Case Name: Martha SCOTT, Individually, And as a Representative of the Estate of David Scott; Estate of David Scott; Robin Denise Bryant, Robin Denise Bryant as Next Friend of ICS, a Minor and ALS, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Raul VENEGAS, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-04-07
Citations: 320 F. App'x 265
Docket Number: No. 08-20564
Parties: Martha SCOTT, Individually, And as a Representative of the Estate of David Scott; Estate of David Scott; Robin Denise Bryant, Robin Denise Bryant as Next Friend of ICS, a Minor and ALS, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Raul VENEGAS, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 320
Pages: 265–266

Head Matter:
Martha SCOTT, Individually, And as a Representative of the Estate of David Scott; Estate of David Scott; Robin Denise Bryant, Robin Denise Bryant as Next Friend of ICS, a Minor and ALS, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Raul VENEGAS, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 08-20564
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 7, 2009.
Matthew S. Muller, Randall L. Kallinen, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Fred A. Keys, Jr., County Attorney’s Office for the County of Harris, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Raul Venegas, a Harris County, Texas deputy sheriff, appeals the interlocutory ruling of the district court denying qualified immunity to Venegas in his individual capacity in connection with claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and grounded in alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment substantiye Due Process rights of decedent David Scott, a pre-trial detainee who had been in the custody of Venegas. Plaintiffs have alleged that Venagas's delivery of Scott to an inmate processing center rather than to a hospital or other medical facility, constituted deliberate indifference to Scott's serious medical needs.
Adopting the recommendations of the magistrate judge in her Memorandum, Recommendation and Order, the district court denied qualified immunity to Vene-gas based on the existence of a dispute of material fact, described by the magistrate judge as "two significantly different versions of key persons of the event" as to the facts leading up to Scott's death, one version being that of Venegas and the other being that of EMS paramedic Kevin Tray-nor. Concluding that the "qualified immunity analysis [for Venegas] hangs in the balance of these critical fact disputes," the recommendations of the magistrate judge adopted by the district court convinces us that, indeed, one of the two widely divergent versions of the critical facts preceding Scott's death will ultimately determine entitlement of Venegas to qualified immunity. This quintessential dispute of material fact deprives us of appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's interlocutory denial of qualified immunity at this summary judgment stage of the proceedings.
Venagas's appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).