Case Name: The State, Appellant, v. Lewis
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1881-10
Citations: 74 Mo. 222
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State, Appellant, v. Lewis.
Judges: All the other judges concur except Norton, J., and Sherwood, C. J., who dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 74
Pages: 222–228

Head Matter:
The State, Appellant, v. Lewis.
1. Murder : passion. The passion which will deprive a homicide < the element of deliberation, and thereby reduce it below the gr of murder of the first degree, may result from some cause shu. what is known as lawful provocation. See The State v. Charles El arde., 207.
2. -: premeditation. Premeditation is an essential element of murder in the second degree.
3. Continuance. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court committed error in refusing the continuance prayed by defendant. Sherwood C. J., and Norton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Aeeirmed.
D. H. McIntyre, Attorney General, for the State.
C. O. Bishop and A. N. Merrick for respondent.

Opinion:
Ray, J.
The defendant was indicted and convicted of murder in the first degree in the St. Louis criminal court, from which he appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, where the judgment of the criminal court was reversed and the cause remanded, on the ground of error in overruling his application for a continuance, and from this reversal, in the court of appeals, the State brings the ease here by appeal. The case is not yet reported, but the opinion of the court of appeals was delivered at its October term, 1880, when the facts were fully stated. This opinion of the court of appeals appears to us both just and well considered, and disposes of the several questions therein discussed in an able, clear and satisfactory manner, and we deem it wholly unnecessary for us to restate the matter or undertake to add anything thereto.
One or two questions, however, have been pressed upon our- attention which were not passed upon by the court of appeals, and which (as the case must go back to the criminal court for retrial for the reasons assigned by the court of appeals) we deem it proper, briefly, to notice. It is insisted that the definition of the term " deliberately " and the instruction given on murder in the second degree, as found in this record, are calculated to mislead and do not state the law correctly. That definition and instruction are as follows: 1. By the term " deliberately " is meant in a cool state of the blood, not in that heated state which the law denominates " passion;" and the passion here meant is not that which comes of no cause, but that and only that which is -produced by some legal provoca-' tion. 2. And if, from the evidence, you find that the defendant actually did the killing complained of, and find that it was not done deliberately, or if deliberately, not premeditatedly, and that it was done at the city of St. Louis and in the manner and by the means alleged in the indictment, then you ought not to convict him of murder in the first, but ought to convict him of murder in the second degree.
These instructions are not in harmony with the definitions and doctrine on these subjects, as laid down in a number of recent decisions of this court. State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State v. Sharp, 71 Mo. 218; State v. Simms, 71 Mo. 538; State v. Robinson, 73 Mo. 306. The phrase "heat of passion," as used in the above authorities, in this connection, is not used in its tech nical sense, but to denote a condition of mind contra-distinguished from that cool state of the blood implied in the use of the term " deliberation," and the " passion " there referred to is not limited to that heated state which comes from and is produced only by some legal provocation, as seems to be stated in the latter part of the above definition in this case, which we think somewhat faulty and calculated to mislead. According to all the authorities above cited, " premeditation " is an essential element of every murder in the second degree. The above instruction on that subject in this case it would seem allows a conviction without that ingredient. That is not the law. In the recent case of the State v. Robinson, supra, this court passed upon an instruction substantially lik'e this, and expressly held that there could be no murder in the second degree without premeditation. This case also recognizes an excited state of the mind produced by a cause short of what is known as lawful provocation, as an element in determining whether the murder is of the first or second degree. The judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the criminal court and remanding the cause, is, therefore, affirmed.
All the other judges concur except Norton, J., and Sherwood, C. J., who dissent.