Case Name: The People of the State of Colorado v. Eugene E. Arellano
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1974-07-01
Citations: 185 Colo. 280
Docket Number: No. 25802
Parties: The People of the State of Colorado v. Eugene E. Arellano
Judges: MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON concurs in the result only.
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 185
Pages: 280–285

Head Matter:
No. 25802
The People of the State of Colorado v. Eugene E. Arellano
(524 P.2d 305)
Decided July 1, 1974.
Rehearings denied July 22, 1974 and July 29, 1974.
John P. Moore, Attorney General, John E. Bush, Deputy, James S. Russell, Assistant, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy, Lee Belstock, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE LEE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On rehearing, the Court's original opinion in this case, announced February 19, 1974, is withdrawn.
Appellant Eugene E. Arellano was convicted of possession of narcotic drugs in violation of C.R.S. 1963, 48-5-2, and, on March 14, 1969, was. sentenced to the state penitentiary. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed in People v. Arellano, 177 Colo. 286,493 P.2d 1362.
While appellant's appeal was pending, the statute under which he was sentenced was amended effective July 1, 1971, to substantially reduce the penalty for violation thereof. 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 48-5-20(7)(a).
After affirmance on appeal, in August of 1972, appellant, pursuant to 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-1-510(1)(f), moved for reduction of his sentence to conform to the new penalty provisions. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.
In People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626, this Court declared unconstitutional section 40-1-510(1)(f) as an invasion of the Governor's exclusive power to grant a commutation after conviction, as provided in Article IV, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution, and also as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as embodied in Article III of the state constitution.
Appellant urges that even without the benefit of section 40-1-510(1)(f) mitigation of penalties may be had where, as here, the amendatory legislation took effect during the pendency of an appeal. In support of this position, he relies upon In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948; People v. Odom, 8 Ill. App. 3d 227, 289 N.E.2d 663; People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d 197; State v. Pardon, 272 N.C. 72, 157 S.E.2d 698; Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 479 P.2d 791.
We do not find the foregoing authorities persuasive in the present circumstances. None of these cases involved the consitutional rule announced in People v. Herrera, supra — that after conviction and exhaustion of appellate remedies, relief from a sentence validly imposed may not be obtained through the judiciary, but rather the remedy therefor lies in the executive department by way of commutation. In Herrera, we drew the line of finality beyond which further judicial proceedings could not be maintained. Here, appellant had exhausted his appellate remedy of appeal and his conviction had become final before he had filed his motion. The court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to entertain his motion for relief.
Appellant further argues that if relief from his sentence is denied him, he is effectively deprived of his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. He claims that the amendment to the penalty provision of the statute under which he was convicted, if applied only to those who are tried, convicted and sentenced after July 1, 1971, will result in an invidious discrimination against him, and others who were tried, convicted and sentenced prior to July 1, 1971. We do not agree.
In the context of sentencing for criminal offenses, equal protection requires only that those who have committed the same offense shall be subject to the same criminal sanctions in effect at the time the offense was committed. See generally Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 256, 27 A.L.R. 375. In other words, those similarly situated must be guaranteed like treatment. Lee v. People, 170 Colo. 268,460 P.2d 796.
It is fundamental that the legislature has the inherent authority to define crimes and to prescribe punishment for criminal violations. This is a part of the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order. Just as the legislature may initially prescribe a penalty for a criminal violation, it may also, in its wisdom, from time to time change and adjust penalties as social necessities may mandate. Equal protection does not compel that equal punishment be imposed regardless of the time frame within which the crime was committed; rather, it requires only that those offenders within the same time frame be subjected to the same criminal sanctions. Jones v. Cupp, 452 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1971); Comerford v. Commonwealth, 233 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1956); Mirenda v. Ulibarri, 351 F. Supp. 676 (C.D. Cal. 1972). We find appellant's contentions in this respect to be without merit.
We have considered appellant's argument based upon the savings clause, C.R.S. 1963, 135-4-7, and find it to be irrelevant and without' merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON concurs in the result only.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE DAY dissent.