Case Name: Joyce WAITE, Appellant, v. Beres WAITE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-05-28
Citations: 593 So. 2d 222
Docket Number: No. 89-868
Parties: Joyce WAITE, Appellant, v. Beres WAITE, Appellee.
Judges: Before BASKIN, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 593
Pages: 222–232

Head Matter:
Joyce WAITE, Appellant, v. Beres WAITE, Appellee.
No. 89-868.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 28, 1991.
On Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Feb. 11, 1992.
Touby, Smith, DeMahy & Drake, and Kenneth R. Drake, Miami, for appellant.
Parenti & Falk, and James C. Blecke, Miami, for appellee.
Before BASKIN, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
Joyce Waite appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of Beres Waite, her former husband, in an action she filed to recover damages for assault, battery, and negligence. We reverse.
At the time of the incident giving rise to Mrs. Waite's lawsuit against Mr. Waite, the parties were husband and wife. Without provocation, Mr. Waite attacked Mrs. Waite with a machete, striking her repeatedly, and causing severe and permanent injuries. In her affidavit, Mrs. Waite stated that she "suffered a compound fracture completely through [her] left tibia, a compound fracture of [her] left fibula, and a slicing fracture through [her] left ulna. The lower portion of [her] left leg was nearly hacked off." (Emphasis in original). During the episode Mr. Waite also attacked several members of Mrs. Waite's family with the machete. He was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. Some time later, the parties were divorced. Subsequently, Mrs. Waite filed this action.
Mr. Waite, through his homeowner's insurer, filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that his former wife's lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity because the parties were married at the time of the attack. The trial court agreed and entered the judgment under review.
In Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988), the Florida Supreme Court receded from a long line of cases when it held that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is abrogated to the extent of liability insurance where traditional policy considerations for maintaining the doctrine do not exist. Mrs. Sturiano was injured when the car in which she was being driven by Mr. Sturiano struck a tree. Mr. Sturiano died as a consequence of the accident. Mrs. Sturiano filed a lawsuit against her husband's estate to recover damages resulting from his negligence. In holding that the interspousal tort immunity doctrine did not bar Mrs. Sturiano's claim, the court stated that "[a]ctions between spouses must be barred when the policy reasons for maintaining the doctrine exist, such as the fear of disruption of the family or other marital discord, or the possibility of fraud or collu sion." Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1128. The court decided, however, that in the absence of such policy considerations the inter-spousal immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of available insurance. Sturi-ano.
When the Florida Supreme Court stated, "the common law unity concept is no longer a valid justification for the doctrine of interspousal immunity," Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1128, it recognized marital partners' increased capacity to sue each other. The court's reasoning, in refusing to apply the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity as a bar to Mrs. Sturiano's suit, is applicable to the case before us.
Here, the claim would neither create disharmony nor support collusion. Barring Mrs. Waite's action will not preserve or promote Waite family harmony. Mr. Waite's egregious conduct was so extreme that his victim would be unlikely to conspire with him for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company. Furthermore, there has been no suggestion of collusion in the record. Thus, the policy reasons in support of the doctrine do not exist.
Although we recognize that in the past an injured spouse was required to seek compensation in the dissolution proceeding, Hill v. Hill, 415 So.2d 20 (Fla.1982); Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So.2d 190 (Fla.1982), we question whether that rule remains viable after Sturiano. Appellee argues that the earlier ease of West v. West, 414 So.2d 189 (Fla.1982), bars Mrs. Waite's action. Mrs. West alleged that she sustained a triple fracture of her left ankle when her husband intentionally threw her to the floor. West, 414 So.2d at 189. The West court held that a wife could not bring a post-dissolution suit against her former husband for personal injuries caused by his intentional tort on the ground that the lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity. West, 414 So.2d at 190. The subsequent Sturiano decision abrogating immunity to the extent of insurance coverage undermines appellee's argument.
We find no legal impediment to holding that Mrs. Waite enjoys no lesser status before the court than do the other injured family members and may recover to the extent of available insurance. The intentional tort was so extreme that it eradicated the policy considerations that might justify the barring of claims. The Sturiano decision abrogated immunity to the extent of insurance coverage in cases lacking the policy considerations it set forth.
Finally, we note that the common law bar to interspousal intentional tort claims, reiterated in West, has been superceded by section 741.235, Florida Statutes (1985), in actions seeking damages for the intentional tort of battery. A statutory enactment "supersedes the common law and, therefore, abrogates common-law defenses in situations covered by the statute." Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 548 So.2d 215, 216 (Fla.1989); Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644 (Fla.1986); Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney, 450 So.2d 1111 (Fla.1984); cf. Dressier v. Tubbs, 435 So.2d 792 (Fla.1983). The statute delineates Florida's public policy abrogating in-terspousal tort immunity in actions for battery. It is clear that West no longer bars actions predicated on battery claims in cases that post-date the statute. Because Mrs. Waite's claim predated the statute, she cannot enjoy its benefits. However, today the tort of battery is entirely outside the former bar of interspousal tort immunity.
Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sturiano, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
LEVY, J., concurs.
. In her complaint Mrs. Waite describes the conduct as "abusive, malicious and committed with wreckless [sic] abandon[,]" and as having been "attributed to mental delusion, insanity or incompetency."
. We are unable to subscribe to the interpretation of post-Sturiano cases in the dissent: Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So.2d 188, 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Treciak v. Treciak, 547 So.2d 169, 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Fitzgibbon, 568 So.2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Lambert v. Indian River Elec., Inc., 551 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 563 So.2d 632 (Fla.1990). Those cases are not persuasive. The Mosbarger court merely found that the wife's criminal activities did not justify inequitable property and alimony awards. In Treciak, 547 So.2d at 169, "the possibility of further disruption of the family unit," a policy reason enunciated in Sturiano, existed. Family harmony does not exist for the Waites; they have no dependents or children, unlike the parties in Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So.2d 190, 191 (Fla.1982), where the court held that a tort claim was barred because the claim "could adversely affect the dependent family beneficiaries, particularly minor children."
In Fitzgibbon, the court did not permit the spouse to recover from her deceased husband's insurer because the policy contained a family exclusion clause. In Lambert, the court permitted the wife to recover damages from the owner of the vehicle negligently driven by her husband. The court did not address Sturiano. In neither Fitzgibbon nor Lambert did the complainant recover from the spouse.
. The other injured persons entered settlement agreements in their lawsuits against Mr. Waite.
. The Supreme Court has already distinguished these types of cases on their facts. In Sturiano, the estate's guardian ad litem argued that under the holding of Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 475 So.2d 1211 (Fla.1985), Mrs. Sturiano's claim should be barred. The Supreme Court rejected the contention, distinguishing Snowten, on its facts. Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1128.
. In 1985, the Florida legislature adopted Section 741.235, Florida Statutes. Laws 1985, ch. 85-328, § 1. That section provides: "The common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is hereby abrogated with regard to the intentional tort of battery, and the ability of a person to sue another person for the intentional tort of battery shall not be affected by any marital relationship between the persons." The attack on Mrs. Waite occurred prior to the effective date of the statute.