory to the reputation of the plaintiff: It might lead to evidence of a particular fact, irrelevant to the issue, and thaton hearsay; andis objectionable on both grounds.
p, 23,
Tried before Mr. Justice Gantt, at Chester, Fall Term, 1830.
Tins was an action of slander, for saying of plaintiff, “ she is a strumpet.” Verdict for plaintiff.
The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, that the words were not actionable per se, and no special damage had been laid, or proved : And for a new trial, on the ground, that his Honor had improperly refused permission to inquire of one of the plaintiff’s witnesses, if he had never heard any thing against the reputation of plaintiff.
Peakeson, for the motion.
A. W. Thompson, contra.

Opinion:
Johnson J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The act of 1824 enacts, that words spoken of a female, " imputing to her a want of chastity," shall be deemed actionable, without proof of special damage: And it would be difficult to impute want of chastity to a female more completely and directly, than by calling her a strumpet. This action is brought under the act of 1824, and there is no foundation, therefore, for the motion in arrest of judgment. That for a new trial must also fail: Under the authority of Buford ads. M'Luny, 1 N. & M. 268, the defendant was at liberty to shew, in mitigation of damages, the general bad character of the plaintiff; or that she was generally suspected of the fact charged; or such other circumstances short of the actual proof of her guilt, as would establish a ground of suspicion. But the rule is already quite broad enough for the purposes of justice ; and to extend it would be calculated to surprise the plaintiff. It is true the question might have been answered by evidence of the general bad character of the plaintiff: But a direct answer to the question would have been evidence of a particular fact, perhaps irrelevant to the issue, and that too on hearsay. In the shape in which it was put, it was objectionable, for both reasons, and Was very properiy excluded.
Motion refused.