Case Name: Richard DICKINSON, III v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2008-01-10
Citations: 372 Ark. 62
Docket Number: 07-355
Parties: Richard DICKINSON, III v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Brown and Imber, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 372
Pages: 62–71

Head Matter:
Richard DICKINSON, III v. STATE of Arkansas
07-355
270 S.W.3d 863
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 10, 2008
Gary W. Potts, for appellant.
No response.

Opinion:
Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
The instant case is a no-merit appeal from a temporary civil-commitment order filed by counsel for Appellant Richard Dickinson, III, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The appeal was certified to this court by the Arkansas Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the Anders procedure is applicable in the context of a civil-commitment order; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l) and (5). Because we hold that the order committing Dickinson for seven days is moot, we dismiss the instant appeal.
On January 8, 2007, Gloria Dickinson, Dickinson's mother, filed a petition in circuit court, alleging that her son was addicted to drugs and needed to be committed to a treatment facility. According to the petition, Dickinson believed people were trying to kill him, had a gun in his possession, and had checked himself into jail. The petition further stated that Dickinson admitted to his mother that he used crystal methamphetamine. Following a preliminary hearing, an order for immediate detention for seventy-two hours was issued, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-210 (Repl. 2001).
In accordance with the procedures set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-209 (Repl. 2001), a seven-day commitment hearing was held on January 11, 2007. Gloria testified at the hearing that her son was paranoid and felt that there were people trying to kill him. Fie also believed that there were people in his attic who were putting poison in his vent. As a result, Dickinson covered his vent with duct tape. At one point, he also believed that people put a bomb in his room, so he tore apart his room's sheetrock. Gloria also testified that she came home to find Dickinson on the roof with a gun and that after he came down from the roof, he went into the backyard to find the "killers." Finally, Gloria stated that her son was hospitalized for mental problems in 1985 and was subsequently diagnosed with a drug-induced psychosis.
Dana Williams, a therapist with Delta Counseling, testified that she evaluated Dickinson during his temporary detention to determine whether he had a mental illness. According to Williams, Dickinson exhibited signs of paranoia, showing her a list of people who were after him, referring to the Da Vinci Code and the end of the world, and stating that he was selling marijuana to the sheriff for money to help his family. After determining there was psychosis present, Williams diagnosed Dickinson as suffering from a psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. She also recommended that he be hospitalized for a period of seven days so that he could be evaluated to determine whether he needed treatment. A copy of Williams's report was introduced into evidence at the hearing.
Dickinson also testified at the hearing, stating that he did believe people were out to get him and that he heard people in his attic. He also stated that he believed himself to be Jesus Christ and offered into evidence, over the objection of his counsel, several pages of handwritten documents he claimed proved him to be Jesus.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench that Dickinson was very paranoid and further evaluation was necessary. The circuit court subsequently entered a written order, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-207 (Supp. 2005), finding that there was probable cause to believe that Dickinson suffered from a mental illness, disease, or disorder that caused him to pose a clear and present danger to himself or others. The order further provided that Dickinson was to be involuntarily admitted to the Arkansas State Hospital or other appropriate facility for a period of seven days so that an evaluation could be performed to determine whether treatment for a mental illness was appropriate.
Counsel for Dickinson filed a notice of appeal from the January 11 commitment order on January 29, 2007. He then simultaneously filed a motion seeking to be relieved as counsel for Dickinson and a no-merit brief, utilizing the Anders procedures promulgated by this court in Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(j) for the withdrawal of counsel "for a defendant in a criminal or a juvenile delinquency case." Dickinson was given thirty days to file a pro se response to the no-merit brief but failed to do so. The State then submitted a letter to this court's clerk indicating that it would not file a responsive brief, because there was no pleading to which it could respond. The State also called into question counsel's authority to apply the Anders procedures to an appeal from a civil-commitment order.
As previously stated, we accepted certification of this case in order to determine whether the Anders procedures are applicable in this case. As a threshold matter, however, we must first determine whether the appeal that is before us is moot. As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot. Kinchen v. Wilkins, 367 Ark. 71, 238 S.W.3d 94 (2006). To do so would be to render advisory opinions and this we will not do. Id. A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007). In other words, a moot case presents no justiciable issue for determination by the court. Id.; Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995). Furthermore, this court has held that courts do not sit for the purpose of determining speculative and abstract questions of law or laying down rules for future conduct. Tsann Kuen Enters. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).
This court has recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, one of which involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. See, e.g., Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark. 130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001). The other mootness exception concerns issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. Id. We hold that the instant appeal does not fall within either of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
First, the issue presented here is whether the circuit court erred in entering the seven-day involuntary commitment order. This is not an issue that is capable of repetition yet evading review. Here, we have a notice of appeal from a seven-day commitment order filed after the court held a forty-five day hearing and committed Dickinson for treatment. There was no appeal of the subsequent forty-five day commitment order, and the forty-five days in which Dickinson was to be treated have passed. Moreover, the temporary order committing Dickinson for seventy-two hours was also never appealed. Based on the record before us, no further action was taken by the circuit court after the passage of those forty-five days. Under these facts, we cannot say that this case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Second, while the issue of whether Anders procedures should be utilized in appeals from commitment orders may at some point raise considerations of substantial public interest, the posture of the present appeal does not lend itself to such a conclusion. Even if we assume that counsel filed the no-merit brief from the seven-day order because his client instructed him to appeal that order, Dickinson never filed any response to the no-merit brief, even though he was given thirty days in which to file a pro se brief. Because no pro se brief was ever filed, the State had no pleading to which it could respond. Thus, the procedural posture of this case is that counsel for Dickinson has assumed that Anders applies and seeks to be relieved on the basis that his client has no meritorious basis for an appeal. As a result, the issue of whether the Anders procedures should be extended to situations involving appeals from civil-commitment orders has not been properly addressed to this court by any party. Thus, the case as it is now before us does not present an issue of substantial public interest.
Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal as moot. The motion to be relieved as counsel is also moot.
Appeal dismissed.
Brown and Imber, JJ., dissent.
No appeal was taken from this order.
Prior to counsel's filing of the notice of appeal, the circuit court held a hearing on January 17, 2007, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-214 (Repl. 2001), to determine whether Dickinson needed to be held for an additional period of forty-five days for purposes of treatment. A written order involuntarily admitting Dickinson to an appropriate treatment facility was filed of record on February 5,2007. No notice of appeal was ever filed from the February 5 order.
Additionally troubling is the fact that there is no order in the record before us finding Dickinson indigent or appointing counsel to represent him. The only indication that counsel was in fact appointed and not retained is counsel's statement in his motion to be relieved as counsel that he was appointed to represent Dickinson at the seven-day commitment hearing.
Even though this court accepted certification of this case on the issue of whether the Anders procedures should be extended to appeals from civil-commitment orders, we are precluded from addressing that specific issue on appeal. It is a well-setded principle of appellate law that this court will not consider an argument unless it has been properly developed. Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181 (2004). Likewise, we do not make a party's argument for him or her. Id. In the instant case, no party raises the issue of whether the Anders procedure is applicable to this appeal. Moreover, we do not have the benefit of a brief from the State addressing such an issue.