Case Name: James C. Evans and Edwin T. Evans, Appellants, v. The Columbian Insurance Company, Respondents
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1870-12-28
Citations: 44 N.Y. 146
Docket Number: 
Parties: James C. Evans and Edwin T. Evans, Appellants, v. The Columbian Insurance Company, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 146–155

Head Matter:
James C. Evans and Edwin T. Evans, Appellants, v. The Columbian Insurance Company, Respondents.
A policy of insurance (marine) which excepts loss by the bursting of boilers, but covers that “ occurring subsequent to and in consequence of such bursting,” does not cover a total loss occasioned by an explosion so violent as to tear open the sides of the vessel to such an extent that the water admitted sinks her in five or ten minutes. As the vessel was manifestly worthless the moment the explosion had occurred, the loss was immediate upon, not subsequent to, the explosion, within, the meaning of the policy.
(Argued September 26, 1870;
decided December 28, 1870.)
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered at a General Term of the Supreme Court, in the eighth district, upon submission of a case under section 372 ■ of the Code of Procedure.
On the 17th of March, 1864, the defendant issued to the plaintiff a policy of insurance, insuring $25,000 upon the body, tackle and apparatus, and other furniture of the steamship (propeller) called the Mile, from 16th April, 1864, to the 16th of December in the same year, the defendant taking upon itself the perils of the lakes, rivers, canals, fires and seasons that should come to the vessel and property insured, or any part thereof, excepting misfortunes arising from divers causes, and among them misfortunes arising. “ from the bursting or explosion of the boilers, collapsing of the flues, or breakage of the machinery, unless by unavoidable external causes or fire ensues therefrom, services rendered in recovering or securing the vessel or property covered by the policy.” It was also provided by a manuscript or written and controlling part of the policy that the clause referring to the bursting of the boilers and breakage of the machinery should be interpreted as follows: “ This policy does not cover any loss or damage done by the bursting of boilers, collapsing of flues, or breakage of machinery, unless occasioned by some unavoidable external cause, or fire ensues; but any loss or damage occurring to the vessel subsequent to and in consequence of the bursting of the boilers,” collapsing of flues, or breakage of machinery, is covered by this policy. In May, following the issuing of the policy, the boiler of the vessel, while navigating the Detroit river, “exploded and thereby became burst, the immediate effect of which was to cause large quantities of steam to escape therefrom through the rents and apertures caused by the bursting; which steam, thus escaping, passed into the hull and body of the vessel, making large rents and apertures therein, through which large quantities of water then commenced to enter within said vessel, insomuch that from five to ten minutes after the explosion the vessel, by the weight of the water, sank, and became and was a total loss.” From a photograph of the vessel, exhibiting what the parties agreed was a truthful representation of her appearance after she was submerged, it appeared that what is described as rents and apertures was a complete uncovering of the ribs of the fore-quarter of her bow, leaving nothing to obstruct the flow of the water of the river into her, and causing her to sink. Upon this agreed case, submitted under section 372 of the Code, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.
George B. Hibbard, for the appellant.
Dudley Field, for the respondent,
cited 2 Pars. Ins. L., 55; Strong v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co. (31 N. Y., 103); St. John v. Amer. Ins. Co. (11 N. Y., 516); Barlow v. Scott (24 N. Y., 40); Paterson v. Harris (1 Best & Smith, 336, 353); 1 Phill. Ins., §§ 1086-7; Barnewall v. Church (1 Caines, 217, 234); Magnus v. Buttemer (11 C. B., 876); Hearne v. Edmunds (1 Brod. & B., 388); Wells v. Hopwood (3 B. & Ad., 20); Corcoran v. Gurney (1 Ellis & B., 456, 463); Blays v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. (7 Cranch, 415); McCargo v. New Orleans Ins. Co. (10 Rob. La., 202); Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (2 Hagg. Conn., 93.)

Opinion:
Gray, C.
If the loss of this vessel was immediate upon, and not subsequent to the bursting of the boiler, the defendant is entitled to judgment. In order to a recovery by the plaintiffs, the onus is upon them to show by the facts agreed upon that it was subsequent to that event. The conceded facts do not, as a whole, in any aspect in which they can be presented, contain an admission or justify an inference that there was, between the bursting of the boiler and the time when the vessel became submerged, a moment, when for any premium however great she could have been insured against sinking, or that she was of any value whatever. The facts agreed upon are not represented by words alone. It is by words agreed, in substance, that an explosion occurred; that it caused the boiler to burst, and thereby rents and apertures to be made in her hull and body, through which large bodies of water then commenced to enter within the vessel. A photograph of agreed truthfulness representing the appearance of the vessel after she became submerged, exhibits the whereabouts of the rents and apertures in her hull and body, and their extent, through which it is agreed the water immediately commenced to enter, communicate to the mind as clearly as words can (the bursting of the boiler and the commencement of the water's entering being simultaneous), that, from the extent of the apertures and the large quantities of water entering through them, that no interposition could have rescued her from sinking. It is true that this fact is not stated in so many words; but the facts stated in words, and those represented by the photograph, render the proposition here stated self-evident; if anything is lacking, there is the conceded fact that the inflowing of the water was so rapid that she beeárne submerged in from five to ten minutes. When, therefore, the moment the boiler burst, the vessel necessarily became valueless, the loss became at once total, immediate, and not subsequent to the cause that occasioned it. When the injury is such that the consummation of the loss insured against commences, as in this case, the moment the injury is inflicted and is certain to be speedily effected, it is not divisible, part immediate, part subsequent, but immediate and total, whenever the thing insured is rendered, the moment of the injury that caused it, of no value. This vessel was manifestly worthless the moment the rents and apertures were made. The judgment should be affirmed.