Case Name: CAPE PUBLICATIONS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. Kathy REAKES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-01-31
Citations: 840 So. 2d 277
Docket Number: No. 5D01-1693
Parties: CAPE PUBLICATIONS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. Kathy REAKES, Appellee.
Judges: PLEUS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 840
Pages: 277–284

Head Matter:
CAPE PUBLICATIONS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. Kathy REAKES, Appellee.
No. 5D01-1693.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 31, 2003.
Rehearing Denied March 18, 2003.
Jack A. Kirschenbaum of Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., Melbourne and Robert C. Bernius of Nixon Peabody, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Douglas R. Beam of Douglas R. Beam, P.A., Melbourne, and James R. Dressier, Cocoa Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PETERSON, J.
Melinda Meers and Cape Publications, Inc., d/b/a Floridá Today appeal a $400,000 judgment for defamation following a jury trial. Phil Currie also appeals a $500 judgment for defamation and Florida Today appeals a $10,000 judgment for conversion.
Employed as a reporter by Florida Today, a Florida newspaper, Kathy Reakes and another reporter, John McAleenan, were assigned the task of investigating Anita Gonzalez, who was under arrest for murder at the time. Reakes and McA-leenan were working on a "color piece" to provide some background information about Gonzalez and the neighborhood in which she lived. The two traveled to an apartment complex in which Gonzalez had rented an apartment and discovered that after a police raid of the dwelling, the apartment was unoccupied and the backdoor open. McAleenan entered the apartment and discovered that it had been ransacked. Reakes later testified that she proceeded approximately ten steps into the apartment and remained inside for about 30 to 60 seconds, but was able to report that the refrigerator door was open, furniture was broken, and trash was strewn about the floor. Discovering a document on the floor which appeared to contain a list of phone numbers, McAleenan took it so that they could later investigate and call the numbers.
After the two returned to the Florida Today offices, the news of the reporters' activities was relayed to others. Reakes told Florida Today's metro editor that the two had "kicked in the apartment door" in order to gain entry. The metro editor thought that the unauthorized entry was serious enough to report the actions of the two reporters to Meers, the Florida Today managing editor. Later that evening, Meers phoned Reakes at her home to ask if Reakes had indeed entered Gonzalez's apartment and obtained an affirmative answer.
When Reakes reported to work the next day, Meers told her that she and McAleen-an were being terminated because of their actions at Gonzalez's apartment and was summarily escorted from the building.
Tom Squires, a Florida Today assistant managing editor, was not at the office the day Reakes and McAleenan were terminated. He was not involved in the decision to terminate the two, but had heard the basic facts concerning the events. Arriving for work the following day, he encountered Meers taking a break outside the Florida Today offices. Squires asked Meers about the reason for the terminations and Meers informed him that Reakes and McAleenan were terminated because they had committed criminal acts. It was this statement by Meers to Squires that was the basis of Reakes' defamation claim against Meers and the newspaper.
After Reakes and McAleenan were terminated, Florida Today, on the advice of their attorney, turned the list McAleenan had taken from the apartment over to the circuit court in a sealed envelope without ever mentioning Reakes' name. A circuit judge opined that the document could be relevant to the murder case against Gonzalez and could also be evidence of trespassing or burglary by the reporters. Accordingly, the judge reported the matter to the grand jury and the State subpoenaed Meers to determine the manner in which the document came into the possession of Florida Today. Although the State felt the crimes of trespassing and burglary had been committed, it decided not to pursue the matter because of potential interference with the Gonzalez murder prosecution.
As news of the terminations spread, aided by Reakes' accounts, the story received national attention, including stories in the Orlando Sentinel, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times. There was also a piece about the terminations in the Columbia Journalism Review, which criticized the paper and expressed the opinion that Reakes and McAleenan should have been supported by Florida Today in their entry into the apartment. Phil Currie, a senior officer of Gannett Co., the owner of Florida Today, responded to the criticism in a June 1996 speech to Gannett publishers and editors. He did not mention the reporters by name, but stated that the "story has become so twisted that editors appear wrong for believing that newspaper people should not break the law, and the reporters appear to be heroes for admittedly having done so." The text of Currie's speech was subsequently published on .a Gannett website. The quoted statement was the basis for Reakes' defamation claim against Currie.
Reakes sued Meers, Currie, and Florida Today, making multiple claims, including defamation, conversion, and wrongful termination. After several years of motion practice, the only claims left for trial were her defamation claims because of Meers and Currie's statements that Reakes had broken the law and Reakes' conversion claim. At trial, Reakes stated that she had trouble finding employment after the claims of criminal wrongdoing and that she had also suffered emotional harm because of the accusations. She further testified that an unreturned box of personal items under her desk had contained notes and information from a confidential informant concerning a case involving the "vampire rapist." She stated that she was planning on writing a book about that case, but now could not do so because of the conversion of the materials.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Reakes' favor awarding her $400,000 on the defamation claim against Meers and Florida Today ($150,-000 for past lost wages, $150,000 for future lost wages, and $100,000 for loss of reputation), $500 on the defamation claim against Currie, and $10,000 on the conversion claim against Florida Today.
It is the judgments entered pursuant to the verdicts that have been appealed.
I. THE STATEMENTS.
A plethora of cases exist which proclaim that a required element of defamation is a false statement made about another. See, e.g., Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 745 So.2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat'l Found., 731 So.2d 702, 705 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999), rev. denied, 753 So.2d 563 (Fla.2000). Stated differently, if the statements are true, the required element of a false statement is not present. See Linafelt, 745 So.2d at 389 ("However, the statement was true. Accordingly, appellant's claim for defamation must fail.") In its instructions to the jury, the trial court defined the criminal offenses of trespass of a structure, theft, and burglary. More specifically, pursuant to section 810.08, Florida Statutes (1995), the court instructed the jury that one was guilty of trespass of a structure "if she, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters a structure." In the instant case, Reakes, herself, admitted that she entered Gonzalez's apartment without permission from Gonzalez or the owner of the apartment. The unauthorized entry constituted the crime of trespass of a structure and the statements made by Meers and Currie appear to be true statements. Meers accurately stated that Reakes and McAleenan had committed "criminal acts." Currie stated that journalists were being celebrated for admittedly breaking the law. Although Reakes did not expressly admit that she broke the law, she admitted that she had entered a structure without permission, making Currie's statement substantially true. See Smith, 731 So.2d at 706 ("Under the substantial truth doctrine, a statement does not have to be perfectly accurate if the 'gist' or the 'sting' of the statement is true.")
Accordingly, if the statements made by Meers and Currie were substantially true, the defamation verdicts are reversible. See id. at 705 ("[A] reviewing court may reverse a jury verdict and instruct the lower court to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant where the statement is not capable of a defamatory effect, i.e., not a false statement which naturally and proximately results in injury to another.")
II. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE.
Even if one assumes that the statements made by Meers and Currie were not substantially true, no liability would attach for the statements if they were protected by a qualified privilege and were made without express malice.
If a speaker makes a statement to another and the two share a legal interest in the subject matter of the statement, the statement is protected by a qualified privilege and is not actionable unless made with express malice. See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803, 809 (Fla.1984). The issue of whether this qualified privilege exists is not a jury question when the circumstances surrounding the communication are undisputed; the question should be decided by the court. See id. at 810. There is no dispute about the cireum- stances surrounding Meers' or Currie's statements. Meers was outside the Florida Today office building on a break when she responded to the question of a fellow editor about the employees. Currie was making a speech to editors of Gannett newspapers. Neither side in this case disputes those circumstances and the trial court should have found that the privilege existed. Id.; Randolph v. Beer, 695 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (statements made by credit union's chairman of the board to the members of the board concerning a rumor about illegal activities of an insurance agent enjoyed a qualified privilege because the speaker and listener both shared a legal interest in the subject matter of the statements).
Once it is determined that a qualified privilege exists, a further examination is necessary to determine whether the speaker lost the privilege because of express malice. This has been described as "ill will, hostility, evil intention to defame and injure. Where a person speaks upon a privileged occasion, but the speaker is motivated more by a desire to harm the person defamed than by a purpose to protect the personal or social interest giving rise to the privilege, then it can be said that there was express malice and the privilege destroyed." Nodar, 462 So.2d at 811. There was no showing of malice in the instant case and the circumstances seem to be exactly those which the privilege was designed to protect.
III. DEFAMATION DAMAGES.
In order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff must show that the damages were proximately caused by the defamatory statements. See Smith, 731 So.2d at 705. There was no showing of proximate cause in this case concerning the statement made by Meers. The trial judge instructed the jury that the case was not one of wrongful termination, but was only about defamation. When the jury awarded $400,000 to Reakes because of Meers' statement, this admonishment was apparently ignored. Accepting Reakes' testimony concerning her inability to find meaningful employment and her emotional difficulties at face value, it is clear that these damages came as a result of being fired and learning that Meers had told Squires that she was fired for committing a crime. Meers only made this statement to Squires, who admittedly did not repeat it to others. Squires, in fact, disagreed with the decision to terminate Reakes and made efforts to help her secure employment. Absent any showing of damages as a result of Meers' statement to Squires, that portion of the verdict must be reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Statements made by Meers and Currie which were the subject of Reakes' defamation claims were true statements and Reakes faded to present a prima facie case for defamation. Moreover, the statements were protected by a qualified privilege which was never lost in the absence of express malice. Reakes also failed to demonstrate that the statement made by Meers proximately caused any of her injuries.
The judgments against Meers, Currie and Florida Today are reversed. We affirm the judgment for $10,000 on the conversion count against Florida Today.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
PLEUS, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The jury verdict form was concerned only with this statement from Meers to Squires and not to anyone else.
. Other cases create confusion, however, when the decisions state that truth is not a complete defense to defamation unless it is accompanied by good motives. See, e.g., Lip sig v. Ramlawi, 760 So.2d 170, 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rev. denied, 786 So.2d 579 (Fla.2001); Drennen v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 328 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The requirement of good motives is derived from article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution which states that in any civil action for defamation, the party accused shall be exonerated "if the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives." There was no issue of "good motives" in the instant case as there was absolutely no evidence that the statements in question were made with any sort of spite or ill will that might be construed as bad motives. Meers simply answered a question of Squires when he asked her why Reakes and McAleenan were terminated. Her answer, the subject of the defamation claim, was simply relaying that information to her assistant managing editor. Likewise, Currie was making a broad-based statement to editors about the ethics of journalism and never mentioned Reakes by name.