Case Name: Alvin J. DUVALLE, Jr. v. LAKE KENILWORTH, INC. et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1984-12-10
Citations: 467 So. 2d 850
Docket Number: Nos. CA 1690, CA 1691
Parties: Alvin J. DUVALLE, Jr. v. LAKE KENILWORTH, INC. et al.
Judges: Before REDMANN, C.J., and CIACCIO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 467
Pages: 850–854

Head Matter:
Alvin J. DUVALLE, Jr. v. LAKE KENILWORTH, INC. et al.
Nos. CA 1690, CA 1691.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Dec. 10, 1984.
Rehearings Denied May 6, 1985.
Writ Denied June 28, 1985.
James S. Quinlivan, Jr., River Ridge, for plaintiff.
Terry J. Freiberger, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, New Orleans, for defendant.
Jack W. Thomson (Coleman, Dutrey & Thomson), New Orleans, for intervenors.
Before REDMANN, C.J., and CIACCIO, JJ.

Opinion:
REDMANN, Chief Judge.
When a 461-unit apartment complex obliges itself towards its tenants and its federal mortgage subsidizer to "make arrangements for," or to provide, pest control in each apartment, does it thereby, within, the workers' compensation law, La.R.S. 23:1061, "undertake to execute any work, which is a part of [its] trade, business or occupation or which [it] had contracted to perform ."?
We answer no. We reason that an apartment complex does not undertake to execute any work by the mere fact of a contractual obligation to arrange for or provide pest control. The apartment complex's only contractual undertaking is that pest control service will be provided and without cost to the tenants, not that it will "execute any work," that is, itself perform the service. We view an apartment complex's obligation to provide pest control service as similar to an apartment complex's obligation to provide utilities. By leasing for stated rents, "utilities included," the apartment complex does not oblige itself to generate and distribute electricity but only to pay for it: it does not make the generation of electricity part of its business and it has not "contracted to perform" the generation or physical delivery of electricity.
The apartment complex would therefore not be liable as a "principal" under R.S. 23:1061 for workers' compensation to an employee of the utility company for injury arising out of and in the course of supplying electricity to the apartments. By the same reasoning, if the only basis for liability is a simple contractual obligation to its tenants and its federal subsidizer to "make arrangements for" or provide pest control service in the apartments, an apartment complex is equally not liable as a principal for workers' compensation to an employee of its pest control service company for injury arising out of and in the course of supplying pest control to the apartments.
Because that is the only record basis for deeming defendant apartment complex a principal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal on grounds of exclusivity of compensation, R.S. 23:1032, of plaintiff pest control company employee's tort action.
Defendant apartment complex contracted with plaintiff's employer to provide pest control service to its apartments. Plaintiff's suit against the complex for injuries from tripping on loose carpeting was first dismissed by summary judgment in the district court and we — on the basis that the complex's contract with its tenants made pest control "work . it had contracted to perform" and therefore made defendant plaintiff's statutory employer — affirmed, 383 So.2d 408 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). Without rejecting that basis as we now do, the supreme court reversed and remanded for trial, 396 So.2d 1268 (La.1980).
After trial, the district court again dismissed, on the basis that the plaintiff's employer's pest control spraying (of the entire complex, including each separate apartment, every month) "was work which [the complex] had contracted with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to perform" within R.S. 23:1061, as a consequence of which the complex was plaintiff's statutory employer, immune to tort liability to plaintiff. Plaintiff now appeals that judgment.
The testimony by a HUD official is that HUD requires a "vermin extermination" clause in the contract documents. The wording of the documents in evidence is that owner's "agent will make arrangements for . vermin extermination." We add that there is also uncontradicted defense testimony that "when someone rents . we inform them that the apartment will be exterminated [sic] once a month. In many cases the new resident will ask us if we have extermination.... [W]e do tell them it will happen once a month." Thus, notwithstanding the absence of this representation from the written lease, the complex did expressly though orally undertake towards its tenants, as well as towards HUD, to provide pest control.
The complex's rental director testified that the complex employees did some pest control work, in dealing with spiders and other bugs drawn to lights in interior hallways and in any special problems in vacant apartments, and in burning wasp nests. He also testified that some other apartment complexes do all necessary pest control work with their own employees.
"Courts must look to the facts of each individual case to determine whether a particular activity is within the scope of a principal's trade, business or occupation." Lewis v. Exxon Corp., 441 So.2d 192, 198 (La.1983). The facts of this case do not establish that pest control is an integral part of the business of renting apartments (as it is of the rice warehouse business, Meche v. Farmers Drier and S. Co., 193 So.2d 807 (La.App. 3 Cir.1967), writ refused 250 La. 369, 195 So.2d 644; and as are "repair and maintenance services performed regularly . an essential and integral part" of the oil and gas production, processing and distribution business, Barnes v. Sun Oil Co., 362 So.2d 761, 764 (La.1978)). Furthermore, defendant did not prove that it in fact so conducted its business as to make pest control part of it. Defendant did prove that some apartment complexes do make pest control a part of their business operation, but not that defendant did so. Defendant also proved that it contracted with HUD that it would "make arrangements for" pest control, and that it contracted with its tenants to provide pest control. But it did not show that it contracted that it would itself perform the service, and it in fact provided the service by contracting with a licensed pest control company, whose employee spent about one week each month in performing the service, and not by training its own employees in the selection and application of the proper chemicals, etc., and having them do the work.
Defendant has not proved that that it "undert[ook] to execute any work, which is a part of [its] trade, business or occupation or which [it] had contracted to perform .," and contracted with plaintiff's employer to do that work. It has not proved that it is the statutory employer of plaintiff. Its defense of exclusivity of workers' compensation must therefore be rejected.
Plaintiff's basic factual allegation is that, while applying pest-control chemicals from a spray-can at defendant's apartment complex, he injured his knee by falling after tripping on hallway carpeting that had become unglued. The question of whether defendant is liable in tort to plaintiff in this case depends, to an extreme degree, on an evaluation of plaintiffs credibility. Plaintiff's alleged accident was unwitnessed; it was immediately reported to defendant, but defendant says a fall down a stairway was reported; there are other discrepancies in plaintiff's testimony. Our review suggests that a trier of fact who heard and observed plaintiff might believe or disbelieve him, depending on indescribable and unquantifiable intuitive factors that might or might not satisfy the hearer-observer of his veracity. Ordinarily, in compliance with Louisiana's practice, we would undertake the evaluation of witness credibility as well as we could, and render a judgment based upon it, thus making our judgment the final one in the case. In this case, however, because the parties stipulated to a separate trial of liability and quantum, if we were to believe plaintiff we would still have to remand the matter. In effect, we would make a credibility evaluation only for the purpose of deciding whether the trial judge should conduct a quantum trial at which he would have to make, in large measure, the same credibility evaluation. We deem it both sound judicial economy and sounder administration of justice, under the circumstances of this case, to permit the trial judge to make that credibility evaluation, in order to decide whether or not he needs to proceed to trial on the quantum question.
Reversed; remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; costs to await final outcome.