Case Name: QUICK FINANCE SERVICE, INC. v. Johnny L. YOUNGBLOOD
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-10-09
Citations: 320 So. 2d 239
Docket Number: No. 6951
Parties: QUICK FINANCE SERVICE, INC. v. Johnny L. YOUNGBLOOD.
Judges: Before LEMMON, GULOTTA and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 320
Pages: 239–242

Head Matter:
QUICK FINANCE SERVICE, INC. v. Johnny L. YOUNGBLOOD.
No. 6951.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Oct. 9, 1975.
Fred P. Westenberger, Edward F. Weg-mann, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee, Marine Specialty Mill and Supply Co., Inc.
Robert F. Fleming, Jr., Alcide J. Wey-sham, in pro per, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant, Alcide J. Weysham.
Before LEMMON, GULOTTA and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against an attorney for reimbursement of the amount of a judgment awarded against the attorney's client because of the attorney's alleged neglect. This suit is brought by a judgment debtor's employer, Marine Specialty and Mill Supply Company, Inc., alleging that the attorney failed to timely answer garnishment interrogatories propounded to the employer, resulting in a judgment pro confesso being entered against the garnishee employer for the full amount owed by the defendant debtor.
Plaintiff bases its cause of action on LSA-R.S. 37:217 which reads as follows:
"If a nonsuit is entered, owing to the absence or neglect of the attorney without a reasonable excuse, the costs shall be paid by the attorney and he shall be liable to pay all the damages which his client suffers by being nonsuited or by any other neglect of the attorney, recoverable in a summary way, on motion after giving the accused notice."
Defendant contends that plaintiff's action has prescribed. The thrust of defendant's appeal is that a malpractice suit filed against an attorney sounds in tort. Accordingly, since more than one year has expired from July 25, 1969 (the date the judgment was rendered against Marine) until June 12, 1973 (the date the suit was filed by Marine against the attorney), plaintiff's action under LSA-R.S. 37:217 was not timely filed. Secondly, defendant contends he was not employed to represent the employer garnishee in the garnishment proceedings.
We are initially confronted with a procedural determination which makes it unnecessary to consider defendant's contentions on appeal relating to prescription and employment. Marine pursued summary process, as provided for in LSA-R.S. 37:217 in asserting its demand against the attorney. However, our interpretation of the statute is that summary process is available only in the instance where a non-suit has been entered.
A nonsuit is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure as follows:
"Art. 1671. Voluntary dismissal
"A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be rendered upon application of the plaintiff and upon his payment of all costs, if the application is made prior to a general appearance by the defendant. If the application is made after a general appearance, the court may refuse to grant the judgment of dismissal except with prejudice."
"Art. 1672. Involuntary dismissal
"A judgment dismissing an action shall be rendered upon application of any party, when the plaintiff fails to appear on the day set for trial. In such case the court shall determine whether the judgment of dismissal shall be with or without prejudice."
In the instant case a judgment was rendered against plaintiff. Marine's claim is not for damages resulting from a nonsuit dismissal because of defendant's negligence.
Our conclusion that LSA-R.S. 37:217 is restricted to a nonsuit situation is buttressed by our failure to find in our research any case where summary process was used to assert a claim based on legal malpractice. Furthermore, in the cross reference under LSA-R.S. 37:217 referral is made to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672. Official revision comment (e) of LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672 states:
"R.S. 37:217, which deals with the liability of an attorney when a nonsuit is entered owing to his neglect, is retained in the Revised Statutes." (Emphasis ours)
We reject plaintiff's contention that the phrase "or by any other neglect of the attorney," as found in LSA-R.S. 37:217, permits the use of summary process in instances other than when a nonsuit has been entered. All parts of a statute must be read together. Each provision must be considered in context with other provisions and should be construed in harmony with the whole. Fruge v. Muffoletto, 242 La. 569, 137 So.2d 336 (1962). LSA-R.S. 37:217 begins with the phrase "If a nonsuit is entered . . . " This suggests that a prerequisite to the use of summary process is a nonsuit dismissal.
Having found that LSA-R.S. 37:217 is limited to use when a nonsuit has been entered, we conclude plaintiff, in the instant case, cannot assert its demand against defendant by use of summary process. Plaintiff's suit must be pursued by ordinary process of petition and answer.
Accordingly, the judgment against defendant is vacated, annulled and set aside.
Vacated, annulled and set aside.
LEMMON, J., concurs and will assign reasons.
. See Giuffria v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 293 So.2d 518 (La.App., 4th Cir. 1974) ; Cannon v. Baron, 289 So.2d 835 (La.App., 4th Cir. 1974) ; Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So.2d 890 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1973).