Case Name: In the Matter of the Application of Bartholomew Donovan, Respondent, for a Writ of Peremptory Mandamus against Jacob A. Cantor, Individually and as President of the Borough of Manhattan of the City of New York, and Willis L. Ogden and Others, Individually and, as Members of the Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-12
Citations: 89 A.D. 50
Docket Number: 
Parties: I the Matter of the Application of Bartholomew Donovan, Respondent, for a Writ of Peremptory Mandamus against Jacob A, Cantor, Individually and as President of the Borough of Manhattan of the City of New York, and Willis L. Ogden and Others, Individually and, as Members of the Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 50–59

Head Matter:
I the Matter of the Application of Bartholomew Donovan, Respondent, for a Writ of Peremptory Mandamus against Jacob A, Cantor, Individually and as President of the Borough of Manhattan of the City of New York, and Willis L. Ogden and Others, Individually and, as Members of the Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, Appellants.
Civil service commission in New York city -—it acts judicially in determining whether the duties of a new, are the same as those of an abolished, position — its determination cannot he reviewed hy mandamus.
Section 1543 of the Revised Greater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466) provides as follows: “ Wherever in any department or institution an office, position or employment is abolished, or made unnecessary through the operation of this act, pr in any other manner, or whenever the number of offices, positions or employments of a certain character is reduced, the person or persons legally holding the office or filling the position or employment thus abolished or made unnecessary, shall be deemed to be suspended without pay, and shall be entitled to a reinstatement in the same office, position or employment, or in any corresponding, or similar office, position or employment, if within one year thereafter there is need for his or their services. Whenever such offices, posi-* tions or employments are abolished or made unnecessary,- it shall be the duty of the head of the department or institution to furnish the names of the person or persons affected to the municipal civil service commission, with a statement in the case of each of the date of' his original appointment in the service. It shall be the duty of the municipal civil service commission forthwith to place the names of said persons upon' a list óf suspended employes for the office or position, or for the class of work in which they have been employed, or for any corresponding or similar office, position or class of work, and to certify the said persons for reinstatement, in the ordei; of their original appointment, before making certifications from any other list.” jBeld, that a decision by the municipal civil service commission, that the duties of a newly created position are not the same as the duties of a position which has •been abolished, is quasi judicial in character and cannot be reviewed by mandamus.
Patterson and Laugbiin, JJ., dissented.
Appeal by the defendants, Jacob A. Cantor, individually and as president of the borough of- Manhattan of the city of New York, and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 14th day of May, 1903, directing ther issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the appel lants to certify the name of, and to appoint the relator in the position of superintendent of public baths and public comfort stations in the city of New York, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 20th day of May, 1903, denying the appellants’ motion to set aside answers to certain questions submitted to the jury, and for a new trial.
Section 1543 of the revised Greater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466) is set forth in full in the dissenting opinion of Laughlin, J.
W. B. Crowell, for the appellants.
Boger Foster, for the respondent.

Opinion:
McLaughlin, J.:
The facts involved in this appeal are not in dispute, and as they are fully and correctly set out in the opinion of Mr. Justice Laughlin it is unnecessary to restate them. Under the statute the position held by the relator having been abolished and his name returned as an employee suspended without pay, it was the duty of the municipal civil service commission to determine whether the duties of the newly created positions were the same or similar to those performed by the relator in the position previously held by him. If they were similar, then the relator was entitled to have his name certified to and be appointed by the president of the borough to one or the other • of such new positions — otherwise not. (Revised Greater N. Y. Charter [Laws of 1901, chap. 466], § 1543.) The municipal civil service commission determined that the duties of the newly created positions were not similar to those performed by the relator in his former position and refused to certify his name. Therefore the president of the borough' had no right' to make the appointment. The act of the commission in making this determination was quasi judicial in character. It necessarily required the commission to pass upon questions of fact and involved the exercise of judgment upon its part, and this, as it seems to me, was the end of the matter. It is a universal rule that in the discharge of duties involving the exercise of judgment or discretion a public official must be left free to act and cannot, by mandamus, be compelled to act one way or the other; in other words, in such cases the courts have no power to direct what shall be done. This rule was tersely stated by Judge Vann in People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners (149 N. Y. 26). He said: " When the law requires a public officer to do a specified act in a specified way, upon a conceded state of facts, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety of the act and with no power to exercise discretion, the duty is ministerial in character and performance may be compelled by mandamus if there is no other remedy. When, however, the law requires a judicial determination to be made, such as the decision of a question of fact or the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the act should be done or not, the duty is. regarded as judicial and mandamus will not lie to compel performance."
Here, from the very nature of things, the municipal civil, service commission must have exercised its judgment upon the facts as to. whether the duties of the positions referred to were similar, and its conclusion cannot be reviewed by mandamus. To hold otherwise is to nullify the statute which confers upon the commission the duty of making the determination by substituting in its place a court or jury to pass upon the facts, and this the court ought not to do in the absence of legislative authority.
The case in principle is precisely like People ex rel. Sims v. Collier (175 H. Y. 196), and upon reason as well as upon the strength of this authority it seems to me that the order appealed from should be reversed and the Writ quashed, with fifty dollars costs and disbursements.
Van Brunt, P. J" concurred; Patterson and Laughlin, JJ., dissented.