Case Name: L. B. DREW and O. C. CARROLL, Appellants, v. M. C. SMITH, Superintendent of Public Streets and Highways in the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1869
Citations: 38 Cal. 325
Docket Number: 
Parties: L. B. DREW and O. C. CARROLL, Appellants, v. M. C. SMITH, Superintendent of Public Streets and Highways in the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 325–334

Head Matter:
L. B. DREW and O. C. CARROLL, Appellants, v. M. C. SMITH, Superintendent of Public Streets and Highways in the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent.
The Act to Limit the Hours of Labor—Construction of.—Contracts for the grading of Streets made with the Superintendent of Public Streets and Highways of the City and County of San Francisco are contracts “by the authority of a municipal government,” within the meaning of the Act “ to limit the hours of labor.” (Stats, of 1367-8, p. 63.)
Idem.—The provision made in the second section of the Act, that “a stipulation to that effect shall be made a part of all contracts,” etc., means that “ eight hours labor shall constitute a legal day’s work,” under the contract to which the stipulation is made applicable. Sprague, J., and Crockett, J., dissenting.
By Sanderson, J.:
Idem.—By the second section of the Act, it was the intention of the Legislature absolutely to prohibit the officers of the State and subordinate local governments from 'requiring any one, doing public work, to work more than eight hours in doing a legal day’s work, but it was not the intention to require' them to prohibit the laborer from doing extra work for extra pay.
Idem.—The Legislature has seen proper not to prescribe a penalty for a breach of the covenant required by the second section of the Act to be incorporated into the contract, but to leave that matter to he determined by the Courts, upon the principles of the common law; and it is not competent for a ministerial officer to declare what shall he the consequences of a breach of a covenant exacted by the Legislature, but to which the Legislature itself has annexed no penalty.
By Sprague, J.:
Idem.—The manifest intent of the Legislature in the enactment of the- second section was, in reference to all labor performed for the State Government, or any subordinate department thereof, to prohibit any stipulation being made or permitted by the officers having charge or control of such work, by which the hours for a day’s labor should be extended beyond the limits fixed by the first clause of the first and second sections; and it is competent and proper that, as a security for the performance of such stipulation on the part of a contractor, a penalty should be prescribed in the contract itself for a failure to comply with the terms of the stipulation.
Idem.—To require of the contractor not to permit any person to work more than eight hours per day, is evidently in excess of the law.
By Cbockett, J.:
Superintendent of Public! Streets' and Highways in the City of San Francisco. —Although contracts are made on behalf of the City and County of San Francisco in the name of the Superintendent of Streets, he is but the agent of the corporation in that behalf; and, pro hac vice, Ms act is the act of the corporation.
Act to Limit the Hours of Labor.—It is the right, and it is the duty, of any person making a contract for labor under the authority of the State Government, or of any subordinate department thereof, to compel the contractor to stipulate that he would not require any laborer, by means of a contract with him, or otherwise, to labor more than eight hours per day. But they have no authority to require that, in case of a violation of the stipulation by the contractor, the latter should “not be entitled to any pay for any work done,” or that he should not “ permit” any person employed on the work to labor more than eight hours per day.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth District, City and County of San Francisco.
This appeal was taken from the order of the Court below dismissing the petition of the appellants for a mandamus to compel the respondent, Street Superintendent of San Francisco, to execute with the appellants a contract which had been awarded to them by the Board of Supervisors for the grading of a certain street.
The other facts of the case are stated in- the opinions of the Judges.
Hale & Edmonds, for Appellants.
Jos. M. Nougues, for Respondent.

Opinion:
Sawyer, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court:
For the purpose of bringing the words of the Act in question to be construed into closer connection, omit the intervening words, not affecting the sense, so far as the Act relates to the case in hand, and Section 2 will read as follows, to wit:
" Eight hours labor shall constitute a day's work in all cases where the same is performed by the authority of any municipal government within this State, or of any officer thereof acting as such; and a stipulation to that effect shall be made a part of all contracts to which any municipal government shall be a party."
It is plain to our minds that "a stipulation to that effect," means nothing more nor less than a stipulation to the effect that " eight hours labor shall constitute a legal day's work" under the contract to which the stipulation is made applicable. This is the provision of the Act to which the words " to that effect" manifestly refer.
We have no doubt that the contract in question is a contract 1 ' by the authority " of a " municipal government, " within the meaning of the Act. The contract tendered to respondent for execution contained this provision, to wit: ' 'And it is hereby expressly stipulated that eight hours labor shall constitute a legal day's work for all work to he performed under this contract." This is the precise stipulation required to be inserted by the statute, in terms every way as broad as those prescribed by the Act. To our minds, it is a full compliance with the requirements of the Act. The provision of the statute is an abridgement of, and a limitation upon, the powers of parties to contract about their own concerns, and we are not authorized to extend, by construction, such an abridgement of the natural rights of parties to cases not strictly within the terms of the Act. The provision which the Superintendent required to be inserted, and which the relators declined to accept, is as follows, to wit:
"And it is further mutually agreed between the parties hereto, that eight hours labor shall constitute a legal day's work for all work done by any person employed by said parties of the first part, in performing this contract; and said parties of the first part further agree not to require or permit any person so employed to work more than eight hours per day; and in case of violation of this covenant, said party of the second part shall be released from all the obligations herein contained, and the parties of the first part shall not be entitled to any pay for the work done. "
It seems to us that it is only necessary to compare this stipulation with the language of the Act before quoted, to at once perceive that it is much broader than the requirements of the Act, and in those particulars not embraced in the Act, and wholly unauthorized by its provisions.
It is argued, that upon this construction Section 1 covers the whole field, and Section 2 becomes surplusage, and has no office to perform. We do not so interpret the Act. Without Section 2, the officers of the State and municipal governments might take it upon themselves to require a stipulation like that permitted by Section 1 to be inserted in all contracts between the State or municipal governments and those contracting with them. But Section 2 obviates this, by making it the duty of such officers to insert in such contracts the stipulation prescribed. But it goes no further. The required stipulation, as we construe the Act, was in the contract tendered to the respondent, and he was not authorized to require more. We think it was his duty to execute it in the form tendered, and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the District Court to issue its mandate in accordance with the views here expressed.
So ordered.
The following opinions were also delivered :