Case Name: PUFF 'N STUFF OF WINTER PARK, INC., et al., Appellants, v. James T. BELL, Daniel W. Lykens, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-12-20
Citations: 683 So. 2d 1176
Docket Number: No. 95-122
Parties: PUFF ’N STUFF OF WINTER PARK, INC., et al., Appellants, v. James T. BELL, Daniel W. Lykens, et al., Appellees.
Judges: PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH, HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 683
Pages: 1176–1186

Head Matter:
PUFF ’N STUFF OF WINTER PARK, INC., et al., Appellants, v. James T. BELL, Daniel W. Lykens, et al., Appellees.
No. 95-122.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 20, 1996.
Douglas C. Spears of Pleus, Adams & Spears, Orlando, for Appellants.
Eli H. Subin of Subin, Rosenbluth, Losey, Brennan, Bittman & Morse, PA., Orlando, for Appellees.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment against the appellants — Puff 'N Stuff of Winter Park, Inc. and Glenn and Christine Dietel — in regard to their counterclaim and third-party actions below against the appellees. The case arises from a foreclosure action instituted by one of the appel-lees, Federal Trust Bank (FTB), against the appellants because of various defaults on loans. The loans to Puff 'N Stuff and the Dietels were made for the acquisition and renovation of a building in Winter Park.
While construction was in progress, a dispute arose between the parties as to whether or not FTB had verbally agreed to fully fund the project. The allegations in the retaliatory counter-actions by Puff 'N Stuff and the Dietels were that they had been verbally assured by Bell, an officer of FTB, that the bank's lending limit would not be a problem, and that ultimately it was, thereby causing a delay in construction and the necessity for Puff 'N Stuff and the Dietels to incur additional financing from a private source in order to complete the construction. They also claimed that FTB failed to honor its verbal commitments to provide additional financing after a "replacement loan" was obtained. All of the damages claimed by Puff 'N Stuff and the Dietels in their affirmative claims were based on the alleged failure of FTB to fully and timely provide funding pursuant to verbal agreements to do so.
We hold that the trial judge was correct in applying section 687.0304(2), Florida Statutes (1989) in accordance with its plain meaning— ie., the debtors in this case cannot maintain their actions which are based, according to the allegations and proof, on an oral promise to extend credit. That section provides:
CREDIT AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRITING. — A debtor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debtor.
The appellants' contention that an oral promise to loan money can be termed "fraud in the inducement," thereby evading the clear intent of the statutory prohibition, was recognized by the trial judge as mere semantics. If this court were to adopt the appellants' analysis in this case, we would effectively repeal the statute. See generally Canell v. Areola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla.l953)(statute of frauds may not be avoided by suit for fraud based upon oral representations).
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH, HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents with opinion, with which W. SHARP, GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
. Clearly, the representations of Federal Trust Bank and its officers were that they would, and had the inherent ability to, extend credit over and above the $600,000 lending limit which simply amounts to an oral agreement to fund, notwithstanding the fact that the representations also may have been viewed as an inducement.