Case Name: Kevin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-03-24
Citations: 730 So. 2d 777
Docket Number: No. 97-2457
Parties: Kevin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, JORGENSON and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 730
Pages: 777–780

Head Matter:
Kevin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-2457.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 24, 1999.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1999.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Christine E. Zahralban, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, JORGENSON and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
SORONDO, J.
Kevin Williams (defendant) appeals his conviction and sentence for the crime of second degree murder.
The defendant was charged with first degree murder and armed burglary in connection with the killing of Osvaldo "Eddie" Gonzalez. At trial he admitted that he shot and killed Mr. Gonzalez during a marijuana sale but maintained that he did so in self-defense. The state presented testimony at trial which suggested that the defendant killed Gonzalez because the latter refused to sell defendant a set of car rims.
During trial, the defendant testified and presented his claim of self-defense. Before the defendant testified, defense counsel advised the trial judge that he wished to ask defendant about the nature of his prior felonies. The state objected and the trial court sustained the objection and forbade any mention of the nature of the prior offenses. During direct examination, defense counsel asked defendant whether he had ever been convicted of a felony and, if so, how many times. The defendant responded that he had been convicted seven times. Defense counsel additionally asked whether he had gone to trial on any of his prior cases. The state again objected and again the trial judge sustained the objection.
The law is clear that the defendant should have been allowed to explain the nature of his prior convictions, and should have been allowed to tell the jury that he had not gone to trial in his previous cases in order to "'reduce the harmful consequences' by explaining something about the nature or character of the damaging information — in other words, to rehabilitate [himself] before he [was] impeached." Lawhorne v. State, 500 So.2d 519, 521 (Fla.1986). See also Bell v. State, 491 So.2d 537 (Fla.1986); Scurry v. State, 701 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Ziermann v. State, 696 So.2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The Court in Lawhome stated:
[W]hile the impeaching party may only inquire as to the existence of convictions and their number (or, if the matter be denied, may show the convictions by documentary evidence) the party presenting the testimony of the witness may delve into the nature or circumstances of the convictions for the purpose of rehabilitating the witness by attempting to diminish the effect of the disclosures.
500 So.2d at 522 (emphasis added).
In McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1957), the plaintiff testified at trial. The defense questioned him about whether he had ever been convicted of a crime. The trial judge disallowed this question. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a previous conviction of a witness was admissible. The Court also addressed the witness' right to respond to such a question:
If the witness so desires he may of his own volition state the nature of the crime and offer any relevant testimony that would eliminate any adverse implications; for example, the fact that he had in the meantime been fully pardoned or that the crime was a minor one and occurred many years before.
Id. at 567. In the present case the defendant was on trial for the charges of first degree murder with a firearm and armed burglary. During his direct testimony he admitted that he had been previously convicted of seven felonies. He further wished to tell the jury the nature of those crimes — all non-violent drug offenses which were not committed with firearms. It is clear that he wanted to avoid "any adverse implications," by establishing that the crimes were "minor" in nature. He had a right to do so and the denial of that right was error.
The dissent observes that Scurry and Ziermann involved prior crimes which were totally different from the crime(s) being tried. It goes on to suggest that in this case "the defendant's seven prior felony convictions were similar to the crime for which he was being tried." The defendant was being tried for the crimes of first degree murder and armed burglary — violent crimes which are totally different from the defendant's priors. The dissent does not address the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to tell the jury that he had not gone to trial in his previous cases, information clearly admissible under Lawhome.
The state's suggestion that any error was harmless is unpersuasive. The evidence in this case boiled down to the testimony of one state witness, himself no saint, and the defendant, who claimed that he killed the alleged victim in self-defense. The credibili-, ty of the defendant in this case was, as it was in Ziermann, critical to the deliberations of the jury.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
NESBITT, J. concurs.