Case Name: UNITED STATES of America v. LIGORI, Anthony R., a/k/a Rocky, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1981-08-24
Citations: 658 F.2d 130
Docket Number: No. 80-2839
Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. LIGORI, Anthony R., a/k/a Rocky, Appellant.
Judges: Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and VAN DUSEN and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 658
Pages: 130–134

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America v. LIGORI, Anthony R., a/k/a Rocky, Appellant.
No. 80-2839.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued July 17, 1981.
Decided Aug. 24, 1981.
Harold B. Shapiro, Asst. Federal Public Defender, D. New Jersey, Camden, N.J., (argued), for appellant.
William W. Robertson, U. S. Atty., Kenneth N. Laptook, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Newark, N.J., for appellee.
Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and VAN DUSEN and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court denying Anthony Ligori's motion for elimination of a $5,000 fine. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
I.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Anthony Ligori pleaded guilty to one count of a four-count indictment. The Government promised in the plea agreement that:
[It] will make no recommendation as to the sentence to be imposed by the Court, but of course reserves the right to correct any factual inaccuracies contained in the presentence report or that might be made at allocution. The United States further agrees to dismiss the remaining counts of the Indictment . . . after the imposition of sentence. There are no other promises made to this defendant in connection with this plea.
The Government made no recommendation at sentencing. Ligori received a seven-year term of imprisonment, to be followed by four years of special parole. In addition, Ligori was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine upon his release from prison.
After sentencing, Ligori filed a motion pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking elimination of the fine because he had not profited from his illegal activity and because his indigency rendered imposition of the fine an extreme financial burden. The Government responded with a letter opposing elimination of the fine and urging the district court to maintain Ligori's original sentence. Ligori then argued that the Government's opposition constituted a violation of the plea agreement. He requested that the rule 35 application be heard by a different judge or, alternatively, that the court "completely disregard the Government's letter."
Ligori's motion was argued before the district court, which refused to transfer the matter to a different judge; the district court noted that it was "not in any way going to consider [the Government's] letter." The court then denied the motion for elimination of the fine, and Ligori filed a notice of appeal.
II.
Ligori argues on appeal that the district court erred when it failed to submit Ligori's motion for reduction of sentence to a different judge after the Government allegedly violated the plea agreement by opposing the motion. Ligori also claims that it was error to deny his motion for elimination of the fine.
A.
It is uncontested that, when Ligori was sentenced, the Government adhered to the terms of the plea bargain. It made no recommendations as to the sentence to be imposed by the district court, and it moved to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. Ligori argues, however, that the Government breached the plea agreement when it submitted, at the rule 35 hearing, its letter urging that Ligori's sentence was fair and appropriate.
"[I]t is the rule of this Circuit that the Government must adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it strikes with defendants." United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 3076, 57 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1978); see United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversing district court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea after Government failed to fulfill its promises). An important part of this rule, however, is that "the Government will be held only to what it has promised." Miller, 565 F.2d at 1275 (interpreting Crusco). Ligori's contention that the Government breached the terms of the plea agreement assumes that the bargain extended to the rule 35 proceedings and encompassed a promise not to oppose reduction of a sentence already imposed. We address that argument and, in doing so, note that the facts are not in dispute.
The Government promised Ligori that it would "make no recommendation as to the sentence to be imposed by the Court." That the plea agreement covered only the original sentencing is shown in that as part of the plea agreement the Government reserved the right to correct any factual inaccuracies contained in the presentence report or that might be made at allocution. Both the presentenee report and allocution relate to the original sentencing process rather than to the sentence reduction hearing. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1), (c). Indeed, a rule 35(b) proceeding presupposes a valid sentence. Compare Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) (procedure for correcting illegal sentence) and id. 35(b) (procedure for reducing a sentence).
Ligori was never assured under the agreement that the Government would not oppose a motion to reduce his sentence after sentence had been imposed. Cf. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting defendant's argument that prosecutor violated plea agreement to recommend no additional sentence by opposing motion to reduce sentence). The clear import of the Government's promise, objectively assessed, see Crusco, 536 F.2d at 24, is that it extended only to the court's initial imposition of sentence and not to a subsequent motion to reduce sentence pursuant to rule 35. Thus, the Government's opposition to Ligori's motion to reduce sentence did not constitute a recommendation as to the sentence to be imposed within the meaning of the plea agreement. There was, therefore, no violation of that agreement. If United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973), can be read as dictating a different result, we find it unpersuasive. See also United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1979) (plea bargain committing Government to take no position on sentence does not under Ewing bind Government as matter of law to remain silent at rule 35 hearing).
B.
Ligori also argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the rule 35 motion and to vacate that portion of the sentence imposing a $5,000 fine. Ligori asserts that such an abuse occurred because he is indigent and did not profit from the crime of which he was convicted. He claims that it is fundamentally unfair to impose a fine under these circumstances. In considering Ligori's motion the district court stated:
I have reviewed the presentence report in this matter in its entirety. I remember this case very well. As a trial judge I am thoroughly [familiar] with it. At the time I sentenced this defendant I gave great consideration to his sentence. I see no reason what so ever to disrupt that sentence.
This court may reverse a district court's determination of a rule 35 application only if it is demonstrated that a clear abuse of discretion occurred. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Bickoff, 531 F.2d 182, 182 (3d Cir. 1976). The presentence report asserted that Ligori "deserves little if any leniency, as he appears to lack remorse for this offense, as well as, numerous victimizations in the past," and as Ligori acknowledges in his brief, he introduced no evidence supporting his rule 35 motion that was not already part of the record. Ligori has few assets, but he also has few liabilities other than this fine. The fine imposed certainly does not exceed the maximum allowed by law. Moreover, the district court was able, as we are not, to judge the credibility of Ligori's claim that he did not profit from his crime, which involved the distribution of cocaine. Given our narrow scope of review, we cannot say that the district court clearly abused its discretion in declining to eliminate the fine.
III.
The order of the district court denying Ligori's motion to reduce sentence will be affirmed.