Case Name: BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1895-02-05
Citations: 65 F. 636
Docket Number: No. 87
Parties: BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO.
Judges: Before GOFF and SIMONTOTST, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 65
Pages: 636–642

Head Matter:
BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
February 5, 1895.)
No. 87.
Writ op Error — To What Judgment Lies.
B. brought a suit in equity against the C. Co. for partition of certain lands. The C. Co. answered, denying B.’s title, and the court stayed proceedings • in the partition suit, and gave leave to plaintiff to bring an action at law, which he did, in the ordinary form for the recovery of land, the C. Co. setting up in defense that B. was estopped to claim the land both by deed and by acts in pais. Upon the trial, before the same judge by whom the partition suit had been stayed, the question of estoppel by deed was reserved from the jury, and, in submitting the question of estoppel in pais, the judge stated that he could, as chancellor, have heard the evidence, and decided the whole controversy himself, but preferred to get the assistance of the jury. The jury found for the defendant, and judgment was entered upon the finding, to which exception was taken, and a writ of error allowed. The judge afterwards passed upon the issue of estoppel by deed in favor of the defendant, but no judgment was entered on that issue. Relé, that the proceedings were anomalous, but, treating them as an action at law, the judgment upon which the writ'of error was allowed was not final, since a decision upon both issues, of estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais, was necessary to a final decision of the action; and, if exception were taken to a judgment upon the former issue, as decided by the judge, the judgment upon the present writ would not end the case, and that, accordingly, such writ could not be entertained. Morris, District Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United, States for the Western District of North Carolina.
This was an action at law by J. Evans Brown and William B. Carter against the Cranberry Iron & Coal Company to recover an undivided interest in certain lands, brought pursuant to leave given in a partition suit between the same parties. One issue was decided by the court without a jury. 59 Fed. 434. Upon another issue, judgment was entered, on the verdict of a jury, in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs bring error.
This case is somewhat peculiar in its character. Certain persons, Hoke. Sumner, and Hutchinson, had become the owners of a tract of land in North Carolina; known as the “Cranberry Iron Ore Bank.” They offered it for sale in 1806 or 1867 to parties in New York. Before negotiations for the purchase were concluded, it was discovered that J. Evans Brown, one of the parties in this case, and A. C. Avery, as executor of Isaac T. Avery, claimed an interest in the minerals in the land. As the proposed purchasers were buying the land chiefly for the minerals in it, this claim induced them to break off negotiations. Thereupon Hoke, Sumner, and Hutchinson opened negotiations with Brown and Avery looking to the extinguishment of their claim, so that they cpuld renew their negotiations with the persons in New York, and offer to them a perfect title. The claim set up by Brown and Avery was this: That Brown and Avery’s testator had owned the minerals in this tract of land, as tenants in common; that, by his deed, the testator, Avery, had released to Brown all his interest in the minerals in that part of the tract of land lying to the east of a road or path running through the land in a general direction north and south, so that Brown owned an undivided half of all the minerals in the land on the west of that road or path, Avery owning the other undivided half, and Brown was sole owner of all the minerals to the east of that road or path. This deed was not on record at the time of the negotiation. There was on record a deed between Brown and Avery, the recital of which contained this information. The negotiations between Hoke and his associates and Brown and Avery, executor, ended in the conveyance by Avery, as executor, of an undivided half interest in the minerals in this kmd, and some weeks afterwards in the conveyance by Brown, through his attorneys in fact, of “the following tract of land, situate and being in the county of Mitchell, in the state of North Carolina; that is, the one-half of the mineral interest in said lands.” Then follows a full description of the lands by metes and bounds. Habendum: “The one-half of the mines and mineral interests in said lands and the appurtenances thereto belonging” to Sumner and Hoke in fee. The consideration paid to Avery, executor, was $17,000; that to Brown, $22,000. These deeds having been executed, the purchasers, thinking they had a clear, unincumbered title in fee, completed the sale to the parties in New York, and, hy mesne conveyance from the latter, the property has 'been conveyed to the defendant, the Cranberry Iron & Coal Company. This transaction between Brown and Avery, executor, with Hoke and his associates, was in 1867. The coal and iron company, having jrarcliased, went to great expense in developing the mineral resources of the property, erecting buildings, constructing a railroad, and sinking shafts. I}ut they have not actually mined, beyond a test or so, any of the land east of the road or path. They have been in actual use and cultivation of the whole surface. Some time preceding February, 1890 (the record does not state when), J. Evans Brown filed his bill in the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of North Carolina, against the Cranberry Iron & Goal Company, praying partition. He joined with him, as co-complainant, William B. Carter, to whom, some time after his deed to Hoke and nis associates, he had conveyed one-half of the interest, he now claims. His position is that his deed, by his attorney, conveyed only one-half of the Interest in the minerals; that he had owned all the minerals in that part of the land east of the road or path, and that still the other half interest in the minerals on this east side remained in him. His prayer is for partition of this mineral interest, — one-fourth to himself, one-fourtli to Carter, and one-half to the Cranberry Company. The answer o-f the Cranberry Company denied the title of the complainant The record does not disclose the exact character of this defense. The judge who presided in the circuit court in equity stayed proceedings in the cause, and gave leave to plaintiff to bring and prosecute an action at law within one year, to establish his title as tenant in common to the land of which he prayed partition, the defendant in its answer having asserted sole seisin. Compare Brown v. Coal Co., 40 Fed. 849. The action was brought in the form prescribed by the Code of North Carolina for the recovery of read property. The answer of the defendant interposed, as a first defense, a general denial of the plaintiff’s title, and, by way of a second defense, set up certain facts constituting, as was claimed, estoppel in pais and estoppel by deed, thus precluding the plaintiff from claiming title as against the defendant. The cause, being at issue, was tried before a jury and the same judge who had presided in the court of equity. At this trial all other issues seem to have been abandoned, and the only issue presented was that of estoppel, the onus having been east on the defendant. This aspect thus presented by the case is explained by the learned judge in his charge to the jury. The “suit has been brought, and the only question for you to determine at issue in this court is, is the plaintiff estopped from claiming title by deed, conduct, acts, or otherwise? As chancellor in the court of equity, I could settle the case myself, and I could have heard all the evidence and all the matitr myself, but I preferred to get the assistance of the jury on certain questions of fact, and I have called you in for that purpose.” The court reserved ils opinion upon the question, were the plaintiffs estopped by deed? and submitted to the jury the other question: “Are the plaintiffs estopped by their acts, declarations, or otherwise from claiming any interest in the mines and minerals in the land described in the complaint?” They answered this question, “Yes.” Judgment was entered on this finding. Exceptions having been, taken in due course, a writ of error was allowed, and the case is before us on the exceptions and assignments of error. After granting the writ, the judge passed upon the issue of law stated by him at the trial, and reserved by him, and held that the plaintiffs were estopped by the deed. No judgment has yet been entered on this issue. The sole question before us Is on the .writ of error.
Charles A. Moore, for plaintiffs in error.
Richard H. Battle, for defendant in error.
Before GOFF and SIMONTOTST, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, District Judge.

Opinion:
SIMOFTON, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts). It Is not easy to determine what this proceeding at law was. It began an action at law, growing out of a proceeding in equity brought under, the direction and with the permission of the chancellor. The complainants claimed to be cotenants in certain mines and minerals with the defendant, and sought partition. The defendant denied their title, and set up sole seisin. This "was not a mere point of law or fact incidentally in dispute, but a general question of right, determinable as such by a law court, and requiring a decision, according to the course of that court, both of disputed facts and the law applicable thereto." The proper course, therefore, was to direct an action at law to be brought to determine the title. Adams, Eq. (7th Ed.) 378. And this is the constant practice of courts of equity in suits for partition when the title is in dispute. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1386, and note 3. But, when the case came before the law court, every other question was eliminated, and the only issue was this of estoppel, in pais as well as by deed, — an issue within the domain of equity jurisprudence, and cognizable by such a court Pom. Eq. Jur. § 802. When this issue was submitted to the jury, it was with the purpose of aiding the chancellor in coming to his conclusion, submitted in his discretion, and not as a matter of right. This he himself distinctly asserted in his charge. It is not excepted to. In this respect the proceeding assumed the form of an issue for a jury. Such an issue is directed when an incidental question of fact is so involved in doubt, by conflicting or insufficient evidence, that the court considering the inefficacy of written evidence is desirous of referring it to the verdict of a jury. Adams, Eq. (7th Ed.) 375. If this be an issue out of chancery, the finding of the jury and the judgment enteréd thereon are not reversible on bills of exception and writ of error here. The error, if any exist, must be removed, and corrected in the court ordering the issue. Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U. S. 372; Watt v. Starke, 101 U. S. 250; Brockett v. Brockett, 3 How. 691; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. (3d Am. Ed.) 1106; Wilson v. Riddle, 123 U. S. 615, 8 Sup. Ct. 255. If, however, it be an action at law, brought under the direction and by leave of the court, then the court of equity does not assume to interfere with the course of proceedings in the court of law, and all errors made at the trial must be corrected in that court or by writ of error to the appellate court Watt v. Stark, 101 U. S., at page 250; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 500; Adams, Eq. (7th Ed.) p. 378; Smith, Ch., Prac. 90. Treating this record as an action at law, reviewed on writ of error, the result of which must be conclusive of the issues presented, the first inquiry is, is it ripe for a hearing in this court? As an action at law, it must be governed by the course of proceeding in a court of law. This case, as presented in the court below, involved two issues, — one determinable by the court alone; the other submitted to the jury. One issue was: "Did the deed of Brown estop him and his privy from denying the title of defendant?" The other issue was: "Are the plaintiffs estopped by their acts, declarations, or otherwise from claiming any interest in the mines and minerals in the land described in the complaint?" Each issue was independent of the other. The decision of both was absolutely necessary to a final- decision of the action. The jury found the issue of fact in favor of defendant. That issue is here. The judge has ruled upon the other issue also in favor of defendant That ruling is not here. If it be not excepted to, it ends the action. If exception be taken hereafter, then our conclusions upon this writ of error will not end the case. In other words, it is not here on a final judgment; and cannot in this record be disposed of. Let the case be remanded to the circuit court for such proceedings as may be necessary, each party to pay the costs by them or it incurred in this court.