Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Plaintiffs in Error, v. John Park, James Higgins and John Riley, Defendants in Error
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-09-23
Citations: 41 N.Y. 21
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Plaintiffs in Error, v. John Park, James Higgins and John Riley, Defendants in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 21–34

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiffs in Error, v. John Park, James Higgins and John Riley, Defendants in Error.
One convicted of and sentenced for the crime of burglary in the third degree is thereby rendered incompetent as a witness in any cause civil or criminal, although at the time of such conviction and sentence he was under sixteen years of age, and under the statutes (chap. 100, Laws of 1840, chap. 24, Laws of 1850) sent to the House of Refuge and not to State prison.
The definition of felony as contained in the Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 701, § 30) must be construed as relating to the punishment prescribed for the crime without reference to any personal exemption of the criminal. (Lott, Grover and Daniels, JJ., contra.)
(Argued June 16th, 1869,
decided September 23d, 1869.)
Error to the Supreme Court at the General Term in the third district reversing a conviction for burglary at the ¡Rensselaer County Sessions.
The defendants in error, and one Charles Corbin, were jointly indicted at the ¡Rensselaer county Oyer and Terminer, in November, 1868, for the crime of burglary in the third degree. A nolle prosequi was subsequently entered as to Corbin ; the other defendants pleaded not guilty, and were tried at a Court of Sessions, held in that county in January,' 1869. Upon their trial, the district attorney, on the part of the people, introduced the said Corbin and offered to have him sworn as a witness, which'was objected toby the defendants’ counsel, “ on the ground, among others, that the witness had been -previously, and in the year 1866, in the Court of Sessions, in and for the county of ¡Rensselaer aforesaid, duly indicted and convicted for the crime of burglary in the third degree; and thereupon, being under the age of sixteen years, sentenced and removed to the house of refuge, established, by the society, for the reformation of juvenile delinquents in the city of New York, pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, where he was confined until he was discharged by due course of law, and without being pardoned or otherwise restored to his rights and privileges as a citizen;” and produced, proved, and gave in evidence the record showing such indictment, conviction, sentence and confinement, as aforesaid, of the said witness, and insisted that he was thereby rendered incompetent to testify as a witness on said trial.
The objection was overruled by the court, and the counsel for the prisoners duly excepted to the said decision.
The said Charles Corbin was then duly sworn, and examined as .a witness by and on behalf of the said people, and gave material evidence tending to prove or establish the crime, with which the prisoners were charged; and they were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, in the Clinton State Prison, for the term of one year and three months.
A bill of exceptions having been signed and sealed, and a certificate of probable cause, with a stay of. proceedings, being subsequently granted by a justice of the -Supreme Court, the district attorney removed the case, by certiorari, to the Supreme Court. That court reversed the conviction and sentence, and ordered a new trial in the Court of Sessions; and the judgment, which was entered with the clerk of Rensselaer county, is brought for review to this court by the district attorney of that county, on a writ of error, allowed by a justice of the Supreme Court, in behalf of the people.
Francis Rising, for the People, plaintiffs in error.
C. E. Patterson, for the defendants in error,
insisted, that the statute of 1850 did not apply to juveniles convicted of burglary in the third degree in the third judicial district, and that the word “ delinquents ” used in that statute did not include those guilty of the graver crimes. As to the meaning of “ delinquent ” and “ delict,” he cited Burrill’s Law Dictionary; Erskine’s Justice b. 4, tit. 4, § 2. He cited on the general question, chap. 100, Laws of 1840, chap. 24, Laws of 1850, chap. 304, Laws of 1850, p. 670.

Opinion:
James, J.
The defendants in error were arraigned on an indictment for burglary, and pleaded not guilty. On the trial, one Corbin was offered as a witness for the prosecution, and objected to as incompetent; it being shown that he had been previously convicted and sentenced for the crime of burglary in the third degree, and had never been pardoned or restored to his rights as a citizen. It also appeared that, at the time of such conviction, said Corbin was under the age of sixteen years, and was sentenced to the house of refuge. The objection was overruled; the witness admitted and gave material testimony, and the prisoners were convicted. The General Term of the Supreme Court reversed that conviction for error in admitting said witness, and the people bring error to this court.
The only question for consideration is the competency of Corbin to testify as a witness on the facts above stated.
Under part 4, chap. 1, of the Revised Statutes, entitled, " an act concerning crimes and their punishments," it is declared (2 R. S., 701, § 23) that "no person sentenced upon a conviction for felony, shall be competent to testify in any canse, matter, or proceeding, civil or criminal, unless he be pardoned by the governor or by the legislature, except in the cases specially provided by law; but no sentence upon a conviction for any offense, less than a felony, shall disqualify or render any person incompetent to be sworn or testify in any cause, matter, or proceeding, civil or criminal." Burglary in the third degree is punishable by imprisonment in the State prison for a term not exceeding five years. (2 R. S., 669, § 21.) The Be vised Statutes declare the term " felony," where used therein, to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death or imprisonment in State prison. (2 R. S., 702, § 30.) The term " offender," in said section, is not used as a word of limitation, making it dependent upon the personal status of the criminal, or his exemption from a particular punishment by reason of age or mental incapacity, where the offense for which he is convicted is a felony; but as a word of general application, in a general sense, to define the punishment following the crime. The statute is to be construed as declaring that the term " felony," as therein used, means any crime which is punishable by death or by imprisonment in the State prison, without reference to the personal exemptions or exceptions of the criminal. And this is not in conflict with Fassett v. Smith, (23 N. Y., 252), as that related to obtaining goods by false pretenses, the punishment for which was in the alternative, State prison, county jail, or fine; and hence not within the statutory definition of felony.
Burglary in the third degree is felony, within the statutory definition of that term ; and in the view above taken it does not lose that character, because the convict is under sixteen years of age. As illustrated by counsel, it would be an absurdity, that a conviction on Monday, for a burglary previously committed, would not be a felony; which would be a felony, had the jury delayed their verdict till the next day/ when the convict had been over sixteen years of age.
Statutes should have a reasonable construction, so as to carry out the legislative intent, as far as possible. When the Revised Statutes were enacted, it is perfectly transparent what was intended by the sections under consideration. In making provision subsequently for ameliorating the punish ment of juvenile delinquents, the legislature- did not intend thereby to repeal, modify or limit the statutory definition of felony. I therefore hold that burglary, in the third degree, is a felony, no matter what may be the age of the convict, or whether the particular prisoner may or may not be punishable therefor in the house of refuge. That being so, and the witness, Corbin, having been convicted of such offense and sentenced, and not restored to citizenship, was excluded by the statute, and was incompetent to testify as a witness. His admission as a witness was error, for which the General Term properly reversed the conviction.
That reversal should be affirmed