Case Name: St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Berger
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1898-01-22
Citations: 64 Ark. 613
Docket Number: 
Parties: St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Berger.
Judges: Wood, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 613–627

Head Matter:
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Berger.
Opinion delivered January 22, 1898.
Instruction—Conductor Resisting Passenger’s Assault.—While, as an abstract proposition, it was error to instruct a jury that a railway company would be liable if its conductor in charge of a train used more force in repelling the assault of a passenger than was necessary to protect himself, instead of instructing them that it would be liable if such conductor used more force than appeared to him necessary, acting as a reasonable man, under the circumstances and surroundings, such error is not prejudicial if it is plain from the testimony that he used more force than was reasonably necessary. (Page 619.)
Assault—Burden of Proof.—Where a conductor, assaulted by a passenger, uses force to repel such assault, the burden is’ on the railroad company to show that the conductor used no more force than appeared to him, as a reasonable man, necessary to repel the assault. (Page 620.)
Same—Justification.—If a conductor in repelling an assault upon him by a passenger uses more force than appeared to him, as a reasonable man, to be necessary, the railroad company will be liable for damages. (Page 620.)
Appeal from Miller Circuit Court.1
Rueus D. Hearn, Judge.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
Appellee filed Ms suit in the circuit court of Miller county, alleging that on June 4, 1894, while a passenger on the road of appellant en route between Lewisville and Texarkana, the conductor of the train, Randall Silverman, cursed and abused him willfully, and did beat, bruise and ill treat him, striking him with a lantern, by reason of which curses, blows and ill treatment he was damaged in the sum of $20,000.
Appellant answered, denying that appellee was a passenger, and alleging that the wounds received by appellee at the hands of Randall Silverman were received in a personal encounter between himself and Silverman, for which appellee alone was responsible; that the altercation was brought about by appellee striking the conductor in the face; that appellee's attack on the conductor was not occasioned by a desire to protect himself, but originated in anger towards the conductor because of the attempt of the said conductor to prevent him from making improper advances toward a young lady passenger on said train; that the conductor, in defending himself, and in striking appellee, acted not as the agent of appellant, but in his own individual capacity, for which appellant is in no wise responsible.
Upon trial verdict was for appellee in the sum of $700, for which judgment was rendered.
At the instance of appellee, the court gave the following instructions:
“No. 1. If the jury find, from a preponderance of the evidence in this case, that, as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was, on the 4th day of June, 1894, a passenger in a coach of defendant,, being transported from Lewisville, Ark., to Texarkana, Ark., and that, while being so transported as a passenger by the defendant, without lawful cause he was beaten and wounded by the conductor of the defendant in charge of said train, and said plaintiff was thereby injured or damaged in any amount, then is plaintiff entitled to recover.
“No. 2. The fact that the plaintiff may have first struck said conductor would not excuse or justify said conductor in using against plaintiff any more force than sufficient to protect said conductor from said blow, or a repetition thereof, or from any further violence at the hands of plaintiff.
“No. 3: Though the jury should believe from the evidence that plaintiff . made the first assault ■ upon the conductor on defendant’s train, still, if they further believe from the evidence that the conductor so attacked repelled plaintiff’s assault with more force and violence, and did more injury to plaintiff, than was reasonably necessary for his own protection from injury at the hands of plaintiff, then, as a matter of law, the conductor using such excessive force would be guilty of assault and battery; and if in this case defendant seeks to justify the assault and battery committed by the conductor upon the plaintiff (if you find such an assault and battery was made, from the evidence), on the ground that plaintiff first assaulted the conductor, it is incumbent on the defendant to show that no more force was used than the exigencies of the case called for. The force used must be suitable in kind and reasonable in degree, otherwise the justification fails. Ah assault by a passenger upon a conductor of a train will not justify the conductor in pursuing and punishing the passenger after the assault is over; if he does so, he makes the defendant liable for the injury.
“No. 4. If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of indecorous conduct toward the lady passenger, then it was the duty of the conductor of the train to use all necessary and reasonable means to protect her from insults or annoyance; but he would have no right to abuse or insult the plaintiff as a punishment for such conduct, the conductor’s duty being only to prevent a continuation of such conduct by the use of all necessary and reasonable means.
“No. 6. The jury are instructed that, the facts, if proved, that the plaintiff may have spoken the first word or made the first remark to the conductor on the defendant’s train, and this word or remark so spoken by plaintiff brought on the difficulty, and caused the assault and battery which ensued, and the plaintiff struck the first blow, would not of itself excuse or justify said conductor in using against the plaintiff any more force than was reasonably necessary to protect him (said conductor) from said blow, or a repetition thereof, or from any further violence at the hands of plaintiff.”
To the giving of each of which the appellant separately excepted.
The appellant asked'the court to give the following instructions, which the court refused:
“No. 2. The jury are instructed that while the1 defendant is responsible for the acts of its conductors in their treatment of passengers, done in the line of their duty in the scope of their authority, yet the conductor has the right to resent and resist an assault made on him by a passenger, or any one else, and his act in resisting or resenting such an assault is a personal act of the conductor, for which the principal (the defendant in this case) is not responsible,
i- “No. 3. If the jury find from the evidence that the assault of the defendant’s conductor on the plaintiff was not malicious, and was not the result of a reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights as a passenger, but was occasioned by the assault of plaintiff on the conductor, and was made to repel and resent such assault, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any damages for the pain, suffering or humiliation experienced by him, and your verdict should be for the defendant.
“No. 5. If the jury find from the testimony that the conductor in charge of the train on which plaintiff was a passenger did strike plaintiff and injure him as claimed by plaintiff, and that in so doing he used more force than was necessary in order to repel any assault which may have been made on him by the plaintiff, or that he used more force than was necessary in order to prevent any improper interference with another passenger on the train by the plaintiff, and you also find that the unnecessary force and violence on the part of the conductor was done under excitement and in anger, occasioned by the assault of plaintiff, or by improper conduct of plaintiff towards another passenger, then plaintiff cannot recover as against defendant, and your verdict will be for defendant.
“No. 6. If the jury find from the testimony that the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant’s railroad at the time and place claimed by him, and that he was beaten and bruised by the conductor of said train with a lantern, and that from the said beating and bruising the plaintiff has suffered physical pain, and may probably continue to suffer therefrom, and also experienced humiliation by reason thereof, and that said beating and bruising was caused by tbe act of plaintiff in slapping tbe said conductor’s face, by which the said conductor was angered and excited, and while so angered and excited gave the blows with the lantern, then your verdict should be for the defendant, although you should find from the testimony that the conductor used more force than was necessary to repel the assault made on him by the plaintiff.”
Of which the court amended instruction No. 3 by adding at the end thereof the words, “unless you find that he used more force than was necessary to protect himself.”
The court gave No. 3, as amended, and refused Nos. 2, 5 and 6.
To the amending said instruction No. 3 as aforesaid, and giving the same as amended, and to the refusal of the court to give each of said instructions, Nos. 2, 5 and 6, appellant separately excepted.
Sam H. West and Gaughan & Sifford, for appellants.
The conductor, being the assaulted party, had a right to use whatever degree of force seemed necessary to him, as a reasonable man, at the time and under the circumstances of the case, to repel such assault. 59 Ark. 137. The master is not liable under circumstances which justify, in law, the acts of the servant; and the court should have given the instruction asked by appellant. 51 Ark. 88. Even if-the servant was not so justified in law, the master is not liable because the appellée was the aggressor. 42 Fed. 787; 81 Ga. 485; 62 Ark. 235; 62 Ark 245. The court erred in permitting improper arguments to the jury by counsel for appellees. 58 Ark. 353; 48 Ark. 106; 58 Ark. 353; 58 Ark. 473; 61 Ark. 130; 37 S. W. 877.
Scott & Jones, for appellee.
No exceptions were saved at the time to .the court’s order overruling the motion for new trial, hence this appeal is not regular. 5 Ark. 708. One who defends a charge of assault and battery on the ground of self-defense must show that he used only such force as was necessary to repel the attack. Webb’s Pollock, Torts, 255. Appellant is liable for excessive force of its servant, and the fact, that the injured party was at fault does not excuse them. 6 ,H. & N. Ex. 359; 7 H. & N. Ex. 356; 15 S. E. 778; 62 Me. 84; 103 111. 546; 11 S. W. ■ 139. The argument used by counsel was not improper, and the coui’t acted within its sound discretion in allowing it. 90 Mo. 548; 63 Fed. 793; 66 Fed. 519; 58 Ark. 381.
Sam U. West and John T. Sifford, for appellant in reply.
This appeal is properly taken. 43 Ark. 391. The proof cured the defect of allegation as to the appearance of necessity to the conductor at the time, and the court should have instructed on the point. 44 Ark. 527; 54 Ark. 289; 59 Ark. 215.

Opinion:
Hughes, J.,
(after stating the facts.) Briefly, the case may be stated as follows:
Appellee was a passenger on train of appellant. He was a New York jewelry drummer, and took a seat near a girl of 17 years, a stranger to him. The conductor removed this girl to the rear of the coach. Appellee said to a friend, he would go back, and see why the conductor moved this girl. He went back, sat down by the girl, and began inquiring where she was going, and asked her other questions. The conductor looked at him in a manner that convinced him that the conductor, to say the least, was suspicious of his intentions. From this an altercation ensued, in which appellee struck the conductor first, and in turn the conductor struck him, and beat him with a lantern.
There was evidence tending to show that the conductor gave the appellee a serious and severe beating with his lantern, and that the appellee was endeavoring to ward off the blows or protect himself by throwing up his hands; that the brakeman, while this was going on, stood behind the conductor, and twice, when the conductor ceased beating the plaintiff, told him to give him some more, and that thereupon the conductor hit him two more licks. To use his language, "I think he gave him some more twice." The evidence tended to show that the conductor only stopped beating the appellee because he discovered he was a mason; that "the conductor struck several blows—as many as three to five each time—then he would talk to the plaintiff, and strike him again. The blows were upon the head and shoulders of the plaintiff, who tried to ward them off with his hands. Plaintiff's hat was knocked off, there was a scalp wound, and the blood ran over his face, hands and clothing.
Dr. Webster, who dressed the plaintiff's wounds, testified: "The wounds were on his head, left shoulder and arms; two or three wounds on the head; his shoulder was pretty badly bruised and finger pretty badly cut. One of the wounds on his head was about two and a half inches long, cut to the skull. The other one was cut to the skull, but was mqre of a puncture, it was probably one-half inch long. The wound on his finger was quite a gash." On cross examination, he said: "I did not regard his wounds of a serious nature." There was other testimony tending to show that the beating was severe; in fact very unnecessary to repel the force used by the appellee in slapping the conductor in the face, which, there is proof tending to show, was provoked by the conductor calling the appellee "a son of a bitch."
The appellant contends that, by the instructions of the court, it was left to the jury to decide whether or not the conductor used more force in repelling the assault of appellee than was necessary to protect himself, and that this was error; that the court should have instructed, as appellee asked, that if they found that the conductor used more force than appeared to him necessary, acting as a reasonable man, under the circumstances and surroundings, etc. Conceding that,. as an abstract proposition, the contention is well founded, yet the refusal to so instruct in this case could not be prejudicial, as it is plain, from the testimony, that the conductor did use more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the assault of the appellee. If error, therefore, it is not prejudicial.
The appellant contends that if the servant is justifiable, under the law, in what he did, the master is not liable. Very true. "When one is wrongfully assaulted, it is lawful to repel force by force (as also to use force in defence of those whom one is bound to protect, or for keeping the peace), provided that no unnecessary violence is used. We must be content to say that' the resistance must not exceed the bounds of mere defense and prevention, or that the force used in defence must not be more than commensurate with that which provoked it." Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 255.
We think the burden was on the appellant to show that the conductor used no more force than appeared to him, as a reasonable man, necessary to repel the assault(of the appellee. This has not been done. On the contrary, it appears from the eyidence of the appellant, as well as that of the appellee, that the amount of force used by the conductor greatly exceeded that which would appear to any reasonable man to have been necessary to repel the assault made by the appellee upon the conductor, by slapping him in the face with his hand.
The appellant also contends that "if the conductor did use more force than seemed to him necessary for his own protection, the appellant, the master, is not liable in damages." To support this contention, they cite Peary v. Ga. R.& B Co. 81 Ga. 485 (in which no authority is cited to sustain the opinion), and Harrison v. Fink, 42 Fed. 787, a case originating in Georgia, to support which Peary v. Ga. R. & B. Co. is cited.
We cannot yield assent to such a doctrine, which is based upon the ground that the injured party is the aggressor; brings on the difficulty. This would exempt a railroad company from liability in a case where, for a simple assault upon a servant, representing the company, the servant might severely and cruelly beat the assailant, a passenger, whom the law makes it his duty not to abuse or mistreat unnecessarily. The rule applicable to such cases is this, that when a prima facie case of 'assault and battery is sought to be justified, it is incumbent upon one who justifies to show that no more force was used than the exigencies of the case called for. The force used must be suitable in kind and degree to the exigencies of the occasion, otherwise the justification fails. Hammon v. Ry., 62 Me. 84; Dillingham v. Anthony (Tex.), 11 S. W. 139.
There are objections based on language used in argument by appellee's counsel, which was perhaps not altogether proper, but we think the case ought not to be reversed on account of it. We do not think it probable that the jury was misled or prejudiced by it. We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The verdict was for $700, actual damages, which we do not think excessive. Upon the whole case, finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.