Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Mitchell ALFRED
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-05-17
Citations: 337 So. 2d 1049
Docket Number: No. 57266
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Mitchell ALFRED.
Judges: TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 337
Pages: 1049–1058

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Mitchell ALFRED.
No. 57266.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 17, 1976.
On Rehearing Sept. 24, 1976.
George H. Fust, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
The Orleans Parish Grand Jury charged Mitchell Alfred in separate indictments with the first-degree murders of Tobin Underwood, Sr., and Johane McQueen in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30. Defendant moved to quash the indictments on the ground that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The trial court granted the motion; the State timely appealed the quashing of the indictments. The State also gave notice of its intention to apply for writs to seek review of the trial court's ruling, although an application for writs was never filed.
Recently, in State v. James, La., 329 So.2d 713 (1976), we held that when the State seeks review of a final pre-con-viction judgment or ruling in a criminal case, application to this Court for a writ under our supervisory jurisdiction is the proper procedure. However, at the time of the State's appeal here, this Court had not as yet determined that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 912(B)(1) was ineffective because of its conflict with the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. There fore, we shall treat this appeal as an application for supervisory writs.
The following chronology of events, gleaned from the record, is necessary to assess the correctness of the trial court's ruling quashing the indictments based on the denial of the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.
The two murders defendant is alleged to have committed took place on November 3, 1973. The Grand Jury returned indictments charging first-degree murder on July 11, 1974. Continuances in the matter were granted the State on September 20, 1974 and November 19, 1974. Due to the unavailability of a jury, the trial court continued the trial on two dates, January 28, 1975 and January 29, 1975. On March 19, 1975, the Court again granted the State's motion for a continuance. The defense filed motions for a speedy trial on April 4, 1975, and the minute entries reflect that on May 15, 1975, the trial date was set for May 22, 1975. On the day the trial was to begin, the State filed a motion for a continuance, to which the defense objected. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance, and the district attorney nolle prosequied the cases.
On June 5, 1975, the Grand Jury again returned two true bills charging defendant with first degree murder. On July 21, the defense filed motions to quash each indictment; on that date the trial court set July 31, 1975, as a hearing date for the motions and set the trial for August 20, 1975. The motions to quash were heard on the assigned date, July 31, and overruled.
On August 20, 1975, the date set for trial, on joint motion of the State and the defense, the trial date was continued. The two reasons for the requested continuance were listed as (1) the absence of a police officer witness "for both the State and the defendant"; and (2) the absence of the attorney of a witness "expected to implicate himself in a crime." The trial was reassigned for September 29, 1975. On the trial date, the State filed a motion for continuance, and the court denied it. Thereupon, the State again nolle prosequied the two cases and again, for a third time, the Grand Jury returned new indictments on October 9, 1975.
On October 14, 1975, the defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that he was being denied a speedy trial. Two days later, he filed a motion to quash the indictments, alleging that he had been denied a speedy trial. A hearing on the motion to quash was held on October 17, 1975, at the conclusion of which, the trial court sustained defendant's motion. It is from this ruling that the State appealed.
The State correctly asserts that under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578 it has three years from the institution of the prosecution in a capital case in which to try the accused. The original indictment was returned on July 11, 1974. On October 17, 1975, the trial court quashed the indictments. The State asserts that it had valid reasons for requesting the several delays in the trial.
Under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 691, the "district attorney has the power, in his discretion, to dismiss an indictment . . . and in order to exercise that power, it is not necessary that he obtain consent of the court." It is clear from Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 693 that the dismissal by the district attorney of an indictment discharges the particular indictment, and the dismissal is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
In State v. Fronton, La., 319 So.2d 405 (1975), in defining the district attorney's power to dismiss an indictment, this Court stated:
"In City of Lake Charles v. Anderson, 248 La. 787, 182 So.2d 70 (1966), we held that the entering of a nolle prosequi rests entirely within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney and leave of court is unnecessary. See also State v. Brackin, 113 La. 879, 37 So. 863 (1905); State v. Frazier, 52 La.Ann. 1305, 27 So. 799 (1900); State v. Moise, 48 La.Ann. 109, 18 So. 943 (1895); State v. Bugg, 6 Rob. 63 (1843); Marr's Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana, Vol. 1, 2nd Edition, Section 11, p. 35; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson) Vol. 1, Section 14, p. 19; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 457c, p. 5; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, Section 296, p. 967.
"The prevailing rule is set forth in Marr's Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana (1906) 'Nolle Prosequi,' Section 466, p. 804, as follows :
" 'In all stages of a criminal prosecution before a jury is impanelled the prosecuting attorney has an arbitrary control over his indictments, and may enter a nolle prosequi as to them, at pleasure, without the consent of the court or of accused. . . .' "
Thus, unless the defendant has been unconstitutionally denied a speedy trial, the defendant has no valid basis for avoiding trial. According to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), this case must be decided on its own facts with regard to four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay.
The facts of this case reveal that the delay from the original indictment to the granting of the motion to quash was fifteen months. This lapse of time, per se, is not inordinate. According to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578, the State has three years in which to try the accused after the institution of the prosecution. The trial court observed during the hearing on the motion to quash that the State was blameless in connection with the delays, recognizing that the continuances granted in the early stages of the proceedings were upon the State's showing of good cause. The defendant requested a speedy trial in April, 1975, complying with Barker. However, several months after requesting a speedy trial, the defendant joined in a motion to continue the case. In State v. Bullock, La., 311 So.2d 242 (1975), after considering the defendant's own responsibility for the delay in commencing his trial, we denied his speedy trial contention. Moreover, in the instant case, the defendant makes no showing of prejudice resulting from the delay.
Under all of the circumstances, we conclude that the fifteen-month delay in bringing the case to trial does not constitute a denial of a speedy trial in violation of the constitutional guarantees.
For the reasons assigned, the State's appeal is dismissed. A supervisory writ is granted, and the trial court's ruling quashing the indictments is reversed and set aside. The motion to quash is overruled, and the case is remanded to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, for further proceedings according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Article 912(B) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
"B. The state cannot appeal from a verdict of acquittal. Adverse judgments or rulings from which the state may appeal include, but are not limited to, judgments or rulings on:
(1) A motion to quash an indictment or any count thereof;
(2) A plea of time limitation;
(3) A plea of double jeopardy;
(4) A motion in arrest of judgment;
(5) A motion to change the venue;
(6) A motion to recuse; and
(7) Repealed."
Article V, Section 5(D) and (E) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides in pertinent part:
"(D) Appellant Jurisdiction. In addition to other appeal provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional; (2) the defendant has been convicted of a felony or fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months actually has been imposed.
"(E) Other Criminal Cases; Review. In all criminal cases not provided in Paragraph (D) (2) of this Section, a defendmvt has a right of appeal or review, as provided by law." (Emphasis added.)