Case Name: Jules MONNIER, Jr. v. Loretta LAWRENCE, Patricia Miller, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Government Employees Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-03-12
Citations: 467 So. 2d 35
Docket Number: No. CA-2552
Parties: Jules MONNIER, Jr. v. Loretta LAWRENCE, Patricia Miller, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Government Employees Insurance Company.
Judges: Before GULOTTA, SCHOTT and KLEES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 467
Pages: 35–37

Head Matter:
Jules MONNIER, Jr. v. Loretta LAWRENCE, Patricia Miller, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Government Employees Insurance Company.
No. CA-2552.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 12, 1985.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1985.
Writ Denied June 17,1985.
Robert B. Nolan, Edward F. Downing, III, New Orleans, for appellee.
Carmelite M. Bertaut, New Orleans, for appellant.
Before GULOTTA, SCHOTT and KLEES, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $15,000.00.
On August 2,1982, while in the course of his employment with Hewlett-Packard Company, Jules Monnier was involved in an automobile accident with a third party. As a result of the accident, medical expenses in the amount of $15,000.00 were incurred and paid by the worker's compensation carrier. Plaintiff seeks recovery in this suit against his own uninsured motorist insurer (GEICO) for the $15,000.00 medical expenses paid by the worker's compensation carrier.
A motion for summary judgment filed by GEICO was dismissed; however, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted.
GEICO claims the trial judge erred in failing to apply the following UM policy provisions:
"The amount payable under this Coverage will be reduced by all amounts: (c) paid or payable under any workman's compensation law, disability benefits law or any similar law."
Defendant argues that the GEICO policy is a contract between the parties, not in contravention of public policy, and is therefore enforceable. According to GEICO, if the tort-feasor had been fully insured, plaintiff would not have collected his medical expenses from that party but rather those expenses would have been reimbursed to Monnier's worker's compensation insurer. GEICO further argues that if plaintiff is allowed to recover the medical expenses under the uninsured motorist provision, he would receive double recovery.
LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a) provides:
"No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under provisions filed with and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the coverage required under this Subsection shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject in writing the coverage or selects lower limits".
It is a settled rule that in the absence of conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers have the right to limit liability and impose conditions or restrictions under the policy. Fruge v. First Continental Life & Acc. Ins., 430 So.2d 1072 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983). However, where a limitation written into the policy is contrary to the affirmative legislative declaration establishing minimum limits of coverage in uninsured motorist policies, such limitations cannot be given effect. Landry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 320 So.2d 254, 260 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975).
Our courts have uniformly allowed recovery in cases similar to the instant case. See Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So.2d 1069 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976); Landry, supra; Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So.2d 58 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1970); Hebert v. Ordoyne, 388 So.2d 407 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980); Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 426 So.2d 684 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982).
In the Williams case, our brothers on the Second Circuit found invalid an uninsured motorist reduction or credit clause (similar to the provisions in our case) because it reduced the limits of the policy below the then statutorily mandated amount. Despite the change in the statute from an earlier requirement for UM coverage in an amount not less than the financial responsibility act limit to an amount not less than the liability coverage, we are in agreement with the holdings in Williams and Landry. We conclude, therefore, that these holdings together with our holding in Gagnard are disposi-tive of the issue in the instant case. Accordingly, we conclude that a policy provision that reduces the amount of UM recovery below the liability coverage is unenforceable and plaintiff is entitled to recover from his UM carrier the medical expenses incurred.
Our holding is consistent with the "collateral source rule" which will not permit a party's recovery to be diminished by insurance benefits received by the party from a source independent of the tortfeasor. See Weir v. Gasper, 459 So.2d 655 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984); Hudson v. Thompson, 422 So.2d 640 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).
Having so concluded, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
SCHOTT, J., concurs.
. LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) provided at the time the Williams case was decided that coverage must be afforded in an amount "... not less than the limits described in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law...."