Case Name: A. & J. Dennistoun v. John Rist et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1854-06
Citations: 9 La. Ann. 464
Docket Number: 
Parties: A. & J. Dennistoun v. John Rist et al.
Judges: (Voorhies, J., and Buchanan, J., absent.)
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 464–468

Head Matter:
A. & J. Dennistoun v. John Rist et al.
X'lain tiffs sued on a promissory note; and on motion of their counsel, it was ordered “that judgment be rendered against plaintiffs as in case of nonsuit.” Held: that this was a voluntary discontinuance of plaintiffs’ suit under Article 8485 of the Civil Code, and therefore the interruption of prescription from having instituted the suit, shall be considered as never having happened, although it appeared probable from the record that the discontinuance was made with the view of reviving the suit under more favorable auspices.
C. C. 8484, 8485.
APPEAL from the District Court of East Feliciana, Sterling, J.
John Mo Vea & W. D. Winter, for plaintiíf:
We submit that a judgment of nonsuit, even when voluntarily taken, is neither a discontinuance nor an abandonment. A discontinuance is a matter entirely within the discretion of tha party. O. P. 491, 492. The court can have no control over it. 3 L. R. 282. 6 Rob. 354. 14 L. R. 280. 1 Rob.
393. 17 L. R. 310. The whole range of authorities go to show that the discontinuance is a matter entirely within the discretion of the party, and with which the court can have nothing to do. A motion for a nonsuit, on the contrary, is addressed entirely to the court, and derives the whole of its validity from the action of the court.
If the court concur with a party on a motion for a nonsuit, a judgment of nonsuit is rendered; if the court do not concur with the party, he cannot go out of Court on such a motion, however willing he may be to do so. It is not so with a discontinuance. Hence, we conclude that a nonsuit is altogether distinct from a discontinuance, the one being simply the act of the party, -the other the act of the court after hearing the case, or upon an examination of the pleadings. Nor does it invalidate the argument to insist that a judgment of nonsqit, voluntarily rendered, is equivalent to a discontinuance, as contemplated by Article 3485. A judgment of nonsuit voluntarily taken, is only a judgment of nonsuit rendered by the court, ivith the consent of the party, to enable him to renew his action in another form, on different allegations, or after he shall have supplied himself with additional means of proof.
This certainly is no abandonment or discontinuance of his demand within the meaning of Article 3485. If the suit had been brought before a court of incompetent jurisdiction, such a suit, according to Article 3484, would interrupt proscription, because it plainly showed an intention on the part of the plaintiff to pursue his demand, and not to abandon it. Now, in what way did plaintiffs show any intention to abandon their demand ? Under the decisions of the old court, and until a late date, the peremptory exception filed by plaintiffs in the first suit was well taken. Plaintiff’s counsel viewing it in this light, (it matters not if he was in error,) in order to preserve the rights of his clients, and to enable him to provide himself with the means of establishing the claim and proving the demand at the elected domicil, the absence of which was alleged by defendants, asked the court to render a judgment of nonsuit instead of a judgment absolutely discharging the defendants. But says the defendant, this cannot avail you, because you then had in your possession the protest showing the demand. This fact does not appear in the record- — and if it did, how could it alter the case? It is apparent that the party had no intention to abandon his demand — and if proof of his intention were wanting, we have it in the fact that ho renewed his suit at the very next term of the court. Wo doubt if a judgment of nonsuit is ever rendered in any other manner than was the one before the court. The plaintiff, finding that an exception is well taken, or that his proof has failed, to avoid an absolute judgment against him, asks the court to make the judgment as of nonsuit, that he may begin again- — -and the court, to enable him to do this, and believing the justice of the case will thus be met, renders it in this form. It is by no means of unfrequent occurrence that a party plaintiff against whom an absolute judgment has been rendered, asks the Supreme Court on appeal to make the judgment-as of non- suit, and the court to meet the equities of the case, grants his prayer. Can it be contended that judgments taken in this manner on motion of the plaintiff do not interrupt prescription ?
Muse & Merridlc, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
Campbell, J.
(Voorhies, J., and Buchanan, J., absent.)
The appellants rely on their plea of prescription. The note sued on, matured in January, 1841. An action was brought in 1845, which terminated in November of that year, by a judgment in these words: " On motion of Mb Vea, of counsel for plaintiffs, it is orderd," etc., " that judgment be rendered against the plaintiffs, as in case of nonsuit, with costs."
The present suit was brought in March, 1846.
The question is, whether plaintiffs lost by their course at the trial of the previous action, the benefit of an interruption of prescription, which they would otherwise unquestionably have had.
The Article 3484, treats of the citation of the possessor, as a legal interruption. The benefit of the rule is extended to creditors, by Articles 351;6, 3517. It may he assumed then, that the case of the debtor as well as that of the pos • sessor is comprehended by the Article 3485, which says: "If the plaintiff after having made his demand, abandons or discontinues it, the interruption shall be considered as never having happened."
The appellants insist that the judgment as in case of nonsuit, having been rendered on motion of plaintiff's counsel, amounts to a voluntary abandonment or discontinuance of the demand, and therefore, no interruption of prescription has happened.
They have arrived at this conclusion, though with much hesitation,
Although the distinction between a voluntary and involuntary nonsuit, as it exists at common law, is not with us, established in direct terms; yet it may be fairly inferred and has been frequently recognized by the court; and we are unable to see any essential difference between a discontinuance as known in our practice and a voluntary nonsuit.
In the case of Dunn and others v. Kenney, 11 R. 249, prescription was relied upon. It was contended by the plaintiffs as in this case, that the prescription had been interrupted by a previous action. The record of the first suit contained the following entry: " This cause came on to-day for trial before a jury, when the plaintiffs having offered no proof in support of their claim, it is adjudged and decreed that judgment of nonsuit be entered against plaintiffs, and that they pay costs of suit." In commenting on this, Judge Bullard, says: "If the record had shown that a jury was empannelled, we might have inferred that the nonsuit was voluntary, because the defendant, in cases tried by a jury, has a right to a verdict, unless the plaintiff chose to suffer a nonsuit. But that does not appear in this case."
In the case of Smith v. Gibbon, 6 Ann. 684, plaintiff having instituted suit to recover a tract of land, at the trial took a voluntary nonsuit, and subsequently renewed his suit. It was held by the court, Preston, pronouncing its opinion, that the first suit was voluntarily abandoned and did not interrupt prescription.
Although it is not impossible from the matters appearing on the record that plaintiffs fearing they were not able to make out their case, and that judgment would therefore be rendered in favor of defendants, applied for a nonsuit, not with the intention of abandoning their claim, but on the contrary, with the intention of renewing it under more favorable auspices, still, under the autho rity of the cases aboye cited, we are constrained to regard their act as a volun' tary discontinuance in the sense of Article 3485, of the Civil Code.
It is therefore adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be reversed and annulled, and that there be judgment in favor of the defendants. The costs of both courts to be paid by plaintiifs and appellees.