Case Name: Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Miller
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1973-05-23
Citations: 452 Pa. 35
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 152
Parties: Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Miller.
Judges: Before Jones, C. J., Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 452
Pages: 35–49

Head Matter:
Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Miller.
Argued March 13, 1972.
Before Jones, C. J., Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ.
Robert L. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, with him Carol Mary Los and J. Kent Gulley, Assistant District Attorneys, and Robert W. Duggan, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant.
No oral argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.
May 23, 1973:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mb. Chief Justice Jones,
On September 8, 1970, appellee returned home from work in an intoxicated state. After arguing with his wife, the prosecutrix, he loaded his gun and threatened to take his own life. When prosecutrix went to the telephone to obtain help, appellee brandished his gun and assured prosecutrix that if she dialed the telephone, it would be her last telephone conversation. Appellee thereafter left the home of his wife and children, but returned on several occasions in the same intoxicated and threatening condition.
On November 10, 1970, after a hearing before a Justice of the Peace, appellee was ordered to enter an appearance bond and was held for the Allegheny County Common Pleas Court, Criminal Division. A hearing commenced on December 16,1970, on appellee's charged violation of the Surety of Peace Statute. On April 20, 1971, appellee was ordered by the court to pay prosecution costs, to enter a bond with surety in the sum of $1,000 and to keep the peace for one year. On May 6, 1971, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the order of April 20, 1971, requiring appellee to post bond.
The question presented by this appeal is ivhether the Surety of Peace Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, as amended by the Acts of March 18, 1909, and April 27, 1909, P. L. 42 and P.L. 260, 19 P.S. §23-28, is violative of Article I, Sections 6 and 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as a deprivation of appellee's right to a trial by jury and the denial of due process and equal protection of the law. The order and opinion of the court below answered each inquiry in the affirmative. Appeal was taken by the Commonwealth to this Court.
Right to Trial by Jury
The elements of the statutory offense of surety of the peace are (1) the making of a threat (2) to some person or his property (3) with the result that the threatened person is put in fear or danger of being injured.
The Act provides preventive justice and requires persons of whom there is probable cause to suspect future violent behavior to give full assurance to the public against the anticipated offenses. Offenders must post a surety bond and pay costs and, in default of payment, the justice may commit the person defaulting to the county jail until such time as costs are paid.
The question whether the Act is violative of appellee's right to trial by jury and purported right to prosecution by indictment has never been decided by this Court. The procedure here employed, however, has been upheld by the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Taub, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 440, 144 A. 2d 628 (1958); Commonwealth v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 193, 132 A. 2d 366 (1957). The Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Taub reasoned that the offense of surety of the peace has never been an indictable offense since the purpose of the statutory enactment is the prevention of the commission of a serious threatened crime. As crime prevention is the gravamen of these provisions, rather than prosecution of a crime already committed, time is of the essence in processing the action. Prosecution via time-consuming indictment is neither required by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution nor practicable in view of the crime prevention posture of the Act.
Article I, Section 6 of the Commonwealth's Constitution provides: "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." Similarly, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution insures that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. . . ." Application of the surety of the peace procedure evokes no violation of appellee's right to trial by jury. Appellee was not charged with an offense triable by jury at common law. The offense was created by statute and the procedure thus prescribed. Commonwealth v. Taub, supra. We hold that Commonwealth v. Taub was properly decided in that the right to prosecution by indictment and trial by jury do not invalidate this crime-preventive process.
Due Process and Equal Protection
The court below determined that the surety of peace bond violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since: (1) the Commonwealth is not called upon to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the burden of proof (of innocence) falls inappropriately upon the defendant; and (3) defendant is not afforded the opportunity to establish his defense under the procedural provisions of the acts.
A summary proceeding does not constitute an abuse of due process where the recor'd discloses that a sufficient information was read to the accused, he pleaded not guilty, testimony sufficient to support the charge was adduced and the accused was found guilty. Commonwealth ex rel. Jenkins v. Costello, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 183, 14 A. 2d 567 (1940). A defendant is convicted absent due process only where the proceedings are so summary and informal that there is a lack of accusation in proper form, notice and opportunity to interpose a defense. The surety of peace procedure requires the filing of complaint and a "full hearing and investigation of the facts." Only when evidence is shown to the satisfaction of the justice that a threat was made with malicious intent and that the threat put the complainant in fear or danger of injury can the justice bind over defendant with sufficient surety.
That the prosecution is not put to its proof, as determined by the court below, is not evident from the express language of the statute. Nor is it supported by the substantial evidentiary record below. The position that defendant is given no opportunity to present a defense is unfounded. Defendants under the surety of peace proceeding have the right to be represented by counsel and can rebut the prosecutor's testimony with respect to each element of the charged offense. If the prosecutor fails to prove any element of the offense to the satisfaction of the justice or judge, the action is dismissed. Commonwealth v. Baker, 30 Pa. D. & C. 457 (1937).
The court below also determined that the surety of peace provisions violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If appellee's indigency had prevented him from posting bond and paying costs, with the result that appellee was imprisoned, then the lower court's analysis respecting equal protection might bear closer scrutiny. This Court, however, will not consider an illusory controversy. The issue of equal protection is not justiciable under the facts of this case.
The order of the Common Pleas Court is reversed and the case remanded for the purpose of determining factually whether, at this time, the surety of the peace bond need necessarily be posted.
Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 19 P.S. §23.
"If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill or destroy him, or do him any harm in person or estate, and the person threatened shall appear before a justice of the peace, and attest, on oath or affirmation, that he believes that by such threatening he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be of his good behavior, and keep the peace towards all citizens of this commonwealth. . . ." Act of 1860, P. L. 427,19, §23.
Act of 1909, P. h. 42, 19 P.S. §25.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage. . . (Emphasis added) Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.