Case Name: ADVISORY OPINION ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1975 PA 227 (QUESTION 1)
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-03-29
Citations: 396 Mich. 123
Docket Number: Docket No. 57850
Parties: ADVISORY OPINION ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1975 PA 227 (QUESTION 1)
Judges: Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 396
Pages: 123–144

Head Matter:
ADVISORY OPINION ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1975 PA 227 (QUESTION 1)
Docket No. 57850.
Argued March 5, 1976
(Calendar No. 11).
Decided March 29, 1976.
The Supreme Court granted a request by the House of Representatives for an advisory opinion to review ten specific questions of law concerning the constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Enrolled House Bill 5250), an act to regulate political activity. In a per curiam opinion by Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., it was held: Public Act 227 of 1975 was unconstitutionally enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 24, the "title-body” clause, because it embraces more than one object. This opinion was issued in order to inform citizens of the act’s unconstitutionality before its effective date; the Court intends to issue a second opinion dealing with the nine remaining issues.
Ryan, J., concurred in the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional but dissented from the portion of the per curiam opinion which stated an intention to issue a second opinion on the constitutionality of the act. A determination of unconstitutionality terminates the statutory life of the act and there remains no legislation on which to issue an advisory opinion.
Levin, J., with whom Kavanagh, C. J., concurred, dissented on the grounds that the stated object of the act is to "regulate political activity” and all its provisions are germane to that single object. The act accomplishes its one primary object by regulating the pre-campaign political activity of candidates and electors, by imposing limitations on the post-election political activity of elected and appointed public officials and those who would influence their decisions, and, through the Political Ethics Commission, by providing a means of implementing and enforcing such regulations. A unifying theme and concern of the act is money for votes: the legitimate use of money to influence the votes of the electors (in political campaigns) and to influence the votes of elected and appointed public officials (through lobbyists); and the corrupt use of money to buy the votes of public officials. To issue further advisory opinions on a statute which has been held unconstitutional involves the Court in the legislative process, something that the phrase "after it has been enacted into law” in the section of the Constitution on advisory opinions was intended to prevent.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-8] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 119 et seq.
Statute declared unconstitutional..
Opinion op the Court
1. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — Advisory Opinion.
An act to regulate political activity which creates a state campaign fund for gubernatorial candidates, regulates lobbying activities, requires financial disclosure by candidates and their families, provides requirements for establishment of candidate committees, and repeals acts concerning legislative agents, general election laws, conflict of interest, and ethics, embraces more than one object and is therefore in violation of the title-body clause of the state constitution (Const 1963, art 4, §24; 1975 PA 227).
2. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — Severability.
Severability is not available in cases challenging constitutionality of a statute on the ground that it embraces more than one object; the prohibition makes the whole act void (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
3. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — More Than One Object.
The term "object” as used in the constitutional provision that' no law shall embrace more than one object was not meant to have unlimited breadth; if the provisions of the law might have been enacted in separate laws without in any way referring to or affecting one another, then they embrace more than one object (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Ryan, J.
See headnotes 1-3.
4. Courts — Statutes—Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinion.
A determination in an advisory opinion by the Supreme Court that a statute is unconstitutional because it embraces more than one object terminates the life of the statute and there remains no legislation on which the Court may later express an opinion of constitutionality.
Dissenting Opinion
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, J.
5. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — Advisory Opinion.
An act whose stated object is to regulate political activity and which accomplishes its one primary object by regulating the pre-campaign political activity of candidates and electors, by imposing limitations on the post-election political activity of elected and appointed public officials and those who would influence their decisions, and, through the Political Ethics Commission, by providing a means of implementing and enforcing such regulations, does not violate the title-body clause of the constitution because it has only a single object (Const 1963, art 4, §24).
6. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — "Object”.
The word "object" in the title-body clause of the constitution expresses an intrinsically elastic concept; especially in the case of a codification, the Legislature is free to conceive of the object of its endeavors in terms of a common denominator and to express that conception in umbrella words (Const 1963, art 4, §24).
7. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Title-Body Clause — "Object”.
The ultimate question in deciding whether an act violates the title-body clause of the constitution is not the congruity of its provisions, but whether there is one object (Const 1963, art 4, §24).
8. Courts — Statutes—Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinion.
Once the Supreme Court has declared an act unconstitutional, to issue further advisory opinions on the act involves the Court in the legislative process (Const 1963, art 3, § 8).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General.
Charles D. Hackney, George M. Elworth, Varda N. Fink, Michael J. Hodge, and Norbert G. Jaworski, Assistants Attorney General, in support of constitutionality.
John D. Pirich, Assistant Attorney General, in opposition to constitutionality.
Amici Curiae:
Kenneth J. Guido, Jr. and Ellen G. Block for Common Cause.
Hyman & Rice for State Bar of Michigan.
Gary L. Cowan, Daniel F. Curran and Dennis R. O’Connell for Michigan Consolidated Gas Company. (
Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg (by James D. Tracy, Nancy C. Kurtz and Ted T. Amsden) for Consumers Power Company.
Lafferty, Reosti, Papakhian & James for Socialist Workers Party and CO DEL.
Keywell & Rosenfeld for Michigan Press Association.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn (by Avern Cohn, Stanley Siegel, and Joseph M. Polito) and Downs & Edwards (McClellan, Schlaybaugh & Whitbeck, of counsel) for Michigan Association of Broadcasters, Michigan State Grange, Michigan Library Association, Michigan Association of School Boards, Michigan Association of State College and University Governing Boards, Michigan Townships Association, Michigan State Building and Construction Trades Council, Michigan Community College Association, Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, Michigan State Farm Bureau, Michigan Association of Counties and County Road Association of Michigan.
Cozadd, Shangle & Smith for Michigan Association of Hospital Authorities, Inc.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On August 27, 1975, Governor William G. Milliken signed Enrolled House Bill 5250. This legislation was designed "to regulate political activity". The Act created the Political Ethics Commission as an autonomous entity within the Department of State and provided for its composition, powers and duties (§§ 31-50); provided requirements for the establishment of candidate committees (after defining "candidate" to include an elected officeholder) and provided for the filing of statements of organization and reporting of contributions and expenditures (§§ 51-98); set maximum limits on expenditures by candidates for certain offices (§§ 83-84); established a State Campaign Fund with a diversion of certain taxpayer-designated portions of income tax revenues to the fund for distribution to qualifying gubernatorial candidates (§§ 101-105); proscribed conflicts of interest (§§ 121-127); required designated individuals to file financial disclosures for themselves and members of their immediate families (§§ 131-137); required the registration and reporting of lobbying activities (§§ 141-150); and provided for the repeal of five existing laws (§ 191).
We have granted a December 9, 1975, request of the House of Representatives to review ten specific questions of law concerning the constitutionality of the Act. 395 Mich 910 (1975).
As major portions of the Act were to have gone into effect on March 31, 1976 (the effective date of some provisions of the Act was to have been delayed until July 1, 1976), and the Act was likely to have had a profound effect on the upcoming elections, we believed it imperative to review the Act before its effective date. This case was submitted to our Court on March 5, 1976, after full briefing and oral argument by the Attorney Gen eral and eight amici. After careful consideration of these arguments, it is our opinion that Public Act 227 of 1975 was unconstitutionally enacted in violation of art 4, § 24 of the Constitution of 1963. We issue this opinion in order to inform the citizens of the Act's unconstitutionality prior to its early effective date. We intend, later, to issue a second opinion dealing with the nine remaining issues.
In House Resolution 248, the House of Representatives phrased its first question of law as:
"Does Act 227 of the Public Acts of 1975, being § 169.1-169.200 of the Michigan Compiled Laws embrace more than one object in violation of § 24 of art 4 of the State Constitution of 1963 which reads [in pertinent part] as follows:
" 'Section 24. No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.' "
This constitutional section embodies two separate concepts:
1. That the law shall not embrace more than one object and
2. That the object which the law embraced shall be expressed in its title. We do not direct attention here to the second concept but only to the first, whether or not more than one object is embraced in this law.
Justice Sharp in Kent County, ex rel Board of Supervisors v Reed, 243 Mich 120, 122; 219 NW 656 (1928), notes that:
"it is to the body of the law that we must look to determine whether it embraces more than one object".
In that case, Justice Sharp pointed out that the first section of the questioned Act imposed upon the boards of supervisors in all counties where county officials are paid salaries fixed by such boards, the duty to fix such salaries. Section 2 of that act expressly repealed a local act of 1891 affecting the county of Kent alone. The Court said:
"Can it be said that this repeal is so connected with the object as disclosed by the provision in § 1 that it may be held to be germane to it? We think not. The provisions in these two sections might have been enacted in separate laws without either of them in any way referring to or affecting the other. The repeal of the local act was unnecessary to give legal effect to § 1. The two objects sought to be attained by the enactment have no necessary connection with each other, and, when grouped together in one act, clearly offend the constitutional provision." Reed, supra, 122-123.
Both of the objects of the law were covered in the title. The Court concluded by saying:
"It is clear that two distinct and unrelated objects are embraced in the one act, and that it offends against the constitutional provision." Reed, supra, 124.
In the briefs filed with this Court which discussed this issue, much attention was devoted to Fritz v Gorton, 83 Wash 2d 275; 517 P2d 911 (1974). However, in Fritz, the statute challenged was adopted by the initiative process by the voters of the State of Washington in the 1972 general election. Of the nine members of Washington's Supreme Court, two dissented from the holding of constitutionality and three believed that the constitutional provision there in question:
"No bill shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title", did not apply to initiative but held that if it did apply, they would uphold constitutionality with the remaining four justices. Then the Washington Court held that a "rational unity" test should be applied between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions. The "rational unity" test has never been adopted in Michigan.
In the brief filed by Common Cause, a numerical count of items in the title represented 28 as having been listed claiming that they were "germane to the purpose of reforming the Michigan political process". The title of the Act does not mention reforming the political process. That brief referred to Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), in which the Court held that the subject matter constituted a code, a unified law. Justice Levin in a concurrence mentioned the justification for its constitutionality "Especially in the case of a codification". In codes as enacted in Michigan, the Legislature tends to use in the title the words to "revise, consolidate and classify the laws" with respect to a particular object. Those words are typically found in code titles but not found here.
In the brief of the Attorney General urging a finding of unconstitutionality, a claim is made that this Act is exactly the type of legislation at which the framers of the Constitution directed their prohibition. We agree.
In addition to the multitude of varying activities sought to be regulated by this Act, the Act specifically repealed five individual and distinct acts. They concerned the licensing and regulation of legislative agents; the corrupt practice section of the general election law; two specific conflict of interest statutes; and an ethics act.
Severability is not available in instances chai lenging constitutionality on this ground. A prohibition against the passage of an act relating to different objects expressed in the title makes the whole act void.
"It is impossible to tell which object was intended by the Legislature, and in such case both fall under the same condemnation." Skinner v Wilhelm, 63 Mich 568, 572; 30 NW 311 (1886).
An early reference to the concept behind the constitutional prohibition is found in colorful language in People v Collins, 3 Mich 343, 384 (1854), a case in which the Court was evenly divided on the constitutionality of an act prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating beverages and the traffic therein. The decision discussed other challenges, but in his opinion and indicative of judicial awareness of the problem, Justice Pratt said:
"This express and positive provision was incorporated into the constitution with the avowed intention on the part of the framers, of arresting, as far as possible, corruption and log rolling in legislation — you help me and I will help you — I will support your bill and help you pass it, if you will permit me to insert a section on a certain matter, etc.; a system of legislation that has often been carried so far as to become disgraceful to representatives and deeply injurious to the public." People v Collins, supra.
Justice Cooley in People, ex rel Drake v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481 (1865), says with respect to the same provision of the Constitution of 1850:
"The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the state." Mahaney, supra, 494-495.
The act which Justice Cooley had under review was one whose general purpose was "to establish a police government for the city of Detroit". He said:
"The act, with great particularity, prescribes how this police government shall be rendered effectual; but this particularity can not possibly be objectionable so long as it introduces nothing foreign and incongruous, but is confined to the means supposed to be important to the end indicated." (Emphasis added.) Mahaney, supra, 496.
This Court cannot engage in idle speculation as to whether, for instance, the provision relating to ethical conduct and conflict of interest contracts would on their own merits have been adopted by the Legislature, nor those relating to campaign contributions and expenditures, nor those establishing the state campaign fund for gubernatorial elections, nor those regulating lobbyists. Applying the tests used by this Court in Reed, supra, these provisions might have been enacted in separate laws without in any way referring to or affecting one another. The term "object" as used in art 4, § 24, was not meant to have unlimited breadth, for an exceedingly broad "object" could likely include several concepts that are wholly foreign and incongruous. That result is inconsistent with the purpose of the constitutional limitation. Some of the concepts sought to be obtained by the enactment have no necessary connection with each other. Nor can it be said that these varied concepts correspond to Justice Cooley's particularities, but in stead do add something foreign and incongruous. For example, the creation of a state campaign fund for gubernatorial candidates is foreign to and incongruous with regulation of lobbying activities; the financial disclosure provisions aimed at preventing unethical conduct are foreign to and incongruous with the organization of a campaign committee. The tying together of these diverse sections resulted in the Legislature being confronted by an all-or-nothing dilemma to which the framers of the Constitution directed their attention.
To say that the purification of the political process is the all-encompassing umbrella under which these various elements receive their protection is to beg the question. It is expected that much legislation within and without the scope of this Act is designed toward that worthy end.
This Court is mindful of the worthy purpose and high motivation of the Legislature and the proponents of the subject Act. It also is mindful of the basic dictates of the Constitution of this state. Our test cannot be one of policy but of constitutionality. On that test, the Act must fall.
Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred.
MCLA 169.1-169.200; MSA 4.1701(1)-4.1701(200). For simplicity we refer to 1975 PA 227 as the Act and any reference thereto will only recite the section numbers involved.