Case Name: William H. Douglass v. Andrew Huston and others
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1833-12
Citations: 6 Ohio 156
Docket Number: 
Parties: *William H. Douglass v. Andrew Huston and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 6
Pages: 160–168

Head Matter:
*William H. Douglass v. Andrew Huston and others.
Liens upon land are given by statute, and can not be extended in equity. Judgment creditor acquires no lien, in equity, upon the choses in action of his debtor, until a bill is filed to charge them. The elder equity is always preferred.
It is not sufficient evidence of fraud to vitiate a contract, that a great bargain was obtained in the purchase of a litigated property from an embarrassed debtor.
This cause was adjourned, for decision here, from the county of Pickaway. It was a bill in chancery, filed under the statute of Ohio, by the complainant, as a creditor, seeking to subject certain alleged equitable interests of his debtor to the payment of the debt. The material facts were these :
The complainant, owned by assignment, two judgments, rendered in favor of the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank of Chillicothe, against John Carlisle and others, in 1821. In 1824, he caused these judgments to be levied upon two hundred acres of land in Pickaway county, as the property of J. Carlisle, and became himself the purchaser, at sheriff’s sale, for eight hundred dollars, which amount was returned as money made on the execution.
Carlisle’s title to the land, thus levied upon and sold, was also derived from a sheriff’s sale. It had been levied upon and sold, in May, 1815, as the property of Ulrick Coonrod, at the suit of J. J. Wills, for the use of J. Carlisle, against U. Coonrod, and J. Carlisle became the purchaser ,for seven hundred and forty-nine dollars and sixty-five cents, which was returned upon the.execution as money made. After the levy of this execution, but before the sale, TJ. Coonrod, the defendant, died, and devised the land to H. Coonrod. TJ. Coonrod only held the land by title bond, the fee being in a third person. But Carlisle obtained the possession, and to that the complainant, Douglass, succeeded upon his purchase. The estate of TJ. Coonrod has been wholly squandered by his devisee, who is insolvent.
In this state of the case, the defendant, Huston, with a full knowledge of all the facts, purchased of H. Coonrod, the devisee, his interest in the lands for the consideration of fifty dollars. After this purchase, he filed a bill against the person who held the fee, and obtained the legal title by a decree. He also purchased and obtained assignment of Carlisle’s judgment against TJ. Coonrod. He then brought an ejectment against the complainant, Douglass, in possession under his purchase on the execution against Carlisle, .and recovered the possession.
*The bill waj) brought by the complainant, to charge the [157 land, as in equity, the property of Carlisle at the time of the levy and purchase, under which complainant claimed. The answers .admitted the facts substantially as stated. Carlisle denied all fraud of act or intention, and Huston insisted upon the fairness .and legality of his purchase, under the circumstances in which it was made.
Doan and G. Swan, for complainant
We believe, from the whole circumstances of this case, the •plaintiff is entitled to relief. It is admitted than no interest passed by the sale and sheriff’s deed to John Carlisle, who purchased on an execution. Wills, for Carlisle, v. Ulrick Coonrod. At the time of the judgment and sale the legal estate was in Joseph Hoffman; the equity alone was in the judgment debtor. This equity, which was not affected by the sale, was devised by the elder Coonrod to his son, Henry. The devisee, with* a full knowledge of the judgment against his father, and the purchase by Carlisle, executed a conveyance to the defendant, Huston, for the consideration of fifty dollars. Carlisle, in insolvent circumstances, assigned, for the nominal consideration specified in the deposition of R. Douglass, Esq., the judgment in Wills’ name. Douglass had notice of all the circumstances, for he was the counsel of Carlisle. Huston, for the sum of two hundred dollars, be came the assignee of Douglass, with that kind of notice which rendered his conduct, if not more reprehensible, vastly less entitled to a favorable consideration from this court. The defendant, Huston, then stands precisely in the situation, with regard to the complainant, that Carlisle and U. Coonrod did before any assignment by the former or the death of the latter. The inquiry is, then, what decree would this court have pronounced had the complainant filed a bill against Carlisle before he assigned his judgment, and li.ving Ulrick Coonrod? The levy of the execution and the sale under it, as well as the indorsement, “ money made,” would have been set aside as proceedings founded in mistake and misapprehension. It would have been iniquitous, indeed, for U. Coonrod to have held the land and insisted upon the discharge of the judgment against him. It would have been unjust, on the part of Carlisle not to have surrendered his interest in this judgment to his bona fide creditor. It can not be doubted but the court would have rectified the mistakes and placed the parties in statu 158] quo. It would be strange, indeed, to *afford protection to one, in the situation of Coonrod, who saw the levy of the sheriff upon that which was no more effectual than a levy upon the winds, and saw his equitable creditor purchase under an evident mistake perfectly known to his debtor, and who would ask the court to give validity to the sheriff’s return in his favor! Coonrod, in this-way, would have discharged the debt without any consideration whatever. Carlisle was a judgment debtor; and as such, in the absence of property tangible by an execution at law, was liable to-have his dioses in acoion and his equitable interests subjected to the discharge of his debts. Coonrod, as the debtor of Carlisle, was bound in equity to pay over the amount to the complainant. Before the statute, choses in action and things not subject to execution could be reached in chancery by creditors. Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Oh. 450. Since the statute, no doubt can possibly exist. 29 Ohio L. 84, see. 16.
The price paid, by Huston to Henry Coonrod, for the conveyance, was so entirely inadequate, that it bears the unquestionable impress of fraud upon its face. Fifty dollars paid for a tract of land which sold at sheriff’s sale, in 1824, for nearly eight hundred dollars ! Upon this point it would be trifling to cite authorities. The situation of Carlisle, known and well known to Huston, made it fraudulent to. purchase from his assignee, who was not in a much more favorable situation than himself, for a consideration totally inadequate, being nearly six times less than the judgment and interest. Thus, Mr. Huston has obtained a judgment which, in equity, is entirely unsatisfied, for something like twelve hundred dollars, and valuable real estate, worth probably two thousand dollars when he recovered the conveyance, for the very inconsiderable sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, in part upon deferred payments; and this speculation, so far as it is such, at the expense and loss of the creditors of Carlisle and TJ. Coonrod. It would be most unconscionable to suffer Huston to enjoy the fruits of such a transaction. Let it be remembered, too, that his official station led him to the knowledge of the fact of which he took advantage-The policy of the law requires that he should not be treated with tenderness or compassion. 1 Johns. Ch. 406.
The complainant relies upon relief as against Huston, who claims as assignee of Douglass, upon the following authorities: 2 Johns. 441, 479 ; 2 Wash. 233, 255. The assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to the equity of the original holder. 2 Munf. 533,
*H. Stanbery, for Huston:
The complainant’s counsel admit that the judgment against TJ. Coonrod was not a lien on his equitable interest in this tract of land, and that no title, legal or equitable, passed to Carlisle, as purchaser, and that his relation' to TJ. Coonrod was merely that of a judgment creditor, without any lien or priority. It follows necessarily, from these admissions, that the complainant, by his purchase of the same tract of land, under his judgment against Carlisle,, acquired no title; that his relation to Carlisle is that of a judgment creditor, without lien, so far as this land is concerned; and his relation to TJ. Coonrod is that of a judgment creditor of Coonrod’» judgment creditor.
Without, for the present, bringing forward the title of Huston, we claim that here is no case for relief. The aspect which is given to the case, in the argument for complainant, is that of a judgment creditor seeking to reach, by the aid of equity, property of the judgment debtor, not tangible at law. The kind of property to be reached is an equitable interest in land, once owned by the judgment debtor of the complainant’s judgment debtor, which equity passed from the original judgment debtor at his death, either to his devisee or to his heirs at law; and the means of reaching it is by' a sale under that original judgment, now dormant by the want of execution within five years, and abated by the death of the defendant.
It is unnecessary to inquire what favor such a case would meet with under any known head of equity jurisdiction, for the reason that we have an express statutory provision upon this subject matter. It will suffice to remark, that it is at this day questio vexata in the English chancery, whether equity will in any case assist a creditor to reach a fund intangible at law, upon which he has no lien. Chancellor Kent, in Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Ch. 459, does give the relief in behalf of assignees of all the debtor’s estate, real and personal, for the benefit of all the creditors, which he carefully distinguishes from the case of a single creditor.
ffe are relieved from this uncertainty by the provisions of section 16 of the chancery act, vol. xxix, 84, which specially designates the cases for such relief, and the mode by which it is to be administered. The complainant attempts to bring his case within that clause of the section which enables a judgment creditor to reach a judgment in favor of his debtor. As he admits this judg160] ment had no lion, and that no *titlo, legal or equitable, passed to Carlisle by the sale, the consequence is, that the only “ interest” to be reached is the judgment. The statute provides for a sale or transfer of the particular interest which is in the creditor’s d.ebtor. Supposing, however, that by the equity of this section, where the- interest of the debtor is a judgment without lien, that the creditor may not only roach the judgment itself, so as to have a sale, and transfer of that, but may, by this statutory proceeding, subject to its operation an equitable interest not bound by the judgment, and have a sale of such interest, we object that such relief can not be had in this case because :
1. By the death of U. Coonrod, this equitable interest either passed to his devisee, or descended to his heirs, subject to the payment of his debts generally, and not to appropriation by any individual creditor, and can only be reached in a course of administration. Bustard v. Dabney, 4 Ohio, 68; Miami Exporting Company v. Turpin, 3 Ohio, 514.
2. The right of the complainant to proceed against this equitable interest depends, among other things, upon the fact that the judgment against Ulrick Coonrod is yet unsatisfied. That judgment is dormant and abated, and being primarily a charge inper sonam, it can only be set up and revived in a litigation to which the personal representatives of Ulriek Coonrod shall be parties.
3. The judgments in favor of the complainant against Carlisle and others are also essential to the complainant’s case. The bill shows no execution or proceeding upon those judgments since the year 1824. More than five years having elapsed, they are dormant. A court of chancery is not the proper jurisdiction for the revival of judgments, and will not entertain a case in which nO' reason is seen why this preliminary step was not taken at law.
But if the court should hold that these objections are not well taken, we then claim that the complainant makes no case for relief, as against the defendant, Huston.
It is admitted by the complainant, that Huston acquired the equitable title to the two hundred acres by purchase of Henry Coonrod, the devisee; that he got in the legal title by decree against Hoffman, and that he has an assignment of the judgment of Car-lisle against Coonrod.
The case made by the complainant’s bill is to reach and sell this equitable title by a sale under this j udgment. If, then, ^either [161 the judgment or the equity is beyond his reach, the case fails: 1. As to the judgment. This was first assigned by Carlisle to E. Douglass, and by E. Douglass to Huston. Both these assignments must be invalidated before the complainant can reach the judgment. The ground on which they are attacked is that of actual fraud.
As to the assignment from Carlisle to Douglass, the answer of Carlisle and the testimony of Douglass concur in a denial of fraud, or of any intent to injure the complainant, or to postpone his rights. The only circumstance relied upon to show the fraud is the inadequacy of {he consideration. This was not of money,, which has a known value, but of professional services, which were not particularly estimated by the parties, further than to satisfy themselves that they constituted a fair equivalent for the assignment.
Before a court will declare a transaction fraudulent on account, of inadequacy, there must be a definite knowledge of the value of that consideration in reference to the value of the thing for which it was given, that, by contrast, the inequality may be so evident as at once to shock the moral sense. Knobb v. Lindsay, 5 Ohio, 472.
Here no foundation is laid for such estimate. We can form, at best, but an imperfect idea of the value of the judgment or the professional services, and when put in contrast, they present no such glaring and evident inequality.
Then as to the assignment from Douglass to Huston. This is •claimed to be set aside on the ground that Huston, with a knowledge of the complainant’s rights, purchased the judgment •of Douglass, with the intent to defraud the complainant, at an inadequate consideration.
The intent to defraud is denied, and not proved.
The consideration is stated by both parties to have been fair and satisfactory; and as they were dealing in reference to their •own rights, without even involving the rights of their creditors, it is difficult to apprehend how the inadequacy of price can be ■regarded as a fraud on the complainant, who has never stood in the relation of a creditor to either.
Then there being no fraud, actual or constructive, in this assignment, is it invalid because of any notice which Huston may have had of the complainant’s rights? 162] What were these rights ? Simply those of a creditor *without title and without lien. There was nothing to which notice ■could attach, so as to affect the conscience of the purchaser; for the knowledge of the indebtedness of the vendor is of no avail if it is unaccompanied with the intent to defraud.
2. As to the equitable interest. The purchase of this is also .attempted to be set aside on account of fraud. Here, too, there is .a denial by both parties of any fraudulent intent, and a reliance upon the inadequacy of the consideration as evidence of fraud per se. The answers show that the bargain was made by parties with opposite interests, and that the value of the equity was carefully weighed against the price paid for it.
But again, this equitable interest no longer exists. The decree against Hoffman invested Huston with the legal title, and this equity of which he was then possessed, eo instanti, merging in the larger estate. Admitting that under peculiar circumstances, a ■court of chancery after such merger will open the title to set up the equity, yet this is not such a ease as to authorize it.
Indeed, the case made by the bill would not allow such decree. It goes for a sale of the equitable interest, by decree against Huston, and of a transfer of the legal title, by decree against Hoffman.
The title of Huston, then, has a four-fold defense: the assignment •of Carlisle, the assignment of R. Douglass, the conveyance of the •equitable title, and the decree, operating a conveyance of the legal estate; all which must be broken down before the complainant can effect his purpose.
Olds, on the same side.

Opinion:
Judge Lane
delivered the opinion of the court:
If the complainant come into equity to set up a specific lien to the two hundred acres of land, in virtue of his purchase, under the judgment against Carlisle and others, such claim is evidently groundless. The existence, validity, and extent of a judgment lien, are matters purely legal, dependent upon statutory provisions. If it fail at law, it can not be aided in equity. 3 Ohio, 517.
In 1824, at the time of his purchase, the complainant occupied the position of a judgment creditor of Carlisle. The levy, sale, and return of money made, on the execution, produced ^nothing [163 because Carlisle had no interest in the property sold, consequently the purchaser could obtain no interest. But this could not affect the case.
If complainant's judgment against Carlisle still subsisted unsatisfied in fact, and open upon the record for the whole amount, the case shows only that Carlisle held a judgment in the same condition against IT. Coonrod. The amount of this judgment would be a debt due Carlise from Coonrod, which might, in a proper case, be applied in equity to the satisfaction of the complainant's judgment. It would be the ordinary case of a creditor pursuing the choses in action of his debtor, in equity, where no means of satisfaction could be found at law. ' This would be according to the common practice in equity, 4 Johns. Ch. 687, and to our own statutory provisions. The application of this principle disposes of the rights of all the parties to this case except those of Huston. Hoffman holds the legal title, as trustee for him who may establish his right to it. H. Coonrod holds what interest he has in the land liable to satisfy any just claim against U. Coonrod's estate. Carlisle would be compelled to give up his interest to satisfy the complainant's judgments against him. Consequently, as between the par ties, the complainant should be aided to enforce Carlisle's rights against the estate of Coonrod.
But Huston claims by purchase. He procured from H. Coonrod a transfer of his interest, March 22, 1827. He has obtained the legal title by a decree against Hoffman, and he holds the interest of Carlisle in the judgment against U. Coonrod, under an assignment by Carlisle to Biehard Douglass, June 1, 1827, and by E. Douglass to him, December 30, 1828. If these assignments are valid, they must prevail against the complainant. They are elder than the attaching of his equity, which commenced with filing his bill in 1831. It is well settled that, in such cases as this, the earliest equity must be preferred.
It is insisted that the purchases, by Huston, of his interest in the land from H. Coonrod, and of the judgments from E. Douglass, are both fraudulent. Admit it were so, the complainant's case would not be aided, unless it is also made out that the purchase of the judgment from Carlisle, by E. Douglass, in 1827, was fraudulent. If that purchase was bona fide, it presents an insurmountable bar to the complainant's recovery. It transferred all Carlisle's 164] interest to E. Douglass, so that nothing remained *in Car-lisle to be secured when the bill was filed. The assignment to Douglass must be shown to have been fraudulent and void before the rights of his assignee can be affected.
There is no evidence, among the proofs of the case, conducing to the conclusion that the purchase of E. Douglass from Carlisle, in 1827, is tinctured with fraud. The right of Carlisle to use the judgment for any beneficial purpose was very obscure, at the best) and certainly involved in litigation. His pecuniary affairs were hopelessly decayed, so that it could be of little moment to him which of his creditors possessed himself of this remnant of doubtful property. It is reasonable to suppose that E. Douglass, in such circumstances, made the purchase with an eye to his ,own profit, and without reference to Carlisle's creditors, or design of defrauding them. We can not justly ascribe to him any other motive than that of making a good bargain out of an harassed debtor. We can impute no other design without proof, and against the express denial of all fraud in Carlisle's answer. In this view of the case, Carlisle had no interest in the subject when the bill was filed; it must, therefore, be dismissed.