Case Name: Merri L. BURT and Randall T. Burt, Sr., Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees; Alvin NOBLES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David Nobles, Deceased, Appellant, v. Jimmy L. BOYETTE and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-05-22
Citations: 383 So. 2d 966
Docket Number: Nos. PP-131, PP-132
Parties: Merri L. BURT and Randall T. Burt, Sr., Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees. Alvin NOBLES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David Nobles, Deceased, Appellant, v. Jimmy L. BOYETTE and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: McCORD and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 966–968

Head Matter:
Merri L. BURT and Randall T. Burt, Sr., Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees. Alvin NOBLES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David Nobles, Deceased, Appellant, v. Jimmy L. BOYETTE and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.
Nos. PP-131, PP-132.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 22, 1980.
Norton Bond, Pensacola, for appellant Nobles.
Louis K. Rosenbloum of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, P. A., Pensacola, for appellants Merri L. Burt and Randall Burt, Sr.
C. Miner Harrell of Harrell, Wiltshire, Stone & Swearingen, Pensacola, for appel-lees State Far Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and Jimmy L. Boyette.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the last sentence of the "anti-stacking" statute, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), permits an individual as an insured to combine uninsured motorist coverage, on a vehicle involved in an accident, with coverage under a policy issued to the father of the individual insured when the named insured in each policy is different. Section 627.4132 reads:
If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not • be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds.
We hold that the injured insured may combine such coverage and agree with Kokay v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 380 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), insofar as it reasoned:
The entirely clear and totally unambiguous language of the concluding sentence of Section 627.4132 explicitly provides that under these facts, the preceding provisions of this section "shall not apply to reduce the coverage," thus plainly leaving the availability of both policies intact. . Since the statute itself contains a term which explicitly excepts its effect upon the situation before us, reversal is required.
[I]f, . . . the legislature meant to provide that, under all circumstances, and even though, there are different named insureds, the injured person is entitled to the coverage provided by one, and only one, applicable policy, it could, should, and undoubtedly would have said so. But it specifically said otherwise, and we are bound to follow its command.
Contra, McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
Accordingly, because we find, as did Kokay, that the last sentence of the anti-stacking statute is clear and unambiguous, and permits "stacking" under the factual situation here, we hereby reverse the trial court's order dismissing the complaints with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Because we conclude the decision in this case directly conflicts with that in McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), we so certify for the purpose of compliance with pertinent provisions of the rules should they be invoked.
Reversed and remanded.
McCORD and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
LARRY G. SMITH, J., dissents with opinion.
. Petition for certiorari was filed March 12, 1980, (case no. 58,830).
. Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(ii).