Case Name: Lonnie Snodgrass v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-02-14
Citations: 67 Tex. Crim. 615
Docket Number: No. 1513
Parties: Lonnie Snodgrass v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 615–648

Head Matter:
Lonnie Snodgrass v. The State.
No. 1513.
Decided February 14, 1912.
Rehearing denied October 16, 1912.
1. —Theft of Horse—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Alibi.
Where, upon trial of theft of a horse, the issue was squarely drawn as to whether defendant was the person who stole the horse, the testimony offered by him proving a complete alibi, if the jury had believed it, but the testimony offered by the State supported the verdict of the jury, there was no reversible error.
2. —Same—Suspension of Sentence—Constitutional law.
The Legislature has no authority under the Constitution to confer upon district judges the authority to suspend sentence after a person has been legally convicted of crime, or to extend immunity from punishment under the condition named in the Act of the Third-Second Legislature, chapter 44.
3. —Same—Suspension of Sentence—Judicial Power.
The power of the court to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves, there being a distinction between a reprieve and a suspension of sentence, in that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time; but the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature permits the court to grant an unconditional pardon, although the word .“pardon” is not used therein, and is unconstitutional as the pardoning power is conferred • by that instrument upon the Governor alone.
4. —Same—Power to Pardon—Constitutional Law.
The Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, chapter 44, under conditions named exempts from punishment persons guilty of crime, and is but an indirect exercise of the power to pardon which by the Constitution is exclusively Conferred upon the Governor.
5. —Same—Constitutional Power—Co-ordinate Branches of Government.
The legislative, judicial and executive departments each received from the people as expressed in the Constitution that portion of power that the sovereign citizenship deemed necessary and proper to discharge all the functions of government relating to their respective departments and no more, and each is sovereign in the exercise of the powers confided to it, each the equal but not the superior of the other co-ordinate branch of the government.
6. —Same—Constitutional Law—Pardoning Power.
The Constitution of Texas having conferred upon the Executive Department the exclusive power to grant pardons, the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, chapter 44, seeking to confer this- power on the district judges of the State is in violation of that provision of the Constitution, and is null and void.
7. —Same—Suspension of Sentence—Power to Reprieve.
While the power to suspend the sentence by the court does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves and pardons, the Legislature had no power to confer on the trial court authority to remit the punishment after a conviction had been obtained and the penalty assessed by a verdict of the jury, and said Act under the guise of suspension of sentence can not exercise the power of the Governor to reprieve or pardon.
8. —Same—Judicial Construction:—Inherent Power of Courts—Benefit of Clergy.
The courts of the other states which hold that the courts have the inherent power to suspend sentence, decline to go to the extent that the court by order entered may entirely remit all punishment, and base the power of suspension of sentence upon the custom of the English courts by whom it was termed a reprieve and who permitted the plea of benefit of clergy to be filed after conviction, but before the punishment had been assessed; but this procedure has no application to the jurisprudence of Texas, and has long since been abolished in England.
9. —Same—Constitutional Law—Pardoning Power.
The people of Texas desiring to make it certain that no one except the Governor should ever exercise the pardoning power, apparently being afraid that as first written the power to reprieve might not be ample to stay the hand of the other departments of government, later added in their written constitution that the power to commute the punishment was vested solely in the Governor, clearly making it known that it was not their wish or will that the judiciary of Texas should ever exercise the power and authority exercised by the English courts under the benefit of clergy plea; whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions under different constitutions and laws, it is not' the rule in Texas.
10. —Same—Practice in English and Federal Courts.
The practice in the English and Federal courts is that the jury passes -on the guilt of the prisoner, but has nothing to say as to the punishment to be assessed; this is done under the sentence of the court, but in Texas the jury in passing on the guilt of the defendant also assesses the punishment if they find defendant guilty and the judge in pronouncing sentence can neither alter nor amend, increase nor diminish the punishment, but must assess the penalty as fixed by the jury, therefore, the plea of benefit of clergy has never had any place in our system of jurisprudence. ^
11. —Same—Policy of Constitution.
As to the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution of Texas, in giving to one department of government the authority to try offenses and assess the punishment thereof, and to another department the authority to remit the punishment, is not a question for- the courts; however, there were many good reasons therefor.
12. —Same—Meaning of the Term “After Conviction.”
The contention of appellant that the words “after conviction,” mean after the sentence has been pronounced and that the Governor has no right to pardon until the court has pronounced sentence is untenable. Distinguishing Arcia v. State, 26 Texas Grim. App., 193.
13. —Same—Judicial Construction—Words and Phrases.
In the case of Arcia v. State, 26 Texas Grim. App., 193, the court was not discussing the meaning of the words “after conviction,” as used in the Constitution of Texas, and only limited the decision as it affected the civil rights of the person adjudged guilty of crime and based it upon the peculiar wording of our statutes at that time with reference to appeals and sentences.
14. —Same—legislative Construction—Common law.
The contemporaneous legislative construction of the meaning of the words “after conviction,” is in accord with the meaning of the words as known to the common law, and as adhered to by the great weight of authority in this county, and is in accord with the opinion of this court in the Arcia case, supra.
15. —Same—Common law—Conviction for Crime.
Under the common law, a person was said to be convicted of the crime when verdict was rendered thereon adjudging him guilty, but not attainted (a forfeiture of civil rights) until after the punishment had been assessed by the judgment and sentence of the court; thus it is seen that the terms, “after conviction,” under our Constitution do not embrace the sentence, but simply the guilt of the defendant who is subject to pardon after conviction.
16. —Same—Right of Appeal—Final Conviction—Statutes Construed.
Under the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, the question of the right of appeal is not involved as thereby no right of appeal shall exist, and after conviction no additional step is authorized to be taken by any tribunal in determining the guilt of the accused, and therefore, the conviction is final.
17. —Same-—Judicial Construction—Common law—Forfeiture of Civil Rights.
Under the common law a man did not forfeit his civil rights until after he had been attainted and this followed the sentence, although he might be convicted of the offense by verdict of the jury; and in the Arcia case, supra, this court limited its holdings to a forfeiture of civil rights and it has so been held in all subsequent decisions, which are not, therefore, in conflict with the opinion in this case; but under the above Act, the right of appeal is taken from a defendant when the court suspends sentence thereunder, and the conviction is, therefore, a finality.
18. —Same—Statutes Construed—Practice in English Courts.
The Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, chapter 44, is drawn in accord-ance with the practice of the English courts .under the benefit of clergy plea as known in the eighteenth century (just before its abolishment in that country), except there is added to the provisions the right to later recall tlie judgment of clemency and inflict the original punishment for some act thereafter committed. This was never known or practiced at common law and is entirely foreign to the jurisprudence of Texas and contrary to our Constitution.
19. —Same—Suspension of Sentence—Reprieve—Pardon.
This character of sentence or reprieve was never exercised by the common laub courts and is unknown to both the English jurisprudence and that of this country; it is a misnomer, and gives to these words a meaning unknown to the law and unauthorized by any lexicographer. The pardoning power in England can only be exercised by the King, and in Texas by the executive, under our Constitution.
20. —Same—Definition of Pardon.
A pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed; this power is exclusively conferred upon the executive of this state and can not be conferred upon the courts as is attempted by the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, which is, therefore, clearly unconstitutional.
21. —Same—New Trial—Motion for New Trial.
That portion of appellant’s brief relating to the power of a court to grant a new trial need not be discussed, as the Act in question does not contemplate another trial of the defendant;" however, the rule of law in this State is, where no motion for new trial has been filed before the end of the term at which the judgment is entered, no court has the power or authority to grant a new trial or change its judgment at a subsequent time.
22. —Same—Constitutional Law—Forfeiture of Rights or Privileges.
The Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature, chapter 44, is also violative of section 2 of article 16 of the Constitution of Texas, wherein it is provided that persons adjudged guilty of certain offenses shall forfeit certain rights and privileges.
23. —Same—Suggestion of Remedial Legislation.
See opinion suggesting a law that, where it appears in the trial court that the offense is the first one of which defendant may be convicted, the court may make recommendations to the Governor for a conditional pardon.
24. —Same—Constitutional Law—Practice on Appeal.
The Constitution of Texas is the supreme law of the State and can not be frittered away by technical judicial construction, and this court will take the Constitution as its guide and uphold it in all its provisions.
Appeal from the District Court of Erath. Tried below before the Hon. W. J. Oxford.
Appeal from conviction of theft of horse; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
0. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, and O. F. Greenwood, for the State.
—No person is finally “convicted in this State, until he is sentenced and accepts his sentence, and does not appeal his ease, or in the event that he does appeal, he is not convicted until the court of last resort affirms his conviction, and that the Governor of this State has no authority to grant him a pardon until one or the other of these conditions precedent exist.
“It is the sentence, and not the judgment, which under our code, concludes the prosecution finally in the trial court, and until sentence has been pronounced, the conviction in the trial court is not complete so as to work a forfeiture of civil rights, and a party is not convicted until he has been sentenced and has taken no appeal from said sentence.”
It is manifest, that until a convicted defendant has been finally sentenced, his status as a citizen has not been affected. He does not need a pardon from the Governor. He is not a supplicant for executive favor or grace in any particular. He does not need a pardon, because he is not a “convict.” He stands in no need of a reprieve, commutation of punishment or a pardon, because his citizenship has in no wise been affected by a preliminary verdict of guilty.
We insist with all the emphasis of which we are capable, that there must be a subject upon whom a pardon can operate, before there can be a pardon. In the absence of a “convict” there can be no pardon. A “pardon” is intended to affect the person to whom it is granted, and to restore him to his original position. The Governor is clothed with the high prerogative of the “pardoning power,” but certainly he can not exercise it, until he can find a convict, upon whom he may confer executive grace, and a pardon issued by him under the laws of Texas to a person who has not been finally convicted would be void.
The fundamental question underlying this whole matter, was passed upon by this court as far back as 1888, in the case of Arcie v. The State, 26 Appeals, 193. Article 27, Penal Code; Articles 730, 791, 792, 793, 794, Code Criminal Procedure; Evans v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 485; Hurley v. State, id., 282; Robinson v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 104; Stanley v. State, 39 id., 482; Foster v. State, id., 399; Underwood v. State, 38 id., 193; Camron v. State, 32 id., 180; Ex parte Mann, 39 id., 491; Kingsbury v. State, 37 id., 259; Jones v. State, 32 id., 135; Rice v. State, 50 id., 648; Wright v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 135, 45 S. W. Rep., 723; Luna v. State, 47 S. W. Rep., 656; United States v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga., 344; Jones v. Alcorn Co. Registrars, 56 Miss., 766; Peoples v. Bowen, 43 Cal., 439; In re William N. Campion v. Nebraska, 112 N. W. Rep., 585.
The power and authority of a court to suspend a sentence and hold the same in abeyance, was directly passed upon in January of the present year, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Fuller v. The State. 1 Bishop New Criminal Pro., section 1299, p. 799; People v. Court of Sessions of Monroe Co., 141 N. Y., 288, and cases therein cited; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 332; Ex parte Wells, 18 How., 307; Article 833, 837, Code Crim. Procedure; 29 Cyc. Law and Procedure, p. 1003.
B. E. OooTc and J. O. George, for appellant.
—On the question of the constitutionality of the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature: People v. Brown, 19 N. W. Rep., 571; People v. Patrick, 50 Pac., 425; Clampitt v. United States, 89 S. W. Rep., 666; Weber v. State, 51 N. E. Rep., 116; In re Flint, 71 Pac., 531; Webster v. State, 43 Ohio State, 696; People v. Ct. of Sessions of Monroe Co., 141 N. Y., 288; George v. Lillard, 51 S. W. Rep., 793.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
—Appellant was charged with the theft of a horse from 0. T. Cline. When tried he was convicted, and his punishment assessed at two years confinement in the - penitentiary.
There are but two grounds presented in the motion for a new trial, the first thing being that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and the other is that the court erred in not submitting to the jury, at the request of defendant, the issue as to whether defendant had ever before been convicted of a felony, defendant having requested that he do so under the provisions of the law as passed by the Thirty-Second Legislature, being chapter 44. The court endorsed on said application refused, because he saw no equities for defendant if he is guilty. Appellant excepted to the action of the court in refusing to submit that issue to the jury.
I. As to the first ground, there is no question but what the horse of Mr. Cline was stolen on the night of the 16th or morning of the 17th of May. Mr. Peak testified that he was in the livery business at Morgan. That in the month of May, not remembering the date of the month, but on Thursday or Friday of the week, "a boy came to his stable leading the horse stolen from Mr. Cline, and offered to sell the horse to him, and that he recognized the defendant as the same boy that "came to his stable with the horse. That he had seen the boy in jail when he was a witness before "the grand jury and recognized him out of two or three others in the jail as the same boy." J. A. Crawford testified he lived at Morgan, and saw a man leading the horse through an alley to the livery stable, and talked to him; that he noticed closely because of his proposal to sell the horse so cheap, saying: "I did not see the boy any more after that until I came here as a witness before the grand jury at this term of the court, when I saw him in the jail, and there I took him to be the same party I saw at Peak's barn with the horses. There could be two men just alike,' of course. I looked at him closely in the jail. What attracted my attention to him was the way he acted and manuevered around and the price he put on the horses, and he was nervous, and seemed to want to go away, and wanted to know too much about where Mr. Peak had gone. To the best of my knowledge the defendant is the same man I saw at Peak's stable in Morgan with the horses, as described. 'I have no doubt in my own mind, but a man could be mistaken.' 'In my own mind I have no doubt about it.'"
J. B. White testified that he was constable of the Morgan precinct, and when Mr. Peak came to him he went and talked to de fendant, saying as well as he remembered it was on Thursday about May 18th when he saw the boy with the horses in Morgan, saying the young man who had the horses looked like defendant. On cross-examination he said: he went to the jail for the purpose of identifying the man. There were two other men in jail with defendant, but neither of them resembled the Morgan man, but he thought defendant did resemble him. As to whether he could be mistaken in hisl identity of the defendant, he said he would not be positive about it.
When the marshal of Stephenville went to Morgan to see about the horses, these three witnesses described the young man who had the horses, and from this description the marshal arrested defendant. The horse was stolen at Stephenville, and carried to Morgan, a distance of about fifty miles. Defendant offered testimony to show that he was at home in Stephenville on the 15th, 16th and 17th of May, and went from home to Dublin on the night of the 17th, and two witnesses testify that he spent Thursday the 18th in Dublin.
The issue was thus squarely drawn as to whether defendant was the person who stole the horse, the testimony offered by him proving a complete alibi, if the jury had believed it. But under appropriate charges the jury find against him. The testimony offered by the State, as shown above, would justify such finding, and under our judicial system, the jury being the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, we never feel inclined to disturb their verdict on an issue of fact where there is evidence to support their finding. Mr. Peak positively identifies him as the man in possession of the stolen horse, and the other witnesses who saw the man at Morgan with the horse support him.
2. As to the other question, that the court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question as to whether or not defendant had theretofore been convicted of a felony, their finding to be the basis of an application to the trial judge to suspend the sentence under the provisions of Chapter 44 of the Acts of the Thirty-Second Legislature, presents a question of some difficulty. Said Act reads:
"Section 1. That when there is a conviction of any felony in any District Court of this State, except murder, rape, perjury, burglary, and burglary of a private residence, robbery, arson, seduction, bigamy, and abortion, the court may suspend sentence upon application made therefor in writing by the defendant when the punishment assessed by the jury shall not exceed five years confinement in the penitentiary; provided, that in no case shall sentence be suspended except when the proof shall show and the jury shall find in their verdict that the defendant has never before been convicted of a. felony in this State or in any other jurisdiction.
"Sec. 2. The court shall submit the question as to whether the defendant has ever before been convicted of a felony, only upon re quest in writing by' the defendant, and when the issue is raised by the evidence.
"Sec. 3. When sentence is suspended at the request of the defendant no appeal shall lie from the judgment of conviction.
"Sec. 4. Upon application for suspension of sentence, the court may hear evidence as to the reputation of the defendant as a law-abiding citizen, and as to whether the defendant has ever been before convicted of a felony, and upon any other matter that may in its judgment enable it to arrive at a proper conclusion; and the suspension of the sentence, or the refusal to do so, shall be wholly within the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of such discretion shall not be subject to review in any court; provided that in no case shall sentence be suspended unless the jury recommend it' in their verdict.
"Sec. 5. When sentence is suspended, the judgment of the court on that subject shall be that' sentence on the judgment of conviction shall be suspended during the good behavior of the defendant. By the term 'good behavior' is meant that the defendant shall not be convicted of .any felony during the time of such suspension or any misdemeanor that involves moral turpitude that the court who granted such suspension may deem not good behavior.
"Sec. 6. Upon the final conviction of the defendant of any other felony or misdemeanor as provided in Section 5 of this Act, pending the suspension of sentence, the court shall cause proper process to issue for the arrest of the defendant, if he is not then in the custody of said court, and upon the execution of the capias, and during a term of the court, shall pronounce sentence upon the original judgment of conviction, and shall cumulate the punishment of the first' with the punishment in any subsequent conviction or convictions.
. "Sec. 7. In- any case of suspended sentence, upon the expiration of double the time assessed as punishment by the jury, the defendant may apply to the court, in term time, to have the judgment of conviction set aside; and if it shall appear to the court, upon the hearing of such application, that the defendant has not been convicted of any other felony, and that there is not then pending against him any charge of felony, the court shall enter an order reciting the facts, and that such judgment of conviction be set aside and annulled. After the setting aside of any judgment of conviction as herein provided for, the fact of such conviction shall not be shown or inquired into in any court for any purpose, except in such cases where the defendant has again been indicted for a felony, and in such event such prior conviction may be shown in case the defendant invokes the benefit of this Act.
"Sec. 8. When sentence is suspended, the defendant shall be released upon his own recognizance, in such sum as may be fixed by the court."
If the law is valid, it appears upon the written request of defend ant, when the issue is raised by the evidence, the court shall submit to them the question of whether or not the defendant has theretofore been convicted of a felony. This part of the law seems to be mandatory on the judge, and if the jury find that this is the first offense, and the punishment is for less than five years, it then becomes discretionary with the court as to whether or not he will suspend the sentence. The questions arise, has the Legislature the authority to confer upon district judges the authority to suspend sentence after a person has been legally convicted of crime, and has the Legislature the authority to confer on district judges the power to extend immunity from punishment under the conditions named in the Act? This law not only gives to district judges discretionary power to suspend the sentence of a person after he has been legally convicted of an offense, but also after lapse of time, upon a showing that he has been guilty of no other offense, to set aside the judgment of conviction, thus in terms conferring on them the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime.
Our Constitution provides in Sec. 11, Art. 4: "In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, he (the Governor) shall have power, after conviction, to grant reprieves, commutations of punishment and pardons; and under such rules as the legislature may prescribe he shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures. With the advice and consent of the Senate he may grant pardons .in cases of treason, and to this end he may respite sentence therefor, until the close of the succeeding legislature."
That the Legislature has the power, being the representative of sovereignty, to confer this power on the courts can not be questioned, unless inhibited by the provisions of the Constitution. It specifically confers upon the Governor the authority to pardon, reprieve and grant commutations of punishment.
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts, it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Camal v. People, 1 Parker Or. Rep., 262; In re Buchanan, 40 N. E., 883, and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, page 000.) This law can not be held in conflict with the power confided in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutation is but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment. A pardon, however, is held to be an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime which he has committed. This Act by its provisions provides that after a person has been legally convicted of a crime, and his- sentence suspended under the provisions thereof, upon the expiration of double the time assessed as pun ishment by the jury, the defendant may apply to the court to have the judgment of conviction set aside, and if it appears that he has not been convicted of any other offense, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and annulled, thus giving to the District Courts the power and authority to exempt from punishment a person legally convicted of crime, and of which he has been adjudged guilty, and to which our laws affix a penalty. By the act of setting the judgment aside such person would also be restored to all the rights and privileges to which one is entitled who has never been convicted of an offense. In other words, this Act of the Legislature grants to such a person an unconditional pardon, although the word "pardon" is not used therein, and this necessarily includes the question, can the Legislature bestow upon any officer, other than the Governor, the power to grant an unconditional pardon? We have carefully examined' the decisions in those states having constitutional provisions similar to our own, and it seems that an unbroken line of decisions hold that the power can not be granted to any other person or agency, where the Constitution of the State confers the power on the Governor. In the case of Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 375, it is held:
"Article 3 of our State Constitution, section 96, R. S. • 1881, distributes the powers of the government into three separate departments, the legislative, the executive, including the administrative, and .the judicial, and provides that 'no person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided/ Section 17 of article 5 (section 143, R. S. 1881) confers upon the Governor 'the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and .pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law/ It also invests him with 'power to remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law/ There is no express provision of the Constitution providing for the exercise of these powers by any person charged with official duties under the legislative or judicial department. The conclusion seems to be inevitable that in this State the Governor, under such regulations as may be provided by law, has the exclusive power to grant pardons, reprieves and commutations, and to remit fines ' and forfeitures. It follows that any legislative enactment which attempts to clothe the courts, or any of the courts, of this State with these powers^ or any of them, is void as being in conflict with the fundamental law.
"The State v. Sloss, 25 Mo., 291, was a case arising upon an Act of the Legislature attempting to relieve persons from penalties incurred by violations of a certain penal statute. It was held that it was not competent for the Legislature to do this, as it was an invasion of the pardoning power which, by the Constitution of the State, was vested exclusively in the Governor. It was said in that case: 'The powers of the General Assembly are not unlimited. . All the departments of our government are confined in their operations. They have prescribed limits, which they can not transcend. The union of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government in the same body, as shown by experience, had been productive of such injustice, cruelty and oppression that the framers of our Constitution, as a safeguard against those evils/ ordained that the powers of government should be divided into three distinct departments, and that no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments should exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except "in the instances expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution. Although questions have sometimes arisen whether a power properly belonged to one department of government or another, yet there is no contrariety of opinion as to the department of the government to which the power of pardoning offenses properly appertains. All unite in pronouncing it an executive function. So the framers of our Constitution thought, and accordingly vested the power of pardoning in the chief executive officer of the State."
"In The Attorney General v. Brown, 1 Wis., 513, the court said: 'The policy of our Constitution and laws has assigned to the different departments of the State government, distinct and different duties, in the performance of which, it is intended that they shall be entirely independent' of each other; so that whatever power or duty is expressly given to, or imposed upon the executive department, is altor gether free from-the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is this the ease, where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive officer, either by the Constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can control its exercise.'
"The Legislature of Alabama passed a special Act requiring a county treasurer to refund to certain sureties money which they had been compelled,"by judgment of court, to pay as a fine for their principal. In Haley v. Clark, 26 Ala., 439, it was held that the act was an attempt indirectly to remit a fine, and was in conflict with the Constitution. The .following language occurs in the opinion: "The principal question is, whether this Act is unconstitutional. By article IV, section II, of the Constitution of Alabama, the power to remit fines and forfeitures is given to the Governor, and by the second article, the powers of the government are divided into three distinct departments—the legislative, executive and judicial, and' no one of these departments, or person belonging thereto, can exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, unless expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution. The power to pardon offenses, except in case of treason and impeachment, and to remit fines and forfeitures, being as we have seen, confided by the fundamental law to the executive branch of the government alone, this power is virtually denied to any other department, and can not, therefore, be exercised by the Legislature/
"Article 3 of the Constitution of Indiana, while too plain to admit of construction, has in several cases been considered by this court, and the law is well settled that constitutional restraints are overstepped where one department of government attempts to exercise powers exclusively delegated to another. Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind., 298; Waldo v. Wallace, 13 Ind., 569; Trustees, etc. v. Ellis, 38 Ind., 3; Columbus, etc. R. W. Co. v. Board, etc., 65 Ind., 427.
"Section 50, 3 E. S. 1876, p. 383, and section 1734, B. S. 1881, recognize the power of courts to remit forfeitures of recognizances. We are satisfied such power does not exist in, and that it can not be conferred upon the courts by the Legislature. Courts may, from inherent powers or those conferred by statute, set aside judgments forfeiting, or upon forfeited recognizance, the same as other judgments, for fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, or in proceedings for review. But courts have not, nor can the Legislature confer upon them, authority to grant pardons, reprieves or commutations, nor to remit fines and forfeitures. These powers, under the Constitution, belong exclusively to the chief executive officer of the State, and they can not be exercised, directly or indirectly, either by the legislative or judicial department."
In the case of People v. Brown, Mr. Cooley, who wrote the standard work "Cooley on Constitutional Limitations," while Chief Justice of Michigan, said: "A judge can not by suspending a sentence indefinitely practically pardon a prisoner." The Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150, says: "The Constitution of the United States gives to the President the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States. As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation, whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bears a close resemblance . A pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed."
This Act of the Legislature authorizes- judges, under conditions named, to exempt from punishment men guilty of crime, and is but an indirect exercise of the power to pardon. The sovereignty of the State is in its citizens. They have assembled in convention and distributed their sovereign power between the department's of government, conferring upon each all the powers they deemed necessary and proper, and to maintain the independence of each department and the distinctiveness of its sphere, have declared that no "person or •collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly provided." The legislative, judicial and executive departments each received from the people that portion of power that the sovereign citizenship deemed necessary and proper to discharge all the functions of government relating to their respective department and no more, and each is sovereign in the exercise of the powers confided to it, each the equal but not the superior of the other coordinate branch of the government. The legislative branch has more extended jurisdiction, and its province is to enact laws for the government and well-being of society, and to make any and all laws wherein they are not inhibited by the Constitution. But further that department can not go, nor can it invade or exercise the powers conferred upon either of the other departments. The Constitution having conferred upon the executive department the power to grant pardons, this Act of the Legislature seeking to confer this power on the district judges of the State is in violation of that provision of the Constitution, and is null and void. There are other features of this law that would, in our opinion, render it void, but we do not deem it necessary to discuss them here, as it would necessitate making this opinion too lengthy.
The law had a humane object, a worthy purpose, and if it were possible under our Constitution to uphold it, we would be glad to do so, but deeming it violative of the. provisions of the organic law, we hold that the Act is void, and the court did not err in refusing to submit the question to the jury.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
PRENDERGAST, Judge.
—I am inclined to believe the Act of the Thirty-Second Legislature quoted in the opinion is constitutional. At least, I have such doubt that I am unwilling to agree to the opinion declaring it unconstitutional.