Case Name: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-07-09
Citations: 136 N.Y.S. 990
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 136
Pages: 990–995

Head Matter:
WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 9, 1912.)
1. Conversion (§ 15*)—Equitable Conversion—Wills.
A will devising real estate to testator’s wife for life, and declaring that, after her death, the property shall be sold and the proceeds equally di-. vided between his children living at that time, affects an equitable conversion of the realty into money for distribution to the children, but a sale is postponed until after the wife’s death.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Conversion, Cent. Dig. §§ 28-37, 52; Dec. Dig. § 15.*]
2. Executors and Administrators (§ 138*)—Power of Sale. .
An executor in a will devising real estate to testator’s wife for life, and directing that, after her death, the same shall be sold and the proceeds equally divided between his children living at that time, has implied power to sell and distribute the proceeds among the children, but •no trust is created or required in order to sell.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 560-566, 568-575; Dec. Dig. § 138.*] ,
3. Executors and Administrators (§ 121*)—Power of Sale—Death of Executor.
The death of an executor before executing the power of sale conferred by a will directing a sale of real estate for distribution among beneficiaries named does not prevent a sale, but an administrator with will annexed may sell and distribute the proceeds, or a person appointed by the court for that purpose may exercise the power.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 493, 4931/2! Dec. Dig. § 121.*]
4. Wills (§ 634*)—Construction—Beneficiaries—Vested Estates.
A will devising real estate to testator’s wife for life, and directing that after her death the same shall be sold, and the proceeds equally divided between his children living at that time, whether construed to equitably convert the real estate into personalty, or as disposing of the real estate, limits the ultimate beneficiaries to the children living at the death of the wife.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1488-1510; Dec. Dig. § 634.*]
5. Wills (§ 629*)—Construction—Vested Estates.
The rule that the construction which permits the vesting of devises as closely as possible after testator’s death is favored is a rule of construction subordinate to the fundamental rule that the intention of testator governs.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1461, 1462; Dec. Dig. § 629.*]
McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
•For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
Appeal from Chautauqua County Court.
Action by Joseph Williams against James Williams and others. From an interlocutory judgment, defendants appeal.
Reversed, and complaint dismissed.
The facts are agreed upon. On the 27th day of September, 1897, William J. Williams, a resident of Chautauqua county, died seised in fee of the lands described .in the complaint. He executed his last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate, and left him surviving his widow, who died in 1909 and prior to the commencement of this action, and also four children and descendants of a deceased daughter. One son, Thomas, died intestate in 1902, survived by his widow and several children, of whom the plaintiff is one. The testator at the time of his death was 83 years of age, and executed his last will and testament five years before that event. By that instrument he gave the use of his homestead, comprising about 15 acres of land, and the premises involved in this action to his wife “so long as she shall live.” The second clause of the will is as follows: “I declare that after the death of my wife that the homestead be sold and the proceeds be equally divided between my children that are living at that time, share and share alike.” He named an executor, who duly qualified, but is now dead, and no administrator with the will annexed has been appointed. The rights of the parties depend upon the construction to be given to the last will and testament of the testator. The County Court held that the estate vested irrevocably upon the death of the testator, so that the children of Thomas Williams acquired the interest of their father.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, KRUSE, ROBSON, and FOOTE, JJ.
George H. Ansley, for appellants.
Daniel Reed, for respondent.
Joseph C. White, Special Guardian for Louise Emaline Farrell.

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
There is no devise of the little estate left by the testator to any of his children. He preferred to have the premises sold and the avails distributed after the death of his widow, and therefore directed that such mode be adopted. The gift was of money, not of land, and, because of the direction of the testator to sell the real estate, it became personal property. In no other way could the distribution of the money be made, and so there was what is known as an equitable conversion of this small farm into personalty. Meakings v. Cromwell, 5 N. Y. 136; Greenland v. Waddell et al., 116 N. Y. 234, 240, 22 N. E. 367, 15 Am. St. Rep. 400 et seq.; Cahill v. Russell et al., 140 N. Y. 402, 35 N. E. 664; Salisbury v. Slade et al., 160 N. Y. 278, 54 N. E. 741.
The will was drawn by a farmer, and it is a reasonable inference that he did not appreciate the importance of endowing the executor with distinct authority to sell the premises. The omission, however, does not impede the primary purpose of the testator to convert the land into personal estate. The sale was necessary in order to make effective the bequests and the implied power to sell and distribute was consequently vested in the executor. (Cases cited.) No trust is created and no trustee is required in order to sell the land. The will itself converts the property into personalty and the executor simply disposes of it like any other personal property in his custody. Conversion into money is necessary that the gift may be made as the tes tator designed, and that change, of course, is a common one in the settlement and distribution of decedents' estates.
Nor does the death of the executor before executing the power of sale prevent the consummation of the intention of the testator. There was no discretionary authority to sell. The direction was mandatory, positive, and the sale of the land was essential to the distribution of the estate. The executor therefore possessed the power to sell by virtue of his official authority, and no special or personal confidence was reposed in him separate from his office. An administrator with the will annexed could sell the land and distribute the avails in compliance with the imperative direction of the testator. Section 2613, Code of Civil Procedure; Clifford v. Morrell, 22 App. Div. 470, 48 N. Y. Supp. 83; Carpenter v. Bonner, 26 App. Div. 462, 50 N. Y. Supp. 298; Ayers v. Courvoisier, 101 App. Div. 97, 91 N. Y. Supp. 549; Mott v. Ackerman, 92 N. Y. 539, 552. Or it may be a person appointed by the court for that purpose could exercise the power. Royce et al. v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 402, 405, 25 N. E. 386; Cooke v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35. The second clause of the will postpones the sale of the land until after the death of the wife of the testator, and the division is among his "children that are living at that time, share and share alike."
It is the claim of the respondent that the title became absolutely vested at the time of the death. If so, Thomas Williams was one of the owners, and his interest, on his death, passed to his heirs at law, including the plaintiff. If there was an equitable conversion of the real estate into, personalty, there was no devise and no vesting in any of the beneficiaries. In the second place, even if the land retained its identity-as such, I think the clear intent of the testator was to limit the ultimate beneficiaries to those living at the death of the wife. If there was a vesting, it was subject to be divested when the period of division was reached.
To be sure, the construction is favored which permits the vesting of devises as closely as possible after the death of the testator. Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N. Y. 406, 60 N. E. 20; Riker v. Gwynne, 201 N. Y. 143, 149, 94 N. E. 632; Van Deusen v. Van Deusen, 138 App. Div. 357, 122 N. Y. Supp. 718. The rule is a technical canon of interpretation and subordinate to the fundamental principle that the intention of the testator is the dominating guide in construing his will. In the cases where the technical rule has prevailed, the language employed in the will was ambiguous and the rendering in conformity with that rule apparently fulfilled the purpose of the testator as well as any that might have been adopted. See cases cited.
In the will we are considering the intention of the testator is explicitly stated, and limits the division of his property to the children living at the death of his wife. While the testator recognized equal obligations to his children, evidently he did not wish any further carving up of his small estate. We are well within the authorities in holding, even if there was a devise of the land, it did not become effective until the.death of the wife, and then vested only in the children of the testator living at that time. Patchen v. Patchen et al., 121 N. Y. 432, 24 N. E. 695; Wright v. Wright, 140 App. Div. 634, 125 N. Y. Supp. 875. The conclusion reached, therefore, is that the plaintiff has no title in the premises described in the complaint.
The interlocutory judgment should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, with costs to the appellant in this court and to the appellant and special guardian in the court below.
So ordered. All concur, except McEENNAN, P. J., who dissents in an opinion.