Case Name: KLINGENBERG v. CITY OF NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-11-20
Citations: 150 N.Y.S. 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: KLINGENBERG v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 150
Pages: 199–202

Head Matter:
(164 App. Div. 718)
KLINGENBERG v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
November 20, 1914.)
Judgment (§ 606 )—Former Conviction—Continuing Trespass.
Where plaintiff had recovered damages for a continuing trespass by the city of New York, in a former action in which recovery was limited to the damages accrued up to the date of the filing of the notice of claim, required by Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, c. 466) § 261, he may in a subsequent action recover the damages accrued between the date of the filing of that claim and the commencement of the former action.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1120; Dec. Dig § 606.*]
Burr and Thomas, JJ., dissenting in part.
Appeal from Trial Term, Queens County.
Action by Charles Klingenberg against the City of New York. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before JENKS, P. J., and BURR, THOMAS, RICH, and STAPLETON, JJ.
William E. C. Mayer, of New York City (Terence Farley, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Charles Coleman Miller, of New York City, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
JENKS, P. J.
Taking into consideration the two former actions, I think that upon this record the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this action for the usable value of his lands from August 26, 1910, to March 1, 1912, exclusive of the period from March to November, 1911. As I read the record, he recovered in his first action for such value up to August 26, 1910, and in his second action for the said period of months which I would exclude.
The first action was begun on August 17, 1911, but the period of recovery therein was limited by the court to the said August 26, 1910, the day of the service of the notice of claim upon the defendant pursuant to section 261 of the Greater New York Charter. The learned corporation counsel insists that there can be no recovery in this action for any period prior to the time of the commencement of the first action, because the plaintiff could have recovered in the first action the damages up to that time, under the rule announced in Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536, 54 Am. Rep. 661, and Pond v. Metropolitan E. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 186, 19 N. E. 487, 8 Am. St. Rep. 734. But I think that the said charter provision is in limitation of the general rule. This provision is to afford the city opportunity for investigation and adjustment without litigation; and incidentally it is in further assurance of the prompt payment of a just claim. If the period of recovery upon such a claim were not limited by the time of filing thereof, but only b) the time of the commencement of the action, then necessarily for 30 days, and for any other period that intervened the filing of the claim and the beginning of the action, there could not be notice to the city, and consequently no opportunity for the investigation and adjustment contemplated by the statute. In fine, no claim is filed that covers at least the period of 30 days, and possibly a much longer period.
I advise that the judgment be reversed, and that a new trial be granted; costs to abide the event.
RICH and STAPLETON, JJ., concur.