Case Name: Gurjit Singh UPPAL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-06-14
Citations: 523 F. App'x 474
Docket Number: No. 11-70984
Parties: Gurjit Singh UPPAL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 523
Pages: 474–476

Head Matter:
Gurjit Singh UPPAL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 11-70984.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 10, 2013.
Filed June 14, 2013.
Viney K. Gupta, Esquire, Immigration Law Office Appeals, Orange, CA, for Petitioner.
OIL, Glen T. Jaeger, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Gurjit Singh Uppal, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying his third motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo claims of due process violations, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Uppal's third motion to reopen as untimely and number barred where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA's final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Uppal failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial). Uppal's contention that the BIA overlooked or disregarded evidence fails to overcome the presumption that the BIA considered all of the evidence. See Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir.2000). We reject Uppal's contention that the BIA's decision was ambiguous or unclear. We also reject his contention that the BIA failed to provide him with an opportunity to explain his case or to get evidence.
The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in declining to equitably toll the time limitation on motions to reopen on the ground that Uppal did not establish due diligence or prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of the two attorneys who represented him in his prior motions to reopen. See Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897-903; Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973-976 (9th Cir.2004) (amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005)) (to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the ineffective assistance). We lack jurisdiction to consider any claimed ineffective assistance of counsel with his original attorney because he did not exhaust this before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review contentions not raised before the agency).
In light of our conclusions, we do not address Uppal's contention that he established prima facie eligibility for relief.
We lack jurisdiction to address any challenge Uppal raises to the merits of the BIA's June 30, 2004, order denying his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because the petition for review is not timely as to that decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Singh v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.2008).
Finally, we deny as moot Uppal's request for a stay of removal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.