Case Name: Gavin J. Moffat, Resp't, v. Robert Fulton, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-04-18
Citations: 31 N.Y. St. Rep. 154
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gavin J. Moffat, Resp’t, v. Robert Fulton, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 31
Pages: 154–159

Head Matter:
Gavin J. Moffat, Resp’t, v. Robert Fulton, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed April 18, 1890.)
Execution—Against the person.
Where the complaint in an action for money had and received fails to specifically state that the money was received in a fiduciary capacity, a provision in the judgment authorizing the issue of execution against the person of defendant is erroneous, even though the complaint and evidence suffice to establish the fact that the money was received in such capacity.
(Brady, J., dissents.)
This is an action to recover the proceeds of two promissory notes made by the plaintiff and endorsed by the defendants.
Both the plaintiff and defendants were in the paper business at the times mentioned in the evidence. The plaintiff was in business in ¡New Haven, Connecticut, and the defendants were partners under the firm name of the Weymouth Paper Mills, having an office in New York city, in charge of the defendant Fulton. In November, 1886, the plaintiff made and delivered to the defendants a note to their order for $908.79, dated November 15, 1886, and payable in three months, for a bill of merchandise. When this note was about to become due, the plaintiff found it would be inconvenient for him to pay it. He therefore made a similar note for the same amount, gave it to his salesman, Mr. McDowell, to take to the office of the defendants and ask them to endorse it, have the same discounted and send the proceeds to him in New Haven in time to pay the note, exhibit B, coming due February 18th.
On February 15th, McDowell took the note to Mr. Fulton in New York, and told him what Mr. Moffat had instructed him to tell him. Mr. Fulton said that he did not know whether he could have the note discounted or not, as it was for the same amount as the old one, but that if Mr. Moffat would make a smaller note he could probably have it discounted. McDowell then asked Mr. Fulton whether he should take the note back to Mr. Moffat and he told him not to, but to leave it with him that afternoon, and he would try and have it discounted, and if he succeeded he-would send the proceeds to Mr. Moffat and if he did not succeed he would return the note that night and write Mr. Moffat in regard to it. And Mr. McDowell knowing Mr. Fulton well, left the note with him on his promise to return it. Either the note or the proceeds were to be be sent to the plaintiff that night. The defendant Fulton did not return the note to the plaintiff, but endorsed it and gave it to Charles A. Colby, a note broker, on February 16th, to have it discounted. Mr. Colby sold the note on Saturday, February 19th, and on Monday, February 21st, paid the proceeds to the Weymouth Paper Mills by giving to Mr. Ful ton his check. Mr. Moffat paid the note at its maturity, February 18th, 1887.
On February 17th, the plaintiff went to the defendant’s office. Mr. Fulton requested Mr. Moffat to make a new note for a smaller amount as it could be more easily discounted than the one of February 15th, 1887. He said there was some doubt whether he could get that note discounted. At Mr. Fulton’s request, he made a smaller note for $750.60 and gave it to Fulton, telling him if he could get it discounted to return the note, Exhibit A, and the proceeds of the note, Exhibit 0. He told him that he wanted the proceeds to take carp of the note B, coming due February 18th. The instructions were that the check for the proceeds was to reach Mr. Moffat on February 18th. The notes were not to be used after that time. The note, Exhibit G, was left by the defendants at their bank to be discounted. The bank discounted the note on March 4, 1887, and passed the proceeds to the credit of the defendants. The note was not held by the bank previous to its discount. The proceeds of neither of the notes, Exhibit A or Exhibit C, have been paid over to the plaintiff. Mr. Moffat paid the two notes, Exhibits A and C, when they became due.
It also appeared on the record that the defendant interposed as a separate answer a counterclaim against the plaintiff, arising from the sale and delivery to him by the defendant of goods, wares and merchandise. To this counterclaim the plaintiff demurred on several grounds, among others that while the cause of action arising out of the facts stated in the complaint was in tort, the counterclaim was founded upon contract, and was therefore not of the character specified in § 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The issues of law created by the demurrer were decided in favor of the plaintiff, with leave to the defendant to amend his answer containing the counterclaim. It also appears that before the cause was opened the defendant’s counsel “ moved to dismiss the complaint as to defendent Fulton, for the reason that the complaint, as to the first alleged cause of action, does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, particularly, does not set forth facts constituting an action in tort; also, for the separate reason that the complaint, as to the second alleged eaase of action, does not set forth facts constituting a cause of action, either in tort or upon contract; also, for the separate reason that the complaint unites an alleged cause of action proceeding upon the theory of tort with one proceeding on the theory of contract”
The court denied each motion, and defendant took a separate exception to each denial.
And, further, that when the plaintiff’s evidence was all in, the following incidents marked the close of the case, the defendants calling no witness.
Defendant’s counsel: I now move to dismiss on both of the alleged causes of action, on the ground that the facts proved do not constitute either a tort, an actionable conversion, nor the fiduciary relation in respect to either cause of action; and on the ground that it appears that the moneys, the proceeds of the notes, were by agreement to be put into the bank of the defendants, and their check was to be sent up to Moffat, and, under those circumstances, the fiduciary relation was not established.
The Court: The plaintiff sets out the cause of the complaint. Those facts establish sufficient to maintain the cause of action for a conversion, or a cause of action for the receipt of money in a fiduciary capacity. He urges in his complaint that he gave those notes to you for discount before a certain time, and that you agreed to have those notes discounted or returned ; that you did. have them discounted, and he has not got the money.
Motion denied. Exception.
Defendant’s counsel: I rest my case on that. Yerdict directed for plaintiff for $1,789.07. Defendant duly excepts.
Defendant’s counsel: I now move, on the same ground, that, your honor direct a verdict in favor of the defendant, Fulton.
Motion denied; exception.
Defendant’s counsel: Q. Was the verdict directed on the theory of tort or contract ?
The court: I think the position the plaintiff has taken here is that the money was received in a fiduciary capacity. I think the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to establish that, and that the plaintiff’s proof is ample to sustain that.
■R. Robertson, for app’lt; H. W. Taft, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Bartlett, J.
I find it difficult to reconcile the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Brady in this case with the decisions of the general term of this department in Hillis v. Bleckert, 53 Hun, 499 ; 25 N. Y. State Rep., 553, and Bartlett v. Sutorius, 25 N. Y. State Rep., 629. If those cases were correctly decided, it seems to me that the judgment under review on this appeal is erroneous, so far as it assumes to authorize the issue of execution against the person of the defendant.
The proof made out a case of money had and received. The learned trial judge held that the complaint and evidence sufficed to establish the fact that the money was received in a fiduciary capacity. But there is no such express averment in the complaint ; and in Bartlett v. Sutorius, supra, we held that in an action to recover money, where it was sought to take the defendant's body in execution on the ground that he had received the money in a fiduciary capacity, the fact that he so received it must be specifically alleged in the complaint.
In view of the decisions to which I have referred, I do not see how that portion of this judgment can be sustained which provides for the issue of execution against the person of the defendant. I think the judgment should be modified by striking that provision therefrom, and as thus modified should be affirmed without costs.
Van Brijnt, P. J., concurs.