Case Name: James A. BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John LAMBERT; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-09-16
Citations: 74 F. App'x 836
Docket Number: No. 02-36104; D.C. No. CV-00-05085-AAM
Parties: James A. BOYD, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. John LAMBERT; et al., Defendants—Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 74
Pages: 836–838

Head Matter:
James A. BOYD, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. John LAMBERT; et al., Defendants—Appellees.
No. 02-36104.
D.C. No. CV-00-05085-AAM.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 8, 2003.
Decided Sept. 16, 2003.
James A. Boyd, pro se, Walla Walla, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Carol A. Murphy, AGWA-Office of the Washington Attorney General (Olympia), Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before PREGERSON, THOMAS and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
James A. Boyd, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation, interference with free exercise of his Muslim religion, violations of due process and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), and we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's November 7, 2002 order.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Boyd's motion to appoint an expert on Islamic practices because the services of an expert were unnecessary.
Judge McDonald did not err by deciding Boyd's motion for recusal in the first instance because a recusal motion may be decided by the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a motion for recusal must be decided by the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned). Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion because Boyd's conclusory allegations of bias failed to establish legally sufficient grounds for recusal. See Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.1993) (concluding that mere speculative assertions of invidious motive are insufficient to show judicial bias).
We have considered Boyd's remaining contentions and find them unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.