Case Name: Gregory L. TOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCO FOOD DISTRIBUTORS, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-10-25
Citations: 666 So. 2d 327
Docket Number: No. 95-348
Parties: Gregory L. TOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCO FOOD DISTRIBUTORS, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before SAUNDERS, and SULLIVAN, JJ., and KNIGHT J. Pro Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 666
Pages: 327–334

Head Matter:
Gregory L. TOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCO FOOD DISTRIBUTORS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 95-348.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 25, 1995.
Order Granting Limited Rehearing Jan. 10,1996.
Roy Maughan, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Denis Paul Juge, Metairie, for Defendant Appellee.
Before SAUNDERS, and SULLIVAN, JJ., and KNIGHT J. Pro Tem.
. Judge William N. Knight of the Thirty-first Judicial District participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as judge Pro Tempore.

Opinion:
liWILLIAM N. KNIGHT, Judge Pro Tem.
This appeal arises from the judgment of the workers compensation hearing officer which held that the plaintiff, Gregory L. Tomas, failed to present evidence of a recovera ble work injury pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e)(i) or (ii), since his stroke was not caused by physical stress. The hearing officer also declined to rule on Tomas' constitutional challenge to this statute finding that she lacked jurisdiction to do so. Tomas appeals the hearing officer's finding of lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS
At the time of his strokes, Tomas was employed by the defendant, Conco Food Distributors. On December 2, 1992, while attending a meeting at work, Tomas suffered a stroke. He was taken to the hospital where diagnostic work, 12including an angiogram, was performed. The angiogram brought about a second stroke which resulted in severe, irreversible brain damage.
Tomas filed a claim for workers compensation benefits. Subsequently, Tomas amended his petition to challenge the constitutionality of La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e)(i) and (ii) which limits recovery to cases of heart-related or perivascular injuries caused by extraordinary physical stress only. After a trial on the merits, the hearing officer in her written reasons for judgment stated:
The court finds that Mr. Tomas proved by clear and convincing evidence that his work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to that experienced by the average employee in that occupation due to the company's bankruptcy proceedings. The court further finds, based upon the testimony of Dr. Anderson, that the work stress was the predominant and major cause of the worsening of Mr. Tomas' diabetic condition which was the predominant and major cause of the first stroke and that the second and disabling stroke occurred as a result of treatment of the first stroke. However, the court also finds that the work stress was emotional or mental as opposed to physical, and therefore, under the terms of the statute, Mr. Tomas' stroke is not compensable. See Charles , supra, at page 1370. As should be evident from the court's findings, the fact that the stress was not physical is the only reason the court denies the compensability of the claim.
Mr. Tomas contends that the statute is unconstitutional because of the increased burden of proof and because of the exclusion from coverage of victims of mental or emotional stress. The court finds that it does not have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality issue. See Whittington v. Langston Drilling Co., Inc., 26,001 CA (2nd Cir.1994).
LAW
As noted in her reasons for judgment, the hearing officer based her finding of lack of jurisdiction on the second circuit case of Whittington v. Langston Drilling Co., Inc., 26,001 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94) 643 So.2d 336. In Whittington, the statute being constitutionally challenged was La.R.S. 23:1271, which requires an employer's consent to lump sum settlements between employees and the employers' worker's compensation carrier. The Whittington court ruled that only the district | ¡court and not the hearing officer had jurisdiction over this question, basing its decision on the following line of reasoning:
The [Office of Worker's Compensation] is a legislatively-created administrative body, in which the [Worker's Compensation Hearing Officer's] function in a quasi-judicial capacity to settle workers' compensation disputes. LSA-R.S. 23:1310.1, et seq.; La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A)(1). Sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the Louisiana constitution establish three separate branches of government, and provide that no branch may exercise powers belonging to another. Only the judicial branch has the authority to declare statutes unconstitutional. State v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections, 186 La. 949, 173 So. 726, 731 (1937), cited in fn. 8 of Church Point Wholesale Beverage v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697 (La.1993).
Determining a statute's constitutionality is strictly a function of the courts. Red River Coors, Inc. v. McNamara, 577 So.2d 187 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991). See also State v. Cenac, 241 La. 1055, 132 So.2d 928
(1961); Appeal of Brisset, 436 So.2d 664 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied; Firefighters Local 632 v. Civ. Service Com'n., 495 So.2d 958 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986), writ denied; Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 483 So.2d 945 (La.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827,107 S.Ct. 105, 93 L.Ed.2d 55.
Id. at 339.
In holding that the determination of a statute's constitutionality is strictly a function of the courts, the second circuit also impliedly found that the legislature did not have the authority to transfer the power to decide a statute's constitutionality from the district court to the worker's compensation hearing officer.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the legislature's power in State of Louisiana in the Interest of AC., 93-1125 (La. 1/27/94) 643 So.2d 719, explaining that:
Unlike the federal Constitution, which functions from "enumerated powers" to each branch of government, the Louisiana Constitution presumes extensive and complete powers to the state legislature. State ex rel. Guste v. Legislative Budget Committee, 347 So.2d 160, 164 (La.1977). The only limits on this power stem from specific enumerations in the state Constitution:
A general principle of judicial interpretation of a state constitution is that, unlike the federal constitution, a state's constitutions are not grants of power, they are rather limitations on the power of the people exercised through the state legislature. In its exercise of the entire I legislative power of the state, the legislature may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit. Thus, to hold legislation invalid under the state constitution, it is necessary to rely upon some particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to enact the statute assailed. In re Gulf Oxygen Welder's Supply
Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement, 297 So.2d 663, 665 (La.1974). One such provision is the prohibition on violations of the principle of separation of powers, as espoused by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
The scheme of separation of powers stems from Article II, which provides that
Section 1. The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others.
Id. at 731-732.
In section two of this article, deviations from the rule of separation of powers is allowed where the constitution provides for it. La. Const, art. V, § 16 provides for such a deviation from the separation of powers. The article is entitled "Judicial Power." Section 16 addresses district court jurisdiction. In pertinent part, the section provides that:
(A)(1) Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative agency determinations in worker's compensation matters, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. (emphasis added)
Thus, the constitution placed in the hands of the legislature the power to carve out the jurisdiction of the worker's compensation hearing officers. As discussed above, |5the legislature has plenary power except as re- strieted by the constitution. In Whittington the court held that determining a statute's constitutionality is strictly a function of the courts and as such, may not be delegated to an agency. However, other strictly judicial functions have been delegated to agencies. The determination of fact is exclusively a judicial function. State in Interest of AC., 93-1125. Yet, there is no question that this function is delegable and has been delegated in the case of the worker's compensation hearing officers.
We acknowledge that in many agencies the function of determining statutory constitutionality has not been delegated, as noted by the Whittington court, and indeed may not be allowed by the state constitution in those cases. However, there is nothing in the constitution which would prohibit the legislature from giving the hearing officers jurisdiction over the constitutionality of worker's compensation statutes. Therefore, the question is whether the legislature has done so.
La.R.S. 23.T310.3 E provides that:
"Except as otherwise provided by R.S. 23:1101(D) and 1378(E), the Hearing Officer shall be vested with original, exclusive jurisdiction over all claims or disputes arising out of this Chapter."
The grant of exclusive jurisdiction of certain subject matters to an agency results in the subtraction of those matters from the district court's jurisdiction. This can be contrasted with concurrent jurisdiction. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists, the district court maintains original jurisdiction in the matters at the same time that an agency has been granted jurisdiction. Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, 612 So.2d 7 (La.1993).
Since the hearing officers have been granted exclusive jurisdiction by the legislature over worker's compensation "claims or disputes," these matters have been excluded from the jurisdiction of district courts. However, the legislature did | snot define "claims or disputes" and the issue is whether this language includes the power to declare a statute unconstitutional.
State district courts are courts of general jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters and as such are considered to have jurisdiction unless specifically denied it. See La. Const, art. II, § 1-2 and art. V, § 16. The law has always been that determining a statute's constitutionality is strictly a function of the courts because of the separation of powers doctrine. The intent of the legislature to deviate from this well established principal of law is not evidenced by its grant to hearing officers of jurisdiction over "claims and disputes." We do not find that this power has been explicitly subtracted from the jurisdiction of the district courts by the legislature and thus, find that the district courts retain this jurisdiction.
DECREE
The judgment of the hearing officer is affirmed as it holds that the hearing officer does not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of worker's compensation statutes. Costs are assessed to Tomas, plaintiff-appellant.
AFFIRMED.
SAUNDERS, J., dissents with written reasons.
. Charles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 627 So.2d 1366 (La.1993).
. By Act 938 of 1988 the Louisiana legislature eliminated the district court role in the worker's compensation litigation process. This act provided for administrative hearing officers within the Office of Worker's Compensation to serve the adjudicatory function that district court judges had previously performed. However, on September 6, 1990, the supreme court in Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75 (La.1990), declared this act unconstitutional. Subsequently, a constitutional amendment divested the district courts of original jurisdiction in worker's compensation, purportedly rendering constitutional the previously unconstitutional worker's compensation legislation. This constitutional amendment became effective on November 7, 1990.