Case Name: THE PEOPLE EX REL. JOSEPH SCHARFF v. JESSE D. FROST
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-30
Citations: 24 N.Y. Crim. 195
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE EX REL. JOSEPH SCHARFF v. JESSE D. FROST.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 195–202

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT—APP. DIV.—FIRST DEPT.
Dec. 30, 1909.
THE PEOPLE EX REL. JOSEPH SCHARFF v. JESSE D. FROST.
(135 App. Div. 473.)
(1) . Jurisdiction—Habeas Corpus.
It seems, that the jurisdiction of the Court of General- Sessions to impose a sentence may be tested by writ of habeas corpus.
(2) . Same—Seduction.
One who has plead guilty to a charge of seduction under promise of marriage and has been convicted with sentence suspended may thereafter be sentenced, although after the plea of guilty he married the complaining witness.
(3) . Same—Penal Law, Section 2176.
Section 2176 of the Penal Law, providing that the subsequent intermarriage of parties before the finding of an indictment for seduction under promise of marriage is a bar to a prosecution, applies only where the marriage takes place before arraignment and conviction.
Clarke and Houghton, JJ., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the relator, Joseph Scharff, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 12th day of April, 1909.
Charles Goldzier (Samuel 8, Koenig, attorney), for the appellant.
Robert 8. Johnstone (William Travers Jerome, District Attorney), for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus sued out to test the validity of a sentence imposed upon the relator. The question is whether or not the Court of General Sessions had jurisdiction under the circumstances to impose sentence, or whether it had been bereft of jurisdiction by reason of the facts hereinafter related. We are disposed to think that this question can properly be raised by a writ of habeas corpus, and as the learned district attorney makes no objection to this procedure, we shall proceed to treat the question as properly before us.
The relator on April 24, 1908, pleaded guilty in the Court of General Sessions to an indictment charging him with the crime of having seduced, under promise of marriage, one Elsie Frankel. Between said date and May 6, 1908, he married the complainant, with the knowledge of the court, which, on May 6, 1908, suspended sentence upon him. Thereafter he and his wife lived together, and on February 17, 1909, for reasons not disclosed by the record, the suspension of sentence was revoked, and the relator was sentenced to imprisonment.
He now claims that, by reason of his marriage to the complaining witness, he became immune from punishment, and that the court was without legal power or jurisdiction to pass sentence upon him. The prosecution was conducted under the Penal Code, the sections of which relating to the crime of seduction under promise of marriage read as follows: " A person who, under promise of marriage, seduces and has sexual intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both." (Penal Code, § 284; Penal Law, § 2175.)
" The subsequent intermarriage of the parties, or the lapse of two years after the commission of the offense before the finding of an indictment, is a bar to a prosecution for a violation of the last section." (Penal Code, § 285; Penal Law, § 2176.)
"No conviction can be had for the offense specified in section two hundred and eighty-four, upon the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence." Penal Code, § 286; Penal Law, § 2177.)
These sections are founded upon and are a substantial reenactment of chapter 111 of the Laws of 1848, which read as follows: " Any man who shall, under promise of marriage, seduce and have illicit connexion with any unmarried female of previous chaste character, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in a State prison not exceeding five years, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year; provided that no conviction shall be had under the .provisions of this act, on the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence, nor unless indictment shall be found within two years after the commission of the offence; and, provided further, that the subsequent marriage of the parties may be plead in bar of a conviction."
It is to be noted that the act of 1848 expressly provided that the subsequent marriage might be pleaded in bar of a conviction, and while, under our simplified criminal procedure, special pleas have generally been abolished, yet the interposition of the fact of marriage as a reason why the prosecution should not proceed partakes of the nature of a special plea in bar. " By a plea in bar the defendant shows, by matter extrinsic of the record, that the indictment is not maintainable." (1 Stark. Cr. Pl. 316; 1 Colby Cr. L. 276.)
Under the former practice a plea in bar could be interposed, as matter of right, only when the accused was arraigned and before he had plead " not guilty." After that he might withdraw his plea and plead in bar only by leave of the court. (People v. Allen, 43 N. Y. 28.) Regarding the plea of subsequent marriage as analogous to a plea in bar under the former practice, it would seem that the fact upon which the special plea is founded must be one which exists before arraignment, and certainly before conviction. The subsequent marriage of a seducer with his victim is accepted by the law, for reasons of public policy, as, a condonation of the crime against the People, to the extent that a prosecution therefor will not be pressed. It seems to be reasonably clear that to have this effect the marriage must take place before the prosecution has been proceeded with to conviction. If it takes place after, it may properly be considered by the court with reference to the suspension of sentence, or by the Executive with reference to a pardon, but cannot, in any proper sense, be said to bar a prosecution which has already ripened into conviction. It may be that it would be to the advantage of betrayed women and their offspring that immunity should follow upon marriage, even if contracted after sentence, but that is a matter for legislation and not for judicial construction. The language of the statute is even open to the construction that in order to bar a prosecution the marriage must take place before the indictment, just as the lapse of time after the commission of the crime, which also bars a prosecution, must have been completed before indictment. Our conclusion is that the Court of General Sessions had jurisdiction to impose sentence upon the relator. Consequently, the order dismissing the writ is affirmed and the relator remanded to custody.
Ingraham and Laughlin, JJ., concurred; Clarke and Houghton, JJ., dissented.