Case Name: Steven N. ABRAMSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charlie PIAZZA, Defendant and Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1967-03-21
Citations: 198 So. 2d 565
Docket Number: No. 1944
Parties: Steven N. ABRAMSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charlie PIAZZA, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: Before CULPEPPER, TATE and FRUGÉ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 198
Pages: 565–570

Head Matter:
Steven N. ABRAMSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charlie PIAZZA, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 1944.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
March 21, 1967.
On Rehearing April 26, 1967.
C. E. Laborde, Jr., and Edwin L. La-fargue, of Laborde & Lafargue, Marks-ville, for plaintiff-appellant.
Maxwell J. Bordelon, Marksville, for defendant-appellee.
Before CULPEPPER, TATE and FRUGÉ, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
The plaintiff, Steven N. Abramson, filed this petitory action against the defendant, Charlie Piazza, seeking recognition of plaintiff's ownership of approximately 3 acres of land. Defendant's answer asserted ownership by acquisitive prescription. After a trial on the merits, the district judge rendered an "Opinion" sustaining defendant's acquisitive prescription. The plaintiff appealed.
We do not reach a consideration of this appeal on its merits because no final judgment has been read and signed by the district judge in open court. The record contains only an instrument denominated "Opinion", consisting of 5 pages and giving in detail the district judge's written reasons. This opinion concludes as follows:
"THEREFORE, the Court rules and holds that the defendant's special defense of acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years and thirty (30) years is proper and well taken.
"LET THERE BE FORMAL JUDGMENT HEREIN, denying the demands of the plaintiff at his costs.
"DONE, READ & SIGNED in open Court at Marksville, Louisiana, on this 15th day of April, 1966.
Earl Edwards
. JUDGE"
This "Opinion" is not a final judgment. In the first place, the concluding language quoted above shows clearly that the district judge did not intend this to be a final judgment. Instead, he contemplated the presentation and signing of a final judgment at a later date.
Furthermore, even if we were to consider this as an attempt by the district judge to combine his written reasons and the final judgment in one instrument, this is prohibited by the mandatory language of LSA-C.C.P. Article 1918, which reads as follows:
"A final judgment shall be identified as such by appropriate language. When written reasons for the judgment are assigned, they shall be set out in an opinion separate from the judgment."
Official Revision Comment (b), under LSA-C.C.P. Article 1918, states that "The requirement of separate judgments and reasons for judgments in the second sentence will avoid the problem presented in Anderson v. Nugent, 16 So.2d 282 (La.App. 1944)." In the cited case, Anderson v. Nu-gent, which was decided before the adoption of our new Code of Civil Procedure in 1960, the question was whether the document, which contained both the judge's written reasons and a decree, could be considered as the final judgment. The many cases cited therein show the confusion caused by this issue under former Code of Practice Articles.
The obvious purpose of LSA-C.C.P. Article 1918, which is new in our law, is to suppress this confusion and to give certainty to what constitutes the final judgment and particularly to the date on which it is rendered. The effective date of the final judgment becomes critically important in ascertaining: the commencement of procedural delays, such as new trial, appeal, etc.; the computing of periods of prescription; and in the establishment of property rights in the judgment.
Although admittedly dicta, our brothers of the First Circuit reached this same conclusion in Davis v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 142 So.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1962). The judgment at issue was rendered before the adoption of our new Code of Civil Procedure, but the court there said: "Under present law as expressed in Article 1918 of the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment must be separate from the written reasons therefor."
It is our conclusion that to suppress the problems which arose under prior law, as mentioned above, LSA-C.C.P. 1918 now makes it mandatory that the written reasons for judgment "shall be set out in an opinion separate from-the judgment." Hence, the written reasons in this case cannot be considered as the final judgment. The result is that no final judgment has yet been rendered, read and signed in these proceedings. This appeal must therefore be dismissed.
For the reasons assigned, this appeal is dismissed without prejudice at the cost of plaintiff-appellant.
Appeal dismissed.
. LSA-C.C.P. Articles 2083, 1911; Manuel v. Employers Fire Insurance Company, et al., 136 So.2d 282 (3rd Cir. 1961)
. See Brawley v. Landreneau, 170 So.2d 673 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1964) for a similar holding.
. Comment, Rendition of Judgments, 21 La. Law Review 228; Hood, Judgments, 35 Tulane Law Review 578 at 583.