Case Name: Priscilla TILLMAN Individually and as Duly Qualified Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Child, Cedric Tillman, v. David JOHNSON
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1992-11-20
Citations: 610 So. 2d 866
Docket Number: No. CA 91 1188
Parties: Priscilla TILLMAN Individually and as Duly Qualified Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Child, Cedric Tillman, v. David JOHNSON.
Judges: Before LOTTINGER, C.J., FOIL, J., and COVINGTON, J. Pro Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 610
Pages: 866–875

Head Matter:
Priscilla TILLMAN Individually and as Duly Qualified Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Child, Cedric Tillman, v. David JOHNSON.
No. CA 91 1188.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Nov. 20, 1992.
Writ Granted Feb. 5, 1993.
Richard H. Barker, IV, Barker & Boyer, New Orleans, Vincent Dagate, Jr., Authement & Larke, Houma, for plaintiff-appellant, Priscilla Tillman.
Christopher H. Riviere, Pugh, Lanier & Riviere, Thibodaux, for defendants-appel-lee, Moise D. Johnson, Sr., Kathleen Johnson & Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
Kerry P. Camarata, Thibodaux, for inter-venors, Richard A. Thalheim.
Stevens J. White, Bureau of Legal Services, Dept, of Health & Hosp., Baton Rouge, for State of Louisiana & Dept, of Health & Hospitals.
James E. Cazalot, Jr., New Orleans, for James E. Cazalot, Jr. & H. Edward Sherman.
Before LOTTINGER, C.J., FOIL, J., and COVINGTON, J. Pro Tem.
Judge Grover L. Covington, retired, is serving as judge pro tem by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Opinion:
GROVER L. COVINGTON, Judge Pro Tem.
Plaintiff-appellant, individually and as natural tutrix of her minor child, Cedric Tillman, seeks damages for lead poisoning suffered by the minor. She also asks awards for medical expenses and loss of consortium.
Additional parties defendant were added through supplemental pleadings.
A motion for summary judgment, filed by the defendants, was granted by the trial court, whose excellent written reasons we adopt as our own.
"The plaintiff claims that her minor child, Cedric Tillman, was injured as a result of eating lead paint on the premises of the defendants. This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have agreed that the following are the facts. This Court has inserted into the facts the dates of the passage of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.20 et seq. to establish a comprehensive sequence of events.
"The defendant, Kathleen Johnson, acquired the residence at 103-105 Lawrence Street, in 1957. Both she and her husband, David, were made defendants.
"The 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act' passed in its original form in 1972. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.20 et seq.
"The defendants, Robert and Nolan Durocher, acquired the residence at 919 Harrison Street from the estate of their father in 1977.
"In mid December of 1985 Priscilla Tillman and her minor child, Cedric Tillman, moved into the house owned by the John-sons, as a guest of a friend. The plaintiff claims that the minor child, Cedric, was injured as a result of eating lead paint found in the residence. The Johnsons had no knowledge of the presence of lead paint on or in the residence until notified by the Department of Health. The plaintiff moved out and the problem was corrected immediately.
"In the fall of 1986 Priscilla Tillman and her minor child, Cedric, vacated the residence owned by the Johnsons at 103-105 Lawrence Street.
"In December of 1986 or January of 1987 Priscilla Tillman and her minor child, Cedric, moved into the house belonging to the Durochers, at 919 Harrison Street, as a guest of her mother. The plaintiff alleges that the minor child, Cedric, was again injured as the result of the child eating lead paint found in the residence. The Duro-chers had no knowledge or notice of the presence of lead paint on or in the residence at 919 Harrison Street, until notified by the Department of Health. When lead paint was discovered the plaintiff moved out and the problem was corrected. All defendants have the same insurer.
"In 1988 the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act' was amended by amending LSA-R.S. 40:1299.26, .27, & .28 and sections 1299.20 through 1299.25 were repealed in 1989.
THE LAW
"Liability of the owners of residential property under the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act' is set forth in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.29 stating that 'The owner of any residential property shall be liable for all damages caused by his failure to perform the duties required of him pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.26 or R.S. 40:1299.27.'
"The prohibitions in the 1972 version of section 1299.26 as it might apply to residential landlords in the context of this case forbids the knowing application of lead based paint on the interior surfaces of any dwelling and the exterior surfaces of any dwelling to which children under six may be commonly exposed. Since there is no allegation that lead base paint was applied to either of the residences owned by the Durochers or the Johnsons there is no liability imposed upon them under section 1299.26 or .26(a) of the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act'.
"If there is to be liability imposed on the Durochers or the Johnsons it must come from section 1299.27 of the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act'. Since the acts complained of occurred before 1988, we must consider the potential liability of the defendants under the 1972 version of section 1299.27 of the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act'. Under section 1299.27 the landlord may be liable under two separate circumstances. The first is when a child under six or a mentally retarded person resides in the residence and the landlord receives notice of the existence of lead paint. He then has a duty to remove it. The statute clearly requires notice of the lead contamination be given to the owner of the property. It is obvious that since the John-sons acquired their rental residence in 1967, and they received no notice of the presence of lead paint, they are not liable under the 'Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act'.
"Secondly, since there was a change of ownership in the premises belonging to the Durochers, after the 'Act'; then we must consider whether or not the statute imposes a duty upon them to remove the lead paint from the house as of the date of the change of ownership. It should be noted that in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.27 A. & B.(b) there are dual requirements which trigger the duty of the landlord to remove the lead contamination from a residence. The statute requires that there must be a '... change of ownership and as a result thereof a child or children under six years of age or mentally retarded persons shall reside therein .' (Emphasis Supplied). It appears that the Durochers meet the first of the requirements in that ownership changed. They do not meet the second requirement and that is as a result of the change of ownership the dwelling became inhabited by a child under six or a mentally retarded person. There is no connexity between the change of ownership and the presence of the child, Cedric Tillman, in the residence. Further, the statute carries a dual caveat in that it is to be '... strictly construed and enforced so as to best protect the safety of residents of such dwellings.' Strict construction of the statute requires that it have a narrow construction. Under the rules of strict construction the Courts are not free to find a remedy by implication. When a requirement of narrow construction is coupled with the caveat that it be enforced for the safety of the residents we must not conclude that there is conflict in the statute. The Court must consider the statute as a whole and it cannot be presumed that only clauses and phrases were enacted. We must find a sensible way to read this act of the Legislature. The only sensible way to read the statute without conflict is that the statute is to be narrowly construed and vigorously enforced.
"Therefore, the Durochers do not incur liability under the statute without having notice of the lead contamination. They had no notice of the contamination and therefore have no liability under the statute.
"We must now explore the potential liability of the Johnsons and the Durochers under other avenues. The Civil Code provides several avenues for liability. They are Louisiana Civil Code Articles, 660 (formerly 670), Article 2822, Article 2696, Article 2315, & Article 2316.
"Articles 660, 2322 & 2695 seem to be commonly lumped together. This seems to be because they relate to one touchstone of liability, ownership of the premises.
"Louisiana Civil Code Article 660 provides that: 'The owner is bound to keep his buildings in repair so that neither their fall nor that of any part of their materials may cause damage to a neighbor or to a passer-by. He is answerable for damages caused by his neglect to do so.' This article by its terms applies only to neighbors and passers-by. Thus, defendants are not liable under this article.
"Louisiana Civil Code Article 2322 provides that: 'The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction.' The ruin contemplated by this article is apparently the actual fall or collapse of the building, some part of the building must break or give way. At any rate, the falling paint chips are not the ruin contemplated by this article. There seems to be a more modern view of ruin as contemplated by this article; but even that falls short of lead paint. The more modem view of liability under this article seems to contemplate:
1. There be a building.
2. The defendant must be its owner.
3. There must be a 'ruin' caused by a vice in construction or a neglect to repair, which occasions the damage to be recovered. Olsen v. Shell Oil Company, 365 So.2d 1285 (La.1978); Charpentier v. St. Martin Parish School Bd., 411 So.2d 717 (La.App.3rd Cir.1982).
However none of these cases espousing a more modern view overrule the two Louisiana lead paint cases, Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970); Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965).
"Finally, we must contemplate Article 2695 as a potential source of liability. Article 2695 provides that: 'The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same.' Both of the Louisiana lead paint cases Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970); Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965) fail to contemplate this article. This may be because of the series of cases which hold that this article runs in favor of the lessee alone and not in favor of his family. There are cases to the contrary, which allow the wife and family of the lessee to recover. It would seem that the cases that limit the responsibility of the lessor to the lessee, alone, and not to the family of the lessee are the majority view and the most recent view of the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals; the Circuit that binds this Court. For this Court to expand the lessors liability in this case would be for it to overrule the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals. If this had been a case of a suit by a wife for injuries to herself, it would seem that the more modern and better view would be to allow the action by the wife. However, the child in this case was at best the guest of his mother's friend at the residence owned by the Johnsons and the guest of the grandmother when the child was at the residence owned by the Duro-chers.
"This leaves the possibility of liability under Article 2315 or 2316 of the Louisiana Civil Code. These articles contemplate liability through a breach of duty or neglect. What is the breach of duty or neglect in this case? The duty is set out by statute in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.27. This Court has already concluded that this duty has not been breached. The Montgomery case has concluded that the conduct of a child eating paint is not something that the landlord could anticipate. Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965).
"Other jurisdictions seem to be split on the issue of the liability of the landlord for the ingestion of lead paint by minors present on the leased premises.
"If liability had been imposed on all houses containing lead paint it would have removed from the rental housing market a large number of older rental properties. This would have left many of the poor, with young children, without available housing. The legislation is simply exposing landlords to liability in a gradual manner so that large numbers of older rental properties are not suddenly removed from the rental market place.
"The policy in this matter has been set by the Legislature and they require notice before liability. There has been no notice to the landowners in this matter, consequently no liability, and the petition of the plaintiff is dismissed at her cost.
"The plaintiff in this matter is a pauper. The cost of trying this lawsuit, including the expert fees would be more than the average man earns in a year in the State of Louisiana. The plaintiff deserves, at the least, to launch or abandon this lawsuit from a stable legal platform."
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant's costs.
AFFIRMED.
LOTTINGER, C.J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
FOIL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
"1. The duties required by sections 1299.26 are limited since in 1972, LSA-R.S. 40:1299.26 was repealed and redesignated as LSA-R.S. 40:1299.-26(a); and then replaced in 1988 by LSA-R.S. 40:1299.26. The 1988 amendment of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.26 does not effect this case.
"2. 2. 'A. Whenever a child or children under six years of age or mentally retarded person resides in any residential premises in which any paint, plaster or other accessible materials contain dangerous levels of lead as defined pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.24, after notification by the director or his representative, the owner shall remove or cover said paint, plaster or other material so as to make it inaccessible to children under six years of age or mentally retarded persons. Whenever any such residential premises containing said dangerous levels of lead undergoes a change of ownership and as a result thereof, a child or children under six years of age or mentally retarded persons will become a resident therein, the new owner shall remove or cover said paint, plaster, or other material so as to make it inaccessible to such children or mentally retarded persons.' LSA R.S. 40:1299.27 A. The duties of a landlord are also set out in the second paragraph of Section B.(b) of R.S. 40:1299.27 provided relative to the duty of a landlord to provide a lead paint free house in pertinent part that: 'This duty shall apply to every owner of residential premises whenever a child or children under six years of age or mentally retarded persons reside therein or whenever such premises undergoes a change of ownership and as a result thereof a child or children under six years of age or mentally retarded persons shall reside therein, whether or not his premises have been inspected pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.24 or otherwise. This section shall be strictly construed and enforced so as to best protect the safety of residents of such dwellings.'
"3. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.20 et seq.
"4. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.27 A. & B.(b).
"5. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.27 B.(b).
"6. Gibbs Const. v. Dept. of Labor, 540 So.2d 268 (La.1989).
"7. See PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN LOUISIANA CIVIL CASES WITH ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS, VOLUME ONE by H. Alston Johnson III, Professor of Law, Copyright C 1978 H. Alston Johnson III. All rights reserved, at page 374.
"8. Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970); Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (App. 4th Cir.1965); Ciaccio v. Carbajal, 142 La. 125, 76 So. 583 (1917); McConnell v. Lemley, 48 La.Ann. 1433, 20 So. 887 (1896).
"9. Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970); Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965); Guidry v. Hamlin, 188 So. 662, 664 (La.App.Orl.1939).
"10. Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970); Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965).
"11. Duplain v. Wiltz, 194 So. 60 (La.App.Orl.1940); Jordan v. Palm Apartments, 353 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977), writs granted 355 So.2d 263. (La.1978). It appears that the writ was granted and then nothing happened. It was writ of review. Shepards refers you back to 353 So.2d 1120 the original case. Hurley v. J.C. Penney Co., 140 So.2d 445 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962); Morris v. Hava, 180 So. 216 (La.App.Orl.1938).
"12. Crawford v. Magnolia, 4 So.2d 48 (La.App.1st Cir.1941).
"13. Dye v. Kean's, 412 So.2d 116, 119 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982); Hurley v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 140 So.2d 445 (La.App. 1st Cir.1962); Weiland v. King, 281 So.2d 688 (La.1973); Albritton v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 385 So.2d 549 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1980); Reed v. Ramsay, 355 So.2d 618 (La. App. 4th Cir.1978); Jordan v. Palm Apartments, 353 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977).
"14. See 43 ALR3rd 1261 et seq.; 48 ALR4th 633-649 [48 ALR4th 638-649 (1992 Supp.) ], Section issued September, 1990. Brown v. Marathon Realty, Inc., 170 A.D.2d 426, 565 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2 Dept.1991), No liability without actual or constructive notice to landlord; Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792, 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990) held that 'Lead Paint Prevention Act' imposed tort liability on landlords; Hardy v. Griffin, 41 Conn.Supp. 283, 569 A.2d 49 (1989); Strict Liability imposed by statute; Garcia v. Jiminez, 184 Ill.App.3d 107, 132 Ill.Dec. 550, 539 N.E.2d 1356 (2 Dist.1989) held that landlord was not under duty to foresee that paint chips created a dangerous condition making injury to a young child foreseeable; Bencosme v. Kokoras, 400 Mass. 40, 507 N.E.2d 748 (1987) held that a residential property owner is strictly liable for injuries by statute; Coalition To End Lead Poisoning v. Koch, 138 Misc.2d 188, 524 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1987); Fishkind Realty v. Sampson, 306 Md. 269, 508 A.2d 478 (1986); Franklin v. Krumanocker, 114 A.D.2d 611, 494 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3 Dept.1985); Ford v. Goffstein Realty, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. 1984); Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584 (Mo.App.1982); Holmes v. District of Columbia, 418 A.2d 142 (D.C.App.1980); copies of the above cited cases are attached as appendix A.