Case Name: Milton G. CARTER, and his wife, Linda Irene Carter, Appellants, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY and Eual T. Berry, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-11-29
Citations: 377 So. 2d 242
Docket Number: No. NN-291
Parties: Milton G. CARTER, and his wife, Linda Irene Carter, Appellants, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY and Eual T. Berry, Appellees.
Judges: MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 377
Pages: CCCXXII–CCCXXIV

Head Matter:
Milton G. CARTER, and his wife, Linda Irene Carter, Appellants, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY and Eual T. Berry, Appellees.
No. NN-291.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 29, 1979.
Marvin A. Urquhart, Jr., Panama City, for appellants.
Dayton Logue of Spear, Bennett, Logue, Burke & Blue, Panama City, for appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The Carters appeal the trial court's ruling that personal injury protection (PIP) and workers' compensation benefits are tó be set off against their recovery of uninsured motorists (UM) benefits from Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO). The Carters argue that a distinction should be made between duplication of benefits per se and duplicate compensation for specific items of damages. To the extent that PIP and workers' compensation benefits do not compensate for pain and suffering, for example, they do not duplicate coverage and therefore should not be set off. The Carters further argue that Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida (1979) amending Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1977), clarifies legislative intent and as such is a remedial statute and should be retroactively applied. Alternatively, they argue the amendment goes only to procedure and should be retroactively applied. We do not agree with any of these contentions. Therefore, we affirm.
This court has twice ruled that under Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1977), PIP benefits are to be set off against the injured party's UM coverage. Masters v. Lester, 366 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), Evans v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty-Insurance Company, 355 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Those decisions control our holding here. See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Ilmonen, 360 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
We are unable to distinguish between workers' compensation and PIP benefits and agree with the Fourth DCA that workers' compensation must also be set off against the UM coverage. Florida Farm Bureau and Casualty Insurance Company v. Andrews, 369 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
Regarding the application of Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida (1979), we are not persuaded that the statute is solely remedial or procedural.
It is a well-settled proposition of law that contracts are made in legal contemplation of the existing applicable law. Johnson v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 333 So.2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), State v. City of Coral Gables, 72 So.2d 48 (Fla.1964). Under the existing law at the time this insurance contract was entered into, PIP benefits and workers' compensation benefits were to be set off against uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1977). The amendment in Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida (1979) makes it clear that these benefits are not to be set off against the UM coverage. This substantially changes the contractual obligations anticipated by the parties at the time of contracting. To retroactively apply this statute to an insurance contract entered into before its enactment would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract. Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla.1978).
Unless the statute clearly expresses a contrary intention, all legislation is presumed to have only prospective effect. Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Ehrman, 316 So.2d 557 (Fla.1975). Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida (1979), expresses no such intent.
We recognize that courts may look to an act's title in interpreting the intent of the Legislature. Cook v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 332 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179 (Fla.1951). However, the title's primary purpose is to give notice of the subject matter contained in the act. Pruitt v. State, 363 So.2d 552 (Fla.1978), and the language of the title is not binding as to the meaning and application of the act.
Based on prior decisions of this court and those of our sister court as noted above, of which the Legislature is presumed to be aware, Main Insurance Company v. Wiggins, 349 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida (1979), is a substantive change in the law. We therefore, decline to give the statute retroactive application and find our prior decisions controlling as to this case. AFFIRMED.
MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents.