Case Name: William Charles HALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-11-15
Citations: 834 So. 2d 254
Docket Number: No. 2D00-604
Parties: William Charles HALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COVINGTON, J, Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 834
Pages: 254–257

Head Matter:
William Charles HALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D00-604.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Nov. 15, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 2003.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
GREEN, Judge.
In this civil commitment action instituted pursuant to the Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act, more commonly known as the Jimmy Ryce Act, sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statutes (1999), the appellant, William Charles Hale, appeals the trial court's final judgment and order declaring him to be a sexually violent predator and committing him indefinitely to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services. Based on the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93 (Fla.2002), we affirm.
Hale raises several points on appeal, only two of which merit discussion. Hale contends that the instruction given by the trial judge in this case was wrong when given and is now determined to be insufficient by the majority ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). In Crane, the Court held there must be a finding that the subject has serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior. Id. at 870.
The trial judge gave, in,pertinent part,, the following instruction:
To prove the Respondent, William Charles Hale, is a sexually violent predator, the State must prove each of the following three elements by clear and, convincing evidence:
1. William Charles Hale has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.
2. William Charles Hale suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder.
3. The mental abnormality or personality disorder makes William Charles Hale likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care[,] and treatment.
A "mental abnormality" means mental condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.
"Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" means a person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.
Mr. Hale requested the following instruction, which was refused:
To prove its case, the State must prove each of the following three elements by clear and convincing evidence: .
• (b) William Charles Hale suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder ' that makes it difficult!,] if not impossible, for him to control his dangerous behavior arid,
We determine that the instruction given was adequate. In effect, the jury in the instant case was instructed that it must consider Mr. Hale's "emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes" him to commit sexually violent offenses. In rejecting a similar argument by Westerheide, the supreme court held: "[W]e do not find that Crane requires a specific jury instruction, but rather that there must be proof of 'serious, difficulty in controlling behavior' in order to civilly commit an individual as a sexually violent predator." Westerheide, 831 So.2d at 107.
In Crane, the Supreme Court explained that when-it approved Kansas's sexually violent predator act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521, U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), it did not give "lack of control" a -particularly narrow or technical meaning because inability to control behavior is not demonstrable with mathematical precision. Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 870. The Court further explained that the Constitution's liberty safeguards in the area of mental illness are not best enforced through bright-line rules.- The Court in Crane also-noted that states retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities'and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment.
Despite this reasoning, in Crane the Court held there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. The instruction given in this case encompassed the requirements for civil commitment and contained the definitions for mental abnormality or personality disorder and likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. We conclude the jury was adequately instructed with respect to Hale's volitional capacity to control his behavior.
We also disagree with Hale's claim that the Act violates the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the Florida and federal Constitutions. See Westerheide.
Affirmed.
COVINGTON, J, Concurs.
BLUE, C.J., Concurs specially with opinion.