Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Grayle, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1971-10-05
Citations: 2 Ill. App. 3d 4
Docket Number: No. 54491
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Grayle, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 2
Pages: 4–6

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Grayle, Defendant-Appellant.
(No. 54491,
First District
— October 5, 1971.
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, of Chicago, (Ronald P. Katz and James J. Doherty, of Defender Project, of counsel,) for appeHant.
Edward V. Hanrahan, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Martin Moltz, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS
delivered the opinion of the court:
After a bench trial defendant was convicted of arson and criminal damage to property and sentenced to serve 10 to 20 years. He appeals contending that the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence and that the sentence is excessive.
Defendant was engaged to be married to Dorothy Gayden who lived with her three children at 3814 South Indiana, Chicago, Illinois. On March 15, 1969, at 2:30 A.M. she received a phone call from defendant. He told her that he was on his way home. Within fifteen minutes he appeared at her apartment and said that he wished to speak to her. She became alarmed and would not remove the chain from the door. She spoke to him through the partially opened door. He accused her of behaving as though he were a dog or a criminal. She then closed and locked the door and did not open it, in spite of defendant's pleas and exhortations. Defendant departed, but within five minutes telephoned and told her that she was nasty and that he was also going to become nasty. He advised her to call the police, because he was going to return to her apartment. She cautioned him not to do so and he terminated the conversation. She awakened her children and hid them in a closet. Shortly thereafter there was a knock at the door and her niece went to respond. They both recognized defendant's voice. He demanded that the door be opened, but the niece told him she was afraid that he would injure her aunt. Within three minutes or so after they last heard defendant speak they observed and smelled gasoline flowing under the door into the apartment. The gasoline flowed about five or ten feet into the apartment. There was a booming sound and the gasoline ignited. Dorothy, her niece and the children fled the apartment. Dorothy furnished the police with defendant's name, description and address. The fire damaged the entire front room and a two foot hole was burned through the kitchen floor.
Defendant related that he visited Dorothy Gayden at 7:30 P.M., March 14, 1969 to pick up some of his clothing. He had been living with her up to that time. He did not have a fight with her, but picked up his clothing and never returned to the apartment. He denied telephoning or visiting her as related by Dorothy Gayden and her niece. Defendant testified to an alibi that placed him in a tavern one block from the apartment between the hours of 8:00 P.M., March 14, to 4:30 A.M., March 15. He denied setting the fire. He was apprehended in an apartment at 2744 South Wentworth, where he was discovered hiding in a clothes closet behind some garments. Defendant testified that he was not found in the clothes closet, but that he was out in the room when the police made their arrest.
Defendant argues that he presented an alibi which placed him at a tavern at the time of the arson and that no one saw him pour the gasoline and ignite it. Defendant submits that the foregoing factors cast reasonable doubt of his guilt, and constitute circumstances that fail to exclude the hypothesis that another may have caused the fire.
In People v. Lofton, 64 Ill.App.2d 238, 243, this court said:
"A conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld where the proof of circumstances leads on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and produces a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant committed the crime as charged. [Cases cited.]"
"It is not necessary that the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of proof if the whole convinces of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cases cited.]"
In People v. Huff, 29 Ill.2d 315, 320 the Supreme Court said:
"The fact that the circumstantial evidence relied upon must not give rise to any reasonable hypotheses under which the defendant could be innocent of the crime charged, [citation omitted], does not mean that the trier of fact is required to search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence, and elevate them to the status of a reasonable doubt."
After reviewing this record at bar we find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction of this defendant according to law.
We do not find that defendant's sentence was excessive.
Defendant concedes that the sentence was within the statutory limit for the offense of arson, but argues that it was unnecessarily severe in view of defendant's background. Defendant was twenty-three years of age, had no previous criminal record, and had worked at a restaurant for three weeks and at a bakery for six months. However, defendant's deliberate and vicious act of starting a gasoline conflagration in the middle of the night in a multi-unit housing structure containing almost 140 persons is reprehensible and the punishment inflicted is not disproportionate to the crime. People v. Taylor, 35 Ill.2d 341, 220 N.E.2d 165, reminds us that our authority to modify sentences should be applied with considerable caution and circumspection. We affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
LEIGHTON, P. J., and SCHWARTZ, J., concur.