Case Name: PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-02-21
Citations: 44 Mich. App. 679
Docket Number: Docket No. 11987
Parties: PEOPLE v MITCHELL
Judges: Before: Bronson, P. J., and Danhof and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 44
Pages: 679–695

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MITCHELL
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law—Evidence—Motion to Suppress—Discretion.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to turn aside from a criminal trial to conduct a separate hearing upon the admissibility of evidence or in refusing to allow a second continuance where defense counsel failed to make a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence as a matter of strategy, argued that portion not originally considered harmful became prejudicial, yet never revealed to the trial judge the precise nature of the prejudice, and where the record does not disclose a miscarriage of justice requiring consideration of the merits of an unpreserved issue.
2. Homicide—Evidence—Character—Homosexuality—Proof of
Specific Acts—Admissibility.
In a trial for murder evidence of a defendant’s homosexuality introduced to prove defendant’s bad character by proof of other bad acts after defendant had claimed self-defense precipitated by the deceased’s alleged homosexual assault and that the defendant had never made homosexual advances is not limited to proof of a reputation for homosexuality but may include proof of specific acts.
Dissent by Bronson, J.
3. Criminal Law—Evidence—Other Offenses—Admissibility.
Evidence regarding other crimes and misconduct is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s criminal disposition or propensity to commit the crime charged.
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 225.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 344, 345, 351.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 307.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 324.
4. Homicide—Evidence—Impeachment—Proof op Specific Acts— Admissibility.
Proof of specif c acts of homosexual conduct between the defendant in a murder trial and a third person, portraying the defendant as the solicitor, should not be admissible to rebut a claim of self-defense portraying the deceased as the sexual aggressor because the defendant’s alleged misconduct with a third person is a collateral issue, irrelevant to the crime charged, and highly prejudicial.
Appeal from Lapeer, James P. Churchill, J.
Submitted Division 2 June 6, 1972, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 11987.)
Decided February 21, 1973.
Garry D. Mitchell was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant-appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Martin E. Clements, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Clayton E Preisel, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bronson, P. J., and Danhof and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Danhof, J.
Defendant was convicted by jury verdict of second-degree murder. MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549. He appeals, raising three allegations of error predicated upon the trial judge's rulings. Reversible error is claimed by these rulings which (1) admitted into evidence defendant's statement made to the police after his arrest because the motion made at trial to suppress was untimely, (2) permitted the prosecution to rebut defendant's claim that he was homosexually assaulted by the deceased with testimony regarding defendant's solicitation of homosexual relations with a third party, and (3) denied defendant's request for a second continuance to produce an additional surre-buttal witness.
At the time the sequence of events leading up to the homicide were set in motion, defendant was on parole. On November 13, 1970, defendant's parole officer received a letter from defendant relating the following story: On Sunday evening, November 8, defendant stopped at the Hillside Tavern located on highway M-24. Near closing time defendant met the deceased, Donald Guthrie, whom he asked for a ride to Lapeer. The deceased invited defendant to spend the night with him and he accepted. When defendant awoke the following morning, deceased was drinking beer at the kitchen table. The deceased offered defendant an "eye-opener" and they drank a quantity of beer and whiskey. Defendant became ill and the deceased told him to lie down in the back bedroom. Defendant was awakened by deceased tugging at his pants with "real big" eyes. He grabbed defendant's penis and defendant reacted by hitting him five or six times. The deceased stepped backwards, reached behind him, and produced a knife. A struggle ensued during which defendant secured possession of the knife and stabbed the deceased in the chest.
Overcome by panic, defendant took the deceased's car keys and fled in his vehicle. Defendant "drove around" for a few days attempting to decide whether or not to surrender to authorities. He wanted to surrender but was afraid he would be convicted since he was an ex-convict and his claim of self-defense would not be believed. He gave the name and location of the deceased and concluded the letter by . requesting that someone be notified since he did not know whether the man was dead.
This letter was forwarded to the Lapeer State Police post which dispatched an officer to the given address. The officer subsequently confirmed the homicide. Defendant was in an automobile which was stopped by Vassar city police officers for speeding in the early morning hours of November 14, 1970. After his identity failed to match the registration certificate listing Donald Guthrie as owner, the officers contacted the Lapeer State Police post for an "identification check" of the vehicle's license plates. Upon being informed of the homicide, they arrested defendant and transported him to the Vassar City Police Department. Custody of defendant was subsequently transferred to Lapeer State Police officers. After they advised defendant of his Miranda rights, he offered a statement in substantial compliance with the letter. On November 20, 1970, defendant gave the police a slightly more elaborate statement which conformed to his earlier statement and letter.
At trial defendant's letter and two statements were offered and received into evidence. The defendant objected to the admission of the statement of November 20, 1970, contending that it was involuntarily procured. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding it untimely. Since the November 20th statement contained ambiguous references to defendant's involvement in homosexual conduct, defendant, upon taking the stand, testified that he had never solicited such relations. The prosecution offered one of defendant's three cellmates during his pretrial confinement as a rebuttal witness to testify to defendant's solicitation of homosexual relations. Defendant responded by requesting and obtaining a continuance and offering one of the remaining cellmates as a surrebuttal witness. Defendant requested a second continuance to secure the attendance of the final cellmate for surrebuttal. Believing further delay to be unjustified, the trial judge denied the motion. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Defendant first challenges the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress the allegedly involuntary statement of November 20, 1970, submitted at trial. The procedure followed by the courts of this state to test the voluntariness of statements and confessions elicited from defendants during police interrogation is found in People v Walker, 374 Mich 331 (On Rehearing, 1965). A Walker hearing, contemplating a pretrial motion, conforms with the general rule which requires a pretrial motion to suppress evidence upon pain of waiver. People v Ferguson, 376 Mich 90 (1965); People v Smith, 19 Mich App 359 (1969); People v Childers, 20 Mich App 639 (1969); People v Paffhousen, 20 Mich App 346 (1969). People v Willie Williams #1, 23 Mich App 129 (1970). This rule is not without exception since the authorities permit the trial judge within his discretion to entertain a motion to suppress at trial. Whether a trial judge abuses his discretion by not turning aside from a criminal case to conduct a separate hearing upon the admissibility of evidence may be tested by the existence of "special circumstances" justifying the delay. Although this concept has not been fully defined, the primary example is offered in People v Ferguson, supra, a case where the factual circumstances constituting the illegality are not known prior to trial.
In the present case, defense counsel, when questioned by thé trial judge regarding the delay in submitting the motion to suppress, answered that it was a matter of strategy. He argued that certain portions of the statement not originally considered harmful subsequently became prejudicial. The precise nature of this prejudice was neither revealed to the trial judge nor appears in defendant's appellate brief. An application of the cited authorities fails to reveal an abuse of discretion. Further, based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that the statement, even if improperly admitted, caused a miscarriage of justice requiring us to consider the merits of an unpreserved issue.
The record shows no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow a second continuance.
The significant issue before us is raised by defendant's challenge to the admission of evidence regarding his alleged homosexual conduct with others. The issue of homosexuality was interjected into the case by defendant's reliance upon a claim of self-defense precipitated by the deceased's alleged homosexual assault. The defendant also testified that he had never made homosexual advances. When the defendant did these things he placed his character in issue insofar as it involves homosexuality. By placing his character in issue he rendered it proper for the prosecution to introduce evidence that his character was not as he said it was. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 58, pp 457-458.
Finding no Michigan authority that is in point on the question of proving bad character by proof of other bad acts, in a case similar to the one at bar, we turn to a line of California cases which we find highly persuasive. People v Westek, 31 Cal 2d 469; 190 P2d 9 (1948), was a prosecution for sodomy and lewd and lascivious conduct. On direct examination the defendant testified that he had never committed any acts of sodomy or lewdness. The prosecution then produced several witnesses who testified that he had performed such acts on them. The Supreme Court of California found such evidence to be admissible. The Court reasoned that unless the prosecutor was allowed to use such evidence the defendant would be able to place himself in an especially favorable light before the jury, and the prosecution would not be allowed to rebut the false impression thus conveyed. We agree with the reasoning of the California Court.
Subsequent California cases have applied the, same reasoning. People v Goff, 100 Cal App 2d 166; 223 P2d 27 (1950), applied the rule in another lewdness case. People v LeBeau, 235 P2d 850 (Cal App, 1951), was a narcotics case. People v Hughes, 123 Cal App 2d 767; 267 P2d 376 (1954), was an assault case. We are convinced that the rule should be applied to the case at bar.
We are not impressed by the argument that evidence of homosexuality should be limited to proof of a reputation for homosexuality. To adopt such a rule would be to reject the more reliable of two types of proof. A homosexual will often have no reputation as such, and a reputation for homosexuality will all too often be based on the rankest of speculation. Proof of specific acts is by far the most reliable means of proof.
Affirmed.
Van Valkenburg, J., concurred.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
People v Ferguson, 376 Mich 90, 94 (1965).
People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702 (1969).