Case Name: HAZEL MAE FOX, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PASSAIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, GUADALUPE OLIVAR AND EMILIA C. LAYUGAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1976-07-09
Citations: 71 N.J. 122
Docket Number: 
Parties: HAZEL MAE FOX, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PASSAIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, GUADALUPE OLIVAR AND EMILIA C. LAYUGAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 122–132

Head Matter:
HAZEL MAE FOX, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. PASSAIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, GUADALUPE OLIVAR AND EMILIA C. LAYUGAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Argued February 23, 1976
Decided July 9, 1976.
Mr. Edward E. Kuebler argued the cause for Defendants-Appellants.
Mr. Albert L. Cohn argued the cause for Plaintiff-Eespondent (Messrs. Cohn •& Lifland, attorneys; Mr. Daniel Crystal on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Cojsteokd, P. J. A. D.,
Temporarily Assigned. We are called upon here further to refine the application of the so- called "discovery" rule to the defense of statute of limitations in medical malpractice and similar actions. See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N. J. 267 (1973); Moran v. Napolitano and Bellavia, 71 N. J. 133 (1976) argued and decided simultaneously herewith.
Succinctly stated, does a plaintiff who discovers the existence of a malpractice cause of action prior to the expiration of a period of two years after the defendant's actionable conduct necessarily have a full two years after such discovery to bring the action ? Or, if the action is not brought within two years of the actionable conduct, is it barred if not brought within "a reasonable time" after discovery of the existence of the cause of action? The trial judge in this case answered the first stated question in the negative and the second in the affirmative and dismissed plaintiff's action by entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. By a divided vote the Appellate Division reversed. The case is here by virtue of the dissent in the Appellate Division. B. 2:2-1 (a) (2).
The factual background of this case is fully set forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division. See 135 N. J. Super. 108 at 109, 113. Por present purposes the facts may be summarized as follows. Plaintiff sustained an abdominal operation at the defendant hospital on October 26, 1970. A drain was left in the incision. Because of discomfort after discharge from the hospital plaintiff was readmitted thereto on November 17, 1970, when an abscess was drained by the operating surgeon and another drain inserted in the incision. The second drain was removed in December 1970, plaintiff still complaining of abdominal pain. On Pebruary 22, 1971 an x-ray examination at another hospital disclosed a foreign object in plaintiff's abdomen, and the original drain, left there in October 1970, was removed by surgical operation performed March 2, 1971.
Plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the operating surgeon in March 1971 and settled her claim against him thereafter. She brought the present action against the defendant hospital and the defendant nurses December 1, 1972, charging them with negligence in her post-operative care and treatment in connection with the original surgery.
The trial court, in dismissing the action because brought more than two years after the alleged actionable conduct of defendants, construed our decision in Lopez v. Swyer, supra, to permit a plaintiff the benefit of the discovery rule only when it was "equitable" to do so, and it found plaintiff was not entitled to the protection of the rule here because "she had better than a year and a half [after discovery] in which to do something and she did absolutely nothing". In agreeing with that determination the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division expressed the view that a plaintiff should be allowed only "a reasonable time" after discovery to bring his action if otherwise beyond two years after the actionable conduct, not "automatically the same period of time afforded by the statutory period of limitation." 135 N. J. Super. 116. She found persuasive a concurring opinion to the same effect in Rothman v. Silber, 90 N. J. Super. 22, 36 (App. Div.), certif. den. 46 N. J. 538 (1966). The majority in the Appellate Division, however, applied literally the rule as enunciated in our per curiam affirmance and modification in Yerzy v. Levine, 57 N. J. 234, 235 (1970), where we stated the question before us was "whether plaintiff brought this action within two years after plaintiff knew or had reason to know that plaintiff might have a basis for a claim against the defendant ."
Subject to the following comments, we are in essential agreement with the rule as understood and applied by the Appellate Division majority in this case.
In our view, the principles governing administration of the discovery rule should be as simple and uncomplicated as is consistent with the achievement of justice for both claimants and defendants in this area. We reaffirm the views expressed in Lopez v. Swyer, supra, calling for an equitable approach to the question of the bar of limitations when discovery by plaintiff of the cause of action is delayed and an action is begun more than two years after the actionable occurrence. 62 N. J. at 275. But we see no utility in a rule which would add to the difficulties already faced by a trial judge in determining, under Lopez, the date of "discovery" of the cause of action by the plaintiffs, the task of resolving in every case the "reasonableness" vel non of the time left for the commencement of an action between the date of discovery and the expiration of the two years from the actionable occurrence. It is convenient as well as logical to take the position that since the cause of action does not accrue until discovery thereof, under the rationale of the discovery principle, Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N. J. 434, 450 (1961), the plaintiff should normally have the benefit of the legislative policy determination that he may institute his action at any time within two years from the date of such accrual. See Yerzy v. Levine, supra, 57 N. J. at 235; Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S. W. 2d 211 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1974); Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N. W. 2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1974).
Subject to administration of this concept with an eye to justice for the defendant as well as the plaintiff — a matter presently to be addressed — we see no reason why it should be required of the plaintiff that he bring his action with any degree of "expedition" after discovery of his cause of action, as intimated in some of the earlier cases. In principle, he should ordinarily have the full statutory two years after accrual, just as he does when discovery is contemporaneous with the actionable conduct. The position we espouse has the virtue of reducing the uncertainty as to when the bar of limitations cuts off the cause of action to the maximum extent consistent with the nature of the discovery rule. It should therefore be helpful to lawyers counselling plaintiffs as well as defendants.
The view we take of this matter seems to have at least the implicit concurrence of other courts generally. We have not been able to find an out-of-state case in this field which accepts, or even discusses, the "reasonable time" rule espoused by the dissenting Appellate Division judge. On the other hand, numerous decisions where plaintiff waited a substantial time after discovery of his cause of action before instituting action have rejected the statute of limitations defense, the action having been filed prior to the expiration of the statutory period after discovery of the cause of action. Representative decisions of this kind in which discovery took place prior to expiration of the initial statutory period are: Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S. W. 2d 211 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1974); Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N. W. 2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1974); Landis v. Delp, 327 F. Supp. 766 (E. D. Pa. 1971); Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967); Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P. 2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P. 2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Representative decisions of the kind noted where discovery took place after expiration of the initial statutory period are: Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital, 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N. E. 2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P. 2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P. 2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P. 2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N. W. 2d 507 (Sup. Ct. N. D. 1968); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N. W. 2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Murphy v. Dyer, 260 F. Supp. 822 (D. Colo. 1966) aff'd 409 F. 2d 747 (10th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 205 (W. D. Ark. 1967).
The general rationale throughout the cited cases is that the cause of action does not "accrue" until discovery.
As already intimated, however, the general rule we here declare must be administered in such manner as not unduly to affect a defendant's right to equitable treatment. The discovery rule possesses the inherent capacity for prejudice to a defendant since the principle of repose inherent in the statute of limitations is necessarily diluted when an action is instituted beyond the statutory period after the defendant's actionable conduct. See Lopez v. Swyer, supra, 62 N. J. at 274. We therefore are of the view, and hold, that if a defendant can establish (a) that the lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the actionable event and the date of institution of the suit "peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant", id. at 276; and (b) that there was a reasonable time for plaintiff to institute his action between discovery of the cause of action and expiration of said two years after the actionable event, the cause of action may be dismissed on limitations grounds. Cf. Owens v. White, 342 F. 2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965); Grey v. Silver Bow County, supra (425 P. 2d at 821).
There is neither claim nor evidence in the present case of prejudice to defendants of the kind and degree indicated in the qualification aforestated.
In view of the stated conclusions we need not address plaintiff's alternative contention that the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous course of treatment..
Judgment affirmed; no costs on this appeal.
However, the statement in the text does not alter the rule of Lopez v. Swyer, supra, 62 N. J. at 276, to the extent that that ease holds that a plaintiff who contends his discovery of his cause of action postdated defendant's actionable conduct has the burden of proof as to the date of such discovery.
By definition, the prejudice rule we here announce is applicable only in cases where plaintiff discovers his cause of action within two years of the actionable conduct of defendant. As to the effect of prejudice to defendant where the cause of action is discovered later, we leave the matter, subject to what we said in Lopez, 62 N. J. at 276, for further consideration in a case presenting that precise issue.
We intend our present holding to be confined to two-year statutes of limitations. We reserve as to comparable problems in the context of longer periods of limitation.