Case Name: Seattle and Walla Walla R. R. Co. vs. Ah Kow, et al.
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1880-07
Citations: 2 Wash. Terr. 36
Docket Number: 
Parties: Seattle and Walla Walla R. R. Co. vs. Ah Kow, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Territory Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 36–44

Head Matter:
Seattle and Walla Walla R. R. Co. vs. Ah Kow, et al.
Motion to dismiss.
•In an appeal in equity, if objection be made to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action, it is not necessary that the evidence in the cause be certified into the Appellate Court, to enable it to review such alleged error.
The evidence in a cause can only be authenticated to this Court by the presiding Judge of the lower Court, or in a proper case of written testimony, by the clerk.
Where, during the pendency of a cause, after the introduction of the evidence and before judgment, another Judge succeeds the one who had thus far heard the cause, and parties proceed to final judgment upon the evidence as introduced, they will be held to have tacitly stipulated, that such was the evidence in the case; and upon that basis, the Judge who decided the case in the lower Court, is empowered to certify the evidence to this Court. The certificate of the former Judge gives no authenticity to the evidence nor does the certificate of the short-hand-reporter, appointed under the act of 1877, give any sanction to such evidence.
Only when the evidence consists wholly of written testimony, can it be cer- ' tilled by the clerk. Written testimony defined and the decision in. Golman vs. Tester, 1W. T. R. 591-3, reviewed and explained.
Opinion on merits.
A common law count of indebitatus assumpsit will, under the code, support proof of a special or implied assumpsit. A court might in its discretion, on proper showing, require a more definite statement, though its ¿failure so .to do would not be error, unless shown to be an abuse of dis•cretion.
^Statement of the 'facts of the case.
'The Mechanic’s Lien Law, of 18.77, was intended as a substitute for, and not .as a continuation of the Act of 1873. All rights accrued under the .earlier Act were repealed, except to .the extent they were kept alive by '.the later act; while all remedies to enforce such .preserved rights are under the provisions of the new statute.
ÍUnless claims were filed in the time and manner prescribed by. the law of 1877, for work which ended with the repeal of the statute of 1873, the liens were lost.
Allowance of attorney fees for foreclosure of lien.
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, holding terms at Seattle.
The complaint, the sufficiency of which is passed upon, in the opinion of the Court, is as follows: ***** The Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff,.............. in the sum of .... .... Dollars, on account for work and labor performed between the .. day of.... 187.., and the .. day of.... 187..,. upon the Seattle and Walla Walla Eailroad, in King County, W. T.,.at the request of said Defendant, by its agent, James M. Colman, duly authorized thereto, and no part thereof has been paid. “ * * * In other respects, the facts of the ease appear in the opinion.
Me,Naught Bros, for appellants,
cited authorities as follows: That the complaint failed to state facts sufficient. Statutes Washington Territory, 1873, p. 441, § 2; 1877, p. 219, § 19; Phillips on Mechanic’s Liens, § 119-20, Willamette v. Smith, 1 Oregon, 171; Davis v. Alvord, 4 Otto, 545; Sympson v. Dalryple, 11 Cush. 308.
That the contract having been made while the statute of of 1873 was in force, that statute was imported into it; and additional liabilities could not be imposed by subsequent acts. 2 Story Constitution, §§ 1384-5, and note on p. 277; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wal. 314; Van Hoffman v. City, etc., 4 Wal. 535; Gann v. Barry, 15 Wal. 623; 38 Cal. 361; 1 Sawyer, 710; 37 Iowa, 631.
That a retrospective effect should not be given to the statutes of 1877. Phillips on Mechanic’s Liens, p. 33; Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Parker v. M. R. Co. 115 Mass. 580; Donohy v. Clapp, 12 Cush. 440.
Thos. Burke and Allen Bros. for appellees,
cited, among others, the following authorities: As to when liens attached and expired. Soule & Page v. Dawes, 7 Cal. 576; Crowell, et al. v. Gilmore, et al. 13 Cal. 55; In Re Hope M. C., 1 Sawyer, 711; Irey v. White, 50 Miss. 142; Douglass, et al. v. St. Louis Z. Co. 56 Mo. 388; Choteau, et al. v Thompson, etc. 2 Ohio St. 115; Davis v. Alvord, 4 Otto, 548.
That the act of 1877 was to be regarded a continuation and extension of, and not a repeal of that of 1873. 1 Sawyer, 711 and 712; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Wright v. Oakly, 5 Metcalf, 400; Skyrme v. Oooidental M. Co. 8 Nevada, 234; Capron v. Strout, 11 Nevada, 310.
That the means of enforcing a contract at the time it is made, are a part of it, and cannot be destroyed without impairing the contract. Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, p. 643-53; Cooley Const. Limt. 290-91; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 Howard, 608; Broson v. McKinzie, 1 id. 311; Quackenbash v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Weaver v. Sells, 10 Kansas, 619; Phillips, et al. v. Mason, et al. 7 Heisk (Tenn.) 62; 56 Mo. 400.
As to the sufficiency of complaint. Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 479; Wyot v. Alord, 1 Salkeld, 325; Mc Rea v. Craig, 23 Cal. 525, and that no express contract is required. Houck on Liens, §§ 130 and 154; Moran v Carrall, 35 Iowa, 26.

Opinion:
Opinion on motion to dismiss, per
Greene, G. J.
In this motion to dismiss, the appellees urge, that what purports to be the evidence is not sufficiently well certified to fulfill the requirements of § 453 of the Civil Practice Act and § 10 of the act creating an Official Short Hand Reporter. We do not understand it to be questioned, but that, aside from the evidence, the clerk's certificate sufficiently informs us that we have a full transcript. It therefore, becomes material to inquire, whether the issues, which the appeal presents, are such as to call for a review of evidence. Looking into the record, we discover, that at least, one objection to the judgment below arises from an alleged lack of support in the pleadings- Light to explore the legal sufficiency of these pleadings can not be furnished by testimony. Given, however, pleadings good in law to sustain the judgment, and it then becomes necessary to produce the proofs and decide whether they too are sufficient.
Objection is made that the complaint contains no cause of action. Inspection of the clerk's certificate, transmitting the transcript, shows that we have the complaint and the judgment here. No evidence can be anything but surplusage in determining the question of jurisdiction thus presented. To compel a defendant, resisting a bad complaint, to bring up evidence would be folly and oppression, for the transcript is full and complete Without it. He was subjected to vexation and cost enough, in being obliged to push through the lower court over proofs unreasonably arrayed against him. Entering this court to get redress, he ought not to be compelled to transport and marshal against himself, at his own expense, the futile forces of his adversary.
Several certificates in this transcript would seem to have been procured out of commendable caution, and yet to be in fact entirely superfluous. The parties had, it appears, begun to try the cause in the District Court, and had proceeded so far, with the aid of the official reporter, as to have put in all their testimony and exhibits, when the proceedings were interrupted by the incoming of a successor to the presiding judge. Rehearing before the new officer followed as of course. Expenses of re-introduction of proofs was obviated by both parties tacitly treating the notes of the reporter and the exhibits as if they correctly presented the evidence. , Neither party ever questioned the propriety of hearing and determining the cause upon that basis, and accordingly thus it was heard and thus it was determined.
Getting the evidence up into this court, by proper certificates, seems to have been, under the circumstances, a matter of some perplexity, and it was sought to be accomplished by procuring one certificate from the retiring judge, a second from the incoming judge, and a third from the clerk, all under § 453, and still a fourth from the reporter under § 10. These certificates were all valueless except that from the incoming judge. He alone tried the ease, and he alone could certify what constituted all the evidence on which he tried it. Only when the evidence consists wholly of written testimony, can it be certified by the clerk (§ 453); and written testimony is such only as after reduction to writing has received the assent of the witnesses, (Colman v. Yesler, 1 W. T. R. 591-3.) Eor the reporter's certificate there could be no use, because the cause was not tried on the evidence taken down by him, as upon evidence taken under the Reporter's Act, but rather as upon a certain mass of writing, having no longer any official solemnity or sanction for the purposes of that trial, but utilized, by consent of parties, for convenience's sake, to speak the facts as they would be spoken if the witnesses were recalled.
Gowan v. Petit, et al., Pincus, et al. v. Light, and Col man v. Yesler have been cited by counsel to sustain this motion. Of these cases, the first two differ from the one before us, in not presenting any question of insufficiency of the pleadings, and the last differ from all, in having, aside from the evidence, a defective Clerk's certificate. Dismissal in the last case was granted upon the ground that the certificate brought up nothing at all. In delivering its opinion, the Court intimated that they were satisfied, from what they saw in the record, that all the evidence could not 'be produced before them, and that consequently it would not be likely to avail the appellant to get an amendment of the certificate. We did not, at the time, have fairly before us the question, whether, if the pleading were objected to, we would insist on having the evidence brought up on pain of otherwise not- hearing the case, and our suggestions about the .impossibility of reaching the evidence must be taken as importing that the complaint was n'ot regarded open to the exceptions urged to it. It is our present opinion, that when the objection to the judgment is that it does not consist with the pleadings, then it is not necessary to' bring up the evidence, but that otherwise the production of the evidence is essential.
Let the motion be denied.