Case Name: McDONALD v. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1996-03-11
Citations: 220 Ga. App. 567
Docket Number: A95A2810
Parties: McDONALD v. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC.
Judges: Pope, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Andrews, J., dissents. Beasley, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., and Ruffin, J., disqualified.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 220
Pages: 567–569

Head Matter:
A95A2810.
McDONALD v. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC.
(469 SE2d 805)

Opinion:
McMurray, Presiding Judge.
David McDonald filed an action, based on respondeat superior, against Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. ("Coca-Cola"), alleging that he was injured when a Coca-Cola employee negligently backed a tractor-trailer into his arm during a docking maneuver at a warehouse where McDonald was employed as a forklift operator. Coca-Cola denied the material allegations of the complaint and later filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that any injuries McDonald sustained were the result of a failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The evidence, construed with an eye toward upholding McDonald's cause of action, Mull v. Mickey's Lumber &c. Co., 218 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1) (461 SE2d 270), reveals the following.
On November 13, 1992, Ronald Holcomb backed an empty tractor-trailer rig into a docking port at a warehouse to pick up a load of soft drink cans for his employer, Coca-Cola. McDonald, who was responsible for loading the trailer, determined that he could not insert his forklift ramp because Holcomb had parked the trailer too close to the loading bay's wall. McDonald thus called for Holcomb to move the trailer forward and, in compliance with this command, Holcomb slowly pulled the rig away from the wall. As soon as sufficient clearance opened between the trailer and the loading bay's wall (about six to eight inches), McDonald stuck his arm through the gap to signal for Holcomb to stop. The trailer, however, suddenly lurched back and crushed McDonald's arm against the wall. McDonald was pinned for a few seconds and then released. He fell dazed and noticed a bone protruding from his arm.
This appeal followed an order granting Coca-Cola's motion for summary judgment. Held:
"Except in plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, questions of negligence, proximate cause, including the related issues of foreseeability, assumption of risk, lack of ordinary care for one's own safety, lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another's negligence, contributory and comparative negligence are for the jury. [Cits.]" Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga. App. 265, 268 (4) (424 SE2d 810). The case sub judice does not fall within the exception. That is, we cannot say (as a matter of law) that it was unreasonable for McDonald to stick his hand between the gap that was opening between the loading bay's wall and the trailer in order to signal Coca-Cola's truck driver to stop. Such questions are for a jury, not the trial court upon summary adjudication. Accordingly, there being genuine issues of material fact regarding Holcomb's alleged negligent operation of Coca-Cola's truck and McDonald's alleged failure to watch out for his own safety, the trial court erred in granting Coca-Cola's motion for summary judgment.
The dissent's statement that McDonald committed a " 'manifestly foolhardy' " act for giving hand signals to Coca-Cola's driver as his truck was pulling away from the loading bay wall improperly assumes the role of the factfinder in such cases. Whether a similarly situated loading bay laborer would or would not have acted as McDonald did, under the same or similar circumstances, is not a matter within the natural province of the court, but is a question uniquely suited for general consideration of the jury.
Judgment reversed.
Pope, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Andrews, J., dissents. Beasley, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., and Ruffin, J., disqualified.