Case Name: Tracy WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-04-25
Citations: 693 So. 2d 69
Docket Number: No. 96-01270
Parties: Tracy WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 693
Pages: 69–73

Head Matter:
Tracy WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-01270.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 25, 1997.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and William E. Lowe, Special Appointed Public Defender, Bradenton, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
WHATLEY, Judge.
Tracy Watson appeals his conviction of aggravated battery. Watson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the time for voir dire. We disagree and affirm.
Watson faced the possibility of being habit-ualized if convicted. However, this related to the importance of the case, but not to the complexity of the trial.
Prior to the commencement of voir dire, the trial court informed the attorneys that they would each have thirty minutes to question the prospective jurors. No objection or question was raised by either counsel to this limitation. The trial court then made introductory remarks and read the instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof. The state completed its voir dire examination. Watson's counsel then conducted his examination of prospective jurors and consumed the thirty minutes allotted by the trial court. When Watson's counsel requested additional time, he was allotted eight additional minutes, which he used. He made a second request for additional time, which was refused. A careful reading of the questions asked of prospective jurors by Watson's counsel in the thirty-eight minutes allotted reveals generalized questions with generalized responses. The trial was concluded in one day. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the aggravated battery charge, and Watson was sentenced to thirty years of prison as a habitual felony offender.
It is well-settled that trial courts have considerable discretion with regard to the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022, 115 S.Ct. 589, 130 L.Ed.2d 502 (1994); Miller v. State, 683 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Baker v. State, 517 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Williams v. State, 424 So.2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Barker v. Randolph, 239 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 137 (Fla.1970).
The trial court in this case accorded counsel reasonable notice that each side would be limited to thirty minutes in questioning prospective jurors by advising counsel of this limitation before voir dire examination began. "[T]he amount of time that is allotted for voir dire depends on the nature of the case and the reasonableness of the use, by the attorneys, of the time allotted by the court for voir dire." Rodriguez v. State, 675 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The appropriateness of the time limitation imposed by a trial court must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Id. Accordingly, we do not disagree with Wilson v. State, 676 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), but determine that that ease was decided on its particular facts.
"The purpose of conducting voir dire is to secure an impartial jury." Boggs v. State, 667 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1996). The length of time allowed for conducting the voir dire examination does not necessarily correlate to the fairness afforded the parties in selecting an impartial jury.
The trial court allowed Watson's counsel to proffer the questions into the record that he would have asked had he been granted more time. Our review of the record reveals that the proffered questions were either of minimal significance, covered by the general jury instructions, or covered during the state's voir dire examination. Watson's counsel made a tactical decision regarding what questions to ask during his voir dire examination. There was no surprise and there were no unanticipated replies from the prospective jurors that would have opened an area of inquiry which would not have otherwise been anticipated. See Leamon v. Punales, 582 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing time limitations on the voir dire process.
Watson's remaining issue on appeal is affirmed without discussion. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of aggravated battery.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
SCHOONOVER, J., dissents with opinion.