Case Name: Warner Gear Division of Borg-Warner Corporation v. Dishner
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1964-11-16
Citations: 137 Ind. App. 500
Docket Number: No. 20,084
Parties: Warner Gear Division of Borg-Warner Corporation v. Dishner.
Judges: Hunter, C. J., and Kelley, J., concur.
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 500–510

Head Matter:
Warner Gear Division of Borg-Warner Corporation v. Dishner.
[No. 20,084.
Filed November 16, 1964.
Rehearing denied December 15,1964. Transfer denied Steptember 13,1965.]
Murray, Stewart, Irwin & Gilliom, and Richard W. Guthrie, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Archie Lapin, of Muncie, for appellee.

Opinion:
Pfaff, J.
This is an appeal from an award favorable. to the appellee herein rendered by the Full Industrial Board of Indiana. In the action below the Board sustained a finding rendered by one of the members on, initial hearing of fifty per cent permanent impairment to the appellee's left index finger, and in addition thereto, amended the original award to include medical expenses.
Error assigned for reversal is that the award of the Board is contrary to law. Such assignment raises the following questions:
1. Is there sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the findings of fact and award of the Board?
2. Did the Board commit harmful error in overruling appellant's objection to certain evidence introduced by appellee?
The pertinent facts to this appeal as they, appear in the record may be briefly stated as follows:
Oh January 7, 1963, appellee sustained an injury to his left index finger while in the course of his employment at a plant owned and operated by the appellant. Medical attention was given at a plant first aid station on the day of the accident, and again oh the following day, at which time the company safety director sent the appellant to have an X-ray taken of the injury. On the following day, January 9, the appellee was sent by the safety director to Ball Memorial Hospital to have the injury examined by a surgeon, not the company doctor, but acting at the request of the company. The doctor examined the injury and applied a local anesthetic to relieve the pain. It was alleged that appellee asked the doctor at this time if he was going to remove the foreign body embedded in appellee's finger. The doctor replied that removal at this time would be unwise because the surgical injury inflicted by removal is frequently more severe than the foreign body itself, and is' more apt to cause permanent impairment than the continued presence of the foreign body in the finger. The doctor then asked appellee to return in two days, at which time the appellee did return and complained, to the doctor that he was still having pain. The doctor again reiterated his reasoning for not performing surgery.
Appellee returned to the doctor's office for a third and final visit on January 25, still bothered by pain, and again asked the doctor if he intended to remove the foreign body. At this point the evidence becomes conflicting as to the events that took place in the doctor's office. However, it appears from the entire record that appellant's doctor at this time arranged for surgery to be performed on February 12, 1963, eighteen days later,. at Ball Memorial Hospital, and appellee was informed of this fact before he left the doctor's office! Appellee, apparently still bothered by the pain, then left the doctor's office and returned to work.
On the following morning appellee called his personal physician and made an appointment to see him a few days later. On February 1, 1963, appellee's physician, together with another physician, performed surgery on appellee's finger, removing the foreign body. Appellee testified that he ^experienced relief from the pain about two or three^clays following the operation.
Appellee did not inform the appellant, nor appellant's physician, that he was being treated by his personal physician. Appellee had been told by appellant's safety director a short time after the accident that if he went to a doctor of his own choice he would do so at his own expense. Appellee's finger was examined approximately two months later by another physician of his own choosing. A written report of the physician's observations was sent to appellee's attorney of record, and a copy of that report was forwarded to the appellant.
Thus, at the initial hearing the single Board member was faced with the ultimate factual question of dé* termining whether or not the appellee was justified in obtaining the services of his own doctor because of. the circumstances existing in :this cause.- In arriving at this ultimate conclusion it was necessary for the Board-member to determine a number of evidentiary facts, and to. draw reasonable inferences therefrom.
Appellant first argues that the responsibility of furnishing medical treatment for injured employees' is that of the employer, and the refusal of the employee to accept such medical attention furnished by the employer shall bar the employee from all compensation to which he would otherwise be entitled. Acts 1929, ch. 172, §25, p. 536, as amended in 1937¿ 1943, 1945 and 1947, being §40-1225, Burns' 1952 Replacement. This section also provides in part as follows :
"If in an emergency or because of the employer's failure to provide such attending physician or such surgical, hospital or nurse's services, and supplies or such treatment by spiritual means or prayer, as herein specified, or for other good reason, a physi cian other than that provided by the employer treats the injured employee within the first one hundred eighty (180) days, or necessary and proper surgical, hospital, or nurse's services and supplies are procured within said period, the reasonable cost of such service and supplies shall, subject to approval of the industrial board, be paid by the employer." (Our emphasis)
On the issue of whether or not a refusal on the part of the employee is reasonable, such a question is one of fact to be determined by the Industrial Board. Pipkin v. Continental Steel Corp. (1938), 105 Ind. App. 669, 16 N. E. 2d 984; Bloomfield Brick Co. v. Blaker (1932), 94 Ind. App. 230, 180 N. E. 501; Vonnegut Hardware Co. v. Rose (1918), 68 Ind. App. 385, 120 N. E. 608. Further, it is a well established rule that this court will not disturb a finding of fact made by the Industrial Board unless the evidence with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are of such conclusive nature as to force a contrary conclusion. Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry Stores, Inc. (1948), 225 Ind. 517, 75 N. E. 2d 662. It has also been stated by this court on numerous occasions that we cannot weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence of probative value to sustain the award, considering only the evidence most favorable to the appellee, it is our duty to sustain the Industrial Board. Logan v. Acme Machine Products Div. (1942), 110 Ind. App. 556, 39 N. E. 2d 797; Wilson v. Betz Corp. et al. (1958), 128 Ind. App. 189, 146 N. E. 2d 570.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are sufficient to sustain the finding of the Board on the factual question of reasonableness.
Appellant's second contention is that the Board committed error in allowing testimony of the examining physician concerning any percentage of impairment to become a part of the record. Appellant bases its objection to the admission of such evidence on the ground that appellee failed to furnish appellant a report from the examining physician stating any estimate of any permanent partial impairment as required by statute. Acts 1929, ch. 172, §27, p. 586, as amended in 1943, 1945, 1947, 1949 and 1963, being §40-1227, Burns' 1964 Cum. Supp. This section requires that each side must provide the other side with a copy of the examining physician's report at least ten days prior to hearing. We are here concerned with that part of the section providing:
"All statements of physicians or surgeons required by this section, whether those engaged by employee or employer, shall contain information regarding the history of the injury, claimed injury, as given by the patient, the physical or mental condition of such employee, and the nature and extent or amount of disability or impairment, if any, of such employee." (Our emphasis)
A report was furnished by the appellee's physician pursuant to the statute, but appellant argues that the report did not in any way provide any percentage of impairment as required by statute, §40-1227, supra.
The portion of the physician's report pertinent to our present inquiry read as follows:
"Mr. Dishner now has a healed hand with the loss of fifty per cent motion of the index finger and fifty per cent loss of sensation with a total incapacity of ten per cent to the hand below the elbow." (Our emphasis)
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,, Unabridged, defines "disability" in the following manner:.
"Disability . (4): a physical or mental illness, injury, or condition that incapacitates in any way. . . ." (Our emphasis)
Referring back to that portion of §40-1227, supra, quoted above, it will be noted that the statute says "disability or impairment". We are of the opinion that the medical report submitted by the appellee was sufficient to comply with the requirements of §40-1227, supra.
For the reasons given herein this court is of. the opinion that the award of the Full Industrial Board is not contrary to law.
Award affirmed.
Hunter, C. J., and Kelley, J., concur.
Mote, J., dissents with opinion to follow.