Case Name: George Pierpont RILEY, Appellant, v. Mary Jordan RILEY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-10-30
Citations: 271 So. 2d 181
Docket Number: No. Q-121
Parties: George Pierpont RILEY, Appellant, v. Mary Jordan RILEY, Appellee.
Judges: WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 271
Pages: 181–186

Head Matter:
George Pierpont RILEY, Appellant, v. Mary Jordan RILEY, Appellee.
No. Q-121.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 30, 1972.
John J. Higgins, of Law Offices of Daniel F. Hubsch, Jacksonville, for appellant.
J. Donald Bruce, of Bruce, Smith & Proctor, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
JOHNSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment ordering that the appellant's petition for the dissolution of his marriage be dismissed for the reason that "this marriage of thirty-nine years has not been proven to be irretrievably broken."
The primary question before this Court is whether the lower court erred in dismissing the petition in light of the particular record before it and in conformity with the new dissolution of marriage laws of Florida.
The parties herein had been married for almost 40 years when the appellant-husband, age 63, filed his Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in July of 1971, alleging that the parties had ceased to live together as husband and wife and that the marriage was irretrievably broken. The appellee-wife answered the petition by denying that this ground for dissolution existed and alleging that the husband had become temporarily enamored with another woman but that, within a reasonable period of time, he will wish to reconcile with appellee.
The appellant-husband testified that during the past ten or twelve years of the marriage, the parties had had no companionship, love, affection or home life, and that they had been drifting along for years with no reason for staying together except for the four children, who had now reached their majority. He admitted that prior to April of 1971, the parties had had no real domestic problems that could not be surmounted. They had had no arguments, because there was nothing to argue about, there being a feeling of indifference between them.
The appellee-wife testified that the parties had lived a happy life together until appellant met the Georgia widow who proposed marriage to him. When asked what specific acts of companionship between the parties existed within the last five or six years, appellee stated that they went to church and that they went out to dinner quite a bit. When asked what she had in common with her husband now that she could base a reconciliation on, appellee answered "39 years".
Upon these facts, the trial judge found that the marriage had not been proven to be irretrievably broken and the petition was dismissed. The husband brings this appeal contending that it was error to dismiss the petition inasmuch as the purpose of the new dissolution of marriage law is to preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaningful family relationships, and that the present record shows that the integrity of the subject marriage had been destroyed prior to the filing of this suit and there existed no meaningful family relationship to be safeguarded.
To our knowledge, this is a case of first impression under the new dissolution of marriage law of Florida, Chápter 61, F.S. A. We are called upon to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition in light of the reforms promulgated by Chapter 61 and the record before this Court.
The basic substantive change in the law is the elimination of fault or guilt as grounds for granting or denying a dissolution of the marriage. The traditional fault-oriented grounds for divorce formerly contained in F.S. § 61.041, F.S.A. have been abolished and replaced with only two grounds; to wit: a showing that the marriage is "irretrievably broken" or mental incompetence of one of the parties. F.S.A. § 61.052.
The Legislature has not seen fit to promulgate guidelines as to what constitutes an "irretrievably broken" marriage. It is suggested that this lack of definitive direction was deliberate and is desirable in an area as volatile as a proceeding for termination of the marital status. Consideration should be given to each case individually and predetermined policy should not be circumscribed by the appellate courts of this State.
Thus, we are hesitant to set forth specific circumstances which trial courts could utilize as permissible indices of an irretrievable breakdown of the marital status. Were we to attempt to do so, we feel that the basic purpose of the new dissolution of marriage law would be frustrated. Such proceedings would either again become primarily adversary in nature or persons would again fit themselves into tailor-made categories or circumstances to fit judicially defined breakdown situations. It is our opinion that these two problems are the very ones which the Legislature intended to eliminate.
While the Legislature did not define an "irretrievably broken" marriage, it has stated that the purpose of the new law is to preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaningful family relationships. Whether or not the marriage is irretrievably broken is left to the trial court's determination based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing. Such evidence need not be corroborated and there need be no showing of fault to determine that the marriage has in fact broken down.
Without attempting to set forth specific guidelines, we think the central inquiry in each situation should be a subjective, rather than an objective, one. In other words, observable acts and occurrences in the marriage relationship and the causes of the state in which the parties find themselves are not as important or controlling as the question of whether the marriage is in fact ended because of the basic unsuitability of the spouses for each other and their state of mind toward the relationship. Self-restrained spouses who do not permit outward manifestations of the failure of their marriage should not be penalized by the denial of the dissolution petition. If refusal of dissolution would amount to a legal perpetuation of a relationship which has ceased to exist in fact, the petition should be granted.
In every case, the important issue is the possibility of a reconciliation and the marriage as a whole must be considered. Before dissolution is granted, the court should be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together because their difficulties are so deep and substantial that no reasonable effort could eradicate them so as to enable the parties to live together in a normal marital relationship. If the trial judge doubts the petitioner's testimony that his or her marriage has irretrievably broken down, he should continue the proceedings to determine if reconciliation is possible.
Applying these principles to the case now before us, we feel that the trial judge erred in flatly dismissing the petition. If one marital partner has made the considered decision that the relationship should be terminated, perhaps it may properly be said that the marital relationship has broken down. However, as noted above, if the trial court doubts this spouse's testimony, we feel that the action should be continued to determine if reconciliation is possible. While the power of the State should be exerted to preserve the marriage if it can be preserved, it should not perpetuate a legal relationship which has or will cease to exist in fact. The power to continue the proceedings for a reasonable length of time not to exceed three months to enable the parties themselves to effect a reconciliation, or to order either or both parties to consult professional counselors, is authorized by F.S.A. § 61.052(2) (b). It is our considered opinion that either of these alternatives would be a better disposition of the present case and would be more in keeping with the new dissolution of marriage laws of this State. If, however, a temporary suspension of the proceedings or consultation with professional counselors fails to effectuate a reconciliation between the parties, the trial judge should then reconsider the issue of whether the marriage has in truth and in fact been irretrievably broken. If this issue is resolved in the affirmative, then a judgment dissolving the marriage should be rendered; otherwise, the prayer for dissolution should be denied and the complaint dismissed.
We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
SPECTOR, C. J., dissents.
. F.S.A. § 61.001(2) (a).
. F.S.A. § 61.052(2).
. McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal.3d 673,100 Cal.Rptr. 140, 493 P.2d 866 (1972).