Case Name: STATE of Maryland v. Stephen PAGOTTO
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2000-11-16
Citations: 361 Md. 528
Docket Number: No. 99
Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Stephen PAGOTTO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 361
Pages: 528–580

Head Matter:
762 A.2d 97
STATE of Maryland v. Stephen PAGOTTO.
No. 99,
Sept. Term, 1999.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Nov. 16, 2000.
Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Kimberly A. Alley and Herny L. Belsky (Schlachman, Bel-sky & Weiner, P.A., on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.
Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Opinion:
RAKER, Judge.
Respondent, Stephen Pagotto, a sergeant with the Baltimore City Police Department, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of reckless endangerment in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 120(a) following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Pagotto noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the State presented legally insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his convictions. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Pagotto and reversed the judgment of conviction. See Pagotto v. State, 127 Md.App. 271, 732 A.2d 920 (1999). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. We shall hold that the evidence was insufficient to support Pagotto's convictions. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
We are mindful that, in an appeal based upon insufficiency of evidence, it is not the function of the appellate court to undertake a review of the record that would amount to a retrial of the case. See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994). Rather, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and the judgment can be reversed only if we find that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337. Fundamentally, our concern is not with whether the trial court's verdict is in accord with the weight of the evidence, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, but only with whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence — evidence which could fairly convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d at 337.
In other words, in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the appellate court is not to ask whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the court only asks "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d at 337-38; Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 661, 612 A.2d 258, 274 (1992).
II.
The facts of this case are undisputed until the critical moments leading up to the discharge of Respondent's weapon. Sergeant Pagotto and his partner, Officer Stephen Wagner, were both assigned to the Gun Recovery Unit of the Baltimore City Police Department (hereinafter "Department"). The mission of the Gun Recovery Unit was to remove guns from the streets of Baltimore City. Each officer assigned to this unit was trained to look for people with certain characteristics that police profiles indicated were more likely to carry guns. The Gun Recovery Unit frequently used pretextual traffic stops to accomplish their mission. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation if police have probable cause to believe driver of automobile is violating traffic regulation, but the stop is to accomplish some other investigative purpose).
The incident in question occurred on the night of February 7, 1996. Officers Pagotto and Wagner were assigned to the Northeastern District of Baltimore in an area called "Little Eastern." This area was selected because it has a high concentration of narcotics trafficking and gun related violence. Pagotto and Wagner were dressed in plain clothes that evening, although they were driving a "marked Tracker," making them easily identifiable as police officers.
At approximately 8:30 p.m., the two officers spotted a white Subaru in the 2600 block of Kirk Avenue. Although the officers stopped the car because the license was displayed improperly, they both testified that their subjective motive in stopping the car was to look for guns. According to Sergeant Pagotto, they decided to stop this particular car because it was in a high drug and gun area and looked suspicious. Officer Pagotto explained the significance of the license tag:
A lot of times people who are going to conceal what they are doing like dealing narcotics or doing a drive-by shooting or even if it is a stolen car, guns and narcotics are synonymous with each other, and they just . [remove the tag] to conceal their identification.
In response to the officers' signal to stop, the Subaru pulled over on the 2700 Block of Kirk Avenue. Sergeant Pagotto stopped the Tracker about ten feet behind the Subaru. Both officers left the Tracker and began to approach the Subaru. Officer Pagotto approached the driver's side and Officer Wagner approached the passenger's side. Three people were in the Subaru: Preston Barnes, Damien Jackson, and Ali Austin. Officer Wagner testified that, as they approached the car, he noticed that all three persons were "very excited and moving." Officer Pagotto testified that,- when he was about five feet from the back of the car, he saw the driver of the car, Preston Barnes, tilt his head back and drop his shoulder. As part of his training for the Gun Recovery Unit, Pagotto had been instructed that movements such as these were consistent with the picking up of a weapon or the placing of one under the seat. It was at this time that Pagotto withdrew from his holster his police weapon, a Glock 17 automatic.
Damien Jackson, testifying for the prosecution, stated that, earlier that evening, the three men in the car had stopped to pick up ten bags of "Ready Rock," a form of cocaine. He further testified that, when the police signaled for them to pull over, Preston Barnes exclaimed, "Oh shit, I'm dirty," referring to the fact that he was carrying drugs. Barnes was on probation for a drug conviction, and Jackson testified that Barnes knew that any new convictions would constitute a violation of probation and could result in a minimum of five years in prison.
Jackson also explained an escape plan that he and Barnes had worked out in case they were ever caught in such a situation. The plan was that, if they were stopped while carrying drugs, they would pull the car over and bring it to a stop. The officers would then presumably stop their vehicle and begin to approach the car. When the officers came close to the car, Barnes would "rev up" the engine and take off. The two figured that they would be able to make a clean getaway by the time that the officers made it back to their vehicle, started it, and began pursuit. It appears that it was this plan that Barnes was attempting to implement on the night in question.
As the two officers approached the car, it began drifting forward slightly. Officer Wagner originally believed that it was drifting because the car had parked on a downslope along Kirk Avenue. Both officers were yelling orders at the driver of the car "to stop, put on the brake, put the car in park." Sergeant Pagotto then arrived at the driver's side door with his weapon drawn in his right hand. Two separate versions of the precise events from this point forward were provided by Sergeant Pagotto, on the one hand, and Damien Jackson and Ali Austin, on the other hand.
Damien Jackson testified that, when Sergeant Pagotto arrived at the driver's side door, Pagotto opened the door and then stepped back two or three feet from the car. He further testified that, as Pagotto stepped back from the door, Pagotto was yelling at Barnes to "[s]top the car, stop the car, or I am going to shoot." It was at this point that Barnes shifted from park to drive and pressed down on the gas pedal. Because there was a car parked in front of the Subaru, Barnes had to move the car toward the center of Kirk Avenue and Sergeant Pagotto. As he did so, Jackson and Austin heard a shot, then heard Barnes exclaim, "Oh shit," and slump over. The car proceeded to crash into a parked car down the street. When it did so, both Jackson and Austin fled the scene.
Sergeant Pagotto's testimony differed slightly. He testified that, as he approached the car, he withdrew his gun from the holster, holding it in his right hand with his finger on the slide of the gun. He then took another two or three steps, and, when he neared the door, the driver opened the door slightly. Sergeant Pagotto had seen a training video that instructed officers to be cautious when a car door opens slightly because many officers had been killed in similar situations. Fearing that he was about to be ambushed by Barnes, he instinctively moved forward to attempt to grab Barnes's arm. Pagotto testified that he had been trained to go into an ambush because it draws other fire towards the attacker.
Pagotto struggled with Barnes with his left hand while his police weapon remained outside the vehicle in his right hand, along his side. Barnes managed to rip his arms away from Pagotto and toward the console. Fearing that Barnes was going for a gun, Pagotto attempted to disengage himself from the car. Pagotto testified that, at this point, he was stuck halfway in the car with his feet outside of the car while the car was rolling forward. When Pagotto heard the engine start, he yelled to Wagner to "get the Tracker," meaning the police vehicle. Pagotto testified that he was then able to free himself of the Subaru just before Barnes put the car into gear. When the Subaru moved out toward him, his hand struck the side of the car, knocking him to the ground, and causing his gun to discharge. Officer Wagner testified that it was while he was getting the Tracker that he heard the shot. He turned around to see Sergeant Pagotto's body falling forward from a position against the car.
The bullet entered the left rear passenger window through the lower left hand corner. It passed between the post that separates the front and rear door and the driver's seat. It then struck the body of Preston Barnes just under his left armpit and continued through his chest, piercing his heart and lung. The trajectory of the lethal bullet was consistent with Sergeant Pagotto's testimony.
III.
The chief question in this case is whether Pagotto's conduct on that night, "considering all of the factors of the case, was such that it amounted to 'wanton or reckless disregard for human life.' " Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 589, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (1954) (quoting Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F.Supp. 335, 341 (1951)). See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348. As such, we must determine if the State produced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Pagotto had not acted as "a reasonable police officer, similarly situated." Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 349.
The State argues that Pagotto was grossly negligent by violating Baltimore City Police Department guidelines in three respects: (1) closing on the victim with his gun drawn; (2) attempting a one-armed vehicular extrication with his gun in the other hand; and (3) placing his trigger finger on the slide of the gun, rather than under the trigger guard as he approached the decedent's car. Pagotto contends that each of these acts was reasonable under the circumstances.
Each side presented several expert witnesses. The State called four key witnesses as experts on police procedure. They were Major Francis Melcavage, a former instructor at the Baltimore City Training Academy and an expert in defense tactics and use of force; Sergeant Craig Meier, a member of the Firearms Training Unit of the Baltimore City Police Education and Training Division and an expert in the use of force and firearms; Sergeant Timothy Yittetoe of the Maryland State Police, an expert in use of force, defense tactics, police training, and police procedures; and John L. Meiklejohn, an expert in defense tactics, training points and procedures, standards of police conduct, and use of force. We shall review the evidence presented at trial, in the light most favorable to the State, to determine if any rational trier of fact could have convicted the defendant of the crimes charged.
A.
The first alleged grossly negligent act is that Pagotto closed on the victim with his gun drawn. It is first important to note that three of the State's experts stated that they did not feel that it was inappropriate for Pagotto to draw his gun when he did; the only problem was that he should not have closed with his gun drawn. Sergeant Meier testified that an officer is justified in drawing his weapon anytime that he has a reasonable-belief that there is a threat of death or serious injury to himself or others and that Sergeant Pagotto was, therefore, justified in drawing his weapon when he did. He testified, however, that it is inappropriate for an officer to close with his weapon drawn and that it is a violation of general police guidelines. Once Pagotto perceived a threat, he should have returned to his car and called for backup, rather than closing on Barnes. He explained that the rationale for the policy is the concern that, should the officer come too close to a suspect, he could become engaged in a struggle and accidentally discharge his weapon.
John Meiklejohn corroborated Sergeant Meier's testimony, stating that Pagotto was justified in drawing his weapon, but should have retreated to his vehicle upon perceiving a threat. Sergeant Vittetoe's testimony differed only slightly. He testified that, once Pagotto perceived a threat, he should not have drawn his weapon, should not have continued to close, and should have sought cover:
THE COURT: [H]e should have stopped closing as soon as he determined or apprehended a danger, correct?
[VITTETOE]: As he approached and he made the determination that the actions of the driver could either put his life in jeopardy and/or his partner's, indicated in his report, his actions of closing should have ceased at that point. Two things he should have done: disengaged making greater distance and also seeked an area of cover or concealment for his protection and also notify his partner of what he was dealing with at that point so his partner could better defend himself.
The one State witness with a different opinion was Major Francis Melcavage. He testified that, while it is inadvisable for an officer to close with a weapon in hand, it is inadvisable only because of the danger that it poses to the officer and that an officer may, therefore, do so if he chooses:
[DEF. ATT'Y]: So it would be in your mind a violation of a policy or guideline to come within five or six feet of a subject with your gun drawn if you suspected they had a weapon?
[MELCAVAGE]: I don't think that policy has even been delineated. I wouldn't say it was a violation of policy, I would say it was probably inadvisable action.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: Well, but there is a policy that you are familiar with that you should not close with your weapon in your hand, right? Isn't that what you are saying?
[MELCAVAGE]: No, not that I am aware of.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: All right. So you can close with a weapon in your hand?
[MELCAVAGE]: Yes.
The defense presented several witnesses addressing the question whether Sergeant Pagotto was reasonable in closing with his weapon drawn. Detective Jeffries, an original member of the Gun Recovery Unit and an expert in defensive strategies and Gun Recovery Unit practices, testified that, while the Department has a guideline to the contrary, an officer must determine if it is appropriate to close with a drawn gun on a case-by-case basis and that it is within the officer's discretion to do so if he deems it appropriate. In addition, he testified that he has been in twenty-five to fifty situations in which he or someone that he was working with had closed with a drawn gun. Lieutenant Charles J. Key, author of the guidelines that Pagotto had allegedly violated, also testified for the defense. He stated that Pagotto had violated the guideline against closing with a drawn gun. He went on to state, however, that guidelines are discretionary and that Pagotto had acted reasonably under the circumstances.
B.
The second alleged violation is that Pagotto attempted a one-armed vehicular extrication with his gun in the other hand. The only testimony that described any contact between Preston Barnes and Sergeant Pagotto was from Sergeant Pagotto. He characterized this confrontation in a far different light than that in which the State had characterized it. According to Sergeant Pagotto, he did not attempt to extricate Preston Barnes; rather, he was attempting to defend himself from what he felt was an oncoming attack. Pagotto's testimony on direct examination was as follows:
[DEF. ATT'Y]: What was the next thing you did after pulling the gun from the holster?
[PAGOTTO]: I took about two or three more steps toward the car, and got to about the back door on the driver's side____[T]hat is when the door sprung open.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: What were you thinking when that door sprung open?
[PAGOTTO]: I was thinking I was going to get shot.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: Why?
[PAGOTTO]: Because I have had training and saw videos where a . door would open up . and there would be a shotgun right inside the door . the shotgun goes off and kills the officer. I also saw a video showing officers being killed as they approached. I just thought at that point in time, I was going to get killed.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: Why didn't you turn and run back to the Tracker?
[PAGOTTO]: I didn't think of it at the time.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: What did you do instead?
[PAGOTTO]: I went towards the driver.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: And why did you do this?
❖ #
[PAGOTTO]: It was the best plan of attack that way to go in and get ahold of him.
[DEF. ATT'Y]: And what are you basing that on when you say it was the best plan of attack?
[PAGOTTO]: Years of experience, and all the time in a possible ambush situation, I was always trained to go into the ambush, drawing any fire towards that person. It was just instinct, I mean, I pushed the door out of the way and grabbed his hand.
Major Melcavage's testimony was most critical of Sergeant Pagotto's attempted extrication. Major Melcavage, who teaches control tactics and vehicular extrications at the police academy, stated that an officer should always holster his weapon before attempting to remove a driver. He testified:
[STATE'S ATT'Y]: If you have a gun in your hand and you intend to remove a driver from a vehicle through the use of a control tactic, what should you do with the weapon?
[MELCAVAGE]: You would have to holster the weapon.
[STATE'S ATT'Y]: And why is that?
[MELCAVAGE]: Because you need two hands to gain control of an individual or to apply a technique as taught at the academy as I taught. And by keeping the gun in the situation, you are unnecessarily endangering yourself. They can take the gun from you just as well, the subject could take the gun from you just as well as you using it on them, or the gun could go off and you could injure innocent bystanders, yourself, or the subject.
[STATE'S ATT'Y]: Okay. Would that fact change whether the vehicle was stationary or moving?
[MELCAVAGE]: No, sir.
[STATE'S ATT'Y]: If you have your weapon drawn and it is not safe to holster it in order to use the control tactic, what should you do?
[MELCAVAGE]: It is not safe to holster them, you need to seek cover and call for assistance, call for other officers. You have to disengage.
Sergeant Vittetoe testified on this subject as well. He stated that an officer should always holster his weapon before struggling with a suspect because two hands are needed to control a suspect. In addition, the holstered weapon protects against the eventuality that the weapon could be used against the officer. He was, therefore, of the opinion that Sergeant Pagotto should not have attempted to reach into the car with a gun in one of his hands. On cross examination, however, Sergeant Vittetoe testified that, prior to 1994, Maryland State Police Officers were permitted to grab a suspect with one hand while the officer had the service weapon in the other hand.
Detective Kenneth Jeffries, testifying for the defense, stated that it is within an officer's discretion whether to attempt to extricate a suspect with a drawn gun. Lieutenant Key testified that the guidelines are designed for departmental use only and are not to be used as a basis for criminal charges. He further testified that, in evaluating officers, the Department gives the officers wide discretion in applying the guidelines.
C.
The final alleged violation is that Sergeant Pagotto had his finger on the slide of the gun rather than below the trigger guard as required by Baltimore City Police guidelines. Major Melcavage testified that the current Baltimore City Police Department guidelines require an officer to place his trigger finger below the trigger guard. He further testified, however, that, when Sergeant Pagotto was trained in 1980, the Department issued revolvers. The guidelines at that time did not address the location or placement of the officer's trigger finger. He also stated that the Department first issued a guideline with respect to the trigger finger in 1990, when the Department switched to the Glock 17. He testified that, in 1990, police officers were taught to keep their trigger finger on the slide of the gun. According to Major Melcavage, this standard was changed to the current one sometime in 1993 or 1994. Sergeant Meir essentially corroborated the testimony of Major Melcavage in this respect and also stated that Baltimore City is the only police department in Maryland that has this particular requirement.
Captain Meiklejohn testified that Montgomery County officers, unlike the officers in Baltimore City, are still trained to keep their trigger finger on the slide of the weapon. He further testified that the reason that Montgomery County officers are taught to keep their finger on the slide is because keeping the finger below the trigger guard can slow reaction time in a critical situation. Sergeant Vittetoe also testified as to the Maryland State Police Department's practices in this regard:
[DEF. ATT'Y]: And isn't it trae that the Maryland State Police Department trains their officers to also keep their finger in a ready position along the slide of the gun as opposed to under the trigger guard, correct?
[VITTETOE]: That is correct, ma'am.
Lieutenant Key, author of the Baltimore City Police Department guidelines requiring the placement of the trigger finger below the trigger guard, testified for the defense. He testified that Baltimore City is the only police department in the State that requires the placement of the trigger finger below the guard. He further testified that, because Sergeant Pagot-to had originally been trained to keep his trigger finger on the slide of the gun, his "muscle memory" would have caused him, in a stress situation, to go back to his original training and past experience. He testified:
Your body trains itself to do certain things. That applies in this situation because if over the years, and in this case 13 years, your finger is alongside the slide, you cannot eradicate this muscle memory in . 20 or 30 minutes worth of training. It just won't happen. He's going to go back and do what he did in a stress situation, what he's trained himself to do most frequently.
He continued that, due to these circumstances, Sergeant Pa-gotto's placement of his finger along the slide of the weapon was reasonable.
D.
Based on this testimony, the trial judge, in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury on the charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment. The trial judge stated:
I think the evidence that has been submitted so far has been strong, certainly permissible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there was gross negligence and recklessness in the defendant's conduct.
The intermediate appellate court found that the State had failed to meet its burden of production with respect to gross negligence and reversed the judgment. The court held:
[T]he evidence shows three or four possible deviations from or violations of departmental guidelines of the Baltimore City Police Department. It shows that the actions of Sergeant Pagotto may well have contributed to the creation of a dangerous confrontation between himself and Preston Barnes. It shows what may be a case of actionable civil negligence.
We hold that it does not show, however, such a departure from the norm of reasonable police conduct that it may fairly be characterized as "extraordinary and outrageous." We hold that it does not show on the part of the law enforcement officer, even if guilty of some negligence in the performance of his duties, a mens rea that qualifies as a "wanton and abandoned disregard of human life." The burden of production with respect to gross criminal negligence was not satisfied.
Pagotto, 127 Md.App. at 357, 732 A.2d at 965-66. The court based this conclusion, in part, on the fact that the prosecution had failed to present evidence that the violation of a police guideline amounted to an action that was not that of a "reasonable police officer similarly situated" or evidenced a "wanton or reckless disregard of human life." The court stated:
All of the testimony of all of the experts, save one, made no mention of a key link in the chain of logic that was an indispensable but unspoken part of the State's case. Even granting, arguendo, the failure of an officer to follow a departmental guideline, what is the significance of such a failure? The missing premise was vital to the validity of the State's ultimate syllogism of guilt.
Id. at 325, 732 A.2d at 948. The only witness to testify as to the significance of an officer's failure to follow departmental guidelines was Lieutenant Charles Key, an expert for the defense and author of the relevant guidelines. Judge Moylan, writing for the intermediate appellate court, pointed out that Key testified that the police guidelines are used for internal evaluations of the officer only and are highly discretionary.
The Court of Special Appeals also found, in the alternative, that Preston Barnes had removed Sergeant Pagotto from the field of proximate cause by attempting his getaway. The court stated:
As a completely alternative holding, we also conclude that when Preston Barnes put into motion his predetermined tactic of attempting a vehicular getaway from the detention scene, that criminal act on his part constituted an independent intervening cause that resulted in his own death.
Id. at 358, 732 A.2d at 966.
We turn now to determine if the evidence was legally sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact of Officer Pagot-to's guilt of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
Upon our independent review of the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its determination that there was insufficient evidence to support Pagotto's convictions. Specifically, we conclude that Pagotto's actions on the night of February 7, 1996, when viewed in their totality, were neither grossly negligent nor reckless.
At the close of the State's case, the trial court granted Pagotto's motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court found that the State had presented no evidence from which a rational jury could find that Pagotto had intentionally killed Preston Barnes. Thus, the case went to the jury on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter is a common law felony in Maryland. It is defined as
an unintentional killing done without malice, (1) by doing some unlawful act endangering life but which does not amount to a felony, or (2) in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or (3) by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.
Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 347. The charge in this case is predicated upon the negligent doing of some lawful act. For the conviction to lie, however, the State must prove more than mere negligence. The State must show a greater degree of negligence or "gross" negligence. See id.; Duley v. State, 56 Md.App. 275, 289, 467 A.2d 776, 783 (1983); Mills v. State, 13 Md.App. 196, 200, 282 A.2d 147, 149 (1971).
In order for the accused's conduct to constitute gross negligence, "the conduct must manifest 'a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.' " Dishman v. State, 352 Md. 279, 291, 721 A.2d 699, 704 (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 348). See Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 590, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (1954). In other words, the accused's conduct, under the circumstances, must manifest such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinary and prudent person so as to amount to a disregard of the consequences and an indifference to the rights of others. See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348; Duren, 203 Md. at 590, 102 A.2d at 280.
The defendant was also charged with two counts of reckless endangerment of the two passengers in the car: Damien Jackson and Ali Austin. While involuntary manslaughter requires the death of a person, reckless endangerment does not require that any actual harm occur to another. See Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 442, 605 A.2d 138, 141 (1992). Maryland's reckless endangerment statute, codified at the time of this incident as Maryland Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol.) Article 27, § 120(a), provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person who recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both.
This statute is aimed at deterring the commission of potentially harmful conduct before an injury or death occurs. See Minor, 326 Md. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141. The statute was enacted "to punish, as criminal, reckless conduct which created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. It is the reckless conduct and not the harm caused by the conduct, if any, which the statute was intended to criminalize." Id. at 441, 605 A.2d at 141. Thus, the focus is on the conduct of the accused. The test to determine whether a defendant's conduct was reckless is
whether the appellant's misconduct, viewed objectively, was so reckless as to constitute a gross departure from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe, and thereby create the substantial risk that the statute was designed to punish.
Id. at 443, 605 A.2d at 141.
A defendant's conduct is typically measured against the conduct of an ordinarily prudent citizen similarly situated. Where the accused is a police officer, however,
the reasonableness of the conduct must be evaluated not from the perspective of a reasonable civilian but rather from the perspective of a reasonable police officer similarly situated. As the intermediate appellate court explained:
Under almost all circumstances, the gratuitous pointing of a deadly weapon at one civilian by another civilian would almost certainly be negligence per se, if not gross negligence per se. A police officer, on the other hand, is authorized and, indeed, frequently obligated to threaten deadly force on a regular basis. The standard of conduct demanded of a police officer on duty, therefore, is the standard of a reasonable police officer similarly situated.
Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 349 (citations omitted) (quoting, in part, from Albrecht v. State, 97 Md.App. 630, 642, 632 A.2d 163, 169 (1993)).
The theory of the prosecution was that the conduct at issue was identical for the charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment. The prosecution was predicated upon the theory that Sgt. Pagotto's conduct, i.e., the alleged violations of departmental guidelines, was both a gross departure from the standard of conduct that a reasonable police officer similarly situated would observe, thereby creating a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to the two passengers, as well as such grossly negligent conduct that manifested a wanton or reckless disregard of human life. Therefore, under the circumstances presented herein, if we find that the evidence provided by the State was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for manslaughter, then the evidence was also insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless endangerment.
V.
We emphasize again that, in reviewing for legal sufficiency of the evidence, we are not sitting as the trier of fact. Rather, we only determine if any rational trier of fact could have found Pagotto guilty. The Court of Special Appeals found that each of the State's alleged violations of departmental guidelines, at best, amounted to an actionable case in civil negligence. We agree.
With respect to Pagotto's placement of his trigger finger on the slide of the gun, the Court of Special Appeals found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The court stated:
We hold that Sergeant Pagotto's placement of his trigger finger along the "slide" of his Glock automatic, whether considered alone or in combination with any other factor, does not remotely generate a prima facie case of gross criminal negligence. We are not substituting our weighing of the evidence for that of the jury. We are holding, as a matter of law, that the burden of production as to gross criminal negligence was not satisfied so as even to permit the jury to consider such a charge. Although Sergeant Pagotto may not have followed a recently imposed and geographically unique guideline, his action in that regard was not inherently wrong or of a malum-in-se character.
Had a Maryland State Trooper or a Baltimore County Officer, for instance, ridden along with Sergeant Pagotto on February 7, 1996, and engaged in precisely the same conduct that Sergeant Pagotto did, that State Trooper or County Officer would have been acting with complete propriety with respect to the placement of the trigger finger on a weapon. Had Sergeant Pagotto himself placed his trigger finger on the "slide" of his weapon on February 7, 1993, instead of on February 7, 1996, he would then have been acting with complete propriety. Except for a criminal violation of a local municipal or county ordinance, precisely the same act under precisely the same circumstances cannot be a crime in Baltimore City but not a crime in Baltimore County.
Pagotto, 127 Md.App. at 310-11, 732 A.2d at 941. The State's logic leads to the conclusion that a police officer placing his finger on the slide of the weapon is criminally negligent behavior if committed by a Baltimore City Police Officer in Baltimore City, but acceptable, non-criminal behavior if committed by any other police officer anywhere else in the State. The Court of Special Appeals was correct in concluding that this result is illogical.
We also agree with the Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that Sergeant Pagotto's act of closing with a drawn gun was not criminally negligent. The intermediate appellate court held:
Even assuming that "closing" to within a few feet of Preston Barnes constituted ordinary civil negligence, there was nothing in the appellant's behavior to suggest "a wanton or reckless disregard for human life." He approached an inherently dangerous confrontation with his weapon in hand.
Hindsight, indeed, revealed that Sergeant Pagotto's suspicions and fears were well-grounded. Although Sergeant Pagotto did not know it at the time, Preston Barnes was almost certainly committing a felony in his presence — the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Rather than risk a violation of probation, Preston Barnes was poised, just as the Sergeant drew near, to initiate a high speed getaway, wantonly running down Sergeant Pagotto in the process if need be. If in a stress-laden situation and for his own self-protection Sergeant Pagotto violated a departmental guideline, he did not thereby commit an act of gross negligence.
Id. at 318, 732 A.2d at 945.
The final alleged violation of Department guidelines was Sergeant Pagotto's so-called one-armed vehicular extrication. The Court of Special Appeals found that Sergeant Pagotto had not violated this guideline and, even if he had, it was not behavior that could legally rise to the level necessary to sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. The court stated in this regard:
The testimony of both Major Melcavage and Sergeant Vittetoe dealt with the subject of vehicular extrication as an abstract academic or training exercise. Self-evidently, one can wrestle with an opponent more effectively with two hands than with one. That's the school situation. They analyzed the problem as if Sergeant Pagotto had moved forward ab initio with a pre-formed and deliberate plan to perform a one-armed vehicular extrication. Their opinions had no pertinence to an instinctive, split-second reaction, actual or hypothetical, where the right hand is already holding a weapon and where a car door suddenly opens, a foot or two away, in front of one's face. The instantaneous reaction either to "move into the ambush" or to attempt to retreat to the cover of the police cruiser is something that is not concerned with the schoolroom paradigm of a model vehicular extrication.
^ ❖ sj«
The appellant's version of this part of the encounter does not permit a finding that the Baltimore City Police Department guideline as to vehicular extrication had been violated. Even assuming, arguendo, that there had been a violation, however, that would be, at most, a prima facie case of ordinary civil negligence. Assuming that this is a case in which an officer might be civilly liable for negligence, there was insufficient evidence of the type of wanton and abandoned indifference to human life required to meet the incremental burden of production that must be satisfied before a jury can consider the issue of gross criminal negligence.
Id. at 320-22, 732 A.2d at 946-47. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the evidence presented at trial, as a matter of law, was insufficient to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter or reckless endangerment. Sergeant Pagotto's behavior simply did not evidence a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life."
In arguing for legal sufficiency, the State relies heavily on State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 649 A.2d 336 (1994). The State contends that Albrecht is dispositive of the instant case because "[l]ike Albrecht, Pagotto's case involves issues of: a police officer's use of his service firearm; the officer's placement of his finger with respect to that service weapon; the officer's aiming of his service weapon at the victim; and, the officer's resort to use his service weapon under circumstances in which the victim presented no threat to the officer." In Albrecht, a Montgomery County Police officer was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of reckless endangerment when the shotgun he was holding accidentally discharged, killing one woman. This Court held that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction for both involun tary manslaughter and reckless endangerment. We conclude, however, that Albrecht is distinguishable.
While these two cases are facially similar, there are several key factors present in Albrecht that are not present in this case. In Albrecht, we noted five factors which elevated Al-brecht's behavior from ordinary civil negligence to gross criminal negligence. We stated:
The State adduced sufficient testimony from which the trial court could have concluded that a reasonable Montgomery County police officer would not have acted as Albrecht did on this occasion, in drawing and racking a shotgun fitted with a bandolier and bringing it to bear, with his finger on the trigger, on an unarmed individual who did not present a threat to the officer or to any third parties, in a situation where nearby bystanders were exposed to danger.
Id. at 505, 649 A.2d at 350-51.
Not one of the five factors that we specifically identified in Albrecht is present in this case. The first factor we noted in Albrecht was the drawing and racking of a shotgun fitted with a bandolier. Sergeant Pagotto, however, drew a standard issue police handgun with no alterations. The second factor in Albrecht was bringing the gun to bear on the victim. The State produced no evidence that Officer Pagotto was aiming his gun at Preston Barnes when it discharged. The third factor we found of particular importance in Albrecht was Albrecht's placement of his, trigger finger on the almost universally prohibited position of directly on the trigger of the gun. Officer Pagotto, in contrast, had his finger on the almost universally accepted position of the slide of the gun. The fourth factor was the fact that Officer Albrecht had ascertained that the victim, Rebecca Garnett, was not armed and no longer presented a threat to him at the time his gun discharged. Preston Barnes, however, still presented a substan tial threat to Officer Pagotto. Barnes was inside a car with his hands hidden from view, and was in the midst of an escape attempt when Officer Pagotto's gun discharged. The final key factor we noted in Albrecht was that several adults and children were standing directly behind the victim when she was shot. The confrontation in this case, by contrast, took place at night on an empty city street. Based on these distinctions, the Court of Special Appeals concluded:
This case, key factor by key factor, is the diametric opposite of Albrecht. The contrast, moreover, highlights the deficiency of the evidence of gross negligence in this case. Even in Albrecht the evidence was close. Here, it did not get close.
Pagotto, 127 Md.App. at 334, 732 A.2d at 953. We agree with the intermediate appellate court and find that the State's reliance on Albrecht to sustain its convictions against Officer Pagotto is misplaced.
The Supreme Court has explained, albeit in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but equally apposite herein, the proper prospective from which we must view a police officer's use of force:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 2%o vision of hindsight... .With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
In hindsight, perhaps Sergeant Pagotto should have acted differently on the night of February 7, 1996. His actions "in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" may even amount to ordinary civil negligence, but they are not such a gross deviation from the actions of an ordinary police officer similarly situated so as to evidence the "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" necessary to support a conviction in this case. We hold, therefore, that Sergeant Pagotto's conduct cannot, as a matter of law, rise to the level of gross negligence. His convictions for involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment must be reversed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
BELL, C.J., dissents.
. The reckless endangerment statute has been recodified as Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) Article 27, § 12A 2, effective October 1, 1996, and was amended by 1997 Maryland Laws Ch. 32 and 1999 Maryland Laws Ch. 34.
. A "marked Tracker" is a Geo Tracker with police striping, the Baltimore City Police shield on the side of the car, and a red light on the roof.
. There was some disagreement, reflected in the testimony, about the status of the license tag. Officer Wagner said that it was displayed in the rear windshield; however, Officer Pagotto did not remember the Subaru displaying a license plate at all.
. The "slide" is a large flat housing that surrounds both the barrel of the gun and other internal mechanisms. When the gun is fired, the "slide" slides to the rear, ejecting the spent shell and then springs back forward, placing another cartridge in firing position.
. "Closing" is term used by police to describe the final stages of an approach toward a suspect. There was some discrepancy at trial as to exactly at what point "approaching" becomes "closing." Various experts placed the distance at anywhere from an arm's length to ten feet from a suspect.
. Because we find, infra, that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we need not address the intermediate appellate court's alternative holding.
. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on this point, we accept Officer Pagotto's version of this part of the encounter, as did the Court of Special Appeals, because it is the only version in evidence.
. Jackson and Austin testified that Pagotto had aimed his gun at Barnes prior to the discharge in an attempt to get Barnes to bring the car to a stop; however, neither witness was able to determine if Pagotto aimed his gun at Barnes when it discharged.