Case Name: Louie Scherini, Appellant, v. Titanium Alloy Company, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1941-10-23
Citations: 286 N.Y. 531
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louie Scherini, Appellant, v. Titanium Alloy Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 286
Pages: 531–543

Head Matter:
Louie Scherini, Appellant, v. Titanium Alloy Company, Respondent.
Submitted June 19, 1941;
decided October 23, 1941.
William L. Clay for appellant.
The Workmen’s Compensation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 67), as amended, does not cover, or apply to, any case involving partial disability due to silicosis or other dust disease. (Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139.) In enacting the amendment (L. 1936, ch. 887) to the Workmen’s Compensation Law the Legislature did not provide a system of compensation for injury to workmen which is exclusive of every other remedy or right of action by an employee or any other person as it was empowered to do by section 19 of article 1 of the Constitution, but instead has expressly limited the application of the act. (Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139; Matter of Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N. Y. 199; Swan v. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. Rep. 500; Connors v. Semet-Solvay Co., 94 Misc. Rep. 405.) If the effect of article 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Law is construed to mean that persons contracting silicosis or other dust disease causing partial disability are barred from obtaining compensation under the Compensation' Law, at common law, or in any other manner whatsoever, the act is unconstitutional in so far as it affects such persons. (New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139; Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514; People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395.)
Ralph W. Dox and Ulysses S. Thomas for respondent.
Article 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Law deprives plaintiff of any right to maintain the action. (Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y. 54; Repka v. Fedders Mfg. Co., 239 App. Div. 271; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139; Matter of Kiriloff v. A. G. W. Wet Wash Laundry, 257 App. Div. 37; 282 N. Y. 466; Matter of Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335; Matter of Schurick v. Bayer Co., 272 N. Y. 217; Matter of Cole, 235 N. Y. 48; Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N. Y. 287.) Sections 66 and 72 of article 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Law are constitutional. (Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y. 54; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139; Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268; 273 N. Y. 645.)
Thomas G. Rickert and Abel Klaw for E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc., amicus curise.
The complaint shows that this action is based upon either an accidental injury or an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. (Matter of Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N. Y. 153; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139; Matter of Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y. 318.) The Workmen’s Compensation Law, as amended, applies to the claim set forth in the complaint herein so as to preclude the maintenance of this action. (Repka v. Fedders Mfg. Co., 239 App. Div. 271; 264 N. Y. 538; Powers v. Porcelain Insulator Corp., 285 N. Y. 54; Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469; del Busto v. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 167 Misc. Rep. 920; Moffet v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 339 Penn. St. 112.) Both the amendments are valid and constitutional. (New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514; Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469; Morris v. Muldoon, 190 App. Div. 689; 229 N. Y. 611; Farnum v. Garner Print Works & Bleachery, 184 App. Div. 911; 229 N. Y. 554; Repka v. Fedders Mfg. Co., 239 App. Div. 271; 264 N. Y. 538.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The suit is against an employer by a workman who alleges that while working in the employer's plant, plaintiff " sustained injuries to his health and aggravation thereof," that these injuries were not accidental in character, and' that they were caused by the employer's negligence and by his violation of various statutes in failing to keep the plant free of smoke, noxious gases and other impurities. The complaint, further alleges that section 3, subdivision 2, of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 67), as amended by chapter 254 of the Laws of 1935, and article 4-A of that act, as added by chapter 887 of the Laws of 1936, or " either or both " of those enactments, are unconstitutional and void, as leaving without any remedy workmen who suffer injuries from impure air conditions through an employer's fault, unless permanent and total disability results therefrom. The courts below have granted defendant's motion under Rules of Civil Practice, 107, subdivision 2, for a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action because the alleged cause of action comes exclusively within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law. While the complaint says nothing as to the dates of plaintiff's employment by defendant, the dates, as supplied by defendant's affidavit, and not disputed, are from November 5, 1936, to February 28, 1938. Nowhere in the complaint or affidavits is there any allegation that plaintiff has been disabled, partially or totally. In the absence of such an allegation, we of course cannot pass on the validity of provisions of article 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Law that there shall be no compensation for partial disability due to dust diseases (§ 66), and that the liability of an employer prescribed by that article shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever (§ 72).
Furthermore, even if the papers on this motion sufficiently alleged that plaintiff had been partly disabled by a dust disease through defendant's fault, we would not be in a position to pass on plaintiff's contention that sections 66 and 72 of the Workmen's Compensation Law are unconstitutional in so far as they provide that an employee shall have no remedy or recovery against his employer for a partial disability resulting from dust diseases. Whether this contention be correct or not, plaintiff cannot bring an action at law to recover for such a disability. Even if sections 66 and 72 were held to be invalid, plaintiff's sole remedy would still be in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law and his rights to compensation would be governed by the provisions of that statute, as it stood before sections 66 and 72 were enacted, as to compensation for disability from occupational diseases.
The judgment should be affirmed, "with costs.