Case Name: PEOPLE v. FRANK LYTLE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-06-17
Citations: 11 N.Y. Crim. 229
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. FRANK LYTLE.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 229–251

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—Appellate Division—Fourth Department.
June 17, 1896.
PEOPLE v. FRANK LYTLE.
(74 S. R. 712.)
1. Statutes—Repeal.
Where the amendatory statute omitted on the schedule is designedly omitted, because it is not germane to the matters embraced in the revision and does not properly come within the qualification, it does not necessarily follow that it is abrogated merely because much of the original chapter, of which it is a part, is repealed
2. Same.
It was not the intention to repeal chap. 123 of 1883 by the schedule annexed to the county law, but it was reserved for repeal upon the enactment of the proposed section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Special district attorney—Appointment.
The power of the court to appoint a special district attorney, in case of the absence or disqualification of the district attorney, or of a vacancy in such office is untrammeled by any other conditions whatever.
4. Statutes—Construction.
The principle, that “and” and “or” are convertible as the sense and intent may require, applies to their use in statutes.
Appeal from a judgment of conviction of burglary in the third degree, and from an order denying a motion to set aside the indictment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The indictment was signed by Daniel W. Forsyth, “Special District Attorney of the County of Monroe. Howard H. Widener, Assistant District Attorney;” and it was indorsed, viz.: “Monroe Oyer and Terminer. The People v. James Franklin and Frank Lytle. Indictment for Burglary Third Degree. Larceny and Receiving Stolen Goods. George D. Forsyth, District Attorney. A True Bill. Thompson G. Jones, Foreman. Filed the 18th day of March, 1895. Sent to the Sessions the 18th day of March, 1895.” In the sessions the defendant made an affidavit upon which the motion to dismiss the indictment was made. The affidavit contains the following language: “I further say, upon information and belief, that while the grand jury of said county which did find said indictment bad the charge embraced in said indictment under consideration, and were receiving evidence concerning the same, one Daniel W. Foirsyth was present in said grand jury room, in the hearing of said grand jury, and, as I am informed and believe, did examine witnesses in relation to said charge before said grand jury, and took part in the framing of said indictment, and signed the same as special district attorney of the county of Monroe, under an alleged appointment made by Hon. William H. Adams, justice of the supreme court. I further say that the said Daniel W. Forsyth is not the district attorney for Monroe county, nor is he either of the assistants to the district attorney, nor even a clerk in 'the district attorney’s office; that he wais not a member of the grand jury, was noit a witness before the grand jury; and that his only right to be present in said grand jury room was derived under, said alleged appointment as special district attorney, which appointment, I am informed and believe, was illegal and void, in that the said. Hon. William H. Adams bad no authority to make such appointment, under the circumstances hereinafter set forth.” The affidavit further states: “I further say, upon information and belief, that while said grand jury were in session, and while it had under consideration the charges embraced in said indictment, both, the said assistant district attorneys of said county and siaid clerk, Fred C. Hanford, were in the city of Rochester, and were in and about the district attorney’s office during said time, attending^ to the duties and affairs of said office, and none of them were incapacitated for any reason from assuming the charge and management of the business pending before said grand jury, and to present to said grand jury the charges against me.” The affidavit does not state that -any officer or other person was present with the grand jury “during the expression of their opinions or the giving of their votes upon any matter.” The other facts are correctly stated in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Follett.
George M. Williams, for appellant.
George D. Forsyth, Dist. Atty., and Fred C. Hanford, for the People.

Opinion:
GREEN, J.
March 18, 1895, when the charge against defendant was being investigated by the grand jury, and when the indictment was found in Monroe county, the duly-qualified district attorney of that county was absent from the state. He had two assistant district attorneys and a managing clerk, duly and legally appointed, qualified, and acting as such, all of whom were in attendance at the term of oyer and terminer where the indictment was found, discharging their respective duties as such assistants and clerk. An application was duly made to the court at that term for the appointment of a special district attorney, by reason of the illness and consequent absence from the state of the duly-qualified district attorney. Thereupon an order was duly made by that court appointing an attorney and counselor at law, residing in and practicing his profession in the county of Monroe, as special district attorney during the absence of the district attorney. The defendant claims that this order of the court was unauthorized, and that the person so appointed had no power thereunder to perform the duties of the district attorney, and that his appearance before the grand jury during the investigation of the charges against this defendant was unauthorized, and that the defendant has not been lawfully indicted and that, therefore, the judgment and orders appealed from should be reversed.
Chapter 12 of part 1 of the Revised Statutes (volume 1, p, 364) treats "Of the Bowers, Duties and Brivileges of Counties and of Certain County Officers." Article 7 of title 2 of that chapter is entitled "Of District Attorneys." By section 90 (page 383) it is provided that:
"When any district attorney shall fail to attend any of the courts above specified, it shall be the duty of such court to appoint some proper person, being an attorney or counselor at law, to transact the business of the district attorney during the sitting of the court; and the person so appointed shall be entitled to the same compensation for the services he shall perform that the district attorney would have been entitled to for the like services, and his account shall be audited and paid in the same manner."
By chapter 470, Laws 1847, entitled "An act to amend the act entitled 'An act in relation to the judiciary,' " passed in the same year, it was provided, in section 33, as follows:
"When the office of district attorney of any county shall be vacant at the term of any court of oyer and terminer or court of sessions of any county, or the district attorney shall for any cause he unable to attend the term of any such court,' the members of -the court, except the justice of the supreme court, may designate some suitable person to act as district attorney at such term of the court; and the person so designated shall have and exercise the same powers and discharge the same duties as district attorneys elected in the manner provided by law, >and shall be entitled to such compensation, to be paid out of the treasury of the county, as the hoard of supervisors shall allow."
No repealing clause is. contained in this statute.
By chapter 123, Laws 1883, entitled "An act to amend section ninety of article seven, title two, chapter twelve, part one, of the Revised Statutes, in relation to the appointment of special district attorneys in certain cases," section 90 "is amended SO' as to read as follows: "
'"Whenever there is a vacancy, or the district attorney of ; any county and his assistant, if he has one, shall not be in at-Í tendance at a term of any court of record, which he is by law required to attend, oir shall be unable by sickness or by being disqualified from acting in a particular case, to discharge his duties at any such term, the court may, by an order entered in its minutes, appoint some attorney at law, residing in the county, to act as special district attorney during the absence, inability or disqualification of the district attorney and his assistant; but such appointment shall not be made for a period beyond the adjournment of the term at wihich made. The special district attorney so appointed shall possess the powers and discharge the duties of the district attorney during the period for which he shall be appointed. The board of supervisors of the county shall pay the necessary disbursements of, and a reasonable compensation for the services of, the person so-appointed and acting."
Thereupon, by -the same act. section 33 of the Laws of 1847, above quoted, was repealed; but its provisions, to an extent substantially re-enacted, with other provisions added, and the whole was incorporated into -and made a part 'of the Revised Statutes. Section 90, as originally enacted, w-as thereby abrogated, and the provisions of the act of 1883 were substituted in its place and stead, by express legislative enactment. Consequently, the act of 1883 wais embodied into and became a constituent part of chapter 12 of part 1 -of the Revised Statutes. At this time the greater part -of the judiciary act of 1847 had been repealed. Properly, the amendment of 1883 should have been incorporated into the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon the enactment of the "County Law" (chapter 686, Laws 1892), all of said chapter 12 was repealed, as appears by "Schedule of Laws Repealed; " but the -act of 1883 is not mentioned in that schedule, no.r d-oe-s it elsewhere appear to -have been expressly repealed.
Counsel for appellant contends that, since the act of 1883 was made a constituent part of said c-bapt-er 12, it became abrogated by the repeal of that chapter; that the repeal of the whole chapter carried with it all the amendatory statutes. On the other hand, it is argued that the act of 1883 stands as an independent enactment, and since the matter of.it is in no way provided for in the county law, nor any provision made the subject, it does not MI with the repeal of the chapter into which it has been incorporated. In the consideration of the question presented, be it observed, the court must not only take cognizance of the statutes providing for the revision and consolidation of the general statutes of the state, but may also examine into 'the various reports made to the legislature by the commissioners to whom the undertaking was intrusted, for the purpose of ascertaining the method adopted in the work of consolidating, revising, re-arranging, and repealing the various laws within the scope of their undertaking.
By chapter 289, Laws 1889, it is provided that the commissioners shall, in their report to the legislature, "suggest such omissions, contradictions and other imperfections as may appear in the existing statutes so proposed to be revised and consolidated, with recommendations for the amendment thereof, and they shall provide for the specific repeal of the statutes which would be suspended or covered by the general statute® so proposed by said commissioners." 3 Rev. St. (9th Ed.), § 2757. Evidently, it was the intention of the legislature to impose upon the commissioners the duty of providing for the specific repeal of laws which were intended to be abrogated and superseded by the provisions of the revised or consolidated laws proposed to the legislature for enactment.
A careful examination of the "Schedule of Laws Repealed," following the various general statutes revised and consolidated, shows that it has been the endeavor of the commissioners to obey this injunction, and to fulfill the duty imposed upon them by the legislature, to the very letter; for it appears, from a thorough inspection and comparison of these schedules with the sections of the Revised Statutes as amended, that the purpose of the revisers has been, not only to repeal the particular chapter or article of the Revised Statutes, but also to specify each and every statute that may have been passed amending any particular section or sections thereof. Of course, the omission to specify in the schedule a particular statute, whether original or amendatory, might not save it from repeal, where the revision contains provisions upon the same subject; hut Where the amendatory statute omitted from the schedule Is designedly omitted, because it is not- germane to the matters embraced in the revision, and does not properly come within the classification, it does not necessarily follow that it is abrogated merely because much of the original chapiter of which it is a part is repealed. The original chapter is expressly repealed, because all, or most all, of its provisions, are embodied into the revision. The provisions of the law of 1883 have no relation to counities, or the powers and duties of any counity officer, but peculiarly appertain to the functions of the courts. In respect to an amendatory statute of that character, it was particularly incumbent upon the commissioners to provide for its specific repeal. There was no reason whatever why this statute should be repealed by a revised law relating to counties and county officers, and it is evident from the report of the commissioners made to the legislature that it was not intended to specify it in the schedule of laws repealed, but, on the contrary, it was reserved for repeal by laws of different character, and for that reason it was designedly omitted from this schedule. This will appear from an examination of the reports of the commissioners of statutory revision.
In the report of the commissioners of statutory revision for the year 1890, and transmitted to the legislature of 1891, they state that they present therewith drafts of amendments to the three Codes, "containing provisions in the statutes consolidated and repealed which belong more properly in such Codes than in the new chapters of the general laws; " that "following each new chapter reported, except the amendments to the Code, is an appendix containing the laws revised by such chapter, and proposed to he repealed by it, with cross references, so that any person with the report before him can compare each section of the revision with the corresponding provisions of existing laws."
In their report for the year 1891, made to the legislature of 1892, the "County Law," among many other general laws revised, was presented for adoption. In the report it is stated that "various amendments to the Codes were also reported, for the purpose of including therein all provisions in -the general laws revised which relate to practice and proceedings in the civil and criminal counts, and to penal offenses." In part 2 of the report, at page 1361, the commissi oners propose "An act to amend the Oode of Criminal Procedure." "The portions and sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to those hereinafter specified are amended to read, respectively, as follows, to take effect October 1,1892." Among the sections following is section 250: "General Duties of Dis- triot Attorneys, Special District Attorneys and Their Assistants." This section embodies said section 90 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the Laws of 1883, and also section 89, which is also enlarged and extended.. A reference in a note to the proposed section (section 250) shows that it was designed to take the place of and supersede said sections 89 and 90. It will be observed -that there is a change in the phraseology of the amendment of 1883. It reads:
"When the district attorney or his assistant shall not be in attendance at any term of any court of record he is required to attend, or shall be unable or disqualified from acting, or there is a vacancy in such office, the court may, by au order entered in its minutes, appoint some attorney to act as special district attorney during such, absence, inability, disqualification or vacancy."
Following the proposed Code amendments (at page 1403) is a proposed "Act to repeal certain acts and parts of acts." "The following acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed, to take effect May 1st, 1892." Here follows a "Schedule of Laws Repealed." Chapter 12 of part 1 of the Revised Statutes is not mentioned in this schedule, but chapter 123 of the Laws of 1883' is specified, with a statement that it is to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, erroneously stated as section 222,—it should have been section 250.
Immediately folio-wing this repealing statute comes the county law, with the "Reviser's Note," prefixed thereto (page 1409), in which they state that:
"The following draft of a county law is designed mainly to-take the place of the following statutes: Chapter twelve, part 1, of the Revised Statutes, entitled 'Of the Powers, Duties and Privileges of Counties and -of Certain County Officers,' and laws since passed, and relating thereto, as contained in the Bevised Statutes, eighth edition, pages 1019-1081."
They also state that:
"The classification of the laws outlined in the last annual report of the commission has been adhered to, and such provisions of these statutes as more properly belong to either of the Codes have been omitted from this chapter. Many of the laws comprised in the Schedule of Laws to be repealed by this chapter will be found in the Appendix) at pages 1508 to 1653. There is also a reference under most of the sections of the revision to the pages of the eighth edition of the Bevised Statutes, and to the chapters of the Session Laws, where the present statutes will be found, which are to be superseded by the revision."
Turning to the proposed county law (sections 200-204), we find that it was not intended to supersede sections 89-92 of the Bevised Statutes by any new enactment; hut in the annexed schedule of laws to be repealed is specified the whole of said chapter 12, pant 1, of the Bevised Statutes, though 'the amendatory act of 1883 (chapter 123) is not mentioned. Page 1512a of Beport. Turn now to "Appendix F, Laws to be Eepealed by the County Law." Page 1508. At page 1574 will be found said sections 89, 91,92, and section 90, as amended by the Laws of 1883, copied verbatim from page 1066 of the eighth edition of the Bevised Statutes. This would seem to indicate an intention to repeal, by 'the county law, section 90 as amended; hut it is also indicated that its provisions were to be incorporated * into the "Code of Civil (Criminal) Procedure."
It was proposed that the county law should take effect May 1, 1892, but it was enacted to take effect May 12th. If the legislature had enacted the proposed Code 'amendments, the question here presented would not have arisen, but it failed to carry into effect the intentions of the commissioners. It will "be noticed that the proposed amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended by the commissioners to take effect October 1, 1892, but the repealing act connected with it was to take effect long before that time, viz., May 1, 1892. If this had been done, then section 90, as amended by the Laws of 1883, would have been abrogated for that period of time. But it is hardly possible that such a blunder would have been committed when it came to enacting these laws. We have said that it would seem to appear to have been the intention of the revisers, as indicated by the "Appendix F, Laws to be Repealed by the County Law" (page 1508), to repeal diopter 123, Laws 1883; but we are of the opinion that this supposed intention is overdone by the circumstance that this chapter was designedly omitted from the schedule, and was reserved for repeal by the repealing act connected with the acts to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, as appears by the schedule following. It was not the design of the revisers to repeal sections of the various laws revised which were reserved for incorporation into the Codes, except by a repealing act to be ena cted by the adoption of the proposed amendments to the different sections of the Codes. But they have clearly committed a blunder in not reserving sections 89 and 91 from the repeal of chapter 12. In view of the plan or scheme adopted and carried out for the revision, consolidation, and classification of the statutes, and the method adopted for the specific repeal of the various statutes, in obedience to express legislative direction, we must hold that it evidently was not the intention to repeal Laws .1883, chapter 123, by the schedule annexed to the county law, but that it was reserved for repeal upon the enactment of the proposed section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The design of the schedule is to show w'hat laws are superseded by flbe provisions of the revised law, and which consequently should be abrogated and repealed, but not to specify provisions of laws that are intended to be incorporated into the Code or other laws to be revised. By the Laws of 1847, the court was empowered to designate some suitable person to act as district attorney whenever there should occur a vacancy at the term of the court, or the district attorney 'should from any cause be unable to attend the term of the court. The construction contended for by the appellant's counsel of the provisions of the amendatory act of 1883, if adopted as the true and only interpretation that may properly be given to the language employed, would be to deprive the court of this power as if was previously exercised, and make the exercise of the power conditional upon the absence or disqualification of the assistant, or the existence of a vacancy in that office. We think this would be a very literal interpretation of certain of the words in which the statute is expressed, and could only be adopted by disregarding, the true purpose and spirit of the statute and the fairly manifest intention of the legislature. When it is considered that the law directs the employment of an assistant to the district attorney, we must assume that there exists an actual necessity for his employment, and, consequently, that the presence of both is necessarily required for the adequate and proper discharge of the duties of the office. That being so, why should the absence or disqualification of both be required *o the exercise of the power of the court to fill up the complement of the office? Clearly, this act was not designed to limit, or in any manner restrict, the power as it had theretofore been exercised : for the period of sixty years.
We are of the opinion that the power of the court to appoint! ' a special district attorney in case of the absence or disqualifies-' , tlom of the district attorney or of a vacancy in such office is , untrammeled by any other conditions whatever. Keeping in view the prior statutes upon the subject and the nature, character, and purpose of the act of 1883, we think this is the true interpretation of the langua ge employed, and effectuates the legislative intention. It will he noticed that the statute authorizes the designation of a person to act as a special district attorney,, but does not in terms authorize a special assistant district attorney. Now, the district attorney being absent, why may not the court appoint a special district attorney to act in his place and stead, as it had heretofore exercised such power? Because, it is argued, he has an assistant, and therefore the. office of district attorney cannot be temporarily filled while the assistant is in attendance and ready, but perhaps not able, to discharge all the duties of the office at that term of the court We do not think that wias the legislative intention. An assistant may be a young and inexperienced lawyer, and may be lacking the requisite ability to conduct successfully or properly the important prosecutions that may be presented. It would be strange that the eoiu-rt should not, under such circumstances, have 'tlhe power to appoint an able and experienced lawyer to prosecute important cases, simply because there is an assistant", who may or may not be -competent or able to perform all the duties incumbent upon the -office of district -attorney. As we said before, we cannot perceive any'infention to- be fairly and reasonably derived from the words of the statute to- deprive the court of the power it- formerly possessed and exercised, to appoint a special district attorney during the absence of the district attorney. By so doing, the court but effectuates the legislative intention that two or more officers are requisite to properly perform the business of the office.
The cases are numerous where the courts have construed the word "and" as "or," and vice versa, when the reason and spirit of the law required or justified it. "The popular use of 'or' and And' is so loose and so frequently inaccurate that it has infected statutory enactments. While they are not treated as interchangeable and should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the -sense dubious, their strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of any other words, and one read in place of the other, in deference to the meaning of the context." Suth. St. Const., 252 et seq. "And" is often used interchangeably with "or," the meaning being determined by the context. The grammatical sense of words is not adhered to in the construction of either a deed or a will, where a contrary intent'is apparent; and, to give effect to the intention of -the parties, the word "and" may be read "or." Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. 388. This principle, that "and" and "or" are convertible as the sense and intent may require, applies to their use in statutes. Townsend v. Read, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 308; Boyles v. McMurphy, 55 Ill. 236; Eisfeld v. Kenworth, 50 Iowa, 389; Simpson v. Morris, 3 Yeates, 104; People v. Sweetser, 1 Dak. 308; 46 N. W. 452; Porter v. State, 58 Ala. 66; Granite Co. v. Devereux, 72 Me. 422. And this is the rule even in a criminal statute. State v. Myers, 10 Iowa, 448; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 476; Streeter v. People, 69 Ill. 595. Observe, also, in the "statute under consideration, that the personal pronouns "he" and "his" are used in the singular; indicating that provisions have reference to the absence or inability of one person only.
We are of the opinion that the court had full power and authority to make the appointment which it made, and that the person so designated was duly authorized to appear before the grand jury, and perform the duties which were performed by Mm.
We have examined the other -objections made by defendant to the legality of the judgment and- orders appealed from, but discover no error calling for their reversal. The evidence was sufficient to require a submission of the case to the jury, and the charge of the learned court explicitly confined the jury to the consideration of one count in the indictment; and these instructions were fully comprehended and followed by the jury,; as appears from the verdict rendered. That verdict was fully' justified by the evidence, and -should not be disturbed. Code Or. Proc., § 684. ¡
The judgment and orders appealed from should he affirmed, | and the judgment of the appellate court entered in the judgment roll, and a certified copy of the entry forthwith remitted to the clerk of Monroe county, pursuant to- -sections 547 and 548, Code Cr. Proc.
WARD, J., concurs in result.