Case Name: DURANT v. STAHLIN. APPEAL in re Van DUSEN, ELLIOTT, ROMNEY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-06-07
Citations: 375 Mich. 628
Docket Number: Calendar Nos. 31-33, Docket Nos. 50,598-50,600
Parties: DURANT v. STAHLIN. APPEAL in re Van DUSEN, ELLIOTT, ROMNEY.
Judges: Dethmers and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 628–664

Head Matter:
DURANT v. STAHLIN. APPEAL in re Van DUSEN, ELLIOTT, ROMNEY.
Decision op the Court.
1. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Libel and Slander.
Motions for summary judgment, interposed by 3 of 14 defendants in action for libel and conspiracy to libel, held, properly granted (GCR 1963, 117).
Separate Opinion.
Dethmers, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ.
2. Constitutional Law — Freedom op Expression — Politics.
Freedom of expression, especially in the area of public affairs and political action, is an essential American heritage.
3. Torts — Libel—Conspiracy.
Libel and conspiracy are tortious in character, and sometimes they are criminal activities, for which the victim should not go remediless.
4. Continuance — Discretion op Gourt.
Refusal of continuance held, not an abuse of discretion by trial jxidge at hearing on defendants’ motions for summary judgment, where the defendants appeared ready to testify in support of their motions, plaintiff’s counsel stated he had lost his voice and could hardly talle and would lilce to cross-examine the defendants at some other time, and a prolonged discussion followed between the trial court and counsel (GCR 1963, 117).
References por Points in Headnotes
41 Am Jur, Pleading §§ 340, 341.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 341 et seq.
33 Am Jur, Libel and Slander §§ 3, 308.
17 Am Jur 2d, Continuance § 3.
41 Am Jur, Pleading § 342.
41 Am Jur, Pleading §§ 340-342.
5. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Plaintiff’s Burden.
A plaintiff who is confronted by a defendant’s motion for summary judgment must establish plaintiff has a case on the law and that there are some evidentiary proofs to support his allegations as to any material fact (GCB 1963,117).
6. Same — Summary Judgment — Function op Defendant’s Affidavit.
The function of a defendant’s affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding is to establish affirmatively under oath that there is no basis in fact to support plaintiff’s claims (GCB 1963, 117).
7. Same — Summary Judgment — Function of Counter Affidavits.
The function of a plaintiff’s counter affidavits in a summary judgment proceeding is to establish that there is some evidence as to material facts upon which to proceed to trial (GCB 1963,117).
8. Same — Summary Judgment — Evidence.
There is no question of the relative weight to be given the evidence in a summary judgment proceeding, for if the party opposing the motion produces some evidence, the motion is denied, the opponent of the motion being given the benefit of all doubt (GCB 1963,117).
9. Same — Summary Judgment — Question Presented.
The question to be determined in a summary judgment proceeding is whether the affidavits together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action present a genuine issue as to any material fact (GCB 1963,117.3).
10. Same — Summary Judgment — Character of Affidavits.
Affidavits used in a summary judgment proceeding must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant and shall set forth with particularity such facts as would be admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the pleading or motion, and such standard is not satisfied with an affidavit which is based solely on information and belief (GCB 1963, 116.4,117.3).
11. Same — Summary Judgment — Counter Affidavits — Sufficiency.
Counter affidavits plaintiff presented in summary judgment proceeding in libel and conspiracy suit, which were based solely on information and belief and did not set forth with particularity facts admissible in evidence, the beliefs related being objectionable as opinion evidence, and alleged information failing to state basis therefor, thereby failed to afford the trial court anything to view in a light favorable to plaintiff in support of his presentation of an issue as to a material fact as required by pertinent court rule (GCB 1963, 116.4, 117.3).
12. Same — Summary Judgment — Purpose of Affidavits.
The purpose of affidavits in a summary judgment proceeding is to ascertain whether or not an issue of fact exists, and is not to usurp the province of the right to trial by jury (GCB 1963,116.4,117.3).
13. Same — Summary Judgment — Affidavits.
Judgment must be rendered forthwith, where the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if the affidavits or other proof show that there is no genuine issue of fact, it not being enough to malee general allegations, notice pleading, and allege matters upon information and belief or common knowledge (GCB 1963, 117.3).
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, O. J., and Souris and Smith, JJ.
14. Judgment — Accelerated Judgment — Summary Judgment — Court Pules.
The court rules relative to accelerated judgment and for summary judgment were designed to provide comprehensively means for terminating litigation prior to trial, but only in certain expressly enumerated circumstances by no means universally applicable to every suit in the State (GCB 1963, 116, 117).
15. Same — Summary Judgment — Failure to State Cause of Action.
The motion for summary judgment is an appropriate means to assert that the opposing party has failed to state a cause of action or claim upon which relief can be granted (GCB 1963, 117.3(11).
16. Same — Summary Judgment — Failure to State a Valid Defense.
The motion for summary judgment may be utilized by the party asserting a claim when the opposite party has failed to state (t valid defense to such claim (GCB 1963, 117.3(31),
17. Same — Summary Judgment — Genuine Issue as to a Material Fact.
The present summary judgment procedure includes the former practice as to summary judgments in respect to absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact (GGM 1963, 117.3[3]).
18. Same — Summary Judgment — Failure to State Cause of Action — Affidavits.
A motion for summary judgment based upon the ground that the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted needs no affidavit in support since the ground for the relief requested must, if at all, appear on the face of the pleading so attacked (GGM 1963, 117.3[T]).
19. Same — Summary Judgment — Failure to State Valid Defense —Affidavits.
A plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant has failed to state a valid defense to a valid claim asserted against him need not be supported by affidavit (GGM 1963,117.3[3]).
20. Same — Summary Judgment — Accelerated Judgment — Affidavits.
Motions for summary judgment predicated upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or a valid defense to the claim asserted may be joined with motions for accelerated judgment upon grounds set forth in court rule pertaining to latter kind of judgment, with or without affidavit support, or combined with motion for summary judgment because of absence of genuine issue as to any material fact and with or without affidavit support as circumstances may require (GGM 1963,116.1,117.3).
21. Same — Motion for Summary Judgment — Affidavits.
Normally affidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment will be appropriate only where such judgment is based on the claim that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact (GCM 1963,117.3[3], 117.3).
22. Same — Summary Judgment — Trial.
The summary judgment procedure cannot be likened to a trial wherein one is confronted with one’s accusers and permitted to cross-examine them (GGM 1963,117).
23. Same — Summary Judgment — Issue of Fact.
The function of a court in disposing of a motion for summary . judgment is. not to decide issues of fact, but to ascertain whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact against the moving party (GCB 1963, 117).
24. Same — Summary Judgment — Issue of Fact.
A summary judgment may not be granted once it is determined that a genuine and material facUtal issue is to be determined (GCB 1963, 117).
25. Same — Summary Judgment — Evidence—Directed Verdict.
The situation must justify a directed verdiet insofar as the facts are concerned in order to justify a summary judgment, that is, the evidence on one or the other hand must be too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds or is without legal probative force even if true (GCB 1963, 117).
■26. Same — Summary Judgment — Use of Affidavits — Issues of Fact.
Affidavits, while usable in an inquiry to determine the existence of an issue of fact on motion for summary judgment, are totally inappropriate for use in resolving disputed issues of fact, where direct evidence thereon is available (GCB 1963, 117).
27. Same — Summary Judgment — Conflicting Inferences.
The existence of permissible conflicting inferences which can be drawn from the affidavits, depositions, and other evidence before the court at its inquiry on motion for summary judgment, bars the grant of such relief (GCB 1963, 117).
28. Same — Summary Judgment — Determination of Credibility.
The trial judge engaged in an inquiry on motion for summary judgment must not usurp a trial jury’s right, nor anticipate his own right as a trial fact finder should he become one, to determine the affiant’s credibility, when the existence of a disputed issue of fact depends upon such credibility (GCB 1963,117).
29. Same — Summary Judgment — Credibility of Affiant or Deponent.
Summary judgment procedure is not available when a presented issue of material fact turns upon the credibility of an affiant or witness whose deposition has been talcen (GCB 1963, 117).
30. Same — Summary Judgment — Credibility of Affiant Interested in Litigation.
A presented issue of fact that turns upon the credibility of an affiant, particularly when he is interested in the result of the litigation, requires submission of the credibility of the witness to the jury as a question of fact, precluding entry of a summary judgment (GCB 1963,117.2).
31. Same — Summary Judgment — Motive—Intent.
Summary judgment procedure should be used sparingly in litigation where motive and intent play leading roles (GCB 1963, 117.2).
32. Same — Summary Judgment — Cross-Examination—Motive—Intent.
The cross-examination of witnesses at the hearing on motion for summary judgment is no substitute for trial by jury even though it may assist in determining whether or not there are genuine issues of material fact, especially where motive and intent are involved (GCB 1963,117.2).
33. Same — Summary Judgment — Affirmative Defenses.
Summary judgment normally will not be warranted in negligence actions unless defendant has asserted an affirmative defense such as res judicata, discharge in bankruptcy, or the statute of limitations and has established such affirmative defense with certainty (GCB 1963, 117).
.34. Same — Summary Judgment — Cost—Delay.
Erroneous grant of a motion for summary judgment, if reversed on appeal, causes an additional cost to the litigants and delay (GCB 1963,117.2).
35. Courts — Prompt Dispatch of Business.
The prompt dispatch of judicial business, a virtue, is neither the sole nor the primary purpose for which courts have been established.
36. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Libel and Slander — Issue of Pact — Evidence.
Motions for summary judgment, interposed by 3 of 14 defendants in action for libel and conspiracy to libel, wherein defendant movers conceded legal adequacy of asserted causes of action against them but denied plaintiff’s ability to prove his asserted charges, which motions were supported by affidavits, did not permit plaintiff to rely upon his pleading but required him to come forward with affidavits or other proof of his own to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and where plaintiff’s affidavits filed were not responsive to defendants’ affidavits, and which were based upon information and belief instead of personal knowledge of the affiant, they were inadequate to prevent entry of summary judgment if otherwise defendants were entitled thereto (GCB 1963,117.2[3J).
37. Same — Summary Judgment — Sufficiency of Affidavits.
Defendants’ affidavits in support of their motions for summary judgment in action for libel, wherein they asserted they had no knowledge of the libelous document before its publication, had not known it was being prepared, had not participated in its preparation or its publication, and had not done anything individually or as a part of a conspiracy in making any ,- accusations against plaintiff contained in the document, justified summary judgment for defendants, where plaintiff failed to show he had any evidence from depositions taken or from any other source to establish that if permitted to go to trial there would be any genuine issue of material fact (GCB 1963, 117.3[3], 117.3).
Appeal from Wayne; Moynihan (Joseph. A.), J.
Submitted February 3, 1965.
(Calendar Nos. 31-33, Docket Nos. 50,598-50,600.)
Decided June 7, 1965.
Complaint by Richard Durant against John H. Stahlin, Richard C. Van Dusen, Arthur G. Elliott, Jr., George Romney, and others for damages arising from'the alleged publication of a libelous document. Summary judgment for defendants Van Dusen, Elliott, and Romney. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
-. Davidow & Davidow (Larry 8. Davidow, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Diclcinson, Wright, McKean & Cudlip (Fred W. Freeman' and George B. Martin, of counsel), for defendants Van Dusen and Elliott.
Cross, Wroch, Miller, Vieson S Kelley (Bethel B. Kelley, W. Robert Chandler, Thomas G. Sawyer, and Newman T. Guthrie, of counsel), for defendant Romney.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
This appeal from orders of the trial court granting motions for summary judgment as to defendants Richard C. Van Dusen,- Arthur G. Elliott, Jr., and George Romney, is another aspect of matters dealt with in Durant v. Stahlin, 374 Mich 82, and Zimmerman v. Stahlin, 374 Mich 93.
Appellant began suit on May 21,1962. Van Dusen, Elliott, and Romney were joined as defendants on April 19, 1963. Appellant has deposed twelve of the defendants or other possible witnesses. The depositions contain 1,250 pages of testimony.
The depositions and pleadings establish that there has been a long-standing political conflict between appellant Richard Durant and other Republican leaders in the 14th congressional district. The so-called liberal group, made up of defendants Robert Waldron, Dean Charles King, Wilbur Brucker, Sr., Paul Bagwell, and others, opposed the leadership of appellant Durant and sought to prevent his re-election as a precinct delegate to the 14th congressional district and his control of that district. These efforts are freely admitted and testified to abundantly.
It is plaintiff's theory of his case that out of these activities there emerged the conspiracy and the libel of which he complains. It is the separation of what plaintiff conceives to be these inextricably mixed political activities and the claimed libel and slander that poses plaintiff's dilemma.
Hundreds of pages of testimony as to political conflict do not make a cause of action. As Judge Horace W. Gilmore, before whom some of the depositions were taken, observed:
"When you are in a political battle you have public attacks all the time."
and
"You are establishing so far by this testimony the fact that Mr. Bagwell participated in a series of meetings among political leaders whose purpose was to find new leadership, and certainly to my knowledge there is nothing illegal about that."
The right to freedom of expression, especially in the area of public affairs, has been dwelt upon recently by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (84 S Ct 710, 11 L ed 2d 686), and by this Court in Robbins v. Evening News Association, 373 Mich 589. It is scarcely necessary to reiterate that freedom, especially as to political action, is an essential American heritage. Libel and conspiracy, on the other hand, are tortious, even sometimes criminal activities. One who has suffered from them should not go remediless.
Plaintiff developed proofs to show that a letter with enclosure over the signature of John H. Stahlin was published on May 10, 1962, charging Richard Durant with being the leader of extremist groups that "are, through bribery, intimidation, misrepresentation, and threats of physical violence, attempting to seize control of the Republican party organization in Wayne county."
The proofs show: The letter and enclosure, designated as exhibit A, was signed by Senator John H. Stahlin and published by him; the document was prepared by Charles A. Perry, who was employed by Stahlin as his publicity director; Paul Bagwell and possibly one or two of the other defendants with whom we are not here concerned had direct contacts with defendants Stahlin and Perry at the time of preparation and publication of the document.
In support of their motions for summary judgment defendants Yan Dusen, Elliott, and Romney, filed affidavits in which they specifically and categorically denied any participation in the preparation or publication of exhibit A; any discussion of the compila tion, formulation, preparation, publication or distribution of exhibit A with the alleged coeonspirators; any agreement to so conspire, or that they aided, abetted, or encouraged any of the other defendants; and, finally, they deny any knowledge of the existence of exhibit A or that it was being compiled, formulated, prepared, published, or distributed prior to its publication in newspapers of the city of Detroit.
The defendants further advised plaintiff in their affidavits that they would appear before the circuit judge at the time set for hearing of the motions for summary judgment for the purpose of permitting cross-examination as to any matters relating to the facts set forth in their affidavits. Defendants Van Dusen and Elliott had been deposed by the plaintiff prior to the filing of the motions for summary judgment. Their testimony on deposition consisted of a complete denial of participation in the matters charged in plaintiff's bill of complaint.
Durant countered the motions for summary judgment with affidavits in which he set up the admission of defendant Van Dusen that he actively endeavored to supplant plaintiff with other Republican leadership in the 14th congressional district of Michigan, and reiterated on information and belief "that the use of libelous statements attacking plaintiff, and particularly libelous statement exhibit A, was common knowledge among the defendants and coconspirators."
On October 4, 1963, the date set for hearing on the motions for summary judgment, defendants Van • Dusen, Elliott, and Romney, presented themselves for cross-examination. Plaintiff's counsel announced to the court that he had lost his voice and mould hardly talk. He asked for a continuance, staffing that he would like to cross-examine the defend •ants'Iiit upon some other occasion. The proceedings • continue-with page upon page of discussion between .'court and counsel, in which counsel for plaintiff reiterated his inability to cross-examine the defendants at that time. The hearing was finally concluded. The court declined to grant the plaintiff a continuance and granted the motions for summary judgment on the basis that:
"There is no genuine issue as to any material fact."
We agree with the ruling of the trial judge and further hold that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a continuance. The basic rule in summary judgment matters is simple. Its application is often difficult. When properly challenged, plaintiff must establish that he has a case on the law and .that there are some evidentiary proofs to support his allegations as to any material fact.
In a summary judgment proceeding, an affidavit is employed as a voluntary statement made ex parte. The function of affidavits by the defendant is to establish affirmatively under oath that there is no basis in.fact to support plaintiff's claims. In the case of plaintiff's counter affidavits, they should establish that there.is some evidence as to material facts upon •which to proceed to trial. There is no question of the relative weight to be given the evidence. The party opposing the motion is given the benefit of all doubt. If he produces some evidence, the motion is denied. In this case the affiants were available for cross-examination by their .own choosing.
' Using the language of'GrCR 1963, 117.3, the question is whether the affidavits "together with the •'pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary • evidence then filed in the action" present a genuine issue as to any material fact.
There has been .presented by plaintiff not one single piece of admissible evidence by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise, of plaintiff or of anyone else from which it could be found that the defendants participated in any way in the preparation or publication of exhibit A or in the purported conspiracy surrounding its preparation and publication. The plaintiff was required to do this by G-CR. 1963, 116.4 and GOR 1363, 117.3. The latter sub-rule provides:
"The affidavits submitted by either party shall be governed by the provisions of sub-rules 116.4."
. GCR 1963, 116.4 requires that the' affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth with particularity such facts as would be admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the pleading or motion."
This language is not satisfied with an affidavit which is based solely on "information and belief". See the decisions under the corresponding Federal rule. Automatic Radio Manfg. Co., Inc., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 US 827, 831 (70 S Ct 894, 94 L ed 1312); F. S. Bowen Electric Co., Inc., v. J. D. Hedin Construction Co., Inc., 114 App DC 361 (316 F2d 362); Dietrich v. Standard Brands, Inc. (DC ED Pa), 32 FRD 325. Such an affidavit does not set forth with particularity facts which are admissible in evidence. The plaintiff's beliefs, although set forth with abundant particularity, are objectionable as opinion evidence. There is no basis given for the information he alleges. It may be hearsay, or objectionable on some other evidentiary ground, or it may be fully competent. The trial court was not given the means with which to make a determination. 2 CJS, Affidavits, § 26a(2), p 982. Although required to view the plaintiff's case in its most favorable light, the trial judge was given nothing to view. There was no issue of fact and he properly entered summary judgment for the defendants as required under. GCR 1963, 117.3. ,. ' , , .
If it be thought that the plaintiff was denied his right to trial by jury, it must be remembered that affidavits with which we are here concerned in a summary judgment proceeding do not resolve issues of fact. Their purpose is to determine whether an issue of fact exists. See 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Summary Judgment, § 1234, pp 119, 129.
Once a party is challenged as to the existence of the facts upon which he purports to build his case, the sum and substance of the summary judgment proceeding is that general allegations and notice pleading are not enough. Matters upon information and belief and alleged common knowledge are not enough. That party must come forward with at least some evidentiary proof, some statement of specific fact upon which to base his case. If he fails, the motion for summary 'judgment is properly granted. In the language of G-CR 1963, 117.3,
"Judgment shall he rendered forthwith if the pleadings show that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if the affidavits or other proof show that there is no genuine issue of fact." (Emphasis supplied.)
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.
Dethmers and O'Hara, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.