Case Name: Gordon G. CARLSON, Appellant, v. RESERVATION RANCH, a partnership consisting of Henry Westbrook, III and Robert Lane Westbrook, partners, Third-Party Plaintiff - Respondent, and S. E. COMFORT and Douglas County Lumber Company, Third-Party Defendants
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1993-05-19
Citations: 120 Or. App. 435
Docket Number: CV 89-0623; CA A72403
Parties: Gordon G. CARLSON, Appellant, v. RESERVATION RANCH, a partnership consisting of Henry Westbrook, III and Robert Lane Westbrook, partners, Third-Party Plaintiff - Respondent, and S. E. COMFORT and Douglas County Lumber Company, Third-Party Defendants.
Judges: Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 120
Pages: 435–437

Head Matter:
On respondent’s petition for reconsideration filed April 6,
and on appellant’s petition for reconsideration filed April 13,
reconsideration allowed; opinion (118 Or App 512, 848 P2d 616) modified and adhered to as modified May 19,
both petitions for review denied July 27, 1993 (317 Or 271)
Gordon G. CARLSON, Appellant, v. RESERVATION RANCH, a partnership consisting of Henry Westbrook, III and Robert Lane Westbrook, partners, Third-Party Plaintiff - Respondent, and S. E. COMFORT and Douglas County Lumber Company, Third-Party Defendants.
(CV 89-0623; CA A72403)
852 P2d 933
Frank R. Alderson, Judge pro tempore. (Motion for Summary Judgment)
Lann D. Leslie and Atherly, Butler & Burgott, Eugene, for petition of respondent.
Larry O. Gildea, Nickolas Facaros and Gildea & Facaros, Eugene, for petition of appellant.
Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
EDMONDS, J.

Opinion:
EDMONDS, J.
Plaintiff appealed a judgment upholding the reservation of a timber interest in a deed. We reversed. 118 Or App 512, 848 P2d 616 (1993). Both parties filed petitions for review, which we treat as petitions for reconsideration. ORAP 9.15. We allow reconsideration on both petitions and adhere to our opinion as modified.
In our opinion, we held that the deed reserves a perpetual interest in "all timber." We also held that the phrase "all timber" was ambiguous and precluded summary-judgment. The reservation at issue consisted of two components: a durational component ("now growing or being or which may hereafter be grown"), which we held to create a perpetual interest, and a subject component ("all timber"), which we held was ambiguous. By holding that the phrase "all timber' ' was ambiguous, we were not referring to the size of the timber. Rather, we meant that the deed was ambiguous as to the species of trees reserved.
The parties' other arguments do not require further discussion.
Reconsideration allowed; opinion modified and adhered to as modified.