Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARCELLIS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-04-22
Citations: 105 Mich. App. 662
Docket Number: Docket No. 49796
Parties: PEOPLE v MARCELLIS
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and Allen and J. H. Gillis, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 105
Pages: 662–670

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MARCELLIS
Docket No. 49796.
Submitted March 2, 1981, at Lansing. —
Decided April 22, 1981.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Cherokee Marcellis, an inmate at Jackson Prison, was charged with carrying a concealed weapon while in prison and with being a habitual offender. Nearly 13 months later, defendant was convicted on the concealed weapon charge following a bench trial in Jackson Circuit Court, Gordon W. Britten, J. Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the charges on the basis of the failure of the prosecution to bring him to trial within 180 days of the bringing of the charges had been denied. In a separate bench trial immediately following the concealed weapon trial, defendant was found to be a habitual offender. Defendant appeals. Held:
The statutory requirement that prison inmates be brought to trial on pending untried charges within 180 days is not rendered inapplicable by the fact that the sentence on the subsequent charge would run consecutively to the sentence being served. The mandate of the statute applies to all cases tried subsequent to the enactment of the statute rather than merely to those cases tried after the date the Court of Appeals rendered its decision that the statute applied to consecutive sentence situations.
Reversed.
Allen, J., dissented. He would affirm the concealed weapon conviction. He would hold that the statutory 180-day rule does not apply to consecutive sentence situations and, even if the statute should be interpreted to apply to consecutive sentence situations, that interpretation should not be applied retroactively to this case which was tried prior to the decisional date of the opinion of the Court of Appeals which adopted this new interpretation of the intent of the statute. He, however, would reverse the habitual offender conviction because of the absence of a specific on-the-record waiver by defendant of his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender charge.
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 249, 547, 549.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 219.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates — 180-Day Rule — Statutes.
The 180-day statutory limitation on bringing an inmate to trial on pending untried charges is not rendered inapplicable by the fact that the sentence on the subsequent charge would run consecutively to the sentence being served (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
2. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates — 180-Day Rule — Retroactivity — Statutes.
The determination by the Court of Appeals that the 180-day statutory limitation on bringing an inmate to trial on pending untried charges is to be applied even where the sentence to be imposed would be consecutive to the sentence being served is controlling in any case tried subsequent to the enactment of the statute, not merely to those cases tried after the decisional date of the opinion of the Court of Appeals holding that the 180-day rule applied to consecutive sentence situations (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
Dissent by Allen, J.
3. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates — 180-Day Rule.
The 180-day statutory limitation on bringing an inmate to trial on pending untried charges does not apply where the sentence on the subsequent charge would run consecutively to the sentence being served (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
4. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates — 180-Day Rule — Consecutive Sentences.
Application of the statutory 180-day limitation on bringing an inmate to trial on pending untried charges to situations where the sentence on the subsequent charge would run consecutively to the sentence being served should be prospectively applied, since there has been reliance on prior holdings of the Court of Appeals that said limitation does not apply where the sentence on the subsequent charge would be consecutive to the sentence being served.
5. Criminal Law — Trial — Jury Trials — Waiver.
Waiver of a jury trial on an underlying felony charge does not constitute a waiver of a jury trial on a habitual offender charge Bowing from the conviction of the underlying felony; reversal of a conviction as a habitual offender following a bench trial on that charge is mandated where the record does not establish that the defendant speciBcally waived his right to a jury trial on the supplemental charge.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and John L. Wildeboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Myron E. Sanderson, for defendant.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and Allen and J. H. Gillis, JJ.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.
We adopt the statement of facts as set forth by our brother Allen but disagree that People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288; 162 NW2d 832 (1968), and People v Ewing, 101 Mich App 51; 301 NW2d 8 (1980), correctly interpret MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). Following instead the rationale of People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754, 760-762; 293 NW2d 700 (1980), and People v Anglin, 102 Mich App 118; 301 NW2d 470 (1980), we hold that the 180-day rule was violated under the facts of this case.
We also disagree with our brother that this interpretation of the 180-day rule ought to be applied prospectively only. Moore, supra, and Anglin, supra, are simply interpretations of a statute. As such, they would be applicable to any case tried subsequent to the enactment of the statute. The instant case would certainly fall within this purview.
Accordingly, we would reverse defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. We note our agreement with our brother Allen's discussion of the defective jury waiver. However, having reversed the principal conviction, we need not address further the validity of the habitual offender conviction.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.