Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario HARO, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-09-25
Citations: 617 F. App'x 820
Docket Number: No. 14-50562
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario HARO, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 617
Pages: 820–821

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario HARO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14-50562.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 21, 2015.
Filed Sept. 25, 2015.
Charlotte E. Kaiser, Peter Ko, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Doug Keller, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Mario Haro appeals from the district court's judgment and challenges the two-year term of supervised release and a special condition of supervised release imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Haro contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release based on the allegedly erroneous determination that it would contribute to his rehabilitation. In light of Haro's history and circumstances, the district court did not err in determining that supervised release was warranted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 & cmt. n. 3.
Haro next challenges the special condition of supervised release which requires him to obtain prior approval from his probation officer for any residence or change in residence. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir.2008). In light of Haro's circumstances and criminal history, the challenged condition is reasonably related to deterrence and protection of the public,' and it does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924 ("[W]e give considerable deference to a district court's determination of the appro priate supervised release conditions." (internal quotations omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.