Case Name: STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. JAMES D. RAINWATER, Appellant, v. J. C. ROSS et al., Respondents
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1912-01-08
Citations: 161 Mo. App. 671
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. JAMES D. RAINWATER, Appellant, v. J. C. ROSS et al., Respondents.
Judges: Nixon, P. J., concurs in the result. Gray, J., not sitting.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 161
Pages: 671–692

Head Matter:
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. JAMES D. RAINWATER, Appellant, v. J. C. ROSS et al., Respondents.
Springfield Court of Appeals,
January 8, 1912.
Certified to Supreme Court, February 5, 1912.
1. LOCAL OPTION ELECTION: Failure to Initial Ballots. In a local option election the failure of the judges of the election in one of the wards to endorse their initials on some of the ballots, does not vitiate those ballots. [Opinion of COX, J.]
2. APPEAL AND ERROR: Latest Decision of Supreme Court. A decision by either one of the divisions of the Supreme Court is the law of the entire state until overruled and it is the duty of the appellate court to follow the latest one. [Opinion of COX, J.]
3. LOCAL OPTION ELECTION: Failure to Lock Ballot Box. In a local option election the fact that one ballot box in one ward had no lock and that the ballots were returned to the city clerk in this box, does not destroy the entire election of the city. [Opinion of COX, J.]
4. -: Feeding Voters: Bribery. In a local option election the fact that the ladies of the city had a booth within one hundred feet of the polls and furnished eatables to the voters in such booth, and displayed on such booth the sign, “Vote ’¿r Dry” would not vitiate such election, and the conduct upon the part of the ladies cannot be construed as bribery. [Opinion of COX, J.]
5. -: Irregularities: Fraud. Irregularities, fraud or crime may avoid an election, but to do so they must be of such a character as to at least throw doubt on the question whether the result of the election, as declared, is in fact the correct result. In other words, that the election contemplated by the law was not in fact held. [Opinion by COX, J.],
6. -; Collateral Attack. Where a city council by a proper petition of the voters of said city had acquired jurisdiction over the matter of calling and holding a local option election, the validity of its proceedings thereafter with respect thereto is not subject to collateral attack and after jurisdiction is shown, the presumption follows in favor of the regularity of the subsequent proceedings. [Separate Opinion of NIXON, P. J.]
7. LOCAL OPTION LAW: Prima Facie Established. The adoption of the Local Option Law is prima facie established by the production of a certified copy of the result of the election, as spread upon the records of the city ordering the election, and proof that the requisite subsequent publication of the result was made. [Separate Opinion of NIXON, P. J.]
8. QUO WARRANTO: Election Contest. A proceeding by quo warranto is not strictly speaking an election contest between two persons claiming the same office. Such proceedings determine only that the person holding the office is or is not an usurper. It does not adjudge the right to hold an office to be in any one else. [Separate Opinion of NIXON, P. J.]
9. MANDAMUS. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is not applicable when there is another specific remedy. [Separate Opinion of NIXON, P. J.]
10. ELECTION CONTEST: Mandamus: Local Option Election. Where a specific remedy for contesting elections has been provided by statute, that mode alone can be resorted to and the limited remedy of contest by mandamus is superseded whenever the statute provides for a contest of local option elections. [Separate Opinion by NIXON, P. J.]
11. -: -: -: Collateral Attack. The validity of a local option election is not open to impeachment or attack in collateral proceedings, such as an application for a dramshop license, for the reason that a direct remedy has been provided by law and the making of an attack by mandamus to compel the issuance of such license on the grounds that the election is invalid is a collateral impeachment of such election. [Separate Opinion by NIXON, P. J.]
12. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. In construing any statute it is proper and often useful to consider the state of the law existing at the time of its enactment as casting light on the intended change made by it. [Separate Opinion by NIXON, P. J.]
13. ELECTION CONTEST: Jurisdiction: Questions to be Decided. The term “contested election” has no technical meaning, and the power to determine contested elections would seem to necessarily carry with it jurisdiction over every possible objection which may under the constitution or any statute be urged against the so-called election. [Separate Opinion by NIXON, P. J.]
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. — Now. B. G. Thurman, Judge.
Affirmed.
A. L. Thomas and McReynolds & Halliburton for appellant.
(1) These provisions of the statute are mandatory. Ballots without numbers were counted in the 5th ward, and the ballots in the 5th ward were not sealed up in a package, but were returned loose on a string in an unfastened box, and should not have been counted. West v. Ross, 53 Mo. 350; Ledbetter v. Hull, 62 Mo. 422; Donald v. Lee, 101 Mo. App. 191; McKay v. Minor, 154 Mo. 608. (2) The law governing special elections must be strictly followed. And there must be reasonable notice of time and polling places and where the time and place is to be designated by some board, then notice of time and place must be given by such board. Haddox v. Clark County, 79 Ya. 677; Morgan v. Gloucester, 44 N. J. L. 137; People v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; George v. Township, Í6 Kas. 88; Stephens v. People, 89 Ill. 337; Westbrook v. Rosebrough, 14 Cal. 180; Taylor v. Betts, 132 S. W. 162. (3) When fraudulent and corrupt methods in the holding of an election are shown to have been resorted to in any precinct the burden is then cast on those asserting the validity of the election to show that the election was not improperly affected by said means. Littlefield ex rel. v. Newell, 27 Atl. Rep. 156; State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 35 Kas. 640; State v. Marston, 6 Kas. 538; Russell v. State, 11 Kas. 322; State v. Stephens, 23 Kas. 456; Patten v. Coats, 41 Ark. Ill; Thompson v. Ewing, 1 Brewster, 67; Wallace v. Simpson, 4 Brewster, 457; People v. Thacher, 55 N. Y. 525; Howard v. Cooper, Contested Elections in Congress, 1834, 1865, p. 275; Blair v. Barrett, Contested Elections in Congress, p. 368; Reed v. Julian, Contested Elections in Congress, p. 821; McCrary on Elections, sec. 438. (4) Appellant maintains that there is no valid statute in this state providing for the contest of a local option election. State v. Fulks, 207 Mo. 26 ; Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 666; State v. Rollins, 231 Mo. 544; St. Louis v. Teifel, 42 Mo. 578; Johnson v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185; State v. Murray, 41 Minn. 123; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Shepherd v. Helmers, 23 Has. 504; Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370; 26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 584. (5) Defendant cannot for the first time in the appellate court object to the form of procedure. Nichols v. Stephens, 123 Mo. 86; Carr v. Nichols, 157 U. S. 370 ; Whitstone v. Shaw, 70 Mo. 575; Bank v. Bank, 69 U. S. 252, 17 Law Ed. 785 ; Russell v. Stocking, 6 Conn. 236; Railroad v. Bekemeier, 72 Ill. 267; Garland v. Wholeban, 26 Iowa, 271; Emmons v. Lord, 18 Me. 351; Brown v. Waterman, 64 Mass. 117; Smith v. Elder, 3 John (N. Y.) 105; Rank v. Rank, 5 Pa. St. 211.
W. N. Andreivs, Prosecuting-Attorney, H. F. Walden, Assistant Prosecuting-Attorney, and Shannon e Phelps for respondents.
(1) With reference to local option elections it is only required of the county court that it shall order an election in the usual voting precinct (Sec. 7238), and the notices of such elections have gone no farther. State ex rel. v. Bird, 108 Mo. App. 167; State ex rel. v. Baldwin, 169 Mo. App. 573; State ex rel. v. Bassett, 133 Mo. App. 366; Gaston v. Lampkin, 115 Mo. 25 ; O ’Laughlin v. Kirkwood, 107 Mo. App. 302. (2) When proceedings under the local option statutes are drawn in question as for sufficiency, we are not disposed to invoke the application of the strict rule of construction by which are usually tested proceedings for the condemnation of private property. State ex rel. v. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 573; State v. McCord, 124 Mo. App. 53; State v. McCord, 207 Mo. 523; State v. Swearengen, 128 Mo. App. 605'; State v. Kellog, 133 Mo. App. 434; State v. Hitchcock, 124 Mo. App. 103. (3) The opinion of Judge Goode in the case of O’Langhlin v. Kirkwood, 107 Mo. App. 302, is decisive of almost every question raised in this case, and it is in harmony with the authorities generally as to the effect of irregularities on the result of an election, a few of which we respectfully call to the attention of-the court. State ex rel. v. Roberts, 153 Mo. 112; Horsefall v. School District, 143 Mo. App. 541; Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266; Bauer v. Board of Denmark, 122 N. W. (Mich) 121; Seamore v. Tacoma, 33 Pac. (Wash.) 1059'; Stearns v. State, 100 Pac. (Okla.) 909; Foster v. Scharff, 16 Ohio State, 532; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Ohio 212; Buchanan v. Graham, 81 S. W. (Tex.) 1237.
On motion for rehearing the constitutionality of the Contest Statute was questioned and for that reason this cause was transferred to the Supreme Court.

Opinion:
COX, J.
This case is the same as State ex rel. Fahran, 160 Mo. App. 682, against same parties just decided by us and involves the same questions with one additional question. On all questions decided in the Fahrman case, we adhere to the rulings there made. The additional point made in this case is that the provisions of the law relative to the conduct of elections were so flagrantly violated that the election was not held in conformity to the law and should be held void for that reason.
This contention is based upon the following facts: That electioneering was done within 100 feet of the polls. That some ballots were counted on which the judges initials were not endorsed. That in one ward one of the ballot boxes used had no lock and the ballots returned to, the city clerk were not returned in sealed envelope^, but were returned in this unlocked box. That certain ladies who were interested in securing a majority vote against the sale of intoxicat ing liquor established eating booths in less than 100 feet of the polling places, and had a large sign posted on the outside of the booth .with the slogan: "Vote 'er dry" printed thereon in large letters; and that all comers to the polls were invited in, and to those who entered, coffee and other eatables were furnished and while eating the voters were importuned to vote dry. These lunches were furnished free to all who would accept them, regardless of how they intended to vote. The evidence disclosed that all of the above alleged irregularities were present in this election, but it failed to show that the result was in any way affected thereby.
The failure of the judges of the election in one ward to endorse their initials on some of the ballots did not vitiate those ballots. It will, be observed that the present statute of this. state which directs the names or initials of judges to be put upon the ballot before it is delivered to the voter does not prescribe what consequences shall follow a failure to observe this requirement. It has been held by our Supreme Court that such failure renders the ballot invalid and in a contest case such ballot should not be counted. See McKay v. Minner, 154 Mo. 608, 55 S. W. 866. This case was decided in division two on February 20, 1900, and on March 5, 1900, a motion for rehearing was overruled. Oh March 14, 1900, division one decided the same question the other way, and held that the failure of the election judges to do their duty could not be charged up to the voter and directed that the votes be counted although no initials were endorsed thereon. Hehl v. Guion, 155 Mo. 76, 55 S. W. 1024, A decision by either one of the divisions of the Supreme Court is the law of the entire state until overruled, and it is our duty to follow the latest one. As the decision in the Hehl v. Quion case is of equal authority to the other, and is nine days later in point of time, we must follow it. The fact that one ballot box in one ward bad no lock and that the ballots were returned to the city clerk in this box certainly does not destroy the entire election of the city.
The irregularity which it is most strongly urged should result in the entire election being declared void, is the charge of improper modes of electioneering by the ladies of the city, by their display of a sign "Vote'er dry" on their booth within the 100 feet limit, and furnishing eatables to voters in the booths. We are asked to brand this conduct upon the part of the ladies as wholesale bribery and by reason of it to hold the election void. We are not disposed to give it so vicious a designation. Whatever may be said as to its propriety we are unwilling to brand it as bribery. These-women were no doubt moved by honest motives and, being familiar with the common frailties of the human family, were no doubt impressed with the logic of that philosophy which has promulgated the theory that the way to reach a man's heart is through his stomach, and acting upon that principle, they sought to reach the center of the voter's affections by first appealing to his natural love of tempting viands. In doing this, they were simply following the example set by the ordinary politician who, without any thought of exposing himself to a charge of bribery, when a candidate for office, has treated a crowd to watermelons or cigars or drinks or has given a banquet to those whom he hopes to enlist as his supporters. We do not think the facts in this case would warrant us in placing the conduct of these women upon a level with the conduct of a man who bribes the individual voter or who by offer to perform the duties of the office for less than the legal. fees induces voters to vote for him as was done in the Collier case, 72 Mo. 13.
Irregularities, fraud, or crime may avoid an election, but to xlo so they must be of such a character as to, at least, throw doubt on the question whether the result of the election as declared is in fact the correct result. Where the result of an election has been declared by the proper authority, that result must stand until proof is offered to overthrow it. It is not sufficient to show a state of facts from which it might be inferred that there was a possibility that the returns did not correctly express the will of the voters, but before a party in whose favor the result is declared can be required to show that the matter complained of did not affect the result, the matters complained of, whether they be mere irregularities or actual fraud or crime, must be of such a character that by reason of them it is prima facie shown that the result as declared is incorrect, or that it is impossible to determine what the correct result is. In other words, that the election contemplated by the law was not in fact held. [O'Laughlin v. Kirkwood, 107 Mo. App. 302, 81 S. W. 512; State ex rel. Atty.-Gen. v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13; Banks v. Sergent (Ky.), 48 S. W. 149; Atty.-Gen. ex rel. v. McQuade (Mich.), 53 N. W. 944; State ex rel. Newell v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; Littlefield, Atty.-Gen., ex rel. Chandler v. Newell (Me.), 27 Atl. 156; State ex rel. Bradford, Atty.-Gen., v. Board of Commis. (Kan.), 11 Pac. 902; People ex rel. Judson v. Thatcher, 55 N. Y. 525.]
There was no evidence that any body's vote was affected by the alleged irregularities or improper conduct and there can be no question under this evidence that there was an entire failure to impeach the correctness of the returns as 'made.
We do not think the fact that electioneering was done inside the 100-foot limit should render the election void. Such a rule would put it in the power of evil designed persons who were willing to violate the law in order to defeat an election to accomplish their purpose in defiance of the will of the voters and would turn the control of all elections over to 'the criminal classes.
We find no irregularities connected with, this election which is of so serious a nature as to vitiate the entire election, and the judgment will therefore be affirmed.
Nixon, P. J., concurs in the result. Gray, J., not sitting.