Case Name: Stephenson, Appellant, vs. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Company, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1925-03-10
Citations: 186 Wis. 403
Docket Number: 
Parties: Stephenson, Appellant, vs. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 186
Pages: 403–408

Head Matter:
Stephenson, Appellant, vs. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Company, Respondent.
February 12 —
March 10, 1925.
Automobiles: Collision with street car: Contributory negligence: Special verdict: .Inconsistent anszvcrs: Specific finding and general conclusion.
1. In an action to recover for the damage sustained by plaintiff’s automobile„when struck by defendant’s street' car at a street intersection, an answer in a special verdict that no want of ordinary care on the part of the driver of the automobile proximately contributed to cause the collision, being a general conclusion inconsistent with another answer that the driver of the automobile was able to see the approaching street car at such a distance from the intersection that by the exercise of ordinary care she might have avoided a collision, was properly changed by the court so as to accord with such other answer, which was a finding of a specific fact making the driver contributorily negligent, p. 405.
2. The driver of the automobile was required to observe ordinary care under the circumstances as they then existed and as they were apparent to her to avoid a collision with the street car approaching on an intersecting street, and on her failure to do so she was contributorily negligent, p. 405.
OwEN, J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha county: E. B. Belden, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Injury to property. Plaintiff was the owner of an automobile which at the time of the accident in question was being driven northerly along Maplewood avenue in the city of Kenosha. Maplewood avenue crosses Grand avenue, which runs east and west. By ordinance the speed of street cars is limited to fifteen miles per hour. Defendant’s employees were operating a street car running westerly on Grand avenue. As the wife of plaintiff approached with the automobile from the south on Maplewood avenue on February 17, 1923, at about 5:15 p. m., there was a collision, resulting in damage to plaintiff’s car, for the recovery of which this action was begun.
There was a jury trial. The jury found that the defendant’s car was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and that defendant’s employees were negligent in other respects which proximately contributed to the injury complained of. In answer to question II the jury found that the driver of plaintiff’s automobile was able to see the approaching street car at such distance east of the intersection that by the exercise of ordinary care she might have avoided the collision. In answer to question 12 the jury„found that the driver of plaintiff’s' automobile was twenty-five feet from the street-car track when she first applied her brakes; and in answer to question 13 that no want of ordinary care on the párt of the driver of plaintiff’s automobile proximately contributed to cause the collision and resulting damage to plaintiff’s automobile.
Upon motions after verdict, the court changed the answer to question 13 from “No” to “Yes,” and defendant had judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, from which the plaintiff appeals.
For the appellant there was a brief by Clarence I. Fisher and Roy S. Stephenson, both of Kenosha, and oral argument by Mr. Stephenson.
For the respondent there was a brief by Simmons, Walker & Wratten of Racine, and oral argument by M. E. Walker.

Opinion:
Rosenberry, J.
It appears from the record that the court also ordered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. However, we find it not necessary to consider that aspect of the case.
The wife of plaintiff, who was driving the car at the time of the accident, in her testimony made no statement as to distances. It appears, however, from her testimony that it was daylight; that she saw the street car half way down the block to her right — that is, to the east, — and that she went forward thinking that she had time to cross the track; that the next time she looked she was just evén with the curb line or the front wheels were a trifle past the curb line, when she applied her brakes and came to a stop with the front wheels of the car within the zone of danger. She knew of the location of the street-car track upon Grand avenue. Mrs. Eliason, who was riding with her at the time, testified that when they were twenty-five feet south of Grand avenue she could see the rear end of the street car, which was then about 125 feet east of the east line of Maplewood avenue, coming at least twenty-five miles per hour, at least two and one-half times as fast as the automobile was _ traveling, and that the rate of speed of the street car could be observed. There was nothing to obstruct the view of the driver.
It is argued very strenuously that the court erred in holding that the answer to cprestion 11 controlled the answer to question 13. The finding of the jury in response to question 11 was of a specific fact, while the finding of the jury in response to question 13 was of a general conclusion, and we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly held that the verdict was inconsistent and that under the evidence the answer to question 11 was a direct finding of contributory negligence amply sustained by the evidence.
It is contended that this case is ruled by Dahinden v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 169 Wis. 1, 171 N. W. 669. In this case it was plainly to be seen that the street car was not approaching at a lawful rate of speed, as appears from the testimony of Mrs. Eliason, and it was the duty of the driver of the automobile to observe ordinary care under the circumstances as they existed and as they were apparent to her by the use of her senses. This the jury found in response to question 11 she did not do. Such being the fact, she was guilty of contributory negligence. The court fully instructed the jury as to the rule set out in the Dahinden Case, and under that instruction the jury found contrary to the plaintiff's contention.
This case is ruled by Vetter v. Southern Wis. R. Co. 140 Wis. 296, 122 N. W. 731.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.