Case Name: Keith NORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-09-08
Citations: 659 So. 2d 1352
Docket Number: No. 94-2931
Parties: Keith NORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: W. SHARP, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 659
Pages: 1352–1356

Head Matter:
Keith NORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-2931.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 8, 1995.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Erin J. O’Leary, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
Keith Norris, a juvenile waived to the adult court, appeals his judgment and sentence for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer entered after a non-negotiated plea. This offense was committed on 6 December 1993. At Norris's plea hearing, Norris also pled guilty to the offense of escape from a juvenile facility, which was committed on 23 January 1994. Norris has not appealed the sentence imposed for the 1994 offense.
On appeal from his conviction for the 1993 offense, Norris contends that his sentence should be reversed because the trial court should have used two sentencing guidelines scoresheets instead of one, and because the trial court failed to enter written reasons for sentencing Norris as an adult and imposing a departure sentence. Norris also contends that the trial court erred in imposing a public defender's Hen without advising Norris of his right to a hearing and in requiring Norris to pay $60 to First Step of Volusia County. We affirm the trial court's decision to sentence Norris as an adult; however, because the trial court used a 1994 sentencing guidelines scoresheet for both offenses, we reverse Norris's sentence and remand for resentencing.
The trial court was required to use two sentencing guidelines scoresheets because one crime was committed before 1 January 1994 and one crime was committed after 1 January 1994. Prior to 1 January 1994, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(1) required that only one guidelines scoresheet "shall be utilized for each defendant covering ah offenses pending before the court for sentencing." See also Alvarez v. State, 600 So.2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); O'Connor v. State, 590 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). When the Florida Supreme Court adopted the 1994 amendments of the Sentencing GuideHnes Commission and the new rule of procedure to implement the new guidelines, however, the court noted that chapter 93-406, Laws of Florida, amended section 921.001, Florida Statutes (1991). Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re Sentencing Guidelines, 628 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1993). As amended, section 921.001 reads in pertinent part:
1. The guidelines enacted effective October 1, 1983, apply to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1983, and before January 1, 1994;
2. The 1994 guidelines apply to sentencing for all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after January 1, 1994.
§ 921.001(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994) (emphasis added). Here, because Norris entered pleas to two non-capital felonies, one of which occurred in 1993 and the other after 1 January 1994, the trial court was required to use two guidelines scoresheets. Allen v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly D1653, — So.2d — [1995 WL 421872] (Fla. 3d DCA July 19, 1995); Heath v. State, 656 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Wood v. State, 655 So.2d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Accordingly, we reverse Norris's sentence for the 1993 offense of battery on a law enforcement officer and remand for resentencing on this offense. In light of our reversal of this sentence, we need not address Norris's additional argument that the sentence constituted an improper departure from the sentencing guidelines.
Norris also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an adult rather than as a juvenile because the court failed to enter written reasons for imposing an adult sentence as required by section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). We conclude that Norris waived his right to challenge the trial court's decision to sentence him as an adult. In Varela v. State, 650 So.2d 683, 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), we held that a juvenile could waive the requirement of contemporaneous written findings pursuant to section 39.059(7). In this ease, Norris appeared at sentencing with his mother and his attorney. The following colloquy occurred regarding the trial court's decision to sentence Norris as an adult and the specific sentence to be imposed:
THE COURT: And, defense, do you have any objection to this Court's imposition of adult sanctions versus juvenile sanctions?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, looking over the PDR, we notice that he has been sentenced and, in fact, completed a level eight which is the most that the juvenile system has to offer and based on that, you know, we have no objection to the Department of HRS's recommendation [that Norris be sentenced as an adult].
THE COURT: . Does the defendant waive any objection to the Court imposing community control and county jail time in order to avoid state prison?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I just have a moment with my client, please?
THE COURT: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, since he was a juvenile at the time of offense I would just like to advise his mother of the decision that he has made, please.
THE COURT: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, after discussing the matter with both Keith and his mother, Keith's mother does agree with the decision that Keith has made and that is to waive any objections to the sentence and allow you to go ahead and sentence him a combination or one or the other of a term in the county jail and/or probation — community control.
THE COURT: Okay. Community control with jail time was my question.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: There is no objection to that. Correct?
Norris, his mother, and his attorney all indicated that they did not object to the sen- tenee. Under these circumstances, the trial judge was not required to enter written reasons for imposing an adult sentence because all the parties waived any objection to the sentence.
Norris also objects to the trial court's imposition of a public defender's lien at the time of sentencing. When asked by the trial court if he had any objection to a lien of $100, Norris replied that he did not. Nevertheless, we do not consider Norris's response to be a valid waiver. The due process requirements of rule 3.720(d)(1) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 27.56(7), Florida Statutes (1993), are not subject to an implied waiver. Henriquez v. State, 545 So.2d 1340 (Fla.1989); McMahon v. State, 561 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Although Norris stated that he had no objection to the lien, Norris did not specifically waive the due process protections outlined in section 27.56(7). The better practice would have been to advise Norris of his rights and to ask if he waived them. Accordingly, we strike the lien; however, at resentencing, the trial court shall have the opportunity to reimpose the lien upon compliance with section 27.56(7) and with rule 3.720(d)(1).
Finally, we strike the imposition of a payment of $60 to First Step of Volusia County because no statutory basis exists for this payment. Tibero v. State, 646 So.2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (en banc).
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE REVERSED and REMANDED for resen-tencing consistent with this opinion.
W. SHARP, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion.
. § 784.03, 784.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1993).
. § 39.061, Fla.Stat. (1993).
. Rule 3.702 was adopted "to implement the 1994 revised sentencing guidelines in strict accordance with chapter 921, Florida Statutes, as revised by chapter 93-406, Laws of Florida." Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re Sentencing Guidelines, 628 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 1993).