Case Name: FINE LAKE IRON CO. v. LA FAYETTE CAR WORKS, (ADAMS, Intervener.)
Court: United States Circuit Court for the District of Indiana
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1893-01-11
Citations: 53 F. 853
Docket Number: No. 8,677
Parties: FINE LAKE IRON CO. v. LA FAYETTE CAR WORKS, (ADAMS, Intervener.)
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 53
Pages: 853–854

Head Matter:
FINE LAKE IRON CO. v. LA FAYETTE CAR WORKS, (ADAMS, Intervener.)
(Circuit Court, D. Indiana.
January 11, 1893.)
No. 8,677.
1. Receivers — Allowance of Cdaims — Jtjdgments in Pending Actions.
A suit commenced before the appointment of a receiver of tlio ‘debtor's property, upon a claim afterwards filed, within the time limited, against the receiver, may be prosecuted to judgment, which, when rendered, establishes as against tbe receiver the amount of the claim.
2. Same — Election of Remedies.
Where a receiver knows of tlio pendency of a suit on a claim which is afterwards filed against him, a failure to refer to the pending suit at the time of filing the claim does not cause a waiver of the right to prosecute the action, or constitute an election of remedies.
8. Same-Costs.
In such case, however, the receiver should not be charged with the costs both of the suit and of the investigation before the master, and the creditor should only be allowed the amount of his judgment, exclusive of costs.
Petition of intervention by B. P. Adams in the suit of the Pine Lake Iron Company against the La Payette Oar Works for the purpose of establishing a claim against the receiver.
Decree for intervener.
Stanton & Scott and J. L. McMaster, for petitioner.
Stuart Bros., for receiver.
A. C. Harris, for general creditors.

Opinion:
WOODS, Circuit Judge.
When the receiver was appointed the intervener had a suit pending in one of the courts of Hew York for the same demand that is in question here. In pursuance of the notice requiring that claims against the receiver be filed here within a time limited, the intervener presented the claim here, saying nothing of the suit in Hew York, and it was referred to the master for proof. Having obtained judgment in the Hew York court, the intervener obtained leave of the master, subject to exceptions, to amend his state-' ment of the claim so as to show the recovery of the judgment, and, having put in evidence a transcript of the judgment, claimed that it was conclusive evidence of the amount of his claim. The master held that it was neither conclusive nor prima facie evidence, and upon the merits reported against the petitioner.
The authorities cited on the subject recognize the right of one who has commenced a suit before the appointment of a receiver of the debtor's property to prosecute tbe action to judgment, and that a judgment so obtained establishes, as against the receiver, the rightful amount of the demand. Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 502; Gluck & B. Rec. pp. 26, 27, and cases cited.
It is insisted, however, that by filing his claim here, without referring to the pending suit, and reserving the right to prosecute it, the petitioner made an election of remedies, and lost his right to proceed with the suit. I do not think the doctrine of election fairly applicable. A. time having been fixed by order of this court within which claims should be filed, the intervener could not omit presenting his demand without great risk of losing it. He could not present the judgment, because that had not been rendered. He might, of course, have made reference to the suit; but his failure to do so, in view of the admitted fact that the receiver and his counsel had knowledge of the pendency of the suit, was not a waiver of the right to prosecute the action. I do not think, however, that the receivership should be charged with the costs of both investigations, and therefore allow the petitioner the amount of his judgment, exclusive of costs, — that is to say, the sum of $7,000.56, — with interest from the date of the judgment. Decree accordingly.