Case Name: EX PARTE JERMAN
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-12-20
Citations: 57 Or. 387
Docket Number: 
Parties: EX PARTE JERMAN
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 387–409

Head Matter:
Argued December 13,
decided December 20, 1910.
EX PARTE JERMAN
[112 Pac. 416.]
Habeas Corpus — Jurisdiction of Circuit and County Courts.
1. The Constitution of Oregon, Article VIII, Section 2, as amended in 1910, provides that the courts, jurisdiction and judicial system, except so far as expressly changed by the amendment, shall remain as at present constituted, until otherwise provided by law, but that the Supreme Court may in its own discretion take original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings'. Section 5 provides that no person shall be charged in any circuit court with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or made punishable by any of the laws, except upon indictment. Held, that while original jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court in habeas carpus proceedings, to be exercised in its discretion, the authority of the circuit and county courts in that respect is not taken away or abridged.
Habeas Corpus — Originad Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Nature —“Discretion."
2. The Constitution of Oregon, Article VIII, Section 2, as amended in 1910, provides that the Supreme Court may in its own discretion take original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Held, that it was the intent to allow to the court the widest latitude consistent with law and justice in determining whether it will act in any given case, “discretion” not meaning absolute or arbitrary power when vested in an officer and meaning when vested in a court the exercising of the best of the court’s judgment upon the occasion that calls for it, and the section does not thrust upon the Supreme Court the burden of hearing and deciding in the first instance every application for habeas corpus which might be presented to it, but before taking jurisdiction the court should consider the condition of its business, the hardships of petitioner incident to a denial of the writ, and whether he has any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the circuit court, and a remedy by appeal, and where the court’s docket is greatly congested, so that If jurisdiction were tallen other criminal cases equally meritorious, some involving the question of life and death, and nearly all involving the present imprisonment of the parties concerned, would have to be postponed, the court will refuse to take jurisdiction of a petition for habeas corpus by persons who have appeared in court and pleaded guilty to an offense, craving immediate sentence, on the ground that the clerk in entering the judgment failed to recite therein the crime for which they were sentenced, as expressly required by Section 1444, B. & C. Comp. ; they having adequate remedy by application to the court to require the clerk to correct the judgment entry, by appeal to the Supreme Court, and by application for habeas corpus in the circuit court.
Habeas Corpus — Original Jurisdiction.
3. Regardless of the rights of a petitioner to apply to the lower court for a writ of habeas corpus, appellate courts refuse original jurisdiction in such proceedings only where it appears that civil rights are concerned. Per Mr. Justice King, dissenting.
Words and Phrases — “Discretion."
4. “Discretion" of the court is freedom to act according to the judgment of the court or according to the rules of equity and the nature of circumstances; sound discretion guided by fixed legal principles, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in accordance with the rules established in reference thereto. Per Mr. Justice King, dissenting.
Habeas Corpus — Record.
5. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus should issue must be determined from the record presented. Per Mr. Justice King, dissenting.
Habeas Corpus — Record.
6. In habeas corpus proceedings in the Supreme Court it cannot be presumed that proceedings in the lower court, upon which a judgment void upon its face was entered, were regular, and that an error occurred through the inadvertence or misprision of the clerk in entering the judgment. Per Mr. Justice King, dissenting.
Habeas Corpus — Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Construction of Constitution.
7. The Constitution of Oregon, Article VIII, Section 2, as amended in 1910, provides that the Supreme Court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction, in habeas corpus proceedings. Held, that the amendment was intended to reach the cases of persons unlawfully held in custody, so as to avoid the delays incident to an appeal from the county and circuit courts to the Supreme Court, and the provision making it discretionary with the Supreme Court whether they should take jurisdiction was intended to be exercised in cases more civil than criminal in nature, such as controversies between divorced parents over the custody of children, and instances requiring possibly an examination of witnesses, and not to cases where the record shows a restraint of petitioner under a void judgment. Per Mr. Justice King, dissenting.
Statement by Mr. Justice McBride.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was made at the instance of Archie M. Jerman, whose connection or relationship to the prisoners and the subject-matter does not appear. After the usual formal allegations, it is alleged that the pretended cause of imprisonment is under color of a void judgment of the circuit court of which the following is a copy, omitting the formal portions of the document:
“State of Oregon v. Francesco Roberto and Lorus Martinez. On this day the State of Oregon appearing by W. C. Winslow, deputy district attorney, and the defendants appearing in person and by their attorney, Wm. P. Lord, Jr., the plea of not guilty heretofore entered by the said defendants is by them changed to a plea of guilty and the said defendants both waiving further time for sentence and requesting the court to at once pass sentence upon them. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that said Francesco Roberto and Lorus Martinez be confined in the penitentiary of the State of Oregon without limitation of time.”
Session laws of 1905, p. 318, provide that whenever any person is convicted of any crime, the maximum punishment of which does not exceed 20 years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, the court may, in its discretion, sentence such person to imprisonment without limitation of time; provided, that such imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum penalty prescribed for such offense. There are further provisions permitting the Governor to parole such person after he has served the minimum penalty for such offense. Section 1444, B. & C. Comp., is as follows:
“When judgment upon a conviction is given, the clerk must enter the same in the journal,- stating briefly the crime for which conviction has been had; such entry may be made at any time during the term as of the day’s proceedings upon which the judgment was given.”
Section 6, Article VII, of the Constitution of Oregon provides:
“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction only to revise the final decisions of the circuit courts.”
Section 9, Article VII, provides:
“All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this constitution, or by laws consistent therewith, exclusively in some other court, shall belong to the circuit courts.”
On November 8, 1910, Article VIII of the Constitution was amended so as to read as follows:
“Section 1. The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law. The judges of the Supreme and other courts shall be elected by the legal voters of the State or of their respective districts for a term of six years, and shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which compensation shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected.
“Sec. 2. The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by law. But the Supreme Court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus proceedings.”
In section 5 of such amendment appears the following:
“No person shall be charged in any circuit court with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or made punishable by any of the laws of this State, except upon indictment found by a grand jury.”
Denied.
Mr. William P. Lord, Jr., for the petitioner.
Mr. Andrew M. Crawford, Attorney General, and Mr. Walter C. Winslow, Deputy District Attorney, for the State.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McBride
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is the first application for the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this court conferred by the constitutional amendment, adopted at the last general election. Counsel for petitioners in the able brief filed by him has, with a fairness as commendable as it is rare, cited the leading authorities both for and against the position contended for by him.
Under the provisions of the original constitution cited in the statement of the case, we think there can be little question that this court had no power to issue the writ; that power being vested exclusively in the circuit and county courts. It is also apparent that, since the amendment, while such power may be exercised by this court in its discretion, the authority of the circuit and county courts in that respect is in no manner taken away or abridged. Until future legislation shall change them, the circuit and county courts continue to exist and to exercise the same powers and jurisdiction in respect to writs of this character which they exercised before the adoption of the amendment. Section 2, above quoted, is clear and distinct on this point, while Section 5 distinctly recognizes the continued existence and authority of the circuit court by providing that "no person shall be charged in any circuit court with the commission of any crime, except by indictment."
Such being the condition, we are now called upon to determine whether the discretion given us by the late amendment should be exercised in this case. It is evident from the nature of the language used, "the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take jurisdiction," that it was the intention of the framers of this amendment to allow to this court the widest latitude consistent with law and justice in determining whether it would act in any given case. It does not, in terms, invest the court with positive jurisdiction. It permits them to take it, and invests the court with a peculiar discretion to do so or refrain from so doing. It does not stop with the usual formula, "in their discretion," but goes further and is more emphatic, using the term "in their own discretion."
"Discretion" is defined as the discernment of what is right and proper, "as deliberate judgment." Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Heath, 29 Ind. App. 395 (62 N. E. 107)! "Discretion does mean and can mean nothing else but exercising the best of the court's judgment upon the occasion that calls for it." Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 462 (24 Am. Dec. 46). "Discretion, when vested in an officer, does not mean absolute or arbitrary power. The discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner, and not maliciously, wantonly, and arbitrarily, to the wrong or injury of another." Nicklaus v. Goodspeed, 56 Or. 184 (108 Pac. 135.) See, also, "Adjudged Words and Phrases," title "Discretion."
We are of the opinion that it was not the intention of the framers of the late amendment to thrust upon this court the burden of hearing, considering, and deciding in the first instance every application for quo warranto, mandamus, and habeas corpus which should be presented to it. Such a construction would overwhelm us with a mass of original business, including the examination of witnesses, hearing arguments of counsel, and considering the merits of the causes presented, which would interfere seriously with those duties for which this court was primarily constituted, namely, the hearing and decision of cases coming here in the usual manner upon appeal. And we are also of the opinion that, before taking jurisdiction in' any of the cases enumerated, we should carefully consider, first, the condition of the business of this court; second, the hardships to the petitioner incident to a denial of the writ; third, whether the petitioner has any plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the circuit court; and, fourth, whether he has a remedy by appeal.
As to the first, it is well known that, at the present time, the docket of this court is greatly congested, and it follows that, if we take jurisdiction of this matter and proceed with a hearing, other criminal cases equally meritorious, some involving the question of life and death, and nearly all involving the present imprisonment of the parties concerned, will have to be postponed to the consideration of the case of these petitioners who are confessedly guilty of some crime,- the particulars of which do not appear.
It does appear from the imperfect record that they appeared in court, pleaded guilty to an offense against the laws of this State, and craved the immediate sentence of the court therefor, and that thereupon the court sentenced them to an indeterminate term in the penitentiary. So far the proceedings seem to have been regular, but the law makes it the duty of the clerk to enter in the judgment the crime for which the defendant was sentenced, and this he has failed to do, so that Roberto and Martinez are in danger of remaining indefinitely in the bastile, unless this inadvertence is corrected. But these gentlemen have several plain, speedy, and adequate remedies. An obvious one is to apply to the court to require the clerk to correct the judgment entry to correspond with the facts. Another is to appeal to this court in the regular way and have the judgment of the circuit court reversed or amended. And a third is to apply for a. writ of habeas corpus before a judge of the circuit court, and find their redress. With all these remedies in other courts open to them, we do not think this is a case wherein this court should exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by the recent amendment to the detriment of other and more meritorious business.
The petition is denied. Denied.