Case Name: Joseph POIRRIER, Appellant (Defendant), v. Hazel JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1989-10-27
Citations: 781 P.2d 531
Docket Number: No. 88-50
Parties: Joseph POIRRIER, Appellant (Defendant), v. Hazel JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Judges: Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 781
Pages: 531–536

Head Matter:
Joseph POIRRIER, Appellant (Defendant), v. Hazel JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 88-50.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Oct. 27, 1989.
Micheál K. Shoumaker of Shoumaker and Murphy, Sheridan, for appellant.
Clay B. Jenkins of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

Opinion:
CARDINE, Chief Justice.
This was an action brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) to recover child support arrear-age in the amount of $7,895. From an order of the Wyoming district court requiring that appellant husband, Joseph Poirrier, pay $125 per month upon the arrearage, this appeal is taken.
We affirm.
The issues presented by appellant are:
"1. Whether the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provides for modification of money judgments.
"2. Whether the Missouri judgment may be modified through the Uniform Foreign Enforcement of Judgments Act.
"3. Whether Hazel Jones established a change in circumstances to necessitate a modification."
Appellee wife, Hazel Jones, states the single issue as:
"Do Wyoming courts have the equitable power to alter child support arrearage installment payments?"
A decree dissolving the marriage of these parties, entered in the state of Washington on April 24, 1975, required that husband pay support for the four children of the marriage, ages six years to twelve years, in the amount of $50 per month per child, or $200 per month. Six years later, on July 13, 1981, wife brought a URESA action in Missouri seeking an order for support. The Missouri Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis entered a support order titled "Memorandum for Clerk" in which it recited the applicable sections of URESA, registered the Washington decree as a local judgment, ordered support payments of $200 per month ($50 per month per child) as provided in the Washington decree, found child support arrearage in the amount of $9,420, and ordered payment of the arrearage at the rate of $25 per month until paid.
Eight years have passed since entry of the Missouri URESA order, and wife now brings this action to recover arrearage in child support from husband who resides in Sheridan, Wyoming. Wife filed and requested registration of both the Washington decree and the Missouri support order. The case was tried on January 7, 1988, and an order entered, finding a total child support arrearage of $7,895. Judgment was entered against husband in that amount requiring $125 monthly payments on the arrearage.
It is husband's position that the Missouri court reduced the arrearage to a stated sum and provided for payment of that sum at $25 per month, that the Missouri order modified the Washington decree, and that the order modifying the decree must be given full faith and credit by the Wyoming court. Stated another way, husband claims that, because he departed the state of Washington leaving his four children without support, failed, to pay support for almost six years, and was found in Missouri $9,420 in arrears, and because of his then current child support obligations was ordered to pay only $25 on the arrearage, he should never be ordered to pay more than $25 per month on the arrearage. At $25 per month, wife will not receive payment of this child support arrearage during her lifetime.
We look first to the support order entered in the Missouri URESA action. '"The states of Wyoming and Missouri have, with minor changes, adopted the model Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. URESA § 31, as adopted in Missouri Revised Statute § 454.280, provides:
"454.280. Application of payments
"No order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding state shall supersede any other order of support but the amounts for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under both."
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Olson v. Olson, 534 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo.Ct.App. 1976), considering the effect of a URESA support order upon a prior decree of a foreign jurisdiction stated:
"The judgment from which this appeal is taken does not purport to modify or supersede the California decree . Indeed, no court of this state when acting as a responding state could issue an order superseding the foreign support order, in the sense of suspending or staying its operation, if for no other reason because of the express provision of § 454.280, supra." (emphasis added)
We agree that the plain language of § 454.280 does not permit the Missouri court proceeding under URESA to modify or supersede a prior decree. The effect of the statute upon this case is that the Missouri support order did not modify the Washington decree but provided for support payments to wife to be credited against both the Missouri order and the Washington decree. Husband can satisfy his support obligation in Missouri by compliance with the Missouri URESA order, and, so long as the order is unchanged, he is not subject to contempt for failure to provide child support. The Missouri court in Eisner v. Eisner, 425 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.Ct. App.1967), held that support orders of responding courts were not judgments entitled to full faith and credit. We agree and hold that the Missouri URESA support order is not entitled to full faith and credit in Wyoming and therefore is not conclusive in the disposition of this case. We note also that the result in this case would be the same under the Wyoming URESA section, W.S. 20-4-131, which provides:
"A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this act [§§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-138] does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular period pursuant to any support order made by the court of another state shall be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under any support order made by the court of this state."
Our resolution of this issue is in conformance with the intent and purpose of the framers of URESA, that being "to provide an inexpensive, simplified and effective means of enforcing the duty of support owed by the obligor in one state to the obligee in another state." Bjugan v. Bju-gan, 710 P.2d 213, 218 (Wyo..1985). See also Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act That No Support Order Shall Supersede or Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R.4th 347, 350 (1984). A URESA proceeding, however, is often one in which the obligor appears and testifies but the obligee, being a resident of a foreign state, may not personally appear. Such a proceeding may not be particularly appropriate as a vehicle for permanent modification of an original decree — the original decree having been entered in a proceeding in which both parties appear, are represented by counsel, and may present evidence and testify.
In arriving at our resolution of this ease, we are not unmindful of our prior decisions in Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1976), and Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213. In Sal-meri we accorded full faith and credit to a New Jersey divorce decree and a New Jersey judgment for arrearage in a UEFJA proceeding. URESA was not involved in Salmeri. In Bjugan, an original Iowa divorce decree was the subject of a URESA action brought in Wyoming. The trial court entered an order modifying the Iowa decree. We reversed, holding that modification was improper absent notice to the wife that modification would be sought. Three justices specially concurred, leaving the question of modification of an original judgment for future consideration. Each case is distinguishable from this case. In Salmeri and Bjugan we considered the efficacy of an original judgment or decree in a divorce action. In this case, we have before us a support order from a foreign jurisdiction in a URESA case. The judgments, decrees and orders result from substantially different proceedings having different purposes and, consequently, are treated differently by courts.
The essence of this appeal was appellant's claim that the Missouri URESA support order establishing arrearage and method of payment was a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit and not subject to modification. This issue has been resolved against appellant. The doctrine of full faith and credit did not preclude the district court from ordering payments on the undisputed arrearage. The judgment of the district court, therefore, is
Affirmed.
BROWN, J., Retired, files a specially concurring opinion in which URBIGKIT, J., joins.
MACY, J., files a dissenting opinion.