Case Name: O. J. WOODWARD, Respondent, v. JOHN BROWN et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1897-12-15
Citations: 119 Cal. 283
Docket Number: Sac. 288
Parties: O. J. WOODWARD, Respondent, v. JOHN BROWN et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 283–310

Head Matter:
[Sac. 288.
In Bank.
December 15, 1897.]
O. J. WOODWARD, Respondent, v. JOHN BROWN et al., Appellants.
Foreclosure of Mortgage—Conditional Liability of Mortgagor—Release of Part of Security for Less than Value—Deficiency.—The mortgaged premises constitute the primary fund out of which the mortgage debt must be paid, and the liability of the mortgagor is contingent on a sale of the mortgaged premises under foreclosure and an application of the proceeds to the debt and costs, and the deficiency which the code directs may take the form of a personal judgment is a deficiency arising from the sale of all the mortgaged premises, and not a part of it; and if the mortgagee arbitrarily releases portions of the mortgaged premises for less than their actual value, without the consent of the mortgagor, he cannot, on foreclosure, hold the mortgagor liable to a judgment for the apparent deficiency, but must credit the mortgagor with the actual value of the portions released, and if there would have been no deficiency, if the mortgagee had not released any part of his security, he cannot hold the mortgagor for any deficiency.
Id.—Deed by Mortgagor—Personal Covenant against Encumbrances— —Release to Grantee.—A covenant against encumbrances, expressed or implied, in a bargain and sale deed by the mortgagor, is a personal covenant, and is not appurtenant to the land nor available to the mortgagee; and a release given to such grantee by the mortgagee, without the consent of the mortgagor, for less than the value of the ■ land released,- cannot affect the right of the mortgagor to have the value of such land applied upon the mortgage debt, as respects a deficiency judgment.
Id.—Decree of Foreclosure—Sale of Mortgaged Lots in Inverse Order of Alienation.—Where portions of the mortgaged premises have been alienated by the mortgagor, the decree of foreclosure must order a sale of the premises, subject to the mortgage, in the inverse order of their alienation.
Id.—Effect of Partial Releases by Mortgagee—Rights of Purchaser of Lots not Released—Notice to Mortgagee.—The record of conveyances by the mortgagor to purchasers of lots from him, which are not released from the mortgage security, is not constructive notice to the prior, mortgagee of such conveyances or of any subsequent conveyances by them to other grantees, and if he has no actual knowledge thereof, he is not prevented thereby from dealing in any manner with the mortgaged premises, and he may release other lots •from the mortgage without liability to such purchasers or their grantees, or any impairment of his remaining security upon the mortgaged premises; and the most that can be claimed by them is that the sale should proceed in the proper order of alienation of lots remaining subject to the mortgage.
Id.—Power of Partial Release—Registry—Notice.—A mortgagee has power to give partial releases from the operation of the mortgage of portions of the mortgaged premises, without, in any manner, affecting, or discharging his security upon the remainder of the premises; and the registry of such partial releases is sufficient to impart notice to any person dealing with the property, whether noted upon the margin of the record of the mortgage or embodied in separate instruments duly acknowledged and recorded.
Id.—Construction of Partial Release—Limitation of General Words of Satisfaction.—A partial release of particular lots from the operation of a mortgage of a larger tract, for a small consideration expressed in the release, will not be construed to operate as an entire satisfaction of the mortgage debt, on account of the use of general words of satisfaction therein, but such words will be construed as limited and not to be extended in effect beyond the evident intention of the mortgagee; nor can purchasers of mortgage lots who took prior to such release be misled by its terms.
Id.—Agreement for Release from Mortgagee — Prior Assignment of Mortgage—Registry—Notice of Assignment.—An agreement made with the mortgagee that he would release lots previously sold from the operation of the mortgage, and would hold the purchaser harmless and secure in the title to the lots, made long after the purchase and deed of the lots, and still longer after the assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff, cannot bind the plaintiff without proof of his knowledge and consent thereto; and the registry of the assign-ment of the mortgage is part of the record title of which a purchaser from the mortgagor must take notice.
Id.—Conflicting Deeds—Release from Mortgage—Knowledge of Mortgagor-Priority of Delivery—Burden of Proof—Presumptions— Credit of Value of Lots Released.—Where a grantee of the mortgagor executed two deeds of the same date to different grantees, one. of which conveyed two lots to one grantee, and the other conveyed the same lots and the residue of the mortgaged property to the other ; grantee, and the mortgagee, with knowledge of both grants, released the two lots to the special grantee thereof, whose deed was first recorded, and his prior right to the lots was recognized in the decree of foreclosure of the mortgage, the burden of proof-is on the defendants claiming under the other deed to prove its prior delivery, and, in the absence of such proof, it is to be presumed in support of the judgment that the deed first recorded was first delivered; but this presumption does not apply as respects the additional mortgaged property included in the other deed, which must be held to have taken effect as to that property of its date, and prior, in time to the special deed of the two lots, which could not be released as against the owners of the other lots, without crediting their full value upon the mortgage debt.
Id.—Apportionment of Value of Lots Released.—The value of the lots released cannot be apportioned so as to be credited wholly to a portion of the other lots included in the mortgage which belong to the defendants appealing, but the nonappealing defendants owning the residue of such lots must share in the benefits of the credit.
Id.—Inverse Order of Alienation—Sheriff’s Deed—Relation to Lien of Attachment.—In determining the inverse order of alienation of mortgaged lots sold by the mortgagor, a sheriff’s deed must be deemed to relate to the lien of an attachment upon the lots sold; and it is error to order such lots sold under the decree o'f foreclosure prior to lots conveyed intermediate the attachment and the sheriff’s deed.
Id.—Lot Conveyed to Person not a Party.—It is error to order a mortgaged lot to be sold under the decree of foreclosure, which prior to the commencement of the action had been sold and conveyed to a person not a party to the suit, unless it is made to appear that prior thereto such person had sold it to a person who was made a defendant.
Id.—Improper Order of Sales—Lands of Party not Appealing—Rights of Appellants.—A party not appealing cannot complain of the order in which the sale of mortgaged lots is to be made; but the sale of the lands of such party which remain subject to the mortgage must, with reference to other defendant's appealing, be made with a due regard for their equities.
Id.—Right of Plaintiff to Sue—Finding—Evidence—Assignments—Recitals.—A finding that plaintiff was the owner and holder of the notes and mortgage when the action was brought substantially finds on the issue raised by the answer that plaintiff was not the real party in interest and had no right to prosecute the action, and the finding is sufficiently sustained by evidence of an assignment made to plaintiff, though he was at the time acting for a bank of which he was president, and testimony by him that he finally bought them outright; and his title as owner and holder cannot be defeated by recitals in a subsequent assignment from the assignor to another assignee to the effect that the notes and mortgage were held by plaintiff and the bank as security for indebtedness to them.
In.—Right of Collection—Immaterial Evidence—Amount Paid for Assignment—Time of Acquisition of Title.—For the purpose of bringing the action, it would be sufficient if plaintiff held an assignment of the notes and mortgage merely for collection, and questions put to him as to the amount paid by him for the mortgage, and whether there was anything owing to the bank of which he had been president, of which he testified that he bought the mortgage, and as to when he acquired the absolute title, were properly disallowed as immaterial.
Id.—Notes Payable at Different Times—Option as to Maturity—Bringing of Action—Application of Payments—Immaterial Application to Last Note.—The bringing of an action upon a note not mature upon its face operates as an exercise of an option given in the note to regard it as due for nonpayment of interest thereon; and where three-notes were given, payable at different times, and the first was paid in full at maturity, and the second was past due when suit was brought thereon, and the last was payable in futuro, but subject to the option to regard it as due for nonpayment of interest, and each bore the same rate of interest, the fact that some of the payments received by the plaintiff were applied upon the third note-instead of the second is immaterial, it appearing that, if all the payments made after payment of the first note had been indorsed • upon the second note, there would still be an unpaid balance on the second note and unpaid interest on both notes when the action was brought.
Id.—Allowance of Attorney’s Fees.—Where the-mortgage provides for a reasonable counsel fee to be fixed by the court in case of foreclosure, the duty of fixing the amount of compensation is cast upon the court, and no evidence of value of the services is necessary.
Id.—Motion for New Trial—Expurgated Affidavit—Harmless Ruling.— An order striking out an affidavit on motion for new trial is harmless where the matters contained in it were mainly recitals of what appeared in the record, and it was not in support of the ground of newly-discovered evidence, and was more in the nature of an argument on the motion than the presentation of any new fact of which the court could take notice.
ID,—Summons—Affidavit for Publication—Return of Sheriff not Required.—Where the complaint states a good cause of action, an affidavit for the publication of summons which gives the names of the defendants, and states that they reside out of the state, names the-state in which each resides, and refers to the verified complaint and makes it a part of the affidavit, and states that the defendants are proper and necessary parties to the action, and that affiant has- a good cause of action against the defendants, as he is advised by his counsel and verily believes, is not defective, and need not state that the sheriff had returned the summons, and it is not material whether the summons had been returned when the affidavit was made.
In.—Proof of Publication—Affidavit of Publisher and Proprietor.—An affidavit proving publication of the summons may be sworn to by the publisher and proprietor of the paper in which it was published, such “proprietor" being in the sense of the statute synonymous with “printer"; and where such affidavit states that the summons was published weekly in a paper named, which was a daily and weekly newspaper, in each and every one of the consecutive weekly issues of said newspaper, and the time of publication stated covered twenty weekly insertions, and a period of seventy days, the affidavit shows a sufficient length of publication, and that the publication was once a week.
Id.—Affidavit of Service—Ex parte Amendment Nunc Pro Tunc.—Am affidavit of the personal service of summons may be amended by leave of the court after judgment, to supply nunc pro tunc the statement omitted by inadvertence that affiant was over the age of eighteen years when he made the affidavit; and though the practice of allowing such an amendment to be made without notice is not to be commended, yet where it was allowed ex parte, and the defendants had subsequent notice and full opportunity to take steps to have the truth of the matter ascertained, and did not ask to have the order vacated for any reason, or controvert any fact stated therein, the exparte order allowing the amendment, and directing that the amended affidavit be made part of the judgment roll, will not be disturbed upon appeal.
Id.—Amendment of Complaint after Publication of Summons—Hatter not of Substance.—An amendment of the complaint in matter of form after the publication of summons, merely setting out the indorsements lof payments on the notes, in the nature of a bill of particulars from which it could be ascertained what appeared in the complaint, does not come within the rule that an amendment m matter of substance after default opens up the default, and such amendment does not require republication of the summons nor service upon absent defendants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County and from an order denying a new trial. W. M. Conley, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinions.
Robert L. Hargrove, for Appellants.
George E. Church, and George B. Graham, for Respondent.

Opinion:
THE COURT.
A petition for hearing in Bank having been granted, upon further consideration it appears that on January .20, 1892, McDonald conveyed to John Brown Colony, a corporation, and to D. S. Dorn blocks 51 and 60. On that day the title still remained in Brown. The Dorn deed was recorded January 23d, while'the John Brown Colony deed was recorded January 26th. On January 25, 1892, Brown conveyed these same blocks to McDonald, the title thus inuring to Dorn, who first recorded his deed. The presumption of law relating to blocks 51 and 60 was correctly applied in holding in the former opinion that the Dorn deed was'first delivered. But it does not apply to the John Brown Colony deed as respects the other blocks and lots conveyed to that corporation. As to them, that deed must take date of January 20th, and therefore prior to the Dorn' deed, and the Dorn block could not be released without crediting their full value upon the mortgage debt, as the mortgagee had actual knowledge of the John Brown Colony deed. The value of these blocks was found to be $8,000. The mortgagee did in fact credit the mortgage debt with $5,000 on account of the sale to Dorn, so that there remains to be credited the further sum of $3,000, which should be done as of the date of the release of the Dorn blocks, March 1, 1892. We see no way to apportion this amount so as to exonerate the lots owned by the, appealing defendants alone in the ratio that their lots bear to the whole number of lots sold by the John Brown Colony; -nor do we see any way by which any principle of apportionment could be applied upon any basis of values. As the case stands, it is the fortune of the nonappealing defendants to share the benefits of this credit, as it would have been their misfortune had the dates of the conveyances to John Brown Colony and to Dorn been different.
In the matter of the petition by plaintiff for a modification of the opinion directing that Cecil Ricketts be made a party defendant, the petition will be granted in so far that should it appear that Ricketts had sold his lot prior to the commencement of the action to a person who was made a defendant, the direction heretofore given may be disregarded.
Wherefore, it is ordered and adjudged by this court in Bank that the judgment heretofore rendered in Department be modi fied in the foregoing particulars, and that the judgment as modified stand approved.