Case Name: JAMES R. IENTILE, INC. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK AND THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1994-03-11
Citations: 271 N.J. Super. 326
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAMES R. IENTILE, INC. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK AND THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 326–334

Head Matter:
638 A.2d 882
JAMES R. IENTILE, INC. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK AND THE TOWNSHIP OF COLTS NECK, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued January 11, 1994
Decided March 11, 1994.
Before Judges SKILLMAN, KESTIN and WEFING.
John F. DeBartolo argued the cause for appellant (Atkinson & DeBartolo, attorneys; Mr. DeBartolo, on the brief).
Michael B. Steib argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Steib, on the brief).

Opinion:
WEFING, J.S.C.
(Temporarily Assigned).
Plaintiff, James R. lentile, Inc. (lentile), is a corporation which is engaged in the business of excavation and contracting. lentile negotiated an agreement with Thomas Orgo which permitted Ientile to use an 8,000 square foot building located on a 240-acre tract of land which was leased by Orgo and used by Orgo as a farm. The agreement between them permitted Ientile to use this building to repair and service its heavy equipment. An Ientile employee was at the site five days a week working on Ientile equipment and, occasionally, on farm equipment owned by Orgo. Ientile used this location solely for maintenance and repair work; it did not store any of its equipment at the site. Ientile did not pay Orgo in cash for this use. Instead, under the agreement between the two, Orgo was permitted to use Ientile's heavy equipment when he needed it in his farming operations.
Orgo's farm is located in the area of Colts Neck which is zoned "AG." Permitted principal uses within the AG zone include buildings and land devoted to agricultural uses, farms and residences. Permitted accessory uses within the AG zone include barns, tool sheds, greenhouses and customary accessory buildings to farms.
Ientile received four notices that its use of Orgo's barn for equipment repair and service violated the Colts Neck zoning ordinance. In each notice Ientile was directed to abate the violation. Ientile's response was to apply to the Colts Neck Board of Adjustment for an interpretation of the Township's zoning ordinance that Ientile's use of this building was a permitted accessory use since it involved the repair and service of equipment used by Orgo on the farm.
At the conclusion of the hearing, one Board member introduced a motion that "this as a whole operation is not permitted." The motion was seconded, but in the subsequent vote the Board split three to three, and the motion failed. Another Board member then proposed a motion "that the use of property to repair items or equipment off premises is a permitted use." Prior to voting, this motion was described as proposing an interpretation of the zoning ordinance in favor of Ientile. This motion also received a three to three vote and thus failed as well.
Thereafter, the Board adopted a resolution in which it found that Ientile's use of the property to repair and service its equipment was for the benefit of its own business, and did not serve as an accessory to Orgo's farm. It further found that Ientile's repair of Orgo's equipment and Orgo's occasional use of Ientile's equipment were "merely a substitute for the payment of rent." The resolution concluded that the three-to-three (tied) vote on the motion, which would have effectively approved Ientile's requested interpretation of the Colts Neck ordinance, constituted a denial of the application.
Ientile then filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, which was similarly unsuccessful. This appeal resulted.
The Colts Neck ordinance defines principal use as: "[t]he main purpose for which a lot, structure or building, or a portion thereof is used." The ordinance further provides that a lot may have only one principal use. The ordinance defines accessory buildings, structure or use in the following manner:
[A] building, structure, or use which is customarily associated with and is subordinate and incidental to the principal building, structure, or use and which is located on the same lot therewith____
We agree with the Board of Adjustment of Colts Neck and with the trial court that lentile's use of this building is not a permitted accessory use under the Colts Neck zoning ordinance and thus we affirm.
We note at the outset that the issue presented is one of interpretation of the Colts Neck zoning ordinance, and that the determinations made by the Board of Adjustment and the trial court rest upon essentially undisputed factual findings. The application to the Board did not call for the exercise of any expert discretionary judgment. It was solely one for interpretation of an ordinance. Such interpretation is a judicial function and the conclusions of the Board of Adjustment and the trial court are not, in consequence, entitled to any special deference. Cherney v. Matawan Borough Zoning Bd. of Adj., 221 N.J.Super. 141, 144-45, 534 A.2d 41 (App.Div.1987).
Even without such special deference, however, we are satisfied that Ientile's use of this building as a repair shop for equipment used in his construction business clearly is not incidental and subordinate to the farm use. That the transaction made economic sense to both parties is not material to the interpretation of the zoning ordinance.
Ientile also argues that the Board never should have entertained the second motion since the first motion that "the whole operation is not permitted" did not pass; Ientile contends that this constituted an approval of a proposed use under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-9(a).
We do not agree. This statute provides in part that "[flailure of a motion to receive the number of votes required to approve an application for development shall be deemed an action denying the application." To adopt the plaintiffs position would be to transform a tie vote on the issue of a permitted use into an affirmative vote. We are satisfied that such an interpretation would not further the legislative intent in this instance. As the trial judge noted in his oral opinion, the substance of what the Board did that night was to deny the application, and that is what they had intended to do. We cannot subvert that intention on the basis of semantic arguments.
Affirmed.