Case Name: Sumit KUMAR, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-10-24
Citations: 699 F. App'x 373
Docket Number: No. 16-60803 Summary Calendar
Parties: Sumit KUMAR, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent
Judges: Before KING, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit-Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 699
Pages: 373–374

Head Matter:
Sumit KUMAR, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent
No. 16-60803 Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed October 24, 2017
Pardeep S. Grewal, Esq., Castro Valley, CA, for Petitioner
James Adelbert Hurley, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
Before KING, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit-Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Sumit Kumar, a native and citizen of India, failed to appear at his December 13, 2010, removal hearing and was ordered removed from the United States in absen-tia. Six years later, Kumar moved to reopen his removal proceedings and to rescind the in absentia removal order. The Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that the motion was untimely and that neither equitable tolling nor changed country conditions warranted reopening the proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed and dismissed Kumar's ensuing appeal, Kumar now petitions this court for review of the BIA's order.
Kumar argues that the BIA misunderstood his argument and abused its discretion in not equitably tolling the 180-day limitations period that he faced in filing the motion to rescind the in absentia order of removal. He asserts that tolling was warranted because he relied on an uncle who iraudulently misrepresented the steps in Kumar's removal proceedings. Kumar asserts that the limitations period should begin from the time he consulted counsel who filed the motion to reopen.
In declining to equitably toll the limitations period, the BIA addressed Kumar's assertion that he had relied on his uncle's misrepresentation that he would have the case transferred to a closer venue and would follow up with him about the pending removal hearing. Moreover, Kumar does not state the date he consulted counsel, and he has not shown that he diligently pursued his rights, given that he obtained copies of the record in his removal proceedings in February 2014 but did not file the instant motion to reopen the proceedings and rescind the removal order until April 2016. See Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2016). Nor has he shown that an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control prevented him from complying with the 180-day deadline. See id. at 344.
Kumar argues also that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen the removal proceedings because he offered evidence of changed conditions in India. Kumar's argument that he made a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum is inappo-site. See I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). Moreover, as the BIA observed, Kumar's evidence showed an ongoing pattern of political violence that existed when he left India, such that he failed to show a material change in country conditions. See Ramos-Lopez v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 2016).
The petition for review is DENIED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.