Case Name: GUYON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-04-06
Citations: 230 S.W. 408
Docket Number: No. 6182
Parties: GUYON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 230
Pages: 408–410

Head Matter:
GUYON v. STATE.
(No. 6182.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 6, 1921.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1921.)
1. Robbery <&wkey;I7(5) — Indictment sufficient though it named special owner.
Under Code Cr. Proe. 1911, art. 457, an indictment for robbery which named a special owner in possession is sufficient; consequently, though money stolen from a bank belonged to the corporate bank, the indictment is sufficient where an employee of the bank who was special custodian and had a special property therein was named as owner.
2. Robbery <&wkey;>4 — Rules as' to allegation and proof of ownership not more restrictive than those pertaining to theft.
The rules with reference to the allegation and proof of ownership in the offense of robbery are not more restrictive than those pertaining to the offense of theft.
3. Robbery <&wkey;24(4) — Evidence held to show that person named as owner had special property.
In a prosecution for bank robbery, where a bank employee was named as owner, evidence held to establish that he had a special property, being custodian of the funds.
4. Robbery &wkey;>8, 27(5) — Although custodian of bank funds opened vault under threats, offense is still robbery, and charge on lesser degrees unnecessary.
Where defendant, who was armed with a pistol, by threats forced the custodian of bank funds to open the vault, the fact of the custodian’s consent does not change the offense from robbery, and a charge on lesser degrees is unnecessary.
5. Jury <&wkey;110(5)— Disqualification of juror waived by urging objection to dismissal of juror.
In a prosecution for bank robbery, where a venireman stated that he had an opinion and was a director of the bank robbed, whereupon the district attorney asked that such juror be excused, and defendant’s counsel objected on the ground that the indictment named another as owner, and that the record did not disclose any interest of the bank which would disqualify the juror, defendant cannot be granted a new trial because such person served as juror, though the evidence showed that the funds stolen belonged to the bank, for he waived any disqualification.
On Motion for Rehearing.
6. Robbery &wkey;?26 — Failure to submit question of ownership not error.
In a prosecution for robbery, where the indictment laid ownership in one having cus.toay of the property, the failure 'to submit the question of ownership held not error; the undisputed evidence establishing the same.
7. Criminal law <&wkey;800(2) — Failure of charge to define “money” not error.
In a prosecution for robbery, where the indictment alleged that the property stolen was money, and the evidence showed it was $20, $10, and $5 bills, it was unnecessary for the court in its charge to define money for the term money must be presumed lawful money of the United States.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other,.definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Money.]
Appeal from District Court, Uvalde County; Joseph Jones, Judge.
P. Guyon was convicted of robbery, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
L. Old, of Uvalde, for appellant.
R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
Appellant was convicted of robbery. Punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of 10 years.
In the indictment Lawrence Little is named as owner. Little was an employee of the Uvalde State Bank, a coporation, one Brashear was the cashier, and McNally the president. Little and Brashear, the cashier, usually reached the bank in the morning at about the same hour. They both, as well as the president, knew the combination to the vault and the safe in which the bank's money was kept. The one first arriving would open the vault and arrange the affairs of the bank for the conduct of business. On the day the offense was committed Brashear was absent from town. Little went to the bank at his. usual time and found there the janitor, one Anderson. Soon after his arrival the appellant entered wearing a suit of overalls and a false face and carrying a pistol in his hand. By threats he caused Little to open the vault and the safe and to take therefrom the sum of over $6,000 in currency, which was delivered to the appellant. These facts were not controverted, but appellant insists that, inasmuch as the money taken was the property of the bank, there is a variance between the proof and the averment of ownership. The fact that the property belonged to the corporation did not render it necessary that it should be named in the indictment as the owner. Price v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 160, 115 S. W. 586; Ricks v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 677, 56 S. W. 928; Thurmond v. State, 30 Tex. App. 539, 17 S. W. 1098. Naming the special owner in possession would comply with the request of the law. Article 457, Code of Crim. Procedure; Otero v. State, 30 Tex. App. 450, 17 S. W. 1081; Bailey v. State, 20 Tex. App. 68; Alexander v. State, 24 Tex. App. 126, 5 S. W. 840. Branch's Ann. Tex. Penal Code, § 2440 and 2477.
The rules with reference to the allegation and proof of ownership in the offense of robbery are not more restrictive than those pertaining to the offense of theft. Ruling Case Law, vol. 23, p. 1154, § 20, and notes.
Appellant Insists, however that under the evidence Little was a mere custodian or servant and therefore was not a special owner within the meaning of the law. The relation of Little to the personal property in the hank was disclosed by the evidence without conflict. McNally, the president, testified that he had supervision of the bank and was there practically every day; that both Brashear, the cashier, and Little were compensated with a salary; that Brashear ordinarily had the management of the bank's affairs under the supervision of a board of directors and the president. Little kept the books and was head man in the absence of Brashear. Mc-Nally said that his principal work was to advise the cashier regarding loans and extensions, and that, in the absence of Brashear, Little's authority was the same as th.e cashier. Little was assistant cashier. The cashier, according to the evidence, had authority to lend the bank's funds. Little, in conducting the business, made loans. At the time the offense was committed there was no officer of the bank present save Little, and no other employee save the janitor. Its funds, after the safe was opened, was taken out- of the safe by Little. That Little was a special owner of the property and in possession of it at the time of the robbery under the evidence is not, we think, a matter of doubt. Bagley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 167; Branch's Texas Crim. Law, § 781; State v. Carrol, 214 Mo. 392, 113 S. W. 1051, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 312, and note.
The evidence is not controverted that Little was caused to open the vault and safe and to deliver the money in obedience to the command of the appellant by 'holding in his hand a loaded pistol in a manner manifesting an intent and ability to enforce his demand by the use of the weapon. It is also in evidence, without conflict, that Little complied because he was put in fear of his-life by the acts of the appellant.
We discern no reason for charging on the lower grades of offenses. The evidence all pointed to the offense of robbery. The consent of Little to the delivery does charge the nature of the offense. Wharton's Crim. Law, vol. 2, § 1091; Brown v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 334, 136 S. W. 265; Green v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 446, 147 S. W. 593.
The contention that the indictment is duplicitous in that it charges robbery by assault and by the use of firearms is one that this court sanctioned in the case of Murdock v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 263, 106 S. W. 374, but from which it later receded. Crouch v. State, 219 S. W. 1099, and cases therein cited.
One of the jurors on the special venire list on his voir dire stated that he had an opinion touching the merits of the case, and also that he was a director of the First State Bank of Uvalde. The district attorney thereupon asked that he be excused. The court assented, and appellant's attorney interposed an objection stating that the indictment named Little as the owner, and the record did not disclose any such interest of the First State Bank as would disqualify the juror, whereupon the court withdrew the dismissal of the juror, and he was taken as a juror, the appellant, at the time, having unused peremptory .challenges. Upon these facts and the development in the evidence of the interest of the First State Bank in the money taken, the appellant, after verdict, sought a new trial because of the disqualification of the juror. The funds of the bank were recovered. If the juror was disqualified, the appellant had power to waive it. His waiver was affirmative, and appellant at the time was conscious of the fact that the money taken was the property of the First State Bank of Uvalde; that the vault and safe which he forced the officer to open belonged to the bank, and he was afforded the right to challenge the juror for cause, and had available peremptory challenges by means of which juror service upon the jury could have been avoided. By his conduct he willfully abandoned a known privilege, and after the verdict is not in a position, by reasserting it, to annul the result of the trial. The court was right in refusing to sustain this ground on the motion for a new trial. In a very recent case we have reviewed the subject of a waiver of the disqualification of a juror, and there will be found in the reasons given the citation of precedents and references to statutes contained in the opinion of Judge Láttünore in the case of Lowe v. State, 226 S. W. 675, all and more than will be demanded in the disposition of the point raised upon the present occasion.
There is no error revealed.
The judgment is affirmed.
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