Case Name: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BAKER
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1915-12-30
Citations: 184 S.W. 664
Docket Number: No. 1535
Parties: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BAKER.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 184
Pages: 664–668

Head Matter:
TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BAKER.
(No. 1535.)
(Court of Civil of Texas. Texarkana.
Dec. 30, 1915.
On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 27, 1916.)
1. CARRIERS <&wkey;283(2) — Carriage oe Passengers — 'Violation oe Separate Coach Law —Statute.
Tinder Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 6753, providing that conductors shall have authority to refuse any passenger admittance to any coach or compartment in which he is not entitled to ride under the provisions of the separate coach law (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 6746-6753), that it shall bo his duty to remove from a car any passenger not entitled to ride therein, and that, upon his refusal to do so knowingly, he shall be punished, a railroad is not relieved of liability for the consequences to a passenger of its conductor’s failure to separate white and negro passengers; the duty being imposed upon the conductor as such.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1121, 1122; Dec. Dig. &wkey;283(2).]
2. Carriers <&wkey;283(2) — Carriage oe Passengers — Violation oe Separate Coach Law —Liability oe Road — Statute.
Where the servants of a railroad knew, or by the exercise of due care might have known, that a white man was in a negro coach, in violation of the separate coach law, and was negligent in not removing such white person from the coach, the road was liable for injuries inflicted by him upon a negro .passenger.
[E‘d. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1121, 1122; Dec. Dig. &wkey;283(2)J
3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;548(5) — Preservation oe Exceptions — Ruling on Evidence.
To take advantage on appeal of the wrongful admission of evidence over objection, a bill of exceptions, duly approved by the trial court, must have been preserved.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 2436; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>548(5).]
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Carriers <&wkey;284(l) — Carriage oe Passengers — Injury to Passenger — Liability oe Road.
A railroad whose white passenger assaulted plaintiff’s negress wife was not liable therefor, aside from the separate coach law, unless the road should have reasonably foreseen, in time to have prevented the assault, that the white person would commit it.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1125, 1127; Dec. Dig. &wkey;2S4(l).]
5. Appeal and Error &wkey;>1064(l) — Harmless
Error — Instruction. , «
In an action against a railroad for injuries to a negress, passenger in a coach for blacks, when a white passenger therein assaulted her, where it conclusively appeared that, one of the road’s employes knew that white men were in the coaches for blacks, error in an instruction that under the separate coach law, the road owed the duty to exercise a high degree of care to discover that white passengers were in the negro coach was harmless.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4219; Dee. Dig. &wkey;>1064(l)J
6. Carriers &wkey;>321(4) — Carriage oe Passengers — Violation oe Separate Coach Law —Instruction.
In an action against a railroad under the separate coach law for injuries suffered by plaintiff’s wife, a negress, riding in a coach for blacks, when assaulted by a white person therein, instructions authorizing a finding against the road J if “its agents and servants” knew that a white passenger was in the negro coach, were not erroneous because of testimony that an employé of the road in no way connected with the operation of the train was on it at the time of the assault, where such employé’s testimony was that he had been an employé, but was- not working the day of the assault, and at the time of the trial, three years later, was still an employé.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases see Carriers, Dec. Dig. &wkey;321(4)J
Hodges, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Red River County; Ben H. Denton, Judge.
Suit by Archie Baker against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Erom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 158 S. W. 263.
Appellee’s .wife, a negress, while a passenger on a coach assigned to negroes in one of appellant’s trains, was assaulted with a whis-ky bottle and severely injured by a white passenger named Melton then in said coach in violation of the “separate coach law.” Articles 6746 to 6753, Vernon’s Statutes. On a former appeal of the case a judgment in favor of appellant was reversed because of error of the trial court in excluding certain testimony offered by appellee. On that trial the court below, in effect, as stated in the opinion reversing the judgment, instructed the jury to find for appellee—
“if they believed his wife was assaulted and injured as alleged in his petition and further believed that such assault might reasonably have been anticipated and guarded against by ap-pellee’s (appellant’s) employés in charge of the train by the exercise of a high degree of care on their part, unless they believe that appellant’s (appellee’s) wife used insulting words to Melton which were calculated to and did provoke him to assault her, and that in using such words she was guilty of negligence, in which event they should find for appellee (appellant).”
With reference to such instruction this court, in remanding the case, said:
“In view of the allegations in the petition referred to, the testimony, and the statute from which we have quoted, we think the court, instead of instructing the jury as he did, should have told them, in effect, to find for appellant (appellee) if they believed appellee (appellant) knew, or in the exercise of the high degree of care it owed to his wife should have known, that Melton and his companions were in the coach assigned to negroes, unless they also believed that appellant’s (appellee’s) wife by her own wrongful conduct towards Melton provoked him to assault her, and that but for such conduct on her part he would have not assaulted her.”
On the trial resulting in the judgment in appellee’s favor for the sum of $500 as the damages he was entitled to recover of appellant, from which this appeal is prosecuted, the pleadings and testimony were not materially different from what they were on the other trial, and, having been sufficiently stated in the opinion disposing of the former appeal, which will be found in 158 S. W. 263, will not be restated here.
On the last trial the court instructed the jury as follows:
“If you believe from the evidence that plaintiff’s wife, while she was a passenger on one of defendant’s passenger trains at the time and place alleged in plaintiff’s petition, was assaulted by a fellow passenger and injured as substantially set out in plaintiff’s petition, and if you further believe that such assault was committed by a white passenger which defendant, its agents and servants, knew, or in the exercise of that high degree of care required by law might havS known, was in the coach assigned to negroes, then, if you so find, you will find a verdict for the plaintiff and assess his damages in accordance with instructions hereinafter given you, unless you find for the defendant upon subsequent instructions contained in this charge.
“(4) On the other hand, if you find from the evidence that the defendant, its agents and employes, did not know of the presence of such white passengers in the coach assigned to ne-groes, and that by the exercise of the high degree of care required by law they could not know it, then you will return a verdict for the defendant.”
The testimony was sufficient to support findings involved in the verdict and judgment, and therefore we find: (1) That ap-pellee’s wife was a negress; (2) that without fault on her part, while she was a passenger in a coach assigned to negroes in one of appellant’s trains, she was wrongfully assaulted and severely injured by one Melton, a white man, who was then unlawfully in said coach; (3) that appellant’s agents and employes in charge of the train knew, or, if they did not, had they exercised due care would have known, that said Melton was in said coach; (4) that, knowing, or being chargeable with knowledge, that said Melton was in said coach, appellant’s said agents and employes were guilty of negligence in failing to remove him therefrom; and (5) that appellee, as the result of such injury to his wife, suffered damages in the sum found by the jury.
Geo. Thompson, of Dallas, and Head, Dillard, Smith, Maxey & Head, of Sherman, for appellant. Chambers & Black, of Clarksville, for appellee.
Application for writ of error pending in Supreme Court.

Opinion:
WILDSON, C. J.
(after stating the facts as above). It is insisted that the third and fourth paragraphs (set out in the statement above) of the trial court's charge to the jury were erroneous —
"in that in said charge liability is imposed upon the defendant if it knew, or in the exercise of a high degree of care could have known, of the presence of white passengers in the colored coach, in that said charge makes a violation of the separate coach law as applied to a case of this kind negligence per se, and makes a violation of the separate coach law the proximate cause of plaintiff's wife's injuries without reference to whether or not defendant could have anticipated and prevented the assault."
It was not contended by appellee that appellant had failed to comply with the provision in the "separate coach law" which required it to provide separate coaches and compartments for the accommodation of white and negro passengers. The contention was that appellant, having complied with the requirement of the law in that respect, failed to comply with the provision thereof in article 6753, Vernon's Statutes, which required it to remove therefrom white passengers it unlawfully permitted to enter the coach it had provided for negro passengers. Said article 6753 is as follows:
"Conductors of passenger trains, street cars, or interurban lines, provided with separate coaches, shall have authority to refuse any passenger admittance to any coach or compartment in which they are not entitled to ride under the provisions of this law; and the conductor in charge of the train or street car, or interurban car, shall have authority, and it shall be his duty, to remove from a coach or street car, or interurban car, any passenger not entitled to ride therein under the provisions of this chapter, and upon his refusal to do so knowingly shall be punished as provided in the Penal Code of this state."
The fact that the duty of enforcing a compliance with the requirement of the law was imposed upon its conductor did not relieve appellant of liability for the consequences to a passenger of a failure to separate white and negro passengers. The duty was imposed upon the conductor as such and not otherwise. Railway Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S. W. 413, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 958, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 517. In the case cited the Supreme Court of Kentucky, with reference to a statute not materially different from our own, said:
"The whole purpose of the separate coach law is to require a carrier not only to provide separate coaches for colored and white passengers, but to see that the law is made effective by assigning the passengers to the coaches to which they belong. While it is true that the statute imposes a penalty on the conductor for a failure of duty in this respect, this in no wise relievos the carrier of its responsibility under the law. In making the conductor liable to a fine for failure of duty, the purpose of the lawmakers was to render tho act more effective. The duty of assigning passengers to the proper coaches is not imposed upon the conductor individually, but is imposed upon him as the conductor of the train. In other words, it is only because of the position that he occupies that the statute imposes upon him a penalty for a failure of duty. In executing the statute, or in failing to execute it, he acts as the agent or the representative of the railroad company, and the doctrine of respondeat superior necessarily applies."
If, as unquestionably was true under the circumstances shown by the testimony, it was a violation of law for Melton and his companions to be in the negro coach, and if, as seems to us to he true, appellant owed to appellee's wife the duty to see to it that the law was not so violated, then it follows, we think, that appellant was guilty of negligence in not removing Melton from the coach, if its agents and servants in charge of the train knew, or by the exercise of the care it owed to appellee's wife as a passenger they might have known, he was in the coach. Therefore we are of opinion the trial court did not err when he instructed the jury to that effect. It is clear Melton would not have been in the negro coach had appellant, in compliance with the requirement of the law, refused to admit him thereto, or, having unlawfully admitted, had removed him there from ; and it is clear if Melton had not been in the coach appellee's wife would not have suffered the injury inflicted upon her. When it is remembered that the main object the Legislature had in view in enacting the separate coach law was to prevent "the frequent disturbances [upon railroad trains] arising between the two races, resulting often in serious injuries being inflicted by the one or the other" (Quinn v. Railway Co., 98 Ky. 231, 32 S. W. 742), we think it should be held that the trial court had a right to tell the jury, as he did in effect in the instructions complained of, that appellant should have anticipated the consequences which resulted to appellee's wife from its failure to comply .with the law.
"Where the conductor or those managing the train," said the court in the case cited above, "knows that one is in the wrong car, it is his duty to expel him, and, by consenting to his remaining, the company becomes responsible for his conduct so long as he does remain." .
We do not think the conclusions we have reached are in conflict with those reached in the eases cited by appellant. The point decided in Railway Co. v. Brown, 158 S. W. 259, was that it was not a violation of the separate coach law for a city marshal in the discharge of his official duties to go into a negro coach within the city limits. The point decided in Norwood v. Railway Co., 12 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 34 S. W. ISO, was that a negro passenger who failed to show that he was thereby damaged was not entitled to recover against a railroad company because of its failure to provide for his color a coach "equal in all points of comforts and convenience" to the one provided for the white passengers. In ¡Segal v. Railway Co., 35 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 80 ¡3. W. 233, the plaintiff, a white woman, while a passenger in a coach provided for white persons, was assaulted by a negro. The negro was not a passenger, and the court properly, we think, held that the separate coach law was inapplicable to the case. In Prokop v. Railway Co., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 520, 79 ¡3. W. 101, the plaintiff, a white woman and a passenger, while in the waiting room of the defendant's depot, was asasulted by a negro. The point decided was that the failure of the railway company to have the waiting room lighted was not the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. In Railway Co. v. Smith, 133 S. W. 695, where the plaintiff, a woman, while in the waiting room of the defendant's depot was injured by boys engaged in a scuffle, it was held, on the authority of the Prokop and Segal Cases, that the absence of the defendant's station agent from the depot at the time the accident occurred was not the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
What has been said disposes of all the assignments in appellant's brief, except the fourth, in which complaint is made of the action of the trial court in overruling an objection thereto and in admitting as evidence certain testimony of the witness John Jackson. As the bill of exceptions taken to the ruling made does not appear to have been approved by the court, his action cannot be reviewed here. Railway Co. v. Crump, 110 S. W. 1013.
The judgment is affirmed.
Associate Justice HODGES thinks the charge complained of was erroneous and dissents from the conclusion reached. He is of the opinion the judgment should be reversed.
&wkey;>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes