Case Name: George ADAMS and Michelle Adams, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Janelle Adams and Jamal Adams, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. HARRAH'S BOSSIER CITY INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant-Applicant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2007-01-10
Citations: 948 So. 2d 317
Docket Number: No. 41,468-CW
Parties: George ADAMS and Michelle Adams, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Janelle Adams and Jamal Adams, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. HARRAH’S BOSSIER CITY INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant-Applicant.
Judges: Before BROWN, STEWART & GASKINS, MOORE & LOLLEY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 948
Pages: 317–327

Head Matter:
George ADAMS and Michelle Adams, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Janelle Adams and Jamal Adams, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. HARRAH’S BOSSIER CITY INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant-Applicant.
No. 41,468-CW.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Jan. 10, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 2007.
Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, by Gregg A. Wilkes, Shreveport, for Defen-dani/Applicant.
Joey W. Hendrix, Shreveport, Edward M. Campbell, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiffs/Respondents.
Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman, Wood-ley, Byrd & Cromwell, LLP, by Edwin H. Byrd, III, Shreveport, for Defendant/Respondent, City of Shreveport.
Before BROWN, STEWART & GASKINS, MOORE & LOLLEY, JJ.

Opinion:
STEWART, J.
hThis civil action arises from the arrest of Plaintiff George Adams at Defendant's, Harrah's Bossier City Investment Co., L.L.C., ("Harrah's"), casino on December 31, 2002. Based on a videotape recording of surveillance footage, Harrah's and the investigating police officers concluded that Mr. Adams had stolen a $500 chip at the craps table where he and his wife were playing. Mr. Adams was charged with felony theft. The district attorney's office ultimately dismissed this charge. Plaintiffs, George Adams and his wife, Michelle Adams, individually and on behalf of their children, Janelle Adams and Jamal Adams, sued Harrah's for damages allegedly arising out of the arrest. Plaintiffs later amended their petition to add the City of Shreveport as a defendant. Harrah's filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Harrah's then sought a writ of supervisory review, which this court granted to docket, and this appeal ensued. For the reasons stated herein, the trial court's judgment denying Har-rah's motion for summary judgment is reversed.
FACTS
On December 31, 2002, George Adams was standing behind his wife at the craps table at Harrah's Casino when he reached around her toward the area on the table where the trays of chips were located. Mr. Adams asserted in his deposition that he took chips from his wife's chip tray, but Harrah's employees, watching the video surveillance, thought that he had taken a $500 chip from the tray of Harley Webb, who was standing next to Mr. Adams' wife. The alleged incident was recorded by security video, andJ^Harrah's employees notified the Shreveport Police Department that a theft had occurred.
The police department dispatched three police officers to the scene; and, when they arrived, Mr. Adams was removed from the casino floor to a security office where he was advised of his Miranda rights and interviewed regarding the alleged theft. Two of the officers viewed the security video and concluded that Mr. Adams had taken a chip from Mr. Webb. When they returned from viewing the video, they told Mr. Adams that he was under arrest, searched and handcuffed him and transported him to the Caddo Correctional Center. When Mr. Adams was searched, however, no $500 chip was found. Mr. Webb was unaware of the alleged theft, but told police officers that he would be willing to press charges against Mr. Adams. As previously stated, the district attorney subsequently • dismissed the charges.
Plaintiffs filed this civil suit against Har-rah's on May 14, 2004, alleging facts that could support claims for general negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false arrest. On November 28, 2005, the trial court granted Plaintiffs leave to file their supplemental and amending petition adding the City of Shreveport as a defendant. On December 6, 2005, Harrah's filed a motion for summary judgment. Harrah's asserted that it could have no liability for false arrest by virtue of its good-faith reporting of the theft to the police officers. Harrah's focused on the fact that the Shreveport police officers conducted an investigation into the alleged theft by Mr. Adams and concluded that there was probable cause for arrest based on their investigation.
| -¡The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment after the matter was submitted on briefs without oral argument, finding that genuine issues of material facts existed that precluded summary judgment. At Harrah's request, the trial court delineated the questions of facts as:
I think the question of fact here is exactly who was the complainant in this matter, whether it was Harrah's or the victim. Also, I didn't see anything there as a sworn statement by the supposed victim in this action as to whether he missed the $500.00 chip that was supposedly stolen from him.. It's going to be impossible for me to determine what the facts are in this case for purposes of a judgment without hearing him testify live and in open court or at least having their depositions for trial purposes.
The trial court also denied Plaintiffs' motion for continuance based on incomplete discovery, stating that a continuance was unnecessary given its denial of Harrah's motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs again amended their petition, with leave of court, adding claims for malicious prosecution and defamation.
DISCUSSION
The standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424 (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern a trial court's consideration of whether or not a summary judgment is appropriate — (1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and (2) whether or not the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, |4show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). The moving party must show that reasonable minds would inevitably conclude that judgment is warranted as a matter of law on the facts before this court. Id.
Further, in a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mov-ant. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). When the burden of proof at trial is on the non-movant, the burden on the movant at summary judgment is to demonstrate an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim; Id. If the non-movant then fails to produce sufficient factual support to show he can meet the evidentiary burden at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. In the case sub judice, the burden at trial is on Plaintiffs to prove their claims. As movant, Harrah's must only point out an absence of factual support, which they do here. The burden on this motion shifts, therefore, to Plaintiffs to establish the requisite evidentiary support on the claims they assert.
The supreme court recently decided a case factually similar to the instant case, Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 05-1418 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669. In Kennedy, the plaintiff attempted to pay at a Jack-in-the Box drive-through window with a 1974 series $100 bill. The drive-through teller suspected that the bill was counterfeit and called the sheriff. The sheriff determined that the bill looked suspicious and arrested the defendant. At the substation, the sheriff verified the authenticity of the bill and released the defendant.
IsAddressing the malicious prosecution claim, the supreme court held that the independent actions and investigation of the sheriff broke the chain of causation between the Jack-in-the Box complaint and the defendant's arrest. This rational is not limited to Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim, but applies to all Plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Banks v. Brookshire Brothers, Inc., 93-1616 (La.App. 3d Cir.6/1/94), 640 So.2d 680 (malicious prosecution); Hughes v. Gulf International, 593 So.2d 776 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992) (false arrest), writ denied, 595 So.2d 658 (La.1992).
In the case sub judice, the Shreveport police conducted a similar independent investigation into the suspected theft. After the three police officers arrived, two of them viewed the video recording and arrived at a decision to arrest Mr. Adams independent of Harrah's. Plaintiffs argue that Harrah's possible involvement in commenting on the video distinguishes this case from Kennedy. In particular, Plaintiffs point out that the usual procedure, as described by one of the investigating police officers, is for Harrah's security to review the video tape with the police and point out what they believed was the criminal act. The officer was unable to recall if, in this particular instance, Harrah's security had such involvement. Even if they did, this involvement does not rise to such a level as to prevent the police investigation from being independent of Harrah's own suspicions. As such, the independent investigation by the police breaks any legal causation.
Plaintiffs further argue that Kennedy is distinguishable because, unlike the employees in Kennedy, Harrah's security force is composed of | ^highly trained personnel amounting to a private police force. We find this distinction unpersuasive. The reasoning of the Kennedy court is not based on the qualifications of who made the complaint, but, instead, on subsequent and intervening law enforcement investigation. The police in the instant case made an independent investigation just as the Sheriffs Office did in Kennedy. This is the critical factor that prevents Plaintiffs from proving legal causation on any of their claims.
While discussing the defamation claims arising from the same facts, the Kennedy court focused on the need to encourage honest and good faith reporting to law enforcement. We find this policy consideration equally applicable in evaluating any claim that arises from a private citizen making a report to law enforcement. The court considered that "[i]t would be self-defeating for society to impose civil liability on a citizen for inaccurately reporting criminal conduct with no intent to mislead. If the risks to the citizen are too high, a fertile field for criminal suppression will have disappeared." Kennedy, supra, citing Arellano v. Henley, 357 So.2d 846 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978). It further emphasized that, "vital to our system of justice is that there be the ability to communicate to police officers the alleged wrongful acts of others without fear of civil action for honest mistakes." Kennedy, supra.
The court recognized the need for balance between a person's individual interests and society's interest in crime prevention.
[The court's holding] strikes a necessary and appropriate balance between a person's interest in protecting his or her reputation and the need to encourage individuals to report suspected criminal activity to the proper authorities without fear of being exposed to |7civil liability for honest mistakes. Unless such protection is extended, fear of being exposed to civil liability could discourage individuals from alerting police to suspicious activity, thereby enabling criminals to escape detection and endangering other potential victims. Individuals who engage in behavior beneficial to society should not be penalized by facing exposure to civil liability for mistakes in judgment attributable to simple negligence.
Kennedy, supra. Notably, these policy considerations are only applicable in cases of honest and good-faith reporting.
Further, the Kennedy court expressly limited its holding to the facts before it. Those facts do-not indicate anything but a good-faith report on the part of the Jack-in-the Box employees. The issue, therefore, becomes whether Harrah's was in good faith in making its complaint and who had the burden on summary judgment on that issue. As Plaintiffs have the burden of proof at trial on all their claims, they have the burden of proof at summary judgment to overcome Kennedy by establishing Harrah's lack of good faith. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). They fail to do so.
Attached to the motion for summary judgment were the depositions of Mr. Adams and two of the investigating officers, along with the police reports. The video at issue was not submitted. The only evidence arguably going to Harrah's lack of good faith is the fact that no $500 chip was found on Mr. Adams, that Har-rah's could not explain the absence of the chip and that Mr. Webb did not miss the chip before being informed of the suspected theft. These facts, at most, show possible error on the part of Harrah's, but do not amount to a genuine fact issue on good faith. Plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and grant Harrah's motion for summary judgment.
| RThis holding is consistent with the policy considerations previously expressed by this court:
Reasonable efforts by a citizen toward [the] suppression of crime, even where a simple mistake exists, do not automatically impose civil liability ., if all the circumstances indicate the efforts were reasonable. The law should, and does, encourage citizens to report suspected criminal activity to the proper authorities.
Craig v. Carter, 30,625 (La.App.2d Cir.9/23/98), 718 So.2d 1068, writ denied, 98-2698 (La.12/18/98), 734 So.2d 636, quoting Sapp v. J.A. West Co., 352 So.2d 268 (La.App. 2d Cir.1977), writ denied, 353 So.2d 1337. The record shows that Har-rah's did little more than report their suspicions, even if it was ultimately mistaken. Its behavior was reasonable given the circumstances.
Further, in attempting to avoid summary judgment, the Plaintiffs, in their second amending and supplemental petition, allege that Harrah's provided the police with an edited or doctored security tape. This bare allegation is unsupported by the record. Alternatively, Plaintiffs' counsel further responded at oral argument that its motion for continuance was improperly denied. Counsel, however, failed to assert denial of this motion as an assignment of error on appeal. It is, therefore, not before this court. See Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4.
Our de novo review of the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact; and, therefore, we conclude that Harrah's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts, as supported by the record, entitle Harrah's to summary judgment dismissing any claims against it. In particular, Plaintiffs | ¡cannot establish the requisite causation between Harrah's actions and Mr. Adams' arrest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in denying Harrah's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of summary judgment. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Harrah's, dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Costs are assessed to Plaintiffs.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
BROWN, C.J., dissents with written reasons.
. Kennedy was released after the trial court's ruling, so the court did not have the benefit of its guidance.