Case Name: Ronneld JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-08-15
Citations: 899 F.3d 1052
Docket Number: No. 15-56007
Parties: Ronneld JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Berzon
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 899
Pages: 1052–1063

Head Matter:
Ronneld JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15-56007
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2018-Pasadena, California
Filed August 15, 2018
Michael T. Drake (argued), Research and Writing Attorney; Hilary L. Potashner, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Charles Shang-Rei Lee (argued) and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General; Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges, and John A. Woodcock, Jr. , District Judge.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Berzon
The Honorable John A. Woodcock, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of Maine, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
WOODCOCK, District Judge:
Ronneld Johnson, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his sentencing enhancement for a prior nonjury juvenile conviction and his sentencing enhancement for a gang-related crime. Johnson argues that the evidence supporting the gang enhancement was constitutionally insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and he argues that the enhancement for his nonjury juvenile conviction violates Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Because the evidence was sufficient to establish that the robbery was "for the benefit of" a gang, and because the juvenile conviction claim was procedurally barred and sentencing enhancements based on nonjury juvenile convictions do not violate any clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, we affirm.
I
Background
A. The Robbery
At roughly 9:00 AM on November 9, 2011, Ronneld Johnson and Jonathan King twice drove by a house in the area of 111th and Anzac or Grape Streets in Southeast Los Angeles. Two men were doing landscaping work at the house. Johnson and King then pulled into an alley next to the house, exited the car, and approached the other men. Johnson pointed a semiautomatic gun at the faces of the victims, first at one, and then he hopped a small fence to point the gun at the other. Johnson and King took their money, a cell phone, and a gold chain. During the robbery, either Johnson or King said, "Hurry up cuz," which was either directed at the other defendant or at one of the victims. Johnson and King then got back in the car and left.
In December 2011, the State charged both Johnson and King with two counts of robbery each, including gang and gun enhancement allegations. In March 2012, a jury convicted Johnson and King and found the gang and gun enhancements to be true.
B. The Gang Evidence
The prosecution called an expert witness, Officer Jose Carias, to testify about the nature of criminal street gangs. For example, Officer Carias explained that gang members sometimes commit crimes so that other members will "respect" them, and he testified that gangs often encourage or require their members to "put in work"-meaning commit crimes-in order to ensure the gang is respected and feared by others in the community, elevating the status of the gang and discouraging witnesses from reporting information to the police. He said that "cuz" is a term typically used by Crip gangs, and is not a term typically used by members of other gangs, like Bloods or Hispanic gangs. He also testified that it is not uncommon for members of different gangs to commit crimes together after forming ties through family, school, or juvenile detention.
King was an admitted member of a gang, the Project Watts Crips. He had numerous tattoos indicating membership in that gang, including some on his face and hands. Johnson had self-identified as a member of the 58th Street Neighborhood Crips in 2006, but the tattoos on his body, including his hands, suggest he was a member of a different gang, the East Coast Crips. Robbery is one of the primary activities of the Project Watts Crips. The robbery occurred within the area the Project Watts Crips claims as its territory.
The territory of the East Coast Crips is roughly four or five miles away.
After a lengthy hypothetical scenario corresponding to the facts of Johnson and King's case, the gang expert opined that the individuals "committed a crime together in concert and thus in association with another gang member," and he concluded that the crime primarily benefited the Project Watts Crips. The expert relied on the following factors: that both perpetrators were members of gangs, they committed the crime within Project Watts Crips territory, they used the word "cuz," they drove by the victims multiple times indicating a level of sophistication, they seemed comfortable because they took the time to jump a fence and rob a second person, and the crime occurred in broad daylight, without any attempt to hide their identities.
C. The Post-Trial Proceedings
On April 4, 2012, the trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of imprisonment of twenty-eight years, eight months. The sentence was based on the robbery, the gang and gun enhancements, and a prior strike from a juvenile conviction, all to run consecutively. The sentencing court also found Johnson in violation of probation in another case, and sentenced him to an additional consecutive 16-month term of imprisonment.
On October 4, 2012, Johnson filed a direct appeal. The California Court of Appeal denied his appeal on May 15, 2013. Johnson sought review from the California Supreme Court, but it denied review without substantive comment on July 24, 2013.
On January 6, 2014, Johnson filed a state habeas petition. The California Court of Appeal denied the petition on January 23, 2014. On February 18, 2014, Johnson filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. It denied Johnson's petition on May 14, 2014.
On June 20, 2014, Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court denied Johnson's habeas petition on June 8, 2015.
II
The Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Gang Enhancement
A. The Standard of Review
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" or "increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury" and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Under Jackson , a due process claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence "can only succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Emery v. Clark , 643 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2011). "When assessing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we thus 'look to [state] law only to establish the elements of [the crime] and then turn to the federal question of whether the [state] court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that sufficient evidence supported [its decision].' " Boyer v. Belleque , 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Juan H. v. Allen , 408 F.3d 1262, 1278 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005) ). In addition to Jackson 's already deferential standard, a second level of deference applies under AEDPA. For the petitioner to prevail, we must conclude that the state court's determination that a rational jury could have found each required element proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not just wrong but was objectively unreasonable. Boyer , 659 F.3d at 964-65.
B. The California Gang Enhancement
California's gang enhancement applies to "any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members." Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). The first prong requires that the crime be related to a gang, and the second prong that the defendant specifically intend to assist a gang member's crime. See People v. Albillar , 51 Cal.4th 47, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062, 1070 (2010). Johnson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the specific intent prong. Rather, he challenges the California appellate court's conclusions that there was sufficient evidence that the robbery he committed with King was "in association with" and "for the benefit of" a gang. "Because the first prong is worded in the disjunctive, [the] gang enhancement may be imposed" based on either gang association or benefit. People v. Weddington , 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 799, 813 (2016).
1. It was objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "in association with" a gang.
"Committing a crime in concert with known gang members can be substantial evidence that the crime was committed in 'association' with a gang." People v. Garcia , 244 Cal.App.4th 1349, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 399, 413 (2016). A crime is committed "in association with" the gang if the "defendants relied on their common gang membership and the apparatus of the gang" when they committed the crime. Id. at 414 (quoting Albillar , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d at 1071 ). In Albillar , the California Supreme Court focused on the act of "committing a crime with fellow gang members. ." 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d at 1072. Albillar teaches that it is not sufficient to simply commit any act in concert with a gang member, rather it is acting in concert with individuals of "common gang membership" that satisfies the "in association with" element of the gang enhancement. Id.
The California Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the gang enhancement based on the "in association with" component because Johnson and King were both gang members, coupled with "the manner in which the robberies were committed, which indicated appellants acted in concert." The court also pointed to the expert's testimony that "gang members' personal ties spill over into street crime." The court's conclusions were unreasonable because Johnson and King did not act "in concert" with "fellow" or "common" gang members. Johnson and King were members of different gangs, with different enrollment and territories.
It is also not enough to say that Johnson and King were both Crips. Under California law, the prosecution cannot group distinct gangs or sets within a larger criminal outfit unless there is "some associational or organizational connection uniting those subsets." People v. Prunty , 62 Cal.4th 59, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480, 486 (2015) ; see also People v. Franklin , 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, 886 (2016) (labeling the State's attempt to group distinct gangs together a "bait-and-switch" and concluding there was insufficient evidence of "association" when the Defendant, a member of the Jim Town gang, committed a crime "with the assistance of three friends who were members of other gangs, not the Jim Town gang.").
Nevertheless, any error regarding gang "association" was harmless because the California Court of Appeal's alternate conclusion-that there was sufficient evidence the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" a gang-was not objectively unreasonable. See infra.
2. It was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" a gang.
Under California law, "[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was 'committed for the benefit of . a [ ] criminal street gang' within the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1)." Albillar , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d at 1073. "[T]he typical close case is one in which one gang member, acting alone, commits a crime." People v. Leon , 161 Cal.App.4th 149, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 796 (2008) (quoting People v. Morales , 112 Cal.App.4th 1176, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 632 (2003) ).
As in many cases, the gang expert here testified that violent crimes benefit a gang by increasing the intimidation in the community, lowering reporting rates among witnesses, and allowing the criminal enterprise to continue free from police restraint. The gang expert also opined that such crimes bestow "respect" on the individual and elevate the status of the gang. Even so, the testimony of a gang expert, without more, "is insufficient to find an offense gang related." People v. Ochoa , 179 Cal.App.4th 650, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 114 (2009). "[T]he record must provide some evidentiary support, other than merely the defendant's record of prior offenses and past gang activities or personal affiliations, for a finding that the crime was committed for the benefit of . a criminal street gang." Id. (quoting People v. Martinez , 116 Cal.App.4th 753, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 751, 757 (2004) ).
Here, there was sufficient evidence to establish the following facts supporting the gang enhancement and the expert's testimony: (1) the robbery was a violent crime, committed with a gun pointed directly into the face of a victim, (2) the robbery occurred within the territory of the Project Watts Crips, (3) robbery is one of the primary activities of the Project Watts Crips, (4) the robbery occurred in broad daylight, (5) the robbery was brazen because it involved multiple victims and occurred at a time of the day, roughly 9:00 a.m., when neighbors were most likely to observe the crime; (6) King had numerous tattoos, including some visible on his face and hands, indicating membership in the Project Watts Crips, (7) during the robbery, either Johnson or King used the term "cuz," a term used by members of Crips gangs, and (8) the victims were ordinary members of the public with no personal relationship with the defendants or gangs.
Even though Johnson and King never explicitly mentioned King's gang or flashed gang signs, it was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that a rational jury could find this cumulative evidence sufficient to show the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" King's gang. The outward manifestations of gang involvement-King's visible tattoos, the use of gang-affiliated lingo, the brazen daylight timing, and the apparent comfort with being observed-were sufficient for a jury to infer that the crime was meant to send a message to the public about gang brutality and control. Those outward signs also pointed to the Project Watts Crips specifically-King's visible tattoos indicated membership in that gang, the lingo was associated with Crips gangs, the crime occurred in that gang's territory, and robberies are one of that gang's primary criminal activities.
A California appellate court considered Johnson's arguments that the robbery was not "for the benefit of" King's gang and concluded the underlying facts were sufficient to support the expert testimony and establish gang benefit under California law. Johnson does not dispute whether the evidence was sufficient under Jackson to establish the key facts, rather, he questions whether those uncontested facts are legally sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this California law. That is a question about what state law requires, on which the state court has spoken. Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 63, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."). The state court decision was not objectively unreasonable.
III
The Prior Nonjury Juvenile Adjudication
Apprendi held that any fact used to increase the maximum penalty for a crime, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction," must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The California Supreme Court interprets Apprendi 's exception for prior convictions to cover nonjury juvenile adjudications. People v. Nguyen , 46 Cal.4th 1007, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 209 P.3d 946, 953 (2009). This court reached the opposite conclusion. United States v. Tighe , 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). But our interpretation of Apprendi "does not represent clearly established federal law 'as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' " as required to overturn a state court decision regarding a federal claim under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Boyd v. Newland , 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ).
The California Supreme Court denied Johnson's Apprendi claim in his habeas petition as procedurally barred, citing In re Dixon , 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d 513, 514 (1953). In California, "[t]he general rule is that . the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction." Id. The United States Supreme Court held that California's Dixon rule is an adequate state ground to bar federal habeas review of a petitioner's claim. Johnson v. Lee , - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1802, 1804, 195 L.Ed.2d 92 (2016) (per curiam).
Johnson contends that the California Supreme Court misapplied its own procedural rule because his Apprendi claim falls within a recognized exception to Dixon . Although we examine the application of state rules that bar review of federal claims, Cone v. Bell , 556 U.S. 449, 468-69, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009), "it is unusual to reject a state court's use of a procedural bar on the ground that it was erroneously applied." Sivak v. Hardison , 658 F.3d 898, 907 (9th Cir. 2011) ; accord Lopez v. Schriro , 491 F.3d 1029, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007). Even assuming that the California Supreme Court should have decided that the Apprendi claim fell within an exception to the Dixon bar, Johnson would not have been entitled to a reduced sentence because the California Supreme Court would have applied Nguyen and reasonably upheld the sentencing enhancement based on Johnson's juvenile conviction.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the district court is AFFIRMED.
We note that this decision was not incompatible with other California caselaw. Habeas relief may lie when a misapplication of state law is weighty enough to rise to the level of a due process violation. See Estelle , 502 U.S. at 71-73, 112 S.Ct. 475. When we "look to [state] law . to establish the elements of [the crime]," Boyer , 659 F.3d at 965, that includes prior state cases because, were a state court to misapply the elements or reinterpret the elements in a wildly inconsistent manner, recasting sufficiency of the evidence questions as matters of state law interpretation, it would doubtless transgress Jackson and due process. But this was far from such a case.
The state court's decision was not objectively unreasonable because even if it involved a slightly novel application of the gang enhancement elements, that interpretation was in harmony with prior California precedent, not so discordant as to undermine the fundamental federal right to proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the prior caselaw prohibited application of the enhancement when the defendant was not a member of the gang that the crime was committed to benefit. See Garcia , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d at 414-16 ; Morales , 5 Cal.Rptr.3d at 632. Those California cases reversing the enhancement are distinguishable. See e.g. , People v. Rios , 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 687, 712-14 (2013) (nonviolent possession crime); Ochoa , 102 Cal.Rptr.3d at 111, 117-18 (at night, outside gang territory, no observable signs of gang affiliation); People v. Ramirez , 244 Cal.App.4th 800, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 318, 322-23 (2016) (personal dispute between neighbors); Franklin , 203 Cal.Rptr.3d at 880-82 (prior romantic relationship with victim); People v. Perez , 18 Cal.App.5th 598, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 820, 826-27 (2017) (outside gang territory, no observable signs of gang affiliation).
Johnson does not attempt to demonstrate cause and prejudice for the procedural default.