Case Name: Joan Beyer QUIGLEY, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2009-02-04
Citations: 965 A.2d 349
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joan Beyer QUIGLEY, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING.
Judges: BEFORE: LEADBETTER, President Judge, McGINLEY, Judge, SMITH-RIB NER, Judge, PELLEGRINI, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, LEAVITT, Judge, BUTLER, Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 349–359

Head Matter:
Joan Beyer QUIGLEY, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Oct. 15, 2008.
Decided Feb. 4, 2009.
Carl A. Parise, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Harold H. Cramer, Asst. Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for appellee.
BEFORE: LEADBETTER, President Judge, McGINLEY, Judge, SMITH-RIB NER, Judge, PELLEGRINI, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, LEAVITT, Judge, BUTLER, Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION BY
Judge BUTLER.
Joan Beyer Quigley (Quigley) filed a notice of appeal from the November 16, 2007 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing her appeal of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing's (PennDOT) one-year suspension of her operating privileges pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code.
On February 16, 2007, Quigley was involved in a one-vehicle accident. Officer David Arnold was the first officer to arrive on the scene of the accident. Based on Officer Arnold's observations at the scene and the administration of field sobriety tests, Quigley was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon arrival at the Bethel Park police station, Quigley was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test. Officer Arnold read the chemical testing warnings required by Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code to Quigley as they appeared on the August 2006 DL-26 Implied Consent Form (DL-26 Form). Officer Arnold alleged that Quigley did not want to take the test, instead insisting that she wanted to talk to her husband.
On March 26, 2007, PennDOT notified Quigley in writing that her operating privileges would be suspended for one year for failing to submit to chemical testing. Quigley appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, raising the issue of whether she had been properly warned that her operating privileges would be suspended. On November 16, 2007, the trial court dismissed her appeal, finding that she had been properly warned, and that she had not proved that she was confused by the language on the DL-26 Form. Quigley appealed to this Court.
Quigley argues on appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that warnings contained in the DL-26 Form were not ambiguous and confusing to Quigley. Based upon the following analysis, we disagree.
The operation of a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania "is a privilege subject to such conditions as the legislature may see fit to impose...." Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 70, 606 A.2d 1264, 1266 (1992) (Palladino, J., dissenting). Among the conditions imposed upon that privilege is the implied consent to submit to chemical testing where there is reasonable cause to believe a licensee is driving under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance. Hoover. Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code is a clear statement of the legislative purpose to keep drunk drivers off the roads. Id. Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code states:
(1)If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 [(relating to DUI)] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privileges of the person as follows:
(i) Except as set forth in subpara-graph (ii), for a period of 12 months.
(ii) For a period of 18 months if any of the following apply:
(A) The person's operating privileges have previously been suspended under this subsection.
(B) The person has, prior to the refusal under this paragraph, been sentenced for:
(I) an offense under section 3802;
(II) an offense under former section 3731 [(related to serious traffic offenses)];
(III) an offense equivalent to an offense under subclause (I) or (II); or
(IV) a combination of offenses set forth in this clause.
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that:
(i) the person's operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing; and
(ii) if the person refuses to submit to chemical testing, upon conviction or plea for violating section 3802(a)(1), the person will be subject to the penalties provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties).
It is well-settled that, in order to sustain a one-year license suspension under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT must show that the driver (1) was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and, (4) was specifically warned that refusal would result in the suspension of his/her driver's license. Martinovic v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). Once PennDOT's "burden has been met, the motorist must prove that his refusal was not knowing or conscious or that he was physically unable to take the test." Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 547 Pa. 440, 446, 691 A.2d 450, 453 (1997).
There is no question that Quigley: was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, was asked to submit to a chemical test, refused to do so, was read all four warnings on the DL-26 Form verbatim by Officer Arnold, and read the form herself. September 27, 2007 Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 13-16, 18-19, 47, 60-61, 76, 78, 84; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 24a-27a, 29a-30a, 58a, 71a-72a, 87a, 89a, 95a, 120a. In order for Quigley to prevail on the appeal of her license suspension, Quigley must, therefore, prove that her refusal to submit to chemical testing was not knowing or conscious.
Because the "knowing and conscious" standard is not explicitly found in Section 1547, it "must be strictly construed as it creates exceptions to the clear language and policy of the implied consent law." Hoover at 1269. There is no requirement in Vehicle Code Section 1547(b)(2)(i) that the implied consent warning issued by an officer contain any specific wording. It must merely "inform" a licensee that his/her "operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing." 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2)(i). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding that a warning is legally sufficient if it informs the licensee that refusing a request for chemical testing means that he/she "will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation." Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Weaver, 590 Pa. 188, 191, 912 A.2d 259, 261 (2006), citing Weaver v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). The DL-26 Form did just that.
Warning 3 on the DL-26 Form states:
[i]t is my duty as a police officer to inform you that if you refuse to submit to the chemical test, your operating privileges will be suspended for at least 12 months, and up to 18 months, if you have prior refusals or have been previously sentenced for driving under the influence. In addition, if you refuse to submit to the chemical test, and you are convicted of or plead to violating Section 3802(a)(1) (relating to impaired driving) of the Vehicle Code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to the more severe penalties set forth in Section 3804(c) (relating to penalties) of the Vehicle Code, the same as if you would be convicted of driving with the highest rate of alcohol, which include a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in jail and a minimum fine of $1,000.00, up to a maximum of five years in jail and a maximum fine of $10,000.
R.R. at 120a, 125a. We hold that this warning sufficiently apprises the driver hearing and/or reading it that, if he/she refuses to submit to the chemical test, his/her operating privileges "will be suspended," and that other penalties may be imposed. That a particular motorist hearing the warning may question its interpretation is not a sufficient basis upon which to state that the refusal was not knowing and conscious. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that "[a] motorist's subjective beliefs are an insufficient justification for refusing to comply with the mandates of the Implied Consent Law." Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 249, 684 A.2d 539, 543 (1996) (driver did not believe the officer's warning). Further, we find it is unreasonable for a driver, whose operating privileges were granted subject to his/ her implied consent to submit to chemical testing where there is reasonable cause to believe a licensee is driving under the influence of alcohol, to believe that there would not be a penalty for failure to submit to that testing.
Furthermore, in this case, Quigley was not confused about the language of the warnings. N.T. 65-66; R.R. at 76a-77a. She never indicated that she had any questions about it, or that she interpreted the language of DL-26 Form to mean that her operating privileges would only be suspended if she had previous refusals or convictions for DUI. N.T. at 19-20, 65-66, 78; R.R. at 30a-31a, 76a-77a, 89a. In addition, the only reason she gives for not wanting to submit to the breathalyzer is that she wanted to speak with her husband first, which she had been told she had no right to do. N.T. at 85-91; R.R. at 96a-102a. Therefore, Quigley did not meet her burden of showing that her refusal to submit to the chemical test was not knowing and conscious.
We find that the DL-26 Form is sufficient as a matter of law to meet the warning requirement under Vehicle Code Section 1547(b), and it appropriately apprised Quigley that her license would be suspended if she refused chemical testing on February 16, 2007.
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err, and its February 7, 2008 order must be affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of February, 2009, November 16, 2007 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.
. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. Section 1547(b)(l)(i) of the Vehicle Code, commonly referred to as the "Implied Consent Law," authorizes suspension of the driving privileges of a licensee where the licensee is placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the licensee refuses a police officer's request to submit to chemical testing.
. The August 2006 version of the DL-26 Form states:
1. Please be advised that you are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code.
2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of_(blood, breath or urine. Officer chooses the chemical test).
3. It is my duty as a police officer to inform you that if you refuse to submit to the chemical test, your operating privileges will be suspended for at least 12 months, and up to 18 months, if you have prior refusals or have been previously sentenced for driving under the influence. In addition, if you refuse to submit to the chemical test, and you are convicted of or plead to violating Section 3802(a)(1) (relating to impaired driving) of the Vehicle Code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to the more severe penalties set forth in Section 3804(c) (relating to penalties) of the Vehicle Code, the same as if you would be convicted of driving with the highest rate of alcohol, which include a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in jail and a minimum fine of $1,000.00, up to a maximum of five years in jail and a maximum fine of $10,000.
4.It is also my duty as a police officer to inform you that you have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing and any request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or remaining silent when asked to submit to chemical testing will constitute a refusal, resulting in the suspension of your operating privileges and other enhanced criminal sanctions if you are convicted of violating Section 3802(a) of the Vehicle Code.
. The trial court filed its opinion on February 6, 2008.
. Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion, and whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Reinhart v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 946 A.2d 167 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008).
. There is no allegation in the record or on appeal that Quigley was physically unable to take the test.
. We acknowledge that Weaver examined the sufficiency of an earlier version of the implied consent warning under Section 1547(b)(2)(ii), as opposed to Section 1547(b)(2)(i); however, the variation in subsections and versions does not change the ultimate conclusion that an implied consent warning in Pennsylvania must notify a licensee he/she will be in violation of the law and will be penalized for that violation if he/she refuses to submit to chemical testing.
. We acknowledge Quigley's claim that the trial court erred in ruling that Warnings 3 and 4 in the DL-26 Form applied to her, in light of the fact that she entered the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program as a result of this arrest, and she had no prior refusals, or DUI convictions or sentences. This is another attempt, however, at saying that the form was ambiguous and led to Quig-ley's confusion. Since we have found that the DL-26 Form is sufficient as a matter of law to meet the warning requirement under Vehicle Code Section 1547(b), and that it was Quig-ley's desire to speak to her husband, rather than any confusion about the warnings that led to her refusal, this issue will not be further addressed.