Case Name: James A. Bass et als. v. R. J. Chambliss, Executor
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1854-06
Citations: 9 La. Ann. 376
Docket Number: 
Parties: James A. Bass et als. v. R. J. Chambliss, Executor.
Judges: Vookhies, J., Ogden, J., and Campbell, J., concurring.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 376–397

Head Matter:
James A. Bass et als. v. R. J. Chambliss, Executor.
Where an administrator’s account has been homologated, he will not be liable, under the Act of 1887, to pay interest on the balance in his hands.
It is the duty of an administrator to use all legal means to collect from the succession of his predecessor in office the balance due to the estate, and he will be bound for the loss which may result to the estate in consequence of his failure to do so. Yet this delinquency does not subject him to pay the interest imposed by the * ct of 1837, on Executors who have failed to deposit money collected in bank, and he will only be hound to pay five per cent, interest.
The charge made by an administrator for lawyer’s fees for the preparation of his account, will not be allowed, when, by his delay, he has compelled the heirs to sue for its rendition.
Where the executor has been guilty of great irregularity in keeping his accounts — of omissions to report annually — of mingling the affairs of the estate with his own, of an unjustifiable concealment of funds received and arrangements made with debtors — of a use of the trust funds, and a continuous effort during a long period to protract the litigation and keep the heirs out of their estate, he will be subject to the application of the rule, u Omnia presmnmvter contra spoliatorem Slidell, O. J.
An Executor who has incurred a liability at a particular date for a sum of money, by reason of his mal administration, is as much bound for interest as if he had actually received cash belonging to the succession, for the statute of 13th March, 1837, imposed the obligation to pay ten per cent, interest, not only on cash actually collected, but “ on all sums for which he may be responsible.” Slidell, C. J., dissenting.
Discussion of the rights, duties and obligations of administrators,
APPEAL from the District Court of the parish of Carroll, Perldns, J.
Short & Parham, Stacy & Sparrow, and Qeo. S. Terger, for plaintiff:
1. The non-payment of interest will be resisted, because it is said, neither the code nor the statute law of the State make any provision for the payment of interest by executors, administrators, curators, or persons who occupy a fiduciary relation, except in the case of tutors; and because, if interest could be charged ordinarily, it ought not to be charged in this case, as the fund in the executor’s hands arose principally from notes collected, which had from one to ten years to mature; and that, by the directions of the will of Job Bass, the fund was not to be distributed to the heirs until the last note fell due, to-wit, in 1845.
The Code (see Articles 2894, 2895, 2896, 1929, 1930, 1931,) provides what shall be the rate of judicial and conventional interest on loans of money, or the withholding of money due by contract. It also specifies the cases wherein interest shall be recovei ed. All of which contemplate the relation of debtor and creditor, or a contract, express or implied. It is therefore granted, that there is no express provision made for payment of interest on money in the hands of trustees, executors or administrators. But the court will notice, that this is also the case in the statutes of Great Britain, New York, and all, or nearly all, of the States in the American Dnion. See English Statutes, New York Statutes, North Carolina Statutes, &c.
If, therefore, this objection were a good one, it would prove that the British courts, and the courts of the American States, have been most lamentably ignorant upon the subject.
But the argument is founded on a total misapprehension of the question. Interest is not, and never has been adjudged against trustees, upon the ground that it is given by statutory enactment, or the positive provisions of a code. Nor is it given by any analogy to such statutory provision. Trustees are charged upon a distinct principle — a principle of universal jurisprudence — a principle of sound, enlightened policy. It is this: that trustees will not be permitted to use the trust fund for their individual benefit, nor will they be permitted to trade with the fund, or make profit on it, or use it any way inconsistent with the terms of the trust; nor to retain it, where it is their duty to invest it, or to pay it over.
All these, and similar cases, are viewed in the light of breaches of trust; and the trustee must bo held to account for the profits or benefit he has derived from the fund, which, generally, not having kept distinct from his own, can not be ascertained; therefore, the courts look to the statutes regulating interest, to ascertain the value of money, in order to ascertain the profit or benefit the trustee has derived from the use of the trust fund.
It matters not what name we give to the party who occupies a fiduciary relation. Whether he is called executor, curator, tutor, guardian, or trustee, the general principles above laid down must apply. In Louisiana, executors, administrators, &c., are trustees, (2d Annual Rep. 923); and in Louisiana, as in other States, an express trust may be created. Hope v. State Bank, 4 L. 213. Malone v. Ba/rker, 2 R. 369. Caldwell v Hermen, 5 R. 20.
If, therefore, there were no positive enactment, stating what rule should prevail in cases where the code or statutory law is silent, the courts of Louisiana would be governed by those principles of justice and equity, generally recognized by enlightened nations.
But the 21st Article of the Civil Code, furnishes a clear rule for the court, in cases not provided for by positive law. It enacts, “in civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is hound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent.”
The construction of this Article is, that the courts of Louisiana, in such cases, will look to the decisions of courts in other States, in analogous cases, for the rule to govern them. Delezardo v. Gossett, 1 Ann. 139. Gredhj v. Conner, 2 Ann. 87. Brown v. In. Co., 3 Ann. 177. Slwt'ke v. Burke,' 5 Ann. 740 ; 5 Ann. 720 ; 4 A. 209, 210; 13 L. 198, 199 ; 12 M. 498.
Looking then to the decisions of courts of equity in England and America, and also to the civil law, we find it laid down, as a principle of universal jurisprudence, that truste.es can only hold and act for their beneficiaries; that all profits and gains enure to their use, and that interest, sometimes simple, sometimes compounded, will be given as the standard or value of the money used.
Thus, the trustee is liable for profits, or interest, where he does not keep accurate and regular accounts, so as to be always ready with them. Willis on Trustees, 125, 176, 177 side page. 14 Yesey, 510. 1 Jacob and Walker, 140. 3 Mer. 43.
Or, where he omits to distribute at the time required by law, or by the terms of the trust Grey v. Thompson, 1 John. Oh. 85.
Or, where he mingles trust money with his own, or uses it, or trades with it, or makes a profit on it by way of interest or otherwise, or fails to invest where it is his duty to do so. Munford v.-,6 John. Oh. Rep. 1. 2 Story’s Equity', sec. 1277. Duneomb v. Duneomb, 1 John, Oh. 508, 527. 2 Dev. & Battle, Oh. Rep, 339. 4 John. Oh. Rep. 305. 1 John. Oh. Rep. 620, 629. Lewin on Trusts, 327, 328.
Such, also, is the rule of the civil law. See 2 Story’s Eq., sec. 1277 — note to sec. 1268. 1 John. Oh. Rep. 629. Doma-t-.
In fact, the principles of English and American equity jurisprudence, on this head, are based upon the civil law.
But it is said, this court, in the case of Fetherston v. Robinson, 7 Lou. Rep. 599, has decided otherwise.
Upon examining that case, it will be seen the point was not made by counsel; nor did it appear in that case, that the executor used the funds, or failed to keep proper accounts. In fact, the grounds on which trustees are chargeable, wore not presented by the facts in that case. The question appears not to have been examined ; and in the absence of all these things, the court, upon the state of case there presented, merely decided, that, as the accounts were not liquidated, he should not pay interest, &c.
But if it were a point decided, this court has several times ruled, that a single decision, particularly when not investigated, or the point examined, will not be considered as settling- the law; and if, upon full investigation, this court deems it erroneous, it will overrule it. Griffin v. His Creditors, 6 R. 228. La Grange v. Barré, 11 R. 302, 310.
That case is therefore no authority upon the state of facts here presented.
According to the facts of this case, and in accordance with the foregoing principles, the dative executor is clearly liable for interest.
First, he is liable, because he failed to keep regular, stated and annual accounts, and because he did not annually present to the probate court, as required by the provisions of the Act of 1837. Revised Statutes, 564, B. & 0. Digest, 499. So far from having his accounts regular, they were in great confusion ; he repeatedly asks time to get them ready; he makes them out several times; he makes mistakes and corrections, and finally asks $1200 to be paid to counsel for assisting him in making them out.
Second, he is liable, because the will of Job Bass directs the property to be divided in 1845. He should have paid over, as directed by the will, the amount then in his hands; he failed to do so.
But third. He is manifestly liable, because he used and mingled the trust money with his own. Where the proof shows large balances in the hands of executors for years, the law presumes he has used it, unless by proof made on his part, he shows he kept it on deposit, or separate and distinct from his own, that it might always be ready when it was wanted; otherwise, the presumption that ho has used it, and more particularly when he fails to keep regular and correct accounts. Peyton v. Smith, 2 Dev. and Battle, Oh. 325 ; 1 John. 510, 621. 4 John. Oh. Rep. 306. Dev. Equity Rep. 369.
April, 1848, his account shows he made a large payment to the heirs, but .it also.- shows that this payment was not made out of money previously in his hands, but from sales of property just then made, and even the whole of this ho did not pay over.
,, But in his opposition, he objects to paying interest, because the money was not to be divided among the heirs until 1845. Why did he not pay it over then, and account for the Barton debt ?
, JSutfthis pretence will not avail. The principles laid down in the cases above cited, ■■'show that a trustee shall make no gain out of the fund, he must account for.all it produces in his hands, although it may not be required for years.
Suppose he had purchased a house in 1841 or 1842, for $10,000 and sold it for $20,000? Suppose he loaned the money at conventional interest, and received $10,000 of interest, is it not the product of the fund? Suppose he uses it all this time, is not the interest the product of the fund? But this is not all; his using it for his individual benefit is a constructive fraud. As it cannot be identified, it becomes part of his estate, and on his death will become assets, and cannot be followed by the beneficiaries: in such case the interest or profit is by law converted into a trust for the beneficiaries. 2 Story Eq’ty, sec. 1261. Willis on Trustees, 121. Pawcell v. WMtehouse, 1 Russell and Milne, 132,149. 2 Dev. and Batt. Oh. Rep. 339.
But the point is explicitly decided by Chancellor Kent. He says, in cases where it is proper for him to retain it or keep it on deposit, yet, if during the time he made interest he must pay it: thus clcarty proving, that if he uses the money during the time, (the profit of which is interest,) he is accountable for it. 4 John. Oh. Rep. 305.
III. Having shown that he is liable to pay interest, the question is, what interest shall he pay, and how shall it be computed ?
The Record shows two claims against him — one for $30,771, the amount due from Barton, the previous executor, and which was homologated and directed to be paid; the other the amount of money actually received bjr himself.
As he was security on Barton’s bonds,' — and it is proved Barton's estate was insolvent, — that debt, particularly as he took no steps to make it out of Barton’s estate, must be charged to him, as he cannot sue himself on the bond. Barton used this money, — for the inventory- of his estate does not show he kept it separate, and as he was ordered to pay it and did not, it unquestionably bears, at least, five per cent, interest. But we coutend for more on this as well as on the amounts actually received by himself. We contend, that, after the lapse of a reasonable time, say twelve months, within which he should bo allowed to make the amount from Barton's estate, as he was liable for the debt as surety, and could not sue himself, the amount must be considered as due by himself; and he so should have charged it. He, therefore, has had the use of this money, which, if any one else but himself had been dative executor, he would have been obliged to pay. He, therefore, must account for the use of this money on the same principle he accounts for the use of any other money in his hands.
What, then, is the interest with which ho should be charged ? Eight per cent., at least, that being the amount claimed in the petition. The rule is, that in cases where he has used the money, has failed to make proper accounts, he shall pay for the profit of the money, the highest rate of interest allowed by law. In England, in such case he will have to pay five per cent,, the highest rate. The highest rate of interest allowed by the law of Louisiana, is conventional interest ten per cent., and this should be charged to him; but as we only claim eight per cent., perhaps we cannot claim more, 3 Gill and John, Rep. 342. See Lewin on Trustees, 328,
But he submitted to pay eight per cent., and the evidence of Oorey Hood, show's he understood his duty, and knew his liability, for he told him he would have to pay interest; therefore, he exacted it.
His sense of natural justice and law instinctively informed him what his liability was; and, by agreement on record, he submitted to render an account, as claimed in the petition.
IV. But whatever rate of interest is allowed under the circumstances of this case, it must be compounded, or annual rests made, or at least the interest due will be applied in the first instance to his disbursements.
In this country, policy — justice to minors — the avoiding all temptation to do wrong, and to prevent endangering the loss of the fund by its use, the will, in a case of great delay, and where the money is used, allow .com interest.
I am aware of the provision in the Code which says : 11 Interest upon ir cannot be allowed, unless it be added to the principal, and by another co: made a new debt. No stipulation to that effect in the original contract is v Art. 1934.
But this provision, like the interest law, only applies to contracts, expn implied, in which the relation of’ debtor and creditor exists.
The laws of the other States, in such cases, equally prohibit interest to compounded, except where it is turned into principal by contract. Indeed, the courts go so far as to decide, that where interest is by contract made payable annually, and is not paid, still interest on it will not bo allowed, because not authorized by the statute. See 7 Greenleaf’s Rep, 48, 8 Mass, 48, 455. 17 Conn. 243. 13 Vt. 430,. 23 Pickering, &,c.
But as I have shown, interest is allowed against trustees to pay for profits made by them — it is not governed by the statute — hence, where compound interest is not allowed by the statute or common law, on ordinary debts, yet the same courts decide it may be charged againt a t/rustee who has used the funds. And this also is the rule of thq civil law. And it should be so; for the yearly interest or profits is a trust fund, as much as the original principal. The modern authorities show, where the money has boon used, and particularly where the party has delayed, or kept inaccurate accounts, or failed to keep regular accounts, ready at all times for inspection, he must pay compound interest; for it is presumed he made this much from the use of the money. 1 John. Oh. Rep., 624. 1 Brown’s Ch. Rep. 359, cited 1 John. Oh. 625. Riley’s Oh. Rep. 38. 2 Story’s Equ. sec. 1277, 1278, 3 Gill. & Johnst. 343. 2 Dev. & Battle, 339. Baily’s Rep. 460, 1 McMullen, 275, 2 McCord’s Oh. 1. Such is the civil law, as shown by Chancellor Kent, in the above case, in 1 John. OK Rep. .
. The policy of this rule, and the injustice of withholding it, is ably sustained by Chancellor Kent, in the above case. See 1 John. Ch. Rep. 626.
V. Having, as I trust, proved the liability of the executor to pay compound interest, 1 will barely advert hero to the pretence set up by defendant against payment of the Barton debt. The only defence he makes to this, is prescription. That is, he says, “ I have not sued myself on my, bond, nor have I sued Barton's estate, as was my duty, in ten years; therefore, as 1 have neglected to do it, I pray the court to give me the benefit of my not proceeding against myself or Barton's estate.” The mere statement of such a case answers the objection.
If he had not been security on the bond, and had failed to sue Barton's estate, so as to let it be barred, the court would hold him responsible, if it could have been made out of that estate. 9 Robinson, 406. 2 Ann. 281. 10 Martin, 708. 3 N. S. 707. And yet where he is absolutely bound as surety to
pay it himself — and because he cannot sue himself — and because he has failed to charge himself with it — he modestly asks the court, to. allow prescription against his own acts. A suit against him alone on his bond could have been sustained — if he could have sued himself. Denys v. Armitage, 6 Martin, G30. Elliott v White, 5 La. R. 824. Pármele v. Brasher, 16 La. R. 72.
VI. I will barely notice one other point.
1st. We objected to the allowance of $1200, paid Mr. Demise (after the litigation began, in which we charged him personally.) This is paid on pretence of professional assistance in filing his acconnts. It is, in fact, a fee paid to defend his own acts, when personally charged. Such a charge, for merely assisting in making out an account, could not be allowed. See Ferrer v. Bofil, 11 Martin, 285.
VII. We object to his account, because it does not charge himself with the above claim against Barton's estate, and others; but as these have been examined by my associate counsel, I can add nothing to what they have said, barely referring to the case of Johnston v. Goon, 13 Lou, Rep. 637, to show that the fact,' that the two annual accounts rendered by him were homologated, does not bar us from showing that he has received other funds, or liable for other charges not contained in said accounts.
Snyder & Selby, for the executor of Mrs. Barton:
June 13, 1839, Martha A. Bass, during her widowhood, executed lo Cham-bliss the obligation “ A.” The consideration of which, as stated in it, is to save Ohambliss harmless, by Mrs. Barton, for all future losses which he may possibly sustain by having been the surety of D. O. Barton, her late husband, through mere friendship towards herself and Barton. But the consideration attempted to be proved different from that expressed in it, is that Mrs. Barton guaranteed Ohambliss against Barton's default, because she had secretly applied the money to her use, found in the succession of Barton, knowing that it belonged to the succession of her father, Job Bass, which, if so, and Cham-bliss knowing it, as he must have known, it was his duty to collect of her, for the creditors and heirs of Job Bass. If this is true of Ohambliss, as his heirs contend that they have proved it true, on behalf of Ohambliss, it was contrary to good morals, and he or his heirs may not now' be permitted to plead and take advantage of it. O. P. 19 ; L. O. 1887 and 1889. “Ex turpi causa non oritur aetes." 11 Wheaton R. 258. 5 R. R. 490. C N- S. 218. 5 N. S. 409. 3 N. S. 46. 1 Ann. 09.
“The administrator is” not only “ responsible for any loss sustained by the estate through his neglect,” (9 R. R. 405,) but “the curator of a succession may sue the surety of a former curator for any amount due b}' his principal.” 1 A. R. 75, succession of Johnson. Therefore, if Barton, as the executor of Job Bass, had received money belonging 1o the latter’s succession, and used it upon his own account, upon the appointment of Ohambliss, and this coming to his knowledge, as he must have known, june 13, 1839, the date of the act “A,” it was his duty as executor to collect it of the succession of Barton ; ar.d if Mrs. Barton had secreted any of it, it was his duty to collect it from her; and upon his failure, from insolvency or otherwise, it then became his duty as executor of Boss, to collect the amount of the default of Barton, from the surety of Barton, himself. This court has said, “it is the doty of courts to look with jealousy upon the conduct of those who act in a fiduciary capacity, and to take care that they do not make personal benefit from the manner in which they manage the estates confided to them.”1 6 Ann. 256.
It is confidently contended, that il the consideration of the act “A” was, as contended for by the representatives of Ohambliss, it was, on his part, a dereliction of duty and immoral, and that a court of justice, under our law's, will not lend its aid to enforce it. 19 L. R. 497. 1 Ann. 76, and an indictable of-fence by our criminal statutes. Clarice v. Scott et als., 2 Ann. 907, and the authorities therein cited, particularly 17 L. R. 118.
Boselius, Bryan and Bemiss, for defendants and appellants :
We shall present our points to the court in order in which the transactions occurred. First noticing the demand to render Chambliss liable as security of B. 0. Barton.
1st. The bonds of Barton on which Chambliss' name appears are dated: one, ICth of September, 1835; the other, 1st of Februar}"-, 1838. This suit was filed 24th of April, 1848 ; citation served 26th of April, 1848. The defendants oppose the prescription of ten years to any demand of plaintiffs so far as his supposed liability as security on D. 0. Barton's bond is concerned.
2d. No judgment should be rendered against Chambliss as security for B. 0. Barton, without ascertaining, contradictorily with the legal representative of D. U. Barton, the amount of Ba>‘ton'$ liability.
3d. If above points should not be sustained by the court, defendant is entitled to recover the same judgment against the legal representative of Martha A. Bass, (Widow Barton,) here represented by IF! M. Benton, as the heirs of Bass may recover against him as security of B. 0. Barton.
4th. The accounts of D. 0. Barton are res juclieata between the parties, and cannot bo disturbed.
5th. No funds are shown to have come into Chambliss' hands from B. 0. Barton, except Rood's and Chambliss' notes for four thousand dollars ($4000), which are accounted for in his account of 3d of April, 1841, and he is not even charged with using the funds in his hands as executor, so no interest can be charged on any balance found to be due from Barton to Bass' succession against Barton's security ; because no interest it stipulated in the bond ; because no statute imposes interest as a penalty; and, because Chambliss has not been placed in default. Art. 0. 0. 1930, 1931, 1932.
6th. Chambliss having a right to retain in his hands the share in the estate of Job Bass belonging to Mrs. Martha A. Bass, amounting to some twelve or fourteen thousand dollars, and there being at-this time only a balance of account of some two thousand dollars, the plaintiffs should be compelled to collate on partition, and pay to the credit of any judgment rendered against Chambliss as security of B. O. Barton, such sum as they or any of them may have received over their share or for any money paid over to Benton for Martha A. Bass, they having paid the same pending this suit.
So far as Chambliss is sued to account as dative testamentary executor of Job Bass, we say :
1st. The account, as presented in a previous part of this brief is correct. The items which the (Jourt ordered to be erased having been excluded, and the additions which were presented during the trial and ordered by the court added.
2d. The plaintiffs have no right to demand interest on any balance in Chambliss' hands as executor, unless, at least, they show that Chambliss converted the funds of the succession to his own use, and so far from showing that Chambliss converted those funds to his own use, the plaintiffs have not alleged it in any part of their pleadings.
3d. Interest can bo allowed only when it is stipulated in the contract, or when the party has been put in default, or as a penalty for violating some statute — 1930-31-32 C. C. No particular statute has been invoked by plaintiffs.
4th. The accounts of Chambliss as dative executor — the first account homo-logated ; second account homologated ; third account homologated — are judgments binding on the parties and cannot be disturbed by any court.
5th. Even if the judgment of the District Court was correct in allowing interest upon the various sums of money which carne into Chambliss' hands as executor from the date of these respective receipts, it was a manifest error to go behind the homologated accounts of 1840, 1841 and 1842, to charge interest on the items of said accounts.
Warren M. Benton, representing his late wife, Mrs. Martha A. Bass, late Widow Barton, and one of the heirs of Job Bass, on the 27th May, 1852, filed what he styles an amended opposition. This the court will see is another one of those singular excrescences which have grown out of uniting two distinct and seperate causes of action in one suit. In this amended opposition various nullities and defences are set up to defeat the effect of the agreement entered into between Martha A. Barton and B. J. .Chambliss. To these objections wo reply:
1st. It is not pretended that the contract of Mrs. Barton with Chambliss is a donation.
2d. It is not necessary to the validity of a contract, that the consideration be sot forth in it, It is only necessary that a legal consideration exists. C. C. 1888.
3d. Mrs. Barton was a widow at the time of contracting with Chambliss, and of ago competent to contract. She was not the security of her husband. She was “ desirous to relieve the estate of her second husband,” to prevent law suits; to be able to retain in her hands some sixteen or eighteen thousand dollars which her husband had on hand at his death. The court will gain some Valuable information upon this subject in 12 R. R. 113, and 19 L. R. 499. None of this large sum of money seen in the possession of Dr. Barton immediately before his death, and in his wife’s hands, by Judge Selby, after his death, is pretended to have been paid over to Chambliss.
There is a natural equity in making Mrs. Barton, at least to the extent of her share, responsible for what she has used herself, or had the benefit and enjoyment of. She should first restore to the succession of her father what she took from it before she demands her portion at the hands of her husband’s security,
It was understood and conceded on the trial of this suit in the lower court, that the portion of Mrs. Barton in her father’s estate had been paid over to TV. M. Benton, her executor, pending this suit, from the funds received from Eobinson, trustee. If this is the fact, plaintiffs generally are bound to refund this money to defendant; they having paid is in derogation and fraud of this suit and defendant’s rights.

Opinion:
Buchanan, J.
This is a suit for an account instituted 24th April, 1848.
The account was filed 27 th November, 1848.
Plaintiffs, the heirs of Job Bass, opposed the account on the following grounds:
1st. "That for the year's 1839, 1840, 1841, and 1842, the executor had in his hands, as will appear from the accounts of those years, about twenty thousand dollars, for which he allowed no interest, except for the year 1839."
This claim of interest is based upon the Act of 1837, page 96, section 6.
The record shows that Chambliss rendered three accounts of his administration — the first on the 7th April, 1840, was homologated by judgment of court, on the 27th April, 1840, and showed a balance in favor of the estate of $20,396 26.
The second account was rendered on the 3d April, 1841, and was homologa-ted by judgment of the '14th April, 1841. This account showed a balance in favor of the estate of $12,247 40.
The third account of executorship was filed the 7th April, 1842. It showed a balance in favor of the estate of $6,636 58. A judgment of homologation of this third account was rendered on the 20th April, 1842, which does not appear to have been signed.
The amounts received at various times between the 10th January, 1840, and the 16th January, 1842, by Chambliss, as executor, as shown by those three accounts of administration, are in the aggregate $56,460. But it is not considered by us that any interest can properly be claimed from the executor therefor, except upon the balance shown by the last of the three accounts, to-wit: $6,636 58. The first- and second accounts have been homologated by judgments signed: and even there has been judgment of homologation rendered upon the third account, which has not been signed indeed, but that appears to have been through inadvertanee, for there was no opposition made to it, nor is it now pretended that there was any error in it Each account commences by crediting the estate with the balance shown by the preceding account; and the interest on the last balance only runs, under section 6 of the Act of 1837, from April 7, 1843, being one year after the filing of said account, by reason of the executor's failure to file another account of administration as required by that section. The rate of interest under the statute would be ten per cent., but the plaintiffs only ask for eight per cent., which is accordingly allowed.
2d. The plaintiffs oppose the account, secondly, because the executor has not credited the estate in his account of 1840, with the interest on two notes collected, and which, it is alleged, bore interest from their date. There is an error of no importance in the date assigned by this objection to the account in which the collection of two notes said to be found. It is in reality the account of 1841, not that of 1840.
The items of that account alluded to, read as follows:
" By amount received of Govey Hood, one thousand dollars, - $1,000 00
'By amount of my note which was given to D. O. Barton, as dative
executor, three thousand dollars, . 8,000 00
The only evidence bearing upon this ground of opposition is found in the testimony of Govey Hood, who swears as follows: " that he paid interest, at ten per cent., for two or three years from the maturity of the note until it was collected." And in another part of his evidence, he says that he paid Cham-bliss as executor of Bass, interest on the note "from its date to its maturity, or from the time it was given until it was paid." ¥e view this evidence as fixing the receipt of interest on the Govey Hood note upon Olicmíbliss. He is bound for that interest as cash received by him on the 7th April, 1840, amounting to $-, and this item must bear eight per cent, interest.
We charge Chambliss likewise as having received interest at ten per cent, on his own note on the 4th April, 1839, date of his receipt to the executrix of Barton, amounting to $-, and this item must bear interest as the other items of cash received and not accounted for.
We also charge defendant with a note of H. Prentice for $8000, and with interest at five per cent, on the same, as received by him on the-June, 1840. This item likewise to bear interest.
3d. The plaintiffs object, thirdly, that defendant has charged commissions, wrongfully, in the three accounts of 1840, 1841 and 1842, as well as in the account filed in 1848, upon moneys collected by him, instead of charging them upon the amount of the inventory that remained to be administered.
We think this obj ection unfounded. Plaintiffs further charge under this same head of their opposition that the defendant has charged certain commissions twice. This objection seems well taken. The amount thus charged twice in this account, is $1900 72.
4th. Plaintiffs object, fourthly, to a charge of $82, for commissions on a sum of $4000, said to have been collected, but which does not appear to have been collected. This objection is admitted to be correct.
5th. The fifth ground of opposition concerns a charge of $278 23 for overseeing, &c., which is admitted to be erroneous.
6th. The sixth ground is a double charge of fifty dollars for cost of a transcript. This objection is sustained, as well as that
7th. In ground seventh, being twenty dollars error of addition to prejudice of plaintiffs.
8th. The eighth ground of opposition relates to a charge of seventy-five dollars for three trips to Natchez and back, on business of the succession. There is no proof in support of this charge, which is therefore disallowed.
9th. The ninth ground of opposition alleges that an item of $92,734 55 to the credit of the estate for sales of negroes, &e., on Point Look-Out plantation, in April, 1848, is too little by $1000.
This item is only put down in the account as approximate. The correct amount of these sales is stated in amended account filed on the 18th May, 1852, to be $95,577 70. The difference on this item is therefore $2,843 21.
10th. The tenth ground "of opposition objects to a charge made by the executor of $5000, paid D. 8. Staey on the 8th May, 1838, which the opposition correctly states, was so paid, not by Ghambliss, the defendant and accountant, but by D. O. Bailón, his predecessor in the executorship. The opponents allege that defendant should not be allowed to credit himself with moneys paid by Barton, unless he likewise charges himself with the assets of the estate received by Barton, and not accounted for; and pray that the account be corrected by charging Ghambliss with the sum of $35,000, for moneys so received by Barton, and by giving Ghambliss credit for all sums paid by Barton for which the latter has not had credit in the account rendered by him to the late Probate Court.
It is in proof by an account of executorship filed by Bwi'ton on the 17th January, 1838, and homologated the 1st February, 1838, that the balance due by Barton to the estate of Bass at that date was $30,771 39. Ba/rton died the 4th January following, (1839). On the 4th February, 1839, Ghambliss qualified as dative testamentary executor of Bass, in place of Barton, deceased.
It was certainly Ohambliss's duty to have used all legal means to make the balance above stated out of Barton's estate. Perhaps the reason he did not do so, was the fact that Barton's widow, who was one of Job Bass's heirs, and entitled to one ninth of his estate, entered into a contract of guaranty with Gha/mbliss, a few months after her husband's death, by which she bound herself in the most unqualified manner, to save Ghambliss harmless for or on account of the balance due by her late husband to her father's estate, and pledged her portion of the inheritance, by covenanting that Ghambliss might retain in his hands the share or portion of said estate coming to her, on account of the indebtedness of Barton to the estate. As Bass's estate, per inventory, was about two hundred thousand dollars in value, the proportion coming to this heir, Mrs. Bm'ton, might reasonably have seemed equal to the balance due by Mr. Ban-ton to the estate at the time of his death. For it is not proved that any moneys came into the hands of Barton after the rendition of his account homologated on the 1st February, 1838; and upon that balance, Barton had paid to Mr. Staey, as alleged in the ground of opposition under consideration, a sum of five thousand dollars ; in addition to further credits allowed Barton of four thousand dollars, by the judgment of the District Court, which are not complained of in this court, and still another credit of $3000, allowed by the present judgment for a note of Horace Prentice. The true balance, after making these allowances, due by the estate of Barton to the estate of Bass, is more particularly shown by the account incorporated in this opinion. We are of opinion that Ghambliss should be charged with this amount, and should have judgment, over against Mrs. Barton, called in warranty. But we do not think this portion of our judgment against the defendant should carry eight per cent, interest, as ordered by the judgment appealed from. This is -not money collected by the executor, and which he has failed to deposit in bank or account for. It does not therefore come within the provision of the Act of 1837, which is a highly penal statute, and should be strictly construed. It is even uncer tain how much, if any, of this balance due by Barton's estate will have to be disbursed by Chambliss's representatives; for although Chambliss rendered himself liable to make good Barton's deficit, yet it will be equitable and necessary, to stay execution of the portion of the judgment against his estate arising from this cause, until it be ascertained what is the precise sum coming to Mrs. Barton in settlement of her father's estate — defendant being clearly entitled to a credit for that amount, under Mrs. Barton's warranty. The balance of Bcorton's account of the executorship after giving credit for the amounts of the three notes of P. J. Chambliss, H. Prentioe and Corey Hood, and the Stacy receipt, in a debt due by the succession of Barton to the succession of Bass, and as such, bore interest at the rate of five per cent, from Barton's death, by the Article 989 of the Code of Practice. For this interest Chambliss is responsible upon the Barton balance, in their double capacity of surety of Barton, and of his successor of Barton in the executorship of Bass.
The very peculiar feature of this portion of the cause is that Chambliss must be viewed as having paid the amount for which he was responsible as surety of Barton to a person who was certainly entitled to some portion, if not the whole of the amount paid, as being one of the heirs of Bass; that person at the same time being bound by contract to hold Chambliss harmless from his said responsibility.
We are of opinion that the Barton balance of account of executorship, is entitled to the following credits:
Gash paid to Mr. Stacy, - - - - - $5,000 00
The following notes turned over by Barton's executrix to
defendant, and by him collected — Covey Hood, $1,000 00
Chambliss, 3,000 00
H. Prentice, 3,000 00
- 7,000 00
Total,.$12,000 00
Together with the interest collected by Chambliss, on those notes.
The eleventh ground of opposition is too vague and general to require any notice.
An amended opposition was filed on the 1st June, 1849, alleging that the defendant had not given credit for two drafts, one of $2,500, and one of $690, paid by Atchison. Annexed to this opposition is a statement signed by defendant. A comparison of this statement with the two accounts filed by defendant in April, 1842, and November, 1848, will show that all the drafts paid by Atchison, are included in one or the other of them, except that of $690, received the 5th April, 1842, with which the defendant must be charged.
This suit, after the account and oppositions filed, dragged along in the District Court until, in December, 1850, an agreement was entered into by the parties and put on file, by which the case was to be continued for another year, provided the administrators of defendant, (who had died in the meanwhile,) would pay $15,000 in cash, and as much more in city acceptances, ($30,000 in all,) on or before the 20th January, 1851. This was done.
On May 18th 1852, defendants, with leave of Court filed an amended account in which the only difference from the account filed at the begining of the suit by Chambliss was, the omission of several of the items objected to by the plaintiffs on the debit side (which have been already noticed in their proper place,) the insertion on the debit side of an item of $1200 for fees of Messrs. Bemiss and Bryan, for filing account and settling tlie succession, and the insertion on the credit side of the sums paid the heirs since the institution of the suit, being- $30,000 to Sparrow & Short, attorneys, and $556 60 to Benton, assignee.
The balance shown by this amended account to the credit of Bass's estate was $1,368 98.
Eight days after this amended account filed, the parties went to trial; and on the second day of the trial, viz: the 27th May, 1852, defendant's counsel tendered still another amendment, composed of a few items, of which the only one that is necessary to notice is, a very obvious error of $1000, in computation of commissions of two and a half per cent, on the amount of Sheriff's sales. The District Court properly allowed this amendment.
The fee of $1200 allowed Messrs, Bemiss & Bryan in the amended account of 18th May, 1852, was objected to, and properly rejected by the District Court.
An heir who after waiting for years, is obliged to sue an executor for an amount, ought not to pay the counsel employed to defend such a suit. It is to be supposed that he has had to employ counsel to prosecute the suit, whom he will have to pay. This is an expense which he has incurred through the fault of the executor, and we see no propriety in doubling that expense to him, by charging him with the fees of counsel who defend the suit.
Upon a review of the evidence and law of the case, we state this account as follows:
A.
Statement of Account with, Interest, R. J. Chambliss, Dative Testmnenlm'y Executor, with Succession of Job Bass.
Statement of Account with Interest, R. J. Chambliss, Dative Testamentary Moeeutor, with Succession of Job Bass.
B.
Statement of Account with Interest, D. 0. Barton, Dative Testamentary Executor with the Succession of Job Bass.
It is therefore adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be reversed; and it is further decreed, that there be judgment in favor of plaintiffs against the legal representatives of Robert J. Ghambliss, namely, Samuel L. Ghambliss, John 3. Martin and Mrs. Mary E. Martin, administrators of the succession of Robert J. Ghambliss, for the sum of $42,931 79 principal, with interest on $25,247 62 of said amount at the rate of eight per cent, from the first of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-one, until paid; and on $17,684 17 of said amount, at the rate of five per cent, from the fourth of January, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, until paid; and that there be judgment in favor of the administrators of the said R. J. Ghambliss against W. M. Benton, in his capacity of executor of Mm'tha A. Bass, for the sum of $17,684 17, with interest at five per cent, per annum from the fourth of January, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, until paid; that the plaintiffs be referred to a Notary Public or Parish Recorder, to be named by the District Judge of the parish of Carroll, for the purpose of making a partition and settlement of their respective rights as heirs of Job Bass, deceased; that execution be stayed upon $17,684 17, and the accruing interest on said sum as above, of the judgment herein rendered against the estate of Ghambliss, as well as upon the whole judgment against the estate of Martha A. Bass, until it shall have been ascertained by said notarial partition and settlement what is the amount of the rights of Martha A. Bass, as one of the heirs of Job Bass, her father; that the amount of said rights be credited upon the judgment stayed as aforesaid, and execution be issued thereupon for the surplus only, after crediting the amount of said rights. It is further decreed, that the costs of the court of the first instance be paid by the appellants, and those of the appeal by the appellee, and it is decreed lastly, that the sum of one hundred dollars be allowed to the auditor, W. O. Horner, by this court appointed, for his services herein, and that said sum be paid by the appellee.
Vookhies, J., Ogden, J., and Campbell, J., concurring.