Case Name: In the Matter of the Application of George Zillig, for the removal of Solomon Rubenstein et al.
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-12-30
Citations: 13 N.Y. St. Rep. 891
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Application of George Zillig, for the removal of Solomon Rubenstein et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 13
Pages: 891–895

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Application of George Zillig, for the removal of Solomon Rubenstein et al.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term,,
Filed December 30, 1887.)
1. Landlord and tenant—Lease—Privilege to renew upon notice in WRITING, AND WAIVER OE REQUIREMENT FOR NOTICE IN WRITING, IS COMPETENT.
The tenant was in the possession of the premises in question by virtue of a written lease under seal, for the term of four years, in which it was provided that the lessee might have the privilege of a further lease for two years after its expiration upon giving a written notice to the lessor, thirty days before the expiration of the lease. These proceedings were instituted to oust the tenant from the premises, the petition alleging the termination of the lease and failure to give the written notice provided for. The answer denied the expiration of the lease and alleged waiver of the written notice. Evidence was offered by the tenant before the trial to prove that in a conversation with his landlord, he had expressed his desire to renew the lease for the term mentioned therein and asked whether written notice would be necessary and that the landlord replied that it would not. Held,.that, it was competent for the parties to waive,' by paroi, the requirement for a written notice. Beckwith, U. J., dissenting, held that paroi evidence is not admissible to show that before a breach there was a paroi modification of a contract under seal.
2. Same—Renewal op lease.
Held, that the continuance of the lease *and waiver of written notice having been proven, such agreement operated as a renewal of the lease for the additional period of two years, and that the element of the statute of frauds was not in the case. Beckwith, C. J., dissenting.
JET. B. Van Peyma, for tenant, app’lt; Joseph P. Schattner, for landlord, resp’t.

Opinion:
Hatch, J.
The tenant was in the possession of certain Eremises by virtue o£ a written lease under seal. In and y the lease, it was provided that the lessee have the privilege of a further lease for two years after the expiration, upon giving a written notice to the lessor, thirty days before the expiration of the lease. No written notice was ever given. Upon the expiration of the lease, the landlord commenced proceedings to oust the tenant and recover possession of the premises. The petition, which forms the basis of the proceeding, alleges a single reason, entitling the lessor to the possession of the demised premises, to wit: The termination of the lease, by a failure to give the written notice before mentioned. The answer of the tenant, denied the expiration of the lease, and alleged a waiver of the written notice.
Upon the trial the tenant offered to prove by himself, wife and another witness that on or about March 1, 1887, he had a conversation with the landlord upon the premises, in which the landlord asked if he desired to continue in the-occupation of the premises for another two years, as provided in the lease; that the tenant answered yes, and thereupon asked ' the landlord if he wanted a written notice served upon him to that effect, as required by the lease; that the landlord replied that he did not, as the tenant's word was just as good, and that it was not necessary to put it in writing. Objection was made to this proof on the part of the landlord, on the ground that it was irrelevant and immaterial. The court sustained the objection and the tenant excepted. We are of opinion that this ruling of the court was error. Long v. Stafford, 103 N. Y., 274; 3 N. Y. State Rep., 87.
It is there held, upon a lease, containing a precisely similar clause to this, that it was competent for the parties to waive, by paroi, the requirement of written notice, and this whether it was for the benefit of the lessee alone, or the lessor, or both, and that in the absence of an express agreement such waiver would be implied from the acts of the parties, which, in that case, was a holding over on the part of the lessees. Here the offer was to prove, by express agreement, the continuance of the lease and waiver of the written notice. With such agreement proved it operated as a renewal of the lease for the additional period of two years. The element of the statute of frauds is not in the case. The terms and conditions of the contract between the parties was embodied in the lease, which was in writing, and under seal; the effect of the agreement was to make it operative as an original lease for the further term of two years. House v. Burr, 24 Barb., 525; W. Trans. Co. of Buffalo v. Lansing, 49 N. Y., 499, 506.
The judgment should be reversed, and restitution of the premises ordered to the tenant with costs.
Titus, J., concurs.