Case Name: Edwin B. Gifford vs. William Barker & another
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1857-10
Citations: 9 Gray 364
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edwin B. Gifford vs. William Barker & another.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 364–364

Head Matter:
Edwin B. Gifford vs. William Barker & another.
The right of an insolvent debtor to a certificate of discharge upon the assent of the requisite proportion of his creditors whose debts are proved at the expiration of the six months cannot be affected by the subsequent expunging of the proof of any debt as having been allowed by mistake.
Appeal from a decree of the judge of insolvency in Bristol, refusing a certificate of discharge to an insolvent debtor. The case was submitted to this court upon the following facts:
On the last day of the six months from the assignment, the appellant procured and filed with the register of insolvency the consent in writing to his discharge of a majority in number and value of the creditors who had proved their claims. At a subsequent adjournment of the third meeting, the judge, in the presence of the debtor, creditors and assignees, passed an order striking out a portion of one of those claims, as having been entered by mistake and on. the supposition that the creditor, who was a surety of the debtor, had paid a certain sum which he had not. This striking out reduced the amount of the claims of creditors who had assented to the discharge to less than one half; and the judge therefore refused the certificate.
O. Prescott, for the appellant,
cited St. 1848, c. 304, § 9; Merriam v. Richards, 3 Gray, 252; Gates v. Campbell, 8 Cush. 104; Leigh v. Arnold, 5 Cush. 615.
No appearance for the assignees.

Opinion:
Bigelow, J.
The insolvent's rights were fixed by the state of the record at the expiration of the six months. If he then had the assent of the requisite proportion of the creditors whose claims appeared to be proved upon the record, he was entitled to his discharge; he has no means, except the record, of knowing what claims are legally proved; nor could his rights be affected by a subsequent amendment of the record. Any other rule would work great injustice to him; for he may, by relying on the record, have been prevented from obtaining the assent of other creditors within the six months.
Decree reversed.