Case Name: J. George NOMEY et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through Honorable Edwin W. EDWARDS, Governor, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-06-09
Citations: 315 So. 2d 709
Docket Number: No. 56336
Parties: J. George NOMEY et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through Honorable Edwin W. EDWARDS, Governor, et al.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents and will assign written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 315
Pages: 709–727

Head Matter:
J. George NOMEY et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through Honorable Edwin W. EDWARDS, Governor, et al.
No. 56336.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 9, 1975.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Car-mack M. Blackmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leon H. Whitten, Dist. Atty. for defendant-relator.
William H. Baker, Holloway, Baker, Culpepper & Brunson, Jonesboro, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
BARHAM, Justice.
In Tolar v. State, 315 So.2d 22 (decided April 24, 1975), this Court declared Act 325 of 1974 unconstitutional. The Tolar case, which originated in Jackson Parish, was an appeal by the State of Louisiana from the district court's judgment declaring Act 325 unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. Thus deprived of a valid existing legal means whereby the sale of alcoholic beverages in Jackson Parish could be prohibited, the requisite number of qualified electors petitioned the Jackson Parish Police Jury, the parish governing authority, requesting that a local option election be called under the surviving provisions of Act 41 of 1974, with a view to controlling alcoholic beverages. On May 12, 1975, pursuant to that petition, the Jackson Parish Police Jury scheduled a parish-wide election for July 1, 1975, at which time the four propositions authorized by Act 41 and contained in La. R.S. 26:583, as amended and reenacted, will be presented to the electorate of Jackson Parish.
Reacting to the Police Jury's action in calling the election, the respondents, holders of valid Class A and Class B retail liquor permits issued by the State, Jackson Parish and the towns in which they respectively operate, filed a petition in the district court attacking the constitutionality of Act 41, the statutory authority pursuant to which the police jury acted in calling the referendum election, and seeking to enjoin the election which they alleged would result in irreparable harm. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, declaring the provisions of Act 41 "patently unconstitutional." Subsequent to the trial court's issuance of the temporary restraining order, the relators applied to this Court for supervisory writs, which we granted. The case was preferentially assigned due to the limited time available for review before the election date set.
Because the district court did not articulate the grounds upon which its determination of the.unconstitutionality of Act 41 rests, the relators apparently attempted to meet each of the various contentions of respondents upon which the district court's determination could have been based.' Having determined that the district court was essentially correct when it pronounced Act 41 unconstitutional we need discuss only those principles which render portions of the legislation void.
La. Const. Art. IV, § 4 (1921) prohibited the passage by the Legislature of any "local or special" law on numerous specified subjects. Explicitly prohibited in that constitutional provision was the passage of any "local or special law [f]or the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting." Likewise prohibited were special laws "[rjegulating labor, trade, manufacturing or agriculture " and special laws "[cjoncerning any civil or criminal actions." Art. Ill, § 12 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 contains a provision substantially similar to the 1921 provision. Art. Ill, § 12 reads in part:
"Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law:
(1) For the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting.
* •
(6) Regulating labor, trade, manufacturing, or agriculture; fixing the rate of interest.
*
(10) Defining any crime."
As may readily be seen by an examination of Section 2 of Act 41, which enacts La.R.S. 26:581.1, Act 41 encompasses a law which is on its face a "special" law since its parish-wide application is confined to twelve enumerated parishes, the parish of Jackson included. Unquestionably, Act 41 affects elections, notwithstanding that the purpose of the elections approved in the act is to regulate intoxicating beverages. Relators argued before this Court that the election provided for in Act 41 is not the type of election contemplated by La. Const. Art. IV, § 4 (1921) and La. Const. Art. III, § 12 (1974) since the Act 41 election is a referendum election which does not bind the governing authority to enact an ordinance in accordance with the will of the electorate. No authority is cited in support of this argument; in point of fact, under an earlier local option law this Court has held that it is the police jury's mandatory duty to adopt an ordinance giving effect to the results of a local option election. Perot v. Police Jury of Natchitoches Parish, 208 La. 1, 22 So.2d 666 (1945). The special character of those provisions of Act 41 which affect only the twelve enumerated parishes is emphasized when the situation under consideration is compared to that which-existed in Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508 (1941). In Peck the Court held that the provision of the voting machine law of 1940 which made the use of voting machines mandatory in New Orleans was not a "special" law, notwithstanding that in all other parishes the use of the voting machine for elections was optional. The Court found that the law operated generally throughout the entire state because it authorized the use of voting machines in all elections. In effect, the special aspect of the law considered in Peck was available state-wide. In this case, the special aspect of the law setting forth procedures for local option elections, i. e., the provision for parish-wide elections in specified parishes, cannot be utilized by the remaining fifty-two parishes in the state. These fifty-two parishes must conduct local option elections on a ward or incorporated municipality basis; thus, those persons in these fifty-two parishes who wish to establish prohibition of certain classes of intoxicants must prevail in the democratic arena on a ward by ward or town by town basis and cannot avail themselves of parish-wide elections.
We reiterate Perot's holding, wherein this Court found that the necessary and mandatory effect of a local option election was1 the enactment of an ordinance giving effect to the results of that election. Necessarily, if the proposition to prohibit the sale of beverages containing 3.2% alcohol by weight and less was favorably voted upon in a parish-wide election, the trade, sale and manufacture of that product in that parish would be prohibited by ordinance. Penalties for the violation of the ordinance would attach. See La. R.S. 26:595. Therefore, in holding that Act 41 is a special law we consider the provisions of the 1974 Constitution which prohibit special laws "(6) [r]eg-ulating labor, trade, manufacturing, or agriculture; fixing the rate of interest " and which prohibit special laws " (10) [d]efining any crime" and the similar provisions in the 1921 Constitution. La. Const. Art. Ill, § 12 (1974); La. Const. Art. IV, § 4 (1921).
It is obvious that the effect of Act 41 of 1974 is to enact special legislation regulating elections and trade . and defining crimes. It is therefore unconstitutional.
Since it appears that a legal determination of whether a law if "local or special" may be based in part on equal protection considerations, and since a determination that a law offends the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Louisiana constitutions would render that provision unenforceable, we turn to a consideration of whether Act 41 works a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws which is constitutionally guaranteed.
Throughout the State of Louisiana, in all of the sixty-four parishes, the sale of alcoholic beverages, recognized to be "a lawful calling" (See Reynolds v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 248 La. 639, 181 So.2d 377 (1966) ), is undertaken by various citizens. Persons engaged in this business and those who desire to undertake such a business, while subject to any lawful exercise of regulation pursuant to the governing authority's police power, are entitled to stand equally before the law and to be accorded due process of law. La. Const. Art. I, § 2 and 3 (1974); La. Const. Art. I, § 2 (1921); United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise entitled to the constitutional protections of equal protection and due process are those persons who wish to patronize these businesses. When the guarantees secured to individuals through the federal and state Bills of Rights are restricted in the lawful exercise of the police power, the restrictions imposed must be reasonable and designed to accomplish a purpose properly within the purview of the police power. See, e. g., City of Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley, 280 So.2d 897 (La.1973). We do not presume to doubt the Legislature's authority to delegate to local governing bodies the right to enforce the will of the electorate as expressed through the outcome of local option elections; nevertheless, the record before us does not contain, nor are we cognizant of, any circumstances which render reasonable the attempted distinctions in the character of local option elections in these twelve specially enumerated parishes. One distinction would effectively deprive persons in those twelve parishes who wish to engage in a business relating to intoxicants and those who wish to patronize such establishments of the right to have the will of their immediate neighbors determine the existence or extent of prohibition on a ward or municipality basis rather than being selectively subjected to a parish-wide determination. Another distinction would arbitrarily permit some governmental subdivisions to vote on four propositions and restrict others to an election on three propositions.
By its very nature, and on its face, Act 41 contains provisions relating to elections, regulating trade and defining crimes which are "special" in nature. Hence, those portions of the Act are constitutionally void. Our declaration of unconstitutionality rests additionally on our determination that those portions of the Act relating specially to the twelve enumerated parishes violate, on their face, the equal protection and due process rights of the inhabitants of those parishes specially affected.
We declare that portion of Act 41 which enacts La. R.S. 26:581.1 unconstitutional in its totality. Having made this pronouncement, we note that it dictates a determination that portions of other sections of Act 41 are unconstitutional. We hold the following sections of Title 26 of the La. Revised Statutes, which Act 41 attempted to amend and reenact, unconstitutional to the extent hereafter indicated:
(1) Section 582 is unconstitutional insofar as it deals with elections on a parish-wide basis.
(2) Section 583 is unconstitutional in respect to the second proposition to be submitted in the petition for referendum because under Section 581.1 which we strike down herein, its submission would be confined to the twelve specially designated parishes'.
(3) Section 587 is unconstitutional insofar as it designates proposition 2 as an issue to be placed on the ballot for election for the same reasons that portions of Section 583 are invalidated.
(4) We have previously declared that the amendment to Section 588 was repealed by Act 325 of 1974, which has been held unconstitutional. See Tolar v. State, supra.
(5) Section 592 is unconstitutional insofar as it deals with election procedures on a parish-wide basis.
We declare proposition 2 which appears in Section 583 and Section 587 unconstitutional because of the severability provision contained in Act 41. In order to preserve the severability of the act we must presume that the legislature did not intend for the proposition concerning beverages containing 3.2% alcohol by weight or less to be a proposition for referendum or on. the ballot, since Section 581.1 particularly states that only three propositions shall appear on the ballots of those localities which are not specially designated. We are cognizant that in the same legislative session, by Act 648, the legislature makes an attempt to have local option- elections on the sale of beverages containing 3.2% alcohol by weight or less in wards and municipal^ ties. That act is not before us and we only construe the act under attack.
For the reasons assigned, we modify the judgment of the trial court to the extent that those portions of Act 41 which are not special' in nature are excluded from our declaration of unconstitutionality. Section 2 of Act 41 of 1974, enacting La. R.S. 26:581.1, and the other portions of Act 41 hereinabove enumerated are declared unconstitutional and the parish-wide election called by the Jackson Parish Police Jury pursuant thereto is permanently enjoined.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents and will assign written reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
. Act 325 of 1974 provides:
"Prohibition of the sale of any or all alcoholic beverages by a local option election held pursuant to this chapter shall not operate as a prohibition of the manufacturing, producing, using, distributing, storing or selling of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight, except where a local option election was held ,on a parishwide, ward or other basis, and an ordinance was subsequently adopted by the local governing authority, specifically including but not limited to parishwide ordinances adopted by the police jury, and was in effect prior to 1948 pursuant to the results of any such election prohibiting the sale of beverages containing alcohol of more than one-half of one percent by volume. It is the solemn expression of the legislative will that this section or any other provision of this chapter shall not be construed in any way whatsoever as or have the effect of vitiating or affecting any such ordinance adopted and in effect prior to 1948 pursuant to a local option election held on a parishwide, ward or other basis which ordinance prohibited the sale of beverages containing alcohol of more than one-half of one percent by volume, and that accordingly such ordinances which were adopted and were in effect prior to 1948 are hereby revived, and any court decisions to the contrary are hereby expressly legislatively overruled."
In the Tolar case the Court noted that the enactment of Act 325 of 1974 repealed that section of Act 41 of 1974 which attempted to amend and reenact La. R.S. 26:-588 (1950). That portion of Act 41 dealing with La. R.S. 26:588 is, therefore, not a part of the act we consider.
. The four propositions read :
"(1) Shall the sale of beverages of low alcoholic content containing more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight and not more than six percent alcohol by volume be permitted?
"(2) Shall the sale of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight be permitted?
"(3) Shall the sale of beverages of high alcoholic content containing more than six percent alcohol by volume for consumption on the premises be permitted?
"(4) Shall the sale of beverages of high alcoholic content containing more than six percent alcohol by volume be permitted by package only and not for consumption on the premises?"
. Act 17 of 1935,1st Bx.Sess., § 4.
. See Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953). See also Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La. 148, 43 So.2d 248 (1949).
. For a discussion of classification as violative of the equal protection right, see Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company v. Goslin, 258 La. 530, 246 So.2d 852 (1971).